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Full text of "The Pretended difficulties in natural or reveal'd religion no excuse for infidelity : sixteen sermons preach'd in the Church of St. Mary-le-Bow, London, in the years 1721 and 1722, at the lecture founded by the Honourable Robert Boyle, Esq"

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V 


i 


L  I  B  11 

A.  K  Y 

' 

Theological    Seminar 

PRINCETON,    N.    J. 

Y  ,  ' 

:    sin//  ■ 

i     Boo/,- 

sea 

D  i  V  i  s  h. 
•    Ho 

The  Pretended  T)tfficuJties  in  Na^ 
tural  or  ReveaVd  Religion 
no  Excufe  for  Infidelity. 

SIXTEEN 

S  E  R  M  O.N  S 

Preach'd  in  the  Church  of 

St.  Mary -^le- Bom,  London ; 

In  the  Years  1721  and   1712  : 

A  T    T  H  E 

Lecture  Founded  by  the  Honourable 
Robert  Boyle,  Efci; 


By  Brampton  Gurdon,  A.  M. 

Chaplain  to  the  Right  Honourable 

Thomas   Earl  of   Macclesfield^ 

Lord  High  Chancellour  ofGnEATBRixAN. 


LONDON: 

Printed  for  RobertKnaplocKj^;?;^^  Biihop's- 
Head;,   m  St.  Paul's  Churchyard.     1725, 


•  V.'     "  ' 


nloDnrJ  "\cs  ^ii^^iS   S^^^\ 


:>^ 


l^dlB^    biWTOVt^ 


TO    THE 

Right    HoNOURA*BLtE 

RICHARD, 

Earl  of  Burlington ; 

The  Right  Reverend  Fathers  in  God, 
Charles  LordBiJhop  o/Winchefter^ 
Edmund  Lord  Bi/hop  of  Lincoln, 
Samuel  Lord  Bi/hop  of  Carlilc, 

AND 

White  Lord  Bijhop  of  7ctQvhovouglu 

TRUSTEES 

Appointed  by  the  moft  Reverend  Father 
in  GOD,  Thomas  late  Lord  Arch- 
bifhop  o^Cdnterbury^  the  laft  Surviving 
Truftee  named  by  the  Honourable    • 

Robert  Boyle,    Efq\ 


Thefe  SERMONS  are  mof^ 

humbly  Dedicated.  \ 


BTWE-'^WOO 


vV;  «a!»«rra^  3t>v 


♦^  ^ 


•  v.iV-     .Ui^J-i 


THE 


CONTENTS. 


3  E  R  M  O  N      I. 

'  H  E  hnfortance  of  the  Dtffute  between  its 

and  the  Infidel.  Pag,  I, 

Soine  Ad'vantages  attending  the  Belief 

of  Religious  Principles.  p.  g. 

Ackno'ivledged  hy  Epicurus.-        p.  7. 

And  hy  all  other  Atheifts  in  their  account  of  the 

frf:  Introdu6iion  of  Religion.  p.  10. 

Religion  lays  no  Rejhaints   upon  us^  but 

for  our  ad'vantage.  p.  If., 

Jhe  Atheifts  Arguments  againfl   it  affe^  only 

Superfiltion,  p.  1-7, 

It  fets  a  Mar^s  mind  eafy  with   regard, 

to  a  future  State.  p.  2r. 

The  Atheift    has    no  reafon    to   make 

Frofelytes,  p.  27. 


A  4 


Sermo^'- 


The  Contents. 


Sermon  s    ir,m^IV,V, 

No   Safety  in  a  Fahb    not  grounded  upon  fomc 

kind  of  Evidence.  p.    5  f. 

Nor  a  Ma7i  always  fafe  in  acting  accord" 

ing  to  his  Opinions.  p.   57. 

Mens    Opinions  ^ofte^tirries   the  <rejult    of 

,tbclr  Vajfions.^  P-    39* 

An  Averfon  to  Superjiltion    one   Moti've    to 

Infidelity.  p.  45. 

Another  Moti've^  the  defire  of  being  un~ 

controuled.  p.  45". 

Such  ^Motives  no  fecurity  agai7tfi  the  appre- 

^  '-henfion  of  Tunijliment.  p.  49. 

2l^  H^^it  of  a.. Car ef id.  Examination   another 

\,     .,C^»fi  of  Infidelity.    ■  P-   5'4- 

Tke  ,  'V'-jpculty.  of  conQ^iving  fame  Terfeciions   in 

Gou.tio  Reafoiifer.  d^lie'vlng  them.  p.6j. 

-,    2>lothing    b:^l^.a  Contradicilon   ctin    jitfiifiz 

.  .fitch  dishlief  p.  64. 

-  iinwateriality  iw piles  no  Contradlclion.     p.  6^. 

C^^  "fht^ ^hiioj«pkerl^  ficnial    of  the.   Creative 

VI  "J    ^^"^'^^'y    ^0'  fi^'^^'^^    ^^    ^'^^'  Atiieift. 

PP|.    h  cannot  be  proved  to  he  impnijiblc.  p.  78, 
^ifmoil-ackno'wlec^cs  many^  tilings,  to  he   true 
ahho'   he  does  not  underfiand  them.     p.  7'9. 


The 


The  Contents. 

The  Being  of  Natural  ani  Moral  Good  and  Evtl 
conjifient  with  the  Being  of  a  good  JPrinci-' 
pie.  p.  8r. 

Tie  Scheme  which   Spinofa  Suhjlltutes    In  the 
place  of  the  Religious  one.  p.   87: 

His   Scheme  encreafes  infiead  of   lejjenlng 
Difficulties.  p.  90, 

Forced  to  alter  the  recel'ved  Notions  of 
Matter.  p.  91. 

To  deny  that   there  is  any  fuch  Thing  in 
Nature  as  a  mutable  Being.       p.   100. 
To  affert    that  Thought  and  Extenfion  are 
the  fame  Thing,  jp.    ror. 

His  NeceJJ'ary   Being  the  SuhjeSl  of  Con^ 
traditions.  p_    107. 

The    other   Atheiftick   Scheme  of   a   Plu- 
rality   of    NeceJJary    Beings    impoj/lifle, 

p.    HI. 

No  'Account  to  he  gi'ven  of  Good  and  E-vil 

by   Spinofa^J   Scheme.  p.    118. 

The  Union   of  GoD    vlth   Man  in    the  Perfon 

of  Christ     will   not    help  out  his  Scheme. 

p.   125, 

No  other   Atheiftick  Scheme   will  account  for 

Good  and  Evil.  p.   116^   &c. 


V.        S  E  R  M  O  N  S     VI, VII,  VIII,  IX. 

Spinofa    could  give    no    Jccoufjt  how   Matter 
I'cafrU  u  he  moved,  p.   ij2. 

Not 


The  Contents. 

-  Nor  Toland  p-oiK  that  it  could  rmx/e 
Itfelf.  p.   lyy. 

7^  contrary  evident  from  its  Idea,  p.  I  y  8_,  &C. 
And  from   fome  appearances  In  Naturt^ 

p.  169. 

The  Oifj'e^iom  againfi  God's  being  the  M.o%)er 

of  Matter,  p.   186. 

Particular    Self-Movers    confifient    with    aji 

Unl'verfal  Mover.  p.   19,2. 

The  Exlfience  of  fuch  particular  Self-Movers 

■  pofihle.  p.  195-. 

Tie  ^Motive  to    Infidelity  on  this  Head  un~ 

.  r     jujilfiahle.  p.  200. 

"^2^(?    accounting   for    Thought      hy     SpinofaV 

Scheme.  p.  21.5, 

T^e  ether  Account  -which  makes  It  to  h^  Figure 

md  Motion  cannot  be  true.    p.  2i8_,&c. 

Delcartes  might  give  occafion  to  this  lafi  O- 

pinion.  p.  224. 

Farther    dlfprovd  from    the  Simple   Nature 

of  Thought.  '  p.  228, 

The  Charge  of  .Difficulties    retmned.  upon  the 

"Terfoxallty  proved    to    be  Imfofflble    on     any 
;;  Foot  of  Atheifm.  p.  244^  &c. 

Thi  Union  of  Material  'with  Immaterial  can- 
'  not  be  provd  tmpojfible.  p.   2^0. 

The~    main    Indacement    to     Atheifm    taken 
'    fi^viiy■'  P-  2jr. 

SERMON 


TJ^  Coiitents, 

Sermon    X. 

jmMr  Proof  of  the  AtfieiftV   Unreafinabk- 

vefs  in   complaining   of  Difficulties,     p.  268. 

He   cm  helieve    undireked  Jl^otions    Jhall  pro-^ 

dffce  d  Regular  Work,  p..  270^' 

_^    That    a  Compofition  of  Being  Jliall  be  a 

c  :,     i>^ecejfary   Being.  P-^JT- 

That  all  the  J)iv&rfity  which  appears  in  the 

,llea'vens   is  necejjary.        p.  277  &c. 

'  X^f/^«    and  Contrivance    provd  from  the 

Earth'' s  Annual  Motion.  p.   284. 

From  the  Vro^ijkn  made  for  Animals   ttp" 

on  our  Earth.  p,  287. 

Our  Ignorance  of  the  Ufcs  of  fo?m  Things  no 

Reafon  for  denying  the  Ufes  of  other  Things 

"ivhich  -we  do  know,  p^  2^0. 

Sermon    XI. 

ne  Atheift'^  Denial  of  Moral  Diff^ef^ces  uhm 
reafonable.  ...      ^,,  p.   ^^j^ 

.     Bis  Denial  will  not  prove  then,  are  none. 

p.   506. 

A  wrong  as  well  as  a  right  Tafie  in  judg- 
ing of  thofe  Differences.  p.   509, 
TheThilofophers  acknowledg'd  fuch  Differences. 

p.   310* 

Even 


The  Contents. 

Even  f/Sf  Epicureans.  p.  5i2. 

They    were   -taken  for  granted  hy  Legijla- 

tors.  p.   314- 

Wicked  Men  bear  their   Tefilwony  in  behalf  of 

them.  P-    319- 

What  Reafoft  for  believing  they  appear  fuch  to 

God  Of  to  us.  p.  325. 


Sermon     XII.  v 

"T^tf  Infiderj   Plea   for    not   en^tdring  into  the 

Merits  of  any    Revelation.  p.    3^1. 

Jhe  Poffibflity   ^f    Miracles  proved,     p.    558. 

Thay  we  a  good   Proof  of  a  Divine  Mi(Ji67j, 

■V    .'-'5    ■    --  >   ■  p.    341. 

"^ht  'living  Lift   to  a  Dead  Body  no  Ejf'ect  of 

^ny  lament  Powers  in  Nature.  p,    542. 

^■|f  h  could-  be    an   Pffe^  cf  any  fuch  Powers ^ 

'•■-      it  -would  not   account  for  oisr  Saviour'j 

Miracles,    .1  '  .-^  '■  •->  "^      p.    346. 

Jt  cannot  be^  done    by  any  Agcfits    inferior  to 

■^■'     Qni).:       -  -  p.  J49. 

7^  Converfon  of  the   Magicians   Rod    into 

'   .^Sei-pentSy  .fiot  real.      a    i;Vr  p.   gj-i. 

•  "iNaPrttof  that  ApoUonius  raised  a  dead  Per- 

'■'^-   fon   io  Lifu  -..  .  ::■   ;    .-.,    ..  p.    55'4. 

O^r  Lord's   Difclples  able  to  judge  whether 

n^\4fUvr^'ifSi7ig\dead   he ^  came   ta  lafe  again. 

c    ...  Tbe\T 


The  Contents. 

Their  fometimes  not  knowing  him^    m  Vroof 
/<  of     his    not    being    the   fame    J^erfon*. 

■  -^iVj^  ;vfcAy  -i^vit  ??uV.  p)»x'3^r 


Sermons    XIII,  XIV. 

Another  OhjeUlon  againfi  Revelation  confder'^d. 

p.   570. 

Faith  CiY  yjuthority  jJ]e^'n  to  he  a  proper  Ground 

of  Terfuafion.  p.   'i^'']6- 

Ihat  in  Fa5i  the  Chrifiian  Religion  puts  an  End 

to  many  Controverfies  of  A^oment.     p.   279, 

To  many  wicked  VraBices.  p.   585"^    299. 

The  Differences   among  Chriftians_,    2Z);// 

TUit  invalidate  this  Vroof.  p.   289. 

The  Way  of  Authority   better  fitted  for  the  In- 

firu5iion  of  the  lower  Sort  of  People,   p.   292. 

I'he  Benefit  of  Preachifig  as   performed  in   cur 

:^.ifhurches.  p.  404. 

The  Philojophers  did  not  teach  Religion  in  their. 

Schools,  p.  ^06, 

The  Heathen  Paefs    taught  no  Morality. 

The  Number  of  Churches    'vaflly    greater    and 
better  dlfpofed  than  the  Schools  for  Philofophy. 

p.  409. 
Julian  the  Apofiate  fenfble  of  thefe  Advantages, 

p.  4"- 
IVhy  no  Revelation    has  yet  been  JJniverfal^ 

p.  412. 
7hat 


^The  Contents. 

Thnt  God    was  not  ohliged  to  maie  any  Re^ 

'^Velation.         -^   ;^  p.  415-. 

l%at  He  has  promlfed   the  Chriftian  Jhall  be 

Uni'verfal.  p,  418. 

l>Jot  preached    at  firfi  to  all ,    hecaufg   all  ?iot 

(qualified  for   receiving  it,  p.  aio. 

Whf  not  in  America.  p,  424. 

•      Why   not  to  the  Chincfc.  p.  425*. 

'  W<?   Word    in    the  Chinefe   Language    -wili 

expre/s  the  Word  God.  p.  426. 

\/idvice  to  the  Deilt  to  examine  hefm'e  he 
makes  a  Jefi  of  our  Religion.       p.  428. 


Sermons     XV,  XVI. 

^0  Keafifi  fir  fufieWng  the  Jpojlles  Teftimo- 
ny   concerning   Gofpel    Miracles,      p.  45-7. 

That  no  worldly  Purpofes  could  be  fer^ved  by 
giving  fnch  a  Teftimony.        p.  459J  &c. 

}sor  no  Trobahility  9f  their  being  able  at  that 
Time  to  impofe    upon   the  IVorld,        p.  45:0, 

The  Falfe  Miracles  of  the  Vlth  and  folio-wing 
Centuries  no  Reafon  for  fufpecilng  Gofpei 
Miracles,  p.  45'4. 

T^^Xhriftian  Religion  preached  at  the  Time 
mentioned  in  our  Gofpels.  p.  461. 

IVJjat  Evidence  for  the  Conveyance  of  the  Chri« 
ftian  Religion  from  the  Apofles  to  our 
Times.  p.  469, 

Tljat 


The  Contents. 

"fhat  feme   of  them  "writ  Gofpels  as  ivell 

^^-^   as  ^reached,  P*  470. 

V^his  confirmed  hy  ?i6^  Teftimony  of  He- 

The  Ebionites  made  ufe  of  St.  J^atthew  j 

'^^fi^^-  p.  47^ 

Tfhjy  the  Gofpel   they  ufed   was  thought   to 

■^''\'be  an  Apocryphal  Gofpel,  p.  475-. 

T^e  many  D^ffevfncs^s  from   the   Greek  Cofy 

accounted  for^  p.  477, 

?''''"Mark  a7td\.\xkQ^t   Cofpcls  fuppe/d  td  ha^ue 

recei'ved  jhe  A^proi^ation  ^  <?«,;  Afofile, 

p.  481'. 

No  fuch  Troof  for  the  Epifiks  of  Barnabas 

and  Clemens.  p.  48;. 

Out  Greek  Copies  could  not    he    alter  d  fe 

much    as   the  Ebionites  Hebrew  Copy.. 

p.  484, 
lie  Gofpel  of  Barnabas  a  Spurious  Piece, ^ 

p.  487.' 
None  hut  our  Four  Gofpels  had  an  undonhi^. 
cd  Authority.  p.  491, 

How    it    might    happen^    that  falfe   Gofpels^ 

might  pafs  for  a  Time,  p.  492. 

Jhe  True  Reading  of  the  Four   Golpels    to  be 

found  in  feme  Copy  at   this  Day.      p.  49  S, 

Hereticks  could  not  c^qrrupt  all  the  Copies   of 

the  New  Teftament,  ,  p.  499, 

7J;e  Conclufion,        -^"^  •^•'  ^    ^^^^ 


ERRATA, 


^&&uu^(^i^»i!^&^u^^*dS^w>^^^Suu 


ERRATA. 

pAGE  94.  line  15  infcrt  not.  p.    183.  1.  15.  dele 
and,  p.  a6a.  1.   19-  «/for  ij*.  p.  461.  1.  9.  dele 
ftfne. 


^1f:^^^f^^W?l"i^¥'fWW¥*l'*# 


S£RM« 


( I ) 


SERMON  I. 

I  Timothy  IV.  8. 

- —  Godlinefs  is  profitable 
unto  all  Things,  having 
the  Vromife  oj  the  Life 
that  now  is^  and  of  that 
which  is  to  come. 


H  E  Subjefl:  which  I  pro- 
pofe  to  difcoLirfe  upon  is 
of  the  laft  Importance  and 
Concern  for  all  of  us  to  be 
fatisfy'd  in ;  for  'tis  no  lefs 
than  this, 

I.  Whether   Men   at  firft  either 

grew  out  of    the  Earth  fpontaneouil/ 

as  Trees  ;     or   that    there    has    been 

B  Ahvajs 


Sermon    i. 

always  a  SuccefTion  of  Men  and  Wo-- 
ftien  upon  Earth,  propagated  after 
the  fame  manner,  as  they  are  at  pre- 
sent ;  or  whether  a  Wife  and  Intelli- 
gent Being  fent  us  into  this  World. 

2.  Whether  we  are  to  go,  as  the 
Materialifi  contends  for,  to  the  Place 
quo  non  nati  jncera ;  or  whether,  as  the 
religious  Man  beheves  ,  there  is  to 
be  another  State  of  Beins;  for  us  after 
this  Ihort  Thread  of  Life  is  wound 
oE 

I F  any  Prejudices  were  allowable, 
they  would  certainly  be  in  this  Con- 
troverfy  between  Us  and  the  Atheifls^ 
where  all  the  Advantages  to  Mankind 
are  on  the  Side  of  Religion;  and  no- 
thing but  Darknefs  and  Defpair  in  the 
.Atheiji\  Scheme  of  Things.  The  Pro- 
iitablenefs  of  Godlinefs,  or  of  living 
under  a  Senfe  of  religious  Principles^ 
and  the  Unprofitablenefs  of  Infidehty, 
may  be  made  very  plain  to  us,  tho' 
we  fliould  fiippoie  that  we  may  be  mi- 
ftaken  in  believing  them  true.  And 
jR)r  thefe  Reafons : 

I.  Because 


Sermon    I. 

1.  Because  nothing  but  fuch  a  Be- 
lief can  cany  a  Man  thro'  the  Diffi- 
culties and  Miferies  that  human  Life 
is  fubjed  to. 

2.  Because  the  Belief  of  religious 
Principles  retrains  a  Man  from  no  En- 
joyments but  fuch  as  would  be  hurtful 
to  him  and  make  him  uneafy. 

^  Because  living  under  a  Senft 
of  Religious  Principles  will  make  a 
Man's  Mind  eafy  with  regard  to  any 
Apprehenfions  of  a  Future  State* 

I.  That   nothing  but  the  Belief  of 
•Religious  Principles,  'viz.    of  G  o  d  and 
a  Providence  can  carry  a  Man  through 
rile   Difficulties  and  Miferies  that  Hu- 
man Life  is   fubjea    to.      If   a    Man 
makes    the  leaft   Reflexion    upon    the 
State  and  Condition    of  his   Life,     he 
will  prefently  fee  that  he  has  not  fuf= 
ficient  Power  of  himJelf  to  procure  his 
own  Happinefs.     That  there  are  many 
Things    which  are    able  to  hurt  him, 
and  he  ndtliQi'  knows   how    to  fecure 
iiimfelf  againll  them,  or  to  acquit  him=. 
Cd^  of  them,    when  they  have  attacked 
him»  There  are  many  Evils  he  muil  own 
B  2  .him" 


Sermon    l 

liimfelf  obnoxious  to,  becaufe  he  fees 
ochers  opprefs'd  by  them.  If  there  was 
no  G  o  D  or  Providence  to  have  Re* 
courfe  to  in  this  difagreeable  Profped 
of  Things  thofe  whom  we  all  of  us  al- 
low to  be  Animals  inferior  to  ourfelves 
would  have  greatly  the  Advantage  of 
him,  for  as  they  have  no  Forefight  of 
Future  Evils,  fo  they  could  have  no 
Forethought  about  them,  nor  torment 
themfelves  with  any  Fears  of  what 
may  be  hereafter  ;  whilft  our  conti- 
nual Anxiety  and  Solicitude  about  Fu- 
ture Evils  would  make  the  Life  of 
Man  appear  to  be  a  Scene  of  Things 
perfeftly  difmal  and  without  any  kind 
of  Hope,  if  nvithout  a  God  in  the  World, 
The  Author  of  the  CharaQ:erifticks 
has  fairly  own'd  that  there  cannot  be 
a  Compleat  Virtue  without  Piety  or 
the  Belief  of  a  God  and  Providence, 
that  thofe  Virtues  which  fliould  fup- 
port  us  in  Adverfity,  fuch  as  Fortitude, 
Patience  and  Contentment  under  our 
Condition,  would  probably  lofc  their 
Etfeds  upon  us,  if"  we  had  nothing  to 
trufl:  to  but  Chance  or    a    blind   JSIe- 

cefTity  • 


S  £  R  M  O  N     I.  5 

eeflity  ;  that  they  would  be  convert- 
ed into  a  natural  Kind  of  Spleen  and 
Abhorrence  of  every  Thing  in  the 
World,  and  imbitter  our  Tempers  to 
that  Degree  as  to  ruin  the  very  Prin- 
ciple of  all  Virtue ,  fo  as  inftead  of 
Fortitude  and  Patience ,  the  Atheifis 
Scheme  in  his  Opinion  would  produce 
Impatience  and  Rage,  "  Nothing, 
^'  Jays  he^  ^  indeed  can  be  more  me- 
-'  lancholy  than  the  Thought  of  living 
^'  in  a  diifraQied  Univerfe  from  whence 
•*'  many  Ills  may  be  fufpeded  ,  and 
''  where  there  is  nothing  that  can  ra ife 
"  any  PafTion  befides  that  of  Contempt, 
"  Hatred  or  Dillike.  Such  an  Opinion 
"  as  this  may  by  Degrees  imbitter  the 
**  Temper  and  help  to  impair  and  ruin 
"  the  very  Principles  of  Virtue ,  " 
Speaking  of  the  Belief  of  a  God  and 
Future  State,  he  fays  -!-,  "  by  Virtue 
"  of  this  Belief  Man  may  retain  his 
*^  Virtue  and  Integrity  even  under  the 
"  hardeii  Thoughts  of  Human  Na- 
B  5  "  true  '\ 


*   Enquiry    concerning  Virtue,    p.  70.       f  lb  hi 
yol.  2,  p.  71, 


Sermon    I. 

"  ture  ",  but  in  the  other  Scheme, 
"  upon  difaftrous  Occafions  and  under 
"  the  Circumllances  of  a  hard  and  cala- 
''  mitous  Fortune  'tis  fcarce  poffible 
"  to  prevent  a  natural  Kind  of  Ab- 
"  horrence  and  Spleen  ''^.  And  in  ano- 
ther Place,  "  That  'tis  not  poiTible 
*'  to  retain  the  fame  Firmnefs  or  Con- 
"  flancy  of  Mind ,  which  Pvehgion 
"  would  naturally  give  a  Man  f  ". 
Thus  we  fee,  if  this  Author's  Obfer- 
vations  (who  has  no  fmall  Credit  with 
Our  Free-thinkers)  have  any  Weight 
in  them,  what  mull:  be  the  Behaviour 
of  a  Man  in  Adverfity,  and  what  mufi: 
be  commonly  expected  from  one  that 
afts  upon  the  Atheidick  Scheme  :  In- 
ftead  of  Coniiancy  and  Firmnefs  of 
Mind  under  Afflidions,  we  muft  ex- 
peel  to  find  the  A.he/Jl  raging  and  cur- 
ling his  Stars,  ading  more  like  a  Mad- 
man than  a  wife  and  fober  Perfbn , 
we  miuii:  exped  that  he  fliould  lofe 
his  Temper  ,  grow  foure  and  melan- 
choiv,  and  confequently  uneafie  to  him- 

'  Page   73.  t  Page    75. 


Sermon   I.  7 

felf,  and  every  one  that  has  any  Thing 
to  do  with  him.  And  is  not  this  a 
Charming  Profpe8:  of  Things  ,  and 
enough  to  induce  a  Man  to  part 
with  his  Rehgious  Principles,  that  in^ 
ftead  of  behaving  under  Afflictions  with 
Decency  and  Dignity,  if  we  will  turn 
Atheifis  we  may  hope  to  lofe  our 
Tempers,  grow  impatient,  contract  a 
Sort  of  Diflike  and  Abhorrence  of  e- 
very  Body  and  every  Thing :  But  if 
we  delire  to  keep  our  Tempers  in  all 
States  of  Life,  and  to  do  nothing  that 
we  fliall  have  Reafon  to  be  ailiamed 
.of,  we  muft  hve  and  a8:  with  a  View 
to  the  Principles  of  Religion ;  it  being 
impoflible  with  any  other  Principles  to 
keep  up  a  good  Compofure  of  the  Af- 
fedions,  or  any  Uniformity  ia  our 
Minds  as  the  above  mentionM  Author 
obferves. 

