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PERSONAL  MEMOIRS 


OF 


U.  S.  GRANT 


VOLUME  ONE 


NEW  YORK 


HARVARD  COLLEGE  LIBRARY 

THE  BEQUEST  OF 

THEODORE  JEWETT  EASTMAN 

1931 


7"/  '..    7^>r^^'^  ^^ 


^^ 


Copyright,  1886,  by 
ULTtfiEs  8.  Grant. 

Copyright,  1895,  by 
Julia  D.  Obamt. 


0 


Tne  DiViNNE  Prim. 


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PREFACE 

< TiJ'AN  proposes  and  Gtod  disposes.^  There  are 
-LTL  but  few  important  events  in  the  aflEairs  of 
men  brought  about  by  their  own  choice. 

Although  frequently  urged  by  friends  to  write 
tny  memoirs,  I  had  determined  never  to  do  so,  nor 
to  write  anything  for  publication.  At  the  age  of 
nearly  sixty-two  I  received  an  injury  from  a  fall, 
which  confined  me  closely  to  the  house  while  it  did 
not  apparently  aflEect  my  general  health.  This 
made  study  a  pleasant  pastime.  Shortly  after,  the 
rascality  of  a  business  partner  developed  itself  by 
the  announcement  of  a  failure.  This  was  followed 
soon  after  by  universal  depression  of  all  securities, 
which  seemed  to  threaten  the  extinction  of  a  good 
part  of  the  income  still  retained,  and  for  which  I 
am  indebted  to  the  kindly  act  of  friends.  At  this 
juncture  the  editor  of  the  "  Century  Magazine^  asked 
me  to  write  a  few  articles  for  him.  I  consented 
for  the  money  it  gave  me ;  for  at  that  moment  I 
was  living  upon  bon'owed  money.  The  work  I 
found  congenial,  and  I  determined  to  continue  it. 
The  event  is  an  important  one  for  me,  for  good  or 
evil ;  I  hope  for  the  f oimer. 

In  prepaiing  these  volumes  for  the  public,  I  have 


VIU  PEEFACE 

National  or  Confederate  side,  other  than  the  un- 
avoidable injustice  of  not  making  mention  often 
where  special  mention  is  due.  There  must  be  many 
errors  of  omission  in  this  work,  because  the  subject 
is  too  large  to  be  treated  of  in  two  volumes  in  such 
way  as  to  do  justice  to  all  the  officers  and  men  en- 
gaged. There  were  thousands  of  instances,  during 
the  rebellion,  of  individual,  company,  regimental, 
and  brigade  deeds  of  heroism  which  deserve  special 
mention  and  are  not  here  alluded  to.  The  troops 
engaged  in  them  will  have  to  look  to  the  detailed 
reports  of  their  individual  commanders  for  the  full 
history  of  those  deeds. 

The  first  volume,  as  well  as  a  portion  of  the  sec- 
ond, was  written  before  I  had  reason  to  suppose  I 
was  in  a  critical  condition  of  health.  Later  I  was 
reduced  almost  to  the  point  of  death,  and  it  became 
impossible  for  me  to  attend  to  anything  for  weeks. 
I  have,  however,  somewhat  regained  my  strength, 
and  am  able,  often,  to  devote  as  many  hours  a  day 
as  a  person  should  devote  to  such  work.  I  would 
have  more  hope  of  satisfying  the  expectation  of  the 
public  if  I  could  have  allowed  myself  more  time. 
I  have  used  my  best  efforts,  with  the  aid  of  my 
eldest  son,  F.  D.  Grant,  assisted  by  his  brothers,  to 
verify  from  the  records  every  statement  of  fact 
given.  The  comments  are  my  own,  and  show  how 
I  saw  the  matters  treated  of,  whether  others  saw 
them  in  the  same  light  or  not. 

With  these  remarks  I  Dresent  thA»A  volnnnAs  in 


PKEFACE  TO  THE  SECOND  EDITION 

THE  marginal  annotation  of  this  edition  has 
been  undertaken  with  a  view  to  supplement- 
ing the  personal  narrative  by  references  not  only 
to  some  of  the  books  with  which  the  author  re- 
freshed his  memory  before  entering  upon  and  dur- 
ing his  autobiographical  labors,  but  also,  to  a 
limited  extent,  to  works  in  which  fuller  details  may 
be  found  concerning  incidents  which  were  neces- 
sarily briefly  treated  by  General  Grant,  either  by 
reason  of  his  own  connection  with  the  action  being 
limited  to  a  small  detail  (as  in  some  of  the  Mexican 
war  scenes),  or  on  account  of  the  haste  with  which 
the  book  was  perforce  completed. 

In  that  part  of  the  Memoirs  which  deals  with  the 
Civil  War,  the  Official  Records  of  the  War  of  the 
Rebellion  (which  are  largely  transcripts  of  General 
Grant's  field  records)  have  been  principally  cited ; 
and  Confederate  sources,  whether  from  the  Official 
Records  or  from  private  publications,  have  been 
ulso  drawn  upon  where  they  serve  to  extend  the 
historical  narrative  or  to  throw  light  upon  inci- 
dents which  have  at  times  aroused  discussion. 


X  PREFACE  TO   THE   SECOND  EDITION 

tion  in  time  between  the  actors  in  the  scenes  re- 
corded  and  the  central  figure  in  this  autobiogi'aphy 
— whether  contemporary,  or  senior  or  junior  in  rank 
or  years ;  and,  in  the  cases  of  officers  of  the  army 
or  navy,  to  show,  where  practicable,  their  militaiy 
experience  or  training,  and  the  rank  they  held  at  the 
time  of  the  incidents  recorded  in  these  Memoirs. 

In  this  work  I  have  been  largely  assisted  by  Mr. 
E.  E.  TreflEry,  of  New  York,  who  has  made  wide  re- 
searches for  the  purpose  of  caiTying  out  the  plan 
outlined  above,  and  has  also  compiled  a  full  Index. 

Fredeeick  D.  Grant. 

New  York,  October  15,  1895. 


TABLE   OF   CONTENTS 


Vol.  I 

PAOl 

Chapter  L    Ancestry — Birth — Boyhood    .       .      1 

Chapter  n.    West  Point — Graduation       .       .    14 

Chapter  in.  Army  Life — Causes  op  the  Mexican 
War — Camp  Salubrity 25 

Chapter  IV.  Corpus  Christi — Mexican  Smuggling 
— Spanish  Eule  in  Mexico — Supplying  Trans- 
portation      39 

Chapter  V.  Trip  to  Austin — Promotion  to  Pull 
Second  Lieutenant — Army  of  Occupation     .    50 

Chapter  VI.  Advance  of  the  Army — Crossing 
THE  Little  Colorado — The  Rio  Grande        .    59 

Chapter  VIL  The  Mexican  War — The  Battle 
op  Palo  Alto — The  Battle  of  Resaca  de  la 
Palm  A — Army  of  Invasion — General  Taylor 
— Movebient  on  Camargo 66 


XU  TABLE  OP  CONTENTS 

^  PAOB 

Chapter  IX.  Political  Intrigue — Buena  Vista — 
Movement  against  Vera  Cruz — Siege  and  Cap- 
ture OP  Vera  Cruz 90 

Chapter  X.  March  to  Jalapa — Battle  op  Cerro 
Gordo — Perote — Puebla — Scott  and  Taylor    98 

Chapter  XI.  Advance  on  the  City  op  Mexico — 
Battle  op  Contreras — Assault  at  Churu- 
Busco — Negotiations  for  Peace — Battle  op 
Molino  del  Rey — Storming  op  Chapultepec — 
San  Cosme — Evacuation  op  the  City — Halls 
op  the  montezumas 108 

Chapter  XII.  Promotion  to  First  Lieutenant — 
Capture  op  the  City  op  Mexico — The  Army — 
Mexican  Soldiers — Peace  Negotiations         .  126 

Chapter  XIII.  Treaty  op  Peace — Mexican  Bull- 
fights—Regimental Quartermaster — Trip  to 
Popocatepetl — Trip  to  the  Caves  op  Mexico  137 

Chapter  XTV.  Return  op  the  Army — Marriage 
— Ordered  to  the  Pacipic  Coast — Crossing 
the  Isthmus — Arrival  at  San  Francisco       .  151 

Chapter  XV.  San  Francisco — Early  California 
Experiencbs — Life  on  the  Pacific  Coast — 
Promoted  Captain — Flush  Times  in  Cali- 
fornia   159 

Chapter  XVI.  Resignation — Private  Life — Life 
AT  Galena — The  Coming  Crisis       .       .       .  167 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  XUl 

PAGE 

Officer  of  State  Troops — Lyon  at  Camp  Jack- 
son— Services  tendered  to  the  Government  .  183 


Chapter  xviii.  Appointed  Colonel  of  the 
Twenty-first  Illinois — Personnel  of  the 
Regiment — General  Logan — March  to  Mis- 
souri— Movement  against  Harris  at  Florida, 
Missouri — General  Pope  in  Command — Sta- 
tioned AT  Mexico,  Missouri      ....  194 

Chapter  XIX.  Commissioned  Brigadier-General 
— Command  at  Ironton,  Missouri — Jefferson 
City — Cape  Girardeau — General  Prentiss — 
Seizure  of  Paducah — Headquarters  at  Cairo  205 


Chapter  XX.  General  Fremont  in  Command — 
Movement  against  Belmont — Battle  of  Bel- 
mont— A  Narrow  Escape — After  the  Battle  218 

Chapter  XXI.  General  Hallbck  in  Command — 
Commanding  the  District  of  Cairo — Move- 
ment ON  Fort  Henry— Capture  of  Fort  Henry  230 


Chapter  XXII.  Investment  of  Fort  Donelson — 
The  Naval  Operations — Attack  of  the  Ene- 
my— ASSAUimNG    THE  WORKS — SURRENDER    OF 

THE  Fort 241 

Chapter  XXIII.  Promoted  Major-General  of 
Volunteers — Unoccupied  Territory — Ad- 
vance  upon    Nashville Situation    op   the 

Troops — Confederate  Pw-^^it.at — Relieved  of 


XIV  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

PAOB 

Chapter  XXIV.  The  Army  at  Pittsburg  Landing 
— Injured  BY  aPall — The  Confederate  Attack 
AT  Shiloh — The  Pirst  Day's  Pight  at  Shiloh 
— General  Sherman — Condition  of  the  Army 
— Close  of  the  Pirst  Day's  Pight — The  Second 
Day's  Pight— Retreat  and  Defeat  of  the  Con- 
federates      272 

Chapter  XXV.  Struck  by  a  Bullet — Precipitate 
Retreat  of  the  Confederates — Intrenchments 
AT  Shiloh — General  Buell — General  Johns- 
ton— Remarks  on  Shiloh 291 

Chapter  XXVI.  Hallbck  assumes  Command  in  the 
Field — The  Advance  upon  Corinth — Occupa- 
tion OF  Corinth — The  Army  separated    .        .  307 

Chapter  XXVII.  Headquarters  moved  to  Mem- 
phis— On  the  Road  to  Memphis— Escaping 
Jackson — Complaints  and  Requests — Halleck 
APPOINTED  Commander-in-chief — Return  to 
Corinth — Movements  of  Bragg — Surrender 
OF  Clarksville — The  Advance  upon  Chatta- 
nooga— Sheridan  Colonel  of  a  Michigan  Regi- 
ment      319 

Chapter  XXVIII.  Advance  of  Van  Dorn  and 
Price — Price  enters  Iuka — Battle  of  Iuka  335 

Chapter  XXIX.  Van  Dorn's  Movements — Battle 
OF  Corinth — Command  of  the  Department  of 
THE  Tennessee 344 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  XV 

PAGE 

Holly  Springs — Sherman  ordered  to  Memphis 
— Sherman's  Movements  down  the  Mississippi 
— Van  Dorn  captures  Holly  Springs — Col- 
lecting Forage  and  Pood         .       .       .       .351 

Chapter  XXXI.  Headquarters  moved  to  Holly 
Springs — General  McClernand  in  Command — 
Assuming  Command  at  Young's  Point — Opera- 
tions ABOVE  ViCKSBURG — PORTIPICATIONS  ABOUT 

VicKSBURG — The  Canal — Lake  Providence — 
Operations  at  Yazoo  Pass       ....  364 

Chapter  XXXH.  The  Bayous  West  op  the  Mis- 
sissippi— Criticisms  of  the  Northern  Press — 
Running  the  Batteries — Loss  op  the  India- 
NOLA — Disposition  of  the  Troops    .       .       .  380 

Chapter  XXXHI.  Attack  on  Grand  Gulf— Op- 
erations BELOW  ViCKSBURG  ....  394 

Chapter  XXXTV.  Capture  of  Port  Gibson — 
Grierson's  Raid — Occupation  of  Grand  Gulp 
— Movement  up  the  Big  Black — Battle  of 
Raymond 405 

Chapter  XXXV.  Movement  against  Jackson — 
Pall  of  Jackson — Intercepting  the  Enemy — 
Battle  of  Champion's  Hill       ....  417 

Chapter  XXXVI.  Battle  of  Black  River  Bridge 
— Crossing  the  Big  Black — Investment  op 
ViCKSBURG — Assaulting  the  Works       .       .  437 

Chapter  XXXVII.    Siege  op  Vicksburg       .       .  446 


XVI  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

THE  Mine — Explosion  op  the  Second  Mine — 
Preparing  for  the  Assault — The  Flag  op 
Truce — Meeting  with  Pemberton — Negotia- 
tions FOB  Surrender — Accepting  the  Terms — 
Surrender  op  Vicksbubg 458 

Chapteb  XXXTX.  Retrospect  of  the  Campaign — 
Sherman's  Movements — Proposed  Movement 
UPON  Mobile — A  Painful  Accident — Ordered 

TO  REPORT  AT  CaIRO 478 

Chapter  XL.  PmsT  Meeting  with  Secretary 
Stanton — General  Bosecrans — Commanding 
Military  Division  of  Mississippi — Andrew 
Johnson's  Address — Arrival  at  Chattanooga  490 

Chapter  XLI.  Assuming  the  Command  at  Chatta- 
nooga— Opening  a  Line  of  Supplies — Battle 
OP  Wauhatchie — On  the  Picket-line      .       .  501 

Chapter  XLn.  Condition  of  the  Army — Rebuild. 
iNG  THE  Railroad — General  Burnside's  Situa- 
tion— Orders  for  Battle — Plans  for  the 
Attack — Hooker's  Position — Sherman's  Move- 
ments   511 


LIST  OF  MAPS  AND  ILLUSTRATIONS 

U.  8.  Grant,  Bbsvkt  Second  Lixutxnant  Poueth  Infantry 

Frontispiece 
Fcusing  page 
Birthplace  of  General  U.  S.  Grant,  Point  Pleasant,  Ohio    16 
General  Grant's  Signatxtre  in  an  Autooraph  Album  Signed 

BY  West  Point  Men 32 

Map  of  Monterey 80 

Lieutenant  U.  S.  Grant  and  Lieutenant  Alexander  Hays    96 

Map  of  the  Valley  of  Mexico 124 

Brigadier-General  U.  S.  Grant 160 

U.  S.  Grant  in  1863 192 

Map  of  Battle-field  near  Belmont 220 

Map  of  the  Region  of  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson 232 

Map  of  Fort  Henry,  February  6,  1862 238 

Map  of  Fort  Donelson,  as  Invested  by  General  Grant..  242 
Fac-simile  of  the  Terms  of  Surrender  of  Fort  Donelson  256 

Map  of  the  Field  of  Shiloh 278 

General  Grant  Writing  his  Memoirs  at  Mount  MacGregor  304 

Map  of  the  Country  about  Corinth,  Mississippi 310 

Battles  of  Iuka  and  Corinth 338 

ViCKSBURG  Campaign 370 

Operations  near  Grand  Gulp 398 

Battles  of  Jackson,  Black  River  Bridge,  etc 419 

Battle  of  Champion's  Hill 431 

Map  of  Battle-field  of  Big  Black  River  Bridge 439 

Map  of  the  Siege  of  Vicksburg,  Mississippi 450 

Operations  before  Vicksburg 458 

Nashville  and  Knoxville  to  Chattanooga 494 

Chattanooga  and  Vicinity 502 


BOOKS,  REVIEWS,  PAMPHLETS,  ETC.,  CITED  IN  THE 
MARGINAL  ANNOTATION  TO  THIS  EDITION. 

''Annual  Report  of  the  Adjntant-General  (Fuller)  of  the  State  of 

niinow,  1861-62." 
Badeau,  Adam.     "  Military  History  of  U.  S.  Grant,  from  April,  1861, 

to  April,  1865." 
Bancroft,  Hubert  H.     "California  Inter  Pocula."    "History  of 

the  Pacific  States." 
Benton,  Thomas  Hart.     "Thirty  Years'  View." 
Century  Co.,  The.     "  Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War."   "  The 

Century  Magazine." 
"Chicago  Tribune,  The." 
''Cincinnati  Commercial,  The." 

CoMTE  DB  Paris.     "  History  of  the  Civil  War  in  America." 
"Congressional  Globe,  The." 

Dana,  Charles  A.,  and  Wilson,  J.  H.    "Life  of  Ulysses  8.  Grant." 
Davis,  Jefferson.   "Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government." 
Eddy,  T.  M.     "The  Patriotism  of  Illinois." 
Pry,  J.  B.    "  The  History  and  Legal  Effect  of  Brevets  in  the  Armies 

of  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States,  from  1692  to  the  Present 

Time  [1877]." 
Greene,  Francis  Vinton.     "The  Mississippi."    ("Campaigns  of 

the  Civil  War"  Series.) 
Howard,  Oliver  Otis.    "  General  Taylor."  (  "  Great  Commanders  " 

Series.) 
Humphreys,  Andrew  A.    "  The  Virginia  Campaign  of  '64  and  '65." 
"Jefferson  Davis,  the  President  of  the  Confederate  States  of  Amer- 
ica :  A  Memoir  by  his  Wife." 
Johnston,  Joseph  E.    "  Narrative  of  Military  Operations  Directed, 

during  the  Late  War  between  the  States,  by  Joseph  E.  Johnston." 
Johnston,  William  Preston.    "Life  of  General  Albert  Sidney 

Johnston." 
McCuLLOCH,  Hugh.     "Men  and  Measures  of  Half  a  Century." 


BOOKS,  ETC^  CITED  IN  THIS  EDITION  XIX 

Polk,  William  M.    "Leonidas  Polk." 
Porter,  David  D.    "Naval  History  of  the  Civil  War." 
RiGHARDBON,  A.  D.     "  Penonal  History  of  U.  8.  Grant." 
Roman,  Alfred.    ''Military  Operations  of  General  BeauregarcL" 
Scott,  Winfibld.    ''Memoirs  of  Lieutenant-General  Scott,  Written 

by  Himself." 
Sheridan,  Philip  H.     "Personal  Memoirs  of  P.  H.  Sheridan." 
Sherman,  William  Tbcumseh.     "Memoirs  of  General  William  T. 

Sherman." 
Twiggs,  D.  E.,  and  Others.     "Memorial  to  Congress." 
Van  Horns,  Thomas  B.    "  History  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland." 

"Life  of  BCajor-General  Thomas." 
"War  of  the  Rebellion,  The :  A  Compilation  of  the  Official  Records 

of  the  Union  and  Confederate  Armies."    (Cited  as  "  W.  R.") 
Wilcox,  Cadmus  M.    "History  of  the  Mexican  War." 
Williams,  Alfred  M.    "  General  Houston  and  the  War  of  Indepen- 
dence in  Texas." 
Yoakum,  H.    "History  of  Texas." 


PERSONAL  MEMOIRS 

OF 

U-  S-  GRANT 


CHAPTER  I 

ANOESTBY— ^BIETH — BOYHOOD 


MY  family  is  American,  and  has  been  for  genera-     chap,  i 
tions,  in  all  its  branches,  direct  and  collateral. 
Matthew  Grant,  the  founder  of  the  branch  in  j^?^^ 
America  of  which  I  am  a  descendant,  reached  Dor-      ^^  ^^ 
Chester,  Massachusetts,  in  May,  1630.    In  1635  he    oot,i«85 
moved  to  what  is  now  Windsor,  Connecticut,  and 
was  the  surveyor  for  that  colony  for  more  than 
forty  years.    He  was  also,  for  many  years  of  the 
time,  town  clerk.    He  was  a  married  man  when  he  ^  Jmr^, 


i«a6 


arrived  at  Dorchester,  but  his  children  were  all 

bom  in  this  country.    His  eldest  son,  Samuel,  took  ^*^oy.  u, 

•^  '  '  1681 ;  m. 

lands  on  the  east  side  of  the  Connecticut  River,  t^J^a^^a?, 
opposite  Windsor,  which  have  been  held  and  occu-       ^^ 
pied  by  descendants  of  his  to  this  day. 

I  am  of  the  eighth  generation  from  Matthew 
Grant,  and  seventh  from  Samuel.   Matthew  Grant's 
first  wife  died  a  few  years  after  their  settlement  Apr.  27.  leu 
Vol.  I.— 1  1 


2  PEESONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

Chap.  I     in  Windsor,  and  lie  soon  after  manied  the  widow 

May  29, 1645  Rockwell,  who,  with  her  first  husband,  had  been 

BookwSi    fellow-passengers  with  him  and  his  fii*st  wife  on 

the  ship  Mary  and  John^  from  Dorchester,  England, 

6.A^.5,     ill  1630.    Mrs.  Rockwell  had  several  children  by 

her  first  marriage,  and  others  by  her  second.    By 

intermarriage,  two  or  three  generations  later,  I  am 

descended  from  both  the  wives  of  Matthew  Grant. 

ji^Sms;      •'•^  *^^  ^^  descending  generation  my  great- 

rteSl**^  grandfather,  Noah  Grant,  and  his  younger  brother, 

^to^"r   Solomon,  held  commissions  in  the  English  army, 

Jan.  29,  \m  uj  1756,  in  the  war  against  the  French  and  Indians. 

Both  were  killed  that  year. 
*•  Jnjf »»       My  grandfather,  also  named  Noah,  was  then  but 
nine  years  old.    At  the  breaking  out  of  the  war  of 
the  Revolution,  after  the  battles  of  Concord  and 
Lexington,  he  went  with  a  Connecticut  company  to 
join  the  Continental  army,  and  was  present  at  the 
battle  of  Bunker  Hill.    He  served  until  the  fall  of 
Yorktown,  or  through  the  entire  Revolutionary 
war.     He  must,  however,  have  been  on  furlough 
part  of  the  time, — as  I  believe  most  of  the  soldiers 
AMa^Sdi-  ^'  *^®'*  period  were, — for  he  married  in  Connecti- 
^'^^^^     cut  during  the  war,  had  two  children,  and  was  a 
widower  at  the  close.    Soon  after  this  he  emigrated 
to  Westmoreland  County,  Pennsylvania,  and  settled 
near  the  town  of  Greensburg  in  that  county.    He 
*•  Y^-  *»    took  with  him  the  younger  of  his  two  children,  Peter 
b,  circ  m»  Grant.  The  elder,  Solomon,  remained  with  his  rela- 
tives in  Connecticut  until  old  enough  to  do  for  him- 
self, when  he  emigrated  to  the  British  West  Indies. 
Not  long  after  his  settlement  in  Pennsylvania 
Raobei      Day  grandfather.  Captain  Noah  Grant,  married  a 
A?r!w;wo5  Miss  Kelly,  and  in  1799  he  emigrated  again,  this 


ANCESTRY  S 

time  to  Ohio,  and  settled  where  the  town  of  Deer-     chap,  i 
field  now  stands.    He  had  now  five  children,  includ-       i7» 
ing  Peter,  a  son  by  his  first  marriage.    My  father, 
Jesse  R.  Grant,  was  the  second  child — oldest  son  ,*^Jyv^. 

'  1794;  d,  June 

by  the  second  marriage.  ^»  ^^ 

Peter  Grant  went  early  to  Maysville,  Kentucky,        i«n 
where  he  was  very  prosperous,  married,  had  a  family 
of  nine  children,  and  was  drowned  at  the  mouth  of 
the  Kanawha  River,  Virginia,  in  1825,  being  at  the 
time  one  of  the  wealthy  men  of  the  West. 

My  grandmother  Grant  died  in  1805,  leaving     Apruio 
seven  childi*en.    This  broke  up  the  family.    Cap- 
tain Noah  Grant  was  not  thrifty  in  the  way  of 
"laying  up  stores  on  earth,^  and,  after  the  death 
of  his  second  wife,  he  went,  with  the  two  youngest 
children,  to  live  with  his  son  Peter,  in  Maysville. 
The  rest  of  his  family  found  homes  in  the  neigh- 
borhood of  Deerfield,  my  father  in  the  family  of 
Judge  Tod,  the  father  of  the  late  Governor  Tod,  of  ^i^gtJ'Sf' 
Ohio.    His  industry  and  independence  of  character   i^^*^*  a. 
were  such  that  I  imagine  his  labor  compensated  ^^^-^'^^ 
fully  for  the  expense  of  his  maintenance. 

There  must  have  been  a  cordiality  in  his  wel- 
come into  the  Tod  family,  for  to  the  day  of  his 
death  he  looked  upon  Judge  Tod  and  his  wife  with 
all  the  reverence  he  could  have  felt  if  they  had 
been  parents  instead  of  benefactors.  I  have  often 
heard  him  speak  of  Mrs.  Tod  as  the  most  admirable 
woman  he  had  ever  known.  He  remained  with  the 
Tod  family  only  a  few  years,  until  old  enough  to 
learn  a  tradci  He  went  first,  I  believe,  with  his  half- 
brother,  Peter  Grant,  who,  though  not  a  tanner  him- 
self, owned  a  tannery  in  Maysville,  Kentucky.  Here 
he  learned  his  trade,  and  in  a  few  years  returned  to       lais 


4  PEHSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GEANT 

Chap.  I     Deerfield  and  worked  for,  and  lived  in,  the  family 
Owen      of  a  Mr.  Brown,  the  father  of  John  Brown — "  whose 

Brown  ' 

body  lies  moldering  in  the  grave,  while  his  soul 
goes  marching  on.''  I  have  often  heard  my  father 
speak  of  John  Brown,  particularly  since  the  events 
of  Harper's  Ferry.  Brown  was  a  boy  when  they 
lived  in  the  same  house,  but  he  knew  him  after- 
ward, and  regarded  him  as  a  man  of  great  purity 
of  character,  of  high  moral  and  physical  coiu'age, 
but  a  fanatic  and  extremist  in  whatever  he  advo- 
cated. It  was  certainly  the  act  of  an  insane  man 
to  attempt  the  invasion  of  the  South  and  the  over- 
throw of  slavery  with  less  than  twenty  men. 
^9  My  father  set  up  for  himself  in  business,  estab- 

lishing a  tannery  at  Ravenna,  the  county-seat  of 
Portage  County.  In  a  few  years  he  removed  from 
Ravenna,  and  set  up  the  same  business  at  Point 
Pleasant,  Clermont  County,  Ohio, 
'^onai'*"  During  the  minority  of  my  father  the  West 
'ttJe w^r  afforded  but  poor  facilities  for  the  most  opulent  of 
the  youth  to  acquire  an  education,  and  the  major- 
ity were  dependent,  almost  exclusively,  upon  their 
own  exertions  for  whatever  learning  they  obtained. 
I  have  often  heard  him  say  that  his  time  at  school 
was  limited  to  six  months,  when  he  was  very  young, 
—  too  young,  indeed,  to  learn  much,  or  to  appreciate 
the  advantages  of  an  education, —  and  to  a  "  quar- 
ter's schooling"  afterward,  probably  while  living 
with  Judge  Tod.  But  his  thirst  for  education  was 
intense.  He  learned  rapidly,  and  was  a  constant 
June  29, 1878  reader  up  to  the  day  of  his  death — in  his  eightieth 


ANCESTBY  D 

scarcity  gave  him  the  early  habit  of  studying  every-  chap,  i 
thing  he  read,  so  that  when  he  got  through  with  a 
book  he  knew  everything  in  it.  The  habit  con- 
tinued through  life.  Even  after  reading  the  daily 
papers — which  he  never  neglected — he  could  give 
all  the  important  information  they  contained.  He 
made  himself  an  excellent  English  scholar,  and 
before  he  was  twenty  yeai*s  of  age  was  a  constant 
contributor  to  Western  newspapers,  and  was  also, 
from  that  time  until  he  was  fifty  years  old,  an  able 
debater  in  the  societies  for  this  purpose,  which 
were  common  in  the  West  at  that  time.  He  always 
took  an  active  part  in  politics,  but  was  never  a 
candidate  for  ofl&ce,  except,  I  believe,  that  he  was 
the  fii'st  mayor  of  Georgetown.  He  supported 
Jackson  for  the  Presidency ;  but  he  was  a  Whig,  a 
great  admirer  of  Henry  Clay,  and  never  voted  for 
any  other  Democrat  for  high  ofl&ce  after  Jackson. 

My  mother's  family  lived  in  Montgomery  County, 
Pennsylvania,  for  several  generations.  I  have  little 
information  about  her  ancestors.    Her  family  took 
no  interest  in  genealogy,  so  that  my  grandfather,  jJ^T^f JSS; 
who  died  when  I  was  sixteen  years  old,  knew  only    ^^Sooa* 
back  to  his  grandfather.    On  the  other  side,  my  jan-^iwOT 
father  took  a  great  interest  in  the  subject,  and  in* 
his  researches  he  found  that  there  was  an  entailed 
estate  in  Windsor,  Connecticut,  belonging  to  the 
family,  to  which  his  nephew,  Lawson  Grant,  was 
the  heir.    He  was  so  much  interested  in  the  sub- 
ject that  he  got  his  nephew  to  empower  him  to  act 


b  PEBSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  8.  GRANT 

Chap.  I  thousand  dollars,  I  think.  I  remember  the  circum- 
stance well,  and  remember,  too,  hearing  him  say, 
on  his  return,  that  he  found  some  widows  hving  on 
the  property,  who  had  little  or  nothing  beyond 
their  homes.  From  these  he  refused  to  receive 
any  recompense. 

My  mother's  father,  John  Simpson,  moved  from 
Montgomery  County,  Pennsylvania,  to  Clermont 
^^,^     County,  Ohio,  about  the  year  1819,  taking  with  him 
^siSS*'     his  four  childi*en  —  three  daughters  and  one  son. 
,  JJ^ov.  93,    My  mother,  Hannah  Simpson,  was  the  third  of  these 
11.1888     children,  and  was  then  over  twenty  years  of  age.^ 
am^i794-  ^^^  eldest  sister  was  at  that  time  married,  and  had 
oJifflt"^.   several  children.    She  still  lives  in  Clermont  County 
Jan.  ae,  1885  ^^  ^j^jg  writing  (October  5, 1884),  and  is  over  ninety 
years  of  age.    Until  her  memory  failed  her,  a  few 
years  ago,  she  thought  the  country  ruined  beyond 
recovery  when  the  Democratic  party  lost  control 
in  1860.     Her  family,  which  was  large,  inherited 
orimth     ^^^  views,  with  the  exception  of  one  son,  who  set- 
tled in  Kentucky  before  the  war.    He  was  the  only 
one  of  the  children  who  entered  the  volunteer  ser- 
vice to  suppress  the  rebellion. 

1  General  Grant's  mother  was  ors  and  success  never  betrayed 

one  of  the  most  modest  and  un-  her  into  an  act  or  remark  which 

selfish  of  women,  with  a  large  would  indicate  that  her  head  was 

fund  of  good  sense.     She  took  a  turned  by  them.     She  was  glad 

lively  interest  in  passing  events,  and  thankful  for  his  good  fortune, 

even  glancing  at  the  morning  pa-  and,  with  the  loving  faithfulness 

per  the  day  she  passed  away;  and  of  a  Christian  mother,  she  had 

on  that  day  her  thoughtfulness  long  made  his  welfare  the  subject 

for  others,  and  forgetfulness  of  of  earnest  prayer.   She  had  faith 

self,  were  several  times  strikingly  for  his  future,  though  not  great 


BIRTH 


Chap.  I 

Samuel 

Simpson, 

d,  Apr.  8, 

1887 


Birtb 


Edacation 
tn  the  West 


Her  brother,  next  of  age,  and  now  past  eighty- 
eight,  is  also  still  living  in  Clermont  County,  within 
a  few  miles  of  the  old  homestead,  and  is  as  active 
in  mind  as  ever.  He  was  a  supporter  of  the  Gov- 
ernment during  the  war,  and  remains  a  firm  be- 
liever that  national  success  by  the  Democratic 
party  means  irretrievable  ruin. 

In  June,  1821,  my  father,  Jesse  R.  Grant,  married 
Hannah  Simpson.  I  was  bom  on  the  27th  of  April, 
1822,  at  Point  Pleasant,  Clermont  County,  Ohio. 
In  the  fall  of  1823  we  moved  to  Georgetown,  the 
county-seat  of  Brown,  the  adjoining  county  east. 
This  place  remained  my  home  until,  at  the  age  of 
seventeen,  in  1839, 1  went  to  West  Point. 

The  schools,  at  the  time  of  which  I  write,  were 
very  indifferent.  There  were  no  free  schools,  and 
none  in  which  the  scholars  were  classified.  They 
were  all  supported  by  subscription,  and  a  single 
teacher — who  was  often  a  man  or  a  woman  in- 
capable of  teaching  much,  even  if  they  imparted  all 
they  knew — would  have  thirty  or  forty  scholars, 
male  and  female,  from  the  infant  learning  the 
a-b-c's  up  to  the  young  lady  of  eighteen  and  the 
boy  of  twenty,  studying  the  highest  branches 
taught — the  three  R's,  "Reading,  'Biting,  'Rith- 
metic.^  I  never  saw  an  algebra,  or  other  mathe- 
naatical  work  higher  than  the  arithmetic,  in  George- 
town, until  after  I  was  appointed  to  West  Point. 
I  then  bought  a  work  on  algebra  in  Cincinnati; 
^Xit  having  no  teacher,  it  was  Greek  to  me. 

My  life  in  Georgetown  was  uneventful.    From  schooways 


8  PEKSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  8.  GRANT 

CHAP.  I    was  spent  in  Maysville,  Kentucky,  attending  the 
school  of  Richeson  and  Band ;  the  latter  in  Ripley, 
Ohio,  at  a  private  school.    I  was  not  studious  in 
habit,  and  probably  did  not  make  progress  enough 
to  compensate  for  the  outlay  for  board  and  tuition. 
At  all  events,  both  winters  were  spent  in  going 
over  the  same  old  arithmetic  which  I  knew  every 
word  of  before,  and  repeating,  "A  noun  is  the  name 
of  a  thing,''  which  I  had  also  heard  my  Q-eorgetown 
teachers  repeat  until  I  had  come  to  beUeve  it — but 
I  cast  no  reflections  upon  my  old  teacher,  Riche- 
son.     He  turned   out  bright   scholars  from  his 
school,  many  of  whom   have   filled  conspicuous 
wthTKy^"  pl^i^^s  in  the  service  of  their  States.    Two  of  my 
mmSrSj.   contemporaries  there — who,  I  believe,  never  at- 
wSohExJ*  tended  any  other  institution  of  learning — have 
conir.Mex.*  held  seats  in  Congress,  and  one,  if  not  both,  other 
E.c.phte-   ^^S^  ofl&ces ;  these  are  Wadsworth  and  Phister. 
il67^jM.a      My  father  was,  from  my  earUest  recollection,  in 
(Ky.)i87»-ea  ^Qjj^Qrta})!^  circimistances,  considering  the  times, 
his  place  of  residence,  and  the  community  in  which 
he  lived.    Mindful  of  his  own  lack  of  facilities  for 
acquiring  an  education,  his  greatest  desire  in  ma- 
turer  years  was  for  the  education  of  his  children. 
Consequently,  as  stated  before,  I  never  missed  a 
quarter  from  school  from  the  time  I  was  old  enough 
to  attend  till  the  time  of  leaving  home.    This  did 
tooreow™   ^^*  exempt  me  from  labor.   In  my  early  days  every 
pations     ^j^Q  labored,  more  or  less,  in  the  region  where  my 
youth  was  spent,  and  more  in  proportion  to  their 
private  means.     It  was  only  the  very  poor  who 
were  exempt.     While  my  father  carried  on  the 


BOYHOOD  9 

detested  'the  trade,  preferring  almost  any  other  chap,  i 
labor;  but  I  was  fond  of  agriculture,  and  of  all  Fannworii 
employment  in  which  horses  were  used*  We  had, 
among  other  lands,  fifty  acres  of  forest  within  a 
mile  of  the  village.  In  the  fall  of  the  year  chop- 
pers were  employed  to  cut  enough  wood  to  last  a 
twelvemonth.  When  I  was  seven  or  eight  years 
of  age  I  began  hauling  aU  the  wood  used  in  the 
house  and  shops.  I  could  not  load  it  on  the  wag- 
ons, of  course,  at  that  time,  but  I  could  drive,  and 
the  choppers  would  load,  and  some  one  at  the 
house  unload.  When  about  eleven  years  old  I 
was  strong  enough  to  hold  a  plow.  From  that  age 
until  seventeen  I  did  all  the  work  done  with  horses, 
such  as  breaking  up  the  land,  fmTowing,  plowing 
com  and  potatoes,  bringing  in  the  crops  when  har- 
vested, hauling  all  the  wood,  besides  tending  two 
or  three  horses,  a  cow  or  two,  and  sawing  wood  for 
stoves,  etc.,  while  still  attending  school.  For  this 
I  was  compensated  by  the  fact  that  there  was  never 
any  scolding  or  punishing  by  my  parents ;  no  ob- 
jection to  rational  enjoyments,  such  as  fishing,  Recreations 
going  to  the  creek  a  mile  away  to  swim  in  summer, 
taking  a  horse  and  visiting  my  grandparents  in  the 
adjoining  county,  fifteen  miles  off,  skating  on  the 
ice  in  winter,  or  taking  a  horse  and  sleigh  when 
there  was  snow  on  the  ground. 

While  still  quite  young  I  had  visited  Cincinnati,  ^^''' 
^orty-five  miles  away,  several  times,  alone;  also 
JMiaysville,  Kentucky,  often,  and  once  Louisville. 
Cl^he  ioumev  to  Louisville  was  a  bier  one  for  a  bov 


10 


PERSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 


Chap.  I 


1887 


Ohio,  and  returned  alone;  and  had  gone  once,  in 
like  manner,  to  Flat  Rock,  Kentucky,  about  seventy- 
miles  away.  On  this  latter  occasion  I  was  fifteen 
years  of  age.  While  at  Flat  Rock,  at  the  house  of  a 
Mr.  Payne,  whom  I  was  visiting  with  his  brother,  a 
neighbor  of  ours  in  Q-eorgetown,  I  saw  a  veiy  fine 
l^jwtog  saddle-horse,  which  I  rather  coveted,  and  proposed 
to  Mr.  Payne,  the  owner,  to  trade  him  for  one  of 
the  two  I  was  driving.  Payne  hesitated  to  trade 
with  a  boy,  but  asking  his  brother  about  it,  the 
latter  told  him  that  it  would  be  all  right,  that  I  was 
allowed  to  do  as  I  pleased  with  the  horses.  I  was 
seventy  miles  from  home,  with  a  carriage  to  take 
back,  and  Mr.  Payne  said  he  did  not  know  that  his 
horse  had  ever  had  a  collar  on.  I  asked  to  have 
him  hitched  to  a  farm-wagon,  and  we  would  soon 
see  whether  he  would  work.  It  was  soon  evident 
that  the  horse  had  never  worn  harness  before ;  but 
he  showed  no  viciousness,  and  I  expressed  a  con- 
fidence that  I  could  manage  him.  A  trade  was  at 
once  strack,  I  receiving  ten  dollars*  difference. 

The  next  day  Mr.  Payne  of  Georgetown  and  I 
started  on  our  return.  We  got  along  very  well  for 
a  few  miles,  when  we  encountered  a  ferocious  dog 
that  frightened  the  horses  and  made  them  run. 
The  new  animal  kicked  at  every  jump  he  made.  I 
got  the  horses  stopped,  however,  before  any  dam- 
age was  done,  and  without  running  into  anything. 
After  giving  them  a  little  rest  to  quiet  their  fears, 
we  started  again.     That  instant  the  new  horse 


A  perilons 
ride 


BOYHOOD  11 

deep  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  pike.  I  got  the  chap,  i 
horses  stopped  on  the  very  brink  of  the  precipice. 
My  new  horse  was  terribly  frightened,  and  trembled 
like  an  aspen ;  but  he  was  not  half  so  badly  fright- 
ened as  my  companion,  Mr.  Payne,  who  deserted 
me  after  this  last  experience,  and  took  passage  on 
a  freight-wagon  for  Maysville.  Every  time  I  at- 
tempted to  start  my  new  horse  would  commence  to 
kick.  I  was  in  quite  a  dilemma  for  a  time.  Once 
in  Maysville,  I  could  borrow  a  horse  from  an  uncle 
who  lived  there ;  but  I  was  more  than  a  day's  travel 
from  that  point.  Finally  I  took  out  my  bandanna 
— the  style  of  handkerchief  in  universal  use  then 
— and  with  this  bhndfolded  my  horse.  In  this  way 
I  reached  Maysville  safely  the  next  day,  no  doubt 
much  to  the  surprise  of  my  friend.  Here  1  bor- 
rowed a  horse  from  my  uncle,  and  the  following 
day  we  proceeded  on  our  journey. 

About  half  my  school-days  in  Georgetown  were 
spent  at  the  school  of  John  D.  White,  a  North 
Carolinian,  and  the  father  of  Chilton  White,  who 
represented  the  district  in  Congress  for  two  terms  ^^-^ 
during  the  rebellion.  Mi\  White  was  always  a 
Democrat  in  politics,  and  Chilton  followed  his 
father.  He  had  two  elder  brothers — all  three  being 
schoolmates  of  mine  at  their  father's  school — who 
did  not  go  the  same  way.  The  second  brother 
died  before  the  rebellion  began;  he  was  a  Whig 
and  afterward  a  Republican.  His  eldest  brother 
was  a  Republican,  and  a  brave  soldier  during  the 
rebellion.     Chilton  is  reimrted  as  havinsr  told  of 


12  PEBSONAL  MEMOIBS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

chaf.  I  much  wanted.  My  father  had  offered  twenty  dol- 
lars for  it,  but  Ralston  wanted  twenty-five.  I  was 
so  anxious  to  have  the  colt  that  after  the  owner 
left  I  begged  to  be  allowed  to  take  him  at  the  price 
demanded.  My  father  yielded,  but  said  twenty 
dollars  was  all  the  horse  was  worth,  and  told  me 
to  offer  that  price ;  if  it  was  not  accepted  I  was  to 
offer  twenty-two  and  a  half,  and  if  that  would  not 
get  him,  to  give  the  twenty-five.  I  at  once  mounted 
a  horse  and  went  for  the  colt.  When  1  got  to 
Mr.  Ralston's  house  I  said  to  him :  "  Papa  says  I  ipay 
offer  you  twenty  dollars  for  the  colt,  but  if  you 
won't  take  that,  I  am  to  offer  twenty-two  and  a 
half,  and  if  you  won't  take  that  to  give  you  twenty- 
five.''  It  would  not  take  a  Connecticut  man  to 
guess  the  price  finally  agreed  upon.  White's  story 
is  nearly  true.  I  certainly  showed  very  plainly 
that  I  had  come  for  the  colt,  and  meant  to  have 
him.  I  could  not  have  been  over  eight  years  old 
at  the  time.  This  transaction  caused  me  great 
heartburning.  The  story  got  out  among  the  boys 
of  the  village,  and  it  was  a  long  time  before  I  heard 
the  last  of  it.  Boys  enjoy  the  misery  of  their  com- 
panions, at  least  village  boys  in  that  day  did,  and 
in  later  life  I  have  found  that  all  adults  are  not 
free  from  the  peculiarity.  I  kept  the  horse  until 
he  was  four  years  old,  when  he  went  blind,  and  I 
sold  him  for  twenty  dollars.  When  I  went  to 
Maysville  to  school,  in  1836,  at  the  age  of  fourteen, 
I  recognized  my  colt  as  one  of  the  blind  horses 
working  on  the  treadwheel  of  the  ferry-boat. 


BOYHOOD  13 

can  be  hired  to  do  in  these  days,  and  attended  ohap.i 
school  at  the  same  time.  I  had  as  many  privileges 
as  any  boy  in  the  village,  and  probably  more  than 
most  of  them.  I  have  no  recollection  of  ever  hav- 
ing been  punished  at  home,  either  by  scolding  or 
by  the  rod.  But  at  school  the  case  was  different. 
The  rod  was  freely  used  there,  and  I  was  not  ex-  ^Jl^^ 
empt  from  its  influence.  I  can  see  John  D.  White, 
the  school-teacher,  now,  with  his  long  beech-switch 
always  in  his  hand.  It  was  not  always  the  same 
one,  either.  Switches  were  brought  in  bundles 
from  a  beech-wood  near  the  school-house,  by  the 
boys  for  whose  benefit  they  were  intended.  Often 
a  whole  bundle  would  be  used  up  in  a  single  day. 
I  never  had  any  hard  feelings  against  my  teacher, 
either  while  attending  school,  or  in  later  years 
when  reflecting  upon  my  experience.  Mr.  White 
was  a  kind-hearted  man,  and  was  much  respected 
by  the  community  in  which  he  lived.  He  only 
followed  the  universal  custom  of  the  period,  and 
that  under  which  he  had  received  his  own  edu- 
cation. 


CHAPTER  n 

WEST  POINT — GRADUATION 

Chap.  II  TN  the  winter  of  1838-^9 1  was  attending  school  at 
-■-  Ripley,  only  ten  miles  distant  from  Georgetown, 
but  spent  the  Christmas  holidays  at  home.  During 
this  vacation  my  father  received  a  letter  from  the 
i^lifoai-  Honorable  Thomas  Morris,  then  United  States 
v^.^wS^  Senator  from  Ohio.  When  he  read  it  he  said  to 
**'  1^'  ^'  me,  "  Ulysses,  I  believe  you  are  going  to  receive 
the  appointment."  "What  appointment!"  I  in- 
quired. "  To  West  Point ;  I  have  applied  for  it." 
"  But  I  won't  go,"  I  said.  He  said  he  thought  I 
would,  and  I  thought  so  too,  if  he  did.  I  really  had 
no  objection  to  going  to  West  Point,  except  that  I 
had  a  very  exalted  idea  of  the  acquirements  neces- 
sary to  get  through.  I  did  not  believe  I  possessed 
them,  and  could  not  bear  the  idea  of  failing.  There 
had  been  four  boys  from  our  village,  or  its  imme- 
diate neighborhood,  who  had  been  graduated  from 
West  Point,  and  never  a  failure  of  any  one  ap- 
pointed from  Georgetown,  except  in  the  case  of  the 
one  whose  place  I  was  to  take.  He  was  the  son  of 
Dr.  Bailey,  our  nearest  and  most  intimate  neighbor. 
Young  Bailey  had  been  appointed  in  1837.    Find- 


WEST  POINT  15 

when  he  was  reappointed.  Before  the  next  exam-  chap,  n 
ination  he  was  dismissed.  Dr.  Bailey  was  a  proud 
and  sensitive  man,  and  felt  the  failui*e  of  his  son 
so  keenly  that  he  forbade  his  return  home.  There 
were  no  telegraphs  in  those  days  to  disseminate 
news  rapidly,  no  railroads  west  of  the  AUeghanies, 
and  but  few  east ;  and,  above  all,  there  were  no 
reporters  prying  into  other  people's  private  aflEairs. 
Consequently  it  did  not  become  generally  known 
that  there  was  a  vacancy  at  West  Point  from 
our  district  until  I  was  appointed.  I  presume 
Mrs.  Bailey  confided  to  my  mother  the  fact  that 
Bartlett  had  been  dismissed,  and  that  the  doctor 
had  forbidden  his  son's  return  home. 

The  Honorable  Thomas  L.  Hamer,  one  of  the  ^-.^bti^ 
ablest  men  Ohio  ever  produced,  was  our  member  of  J^iJ^; 
Congress  at  the  time,  and  had  the  right  of  nomina-  *  SS*^' 
tion.  He  and  my  father  had  been  members  of  the 
same  debating  society  (where  they  were  generally 
pitted  on  opposite  sides),  and  intimate  personal 
friends  from  their  early  manhood  up  to  a  few 
years  before.  In  poUtics  they  differed.  Hamer 
was  a  lifelong  Democrat,  while  my  father  was  a 
Whig.  They  had  a  warm  discussion,  which  finally 
became  angry,  over  some  act  of  President  Jackson, 
— the  removal  of  the  deposit  of  public  moneys,  I 
think, — after  which  they  never  spoke  until  after 
my  appointment.  I  know  both  of  them  felt  badly 
over  this  estrangement,  and  would  have  been  glad 
at  any  time  to  come  to  a  reconciliation ;  but  neither 
would  make  the  advance.  Under  these  circimi- 
stances  my  father  would  not  write  to  Hamer  for 
the  appointment,  but  he  wrote  to  Thomas  Morris, 


16  PEBSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

CHAP,  n  that  there  was  a  vacancy  at  West  Point  from  our 
district,  and  that  he  would  be  glad  if  I  could  be 
appointed  to  fill  it.  This  letter,  I  presume,  was 
turned  over  to  Mr.  Hamer,  and,  as  there  was  no 
other  applicant,  he  cheerfully  appointed  me.  This 
healed  the  breach  between  the  two,  never  afterwards 
reopened. 

Besides  the  argument  used  by  my  father  in  favor 
of  my  going  to  West  Point — that  "  he  thought  I 
would  go  ^ — there  was  another  very  strong  induce- 
SpiStS  ment.  I  had  always  a  great  desire  to  travel.  I 
was  already  the  best-traveled  boy  in  Georgetown, 
except  the  sons  of  one  man,  John  Walker,  who  had 
emigrated  to  Texas  with  his  family,  and  immi- 
grated back  as  soon  as  he  could  get  the  means  to 
do  so.  In  his  short  stay  in  Texas  he  acquired  a 
very  different  opinion  of  the  country  from  what 
one  would  form  going  there  now. 

I  had  been  east  to  Wheeling,  Virginia,  and  north 
to  the  Western  Reserve,  in  Ohio,  west  to  Louisville, 
and  south  to  Bourbon  County,  Kentucky,  besides 
having  driven  or  ridden  pretty  much  over  the  whole 
country  within  fifty  miles  of  home.  Going  to  West 
Point  would  give  me  the  opportunity  of  visiting 
the  two  great  cities  of  the  continent,  Philadelphia 
and  New  York.  This  was  enough.  When  these 
places  were  visited  I  would  have  been  glad  to  have 
had  a  steamboat  or  railroad  collision  or  any  other 
accident  happen,  by  which  I  might  have  received  a 
temporary  injury  sufficient  to  make  me  ineligible, 
for  a  time,  to  enter  the  Academy.  Nothing  of  the 
kind  occurred,  and  I  had  to  face  the  music. 


WEST  POINT  17 

existence,  a  Democratic  town.     There  was  prob-    CHAP.n 
ably  no  time  during  the  rebellion  when,  if  the    ^^f^ 
opportunity  could  have  been  afforded,  it  would  not       ^^^^ 
have  voted  for  Jefferson  Davis  for  President  of  the 
United  States  over  Mr.  Lincoln  or  any  other  repre- 
sentative of  his  party ;  unless  it  was  immediately 
after  some  of  John  Morgan's  men,  in  his  celebrated  i^'atSM 
raid  through  Ohio,  spent  a  few  hours  in  the  village.    ^mT^ 
The  rebels  helped  themselves  to  whatever  they 
could  find, — horses,  boots  and  shoes,  especiafly 
horses, — and  many  ordered  meals  to  be  prepared 
for  them  by  the  families.    This  was  no  doubt  a  far 
pleasanter  duty  for  some  families  than  it  would 
have  been  to  render  a  like  service  for  Union  sol- 
diers.   The  line  between  the  Rebel  and  Union  ele- 
ments in  Georgetown  was  so  marked  that  it  led 
to  divisions  even  in  the  churches.     There  were 
churches  in  that  part  of  Ohio  where  treason  to  the   ^^^""^^^^ 
Government  was  preached  regularly,  and  where,    o^^"*®« 
to  secure  membership,  hostility  to  the  war  and  to 
the  liberation  of  the  slaves  was  far  more  essential 
than  a  belief  in  the  authenticity  or  credibility  of 
the  Bible.     There  were  men  in  Georgetown  who 
filled  all  the  requirements  for  membership  in  these 
churches. 

Yet  this  far-off  Western  village,  with  a  popula- 
tion, including  old  and  young,  male  and  female,  of 
about  one  thousand, — about  enough  for  the  organi- 
zation of  a  single  regiment  if  all  had  been  men 
capable  of  bearing  arms, — furnished  the  Union 
^^^v  four  general  officers  and  one  colonel,  West 


18 


PERSONAL  MEMOmS   OF  U.  S.  GRANT 


Chap,  n 

W.  P.  1848- 
62;  Capt.  eth 
Cav.  May, 
1861;  Bvt. 
M«J.-Oen. 
Mar.  13, 1865 


Joimiey  to 
West  Point 


Travel  on 

the  Ohio 

River 


elsewhere  at  the  breaking  out  of  the  rebellion, 
except  possibly  General  A.  V.  Kautz,  who  had  re- 
mained in  the  army  from  his  graduation.  Two  of 
the  colonels  also  entered  the  service  from  other  lo- 
calities. The  other  seven,  General  Groierty,  Colo- 
nels White,  Fyffe,  Loudon,  and  Marshall,  Majors 
King  and  Bailey,  were  all  residents  of  Georgetown 
when  the  war  broke  out,  and  all  of  them  who  were 
alive  at  the  close  retm'ned  there.  Major  Bailey 
was  the  cadet  who  had  preceded  me  at  West  Point. 
He  was  killed  in  West  Virginia  in  his  first  engage- 
ment. As  far  as  I  know,  every  boy  who  has  en- 
tered West  Point  from  that  village  since  my  time 
has  been  gi'aduated. 

I  took  passage  on  a  steamer  at  Ripley,  Ohio,  for 
Pittsburg,  about  the  middle  of  May,  1839.  West- 
em  boats  at  that  day  did  not  make  regular  trips  at 
stated  times,  but  would  stop  anywhere,  and  for  any 
length  of  time,  for  passengers  or  freight.  I  have 
myseH  been  detained  two  or  three  days  at  a  place 
after  steam  was  up,  the  gang-planks,  all  but  one, 
drawn  in,  and  after  the  time  advertised  for  starting 
had  expired.  On  this  occasion  we  had  no  vexa- 
tious delays,  and  in  about  three  days  Pittsburg 
was  reached.  From  Pittsburg  I  chose  passage  by 
the  canal  to  Harrisburg,  rather  than  by  the  more 
expeditious  stage.  This  gave  a  better  opportunity 
of  enjoying  the  fine  scenery  of  western  Pennsyl- 
vania, and  I  had  rather  a  dread  of  reaching  my 

HAstinflf.inn    f\.t   «11         Af.   fVinf.   fimA   tViA   prtirI    "waa 


WEST  POINT  19 

was  a  railroad, — the  first  I  had  ever  seen,  except  chap,  n 
the  one  on  which  I  had  just  crossed  the  summit  of 
the  Alleghany  Mountains, — and  over  which  canal- 
boats  were  transported.  In  trayeling  by  the  road 
from  Harrisburg  I  thought  the  perfection  of  rapid 
transit  had  been  reached.  We  traveled  at  least 
eighteen  miles  an  hour  when  at  full  speed,  and 
made  the  whole  distance  averaging  probably  as 
much  as  twelve  miles  an  hour.  This  seemed  like 
annihilating  space.  I  stopped  five  days  in  Phila- 
delphia, saw  about  every  street  in  the  city,  attended 
the  theater,  visited  Girard  College  (which  was  then 
in  course  of  constniction),  and  got  reprimanded 
from  home  afterward  for  dallying  by  the  way  so 
long.  My  sojourn  in  New  York  was  shorter,  but 
long  enough  to  enable  me  to  see  the  city  very  well. 
I  reported  at  West  Point  on  the  30th  or  31st  of  ^^igt 
May,  and  about  two  weeks  later  passed  my  exami- 
nation for  admission  without  difficulty,  very  much 
to  my  surprise. 

^  military  life  had  no  charms  for  me,  and  I  had 
not  the  faintest  idea  of  staying  in  the  army  even 
if  I  should  be  gi^aduated,  which  I  did  not  expect^> 
The  encampment  which  preceded  the  commence- 
ment of  academic  studies  was  very  wearisome  and 
uninteresting.    When  the  28th  of  August  came — 
the  date  for  breaking  up  camp  and  going  into  bar- 
racks— I  felt  as  though  I  had  been  at  West  Point 
always,  and  that  if  I  stayed  to  graduation  I  would 
have  to  remain  always.    I  did  not  take  hold  of  nay 
studies  with  aviditv — in  fan.t.  I  rareW  ever  reacl 


Cadet  life 


20 


PEBSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GBAKT 


Early  read> 
ingand 
studies 


Chap,  n  Academy,  from  which  cadets  can  get  books  to  read 
in  their  quarters.  I  devoted  more  time  to  these 
than  to  books  relating  to  the  course  of  studies. 
Much  of  the  time,  I  am  sorry  to  say,  was  devoted 
to  novels,  but  not  those  of  a  trashy  sort.  I  read 
all  of  Bulwei'^s  then  published.  Cooper's,  Marryat's, 
Scott's,  Washington  Irving's  works.  Lever's,  and 
many  others  that  I  do  not  now  remember.  Mathe- 
matics was  very  easy  to  me,  so  that  when  January 
came  I  passed  the  examination,  taking  a  good 
standing  in  that  branch.  In  French — the  only 
other  study  at  that  time  in  the  first  year's  course 
— my  standing  was  very  low.  In  fact,  if  the  class 
had  been  turned  the  other  end  foremost,  I  should 
have  been  near  head.  I  never  succeeded  in  getting 
squarely  at  either  end  of  my  class  in  any  one  study 

xB^^f  during  the  four  years.  I  came  near  it  in  French, 
artiflery,  infantry,  and  cavalry  tactics,  and  conduct. 
Early  in  the  session  of  the  Congress  which  met 
in  December,  1839,  a  bill  was  discussed  abolishing 
the  Military  Academy.  I  saw  in  this  an  honorable 
way  to  obtain  a  discharge,  and  read  the  debates 
with  much  interest,  but  with  impatience  at  the 
delay  in  taking  action,  for  I  was  selfish  enough  to 
favor  the  bill.  It  never  passed,  and  a  year  later, 
although  the  time  hung  drearily  with  me,  I  would 
have  been  sorry  to  have  seen  it  succeed<^^y  idea 
then  was  to  get  through  the  course,  secure  a  detail 
for  a  few  years  as  assistant  professor  of  mathe- 
matics at  the  Academy,  and  afterward  obtain  a 
permanent  position  as  professor  in  some  respec- 


North  Am. 

Rev. 
CXII,6iO 


WEST  POINT 


21 


CHAP.n 

1841 


Jesse  R. 
Grant, 


Cadet  or- 
ganization 


usual  furlough,  extending  from  the  close  of  the 
June  examination  to  the  28th  of  August.  This  I 
enjoyed  beyond  any  other  .period  of  my  life.  My 
father  had  sold  out  his  business  in  Georgetown — 
where  my  youth  had  been  spent,  and  to  which  my 
day-dreams  carried  me  back  as  my  future  home,  if 
I  should  ever  be  able  to  retire  on  a  competency. 
He  had  moved  to  Bethel,  only  twelve  miles  away, 
in  the  adjoining  county  of  Clermont,  and  had  Be&^fiwa 
bought  a  young  horse  that  had  never  been  in  har- 
ness for  my  special  use  under  the  saddle  during 
my  furlough.  Most  of  my  time  was  spent  among 
my  old  schoolmates — these  ten  weeks  were  shorter 
than  one  week  at  West  Point. 

Persons  acquainted  with  the  Academy  know 
that  the  corps  of  cadets  is  divided  into  four  com- 
panies for  the  pui*pose  of  military  exercises.  These 
companies  are  oflBcered  from  the  cadets,  the  super- 
intendent and  commandant  selecting  the  officers 
for  their  military  bearing  and  qualifications.  The 
adjutant,  quartermaster,  four  captains,  and  twelve 
lieutenants  are  taken  from  the  first  or  senior  class ; 
the  sergeants  from  the  second  or  junior  class ;  and 
the  corporals  from  the  third  or  sophomore  class.  I 
had  not  been  "  called  out '^  as  a  corporal,  but  when 
I  returned  from  furlough  I  found  myself  the  last 
but  one — about  my  standing  in  all  the  tactics — of 
eighteen  sergeants.  The  promotion  was  too  much 
for  me.  That  year  my  standing  in  the  class — as 
shown  by*  the  number  of  demerits  of  the  year — 
^as  about  the  same  as  it  was  amoncr  thft  sererean+^q. 


Flrstj 
motion 


22  PEESONAL  MEMOIRS  OP  U.  S.  GRANT 

Chap,  n     Scott  visited  West  Point  and  reviewed  the  cadets. 
sJSSfSn.   With  his  commanding  figure,  his  quite  colossal 
jujy 25mi;  size  and  showy  uniform,  I  thought  him  the  finest 
Md^n.-hi-  specimen  of  manhood  my  eyes  had  ever  beheld, 
36,  i8tt"*  and  the  most  to  be  envied.    I  could  never  resem- 
ble him  in  appearance,  but  I  believe  I  did  have  a 
^^^^^'  presentiment  for  a  moment  that  some  day  I  should 
occupy  his  place  on  review— although  I  had  no 
intention  then  of  remaining  in  the  army.    My  ex- 
perience in  a  horse-trade  ten  years  before,  and  the 
ridicule  it  caused  me,  were  too  fresh  in  my  mind 
for  me  to  communicate  this  presentiment  to  even 
my  most  intimate  chum.    The  next  summer  Martin 
Van  Buren,  then  President  of  the  United  States, 
visited  West  Point  and  reviewed  the  cadets;  he 
did  not  impress  me  with  the  awe  which  Scott  had 
inspired.    In  fact,  I  regarded  General  Scott  and 
ASfooi^sd  Captain  C.  F.  Smith,  the  commandant  of  cadets,  as 
SSj^.a'p?!  the  two  men  most  to  be  envied  in  the  nation.    I 
^'^^     retained  a  high  regard  for  both  up  to  the  day  of 
their  death. 

The  last  two  years  wore  away  more  rapidly  than 
the  first  two,  but  they  still  seemed  about  five  times 
^"i8«*^°'  as  long  as  Ohio  years  to  me.  At  last  all  the  exam- 
inations were  passed,  and  the  members  of  the  class 
were  called  upon  to  record  their  choice  of  arms  of 
service  and  regiments.  I  was  anxious  to  enter  the 
cavalry,  or  dragoons,  as  they  were  then  called ;  but 
there  was  only  one  regiment  of  dragoons  in  the 
army  at  that  time,  and  attached  to  that,  besides  the 
full  complement  of  officers,  there  were  at  least  four 


GRADUATION  23 

or,  more  properly  speaking,  leave  of  absence,  for    chap,  n 
the  class  were  now  commissioned  officers, — this 
time  to  the  end  of  September.    Again  I  went  to 
Ohio  to  spend  my  vacation  among  my  old  school- 
mates, and  again  I  found  a  fine  saddle-horse  pur- 
chased for  my  special  use,  besides  a  horse  and 
buggy  that  I  could  drive ;  but  I  was  not  in  a  phys- 
ical condition  to  enjoy  myself  quite  as  well  as  on 
the  former  occasion.    For  six  months  before  grad- 
uation I  had  had  a  desperate  cough   ("Tyler's  ^^^^* 
grip,''  it  was  called),  and  I  was  very  much  reduced,    "'^^p^*'^ 
weighing  but  one  hundred  and  seventeen  pounds, 
just  my  weight  at  entrance,  though  I  had  grown 
six  inches  in  stature  in  the  mean  time.     There  ^'^i^^. 
was  consumption  in  my  father's  family,  two  of  his  iMif^oim, 
brothers  having  died  of  that  disease,  which  made  hw^^jml 
my  symptoms  more  alarming.     The  brother  and    ga^^eis., 
sister  next  younger  than  myself  died,  during  the  iM6^se?L 
rebellion,  of  the  same  disease,  and  I  seemed  the  caSraB.7&. 
most  promising  subject  for  it  of  the  three  in  1843.    a^'mm.c,' 

Having  made  alternate  choice  of  two  different 
arms  of  service,  with  imif orms,  I  could  not  get  a 
uniform  suit  until  notified  of  my  assignment.    I 
left  my  measurement  with  a  tailor,  with  directions 
not  to  make  the  uniform   until  I  notified  him 
whether  it  was  to  be  for  infantry  or  dragoons. 
Notice  did  not  reach  me  for  several  weeks,  and    ^^^ 
then  it  took  at  least  a  week  to  get  the  letter  of  in- 
structions to  the  tailor,  and  two  more  to  make  the 
clothes  and  have  them  sent  to  me.     Ibis  was  a 
time  of  great  suspense.    I  was  impati^xx^^  to  get  on 


24  PERSONAL  MEMOIBS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

Chap,  n  The  conceit  was  knocked  out  of  me  by  two  little 
circumstances  that  happened  soon  after  the  anival 
^^^^^<>'  of  the  clothes,  which  gave  me  a  distaste  for  military 
uniform  that  I  never  recovered  from.  Soon  after 
the  arrival  of  the  suit  I  donned  it,  and  put  off  for 
Cincinnati  on  horseback.  While  I  was  riding  along 
a  street  of  that  city,  imagining  that  every  one  was 
looking  at  me  with  a  feeling  akin  to  mine  when  I 
first  saw  General  Scott,  a  little  urchin,  bareheaded, 
barefooted,  with  dirty  and  ragged  pants  held  up 
by  a  single  gallows — that's  what  suspenders  were 
called  then — and  a  shirt  that  had  not  seen  a  wash- 
tub  for  weeks,  turned  to  me  and  cried :  "  Soldier ! 
will  you  work  I  No,  sir-ee ;  PU  sell  my  shirt  first ! !  ^ 
The  horse-trade  and  its  dire  consequences  were  re- 
called to  mind. 

The  other  circumstance  occurred  at  home.  Op- 
posite our  house  in  Bethel  stood  the  old  stage-tav- 
ern where  "  man  and  beast ''  found  accommodation. 
The  stable-man  was  rather  dissipated,  but  possessed 
of  some  humor.  On  my  return  I  found  him  parad- 
ing the  streets  and  attending  in  the  stable  bare- 
footed, but  in  a  pair  of  sky-blue  nankeen  panta- 
loons— just  the  color  of  my  uniform  trousers — 
with  a  strip  of  white-cotton  sheeting  sewed  down 
the  outside  seams  in  imitation  of  mine.  The  joke 
was  a  huge  one  in  the  mind  of  many  of  the  people, 
and  was  much  enjoyed  by  them;  but  I  did  not 
appreciate  it  so  highly. 


CHAPTER  in 

I 

jLBMY    LIFE — CAUSES    OP    THE    MEXICAN    WAB — CAMP 
SALUBRITY 

ON  the  30th  of  September  I  reported  for  duty  at  chap,  in 
Jefferson  Baoracks,  St.  Louis,  with  the  Fourth  ^^ 
United  States  Infantry.  It  was  the  largest  military  ^^^J^*^ 
post  in  the  country  at  that  time,  being  garrisoned  by 
sixteen  companies  of  infantry — eight  of  the  Third 
Regiment,  the  remainder  of  the  Fourth.  Colonel 
Stephen  Kearny,  one  of  the  ablest  oflBcers  of  the  i«tDrag. 
day,  commanded  the  post,  and  under  him  discipline 
was  kept  at  a  high  standard,  but  without  vexatious 
rules  or  regulations.  Every  drill  and  roll-call  had 
to  be  attended ;  but  in  the  intervals  oflBcers  were 
permitted  to  enjoy  themselves,  leaving  the  garri- 
son, and  going  where  they  pleased,  without  making 
written  application  to  state  where  they  were  going, 
for  how  long,  etc.,  so  that  they  were  back  for  their 
next  duty.  It  did  seem  to  me  in  my  early  army 
days  that  too  many  of  the  older  oflBcers,  when  they 
came  to  command  posts,  made  it  a  study  to  think 
what  orders  they  could  publish  to  annoy  their 
subordinates  and  render  them  uncomfortable.  I 
noticed,  however,  a  few  years  later,  when  the  Mex- 

i« —      1 1-  J.       J.l-_x  -J-        -i»     J."L»_       -1 ^£ 


26  PEKSONAL  MEMOmS  OP  U.  S.  GRANT 

CHxp.in    ties  which  entirely  incapacitated  them  for  active 
field-service.    They  had  the  moral  courage  to  pro- 
claim it,  too.    They  were  right ;  but  they  did  not 
always  give  their  disease  the  right  name. 
At  West  Point  I  had  a  classmate, — in  the  last 

M  lto*3o  y^^^  ^^  ^^^  studies  he  was  room-mate  also, — F.  T. 

G«L. v^it'  Dent,  whose  family  resided  some  five  miles  west  of 

"^DejJalJ'  Jefferson  Barracks.  Two  of  his  unmarried  brothers 
^^  were  living  at  home  at  that  time,  and  as  I  had  taken 
with  me  from  Ohio  my  horse,  saddle,  and  bridle,  I 
soon  found  my  way  out  to  White  Haven — the  name 
of  the  Dent  estate.  As  I  found  the  family  con- 
genial, my  visits  became  frequent.    There  were  at 

™ma^\  l^^^^j  besides  the  young  men,  two  daughters— one 
a  school-miss  of  fifteen,  the  other  a  girl  of  eight  or 

Julia  Dent  nine.  There  was  still  an  older  daughter  of  seven- 
teen, who  had  been  spending  several  years  at 
boarding-school  in  St.  Louis,  but  who,  though 
through  school,  had  not  yet  returned  home.  She 
was  spending  the  winter  in  the  city  with  connec- 
tions, the  family  of  Colonel  John  O'Fallon,  well 
18**  known  in  St.  Louis.  In  February  she  returned  to 
her  country  home.  After  that  I  do  not  know  but 
my  visits  became  more  frequent;  they  certainly 
did  become  more  enjoyable.  We  would  often  take 
walks,  or  go  on  horseback  to  visit  the  neighbors, 
until  I  became  quite  well  acquainted  in  that  vicin- 
ity. Sometimes  one  of  the  brothers  would  accom- 
pany us,  sometimes  one  of  the  younger  sisters.  If 
the  Fourth  Infantry  had  remained  at  Jefferson 
Barracks  it  is  possible — even  probable — that  this 


ABMY  LIFE  27 

circumstance  occurred  which  developed  my  senti-    chap,  m 
ment  so  palpably  that  there  was  no  mistaking  it 

The  annexation  of  Texas  was  at  this  time  the  J^^?^ 
subject  of  violent  discussion  in  Congress,  in  the  tonffi^ 
press,  and  by  individuals.    The  administration  of  ^®n!Thf^' 
President  Tyler,  then  in  power,  was  making  the    wlm^. 
most  strenuous  efforts  to  effect  the  annexation,  ton,"p.m 

'     —Howard, 

which  was,  indeed,  the  great  and  absorbing  ques-  i^^^» 
tion  of  the  day.     During  these  discussions  the 
greater  part  of  the  single  rifle-regiment  in  the 
army — the  Second  Dragoons,  which  had  been  dis- 
mounted a  year  or  two  before,  and  designated  "  Dis- 
mounted Eifles'* — was  stationed  at  Fort  Jessup, 
Louisiana,  some  twenty-five  miles  east  of  the  Texas 
line,  to  observe  the  frontier.    About  the  1st  of  May       i®** 
the  Third  Infantry  was  ordered  from  Jefferson  Bar- 
racks to  Louisiana,  to  go  into  camp  in  the  neigh- 
borhood of  Fort  Jessup,  and  there  await  further   ^^^^ 
orders.    The  troops  were  embarked  on  steamers    w«r,p.7 
and  were  on  their  way  down  the  Mississippi  within 
a  few  days  after  the  receipt  of  this  order.    About 
the  time  they  started  I  obtained  a  leave  of  absence 
for  twenty  days  to  go  to  Ohio  to  visit  my  parents. 
I  was  obhged  to  go  to  St.  Louis  to  take  a  steamer 
for  Louisville  or  Cincinnati,  or  the  first  steamer 
going  up  the  Ohio  Eiver  to  any  point.     Before  I 
left  St.  Louis  orders  were  received  at  Jefferson 
Barracks  for  the  Fourth  Infantry  to  follow  the 
Third.    A  messenger  was  sent  after  me  to  stop  my 
leaving ;  but  before  he  could  reach  me  I  was  off, 
totally  ignorant  of  these  events.     A  day  or  two 
after  my  arrival  at  Bethel  I  received  a  letter  from 


28  PERSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

CHAP.ni  and  advising  me  not  to  open  any  letter  post- 
marked St.  Louis  or  Jefferson  Barracks  until  the 
expiration  of  my  leave,  and  saying  that  he  would 
pack  up  my  things  and  take  them  along  for  me. 
His  advice  was  not  necessary,  for  no  other  letter 
was  sent  to  me.  I  now  discovered  that  I  was  ex- 
ceedingly anxious  to  get  back  to  Jefferson  Barracks, 
and  I  understood  the  reason  without  explanation 
from  any  one.  My  leave  of  absence  required  me 
to  report  for  duty  at  Jeffei'son  Barracks  at  the  end 
of  twenty  days.  I  knew  my  regiment  had  gone  up 
the  Eed  River,  but  I  was  not  disposed  to  break  the 
letter  of  my  leave ;  besides,  if  I  had  proceeded  to 
Louisiana  direct,  I  could  not  have  reached  there 
until  after  the  expiration  of  my  leave.  Accord- 
ingly, at  the  end  of  the  twenty  days  I  reported  for 

^en^JdLt.  ^^*y  *^  Lieutenant  Ewell,  commanding  at  Jeffer- 
^LtJ^:'    son  Barracks,  handing  him  at  the  same  time  my 

?8rafrf^M:  leave  of  absence.  After  noticing  the  phraseology 
of  the  order — leaves  of  absence  were  generally 
worded,  "  At  the  end  of  which  time  he  will  report 
for  duty  with  his  proper  command'' — he  said  he 
would  give  me  an  order  to  join  my  regiment  in 
Louisiana.  I  then  asked  for  a  few  days'  leave 
before  starting,  which  he  readily  granted.  This 
was  the  same  Ewell  who  acquired  considerable 
reputation  as  a  Confederate  general  during  the 
rebellion.  He  was  a  man  much  esteemed,  and 
deservedly  so,  in  the  old  army,  and  proved  himself 
a  gallant  and  efficient  officer  in  two  wars — both,  in 


35,1872 


irv^^TP    /%«• 


i^^»v^  r*^'*  rvir»        v^  ^Tk  1r%  rx  1  ^-r 


ARMY  LIFE  29 

tween  Jeff ei'son  Barracks  and  the  place  to  which  I  chap,  in 
was  going,  and  at  that  day  there  was  not  a  bridge 
over  it  from  its  source  to  its  mouth.  There  is  not 
water  enough  in  the  creek  at  ordinary  stages  to 
run  a  coffee-mill,  and  at  low  water  there  is  none 
running  whatever.  On  this  occasion  it  had  been 
raining  heavily,  and  when  the  creek  was  reached  I 
found  the  banks  full  to  overflowing,  and  the  cur- 
rent rapid.  I  looked  at  it  a  moment  to  consider 
what  to  do.  One  of  my  superstitions  had  always  ^^^^^ 
been,  when  I  started  to  go  anywhere  or  to  do  any- 
thing, not  to  turn  back  or  stop  until  the  thing 
intended  was  accomplished.  I  have  frequently 
started  to  go  to  places  where  I  had  never  been,  and 
to  which  I  did  not  know  the  way,  depending  upon 
making  inquiries  on  the  road ;  and  if  I  got  past  the 
place  without  knowing  it,  instead  of  turning  back 
I  would  go  on  imtil  a  road  was  found  turning  in 
the  right  direction,  take  that,  and  come  in  by  the 
other  side.  So  I  stnick  into  the  stream,  and  in  an 
instant  the  horse  was  swimming  and  I  being  car- 
ried down  by  the  current.  I  headed  the  horse 
toward  the  other  bank  and  soon  reached  it,  wet 
through  and  without  other  clothes  on  that  side  of 
the  stream.  I  went  on,  however,  to  my  destina- 
tion, and  borrowed  a  dry  suit  from  my — future — 
brother-in-law.  We  were  not  of  the  same  size,  but 
the  clothes  answered  every  purpose  until  I  got 
more  of  my  own. 

Before  I  returned  I  mustered  up  courage  to  make  ^£^^* 
known,  in  the  most  awkward  manner  imaginable. 


30  PEKSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

CHAP.m  admitted  that  she  too — although  until  then  she 
had  never  looked  upon  me  other  than  as  a  visitor 
whose  company  was  agreeable  to  her — had  experi- 
enced a  depression  of  spirits  she  could  not  accoimt 
for  when  the  regiment  left.  Before  separating  it 
was  definitely  understood  that  at  a  convenient 
time  we  would  join  our  fortunes,  and  not  let  the 
removal  of  a  regiment  trouble  us.  This  was  in 
May,  1844.  It  was  the  22d  of  August,  1848,  before 
the  fulfilment  of  this  agreement.  My  duties  kept 
me  on  the  frontier  of  Louisiana  with  the  army  of 
observation  during  the  pendency  of  annexation; 
and  afterward  I  was  absent  through  the  war  with 

s«e^p^38,  Mexico — provoked  by  the  action  of  the  army,  if  not 
by  the  annexation  itself.  During  that  time  there 
was  a  constant  correspondence  between  Miss  Dent 
and  myself,  but  we  only  met  once  in  the  period  of 
four  years  and  three  months.  In  May,  1845, 1  pro- 
cured a  leave  for  twenty  days,  visited  St.  Louis, 
and  obtained  the  consent  of  the  parents  to  the 
union,  which  had  not  been  asked  for  before. 
As  already  stated,  it  was  never  my  intention  to 

«OT?^S?    remain  in  the  army  long,  but  to  prepare  myseH 

feeeorahip  f^j.  q^  profcssorship  in  some  college.  Accordingly, 
soon  after  I  was  settled  at  Jefferson  Ban^acks,  I 
wrote  a  letter  to  Professor  Church — professor  of 
mathematics  at  West  Point — requesting  him  to 
ask  my  designation  as  his  assistant,  when  next  a 
detail  had  to  be  made.  Assistant  professors  at 
West  Point  are  all  officers  of  the  army,  supposed 
to  be  selected  for  their  special  fitness  for  the  par- 


ARMY  LIFE  31 

tailed  a  year  or  two  later  but  for  the  Mexican  war  chap,  m 
coming  on.  Accordingly  I  laid  out  for  myself  a 
course  of  studies  to  be  pursued  in  garrison,  with 
regularity,  if  not  persistency.  I  reviewed  my  West 
Point  course  of  mathematics  during  the  seven 
months  at  Jefferson  Barracks,  and  read  many  val- 
uable historical  works,  besides  an  occasional  novel. 
To  help  my  memory  I  kept  a  book  in  which  I  would 
write  up,  from  time  to  time,  my  recollections  of  all 
I  had  read  since  last  posting  it.  When  the  regi- 
ment was  ordered  away,  I  being  absent  at  the  time, 
my  effects  were  packed  up  by  Lieutenant  Haslett, 
of  the  Fourth  Infantry,  and  taken  along.  I  never 
saw  my  journal  after,  nor  did  I  ever  keep  another, 
except  for  a  portion  of  the  time  while  traveling 
abroad.  Often  since  a  fear  has  crossed  my  mind 
lest  that  book  might  turn  up  yet,  and  fall  into  the 
hands  of  some  malicious  person  who  would  publish 
it.  I  know  its  appearance  would  cause  me  as  much 
heartburning  as  my  youthful  horse-trade,  or  the 
later  rebuke  for  wearing  uniform  clothes. 

The  Third  Infantiy  had  selected  camping-grounds  ^^^  J®«»«ip 
on  the  reservation  at  Fort  Jessup,  about  midway 
between  the  Red  Eiver  and  the  Sabine.  Our  orders 
required  us  to  go  into  camp  in  the  same  neighbor- 
hood, and  await  further  instructions.  Those  au- 
thorized to  do  so  selected  a  place  in  the  pine-woods 
between  the  old  town  of  Natchitoches  and  Grand 
Ecore,  about  three  miles  from  each,  and  on  high 
ground  back  from  the  river.  The  place  was  given 
the  name  of  Camn  Salubritv.  and  nroved  entitled  ^*^1^^- 


32  ,  PEBSONAL  BIEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

CHAP,  m    pure  water,  and  the  ridge  was  above  the  flight  of 
mosquitos,  which  abound  in  that  region  in  great 
multitudes  and  of  great  voracity.    In  the  valley 
they  swarmed  in  myriads,  but  never  came  to  the 
summit  of  the  ridge.    The  regiment  occupied  this 
camp  six  months  before  the  first  death  occurred, 
and  that  was  caused  by  an  accident. 
"GSn.T2y.       There  was  no  intimation  given  that  the  removal 
lor."  p.  84    ^f  tij^  Third  and  Fourth  regiments  of  infantry  to 
the  western  border  of  Louisiana  was  occasioned  in 
any  way  by  the  prospective  annexation  of  Texas, 
but  it  was  generally  imderstood  that  such  was  the 
case.    Ostensibly  we  were  intended  to  prevent  fili- 
bustering into  Texas,  but  really  as  a  menace  to 
Mexico  in  case  she  appeared  to  contemplate  war. 
generally  the  officers  of  the  army  were  indifferent 
whether  the  annexation  was  consummated  or  not ; 
fSS^Ii  ^^*  ^^*  ®^  ^^^  ^^  them.    For  myself,  I  was  bitterly 
«SJ^^^®  opposed  to  the  measure,  and  to  this  day  regard  the 
^^       war  which  resulted  as  one  of  the  most  unjust  ever 
waged  by  a  stronger  against  a  weaker  nation.    It 
was  an  instance  of  a  republic  following  the  bad 
example  of  European  monarchies,  in  not  consider- 
ing justice  in  their  desire  to  acquire  additional 
territoryA 

Texas  was  originally  a  State  belonging  to  the 
republic  of  Mexico.  It  extended  from  the  Sabine 
Eiver  on  the  east  to  the  Rio  Grande  on  the  west, 
and  from  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  on  the  south  and  east 
to  the  territory  of  the  United  States  and  New  Mex- 
ico— another  Mexican  State  at  that  time — on  the 
north  and  west.  An  empire  in  territory,  it  had 
hS?t2™*i,  ^^*  ^  ^^^  sparse  population  until  settled  by  Amer- 
**        icans  who  had  received  authority  from  Mexico  to 


/7  ^  ^^^^i^^Py^ 


GENERAL    GKANT  S    SlONATl  KH    IN    AN    Al HK.UM'H    ALUIM 
SIGNED  BY  WEST  K>INT  MEN.      (nKVKK  HKK»kK  ITHl.lSHEO. ) 


CAUSES  OF  THE  MEXICAN  WAB 


33 


colonize.  These  colonists  paid  very  little  attention 
to  the  supreme  government,  and  introduced  slavery 
into  the  State  almost  from  the  start,  though  the 
constitution  of  Mexico  did  not,  nor  does  it  now, 
sanction  that  institution.  Soon  they  set  up  an 
independent  government  of  their  own,  and  war 
existed  between  Texas  and  Mexico  in  name  from 
that  time  until  1836,  when  active  hostilities  very 
nearly  ceased  upon  the  capture  of  Santa  Anna, 
fhe  Mexican  President.  Before  long,  however,  the 
same  people  who  with  permission  of  Mexico  had 
colonized  Texas,  and  afterward  set  up  slavery- 
there,  and  then  seceded  as  soon  as  they  felt  strong 
enough  to  do  so,  offered  themselves  and  the  State 
to  the  United  States,  and  in  1845  their  offer  was 
accepted.  The  occupation,  separation,  and  annex- 
ation were,  from  the  inception  of  the  movement  to 
its  final  consummation,  a  conspiracy  to  acquire  ter- 
ritory out  of  which  slave  States  might  be  formed 
for  the  American  Union. 

Even  if  the  annexation  itself  could  be  justified, 
the  manner  in  which  the  subsequent  war  was  forced 
upon  Mexico  cannot.  The  fact  is,  annexationists 
wanted  more  territory  than  they  could  possibly 
lay  any  claim  to,  as  part  of  the  new  acquisition. 
Texas,  as  an  independent  State,  never  had  exer- 
cised jurisdiction  over  the  territory  between  the 
Nueces  Eiver  and  the  Rio  Grande.  Mexico  had 
never  recognized  the  independence  of  Texas,  and 
maintained  that,  even  if  independent,  the  State 


Chap.III 


Hist  Tex. 
11,147 


Banoroffc, 

HlstPao. 

Btate8,yiEU 

888 

Howard, 
"GeiLTaj- 
lor,"  p.  80 


Benton, 

Thirty 

Years' 

Vlew,II, 

oh.  czllx 


har^      trky^      ^1  r 


,i.U     ^fi   *X.^    XT^ -»-     ^- 


34  PERSONAL  MEMOIBS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

CHAP,  m    but  he  was  a  prisoner  of  war  when  the  treaty  was 
made,  and  his  life  was  in  jeopardy.    He  knew,  too, 
that  he  deserved  execution  at  the  hands  of  the 
Texans,  if  they  should  ever  capture  him.     The 
^gjj^    Texans,  if  they  had  taken  his  life,  would  have  only 
'w^Ban?'  followed  the  example  set  by  Santa  Anna  himseU 
SSj^StS^  a  few  weeks  before,  when  he  executed  the  entire 
garrison  of  the  Alamo  and  the  villagers  of  Goliad. 
In  taking  military  possession  of  Texas  after  an- 
nexation, the  army  of  occupation,  under  General 
Taylor,  was  directed  to  occupy  the  disputed  terri- 
-Gen^^y.  ^^'    ^hc  army  did  not  stop  at  the  Nueces  and 
lop/'^p.w,  ^flf^j.  tQ  negotiate  for  a  settlement  of  the  boundary 
question,  but  went  beyond,  apparently  in  order  to 
force  Mexico  to  initiate  war.    It  is  to  the  credit  of 
the  American  nation,  however,  that  after  conquer- 
ing Mexico,  and  while  practically  holding  the  coun- 
try in  our  possession,  so  that  we  could  have  re- 
tained the  whole  of  it,  or  made  any  terms  we  chose, 
we  paid  a  round  sum  for  the  additional  territory 
taken — more  than  it  was  worth,  or  was  likely  to 
be,  to  Mexico.    To  us  it  was  an  empire,  and  of  in- 
calculable value ;  but  it  might  have  been  obtained 
by  other   means,  ^he    Southern   rebellion   was 
largely  the  outgrowm  of  the  Mexican  war.    Na- 
tions, like  individuals,  are  punished  for  their  trans- 
gressions.   We  got  our  punishment  in  the  most 
sanguinary  and  expensive  war  of  modern  time^ 
^SiS^S^^       The  Fourth  Infantry  went  into  camp  at  ^lu- 
brity  in  the  month  of  May,  1844,  with  instructions, 
as  I  have  said,  to  await  further  orders.    At  first 
oflicers  and  men  occupied  ordinary  tents.    As  the 


CAMP   SALUBKITY  35 

was  whijed  away  in  social  enjoyments  among  the  chap,  in 
oflBcers,  in  visiting  those  stationed  at  and  near 
Fort  Jessup,  twenty-five  miles  away,  visiting  the 
planters  on  the  Eed  Eiver,  and  the  citizens  of 
Natchitoches  and  Grand  Ecore.  There  was  mnch 
pleasant  intercourse  between  the  inhabitants  and 
the  oflicers  of  the  army.  I  retain  very  agreeable 
recollections  of  my  stay  at  Camp  Salubrity,  and  of 
the  acquaintances  made  there ;  and  no  doubt  my 
feeling  is  shared  by  the  few  officers  living  who 
were  there  at  the  time.  I  can  call  to  mind  only 
two  officers  of  the  Fourth  Infantry,  besides  myself, 
who  were  at  Camp  Salubrity  with  the  regiment, 
who  are  now  alive. 

With  a  war  in  prospect,  and  belonging  to  a  regi- 
ment that  had  an  unusual  number  of  officers  de- 
tailed on  special  duty  away  from  the  regiment,  my 
hopes  of  being  ordered  to  West  Point  as  instructor 
vanished.    At  the  time  of  which  I  now  write,  offi-       ^^ 
cers  in  the  quartermaster's,  commissary's,  and  ad- 
jutant-general's departments  were  appointed  from 
the  line  of  the  army,  and  did  not  vacate  their  regi- 
mental commissions  until  their  regimental  and  staff 
commissions  were  for  the  same  grades.    Generally 
lieutenants  were  appointed  to  captaincies  to  fill 
vacancies  in  the  staff-corps.    If  they  should  reach 
a  captaincy  in  the  line  before  they  arrived  at  a 
majority  in  the  staff,  they  would  elect  which  com- 
mission they  would  retain.    In  the  Fourth  Inf  au- 
try,  in  1844,  at  least  six  line-officers  were  on  duty 
in  the  staff,  and  therefore  permanently  detached 
from  the  regiment.    Under  these  circtuxistances  X 


36 


PERSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 


CHAF.m 


Restoration 
toheftlth 


Winter 

anarteiSy 

184i-A6 


Benton, 

Thirty 

Years' 

View,  n, 

olLOzlviii 


and  not  very  much  for  that,  until  the  war  was 
over.  I  kept  a  horse  and  rode,  and  stayed  out  of 
doors  most  of  the  time  by  day,  and  entirely  recov- 
ered from  the  cough  which  I  had  carried  from  West 
Point,  and  from  all  indications  of  consumption.  I 
have  often  thought  that  my  life  was  saved  and  my 
health  restored  by  exercise  and  exposure  enforced 
by  an  administrative  act  and  a  war,  both  of  which 
I  disapproved. 

As  summe/wore  away,  and  cool  days  and  colder 
nights  came  upon  us,  the  tents  we  were  occupying 
ceased  to  afford  comfortable  quarters ;  and  "  further 
orders  ^  not  reaching  us,  we  began  to  look  about  to 
remedy  the  hardship.  Men  were  put  to  work  get- 
ting out  timber  to  build  huts,  and  in  a  very  short 
time  all  were  comfortably  housed — privates  as 
well  as  officers.  The  outlay  by  the  Government  in 
accomplishing  this  was  nothing,  or  nearly  nothing. 
The  winter  was  spent  more  agreeably  than  the 
summer  had  been.  There  were  occasional  parties 
given  by  the  planters  along  the  "coast" — as  the 
bottom-lands  on  the  Red  Eiver  were  called.  The 
climate  was  delightful. 

Near  the  close  of  the  short  session  of  Congress 
of  1811-45,  the  bill  for  the  annexation  of  Texas  to 
the  United  States  was  passed.  It  reached  Presi- 
dent Tyler  on  the  1st  of  March,  1845,  and  promptly 
received  his  approval.  When  the  news  reached  us 
we  began  to  look  again  for  "  further  orders.''  They 
did  not  arrive  promptly,  and  on  the  1st  of  May 


NEW  OELEANS  37 

Early  in  July  the  long-expected  orders  were  re-    chap.hi 
.ceived,  but  they  only  took  the  regiment  to  New  ^^^^Y^ 
Orleans  Barracks.    We  reached  there  before  the      ^®*^ 
middle  of  the  month,  and  again  waited  weeks  for 
still  further  orders.    The  yellow  fever  was  raging 
in  New  Orleans  during  the  time  we  remained  there, 
and  the  streets  of  the  city  had  the  appearance  of  a 
continuous  well-observed  Sunday.    I  recollect  but 
one  occasion  when  this  observance  seemed  to  be 
broken  by  the  inhabitants.     One  morning  about 
daylight  I  happened  to  be  awake,  and,  hearing  the 
discharge  of  a  rifle  not  far  off,  I  looked  out  to  as- 
certain where  the  sound  came  from.    I  observed 
a  couple  of  clusters  of  men  near  by,  and  learned 
afterward  that  "it  was  nothing — only  a  couple  of 
gentlemen  deciding  a  difference  of  opinion  with 
rifles,  at  twenty  paces.''     I  do  not  remember  if 
either  was  killed,  or  even  hurt,  but  no  doubt  the 
question  of  difference  was  settled  satisfactorily, 
and  "  honorably,"  in  the  estimation  of  the  parties 
engaged.    I  do  not  beUeve  I  ever  would  have  the    ^^^^ 
courage  to  fight  a  duel.    If  any  man  should  wrong 
me  to  the  extent  of  my  being  willing  to  kill  him  I 
would  not  be  willing  to  give  him  the  choice  of 
weapons  with  which  it  should  be  done,  and  of  the 
time,  place,  and  distance  separating  us,  when  I  ex- 
ecuted him.    If  I  should  do  another  such  a  wrong 
as  to  justify  him  in  killing  me  I  would  make  any 
reasonable  atonement  within  my  i)ower,  if  con- 
vinced of  the  wrong  done.     I  place  my  opposition 
to  dueling  on  higher  groimds  than  any  here  stated 
No  doubt  a  maioritv  of  the  Huela  fousrht  have  been 


38  PERSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

CHAP,  ra  At  Camp  Salubrity,  and  when  we  went  to  New 
Orleans  Barracks,  the  Fourth  Infantry  was  oom- 

MpA^fS    naanded  by  Colonel  Vose,  then  an  old  gentleman, 

^*jm1*^  'vvho  had  not  commanded  on  drill  for  a  number  of 
^^  years.  He  was  not  a  man  to  discover  infirmity  in 
the  presence  of  danger.  It  now  appeared  that  war 
was  imminent,  and  he  felt  that  it  was  his  duty  to 
brush  up  his  tactics.  Accordingly,  when  we  got 
settled  down  at  our  new  post,  he  took  command  of 
the  regiment  at  a  battalion  drill.  Only  two  or  three 
evolutions  had  been  gone  through  when  he  dis- 
missed the  battalion,  and,  turning  to  go  to  his  own 

July  15, 1845  quarters,  dropped  dead.  He  had  not  been  com- 
plaining of  ill  health,  but  no  doubt  died  of  heart- 
disease.  He  was  a  most  estimable  man,  of  exem- 
plary habits,  and  by  no  means  the  author  of  his 
own  disease. 


CHAPTER  IV 

CORPUS       CHBISTI — MEXICAN       SMUGGLING — SPANISH 
RULE  IN   MEXICO — SUPPLYING  TRANSPORTATION 

EARLY  in  September  the  regiment  left  New  Or-    chap,  iv 
leans  for  Corpus  Christi,  now  in  Texas.    Ocean       ^^ 
steamers  were  not  then  common,  and  the  passage  «^^. 
was  made  in  sailing-vessels.   At  that  time  there  was    ^®''"  ^  ^ 
not  more  than  three  feet  of  water  in  the  channel  at 
the  outlet  of  Corpus  Christi  Bay ;  the  debarkation, 
therefore,  had  to  take  place  by  small  steamers,  and 
at  an  island  in  the  channel  called  Shell  Island, 
the  ships  anchoring  some  miles  out  from  shore. 
This  made  the  work  slow ;  and  as  the  army  was 
only  supplied  with  one  or  two  steamers,  it  took  a 
number  of  days  to  effect  the  landing  of  a  single 
regiment,  with  its  stores,  camp  and  garrison  equi- 
page, etc.    There  happened  to  be  pleasant  weather 
while  this  was  going  on,  but  the  land-swell  was 
so  great  that  when  the  ship  and  steamer  were  on 
opposite  sides  of  the  same  wave  they  would  be  a 
considerable  distance  apart.     The  men  and  bag- 
gage were  let  down  to  a  point  higher  than  the 
lower  deck  of  the  steamer,  and  when  ship  and 
steamer  got  into  the  trough  between  the  waves, 
and  were  close  tocrether,  th^  load  would  be  drawn 


40  PEBSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GBAKT 

Chap.  IT  After  I  had  gone  ashore,  and  had  been  on  guard 
several  days  at  Shell  Island — quite  six  miles  from 
the  ship — I  had  occasion,  for  some  reason  or  other, 

Mutiny  to  return  on  board.  While  on  the  Suviah — I  think 
that  was  the  name  of  our  vessel — I  heard  a  tre- 
mendous racket  at  the  other  end  of  the  ship,  and 
much  and  excited  sailor  language,  such  as  "  Damn 
your  eyes,''  etc.  In  a  moment  or  two  the  captain — 
who  was  an  excitable  little  man,  dying  with  con- 
sumption, and  not  weighing  much  over  a  hundred 
pounds — came  running  out,  carrying  a  saber  nearly 
as  large  and  as  heavy  as  he  was,  and  crying  that 
his  men  had  mutinied.  CU  was  necessary  to  sustain 
the  captain  without  question,  and  in  a  few  minutes 
all  the  sailors  charged  with  mutiny  were  in  irons. 
I  rather  felt  for  a  time  a  wish  that  I  had  not  gone 
aboard  just  then.  As  the  men  charged  with  mutiny 
submitted  to  being  placed  in  irons  without  resis- 
tance, I  always  doubted  if  they  knew  that  they  had 
mutinied  until  they  were  tolcL^ 

By  the  time  I  was  ready  to  leave  the  ship  again 
I  thought  I  had  learned  enough  of  the  working  of 
the  double  and  single  pulley  by  which  passengers 
were  let  down  from  the  upper  deck  of  the  ship  to 
the  steamer  below,  and  determined  to  let  myself 
down  without  assistance.  Without  saying  any- 
thing of  my  intentions  to  any  one,  I  mounted  the 
railing,  and  taking  hold  of  the  center-rope  just 
below  the  upper  block,  I  put  one  foot  on  the  hook 
below  the  lower  block  and  stepped  off.  Just  as  I 
did  so  some  one  called  out,  "  Hold  on ! ''  It  was  too 
late.    I  tried  to  "  hold  on  ^  with  all  my  might,  but 


An    fnvnlnn.       -m^-^    l^^^lm     -m-yx-w^-^-     ••-.•^        ^-^y]     ••^•r*-   l«yx<>y3    'rwy^-^4-     A^'wrr-^ 


tr\    v.rk'vv 


CORPUS  CHRISTI  41 

most  into  the  water,  some  twenty-five  feet  below,  chap,  iv 
with  such  velocity  that  it  seemed  to  me  I  never 
would  stop.  When  I  came  to  the  surface  again, 
being  a  fair  swimmer,  and  not  having  lost  my  pres- 
ence of  mind,  I  swam  around  until  a  bucket  was 
let  down  for  me,  and  I  was  drawn  up  without  a 
scratch  or  injury.  I  do  not  believe  there  was  a 
man  on  board  who  sympathized  with  me  in  the 
least  when  they  found  me  uninjured.  I  rather  en- 
joyed the  joke  myself.  The  captain  of  the  Suviah 
died  of  his  disease  a  few  months  later,  and,  I  believe, 
before  the  mutineers  were  tried.  <^  hope  they  got 
clear,  because,  as  before  stated,  I  always  thought 
the  mutiny  was  all  in  the  brain  of  a  very  weak  and 
sick  man^> 

After  reaching  shore,  or  Shell  Island,  the  labor 
of  getting  to  Corpus  Christi  was  slow  and  tedious. 
There  was,  if  my  memory  serves  me,  but  one  small 
steamer  to  transport  troops  and  baggage  when  the 
Fourth  Infantry  arrived.  Others  were  procured 
later.  The  distance  from  Shell  Island  to  Corpus 
Christi  was  some  sixteen  or  eighteen  miles.  The  ^^SS^ 
channel  to  the  bay  was  so  shallow  that  the  steamer, 
small  as  it  was,  had  to  be  dragged  over  the  bottom 
when  loaded.  Not  more  than  one  trip  a  day  could 
be  effected.  Later  this  was  remedied  by  deepening 
the  channel  and  increasing  the  number  of  vessels 
suitable  to  its  navigation. 

Corpus  Christi  is  near  the  head  of  the  bay  of  tlx^     ^g^ 
same  name,  formed  by  the  entrance  of  the  Nuec^^ 
Eiver  into  tide-water,  and  iq  on  the  west  bank  ^t. 
that  bay.    At  the  time  of  ^tB  first  occupancy  1:>>^ 


42 


PEBSOKAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 


Cigarette- 
Rmokiiig 


Chap.  IV  hundred  souls.  There  was,  in  addition,  a  small 
American  trading-post,  at  which  goods  were  sold 
to  Mexican  smugglers.  All  goods  were  put  up  in 
compact  packages  of  about  one  hundred  pounds 
each,  suitable  for  loading  on  pack-mules.  Two  of 
these  packages  made  a  load  for  an  ordinary  Mex- 
ican mule,  and  three  for  the  larger  ones.  The  bulk 
of  the  trade  was  in  leaf-tobacco  and  domestic  cot- 
ton cloths  and  calicoes.  The  Mexicans  had,  before 
the  arrival  of  the  army,  but  little  to  offer  in  ex- 
change except  silver.  The  trade  in  tobacco  was 
enormous,  considering  the  population  to  be  sup- 
plied. Almost  every  Mexican  above  the  age  of  ten 
years,  and  many  much  younger,  smoked  the  cigar- 
ette. Nearly  every  Mexican  carried  a  pouch  of 
leaf -tobacco,  powdered  by  rolling  in  the  hands,  and 
a  roll  of  corn-husks  to  make  wrappers.  The  cigar- 
ettes were  made  by  the  smokers  as  they  used  them. 
Up  to  the  time  of  which  I  write,  and  for  years 
afterward, — I  think  until  the  administration  of 
President  Juarez, — the  cultivation,  manufacture, 
and  sale  of  tobacco  constituted  a  government  mo- 
nopoly, and  paid  the  bulk  of  the  revenue  collected 
from  internal  sources.  The  price  was  enormously 
high,  and  made  successful  smuggling  very  profit- 
able. The  difficulty  of  obtaining  tobacco  is  prob- 
ably the  reason  why  everybody,  male  and  female, 
used  it  at  that  time.  I  know  from  my  own  experi- 
ence that,  when  I  was  at  West  Point,  the  fact  that 
tobacco  in  every  form  was  prohibited,  and  the  mere 


A  goyero- 
ment  mo- 
nopoly 


SPANISH  BULE  IN   MEXICO  43 

jority  accomplished  the  object  of  their  youthful    cshap.iv 
ambition. 

Under  Spanish  rule  Mexico  was  prohibited  from  mS^iSx- 
producing  anything  that  the  mother-country  could  ^ 
supply.  This  rule  excluded  the  cultivation  of  the 
grape,  olive,  and  many  other  articles  to  which  the 
soil  and  climate  were  well  adapted.  The  country 
was  governed  for  "revenue  only^;  and  tobacco, 
which  cannot  be  raised  in  Spain,  but  is  indigenous 
to  Mexico,  offered  a  fine  instrumentality  for  secur- 
ing this  prime  object  of  government.  The  native 
population  had  been  in  the  habit  of  using  "the 
weed"  from  a  period  back  of  any  recorded  history 
of  this  continent,  /fead  habits,  if  not  restrained 
by  law  or  public  opinion,  spread  more  rapidly 
and  universally  than  good  ones,  and  the  Spanish 
colonists  adopted  the  use  of  tobacco  almost  as  gen- 
erally as  the  natives\  Spain,  therefore,  in  order  to 
secure  the  largest  revenue  from  this  source,  pro- 
hibited the  cultivation,  except  in  specified  localities, 
and  in  these  places  farmed  out  the  privilege  at  a 
very  high  price.  The  tobacco,  when  raised,  could 
only  be  sold  to  the  government,  and  the  price  to 
the  consumer  was  limited  only  by  the  avarice  of  the 
authorities  and  the  capacity  of  the  people  to  pay. 

All  laws  for  the  government  of  the  country  were 
enacted  in  Spain,  and  the  officers  for  their  execu- 
tion were  appointed  by  the  crown  and  sent  out  to 
the  New  El  Dorado.  The  Mexicans  had  been 
brought  up  ignorant  of  how  to  legislate  or  how  to 
rule.    When  thev  crained  their  indepenclftnce,  aftc^r 


44 


PEBSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GBANT 


Chap.  IV 


Howard, 
•*  Gen.  Tay- 
lor," pp.  87- 


h.  Nov.  24, 
1784:  IstlA 
7th  Inf.  May 
8,1806;CoI. 
8th  Inf.  Apr. 
4, 1832;  Bvt 

Brlg.-Gen. 
1)60.26,1887; 

M%).-Oen. 
Jmie29,l846 


Bancroft, 

Hist.  Pac. 

States, 

Vin,847 


that  Mexico  became  her  own  executor  of  the  laws 
and  the  recipient  of  the  revenues.  The  tobacco 
tax,  yielding  so  large  a  revenue  under  the  law  as 
it  stood,  was  one  of  the  last,  if  not  the  very  last, 
of  the  obnoxious  imposts  to  be  repealed.  Now  the 
citizens  are  allowed  to  cultivate  any  crops  the  soil 
will  yield.  Tobacco  is  cheap,  and  every  quality 
can  be  produced.  Its  use  is  by  no  means  so  gen- 
eral as  when  I  first  visited  the  country. 

Gradually  the  "  army  of  occupation  ^  assembled 
at  Corpus  Christi.  When  it  was  all  together  it 
consisted  of  seven  companies  of  the  second  regi- 
ment of  dragoons,  four  companies  of  light  artillery, 
five  regiments  of  infantry, — the  third,  fourth,  fifth, 
seventh,  and  eighth, — and  one  regiment  of  artillery 
acting  as  infantry — not  more  than  three  thou- 
sand men  in  alL  General  Zachary  Taylor  com- 
manded the  whole.  There  were  troops  enough  in 
one  body  to  establish  a  drill  and  discipline  suffi- 
cient to  fit  men  and  officers  for  all  they  were  capa- 
ble of  in  case  of  battle.  The  rank  and  file  were 
composed  of  men  who  had  enlisted  in  time  of 
peace  to  serve  for  seven  dollars  a  month,  and  were 
necessarily  inferior  as  material  to  the  average  vol- 
unteers enlisted  later  in  the  war  expressly  to  fight, 
and  also  to  the  volunteers  in  the  war  for  the  pres- 
ervation of  the  Union.  The  men  engaged  in  the 
Mexican  wax*  were  brave,  and  the  officers  of  the 
regular  army,  from  highest  to  lowest,  were  edu- 
cated in  their  profession.  A  more  efficient  army 
for  its  number  and  armament  I  do  not  believe  ever 
fought  a  battle  than  the  one  commanded  by  General 


PROVOKING  THE  WAR  45 

The  presence  of  United  States  troops  on  the  edge    chaf.  iv 
of  the  disputed  territory  farthest  from  the  Mexican  ^^I^^SS^*^ 
settlements  was  not  sufficient  to  provoke  hostili-  ^L%i^ 
ties.    We  were  sent  to  provoke  a  fight,  but  it  was  nih  cS^., 
essential  that  Mexico  should  commence  it.    It  was     ^^'^' 
very  doubtful  whether   Congress   would   declare 
war;  but  if  Mexico  should  attack  our  troops,  the 
executive  could  announce,  "Whereas,  war  exists 
by  the  acts  of,''  etc.,  and  prosecute  the  contest  with 
vigor.     Once  initiated,  there  were  but  few  public  ^^fSj^' 
men  who  would  have  the  courage  to  oppose  it.   Ex-    ^^^, 
perience  proves  that  the  man  who  obstructs  a  war    speeS  of 
in  which  his  nation  is  engaged,  no  matter  whether  cong-Qiobe, 
right  or  wrong,  occupies  no  enviable  place  in  life  or  ^^^ppj- 
history.    Better  for  him,  individually,  to  advocate 
"war,  pestilence,  and  famine,"  than  to  act  as  an  ob- 
structionist to  a  war  already  begun.    The  history 
of  the  defeated  rebel  will  be  honorable  hereafter 
compared  with  that  of  the  Northern  man  who  aided 
him  by  conspiring  against  his  Government  while 
protected  by  it.    The  most  favorable  posthumous 
history  the  stay-at-home  traitor  can  hope  for  is — 
oblivion. 

Mexico  showing  no  willingness  to  come  to  the 
Nueces  to  drive  the  invaders  from  her  soil,  it  be- 
came necessary  for  the  "  invaders  "  to  approach  to 
within  a  convenient  distance  to  be  struck.    Ac- 
cordingly, preparations  were  begun  for  moving  the 
army  to  the  Rio  Grande,  to  a  point  near  Mata- 
moras.    It  was  desirable  to  occupy  a  position  near 
the  largest  center  of  population  possible  to  reae\x 
without  absolutely  invading  territory  to  which  ^w^^ 

RAf  nrfc  nrfc  />1oitvi  -rtVi o f^TTAr 


46  PERSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GBANT 

CHAP.  IV  is  about  one  hundred  and  fifty  miles.  The  country- 
does  not  abound  in  fresh  water,  and  the  length  of 
the  marches  had  to  be  regulated  by  the  distance 
between  water-supplies.  Besides  the  streams,  there 
were  occasional  pools,  filled  during  the  rainy  sea- 
son, some  probably  made  by  the  traders,  who  trav- 
eled constantly  between  Corpus  Christi  and  the  Rio 
Grande,  and  some  by  the  buffalo.  There  waS  not 
at  that  time  a  single  habitation,  cultivated  field,  or 
herd  of  domestic  animals  between  Corpus  Christi 
^jS^^Jjg^  and  Matamoras.  It  was  necessary,  therefore,  to 
^^^  have  a  wagon-train  sufficiently  large  to  transport 
the  camp  and  garrison  equipage,  officers'  baggage, 
rations  for  the  army,  and  part  rations  of  grain  for 
the  artillery  horses  and  all  the  animals  taken  from 
the  North,  where  they  had  been  accustomed  to  hav- 
ing their  forage  furnished  them.  The  army  was 
but  indifferently  supplied  with  transportation. 
Wagons  and  harness  could  easily  be  supplied  from 
the  North ;  but  mules  and  horses  could  not  so  read- 
ily be  brought.  The  American  traders  and  Mexi- 
can smugglers  came  to  the  relief.  Contracts  were 
made  for  mules  at  from  eight  to  eleven  dollars 
each.    The  smugglers  furnished  the  animals,  and 

Page  42  took  their  pay  in  goods  of  the  description  before 
mentioned.  I  doubt  whether  the  Mexicans  received 
in  value  from  the  traders  five  dollars  per  head  for 
the  animals  they  furnished,  and  still  more,  whether 
they  paid  anything  but  their  own  time  in  procuring 
them.  Such  is  trade ;  such  is  war.  The  Govern- 
ment paid  in  hard  cash  to  the  contractor  the  stipu- 
lated price. 

wild  honuM  Ty^L Xl-  ^    T^5-     /N J- J     J-l-  _     -KT J.^ 


PREPAMNG  FOB  MOVEMENT  47 

ing;  as  numerous,  probably,  as  the  band  of  buffalo  chaf.  iv 
roaming  farther  north  was  before  its  rapid  exter- 
mination commenced.  The  Mexicans  used  to  cap- 
ture these  in  large  numbers  and  bring  them  into 
the  American  settlements  and  sell  them.  A  picked 
animal  could  be  purchased  at  from  eight  to  twelve 
dollars,  but  taken  at  wholesale  they  could  be 
bought  for  thirty-six  dollars  a  dozen.  Some  of 
these  were  purchased  for  the  army,  and  answered 
a  most  useful  purpose.  The  horses  were  generally 
very  strong,  formed  much  like  the  Norman  horse, 
and  with  very  heavy  manes  and  tails.  A  number 
of  officers  supplied  themselves  with  these,  and  they 
generally  rendered  as  useful  service  as  the  North- 
em  animal ;  in  fact,  they  were  much  better  when 
gi-azing  was  the  only  means  of  supplying  forage. 

There  was  no  need  for  haste,  and  some  months 
were  consumed  in  the*  necessary  preparations  for  a 
move.    In  the  mean  time  the  army  was  engaged 
in  all  the  duties  pertaining  to  the  officer  and  the 
soldier.    Twice,  that  I  remember,  small  trains  were 
sent  from  Corpus  Christi,  with  cavalry  escorts,  to 
San  Antonio  and  Austin,  with  paymasters  and 
funds  to  pay  off  small  detachments  of  troops  sta- 
tioned at  those  places.    General  Taylor  encouraged  ^"^^^ 
officers  to  accompany  these  expeditions.    I  accom- 
panied one  of  them  in  December,  1845.    The  dis- 
tance from  Corpus  Christi  to  San  Antonio  was  then 
computed  at  one  hundred  and  fifty  miles.    Now 
that  roads  exist,  it  is  probably  less.    From  San  An- 
tonio to  Austin  we  computed  the  distance  at  one 
hundred  and  ten  miles,  and  from  the  latter  place 


48  PERSONAL  MEMOmS  OP  U.  S.  GRANT 

CHAP.  IV    Austin  is  but  little  over  eighty  miles,  so  that  our 

computation  was  probably  too  high. 
msLrSi  There  was  not  at  the  time  an  individual  living 
11,60,61  between  Corpus  Christi  and  San  Antonio  until 
within  about  thirty  miles  of  the  latter  point,  where 
there  were  a  few  scattered  Mexican  settlements 
along  the  San  Antonio  River,  The  people  in  at 
least  one  of  these  hamlets  lived  underground  for  pro- 
tection against  the  Indians.  The  country  abounded 
in  game,  such  as  deer  and  antelope,  with  abun- 
dance of  wild  turkeys  along  the  streams  and  where 
there  were  nut-bearing  woods.  On  the  Nueces, 
about  twenty-five  miles  up  from  Corpus  Christi, 
were  a  few  log  cabins,  the  remains  of  a  town  called 
San  Patricio;  but  the  inhabitants  had  all  been 
massacred  by  the  Indians,  or  driven  away. 

San  Antonio  was  about  equally  divided  in  popu- 
lation between  Americans  and  Mexicans.  From 
there  to  Austin  there  was  not  a  single  residence 
except  at  New  Braunf els,  on  the  Guadalupe  Eiver. 
.  At  that  point  was  a  settlement  of  Germans  who 
M«  had  only  that  year  come  into  the  State.  At  all 
events,  they  were  living  in  small  huts,  about  such 
as  soldiers  would  hastily  construct  for  temporary 
occupation.  From  Austm  to  Corpus  Christi  there 
was  only  a  small  settlement  at  Bastrop,  with  a  few 
farms  along  the  Colorado  River ;  but  after  leaving 
that  there  were  no  settlements  except  the  home  of 
one  man,  with  one  female  slave,  at  the  old  town  of 
Goliad.  Some  of  the  houses  were  still  standing. 
Goliad  had  been  quite  a  village  for  the  period  and 
Mar.  27, 1886  re^on,  but  some  years  before  there  had  been  a 


MEXICAN  MASSACRES  49 

sacre  of  the  prisoners  in  the  Alamo,  San  Antonio,    chap,  iv 
about  the  same  time, — more  than  three  hundred  Mar.Msac 
men  in  all, — furnished  the  strongest  justification    j£^™' 
the  Texans  had  for  carrying  on  the  war  with  so     ii»^*-«i 
much  cruelty.    In  fact,  from  that  time  until  the 
Mexican  war  the  hostilities  between  Texans  and 
Mexicans  were  so  great  that  neither  was  safe  in  the 
neighborhood  of  the  other  who  might  be  in  superior 
numbers  or  possessed  of  superior  arms.    The  man 
we  found  living  there  seemed  like  an  old  friend; 
he  had  come  from  near  Fort  Jessup,  Louisiana, 
where  the  officers  of  the  Third  and  Fourth  Infan- 
try and  the  Second  Dragoons  had  known  him  and 
his  family.    He  had  emigrated  in  advance  of  his 
family  to  build  up  a  home  for  them. 


CHAPTER  V 

TBIP  TO  AUSTIN — PBOMOTION  TO  FULL  SECOND  LIEU- 
TENANT— ABMY  OP  OCCUPATION 

chap.v    TT7HEN  our  party  left  Corpus  Christi  it  was 
▼  ▼    qtiite  large,  including  the  cavalry  escort,  pay- 
^m^S^  master  Major  Dix,  his  clerk,  and  the  officers  who,  like 
w.p.i827-«2  myself,  were  simply  on  leave;  but  all  the  officers 
^jSmS.^'  on  leave,  except  Lieutenant  Benjamin, —  afterward 
Sept.  18, 1847  killed  in  the  valley  of  Mexico, — Lieutenant,  now 
Svppf SS^*  General,  Augur,  and  myself,  concluded  to  spend 
*i{5f;  m"^?^  their  allotted  time  at  San  !l!^ntonio  and  return  from 
Aiw%.i8e2;  there.   We  were  all  to  be  back  at  Corpus  Christi  by 
u-  8-  \j^'^'  the  end  of  the  month.    The  paymaster  was  detained 
in  Austin  so  long  that  if  we  had  waited  for  him 
we  would  have  exceeded  our  leave.    We  concluded, 
therefore,  to  start  back  at  once  with  the  animals 
we  had ;  and  having  to  rely  principally  on  grass  for 
their  food,  it  was  a  good  six-days'  journey.    We 
had  to  sleep  on  the  prairie  every  night,  except  at 
Goliad,  and  possibly  one  night  on  the  Colorado, 
without  shelter  and  with  only  such  food  as  we  car- 
ried with  us  and  prepared  ourselves.    The  journey 
was  hazardous  on  account  of  Indians,  and  there 
were  white  men  in  Texas  whom  I  would  not  have 
cared  to  meet  in  a  secluded  place.     Lieutenant 
Augur  was  taken  seriously  sick  before  we  reached 


TRIP  TO  AUSTIN  51 

add  to  the  complication,  his  horse — a  mustang  that  chap,  v 
had  probably  been  captured  from  the  band  of  wild 
horses  before  alluded  to,  and  of  undoubted  longev- 
ity at  his  capture — gave  out.  It  was  absolutely 
necessary  to  get  forward  to  Goliad  to  find  a  shelter 
for  our  sick  companion.  By  dint  of  patience  and 
exceedingly  slow  movements  Goliad  was  at  last 
reached,  and  a  shelter  and  bed  secured  for  our 
patient.  We  remained  over  a  day,  hoping  that 
Augur  might  recover  sufficiently  to  resume  his 
travels.  He  did  not,  however ;  and  knowing  that 
Major  Dix  would  be  along  in  a  few  days,  with  his 
wagon-train,  now  empty,  and  escort,  we  arranged 
with  our  Louisiana  friend  to  take  the  best  of  care 
of  the  sick  lieutenant  imtil  thus  relieved,  and 
went  on. 

I  had  never  been  a  sportsman  in  my  life;  had 
scarcely  ever  gone  in  search  of  game,  and  rarely 
seen  any  when  looking  for  it.    On  this  trip  there  -^JJ^JSJg^ 
was  no  minute  of  time,  while  traveling  between  San 
Patricio  and  the  settlements  on  the  San  Antonio 
River,  from   San  Antonio  to  Austin,  and  again 
from  the  Colorado  River  back  to  San  Patricio, 
when  deer'  or  antelope  could  not  be  seen  in  great 
numbers.     Each  officer  carried  a  shot-gun,  and 
every  evening,  after  going  into  camp,  some  would 
go  out  and  soon  return  with  venison  and  wild  tur- 
keys enough  for  the  entire  camp.  I,  however,  never 
went  out,  and  had  no  occasion  to  fire  my  gun ;  ex- 
cept, being  detained  over  a  day  at  Goliad,  Benja- 
min and  I  concluded  to  go  down  to  the  creek — 
which  was  fringed  with  timber,  much  of  it  th^ 


52  PEBSONAL  MEMOIRS  OP  U.  S.  GRANT 

CHAP.  V  heard  the  flutter  of  wings  overhead,  and  in  an  in- 
stant I  saw  two  or  three  turkeys  flying  away. 
These  were  soon  followed  by  more,  then  more,  and 
more,  until  a  flock  of  twenty  or  thirty  had  left  from 
just  over  my  head.  All  this  time  I  stood  watching 
the  turkeys  to  see  where  they  flew,  with  my  gun 
on  my  shoulder,  and  never  once  thought  of  level- 
ing it  at  the  birds.  When  I  had  time  to  reflect 
upon  the  matter,  I  came  to  the  conclusion  that  as 
A»  a^pjrto*  a  sportsman  I  was  a  failure,  and  went  back  to  the 
house.  Benjamin  remained  out,  and  got  as  many 
turkeys  as  he  wanted  to  carry  back. 

After  the  second  night  at  Goliad,  Benjamin  and 
I  staiiied  to  make  the  remainder  of  the  journey 
alone.  We  reached  Corpus  Christi  just  in  time  to 
avoid  "  absence  without  leave."  We  met  no  one — 
not  even  an  Indian — during  the  remainder  of  our 
journey,  except  at  San  Patricio.  A  new  settle- 
ment had  been  started  there  in  our  absence  of 
three  weeks,  induced,  possibly,  by  the  fact  that 
there  were  houses  already  built,  while  the  proxim- 
ity of  troops  gave  protection  against  the  Indians. 
On  the  evening  of  the  first  day  out  from  Goliad  we 
Wolves  heard  the  most  unearthly  howling  of  wolves  directly 
in  our  front.  The  prairie-grass  was  tall  and  we 
could  not  see  the  beasts,  but  the  sound  indicated 
that  they  were  near.  To  my  ear  it  appeared  that 
there  must  have  been  enough  of  them  to  devour 
our  party,  horses  and  all,  at  a  single  meal.  The 
part  of  Ohio  that  I  hailed  from  was  not  thickly 
settled,  but  wolves  had  been  driven  out  long  before 
T  Iftft      Rpn-iftTnin  wn«  from  Indiana,  still  less  Donu- 


PBOMOTION  TO  FULL  SECOND  LIEUTENANT  53 

capacity  of  a  few  to  make  believe  there  was  an  un-  chap,  v 
limited  number  of  them.  He  kept  on  toward  the 
noise  unmoved.  I  followed  in  his  trail,  lacking 
moral  courage  to  turn  back  and  join  our  sick  com- 
panion. I  have  no  doubt  that  if  Benjamin  had 
proposed  returning  to  Goliad  I  would  not  only 
have  "  seconded  the  motion,''  but  have  suggested 
that  it  was  very  hard-hearted  in  us  to  leave  Augur 
sick  there  in  the  first  place ;  but  Benjamin  did  not 
propose  turning  back.  When  he  did  speak  it  was 
to  ask,  "Grant,  how  many  wolves  do  you  think 
there  are  in  that  pack!"  Knowing  where  he  was 
from,  and  suspecting  that  he  thought  I  would  over- 
estimate the  number,  I  determined  to  show  my 
acquaintance  with  the  animal  by  putting  the  esti- 
mate below  what  possibly  could  be  correct,  and 
answered,  "  Oh,  about  twenty,"  very  indiflEerently. 
He  smiled  and  rode  on.  In  a  minute  we  were  close 
upon  them,  and  before  they  saw  us.  There  were 
just  two  of  them.  Seated  upon  their  haimches, 
with  their  mouths  close  together,  they  had  made 
all  the  noise  we  had  been  hearing  for  the  past  ten 
minutes.  I  have  often  thought  of  this  incident 
since  when  I  have  heard  the  noise  of  a  few  disap- 
pointed politicians  who  had  deserted  their  associ- 
ates. There  are  always  more  of  them  before  they 
are  counted. 

A  week  or  two  before  leaving  Corpus  Christi  on 
this  trip  I  had  been  promoted  from  brevet  second  Bept.80.i845 
lieutenant,  Fourth  Infantry,  to  fuU  second  lieuteu-. 
ant  Seventh  Infantrv.      FrankliTi  Oari^nar   of  f>i^    tf.P -^^ 


54  PEESONAL  MEMOmS   OF  V.  S,  GKANT 

chap.v     On  my  return  I  found  tbat  our  application  had 
been  approved  at  Washington.    While  in  the  Sev- 
enth Infantry  I  was  in  the  company  of  Captain 
^HotoM,  Holmes,  afterward  a  lieutenant-general  in  the  Con- 
!» 1 5;  jSSe  federate  army.    I  never  came  in  contact  with  him 
30,1880     ^  ^YiQ  -vv^ar  of  the  rebellion,  nor  did  he  render  any 
very  conspicuous  service  in  his  high  rank.     My 
transfer  carried  me  to  the  company  of  Captain  Mc- 
^MoSoif'    ^^^^'  ^^^  resigned  from  the  army  after  the  Mex- 
M;^^.^  ican  war  and  settled  in  Philadelphia.     He  was 
B^iTTwn;  prompt,  however,  to  volunteer  when  the  rebellion 
**'  iSm^'    broke  out,  and  soon  rose  to  the  rank  of  major- 
general  in  the  Union  army.    I  was  not  fortunate 
enough  to  meet  him  after  he  resigned.    In  the  old 
army  he  was  esteemed  very  highly  as  a  soldier 
and  gentleman.    Our  relations  were  always  most 
pleasant. 

The  preparations  at  Corpus  Christi  for  an  ad- 
vance progressed  as  rapidly  in  the  absence  of  some 
twenty  or  more  lieutenants  as  if  we  had  been  there. 
The  principal  business  consisted  in  securing  mules 
and  getting  them  broke  into  harness.  The  process 
Me^oan  yjras  slow,  but  amusiug.  The  animals  sold  to  the 
Government  were  all  young  and  unbroken,  even  to 
the  saddle,  and  were  quite  as  wild  as  the  wild  horses 
of  the  prairie.  Usually  a  number  would  be  brought 
in  by  a  company  of  Mexicans,  partners  in  the  de- 
livery. The  mules  were  first  driven  into  a  stock- 
ade, called  a  corral^  inclosing  an  acre  or  more  of 
ground.    The  Mexicans — who  were  all  experienced 


MEXIOAN  MULES  55 

the  former  with  ropes  to  serve  as  halters,  the  latter  chap,  v 
with  branding-irons  and  a  fire  to  keep  the  irons 
heated.  A  lasso -was  then  thrown  over  the  neck  of 
a  mnle,  when  he  would  immediately  go  to  the 
length  of  his  tether,  first  one  end,  then  the  other, 
in  the  air.  While  he  was  thus  plunging  and  gyrat- 
ing, another  lasso  would  be  thrown  by  another 
Mexican,  catching  the  animal  by  a  fore  foot.  This 
would  bring  the  mule  to  the  ground,  when  he  was 
seized  and  held  by  the  teamsters  while  the  black- 
smith put  upon  him,  with  hot  irons,  the  initials 
"  U.  S.''  Ropes  were  then  put  about  the  neck,  with 
a  slip-noose  which  would  tighten  around  the  throat 
if  pulled.  With  a  man  on  each  side  holding  these 
ropes,  the  mule  was  released  from  his  other  bind- 
ings and  allowed  to  rise.  With  more  or  less  diffi- 
culty he  would  be  conducted  to  a  picket-rope  out- 
side and  fastened  there.  The  delivery  of  that  mule 
was  then  complete.  This  process  was  gone  through 
with  every  mule  and  wild  horse  with  the  army  of 
occupation. 

The  method  of  breaking  them  was  less  cruel  and  S^^ 
much  more  amusing.  It  is  a  well-known  fact  that  ^«^««« 
where  domestic  animals  are  used  for  specific  pur- 
poses from  generation  to  generation  the  descen- 
dants are  easily,  as  a  rule,  subdued  to  the  same  uses. 
At  that  time  in  northern  Mexico  the  mule,  or  his 
ancestors,  the  horse  and  the  ass,  was  seldom  used 
except  for  the  saddle  or  pack.  At  all  events,  the 
Corpus  Christi  mule  resisted  the  new  use  to  whicb 


56  PERSONAL  MEMOIRS  OP  U.  S.  GRANT 

Chap.  V  enlisted  in  our  laa'ge  cities,  and,  with  the  exception 
of  a  chance  drayman  among  them,  it  is  not  prob- 
able that  any  of  the  men  who  reported  themselves 
as  competent  teamsters  had  ever  driven  a  mule- 
team  in  their  lives,  or,  indeed,  that  many  had  had 
any  previous  experience  in  driving  any  animal 
whatever  to  harness.  Numbers  together  can  ac- 
complish what  twice  their  number  acting  individ- 
ually could  not  perform.  Five  mules  were  allotted 
to  each  wagon.  A  teamster  would  select  at  the 
picket-rope  five  animals  of  nearly  the  same  color 
and  general  appearance  for  his  team.  With  a  full 
corps  of  assistants — other  teamsters — he  would 
then  proceed  to  get  his  mules  together.  In  twos 
the  men  would  approach  each  animal  selected, 
avoiding  as  far  as  possible  its  heels.  Two  ropes 
would  be  put  about  the  neck  of  each  animal,  with 
a  slip-noose,  so  that  he  could  be  choked  if  too  un- 
ruly. They  were  then  led  out,  harnessed  by  force, 
and  hitched  to  the  wagon  in  the  position  they  had 
to  keep  ever  after.  Two  men  remained  on  either 
side  of  the  leader,  with  the  lassos  about  its  neck, 
and  one  man  retained  the  same  restraining  influ- 
ence over  each  of  the  others.  All  being  ready,  the 
hold  would  be  slackened  and  the  team  started. 
The  first  motion  was  generally  five  mules  in  the 
air  at  one  time,  backs  bowed,  hind  feet  extended  to 
the  rear.  After  repeating  this  movement  a  few 
times  the  leaders  would  start  to  run%  This  woidd 
hrinor  f.liA  hrftAp.hiTifir  tiirht  afi^ainflt  the  mules  at  the 


LOSS  OF  HORSES  57 

duty  submissively,  if  not  cheerfully;   but  there     chap.v 
never  was  a  time  during  the  war  when  it  was  safe 
to  let  a  Mexican  mule  get  entirely  loose.    Their 
drivers  were  all  teamsters  by  the  time  they  got 
through. 

I  recollect  one  case  of  a  mule  that  had  worked  in 
a  team  under  the  saddle,  not  only  for  some  time  at 
Corpus  Christi,  where  he  was  broken,  but  all  the 
way  to  the  point  opposite  Matamoras,  then  to 
Camargo,  where  he  got  loose  from  his  fastenings 
during  the  night.  He  did  not  run  away  at  first, 
but  stayed  in  the  neighborhood  for  a  day  or  two, 
coming  up  sometimes  to  the  feed-trough  even ;  but 
on  the  approach  of  the  teamster  he  always  got  out 
of  the  way.  At  last,  growing  tired  of  the  constant 
effort  to  catch  him,  he  disappeared  altogether. 
Nothing  short  of  a  Mexican  with  his  lasso  could 
have  caught  him.  Regulations  would  not  have  "Red  tape 
warranted  the  expenditure  of  a  dollar  in  hiring  a 
man  with  a  lasso  to  catch  that  mule ;  but  they  did 
allow  the  expenditure  "  of  the  mule,''  on  a  certifi- 
cate that  he  had  run  away  without  any  fault  of 
the  quartermaster  on  whose  returns  he  was  borne, 
and  also  the  purchase  of  another  to  take  his  place. 
I  am  a  competent  witness,  for  I  was  regimental 
quartermaster  at  the  time. 

While  at  Corpus  Christi  all  the  officers  who  had      §^ 
a  fancy  for  riding  kept  horses.     The  animals  cost 
but  little  in  the  first  instance,  and  when  picketed 
they  would  get  their  living  without  any  cost.     I 


58  PEBSOKAL  MEICOIBS  OF  U.  8.  GRANT 

CBAP.v  classmate  and  fellow-lieutenant,  and  cooking  for 
US,  all  for  about  eight  dollars  per  month — was  rid- 
ing one  to  water  and  leading  the  other  two.  The 
led  horses  pulled  him  from  his  seat,  and  all  three 
ran  away.  They  never  were  heard  of  afterward. 
B^ijwfp.  Shortly  after  that  some  one  told  Captain  Bliss, 

<L%|?k  General  Taylor's  adjutants-general,  of  my  misfor- 
^  tune.    "  Yes ;  I  heard  Grant  lost  five  or  six  dollars' 

worth  of  horses  the  other  day,''  he  replied.  That 
was  a  slander;  they  were  broken  to  the  saddle 
when  I  got  them,  and  cost  nearly  twenty  dollars. 
I  never  suspected  the  colored  boy  of  malicious  in- 
tent in  letting  them  get  away,  because,  if  they  had 
not  escaped,  he  could  have  had  one  of  them  to  ride 
on  the  long  march  then  in  prospect. 


CHAPTER  VI 

ADVANCE  OP  THE  ABMT — CROSSING  THE  LITTLE  COLO- 
RADO— THE  RIO  GRANDE 

AT  last  the  preparations  were  complete,  and  orders    chap,  vi 
-^  were  issued  for  the  advance  to  begin  on  the 
8th  of  March.    General  Taylor  had  an  army  of  not       iw« 
more  than  three  thousand  men.    One  battery,  the   • 
siege-guns,  and  all  the  convalescent  ti'oops  were    niSfplS; 
sent  on  by  water  to  Brazos  Santiago,  at  the  mouth  ^sw^^o™' 
of  the  Eio  Grande.   A  guard  was  left  back  at  Corpus   ^i^p 
Christi  to  look  after  public  property  and  to  take  care 
of  those  who  were  too  sick  to  be  removed.   The 
remainder  of  the  army — probably  not  more  than 
twenty-five  hundred  men — was  divided  into  three 
brigades,  with  the  cavalry  independent.     Colonel   j^$^^ 
Twiggs,  with  seven  companies  of  dragoons  and  a   bS^SIh. 
battery  of  light  artillery,  moved  on  the  Sth.     He     j^uueis, 
was  followed  by  the  three  infantry  brigades,  with  a  g^'c^s^a. 
day's  interval  between  the  commands.    Thus  the   ^'^^p*-"*' 
rear  brigade  did  not  move  from  Corpus  Christi 
until  the  11th  of  March.    In  view  of  the  immense 
bodies  of  men  moved  on  the  same  day  over  nar- 
row roads,  through  dense  forests,  and  across  large 
streams,  in  our  late  wan  it  seems  stranere  now  thfif. 


60  PERSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

CHAP.  VI  General  Taylor  was  opposed  to  anything  like 
plundering  by  the  troops,  and  in  this  instance,  I 
doubt  not,  he  looked  upon  the  enemy  as  the  ag- 
grieved party  and  was  not  wilUng  to  injure  them 
further  than  his  instructions  from  Washington  de- 
"Ge^  Tay-  Dafl-^ded.  His  orders  to  the  troops  enjoined  scrupu- 
lop,"  p.  9§  i^^g  regard  for  the  rights  of  all  peaceable  persons, 
and  the  payment  of  the  highest  price  for  all  sup- 
plies taken  for  the  use  of  the  army. 

All  oflBcers  of  foot-regiments  who  had  horses 
were  permitted  to  ride  them  on  the  march  when  it 
did  not  interfere  with  their  military  duties.  As 
already  related,  having  lost  my  "  five  or  six  dollars' 
•  worth  of  horses  ^  but  a  short  time  before,  I  deter- 
mined not  to  get  another,  but  to  make  the  journey 
on  foot.  My  company  commander.  Captain  Mc- 
Call,  had  two  good  American  horses,  of  consider- 
ably more  value  in  that  country,  where  native 
horses  were  cheap,  than  they  were  in  the  States. 
He  used  one  himself  and  wanted  the  other  for  his 
servant.  He  was  quite  anxious  to  know  whether  I 
did  not  intend  to  get  me  another  horse  before  the 
march  began.  I  told  him  no ;  I  belonged  to  a  foot- 
regiment.  I  did  not  understand  the  object  of  his 
solicitude  at  the  time,  but  when  we  were  about  to 
start,  he  said,  "  There,  Grant,  is  a  horse  for  you.'* 
I  found  that  he  could  not  bear  the  idea  of  his  ser- 
vant riding  on  a  long  march  while  his  lieutenant 
went  afoot.    He  had  found  a  mustang — a  three- 


ADVANCE  OP  THE  ABMY  Gl 

sonable  price.  Five  dollars — sixty-six  and  two-  chap.vi 
thirds  per  cent,  advance — induced  the  owner  to 
part  with  the  mustang.  I  was  sorry  to  take  him, 
because  I  really  felt  that,  belonging  to  a  foot-regi- 
ment, it  was  my  duty  to  march  with  the  men.  But 
I  saw  the  captain's  earnestness  in  the  matter,  and 
accepted  the  horse  for  the  trip.  The  day  we  started 
was  the  first  time  the  horse  had  ever  been  under 
the  saddle.  I  had,  however,  but  little  diflSculty  in 
breaking  him,  though  for  the  first  day  there  were 
frequent  disagreements  between  us  as  to  which  way 
we  should  go,  and  sometimes  whether  we  should  go 
at  all.  At  no  time  during  the  day  could  I  choose 
exactly  the  part  of  the  column  I  would  march  with ; 
but  after  that  I  had  as  tractable  a  horse  as  any  with 
the  army,  and  there  was  none  that  stood  the  trip 
better.  He  never  ate  a  mouthful  of  food  on  the 
journey  except  the  grass  he  could  pick  within  the 
length  of  his  picket-rope. 

A  few  days  out  from  Corpus  Christi  the  immense  wud  hones 
herd  of  wild  horses  that  ranged  at  that  time  between 
the  Nueces  and  the  Rio  Grande  was  seen  directly 
in  advance  of  the  head  of  the  column,  and  but  a 
few  miles  off.  It  was  the  very  band  from  which 
the  horse  I  was  riding  had  been  captured  but  a  few 
weeks  before.  The  column  was  halted  for  a  rest, 
and  a  number  of  oflBcers,  myself  among  them,  rode 
out  two  or  three  miles  to  the  right  to  see  the  extent 
of  the  herd.  The  country  was  a  rolling  prairie, 
and,  from  the  higher  ground,  the  vision  was  ob- 


62  PERSONAL  MEMOIBS  OS*  U.  8.  GRANT 

CHAP.  VI  idea  that  they  could  all  have  been  corraled  in  the 
State  of  Rhode  Island  or  Delaware  at  one  time.  If 
they  had  been,  they  would  have  been  so  thick  that 
the  pasturage  would  have  given  out  the  first  day. 
People  who  saw  the  Southern  herd  of  buffalo  fifteen 
or  twenty  years  ago  can  appreciate  the  size  of  the 
Texas  band  of  wild  horses  in  1846. 
^2^3^  At  the  point  where  the  army  struck  the  Little 
Colorado  Colorado  Eiver  the  stream  was  quite  wide  and  of 
sufficient  depth  for  navigation.  The  water  was 
brackish  and  the  banks  were  fringed  with  timber. 
Here  the  whole  army  concentrated  before  attempt- 
ing to  cross.  The  army  was  not  accompanied  by  a 
pontoon-train,  and  at  that  time  the  troops  were  not 
instructed  in  bridge-building.  To  add  to  the  em- 
barrassment of  the  situation,  the  army  was  here, 
8S^,vm,  ^^^  *^^  ^^®*  time,  threatened  with  opposition.  Bu- 
^■^  glers,  concealed  from  our  view  by  the  brush  on  the 
opposite  side,  sounded  the  "assembly^  and  other 
Pa«e»  military  calls.  Like  the  wolves  before  spoken  of, 
they  gave  the  impression  that  there  was  a  large 
number  of  them,  and  that,  if  the  troops  were  in 
proportion  to  the  noise,  they  were  sufficient  to  de- 
vour General  Taylor  and  his  army.  There  were 
probably  but  few  troops,  and  those  engaged  princi- 
pally in  watching  the  movements  of  the  "invader.'' 
A  few  of  our  cavalry  dashed  in  and  forded  and 
swam  the  stream,  and  all  opposition  was  soon  dis- 
persed. I  do  not  remember  that  a  single  shot  was 
fired. 

The  troops  waded  the  stream,  which  was  up  to 
their  necks  in  the  deepest  part.  Teams  were  crossed 


GROSSING  THE  LITTLE  GOLOEASO  63 

and  by  the  side  of  the  leader,  hitching  his  bridle,  as  chap,  vi 
well  as  the  bridle  of  the  mules  in  rear,  to  it,  and 
carrying  the  end  to  men  on  the  opposite  shore. 
The  bank  down  to  the  water  was  steep  on  both 
sides.  A  rope  long  enough  to  cross  the  river,  there* 
fore,  was  attached  to  the  back  axle  of  the  wagon, 
and  men  behind  would  hold  the  vo^  to  prevent 
the  wagon  "beating''  the  mules  into  the  water. 
This  latter  rope,  also  served  the  purpose  of  bringing 
the  end  of  the  forward  one  back,  to  be  used  over 
again.  The  water  was  deep  enough,  for  a  short 
distance,  to  swim  the  little  Mexican  mules  which 
the  army  was  then  using ;  ^but  they  and  the  wagons 
were  ptdled  through  so  fast  by  the  men  at  the  end 
of  the  rope  ahead  that  no  time  was  left  them  to 
show  their  obstinacy.  In  this  manner  the  artillery 
and  transportation  of  the  "army  of  occupation'' 
crossed  the  Little  Colorado  River. 

About  the  middle  of  the  month  of  March  the  iw« 
advance  of  the  army  reached  the  Eio  Grande,  and 
went  into  camp  near  the  banks  of  the  river,  oppo- 
site the  city  of  Matamoras  and  almost  under  the 
guns  of  a  small  fort  at  the  lower  end  of  the  town. 
There  was  not  at  that  time  a  single  habitation 
from  Corpus  Christi  imtil  the  Rio  Grande  was 
reached. 

The  work  of  fortifying  was  commenced  at  once.  ^^^^^^^^ 
The  fort  was  laid  out  by  the  engineers,  but  the    ^^SS*^ 
work  was  done  by  the  soldiers  under  the  supervi- 
sion of  their  oflScers,  the  chief  engineer  retaining 


64  PEESONAL  MEMOmS  OP  U.  S.  GKANT 

CHAP.  VI    limits  of  camp.    They  captured  two  companies  of 
ThSmtoii    dragoons,  commanded  by  Captains  Thornton  and 
i?.^j?Se*ii,   Hardee,    The  latter  figured  as  a  general  in  the  late 
J^\      war  on  the  Confederate  side,  and  was  author  of  the 
nSi^^^Lti  tactics  first  used  by  both  armies.    Lieutenant  The- 
oX:w^''fd.  odore  Porter,  of  the  Fourth  Infantry,  was  killed 
^^aVjT  ^^^^  ^^*  ^*^  ^  ^^^  detachment;  and  Colonel 
iwe'  '    Cross,  the  assistant  quartermaster-general,  had  also 
ttSSX    been  killed  not  far  from  camp. 
Apr.  21,1846      There  was  no  base  of  supplies  nearer  than  Point 
Isabel,  on  the  coast,  north  of  the  mouth  of  the  Rio 
Grande,  and  twenty-five  miles  away.     The  enemy 
— if  the  Mexicans  could  be  called  such  at  this  time, 
when  no  war  had  been  declared — hovered  about  in 
such  numbers  that  it  was  not  safe  to  send  a  wagon- 
train  after  supplies  with  any  escort  that  could  be 
Pa«®«*     spared.    I  have  already  said  that  General  Taylor's 
whole  command  on  the  Rio  Grande  numbered  less 
than  three  thousand  men.    He  had,  however,  a  few 
more  troops  at  Point  Isabel  or  Brazos  Santiago. 
The  supplies  brought  from  Corpus  Christi  in  wagons 
were  running  short.    Work  was  therefore  pushed 
with  great  vigor  on  the  defenses,  to  enable  the 
minimum  number  of  troops  to  hold  the  fort.    All 
the  men  who  could  be  employed  were  kept  at  work 
from  early  dawn  until  darkness  closed  the  labors  of 
the  day.    With  all  this  the  fort  was  not  completed 
until  the  supplies  grew  so  short  that  further  delay 
in  obtaining  more  could  not  be  thought  of.   By  the 
!«*•       latter  part  of  April  the  work  was  in  a  partially  de- 


THE  BIO  GBANDE  65 

cany  the  rest  of  the  army  to  Point  Isabel,  were  left  chap,  vi 
with  the  garrison,  and  the  march  was  commenced 
with  the  remainder  of  the  command,  every  wagon 
being  taken  with  the  army.  Early  on  the  second 
day  after  starting  the  force  reached  its  destination, 
withont  opposition  from  the  Mexicans.  There  was 
some  delay  in  getting  supplies  ashore  from  vessels 
at  anchor  in  the  open  roadstead. 


VoL.L-^ 


Bt«teB,VIII, 
862 


CHAPTER  Vn 

THE  MEXICAN  WAB — THE  BATTLE  OF  PALO  ALTO — 
THE  BATTLE  OP  BESACA  DE  LA  PALMA — ABMY 
OP  INVASION — GENEBAL  TAYLOB — MOVEMENT  ON 
GAMABQO 

CHAP,  vn    V)l7HILE  Greneral  Taylor  was  away  with  the  bulk 

April,  iwe      ▼  ▼    of  his  army  the  little  garrison  up  the  river 

was  besieged.  As  we  lay  in  our  tents  upon  the  sea- 

gjnorof^    shore  the  artillery  at  the  fort  on  the  Eio  Grande 

could  be  distinctly  heard. 

The  war  had  begun. 

There  were  no  possible  means  of  obtaining  news 
from  the  garrison,  and  information  from  outside 
could  not  be  otherwise  than  unfavorable. <;^W 
General  Taylor's  feelings  were  during  this  suspense 
I  do  not  know;rbut  for  myself,  a  young  second 
lieutenant  who  had  never  heard  a  hostile  gun  be- 
fore, I  felt  sorry  that  I  had  enlisted^  A  great  many 
men,  when  they  smell  battle  afar  off,  chafe  to  get 
into  the  fray.  When  they  say  so  themselves  they 
generally  fail  to  convince  their  hearers  that  they 
are  as  anxious  as  they  would  like  to  make  believe, 
and  as  they  approach  danger  they  become  more 


BATTLE  OP  PALO   ALTO  67 

good  as  their  word  when  the  battle  did  come.    But   chap,  vn 
the  number  of  such  men  is  smalLV 

On  the  7th  of  May  the  wagoilswere  all  loaded,  ^^ 
and  General  Taylor  started  on  his  return,  with  his  "oen^xay- 
army  reinforced  at  Point  Isabel,  but  still  less  than 
three  thousand  strong,  to  relieve  the  garrison  on  the 
Rio  Grande.  The  road  from  Point  Isabel  to  Mat- 
amoras  is  over  an  open,  rolling,  treeless  prairie, 
until  the  timber  that  borders  the  bank  of  the  Eio 
Grande  is  reached.  This  river,  like  the  Mississippi, 
flows  through  a  rich  alluvial  valley  in  the  most 
meandering  manner,  running  toward  all  points  of 
the  compass,  at  times,  within  a  few  miles.  For- 
merly the  river  ran  by  Besaca  de  la  Palma,  some 
four  or  five  miles  east  of  the  present  channel.  The 
old  bed  of  the  river  at  Besaca  had  become  filled  at 
places,  leaving  a  succession  of  little  lakes.  The 
timber  that  had  formerly  grown  upon  both  banks, 
and  for  a  considerable  distance  out,  was  still  stand- 
ing. This  timber  was  struck  six  or  eight  miles  out 
from  the  besieged  garrison,  at  a  point  known  as 
Palo  Alto — "  tall  trees  ^  or  "  woods.'' 

Early  in  the  forenoon  of  the  8th  of  May,  as  Palo  gSg^lf^ 
Alto  was  approached,  an  army,  certainly  outnum- 
bering our  httle  force,  was  seen,  drawn  up  in  line  of 
battle  just  in  front  of  the  timber.  Their  bayonets 
and  spear-heads  glistened  in  the  sunlight  formi- 
dably. The  force  was  composed  largely  of  cavalry 
armed  with  lances.  Where  we  were  the  grass  was 
tall,  reaching  nearly  to  the  shoulders  of  the  men, 


68  PERSONAL  MEMOmS  OP  U.  S.  GRANT 

Chap,  yn  icans.  He  then  formed  a  line  of  battle,  facing  the 
enemy.  His  artillery,  two  batteries  and  two  eigh- 
teen-pounder  iron  guns,  drawn  by  oxen,  was  placed 
in  position  at  intervals  along  the  line.  A  battalion 
was  thrown  to  the  rear,  commanded  by  Lieutenant- 

<Sid?%    Colonel  Childs,  of  the  artillery,  as  reserves.    These 

e^i^9,  preparations  completed,  orders  were  given  for  a 
"**  platoon  of  each  company  to  stack  arms  and  go  to  a 
stream  off  to  the  right  of  the  command,  to  flU  their 
canteens  and  also  those  of  the  rest  of  their  respec- 
tive companies.  When  the  men  were  all  back  in 
their  places  in  line,  the  command  to  advance  was 
given.  As  I  looked  down  that  long  line  of  about 
three  thousand  armed  men,  advancing  toward  a 
larger  force  also  armed,  I  thought  what  a  fearful  re- 
sponsibility General  Taylor  must  feel,  commanding 
such  a  host  and  so  far  away  from  friends.  The  Mex- 
icans immediately  opened  fire  upon  us,  first  with  ar- 
tillery and  then  with  infantry.  At  first  their  shots 
did  not  reach  us,  and  the  advance  was  continued.  As 
we  got  nearer,  the  cannon-balls  commenced  going 
through  the  ranks.  They  hurt  no  one,  however, 
during  this  advance,  because  they  would  strike  the 
ground  long  before  they  reached  our  line,  and  rico- 
chetted  through  the  tall  grass  so  slowly  that  the 
men  would  see  them  and  open  ranks  and  let  them 
pass.  When  we  got  to  a  point  where  the  artillery 
could  be  used  with  effect,  a  halt  was  called,  and 
the  battle  opened  on  both  sides. 

^S^e"*  <^te  infantry  under  General  Taylor  was  armed 
*^i*      with   flint-lock   muskets,    and    paper    cartridges 

-.1 J   rxl. J T 1 "L^4.     «^J   "U^M  A  4.  4.1..^ 


BATTLE  OF  PALO  ALTO  69 

artillery  was  generally  six-pounder  brass  guns  CHAP.vn 
throwing  only  solid  shot ;  but  General  Taylor  had 
with  him  three  or  four  twelve-pounder  howitzers 
throwing  shell,  besides  his  eighteen-pounders  be- 
fore spoken  of,  that  had  a  long  range.  This  made 
a  powerful  armament.  ThQ  Mexicans  were  armed 
about  as  we  were  so  far  as  their  infantry  was  con- 
cerned, but  their  artillery  only  fired  solid  shot.  We 
had  greatly  the  advantage  in  this  arm. 

The  artillery  was  advanced  a  rod  or  two  in  front 
of  the  line,  and  opened  fire.    The  infantry  stood  at 
order  arms  as  spectators,  watching  the  effect  of  our 
shots  upon  the  enemy,  and  watching  his  shots  so 
as  to  step  out  of  their  way.    It  could  be  seen  that 
the  eighteen-poimdera  and  the  howitzers  did  a  great 
deal  of  execution.    On  our  side  there  was  little  or 
no  loss  while  we  occupied  this  position.    During 
the  battle  Major  Ringgold,  an  accomplished  and  RiS^^^jd 
brave  artillery  oflBcer,  was  mortally  wounded,  and  '^'1,1*846*^ 
Lieutenant  Luther,  also  of  the  artillery,  was  struck,    ^^f  ^ 
During  the  day  several  advances  were  made,  and  '^gjai^' 
just  at  dusk  it  became  evident  that  the  Mexicans 
were  falling  back.    We  again  advanced,  and  occu- 
pied at  the  close  of  the  battle  substantially  the 
ground  held  by  the  enemy  at  the  beginning.    In 
this  last  move  there  was  a  brisk  fire  upon  our 
troops,  and  some  execution  was  done.    One  can- 
non-ball passed  through  our  ranks  not  far  from 
me.     It  took  off  the  head  of  an  enlisted  man 
and  the  under-jaw  of  Captain  Page,  of  my  regi-  ^  jj^^ 
ment,  while  the  splinters  from  the  musket  of  the       ^^ 


70  PEBSONAL  MEMOIRS  OP  U.  S.  GRANT 

CHAP.vn   Our  casualties  for  the  day  were  9  killed  and  47 

wounded. 
May,  1846        ^t  the  break  of  day  on  the  9th,  the  army  under 

BeMoa^deia  Taylor  was  ready  to  renew  the  battle;  but  an  ad- 
vance showed  that  the  enemy  had  entirely  left  our 
front  during  the  night.  The  chaparral  before  us 
was  impenetrable  except  where  there  were  roads  or 
trails,  with  occasionally  clear  or  bai'e  spots  of  small 
dimensions.  A  body  of  men  penetrating  it  might 
easily  be  ambushed.  It  was  better  to  have  a  few 
men  caught  in  this  way  than  the  whole  army,  yet  it 
was  necessary  that  the  garrison  at  the  river  should 
be  relieved.  To  get  to  them  the  chaparral  had  to 
be  passed.  Thus,  I  assumed.  General  Taylor  rea- 
soned. He  halted  the  army  not  far  in  advance  of 
the  ground  occupied  by  the  Mexicans  the  day  be- 
fore, and  selected  Captain  C.  F.  Smith,  of  the  artil- 
lery, and  Captain  McCall,  of  my  company,  to  take 
150  picked  men  each  and  find  where  the  enemy 

m^^the  ^^  gone.    This  left  me  in  command  of  the  com- 
^^^      pany — an  honor  and  responsibility  I  thought  very 
great. 

Smith  and  McCall  found  no  obstruction  in  the 
way  of  their  advance  until  they  came  up  to  the 
succession  of  ponds,  before  described,  at  Resaca. 
The  Mexicans  had  passed  them  and  formed  their 
lines  on  the  opposite  bank.  This  position  they 
had  strengthened  a  little  by  throwing  up  dead 
trees  and  brush  in  their  front,  and  by  placing  artil- 
lery to  cover  the  approaches  and  open  places. 
Smith  and  McCall  deployed  on  each  side  of  the 
road  as  well  as  they  could,  and  engaged  the  enemy 


BATTLE  OP  RESACA  DE  LA  PALMA  71 

As  we  came  up  we  were  deployed  in  like  manner,  chap,  vn 
I  was  with  the  right  wing,  and  led  my  company 
through  the  thicket  wherever  a  penetrable  place 
could  be  found,  taking  advantage  of  any  clear  spot 
that  would  carry  me  toward  the  enemy.  At  last  I 
got  pretty  close  up  without  knowing  it.  The  balls 
commenced  to  whistle  very  thick  overhead,  cutting 
the  limbs  of  the  chaparral  right  and  left.  We  could 
not  see  the  enemy,  so  I  ordered  my  men  to  lie  down 
— an  order  that  did  not  have  to  be  enforced.  We 
kept  our  position  until  it  became  evident  that  the 
enemy  were  not  firing  at  us,  and  then  withdrew  to 
find  better  ground  to  advance  upon. 

By  this  time  some  progress  had  been  made  on 
our  left.    A  section  of  artillery  had  been  captured 
by  the  cavalry,  and  some  prisoners  had  been  taken. 
The  Mexicans  were  giving  way  all  along  the  line, 
and  many  of  them  had,  no  doubt,  left  early.    I  at 
last  found  a  clear  space  separating  two  ponds. 
There  seemed  to  be  a  few  men  in  front,  and  I 
charged  upon  them  with  my  company.    There  was 
no  resistance,  and  we  captured  a  Mexican  colonel, 
who  had  been  wounded,  and  a  few  men.    Just  as  I 
was  sending  them  to  the  rear  with  a  guard  of  two 
or  three  men,  a  private  came  from  the  front  bring- 
ing back  one  of  our  oflBcers,  who  had  been  badly  ^^^todf* 
wounded  in  advance  of  where  I  was.    The  ground  **^.  ^l^ 
had  been  charged  over  before.  My  exploit  was  equal    B«it^^. 
to  that  of  the  soldier  who  boasted  that  he  had  cut  off  ^^  ^' 
the  leg  of  one  of  the  enemy.  When  asked  why  he  did 


72 


PEBSOKAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GBAin? 


Chap,  vn 
May,  1846 


Brownsyllle 


Benton, 

Thirty 

Years' 

View,  n, 

chs.  olx, 

dzi 


Howard, 
"Gen.  Tay- 
lor," oh.  xL 

-WUcox, 
Hist.  Mex. 

War,  pp. 
76-78 


There  was  no  further  resistance.  The  evening  of 
the  9th  the  army  was  encamped  on  its  old  ground 
near  the  fort,  and  thie  garrison  was  reUeved.  The 
siege  had  lasted  a  number  of  days,  but  the  casual- 
ties were  few  in  number.  Major  Jacob  Brown,  of 
the  Seventh  Infantry,  the  commanding  oflBcer,  had 
been  killed,  and  in  his  honor  the  fort  was  named. 
Since  then  a  town  of  considerable  importance  has 
sprung  up  on  the  ground  occupied  by  the  fort  and 
troops,  which  has  also  taken  his  name. 

The  battles  of  Palo  Alto  and  Besaca  de  la  Palma 
seemed  to  us  engaged  as  pretty  important  affairs ; 
but  we  had  only  a  faint  conception  of  their  magni- 
tude until  they  were  fought  over  in  the  North  by 
the  press  and  the  reports  came  back  to  us.  At  the 
same  time,  or  about  the  same  time,  we  learned 
that  war  existed  between  the  United  States  and 
Mexico,  by  the  acts  of  the  latter  countiy.  On 
learning  this  fact,  General  Taylor  transferred  our 
camps  to  the  south  or  west  bank  of  the  river,  and 
Matamoras  was  occupied.  We  then  became  the 
"army  of  invasion.'' 

Up  to  this  time  Taylor  had  none  but  regular 
troops  in  his  command ;  but  now  that  invasion  had 
already  taken  place,  volimteers  for  one  year  com- 
menced arriving.  The  army  remained  at  Mata- 
moras until  sufl&ciently  reinforced  to  warrant  a 
movement  into  the  interior.  General  Taylor  was 
not  an  oflBcer  to  trouble  the  administration  much 
with  his  demands,  but  was  inclined  to  do  the  best 
he  could  with  the  means  given  him.  He  felt  his 
responsibility  as  going  no  further.     If  he  had 


GENERAL  TAYLOR  73 

have  informed  the  authorities  of  his  opinion  and  CHAP.yn 
left  them  to  determine  what  should  be  done.  If 
the  judgment  was  against  him  he  would  have  gone 
on  and  done  the  best  he  could  with  the  means  at 
hand,  without  parading  his  grievance  before  the 
public.  No  soldier  could  face  either  danger  or 
responsibility  more  calmly  than  he.  These  are 
qualities  more  rarely  found  than  genius  or  physi- 
cal courage. 

General  Taylor  never  made  any  great  show  or  JJ^^^Sy^ 
parade,  either  of  uniform  or  retinue.    In  dress  he    Howard, 
was  possibly  too  plain,  rarely  wearing  anything  in  iop/^pp.m, 
the  field  to  indicate  his  rank,  or  even  that  he  was 
an  oflBcer ;  but  he  was  known  to  every  soldier  in 
his  army,  and  was  respected  by  all.    I  can  call  to 
mind  only  one  instance  when  I  saw  him  in  uni- 
form, and  one  other  when  I  heard  of  his  wearing 
it.    On  both  occasions  he  was  unfortunate.    The 
first  was  at  Corpus  Christi.    He  had  concluded  to 
review  his  army  before  starting  on  the  march,  and 
gave  orders  accordingly.    Colonel  Twiggs  was  then 
second  in  rank  with  the  army,  and  to  him  was 
given  the  command  of  the  review.    Colonel  and  ^^^S;^- 
Brevet  Brigadier-General  Worth — a  far  different   q^  ^^ 
soldier  from  Taylor  in  the  use  of  the  uniform —  Mky^idi 
was  next  to  Twiggs  in  rank,  and  claimed  superior- 
ity by  virtue  of  his  brevet  rank  when  the  accidents 
of  service  threw  them  where  one  or  the  other  had 
to  command.    Worth  declined  to  attend  the  review 
as  subordinate  to  Twiggs  until  the  questi^on  was 
Settled  bv  the  hierhest  authoritv.     This  broke  tiD 


74  PERSONAL  MEMOIRS   OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

chaf.  VII   real  rank  at  that  time,  and  a  brigadier-general  by 
brevet.    He  was  assigned  to  duty,  however,  by  the 
President,  with  the  rank  which  his  brevet  gave 
him.    Worth  was  not  so  assigned,  but  by  virtue  of 
commanding  a  division  he  must,  under  the  army 
regulations  of  that  day,  have  drawn  the  pay  of 
M^offito  ^^^  brevet  rank.    The  question  was  submitted  to 
D?E?^^g8  Washington,  and  no  response  was  received  until 
""co^ro^"*  after  the  army  had  reached  the  Eio  Grande.    It 
Dec  1^*1845  was  decided  against  General  Worth,  who  at  once 
tendered  his  resignation  and  left  the  army,  going 
North,  no  doubt,  by  the  same  vessel  that  carried  it. 
This  kept  him  out  of  the  battles  of  Palo  Alto  and 
Eesaca  de  la  Palma.     Either  the  resignation  was 
not  accepted  or  General  Worth  withdrew  it  before 
action  had  beien  taken.    At  all  events,  he  returned 
to  the  army  in  time  to  command  his  division  in  the 
battle  of  Monterey,  and  served  with  it  to  the  end  of 
the  war. 
w^t?oi        ^^®  second  occasion  on  which  General  Taylor 
^^^.'ui^*   was  said  to  have  donned  his  uniform  was  in  order 
to  receive  a  visit  from  the  flag-officer  of  the  naval 
squadron  off  the  mouth  of  the  Eio  Grande.    While 
commodoTO  the  army  was  on  that  river  the  flag-officer  sent 
Conner     ^ord  that  hc  would  call  on  the  general  to  pay  his 
respects  on  a  certain  day.    General  Taylor,  know- 
ing that  naval  officers  habitually  wore  aD  the  uni- 
form the  "law  allowed''  on  aU  occasions  of  cere- 
mony, thought  it  would  be  only  civil  to  receive  his 
guest  iij  the  same  style.    His  uniform  was  there- 
fore got  out,  brushed  up,  and  put  on,  in  advance 


GENEBAL  HAMEB  75 

ment  should  he  meet  him  in  civilian's  dress,  left  off   chaf.  vn 
his  uniform  for  this  occasion.    The  meeting  was 
said  to  have  been  embarrassing  to  both,  and  the 
conversation  was  principally  apologetic. 

The  time  was  whiled  away  pleasantly  enough  at 
Matamoras  while  we  were  waiting  for  volunteers. 
It  is  probable  that  all  the  most  important  people  of 
the  territory  occupied  hy  our  army  left  their  homes 
before  we  got  there ;  but  with  those  remaining  the 
best  of  relations  apparently  existed.  It  was  the  8eep.«o 
policy  of  the  commanding  general  to  allow  no  pil- 
laging, no  taking  of  private  property  for  public  or 
individual  use  without  satisfactory  compensation, 
so  that  a  better  market  was  afforded  than  the  peo- 
ple had  ever  known  before. 

Among  the  troops  that  joined  us  at  Matamoras 
was  an  Ohio  regiment,  of  which  Thomas  L.  Hamer,     see  p.  w 
the  member  of  Congress  who  had  given  me  my 
appointment  to  West  Point,  was  major.     He  told 
me  then  that  he  could  have  had  the  colonelcy,  but 
that  as  he  knew  he  was  to  be  appointed  a  brigadier-  ^ijf  j^, 
general,  he  preferred  at  first  to  take  the  lower  grade.       ^^  . 
I  have  said  before  that  Hamer  was  one  of  the  ablest 
men  Ohio  ever  produced.    At  that  time  he  was  in 
the  prime  of  life,  being  less  than  fifty  years  of  age, 
and  possessed  an  admirable  physique,  promising 
long  Itf e.    But  he  was  taken  sick  before  Monterey, 
and  died  within  a  few  days.   I  have  always  believed  doc  a,  i84« 
that  had  his  life  been  spared  he  would  have  been 
President  of  the  United  States  during  the  term 
filled  by  President  Pierce.    Had  Hamer  filled  tliat 
office,  his  nartialitv  for  me  was  such  there  is  >Mit 


76 


PEBSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GBANT 


Chap,  yn 


1846 


Monterey 


18M 


Jolm  Oar- 
land,  GoL 

May  7,1849; 
Bvt  Brlg.- 
Gen.  Aug. 
ao,  1847 ;  a. 

June  5, 1861 


probably, — and  would  therefore  now  be  preparing 
to  retire.  Neither  of  these  speculations  is  unreason- 
able, and  they  are  mentioned  to  show  how  little 
men  control  their  own  destiny. 

Reinforcements  having  arrived,  in  the  month  of 
August  the  movement  commenced  from  Mata- 
moras  to  Camargo,  the  head  of  navigation  on  the 
Eio  Grande.  The  line  of  the  Eio  Grande  was  all 
that  was  necessary  to  hol^,  unless  it  was  intended 
to  invade  Mexico  from  the  north.  In  that  case  the 
most  natural  route  to  take  was  the  one  which  Gen- 
eral Taylor  selected.  It  entered  a  pass  in  the  Sierra 
Madre  Mountains,  at  Monterey,  through  which  the 
main  road  runs  to  the  city  of  Mexico.  Monterey 
itself  was  a  good  point  to  hold,  even  if  the  line  of 
the  Rio  Grande  covered  all  the  territory  we  desired 
to  occupy  at  that  time.  It  is  built  on  a  plain  two 
thousand  feet  above  tide-water,  where  the  air  is 
bracing  and  the  situation  healthy. 

On  the  19th  of  August  the  army  started  for  Mon- 
terey, leaving  a  small  garrison  at  Matamoras.  The 
troops,  with  the  exception  of  the  artillery,  cavalry, 
and  the  brigade  to  which  I  belonged,  were  moved 
up  the  river  to  Camargo  on  steamers.  As  there 
were  but  two  or  three  of  these,  the  boats  had  to 
make  a  number  of  trips  before  the  last  of  the  troops 
were  up.  Those  who  marched  did  so  by  the  south 
side  of  the  river.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Garland,  of 
the  Fourth  Infantry,  was  the  brigade  commander, 
and  on  this  occasion  commanded  the  entire  march- 
ing force.  One  day  out  convinced  him  that  march- 
ing by  day  in  that  latitude  in  the  month  of  August 


MOVEMENT  ON  CAMABGO  77 

chaBged)  and  night-marches  were  substituted  with   csAP.Tn 
the  best  results. 

When  X!amargo  was  reached,  we  fouud  a  city  of 
tents  outside  the  Mexican  hamlet.    I  was  detailed    stairciixiy 
to  act  as  quartermaster  and  commissary  to  the 
regiment.    The  teams  that  had  proven  abundantly 
sufficient  to  transport  all  supplies  from  Corpus 
Christi  to  the  Rio  Grande  over  the  level  prairies  of 
Texas  were  entirely  inadequate  to  the  needs  of  the 
reinforced  army  in  a  mountainous  country.    To 
obviate  the  deficiency,  pack-mules  were  hired,  with  Apacktram 
Mexicans  to  pack  and  drive  them.    I  had  charge 
of  the  few  wagons  allotted  to  the  Fourth  Infantry, 
and  of  the  pack-train  to  supplement  them.    There 
were  not  men  enough  in  the  army  to  manage  that 
train  without  the  help  of  Mexicans  who  had  learned 
how.    As  it  was,  the  difficulty  was  great  enough. 
The  troops  would  take  up  their  march  at  an  early 
hour  each  day.    After  they  had  started,  the  tents 
and  cooking-utensils  had  to  be  made  into  packages, 
so  that  they  could  be  lashed  to  the  backs  of  the 
mules.     Sheet-iron  kettles,  tent-poles,  and  mess- 
chests  were  inconvenient  articles  to  transport  in 
that  way.    It  took  several  hours  to  get  ready  to 
start  each  morning,  and  by  the  time  we  were  ready     • 
some  of  the  mules  first  loaded  would  be  tired  of 
standing  so  long  with  their  loads  on  their  backs. 
Sometimes  one  would  start  to  run,  bowing  his  back 
and  kicking  up  until  he  scattered  his  load;  others 
would  lie  down  and  try  to  disarrange  their  loads 
by  attempting  to  get  on  the  top  of  them  by  rolling 
on  them ;  others  with  tent-poles  for  part  of  thei^ 


l/\orln    vvTAvii 


lA 


irj!tao\jaiuLi   juxjjulv/xao    kjj:    u*  o«  vjaaj.^x 


CHAP,  vn  am  not  aware  of  ever  having  used  a  profane  exple- 
tive in  my  life;  but  I  would  have  the  charity  to 
excuse  those  who  may  have  done  so,  if  they  were 
in  charge  of  a  train  of  Mexican  pack-mules  at  the 
time. 


CHAPTER  Vm 

ADVANCE  ON  MONTEREY — THE  BLACK  FORT — THE  BAT- 
TLE OP  MONTEREY — SURRENDER  OP  THE  CITY 

THE  advance  from  Camargo  was  commenced  on  ceip.vin 
the  5th  of  September.  The  army  was  divided  i846 
into  four  columns,  separated  from  each  other  by  Monterey* 
one  day's  march.  The  advance  reached  Cerralvo 
in  four  days,  and  halted  for  the  remainder  of  the 
troops  to  come  up.  By  the  13th  the  rear-guard  had 
arrived,  and  the  same  day  the  advance  resumed  its 
march,  followed  as  before,  a  day  separating  the 
divisions.  The  forward  division  halted  again  at 
Marin,  twenty-four  miles  from  Monterey.  Both 
this  place  and  Cerralvo  were  nearly  deserted,  and 
men,  women,  and  children  were  seen  running  and 
scattered  over  the  hills  as  we  approached;  but 
when  the  people  returned  they  found  all  their 
abandoned  property  safe,  which  must  have  given 
them  a  favorable  opinion  of  Los  Grengos — "the 
Yankees.''  From  Marin  the  movement  was  in 
mass.  On  the  19th  General  Taylor,  with  his  army, 
was  encamped  at  Walnut  Springs,  withiu  three 
miles  of  Monterey. 

The  town  is  on  a  small  stream  comincr  out  of  the     195*,^;,. 


80  PERSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

OHikp.ym  plain.    On  this  plain,  and  entirely  outside  of  the 
last  houses  of  the  city,  stood  a  strong  fort,  inclosed 
on  all  sides,  to  which  our  army  gave  the  name  of 
"Black  Fort.''  Its  guns  commanded  the  approaches 
to  the  city  to  the  full  extent  of  their  range.    There 
were  two  detached  spurs  of  hills  or  mountains  to 
the  north  and  northwest  of  the  city,  which  were 
also  fortified.    On  one  of  these  stood  the  Bishop's 
Palace.    The  road  to  Saltillo  leaves  the  upper  or 
western  end  of  the  city  under  the  fire  of  the  guns 
from  these  heights.    The  lower  or  eastern  end  was 
defended  by  two  or  three  small  detached  works 
armed  with  artillery  and  infantry.    To  the  south 
was  the  mountain  stream  before  mentioned,  and 
back  of  that  the  range  of  foot-hills.    The  plaza  in 
the  center  of  the  city  was  the  citadel,  properly 
speaking.     All  the  streets  leading  from  it  were 
swept  by  artillery,  cannon  being  intrenched  behind 
temporary  parapets.   The  housetops  near  the  plaza 
were  converted  into  infantry  fortifications  by  the 
mStfpiol    ^®®  ^^  sand-bags  for  parapets.    Such  were  the  de- 
8tate8,vra,  fenses  of  Monterey  in  September,  1846.    General 
Ampudia,  with  a  force  of  certainly  ten  thousand 
men,  was  in    command, 
w. OjBnt-       General  Taylor's  force  was  about  sixty-five  hun- 
jnDS*iJ  witf  ^^  strong,  in  three  divisions,  under  Generals  But- 
ler, Twiggs,  and  Worth.    The  troops  went  into  camp 
at  Walnut  Springs,  while  the  engineer  officers,  under 
BtoMflSd,    Major  Mansfield, — a   general   in  the  late  war, — 
iSi^i^iSi:  commenced  their  reconnaissance.  Major  Mansfield 


82  FEBSONAL  MEMOIBS  OF  U.  8.  GRANT 

CHAP,  vin  session,  the  enemy  would  be  cut  off  from  receiving 
further  supplies,  if  not  from  all  communication  with 
82te8,vra,  the  interior.   General  Worth,  with  his  division  some- 
^        what  reinforced,  was  given  the  task  of  gaining  pos- 
session of  the  Saltillo  road,  and  of  carrying  the 
detached  works  outside  the  city  in  that  quarter. 
He  started  on  his  march  early  in  the  afternoon 
Sept.,  1848   of  the  20th.    The  divisions  under  Generals  Butler 
and  Twiggs  were  drawn  up  to  threaten  the  east 
and  north  sides  of  the  city  and  the  works  on  those 
fronts,  in  support  of  the  movement  under  General 
Worth.    Worth's  was  regarded  as  the  main  attack 
on  Monterey,  and  all  other  operations  were  in  sup- 
port of  it.    His  march  this  day  was  uninterrupted ; 
but  the  enemy  was  seen  to  reinforce  heavily  about 
the  Bishop's  Palace  and  the  other  outside  fortifica- 
tions on  their  left.     General  Worth  reached  a  de- 
fensible position  just  out  of  range  of  the  enemy's 
dSs^w^    guns  on  the  heights  northwest  of  the  city,  and  biv- 
^y^^^  ouacked  for  the  night.     The  engineer  officers  with 
j^^aS'iMs  biDa — Captain  Sanders  and  Lieutenant  George  G. 
Y.'  ^\,W"  Meade,  afterward  the  commander  of  the  victorious 
i£y^aS^  national  army  at  the  battle  of  Gettysburg — made 
a  reconnaissance  to  the  Saltillo  road  under  cover 
of  night. 
Sept.,  1846       During  the  night  of  the  20th  General  Taylor  had 
estabhshed  a  battery,  consisting  of  two  twenty- 
four-pounder  howitzers  and  a  ten-inch  mortar,  at  a 
point  from  which  they  could  play  upon  Black  Fort. 


THE  BLACK  FOBT  83 

was  ordered  to  support  the  artillerists  while  they  CHAp.vm 
were  intrenching  themselves  and  their  guns.  I 
was  regimental  quartermaster  at  the  time,  and  was 
ordered  to  remain  in  charge  of  camp  and  the  pub- 
lic property  at  Walnut  Springs.  It  was  supposed 
that  the  regiment  would  return  to  its  camp  in  the 
morning. 

The  point  for  establishing  the  siege-battery  was 
reached  and  the  work  performed  without  attract- 
ing the  attention  of  the  enemy.  At  daylight  the  8eptai.iM6 
next  morning  fire  was  opened  on  both  sides,  and 
continued  with  what  seemed  to  me  at  that  day 
great  fury.  My  curiosity  got  the  better  of  my 
judgment,  and  I  mounted  a  horse  and  rode  to  the 
front  to  see  what  was  going  on.  I  had  been  there 
but  a  short  time  when  an  order  to  charge  was  8totlM,viii, 
given ;  and,  lacking  the  moral  courage  to  return  ^ 
to  camp,— where  I  had  been  ordered  to  stay,-;- 1 
charged  with  the  regiment.  As  soon  as  the  troops 
were  out  of  the  depression  they  came  under  the 
fire  of  Black  Fort.  As  they  advanced  they  got 
under  fii'e  from  batteries  guarding  the  east  or  lower 
end  of  the  city,  and  of  musketry.  About  one  third 
of  the  men  engaged  in  the  charge  were  killed  or 
wounded  in  the  speice  of  a  few  minutes.  We  re- 
treated to  get  out  of  fire — not  backward,  but  east- 
ward, and  pei-pendicular  to  the  direct  road  running 
into  the  city  from  Walnut  Springs.  I  was,  I  be- 
lieve, the  only  person  in  the  Fourth  Infantry  in 
the  charge  who  was  on  horseback.  When  we  got 
to  a  place  of  safety  the  regiment  halted  and  drew 
itself  together — what  was  left  of  it.    The  adjutant 


84  PEKSONAL  MEMOIRS  OP  U.  S.  GEANT 

CHAF.vra  from  running  on  foot  in  the  charge  and  retreat, 
and,  seeing  me  on  horseback,  expressed  a  wish  that 
he  could  be  mounted  also.  I  offered  him  my  horse, 
and  he  accepted  the  offer.  A  few  minutes  later  I 
saw  a  soldier — a  quartermaster's  man — mounted, 
not  far  away.  I  ran  to  him,  took  his  horse,  and 
was  back  with  the  regiment  in  a  few  minutes.  In 
a  short  time  we  were  off  again ;  and  the  next  place 
of  safety  from  the  shots  of  the  enemy  that  I  recol- 
lect of  being  in  was  a  field  of  cane  or  com  to  the 
northeast  of  the  lower  batteries.    The  adjutant  to 

iSS^uly  ^hom  I  had  loaned  my  horse  was  killed,  and  I  was 
designated  to  act  in  his  place. 

This  charge  was  ill  conceived  or  badly  executed. 
We  belonged  to  the  brigade  commanded  by  Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Garland,  and  he  had  received  orders 
to  charge  the  lower  batteries  of  the  city,  and  carry 
thqm  if  he  could  without  too  much  loss,  for  the 
purpose  of  creating  a  diversion  in  favor  of  Worth, 
who  was  conducting  the  movement  which  it  was 
intended  should  be  decisive.  By  a  movement  by 
the  left  flank  Garland  could  have  led  his  men 
beyond  the  range  of  the  fire  from  Black  Fort,  and 
advanced  towai-d  the  northeast  angle  of  the  city,  as 
well  covered  from  fire  as  could  be  expected.  There 
was  no  undue  loss  of  life  in  reaching  the  lower  end 
of  Monterey,  except  that  sustained  by  Garland's 
command. 

Meanwhile,  Quitman's  brigade,  conducted  by  an 
officer  of  engineers,  had  reached  the  eastern  end  of 
the  city,  and  was  placed  under  cover  of  the  houses 

8tetei.vin.  ^tl^^^^^  much  loss.    Colonel  Garland's  brigade  also 


BATTLE  OF  MONTEREY  85 

from  which  they  cotdd  fire  into  a  little  battery  co v-  chap,  vni 
ering  the  approaches  to  the  lower  end  of  the  city, 
the  battery  was  speedily  captured,  and  its  guns 
were  turned  upon  another  work  of  the  enemy.  An 
entrance  into  the  east  end  of  the  city  was  now  se- 
cured, and  the  houses  protected  our  troops  so  long 
as  they  were  inactive. 
On  the  west  General  Worth  had  reached  the  cSf*-g??v 

states,  vllly 

Saltillo  road  after  some  fighting,  but  without  heavy  *®*-*^ 
loss.  He  turned  from  his  new  position  and  caj)- 
tured  the  forts  on  both  heights  in  that  quarter. 
This  gave  him  possession  of  the  upper  or  west  end 
of  Monterey.  Troops  from  both  Twiggs's  and  But- 
ler's divisions  were  in  possession  of  the  east  end  of 
the  town,  but  the  Black  Fort  to  the  north  of  the 
town  and  the  plaza  in  the  center  were  still  in  the 
possession  of  the  enemy.  Our  camps  at  Walnut 
Springs,  three  miles  away,  were  guarded  by  a  com- 
pany from  each  regiment.  A  regiment  of  Kentucky 
volunteers  guarded  the  mortars  and  howitzers  en- 
gaged against  Black  Fort.  Practically  Monterey 
was  invested. 

There  was  nothing  done  on  the  22d  by  the  United  sept,  im 
States  troops ;  but  the  enemy  kept  up  a  harmless 
fire  upon  us  from  Black  Fort  and  the  batteries  still 
in  their  possession  at  the  east  end  of  the  city.  Dur- 
ing the  night  they  evacuated  these ;  so  that  on  the 
morning  of  the  23d  we  held  undisputed  possession 
of  the  east  end  of  Monterey. 

Twiggs's  division  was  at  the  lower  end  of  tlx^ 
city,  and  well  covered  from  the  fire  of  the  enenciy. 
But  thfi  streets  leadincr  to  thft  ulaza — all  SDani»T, 


86 


PEBSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GBANT 


Howard, 
"Gen.  Tay- 
lor/' p.  175 


CHAP,  vm  directions  by  artillery.  The  houses  were  flat-roofed 
and  but  one  or  two  stories  high,  and  about  the  plaza 
the  roofs  were  manned  with  infantry,  the  troops 
being  protected  from  our  fire  by  parapets  made  of 
sand-bags.  All  advances  into  the  city  were  thus 
attended  with  much  danger.  While  moving  along 
streets  which  did  not  lead  to  the  plaza,  our  men 
were  protected  from  the  fire  and  from  the  view  of 
the  enemy,  except  at  the  crossings ;  but  at  these  a 
volley  of  musketry  and  a  discharge  of  grape-shot 
were  invariably  encountered.  The  Third  and 
Fourth  regiments  of  infantry  made  an  advance 
nearly  to  the  plaza  in  this  way,  and  with  heavy- 
loss.  The  loss  of  the  Third  Infantry  in  commis- 
sioned officers  was  especially  severe.  There  were 
only  five  companies  of  the  regiment  and  not  over 
twelve  officers  present,  and  five  of  these  officers 
were  killed.  When  within  a  square  of  the  plaza 
this  small  command — ten  companies  in  all — was 
brought  to  a  halt.  Placing  themselves  under  cover 
from  the  shots  of  the  enemy,  the  men  would  watch 
to  detect  a  head  above  the  sand-bags  on  the  neigh- 
boring houses.  The  exposure  of  a  single  head 
would  bring  a  volley  from  our  soldiers. 

We  had  not  occupied  this  position  long  when  it 
was  discovered  that  our  ammunition  was  growing 
low.  I  volunteered  to  go  back^  to  the  point  we 
had  started  from,  report  our  position  to  General 


Volun- 
teered ser- 
vlcee 


1  General  Garland  expressed  a    be  reinforced.    Deenxinti:  the  re- 


BATTLE  OF  MONTEREY  87 

Twiggs,  and  ask  for  ammunition  to  be  forwarded,  ceip.vin 
We  were  at  this  time  occupying  ground  off  from 
the  street,  in  rear  of  the  houses.  My  ride  back 
was  an  exposed  one.  Before  starting  I  adjusted 
myself  on  the  side  of  my  horse  farthest  from  the 
enemy ;  and  with  only  one  foot  holding  to  the  cantle 
of  the  saddle,  and  an  arm  over  the  neck  of  the 
horse  exposed,  I  started  at  full  run.  It  was  only 
at  street-crossings  that  my  horse  was  under  fire; 
but  these  I  crossed  at  such  a  flying  rate  that  gen- 
erally I  was  past  and  under  cover  of  the  next  block 
of  houses  before  the  enemy  fired.  I  got  out  safely 
without  a  scratch. 

At  one  place  on  my  ride  I  saw  a  sentry  walking 
in  front  of  a  house,  and  stopped  to  inquire  what  he 
was  doing  there.    Finding  that  the  house  was  full 
of  wounded  American  officers  and  soldiers,  I  dis-  ^'JJgSJJJJ^- 
mounted  and  went  in.     I  found  there  Captain  ^:J;s^. 
Williams,  of  the  Engineer  Corps,  wounded  in  the     ^'^^ 
head,  probably  fatally,  and  Lieutenant  Terrett,  also  ^{?  JjJ^^ 
badly  wounded,  his  bowels  protruding  from  his  qS^;\^ 
wound.    There  were  quite  a  number  of  soldiers 
also.    Promising  them  to  report  their  situation,  I 
left,  readjusted  myself  to  my  horse,  recommenced 
the  run,  and  was  soon  with  the  troops  at  the  east 
end.     Before  ammunition  could  be  collected  the 
two  regiments  I  had  been  with  were  seen  return- 
ing, running  the  same  gauntlet  in  getting  out  that 
they  had  passed  in  going  in,  but  with  compara- 
tively little  loss.     The  movement  was  counter- 
manded and  the  troops  were  withdrawn.     T\xe 
Door  wounded  officers  and  mftn  I  liad  found   f «ll 


88  FEBSONAL  MEMOIBS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

CHAP.vin       While!  this  was  going  on  at  the  east,  General 
uQe^^y.  Worth,  with  a  small  division  of  troops,  was  ad- 
\oTrp>m   ya]2cing  toward  the  plaza  from  the  opposite  end  of 
the  city.     He  resorted  to  a  better  expedient  for 
getting  to  the  plaza — the  citadel — than  we  did  on 
the  east.    Instead  of  moving  by  the  open  streets, 
he  advanced  through  the  houses,  cutting  passage- 
ways from  one  to  another.    Without  much  loss  of 
life  he  got  so  near  the  plaza  during  the  night  that 
Sept  24. 1846  before  morning  Ampudia,  the  Mexican  commander, 
made  overtures  for  the  surrender  of  the  city  and 
"Q^^Y-  garrison.   This  stopped  all  further  hostilities.    The 
ior,"^.i7i-  ^QYjj^Q  Qf  surrender  were  soon  agreed  upon.    The 
prisoners  were  paroled  and  permitted  to  take  their 
horses  and  personal  property  with  them. 

My  pity  was  aroused  by  the  sight  of  the  Mexican 
garrison  of  Monterey  marching  out  of  town  as 
prisoners,  and  no  doubt  the  same  feeling  was  ex- 
perienced by  most  of  our  army  who  witnessed  it. 
Many  of  the  prisoners  were  cavalry,  armed  with 
lances,  and  mounted  on  miserable  little  half -starved 
horses  that  did  not  look  as  if  they  could  carry  their 
riders  out  of  town.  The  men  looked  in  but  little 
better  condition.  I  thought  how  little  interest  the 
men  before  me  had  in  the  results  of  the  war,  and 
how  little  knowledge  they  had  of  "  what  it  was  all 
about.^ 
stnS^der  After  the  surrender  of  the  garrison  of  Monterey 
*®*^^      a  quiet  camp  life  was  led  until  midwinter.    As  had 

Vl/%^\«%      ^l^/%      ^AM^      y^v^      ^Vkr\     1^'«>^     /-L«.A  ««k  y^  y%        ^Vk/-k      wAyNVNl/%     wrVk/^ 


SUBBEKDEB  OF  THE  CITY  89 

ican  people  did  not  regret  our  departure  as  much  chap-vhi 
as  they  had  r^retted  our  coming.  Property  and 
person  were  thoroughly  protected,  and  a  market 
was  afforded  for  all  the  products  of  the  country 
such  as  the  people  had  never  enjoyed  before.  The 
educated  and  wealthy  portion  of  the  population 
here,  as  elsewhere,  abandoned  their  homes  and  re- 
mained away  from  them  as  long  as  they  were  in  the 
possession  of  the  invaders ;  but  this  class  formed  a 
very  small  percentage  of  the  whole  population. 


CHAPTER  IX 

POLITICAL  INTRIGUE  —  BUENA  VISTA  —  MOVEMENT 
AGAINST  VERA  CRUZ  —  SIEGE  AND  CAPTURE  OP 
VERA  CRUZ 

CHAP.  IX    rilHE  Mexican  war  was  a  political  war,  and  the 

gS;.  juiy  administration  conducting  it  desired  to  make 

MSS^oen.    party  capital  out  of  it.    General  Scott  was  at  the 

iS?  b!?1    head  of  the  army,  and,  being  a  soldier  of  acknow- 

^»tor.^'    ledged  professional  capacity,  his  claim  to  the  com- 

^IJiiay  wV  ^^^^  ^^  *^^  forces  in  the  field  was  almost  indis- 

^^       putable,  and  does  not  seem  to  have  been  denied  by 

m^t  Mei:.   I^^sidcut  Polk,  or  Marcy,  his  Secretary  of  War. 

war,p.m   gcott  was  a  Whig  and  the  administration  was 

Democratic.    General  Scott  was  also  known  to 

^cS^nom.  ^^^^  political  aspirations,  and  nothing  so  popular- 

omdl  ^^SL  izes  a  candidate  for  high  civU  positions  as  military 

^^*       victories. .  It  would  not  do,  therefore,  to  give  him 

command  of  the  "  army  of  conquest."    The  plans 

submitted  by  Scott  for  a  campaign  in  Mexico  were 

disapproved  by  the  administration,  and  he  replied, 

in  a  tone  possibly  a  little  disrespectful,  to  the  eflfect 

that  if  a  soldier's  plans  were  not  to  be  supported  by 

the  administration,  success  could  not  be  expected. 

jj^^rtP   This  was  on  the  27th  of  May,  1846.     Four  days 

jto!5u777;  lat^r  General  Scott  was  notified  that  he  need  not 


POLITICAL  mTBIGUE  91 

Colonel  Zachary  Taylor — a  brigadier-general  by    chap.ix 
brevet — was  therefore  left  in  command.    He  too  ^^.^^^: 
was  a  Whig,  but  was  not  supposed  to  entertain    oen.  Dec!' 
any  political  ambitions ;  nor  did  he ;  but  after  the    MaS.^-oen. 
fall  of  Monterey — his  third  battle  and  third  com-  ^^p^ 
plete  victory — the  Whig  papers  at  home  began  to    ^\^  »» 
speak  of  him  as  the  candidate  of  their  party  for  the 
Presidency.    Something  had  to  be  done  to  neutral- 
ize his  growing  popularity.    He  could  not  be  re- 
lieved from  duty  in  the  field,  where  all  his  battles 
had  been  victories ;  the  design  would  have  been  too 
transparent.   It  was  finally  decided  to  send  General  ^^pgj!)" 
Scott  to  Mexico  in  chief  command,  and  to  author-      ^-^ 
ize  him  to  carry  out  his  own  original  plan — that 
is,  capture  Vera  Cruz  and  march  upon  the  capital 
of  the  country.     It  was  no  doubt  supposed  that 
ScotVs  ambition  would  lead  him  to  slaughter  Tay- 
lor or  destroy  his  chances  for  the  Presidency,  and 
yet  it  was  hoped  that  he  would  not  make  suflBcient 
capital  himself  to  secure  the  prize. 

The  administration  had  indeed  a  most  embar- 
rassing problem  to  solve.  It  was  engaged  in  a  war 
of  conquest  which  must  be  carried  to  a  successful 
issue,  or  the  political  object  would  be  unattained. 
Yet  all  the  capable  officers  of  the  reqiiisite  rank  ibid.  p.  400 
belonged  to  the  opposition,  and  the  man  selected 
for  his  lack  of  political  ambition  had  himself  be- 
come a  prominent  candidate  for  the  Presidency. 
It  was  necessary  to  destroy  his  chances  promptly. 
The  problem  was  to  do  this  without  the  loss  of 
conquest  and  without  permitting  another  general 
of  the  same  political  party  to  acquire  like  popular- 
itv.     The  fact  is.  the  administration  of  Mr.  Polk 


92  PEBSONAL  MEMOIES  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

CHAP.  IX    speak  more  correctly,  to  drive  him  to  such  despera- 
tion that  he  would  disgrace  himself. 

General  Scott  had  opposed  conquest  by  the  way 
of  the  Rio  Grande,  Matamoras,  and  Saltillo  from 

"G?n!^y-  *^®  ^^*'  -^^^  *^^*  ^^  ^^  ^  command  of  all  the 
ior/»ro.M5-  forces  in  Mexico  he  withdrew  from  Taylor  most  of 
his  regular  troops,  and  left  him  only  enough  volun- 
teers, as  he  thought,  to  hold  the  line  then  in  pos- 
session of  the  invading  army.  Indeed,  Scott  did 
not  deem  it  important  to  hold  anything  beyond 
the  Eio  Grande,  and  authorized  Taylor  to  fall  back 
to  that  line  if  he  chose.  General  Taylor  protested 
against  the  depletion  of  his  army,  and  his  subse- 
quent movement  upon  Buena  Vista  would  indicate 
that  he  did  not  share  the  views  of  his  chief  in  re- 
gard to  the  unimportance  of  conquest  beyond  the 
Eio  Grande. 

Scott  had  estimated  the  men  and  material  that 

would  be  required  to  capture  Vera  Cruz  and  to 

march  on  the  capital  of  the  country,  two  himdred 

Wo***  ^h^  ^^^  sixty  miles  in  the  interior.    He  was  promised 

pp.400.4fi   aji  he  asked,  and  seemed  to  have  not  only  the 

confidence  of  the  President,  but  his  sincere  good 

wishes.     The  promises  were  all  broken.     Only 

about  half  the  troops  were  furnished  that  had  been 

pledged,  other  war  material  was  withheld,  and 

Scott  had  scarcely  started  for  Mexico  before  the 

President  undertook  to  supersede  him  by  the  ap- 

i^"^^  pointment  of  Senator  Thomas  H.  Benton  as  lieu- 

£:?;o5S;!  tenant-ereneral.    This  beins:  refused  bv  Conerress, 


nur. 


BUENA  VISTA  93 

army ;  but  Congress  failed  to  accede  to  this  propo-    chap,  ix 
sition  as  well,  and  Scott  remained  in  command. 
But  every  general  appointed  to  serve  under  him 
was  politically  opposed  to  the  chief,  and  several 
were  personally  hostile. 

General  Scott  reached  Brazos  Santiago  or  Point 
Isabel,  at  the  mouth  of  the  Rio  Grande,  late  in 
December,  1846,  and  proceeded  at  once  up  the  river 
to  Camargo,  where  he  had  written  General  Taylor 
to  meet  him.  Taylor,  however,  had  gone  to  or  to-  ..ggT^^y. 
^ard  Tampico,  for  the  purpose  of  establishing  a  ^^^'^'^-^^^ 
post  there.  He  had  started  on  this  march  before 
he  was  aware  of  General  Scott  being  in  the  coim- 
try.  Under  these  circumstances,  Scott  had  to  issue 
his  orders  designating  the  troops  to  be  withdrawn 
from  Taylor  without  the  personal  consultation  he 
had  expected  to  hold  with  his  subordinate. 

General  Taylor's  victory  at  Buena  Vista,  Febru-  ^^f  • 
ary  22,  23,  and  24, 1847,  with  an  army  composed 
almost  entirely  of  volimteers  who  had  not  been 
in  battle  before,  and  over  a  vastly  superior  force 
numerically,  made  his  nomination  for  the  Presi- 
dency by  the  Whigs  a  foregone  conclusion.  He 
was  nominated  and  elected  in  1848.  I  believe  that  ™^- pl^ 
he  sincerely  regretted  this  turn  in  his  fortunes, 
preferring  the  peace  afforded  by  a  quiet  life  free 
from  abuse  to  the  honor  of  filling  the  highest  office 
in  the  gift  of  any  people — the  Presidency  of  the 
United  States. 

When  General  Scott  assumed  command  of  the 
army  of  invasion  I  was  in  the  division  of  General 
David  Twiggs,  in  Taylor's  command;  but  under 
thft  new  ordftrs  mv  rAcnTYiAnt  was  transfGrPAd   t^ 


94  PERSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

CHAP.  IX  sei*ved  to  the  close  of  the  war.  The  troops  with- 
drawn from  Taylor  to  form  part  of  the  forces  to 
operate  against  Vera  Cruz  were  assembled  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Eio  Grande  preparatory  to  embarka- 

oSSSStOT-  *^^^  ^^^  *^®^  destination.  I  found  General  Worth 
^^^  a  different  m^n  from  any  I  had  before  served 
directly  under.  He  was  nervous,  impatient,  and 
restless  on  the  march,  or  when  important  or  re- 
sponsible duty  confronted  him.  There  was  not 
the  least  reason  for  haste  on  the  march,  for  it  was 
known  that  it  would  take  weeks  to  assemble  ship- 
ping enough  at  the  point  of  our  embarkation  to 
carry  the  army;  but  General  Worth  moved  his 
division  with  a  rapidity  that  would  have  been 
commendable  had  he  been  going  to  the  relief  of  a 
beleaguered  garrison.  The  length  of  the  marches 
was  regulated  by  the  distances  between  places  af- 
fording a  supply  of  water  for  the  troops,  and  these 
distances  were  sometimes  long  and  sometimes 
short.  General  Woi-th,  on  one  occasion  at  least, 
after  having  made  the  full  distance  intended  for 
the  day,  and  after  the  troops  were  in  camp  and 
preparing  their  food,  ordered  tents  struck,  and 
made  the  march  that  night  which  had  been  in- 
tended for  the  next  day.  Some  commanders  can 
move  troops  so  as  to  get  the  maximum  distance 
out  of  them  without  fatigue,  while  others  can  weai* 
them  out  in  a  few  days  without  accomplishing  so 
much.  General  Worth  belonged  to  this  latter  class. 
He  enjoyed,  however,  a  fine  reputation  for  his 


MOVEMENT  AGAINST  VERA  CRUZ  95 

for  several  weeks,  awaiting  the  arrival  of  transports  chip,  ix 
to  carry  it  to  its  new  field  of  operations.  The 
transports  were  all  sailing-vessels.  The  passage 
was  a  tedious  one,  and  many  of  the  troops  were  on 
shipboard  over  thirty  days  from  the  embarkation 
at  the  mouth  of  the  Eio  Grande  to  the  time  of 
debarkation  south  of  Vera  Cruz.  The  trip  was  a 
comfortless  one  for  officers  and  men.  The  trans- 
ports used  were  built  for  carrying  freight  and  pos- 
sessed but  limited  accommodations  for  passengers, 
and  the  climate  added  to  the  discomfort  of  alL 

The  transports  with  troops  were  assembled  in 
the  harbor  of  Anton  Lizardo,  some  sixteen  miles  82^^5*<>- 

'  Dlograpliy, 

south  of  Vera  Cruz,  as  they  arrived,  and  there  ^-^^ 
awaited  the  remainder  of  the  fleet,  bringing  artil- 
lery, ammunition,  and  supplies  of  all  kinds  from 
the  North.  With  the  fleet  there  was  a  little  steam- 
propeller  despatch-boat — the  first  vessel  of  the 
'kind  I  had  ever  seen,  and  probably  the  first  of  its 
kind  ever  seen  by  any  one  then  with  the  army. 
At  that  day  ocean  steamers  were  rare,  and  what 
there  were  were  side-wheelers.  This  little  vessel, 
going  through  the  fleet  so  fast,  so  noiselessly,  and 
with  its  propeller  under  water  out  of  view,  attracted 
a  great  deal  of  attention.  I  recollect  that  Lieuten- 
ant Sidney  Smith,  of  the  Fourth  Infantry,  by  whom  ^1^^^^. 
I  happened  to  be  standing  on  the  deck  of  a  vessel  ^^iJf i^T 
when  this  propeller  was  passing,  exclaimed,  "  Why, 
the  thing  looks  as  if  it  was  propelled  by  the  force 
of  circimistances  I " 

Finally,  on  the  7th  of  March,  1847,  the  little  army 
of  ten  or  twelve  thousand  men  given  Scott  to  in- 


96  FEBSONAL  MEMOHtS  OF  U.  S.  GBANT 

CHAP.  IX  greatest  possible  natural  advantages  for  defense — 
was  all  assembled  and  ready  to  commence  the  peril- 
ous task  of  landing  from  vessels  lying  in  the  open 
sea. 

Mar.  9,1847  The  debarkation  took  place  inside  of  the  little 
island  of  Sacrificios,  some  three  mUes  south  of 
Vera  Cruz.  The  vessels  could  not  get  anywhere 
near  shore,  so  that  everything  had  to  be  landed  in 

wo*^p^  lighters  or  surf-boats ;  General  Scott  had  provided 

pp.  irf^  these  before  leaving  the  North.  The  breakers  were* 
sometimes  high,  so  that  the  landing  was  tedious. 
The  men  were  got  ashore  rapidly,  because  they 
could  wade  when  they  came  to  shallow  water ;  but 
the  camp  and  garrison  equipage,  provisions,  am- 
munition, and  all  stores  had  to  be  protected  from 
the  salt  water,  and  therefore  their  landing  took 
several  days.  The  Mexicans  were  very  kind  to  us, 
however,  and  threw  no  obstacles  in  the  way  of  our 
landing  except  an  occasional  shot  from  their  near-" 
est  fort.    During  the  debarkation  one  shot  took  oflE 

^^j^j^-  the  head  of  Major  Albertis.    No  other,  I  believe, 

Mai?iMW7  reached  anywhere  near  the  same  distance.  On  the 
9th  of  March  the  troops  were  landed,  and  the  in- 
vestment of  Vera  Cruz,  from  the  Gulf  of  Mexico 
south  of  the  city  to  the  Gulf  again  on  the  north, 
was  soon  and  easily  eflfected.  The  landing  of  stores 
was  continued  until  everything  was  got  ashore. 

soott,  Auto-      Vera  Cruz,  at  the  time  of  which  I  write  and  up 

blogTaphy»  '  "^ 

pp.  421-429  to  1880,  was  a  walled  city.  The  wall  extended  from 
the  water's  edge  south  of  the  town  to  the  water 
again  on  the  north.  There  were  fortifications  at 
intArvflla  alone  thft  linft  and  at  thft  anc^lfts.     In  front 


I.IKITKN ANT  I',  s.  (;kant  ano  (;knkk\i.  ai.kxandhk  havs. 

(l  KOM    A    »'HOT(M;KArH    OF    AN    Ol.D    U  \(;i  KK'UKO  IVI'E.) 


KMJT X  KJ Ik£4     Vrj       V  JUUL     V/AUA 


fication  of  large  dimensions  and  great  strength  for  chap.ix 
that  period.  Against  artillery  of  the  present  day 
the  land  forts  and  walls  would  prove  elements  of 
weakness  rather  than  strength.  After  the  invading 
army  had  established  their  camps  out  of  range  of  the 
fire  from  the  city,  batteries  were  placed  under  cover 
of  night,  far  to  the  front  of  the  line  where  the  troops 
lay.  These  batteries  were  intrenched  and  the  ap- 
proaches suflBciently  protected.  If  a  sortie  had  been 
made  at  any  time  by  the  Mexicans,  the  men  serv- 
ing the  batteries  could  have  been  quickly  reinforced 
without  great  exposure  to  the  fire  from  the  enemy's 
main  line.  No  serious  attempt  was  made  to  cap- 
ture the  batteries  or  to  drive  our  troops  away. 

The  siege  continued,  with  brisk  firing  on  our 
side,  till  the  27th  of  March,  by  which  time  a  con-  imt 
siderable  breach  had  been  made  in  the  wall  sur- 
rounding the  city.  Upon  this  General  Morales, 
who  was  governor  of  both  the  city  and  of  San 
Juan  de  Ulloa,  commenced  a  correspondence  with 
General  Scott  looking  to  the  surrender  of  the  town, 
forts,  and  garrison.  On  the  29th  Vera  Cruz  and 
San  Juan  de  Ulloa  were  occupied  by  Scott's  army. 
About  five  thousand  prisoners  and  four  hundred  ^^(JiJiJ®™ 
pieces  of  artillery,  besides  large  amounts  of  small 
arms  and  ammunition,  fell  into  the  hands  of  the 
victorious  force.  The  casualties  on  oui*  side  during 
the  siege  amounted  to  64  officers  and  men,  killed 
and  woimded. 


Vol.  L— 7 


CHAPTER  X 

MABCH  TO  JALAPA — BATTLE  OF  CEBEO  GORDO — PEEOTE 
— PUEBLA — SCOTT  AND  TAYLOR 

CHAF.x  /GENERAL  SCOTT  had  less  than  twelve  thou- 
Boott.Auto-  ^J  sand  men  at  Vera  Cruz.  He  had  been  promised 
c^m&*  by  the  administration  a  very  much  larger  force — 
or  claimed  that  he  had,  and  he  was  a  man  of  verac- 
ity. Twelve  thousand  was  a  very  small  army  with 
which  to  penetrate  two  hundred  and  sixty  miles  into 
an  enemy's  country,  and  to  besiege  the  capital — a 
city,  at  that  time,  of  largely  over  one  himdred  thou- 
see  p.  127  sand  inhabitants.  Then,  too,  any  line  of  march  that 
could  be  selected  led  through  mountain  passes  easily 
defended.  In  fact,  there  were  at  that  time  but  two 
roads  from  Vera  Cruz  to  the  city  of  Mexico  that 
could  be  taken  by  an  army — one  by  Jalapa  and 
Perote,  the  other  by  Cordova  and  Orizaba,  the  two 
coming  together  on  the  great  plain  which  extends 
to  the  city  of  Mexico  after  the  range  of  mountains 
is  passed. 
wS^phyT  ^^  ^^^  ^^^  important  to  get  the  army  away  from 
Vera  Cruz  as  soon  as  possible,  in  order  to  avoid  the 
yellow  fever,  or  vomito,  which  usually  visits  that 
city  early  in  the  year,  and  is  very  fatal  to  persons 


p. 


MABGH  TO  JALAFA  99 

ply  the  army  to  Jalapa,  sixty-five  miles  in  the  in-    chap,  x 
tenor,  and  above  the  fevers  of  the  coast.    At  that 
point  the  couhtry  is  fertile,  and  an  army  of  the  size 
of  General  Scott^s  could  subsist  there  for  an  indefi- 
nite period.    Not  counting  the  sick,  the  weak,  and 
the  garrisons  for  the  captured  city  and  fort,  the  mov* 
ing  column  was  now  leas  than  ten  thousand  strong. 
This  force  was  composed  of  three  divisions,  under 
Generals  Twiggs,  Patterson,  and  Worth.    The  im-  S2SM5!l 
portance  of  escaping  the  vomito  was  so  great  that  j^T/iaS. 
as  soon  as  transportation  enough  could  be  got   ^i^.' 
together  to  move  a  division  the  advance  was  com-  Aug.  7.  iari 
menced.     On  the  8th  of  April  Twiggs's  division       mi 
started  for  Jalapa.    He  was  followed  very  soon  by 
Patterson  with  his  division.     General  Worth  was  ^JS^^^^J^ 
to  bring  up  the  rear  with  his  command  as  soon  as  ^i^n^'" 
transportation  enough  was  assembled  to  carry  six   ^^X"' 
days'  rations  for  his  troops,  with  the  necessary 
amimunition  and  camp  and  garrison  equipage.    It 
was  the  13th  of  April  before  this  division  left  Vera 
Cruz. 

The  leading  division  ran  against  the  enemy  at 
Cerro  Gordo,  some  fifty  miles  west,  on  the  road  to 
Jalapa,  and  went  into  camp  at  Plan  del  Eio,  about 
three  miles  from  the  fortifications.  General  Pat- 
terson reached  Plan  del  Eio  with  his  division  soon 
after  Twiggs  arrived.  The  two  were  then  secure 
against  an  attack  from  Santa  Anna,  who  com- 
manded the  Mexican  forces.  At  all  events,  they 
confronted  the  enemy  without  reinforcements  and 
without  molestation  until  the  18th  of  April.    Gen- 


100  PERSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

•CHAP.  X  personal  supervision.  He  at  once  commenced  his 
preparations  for  the  capture  of  the  position  held 
by  Santa  Anna  and  of  the  troops  holding  it. 

Cerro  Gordo  is  one  of  the  higher  spurs  of  the 
mountains  some  twelve  to  fifteen  miles  east  of 
Jalapa,  and  Santa  Anna  had  selected  this  point  as 
the  easiest  to  defend  against  an  invading  army. 

wo^h^T  T^®  ^^^ — said  to  have  been  built  by  Cortez — 
^'^  zigzags  aroimd  the  mountain-side,  and  was  de- 
fended at  every  turn  by  artillery.  On  either  side 
were  deep  chiasms  or  mountain  walls.  A  direct 
attack  along  the  road  was  an  impossibility.  A 
flank  movement  seemed  equally  impossible.  After 
the  arrival  of  the  commanding  general  upon  the 
scene,  reconnaissances  were  sent  out  to  find,  or  to 
make,  a  road  by  which  the  rear  of  the  enemy's 
works  might  be  reached  without  a  front  attack. 
These  reconnaissances  were  made  under  the  super- 
vision of  Captain  Robert  E.  Lee,  assisted  by  Lieu- 

^J2^^^^  tenants  P.  G.  T.  Beauregard,  Isaac  I.  Stevens,  Z.  B. 

lSe^^u^  Tower,  G.  W.  Smith,  George  B.  McClellan,  and  J.  G. 

^G^^^^."  Foster,  of  the  corps  of  engineers,  all  officers  who 

fc!ci^lntiiS!  attained  rank  and  fame,  on  one  side  or  the  other, 
in  the  gi*eat  conflict  for  the  preservation  of  the 
unity  of  the  nation.  The  reconnaissance  was  com- 
pleted, and  the  labor  of  cutting  out  and  making 
roads  by  the  flank  of  the  enemy  was  eflfected  by 

Apr.,  1847  the  17th  of  the  month.  This  was  accomplished 
without  the  knowledge  of  Santa  Anna  or  his  army, 
and  over  ground  where  he  supposed  it  impossible. 


BATTLE  OF  CEKEO  GORDO  101 

any  other,  where  orders  issued  before  an  engage-    chap,  x 
ment  were  nearer  being  a  correct  report  of  what 
afterward  took  place.     Under  the  supervision  of 
the  engineers,  roadways  had  been  opened  over 
chasms  to  the  right,  where  the  walls  were  so  steep 
that  men  could  barely  climb  them ;  animals  could 
not.    These  had  been  opened  under  cover  of  night 
without  attracting  the  notice  of  the  enemy.    The 
engineers  who  had  directed  the  opening  led  the 
way,  and  the  troops  followed.     Artillery  was  let 
down  the  steep  slopes  by  hand,  the  men  engaged 
attaching  a  strong  rope  to  the  rear  axle  and  letting 
the  guns  down,  a  piece  at  a  time,  while  the  men 
at  the  ropes  kept  their  ground  on  top,  paying  out 
gradually,  while  a  few  at  the  front  directed  the 
course  of  the  piece.    In  like  manner  the  guns  were 
drawn  by  hand  up  the  opposite  slopes.    In  this 
way  Scott^s  troops  reached  their  assigned  position 
in  rear  of  most  of  the  intrenchments  of  the  enemy 
imobsei*ved.    The  attack  was  made,  the  Mexican 
reserves  behind  the  works  beat  a  hasty  retreat,  and 
those  occupying  them  surrendered.     On  the  left 
General  Pillow's  conmiand  made  a  formidable  dem-    ^i^SS^f • 
onstration,  which  doubtless  held  a  part  of  the  enemy  ^SfS^i. 
in  his  front  and  contributed  to  the  victory.    I  am  G^'uf^i'. 
not  pretending  to  give  full  details  of  all  the  battles   ^.-o^n.' 
fought,  but  of  the  portion  that  I  saw.    There  were    ' «.  i«i 
troops  engaged  on  both  sides  at  other  points,  where 
both  sustained  losses;  but  the  battle  was  won  as 
here  narrated. 

The  surprise  of  the  enemy  was  complete,  the  vie-  ^^byT 
torv  overwhelminfiT :  some  thrfifi  thousand  nrianiiArfl       p-  *** 


102  PEESONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GBANT 

CHAP.  X  the  artillery  parked,  and  the  small  arms  and  ammu- 
nition destroyed.  The  battle  of  Buena  Vista  was 
probably  very  important  to  the  success  of  General 
Scott  at  Cerro  Gordo  and  in  his  entire  campaign 
from  Vera  Cruz  to  the  great  plains  reaching  to  the 
city  of  Mexico.  The  only  army  Santa  Anna  had 
to  protect  his  capital  and  the  mountain  passes  west 
of  Vera  Cruz  was  the  one  he  had  with  him  con- 
fronting General  Taylor.  It  is  not  likely  that  he 
would  have  gone  as  far  north  as  Monterey  to  attack 
the  United  States  troops  when  he  knew  his  coun- 
try was  threatened  with  invasion  farther  south. 
When  Taylor  moved  to  Saltillo  and  then  advanced 
on  to  Buena  Vista,  Santa  Anna  crossed  the  desert 
confronting  the  invading  army,  hoping,  no  doubt, 
to  crush  it  and  get  back  in  time  to  meet  General 
Scott  in  the  mountain  passes  west  of  Vera  Cruz. 
His  attack  on  Taylor  was  disastrous  to  the  Mex- 

H^*Mex.   ^^^^^  army ;  but,  notwithstanding  this,  he  marched 

^m^^'  his  army  to  Cerro  Gordo — a  distance  not  much 
short  of  one  thousand  miles  by  the  line  he  had  to 
travel — in  time  to  intrench  himself  well  before 
Scott  got  there.  If  he  had  been  successful  at  Buena 
Vista  his  troops  would  no  doubt  have  made  a  more 
stubborn  resistance  at  Cerro  Qt)rdo.  Had  the  bat- 
tle of  Buena  Vista  not  been  fought,  Santa  Anna 
would  have  had  time  to  move  leisurely  to  meet 
the  invader  farther  south,  and  with  an  army  not 
demoralized  nor  depleted  by  defeat. 

Ibid.  p.  297  After  the  battle  the  victorious  army  moved  on  to 
Jalapa,  where  it  was  in  a  beautiful,  productive,  and 
healthv  countrv,  far  above  the  fevers  of  the  coast 


PEROTE  103 

the  road  is  easy  of  defense.  It  was  important,  there-  chap,  x 
fore,  to  get  possession  of  the  great  highway  between 
the  sea-coast  and  the  capital  np  to  the  point  where 
it  leaves  the  mountains,  before  the  enemy  could 
have  time  to  reorganize  and  fortify  in  our  front. 
Worth's  division  was  selected  to  go  forward  to  se- 
cure this  result.    The  division  marched  to  Perote  soott,  Auto- 

bioffrapby, 

on  the  great  plain,  not  far  from  where  the  road  ^'^^^^}' 
debouches  from  the  mountains.    There  is  a  low,    ^^p/^""' 
strong  fort  on  the  plain  in  front  of  the  town,  known 
as  the  Castle  of  Perote.    This,  however,  offered 
no  resistance,  and  fell  into  our  hands,  with  its 
armament. 

General  Scott  having  now  only  nine  or  ten  thou-  ^^pj^ 
sand  men  west  of  Vera  Cruz,  and  the  time  of  some      p**^ 
four  thousand  of  them  being  about  to  expire,  a 
long  delay  was  the  consequence.    The  troops  were 
in  a  healthy  climate,  and  where  they  could  subsist 
for  an  indefinite  period  even  if  their  line  back  to 
Vera  Cruz  should  be  cut  off.    It  being  ascertained   h^S  Mex. 
that  the  men  whose  time  would  expire  before  the    ^S^:^* 
city  of  Mexico  could  possibly  faU  into  the  hands  of 
the  American  army  would  not  remain  beyond  the 
term  for  which  they  had  volunteered,  the  command- 
ing general  determined  to  discharge  them  at  once ; 
for  a  delay  until  the  expiration  of  their  time  would 
have  compelled  them  to  pass  through  Vera  Cruz 
during  the  season  of  the  vomito.    This  reduced 
Scott's  force  in  the  field  to  about  five  thousand  men. 

Early  in  May,  Worth,  with  his  division,  left  Pe- 
rote and  marched  on  to  Puebla.  The  roads  were 
wide  and  the  country  open,  except  through  one 

nAAA  in   A  fiTkiiT*  /^■P  ThrfcTinffli-na  nnminct  nn  from   i.ViA      Raad.197 


104  PEBSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

Chap.  X  Standing  this,  the  small  column  was  divided  into 
two  bodies,  moving  a  day  apart.  Nothing  occurred 
on  the  march  of  special  note,  except  that  while 
lying  at  the  town  of  Amozoque — an  easy  day's 

May  14, 1847  march  east  of  Puebla — a  body  of  the  enemy's  cav- 

nSt^Mex.   ^^>  ^^  ^^  three  thousand  strong,  was  seen  to  our 

war,p.8(»  right,  not  more  than  a  mile  away.  A  battery  or 
two,  with  two  or  three  infantiy  regiments,  was 

^ot^^S*  sent  against  them,  and  they  soon  disappeared.  On 
1847       the  15th  of  May  we  entered  the  city  of  Puebla. 

^SiMitiS'  General  Worth  was  in  command  at  Puebla  until 
the  latter  end  of  May,  when  General  Scott  arrived. 
Here,  as  well  as  on  the  march  up,  his  restlessness, 
particularly  under  responsibilities,  showed  itself. 
During  his  brief  command  he  had  the  enemy  hover- 
ing around  near  the  city,  in  vastly  superior  numbers 
to  his  own.  The  brigade  to  which  I  was  attached 
changed  quarters  three  different  times  in  about  a 
week,  occupying  at  first  quarters  near  the  plaza,  in 
the  heart  of  the  city ;  then  at  the  western  entrance ; 
then  at  the  extreme  east.  On  one  occasion  General 
Worth  had  the  troops  in  line,  under  arms,  all  day, 
with  three  days'  cooked  rations  in  their  haversacks. 
He  galloped  from  one  command  to  another  pro- 
claiming the  near  proximity  of  Santa  Anna  with 

wo^'  ^S^  *^  army  vastly  superior  to  his  own.  General  Scott 
p-  *^  '  arrived  upon  the  scene  the  latter  part  of  the  month, 
and  nothing  more  was  heard  of  Santa  Anna  and 
his  myriads.  There  were,  of  course,  bodies  of 
mounted  Mexicans  hovering  around  to  watch  our 
movements,  and  to  pick  up  stragglers,  or  small 
bodies  of  troops,  if  they  ventured  too  far  out.   These 


PUEBLA  105 

General  Scott  I  was  sent,  as  quartermaster,  with  csiLP.x 
a  large  train  of  wagons,  back  two  days'  march  at  mSJterdttty 
least,  to  procure  forage.  We  had  less  than  a  thou- 
sand men  as  escort,  and  never  thought  of  danger. 
We  procured  full  loads  for  our  entire  train  at  two 
plantations,  which  could  easily  have  furnished  as 
much  more. 

There  had  been  great  delay  in  obtaining  the  ^^^S^ 
authority  of  Congress  for  the  raising  of  troops  ^^^?' 
asked  for  by  the  administration.    A  bill  was  before  ^^^^ 
the  national  legislature  from  early  in  the  session  ^^®^'^^»^ 
of  1846-47,  authorizing  the  creation  of  ten  addi- 
tional regiments  for  the  war,  to  be  attached  to  the 
regular  army;  but  it  was  the  middle  of  February 
before  it  became  a  law.    Appointments  of  commis- 
sioned officers  had  then  to  be  made ;  men  had  to 
be  enlisted,  the  regiments  equipped,  and  the  whole 
transported  to  Mexico.    It  was  August  before  Gen-       mi 
eral  Scott  received  reinforcement  sufficient  to  war- 
rant an  advance.    His  moving  column — not  even 
now  more  than  ten  thousand  strong — was  in  four  ^^pS^ 
divisions,  commanded  by  Generals  Worth,  Twiggs,    pp-  *^*^"**^ 
Pillow,  and  Quitman.    There  was  also  a  cavalry 
corps  under  General  Harney,  composed  of  detdch-    ^^^^^' 
ments  of  the  First,  Second,  and  Third  Dragoons,  ^^as, 
The  advance  commenced  on  the  7th  of  August,  with    iSS^Gen. 
Twiggs's  division  in  front.    The  remaining  three    ^•^•'* 
divisions  followed,  with  an  interval  of  a  day  be- 
tween.   The  marches  were  short,  to  make  concen- 
tration easier  in  case  of  attack. 

I  had  now  been  in  battle  with  two  leading  com-  "oelrSy- 


106  PERSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

CHAP.x  self  entirely  for  comfort.  He  moved  about  the 
field  in  which  he  was  operating  to  see  the  situation 
through  his  own  eyes.  Often  he  would  be  without 
staflE-officers,  and  when  he  was  accompanied  by 
them  there  was  no  prescribed  order  in  which  they 
followed.  He  was  very  much  given  to  sitting  his 
horse  sideways, — with  both  feet  on  one  side, — par- 
ticularly on  the  battle-field.  General  Scott  was  the 
reverse  in  all  these  particulars.  He  always  wore 
all  the  uniform  prescribed  or  allowed  by  law  when 
he  inspected  his  lines.  Word  would  be  sent  to  all 
division  and  brigade  commanders  in  advance,  noti- 
fying them  of  the  hour  when  the  commanding 
general  might  be  expected.  This  was  done  so  that 
all  the  army  might  be  under  arms  to  salute  their 
chief  as  he  passed.  On  these  occasions  he  wore 
his  dress-uniform,  cocked  hat,  aiguillettes,  saber, 
and  spurs.  His  staff  proper,  besides  all  officers 
constructively  on  his  staff, — engineers,  inspectors, 
quartermasters,  etc.,  that  could  be  spared, — fol- 
lowed, also  in  uniform  and  in  prescribed  order. 
Orders  were  prepared  with  great  care,  and  evidently 
with  the  view  that  they  should  be  a  history  of  what 
followed, 
swtt  wn?       ^^  *^^^  modes  of  expressing  thought  these  two 

^'**®^**  generals  contrasted  quite  as  strongly  as  in  their 
other  characteristics.  General  Scott  was  precise  in 
language ;  cultivated  a  style  peculiarly  his  own ;  was 
proud  of  his  rhetoric;  not  averse  to  speaking  of 
himself, — often  in  the  third  person, — and  he  could 
bestow  praise  upon  the  person  he  was  talking  about 

:j.i J.  x-L  ^  1 J. 1 J.        m 1 a. 


800TT  AND  TAYLOB  107 

ing  it.  He  knew  how  to  express  what  he  wanted  chap,  x 
to  say  in  the  fewest  well-chosen  words,  but  would 
not  sacrifice  meaning  to  the  construction  of  high- 
sounding  sentences.  But  with  their  opposite  char- 
acteristics both  were  great  and  successful  soldiers; 
both  were  true,  patriotic,  and  upright  in  all  their 
dealings.  Both  were  pleasant  to  serve  under — 
Taylor  was  pleasant  to  serve  with.  Scott  saw  more 
through  the  eyes  of  his  staff-officers  than  through 
his  own ;  his  plans  were  deliberately  prepared,  and 
fully  expressed  in  orders.  Taylor  saw  for  himself, 
and  gave  orders  to  meet  the  emergency  without 
reference  to  how  they  would  read  in  history. 


CHAPTER  XI 

ADVANCE  ON  THE  CITY  OF  MEXICO — BATTLE  OF  CONTBE- 
BAS — ASSAULT  AT  CHUBUBUSCO — NEGOTIATIONS 
FOB  PEACE — BATTLE  OF  MOUNO  DEL  BEY — STOBM- 
ING  OF  CHAPULTEPEC— SAN  COSME — EVACUATION 
OF  THE  CITY — HALLS  OF  THE  MONTEZUMAS 

CHAP.  XI  ri^HE  route  followed  by  the  army  from  Puebla  to 
A    the  city  of  Mexico  was  over  Rio  Frio  mountain, 

Seep.  127  the  road  leading  over  which,  at  the  highest  point,  is 
about  eleven  thousand  feet  above  tide-water.  The 
pass  through  this  mountain  might  have  been  easily 

bto*' ^h^  defended,  but  it  was  not ;  and  the  advanced  divi- 

p.  466  '   QiQn  reached  the  summit  in  three  days  after  leaving 

Puebla.    The  city  of  Mexico  lies  west  of  Rio  Frio 

mountain,  on  a  plain  backed  by  another  mountain 

six  miles  farther  west,  with  others  still  nearer  on 

H?8t%^x    the  north  and  south.    Between  the  western  base 

War,  p.  342   Qf  jjiQ  Fri^  aj^(j  i]^Q  qHj  Qf  Mexico  there  are  three 

lakes — Chalco  and  Xochimilco  on  the  left  and  Tex- 
coco  on  the  right,  extending  to  the  east  end  of  the 
city  of  Mexico.  Chalco  and  Texcoco  are  divided  by 
a  narrow  strip  of  land  over  which  the  direct  road 
to  the  city  runs.  Xochimilco  is  also  to  the  left  of 
the  road,  but  at  a  considerable  distance  south  of  it, 
and  is  connected  with  Lake  Chalco  by  a  narrow 


ADVANCE  ON  THE  CITY  OF  MEXICO  109 

from  the  low,  flat  ground  dividing  the  lakes.    This    chap,  xi 
mound  was  strengthened  by  intrenchments  at  its 
base  and  summit,  and  rendered  a  direct  attack 
impracticable. 

Scott's   army  was  rapidly  concentrated  about 
Ayotla  and  other  points  near  the  eastern  end  of 
Lake  Chalco.    Reconnaissances  were  made  up  to  ^^  ^^ 
within  gunshot  of  El  Penon,  while  engineers  were     ^ii^Ji; 
seeking  a  route  by  the  south  side  of  Lake  Chalco  wsS^pf^i 
to  flank  the  city  and  come  upon  it  from  the  south 
and  southwest.    A  way  was  found  around  the  lake, 
and  by  the  18th  of  August  troops  were  in  San       iw? 
Augustin  Tlalpan,  a  town  about  eleven  miles  due 
south  from  the  plaza  of  the  capital.    Between  San 
Augustin  Tlalpan  and  the  city  lie  the  hacienda  of 
San  Antonio  and  the  village  of  Churubusco,  and 
southwest  of  them  is  Contreras.    All  these  points 
except  San  Augustin  Tlalpan  were  intrenched  and 
strongly  garrisoned.    Contreras  is  situated  on  the 
side  of  a  mountain,  near  its  base,  where  volcanic 
rocks  are  piled  in  great  confusion,  reaching  nearly 
to  San  Antonio.    This  made  the  approach  to  the 
city  from  the  south  very  difficult. 

The  brigade  to  which  I  was  attached — Garland's,    nlatlX'x. 
of  Worth's  division — was  sent  to  confront  San  An-    ^^*  p-  ^ 
tonio,  two  or  three  miles  from  San  Augustin  Tlal- 
pan, on  the  road  to  Churubusco  and  the  city  of 
Mexico.    The  ground  on  which  San  Antonio  stands 
is  completely  in  the  valley,  and  the  surfewie  of  the 
land  is  only  a  little  above  the  level  of  the  lakes; 
and,  except  to  the  southwest,  it  was  cut  up  by  deep 
ditches  filled  with  water.    To  the  southwest  is  the  ibi<t  p.  859 
Pedresral, — the  volcanic  rooks  before  spoken  ol — 


110  FEBSONAL  MEMOIBS  OF  U.  8.  GRANT 

CHAP.  XI  and  infantry  would  make  but  poor  progress  if  con- 
fronted by  an  enemy.  From  the  position  occupied 
by  Garland's  brigade,  therefore,  no  movement  could 
be  made  against  the  defenses  of  San  Antonio  except 

wSSfapb^T  ^  ^^^  front,  and  by  a  narrow  causeway,  over  per- 
^•*^®  fectly  level  ground,  every  inch  of  whidi  was  com- 
manded by  the  enemy's  artillery  and  infantry.  If 
Contreras — some  three  miles  west  and  south — 
should  fall  into  our  hands,  troops  from  there  could 
move  to  the  right  flank  of  all  the  positions  held  by 
the  enemy  between  us  and  the  city.  Under  these 
circumstances.  General  Scott  directed  the  holding 
of  the  front  of  the  enemy  without  making  an  attack 
until  further  orders. 
1847  On  the  18th  of  August — the  day  of  reaching  San 

Augustin  Tlalpan — Garland's  brigade  secured  a  po- 
sition within  easy  range  of  the  advanced  intrench- 
ments  of  San  Antonio,  but  where  his  troops  were 
protected  by  an  artificial  embankment  that  had 
been  thi'own  up  for  some  other  purpose  than  de- 
fense. General  Scott  at  once  set  his  engineers 
reconnoitering  the  works  about  Contreras,  and  on 

Aug..  1847  the  19th  movements  were  commenced  to  get  troops 
into  positions  from  which  an  assault  could  be  made 
upon  the  force  occupying  that  place.  The  Pedregal 
on  the  north  and  northeast,  and  the  mountain  on 
the  south,  made  the  passage  by  either  flank  of  the 
enemy's  defenses  difficult,  for  their  woi'k  stood  ex- 

wSSfapSyT  ^*^y  l^^tw^^ii  those  natural  bulwarks ;  but  a  road 
^•*^      was  completed  during  the  day  and  night  of  the 
19th,  and  troops  were  got  to  the  north  and  west  of 
the  enemy. 


CONTBEBAS  AND  SAN  ANTONIO  111 

Corps  won  special  distinction.     In  fact,  in  both    cbulp.xi 
cases,  tasks  which  seemed  difficult  at  first  sight 
were  made  easier  for  the  troops  that  had  to  execute 
them  than  they  would  have  been  on  an  ordinary 
field.    The  very  strength  of  each  of  these  positions 
was,  by  the  skill  of  the  engineers,  converted  into  a 
defense  for  the  assaulting  parties  while  securing 
their  positions  for  final  attack.   AU  the  troops  with 
General  Scott  in  the  valley  of  Mexico — except  a 
part  of  the  division  of  General  Quitman  at  San 
Augustin  Tlalpan   and  the  brigade  of  Garland 
(Worth's  division)  at  San  Antonio — were  engaged 
at  the  battle  of  Contreras,  or  were  on  their  way,  in 
obedience  to  the  orders  of  their  chief,  to  reinforce 
those  who  were  engaged.    The  assault  was  made 
on  the  morning  of  the  20th,  and  in  less  than  half    Aug.,  mi 
an  hour  from  the  sound  of  the  advance  the  position 
was  in  our  hands,  with  many  prisoners  and  large  rSIJ'b^ 
quantities  of  ordnance  and  other  stores.    The  bri-  A^a^iwV; 
gade  commanded  by  General  Riley  was,  from  its    **  iSw  *' 
position,  the  most  conspicuous  in  the  final  assault;  ^jS^StT 
but  all  did  well — volunteers  and  regulars.  ^'  ** 

From  the  point  occupied  by  Garland's  brigade  s^lSto^o 
we  could  see  the  progress  made  at  Contreras  and 
the  movement  of  troops  toward  the  flank  and  rear 
of  the  enemy  opposing  us.  The  Mexicans  all  the 
way  back  to  the  city  could  see  the  same  thing,  and 
their  conduct  showed  plainly  that  they  did  not  en- 
joy the  sight.  We  moved  out  at  once,  and  found 
them  gone  from  our  immediate  front.  Clarke's  SSSSrSn. 
brigade  of  Worth's  division  now  moved  west  over   ^mm.  w^^* 


112  PEKSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GBANT 

CHAP.  XI    Churubusco  and  the  city  of  Mexico.     When  he 
HofltaS,    approached  Churubusco,  his  left,  under  Colonel 
Bvt  ]^<iL  HoflEman,  attacked  a  tete-de-pont  at  that  place  and 
Bept  8, 1847  i^rought  on  an  engagement.    About  an  hour  after, 
Garland  was  ordered  to  advance  directly  along  the 
causeway,  and  got  up  in  time  to  take  part  in  the 
engagement.    San  Antonio  was  found  evacuated, 
the  evacuation  having  probably  taken  place  imme- 
diately upon  the  enemy  seeing  the  stars  and  stripes 
waving  over  Contreras. 
oi^bS-       T^®  troops  that  had  been  engaged  at  Contreras, 
00,  Au^.  20.  gj^^  ^^^^  ^Yxen  on  their  way  to  that  battle-field,  were 
moved  by  a  causeway  west  of  and  parallel  to  the 
one  by  way  of  San  Antonio  and  Churubusco.    It 
was  expected  by  the  commanding  general  that  these 
troops  would  move  north  sufficiently  far  to  flank 
the  enemy  out  of  his  position  at  Churubusco,  before 
turning  east  to  reach  the  San  Antonio  road;  but 
they  did  not  succeed  in  this,  and  Churubusco  proved 
to  be  about  the  severest  battle  fought  in  the  valley 
wS^ph^T  ^^  Mexico.    General  Scott,  coming  upon  the  battle- 
PP.4W-496   fl^j^  about  this  juncture,  ordered  two  brigades, 
sbtewS  BTt  ^iid^r  Shields,  to  move  north  and  turn  the  right  of 
A^ni^S?;  tt^^  enemy.    This  Shields  did,  but  not  without  hard 
vSl:  AugT   fighting  and  heavy  loss.    The  enemy  finally  gave 
d.  iune  i,    way,  leaving  in  our  hands  prisoners,  artillery,  and 
small  arms.    The  balance  of  the  causeway  held  by 
the  enemy — up  to  the  very  gates  of  the  city — fell 
in  like  manner.    I  recollect  at  this  place  that  some 
of  the  gunners  who  had  stood  their  ground  were 


1879 


GENERAL  FRANEUN  PIEBCB  113 

20th  of  August,  1847,  were  faultless,  as  I  look  upon    chap,  xi 
them  now  after  the  lapse  of  so  many  years.    As 
before  stated,  the  work  of  the  engineer  officers  who    Page  uo 
made  the  reconnaissances  and  led  the  different 
commands  to  their  destinations  was  so  perfect  that 
the  chief  was  able  to  give  his^rdei*s  to  his  various 
subordinates  with  all  the  precision  he  could  use  on 
an  ordinary  march ;  I  mean,  up  to  the  points  from 
which  the  attack  was  to  commence.     After  that 
stage  is  reached  the  enemy  often  induces  a  change 
of  orders  not  before  contemplated.     The  enemy 
outside  the  city  outnumbei'ed  our  soldiery  quite 
three  to  one ;  but  they  had  become  so  demoralized 
by  the  succession  of  defeats  this  day  that  the  city 
of  Mexico  could  have  been  entered  without  much 
further  bloodshed.    In  fact.  Captain  Phihp  Kearny   ^5^2§; 
— afterward  a  general  in  the  war  of  the  rebellion  ^^%^^^y' 
— rode  with  a  squadron  of  cavalry  to  the  very  gates  ^^ISii^i^' 
of  the  city,  and  would  no  doubt  have  entered  with  septi.iwa 
his  little  force,  only  at  that  point  he  was  badly 
wounded,  as  were  several  of  his  officers.    He  had  ^jj^^^ 
not  heard  the  call  for  a  halt.  p-*** 

General  Fi'anklin  Pierce  had  joined  the  army  li^P^i^- 
in  Mexico,  at  Puebla,  a  short  time  before  the  ad-  ?^;*pSi' 
vance  upon  the  capital  commenced.    He  had  con-  ^'I'^tt!* 
sequently  not  been  in  any  of  the  engagements  of 
the  war  up  to  the  battle  of  Contreras.    By  an  un- 
fortunate fall  of  his  horse  on  the  afternoon  of  the 
IJHh  he  was  painfully  injured.    The  next  day,  when    Aug.,  im 
his  brigade,  with  the  other  troops  engaged  on  the 
same  field,  was  ordered  against  the  flank  and  rear 
of  the  enemy  guarding  the  different  points  of  the 
road  from  San  Augustin  Tlalpan  to  the  city,  G-eneral  soott,  Auto- 
Pierce  attempted  to  accompany  them.    He  was  not     ^pTS  ^' 
Vol.  L— 8 


114  PEESONAL  MEMOntS  OP  U.  S.  GEANT 

Chap.  XI  suflSciently  recovered  to  do  so,  and  fainted.  This 
circumstance  gave  rise  to  exceedingly  unfair  and 
unjust  criticisms  of  him  when  he  became  a  candi- 
date for  the  Presidency.  Whatever  General  Pierce's 
qualifications  may  have  been  for  the  Presidency,  he 
was  a  gentleman  and^  man  of  courage.  I  was  not 
a  supporter  of  him  politically,  but  I  knew  him 
more  intimately  than  I  did  any  other  of  the  volun- 
teer generals. 

wo^im^  General  Scott  abstained  from  entering  the  city 
p.^      ^^  ^j^jg  ^^^  because  Mr.  Nicholas  P.  Trist,  the  com- 

Asat.  Sec  of 

State,  1846  missioner  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  to  nego- 
tiate a  treaty  of  peace  with  Mexico,  was  with  the 
army,  and  either  he  or  General  Scott  thought — 
probably  both  of  them — that  a  treaty  would  be 
more  possible  while  the  Mexican  government  was 
in  possession  of  the  capital  than  if  it  was  scattered 
and  the  capital  in  the  hands  of  an  invader.  Be 
this  as  it  may,  we  did  not  enter  at  that  time.  The 
army  took  up  positions  along  the  slopes  of  the 
mountains  south  of  the  city,  as  far  west  as  Tacu- 
woS^^  baya.  Negotiations  were  at  once  entered  into  with 
'ooS  Htet  Santa  Anna,  who  was  then  practically  the  govern- 
ppt^bSw  mentj  and  the  immediate  commander  of  aU  the 
troops  engaged  in  defense  of  the  country.  A  truce 
was  signed  which  denied  to  either  party  the  right 
to  strengthen  its  position  or  to  receive  reinforce- 
ments during  the  continuance  of  the  armistice,  but 
authorized  General  Scott  to  draw  supplies  for  his 
army  from  the  city  in  the  mean  time. 

8oott,Aato-        -VT j.i^j.1 J  ^i. ^ Ji  «,^^rv 


NEGOTIATIONS  FOE  PEACE 


115 


handed  in  his  ultimatum.  Texas  was  to  be  given 
up  absolutely  by  Mexico,  and  New  Mexico  and 
California  ceded  to  the  United  States  for  a  stipu- 
lated sum  to  be  frfterward  determined.  I  do  not 
suppose  Mr.  Trist  had  any  discretion  whatever  in 
regard  to  boundaries.  The  war  was  one  of  con- 
quest, in  the  interest  of  an  institution,  and  the 
probabilities  are  that  private  instructions  were  for 
the  acquisition  of  territory  out  of  which  new  States 
might  be  carved.  At  all  events,  the  Mexicans  felt 
so  outraged  at  the  terms  proposed  that  they  com- 
menced preparations  for  defense,  without  giving 
notice  of  the  termination  of  the  armistice.  The 
terms  of  the  truce  had  been  violated  before,  when 
teams  had  been  sent  into  the  city  to  bring  out  sup- 
plies for  the  army.  The  first  train  entering  the 
city  was  very  severely  threatened  by  k  mob.  This, 
however,  was  apologized  for  by  the  authorities,  and 
all  responsibility  for  it  denied ;  and  thereafter,  to 
avoid  eiciting  the  Mexican  people  and  soldiery,  our 
teams  with  their  escorts  were  sent  in  at  night,  when 
the  troops  were  in  barracks  and  the  citizens  in  bed. 
The  circumstance  was  overlooked  and  negotiations 
continued.  As  soon  as  the  news  reached  General 
Scott  of  the  second  violation  of  the  armistice — 
about  the  4th  of  September — he  wrote  a  vigorous 
note  to  President  Santa  Anna,  calling  his  attention 
to  it,  and,  receiving  an  unsatisfactory  reply,  declared 
the  armistice  at  an  end. 

General  Scott,  with  Worth's  division,  was  now 
occunvinsr  Tacuhava.   a  villaffft   some   four    -milAs 


CHAP.  XI 


Benton, 
Thirty 
Yean' 

View,  n, 
706 


Wlloox, 
Hist  Hex. 
War,  p.  439 

Ibid.  pp. 
416,417 


1847 

Wlloox, 

HlBtMex. 

War,  pp. 

4ad-436 


116 


PERSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 


Chap.  XI 

Wiloox, 
Hist.  Mex. 
War.  p.  439. 

-Scott, 
Autobiogra- 
phy, p.  000 


Ghapnlte- 
peo 


WUoox, 

Hist  Mex. 

War,  pp. 

449-401 


also  a  little  above  the  plain,  stands  Molino  del  Rey. 
The  mill  is  a  long  stone  structure,  one  story  high 
and  several  hundred  feet  in  length.  At  the  period 
of  which  I  speak  General  Scott  supposed  a  portion 
of  the  mill  to  be  used  as  a  foundry  for  the  casting 
of  guns.  This,  however,  proved  to  be  a  mistake. 
It  was  valuable  to  the  Mexicans  because  of  the 
quantity  of  grain  it  contained.  The  building  is 
flat-roofed,  and  a  line  of  sand-bags  over  the  outer 
walls  rendered  the  top  quite  a  formidable  defense 
for  infantry.  Chapultepec  is  a  mound  springing 
up  from  the  plain  to  the  height  of  probably  three 
hundred  feet,  and  almost  in  a  direct  line  between 
Molino  del  Rey  and  the  western  part  of  the  city. 
It  was  fortified  both  on  the  top  and  on  the  rocky 
and  precipitous  sides. 

The  city  of  Mexico  is  supplied  with  water  by  two 
aqueducts,  resting  on  strong  stone  arches.  One  of 
these  aqueducts  draws  its  supply  of  water  from  a 
mountain  stream  coming  into  it  at  or  near  Molino 
del  Rey,  and  runs  north  close  to  the  west  base  of 
Chapultepec;  thence  along  the  center  of  a  wide 
road  until  it  reaches  the  road  running  east  into  the 
city  by  the  Garita  San  Cosme,  from  which  point 
the  aqueduct  and  road  both  run  east  to  the  city. 
The  second  aqueduct  starts  from  the  east  base  of 
Chapultepec,  where  it  is  fed  by  a  spring,  and  runs 
northeast  to  the  city.  This  aqueduct,  like  the 
other,  runs  in  the  middle  of  a  broad  roadway,  thus 
leaving  a  space  on  each  side.  The  arches  support- 
ing the  aqueduct  afforded  protection  for  advancing 

f.rAArkfl  asi  ttaII  flfl  fn  f.VirkflA  cymrnctaA  /^A-pATifiiTrAW       Af. 


BATTLE  OF  MOLINO  DEL  BEY  11? 

artillery  in  each.  At  the  point  where  both  road  chap,  xi 
and  aqueduct  turn  at  right  angles  from  north  to 
east  there  was  not  only  one  of  these  parapets  sup- 
plied by  one  gun  and  infantry  supports,  but  the 
houses  to  the  north  of  the  San  Cosme  road — facing 
south  and  commanding  a  view  of  the  road  back  to 
Chapultepec — were  covered  with  infantry,  pro- 
tected by  parapets  made  of  sand-bags.  The  roads 
leading  to  Garitas  (the  gates)  San  Cosme  and  Belen, 
by  which  these  aqueducts  enter  the  city,  were 
strongly  intrenched.  Deep,  wide  ditches,  filled 
with  water,  lined  the  sides  of  both  roads.  Such 
were  the  defenses  of  the  city  of  Mexico  in  Sep-  ^"^^^*^' 
tember,  1847,  on  the  routes  over  which  General 
Scott  entered. 

Prior  to  the  Mexican  war  General  Scott  had 
been  very  partial  to  General  Worth, — indeed,  he 
continued  so  up  to  the  close  of  hostilities, — but, 
for  some  reason.  Worth  had  become   estranged 
from  his  chief.    Scott  evidently  took  this  coldness 
somewhat  to  heart.    He  did  not  retaliate,  however, 
but,  on  the  contrary,  showed  every  disposition  to 
appease  his  subordinate.    It  was  understood  at  the 
time  that  he  gave  Worth  authority  to  plan  and  ^*^^^^ 
execute  the  battle  of  Molino  del  Eey  without  die-      ^'  ** 
tation  or  interference  from  any  one,  for  the  very 
purpose  of  restoring  their  former  relations.    The 
effort  failed,  and  the  two  generals  remained  ever  ^*^^' 
after  cold  and  indifferent  toward  each  other,  if  not 
actually  hostile. 
The  battle  of  Molino  del  Rev  was  fouerht  on  the 


118  PERSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

CHAP.  XI  instructions  for  the  morrow.  These  orders  contem- 
plated a  movement  up  to  within  striking  distance 
of  the  mills  before  daylight.  The  engineers  had 
reconnoitered  the  ground  as  well  as  possible,  and 
had  acquired  all  the  information  necessary  to  base 
proper  orders  both  for  approach  and  attack. 
Sept.  1847  By  daylight  on  the  morning  of  the  8th  the  troops 
mS!  Mex.  t^  ^®  engaged  at  Molino  were  all  at  the  places  des- 
war,p.«3  ignated.  The  ground  in  front  of  the  mills,  to  the 
south,  was  commanded  by  the  artillery  from  the 
summit  of  Chapultepec  as  weU  as  by  the  lighter 
batteries  at  hand ;  but  a  charge  was  made,  and  soon 
all  was  over.  Worth's  troops  entered  the  mills  by 
every  door,  and  the  enemy  beat  a  hasty  retreat 
back  to  Chapultepec.  Had  this  victory  been  fol- 
lowed up  promptly,  no  doubt  Americans  and  Mexi- 
cans would  have  gone  over  the  defenses  of  Chapul- 
tepec so  near  together  that  the  place  would  have 
fallen  into  our  hands  without  further  loss.  The 
defenders  of  the  works  could  not  have  fired  upon 
us  without  endangering  their  own  men.  This  was 
not  done,  and  five  days  later  more  valuable  lives 
were  sacrificed  to  carry  works  which  had  been  so 
Sept.  1847  nearly  in  our  possession  on  the  8th.  I  do  not  criti- 
cize the  failure  to  capture  Chapultepec  at  this  time. 
The  result  that  followed  the  first  assault  could  not 
possibly  have  been  foreseen,  and  to  profit  by  the 
unexpected  advantage  the  commanding  general 
must  have  been  on  the  spot  and  given  the  neces- 
sary instructions  at  the  moment,  or  the  troops 
must  have  kept  on  without  orders.  It  is  always, 
however,  in  order  to  follow  a  retreating  foe,  unless 


BATTLE  OF   MOUNO  DEL  KEY  119 

engaged.   It  was  especially  so  among  commissioned    chap,  xi 
officers. 


I  was  with  the  earliest  of  the  troops  to  enter  the  S^n^^at 
mills.  In  passing  through  to  the  north  side,  look-  ^<*^^^^«i 
ing  toward  Chapultepec,  I  happened  to  notice  that 
there  were  armed  Mexicans  still  on  top  of  the  build- 
ing, only  a  few  feet  from  many  of  our  men.  Not 
seeing  any  stairway  or  ladder  reaching  to  the  top 
of  the  building,  I  took  a  few  soldiers,  and  had  a 
cart  that  happened  to  be  standing  near  brought  up, 
and,  placing  the  shafts  against  the  wall  and  chock- 
ing the  wheels  so  that  the  cart  could  not  back,  used 
the  shafts  as  a  sort  of  ladder,  extending  to  within 
three  or  four  feet  of  the  top.  By  this  I  climbed  to 
the  roof  of  the  building,  followed  by  a  few  men,  but 
found  a  private  soldier  had  preceded  me  by  some 
other  way.  There  were  still  quite  a  number  of 
Mexicans  on  the  roof,  among  them  a  major  and 
five  or  six  officers  of  lower  grades,  who  had  not 
succeeded  in  getting  away  before  our  troops  occu- 
pied the  building.  They  still  had  their  arms,  while 
the  soldier  before  mentioned  was  walking  as  sen- 
try, guarding  the  prisoners  he  had  SKrrotmded  all 
by  himself.  I  halted  the  sentinel,  received  the 
swords  from  the  commissioned  officers,  and  pro- 
c*ded,  with  the  assistance  of  the  soldiers  now  with 
me,  to  disable  the  muskets  by  striking  them  against 
the  edge  of  the  wall,  and  threw  them  to  the  ground 
below. 

Molino  del  Key  was  now  captured;  and  the 
troops  engaged,  with  the  exception  of  an  appropri- 
ate guard  over  the  caDtured  nosition  and  DroBertv. 


120  PEESONAL  MEMOIRS  OP  U.  S.  GRANT 

CHAP.  XI    the  killed  and  wounded  were  numerous  for  the 
Htet  Me*!,    number  of  troops  engaged. 
War.  p.  487       During  the  night  of  the  11th  batteries  were  estab- 
soott.'Auto-  lished  which  could  play  upon  the  fortifications  of 
^*«S?f  S^.  Chapultepec.    The  bombardment  commenced  early 
mst  mS.  on  the  morning  of  the  12th,  but  there  was  no  f  ui*- 
ther  engagement  during  this  day  than  that  of  the 
artillery.    General  Scott  assigned  the  capture  of 
Chapultepec  to  General  Pillow,  but  did  not  leave 
Mo'SSrfe,   *^®  details  to  his  judgment.    Two  assaulting  col- 
Art^^d.  ^  umns, — 250  men  each, — composed  of  volunteers  for 
19, 1847     ^^^  occasion,  were  formed.    They  were  commanded 
8^p^y»  by  Captains  McKenzie  and  Casey  respectively.  The 
^Lt.'-a)L^    assault  was  successful,  but  bloody. 
iSS^VS.-       In  later  years,  if  not  at  the  time,  the  battles  of 
Ma^i,i8«i;  Molino  dcl  Rey  and  Chapultepec  have  seemed  to 
188a       me  to  have  been  wholly  unnecessary.    When  the 
assaults  upon  the  garitas  of  San  Cosme  and  Belen 
were  determined  upon,  the  road  running  east  to  the 
former  gate  could  have  been  reached  easily,  without 
an  engagement,  by  moving  along  south  of  the  mills 
until  west  of  them  sufficiently  far  to  be  out  of 
range,  thence  north  to  the  road  above  mentioned ; 
or,  if  desirable  to  keep  the  two  attacking  columns 
nearer  together,  the  troops  could  have  been  turned 
east  so  as  to  come  on  the  aqueduct  road  out%>f 
range  of  the  guns  from  Chapultepec.    In  like  man- 
ner the  troops  designated  to  act  against  Belen  could 
have  kept  east  of  Chapultepec,  out  of  range,  and 
come  on  to  the  aqueduct,  also  out  of  range  of  Gha- 


SAN  C08MK  121 

Mississippi,  who  stood  well  with  the  army  both  8.8    chap.xi 
a  soldier  and  as  a  man,  commanded  the  column 
acting  against  Belen.    General  Worth  commanded 
the  column  against  San  Cosme.    When  Chapul- 
tepec  fell  the  advance  commenced  along  the  two   wo™S^ 
aqueduct  roads.    I  was  on  the  road  to  San  Cosme,      ^-  ^ 
and  witnessed  most  that  took  place  on  that  route. 
When  opposition  was  encountered  our  troops  shel- 
tered themselves  by  keeping  under  the  arches  sup- 
porting the  aqueduct,  advancing  an  arch  at  a  time. 
We  encountered  no  serious  obstruction  until  within 
gunshot  of  the  point  where  the  road  we  were  on 
intersects  that  running  east  to  the  city — the  point 
where  the  aqueduct  turns  at  a  right  angle.    I  have 
described  the   defenses   of  this   position  before,   pp.1i6.n7 
There  were  but  three  commissioned  officers  besides   LtfuS^ 
myself,  that  I  can  now  call  to  mind,  with  the  ^SSaS®* 
advance  when  the   above  position  was  reached.  "'^laS^" 
One  of  these  officers  was  a  Lieutenant  Semmes,  csS-Apr. 

3  1866 

of  the  navy.    I  think  Captain  Gore  and  Lieuten-     jJimH. 
ant  Judah,  of  the  Fourth  Infantry,  were  the  others.  A^luwsa 
Our  progress  was  stopped  for  the  time  by  the  sin-  jj^hrwfp. 
gle  piece  of  artillery  at  the  angle  of  the  roads   sl^^^ek 
and  the  infantry  occupying  the  housetops  back   n?\«n^*rf; 

A  ..  Jan.  14, 1866 

from  it. 

'  West  of  the  road  from  where  we  were  stood  a 
house  occupying  the  southwest  angle  made  by  the 
San  Cosme  road  and  the  road  we  were  moving 
upon.  A  stone  wall  ran  from  the  house  along  each 
of  these  roads  for  a  considerable  distance,  and 
thence  back  until  it  joined,  inclosing  quite  a  yard 


122  PERSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

CHAP.  XI  closure,  I  peeped  around,  and,  seeing  nobody,  con- 
tinued, still  cautiously,  until  the  road  running  east 
and  west  was  reached.  I  then  returned  to  the 
troops  and  called  for  volunteers.  All  that  were 
close  to  me,  or  that  heard  me, — about  a  dozen, — 
oflfered  their  services.  Commanding  them  to  carry 
their  arms  at  a  trail,  I  watched  our  opportunity 
and  got  them  across  the  road  and  under  cover  of 
the  wall  beyond  before  the  enemy  had  a  shot  at  us. 
Our  men  under  cover  of  the  arches  kept  a  close 
watch  on  the  intrenchments  that  crossed  our  path 
and  the  housetops  beyond,  and  whenever  a  head 
showed  itseK  above  the  parapets  they  would  fire  at 
it.  Our  crossing  was  thus  made  practicable  with- 
out loss. 

When  we  reached  a  safe  position  I  instructed 
my  little  command  again  to  carry  their  arms  at  a 
trail,  not  to  fire  at  the  enemy  until  they  were  or- 
dered, and  to  move  very  cautiously,  following  me, 
until  the  San  Cosme  road  was  reached;  we  would 
then  be  on  the  flank  of  the  men  serving  the  gun  on 
the  road,  and  with  no  obstruction  between  us  and 
them.  When  we  reached  the  southwest  comer  of 
the  inclosure  before  described  I  saw  some  United 
States  troops  pushing  north  through  a  shallow 
ditch  near  by,  who  had  come  up  since  my  recon- 

^p*^    naissance.    This  was  the  company  of  Captain  Hor- 
Au^tim;  ^^  Brooks,  of  the  artillery,  acting  as  infantry.    I 

G^n.^?;"  explained  to  Brooks  briefly  what  I  had  discovered 
and  what  I  was  about  to  do.  He  said,  as  I  knew 
the  ground  and  he  did  not,  I  might  go  on  and  he 
would  follow.  As  soon  as  we  got  on  the  road  lead- 
in  <»  -frk   i-ln^   />if"fr  Unck  4-r»r\r\ir\a   om»xrinfr  fViA  omn    rvn    -fl-iA 


18,1866 


SAN  COSME  123 

by  followed;  our  men  went  after  them  in  such  ohap.xi 
close  pursuit— the  troops  we  had  left  imder  the 
arches  joining — that  a  second  line  across  the  road, 
about  half-way  between  the  first  and  the  garitaj 
was  carried.  No  reinforcements  had  yet  come  up 
except  Brooks's  company,  and  the  position  we  had 
taken  was  too  advanced  to  be  held  by  so  small  a 
force.  It  was  given  up,  but  retaken  later  in  the 
day  with  some  loss. 

Worth's  command  gradually  advanced  to  the 
front  now  open  to  it.  Later  in  the  day,  in  recon- 
noitering,  I  found  a  church  oflf  to  the  south  of  the 
road,  which  looked  to  me  as  if  the  belfry  would 
command  the  ground  back  of  the  G^ta  San  Cosme. 
I  got  an  officer  of  the  voltigeurs,  with  a  mountain  ^g^ 
howitzer  and  men  to  work  it,  to  go  with  me.  The 
road  being  in  possession  of  the  enemy,  we  had  to 
take  the  field  to  the  south  to  reach  the  church. 
This  took  us  over  several  ditches  breast-deep  in 
water  and  grown  up  with  water-plants.  These 
ditches,  however,  were  not  over  eight  or  ten  feet  in 
width.  The  howitzer  was  taken  to  pieces  and  car- 
ried by  the  men  to  its  destination.  When  I  knocked 
for  admission  a  priest  came  to  the  door,  who,  while 
extremely  polite,  declined  to  admit  us.  With  the 
Uttle  Spanish  then  at  my  command  I  explained  to 
him  that  he  might  save  property  by  opening  the 
door,  and  he  certainly  would  save  himself  from 
becoming  a  prisoner,  for  a  time  at  least ;  and  be- 
sides, I  intended  to  go  in  whether  he  consented  or 
not.  He  began  to  see  his  duty  in  the  same  light 
that  I  did,  and  opened  the  door,  though  he  did  not 


124  PEBSOKAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

CHAP.  XI    We  were  not  more  than  two  or  three  hundred 

yards  from  San  Cosme.    The  shots  from  our  little 

gun  dropped  in  upon  the  enemy  and  created  great 

confusion.    Why  they  did  not  send  out  a  small 

party  and  capture  us  I  do  not  know.    We  had  no 

infantry  or  other  defenses  besides  our  one  gun. 

The  eflfect  of  this  gun  upon  the  troops  about  the 

^^  LeSl'   S^^  ^f  ^^^  city  ^^  so  mai'ked  that  General  Worth 

fiSd/lnd    saw  it  from  his  position.    He  was  so  pleased  that 

GenTVorth  j^^  ^^^^^  ^  staff-officcr,  Lieutenant  Pemberton,— later 

Jobn  C.  '  ' 

pembo^  lieutenant-general   commanding  the  defenses   of 
4SArt;Bvt.  Vicksburg, — to  bring  me  to  him.    He  expressed  his 
M^.^^pt.8,  gratification  at  the  services  the  howitzer  in  the 
church  steeple  was  doing,  saying  that  every  shot 
was  eflfective,  and  ordered  a  captain  of  voltigeurs 
to  report  to  me  with  another  howitzer,  to  be  placed 
along  with  the  one  already  rendering  so  much  ser- 
vice.   I  could  not  tell  the  general  that  there  was 
not  room  enough  in  the  steeple  for  another  gun, 
because  he  probably  would  have  looked  upon  such 
a  statement  as  a  contradiction  from  a  second  lieu- 
tenant.   I  took  the  captain  with  me,  but  did  not 
use  his  gun. 
1847  The  night  of  the  13th  of  September  was  spent 

by  the  troops  under  General  Worth  in  the  houses 
near  San  C!osme,  and  in  line  confronting  the  general 
line  of  the  enemy  across  to  Belen.  The  troops  that 
I  was  with  were  in  the  houses  north  of  the  road 
leading  into  the  city,  and  were  engaged  during  the 
night  in  cutting  passageways  from  one  house  to 
of Sed^  another  toward  the  town.  During  the  night  Santa 
Anna,  with  his  army, — except  the  deserters, — left 


<<  HALLS  OP  THE  M0NTEZUMA8'*  125 

upon  US  some  injury  before  daylight;  but  several  chap.xi 
hours  after  Santa  Anna  was  out  of  the  way  the 
city  authorities  sent  a  delegation  to  General  Scott 
to  ask — if  not  demand — an  armistice  respecting 
church  property,  the  rights  of  citizens,  and  the 
supremacy  of  the  city  government  in  the  manage- 
ment of  municipal  affairs.  General  Scott  declined 
to  trammel  himself  with  conditions,  but  gave  assur- 
ances that  those  who  chose  to  remain  within  our 
lines  would  be  protected  so  long  as  they  behaved 
themselves  properly. 