Epicurus  himfelf  could  not  for- 
bear faying,  that  he  thought  it  better 
to  believe  the  Fable  of  the  Heathen 
Gods  than  to  fubmit  to  that  blind  Ne= 
cefTity  which  our  Modern  Atheifts  feem 
to  be  fo  fond  of  Qn.  his  Letter  to  M^? 

B   4  iJ2C§^    . 


8  Sermon    I. 

mcxus  given  us  by  Diogenes  hxentas  m 
his  Life)  becaufe,  he  fays,  there  is 
Hopes  that  the  Gods  may  be  prevail- 
ed upon  by  Worfhip  and  Prayer,  but 
the  other,  viz,  NecelTxty  is  deaf  and 
inexorable  to  all  Applications  ^.  And 
tho'  he  did  not  much  mend  the  Matter 
by  his  introducing  the  Clinamen  or  Ob- 
lique Motion  of  his  Atoms,  in  order  to 
fecLire  the  Liberty  of  our  Minds,  yet 
the  Force  of  Truth  extorted  this  Con- 
feflion  fi-om  him,  that  the  Fatality 
which  Leucipp!^  and  'Democritm  had  in- 
troduced, and  which  is  ftill  maintained 
by  our  Athafis  did  reduce  Mankind 
to  a  moft  hopelefs  and  miferable  [Con- 
dition ;  that  it  would  be  even  better 
to  embrace  Superftition  for  fuch  was 
the  Heathen  Mythology,  than  to  be 
tied  down  to  the  Laws  of  an  unre- 
lenting NeceflTity. 

The 


Ortj",    n  <j^  ^v(7ix,uv    (meaning  the  Stolcks)    ei^uctgiA- 
AvciyKiiy. 


Sermon  I. 

The  Athetfi  when  he  is  called  up- 
on to  give  an  Account  of  the  general 
Confent  of  Mankind  in  the  Behef  of 
a  G  o  D  and  Providence  is  forced  to 
affign  fuch  Reafons  for  it  as  plainly 
fhew  him  very  fenfible  of  the  Profita- 
blenefs  of  Godhnefs  or  Religious  Prin- 
ciples, as  firft  ^,  When  he  accounts  for 
the  Introdudion  of  Religion,  by  Mens 
Fears  and  Solicitude  about  Future  E- 
vents ;  he  muft  own  it  to  be  his  Opini- 
on that  it  would  be  for  the  Benefit  of 
Mankind  that  fome  Being  fliould  exift 
who '  could  order  and  difpofe  of  all  E- 
vents,  to  whom  Men  might  addrefs 
themfelves  for  Rehef,  and  in  whom 
they  might  take  Refuge,  as  being  able 
to  proted  them  againft  every  Acci- 
dent. Whereas  the  Fear  and  Concern 
about  Future  Events  which  themfelves 
fuppofe  to  be  natural  to  us,  would  en- 
creafe  upon  us,  grow  worfe  and  worfe, 
if  we  were  once  perfuaded  that  Fu- 
ture 'Events  were  under  no  Diredion 
but  fubjecl  to  the  Caprices  of  Fortune 
or  what  would  be  as  bad  for  us,  the  un- 
alterable 

*  Primus  in  orbe  Decs,  fecic  timor. 


lo  Serjmon    I. 

alterable  Laws  of  a  blind  and  un- 
thinking NecelTity,  becauie  in  fuch  a 
Cafe  there  is  nothing  to  apply  to,  no- 
thing to  truft  in :  For  as  thefe  Athei- 
flical  Deities  bring  about  every  Tiling 
without  knowing  all  the  while  what 
they  are  doing,  it  can  be  to  no  Pur- 
pofe  to  make  any  Application  to  them 
or  hope  for  any  Relief  from  them.  In 
order  to  amend  this  ill  State  of  Things 
the  At  he  i ft  tells  us  Mankind  found  out 
this  Expedient  of  making  themfelves 
believe  that  there  muit  be  fome  other 
Agent  beiides  this  material  World  , 
which  they  were  fure  could  not  help 
them ',  and  tho'  they  could  not  fee  him 
doing  any  Thing  that  yet  he  did  all, 
direded  the  Motions  of  the  Heavens, 
manag'd  all  Events  here  upon  Earth, 
and  was  able  and  ready  ro  relieve  his 
Creatures  when  they  called  upon  him 
for  Help.  What  Proof  v^-e  have  for 
a  G  o  D  fhall  be  afterwards  fnewn,  by 
which  it  will  appear  to  (land  upon 
the  bed:  of  Evidence,  -and  th-retbre 
that  Fear  was  not  the  onely  Caufe  of 
introducing  Religion  among  Alen.     It 

is 


Sermon    I.  Il 

IS  enough  for  my  prefent  Purpofe  that 
we  have  the  J^'heifi  acknowledging  the 
Advantages  of  Rehgious  Principles  for 
ilipporting  Men  againft  the  Fears  of 
Future  Evils ,  and  confequently  the 
Being  of  a  God  and  Providence  is 
what  of  all  Things  ought  to  be  de- 
fired  and  wifli'd  for  by  us   all. 

Another  Account  they  arc  woiit 
to   give    of   the   General    Confent    of 
Mankind    in   the  Belief   of   a  God  is 
that  Legiflators  and  Politicians  perfuad- 
ed  Men  there  was  a  G  o  d    as  fuch  a 
Perfuafion  was  thought  to  be  the  beft 
Means    of  keeping  Societies  in   order 
and  in  Obedience  to  the  Laws.     This 
too  is    a  plain  Acknowledgment  from 
them   of   the  Profitablenefs  of  Religi- 
ous   Principles,    fince  the  wifefl  Men 
fuch  as  the  Founders  of  States  were, 
faw  no  Way  of  fecuring  the  Peace  of 
Societies  but    by    making   the    Princi- 
ples of  Religion  a  Part  of    the  Civil 
Conrtitution  ;    and  Mr.  Hol?h    tells  us 
how  thofe  Religious   Principles  prefer- 
ved  the  Peace  of  Societies  in  as  much 
as  the  People    v/hen  they  were  under 

any 


12  Sermon   I. 

any  Misfortunes  or  Calamities ,  and 
were  therefore  moft  inclined  to  Mu- 
tiny ,  would  not  blame  their  Gover- 
nors f  but  rather  attribute  their 
Misfortunes  to  iheir  Want  of  Refpett 
to  G  o  D  ,  to  their  OmiiTion  of  fome 
Religious  Inftitution  or  fome  Miftake 
in  performing  it.  I  think  a  higher 
Commendation  of  Religious  Principles 
cannot  poflibly  be  given  than  the  ma- 
king them  neceffary  to  the  Peace  of 
Societies.  And  the  Hobbtji  above  all 
others  muft  acknowledge  the  Necef- 
fity  of  imbodying  for  our  mutual 
Security  ,  becaufe  according  to  his 
Scheme  y  every  Man  is  an  Enemy 
to  every  other  Man  in  a  State  of 
Nature.  Every  Man  has  a  Natural 
Right  to  whatever  he  can  get  by 
any  Methods  what  foe  ver  ;  there  be- 
ing according  to    him  no   fuch  Thing 

as 


\  Per  has  fimilefq;  Iqftitutiones  ad  finem  fuum, 
nempe  Pacem  Civitatis,  hoc  raltem  obtinueiunt, 
ut  populus  Calamitatcs  fuas  Errori  allcui  vel  ne- 
gleftui  In]  agendls  facris  - —  attribueris  minus  con* 
tja  Reftores  iuos  incitaretur,    Liviatban,  p.  Co. 


Sermon   I.  13 

as  Right  and  Wrong,  Jutl   and  Unjuft, 
before  Men  enter    into   Society ,     nor 
confeqiiently    any  Thing  but  their  own 
Intereft  to   hinder  them  from  being  a 
Plague    and  Vexation    to   each   other. 
Having  now  feen  fome  of  the  Advan- 
tages of   Rehgious   Principles    for  our 
Support  in  the  uneafy  Parts  of  Life,  it 
may  be  fit  to  fee   what  thofe    Advan- 
tages are  which  the  Atheift  propofes  by 
his  Scheme  as  an  Equivalent  for  what 
by  his  own  ConfefTion  he  muft  deprive 
•  himfelf  and  others  of  by  his  Disbelief 
of    a  God    and   Providence,     and   by 
endeavouring  to  draw  others  into    the 
fame    Degree    of    Infidelity.     Plutarch 
tells    us   his  Defign    is   to  free  himfelf 
from   Fear,     that  he    might    ftand   in 
Awe  of   no  Body,    and  be  at  full  Li- 
berty to  do  what  he  pieas'd  f.     This 
leads  to  the  Second  Advantage  of  God- 
linefs,  i'iz-» 

That  the  true    and    Genuine  No* 
tion  of  a  G  o  D    has  nothing  frightful 

id 


t  T«A©-  n  ,u>)   I'ouii^eif   9«K?j    /LO>    ^«^rt»^.- 


14  Sermon    I. 

in  it,  that  it  reftrains  a  Man  in  no 
Enjoyments  but  what  would  be  hurt- 
ful to  him  and  make  him  uneafy,  and 
therefore  that  a  Man  can  be  no  Lofer 
by  being  a  Behever,  if  it  fhould  prove 
at  laft  that  there  is  to  be  no  after  State. 
Tliat  Plui;aych\  Obfervation  was  a  juft 
one,  or  that  the  At  he  i ft  s  Unwillingnefs 
to  admit  a  God  arifcs  from  a  fright- 
ful Notion  that  he  entertains  of  him, 
is  evident  from  the  Epcuream  continu- 
ally reprefenting  Rehgion  as  a  grievous 
'  and  heavy  Burden.  Thus  Ve'deius  in 
TuUy  de  NaturaDeorui-K^  lib.  i.  pag.  48. 
fays ,  That  thofe  who  had  introduced 
a  Governor  of  the  World,  had  made 
Mankind  perfedt  Slaves  ^.  So  Lucretius 
in.  the  Beginning  of  his  firfl  Book  , 
reprefents  Mankind  as  finking  under 
the  heavy  Load  of  Religion,  grovel- 
ling upon  the  Ground,  not  able  to  look 
up  or  lift  up  its  Head  for  tear  of  the 
terrible    Afpecl   of     a  God    appearing 

from 


*  Itaque  impofuiftis  in  Cerviclbus  noftrls  fem- 
pirernuai  domiaum,  quern  Ulos  5v  iiowtes  timere- 
mus. 


Sermon  I.  15 

from  above,  and  that  this  was  the  mi- 
ferable  Cafe  of  Man  till   Epicurus  ap^ 
peared  ^.    And  the  fame  Writer  fpeaks 
of     Epicrma^s    curing    Men    of     tlie 
Fear  of  a  G  o  d    as  the   mod    fignai 
Piece  of  Service    that  was  ever    done 
for  Mankind  -K    But  there  is  nothing 
can  be  more  fahe  than  this  Reprefen- 
tion  of  G  o  D  and  Rehgion.    'Tis  true 
indeed  our  Holy  Writings  fpeak  of  Re- 
ligion under  the  Phrate  of  the  Fear  of 
God.    But  then  this  is  not  the  Fear  of 
an  Arbitrary  Being  who  has  no  regard 
to   the  Good    and  Welfare  of  others* 
'Tis  not    the  Fear   of  an  Omnipotent 
Tyrant,     that    acts    by   Humour  and 
PalTion ,   but  the  Fear  of   a  wife  and 
good    Being,    that    always   governs 
himfelf   by    the    unalterable   Rules    of 
good  Senfe,    fuch  a  Fear  as  fliould  re- 
train Men  from  playing  the  Fool  and 
hurting  themfelves,  from  violating  the 
Laws  of  Reafon,   and  confounding  the 

Moral 


*  Primum  Graius  homo  mortales  tendcre  contra 
tfi:  Oculos   aufus. 

t  Nos  exsequat  Victoria  Cxlo. 


t6  Sermon    L 

Moral  Diflerences  of  Things.  And 
fuch  a  Fear  no  confiderate  Man  ought 
to  be  concern'd  at,  for  a  Fear  of  this 
Kind  is  greatly  for  the  Advantage  of 
Mankind,  as  it  tends  to  the  keeping 
the  World  in  Peace  and  good  Order, 
and  hindring  thenn  from  injuring  one 
another  ;  'tis  the  Fear  of  a  juft  B  e- 
I N  G  who  threatens  Punifliment  for 
doing  fuch  Things  as  would  turn  to 
Our  real  Detriment ;  'tis  the  Fear  of 
a  kind  Father,  who  knowing  better 
than  ourfelves  what  is  good  for  us  and 
what  would  be  mifchievous  to  us,  leads 
us  to  our  Happinefs  and  keeps  us  from 
hurting  ourfelves  by  the  Fear  of  of- 
fending him.  This  is  the  true  and 
genuine  Fear  of  a  God;  what  Ad- 
vantage then  would  it  be  to  any  Per- 
fon  if  he  were  deliver'd  from  fuch  a 
Fear.  Every  Man  that  thinks  at  all 
would  rejoice  that  there  fliould  be  fuch 
an  Objed  of  his  Fear  as  might  keep 
his  PafFions  and  Appetites  from  doing 
him  Harm,  he  would  fee  that  fuch 
a  Fear  was  fo  far  from  being  Sla- 
very ,    that    'tis    confident   with    the 

trucft 


Sermon    i.  17 

truell  Liberty,  and  the  beft  Prefervative 
of  itj  and  that  withutt^  it,  it  would 
fcarce  be  pofTible  to  fecure  the  Free- 
dom of  our  Thoughts  and  Aftions, 
Whenever  this  Fear  is  attended  with 
Jealoufies  and  Sufpicions  of  the  Deity, 
as  an  imperious  and  arbitrary  Being, 
that,  father  dehghts  Himfelf  in  the  Mi- 
feries  than  the  Happinefs  of  his  Crea- 
tures, it  then  ceafes  to  be  a  rehgi* 
ous  ,  and  cornmences  a  vicious  Fear, 
or  what  we  are  wont  to  call  Supet- 
ftition. 

'T I  s  againfl  this  lafi  Soit  of  Fear, 
that  the  Arguments  of  Lucretius^  and 
of  all  Sorts  of  Jtheifis  are  direfted. 
For  they,  laying  it  down  as  a  certain 
Truth,  That  there  is  no  fuch  Thing 
m  Nature  as  Moral  Differences,  no 
Right  or  Wrong,  Jufi:  or  Unjuil:,  fepa- 
rate  from  Pleafure  and  Pain ,  Conveni- 
ence and  Inconvenience,  k  would  then 
indeed  follow.  That  if  there  was  a 
God  ,  He  could  have  no  Moral  Qiia- 
lities,  nor  be  obhg'd  to  ad  in  Virtue 
of  them.  If  there  was  a  Being  diftinct 
from  the  World,    and    enduM  with  a 

C  Power 


i8  Sermon    I. 

Power  of  doing  every  Thing  ;  yet  there 
could  not  be  a  juft  Being,  if  there  be 
no  fuch  Thing  as  Juftice  (abftra£led 
from  the  Laws  of  Civil  Government.) 
If  there  exifled  an  infinite  Intelligence, 
yet  fuch  Intelligent  Being  could  make 
no  Difi:in61:ion  between  Right  and 
Wrong,  if  there  really  be  no  fuch  Thing 
as  Right  and  Wrong  in  the  Nature  of 
Things ;  and  then  what  fhould  we  be 
the  better  for  fuch  a  Being -^  Or  fa- 
ther, fhould  we  not  probably  fare  bet- 
ter, if  we  were  without  fuch  a  Go- 
vernor as  ads  by  mere  Will  and  Plea- 
fure?  That  thefe  Notions  are  juftly 
cliarg'd  upon  the  ancient  and  modern 
Atheifisy  may  appear  by  a  Quotation 
from  each  of  them  :  Cotta,  in  Tully  de 
Natura  Deorun?^  pag.  98.  Davie s''s  Edit,, 
tells  us,  one  Opinion  of  the  Epicuream 
was,  That  there  was  no  fuch  Thing 
as  Benevolence  or  an  Obligation  to  do 
A£1:s  of  Kindnefs ;  but  that  whatever 
appears  of  this  Kind,  arifes  merely  from 
Weakncfs  ^5     and   therefore,   ii  there 

was 

^  Cum  ill  imbecllllcate  gratliicatloncni  §;  bcneyo- 
Untriam  ponicls. 


S  E  R  M  O  N     I.  I  p 

was  any  fuch  Thing  as  a  God,  there 
could  be  no  fuch  Thing  as  Love  or 
Benevolence  in  him ;  becaufe  as  He 
would  be  all-powerful,  He  could  want 
no  one's  Afliftance,  ftand  in  Need  of 
no  Body,  and  therefore  care  for  no  Body. 
And  thus  again,  Mr.  Hobbs  m  his  Levia^ 
thm^  and  his  Book  De  Cive,  p.  260,  262. 
founds  all  the  Right  that  God  has  of  Go- 
verning us,  upon  his  Almighty  Power ; 
and  all  the  Obligation  that  we  have  to 
obey  him,  upon  this.  That  we  cannot 
help  it,  his  Power  being  irrefiftible  ^* 
Thus  we  fee  the  Atbeijls  Drefling  up 
God  in  a  frightful  Shape,  that  they 
might  have  the  better  Colour  for  De- 
nying his  Exiftence.  But  I  have  alrea- 
dy fhewn,  that  this  is  a  falfe  Repre- 
fentation  of  Him ;  that  when  He  is  re- 
prefented  as  He  ought  to  be,  and  fuch 
as  He  really  is  ;  that  He  is  the  moft 
amiable  Being  in  the  World  j  fuch  a 
C  2  Being 


*  Deo  omnipotenti  jus  dominandi  ab  ipfa  poten- 
tii  derivator':  manifeftum  eft  Obligationem  ad  prje- 
ftandam  ipfi  Obedlentiam  incumbere  hominlbus 
propter  imbecUlitatem. 


20  S  E  H  M  O  N^    I. 

Being  as  every  confiderate  Man  would 
heartily  wiili  for,  and  would  even  part 
with  all  the  World,  rather  than  give 
up  the  Belief  of  Him  ;  as  the  Want  of 
fuch  a  Being  would  rob  him  of  a  moft 
comfortable  Profpeft  in  a  Time  of  Dif- 
ficulty and  Diftrefs,  and  in  a  Time  of 
Profperity  take  off  that  Reftraint  from 
his  Appetites  and  PafTions,  which  is  ab- 
foluteiy  neceffary  to  keep  them  from 
hurting  him. 

Hitherto  I  have  fhewn  the  Profi- 
tablenefs  of  Religious  Principles,  and 
{cor/fzqtiently)  the  Difadvantages  of  thofe 
of  the  Atheifls  on  the  Suppofition,  that 
they  could  fully  perfuadc  themfelves.  of 
the  Truth  of  their  Scheme:  But,  if  af- 
ter all  the  Pains  they  take  to  difown  a: 
God,  they  cannot  fet  their  Minds  eafy 
from  the  Fears  of  Him,  then  the  Pro^ 
fitablenefs  of  living  under  a  Senfe  of 
Religious  Principles,  and  the  Difadvan- 
tages of  Athiij?;-?.,  will  receive  a  new 
D^igree  of  Evidence :  Which  was  the 
third  Advantage  of  Rehgious  Principles 
that  I  proposed  to  difcourfe  upon,  viz. 
That   the  Belief  of  them  will    fet  the 

Religious 


S  E  R  M  O  N     I.  21 

Religious  Man's  Mind  at  Eafe  with  Re^ 
gard  to  any  Apprehenfions  of  an  after 
State. 

The  Hiftories  of  all  Times,  and  all 
Countries  inform  us,  That  there  con- 
ftantly  has  been  a  Belief  of  fome  future 
State,  in  which  Men  v/ere  to  be  ac- 
countable for  their  Behaviour  in.  this.  ' 
I  am  not  now  to  confider,  Whether  this 
Apprehenfion  in  Mankind  be  agreea- 
ble to  the  Truth  of  Things,  or  any 
good  Proof  of  them  :  I  am  at  this  Time 
pnly  to  confider,  What  EHeds  fuch  an 
Apprehenfion  may  have  upon  Mens 
Minds.  And  I  think  it  muft  be  granted 
me.  That  whilft  Men  have  fuch  Ap- 
prehenfions, they  cannot  be  indiflerent 
or  unconcerned  what  is  to  become  of 
them  in  this  after  State,  no  more  than 
a  Man  can  be  indifferent  with  Regard 
to  his  Happinefs  or  Mifery  in  this 
prefent  one.  And  therefore,  unlefs  the 
Jthtifl  can  give  us  a  fure  and  certain 
Method  by  which  we  may  get  entirely 
rid  of  fuch  Fears,  he  muft  acknowledge 
his  Scheme  to  be  neither  calculated  for 
fhe  GoocJ  of  himfelf  nor  any  Body  elfc. 


22  Sermon    I. 

For  I  have  already  fhewn    the  Advan- 
tages of  a   true   and  genuine  Fear   of 
God,  for    the    better  Conduct   of  our 
Lives ;  and   if  the  Atheijl  is  willing    to 
give   up   thofe  Advantages,    fo    as   he 
might  free   himfelf  from    the  Fears  of 
an  after  Reckoning,    we  might  expe8: 
%hd,t  he  was  fure  of  gaining  this  Point ;  • 
Bnt  the  Hiftories  of  all  Ages  fliew   us, 
that  the  Convidions    of  Mens  Confci- 
ences  are  not    to  be  filenced    by  fuch 
weak   and   trifling    Reafonings   as    the 
Jthetfis  Scheme  is  built  upon  :  The  Ap- 
prehenfions  of  a  future  State  have  ta- 
ken  too   deep  Root   in    Mens  Minds 
to    be  overturn  d  by  any  Speculations 
of  Men;   and  I  will  venture    to  fay, 
That  the  Athei[t    himfelf,  with  all   the 
Confidence  he  pretends  to   have  in  the 
Truth   of  his    Scheme,    cannot   infure 
himfelf  for  Life  againit  the  Fears  of  a 
future  State,  and  for  this  plain  Realbn, 
That  he  cannot   prove  it  to  be  impof- 
fible,  that  fuch  a  Being    as  God    (in 
the    Religious    Notion    of    the  Word) 
fliould  exill :    For  if  he  cannot   have  an 
abfolute  Certainty  of  that,   neither  cai^ 


Sermon   I.  2g 

lie  have  any  of  the  other.  The  Cafe  be- 
ing this,  there  can  be  no  Difficulty  in 
fhewing,  That  the  Principles  of  Religi- 
on are  better  calculated  for  the  Eafe 
of  Mens  Minds,  with  Regard  to  a  fii- 
ture  6tate,  than  thofe  of  the  Atheift, 
For  the  Man  that  lives  under  Religious 
Principles,  has  a  comfortable  Profped :  If 
his  Apprehenfions  be  juft,  he  knows  that 
he  is  made  for  ever,  that  his  Happinefs 
will  be  beyond  the  utmoft  of  his  Con- 
ceptions, and  the  Continuance  of  it  to  all 
Eternity.  And  if  his  Thoughts  of  the 
Matter  fhould  prove  nothing  but  a  Mi- 
ftake  ;  yet  his  Belief  has  made  him  pafs 
plf  Life  with  more  Satisfaftion  than  J- 
theifm  can  afford  a  Man,  and  it  can  be  at 
laft  no  worfe  with  him  than  the  other. 

L  B  T  us  now  take  a  View  of 
the  Unbeliever,  with  Regard  to  the 
Apprehenfions  of  a  future  State :  As  I 
have  already  obferv'd,  That  he  cannot 
demonftrate  the  ImpofTibihty  of  a  Lire 
after  the  Conclufion  of  this  prefent  one, 
the  Suppofirion  of  its  being  bArely  pof- 
fibly  to  be  true,  mull  give  him  now 
and  then  an  uneafy  Thought,  for  Fear 
C  4  that 


24-  S  E  R  M  O  N     I. 

that  PofTibility  lliould  arife ;  and  when- 
ever fuch  a  troublefome  Thought  di- 
fturhs  him,  I  know  of  no  other  Way 
he  can  take  to  make  himfelf  cafy,  but 
by  perfuading  himfelf,  either  ift,  That 
no  Man  is  under  any  Obhgation  of  Re- 
verencing or  Honouring  God,  tho' 
there  fhould  be  One  ;  or  elfe,  if  he 
dares  not  truft  to  that,  That  he  is  un- 
der no  Obhgation,  becaufe  not  behev- 
ing  there  is  a  God,  he  cannot  pay  any 
Reverence  to  Him.  As  to  the  lirft  of 
thefe  Excufes,  I  beheve  the  Atheift  will 
jfind  it  hard  enough  to  make  himfelf 
■  believe,  that  no  Man  is  under  an  Obli- 
•gation  of  honouring  Him,  if  there  real- 
ly be  One ;  for  if  there  be  fuch  a  Be- 
ing, the  Relation  that  we  fland  in  to 
•  Him,  and  the  Obhgations  we  have  re- 
ceived from  Him,  will  make  it  fit  for 
us  to  exprefs  our  Thankfulnefs  and  Ac- 
knowledgments to  Him. 