General  Quitman  had  advanced  along  his  line 
very  successfully  on  the  13th,  so  that  at  night  his  sept^iwT 
command  occupied  nearly  the  same  position  at 
Belen  that  Worth's  ti'oops  did  about  San  Cosme. 
After  the  interview  above  related  between  General 
Scott  and  the  city  council,  orders  were  issued  for 
the  cautious  entry  of  both  coliunns  in  the  morning. 
The  troops  imder  Worth  were  to  stop  at  the  Ala-  ^J^^ 
meda — a  park  near  the  west  end  of  the  city.  Quit-  ^  ** 
man  was  to  go  directly  to  the  plaza  and  take  pos- 
session of  the  palace — a  mass  of  buildings  on  the 
east  side,  in  which  Congress  has  its  sessions,  the 
national  courts  are  held,  the  public  offices  are  all 
located,  the  President  resides,  and  much  room  is 
left  for  museums,  receptions,  etc.  This  is  the 
building  generally  designated  as  the  "  Halls  of  the 
Montezumas." 


CHAPTER  XII 

PBOMOTION  TO  FIRST  LIEUTENANT — CAPTUBE  OF  THE 
CITY  OF  MEXICO — THE  ABMT — MEXICAN  SOLDIEBS 
— PEACE  NEGOTUTIONS 


Chap.XII 
Sept.  14» 

1847 


Wiloox, 
HlstMex. 
War,  p.  484 


Promoted, 
First  Lieu- 
tenant 


ON  entering  the  city  the  troops  were  fired  upon 
by  the  released  convicts,  and  possibly  by  de- 
serters and  hostile  citizens.  The  streets  were  de- 
serted, and  the  place  presented  the  appearance  of  a 
"  city  of  the  dead,"  except  for  this  firing  by  unseen 
persons  from  housetops,  windows,  and  around  cor- 
ners. In  this  filing  the  lieutenant-colonel  of  my 
regiment — Gaiiand — was  badly  wounded.  Lieu- 
tenant Sidney  Smith,  of  the  Fourth  Infantry,  was 
also  wounded  mortally.  He  died  a  few  days  after, 
and  by  his  death  I  was  promoted  to  the  grade  of 
first  lieutenant.  I  had  gone  into  the  battle  of  Palo 
Alto  in  May,  1846,  a  second  lieutenant,  and  I  en- 
tered the  city  of  Mexico  sixteen  months  later  with 
the  same  rank,  after  having  been  in  all  the  engage- 
ments possible  for  any  one  man,  and  in  a  regiment 
that  lost  more  officers  during  the  war  than  it  ever 
had  present  at  any  one  engagement.  My  regiment 
lost  four  commissioned  officers,  all  senior  to  me, 
by  steamboat  explosions  during  the  Mexican  war. 
The  Mexicans  were  not  so  discriminating;  they 


rirf%w*i%^i*vi/%a    imy^Tri^^     rf%flp 


w^^r    -111*^1 


ENTERING  THE  CITY  OF  MEXICO  127 

city  in  state.    I  wonder  that  he  was  not  fii-ed  upon,    chap,  xn 
but  I  believe  he  was  not ;  at  all  events,  he  was  not    nutl  Mex. 
hurt.    He  took  quai-ters  at  first  in  the  "Halls  of  ^*^'»*® 
the  Montezumas,^  and  from  there  issued  his  wise 
and  discreet  orders  for  the  government  of  a  con- 
quered city  and  for  suppressing  the  hostile  acts  of 
liberated  convicts  already  spoken  of — orders  which 
challenge  the  respect  of  all  who  study  them.    Law- 
lessness was  soon  suppressed,  and  the  city  of  Mex- 
ico settled  down  into  a  quiet,  law-abiding  place. 
The  people  began  to  make  then*  appeai*ance  upon 
the  streets  without  fear  of  the  invaders.    Shortly 
afterward  the  bulk  of  the  troops  were  sent  from  the 
city  to  the  villages  at  the  foot  of  the  mountains, 
four  or  five  miles  to  the  south  and  southwest. 

Whether  General  Scott  approved  of  the  Mexi- 
can war  and  the  manner  in  which  it  was  brought 
about  I  have  no  means  of  knowing.  His  orders  to 
troops  indicate  only  a  soldierly  spirit,  with  prob- 
ably a  little  regard  for  the  perpetuation  of  his  own 
fame.  On  the  other  hand.  General  Taylor's,  I  think, 
indicate  that  he  considered  the  administration 
accountable  for  the  war,  and  felt  no  responsibility 
resting  on  himself  further  than  for  the  faithful  per- 
formance of  his  duties.  Both  generals  deserve  the 
commendations  of  their  countrymen  and  to  live  in 
the  grateful  memory  of  this  people  to  the  latest  gen- 
eration. 

Earlier  in  this  narrative  I  have  stated  that  the    ^^m* 
plain  reached  after  passing  the  mountains  east  of 


128  PERSONAL  MEMOIBS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

CHiLP.xn  tible  of  defense  by  a  smaller  against  a  larger  force. 
Again,  the  highest  point  of  the  road-bed  between 
Vera  Cruz  and  the  city  of  Mexico  is  over  Rio  Fiio 
Mountain,  which  also  might  have  been  successfully 
defended  by  an  inferior  against  a  superior  force. 
But  by  moving  north  of  the  mountains,  and  about 
thirty  miles  north  of  Puebla,  both  of  these  passes 
would  have  been  avoided.  The  road  from  Perote 
to  the  city  of  Mexico  by  this  latter  route  is  as  level 
as  the  prauies  in  our  West.  Arriving  due  north 
fi'om  Puebla,  troops  could  have  been  detached  to 
take  possession  of  that  place,  and  then,  proceeding 
west  with  the  rest  of  the  army,  no  mountain  would 
have  been  encountered  before  reaching  the  city  of 
Mexico.  It  is  true  this  road  would  have  brought 
troops  in  by  Guadalupe, — a  town,  church,  and  de- 
tached spur  of  mountain  about  two  miles  north  of 
the  capital,  all  beaiing  the  same  general  name, — 
and  at  this  point  Lake  Texcoco  comes  near  to  the 
moimtain,  which  was  fortified  both  at  the  base  and 
on  the  sides ;  but  troops  could  have  passed  north  of 
the  mountain  and  come  in  only  a  few  miles  to  the 
northwest,  and  so  flanked  the  position,  as  they 
actually  did  on  the  south. 

It  has  always  seemed  to  me  that  this  northern 
route  to  the  city  of  Mexico  would  have  been  the 
better  one  to  have  taken.  But  my  later  experience 
has  taught  me  two  lessons :  first,  that  things  are 
seen  plainer  after  the  events  have  occurred ;  second, 

<^J{gjj^  that  the  most  confident  critics  are  generally  those 


TACTICS  OF  THE  WAB  129 

tant  city  like  Puebla  should  not  have  been  passed  chap.xii 
with  contempt;  it  may  be  natural  that  the  direct 
road  to  it  should  have  been  taken;  but  it  could 
have  been  passed,  its  evacuation  insured,  and  pos- 
session acquired  without  danger  of  encountering 
the  enemy  in  intricate  moimtain  defiles.  In  this 
same  way  the  city  of  Mexico  could  have  been  ap- 
proached without  any  danger  of  opposition  except 
in  the  open  field. 

But  General  ScotVs  successes  are  an  answer  to 
all  criticism.  He  invaded  a  populous  country, 
penetrating  two  hundred  and  sixty  miles  into  the 
interior,  with  a  force  at  no  time  equal  to  one  half 
of  that  opposed  to  him ;  he  was  without  a  base ;  the  ^S^^?^ 
enemy  was  always  intrenched,  always  on  the  de-  p-*»»>oie 
f ensive ;  yet  he  won  eveiy  battle,  he  captured  the 
capital  and  conquered  the  government.  Credit  is 
due  to  the  troops  engaged,  it  is  true,  but  the  plans 
and  the  strategy  were  the  general's. 

I  had  now  made  marches  and  been  in  battle 
under  both  General  Scott  and  General  Taylor.  The  j^^^ 
former  divided  his  force  of  10,500  men  into  four  *^^^5X 
columns,  starting  a  day  apart,  in  moving  from    ^^tS^' 
Puebla  to  the  capital  of  the  nation,  when  it  was 
known  that  an  army  more  than  twice  as  large  as 
his  own  stood  ready  to  resist  his  coming.     The 
road  was  broad  and  the  country  open,  except  in 
crossing  the  Rio  Frio  Mountain.     General  Taylor 
pursued  the  same  course  in  marching  towai'd  an 
enemy.   He  moved  even  in  smaller  bodies.   I  never 
thought  at  the  time  to  doubt  the  infallibility  of 
these  two  generals  in  all  matters  pertaining  to  their 


130  PEBSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

CHAP.xu  gle  road  on  the  same  day  with  theh*  artillery  and 
necessaiy  trains.  Later  I  found  the  fallacy  of  this 
belief.  The  rebellion,  which  followed  as  a  sequence 
to  the  Mexican  war,  never  could  have  been  sup- 
pressed if  larger  bodies  of  men  could  not  have  been 
moved  at  the  same  time  than  was  the  custom  under 
Scott  and  Taylor. 

The  victories  in  Mexico  were  in  every  instance 
over  vastly  superior  numbers.    There  were  two 

o?^^  a  i*®fts^^s  for  this.  Both  General  Scott  and  General 
"^"^  Taylor  had  such  armies  as  are  not  often  got  to- 
gether. At  the  battles  of  Palo  Alto  and  Resaca  de 
la  Palma,  General  Taylor  had  a  small  army,  but  it 
was  composed  exclusively  of  regular  troops,  under 
the  best  of  drill  and  discipline.  Every  officer,  from 
the  highest  to  the  lowest,  was  educated  in  his  pro- 
fession— not  at  West  Point  necessarily,  but  in  the 
.  camp,  in  garrison,  and  many  of  them  in  Indian 
wars.  The  rank  and  file  were  probably  inferior,  as 
material  out  of  which  to  make  an  army,  to  the  vol- 
unteers that  participated  in  all  the  later  battles  of 
the  war ;  but  they  were  brave  men,  and  then  diill 
and  discipline  brought  out  all  there  was  in  them. 
A  better  army,  man  for  man,  probably  never  faced 
an  enemy  than  the  one  commanded  by  General 
Taylor  in  the  earliest  two  engagements  of  the  Mex- 
ican war.  The  volunteers  who  followed  were  of 
better  material,  but  without  drill  or  discipline  at  the 
start.  They  were  associated  with  so  many  disci- 
plined men  and  professionally  educated  officers  that 
when  they  went  into  engagements  it  was  with  a  con- 
fidence they  would  not  have  felt  otherwise.    They 


THE  MEXICAN  ABMY  131 

The  Mexican  army  of  that  day  was  hardly  an   chap.xh 
organization.    The  private  soldier  was  picked  up  ^®JSS|- 
from   the  lower  class  of  the  inhabitants  when    *^Sow°^ 
wanted ;  his  consent  was  not  asked ;  he  was  poorly 
clothed,  worse  fed,  and  seldom  paid.     He  was 
turned  adrift  when  no  longer  wanted.    The  officei-s 
of  the  lower  grades  were  but  little  superior  to  the 
men.    With  all  this  I  have  seen  as  brave  stands 
made  by  some  of  these  men  as  I  have  ever  seen 
made  by  soldiers.     Now  Mexico  has  a  standing 
army  larger  than  that  of  the  United  States.    They 
have  a  military  school  modeled  after  West  Point. 
Their  officers  ai'e  educated  and,  no  doubt,  generally 
brave.    The  Mexican  war  of  1846-48  would  be  an 
impossibility  in  this  generation. 

The  Mexicans  have  shown  a  patriotism  which  it  jJJ^Smi 
would  be  well  if  we  would  imitate  in  part,  but  with 
more  regard  to  truth.  They  celebrate  the  anniver- 
saries of  Chapultepec  and  Molino  del  Rey  as  of  very 
great  victories.  The  anniversaries  are  recognized 
as  national  holidays.  At  these  two  battles,  while 
the  United  States  troops  were  victorious,  it  was 
at  veiy  great  sacrifice  of  life  compared  with  what 
the  Mexicans  suffered.  The  Mexicans,  as  on  many 
other  occasions,  stood  up  as  well  as  any  troops  ever 
did.  The  trouble  seemed  to  be  the  lack  of  experi- 
ence among  the  officers,  which  led  them  after  a  cer- 
tain time  to  simply  quit,  without  being  particularly 
whipped,  but  because  they  had  fought  enough. 
Their  authorities  of  the  present  day  grow  enthusi- 
astic over  their  theme  when  telling  of  these  victo- 
ries, and  speak  with  pride  of  the  large  sum  of  money 


132  PERSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  8.  GRANT 

CHAP.xn  known,  we  have  writers — who  profess  devotion  to 
the  nation — engaged  in  trying  to  prove  that  the 
Union  forces  were  not  victorious ;  practically,  they 
say,  we  were  slashed  around  from  Donelson  to 
Vicksburg  and  to  Chattanooga;  and  in  the  East 
from  Gettysburg  to  Appomattox,  when  the  physical 
rebellion  gave  out  from  sheer  exhaustion.  There 
is  no  difference  in  the  amount  of  romance  in  the 
two  stories. 

.  I  would  not  have  the  anniversaries  of  our  victo- 

ries celebrated,  nor  those  of  om*  defeats  made  fast- 
days  and  spent  in  humiliation  and  prayer;  but  I 

S?Era^f  ''^^^d  ^^  ^^  ^^^  truthful  history  written.  Such 
^tory  history  will  do  full  credit  to  the  courage,  endur- 
ance, and  soldierly  ability  of  the  American  citizen, 
no  matter  what  section  of  the  country  he  hailed 
from,  or  in  what  ranks  he  fought.  The  justice  of 
the  cause  which  in  the  end  prevailed  will,  I  doubt 
not,  come  to  be  acknowledged  by  every  citizen  of 
the  land  in  time.  For  the  present,  and  so  long  as 
there  are  living  witnesses  of  the  great  war  of  sec- 
tions, there  will  be  people  who  will  not  be  consoled 
for  the  loss  of  a  cause  which  they  believed  to  be 
holy.  As  time  passes,  people,  even  of  the  South, 
will  begin  to  wonder  how  it  was  possible  that 
their  ancestors  ever  fought  for  or  justified  insti- 
tutions which  acknowledged^  the  right  of  property 
in  man. 

After  the  fall  of  the  capital  and  the  dispersal  of 
the  government  of  Mexico  it  looked  very  much  as 


POLICY  OP  THE  OCCUPATION 


133 


plated  making  the  country  pay  all  the  expenses  of 
the  occupation,  without  the  army  becoming  a  per- 
ceptible burden  upon  the  people.^  His  plan  was  to 
levy  a  direct  tax  upon  the  separate  States,  and  col- 
lect at  the  ports  left  open  to  trade  a  duty  on  all 
imports.  From  the  beginning  of  the  war  private 
property  had  not  been  taken,  either  for  the  use  of 
the  army  or  of  individuals,  without  full  compensa- 
tion. This  policy  was  to  be  pursued.  There  were 
not  troops  enough  in  the  valley  of  Mexico  to  occupy 
many  points,  but  now  that  there  was  no  organized 
army  of  the  enemy  of  any  size,  reinforcements 
could  be  got  from  the  Rio  Grande,  and  there  were 
also  new  volunteers  arriving  from  time  to  time,  all 
by  way  of  Vera  Cruz.  Military  possession  was 
taken  of  Cuemavaca,  fifty  miles  south  of  the  city 
of  Mexico ;  of  Toluca,  nearly  as  far  west ;  and  of 
Pachuca,  a  mining  town  of  great  importance,  some 


CHAP.  XXI 


^  It  had  been  a  fayorite  idea 
with  General  Scott  for  a  great 
many  years  before  the  Mexican 
war  to  have  established  in  the 
United  States  a  soldiers'  home, 
patterned  after  something  of  the 
kind  abroad,  particularly,  I  be- 
lieve, in  France.  He  recom- 
mended this  uniformly,  or  at  least 
frequently,  in  his  annual  reports 
to  the  Secretary  of  War,  but  never 
got  any  hearing.  Now,  as  he  had 
conquered  the  State,  he  made  as- 
sessments upon  the  different  large 
towns  and  cities  occupied  by  our 
troops,  in  proportion  to  their  ca- 


whioh  swelled  the  fund  to  a  total 
of  about  $220,000.  Portions  of 
this  fund  were  distributed  among 
the  rank  and  file,  given  to  the 
wounded  in  hospital,  or  applied 
in  other  ways,  leaving  a  balance 
of  some  $118,000  remaining  un- 
applied at  the  close  of  the  war. 
After  the  war  was  over  and  the 
troops  all  home,  General  Scott 
applied  to  have  this  money,  which 
had  never  been  turned  into  the 
treasury  of  the  United  States, 
expended  in  establishing  such 
homes  as  he  had  previously  rec- 
ommended.   This  fund  was  the 


Scott,  Auto- 

cox.  Hist. 
Mex.  War, 
pp.  680-032 


134  PEESONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

CHAP.xn    sixty  mUes  to  the  northeast.    Vera  Cruz,  Jalapa, 
Orizaba,  and  Puebla  were  already  in  our  possession. 
Meanwhile  the  Mexican  government  had  departed 
in  the  person  of  Santa  Anna^  and  it  looked  doubtful 
for  a  time  whether  the  United  States  commissioner, 
Mr.  Trist,  would  find  anybody  to  negotiate  with.  A 
H^*Mex.   temporary  government,  however,  was  soon  estab- 
^m,*S!tSo'  lished  at  Queretaro,  and  Trist  began  negotiations 
for  a  conclusion  of  the  war.    Before  terms  were 
finally  agreed  upon  he  was  ordered  back  to  Wash- 
ington; but  General  Scott  prevailed  upon  him  to 
remain,  as  an  arrangement  had  been  so  nearly 
reached,  and  the  administration  must  approve  his 
acts  if  he  succeeded  in  making  such  a  treaty  as  had 
(SSSu^  been  contemplated  in  his  instructions.    The  treaty 
™*^    was  finally  signed  the  2d  of  February,  1848,  and 
accepted  by  the  Government  at  Washington.    It  is 
that  known  as  the  "  Treaty  of  Guadalupe  Hidalgo,^ 
and  secured  to  the  United  States  the  Rio  Grande 
as  the  boundary  of  Texas,  and  the  whole  territory 
then  included  in  New  Mexico  and  Upper  California, 
for  the  sum  of  fifteen  million  dollars. 

Soon  after  entering  the  city  of  Mexico  the  oppo- 

?2SSdA?ti  sition  of  Generals  Pillow,  Worth,  and  Colonel  Dun- 

sImbvucoL  <^^  t^  General  Scott  became  very  marked.    Scott 

eept.28,1846  claimed  that  they  had  demanded  of  the  President 

his  removal.    I  do  not  know  whether  this  is  so  or 

not,  but  I  do  know  of  their  unconcealed  hostility  to 

wSmth^  their  chief.    At  last  he  placed  them  in  arrest,  and 

p.  573      preferred  charges  against  them  of  insubordination 

and  disrespect.    This  act  brought  on  a  crisis  in  the 


SCJOTT  BELIEVED  FROM  CX)MMAND  135 

men  and  war  material;  that  the  President  himself   chap.xii 
had  shown  duplicity,  if  not  treachery,  in  the  en- 
deavor to  procure  the  appointment  of  Benton ;  and  wJmpbyT 
the  administration  now  gave  open  evidence  of  its  ^^i^iJ^"" 
enmity.     About  the  middle  of  February  orders   ^^,^pf' 
came  convening  a  court  of  inquiry — composed  of     Nathan 
Brevet  Brigadier-General  Towson,  the  paymaster-     ^^^" 
general  of  the  army,  Brigadier-General  Gushing,       *«« 
and  Colonel  Belknap — to  inquire  into  the  conduct  ^p!l?col 
of  the  accused  and  the  accuser ;  and  shortly  af  tei*- 
ward  orders  were  received  from  Washington  reliev- 
ing Scott  of  the  command  of  the  army  in  the  field, 
and  assigning  Major-General  William  0.  Butler,  of 
Kentucky,  to  the  place.    These  orders  also  released 
Pillow,  Worth,  and  Duncan  from  arrest. 

If  a  change  was  to  be  made,  the  selection  of 
General  Butler  was  agreeable  to  every  one  con- 
cerned, so  far  as  I  remember  to  have  heard  expres- 
sions on  the  subject.  There  were  many  who  re- 
garded the  treatment  of  General  Scott  as  harsh  and 
unjust.  It  is  quite  possible  that  the  vanity  of  the 
general  had  led  him  to  say  and  do  things  that 
afforded  a  plausible  pretext  to  the  administration 
for  doing  just  what  it  did  and  what  it  had  wanted 
to  do  from  the  start.  The  court  tried  the  accuser 
quite  as  much  as  the  accused.  It  was  adjourned 
before  completing  its  labors,  to  meet  in  Frederick,  ^JSraph^ 
Maryland.  General  Scott  left  the  country,  and  pp<^»* 
never  after  had  more  than  the  nominal  command 
of  the  aimy  until  early  in  1861.  He  certainly  was 
not  sustained  in  his  efforts  to  maintain  discipline 
in  high  places. 


136 


PERSONAL  MEMOmS  OP  U.  8.  GRANT 


Chap,  xn  Presidency.  General  Taylor  was  nominated  in 
1848,  and  was  elected.  Four  years  later  General 
Scott  received  the  nomination,  but  was  badly 
beaten,  and  the  party  nominating  him  died  with 
his  defeat.^ 


1  The  Mexican  war  made  three 
Presidential  candidates — Scott, 
Taylor,  and  Pierce — and  any 
number  of  aspirants  for  that  high 
office.  It  made  also  governors  of 
States,  members  of  the  cabinet, 
foreign  ministers,  and  other  offi- 
cers of  hi^  rank  both  in  State 
and  nation.  The  rebellion,  which 
contained  more  war  in  a  single 
day,  at  some  critical  periods,  than 
the  whole  Mexican  war  in  two 
years,  has  not  been  so  fmitfol  of 


political  results  to  those  engaged 
on  the  Union  side.  On  the  other 
side — the  side  of  the  South — 
nearly  every  man  who  holds  office 
of  any  sort  whatever,  either  in 
the  State  or  in  the  nation,  was  a 
Confederate  soldier;  but  this  is 
easily  accounted  for  from  the 
fact  that  the  South  was  a  mili- 
tary camp,  and  there  were  very 
few  people  of  a  suitable  age  to 
be  in  the  army  who  were  not 
in  it. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

TKEATY  OP  PEACE — ^MEXICAN  BULL-FIGHTS — KEGMEN- 
TAL  QUABTEBMASTER — TBIP  TO  POPOCATEPETL — 
TBIP  TO  THE  CAVES  OF  BIEXICO 

THE  treaty  of  peace  between  the  two  countries  chap,  xih 
was  signed  by  the  commissioners  of  each  side 
early  in  Februaiy,  1848.  It  took  a  considerable  time   Feb.  2.  ms 
for  it  to  reach  Washington,  receive  the  approval  of 
the  administration,  and  be  finally  ratified  by  the 
Senate.    It  was  naturally  supposed  by  the  army 
that  there  would  be  no  more  fighting,  and  officers 
and  men  were  of  course  anxious  to  get  home ;  but 
knowing  there  must  be  delay,  they  contented  them- 
selves as  best  they  could.     Every  Sunday  there  -^JJ^^^"^ 
was  a  bull-fight  for  the  amusement  of  those  who 
would  pay  their  fifty  cents.    I  attended  one  of 
them, — just  one, — not  wishing  to  leave  the  coun- 
try without  having  witnessed  the  national  sport. 
The  sight  to  me  was  sickening.    I  could  not  see 
how  human  beings  could  enjoy  the  sufferings  of 
beasts,  and  often  of  men,  as  they  seemed  to  do  on 
these  occasions. 
At  these  sports  there  are  usuallv  from  four  to 


\ 


138  PEBSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

CHAP,  xin  one  in  front,  so  that  every  one  can  get  a  full  view 
of  the  sport.  When  all  is  ready  a  bull  is  turned 
into  the  ring,  and  from  three  to  five  toreros  excite 
his  rage  by  waving  red  flags  before  his  eyes.  In 
the  next  stage  three  or  four  men,  called  picadores, 
come  in,  mounted  on  the  merest  skeletons  of  horses, 
blind  or  blindfolded,  and  so  weak  that  they  could 
not  make  a  sudden  turn  with  their  riders  without 
danger  of  falling  down.  These  men  are  armed  with 
spears  having  points  as  sharp  as  needles,  but  pro- 
vided with  buttons  or  disks  a  short  way  from  their 
points,  which  prevent  the  giving  of  too  deep  a  thrust. 
Other  men  (banderilleros)  enter  the  arena  on  foot, 
armed  with  banderillas,  or  barbed  darts,  trimmed 
with  ribbons  or  colored  paper,  and  sometimes  car- 
rying fire-crackers  for  the  purpose  of  arousing  a 
sluggish  animal.  The  pain  from  the  pricking  of  the 
skin  by  the  needles  is  exasperating;  but  when  the 
explosions  of  the  fire-crackers  commence  the  animal 
becomes  frantic.  As  he  makes  a  lunge  toward  one 
horseman  another  runs  a  spear  into  him.  He  turns 
toward  his  last  tormentor,  when  a  man  on  foot  holds 
out  a  red  flag;  the  bull  rushes  for  this  and  is  al- 
lowed to  take  it  on  his  horns.  The  flag  drops  and 
covers  the  eyes  of  the  animal,  so  that  he  is  at  a  loss 
what  to  do ;  it  is  jerked  from  him,  and  the  torment 
is  renewed.  When  the  animal  is  worked  into  an 
uncontrollable  frenzy  the  horsemen  withdraw,  and 
the  matadores — literally  murderers — enter,  armed 
with  knives  having  blades  twelve  or  eighteen  inches 
long,  and  sharp.    The  trick  is  to  dodge  an  attack 


MEXICAN  BULL-FIGHTS  139 

into  the  spinal  column  just  back  of  the  horns.    He  chap,  xiij 
is  then  dragged  out  by  horses  or  mules,  another  is 
let  into  the  ring,  and  the  same  performance  is 
renewed. 

On  the  occasion  when  I  was  present  one  of  the 
bulls  was  not  turned  aside  by  the  attacks  in  the 
rear,  the  presentations  of  the  red  flag,  etc.,  but 
kept  right  on,  and  placing  his  horns  under  the 
flanks  of  a  horse,  threw  him  and  his  rider  to  the 
ground  with  great  force.  The  horse  was  killed  and 
the  rider  lay  prostrate,  as  if  dead.  The  bull  was 
then  lassoed  and  killed  in  the  manner  above  de- 
scribed. Men  came  in  and  carried  the  dead  man  oflE 
in  a  litter.  When  the  slaughtered  bull  and  horse 
were  dragged  out,  a  fresh  bull  was  turned  into  the 
ring.  Conspicuous  among  the  spectators  was  the 
man  who  had  been  carried  out  on  a  litter  but  a 
few  minutes  before.  He  was  only  dead  so  far  as 
that  performance  went ;  but  the  corpse  was  so  lively 
that  it  could  not  forego  the  chance  of  witnessing 
the  discomfiture  of  some  of  his  brethren  who  might 
not  be  so  fortunate.  There  was  a  feeling  of  disgust 
manifested  by  the  audience  to  find  that  he  had 
come  to  life  again.  I  confess  that  I  felt  sorry  to 
see  the  cruelty  to  the  bull  and  the  horse.  I  did  not 
stay  for  the  conclusion  of  the  performance;  but 
while  I  did  stay  there  was  not  a  bull  killed  in  the 
prescribed  way. 

Bull-fights  are  now  prohibited  in  the  Federal  o?th^5^ 
District, — embracing  a  territory  around  the  city  of 
Mexico  somewhat  larger  than  the  District  of  Colum- 
bia.— s,nd  fhev  are  -nnf.  an  institution  in  anv  nart 


140  PEESONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  8.  GRANT 

Chap,  xni  Puebla  and  at  Pachuca,  I  was  not  notified  in  ad- 
vance so  as  to  be  able  to  decline  and  thus  prevent 
the  performance;  but  in  both  cases  I  civilly  de- 
clined to  attend. 
^^^  Another  amusement  of  the  people  of  Mexico  of 
that  day,  and  one  which  nearly  all  indulged  in, 
male  and  female,  old  and  young,  priest  and  lay- 
man, was  monte-playing.  Regular  feast-weeks 
were  held  every  year  at  what  was  then  kaown  as 
San  Augustin  Tlalpan,  eleven  miles  out  of  town. 
There  were  dealers  to  suit  every  class  and  condition 
of  people.  In  many  of  the  booths  tlacos — the  cop- 
per coin  of  the  country,  four  of  them  making  six 
and  a  quarter  cents  of  our  money — were  piled  up 
in  great  quantities,  with  some  silver,  to  accommo- 
date the  people  who  could  not  bet  more  than  a  few 
pennies  at  a  time.  In  other  booths  silver  formed 
the  bulk  of  the  capital  of  the  bank,  with  a  few 
doubloons  to  be  changed  if  there  should  be  a  run 
of  luck  against  the  bank.  In  some  there  was  no 
coin  except  gold.  Here  the  rich  were  said  to  bet 
away  their  entire  estates  in  a  single  day.  All  this 
is  stopped  now. 

aothiDgthe  For  myself,  I  was  kept  somewhat  busy  during 
the  winter  of  1847-48.  My  regiment  was  stationed 
in  Tacubaya.  I  was  regimental  quartermaster  and 
commissary.  General  Scott  had  been  unable  to  get 
clothing  for  the  troops  from  the  North.  The  men 
were  becoming — well,  they  needed  clothing.  Ma- 
terial had  to  be  purchased,  such  as  could  be  ob- 


EEGIMENTAL  QUABTEKMASTEB  141 

fast  as  made  up.    A  regiment  was  glad  to  get  a  chap,  xm 
dozen  suits  at  a  time.    I  had  to  look  after  this  mat- 
ter for  the  Fourth  Infantry.    Then  our  regimental  ^gJSS*** 
fund  had  run  down,  and  some  of  the  musicians  in 
the  band  had  been  without  their  extra  pay  for  a 
number  of  months. 

The  regimental  bands  at  that  day  were  kept  up 
partly  by  pay  from  the  Government  and  partly  by 
pay  from  the  regimental  fund.  There  was  author- 
ity of  law  for  enlisting  a  certain  number  of  men  as 
musicians.  So  many  could  receive  the  pay  of  non- 
commissioned officers  of  the  various  grades,  and 
the  remainder  the  pay  of  privates.  This  would  not 
secure  a  band  leader,  nor  good  players  on  certain 
instruments.  In  garrison  there  are  various  ways  meS^lSid 
of  keeping  up  a  regimental  fund  sufficient  to  give 
extra  pay  to  musicians,  establish  libraries  and  ten- 
pin  alleys,  subscribe  to  magazines,  and  furnish 
many  extra  comforts  to  the  men.  The  best  device 
for  supplying  the  fund  is  to  issue  bread  to  the  sol- 
diers instead  of  flour.  The  ration  used  to  be  eigh- 
teen ounces  per  day  of  either  flour  or  bread ;  and 
one  hundred  pounds  of  flom*  will  make  one  hundred 
and  forty  pounds  of  bread.  This  saving  was  pur- 
chased by  the  commissary  for  the  benefit  of  the 
fund.  In  the  emergency  the  Fourth  Infantry  was 
laboring  under,  I  rented  a  bakery  in  the  city,  hired 
bakers, — Mexicans, — bought  fuel  and  whatever  was 
necessary,  and  I  also  got  a  contract  from  the  chief 
commissaiy  of  the  army  for  baking  a  large  amount 
of  hRrd  bread.   In  two  monfViR  I  made  more  monev 


142 


PERSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 


Exounion 

toPopooate- 

peU 


ciup.  xin  ever,  was  no  profit  except  in  the  saving  of  flour  by 
converting  it  into  bread. 

In  the  spring  of  1848  a  party  of  officers  obtained 
leave  to  visit  Popocatepetl, — the  highest  volcano 
in  America, — and  to  take  an  escort.  I  went  with 
the  party,  many  of  whom  afterwai'd  occupied  con- 
spicuous positions  before  the  country.  Of  those 
who  "  went  South  ^  and  attained  high  rank,  there 
was  Lieutenant  Richard  Anderson,  who  com- 
manded a  corps  at  Spottsylvania ;  Captain  Sibley, 
a  major-general,  and,  after  the  war,  for  a  number 
of  years  in  the  employ  of  the  Khedive  of  Egypt ; 
Captain  George  Crittenden,  a  rebel  general ;  S.  B. 
Buckner,  who  surrendered  Fort  Donelson;  and 
Mansfield  Lovell,  who  commanded  at  New  Orleans 
before  that  city  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  national 
troops.  Of  those  who  remained  on  our  side  there 
were  Captain  Andrew  Porter,  Lieutenant  C.  P. 
Stone,  and  Lieutenant  Z.  B.  Tower.  There  were 
quite  a  number  of  other  officers,  whose  names  I 
cannot  recollect. 

At  a  little  village  (Ozumba)  near  the  base  of 
Popocatepetl,  where  we  purposed  to  commence  the 
ascent,  we  procured  guides  and  two  pack-mules 
with  forage  for  our  horses.  High  up  on  the  moun- 
tain there  was  a  deserted  house  of  one  room,  called 
the  Vaqueria,  which  had  been  occupied  years  before 
by  men  in  charge  of  cattle  ranging  on  the  moun- 
tain. The  pasturage  up  there  was  very  fine  when 
we  saw  it.  and  there  were  still  some  cattle,  descen- 


"  stone 
Pacha" 


Tlie  ascent 


TBIP  TO  POPOCATEPETL  143 

narrow,  with  a  yawning  precipice  on  one  side —  chap,  xm 
hundreds  of  feet  down  to  a  roaring  mountain  tor- 
rent below — and  almost  perpendicular  walls  on 
the  other  side.  At  one  of  these  places  one  of  our 
mules,  loaded  with  two  sacks  of  barley,  one  on  each 
side,  the  two  about  as  big  as  he  was,  struck  his 
load  against  the  mountain-side  and  was  precipi- 
tated to  the  bottom.  The  descent  was  steep,  but 
not  perpendicular.  The  mule  rolled  over  and  over 
until  the  bottom  was  reached,  and  we  supposed,  of 
course,  the  poor  animal  was  dashed  to  pieces. 
What  was  our  surprise,  not  long  after  we  had  gone 
into  bivouac,  to  see  the  lost  mule,  cargo,  and  owner 
coming  up  the  ascent !  The  load  had  protected  the 
animal  from  serious  injury;  and  his  owner  had 
gone  after  him  and  found  a  way  back  to  the  path 
leading  up  to  the  hut  where  we  were  to  stay. 

The  night  at  the  Vaqueria  was  one  of  the  most  ^  "J^^***^ 
unpleasant  I  ever  knew.  It  was  very  cold  and  the 
rain  fell  in  torrents.  A  little  higher  up  the  rain 
ceased  and  snow  began.  The  wind  blew  with  great 
velocity.  The  log  cabin  we  were  in  had  lost  the 
roof  entirely  on  one  side,  and  on  the  other  it  was 
hardly  better  than  a  sieve.  There  was  little  or  no 
sleep  that  night.  As  soon  as  it  was  light  the  next 
morning  we  started  to  make  the  ascent  to  the  sum- 
mit. The  wind  continued  to  blow  with  violence 
and  the  weather  was  still  cloudy,  but  there  was 
neither  rain  nor  snow.  The  clouds,  however,  con- 
cealed from  our  view  the  country  below  us,  except 
at  times  a  momentary  gUmpse  could  be  got  through 
a  clear  space  between  them.     The  wind  carried  the 


144  FEBSONAL  MEMOIBS  OF  U.  8.  GBANT 

CHAP,  xra  against  it.  We  labored  on  and  on,  until  it  became 
evident  that  the  top  could  not  be  reached  before 
night,  if  at  all  in  such  a  storm,  and  we  concluded 
to  return.  The  descent  was  easy  and  rapid,  though 
dangerous,  imtil  we  got  below  the  snow-line.  At 
the  cabin  we  mounted  our  horses,  and  by  night 
were  at  Ozumba. 

The  fatigues  of  the  day  and  the  loss  of  sleep  the 
night  before  drove  us  to  bed  early.  Our  beds  con- 
sisted of  a  place  on  the  dirt  floor,  with  a  blanket 
under  us.  Soon  all  were  asleep;  but  long  before 
morning  first  one  and  then  another  of  our  party 

snow^nd-  began  to  cry  out  with  excruciating  pain  in  the  eyes. 
Not  one  escaped  it.  By  morning  the  eyes  of  half 
the  party  were  so  swollen  that  they  were  entirely 
closed.  The  others  suffered  pain  equally.  The 
feeling  was  about  what  might  be  expected  from 
the  prick  of  a  sharp  needle  at  a  white  heat.  We 
remained  in  quarters  until  the  afternoon  bathing 
our  eyes  in  cold  water.  This  relieved  us  very 
much,  and  before  night  the  pain  had  entirely  left. 
The  swelling,  however,  continued,  and  about  half 
the  party  still  had  their  eyes  entirely  closed ;  but 
we  concluded  to  make  a  start  back,  those  who 
could  see  a  little  leading  the  horses  of  those  who 
could  not  see  at  all.  We  moved  back  to  the  village 
of  Ameca  Ameca — some  six  miles — and  stopped 
again  for  the  night.  The  next  morning  all  were 
entirely  well  and  free  from  pain.  The  weather  was 
clear,  and  Popocatepetl  stood  out  in  all  its  beauty, 
the  top  looking  as  if  not  a  mile  away,  and  inviting 
us  to  return.  About  half  the  party  were  anxious 
to  trv  the  ascent  a&rain.  and  concluded  to  do  so. 


TRIP  TO  THE  CAVES  OF  MEXICO  145 

eluded  that  we  had  got  all  the  pleasure  there  was  chap,  xra 
to  be  had  out  of  mountain-climbing,  and  that  we 
would  visit  the  great  caves  of  Mexico,  some  ninety- 
miles  from  where  we  then  were,  on  the  road  to 
Acapulco. 

The  party  that  ascended  the  mountain  the  sec-  -^"SSSf^ 
ond  time  succeeded  in  reaching  the  crater  at  the 
top,  with  but  little  6t  the  labor  they  encountered 
in  their  first  attempt.  Three  of  them — Anderson, 
Stone,  and  Buckner — wrote  accounts  of  their  jour- 
ney, which  were  pubhshed  at  the  time.  I  made  no 
notes  of  this  excursion,  and  have  read  nothing 
about  it  since,  but  it  seems  to  me  that  I  can  see  the 
whole  of  it  as  vividly  as  if  it  were  but  yesterday. 
I  have  been  back  at  Ameca  Ameca,  and  the  village 
beyond,  twice  in  the  last  :five  years.  The  scene  had 
not  changed  materially  from  my  recollection  of  it. 

The  party  which  I  was  with  moved  south  down  Trf^tothe 
the  valley  to  the  town  of  Cuautla,  some  forty  miles 
from  Ameca  Ameca.  The  latter  stands  on  the 
plain  at  the  foot  of  Popocatepetl,  at  an  elevation  of 
about  eight  thousand  feet  above  tide-water.  The 
slope  down  is  gradual  as  the  traveler  moves  south, 
but  one  would  not  judge  that,  in  going  to  Cuautla, 
descent  enough  had  been  made  to  occasion  a  mate- 
rial change  in  the  climate  and  productions  of  the 
soil ;  but  such  is  the  case.  In  the  morning  we  left 
a  temperate  climate  where  the  cereals  and  fruits 
are  those  common  to  the  United  States ;  we  halted 
in  the  evening  in  a  tropical  climate  where  the 


146  PEBSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  8.  GBANT 

CHAP,  xm  Soon  after  the  capture  of  the  city  of  Mexico  an 
armistice  had  been  agreed  to,  designating  the  limits 
beyond  which  troops  of  the  respective  armies  were 
not  to  go  during  its  continuance.    Our  party  knew 

^Me^fin^  nothing  about  these  limits.  As  we  approached 
soldiers  Cuautla  buglcs  sounded  the  assembly,  and  soldiers 
rushed  from  the  guard-house  in  the  edge  of  the 
town  toward  us.  Our  party  halted,  and  I  tied  a 
white  pocket-handkerchief  to  a  stick  and,  using  it 
as  a  flag  of  truce,  proceeded  on  to  the  town.  Cap- 
tains Sibley  and  Porter  followed  a  few  hundred 
yards  behind.  I  was  detained  at  the  guard-house 
until  a  messenger  could  be  despatched  to  the  quar- 
ters of  the  commanding  general,  who  authorized 
that  I  should  be  conducted  to  him.  I  had  been 
with  the  general  but  a  few  minutes  when  the  two 
officers  following  announced  themselves.  The  Mex- 
ican general  reminded  us  that  it  was  a  violation  of 
the  truce  for  us  to  be  there.  However,  as  we  had 
no  special  authority  from  our  own  commanding 
general,  and  as  we  knew  nothing  about  the  terms 
of  the  truce,  we  were  permitted  to  occupy  a  vacant 
house  outside  the  guard  for  the  night,  with  the 
promise  of  a  guide  to  put  us  on  the  road  to  Cuer- 
navaca  the  next  morning. 

Cuemavaca  is  a  town  west  of  Cuautla.  The 
country  through  which  we  passed  between  these 
two  towns  is  tropical  in  climate  and  productions 
and  rich  in  scenery.  At  one  point,  about  half-way 
between  the  two  places,  the  road  goes  over  a  low 
Dass  in  the  mountains  in  which  there  is  a  verv 


TRIP  TO  THE  OAVEB  OF  MEXICO  147 

were  built  of  stone  and  generally  only  one  story  c»ap.  xm 
high.  The  streets  were  narrow,  and  had  probably 
been  paved  before  Cortez  visited  the  country. 
They  had  not  been  graded,  but  the  paving  had 
been  done  on  the  natural  surface.  We  had  with 
us  one  vehicle, — a  cart, — which  was  probably  the 
first  wheeled  vehicle  that  had  ever  passed  through 
that  town. 

On  a  hill  overlooking  this  town  stands  the  tomb  ^^^ 
of  an  ancient  king ;  and  it  was  understood  that  the 
inhabitants  venerated  this  tomb  very  highly,  iEis 
well  as  the  memory  of  the  ruler  who  was  supposed 
to  be  buried  in  it.  We  ascended  the  mountain  and 
surveyed  the  tomb;  but  it  showed  no  particular 
marks  of  architectural  taste,  mechanical  skill,  or 
advanced  civilization.  The  next  day  we  went  into 
Cuemavaca. 

After  a  day's  rest  at  Cuernavaca  our  party  set 
out  again  on  the  journey  to  the  great  caves  of 
Mexico.    We  had  proceeded  but  a  few  miles  when 
we  were  stopped,  as  before,  by  a  guard,  and  noti-     ^J^^ 
fied  that  the  terms  of  the  existing  armistice  did  not 
permit  us  to  go  farther  in  that  direction.    Upon 
convincing  the  guard  that  we  were  a  mere  party 
of  pleasure-seekers  desirous  of  visiting  the  great 
natural  curiosities  of  the  country  which  we  ex- 
pected soon  to  leave,  we  were  conducted  to  a  large 
hacienda  near  by,  and  directed  to  remain  there 
until  the  commanding  general  of  that  department 
could  be  communicated  with,    and  his  decision 
obtained  as  to  whether  we  should,  be  permitted  to 


148  PEBSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GBANT 

CHAP,  xra  ing  general,  but  the  captain  of  the  guard  was  sure 
he  would  have  a  reply  by  morning.  Again  in  the 
morning  there  was  no  reply.  The  second  evening 
the  same  thing  happened,  and  finally  we  learned 
that  the  guard  had  sent  no  message  or  messenger 

T^J^™y  to  the  department  commander.  We  determined, 
therefore,  to  go  on  unless  stopped  by  a  force  suffi- 
cient to  compel  obedience. 

After  a  few  hours'  ti'avel  we  came  to  a  town 
where  a  scene  similar  to  the  one  at  Cuautla  oc- 
curred. The  commanding  officer  sent  a  guide  to 
conduct  our  party  around  the  village  and  to  put  us 
upon  our  road  again.  This  was  the  last  interrup- 
tion ;  that  night  we  rested  at  a  large  coffee-planta- 
tion, some  eight  miles  from  the  cave  we  were  on 

Q^^  the  way  to  visit.  It  must  have  been  a  Saturday 
night ;  the  peons  had  been  paid  off,  and  spent  part 
of  the  night  in  gambling  away  their  scanty  week's 
earnings.  Their  coin  was  principally  copper,  and 
I  do  not  believe  there  was  a  man  among  them 
who  had  received  as  much  as  twenty-five  cents  in 
money.  They  were  as  much  excited,  however,  as 
if  they  had  been  staking  thousands.  I  recollect 
one  poor  fellow,  who  had  lost  his  last  tlaco,  pulled 
off  Ms  shirt  and,  in  the  most  excited  manner,  put 
that  up  on  the  turn  of  a  card.  Monte  was  the 
game  played,  the  place  out  of  doors,  near  the  win- 
dow of  the  room  occupied  by  the  officers  of  our 
party. 
TheoETe  The  next  morning  we  were  at  the  mouth  of  the 
cave  fit  an  early  hour,  provided  with  guides,  can- 
dles, and  rockets.    We  explored  to  a  distance  of 


J-  i.1 


TBIP  TO  THE  CAVES  OP  MEXICO  149 

great  beauty  when  lit  up  with  our  rockets.  Stalac-  chip,  xra 
tites  and  stalagmites  of  all  sizes  were  discovered.  ^^^ 
Some  of  the  former  were  many  feet  in  diameter 
and  extended  from  ceiling  to  floor;  some  of  the 
latter  were  but  a  few  feet  high  from  the  floor ;  but 
the  formation  is  going  on  constantly,  and  many 
centuries  hence  these  stalagmites  will  extend  to 
the  ceiling  and  become  complete  columns.  The 
stalagmites  were  all  a  little  concave,  and  the  cavi- 
ties were  filled  with  water.  The  water  percolates 
through  the  roof,  a  drop  at  a  time, — often  the 
drops  several  minutes  apart, — and  more  or  less 
charged  with  mineral  matter.  Evaporation  goes 
on  slowly,  leaving  the  mineral  behind.  This  in 
time  makes  the  immense  columns — many  of  them 
thousands  of  tons  in  weight — which  serve  to  sup- 
port the  roofs  over  the  vast  chambers.  I  recollect 
that  at  one  point  in  the  cave  one  of  these  columns 
is  of  such  huge  proportions  that  there  is  only  a 
narrow  passage  left  on  either  side  of  it.  Some  of 
our  party  became  satisfied  with  their  explorations 
before  we  had  reached  the  point  to  which  the 
guides  were  accustomed  to  take  explorers,  and 
started  back  without  guides.  Coming  to  the  large 
column  spoken  of,  they  followed  it  entirely  around, 
and  commenced  retracing  their  steps  into  the  bow- 
els of  the  mountain,  without  being  aware  of  the 
fact.  When  the  rest  of  us  had  completed  our  ex- 
plorations, we  started  out  with  our  guides,  but  had 
not  gone  far  before  we  saw  the  torches  of  an  ap- 


150  PERSONAL  HEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

CHAP,  xm  our  friends.  It  took  them  some  time  to  conceive 
how  they  had  got  where  they  were.  They  were 
sure  they  had  kept  straight  on  for  the  mouth  of 
the  cave,  and  had  gone  about  far  enough  to  have 
reached  it. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

RETUKN  OP  THE  ARMY  —  MARRIAGE  —  ORDERED  TO 
THE  PACIFIC  COAST — CROSSING  THE  ISTHMUS — 
ARRIVAL  AT   SAN  FRANaSCO 

MY  experience  in  the  Mexican  war  was  of  great  chap,  xiv 
advantage  to  me  afterward.     Besides  the  ^^^J^n^ 
many  practical  lessons  it  tanght,  the  war  brought 
nearly  all  the  officers  of  the  regular  army  together 
so  as  to  make  them  personally  acquainted.    It  also 
brought  them  in  contact  with  volunteers,  many  of 
whom  served  in  the  war  of  the  rebellion  afterward. 
Then,  in  my  particular  case,  I  had  been  at  West 
Point  at  about  the  right  time  to  meet  most  of  the      i88»-48 
graduates  who  were  of  a  suitable  age  at  the  break- 
ing out  of  the  rebellion  to  be  trusted  with  large 
commands.     Graduating  in  1843,  I  was  at  the 
Military  Academy  from  one  to  four  years  with  all 
cadets  who  graduated  between  1840  and  1846 — 
seven  classes.    These  classes  embraced  more  than  ^ 

fifty  officers  who  afterward  became  generals  on  one 
side  or  the  other  in  the  rebellion,  many  of  them 
holding  high  commands.      All  the  older  officers  SS^^S.- 
who  became  conspicuous  in  the  rebellion  I  had  p^^^*^'^^ 
also  served  with  and  known  in  Mexico — Lee,  J,  E.  ^'^^fA'. 


152  PERSONAL  MEMOmS  OP  U.  S.  GBANT 

CHAP.  XIV  Mansfield,  P^ul.  Kearny,  and  others  on  the  Na- 
Bton^S'd,  tional  side.  The  acquaintance  thus  formed  was 
^oSf^"  of  inunense  service  to  me  in  the  war  of  the  rebel- 
lion— I  mean  what  I  learned  of  the  characters  of 
those  to  whom  I  was  afterward  opposed,  I  do  not 
pretend  to  say  that  all  movements,  or  even  many 
of  them,  were  made  with  special  reference  to  the 
characteristics  of  the  commander  against  whom 
they  were  directed;  but  my  appreciation  of  my 
enemies  was  certainly  affected  by  this  knowledge. 
The  natural  disposition  of  most  people  is  to  clothe 
a  commander  of  a  large  army  whom  they  do  not 
know  with  almost  superhuman  abilities.  A  large 
part  of  the  National  army,  for  instance,  and  most 
of  the  press  of  the  country,  clothed  General  Lee 
with  just  such  qualities;  but  I  had  known  him 
personally,  and  knew  that  he  ^as  mortal;  and  it 
was  just  as  well  that  I  felt  this. 
M47  80, 1848  The  treaty  of  peace  was  at  last  ratified,  and  the 
evacuation  of  Mexico  by  United  States  troops  was 
Jane  12  Ordered.  Early  in  June  the  troops  in  the  city  of 
Mexico  began  to  move  out.  Many  of  them — in- 
cluding the  brigade  to  which  I  belonged — were 
assembled  at  Jalapa,  above  the  vomito,  to  await 
the  arrival  of  transports  at  Vera  Cruz ;  but  with 
all  this  precaution  my  regiment  and  others  were  in 
camp  on  the  sand-beach  in  a  July  sun  for  about  a 
week  before  embarking,  while  the  fever  raged  with 
great  virulence  in  Vera  Cruz,  not  two  miles  away. 
I  can  call  to  mind  only  one  person — an  officer — 
who  died  of  the  disease.    My  re^ment  was  sent  to 


ORDEEED  TO  THE  PACIFIC  COAST  153 

Louis.    On  the  22d  of  August,  1848, 1  was  married  chap,  xiv 
to  Miss  Julia  Dent,  the  lady  of  whom  I  have  before    ^^a^*^ 
spoken.    We  visited  my  parents  and  relations  in  pp.  ae,  29, 30 
Ohio,  and  at  the  end  of  my  leave  proceeded  to 
my  post  at  Sackett's  Harbor,  New  York.    In  April       isio 
following  I  was  ordered  to   Detroit,   Michigan,  ^*^^J^** 
where  two  years  were  spent  with  but  few  impor- 
tant incidents. 

The  present  constitution  of  the  State  of  Michi- 
gan was  ratified  during  .this  time.    By  the  terms 
of  one  of  its  provisions,  all  citizens  of  the  United 
States  residing  within  the  State  at  the  time  of  the 
ratification  became  citizens  of  Michigan  also.   Dur- 
ing my  stay  in  Detroit  there  was  an  election  for 
city  officers.    Mr.  Zachariah  Chandler  was  the  can-   Jsi^Vb. 
didate  of  the  Whigs  for  the  office  of  mayor,  and  i^-Tj'iOTlil 
was  elected,  although  the  city  was  then  reckoned   i^Vt^V 
Democratic.    All  the  officers  stationed  there  at  the     ^^'  '  ^ 
time  who  offered  their  votes  were  permitted  to  cast 
them.    I  did  not  offer  mine,  however,  as  I  did  not 
wish  to  consider  myself  a  citizen  of  Michigan. 
This  was  Mr.  Chandler's  first  entry  into  politics — 
a  career  he  followed  ever  after  with  great  success, 
and  in  which  he  died  enjoying  the  friendship, 
esteem,  and  love  of  his  countrymen. 

In  the  spring  of  1851  the  garrison  at  Detroit  was  ^^hSj^**'* 
transferred  to  Sackett's  Harbor,  and  in  the  fol- 
lowing spring  the  entire  Fourth  Infantry  was  or-  Se  PaSiaS 
dered  to  the  Pacific  coast.    It  was  decided  that      ^~^ 
Mrs.  Grant  should  visit  my  parents  at  first  for  a  few 
months,  and  then  remain  with  her  own  family  at 
their  St.  Louis  home  until  an  opportunity  offered       ^^^^ 


154  PEBSONAL  MEMOmS  OP  U.  S.  GRANT 

CHAP.  XIV  York  harbor,  and  on  the  5th  of  July  eight  com- 
i«5a  panies  sailed  for  Aspinwall.  We  numbered  a  little 
over  seven  hundred  persons,  including  the  families 
of  officers  and  soldiers.  Passage  was  secured  for 
us  on  the  old  steamer  OhiOj  commanded  at  the  time 
by  Captain  Schenck,  of  the  navy.  It  had  not  been 
determined  until  a  day  or  two  before  starting  that 
the  Fourth  Infantry  should  go  by  the  Ohio;  conse- 
quently a  complement  of  passengers  had  already 
been  secured.  The  addition  of  over  seven  hundred 
to  this  list  crowded  the  steamer  most  uncomforta- 
bly, especially  for  the  tropics  in  July. 

^mSs*"  ^^  eight  days  Aspinwall  was  reached.  At  that 
time  the  streets  of  the  town  were  eight  or  ten 
inches  under  water,  and  foot-passengers  passed 
from  place  to  place  on  raised  footwalks.  July  is 
at  the  height  of  the  wet  season  on  the  isthmus. 
At  intervals  the  rain  would  pour  down  in  streams, 
followed  in  not  many  minutes  by  a  blazing,  trop- 
ical summer's  sun.  These  alternate  changes  from 
rain  to  sunshine  were  continuous  in  the  after- 
noons. I  wondered  how  any  person  could  live 
many  months  in  Aspinwall,  and  wondered  still 
more  why  any  one  tried. 
cf.Thecen-      In  the  summcr  of  1852  the  Panama  Railroad  was 

tury,  XLI, 

ciSftT  Hist  completed  only  to  the  point  where  it  now  crosses 

Ivnif*^!  the  Chagres  Eiver.    From  there  passengers  were 

StOT*pS^    carried  by  boats  to  Gorgona,  at  which  place  they 

'vii'   '  took  mules  for  Panama,  some  twenty-five  miles 

farther.    Those  who  traveled  over  the  isthmus  in 

those  days  will  remember  that  boats  on  the  Chagres 

Eiver  were  propelled  by  natives  not  inconveniently 


CKOSSINa  THE  ISTHMUS  155 

six  men  to  a  boat,  armed  with  long  poles.  There  chap,  xiv 
were  planks,  wide  enough  for  a  man  to  walk  on 
conveniently,  running  along  the  sides  of  each  boat 
from  end  to  end.  The  men  would  start  from  the 
bow,  place  one  end  of  their  poles  against  the  river- 
bottom,  brace  their  shoulders  against  the  other  end, 
and  then  walk  to  the  stem  as  rapidly  as  they  could. 
In  this  way  from  a  mile  to  a  mile  and  a  half  an  hour 
could  be  made  against  the  current  of  the  river. 

I,  as  regimental  quartermaster,  had  charge  of  ^^^^^ 
the  public  property,  and  had  also  to  look  after  the  ^^^ 
transportation.  A  contract  had  been  entered  into 
with  the  steamship  company  in  New  York  for  the 
transportation  of  the  regiment  to  Califomia,  in- 
cluding the  isthmus  transit.  A  certain  amoimt  of 
baggage  was  allowed  per  man,  and  saddle-animals 
were  to  be  furnished  to  commissioned  officers  and 
to  all  disabled  persons.  The  regiment,  with  the 
exception  of  one  company  left  as  guards  to  the 
public  property,— camp  and  garrison  equipage 
principally, — and  the  soldiers  with  families,  took 
boats,  propelled  as  above  described,  for  Qorgona. 
From  this  place  they  marched  to  Panama,  and 
were  soon  comfortably  on  the  steamer  anchored  in 
the  bay  some  three  or  four  miles  from  the  town. 
I,  with  one  company  of  troops  and  all  the  soldiers 
with  families,  all  the  tents,  mess-chests,  and  camp 
kettles,  was  sent  to  Graces,  a  town  a  few  miles 
higher  up  the  Chagres  Eiver  than  Gorgona.  There 
I  found  an  impecunious  American  who  had  taken 
the  contract  to  furnish  transportation  for  the  regi- 
ment at  a  stipulated  price  per  hundred  pounds  for 


156  PEBSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  8.  GRANT 

CHAP.  XIV  either  for  pack  or  saddle,  in  the  place.  The  con- 
tractor promised  that  the  animals  should  be  on 
hand  in  the  morning.  In  the  morning  he  said  that 
they  were  on  the  way  from  some  imaginary  place, 
and  would  arrive  in  the  course  of  the  day.  This 
went  on  trntil  I  saw  that  he  could  not  procure  the 
animals  at  all  at  the  price  he  had  promised  to  fur- 
nish them  for.  The  unusual  number  of  passengers 
that  had  come  over  on  the  steamer,  and  the  large 
amount  of  freight  to  pack,  had  created  an  unprece- 
dented demand  for  mules.  Some  of  the  passengers 
paid  as  high  as  forty  dollars  for  the  use  of  a  mule 
to  ride  twenty-five  miles,  when  the  mule  would  not 
have  sold  for  ten  dollars  in  that  market  at  other 
Cholera  times.  Meanwhile  the  cholera  had  broken  out,  and 
men  were  dying  every  hour.  To  diminish  the  food 
for  the  disease,  I  permitted  the  company  detailed 
with  me  to  proceed  to  Panama.  The  captain  and 
the  doctors  accompanied  the  men,  and  I  was  left 
alone  with  the  sick  and  the  soldiers  who  had  fami- 
lies. The  regiment  at  Panama  was  also  affected 
with  the  disease ;  but  there  were  better  accommo- 
dations for  the  well  on  the  steamer,  and  a  hospital 
for  those  taken  with  the  disease  on  an  old  hulk 
anchored  a  mile  off.  There  were  also  hospital 
tents  on  shore  on  the  island  of  Flamingo,  which 
stands  in  the  bay. 

I  was  about  a  week  at  Cruces  before  transporta- 
tion began  to  come  in.  About  one  third  of  the 
people  with  me  died,  either  at  Cruces  or  on  the 
way  to  Panama.    There  was  no  agent  of  the  trans- 


CROSSINa  THE  ISTHMUS  157 

dismissed  the  contractor  and  made  a  new  contract  chap,  xiv 
with  a  native,  at  more  than  double  the  original 
price.     Thus  we  finally  reached  Panama.     The 
steamer,  however,  could   not  proceed  until  the 
cholera  abated,  and  the  regiment  was  detained  still 
longer.    Altogether,  on  the  isthmus  and  on  the 
Pacific  side,  we  were  delayed  six  weeks.    About  ^'tS^^!^' 
one  seventh  of  those  who  left  New  York  harbor   ^Srcfs?*" 
with  the  Fourth  Infantry  on  the  5th  of  July  now   ^iSl^£^* 
lie  buried  on  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  or  on  Fla- 
mingo Island  in  Panama  Bay. 

One  amusing  circumstance  occurred  while  we 
were  lying  at  anchor  in  Panama  Bay.    In  the  regi- 
ment there  was  a  Lieutenant  Slaughter,  who  was    g^S^jj^^ 
very  liable  to  seasickness.    It  almost  made  him    ^jli**'' 
sick  to  see  the  wave  of  a  table-cloth  when  the  ser- 
vants were  spreading  it.     Soon  after  his  gradua- 
tion Slaughter  was  ordered  to  Calif  omia,  and  took 
passage  by  a  sailing-vessel  going  around  Cape 
Horn.    The  vessel  was  seven  months  making  the 
voyage,  and  Slaughter  was  sick  every  moment  of   ^f^i^ 
the  time — never  more  so  than  while  lying  at      "®®®- 
anchor  after  reaching  his  place  of  destination.    On 
landing  in  California  he  found  orders  which  had 
come  by  the  isthmus  notifying  him  of  a  mistake  in 
his  assignment ;  he  should  have  been  ordered  to  the 
Northern  lakes.    He  started  back  by  the  isthmus 
route  and  was  sick  all  the  way.    But  when  he 
arrived  at  the  East  he  was  again  ordered  to  Cali- 
fornia,— this  time  definitely, — and  at  this  date  was 
Tnaldner  hia  third  trin.    Ha  was  as  sick  as  ever,  and 


158  FEBSOKAL  MEMOIBS  OF  U.  S.  GBANT 

CHAP.  XIV  chin  between  his  hands,  and  looking  the  picture  of 
despair.  At  last  he  broke  out :  "  I  wish  I  had  taken 
my  father's  advice ;  he  wanted  me  to  go  into  the 
navy ;  if  I  had  done  so,  I  should  not  have  had  to 
go  to  sea  so  much.''   Poor  Slaughter  1  it  was  his  last 

Deo.  4, 1865  sea- voyage.    He  was  killed  by  Indians  in  Oregon. 

18(0  By  the  last  of  August  the  cholei'a  had  so  abated 

that  it  was  deemed  safe  to  start.    The  disease  did 

not  break  out  again  on  the  way  to  California,  and 

we  reached  San  Francisco  early  in  September. 


CHAPTER  XV 

SAN  FRANCISCO — EARLY  CALIFORNIA  EXPERIENCES — 
LIFE  ON  THE  PACIFIC  COAST — PROMOTED  CAPTAIN 
— FLUSH  TIMES  IN  CALIFORNIA 

SAN  FRANCISCO  at  that  day  was  a  Uvely  place,  chap,  xv 
Gold,  or  placer-digging,  as  it  was  called,  was  iBsa 
at  its  height.  Steamers  plied  daily  between  San 
Francisco  and  both  Stockton  and  Sacramento. 
Passengers  and  gold  from  the  southern  mines  ooidendAys 
came  by  the  Stockton  boat;  from  the  northern 
mines  by  Sacramento.  In  the  evening,  when  these 
boats  arrived.  Long  Wharf — there  was  but  one 
wharf  in  San  Francisco  in  1852 — was  alive  with 
people  crowding  to  meet  the  miners  as  they  came 
down  to  sell  their  "dust**  and  to  "have  a  time.*^ 
Of  these  some  were  runners  for  hotels,  boarding- 
houses,  or  restaurants ;  others  belonged  to  a  class 
of  impecunious  adventurers,  of  good  maimers  and 
good  presence,  who  were  ever  on  the  alert  to  make 
the  acquaintance  of  people  with  some  ready  means, 
in  the  hope  of  being  asked  to  take  a  meal  at  a 
restaurant.  Many  were  young  men  of  good  family, 
good  education,  and  gentlemanly  instincts.  Their 
parents  had  been  able  to  support  them  during  their 
minority,  and  to  give  them  good  educations,  but 


160  PEBSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GEANT 

CHAP.  XV   of  the  class  described.    All  thought  that  fortunes 
were  to  be  picked  up,  without  eflfort,  in  the  gold- 
fields  on  the  Pacific.     Some  realized  more  than 
their  most  sanguine  expectations ;  but  for  one  such 
^        there  were  hundreds  disappointed,  many  of  whom 
now  fill  unknown  graves;  others  died  wrecks  of 
their  former  selves ;  and  many,  without  a  vicious 
instinct,  became  criminals  and  outcasts.    Many  of 
the  real  scenes  in  early  California  life  exceed  in 
strangeness  and  interest  any  of  the  mere  products 
of  the  brain  of  the  novelist. 
t^  SSi,       Those  early  days  in  California  brought  out  char- 
xii^paaa-  ^ctcr.    It  was  a  long  way  oflf  then,  and  the  journey 
was  expensive.    The  fortunate  could  go  by  Cape 
Horn  or  by  the  Isthmus  of  Panama;  but  the  mass 
HiSfpac!    ^^  pioneers  crossed  the  plains  with  their  ox-teams. 
xvmSV   This  took  an  entire  summer.     They  were  very 
foraia^iSer  lucky  whcu  they  got  through  with  a  yoke  of  wom- 
pocuimciLv  ^^^  cattle.     All  other  means  were  exhausted  in 
procuring  the  outfit  on  the  Missouri  Eiver.    The 
immigrant,  on  arriving,  found  himself  a  stranger 
in  a  strange  land,  far  from  friends.    Time  pressed, 
for  the  little  means  that  could  be  realized  from  the 
sale  of  what  was  left  of  the  outfit  would  not  sup- 
port a  man  long  at  California  prices.   Many  became 
Theccn.    discouragcd.     Others  would  take  oflf  their  coats 
xLiitW   Q^jj^  IqqJj  fQj.  a^  jQ^j^  j^Q  matter  what  it  might  be. 
These  succeeded,  as  a  rule.     There  were  many 
young  men  who  had  studied  professions  before 
they  went  to  California,  and  who  had  never  done  a 

^«*»'«    »v%r»i^^-»«l     loVi^-wi.    ^f*     4-V»/i"ii»     liTT/io      ■t*tV»^%    4'r\r\^r-    iir%     r\nA 


LIFE  ON  THE  PACIFIC  COAST  161 

plank,  brick,  or  mortar,  as  the  case  might  be;  chap, xv 
others  drove  stages,  drays,  or  baggage-wagons 
until  they  could  do  better.  More  became  discou- 
raged early,  and  spent  their  time  looking  up  people 
who  would  "  treat,''  or  lounging  about  restaurants 
and  gambling-houses  where  free  lunches  were  fur- 
nished daily.  They  were  welcomed  at  these  places 
because  they  often  brought  in  miners  who  proved 
good  customers. 

My  regiment  spent  a  few  weeks  at  Benicia  Bar- 
racks, and  then  was  ordered  to  Fort  Vancouver,  ^^^^^ 
on  the  Columbia  Eiver,  then  in  Oregon  Territory. 
During  the  winter  of  1852-53  the  Territory  was 
divided,  all  north  of  the  Columbia  Eiver  being 
taken  from  Oregon  to  make  Washington  Territory. 

Prices  for  all  kinds  of  supplies  were  so  high  on  ^""tS^*^* 
the  Pacific  coast  from  1849  until  at  least  1853  that  ^^^^ 
it  would  have  been  impossible  for  officers  of  the 
army  to  exist  upon  their  pay,  if  it  had  not  been 
that  authority  was  given  them  to  purchase  from 
the  commissary  such  supplies  as  he  kept,  at  New 
Orleans  wholesale  prices.  A  cook  could  not  be 
hired  for  the  pay  of  a  captain.  The  cook  could  do 
better.  At  Benicia,  in  1852,  flour  was  25  cents  per 
pound ;  potatoes  were  16  cents ;  beets,  turnips,  and 
cabbage,  6  cents ;  onions,  37i  cents ;  meat  and  other 
articles  in  proportion.  In  1853,  at  Vancouver, 
vegetables  were  a  little  lower.  I  with  three  other 
officers  concluded  that  we  would  raise  a  crop  for  ^^Sl 
ourselves,  and  by  selling  the  surplus  realize  some- 
thing handfifoiue.  I  bought  a  pair  of  horses  that 
had  crossed  th^  plains  that  summer  and  were  very 


162  PEESONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

chaf.  XV  I  performed  all  the  labor  of  breaking  up  the  ground, 
while  the  other  officers  planted  the  potatoes.  Our 
crop  was  enormous.  Luckily  for  us,  the  Columbia 
Eiver  rose  to  a  great  height  from  the  melting  of 
the  snow  in  the  mountains  in  June,  and  overflowed 
and  killed  most  of  our  crop.  This  saved  digging 
it  up,  for  eveiybody  on  the  Pacific  coast  seemed  to 
have  come  to  the  conclusion  at  the  same  time  that 
agricultm'e  would  be  profitable.  In  1853  more  than 
three  quarters  of  the  potatoes  raised  were  permitted 
to  rot  in  the  ground,  or  had  to  be  thrown  away. 
The  only  potatoes  we  sold  were  to  our  own  mess. 

Indians  of       While  I  was  stationed  on  the  Pacific  coast  we 

tbeNorUi- 

w«8t  were  free  from  Indian  wars.  There  were  quite  a 
number  of  remnants  of  tribes  in  the  vicinity  of 
Portland  in  Oregon,  and  of  Fort  Vancouver  in 
Washington  Territory.  They  had  generally  ac- 
quired some  of  the  vices  of  civilization,  but  none 
of  the  virtues,  except  in  individual  cases.  The 
TgeHndron  Hudsou  Bay  Company  had  held  the  Northwest 

p*^  with  their  trading-posts  for  many  years  before  the 
United  States  was  represented  on  the  Pacific  coast. 
They  still  retained  posts  along  the  Columbia  Eiver, 
and  one  at  Fort  Vancouver  when  I  was  there. 
Their  treatment  of  the  Indians  had  brought  out 
the  better  qualities  of  the  savages.  Farming  had 
been  undertaken  by  the  company  to  supply  the 
Indians  with  bread  and  vegetables;  they  raised 
some  cattle  and  horses ;  and  they  had  now  taught 
the  Indians  to  do  the  labor  of  the  farm  and  herd. 


LIFE  ON  THE  PACIFIO  COAST  163 

of  exchange  between  the  Indian  and  the  white  man  chap,  xv 
was  pelts.  Afterward  it  was  silver  coin.  K  an  ^^J^^^ 
Indian  received  in  the  sale  of  a  horse  a  fifty-dollar 
gold-piece — not  an  infi'equent  occuiTence  —  the 
first  thing  he  did  was  to  exchange  it  for  American 
half-dollars.  These  he  could  count.  He  would 
then  commence  his  purchases,  paying  for  each 
article  separately  as  he  got  it.  He  would  not  trust 
any  one  to  add  up  the  bill  and  pay  it  all  at  once. 
At  that  day  fifty-dollar  gold-pieces — not  the  issue 
of  the  government — were  common  on  the  Pacific 
coast.    They  were  called  slugs. 

The  Indians  along  the  lower  Columbia  as  far  as  '"^^^"^ 
the  Cascades,  and  on  the  lower  Willamette,  died  oflf 
very  fast  during  the  year  I  spent  in  that  section ; 
for  besides  acquiring  the  vices  of  the  white  people, 
they  had  acquired  also  their  diseases.  The  measles 
and  the  smallpox  were  both  amazingly  fatal  In 
their  wild  state,  before  the  appearance  of  the  white 
man  among  them,  the  principal  complaints  they 
were  subject  to  were  those  produced  by  long  invol- 
untary fasting,  violent  exercise  in  pursuit  of  game, 
and  overeating.  Instinct  more  than  reason  had 
taught  them  a  remedy  for  these  ills.  It  was  the 
steam-bath.  Something  like  a  bake-oven  was  ^"*%J^^ 
built,  large  enough  to  admit  a  man  lying  down. 
Bushes  were  stuck  in  the  ground  in  two  rows 
about  six  feet  long  and  some  two  or  three  feet 
apart;  other  bushes  connected  the  rows  at  one 
end.    The  tops  of  the  bushes  were  drawn  together 


164  PERSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

Chap.  XV  a  hole  that  would  hold  a  bucket  or  two  of  water. 
These  ovens  were  always  built  on  the  banks  of  a 
sti'eam,  a  big  spring,  or  pool  of  water.  When  a 
patient  required  a  bath,  a  fire  was  built  near  the 
oven  and  a  pile  of  stones  put  upon  it.  The  cavity 
at  the  front  was  then  filled  with  water.  When  the 
stones  were  sufficiently  heated,  the  patient  would 
draw  himself  into  the  oven ;  a  blanket  would  be 
thrown  over  the  open  end,  and  hot  stones  put  into 
the  water  until  the  patient  could  stand  it  no  longer. 
He  was  then  withdrawn  from  his  steam-bath  and 
doused  into  the  cold  stream  near  by.  This  treat- 
ment may  have  answered  with  the  early  ailments 
of  the  Indians.  With  the  measles  or  smallpox  it 
would  kill  every  time. 

smaupox  During  my  year  on  the  Columbia  Eiver  the  small- 
pox exterminated  one  small  remnant  of  a  band  of 
Indians  entirely,  and  reduced  others  materially.  I 
do  not  think  there  was  a  case  of  recovery  among 
them  until  the  doctor  with  the  Hudson  Bay  Com- 
pany took  the  matter  in  hand  and  established  a 
hospital  Nearly  every  case  he  treated  recovered. 
I  never,  myself,  saw  the  treatment  mentioned  in  the 
preceding  paragraph,  but  have  heard  it  described 
by  persons  who  have  witnessed  it.  The  decima- 
tion among  the  Indians  I  knew  of  personally,  and 
the  hospital  established  for  their  benefit  was  a 
Hudson's  Bay  building  not  a  stone's  throw  from 
my  own  quarters. 

\uJ'  The  death  of  Colonel  Bliss,  of  the  adjutant-gen- 
eral's denartment.  which  occurred  Aiionsf.  5  1AM 


SAN  FRANOISOO  165 

and  I  very  soon  started  to  join  my  new  command,    chat,  xv 
There  was  no  way  of  reaching  Humboldt  at  that  portni^ 
time  except  to  take  passage  on  a  San  Franciso      ^®^^* 
sailing-vessel  going  after  lumber.      Eedwood,  a 
species  of  cedar,  which  on  the  Pacific  coast  takes 
the  place  filled  by  white  pine  in  the  East,  then 
abounded  on  the  banks  of  Humboldt  Bay.    There 
were  extensive  saw-mills  engaged  in  preparing  this 
lumber  for  the  San  Francisco  market,  and  sailing- 
vessels  used  in  getting  it  to  market  furnished  the 
only  means  of  communication  between  Humboldt 
and  the  balance  of  the  world. 

I  was  obliged  to  remain  in  San  Francisco  for 
several  days  before  I  found  a  vessel.     This  gave 
me  a  good  opportunity  of  comparing  the   San 
Francisco  of  1852  with  that  of  1853.    As  before     Pageiw 
stated,  there  had  been  but  one  wharf  in  front  of 
the  city  in  1852— Long  Wharf.    In  1853  the  town     T^n- 
had  grown  out  into  the  bay  beyond  what  was  the  ^^^'^' 
end  of  this  wharf  when  I  first  saw  it.     Streets  and 
houses  had  been  built  out  on  piles  where  the  year 
before  the  largest  vessels  visiting  the  port  lay  at 
anchor  or  tied  to  the  wharf.    There  was  no  filling 
under  the  streets  or  houses.    San  Francisco  pre-    ^;^' 
sented  the  same  general  appearance  as  the  year 
before — that  is,  eating,  drinking,  and  gambling 
houses  were  conspicuous  for  their  number  and 
publicity.    They  were  on  the  first  floor,  with  doors 
wide  open.    At  all  hours  of  the  day  and  night,  in 
walking  the  streets,  the  eye  was  regaled,  on  every 


166 


PERSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GBANT 


Ohap.  XV 


The  Cen- 
tury, XLm, 


Bancroft: 
California 
Inter  Poo- 
ula,  p.  961; 
Hist.  Pao. 

Btatea, 
xvin.  7n- 

783 


the  people  who  went  to  the  Pacific  coajst  in  the 
early  days  of  the  gold  excitement  and  have  never 
been  heard  from  since,  or  who  were  heard  from 
for  a  time  and  then  ceased  to  write,  found  watery 
graves  beneath  the  houses  or  streets  built  over 
San  Francisco  Bay. 

Besides  the  gambling  in  cards,  there  was  gam- 
bling on  a  larger  scale  in  city  lots.  These  were 
sold  "  on  ^Change,"  much  as  stocks  are  now  sold  on 
Wall  Street.  Cash  at  time  of  purchase  was  always 
paid  by  the  broker;  but  the  purchaser  had  only  to 
put  up  his  margin.  He  was  charged  at  the  rate  of 
two  or  three  per  cent,  a  month  on  the  difference, 
besides  commissions.  The  sand-hills — some  of 
them  almost  inaccessible  to  foot-passengers — were 
surveyed  oflf  and  mapped  into  fifty-vara  lots — a 
vara  being  a  Spanish  yard.  These  were  sold  at 
first  at  very  low  prices,  but  were  sold  and  resold 
for  higher  prices  until  they  went  up  to  many  thou- 
sands of  dollars.  The  brokers  did  a  fine  business, 
and  so  did  many  such  purchasers  as  were  sharp 
enough  to  quit  purchasing  before  the  final  crash 
came.  As  the  city  grew,  the  sand-hills  back  of 
the  town  furnished  material  for  filling  up  the  bay 
under  the  houses  and  streets,  and  still  farther  out. 
The  temporary  houses  first  built  over  the  water  in 
the  harbor  soon  gave  way  to  more  solid  structures. 
The  main  business  part  of  the  city  now  is  on  solid 
ground,  made  where  vessels  of  the  largest  class  lay 
at  anchor  in  the  early  days.  I  was  in  San  Fran- 
rtiRno  afi^ain  in  1854.     fl-amblinfi^-housAa  had  di»an- 


CHAPTER  XVI 

RESIGNATION — PRIVATE  LIFE — LIFE  AT  GALENA — THE 
COMING  CRISIS 


M 


Y  family,  all  this  while,  was  at  the  East.    It  chap.xvi 
consisted  now  of  a  wife  and  two  children.    I  rSS^S^t, 
saw  no  chance  of  supporting  them  on  the  Pacific  i8«f-&^ 
coast  out  of  my  pay  as  an  army  officer.    I  con-  b«dg?S5?6^ 
eluded,  therefore,  to  resign,  and  in  March  applied 
for  a  leave  of  absence  until  the  end  of  the  July 
following,  tendering  my  resignation  to  take  effect  ^JgJ§?the^ 
at  the  end  of  that  time.     I  left  the  Pacific  coast      "™^ 
veiy  much  attached  to  it,  and  with  the  full  expec- 
tation of  making  it  my  future  home.     That  expec- 
tation and  that  hope  remained  uppermost  in  my 
mind  until  the  Lieutenant-Generalcy  bill  was  intro- 
duced into  Congress  in  the  winter  of  1863-64.    The 
passage  of  that  bill,  and  my  promotion,  blasted  my 
last  hope  of  ever  becoming  a  citizen  of  the  farther 
West. 

In  the  late  summer  of  1854 1  rejoined  my  family, 
to  find  in  it  a  son  whom  I  had  never  seen,  bom    ^^S") 
while  I  was  on  the  Isthmus  of  Panama.     I  was      ®"*"* 
now  to  commence,  at  the  age  of  thirty-two,  a  new 


168  PEBSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GBAKT 

Chap.  XVI  Weather,  and  accomplished  the  object  in  a  moder- 
ate way.  If  nothing  else  could  be  done  I  would 
load  a  cord  of  wood  on  a  wagon  and  take  it  to  the 
city  for  sale.    I  managed  to  keep  along  very  well 

m  health  until  1858,  when  I  was  attacked  by  fever  and  ague. 
I  had  suffered  very  severely  and  for  a  long  time 
from  this  disease  while  a  boy  in  Ohio.  It  lasted 
now  over  a  year,  and  while  it  did  not  keep  me  in 
the  house,  it  did  interfere  greatly  with  the  amount 
of  work  I  was  able  to  perform.  In  the  fall  of  1858 
I  sold  out  my  stock,  crops,  and  farming-utensils  at 
auction,  and  gave  up  farming. 

^G^ t*  I^  *^^  winter  I  established  a  partnership  with 
Harry  Boggs,  a  cousin  of  Mrs.  Grant,  in  the  real- 
estate  agency  business.  I  spent  that  winter  at  St. 
Louis  myself,  but  did  not  take  my  family  into  town 
until  the  spring.  Our  business  might  have  become 
prosperous  if  I  had  been  able  to  wait  for  it  to  grow. 
As  it  was,  there  was  no  more  than  one  person  could 
attend  to,  and  not  enough  to  support  two  families. 
While  a  citizen  of  St.  Louis  and  engaged  in  the 
ior^vifof?  real-estate  agency  business,  I  was  a  candidate  for 
*^  the  office  of  county  engineer,  an  office  of  respecta- 
bility and  emolument  which  would  have  been  very 
acceptable  to  me  at  that  time.  The  incimibent  was 
appointed  by  the  county  court,  which  consisted  of 
five  members.  My  opponent  had  the  advantage  of 
birth  over  me  (he  was  a  citizen  by  adoption)  and 
carried  off  the  prize.     I  now  withdrew  from  the 


POLITICAL  TENDENCIES  169 

curred.    I  had  been  in  the  army  from  before  at-   chap.xvi 
taining  my  majority,  and  had  thought  but  little 
about  politics,  although  I  was  a  Whig  by  education 
and  a  gi-eat  admirer  of  Mi-.  Clay.    But  the  Whig    ^^^^ 
party  had  ceased  to  exist  before  I  had  an  oppor- 
tunity of  exercising  the  privilege  of  casting  a  bal- 
lot ;  the  Know-nothing  party  had  taken  its  place, 
but  was  on  the  wane ;  and  the  Republican  party 
was  in  a  chaotic  state  and  had  not  yet  received  a 
name.     It  had  no  existence  in  the  slave  States  ex- 
cept at  points  on  the  borders  next  to  free  States. 
In  St.  Louis  City  and  County,  what  afterward  be- 
came the  Eepublican  party  was  known  as  the  Free- 
soil  Democracy,  led  by  the  Honorable  Frank  P.  ^^iffi^; 
Blaii'.    Most  of  my  neighbors,  had  known  me  as  an  ^^.^'i^' 
officer  of  the  army  with  Whig  proclivities.    They  ^mi;^m|j.-* 
had  been  on  the  same  side,  and  on  the  death  of  Nov.kwei; 
their  party  many  had  become  Know-nothings,  or  ^iJJ-i?-. 
members  of  the  American  party.     There  was  a  ^'•JniySiisTs 
lodge  near  my  new  home,  and  I  was  invited  to  ^  pSl^" 
join  it.    I  accepted  the  invitation;  was  initiated; 
attended  a  meeting  just  one  week  later ;  and  never 
went  to  another  afterward. 

I  have  no  apologies  to  make  for  having  been  one 
week  a  member  of  the  American  party ;  for  I  still 
think  native-bom  citizens  of  the  United  States 
should  have  as  much  protection,  as  many  privileges 
in  their  native  country,  as  those  who  voluntarily 
select  it  for  a  home.  But  all  secret,  oath-bound 
political  parties  are  dangerous  to  any  nation,  no 
matter  how  pure  or  how  patriotic  the  motives  and 
principles  which  first  bring  tliem  together.     No 


170 


PERSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  6BANT 


Ghap.XYI 


AboUtion- 
iBto 


and  to  the  right  to  worship  God  "  according  to  the 
dictate  of  one's  own  conscience,''  or  according  to 
the  creed  of  any  religious  denomination  whatever. 
Nevertheless,  if  a  sect  sets  up  its  laws  as  binding 
above  the  State  laws,  wherever  the  two  come  in 
conflict  this  claim  must  be  resisted  and  suppressed 
at  whatever  cost. 

Up  to  the  Mexican  war  there  were  a  few  out-and- 
out  abolitionists — men  who  carried  their  hostility 
to  slavery  into  all  elections,  from  those  for  a  justice 
of  the  peace  up  to  the  Presidency  of  the  United 
States.  They  were  noisy,  but  not  numerous.  But 
the  great  majority  of  people  at  the  North,  where 
slavery  did  not  exist,  were  opposed  to  the  institu- 
tion, and  looked  upon  its  existence  in  any  part  of 
the  country  as  unfortunate.  They  did  not  hold  the 
States  where  slavery  existed  responsible  for  it,  and 
believed  that  protection  should  be  given  to  the 
right  of  propei-ty  in  slaves  until  some  satisfactory 
way  could  be  reached  to  be  rid  of  the  institution. 
Opposition  to  slavery  was  not  a  creed  of  either 
political  party.  In  some  sections  more  antislavery 
men  belonged  to  the  Democratic  party,  and  in 
others  to  the  Whigs.  But  with  the  inauguration 
of  the  Mexican  war — in  fact,  with  the  annexation 
of  Texas — "the  inevitable  conflict"  commenced. 

As  the  time  for  the  Presidential  election  of  1856 
— the  flrst  at  which  I  had  the  opportunity  of  vot- 
ing— approached,  party  feeling  began  to  run  high. 
^^k^wuS^  The  Republican  party  was  regarded  in  the  South 


"The  inevi- 
table oon- 
mot" 

PoUticsln 
1866 


LIFE  AT  GALENA  171 

seemed  to  present  themselves  to  the  minds  of  chaf.xvi 
people  who,  one  would  suppose,  ought  to  have 
known  better.    Many  educated  and  otherwise  sen- 
sible persons  appeared  to  believe  that  emancipation 
meant  social  equality.    Treason  to  the  government 
was  openly  advocated  and  was  not  rebuked.    It 
was  evident  to  my  mind  that  the  election  of  a   ^^^^Sf 
Republican  President  in  1856  meant  the  secession 
of  all  the  slave  States,  and  rebellion.    Under  these 
circumstances  I  preferred  the  success  of  a  candidate 
whose  election  would  prevent  or  postpone  secession, 
to  seeing  the  countiy  plunged  into  a  war  the  end 
of  which  no  man  could  foretell.    With  a  Democrat 
elected  by  the  unanimous  vote  of  the  slave  States, 
there  could  be  no  pretext  for  secession  for  four 
years.    I  very  much  hoped  that  the  passions  of 
the  people  would  subside  in  that  time,  and  the 
catastrophe  be  averted  altogether ;  if  it  was  not,  I 
believed  the  country  would  be  better  prepared  to 
receive  the  shock  and  to  resist  it.    I  therefore  voted 
for  James  Buchanan  for  President.    Four  years  ^^^*(^' 
later  the  Eepublican  party  was  successful  in  elect-  ^"^j^i?: 
ing  its  candidate  to  the  Presidency.    The  civilized  e^^  jSe 
world  has  learned  the  consequence.    Four  millions      ^'  ^^ 
of  human  beings  held  as  chattels  have  been  liber- 
ated ;  the  ballot  has  been  given  to  them ;  the  free 
schools  of  the  country  have  been  opened  to  their 
children.    The  nation  still  lives,  and  the  people  are 
just  as  free  to  avoid  social  intimacy  with    the 
blacks  as  ever  they  were,  or  as  they  are  ^th 
white  people. 

While  livinir  in  Galena  T  w«.b  TioTninallv  onlv  a    ^?MSis^ 


172 


PEESONAL  3iEM0IBS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 


Chap.  XVI 

Samuel  B. 

Granted. 

Bept23.l826; 

d.  Sepi  13, 

1861 

OrvllL. 

Grant,  b. 

May  15, 1886; 

d,  Aag.  4, 

1881 

8.  8.  Grant 


Seep.  28 


May.  1860- 
Apiil,  1861 


Election  of 
1860 


B.  A.  Doo- 


U.  8.  H.  R. 
1848-46:11.8. 
Sen.  1847-41 ; 

d,  Jane  8, 
1861       • 

John  C. 
Breckin- 
ridge, U.  8. 
H.B.1851-66; 
V.-P.1867-61; 
U.  8.  Sen. 
1861 ;  MaJ.. 
Gen.  C.S.A. 
Aug.  6, 1863; 
d.  May  17, 
1876 


father  had  never  lived  in  Galena  himself,  but  had 
established  my  two  brothers  there,  the  one  next 
younger  than  myself  in  charge  of  the  business,  as- 
sisted by  the  youngest.  When  I  went  there  it  was 
my  father's  intention  to  give  up  all  connection  with 
the  business  himself,  and  to  establish  his  three  sons 
in  it ;  but  the  brother  who  had  really  built  up  the 
business  was  sinking  with  consumption,  and  it  was 
not  thought  best  to  make  any  change  while  he  was 
in  this  condition.  He  lived  until  September,  1861, 
when  he  succumbed  to  that  insidious  disease  which 
always  flatters  its  victims  into  the  belief  that  they 
ai'e  growing  better  up  to  the  close  of  life.  A  more 
honorable  man  never  transacted  business.  In  Sep- 
tember, 1861,  I  was  engaged  in  an  employment 
which  required  all  my  attention  elsewhere. 

During  the  eleven  months  that  I  lived  in  Galena 
prior  to  the  first  call  for  volunteers  I  had  been 
strictly  attentive  to  my  business,  and  had  made 
but  few  acquaintances  other  than  customers  and 
people  engaged  in  the  same  line  with  myself. 
When  the  election  took  place  in  November,  1860, 
I  had  not  been  a  resident  of  Illinois  long  enough  to 
gain  citizenship,  and  could  not,  therefore,  vote.  I 
was  really  glad  of  this  at  the  time,  for  my  pledges 
would  have  compelled  me  to  vote  for  Stephen  A. 
Douglas,  who  had  no  possible  chance  of  election. 
The  contest  was  really  between  Mr.  Breckinridge 
and  Mr.  Lincoln ;  between  minority  rule  and  rule 
by  the  majority.  I  wanted,  as  between  these  can- 
didates, to  see  Mr.  Lincoln  elected.  Excitement 
ran  high  during  the  canvass,  and  torch-light  pro- 


xi- n_ 


THE  IMPENDING  OKISIS  173 

I  did  not  parade  with  either  party,  but  occasionally  chap,  xvi 
met  with  the  "wide-awakes" — Eepublicans — in 
their  rooms,  and  superintended  their  drilL  It  was  ^JSSJjJgJ®" 
evident,  from  the  time  of  the  Chicago  nomination 
to  the  close  of  the  canvass,  that  the  election  of  the 
Eepublican  candidate  would  be  the  signal  for  some 
of  the  Southern  States  to  secede.  I  still  had  hopes 
that  the  four  years  which  had  elapsed  since  the  first 
nomination  of  a  Presidential  candidate  by  a  party 
distinctly  opposed  to  slavery  extension  had  given 
time  for  the  extreme  pro-slavery  sentiment  to  cool 
down ;  for  the  Southerners  to  think  well  before  they 
took  the  awful  leap  which  they  had  so  vehemently 
threatened.    But  I  was  mistaken. 

The  Republican  candidate  was  elected,  and  solid  ^.  jSTi"' 
substantial  people  of  the  Northwest,  and  I  presume  *m.'viiS** 
the  same  order  of  people  throughout  the  entire  ^^isSiiT 
North,  felt  very  serious,  but  determined,  after  this  (m.)i847^9; 
event.    It  was  veiy  much  discussed  whether  the   ^^^^-ffCi' 

*'  Apr.  IS,  I860 

South  would  carry  out  its  threat  to  secede  and  set 
up  a  separate  government,  the  comer-stone  of 
which  should  be,  protection  to  the  "  Divine  ^  insti-  ^§tJtiSi' 
tution  of  slavery.  For  there  were  people  who  be- 
lieved in  the  "divinity"  of  huqaan  slavery,  as 
there  are  now  people  who  believe  Mormonism  and 
polygamy  to  be  ordained  by  the  Most  High.  We 
forgive  them  for  entertaining  such  notions,  but 
forbid  their  practice.  It  was  generally  believed 
that  there  would  be  a  flurry ;  that  some  of  the  ex- 
treme Southern  States  would  go  so  far  as  to  pass 
ordinances  of  secession.    But  the  common  impres- 


XT I.    XI 


174  PEESONAL  MEM0IK8  OF  U.  8.  GRANT 

CHAP.  XVI  Doubtless  the  founders  of  our  government — the 
^Moe^on^  majority  of  them,  at  least — regarded  the  confedera- 
tion of  the  colonies  as  an  experiment.  Each  colony- 
considered  itself  a  separate  government ;  that  the 
confederation  was  for  mutual  protection  against  a 
foreign  foe,  and  the  prevention  of  strife  and  war 
among  themselves.  If  there  had  been  a  desire  on 
the  part  of  any  single  State  to  withdraw  from  the 
compact  at  any  time  while  the  number  of  States  was 
limited  to  the  original  thii'teen,  I  do  not  suppose 
there  would  have  been  any  to  contest  the  right,  no 
matter  how  much  the  determination  might  have 
been  regretted.  The  problem  changed  on  the  rati- 
fication of  the  Constitution  by  all  the  colonies ;  it 
changed  still  more  when  amendments  were  added ; 
and  if  the  right  of  any  one  State  to  withdraw  con- 
tinued to  exist  at  all  after  the  ratification  of  the 
Constitution,  it  certainly  ceased  on  the  formation 
of  new  States,  at  least  so  far  as  the  new  States 
themselves  were  concerned.  /U  was  never  pos- 
sessed at  all  by  Florida  or  the  States  west  of  the 
Mississippi,  all  of  which  were  purchased  by  the 
treasury  of  the  entire  nation.  Texas  and  the  ter- 
ritory brought  into  the  Union  in  consequence  of 
annexation  were  purchased  with  both  blood  and 
treasure;  and  Texas,  with  a  domain  greater  than 
that  of  any  European  state  except  Russia,  was  per- 
mitted to  retain  as  State  property  all  the  public 
lands  within  its  borders.  It  would  have  been  in- 
gratitude and  injustice  of  the  most  flagrant  sort  for 
this  State  to  withdraw  from  the  Union  after  all  that 
had  been  snent  and  done  to  introduce  her :  vet.  if 


THE  IHPENDINO  CBISI8 


175 


Tbe  real 
Southern 
poeitloD; 


of  her  institutions  and  her  geographical  position,   chap.xvi 
Secession  was  illogical  as  well  as  impracticable ;  it 
was  revolution. 

Now  the  right  of  revolution  is  an  inherent  one.  ^y^uSlS' 
When  people  are  oppressed  by  their  government  it 
is  a  natural  right  they  enjoy  to  relieve  themselves 
of  the  oppression,  if  they  are  strong  enough,  either 
by  withdrawal  from  it,  or  by  overthrowing  it  and 
substituting  a  government  more  acceptable.  But 
any  people  or  part  of  a  people  who  resort  to  this 
remedy  stake  their  lives,  their  property,  and  every 
claim  for  protection  given  by  citizenship,  on  the 
issue.  Victory,  or  the  conditions  imposed  by  the 
conqueror,  must  be  the  result^ 
<^n  the  case  of  the  war  between  the  States  it 
would  have  been  the  exact  truth  if  the  South  had 
said,  "  We  do  not  want  to  live  with  you  Northern 
people  any  longer;  we  know  our  institution  of 
slavery  is  obnoxious  to  you,  and,  as  you  are  grow- 
ing numerically  stronger  than  we,  it  may  at  some 
time  in  the  future  be  endangered.  So  long  as  you 
permitted  us  to  control  the  government,  and  with 
the  aid  of  a  few  friends  at  the  North  to  enact  laws 
constituting  your  section  a  guard  against  the  escape 
of  our  property,  we  were  willing  to  live  with  you. 
You  have  been  submissive  to  our  rule  heretofore ; 
but  it  looks  now  as  if  you  did  not  intend  to  con- 
tinue so,  and  we  will  remain  in  the  Union  no 
longer."  Instead  of  this  the  seceding  States  cried 
lustily,  "Let  us  alone;  you  have  no  constitutional  S^lSS^ 
power  to  interfere  with  us.''  Newspapers  and  *^' 
nftonlft  at  tliA  North  rftif^vafWl   f.liA  om.     Individ- 


176 


PERSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GBANT 


Chap.  XVI 


The  inten- 
tion of  the 
fathers 


Changed 
oondltfons 


strictest  construction  of  that  instrument — the  con- 
struction put  upon  it  by  the  Southerners  them- 
selves. The  fact  is,  the  Constitution  did  not  apply 
to  any  such  contingency  as  the  one  existing  from 
1861  to  1865.  Its  framers  never  dreamed  of  such  a 
contingency  occurring.  If  they  had  foreseen  it,  the 
probabilities  are  that  they  would  have  sanctioned 
the  right  of  a  State  or  States  to  withdraw  rather 
than  that  there  should  be  war  between  brothers^ 
/The  framers  were  wise  in  their  generation,  and 
wanted  to  do  the  very  best  possible  to  secure  then* 
own  liberty  and  independence,  and  that  also  of  their 
descendants  to  the  latest  days.  It  is  preposterous 
to  suppose  that  the  people  of  one  generation  can  lay 
down  the  best  and  only  rules  of  government  for  aU 
who  are  to  come  after  them,  and  under  imf oreseen 
contingencies.  At  the  time  of  the  framing  of  our 
Constitution  the  only  physical  forces  that  had  been 
subdued  and  made  to  serve  man  and  do  his  labor 
were  the  currents  in  the  streams  and  in  the  air 
we  breathe.  Rude  machinery,  propelled  by  water- 
power,  had  been  invented;  sails  to  propel  ships 
upon  the  waters  had  been  set  to  catch  the  passing 
breeze ;  but  the  application  of  steam  to  propel  ves- 
sels against  both  wind  and  current,  and  machinery 
to  do  all  manner  of  work,  had  not  been  thought  of. 
The  instantaneous  transmission  of  messages  around 
the  world  by  means  of  electricity  would  probably 
at  that  day  have  been  attributed  to  witchcraft  or  a 
league  with  the  devU.  Immaterial  circumstances 
had  changed  as  greatly  as  material  ones.  We  could 
not  and  ought  not  to  be  rigidly  bound  by  the  rules 


l^U       J^^ 


>^^«    ^: 


^^      AZ£e ^-^i.     £ 


THE  IMPENDING   CBISI8  177 

themselves  would  have  been  the  first  to  declare  chap.xvi 
that  their  prerogatives  were  not  irrevocable.    They 
would  surely  have  resisted  secession  could  they 
have  lived  to  see  the  shape  it  assumed.^ 

I  traveled  through  the  Northwest  considerably  1^^??^. 
during  the  winter  of  1860-61.    We  had  customers       ^^* 
in  all  the  little  towns  in  southwest  Wisconsin, 
southeast  Minnesota,  and  northeast  Iowa.    These 
generally  knew  I  had  been  a  captain  in  the  regular 
army  and  had  served  through  the  Mexican  war. 
Consequently,  wherever  I  stopped  at  night,  some 
of  the  people  would  come  to  the  public  house  where 
I  was,  and  sit  till  a  late  hour  discussing  the  proba- 
bilities of  the  futui'e.    My  own  views  at  that  time 
were  like  those  officially  expressed  by  Mr.  Seward  ,^  ^o^^. 
at  a  later  day — that  "the  war  would  be  over  in    u/alS.' 
ninety  days.^   I  continued  to  entertain  these  views  ^^S^tate^* 
until  after  the  battle  of  Shiloh.    I  believe  now  that 
there  would  have  been  no  more  battles  at  the  West 
after  the  capture  of  Fort  Donelson  if  all  the  troops 
in  that  region  had  been  under  a  single  commander 
who  would  have  followed  up  that  victory. 

xfhere  is  little  doubt  in  my  mind  now  that  the  inthesoath 
prevailing  sentiment  of  the  South  would  have  been 
opposed  to  secession  in  1860  and  1861,  if  there  had 
been  a  fair  and  cahn  expression  of  opinion,  unbiased 
by  threats,  and  if  the  ballot  of  one  legal  voter  had 
counted  for  as  much  as  that  of  any  other.  But 
there  was  no  calm  discussion  of  the  question. 
Demagogues  who  were  too  old  to  enter  the  army 
if  there  should  be  a  war ;  others  who  entertained  so 


178  PERSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

Chap. XVI  vehemently  and  unceasingly  against  the  North; 
against  its  aggressions  upon  the  South,  its  in- 
terference with  Southern  rights,  etc.     They  de- 
nounced the  Northerners  as  cowards,  poltroons, 
negro-worshipers ;  claimed  that  one  Southern  man 
was  equal  to  five  Northern  men  in  battle ;  that  if 
the  South  would  stand  up  for  its  rights  the  North 
i)i?i?^  p.  ^^^d  back  down.    Mr.  JeflEerson  Davis  said,  in  a 
gf^a^gi}^;  speech  delivered  at  La  Grange,  Mississippi,  before 
Mi^iflS;  the  secession  of  that  State,  that  he  would  agree  to 
sSSr^'Ates.)  drink  all  the  blood  spilled  south  of  Mason  and 
61;  Sec.  of"  Dixon's  line  if  there  should  be  a  war.     The  young 
^_c..s.A.  men  who  would  have  the  fighting  to  do  in  case  of 
Deo.  6, 1889  ^Qj.  believed  all  these  statements,  both  in  regard  to 
the  aggressiveness  of  the  North  and  its  cowardice. 
They  too  cried  out  for  a  separation  from  such 
people.    The  great  bulk  of  the  legal  voters  of  the 
South  were  men  who  owned  no  slaves ;  their  homes 
were  generally  in  the  hills  and  poor  country;  then* 
facilities  for  educating  their  children,  even  up  to 
the  point  of  reading  and  writing,  were  very  lim- 
ited ;  their  interest  in  the  contest  was  very  meager 
— what  there  was,  if  they  had  been  capable  of  see- 
ing it,  was  with  the  North ;  they  too  needed  eman- 
cipation.   Uuder  the  old  regime  they  were  looked 
down  upon,  by  those  who  controlled  all  the  affairs 
in  the  interest  of  slave-owners,  as  poor  white  trash 
who  were  allowed  the  ballot  so  long  as  they  cast  it 
according  to  direction^ 
coeroioii        I  am  aware  that  this  last  statement  may  be  dis- 
puted, and  individual  testimony  perhaps  adduced 
to  show  that  in  ante-bellum  days  the  ballot  was  as 


THE  IMPENDING  OBISIS  179 

I  reassert  the  statemeat.  The  shot-gun  was  not  chap.xvi 
resorted  to.  Masked  men  did  not  ride  over  the 
country  at  night  intimidating  voters;  but  there 
was  a  firm  feeling  that  a  class  existed  in  every 
State  with  a  sort  of  divine  right  to  control  public 
aflEairs.  If  they  could  not  get  this  control  by  one 
means  they  must  by  another.  The  end  justified  the 
means.    The  coercion,  if  mild,  was  complete. 

There  were  two  political  parties,  it  is  true,  in  all 
the  States,  both  strong  in  numbers  and  respectabil- 
ity, but  both  equally  loyal  to  the  institution  which 
stood  paramount  in  Southern  eyes  to  all  other  in- 
stitutions in  State  or  nation.  The  slave-owners  SSJSon 
were  the  minority,  but  governed  both  parties.  Had 
politics  ever  divided  the  slaveholders  and  the  non- 
slaveholders,  the  majority  would  have  been  obliged 
to  yield,  or  internecine  war  would  have  been  the 
consequence.  I  do  not  know  that  the  Southern 
people  were  to  blame  for  this  condition  of  affairs. 
There  was  a  time  when  slavery  was  not  profitable, 
and  the  discussion  of  the  merits  of  the  institution 
was  confined  almost  exclusively  to  the  territory 
where  it  existed.  The  States  of  Virginia  and  Ken- 
tucky came  near  abolishing  slavery  by  their  own 
acts,  one  State  defeating  the  measure  by  a  tie-vote 
and  the  other  only  lacking  one.  But  when  the  in- 
stitution became  profitable,  all  talk  of  its  abolition 
ceased  where  it  existed ;  and  naturally,  as  human 
nature  is  constituted,  arguments  were  adduced  in 
its  support.  The  cotton-gin  probably  had  much  to 
do  with  the  justification  of  slavery. 

The  winter  of  1860-61  will  be  remembered  ty 


180  PERSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

Chap.  XVI  the  result  of  the  Presidential  election  was  known. 
Other  Southern  States  proposed  to  follow.  In 
some  of  them  the  Union  sentiment  was  so  strong 
that  it  had  to  be  suppressed  by  force.  Maryland, 
Delaware,  Kentucky,  and  Missouri — all  slave  States 
— failed  to  pass  ordinances  of  secession ;  but  they 
were  all  represented  in  the  so-called  congress  of  the 

ciaibomep.  so-callcd  Confederate  States.    The  Governor  and 

Jaoksoii, 

j^^s*]^    Lieutenant-Governor  of  Missouri  in  1861,  Jackson 

Thomas  c.  and  Reynolds,  were  both  supporters  of  the  rebel- 
lion and  took  refuge  with  the  enemy.    The  gover- 

Dec.  6,  uea  nor  soon  died ;  and  the  lieutenant-governor  assumed 
his  office,  issued  proclamations  as  governor  of  the 
State,  was  recognized  as  such  by  the  Confederate 
government,  and  continued  his  pretensions  until 
^^SESwy  *^^  collapse  of  the  rebellion.  The  South  claimed 
the  sovereignty  of  States,  but  claimed  the  right 
to  coerce  into  their  confederation  such  States  as 
they  wanted — that  is,  all  the  States  where  slavery 
existed.    They  did  not  seem  to  think  this  course  in- 

N.  Y.  M-    consistent.-i^he  fact  is,  the  Southern  slave-owners 

bune,  Dec.  ^  ' 

ao,  1869  believed  that,  in  some  way,  the  ownership  of  slaves 
conferred  a  sort  of  patent  of  nobility — a  right  to 
govern  independent  of  the  interest  or  wishes  of 
thos€f  who  did  not  hold  such  property.  They  con- 
vinced themselves,  first,  of  the  divine  origin  of  the 
institution,  and,  next,  that  that  particular  institu- 
tion was  not  safe  in  the  hands  of  any  body  of  legis- 
lators but  themselves.  ^ 
Meanwhile  the  administration  of  President  Bu- 


.^J     Xl^-^i. 


THE  IMPENDING  CRISIS  181 

least  who  were  as  earnest — to  use  a  mild  term — in  chap,  xvi 
the  cause  of  secession  as  Mr.  Davis  or  any  South- 
em  statesman.    One  of  them,  Floyd,  the  Secretary  pf^jS[|  i^c. 
of  War,  scattered  the  army  so  that  much  of  it  could  ^cof  bI^-'" 
be  captured  when  hostilities  should  commence,  and  %i ' 
distributed  the  cannon  and  small  arms  from  North- 
em  arsenals  throughout  the  South  so  as  to  be  on 
hand  when  treason  wanted  them.     The  navy  was  isaao  tou- 

^  c«y,  U.  8. 

scattered  in  like  manner.     The  President  did  not  iSai«7f sSi! 
prevent  his  cabinet  preparing  for  war  upon  their     ^ISn^* 
government,  either  by  destroying  its  resources  or 
storing  them  in  the  South,  until  a  de-facto  govern- 
ment was  established,  with  Jefferson  Davis  as  its   Peb.9,i86i. 
President,  and  Montgomery,  Alabama,  as  the  capi- 
tal.    The  secessionists  had  then  to  leave  the  cabi- 
net.   In  their  own  estimation  they  were  aliens  in 
the  country  which  had  given  them  birth.    Loyal 
men  were  put  into  their  places.    Treason  in  the 
executive  branch  of  the  government  was  stopped. 
But  the  harm  had  already  been  done.     The  stable 
door  was  locked  after  the  horse  had  been  stolen. 

During  all  of  the  trying  winter  of  1860-61,  when  uK^V 
the  Southerners  were  so  defiant  that  they  would  ^gJiSi^® 
not  allow  within  their  borders  the  expression  of  a 
sentiment  hostile  to  their  views,  it  was  a  brave 
man  indeed  who  could  stand  up  and  proclaim  his 
loyalty  to  the  Union.     On  the  other  hand,  men  at   ^^^^ 
the  North — prominent  men — proclaimed  that  the  ^'^iS^^ 
government  had  no.  power  to  coerce  the   South 
into  submission  to  the  laws  of  the  land ;  that  if  the 


CI XX.     XT 


182  PERSONAL  MEMOIRS  OP  U.  S.  GRANT 

CHAP.  XVI  the  time  arrived  for  the  President-elect  to  go  to  the 
H^iffe  of  capital  of  the  nation  to  be  sworn  into  office,  it  was 
^^^^mSISiJ^  deemed  unsafe  for  him  to  travel,  not  only  as  a 
President-elect,  but  as  any  private  citizen  should  be 
allowed  to  do.  Instead  of  going  in  a  special  car, 
receiving  the  good  wishes  of  his  constituents  at  all 
the  stations  along  the  road,  he  was  obliged  to  stop 
on  the  way  and  to  be  smuggled  into  the  capitaL 
He  disappeared  from  public  view  on  his  journey, 
and  the  next  the  country  knew,  his  arrival  was  an- 
nounced at  the  capitaL  There  is  little  doubt  that  he 
would  have  been  assassinated  if  he  had  attempted 
to  travel  openly  throughout  his  journey. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

OUTBREAK  OP  THE  REBELLION — PRESIDING  AT  A  UNION 
MEETING — MUSTERING-OFFICER  OP  STATE  TROOPS 
— LYON  AT  CAMP  JACKSON — SERVICES  TENDERED 
TO  THE  GOVERNMENT 

THE  4th  of  March,  1861,  came,  and  Abraham  CHAP.xvn 
Lincoln  was  sworn  to  maintain  the  Union 
against  all  its  enemies.    The  secession  of  one  State  £,^5^'  ^ 
after  another  followed,  until  eleven  had  gone  out.  Jjj;    ;;  JJ 
On  the  12th  of  April,  Fort  Sumter,  a  National  fort  ^t    "  ae 
in  the  harbor  of  Charleston,  South  Carolina,  was  vS^'^^n 
fired  upon  by  the  Southerners,  and  a  few  days  ArSf"  ;;^^ 
after  was  captured.    The  Confederates  proclaimed 
themselves  aliens,  and  thereby  debarred  themselves    ^J^f^^^ 
of  all  right  to  claim  protection  imder  the  Constitu- 
tion of  the  United  States.    We  did  not  admit  the 
fact  that  they  were  aliens,  but  all  the  same  they 
debarred  themselves  of  the  right  to  expect  better 
treatment  than  people  of  any  other  foreign  state 
who  make  war  upon  an  independent  nation.    Upon 
the  firing  on  Sumter,  President  Lincoln  issued  a 
proclamation  calling  for  troops   and   convening    1^2?  pjJ 
Congress  in  extra  session.    The  call  was  for  75,000  p«™»  ^»* 
volunteers  for  ninety  days'  service.    If  the  shot 


184 


PEBSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  8.  GRANT 


Chap.  XVII 

Northern 
patriotism 


Id  Galena 


Meeting  in 

theoonrt- 

house 


Bee  p.  906 

U.  8.  H.  R. 

(I1L)1868- 

69;  Becof 

State,  1869; 

Biln.to 

France, 

1869-77;  d, 

Oct.  32,  1887 


throughout  the  Northern  States.  There  was  not 
a  State  in  the  North  of  a  million  of  inhabitants 
that  would  not  have  furnished  the  entire  number 
faster  than  arms  could  have  been  supplied  to  them, 
if  it  had  been  necessary. 

<^s  soon  as  the  news  of  the  call  for  volunteers 
reached  Galena,  posters  were  stuck  up  calling  for 
a  meeting  of  the  citizens  at  the  court-house  in  the 
evening.  Business  ceased  entirely ;  all  was  excite- 
ment ;  for  a  time  there  were  no  party  distinctions ; 
all  were  Union  men,  determined  to  avenge  the  insult 
to  the  national  flagN  In  the  evening  the  court-house 
was  packed.  Almough  a  comparative  stranger,  I 
was  called  upon  to  preside ;  the  sole  reason,  possi- 
bly, was  that  I  had  been  in  the  army  and  had  seen 
service.  With  much  embarrassment  and  some 
prompting  I  made  out  to  announce  the  object  of 
the  meeting.  Speeches  were  in  order,  but  it  is 
doubtful  whether  it  would  have  been  safe  just  then 
to  make  other  than  patriotic  ones.  There  was  prob- 
ably no  one  in  the  house,  however,  who  felt  like 
making  any  other.  The^  two  principal  speeches 
were  by  B.  B.  Howard,  the  postmaster  and  a  Breck- 
inridge Democrat  at  the  November  election  the  fall 
before,  and  John  A.  Rawlins,  an  elector  on  the 
Douglas  ticket.  E.  B.  Washbrn-ne,  with  whom  I 
was  not  acquainted  at  that  time,  came  in  after 
the  meeting  had  been  organized,  and  expressed,  I 
understood  afterward,  a  little  surprise  that  Galena 
could  not  furnish  a  presiding  officer  for  such  an  oc- 
casion without  taking  a  stranger.  He  came  forward 
and  was  introduced,  and  made  a  speech  appealing 


MUSTERING-OFFICEB  OF  STATE  TROOPS  185 

called  for  to  form  a  company.  The  quota  of  Illinois  chap,  xvn 
had  been  fixed  at  six  regiments,  and  it  was  supposed 
that  one  company  would  be  as  much  as  would  be  ac- 
cepted from  Galena.  The  company  was  raised  and 
the  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers  elected 
before  the  meeting  adjourned.  I  declined  the  cap- 
taincy before  the  balloting,  but  announced  that  I 
would  aid  the  company  in  every  way  I  could,  and 
would  be  found  in  the  service  in  some  position  if 
there  should  be  a  war.  I  never  went  into  our  leather- 
store  after  that  meeting  to  put  up  a  package  or  do 
other  business. 

The  ladies  of  Galena  were  quite  as  patriotic  as  ^^^ 
the  men.  They  could  not  enlist,  but  they  conceived 
the  idea  of  sending  their  first  company  to  the  field 
uniformed.  They  came  to  me  to  get  a  description 
of  the  United  States  uniform  for  infantry;  sub- 
scribed and  bought  the  material ;  procured  tailors 
to  cut  out  the  garments,  and  the  ladies  made  them 
up.  In  a  few  days  the  company  was  in  uniform 
and  ready  to  report  at  the  State  capital  for  assign- 
ment. The  men  all  turned  out  the  morning  after  ^^"^SSIre  ^" 
their  enlistment,  and  I  took  charge,  divided  them 
into  squads,  and  superintended  their  driU.  When 
they  were  ready  to  go  to  Springfield  I  went  with 
them,  and  remained  there  until  they  were  assigned 
to  a  regiment. 

There  were  so  many  more  volunteers  than  had 
been  called  for  that  the  question  whom  to  accept 
was  quit©  embarrassing  to  the  governor,  Ricliard  Si.®iSi^; 


186  PERSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

CHAP,  xvn  sional  district,  for  one  month,  to  be  paid  by  the 
State,  but  pledged  to  go  into  the  service  of  the 
United  States  if  there  should  be  a  further  call  dur- 
ing their  term.  Even  with  this  relief  the  governor 
was  still  very  much  embarrassed.  Before  the  war 
was  over  he  was  like  the  President  when  he  was 
taken  with  the  varioloid — "at  last  he  had  some- 
thing he  could  give  to  all  who  wanted  if 

In  time  the  Galena  company  was  mustered  into 
the  United  States  service,  forming  a  part  of  the 
Eleventh  Illinois  Volimteer  Infantry.  My  duties, 
I  thought,  had  ended  at  Springfield,  and  I  was  pre- 
pared to  start  home  by  the  evening  train,  leaving 
at  nine  o^clock.  Up  to  that  time  I  do  not  think  I 
had  been  introduced  to  GFovemor  Yates,  or  had 
ever  spoken  to  him.  I  knew  him  by  sight,  how- 
ever, because  he  was  living  at  the  same  hotel  and 
I  often  saw  him  at  table.  The  evening  I  was  to 
quit  the  capital  I  left  the  supper-room  before  the 
governor,  and  was  standing  at  the  front  door  when 
he  came  out.  He  spoke  to  me,  calling  me  by  my 
old  army  title,  "  Captain,''  and  said  he  understood 
that  I  was  about  leaving  the  city.  I  answered  that 
I  was.  He  said  he  would  be  glad  if  I  would  remain 
overnight  and  call  at  the  executive  office  the  next 
morning.  I  complied  with  his  request,  and  was 
asked  to  go  into  the  adjutant-general's  office  and 
render  such  assistance  as  I  could,  the  governor  say- 
ing that  my  army  experience  would  be  of  great 
service  there.    I  accepted  the  proposition. 

Surt-otner-      ^7  ^^^  army  experience  I  found  indeed  of  very 

Al'ftOfiloe i. i^^  T ^1 1- "L^J     T 


MUSTERINCh-OFFICEB  OF  STATE  TE00P8  187 

either  a  side  coat-pocket  or  the  hands  of  a  clerk  or  chap,  xvn 
secretary  more  careful  than  myself.  But  I  had 
been  quartermaster,  commissary,  and  adjutant  in 
the  field.  The  army  forms  were  familiar  to  me,  and 
I  could  direct  how  they  should  be  made  out.  There 
was  a  clerk  in  the  office  of  the  adjutant-general  who 
supplied  my  deficiencies.  The  ease  with  which  the 
State  of  Illinois  settled  its  accounts  with  the  gov- 
ernment at  the  close  of  the  war  is  evidence  of  the 
efficiency  of  Mr.  Loomis  as  an  accountant  on  a 
large  scale.  He  remained  in  the  office  until  that 
time. 

As  I  have  stated,  the  legislature  authorized  the 
governor  to  accept  the  services  of  ten  additional 
regiments.  I  had  charge  of  mustering  these  regi-  ^^JSJ^*" 
ments  into  the  State  service.  They  were  assembled 
at  the  most  convenient  railroad  centers  in  their  re- 
spective congi'essional  districts.  I  detailed  officers 
to  muster  in  a  portion  of  them,  but  mustered  three 
in  the  southern  part  of  the  State  myseH.  One  of 
these  was  to  assemble  at  Belleville,  some  eighteen 
miles  southeast  of  St.  Louis.  "When  I  got  there  I 
found  that  only  one  or  two  companies  had  arrived. 
There  was  no  probability  of  the  regiment  coming 
together  under  five  days.  This  gave  me  a  few  idle 
days,  which  I  concluded  to  spend  in  St.  Louis. 

There  was  a  considerable  force  of  State  militia  ^SS^mX 
at  Camp  Jackson,  on  the  outskirts  of  St.  Louis,  at    *«*«*»®^- 
the  time.    There  is  but  little  doubt  that  it  was  the 
design  of  Governor  Claiborne  Jackson  to  have 
these  troops  ready  to   seize  the  United   States 
arsenal  and  the  city  of  St.  Louis.     Why  they 


188  PERSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

CHAP,  xvn  Captain  Nathaniel  Lyon  at  the  arsenal,  and  but  for 

SiM.?'^??:  *h^  timely  services  of  the  Honorable  F.  P.  Blair, 

BiSS^e^   I  have  little  doubt  that  St.  Louis  would  have  gone 

Si^fci^i-  into  rebel  hands,  and  with  it  the  arsenal  with  all 

8on*e  Creek,    . ,  , 

Aug.io,i86i  its  arms  and  anununition. 

^^'e&^'        Blair  was  a  leader  among  the  Union  men  of  St. 

Louis  in  1861.    There  was  no  State  government  in 

Missouri  at  the  time  that  would  sanction  the  raising 

of  troops  or  conmiissioned  ofl&cers  to  protect  United 

state  PaJ    states  property,  but  Blair  had  probably  procured 

por8,ii,6a,72  gonie  form  of  authority  from  the  President  to  raise 
troops  in  Missouri  and  to  muster  them  into  the 
service  of  the  United  States.  At  all  events,  he  did 
raise  a  regiment,  and  took  command  himself  as 
coloneL  With  this  force  he  reported  to  Captain 
Lyon  and  placed  himself  and  regiment  under  his 
orders.  It  was  whispered  that  Lyon,  thus  rein- 
forced, intended  to  break  up  Camp  Jackson  and 
capture  the  militia.  I  went  down  to  the  arsenal 
in  the  morning  to  see  the  troops  start  out.  I  had 
known  Lyon  for  two  years  at  West  Point  and  in 
the  old  army  afterward.  Blair  I  knew  very  well  by 
sight.  I  had  heard  him  speak  in  the  canvass  of 
1858,  possibly  several  times,  but  I  had  never  spoken 
to  him.  As  the  troops  marched  out  of  the  inclosure 
around  the  arsenal,  Blair  was  on  his  horse  outside, 
forming  them  into  line  preparatory  to  their  march. 
I  introduced  myself  to  him,  and  had  a  few  moments' 
conversation  and  expressed  my  sympathy  with  his 
purpose.    This  was  my  first  personal  acquaintance 


LYON  AT  CAMP  JACKSON  189 

Up  to  this  time  the  enemies  of  the  government  in  chap,  xvn 
St.  Louis  had  been  bold  and  defiant,  while  Union    '^n^et 
men  were  quiet  but  determined.    The  enemies  had      ^"** 
their  headquarters  in  a  central  and  public  position 
on  Pine  Street,  near  Fifth,  from  which  the  rebel 
flag  was  flaunted  boldly.    The  Union  men  had  a 
place  of  meeting  somewhere  in  the  city, — I  did  not 
know  where, — and  I  doubt  whether  they  dared  to 
enrage  the  enemies  of  the  government  by  placing 
the  national  flag  outside  their  headquarters.    As 
soon  as  the  news  of  the  capture  of  Camp  Jackson 
reached  the  city  the  condition  of  affairs  was  changed. 
Union  men  became  rampant,  aggressive,  and,  if  you 
will,  intolerant.    They  proclaimed  then*  sentiments 
boldly,  and  were  impatient  at  anything  like  dis- 
respect for  the  Union.    The  secessionists  became 
quiet,  but  were  filled  with  suppressed  rage.    They 
had  been  playing  the  bully.    The  Union  men  or-    ^JJJf^ 
dered  the  rebel  flag  taken  down  from  the  build-  ^^|2|™*« 
ing  on  Pine  Street.    The  command  was  given  in 
tones  of  authority,  and  it  was  taken  down,  never  to 
be  raised  again  in  St.  Louis. 

I  witnessed  the  scene.    I  had  heard  of  the  sur- 
render of  the  camp  and  that  the  garrison  was  on  its 
way  to  the  arsenaL    I  had  seen  the  troops  start  out 
in  the  morning  and  had  wished  them  success.    I 
now  determined  to  go  to  the  arsenal  and  await  their 
arrival  and  congratulate  them.    I  stepped  on  a  car  An  inddent 
standing  at  the  comer  of  Fourth  and  Pine  streets, 
and  saw  a  crowd  of  people  standing  quietly  in  front 
of  the  headquarters,  who  were  there  for  the  purpose 
of  hauliner  down  the  flaa*.     There  'W'Pire  sauads  of 


190  PEESONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GEANT 

CHAP,  xvn  muttered  their  resentment  at  the  insult  to  what  they 
called  "their"  flag.  Before  the  car  I  was  in  had 
started,  a  dapper  little  fellow — he  would  be  called 
a  dude  at  this  day — stepped  in.  He  was  in  a  great 
state  of  excitement,  and  used  adjectives  freely  to 
express  his  contempt  for  the  Union  and  for  those 
who  had  just  perpetrated  such  an  outrage  upon  the 
rights  of  a  free  people.  There  was  only  one  other 
passenger  in  the  car  besides  myself  when  this  young 
man  entered.  He  evidently  expected  to  find  noth- 
ing but  sympathy  when  he  got  away  from  the 
"  mudsills  "  engaged  in  compelling  a  "  free  people  ^ 
to  pull  down  a  flag  they  adored.    He  turned  to  me, 

saying,  "  Things  have  come  to  a pretty  pass 

when  a  free  people  can't  choose  their  own  flag. 
Where  I  came  from,  if  a  man  dares  to  say  a  word 
in  favor  of  the  Union  we  hang  him  to  a  limb  of  the 
first  tree  we  come  to.''  I  replied  that, "  after  all,  we 
were  not  so  intolerant  in  St. Louis  as  we  might  be; 
I  had  not  seen  a  single  rebel  hung  yet,  nor  heard 
of  one ;  there  were  plenty  of  them  who  ought  to  be, 
however."  The  young  man  subsided.  He  was  so 
crestfallen  that  I  believe  if  I  had  ordered  hinn  to 
leave  the  car  he  would  have  gone  quietly  out,  say- 
ing to  himself,  "  More  Yankee  oppression." 

By  nightfall  the  late  defenders  of  Camp  Jackson 

were  all  within  the  walls  of  the  St.  Louis  arsenal, 

prisoners  of  war.    The  next  day  I  left  St.  Louis  for 

t^°Sm*5fi-  Mattoon,  Illinois,  where  I  was  to  muster  in  the 

noie^an-  regiment  from  that  congressional  district.    This 

was  the  Twenty-first  Illinois  Infantry,  the  regi- 


SEEVICES  TENDEEED  TO  THE  GOVEENMENT  191 

Brigadier-General  John  Pope  was  stationed  at  chap.xvh 
Springfield,  as  United  States  mustering-officer,  all   ^'.^5^ 
the  time  I  was  in  the  State  service.    He  was  a  jto?iiTi»S; 
native  of  Illinois  and  well  acquainted  with  most  of  ***  ^m  "' 
the  prominent  men  in  the  State.    I  was  a  carpet- 
bagger and  knew  but  few  of  them.    While  I  was 
on  duty  at  Springfield  the  Senators,  Representatives 
in  Congress,  ex-governors,  and  the  State  legislators 
were  nearly  all  at  the  State  capital    The  only  ac- 
quaintance I  made  among  them  was  with  the  gov- 
ernor, whom  I  was  serving,  and,  by  chance,  with 
Senator  S.  A.  Douglas.    The  only  members  of  Con- 
gress I  knew  were  Washbume  and  Philip  Fouke.  FoSte^i^'s. 
With  the  former,  though  he  represented  my  district    ^i&iS^^ 
and  we  were  citizens  of  the  same  town,  I  only 
became  acquainted  at  the  meeting  when  the  first 
company  of  Galena  volunteers  was  raised.    Fouke 
I  had  known  in  St.  Louis  when  I  was  a  citizen  of 
that  city.    I  had  been  three  years  at  West  Point 
with  Pope,  and  had  served  with  him  a  short  time 
during  the  Mexican  war,  under  General  Taylor.    I 
saw  a  good  deal  of  him  during  my  service  with  the 
State.    On  one  occasion  he  said  to  me  that  I  ought 
to  go  into  the  United  States  service.    I  told  him  I 
intended  to  do  so  if  there  was  a  war.    He  spoke  of 
his  acquaintance  with  the  public  men  of  the  State, 
and  said  he  could  get  them  to  reconamend  me  for  a 
position  and  that  he  would  do  aU  he  could  for  me. 
I  declined  to  receive  indorsement  for  permission  to 
fight  for  my  country. 

r>i    ' 1 n  1  •.    _.  i.v:^ Offer  olaer- 


192  PEB80NAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

Chap.  XVH  GaLENA,  ILLINOIS, 

May  24, 1861. 

Sm:  Having  served  for  fifteen  years  in  the  regular 
army,  including  four  years  at  West  Point,  and  feeling  it 
the  duty  of  every  one  who  has  been  educated  at  the  gov- 
ernment expense  to  offer  their  services  for  the  support  of 
that. government,  I  have  the  honor,  very  respectfully,  to 
tender  my  services  until  the  close  of  the  war  in  such 
capacity  as  may  be  offered.  I  would  say,  in  view  of  my 
present  age  and  length  of  service,  I  feel  myself  competent 
to  command  a  regiment  if  the  President,  in  his  judgment, 
should  see  fit  to  intrust  one  to  me.  Since  the  first  call  of 
the  President,  I  have  been  serving  on  the  staff  of  the 
Governor  of  this  State,  rendering  such  aid  as  I  could  in 
the  organization  of  our  State  militia,  and  am  still  engaged 
in  that  capacity.  A  letter  addressed  to  me  at  Springfield, 
Illinois,  will  reach  me. 

I  am,  very  respectfully. 

Your  obedient  servant, 

U.  S.  Grant. 

Lorenxo  COL.  L.  ThOMAS, 

Thomas,  W.  *  ,.,    ^         4^    o.     *      *»^     ,  .  ^    ^ 

P.  1819-23;  Adjt.-G^n.  U.  S.  A.,  Washmgton,  D.  C. 

J^a  A.~\T«loSO~ 

48;  A.-Q. 
1848-63 

This  letter  failed  to  elicit  an  answer  from  tlie 

adjutant-general  of  the  army.    I  presume  it  was 

hardly  read  by  him,  and  certainly  it  could  not 

have  been  submitted  to  higher  authority.     Sub- 

^t^'fti^  sequent  to  the  war,  General  Badeau,  having  heard 

Mar.' wa864;  ^^  *^s  letter,  applied  to  the  War  Department  for  a 

GOT.  v^'.'   copy  of  it.     The  letter  could  not  be  found,  and  no 

d.iiBT,  w/  one  recollected  ever  having  seen  it.    I  took  no  copy 

whfin  it  was  written.     TiOUff  aftp»r  thp»  annli nation 


SEEVIOES  TENDEEED  TO  THE  GOVEBNBiENT  193 

had  not  been  destroyed,  but  it  had  not  been  regu-  chap,  xvn 
larly  filed  away. 

I  felt  some  hesitation  in  suggesting  rank  as  high 
as  the  colonelcy  of  a  regunent,  feeling  somewhat 
doubtful  whether  I  would  be  equal  to  the  position. 
But  I  had  seen  nearly  every  colonel  who  had  been 
mustered  in  from  the  State  of  Illinois,  and  some 
from  Indiana,  and  felt  that  if  they  could  command 
a  regiment  properly  and  with  credit,  I  could  also. 

Having  but  little  to  do  after  the  muster  of  the 
last  of  the  regunents  authomed  by  the  State  legis- 
lature, I  asked  and  obtained  of  the  governor  leave 
of  absence  for  a  week  to  visit  my  parents  in  Cov- 
ington, Kentucky,  immediately  opposite  Cincinnati 
General  McClellan  had  been  made  a  major-general  aeium.  w!' 
and  had  his  headquarters  at  Cincinnati.    In  reality  SitESg. 
I  wanted  to  see  him.    I  had  known  him  slightly  at    &^en/ 
West  Point,  where  we  served  one  year  together,  and    <'.  o^  »» 
in  the  Mexican  war.    I  was  in  hopes  that  when  he 
saw  me  he  would  oflfer  me  a  position  on  his  staff. 
I  called  on  two  successive  days  at  his  ofl&ce,  but 
failed  to  see  him  on  either  occasion,  and  returned 
to  Springfield. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

APPOINTED  COLONEL  OF  THE  TWENTY-FIBST  ILLINOIS 
— PEB80NNEL  OF  THE  KEGDIENT — GENEBAL  LO- 
GAN— MABCH  TO  MISSOURI — MOVEMENT  AGAINST 
HARRIS  AT  FLORIDA,  MISSOURI — GENERAL  POPE 
IN   COMMAND — STATIONED  AT  MEXICO,   MISSOURI 

ch.  xvm   X¥7HILE  I  was  absent  from  the  State  capital  on 
May  8. 1861      ▼  ▼     this  occasion  the  President's  second  call  for 
troops  was  issued,  this  time  for  three  years  or  the 
war.    This  brought  into  the  United  States  service 
all  the  regiments  then  in  the  State  service.    These 
had  elected  their  ofl&cers  from  highest  to  lowest,  and 
were  accepted  with  their  organizations  as  they  were, 
except  in  two  instances.    A  Chicago  regiment,  the 
Nineteenth  Infantry,  had  elected  a  very  young  man 
to  the  colonelcy.   When  it  came  to  taking  the  field 
the  regiment  asked  to  have  another  appointed  colo- 
nel, and  the  one  they  had  previously  chosen  made 
m?^i5L*f  lieutenant-colonel.     The  Twenty-first  Regiment  of 
m-E^dK'  Infantry,  mustered  in  by  me  at  Mattoon,  refused  to 
ofiutoS?  go  into  the  service  with  the  colonel  of  their  selec- 
tion in  any  position.    While  I  was  still  absent,  Gov- 
<^nei.2i«t  emor  Yates  appointed  me  colonel  of  this  latter 


PEKSONNEL  OF  THE  BEGIMENT  195 

young  men  of  as  good  social  position  as  any  in  caxvin 
their  section  of  the  State.  It  embraced  the  sons 
of  farmers,  lawyers,  physicians,  politicians,  mer- 
chants, bankers,  and  ministers,  and  some  men  of 
matnrer  years  who  had  filled  such  positions  them- 
selves. There  were  also  men  in  it  who  could  be  led 
astray ;  and  the  colonel  elected  by  the  votes  of  the 
regiment  had  proved  to  be  fully  capable  of  develop- 
ing all  there  was  in  his  men  of  recklessness.  It  was 
said  that  he  even  went  so  far  at  times  as  to  take 
the  guard  from  their  posts  and  go  with  them  to  the 
village  near  by  and  make  a  night  of  it.  When  there 
came  a  prospect  of  battle  the  regiment  wanted  to 
have  some  one  else  to  lead  them.  I  found  it  very  §^^2^ 
hard  work  for  a  few  days  to  bring  all  the  men  into  "feJ^fSSST 
anything  like  subordination ;  but  the  great  majority 
favored  discipline,  and  by  the  application  of  a  little 
regular  army  punishment  all  were  reduced  to  as 
good  discipline  as  one  could  ask. 

The  ten  regiments  which  had  volunteered  in  the  ^^SS*^ 
State  service  for  thirty  days,  it  will  be  remembered, 
had  done  so  with  a  pledge  to  go  into  the  National 
service  if  called  upon  within  that  .time.    When  they 
volunteered  the  government  had  only  called  for 
ninety-days  enlistments.    Men  were  called  now  for  ^§|^^^^" 
three  years  or  the  war.    They  felt  that  this  change    *^'  ^'  ^* 
of  period  released  them  from  the  obligation  of  re- 
volunteering.    When  I  was  appointed  colonel,  the 
Twenty-first  Regiment  was  stiU  in  the  State  service. 
About  the  time  they  were  to  be  mustered  into  the  gj^^^i^. 
United  States  service,  such  of  them  as  would  ero,  two  foSi^itsil 


196  PERSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

Oh.  xviu  before,  but  I  had  read  a  great  deal  about  them,  and 
^vsmSl^  particularly  about  Logan,  in  the  newspapers.    Both 
7?!*u.^6.6ST  were  Democratic  members  of  Congress,  and  Logan 
85?Sid?^  had  been  elected  from  the  southern  district  of  the 
Dw.  96. 1886.  State,  where  he  had  a  majority  of  eighteen  thousand 
over  his  Republican  competitor.    His  district  had 
been  settled  originally  by  people  from  the  Southern 
States,  and  at  the  breaking  out  of  secession  they 
«?SSaSL  sympathized  with  the  South.    At  the  first  outbreak 
*"^J"*"    of  war  some  of  them  joined  the  Southern  army ; 
many  others  were  preparing  to  do  so ;  others  rode 
over  the  country  at  night  denouncing  the  Union, 
and  made  it  as  necessary  to  guard  railroad-bridges 
over  which  National  troops  had  to  pass  in  southern 
Illinois  as  it  was  in  Kentucky  or  any  of  the  border 
popoSSly  sl^^®  States.    Logan's  popularity  in  this  district 
was  unbounded.    He  knew  almost  enough  of  the 
people  in  it  by  their  Christian  names  to  form  an 
ordinary  congressional  district.    As  he  went  in 
politics,  so  his  district  was  sure  to  go.    The  Repub- 
lican papers  had  been  demanding  that  he  should 
announce  where  he  stood  on  the  questions  which 
at  that  time  engrossed  the  whole  of  public  thought. 
Some  were  very  bitter  in  their  denunciations  of  his 
silence.    Logan  was  not  a  man  to  be  coerced  into 
an  utterance  by  threats.    He  did,  however,  come 
mh^ng!^  out  in  a  speech  before  the  adjournment  of  the 
IJJi.^  ni  special  session  of  Congress  which  was  convened  by 
the  President  soon  after  his  inaugm-ation,^  and  an- 


GENERAL  LOGAN  197 

SO  that  when  I  first  met  Logan  my  impressions  CH.xvra 
were  those  formed  from  reading  denunciations  of 
him.  McClemand,  on  the  other  hand,  had  early 
taken  strong  grounds  for  the  maintenance  of  the 
Union,  and  had  been  praised  accordingly  by  the 
Republican  papers.  The  gentlemen  who  presented 
these  two  members  of  Congress  asked  me  if  I  would 
have  any  objections  to  their  addressing  my  regi- 
ment I  hesitated  a  little  before  answering.  It 
was  but  a  few  days  before  the  time  set  for  muster- 
ing into  the  United  States  service  such  of  the  men 
as  were  willing  to  volunteer  for  three  years  or  the 
war.  I  had  some  doubt  as  to  the  effect  a  speech 
from  Logan  might  have ;  but  as  he  was  with  Mc- 
Clemand,  whose  sentiments  on  the  all-absorbing 
questions  of  the  day  were  well  known,  I  gave  my 
consent.  McClemand  spoke  first;  and  Logan  fol-  ^'^^SStio^^ 
lowed  in  a  speech  which  he  has  hardly  equaled  ®^^^®*^ 
since  for  force  and  eloquence.  It  breathed  a  loyalty 
and  devotion  to  the  Union  which  inspired  my  men 
to  such  a  point  that  they  would  have  volunteered 
to  remain  in  the  army  as  long  as  an  enemy  of  the 
country  continued  to  bear  arms  against  it.  They 
entered  the  United  States  service  almost  to  a  man. 
General  Logan  went  to  his  part  of  the  State  and 
gave  his  attention  to  raising  troops.  The  very  men 
who  at  first  made  it  necessary  to  guard  the  roads 
in  southern  Illinois  became  the  defenders  of  the 
Union.  Logan  entered  the  service  himself  as  colo-  ^oiS^^S' 
nel  of  a  regiment,  and  rapidly  rose  to  the  rank  ol   Brig^5^k 


198  PEBSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

OH.xvm  there  were  not  more  volunteers  than  were  asked 
for.  That  congressional  district  stands  credited 
at  the  War  Department  to-day  with  furnishing 
more  men  for  the  army  than  it  was  called  on  to 
supply. 
I  remained  in  Springfield  with  my  regiment 
1861  until  the  3d  of  July,  when  I  was  ordered  to  Quincy, 
Illinois.  By  that  time  the  regiment  was  in  a  good 
state  of  discipline  and  the  officers  and  men  were 
well  up  in  the  company  drill.  There  was  direct 
raikoad  communication  between  Springfield  and 

S?*meS"  Q^^cy?  ^^t  I  thought  it  would  be  good  preparation 

Grwit,  p.  48  fQY  the  troops  to  march  there.  We  had  no  trans- 
portation for  our  camp  and  garrison  equipage,  so 
wagons  were  hired  for  the  occasion,  and  on  the  3d 
of  July  we  started.  There  was  no  hurry,  but  fair 
marches  were  made  every  day  until  the  Illinois 
Eiver  was  crossed.  There  I  was  overtaken  by  a 
despatch  saying  that  the  destination  of  the  regiment 

^iSttSom?  ^^d  been  changed  to  Ironton,  Missouri,  and  order- 
ing me  to  halt  where  I  was  and  await  the  arrival  of 
a  steamer  which  had  been  despatched  up  the  Illinois 
Eiver  to  take  the  regiment  to  St.  Louis.  The  boat, 
when  it  did  come,  grounded  on  a  sand-bar  a  few 
miles  below  where  we  were  in  camp.  We  remained 
there  several  days  waiting  to  have  the  boat  get  off 
the  bar ;  but  before  this  occurred  news  came  that 
an  Illinois  regiment  was  surrounded  by  rebels  at  a 
point  on  the  Hannibal  and  St.  Joe  Eailroad  some 
miles  west  of  Palmyra,  in  Missouri,  and  I  was 
ordered  to  proceed  with  all  despatch  to  their  relief. 


MOVEBiENT  AGAINST  HARRIS  199 

mand  of  the  Twenty-first  Regiment  I  took  with  me  ch.  xvin 
my  eldest  son,  Frederick  D.  Grant,  then  a  lad  of  'n^'^jjt^ 
eleven  years  of  age.    On  receiving  the  order  to  take  mif  Sft^itl 
rail  for  Quincy  I  wrote  to  Mrs.  Grant,  to  relieve  Lt^c^/SSi 
what  I  supposed  would  be  her  great  anxiety  for  one   i^'!v.  s! 
so  young  going  into  dangeV,  that  I  would  send  Fred  trimi889-w 
home  from  Quincy  by  river.    I  received  a  prompt 
letter  in  reply  decidedly  disapproving  my  proposi- 
tion, and  urging  that  the  lad  should  be  allowed  to 
accompany  me.    It  came  too  late.    Fred  was  already 
on  his  way  up  the  Mississippi,  bound  for  Dubuque, 
Iowa,  from  which  place  there  was  a  railroad  to 
Galena. 

/^j  sensations  as  we  approached  what  I  supposed  ?JS^^^ 
might  be  "a  field  of  battle''  were  anything  but 
agreeable.  I  had  been  in  all  the  engagements  in 
Mexico  that  it  was  possible  for  one  person  to  be  in, 
but  not  in  command.  If  some  one  else  had  been 
colonel  and  I  had  been  lieutenant-colonel  I  do  not 
think  I  would  have  felt  any  trepidation.  Before 
we  were  prepared  to  cross  the  Mississippi  River  at 
Quincy  my  anxiety  was  relieved,  for  the  men  of  the 
besieged  regiment  came  straggling  into  town.  I  am 
inclined  to  think  both  sides  got  frightened  and  ran 

SLWQ.J\ 

I  took  my  regiment  to  Palmyra  and  remained 
there  for  a  few  days,  until  relieved  by  the  Nine- 
teenth Illinois  Infantry.  From  Palmyra  I  pro- 
ceeded to  Salt  River,  the  railroad-bridge  over 
which  had  been  destroyed  by  the  enemy.    Colonel 

John    M.    PalmAr    flf.    f.Viof.    timA    pOTYinannded     M\\&    S^i5*  rl^* 


200  PEESONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S,  GBANT 

ch.  xvm  the  two  regiments  as  long  as  we  remained  together. 
The  bridge  was  finished  in  about  two  weeks,  and  I 
received  orders  to  move  against  Colonel  Thomas 
Harris,  who  was  said  to  be  encamped  at  the  little 
town  of  Florida,  some  twenty-five  miles  south  of 
where  we  then  were. 
July,  1861  At  the  time  of  which  I  now  write  we  had  no 
transportation,  and  the  country  about  Salt  Eiver 

^5S5!3mj^.  ^^  sparsely  settled,  so  that  it  took  some  days  to 
®™^  collect  teams  and  drivers  enough  to  naove  the  camp 
and  garrison  equipage  qt  a  regiment  nearly  a  thou- 
sand strong,  together  with  a  week's  supply  of  pro- 
visions and  some  ammunition.  While  preparations 
for  the  move  were  going  on  I  felt  quite  comfortable ; 
but  when  we  got  on  the  road  and  found  every  house 
deserted  I  was  anything  but  easy.  In  the  twenty- 
five  miles  we  had  to  march  we  did  not  see  a  person, 
old  or  young,  male  or  female,  except  two  horsemen 
who  were  on  a  road  that  crossed  ours.  As  soon  as 
they  saw  us  they  decamped  as  fast  as  their  horses 
could  carry  them.  I  kept  my  men  in  the  ranks  and 
forbade  their  entering  any  of  the  deserted  houses 
or  taking  anything  from  them.  We  halted  at  night 
on  the  road  and  proceeded  the  next  morning  at  an 
early  hour.  Harris  had  been  encamped  in  a  creek- 
bottom  for  the  sake  of  being  near  water.  The  hills 
on  either  side  of  the  creek  extend  to  a  considerable 
height — possibly  more  than  a  hundred  feet.    As 

Trepidation  wc  approached  the  brow  of  the  hill  from  which  it 
was  expected  we  could  see  Harris's  camp,  and  pos- 
sibly find  his  men  ready  formed  to  meet  us,  my 


GENERAL  POPE  IN  COMMAND  201 

but  I  had  not  the  moral  courage  to  halt  and  consider  ch.  xvm  ' 
what  to  do ;  I  kept  right  on.  When  we  reached  a 
point  from  which  the  valley  below  was  in  full  view 
I  halted.  The  place  where  Harris  had  been  en- 
camped a  few  days  before  was  still  there,  and  the 
marks  of  a  recent  encampment  were  plainly  visible,       ^  / 

but  the  troops  were  gone..  My  heart  resumed  its  »ouef 
place.  It  occurred  to  me  at  once  that  Harris  had 
been  as  much  afraid  of  me  as  I  had  been  of  him; 
This  was  a  view  of  the  question  I  had  never  taken 
before,  but  it  was  one  I  never  forgot  afterward. 
From  that  event  to  the  close  of  the  war  I  never  ex- 
perienced trepidation  upon  confronting  an  enemy, 
though  I  always  felt  more  or  less  anxiety.  I  never 
forgot  that  he  had  as  much  reason  to  fear  my  forces 
as  I  had  his.    The  lesson  was  valuable.  > 

Inquiries  at  the  village  of  Florida>^divulged  the 
fact  that  Colonel  Harris,  learning  of  my  intended  ^®S^'®' 
movement,  while  my  transportation  was  being  col- 
lected took  time  by  the  forelock  and  left  Florida 
before  I  had  started  from  Salt  Eiver.    He  had  in- 
creased the  distance  between  us  by  forty  miles. 
The  next  day  I  started  back  to  my  old  camp  at 
Salt  Eiver  bridge.    The  citizens  living  on  the  line 
of  our  march  had  returned  to  their  houses  after  we 
passed,  and,  finding  everything  in  good  order,  noth-  '^^^^iSe  ^ 
ing  carried  away,  they  were  at  their  front  doors 
ready  to  greet  us  now.    They  had  evidently  \^&^ 
led  to  believe  that  the  National  troops  carried  d^0»^ 
and  devastation  with  them  wherever  they  wetx^. 

In  a  short  time  after  our  return  to  Salt  I^^<€)t 
bridge  I  was  ordered  with  my  regiment  to  the  "fc^^^v^^  ^.^ra. 


202  PERSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

ch.  xvin  between  the  Mississippi  and  Missouri  rivers,  with 
his  headquartei's  in  the  village  of  Mexico.    I  was 

iS^TSSSSt  assigned  to  the  command  of  a  subdistrict  embrac- 
^®*  ing  the  troops  in  the  immediate  neighborhood — 
some  three  regiments  of  infantry  and  a  section  of 
artillery.  There  was  one  regiment  encamped  by  the 
side  of  mine.  I  assumed  command  of  the  whole,  and 
the  first  night  sent  the  commander  of  the  other 
regiment  the  parole  and  countersign.  Not  wish- 
ing to  be  outdone  in  courtesy,  he  immediately  sent 
me  the  countersign  for  his  regiment  for  the  night. 
When  he  was  informed  that  the  countersign  sent 
to  him  was  for  use  with  his  regiment  as  well  as 
mine,  it  was  difficult  to  make  him  understand  that 
this  was  not  an  unwarranted  interference  by  one 
colonel  with  another.  No  doubt  he  attributed  it 
for  the  time  to  the  presumption  of  a  graduate  of 
West  Point  over  a  volunteer  pure  and  simple.  But 
the  question  was  soon  settled  and  we  had  no  further 
trouble. 

LMkof^dis-  My  arrival  in  Mexico  had  been  preceded  by  that 
of  two  or  three  regiments  in  which  proper  discipline 
had  not  been  maintained,  and  the  men  had  been  in 
the  habit  of  visiting  houses  without  invitation  and 
helping  themselves  to  food  and  drink,  or  demand- 
ing them  from  the  occupants.  They  carried  their 
muskets  while  out  of  camp  and  made  every  man 
they  found  take  the  oath  of  allegiance  to  the  gov- 
ernment. I  at  once  published  orders  prohibiting 
the  soldiers  from  going  into  private  houses  unless 
invited  by  the  inhabitants,  and  from  appropriat- 
ing private  property  to  their  own  or  to  govern- 


STATIONED  AT  MEXICO,  MO, 


203 


Bnuhing 
ap  taotioB 


from  the  citizens  of  Mexico  as  long  as  I  remained  ch.  xym 
there. 

Up  to  this  time  my  regiment  had  not  been  carried 
in  the  school  of  the  soldier  beyond  the  company 
drill,  except  that  it  had  received'  some  training  on 
the  march  from  Springfield  to  the  Illinois  Eiver. 
There  was  now  a  good  opportunity  of  exercising  it 
in  the  battalion  drill.  While  I  was  at  West  Point 
the  tactics  used  in  the  army  had  been  Scott's,  and 
the  musket  the  flint-lock.  I  had  never  looked  at  a 
copy  of  tactics  from  the  time  of  my  graduation.  My 
standing  in  that  branch  of  studies  had  been  near  Ante,  p.  ao 
the  foot  of  the  class.  In  the  Mexican  war,  in  the 
summer  of  1846,  I  had  been  appointed  regimental  Ante,  p.  77 
quartermaster  and  commissary,  and  had  not  been  at 
a  battalion  drill  since.  The  arms  had  been  changed 
since  then  and  Hardee's  tactics  had  been  adopted. 
I  got  a  copy  of  tactics  and  studied  one  lesson,  -in- 
tending to  confine  the  exercise  of  the  first  day  to 
the  commands  I  had  thus  learned.  By  pursuing 
this  course  from  day  to  day  I  thought  I  would  soon 
get  through  the  volume. 

We  were  encamped  just  outside  of  town  on  the 
common,  among  scattering  suburban  houses  with 
inclosed  gardens ;  and  when  I  got  my  regiment  in 
line  and  rode  to  the  front  I  soon  saw  that  if  I  at- 
tempted to  follow  the  lesson  I  had  studied  I  would 
have  to  clear  away  some  of  the  houses  and  garden 
fences  to  make  room.  I  perceived  at  once,  however, 
that  Hardee's  tactics — a  mere  translation  from  the    ^S^* 


204  PEESONAL  MEMOIRS  OP  U.  8.  GBANT 

CH.  xvm  the  old  tactics  almost  every  change  in  the  order  of 
march  was  preceded  by  a  "  halt  ^ ;  then  came  the 
change,  and  then  the  "  forward  march.''  With  the 
new  tactics  all  these  changes  could  be  made  while 
in  motion.  I  found  no  trouble  in  giving  commands 
that  would  take  my  regiment  where  I  wanted  it  to 
go  and  carry  it  around  all  obstacles.  I  do  not  be- 
lieve that  the  officers  of  the  regiment  ever  discovered 
that  I  had  never  studied  the  tactics  that  I  used. 


CHAPTER  XIX 

COMMISSIONED  BRIGADIEB-GENERAL  —  COMMAND  AT 
ntONTON,  MISSOU  — JEFFEBSON  CITY — CAPE  GIB- 
AKDEAU — GENERAL  PEENTISS — 8EIZUEE  OP  PADU- 
CAH — HEADQUARTERS  AT  CAIRO 

1HAD  not  been  in  Mexico  many  weeks  when,  chap.xix 
reading  a  St.  Louis  paper,  I  found  the  Presi-    bSSSJS^ 
dent  had  asked  the  Illinois  delegation  in  Congress     ^^^^^ 
to  recommend  some  citizens  of  the  State  for  the  \^nT^d' 
position  of  brigadier-general,  and  that  they  had      ^^**®" 
unanimously  recommended  me  as  first  on  a  list  of 
seven.    I  was  very  much  surprised,  because,  as  I 
have  said,  my  acquaintance  with  the  Congressmen    Beep.i9i 
was  very  limited,  and  I  did  not  know  of  anything 
I  had  done  to  inspire  such  confidence.    The  papers 
of  the  next  day  announced  that  my  name,  with  three 
others,  had  been  sent  to  the  Senate,  and  a  few  days 
after  our  confirmation  was  announced. 

When   appointed   brigadier-general   I  at  once  ^^''^"f^" 
thought  it  proper  that  one  of  my  aides  should  ^^y^^*^^^ 
come  from  the  regiment  I  had  been  commanding, 
and  so  selected  Lieutenant  C.  B.  Lagow.    "While  ^^tiwa 
living  in  St.  Louis  I  had  had  a  desk  in  the  law-office 
ofMcClellan,Moodv,&Hillver.   DiflEerence  in  views 


206  PERSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GRAKT 

Chap.  XIX  quite  a  young  man,  then  in  his  twenties,  and  very 
brilliant.  I  asked  him  to  accept  a  place  on  my 
staff.  I  also  wanted  to  take  one  man  from  my  new 
home.  Galena.  The  canvass  in  the  Presidential 
campaign  the  fall  before  had  brought  out  a  young 
lawyer  by  the  name  of  John  A.  Rawlins,  who  proved 
himself  one  of  the  ablest  speakers  in  the  State.  He 
was  also  a  candidate  for  elector  on  the  Douglas 
ticket.  When  Sumter  was  fired  upon  and  the  in- 
tegrity of  the  Union  threatened,  there  was  no  man 
more  ready  to  serve  his  country  than  he.  I  wrote 
at  once  asking  him  to  accept  the  position  of  as- 
sistant adjutant-general,  with  the  rank  of  captain, 
on  my  staff.  He  was  about  entering  the  service  as 
major  of  a  new  regiment  then  organizing  in  the 

Aug. 80, 1861  northwestern  part  of  the  State;  but  he  threw  this 
up  and  accepted  my  offer. 

Neither  Hillyer  nor  Lagow  proved  to  have  any 
particular  taste  or  special  qualifications  for  the 
duties  of  the  soldier,  and  the  former  resigned  dur- 
ing the  Vicksburg  campaign ;  the  latter  I  relieved 
after  the  battle  of  Chattanooga.  Rawlins  remained 
with  me  as  long  as  he  lived,  and  rose  to  the  rank  of 

Mar.  8, 1865  brigadier-general  and  chief  of  staff  to  the  general 
of  the  army — an  oflfice  created  for  him — before  the 
war  closed.  He  was  an  able  man,  possessed  of  great 
fimmess,  and  could  say  " no''  so  emphatically  to  a 
request  which  he  thought  should  not  be  granted 
that  the  person  he  was  addressing  would  under- 

flfi).iirl  flf.  nnAA  f.hflf.  fliAr«  was  no  iira  nf  nrARsinir  thft 


COMMAND  AT  IBONTON,  MO.  207 

Ironton,  Missouri,  to  command  a  district  in  that  chap.xix 
part  of  the  State,  and  took  the  Twenty-first  Illinois,  ^"^Ji 
my  old  regiment,  with  me.    Several  other  regiments  ^^^^^^ 
were  ordered  to  the  same  destination  about  the 
same  time.    Ironton  is  on  the  Iron  Mountain  BaU- 
road,  about  seventy  miles  south  of  St.  Louis,  and 
situated  among  hUls  rising  almost  to  the  dignity  of 
mountains.    When  I  reached  there,  about  the  8th  of       1861 
August,  Colonel  B.  Gratz  Brown — afterward  Gov-  ^*^^^j 
emor  of  Missouri  and  in  1872  Vice-Presidential    e?n.*(Mo?) 
candidate — was  in  command.     Some  of  his  troops    gS^o. 
wSre  ninety-days'  men,  and  their  time  had  expired      w,  I'sss^" 
some  time  before.    The  men  had  no  clothing  but 
what  they  had  volunteered  in,  and  much  of  this  ci^;i;t?coi. 
was  so  worn  that  it  would  hardly  stay  on.    General     jt^i©  m; 

^_^  1  QUA  ■    Tll*f  *y 

Hardee — the  author  of  the  tactics  I  did  not  study  oenlcsx 
— was  at  Greenville,  some  twenty-five  miles  farther     Lt-oin.  * 

south,  it  was  said,  with  five  thousand  Confeder-  nov.6,i878 

ate  troops.     Under  these  circumstances,  Colonel  rSadeS*, 

279  — **Ii60D- 

Brown's  command  was  very  much  demoralized.  idiaPoik,*' 
A  squadron  of  cavalry  could  have  ridden  into  the 
vaUey  and  captured  the  entire  force.  Brown  him- 
self was  gladder  to  see  me  on  that  occasion  than 
he  ever  has  been  since.  I  relieved  him  and  sent  all  w.r.  01,431 
his  men  home  within  a  day  or  two  to  be  mustered 
out  of  service. 

Within  ten  days  after  reaching  Ironton  I  was  pre-     md.  445 
pared  to  take  the  offensive  against  the  enemy  at 
Greenville.    I  sent  a  column  east  out  of  the  valley 
we  were  in,  with  orders  to  swing  around  to  the 
south   and  west   and   come  into   t\\^  GreenviJle 


208  PEBSONAL  MEMOIRS  OP  U.  S.  GRANT 

CHAP.  XIX  I  was  to  ride  out  the  next  morning  and  take  per- 
sonal command  of  the  movement.    My  experience 
against  Harris,  in  northern  Missouri,  had  inspired 
me  with  confidence.     But  when  the  evening  train 
v?i1'"mS'*   ^^^^  ^y  it  brought  General  B.  M.  Prentiss  with 
mL^^.    orders  to  take  command  of  the  district.    His  orders 
2j?»2;^J*d  did  not  relieve  me,  but  I  knew  that  by  law  I  was 
w.R.ni,448  senior,  and  at  that  time  even  the  President  did  not 
have  the  authority  to  assign  a  junior  to  command  a 
senior  of  the  same  grade.    I  therefore  gave  General 
Prentiss  the  situation  of  the  troops  and  the  general 
condition  of  affairs,  and  started  for  St.  Louis  the 
same  day.    The  movement  against  the  rebels  at 
Greenville  went  no  further. 
^yTL^e^f      From  St.  Louis  I  was  ordered  to  Jefferson  City, 
^^^JS'^'  the  capital  of  the  State,  to  take  command.    Gen- 
v^  jS*"    ®^^  Sterling  Price,  of  the  Confederate  army,  was 
Gov^^o.    tJiought  to  be  threatening  the  capital,  Lexington, 
Mi*SJi!c.  Chillicothe,  and  other  comparatively  large  towns  in 
i&trf^sSpt.  the  central  part  of  Missouri.    I  found  a  good  many 
^'  *        troops  in  Jefferson  City,  but  in  the  greatest  confu- 
sion, and  no  one  person  knew  where  they  all  were. 
'uSim.'^i!'  Colonel  Mulligan,  a  gallant  man,  was  in  command, 
wiS; »Jt?  lt)ut  he  had  not  been  educated  as  yet  to  his  new 
vS£*  j5&   profession  and  did  not  know  how  to  maintain  dis- 
wiiohesW,  cipline.    I  found  that  volunteers  had  obtained 

July  24, 1864  .       .  «  ,  ,  , 

permission  from  the  department  commander,  or 
claimed  they  had,  to  raise,  some  of  them  regiments, 
some  battalions,  some  companies — the  oflficers  to  be 
commissioned  according  to  the  number  of  men  they 
brought  into  the  service.  There  were  recruiting- 
fltAt.ionR  all  ovftr  t.nwn.  with  notiftfts.  nid«lv  lfttt^r«d 


JEFFEBSON  CITY.  209 

that  station  would  be  received.    The  law  required  chap.xix 
all  volunteers  to  serve  for  three  years  or  the  war. 
But  in  JeflEerson  City,  in  August,  1861,  they  were    !£*?  piJi 
recruited  for  different  periods  and  on  different  con-   ^^^^  ^*  ''^ 
ditions ;  some  were  enlisted  for  six  months,  some  for 
a  year ;  some  without  any  condition  as  to  where  they 
were  to  serve,  others  were  not  to  be  sent  out  of  the 
State.    The  recruits  were  principally  men  from 
regiments  stationed  there  and  already  in  the  ser- 
vice, bound  for  three  years  if  the  war  lasted  that 
long. 

The  city  was  filled  with  Union  fugitives  who  had 
been  driven  by  guerrilla  bands  to  take  refuge  with 
the  National  troops.  They  were  in  a  deplorable 
condition  and  must  have  starved  but  for  the  sup- 
port the  government  gave  them.  They  had  gener- 
ally made  their  escape  with  a  team  or  two,  some- 
times a  yoke  of  oxen  with  a  mule  or  a  horse  in 
the  lead.  A  little  bedding,  besides  their  clothing 
and  some  food,  had  been  thrown  into  the  wagon. 
All  else  of  their  worldly  goods  was  abandoned  and 
appropriated  by  their  former  neighbors;  for  the 
Union  man  in  Missouri  who  stayed  at  home  during  ^^^* 
the  rebellion,  if  he  was  not  immediately  under  the 
protection  of  the  National  troops,  was  at  pei^petual 
war  with  his  neighbors.  I  stopped  the  recruiting- 
service  and  disposed  the  troops  about  the  outskirts 
of  the  city  so  as  to  guard  all  approaches.  Order  was 
soon  restored. 

I  had  been  at  Jefferson  City  but  a  few  days  when 
I  was  directed  from  department  headquarters   to  i^ildiw.^. 


210  PEBSONAL  MEMOntS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

Chap.  XIX  to  St.  Louis.  The  Western  army  had  not  yet  been 
supplied  with  transportation.  It  became  necessary, 
therefore,  to  press  into  the  service  teams  belonging 
to  sympathizers  with  the  rebellion,  or  to  hii'e  those 
of  Union  men.  This  afforded  an  opportunity  of 
giving  employment  to  such  of  the  refugees  within 
our  Imes  as  had  teams  suitable  for  our  purposes. 
They  accepted  the  service  with  alacrity.  As  fast  as 
troops  could  be  got  off  they  were  moved  west  some 
twenty  miles  or  more.  In  seven  or  eight  days  from 
my  assuming  command  at  Jefferson  City  I  had  aU 
the  troops,  except  a  small  garrison,  at  an  advanced 
position,  and  expected  to  join  them  myself  the  next 
day. 

But  my  campaigns  had  not  yet  begim ;  for  while 

seated  at  my  oflfice  door,  with  nothing  further  to  do 

until  it  was  time  to  start  for  the  front,  I  saw  an 

officer  of  rank  approaching,  who  proved  to  be  Colo- 

A??: j^cTiT,  ^^^  Jefferson  C.  Davis.    I  had  never  met  him  be- 

ili^ii^^  fore,  but  he  introduced  himself  by  handing  me  an 

in4.^^i6,  order  for  him  to  proceed  to  Jefferson  City  and  re- 

voi8fi)eo.i8,  lieve  me  of  the  command.    The  order  directed  that 

1861;  d.  Nov.    T,,-  -  -_  ^ 

»,i87»  I  should  report  at  department  headquarters  at  St 
Louis  without  delay,  to  receive  important  special 
instructions.  It  was  about  an  hour  before  the  only 
regular  train  of  the  day  would  start.    I  therefore 

Aiig.27,i8n  turned  over  to  Colonel  Davis  my  orders,  and  hur- 
riedly stated  to  him  the  progress  that  had  been 
made  to  carry  out  the  department  instructions  al- 
ready described.    I  had  at  that  time  but  one  staff- 

C.6.LAC0W  officer,  doing  myself  all  the  detail-work  usually 
performed  by  an  adjutant-general.    In  an  hour 


AT  CAPE  GIBABDEAU  211 

to  follow  the  next  day  with  our  horses  and  bag-  ohap.xix 
gage. 

The  "  important  special  instructions  ^  which  I  re- 
ceived the  next  day  assigned  me  to  the  command  Aiig.28,i86i 
of  the  district  of  southeast  Missouri,  embracing  all  ^^^  &' 
the  territory  south  of  St.  Louis,  in  Missouri,  as  well   ^^^^*  ^' 
as  all  southern  Illinois.    At  first  I  was  to  take  per- 
sonal command  of  a  combined  expedition  that  had 
been  ordered  for  the  capture  of  Colonel  Jeff.  Thomp-   ^^-^J^^ 
son,  a  sort  of  independent  or  partizan  commander     G"*^ 
who  was  disputing  with  us  the  possession  of  south-    ^i^^^ 
east  Missouri.     Troops  had  been  ordered  to  move 
from  Ironton  to  Cape  Girardeau,  sixty  or  seventy   ™^^  ®* 
miles  to  the  southeast,  on  the  Mississippi  Eiver; 
while  the  forces  at  Cape  Girardeau  had  been  ordered 
to  move  to  Jacksonville,  ten  miles  out  toward  Iron- 
ton  ;  and  troops  at  Cairo  and  Bird's  Point,  at  the 
junction  of  the  Ohio  and  Mississippi  rivers,  were  to 
hold  themselves  in  readiness  to  go  down  the  Mis- 
sissippi to  Belmont,  eighteen  miles  below,  to  be 
moved  west  from  there  when  an  oflficer  should 
come  to  command  them.    I  was  the  officer  who 
had  been  selected  for  this  purpose.    Cairo  was  to 
become  my  headquarters  when  the  expedition  ter- 
minated. 

In  pursuance  of  my  orders  I  established  my    ixa^\*a 
temporary  headquarters  at  Cape  Girardeau  and  Aug.8o,i86i 
sent  instructions  to  the  commanding  officer  at 
Jackson  to  inform  me  of  the  approach  of  General 
Prentiss  from  Ironton.    Hired  wagons  were  kept 
moving  night  and  day  to  take  additional  rations  to 
Jackson,  to  supply  the  troops  when  they  started 


212  PEBSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GEANT 

CHAP.  XIX  destination.  I  drew  up  all  the  instructions  for  the 
contemplated  move,  and  kept  them  in  my  pocket 
until  I  should  hear  of  the  junction  of  our  troops  at 
Jackson.  Two  or  three  days  after  my  arrival  at 
Cape  Girardeau,  word  came  that  General  Prentiss 

Sept  1,1861  was  approaching  that  place  (Jackson).  I  started  at 
once  to  meet  him  there  and  to  give  him  his  orders^ 
As  I  turned  the  first  comer  of  a  street  after  stai't- 
ing,  I  saw  a  column  of  cavalry  passing  the  next 
street  in  front  of  me.  I  turned  and  rode  around 
the  block  the  other  way,  so  as  to  meet  the  head  of 
the  column.  I  found  there  General  Prentiss  him- 
self, with  a  large  escort.  He  had  halted  his  troops 
at  Jackson  for  the  night,  and  had  come  on  himself 
to  Cape  Girardeau,  leaving  orders  for  his  command 
to  follow  him  in  the  morning.  I  gave  the  general 
his  orders, — which  stopped  him  at  Jackson, — but 

^i^i™'  ^®  ^^®  very  much  aggrieved  at  being  placed  under 
another  brigadier-general,  particularly  as  he  be- 
lieved himself  to  be  the  senior.  He  had  been  a 
brigadier,  in  command  at  Cairo,  whUe  I  was  muster- 
ing-oflficer  at  Springfield,  without  any  rank.  But 
we  were  nominated  at  the  same  time  for  the  United 
^  States  service,  and  both  our  commissions  bore  date 

May  17,  1861.  By  virtue  of  my  former  anny  rank 
I  was,  by  law,  the  senior.  General  Prentiss  failed 
to  get  orders  to  his  troops  to  remain  at  Jackson, 
and  the  next  morning  early  they  were  reported  as 
approaching  Cape  Girardeau.  I  then  ordered  the 
general  very  peremptorily  to  countermarch  his  com- 
mand and  take  it  back  to  Jackson.  He  obeyed  the 
order,  but  bade  his  command  adieu  when  he  got 
them  to  Jackson,  and  went  to  St.  Louis  and  reported 
Ibid.  148    himself.    This  broke  up  the  expedition.    But  little 


GENEBAL  PBENTISS.  213 

hann  was  done,  as  Jeff.  Thompson  moved  light  and  chap,  xix 
had  no  fixed  place  for  even  nominal  headquarters. 
He  was  as  much  at  home  in  Arkansas  as  he  was 
in  Missouri,  and  would  keep  out  of  the  way  of  a 
superior  force.  Prentiss  was  sent  to  another  part 
of  the  State. 

General  Prentiss  made  a  great  mistake  on  the  tiSJichS^ 
above  occasion — one  that  he  would  not  have  com-  *®*«^*^<» 
mitted  later  in  the  war.  When  I  came  to  know  him 
better  I  regretted  it  much.  In  consequence  of  this 
occurrence  he  was  off  duty  in  the  field  when  the 
principal  campaign  at  the  West  was  going  on,  and 
his  juniors  received  promotion  while  he  was  where 
none  could  be  obtained.  He  would  have  been  next 
to  myself  in  rank  in  the  district  of  southeast  Mis- 
somi,  by  virtue  of  his  services  in  the  Mexican  war. 
He  was  a  brave  and  very  earnest  soldier.  No  man 
in  the  service  was  more  sincere  in  his  devotion  to 
the  cause  for  which  we  were  battling ;  none  more 
ready  to  make  saciifices  or  risk  life  in  it. 

On  the  4th  of  September  I  removed  my  head-       isei 
quarters  to  Cairo,  and  found  Colonel  Eichard  Og-  ^i;2jJ\Si. 
lesby  in  command  of  the  post.    We  had  never  met    voil*  mI?.* 
— at  least  not  to  my  knowledge.    After  my  promo-  ^VJS?nJ»^ 
tion  I  had  ordered  my  brigadier-generaPs  uniform     gov.  nf. 

tflftK  .flo  1879* 

from  New  York ;  but  it  had  not  yet  arrived,  so  that  ^i§j^^^  * 
I  was  in  citizen's  dress.  The  colonel  had  his  oflfice 
full  of  people,  mostly  from  the  neighboring  States 
of  Missouri  and  Kentucky,  making  complaints  or 
asking  favors.  He  evidently  did  not  catch  my 
name  when  I  was  presented,  for  on  my  taking  a 
piece  of  paper  from  the  table  where  he  was  seated 
and  writing  the  order  assuming  command  of  the  w.B.in,47o 
district  of  southeast  Missouri,  Colonel  Eichard  J. 


214 


PEBSONAL  MEMOIRS  OP  U.  S.  GRANT 


Chap.  XIX 


oommancn 
Diet.  8.  £. 
Missouri 

Sept  6, 1861 

Battles  & 
Leaden,!, 


'Leonidas 

Polk." 
11,17-ao 


Oglesby  to  command  the  post  at  Bird's  Point,  and 
handing  it  to  him,  he  put  on  an  expression  of  sur- 
prise that  looked  a  little  as  if  he  would  like  to  have 
some  one  identify  me.  But  he  smTendered  the 
oflfice  without  question. 

The  day  after  I  assumed  conmaand  at  Cairo  a 
man  came  to  me  who  said  he  was  a  scout  of  Gen- 
eral Fremont.  He  reported  that  he  had  just  come 
from  Columbus, — a  point  on  the  Mississippi  twenty 
miles  below,  on  the  Kentucky  side, — and  that  troops 
had  started  from  there,  or  were  about  to  start,  to 
seize  Paducah,  at  the  mouth  of  the  Tennessee. 
There  was  no  time  for  delay ;  I  reported  by  tele- 
graph to  the  department  commander  the  informa- 
tion I  had  received,  and  added  that  I  was  taking 
steps  to  get  off  that  night,  to  be  in  advance  of  the 
enemy  in  securing  that  important  point.  There 
were  a  large  nimiber  of  steamers  lying  at  Cairo,  and 
a  good  many  boatmen  were  staying  in  the  town.  It 
was  the  work  of  only  a  few  hours  to  get  the  boats 
manned,  with  coal  aboard  and  steam  up.  Troops 
were  also  designated  to  go  aboard.  The  distance 
from  Cairo  to  Paducah  is  about  forty-five  miles.  I 
did  not  wish  to  get  there  before  daylight  of  the  6th, 
and  directed,  therefore,  that  the  boats  should  lie  at 
anchor  out  in  the  stream  until  the  time  to  start. 
Not  having  received  an  answer  to  my  first  des- 
patch, I  again  telegraphed  to  department  head- 
quarters that  I  should  start  for  Paducah  that  night 
unless  I  received  further  orders.    Hearing  nothing. 


...    «i.««^..J     X^^fi^ 


:A^irJU4-      ^^A      »w»;<r^/%^ 


»l^    4.1>, 


SEIZUBE  OF  PADUOAH.  215 

son  had  been  broken  up.    Had  it  not  been,  the  ohap.xix 
enemy  would  have  seized  Paducah  and  fortified  it, 
to  our  very  great  annoyance. 

When  the  National  troops  entered  the  town  the  ^fj^l^ 
citizens  were  taken  by  surprise.  I  never  after  saw 
such  consternation  depicted  on  the  faces  of  the 
people.  Men,  women,  and  children  came  out  of 
their  doors  looking  pale  and  frightened  at  the  pres- 
ence of  the  invader.  They  were  expecting  rebel  w.K.nr.m 
troops  that  day.  In  fact,  nearly  four  thousand 
men  from  Columbus  were  at  that  time  within  ten 
or  fifteen  miles  of  Paducah,  on  their  way  to  occupy 
the  place.  I  had  but  two  regiments  and  one  battery 
with  me ;  but  the  enemy  did  not  know  this  and  re- 
turned to  Columbus.  I  stationed  my  troops  at  the 
best  points  to  guard  the  roads  leading  into  the  city, 
left  gimboats  to  guard  the  river-fronts,  and  by  noon 
was  ready  to  start  on  my  return  to  Cairo.  Before 
leaving,  however,  I  addressed  a  short  printed  proc- 
lamation to  the  citizens  of  Paducah,  assuring  them 
of  our  peaceful  intentions,  that  we  had  come  among 
them  to  protect  them  against  the  enemies  of  our 
country,  and  that  all  who  chose  could  continue 
their  usukl  avocations  with  assurance  of  the  pro- 
tection of  the  government.  This  was  evidently  a 
relief  to  them ;  but  the  majority  would  have  much 
preferred  the  presence  of  the  other  army.  I  rein- 
forced Paducah  rapidly  from  the  troops  at  Cape 
Girardeau;  and  a  day  or  two  later  General  C.  F.  w.p.imo- 
Smith,  a  most  accomplished  soldier,  reported  at  j^^^,^^. 
Cairo  and  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  post  vS£"a^. 
at  the  mouth  of  the  Tennessee.    In  a  short  time  it  iS*.  sept.  9, 


216  PERSONAL  MEMOmS   OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

CHAP.  XIX  The  State  govemment  of  Kentucky  at  that  time 

nLyTiS^e^f  ^^  rebel  in  sentiment,  but  wanted  to  preserve  an 

a^SilrvyS  armed  neutrality  between  the  North  and  the  South, 

"i^das  and  the  governor  really  seemed  to  think  the  State 

Polk  "  II  17 

etBeq'.     had  a  perfect  right  to  maintain  a  neutral  position. 
The  rebels  already  occupied  two  towns  in  the  State, 
Columbus  and  Hickman,  on  the  Mississippi ;  and  at 
w.B.iv,m  the  very  moment  the  National  troops  were  entering 
m2dL^k  Paducah  from  the  Ohio  front.  General  Lloyd  Tilgh- 
^^Brig^  man, — a  Confederate, — with  his  staff  and  a  small 
^  wiu'jk."^  detachment  of  men,  was  getting  out  in  the  other 
Hm?Mayi6,  direction,  while,  as  I  have  already  said,  nearly  four 
w.R.in.i«6  thousand  Confederate  troops  were  on  Kentucky  soil 
on  their  way  to  take  possession  of  the  town.    But, 
in  the  estimation  of  the  governor  and  of  those  who 
thought  with  him,  this  did  not  justify  the  National 
authorities  in  invading  the  soil  of  Kentucky.    I  in- 
formed the  legislature  of  the  State  of  what  I  was 
doing,  and  my  action  was  approved  by  the  majority 
of  that  body.    On  my  return  to  Cairo  I  found  au- 
thority from  department  headquarters  for  me  to 
Ibid.  149     take  Paducah,  "  if  I  felt  strong  enough  f  but  very 
soon  after  I  was  reprimanded  from  the  same  quar- 
ter for  my  correspondence  with  the  legislature,  and 
warned  against  a  repetition  of  the  offense. 

Soon  after  I  took  command  at  Cairo,  General 
Fi*emont  entered  into  arrangements  for  the  ex- 
change of  the  prisoners  captured  at  Camp  Jackson 
seTaStSfp;  i^  th^  month  of  May.  I  received  orders  to  pass 
^  them  through  my  lines  to  Columbus  as  they  pre- 
sented themselves  with  proper  credentials.  Quite 
a  number  of  these  prisoners  I  had  been  personally 


AN  mCIDENT   OF  .CIVIL  WAB.  217 

as  old  acquaintances,  and  ordinary  routine  busi-  chap.xix 
ness  was  not  disturbed  by  their  presence.  On  one 
occasion,  when  several  were  present  in  my  office,  my 
intention  to  visit  Cape  Girardeau  the  next  day,  to 
inspect  the  troops  at  that  point,  was  mentioned. 
Something  transpired  which  postponed  my  trip; 
but  a  steamer  employed  by  the  government  was 
passing  a  point  some  twenty  or  more  miles  above 
Cairo  the  next  day,  when  a  section  of  rebel  artillery 
with  proper  escort  brought  her  to.  A  major — one 
of  those  who  had  been  at  my  headquarteijs  the  day 
before — came  at  once  aboard,  and  after  some  search 
made  a  direct  demand  for  my  delivery.  It  was  hard  ^^^^ 
to  persuade  him  that  I  was  not  there.  This  officer 
was  Major  BaiTett,  of  St.  Louis.  I  had  been  ac- 
quainted with  his  family  before  the  war. 


CHAPTER  XX 

GENERAL  FREMONT  IN  COMMAND — MOVEMENT  AGAINST 
BELMONT — BATTLE  OF  BELMONT — A  NARROW  ES- 
CAPE—AFTER THE  BATTLE 


Chap,  "y^ 


FROM  the  occupation  of  Padncah  up  to  the  early- 
part  of  November  nothmg  important  occurred 
with  the  troops  under  my  command.    I  was  rein- 
forced from  time  to  time,  and  the  men  were  drilled 
and  disciplined  preparatory  to  the  service  which 
was  sure  to  come.    By  the  1st  of  November  I  had 
not  fewer  than  twenty  thousand  men,  most  of  them 
under  good  drill  and  ready  to  meet  any  equal  body 
of  men  who,  like  themselves,  had  not  yet  been  in  an 
engagement.   They  were  growing  impatient  at  lying 
idle  so  long,  almost  in  hearing  of  the  guns  of  the 
enemy  they  had  volunteered  to  fight  against    I 
^'^^^'  asked  on  one  or  two  occasions  to  be  allowed  to 
move  against  Columbus.    It  could  have  been  taken 
soon  after  the  occupation  of  Paducah ;  but  before 
Jh-**i^  November  it  was  so  strongly  fortified  that  it  would 
nfi7T2M4  have  required  a  large  force  and  a  long  siege  to 
j.c.  Fre-    capture  it. 


MOVEMENT  AGAINST  BELMONT  219 

mand.    About  the  1st  of  November  I  was  directed    chap,  xx 
from  department  headquarters  to  make  a  demon-  w.R.in,267 
stration  on  both  sides  of  the  Mississippi  River,  with 
the  view  of  detaining  the  rebels  at  Columbus  within 
their  lines.    Before  my  troops  could  be  got  off  I  was 
notified  from  the  same  quarter  that  there  were  some 
three  thousand  of  the  enemy  on  the  St.  Francis 
River,  about  fifty  mUes  west  or  southwest  from  Cairo, 
and  was  ordered  to  send  another  force  against  them.     ibid.  968 
I  despatched  Colonel  Oglesby  at  once  with  troops 
sufficient  to  compete  with  the  reported  number  of 
the  enemy.    On  the  5th  word  came  from  the  same    Nov.,  isw 
source  that  the  rebels  were  about  to  detach  a 
large  force  from  Columbus,  to  be  moved  by  boats 
down  the  Mississippi  and  up  the  White  River,  in 
Arkansas,  in  order  to  reinforce  Price,  and  I  was  w.R.m,a«8 
directed  to  prevent  this  movement  if  possible.    I 
accordingly  sent  a  regiment  from  Bird^s  Point  under     nth  m. 
Colonel  W.  H.  L.  Wallace  to  overtake  and  reinforce   vSImS: 
Oglesby,  with  orders  to  march  to  New  Madrid,  a  ^'mii^f' 
point  some  distance  below  Columbus,  on  the  Mis-  Ap^cJ'iaea 
souri  side.    At  the  same  time  I  directed  General  w^-™*^ 
C.  F.  Smith  to  move  all  the  troops  he  could  spare 
from  Paducah  directly  against  Columbus,  halting 
them,  however,  a  few  miles  from  the  town  to  await 
further  orders  from  me.    Then  I  gathered  up  all 
the  troops  at  Cairo  and  Fort  Holt,  except  suitable   ^S^w,^ 
guards,  and  moved  them  down  the  river  on  steam-        ^ 
ers  convoyed  by  two  gunboats,  accompanying  them    ^S^^l^ 
myself.    My  force  consisted  of  a  little  over  three 
thousand  men,  and  embraced  five  regiments  of  in- 


220  PERSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

Chap.  XX    on  the  Kentucky  side,  and  established  pickets  to 
connect  with  the  troops  from  Paducah. 

I  had  no  orders  which  contemplated  an  attack  by 
the  National  troops,  nor  did  I  intend  anything  of 
the  kind  when  I  started  out  from  Cairo ;  but  after 
we  started  I  saw  that  the  officers  and  men  were 
elated  at  the  prospect  of  at  last  having  the  oppor- 
tunity of  doing  what  they  had  volunteered  to  do — 
fight  the  enemies  of  theii*  country.  I  did  not  see 
how  I  could  maintain  discipline  or  retain  the  confi- 
dence of  my  command  if  we  should  return  to  Cairo 
without  an  effort  to  do  something.  Columbus,  be- 
sides being  strongly  fortified,  contained  a  garrison 
much  more  numerous  than  the  force  I  had  with 
me.  It  would  not  do,  therefore,  to  attack  that 
point.    About  two  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the 

Nov.,  iMi    7th  I  learned  that  the  enemy  was  crossing  troops 

w.B.in,2«9  from  Columbus  to  the  west  bank,  to  be  despatched, 
presumably,  after  Oglesby.  I  knew  there  was  a 
small  camp  of  Confederates  at  Belmont,  immedi- 
ately opposite  Columbus,  and  I  speedily  resolved 
to  push  down  the  river,  land  on  the  Missouri  side, 
capture  Belmont,  break  up  the  camp,  and  return. 
Accordingly  the  pickets  above  Columbus  were 
drawn  in  at  once,  and  about  daylight  the  boats 
moved  out  from  shore.  In  an  hour  we  were  de- 
barking on  the  west  bank  of  the  Mississippi,  just 
out  of  range  of  the  batteries  at  Columbus. 

of^^oS?      The  ground  on  the  west  shore  of  the  river,  op- 


222  PEBSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

Chap,  xx  the  native  forests.  We  landed  in  front  of  a  corn- 
field.   When  the  debarkation  commenced  I  took  a 

w.R.m,Mi  regiment  down  the  river  to  post  it  as  a  guard 
against  surprise.  At  that  time  I  had  no  staff-officer 
who  could  be  trusted  with  that  duty.  In  the  woods, 
at  a  short  distance  below  the  clearing,  I  found  a  de- 
pression, dry  at  the  time,  but  which  at  high  water 
became  a  slough  or  bayou.  I  placed  the  men  in  the 
hollow,  gave  them  their  instructions,  and  ordered 
them  to  remain  there  until  they  were  properly  re- 
lieved. These  troops,  with  the  gunboats,  were  to 
protect  our  transports. 

poiv^iifSs  ^P  *^  *^i®  *™^^  *^^  enemy  had  evidently  failed 
to  divine  our  intentions.  From  Columbus  they 
could,  of  course,  see  our  gunboats  and  transports 
loaded  with  troops.  But  the  force  from  Paducah 
was  threatening  them  from  the  land  side,  and  it  was 
hardly  to  be  expected  that  if  Columbus  was  our  ob- 
ject we  would  separate  our  troops  by  a  wide  river. 
They  doubtless  thought  we  meant  to  draw  a  large 
force  from  the  east  bank,  then  embark  ourselves, 
land  on  the  east  bank,  and  make  a  sudden  assault 
on  Columbus  before  their  divided  command  could 
be  united. 

Nov.7,iMi  About  eight  o'clock  we  started  from  the  point  of 
debarkation,  marching  by  the  flank.  After  moving 
in  this  way  for  a  mile  or  a  mile  and  a  half,  I  halted 
where  there  was  marshy  ground  covered  with  a 

^h^^*  heavy  growth  of  timber  in  oui-  front,  and  deployed 
a  large  part  of  my  force  as  skirmishers.    By  this 

^l£V^$^  time  the  enemv  discovered  that  we  were  moving 


BATTLE   OF  BELMONT  223 

continued,  growing  fiercer  and  fiercer,  for  about    chap.xx 
four  hours,  the  enemy  being  forced  back  gradually 
until  he  was  driven  into  his  camp.    Early  in  this 
engagement  my  horse  was  shot  under  me,  but  I  got  w.R.in,27» 
another  from  one  of  my  staff  and  kept  well  up  with 
the  advance  until  the  river  was  reached. 

The  officers  and  men  engaged  at  Belmont  were 
then  under  fire  for  the  first  time.  Veterans  could 
not  have  behaved  better  than  they  did  up  to  the 
moment  of  reaching  the  rebel  camp.  At  this  point 
they  became  demoralized  from  their  victory  and  ^J^^e*f 
failed  to  reap  its  full  reward.  The  enemy  had  been  ^^<g^  ^> 
followed  so  closely  that  when  he  reached  the  clear 
ground  on  which  his  camp  was  pitched  he  beat  a 
hasty  retreat  over  the  river-bank,  which  protected 
him  from  our  shots  and  from  view.  This  precipitate 
retreat  at  the  last  moment  enabled  the  National 
forces  to  pick  their  way  without  hindrance  through 
the  abatis — the  only  artificial  defense  the  enemy 
had.  The  moment  the  camp  was  reached  our  men 
laid  down  their  arms  and  commenced  rummaging 
the  tents  to  pick  up  trophies.  Some  of  the  higher 
officers  were  little  better  than  the  privates.  They 
galloped  about  from  one  cluster  of  men  to  another, 
and  at  every  halt  delivered  a  short  eulogy  upon 
the  Union  cause  and  the  achievements  of  the  com- 
mand. 

All  this  time  the  troops  we  had  been  engaged  with  ^^-^^ 
for  four  hours  lay  crouched  under  cover  of  the  river- 
bank,  ready  to  come  up  and  surrender  if  summoned 
to  do  so ;  but  finding  that  they  were  not  pursued^ 


224  PERSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

CHAP.  XX  Columbus  side  toward  the  west  shore,  above  us, 
black — or  gi^ay — with  soldiers  from  boiler-deck  to 
roof.  Some  of  my  men  were  engaged  in  firing  from 
captured  gims  at  empty  steamers  down  the  river, 
out  of  range,  cheering  at  every  shot.  I  tried  to  get 
them  to  turn  their  guns  upon  the  loaded  steamers 
above  and  not  so  far  away.    My  efforts  were  in  vain. 

^^^^  At  last  I  directed  my  staff-officers  to  set  fire  to  the 
camps.  This  drew  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  guns 
located  on  the  heights  of  Columbus.  They  had  ab- 
stained from  firing  before,  probably  because  they 
were  afraid  of  hitting  their  own  men ;  or  they  may 
have  supposed,  until  the  camp  was  on  fire,  that  it 
was  still  in  the  possession  of  their  friends.  About 
this  time,  too,  the  men  we  had  driven  over  the  bank 
w.R.ra,844  were  seen  in  line  up  the  river  between  us  and  our 
transports.  The  alarm  "surrounded^  was  given. 
The  guns  of  the  enemy  and  the  report  of  being 
surrounded  brought  officers  and  men  completely 
under  control.  At  first  some  of  the  officers  seemed 
to  think  that  to  be  surrounded  was  to  be  placed  in 
a  hopeless  position,  where  there  was  nothing  to  do 
but  surrender.  But  when  I  announced  that  we  had 
cut  our  way  in,  and  could  cut  our  way  out  just  as 
well,  it  seemed  a  new  revelation  to  officers  and 
soldiers.  They  formed  line  rapidly  and  we  started 
back  to  our  boats,  with  the  men  deployed  as  skir- 
mishers as  they  had  been  on  entering  camp.  The 
enemy  was  soon  encountered,  but  his  resistance  this 
time  was  feeble.  Again  the  Confederates  sought 
shelter  under  the  river-banks.  We  could  not  stop, 
however,  to  pick  them  up,  because  the  troops  we 


BATTLE  OF  BELMONT  225 

It  would  be  prudent  to  get  them  behind  us ;  but  we   chap,  xx 
were  not  again  molested  on  our  way  to  the  boats. 

From  the  beginning  of  the  fighting*  our  wounded 
had  been  carried  to  the  houses  at  the  rear,  near  the 
place  of  debarkation.    I  now  set  the  troops  to  bring-    ^J^Sn*^ 
ing  their  wounded  to  the  boats.    After  this  had  gone      ^^ 
on  for  some  little  time  I  rode  down  the  road,  with- 
out even  a  staff-officer,  to  visit  the  guard  I  had    The  guard 
stationed  over  the  approach  to  our  transports.    I 
knew  the  enemy  had  crossed  over  from  Columbus 
in  considerable  numbers  and  might  be  expected  to 
attack  us  as  we  were  embarking.    This  guard  would 
be  encountered  first,  and,  as  they  were  in  a  natural 
intrenchment,  would  be  able  to  hold  the  enemy  for 
a  considerable  time.    My  surprise  was  great  to  find 
there  was  not  a  single  man  in  the  trench.    Riding 
back  to  the  boat,  I  found  the  officer  who  had  com- 
manded the  guard,  and  learned  that  he  had  with-  w.b.  111,29s 
drawn  his  force  when  the  main  body  fell  back.    At 
first  I  ordered  the  guard  to  return ;  but  finding  that 
it  would  take  some  time  to  get  the  men  together 
and  march  them  back  to  their  position,  I  counter- 
manded the  order.    Then,  fearing  that  the  enemy 
we  had  seen  crossing  the  river  below  might  be  com- 
ing upon  us  unawares,  I  rode  out  in  the  field  to  our    ^<5SS^ 
front,  still  entirely  alone,  to  observe  whether  the 
enemy  was  passing.    The  field  was  grown  up  with 
com  so  tall  and  thick  as  to  cut  off  the  view  of  even 
a  person  on  horseback,  except  directly  along  tlie 
rows.    Even  in  that  direction,  owing  to  the  over- 
hanging blades  of  com,  the  view  was  not  extensive. 


226  PERSONAL  MEMOIBS  OF  U.  S.  GBANT 

CHAP.  XX  and  then  turned  my  horse  toward  the  river  and 
started  back,  first  in  a  walk,  and  when  I  thought 
myself  concealed  from  the  view  of  the  enemy,  as 
fast  as  my  horse  could  carry  me.  When  at  the 
river-bank  I  still  had  to  ride  a  few  hundred  yards 
to  the  point  where  the  nearest  transport  lay. 

The  corn-field  in  front  of  our  transports  termi- 
nated at  the  edge  of  a  dense  forest.  Before  I  got  back 
w.R.ra^o,  ^-j^Q  enemy  had  entered  this  forest  and  had  opened 
a  brisk  fire  upon  the  boats.  Our  men,  with  the  ex- 
ception of  details  that  had  gone  to  the  front  after 
the  wounded,  were  now  either  aboard  the  trans- 
ports or  very  near  them.  Those  who  were  not 
aboard  soon  got  there,  and  the  boats  pushed  off.  I 
was  the  only  man  of  the  National  army  between  the 
rebels  and  our  transports.  The  captain  of  a  boat 
that  had  just  pushed  out,  but  had  not  started,  recog- 
nized me,  and  ordered  the  engineer  not  to  start  the 
engine ;  he  then  had  a  plank  run  out  for  me.  My 
horse  seemed  to  take  in  the  situation.  There  was 
Ibid,  aoi  no  path  down  the  bank,  and  every  one  acquainted 
with  the  Mississippi  Eiver  knows  that  its  banks,  in 
a  natural  state,  do  not  vary  at  any  great  angle  from 
the  perpendicular.  My  horse  put  his  fore  feet  over 
the  bank  without  hesitation  or  urging,  and,  with  his 
hind  feet  well  under  him,  slid  down  the  bank,  and 
trotted  aboard  the  boat,  twelve  or  fifteen  feet  away, 
over  a  single  gang-plank.  I  dismounted  and  went 
at  once  to  the  upper  deck. 

The  Mississippi  River  was  low  on  the  7th  of 


AFTER  THE  BATTLE  227 

and  did  us  but  little  harm.  Our  smoke-stack  was  chap,  xx 
riddled  with  bullets,  but  there  were  only  three  men 
wounded  on  the  boats,  two  of  whom  were  soldiers. 
When  I  first  went  on  deck  I  entered  the  captain's  ^oh^ 
room,  adjoining  the  pilot-house,  and  threw  myself 
on  a  sofa.  I  did  not  keep  that  position  a  moment, 
but  rose  to  go  out  on  the  deck  to  observe  what  was 
going  on.  I  had  scarcely  left  when  a  musket-ball 
entered  the  room,  struck  the  head  of  the  sofa,  passed 
through  it,  and  lodged  in  the  foot. 

When  the  enemy  opened  fiire  on  the  transports 
our  gunboats  returned  it  with  vigor.  They  were  ^^"JSSon*^ 
well  out  in  the  stream  and  some  distance  down,  so 
that  they  had  to  give  but  very  little  elevation  to 
their  guns  to  clear  the  banks  of  the  river.  Their 
position  very  nearly  enfiladed  the  line  of  the  enemy 
while  he  was  marching  through  the  corn-field.  The 
execution  was  very  great,  as  we  could  see  at  the  w.R.ni,a76 
time  and  as  I  afterward  learned  more  positively. 
We  were  very  soon  out  of  range,  and  went  peace- 
fully on  our  way  to  Cairo,  every  man  feeling  that 
Belmont  was  a  great  victory  and  that  he  had  con- 
tributed his  share  to  it. 

Our  loss  at  Belmont  was  485  in  killed,  wounded, 
and  missing.  About  125  of  our  wounded  fell  into 
the  hands  of  the  enemy.  We  returned  with  175 
prisoners  and  two  guns,  and  spiked  four  other 
pieces.  The  loss  of  the  enemy,  as  officially  re- 
ported, was  642  men,  killed,  wounded,  and  missing. 
We  had  engaged  about  2500  men,  exclusive  of  tlx^ 
guard  left  with  the  transport?.     The  enemy  had 


228  PEBSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

Chap.  XX  The  two  objects  for  which  the  battle  of  Behnont 
^ticM?fa*'  ^^  fought  were  fully  accomplished.  The  enemy 
Srotejw! R."  gave  up  all  idea  of  detaching  troops  from  Colum- 
bus.  His  losses  were  very  heavy  for  that  period  of 
the  war.  Columbus  was  beset  by  people  looking 
for  their  wounded  or  dead  kin,  to  take  them  home 
for  medical  treatment  or  burial  I  learned  later, 
when  I  had  moved  farther  south,  that  Belmont  had 
caused  more  mourning  than  almost  any  other  battle 
up  to  that  time.  The  National  troops  acquired  a 
confidence  in  themselves  at  Belmont  that  did  not 
desert  them  through  the  war. 
T^^n^  The  day  after  the  battle  I  met  some  officers  from 
General  Polkas  command,  arranged  for  permission 
to  bury  our  dead  at  Belmont,  and  also  commenced 
negotiations  for  the  exchange  of  prisoners.  When 
our  men  went  to  bury  their  dead,  before  they  were 
allowed  to  land  they  were  conducted  below  the 
point  where  the  enemy  had  engaged  our  transports. 
Some  of  the  officers  expressed  a  desire  to  see  the 
field ;  but  the  request  was  refused  with  the  state- 
ment that  we  had  no  dead  there. 

While  on  the  truce-boat  I  mentioned  to  an  officer 
whom  I  had  known  both  at  West  Point  and  in  the 
Mexican  war,  that  I  was  in  the  corn-field  near  their 
troops  when  they  passed ;  that  I  had  been  on  horse- 
back and  had  worn  a  soldier's  overcoat  at  the  time. 
This  officer  was  on  General  Polk's  staff.  He  said 
both  he  and  the  general  had  seen  me,  and  that  Polk 

hsu\  flAiri  'fn  liis  tyiati.  "TliArA  ir  RVanlrAA?  von  mav 


AFTER  THE  BATTLE  229 

possibility  of  them  from  the  beginning.    If  it  had   chap,  xx 
not  been  fought,  Colonel  Oglesby  would  probably 
have  been  captured  or  destroyed,  with  his  three 
thousand  men.    Then  I  should  have  been  culpable 
indeed. 


CHAPTER  XXI 

GENERAL  HALLEGE  IK  COMMAND — COMMANDING  THE 
DISTRICT  OF  CAIRO — MOVEMENT  ON  FORT  HENRY 
— CAPTURE  OF  FORT  HENRY 


Chap.  XXI  "VlTHILE  at  Cairo  I  had  frequent  opportunities 

poik?'ii,*«  ^^  meeting  the  rebel  officers  of  the  Columbus 

etseq.     garrisou.    They  seemed  to  be  very  fond  of  coming 

up  on  steamers  under  flags  of  truce.    On  two  or 

three  occasions  I  went  down  in  like  manner.   When 

one  of  their  boats  was  seen  coming  up  carrying  a 

white  flag,  a  gun  would  be  fired  from  the  lower 

battery  at  Fort  Holt,  throwing  a  shot  across  the 

bow  as  a  signal  to  come  no  farther.    I  would  then 

take  a  steamer  and,  with  my  staff  and  occasionally 

a  few  other  officers,  go  down  to  receive  the  party. 

There  were  several  officers  among  them  whom  I  had 

known  before,  both  at  West  Point  and  in  Mexico. 

"•   .         -/Seeing  these  officers,  who  had  been  educated  for 

the  profession  of  arms,  both  at  school  and  in  actual 

war,  which  is  a  far  more  efficient  training,  impressed 

^?SSi^  me  with  the  great  advantage  the  South  possessed 

^^       over  the  North  at  the  beginning  of  the  rebellion. 

They  had  from  thirty  to  forty  per  cent,  of  the  edu- 


GENERAL  HALLECK  IN  COMMAND  231 

education  and  training  was  distributed  throughout  chap,  xxi 
their  whole  army.    The  whole  loaf  was  leavened. 

The  North  had  a  greater  number  of  educated  and  ^SS^Sn 
trained  soldiers,  but  the  bulk  of  them  were  still  in 
the  army,  and  were  retained,  generally  with  their 
old  commands  and  rank,  until  the  war  had  lasted 
many  months.  In  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  there 
was  what  was  known  as  the  "  regular  brigade,^  in 
which,  from  the  commanding  officer  down  to  the 
youngest  second  lieutenant,  every  one  was  educated 
to  his  profession.  So,  too,  with  many  of  the  bat- 
teries ;  all  the  officers — generally  four  in  \iumber 
to  each — were  men  educated  for  their  profession. 
Some  of  these  went  into  battle  at  the  beginning 
under  division  commanders  who  were  entirely  with-r 
out  military  training.  This  state  of  affairs  gave  me 
an  idea,  which  I  expressed  while  at  Cairo :  that  the  §^Sd/n| 
government  ought  to  disband  the  regular  army,  *^®^y^^ 
with  the  exception  of  the  staff-corps,  and  notify  the 
disbanded  officers  that  they  would  receive  no  com- 
pensation while  the  war  lasted,  except  as  volunteers. 
The  register  should  be  kept  up,  but  the  names  of 
all  officera  who  were  not  in  the  volunteer  service  at 
the  close  should  be  stricken  from  it. 

On  the  9th  of  November,  two  days  after  the  battle  g^^'^^; 
of  Belmont,  Major-General  H.  W.  Halleck  super-  cJSt^. 
seded  General  Fremont  in  command  of  the  Depart-  "^M^I-oeS' 
ment  of  the  Missouri.    The  limits  of  his  command   w/iaii;^ 

Jan.  9, 1872 

took  in  Arkansas  and  west  Kentucky  east  to  the  v?.B.in.wn 
Cumberland  River.    From  the  battle  of  Belmont 

until  Aarlv  in  "F'A'hmflrv    IftftO    fVin  frArw-^o  -n-nflpir  tv>^ 


232 


PERSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 


Chap.  XXI  from  the  Mississippi  Eiver  at  Columbus  to  Bowling- 
^6m!*946 ''  Green  and  Mill  Springs,  Kentucky.  Each  of  these 
positions  was  strongly  fortified,  as  were  also  points 
an  the  Tennessee  and  Cumberland  rivers  near  the 
Tennessee  State  line.  The  works  on  the  Tennessee 
^%'^vi^'  ^^^^  called  Fort  Heiman  and  Fort  Henry,  and  that 
on  the  Cumberland  was  Fort  Donelson.    At  these 


eCALE  OF  STATUTt  MILM 
^S™T?       50  1^ 

I         N         0 
EvaiwTllIp 


MAP  OF  THB  BBGION  OF  F0BT8  HENBT  AlTD  DONBLBOV. 


points  the  two  rivers  approached  within  eleven 
miles  of  each  other.  The  lines  of  rifle-pits  at  each 
place  extended  back  from  the  water  at  least  twa 
miles,  so  that  the  garrisons  were  in  reality  only 
seven  miles  apart.    These  positions  were  of  im- 


COMMANDING  THE  DISTMCT  OF  CAIBO  233 

of.  With  Fort  Henry  in  our  hands  we  had  a  navi-  ghap.xxi 
gable  stream  open  to  us  up  to  Muscle  Shoals,  in 
Alabama.  The  Memphis  and  Charleston  railroad 
strikes  the  Tennessee  at  Eastport,  Mississippi,  and 
follows  close  to  the  banks  of  the  river  up  to  the 
Shoals.  This  road,  of  vast  importance  to  the  enemy, 
would  cease  to  be  of  use  to  them  for  through  traffic 
the  moment  Fort  Henry  became  ours.  Fort  Donel-  w.B.vii,4a6 
son  was  the  gate  to  Nashville — a  place  of  great 
military  and  political  importance — and  to  a  rich 
country  extending  far  east  in  Kentucky.  These 
two  points  in  our  possession,  the  enemy  would 
necessarily  be  thrown  back  to  the  Memphis  and 
Charleston  road,  or  to  the  boundary  of  the  cotton 
States,  and,  as  before  stated,  that  road  would  be 
lost  to  them  for  through  conmiunication. 

The    designation   of   my   command   had   been    md.5i« 
changed,  after  Halleck's  arrival,  from  the  District 
of  Southeast  Missouri  to  the  District  of  Cairo ;  and 
the  small  district  commanded  by  General  C.  F. 
Smith,  embracing  the  mouths  of  the  Tennessee 
and  Cumberland  rivers,  had  been  added  to  my  ju- 
risdiction.   Early  in  January,  1862, 1  was  directed  iwd.  m,M8; 
by  General  McClellan,  through  my  department 
commander,  to  make  a  reconnaissance  in  favor  of  w.p.'iw?hS; 
Brigadier-General   Don  Carlos   Buell,  who  com-  ^^it:  m^' 
manded  the  Department  of  the  Ohio,  with  head-  voiB?MayS7, 
quarters  at  Louisville,  and  who  was  confronting  ^ilJi?*^.?^'^ 
General  S.  B.  Buckner,  with  a  larger  Confederate  J"i»ei»i8«*' 
force,  at  Bowling  Green.    It  was  supposed  that  ®i5',w?^p^" 
Buell  was  about  to  make  some  move^  asrainst  the   BriK.-G€li, 


234  PERSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

CHAP.  XXI  Q-eneral  Smith  to  send  a  force  up  the  west  bank  of 
the  Tennessee  to  threaten  Forts  Heiman  and  Henry ; 

w.R.vii,«8  McClemand  at  the  same  time,  with  a  force  of  six 
thousand  men,  was  sent  out  into  west  Kentucky, 
threatening  Columbus  with  one  column  and  the  Ten- 
nessee River  with  another.  I  went  with  McCler- 
nand's  command.  The  weather  was  very  bad ;  snow 
and  rain  fell ;  the  roads,  never  good  in  that  section, 
were  intolerable.  We  were  out  more  than  a  week, 
splashing  through  the  mud,  snow,  and  rain,  the 
men  suffering  very  much.  The  object  of  the  ex- 
pedition was  accomplished.  The  enemy  did  not 
send  reinforcements  to  Bowling  Green,  and  General 

Jan.  19, 188Q  George  H.  Thomas  fought  and  won  the  battle  of 

w.R.vn^5-  Mill  Springs  before  we  returned. 

^\^"  ^^  ^  result  of  this  expedition  General  Smith  re- 
^  ported  that  he  thought  it  practicable  to  capture 
Fort  Heiman.  This  fort  stood  on  high  ground, 
completely  commanding  Fort  Henry,  on  the  op- 
posite side  of  the  river,  and  its  possession  by  us, 
with  the  aid  of  our  gunboats,  would  insure  the 
capture  of  Fort  Henry.  This  report  of  Smith's 
confirmed  views  I  had  previously  held,  that  the 
true  line  of  operations  for  us  was  up  the  Tennessee 
and  Cumberland  rivers.  With  us  there,  the  enemy 
would  be  compelled  to  fall  back  on  the  east  and 
west,  entirely  out  of  the  State  of  Kentucky.  On 
1882       the  6th  of  January,  before  receiving  orders  for  this 

w.R.vn,x»4  expedition,  I  had  asked  permission  of  the  general 
commanding  the  department  to  go  to  see  him  at 
St.  Louis.    My  object  was  to  lay  this  plan  of  cam- 


MOVEMENT  ON  FOET  HENEY  233 

portant  military  business.    The  leave  was  granted,  chap.xxi 

but  not  graciously.    I  had  known  General  Halleek 

but  very  slightly  in  the  old  army,  not  having  met 

him  either  at  West  Point  or  during  the  Mexican 

war.    I  was  received  with  so  little  cordiality  that  ^^^\^^- 

I  perhaps  stated  the  object  of  my  visit  with  less 

clearness  than  I  might  have  done,  and  I  had  not 

uttered  many  sentences  before  I  was  cut  short  as 

if  my  plan  were  preposterous.    I  returned  to  Cairo 

very  much  crestfallen. 

Flag-OflScer  Foote  commanded  the  little  fleet  of  F5^,u.a 
gunboats  then  in  the  neighborhood  of  Cairo,  and,    Ato/juiy 
though  in  another  branch  of  the  service,  was  sub-  Juneac/isis 
ject  to  the  command  of  General  Halleek.    He  and 
I  consulted  freely  upon  military  matters,  and  he 
agreed  with  me  perfectly  as  to  the  feasibility  of  the 
campaign  up  the  Tennessee.    Notwithstanding  the 
rebuff  I  had  received  from  my  immediate  chief,  I 
therefore,  on  the  28th  of  January,  renewed  the  sug-       isea 
gestion  by  telegraph  that,  "  if  permitted,^  I  could   ^ij^'J"' 
take  and  hold  Fort  Heniy  on  the  Tennessee.    This 
time  I  was  backed  by  Flag-Officer  Foote,  who  sent 
a  similar  despatch.    On  the  29th  I  wrote  fully  in 
support  of  the  proposition.    On  the  Ist  of  February 
I  received  full  instructions  from  department  head-  w.B.vn,m 
quarters  to  move  upon  Fort  Henry.    On  the  2d  the 
expedition  started. 

In  February,  1862,  there  were  quite  a  good  many 
steamers  laid  up  at  Caii'o  for  want  of  employment,  ^ 

the  Mississippi  River  being  closed  against  naviga^ 
tion  below  that  point.  There  were  also  many  metx 
in  the  town  whose  occupation  had  bef^n  foUowiujjc 


236  PEBSONAL  MEMOIBS  OF  U.  S.  GBANT 

CHAP.  XXI  boats  or  men  to  move  at  one  time  the  seventeen 
thousand  men  I  proposed  to  take  with  me  up  the 
Feb.  a,  1M2   Tennessee.    I  loaded  the  boats  with  more  than  half 
the  force,  however,  and  sent  General  McClemand  in 
command,    I  followed  with  one  of  the  later  boats, 
w.R.vn,ia6  and  found  McClemand  had  stopped,  very  properly, 
uSdlrtl,  ^^^^  miles  below  Fort  Henry.     Seven  gunboats 
^^        under  Flag-OflBlcer  Foote  had  accompanied  the  ad- 
vance.   The  transports  we  had  with  us  had  to  re- 
turn to  Paducah  to  bring  up  a  division  from  there, 
with  General  C.  F.  Smith  in  command. 

Before  sending  the  boats  back  I  wanted  to  get 
the  troops  as  near  to  the  enemy  as  I  could  without 
coming  within  range  of  their  guns.    There  was  a 
stream  emptying  into  the  Tennessee  on  the  east 
side,  apparently  at  about  long-range  distance  below 
the  fort.     On  account  of  the  narrow  watershed 
separating  the  Tennessee  and  Cumberland  rivers 
at  that  point,  the  stream  must  be  insignificant  at 
ordinary  stages ;  but  when  we  were  there,  in  Febru- 
ary, it  was  a  torrent.    It  would  facilitate  the  invest- 
ment of  Fort  Henry  materially  if  the  troops  could 
be  landed  south  of  that  stream.    To  test  whether 
this  could  be  done  I  boarded  the  gunboat  Essex 
pSt£*u  ^8   ^^^  requested  Captain  William  Porter,  commanding 
cwd^re,    it,  to  approach  the  fort  to  draw  its  fire.    After  we 
^d/jiay^'  had  gone  some  distance  past  the  mouth  of  the 
^^       stream  we  drew  the  fire  of  the  fort,  which  fell 
much  short  of  us.    In  consequence  I  had  made  up 
my  mind  to  return  and  bring  the  troops  to  the 
upper  side  of  the  creek,  when  the  enemy  opened 

RaMIaa  Ar.       iiT^i^n    11  a    fxri-fVi    o    -nifl^rl     min     fViof    a/^n-f.    oVirk-f    -Fav*    Via. 


THE  FOBT  AND  ITS   SITUATION  237 

ing,  struck  the  deck  near  the  stem,  penetrated  and  chap.xxi 
passed  through  the  cabin,  and  so  out  into  the  river. 
We  immediately  turned  back,  and  the  troops  were 
debarked  below  the  mouth  of  the  creek. 

When  the  landing  was  completed  I  returned  with 
the  transports  to  Paducah  to  hasten  up  the  balance 
of  the  troops.  I  got  back  on  the  5th  with  the  ad-  Feb.,i86a 
vance,  the  remainder  following  as  rapidly  as  the 
steamers  could  carry  them.  At  ten  o'clock  at  night 
on  the  5th  the  whole  command  was  not  yet  up. 
Being  anxious  to  commence  operations  as  soon  as 
possible  before  the  enemy  could  reinforce  heavily,  I 
issued  my  orders  for  an  advance  at  11  a.m.  on  the  ^j^^' 
6th.  I  felt  sure  that  all  the  troops  would  be  up  by 
that  time. 

Fort  Henry  occupies  a  bend  in  the  river,  which  ibid,  m-isa 
gave  the  guns  in  the  water-battery  a  direct  fire 
down  the  stream.    The  camp  outside  the  fort  was 
intrenched,  with  rifle-pits  and  outworks  two  miles 
back  on  the  road  to  Donelson  and  Dover.    The 
garrison  of  the  fort  and  camp  was  about  twenty- 
eight  hundred,  with  strong  reinforcements  from 
Donelson  halted  some  miles  out.    There  were  sev-   ^^^^^ 
enteen  heavy  guns  in  the  fort.    The  river  was  very        ^ 
high,  the  banks  being  overflowed  except  where  the 
bluffs  come  to  the  water's  edge.    A  portion  of  the 
ground  on  which  Fort  Henry  stood  was  two  feet  ^*§i9j^8ji^ 
deep  in  water.    Below,  the  water  extended  into  the 
woods  several  himdred  yards  back  from  the  bank 
on  the  east  side.    On  the  west  bank  Fort  Heiman 

fitonri  An  liic^li  orrAnnil  /♦nmrkla-faW  /»nTTnTir\QTi<1inflr  Ff\>%4- 


238 


PEBSOKAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GBANT 


cjHAP.xxi  it  was  natural  to  suppose  that  reinforcements 
would  come  from  every  quarter  from  which  they 
could  be  got.  Prompt  action  on  our  part  was  im- 
perative. 

The  plan  was  for  the  troops  and  gunboats  to 
start  at  the  same  moment.    The  troops  were  to 


ICAP  OF  FOBT  HENBT»  FEBRUABT  t,  180. 


invest  the  irarrison.  and  the  crunboats  to  attack 


CAPTUBE  OF  FOBT  HENBY  239 

At  the  hour  designated  the  troops  and  gunboats  chap,  xxi 
started.    General  Smith  found  Fort  Heiman  had  ^SdeSS,'!. 
been  evacuated  before  his  men  arrived.    The  gun-        ^ 
boats  soon  engaged  the  water-batteries  at  very  close  w.R.vn,i29 
quarters ;  but  the  troops  which  were  to  invest  Fort 
Henry  were  delayed  for  want  of  roads,  as  well  as 
by  the  dense  forest  and  the  high  water  in  what 
would  in  dry  weather  have  been  unimportant  beds 
of  streams.     This  delay  made  no  difference  in  the 
result.    On  our  first  appearance,  Tilghman  had  sent  n>id.  m,  140 
his  entire  command,  with  the  exception  of  about 
one  hundred  men  left  to  man  the  guns  in  the  fort, 
to  the  outworks  on  the  road  to  Dover  and  Donel- 
son,  so  as  to  have  them  out  of  range  of  the  guns  of 
our  navy ;  and  before  any  attack  on  the  6th  he  had 
ordered  them  to  retreat  on  Donelson.    He  stated 
in  his  subsequent  report  that  the  defense  was  in-  w.R.vn,i4o 
tended  solely  to  give  his  troops  time  to  make  their 
escape. 

Tilghman  was  captured,  with  his  staff  and  ninety  5J2S«,^ 
men,  as  well  as  the  armament  of  the  fort,  the  am-  ^'  ^^ 
munition,  and  whatever  stores  were  there.  Our 
cavalry  pursued  the  retreating  column  toward 
Donelson  and  picked  up  two  guns  and  a  few 
stragglers;  but  the  enemy  had  so  much  the  start 
that  the  pursuing  force  did  not  get  in  sight  of  any 
except  the  stragglers. 

All  the  gunboats  engaged  were  hit  many  times,  ^t^^^ 
The  damage,  however,  beyond  what  could  be  re-  ^^^•^**"^^ 
paired  by  a  small  expenditure  of  money,  was  sliglxt,, 
except  to  the  Essex.    A  shell  penetrated  the  boil^j 

of  fhfti.  -fTAflflAl  Q-n/1  /ivrfclrM^A/l  -i-f    IriUinor  A->^>^  TxrmiTldi'r^  -- 


240  PERSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

CHAP.  XXI  several  occasions  during  the  war  such  details  were 

made,  when  the  complement  of  men  with  the  navy 

u.s'.KiM?!  ^^^  insufficient  for  the  duty  before  them.    After 

j^/w™  MBi  the  fall  of  Fort  Henry,  Captain  Phelps,  command- 

<^J^,^  ing  a  naval  division,  at  my  request  ascended  the  Ten- 

^***^*^    nessee  Eiver  and  thoroughly  destroyed  the  bridge 

i»-iM     of  the  Memphis  and  Ohio  railroad. 


V 

L 


CHAPTER  XXII 

INVESTMENT  OF  FOKT  DONELSON — THE  NAVAL  OPERA- 
TIONS—  ATTACK  OF  THE  ENEMY — ASSAULTING 
THE  WORKS — SURRENDER  OF  THE  FORT 

I  INFORMED  the  department  commander  of  our  chap.xxh 
success  at  Fort  Henry,  and  that  on  the  8th  I  w.B.vii,m 
would  take  Fort  Donelson.  But  the  rain  continued 
to  fall  so  heavily  that  the  roads  became  impassable 
for  artillery  and  wagon  trains.  Then,  too,  it  would 
not  have  been  prudent  to  proceed  without  the  gun- 
boats. At  least  it  would  have  been  leaving  behind 
a  valuable  part  of  our  available  force. 

On  the  7th,  the  day  after  the  fall  of  Fort  Henry,    i^b.,  im 
I  took  my  staff  and  the  cavalry — a  part  of  one 
regiment — and  made  a  reconnaissance  to  within  w.R.vn;j696 
about  a  mile  of  the  outer  line  of  works  at  Donel- 
son.   I  had  known  General  Pillow  in  Mexico,  and 
judged  that  with  any  force,  no  matter  how  small,  I 
could  march  up  to  within  gunshot  of  any  intrench- 
ments  he  was  given  to  hold.    I  said  this  to  the 
officers  of  my  staff  at  the  time.    I  knew  that  Floyd   ^^ 
was  in  command;  but  he  was  no  soldier,  and  I  SSy'u^s. 
judged  that  he  would  yield  to  Pillow's  pretensions.  ^^'^    ^ 


. -X-.  J      «^^    ^« 


242 


PEBSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 


CHAP.xxn  marching;  one  leading  to  the  village  of  Dover,  the 
m  wi-Si,  other  to  Donelson. 

^ijmSn       Fort  Donelson  is  two  miles  north,  or  down  the 
river,  from  Dover.     The  fort,  as  it  stood  in  1861, 


MJLP  OF  FOBT  DONELSON,  AB  INVB8TBD  BT  OENBBAL  GBANT;  BA8BO  ON  THB 
OFFICIAL  MAP  BT  OBNBBAL  J.  B.  MOPHEBSON. 


^^^  \    embraced  about  one  hundred  acres  of  land.    On  the 

896  6t  Beq.    ^Q^g^  jj.  fronted  the  Cumberland ;  to  the  north  it  faced 

Hickman's  Creek,  a  small  stream  which  at  that  time 


INVESTMENT  OP  POBT  DONELSON  243 

or  rather  a  ravine,  opening  into  the  Cumberland;  chap.xxh 
this  also  was  filled  with  back-water  from  the  river. 
The  fort  stood  on  high  ground,  some  of  it  as  much 
as  a  hundred  feet  above  the  Cumberland,  Strong 
protection  to  the  heavy  guns  in  the  water-batteries 
had  been  obtained  by  cutting  away  places  for  them 
in  the  bluff.  To  the  west  there  was  a  line  of  rifle- 
pits  some  two  miles  back  from  the  river  at  the 
farthest  point.  This  line  ran  generally  along  the 
crest  of  high  ground,  but  in  one  place  crossed  a 
ravine  which  opens  into  the  river  between  the 
village  and  the  fort.  The  ground  inside  and  out-  w.K.vn,m 
side  of  this  intrenched  line  was  very  broken  and 
generally  wooded.  The  trees  outside  of  the  rifle- 
pits  had  been  cut  down  for  a  considerable  way  out, 
and  had  been  felled  so  that  their  tops  lay  outward 
from  the  intrenchments.  The  limbs  had  been 
trimmed  and  pointed,  and  thus  formed  an  abatis 
in  front  of  the  greater  part  of  the  line.  Outside  of 
this  intrenched  line,  and  extending  about  half  the 
entire  length  of  it,  is  a  ravine  running  north  and 
south  and  opening  into  Hickman's  Creek  at  a  point 
north  of  the  fort.  The  entire  side  of  this  ravine 
next  to  the  works  was  one  long  abatis. 
General  Halleck  commenced  his  efforts  in  all 

quarters  to  get  reinforcements  to  forward  to  me  navidHim. 

tw,  w.  p. 
immediately  on  my  departure  from  Cairo.    General  ^^^^  S^^ 

Hunter  sent  men  freely  from  Kansas,  and  a  large    oe^^i. 

division  under  General  Nelson,  from  BueU's  army^  "§^^1^^ 

was  also  despatched.    Odd's  went  out  trom  th^    ^^ate^Mm. 

War  Department  to  consolidate  fragments  of  com^   ^^^^ 

panics  that  were  being  recruited  in  tbe  Westerix    ^^^^f^^: 


244  PEBSONAL  MEMOIBS  OF  U.  8.  GKANT 

GHJLP.xxn  leek  did  not  approve  or  disapprove  of  my  going  to 
Fort  Donelson.    He  said  nothing  whatever  to  me 
F6b.,  1862    on  the  subject    He  informed  Buell  on  the  7th  that 
I  would  march  against  Fort  Donelson  the  next  day ; 
w.R.vii,«oo  but  on  the  10th  he  directed  me  to  fortify  Fort  Henry 
strongly,  particularly  to  the  land  side,  saying  that 
he  forwarded  me  intrenching-tools  for  that  purpose* 
I  received  this  despatch  in  front  of  Fort  Donelson. 
I  was  very  impatient  to  get  to  Fort  Donelson, 
because  I  knew  the  importance  of  the  place  to  the 
enemy  and  supposed  he  would  reinforce  it  rapidly. 
I  felt  that  fifteen  thousand  men  on  the  8th  would 
be  more  effective  than  fifty  thousand  a  month  later. 
I  asked  Flag-Officer  Foote,  therefore,  to  order  his 
gunboats  still  about  Cairo  to  proceed  up  the  Cum- 
berland Eiver  and  not  to  wait  for  those  gone  to 
Eastport  and  Florence ;  but  the  others  got  back  in 
time  and  we  started  on  the  12th.    I  had  moved 
iwd.  170    McClemand  out  a  few  miles  the  night  before,  so  as 
to  leave  the  road  as  free  as  possible. 

Just  as  we  were  about  to  start  the  first  reinforce- 
ment reached  me  on  transports.    It  was  a  brigade 
composed  of  six  full  regiments  commanded  by 
Thaw,a)i.  Colonel  Thayer,  of  Nebraska.    As  the  gunboats 
Brig^^G^    were  going  around  to  Donelson  by  the  Tennessee, 
TSw;^rt^  Ohio,  and  Cumberland  rivers,  I  directs  Thayer  to 
Map.  18, 1886  turn  about  and  go  under  their  convoy. 
w.K.vn.iw      I  started  from  Fort  Henry  with  fifteen  thousand 
men,  including  eight  batteries  and  part  of  a  regiment 
of  cavalry,  and,  meeting  with  no  obstruction  to  de- 
tain us.  the  advance  arrived  in  front  of  the  enemv  bv 


INVESTMENT  OP  POBT  DONELSON  245 

to  leave  a  portion  of  his  division  behind  to  guard  cjhap.xxh 
Forts  Heury  and  Heiman.    He  left  General  Lew.  vSuus^i, 
Wallace  with  twenty-flve  hundred  men.    With  the  'IJiSi^l*- 
remainder  of  his  division  he  occupied  our  left,  ex-   vSL  mm. 
tending  to  Hickman's  Creek.    McClemand  was  on 
the  right  and  covered  the  roads  running  south  and  w.R.vn,m 
southwest  from  Dover.    His  right  extended  to  the 
back-water  up  the  ravine  opening  into  the  Cumber- 
land  south  of  the  village.    The  troops  were  not  in- 
trenched, but  the  nature  of  the  ground  was  such 
that  they  were  just  as  well  protected  from  the  fire 
of  the  enemy  as  if  rifle-pits  had  been  thrown  up. 
Our  line  was  generally  along  the  crest  of  ridges. 
The  artillery  was  protected  by  being  sunk  in  the 
ground.    The  men  who  were  not  serving  the  guns 
were  perfectly  covered  from  fire  on  taking  position 
a  little  back  from  the  crest.    The  greatest  suffering  iSS^rS,^ 
was  from  want  of  shelter.    It  was  midwinter,  and     **^'*^* 
during  the  siege  we  had  rain  and  snow,  thawing  w.R.vn,m 
and  freezing,  alternately.    It  would  not  do  to  allow 
camp-fires,  except  far  down  the  hill  out  of  sight  of 
the  enemy,  and  it  would  not  do  to  allow  many  of 
the  troops  to  remain  there  at  the  same  time.    In 
the  march  over  from  Fort  Henry  numbers  of  the 
men  had  thrown  away  their  blankets  and  over- 
coats.   There  was  therefore  much  discomfort  and 
absolute  suffering. 

During  the  12th  and  13th,  and  until  the  arrival  oi    iPe\)Mi«ft 
Wallace  and  Thayer  on  the  14th,  the  National  iorces, 
composed  of  but  fifteen  thousand  ixxeUi  mtliou\. 


i—x T-- 


246  PERSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

CHAP,  xxn  each  day,  brought  on  by  the  movement  of  our  troops 
in  securing  commanding  positions ;  but  there  was 
no  actual  fighting  during  this  time  except  once,  on 
the  13th,  in  front  of  McClemand's  command.    That 
^«^A    general  had  undertaken  to  capture  a  battery  of  the 
ni'Yu'imi  ©nemy  which  was  annoying  his  men.    Without  or- 
"*        ders  or  authority  he  sent  three  regiments  to  make 
the  assault.    The  battery  was  in  the  main  line  of 
the  enemy,  which  was  defended  by  his  whole  army 
present.    Of  course  the  assault  was  a  failure,  and 
of  course  the  loss  on  our  side  was  great  for  the 
number  of  men  engaged.    In  this  assault  Colonel 
^Smte  m'  William  Morrison  fell  badly  wounded.    Up  to  this 
Brig.iiKDiv.  ^jjjjQ  ^Yie  surgeons  with  the  army  had  no  difficulty 
in  finding  room  in  the  houses  near  our  line  for  all 
the  sick  and  wounded ;  but  now  hospitals  were  over- 
crowded.   Owing,  however,  to  the  energy  and  skill 
of  the  surgeons  the  suffering  was  not  so  great  as  it 
might  have  been.    The  hospital  arrangements  at 
Fort  Donelson  were  as  complete  as  it  was  possible 
to  make  them,  considering  the  inclemency  of  the 
weather  and  the  lack  of  tents,  in  a  sparsely  settled 
country  where  the  houses  were  generally  of  but  one 
or  two  rooms. 
5SSS*       ^^  ^^^  return  of  Captain  Walke  to  Fort  Henry 
tfo  et  eeq.'   qjj  ^hc  10th,  I  had  requested  him  to  take  the  vessels 
that  had  accompanied  him  on  his  expedition  up  the 
Tennessee,  and  get  possession  of  the  Cumberland 
as  far  up  toward  Donelson  as  possible.    He  started 
without  delay,  taking,  however,  only  his  own  gun- 
^N^tb  i®'  ^^*>  ^^^  Carondelet,  towed  by  the  steamer  Alps. 
i^l.u,i8«;  Captain  Walke  arrived  a  few  miles  below  Donelson 


THE  NAVAJL  OPERATIONS.  247 

of  the  fort  on  the  land  side,  he  engaged  the  water-  osAP.xxn 
batteries  at  long  range.    On  the  13th  I  informed    ^^'iw^ 
him  of  my  arrival  the  day  before  and  of  the  establish- 
ment of  most  of  our  batteries,  requesting  him  at  the 
same  time  to  attack  again  that  day,  so  that  I  might 
take  advantage  of  any  diversion.    The  attack  was 
made  and  many  shots  fell  within  the  fort,  creating  w.b.vii,28o 
some  consternation,  as  we  now  know.    The  invest- 
ment of  the  land  side  was  made  as  complete  as  the 
number  of  troops  engaged  would  admit  of. 

During  the  night  of  the  13th  Flag-Officer  Foote  ^^^ 
arrived  with  the  ironclads  St  LouiSy  Louisville^  and       ^  '  ' 
Pittsburg^  and  the  wooden  gunboats  Tyler  and 
Conestoga^  convoying  Thayer's  brigade.    On  the 
morning  of  the  14th  Thayer  was  landed.    Wallace, 
whom  I  had  ordered  over  from  Fort  Henry,  also 
arrived  about  the  same  time.    Up  to  this  time  he 
had  been  commanding  a  brigade  belonging  to  the 
division  of  General  C.  F.  Smith.    These  troops  were 
now  restored  to  the  division  they  belonged  to,  and 
General  Lew.  Wallace  was  assigned  to  the  command    md.  409 
of  a  division  composed  of  the  brigade  of  Colonel  ^^Jfon*^ 
Thayer  and  other  reinforcements  that  arrived  the 
same  day.    This  new  division  was  assigned  to  the 
center,  giving  the  two  flanking  divisions  an  op- 
portunity to  close  up  and  form  a  stronger  line. 

The  plan  was  for  the  troops  to  hold  the  enemy 
within  his  lines,  while  the  gunboats  should  attack 
the  water-batteries  at  close  quarters  and  silence  hia 
guns  if  possible.    Some  of  the  gunboats  were  to  ruxx 


248  PEBSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

CHAF.xxn  That  position  attained  by  the  gunboats,  it  would 
have  been  but  a  question  of  time — and  a  very  short 
time,  too — when  the  garrison  would  have  been 
compelled  to  surrender. 
Feb..  186a  By  three  in  the  afternoon  of  the  14th  Flag-0fl5cer 
5Sde?S.*  Foote  was  ready,  and  advanced  upon  the  water- 
mTw['m  batteries  with  his  entire  fleet.  After  coming  in 
281,888401  j.Q^jjg^  ^f  ^jj^  batteries  of  the  enemy  the  advance 
was  slow,  but  a  constant  fire  was  delivered  from 
every  gun  that  could  be  brought  to  bear  upon  the 
fort.  I  occupied  a  position  on  shore  from  which  I 
could  see  the  advancing  navy.  The  leading  boat 
got  within  a  very  short  distance  of  the  water- 
batteries, — not  farther  off,  I  think,  than  two  hun- 
dred yards, — and  I  soon  saw  one  and  then  another 
of  them  dropping  down  the  river,  visibly  disabled. 
Then  the  whole  fleet  followed  and  the  engagement 
closed  for  the  day.  The  gunboat  which  Flag-OflScer 
Foote  was  on,  besides  having  been  hit  about  sixty 
times,  several  of  the  shots  passing  through  near 
the  water-line,  had  a  .shot  enter  the  pilot-house 
which  killed  the  pilot,  carried  away  the  wheel,  and 
wounded  the  flag-officer  himself.  The  tiller-ropes 
of  another  vessel  were  carried  away,  and  she,  too, 
dropped  helplessly  back.  Two  others  had  their 
pilot-houses  so  injured  that  they  scarcely  formed  a 
protection  to  the  men  at  the  wheeL 

The  enemy  had  evidently  been  much  demoralized 
by  the  assault,  but  they  were  jubilant  when  they 
saw  the  disabled  vessels  dropping  down  the  river 
entirely  out  of  the  control  of  the  men  on  board. 
Of  course  I  only  witnessed  the  falling  back  of  our 


SEVEEITT  OF  THE  WEATHEB  249 

that  the  enemy  telegraphed  a  great  victory  to  Rich-  chap.xxh 
mond.  The  sun  went  down  on  the  night  of  the 
14th  of  February,  1862,  leaving  the  army  confront- 
ing Fort  Donelson  anything  but  comforted  over  the 
prospects.  The  weather  had  turned  intensely  cold ; 
the  men  were  without  tents  and  could  not  keep  up 
fires  where  most  of  them  had  to  stay ;  and,  as  pre- 
viously stated,  many  had  thrown  away  their  over-  Ante,p,%i5 
coats  and  blankets.  Two  of  the  strongest  of  our 
gunboats  had  been  disabled,  presumably  beyond 
the  possibility  of  rendering  any  present  assistance. 
I  retired  this  night  not  knowing  but  that  I  would 
have  to  intrench  my  position,  and  bring  up  tents 
for  the  men  or  build  huts  under  the  cover  of  the 
hiUs, 

On  the  morning  of  the  ISth,  before  it  was  yet  Peb.,i«2 
broad  day,  a  messenger  from  Flag-OflScer  Foote 
handed  me  a  note,  expressing  a  desire  to  see  me  on 
the  flag-ship,  and  saying  that  he  had  been  injured 
the  day  before  so  much  that  he  could  not  come 
himself  to  me,  I  at  once  made  my  preparations  for 
starting,  I  directed  my  adjutant-general  to  notify 
each  of  the  division  commanders  of  my  absence 
and  instruct  them  to  do  nothing  to  bring  on  an  en- 
gagement until  they  received  further  orders,  but  to 
hold  their  positions.  From  the  heavy  rains  that 
had  fallen  for  days  and  weeks  preceding,  and  from 
the  constant  use  of  the  roads  between  the  troops 
and  the  landing  four  to  seven  miles  below,  these 
roads  had  become  cut  up  so  as  to  be  hardly  passable. 


250 


PEBSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  8.  GRANT 


Visit  to 
Foote 


CHAP.xxn  When  I  reached  the  fleet  I  found  the  flag-ship 
was  anchored  out  in  the  stream.  A  small  boat, 
however,  awaited  my  arrival,  and  I  was  soon  on 
board  with  the  flag-ofl5cer.  He  explained  to  me  in 
short  the  condition  in  which  he  was  left  by  the 
engagement  of  the  evening  before,  and  suggested 
that  I  should  intrench  while  he  returned  to  Mound 
City  with  his  disabled  boats,  expressing  at  the  time 
the  belief  that  he  could  have  the  necessary  repairs 
made  and  be  back  in  ten  days.  I  saw  the  absolute 
necessity  of  his  gunboats  going  into  hospital,  and 
did  not  know  but  I  should  be  forced  to  the  alterna- 
tive of  going  through  a  siege.  But  the  enemy  re- 
lieved me  from  this  necessity. 

When  I  left  the  National  line  to  visit  Flag-0fl5cer 
Foote  I  had  no  idea  that  there  would  be  any  en- 
gagement on  land  unless  I  brought  it  on  myself* 
The  conditions  for  battle  were  much  more  favora- 
ble to  us  than  they  had  been  for  the  first  two  days 
of  the  investment.  From  the  12th  to  the  14th  we 
had  but  fifteen  thousand  men  of  all  arms  and  no 
gunboats.  Now  we  had  been  reinforced  by  a  fieet 
of  six  naval  vessels,  a  large  division  of  troops  under 
General  L.  Wallace,  and  twenty-five  hundred  men 
brought  over  from  Fort  Henry  belonging  to  the 
division  of  C.  F.  Smith.  The  enemy,  however,  had 
taken  the  initiative.  Just  as  I  landed  I  met  Cap- 
tain Hillyer  of  my  staff,  white  with  fear,  not  for  his 
personal  safety,  but  for  the  safety  of  the  National 
^w^-ma  troops.  He  said  the  enemy  had  come  out  of  his 
w^rv^itS  1^^^®  ^  f^  force  and  attacked  and  scattered  Mc- 
®*"^*     Clemand^s  division,  which  was  in  full  retreat.    The 


Feb.,  188a 


ATTACK  OF  THE  ENEMY.  251 

The  attack  had  been  made  on  the  National  right.    I  chap.xxh 

was  some  four  or  five  miles  north  of  our  left.    The 

line  was  about  three  miles  long.    In  reaching  the 

point  where  the  disaster  had  occurred  I  had  to  pass 

the  divisions  of  Smith  and  Wallace.    I  saw  no  sign 

of  excitement  on  the  portion  of  the  line  held  by 

Smith ;  Wallace  was  nearer  the  scene  of  conflict  and 

had  taken  part  in  it.    He  had,  at  an  opportune 

time,  sent  Thayer's  brigade  to  the   support  of  w.Rvii,a87 

McClemand  and  thereby  contributed  to  hold  the 

enemy  within  his  lines. 

I  saw  everything  favorable  for  us  along  the  line 
of  our  left  and  center.  When  I  came  to  the  right 
appearances  were  different.  The  enemy  had  come 
out  in  full  force  to  cut  his  way  out  and  make  his 
escape.  McClemand's  division  had  to  bear  the 
brunt  of  the  attack  from  this  combined  force.  His 
men  had  stood  up  gallantly  until  the  ammuni- 
tion in  their  cartridge-boxes  gave  out.  TherQ  was 
abundance  of  ammunition  near  by,  lying  on  the 
ground  in  boxes,  but  at  that  stage  of  the  war  it  was 
not  all  of  our  commanders  of  regiments,  brigades, 
or  even  divisions,  who  had  been  educated  up  to  the 
point  of  seeing  that  their  men  were  constantly 
supplied  with  ammunition  during  an  engagement 
When  the  men  found  themselves  without  ammuni- 
tion they  could  not  stand  up  against  troops  who 
seemed  to  have  plenty  of  it.  The  division  broke 
and  a  portion  fled ;  but  most  of  the  men,  as  they 
were  not  pursued,  only  fell  back  out  of  range  of  the 
fire  of  the  enemy.     It  must  have  been  about  tlus 


252  PERSONAL  HEMOntS  OF  U.  8.  GRANT 

CHAP.xxn  back  within  his  intrenchments  and  was  there  when 
I  got  on  the  field. 

I  saw  the  men  standing  in  knots  talking  in  the 
most  excited  manner.  No  officer  seemed  to  be  giv- 
ing any  directions.  The  soldiers  had  their  muskets, 
but  no  ammunition,  while  there  were  tons  of  it  close 
at  hand.  I  heard  some  of  the  men  say  that  the 
enemy  had  come  out  with  knapsacks  and  haver- 
sacks filled  with  rations.  They  seemed  to  think 
this  indicated  a  determination  on  his  part  to  stay 
out  and  fight  just  as  long  as  the  provisions  held 

8tS^%&.-  ^^t*    I  turned  to  Colonel  J.  D.Webster,  of  my  staflE, 

Nov^'aJ^iMa  who  was  with  me,  and  said :  "  Some  of  our  men  are 
pretty  badly  demoralized ;  but  the  enemy  must  be 
more  so,  for  he  has  attempted  to  force  his  way  out, 
but  has  fallen  back ;  the  one  who  attacks  first  now 
will  be  victorious,  and  the  enemy  will  have  to  be  in 

^ra^af  ^  hurry  if  he  gets  ahead  of  me.^  I  determined  to 
***^  make  the  assault  at  once  on  our  left.  It  was  clear 
to  my  mind  that  the  enemy  had  started  to  march 
out  with  his  entire  force,  except  a  few  pickets ;  and 
if  our  attack  could  be  made  on  the  left  before  the 
enemy  could  redistribute  his  forces  along  the  line, 
we  would  find  but  little  opposition,  except  from  the 
intervening  abatis.    I  directed  Colonel  Webster  to 

^t^§f^^  ride  with  me  and  call  out  to  the  men  as  we  passed, 
"  Fill  your  cartridge-boxes  quick,  and  get  into  line ; 
the  enemy  is  trying  to  escape,  and  he  must  not  be 
permitted  to  do  so.''  This  acted  like  a  charm.  The 
men  only  wanted  some  one  to  give  them  a  com- 
mand.   We  rode  rapidly  to  Smith's  quarters,  when 


ASSAULTING  THE  WOEKS  253 

would  find  nothing  but  a  very  thin  line  to  contend  CHAP.xxn 
with.    The  general  was  off  in  an  incredibly  short  ^^^X 
time,  going  in  advance  himself  to  keep  his  men  from  ySTm',  So 
firing  while  they  were  working  their  way  through 
the  abatis  intervening  between  them  and  the  enemy. 
The  outer  line  of  rifle-pits  was  passed,  and  the  night 
of  the  15th  General  Smith,  with  much  of  his  divi-    Feb.,iM2 
sion,  bivouacked  within  the  lines  of  the  enemy. 
There  was  now  no  doubt  but  that  the  Confederates 
must  surrender  or  be  captured  the  next  day. 

There  seems,  from  subsequent  accounts,  to  have 
been  much  consternation,  particularly  among  the   5S^* 
oflicers  of  high  rank,  in  Dover  during  the  night  of  *^^'  *^  *^' 
the  15th.    General  Floyd,  the  commanding  officer, 
who  was  a  man  of  talent  enough  for  any  civil  posi- 
tion, was  no  soldier,  and  possibly  did  not  possess 
the  elements  of  one.    He  was  further  unfitted  for 
command  for  the  reason  that  his  conscience  must 
have  troubled  him  and  made  him  afraid.    As  Sec-  ^nu,  p.  m 
retary  of  War  he  had  taken  a  solemn  oath  to  main- 
tain the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  and  to 
uphold  the  same  against  all  its  enemies.    He  had 
betrayed  that  trust.    As  Secretary  of  War  he  was 
reported  through  the  Northern  press  to  have  scat- 
tered the  little  army  the  country  had  so  that  the 
most  of  it  could  be  picked  up  in  detail  when  seces- 
sion occurred.    About  a  year  before  leaving  the 
Cabinet  he  had  removed  arms  from  Northern  to 
Southern  arsenals.    He  continued  in  the  Cabinet  of 
President  Buchanan  until  about  the  1st  of  January, 


254  PERSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

CHAP.xxn  have  been  tried  for  misappropriating  public  prop- 
erty, if  not  for  treason,  had  he  been  captured. 
eSr^nS;  General  Pillow,  next  in  command,  was  conceited, 
^n.aa^  aiid  prided  himself  much  on  his  services  in  the 
^Vp.  wii.'  Mexican  war.    He  telegraphed  to  General  Johnston, 
^rn^ki     at  Nashville,  after  our  men  were  within  the  rebel 
rifle-pits,  and  almost  on  the  eve  of  his  making  his 
escape,  that  the  Southern  troops  had  had  great 
success  all  day.     Johnston   forwarded  the  des- 
patch to  Richmond.    While  the  authorities  at  the 
capital  were  reading  it,  Floyd  and  Pillow  were 
fugitives. 
M9, 070^       A  council  of  war  was  held  by  the  enemy,  at  which 
^1^;^  all  agreed  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  hold  out 
2»ia2e  A    longer.    General  Buckner,  who  was  third  in  rank  in 
426^36     the  garrison,  but  much  the  most  capable  soldier, 
seems  to  have  regarded  it  a  duty  to  hold  the  fort 
until   the  general  commanding  the  department, 
A.  S.  Johnston,  should  get  back  to  his  headquarters 
^82?^»?^   at  Nashville.    Buckner's  report  shows,  however, 
that  he  considered  Donelson  lost,  and  that  any  at- 
tempt to  hold  the  place  longer  would  be  at  the 
sacrifice  of  the  command.     Being  assured  that 
Johnston  was  already  in  Nashville,  Buckner  too 
agreed  that  surrender  was  the  proper  thing.    Floyd 
turned  over  the  command  to  Pillow,  who  declined 
it.    It  then  devolved  upon  Buckner,  who  accepted 
Ibid.  274,    the  responsibility  of  the  position.    Floyd  and  Pillow 
^^»f'  took  possession  of  all  the  river  transports  at  Dover, 


SUBBENDEB  OF  THE  FOET  255 

During  the  night  Forrest  also,  with  his  cavahy  and  OHAP.xxn 
some  other  troops, — about  a  thousand  in  all, — made  f^^S^uI- 
their  way  out,  passing  between  our  right  and  the  c^s!  A?cSt., 
river.  They  had  to  ford  or  swim  over  the  back-  o^.'j^lfi, 
water  in  the  little  creek  just  south  of  Dover.  Gjm.'Deo.*4, 

Before  daylight  General  Smith  brought  to  me  the  SS?;  d?  oS: 
following  letter  from  General  Buckner:  ^'^^ 

Headquarters,  Port  Donelson, 
February  16, 1862. 

Sir  :  In  consideration  of  all  the  circumstances  govern- 
ing the  present  situation  of  affairs  at  this  station,  I  pro- 
pose to  the  commanding  of&cer  of  the  Federal  forces  the 
appointment  of  commissioners  to  agree  upon  terms  of  cap- 
itulation of  the  forces  and  fort  under  my  command,  and  in 
that  view  suggest  an  armistice  until  twelve  o'clock  to-day 
I  am,  sir,  very  respectfully. 
Your  obedient  servant, 
S.  B.  Buckner, 

Brig.'Gen.  C.  8.  A. 

To  Bbig.-Gen.  U.  S.  Grant, 
Com'ding  U.  S.  Forces, 

Near  Fort  Donelson. 

To  this  I  responded  as  follows : 

Headquarters,  Army  m  the  Field, 
Camp  near  Donelson, 
February  16, 1862. 
Gen.  S.  B.  Buckner, 
Confederate  Army. 
Sra:  Tours  of  this  date,  proposing  annistice  and  ap- 
pointment of  commissioners  to  settle  terms  of  capituki- 
tion,  is  just  received.    No  terms  except  an  unconditional 
and  immediate  smrender  can  be  accepted.    I  propose  to 


256  PERSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GBANT 

CHAF.xxn      To  this  I  received  the  following  reply: 

Headquarters,  Dover,  Tennessee, 
February  16, 1862. 
To  Brig.-Gen.  U.  S.  Grant, 
U.  S.  Army. 
Sir  :  The  distribution  of  the  forces  under  my  command, 
incident  to  an  unexpected  change  of  commanders,  and  the 
overwhehning  force  under  your  command,  comi)el  me, 
notwithstanding  the  brilliant  success  of  the  Confederate 
arms  yesterday,  to  accept  the  ungenerous  and  unchival- 
rous  terms  which  you  propose. 
I  am,  sir. 

Your  very  obedient  servant, 

S.  B.  BUCKNER, 

Brig.'Oen.  C.  8.  A. 

oSS^on-  Q-eneral  Buckner,  as  soon  as  he  had  despatched 
®^^  the  first  of  the  above  letters,  sent  word  to  his  difl!er- 
ent  commanders  on  the  line  of  rifle-pits,  notifying 
them  that  he  had  made  a  proposition  looking  to  the 
surrender  of  the  garrison,  and  directing  them  to 
notify  National  troops  in  their  front,  so  that  all 
fighting  might  be  prevented.  White  flags  were 
stuck  at  intervals  along  the  line  of  rifle-pits,  but 
none  over  the  fort.  As  soon  as  the  last  letter  from 
Buckner  was  received  I  mounted  my  horse  and  rode 

Battles*    to  Dovcr.    General  Wallace,  I  found,  had  preceded 

*^^^  me  an  hour  or  more.  I  presume  that,  seemg  white 
flags  exposed  in  his  front,  he  rode  up  to  see  what 
they  meant ;  and  not  being  flred  upon  or  halted,  he 
kept  on  until  he  found  himself  at  the  headquarters 
of  General  Buckner. 

Gen.  Buck-        T  Tifl/l  hAAu  At  Wfiftt  Point  thrftft  vears  with  Buck- 


SUSBENDEB  OF  THE  FORT  257 

of  our  conversation,  which  was  very  friendly,  he  chaf.xxh 
said  to  me  that  if  he  had  been  in  command  I  would 
not  have  got  up  to  Donelson  as  easily  as  I  did.  I 
told  him  that  if  he  had  been  in  command  I  should 
not  have  tried  in  the  way  I  did.  I  had  invested 
their  lines  with  a  smaller  force  than  they  had  to  de- 
fend them,  and  at  the  same  time  had  sent  a  brigade 
full  five  thousand  strong  around  by  water;  I  had 
relied  very  much  upon  their  commander  to  allow 
me  to  come  safely  up  to  the  outside  of  their  works. 
I  asked  General  Buckner  about  what  force  he  had 
to  surrender.  He  replied  that  he  could  not  tell  with 
any  degree  of  accuracy ;  that  all  the  sick  and  weak 
had  been  sent  to  Nashville  while  we  were  about 
Fort  Henry ;  that  Floyd  and  Pillow  had  left  during 
the  night,  taking  many  men  with  them ;  and  that 
Forrest,  and  probably  others,  had  also  escaped  dur- 
ing the  preceding  night ;  the  number  of  casualties 
he  could  not  tell;  but  he  said  I  would  not  find 
fewer  than  twelve  thousand  nor  more  than  fifteen 
thousand. 

He  asked  permission  to  send  parties  outside  of  ^'^'JJSI^® 
the  lines  to  bury  his  dead,  who  had  fallen  on  the 
15th  when  they  tried  to  get  out.    I  gave  directions 
that  his  permit  to  pass  our  limits  should  be  recog- 
nized.   I  have  no  reason  to  believe  that  this  privi-    oSSeSw^ 
lege  was  abused;  but  it  familiarized  our  guards  so       **^ 
much  with  the  sight  of  Confederates  passing  to 
and  fro  that  I  have  no  doubt  many  got  beyond  our 
pickets  unobserved  and  went  on.    The  most  of  tlxe 
men  who  went  in  that  wav  no  doubt  thon<A^+ 


258  PERSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GBANT 

CHAP.xxn  ing  that  they  were  tired  of  the  war  and  would 
not  be  caught  in  the  ranks  again;  and  I  bade 
them  go. 

^Do^Bon*  ^^^  actual  number  of  Confederates  at  Fort  Donel- 
son  can  never  be  given  with  entire  accuracy.  The 
largest  number  admitted  by  any  writer  on  the 

j^nlrtot;?;  Southern  side  is  by  Colonel  Preston  Johnston. 
^       He  gives  the  number  at  seventeen  thousand.    But 
this  must  be  an  underestimate.    The  commissary- 
general  of  prisoners  reported  having  issued  rations 
to  14,623 'Fort  Donelson  prisoners  at  Cairo  as  they 

w.B.vn,»i  passed  that  point.  General  Pillow  reported  the 
killed  and  wounded  at  two  thousand;  but  he  had 
less  opportunity  of  knowing  the  actual  nimibers 
than  the  officers  of  McClemand's  division,  for  most 
of  the  killed  and  wounded  fell  outside  their  works, 
in  front  of  that  division,  and  were  buried  or  cared 
for  by  Buckner  after  the  surrender  and  when  Pillow 
was  a  fugitive.  It  is  known  that  Floyd  and  Pillow 
escaped  during  the  night  of  the  15th,  taking  with 
them  not  less  than  three  thousand  men.  Forrest 
escaped  with  about  one  thousand,  and  others  were 
leaving  singly  and  in  squads  all  night.  It  is  proba- 
ble that  the  Confederate  force  at  Donelson  on  the 
15th  of  February,  1862,  was  twenty-one  thousand 
in  round  nimibers. 

On  the  day  Fort  Donelson  fell  I  had  twenty- 
seven  thousand  men  to  confront  the  Confeder- 
ate lines  and  guard  the  road  four  or  five  miles 
to  the  left,  over  which  all  our  suddUcs  had  to 


QENEBAL  SHEBHAK  259 

to  Smithland,  at  the  mouth  of  the  Cnmberland  chap.xxh 
Eiver,  to  forward  reinforcements  and  supplies  to  mknl'wlpi 
me.  At  that  time  he  was  my  senior  in  rank,  and  £^.G£m. 
there  was  no  authority  of  law  to  assign  a  junior  to  ^Sn  ;^LV-' 
command  a  senior  of  the  same  grade.  But  every  ig^  i,  isw; 
boat  that  came  up  with  supplies  or  reinforcements  ?i^4  m2^ 
brought  a  note  of  encouragement  from  Sherman,  ^^4^^^ 
asking  me  to  call  upon  him  for  any  assistance  he  ^S6f'§en^ 
could  render,  and  saying  that  if  he  could  be  of  ser-  ^i4?i!!' 
vice  at  the  front  I  might  send  for  him  and  he  would 
waive  rank.  • 


ch.  xxm 


CHAPTER  xxm 

PBOMOTED  MAJOB-GENERAL  OF  VOLUNTEERS — UNOC- 
CUPIED TERRITORY — ADVANCE  UPON  NASHVILLE 
— SITUATION  OF  THE  TROOPS — CONFEDERATE  RE- 
TREAT— RELIEVED  OF  THE  COMMAND — RESTORED 
TO  THE  COMMAND — GENERAL  SMITH 

THE  news  of  the  fall  of  Fort  Donelson  caused 
Hay.uteof  great  delight  all  over  the  North.    At  the 

unc^v,  gouth,  particularly  in  Eichmond,  the  eflEect  was 
jgj^j^.   correspondingly  depressing.    I  was  promptly  pro- 
^MBPeb.  i^ot^d  to  the  grade  of  major-general  of  volunteers, 
16,1882     ^j^^  confirmed  by  the  Senate.    All  three  of  my 
hmSu^op.  division  commanders  were  promoted  to  the  same 
wau'ac©^  grade,  and  the  colonels  who  commanded  brigades 
were  made  brigadier-generals  in  the  volunteer  ser- 
Haueok     vicc.    My  chicf,  who  was  in  St.  Louis,  telegraphed 
w.R.vn,636  his  congratulations  to  General  Hunter,  in  Kansas, 
for  the  services  he  had  rendered  in  securing  the 
fall  of  Fort  Donelson  by  sending  reinforcements  so 
Ibid.  687    rapidly.    To  Washington  he  telegraphed  that  the 
victory  was  due  to  General  C.  F.  Smith.    "  Promote 
him,''  he  said, "  and  the  whole  country  will  applaud." 


UNCXJCUPIED  TEBKITOBY  261 

received  no  other  recognition  whatever  from  Gen-  oh.  xxm 
eral  Halleck.    But  General  Cnllmn,  his  chief  of 
staflE,  who  was  at  Cairo,  wrote  me  a  warm  con- 
gratulatory letter  on  his  own  behalf.    I  approved  w.B.vn,«48 
of  General  Smith's  promotion  highly,  as  I  did  all  the 
promotions  that  were  made. 

My  opinion  was,  and  still  is,  that  immediately  S^SUSS? 
after  the  fall  of  Fort  Donelson  tiie  way  was  opened  ^^^ 
to  the  National  forces  all  over  the  Southwest  with- 
out much  resistance.  If  one  general  who  would 
have  taken  the  responsibility  had  been  in  command 
of  all  the  troops  west  of  the  Alleghanies,  he  could 
have  marched  to  Chattanooga,  Corinth,  Memphis, 
and  Vicksburg  with  the  troops  we  then  had ;  and  as 
volunteering  was  going  on  rapidly  over  the  North 
there  would  soon  have  been  force  enough  at  all 
these  centers  to  operate  offensively  against  any 
body  of  the  enemy  that  might  be  found  near  them. 
Bapid  movements  and  the  acquisition  of  rebellious 
territory  would  have  promoted  volunteering,  so 
that  reinforcements  could  have  been  had  as  fast  as 
transportation  could  have  been  obtained  to  carry 
them  to  their  destination.  On  the  other  hand, 
there  were  tens  of  thousands  of  strong,  able-bodied 
young  men  still  at  their  homes  in  the  Southwestern 
States,  who  had  not  gone  into  the  Confederate  army 
in  February,  1862,  and  who  had  no  particular  desire 
to  go.  If  our  lines  had  been  extended  to  protect 
their  homes,  many  of  them  never  would  have  gone. 
Providence  ruled  differently.  Time  was  given  the 
enemy  to  collect  armies  and  fortify  his  new  posi- 
tions; and  twice  afterward  he  came  near  forcing 


262  PEBSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

Oh.  xxm  of  our  success  at  Fort  Donelson,  and  that  the  way- 
was  open  now  to  Clarksville  and  Nashville;  and 
that  unless  I  received  orders  to  the  contrary  I 

peb..i8»  should  take  Clarksville  on  the  21st  and  Nashville 
about  the  1st  of  March.  Both  these  places  are  on 
the  Cumberland  Eiver  above  Fort  Donelson.  As 
I  heard  nothing  from  headquarters  on  the  subject, 

w.R.vn,438  General  C.  F.  Smith  was  sent  to  Clarksville  at  the 
time  designated,  and  found  the  place  evacuated. 
The  capture  of  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson  had 
broken  the  line  the  enemy  had  taken  from  Colum- 
bus to  Bowling  Green,  and  it  was  known  that  he 
was  falling  back  from  the  eastern  point  of  this  line, 
and  that  Buell  was  following,  or  at  least  advancing. 
I  should  have  sent  troops  to  Nashville  at  the  time 
I  sent  to  Clarksville,  but  my  transportation  was 
limited  and  there  were  many  prisoners  to  be  for- 
warded north. 

None  of  the  reinforcements  from  Buell's  army 
arrived  until  the  24th  of  February.    Then  General 

n>id.66i,«w  Nelson  came  up,  with  orders  to  report  to  me  with 
two  brigades,  he  having  sent  one  brigade  to  Cairo. 
I  knew  General  Buell  was  advancing  on  Nashville 
from  the  north,  and  I  was  advised  by  scouts  that 
the  rebels  were  leaving  that  place  and  trying  to  get 
out  all  the  supplies  they  could.    Nashville  was  at 

ihiA.4M,4M,  that  time  one  of  the  best-provisioned  posts  in  the 
South.  I  had  no  use  for  reinforcements  now,  and 
thinking  Buell  would  like  to  have  his  troops  again, 
n)id.  602  I  ordered  Nelson  to  proceed  to  Nashville  without 
debarking  at  Fort  Donelson.  I  sent  a  gunboat  also 
as  a  ftonvov.    Thfi  Cnmberland  River  was  verv  hisrh 


ADVANCE  UPON  NASHVILLE  263 

or  would  be  before  the  enemy  left.    Nashville  is  on   ch.  xxra 
the  west  bank  of  the  Cumberland,  and  Buell  was 
approaching  from  the  east.    I  thought  the  steamers 
cariying  Nelson^s  division  would  be  useful  in  ferry- 
ing the  balance  of  Buell^s  forces  across.    I  ordered  w.B.vn,668 
Nelson  to  put  himself  in  communication  with  Buell 
as  soon  as  possible,  and  if  he  found  him  more  than 
two  days  off  from  Nashville  to  return  below  the  city 
and  await  orders.    Buell,  however,  had  already  ar- 
rived in  person  at  Edgefield,  opposite  Nashville,  and    n)id.  43s 
Mitchel's  division  of  his  command  reached  there  the  S^w^pflsSl 
same  day.    Nelson  immediately  took  possession  of  aS!  j^\ 

A"!  'J,  1829;  Bng,' 

the  City.  Gen.  Voft. 