I  Am  fenfible  UnbeHevcrs  do  not 
allow  what  we  call  moral  Differences; 
but  then  this  is  upon  Suppofition  that 
their  Material  Scheme  is  the  true  one, 
and  that  there  is  no  God,  or  no  Su- 
preme 


Sermon    1.  2$ 

preme  Being  endued  with  Moral  Per- 
feftions.    But  if  there  fhould  be  fuch  a 
Being,  the  Jtheiji  may  be,    lor    any 
thing  he  knows,  anfwerable  to  this  Be- 
ing for  denying  his  Exiftence,    and  in 
Confequence  of  that,  for  paying  no  Re- 
;verence  nor   Acknowledgments  to  Him 
for    the  Favours  received  from   Him, 
For  if  there  are  any  moral  Differences 
in  the  Nature  of  Things,  and  they  are 
judg'd  of  by    the  Supreme  Underftand- 
ing  fuch  as  by  other  underftanding  Be- 
ings, making    only   an  Abatement    for 
the  Difference  between  a  finite  and  in- 
finite Underftanding ;    that    is,  Suppofe     . 
we  know  what  Juftice  is  in  God,   we 
muft  believe  that   it  is  unjuft  to  deny 
Reverence  to  the  Supreme  Being,   as 
well  as  it  would  be   Injuftice  to  refufb 
our  Acknowledgments    to   any  Friend 
or   Benefactor    for   any  Kindnefl'es  we 
had  received   from  him.     And  it  can't 
be   thought  but  that  the  Supreme  (as 
well  as  other  Beings)  muft  make  a  Dif- 
ference between  thofe  that  honour  Him, 
and  thofe  that  deny  his  Being  and  Au-. 
^hority  oyer  them.      For  if  God  has 

tonftitutecj 


2(5  S  E  R  M  O  N     I. 

conftituted    any    moral    Differences    la 
Things,  He  has  thereby  fufficiently  de- 
clared that  it  is  his  Intention  to  adi  fui- 
tably  to  thofe  Differences.     The  Thing 
is  fo  evident,  that  the  Learned  and  Un- 
learned have  agreed  in   honouring   the 
the  Deity,    TuUj  has  long  ago  told  it 
as  a    certain    and    undoubted     Truth, 
That  if  there   is  a  Supreme  and  Eter- 
nal B  e  i  n  g  ,    He  is  to  be  had  in  the 
greateft  Reverence  and   Admiration  by 
Mankind  ^.     And  even  Epicurus  f  him- 
felf  wrote  a  Book  of  Piety  tov^^ards  the 
Gods.    If  he  wrote  this  Book  for  no 
.     other  Reafon  than  to  fcreen  himfelf  froni 
the  Publick  Odium,   yet  it  fhews  thus 
much,  That  it  was  the  general  Belief 
of  People  at  that  Time,  that  the  Deity 
tught  to  be  honoured.     And  that  thisf 
Belief  was    well-grounded,    will  after- 
wards appear,  when  I  come  to  prove  a 
real  Difference  in  the  Nature  of  Things 
between  Virtue  and  Vice.     Fide  Serm. 
XI. 

I 


*  Tully  de  Natura  Deorum..    Lib. 
t  De  Divinatione.     Lib.  z. 


S  E  R  M  O  N     I.  27 

I  Cannot  forbear  making  one  Re- 
mark from  what  has  been  faid,    which 
is  this :    That  fuppofing   there  are  any 
Perfons  of  fo  perverfe  an  Underftand- 
ing,  as  cannot    perfuade    themfelves  of 
a  God  and  Providence,  that  they  fhould 
not  give    themfelves  much  Trouble  in 
drawing  Men  off  from  fuch  a  Belief  j 
becaufe,  by  their  own  Confeflion,  Man- 
kind was  brought  into    this  Belief  for 
their  own  Good,  that  they  might  re- 
lieve themfelves    from  the  Uneafineffes 
which  human  Nature   is  fubje<3;  to.    If 
they   make  any    Pretenfions  to   Good- 
nature, or  have  any  Love  for  their  Spe- 
cies, they  fhould  be  contented  to  believe 
themfelves  in   the  right,    without  uling 
any  Endeavors  to  draw  other  Perfons  in- 
to a  Scheme  which  is  fo  difmal  anrl  with= 
out  all  Comfort,  as  theirs  is ;  they  can 
lie  under  no  Obligations  of  Confcience, 
becaufe   they    make  fhew   of  Denying 
all  moral  DiiTerences ;    and  therefore  if 
they  were  not  a  Set  of  four  and  ill-na- 
tured People,  they  would  be  contented 
to  be  miferableby  themfelves,  and  leave 
the  reft  of  Mankind  in  the  quiet  Pof- 

feffioa 


28  S  E  R  M  O  N     I. 

feilion  of  fo  agreeable  a  Deiijfion  as 
tliat  of  a  God  and  future  State,  I 
can  fee  but  one  Tiling  they  can  urge 
for  themfelves,  which  is,  That  tho'  a 
right  Notion  of  Rehgion  would  be  real- 
ly beneficial  to  Mankind,  yet  Superfli- 
tion  is  more  deftru8:ive  of  the  publicly 
.as  well  as  private  Quiet  of  every  Man 
^^han  Jtheifm  itfelf :  And  for  the  Truth 
.of  this,  they  refer  you  to  Vlutarch  m  his 
Treatife,  ^a^d  j'nenJ'My.oviaf,  and  to  the  vi- 
fible  EfleQs  of  it,  wherever  it  has  pre- 
vailed. They  add  further,  That  the 
Hiftories  of  every  Age  have  convinced 
them,  that  Mankind  is  a  Creature  that 
Is  more  apt  to  be  influenced  by  a  fu- 
perflitious,  than  by  a  religious  Fear. 
And  therefore,  the  Odds  in  Iiuman  Na- 
ture being  on  the  Side  of  Superftition 
that  'tis  not  fafe  truiting  it  with  any 
Religion.  The  Anfwer  to  this  is  very 
eafy,  That  if  the  Fears  of  SuperlHtion, 
.  are  the  only  Reafon  of  his  rejedling  re- 
ligious Principles,  then  indead  of  letting 
himfelf  againft  all  Religion,  let  him  en- 
deavour to  fet  the  World  right  in  their 
Notions  of  Religion,  and  we  will  hear- 
tily 


Sermon  i. 

tily  joyn  with  him  in  fo  laudable  an 
Undertaking.  And ,  as  I  hope  the 
Danger  of  Mens  falling  into  Superftition 
may  be  much  lelTen'd  by  our  joynt 
Endeavours ;  fo  I  am  fure,  the  above- 
mentioned  Advantages  of  true  Religion 
will  fufliciently  juftify  us  in  the  At- 
tempt. 


2p 


S  E  R  M. 


3t 


SERMON  11. 


1    ThESSALONIANS     v.    21. 

Vrove  all  Things  :  hold  fafi 
that  which  is  good. 

HE  Reafonablenefs  of  Ob- 
ferving  this  Rule  of  our 
Apoftle,  is  grounded  upon 
this  undoubted  Matter  of 
Fact,  That  there  has  been 
always  a  Mixture  of  Trutli  and  Falfe- 
hood  in  the  World :  That  there  have 
always  been  Perfons  who  have  endea- 
vour'd  to  propagate  falfe,  as  well  as 
true  Doctrines,  and  therefore  no  Safety 
in  holding  faft  any  Opinions,  before  we 
have  carefully  prov'd  and  examined 
them. 

If 


/ 

32  S  E  R  xM  0  N     It. 

If  our  Apoftle  might  have  a  par- 
ticular View  to  the  trying  of  Revela- 
tions or  divine  Infpirations ;  yet  this 
Advice  of  his  will  equally  extend  to 
every  SubjeQ;  that  is  propofed  to  our 
Confideration ;  and  if  we  are  guided  by 
it,  we  fhall  never  give  our  Ailent  to 
any  Propofition,  till  we  have  fully  and 
fairly  examin'd  it  \  For  if,  as  in  the  pre- 
fent  Cafe,  which  the  Apoftle  feems  par- 
ticularly to  referr  to,  we  fuppofe  a  Man 
led  into  Error  by  fome  mere  Pretender  to 
Infpiration,  if  it  would  not,  I  fay,  be  a 
good  Excufe  before  God,  that  he  be- 
lieved fuch  a  Perfon  infpired,  ahd  pra- 
6:ifed  amils  in  the  Virtue  of  fuch  a  Be- 
lief, becaufe  he  ought  to  have  examin'd 
his  Credentials,  and  proved  his  Spirit, 
whether  it  was  of  God,  or  not ;  neither 
would  it  be  a  good  Juftification  of  a 
Man,  if  he  fliould  plead.  That  he  aded 
fuitably  to  his  own  Opinions;  unlefs 
'twas  alfo  true,  that  he  had  carefully 
examined  them  before  he  efpoufed  them  ; 
becaufe  every  Man  will  be  as  much  con- 
cerned to  avoid  Miftakes  concernino- 
the   Truths  of    Natural,     as    well  as 

thofe 


Sermon    11.  33 

thofe  of  Revealed  Religion.  And  he 
that  afTents  to  either  upon  any  other 
Motive  than  that  of  Evidence,  alcho'' 
he  fhould  embrace  the  Truth,  as  this  is 
purely  accidental,  may  be  anf^verable 
to  God  for  not  making  a  due  Ufe  of 
his  Faculties :  for  St.  Paul's  Rule  is.  To 
prove  ail  Thi^^gs :  and  then  to  hold  fnfi 
that   which  is  good. 

We  who  are  guided  by  St.  Vaul 
and  the  reft  of  the  infpired  Teachers, 
do  require,  and  pfefs  Upon  all  PerionS 
a  thorough  Examination  of  the  Argu- 
ments on  which  Religion  is  built :  Y/e 
defire  nothing  more  than  a  fair  Trial, 
and  are  willing  to  abide  by  the  Suc- 
cefs  of  it.  And  therefore  the  Author 
of  the  Difcourfe  of  Free-Thinkifigy  is  a 
Slanderer  of  his  Brethren ,  vv^hen  he 
would  infinuate,  as  if  the  Jlehgious 
Man  was  averfe  to  a  free  and  impar- 
tial Examination  of  Rehgious  Truths. 
We  defire  Men  would  examine  with 
the  utmoft  Stridnefs;  we  only  defire 
them  to  lay  afide  all  Partiality,  and 
every  Prejudice ;  we  are  only  againft 
Licentioufnefs  in  Thinking,  as  we  are 
D  perfuaded 


34  S  E  R  M  O  N     II. 

perfuaded,  That  a  Man  may  as  well 
abufe  his  Freedom  in  Thinking ,  as 
he  may  his  Liberty  in  Acting  ;  as  I 
fliali  have  Occafion  to  fhew  in  Confider- 
ing  another  Evafion  the  Jtheifl  has  to 
avoid  the  Apprehenfions  of  a  future 
State,  vijc.  That  a  Man  cannot  deferve 
Blame  or  Punifliment,  fo  long  as  he 
ads  confiflently  with  his  own  Opinion, 
or  that  himfelf  cannot  deferve  Blame 
or  Punifhment  for  not  Honouring  God, 
becaufe  he  does  not  beheve  there  is 
one. 

F  o  R  if  this  Excufe  be  a  good  one, 
one  of  thefe  two  Things  muft  be  true, 
either  i/,  That  a  Man  cannot  deferve 
Blame  for  ading  according  to  his  Opi- 
nions, how  groundlefs  foever  they  be. 
Or,  2dly,  Becaufe  he  had  made  a  due 
Examination  and  Trial  of  this  Quefti- 
on,  and  could  find  no  Evidence  for  a 
God. 

A  s  to  the  firfl  of  thefe :  Let  us  fee 
what  Grounds  the  Atheifl  can  have  to 
hope  for  Impunity,  merely  becaufe  he 
ads  according  to  his  Opinion,  when  he 
refufes  Refped  to   a  Supreme  Being. 

I 


Sermon    11. 

I  Must  confcfs,  I  cannot  fee  much 
in  the  Argument  ufed  by  jbme  great 
Men  againft  incurring  this  Blame  and 
Punifhment,  'viz,,  they  advife  the  Atheifi^ 
That  he  fhould  ftrive  to  have  Faith 
and  beheve  to  the  utmoft  ;  becaufe, 
i^  after  all  there  be  nothing  in  the 
Matter ,  there  will  be  no  Harm  in 
being  thus  deceived  ;  but  if  there  be 
any  thing,  it  will  be  fatal  for  him 
not  to  have  believed  to  the  fall  i 
And  my  Reafon  is  this  :  Becaufe  the 
Perfon  \ve  advife  to  believe,  is  fuppofed 
at  beft  to  be  doubtful,  whether  there 
is  a  G  0  D  ai)d  Providence  ;  And  how^ 
then  can  the  Man  believe  them,  who 
at  the  fame  time  is  not  perfuaded  of 
their  Truth ;  but  rather  believes  there 
is  no  fuch  Thing  ?  For  if  a  Man  fbould 
affect  to  believe,  what  he  does  not  be- 
lieve, there  is  little  Reafon  for  thinking 
that  fuch  a  Procedure  would  be  agree- 
able to  God;  becaufe  this  would  be 
acting  againft  the  Light  of  his  own 
Mind,  which  no  one  that  believes  a 
God,  will  fuppofe  to  be  a  probable 
Way  of  recommending  any  one  to  his 
Favour-  D  2  I 


3S 


§6  S  E  R  M  O  T'T      It. 

I  Should  rather  advife  the  Afheiji 
to  examine  carefully,  What  were  tJie 
real  Motives  that  prevailed  upon  him 
to  quit  the  Religion  he  had  been  edu- 
cated in,  and  to  take  up  with  Infide- 
lity ?  Whether  a  fmcere  Love  of  the 
Truth,  or  rather  fome  fecret  Paflion 
had  influenced  him  ?  If  he  would  deal 
fairly  with  himfelf  in  this  Self-examina- 
tion, I  am  perfuaded  he  would  find, 
that  the  Alteration  of  his  Opinion  is 
not  fo  much  owing  to  any  rational 
Convidion  of  his  Mind,  as  to  fome  vi- 
cious Inclinations,  which  had  made  Ar- 
guments appear  weighty. to  him,  which 
would  pafs  with  other  People  for  mean 
and  trifling ;  as  I  fliall  afterwards  fhew 
when  I  come  to  corifider  the  Argn- 
ments  by  which  he  pretends  to  fupport 
liis  Material  Scheme. 

I N  the  mean  time  I  am  to  fhew, 
That  there  are  many  Motives  befides 
rational  Evidence,  which  have  deter- 
mined Men  to  the  Opinions  that  they 
efpoufe,  and  confequently,  that  this  Eva- 
fion  of  the  Atheifl,  i/iz.  That  a  Man 
cannot   deferve   Blame   or  Punifliment 

for 


Sermon    it.  37 

for  acting  agreeably  to  his  Opinions, 
cannot  be  relied  upon  by  any  prudent 
or  confiderate  Man,  And  then  the  J- 
theiji  can  never  fecure  himfelf  againft 
the  Apprehenfions  of  future  Punifhment 
upon  this  Foot  of  Reafoning. 

When  I  am  fliewing,  that  a  Man 
may  be  anfwerable  for  his  Opinions, 
and  for  what  he  does  in  Virtue  of  them ; 
I  woulcj  aot  be  thought  to  alTert, 
That  'tis  in  any  Man's  Power  to  be- 
lieve what  he  has  a  mind  to  beheve; 
for  his  Belief  and  his  Opinion  mull  de- 
pend upon  the  Evidence,  fuch  as  it  ap- 
pears to  the  Man ;  and  yet  thus  much 
is  certain,  That  a  Man  may  defervc 
Blame  for  his  Opinions,  i^  he  has  not 
duly  qualified  himfelf  for  Evidence  when 
'tis  offered  to  him.       As, 

I  /?,  I  F  when  he  is  enquiring  after 
Truth,  he  fuiTers  himfelf  to  be  byafs'd 
by  any  predominant  PafTion  or  Appe- 
tiie;  for  thefe  are  known  to  make 
Men  deaf  to  the  plained  Evidence  of 
Reafon.      Or, 

2^/j,  If  thro'  Lazinefs  he  declines  a 

full  or   thorough  Examination   of  any 

Jj  I  Queftioi^ 


;8  S  E  R  M  O  N      II. 

Qiieftion    in    which    he    is  much  con* 
cerned.     That  thefe  may  be,  and  often 
are,    the   true    Caufes   of   many   Per- 
fons  Infidelity,    will    appear    probable, 
by    confidering  fome    of  the  Motives 
wliich  too  often  govern  Men,  with  Re- 
gard   to    the   Perfuafions    or  Opinions 
that  are  held  by  them  :  The  Prejudices 
which  I   fliall  at    prefent    confider,    as 
having  a  great  Influence  upon  us,  and 
which  may  lead  Men  into  an  Inclination 
for   the     Principles    of  Infidelity,     are 
thefe  ; 

1.  An  Affectation  of  Singularity; 
which  is  v/ont  to  take  much  with  fuch 
Perfons  as  defire  to  be  diftinguifhed  by 
being  thought  to  fee  farther  than  their 
Neighbours. 

2.  An  Averfioji  to  the  Errors  that 
have  crept  into  true  Religion,  .has  in^ 
fenfibly  led  many  Perfons  into  a  total 
Disbelief  of  all  Rehgion. 

^.  A  Desire  of  being  independent, 
and  uncontroulable  by  any  one  :  When 
this  meets  with  Perfons  of  an  impe^ 
rious  Temper,  'tis  a  lirong  Temptation 
to  Infidelity. 

Whenevhr 


S  £  R  M  O  N     11.  39 

Whenever  any  of  tliefe  prevail, 
they  muft  be  allowed  to  be  falfe  Grounds 
pf  Perfiiafion,  and  for  which  a  Man  will 
be  juftly  accountable,  if  there  be  a  Su- 
preme Being  to  whom  an  Account  is 
jto  be  given  for  the  Ufe,  or  Abufe  of 
our  underftanding  Faculties. 

i/.  An  Affedation  of  Singularity  is 
wont  to  have  a  powerful  Influence  up- 
pn  a  Man's  Opinions,  efpecially  when 
it  meets  with  a  proud  Temper. 

A  Man  muft  have  pafs'd  his  Life 
without  much  RefleQ:ion  upon  human 
Nature,  that  has  not  obferved,  That 
Men  are  more  commonly  influenced, 
as  to  the  Opinions  they  hold,  by  fome 
predominant  PafTion,  than  by  any  Con- 
y'lEtion  from  the  Principles  of  Reafon. 
The  ftriking  out  into  a  difl'erent  Way 
of  Thinking  fl'om  the  red  of  Mankind, 
flatters  the  Vanity  of  a  proud  Man  with 
this  pleafing  Imagination  ,  That  he 
fliall  be  thought  to  fee  farther  than 
any  Body  elfe.  For  he  that  contradids 
any  received  Notions,  expects  the  World 
fhould  beheve,  that  he  does  fo,  becaufc 
he  reafons  with  greater  Freedom  and  Im- 
P  4  partiality 


Sermon    ii. 

partiality  than  other  People  ;  and  the 
more  p^^enerally  received  the  Opinions 
are  which  he  oppofes,  the  greater  Credit 
he  hopes  to  gain  by  it  \  and  therefore, 
Reh'gion  having  been  the  general  Per- 
fuafion  of  Mankind,  is  for  that  Reafon 
the  fittell:  Mark  for  the  proud  Man  to 
point  his  Arguments  againll:  :  for  the 
Fewer  he  has  on  his  Side,  the  more  he 
hopes  to  fliine,  as  he  knows  a  Man  is 
apt  to  be  Ipil:  in  a  Croud,  and  that  if 
he  would  be  taken  Notice  of,  he  muft 
fland  fingle,  or  have  but  Few  in  his 
Company. 

The  Author  of  the  Difcourfe 
about  free-thinkii^g  ,  has  acknorvledged 
this  fecret  Temptation  to  Infidelity, 
when  he  would  put  it  off  as  the 
common  Opinion  of  Mankind,  that  the 
Aiheiji  has  more  Senfe  than  other  Peo- 
ple. For^  fays  he,  //  ar/y  good  Chrijiian 
happens  to  Reafon  better  thra  ordmnrj^  they 
(meaning  the  Chriftians)  charge  him  with 
Athtifm.  He  takes  this  fly  Way  of 
commending  the  Atheifts  for  good  Rea- 
foners,  in  fuggefting  that  thofe  very 
Perfons  who  believed  a  God  and  future 

State^ 


Se  RMON    II.  4^ 

State,  could  not  forbear  ownmg  Atheifm 
to  be  the  Effe6:  of  good  Reafoning,  and 
the  Atheijls  better  Reafoners  than  other 
People.    How  weak   and  groundlefs  fo- 
ever  this  Notion   may  be  of  Mens  be- 
ing   better  Reafoners  in  proportion  as 
they  beheved  lefs  of  a  G  o  d  and  Pro- 
vidence ;  yet  thus  much  may  be  obferv- 
ed  from  it  to  my  prefent  Purpofe,  That 
fome  Perfons  may  have  been,  and  ftill 
are  tempted  to  appear  on  the  Side  of 
Infidelity,  from  the  vain  Hopes  of  be- 
ing thought  more  difcerning  and  faga- 
cious  than  the  reft  of  the  World. 

Monsieur  Bayle^  whofe  Writings 
will  free  him  from  any  Sufpicion  of  be- 
ing overpartial  in  the  Caufe  of  Religion, 
does  honeftly  ackflowledge,  That  the 
Infidelity  of  many  People  is  owing 
more  to  fome  Degree  of  Vanity,  and  a 
Defire  of  diftinguiiliing  themftlves,  than 
to  any  Force  of  Evidence  :  and  nothing 
can  be  truer  than  what  he  has  faid  up^ 
on  this  Qccafion  in  his  Hifiorical  Dicfia' 
n^ry^  "  It  is  plain  enough,  jays  he ^ 
*'  that  thofe  who  make  a  Shew  in 
j-  Company    of   pppofing    the    moft 

"  common 


42  S  E  R  jM  O  N     II. 

^'  common  Truths  of  Religion,   fpealf 
"  what  they  do  not  really  think  ;  their 
"  Vanity  has  a  greater  Share  in  their 
"  Debates  than  any  Convidion  of  their 
"  own  Minds  ;    they  pleafe  themfelves 
*'  with  the  Thoughts  that  the  Boldnefs 
*'  and  Singularity  of  the  Opinions  which 
"  they  defend,  will  gain  them  the  Repur 
*'  tation  of  great  Genius's,  and  of  Men 
*'  of  a  fuperior   Way   of  Thinking   to 
*^  the  reft  of  Mortals.     Thus  they  are 
"  tempted  againft  their  Confciences  to 
"  fet  forth  the  Difficulties   which   the 
"  DoQrines  of  Providence  and  tliofe  of 
"  the  Gofpel  are  fubjeft  to  ;  fo  that  by 
"  Degrees  they  get  a  Habit  of  fpeaking 
"  impiouily  :    And   if  their   Vanity  be 
^'  attended    with  tlfe   Love  of  Scnfua- 
"  Iky,  they  go  on  fafter   ia   their  Im- 
"  piety  ".     Thus   far  Mr.  Bajle  ipeaks 
in    relation  to  an  ingenious   Fref?ch  Li- 
bertine,    and    to    all  of  that  Sort    ia 
the   Title    Des    Barnaux.      The  Jthei/l 
has  perhaps   heard  too,     That    the  E- 
ficurean    Atheifl    was    wont    to  impute 
the  Belief   of   a  God  to   Mens  Igno- 
rance    of    the  Povvers  of    Matter  iri 

Motion : 


S  E  R  M  O  N     II.  43 

Motion;  and  therefore  hopes  by  the 
Denial  of  Him,  to  acquire  a  great  Re- 
putation for  Knowledge. 

Another  common  Fountain  from 
whence  Infidelity  is  wont  to  arife,   is, 
An  Averfion  to  Superftition.   Some  Men 
do  no   fooner  difcover   the  Errors  that 
are  crept  into  true  Religion,  than  they 
conceive  fuch   an  Averfion  to  thefe  Er-^ 
rors,  as  that  they  begin  to  fufped  all 
the  reft  to  be  a  Miftake,  and  from  be- 
ing Enemies    to  Superftition,     become 
Enemies  to  all  Religion  in  general.  This 
I  take  to  be   the  moft  ufual  Way  by 
which  Men  arrive  at  a  State  of  Infide- 
lity ;   but  this  is  an  unjuftifiable  Proce- 
ding  in  any  one  that  pretends  to  be  a 
Lover    of  Truth;    becaufe    it    fuppofes 
that  where  there  are  Errors,  there  can 
be  no  Truth,     There  are  Errors  in  all 
Communities  of  Men  profefTing   Reli- 
gion, therefore  there  can  be  no  Truth 
at  all  in  Religion  itfelf ;  Men  have  made 
great  Miftakes  in  the  Pidures  they  have 
drawn  for  the  Deity,   therefore  there 
can  be  no  Deity  at  all ;    becaufe  they 
are  fure  there  cannot  be  a  God  with 
'"'  "'  human 


44  S  E  R  JVf  O  N     II. 

human  WeaknefTes,  therefore  there  can- 
npt  be  one  with  divine  Perfections: 
They  might  with  as  much  Juftice  ar- 
gue, That  becaufe  there  is  a  Wrong, 
there  can  be  no  fuch  Tiling  as  a 
Right. 