After  Nelson  had  gone,  and  before  I  had  learned    M|j.-GeiL' 
of  Buell's  arrival,  I  sent  word  to  department  head-  ^^  f^^ 
quarters  that  I  should  go  to  Nashville  myself  on 
the  28th  if  I  received  no  orders  to  the  contrary.  w.b.vii,666 
Hearing  nothing,  I  went,  as  I  had  informed  my 
superior  officer  I  would  do.    On  arriving  at  Clarks- 
ville  I  saw  a  fleet  of  steamers  at  the  shore — the 
same  that  had  taken  Nelson's  division — and  troops 
going  aboard.    I  landed  and  called  on  the  command- 
ing officer.  General  C.  F.  Smith.    As  soon  as  he  saw 
me  he  showed  an  order  he  had  just  received  from  w.b.vii,w4 
Buell  in  these  words : 

NASHVUiLB,  February  25, 1862. 
General  C.  F.  Smfth, 

Commanding  U.  S.  Forces,  Clarksville. 
General  :  The  landing  of  a  portion  of  our  troops,  con- 
trary to  my  intentions,  on  the  south  side  of  tiie  river,  has 
compelled  me  to  hold  this  side  at  every  hazard.    If  the 
enemy  should  assume  the  offensive, — and  I  am  assured  by 


264  PEBSONAL  MEMOntS  OF  U.  8.  GRANT 

ch.  xxm  sisting  of  only  fifteen  thousand  men.  I  have  to  request 
you,  therefore,  to  come  forward  with  all  the  available  force 
under  your  command.  So  important  do  I  consider  the 
occasion  that  I  think  it  necessary  to  give  this  communica- 
tion all  the  force  of  orders,  and  I  send  four  boats,  the 
Diana,  Woodford,  John  Bain,  and  Autocrat,  to  bring  you 
up.  In  five  or  six  days  my  force  will  probably  be  suffi- 
cient to  relieve  you. 

Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

D.  C.  BUELL, 

Brigadier-Oenerai  Comd^g. 
P.S. — The  steamers  will  leave  here  at  twelve  o'clock 
to-night. 

General  Smith  said  this  order  was  nonsense. 
But  I  told  him  it  was  better  to  obey  it.  The  gen- 
eral replied,  "  Of  course  I  must  obey,"  and  said  his 
men  were  embarking  as  fast  as  they  could.  I  went 
on  up  to  Nashville  and  inspected  the  position  taken 
by  Nelson's  troops.  I  did  not  see  Buell  during  the 
w.B.vii,67o  day,  and  wrote  him  a  note  saying  that  I  had  been 
in  Nashville  since  early  morning  and  had  hoped  to 
meet  him.  On  my  return  to  the  boat  we  met.  His 
troops  were  still  east  of  the  river,  and  the  steamers 
that  had  carried  Nelson's  division  up  were  mostly 
at  Clarksville  to  bring  Smith's  division.  I  said  to 
General  Buell  my  information  was  that  the  enemy 
was  retreating  as  fast  as  possible.  General  Buell 
said  there  was  fighting  going  on  then  only  ten  or 
twelve  miles  away.  I  said, "  Quite  probably ;  Nash- 
ville contained  valuable  stores  of  arms,  ammunition. 


SITUATION  OF  THE  TEOOPS  265 

an  attack  from  the  enemy.  I  said,  in  the  absence  ch.  xxm 
of  positive  information,  I  believed  my  informa- 
tion was  correct.  He  responded  that  he  "knew." 
"  Well,''  I  said,  "  I  do  not  know ;  but  as  I  came  by 
ClarksviUe  General  Smith's  troops  were  embarking 
to  join  yon.'' 

Smith's  troops  were  returned  the  same  day.  The 
enemy  was  trying  to  get  away  from  Nashville  and 
not  to  return  to  it. 

At  this  time  General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  ^%^}f^ 
commanded  all  the  Confederate  troops  west  of  the  ^iri^-GSL*' 
Alleghany  Mountains,  with  the  exception  of  those  Seu&^s! 
in  the  extreme  South.    On  the  National  side  the  May^iwil 
forces  confronting  him  were  divided  into  at  first  Apr.Msai 
three,  then  four  separate  departments.    Johnston 
had  greatly  the  advantage  in  having  supreme  com- 
mand over  all  troops  that  could  possibly  be  brought 
to  bear  upon  one  point,  while  the  forces  similarly 
situated  on  the  National  side,  divided  into  indepen- 
dent commands,  could  not  be  brought  into  harmo- 
nious action  except  by  orders  from  Washington. 

At  the  beginning  of  1862  Johnston's  troops  east 
of  the  Mississippi  occupied  a  line  extending  from 
Columbus,  on  his  left,  to  Mill  Springs,  on  his  right. 
As  we  have  seen,  Columbus,  both  banks  of  the  Ten-  Ante,  p.  232 
nessee  Eiver,  the  west  bank  of  the  Cumberland,  and 
Bowling  Green,  all  were  strongly  fortified.  Mill 
Springs  was  intrenched.  The  National  troops  oc-  w.b.vii,»45 
cupied  no  territory  south  of  the  Ohio,  except  three 
small  garrisons  along  its  bank  and  a  force  thrown 
out  from  Louisville  to  confront  that  at  Bowling 
Green.    Johnston's  strength  was  no  doubt  numeri- 


266  PEBSONAL  MEMOIBS  OF  U.  S.  GBAKT 

CH-xxra  sole  commander  x)f  all  the  Confederate  forces  at 
the  West,  and  of  operating  in  a  country  where  his 
friends  would  take  care  of  his  rear  without  any 
detail  of  soldiers.     But  when  General  Q-eorge  H. 
^^w?p?'  Thomas  moved  upon  the  enemy  at  Mill  Springs  and 
^L^'oiv^  totally  routed  him,  inflicting  a  loss  of  some  thi-ee 
BriSy^i.    hundred  killed  and  wounded,  and  Forts  Henry  and 
1861*;  M^.-'  Heiman  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  National  forces, 
gS'uSII.  ^^^  *^^^^  armaments  and  about  one  hundred  pns- 
^ito.^asj'  oners,  those  losses  seemed  to  dishearten  the  Con- 
^^^       federate  commander  so  much  that  he  immediately 
w.B.vn,4i8  commenced  a  retreat  from  Bowling  Q-reen  on  Nash- 
ville.   He  reached  this  latter  place  on  the  14th  of 
February,  while  Donelson  was  still  besieged.    Buell 
followed  with  a  portion  of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio ; 
but  he  had  to  march  and  did  not  reach  the  east 
bank  of  the  Cumberland,  opposite  Nashville,  until 
n)id.425     the  24th  of  the  month,  and  then  with  only  one 

division  of  his  army. 
Ibid,  m  The  bridge  at  Nashville  had  been  destroyed  and 
all  boats  removed  or  disabled,  so  that  a  small  garri- 
son could  have  held  the  place  against  any  National 
troops  that  could  have  been  brought  against  it 
within  ten  days  after  the  arrival  of  the  force  from 
Bowling  Green.  Johnston  seemed  to  lie  quietly  at 
Nashville  to  await  the  result  at  Fort  Donelson,  on 
which  he  had  staked  the  possession  of  most  of  the 
territory  embraced  in  the  States  of  Kentucky  and 
Tennessee.  It  is  true,  the  two  generals  senior  in 
Ante,  p.  364  rank  at  Fort  Donelson  were  sending  him  encourag- 
ing despatches,  even  claiming  great  Confederate 

vipfi^riAa   n-n   fn  fiiA  -nicylif.   nf  fliA  IfifVi.  xrViftn   thftV 


CONFEDERATE  RETREAT  267 

ing  SO  important  a  command  to  Floyd,  who  he  must  ch.  xxra 
have  known  was  no  soldier,  even  if  he  possessed  the  -***^  p-  ^ 
elements  of  one.  Pillow's  presence  as  second  was 
also  a  mistake.  If  these  officers  had  been  forced 
upon  him  and  designated  for  that  particular  com- 
mand, then  he  should  have  left  Nashville  with  a 
small  garrison  under  a  trusty  officer,  and  with  the 
remainder  of  his  force  gone  to  Donelson  himself. 
If  he  had  been  captured  the  result  could  not  have 
been  worse  than  it  was. 

Johnston's  heart  failed  him  upon  the  first  ad- 
vance of  National  troops.    He  wrote  to  Eichmond 
on  the  8th  of  February:  "I  think  the  gunboats  of       iwa 
the  enemy  will  probably  take  Fort  Donelson  with-  w.B.vn,i3o 
out  the  necessity  of  employing  their  land  force  in 
cooperation.''    After  the  fall  of  that  place  he  aban- 
doned Nashville  and  Chattanooga  without  an  effort 
to  save  either,  and  fell  back  into  northern  Miss- 
issippi, where,  six  weeks  later,  he  was  destined  to  ®*^^ij^^- 
end  his  career. 

From  the  time  of  leaving  Cairo  I  was  singularly 
unfortunate  in  not  receiving  despatches  from  Gen- 
eral Halleck.    The  order  of  the  10th  of  February  w.B.vn.6oo 
directing  me  to  fortify  Fort  Henry  strongly,  particu- 
lai'ly  to  the  land  side,  and  saying  that  intrenching- 
tools  had  been  sent  for  that  purpose,  reached  me 
after  Donelson  was  invested.    I  received  nothing 
direct  which  indicated  that  the  department  com- 
mander knew  we  were  in  possession  of  Donelson.    i^^ |? 
I  was  reporting  regularly  to  the  chief  of  staff,  who  J^^^i 
had  hftftn  SAnt  to  Cairo,  soon  affp>v  th«  trooDS  l«ft    iV_%J^T 


268  PEBSOKAL  MEMOntS  OF  U.  S.  GBANT 

CH.  xxm  telegraph-wire.  Another  line  was  started  at  once 
from  Cairo  to  Paducah  and  Smithland,  at  the 
mouths  of  the  Tennessee  and  Cumberland  respec- 

^Imjwi,  tively.  My  despatches  were  all  sent  to  Cairo  by 
^  boat ;  but  many  of  those  addressed  to  me  were  sent 
to  the  operator  at  the  end  of  the  advancing-wire, 
and  he  failed  to  forward  them.  This  operator 
afterward  proved  to  be  a  rebel;  he  deserted  his 
post  after  a  short  time  and  went  South,  taking  his 
despatches  with  him.  A  telegram  from  General 
1863  McClellan  to  me  of  Februaiy  16th,  the  day  of  the 
surrender,  directing  me  to  report  in  full  the  situa- 
tion, was  not  received  at  my  headquarters  imtil  the 
3d  of  March. 

w.R.vn,674  On  the  2d  of  March  I  received  orders,  dated 
March  1st,  to  move  my  command  back  to  Fort 
Henry,  leaving  only  a  small  garrison  at  Donelson. 
From  Fort  Henry  expeditions  were  to  be  sent 
against  Eastport,  Mississippi,  and  Paris,  Tennes- 
see. We  started  from  Donelson  on  the  4th,  and  the 
same  day  I  was  back  on  the  Tennessee  Eiver.  On 
March  4th  I  also  received  the  following  despatch 
from  General  HaUeck : 

Maj.-Gen.  U.  S.  Grant, 
Port  Henry : 
Yon  will  place  Maj.-Gten.  C.  P.  Smith  in  command  of 
expedition,  and  remam  yourself  at  Port  Henry.    Why  do 
you  not  obey  my  orders  to  report  strength  and  positions 
of  your  commandT 

H.  W.  Halleck, 

Major-QeneraJ, 


BELIEVED  OF  THE  COMMAND  269 

the  6th  he  wrote  to  me  again:  "Tour  going  to   cn-xxm 
Nashville  without  authority,  and  when  your  pres-  JJ-.^^i; 
ence  with  your  troops  was  of  the  utmost  impor-  «8^'«»'«83' 
tance,  was  a  matter  of  very  serious  complaint  at 
Washington ;  so  much  so  that  I  was  advised  to  ar- 
rest you  on  your  return."   This  was  the  first  I  knew 
of  his  objecting  to  my  going  to  Nashville.    That 
place  was  not  beyond  the  limits  of  my  command, 
which,  it  had  been  expressly  declared  in  orders,  w.B.vn,e29 
were  "  not  defined.''   Nashville  is  west  of  the  Cum- 
berland Biver,  and  I  had  sent  troops  that  had  re-    n>id.  m 
ported  to  me  for  duty  to  occupy  the  place.   I  turned 
over  the  command  as  directed,  and  then  replied  to  w.b.x(2),i6 
General  Halleck  courteously,  but  asked  to  be  re- 
lieved from  further  duty  under  him. 

Later  I  learned  that  General  Halleck  had  been 
calling  lustily  for  more  troops,  promising  that  he  (S;S«7m6'. 
would  do  something  important  if  he  could  only  be     ^*  ^^ 
suflSiciently  reinforced.    McClellan  asked  him  what 
force  he  then  had.    Halleck  telegraphed  me  to 
supply  the  information  so  far  as  my  command  was 
concerned,  but  I  received  none  of  his  despatches. 
At  last  Halleck  reported  to  Washington  that  he    niid.  67» 
had  repeatedly  ordered  me  to  give  the  strength  of 
my  force,  but  could  get  nothing  out  of  me ;  that  I 
had  gone  to  Nashville,  beyond  the  limits  of  my 
command,  without  his  authority;   and  that  my 
army  was  more  demoralized  by  victory  than  the 
army  at  Bull  Run  had  been  by  defeat.    General 
McClellan,  on   this  information,  ordered  that  I    md.«8o 
should  he  rftliAVftd  from  dntv  ahH  that  an  invAfu 


270  PEBSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  8.  GRANT 

CH.xxm  two  leading  generals  in  the  army  were  in  corre- 
spondence as  to  what  disposition  should  be  made 
^  of  me,  and  in  le^s  than  three  weeks  I  was  virtually 

in  arrest  and  without  a  command* 

W.B.X  (2),82  On  the  13th  of  March  I  was  restored  to  command, 
Ibid.  43  and  on  the  17th  Halleck  sent  me  a  copy  of  an  order 
from  the  War  Department  which  stated  that  ac- 
counts of  my  misbehavior  had  reached  Washington 
and  directed  him  to  investigate  and  report  the  facts. 

w.B.vii,«8s  He  forwarded  also  a  copy  of  a  detailed  despatch 
from  himself  to  Washington  entirely  exonerating 
me ;  but  he  did  not  inform  me  that  it  was  his  own 
reports  that  had  created  all  the  trouble.    On  the 

w.Rxw^  contrary,  he  wrote  to  me:  "Instead  of  relieving 
you,  I  wish  you,  as  soon  as  your  new  army  is  in  the 
field,  to  assume  immediate  command  and  lead  it  to 
new  victories.''  In  consequence  I  felt  very  grateful 
Ibid.  82  to  him,  and  supposed  it  was  his  interposition  that 
had  set  me  right  with  the  government.    I  never 

^w™ote^'  knew  the  truth  until  General  Badeau  unearthed 
the  facts  in  his  researches  for  his  history  of  my 
campaigns. 

g^*^j^i^  General  Halleck  unquestionably  deemed  General 
6i8-«a  Q  ji  gtnith  a  much  fitter  oflScer  for  the  command 
of  all  the  forces  in  the  military  district  than  I  was, 
and,  to  render  him  available  for  such  command, 
desired  his  promotion  to  antedate  mine  and  those 
of  the  other  division  commanders.  It  is  probable 
that  the  general  opinion  was  that  Smith's  long  ser- 


GENEBAL  SMITH  271 

did  not  justify  the  despatches  which  General  Hal-  ch.  xxm 
leek  sent  to  Washington,  or  his  subsequent  conceal- 
ment of  them  from  me  when  pretending  to  explain 
the  action  of  my  superiors. 

On  receipt  of  the  order  restoring  me  to  command 
I  proceeded  to  Savannah,  on  the  Tennessee,  to  which 
point  my  troops  had  advanced.  General  Smith  was  w.b.  x  a),  s 
delighted  to  see  me  and  was  unhesitating  in  his 
denunciation  of  the  treatment  I  had  received.  He 
was  on  a  sick-bed  at  the  time,  from  which  he  never 
came  away  alive.  His  death  was  a  severe  loss  to  *  ^ffif  ^' 
our  Western  army.  His  personal  courage  was  un- 
questioned, his  judgment  and  professional  acquire- 
ments were  unsurpassed,  and  he  had  the  confidence 
of  those  he  commanded  as  well  as  of  those  over 
him. 


CHAPTER   XXIV 

THE  AEMY  AT  PITTSBUEG  LANDING  —  INJUBED  BY  A 
FALL — THE  CONFEDERATE  ATTACK  AT  SHILOH — 
THE  FIBST  DAY^S  FIGHT  AT  SHILOH — GENERAL 
SHERMAN — CONDITION  OF  THE  ARMY — CLOSE  OF 
THE  FIRST  day's  FIGHT — THE  SECOND  DAY'S  FIGHT 
— RETREAT  AND  DEFEAT  OF  THE  CONFEDERATES 

CH.xxrv^   XWTHEN  I  reassumed  command  on  the  17th  of 
1M3          ^  ^     March  I  found  the  army  divided,  about  half 
being  on  the  east  bank  of  the  Tennessee,  at  Savan- 
nah, while  one  division  was  at  Crump's  Landing,  on 
the  west  bank,  about  four  miles  higher  up,  and  the 
remainder  at  Pittsburg  Landing,  five  miles  above 
^^^^^  Crump's.    The  enemy  was  in  force  at  Corinth,  the 
e^  *  575!-  junction  of  the  two  most  important  railroads  in  the 
pou??»'emo  Mississippi  Valley — one  connecting  Memphis  and 
^  *^'      the  Mississippi  Eiver  with  the  East,  and  the  other 
leading  south  to  all  the  cotton  States.    Still  an- 
other railroad  connects  Corinth  with  Jackson,  in 
West  Tennessee.    If  we  obtained  possession  of 
Corinth  the  enemy  would  have  no  railroad  for  the 
transportation  of  armies  or  supplies  until  that  run- 
ning east  from  Vicksburg  was  reached.    It  was  the 


THE  ABMY  AT  PITTSBUBG  LANDING  273 

I  at  once  pnt  all  the  troops  at  Savannah  in  motion    ch.  xxiv 
for  Pittsburg  Landing,  knowing  that  the  enemy  was  mm.  n.  im 
fortifying  at  Corinth  and  collecting  an  army  there  w.B.x(a),i6 
under  Johnston.    It  was  my  expectation  to  march 
against  that  army  as  soon  as  Bnell,  who  had  been 
ordered  to  reinforce  me  with  the  Army  of  the  Ohio, 
should  arrive ;  and  the  west  bank  of  the  river  was 
the  place  to  start  from.    Pittsburg  is  only  about 
twenty  miles  from  Corinth;  and  Hamburg  Land- 
ing, four  miles  farther  up  the  river,  is  a  mile  or 
two  nearer.    I  had  not  been  in  command  long  be- 
fore I  selected  Hamburg  as  the  place  to  put  the  w.B.xa).» 
Army  of  the  Ohio  when  it  arrived.    The  roads  from 
Pittsburg  and  Hamburg  to  Corinth  converge  some 
eight  miles  out.    This  disposition  of  the  troops 
would  have  given  additional  roads  to  march  over 
when  the  advance  commenced,  within  supporting 
distance  of  each  other. 

Before  I  arrived  at  Savannah,  Sherman,  who  TOTOrt^^S. 
had  joined  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  and  been  ^<^>»^ 
placed  in  command  of  a  division,  had  made  an  ex- 
pedition on  steamers  convoyed  by  gunboats  to  the 
neighborhood  of  Bumsville,  thirty  miles  south, 
for  the  purpose  of  destroying  the  railroad  east  of 
Corinth.  The  rains  had  been  so  heavy  for  some 
time  before  that  the  lowlands  had  become  impassa- 
ble swamps.  Sherman  debarked  his  troops  and 
started  out  to  accomplish  the  object  of  the  expedi- 
tion ;  but  the  river  was  rising  so  rapidly  that  the 
back-water  up  the  small  tributaries  threatened  to 


274  PEBSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

CH.  XXIV       On  the  17th  of  March  the  anny  on  the  Tennes- 
^'iw-w4^^'  see  Eiver  consisted  of  five  divisions,  commanded 
respectively  by  Generals  C.  F.   Smith,  McCler- 
^Huribu^'  nand,  L.  Wallace,  Hurlbut,  and  Sherman.    General 
voi8?iiay  17,  W.  H.  L.  Wallace  was  temporarily  in  command  of 
Q^k\^',    Smith's  division,  General  Smith,  as  I  have  said, 
<*mm.27,   bemg  confined  to  his  bed.    Remforcements  were 
arriving  daily,  and  as  they  came  up  they  were 
organized,  first  into  brigades,  then  into  a  division, 
w.R.x(i)io4  and  the  command  given  to  General  Prentiss,  who 
had  been  ordered  to  report  to  me.    General  Buell 
Ibid.  105-107  was  on  his  way  from  Nashville  with  forty  thousand 
veterans.    On  the  19th  of  March  he  was  at  Colum- 
bia, Tennessee,  eighty-five  miles  from  Pittsburg. 
When  all  reinforcements  should  have  arrived  I 
expected  to  take  the  initiative  by  marching  on 
Corinth,  an4  had  no  expectation  of  needing  forti- 
fications, though  this  subject  was  taken  into  con- 
^OTBonfw.  sideration.    McPherson,  my  only  military  engineer, 
Lt-cSuA?!.  was  directed  to  lay  out  a  line  to  intrench.    He  did 
1861  ;^B%?.'  so,  but  reported  that  it  would  have  to  be  made  in 
Mayw^g!-  rear  of  the  line  of  encampment  as  it  then  ran.    The 
^rig^-olS*  ^^^  ^^'  while  it  would  be  nearer  the  river,  was 
^ifiSsf  !kf*  yet  too  far  away  from  the  Tennessee,  or  even  from 
July  22, 1864  ^j^^  crccks,  to  bc  easily  supplied  with  water ;  and  in 
case  of  attack  these  creeks  would  be  in  the  hands  of 
the  enemy.    The  fact  is,  I  regarded  the  campaign 
we  were  engaged  in  as  an  offensive  one,  and  had  no 
idea  that  the  enemy  would  leave  strong  intrench- 
ments  to  take  the  initiative  when  he  knew  he  would 
be  attacked  where  he  was  if  he  remained.    This 


THE  ABMY  AT  PITTSBURG  LANDING  275 

Jolmston^s  cavalry,  meanwhile,  had  been  well   ch.xxiv 
out  toward  our  front,  and  occasional  encounters 
occurred  between  it  and  our  outposts.    On  the  1st 
of  April  this  cavalry  became  bold  and  approached       im 
our  lines,  showing  that  an  advance  of  some  kind 
was  contemplated.    On  the  2d  Johnston  left  Corinth  ^ss^troS^' 
in  force  to  attack  my  army.    On  the  4th  his  cavalry 
dashed  down  and  captured  a  small  picket-guard  of  ^-  ^^  <^> 
six  or  seven  men,  stationed  some  five  miles  out  from 
Pittsburg  on  the  Corinth  road.    Colonel  Buckland   ^fi£^ 
sent  relief  to  the  guard  at  once  and  soon  followed    "^^^® 
in  person  with  an  entire  regiment,  and  General 
Sherman  followed  Buckland,  taking  the  remainder 
of  a  brigade.    The  pursuit  was  kept  up  for  some 
three  miles  beyond  the  point  where  the  picket- 
guard  had  been  captured,  and  after  nightfall  Sher- 
man returned  to  camp  and  reported  to  me  by  letter 
what  had  occurred. 

At  this  time  a  large  body  of  the  enemy  was 
hovering  to  the  west  of  us,  along,  the  line  of  the 
Mobile  and  Ohio  railroad.  My  apprehension  was  ^^^®^.?' 
much  greater  for  the  safety  of  Crump^s  Landing  ^^^^ 
than  it  was  for  Pittsburg.  I  had  no  apprehension 
that  the  enemy  could  really  capture  either  place. 
But  I  feared  it  was  possible  that  he  might  make  a 
rapid  dash  upon  Crump's  and  destroy  our  transports 
and  stores,  most  of  which  were  kept  at  that  point, 
and  then  retreat  before  Wallace  could  be  reinforced. 
Lew.  Wallace's  position  I  regarded  as  so  well  chosen 
that  he  was  not  removed. 

At  this  time  I  generally  spent  the  day  at  Pitts-    Aprii,iM2 
burff  and  returned  to  Savannah  in  the  evening.    I 


276  PEESONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

ca  XXIV  in  at  Savannah.  I  remained  at  this  point,  there- 
fore, a  tew  days  longer  than  I  otherwise  should 
have  done,  in  order  to  meet  him  on  his  arrival. 
The  skirmishing  in  our  front,  however,  had  been  so 
continuous  from  about  the  3d  of  April  that  I  did 
not  leave  Pittsburg  each  night  until  an  hour  when 
I  felt  there  would  be  no  further  danger  before  the 
morning. 

mjuiMbya  On  Friday,  the  4th,  the  day  of  Buckland's  ad- 
vance, I  was  very  much  injured  by  my  horse  fall- 
ing with  me,  and  on  me,  while  I  was  trying  to  get 
to  the  front,  where  firing  had  been  heard.  The 
night  was  one  of  impenetrable  darkness,  with  rain 
pouring  down  in  torrents ;  nothing  was  visible  to 
the  eye  except  as  revealed  by  the  frequent  flashes 
of  lightning.  Under  these  circumstances  I  had  to 
trust  to  the  horse,  without  guidance,  to  keep  the 
road.  I  had  not  gone  far,  however,  when  I  met 
General  W.  H.  L.  Wallace  and  Colonel  (afterward 
General)  McPherson  coming  from  the  direction  of 
the  front.  They  said  all  was  quiet  so  far  as  the 
enemy  was  concerned.  On  the  way  back  to  the 
boat  my  horse's  feet  slipped  from  under  him,  and 
he  fell  with  my  leg  under  his  body.  The  extreme 
softness  of  the  ground,  from  the  excessive  rains  of 
the  few  preceding  days,  no  doubt  saved  me  from  a 
severe  injury  and  protracted  lameness.  As  it  was, 
my  ankle  was  very  much  injured ;  so  much  so  that 
my  boot  had  to  be  cut  oflE.  For  two  or  three  days 
after  I  was  unable  to  walk  except  with  crutches. 

AnHi  lOM         On   t.liA  .'Sth   (^Anftval  NaIsoti.  -with   a  division   of 


J.  B.  Mo- 
Phenon 


GENEKAL  LEW.  WALLACE'S  POSITION  277 

Ciaimp^s  Landing  or  Pittsburg,  as  occasion  required,    ch,  xxiv 
I  had  learned  that  General  Buell  himseK  would  be  ^'  \^  <^^' 
at  Savannah  the  next  day  and  desired  to  meet  me 
on  his  arrival.    Affairs  at  Pittsburg  Landing  had 
been  such  for  several  days  that  I  did  not  want  to 
be  away  during  the  day.    I  determined,  therefore, 
to  take  a  very  early  breakfast  and  ride  out  to  meet  Apr.  6,  im 
Buell,  and  thus  save  time.    He  had  arrived  on  the 
evening  of  the  5th,  but  had  not  advised  me  of  the 
fact,  and  I  was  not  aware  of  it  until  some  time 
after.    While  I  was  at  breakfast,  however,  heavy 
firing  was  heard  in  the  direction  of  Pittsburg  Land- 
ing, and  I  hastened  there,  sending  a  hurried  note 
to  Buell  informing  him  of  the  reason  why  I  could 
not  meet  him  at  Savannah.    On  the  way  up  the  itS^^\ 
river  I  directed  the  despatch-boat  to  run  in  close  to      ^^^'  ^" 
Crump's  Landing,  so  that  I  could  communicate  with 
General  Lew.  Wallace.    I  found  him  waiting  on  a 
boat,  apparently  expecting  to  see  me,  and  I  directed 
him  to  get  his  troops  in  line  ready  to  execute  any 
orders  he  might  receive.    He  replied  that  his  troops 
were  already  under  arms  and  prepared  to  move. 

Up  to  that  time  I  had  felt  by  no  means  certain 
that  Crump's  Landing  might  not  be  the  point  of 
attack.  On  reaching  the  front,  however,  about  ^^Sm 
8  a.m.,  I  found  that  the  attack  on  Pittsburg  was 
unmistakable,  and  that  nothing  more  than  a  small 
guard,  to  protect  our  transports  and  stores,  was 
needed  at  Crump's.  Captain  Baxter,  a  quarter-  A.B.Baxt»r 
master  on  my  staff,  was  accordingly  directed  to  go 
back  and  order  General  Wallace  to  inarch  immedi-   ^^^^ 


278  PERSONAL  MEMOIES  OP  U.  8.  GEANT 

ch.  XXIV   much  in  need  of  reinforcements,  I  sent  two  more  of 
i^.ca^ll  ^^y  staflE,  Colonel  McPherson  and  Captain  Rowley, 
isS£i.A^v.  to  bring  him  up  with  his  division.    They  reported 
i862;^BVt;    finding  him  marching  toward  Purdy,  Bethel,  or 
?Fe^i^  some  point  west  from  the  river,  and  farther  from 
Rawiins'8    Pittsburg  by  several  miles  than  when  he  started, 
(i)/i8i-i88    The  road  from  his  first  position  to  Pittsburg  Land- 
ing was  direct  and  near  the  river.    Between  the  two 
points  a  bridge  had  been  built  across  Snake  Creek 
by  our  troops,  at  which  Wallace^s  command  had 
assisted,  expressly  to  enable  the  troops  at  the  two 
places  to  support  each  other  in  case  of  need.    Wal- 
lace did  not  arrive  in  time  to  take  part  in  the  first 
day^s  fight.    General  Wallace  has  since  claimed  that 
^'ni-m^^'  tiie  order  delivered  to  him  by  Captain  Baxter  was 
simply  to  join  the  right  of  the  army,  and  that  the 
road  over  which  he  marched  would  have  taken  him 
to  the  road  from  Pittsburg  to  Purdy  where  it  crosses 
Owl  Creek,  on  the  right  of  Sherman ;  but  this  is  not 
where  I  had  ordered  him,  nor  where  I  wanted  him 
to  go. 

I  never  could  see,  and  do  not  now  see,  why  any 
order  was  necessary  further  than  to  direct  him  to 
come  to  Pittsburg  Landing,  without  specifying  by 
what  route.  His  was  one  of  three  veteran  divisions 
that  had  been  in  battle,  and  its  absence  was  severely 
felt.  Later  in  the  war  Qenejral  Wallace  would  not 
have  made  the  mistake  that  he  committed  on  the 
6th  of  April,  1862.  I  presume  his  idea  was  that  by 
taking  the  route  he  did  he  would  be  able  to  come 


POSITIONS  OF  THE  TBOOPS  279 

Some  two  or  three  miles  from  Pittsburg  Landing   ch.  xxiv 
was  a  log  meeting-house  called  Shiloh.    It  stood  on     ^^^^ 
the  ridge  which  divides  the  waters  of  Snake  and 
Lick  creeks,  the  former  emptying  into  the  Tennes- 
see just  north  of  Pittsburg  Landing,  and  the  latter 
south.    This  point  was  the  key  to  our  position  and 
was  held  by  Sherman.    His  division  was  at  that  ^^^^^x 
time  wholly  raw,  no  part  of  it  ever  having  been  in      ^^^'  ^^ 
an  engagement;  but  I  thought  this  deficiency  was 
more  than  made  up  by  the  superiority  of  the  com- 
mander.   McClernand  was  on  Sherman's  left,  with 
troops  that  had  been  engaged  at  Forts  Henry  and 
Donelson,  and  were  therefore  veterans,  so  far  as 
Western  troops  had  become  such  at  that  stage  of 
the  war.    Next  to  McClernand  came  Prentiss,  with 
a  raw  division,  and  on  the  extreme  left,  Stuart, 
with  one  brigade  of  Sherman's  division.    Hurlbut 
was  in  rear  of  Prentiss,  massed,  and  in  reserve 
at  the  time  of  the  onset.    The  division  of  General 
C.  F.  Smith  was  on  the  right,  also  in  reserve.    Gen- 
eral Smith  was  still  sick  in  bed  at  Savannah,  but 
within  hearing  of  our  guns.    His  services  would  no 
doubt  have  been  of  inestimable  value  had  his  health 
permitted  his  presence.    The  command  of  his  divi- 
sion devolved  upon  Brigadier-General  W.  H.  L. 
Wallace,  a  most  estimable  and  able  oflScer ;  a  vet- 
eran, too,  for  he  had  served  a  year  in  the  Mexican  ^^  \^i^^ 
war  and  had  been  with  his  command  at  Henry  and 
Donelson.    Wallace  was  mortally  wounded  in  the   **•  ^Sa^^' 
first  day's  engagement,  and  with  the  change   of 
commanders  thus  necessarily  eflfected  in  the  heat 
of  battle  the  eflSciency  of  his  division  was  much 


280  PEESONAL  MEMOIBS  OP  U.  S.  GRANT 

ch.  XXIV  from  Lick  Creek  on  the  left  to  Owl  Creek,  a  branch 
of  Snake  Creek,  on  the  right,  facing  nearly  south 
and  possibly  a  little  west.  The  water  in  all  these 
streams  was  very  high  at  the  time  and  contributed 
to  protect  our  flanks.  The  enemy  was  compelled, 
therefore,  to  attack  directly  in  front.  This  he  did 
with  great  vigor,  inflicting  heavy  losses  on  the 
National  side,  but  suffering  much  heavier  on  his 
own. 

^®^^*®  The  Confederate  assaults  were  made  with  such  a 
disregard  of  losses  on  their  own  side  that  our  line 
of  tents  soon  fell  into  their  hands.  The  ground  on 
which  the  battle  was  fought  was  undulating,  heavily 
timbered  with  scattered  clearings,  the  woods  giving 
some  protection  to  the  troops  on  both  sides.  There 
was  also  considerable  underbrush.  A  number  of 
attempts  were  made  by  the  enemy  to  turn  our  right 
flank,  where  Sherman  was  posted ;  but  every  effort 
was  repulsed  with  heavy  loss.  But  the  front  attack 
was  kept  up  so  vigorously  that,  to  prevent  the  suc- 
,  cess  of  these  attempts  to  get  on  our  flanks,  the 

w?Rxw&  National  troops  were  compelled,  several  times,  to 
take  positions  to  the  rear,  nearer  Pittsburg  Land- 
ing. When  the  firing  ceased  at  night  the  National 
line  was  all  of  a  mile  in  rear  of  the  position  it  had 
occupied  in  the  morning. 

In  one  of  the  backward  moves  on  the  6th  the 
division  commanded  by  General  Prentiss  did  not 
fall  back  with  the  others.    This  left  his  flanks  ex- 

^'7^1?"  P^s^d  Q^d  enabled  the  enemy  to  capture  him,  with 


CAPTURE  OF  PBENTISS'S  COMMAND  281 

hour  was  later.  General  Prentiss  himself  gave  the  ch.  xxiv 
hour  as  half-past  five.  I  was  with  him,  as  I  was  w.R.x(i)a7» 
with  each  of  the  division  commanders  that  day, 
several  times,  and  my  recollection  is  that  the  last 
time  I  was  with  him  was  about  half-past  four,  when 
his  division  was  standing  up  firmly  and  the  general 
was  as  cool  as  if  expecting  victory.  But  no  matter 
whether  it  was  four  or  later,  the  story  that  he  and 
his  command  were  surprised  and  captured  in  their 
camps  is  without  any  foundation  whatever.  If  it 
had  been  true,  as  currently  reported  at  the  time  and 
yet  believed  by  thousands  of  people,  that  Prentiss 
and  his  division  had  been  captured  in  their  beds, 
there  would  not  have  been  an  all-day  struggle,  with 
the  iloss  of  thousands  killed  and  wounded  on  the 
Confederate  side. 

With  the  single  exception  of  a  few  minutes  after  ^atS|®' 
the  capture  of  Prentiss,  a  continuous  and  unbroken 
line  "was  maintained  all  day  from  Snake  Creek  or 
its  tributaries  on  the  right  to  Lick  Creek  or  the 
Tennessee  on  the  left  above  Pittsburg.  There  was 
no  hour  during  the  day  when  there  was  not  heavy 
firing  and  generally  hard  fighting  at  some  point  on 
the  line,  but  seldom  at  all  points  at  the  same  time. 
It  was  a  case  of  Southern  dash  against  Northern 
pluck  and  endurance.  Three  of  the  five  divisions  Raw  troops 
engaged  on  Sunday  were  entirely  raw,  and  many  of 
the  men  had  only  received  their  arms  on  the  way 
from  their  States  to  the  field.  Many  of  them  had 
arrived  but  a  day  or  two  before,  and  were  hardly 
abh  to  load  their  muskets  according  to  the  manual 


282  PEBSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

CH.  XXIV  In  two  cases,  as  I  iiow  remember,  colonels  led  their 
regiments  from  the  field  on  first  hearing  the  whistle 

tkSSS^-  ^^  *^^  enemy's  bullets.  In  these  cases  the  colonels 
*'^  were  constitutional  cowards,  unfit  for  any  military 
position ;  but  not  so  the  oflScers  and  men  led  out  of 
danger  by  them.  Better  troops  never  went  upon 
a  battle-field  than  many  of  these,  oflScers  and  men, 
afterward  proved  themselves  to  be,  who  fled  panic- 
stricken  at  the  first  whistle  of  bullets  and  shell  at 
Shiloh. 

Apr.  6, 1862       During  the  whole  of  Sunday  I  was  continuously 

MeS^£  engaged  in  passing  from  one  part  of  the  field  to 
^        another,  giving  directions  to  division  commanders. 

Bhemian's 

iSuieSo  ^^  *^^®  moving  along  the  line,  however,  I  never 
deemed  it  important  to  stay  long  with  Sherman. 
Although  his  troops  were  then  imder  fire  for  the 
first  time,  their  commander,  by  his  constant  pres- 
ence with  them,  inspired  a  confidence  in  officers  and 
men  that  enabled  them  to  render  services  on  that 
bloody  battle-field  worthy  of  the  best  of  veterans. 
McClemand  was  next  to  Sheiman,  and  the  hardest 
fighting  was  in  front  of  these  two  divisions.    Mc- 

na^^R^p.  Clemand  told  me  on  that  day,  the  6th,  that  he 
profited  much  by  having  so  able  a  commander  sup- 
porting him.  A  casualty  to  Sherman  that  woiQd 
have  taken  him  from  the  field  that  day  would  have 
been  a  sad  one  for  the  troops  engaged  at  Shiloh. 
And  how  near  we  came  to  this !  On  the  6th  Sher- 
man was  shot  twice,  once  in  the  hand,  once  in  the 
shoulder,  the  ball  cutting  his  coat  and  making  a 
slight  wound;  and  a  third  ball  passed  through  his 
hat.    In  addition  to  this  he  had  several  horses  shot 


W.R.X(1)117 


8TKAGGLERS  AT  THE  KIVEB  283 

could  not  be  used  in  front ;  I  therefore  formed  ours    ch.  xxiv 
into  line  in  rear,  to  stop  stragglers — of  whom  there 
were  many.    When  there  would  be  enough  of  them 
to  make  a  show,  and  after  they  had  recovered  from 
their  fright,  they  would  be  sent  to  reinforce  some 
part  of  the  line  which  needed  support,  without  re- 
gard to  their  companies,  regiments,  or  brigades, 
^n  one  occasion  dming  the  day  I  rode  back  as 
far  as  the  river  and  met  General  Buell,  who  had    ^^^. 
just  arrived ;  I  do  not  remember  the  hour,  but  at      ^®" 
that  time  there  probably  were  as  many  as  four  or 
five  thousand  stragglers  lying  under  cover  of  the 
river-bluff,  panic-stricken,  most  of  whom  would 
have  been  shot  where  they  lay,  without  resistance, 
before  they  would  have  taken  muskets  and  marched 
to  the  front  to  protect  themselves.    This  meeting 
between  General  Buell  and  myself  was  on  the  des- 
patch-boat used  to  run  between  the  Landing  and 
Savannah.    It  was  brief,  and  related  specially  to 
his  getting  his  troops  over  the  river.    As  we  left  ^gS(?^ 
the  boat  together,  BuelPs  attention  was  attracted 
by  the  men  lying  under  cover  of  the  river-bank.   I 
saw  him  berating  them  and  trying  to  shame  them 
into  joining  their  regiments.    He  even  threatened 
them  with  shells  from  the  gunboats  near  by.    But 
it  was  all  to  no  effect.    Most  of  these  men  after- 
ward proved  themselves  as  gallant  as  any  of  those 
who  saved  the  battle  from  which  they  had  deserted. 
I  have  no  doubt  that  this  sight  impressed  General 
Buell  with  the  idea  that  a  line  of  retreat  would  be 
a  good  thing  just  then.    K  he  had  come  in  by  tlie 
front  instead  of  throuerh  the  strae^crlers  in  the  rear^ 


284  PERSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

CH.  XXIV  would  have  witnessed  there  a  scene  similar  to  that 
^?^p,  at  our  own.  The  distant  rear  of  an  army  engaged 
w.R.X(i)89i  j^  battle  is  not  the  best  place  from  which  to  judge 
correctly  what  is  going  on  in  front.  Later  in  the 
war,  while  occupying  the  country  between  the  Ten- 
nessee and  the  Mississippi,  I  learned  that  the  panic 
in  the  Confederate  lines  had  not  differed  much  from 
that  within  our  own.  Some  of  the  country-people 
estimated  the  stragglers  from  Johnston^s  army  as 
high  as  twenty  thousand.  Of  course  this  was  an 
exaggeration. 

The  situation  .-at  the  close  of  Sunday  was  as  fol- 
lows :  Along  the  top  of  the  bluff  just  south  of  the 
log  house  which  stood  at  Pittsburg  Landing,  Colo- 
w.R.xa)uo  nel  J.  D.  Webster,  of  my  staff,  had  arranged  twenty 
or  more  pieces  of  artillery  facing  south  or  up  the 
river.    This  line  of  artillery  was  on  the  crest  of  a 
hill  overlooking  a  deep  ravine  opening  into  the 
tionfJ^RTx  Tennessee.    Hurlbut,  with  his  division  intact,  was 
<^>*^      on  the  right  of  this  artillery,  extiending  west  and 
Ibid.  100    possibly  a  little  north.    McClemand  came  next  in 
the  general  line,  looking  more  to  the  west.    His 
division  was  complete  in  its  organization  and  ready 
Ibid.  108    for  any  duty.    Sherman  came  next,  his  right  ex- 
tending to  Snake  Creek.    His  command,  like  the 
other  two,  was- complete  in  its  organization,  and 
ready,  like  its  chief,  for  any  service  it  might  be 
called  upon  to  render.   All  three  divisions  were,  as 
a  matter  of  course,  more  or  less  shattered  and  de^ 
pleted  in  numbers  from  the  terrible  battle  of  the 
Ibid,  m    day.    The  division  of  W.  H.  L.  Wallace,  as  much 
from  the  disorder  arising  from  changes  of  division 


CLOSE  OP  THE  FEBST  DAY'S  FIGHT  285 

not  occupy  a  place  in  the  line  as  a  division.    Pren-   ch.  xxiv 
tiss's  command  was  gone  as  a  division,  many  of  its  tto5?w^Rfx 
members  having  been  killed,  wounded,  or  captured ;      ^^^'  ^^ 
but  it  had  rendered  valiant  services  before  its  final 
dispersal,  and  had  contributed  a  good  share  to  the 
defense  of  Shiloh. 

The  right  of  my  line  rested  near  the  bank  of 
Snake  Creek,  a  short  distance  above  the  bridge    see  p.  278 
which  had  been  built  by  the  troops  for  the  pur- 
pose of  connecting  Crump's  Landing  aiid  Pittsburg 
Landing.    Sherman  had  posted  some  troops  in  a  ^p™Rx 
log  house  and  outbuildings  which  overlooked  both      ^^^  ^ 
the  bridge  over  which  Wallace  was  expected  and 
the  creek  above  that  point.    In  this  last  position 
Sherman  was  frequently  attacked  before  night,  but 
held  the  point  until  he  voluntarily  abandoned  it  to 
advance  in  order  to  make  room  for  Lew.  Wallace, 
who  came  up  after  dark. 

There  was,  as  I  have  said,  a  deep  ravine  in  front  w.r.x(i)io9 
of  our  left.    The  Tennessee  Eiver  was  very  high, 
and  there  was  water  to  a  considerable  depth  in  the 
ravine.    Here  the  enemy  made  a  last  desperate 
effort  to  turn  our  flank,  but  was  repelled.    The 
gunboats  Tyler  and  Lexington^  Gwin  and  Shirk  u^™i?iSS*; 
commanding,  with  the  artilleiy  under  Webster,  ^im^tt^^* 
aided  the  army  and  eflfectually  checked  their  fur-  ^^^'^i?^ 
ther  progress.    Before  any  of  Buell's  troops  had   »^^ 
reached  the  west  bank  of  the  Tennessee,  firing  had      jiL.w. 
almost  entirely  ceased ;  anything  like  an  attempt  on   N^iSfe  -^^.^ 


the  part  of  the  enemy  to  advance  had  absolutely  ^^^J^^- 

J  rrn Lilt -C— i £^^,^^      ^^       -wi^V..  nrt-"^*^ 


Nov.  5,  ^^1 


286  PEBSONAL  MEMOIBS  OF  U.  S.  GBAKT 

ch.  XXIV   troops  arrived  in  the  dusk,  General  Buell  marched 
^UuSi^'   several  of  his  regiments  part  way  down  the  face  of 
the  hill,  where  they  fired  briskly  for  some  minutes ; 
but  I  do  not  think  a  single  man  engaged  in  this 
firing  received  an  injury.    The  attack  had  spent 
its  force. 
i^?JwSiaw      General  Lew.  Wallace,  with  five  thousand  effec- 
tive men,  arrived  after  firing  had  ceased  for  the 
day,  and  was  placed  on  the  right.    Thus  night 
came,  Wallace  came,  and  the  advance  of  Nelson^s 
division  came ;  but  none — unless  night — in  time  to 
be  of  material  service  to  the  gallant  men  who  saved 
Shiloh  on  that  first  day  against  large  odds.    Buell's 
1862       loss  on  the  6th  of  April  was  two  men  killed  and  one 
wounded,  all  members  of  the  Thirty-sixth  Indiana 
Infantry.   The  Army  of  the  Tennessee  lost  on  that 
day  at  least  seven  thousand  men.    The  presence  of 
two  or  three  regiments  of  BuelPs  army  on  the  west 
bank  before  firing  ceased  had  not  the  slightest  effect 
in  preventing  the  capture  of  Pittsburg  Landing. 
Hi^M^e^f      ®^  confident  was  I  before  firing  had  ceased  on 
Lincoln,  V,  ^j^^  g^j^  ^j^^^^  ^^le  ucxt  day  would  bring  victory  to 
our  arms  if  we  could  only  take  the  initiative,  that 
I  visited  each  division  commander  in  person  before 
any  reinforcements  had  reached  the  field.   I  directed 
them  to  throw  out  heavy  lines  of  skirmishers  in  the 
morning  as  soon  as  they  could  see,  and  push  them 
forward  until  they  found  the  enemy,  following  with 
their  entire  divisions  in  supporting  distance,  and  to 
M^^i,  ^^gflg®  the  enemy  as  soon  as  found.    To  Sherman 


THE  SECOND  DAY'S  BATTLE  287 

ever,  to  see  the  reinforcements  of  Buell,  and  credit   ch.  xxiv 
them  with  doing  all  there  was  for  them  to  do.    Dur- 
ing the  night  of  the  6th  the  remainder  of  Nelson's 
division,  Buell's  army,  crossed  the  river  and  were  ^^00"^^ 
ready  to  advance  in  the  morning,  forming  the  left   vSl'^t 
wing.    Two  other  divisions,  Crittenden's  and  Mc-  oi^jlxi^i] 
Cook's,  came  up  the  river  from  Savannah  in  the  ^%*,  im^ ' 
transports  and  were  on  the  west  bank  early  on  the  coSi!^v  ?^r 
7th.    Buell  commanded  them  in  person.    My  com-  ^  jU^om?^" 
mand  was  thus  nearly  doubled  in  numbers  and    nnit^^tlu 
efficiency.  ^^^  ^  ^i^- 

^During  the  night  rain  fell  in  torrents,  and  our  J«iy"»i862 
trodps  were  exposed  to  the  storm  without  shelter. 
I  made  my  headquarters  under  a  tree  a  few  hundred 
yards  back  from  the  river-bank.  My  ankle  was  so 
much  swollen  from  the  fall  of  my  horse  the  Friday 
night  preceding,  and  the  bruise  was  so  painful,  that 
I  could  get  no  rest.  The  drenching  rain  would 
have  precluded  the  possibility  of  sleep  without  this 
additional  cause.  Some  time  after  midnight,  grow- 
ing restive  under  the  storm  and  the  continuous 
pain,  I  moved  back  to  the  log  house  under  the 
bank.  This  had  been  taken  as  a  hospital,  and  all 
night  wounded  men  were  being  brought  in,  their 
wounds  dressed,  a  leg  or  an  arm  amputated,  as  the 
case  might  require,  and  everything  being  done  to 
save  life  or  alleviate  suffering.  The  sight  was  more 
unendurable  than  encountering  the  enemy's  fire, 
and  I  returned  to  my  tree  in  the  rain> 
The  advance  on  the  morning  of  the  7m  developed   ^p^^»  ^^ 


288  PEBSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  8.  GRANT 

CU.XXIV  yet  learned  of  the  arrival  of  Buell's  command. 
Possibly  they  fell  back  so  far  to  get  the  shelter  of 

w.R.x(i)8M  our  tents  during  the  rain,  and  also  to  get  away 
from  the  shells  that  were  dropped  upon  them  by  the 
gunboats  every  fifteen  minutes  during  the  night. 
The  position  of  the  Union  troops  on  the  morning 

April.  1863  of  the  7th  was  as  follows :  General  Lew.  Wallace  on 
the  right ;  Sherman  on  his  left ;  then  McClemand 
and  then  Hurlbut.  Nelson,  of  Buell's  army,  was  on 
our  extreme  left,  next  to  the  river.  Crittenden  was 
next  in  line  after  Nelson,  and  on  his  right ;  McCook 
followed  and  formed  the  extreme  right  of  BuelPs 
command.  My  old  command  thus  formed  the  right 
wing,  while  the  troops  directly  under  Buell  consti- 
tuted the  left  wing,  of  the  army.  These  relative 
positions  were  retained  during  the  entire  day,  or 
until  the  enemy  was  driven  from  the  field. 

iS;  wof  170-      ^  ^  v^^  short  time  the  battle  became  general  all 

178. 251, 262  g^jQjjg  i]^q  jjj^q^    T}ns  day  everything  was  favorable 

to  the  Union  side.  We  had  now  become  the  attack- 
ing party.  The  enemy  was  driven  back  all  day,  as 
we  had  been  the  day  before,  until  finally  he  beat  a 
precipitate  retreat.  The  last  point  held  by  him  was 
near  the  road  leading  from  the  Landing  to  Coiinth, 
on  the  left  of  Sherman  and  right  of  McClemand. 
About  three  o'clock,  being  near  that  point,  and 
seeing  that  the  enemy  was  giving  way  everywhere 
else,  I  gathered  up  a  couple  of  regiments,  or  parts 
of  regiments,  from  troops  near  by,  formed  them  in 
line  of  battle,  and  marched  them  forward,  going  in 
front  myself  to  prevent  premature  or  long-range 
firing.  At  this  point  there  was  a  clearing  between 
us  and  the  enemy  favorable  for  charging,  although 
exposed.    I  knew  the  enemy  were  ready  to  break. 


THE  CONFEDEBATE  BETEEAT  AND  DEFEAT 


289 


and  only  wanted  a  little  encouragement  from  us  to 
go  quickly  and  join  their  friends  who  had  started 
earlier.  After  marching  to  within  musket-range  I 
stopped  and  let  the  troops  pass.  The  command 
Charge  was  given,  and  was  executed  with  loud 
cheers  and  with  a  run,  when  the  last  of  the  enemy 
broke. 


Ch.  xxiv 


TheflDftl 
oharge 


Note. — Since  writing  this  chap- 
ter I  have  received  from  Mrs.  W. 
H.  L.  Wallace,  widow  of  the  gal- 
lant general  who  was  killed  in 
the  first  day's  fight  on  the  field 
of  Shiloh,  a  letter  from  General 
Lew.  Wallace  to  him,  dated  the 
morning  of  the  5th.  At  the  date 
of  this  letter  it  was  well  known 
that  the  Confederates  had  troops 
out  along  the  Mobile  and  Ohio 
railroad  west  of  Crump's  Land- 
ing and  Pittsburg  Landing,  and 
were  also  collecting  near  Shiloh. 
This  letter  shows  that  at  that  time 
General  Lew.  Wallace  was  making 
preparations  for  the  emergency 
that  might  happen  for  the  passing 
of  reinforcements  between  Shiloh 
and  his  position,  extending  from 
Crump's  Landing  westward ;  and 
he  sends  it  over  the  road  running 
from  Adamsville  to  the  Pittsburg 
Landing  and  Purdy  road.  These 
two  roads  intersect  nearly  a  mile 
west  of  the  crossing  of  the  latter 
over  Owl  Creek,  where  our  right 
rested.  Lot  this  letter  General 
Lew.  Wallace  advises  General  W. 
H.  L.  Wallace  that  he  will  send 
"to-morrow"  (and  his  letter  also 
says  "April  5th, "  which  is  the 
same  day  the  letter  was  dated, 
and  which,  therefore,  must  have 
been  written  on  the  4th)  some 
cavalry  to  report  to  him  at  his 
headquarters,  and  suggests  the 
propriety  of  General  W.  H.  L. 

Vol.  L— 19 


Wallace's  sending  a  company 
back  with  them  for  the  purpose 
of  having  the  cavalry  at  the  two 
Landings  familiarize  themselves 
with  the  road,  so  that  they  could 
"act  promptly,  in  case  of  emer- 
gency, as  guides  to  and  from  the 
different  camps." 

This  modifies  very  materially 
what  I  have  said,  and  what  has 
been  said  by  others,  of  the  con- 
duct of  General  Lew.  Wallace  at 
the  battle  of  Shiloh.  It  shows 
that  he  naturally,  with  no  more 
experience  than  he  had  at  the 
time  in  the  profession  of  arms, 
would  take  the  particular  road 
that  he  did  start  upon,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  orders  to  move  by  a  dif- 
ferent road. 

The  mistake  he  made,  and 
which  probably  caused  his  ap- 
parent dilatoriness,  was  that  of 
advancing  some  distance  after  he 
found  that  the  firing,  which  would 
be  at  first  directly  to  his  front  and 
then  off  to  the  left,  had  fallen  back 
until  it  had  got  very  much  in  rear 
of  the  position  of  his  advance. 
This  falling  back  had  taken  place 
before  I  sent  General  Wallace 
orders  to  move  up  to  Pittsburg 
Landing,  and,  naturally,  my  order 
was  to  follow  the  road  nearest  the 
river.  But  my  order  was  verbal,  W.B.X(l)l79 
and  to  a  staff -officer  who  was  to 
deliver  it  to  General  Wallace,  so 
that  I  am  not  competent  to  say 


290 


PEKSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 


Ch.  XXIV    jiwt  what  order  the  general  actu- 
ally received. 

General  Wallace's  division  was 
stationed,  the  First  Brigade  at 
Crump's  Landing,  the  Second  out 
two  miles,  and  the  Third  two  and 
a  half  miles  out.  Hearing  the 
sounds  of  battle,  General  Wallace 
earlj  ordered  his  First  and  Third 


brigades  to  concentrate  on  the 
Second.  If  the  position  of  our 
front  had  not  changed,  the  road 
which  Wallace  took  would  have 
been  somewhat  shorter  to  our 
right  than  the  river  road. 

U.  S.  Grant. 
Mount  MacGregob,  N.  Y., 
June  21,  1885. 


CHAPTER  XXV 

STBUCK  BY  A  BULLET — PRECIPITATE  RETREAT  OP  THE 
CONFEDERATES — INTRENCHMENTS  AT  SHILOH — 
GENERAL  BUELL — GENERAL  JOHNSTON — REMARKS 
ON  SHILOH 

DUEING  this  second  day  of  the  battle  I  had  chap.xxv 
been  moving  from  right  to  left  and  back,  to    ^^^| 
see  for  myself  the  progress  made.    In  the  early 
part  of  the  afternoon,  while  riding  with  Colonel    p^iSn 
McPherson  and  Major  Hawkins,  then  my  chief     Johnp, 
commissary,  we  got  beyond  the  left  of  onr  troops,  ^^^^ij^?"!^' 
We  were  moving  along  the  northern  edge  of  a  ^B¥5;r^.G^V 
clearing,  very  leisurely,  toward  the  river  above  the  ^mf  ^n!*' 
Landing.    There  did  not  appear  to  be  an  enemy  to  v^i!j^mr. 
onr  right,  until  suddenly  a  battery  with  musketry 
opened  upon  us  from  the  edge  of  the  woods  on  the 
other  side  of  the  clearing.    The  shells  and  balls 
whistled  about  our  ears  very  fast  for  about  a 
minute.    I  do  not  think  it  took  us  longer  than 
that  to  get  out  of  range  and  out  of  sight.    In  the 
sudden  start  we  made  Major  Hawkins  lost  his  hat. 
He  did  not  stop  to  pick  it  up.    When  we  arrived 
at  a  perfectly  safe  position  we  halted  to  take  an  ac- 
count of  damages.    McPherson's  horse  was  panting 


19.  1S05 


292  PERSONAL  MEMOIBS  OF  U.  S.  GBAITT 

Chap.  XXV  In  a  f ew  minutes  the  poor  beast  dropped  dead ;  he 
had  given  no  sign  of  injuiy  until  we  came  to  a  stop. 
A  ball  had  struck  the  metal  scabbard  of  my  sword, 
just  below  the  hilt,  and  broken  it  nearly  off ;  before 
the  battle  was  over  it  had  broken  off  entirely.  There 
were  three  of  us :  one  had  lost  a  horse,  killed ;  one  a 
hat,  and  one  a  sword-scabbard.  All  were  thankful 
that  it  was  no  worse. 
-^J^^®  After  the  rain  of  the  night  before  and  the  frequent 
and  heavy  rains  for  some  days  previous,  the  roads 
were  almost  impassable.  The  enemy,  carrying  his 
artillery  and  supply  trains  over  them  in  his  re- 
treat, made  them  still  worse  for  troops  following. 
I  wanted  to  pursue,  but  had  not  the  heart  to  order 
the  men  who  had  fought  desperately  for  two  days, 
lying  in  the  mud  and  rain  whenever  not  fighting; 

Note. — In  an  article  on  the  gaged  in  the  battle  of  the  second 

battle  of  Shiloh  which  I  wrote  for  day,  and  did  as  good  service  as  its 

Feb.,l88S     the ''Centmy  Magazine,'' I  stated  position  allowed.   In  fact,  an  op- 

that  General  A.  McD.  McCk>ok,  portnnity  occurred  for  it  to  per- 

who  commanded  a  division  of  form  a  conspicnous  act  of  gallan- 

Bnell's  army,  expressed  some  un-  try  which  elicited  the   highest 

willingness  to  pursue  the  enemy  commendation  from  division  com- 

on  Monday,  April  7th,  because  of  manders  in  the  Army  of  the  Ten- 

the  condition  of  his  troops.   Gen-  nessee.    General  Sherman,  both 

MIL  Hist  1,   eral  Badeau,  in  his  history,  also  in  his  memoirs  and  in  his  report, 

^  makes  the  same  statement,  on  my  makes  mention  of  this  fact.  Gren> 

authority.   Out  of  justice  to  Gen-  eral  McCook  himself  belongs  to  a 

eral  McCook  and  his  command  I  family  which  furnished  many  vol- 

must  say  that  they  left  a  point  unteers  to  the  army.    I  refer  to 

twenty-two  miles  east  of  Savan-  these  circumstances  with  minute- 

nah  on  the  morning  of  the  6th.  ness  because  I  did  General  Mc- 

From  the  heavy  rains  of  a  few  Ck>ok  injustice  in  my  article  in  the 

days  previous,  and  the  passage  of  "Century,'*  though   not  to   the 

trains  and  artillery,   the  roads  extent  one  would  suppose  from 


PRECIPITATE  BETREAT  OP  THE  COKFEDEBATES  293 

and  I  did  not  feel  disposed  to  positively  order  Buell,  chap,  xxv 
or  any  part  of  his  command,  to  pursue.  Although 
the  senior  in  rank  at  the  time,  I  had  been  so  only  a 
few  weeks.  Buell  was,  and  had  been  for  some  time 
past,  a  department  commander,  while  I  commanded 
only  a  district.  I  did  not  meet  Buell  in  person 
until  too  late  to  get  troops  ready  and  pursue  with 
effect ;  but  had  I  seen  him  at  the  moment  of  the 
last  charge  I  should  have  at  least  requested  him  to 
follow. 

I  rode  forward  several  miles  the  day  after  the  ^JSg^^** 
battle,  and  found  that  the  enemy  had  dropped  much, 
if  not  all,  of 'their  provisions,  some  ammunition,  and 
the  extra  wheels  of  their  caissons,  lightening  their 
loads  to  enable  them  to  get  off  their  guns.  About  w.r.x(1)mo 
five  miles  out  we  found  their  field-hospital  aban- 
doned. An  immediate  pursuit  must  have  resulted 
in  the  capture  of  a  considerable  number  of  prison- 
ers and  probably  some  guns. 

Shiloh  was  the  severest  battle  fought  at  the  West  ^^'^a^^®" 
during  the  war,  and  but  few  in  the  East  equaled  it 
for  hard,  determined  fighting.  I  saw  an  open  field, 
in  our  possession  on  the  second  day,  over  which  the 
Confederates  had  made  repeated  charges  the  day 
before,  so  covered  with  dead  that  it  would  have 
been  possible  to  walk  across  the  clearing,  in  any 
direction,  stepping  on  dead  bodies,  without  a  foot 
touching  the  ground.  On  our  side  National  and 
Confederate  troops  were  mingled  together  in  about 
equal  proportions ;  but  on  the  remainder  of  the  field 
nearly  all  were  Confederates.    On  one  part,  which 


294  PEESONAL  MEMOIKS  OF  U.  S.  GBANT 

Chap.  XXV  There  was  not  one  of  these  left  standing  unpierced 
by  bullets.    The  smaller  ones  were  all  cut  down. 

Contrary  to  aU  my  experience  up  to  that  time, 
and  to  the  experience  of  the  army  I  was  then  com- 
manding, we  were  on  the  defensive.  We  were 
without  intrenchments  or  defensive  advantages  of 

^thS*anny '  any  sort,  and  more  than  half  the  army  engaged  the 
first  day  was  without  experience  or  even  drill  as 
soldiers.  The  officers  with  them,  except  the  divi- 
sion commanders  and  possibly  two  or  three  of  the 
brigade  commanders,  were  equally  inexperienced  in 
war.  The  result  was  a  Union  victory  that  gave  the 
men  who  achieved  it  great  confidence  in  themselves 
ever  after. 

The  enemy  fought  bravely,  but  they  had  started 
out  to  defeat  and  destroy  an  army  and  capture  a 
position.  They  failed  in  both,  with  very  heavy  loss 
in  killed  and  wounded,  and  must  have  gone  back 
discouraged  and  convinced  that  the  "  Yankee  ^  was 
not  an  enemy  to  be  despised. 
tb^diSi  After  the  battle  I  gave  verbal  instructions  to 
division  commanders  to  let  the  regiments  send  out 
parties  to  bury  their  own  dead,  and  to  detail  parties, 
^  under  commissioned  officers  from  each  division,  to 
bury  the  Confederate  dead  in  their  respective  fronts 
and  to  report  the  numbers  so  buried.  The  latter 
part  of  these  instructions  was  not  carried  out  by 
all;  but  it  was  by  those  sent  from  Sherman's 
division,  and  by  some  of  the  parties  sent  out  by 
McClemand.    The  heaviest  loss  sustained  by  the 


GENEBAL  BUELL  295 

resorted  to  at  the  West.   I  had,  however,  taken  this  chap,  xxv 
subject  under  consideration  soon  after  reassuming 
command  in  the  field,  and,  as  abeady  stated,  my  B^k^Sw^* 
only  military  engineer  reported  unfavorably.    Be-       ^^ 
sides  this,  the  troops  with  me,  officers  and  men, 
needed  discipline  and  drill  more  than  they  did  ex- 
perience with  the  pick,  shovel,  and  ax.    Eeinforce- 
ments  were  arriving  almost  daily,  composed  of 
troops  that  had  been  hastily  thrown  together  into 
companies  and  regiments — fragments  of  incom- 
plete organizations,  the  men  and  officers  strangers 
to  each  other.    Under  all  these  circumstances  I 
concluded  that   drill  and  discipline  were  worth 
more  to  our  men  than  fortifications. 

General  Buell  was  a  brave,  intelligent  officer,  G«n.Bnfiii 
with  as  much  professional  pride  and  ambition  of  a 
commendable  sort  as  I  ever  knew.  I  had  been  two  isw-tt 
years  at  West  Point  with  him,  and  had  served  with 
him  afterward,  in  garrison  and  in  the  Mexican  war, 
several  years  more.  He  was  not  given  in  early  life 
or  in  mature  years  to  forming  intimate  acquain- 
tances. He  was  studious  by  habit,  and  commanded 
the  confidence  and  respect  of  all  who  knew  him. 
lEe  was  a  strict  disciplinarian,  and  perhaps  did  not 
distinguish  sufficiently  between  the  volunteer  who 
"  enlisted  for  the  war  "  and  the  soldier  who  serves 
in  time  of  peace.  One  system  embraced  men  who 
risked  life  for  a  principle,  and  often  men  of  social 
standing,  competence  or  wealth,  and  independence 
of  character.  The  other  includes,  as  a  rule,  only 
men  who  could  not  do  as  well  in  any  other  occu- 
pation. .   General  Buell  became  an  obnect  of  harsh 


296  PEESONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

Chap.  XXV  him  Capable  of  a  dishonorable  act,  and  nothing  could 
be  more  dishonorable  than  to  accept  high  rank  and 
command  in  war  and  then  betray  the  trust.  When 
I  came  into  command  of  the  army  in  1864,  I  re- 
quested the  Secretary  of  War  to  restore  General 
Buell  to  duty, 
critfcffirf-  After  the  war,  during  the  summer  of  1865,  I 
tepthewap  traveled  considerably  through  the  North,  and  was 
everywhere  met  by  large  numbers  of  people.  Every 
one  had  his  opinion  about  the  manner  in  which  the 
war  had  been  conducted:  who  among  the  gener- 
als had  failed,  how,  and  why.  Correspondents  of 
the  press  were  ever  on  hand  to  hear  every  word 
dropped,  and  were  not  always  disposed  to  report 
correctly  what  did  not  confirm  their  preconceived 
notions,  either  about  the  conduct  of  the  war  or  the 
individuals  concerned  in  it.  The  opportunity  fre- 
quently occuri'ed  for  me  to  defend  General  Buell 
against  what  I  believed  to  be  most  unjust  charges. 
On  one  occasion  a  correspondent  put  in  my  mouth 
the  very  charge  I  had  so  oftened  refuted — of  disloy- 
alty. This  brought  from  General  Buell  a  very  severe 
retort,  which  I  saw  in  the  New  York  "WorW 
some  time  before  I  received  the  letter  itself.  I 
could  very  well  understand  his  grievance  at  seeing 
untrue  and  disgraceful  charges  apparently  sustained 
by  an  oflScer  who,  at  the  time,  was  at  the  head  of  the 
army.  I  replied  to  him,  but  not  through  the  press. 
I  kept  no  copy  of  my  letter,  nor  did  I  ever  see  it  in 
print ;  neither  did  I  receive  an  answer. 

General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston,  who  commanded 
the  Confederate  forces  at  the  beginning  of  the  battle. 


GENERAL  JOHKBTON  297 


was  not  necessarily  fatal,  or  even  dangerous.    But  chap,  xxv 
he  was  a  man  who  would  not  abandon  what  he  to/i5?e^ 

A.  8.  Job 
ton,m».6: 


deemed  an  important  trust  in  the  face  of  danger,  ti^vK^ 


and  consequently  continued  in  the  saddle,  com- 
manding, until  so  exhausted  by  the  loss  of  blood 
that  he  had  to  be  taken  from  his  horse,  and  soon 
after  died.  The  news  was  not  long  in  reaching  our 
side,  and  I  suppose  was  quite  an  encouragement  to 
the  National  soldiers. 

I  had  known  Johnston  slightly  in  the  Mexican 
war  and  later  as  an  officer  in  the  regular  army.    He 
was  a  man  of  high  character  and  ability.    His  con- 
temporaides  at  West  Point,  and  officers  generally      leaa-ae 
who  came  to  know  him  personally  later,  and  who  pou?»"^, 
remained  on  our  side,  expected  him  to  prove  the   ^'iS*  *** 
most  formidable  man  to  meet  that  the  Confederacy 
would  produce. 

I  once  wrote  that  nothing  occurred  in  his  brief 
command  of  an  army  to  prove  or  disprove  the  high 
estimate  that  had  been  placed  upon  his  military 
ability;  but  after  studying  the  orders  and  des- 
patches of  Johnston  I  am  compelled  to  materially 
modify  my  views  of  that  officer's  qualifications  as  a 
soldier.  My  judgment  now  is  that  he  was  vacillat- 
ing and  undecided  in  his  actions. 

All  the  disasters  in  Kentucky  and  Tennessee  were 
so  discouraging  to  the  authorities  in  Richmond  that 
Jefferson  Davis  wrote  an  unofficial  letter  to  Johns-  ^^^b. 
ton  expressing  his  own  anxiety  and  that  of  the 
public,  and  saying  that  he  had  made  such  defense 
as  was  dictated  by  long  friendship,  but  that  in  the 
absence  of  a  report  he  needed  facts.    The  letter 


Vn,  267-^1 


298 


PERSONAL  MEMOntS  OF  U.  B.  GRANT 


Chap.  XXV 


W.  P.  Johns- 
ton, Life  of 
A.  8.  Jobns- 
ton,  pp.  589, 
088 


Battles  ft 
Leaders,  I» 

676,  577 


Life  Of  A.  8. 
Jobnston, 
pp.  666-672 


General  Johnston  raised  another  army  as  rapidly 
as  he  could,  and  fortified  or  strongly  intrenched  at 
Corinth.  He  knew  the  National  troops  were  pre- 
paring to  attack  him  in  his  chosen  position.  But 
he  had  evidently  become  so  disturbed  at  the  results 
of  his  operations  that  he  resolved  to  strike  out  in 
an  offensive  campaign  which  would  restore  all  that 
was  lost,  and,  if  successful,  accomplish  still  more. 
We  have  the  authority  of  his  son  and  biographer 
for  saying  that  his  plan  was  to  attack  the  forces  at 
Shiloh  and  crush  them ;  then  to  cross  the  Tennes- 
see and  destroy  the  army  of  Buell,  and  push  the  war 
across  the  Ohio  River.  The  design  was  a  bold  one ; 
but  we  have  the  same  authority  for  saying  that  in 
the  execution  Johnston  showed  vacillation  and  in- 
decision. He  left  Corinth  on  the  2d  of  April,  and 
was  not  ready  to  attack  until  the  6th.  The  distance 
his  army  had  to  march  was  less  than  twenty  Iniles. 
Beauregard,  his  second  in  command,  was  opposed 
to  the  attack  for  two  reasons :  first,  he  thought,  if 
let  alone,  the  National  troops  would  attack  the 
Confederates  in  their  intrenchments ;  second,  we 
were  in  ground  of  our  own  choosing  and  would 
necessarily  be  intrenched.  Johnston  not  only  lis- 
tened to  the  objection  of  Beauregard  to  an  attack, 
but  held  a  council  of  war  on  the  subject  on  the 
morning  of  the  5th.  On  the  evening  of  the  same 
day  he  was  in  consultation  with  some  of  his  gen- 
erals on  the  same  subject,  and  still  again  on  the 
morning  of  the  6th.    During  this  last  consultation, 


BEMABES  ON  SHILOH  299 

also  seems  to  me  to  settle  the   question  as  to  chap.xxv 
whether  there  was  a  surprise. 

I  do  not  question  the  personal  courage  of  Gen- 
eral Johnston,  or  his  ability.  But  he  did  not  win 
the  distinction  predicted  for  him  by  many  of  his 
friends.  He  did  prove  that  as  a  general  he  was 
overestimated. 

General  Beauregard  was  next  in  rank  to  Johns-     ^ii^uj^ 
ton,  and  succeeded  to  the  command,  which  he  re-   m^\'l\ 
tained  to  the  close  of  the  battle  and  during  the  jWi!i^\ 
subsequent  retreat  on  Corinth,  as  well  as  in  the  Mar's.  laS"; 
Siege  of  that  place.    His  tactics  have  been  severely  ^-^^^^^ 
criticized  by  Confederate  writers,  but  I  do  not  be-  "^^i^^]^/ 
lieve  his  fallen  chief  could  have  done  any  better       ^^ 
under  the  circumstances.    Some  of  these  critics 
claim  that  Shiloh  was  won  when  Johnston  fell,  and 
that  if  he  had  not  fallen  the  army  under  me  would 
have  been  annihilated  or  captured.    Ifs  defeated  the 
Confederates  at  Shiloh.    There  is  little  doubt  that 
we  would  have  been  disgracefully  beaten  if  all  the 
shells  and  bullets  fired  by  us  had  passed  harmlessly 
over  the  enemy,  and  if'aM  of  theirs  had  taken  effect. 
Commanding  generals  are  liable  to  be  killed  during 
engagements ;  and  the  fact  that  when  he  was  shot 
Johnston  was  leading  a  brigade  to  induce  it  to  ^^S^Ji;^/ 
make  a  charge  which  had  been  repeatedly  ordered   ^^'  *"'  ^ 
is  evidence  that  there  was  neither  the  imiversal  de- 
moralization on  our  side  nor  the  unboimded  confi- 
dence on  theirs  which  has  been  claimed.    There  was, 
in  fact,  no  hour  during  the  day  when  I  doubted  the 


300  PEBSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GBANT 

Chap.  XXV  Colonel  William  Preston  Johnston  is  very  graphic 
^liSstoiif '  ^^d  ^^^  t^ld-  The  reader  will  imagine  that  he  can 
pp^et  g^^  ^g^jj  blow  struck,  a  demoralized  and  broken 
mob  of  Union  soldiers,  each  blow  sending  the 
enemy  more  demoralized  than  ever  toward  the 
Tennessee  Eiver,  which  was  a  little  more  than  two 
miles  away  at  the  beginning  of  the  onset.  If  the 
reader  does  not  stop  to  inquire  why,  with  such 
Confederate  success  for  more  than  twelve  hours  of 
hard  fighting,  the  National  troops  were  not  all  killed, 
captured,  or  driven  into  the  river,  he  will  regard  the 
pen  picture  as  perfect.  But  I  witnessed  the  fight 
from  the  National  side  from  eight  o'clock  in  the 
morning  until  night  closed  the  contest.  I  see  but 
little  in  the  description  that  I  can  recognize.  The 
Confederate  troops  fought  well,  and  deserve  com- 
mendation enough  for  their  bravery  and  endurance 
on  the  6th  of  April,  without  detracting  from  their 
antagonists  or  claiming  anything  more  than  their 
just  dues. 
^^xa)T'  T^^  reports  of  the  enemy  show  that  their  condi- 
?p?887!^  tion  at  the  end  of  the  first  day  was  deplorable ;  their 
toM?g,pp.'  losses  in  killed  and  wounded  had  been  very  heavy, 
*^  ^^  and  their  stragglers  had  been  quite  as  numerous  as 
on  the  National  side,  with  the  difference  that  those 
of  the  enemy  left  the  field  entirely,  and  were  not 
brought  back  to  their  respective  commands  for 
many  days.  On  the  Union  side  but  few  of  the 
stragglers  fell  back  farther  than  the  Landing  on 
the  river,  and  many  of  these  were  in  line  for  duty 
on  the  second  day.  The  admissions  of  the  highest 
Confederate  officers  engaged  at  Shiloh  make  the 
claim  of  a  victory  for  them  absurd.  The  victory 
was  not  to  either  party  until  the  battle  was  over. 


BEMABES  ON  SHILOH  301 

It  was  then  a  Union  victoiy,  in  which  the  armies  chap,  xxv 

of  the  Tennessee  and  the  Ohio  both  participated. 

But  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  fought  the  entire 

rebel  army  on  the  6th,  and  held  it  at  bay  until  near   April.  1862 

night ;  and  night  alone  closed  the  conflict,  and  not 

the  three  regiments  of  Nelson's  division. 

The  Confederates  fought  with  courage  at  Shiloh,  ^^S^^ 
but  the  particular  skill  claimed  I  could  not  and  still 
cannot  see ;  though  there  is  nothing  to  criticize  ex- 
cept the  claims  put  forward  for  it  since.  But  the 
Confederate  claimants  for  superiority  in  strategy, 
superiority  in  generalship,  and  superiority  in  dash 
and  prowess  are  not  so  unjust  to  the  Union  troops 
engaged  at  Shiloh  as  are  many  Northern  writers. 
The  troops  on  both  sides  were  American,  and  united 
they  need  not  fear  any  foreign  foe.  It  is  possible 
that  the  Southern  man  started  in  with  a  little  more 
dash  than  his  Northern  brother ;  but  he  was  corre- 
spondingly less  enduring. 

The  endeavor  of  the  enemy  on  the  first  day  was 
simply  to  hurl  their  men  against  ours — first  at  one 
point,  then  at  another,  sometimes  at  several  points 
at  once.  This  they  did  with  daring  and  energy, 
until  at  night  the  rebel  troops  were  worn  out.  Our 
effort  during  the  same  time  was  to  be  prepared  to 
resist  assaults  wherever  made.  The  object  of  the 
Confederates  on  the  second  day  was  to  get  away 
with  as  much  of  their  army  and  material  as  possi- 
ble. Ours  then  was  to  drive  them  from  our  front, 
and  to  capture  or  destroy  as  great  a  part  as  possible 
of  theii*  men  and  material.  We  were  successful  in 
driving  them  back,  but  not  so  successful  in  captures 
as  if  further  pursuit  could  have  been  made.  As  it 
was,  we  captured  or  recaptured  on  the  second  day 


302  PERSONAL  KEMOIBS  OF  U.  8.  GRANT 

Chap,  xxv  about  as  much  artillery  as  we  lost  on  the  first ;  and, 
^*Mi?'£?^  leaving  out  the  one  great  capture  of  Prentiss,  we 
took  more  prisoners  on  Monday  than  the  enemy 
ne  ^iuM,  gained  from  us  on  Sunday.    On  the  6th  Sherman 
90^,  308, 399  j^g^  seven  pieces  of  artillery,  McClemand  six,  Pren- 
tiss eight,  and  Hurlbut  two  batteries.    On  the  7th 
Sherman  captured  seven  guns,  McClemand  three, 
and  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  twenty. 
gj5^]2        -^*  Shiloh  the  effective  strength  of  the  Union 
8bUoh      forces  on  the  morning  of  the  6th  was  thirty-thi-ee 
thousand  men.    Lew.  Wallace  brought  five  thou- 
sand more  after  nightfalL    Beauregard  reported 
w.B.x(i)896  the  enemy^s  strength  at  40,335.    According  to  the 
custom  of  enumeration  in  the  South,  this  number 
probably  excluded  every  man  enlisted  as  musician 
or  detailed  as  guard  or  nurse,  and  all  commissioned 
oflBcers — everybody  who  did  not  carry  a  musket  or 
serve  a  cannon.    With  us  everybody  in  the  field  re- 
ceiving pay  from  the  government  is  counted.    Ex- 
cluding the  troops  who  fled,  panic-stricken,  before 
they  had  fired  a  shot,  there  was  not  a  time  during 
the  6th  when  we  had  more  than  twenty-five  thou- 
sand men  in  line.    On  the  7th  Buell  brought  twenty 
thousand  more.    Of  his  remaining  two  divisions, 
Thomas's  did  not  reach  the  field  during  the  engage- 
ment ;  Wood's  arrived  before  firing  had  ceased,  but 
not  in  time  to  be  of  much  service. 
w.R.xa)io8      Our  loss  in  the  two  days'  fight  was  1754  killed, 
8408  wounded,  and  2885  missing.    Of  these  2103 
were  in  the  Army  of  the  Ohio.    Beauregard  re- 
ibid.  896    Dorted  a  total  loss  of  10,699,  of  whom  1728  were 


NAVAL  SUPPOBT  AT  SHILOH  303 

divisions  of  McClemand  and  Sherman  alone  than  chap,  xxv 
here  reported,  and  four  thousand  was  the  estimate 
of  the  burial  parties  for  the  whole  field.    Beau- 
regard reports  the  Confederate  force  on  the  6th  at  «^|g5iu. 
over  forty  thousand,  and  their  total  loss  during  the   '®*^"  ^' 
two  days  at  10,699 ;  and  at  the  same  time  declares 
that  he  could  put  only  twenty  thousand  men  in  w.b.x(1)89i 
battle  on  the  morning  of  the  7th. 

The  navy  gave  a  hearty  support  to  the  army  at  ^^^pj'*^ 
Shiloh,  as,  indeed,  it  always  did  both  before  and 
subsequently  when  I  was  in  command.    The  nature 
of  the  ground  was  such,  however,  that  on  this  oc- 
casion it  could  do  nothing  in  aid  of  the  troops  until 
sundown  on  the  first  day.    The  country  was  broken  ^7,^^466 
and  heavily  timbered,  cutting  off  all  view  of  the 
battle  from  the  river,  so  that  friends  would  be  as 
much  in  danger  from  fire  from  the  gunboats  as  the 
foe.    But  about  sundown,  when  the  National  troops 
were  back  in  their  last  position,  the  right  of  the 
enemy  was  near  the  river  and  exposed  to  the  fire  of 
the  two  gunboats,  which  was  delivered  with  vigor 
and  effect.    After  nightfall,  when  firing  had  en- 
tirely ceased  on  land,  the  commander  of  the  fleet 
informed  himself,  approximately,  of  the  position  of 
our  troops,  and  suggested  the  idea  of  dropping  a  ^'S^?^ 
shell  within  the  lines  of  the  enemy  every  fifteen 
minutes  during  the  night.    This  was  done  ^wit\i 
effect,  as  is  proved  by  the  Confederate  reports.  _^e«wu*Mx 

Up  to  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  I,  as  weU  as  thousaiiA^  b^.x...«. 
of  other  citizens,  believed  that  the  rebellion  ag»»^^^ 
the  government  would  collapse  suddenly  ^^^  ^^^^ 
if  a  decisive  victorv  could  be  chained  over  any  ^    . 


304  PEBSOKAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

Chap.  XXV  was  captured  or  destroyed.  Bowling  Green,  Colum- 
bus, and  Hickman,  Kentucky,  fell  in  consequence, 
and  Clarksville  and  Nashville,  Tennessee, — the  last 
two  with  an  immense  amount  of  stores, — also  fell 
into  our  hands.  The  Tennessee  and  Cumberland 
rivers,  from  thek  mouths  to  the  head  of  navigation, 
were  secured.  C^ut  when  Confederate  armies  were 
collected  which  not  only  attempted  to  hold  a 
line  farther  south,  from  Memphis  to  Chattanooga, 
Knoxville,  and  on  to  the  Atlantic,  but  assumed  the 
offensive  and  made  such  a  gallant  eflfort  to  regain 
what  had  been  lost,  then,  indeed,  I  gave  up  all  idea 
of  saving  the  Union  except  by  complete  conquest. 
Up  to  that  time  it  had  been  the  policy  of  our  army 
— certainly  of  that  portion  commanded  by  me — to 
protect  the  property  of  the  citizens  whose  territory 
was  invaded  without  regard  to  their  sentiments, 

oo"^t  wh^tJi^r  Union  or  Secession.  After  this,  however, 
I  regarded  it  as  humane  to  both  sides  to  protect  the 
persons  of  those  found  at  their  homes,  but  to  con- 
sume everything  that  could  be  used  to  support  or 
supply  armies.  Protection  was  still  continued  over 
such  supplies  as  were  within  lines  held  by  us  and 
which  we  expected  to  continue  to  hold;  but  such 
supplies  within  the  reach  of  Confederate  armies  I 
regarded  as  much  contraband  as  arms  or  ordnance 
stores.  Their  destruction  was  accomplished  with- 
out bloodshed,  and  tended  to  the  same  result  as  the 
destruction  of  armies.    I  continued  this  policy  to 


BEMAKKS  ON  8HIL0H  305 

the  property  over  to  officers  of  the  quartermaster  chap,  xxv 
or  commissary  departments,  to  be  issued  as  if  fur- 
nished from  our  Northern  depots.  But  much  was 
destroyed  without  receipts  to  owners,  when  it  could 
not  be  brought  within  our  lines  and  would  other- 
wise have  gone  to  the  support  of  secession  and 
rebellion. 

This  policy,  I  believe,  exercised  a  material  influ- 
ence in  hastening  the  end. 

The  battle  of  Shiloh,  or  Pittsburg  Landing,  has 
been  perhaps  less  understood,  or,  to  state  the  case 
more  accurately,  more  persistently  misunderstood, 
than  any  other  engagement  between  National  and 
Confederate   troops   during  the   entire   rebellion. 
Correct  reports  of  the  battle  have  been  published, 
notably  by  Sherman,  Badeau,  and,  in  a  speech  be-    fJJJSSgS; 
fore  a  meeting  of  veterans,  by  General  Prentiss ;  but   dwm,^L 
all  of  these  appeared  long  subsequent  to  the  close  ^^  ^^  ^ 
of  the  rebellion  and  after  public  opinion  had  been 
most  erroneously  formed.^ 

I  myself  made  no  report  to  General  HaUeck, 
further  than  was  contained  in  a  letter,  written  im-  wJt.3ta>ioe 
mediately  after  the  battle,  informing  him  that  an 
engagement  had  been  fought  and  announcing  the 
result.    A  few  days   afterward  General  Halleck 
moved  his  headquarters  to  Pittsburg  Landing  and 
assumed  command  of  the  troops  in  the  field.    Al- 
though next  to  him  in  rank,  and  nominally  in  com- 
mand of  my  old  district  and  army,  I  was  ignored 
as  much  as  if  I  had  been  at  the  most  distant  point 
of  territory  within  my  jixxrisdiction;  and  although.  1 


306  PERSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GBAKT 

Chap,  xzt  wa8  in  Command  of  all  the  troops  engaged  at  Shiloh, 
I  was  not  permitted  to  see  one  of  the  reports  of 
Greneral  Buell  or  his  subordinates  in  that  battle 
until  they  were  published  by  the  War  Department, 
long  after  the  event.  For  this  reason  I  never  made 
a  full  official  report  of  this  engag^nent 


CHAPTER  XXVI 

HALLECK  ASSUMES  COMMAND  IN  THE  FIELD — THE  AD- 
VANCE UPON  COKINTH — OCCUPATION  OP  OOBINTH 
— THE  ABMY  SEPARATED 

GENERAL  HALLECK  arrived  at  Pittsburg   cilxxvi 
Landing  on  the  11th  of  April,  and  immedi-  jgSSSSSJl, 
ately  assumed  command  in  the  field.    On  the  21st     **®"^ 
General  Pope  arrived  with  an  army  thirty  thousand 
strong,  fresh  from  the  capture  of  Island  No.  10,  in 
the  Mississippi   River.    He  went  into   camp  at 
Hamburg  Landing,  five  miles  above  Pittsburg. 
Halleck  had  now  three  armies:  the  Army  of  the 
Ohio,  Buell  commanding;  the  Army  of  the  Miss- 
issippi, Pope  commanding;  and  the  Army  of  the 
Tennessee.    His  orders  divided  the  combined  force  w.B.X(a)m 
into  the  right  wing,  reserve,  center,  and  left  wing. 
Major-General  George  H.  Thomas,  who  had  been  in 
Buell's  army,  was  transferred  with  his  division  to 
the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  and  given  command  of 
the  right  wing,  composed  of  all  of  that  anny  ex- 
cept McClemand's  and  Lew.  Wallace*s  divisions. 
McClemand  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  the 

TAfiArvA.  oi^rmv^fiA^    nf   "hi a  rvxKrn   a-nA   T*aW-  ^WA.lljtnfi'a 


308  PERSONAL  MEMOmS  OP  U.  8.  GEANT 

CB.XXVI  of  the  whole,  and  was  also  supposed  to  be  in  com- 
mand of  the  right  wing  and  reserve. 

Orders  were  given  to  all  the  commanders  engaged 
at  Shiloh  to  send  in  their  reports  without  delay  to 
department  headquarters.  Those  from  oflBcers  of 
the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  were  sent  through  me ; 
but  from  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  they  were  sent  by 
General  Buell,  without  passing  through  my  hands. 
General  Halleck  ordered  me,  verbally,  to  send  in 
my  report ;  but  I  positively  declined,  on  the  ground 
that  he  had  received  the  reports  of  a  part  of  the 
army  engaged  at  Shiloh  without  their  coming 
through  me.  He  admitted  that  my  refusal  was 
justifiable  under  the  circumstances,  but  explained 
that  he  had  wanted  to  get  the  reports  oflf  before 
moving  the  command,  and  as  fast  as  a  report 
had  come  to  him  he  had  forwarded  it  to  Wash- 
ington. 

U7^?m  Preparations  were  at  once  made  upon  the  arrival 
of  the  new  commander  for  an  advance  on  Corinth. 
Owl  Creek,  on  our  right,  was  bridged,  and  expedi- 
tions were  sent  to  the  northwest  and  west  to  ascer- 
tain if  our  position  was  being  threatened  from  those 
quarters ;  the  roads  toward  Corinth  were  corduroyed 
and  new  ones  made ;  lateral  roads  were  also  con- 
structed, so  that  in  case  of  necessity  troops  march- 
ing by  different  routes  could  reinforce  each  other. 
All  commanders  were  cautioned  against  bringing 
on  an  engagement,  and  informed  in  so  many  words 
that  it  would  be  better  to  retreat  than  to  fight.    By 


THE  ADVANCE  UPON  COKINTH  309 

Pittsburg.    Everywhere  small  bodies  of  the  enemy    ch.xxvi 
had  been  encountered,  but  they  were  observers  and 
not  in  force  to  fight  battles. 

Corinth,  Mississippi,  lies  in  a  southwesterly  direc-  ^/cSSSi^ 
tion  from  Pittsburg  Landing,  and  about  nineteen 
miles  away  as  the  bird  would  fly,  but  probably 
twenty-two  by  the  nearest  wagon-road.  It  is  about 
four  miles  south  of  the  line  dividing  the  States  of 
Tennessee  and  Mississippi,  and  at  the  junction  of 
the  Memphis  and  Charleston  railroad  with  the 
Mobile  and  Ohio  road,  which  runs  from  Columbus 
to  Mobile.  From  Pittsburg  to  Corinth  the  land  is 
rolling,  but  at  no  point  reaching  an  elevation  that 
makes  high  hills  to  pass  over.  In  1862  the  greater 
part  of  the  country  was  covered  with  forest,  with 
intervening  clearings  and  houses.  Underbrush  was 
dense  in  the  low  grounds  along  the  creeks  and 
ravines,  but  generally  not  so  thick  on  the  high 
land  as  to  prevent  men  passing  through  with  ease. 
There  are  two  small  creeks  running  from  north  of 
the  town  and  connecting  some  four  miles  south, 
where  they  form  Bridge  Creek,  which  empties  into 
the  Tuscumbia  River.  Corinth  is  on  the  ridge  be- 
tween these  streams,  and  is  a  naturally  strong  de- 
fensive position.  The  creeks  are  insignificant  in 
volume  of  water,  but  the  stream  to  the  east  widens 
out  in  front  of  the  town  into  a  swamp,  impassable 
in  the  presence  of  an  enemy.  On  the  crest  of  the 
west  bank  of  this  stream  the  enemy  was  strongly 
intrenched. 

Corinth  was  a  valuable  strategic  Doint  for  the    ^^^^oxtasic^ 


310 


PERSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  8.  GRANT 


CH.XXVI  Nashville,  when  it  could  have  been  taken  without 
a  battle ;  but  failing  then,  it  should  have  been  taken, 
without  delay,  on  the  concentration  of  troops  at 
Pittsburg  Landing  after  the  battle  of  Shiloh.  In 
fact,  the  arrival  of  Pope  should  not  have  been 
awaited.  There  was  no  time,  from  the  battle  of 
Shiloh  up  to  the  evacuation  of  Corinth,  when  the 
enemy  would  not  have  left  if  pushed.  The  de- 
moralization among  the  Confederates  from  their 
defeats  at  Henry  and  Donelson,  their  long  marches 
from  Bowling  Green,  Columbus,  and  Nashville,  and 
their  failure  at  Shiloh, — in  fact,  from  having  been 
driven  out  of  Kentucky  and  Tennessee, — was  so 
great  that  a  stand,  for  the  time,  would  have  been 
impossible.  Beauregard  made  strenuous  efforts  to 
reinforce  himself,  and  partially  succeeded.  He  ap- 
pealed to  the  people  of  the  Southwest  for  new  regi- 
ments, and  received  a  few.  A.  S.  Johnston  had 
made  efforts  to  reinforce  in  the  same  quarter,  be- 
fore the  battle  of  Shiloh,  but  in  a  different  way. 
He  had  negroes  sent  out  to  him  to  take  the  place 
of  teamsters,  company  cooks,  and  laborers  in  every 
capacity,  so  as  to  put  all  his  white  men  into  the 
ranks.  The  people,  while  willing  to  send  their  sons 
to  the  field,  were  not  willing  to  part  with  their 
negroes.  It  is  only  fair  to  state  that  they  probably 
wanted  their  blacks  to  raise  supplies  for  the  army 
and  for  the  families  left  at  home. 

Beauregard,  however,  was  reinforced  by  Van 
Dom  immediately  after  Shiloh  with  seventeen 
thousand  men.    Interior  points,  less  exposed,  were 

i86ofBrig.-  pIs^  rlftnlAtftd  to  add  to  the  strencrth  at  Corinth. 


Earl  Van 
Dom.W.P. 

1888-43; 

Mexico, 

1846-48; 

MiOpr,  9d 
Cav.jonem, 


MAP 

OF  THB 

COUNTRY  ABOUT 

CORINTH, 

MISS. 


312  FEBSONAL  MEMOIBS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

CH.XXVI    a  large  force  on  paper,  but  probably  not  much 
•'^^jSSau-  ^^^^  fi^ty  thousand  effective  men.    We  estimated 
^*^  j«6' '  ^   his  strength  at  seventy  thousand.    Our  own  was, 
w.^R  x^(2)   in  round  numbers,  one  hundred  and  twenty  thou- 
sand.   The  defensible  nature  of   the  ground  at 
Coiinth,  and  the  fortifications,  made  fifty  thousand 
then  enough  to  maintain  their  position  against 
double  that  number  for  an  indefinite  time  but  for 
the  demoralization  spoken  of. 
1863  On  the  30th  of  April  the  grand  army  commenced 

its  advance  from  Shiloh  upon  Corinth.  The  move- 
MeSSSSS^i  ^®^*  ^^^  ^  siege  from  the  start  to  the  close.  The 
^^  National  troops  were  always  behind  intrenchments, 
except,  of  course,  the  small  reconnoitering  parties 
sent  to  the  front  to  clear  the  way  for  an  advance. 
Even  the  commanders  of  these  parties  were  cau- 
w.R.x(2)m  tioned  "not  to  bring  on  an  engagement.^  "It  is 
better  to  retreat  than  to  fight.^  The  enemy  were 
constantly  watching  our  advance,  but  as  they  were 
simply  observers  there  were  but  few  engagements 
that  even  threatened  to  become  battles.  All  the 
engagements  fought  ought  to  have  served  to  en- 
courage the  enemy.  Roads  were  again  made  in 
our  front,  and  again  corduroyed;  a  line  was  in- 
trenched, and  the  troops  were  advanced  to  the  new 
position.  Cross-roads  were  constructed  to  these 
new  positions  to  enable  the  troops  to  concentrate  in 
case  of  attack.  The  National  armies  were  thor- 
oughly intrenched  all  the  way  from  the  Tennessee 
River  to  Corinth. 

Sberman,  ITnr  TVi'U'flAl'F    T  "wnjs.   liff.la  mnfa  flion   or*   /\'haiaT«rm-»» 


THE  ADVANCE  UPON  OOBINTH  313 

My  position  was  so  embairassing,  in  fact,  that  I    caxxvi 
made  several  applications  during  the  siege  to  be 
relieved. 

General  Halleck  kept  his  headquarters  generally, 
if  not  all  the  time,  with  the  right  wing.    Pope,  be- 
ing on  the  extreme  left,  did  not  see  so  much  of  his 
chief,  and  consequently  got  loose,  as  it  were,  at 
times.    On  the  3d  of  May  he  was  at  Seven  Mile       isea 
Creek  with  the  main  body  of  his  command,  but 
threw  forward  a  division  to  Farmington,  within 
four  miles  of  Corinth.    His  troops  had  quite  a  little  w.b.x(i)8oi 
engagement  at  Farmington  on  that  day,  but  carried 
the  place  with  considerable  loss  to  the  enemy. 
There  would  then  have  been  no  difficulty  in  ad- 
vancing the  center  and  right  so  as  to  form  a  new  • 
line  well  up  to  the  enemy,  but  Pope  was  ordered 
back  to  conform  with  the  general  line.    On  the  8th 
of  May  he  moved  again,  taking  his  whole  force  to  ^af intiT? 
Farmington,  and  pushed  out  two  divisions  close  to 
the  rebel  line.    Again  he  was  ordered  back.    By 
the  4th  of  May  the  center  and  right  wing  reached 
Monterey,  twelve  miles  out.  Their  advance  was  slow 
from  there,  for  they  intrenched  with  every  forward 
movement.    The  left  wing  moved  up  again  on  the 
25th  of  May  and  intrenched  itself  close  to  the  enemy. 
The  creek,  with  the  marsh  before  described,  sepa-  Ante,  p.  so^ 
rated  the  two  lines.     Skirmishers  thirty  feet  apart 
could  have  maintained  either  line  at  this  point. 

Our  center  and  right  were,  at  this  time,  extended 
so  that  the  right  of  the  right  wing  was  probably  five 
miles  from  Corinth  and  four  from  the  works  in  tlieir 
front.    The  creek,  which  was  a  formidable  obstacle 


CH.XXVI  cupied  two  positions.  One  of  them,  as  much  as  two 
miles  out  from  his  main  line,  was  on  a  commanding 
elevation  and  defended  by  an  intrenched  battery 
with  infantry  supports.  A  heavy  wood  intervened 
between  this  work  and  the  National  forces.  In  rear 
to  the  south  there  was  a  clearing  extending  a  mile 
or  more,. and  south  of  this  clearing  a  log  house 
which  had  been  loopholed  and  was  occupied  by 

MeSS?!    iiifantry.     Sherman's  division  carried  these  two 


'in.  X. 


^"3^1)7*0'  positions  with  some  loss  to  himself,  but  with  prob- 
ably greater  to  the  enemy,  on  the  28th  of  May, 
and  on  that  day  the  investment  of  Corinth  was 
complete,  or  as  complete  as  it  was  ever  made. 
Thomas's  right  now  rested  west  of  the  Mobile  and 
Ohio  railroad.  Pope's  left  commanded  the  Mem- 
phis and  Charleston  railroad  east  of  Corinth. 

Some  days  before  I  had  suggested  to  the  com- 
manding general  that  I  thought  if  he  would  move 
the  Army  of  the  Mississippi  at  night,  by  the  rear  of 
the  center  and  right,  ready  to  advance  at  daylight, 
Pope  would  find  no  natural  obstacle  in  his  front,  and, 
I  believed,  no  serious  artificial  one.  The  ground  or 
works  occupied  by  our  left  could  be  held  by  a  thin 
picket-line,  owing  to  the  stream  and  swamp  in 
front.  To  the  right  the  troops  would  have  a  dry 
ridge  to  march  over.  I  was  silenced  so  quickly  that 
I  felt  that  possibly  I  had  suggested  an  unmilitaiy 
movement. 
1883  Later,  probably  on  the  28th  of  May,  General  Lo- 

gan, whose  command  was  then  on  the  Mobile  and 
Ohio  railroad,  said  to  me  that  the  enemy  had  been 
evacuating  for  several  days,  and  that  if  allowed 
he  could  go  into  Corinth  with  his  brigade.  Trains 
of  cars  were  heard  coming  in  and  going  out  of 


OCCUPATION  OF  COKINTH  315 

Corinth  constantly.    Some  of  the  men  who  had  been    ch.  xxvi 
engaged  in  various  capacities  on  raiboads  before 
the  war  claimed  that  they  could  tell,  by  putting  " 
their  ears  to  the  rail,  not  only  which  way  the  trains 
were  moving,  but  which  trains  were  loaded  and 
which  were  empty.    They  said  loaded  trains  had  ^ 
been  going  out  for  several  days  and  empty  ones 
coming  in.    Subsequent  events  proved  the  correct- 
ness of  their  judgment.    Beauregard  published  his  ^'^^qV^ 
orders  for  the  evacuation  of  Corinth  on  the  26th  of  ^ 
May,  and  fixed  the  29th  for  the  departure  of  his 
troops;  and  on  the  30th  of  May  General  Halleck 
had  his  whole  army  drawn  up  prepared  for  battle, 
and  announced  in  orders  that  there  was  every  indi- 
cation that  our  left  was  to  be  attacked  that  morn- 
ing.   Corinth  had  already  been  evacuated,  and  the 
National  troops  marched  on  and  took  possession 
without    opposition.     Everything  had  been   de-     n)id.  «68 
stroyed  or  carried  away.    The  Confederate  com- 
mander had  instructed  his  soldiers  to  cheer  on  the  „5<»™?»' , 

"  Gen.Beau- 

arrival  of  eveiy  train,  to  create  the  impression  '**^"^' 
among  the  Yankees  that  reinforcements  were  arriv- 
ing. There  was  not  a  sick  or  wounded  man  left 
by  the  Confederates,  nor  stores  of  any  kind.  Some 
ammunition  had  been  blown  up, — not  removed, —  w.r.x(i)748 
but  the  trophies  of  war  were  a  few  Quaker  guns 
— logs  of  about  the  diameter  of  ordinary  cannon, 
mounted  on  wheels  of  wagons  and  pointed  in  tlie 
most  threatening  manner  toward  us.  ^?t£p. 

The  possession  of  Corinth  by  the  National  troops  ^^^tl 
was  of  strategic  importance,  but  tlxe  victory  v^as  ^^ottv" 

,  1  -^^  Ijuue"  ana 

barren  m  every  other  particular.      ;it  ^^*  nearly  **^^^Ji?* 


316  PEBSONAL  MEMOIBS  OF  U.  S.  GBANT 

CH.XXVI  improved  by  the  immunity  with  which  they  were 
permitted  to  remove  all  public  property  and  then 
withdraw  themselves.  On  om*  side,  I  know  officers 
and  men  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee — and  I 
presume  the  same  is  tioie  of  those  of  the  other 
♦  commands — were  disappointed  at  the  result.  They 
could  not  see  how  the  mere  occupation  of  places 
was  to  close  the  war  while  large  and  effective  rebel 
annies  existed.  They  believed  that  a  well-directed 
attack  would  at  least  have  partially  destroyed  the 
army  defending  Corinth.  For  myself,  I  am  satisfied 
that  Corinth  could  have  been  captured  in  a  two 
days'  campaign  commenced  promptly  on  the  arrival 
of  reinforcements  after  the  battle  of  Shiloh. 
^corinth^  General  Halleck  at  once  commenced  erecting  for- 
tifications around  Corinth  on  a  scale  to  indicate 
that  this  one  point  must  be  held  if  it  took  the 
whole  National  army  to  do  it.  All  commanding 
points  two  or  three  miles  to  the  south,  southeast, 
and  southwest  were  strongly  fortified.  It  was  ex- 
pected in  case  of  necessity  to  connect  these  forts  by 
rifle-pits.  They  were  laid  out  on  a  scale  that  would 
have  required  one  hundi^ed  thousand  men  to  fully 
man  them.  It  was  probably  thought  that  a  final 
battle  of  the  war  would  be  fought  at  that  point. 
These  fortifications  were  never  used.  Immediately 
May  80,1868  after  the  occupation  of  Corinth  by  the  National 
tbTcSlrfSd-  troops.  General  Pope  was  sent  in  pursuit  of  the  re- 
erates  treating  garrison,  and  General  Buell  soon  followed. 
T^uftll  was  the  senior  of  the  two  crenerals  and  com- 


THE  AKMY  DISINTEGKATED  317 

willing  captives. .  On  the  10th  of  June  the  pursuing   ch.xxvi 
column  was  all  back  at  Corinth.    The  Anny  of  the 
Tennessee  was  not  engaged  in  any  of  these  move- 
ments. 

The  Confederates  were  now  driven  out  of  West 
Tennessee,  and  on  the  6th  of  June,  after  a  well-       1862 
contested  naval  battle,  the  National  forces  took   ^^g^'J^'d 
possession  of  Memphis  and  held  the  Mississippi  aS w!r^      ^ 
River  from  its  source  to  that  point.    The  railroad    ^^^  ^^'^^ 
from  Columbus  to  Corinth  was  at  once  put  in  good 
condition  and  held  by  us.    We  had  garrisons  at 
Donelson,  Clarksville,  and  Nashville,  on  the  Cum- 
berland River,  and  held  the  Tennessee  River  from 
its  mouth  to  Eastport.    New  Orleans  and  Baton 
Rouge  had  fallen  into  the  possession  of  the  National  ^  New  o^^ 
forces,  so  that  now  the  Confederates  at  the  West  ^^%lj 
were  narrowed  down  for  all  communication  with      ^'^^ 
Richmond  to  the  single  line  of  road  lomning  east 
from  Vicksburg.    To  dispossess  them  of  this,  there- 
fore, became  a  matter  of  the  first  importance.    The 
possession  of  the  Mississippi  by  us  from  Memphis 
to  Baton  Rouge  was  also  a  most  important  object. 
It  would  be  equal  to  the  amputation  of  a  limb  in  its 
weakening  effects  upon  the  enemy. 

After  the  capture  of  Corinth  a  movable  force  of  ^'^^^^^ 
eighty  thousand  men,  besides  enough  to  hold  all  the 
territory  acquired,  could  have  been  set  in  motion  for 
the  accomplishment  of  any  great  camp^-^g^  ^^^  ^^ 
suppression  of  the  rebellion.    In  a.^di^^^  ^  ^^^^> 
fresh  troops  were  being  raised  to  sw^W  t'h^e  elective         ^^^ifk^ 
force.    But   the  work   of   depleti^>^    commenced,    ^^g^)- 
Buell,  with  the  Ai-my  of  the  Ohio,    -^^^  ^,^^\  ^^^!    ^^S^ 


318  PERSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

ch.  XXVI  vanced — only  to  have  it  destroyed  by  small  guerrilla 
bands  or  other  troops  as  soon  as  he  was  out  of  the 
way.  If  he  had  been  sent  directly  to  Chattanooga 
as  rapidly  as  he  could  march,  sending  two  or  three 
divisions  along  the  line  of  the  railroad  from  Nash- 
ville forward,  he  could  have  arrived  with  but  little 
fighting,  and  would  have  saved  much  of  the  loss  of 
life  which  was  afterward  incurred  in  gaining  Chat- 
tanooga. Bragg  would  then  not  have  had  time  to 
raise  an  army  to  contest  the  possession  of  Middle 
and  East  Tennessee  and  Kentucky ;  the  battles  of 
Stone  Eiver  and  Chickamauga  would  not  neces- 
sarily have  been  fought;  Bumside  would  not  have 
been  besieged  in  Knoxville  without  the  power  of 
helping  himself  or  escaping;  the  battle  of  Chatta- 
nooga would  not  have  been  fought.  These  are  the 
negative  advantages — if  the  term  negative  is  ap- 
plicable— which  would  probably  have  resulted  from 
prompt  movements  after  Corinth  fell  into  the  pos- 
session of  the  National  forces.  The  positive  results 
might  have  been :  a  bloodless  advance  to  Atlanta, 
to  Vicksburg,  or  to  any  other  desired  point  south 
of  Corinth  in  the  interior  of  Mississippi. 


CHAPTER  XXVII 

HEADQUABTEBS  MOVED  TO  MEMPHIS — ON  THE  BOAD  TO 
MEMPHIS — ESCAPING  JACKSON — COMPLAINTS  AND 
BEQUESTS — HALLECK  APPOINTED  COMMANDEB-IN- 
CHIEF  —  BETUBN  TO  COBINTH  —  MOVEMENTS  OP 
BBAGO — SUBBENDEB  OP  CLABKSVILLE — THE  AD- 
VANCE UPON  CHATTANOOGA — SHEBIDAN  COLONEL 
OF  A  MICHIGAN  BEGIMENT 

MY  position  at  Corinth,  with  a  nominal  com-  CH.xxvn 
mand  and  yet  no  command,  became  so  im- 
bearable  that  I  asked  permission  of  Halleck  to 
remove  my  headquarters  to  Memphis.    I  had  re- 
peatedly asked,  between  the  fall  of  Donelson  and  ^'^£^^' 
the  evacuation  of  Corinth,  to  be  relieved  from  duty 
under  Halleck ;  but  all  my  applications  were  refused 
until  the  occupation  of  the  town.    I  then  obtained 
permission  to  leave  the  department;  but  General 
Sherman  happened  to  call  on  me  as  I  was  about  jfSS^^j^ 
starting,  and  urged  me  so  strongly  not  to  think  of     *^^ 
going  that  I  concluded  to  remain.    My  application 
to  be  permitted  to  remove  my  headquarters  to 
Memphis  was,  however,  approved,  and  on  the  21st 
of  June  I  started  for  that  point  with  my  stafiE  and  a       ^^ 
cavalry  escort  of  only  a  part  of  one  company.   There 


320  PEBSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

CH.  xxvn  escort  to  the  end  of  their  march,  and  the  next  morn- 
ing proceeded  to  La  Grange  with  no  convoy  but  the 
few  cavalrymen  I  had  with  me. 

From  La  Grange  to  Memphis  the  distance  is 
forty-seven  miles.  There  were  no  troops  stationed 
between  these  two  points,  except  a  small  force 
guarding  a  working-party  which  was  engaged  in 
repairing  the  railroad.    Not  knowing  where  this 

^(a^fw"  party  would  be  f oimd,  I  halted  at  La  Grange.  Gen- 
eral Hurlbut  was  in  command  there  at  the  time,  and 
had  his  headquarters  tents  pitched  on  the  lawn  of 
a  very  commodious  countiy  house.  The  proprietor 
was  at  home,  and,  learning  of  my  arrival,  he  invited 
General  Hurlbut  and  me  to  dine  with  him.  I  ac- 
cepted the  invitation  and  spent  a  very  pleasant 
afternoon  with  my  host,  who  was  a  thorough 
Southern  gentleman,  fully  convinced  of  the  justice 
of  secession.   After  dinner,  seated  in  the  capacious 

^wottSm  P<>rch,  he  entertained  me  with  a  recital  of  the  ser- 
vices he  was  rendering  the  cause.  He  was  too  old 
to  be  in  the  ranks  himself, — he  must  have  been 
quite  seventy  then, — but  his  means  enabled  him  to 
be  useful  in  other  ways.  In  ordinary  times  the 
homestead  where  he  was  now  living  produced  the 
bread  and  meat  to  supply  the  slaves  on  his  main 
plantation,  in  the  lowlands  of  Mississippi.  Now  he 
raised  food  and  forage  on  both  places,  and  thought 
he  would  have  that  year  a  surplus  sufficient  to  feed 
three  hundred  families  of  poor  men  who  had  gone 
into  the  war  and  left  their  f amiUes  dependent  upon 
the  "patriotism''  of  those  better  off.    The  crops 

J 1>.^U^J     A^^     ^^Jl     T    V^^Jl     ^J.    J.V.^ J. 


ON  THE  BOAD  TO  MEMPHIS  321 

neighborhood  and  harvest  them  for  the  benefit  of  CH.xxvn 
those  engaged  in  the  suppression  of  the  rebellion  ^^,J^'*''' 
instead  of  its  support.    I  felt,  however,  the  greatest 
respect  for  the  candor  of  my  host,  and  for  his  zeal 
in  a  cause  he  thoroughly  believed  in,  though  our 
views  were  as  wide  apart  as  it  is  possible  to  conceive. 

The  23d  of  June,  1862,  on  the  road  from  La 
Grange  to  Memphis,  was  very  warm,  even  for  that 
latitude  and  season.  With  my  staff  and  small  es- 
cort I  started  at  an  early  hour,  and  before  noon  we 
arrived  within  twenty  miles  of  Memphis.  At  this 
point  I  saw  a  very  comfortable-looking  white-haired 
gentleman  seated  at  the  front  of  his  house,  a  little 
distance  from  the  road.  I  let  my  staff  and  escort 
ride  ahead  while  I  halted  and,  for  an  excuse,  asked 
for  a  glass  of  water.  I  was  invited  at  once  to  dis- 
mount and  come  in.  I  found  my  host  very  genial 
and  communicative,  and  stayed  longer  than  I  had 
intended,  until  the  lady  of  the  house  annoimced 
dinner  and  asked  me  to  join  them.  The  host,  how- 
ever, was  not  pressing,  so  that  I  declined  the  in- 
vitation and,  mounting  my  horse,  rode  on. 

About  a  mile  west  from  where  I  had  been  stop- 
ping a  road  comes  up  from  the  southeast,  joining 
that  from  La  Grange  to  Memphis.  A  mile  west  of 
this  junction  I  found  my  staff  and  escort  halted  and 
enjoying  the  shade  of  forest-trees  on  the  lawn  of  a 
house  located  several  hundred  feet  back  from  the 
road,  their  horses  hitched  to  the  fence  along  the 
line  of  the  road.  I,  too,  stopped,  and  we  remained 
there  until  the  cool  of  the  afternoon,  and  then  ro^,^ 


322  PEBSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GBAKT 

CH.xxvn  loyal  to  the  Union.    He  had  not  pressed  me  to 

tarry  longer  with  him  because  in  the  early  part  of 

my  visit  a  neighbor — a  Dr.  Smith — had  called, 

and,  on  being  presented  to  me,  backed  oflf  the  porch 

as  if  something  had  hit  him.    Mr.  De  Loche  knew 

^timw^'  *^^*  *^®  rebel  General  Jackson  was  in  that  neigh- 

cmT?/  caV:  borhood  with  a  detachment  of  cavalry.    His  neigh- 

^'  16, ww'^  bor  was  as  earnest  in  the  Southern  cause  as  was  Mr. 

De  Loche  in  that  of  the  Union.    The  exact  location 

of  Jackson  was  entirely  unknown  to  Mr.  De  Loche ; 

but  he  was  sure  that  his  neighbor  would  know  it 

and  would  give  information  of  my  presence,  and 

this  made  my  stay  unpleasant  to  him  after  the  call 

of  Dr.  Smith. 

I  have  stated  that  a  detachment  of  troops  was 
engaged  in  guarding  workmen  who  were  repairing 
the  railroad  east  of  Memphis.  On  the  day  I  entered 
w.  ^^5^^  Memphis,  Jackson  captured  a  small  herd  of  beef- 
cattle  which  had  been  sent  east  for  the  troops  so 
engaged.  The  drovers  were  not  enlisted  men,  and 
he  released  them.  A  day  or  two  after  one  of  these 
drovers  came  to  my  headquarters  and,  relating  the 
circumstances  of  his  capture,  said  Jackson  was 
very  much  disappointed  that  he  had  not  captured 
me ;  that  he  was  six  or  seven  miles  south  of  the 
Memphis  and  Charleston  railroad  when  he  learned 
that  I  was  stopping  at  the  house  of  Mr.  De  Loche, 
and  had  ridden  with  his  command  to  the  junction 
of  the  road  he  was  on  with  that  from  La  Grange 


ESCAPING  JACKSON  323 

have  found  me  with  my  party  quietly  resting  under  ch.  xxvn 
the  shade  of  trees,  and  without  even  arms  in  our 
hands  with  which  to  defend  ourselves. 

General  Jackson,  of  course,  did  not  communicate 
his  disappointment  at  not  capturing  me  to  a  pris- 
oner, a  young  drover;  but  from  the  talk  among  the 
soldiers  the  facts  related  were  learned.  A  day  or 
two  later  Mr.  De  Loche  called  on  me  in  Memphis  to 
apologize  for  his  apparent  incivility  in  not  insist- 
ing on  my  staying  for  dinner.  He  said  that  his 
wife  accused  him  of  marked  discourtesy,  but  that, 
after  the  call  of  his  neighbor,  he  had  felt  restless 
until  I  got  away.  I  never  met  General  Jackson  be- 
fore the  war  nor  during  it,  but  have  met  him  since 
at  his  very  comfortable  summer  home  at  Manitou 
Springs,  Colorado.  I  reminded  him  of  the  above 
incident,  and  this  drew  from  him  the  response  that 
he  was  thankful  now  he  had  not  captured  me.  I 
certainly  was  very  thankful  too. 

My  occupation  of  Memphis  as  district  headquar-  jJ^Sj^^w 
ters  did  not  last  long.    The  period,  however,  was 
marked  by  a  few  incidents  which  were  novel  to  me. 
Up  to  that  time  I  had  not  occupied  any  place  in 
the  South  where  the  citizens  were  at  home  in  any 
great  numbers.    Dover  was  within  the  f  ortiftcationa 
at  Fort  Donelson,  and,  as  far  as  I  remember,  ^^^"^ 
citizen  was  gone.    There  were  no  people  WvVt^?*  ^ 
Pittsburg  Landing,  and  but  very  f e^w  at  Oo"^^^  ^^ 
Memphis,  however,  was  a  populous  city,  and-       -V5i>^ 
were  many  of  the  citizens  remaining    ttietr^        Vo&r 
were  not  only  thoroughly  impressed  ^WT^tla.  ^^^.^^   -tha 


324  PERSONAL  MEMOIBS  OF  U.  S.  GBANT 

CH.xxvn  confession.  It  took  hours  of  my  time  every  day  to 
listen  to  complaints  and  requests.  The  latter  were 
generally  reasonable,  and  if  so  they  were  granted ; 
but  the  complaints  were  not  always,  or  even  often, 
well  founded.    Two  instances  will  mark  the  general 

Ira (2^90  character.  First:  the  officer  who  commanded  at 
Memphis  inmiediately  after  the  city  fell  into  the 
hands  of  the  National  troops  had  ordered  one  of  the 
churches  of  the  city  to  be  opened  to  the  soldiers. 
Army  chaplains  were  authorized  to  occupy  the 
pulpit.  Second:  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  the 
Confederate  Congress  had  passed  a  law  confiscating 
all  property  of  "  aUen  enemies  ^  at  the  South,  in- 
cluding the  debts  of  Southerners  to  Northern  men. 
In  consequence  of  this  law,  when  Memphis  was  oc- 
cupied the  provost  marshal  had  forcibly  collected 
all  the  evidences  he  could  obtain  of  such  debts. 

ovlSS^S^  Almost  the  first  complaints  made  to  me  were 
these  two  outrages.  The  gentleman  who  made  the 
complaints  informed  me  first  of  his  own  high  stand- 
ing as  a  lawyer,  a  citizen,  and  a  Christian.  He  was 
a  deacon  in  the  church  which  had  been  defiled  by 
the  occupation  of  Union  troops,  and  by  a  Union 
chaplain  filling  the  pulpit.  He  did  not  use  the  word 
"  defile,"  but  he  expressed  the  idea  very  clearly.  He 
asked  that  the  church  be  restored  to  the  former 
congregation.  I  told  him  that  no  order  had  been 
issued  prohibiting  the  congregation  attending  the 
church.  He  said  of  course  the  congregation  could 
not  hear  a  Northern  clercrvman  who  differed  so 


HALLECK  APPOINTED  COMMANDEB-IN-CHIEF  325 

from  the  pulpit.    This  closed  the  argument  on  the  CH.xxvn 
first  point. 

Then  came  the  second.  The  complainant  said 
that  he  wanted  the  papers  restored  to  him  which 
had  been  surrendered  to  the  provost  marshal  under 
protest ;  he  was  a  lawyer,  and  before  the  establish- 
ment of  the  "  Confederate  States  Government  ^  had 
been  the  attorney  for  a  number  of  large  business 
houses  at  the  North;  that  "his  government^  had 
confiscated  all  debts  due  "  aUen  enemies,''  and  ap- 
pointed commissioners,  or  officers,  to  collect  such 
debts  and  pay  them  over  to  the  "  government " ;  but 
in  his  case,  owing  to  his  high  standing,  he  had  been 
permitted  to  hold  these  claims  for  collection,  the  re- 
sponsible officials  knowing  that  he  would  account 
to  the  "  government "  for  every  dollar  received.  He 
said  that  his  "  government,"  when  it  came  in  posses- 
sion of  all  its  territory,  would  hold  him  personally 
responsible  for  the  claims  he  had  surrendered  to  the 
provost  marshal  His  impudence  was  so  sublime 
that  I  was  rather  amused  than  indignant.  I  told 
him,  however,  that  if  he  would  remain  in  Memphis 
I  did  not  believe  the  Confederate  government  would 
ever  molest  him.  He  left,  no  doubt,  as  much  amazed 
at  my  assurance  as  I  was  at  the  brazenness  of  his 
request. 

On  the  11th  of  July  General  Halleck  received  "^'^^^^ 
telegraphic  orders  appointing  him  to  the  commaiid 
of  all  the  armies,  with  headquarters  in  WashingWsv. 
His  instructions  pressed  him  to  proceed  to  bis  xx«^ 
field  of  duty  with  as  little  delay  as  was  coiisi»^^^^ 
with  the  safety  and  interests  of  his  previous  oom- 


326  PERSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GBANT 

CH.xxvn  at  Corinth.  I  was  not  informed  by  the  despatch 
that  my  chief  had  been  ordered  to  a  different  field, 
and  did  not  know  whether  to  move  my  headquar- 
ters or  not.  I  telegraphed  asking  if  I  was  to  take 
my  staff  with  me,  and  received  word  in  reply: 
"  This  place  will  be  your  headquarters.  You  can 
judge  for  yourself.^    I  left  Memphis  for  my  new 

^'  w  w^  ^^1^  without  delay,  and  reached  Corinth  on  the  15th 
of  the  month.  General  Halleck  remained  until  the 
17th  of  July ;  but  he  was  very  uncommunicative, 
and  gave  me  no  information  as  to  what  I  had  been 
called  to  Corinth  for. 
When  General  Halleck  left  to  assume  the  duties 

Ibid.  101,103  of  general-in-chief  I  remained  in  command  of  the 
District  of  West  Tennessee.  Practically  I  became 
a  department  commander,  because  no  one  was  as- 
signed to  that  position  over  me,  and  I  made  my 
reports  direct  to  the  general-in-chief ;  but  I  was 

Ibid.  378, 394  uot  asslgucd  to  the  position  of  department  com- 
mander imtil  the  25th  of  October.  General  Halleck, 
while  commanding  the  Department  of  the  Miss- 
issippi, had  had  control  as  far  east  as  a  line  drawn 
from  Chattanooga  north.  My  district  only  em- 
braced West  Tennessee  and  Kentucky  west  of  the 
Cumberland  Eiver.    Buell,  with  the  Army  of  the 

Ante,  p.  817  Ohio,  had,  as  previously  stated,  been  ordered  east 
toward  Chattanooga,  with  instructions  to  repair  the 
Memphis  and  Charleston  railroad  as  he  advanced. 
Troops  had  been  sent  north  by  Halleck  along  the 
line  of  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  railroad,  to  Dut  it  in 


EETUEN  TO  CORINTH  327 

The  remainder  of  the  magnificent  army  of  one  CH.xxvn 
hundred  and  twenty  thousand  men  which  entered  ^^^^^ 
Corinth  on  the  30th  of  May  had  now  become  so     ^'^ 
scattered  that  I  was  put  entirely  on  the  defensive 
in  a  territory  whose  population  was  hostile  to  the 
Union.    One  of  the  first  things  I  had  to  do  was  to    ^l^SSS* 
construct  fortifications  at  Corinth  better  suited  to 
the  garrison  that  could  be  spared  to  man  them. 
The  structures  that  had  been  built  during  the 
months  of  May  and  June  were  left  as  monuments 
to  the  skill  of  the  engineer,  and  others  were  con- 
structed in  a  few  days,  plainer  in  design,  but  suited 
to  the  command  available  to  defend  them. 

I  disposed  the  troops  belonging  to  the  district  in  ^^^^^ 
conformity  with  the  situation  as  rapidly  as  possible. 
The  forces  at  Donelson,  ClarksviUe,  and  NashviUe, 
with  those  at  Corinth  and  along  the  railroad  east- 
ward, I  regarded  as  sufficient  for  protection  against 
any  attack  from  the  east.  The  Mobile  and  Ohio 
railroad  was  guarded  from  Rienzi,  south  of  Corinth, 
to  Columbus ;  and  the  Mississippi  Central  railroad 
from  Jackson,  Tennessee,  to  Bolivar.  Grand  Junc- 
tion and  La  Grange,  on  the  Memphis  railroad, 
were  abandoned. 

South  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  and  con-  M?^^?i, 
fronting  it,  was  Van  Dom,  with  a  sufficient  toxce 
to  organize  a  movable  army  of  thirty-five  to  iorty 
thousand  men,  after  being  reinforced  by  PrieeiTom 
Missouri.    This  movable  force  cox^ld  ^^  \\xxo^^v 
against  either  Corinth,  Bolivar,  or  ^etxi'^'^^^  ^^ 
the  best  that  could  be  don^^  in  such.  ^<eia^  ^^^_  iL 


328  PEBSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GBANT 

CH.xxvn  cause  the  territory  already  occupied  was  as  much 
as  the  force  present  could  guard.  The  most  anxious 
period  of  the  war,  to  me,  was  during  the  time  the 
Army  of  the  Tennessee  was  guarding  the  territory 
acquired  by  the  fall  of  Corinth  and  Memphis,  and  ^ 
before  I  was  sufficiently  reinforced  to  take  the 
offensive.  The  enemy,  also,  had  cavalry  operating 
in  our  rear,  making  it  necessary  to  guard  every 
point  of  the  railroad  back  to  Columbus,  on  the  se- 
curity of  which  we  were  dependent  for  all  our  sup- 
plies. Headquarters  were  connected  by  telegraph 
with  all  points  of  the  command  except  Memphis  and 
the  Mississippi  below  Columbus.  With  these  points 
communication  was  had  by  the  railroad  to  Colum- 
bus, then  down  the  river  by  boat.  To  reinforce 
Memphis  would  have  taken  three  or  four  days,  and 
to  get  an  order  there  for  troops  to  move  elsewhere 
would  have  taken  at  least  two  days.  Memphis, 
therefore,  was  practically  isolated  from  the  balance 
of  the  command.  But  it  was  in  Sherman^s  hands. 
Then,  too,  the  troops  were  well  intrenched,  and  the 
gunboats  made  a  valuable  auxiliary. 

^^^  During  the  two  months  after  the  departure  of 
General  Halleck  there  was  much  fighting  between 
small  bodies  of  the  contending  armies;  but  these 
encounters  were  dwarfed  by  the  magnitude  of  the 
main  battles  so  as  to  be  now  almost  forgotten,  ex- 
cept by  those  engaged  in  them.  Some  of  them, 
however,  estimated  by  the  losses  on  both  sides  in 
killed  and  wounded,  were  equal  in  hard  fighting  to 
most  of  the  battles  of  the  Mexican  war,  which  at- 


BBAGG'S  MOVEMENTS  329 

a  large  force  of  the  enemy,  so  that  he  had  to  be  re-  CH.xxvn 

inforced  from  Jackson  and  Corinth.    On  the  27th 

there  was  skirmishing  on  the  Hatchie  River,  eight 

miles  from  Bolivar.    On  the  30th  I  learned  from    Jiiiy,i8w 

Colonel  P,  H.  Sheridan,  who  had  been  far  to  the 

south,  that  Bragg  in  person  was  at  Rome,  Georgia, 

with  his  troops  moving  by  rail  (by  way  of  Mobile) 

to  Chattanooga,  and  his  wagon-train  marching 

overland  to  join  him  at  Rome.    Price  was  at  this 

time  at  Holly  Springs,  Mississippi,  with  a  large 

force,  and  occupied  Grand  Junction  as  an  outpost. 

I  proposed  to  the  general-in-chief  to  be  permitted  ^ij^jefi^ 

to  drive  him  away,  but  was  informed  that,  while  I 

had  to  judge  for  myself,  the  best  use  to  make  of  my 

troops  was  not  to  scatter  thenij  but  hold  them  ready 

to  reinforce  Buell. 

The  movement  of  Bragg  himself,  with  his  wagon-  bSm^V 
trains,  to  Chattanooga  across  country,  while  his    ^^?Gen. 
troops  were  transported  over  a  long  roundabout  ^i^o^y 
road  to  the  same  destination,  without  need  of  guards   i^sep^. 
except  when  in  my  immediate  front,  demonstrates 
the  advantage  which  troops  enjoy  while  acting  in  a 
country  where  the  people  are  friendly.    Buell  was 
marching  through  a  hostile  region,  and  had  to  have 
his  communications  thoroughly  guarded  back  to  a 
base  of  supplies.   More  men  were  required  the  iax- 
ther  the  National  troops  penetrated  into  tlie  euexxiY^ 
country.    I,  with  an  army  sufficiently  po^erf'*^  }^ 
have  destroyed  Bragg,  was  purely  on  the  deie'x^®^'^ 
and  accomplishing  no  more  than  to  hold,  a,  f  or<^^     ^  ^^ 

inferior  to  my  own.  ^^         v,  ^'  c*>  "^"^ 

On  the  2d  of  August  I  was  ordered  from  W^  .,^^-^.j^e 


330  PEBSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GBAKT 

CH.xxvn  practicable.  I  was  also  directed  to  handle  rebels 
within  our  lines  "without  gloves'' — to  imprison 
them,  or  to  expel  them  from  their  homes  and  from 
our  lines.  I  do  not  recollect  having  arrested  and 
confined  a  citizen  (not  a  soldier)  during  the  entire 
rebellion.  I  am  aware  that  a  great  many  were  sent 
to  Northern  prisons — particularly  to  Joliet,  Illinois 
*  — by  some  of  my  subordinates,  with  the  statement 
that  it  was  my  order.  I  had  all  such  released  the 
moment  I  learned  of  their  arrest ;  and  finally  sent 
a  stafE-officer  North  to  release  every  prisoner  who 
was  said  to  be  confined  by  my  order.  There  were 
many  citizens  at  home  who  deserved  punishment 
because  they  were  soldiers  when  an  opportunity 
was  afforded  to  inflict  an  injury  to  the  National 
cause.  This  class  was  not  of  the  kind  that  were 
apt  to  get  arrested,  and  I  deemed  it  better  that  a 
few  guilty  men  should  escape  than  that  a  great 
many  innocent  ones  should  suffer. 
Sf  ^^!  ^^  ^^^  l**'^  ^^  August  I  was  ordered  to  send  two 
^iu^l^^^  more  divisions  to  Buell.  They  were  sent  the  same 
day  by  way  of  Decatur.  On  the  22d  Colonel  Rod- 
ney Mason  surrendered  Clarksville  with  six  com- 
panies of  his  regiment. 
^iJo"*  Colonel  Mason  was  one  of  the  officers  who  had  led 
their  regiments  off  the  field  at  almost  the  first  fire 
^^-^  of  the  rebels  at  Shiloh.  He  was  by  nature  and 
Anu,  p.  382  educatlou  a  gentleman,  and  was  terribly  mortified 
at  his  action  when  the  battle  was  over.  He  came  to 
me  with  tears  in  his  eyes  and  begged  to  be  allowed 
to  have  another  trial.    I  felt  great  svmpathv  for 


SUKEENDER  OF  CLABKSVILLE  331 

it  as  the  post  of  danger,  it  being  nearer  the  enemy.  CH.xxvn 
But  when  he  was  summoned  to  surrender  by  a  band  ^SsSro ^^^ 
of  guerrillas,  his  constitutional  weakness  overcame 
him.  He  inquired  the  number  of  men  the  enemy 
had,  and  receiving  a  response  indicating  a  force 
greater  than  his  own,  he  said  if  he  could  be  satisfied 
of  that  fact  he  would  surrender.  Arrangements 
were  made  for  him  to  count  the  guerrillas,  and  hav- 
ing satisfied  himself  that  the  enemy  had  the  greater 
force,  he  surrendered  and  informed  his  subordinate 
at  Donelson  of  the  fact,  advising  him  to  do  the 
same.  The  guerrillas  paroled  their  prisoners  and 
moved  upon  Donelson,  but  the  officer  in  command 
at  that  point  marched  out  to  meet  them  and  drove 
them  away. 

Among  other  embarrassments,  at  the  time  of  q^^I^^ 
which  I  now  write,  was  the  fact  that  the  govern-  xviiTi  ws. 
ment  wanted  to  get  out  all  the  cotton  possible  from        ^ 
the  South,  and  directed  me  to  give  every  facility  ^-^^^ 
toward  that  end.    Pay  in  gold  was  authorized,  and 
stations  on  the  Mississippi  River  and  on  the  railroad 
in  our  possession  had  to  be  designated  where  cotton 
would  be  received.    This  opened  to  the  enemy  not  ^J^S^^* 
only  the  means  of  converting  cotton  into  money      ^»*-^*^ 
which  had  a  value  all  over  the  world,  and  which 
they  so  much  needed,  but  it  afforded  \hem  meaiiB. 
of  obtaining  accurate  and  iiitelligeix\,  \xiioTrci^\ivQTx 
in  regard  to  our  position  and  strength-  \\,N^a%  «^^ 
demoralizmg  to   the    troops.     Cj^tlJ^^^^  ^'^'^'^?^^ 
permits  from  the  Treasix^y  I>ei^^rtt^^^^^^^^ 
protected  withm  our  liV^^   svr^A    .  ^^=^^>^\^ ^^.^ 


332  PERSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  V.  S.  GRANT 

CH.xxvn  tecting  a  traffic  which  went  to  the  support  of  an 
enemy  they  had  to  fight,  and  the  profits  of  which 
went  to  men  who  shared  none  of  their  dangers. 

oSS;jiS2i,      On  the  30th  of  August  Colonel  M.  D.  Leggett, 

iSv?2Mpi;  near  Bolivar,  with  the  Twentieth  and  Twenty-ninth 

voU-Aug.  Ohio  Volunteer  Infantry,  was  attacked  by  a  force 
supposed  to  be  about  four  thousand  strong.  The 
enemy  was  driven  away  with  a  loss  of  more  than 

%M^S^  one  hundred  men.  On  the  1st  of  September  the 
bridge  guard  at  Medon  was  attacked  by  guerrillas. 
The  guard  held  the  position  until  reinforced,  when 
the  enemy  were  routed,  leaving  about  fifty  of  their 
number  on  the  field  dead  or  wounded,  our  loss 
being  only  two  killed  and  fifteen  wounded.  On  the 

EUass^Den-  game  day  Colonel  Dennis,  with  a  force  of  less  than 
five  hundred  infantry  and  two  pieces  of  artillery, 
met  the  cavalry  of  the  enemy  in  strong  force  a  few 
miles  west  of  Medon,  and  drove  them  away  with 

^iifisfw"  great  loss.  Our  troops  buried  one  hundred  and 
seventy-nine  of  the  enemy^s  dead,  left  upon  the  field. 
Afterward  it  was  found  that  all  the  houses  in  the 
vicinity  of  the  battle-field  were  turned  into  hospitals 
for  the  wounded.  Our  loss,  as  reported  at  the  time, 
was  forty-five  killed  and  wounded.    On  the  2d  of 

^m^*)?w,  September  I  was  ordered  to  send  more  reinforce- 

196-199      ments  to  BuelL     Jackson  and  Bolivar  were  yet 

threatened^  but  I  sent  the  reinforcements.    On  the 

Gorton     4th  I  received  direct  orders  to  send  Oranger^s  divi- 

^wS«T'  sion  also  to  Louisville,  Kentucky. 

i84fr^7:*coL      General  Buell  had  left  Corinth  about  the  10th  of 

Oil    M'lOtl 


GENEBAIi  SHEBIDAN  333 

If  he  had  not  been  required  to  repair  the  railroad  CH.xxvn 
as  he  advanced,  the  march  could  have  been  made  in  iSde^m, 
eighteen  days  at  the  outside,  and  Chattanooga  must  " 
have  been  reached  by  the  National  forces  before 
the  rebels  could  have  possibly  got  there.  The  road 
between  Nashville  and  Chattanooga  could  easily 
have  been  put  in  repair  by  other  troops,  so  that 
communication  with  the  North  would  have  been 
opened  in  a  short  time  after  the  occupation  of  the 
place  by  the  National  troops.  If  Buell  had  been 
permitted  to  move,  in  the  first  instance,  with  the 
whole  of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  and  that  portion  of 
the  Army  of  the  Mississippi  afterward  sent  to  him, 
he  could  have  thrown  four  divisions  from  his  own 
command  along  the  line  of  road  to  repair  and 
guard  it. 

Granger's  division  was  promptly  sent  on  the  4th 
of  September.  I  was  at  the  station  at  Corinth  when  leea 
the  troops  reached  that  point,  and  found  General 
P.  H.  Sheridan  with  them.  I  expressed  surprise  at  ^'^^^^ 
seeing  him,  and  said  that  I  had  not  expected  him 
to  go.  He  showed  decided  disappointment  at  the 
prospect  of  being  detained.  I  felt  a  little  nettled 
at  his  desire  to  get  away  and  did  not  detain  him. 

Sheridan  was  a  first  lieutenant  in  the  regiment  in  ^£S^^^ 
which  I  had  served  eleven  years,  the  Fourtu  m.-  ^-.  ^^L 
fantry,  and  stationed  on  the  Pacific  coast  ^\xeTi>i5aft    ^S^^^^^., 
war  broke  out.    He  was  promoted  to  «•  ca^^^"®^^^^^  ^^^^^ 
in  May,  1861,  and  before  the  close    o^  ^2«^®  ^^JT^^'"'^ 
managed  in  some  way — I  do  not  kno^^v  \xo^^  '^w:o-o-^^ 
East.    He  went  to  Missouri.     Halleoi:^  \x»^  ^^kS>^*> 
him  as  a  very  successful  young  office:^*  x^  ^«c  <^^^^^ 


334  PEESONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GRAOT? 

CH-xxyn  west  Missouri.  There  was  no  trouble  in  getting 
supplies  forward  while  Sheridan  served  in  that 
capacity;  but  he  got  into  difficulty  with  his  im- 
mediate superiors  because  of  his  stringent  rules  for 
preventing  the  use  of  public  transportation  for 
private  purposes.  He  asked  to  be  relieved  from 
further  duty  in  the  capacity  in  which  he  was  en- 
gaged, and  his  request  was  granted.  When  Gen- 
eral Halleck  took  the  field  in  April,  1862,  Sheridan 
was  assigned  to  duty  on  his  staff.  During  the  ad- 
vance on  Corinth  a  vacancy  occurred  in  the  colo- 
nelcy of  the  Second  Michigan  Cavalry.    Gk>vemor 

Bi^Sf^v.  Blair,  of  Michigan,  telegraphed  General  Halleck, 
im-w  asking  him  to  suggest  the  name  of  a  professional 
soldier  for  the  vacancy,  saying  he  would  appoint  a 
good  man  without  reference  to  his  State.  Sheridan 
was  named,  and  was  so  conspicuously  efficient  that 
when  Corinth  was  reached  he  was  assigned  to 
command  a  cavalry  brigade  in  the  Army  of  the 

iSdSS  n.  Mississippi    He  was  in  command  at  Boonville  on 

''^        the  1st  of  July,  with  two  small  regiments,  when  he 

was  attacked  by  a  force  full  three  times  as  numer- 

w.B.x(i)864  ous  as  his  own.  By  very  skilful  manoeuvers  and 
boldness  of  attack  he  completely  routed  the  enemy. 
For  this  he  was  made  a  brigadier-general  and  became 
a  conspicuous  figure  in  the  army  about  Corinth. 
On  this  account  I  was  sorry  to  see  him  leaving  me. 
His  departure  was  probably  fortunate,  for  he  ren- 
dered distinguished  services  in  his  new  field. 
Granger  and  Sheridan  reached  Louisville  before 


CHAPTEE  XXVIII 

ADVANCE  OF  VAN  DOBN  AND  PMCE — PMCE  ENTERS 
IXJKA — BATTLE  OF  lUKA 

^T  this  time — September  4 — I  had  two  divi-  CH.xxvm 
sions  of  the  Army  of  the  Mississippi  stationed       ^^ 
at  Corinth,  Rienzi,  Jacinto,  and  Danville.    There 
were  at  Coiinth,  also,  Davies's  division  and  two  t.  a.  navies 
brigades  of  McArthur's,  besides  cavalry  and  artil-  -^^^^^ 
lery.    This  force  constituted  my  left  wing,  of  which 
Eosecrans  was  in  command.    General  Ord  com-  ^,pS^: 
manded  the  center,  from  Bethel  to  Humboldt,  on     mi^^"' 
the  Mobile  and  Ohio  railroad,  and  from  Jackson  to   voif:  i^^S^^ 
Bolivar,  where  the  Mississippi  Central  is  crossed  by  j^^?-^^^^. 
the  Hatchie  Eiver.    General  Sherman  commanded  ^j^^^Vl^ia' 


i8e6 


on  the  right  at  Memphis,  with  two  of  his  brigades 
back  at  Brownsville,  at  the  crossing  of  the  Hatchie 
Eiver  by  the  Memphis  and  Ohio  railroad.  This 
made  the  most  convenient  arrangement  I  could  de- 
vise for  concentrating  all  my  spare  forces  upon  any  ^-^^^^ 
threatened  point.  All  the  troops  of  the  command 
were  within  telegraphic  communication  with  one 
another,  except  those  under  Sherman.  By  bring- 
ing a  portion  of  his  command  to  Brownsville,  from 
which  Doint  there  was  a  railroad  and  telesranh 


336  PEBSONAL  MEM0IB6  OF  U.  S.  6BANT 

CH.xxvm  by  the  use  of  couriers.  In  case  it  became  necessary 
to  reinforce  Corinth,  by  this  arrangement  all  the 
troops  at  Bolivar,  except  a  small  guard,  could  be 
sent  by  rail  by  the  way  of  Jackson  in  less  than 
twenty-four  hours ;  while  the  troops  from  Browns- 
ville could  march  up  to  Bolivar  to  take  their  place. 
1862  On  the  7th  of  September  I  learned  of  the  ad- 

wiwfetaS  vance  of  Van  Dom  and  Price,  apparently  upon 
Corinth.  One  division  was  brought  from  Memphis 
to  Bolivar  to  meet  any  emergency  that  might  arise 
from  this  move  of  the  enemy.  I  was  much  con- 
cerned^ because  my  first  duty,  after  holding  the 
territory  acquired  within  my  command,  was  to 
prevent  further  reinforcing  of  Bragg  in  Middle 
Tennessee.  Already  the  Army  of  Northern  Vir- 
ginia had  defeated  the  army  under  General  Pope 
and  was  invading  Maryland.  In  the  center  Gen- 
eral Buell  was  on  his  way  to  Louisville,  and  Bragg 
marching  parallel  to  him  with  a  large  Confederate 
force  for  the  Ohio  Eiver. 

^ffe^*  I  had  been  constantly  called  upon  to  reinforce 
Buell,  until  at  this  time  my  entire  force  numbered 
less  than  fifty  thousand  men,  of  all  arms.  This  in- 
cluded everything  from  Cairo  south  within  my 
jurisdiction.  If  I  too  should  be  driven  back,  the 
Ohio  River  would  become  the  line  dividing  the 
belligerents  west  of  the  Alleghanies,  while  at  the 
East  the  line  was  already  farther  north  than  when 
hostilities  commenced  at  the  opening  of  the  war. 
It  is  true,  Nashville  was  never  given  up  after  its 
first  capture ;  but  it  would  have  been  isolated,  and 
the  garrison  there  would  have  been  obliged  to  beat 


PRICE  ENTERS  lUKA  337 

the  second  year  of  the  war,  the  line  dividing  the  caxxvin 
contestants  at  the  East  was  pushed  north  of  Mary- 
land, a  State  that  had  not  seceded,  and  at  the  West 
beyond  Kentucky,  another  State  which  had  been 
always  loyal,  would  have  been  discouraging  indeed. 
As  it  was,  many  loyal  people  despaired  in  the  fall 
of  1862  of  ever  saving  the  Union.  The  adminis- 
tration at  Washington  was  much  concerned  for  the 
safety  of  the  cause  it  held  so  dear.  But  I  believe 
there  was  never  a  day  when  the  President  did  not 
think  that,  in  some  way  or  other,  a  cause  so  just  as 
ours  would  come  out  triumphant. 

Up  to  the  11th  of  September  Bosecrans  still  had 
troops  on  the  railroad  east  of  Corinth,  but  they  had 
all  been  ordered  in.  By  the  12th  all  were  in  except 
a  small  force  under  Colonel  Murphy,  of  the  Eighth  ^5S*y' 
Wisconsin.  He  had  been  detained  to  guard  the 
remainder  of  the  stores  which  had  not  yet  been 
brought  in  to  Corinth. 

On  the  13th  of  September  General  Sterling  Price 
entered  luka,  a  town  about  twenty  miles  east  of 
Corinth,  on  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  railroad. 
Colonel  Murphy,  with  a  few  men,  was  guarding  the 
place.    He  made  no  resistance,  but  evacuated  the  ^'^^^^ 
town  on  the  approach  of  the  enemy.    I  was  appre- 
hensive lest  the  object  of  the  rebels  mi^ht  be  to  get 
troops  into  Tennessee  to  reinforce  Bragg,  as  it  ^as    iwo.  m 
afterward  ascertained  to  be.    The   authorities  a\. 
Washington,  including  the  general-in-chief  ot  t\ie>      ^^^^^ 
army,  were  very  anxious,  as  I  have  said,  abo"*^*  ^"  ^^w*^ 
fairs  both  in  East  and  Middle  Tennessee;  aJCt^  ^^ 


338  PERSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GBANT 

OHjxxym  stripping  everything;  and  there  was  danger  that 
before  troops  could  be  got  from  other  points  he 
might  be  far  on  his  way  across  the  Tennessee.    To 
^<2bcS^  prevent  this,  all  spare  forces  at  Bolivar  and  Jackson 
inth       y^QYQ  ordered  to  Corinth,  and  cars  were  concentrated 
at  Jackson  for  their  transportation.  Within  twenty- 
four  hours  from  the  transmission  of  the  order  the 
troops  were  at  their  destination,  although  there  had 
been  a  delay  of  four  hours  resulting  from  the  for- 
ward train  getting  off  the  track  and  stopping  all  the 
others.    This  gave  a  reinforofiment  of  nearly  eight 
thousand  men,  General  Ord  in  command.    General 
Bosecrans  commanded  the  district  of  Corinth  with 
a  movable  force  of  about  nine  thousand,  indepen- 
dent of  the  garrison  deemed  necessary  to  be  left 
behind.   It  was  known  that  General  Van  Dom  was 
about  a  four  days'  march  south  of  us,  with  a  large 
force.    It  might  have  been  part  of  his  plan  to  at- 
tack at  Corinth,  Price  coming  from  the  east  while 
he  came  up  from  the  south.    My  desire  was  to  at- 
tack Price  before  Van  Dorn  could  reach  Corinth  or 
go  to  his  relief. 
^i,^^.      General  Bosecrans  had  previously  had  his  head- 
^MdoiiSf*  quarters  at  luka,  where  his  command  was  spread 
bJ^SjSl    out  along  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  railroad 
^'i6;i86i^  eastward.    While  there  he  had  a  most  excellent 
vo&'i^  map  prepared,  showing  all  the  roads  and  streams  in 
s!2.'Mk*S;  *^®  surrounding  country.    He  was  also  personally 
^^       familiar  with  the  ground^  so  that  I  deferred  very 
much  to  him  in  my  plans  for  the  approach.    We 

T--J r.   j.^   i. I.  -.11   ^£  n 1  rw-.ji- 


340  PEBSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

CH.xxvm  side  of  the  railroad  and  attack  Price  from  the 
northwest,  while  Rosecrans  was  to  move  eastward 
from  his  position  south  of  Corinth  by  way  of  the 
Jacinto  road.  A  small  force  was  to  hold  the  Jacinto 
road  where  it  turns  to  the  northeast,  while  the  main 
force  moved  on  the  Fulton  road,  which  comes  into 
luka  farther  east.  This  plan  was  suggested  by 
Bosecrans. 

Bear  Creek,  a  few  miles  to  the  east  of  the  Fulton 
road,  is  a  formidable  obstacle  to  the  movement  of 
troops  in  the  absence  of  bridges,  all  of  which,  in 
September,  1862,  had  been  destroyed  in  that  vicin- 
ity. The  Tennessee,  to  the  northeast,  not  many 
miles  away,  was  also  a  formidable  obstacle  for  an 
army  followed  by  a  pursuing  force.  Ord  was  on 
the  northwest,  and  even  if  a  rebel  movement  had 
been  possible  in  that  direction,  it  could  have 
brought  only  temporary  relief,  for  it  would  have 
carried  Price^s  army  to  the  rear  of  the  National 
forces  and  isolated  it  from  all  support.  It  looked 
to  me  as  though,  if  Price  would  remain  in  luka 
until  we  could  get  there,  his  annihilation  was  in- 
evitable. 
186a  On  the  morning  of  the  18th  of  September  Gen- 

eral Ord  moved  by  rail  to  Bumsville,  and  there  left 

w-  (^1^7°  the  cars  and  moved  out  to  perform  his  part  of  the 
programme.  He  was  to  get  as  near  the  enemy  as 
possible  during  the  day,  and  intrench  himself  so  as 
to  hold  his  position  until  the  next  morning.  Rose- 
crans was  to  be  up  by  the  morning  of  the  19th  on 


BATTLE  OF  lUEA  341 

to  make  a  sudden  dash  into  Corintli  until  I  could  CH.xxvin 
be  notified.    There  was  a  telegraph-wire  along  the 
railroad,  so  there  would  be  no  delay  in  communica- 
tion.   I  detained  cars  and  locomotives  enough  at 
Bumsville  to  transport  the  whole  of  Ord's  com- 
mand at  once,  and  if  Van  Dom  had  moved  against 
Corinth  instead  of  luka  I  could  have  thrown  in 
reinforcements  to  the  number  of  seven  or  eight 
thousand  before  he  could  have  arrived.     I  re- 
mained at  Bumsville  with  a  detachment  of  about 
nine  hundred  men  from  Ord's  command,  and  com- 
municated with  my  two  wings  by  courier.    Ord  met 
the  advance  of  the  enemy  soon  after  leaving  Bums- 
ville.   Quite  a  sharp  engagement  ensued,  but  he 
drove  the  rebels  back  with  considerable  loss,  in- 
cluding one  general  officer  killed.    He  maintained 
his  position  and  was  ready  to  attack  by  daylight 
the  next  morning.    I  was  very  much  disappointed  ^'^^^ 
at  receiving  a  despatch  from  Bosecrans  after  mid- 
night, from  Jacinto,  twenty-two  miles  from  luka, 
saying  that  some  of  his  command  had  been  delayed, 
and  that  the  rear  of  his  column  was  not  yet  up  as 
far  as  Jacinto.    He  said,  however,  that  he  would 
still  be  at  luka  by  two  o^clock  the  next  day.    I  did 
not  believe  this  possible,  because  of  the  distance 
and  the  condition  of  the  roads,  which  was  "baA*, 
besides,  troops,  after  a  forced  march  of  t^went^ 
miles,  are  not  in  a  good  condition  for  fightiag  "^^ 
moment  they  get  through.    It  might  do  ixx  irx^^^^' 
ing  to  relieve  a  beleaguered  garrison,  "bixt  xx^  ^^- o^"^^^ 

make  an  assault.    I  immediately  sent  Oxd.  ^  ^        -^ 


342  PEBSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GEANT 

OH.zzvin  stmcted  to  notify  his  officers  to  be  on  the  alert  for 
any  indications  of  battle.  During  the  19th  the 
wind  blew  in  the  wrong  direction  to  transmit  sound 
either  toward  the  point  where  Ord  was,  or  to  Bums- 
ville,  where  I  had  remained. 

Sept,  186a  A  couple  of  hours  before  dark  on  the  19th  Bose- 
crans  arrived  with  the  head  of  his  column  at  Bar- 
nett's,  the  point  where  the  Jacinto  road  to  luka 
leaves  the  road  going  east.  He  here  turned  north 
without  sending  any  troops  to  the  Fulton  road. 

w.  ^j^^™  While  still  moving  in  column  up  the  Jacinto  road 
he  met  a  force  of  the  enemy  and  had  his  advance 
badly  beaten  and  driven  back  upon  the  main  road. 
In  this  short  engagement  his  loss  was  considerable 
for  the  number  engaged,  and  one  battery  was  taken 
from  him.  The  wind  was  still  blowing  hard,  and 
in  the  wrong  direction  to  transmit  sound  toward 
iwd.  70  either  Ord  or  me.  Neither  he  nor  I  nor  any  one  in 
either  command  heard  a  gun  that  was  fired  upon 
the  battle-field.  After  the  engagement  Bosecrans 
sent  me  a  despatch  announcing  the  result.  This 
was  brought  by  a  courier.  There  was  no  road 
between  Burnsville  and  the  position  then  occupied 
by  Rosecrans,  and  the  country  was  impassable  for 
a  man  on  horseback.  The  courier  bearing  the 
message  was  compelled  to  move  west  nearly  to 
Jacinto  before  he  found  a  road  leading  to  Bums- 
n>id.«7  ville.  This  made  it  a  late  hour  of  the  night  before 
I  learned  of  the  battle  that  had  taken  place  during 
the  afternoon.    I  at  once  notified  Ord  of  the  fact, 


BATTLE  OP  lUKA.  343 

ing  a  gun  from  the  south  of  the  town,  but  suppos-  oh.  xxix 
ing  the  troops  coming  from  the  southwest  must  be 
up  by  that  time.  Rosecrans,  however,  had  put  no 
troops  upon  the  Fulton  road,  and  the  enemy  had 
taken  advantage  of  this  neglect  and  retreated  by 
that  road  during  the  night.  Word  was  soon  brought 
to  me  that  our  troops  were  in  luka.  I  immediately 
rode  into  town,  and  found  that  the  enemy  was  not  ^-  ^^  J^^ 
being  pursued  even  by  the  cavalry.  I  ordered  pur- 
suit by  the  whole  of  Rosecrans's  command,  and 
went  on  with  him  a  few  miles  in  person.  He  fol- 
lowed only  a  few  miles  after  I  left  him,  and  then 
went  into  camp,  and  the  pursuit  was  continued  no 
farther.  I  was  disappointed  at  the  result  of  the 
battle  of  luka;  but  I  had  so  high  an  opinion  of 
General  itosecrans  that  I  found  no  fault  at  the  time. 


CHAPTER  XXIX 

VAN  DORN'S  MOVEMENTS — BATTLE  OF  CORINTH — COM- 
MAND OF  THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  TENNESSEE 

GH.XXIX    f\i^  the  19th  of  September  General  George  H. 

*^       V^  Thomas  was  ordered  east  to  reinforce  Buell. 

This  threw  the  army  at  my  command  still  more  on 

-SSmU-  t^^  defensive.    The  Memphis  and  Charleston  rail- 

lati^j^BP.  j.^g^  ^^  abandoned,  except  at  Corinth,  and  small 
forces  were  left  at  Chewalla  and  Grand  Junction. 
Soon  afterward  the  latter  of  these  two  places  was 
given  up,  and  Bolivar  became  our  most  advanced 
position  on  the  Mississippi  Central  railroad.  Our 
cavalry  was  kept  well  to  the  front,  and  frequent 
expeditions  were  sent  out  to  watch  the  movements 
of  the  enemy.  We  were  in  a  country  where  nearly 
all  the  people,  except  the  negroes,  were  hostile  to 
us  and  friendly  to  the  cause  we  were  trying  to  sup- 
press. It  was  easy,  therefore,  for  the  enemy  to  get 
early  information  of  our  every  move.  We,  on  the 
contrary,  had  to  go  after  our  information  in  force, 
and  then  often  returned  without  it. 

^)  MiHi2^  On  the  22d  Bolivar  was  threatened  by  a  large 
force  from  south  of  Grand  Junction,  supposed  to 
be  twenty  regiments  of  infantry  with  cavalry  and 


VAN  DORN'S  MOVEMENTS  345 

to  whatever  point  the  attack  might  be  made  upon.   oh.  xxix 
The  troops  from  Corinth  were  brought  up  in  time 
to  repel  the  threatened  movement  without  a  battle. 
Our  cavalry  followed  the  enemy  south  of  Davis's 
Mills  in  Mississippi. 

On  the  30th  I  found  that  Van  Dom  was  appa-  s^pt^iaea 
rently  endeavoring  to  strike  the  Mississippi  Eiver 
above  Memphis.  At  the  same  time  other  points 
within  my  command  were  so  threatened  that  it  was 
impossible  to  concentrate  a  force  to  drive  him  away. 
There  was  at  this  juncture  a  large  Union  force  at 
Helena,  Arkansas,  which,  had  it  been  within  my 
command,  I  could  have  ordered  across  the  river  to 
attack  and  break  up  the  Mississippi  Central  rail- 
road far  to  the  south.  This  would  not  only  have 
called  Van  Dom  back,  but  would  have  compelled 
the  retention  of  a  large  rebel  force  far  to  the  south 
to  prevent  a  repetition  of  such  raids  on  the  enemy's 
line  of  supplies.  Geographical  lines  between  the 
commands  during  the  rebellion  were  not  always 
well  chosen,  or  they  were  too  rigidly  adhered  to. 

Van  Dorn  did  not  attempt  to  get  upon  the  line  ..§J|®5fi». 
above  Memphis,  as  had  apparently  been  his  inten-  *«*ppf»"  p- 
tion.    He  was  simply  covering  a  deeper  design — 
one  much  more  important  to  his  cause.    By  the  1st 
of  October  it  was  fully  apparent  that  Corintli  was 
to  be  attacked  with  great  force  and  determination, 
and  that  Van  Dom,  Lovell,  Price,  ViUepigue,  aaad 
Eust  had  joined  their  strength  for  this  ptxrpofeek. 
There  was  some  skirmishing  oxitside  oi  Oo"*^^^ 

with  the  AHvAn/»A   of   t.liA   Arfcrkm-v    c^-n   ilriA  ^^* 


346  PEBSOKAL  MEMOIBS  OF  U.  8.  GBANT 

CH.  XXIX   and  all  possible  reinforcements/  Any  fresh  troops 

for  us  mnst  come  by  a  circuitous  route. 
oot,i8w        On  the  night  of  the  3d,  accordingly,  I  ordered 
General  McPherson,  who  was  at  Jackson,  to  join 

^*w^^  Rosecrans  at  Corinth  with  reinforcements  picked 
up  along  the  line  of  the  railroad  equal  to  a  brigade. 
Hurlbut  had  been  ordered  from  Bolivar  to  march 
for  the  same  destination;  and  as  Van  Dom  was 
coming  upon  Corinth  from  the  northwest,  some  of 
his  men  fell  in  with  the  advance  of  Hurlbut's,  and 
some  skirmishing  ensued  on  the  evening  of  the  3d. 

^'aim^  On  the  4th  Van  Dom  made  a  dashing  attack,  hop- 
ing, no  doubt,  to  capture  Rosecrans  before  his  rein- 
forcements could  come  up.  In  that  case  the  enemy 
himself  could  have  occupied  the  defenses  of  Corinth 
and  held  at  bay  all  the  Union  troops  that  arrived. 
In  fact,  he  could  have  taken  the  offensive  against 
the  reinforcements  with  three  or  four  times  their 
number,  and  stiU  left  a  sufficient  garrison  in  the 
works  about  Corinth  to  hold  them.  He  came  near 
success,  some  of  his  troops  penetrating  the  National 
lines  at  least  once ;  but  the  works  that  were  built 
after  Halleck's  departure  enabled  Rosecrans  to  hold 
his  position  until  the  troops  of  both  McPherson  and 
Hurlbut  approached  toward  the  rebel  front  and 
rear.  The  enemy  was  finally  driven  back  with 
great  slaughter;  all  their  charges,  made  with  great 
gallantry,  were  repulsed.  The  loss  on  our  side  was 
heavy,  but  nothing  to  compare  with  Van  Dom's. 


BATTLE  OP  OOBINTH  347 

the  enemy  and  had  a  moral  effect.    General  Eose-   cb.  xxix 
crans,  however,  failed  to  follow  up  the  victory,  al-  "tSTm^ 
though  I  had  given  specific  orders  in  advance  of  the  ****i*|J'"  ^' 
battle  for  him  to  pursue  the  moment  the  enemy  was 
repelled.    He  did  not  do  so,  and  I  repeated  the 
order  after  the  battle.    In  the  first  order  he  was 
notified  that  the  force  of  four  thousand  men  which 
was  going  to  his  assistance  would  be  in  great  peril 
if  the  enemy  was  not  pursued. 

General  Ord  had  joined  Hurlbut  on  the  4th,  and  ^j^^^ 
being  senior  took  command  of  his  troops.  This 
force  encountered  the  head  of  Van  Dom's  retreating 
column  just  as  it  was  crossing  the  Hatchie  by  a 
bridge  some  ten  miles  out  from  Corinth.  The 
bottom-land  here  was  swampy  and  bad  for  the 
operations  of  troops,  making  a  good  place  to  get 
an  enemy  into.  Ord  attacked  the  troops  that  had 
crossed  the  bridge,  and  drove  them  back  in  a  panic. 
Many  were  killed,  and  others  were  drowned  by  be- 
ing pushed  off  the  bridge  in  their  hurried  retreat. 
Ord  followed  and  met  the  main  force.  He  was  too 
weak  in  numbers  to  assault,  but  he  held  the  bridge 
and  compelled  the  enemy  to  resume  his  retreat  by 
another  bridge  higher  up  the  stream.  Ord  was 
wounded  in  this  engagement,  and  the  command 
devolved  on  Hurlbut. 

Rosecrans  did  not  start  in  pursuit  till  the  moTn-    ibid,  laa 
ing  of  the  5th,  and  then  took  the  wrong  roaA, 
Moving  in  the  enemy's  country,  he  traveled  witTci  %, 
wagon-train  to  carry  his  provisions  and  niTimtVoTiB. 
of  war.    His  march  was  therefore  slower  than  ttta.t 
of  the  enemy,  who  was  moving  toward  his  suppl^^^- 


348  PERSONAL  MEMOmS  OP  U.  8.  GRANT 

ch.  XXIX  their  persons,  would  have  been  worth  more  than 
any  pursuit  commenced  the  next  day  could  have 
possibly  been.  Even  when  he  did  start,  if  Rose- 
crans  had  followed  the  route  taken  by  the  enemy, 
he  would  have  come  upon  Van  Dom  in  a  swamp 
with  a  stream  in  front  and  Ord  holding  the  only 

^'^m^  bridge;  but  he  took  the  road  leading  north  and  to- 
ward Chewalla  instead  of  west,  and,  after  having 
marched  as  far  as  the  enemy  had  moved  to  get  to 
the  Hatchie,  he  was  as  far  from  battle  as  when  he 
started.  Hurlbut  had  not  the  numbers  to  meet  any 
such  force  as  Van  Dom's  if  they  had  been  in  any 
mood  for  fighting,  and  he  might  have  been  in  great 
peril. 

I  now  regarded  the  time  to  accomplish  anjrthing 
by  pursuit  as  past,  and,  after  Rosecrans  reached 

^?«MM^  Jonesboro,  I  ordered  him  to  return.  He  kept  on  to 
Ripley,  however,  and  was  persistent  in  wanting  to 
go  farther.  I  thereupon  ordered  him  to  halt  and 
submitted  the  matter  to  the  general-in-chief,  who 
allowed  me  to  exercise  my  judgment  in  the  matter, 
but  inquired,  "Why  not  pursue?''  Upon  this  I 
ordered  Rosecrans  back.  Had  he  gone  much  far- 
ther he  would  have  met  a  greater  force  than  Van 
Dom  had  at  Corinth,  and  behind  intrenchments  or 
on  chosen  ground,  and  the  probabilities  are  he 
would  have  lost  his  army. 

^wiSk"*'  The  battle  of  Corinth  was  bloody,  our  loss  being 
315  killed,  1812  wounded,  and  232  missing.    The 

?lA:J^?"  enemv  lost  manv  more.     Rosecrans  renorted  1423 


BATTLE  OF  COEINTH  349 

for  some  time  supposed  mortally — wounded.  I  re-  caxxix 
ceived  a  congratulatory  letter  from  the  President,  ^'^^^ 
which  expressed  also  his  sorrow  for  the  losses. 

This  battle  was  recognized  by  me  as  being  a  de- 
cided victory,  though  not  so  complete  as  I  had 
hoped  for,  nor  nearly  so  complete  as  I  now  think 
was  within  the  easy  grasp  of  the  commanding 
oflBcer  at  Corinth.  Since  the  war  it  is  known  that 
the  result,  as  it  was,  was  a  crushing  blow  to  the 
enemy,  and  felt  by  him  much  more  than  it  was 
appreciated  at  the  North.  The  battle  relieved  me 
from  any  further  anxiety  for  the  safety  of  the 
territory  within  my  jurisdiction,  and  soon  after 
receiving  reinforcements  I  suggested  to  the  general- 
in-chief  a  forward  movement  against  Vicksburg. 

On  the  23d  of  October  I  learned  of  Pemberton's  ^i,^f^ 
being  in  command  at  Holly  Springs  and  much  rein- 
forced by  conscripts  and  troops  from  Alabama  and 
Texas.    The  same  day  General  Rosecrans  was  re-   ^'^^^ 
lieved  from  duty  with  my  command,  and  shortly 
after  he  succeeded  Buell  in  the  conamand  of  the 
army  in  Middle  Tennessee.    I  was  delighted  at  tbe 
promotion  of  General  Rosecrans  to  a  separate  com- 
mand, because  I  still  believed  that  when  iudep^^" 
dent  of  an  immediate  superior  the  qualities  '^^^  \a. 
I  at  that  time  credited  him  with  possessing  ^^^^  "S^ 
show  themselves.    As  a  subordinate  I  f oixii^  ^^,^>^"" 
could  not  make  him  do  as  I  wished,  and.  tiaA  ^^^  ^        c^^^^^S^^ 

mined  to  relieve  him  from  duty  that  veiry  ^a.-^.     4^^^^^^s>  ^^^^ 

At  the  close  of  the  operations  just  des<ixriVy^  ^^^ 
force,  in  round  numbers,  was  48.500.         Of 


350 


PEBSONAL  MEMOIBS  OF  U.  S.  GBANT 


Ibid.  SM 


from  Washington  to  go  North  and  organize  troops 
to  be  used  in  opening  the  Mississippi  These  new 
levies,  with  other  reinforcements,  now  began  to 
come  in. 

On  the  25th  of  October  I  was  placed  in  command 
of  the  Department  of  the  Tennessee.  Reinforce- 
ments continued  to  come  from  the  North,  and  by 
the  2d  of  November  I  was  prepared  to  take  the 
initiative.  This  was  a  great  relief  after  the  two 
and  a  half  months  of  continued  defense  over  a  large 
district  of  country,  and  where  nearly  every  citizen 
was  an  enemy  ready  to  give  information  of  our 
every  move.  I  have  described  very  imperfectly  a 
few  of  the  battles  and  skirmishes  that  took  place 
during  this  time.  To  describe  all  would  take  more 
space  than  I  can  allot  to  the  purpose;  to  make 
special  mention  of  all  the  oflBcers  and  troops  who 
distinguished  themselves  would  take  a  volume. 


C.  8.  Hamil- 
ton, W.  P. 
1889-48; 
Mexico, 
1846-48; 
BHg.-Oen. 
Voir.  May 
17a861:Mfl3.- 
Gen.  vols. 
Sept.19,1862; 
<f.Apr.l7,1891 


Note. — Pop  gallantry  in  the 
yarious  engagements  from  the 
time  I  was  left  in  command  down 
to  the  26th  of  October,  and  on  my 
recommendation,  Oenerals  Mc- 
Pherson  and  C.  8.  Hamilton  were 
promoted  to  be  major-generals, 
and  Colonels  C.  C.  Marsh,  Twen- 


tieth Illinois,  Marcellus  M.  Crock- 
er, Thirteenth  Iowa,  Joseph  A. 
Mower,  Eleventh  Missouri,  Mor- 
timer D.  Leggett,  Seventy-eighth 
Ohio,  J.  D.  Stevenson,  Seventh 
Missouri,  and  John  E.  Smith, 
Forty-fifth  Illinois,  to  be  briga- 
diers.—U.  8.  G. 


CHAPTER  XXX 

THE  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  VICK8BUKG — EMPLOYING  THE 
FEEEDMEN — OOCUPATION  OF  HOLLY  SPRINGS — 
SHERMAN  ORDERED  TO  MEMPHIS  —  SHERMAN'S 
MOVEMENTS  DOWN  THE  MISSISSIPPI — VAN  DORN 
CAPTURES  HOLLY  SPRINGS — COLLECTING  FORAGE 
AND  FOOD 

TTICKSBURG  was  important  to  the  enemy  be-  chap.xxx 

▼     cause  it  occupied  the  first  high  ground  coming 
close  to  the  river  below  Memphis.    From  there  a  cwfvi^to^ 
railroad  runs  east,  connecting  with  other  roads  ^^-^^^ 
leading  to  all  points  of  the  Southern  States.    A 
railroad  also  starts  from  the  opposite  side  of  the 
river,  extending  west  as  far  as  Shreveport,  Louisi- 
ana.   Vicksburg  was  the  only  channel,  at  the  time 
of  the  events  of  which  this  chapter  treats,  connect- 
ing  the  parts  of  the  Confederacy  divided  by  the 
JlCssissippi.    So  long  as  it  was  held  by  the  enemy 
the   free  navigation  of  the  river  was  preveut-^^ 
ffenoe  its  importance.    Points  on  the  river    ^*^>^^ 
fy^0^ik  Vicksburg  and  Port  Hudson  wero  hel^    ^^ 
^^^^^xidencies;  but  their  fall  was  sure  to  foUo^  *icxa 


352  PEBSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  8.  GRANT 

Chap. XXX  the  general-in-chief  in  the  following  words:  "I 
have  commenced  a  movement  on  Grand  Junction 
^'ai^^  with  three  divisions  from  Corinth  and  two  from 
Bolivar.  Will  leave  here  [Jackson,  Tennessee]  to- 
morrow evening  and  take  command  in  person.  If 
found  practicable,  I  will  go  on  to  Holly  Springs, 
and  maybe  Grenada,  completing  railroad  and  tele- 
graph as  I  go.'' 

At  this  time  my  command  was  holding  the 
Mobile  and  Ohio  railroad  from  about  twenty-five 
miles  south  of  Corinth,  north  to  Columbus,  Ken- 
tucky ;  the  Mississippi  Central  from  Bolivar  north 
to  its  junction  with  the  Mobile  and  Ohio;  the 
Memphis  and  Charleston  from  Corinth  east  to  Bear 
Creek;  and  the  Mississippi  River  from  Cairo  to 
Memphis.    My  entire  command  was  no  more  than 
was  necessary  to  hold  these  lines,  and  hardly  that 
if  kept  on  the  defensive.    By  moving  against  the 
enemy  and  into  his  unsubdued,  or  not  yet  captured, 
territory,  driving  his  army  before  us,  these  lines 
would  nearly  hold  themselves,  thus  affording  a 
large  force  for  field  operations.    My  moving  force 
at  that  time  was  about  thirty  thousand  men,  and  I 
het&mSue,  estimated  the  enemy  confronting  me,  under  Pem- 
8eS!^6^i.'  berton,  at  about  the  same  number.    General  Mc- 
"^SSoJJie^''  Pherson  commanded  my  left  wing  and  General 
cten.oct.i8i  C.  S.  Hamilton  the  center,  while  Sherman  was  at 

1883;  <i.  July  ' 

18,1881      Memphis  with  the  right  wing.    Pemberton  was 

fortified  at  the  Tallahatchie,  but  occupied  Holly 

Springs  and  Grand  Junction,  on  the  Mississippi 

^'^SP^  Central  railroad.    On  the  4th  we  occupied  Grand 

Junction  and  La  Grange,  throwing  a  considerable 


ElilPLOYING  THE  FBEEDMEN  353 

repaired  and  put  in  running  order  as  the  troops  chap.xzx 
advanced. 

Up  to  this  time  it  had  been  regarded  as  an  axiom 
in  war  that  large  bodies  of  troops  must  operate 
from  a  base  of  supplies,  which  they  always  covered 
and  guarded  in  all  forward  movements.  There  was 
delay,  therefore,  in  repairing  the  road  back,  and  in 
gathering  and  forwarding  supplies  to  the  front. 

By  my  orders,  and  in  a<5cordance  with  previous  ^'^^^^ 
instructions  from  Washington,  all  the  forage  within 
reach  was  collected  under  the  supervision  of  the  • 
chief  quartermaster,  and  the  provisions  imder  the 
chief  commissary,  receipts  being  given  when  there 
was  any  one  to  take  them;  the  supplies,  in  any 
event,  to  be  accounted  for  as*  government  stores. 
The  stock  was  bountiful,  but  still  it  gave  me  no 
idea  of  the  possibility  of  supplying  a  moving  column 
in  an  enemy's  country  from  the  coimtry  itself. 

It  was  at  this  point,  probably,  where  the  first  idea  i^^^» 
of  a  "  rreedman's  Bureau  ^  took  its  origin.   Orders     ^ 
of  the  government  prohibited  the  expulsion  of  the 
negroes  from  the  protection  of  the  army  when  they 
came  in  voluntarily.     Humanity  forbade  allowii^g 


Bureau 


.-K^> 


them  to  starve.    With  such  an  army  of  them,  ^^    ^  ^'-^ 

all  ages  and  both  sexes,  as  had  congregated  abo"*^*     o^v*''^'^'*'''^ 

Grand  Junction,  amounting  to  many  thousands,  ^^ 

^as  iinpossible  to  advance.    There  was  no  speci^'^^ 

^ntbority  for  feeding  them  unless  they  were  e1^^ 

Phyed  ^s  teamsters,  cooks,  and  pioneers  ^^^^  \p-^ 

^^7;  ^^*  ^^y  able-bodied  young  men  were  stdt^^ 

^kfor  ^'^^^  work.   This  labor  would  support  \^^^  ^ 

^eij^i/jrj^J^ted  percentage  of  them.    Theplaixta^  t>^ 


1886 


354  PEBSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GBANT 

Chap.  XXX  could  be  employed  in  saving  these  crops.  To  do 
this  work  with  contrabands,  or  to  have  it  done, 
organization  under  a  competent  chief  was  neces- 
'cS^^tS'  s^^*  On  inquiring  for  such  a  man.  Chaplain  Eaton, 
^^ij^s!'  iiow  and  for  many  years  the  very  able  United 
oS!^^  18W;  States  Commissioner  of  Education,  was  suggested. 
ofEd.i87(^  He  proved  as  eflBcient  in  that  field  as  he  has  since 
done  in  his  present  one.  I  gave  him  all  the  assis- 
tants and  guards  he  called  for.  We  together  fixed 
the  prices  to  be  paid  for  the  negro  labor,  whether 
rendered  to  the  government  or  to  individuals. 
The  cotton  was  to  be  picked  from  abandoned  plan- 
tations, the  laborers  to  receive  the  stipulated  price 
(my  recollection  is  twelve  and  a  half  cents  per 
pound  for  picking  and  ginning)  from  the  quarter- 
master, he  shipping  the  cotton  North  to  be  sold  for 
the  benefit  of  the  government.  Citizens  remaining 
on  their  plantations  were  allowed  the  privilege  of 
having  their  crops  saved  by  f reed^en  on  the  same 
terms. 

At  once  the  freedmen  became  self-sustaining. 
The  money  was  not  paid  to  them  directly,  but  was 
expended  judiciously  and  for  their  benefit.  They 
gave  me  no  trouble  afterward. 

Later  the  freedmen  were  engaged  in  cutting 
wood  along  the  Mississippi  River  to  supply  the 
large  number  of  steamers  on  that  stream.  A  good 
price  was  paid  for  chopping  wood  used  for  the  sup- 
ply of  government  steamers  (steamers  chartered 
and  which  the  government  had  to  supply  with  fuel). 

mi 1 — : x-u-.* i?„^i  ^^zji ,,^1.  i.:^i*^« 


OCCUPATION  OF  HOLLY  SPEINGS  355 

hospitals  for  the  sick,  and  to  supply  them  with  many  chap,  xxx 
comforts  they  had  never  known  before. 

At  this  stage  of  the  campaign  against  Vicksburg 
I  was  very  much  distui'bed  by  newspaper  rumors  mfi^i^^ 
that  General  McClernand  was  to  have  a  separate    rSs^vf 
and  independent  command  within  mine,  to  operate  ^U6,tw* 
against  Vicksburg  by  way  of  the  Mississippi  River. 
Two  commanders  on  the  same  field  are  always  one 
too  many,  and  in  this  case  I  did  not  think  the  gen- 
eral selected  had  either  the  experience  or  the  quali- 
flcations  to  fit  him  for  so  important  a  position. 
I  feared  for  the  safety  of  the  troops  intrusted  to 
him,  especially  as  he  was  to  raise  new  levies — raw 
troops — to  execute  so  important  a  trust.    But  on 
the  12th  I  received  a  despatch  from  General  Hal-  ^)  A»f3? 
leek  saying  that  I  had  command  of  all  the  troops 
sent  to  my  department,  and  authorizing  me  to  fight 
the  enemy  where  I  pleased.    The  next  day  my 
cavalry  was  in  Holly  Springs,  and  the  enemy  fell 
back  south  of  the  Tallahatchie. 

Holly  Springs  I  selected  for  my  depot  of  supplies 
and  munitions  of  war,  all  of  which  at  that  time 
came  by  rail  from  Columbus,  Kentucky,  except  the 
few  stores  collected  about  La  Grange  and  Grand 
Junction.    This  was  a  long  line   (increasing  in 
length  as  we  moved  south)  to  maintain  in  an 
enemy's  country.    On  the  15th  of  November,  winVe  ^SJ^ 
I  was  still  at  Holly  Springs,  I  sent  vsrord  to  S\i«t-       ^ 
man  to  meet  me  at  Columbus.   We  were  \>\it  iox\^- 
seven  miles  apart,  yet  the  most  expeditio\xE^ay  ^^^^^ 
ns  to  meet  was  for  me  to  take  the  rail  to  Co\\iJ3tiV>^ 
^nd  SIiGTixxan  a  steamer  for  the  sarrxo  pl«^-  "^ 


356  PEBSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GBANT 

Chap.  XXX  and  to  march  them  down  the  Mississippi  Central 
raikoad  if  he  could.    Sherman,  who  was  always 
^'(^m^  prompt,  was  up  by  the  29th  to  Cottage  Hill,  ten 
miles  north  of  Oxford.    He  brought  three  divisions 
with  him,  leaving  a  garrison  of  only  four  regiments 
of  infantry,  a  couple  of  pieces  of  artillery,  and  a 
small  detachment  of  cavalry.    Further  reinforce- 
ments, he  knew,  were  on  their  way  from  the  North 
ciLiShiSS  to  Memphis.    About  this  time  General  Halleck 
B^!-^'   ordered  troops  from  Helena,  Arkansas  (territory 
im;  6^  west  of  the  Mississippi  was  not  under  my  command 
voTa^y,    then),  to  cut  the  road  in  Pemberton's  rear.    The 
expedition  was  under  Generals  Hovey  and  C.  C. 
bim',Si?&  Washburn,  and  was  successful  so  far  as  reaching 
oSiolwei;  the  railroad  was  concerned;  but  the  damage  done 
^k?jS^.  was  very  slight  and  was  soon  repaired. 
Nov. '»,  isea      The  Tallahatchie,  which  confronted  me,  was  very 
high,  the  railroad-bridge  destroyed,  and  Pemberton 
strongly  fortified  on  the  south  side.    A  crossing 
would  have  been  impossible  in  the  presence  of  an 
^)  m^'  enemy.    I  sent  the  cavalry  higher  up  the  stream 
and  they  secured  a  crossing.    This  caused  the 
enemy  to  evacuate  his  position,  which  was  pos- 
sibly  accelerated  by  the  expedition  of  Hovey  and 
Washburn.    The  enemy  was  followed  as  far  south 
as  Oxford  by  the  main  body  of  troops,  and  some 
seventeen  miles  farther  by  McPherson's  command.. 
Here  the  pursuit  was  halted  to  repair  the  railroad 
from  the  Tallahatchie  northward,  in  order  to  bring 
up  supplies.   The  piles  on  which  the  railroad-bridge 
rested  had  been  left  standing.    The  work  of  con- 
fttrnptinir  a  rofl/^WAV  for  thft  troonfl  "was  but  a  short 


SHEBMAN  OBDEBED  TO  MEMPHIS 


357 


I  learned  that  an  expedition  down  the  Mississippi  chap.xxx 
now  was  inevitable ;  and,  desiring  to  have  a  com- 
petent commander  in  charge,  I  ordered  Sherman 
on  the  8th  of  December  back  to  Memphis  to  take 
charge.    The  following  were  his  orders : 


Sli6rmaii« 
Memoirs,  i, 
281  et  seq.— 
Badeaa,MiL 
HistJ.lMet 
seq. 


HeADQUABTEBS  TmBTEENTH  Abmy-oobps, 
Depabtment  op  the  Tennessee, 
OxpoBD,  Mississn>Pi,  December  8, 1862. 

Majob-Genebal  W.  T.  Shebman, 
Commanding  Bight  Wing : 

You  will  proceed,  with  as  Uttle  delay  as  possible,  to 
Memphis,  Tennessee,  taking  with  you  one  division  of  your 
present  command.  On  your  arrival  at  Memphis  you  will 
assume  command  of  all  the  troops  there,  and  that  portion 
of  General  Curtis's  forces  at  present  east  of  the  Mississippi  ^^fS^? 
River,  and  organize  them  into  brigades  and  divisions  in 
your  own  army.  As  soon  as  possible,  move  with  them 
down  the  river  to  the  vicinity  of  Vicksburg,  and,  with  the 
cooperation  of  the  gunboat  fleet  under  conmiand  of  Plag- 
Officer  Porter,  proceed  to  the  reduction  of  that  place  in 
such  manner  as  circmnstances  and  your  own  judgment 
may  dictate. 

The  amount  of  rations,  forage,  land  transportation,  etc., 
necessary  to  take  will  be  left  entirely  with  yourself.     The 
quartennaster  at  St.  Louis  wiU  be  instructed  to  send,  you 
transportation  for  thirty  thousand  men ;  should  yo'O-  stVSV 
find  yourself  deficient,  your  quartermaster  will  be  at^i"*^^^' 
ized  to  make  up  the  deficiency  from  such  transpOi^^'^^ 
may  come  into  the  port  of  Memphis.  -    at  ^ 

On  arriving  in  Memphis,  put  yourself  in  comm'^^^^^^^Vii^  ^'^^  «^ 
tion  with  Admiral  Porter,  and  arrange  witli  hiij^  fi7^  ^^^^^ 

cooperation.  .a--^-^*^^  "* 

Inform  me  at  the  earliest  practicable  day  ot  th^    ^^^  ^^^ 
when  you  will  embark,  and  such  plans  as  ma^  ^i^^^^^^^-^^^-^^l^.^     '^^' 


w.  B.  xvn 

cir«oi 


81 ;  Mexico, 

1846-48; 

BTig.-Oeii. 

Vols.  May  17, 

1861:  MiO-- 

Geii.Mar.31, 

1862;  d. Deo. 

96,1866 


>^^5*"^»>' 


358  PEBSONAL  MEMOIBS  OF  U.  S.  GBAKT 

Chap,  xx-y  Leave  the  District  of  Memphis  in  the  command  of  an 
efficient  officer,  and  with  a  garrison  of  four  regiments  of 
infantry,  the  siege-guns,  and  whatever  cavalry  may  be 
there. 

U.  S.  Grant, 

Major-General. 


w.  R  xvn 

(l)47aet8e<i. 


This  idea  had  presented  itself  to  my  mind  ear- 
lier, for  on  the  4th  of  December  I  asked  Halleck  if 
it  would  not  be  well  to  hold  the  enemy  south  of 
the  Yaiabusha  and  move  a  force  from  Helena  and 
Memphis  on  Vicksburg.  On  the  5th  again  I  sug- 
gested, from  Oxford,  to  Halleck  that  if  the  Helena 
troops  were  at  my  command  I  thought  it  would  be 
possible  to  take  them  and  the  Memphis  forces  south 
of  the  mouth  of  the  Yazoo  River,  and  thus  secure 
Vicksburg  and  the  State  of  Mississippi.  Halleck 
isea  on  the  same  day — the  5th  of  December — directed 
me  not  to  attempt  to  hold  the  country  south  of  the 
Tallahatchie,  but  to  collect  twenty-five  thousand 
troops  at  Memphis  by  the  20th  for  the  Vicksburg 
expedition.  I  sent  Sherman  with  two  divisions  at 
once,  informed  the  general-in-chief  of  the  fact,  and 
asked  whether  I  should  command  the  expedition 
down  the  river  myself  or  send  Sherman.  I  was 
authorized  to  do  as  I  thought  best  for  the  accom- 
plishment of  the  great  object  in  view.  I  sent  Sher- 
man, and  so  informed  General  Halleck. 

As  stated,  my  action  in  sending  Sherman  back 

was  expedited  by  a  desire  to  get  him  in  command 

of  the  forces  separated  from  my  direct  supervision. 

^T^iSte  oi  I  feared  that  delay  might  bring  McClernand,  who 

^m!w     was  his  senior,  and  who  had  authority  from  the 

President  and  Secretary  of  War  to  exercise  that  par- 


SHEBMAN'S  MOVEMENTS  DOWN  THE  MISSISSIPPI  359 

McClemand's  fitness;  and  I  had  good  reason  to  be-  chap.xxx 
lieve  that  in  forestalling  him  I  was  by  no  means 
giving  offense  to  those  whose  authority  to  command   a  Sl^i«- 
was  above  both  him  and  me.  *^ppJ'"  p- 

Neither  my  orders  to  General  Sherman,  nor  the 
correspondence  between  us  or  between  General 
Halleck  and  myself,  contemplated  at  the  time  my 
going  farther  south  than  the  Yalabusha.  Pember- 
ton's  force  in  my  front  was  the  main  part  of  the 
garrison  of  Vicksburg,  as  the  force  with  me  was 
the  defense  of  the  territory  held  by  us  in  West 
Tennessee  and  Kentucky.  I  hoped  to  hold  Pem-  mSSoS^I. 
berton  in  my  front  while  Sherman  should  get  in  ^ 
his  rear  and  into  Vicksburg.  The  farther  north  the 
enemy  could  be  held  the  better. 

It  was  understood,  however,  between  General 
Sherman  and  myself  that  our  movements  were  to 
be  cooperative;  if  Pemberton  could  not  be  held 
away  from  Vicksburg  I  was  to  follow  him ;  but  at 
that  time  it  was  not  expected  to  abandon  the  rail- 
road north  of  the  Yalabusha.  With  that  point  as  a 
secondary  base  of  supplies,  the  possibility  of  mov-  nSSeSk.*^ 
ing  down  the  Yazoo  until  communications  could  be 


xvS< 


B.  xvn  (1) 

474 

opened  with  the  Mississippi  was  contemplated. 

It  was  my  intention,  and  so  understood  by  Sher- 
man and  his  command,  that  if  the  enemy  should 
faJJ  back  I  would  follow  him  even  to  the  gates  oi 
Viclcshurg.    I  intended  in  such  an  event  to  b-olA. 
the  -Toad  to  Grenada,  on  the  Yalabusha,  and  <^"*^^ 
Joos^  f  i*om  there,  expecting  to  establish  a  new  Xy^'^^^ 
o/^iaLF>I>lies  on  the  Yazoo,  or  at  Yicksburg  its^^^^^^ 
^ib     *3F^renada  to  fall  back  upon  in  case  of  f ail^^^-^^I.  t^STv^ 


360  PEBSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GBAKT 

CHAP.  XXX  operate  in  an  enemy's  territory,  depending  upon 
the  country  for  supplies.  A  halt  was  called  at 
Oxford,  with  the  advance  seventeen  mUes  south  of 
there,  to  bring  up  the  road  to  the  latter  point  and 
to  bring  supplies  of  food,  forage,  and  munitions  to 
the  front. 
G^Sw.  R.  ^^  *^^  1^^^  ^^  December  I  received  orders  from 
xvn  a) ««  "VVashington  to  divide  my  command  into  four  army- 
corps,  with  General  McClernand  to  command  one  of 
them  and  to  be  assigned  to  that  part  of  the  army 
which  was  to  operate  down  the  Mississippi  This 
interfered  with  my  plans,  but  probably  resulted 
in  my  ultimately  taking  the  command  in  person. 
McClernand  was  at  that  time  in  Springfield,  Uli- 


^SSnaSaT  ^^^^'    ^^  order  was  obeyed  without  any  delay. 
^'^m^  Despatches  were  sent  to  him  the  same  day  in 


w.  B.  xvn      On  the  20th  General  Van  Dom  appeared  at  Holly 


cvn 

conformity. 

[ 

0)606  etseq. 

Springs,  my  secondary  base  of  supplies,  captured 
the  garrison  of  fifteen  hundred  men,  commanded  by 
Colonel  Murphy,  of  the  Eighth  Wisconsin  Regiment, 
and  destroyed  all  our  munitions  of  war,  food,  and 
forage.  The  capture  was  a  disgraceful  one  to  the 
M^5^S»-  ^^^^^  commanding,  but  not  to  the  troops  under 
™*5JJi^"^  him.  At  the  same  time  Forrest  got  on  our  line  of 
railroad  between  Jackson,  Tennessee,  and  Colum- 
bus, Kentucky,  doing  much  damage  to  it.  This  cut 
me  off  from  all  communication  with  the  North  for 
more  than  a  week,  and  it  was  more  than  two  weeks 


VAN  DOBN  CAPTUBES  HOLLY  SPEINGS  361 

fore,  to  abandon  my  campaign  into  the  interior  with  chap,  xxx 
Columbus  as  a  base,  and  returned  to  La  Grange  and 
Grand  Junction,  destroying  the  road  to  my  front  ^^^^^' 
and  repairing  the  road  to  Memphis,  making  the  ^^-^^^ 
Mississippi  River  the  line  over  which  to  draw  sup- 
plies.   Pemberton  was  falling  back  at  the  same 
time. 

The  moment  I  received  the  news  of  Van  Dom's  ^'^)^P^ 
success  I  sent  the  cavalry  at  the  front  back  to  drive 
him  from  the  country.  He  had  start  enough  to 
move  north,  destroying  the  railroad  in  many  places, 
and  to  attack  several  small  garrisons  intrenched  as 
guards  to  the  railroad.  All  these  he  found  warned 
of  his  coming  and  prepared  to  receive  him.  Van 
Dom  did  not  succeed  in  capturing  a  single  garrison, 
except  the  one  at  Holly  Springs,  which  was  larger 
than  all  the  others  attacked  by  him  put  together. 
Murphy  was  also  warned  of  Van  Dom's  approach, 
but  made  no  preparations  to  meet  him.  He  did  not 
even  notify  his  command. 

Colonel  Murphy  was  the  officer  who,  two  months  ^***i 
before,  had  evacuated  luka  on  the  approach  of  the 
enemy.    General  Rosecrans  denounced  him  for  t^^ 
act  and  desired  to  have  him  tried  and  punished- 
sustained  the  colonel  at  the  time  because  his  o^^*^^^ 
mand  was  a  small  one  compared  with  that  of  *^^  ^ 
enemy^—not  one  tenth  as  large,-— and  I  thoughts  ^  :^ 
bad  doJxe  well  to  get  away  without  f aUing  ij^^  tl>^^^ 
band^-  .  His  leaving  large  stores  to  fall  into  Pri^^^^"^ 
Posse^f^^^  I  looked  upon  as  an  oversight,  ^^  ^'^^^ 
^^8ed   ^*  ^^  *^®  ground  of  inexperience  iu  xtxiUi^^^^^ 
^^tt^^^^.  ^^  should,  however,  have  destroy e<i  t\xe^^^^^^^ 


891, 


Tti 


362  PERSONAL  HEM0IB8  OF  U.  8.  OSANT 

CHAP.  XXX  was  correct  The  surrender  of  Holly  Springs  was 
most  reprehensible,  and  showed  either  the  disloyalty 
of  C!olonel  Murphy  to  the  cause  which  he  professed 
to  serve,  or  gross  cowardice. 

After  the  war  was  over  I  read  from  the  diary  of 
a  lady  who  accompanied  (General  Pemberton  in  his 
retreat  from  the  Tallahatchie  that  the  retreat  was 
almost  a  panic.  The  roads  were  bad  and  it  was 
difficult  to  move  the  artillery  and  trains.  Why 
there  should  have  been  a  panic  I  do  not  see.  No 
expedition  had  yet  started  down  the  Mississippi 

a^/^5^  Eiver.    Had  I  known  the  demoralized  condition 

Am.u,4u  ^£  ^^^  enemy,  or  the  fact  that  central  Mississippi 

abounded  so  in  all  army  supplies,  I  would  have 

been  in  pursuit  of  Pemberton  while  his  cavalry  was 

destroying  the  roads  in  my  rear. 

After  sending  cavalry  to  drive  Van  Dom  away, 

tbe^u^  my  next  order  was  to  despatch  all  the  wagons  we 
had,  under  proper  escort,  to  collect  and  bring  in  all 
supplies  of  forage  and  food  from  a  region  of  fifteen 
•  miles  east  and  west  of  the  road  from  our  front  back 
to  Grand  Junction,  leaving  two  months'  supplies  for 
the  families  of  those  whose  stores  were  taken.  I 
was  amazed  at  the  quantity  of  supplies  the  country 
afforded.  It  showed  that  we  could  have  subsisted 
off  the  country  for  two  months  instead  of  two  weeks 
without  going  beyond  the  limits  designated.  This 
taught  me  a  lesson  which  was  taken  advantage  of 
later  in  the  campaign,  when  our  army  lived  twenty 
days  with  the  issue  of  only  five  days*  rations  by  the 
commissary.  Our  loss  of  supplies  was  great  at 
HoUv  SDriners,  but  it  was  more  than  compensated 


COLLECTING  FORAGE  AND  FOOD  363 

The  news  of  the  capture  of  Holly  Springs  and  the  chap,  xxx 
destruction  of  our  supplies  caused  much  rejoicing 
among  the  people  remaining  in  Oxford.  They  ^*^ 
came  with  broad  smiles  on  their  faces,  indicating  ^mb^ta 
intense  joy,  to  ask  what  I  was  going  to  do  now 
without  anything  for  my  soldiers  to  eat.  I  told 
them  that  I  was  not  disturbed;  that  I  had  already 
sent  troops  and  wagons  to  collect  all  the  food  and 
forage  they  could  find  for  fifteen  miles  on  each  side 
of  the  road.  Countenances  soon  changed,  and  so 
did  the  inquiry.  The  next  was,  "What  are  we  to 
do  f "  My  response  was  that  we  had  endeavored  to 
feed  ourselves  from  our  own  Northern  resources 
while  visiting  them ;  but  their  friends  in  gray  had 
been  uncivil  enough  to  destroy  what  we  had  brought 
along,  and  it  could  not  be  expected  that  men  with 
arms  in  their  hands  would  starve  in  the  midst  of 
plenty.  I  advised  them  to  emigrate  east  or  west 
fifteen  miles,  and  assist  in  eating  up  what  we  left. 


CHAPTER  XXXI 

HEADQUAETEBS  MOVED  TO  HOLLY  SPMNGS — GENEEAL 
MoCLEENAND  IN  COMMAND — ASSUMING  COMMAND 
AT  young's  point — OPERATIONS  ABOVE  VICK8BUEG 
— FOBTTFICATIONS  ABOUT  VICK8BURG — THE  CANAL 
— LAKE  PROVIDENCE — OPERATIONS  AT  YAZOO  PASS 


CH.XXXI 


THIS  interruption  in  my  communications  North 
— I  was  really  cut  off  from  communication 
with  a  great  part  of  my  own  command  during  this 

iSmSIS^,  *™® — resulted  in  Sherman's  moving  from  Memphis 
^       before  McClemand  could  arrive ;  for  my  despatch 

Dea,i8w  of  the  18th  did  not  reach  McClemand.  Pemberton 
got  back  to  Vicksburg  before  Sherman  got  there. 
The  rebel  positions  were  on  a  bluff  on  the  Yazoo 
Kiver,  some  miles  above  its  mouth.  The  waters 
were  high,  so  that  the  bottoms  were  generally  over- 
flowed, leaving  only  narrow  causeways  of  dry  land 
between  points  of  debarkation  and  the  high  bluffs. 
These  were  fortified  and  defended  at  all  points. 

"tSSmi^  The  rebel  position  was  impregnable  against  any 

^et  i»4?'  force  that  could  be  brought  against  its  front.  Sher- 
man could  not  use  one  fourth  of  his  force.  His 
efforts  to  capture  the  city,  or  the  high  ground  north 
of  it,  were  necessarily  unavailing. 


HEADQUAETEBS  MOVED  TO  HOLLY  SPRINGS  365 

after  the  destmction  of  the  road  and  telegraph  to   ch.xxxi 

my  rear  on  the  20th.    He  did  not  know  but  what  I    nee,  laea 

was  in  the  rear  of  the  enemy  and  depending  on  him 

to  open  a  new  base  of  supplies  for  the  troops  with 

me.   I  had,  before  he  started  from  Memphis,  directed  ^'^^^ 

him  to  take  with  him  a  few  small  steamers  suitable 

for  the  navigation  of  the  Tazoo,  not  knowing  but 

that  I  might  want  them  to  supply  me  after  cutting 

loose  from  my  base  at  Grenada. 

On  the  23d  I  removed  my  headquarters  back  to  *.S[Sm^ 
Holly  Springs.  The  troops  were  drawn  back  grad-  **^?F,*7a^^' 
ually,  but  without  haste  or  confusion,  finding  sup- 
plies abundant  and  no  enemy  following.  The  road 
was  not  damaged  south  of  Holly  Springs  by  Van 
Dom,  at  least  not  to  an  extent  to  cause  any  delay. 
As  I  had  resolved  to  move  headquarters  to  Mem- 
phis, and  to  repair  the  road  to  that  point,  I  remained 
at  Holly  Springs  until  this  work  was  completed. 

On  the  10th  of  January,  the  work  on  the  road       wes 
from  Holly  Springs  to  Grand  Junction  and  thence 
to  Memphis  being  completed,  I  moved  my  head- 
quarters to  the  latter  place.    During  the  campaign 
here  described  the  losses  (mostly  captures)  were 
about  equal,  crediting  the  rebels  with  their  HoUy 
Springs  capture,  which  they  cotdd  not  hold.  w,erm«tf  • 

When  Sherman  started  on  Ms  expedition  do^^^^"^  |§\i^Sft, 
the  river  he  had  twenty  thousand  mea  taken  fro''^^ 
Memphis,  and  was  reinforced  by  twelve  thous^'^'^^ 
more  at  Helena,  Arkan/^as.    The  troops  on  the  ^^^^        ^^ 
bank  of  the  river  had  f^i'^^ously  \>eeu  assigned         ^  ^^ 
my  command.    AfeCter^^^^^  Ixavincr  received  ^^^^^'^' 


366  PERSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

ch.  XXXI    being  a  paoi;  of  his  own  corps,  the  Thirteenth,  and 
all  of  Sherman's,  the  Fifteenth.     Sherman,  and 
Admiral  Porter  with  the  fleet,  had  withdrawn  from 
jtoS^SX  *^®  Yazoo.    After  consultation  they  decided  that 
^'^     neither  the  army  nor  navy  could  render  service  to 
the  cause  where  they  were,  and  learning  that  I  had 
withdrawn  from  the  interior  of  Mississippi,  they 
determined  to  return  to  the  Arkansas  Eiver  and 
to  attack  Arkansas  Post,  about  fifty  miles  up  that 
stream  and  garrisoned  by  about  five  or  six  thousand 
Ibid.  306    men.    Sherman  had  learned  of  the  existence  of  this 
force  through  a  man  who  had  been  captured  by  the 
enemy  with  a  steamer  loaded  with  ammunition  and 
other  supplies  intended  for  his  command.    The  man 
had  made  his  escape.    McClemand  approved  this 
move  reluctantly,  as  Sherman  says.    No  obstacle 
was  encountered  until  the  gunboats  and  transports 
w*^^Era  ^^^^  within  range  of  the  fort.    After  three  days' 
(i)«98etBeq.  bombardment  by  the  navy  an  assault  was  made  by 
the  troops  and  marines,  resulting  in  the  capture  of 
the  place,  and  in  taking  five  thousand  prisoners  and 
o^J^o-  seventeen  guns.    I  was  at  first  disposed  to  disap- 
^i)  M^^  prove  of  this  move  as  an  unnecessary  side  move- 
ment having  no  especial  bearing  upon  the  work 
before  us ;  but  when  the  result  was  understood  I 
regarded  it  as  very  important.    Five  thousand 
Confederate  troops  left  in  the  rear  might  have 
caused  us  much  trouble  and  loss  of  property  while 
navigating  the  Mississippi. 

Immediately  after  the  reduction  of  Arkansas 


DIFFICULTIES  CONCERNING  MCCLEBNANP  367 

Porter,  urging  me  to  come  and  take  command  in  ch.  xxxi 
person,  and  expressing  their  distrust  of  McCler- 
nand's  ability  and  fitness  for  so  important  and 
intricate  an  expedition. 

On  the  17th  I  visited  McClemand  and  his  com-  jfJSS'i, 
mand  at  Napoleon.    It  was  here  made  evident  to        ^ 
me  that  both  the  army  and  navy  were  so  distrust- 
ful of  McClemand's  fitness  to  command  that,  while 
they  would  do  all  they  could  to  iiisure  success,  this 
distrust  was  an  element  of  weakness.    It  would 
have  been  criminal  to  send  troops  under  these  cir- 
cumstances into  such  danger.    By  this  time  I  had 
received  authority  to  relieve  McClemand,  or  to  as-  ^^tlw.  r. 
sign  any  person  else  to  the  command  of  the  river  ^^^  ^^^*" 
expedition,  or  to  assume  command  in  person.    I 
felt  great  embarrassment  about  McClemand.    He 
was  the  senior  major-general  after  myself  within 
the  department.    It  would  not  do,  with  his  rank 
and  ambition,  to  assign  a  junior  over  him.    Noth-  Hut^^iS^ 
ing  was  left,  therefore,  but  to  assume  the  command       ^ 
myself.    I  would  have  been  glad  to  put  Sherman  in 
command,  to  give  him  an  opportunity  to  accomplish 
^hat  he  had  failed  in  the  December  before ;  but  there 
®6emed  no  other  way  out  of  the  difficulty,  for  he  was 
Junior  to  McClemand.    Sherman's  failure  needs  no 

apology- 

Ob  tii^  20th  I  ordered  General  McClemand  with    j^iv..-^^* 
^^eenti^^  <^onimand  to  Young's  Point  and  Milli^^^'» 
\d  r^^tfJ^^  I  retumed  to  Memphis  to  make  all  t^ 
SesLx-y^    J^^^Paration  for  leaving  the  territory^ 

C^^^    ST"^^    General  Hurlbut  ^th  tl^t^^ 


368  PEBSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GKANT 

CH.XXXI   only  point  between  Cairo  and  Memphis,  on  the 

river,  left  with  a  garrison.    All  the  troops  and 

guns  from  the  posts  on  the  abandoned  railroad  and 

river  were  sent  to  the  front. 

On  the  29th  of  January  I  arrived  at  Toimg's 

w!r.^xxi^  Point,  and  assumed  command  the  following  day. 
^^ "       General  McClemand  took  exception  in  a  most  char- 

ibUL  u-u  acteristic  way — for  him.  His  correspondence  with 
me  on  the  subject  was  more  in  the  nature  of  a  rep- 
rimand than  a  protest.  It  was  highly  insubor- 
dinate, but  I  overlooked  it,  as  I  believed,  for  the 
good  of  the  service.  General  McClemand  was  a 
politician  of  very  considerable  prominence  in  his 
State;  he  was  a  member  of  Congress  when  the 
secession  war  broke  out ;  he  belonged  to  that  politi- 
cal party  which  furnished  all  the  opposition  there 
was  to  a  vigorous  prosecution  of  the  war  for  sav- 
ing the  Union ;  there  was  no  delay  in  his  declaring 
himself  for  the  Union  at  all  hazards,  and  there  was 
no  uncertain  sound  in  his  declaration  of  where  he 
stood  in  the  contest  before  the  country.  He  also 
gave  up  his  seat  in  Congress  to  take  the  field  in 
defense  of  the  principles  he  had  proclaimed. 

h^e^       ^^^  ^^  work  of  the  campaign  and  siege  of 

^nS^dbSJ^  Vicksburg  now  began.  The  problem  was  to  secure 
®^  a  footing  upon  diy  ground  on  the  east  side  of  the 
river  from  which  the  troops  could  operate  against 
Vicksburg.  The  Mississippi  River,  from  Cairo 
south,  runs  through  a  rich  alluvial  valley  of  many 
miles  in  width,  bound  on  the  east  by  land  running 
from  eiffhtv  up  to  two  or  more  hundred  feet  above 


OPERATIONS  ABOVE  VICKSBURG  369 

tortuous  way,  varying  in  direction  to  all  points  of  ch.  xxxi 
the  compass.    At  places  it  runs  to  the  very  foot  of 
the  bluffs.    After  leaving  Memphis  there  are  no 
such  highlands  coming  to  the  water's  edge  on  the 
east  shore  until  Vicksburg  is  reached. 

The  intervening  land  is  cut  up  by  bayous  filled  nfirS'^' 
from  the  river  in  high  water — many  of  them  naviga-      ®*  ^^' 
ble  for  steamers.    All  of  them  would  be,  except  for 
overhanging  trees,  narrowness,  and  tortuous  course, 
making  it  impossible  to  turn  the  bends  with  vessels 
of  any  considerable  length.    Marching  across  this 
country  in  the  face  of  an  enemy  was  impossible ; 
navigating  it  proved  equally  impracticable.    The 
strategical  way,  according  to  the  rule,  therefore, 
would  have  been  to  go  back  to  Memphis ;  establish 
that  as  a  base  of  supplies;  fortify  it  so  that  the 
storehouses  could  be  held  by  a  small  gan-ison ;  and 
move  from  there  along  the  line  of  railroad,  repair- 
ing as  we  advanced,  to  the  Talabusha,  or  to  Jack- 
son, Mississippi.  At  this  time  the  North  had  become  £J^S^ 
very  much  discouraged.    Many  strong  Union  men      ^*"**^ 
believed  that  the  war  must  prove  a  failure.    The 
elections  of  1862  had  gone  against  the  party  which 
was  for  the  prosecution  of  the  war  to  save  the 
Union  if  it  took  the  last  man  and  the  last  doUax. 
Voluntary  enlistments  had  ceased  throughout  ihe 
greater  part  of  the  North,  and  the  draft  liad  been    Tbedrait 
resorted  <o  to  fill  up  our  ranks.    It  was  my  judg- 
ment at  ttM.e  time  that  to  make  a  backv^a-^^  move- 
ment  as  Jc^^g  as  that  from  Vicksbxiig  to  ^empV^^ 
yfouldbe  i  ^terpj.^^  ,     ^^ny  oi  ttioae  7^^  ^  ^. 
hope  for  t^^  P^^^mm  of  tlxe  TJinon  ^^.*^f ^^-. 


370  PEESONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

ch.  XXXI  be  lost.  There  was  nothing  left  to  be  done  but  to  go 
forward  to  a  decisive  victory.  This  was  in  my  mind 
from  the  moment  I  took  command  in  person  at 
Young's  Point. 

The  winter  of  1862-63  was  a  noted  one  for  con- 
tinuous high  water  in  the  Mississippi  and  for  heavy- 
rains  along  the  lower  river.  To  get  dry  land,  or 
rather  land  above  the  water,  to  encamp  the  troops 
upon  took  many  miles  of  river-front.  We  had  to 
occupy  the  levees  and  the  ground  immediately  be- 
hind. This  was  so  limited  that  one  corps,  the  Seven- 
teenth, under  General  McPherson,  was  at  Lake 
Providence,  seventy  miles  above  Vicksburg. 
^^  It  was  in  January  the  troops  took  their  position 

opposite  Vicksburg.  The  water  was  very  high  and 
the  rains  were  incessant.  There  seemed  no  possi- 
bility of  a  land  movement  before  the  end  of  March 
or  later,  and  it  would  not  do  to  he  idle  all  this  time. 
The  effect  would  be  demoralizing  to  the  troops  and 
injurious  to  their  health.  Friends  in  the  North 
would  have  grown  more  and  more  discouraged,  and 
enemies  in  the  same  section  more  and  more  insolent 
in  their  gibes  and  denimciation  of  the  cause  and 
those  engaged  in  it. 

^^^  <^  always  admired  the  South,  as  bad  as  I  thought 
their  cause,  for  the  boldness  with  which  they 
silenced  all  opposition  and  all  croaking,  by  press 
or  by  individuals,  within  their  control.  War  at  all 
times,  whether  a  civil  war  between  sections  of  a 
common  country  or  between  nations,  ought  to  be 
avoided,  if  possible  with  honor.    But,  once  entered 


FOBTIFIOATIONS  ABOVE  VICKSBUEG  371 

Vicksbnrg,  as  stated  before,  is  on  the  first  high  ch.  xxxi 
land  coining  to  the  river's  edge  below  that  on  which  ^?^R^^ 
Memphis  stands.  The  bluff,  or  high  land,  follows  ^^^ 
the  left  bank  of  the  Yazoo  for  some  distance  and 
continues  in  a  southerly  direction  to  the  Mississippi 
River;  thence  it  runs  along  the  Mississippi  to 
Warrenton,  six  miles  below.  The  Yazoo  Kiver 
leaves  the  high  land  a  short  distance  below  Haines's 
Bluff  and  empties  into  the  Mississippi  nine  miles 
above  Vicksburg.  Vicksburg  is  built  on  this  high 
land  where  the  Mississippi  washes  the  base  of  the 
hill.  Haines's  Bluff,  eleven  miles  from  Vicksburg,  on 
the  Yazoo  River,  was  strongly  fortified.  The  whole 
distance  from  there  to  Vicksburg  and  thence  to 
Warrenton  was  also  intrenched,  with  batteries  at 
suitable  distances  and  rifle-pits  connecting  them. 

From  Young's  Point  the  Mississippi  turns  in  a 
northeasterly  direction  to  a  point  just  above  the 
city,  when  it  again  turns  and  runs  southwesterly, 
leaving  vessels  which  might  attempt  to  run  the 
blockade  exposed  to  the  fire  of  batteries  six  miles 
below  the  city  before  they  were  in  range  of  the 
upper  batteries.    Since  then  the  river  has  made  a 
cut-off,  leaving  what  was  the  peninsula  in  front  of 
the  city  an  island.    North  of  the  Yazoo  was  all  a 
marsh,  heavily  timbered,  cut  up  with  bayous,  and 
much  overflowed.    A  front  attack  was  therefore 
impossible,  and  was  never  coDtemplated;  certainly 
not  by  me.     The  problem  tbex^  became  lio^  ^  ^^". 
curealandingonhighground  eaBtoittxe^i^^^^l. 
mtixout  an  apparent  retreat.       "^^W  comtA^^^.rt 


'  372  PEB80NAL  MEMOIBS  OF  U.  B.  GRANT 

ch.  XXXI   confidence  that  any  of  the  experiments  resorted  to 

would  prove  successful.   Nevertheless  I  was  always 

prepared  to  take  advantage  of  them  in  case  they 

did. 

^Me:^^'      In  1862  General  Thomas  Williams  had  come  up 

JtffirtlMay  from  New  Orleans  and  cut  a  ditch  ten  or  twelve  feet 

ot'iifvoSi.    wide,   and  about  as  deep,   straight  across  from 

86Pt.38 1861*  X  /  c» 

_£  Baton  •  Young^s  Poiut  to  the  river  below.    The  distance 

Bonge,  Aug.  ^ 

«.  1862  across  was  a  little  over  a  mile.  It  was  WiUiams's 
expectation  that  when  the  river  rose  it  would  cut  a 
navigable  channel  through;  but  the  canal  started 
in  an  eddy  from  both  ends,  and,  of  course,  it  only 
filled  up  with  water  on  the  rise  without  doing  any 
execution  in  the  way  of  cutting.  Mr.  Lincoln  had 
navigated  the  Mississippi  in  his  younger  days,  and 
understood  well  its  tendency  to  change  its  channel^ 
in  places,  from  time  to  time.  He  set  much  store^ 
accordingly,  by  this  canaL  General  McClemand 
had  been,  therefore,  directed  before  I  went  ta 
Young's  Point  to  push  the  work  of  widening  and 
deepening  this  canal.  After  my  arrival  the  work 
was  diligently  pushed  with  about  four  thousand 
men — as  many  as  could  be  used  to  advantage — 
until  interrupted  by  a  sudden  rise  in  the  river  that 
broke  a  dam  at  the  upper  end,  which  had  been  put 
there  to  keep  the  water  out  until  the  excavation 
1868  was  completed.  This  was  on  the  8th  of  March. 
"tSTmSU-  Even  if  the  canal  had  proven  a  success,  so  fai'  as 
^^w^'  to  be  navigable  for  steamers,  it  could  not  have  been 
of  much  advantage  to  us.    It  runs  in  a  direction 

olTrinaf.   "na-rr^an ^i/inlov   +^    4."U-    "■•- 


THE  CANAL  373 

out  its  length.  This  battery  soon  drove  out  our  oh.xxxi 
dredges, — two  in  number, — which  were  doing  the 
work  of  thousands  of  men.  Had  the  canal  been 
completed  it  might  have  proven  of  some  use  in 
running  transports  through,  imder  the  cover  of 
night,  to  use  below ;  but  they  would  yet  have  to  run 
batteries,  though  for  a  much  shorter  distance. 

While  this  work  was  progressing  we  were  busy 
in  other  directions,  trying  to  find  an  available  land- 
ing on  high  ground  on  the  east  bank  of  the  river,  or 
to  make  waterways  to  get  below  the  city,  avoiding 
the  batteries. 

On  the  30th  of  January,  the  day  after  my  arrival  ^^SfTJSS" 
at  the  front,  I  ordered  General  McPherson,  stationed  i*"^^^®"^ 
with  his  corps  at  Lake  Providence,  to  cut  the  levee 
at  that  point.  If  successful  in  opening  a  channel 
for  navigation  by  this  route,  it  would  carry  us  to 
the  Mississippi  Eiver  through  the  mouth  of  the 
Red  River,  just  above  Port  Hudson  and  four  hun- 
dred miles  below  Vicksburg  by  the  river. 

Lake  Providence  is  a  part  of  the  old  bed  of  the   uI^SmSu. 
Mississipi^ij  about  a  mile  from  the  present  channel.  S?^?i!Tv?Sl 
Jtjs  six  miles  long  and  has  its  outlet  through  Bayou  ^^g^^^' 
^ajct^T^  Bayou  Macon,  and  the  Tensas,  Washita,  and 
-^ed   jri^ers.    The  last  three  are  navigable  streams 
^t  all  isr^asons.    Bayous  Baxter  and  Macon  are  nar- 
^Oir  ^^t:^  ^  tortuous,  and  the  banks  ^^  covered  with 
^^xi80    :^oj-ests  overhanging  the  chai^^^^   They  were 
^80  s^JJ^^  with  fallen  timber,  the  accumulation  of 
l^dTff^        J^J^e  land  along  the  Mississippi  ^"^^^^i  ^^^ 
W^fc^^^  <Jowii,  is  i^  ^u  instances  Wgbest  next  to 
tl.    ^^^,    except  ^l,_^H..^^^\^..L«f.>..hluff« 


374  PEBSOKAL  MEMOntS  OF  U.  S.  GBANT 

CH.  XXXI  land,  begins  to  spread  out,  and  disappears  entirely 
in  a  cypress-swamp  before  it  reaches  the  Macon. 
There  was  about  two  feet  of  water  in  this  swamp 
at  the  time.  To  get  through  it,  even  with  vessels 
of  the  lightest  draft,  it  was  necessary  to  clear  oflE  a 
belt  of  heavy  timber  wide'enough  to  make  a  passage- 
way. As  the  trees  would  have  to  be  cut  close  to  the 
bottom — under  water — it  was  an  imdertaking  of 
great  magnitude. 
i8»  On  the  4th  of  February  I  visited  General  McPher- 

son,  and  remained  with  him  several  days.  The  work 
had  not  progressed  so  far  as  to  admit  the  water  from 
the  river  into  the  lake,  but  the  troops  had  succeeded 
in  drawing  a  small  steamer,  of  probably  not  over 
thirty  tons^  capacity,  from  the  river  into  the  lake. 
With  this  we  were  able  to  explore  the  lake  and 

^Sv^lSS^  bayou  as  far  as  cleared.  I  saw  then  that  there  was 
scarcely  a  chance  of  this  ever  becoming  a  practi- 
cable route  for  moving  troops  through  an  enemy's 
coimtry.  The  distance  from  Lake  Providence  to 
the  point  where  vessels  going  by  that  route  would 
enter  the  Mississippi  again  is  about  four  hundred 
and  seventy  miles  by  the  main  river.  The  distance 
would  probably  be  greater  by  the  tortuous  bayous 
through  which  this  new  route  would  carry  us. 
The  enemy  held  Port  Hudson,  below  where  the 
Eed  Eiver  debouches,  and  all  the  Mississippi  above 
to  Vicksburg.  The  Red  River,  Washita,  and  Tensas 
were,  as  has  been  said,  all  navigable  streams,  on 

ixr'hi/>'h  +."hft  ft-nttinfr  />milH   +.TirATJ[r  flTnn.11   ViaHiaa  f\f  mAn 


route 


0PKBATI0N8  AT  YAZOO  PASS  375 

gave  a  better  prospect  of  success.    This  work  was  ch.  xxxi 
abandoned  after  the  canal  proved  a  failure. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Wilson,  of  my  staflE,  was  sent  •'^!Si,\T^" 
to  Helena,  Arkansas,  to  examine  and  open  a  way  i^SS')^. 
through  Moon  Lake  and  Yazoo  Pass  if  possible.  Lt^ooisto* 
Formerly  there  was  a  route  by  way  of  an  inlet  from  ^^Jjjfg^j: 
the  Mississippi  Eiver  into  Moon  Lake,  a  mile  east  of   g^J  |^-; 
the  river,  thence  east  through  Tazoo  Pass  to  the  -^p'-^^'I^^ 
Coldwater,  along  the  latter  to  the  Tallahatchie,  which 
joins  the  Yalabusha  about  two  hundred  and  fifty 
miles  below  Moon  Lake  and  forms  the  Yazoo  Eiver. 
These  were  formerly  navigated  by  steamers  trading 
with  the  rich  plantations  along  their  banks ;  but  the 
State  of  Mississippi  had  built  a  strong  levee  across 
the  inlet  some  years  before,  leaving  the  only  en- 
trance for  vessels  into  this  rich  region  the  one  by 
way  of  the  mouth  of  the  Yazoo,  several  hundreds  of 
miles  below. 

On  the  2d  of  February  this  dam,  or  levee,  was  ^T'L 
cut.    The  river  being  high,  the  rush  of  water  ^^t^!^ 
through  the  cut  was  so  great  that  in  a  very  short 
time  the  entire  obstruction  was  washed  away.    The 
l>ayous  were  soon  filled  and  much  of  the  country 
^08  overflowed.    This  pass  leaves  the  Mississippi 
-^iver  but  a  few  miles  below  Helena.    On  the  24th 
General  J^oss,  with  his  brigade  of  about  forty-five  ^^^^; 
^^dred  ^cnen  on  transports,  moved  ^^^  t^^^  ^^^    ^^'^  ^^' 
^^terx^^y^-     "^^^  rebels  had  obstructed  the  naviga- 
5^«  of    ^^-^^<^  Pass  and  the  Coldwater  by  t^"^^^ 
Ssjut^^   ^^^"^^   Much  of  the  timber  in  thiB  ^^^^ 

\a^    "^r^.  r  ^^^1  th^^^  removal  wa0  a  n^^^^a  otx  "^f^^^^ 


376  PERSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

ch.  XXXI   by  two  gunboats  under  the  command  of  Lieutenant- 

smuvas.  Commander  Watson  Smith,  confronting  a  forti- 

m?f  lS'    fication  at  Greenwood,  where  the  Tallahatchie  and 

^w^iS^^  Yalabusha  unite  and  the  Yazoo  begins.    The  bends 

of  the  rivers  are  such  at  this  point  as  to  almost  form 

an  island,  scarcely  above  water  at  that  stage  of  the 

river.    This  island  was  fortified  and  manned.    It 

«SJ®^?     was  named  Fort  Pemberton,  after  the  commander 

"  Tne  Miss-  ' 

*"*\^i^pp-  at  Vicksburg.  No  land  approach  was  accessible. 
The  troops,  therefore,  could  render  no  assistance 
toward  an  assault  further  than  to  establish  a  battery 
on  a  little  piece  of  ground  which  was  discovered 
oi'sro^^  above  water.  The  gunboats,  however,  attacked  on 
the  11th  and  again  on  the  13th  of  March.  Both 
efforts  were  failures  and  were  not  renewed.  One 
gunboat  was  disabled,  and  we  lost  six  men  kiUed 
and  twenty-five  wounded.  The  loss  of  the  enemy 
was  less. 

Fort  Pemberton  was  so  little  above  the  water  that 
it  was  thought  that  a  rise  of  two  feet  would  drive 
the  enemy  out.    In  hope  of  enlisting  the  elements 
on  our  side,  which  had  been  so  much  against  us  up 
to  this  time,  a  second  cut  was  made  in  the  Miss- 
issippi levee,  this  time  directly  opposite  Helena,  or 
six  miles  above  the  former  cut.    It  did  not  accom- 
plish the  desired  result,  and  Ross,  with  his  fleet, 
w^SSSSs;  started  back.    On  the  22d  he  met  Quinby  with  a 
i84?^°c{dl  brigade  at  Yazoo  Pass.    Quinby  was  the  senior  of 
3tf^^i?iwi;  Ross,  and  assumed  command.    He  was  not  satisfied 
vois'.Mar;    with  rctumiug  to  his  former  position  without  seeing 

rAT!^^¥? ».£■:.    ^_„i.' ij* 1-  .J.T Li.: ij  1 i:«i.«j 


OPERATIONS  AT  YAZOO  PASS  377 

returned  with  but  little  delay.  In  the  mean  time  ch.  xxxi 
I  was  much  exercised  for  the  safety  of  Ross,  not 
knowing  that  Quinby  had  been  able  to  join  him. 
Reinforcements  were  of  no  use  in  a  country  covered 
with  water,  as  they  would  have  to  remain  on  board 
of  their  transports.  Relief  had  to  come  from  an- 
other quarter.  So  I  determined  to  get  into  the 
Yazoo  below  Fort  Pemberton. 

•  Steele's  Bayou  empties  into  the  Yazoo  River  be-  ®*®^®'J  ®*" 

tween  Haines's  Blujff  and  its  mouth.  It  is  nar- 
row, very  tortuous,  and  fringed  with  a  very  heavy 
growth  of  timber,  but  it  is  deep.  It  approaches  to 
within  one  mile  of  the  Mississippi  at  Eagle  Bend, 
thirty  miles  above  Young's  Point.  Steele's  Bayou  x]^a)^ 
connects  with  Black  Bayou,  Black  Bayou  with  Deer 
Creek,  Deer  Creek  with  Rolling  Fork,  Rolling  Fork 
with  the  Big  Sunflower  River,  and  the  Big  Sun- 
flower with  the  Yazoo  River  about  ten  miles  above 
Haines's  BluflE  in  a  right  line,  but  probably  twenty 
or  twenty-five  miles  by  the  winding  of  the  river. 
All  these  waterways  are  of  about  the  same  natui'e, 
so  far  as  navigation  is  concerned,  until  the  Sunflower 
is  reached ;  this  affords  free  navigation. 

Admiral  Porter  explored  this  waterway  as  far  as  NavSiltlp. 
Deer  Creek  on  the  14th  of  March,  and  reported  it    «»*'»^- 
Davi^able.    On  the  next  day  he  started  with  five 
gunboats  and  four  mortar-boats.    I  went  with  him 
for  5C>i3ae  distance.    The  heavy,  overhanging  timber 
fetar^^^  progress  very  much,  as  did  also  the  short 
^^s   ^^'^  ®^  narrow  a  stream.    The  gunboats,  hov^- 

evoH       ^^^iowed   their  wav   thronerh  without   otb.eY 


378  PERSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

ch.  XXXI    gunboats.    In  the  evening  I  returned  to  headquar- 
MfflS^J^  ters  to  hurry  up  reinforcements.    Sherman  went  in 
^       person  on  the  16th,  taking  with  him  Stuart's  divi- 
^^i^wjii  sion  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps.   They  took  large  river 
*^  v^*  transports  to  Eagle  Bend,  on  the  Mississippi,  where 
Nov.29,i8M  ijj^^y  debarked  and  marched  across  to  Steele's  Ba- 
you, where  they  reembarked  on  the  transports.  The 
river  steamers,  with  their  tall  smoke-stacks  and 
light  guards  extending  out,  were  so  much  impeded 
NavfrnSlp.  *^**  *^®  gunboats  got  far  ahead.    Porter,  with  his 
805  et  864.    fleet,  got  within  a  few  hundred  yards  of  where  the 
sailing  would  have  been  clear  and  free  from  the 
obstructions  caused  by  felling  trees  into  the  water, 
when  he  encountered  rebel  sharp-shooters,  and  his 
progress  was  delayed  by  obstructions  in  his  front. 
He  could  do  nothing  with  gunboats  against  sharp- 
shooters.   The  rebels,  learning  his  route,  had  sent 
in  about  four  thousand  men — many  more  than 
there  were  sailors  in  the  fleet. 
iSSSS^t.       Sherman  went  back,  at  the  request  of  the  admiral, 
xxivo')«6  to  clear  out  Black  Bayou  and  to  hurry  up  reinforce- 
ments, which  were  far  behind.    On  the  night  of  the 
19th  he  received  notice  from  the  admiral  that  he 
had  been  attacked  by  sharp-shooters  and  was  in 
imminent  peril.    Sherman  at  once  returned  through 
Black  Bayou  in  a  canoe,  and  passed  on  imtil  he 
met  a  steamer,  with  the  last  of  the  reinforcements 
he  had,  coming  up.    They  tried  to  force  their  way 
through  Black  Bayou  with  their  steamer,  but,  find- 
ing it  slow  and  tedious  work,  debarked  and  pushed 


-1 XT 1 J^J 


OPERATIONS  AT  YAZOO  PASS  379 

way  through  this  with  candles  carried  in  their  ob.xxxi 
hands  for  a  mile  and  a  half,  when  they  came  to  an 
open  plantation.    Here   the   troops  rested  imtil 
morning.    They  made  twenty-one  miles  from  this 
resting-place  by  noon  the  next  day,  and  were  in 
time  to  rescue  the  fleet.    Porter  had  fully  made  up 
his  mind  to  blow  up  the  gunboats  rather  than  have 
them  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.    More  wel- 
come visitors  he  probably  never  met  than  the  "  boys 
in  blue  ^  on  this  occasion.   The  vessels  were  backed  tSS^?^. 
out  and  returned  to  their  rendezvous  on  the  Miss-       ^^ 
issippi ;  and  thus  ended  in  failure  the  fourth  attempt 
to  get  in  rear  of  Vicksburg. 


CHAPTER  XXXII 

THE  BAYOUS  WEST  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI — GBITIOISMS  OF 
THE  NORTHERN  PRESS — RUNNING  THE  BATTERIES 
— LOSS  OF  THE  INDIANOLA — DISPOSITION  OF  THE 
TROOPS 

ch.  xxxn  FTIHE  original  canal  scheme  was  also  abandoned 

Anu,v.m    -I-    on  the  27th  of  March.    The  eflEort  to  make  a 
waterway  through  Lake  Providence  and  the  con- 

^S^F'    ^^^ti^S  bayous  was  abandoned  as  wholly  imprac- 
ticable about  the  same  time. 

At  Milliken's  Bend,  and  also  at  Young^s  Point, 
bayous  or  channels  start,  which,  connecting  with 
other  bayous  passing  Eichmond,  Louisiana,  enter 
the  Mississippi  at  Carthage,  twenty-five  or  thirty 
miles  above  Grand  Gulf.  The  Mississippi  levee 
cuts  the  supply  of  water  oflE  from  these  bayous  or 
channels,  but  all  the  rainfall  behind  the  levee,  at 
these  points,  is  carried  through  these  same  channels 
to  the  river  below.  In  case  of  a  crevasse  in  this 
vicinity,  the  water  escaping  would  find  its  outlet 
through  the  same  channels.  The  dredges  and  labor- 
ers from  the  canal  having  been  driven  out  by  over- 

JJ^^^   flow  and  the  enemy^s  batteries,  I  determined  to  open 
^^       these  other  channels,  if  possible.    If  successful  the 


THE  BAYOUS  WEST  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI  381 

road  back  of  the  levees,  along  these  bayous,  to  carry  ch.  xxxn 
the  troops,  artillery,  and  wagon-trains  over  when- 
ever the  water  receded  a  little,  and  after  a  few  days 

of  dry  weather.    Accordingly,  with  the  abandon-  i 

ment  of  all  the  other  plans  for  reaching  a  base  j 

heretofore  described,  this  new  one  was  undertaken.  j 

As  early  as  the  4th  of  February  I  had  written  to  ^-^^^  ! 

Halleck  about  this  route,  stating  that  I  thought  it  | 

much  more  practicable  than  the  other  imdertaking  I 

(the  Lake  Providence  route),  and  that  it  would 
have  been  accomplished  with  much  less  labor  if 
commenced  before  the  water  had  got  all  over  the 
country.  i 

The  upper  end  of  these  bayous,  being  cut  off  l 

from  a  water-supply,  further  than  the  rainfall  back  i 

of  the  levees,  was  grown  up  with  dense  timber  for 
a  distance  of  several  miles  from  their  source.  It 
was  necessary,  therefore,  to  clear  this  out  before 

letting  in  the  water  from  the  river.    This  work  , 

was  continued  until  the  waters  of  the  river  began 
to  recede  and  the  road  to  Eichmond,  Louisiana, 
emerged  from  the  water.    One  small  steamer  and 
some  barges  were  got  through  this  channel,  but  no 
further  use  could  be  made  of  it  because  of  the  fall 
in  the  river.    Beyond  this  it  was  no  more  success-    -^^ 
ful  than  the  other  experiments  with  which  the 
winter  was  whiled  away.    All  these  f cdlures  would 
have  been  very  discouraging  if  I  liad  expected  much 
from  the  efforts ;  but  I  had  not.    :From  the  fi^*  *^^ 
most  I  hoped  to  accomplish  ^was  the  p»^®^  ^^ 
transports,  to  be  used  below  VioVoV^^or.  i?vit\iout 


382  PEESONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GEANT 

CH.  xxzn  rains  and  high  water,  unprecedented  winter  was  one 
of  great  hardship  to  all  engaged  about  Vicksburg. 
The  river  was  higher  than  its  natural  banks  from 
December,  1862,  to  the  following  April.  The  war 
had  suspended  peaceful  pursuits  in  the  South,  fur- 
ther than  the  production  of  army  supplies,  and  in 
consequence  the  levees  were  neglected  and  broken 
in  many  places,  and  the  whole  country  was  covered 
toe^s^  with  water.  Troops  could  scarcely  find  dry  ground 
**^dB^'  on  which  to  pitch  their  tents.  Malarial  fevers  broke 
out  among  the  men.  Measles  and  smallpox  also 
attacked  them.  The  hospital  aiTangements  and 
medical  attendance  were  so  perfect,  however,  that 
the  loss  of  life  was  much  less  than  might  have  been 
expected.  Visitors  to  the  camps  went  home  with 
dismal  stories  to  relate ;  Northern  papers  came  back 
^i^^  to  the  soldiers  with  these  stories  exaggerated.  Be- 
"^Bacie^f'  cause  I  would  not  divulge  my  ultimate  plans  to 
^"^So***  visitors,  they  pronounced  me  idle,  incompetent, 
and  unfit  to  command  men  in  an  emergency,  and 
clamored  for  my  removal.  They  were  not  to  be 
satisfied,  many  of  them,  with  my  simple  removal, 
but  named  who  my  successor  should  be.  McCler- 
nand,  Fremont,  Hunter,  and  McClellan  were  all  men- 
tioned in  this  connection.  I  took  no  steps  to  answer 
these  complaints,  but  continued  to  do  my  duty,  as 
I  understood  it,  to  the  best  of  my  ability.  Every 
'^"Sn^*  one  has  his  superstitions.  One  of  mine  is  that  in 
positions  of  great  responsibility  every  one  should  do 
his  duty  to  the  best  of  his  ability  where  assigned  by 
competent  authority,  without  application  or  the  use 


FOUTIGAL  COMMANDERS  383 

the  main  field  of  the  war.  I  had  no  idea  myself  of  ch.  xxxrr 
ever  having  any  large  command,  nor  did  I  suppose 
that  I  was  equal  to  one ;  but  I  had  the  vanity  to 
think  that  as  a  cavalry  oflBcer  I  might  succeed  very 
well  in  the  command  of  a  brigade.  On  one  occa- 
sion, in  talking  about  this  to  my  staflf-oflBcers,  all  of 
whom  were  civilians  without  any  military  education 
whatever,  I  said  that  I  would  give  anything  if  I  were 
commanding  a  brigade  of  cavalry  in  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  and  I  believed  I  could  do  some  go6d. 
Captain  Hillyer  spoke  up  and  suggested  that  I 
make  application  to  be  transferred  there  to  com- 
mand the  cavalry.  I  then  told  him  that  I  would 
cut  my  right  arm  oflE  first,  and  mentioned  this  su- 
perstition. 

In  time  of  war  the  President,  being  by  the  Con- 
stitution commander-in-chief  of  the  army  and  navy, 
is  responsible  for  the  selection  of  commanders.   He 
should  not  be  embarrassed  in  making  his  selections. 
I  having  been  selected,  my  responsibiUty  ended  with 
my  doing  the  best  I  knew  how.    If  I  had  sought  the  uSSi^^SSl 
place,  or  obtained  it  through  personal  or  political  ^^mbSqi^ 
influence,  my  belief  is  that  I  would  have  feared  to  "J^^^""*"*^ 
undertake  any  plan  of  my  own  conception,  and 
would  probably  have  awaited  direct  orders  from 
my  distant  superiors.    Persons  obtaining  impor- 
tant commands  by  application  or  political  influence 
are  apt  to  keep  a  written  record  of  complaints  and 
predictions  of  defeat,  which  are  shown  in  case  of 
disaster.    Somebody  must  be  responsible  for  their 
fftilnrfts. 


384  PEESONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  8.  GBAiJt 

ch.  xxxn  never  met  Mr.  Lincoln,  but  his  support  was  con- 
stapUt. 

At  last  the  waters  began  to  recede;  the  roads 
crossing  the  peninsula  behind  the  levees  of  the 
bayous  were  emerging  from  the  waters ;  the  troops 
were  all  concentrated  from  distant  points  at  Milli- 
ken's  Bend,  preparatory  to  a  final  move  which  was 
to  crown  the  long,  tedious,  and  discouraging  labors 
with  success. 

I  had  had  in  contemplation  the  whole  winter  the 
movement  by  land  to  a  point  below  Vicksburg  from 
which  to  operate,  subject  only  to  the  possible  but 
not  expected  success  of  some  one  of  the  expedients 
resorted  to  for  the  purpose  of  giving  us  a  diflfel-ent 
base.  This  could  not  be  undertaken  until  the 
waters  receded.  I  did  not,  therefore,  communicate 
•  this  plan,  even  to  an  ofl&cer  of  my  staff,  until  it  was 
^jjw^jjj-  necessary  to  make  preparations  for  the  start.  My 
^^5^^  recollection  is  that  Admiral  Porter  was  the  first  one 
to  whom  I  mentioned  it.  The  cooperation  of  the 
navy  was  absolutely  essential  to  the  success  (even 
to  the  contemplation)  of  such  an  enterprise.  I  had 
no  more  authority  to  command  Porter  than  he  had 
to  command  me.  It  was  necessary  to  have  part  of 
his  fleet  below  Vicksburg  if  the  troops  went  there. 
Steamers  to  use  as  ferries  were  also  essential.  The 
navy  was  the  only  escort  and  protection  for  these 
steamers,  all  of  which,  in  getting  below,  had  to  run 
about  fourteen  miles  of  batteries.  Porter  fell  into 
the  plan  at  once,  and  suggested  that  he  had  better 
superintend  the  preparation  of  the  steamers  selected 
to  run  the  batteries,  as  sailors  would  probably  under- 


EX-8ECKETABY  JACOB  THOMPSON  385 

his  argument,  but  because  it  would  enable  me  to  ch.  xxxn  * 

keep  our  designs  from  the  enemy  a  little  longer.  "• 

Porter^s  fleet  was  on  the  east  side  of  the  river  above  * 

the  mouth  of  the  Yazoo,  entirely  concealed  from  the 
enemy  by  the  dense  forests  that  intervened.  Even 
spies  could  not  get  near  him,  on  account  of  the 
undergrowth  and  overflowed  lands.  Suspicions  of 
some  mysterious  movements  were  aroused.  Our 
river  guards  discovered  one  day  a  small  skiff  mov- 
ing quietly  and  mysteriously  up  the  river  near  the 
east  shore,  from  the  direction  of  Vicksburg,  toward 
the  fleet.  On  overhauling  the  boat  they  found  a 
small  white  flag,  not  much  larger  than  a  handker- 
chief, set  up  in  the  stern — no  doubt  intended  as  a 
flag  of  truce  in  case  of  discovery.  The  boat,  crew, 
and  passengers  were  brought  ashore  to  me.  The 
chief  personage  aboard  proved  to  be  Jacob  Thomp-  Thoi^D»t 
son.  Secretary  of  the  Interior  under  the  adminis-  ^^^^^^ 
tration  of  President  Buchanan.  After  a  pleasant 
conversation  of  half  an  hour  or  more,  I  allowed  the 
boat  and  crew,  passengers  and  all,  to  return  to 
Vicksburg,  without  creating  a  suspicion  that  there 
was  a  doubt  in  my  mind  as  to  the  g6od  faith  of 
Mr.  Thompson  and  his  flag. 

Admiral  Porter  proceeded  with  the  preparation  ^(^yi^^^ 
of  the  steamers  for  their  hazardous  passage  of  the 
enemy's  batteries.    The  great  essential  was  to  pro* 
tect  the  boilers  from  the  enemy's  shot,  and  to  cotx* 
ceal  the  fires  under  the  boilers  from  view.    Thislx^ 
accomplished  by  loading  the  steamers,  between  t\x^ 
fioiards  and  hnilArs  on  thft  Iv^il  ^r^AAk  UD  to  tilae  deO^^ 


386  PERSONAL  MEMOIES  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

CH.  xxxn  and  could  not  be  transported  in  sufficient  quantity  by 

the  muddy  roads  over  which  we  expected  to  march. 

Before  this  I  had  been  collecting,  from  St.  Louis 

and  Chicago,  yawls  and  barges  to  be  used  as  ferries 

im       when  we  got  below.    By  the  16th  of  April  Porter 

was  ready  to  start  on  his  perilous  trip.    The  ad- 

Navfmet.   ^^T^<^j  flag-ship  Benton^  Porter  commanding,  started 

pp.  810.  an  ^^  ^^^  o'clock  at  night,  followed  at  intervals  of  a 
few  minutes  by  the  Lafayette^ — with  a  captured 
steamer,  the  Pricey  lashed  to  her  side, — the  Louis- 
mlUy  Mound  Cityj  Pittsburgh^  and  Carondelet — all 
of  these  being  naval  vessels.  Next  came  the  trans- 
ports— Forest  Queens  Silver  Wave^  and  Henry  Clay, 
each  towing  barges  loaded  with  coal  to  be  used  as 
fuel  by  the  naval  and  transport  steamers  when  be- 
low the  batteries.  The  gunboat  Tuscumhia  brought 
up  the  rear.  Soon  after  the  start  a  battery  between 
Vicksburg  and  Warrenton  opened  fire  across  the 
intervening  peninsula,  followed  by  the  upper  bat- 
teries, and  then  by  batteries  all  along  the  line.  The 
gunboats  ran  up  close  imder  the  bluflEs,  delivering 
their  fire  in  return  at  short  distances,  probably  with- 
out much  effect.  They  were  under  fire  for  more  than 
two  hours,  and  every  vessel  was  struck  many  times, 
but  with  little  damage  to  the  gunboats.    The  trans- 

^•^^™v  ports  did  not  fare  so  well.  The  Henry  Clay  was  dis- 
abled, and  deserted  by  her  crew.  Soon  after  a  shell 
burst  in  the  cotton  packed  about  the  boilers,  set  the 
vessel  on  fire,  and  burned  her  to  the  water's  edge. 
The  burning  mass,  however,  floated  down  to  New 
Carthage  before  grounding,  as  did  also  one  of  the 
barges  in  tow. 


RUNNING  THE  BATTERIES  387 

of  bonfires  on  the  east  side  and  by  firing  houses  on  ch.  xxxn 
the  point  of  land  opposite  the  city  on  the  Louisiana 
side.  The  sight  was  magnificent,  but  terrible.  I 
witnessed  it  from  the  deck  of  a  river  transport  run 
out  into  the  middle  of  the  river  and  as  low  down  as 
it  was  prudent  to  go.  My  mind  was  much  relieved 
when  I  learned  that  no  one  on  the  transports  had 
been  killed,  and  but  few,  if  any,  wounded.  During 
the  running  of  the  batteries  men  were  stationed  in 
the  holds  of  the  transports  to  partially  stop  with 
cotton  shot-holes  that  might  be  made  in  the  hulls. 
All  damage  was  afterward  soon  repaired  imder  the 
direction  of  Admiral  Porter. 

The  experiment  of  passing  batteries  had  been  Sit?iLaNl 
tried  before  this,  however,  during  the  war.  Admiral  cS^t  ip?.' 
Farragut  had  run  the  batteries  at  Port  Hudson  with    Ad^ieo." 

91  1864* 

the  flag-ship  Hartford  and  one  ironclad,  and  visited   Adm.  juW 

___  .^^  35f  I860  f  flp» 

me  from  below  Vicksburg.    The  13th  of  February  ^'^'  !*»  ^^^ 
Admiral  Porter  had  sent  the  gunboat  Indianolaj 
Lieutenant-Commander  George  Brown  command- 
ing, below.    She  met  Colonel  Ellet,  of  the  Marine  ^J?'  ^" 
Brigade,  below  Natchez  on  a  captured  steamer.  Two 
of  the  colonePs  fleet  had  previously  run  the  batter-  Feto.io.  im 
ies,  producing  the  greatest  consternation  among  the 
people  along  the  Mississippi  from  Vicksburg^  to  tlae  ^dfiSS^ 
Bed  Eiver. 

The  Indianola  remained  about  the  mouth  of  th^© 
Red  River  some  days,  and  then  started  tip  the  Mi^^" 

1  Olonel  Ellet  reported  having  his  men  feU  into  the  haii^  ^^ 
attacked  a  Confederate  battery  on  the  enemy.  "With  the  'bftl^^^>-' 
the  Red  River  two  days  before    he   escaped   on    the  smali   ^^^3- 


388  FEB80KAL  MEMOIBS  OF  V.  8.  GSAKT 

ctL  xxxn  issippL  The  Confederates  soon  raised  the  Queen  of 
the  Westj^  and  rei>aired  her.  With  this  vessel  and 
the  ram  Webbj  which  they  had  had  for  some  time 
in  the  Eed  Kiver,  and  two  other  steamers,  they 
followed  the  Indianola.  The  latter  was  encumbered 
with  barges  of  coal  in  tow,  and  consequently  could 
make  but  little  speed  against  the  rapid  current  of 

w^ufv  the  Mississippi  The  Confederate  fleet  overtook  her 
a)  m-wn  j^^^  above  Grand  Gulf,  and  attacked  her  after  dark 
on  the  24th  of  February.  The  Indianola  was  su- 
perior to  all  the  others  in  armament,  and  probably 
would  have  destroyed  them  or  driven  them  away 
but  for  her  encumbrance.  As  it  was,  she  fought 
them  for  an  hour  and  a  half,  but,  in  the  dark,  was 
struck  seven  or  eight  times  by  the  ram  and  other 
vessels,  and  was  finally  disabled  and  reduced  to  a 
sinking  condition.  The  armament  was  thrown 
overboard  and  the  vessel  run  ashore.  Officers  and 
crew  then  surrendered. 

ii»^i?Sp,      1 1^^  started  McClemand  with  his  corps  of  four 

a/SiS^  divisions  on  the  29th  of  March,  by  way  of  Rich- 
mond, Louisiana,  to  New  Cai1;hage,  hoping  that  he 
might  capture  Grand  GuK  before  the  balance  of  the 
troops  could  get  there ;  but  the  roads  were  very 
bad — scarcely  above  water  yet  Some  miles  from 
New  Carthage  the  levee  to  Bayou  Vidal  was  broken 
in  several  places,  overflowing  the  roads  for  the  dis- 
tance  of  two  miles.  Boats  were  collected  from  the 
surrounding  bayous,  and  some  constructed  on  the 


YANKEE  INGENUITY  389 

Carthage  with  one  division  and  its  artillery,  the  ch.  xxxn 
latter  ferried  through  the  woods  by  these  boats. 
On  the  17th  I  visited  New  Carthage  in  person,  and   Apm,  m» 
saw  that  the  process  of  getting  troops  through  in 
the  way  we  were  doing  was  so  tedious  that  a  better 
method  must  be  devised.    The  water  was  falling, 
and  in  a  few  days  there  would  not  be  depth  enough 
to  use  boats ;  nor  would  the  land  be  dry  enough  to 
march  over.   McClemand  had  already  found  a  new 
route  from  Smith's  plantation,  where  the  crevasse 
occurred,  to  Perlrins's  plantation,  eight  to  twelve 
miles  below  New  Carthage.    This  increased  the 
march  from  MiUiken's  Bend  from  twenty-seven  to 
nearly  forty  miles.    Four  bridges  had  to  be  built 
across  bayous,  two  of  them  each  over  six  hundred 
feet  long,  malring  about  two  thousand  feet  of  bridg- 
ing in  all.    The  river  falling  made  the  current  in 
these  bayous  very  rapid,  increasing  the  difficulty  of 
building  and  permanently  fastening  these  bridges ; 
but  the  ingenuity  of  the  "  Yankee  soldier  ^  was  equal 
to  any  emergency.    The  bridges  were  soon  built  of 
such  material  as  could  be  found  near  by,  and  so 
substantial  were  they  that  not  a  single  mishap  oc- 
curred in  crossing  all  the  army,  with  artillery, 
cavalry,  and  wagon-trains,  except  the  loss  of  one 
siege-gun  (a  32-pounder).      This,  if  my  memory 
serves  me  correctly,  broke  through  tlie  o\i^^  ^^^- 
toon-bridge  we  had  in  aU  our  maTcb-    ^^'co^*^*  "^^ 
peninsula.    These  bridges  ^ere  all  t>"«-'^^?  ^\\         ^^^>^^ 
demand's  command,   tmder  the  stil>^^"^^^^^  ^  ^^^^ 

Lieutenant  Hams,  of  the  Engiueer  O^^*"^^^^'    o^  ^"^"^ 
I  returned  to  Milliken's  T^^^T.^  .     .  ^  "L^^^*>     ;^^t- ^c^t 


390  PEBSONAL  MEMOntS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

CH.  xxxn      Special  Orders  Headquabtebs 

No.  110.  Depabt&ient  of  the  Tennessee, 

Milueen's  Bend,  La.,  April  20, 1863. 

Vni.  The  following  orders  are  published  for  the  in- 
formation and  guidance  of  the  army  in  the  field,  in  its 
present  movement  to  obtain  a  foothold  on  the  east  bank 
of  the  Mississippi  River,  from  which  Vicksbnrg  can  be 
approached  by  practicable  roads. 

First  The  Thirteenth  Army-corps,  Major-Qeneral  John 
A.  McClemand  commanding,  will  constitute  the  right  wing. 

Second.  The  Fifteenth  Army-corps,  Major-Q^neral  W.  T. 
Sherman  commanding,  will  constitute  the  left  wing. 

Third.  The  Seventeenth  Army-corps,  Major-Gteneral 
James  B.  McPherson  commanding,  will  constitute  the 
center. 

Fourth.  The  order  of  march  to  New  Carthage  will  be 
from  right  to  left. 

Fifth.  Reserves  will  be  formed  by  divisions  from  each 
army-corps,  or  an  entire  army-corps  will  be  held  as  a  re- 
serve, as  necessity  may  require.  When  the  reserve  is 
formed  by  divisions  each  division  will  remain  under  the 
immediate  command  of  its  resi>ective  corps  commander, 
unless  otherwise  specially  ordered  for  a  particular  emer- 
gency. 

Sixth.  Troops  will  be  required  to  bivouac,  until  proper 
facilities  can  be  afforded  for  the  transportation  of  camp 
equipage. 

Seventh.  In  the  present  movement  one  tent  will  be 
allowed  to  each  company  for  the  protection  of  rations 
from  rain;  one  wall-tent  for  each  regimental  headquar- 
ters; one  wall-tent  for  each  brigade  headquarters;  and 
one  waU-tent  for  each  division  headquarters.  Corps  com- 
manders having  the  books  and  blanks  of  their  respective 
commands  to  provide  for  are  authorized  to  take  such 


DISPOSITION  OP  THE  TBOOPS  391 

on  their  returns,  will  constitute  a  train  for  carrying  sup-  ch.  xxxn 
plies  and  ordnance  and  the  authorized  camp  equipage  of 
the  army. 

Ninth,  As  fast  as  the  Thirteenth  Army-corps  advances, 
the  Seventeenth  Army-corps  will  take  its  place ;  and  it,  in 
turn,  will  be  followed  in  like  manner  by  the  Fifteenth 
Army-corps. 

Tenth,  Two  regiments  from  each  army-corps  will  be 
detailed  by  corps  commanders  to  guard  the  lines  from 
Richmond  to  New  Carthage. 

Eleventh.  General  hospitals  will  be  established  by  the 
medical  director  between  Duckport  and  Milliken's  Bend. 
All  sick  and  disabled  soldiers  will  be  left  in  these  hospi- 
tals. Surgeons  in  charge  of  hospitals  will  report  conva- 
lescents as  fast  as  they  become  fit  for  duty.  Each  corps 
commander  will  detail  an  intelligent  and  good  drill-officer 
to  remain  behind  and  take  charge  of  the  convalescents  of 
their  respective  corps.  Officers  so  detailed  will  organize 
the  men  under  their  charge  into  squads  and  companies, 
without  regard  to  the  regiments  they  belong  to ;  and  in 
the  absence  of  convalescent  commissioned  officers  to  com- 
mand them,  will  appoint  non-commissioned  officers  or  pri- 
vates. The  force  so  organized  will  constitute  the  guard  of 
the  line  from  Duckport  to  Milliken's  Bend.  They  will 
furnish  all  the  guards  and  details  required  for  general 
hospitals,  and,  with  the  contrabands  that  may  be  about 
the  camps,  will  furnish  all  the  details  for  loading  and 
unloading  boats. 

Twelfth,  The  movement  of  troops  from  Milliken's  Bend 
to  New  Carthage  will  be  so  conducted  as  to  allow  the 
transportation  of  ten  days'  supply  of  rations,  and  one 
half  the   allowance  of  ordnance   reqxdred  by  previous 
orders. 

Thirteenth,  Commanders  are  autliorized  atx^.  eniomed 

to  collect  all  the  beef-cattle,  com,  and  other  txeeesaaxy 

supplies  on  the  line  of  march ;  but  iJvaaitoTi  de^^^^'^^^^^  ^ 

property,  taking  of  articles  useless  for  military  P^^^HP^^' 
•    ix^         ...  .       .   .  -  --**Axu^  _*-iftpia  vntu- 


392  PERSONAL  MEMOntS  OF  U.  S.  GBiLNT 

ch.  xxxn  prohibited.    All  such  irregolarities  most  be  smnmanly 

punished. 
^Svo^'m'      Fourteenth.  Brigadier-General   J.  C.  Sullivan   is   ap- 
,i2?*i2f^     pointed  to  the  command  of  all  the  forces  detailed  for  the 
Gen.  Vote,    protection  of  the  line  from  here  to  New  Carthage.    His 

particular  attention  is  called  to  General  Orders  No.  69, 

from   Adjutant-General's   Office,  Washington,    of   date 

March  20,  1863. 

By  order  of 

Major-General  U.  S.  Grant. 

McClernand  was  already  below  on  the  Mississippi. 
Two  of  McPherson^s  divisions  were  put  upon  the 
march  immediately.  The  third  had  not  yet  amved 
from  Lake  Providence ;  it  was  on  its  way  to  Milli- 
ken's  Bend  and  was  to  follow  on  arrival. 

Sherman  was  to  follow  MePherson.    Two  of  his 

divisions  were  at  Duckport  and  Young's  Point,  and 

^^t^M^.  the  third,  under  Steele,  was  under  orders  to  return 

184^^  maj.  from  Greenville,  Mississippi,  where  it  had  been  sent 

^^  ufww  r^  to  expel  a  rebel  battery  that  had  been  annoying  our 

Brig.-Oen.     .  _, 

voisTjan-ag,  transports. 

Nov.i9486«;      It  had  now  become  evident  that  the  army  could 

d,  Jan.  la,  *^ 

^^  not  be  rationed  by  a  wagon-train  over  the  single 
nan*ow  and  almost  impassable  road  between  Milli- 
ken's  Bend  and  Perkins's  plantation.  Accordingly 
six  more  steamers  were  protected  as  before,  to  run 
the  batteries,  and  were  loaded  with  supplies.  They 
took  twelve  barges  in  tow,  loaded  also  with  rations. 
\fi^^  On  the  night  of  the  22d  of  April  they  ran  the 
batteries,  five  getting  through  more  or  less  dis- 
abled, while  one  was  sunk.  About  half  the  barges 
got  through  with  their  needed  freight. 
When  it  was  first  proposed  to  run  the  blockade  at 


VOLUNTEERS  FOB  RIVEB  WORK  393 

their  vessels,  and  but  one  crew.    Volunteers  were  ch.  xxxn 
called  for  from  the  army — men  who  had  had  ex-  s^5i*w. 
perience  in  any  capacity  in  navigating  the  West-  ^^ff^<^^ 
em  rivers.     Captains,  pilots,  mates,  engineers,  and 
deck-hands  enough  presented  themselves  to  take 
five  times  the  number  of  vessels  we  were  moving 
through  this  dangerous  ordeal.    Most  of  them  were 
from  Logan^s  division,  composed  generally  of  men 
from  the  southern  part  of  Illinois  and  from  Missouri. 
All  but  two  of  the  steamers  were  commanded  by  vol- 
unteers from  the  army,  and  all  but  one  so  manned. 
In  this  instance,  as  in  all  others  during  the  war,  I 
found  that  volunteers  could  be  found  in  the  ranks 
and  among  the  commissioned  officers  to  meet  every 
call  for  aid,  whether  mechanical  or  professional. 
Colonel  W.  S.  Oliver  was  master  of  transportation  ^M^iiit'^ 
on  this  occasion  by  special  detail. 


CHAPTEE  XXXm 

ATTACK  ON  GBAND  GULF — OPERATIONS  BELOW 
VICKSBURG 

CH.xxxm  f\^  the  24th  my  headquarters  were  with  the  ad- 

Aprii.1868    v./    vance  at  Perkins's  plantation.     Eeconnais- 

sances  were  made  in  boats  to  ascertain  whether  there 

was  high  land  on  the  east  shore  of  the  river  where 

we  might  land  above  Grand  Gulf.  There  was  none 

practicable.    Accordingly  the  troops  were  set  in 

Tiuii^ftt^  motion  for  Hard  Times,  twenty-two  miles  farther 

^        down  the  river  and  nearly  opposite  Grand  Gulf. 

The  loss  of  two  steamers  and  six  barges  reduced  our 

transportation  so  that  only  ten  thousand  men  could 

be  moved  by  water.    Some  of  the  steamers  that  had 

got  below  were  injured  in  their  machinery,  so  that 

they  were  only  useful  as  barges,  towed  by  those  less 

severely  injured.    All  the  troops,  therefore,  except 

what  could  be  transported  in  one  trip,  had  to  march. 

^pfw^R.   The  road  lay  west  of  Lake  St.  Joseph.    Three  large 

^5n^^^    bayous   had  to   be  crossed.    They  were  rapidly 

bridged  in  the  same  manner  as  those  previously 

encountered. 

On  the  27th  McClemand's  corps  was  all  at  Hard 

Note. — On  this  occasion  Gk>y-    Carthage.    I  furnished  an  ambu- 


I 


ATTACK  ON  GRAND  GULP  395 

Times,  and  McPherson^s  was  following  closely.    I  c^xxxin 

had  determined  to  make  the  attempt  to  eflfect  a 

landing  on  the  east  side  of  the  river  as  soon  as 

possible.    Accordingly,  on  the  morning  of  the  29th, 

McClemand  was  directed  to  embark  all  the  troops  ^aif^^ 

from  his  corps  that  our  transports  and  barges  could 

carry.    About  ten  thousand  men  were  so  embarked. 