But  they  are  not  only  unjuftifiable, 
when  they  have  no  better  Reafon  for 
leaving  us,  but  alfo  (which  I  believe 
will  concern  the  Atheift  more,  becaufe 
it  reflects  upon  his  Underflanding)  they 
fhew  great  Weaknefs  when  they  are 
byafs'd  to  Infidehty  by  their  Averfion 
to  Superflition,  as  this  fhcws  a  great 
Defeat  in  Point  of  Judgment.  Fqr 
when  Men  flee  from  one  Extream  to 
the  other,  when  they  take  Refuge  m 
Atheifm  out  of  an  Hatred  to  Superfl:ition, 
the  Reafon  muft  be  becaufe  they  know 
not  how  to  difl:ingui(h  what  is  true 
from  what  is  falfe.  They  And  they 
have  not  Skill  enough  to  take  ofl'  the 
Difguife  froiji  Religion,  to  feparate  the 
Appearance  from  the  Reahty;  and 
therefore  finding  they  mufl:  take  all  or 
none  \  the  Hatred  they  have  conceived 
againft  the  Errors  they  have  already  de- 
tected;. 


S  E  R  M  O  N     11.  4$ 

tested,  prompts  them  to  quit  Religion 
entirely,  as  the  only  Way  for  fuch  poor 
Reafoners  to  be  fecure  againft  Errors 
in  Rehgious  Matters.  This  is  the  true 
Reafon  and  Foundation  of  that  Obfer- 
vation  fo  often  made,  That  where  there 
is  moft  Superftition,  as  in  luly,  Atheijis 
are  moft  frequent;  becaufe  the  Gene- 
rality of  People  are  apt  to  conceive 
fo  ftrong  a  Prejudice  againft  any  Caufe, 
how  juft  foever,  when  they  difcover  any 
Fraud  ufed  in  the  Support  of  it,  that 
they  immediately  conclude  the  whole 
to  be  a  Cheat.  Their  Averfion  for  the 
Fraud,  makes  them  overlook  all  tlie 
Arguments  that  can  be  given  them  for 
the  Support  of  the  Truth ;  as  i?  it  was 
an  IrtipoiTibility  in  the  Nature  of  the 
Thing,  for  evil  Men  to  defend  the 
Truth  by  a  FalQiood.  But  this  has 
fo  often  happened  in  the  World,  that 
no  Man  can  be  accounted  a  fair  Ex- 
aminer that  rejects  Religion  merely 
upon  this   Account. 

3^/7,  A  Desire  of  being  uncontrouFd 
and  unaccountable  as  to  their  Thoughts 
and  Behaviour,  tempts  fome  Perlbns  to 

the 


/^6  S  E  R  M  O  N     II. 

the  Denial  of  God's  Exiftence.  Men  of 
haughty  and  imperious  Tempers  would 
be  Monarchs  to  themfelves,  they  care 
not  to  believe  themfelves  obliged  to 
any  Body,  and  therefore  are  fond  of 
the  Material  Scheme,  as  it  fets  them 
at  fiiU  Liberty  from  all  Obligations; 
for  no  one  can  think  himfelf  obliged 
to  any  Being  merely  for  doing  for  him 
what  it  can't  help  doing.  Atoms  by 
luckily  jumbling  together  for  my  Good, 
or  the  neceffary  and  unalterable  Laws 
of  Matter  in  Motion  producing  all  that 
we  fee,  tho'  I  received  never  fo  much 
Benefit  from  them,  could  lay  me  un- 
der no  Obligation  of  Gratitude  to  them  ; 
I  fhould  ftill  be  under  the  fulleft  Li- 
berty of  Thinking  and  Ading  as  I 
liked  beft ;  (if  any  fuch  thing  as  Li- 
berty were  confident  with  either  of 
thofe  Schemes)  But  if  a  Man  fliould  ac- 
knowledge an  Intelligent  Being  for 
his  Creator  and  the  Author  of  all  the 
Comforts  he  meets  with  in  Life,  he 
cannot  forbear  thinking  fometimes  that 
fonie  fuch  Submiflion  may  be  due    to 

Him 


Sermon   II.  47 

Him,   as   may  reftrain    his  Fulnefs    of 
Freedom  in  Thinking  and  Ading. 

And  this  St.  Evremonty  who  was 
never  thought  to  be  troubled  with  Be- 
lieving too  much  in  Rehgious  Matters, 
acknowledges  might  be  a  Temptation 
to  Ferfons  of  an  imperious  Temper ; 
if  he  was  truly  tlie  Author  of  a  Trea- 
tife  afcribed  to  him  ^,  where  it  is  faid, 
"  That  there  are  others  who  in  an 
"  extravagant  Prefumption  of  their  ov/n 
"  Abilities,  fcorn  to .  depend  on  their 
*'  Maker;  vainly  imagining,  that  the 
"  Obedience  that  is  paid  to  this  Infi- 
*'  nite  Majesty,  muft  necelTarily  take 
"  away  the  Freedom  of  their  Thoughts 
"  or  Opinions.  "  We  have  already 
feen  by  the  ConfelTion  of  Lucretius  f, 
that  the  Defire  of  being  in  a  State  of 
Independence,  and  of  having  none  to 
controul  them,  was  a  great  Induce- 
ment to  many  Perfons  to  enter  them- 
felves  in  the  School  of  Eficurus ;  and  v/e 
cannot  doubt    but  the  fame  Caufe   is 

ftill 


ff  Vid.  Curious  Mucellanie?.        t  Sevmon  I. 


48 


Sermon    il 

flill  working  the  fame  Effecl:  in  the 
Children  of  Difobedience  :  Efpecially  as 
to  thofe  who  are  Libertines  in  Action 
as  well  as  Thought,  who  defire  to  gra- 
tify every  irregular  Appetite,  and  to 
extinguifli  the  Clamours  of  theii-  Con- 
fciences,  'tis  their  Interefl:  to  throw  off 
the  Belief  of  a  G  o  d  and  turn  Atbeip :  as 
long  as  they  have  any  Reafon  left,  they 
muft  for  Peace  and  Quietnefs  Sake  en- 
deavour to  perfwade  themfelves,  that 
there  is  no  Superior  Underftanding  to 
take  notice  of  and  animadvert  upon 
them  for  ading  againft  the  Senfe  of 
their  own  Minds.  Atheifm  is  the  only 
Refuge  they  have  to  take  to;  for  fo 
long  as  Men  will  a£b  againft  their 
ownUnderftandings,  they  muft  wiili  that 
there  were  no  Underftanding  Being  to 
obfcrve  what  they  are  doing :  but 
thefe  are  the  Fools,  which  the  Pfalmijt 
tells  us  have  [aid  in  their  Hearts^  that 
there  is  no  God, 

The  Ufe  that  I  would  make  of  this, 
fhould  be  to  advife  the  Atheijl^  That 
fince  there  are  confeifedly  vicious  Motives 
that  have  led  Men  into  their  Opinions, 

that 


S  E  R  M  O  NT     II. 

that  he  would  examine,  whether  none 
•  of  thok  I  have  already  mentioned  had 
determin'd  him  to  exchange  the  Reh^ 
gion  he  was  brought  up  in  for  Jthe^fm. 
For  i[  he  has  left  it  without  fufficient 
Reafon,  his  pleading  that  he  ads  ac- 
cording to  his  Opinion,  will  not  ex- 
cufe  him  from  Blame  and  Punif[> 
ment. 

I  A  M  eafy  to  believe,    that  the  M. 
■del  will   difregard    the    Advife    I  have 
given  him  of  examining  what  were  the 
Motives  that  principally  occafioned  his 
.  Infidelity,  and  may  think,  that  his  Mif- 
take,    if   it  fhould  prove  fuch,   can  do 
lym  no  Harm.    I  fliall  therefore  chufe 
to  put  him  m  mind  of  what  Monfieur 
BAjite  fays  of  fuch  as  have  been  drawn 
into  Infidelity    thro'    any    vicious  Mo- 
tives, particularly  thofe  he  infiances  of 
Pride  or  Senfuality  in  his  Hiftorkal  Dicii^ 
onary^  Title   Des  Barrea^x  :  ''  That  qviI 
^'  Cufiom,  fays  he,,  which  fome  Perfons 
"  had  taken  up  in  Converfation  of  oppo- 
"  fing  the  great  Truths  of  Religion,  oc- 
*|  cafion'd  either  by  Vanity,  or  a  Defire 
''  of  being  thought  more  knowing  than 
^  **  others. 


49 


^O  S  E  R  M  O  N      II. 

"  thers,  or  to  juftify  themfelves  in  their 
"  Senfuality,  may  for  fome  time  filence 
^^  the  inward  ConviQ:ionsof  their  Minds, 
"  and  make  them  to  have  entirely  for- 
^'  got  what  they  had  learnt  in  their 
"  Youth  concerning  a  God,  a  Hea- 
"  ven  and  a  Hell:  but  they  cannot 
"  wholly  extinguifh  the  Belief  of  them, 
'^  it  being  only  like  a  Fire  concealed 
**  under  the  Afhes,  which  will  quickly 
"  fliew  its  Adivity,  efpecially  when 
*'  tliere  is  any  ProfpeQ:  of  Danger ; 
*'  then,  fays  he^  we  find  them  Trem- 
"  bhng,  and  more  in  Fear  than  any 
*'  body  elfe ;  they  become  then  even 
*'  fuperiiitious  :  '*  And  he  gives  this 
Reafon  for  it ;  "  That  the  Remembrance 
"  of  their  having  fliewn  more  Con- 
**  tempt  for  Holy  Things  than  others, 
*'  increafes  their  Uneafinefs.  "  If  this 
Obfervation  of  Monfieur  Baylis  be  juft 
and  agreeable  to  Truth,  the  Advice  I 
have  given  the  Jt'^eijl  of  examining  the 
Motives  that  induced  him  to  renounce 
Religion,  may  not  be  altogether  amifs. 
Becauic  whatever  he  may  think  while 
he  is  in  Health,  and  out  of  Danger,  he 

cannot 


S  E  R  M  o  jsr   II.  5  r 

cannot  fecure  himfelf  againft  the  Ap- 
prehenfions  of  Punifhment,  i?  he  has 
wantonly  taken  up  the  Caufe  of  Infi- 
delity. 

But  fome  one  may  fay,  That  this 
Way  of  arguing  againfi:  Atheijis^  is  en- 
tring  into  the  Hearts  of  Men,  and  charg- 
ing them  with  what  may  be  as  eafily 
denied  as  affirmed  ;  that  it  is  an  un- 
fair Procedure  with  them,  becaufe  'tis 
taking  for  granted,  that  a  Man  mail:  be 
influenced  by  fome  Prejudices  whenever 
he  embraces  Atheifm ;  that  this  might 
be  with  equal  Juftice  retorted  upon 
the  Believer,  that  he  too  is  prejudiced, 
and  willing  againft  Evidence  to  believe 
a  G  o  D,  becaufe  he  wifhes  there  was 
one,  and  thinks  it  would  be  better  for 
him  that  there  fhould  be  one;  and 
therefore  that  the  Argument  drawn 
from  Prejudices  ihould  be  omitted  by 
both  Sides. 

The  Anfwer  is,  That  I  ought  to  fhew, 
if  I  could,  that  other  Motives  befides 
Evidence,  might  influence  Men  in  their 
Opinions;  that  fuch  Motives  were  \\- 
cious  and  punifhable  if  there  fhould  be 
E  2  a  God : 


^2  Sermon    n. 

a  God  :  And  this,  in  order  to  engage 
the  Atheifi  to  examine  carefully  upon 
what  Motives  he  took  up  his  Opini- 
ons :  If  the  Reh'gious  Man  is  under  a 
ftrong  Prejudice  to  believe  a  God,  and 
he  fliould  be  miftaken,  his  Miftake  can- 
not be  dangerous  or  hurtful  to  him. 
I  ought  alfo  not  to  have  omitted  thefe- 
Prejudices  as  probable  Motives  to  In- 
fidelity, becaufe  many  of  thofe  who 
feem  to  difown  all  Religion,  have  been 
(as  we  have  alrady  feen  from  the  Con- 
feffion  of  unfufpecled  Writers )  in- 
fluenced by  fome  or  other  of  them. 

If  there  are  any  others  who  have 
from  any  thing  like  a  ferious  Confide- 
ration  wrought  themfelves  into  a  Be* 
iief.  That  this  Frame  of  Things  might 
have  either  cafually  fallen  into  the  Or- 
der we  find  it  in,  or  necefTarily  have 
exifted  fuch  as  it  is  from  all  Eternity, 
they  are  not  concerned  with  what  has 
been  faid  under  the  Head  of  Prejudices, 
and  fliall  be  diftinftly  confidered  by 
themfelves,  when  I  come  to  confider 
another  Evafion  of  the  Atheifi s^  'viz. 
That    after     tlie     bell:   Enquiry,      he 

could 


Se  R  M  O  N      II.  52 

could  find  no  Evidence  for  a  G  0  d,  and 
therefore  could  deferve  neither  BJame 
nor  Punifliment  for  being  confident 
with  himfelf,  in.  not  paying  any  Re- 
fped  to  One  whom  he  did  not  acknow- 
ledge for  God. 

Having    confidered  certain   Preju- 
dices  which  might  be  fuppofed  to  have 
determined  many    of  thofe  who  have 
efpoufed   the  Caufe  of  Jtheif^^  it  can- 
not be  amifs  to  put  them  in  mind,  That 
their  Anceftors    in  Iniidehty  fupported 
their  Pj'inciples   by  Reafons  which  our 
Modern  Jtheifls  mull  acknowledge  to  be 
falfe,  and    therefore    were    certainly  to 
blame  in  concluding  againft  a  God   up- 
on  fuch  Reafonings,    as  a  further  and 
more   careful  Examination  into  Nature 
would  have  difcovered  to  be  faife.  Tiiis 
fhould   difcourage    the    modern  Jcbeift 
from  being  over-confident  in  his  Scheme, 
left   further    Difcoveries  in  Knowledge 
Ihould  make  his   Caufe   lefs   defenfibie, 
and    himfelf  culpable    for    determining 
haftily  againft  a  God,  before  a  full  and 
thorough    Examination  of  the    feveral 
Particulars  on    which    he    is    wont  to 
K  ?  groun<i 


54  S  E  R  M  O  NT     II. 

ground  his  Infidelity.  Which  brings 
me  to  confider  another  Defed  in  try* 
ing  any  Qiieftion,   viz, 

2dly.  That  we  defer ve  Blame,  i^ 
tliro"*  Lazinefs  we  decline  a  thorough 
Examination  before  we  take  up  our 
O'g'mioTis. 

Ir  cannot  be  doubted  that  there  are 
in  the  world  Half-Thinkers    as  well  as 
Free-Thinkers  ;  fuch  as  lead  themfelves 
into  Miilakes,  either  becaufe  they  want 
Abihties  or  Inclination  to  make  a  cjofe 
Inquiry  into  Things.     The  great  Lord 
Baco^  places  Atheifm  to    the  account  of 
Short-Thinking,  to  a  fmattering  in  Phi- 
lofophy.    I  know  our    modern    Unbe- 
lievers would  think   themfelves  greatly 
injured  li  we   charged  them  with  any 
V/ant  of   Ability,    and  fo  would  their 
PredecefTors ;    for  we  find  Lucretius  per- 
petually Talking  with  fuch    an  Air  of 
AlTurance,  as  if  he  had  adually  wreft- 
ed    the  Thunderbolt    out   of  Jupiter\ 
Hands ;  and    yet   he  appears   to    have 
been  a  carelefs  Examiner  into  Nature, 
when    he     accounted    for  the   Produ- 
clion  of  x^nimals   from  infenfible  Mat- 
ter 


S  E  R  M  O  N      II.  55 

ter,  by  Worms  arifmg  from  corrupted 
Carcafles  ;  which  was  the  only  Ac- 
count he  could  give  of  Animal  Pro- 
dudions,  z'iz,  of  Life  and  Senfation  ^ ; 
And  yet  our  prefent  Atheip  muft  ac- 
knowledge, That  he  pronounced  in  this 
Cafe  as  a  poor  Philofopher,  and  be- 
fore he  had  made  a  fair  Examination : 
For  I  think  Equivocal  Generations  are 
now  generally  given  up.  This  there^ 
fore  muft  pafs  with  our  Unbelievers  for 
a  Proof,  That  their  Anceftors  were  ia 
this  RefpeQ:  Short-Thinkers,  and  took 
up  their  Opinions  upon  infufficient  Mo- 
tives. 

There  is  another  Inftance  may 
be  given,  in  which  the  Atheifts  have 
taken  up  their  Opinions  before  their 
having  made  a  due  Examination  ;  which 
is  this :  That  nothing  could  aO:  upon 
Matter  but  by  Contad ;  from  thence 
they  inferred,  there  could  be  no  real 
E  4  Being 


Quippe  videre  licet  vivos  exiflere    vermes, 
ftercore  de  tetro  putrorem  cum  fibi  nafta  eft,  ^c. 


55 


Sermon   ii. 

Being  but  Matter,  or,  which  would 
be  the  fame  thing ,  that  if  there  was 
any  thing  immaterial  in  Nature,  it 
could  have  nothing  to  do  with  the 
Material  World  ;  becaufe  Matter  could 
be  acled  upon  in  no  other  Way  but 
by  Contacl,  and  then  nothing  but 
Matter  could  aQ;  upon  Matter ;  and  con- 
fequently,  an  Immaterial  Being,  which 
could  not  a£l  in  the  Way  of  Contact, 
could  have  no  E&iency  or  Aftion  up- 
on Matter :  But  a  farther  Examinatir 
on  into  the  Laws  by  which  Nature  is 
govern'd,  has  convinced  the  World, 
that  Bodies  themfelves  can  a8:  upon 
cne  another  at  the  greateft  Diftance 
from  each  other,  and  in  another  Way 
than  that  of  Contact ;  and  then  it  muft 
be  allowed,  that  the  Argument  built 
upon  it  was  form'd  before  a  due  Ex- 
amination had  been  made  into  the 
Nature  of  Things. 

Avery  Learned  Man  and  a  great 
Thinker    in    our  Time,    who  had    af- 
ferted,  "  That  we  might  as  well  con- 
"  ceive  that   God  might   have  added 
"  a  Thinking   (Quality    to    Matter,  as 

'*  make 


Sermon.  II.  57 

'^  make  a  material  Subftance  capable  of 
"  Ading  or  being  aded  upon  by  an 
''*  Immaterial  one ;  becaufe  there  could 
"  be  no  relation  of  Contact  between 
^^  fuch  heterogeneous  Subftances ; "  was 
afterwards  convinced,  that  there  was 
another  Way  than  that  of  Contad  by 
which  Bodies  might  be  afted  upon; 
as  may  be  {qqh  in  his  Pojihumous  Let- 
ters. 

The  Ufe  that  I  would  make  of 
this,  is,  That  in  a  Matter  of  fo  great 
Concern  as  that  of  a  God  and  Pro- 
vidence, the  Unbehever  would  fufter 
himfelf  to  be  perfuaded  to  re-examine 
his  Conclufions,  and  fee  whether  he 
has  not  been  deceived  in  any  of  his 
Premifes.  he  fees  his  Predecellbrs  ia 
Infidelity  by  a  clofer  Infpedion  into 
Nature,  ftripp'd  of  fome  Part  of  that 
Armour  in  which  they  trufted  moft : 
And  how  can  he  be  fure ,  that  far- 
ther Enquiries  into  Nature  may  not 
ftill  weaken  his  Caufe  ?  And  if  thro' 
Lazinefs  he  fliould  dechne  fuch  En- 
quiries ,  and  his  Opinions  fhould  at 
kft    prove  falfe,    his   Negled  will  be 

Criminal, 


58  Sermon   II. 

Criminal,  and  himfelf  anfwerable  for 
not  taking  due  Information  ,  before 
he  took  his  Opinions  for  Better  ,  for 
Worfe, 


S  E  R  M. 


SERMON  III 


I  Thessalonians  v.   21* 

Trove  all  Things :  hold  fajl 
that  "which  is  good. 


5? 


HAVE  already  in  difcour- 
fing  upon  thefe  Words 
fhewn  how  we  muft  pre- 
pare ourfelves  for  a  fair 
Examination  of  any  Que- 
ftion ;  that  we  muft,  previoufly  to 
our  Inquiries,  diveft  ourfelves  of  every 
Prejudice  and  Paflion,  fuffer  no  Incli- 
nations, nor  any  Defires,  but  thofc  of 
finding  the  Truth,  to  influence  our 
Judgments  :   That  we  muft   be    con^ 

tented 


(5o  Sermon   hi. 

tented  in  Qiieftions  of  great  Moment,  to 
undergo  the  Fatigue  of  a  full  and  care- 
ful Examination,  and  not  thro'  Lazinefs 
decline  a  thorough  Search  into  the  Ar- 
guments on  both  Sides,  or  draw  our 
Conclufions  before  we  have  well  con- 
fidered  our  Premifes. 

I  HAVE  fhewn  that  the  Want  of 
obferving  thefe  Rules,  doth  often  lead 
Men  into  Errors ;  and  that  the  greateft 
and  worft  of  all  Errors,  'viz.  Infidelity, 
would  decreafe  in  its  Numbers,  and 
lofe  a  great  Part  of  its  Profelytes^ 
whenever  the  World  ihall  refolve  to 
take  up  their  Opinions  from  no  other 
Principle  but  a  fincere  Love  of  the 
Truth.  That  the  Jtheifl  ought  to  lay 
his  Hand  upon  his  Heart,  and  declare 
if  he  can,  That  nothing  but  a  Love 
for  the  Truth  had  determin'd  him  to 
exchange  Religion  for  Atheifm  ;  and 
that  it  concerns  him  to  be  fincere  in 
fuch  a  Declaration ;  becaufe  every  o- 
ther  Reafon  for  making  the  Exchange, 
would  render  him  a  Criminal  for  the 
Abufe  of    thofe  Faculties  of  his  Mind 

which 


Sermon     hi.         6i 

which   would  have  dire£led-  him  bet- 
ter* 

I  AM  now  to  confider  ihe  other 
Excufe  the  Athcift  is  wont  to  make, 
That  he  has  made  the  befl:  Enquiry 
he  can,  without  being  able  to  difcover 
any  Evidence  for  a  G  o  d. 

But  before   I  confider  what   thofe 
have  to  fay  for   tliemfelves,   who  pre- 
tend to  have   taken   up    Atheifm   after 
a   ferious    Confideration  of  Things,    I 
mull  infift   upon   this,  .as   a  Prelimina- 
ry   to     the  Debate,    That    the   Atheifi 
ought   not    to   bring   againft     us    any 
fuch  Objeftions,  whofe  whole  Strength 
arifes  merely    from  our    Incapacity  of 
conceiving  the  Nature  and  Operations 
of  G  0  D  ;   and    for    this  plain   Reafon, 
Becaufe  'tis  agreed  betwixt  us,  that  we 
are  finite  or  limited  Beings  ;    and  muft 
therefore  have  limited  Underftandings  : 
But  that  the  neceffarily  exifting  Being, 
w^hoever  He  is,  muft  be  an  Infinite  and 
Eternal   One,    filling  all  Time   and  all 
Place.    For  there    is    no   denying  that 
Something  muft  have  been  from  Eter- 
nity j  becaufe  if  it  were  not  fo,  Some- 
thing 


62  Sermon   hi. 

thing  mufl:  have  arifen  abfolutely  from 
Nothing,  or  exifted  without  having 
any  Caufe  or  Reafon  of  its  Exift- 
ence  :  Which  is  plainly  impofTible.  And 
yet  'tis  certain,  we  can  form  no  No- 
tion of  an  eternal  Duration  already 
paft ;  an  Argument  therefore  drawn 
from  our  Inability  to  conceive  the  Na- 
ture of  a  Being  that  has  actually  ex- 
ifted from  Eternity,  or  to  comprehend 
its  Manner  of  Operation,  ought  to 
have  no  Weight,with  «^,  nor  be  urg'd 
by  the  Jiheift,  becaufe  his  Material 
God  would  be  equally  affeded  by  it. 
If  then  he  would  juftify  himfelf,  the 
only  rational  Inducements  that  can  pof- 
fibly  be  aflign'd  for  exchanging  Re- 
ligion for  Atheifm  y  muft  be  one  or 
other  of  thefe  : 

Either  for  the  avoiding  fome  par- 
ticular Difficulties,  which  he  thinks 
may  be  proved  to  amount  to  Impof- 
fibilities  in  our  Notion  of  a  God, 
and  which  too  his  Material  Scheme  is 
not  attended  with : 

O  R  elfe,  becaufe  in  general  there  are 
far  leis   Difficulties  to  be  gotten  over 

m 


Sermon    m.         63 

in  accounting  for  Appearances  by  the 
material  Scheme,  than  there  would  be, 
fhould  we  once  admit  a  God  and 
Providence.  Thefe  are  the  only  juftifia- 
bk  Inducements  that  can  be  affigned 
for  quitting  Religion  and  embracing 
Atheifm,  And  if  the  firfl:  of  thefe  fhould 
appear  to  be  fuch  as  cannot  be  de- 
fended, and  the  other  to  be  falfe  ia 
Fad ;  then  it  muft  be  granted,  that 
the  Atheif  has  not  taken  up  his  Ma- 
terial Hypothefis  after  a  fair  Examina- 
tion ;  and  will  be  therefore  highly  cul- 
pable for  not  aOiing  with  that  In- 
genuity which  becomes  a  Lover  of 
Truth. 