The  plan  was  to  have  the  navy  silence  the  guns  at 

Grand  Gulf,  and  to  have  as  many  men  as  possible 

ready  to  debark  in  the  shortest  possible  time,  under 

cover  of  the  fire  of  the  navy,  and  carry  the  works 

by  storm.    The  following  order  was  issued :  : 

I 

Perkins's  Plantation,  Louisiana,  * 

April  27, 1863.  1 

Major-General  J.  A.  McClernand,  T- 

Commanding  Thirteenth  A.  C. :  \ 

Commence  immediately  the  embarkation  of  your  corps, 
or  so  much  of  it  as  there  is  transportation  for.  Have 
put  aboard  the  artillery  and  every  article  authorized  in 
orders  limiting  baggage,  except  the  men,  and  hold  them 
in  readiness,  with  their  places  assigned,  to  be  moved  at  a 
moment's  warning. 

All  the  troops  you  may  have,  except  those  ordered  to 
remain  behind,  send  to  a  point  nearly  opposite  Grand 
Gulf,  where  you  see,  by  special  orders  of  this  date.  General 
McPherson  is  ordered  to  send  one  division. 

The  plan  of  the  attack  will  be  for  the  navy  to  attaxik. 
and  silence  all  the  batteries  commanding  the  river.   ^^^^^^ 
corps  will  be  on  the  river,  ready  to  run  to  and.  ^^^^^1^^ 
on  the  nearest  eligible  land  below  the  promon'tory  ^^"l^^^ 
brought  to  view  passing  down  the  river.     Once  oxl  ^^-^^^3^1 
have  each  commander  instructed  beforehand  to  form    ^^ 


W.K.XXIV 

(8)387 


396  PERSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  8.  GRANT 

OH.xxxni  first  object  is  to  get  a  foothold  where  our  troops  can 
inaintain  themselves  nntil  such  time  as  preparations  can 
be  made  and  troops  collected  for  a  forward  movement. 

Admiral  Porter  has  proposed  to  place  his  boats  in  the 
position  indicated  to  you  a  few  days  ago,  and  to  bring 
over  with  them  such  troops  as  may  be  below  the  city  after 
the  guns  of  the  enemy  are  silenced. 

It  may  be  that  the  enemy  will  occupy  positions  back 
from  the  city,  out  of  range  of  the  gunboats,  so  as  to  make 
it  desirable  to  run  past  Grand  Gulf  and  land  at  Rodney. 
In  case  this  should  prove  the  plan,  a  signal  will  be  arranged 
and  you  duly  informed  when  the  transports  are  to  start 
with  this  view.  Or  it  may  be  expedient  for  the  boats  to 
run  past,  but  not  the  men.  In  this  case,  then,  the  trans- 
ports would  have  to  be  brought  back  to  where  the  men 
could  land  and  move  by  forced  marches  to  below  Grand 
Gulf,  reembark  rapidly,  and  proceed  to  the  latter  place. 
There  will  be  required,  then,  three  signals :  one  to  indicate 
that  the  transports  can  run  down  and  debark  the  troops 
at  Grand  Gulf;  one  that  the  transports  can  run  by  with- 
out the  troops ;  and  the  last  that  the  transports  can  run 
by  with  the  troops  on  board. 

Should  the  men  have  to  march,  all  baggage  and  artillery 
will  be  left  to  run  the  blockade. 

If  not  already  directed,  require  your  men  to  keep  three 
days'  rations  in  their  haversacks,  not  to  be  touched  until 
a  movement  commences. 

U.  S.  Grant, 

Majar-Omeral 

Taia&^pp.      At  8  A.M.  on  the  29tli,  Porter  made  the  attack 

b^ma    ^^^  ^is  entire  strength  present — eight  gunboats. 

^567,Tjte^  For  nearly  five  and  a  half  hours  the  attack  was  kept 

up  without  silencing  a  single  gun  of  the  enemy.    All 


ATTACK  ON  GRAND  GULP  397 

both  sides,  within  range  of  the  enemy's  guns ;  but  cnjtxxni 
a  small  tug,  without  armament,  was  not  calculated 
to  attract  the  fire  of  batteries  while  they  were  being 
assailed  themselves.  About  half-past  one  the  fleet 
withdrew,  seeing  their  efforts  were  entirely  unavail- 
ing. The  enemy  ceased  filing  as  soon  as  we  with- 
drew. I  immediately  signaled  the  admiral  and  went 
aboard  his  ship.  The  navy  lost  in  this  engagement 
eighteen  killed  and  fifty-six  wounded.  A  large  pro- 
portion of  these  were  of  the  crew  of  the  flag-ship, 
and  most  of  those  from  a  single  shell,  which  pene- 
trated the  ship's  side  and  exploded  between  decks, 
where  the  men  were  working  their  guns.^he  sight 
of  the  mangled  and  dying  men  which  met  my  eye 
as  I  boarded  the  ship  was  sickening^> 

Grand  Gulf  is  on  a  high  bluff  wh^  the  river  runs 
at  the  very  foot  of  it.  It  is  as  defensible  upon  its 
front  as  Vicksburg,  and  at  that  time  would  have 
been  just  as  impossible  to  capture  by  a  front  attack. 
I  therefore  requested  Porter  to  run  the  batteries  ^•^)8a 
with  his  fleet  that  night,  and  to  take  charge  of  the 
transports,  all  of  which  wonld  be  wanted  below. 

There  is  a  long  tongue  of  land  from  tlie  Louisio^®* 
side  extending  toward  Grand  Gulf,madeby  theri^^^ 
running  nearly  east  from  about  three  VO^^^^  ^^T^ A, 
and  nearly  in  the  opposite  direction  frot^^  ^^^^  ^^^^ 
for  about  the  same  distance  \>elow    Tb^  'V^iid^ja^    ^^> 
low  and  wet  that  it  would  not  Wc.  Wftt^  V'^^^^^Z/^ 
to  march  an  army  across  but  for    \  ^^^^^^j^^ 

this  explored  before,  as  ^eU  aa  \:^  '\j0^  V^\^'^<^ 
to  ascertain  if  there  was  a  po^i, ^  ^^^  ^ ^i  ^^^\^^^ 
tion  north  of  Rn/^n av       t^  tl     ^^^^  lanmt  *^.  tVi<^  +^v> 


398  PEBSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GEANT 

CH.xTTTn  acquiesced  in  the  plan,  but  volunteered  to  use  his 
entire  fleet  as  transports.  I  had  intended  to  make 
this  request,  but  he  anticipated  me.  At  dusk,  when 
concealed  from  the  view  of  the  enemy  at  Grand  Gulf, 

^'ojS^  McClemand  landed  his  command  on  the  west  bank. 
The  navy  and  transports  ran  the  batteries  success- 
fully. The  troops  marched  across  the  point  of  land, 
tmder  cover  of  night,  unobserved.  By  the  time  it 
was  light  the  enemy  saw  our  whole  fleet — ironclads, 
gunboats,  river  steamers,  and  barges — quietly  mov- 
ing down  the  river  three  miles  below  them,  black, 
or  rather  blue,  with  National  troops. 
When  the  troops  debarked,  the  evening  of  the 

April.  1868  29th,  it  was  expected  that  we  would  have  to  go  to 
Eodney,  about  nine  miles  below,  to  find  a  landing ; 
but  that  night  a  colored  man  came  in  who  informed 
me  that  a  good  landing  would  be  found  at  Bruins- 
burg,  a  few  miles  above  Eodney,  from  which  point 
there  was  a  good  road  leading  to  Port  Gibson,  some 
twelve  miles  in  the  interior.  The  information  was 
found  correct,  and  our  landing  was  eflfected  without 
opposition. 

Sherman  had  not  left  his  position  above  Vicks- 
SSmM     ^^^S  y®**    ^  *^^  morning  of  the  27th  I  ordered 

%^^-^  him  to  create  a  diversion  by  moving  his  corps  up 

GM^bkL  the  Yazoo  and  threatening  an  attack  on  Haines's 
Bluff. 

My  object  was  to  compel  Pemberton  to  keep  as 
much  force  about  Vicksburg  as  I  could,  until  I  could 
secure  a  good  footing  on  high  land  east  of  the  river. 
The  move  was  eminently  successful,  and,  as  we  after- 

TB-Q  Til  lAo-mo/1   ATAnf^  OTA  At  r>onfnainn  fthnnt  Vio.lra- 


043,348 


400  PERSONAL  HEMOIBS  OF  U.  8.  GRANT 

OH.xxxin  29tli,  with  ten  regiments  of  his  command  and  eight 
gunboats  which  Porter  had  left  above  Vicksburg. 

He  debarked  his  troops  and  apparently  made 
every  preparation  to  attack  the  enemy,  while  the 
navy  bombarded  the  main  forts  at  Haines's  Bluff. 
This  move  was  made  without  a  single  casualty  in 
either  branch  of  the  service.  On  the  1st  of  May 
^•5;S^  Sherman  received  orders  from  me  (sent  from  Hard 
Times  the  evening  of  the  29th  of  April)  to  withdraw 
from  the  front  of  Haines's  Bluff  and  follow  McPher- 
son  with  two  divisions  as  fast  as  he  could. 

I  had  established  a  depot  of  supplies  at  Perkins's 
plantation.  Now  that  all  our  gunboats  were  below 
Grand  GuK,  it  was  possible  that  the  enemy  might 
fit  out  boats  in  the  Big  Black  with  improvised 
armament  and  attempt  to  destroy  these  supplies. 
McPherson  was  at  Hard  Times  with  a  portion  of  his 
corps,  and  the  depot  was  protected  by  a  part  of  his 
command.  The  night  of  the  29th  I  directed  him  to 
arm  one  of  the  transports  with  artillery  and  send  it 
up  to  Perkins's  plantation  as  a  guard ;  and  also  to 
have  the  siege-guns  we  had  brought  along  moved 
there  and  put  in  position. 

The  embarkation  below  Grand  GuK  took  place  at 

De  Shroon's,  Louisiana,  six  miles  above  Bruinsburg, 

wB-^v  Mississippi.    Early  on  the  morning  of  the  30th  of 

April  McClemand's  corps  and  one  division  of  Mc- 

Pherson's  corps  were  speedily  landed. 

When  this  was  effected  I  felt  a  degree  of  relief 
scarcely  ever  equaled  since.   Vicksburg  was  not  yet 


OPERATIONS  BELOW  VICK8BUEG  401 

plies.  But  I  was  on  dry  ground  on  the  same  side  CH.xxxni 
of  the  river  with  the  enemy.  All  the  campaigns, 
labors,  hardships,  and  exposures,  from  the  month 
of  December  previous  to  this  time,  that  had  been 
made  and  endured,  were  for  the  accomplishment  of 
this  one  object. 

I  had  with  me  the  Thirteenth  Corps,  General  Mc-  tSS^tot 
demand  commanding,  and  two  brigades  of  Logan's  '^^iv  isf" 
division  of  the  Seventeenth  Corps,  General  McPher-      ^"^* 
son  commanding — in  all  not  more  than  twenty 
thousand  men  to  commence  the  campaign  with. 
These  were   soon   reinforced  by   the  remaining 
brigade  of  Logan's  division  and  Crocker's  division 
of  the  Seventeenth  Corps.    On  the  7th  of  May  I  was       im 
further  reinforced  by  Sherman  with  two  divisions 
of  his,  the  Fifteenth  Corps.   My  total  force  was  then 
about  thirty-three  thousand  men. 

The  enemy  occupied  Grand  Gulf,  Haines's  Bluff,  tSSS^f 
and  Jackson  with  a  force  of  nearly  sixty  thousand  ^kiv  (sf* 
men.    Jackson  is  fifty  miles  east  of  Vicksburg  and     ^^^^~ 
is  connected  with  it  by  a  railroad.    My  first  problem 
^^8  to  capture  Grand  GuK  to  use  as  a  base. 
-Bnzinsburg  is  two  miles  from  high  ground.   The 
^ttom  at  that  point  is  higher  than  most  of  the  low 
^^^d in     *i^  valley  of  the  Mississippi,  and  a  good 
^?^]e^-^^  ^  ^^  1>1^-    It  w««  natural  to  expect 
^^g^^^^foi^  from  Grand  GuK  to  come  out  *^  me€>^^ 

hSh^^^"^^^       ^^^"""^  ^'^""^  ^""^^^^  *^^  Mi&^^^«^P^^ 
V;  %^-^      ^Bruinsburg,  and,  as   it  is  ^  ^fl,^e;a\A^ 

\\^^^^    wa8Mghatthethne,inor^^^t^iu^<- 
*-aere  was  a  bridge  to  crnAo  L ^^  _ .    rpv. 4^ 


402  PERSONAL  MEMOIBS  OF  U.  S.  GBANT 

CH.xxxm  the  high  land  back  of  Bruinsburg.  No  time  was  to 
be  lost  in  securing  this  foothold.  Our  transporta- 
tion was  not  sufficient  to  move  all  the  army  across 
the  river  at  one  trip,  or  even  two ;  but  the  landing  of 
the  Thirteenth  Corps  and  one  division  of  the  Sev- 
enteenth was  effected  during  the  day — April  30th 
— and  early  evening.  McClemand  was  advanced 
as  soon  as  ammunition  and  two  days'  rations 
(to  last  five)  could  be  issued  to  his  men.  The 
ii^d'?Rep.  ^li^s  were  reached  an  hour  before  sunset,  and 
^'a)?«^  McClernand  was  pushed  on,  hoping  to  reach  Port 
Gibson  and  save  the  bridge  spanning  the  Bayou 
Pierre  before  the  enemy  could  get  there ;  for  cross- 
ing a  stream  in  the  presence  of  an  enemy  is  always 
difficult.  Port  Gibson,  too,  is  the  starting-point  of 
roads  to  Grand  Gulf,  Vicksburg,  and  Jackson. 
Ibid.  McClemand's  advance  met  the  enemy  about  five 

miles  west  of  Port  Gibson,  at  Thompson's  planta- 
tion.   There  was  some  firing  during  the  night,  but 
nothing  rising  to  the  dignity  of  a  battle  until  day- 
light.   The   enemy  had  taken  a  strong  natural 
Joimai^w-  position  with  most  of  the  Grand  Gulf  garrison, 
Brt^^.   numbering  about  seven  or  eight  thousand  men, 
SmT^  jSy  under  General  Bowen.    His  hope  was  to  hold  me 
18.1868      j^  check  until  reinforcements  under  Loring  could 
i^Me^oo   ^^^^^  him  from  Vicksburg;  but  Loring  did  not 
i^j^jgj-'  come  in  time  to  render  much  assistance  south  of 
^riJ?.'G€n.'  Port  Gibson.    Two  brigades  of  McPherson's  corps 
^seif  *mS^'  followed  McClemand  as  fast  as  rations  and  ammuni- 


0PEEATI0N8  BELOW  VICKSBUBG  403 

except  when  they  occasionally  pass  from  one  ridge  cELXxxm 

to  another.   Where  there  are  no  clearings  the  sides 

of  the  hills  are  covered  with  a  very  heavy  growth  of 

timber  and  with  undergrowth,  and  the  ravines  are 

filled  with  vines  and  cane-brakes,  almost  impene- 
trable.   This  makes  it  easy  for  an  inferior  force  to 

delay,  if  not  defeat,  a  far  superior  one. 

Near  the  point  selected  by  Bowen  to  defend,  the 

road  to  Port  Gibson  divides,  taking  two  ridges 

w^hich  do  not  diverge  more  than  a  mile  or  two  at 

the  widest  point.    These  roads  unite  just  outside 

the  town.    This  made  it  necessary  for  McClemand 

to  divide  his  force.    It  was  not  only  divided,  but 

it  was  separated  by  a  deep  ravine  of  the  character 

above  described.   One  flank  could  not  reinforce  the 

other  except  by  marching  back  to  the  junction  oi 

the  roads.   McClemand  put  the  divisions  of  Hovey^  ^k.^^^, 
Carr,  and  A.  J.  Smith  upon  the  right-hand  brax^^'^  ^^^^^S^ 
and  Osterhaus  on  the  left.    I  was  on  the  field  J^^  ^^^^.- 
10  A.M.,  and  inspected  both  flanks  in  person.     ^-0   ^^-^4^^ 
the  right  the  enemy,  if  not  being  pressed  "back,  ^^^^  %-^?^' 
at  least  not  repulsing  our  advance.    On  the  1^^  ^   "^^^^^9^ 
however,  Osterhaus  was  not  faring  so  well.     He  ^^ j^      y^^ 
'^en  repulsed  with  some  loss.    As  soon  as  tlie  tO^^^^ 
couJd  be  cleared  of  McClemand's  troops  I  ordef  ^  ^  ,^^^ 

Jp  ACeJiierson,  who  was  close  upon  the  rear  ol  t^  ^       -^'^ 
Jurt^^uth  Corps,  with  two  brigades  of    Logatv^^ 
^irisxc^^i  This  was  about  noon.    I  ordered  him  ^^^ 
^d    ^^ne  brigade  (General  John  E.  Smith's    ^^^ 
y  '^^^^)to  support  Osterhaus,  and  to  move  to  t\v^ 

^^^^^^^  flank  the  enemy  out  of  liis  x>os\tion.      Tbi^ 

<  !^^4r:^^^^t  carried  the  brigade  over  a.  d.eep  ravine  \ff 


V  ^^    _  ^^^  riAjTA  •   an /I  nrViAn   Smif.Vl'pl    "f-.-rr^r^T^o   — ' 


404  PEESONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GBANT 

GH.xxQn  renew  his  front  attack.  It  was  successful  and  un- 
attended by  heavy  loss.  The  enemy  was  sent  in 
full  retreat  on  their  right,  and  their  left  followed 
before  sunset.  While  the  movement  to  our  left 
was  going  on,  McClemand,  who  was  with  his  right 
flank,  sent  me  frequent  requests  for  reinf orcements^ 
although  the  force  with  him  was  not  being  pressed. 
I  had  been  upon  the  ground  and  knew  it  did  not 
admit  of  his  engaging  all  the  men  he  had.  "We 
followed  up  our  victory  until  night  overtook  us 
about  two  miles  from  Port  Gibson ;  then  the  troops 
went  into  bivouac  for  the  night. 


w.iLxxrv 


CHAPTER  XXXIV 

€APTUBE  OF  POBT  GIB80K — GRIEBSON^S  RAID — 0C5CU- 
PATIOK  OP  GRAND  GULF — MOVEMENT  UP  THE  BIG 
BLACK — BATTLE  OF  RAYMOND 

"VITE  started  next  morning  for  Port  Gibson  aa  cblxxxiv 

▼  ▼  soon  as  it  was  light  enough  to  see  the  road. 
We  were  soon  in  the  town,  and  I  was  delighted  to 
find  that  the  enemy  had  not  stopped  to  contest  our 
crossing  further  at  the  bridge,  which  he  had  burned. 
The  troops  were  set  to  work  at  once  to  construct  a  -^^^-^ 
bridge  across  the  South  Fork  of  the  Bayou  Pierre.    ^ia»-w  } 

At  this  time  the  water  was  high  and  the  curreixt 
^a^pid.     What  might  be  called  a  raft-bridge  wa» 
Soon     constructed   from   material    obtained  troto- 
^ood^n  buildings,  stables,  fences,  etc.,  which  8ti>" 
^ced^ox^  carrying  the  whole  army  over  safely.  Col^^ 
Ve/l     -B:.  Wilson,  a  member  of  my  staff,  planned 
^^e/.^r^-^:ierintended  the  construction  of  this  bridg^^ 
?0/^^  ^^to  the  water  and  working  a^  hard  as  au/  ^^t^ 

^^..^^^aged^Officers  and  men  generally  joined  iJ>  .^^^^ 

^ched  eight  miles  beyond  to  the :Nottlx^OT^     ^ 


406  PEBSONAL  MEMOmS  OP  U.  S.  GRANT 

ch.  xmv  f antry  supports  to  prevent  our  repairing  the  burnt 
railroad-bridge.  Two  of  his  brigades  were  sent  up 
the  bayou  to  find  a  crossing  and  reach  the  North 
Fork  to  repair  the  bridge  there.  The  enemy  soon 
left  when  he  found  we  were  building  a  bridge  else- 
where. Before  leaving  Port  Gibson  we  were  rein- 
forced by  Crocker's  division,  McPherson's  corps, 
which  had  crossed  the  Mississippi  at  Bruinsburg 
and  come  up  without  stopping  except  to  get  two 
days'  rations.  McPherson  still  had  one  division 
west  of  the  Mississippi  River,  guarding  the  road 
from  Milliken's  Bend  to  the  river  below  until  Sher- 
man's command  should  relieve  it. 

On  leaving  Bruinsburg  for  the  front  I  left  my 
son  Frederick,  who  had  joined  me  a  few  weeks 
before,  on  board  one  of  the  gunboats  asleep,  and 
hoped  to  get  away  without  him  until  after  Grand 
GuK  should  fall  into  our  hands ;  but  on  waking  up 
he  learned  that  I  had  gone,  and  being  guided  by 
the  sound  of  the  battle  raging  at  Thompson's  HiU 
— called  the  battle  of  Port  Gibson — found  his  way 

BongWngit  to  whcrc  I  was.  He  had  no  horse  to  ride  at  the 
time,  and  I  had  no  facilities  for  even  preparing  a 
meal.  He  therefore  foraged  around  the  best  he 
could  until  we  reached  Grand  Gulf.    Mr.  C.  A. 

^wm^-'  Dana,  then  an  officer  of  the  War  Department,  ac- 

"SSi'^i'sM  companied  me  on  the  Vicksburg  campaign  and 
through  a  portion  of  the  siege.  He  was  in  the 
same  situation  as  Fred  so  far  as  transportation  and 


SECURING  TBANSPORTATION  407 

Our  trains  arrived  a  few  days  later,  after  which  crxxxht 
we  were  all  perfectly  equipped. 

My  son  accompanied  me  throughout  the  cam-  ^^'Se*of 
paign  and  siege,  and  caused  no  anxiety  either  to  ^" 
me  or  to  his  mother,  who  was  at  home.  He  looked 
out  for  himself  and  was  in  every  battle  of  the  cam- 
paign. His  age,  then  not  quite  thirteen,  enabled 
him  to  take  in  all  he  saw,  and  to  retain  a  recollec- 
tion of  it  that  would  not  be  possible  in  more  mature 
years. 

When   the   movement   from    Bruinsburg  com- 
menced we  were  without  a  wagon-train.    The  train 
still  west  of  the  Mississippi  was  carried  around, 
with  proper  escort,  by  a  circuitous  route  from  Mil- 
liken's  Bend  to  Hard  Times,  seventy  or  more  miles 
below,  and  did  not  get  up  for  some  days  after  the 
battle  of  Port  Gibson.    My  own  horses,  headquar- 
ters' transportation,  servants,  mess-chest,  and  every- 
thing except  what  I  had  on,  was  with  this  train. 
General  A.  J.  Smith  happened  to  have  an  extra  ^w^ipjje^^j;^ 
horse  at  Bruinsburg,  which  I  borrowed,  witli  a  c^^^^^t,t?: 
saddle-tree  without  upholstering  further  than  stir-  ^^^^^^a^^a 
rups.    I  had  no  other  for  nearly  a  week.  ^"^^\S^^^^* 

It  was  necessary  to  have  transportation  for  ^^^ 
munition.    Provisions   coiil(^  \)e  tak^^  irom      ,     ^ 
country ;  but  all  the  ammunition  that  (^^^  ^^  caf  ^^    \e> 
on  the  person  is  soon   exhausted  ^1^^^  ttiet^  ^"V?  "^""^^ 
much  fighting.    I  directed,  theteiore  i^^^di^^^'V^  ^ 
on  landing,  that  all  the  vehicW      a  \ir^^^^^^\'^^4>^'^ 
whether  horses,  mules,    or  o^l        \p^  ^^x^^^^.^-      v^>^ 
should  be  collected    axxd  loade> '\y^   ^^^^^^^^^ 


408  PEBSONAL  MEM0IB8  OF  U.  8.  GRANT 

CH.  XXXIV  with  boxes  of  cartridges  that  had  been  pitched  in 
promiscuously,  drawn  by  mules  with  plow-harness, 
straw  collars,  rope  lines,  etc. ;  long-coupled  wagons, 
with  racks  for  carrying  cotton-bales,  drawn  by 
oxen ;  and  everything  that  could  be  found  in  the 
way  of  transportation  on  a  plantation,  either  for 
use  or  pleasure.    The  making  out  of  provision  re- 
turns was  stopped  for  the  time.    No  formalities 
were  to  retard  our  progress  until  a  position  was 
secured  when  the  time  could  be  spared  to  observe 
them. 
£ii\3^^      It  was  at  Port  Gibson  I  first  heard  through  a 
A^M.i8ii;  Southern  paper  of  the  complete  success  of  Colonel 
wMfBrij^'  Grierson,  who  was  making  a  raid  through  central 
jun2*87iw3;  Mississippi.    He  had  started  from  La  Grange  April 
May  117, 1866  17th,  with  thrcc  regiments  of  about  seventeen  hun- 
dred men.    On  the  21st  he  had  detached  Colonel 
hSSTcJl  Hatch  with  one  regiment  to  destroy  the  railroad 
^juSi^^*  between  Columbus  and  Macon  and  then  return  to 
g2?.'^85a.  La  Grange.    Hatch  had  a  sharp  fight  with  the 
ttf^ih   enemy  at  Columbus,  and  retreated  along  the  rail- 
road, destroying  it  at  Okalona  and  Tupelo,  and 
arriving  in  La  Grange  April  26th.    Grierson  con- 
tinued his  movement  with  about  one  thousand  men, 
breaking  the  Vicksburg  and  Meridian  railroad,  and 
the  New  Orleans  and  Jackson  railroad,  arriving  at 
w.Rxxiv  Baton  Eouge  May  2d.    This  raid  Was  of  gi'eat  im- 
portance, for  Grierson  had  attracted  the  attention 
of  the  enemy  from  the  main  movement  against 
Vicksburg. 
Ibid.  139        During  the  night  of  the  2d  of  May  the  bridge 
over  the  North  Fork  was  repaired,  and  the  troops 


OCCUPATION  OF  GEAND  GULF  409 

by  the  enemy  from  a  commanding  position;  but  ch.xxxiv 
they  were  soon  driven  off.    It  was  evident  that  the 
enemy  was  covering  a  retreat  from  Grand  Gulf  to 
Vicksburg.    Every  commanding  position  from  this 
(Grindstone)  crossing  to  Hankinson's  ferry  over  the 
Big  Black  was  occupied  by  the  retreating  foe  to 
delay  our  progress.    McPherson,  however,  reached  ^-5)^^ 
Hankinson^s  ferry  before  night,  seized  the  ferry- 
boat, and  sent  a  detachment  of  his  command  across 
and  several  miles  north  on  the  road  to  Vicksburg. 
When  the  junction  of  the  road  going  to  Vicksburg 
with  the  road  from  Grand  GuK  to  Eaymond  and 
Jackson  was  reached,  Logan  with  his  division  was  iwd.  644,645 
turned  to  the  left  toward  Grand  GuK.    I  went  with 
him  a  short  distance  from  this  junction.    McPher- 
son had  encountered  the  largest  force  yet  met  since 
the  battle  of  Port  Gibson,  and  had  a  skirmish  nearly 
approaching  a  battle ;  but  the  road  Logan  had  taken 
enabled  him  to  come  up  on  the  enemy's  right  flank, 
and  they  soon  gave  way.    McPherson  was  ordered 
to  hold  Hankinson's  ferry  and  the  road  back  to 
Willow  Springs  with  one  division;  McClemand,  ^•^)S^ 
^bo  was  now  in  the  rear,  was  to  join  in  this,  as 
^ell  as  to  guard  the  line  back  down  the  bayou.    1 
^'d  no^  want  to  take  the  chances  of  having   mi 
^^emy^     Jurking  in  our  rear. 

Q^     ^ii©  way  ft-om  the  junction  to  Grand  G"**^*^^ 
\         ^^fcie  road  comes  into  the  one  from'^^^^^^^*'^^^ 
\T  ^.^^^^^^  place  six  or  seven  miles  out  ^^^^^^^U^-^:* 

K  f^^         *^^i^-^»y  to  Vicksburg.    \\...V^^^j^^^^^  ^ 


410  PEKSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  8.  GBANT 

CH.XXXIV  arrived  with  his  fleet.    The  enemy  had  abandoned 

his  heavy  guns  and  evacuated  the  place. 

1868  When  I  reached  Grand  GuK,  May  3d,  I  had  not 

been  with  my  baggage  since  the  27th  of  April,  and 

consequently  had  had  no  change  of  underclothing, 

no  meal  except  such  as  I  could  pick  up  sometimes 

at  other  headquarters,  and  no  tent  to  cover  me. 

The  first  thing  I  did  was  to  get  a  bath,  borrow 

some  fresh  underclothing  from  one  of  the  naval 

officers,  and  get  a  good  meal  on  the  flag-ship.   Then 

H^ok*w.  ■"■  ^^^^^  letters  to  the  general-in-chief  informing 

^^Jjf  ^^>  him  of  our  present  position,  despatches  to  be  tele- 

Gnmtto    graphed  from  Cairo,  orders  to  General  Sullivan 

w.RjXxiv  commanding  above  Vicksburg,  and  gave  orders  to 

w.R.xxr7  all  my  corps  commanders.    About  twelve  o'clock 

(8)  268 

at  night  I  was  through  my  work  and  started  for 

Hankinson's  ferry,  arriving  there  before  daylight. 

gSS^^  While  at  Grand  GuM  I  heard  from  Banks,  who  was 

i^^pap-  on  the  Red  Eiver,  and  who  said  that  he  could  not 

Graat!  iwd.  be  at  Port  Hudson  before  the  10th  of  May,  and 

then  with  only  fifteen  thousand  men.    Up  to  this 

time  my  intention  had  been  to  secure  Grand  GuM 

as  a  base  of  supplies,  detach  McClemand's  corps  to 

Banks,  and  cooperate  with  him  in  the  reduction  of 

Port  Hudson. 

M  c  (mSS?)      ^^^  news  from  Banks  forced  upon  me  a  different 

^?2fm'(M^  plan  of  campaign  from  the  one  intended.    To  wait 

^^^laS^*  for  his  cooperation  would  have  detained  me  at  least 

G^n.^oto.   a  month.     The  reinforcements  would  not  have 

Mayl64861;  v    j    x         xi.  j  i»x        j    j       j.«  -i 


CUTTINQ  LOOSE  FBOM  THE  BASE  411 

have  brought.     I  therefore  determined  to  move  oaxxxiv 
independently  of  Banks,  cut  loose  from  my  base, 
destroy  the  rebel  force  in  rear  of  Vicksburg,  and  ^ 

invest  or  capture  the  city. 

Grand  Gulf  was  accordingly  given  up  as  a  base,   ^l^f?^^' 
and  the  authorities  at  WasMngton  were  notified.  -^•™-«»' 
I  knew  well  that  Halleck^s  caution  would  lead  him 
to  disapprove  of  this  course ;  but  it  was  the  only 
one  that  gave  any  chance  of  success.    The  time  it 
would  take  to  communicate  with  Washington  and 
get  a  reply  would  be  so  great  that  I  could  not  be 
interfered  with  until  it  was  demonstrated  whether 
my  plan  was  practicable.    Even   Sherman,  who 
afterward  ignored  bases  of  supplies  other  than 
what  were  afforded  by  the  country  while  marching 
through  four  States  of  the  Confederacy  with  an 
army  more  than  twice  as  large  as  mine  at  this  time, 
wrote  me  from  Hankinson's  ferry,  advising  me  of  ^•^)S^ 
the  impossibility  of  supplying  our  army  over  a  sin- 
gle road.    He  urged  me  to  "  stop  all  troops  till  your 
army  is  partially  supplied  with  wagons,  and  then 
act  as  quickly  as  possible;  for  this  road  will  "be 
jammed,  as  sure  as  lif e.^    To  this  I  replied :  "  I  ^^    ^'"^  "** 
not  calculate  upon  the  possibility  of  supplying  ^^^ 
army  with  full  rations  from  Grand  Gi^-    ^  ^^^  v- 
it  will  be  impossible  without  constm^^^S  ^    ^^ 
tional  roads.    What  I  do  expect  is  to  ^^*  ^^  ^^^^>^ 
rations  of  hard  bread,  cofEee,  and     \t  ^^  ^^^>  ^^\c^^ 
make  the  country  fumisli  the  bfi\  ^^       ^^  BtaJ*^^^^^ 
from  Bruinsburg  with   an   aver      ^*f    ^^""^^  ^"^^^^^^ 
days'  rations,  and  received  no  ly^^  2  i^  ^'^'^  o^^^^^ 

^        ^0     ^   to\lr.A        ^"^ 


supplies  for  some  days.      Abun?^^^  ^^^^  *^>^Txd 


.^^ 


412  PERSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U-  S.  GRANT 


CH.XXXIY 


McClemand's  and  McPherson^s  commands  were 

kept  substantially  as  they  were  on  the  night  of  the 

Bfay.  1868    2d,  awaiting  supplies  sufficient  to  give  them  three 

days'  rations  in  haversacks.     Beef,  mutton,  poul- 

the  wmitey  *^>  ^^^  f oragc  Were  found  in  abundance.  Quite  a 
quantity  of  bacon  and  molasses  was  also  secured 
from  the  country,  but  bread  and  coffee  could  not 
be  obtained  in  quantity  sufficient  for  all  the  men. 
Every  plantation,  however,  had  a  run  of  stone, 
propelled  by  mule-power,  to  grind  com  for  the 
owners  and  their  slaves.  All  these  were  kept  nm- 
ning,  while  we  were  stopping,  day  and  night,  and 
when  we  were  marching,  during  the  night,  at  all 
plantations  covered  by  the  troops.  But  the  prod- 
uct was  taken  by  the  troops  nearest  by,  so  that 
the  majority  of  the  command  was  destined  to  go 
without  bread  until  a  new  base  was  established  on 
the  Yazoo  above  Vicksburg. 

While  the  troops  were  awaiting  the  arrival  of 
rations  I  ordered  reconnaissances  made  by  McCler- 
nand  and  McPherson,  with  the  view  of  leading  the 
enemy  to  believe  that  we  intended  to  cross  the  Big 
Black  and  attack  the  city  at  once. 

Mem^s^       On  the  6th  Sherman  arrived  at  Grand  Gulf  and 
^  '  '  crossed  his  command  that  night  and  the  ^uext  day. 
Three  days'  rations  had  been  brought  up  from 
Grand  Gulf  for  the  advanced  troops  and  were  is- 
sued.   Orders  were  given  for  a  forward  movement 

^*  w^^  the  next  day.     Sherman  was  directed  to  order  up 
Blair,  who  had  been  left  behind  to  guard  the  road 


MOVEMENT  UP  THE  BIG  BLACK  413 

commissary  was  to  load  them  with  hard  bread,  cof-  caxxxiv 
fee,  sugar,  salt,  and  one  hundred  thousand  pounds 
of  salt  meat. 

On  the  3d  Hurlbut,  who  had  been  left  at  Mem-  May,  im 
phis,  was  ordered  to  send  four  regiments  from  his 
command  to  Milliken^s  Bend  to  relieve  Blair's  divi- 
sion, and  on  the  5th  he  was  ordered  to  send  Lau-  ^-^j^P^ 
man's  division  in  addition,  the  latter  to  join  the 
army  in  the  field.  The  four  regiments  were  to  be 
taken  from  troops  near  the  river,  so  that  there 
would  be  no  delay. 

During  the  night  of  the  6th  McPherson  drew  in  ^^r^xJ^ 
his  troops  north  of  the  Big  Black  and  was  off  at  SiiifpfiS^ 
an  early  hour  on  the  road  to  Jackson,  via  Rocky  p.  wcfeSS^ 

/  •f        man,  pp. 

Springs,  Utica,  and  Raymond.    That  night  he  and      752, 75f 
McClemand  were  both  at  Rocky  Springs,  ten  miles 
from    Hankinson's   ferry.      McPherson   remained 
there  during  the  8th,  while  McClemand  moved  to 
Big  Sandy  and  Sherman  mai-ched  from  Grand  Gulf 
to  Hankinson's  ferry.    The  9th  McPherson  moved 
*o  a  point  within  a  few  miles  west  of  Utica ;  Mc- 
OJem&nd  and  Sherman  remained  where  they  were. 
Oz2  tite  10th  McPherson  moved  to  Utica,  Sherman 
^0  Si^  Sandy ;  McClemand  was  still  at  Big  Sandy- 
^e     -Xith  McClemand  was  at  Five  Mile  Creek.-, 
i^r:^^^*^^^   ^*  Auburn;  McPherson  fi^e  mAa^  »^* 
\^^.^:3.    from  Utica.    May  12th  McClerxx^Ti5iL^^^^ 
^o^^^^^^^xi  Mile  Creek;  Sherman  at  ForocO^"^"^^^^ 
fi  .  -  ^       -ZMTcPherson  at  Raymond  af t^^  ^^  X)^"^"^^*  ^i^^>''^ 
^ —     JMcPherson  crossed  the  Big  ;^X^/3^  ^^       ^^ 
ferry,  Vicksburg    co-old  \^ 

azid  besieged  by  the  sout\x  ftV 


414  PEBSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GBANT 

CH.xxxiy  of  the  ground  would  have  enabled  him  to  hold  a 
strong  defensible  line  from  the  river  south  of  the 
city  to  the  Big  Black,  retaining  possession  of  the 
railroad  back  to  that  point.  It  was  my  plan,  there- 
fore, to  get  to  the  railroad  east  of  Vicksburg,  and 
approach  from  that  direction.  Accordingly,  Mc- 
Pherson's  troops  that  had  crossed  the  Big  Black 
were  withdrawn  and  the  movement  east  to  Jackson 
commenced. 

Ante,  p.  403  As  has  bccu  stated  before,  the  country  is  very 
much  broken  and  the  roads  generally  confined  to 
the  tops  of  the  hills.  The  troops  were  moved  one 
(sometimes  two)  corps  at  a  time  to  reach  designated 
points  out  parallel  to  the  railroad  and  only  from 
six  to  ten  miles  from  it.  McClernand's  corps  was 
kept  with  its  left  flank  on  the  Big  Black  guarding 
all  the  crossings.  Fourteen  Mile  Creek,  a  stream 
substantially  parallel  with  the  railroad,  was  reached, 
and  crossings  effected  by  McClemand  and  Sherman 
with  slight  loss.    McPherson  was  to  the  right  of 

w.R^mv  Sherman,  extending  to  Eaymond.  The  cavalry 
was  used  in  this  advance  in  reconnoitering  to  find 
the  roads ;  to  cover  our  advances  and  to  find  the 
most  practicable  routes  from  one  commai^d  to  an- 
other, so  they  could  support  each  other  in  case  of 
an  attack.  In  making  this  move  I  estimated  Pem- 
berton's  movable  force  at  Vicksburg  at  about  eigh- 
teen thousand  men,  with  smaller  forces  at  Haines^s 
Bluff  and  Jackson.  It  would  not  be  possible  for 
Pemberton  to  attack  me  with  all  his  troops  at  one 
place,  and  I  determined  to  throw  my  army  between 
his  and  fight  him  in  detail.  This  was  done  with 
success,  but  I  found  afterward  that  I  had  entirely 
underestimated  Pemberton's  strength. 


BATTLE  OF  RAYMOND  415 

Up  to  this  point  our  movements  had  been  made  GH.xxxiy 
without  serious  opposition.  My  line  was  now 
nearly  parallel  with  the  Jackson  and  Vicksburg 
railroad  and  about  seven  miles  south  of  it.  The 
right  was  at  Raymond,  eighteen  miles  from  Jackson, 
McPherson  commanding;  Sherman  in  the  center, 
on  Fourteen  Mile  Creek,  his  advance  thrown  across ; 
McClemand  to  the  left,  also  on  Fourteen  Mile 
Creek,  advance  across,  and  his  pickets  within  two 
miles  of  Edward's  Station,  where  the  enemy  had 
concentrated  a  considerable  force,  and  where  they 
undoubtedly  expected  us  to  attack.  McClemand's 
left  was  on  the  Big  Black.  In  all  our  moves  up  to 
this  time  the  left  had  hugged  the  Big  Black  closely, 
and  all  the  ferries  had  been  guarded  to  prevent  the 
enemy  throwing  a  force  on  our  rear. 

McPherson  encountered  the  enemy,  five  thousand  May  w,  im 
strong,  with  two  batteries,  under  General  Gregg,  "^^^J^^^ 
about  two  miles  out  of  Raymond.    This  was  about  p^tS^fu^, 
2  P.M.    Logan  was  in  advance  with  one  of  his   ^^^^'^^ 
brigades.    He  deployed  and  moved  up  to  engage 
the  enemy.    McPherson  ordered  the  road  in  rear   ^»f^. 
to  be  cleared  of  wagons,  and  the  balance  of  Logan's    ^^^  ^ 
division,  and  Crocker's,  which  was  still  farther  in 
rear,  to  come  forward  with  all  despatch.    The  order 
was  obeyed  with  alacrity..  Logan  got  his  division  in    ^^^Sl 
position  for  assault  before  Crocker  could  get  up,  and        ^ 
attacked  with  vigor,  carrying  the  enemy's  position 
easily,  sending  Gregg  flying  from  the  field,  not  to  ap- 
pear against  our  front  again  until  we  met  at  Jackson. 

In  this  battle  McPherson   lost  66  killed,  339  ^-^jf^J^ 
wounded,  and  37  missing — nearly  or  quite  all  from 
Logan's  division.    The  enemy's  loss  was  100  killed, 
305  wounded,  besides  415  taken  prisoners. 


416  PEBSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  17.  S.  GRANT 

GH.xxxiy      I  regarded  Logan  and  Crocker  as  being  as  com- 
petent division  commanders  as  could  be  found  in 
or  out  of  the  army,  and  both  equal  to  a  much  higher 
"^fcS^'  command    Crocker,  however,  was  dying  of  con- 
^m!mu'   sumption  when  he  volunteered.    His  weak  condi- 
voil:  No?;    tion  never  put  him  on  the  sick-report  when  there 
Aug.  86.1866  was  a  battle  in  prospect  as  long  as  he  could  keep 
on  his  feet.    He  died  not  long  after  the  close  of  the 
rebellion. 


CHAPTEE  XXXV 

MOVEMENT  AGAINST  JACKSON — FALL  OF  JACKSON — IN- 
TERCEPTING THE  ENEMY — BATTLE  OF  CHAMPION'S 
HILL 

WHEN  the  news  reached  me  of  McPherson's  caxxxv 
victory  at  Eaymond  about  sundown,  my  M8yia,i«8 
position  was  with  Sherman.    I  decided  at  once  to 
turn  the  whole  column  toward  Jackson  and  capture 
that  place  without  delay. 

Pemberton  was  now  on  my  left,  with,  as  I  sup- 
posed, about  eighteen  thousand  men ;  in  fact,  as  I 
learned  afterward,  with  nearly  fifty  thousand.    A 
force  was  also  collecting  on  my  right,  at  Jackson, 
the  point  where  all  the  railroads  communicatiiig 
with  Vicksburg  connect.    All  the  enemy's  supp^^^ 
of  men  and  stores  would  come  by  that  point.     ^^ 
I  hoped  in  the  end  to  besiege  Vicksb\nrg,  I  io>^        ^-^^^^ 
first  destroy  all  possibility  of  aid.     I  thereiore  ^^  "-S^^^' 
termined  to  move  swiftly  toward  Jackson,  ^^^^^^^x^ 
or  drive  any  force  in  that  direction,  au^  \\v^ix  ^^^^^^^ 
^Poz?  i^^^'^^^t^erton.    But  by  moving  a»gaii\^\,3«^^-'vV" 
^  Unea^^^^^  ^7  o'^^  communicatioxx.      ^  \  '^^^.^^>^ 
%ided   *^  have  none— to  cut  loose  alto^^\;^^'^^^     ^ 
\y0^      «'Jid  move  my  whole    foroe    ^v^^\.t  ^ 
Sk^     ^^  fears  for  my  commT^txxioa.t.loTx^^^^^'^ 


MOVEMENT  AGiklNST  JACKSON 


419 


TV.  R,  xsrv 

43)360 


p.  317 


Accordingly  all  previous  orders  given  during  the  ch.  xxxv 
day  for  movements  on  the  13th  were  annulled  by    m&j,  lau 
new  ones.    McPherson  was  ordered  at  daylight  to 
move  on  Clinton,  ten  miles  from  Jackson.     Sher-  M^Ph©^. 
man  was  notified  of  my  determination  to  capture  iind™cfei> 
Jackson  and  work  from  there  westward-    He  was    xxi\-'(3)" 

300,301 

ordered  to  start  at  four  in  the  morning  and  march 
to  Eaymond.  McClemand  was  ordered  to  mai*ch 
with  three  divisions  by  Dillon's  to  Raymond.  One 
was  left  to  guard  the  crossing  of  the  Big  Black, 

On  the  10th  I  had  received  a  letter  from  Banks, 
on  the  Red  River,  asking  reinforcements.  Porter 
had  gone  to  his  assistance  with  a  part  of  his  fleet  NJ^fnlrt. 
on  the  3d,  and  I  now  wrote  to  him  describing  my 
position  and  declining  to  send  any  troops*  I  looked 
upon  side  movements  as  long  as  the  enemy  held 
Port  Hudson  and  Vicksburg  as  a  waste  of  time 
and  material. 

General  Joseph  E.  Johnston  arrived  at  Jackson 
in  the  night  of  the  13th  from  Tennessee,  and  im-     ^m^^, 
mediately  assumed  command  of  all  the  Confederate  ^ti?M^d- 
troops  in  Mississippi.    I  knew  he  wbb  espeetii^S     '^^a?'^^ 
reinforcements  from  the  south  and  east.    On  t\^^  "^^^^^ 
6th  I  had  written  to  General  Halleck :  **  Informati^^^     -«  5^^S^ 
from  the  other  side  leads  me  to  believe  ttie  euet*^ 
ftre  bringing  forces  from  TuUahoma.^  ^ — - 

Vp  to  this  time  my  troops  had  "been  Vept  Vtx  ^W^^^^ 
VoTting'  ^distances  of  each  other,  as  fax  aat\v^  ^%!c<V^  ^^^ 
of  ti^^^xxxitry  would  admit.    Reconxxai^Q^e^^  ^^ 
^%si^^y    made  from  each  corps   to    ^^i^"V^  \>^e^ 
^y^^^*^^  themselves  with  tlie   irto^t  v^t^^'^^^Jis^ 


L-^<S>^ 


420  PEBSONAL  MEMOntS  OF  U.  S.  GBANT 

CH.  XXXV  early  on  the  13th,  and  immediately  set  to  work  de- 
stroying the  railroad.  Sherman's  advance  reached 
Eaymond  before  the  last  of  McPherson's  command 

^'oi^w^  had  got  out  of  the  town.  McClemand  withdrew 
from  the  front  of  the  enemy,  at  Edward's  Station, 
with  much  skill  and  without  loss,  and  reached  his 
position  for  the  night  in  good  order.    On  the  night 

^•§5™^  of  the  13th  McPherson  was  ordered  to  march  at 
early  dawn  upon  Jackson,  only  fifteen  miles  away. 
Sherman  was  given  the  same  order;  but  he  was  to 
move  by  the  direct  road  from  Raymond  to  Jackson^ 
which  is  south  of  the  road  McPherson  was  on  and 
does  not  approach  within  two  miles  of  it  at  the 
point  where  it  crossed  the  line  of  intrenchments 
iwd.  806  which  at  that  time  defended  the  city.  McClemand 
was  ordered  to  move  one  division  of  his  command 
to  Clinton,  one  division  a  few  miles  beyond  Mississ- 
ippi Springs,  following  Sherman's  line,  and  a  third 
to  Eaymond.  He  was  also  directed  to  send  his 
siege-guns,  four  in  number,  with  the  troops  going 
by  Mississippi  Springs.  McClemand's  position  was 
an  advantageous  one  in  any  event.  With  one  divi- 
sion at  Clinton  he  was  in  position  to  reinforce 
McPherson  at  Jackson  rapidly  if  it  became  neces- 
sary ;  the  division  beyond  Mississippi  Springs  was 
equally  available  to  reinforce  Sherman ;  the  one  at 
Eaymond  could  take  either  road.    He  still  had  two 

pfS'.'wSt,  other  divisions  farther  back,  now  that  Blair  had 

2d bi?!i2fe  come  up,  available  within  a  day  at  Jackson.  If  this 
last  command  should  not  be  wanted  at  Jackson^ 
they  were  already  one  day's  march  from  there  on 
their  way  to  Vicksbur^?,  and  on  three  different  roads 


MOVEMENT  AGAINST  JACKSON 


421 


W.R.XXIV 

(1)W 


Memoin,  i, 
821 


fronting  Pemberton  if  he  should  come  out  to  attack  ch.  xxxv 
my  rear.    This  I  expected  him  to  do;  as  shown 
further  on,  he  was  directed  by  Johnston  to  make   Post,  p.  m 
this  very  move. 

I  notified  General  Halleck  that  I  should  attack 
the  State  capital  on  the  14th.  A  courier  carried 
the  despatch  to  Grand  Gulf  through  an  unprotected 
country. 

Sherman  and  McPherson  communicated  with 
each  other  during  the  night  and  arranged  to  reach 
Jackson  at  about  the  same  hour.    It  rained  in  tor- 
rents during  the  night  of  the  13th  and  the  fore  part 
of  the  day  of  the  14th.    The  roads  were  intolerable, 
and  in  some  places  on  Sherman's  line,  where  the 
land  was  low,  they  were  covered  more  than  a  foot 
deep  with  water.    But  the  troops  never  murmured. 
By  nine  o'clock  Crocker,  of  McPherson's  corps,  who 
was  now  in  advance,  came  upon  the  enemy's  pickets 
and  speedily  drove  them  in  upon  the  main  body. 
They  were  outside  of  the  intrenchments  in  a  strong 
position,  and  proved  to  be  the  troops  that  had  been 
^Ven  out  of  Raymond.    Johnston  had  been  rein- 
-^^^ced   during  the  night  by  Georgia  and  South 
^^Wlin^  regiments,  so  that  his  force  amounted  to 
^^^Vez2     thousand  men,  and  he  was  expecting  still 


W.R.XXIV 

a)  728 


^o^e. 


Xa!^ 


^^^-^r^aan  also  came  upon  the  rebel  pickets  some 

^kni^^     out  from  the  town,  but  speedily  drove 

\    -v^^  Be  was  now  on  the  south  and  southwes^ 

^^/  ^^"^^  confronting  the    ConfedeTates  hehi^xa. 

i^^-^^-^^stworks,  while  MoPhersoxx^s  nght  ^^^^ 

\^^^^^^^^^^  miles  north,  oceixTy^S  ^  ^^^  ^^^"^^iS^ 


n«* 


9i*^- 


south  across  +>•«  Vicksburg  rai^**    ^ 


422  PEBSONAL  MEMOntS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

ch.  XXXV  preparatory  to  an  assatQt.    McPherson  brought  up 

^O)^^  Logan's  division,  while  he  deployed  Crocker's  for 

the  assault.     Sherman  made  similar  dispositions  on 

the  right.    By  11  a.m.  both  were  ready  to  attack. 

Ibid,  m  Crocker  moved  his  division  forward,  preceded  by 
a  strong  skirmish-line.  These  troops  at  once  en- 
countered the  enemy's  advance  and  drove  it  back 
on  the  main  body,  when  they  returned  to  their 
proper  regiment  and  the  whole  division  charged^ 
routing  the  enemy  completely  and  driving  him  into 
this  main  line.  This  stand  by  the  enemy  was  made 
more  than  two  miles  outside  of  his  main  fortifica- 

ibicL689  tions.  McPherson  followed  up  with  his  command 
until  within  range  of  the  guns  of  the  enemy  from 
their  intrenchments,  when  he  halted  to  bring  his 
troops  into  line  and  reconnoiter  to  determine  the 
next  move.    It  was  now  about  noon. 

Ibid.  758  While  this  was  going  on  Sherman  was  confront- 
ing a  rebel  battery  which  enfiladed  the  road  on 
which  he  was  marching — the  Mississippi  Springs 
road — and  commanded  a  bridge  spanning  a  stream 
over  which  he  had  to  pass.  By  detaching  right 
and  left  the  stream  was  forced  and  the  enemy 
flanked  and  speedily  driven  within  the  main  line. 
This  brought  our  whole  line  in  front  of  the  enemy's 
line  of  works,  which  was  continuous  on  the  north, 
west,  and  south  sides  from  the  Pearl  Eiver  north 
of  the  city  to  the  same  river  south.  I  was  with 
Sherman.  He  was  confronted  by  a  force  sufficient 
to  hold  us  back.    Appearances  did  not  justify  an 

li.  1 TT-.J     Ji i.^J     CIT X^ 


.       FALL  OP  JACKSON  423 

staflE,  and  soon  found  that  the  enemy  had  left  that  ch.  xxxv 
part  of  the  line.   Tuttle^s  movement  or  McPherson's 
pressure  had  no  doubt  led  Johnston  to  order  a  re- 
treat, leaving  only  the  men  at  the  guns  to  retard  us 
whUe  he  was  getting  away.    Tuttie  had  seen  this,  ^  ^j^^ 
and,  passing  through  the  lines  without  resistance, 
came  up  in  the  rear  of  the  artillerists  confronting 
Sherman  and  captured  them,  with  ten  pieces  of 
artillery.    I  rode  immediately  to  the  State  House,  mS^S?!, 
where  I  was  soon  followed  by  Sherman.    About        ^ 
the   same  time  McPherson   discovered  that  the 
enemy  was  leaving  his  front,  and  advanced  Crocker, 
who  was  so  close  upon  the  enemy  that  they  could 
not  move  their  guns  or  destroy  them.    He  captured 
seven  guns  and,  moving  on,  hoisted  the  National  ^^yi^^ 
flag  over  the  rebel  capital  of  Mississippi.    Steven-  J.n.gtevc^ 
son's  brigade  was  sent  to  cut  off  the  rebel  retreat,  ^^"[^i^ 
but  was  too  late  or  not  expeditious  enough.  i!Sv?*iJ  mw 

Our  loss  in  this  engagement  was :  McPherson,  35 
killed,  227  wounded ;  Sherman,  6  killed  and  26 
wounded  and  missing.  The  enemy  lost  845  killed,  ^o)^^ 
wounded,  and  captured.  Seventeen  guns  fell  into 
our  hands,  and  the  enemy  destroyed  by  fire  their 
store-houses,  containing  a  large  amount  of  commis- 
sary stores. 

On  this  day  Blair  reached  New  Auburn  and  joined  ^-^^^i?^ 
^cQJerti^>^d^s  fourth  division.    He  had  with  hiax 
t\^  jjUXKi^^d  wagons  loaded  with  rations,  the  only 
Oq      /^>er-»^r^   supplies  received  during   the  entire 

^P^^    ±^:tx^t  night  in  the  room  that  Jolinstoix  ^ 

^^^^Kf^^^^^^i  occupied  the  night  before. 

^P  ^,    ^^^•^^Xir  in  the  afternoon  I  sent  for  the  coirx^. 


424  PEBSONAL  MEMOIBS  OF  U*  S.  GBANT 

ch.  XXXV  made  of  their  troops.  Sherman  was  to  remain  in 
^smIu  ni7  J^^l^son  until  he  destroyed  that  place  as  a  railroad 
"^^  center  and  manufacturing  city  of  military  supplies. 
He  did  the  work  most  effectually.  Sherman  and  I 
went  together  into  a  manufactory  which  had  not 
ceased  work  on  account  of  the  battle  nor  for  the 
entrance  of  Yankee  troops.  Our  presence  did  not 
seem  to  attract  the  attention  of  either  the  manager 
or  the  operatives,  most  of  whom  were  girls.  We 
looked  on  for  a  while  to  see  the  tent-cloth  which 
they  were  making  roll  out  of  the  looms  with  "  C.  S.  A.'* 
woven  in  each  bolt.  There  was  an  immense  amount 
of  cotton,  in  bales,  stacked  outside.  Finally  I  told 
Sherman  I  thought  they  had  done  work  enough. 
The  operatives  were  told  they  could  leave  and  take 
with  them  what  cloth  they  could  carry.  In  a  few 
minutes  cotton  and  factory  were  in  a  blaze.  The 
proprietor  visited  Washington  while  I  was  President 
to  get  his  pay  for  this  property,  claiming  that  it  was 
private.  He  asked  me  to  give  him  a  statement  of 
the  fact  that  his  property  had  been  destroyed  by 
National  troops,  so  that  he  might  use  it  with  Con- 
gress, where  he  was  pressing,  or  proposed  to  press, 
his  claim.  I  declined. 
^(^m^  ^^  *^®  night  of  the  13th  Johnston  sent  the  fol- 
NS!5S?e'  lowing  despatch  to  Pemberton  at  Edward^s  Station : 
p.  176  a  J  ^^yQ  lately  arrived,  and  learn  that  Major-Gen- 
eral Sherman  is  between  us,  with  four  divisions,  at 
Clinton.  It  is  important  to  establish  communica- 
tions, that  you  may  be  reinforced.    If  practicable, 


INTEEOEFTING  THE  ENEMY 


425 


oi  ine      (8)810 


was  sent  in  triplicate,  by  different  messengers.  One  ch.xxxv 
of  the  messengers  happened  to  be  a  loyal  man  who 
had  been  expelled  from  Memphis  some  months  be- 
fore by  Hurlbut  for  uttering  disloyal  and  threat- 
ening sentiments.  There  was  a  good  deal  of  parade 
about  his  expulsion,  ostensibly  as  a  warning  to 
those  who  entertained  the  sentiments  he  expressed ; 
but  Hurlbut  and  the  expelled  man  understood  each 
other.  He  delivered  his  copy  of  Johnston^s  des- 
patch to  McPherson,  who  forwarded  it  to  me. 

Receiving  this  despatch  on  the  14th,  I  ordered    May,  i868 
McPherson  to  move  promptly  in  the  morning  back 
to  Bolton,  the  nearest  point  where  Johnston  could 
reach  the  road.    Bolton  is  about  twenty  miles  west 
of  Jackson.    I  also  informed  McClemand 
capture  of  Jackson  and  sent  him  the  following  or- 
der :  "  It  is  evidently  the  design  of  the  enemy  to 
get  north  of  us  and  cross  the  Black  Eiver,  and  beat 
us  into  Vicksburg.    We  must  not  allow  them  to  do 
this.     Turn  all  your  forces  toward  Bolton  Station, 
^^d  make  all  despatch  in  getting  there.    Move 
t^oopa  by  the  most  direct  road  from  wherever  they 
^Hjr  foe  on  the  receipt  of  this  order.'* 
And  to  Blair  I  wrote :  "  Their  design  is  evidently 
>  ^  Oro^^  *^^  Big  Black  and  pass  down  the  x>^iiiii8XtV»' 
i^^tr^^^'^  the  Big  Black  and  Yazoo  rivers.    "We  ixlvi^Bt* 
f\  ^/^  ^xn.     Turn  your  troops  immediately  to  B^^''      -*^^^^ 
^%       ^^r^  all  the  trains  with  you.     Smith's  dxvAsV^'^^ 
Y    ^^^^^     43t:her  troops  now  with  you,  ^^  go  \^  \S^  ^^ 
\  ^/^^^^^-    If  practicable,  take  paxaSlel  xoeuQ^^  ^ 
^f^^j;^^^^^  ^^^e  your  troops  and  train.^ 


TttWuB^^ 


stopped  on  the  Can-ton  road  oxxly  ^^. 


426  PEESONAL  MEMOmS  OP  U,  8,  GRANT 

CH.xxxv  nouncing  the  loss  of  Jackson,  and  the  following 
order : 

^•^j™^  "As  soon  as  the  reinforcements  are  all  up,  they 
must  be  united  to  the  rest  of  the  army.  I  am 
anxious  to  see  a  force  assembled  that  may  be  able 
to  inflict  a  heavy  blow  upon  the  enemy.  Can 
Grant  supply  himself  from  the  Mississippi!  Can 
you  not  cut  him  oflf  from  it,  and,  above  all,  should 
he  be  compelled  to  fall  back  for  want  of  supplies, 
beat  himt^ 

The  concentration  of  my  troops  was  easy,  con- 
sidering the  character  of  the  country.  McPherson 
moved  along  the  road  parallel  with  and  near  the 
railroad.  Of  McClernand's  command,  one  division 
(Hovey^s)  was  on  the  road  McPherson  had  to  take, 
but  with  a  start  of  four  miles ;  one  (Osterhaus's)  was 
at  Eaymond,  on  a  converging  road  that  intersected 
the  other  near  Champion^s  Hill ;  one  (Carr's)  had  to 
pass  over  the  same  road  with  Osterhaus,  but,  being 
back  at  Mississippi  Springs,  would  not  be  detained 
by  it;  the  fourth  (Smith's),  with  Blair's  division, 
was  near  Auburn,  with  a  different  road  to  pass  over. 

^'  o)  uP^  McClernand  faced  about  and  moved  promptly.  His 
cavalry  from  Raymond  seized  Bolton  by  half -past 
nine  in  the  morning,  driving  out  the  enemy's  pickets 
and  capturing  several  men. 

May,  1868        The  night  of  the  15th  Hovey  was  at  Bolton ;  Carr 

and  Osterhaus  were  about  three  miles  south,  but 

abreast,  facing  west ;  Smith  was  north  of  Eaymond, 

with  Blair  in  his  rear. 

McPherson's  command,  with  Loeran  in  front,  had 


INTEBCEPTING  THE  ENEMY  427 

man,  with  two  divisions,  was  in  Jackson,  complet-  ch.  xxxv 
ing  the  destruction  of  roads,  bridges,  and  military 
factories.  I  rode  in  person  out  to  Clinton.  On  my  , 
arrival  I  ordered  McClemand  to  move  early  in  the 
morning  on  Edward^s  Station,  cautioning  him  to 
watch  for  the  enemy  and  not  bring  on  an  engage- 
ment unless  he  felt  very  certain  of  success. 

I  naturally  expected  that  Pemberton  would  en- 
deavor to  obey  the  orders  of  his  superior,  which  I 
have  shown  were  to  attack  us  at  Clinton.    This,  ^^^^vv-^^ 
indeed,  I  knew  he  could  not  do ;  but  I  felt  sure  he 
would  make  the  attempt  to  reach  that  point.    It 
turned  out,  however,  that  he  had  decided  his  supe- 
rior's plans  were  impracticable,  and  consequently 
determined  to  move  south  from  Edward's  Station 
and  get  between  me  and  my  base.    I,  however,  had 
no  base,  having  abandoned  it  more  than  a  week  ^^^^'*^' 
before.      On   the   15th   Pemberton   had   actually 
marched  south  from  Edward's  Station;  but  the 
rains  had  swollen  Baker's  Creek,  which  he  had  to 
cross,  so  much  that  he  could  not  ford  it,  and  the 
^ridges   were  washed  away.     This  brought  htm 
^^k  to  the  Jackson  road,  on  which  there  was    ^ 
^O0(j    bridge  over  Baker's  Creek.      Some  of  h^^ 
^^ops  ^^^^  marching  until  midnight  to  get  therf^'    ^^1^^^- 
^^Oeivix^S  ^^^^  ^^rly  on  the  16th  a  repetition  oi  l>^  ^^^^"^ 

^%r  t4y  J^^  Johnston  at  Clinton,  he  cotx^^^^^d  ^"^     ^^ 
rV  0.X^^    ®^^*  ^  despatch  to  his  c\xi^^  ipioximO^ 

>\'^^     ^^/een  employed  oxx  tC;,^t^^^ 


^' 


428  PEBSONAL  MEMOmS  OP  U.  8.  GBANT 

CH.  XXXV  east.  They  reported  him  to  have  eighty  regiments 
of  infantry  and  ten  batteries ;  in  all,  abont  twenty- 
five  thousand  men. 

I  had  expected  to  leave  Sherman  at  Jackson  an- 
other day  in  order  to  complete  his  work ;  but  get- 

^*w™^  ting  the  above  information,  I  sent  him  orders  to 
move  with  all  despatch  to  Bolton,  and  to  put  one 
division  with  an  ammunition  train  on  the  road  at 
once,  with  directions  to  its  commander  to  march 
with  all  possible  speed  until  he  came  up  to  our  rear. 
Within  an  hour  after  receiving  this  order  Steele's 
division  was  on  the  road.  At  the  same  time  I  des- 
ibid.  patched  to  Blair,  who  was  near  Auburn,  to  move 
with  all  speed  to  Edward^s  Station.  McClemand 
was  directed  to  embrace  Blair  in  his  command  for 
the  present.  Blau-'s  division  was  a  part  of  the 
Fifteenth  Army-corps  (Sherman^s) ;  but  as  it  was 
on  its  way  to  join  its  corps,  it  naturally  struck  our 
left  first,  now  that  we  had  faced  about  and  were 
moving  west.  The  Fifteenth  Corps,  when  it  got 
Ibid  sao  up,  would  be  on  our  extreme  right.  McPherson 
was  directed  to  get  his  trains  out  of  the  way  of  the 
troops,  and  to  follow  Hovey's  division  as  closely  as 
possible.  McClemand  had  two  roads  about  three 
miles  apart,  converging  at  Edward's  Station,  over 
which  to  march  his  troops.  Hovey's  division  of  his 
corps  had  the  advance  on  a  third  road  (the  Clinton) 
still  farther  north.  McClemand  was  directed  to 
move  Blair's  and  A.  J.  Smith's  divisions  by  the 
southernmost  of  these  roads,  and  Osterhaus  and 
Carr  by  the  middle  road.  Orders  were  to  move 
cautiously,  with  skirmishers  to  the  front  to  feel  for 


BATTLE  OF  CHAMPION'S  HILL 


429 


(3)930 


the  first  to  encounter  the  enemy^s  pickets,  who  cu.  xxxv 
were  speedily  driven  in.  Osterhaus,  on  the  middle  ^-  ^i^f  ^^ 
road,  hearing  the  firing,  pusheci  his  skirmishers 
forward,  found  the  enemy's  pickets,  and  forced 
them  back  to  the  main  line.  About  the  same  time 
Hovey  encountered  the  enemy  on  the  northern  or 
direct  wagon-road  from  Jackson  to  Vicksburg. 
McPherson  was  hastening  up  to  join  Hovey,  but 
was  embarrassed  by  Hovey's  trains  occupying  the 
roads.  I  was  still  back  at  Clinton.  McPherson 
sent  me  word  of  the  situation,  and  expressed  the 
wish  that  I  was  up.  By  half-past  seven  I  was 
on  the  road  and  proceeded  rapidly  to  the  front,  or- 
dering all  trains  that  were  in  front  of  troops  off 
the  road.  When  I  arrived  Hovey's  skirmishing 
amounted  almost  to  a  battle. 

McClernand  was  in  person  on  the  middle  road 
and  had  a  shorter  distance  to  march  to  reach  tlie 
enemy's  position  than  McPherson.  I  sent  him 
word  by  a  staff-officer  to  push  forward  and  atta^^k. 
These  orders  were  repeated  several  times  without 
apparently  expediting  McClemand's  advance. 

Champion's  Hill,  where  Pemberton  had  choB^^ 
his  position  to  receive  us,  whether  taken  by  ac^'^ 
dent  or  design,  was  well  selected.     It  is  one  o!  ^^^.-3^ 
^Sbest  points  in  that  section,  and  commanieA  ^,^3?^-^ 
Aground  in  range.    On  the  east  side  oi  tb^  x\A^^^^' 
is  quite  precipitous,  is  a  ravine  rvmuixx^  ^<^^!^  ^^^ 
tlx&Tx  westerly,  terminating  a.t  ^aket*^  ^^^e^^^""^ 

^^o  wn  up  thickly  with  large  tr^e^  ^xv^  ^Xvi^e^^^  "^^ 
Sk  ^»^^^king  it  difficult  to  peiietx-a.t.^  VVt^V  ^^5^qo^ 
Sl^^"^   ^ot  defended.    The   rid^e  r^^.i^Pi^  V 


It 


BATTLE  OF  CHAMPION'S  HILL 


431 


the  north  end  of  this  ridge.    The  Bolton  and  Ed-  ch.  xxxv 

ward's  Station  wagon-road  turns  ahnost  due  south 

at  this  point  and  ascends  the  ridge,  which  it  follows 

for  about  a  mile ;  then,  turning  west,  descends  by 

a  gentle  declivity  to  Baker's  Creek,  nearly  a  mile 

away.    On  the  west  side  the  slope  of  the  ridge  is 

gradual  and  is  cultivated  from  near  the  summit  to 

the  creek.    There  was,  when  we  were  there,  a  nar-  May  w.  laea 

row  belt  of  timber  near  the  summit  west  of  the 

road. 

From  Eaymond  there  is  a  direct  road  to  Edward's 
Station,  some  three  miles  west  of  Champion's  Hill. 
There  is  one  also  to  Bolton.    From  this  latter  road 
there  is  still  another,  leaving  it  about  three  and  a 
half  miles  before  reaching  Bolton,  and  leading  direct 
to  the  same  station.    It  was  along  these  two  roads 
that  three  divisions  of  McClemand's  corps,  and 
Blair  of  Sherman's,  temporarily  under  McClemand, 
were  moving.    Hovey  of  McClemand's  command 
was  with  McPherson,  farther  north  on  the  road 
from  Bolton  direct  to  Edward's  Station.    The  mid- 
dle road  comes  into  the  northern  road  at  the  point 
where  the  latter  turns  to  the  west  and  descends  ^^ 
Baker's  Creek;  the  southern  road  is  still  sev^^^^y 
miles  south  and  does  not  intersect  the  others  \P^  ^^^ 
it  reaches  Edward's  Station.     PembettotfE  ^^^^^^^* 
^^^ereJ  all  these  roads  and  faced,  e^^al.    H.oV^^^^^^^ 
^^^f  WhexL  it  first  drove  in  the  enexny^  mcVfets, ^  ^^ ^^ 
^^^edp^^^el  to  that  of  the  enena-y  a.xi^cOTiSTotv*^'^ 


^%M^^^  o'clock  the  skirmisliixLg  Yvecd  ifr0^frii\p^  ^^ 


432  PERSONAL  MEMOntS  OF  U.  S.  GRA&T 

CH.XXXV  his  position  and  had  to  abandon  the  artillery. 

^'ai^^  McPherson  brought  up  his  troops  as  fast  as  possi- 
ble, Logan  in  front,  and  posted  them  on  the  right 

Ibid.  M7. 048  of  Hovey  and  across  the  flank  of  the  enemy.  Logan 
reinforced  Hovey  with  one  brigade  from  his  divi- 
sion ;  with  his  other  two  he  moved  farther  west  to 
make  room  for  Crocker,  who  was  coming  up  as 
rapidly  as  the  roads  would  admit.  Hovey  was  still 
being  heavily  pressed,  and  was  calling  on  me  for 
more  reinforcements.  I  ordered  Crocker,  who  was 
now  coming  up,  to  send  one  brigade  from  his  divi- 
sion. McPherson  ordered  two  batteries  to  be 
stationed  where  they  nearly  enfiladed  the  enemy's 
line,  and  they  did  good  execution. 

From  Logan's  position  now  a  direct  forward 
movement  carried  him  over  open  fields,  in  rear  of 
the  enemy  and  in  a  line  parallel  with  them.  He 
did  make  exactly  this  move,  attacking,  however, 
the  enemy  through  the  belt  of  woods  covering  the 
west  slope  of  the  hill  for  a  short  distance.  Up  to 
this  time  I  had  kept  my  position  near  Hovey,  where 
we  were  the  most  heavily  pressed ;  but  about  noon 
I  moved  with  a  part  of  my  staff  by  our  right 
around  until  I  came  up  with  Logan  himself.  I 
found  him  near  the  road  leading  down  to  Baker's 
Creek.  He  was  actually  in  command  of  the  only 
road  over  which  the  enemy  could  retreat ;  Hovey, 
reinforced  by  two  brigades  from  McPherson's  com- 
mand, confronted  the  enemy's  left ;  Crocker,  with 

TEG  Ban-  ^^  brigades,  covered  their  left  flank ;  McClemand^ 

f?™A*-^!;  two  hours  before,  had  been  within  two  miles  and  a 


BATTLE  OF  CHAMPION'S  HILL  433 

McArthur^s  division  of  the  Seventeenth  Corps  gh.xxxv 
(McPherson's),  had  crossed  the  river  at  Grand  Gulf 
a  few  days  before,  and  was  coming  up  on  their 
right  flank.  Neither  Logan  nor  I  knew  that  we 
liad  cut  oflf  the  retreat  of  the  enemy.  Just  at  this 
jimcture  a  messenger  came  from  Hovey,  asking  for 
more  reinforcements.  There  were  none  to  spare. 
I  then  gave  an  order  to  move  McPherson's  com-  ^  ^)^^ 
mand  by  the  left  flank  around  to  Hovey.  This  un- 
covered the  rebel  line  of  retreat,  which  was  soon 
taken  advantage  of  by  the  enemy. 

During  all  this  time,  Hovey,  reinforced  as  he  was 
by  a  brigade  from  Logan  and  another  from  Crocker, 
and  by  Crocker  gallantly  coming  up  with  two  other 
brigades  on  his  right,  had  made  several  assaults, 
the  last  one  about  the  time  the  road  was  opened  to 
"the  rear.    The  enemy  fled  precipitately.    This  was 
between  three  and  four  o'clock.    I  rode  forward,  or      ibw. 
rather  back,  to  where  the  middle  road  intersects  the 
north  road,  and  foimd  the  skirmishers  of  Carr's 
division  just  coining  in.    Osterhaus  was  farther 
south,  and  soon  after  came  up  with  skirmishers 
advanced  in  like  manner.    Hovey's  division,  and 
McPherson's  two  divisions  with  Mm,  had  marched 
and  fought  from  early  dawn,  and  ^ere  i^ot  m  tlie 
best  condition  to  follow  the  retreating  ioe.    ^  ®^^^ 
orders  to  Osterhaus  to  pursue  the  enemy  ^  ^^.  ^ 
Carr,  wioin  I  saw  personally,  I  expl^^^^^  t*^^  ^^^' 

as 

^^^  to  foMov^  jjim.  _ 

Tbeb&ttl^  ot^  rfliATnT>ion's  Hill  i..^.  ^^^^^^  ^^ 


434  PEBSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.'  GBANT 

CH.  XXXV  of  skirmishiiig,  some  of  which  almost  rose  to  the 
^I^^PJ  dignity  of  battle.  Every  man  of  Hovey's  division 
^''^^IS**^*"  and  of  MePherson's  two  divisions  was  engaged  dur- 
ing the  battle.  No  other  part  of  my  command  was 
engaged  at  all,  except  that  as  described  before. 
Osterhaus^s  and  A.  J.  Smith's  divisions  had  en- 
countered the  rebel  advanced  pickets  as  eaily  as 
half-past  seven.  Their  positions  were  admirable 
for  advancing  upon  the  enemy's  line.  McClemand, 
with  two  divisions,  was  within  a  few  miles  of  the 
battle-field  long  before  noon,  and  in  easy  hearing, 
gg^^  I  sent  him  repeated  orders  by  staff-oflScers  fully 
Mocaemand  competent  to  explain  to  him  the  situation.  These 
traversed  the  wood  separating  us,  without  escort, 
and  directed  him  to  push  forward;  but  he  did  not 
come.  It  is  true,  in  front  of  McClemand  there  was 
a  small  force  of  the  enemy,  and  posted  in  a  good 
position  behind  a  ravine  obstructing  his  advance; 
but  if  he  had  moved  to  the  right  by  the  road  my 
staflE-oflScers  had  followed  the  enemy  must  either 
have  fallen  back  or  been  cut  off.  Instead  of  this 
he  sent  orders  to  Hovey,  who  belonged  to  his  corj)s, 
to  join  on  to  his  right  flank.  Hovey  was  bearing 
the  brunt  of  the  battle  at  the  time.  To  obey  the 
order  he  would  have  had  to  pull  out  from  the  front 
of  the  enemy  and  march  back  as  far  as  McClemand 
had  to  advance  to  get  into  battle,  and  substantially 
over  the  same  ground.  Of  course  I  did  not  per- 
mit Hovey  to  obey  the  order  of  his  intermediate 
superior. 


BATTLE  OF  CHAMPION'S  HILL  435 

Hovey  alone  lost  1200  killed,  wounded,  and  missing  ch.  xxxv 
— more  than  one  third  of  his  division. 

Had  McClemand  come  up  with  reasonable 
promptness,  or  had  I  known  the  ground  as  I  did 
afterward,  I  cannot  see  how  Pemberton  could  have 
escaped  with  any  organized  force.  As  it  was,  he  ^  ^MeT^ 
lost  over  three  thousand  killed  and  wounded  and 
about  three  thousand  captured  in  battle  and  in 
pursuit.  Loring's  division,  which  was  the  right  of 
Pemberton^s  line,  was  cut  off  from  the  retreating 
army  and  never  got  back  into  Vicksburg.  Pem-  to5?rei^t 
berton  himself  fell  back  that  night  to  the  Big  Black 
Eiver.  His  troops  did  not  stop  before  midnight, 
and  many  of  them  left  before  the  general  retreat 
commenced,  and  no  doubt  a  good  part  of  them  re- 
turned to  their  homes.  Logan  alone  captured  1300 
prisoners  and  eleven  guns.  Hovey  captured  300 
under  fire  and  about  700  in  all,  exclusive  of  500  sick 
and  wounded  whom  he  paroled,  thus  making  1200. 

McPherson  joined  in  the  advance  as  soon  as  his  ^'Sj^J^ 
men  could  fill  their  cartridge-boxes,  leaving  one 
brigade  to  guard  our  wounded.  The  pursuit  was 
continued  as  long  as  it  was  light  enough  to  see  the 
road.  The  night  of  the  16th  of  May  found  McPher- 
son's  command  bivouacked  from  two  to  six  miles 
west  of  the  battle-field,  along  the  line  of  the  road 
to  Vicksburg.  Carr  and  Osterhaus  were  at  Edward's 
Station,  and  Blair  was  about  three  miles  southeast ; 
Hovey  remained  on  the  field  where  his  troops  had 
fought  so  bravely  and  bled  so  freely.  Much  war 
material  abandoned  by  the  enemy  was  picked  up 
on  the  battle-fiftld.  Amonir  it  f.liirfv  T>ieces  of  artil- 


436  PEBSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

CH.zzxy  Finding  ourselves  alone,  we  stopped  and  took  pos- 
session of  a  vacant  house.  As  no  troops  came  up 
we  moved  back  a  mile  or  more  imtil  we  met  the 
head  of  the  column  just  going  into  bivouac  on  the 
road.  We  had  no  tents,  so  we  occupied  the  porch 
of  a  hohse  which  had  been  taken  for  a  rebel  hos- 
pital, and  which  was  filled  with  wounded  and  dying^ 
who  had  been  brought  from  the  battle-field  we  had 
just  left. 

While  a  battle  is  raging  one  can  see  his  enemy 
mowed  down  by  the  thousand  or  the  ten  thousand 
with  great  composure;  but  after  the  battle  these 
scenes  are  distressing,  and  one  is  naturally  disposed 
to  do  as  n^uch,  to  alleviate  the  suffering  of  an  enemy 
as  a  friend. 


After  alMtr 
tie 


CHAPTER  XXXVI 

BATTLE  OF  BLACK  RIVER  BRIDGE — CROSSING  THE  BIG 
BLACK — INVESTMENT  OF  VICKSBURG — ASSAULT- 
ING THE  WORKS 

WE  were  now  assured  of  our  position  between  gh.xxxvi 
Johnston  and  Pemberton,  without  a  possi- 
bility of  a  junction  of  their  forces.    Pemberton 
might  have  made  a  night-march  to  the  Big  Black, 
crossed  the  bridge  there,  and,  by  moving  north  on 
the  west  side,  have  eluded  us  and  finally  returned 
to  Johnston.    But  this  would  have  given  us  Vicks- 
burg.    It  would  have  been  his  proper  move,  how- 
ever, and  the  one  Johnston  would  have  made  had   jfJ^JSve! 
he  been  in  Pemberton's  place.    In  fact,  it  would      ^'^^ 
have  been  in  conformity  with  Johnston's  orders  to 
Pemberton. 

Sherman  left  Jackson  with  the  last  of  his  troops  \yi^^T^ 
about  noon  on  the  16th,  and  reached  Bolton,  twenty 
miles  west,  before  halting.    His  rear-guard  did  not 
get  in  imtil  2  a.m.  the  ITth,  but  renewed  their  march    May,  ims 
by  daylight.    He  paroled  his  prisoners  at  Jackson, 
and  was  forced  to  leave  his  own  wounded  in  care 
of  surgeons  and  attendants.    At  Bolton  he  was  in- 
formed of  our  victory.    He  was  directed  to  com-  ^^JJ^, 
mence  the  march  earlv  next  dav.  and  to  divercre     wa.«^ 


438 


PEBSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GBANT 


ch.  XXXVI  ordered  to  join  him  there  with  the  pontoon-train 
as  early  as  possible. 

This  movement  brought  Sherman's  corps  to- 
gether, and  at  a  point  where  I  hoped  a  crossing  of 
the  Big  Black  might  be  effected  and  Sherman's 


JlAP  OrBATTLElTELD  OT 

BIG  BLACK  RIVER  BRJDCE 


corps  used  to  flank  the  enemy  out  of  his  position 
in  our  front,  thus  opening  a  crossing  for  the  re- 


BATTLE  OP  BLACK  BIVER  BBEDGE  439 

corps),  resumed  the  pursuit  at  half -past  three  a.m.  ch.xxxvi 
on  the  17th,  followed  closely  by  Osterhaus,  McPher-    ^^^*  ^^ 
son  bringing  up  the  rear  with  his  corps.    As  I  ex- 
pected, the  enemy  was  found  in  position  on  the 
Big  Black.    The  point  was  only  six  miles  from  that 
where  my  advance  had  rested  for  the  night,  and 
was  reached  at  an  early  hour.     Here  the  river 
makes  a  turn  to  the  west,  and  has  washed  close  up 
to  the  high  land;  the  east  side  is  a  low  bottom, 
sometimes  overflowed  at  very  high  water,  but  was 
cleared  and  in  cultivation.    A  bayou  runs  irregu- 
larly across  this  low  land,  the  bottom  of  which, 
however,  is  above  the  surface  of  the  Big  Black  at 
ordinary  stages.    When  the  river  is  full,  water 
runs  through  it,  converting  the  point  of  land  into 
an  island.    The  bayou  was  grown  up  with  timber, 
which  the  enemy  had  felled  into  the  ditch.    At  this 
time  there  was  a  foot  or  two  of  water  in  it.    The 
rebels  had  constructed  a  parapet  along  the  inner 
bank  of  this  bayou  by  using  cotton-bales  from,  tlie 
plantation  close  by  and  throwing  dirt  over  them. 
The  whole  was  thoroughly  commanded  troTn  xne 
height  west  of  the  river.    At  the  upper  eua  ^       , 
bayou  there  was  a  strip  of  uncleared  ^^^     Carc*^ 
afforded  a  cover  for  a  portion  ot  our  tX>^^*^\5^-g?A^  ^^^^^ 
division  was  deployed  on  our  righ.t,  luaV?^^        Xjctoxv^  ^^^^. 
forming  his  extreme  right  and.  r^aciAt^^^sLdi^^^^^  "^^ 
these  woods  to  the  river  above.     O^te^W  \)^  ^^  e^^ 
was  deployed  to  the  left  of  Cao^   Jj  ^^^    ""^^s^ 
enemy's  entire  front.    McPlier^OTi  V^^    ^^ 

on  the  road,  the  head  close  \>y    ire^^^  v>^  i^r^^^ 

wherever  he  could  be  of  assist^i^^  ^^^        ^M.'^^  e^^^^ 
While  the  troons  were  standi  r^  ^  ^     \         ^^1^^ 


st:^^^ 


440  PEBSOKAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

CH.  XXXVI  me  with  a  letter  from  General  Halleck,  dated  the 
w^^xr*^  11*^  ^^  May.    It  had  been  sent  by  the  way  of  New 
^^  ^      Orleans  to  Banks  to  be  forwarded  to  me.   It  ordered 
me  to  return  to  Grand  Gulf  and  to  cooperate  from 
there  with  Banks  against  Port  Hudson,  and  then 
to  return  with  our  combined  forces  to  besiege 
Vicksburg.    I  told  the  oflScer  that  the  order  came 
too  late,  and  that  Halleck  would  not  give  it  now  if 
he  knew  our  position.    The  bearer  of  the  despatch 
insisted  that  I  ought  to  obey  the  order,  and  was 
giving  arguments  to  support  his  position  when  I 
heard  great  cheering  to  the  right  of  our  line,  and, 
looking  in  that  direction,  saw  Lawler  in  his  shirt- 
i^wTl.   sl^^ves  leading  a  charge  upon  the  enemy.    I  im- 
^^^.^  mediately  moimted  my  horse  and  rode  in  the  direc- 
tion of  the  charge,  and  saw  no  more  of  the  oflScer 
who  delivered  the  despatch;  I  think,  not  even  to 
this  day. 
^^^        The  assault  was  successful.    But  little  resistance 
^)^i^^  wfl^  made.    The  enemy  fled  from  the  west  bank  of 
the  river,  burning  the  bridge  behind  him  and  leav- 
ing the  men  and  guns  on  the  east  side  to  fall  into 
our  hands.    Many  tried  to  escape  by  swimming  the 
river.    Some  succeeded  and  some  were  drowned 
in  the  attempt.    Eighteen  guns  were  captured  and 
^H^S^  1751  prisoners.  Our  loss  was  39  killed,  237  wounded, 
and  3  missing.    The  enemy  probably  lost  but  few 
men  except  those  captured  and  drowned.    But  for 
the  successful  and  complete   destruction  of  the 
bridfire  I  have  but  little  doubt  that  we  should  have 


GROSSING  THE  BIG  BLAOE  441 

after  9  o'clock  a.m.  when  the  capture  took  place.  ch.xxxvi 
As  soon  as  work  could  be  commenced,  orders  were  ^^^  "'  ^^ 
given  for  the  construction  of  three  bridges.  One 
was  taken  charge  of  by  Lieutenant  Hains,  of  the 
Engineer  Corps,  one  by  General  McPherson  himself, 
and  one  by  General  Bansom,  a  most  gallant  and 
intelligent  volunteer  officer.  My  recollection  is 
that  Hains  built  a  raft-bridge ;  McPherson  a  pon-  mvxi)^ 
toon,  using  cotton-bales  in  large  numbers  for  pon- 
toons; and  that  Bansom  felled  trees  on  opposite 
banks  of  the  river,  cutting  only  on  one  side  of  the 
tree,  so  that  they  would  fall  with  their  tops  interlac- 
ing in  the  river,  without  the  trees  being  entirely 
severed  from  their  stumps.  A  bridge  was  then 
made  with  these  trees  to  support  the  roadway. 
Lumber  was  taken  from  buildings,  cotton-gins,  and 
wherever  found,  for  this  purpose.  By  eight  o'clock 
in  the  morning  of  the  18th  all  three  bridges  were 
complete  and  the  troops  were  crossing. 

Sherman  reached  Bridgeport  about  noon  of  the   1^^^^ 
17th,  and  found  Blair  with  the  pontoon-train  already 
there.    A  few  of  the  enemy  were  intrenched  on  t\ie 
west  bank,  but  they  made  little  resistance  a^^  ^^^^t 
surrendered.    Two  divisions  were  crossed  tb-^^^^^ 
and  the  third  the  following  morning.  ^o«j^   ^^s**'"^*^ 

On  the  18th  I  moved  along  the  ■Vicka\>^^e^'^^ 
in  advance  of  the  troops,  and  as  sooxi  ^  ^ r>cS^^  ^ 
joined  Sherman.    My  first  anxiety  "^v^a^  \j^  ^    "^^     ^-^ 
base  of  supplies  on  the  Yazoo  Ri-veir  «CVks<^-vv^  ^  vN^"*^ 
burg.    Sherman^s  line  of  march  lo^  Ictxxxx  \iO     j<>^^^<i^^^^^^'^^ 
point  on  Walnut  Hills  occupied  l^y   -fcVx^  ^a^^l^^^^^"'^^^^ 


442  PEBSONAL  MEMOntS  OF  U.  S.  GBANT 

ch.  XXXVI  up  with  the  advanced  skirmishers.  There  ^were 
some  detached  works  along  the  crest  of  the  hilL 
These  were  still  occupied  by  the  enemy,  or  else  the 
garrison  from  Haines's  Bluff  had  not  all  got  past  on 

mSS^I,  *teir  way  to  Vicksburg.  At  all  events,  the  bullets 
^  of  the  enemy  whistled  by  thick  and  fast  for  a  short 
time.  In  a  few  minutes  Sherman  had  the  pleasure 
of  looking  down  from  the  spot  coveted  so  much  by 
him  the  December  before,  on  the  ground  where  his 
command  had  lain  so  helpless  for  offensive  action. 
He  turned  to  me,  saying  that  up  to  this  minute 
he  had  felt  no  positive  assurance  of  success.  This, 
however,  he  said,  was  the  end  of  one  of  the  greatest 
campaigns  in  history,  and  I  ought  to  make  a  report 
of  it  at  once.  Vicksburg  was  not  yet  captured,  and 
there  was  no  telling  what  might  happen  before  it 
was  taken ;  but  whether  captured  or  not,  this  was  a 
complete  and  successful  campaign.  I  do  not  claim 
to  quote  Sherman's  language,  but  the  substance 

Fo»t,  p.  408   only.    My  reason  for  mentioning  this  incident  will 
appear  farther  on. 

^' 0)^^  McPherson,  after  crossing  the  Big  Black,  came 
into  the  Jackson  and  Vicksburg  road,  which  Sher- 
man was  on,  but  to  his  rear.  He  arrived  at  night 
near  the  lines  of  the  enemy,  and  went  into  camp. 
Ibid.  108  McClemand  moved  by  the  direct  road  near  the 
railroad  to  Mount  Albans,  and  then  turned  to  the 
left  and  put  his  troops  on  the  road  from  Baldwin's 
ferry  to  Vicksburg.  This  brought  him  south  of 
McPherson.    I  now  had  my  three  corps  up  to  the 


INVESTMENT  OF  VICKSBUBG 


443 


W.R.XXIV 

a)  IM,  154, 
766 


limited  rnimber  of  troops  would  allow.    Sherman  caxxxvi 
was  on  the  right,  and  covered  the  high  ground  from  iSSSSS^ 
where  it  overlooked  the  Yazoo  as  far  southeast  as       *" 
his  troops  would  extend.    McPherson  joined  on  to 
his  left,  and  occupied  ground  on  both  sides  of  the 
Jackson  road.    McClemand  took  up  the  ground  to 
his  left  and  extended  as  far  toward  Warrenton  as 
he  could,  keeping  a  continuous  line. 

On  the  19th  there  was  constant  skirmishing  with  May,  i868 
the  enemy  while  we  were  getting  into  better  posi- 
tion. The  enemy  had  been  much  demoralized  by 
his  defeats  at  Champion's  Hill  and  the  Big  Black, 
and  I  believed  he  would  not  make  much  effort  to 
hold  Vicksburg.  Accordingly  at  two  o'clock  I  or- 
dered an  assault.  It  resulted  in  securing  more 
advanced  positions  for  all  our  troops  where  they 
were  fully  covered  from  the  fire  of  the  enemy. 

The  20th  and  21st  were  spent  in  strengthening 
our  position  and  in  making  roads  in  rear  of  the 
axmy,  from  Yazoo  Eiver   or  Chickasaw  Bayou. 
Most  of  the  army  had  now  been  for  three  weeks 
vith  only  five  days'  rations  issued  by  the  commis- 
sary.  They  had  an  abundance  of  food,  however, 
^^t  began  to  feel  the  want  of  bread.    I  remember 
ttat  in  passing  around  to  the  left  of  the  Im^  on  tlie 
^Ist,  a  soldier,  recognizing  me,  said  in  ratti^^  a  Ion^ 
^Sbut  yet  so  that  I  heard  him  ^'^^^  ^^^ 
;^  a  moment  the  cry  was  taken  i.l  a11  ^^^®  ^^^ 
S«HardtackI     Hard  tack!  n^'^^^ia^^^^^^ 
^>t  to  ixiQ  that  we  had  been  e>.         A  ^^""^  ^^ex 
llf^^  of  the  troops  in  bu^^?^^   ^^"^^e>au 
^*^>ply  them  vvithevex^>^  ^^^^^""^"^^^ 

^''^  V  21st  aU  the  troon^  .^J^^S*>^  ^ 


a 


444 


PERSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 


Ch.  XXXVI 


Johnston's 
Narratiye, 
pp.  189, 190 


Memoirs,  l 
836 


MoCler- 
nand's  Rep. 
W.iLXXlV 
a)lMetseq. 


issued  to  them.    The  bread  and  coflfee  were  highly 
appreciated* 

I  now  determined  on  a  second  assault.    Johnston 
was  in  my  rear,  only  fifty  miles  away,  with  an  army 
not  much  inferior  in  numbers  to  the  one  I  had  i/vith 
me,  and  I  knew  he  was  being  reinforced.    There 
was  danger  of  his  coming  to  the  assistance  of  Pem- 
berton,  and,  after  all,  he  might  defeat  my  anticipa- 
tions of  capturing  the  garrison,  if,  indeed,  he  did 
not  prevent  the  capture  of  the  city.    The  immediate 
capture  of  Vicksburg  would  save  sending  me  the 
reinforcements  which  were  so  much  wanted  else- 
where, and  would  set  free  the  army  under  me  to 
diive  Johnston  from  the  State.    But  the  first  con- 
sideration of  all  was — the  troops  believed  they 
could  carry  the  works  in  their  front,  and  would  not 
have  worked  so  patiently  in  the  trenches  if  they 
had  not  been  allowed  to  try. 

The  attack  was  ordered  to  commence  on  all  parts 
of  the  line  at  10  o^clock  a.m.  on  the  22d  with  a 
furious  cannonade  from  every  battery  in  position. 
All  the  corps  commanders  set  their  time  by  mine, 
so  that  all  might  open  the  engagement  at  the  same 
minute.  The  attack  was  gallant,  and  portions  of 
each  of  the  three  corps  succeeded  in  getting  up  to 
the  very  parapets  of  the  enemy  and  in  planting 
their  battle-flags  upon  them ;  but  at  no  place  were 
we  able  to  enter.  General  McClemand  reported 
that  he  had  gained  the  enemy's  intrenchments  at 
several  points  and  wanted  reinforcements.  I  occu- 
pied a  position  from  which  I  believed  I  could  see 
as  well  as  he  what  took  place  in  his  front,  and  I  did 


ASSAULTING  THE  WORKS  445 

it,  and  sent  him  Qninby^s  division  of  the  Seven-  caxxxvi 
teenth  Corps.     Sherman  and  McPherson  were  both  jf^^S^i^ 
ordered  to  renew  their  assaults  as  a  diversion  in     ^'^ 
favor  of  McClernand.    This  last  attack  only  served 
to  increase  our  casualties  without  giving  any  bene- 
fit whatever.    As  soon  as  it  was  dark  our  troops 
that  had  reached  the  enemy's  line,  and  been  obliged 
to  remain  there  for  security  all  day,  were  with- 
drawn ;  and  thus  ended  the  last  assault  upon  Vicks- 
burg. 


CHAPTER  XXXVII 

SIEGE  OF  VICKSBUBG 

CH.xxxyn  T  NOW  determined  upon  a  regular  siege — to 
A  "  outcamp  the  enemy,''  as  it  were,  and  to  incur 
no  more  losses.  The  experience  of  the  22d  con- 
vinced oflBcers  and  men  that  this  was  best,  and  they 
went  to  work  on  the  defenses  and  approaches  with 

^fvtok^*  a  will.    With  the  navy  holding  the  river,  the  in- 

*^"*      vestment  of  Vicksburg  was  complete.    As  long  as 

we  could  hold  our  position  the  enemy  was  limited  in 

supplies  of  food,  men,  and  munitions  of  war  to  what 

they  had  on  hand.    These  could  not  last  always. 

^the*Sfl^'  The  crossing  of  troops  at  Bruinsburg  commenced 
P**«^  April  30th.  On  the  18th  of  May  the  army  was  in 
rear  of  Vicksburg.  On  the  19th,  just  twenty  days 
after  the  crossing,  the  city  was  completely  invested 
and  an  assault  had  been  made ;  five  distinct  battles 
(besides  continuous  skirmishing)  had  been  fought 
and  won  by  the  Union  forces ;  the  capital  of  the 

May  u,  1868  State  had  fallen,  and  its  arsenals,  military  manu- 
factories, and  everything  useful  for  military  pur- 
poses had  been  destroyed;  an  average  of  about  one 


SIEGE  OP  VICKSBURG 


447 


cannon  and  sixty-one  field-pieces  had  fallen  into 
our  hands;  and  four  hundred  miles  of  the  river, 
from  Vicksburg  to  Port  Hudson,  had  become  ours. 
The  Union  force  that  had  crossed  the  Mississippi 
River  up  to  this  time  was  less  than  forty-three 
thousand  men.  One  division  of  these — Blair's — 
only  arrived  in  time  to  take  part  in  the  battle  of 
Champion's  Hill,  but  was  not  engaged  there ;  and 
one  brigade,  Ransom's  of  McPherson's  corps, 
reached  the  field  after  the  battle.  The  enemy  had 
at  Vicksburg,  Grand  Gulf,  Jackson,  and  on  the 
roads  between  these  places,  over  sixty  thousand 
men.  They  were  in  their  own  country,  where  no 
rear-guards  were  necessary.  The  country  is  admi- 
rable for  defense,  but  difficult  for  the  conduct  of  an 
offensive  campaign.  All  their  troops  had  to  be 
met.  We  were  fortunate,  to  say  the  least,  in  meet- 
ing them  in  detail :  at  Port  Gibson  seven  or  eight 
thousand ;  at  Raymond  five  thousand ;  at  Jackson 
from  eight  to  eleven  thousand ;  at  Champion's  Hill 
twenty-five  thousand;  at  the  Big  Black  four  thou- 
sand. A  part  of  those  met  at  Jackson  were  all  that 
was  left  of  those  encountered  at  Raymond.  They 
were  beatenin  detail  byaforcesmallerthantheirown, 
upon  their  own  ground.  Our  loss  up  to  this  time  was : 


CH.XXXVII 


AT 

Port  Gibson 

South  Fork  Bayou  Pierre 

Skirmishes,  May  3d 

Fourteen  Mile  Creek  . . . . 

Raymond 

Jackson  

nt • t_  TT'ii 


KILLED 


131 

i 

6 
66 

42 


WOUNDED 


719 

1 

9 

24 

339 

251 


MISSING       LoBses  In 

the  Vlol»- 

25  burg  cam- 

paign 


37 
7 

1  OT 


448 


PEBSONAL  MEMOntS  OF  U.  S.  GBANT 


CH.XX2LV1I 


John  MoAr- 

ihar.Ool. 
12t;hm.Ma7 

8,1861; 

6TiK.-Geii. 

yol0.Mar.2i, 

1862 

J.  G.  Lau- 
maD.CoLTth 
Iowa,  July 

11, 1861 ; 

Brig*-<3en. 

yolB.Mar. 

21,1862 


Sherman, 
Memoirs,!, 


Johnston's 

Narrative, 

p.  190 


Of  the  wounded  many  were  but  slightly  so,  and 
continued  on  duty.  Not  half  of  them  were  disabled 
for  any  length*  of  time. 

After  the  unsuccessful  assault  of  the  22d  the 
work  of  the  regular  siege  began.  Sherman  occu- 
pied the  right  starting  from  the  river  above  Vicks- 
burg,  McPherson  the  center  (McArthur^s  division 
now  with  him),  and  McClernand  the  left,  holding 
the  road  south  to  Warrenton.  Lauman^s  division 
arrived  at  this  time  and  was  placed  on  the  extreme 
left  of  the  line. 

In  the  interval  between  the  assaults  of  the  19th 
and  22d  roads  had  been  completed  from  the  Yazoo 
River  and  Chickasaw  Bayou,  around  the  rear  of  the 
army,  to  enable  us  to  bring  up  supplies  of  food  and 
ammunition ;  ground  had  been  selected  and  cleared 
on  which  the  troops  were  to  be  encamped,  and  tents 
and  cooking-utensils  were  brought  up.  The  troops 
had  been  without  these  from  the  time  of  crossing 
the  Mississippi  up  to  this  time.  All  was  now  ready 
for  the  pick  and  spade.  Prentiss  and  Hurlbut  were 
ordered  to  send  forward  every  man  that  could  be 
spared.  Cavalry  especially  was  wanted  to  watch 
the  fords  along  the  Big  Black,  and  to  observe 
Johnston.  I  knew  that  Johnston  was  receiving 
reinforcements  from  Bragg,  who  was  confronting 
Rosecrans  in  Tennessee.  Vicksburg  was  so  impor- 
tant to  the  enemy  that  I  believed  he  would  make 
the  most  strenuous  efforts  to  raise  the  siege,  even 
at  the  risk  of  losing:  crround  elsewhere. 


SIEGE  OP  YICKSBUBG 

Canton  and  Jackson,  in  our  rear,  who  was  beii 
constantly  reinforced,  we  required  a  second  line 
defense  facing  the  other  way.  I  had  not  troo] 
enough  under  my  command  to  man  these.  Gtener 
Halleck  appreciated  the  situation  and,  without  beii 
asked,  forwarded  reinforcements  with  all  possib 
despatch. 

The  ground  about  Vicksburg  is  admirable  f 
defense.  On  the  north  it  is  about  two  hundr( 
feet  above  the  Mississippi  River  at  the  highe 
point,  and  very  much  cut  up  by  the  washing  raini 
the  ravines  were  grown  up  with  cane  and  unde 
brush,  while  the  sides  and  tops  were  covered  wii 
a  dense  forest.  Farther  south  the  ground  flattej 
out  somewhat,  and  was  in  cultivation.  But  hei 
too,  it  was  cut  up  by  ravines  and  small  strean 
The  enemy's  line  of  defense  followed  the  crest  of 
ridge  from  the  river  north  of  the  city  eastwar 
then  southerly  around  to  the  Jackson  road,  fi 
three  miles  back  of  the  city ;  thence  in  a  southwej 
erly  direction  to  the  river.  Deep  ravines  of  tl 
description  given  lay  in  front  of  these  defense 
As  there  is  a  succession  of  gullies  cut  out  by  rai 
along  the  side  of  the  ridge,  the  line  was  necessari 
very  irregular.  To  follow  each  of  these  spurs  wi 
intrenchments,  so  as  to  command  the  slopes 
either  side,  would  have  lengthened  their  line  v< 
much.  Generally,  therefore,  or  in  many  pla 
their  line  would  run  from  near  the  head  of 
gully  nearly  straight  to  the  head  of  another, 
an  outer  work  triangular  in  shape,  generally 


450 


Co.  XXXVII 


Fh  E.  Prime. 
Corxiw,  Aiitf. 

C.  B,  Coin- 
Rtock.  W.  P. 

ISCt^&s;  tut 
Lt.  Edk. 

1,  l«60;€ftpt. 

Mar.  3,  l»e3; 

LL-Col, 


Briff.'Qi^n. 


lery 


PEBSONAL  5IEM0i 

be  done 
the  enemy 


pomj 
us. 
eliiefj 
directed^ 
he  was  su? 
Engineer  i 
long  line  I  c 
ated  at  West 
study  militar 
their  other  dut. 

The  chief  qua 
sary  were  gi^aduai 
the  Commissary^Ge. 
however,  saying  that  i 
iug  that  he  was  good  fo. 
sap-roller.    As  soldiers  req^ 
ing  in  the  ditches  as  well  as  i 
fighting,  and  as  we  would  be  sufl 
was  used  as  a  sap-roller,  I  let  him  g 
is  a  large  man ;  weighs  two  hundr^ 
pounds,  and  is  not  tall. 

We  bad  no  siege-guns  except  six 
and  there  were  none  at  the  West  t 
Admiral  Poiier,  howeverj  supplied  us  i 
of  navy  guns  of  large  caliber,  and  w  it 
the  field-artilleiy  used  in  the  campniti 
began.    The  first  thing  to  do  was  to 


450  PEBSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

CH.xxxvn      The  work  to  be  done  to  make  our  position  as 

strong  against  the  enemy  as  his  was  against  us  was 

very  great.    The  problem  was  also  complicated  by 

our  wanting  our  line  as  near  that  of  the  enemy  as 

possible.    We  had  but  four  engineer  officers  with 

w.piwSS^  us.    Captain  Prime,  of  the  Engineer  Corps,  was  the 

(Srp^^iS.  chief,  and  the  work  at  the  beginning  was  mainly 

§^iiS'  directed  by  him.    His  health  soon  gave  out,  when 

c.  B.  Com-  he  was  succeeded  by  Captain  Comstock,  also  of  the 

stock.  W.  P.  V  JT  7 

i^^«^t  Engineer  Corps.    To  provide  assistants  on  such  a 
mSK'oIS^  long  line  I  directed  that  all  officers  who  had  gradu- 
^t.<joL  '  ated  at  West  Point — where  they  had  necessarily  to 
^^mtio'^  study  military  engineering — should  in  addition  to 
their  other  duties  assist  in  the  work. 
The  chief  quartermaster  and  the  chief  commis- 
B^&SSSy  ^^^  were  graduates.    The  chief  commissary,  now 
the  Commissary-General  of  the  Army,  begged  off, 
however,  saying  that  there  was  nothing  in  engineer- 
ing that  he  was  good  for,  unless  he  would  do  for  a 
sap-roller.    As  soldiers  require  rations  while  work- 
ing in  the  ditches  as  well  as  when  marching  and 
fighting,  and  as  we  would  be  sure  to  lose  him  if  he 
was  used  as  a  sap-roller,  I  let  him  off.    The  general 
is  a  large  man ;  weighs  two  hundred  and  twenty 
pounds,  and  is  not  taU. 
iteSe  a^-       ^®  ^^  ^^  siege-guns  except  six  32-pounders, 
and  there  were  none  at  the  West  to  draw  from. 
Admiral  Porter,  however,  supplied  us  with  a  battery 
of  navy  guns  of  large  caliber,  and  with  these,  and 
the  field-artillery  used  in  the  campaign,  the  siege 
began.    The  first  thing  to  do  was  to  get  the  artil- 
lery in  batteries  where  they  would  occupy  com- 


^"i^PUS 


Conffdaroir 


MAP 


X 


\ 


SIEGE  OF  YIOKSBUBG  451 

possible ;  and  then  construct  idfle-pits  and  covered  OH.xxxvn 
ways,  to  connect  the  entire  command  by  the  short- 
est route.    The  enemy  did  not  harass  us  much 
while  we  were  constructing  our  batteries.    Probably 
their  artillery  ammunition  was  short ;  and  their  in- 
fantry was  kept  down  by  our  sharp-shooters,  who  1 
were  always  on  the  alert  and  ready  to  fire  at  a  head  i 
whenever  it  showed  itself  above  the  rebel  works. 

In  no  place  were  our  lines  more  than  six  hundred  ^SfS^i 
yards  from  the  enemy.  It  was  necessary,  therefore, 
to  cover  our  men  by  something  more  than  the  or- 
dinary parapet.  To  give  additional  protection,  sand- 
bags, bullet-proof,  were  placed  along  the  tops  of 
the  parapets  far  enough  apart  to  make  loopholes 
for  musketry.  On  top  of  these  logs  were  put.  By 
these  means  the  men  were  enabled  to  walk  about 
erect  when  off  duty,  without  fear  of  annoyance  from 
sharp-shooters.  The  enemy  used  in  their  defense 
explosive  musket-balls,  no  doubt  thinking  that,  pSSvemui- 
bursting  over  our  men  in  the  trenches,  they  would  ^^^^^ 
do  some  execution ;  but  I  do  not  remember  a  single 
case  where  a  man  was  injured  by  a  piece  of  one  of 
these  shells.  When  they  were  hit  and  the  ball  ex- 
ploded the  wound  was  terrible.  In  these  cases  a  solid 
ball  would  have  hit  as  well.  Their  use  is  barbarous, 
because  they  produce  increased  suffering  without 
any  corresponding  advantage  to  those  using  them. 

The  enemy  could  not  resort  to  our  method  to 
protect  their  men,  because  we  tiad  an  inexhaustible 
supply  of  ammunition  to  dra^w  vl^u  and  used  it 
freely.    Splinters  from  the  tiral>^^  would  have  made 


452  PEBSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  8.  GBANT 

CH.xxxvn  ones  were  made  by  taking  logs  of  the  toughest 
wood  that  could  be  found,  boring  them  out  for  six 
or  twelve  pound  shells,  and  binding  them  with 
strong  iron  bands.  These  answered  as  coehorns, 
and  shells  were  successfully  thrown  from  them  into 
the  trenches  of  the  enemy. 

The  labor  of  building  tiie  batteries  and  intrench- 
ing was  largely  done  by  the  pioneers,  assisted  by 
negroes  who  came  within  our  lines  and  who  were 
paid  for  their  work;  but  details  from  the  troops 
had  often  to  be  made.  The  work  was  pushed  for- 
ward as  rapidly  as  possible,  and  when  an  advanced 
position  was  secured  and  covered  from  the  fire  of 
the  enemy  the  batteries  were  advanced.  By  the 
1868  30th  of  June  there  were  two  hundred  and  twenty 
guns  in  position,  mostly  light  field-pieces,  besides  a 
battery  of  heavy  guns  belonging  to,  manned,  and 
commanded  by  the  navy.  We  were  now  as  strong 
for  defense  against  the  garrison  of  Vicksburg  as 
iSSfSttveJ  *^®y  ^^^^  against  us ;  but  I  knew  that  Johnston 
p.ifloet8eq.  ^^^  jj^  ^^^j.  resiTj  and  was  receiving  constant  rein- 
forcements from  the  east  He  had  at  this  time  a 
larger  force  than  I  had  had  at  any  time  prior  to  the 
battle  of  Champion's  HilL 
Ni^fflm  j^  soon  as  the  news  of  the  arrival  of  the  Union 
army  behind  Vicksburg  reached  the  North  floods 
of  visitors  began  to  pour  in.  Some  came  to  gratify 
curiosity ;  some  to  see  sons  or  brothers  who  had 
passed  through  the  terrible  ordeal ;  members  of  the 


SIEGE  OF  VICKSBUBa 

soldiers  had  lived  so  much  on  chickens,  ducks,  and  CF,xixyn 
turkeys  without  bread  during  the  march  that  tlie 
sight  of  poultry,  if  they  could  get  bacon,  almost  took 
away  their  appetite.    But  the  intention  was  good. 

Among  the  earliest  arrivals  was  the  Governor  of 
Illinois,  with  most  of  the  State  officers,    I  natui'ally 
wanted  to  show  them  what  there  was  of  most  inter- 
est.   In  Sherman's  front  the  ground  was  the  most 
broken  and  most  wooded,  and  more  was  to  be  seen 
without  exposure.    I  therefore  took  them  to  Sher- 
man's headquarters  ^and  presented  them.    Before 
starting  out  to  look  at  the  lines — possibly  while 
Sherman's  horse  was  being  saddled — there  were 
many  questions  asked  about  the  lata  campaign, 
about  which  the  North  had  been  so  imperfectly  In- 
foi-med.    There  was  a  little  knot  around  Sherman 
and  another  around  me,  and  I  heard  Shennan  re- 
peating, in  the  most  animated  manner,  what  he  had 
said  to  me  when  we  first  looked  down  from  Walnut  Anu,  p-  **» 
Hills  upon  the  land  below  on  the  18th  of  May,  add^-      ^i  «^^^ 
ing,  "Grant  is  entitled  to  every  bit  of  the  crecV^t    ^*^,t^ 
for  the  campaign;  I  opposed  it     I  wrote  1i\tO-    *^ 
letter  about  it."    But  for  this  speech  it  is  not  IV^^^^^ 
that  Sherman's  opposition  would  liave  ever  \>e^  '^ 
heard  of.    His  untiring  energy  and  great  ^fi&eietx*^^^ 
during  the  campaign  entitle  him  to  a  iu^  »iia.T^  ^  >^ 
all  the  credit  due  for  its  success,     "g^  c^^o\^  \^ 
We  done  more  if  the  plan  had  \>^^^  >^^   o^^ny.    ^ 

NoTi:.^^^^en  General  Sher-     engagea  in  o^_  ^^^^  "'^XV  ^v[^ 

^fi'st  learned  of  the  move  I    staff  wlieix^^^t^S'^    ^^i«i«i-- 


454 


PEBSONAL  MEMOntS  OF  U.  S.  GBANT 


CH.xxxvn      On  the  26th  of  May  I  sent  Blair^s  division  up  the 

1Sm,w!r.  Yazoo  to  drive  out  a  force  of  the  enemy  supposed 

xxiv'(8)*852  j^  1^^  between  the  Big  Black  and  the  Yazoo.    The 

country  was  rich  and  full  of  supplies  of  both  food 


W.  R.  XXIV 

(8)  179, 180 


MIL  Hist.  p. 
616-618 


dered,  saying  that  I  was  putting 
myself  in  a  i>08ition  yolnntarily 
which  an  enemy  would  be  glad  to 
manoeuver  a  year — or  a  long  time 
— to  get  me  in.  I  was  going  into 
the  enemy's  country  with  a  large 
river  behind  me,  and  the  enemy 
holding  points  strongly  fortified 
above  and  below.  He  said  that 
it  was  an  axiom  in  war  that  when 
any  great  body  of  troops  moved 
against  an  enemy  they  should  do 
so  from  a  base  of  supplies,  which 
they  would  guard  as  they  would 
the  apple  of  the  eye,  etc.  He 
pointed  out  all  the  difficulties  that 
might  be  encountered  in  the  cam- 
paign proposed,  and  stated  in  turn 
what  would  be  the  true  campaign 
to  make.  This  was,  in  substance, 
to  go  back  imtil  high  groimd  could 
be  reached  on  the  east  bank  of  the 
river ;  fortify  there  and  establish 
a  depot  of  supplies,  and  move 
from  there,  being  always  prepared 
to  fall  back  upon  it  in  case  of  dis- 
aster. I  said  this  would  take  us 
back  to  Memphis.  Sherman  then 
said  that  was  the  very  place  he 
would  go  to,  and  would  move  by 
railroad  from  Memphis  to  Gren- 
ada, repairing  the  road  as  we  ad- 
vanced. To  this  I  replied:  the 
country  is  already  disheartened 
over  the  lack  of  success  on  the 


.U.    ^M    ^^ 


.  .  4.1^^  ^^^4. 


people  so  much  that  bases  of  sup- 
plies would  be  of  no  use :  neither 
men  to  hold  them  nor  supplies  to 
put  in  them  would  be  furnished. 
The  problem  for  us  was  to  move 
forward  to  a  decisive  victory,  or 
our  cause  was  lost.  No  progress 
was  being  made  in  any  other  field, 
and  we  had  to  go  on. 

Sherman  wrote  to  my  adjutant- 
general,  Ck)lonel  J.  A.  Rawlins, 
embodying  his  views  of  the  cam- 
paign that  should  be  made,  and 
asking  him  to  advise  me  to  at  least 
get  the  views  of  my  generals  upon 
the  subject.  Ck)lonel  Bawlins 
showed  me  the  letter,  but  I  did 
not  see  any  reason  for  changing 
my  plans.  The  letter  was  not  an- 
swered, and  the  subject  was  not 
subsequently  mentioned  between 
Sherman  and  myself  to  the  end  of 
the  war,  that  I  remember  of.  I 
did  not  regard  the  letter  as  offieial, 
and  consequently  did  not  preserve 
it.  General  Sherman  furnished  a 
copy  himself  to  General  Badeau, 
who  printed  it  in  his  history  of  my 
campaigns.  I  did  not  regard  either 
the  conversation  between  us  or 
the  letter  to  my  adjutant-general 
as  protests,  but  simply  friendly 
advice  which  the  relations  be- 
tween us  fully  justified.  Sherman 
gave  the  same  energy  to  make  the 


SIEGE  OF  YICK8BUBG  455 

and  forage.    Blair  was  instructed  to  take  all  of  it.  CH.xxxTn 
The  cattle  were  to  be  driven  in  for  the  use  of  our 
army,  and  the  food  and  forage  to  be  consumed  by 
our  troops  or  destroyed  by  fire ;  all  bridges  were  to 
be  destroyed,  and  the  roads  rendered  as  nearly  im- 
passable as  possible.    Blair  went  forty-five  miles 
and  was  gone  almost  a  week.    His  work  was  effec-  ^jf^^S^ 
tually  done.   I  requested  Porter  at  this  time  to  send 
the  Marine  Brigade — a  fioating  nondescript  force 
which  had  been  assigned  to  his  command  and  which 
proved  very  useful — up  to  Haines's  Bluff  to  hold  it  ^5)^^ 
until  reinforcements  could  be  sent. 

On  the  26th  I  also  received  a  letter  from  Banks,    MBj,ms 
asking  me  to  reinforce  him  with  ten  thousand  men 
at  Port  Hudson.    Of  course  I  could  not  comply 
with  his  request,  nor  did  I  think  he  needed  them.  ^SS^^jJ^ 
He  was  in  no  danger  of  an  attack  by  the  garrison  ^"°^>**^ 
in  his  front,  and  thei*e  was  no  army  organizing  in 
his  rear  to  raise  the  siege. 

On  the  3d  of  June  a  brigade  from  Hurlbut's  com-    £5^. 
mand  arrived,  General  Kimball  commanding.    It  ^i^Jwn^ 
was  sent  to  Mechanicsburg,  some  miles  northeast  ySSiS^s, 
of  Haines's  Bluff,  and  about  midway  between  the  w.b.xxiv 
Big  Black  and  the  Yazoo.    A  brigade  of  Blair's    ^"'•'•^ 
division  and  twelve  hundred  cavalry  had  already, 
on  Blair's  return  from  the  Yazoo,  been  sent  to  the 
same  place,  with  instructions  to  watch  the  cross-  n>jd.878,m 
ings  of  the  Big  Black  River,  to  destroy  the  roads 
in  his  (Blair's)  front,  and  to  gather  or  destroy  all 
supplies. 

On  the  7th  of  June  our  little  force  of  colored  and  ^)^^"^ 


white  troops  across  the  Mississippi,  at  Milliken's  ^^^i^' 
Bend,  were  attacked  by  about  three  thousand  men 
from  Eichard  Taylor's  trans-Mississippi  command. 


456  PEBSONAL  HEM0IB8  OF  U.  8.  Q&ANT 

CH.xxxvn  With  the  aid  of  the  gunboats  they  were  speedily 
cJ^^iSl  repelled.  I  sent  Mower's  brigade  over  with  instrue- 
^riMiS^'  tions  to  drive  the  enemy  beyond  the  Tensas  Bayou ; 
^»,  w«T'  and  we  had  no  further  trouble  in  that  quarter  dur- 
v%.  Aa^  ing  the  siege.  This  was  the  first  important  engage- 
Jan. «,  imi  ment  of  the  war  in  which  colored  troops  were  under 
bSSSS^.  fire.  These  men  were  very  raw,  having  all  been 
^  "  ^*^  enlisted  since  the  beginning  of  the  siege,  but  they 
behaved  welL 

On  the  8th  of  June  a  full  division  arrived  from 
Hurlbut's  command,  under  General  Sooy  Smith. 
It  was  sent  immediately  to  Haines's  BlufE,  and  Gen- 
eral 0.  0.  Washburn  was  assigned  to  the  general 
command  at  that  point. 

On  the  11th  a  strong  division  arrived  from  the 
Department  of  the  Missouri  under  General  Herron, 
which  was  placed  on  our  left.    This  cut  off  the  last 
possible  chance  of  communication  between  Pem- 
berton  and  Johnston,  as  it  enabled  Lauman  to  close 
up  on  McClemand's  left  while  Herron  intrenched 
from  Lauman  to  the  water's  edge.    At  this  point 
the  water  recedes  a  few  hundred  yards  from  the 
high  land.    Through  this  opening,  no  doubt,  the 
Confederate  commanders  had  been  able  to  get  mes- 
sengers under  cover  of  night. 
wpifS^S^      On  the  14th  General  Parke  arrived  with  two 
^SiSif*    divisions  of  Bumside's  corps,  and  was  immediately 
v?il  No?:   despatched  to  Haines's  BluflE.    These  latter  troops 
M^lSaeL    — Herron's  and  Pai'ke's — were  the  reinforcements 
1962    '  already  spoken  of  sent  by  Halleck  in  anticipation 
Ante,  p.  449  ^£  ^^^:^  bciug  ncedcd.    They  arrived  none  too  soon. 
I  now  had  about  seventv-one  thousand  men. 


SIEGE  OF  VICKSBUBG  457 

Black,  with  the  division  of  Osterhaus  watching  the  CH.xxxvn 
(Crossings  of  the  latter  river  farther  sonth  and  west 
from  the  crossing  of  the  Jackson  road  to  Baldwin's 
ferry  and  below. 

There  were  eight  roads  leading  into  Vicksburg, 
along  which  and  their  immediate  sides  our  work 
was  specially  pushed  and  batteries  advanced ;  but 
no  conamanding  point  within  range  of  the  enemy 
was  neglected. 

On  the  17th  I  received  a  letter  from  General  ^)^(^S^ 
Sherman,  and  one  on  the  18th  from  General  Mc- 
Pherson,  saying  that  their  respective  commands 
had  complained  to  them  of  a  fulsome  congratula- 
tory order  published  by  General  McClemand  to  the  bml  umm 
Thirteenth  Corps,  which  did  great  injustice  to  the 
other  troops  engaged  in  the  campaign.    This  order 
had  been  sent  North  and  published,  and  now  papers 
containing  it  had  reached  our  camps.    The  order 
had  not  been  heard  of  by  me,  and  certainly  not 
by  troops  outside  of  McClemand's  conamand  until 
brought  in  this  way.    I  at  once  wrote  to  McCler-  ^  ^'i!  m*^' 
nand,  directing  him  to  send  me  a  copy  of  this  order. 
He  did  so,  and  I  at  once  relieved  him  from  the   ^*^^®* 
command  of  the  Thirteenth  Army-corps  and  or- 
dered him  back  to  Springfield,  Illinois.    The  publi- 
cation of  his  order  in  the  press  was  in  violation  of 
War  Department  orders  and  also  of  mine. 


CHAPTER  XXXVlll 

JOHNSTON'S  MOVEMENTS — FOBTIFICATIONS  AT  HAINES'S 
BLUFF — EXPLOSION  OF  THE  MINE — EXPLOSION  OF 
THE  SECOND  MINE — PBEPAEING  FOB  THE  ASSAULT 
— THE  FLAG  OF  TBUCE — MEETING  WITH  PEMBEB- 
TON — NEGOTIATIONS  FOB  SUBBENDEB — ACCEPT- 
ING THE  TEBMS — SUBBENDEB  OF  YICKSBUBG 


CH.XXXyilI 
1863 


W.K.XXIV 

(8)96a-906, 

967,909,971, 

974 


Tbld.  428 


F.J.HeiTon, 

Captl0t 

Iowa,  May 

14.1861; 

Brig.-OeD. 

yol8Uriily99, 

1862;  M%).- 


ON  the  22d  of  June  positive  information  was 
received  that  Johnston  had  crossed  the  Big 
Black  Eiver  for  the  purpose  of  attacking  our  rear, 
to  raise  the  siege  and  release  Pemberton.  The 
correspondence  between  Johnston  and  Pemberton 
shows  that  all  expectation  of  holding  Vicksburg 
had  by  this  time  passed  from  Johnston's  mind.  I 
immediately  ordered  Sherman  to  the  command  of 
all  the  forces  from  Haines's  Bluff  to  the  Big  Black 
River.  This  amounted  now  to  quite  half  the  troops 
about  Vicksburg,  Besides  these,  Herron's  and  A.  J. 
Smith's  divisions  were  ordered  to  hold  themselves 
in  readiness  to  reinforce  Sherman.    Haines's  Bluff 


l<«  ««  >4       l^^x^xw 


mi-^^-^x^-w^    fi^'-i-Z'H^Ji 


460  PEBSONAL  MEMOIBS  OP  U.  S.  GRANT 

caxxxvin  We  were  now  looking  west,  besieging  Pemberton, 
while  we  were  also  looking  east  to  defend  ourselves 
against  an  expected  siege  by  Johnston.  But,  as 
against  the  garrison  of  Vicksburg,  we  were  as  sub- 
stantially protected  as  they  were  against  us.  Where 
we  were  looking  east  and  north  we  were  strongly 
notbSv^  fortified  and  on  the  defensive.  Johnston  evidently 
p.iMetseq.  ^^j^  jj^  ^^^  situation,  and  wisely,  I  think,  abstained 
from  making  an  assault  on  us,  because  it  would 
simply  have  inflicted  loss  on  both  sides  without 
accomplishing  any  result.  We  were  strong  enough 
to  have  taken  the  offensive  against  him ;  but  I  did 
not  feel  disposed  to  take  any  risk  of  losing  our  hold 
upon  Pemberton's  army,  while  I  would  have  rejoiced 
at  the  opportunity  of  defending  ourselves  against 
an  attack  by  Johnston. 
1868  From  the  23d  of  May  the  work  of  fortifying  and 

pushing  forward  our  position  nearer  to  the  enemy 
had  been  steadily  progressing.    At  three  points  on 
^^^^*^  the  Jackson  road,  in  front  of  Leggett's  brigade,  a 
xx^2)29e,  gQ^p  ^g^  j.^^  ^p  ^  ^jj^  enemy's  parapet,  and  by  the 

25th  of  June  we  had  it  undermined  and  the  mine 
charged.  The  enemy  had  countermined,  but  did 
not  succeed  in  reaching  our  mine.  At  this  partic- 
ular point  the  hill  on  which  the  rebel  work  stands 
rises  abruptly.  Our  sap  ran  close  up  to  the  outside 
of  the  enemy's  parapet.  In  fact,  this  parapet  was 
also  our  protection.  The  soldiers  of  the  two  sides 
occasionally  conversed  pleasantly  across  this  bar- 
rier; sometimes  they  exchanged  the  hard  bread  of 
the  Union  soldiers  for  the  tobacco  of  the  Confeder- 
ates; at  other  times  the  enemy  threw  over  hand- 


EXPLOSION  OF  THE  MIKE  461 

Our  mine  had  been  started  some  distance  back  CH.xxxyni 
down  the  hill;  consequently  when  it  had  extended 
as  far  as  the  parapet  it  was  many  feet  below  it 
This  caused  the  failure  of  the  enemy  in  his  search 
to  find  and  destroy  it.  On  th^  25th  of  June,  at  ^^^r. 
three  o'clock,  all  being  ready,  the  mine  was  ex-  9w.-8{S^ 
ploded.  A  heavy  artillery  fire  all  along  the  line  ^Sil. w 
had  been  ordered  to  open  with  the  explosion.  The 
effect  was  to  blow  the  top  of  the  hiU  off  and  make 
a  crater  where  it  stood.  The  breach  was  not  suffi- 
cient to  enable  us  to  pass  a  column  of  attack 
through.  In  fact,  the  enemy,  having  failed  to 
reach  our  mine,  had  thrown  up  a  line  farther  back, 
where  most  of  the  men  guarding  that  point  were 
placed.  There  were  a  few  men,  however,  left  at 
the  advance  line,  and  others  working  in  the  coun- 
termine, which  was  still  being  pushed  to  find  ours. 
All  that  were  there  were  thrown  into  the  air,  some 
of  them  coming  down  on  our  side,  still  alive.  I 
remember  one  colored  man,  who  had  been  imder- 
ground  at  work  when  the  explosion  took  place,  who 
was  thrown  to  our  side.  He  was  not  much  hurt, 
but  terribly  frightened.  Some  one  asked  him  how 
high  he  had  gone  up.  "Dunno,  massa,  but  t'ink 
'bout  free  mile,''  was  his  reply.  General  Logan 
commanded  at  this  point  and  took  this  colored  man 
to  his  quarters,  where  he  did  service  to  the  end  of 
the  siege. 

As  soon  as  the  explosion  took  place  the  crater  ^^jS^ 
was  seized  by  two  regiments  of  our  troops  who  were 
near  by,  under  cover,  where  they  had  been  placed 
for  the  express  purpose.  The  enemy  made  a  des- 
perate effort  to  expel  them,  but  failed,  and  soon 
retired  behind  the  new  line.    From  here,  however. 


462 


PEBSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 


CH.xxxvm  they  threw  hand-grenades,  which  did  some  execu- 
tion. The  compliment  was  returned  by  our  men, 
but  not  with  so  much  effect.  The  enemy  could  lay 
their  grenades  on  the  parapet,  which  alone  divided 
the  contestants,  and  roll  them  down  upon  us ;  while 
from  our  side  they  had  to  be  thrown  over  the  par- 
apet, which  was  at  considerable  elevation.  During 
the  night  we  made  efforts  to  secure  our  position  in 
the  crater  against  the  missiles  of  the  enemy,  so  as 
to  run  trenches  along  the  outer  base  of  their  para- 
pet, right  and  left ;  but  the  enemy  continued  throw- 
ing their  grenades,  and  brought  boxes  of  field  am- 
munition (shells),  the  fuses  of  which  they  would 
light  with  port-fires  and  throw  them  by  hand  into 
our  ranks.  We  found  it  impossible  to  continue  this 
mctoio^  work.  Another  mine  was  consequently  started, 
B.  xxfv  (2)  ^hich  was  exploded  on  the  1st  of  July,  destroying 
an  entire  rebel  redan,  killing  and  wounding  a  con- 
siderable number  of  its  occupants,  and  leaving  an 
immense  chasm  where  it  stood.  No  attempt  to 
charge  was  made  this  time,  the  experience  of  the 
25th  admonishing  us.  Our  loss  in  the  first  affair 
was  about  thirty  killed  and  wounded.  The  enemy 
must  have  lost  more  in  the  two  explosions  than  we 
did  in  the  first.    We  lost  none  in  the  second. 

From  this  time  forward  the  work  of  mining  and 
pushing  our  position  nearer  to  the  enemy  was 
prosecuted  with  vigor,  and  I  determined  to  explode 

•w\r\     wv\r\ii»rk    mntirkrka     iiti4-i1    "rrrrk    "rrrrkifrk     i./\ck^-rr    4'r\     rk-mr-tn.! r\^ r%      a 


ao3,ao8 


AT  THE  ENEM7B  THBOAT  463 

ton  to  Pemberton  informed  me  that  Johnston  in-  OBuxxxvm 
tended  to  make  a  determined  attack  upon  us  in 
order  to  relieve  the  garrison  at  Vicksburg.    I  knew 
the  garrison  would  make  no  formidable  effort  to 
relieve  itself.    The  picket-lines  were  so  close  to 
each  other — where  there  was  space  enough  between 
the  lines  to  post  pickets — that  the  men  could  con- 
verse.  On  the  21st  of  June  I  was  informed,  through       im 
this  means,  that  Pemberton  was  preparing  to  es- 
cape, by  crossing  to  the  Louisiana  side  under  cover    ^*^t^ 
of  night;  that  he  had  employed  workmen  in  mak-  ^S^wot^ 
ing  boats  for  that  purpose ;  that  the  men  had  been 
canvassed  to  ascertain  if  they  would  make  an 
assault  on  the  "  Yankees  ^  to  cut  their  way  out ; 
that  they  had  refused,  and  ahnost  mutinied  because  i^dim?°^ 
their  commander  would  not  surrender  and  relieve  wfSfixi^ 

(8)  9(B2*  983 

their  sufferings,  and  had  only  been  pacified  by  the 
assurance  that  boats  enough  would  be  finished  in 
a  week  to  carry  them  all  over.  The  rebel  pickets 
also  said  that  houses  in  the  city  had  been  pulled 
down  to  get  material  to  build  these  boats  with. 
Afterward  this  story  was  verified :  on  entering  the 
city  we  found  a  large  number  of  very  rudely  con- 
structed boats. 

All  necessary  steps  were  at  once  taken  to  ren- 
der such  an  attempt  abortive.  Our  pickets  were 
doubled;  Admiral  Porter  was  notified,  so  that  the 
river  might  be  more  closely  watched;  material  was 
collected  on  the  west  bank  of  the  river  to  be  set  on 
fire  and  light  up  the  river  if  the  attempt  was  made ; 
and  batteries  were  established  along  the  levee  cross- 
ing the  peninsula  on  the  Louisiana  side.  Had  the 
attempt  been  made  the  garrison  of  Vicksburg  would 
have  been   drowned,  or  made  prisoners  on  the 


464  PERSONAL  MEMOIBS  OF  U.  S.  GBANT 

CH.xxxvra  Ajouisiana  side.    General  Eichard  Taylor  was  ex- 
a-^^eS   pected  on  the  west  bank  to  cooperate  in  this  move- 
S',S6^'mS^-  ^^^^  I  helieve ;  but  he  did  not  come,  nor  could  he 
A^pr.  iaji879'  have  done  so  with  a  force  sufficient  to  be  of  service. 
The  Mississippi  was  now  in  our  possession  from  its 
source  to  its  mouth,  except  in  the  immediate  front 
of  Vicksburg  and  of  Port  Hudson.    We  had  nearly 
exhausted  the  country,  along  a  line  drawn  from 
Lake  Providence   to   opposite  Bruinsburg.    The 
roads  west  were  not  of  a  character  to  draw  sup- 
plies over  for  any  considerable  force, 
to  SSSSft       ^y  *^®  1st  of  July  our  approaches  had  reached 
the  enemy^s  ditch  at  a  number  of  places.    At  ten 
points  we  could  move  imder  cover  to  within  from 
five  to  one  hundred  yards  of  the  enemy.    Orders 
were  given  to  make  all  preparations  for  assault 
on  the  6th  of  July.    The  debouches  were  ordered 
widened  to  afford  easy  egress,  while  the  approaches 
were  also  to  be  widened  to  admit  the  troops  to  pass 
through  four  abreast.    Plank,  and  bags  filled  with 
cotton  packed  in  tightly,  were  ordered  prepared  to 
enable  the  troops  to  cross  the  ditches. 
1863  On  the  night  of  the  1st  of  July  Johnston  was  be- 

tween Brownsville  and  the  Big  Black,  and  wrote 
w.RMnr  Pemberton  from  there  that  about  the  7th  of  the 
month  an  attempt  would  be  made  to  create  a  diver- 
sion to  enable  him  to  cut  his  way  out.  Pemberton 
was  a  prisoner  before  this  message  reached  him. 
^-  h  S^      On  July  1st,  Pemberton,  seeing  no  hope  of  outside 


THE  FLAG  OP  TBUCE  465 

are  many  great,  if  not  m6ui>erable,  obstacles  in  the  way  of  CH.xxxvni 
the  latter.  You  are  therefore  requested  to  inform  me, 
with  as  little  delay  as  possible,  as  to  the  condition  of  your 
troops  and  their  ability  to  make  the  marches  and  undergo 
the  fatigues  necessary  to  accomplish  a  successful  evacua- 
tion. 

Two  of  his  generals  suggested  surrender,  and  the  ^i)^^^ 
other  two  practicaUy  did  the  same.   They  expressed 
the  opinion  that  an  attempt  to  evacuate  would  fail. 
Pemberton  had  previously  got  a  message  to  Johns-  ^Si^^^ 
ton  suggesting  that  he  should  try  to  negotiate  with 
me  for  a  release  of  the  garrison  with  their  arms. 
Johnston  replied  that  it  would  be  a  confession  of  '  ibia-  eeo 
weakness  for  him  to  do  so ;  but  he  authoiized  Pem- 
bei-ton  to  use  his  name  in  making  such  an  arrange- 
ment. ^^ 
On  the  3d,  about  10  o'clock  a.m.,  white  flags  oS^^ 
appeared  on  a  portion  of  the  rebel  works.     Hostiu-  ^fva)««^' 
ties  along  that  part  of  the  line  ceased  at  once.    Soon       ^ 
*^o  persons  were  seen  coming  toward  onr  lin^® 
^^^^ng  a  white  flag.    They  proved  to  be  Gener^  j^u.^^^^ 
^^^en,  O'  division  commander,  and  Colonel  Moti*^     goiue^^ 
S^^ery,  aide-de-camp  to  Pemberton,  bearing  th^ 
foUo^n^  letter  to  me: 

I  have  the  honor  to  propose  to  you  an  armistice  for "^     '  (d  5» 

^^nrs  with  a  view  to  arranging  terms  for  the  capitulation^ 
^f  Vicksburg.    To  this  end,  if  agreeable  to  you,  I  will  ap- 
I^oint  three  commisBieners  to  meet  a  like  number,  \o  \)^ 
^^ined  by  yourself,  »t  such  place  and  hour  to-day  »&^o\J^ 
^^v  4^d  convenient.    I  make  this  proposition  to  ^^•'^^  ^^ 
^^uer  effusion  of  hlood,  which  must  otherwise    ^«^,^^ 


466  FEB80NAL  MEMOIBS  OF  U.  S.  QBANT 

CH.xxxyin  It  was  a  ^orions  sight  to  officers  and  soldiers  on 
''^iSSm^  t^®  ^®  where  these  white  flags  were  visible,  and 
the  news  soon  spread  to  all  parts  of  the  command* 
The  troops  felt  that  their  long  and  weary  marches, 
hard  fighting,  ceaseless  watching  by  night  and  day, 
in  a  hot  climate,  exposure  to  all  sorts  of  weather, 
to  diseases,  and,  worst  of  all,  to  the  gibes  of  many 
Northern  papere  that  came  to  them  saying  all  their 
suffering  was  in  vain,  that  Vlcksbnrg  would  never 
be  taken,  were  at  last  at  an  end  and  the  Union  sure 
to  be  saved. 

^  Bowen  was  received  by  General  A.  J.  Smith,  and 
asked  to  see  me.  I  had  been  a  neighbor  of  Bowen's 
in  Missouri,  and  knew  him  well  and  favorably  be- 
fore the  war ;  but  his  request  was  refused.  He  then 
suggested  that  I  should  meet  Pemberton.  To  this 
I  sent  a  verbal  message  saying  that  if  Pemberton 
desired  it  I  would  meet  him  in  front  of  McPherson's 
^•gj™v  corps  at  three  o^clock  that  afternoon.  I  also  sent 
the  following  written  reply  to  Pemberton's  letter: 

Toar  note  of  this  date  is  just  received,  proposing  an 
armistice  for  several  hoars,  for  the  purpose  of  arranging 
terms  of  capitulation  through  commissioners  to  be  ap- 
pointed, etc.  The  useless  effusion  of  blood  you  propose 
stopping  by  this  course  can  be  ended  at  any  time  you 
may  choose  by  an  unconditional  surrender  of  the  city  and 
garrison.  Men  who  have  shown  so  much  endurance  and 
courage  as  those  now  in  Yicksborg  will  always  challenge 
the  respect  of  an  adversary,  and,  I  can  assure  you,  will  be 
treated  with  all  the  respect  due  to  prisoners  of  war.  I  do 
not  favor  the  proposition  of  appointing  commissioners  to 
arrange  the  terms  of  capitulation,  because  I  have  no  terms 
other  than  those  indicated  above. 

jniv  a.  iM»       At  three  o'clock  Pemberton  anneared  at  the  noint 


MEBTINa  WITH  PEUBEBTON 


467 


Meeting 

with  Pern- 

berton 


the  same  officers  who  had  borne  his  letter  of  the  CHJLxxvm 
morning.  Gtenerals  Ord,  McPherson,  Logan,  and 
A.  J.  Smith,  and  several  officers  of  my  stafiE,  accom- 
panied me.  Onr  place  of  meeting  was  on  a  hillside 
within  a  few  hundred  feet  of  the  rebel  lines.  Near 
by  stood  a  stunted  oak-tree,  which  was  made  histor- 
ical by  the  event.  It  was  but  a  short  time  before 
the  last  vestige  of  its  body,  root  and  limb,  had  dis- 
appeared, the  fragments  taken  as  trophies.  Since 
then  the  same  tree  has  furnished  as  many  cords 
of  wood,  in  the  shape  of  trophies,  as  the  "True 
Cross.'' 

Pemberton  and  I  had  served  in  the  same  division  ^nu,  p.  m 
during  part  of  the  Mexican  war.    I  knew  him  very 
well,  therefore,  and  greeted  him  as  an  old  acquain- 
tance.   He  soon  asked  what  terms  I  proposed  to 
give  his  army  if  it  surrendered.    My  answer  was  <»p"^**<'" 
the  same  as  proposed  in  my  reply  to  his  letter. 
Pemberton  then  said,  rather  snappishly,  "  The  con- 
ference might  as  well  end,''  and  turned  abruptly  as 
if  to  leave.    I  said,  "  Very  well."    General  Bowen, 
I  saw,  was  very  anxious  that  the  surrender  should 
be  consunmiated.    His  manner  and  remarks  while 
Pemberton  and  I  were  talking  showed  this.    He 
now  proposed  that  he  and  one  of  our  generals 
should  have  a  conference.    I  had  no  o\>jectioii  to 
this,  as  nothing  could  be  made  binding  upon  tO-^ 
that  they  might  propose.    Smith  aa^^  Bo^eiU  a^icot^^ 
ingly  had  a  conference,  during  whiclx  ^^xs^W^^'^^ 
and  I,  moving  a  short  distance  away  to^«f^  i^  ^^ 
enemy's  lines,  were  in  converBatioi^*      -^itiet  Bi^\j>^^^_ 
Bowen  suggested  that  the  Coxn^ftderate  aarmy  shoi^^^^^ 


DlsoiiMiiig 
tenDiiof 


468  PEBSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

CH.xxxvm  was  promptly  and  unceremoniously  rejected.  The 
interview  here  ended,  I  agreeing,  however,  to  send 
a  letter  giving  final  terms  by  ten  o'clock  that 
night. 
^3)^So^  Word  was  sent  to  Admiral  Porter  soon  after  the 
correspondence  with  Pemberton  commenced,  so 
that  hostilities  might  be  stopped  on  the  part  of 
both  army  and  navy.  It  was  agreed  on  my  parting 
with  Pemberton  that  they  should  not  be  renewed 
until  our  correspondence  cieased. 

When  I  returned  to  my  headquarters  I  sent  for 
all  the  corps  and  division  commanders  with  the 
army  immediately  confronting  Vicksburg.  Half 
the  army  was  from  eight  to  twelve  miles  oflE,  wait- 
ing for  Johnston.  I  informed  them  of  the  contents 
of  Pemberton's  letter,  of  my  reply,  and  the  sub- 
stance of  the  interview,  and  that  I  was  ready  to 
hear  any  suggestion,  but  would  hold  the  power  of 
deciding  entirely  in  my  own  hands.  This  was  the 
nearest  approach  to  a  "  council  of  war  ^  I  ever  held. 
Against  the  general  and  almost  unanimous  judg- 
ment of  the  council  I  sent  the  following  letter : 

w-^^^  In  conformity  with  agreement  of  this  afternoon,  I  will 
submit  the  following  proposition  for  the  surrender  of  the 
city  of  Vicksburg,  pubUc  stores,  etc.  On  your  accepting 
the  terms  proposed,  I  will  march  in  one  division  as  a  guard, 
and  take  possession  at  8  a.m.  to-morrow.  As  soon  as  rolls 
can  be  made  out,  and  paroles  signed  by  officers  and  men, 
you  will  be  allowed  to  march  out  of  our  lines,  the  offi- 
cers taking  with  them  their  side-arms  and  doihing,  and 
the  field,  staff,  and  cavalry  officers  one  horse  each.  The 
i*ank  and  file  will  be  allowed  all  their  clothing,  but  no  other 


NEGOTIATIONS  FOB  SUBRENDEB  469 

sils  for  preparing  them.  Thirty  wagons  also,  counting  two  CH.xxxyni 
two-horse  or  mule  teams  as  one,  will  be  allowed  to  trans- 
port such  articles  as  cannot  be  carried  along.  The  same 
conditions,  will  be  allowed  to  all  sick  and  wounded  officers 
and  soldiers  as  fast  as  they  become  able  to  travel.  The 
paroles  for  these  latter  must  be  signed,  however,  while 
officers  are  present  authorized  to  sign  the  roll  of  prisoners. 

By  the  terms  of  the  cartel  then  in  force,  prisoners  ^^S^n 
captured  by  either  army  were  required  to  be  for- 
warded as  soon  as  possible  to  either  Aiken's  Land- 
ing below  Dutch  Gap  on  the  James  Eiver,  or  to 
Vicksburg,  there  to  be  exchanged,  or  paroled  until 
they  could  be  exchanged.    There  was  a  Confederate 
commissioner  at  Vicksburg  authorized  to  make  the 
exchange.    I  did  not  propose  to  take  him  a  pris- 
oner, but  to  leave  him  free  to  perform  the  functions 
of  his  office.    Had  I  insisted  upon  an  imconditional 
surrender  there  would  have  been  over  thirty  thou- 
sand men  to  transport  to  Cairo,  very  much  to  the 
inconvenience  of  the  army  on   the  Mississippi. 
Thence  the  prisoners  would  have  had  to  be  trans- 
ported by  rail  to  Washington  or  Baltimore ;  thence 
again  by  steamer  to  Aiken's — all  at  very  great  ex- 
pense.   At  Aiken's  they  would  have  had  to  be 
paroled,  because  the  Confederates  did  not  have 
Union  prisoners  to  give  in  exchange.    TTien,  again  •> 
Pemberton's  army  was  largely  composed  oi  ixx^^^ 
whose  homes  were  in  the  Soutlivrest ;  X  ^uew  mai^^ 
of  them  were  tired  of  the  wajr  and  woxxVA  g^^  \oV^  j^ 
just  as  soon  as  thev  could.       A.  larjjce   iixvxeJq^t  ^^  ^-^^ 


470  PERSONAL  HEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GBAIH* 

CH.xxxvm      Late  at  night  I  received  the  following  reply  to 
my  last  letter: 

^*^"^  I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  yonr 
communication  of  this  date,  proposing  terms  of  capitula- 
tion for  thus  garrison  and  post.  In  the  main  your  terms 
are  accepted ;  but,  in  justice  both  to  the  Honor  and  spirit 
of  my  troops,  manifested  in  the  defense  of  Yicksburg,  I 
have  to  submit  the  following  amendments,  which,  if  ac- 
ceded to  by  you,  will  perfect  the  i^eement  between  us.  At 
10  A.M.  to-morrow  I  propose  to  evacuate  the  works  in  and 
around  Vicksburg,  and  to  surrender  the  city  and  garrison 
under  my  command,  by  marching  out  with  my  colors  and 
arms,  stacking  them  in  front  of  my  present  lines,  after 
which  you  will  take  possession.  Officers  to  retain  their 
side-arms  and  personal  property,  and  the  rights  and  prop- 
erty of  citizens  to  be  respected. 

This  was  received  after  midnight    My  reply  was 
as  follows: 

Ibid.  I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  your 

communication  of  July  3d.  The  amendment  propos^  by 
you  cannot  be  acceded  to  in  full.  It  will  be  necessary  to 
furnish  every  officer  and  man  with  a  parole  signed  by  him- 
self, which,  with  the  completion  of  the  rolls  of  prisoners, 
will  necessarily  take  some  time.  Again,  I  can  make  no 
stipulations  with  regard  to  the  treatment  of  citizens  and 
their  private  property.  While  I  do  not  propose  to  cause 
them  any  undue  annoyance  or  loss,  I  cannot  consent  to 
leave  myself  under  any  restraint  by  stipulations.  The 
property  which  officers  will  be  allowed  to  take  with  them 
will  be  as  stated  in  my  proposition  of  last  evening;  that 


ACCEPTING  THE  TERMS 


471 


my  terms  by  9  a^.  I  shall  regard  them  as  having  heen  CH.xxxYxn 
rejected,  and  shall  act  accordingly.    Should  these  terms 
be  accepted,  white  flags  should  be  displayed  along  your 
lines,  to  prevent  such  of  my  troops  as  may  not  have  been 
notified  from  firing  upon  your  men. 

Pemberton  promptly  accepted  these  terms. 
During  the  siege  there  had  been  a  good  deal  of  tuSbSween 
friendly  sparring  between  the  soldiers  of  the  two    ^®p*<^^®^ 
armies,  on  picket  and  where  the  lines  were  close 
together.    All  rebels  were  known  as  "Johnnies,'' 
all  Union  troops  as  "Yanks.''    Often  "Johnny" 
would  call,  "  Well,  Yank,  when  are  you  coming  into 
townt"    The  ceply  was  sometimes,  "We  propose 
to  celebrate  the  4th  of  July  there."    Sometimes  it 
would  be, "  We  always  treat  our  prisoners  with  kind- 
ness and  do  not  want  to  hurt  them ;"  or,  "  We  are 
holding  you  as  prisoners  of  war  while  you  are  feed- 
ing yourselves."  The  garrison^  from  the  command- 
ing general  dovm,  undoubtedly  expected  an  assault 
on  the  4th.    They  knew  from  the  temper  of  their 
men  it  would  be  successful  when  made ;  and  that 
would  be  a  greater  humiliation  than  to  surrender. 
Besides,  it  would  be  attended  with  severe  loss  to  thena. 
The  Vicksburg  paper,  which  we  received  rega- 
JarJy  through  the  courtesy  of  the  rebel  pickets,  saiA. 
prior  to  the  4th,  in  speaking  of  the  "  Yaiit^iek^  \ioa»:^ 
tb&t  tbey  would  take  dinner  in  Vicksbxirg  ^^^  ^"^  "• 
that  th€^  best  receipt  for  cookiiig  a  Ta\>V>it  ^"^^''^^"^^ 
keteb  i^onr  rabbit."    The  paper  at  tVua  tiJ»^  "^^  ^.-s= 
%me  *i^^«  previous  was  printed  on  t\xe  TE'^^cs^vC^-^ 

^      ,.ci  axmounced  that  T^eb»<i  '*  caught  c^'^^^Io^Vv^ 


472  PEESONAL  MEMOmS  OP  U.  S.  GRANT 

CH.xxrvni  first,  to  avoid  an  assault,  which  he  knew  would  be 
successful,  and  second,  to  prevent  the  capture  tak- 
ing place  on  the  great  national  holiday,  the  anni- 
versary of  the  Declaration  of  American  Indepen- 
dence. Holding  out  for  better  terms  as  he  did,  he 
defeated  his  aim  in  the  latter  particular. 

of^SwS-  -^*  *^®  appointed  hour  the  garrison  of  Vicksburg 
^^  marched  out  of  their  works  and  formed  line  in 
front,  stacked  arms,  and  marched  back  in  good 
order.  Our  whole  army  present  witnessed  this 
scene  without  cheering.  Logan's  division,  which 
had  approached  nearest  the  rebel  works,  was  the 

45th  niinoiB  first  to  march  in ;  and  the  flag  of  one  of  the  regi- 
ments of  his  division  was  soon  floating  over  the 
court-house.  Our  soldiers  were  no  sooner  inside 
the  lines  than  the  two  armies  began  to  fraternize. 
Our  men  had  had  full  rations  from  the  time  the 
siege  commenced  to  the  dose.  The  enemy  had 
been  suffering,  particularly  toward  the  last.    I  my- 

^^J^^®  self  saw  our  men  taking  bread  from  their  haversacks 
and  giving  it  to  the  enemy  they  had  so  recently 
been  engaged  in  starving  out.    It  was  accepted 
with  avidity  and  with  thanks. 
Pemberton  says  in  his  report : 

w.  R.  ^iv  If  it  should  be  asked  why  July  4th  was  selected  as  the  day 
for  the  surrender,  the  answer  is  obvious.  I  beUeved  that 
upon  that  day  I  ^ould  obtain  better  terms.  Well  aware 
of  the  vanity  of  our  foes,  I  knew  they  would  attach  vast 
importance  to  the  entrance  on  July  4th  into  the  stronghold 
of  the  great  river,  and  that,  to  gratify  their  national  van- 
ity, they  would  yield  then  what  could  not  be  extorted  from 
them  at  any  other  time. 


8UKRENDEB  OP  VICKSBUEO  473 

must  be  recollected  that  his  first  letter  asking  terms  c7H.xxxvra 

was  received  about  10  o'clock  a.m.,  July  3d.     It 

then  could  hardly  be  expected  that  it  would  take 

twenty-four  hours  to  effect  a  surrender.    He  knew 

that  Johnston  was  in  our  rear  for  the  purpose  of 

raising  the  siege,  and  he  naturally  would  want  to 

hold  out  as  long  as  he  could.    He  knew  his  men 

would  not  resist  an  assault,  and  one  was  expected 

on  the  4th.    In  our  interview  he  told  me  he  had 

rations  enough  to  hold  out  for  some  time — my 

recollection  is,  two  weeks.    It  was  this  statement 

that  induced  me  to  insert  in  the  terms  that  he  was 

to  draw  rations  for  his  men  from  his  o^  supplies.       t.  h. 

On  the  4th  of  July  General  Holmes,  with  an  (^^J^: 
aimy  of  eight  or  nine  thousand  men  belonging  to  c^^^y* 
the  Trans-Mississippi  Department,  made  an  attack    ^Uew 
wpon  Helena,  Arkansas.    He  was  totally  defeated       ^^i^ 
*>y  General  Prentiss,  who  was  holding  Helena  wi**^  (i>"888et»e«^- 
Jess  than  forty-two  hundred  soldiers.    Holmes  Y^" 
ported  Ms  loss  at  1636,  of  which  173  were  kille<i  5 
but  as  Prentiss  buried  400,  Holmes  evidently  xmdet'^ 
®*^ted  his  losses.    The  Union  loss  ^m  57  iSle^ 
■^^7  ^ottPided,  and  between  30  and  40  missing' 
^Ms  was  *he  last  effort  on  the  part  of  the  Confe<i^ 
^^^y  to  raise  the  siege  of  Vicksburg- 

On  the  3d,  as  soon  as  negotiations  were  cona—     ^^'i^rv 
fenced,  I  notified  Sherman,  and  directed  him  to      w«». *^ 
^  ready  to  take   the  offensive  against  JoVxhsV^Ut 
^Hve  him  out  of  the  State,  and  destroy  hi»  «^^T 
if  |j^  conld.    Steele  and  Ord  were  directei3L     ^"^  "^^ 
^aw      ^Ame  to  be   in  readiness  to  ioin  Shftt*'"'^""^®'^  ^ 


474  PEBSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

CH.xxxym  to  the  river  to  exchange  congratulations  with  the 
^ff^^    navy  upon  our  joint  victory.    At  that  time  I  found 
that  many  of  the  citizens  had  been  living  under- 
ground.  The  ridges  upon  which  Vicksburg  is  built, 
and  those  back  to  the  Big  Black,  are  composed  of 
a  deep  yellow  clay  of  great  tenacity.    Where  roads 
asd  streets  are  cut  through,  perpendicular  banks 
are  left,  and  stand  as  well  as  if  composed  of  stone. 
The  magazines  of  the  enemy  were  made  by  running 
passageways  into  this  day  at  places  where  there 
were  deep  cuts.    Many  citizens  secured  places  of 
safety  for  their  families  by  carving  out  rooms  in 
these  embankments.    A  doorway,  in  these  cases, 
would  be  cut  in  a  high  bank,  starting  from  the  level 
of  the  road  or  street,  and  after  running  in  a  few 
feet  a  room  of  the  size  required  was  carved  out  of 
the  clay,  the  dirt  being  removed  by  the  doorway. 
In  some  instances  I  saw  where  two  rooms  were  cut 
out,  for  a  single  family,  with  a  doorway  in  the  day 
wall  separating  them.    Some  of  these  were  carpeted 
and  furnished  with  considerable  elaboration.    In 
these  the  occupants  were  fully  secure  from  the 
shells  of  the  navy,  which  were  dropped  into  the 
city  night  and  day  without  intermission. 

I  returned  to  my  old  headquarters  outside  in  the 
afternoon,  and  did  not  move  into  the  town  until 
the  6th.  On  the  afternoon  of  the  4th  I  sent  Cap- 
tain William  M.  Dunn,  of  my  staflE,  to  Cairo,  the 
nearest  point  where  the  telegraph  could  be  reached, 
with  a  despatch  to  the  general-in-chief  •  It  was  as 
follows: 

^*a)^^      The  enemy  surrendered  this  morning.    The  only  terms 

_n J  •-.  j-t- .• "I • ^ mi- •_  ▼ ^_j 


FALL  OP  POBT  HUDSON  475 

ably  several  days  in  the  capture  and  leaves  troops  and  CB.xx:rvin 
transports  ready  for  immediate  service.    Sherman,  with  a 
large  force,  moves  immediately  on  Johnston,  to  drive  him 
from  the  State.    I  will  send  troops  to  the  relief  of  Banks, 
and  return  the  Ninth  Army-corps  to  Bumside. 

This  news,  with  the  victory  at  Gettysburg  won  ^  cJ^eS- 
the  same  day,  lifted  a  great  load  of  anxiety  from  "^y*^^ 
the  minds  of  the  President,  his  Cabinet,  and  the 
loyal  people  all  over  the  North.  The  fate  of  the 
Confederacy  was  sealed  when  Vicksburg  fell.  Much 
hard  fighting  was  to  be  done  afterward  and  many 
precious  lives  were  to  be  sacrificed;  but  the  morale 
was  with  the  supporters  of  the  Union  ever  after. 

I  at  the  same  time  wrote  to  General  Banks  in-  ^'(8)470 
forming  him  of  the  fall  and  sending  him  a  copy  of 
the  terms ;  also  saying  I  would  send  him  all  the 
troops  he  wanted  to  insure  the  capture  of  the  oiily 
foothold  the  enemy  now  had  on  the  Mississippi 
-^i^er.    General  Banks  had  a  number  of  copies  ^^ 
*^  letter  printed,  or  at  least  a  synopsis  of  it,  a»^ 
^^^  soon  a  copy  fell  into  the  hands  of  Gener^ 
^^^dner,  ^ho  was  then  in  conunand  of  Port  Hud-         x^^^ 
®^^-     Gardner  at  once  sent  a  letter  to  the  com--     *  (i)»^ 
^«^xider  of  the  National  forces  saying  that  he  had 
^^n  informed  of  the  surrender  of  Vicksburg  and 
^Uing  ho^w  the  information  reached  him.    He  added 
*'l^at  if  this  was  trne  it  was  useless  for  him  to  TciolA      ^^  jj,  e* 
^Ut  longer.    General  Banks  gave  him  asstM»u<i^         ^- 
*'^at  Vicksburg  ha^  been  surrendered,  and  0«^^^«^ 
Cf^^^^er  surrendered  unconditionally  on  tb^  ^^^}^ 


^MA 


476  PERSONAL  MEMOmS  OP  U.  S.  GRANT 

CH.xxxvra  from  its  source  to  its  mouth,  remained  in  the  con- 
trol of  the  National  troops. 

toe^^n-  Pemberton  and  his  army  were  kept  in  Vicksburg 
^  until  the  whole  could  be  paroled.  The  paroles 
were  in  duplicate,  by  organization  (one  copy  for 
each,  Federals  and  Confederates),  and  signed  by 
the  commanding  officers  of  the  companies  or  regi- 
ments. Duplicates  were  also  made  for  each  soldier 
and  signed  by  each  individually,  one  to  be  retained 
by  the  soldier  signing  and  one  to  be  retained  by 

^' wS^^  us.  Several  hundred  refused  to  sign  their  paroles, 
preferring  to  be  sent  to  the  North  as  prisoners  to 
being  sent  back  to  fight  again.  Others,  again,  kept 
out  of  the  way,  hoping  to  escape  either  alternative. 

ton?diffl-  Pemberton  appealed  to  me  in  person  to  compel 
ooitiw  these  men  to  sign  their  paroles,  but  I  declined.  It 
also  leaked  out  that  many  of  the  men  who  had 
signed  their  paroles  intended  to  desert  and  go  to 
their  homes  as  soon  as  they  got  out  of  our  lines. 
Pemberton,  hearing  this,  again  appealed  to  me  to 
assist  him.  He  wanted  arms  for  a  battalion  to  act 
as  guards  in  keeping  his  men  together  while  being 
marched  to  a  camp  of  instruction,  where  he  ex- 
pected to  keep  them  imtil  exchanged.  This  request 
was  also  declined.    It  was  precisely  what  I  expected 

^' w^^  and  hoped  that  they  would  do.  I  told  him,  how- 
ever, that  I  would  see  that  they  marched  beyond 

July,  1863    our  liucs  iu  good  order.    By  the  11th,  just  one 
week  after  the  surrender,  the  paroles  were  com- 


CONFEDERATES  MAECH  OUT  OP  VICKSBURG  477 

<^s  soon  as  our  troops  took  possession  of  the  city,  CB.xxxvra 
guards  were  established  along  the  whole  line  of 
parapet,  from  the  river  above  to  the  river  below. 
The  prisoners  were  allowed  to  occupy  their  old 
camps  behind  the  intrenchments.  No  restraint 
was  put  upon  them,  except  by  their  own  comman- 
ders. They  were  rationed  about  as  our  own  men, 
and  from  our  supplies.  The  men  of  the  two  armies 
fraternized  as  if  they  had  been  fighting  for  the 
same  cause.  When  they  passed  out  of  the  works  S^^^. 
they  had  so  long  and  so  gallantly  defended,  between  '**^*™*^ 
lines  of  their  late  antagonists,  not  a  cheer  went 
up,  not  a  remark  was  made  that  would  give  pain. 
Really,  I  believe  there  was  a  feeling  of  sadness  just 
then  in  the  breasts  of  most  of  the  Union  soldiers  at 
seeing  the  dejection  of  their  late  antagonists^ 

The  day  before  the  departure  the  f ollowin^rder 
^as  issued: 

Paroled  prisoners  will  be  sent  out  of  here  to-morrow. 
They  will  be  authorized  to  cross  at  the  raUroad-bridge,  and 
move  from  there  to  Edward's  ferry,^  and  on  by  way  of 
Raymond.  Instruct  the  commands  to  be  orderly  and  quiet 
as  these  prisoners  pass,  to  make  no  offensive  remarks,  and 
not  to  harbor  any  who  fall  out  of  ranks  after  they  have 

1  Error  for  Edward's  Station. 


CHAPTER  XXXIX 

BETBOSPEGT    OF    THE    CAMPAIGN — SHERliAN'S    MOVE- 
MENTS— PBOPOSED    MOVEMENT    UPON    MOBILE 

A   PAINFUL   ACCIDENT — OBDESED   TO  BEPOBT  AT 
OAIBO. 


CH.  XXXIX 


Nattonal 


THE  capture  of  Vicksburg,  with  its  garrison, 
ordnance,  and  ordnance  stores,  and  the  suc- 
cessful battles  fought  in  reaching  them,  gave  new 
spirit  to  the  loyal  people  of  the  North.  New  hopes 
for  the  final  success  of  the  cause  of  the  Union  were 
inspired.  The  victory  gained  at  Gettysburg,  upon 
the  same  day,  added  to  their  hopes.  Now  the  Miss- 
issippi River  was  entirely  in  the  possession  of  the 
National  troops ;  for  the  fall  of  Vicksburg  gave  us 
Port  Hudson  at  once.  The  Army  of  Northern  Vir- 
ginia was  driven  out  of  Pennsylvania  and  forced 
back  to  about  the  same  ground  it  occupied  in  1861. 
The  Army  of  the  Tennessee  united  with  the  Army 
of  the  Gulf,  dividing  the  Confederate  States  com- 
pletely. 

The  first  despatch  I  received  from  the  govern- 
ment after  the  fall  of  Vicksburg  was  in  these  words : 


BETBOSPEGT  OP  THE  OAKPAIGN  479 

in  the  ranks  of  the  enemy.    Such  has  been  the  case  else-  cb.xxxix 
where.    If  these  prisoners  have  not  been  allowed  to  depart, 
you  will  detain  ^em  until  farther  orders. 

Halleck  did  not  know  that  they  had  already  been 
delivered  into  the  hands  of  Major  Watts,  Confeder-  n.  g.  watte 
ate  commissioner  for  the  exchange  of  prisoners. 

At  Vicksburg  31,600  prisoners  were  surrendered, 
together  with  172  cannon,  about  60,000  muskets, 
and  a  large  amount  of  anmiunition.    The  small  ^ofcS^- 
arms  of  the  enemy  were  far  superior  to  the  bulk  of  ^^S"*^ 
Ours.    Up  to  this  time  our  troops  at  the  West  had 
been  limited  to  the  old  United  States  flint-lock 
muskets  changed  into  percussion,  or  the  Belgiau 
musket  imported  early  in  the  war — almost  as  dan- 
gerous to  the  person  firing  it  as  to  the  one  aimed 
at — and  a  few  new  and  improved  arms.    These 
^ere  of  many  different  calibers,  a  fact  that  caused 
^lich  trouble  in  distributing  ammunition  during 
^^   engagement.    The  enemy  had  generally  ne^ 
^^*Qis  ^hich  had  run  the  blockade  and  were  of  uni- 
forna  caliber.    After  the  surrender  I  authorized  all 
colon^jg  ^hose  regiments  were  armed  with  inferior 
^^skets  to  place  them  in  the  stack  of  captured 
^^*^8  and  replace  them  with  the  latter.    A  large 
^^^iiiber  of  arms  turned  in  to  the  Ordnance  Depart- 
^^nt  as  captured  ^^^e  thus  arms  that  had  really 
^^n  used   by  the  XJnion  army  in  the  capture  of 
^i^iksburg. 

X^  this  narrative  I  have  not  made  the  met^'*^^'^^ 
?^^bW  i^^  ^^  officers,  dead  and  alive,  wha^^  .^^ 


480  PEBSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  8.  GRANT 

CH.XXXIX  passed,  in  proportion  to  its  numbers,  taken  as  a 
whole  of  officers  and  men.  A  military  education 
was  acquired  which  no  other  school  could  have 
given.  Men  who  thought  a  company  was  quite 
enough  for  them  to  command  properly  at  the  be- 
ginning would  have  made  good  regimental  or 
brigade  commanders;  most  of  the  brigade  com- 
manders were  equal  to  the  command  of  a  division, 
and  one,  Ransom,  would  have  been  equal  to  the 
command  of  a  corps  at  least  Logan  and  Crocker 
ended  the  campaign  fitted  to  command  independent 
armies. 

™BSd?*^  General  F.  P.  Blair  joined  me  at  Milliken^s  Bend 
a  full-fledged  general,  without  having  served  in  a 
lower  grade.  He  commanded  a  division  in  the 
campaign.  I  had  known  Blair  in  Missouri,  where 
I  had  voted  against  him  in  1858,  when  he  ran  for 
Congress.  I  knew  him  as  a  frank,  positive,  and 
generous  man,  true  to  his  friends  even  to  a  fault, 
but  always  a  leader.  I  dreaded  his  coming ;  I  knew 
from  experience  that  it  was  more  difficult  to  com- 
mand two  generals  desiring  to  be  leaders  than  it 
was  to  command  one  army  officered  intelligently 
and  with  subordination.  It  affords  me  the  greatest 
pleasure  to  record  now  my  agreeable  disappoint- 
ment in  respect  to  his  character.  There  was  no 
man  braver  than  he,  nor  was  there  any  who  obeyed 
all  orders  of  his  superior  in  rank  with  more  un- 
questioning alacrity.  He  was  one  man  as  a  soldier, 
another  as  a  politician. 


BETBOSPECT  OF  THE  CAUFAION 


481 


Theoam- 
paigDgov- 

emeaby 
oiroum- 
stances 


not  Jiave  been  made  at  all,  in  the  way  it  was,  with  ch.xxxix 
any  number  of  men,  without  such  assistance.  The 
most  perfect  harmony  reigned  between  the  two 
arms  of  the  service.  There  never  was  a  request 
made,  that  I  am  aware  of,  either  of  the  flag-officer 
or  any  of  his  subordinates,  that  was  not  promptly 
complied  with. 

The  campaign  of  Vicksburg  was  suggested  and 
developed  by  circumstances.    The  elections  of  1862 
had  gone  against  the  prosecution  of  the  war.    Vol- 
untary enlistments  had  nearly  ceased  and  the  draft 
had  been  resorted  to ;  this  was  resisted,  and  a  defeat 
or  backward  movement  would  have  made  its  exe- 
cution  impossible.     A  forward  movement  to  a 
decisive  victory  was  necessary.    Accordingly  I  re- 
solved to  get  below  Vicksburg,  unite  with  Banks 
against  Port  Hudson,  make  New  Orleans  a  base, 
and,  with  that  base  and  Grand  Gulf  as  a  starting- 
point,  move  eur  combined  forces  against  Vicksburg. 
Upon  reaching  Grand  Gulf,  after  running  its  bat- 
teries and  fighting  a  battle,  I  received  a  letter  from  Anu,  p.  410 
Banks  informing  me  that  he  could  not  be  at  Port 
Hudson  under  ten  days,  and  then  with  only  fifteen 
thousand  men.    The  time  was  worth  more  than  tlie 
reinforcements;  I  therefore  determined  to  pus\x 
into  the  interior  of  the  enemy's  country. 
With  a  large  river  behind  us,  lield  abov^  ^^^^^^w 
hr  by  *he  enemy,  rapid  movements  ^ere»  e«.^n^V    ^^ 
to  gtie<^^^^    Jackson  was  captiired  t\x^  d^*^  ^"^^3^  ^^i 
*eir  eorxxrxxasidQT  had  arrived,  and  onVv  ^    ^^^k  ^ 


WV* 


482  PEBSOKAL  MEMOIBS  OF  U.  S.  GBANT 

CH.XXXIX  successfully  besieged.<^t  looks  now  as  though  Prov- 
idence had  directed  the  course  of  the  campaign,  while 
the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  executed  the  decree»b^ 

Upon  the  surrender  of  the  garrison  of  Vicksburg 
there  were  three  things  that  required  immediate 
attention.  The  first  was  to  send  a  force  to  diive 
the  enemy  from  our  rear  and  out  of  the  State.  The 
second  was  to  send  reinforcements  to  Banks,  near 
Port  Hudson,  if  necessary,  to  complete  the  triumph 
of  opening  the  Mississippi  from  its  source  to  its 
mouth  to  the  free  navigation  of  vessels  bearing 
the  Stars  and  Stripes.  The  third  was  to  inform 
the  authorities  at  Washington  and  the  North  of 
the  good  news,  to  relieve  their  long  suspense  and 
strengthen  their  confidence  in  the  ultimate  success 
of  the  cause  they  had  so  much  at  heart. 

Soon  after  negotiations  were  opened  with  Gen- 
eral Pemberton  for  the  surrender  of  the  city,  I 

w5b^!I  notified  Sherman,  whose  troops  extended  from 

MemXTi,  Haines's  Bluj0f  on  the  left  to  the  crossing  of  the 
^^  Vicksburg  and  Jackson  road  over  the  Big  Black  on 
the  right,  and  directed  him  to  hold  his  command 
in  readiness  to  advance  and  drive  the  enemy  from 
the  State  as  soon  as  Vicksburg  suiTendered  Steele 
and  Ord  were  directed  to  be  in  readiness  to  join 
Sherman  in  his  move  against  General  Johnston, 

^m^^  and  Sherman  was  advised  of  this  also.  Sherman 
moved  promptly,  crossing  the  Big  Black  at  three 
different  points  with  as  many  columns,  all  concen- 
trating at  Bolton,  twenty  miles  west  of  Jackson. 

jojmflton^       Johnston  heard  of  the  surrender  of  Vicksburcr 


SHERMAN'S  MOVEMENTS  483 

was  close  up  to  the  defenses  of  the  city  and  shelling  c^,xxxix 
the  town.  The  siege  was  kept  up  until  the  mom-  ^j^^i^f^ 
ing  of  the  17th^  when  it  was  found  that  the  enemy 
had  evacuated  during  the  night.  The  weather  was 
very  hot,  the  roads  dusty,  and  the  water  bad. 
Johnston  destroyed  the  roads  as  he  passed,  and 
had  so  much  the  start  that  pursuit  was  useless; 
but  Sherman  sent  one  division,  Steele^s,  to  Brandon, 
fourteen  miles  east  of  Jackson. 

The  National  loss  in  the  second  capture  of  Jack- 
son was  less  than  one  thousand  men,  killed, 
wounded,  and  missing.  The  Confederate  loss  was 
probably  less,  except  in  captm^ed.  More  than  this 
number  fell  into  our  hands  as  prisoners. 

Medicines  and  food  were  left  for  the  Confederate  n>id.  fiacon 
wounded  and  sick  who  had  to  be  left  behind.    A 
large  amount  of  rations  was  issued  to  the  families 
that  remained  in  Jackson.  Medicines  and  food  were 
also  sent  to  Raymond  for  the  destitute  families  as 
well  as  the  sick  and  wounded,  as  I  thought  it  only 
fair  that  we  should  return  to  these  people  sotxxe  oi 
the  articles  we  had  taken  while  marching  tb^^^®^ 
the  country.    I  wrote  to  Sherman :  "  Inipt^eB  ^^  Vfe 
the  men  the  importance  of  going  throxigV^  \\\0  ^' 

in  an  orderly  manner,  abstaining  from  t,tfu\  d.  ^  -cv^^ 
thiugnot  absolutely  necessary  for  tlieiir  ^  \^^^      ^^ 
^iiJe  fcrav^g.     They  should  try    \a^     \/^y.^e^^ 
^HmWo  an  impression  as  possible  ixvwv^^^     r^^^^ 
^^  ji  provisions  and  forage,  whexx    c^^^^  ^^  ^    ^^/^ 

,  r&re  issued  to  all  the  T>eople.  iP^^^  ^  aV^^^ 


Sk.  ir^re  issued  to  all  the  people,  ^^ 


\ 


\p    -Jackson  and  back  to  Viclcs^^  ^\^/f^ 
^.M&      liad  been  taken  frtx-  f.li**    «,_    ^^^    J^  *^^ 


Z>^ 


484  PEBSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

CH.  XXXIX  Sherman  was  ordered  back  to  Vicksburg,  and  his 
^8)^  m7  troops  took  much  the  same  position  they  had  occu- 
pied before — from  the  Big  Black  to  Haines's  Bluff. 
Having  cleaned  up  about  Vicksburg,  and  cap- 
tured or  routed  all  regular  Confederate  forces  for 
more  than  a  hundred  miles  in  all  directions,  I  felt 
that  the  troops  that  had  done  so  much  should  be 
allowed  to  do  more  before  the  enemy  could  recover 
from  the  blow  he  had  received,  and  while  impor- 
tant points  might  be  captured  without  bloodshed. 
I  suggested  to  the  general-in-chief  the  idea  of  a 
Ibid.  6»  campaign  against  Mobile,  starting  from  Lake  Pont- 
(Snribw.  chartrain.  Halleck  preferred  another  course.  The 
^  possession  of  the  trans-Mississippi  by  the  Union 
forces  seemed  to  possess  more  importance  in  his 
mind  than  almost  any  campaign  east  of  the  Mississ- 
ippi I  am  well  aware  that  the  President  was  very 
anxious  to  have  a  foothold  in  Texas,  to  stop  the 
clamor  of  some  of  the  foreign  governments  which 
seemed  to  be  seeking  a  pretext  to  interfere  in  the 
war,  at  least  so  far  as  to  recognize  belligerent  rights 
to  the  Confederate  States.  This,  however,  could 
have  been  easily  done  without  wasting  troops  in 
western  Louisiana  and  eastern  Texas,  by  sending  a 
garrison  at  once  to  Brownsville  on  the  Rio  Grande. 
Halleck  disapproved  of  my  proposition  to  go 
against  Mobile,  so  that  I  was  obliged  toisettle  down 
and  see  myself  put  again  on  the  defensive,  as  I  had 
been  a  year  before  in  West  Tennessee.  It  would 
have  been  an  easy  thing  to  capture  Mobile  at  the 
time  I  proposed  to  go  there.  Having  that  as  a 
base  of  operations,  troops  could  have  been  thrown 
into  the  interior  to  operate  asrainst  General  Bragff's 


PEOPOSED  MOVEMENT  AGAINST  MOBILE  485 

Bragg  to  detach  in  order  to  meet  this  fire  in  his  ch.xxxix 
rear.  K  he  had  not  done  this  the  troops  from  Mo- 
bile could  have  inflicted  inestimable  damage  upon 
much  of  the  country  from  which  his  army  and 
Lee^s  were  yet  receiving  their  supplies.  I  was  so 
much  impressed  with  this  idea  that  I  renewed  my  Hai^t.^v. 
request  later  in  July  and  again  about  the  1st  of  ^'S^*^* 
August,  and  proposed  sending  all  the  troops  neces- 
sary, asking  only  the  assistance  of  the  navy  to 
protect  the  debarkation  of  troops  at  or  near  Mobile. 
I  also  asked  for  a  leave  of  absence  to  visit  New 
Orleans,  particularly  if  my  suggestion  to  move 
against  Mobile  should  be  approved.  Both  requests 
were  refused.  So  far  as  my  experience  with  Gen- 
eral Halleck  went,  it  was  very  much  easier  for  him 
to  refuse  a  favor  than  to  grant  one.  But  I  did  not 
regard  this  as  a  favor.  It  was  simply  in  line  of 
duty,  though  out  of  my  department. 

The  general-in-chief  having  decided  against  me,  ^^^S^'f 
the  depletion  of  an  army  which  had  won  a  succes- 
sion of  great  victories  commenced,  as  had  been  the 
case  the  year  before  after  the  fall  of  Corintlx,  wben 
the  army  was  sent  where  it  would  do  the  least  good. 
By  orders  I  sent  to  Banks  a  force  of  four  tUoias*^**^  ^iVl^Si  ^ 

^ca,  returned  the  Ninth  Corps  to  Kentucky'  ®'^^' 
^ben  if-a-nsportation  had  been  collectea  gt*''^^.*'    i.u.w^:"'? 
^^8ioQ  of  five  thousand  men  to  Scliofte\i  ^"^      To  **^*S^^- 
^**^^;  irZi^^«  Price  was  raiding  the   State      ^       \f>  "^^I^S^a- 
®^%     »    brigade  under  Ransom  to  :fc^ait(jT^®*'  v©    ^^"^^^^^S-' 
^'^i?  ^^^*Pla^  permanently.    THis  i^.  .^ir  ^^_0^  "IS^N^iA^ 

«^^^^     fortunate  as  to  the  time  ^Or^^::    -     ^V^^ 
W^^tt^'^^^-     The  enemy  happenea    t^  ^fl^f-         ^^' 


486 


PEBSOKAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  8.  GBANT 


Ouerrllla 
warfare 


CH.xxxix  Eastern  armies,  and  also  a  large  amount  of  muni- 
tions of  war,  which  had  probably  come  through 
Texas  from  the  Eio  Grande,  and  which  were  on  the 
way  to  Lee's  and  other  armies  in  the  East. 

The  troops  that  were  left  with  me  around  Vieks- 
burg  were  very  busily  and  unpleasantly  employed 
in  making  expeditions  against  guerrilla  bands  and 
small  detachments  of  cavalry  which  infested  the 
interior,  and  in  destroying  mills,  bridges,  and  roll- 
ing-stock on  the  railroads.  The  guerrillas  and 
cavalry  were  not  there  to  fight,  but  to  annoy,  and 
therefore  disappeared  on  the  first  approach  of  our 
troops. 

The  country  back  of  Vicksburg  was  filled  with 
deserters  from  Pemberton's  army  and,  it  was  re- 
ported, many  from  Johnston's  also.  The  men 
determined  not  to  fight  again  while  the  war  lasted. 
Those  who  lived  beyond  the  reach  of  the  Confeder- 
ate army  wanted  to  get  to  their  homes.  Those 
who  did  not  wanted  to  get  North,  where  they  could 
work  for  their  support  till  the  war  was  over.  Be- 
sides all  this  there  was  quite  a  peace  feeling,  for 
the  time  being,  among  the  citizens  of  that  part  of 
Mississippi ;  but  this  feeling  soon  subsided.  It  is 
not  probable  that  Pemberton  got  off  with  over  four 
thousand  of  his  army  to  the  camp  where  he  pro- 
posed taking  them,  and  these  were  in  a  demoralized 
condition. 

On  the  7th  of  August  I  further  depleted  my 
armv  bv  sendiner  the  Thirteenth  Corns.  General 


Demorali- 
zation of 
Pember- 

toii*8  army 


W.R.XXr7 
(3)  681,  683 


A  PAINFUL  ACCIDENT  487 

Banks  about  the  proposed  movement.    All  these  ch.xxxix 
movements  came  to  naught. 

During  this  visit  I  reviewed  Banks's  army  a 
short  distance  above  Carrollton.  The  horse  I  rode 
was  vicious  and  but  little  used,  and  on  my  return 
to  New  Orleans  ran  away  and,  shying  at  a  locomo- 
tive in  the  street,  fell,  probably  on  me.  I  was  ren- 
dered insensible,  and  when  I  regained  consciousness  y/' 
I  found  myself  in  a  hotel  nearby  with  several  doctors 
attending  me.  My  leg  was  swollen  from  the  knee 
to  the  thigh,  and  the  swelling,  almost  to  the  point 
of  bursting,  extended  along  the  body  up  to  the  arm- 
pit. The  pain  was  almost  beyond  endurance.  I  lay 
at  the  hotel  something  over  a  week  without  being 
able  to  turn  myself  in  bed.  I  had  a  steamer  stop  at 
the  nearest  point  possible,  and  was  carried  to  it  on 
a  litter.  I  was  then  taken  to  Vicksburg,  where  I  re- 
mained unable  to  move  for  some  time  afterward. 

While  I  was  absent  General  Sherman  declined  to   Ss^JcS 
assume  command,  because,  he  said,  it  would  con- 
fuse the  records ;  but  he  let  all  the  orders  be  made 
in  my  name,  and  was  glad  to  render  any  assiBtance 
he  could.    No  orders  were  issued  by  my  BtaB. — 
cei1;aiiily  no  important  orders — except  up^^  ^^^" 
^^tation  with  and  approval  of  Shemxan. 
On  the  13th  of  September,  while  I  ^^j^    ^^  ^  ^.%'«^?^ 

s 


^^■U.      IfJJ^^^       AVl/XX     VX      K^^^l/VJUU.h/X7X,     TTXXXXX7       J.      ^V&3  ;% 

^e\r  Qx'leiaiiB,  Halleck  telegraphed  to  ^^g  *<>  * 


ijh' 


**^  HvaxJ^ble  forces  to  Memphis  and  tb.^^„0  ***     Vel 
^^^bia     **^  cooperate  with  Bosecrana  f  ^   ^^  '^trflai*- 
f  ^  %ti^^^«^    On  the  15th  he  t«le^i^sj.^Y.eA  *SbS 
^^9i/^^t^^ilo,hle  forces  to  go  to  Ros^^.  *    0-     \  \ 
"""^fSt^^^  on  the  27th.^    I  was  stm  ^^V^  . 


ooi*  tj*'*-" 


488  PEBSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GBANT 

ch.  XXXIX  my  bed,  unable  to  rise  from  it  without  a43sistance ; 
but  I  at  once  ordered  Sherman  to  send  one  division 
to  Memphis  as  fast  as  transports  could  be  provided. 
The  division  of  McPherson's  corps  which  had  got 
off  and  was  on  the  way  to  join  Steele  in  Arkansas 
was  recalled,  and  sent,  likewise,  to  report  to  Hurt 

^wm"^  but  at  Memphis.  Hurlbut  was  directed  to  forward 
these  ^o  divisions,  with  two  others  from  his  own 
corps,  at  once,  and  also  to  send  any  other  troops 
Ibid.  923  that  might  be  returning  there.  Halleck  suggested 
that  some  good  man,  like  Sherman  or  McPherson, 
should  be  sent  to  Memphis  to  take  charge  of  the 
troops  going  east.  On  this  I  sent  Sherman,  as  be- 
ing, I  thought,  the  most  suitable  person  for  an  in- 
dependent command ;  and  besides,  he  was  entitled 
to  it  if  it  had  to  be  given  to  any  one.  He  was 
directed  to  take  with  him  another  division  of  his 
corps.  This  left  one  back;  but  having  one  of 
McPherson's  divisions,  he  had  still  the  equivalent. 
Before  the  receipt  by  me  of  these  orders  the  bat- 

^^m  ^'  *1^  ^^  Chickamauga  had  been  fought  and  Bosecrans 
forced  back  into  Chattanooga.    The  administration, 

u^luteot  ^  ^^^  *^  *^^  general-in-chief,  was  nearly  frantic 

rai.Twet  ^*  th^  situation  of  affairs  there.    Mr.  Charles  A. 
•®^*       Dana,  an  officer  of  the  War  Department,  was  sent 
to  Rosecrans's  headquarters.    I  do  not  know  what 
his  instructions  were,  but  he  was  still  in  Chatta- 
nooga when  I  arrived  there  at  a  later  period. 

It  seems  that  HaUeck  suggested  that  I  should  go 
to  Nashville  as  soon  as  able  to  move,  and  take  gen- 
eral direction  of  the  troops  moving  from  the  West. 


OBDEBED  TO  REPOKT  AT  CAIBO  489 

I  received  the  following  despatch  dated  October  gh.xxxix 
3d :  "  It  is  the  wish  of  the  Secretary  of  War  that  as  ^-  ^^  J^^ 
soon  as  General  Grant  is  able  to  take  the  field,  he 
will  come  to  Cairo  and  report  by  telegraph.''  I  was 
still  very  lame,  but  started  without  delay.    Arriv- 
ing at  Columbus  on  the  16th,  I  reported  by  tele- 
graph :  "  Your  despatch  from  Cairo  of  the  3d  direct-  x^^ij^g 
ing  me  to  report  from  Cairo  was  received  at  11 :  30 
on  the  10th.  Left  the  same  day  with  staff  and  head- 
quarters, and  am  here  en  route  for  Cairo.'' 


CHAPTER  XL 

FmST  MEETING  WITH  BEC5RETABY  STANTON — GENERAIi 
ROSECRANS — COMMANDING  MILITABY  DIVISION  OP 
MISSISSIPPI — ANDREW  JOHNSON^S  ADDRESS — AB- 
RIVAL  AT  CHATTANOOGA 


Chap.  XL 

W.  R.XXX 
(4)  408,  404 


£.  M.  Stan- 
ton, Atty.- 
Gen.  U.  8. 

Deo.90,1860; 

8eo.  of  War, 

Jan.  16, 1863; 

d.  Deo.  24, 

1869 


John 


THE  reply  (to  my  telegram  of  October  16, 1863, 
from  Cairo,  announcing  my  arrival  at  that 
point)  came  on  the  morning  of  .the  17th,  directing 
me  to  proceed  immediately  to  the  Gait  House,  Louis- 
ville, where  I  would  meet  an  officer  of  the  War  De- 
partment with  my  instructions.  I  left  Cairo  within 
an  hour  or  two  after  the  receipt  of  this  despatch, 
going  by  rail  via  Indianapolis.  Just  as  the  train  I 
was  on  was  starting  out  of  the  depot  at  Indianapolis, 
a  messenger  came  running  up  to  stop  it,  saying  the 
Secretaiy  of  War  was  coming  into  the  station  and 
wanted  to  see  me. 

I  had  never  met  Mr.  Stanton  up  to  that  time, 
though  we  had  held  frequent  conversations  over 
the  wires  the  year  before,  when  I  was  in  Tennessee. 
Occasionally  at  night  he  would  order  the  wires  be- 
tween the  War  Department  and  my  headquarters 
to  be  connected,  and  we  would  hold  a  conversation 
for  an  hour  or  two.    On  this  occasion  the  Secretary 


t^ovk^r^/^        Vv^f     f-L/^ 


^4?  nu^^ 


FIRST  MEETING  WITH   SECRETARY  STANTON  491 

the  special  train  that  had  brought  him  to  Indian-    chap,  xl 
apolis,  and  accompanied  me  to  Louisville. 

Up  to  this  time  no  hint  had  been  given  me  of 
what  was  wanted  after  I  left  Vicksburg,  except  the 
suggestion  in  one  of  Halleck's  despatches  that  I  had 
better  go  to  Nashville  ^  and  superintend  the  opera-  xxx^i)^ 
tion  of  troops  sent  to  relieve  Rosecrans.  Soon  after 
we  started  the  Secretary  handed  me  two  orders, 
saying  that  I  might  take  my  choice  of  them.  The 
two  were  identical  in  all  but  one  particular.  Both 
created  the  "Militaiy  Division  of  the  Mississippi^ 
(giving  me  the  command),  composed  of  the  Depart- 
ments of  the  Ohio,  the  Cumberland,  and  the  Ten- 
nessee, and  all  the  territoiy  from  the  Alleghanies 
to  the  Mississippi  River  north  of  Banks's  command 
in  the  Southwest.  One  order  left  the  department 
commanders  as  they  were,  while  the  other  relieved 
Rosecrans  and  assigned  Thomas  to  his  place.    I  uof&i^v\k. 

._.  "^"X'X.  (4^  404* 

accepted  the  latter.    We  reached  Louisville  after      -van 

^  -    .         Home.!-"® 

night  and,  if  I  remember  rightly,  in  a  cold,  driz-   otT^oT^^^ 
zling  rain.   The  Secretary  of  War  told  me  afterward 
that  he  caught  a  cold  on  that  occasion  from  ^lxi<^^ 
he  never  expected  to  recover.    He  never  di^ 

A  day  was  spent  in  Louisville,  the    S^xe^^'^^ 

giving  me  the  military  news  at  the   ca.pVtB\.  ^jf 

talking  about  the  disappointment  at  tlxe  x^^^  A^g  ^^ 

some  of  the  campaigns.    By  the  evening  4-^^  .  ^  31^^^ 

after  our  arrival  all  matters  of  discnsaioxi        it>^\^ 

exhausted,  and  I  left  the  hotel  to  spend.  t\x^  ^^    .^^ 

away,  both  Mrs.  Grant  (who  was  witlx  ttx^^  ^^^^^  V"^ 

s^lf  bavijjg  relatives  living  in  LoixisviXlef    ^^^^L^ 


492  FEBSONAL  MEMOIBS  OF  U.  &  6BANT 

CHAP.  XL  informiiig  him  that,  unless  prevented,  Bosecrans 
would  retreat,  and  advising  peremptory  orders 
against  his  doing  so. 
Anu,9.iu  As  stated  before,  after  the  fall  of  Yicksburg  I 
urged  strongly  upon  the  government  the  propriety 
of  a  movement  against  Mobile.  Greneral  Bosecrans 
had  been  at  Murf  reesboro*,  Tennessee,  with  a  large 
and  well-equipped  army  from  early  in  the  year 
1863,  with  Bragg  confronting  him  with  a  force 
quite  equal  to  his  own  at  first,  considering  it  was 
on  the  defensive.  But  after  the  investment  of 
Vicksburg,  Bragg's  army  was  largely  depleted  to 
strengthen  Johnston,  in  Mississippi,  who  was  being 
reinforced  to  raise  the  siege.  I  frequently  wrote 
General  Halleck  suggesting  that  Bosecrans  should 
move  against  Bragg.  By  so  doing  he  would  either 
detain  the  latter's  troops  where  they  were  or  lay 
Chattanooga  open  to  capture.  Greneral  Halleck 
strongly  approved  the  suggestion,  and  finally  wrote 
I^Jg^^  me  that  he  had  repeatedly  ordered  Bosecrans  to 
^^^nai-  advance,  but  that  the  latter  had  constantly  failed 
w!^  xxfii  to  comply  with  the  order,  and  at  last,  after  having 
held  a  council  of  war,  had  replied  in  effect  that  it 
was  a  military  maxim  "  not  to  fight  two  decisive 
battles  at  the  same  time."  If  true,  the  maxim  was 
not  applicable  in  this  case.  It  would  be  bad  to  be 
defeated  in  two  decisive  battles  fought  the  same 
day,  but  it  would  not  be  bad  to  win  them.  I,  how- 
ever, was  fighting  no  battle,  and  the  siege  of  Vicks- 
burg had  drawn  from  Bosecrans's  front  so  many  of 
the  enemy  that  his  chances  of  victory  were  much 
greater  than  they  would  be  if  he  waited  until  the 


(1)  7-10 


rT"Urv«        4."U^«^        4^^^^^        ^^«1^        V^ 


GENEBAL  BOSECRANS  493 

the  army  that  was  detaching  troops  to  raise  the    chap,  xl 
siege.    Finally  he  did  move,  on  the  24th  of  June ; 
but  ten  days  afterward  Vicksburg  surrendered,  and 
the  troops  sent  from  Bragg  were  free  to  return* 

It  was  at  this  time  that  I  recommended  to  the    ^SJS^' 
general-in-chief  the  movement  against  Mobile.    I  ^LtPlii 
knew  the  peril  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  was 
in,  being  depleted  continually,  not  only  by  ordi- 
nary casualties,  but  also  by  having  to  detach  troops 
to  hold  its  constantly  extending  line  over  which  to 
draw  supplies,  while  the  enemy  in  front  was  as 
constantly  being  strengthened.    Mobile  was  impor- 
tant to  the  enemy,  and  in  the  absence  of  a  threaten- 
ing force  was  guarded  by  little  else  than  artillery. 
If  threatened  by  land  and  from  the  water  at  the 
same  time,  the  prize  would  fall  easily,  or  troops 
would  have  to  be  sent  to  its  defense.   Those  troops 
would  necessarily  come  from  Bragg.    My  judgment 
was  overruled,  and  the  troops  under  my  command 
were  dissipated  over  other  pai*ts  of  the  country 
where  it  was  thought  they  could  render  tlie  most 
service.  _^««istff* 

Soon  it  was  discovered  in  Washington  tKatB»o^^"    «5»«»^ 
crans  was  in  trouble  and  required  assistance,    ^T^^ 
emergency  was  now  too  immediate  to  aVlo^  y\6  *^ 
give  this  assistance  by  making  an  attaclc  \^       -•  O^ 
Bragg  upon  Mobile.    It  was  therefore  n^o^^    t^  ^^ 
reinforce  directly,  and  troops  were  sent  tirov^x^    e^^ 
available  point.  ^^ 

Uosecrans  had  very  skilfully  manoBrtve^^     -^        ^^ 
south  of  the  Tennessee  Eiver,  and  tliro\:i^>^^^'^^^ 


494  PEESONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GBANT 

Chap.  XL   earlier  would  have  been  partially  compensated.   But 
XXX  ^')  M  ^^  pushed  on,  with  his  forces  very  much  scattered, 
et  seq.      imtil  Bragg's  troops  from  Mississippi  began  to  join 
him.    Then  Bragg  took  the  initiative.    Boseerans 
had  to  fall  back  in  turn,  and  was  able  to  get  his 
army  together  at  Chickamauga,  some  miles  south- 
east of  Chattanooga,  before  the  main  battle  was 
wT  R  xTx  brought  on.    The  battle  was  fought  on  the  19th  and 
^cJSff^'  20th  of  September,  and  Boseerans  was  badly  de- 
w^etseq.  fcated,  with  a  heavy  loss  in  artillery  and  some  six- 
teen thousand  men  killed,  wounded,  and  captured. 
The  corps  under  Major-General  Gteorge  H.  Thomas 
stood  its  ground,  while  Boseerans,  with  Crittenden 
and  McCook,  returned  to  Chattanooga.   Thomas  re- 
turned also,  but  later,  and  with  his  troops  in  good 
order.   Bragg  followed  and  took  possession  of  Mis- 
sionary Bidge,  overlooking  Chattanooga.    He  also 
occupied  Lookout  Mountain,  west  of  the  town, 
which  Boseerans  had  abandoned,  and  with  it  his 
control  of  the  river  and  the  river  road  as  far  back 
as  Bridgeport.      The  National  troops  were  now 
strongly  intrenched  in  Chattanooga  Valley,  with 
the  Tennessee  Biver  .behind  them  and  the  enemy 
occupying  commanding  heights  to  the  ea«t  and 
west,  with  a  strong  line  across  the  valley  from 
mountain    to   mountain,   and  with   Chattanooga 
Creek,  for  a  large  part  of  the  way,  in  front  of  their 
line. 
Sept  1863        On  the  29th  Halleck  telegraphed  me  the  above 
^'&)^^  results,  and  directed  all  the  forces  that  could  be 


R0BECRAN8  AT  CHATTANOOGA  495 

A  retreat  at  that  time  wcoild  have  been  a  terrible   chap,  xl 
disaster.   It  would  not  only  have  been  the  loss  of  a  5?^^,^ 
most  important  strategic  position  to  us,  but  it  would       ^®" 
have  been  attended  with  the  loss  of  all  the  artillery 
still  left  with  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  and  the 
annihilation  of  that  army  itself,  either  by  capture 
or  demoralization. 

All  supplies  for  Eosecrans  had  to  be  brought 
from  Nashville.  The  railroad  between  this  base 
and  the  army  was  in  possession  of  the  government 
up  to  Bridgeport,  the  point  at  which  the  road 
crosses  to  the  south  side  of  the  Tennessee  River; 
but  Bragg,  holding  Lookout  and  Raccoon  moun- 
tains, west  of  Chattanooga,  commanded  the  rail- 
road, the  river,  and  the  shortest  and  best  wagon- 
roads,  both  south  and  north  of  the  Tennessee,  be- 
tween Chattanooga  and  Bridgeport.  The  distance 
between  these  two  places  is  but  twenty-six  miles 

by  rail ;  but,  owing  to  the  position  of  Bragg,  all  « 

supplies  for  Rosecrans  had  to  be  hauled  by  a  V 

circuitous  route  north  of  the  river  and  over  a 
mountainous  country,  increasing  the  distanc©  ^ 
over  sixty  miles.  .     ^uKsgi.<^«°=^ 

This  country  afforded  but  little  food  fox  \iiB  e^^"       ^^^ 
mals,  nearly  ten  thousand  of  which,  "kia^  «l\t^^^ 
starved,  and  not  enough  were  left  to  dra^w-  ».  ft\tV^  -^/^ 
piece  of  artillery  or  even  the  ambulanceB  tic\     xC^^Zt\- 
the  sick.    The  men  had  been  on  hal£-rcLt»lox\  ^^%\J^^^ 
bread  tor  a  considerable  time,  with  "brtti  -g^       \t>^  ^ 
supplies  except  beef  driven  from  NasHA^^^T^  ^  n^^^ 


496 


PERSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 


Chap.  XL  the  lift."  Indeed,  the  Jt)eef  was  so  poor  that  the 
soldiers  were  in  the  habit  of  saying,  with  a  faint 
f  acetiousness,  that  they  were  living  on  "  half-rations 
of  hard  bread  and  beef  dried  on  the  hoof.^ 

Nothing  could  be  transported  but  food,  and  the 
troops  were  without  sufficient  shoes  or  other  cloth- 
ing suitable  for  the  advancing  season.  What  they 
had  was  well  worn.  The  fuel  within  the  Fedei-al 
lines  was  exhausted,  even  to  the  stumps  of  trees. 
There  were  no  teams  to  draw  it  from  the  opposite 
bank,  where  it  was  abundant.  The  only  way  of  sup- 
plying fuel,  for  some  time  before  my  arrival,  had 
been  to  cut  trees  on  the  north  bank  of  the  river  at 
a  considerable  distance  up  the  stream,  form  rafts  of 
them,  and  float  them  down  with  the  current,  effect- 
ing a  landing  on  the  south  side  within  our  lines 
by  the  use  of  paddles  or  poles.  They  would  then 
be  carried  on  the  shoulders  of  the  men  to  their 
camps. 

If  a  retreat  had  occurred  at  this  time  it  is  not 
probable  that  any  of  the  army  would,  have  reached 
the  railroad  as  an  organized  body,  if  followed  by 
the  enemy. 
^^uuSS  *  ^^  *^®  receipt  of  Mr.  Dana's  despatch  Mr.  Stan- 
ton sent  for  me.  Finding  thati  was  out,  he  became 
nervous  and  excited,  inquiring  of  every  person  he 
met — including  guests  of  the  house — whether  they 
knew  where  I  was,  and  bidding  them  find  me  and 
Oct  18, 1868  send  me  to  him  at  once.  About  eleven  o'clock  I  re- 
turned to  the  hotel,  and  on  my  way,  when  near  the 
house,  every  person  met  was  a  messenger  from  the 


CJ^ 4. 


^^^4.1 L^t-l 


ANDKEW  JOHNSON'S  ADDEE8S  497 

ing-gown.     Saying  that  the  retreat  must  be  pre-    chap,  xl 

vented,  he  showed  me  the  despatch.    I  immediately  ^-  JJ  ^^ 

wrote  an  order  assuming  command  of  the  Military 

Division  of  the  Mississippi,  and  telegraphed  it  to 

General  Rosecrans.    I  then  telegraphed  to  him  the 

order  from  Washington  assigning  Thomas  to  the     n>id.  4k 

conmiand  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland ;  and  to 

Thomas  that  he  must  hold  Chattanooga  at  all  haz-     ibid.  479 

ards,  informing  him  at  the  same  time  that  I  would 

be  at  the  front  as  soon  as  possible.    A  prompt 

reply  was  received  from  Thomas,  saying,  "We 

will  hold  the  town  till  we  starve.^    I  appreciated 

the  force  of  this  despatch  later  when  I  witnessed  the 

condition  of  affairs  which  prompted  it.    It  looked, 

indeed,  as  if  but  two  courses  were  open:  one  to 

starve,  the  other  to  surrender  or  be  captured. 
On  the  morning  of  the  20th  of  October  I  started 

with  my  staff  and  proceeded  as  far  as  Nashville.  At 

that  time  it  was  not  prudent  to  travel  beyond  that 

point  by  night,  so  I  remained  in  Nashville  until 

the  next  morning.    Here  I  met  for  the  first  time 

Andrew  Johnson,  Military  Governor  of  Tennessee.  ^.^£^§fS* 

He  delivered  a  speech  of  welcome.    His  composaTe  ^w^;^^ 
^owed  that  it  was  by  no  means  his  maideu  ett-oxV,.  ^^'I;^'^ 
It  "^08  longj  and  I  was  in  torture  ij^lnle  Yie  ^ea  ^^  ?S£^!^ 
^^^Jing  ity  fearing  something  woxjMl  \>^  ^s:iP^*^^  vS^l-S^ 
^^^^  me  i^  response.   I  was  relie-veAi^o^^V^^^'^'^^ 
^I'^Ple^^^^^^^  having  appareix\\5^^^^^1>'5^^^^^ 
2\  ^  e^^^\  they  comiaencea.     0.  fe^^^x^  ^^e  ^^  N«%i^^ 
«o  V/     ^^^'^^  although  tiyin  ^  ^^^-^^  ^^    \V^ 


tyttrillex 


W.  R.  XXX 

(1)836 


498  PERSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GBANT 

CHAP.  XL  department  ought  to  be  fortified,  so  that  they  could 
be  held  with  the  least  number  of  men ;  to  Admiral 
Porter  at  Cairo,  that  Sherman's  advance  had  passed 
Eastport,  Mississippi,  that  rations  were  probably 
on  their  way  from  St  Louis  by  boat  for  supplying 
his  army,  and  requesting  him  to  send  a  gunboat  to 
iMd.  flTo  convoy  them ;  and  to  Thomas,  suggesting  that  large 
parties  should  be  put  at  work  on  the  wagon-road 
then  in  use  back  to  Bridgeport 

On  the  morning  of  the  21st  we  took  the  train  for 
the  front,  reaching  Stevenson,  Alabama,  after  dark. 
Rosecrans  was  there  on  his  way  North.  He  came 
into  my  car  and  we  held  a  brief  interview,  in  which 
he  described  very  clearly  the  situation  at  Chatta- 
nooga, and  made  some  excellent  suggestions  as  to 
what  should  be  done.  My  only  wonder  was  that  he 
had  not  carried  them  out.  We  then  proceeded  to 
Bridgeport,  where  we  stopped  for  the  night  From 
here  we  took  horses  and  made  our  way  by  Jasper 
and  over  Waldron's  Eidge  to  Chattanooga.  There 
had  been  much  rain,  and  the  roads  were  ahnost  im- 
passable from  mud,  knee-deep  in  places,  and  from 
washouts  on  the  mountain-sides.  I  had  been  on 
crutches  since  the  time  of  my  fall  in  New  Orleans, 
and  had  to  be  carried  over  places  where  it  was  not 
safe  to  cross  on  horseback.  The  roads  were  strewn 
with  the  debris  of  broken  wagons  and  the  carcasses 
o.  o.  How-  ^^  thousands  of  starved  mules  and  horses.  At  Jas- 
^McSir  P^^>  some  ten  or  twelve  miles  from  Bridgeport, 
^iSEfSS^L  there  was  a  halt    General  O.  O.  Howard  had  his 


AKRIVAIi  AT   CHATTANOOGA  499 

hamlet  some  ten  or  twelve  miles  farther  on.    The    chap,  xl 
next  day  we  reached  Chattanooga,  a  little  before 
dark.    I  went  directly  to  General  Thomas's  head- 
quarters, and  remained  there  a  few  days,  until  I 
could  establish  my  own. 

During  the  evening  most  of  the  general  officers  oct.  as,  ww 
called  in  to  pay  their  respects  and  to  talk  about  the 
condition  of  affairs.    They  pointed  out  on  the  map 
the  line,  marked  with  a  red  or  blue  pencil,  which 
Rosecrans  had  contemplated  falling  back  upon.    If 
any  of  them  had  approved  the  move  they  did  not 
say  so  to  me.    I  found  General  W.  F.  Smith  occu-   (^Rjalr^ 
pying  the  position  of  chief  engineer  of  the  Army  of  ^'^ilS^;  " 
the  Cumberland.    I  had  known  Smith  as  a  cadet  at  eSJ^VTh^. 
West  Point,  but  had  no  recollection  of  having  met    tien".  voi^ 
him  after  my  graduation,  in  1843,  up  to  this  time.   ^^/V^i^ 
He  explained  the  situation  of  the  two  armies  and 
the  topography  of  the  country  so  plainly  that  I 
could  see  it  without  an  inspection.    I  found  tliat 
he  had  established  a  saw-mill  on  the  banks  of  ^^ 
^1  ver,  hy  utilizing  an  old  engine  found  in  the  neig^* 
^^rfiood;  and,  by  rafting  logs  from  the  north  B^^^ 
J  *ieri\rer  above,  had  got  out  the  lumber  aix^c^^^^ 
P^fte(J  pontoons  and  roadway  plank  for  a.  seC^2^ 
^^^^©^  t>xie  flying  bridge  being  there  already.     ^  ^ 
sf^  ^  ^  x-^'Pidly  getting  out  the  materials  atxd  ^^*^^ 
to^^^^n^   *Xie  boats  for  a  third  bridge,      ^xx  addV*^^^ 
h^J^sA^     ^*=^^^  ^^  ^^^^^  ^ay  a  steanaeir  :Eor  -^^ 
S^o  4:X^^^^^^oog^  and  Bridgeport  wlx^x^^^^^  ^^ 
%i%^^     j^>ossession  of  the  river.    Tlxis  \>oa\.  cO^" 


500  PERSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 


CHAP.  XL  I  telegraphed  to  Washington  this  night,  notifying 
^'oi^w^  General  HaUeck  of  my  arrival,  and  asking  to  have 

General  Sherman  assigned  to  the  command  of  the 
Ibid.  712.759  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  headquarters  in  the  field* 

The  request  was  at  once  complied  with. 


CHAPTER  XLI 

ASSUMIKG  THE  COMMAND  AT  CHATTANOOGA— OPENINO 
A  lilNB  OP  SUPPLIES — BATTLE  OF  WADHATCHIE — 
ON  THE  PICKET-LINE 

^HE  next  day,  the  24th,  I  started  out  to  make   c*^",S 
-*-     a  personal  inspection,  taking  Thomas  and. 
^^ith  with  me,  besides  most  of  the  members  of  my 
personal  staff.   We  crossed  to  the  north  side  of  the 
hiJ7^^'  *°^  moving  to  the  north  of  detached  spurs  of  ^y. 

^^^'  reached  the  Tennessee  at  Brown's  ferry,  some       ^^«,{f 
bv***  ^  miles  below  Lookout  Mountain,  unobserved        ^fS^' 
th      •    enemy.    Here  we  left  our  horses  back  from 
<^  ®  **'^er  and  approached  the  water  on  foot.   There 
gjr®  *  picket-station  of  the  enemy  on  the  oppo- 
®  side,  of  about  twenty  men,  in  full  view,  and 
®   '''"ere    ■within  easy  range.     They  did  not  fire 
Pon  ^g  jj^jj.  gggjjj  ^  |jg  disturbed  by  our  presence. 
Hey  must  have  seen  that  we   "were  aH  commis- 
^^<^tied  oflScers.    But  I  suppose  "they  looked  upon 
^*^^  garrison  of  Chattanooga  as    prisoners  of  -war, 
®^4iiig  or  starving  themselves,  and  tkouglit  it 
''■^^dd  be  inhuman  to  kill  anv    of  tkem  except  m 


502  PEBSONAL  MEMOIRS   OF  U.  S.  GEANT 

CHAP.  xLi  short  rations  that  my  first  thought  was  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  line  over  which  food  might  reach 
them. 

'^oF^^  Chattanooga  is  on  the  south  bank  of  the  Tennes- 
^^^^  see,  where  that  river  runs  nearly  due  west.  It  is 
at  the  northeni  end  of  a  valley  five  or  six  miles  in 
width,  through  which  Chattanooga  Creek  runs. 
To  the  east  of  the  valley  is  Missionary  Bidge,  ris- 
ing from  five  to  eight  hundred  feet  above  the  creek, 
and  terminating  somewhat  abruptly  a  half-mile  or 
more  before  reaching  the  Tennessee.  On  the  west 
of  the  valley  is  Lookout  Mountain,  twenty-two  hun- 
dred feet  above  tide- water.  Just  below  the  town 
the  Tennessee  makes  a  turn  to  the  south  and  runs 
to  the  base  of  Lookout  Mountain,  leaving  no  level 
ground  between  the  mountain  and  river.  The 
Memphis  and  Charleston  railroad  passes  this  point, 
where  the  mountain  stands  nearly  perpendicular. 
East  of  Missionary  Ridge  flows  the  South  Chicka- 
mauga  Eiver ;  west  of  Lookout  Mountain  is  Look- 
out Creek ;  and  west  of  that,  Eaccoon  Mountains. 
Lookout  Mountain,  at  its  northern  end,  rises  almost 
perpendicularly  for  some  distance,  then  breaks  off 
in  a  gentle  slope  of  cultivated  fields  to  near  the 
summit,  where  it  ends  in  a  palisade  thirty  or  more 
feet  in  height.  On  the  gently  sloping  ground  be- 
tween the  upper  and  lower  palisades  there  is  a  single 
farm-house,  which  is  reached  by  a  wagon-road  from 

f.VlA   VSlIIaV  AAfif 


BOSECBANS  BESIEGED  IN  CHATTANOOGA  503 

the  enemy,  who  also  kept  troops  in  Lookout  Valley  chaf.  xm 
west,  and  on  Raccoon  Mountain,  with  pickets  ex- 
tending down  the  river  so  as  to  command  the  road 
on  the  north  bank  and  render  it  useless  to  us.  In 
addition  to  this  there  was  an  intrenched  line  in 
Chattanooga  Valley,  extending  from  the  river  east 
of  the  town  to  Lookout  Mountain,  to  make  the  in- 
vestment complete.  Besides  the  fortifications  on 
Missionary  Bidge,  there  was  a  line  at  the  base  of 
the  hill,  with  occasional  spurs  of  rifle-pits  half-way 
up  the  front  The  enemy's  pickets  extended  out 
into  the  valley  toward  the  town,  so  far  that  the 
pickets  of  the  two  armies  could  converse.  At  one 
point  they  were  separated  only  by  the  narrow  creek 
which  gives  its  name  to  the  valley  and  town,  and 
from  which  both  sides  drew  water.  The  Union  lines 
were  shorter  than  those  of  the  enemy. 

Thus  the  enemy,  with  a  vastly  superior  force,  was 

atrongly  fortified  to  the  east,  south,  and  west,  and 

coinuriai2(jed  the  river  below.    Practically  the  Army 

^'  the  Oumberland  was  besieged.    The  enemy  ha^ 

^^Pped  Tvith  his  cavalry  north  of  the  river  the 

-P^^six^g  of  a  train  loaded  with  ammunitioTX  wad 

k^^^c^i/  ^erixpplies.    The  Union  army  was  shoTt  oi 

S   r^  i(7^   Jzaving  ammunition  enough,   tot  a  day^^ 

^^  ^Or  j^^^^  ordered  parts  of  the  El^v^^\\).  ^^^ 


and  Slocum,  Hooker^irx  oo^^^-^^^^-     ^^S^ 


504  PERSONAL  KEM0IB8  OF  U.  S.  GKANT 

CHAF.xLi  railroad,  where  supplies  could  be  brought  to  them. 
Before  my  arrival,  Thomas  ordered  their  concen- 
tration at  Bridgeport 

General  W.  F.  Smith  had  been  so  instrumental 
in  preparing  for  the  move  which  I  was  now  about 
to  make,  and  so  clear  in  his  judgment  about  the 
manner  of  making  it,  that  I  deemed  it  but  just  to 
him  that  he  should  have  command  of  the  troops 
detailed  to  execute  the  design,  although  he  was 
then  acting  as  a  staff-officer  and  was  not  in  com- 
mand of  troops. 
w.R.xpi      On  the  24th  of  October,  after  my  return  to  Chat- 
tanooga, the  following  details  were  made :  General 
Hooker,  who  was  now  at  Bridgeport,  was  ordered 
to  cross  to  the  south  side  of  the  Tennessee  and 
march    up    by   Whitesides   and   Wauhatchie    to 
Brown's  ferry.    General  Palmer,  with  a  division 
of  the  Fourteenth  Corps,  Anny  of  the  Cumberland, 
was  ordered  to  move  down  the  river  on  the  north 
side,  by  a  back  road,  until  opposite  Whitesides, 
then  cross  and  hold  the  road  in  Hooker's  rear  after 
he  had  passed.    Four  thousand  men  were  at  the 
same  time  detailed  to  act  under  General  Smith 
directly  from  Chattanooga.    Eighteen  hundred  of 
w.B.^^tf^.  them,  under  General  Hazen,  were  to  take  sixty 
oSilcStw,  pontoon-boats,  and  under  cover  of  night  float  by 
gSiI  vSl"  the  pickets  of  the  enemy  at  the  north  base  of  Look- 
^Mai%^S?'  out,  down  to  Brown's  ferry,  then  land  on  the  south 
^  1864       side  and  capture  or  drive  away  the  pickets  at  that 


OPENING  A  LINE  OF  SUPPLIES  505 


On  the  26th  Hooker  crossed  the  river  at  Bridge-  chap,  xu 

RX2 

(1)92 


port  and  commenced  his  eastward  march.  At  three  wR-^xi 


o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  27th  Hazen  moved 
into  the  stream  with  his  sixty  pontoons  and  eigh- 
teen hundred  brave  and  well-equipped  men.   Smith  ^-^^^^ 
started  enough  in  advance  to  be  near  the  river 
when  Hazen  should  arrive.    There  are  a  number 
of  detached  spurs  of  hills  north  of  the  river  at 
Chattanooga,  back  of  which  is  a  good  road  parallel 
to  the  stream,  sheltered  from  the  view  from  the  top 
of  Lookout    It  was  over  this  road  Smith  marched. 
At  five  o'clock  Hazen  landed  at  Brown's  ferry,      ibid.82 
surprised  the  picket-guard,  and  captured  most  of 
it.    By  seven  o'clock  the  whole  of  Smith's  force 
was  ferried  over  and  in  possession  of  a  height  com- 
manding the  ferry.    This  was  speedily  foi-tifled, 
while  a  detail  was  laying  the  pontoon-bridge.    By 
ten  o'clock  the  bridge  was  laid,  and  our  extreme 
right,  now  in  Lookout  Valley,  was  fortified  and 
connected  with  the  rest  of  the  army.    The  two 
bridges  over  the  Tennessee  Eiver, — a  flying  one  at 
Chattanooga  and  the  new  one  at  Brown's  ferry, — 
with  the  road  north  of  the  river,  covered  from.'bot^i 
the  fire  and  the  view  of  the  enemy,  made  tTaa  con- 
nection complete.    Hooker  found  "bixt  sVigkilu  o\i«X»^ 
cie«  in  his  way,  and  on  the  afte>tTiOOii  ol  tltx^^"^ 
^ttierged-  into  Lookout  Valley  at  ■>JI  aMiiia\ic«\aC»  •  ^siss    ^-^ 
^i-^  aia^<^iieA  on  to  Brown's    t^tt^,  ^VAe     ^^1^,  "' 
H^^-^J^^^anded  a  division  in    ^\>ft  "^^^^Mn^     ol  V 

,Sp0^    ^^""^  ^^^  south.    ■:r>\>«  '^''^^^•«* 

^  \:<*-^^r  wa.^  now  on.?!^      S^'   mS  i^o^l^l^  «^^ 


506  PEBSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

CHAP.xLi  Kelly's  feny  the  Tennessee  runs  throngh  a  narrow 
gorge  in  the  mountains,  which  contracts  the  stream 
so  much  as  to  increase  the  current  beyond  the 
capacity  of  an  ordinary  steamer  to  stem  it.  To  get 
up  these  rapids,  steamers  must  be  cordelled ;  that 
is,  pulled  up  by  ropes  from  the  shore.  But  there  is 
no  difficulty  in  navigating  the  stream  from  Bridge- 
port to  Kelly's  ferry.  The  latter  point  is  only 
eight  miles  from  Chattanooga  and  connected  with 
it  by  a  good  wagon-road,  which  runs  through  a  low 
pass  in  the  Raccoon  Mountains  on  the  south  side 
of  the  river  to  Brown's  ferry,  thence  on  the  north 
side  to  the  river  opposite  Chattanooga.  There  were 
several  steamers  at  Bridgeport,  and  abundance  of 
forage,  clothing,  and  provisions. 

^J?S?"  ^^  *^^  ^^y  *^  Chattanooga  I  had  tel^raphed 
*™^  back  to  Nashville  for  a  good  supply  of  vegetables 
and  small  rations,  which  the  troops  had  been  so 
long  deprived  of.  Hooker  had  brought  with  him 
from  the  east  a  full  supply  of  land  transportation. 
His  animals  had  not  been  subjected  to  hard  work 
on  bad  roads  without  forage,  but  were  in  good  con- 
dition. In  five  days  from  my  arrival  in  Chatta- 
nooga the  way  was  open  to  Bridgeport,  and,  with 
the  aid  of  steamers  and  Hooker's  teams,  in  a  week 
the  troops  were  receiving  full  rations.  It  is  hard 
for  any  one  not  an  eye-witness  to  realize  the  relief 
this  brought.    The  men  were  soon  reclothed  and 


OPENING  A  LINE  OP  SUPPLIES  507 

what  the  effect  was  on  the  other  side,  but  assume  chap.xli 
it  must  have  been  correspondingly  depressing.  Mr. 
Davis  had  visited  Bragg  but  a  short  time  before, 
and  must  have  perceived  our  condition  to  be  about 
as  Bragg  described  it  in  his  subsequent  report. 
"  These  dispositions,"  he  said, "  faithfully  sustained, 
insured  the  enemy^s  speedy  evacuation  of  Chatta- 
nooga for  want  of  food  and  forage.    Possessed  of 
the  shortest  route  to  his  depot,  and  the  one  by 
which  reinforcements  must  reach  him,  we  held  him 
at  our  mercy,  and  his  destruction  was  only  a  ques^ 
tion  of  tuney^/bnt  the  dispositions  were  not "  faith- 
fully sustained,"  and  I  doubt  not  but  thousands 
of  men  engaged  in  trying  to  "  sustain "  them  now 
rejoice  that  they  were  not.    There  was  no  time 
during  the  rebellion  when  I  did  not  think,  and 
often  say,  that  the  South  was  more  to  be  benefited  iSl^SdSy 
by  its  defeat  than  the  North.    The  latter  had  the     ^^'^ 
people,  the  institutions,  and  the  territory  to  make 
*  great  and  prosperous  nation.    The  former  ^»& 
burdened  with  an  institution  abhorrent  to  all  cvvtIV- 
^^  people  not  brought  up  under  it,  and  oxxe  ^^^^ 
^®*5*ade<i  labor,  kept  it  in  ignorance,  and  eiiet^^^'^^ 
^  governing  class.    With  the  outside  ^ot^^   ^  - 
y^^^  W*J^  this  institution,  they  could  not  Ixa^^  ^-tr^ 
^^ded    t^^ieir  territory.    The  labor  of   t\ie  co^^S^ 
^uc^t^      skilled,  nor  allowed  to  becoxxxe   ar.  ^^^^^ 

Mt^  ^:^<3^nld  not  toil  without  becoming  ^  iff  ^  H^^ 
k^^a^^^^^^L  ^^^  ^^  ^^^®  denominated.  **  Tk^^^.-^^^ 
S^  ^^1^^  system  of  labor  would  lxa.>r^  slot)-  ^Z^i 


508 


PERSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 


Chap.  XLI 


Jas.  Lonff- 

8tr«et,wrP. 

1888-43; 

Mexioo, 

19i&-iS; 

Brig.-Oen. 

C.  8.  A.  1861; 

M%).-6eii. 

1862;  Lt- 

OeiLl8«8 

W.R.XXXI 

(1)96,  »7 


Ibid,  m 


have  outnumbered  the  masters,  and,  not  being  in 
sympathy  with  them,  would  have  risen  in  theii* 
might  and  exterminated  them.    The  war  was  ex- 
pensive to  the  South  as  well  as  to  the  North,  both 
in  blood  and  treasure,  but  it  was  worth  all  it  cos£\ 
The  enemy  was  surprised  by  the  movements 
which  secured  to  us  a  line  of  supplies.   He  appreci- 
ated its  importance,  and  hastened  to  try  to  recover 
the  line  from  us.    His  strength  on  Lookout  Moun- 
tain was  not  equal  to  Hooker's  command  in  the 
valley  below.    From  Missionary  Ridge  he  had  to 
march  twice  the  distance  we  had  from  Chattanooga, 
in  order  to  reach  Lookout  Valley;  but  on  the  night 
of  the  28th  and  29th  an  attack  was  made  on  Gteary 
at  Wauhatchie  by  Longstreet's  corps.    When  the 
battle  commenced.  Hooker  ordered  Howard  up  from 
Brown's  feny.    He  had  three  miles  to  march  to 
reach  Q-eary.    On  his  way  he  was  fired  upon  by 
rebel  troops  from  a  foot-hill  to  the  left  of  the  road 
and  from  which  the  road  was  commanded.    How- 
ard turned  to  the  left,  charged  up  the  hill,  and 
captured  it  before  the  enemy  had  time  to  intrench, 
taking  many  prisoners.    Leaving  sufficient  men  to 
hold  this  height,  he  pushed  on  to  reinforce  Geary. 
Before  he  got  up,  Gteary  had  been  engaged  for 
about  thi'ee  hours  against  a  vastly  superior  force. 
The  night  was  so  dark  that  the  men  could  not  dis- 
tinguish one  from  another  except  by  the  light  of 

ih(\  f1fljsi}iAR  nf  fViAir  TYinftlrAffl.      Tn  fViA  rlArlrriAftR  atiH 


ON  THE  PICKET-LINE  509 

peded  in  turn.    By  four  o'clock  in  the  morning  the   ohap.xli 
battle  had  entirely  ceased,  and  our  "cracker  line*' 
was  never  afterwai'd  disturbed. 

In  securing  possession  of  Lookout  Valley,  Smith 
lost  one  man  killed  and  four  or  five  wounded.  The 
enemy  lost  most  of  his  pickets  at  the  ferry,  cap- 
tured. In  the  night  engagement  of  the  28th-29th  ^•^)^^ 
Hooker  lost  416  killed  and  wounded.  I  never  knew 
the  loss  of  the  enemy,  but  our  troops  buried  over 
one  hundred  and  fifty  of  his  dead,  and  captured 
more  than  a  hundred. 

After  we  had  secured  the  opening  of  a  line  over 
which  to  bring  our  supplies  to  the  army,  I  made 
a  personal  inspection  to  see  the  situation  of  tlx© 
pickets  of  the  two  armies.   As  I  have  stated,  Cb»'*^ 
^Q-nooga  Creek  comes  down  the  center  of  the  valley 
*^  within  a  mile  or  such  a  matter  of  the  town  ^^ 
^^attanooga,  then  bears  off  westerly,  then  nortt"-- 
^^sterly,  and  enters  the  Tennessee  River  at  tb^ 
^^ot  of  liookout  Mountain.    This  creek,  from  i*^ 
^^Uth  up  to  where  it  bears  ofiE  ^«st,  lay  betweeJX 
**^^  two   lines  of  pickets,  and  the  guards  of  botli 
^^"iiiies  drew  their  water  from  the  same  stream.  As 
^  ^ould    be  under  short-range  fir®  «^d  ^^  ^^  op®^ 
^^Untry,  I  took  nobody  with  me,  except,  I  believe, 
^  ^Ugler,  who  stayed  some  distance  to  the  rear.    I 
^'ode  from  our  right  aroimd  to  our  leit.    'When  I 
^aine  to  the  camp  of  the  picket>guaYd  oi  our  side, 
I  lieard  the  call,  "  Turn  out  th«  guard  ior  the  com- 
landing  general.^     I  replied,      ''iSever   mini  thft 
euard,''  and  tbey  were  dismisse*^  and  went  Taack  to 
their  tents.    Jris±  lia€»k  nf  fh^^.^   und  about  equaUy  ^^^^^er^?** 


510  PERSONAL  HEM0IB8  OP  U.  8.  GRANT 

CHAF.xLi  out  in  like  maimer,  "Turn  out  the  guard  for  the 
commanding  general,"  and,  I  believe,  added,  "  Gen- 
eral Granf  Their  line  in  a  moment  front-faced 
to  the  north,  facing  me,  and  gave  a  salute,  which  I 
returned. 

The  most  friendly  relations  seemed  to  exist  be- 
tween the  pickets  of  the  two  armies.  At  one  place 
there  was  a  tree  which  had  fallen  across  the  stream, 
and  which  was  used  by  the  soldiers  of  both  armies 
in  drawing  water  for  their  camps.  General  Long- 
street's  corps  was  stationed  there  at  the  time,  and 
wore  blue  of  a  little  different  shade  from  our  uni- 
form. Seeing  a  soldier  in  blue  on  this  log,  I  rode 
up  to  him,  commenced  conversing  with  him,  and 
asked  whose  corps  he  belonged  to.  He  was  very 
polite,  and,  touching  his  hat  to  me,  said  he  belonged 
to  General  Longstreet's  corps.  I  asked  him  a  few 
questions, — but  not  with  a  view  of  gaining  any 
particular  information, — all  of  which  he  answered, 
and  I  rode  off. 


CHAPTER  XLII 

CONDITION  OF  THE  ABMY — KEBUILDING  THE  BAILROAD 
— GENERAL  BURNSIDE'S  SITUATION — ORDERS  FOR 
BATTLE — PLANS  FOR  THE  ATTACK — HOOKER'S  PO- 
SITION— SHERMAN'S  MOVEMENTS 


AVINQ-  got  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  in  chap,  ^iai 
a  comfortable  position,  I  now  began  to  look 


H 

after  the  remainder  of  my  new  command.  Bum-  f^w^S 
side  was  in  about  as  desperate  a  condition  as  the  -^SiSe 
Army  of  the  Cumberland  had  been,  only  he  was  R.3^a)' 

^  680 

^ot  yet  besieged.    He  was  a  himdred  miles  from 
tie  nearest  possible  base,  Big  South  Fork  of  the 
^^^^^berJand  River,  and  much  farther  from  any  rail- 
^oad  y^0  2iad  possession  of.    The  roads  back  were 
o^ej*  ^^12X1  tains,  and  all  supplies  along  the  line  \^bA 
kJ^^  ^e0   b^en  exhausted.    His  animalB,  too,  ^^ 
f^^  etaT^^^^  *^^  *^®^^  carcasses  lined  t\ie  tooA 
i^^^  Cfezrxi>«rland  Gap,  and  far  back  toward  ^^^^^|k 
Sh^^  ^^xitjocky.    East  Tennessee  still  tuiti^^^^\, 
^rih%s  ^^    *>^ef,  bread,  and  forage,  bixti  \t  ^  ^^< 
V^^i^^^^^^''^^'*''''''  clothing,  medical   STx^^^ieSi  ^^. 

A//V^>^^^   such  as  coffee,  sugar,  soit^  ai^t^^i.^^     M^^> 


512  PERSONAL  MEMOIBS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

Chap,  xlh  and  thirty  miles  through  a  hostile  country.  His 
entire  command  could  not  have  maintained  the 
road  if  it  had  been  completed.  The  bridges  had 
all  been  destroyed  by  the  enemy,  and  much  other 
damage  done.  A  hostile  community  lived  along 
the  road ;  guerrilla  bands  infested  the  country,  and 
more  or  less  of  the  cavalry  of  the  enemy  was  still 
in  the  West.  Often  Sherman^s  work  was  destroyed 
as  soon  as  completed,  and  he  only  a  short  distance 
away. 

The  Memphis  and  Charleston  railroad  strikes  the 
Tennessee  Eiver  at  Eastport,  MississippL  Kiiow- 
ing  the  difficulty  Sherman  would  have  to  supply 
himself  from  Memphis,  I  had  previously  ordered 
supplies  sent  from  St.  Louis  on  small  steamers,  to 
be  convoyed  by  the  navy,  to  meet  him  at  Eastport 

^*  u)^^  These  he  got.  I  now  ordered  him  to  discontinue 
his  work  of  repairing  roads  and  to  move  on  with 
his  whole  force  to  Stevenson,  Alabama,  without 

^'wotP^  delay.  This  order  was  borne  to  Sherman  by  a 
messenger,  who  paddled  down  the  Tennessee  in  a 
canoe  and  floated  over  Muscle  Shoals;  it  was  deliv- 
oct.1868  ered  at  luka  on  the  27th.  In  this  Sherman  was 
notified  that  the  rebels  were  moving  a  force  toward 
Cleveland,  East  Tennessee,  and  might  be  going  to 
Nashville,  in  which  event  his  troops  were  in  the 
best  position  to  beat  them  there.  Sherman,  with 
his  characteristic  promptness,  abandoned  the  work 
he  was  engaged  upon  and  pushed  on  at  once.  On 
the  1st  of  November  he  crossed  the  Tennessee  at 
Eastport,  and  that  day  was  in  Florence,  Alabama, 
with  the  head  of  column,  while  his  troops  were  still 
crossing  at  Eastport,  with  Blair  bringing  up  the  rear. 


SEBUILDIKO  THE  BAILBOAD 


513 


SbermaD, 

Memoirs,  I, 

869 


cavahy,  artillery,  and  trains,  all  to  be  supplied  by  chap,  xlii 
the  single-track  road  from  Nashville.    All  indica- 
tions pointed  also  to  the  probable  necessity  of  sup- 
plying Burnside's  command  in  East  Tennessee — 
twenty-five  thousand  more — by  the  same  route.    A 
single  track  could  not  do  this.    I  gave,  therefore, 
an  order  to  Sherman  to  halt  General  Q-.  M.  Dodge's 
command,  of  about  eight  thousand  men,  at  Athens, 
and  subsequently  directed  the  latter  to  arrange  his 
troops  along  the  railroad  from  Decatur  north  to- 
ward Nashville,  and  to  rebuild  that  road.   The  road 
from  Nashville  to  Decatur  passes  over  a  broken 
country,  cut  up  with  innumerable  streams,  many 
of  them  of  considerable  width,  and  with  valleys  far 
below  the  road-bed.   All  the  bridges  over  these  had 
been  destroyed,  and  the  rails  taken  up  and  twisted 
by  the  enemy.    All  the  cars  and  locomotives  not 
carried  off  had  been  destroyed  as  effectually  as  tbey 
knew  how  to  destroy  them.    All  bridges  and  ctxl- 
verts  had  been  destroyed  between  Nashville  axx^ 
Decatur,  and  thence  to  Stevenson,  where  theMet^' 
phis  and  Charleston  and  the  Nashville  and  Chatty 
Booga  roads  unite.    The  rebuilding   of  this  TO^^ 
would  give  us  two  roads  as  far  as  Stevenson  o^^^ 
whicli  to  supply  the  army.     From  Bridgeport,    ^ 
short  distance  farther  east,  the  river  supplem©^*^ 
the  road.  ^.^ 

General  Dodge,  besides    being  a  naost   ^wfi^^   ^^^ 
soldier,  was  an  experienced  railtoad-buUder     ^®    /^^^5?^' 
tad  no  tools  to  work  with  except  tlaose  of  tW  t>^^   ^Sti^ 
neers^axes,  picks,  and  spa^cles.  ^ith  these  he^^  ^ 
able  to  intrench  his  men  and  protect  them  ae^i^^* 
sniT)n8e8by  sraall  parties    of  the  enemy.     J^^J^^ 
\        had  Tift  U 0/1  r^i !• . ., 


N 


514  PERSONAL  MEH0IB8  OF  V.  S.  OBANT 

oiAP.  xLn  completed  back  to  Nashville,  the  first  matter  to 
consider  after  protecting  his  men  was  the  getting 
in  of  food  and  forage  from  the  surrounding  conn- 
try.  He  had  his  men  and  teams  bring  in  aH.  the 
grain  they  could  find,  or  all  they  needed,  and  all 
the  cattle  for  beef,  and  such  other  food  as  could  be 
found.  MiUers  were  detailed  from  the  ranks  to 
run  the  mills  along  the  line  of  the  army.  When 
these  were  not  near  enough  to  the  troops  for  pro- 
tection they  were  taken  down  and  moved  up  to  the 

^^*|jgJ2i  ^^  ^^  *^®  road.  Blacksmith-shops,  with  all  the 
iron  and  steel  found  in  them,  were  moved  up  in 
like  manner.  Blacksmiths  were  detailed  and  set  to 
work  making  the  tools  necessary  in  railroad  and 
bridge  building.  Axmen  were  put  to  work  getting 
out  timber  for  bridges  and  cutting  fuel  for  locomo- 
tives when  the  road  should  be  completed.  Car- 
builders  were  set  to  work  repairing  the  locomotives 
and  cars.  Thus  every  branch  of  raih-oad-building, 
making  tools  to  work  with,  and  supplying  the 
workmen  with  food,  was  all  going  on  at  once,  and 
without  the  aid  of  a  mechanic  or  laborer  except 
what  the  command  itself  furnished.  But  rails  and 
cars  the  men  could  not  make  without  material,  and 
there  was  not  enough  rolling-stock  to  keep  the  road 
we  already  had  worked  to  its  full  capacity.  There 
were  no  rails  except  those  in  use.    To  supply  these 

^'%^^^  deficiencies  I  ordered  eight  of  the  ten  engines  Gen- 
eral McPherson  had  at  Vicksburg  to  be  sent  to 
Nashville,  and  all  the  cars  he  had  except  ten.  I 
also  ordered  the  troops  in  West  Tennessee  to  points 
on  the  river  and  on  the  Memphis  and  Charleston 


GENERAL  BUENSIDE'S  SITUATION  515 

Charleston  to  Nashville.    The  military  manager  of  chap,  xm 
raih'oads,  also,  was  directed  to  fm-nish  more  roll-  j-^^-  ^^ 
ing-stock  and,  as  far  as  he  could,  bridge  material,  ^^^^i^  » 
General  Dodge  had  the  work  assigned  him  finished 
within  forty  days  after  receiving  his  orders.    The 
number  of  bridges  to  rebuild  was  one  hundred  and 
eighty-two,  many  of  them  over  deep  and  wide 
chasms ;  the  length  of  road  repaired  was  one  hun- 
dred and  two  miles. 

The  enemy's  troops,  which  it  was  thought  were 
either  moving  against  Bumside  or  were  going  to 
Nashville,  went  no  farther  than  Cleveland.    Their 
presence  there,  however,  alarmed  the  authorities 
at  Washington,  and,  on  account  of  our  helpless  ^'^?^?^* 
condition  at  Chattanooga,  caused  me  much  uneasi- 
ness.   Despatches  were  constantly  coming,  m-giug 
me  to  do  something  for  Burnside's  relief ;  calling 
attention  to  the  importance  of  holding  East  Ten- 
nessee ;  saying  the  President  was  much  concerned      ^^^^^  ^ 
for  the  protection  of  the  loyal  people  in  that  section,  ^^^^^f 
etc.    We  had  not  at  Chattanooga  animals  to  p^^  ^    ^\^*^ 
single  piece  of  artillery,  much  less  a  supply-tr^^^; 
Reinforcements  could  not  help  Bumside,  "becsv^^^  ^ 
^®  had  neither  supplies  nor  ammunition  siiffici^,-^^ 
^^  them  •  lidwJly?  indeed,  bread  and  mectt  lot  **,  ,rt> 
^^^  hehad^       There  was  no  relief  possible  foi  ^^.^^ 
?^^^Pt  hy  e:^I^^^^^  *^^  enemy  frona  IMlissiotx^  ^^*^S^^ 

^^i^r.      .   ^^^^out  Chattanooea.  ^-^ 


I^Q     •;  ^l:?^^t  Chattanooga.  ^^^^^ 

f  ^^  it  .^H      ^^  November  Longstreeti    left  ^ZZ^         ^^\ 
:^^t  J^^f^»*  fifteen  thousand  troox>s,  \^^\^^d^        ^^^ 


^^^^!^Zr:y,—&YQ  thousand  more, to   ^^^»^         ^^^ 


«^\,      i^^^-    The  situation  geemed  a©sper* 


PERSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 

OHAP.xLn  ities  at  Washington  were  now  more  than  ever 
anxious  for  the  safety  of  Bumside's  army,  and 
plied  me  with  despatches  faster  than  ever,  urging 
that  something  should  be  done  for  his  relief.     On 

^'%^f ^^  the  7th,  before  Longstreet  could  possibly  have 
reached  KJaoxville,  I  ordered  Thomas  peremptorily 
to  attack  the  enemy's  right,  so  as  to  force  the  re- 
turn of  the  troops  that  had  gone  up  the  valley.  I 
directed  him  to  take  mules,  officers'  horses,  or  ani- 
mals wherever  he  could  get  them,  to  move  the 
necessary  artillery.  But  he  persisted  in  the  decla- 
ration that  he  could  not  move  a  single  piece  of 
artillery,  and  could  not  see  how  he  could  possibly 
comply  with  the  order.    Nothing  was  left  to  be 

iwd.74.84.w  done  but  to  answer  Washington  despatches  as  best 

Ibid.  79     I  could ;  urgc  Sherman  forward,  although  he  was 

making eveiy  effort  to  get  forward;  and  encourage 

Ibid.  76, 88  Bumside  to  hold  on,  assuring  him  that  in  a  short 
time  he  should  be  relieved.  All  of  Bumside's 
despatches  showed  the  greatest  confidence  in  his 
ability  to  hold  his  position  as  long  as  his  ammuni- 
tion held  out.  He  even  suggested  the  propriety  of 
Ibid.  188  abandoning  the  territory  he  held  south  and  west  of 
EjQOXville,  so  as  to  draw  the  enemy  farther  from 
his  base  and  make  it  more  difficult  for  him  to 
get  back  to  Chattanooga  when  the  battle  should 
begin. 

Longstreet  had  a  railroad  as  far  as  Loudon ;  but 


ORDEBS  FOR  BATTLE 


517 


farthest.  If  you  can  hold  Longstreet  in  check  until  he  chap,  xlh 
gets  up,  or  by  skirmishing  and  falling  back  can  avoid  seri- 
ous loss  to  yourself  and  gain  time,  I  will  be  able  to  force 
the  enemy  back  from  here  and  place  a  force  between  Long- 
street  and  Bragg  that  must  inevitably  make  the  former 
take  to  the  mountain  passes  by  every  available  road  to 
get  to  his  supplies.  Sherman  would  have  been  here  be- 
fore this  but  for  the  high  water  in  Elk  River  driving  him 
some  thirty  miles  up  that  river  to  cross. 


Sherman, 

Memoirs,!, 

860 


And  again  later  in  the  day,  indicating  my  plans  ^'^ijl?^^ 
for  his  relief,  as  follows : 


Your  despatch  and  Dana's  just  received.    Being  there, 
you  can  tell  better  how  to  resist  Longstreet's  attack  than 
I  can  direct.    With  your  showing  you  had  better  give  up 
Eongston  at  the  last  moment  and  save  the  most  produc- 
tive part  of  your  possessions.    Every  arrangement  is  now 
made  to  throw  Sherman's  force  across  the  river,  just  at 
and  below  the  mouth  of  Chickamauga  Creek,  as  soon  as  it 
arrives.    Thomas  will  attack  on  his  left  at  the  same  time, 
and  together  it  is  expected  to  carry  Missionary  Bidge,  and 
from  there  push  a  force  on  to  the  railroad  between  Cleve- 
land and  Dalton.    Hooker  will  at  the  same  time  attack 
and,  if  he  can,  carry  Lookout  Mountain.    The  enemy  now 
seems  to  be  looking  for  an  attack  on  his  left  flank.     This 
favors  us.    To  further  confirm  this,  Sherman's  advance 
division  will  march  direct  from  Whitesides  to  Trenton. 
The  remainder  of  his  force  will  pass  over  a  new  road  just 
made  from  Whitesides  to  Kelly's  ferry,  thus  being  con- 
cealed from  the  enemy,  and  leave  him  to  suppose  the  whole 
force  is  going  up  Lookout  Valley.   Sherman's  advance  "had 
only  just  reached  Bridgeport.    The  rear  will  only  reaeb- 
there  on  the  16th.     This  will  bring  it  to  the  19th  as  th© 
earliest  day  for  making  the  combined  movement  as  desired. 
Inform  me  if  you  think  you  can  sustain  yourself  until 
this  time.    I  can  hardly  conceive  of  the  enemy  breaking' 


fT. 


l^\%    of    17'i*^^^^4^r^.^ 


T4*  t.liPV^ 


518 


PEBSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  S.  GBAKT 


Chat,  xiji  Thomas  has  ordered  a  division  of  cavalry  to  the  vieinity 
of  Sparta.  I  will  ascertain  if  they  have  started,  and  inform 
yon.  It  will  be  entirely  ont  of  the  question  to  send  you 
ten  thousand  men,  not  because  they  cannot  be  spared,  but 
how  would  they  be  fed  after  they  got  even  one  day  east 
from  here  t 


\ 


W.R.XXXI 

a)«7 


Sherman. 

Memoirs,  I, 

860 


Longstreet,  for  some  reason  or  other,  stopped  at 
Loudon  until  the  13th.  That  being  the  terminus 
of  his  railroad  communications,  it  is  probable  he 
was  directed  to  remain  there  awaiting  orders.  He 
was  in  a  position  threatening  KnoxviUe,  and  at  the 
same  time  where  he  could  be  brought  back  speedily 
to  Chattanooga.  The  day  after  Longstreet  left 
Loudon,  Sherman  reached  Bridgeport  in  person  and 
proceeded  on  to  see  me  that  evening,  the  14th,  and 
reached  Chattanooga  the  next  day. 

My  orders  for  battle  were  all  prepared  in  advance 
of  Sherman's  arrival,^  except  the  dates,  which  could 


1  Chattanooga,  Nov.  18, 1863. 
Haj.-Oen.  W.  T.  Sherman  : 
W.B.XXXI       Inclosed  herewith  I  send  you 
W92        copy  of  instruction  8  to  Major- 
General  Thomas.      You  having 
been  over  the  ground  in  person, 
and  having  heard  the  whole  mat- 
ter discussed,  further  instructions 
will  not  be  necessary  for  you.    It 
is  particularly  desirable  that  a 
force  should  be  got  through  to  the 
railroad  between  Cleveland  and 
Dalton,  and  Longstreet  thus  cut 
Ibid.  81       off  from  communication  with  the 


has  been  ordered  here,  which,  if 
it  arrives  in  time,  will  be  thrown 
across  the  Tennessee  above  Chick- 
amauga,  and  may  be  able  to  make 
the  trip  to  Cleveland  or  there- 
abouts. 

U.  S.  Qrant, 
JHqjar-GeneraU 


Chattanooga,  Nov.  18, 18ft3. 

Maj.-Qen.  Gbobos  H.  Thomas, 
Chattanooga : 

All    preparations    should    be 


PLANS  FOB  THE  ATTACK 


519 


not  be  fixed  while  troops  to  be  engaged  were  so  far  chap,  xlu 
away.  The  possession  of  Lookout  Mountain  was 
of  no  special  advantage  to  us  now.  Hooker  was 
instructed  to  send  Howard's  corps  to  the  north  side 
of  the  Tennessee,  thence  up  behind  the  hills  on 
the  north  side,  and  to  go  into  camp  opposite  Chat- 
tanooga; with  the  remainder  of  the  command 
Hooker  was,  at  a  time  to  be  afterward  appointed, 
to  ascend  the  western  slope  between  the  upper 


the  general  plan,  you  understand, 
is  for  Sherman,  with  the  force 
brought  with  him  strengthened 
by  a  division  from  your  command, 
to  effect  a  crossing  of  the  Tennes- 
see Biver  just  below  the  mouth  of 
Chickamauga ;  this  crossing  to  be 
protected  by  artillery  from  the 
heights  on  Uie  north  bank  of  the 
river  (to  be  located  by  your  chief 
of  artillery),  and  to  secure  the 
heights  on  the  northern  extrem- 
ity to  about  the  railroad  tunnel 
before  the  enemy  can  concen- 
trate against  him.  You  will 
eoOperate  with  Sherman.  The 
troops  in  Chattanooga  Valley 
should  be  well  o<meentrated  on 
your  left  flank,  leaving  only  the 
necessary  force  to  defend  fortifi- 
cations on  the  right  and  center, 
and  a  movable  column  of  one 
division  in  readiness  to  move 
wherever  ordered.  This  division 
should  show  itself  as  threaten- 
ingly as  possible  on  the  most 
practicable  line  for  making  an 
attack  up  the  valley.  Your  effort 
then  will  be  to  form  a  junction 
with  Sherman,  making  your  ad- 
vance well  toward  the  northern 


carried,  communications  will  be 
at  once  established  between  the 
two  armies  by  roads  on  the  south 
bank  of  the  river.   Further  move- 
ments will  then  depend  on  those 
of  the  enemy.    Lookout  Valley, 
I  think,  will  be  easily  held  by 
Geary's  division  and  what  troops 
you  may  still  have  there  belong- 
ing to  the  old  Army  of  the  Cum- 
berland.     Howard's   corps  can 
then  be  held  in  readiness  to  act 
either  with  you  at  Chattanooga 
or  with  Sherman.    It  should  be 
marched  on  Friday  night  to  a 
position  on  the  north  side  of  the 
river,  not  lower  down  than  the 
first  pontoon-bridge,   and  there 
held  in  readiness  for  such  orders 
as  may  become  necessary.    All 
these  troops  will  be  provided  with 
two  days'  cooked  rations  in  haver- 
sacks, and  one  hundred  rounds 
of  ammunition  on  the  person  ot 
each  infantry  soldier.      Special 
care  should  be  Uken  by  all  oi*^- 
c«rs  to  see  that  ammunition^^ 
not  wasted  or  unnecessarily  ftr^^ 
away.    You  will  call  on  the  ^^^ 
gineer  department  for  sncli  V^^^i^ 
aratioTiR  as  vou  may  deem  neo^_^^ 


520  PERSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  V.  S.  GRANT 

CHAP.  xLu  and  lower  palisades,  and  so  get  into  Chattanooga 
Valley. 

^^ttie*^**  The  plan  of  battle  was  for  Sherman  to  attack  the 
enemy's  right  flank,  form  a  line  across  it,  extend 
onr  left  over  Sonth  Ghickamauga  River  so  as  to 
threaten  or  hold  the  railroad  in  Bragg's  rear,  and 
thus  force  him  either  to  weaken  his  lines  elsewhere 
or  lose  his  connection  with  his  base  at  Chicka- 
mauga  station.  Hooker  was  to  perform  like  ser- 
vice on  our  right.  His  problem  was  to  get  from 
Lookout  Valley  to  Chattanooga  Valley  in  the  most 
expeditious  way  possible;  cross  the  latter  valley 
rapidly  to  RossviUe,  south  of  Bragg's  line  on  Mis- 
sionary Bidge,  form  line  there  across  the  ridge 
facing  north,  with  his  right  flank  extended  to 
Chickamauga  Valley  east  of  the  ridge,  thus  threat- 
ening the  enemy's  rear  on  that  flank  and  compel- 

Mem'SSSI^,  ling  him  to  reinforce  this  also.    Thomas,  with  the 
^        Army  of  the  Cumberland,  occupied  the  center,  and 
was  to  assault  while  the  enemy  was  engaged  with 
mostof  his  forces  on  his  two  flanks. 

To  carry  out  this  plan,  Sherman  was  to  cross  the 
Tennessee  at  Brown's  ferry  and  move  east  of  Chat- 
tanooga to  a  point  opposite  the  north  end  of  Mis- 
sionary Ridge,  and  to  place  his  command  back  of 
the  foot-hills,  out  of  sight  of  the  enemy  on  the 
ridge.  There  are  two  streams  called  Chickamauga 
emptying  into  the  Tennessee  River  east  of  Chat- 


hooker's  position  521 

were  now  one  hundred  and  sixteen  pontoons  in  the  chap,  xlh 
North  Chickamauga  Eiver,  their  presence  there 
being  unknown  to  the  enemy. 

At  night  a  division  was  to  be  inarched  up  to  that  ^*^^^® 
point,  and  at  two  o'clock  in  the  morning  moved 
down  with  the  current,  thirty  men  in  each  boat.  A 
few  were  to  land  east  of  the  mouth  of  the  South 
Chickamauga,  capture  the  pickets  there,  and  then 
lay  a  bridge  connecting  the  two  banks  of  the  river. 
The  rest  were  to  land  on  the  south  side  of  the  Ten- 
nessee, where  Missionary  Eidge  would  strike  it  if 
prolonged ;  and  a  sufficient  number  of  men  to  man 
the  boats  were  to  push  to  the  north  side  to  ferry 
over  the  main  body  of  Sherman's  command  while 
those  left  on  the  south  side  intrenched  themselves. 
Thomas  was  to  move  out  from  his  lines  facing  the 
ridge,  leaving  enough  of  Palmer's  corps  to  guard 
against  an  attack  down  the  valley.  Lookout  Val- 
ley being  of  no  present  value  to  us,  and  being 
untenable  by  the  enemy  if  we  should  secure  Mis- 
sionary Eidge,  Hooker's  orders  were  changed.  His 
revised  orders  brought  him  to  Chattanooga  by  the 
established  route  north  of  the  Tennessee.  He  was 
then  to  move  out  to  the  right  to  Eossville. 

Hooker's  position  in  Lookout  Valley  was  abso- 
lutely essential  to  us  so  long  as  Chattanooga  was 
besieged.    It  was  the  key  to  our  line  for  suppVy^g 
the  army.   But  it  was  not  essential  after  -t\x©  ^^^^T 
Wa5  dispersed  from  our  front,  or  even     ^tet  tlae 
battle  for  this  pm-pose  was  begun.  Hook^^-f^s  ot^«^ 
therofo^By  were  designed  to  get  his  force  fc^^s*  ^^^^ 
Out  ikf  onutain  and  Chattanooga  Valley,    ^x^d  ^P  ^ 
Missionary  Eidge.    By  crossing  the  no-r-^.U  ^^^^ 


522  PERSONAL  MEMOmS  OF  U.  8.  GRANT 

CHAP.  xLn  Valley  in  rear  of  the  line  held  by  the  enemy  across 
^^we*^  the  valley,  and  would  necessarily  force  its  evacua- 
tion. Orders  were  accordingly  given  to  march  by 
this  route.  But  days  before  the  battle  began  the 
advantages  as  well  as  the  disadvantages  of  this  plan 
of  action  were  all  considered.  The  passage  over 
the  mountain  was  a  difficult  one  to  make  in  the 
face  of  an  enemy.  It  might  consume  so  much  time 
as  to  lose  us  the  use  of  the  troops  engaged  in  it  at 
other  points  where  they  were  more  wanted.  After 
reaching  Chattanooga  Valley,  the  creek  of  the  same 
name — quite  a  formidable  stream  to  get  an  army 
over — had  to  be  crossed.  I  was  perfectly  willing 
that  the  •enemy  should  keep  Lookout  Mountain 
until  we  got  through  with  the  troops  on  Missionary 
fiidge.  By  marching  Hooker  to  the  north  side  of 
the  river,  thence  up  the  stream,  and  recrossing  at 
the  town,  he  could  be  got  in  position  at  any  named 
time;  when  in  this  new  position  he  would  have 
Chattanooga  Creek  behind  him,  and  the  attack  on 
Missionary  fiidge  would  unquestionably  cause  the 
evacuation  by  the  enemy  of  his  line  across  the 
valley  and  on  Lookout  Mountain.  Hooker^s  order 
was  changed  accordingly.  As  explained  elsewhere, 
the  original  order  had  to  be  reverted  to,  because  of 
a  flood  in  the  river  rendering  the  bridge  at  Brown's 
ferry  unsafe  for  the  passage  of  troops  at  the  exact 
juncture  when  it  was  wanted  to  bring  all  the  troops 
together  against  Missionary  fiidge. 
Nov.  15,  IMS      The  next  day  after  Sherman's  arrival  I  took  him, 

— !j."L  n 1-  rm a  a iat j  ^xi nc^^ 


SHERMAN'S  MOVEMENTS  523 

I,  as  well  as  the  authorities  in  Washington,  was  chap,  xlh 
still  in  a  great  state  of  anxiety  for  Bumside's  safe-  ^^^e  of 
ty.    Bumside  himself,  I  believe,  was  the  only  one    ^mJiS 
who  did  not  share  in  this  anxiety.    Nothing  could 
be  done  for  him,  however,  until  Sherman's  troops 
were  up.   As  soon,  therefore,  as  the  inspection  was 
over,  Sherman  started  for  Bridgeport  to  hasten 
matters,  rowing  a  boat  himself,  I  believe,  from  itoSSSTi. 
Kelly's  ferry.    Sherman  had  left  Bridgeport  the       ^ 
night  of  the  14th,  reached  Chattanooga  the  evening 
of  the  15th,  made  the  above-described  inspection 
on  the  morning  of  the  16th,  and  started  back  the 
same  evening  to  huny  up  his  command,  fully  ap- 
preciating the  importance  of  time. 

His  march  was  conducted  with  as  much  expedi- 
tion as  the  roads  and  season  would  admit  of.    By 
the  20th  he  was  himself  at  Brown's  ferry  with  the 
head  of  column ;  but  many  of  his  troops  were  far 
behind,  and  one  division  (Ewing's)  was  at  Trenton,  ^{^^JjS^' 
sent  that  way  to  create  the  impression  that  Look-   ^^i^' 
out  was  to  be  taken  from  the  south.    Sherman    v^nov.' 
received  his  orders  at  the  ferry,  and  was  asked  if  ^iiS^^^ 
he  could  not  be  ready  for  the  assault  the  following     w.  iw ' 
morning.    News  had  been  received  that  the  battle 
had  been  commenced  at  Knoxville.    Bumside  had 
been  cut  off  from  telegraphic  communications.  The 
President,  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  General  Hal- 
ieck  were  in  an  agony  of  suspense.    My  suspense 
yraa  also  great,  but  more  endurable,  because  1  was 
^bero   I  could  soon  do  something  to  relieve  tk^ 


524  PEBSONAL  BCEMOmS  OF  U.  8.  GBANT 

CHJLP.  xMi  move  on  that  date.   But  the  elements  were  against 

us.    It  rained  all  the  20th  and  21st.   The  river  rose 

so  rapidly  that  it  was  difficult  to  keep  the  pontoons 

in  place. 

^MeSrof^*      General  Orlando  B.  Willcox,  a  division  com- 

^JtMic^^  mander  under  Bumside,  was  at  this  time  occupying 

Biig^G«i.   a  position  farther  up  the  valley  than  KJaoxville, — 

^iSif  Bv?'  about  Maynardville, — and  was  still  in  telegraphic 

Aiig.*i.i8M  communication  with  the  North.    A  despatch  was 

received  from  him  saying  that  he  was  threatened 

from  the  east.    The  following  was  sent  in  reply : 

W.RXXXI  If  you  can  communicate  with  Gteneral  Bumside,  say  to 
him  that  our  attack  on  Bragg  will  commence  in  the  morn- 
ing. If  successful,  such  a  move  will  be  made  as  I  think 
will  reUeve  East  Tennessee,  if  he  can  hold  out  Longstreet 
passing  through  our  hues  to  Kentucky  need  not  cause 
alarm.  He  would  find  the  country  so  bare  that  he  would 
lose  his  transportation  and  artillery  before  reaching  Ken- 
tucky, and  would  meet  such  a  force  before  he  got  through 
that  he  could  not  return. 


W.B.XXXI 

(^672 


Meantime,  Sherman  continued  his  crossing  with- 
out intermission  as  fast  as  his  troops  could  be  got 
up.  The  crossing  had  to  be  effected  in  full  view 
of  the  enemy  on  the  top  of  Lookout  Mountain. 
Once  over,  however,  the  troops  soon  disappeared 
behind  the  detached  hills  on  the  north  side,  and 
would  not  come  to  view  again,  to  watchmen  either 

r\in  T.i%/\Vrknf'M"/Miiifoir^  r%^•  r%-n  Tlfiaoi/Miorrr  "R.i^ota   nnf.il 


SHERMAN'S   MOVEMENTS  525 

of  march  to  join  the  troops  on  the  south  side.   His  chap,  xlii 
crossing  was  in  fuU  view  both  from  Missionaiy 
Bidge  and  from  the  top  of  Lookout,  and  the  enemy 
of  course  supposed  these  troops  to  be  Sherman's.  ^S;"^ 
This  enabled  Sherman  to  get  to  his  assigned  posi- 
tion without  discovery. 


END  OF  VOLUME  I 


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THE  BORROWER  WILL  BE  CHARGED 
AN  OVERDUE  FEE  IF  THIS  BOOK  IS 
NOT  RETURNED  TO  THE  LIBRARY  ON 
OR  BEFORE  THE  LAST  DATE  STAM  PED 
BELOW.  NON-RECEIPT  OF  OVERDUE 
NOTICES  DOES  NOT  EXEMPT  THE 
BORROWER  FROM  OVERDUE  FEES. 

Harvard  Coflege  Widener  I 
Cambridge,  MA  02 1 38~l[lf1  t7^pWB.^1  i 


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