A  s  to  the  firft  of  thefe  Inducements, 
I  will  fhew,  That  it  can  never  juftify 
him  in  rejecting  Religion. 

i/?,  Because  he  can  never  prove 
that  the  particular  Difficulties  he 
complains  of,  do  amount  to  an  Im.- 
poffibility  or  a  Contradiction. 

2flJ/j,  Because  his  Material  Scheme 
which  he  takes  up  with  for  avoiding 
thofe  Difficulties,  is  attended  with  infi- 
nitely greater  ones  than  thofe  which  he 

finds 


6j^  S  e  r  xM  o  n   Hi. 

finds  fault  with  in  our  Notion  of  a  Gop'i 

And  then,  as  to  the  other  Induce- 
ment, 'viz.  That  in  general,  there  are 
fewer  Difficulties  in  accounting  for 
Things  by  a  Material  Principle ;  I  will 
ihew,  that  fome  of  the  moft  confidera- 
ble  Ph£»omena  in  Nature,  cannot  be  ac- 
counted for  by  fuch  a  Principle  only. 

The  firft  Inducement  for  embra- 
cing Atheifm^  is  not  defenfible,  becaufe 
the  Atheift  can  never  prove,  That  the 
particular  Difficulties  he  complains  of 
in  our  Notion  of  a  G  o  d,  do  amount 
to  an  Impoffibihty  or  a  Contradi6;ion. 
The  chief  Difficulties  which  the  Jtheifl 
is  wont  to  charge  upon  our  Idea  of  a 
God,  are  thefe: 

17?,  That  we  afcribe  Immateriality 
to  Him. 

idly^  That  we  allow  Him  a  Pow- 
er of  making  Something  out  of  No- 
thing :  Both  which  are  thought  by  him 
to  be  impoffible ,  whenever  they  are 
fuppofed  to  be  the  Nature  or  the  Ope- 
rations of  any  Thing  whatfoever.  And 

^dly^  Because  we  make  Goodnefs 
a  Part  of  his  Charader  j    which   they 

think 


Sermon    III.  65 

think  to  be  fufficiently  contradicted  by 
the  many  Natural  and  Moral  Evils 
that  appear  in  his  Workmanfliip. 

ly?,  I  A  M  to  confider  the  Difficulties 
which  are  raifed  againft  a  God  from 
his  Immateriality.  If  the  Jtheift  would 
prove  an  immaterial  or  incorporeal  Sub- 
ftance  to  be  impoflible  or  a  Contra- 
di£lion  ;  in  order  to  prove  it  fuch,  he 
muft  undertake  the  Proof  of  this  Pro- 
pofition,  "  Whatever  is  immaterial,  is 
"  Nothing."  And  therefore  an  imma- 
terial Subftance,  a  mere  Non  Entity,  And 
he  muft  prove  this,  one  of  thefe  two 
Ways ;  either^  That  what  we  have  no 
Idea  of,  can  have  no  Exiftence  in  the 
Nature  of  Things;  that  we  have  no 
Idea  of  an  immaterial  Subftance,  there- 
fore there  can  be  no  fuch  Thing.  Or 
elfe  he  muft  affirm,  That  the  only  fub- 
ftantial  Thing  in  the  World  is  Matter 
or  Body  ;  and  therefore  an  incorporeal 
Subftance  would  be  the  fame  thino-  as 
an  incorporeal  Body  :  Which  muft  be 
a  Contradiclion  in  Terms. 

The  Anfwer  we  give  to  the  firft  of 

thefe  Obieclions,   is,    That  we   cannot 

F  allo^ 


66  Sermon    III. 

allow  them  to  fpeak  Truth,  if  they  af= 
firm,  That  we  have  no  Conception  of 
•an  immaterial  Subftance.  2^'/j,  That  if 
it  were  a  Truth,  it  could  not  be  a  good 
Proof  of  the  Impoflibility  of  its  Ex- 
iftence. 

A  s  to  the  firft  of  thefe  Objeftions,  we 
are  perfuaded,That  we  as  certainly  know 
fome  of  the  Properties  of  immaterial , 
as  we  do  thofe  of  material  Subftance , 
that  Perception,  Underftanding,  and  a 
Power  of  beginning  Motion ,  are  as 
certainly  the  Properties  of  an  immate- 
rial Subftance,  as  Solidity,  and  a  Ca- 
pacity of  receiving  and  communicating 
Motion  are  Properties  of  Matter  or  Bo- 
dy. I  know  the  Atkift  would  make 
all  thefe  Properties  of  immaterial  Sub- 
ftance, to  be  only  Qualities  refulting 
ft-om  Matter.  But  as  I  ftiall  after- 
wards have  Occafion  to  fliew,  Tiiat  this 
Suppolition  of  the  Athsiji  is  Groundlefs 
and  Unphilofophical,  I  will  for  the 
prefent  take  it  for  granted,  what  fhall 
afterwards  be  proved,  viz,.  That  thefe 
are  Properties  of  immaterial  Subfence ; 
and  iis  a  Confequence  of  that,   that  we 

are 


S  E  R  M  O    M    III.  67 

are  able  to  form  fome  Notion  of  an 
Immaterial  Subftance  ^.  And  as  for 
the  Subftance  itfelf  of  an  Immaterial 
Being,  it  would  be  'm  vain  and  to  no  ' 
Purpofe  to  argue,  that  we  knew  no- 
thing of  it,  or  could  form  no  Idea 
about  it;  becaufe  the  fame  Objeftion 
would  equally  affeQ:  Material  or  Cor- 
poreal Subftance,  of  which  we  know 
as  little  as  we  do  of  the  other. 

But  fuppofing  it  never  fo  certain, 
That  we  could  form  no  Idea  of  an 
Immaterial  Being ;  this  would  not  prove 
the  Impoflibihty  of  its  Exiftence  ;  un- 
lefs  it  was  as  certain,  That  the  Facul- 
ties of  a  limited  Nature,  fuch  as  ours 
confeiTedly  is,  could  reach  to  the  ut- 
moft  Extent  of  every  Truth,  and  no 
PofTibility  of  Being  could  efcape  the 
Searches  of  our  Underftanding.  Where- 
as all  the  Knowledge  we  can  pretend 
to  have  of  the  Exiftence  of  Things 
without  us,  muft  be  derived  to  us  thro' 
fome  or  other  of  the  Senfes ;  for   thefe 

F  2  are 


^  Vide  Serm.  VI,  VH^  VIII,  IX. 


6S  S  E  R  xM  O  N     HI. 

are  the  only  Carriers  of  all  the  Intel- 
ligence that  the  Mind  receives  con- 
cerning External  Exiftences.  And  then 
which  Way  will  the  Jtheiji  take  to 
convince  any  Body,  that  our  Five  Senfes 
are  all  the  poiTible  Ways  of  receiving 
Information  concerning  the  Nature  and 
Operations  of  External  Objects.  If  we 
fhould  confult  our  Reafon  in  this  Mat- 
ter, that  would  probably  tell  us.  That 
this  particular  Number  of  Informers 
was  rather  calculated  for  our  prefent 
State  (in  which  we  find  ourfelves  be- 
fet  on  all  Sides  with  Corporeal  Objects, 
fome  of  which  are  good  for  us,  and 
others  would  hurt  us)  than  to  give  us 
an  exad  Infight  into  the  Nature  of 
Things.  And  that  probably  there  may  be 
many  more  Chanels  of  Knowledge  than 
thofe  we  are  furnifhed  with,  and  fuch 
as  would  have  given  us  farther  Views 
into  Things  than  we  are  capable  of 
in  our  prefent  Condition.  And  there- 
fore we  fliould  with  juft  the  fame  Rea- 
fon and  Juftice  pronounce  againft  the 
PofTibility  of  any  Thing  which  is  not 
the  Objed  of  one  of  our  Five  Senfes, 

as 


Sermon   lir.  6p 

as  a  Man  that  is  born  blind  might  de- 
clare againft  the  Poflibihty  of  Light  or 
Colours,  becaufe  •  he  has  no  Idea  of 
them ;  or  as  we  all  fhould  have  done, 
had  our  whole  Species  come  into  the 
"World  with  only  Four  of  them,  or  with- 
out the  Senfe  of  Seeing. 

It  is  certain  we  can  form  no  Idea 
of  an    Eternal  Duration    already   paft ; 
and  yet  the  Atheijl^  as   well  as  we,  is 
forced  to   acknowledge    the   Exiftence 
of  Something  from  all  Eternity.     And 
his  Want  of  an  Idea  of  Eternity,  is  not 
fuJiicient,  even  in  his  own  Opinion,  to 
exeufe  him  from  believing  it  true.   Let 
but    Immaterial    Subftance    have    the 
fame  fair  Play,  and  we  are  in  no  Pain 
from  this  Objection  againft  a  God.  For 
the  very    fame  Reafon    which  obliges 
the  Atheifi  to  admit  Something  Eternal, 
tho'   he  has   no  Idea  of  Eternity ;  will 
equally  hold  in  the   Cafe  of  Immaterial 
Subftance,  if  there  are,  as  I  fhall  after- 
wards prove    ^  certain  Appearances  in 
F  I  the 


Vide  Sermon  VII,  VIH,  IX,  X. 


70  Sermon    hi. 

the  World  which  cannot  be  accounted 
for  by  the  mere  Mechanical  Laws  of 
Matter  in  Motion.  For  then  he  will 
have  the  fame  Motive  for  taking  in 
forne  Being  that  is  not  a  Material  one, 
as  he  has  for  that  of  an  Adual  Eter- 
nity. For  he  takes  Refuge  in  this, 
that  he  may  avoid  the  Abfurdity  of 
Acknowledging,  that  any  Thing  can 
come  into  Being  abfolutely  from  No- 
thing, or  without  any  Caufe  of  its  Be- 
ing ;  and  if  he  cannot  make  it  very 
probable,  that  certain  Powers  I  lately 
mentioned,  may  arife  purely  from  Mat- 
ter ;  he  muft  then  either  acknowledge 
thofe  Powers  to  have  exifted  without 
any  Caufe  or  Reafon  of  their  Exiftence, 
or  elfe  with  us  he  muft  admit  Immate- 
rial Subflance. 

The  other  Argument  againft  Im- 
material Subflance,  viz.  That  there  is 
nothing  fubftantial  in  the  World  but 
Matter ;  is  a  fhameful  begging  of  the 
Queftion  in  Difpute,  and  taking  for 
granted,  what  they  know  we  con- 
ftantly  deny.  For  how  would  the 
Jtheijl  prove   this?    Why    thus   Spinofa 

does 


Sermon    ill-  7  v 

does  it,  he  gives  us  a  Definition  of 
Subftance,  that  "  'Tis  Something  In- 
^'  dependent  of  every  other  Thing,  and 
'^  exifting  by  a  Neceflity  of  Nature. " 
From  thence  lie  inferrs.  That  fince 
there  can  be  but  One  Self-exillent  or 
Independent  Being,  and  Exten- 
fion  or  Matter  is  confelled  to  be  a 
fubflantial  Being,  therefore  there  can 
be  no  other  Subftance  in  the  World 
befides  Matter ;  and  confequently,  no 
fuch  Thing  as  Immaterial  Subftance. 
But  all  this  Proof  amounts  to  no  more 
than  if  he  had  only  told  us,  there  is 
Nothing  but  Matter,  therefore  no  Im- 
material Being.  For  he  knows  very 
well  that  we  denied  Matter  to  be  the 
Self-exiftent  Being;  and  therefore  that 
if  his  Definition  of  Subftance  was  a 
good  one,  that  we  fhould  deny  it  be- 
longed to  Matter,  or  in  this  Senfe 
of  the  Word,  that  Matter  itfelf  could 
be  a  Subftantlal  Being,  or  indeed  any 
Thing  except  the  One  Self-exiftent  Be- 
ing :  And  then  how  will  his  Definition 
prove  to  us  the  impoffibility  of  Imma. 
terial  Subftance  ?  Thus  far  then  we  can 
F  4  §0 


7?  Sermon   m. 

go  in  Defence  of  a  God,  That  his 
Immateriality  cannot  be  proved  to  be 
impofTible,  or  to  imply  a  Contra* 
diction. 

2dlj,     Another     Difficulty    the 
JtkfJI:  is  wont  to  raife  againft  our  No- 
tion of  a  G  o  D,    is,   The  Power  that 
we  afcribe  to    Him  of  making  Some- 
thing from  Nothing.    Here  the  Jtheijl 
is  wont  to  triumph,  as  if  we  had  found 
out   a  Power  that    could    not  pofTibly 
have  any  other  Exiftence    than  in  our 
own  Imaginations  :  Here  they  perfuade 
'   themfelves,  that  they  are  fupported  by 
Authority    as    well    as    Reafon.     The 
Jtheifl  does  feldom  take  Refbge  in  Au- 
thority, but  in  this  particular  Cafe  he 
condefcends   to   part  with  his   beloved 
Singularity,  and    is  contented  for  once 
to  be  found   in  a  Croud,   and  to  take 
Shelter  m  Numbers.   But  he  might  as 
well  have  kept  out  of  them    for  any 
Advantage  they  will  be  to  his  Caufe 
For  he  fuppofes  the  Meaning  of  this 
Jxtom,  Nothing  can    he   made  out  of  No^ 
thing,    to.  be  defigned  by  all  thofe  who 
made    ufe  of  it,    not    only  againft  the 

Produftioa 


Se  rmon   111.  73 

Produfiton  and  Annihilation  of  any  Spe- 
cies of  Things ;  but  alfo  that  there  can 
be  no  other  ProduQ:ions  but  what  are 
from   pre-exiftent  Matter;   that  every 
Thing  muft  have  a  Material  as  well  as 
an  Efficient  Caufe  of  its  Being.    But 
here  his  Numbers  forfake  him,  and  he 
is  reduced    to  thofe   of  his  own  SqS:, 
For    altho'    it   was   generally  believed 
before  the  Appearance  of  Chriftianity, 
That  Matter  was  eternal  and  unmade, 
yet  we  are  fure  that  all  thofe,  at  leaft, 
who  acknowledged  our  Souls  to  be  in- 
corporeal, did  not  derive  them  from  pre- 
exiftent  Matter :  For  thus  Plato  fays  ^, 
^^  That  if  the  Soul  be   ancienter   than 
"  the  Body,  then  muft    the  Things  of 
"  the  Soul  alfo  be  ancienter  than  thofe 
"  of  the  Body ;    and  therefore  Cogita- 
*^  tion,    and    the   feveral  Species    of  it 
^f  muft  be  in  the  Order  of  Nature,  not 
"  only  before   local   Motion,    but  alfo 
*^  before   the  Longitude,  Latitude  and 
^t  Profundity  of  Bodies.  "  From  whence 

'tis 


*  Plato  de  Legib.  Ub.  X.  pag.  8^5, 


74  Sermon   hi. 

'tis  evident,  Plato  could  not  poffibly 
fuppofe  the  fiijR:  Produdion  of  Souls  to 
be  derived  from  pre-exiftent  Matter : 
Wliich  is  diredly  contrary  to  the  Act 
count  which  the  Atheifi  gives  of  Things  : 
For  he  muft  fay,  That  the  Things  of 
the  Soul,  viz.  Thought,  &c,  are  pofte- 
rior  in  the  Order  of  Nature  to  the 
Formation  of  Things,  being  an  EfFe6t 
of  Matter  properly  moved.  And  there- 
fore fuppofing  the  Antients  to  have  been 
unanimous  in  Denying  the  Produftion 
of  any  Subftances  ef  «»  ov\av ;  yet  fince 
they  did  not  derive  all  Beings  from 
Matter,  they  will  do  the  Atheiji's  Caufe 
little  Service ;  for  if  the  Atheift  will  not 
allow  their  Authority,  when  they  fup- 
pofe that  there  muft  be  forne  adive 
Subftance  not  derivable  from  Matter ; 
neither  are  we  obliged  to  allow  it,  when 
they  fuppofe  the  EiTences  ol^  all  Things 
to  be  eternal. 

But  the  Atheifl  may  fay,  that  their 
Agreement  in  denying  a  Power  of  pro- 
ducing Subftances ,  will  be  of  great  Ser-^ 
vice  to  him,  becaufe  a  juft  Purfuit  of 
that  "Principle    muft  neceflkrily  end  m 

the 


Sermon  111.  7$ 

the  Denial  of  a  God,  as  the  advan- 
cing of  two  Independent  Principles,  is 
a  fetting  up  two  Gods,,  which  is  the 
the  fame   Thing   with    pulling    down 

one. 

And  therefore  if  they  had  feen  the 
Impofllbility  of  two  Self-exiftent  Prin- 
ciples,  they  muft  have  joyn'd  with  the 
Atheift,  in  deriving  all  Things  from  that 
which  every  Body's  Senfes  affure  them 
to  be  a  fubllantial  Being,  viz.  Body 
or  Matter. 

To  this  we  anfwer,  That  alltheSeds 
of  Philofophy,  excepting  that  oi  Epicurus, 
fpeak  fo  fully  their  Senfe  as  to  the  Ne- 
cefTity  of  fome  aftive  Being  diftinft  in 
its  Original  from  Matter,  in  order  to 
account  for  the  Appearances-  of  Things, 
that  we   may  with  much  better  Rea- 
fon   conclude,  that  if  they  had  feen  the 
Confequcnce   of  their    Dodrine,    they 
would  rather  have  allowed    of  a  Crea- 
tive, than  have  given  up  to  the  Metft 
an  Mive  Power  diftinft  from  Matter, 
As  the  Stoick  is  generally  fuppofed  to 
be  the    greateft  M^teridifi   of   all  the 
Seds,  next  to  that  oiEpcurus^hQ  will 

be 


l6  Sermon  hi. 

be  the  fitteft  Perfon  to  be  interrogated 
upon  this  Occafion  ;  and  I  think  it  cannot 
be  difficult  to  .fhew,  that  if  the  Stokk 
argued  confiftently,  he  muft  have  been 
more  eafily  perfuaded  to  admit  a  Pow- 
er  of  Creating   Matter,    than   to  part 
with  his   Adive  Power   or  Principle ; 
for  io  long  as  he  fuppofed  Matter  or 
his  Materia  friwa  (which,  according  to 
him,  was  the  Principle  of  all  material 
Exigences)  to   be  a  lazy  and   inactive 
Being,  it  would  be  impoflible  for  him 
to  give  any  Account  of  this  Frame  of 
Things,  without   an    a6i:ive   Power  to 
work  upon  the   Inertia    of  Matter,  or 
rouze  it  out  of  its  Stupidity  ^. 

And  therefore  'tis  reafonable  to  be- 
lieve ,  that-  had  he  been  reduced  to 
this  Dilemma  y  of  either  admitting 
a  Power  of  Creation ,    or  rejeding  an 

Adive 


*  Dicunt,  ut  fcis,  Stolcl  noftrl  duo  efle  in  rerum 
N^tura,  ex  quibus  omnia  fiant,  Caufam  &  mate- 
riam  :  Materia  jacet  iners,  res  ad  omnia  parara, 
cefTatura,  ft  nemo  moveat.  Caufa  autem,  id  eft, 
Ratio,  materiam  format,  &  quocunque  vult  verfat,, 
fix  ilia  varia  opera  producic.      Smcca  Epift.  65. 


Sermon   HI.  yj 

A(Elive  Principle ,  that  he  would  have 
chofen  the  former,  rather  than  have 
owned  himfelf  to  be  of  a  Sed  of 
Philofophy  that  could  give  no  Ac- 
count concerning  the  Formation  of 
Things.  For  it  cannot  be  faid,  that 
the  Stoical  Active  Principle  might  be 
a  very  volatile  Matter,  and  what  he 
called  Matter,  the  grolTer  Part  of  ky 
to  diftinguilh  it  from  the  former  ;  be- 
caufe  there  is  no  other  Difference  be- 
tween the  fineft  and  the  grofleft  Mat- 
ter, if  Matter,  as  Matter,  be  inadive, 
than  that  the  fineft  requires  a  lefs  Force 
to  put  it  into  Motion  :  and  then  this 
Adive  Principle,  inftead  of  giving  Mo- 
tion to  every  Thing,  muft  be  moved  it- 
felf  by  Something  ;  and  therefore  could 
not  be  a  Principle  of  Adion,  or  account 
for  the  Formation  of  Things. 

But  however  that  be,  if  we  con- 
fider  the  Reafons  by  which  he  and  the 
rell  of  the  Philofophers  were  deter- 
mined in  rejeding  the  Creative  Power, 
they  will  appear  to  be  fo  weak  and  in- 
conclufwe,  that  their  Authority  in  this 
particular  Point   ought    to  have  httle 

Weight 


78 


Sermon    hi. 

Weight  with  us;  they  either  argued 
from  Natural  Generations,  or  Artificial 
Produdions.  Becaufe  we  do  not  now 
fee  Nature  producing  any  Subftances, 
but  only  different  Modes  of  Being, 
therefore  the  Author  of  Nature  never 
could :  Becaufe  all  Works  of  Art  are 
only  the  Management  of  pre-exiftent 
Matter ,  and  fitting  it  for  particular 
Ufes,  therefore  God,  as  well  as  eve- 
ry other  Artifl:,  muft  have  a  Subjed 
prepared  to  his  Hands  to  work  upon. 
But  this  Way  of  Reafoning  will  never 
prove  what  ought  to  be  proved,  viz. 
That  it  is  impoffible  in  the  Nature  of 
the  Thing,  that  there  fhould  be  any 
fuch  Power.  For  this  Power  of  ma* 
king  Something  out  of  Nothing,  or  of 
creating  a  Subftance,  is  no  more  than 
the  bringing  Something  into  Being, 
which  before  had  no  manner  of  Ex- 
iftence ;  but  this  is  not  to  aiiirm,  That 
a  Thing  may  be,  and  not  be  at  the 
fame  Time;  which  is  a  Contradiction, 
and  therefore  the  Object  of  no  Power 
whatfoever ;  but  only  that  Something, 
which  once  had  no  Being  at  all,  may 

be 


Sermon   iil  19 

be  brought  into  Being.  If  we,  who 
work  only  upon  pre-exiftent  Matter, 
cannot  conceive  how  this  fhould  be 
done ;  this  can  be  no  good  Argument 
againft  the  PofTibiUty  of  its  being  done 
by  an  Infinite  Power;  for  there  will 
always  be  fomething  in  fuch  an  Ob- 
-ject  as  the  Infinite  Being,  that  will 
more  than  fill  our  finite  Capacities. 

And  Sfinofa  himfelf  confeffes  as 
much,  when  he  tells  us,  ^  "  That  he 
"  cannot  underil:and  the  Manner  how 
"  many  Things  are  brought  about  by 
^'  his  Self-exiftent  Being,  fuch  as  the 
"  Cohasfion  of  the  Parts  of  Matter, 
"  and  the  Connexion  which  particu- 
**  lar    Beings   have    with  each    other. 

And 

*  Seriem  rerum  fingularlum  murabilium  impof- 
fibile  foret  humance  imbecillitati  afTequi,  cum  prop-  " 
ter  earum  omnem  numerum  fuperantem  multitu- 
dinem,  turn  propter  infinltas  iclrcumflantias,  in  una 
&  eadem  re,  quarum  unaquseque  poteft  efle  caufa  ut 
res  exiftat  aut  non  exiftat.  Traft.  de  Emend. 
Intellea.  p.  38S. 

Cognofcere  quomoJo  partes  nature  revera  co 
haereant,  8c  quomodo  unaqusque  pars  cum  fuo  to- 
to  convemat,  id  me  ignorare  dixi  in  antecedenti 
mea  Epiftola,  quia  ad  hoc  cognofceudum  rcquire- 
rerur  totam  naturam  omnefque  ejus  partes  co^- 
nofceie.  p.  439. 


8o  Sermon    ill. 

^^  And  yet  he  is  fully  perfuaded,  that 
*^  there  is  a  Chain  and  Connexion  of 
"  particular  Beings;  that  there  is  fuch 
*'  a  Thing  as  the  Cohaefion  of  the 
"  Parts  of  the  Body,  and  an  Union  of 
"  all  the  Parts  with  the  whole. "  And 
therefore,  in  Purfuance  of  the  fame 
Way  of  Reafoning,  Altho""  we  cannot 
tell  how  God  could  make  all  Things 
out  of  Nothing,  our  Ignorance  will 
never  prove  the  Thing  to  be  impof- 
fible,  no  more  than  Spwofa^s  Ignorance 
of  the  Caufe  of  Cohaefion  in  the  Parts 
of  Matter,  will  prove  that  there  cari 
be  no  fuch  Thing. 

The  Neceflity  of  admitting  a  Crea- 
tive Power,  will  appear  ftill  ftronger, 
when  we  come  to  fhew  the  Abfurdities 
which  the  Mutertdift  for  Want  of  fuch 
a  Power  is  reduced  to.      But 

^dljy  Another  ImpolTibility  the 
Atheift  is  wont  to  charge  upon  our 
Notion  of  a  G  o  D  ,  is  on  account  of 
our  afcribing  Goodnefs  to  Him,  which 
they  fay,  is  plainly  contradicted  by  the 
many  Marks  and  Tokens  of  Natural 
and  Moral   Evil  which  appear  in  that 

Part 


Sermon    ill.  8i 

Part  of    his  Workmanfhip   which  we 
are    beft  acquainted  with.    Before  the 
Atheift  can    prove  that  thefe  could  not 
poflibly  proceed  from  a  Good  Being, 
it  will  be  incumbent  on  him  to  (hew, 
That  'tis  inconfiftent  with  the  Nature 
of  Goodnefs  to  make  Beings    with  dif- 
ferent   Degrees    of    Perfedion.    If  he 
cannot  do  that,   then    certainly   every 
Degree  of  Imperfedion    makes  an  A- 
batement  of  the  Happinefs  of  the  Crea- 
ture;   and   fuch  an    Abatement  confti- 
tutes  what   we  call    Natural    or  Phy- 
fical  Evil.     Thus  for  Inftance,  'Tis  an 
Imperfeftion     m    us     Men     that    we 
want  a  perfeQ:  Knowledge  of  our  own 
Frame  and  Conftitution  ;  fuch  a  Know-  ' 
ledge,    I   mean,    as  would    enable    us 
to  find  out   (antecedently  to  the  tedi- 
ous   Way    of  Trial   and   Experience) 
what  would  be  good  for  us,  and  what 
would  be   prejudicial  or   hurtful  to  us. 
To   fupply   the  Want    of  this    Know- 
ledge,   God  has    affix'd    the    Idea  of 
Pain   to    our   Natures,    which    is    de- 
figned     to    give    us  Warning    of  any 
Thing   that   might   hurt    us.     Pain   fs 

G  acknow- 


82  Sermon    hl 

acknowledged  to  be  a  real  Evil,  and 
yet  if  we  were  not  admonillied  by 
it  to  avoid  fuch  Things  as  would  be 
hurtful  to  us,  what  thro'  Inadvertence 
and  Ignorance  of  our  own  Frame, 
we  fliould  never  know  when  it  was 
Out  of  Order,  nor  endeavour  to  fet  it 
aright,  till  it  was  too  late.  If  there* 
fore  it  be  not  repugnant  to  the  Idea 
of  Goodnefs  to  create  a  Being  with 
fuch  a  limited  Knowledge;  neither 
could  it  be  inconfiftent  with  the  fame 
Goodnefs  to  make  him  capable  of  re- 
ceiving painful  Ideas,  when  fuch  a 
Conflitution  was  fitted  for  the  Ufe  and 
Benefit  of  fuch  a  Creature. 

And  thus  for  Moral  Evil,  the 
Atheift  can  never  fliew  its  Exifi^ 
ence  to  be  a  Contradiction  to  the 
Idea  of  Goodnefs,  till  he  can  fully  fatisfy 
us,  that  there  can  be  no  fuch  thing 
as  a  Creature  endued  with  a  'Power 
over  its  own  Actions ;  becaufe  if  that 
is  pofTible,  which  the  Atheift  cannot 
difprove,  fuch  a  Creature  may  mofl:  cer- 
tainly make  an  ill  Ufe  of  that  Power, 
and  involve  itfelf  in.  Moral  Evil. 

But 


Sermon"   m. 

But  I  fhall  decline  faying  any  more 
upon  this  Head  of  Natural  and  Moral 
Evil,  becaufe  this  Subjed  has  been  aj. 
ready  Handled  by  the  Learned  Perfon 
who  lately  Preached  thefe  Leftures- 
^o  whom  the  Reader  is  referred  for 
farther  Satisfadion. 


83 


G 


serm. 


SERMON  IV. 

I   ThESSALONIANS    v.     21- 

Trove  all  Things  :  hold  fafi 
that  which  is  good. 


H 


AVING  in  the  preceding 
Difcourfe  fhewn  that  the 
Jtheift  cannot  prove  a  Con- 
tradition  upon  our  Notion 
of  a  God  ;  and  yet  lure  if 
there  was  a  real  Contradiction  in  it,  he 
might  help  others  to  a  Sight  of  it  as 
well  as  himfelf;  I  proceed  to  confider 
the  Difficulties  attending  his  Scheme, 
by  which  he  will  appear  to  be  a  very 
partial  Enquirer  after  Truth,  as  he 
G  3  might 


S6  S  E  R  M  O  N     IV. 

might  have  feen  much  greater  Diffi- 
culties in  his  Material  Scheme,  than 
thofe  which  he  makes  Obje£l:ions  againft 
the  Religious  one  ;  that  under  the  Co- 
lour of  avoiding  the  three  Difficulties 
of  an  Immaterial ,  Omnipotent ,  and 
Good  G  o  D,  he  is  fore'd  to  take  Re- 
fuge in  fuch  Explications  of  Things  as 
are  evidently  falfe  and  impoffible  ;  and 
is  therefore  inexcufable  in  making  thofe 
Difficulties  a  Pretence  for  rejeding  Re- 
ligion. 

Spinosa  is  the  only  Perfon  among 
the  modern  Atheifls,  that  has  pretend- 
ed to  give  us  a  regular  Scheme  of 
Atheifm  j  and  therefore  I  cannot  aO:  un- 
fairly in  making  him  the  Rcprefenta- 
tive  of  their  Party,  and  in.  proving  the 
Weaknefs  and  Abfurdities  of  the  Athe- 
iftick  Scheme,  by  fliewing  the  Faults 
of  his :  tho'  I  flaall  not  fo  entirely  con- 
fine myfelf  to  the  Examination  of  his 
Scheme,  as  not  to  iliew  occafionally^ 
that  every  other  Scheme  that  leaves 
out  the  Religious  Notion  of  a  God, 
will  be  liable  to  great  Abfurdities.  And 
if  we    examine  the   Hypothefis  which 

Spnofa 


Sermon    iv-  87 

spinoff  has  fubftltuted  as  a  Remedy  to 
the  above-mentioned  Difficulties,  I  am 
fully  perfuaded  his  Remedy  will  appear 
to  all  indifferent  Perfons  to  be  much 
worfe  than  the  Difeafe  he  complains 
of. 

He  fuppofes  with  us,  "  That  Some- 
"  thing  muft  have  exifted  from  all 
"  Eternity,  without  having  any  other 
"  Caufe  of  its  Exiilence  than  the  abfo- 
"  lute  Neceflity  of  its  own  Nature  : " 
Thus  far  we  are  agreed.  He  further 
fuppofes,  ''  That  there  is  Nothing  in 
"  Nature,  that  is,  no  Subftance  or  rtal 
"  Being,  befides  this  One  NeceiTarily 
"  Exiitent  Being ;  and  fince  the  Ex- 
*'  iftence  of  Material  Subftance  is  moft 
"  evident,  that  this  muft  be  the  One 
*^  Self-exiftent  Being,  and  all  the  va- 
"  riety  of  Beings  in  the  ^yorld,  no- 
"  thing  but  ditferent  Modifications  of 
"  this  One  Material  Subftance.  He  fup- 
*^  pofes  this  Subftance  to  be  Infinite 
"  or  Immenfe,  and  to  have  an  in^iiitQ 
"  Number  of  Attributes,  two  of  which 
"  he  fuppofes  to  be  Thought  and  Ex- 
^[  tenfion  ;  he  then  affirms  in  Confe- 
G  4  "  quence 


88  Sermon   iv. 

"  quence    of  this ,    That    all    Bodies 
"  are  Modifications    of  this  One  Sub- 
^^  ftance,  confidered  as  extended ;  as  alt 
"  Souls    or    Thinking  Beings    are   the 
''  Modifications  of  this   One  Subftance 
^'  confidered     under     the    Notion     of 
"  Thought.  So  that  God,  the  Neceffari- 
"  ly  Exiftent  Being,  and  endued  with 
"  infinite  Perfeftions,    is  the  Caufe  of 
"  all  Things  that  exift,  tho'  at  the  fame 
"  time    He   himfelf  differs    not    really 
"  from  thofe  Things  that    exift ;    they 
"  being  all  of  them  Confubilantial  with 
"  him,    and  not  fo  much  as  perfonally 
"  differing    from  Him.     He  is    at  the 
'  "  fame  time  Agent  and  Patient,  Caufe 

*'  and  Effed,  and  every  Thing  He  pro- 
"' duces,  is  only  praftifing  upon  Him- 
"  y^(/ ;  and  generating  a  new  Appear- 
"  ance  of  Hmjelf.  " 

This  is  the  extraordinary  Scheme 
that  Sf'mofa  has  thought  fit  to  ered,  in 
order  to  get  himfelf  clear  of  the  Three 
above-mentioned  Difficulties.  From  this 
Account  of  his  Syftem  'tis  evident,  that 
tho'  6pmofa  and  we  do  differ  as  to 
the  Subjed  of  the  Self-exiflent  Nature ; 

yet, 


Sermon  IV.  89 

yet,  as    to  certain  Characters  or  Pro- 
perties of  it,  we  are  both  agreed ;  fuch 

i/,  The  Unity  or  Simplicity  of  the 
Self-exiftent  Being.  And  2^/7,  Its 
Immutability.  For  whatever  Diverfi- 
ty,  whatever  Changes  there  may  feem 
to  be  in  the  Nature  of  Things,  yet  all 
this  does  feem  to  pafs  with  him  for 
nothing ;  fo  long  as  'tis  but  one  and  the 
fame  Numerical  Being  appearing  in 
different  DrefTes :  As  a  Man  fuffers  no 
real  Change  by  alTuming  different  Cha- 
racters, or  by  perfonating  any  State  or 
Condition  of  Life  different  from  his 
own  :  Which  he  thinks  fuiBcient  to  fe- 
cure  both  the  Unity  and  Immutability 
of  his  Self-exiftent  Being.  Thus  far 
then  being  agreed,  we  are  to  enquire, 
How  far  he  has  mended  the  Reli- 
gious Scheme  by  rejecting  Immaterial 
Subftance;  and  whether  his  Material 
Scheme  can  poffibly  anfwer  the  above- 
mentioned  Characters. 

The  infuperable  Difficulties  which 
thinking  Men  found  in  reconciling  thefc 
Attributes  with  material  Extenfion,  in- 

clia'd 


90  Sermon  IV. 

clin'd  them  to  admit,  altho'  their  Senfes 
could  give  them  no  Information  con- 
cerning the  Exiftcnce  of  any  fuch  Be- 
ing, that  there  might  be  in  Nature 
fome  more  perfeQ:  Manner  of  Exiftence 
than  the  Material  one  ;  and  this  they 
called  Immaterial  jubilance,  ^pwofa 
himfelf  was  well  aware  of  the  Diffi- 
culties that  would  difturb  his  Material 
Scheme,  and  therefore  tound  it  necclla- 
ry  to  give  us  a  new  Notion  of  Matter, 
and  different  from  what  the  World  had 
hitherto  fufpedled  of  it.  Matter  had 
always  been  thought  capable  of  Di- 
vifion  into  numberlcfs  Parts ;  each  of 
which  Parts  might  exift  feparately  from 
the  whole ;  and  confequently,  if  Matter 
was  the  Self-exiftent  Being,  according  to 
the  common  Notion  the  World  had  of 
it,  there  muft  have  been  as  many  Self- 
exiftent  Beings  as  there  are  Parts  into 
which  Matter  is  divifible.  But  Spinoja 
was  feniible  that  the  Being  which 
was  NecelTarily  Exiftent,  could  be  but 
One  ;  he  therefore  lays  it  down  as  the 
Foundation  of  his  Undertaking,  "  That 
"  there  is  no  more  than  One,Material 

"  Subftance 


Sermon    iv.  ^ 

^'  Subftance  in  the  World ;  that  what 
"  every  Body  before  him  had  calfd  di- 
*'  {\'m8:  Subftances,  were  to  be  no  long^ 
*^  er  fuch.  "    And  tho'  the  feveral  Parts 
of  Matter   are  every   Day    feen  to  be 
feparated  from  each  other  without   lo- 
fing  their  Exiftence,  as  when  the  Parts 
of  Wood  are  divided  from  each  other 
into  Smoke  and   Afhes      and  tho'  the 
feparate  Exiftence  of  Individuals,  and  of 
the  feveral  Concretions  of  Matter  look 
never  fo  much  like  diftinO:  Subftances ; 
yet  they  fhall  all   pafs  with  Spif?ofa  for 
nothing  more   than  different   Modes  of 
one  and  the  fame  Being. 

But  if  we  know  any  thing  at  all, 
we  know  this  to  be  falfe  and  impoili- 
ble :  if  we  have  any  diftinft  Ideas,  and 
if  fuch  diftind  Ideas  will  at  all  prove  a 
real  Diftindion  or  Difference  ia  Things 
exifting  without  us,  we  are  as  certain 
as  we  can  be  of  any  Thing,  that  there 
muft  be  more  than  one  Material  Sub- 
ftance  ;  as  many  as  there  are  or  can  be 
of  feparate,  material  Exiftences,  and 
thofe  as  many  as  the  Divifions  which 
Matter    is  capable  of  receiving.    And 

therefore 


p2  S  E  R  M  O  N    IV. 

therefore  Spifjofa  by  fubftituting  Mat- 
ter in  the  Room  of  Immaterial  Sub- 
ftance,  has  avoided  a  Difficulty,  and 
taken  up  with  an  Impoflibility.  For 
let  there  be  never  fo  much  Difficulty 
in  conceiving  Immaterial  Subftance,  yet 
when  we  find  ourfelves  reduced  to  this 
Dilemma,  of  either  admitting  it  for  true, 
or  elfe  acknowledging  Matter  to  be  a 
Simple  Being,  the  Choice  which  Side 
to  take,  cannot  be  long  in  making  : 
For  all  that  any  one  can  fay  againft  Im- 
material Subftance,  is  only  this ;  That  his 
Senfes  give  him  no  Account  of  any  fuch 
Exiftences  5  but  as  for  Matter  or  the 
Material  World,  he  fees  nothing  plain- 
er than  that  this  is  a  Compound  Being, 
each  of  whofe  Parts  may  exift  feparate- 
ly ;  and  therefore  can  never  be  made 
confiftent  with  that  Unity  and  Simpli- 
city which  are  neceflary  Confequences 
of  that  Onenefs  of  Subftance  which  Spi^ 
nofa.  afcribes  to  the  NecelTarily  Exifting 
Being.  The  only  Subterfuge  Spinoff 
has,  and  a  mere  Subterfuge  it  is,  is 
this;  That  he  takes  it  for  granted, 
there  is  no  fuch  Thing  as    a  Vacuum ; 

and 


S  p  R  M  O  N     IV.  93 

^nd  therefore  that  there  can  be  no  real 
Separation  of  one  Part  of  Matter  from 
another. 

I N  the  firfl:  place,  This  is  taking  for 
granted,  and  Building  his  whole  Scheme 
upon  what  Sir  Ifaac  Newton,  a  much 
better  Philofopher  than  himfelf,  has 
fince  his  Time  given  the  World  ftrong 
Reafons  for  believing  to  be  falfe,  viz:., 
That  there  are  no  Spaces  void  of  Matter. 
But  fuppofing  there  is  no  fuch  Thing 
as  a  Vacuum ;  yet  thofe  who  maintain'd 
the  Infinity  of  Matter,  or  that  all  Space 
was  filled  with  Matter,  did  acknow- 
ledge, that  the  Parts  of  Matter  were 
really  divifible  and  feparablc  from  each 
other ;  and  confequently  did  not  think 
void  Spaces  necejGfary  in  making  a  Se- 
paration of  one  particular  Part  of  Mat- 
ter from  another,  however  necelTary 
they  might  be  to  make  a  total  Sepa- 
ration from  all  Matter  in  general :  For 
\irho  will  not  fay,  that  two  Perfons  are 
as  really  feparated  from  one  another, 
tho'  the  Space  or  Diftance  that  fepa- 
rates  them  fhould  be  filled  with  other 
Perfons,  as  if  it  were  taken  up  by  any 

Thing 


94  S  E  R  xM  O  N    IV. 

Thing  elfe?  and  therefore  one  Part  of 
Matter  may  be  really  divided  from'  an- 
other, altho'  the  Space  between  thoie 
two  Parts  of  Matter  fhould  be  filled 
up  by  other  Matter. 

Indeed,  Spmofa  himfelf  feems  to 
miftruft  the  Strength  of  this  Argument, 
and  therefore  thinks  it  beft  to  provide 
himfelf  a  Retreat  in  cafe  he  were  beat- 
en out  of  it,  by  faying.  That  he  does 
not  know  whether  he  attributes  any 
thing  to  God,  that  is  unworthy  of 
him,  i£  he  fhould  grant  that  He  was  di- 
vifible  *.  And  all  the  Reafon  he  gives 
why  Divifibility  fhould  be  an  Imper- 
fe6lion  in  God,  is,  "  Becaufe  if  He  is 
*'  divifible.  He  is  divided  by  Himfelf^ 
"  and  not  by  any  External  Caufe.  "  But 
this  Anfwer  leaves  the  Difficulty  in  all 
its  Strength  :  For  let  the  Divifibility  be 
caufed  by  what  it  will,  ftill  the  Dif- 
ficulty  remains,   how   a   partable   and 

feparabte 


♦  Se  nefcire  cur  dlvina  Natura  indigna  efTet,  (I 
akatur  Dlvifibilis.  in  tbi  latter  End  of  the  ScholiOT 
<m  Prop.  15.  Part  i. 


Sermon    iv. 

feparable  Nature,  can  be  a  Simple 
or  Uncompounded  Being.  Till  the 
Materidift  can  fatisfy  us  in  that  Point, 
we  muft  beg  Leave  to  affirm,  That  he 
is  no  fair  Examiner;  that  he  could 
not  be  deterniined  by  the  greater  Evi- 
dence, when  he  left  Religion  to  free 
himfelf  from  the  Belief  of  Immaterial 
Subftance,  becaufe  at  the  fame  time  he 
faw  himfelf  under  a  NecelTity  of  fwal- 
lowing  an  Article  of  Belief  of  much 
harder  Digeftion ;  I  mean,  that  Divifi- 
bility  is  irreconcileable  with  Unity. 

idly^  Another  remarkable  Diffi- 
culty the  Atheifl  brings  upon  himfelf,  \s^ 
To  make  a  fufficient  Provifion  for  the 
Immutability  of  his  Self-exiftent  Being, 
while  he  makes  Matter  to  be  the  Sub- 
ject of  it.  We  are  fully  perfuaded  that 
we  know  the  Difference  between  a  Be- 
ing that  always  continues  the  fame,  and 
a  Being  that  is  perpetually  changing  the 
Manner  of  its  Exiftence  ;  that  a  Being 
who  is  what  it  is  by  a  Neceffity  of 
Nature,  cannot  be  fubjed  to  Change 
or  Corruption :  we  are  alfo  well  alTured 
that  Material  Beings  are  fo  far  from 

being 


pd  S  E  R  M  O  N     IV. 

being  without  Variation  or  Shadow  of 
TuYning^  that  they  are  fubjedt  to  all 
manner  of  Alterations,  that  they  are 
fucce (lively  putting  on  new  Modes  of 
Being,  acquiring  fome  Forms  that  they 
had  not  before,  and  lofing  others  that 
they  had. 

How  much  foever  Our  modern  Atheif 
may  think  fit  to  laugh  at  the  Eficurems^ 
yet  I  think,  in  this  Refped,  they  have 
taken  better  Care  of  their  Gods  than  he 
lias  done.  The  Eftcuream  faw  that  their 
Material  Gods  could  never  be  perma- 
nent Beings,  if  they  were  in  the  Way 
of  their  Atoms;  that  their  Frame 
would  be  in  continual  Danger  of  be- 
ing difordered,  if  not  deftroyed  by  their 
continual  Incur fions :  and  therefore  they 
wifely  removed  them  out  of  their  num- 
berlefs  Worlds,  where  the  Atoms  were 
continually  joftling  each  other,  and 
placed  theni  in  Security  in  their  Intra- 
mundan  Spaces:  But  our  modern  A- 
theiji  has  taken  no  fuch  Care  of  his 
God ,  for  he  has  left  him  in  all  the 
Hurry  and  Confufion  of  Things,continu- 
ally  altering  and  changing  his  State  and 

Condition, 


S  E  R  xM  O  N     IV,  ^J 

Condition,  fometimes  for  the  better, 
fometimes  for  the  worfe;  he  is  the  Sub- 
jed  of  all  the  Generations,  and  all  the 
Corruptions  that  are  feen  in  the  World. 
For,  as  what  others  would  call  parti^ 
cular  Beings  or  Subftances,  are  with 
S^imfa,  only  Modes  of  the  fame  One 
Subftance  God;  fo  it  muft  be  God 
that  is  the  Subjed  of  all  the  Changes; 
and  yet  Cotta  in  Ttd)  de  Natura  Deorumy 
ipeaks  of  it  as  an  undoubted  Axiom  in 
Philof'phjj  Si  ortus  eji  DeoruWy  intcritus 
[it  mceffe  efl.  p.  56. 

Mutability  has  fo  plain  a  Mark 
of  Imperfedlion  upon  it,  and  is  fo  in- 
confiftent  with  necelFary  Exiftence^  that 
it  gives  Spinoff  no  fmall  Trouble  to 
dear  his  NecefTary  Being  from  any  fuch 
Imputation ;  and  the  only  Way  he  could 
think  of,  was  this :  That  tho'  the  Man- 
ner of  Being  was  always  changing, 
yet  the  Subftance  or  SubjeQ:  of  thofe 
Changes  always  continued  the  fame. 
But  this  Plea  will  never  excufe  his.  Self- 
exiftent  Being  from  Variablenefs  and 
Change,  whenever  we  appeal  to  any 
of  the  Ancients  who  have  made  ufe  of 
H  thefe 


pS  SerxMon    IV. 

thefe  Words:  For  they  all  maintained, 
as  much  as  Spimjk,  the  Immutability  of 
the  Subftance  of  Body  ;  they  fuppofed 
that  the  Sublknce  of  Matter  was  never 
created  or  annihilated,  but  always  conti- 
nued the  fame ;  and  yet  believed  it  a 
Being  that  was  akkoU^q-  &  r^iirVoi, 
becaufe  o'l  its  fo  often  altering  the 
Manner  of  its  Exiftence. 

The  Proteus  of  the  Ancients,  tho' 
the  Emblem  of  the  greateft  Inconftan- 
cy,  would  be  as  immutable  a  God, 
with  all  the  different  Forms  he  threw 
himfelf  into,  as  Sfinofa\  Self-exiftent  Be- 
ing. For  'twas  always  the-  felf-fame 
Being,  tho'  fometimes  in  one  Shape, 
fometimes  in.  another.  And  therefore 
to  deny  the  Mutability  of  any  Being 
merely  becaufe  the  Subftance  remains 
the  fame,  is  to  give  a  new  Significa- 
tion to  the  Word,  and  different  from 
what  was  ever  given  before.  For  in 
every  Mutable  Being  'twas  always  un- 
dei'ftood,  that  the  Subftance  remained 
what  it  was,  only  the  Mode  of  its  Ex- 
iftence  was  altered ;  otherwife  there 
would  be    no    Difference   between  the 

Change 


Sermon    IV. 

Change  and  the  Annihilation  of  a  Being  ; 
and  yec  the  Poets  as  well  as  Pliilofopliers, 
the  fabulous  Mitiimorphofes  of  Ovid^  as 
well  as  the  real  Chajiges  and  Corrup- 
tions, as  explained  by  the  PhilofoplierSj 
have  always  fuppofed  a  Difference  be- 
tween  thefe  two  Ideas.  And  therefore 
Si)inofa\  Argument  will  only  prove  the 
Iin  mortality,  not  the  Immutability  of 
his  Self-exiftent  Being. 

'T I  s  plain  from  Flutnrch^  That  lie 
thought  a  Being  might  be  immortal,  and 
yet  an  imperfect  and  mutable  Being  .^ 
For  thus  he  expreiles  himfelf  in  his 
Treatife  asrainft  the  Steicks.  where  he  is 
ridiculing  the  Stoical  Notion  of  Jr/plter^ 
into  whom  the  Stdich  fuppofed  all  o- 
ther  Beings,  Gods  as  well  as  Men,  to 
be  transformed  at  the  Conflagration  5 
"  CLryftppus  ^  fays  he^  and  l  leant  he  s  ^ 
"  when  they  had  filled  the  whole 
"  World  with  what  they  called  Gods„ 
"  tjiey  took  no  Care  of  fecuring  any 
""  of  them  from  Corruption  but  "JuPiter 
*'  only,  m  whom  all  the  reft  of  the 
"  Gods  were  lod.  And  then  he  makes 
this  Remark,  "  Tliat  his  d&^Xvoymgoi 
H  2  ''  them. 


loo  Sermon    IV. 

^'  them  was  no  better  a  Proof  of  his 
"  own  Immutability  than  it  was  of 
**  theirs.  For,  fays  he,  it  is  no  more 
"  an  Argument  of  Weaknefs  and  Mu- 
'^  tability  in  the  Gods,  that  they  are  ^ 
^*  changed  and  corrupted,  into  ^upter^ 
"  than  it  is  in  Jupiter  into  whom  they 
^  are  changed  ^.  " 

Besides,  this  Argument  of  the 
Spinolifts  cannot  be  a  good  one,  be- 
caufe  it  would  prove  too  much :  for 
it  would  prove  not  only  that  the 
Self  exiflent  Being  was  not  a  Mutable 
Being,  but  alfo  that  there  could  be  no 
fuch  Thing  as  a  Mutable  Being  in  the 
World.  For  if  the  Self-exiftent  Being 
could  be  an  Immutable  one  amidftall 

the 


*  Plutarch.  Tlzeit  ^  koiv&^v   Ivvoiuv  -TS-fSf  ti^j 
'S.Tco'iKVi.  Seft.  looo. 

il)    70    (JLijetCoiKKoV  di  iTfJV  (pQei^iJttl,    K^  70   ToTf    Ahhtlf 


Sermon    IV.         loi 

the  Changes  He  went  thro',  only  be- 
caufe  his  Subftance  was  not  deftroy- 
ed  but  remained  the  fame ;  then  what 
fhould  hinder  Man  from  being  an 
Immutable  Being  ,  altho'  he  fhould 
change  his  Opinions,  Inclinations  and 
Purpofes  every  Day,  or,  if  you  will, 
every  Hour  of  the  Day  ?  for  amidft 
all  thefe  Changes,  he  is  ftill  the  fame 
Perfon  or  perfonal  Being.  And  there- 
fore by  the  Reafoning  of  the  S^ino^ 
Iffls,  he  too  would  be  a  moil  fteady 
Being,  tho'  his  Thoughts  and  Purpofes 
were  unfteady  enough. 

These  Difficulties ,  or  rather 
ImpofFibihties  ,  muft  aHecl:  every 
Scheme  that  the  Atheiji  can  ra  ife  up- 
on the  Foot  of  a  A'Jaterial  God.  And 
now  I  will  leave  it  with  every 
Thoughtful  Perfon ,  whether  the  A* 
theifi  could  be  moved  by  any  rational 
Conviftion,  when  he  took  Refuge  in 
the  Material  Hypothefis,  to  avoid  the 
Difficulty  of  conceiving  an  Immate- 
rial Exigence  ;  '  and  whether  he  has 
not  a.Q;ed  the  fame  foolifh  Part,  which 
H  3  Coiu 


102  Sermon    IV. 

CoUx  charged  upon  Epicurus  in  another 
Cafe  ^.     But, 

2^/7,  I  AM  now  to  confider  how  hq  • 
has  mended    the   Matter  by    rejefting 
a  Power    of  making    Something  from 
Nothing.  As  he  allows  no  fuch  Power, 
he  is  under  a  Necellity  of  deriving  all 
the  Powers  of  Nature    from   the  Sub- 
iftance  of  Matter,  as  from  an  Emamtive 
Caufe,  producing  them  by  adling  upon 
iifelf;    and   thus  Thought,    Senfe,   and 
Life,    as  well    as    Material   Extenfion , 
muft   all  be  drawn  out  of  the  ^^cwels 
of  this  fimpie  Subftance   of  Matter. 

As  there  are  evidently  Thinking, 
as  well  as  Unthinking  Beings  in  the 
World  ;  the  Difficulty  is,  how  to  de- 
rive both  of  them  from  one  fingle  Prin- 
ciple. SpifwfA  and  we  are  agreed.  That 
there  is  but  One  Principle  01'  all  Things : 
we  account  for  it,  by  fuppofmg  an  Om- 
nipotent, Subftantial  Intelhgence  to  have 
given  Being  to  Matter,  not  as  an  Ema- 

native 


*  GravJorein  plagam  recipiclMt,  ut  Icv'orcm  repe'- 
?.£vet,  r>.  58.  d«  Nar.  Deoiam.    Da-j'.es''^  EJIr. 


Sermon    iv.         103 

native  Caufe,  by  producing  it  out  of 
its  own  Subflance;  for  we  do  not  fee 
how  material  Extenfion  fhould  flow  from 
the  Subftance  of  a  Thoughtflil  Being, 
any  more  than  how  Thought  fhould 
arife  from  Matter ;  but  that  God  gave 
a  Being  to  Matter  from  Nothings  or 
when  it  had  no  manner  of  Exigence 
previoufly  to  the  Exercife  of  this  Pow^ 
er  of  his. 

The  Atheift^  that  he  may  avoid 
afcribing  this  Power  of  producing  Sub- 
ftances,  or  of  making  Something  from 
Nothing,  which  he  thinks  to  be  the  Ob- 
ject of  no  Pov/er  whatever,  is  forced  to 
have  recourfe  to  Material  Subifance  as 
the  only  Source  from  whence  mull  a- 
rife  both  Thought  and  Extenfion,  all 
the  Variety  of  Corporeal  Beings,  all 
their  Powers  and  Qualities,  -and  alfo  all 
the  Powers  of  Mind,  fuch  as  thofe  of 
Perception  and  Intelligence.  A  hard 
Task  I  his  is  for  him  to  perform  ;  and 
yet  hard  as  it  is,  he  mull  go  thro^ 
with  it,  if  he  will  not  with  us  admit  -o^ 
Power  of  Creation. 

H4.  ^yE, 


loz}.  Sermon   iv. 

^'  We  agree  to  what  the  Author  of  the 
Char  act  ertfiicks  has  faid  concerning  the 
Production  of  either  of  thefe  Sub- 
ftances,  (to  wit,  Extended  and  Think- 
ing) out  of  the  other,  when  he  fays  ^, 
"  That  the  poor  Dregs  of  forry  Mat- 
"  ter,  can  no  more  be  made  out  of 
^'  the  fimple,  pure  Subftance  of  imma- 
"  teriai  Thought,  than  the  high  Spi- 
"  rits  of  Thought  or  Reafon  can  be 
^'  extracted  from  the  grofs  Subftance 
^'  of  heavy  Matter. ''  We  joyn,  I  fay, 
with  him  in  this  Reafoning,  and  do 
therefore  aifert  the  NecelEty  of  having 
Recourfe  to  a  Creative  Power  •  for  fince 
neither  Materia}  Subftance  can  flow 
from  Immaterial,  nor  Immaterial  Think- 
ing Subftance  from  Material  m  the  Way 
of  Emanation ;  there  mupj  either  be  two 
Independerit  Principles  from  whence  we 
may  draw  out  thefe  two  dilferent  Kinds 
of  Being ;  or  eife  on^  of  them  muft 
neceftarily  be  produced  from  Nothing. 
If  the  Aiheifi  will  affirm,  That  Thought 

and 


*  Vol.  II.  p.  z^C,  "-97. 


Sermon    IV.  i  o$ 

and  Extenfion  may  arife  from  the  fame 
Subftance;  the  Abfurdities  he  will  be 
reduced  to,  are  thefe;  he  muft  fay, 
That  Senfe  and  Infenftbility  are  the  At- 
tributes of  the  fame  Simple  Subftance 
of  G  o  D  ;  and  yet  he  nor  no  Man  a- 
hve  can  tell  how  fuch  incompatible  At- 
tributes could  be  identified,  fo  as  to 
conftitute  one  Simple  Subftance  ;  that  is, 
how  the  fanie  fimple  Subftance  could 
be  both  fenfible  and  infenfible,  thought- 
ful and  thoughtlefs. 

To   avoid  this  Abfurdity,   he   muft 
then  fay,  That  there  is  no  real  Diffe- 
rence between  Thought  and  Extenfion ; 
he  muft  fall  in  with  that  abfurd  No- 
tion of  Mr.  Hobbs,  "  That  all  Matter 
*^  is  furnilhed  with  adual  Senfation  and 
"  Thought  ;   altho'  only  Matter  Orga- 
"  nized  and  in  Life,  can  make  Evidence 
"  of  its  Perceptions."   And  Spwofa  feems 
to  be  under   a  Neceffity    of  acknow- 
ledging this ;  becaufe  he  makes  Thought 
and  Extenfion  to    be  Two  Attributes 
of  his  One  Subftance,  and  fays,  "  That 
f'  there   is  no  real  Difference  between 
f  the    Attributes  and  the  Subftance. " 
"   ■  '       ~  For 


io6  Sermon   iv. 

For  if  there  be  no  real  Difference  be- 
tween the  Attributes  and  the  Subftance, 
there  can  be  none  between  the  At- 
tributes themfclves ,  to  wit,  between 
Thought  and  Extenfion,  according  to 
that  known  Rule,  That  thofe  Things 
which  agree  in  a  third,  muft  agree  a- 
mong  themfelves. 

Thus  we  fee  Sfinofx  in  avoiding  the 
Difficulty  of  conceiving  Something  made 
out  of  Nothing,  reduced  to  the  Neceflity 
of  making  no  real  Difference  between 
Thought  and  material  Extenfion,  tho' 
every  Body  elfe  fees  a  manifeft  Difference 
between  them.  Whatever  Difficulty  then 
there  may  be  in  conceiving  it  poffible 
that  Something  fliould  be  made  from  No- 
thing ;  yet  I  hope  there  is  a  great  deal 
of  DiiTerence  between  our  not  conceii'ing 
the  Vojiihilitj  of  a  Thing,  and  the  con^ 
celvhg  it  hn^ofjlhle  to  be  :  That  Thought 
and  Extenfion  (hould  be  really  the  fame 
Thing,  we  fee,  if  we  fee  any  thing,  to  be 
impoffible  ;  becaufe  our  Ideas  of 'em  are 
evidently  the  Ideas  of  different  Things  *, 

and 

*  Vide  Serm.  VJII. 


Sermon    iv.        107 

and  we  mufl:  defpair  of  ever  knowing 
that  one  Thing  is  not  another,  if  fuch 
Marks  of  Diftinclion  in  our  Ideas  will 
not  prove  a  Difference  in  the  Things 
themfelves. 

2^/)',  There  is  another  Abfurdity 
which  Sp/mja  is  led  into  by  rejefting 
the  Creative  Power,  which  is  this : 
He  mufl:  make  his  Self-exiftent  Being 
the  Subjed  of  all  the  contradictory  In-' 
clinations  and  Paflions  which  are  met 
with  in  Mankind ;  for  if  there  be 
no  Creative  Power,  there  will  be  no 
other  Way  in  accounting  for  the  Exifl:- 
ence  of  Things,  but  by  deriving  them 
from  the  Subllance  of  the  Self-exiftent 
Being:  But  all  fuch  Derivations  can 
be  nothing  but  fo  many  different  Modes, 
as  himfelf  confeffes,  of  the  Divine  Sub- 
ftance ;  and  confequently,  tli€  Souls  of 
Men,  all  their  Thoughts  and  Paflions, 
will  be  only  different  Modes  of  the 
Divine  Being.  And  therefore  it  will 
be  God,  and  not  the  Man  (for  he 
is  only  a  Mode  of  the  Divine  Being) 
that  thinks,  affirms  or  denies,  loves  or  • 
jiates ,   fo  often    as   Man  feems  to  do 

either 


ic8  Sermon   IV. 

either.  For  it  is  an  undifputed  Jjchm 
in  Phllofophy,  That  whenever  we  affirm 
of  any  Thing ,  That  it  is  an  Agent 
or  a  Patient,  we  mean,  that  the  Sub- 
ftance,  and  not  the  Accidents ,  does 
or  fuffers  this  or  that ;  as  when  we 
fay,  Iron  is  hard,  or  Wax  foft ;  we 
mean  not  to  fay,  that  the  Accident  of 
Hardnefs  is  hard,  or  of  Softnefs  is  foft, 
for  this  would  be  ridiculous ;  but  that  the 
Subftance  or  EfTence  which  conftitutes 
thefe  Bodies  is  hard  or  foft :  fo  when 
we  fay  that  a  Man  thinks  of  any  Thing, 
affirms  or  denies,  loves  or  hates  any 
Thing ;  we  do  not  mean,  that  the 
Thoughts  themfelves  (which  are  only 
Accidents  or  Modes  of  the  Soul)  but  the 
Man  himfelf  or  his  Soul  thinks ,  affirms 
or  denies,  loves  or  hates.  From  thence 
it  muft  follow,  that  the  Souls' of  Men, 
being  according  to  Sfdnofx's  Scheme, 
Modifications  of  the  Divine  Subllance, 
we  mud  not  (if  we  v/ould  fpeak  pro- 
perly) lay;  that  the  Man  affirms  or  de- 
nies, loves  or  hates  j  but  that  Gop 
loves  or  hates,  affirms  or  denies,  as  of- 
ten as  Men  do  fo  :  And  as  on^  Ivlari  at 

th^ 


StiRMON     IV.  IOC) 

the  fame  Time,  and  in  the  fame  Re- 
fpefts,  afiirms  what  another  denies,  and 
loves  what  another  hates.  According  to 
this  Account  of  Things,  God  muft  at 
the  fame  Time,  and  in  the  fame  Re- 
fpect  affirm,  and  not  affirm  or  deny, 
love,  and  not  love  or  hate,  which  are 
palpable  Contradictions ;  and  if  we 
know  any  thing  at  all,  cannot  poffibly 
belong  to  any  Being.  Yet  thefe,  or  as 
great  Abfurdities  will  ftick  fafl:  to  all 
the  Deniers  of  Creative  Power. 

For  they  muft  either  affirm,  with 
Spinofa,  That  all  the  feveral  Beings  in 
the  "World  are  only  Modes  of  the  Ne- 
celTarily-exiftent  Being,  which  muft 
end  in  the  Abfurdity  I  have  now  men- 
tioned, of  making  all  the  contradi([iiory 
Volitions  and  Paffions  of  Men  to  be  the 
Affections  of  one  and  the  fame  Being : 
Or  if  they  affirm  thefe  Modes  of  Spinoff 
to  be  real  and  fubftantial  Beings ;  they 
muft  admit  what  is  equally  abfurd,  an 
infinite  Number  of  Neceffarily-exiftent 
Beings,  as  many  as  there  are  real  Be- 
ings in  the  World  :  Or  elfe  they  muft 
with  us,  allow,  how  difficult  foever  it 

may 


no  Sermon   iv. 

may  be  to  conceive,  that  there  muft  be 
fomewhere  or  other  a  Power  of  ma- 
king Subftances  or  real  Beings,  which 
is  the  fame  thing  with  what  we  call 
the  Creative  Power.  For  nothing  can 
be  plainer,  than  that  all  particular  Be- 
ings (fuppofing  them  to  be  real  or  fub- 
ftantial  Beings)  muft  exift  by  a  Necef- 
fity  of  Nature,  if  there  be  no  fuch 
Thing  ia  the  World  as  a  Power  of 
making  real  Exiftences. 

S  p  I N  o  s  A  was  well  aware  of  this 
Confequence,  and  therefore  as  he  was 
neither  willing  to  admit  a  Power  of 
Creation,  nor  a  Plurality  of  NecefTari- 
ly-exiftent  Beings,  he  could  fee  no  other 
Way  of  extricating  himfelf  out  of  this 
Difficulty,  but  by  advancing  this  new 
Notion,  "  That  what  the  World  had 
"  before  him  called  real  Beings,  was  no- 
"  thing  more  than  different  Modes  of 
"  Being."  And  tho'  Mr.  Boyle  feems 
to  think  the  Chinefe  Notion,  which 
makes  all  particular  Souls  to  be  {q 
many  Self-exiftent  Beings,  or  'UemocrU 
tus  and  Epfcurus\  infinite  Number  of 
Self-exiftent  Atoms,  to  be  a  more  ra- 
tional 


Sermon   IV.  xii 

tional  Account  of  Things,  than  that 
which  makes  all  particular  Beings  to  be 
only  Modes  of  Being ;  yet  thus  far  I 
think  fuiSciently  clear,  That  the  Jtheifi 
a£ls  a  moft  fooiifh  Part  when  he  takes 
Refuge  in.  either  of  thefe,  to  excufe  him- 
felf  from  admitting  a  Power  of  Creation. 
For  as  to  a  Plurality  of  Self-exiftent 
Beings,  nothing  can  be  more  abfurd 
than  to  make  all  the  Diverfity  of  Be- 
ings, with  different  Degrees  of  Power, 
to  be  all  NeceiTarily-exiilent.  The  Rea- 
fon  which  induced  the  Chinefe  to  fup- 
pofe  a  great  Number  of  Self-exiftent 
Souls  with  dijftrent  Powers,  was,  That 
they  might  the  better  account  for  their 
animating  dijftrent;  and  tmequd  Portions 
of  Matter ;  and  the  Reafon  why  the 
Epicure  am  fuppofed  their  Self-exiftent 
Atoms  to  be  of  different  Figures,  was, 
That  they  might  give  a  more  proba- 
ble Account  of  the  different  Combina- 
tions of  Material  Beings.  But  i^  tliis 
Inequality  of  Souls,  and  the  Different 
Figures  of  Atoms,  was  really  necefTa- 
ry  in  accounting  for  the  Diverfity  of 
Beings  in  the  World,   it  will  be  ntQt.{- 

fary. 


112  Sermon   IV. 

iary  to  look  farther,  and  enquire  for 
the  Caufe  of  this  Difference  in  the 
Chinefe  and  Eficurean  Principles:  For  if 
.  the  Inequahty  in  the  feveral  Portions 
of  Matter,  was  a  good  Reafon  for  fup- 
pofing  an  Inequality  in  the  Self-exiftent 
Principles,  what  Reafon  can  they  give 
why  we  fhould  not  as  well  look  out 
for  the  Caufe  of  the  Inequality  of  their 
Principles,  as  well  as  they  provide  a 
Caufe  of  the  different  and  unequal 
Combinations  of  Bodies  ?  They  could, 
I  fay,  have  no  more  Reafon  for  fup- 
pofing  the  Difference  of  their  Princi* 
pies  to  have  arifen  from  the  Neceflity 
of  their  Natures,  than  that  the  diffe* 
rent  Combinations  of  Matter,  fhould 
have  arifen  from  fuch  a  Neceffity ; 
which  latter  they  do  not  fuppofe.  And 
therefore,  if  they  would  argue  con* 
fiftently  with  themfelves,  they  muff  ac- 
knowledge fome  external  Caufe  of  the 
Difference  that  is  fuppofed  to  be  in 
their  Principles;  and  this  Caufe  mufl 
be  fome  One  Simple  Being,  not  ma- 
ny Beings ;  becaufe  all  Diverfity  of  Be- 
ing  does  plainly  fuppofe   a   Reafon  of 

its 


Sermon    IV.  113 

its  being  what  it  is,  extrinfical  to  the 
Nature  of  the  Being ,  to  wit,  that  it 
muft  have  fome  external  Caufe,  that 
makes  it  to  be  what  it  is,  or  different 
from  any  Thing  elfe. 

And  thus  I  have  fhewn  that  the 
Atheifi  does  not  acb  hke  a  fair  Exa- 
miner, when  lie  rejects  a  G  o  d  with  a 
Power  of  Creation ;  becaufe  he  either 
takes  up  with  a  Number  of  Self-exiilent 
Peings  of  unequal  Forces,  or  ehe,  with 
Spif7oJa,  he  makes  the  Self-exiftent  Be- 
ing to  be  every  Thing,  in  the  flrid- 
eft  and  propered:  Senfe  of  the  Words; 
which  are  fuch  Abfurdities,  that  we 
may  without  Breach  of  Charity,  deny 
fuch  Perfons  to  be  impartial  Searchers 
after  Truth. 


I  S  E  R  M, 


11^ 


SERMON    V. 


I   ThESSALONIANS    v.     21. 


Trove  all  Things :  hold  faji 
that  which  is  good. 


HAVE  already  fliewn  that 
the  Jthei/l  cannot  be  a 
fair  Examiner,  wlien  he 
quits  Religion  for  the  a- 
voiding  fome  Difficulties  in 
the  Religious  Scheme  •  becaufe  he  muft 
fwallow  much  greater,  if  he  will  ac- 
count for  the  Appearances  of  Things, 
and  abide  by  his  Material  one.  As  to 
two  of  the  Difficulties  which  he  is 
wont  to  complain  of,  "jiz.  The  Imma- 
I  2  teriality 


II 6         Sermon    V. 

teriality  of  God,  and  his  Power  of 
Creation,  or  of  making  Something  from 
Nothing,  we  have  already  feen,  that  if 
he  will  not  admit  thefe,  he  muil  ad- 
mit fome  Things  that  are  much  hard- 
er of  Belief,  and  that  therefore  he  can- 
not be  juftified  by  any  f4ir  an^  can- 
did Reafoner  in  rejecfing  Religion,  for 
the  Sake  of  thefe  Difficulties. 

I  AM  now  to  confider  one  other 
Difficulty,  which  he  makes  in  Excufe 
for  not  believing  a  G  o  d,  which  is, 
That  it  would  obhge  him  to  believe 
that  Evil  may  be  reconciled  with  the 
fuppofal  of  a  Good  Being  •  and  am  to 
fhew,  That  all  the  Ways  he  can  pof- 
fibly  take  to  account  for  the  real  State 
of  Good  and  Evil  upon  the  Foot  of 
Atbsifm^  are  impoffible  to  be  true ;  and 
therefore  that  he  is  an  unfair  Examiner 
in  rejecting  Religion  for  the  Sake  oi 
this  Difficulty.  1  will  begin  with  that 
Account  Spwofa  is  able  to  give'  of  tjiis 
Vh£nome-rion^  confidently  with  his  Syfleni 
of  the  World ,  which  is  built  upon  a 
fmgle  Principle,  from  whence  he  is  tp 
drav/  both  Good  and  Evil. 

If 


Sermon    V.  117 

If  there  was  in  the  World  nothing 
tut  Natural  and  Moral  Good,  or  no- 
thing but  Natural  and  Moral  Evily 
there  would  be  no  Difficulty  in  deriving 
either  of  them  from  one  fingle  Prin- 
ciple; but  as  there  is  an  evident  Mix- 
ture of  both  in  the  World,  SpjKofa  judged 
it  to  be  impolTibie  that  fuch  a  Mix° 
ture  fhould  arile  from  a  good  Prineiple^ 
and  therefore  ere£ts  a  new  Syftem  with 
a  Material  God  at  the  Head  of  ir,  tliat 
lliould  be  neither  Good  nor  Evil,  but 
in  its  own  Nature  indifferent  to  both  :■ 
Such  a  Being  then  acting  necefTarily  ac« 
cording  to  its  Nature,  which  Nature  is 
fuppofed  to  be  perfedly  indifferent  as 
to  Good  and  Evil,  and  a£l:ing  by  an 
infinite  Force  or  Power,  mult  produce 
all  the  Poflibilities  of  Being.  For  Spi^ 
nofn,  fays  *,  Ex  Neceffitate  D:vm£  Naturd 
wfinitA  infinitis  modis^  hoc  ejiy  omnU  qua 
fub  intelUBum  infiifnttim  aider e  poffunt^  fe- 
qui  debent.  Arid  therefore,  fince  Errors 
and  Crimes,  Grief  and  Pain,  are  as  real 
Modifications  of  Being,  as  Truth  and 
I  3  Virtue'^ 

"■  Piop.   XTI, 


1 1 8  Sermon    V. 

Virtue,  Pleafure  and  Happinefs  ;  confe- 
quently  one  as  well  as  the  other  muft 
have  a  Place  in  the  Univerfe.  For  this 
Principle  being  in  its  own  Nature  in- 
different to  either  what  we  call  Good 
or  Evil,  and  producing  all  that  is  pof- 
fible  to  be  produced,  it  muft  of  courfe 
pfoduce  Evil  as  well  as  Good. 

W  E  will  now  fee  whether  'twas 
worth  S^mofa's  while  to  quit  Religion 
in  order  to  get  rid  of  that  difficult 
Queflion,  If  a  Good  God,  '^'ohv  t^  aclka. 
I  would  grant  Spnofa^  that  his  Infinite 
Being  fliould  produce  all  the  Polli- 
bilities  of  Being ;  but  then  I  can  never 
grant,  that  ContradiQ:ions  are  PolTibi- 
lities  of  Being.  And  yet  furely  it  looks 
as  much  like  a  Contradiction  as  can  be, 
to  draw  out  of  the  fame  Simple,  Un- 
compounded  Subftance  both  Wifdom 
and  Folly,  Virtue  and  Vice,  Happinefs 
and  Mifery ;  and  yet  if  this  Account 
could  ,  be  true,  thefe  muft  all  flow 
from  the  EfTence  of  the  Self-exiftent 
Beingv 

Homer     has  fhewn    much  better 
Senfe,  when  he  accounted  for  the  Goods 

and 


SfiRMON     V.  tip 

and  Evils  of  this  Life  by  placing  two 
Tuns  near  the  Throne  of  Japiter,    one 
filled  with  good  Things,  the  other  with 
Evils,   and  that  Goods  and  Evils  came 
from  Heaven,  as  JufheripouYQd  out  of  ei- 
ther of  them ;  if  he  poured  out  of  both 
at  the  fame  Time,  then  there  was  up- 
on Earth  an  Appearance   of  both  Good 
and  Evil,   or  a  Mixture  of  both.    He 
faw  that   if  he  had  made  both  Happi- 
nefs  and   Mifery    to  be  drawn   out  of 
the  fame  VeiTel,  that  it  would  have  had 
too  much  of  the  Air  of  Incredible,  even 
.for  a  Poem;   that  it  would  have  been 
as  bad  as  if  he  fhould  have  pretended 
to  fetch  both /i/^  Water  and  frefjj  froni 
the  fame  Spring  or  Fountain,  v/hich  was 
in.  St.  Jamesh  Time  a  proverbial  Saying 
:,by  which  they  ufed  to  exprefb  an  Im- 
pofTibility.     Had  Spinofa  lived    m  thofe 
Days,  and  broached  this  DoQirine,  his 
God  might   have    been    in    Danger  of 
.becoming  a  proverbial  Expreilion    for 
..any  Thing  that  was  thought  iiTtpofTi" 
ble..   For  to  fuppofe  a  Simple  Being  to 
be  neither  Good  nor  Bad,  but  a  Mix- 
ture of  both,    is  fuppoling  what  is  al- 
I  4  togetbg!' 


I  20  S  E  R  M  d  N     V. 

togethei*  unintelligible.  The  Spwojiji 
muft  allow  a  real  Difference  between 
Phyfical  Good  and  Pliyfical  Evil,  Plea- 
fure  and  Pain,  Happinefs  and  Mifery  : 
And  yet  if  his  Account  of  Things  were 
true,  thefe  muft  be  fo  like  one  another, 
and  fo  much  of  the  fame  Nature,  as  to 
come  indifferently  from  the  fame  Un- 
compounded  Subftance. 

But  this  is  not  all,  here  is  not  only 
a  DiiHculty   of  giving    Birth    to  both 
Good    and    Evil     from    fuch    a  fmgle 
Principle,   but  alfo  when  that  is  done, 
of  freeing    fuch   a   Principle  from  the 
Contradidion    of  being    at  the    fame 
Time    happy    and    miferable,    in    Joy 
and  in  Grief,   as  often  as  Men  or  any 
other  Beings  are  in  thefe  Circumftances, 
which   is  always  the  Cafe   of  fome  or 
other  of  them.    Tulfy  ^  ridicules  a  No- 
tion   of  Pythagoras^     which    made    the 
Souls  of  Men    to  be  Parts  of   the  Di- 
vine  Being;   becaufe  Go d   muff    in. 
fuch  Cafe  be   often  miferable ;  but  this 
was  not  to  be  reconcil'd  with  his  fuppofed 

Happinefs^ 

•  Tull.   De  Natura  Deorum. 


Sermon    v.         121 

Happmefs.  Na^  Fythagoras  qui  cenfuit 
Deum  animum  effe  per  Natr/ram  rerum  om^ 
mm  intent um  Isf  commemtem^  ex  quo  nojlri 
anim'i  carp:rentur^  non  vidit  diftrAciione  hu- 
nt a  nor  um  animorum  difcerpl  £jf  dilacerari 
Deum :  dr  cum  wiferi  ejfent  animi,  quod 
plerifque  contingeret^  turn  Dei  partem  ejfe 
miferam.  We  fee  that  it  was  then 
thought  a  good  Argument  againfl:  Py- 
thagor^ih  Opinion,  That  if  it  were  true^ 
the  Deity  muft  be  miferable,  which 
could  not  be,  becaufe  God  was  a  Hap- 
py Being,  and  they  hctle  thought  that 
'twas  pofTible  to  be  both  happy  and 
miferable  at  the  fame  Time ;  and  there- 
fore Pyth.\2^oras\  Notion  was  juftly  re- 
jeded,  and  fo  muft  SpinoJa*s  too  for  the 
fame  Reafon  ;  for  i[  Pjthagcras  made 
the  Souls  of  Men  to  be  Parts  of  the 
Divine  Being,  Spinofa  makes  them  to 
be  Modes  of  the  fame  Being,  or  the 
fame  Nature  of  God,  differing  only 
in  the  Manner  of  its  Exiftence ;  and 
therefore  the  Divine  Being  muft  be 
at  leaft  equally  affeiSled  in  the  one  as 
in  the  other  Cafe. 

The 


1^2  SeR  MO  N    V. 

The  Religious  Man  ftands  (4lar  of 
any  fuch  Abfurdities ;  as  he  fuppofes 
thefe  particular  Exiftences  wliicli  are 
the  Subjeds  of  Evil,  to  be  made  not  out 
of  the  Divine  Subftance,  but  from  No- 
thing^  and  to  be  created  with  different 
Degrees  of  Perfection,  and  confequent- 
iy,  that  the  Evils  they  are  obnoxious 
to,  whether  Phyfical  or  Moral,  do  not 
proceed  from  Him,  but  are,  as  I  be- 
fore obferved,  merely  the  Effects  of 
their  imperfed  Natures.  And  we  do 
not  think  that  the  Atheijl  can  prove  it 
inconfiftent  with  Goodnefs  to  make  li- 
mited or  imperfeO:  Natures.  Thus  far 
we  are  fure  we  can  talk  Senfe.  Where- 
as Spmoja  having  no  Creatures  nor  li- 
mited Natures  to  take  Refuge  in,  muft 
neceflarily  fuppofe  all  the  Evils  and  Im° 
perfe«Etions  of  the  World  to  be  the  At- 
tributes of  his  Infinite  Being:  And 
therefore  cannot  avoid  the  Abfurdities 
I  have  now  charged  upon  him. 

There  is  aUb  one  other  Abfur- 
dity  chargeable  upon  Sfwofah  Syftem, 
viz.  That .  all  the  fooliili  and  wicked 
Thoughts  of  Men,  as  well  as  thofe  that 

ars 


Sermon  V.  123 

are  good  and  rational,  muft  be  the 
Thoughts  of  his  Self-exiftent  Being; 
but  fo  long  as  we  fee  a  real  Difference 
between  good  Senfe  and  Foolifhnefs, 
Virtue  and  Vice,  we  can  never  fee  how 
fuch  incompatible  Properties  can  flow 
from  the  fame  Principle.  For  this  would 
be  to  make  a  moft  Simple  Being  to 
be  not  only  a  Compound  Being,  which 
is  Contradiftion  enough;  but  alfo  com- 
pounded of  fuch  inconfiftent  Ingredients 
as  could  never  be  united  together  in 
the  fame  Being,  but  would  battle  each 
other  till  one  of  them  had  fubdued  and 
deitroyed    the    other. 

But  then,  it  may  be  faid,  Why  may 
not  this  be  true,  as  well  as  what  the 
Chriftian  Religion  fuppofes  to  be  true^ 
w^  That"  the  fame  Perfon  may  be  the 
Subjed  of  both  human  and  divine  At- 
tributes? For  human  Wifdom,  or  the 
Wifdom  which  human  Nature,  for  In- 
ftance,  is  capable  of,  when  compared 
with  divine  Wifdom,  is  no  better  than 
Folly:  And  if  this  be  true,  then  the 
Subjea  of  both  Natures  muft  be  at  the 
fame  Time  divinely  and  humanly  wife, 

that 


12^  S  E  R  M  0  N    V. 

that  IS,  wife,  and  not  wife ;  but  this 
can  no  more  be  conceived  than  the 
other ;  and  if  thefe  Things  can  be  fup- 
pofed  by  the  ReUgious  Man  to  exift  in 
God,  why  not  by  the  Spinofift  in  his  Self-* 
exiftent  Being.  Some  Christians  to  avoid 
this  Difficulty  of  uniting  God  and  Man 
in  the  Perfon  of  our  Saviour,  either 
fuppofcd  one  of  the  Natures  to  be  fwal- 
lowed  up,  loft  or  confounded  in  the 
other,  'viz,  the  Man  in  G  o  d  ;  or  elfe, 
that  after  the  Union  there  ftill  conti- 
nued two  diftind  Subjefts  of  the  two 
diiferent  Natures ;  but  there  is  no  Need 
of  either  of  thefe  Solutions  to  clear  the 
Union  of  God  with  Man  from  the  Ob- 
jections I  have  raifed  againft  Sfi}?ofa\ 
Self-exiftent  Being.  For  when  God  took 
upon  him  human  Nature,  that  human 
Nature  was  per  eftly  fubmitted  to  the 
Divine,  and  conftantly  followed  its  Gui- 
dance, and  the  AQiions  of  the  Perfon 
were  always  the  laft  Determinations,  not 
of  the  PafTions  and  Appetites  of  the 
Man,  but  of  the  Divine  Logos.  No  con- 
trary Volitions,  no  ConfliQ:  between 
God  and  Man,  but  the  Word  direded, 

and 


Sermon    V.  125 

and  the  Man  followed-  And  tho'  cue 
Saviour,  as  a  Man,  is  faid  to  have  en- 
creafed  in  Wifdom  as  wd\  as  Stature ; 
yet  it  is  enough  for  my  prefent  Pur- 
pofe,  that  there  was  no  Clafhing  be- 
tween the  Wifdom  of  the  Divine  and  ' 
Human  Nature  :  If  the  Wifdom  of  the 
latter  was  lefs  extenfive,  yet  it  was 
without  any  Mixture  of  Folly  :  Where- 
as I  objecled  again  ft  Spinofa*s  Syftem, 
becaufe  it  introduced  a  Nature  which 
was  a  perfed  Scene  of  Contention  and 
Inconfiftency,  as  it  was  evident  from 
the  many  rational  and  foolijh  Thoughts 
of  Men ;  which  if  we  know  what  Con- 
tradidions  are,  muft  be  fuch,  when- 
ever they  are  both  made  to  be  at  the 
fame  Time  the  Thoughts  of  one  and 
the  fame  Being.  And  yet  (as  I  have 
already  ihewn)  his  Self-exiflent  Being, 
fo  long  as  he  fuppofes  him  the  only 
Subftance  or  real  Being  in  the  World, 
and  all  other  Beings  only  the  fame  Be- 
ing in  different  Shapes  and  Dreffes,  ac- 
cording to  the  Diverfity  and  Variety 
that  we  fee  in  Nature,  muft  be  charge- 
able 


12(5  Sermon    v. 

able  with  all  the  foolifli  as  well  as  ra- 
tional Thoughts  of  Men  ^. 

H  A.  V I N  G  now  fliewxi  that  5/>/>r/^'s 
Hypothefis  is  fo  far  from  giving  a  bet- 
ter Account  of  that  Mixture  of  Good 
and  Evil  which  appears  in  the  World, 
than  the  Religious  Scheme,  that  it  will 
by  no  means  introduce  any  fuch  Mix- 
ture into  the  World  ;  and  therefore  that 
every  Spinofift  is  Culpable  when  he  re- 
jects Religion  for  the  Difficulty  of  re- 
conciling Good  and  Evil  with  a  Good 
God  : 

I  COME  now  to  fhew,  That  no  o- 
ther  Atheiftick  Scheme  ought  to  be  ta- 
ken up  by  any  fair  and  impartial  Exa- 
miner; becaufe  every  other  Atheiftick 
Scheme,  different  from  that  of  Spinofa, 
will  fuppofe  more  than  One  Neceffa- 
rily-exiftent  Principle;  but  a  Plurahty 
pf  Self-exiftent  Beings  cannot  poffibly 
be  true.  And  therefore  how  well  foe- 
ver  a  Plurality  of  Principles  would  ac- 
count for  this  particular  Difficulty,  yet 

it 


Vide  Serm    IV, 


Sermon    V.  127 

It  ought  not  to  be  admitted  for  a  So- 
lution of  it ;  becaufe  every  good  Syftem 
ought  to  be  built  upon  clear  and  evi- ' 
dent  Principles  of  Reafon,  as  well  as  to 
be  qualified  for  folving  Appearances  of      ' 
Things  :   But  every   Scheme  that  fup- 
pofes  a   Plurality  t>f  Independent,  Ne- 
cejGTarily-exiftent  Beings,    is  fo  far  from 
being  fupported  by  clear,  evident  Prin- 
ciples of  Reafon,    that  'tis  diredly  re- 
pugnant to  the  cleareft  Ideas  we  have 
of  the  Order  of  Things.    All  the  real 
Perfections    that   Men  have   ever  had 
any  Notion  of,  they  have  been  wont  to 
give  to  the  Self-exiftent  Being;  they 
were    fure    that   Something    muft    be 
boundlefs   in    its  Exiftence,  both  with 
regard  to  Time  and  Place ;   and  as  the 
Exigence  of  that  Something  was  exclu- 
ded from  no  Place  nor  Time,   that  its 
Operation  could  not  be  hindered    any 
rvhere  nor  any  when.  As  thefe  Powers  and 
Privileges,  I  fay,   were  always  thought 
to  have    a  real  Exiftence    in  Nature, 
they  were    as    conftantly    afcribed    to 
the  Self-exiftent  Being  ;  for  the  Excel- 
lency of  fuch  a  Nature  muft  be,  accord- 
ins 


128  Sermon    v. 

ing  to  our  Conceptions,  if  any  Thing 
be  fo,  entitled  to  all  pofTible  Perfedi- 
ons ;  but  then  it  mull:  be  very  hard 
to  conceive  two  fuch  Beings  with  all 
thefe  Powers  and  Privileges;  as  for  In- 
ftance,  We  fhall  be  hard  put  to  it  to 
find  Room  for  more  than  One  of  fuch 
a  Kind  of  Beings,  as  would  by  Itfelf 
fill  up  and  exift  in  every  Part  of  the 
infinite  Space,  as  it  muft  of  Necedity, 
fince  'tis  fuppofed  to  be  Infinite  or 
Iramenfe. 

'Till  the  Jtheifi  can  tell  us  how  to 
provide  a  Reception  for  a  fecond  Infi- 
nite, when  all  is  already  taken  up  by 
the  other ;  we  muft  beg  Leave  to  af- 
firm, that  he  has  a  much  greater  Dif- 
ficulty upon  his  Hands,  than  the  Reli- 
gious Man  has,  when  he  is  called  upon 
to  account  for  Good  and  Evil  upon  the 
Foot  of  a  Good  God.  For  as  the  Atheiflh 
Self-cxiftent  Beings,  are  fuppofed  to  be 
Material,  they  cannot  be  both  in  the 
fame  Place ;  and  therefore  a  Second  can- 
not be. at  all,  becaufe  the  Firft  is  fup^ 
pofed  to  be  Infinite,  and  to  have  alrea- 
dy filled  all  the  infinite  Space. 

Bu  T 


Sermon    V,         120 

But  farther,    The  Idea   of  Power 
ftfcks  clofe  to  our  Idea   of  the   Self-ex- 
iftent  Being,  and  yet  our  Ideas  will 
not  allow  of  halfing  or  dividing  the  Pow* 
er  between  Two  ;  becaufe  this  would  be 
to  admit  Two  Powers  that  could  con- 
troul  one  another,  and  difturb  each  other 
in  their  Operations ;  which  furniilies  out 
a  very  faint  Idea  of  Power,  too  much 
limited  and  retrained    to  be   given  -to 
a  NecefTarily-exilknt  and    Infinite  Be- 
ing.    For  in   this  Cafe,   neither  of  the 
Self-exiftent  Beings    would   be  able  to 
produce   any   one  Thing    without    the 
Interpofition  of  the  other.     And  there- 
fore every  Being  m   the   World  would 
be  the  Effedt  of  their  oppofing  one  an- 
other,  and   fo  receive  not    its    Nature 
from  either,  but  from  both. 

As  the  Appearances  of  Things  are 
no  where  pure  or  unmix'd  Good;,  nor 
pure  or  unmixt  Evil,  fome  Perfons  have 
difcovered  a  great  Fondnefs  for  Two 
Contrary  and  Independent  Principles, 
hoping  that  fuch  a  Syftem  would  per- 
feOily  well  account  for  the  Mixture  of 
Good  and  Evil,  as  whatever  fhould  be 
K  produced 


I  ^o  Sermon     V. 

produced  from  the  Struggle  and  Con. 
Aid  of  two  contrary  Powers,  muft  of 
Courfe  partake  of  the  Nature  of  both. 
But    however    fond   they  may    be  of 
this  Way  of  folving  the  Diiiiculty,  they 
may  do  well  to  confider,    whether  the 
afcribing  to  the  NecefTarily-exiftent  Be- 
ing   fuch  a  limited  Power  as  evident- 
ly contradi8:s  our  clearefi:  Ideas,  be  not 
a  better  Proof  of  the  Falfliood  of  this 
J^ypothefsy  than  any  Arguments  they  can 
bring  againft  the  Being  of  a  God  from 
their   Fhxnomenon   of   Good   and     Evil, 
the    firfl:    we  are    lure    cannot  be  the 
Truth,  for  Reafons  I  have    already  gi- 
ven ;  the  lall  may  poffibly  be  true,  al- 
tho'  we  cannot  clear  up  every  Difficul- 
ty that  may  offer  itfelf  to  us,  when  we 
are  endeavouring  to  reconcile  Good  and 
Evil  with  a  Good  God.      But, 

2^/7,  I  WILL  now  fhew,  that  fup- 
pofing  the  PofTibility  of  the  Exiftence 
of  Two  or  more  Contrary,  Indepen- 
dent Principles,  that  yet  they  would 
not,  any  more  than  SpnofA's  Syftem, 
account  for  the  Appearances  of  Good 
and  Evil  in  tl:e  World. 

r 


Sermoh    v.  131 

I  HAVE,  as  T  before  cbferved,  a- 
voidecl  entring  into  a  particular  Detail 
of  the  DiiHculties  that  are  met  with  in 
reconciling  Evil  with  a  Good  B  e  i  i^  g^ 
becaufe  the  Learned  Dr.  Joh/f  Clark  has 
lately  ex  profcjjo  examined  them  ;  howe-s 
ver,  I  hope,  even  in  this  Way  of  Hand- 
h'ng  the  Matter,  to  fliew,  That  the 
Atheiii  is  an  Unreafcnable  Pcrfon,  if  he 
has  left  Religion  for  the  Sake  of  this 
DiiKcuky.  As  I  have  already  fliewn, 
That  the  Scheme  of  many  Self-exillent 
Principles,  the  Refuge  of  fome  Atheijis 
from  this  particular  Dificulty,  is  incon= 
fiftent  with  our  plaineil  Ideas :  If  I 
t'an  alfo  fneW,  That  fhould  we  give 
jiim  any  of  his  Schem.es  on  the  Foot  of 
Plurahty,  yet  he  would  not  be  able 
to  account  for  the  Difficulties ;  v/e  fliall 
^  leave  him  without  any  Shew  of  an  Ex- 
cufcj  if  he  pretends  to  have  hft  us^  tliat 
he  might  itand  clear  of  Di&ulties. 

Supposing  then  for  once,  the  Pof- 
fibility  of  the  Exigence  of  Tv/o  or  more 
Independent  Principles  of  contrary  Na-- 
tures  •  thefe  Principles  mull  either  havd 
sn  equal  or  unequal  Force.  .  If  they  v/erd  • 
K  2  unequal 


132  Sermon    V. 

unequal  Powers,  tlien  the  fuperior  Pow- 
er adiiig  necefTarily  and  to  the  utmoft 
Stretch  of  its  Power,  muft,  in  an  eter- 
nal Duration,  have  deftroyed  all  the 
Effects  of  the  weaker  Power ;  And 
then  if  the  fuperior  Force  were  Good, 
there  could  be  mw  no  fuch  Thing  as 
Evil;  or  if  Evil,  no  fuch  Thing  as  Good; 
neither  of  which  will  anfwer  to  the 
true  Appearance  of  Things.  The 
Atheifi  cannot  defend  himfelf  by  the 
Ancients,  who  fuppofed  unequal,  con- 
trary Powers  to  have  always  had  an  Ex- 
iftence,  without  deftroying  one  ano- 
ther :  For  altho'  the  ancient  Theology  of 
the  Pagans  J  as  we  find  by  the  Poets 
and  other  Mythologies^  confiftcd  of  many 
contrary  Principles  endued  with  une- 
qual Powers;  tho'  the  good  Beings, 
fuch  as  Jupiter  J  ^c.  were  fuppofed  by 
them  to  be  fuperior  in  Power  to  their 
Ve'joi'e^ :  yet  they  might  eafily  beheve 
the  eternal  Co-exiftence  of  fuch  unequal 
Powers,  or  that  the  leffer  were  not  de- 
ftroyed by  the  Greater;  becaufe  they 
fuppofed  "Jupter  and  the  rcll  of  the 
Good  Principles  to  be  hee'  jfgenty  that 

aded 


Sermon    V.  133 

a£ted  with  Views  and  for  Ends,  and 
might  therefore  believe  that  the  Good, 
the'  a  fuperior  Principle,  had  permitted 
the  Aftion  of  the  inferior  Evil  Being, 
in  a  Way  of  Punifhment  to  fuch  as 
had  broken  the  Laws-  of  thofe  Beings, 
whD  were  the  Principles  of  Goodnefs. 
But  as  to  the  Atheiftick  Principles  which 
a6t  neeeffarily,  or  becaufe  they  can't 
help  it ;  and  confequentiy,  a£t  to  the 
utmoft  of  their  Power,  the  eternal 
Subfiftence  of  unequal  contrary  Forces 
muft  be  impoffible,  for  the  Reafon  al- 
ready given  5  and  therefore  they  can- 
not account  for  the  State  of  Good  and 
Evil  in  the  World.      But, 

2dly^  I F  we  take  two  contrary  Prin- 
ciples of  equal  Force    to   account   for 
Good  and  Evil,  then  as  they  2.8:  necef- 
farily,  and    therefore  to   the  utmoft  of 
their  Powers,  their  continual  Oppofitiori 
to  each  other  muft  either  produce  no- 
thing   but  Confufion ;    that  is,   the  evil 
Principle   muft  deftroy   as   faft   as   the 
Good    Principle    produces   any  Thing, 
becaufe  the  Evil   Principle    is  fuppofed 
to   have  as  much  Power,    and   to    be 
K  5  under. 


J  24  S  E  R  M  O  M      V. 

uflcter  as  great  a  Ne^^elTity  of  ufmg  th^t 
yovver  as  the  Good  One:  Or  elfe  an 
equal  Mixture  of  Good  and  ^vil  n?iujfl: 
run  thro'  all  Things,  as  the  neccfTary 
Refult  of  the  Equality  of  liieir  mutual  Op- 
pofition.  For  there  is  no  third  Way  of 
conceiving  the  Effect  of  the  Ageney  of 
two  neceiXary,  equal,  and  contrary  Pow- 
ers. But  if  neither  of  thefe  be  agreeable 
to  the  truth  of  Things,  then  the  /Itheiji  is 
not  to  be  juftified  in.  rejcding Rehgion  for 
the  Difficulty  of  folving  the  Appear- 
ances of  Good  and  Evil,  becaufe  every 
pretended  Solution  upon  the  Foot  of 
Jtheijm^  will  then  appear  to  be  lalfe. 

i/,  The  Appearance  of  Good  and 
Evil  cannot  be  accounted  for  by  Two 
contrary,  equal  Principles;  becaufe  if 
they  aded  NecefTarily,  the  Effed  of 
their  mutual  Aclioii  would  be  nothing 
but  Diforder  and  Confuilon,  as  Two 
equal,  contrary  Powers  mull  of  Ne> 
celRty  deftroy  the  Operations  of  each 
other.  Monfieur  Bayle^  as  fond  as  he 
fliews  himfelf  upon  all  Occafions  of  the 
H^pothefii  which  pretends  to  account 
ibr   Good  and   Evil   by  Two  contrary 

Principles: 


Sermon     v.         135 

Principles;  was  yet  fenfible,  that  Two 
fucli  contrary  Natures,  unlefs  they  aft- 
ed  with  fomething  Hke  Freedom,  could 
never  account  for  Good  and  Evil ;  and 
therefore  v/hen  he  is  making  an  Apo- 
logy for  Zorodjier^  he  reprefents  him  as 
juftifying  his  Two  Principles  in  this 
Manner  :  "  That  it  was  with  his  Two 
Principles  for  fome  Time,  as  it  was  with 
"  Mr.  Hobbs's  Men  in  a  State  of  Na- 
^'  ture,  and  before  the  Eftablifhment 
"  of  Societies ;  that  every  Man  was  an 
"  Enemy  to  every  other  Man,  and  did 
"  each  other  all  the  Miichief  they 
"  could  ;  and  thus,  fays  he,  it  was  with 
^'  the  Two  Principles  at  firll,  till  they, 
^'  as  well  as  Mr.  Hohbs^s  Men,  weary 
*'  of  fuch  a  confufed  State  of  Things, 
•■'  in  which  one  Principle  was  conti- 
*^  nually  overturning  what  the  other 
*^  •  was  building  up,  came  at  laft  to  an 
^'  Accommodation,  and  joyned  arnica- 
■^  bly  together  for  the  future,  in  the 
'*  feveraj  Produdions  of  Nature  *. " 
K  4  Mr. 


*  'Hlftcr.   DiS:.  in  voce  Zoroaflier, 


I  3<^  S  E  R  M  O  N     V. 

Mr.  Baj/le  enters  into  fo  many  Particu- 
lars in  Iiis  Vindication  of  this  Dodrine 
of  X^ronfie-^^  that  we  may  believe  he 
look'd  upon  it  as  the  molt  rational  Soluti- 
on of  the  prefent  Difficulty.  But  from 
hence  we  may  obferve,  That  Two  con- 
trary Principles,  fo  long  as  they  aded 
NeceiTarily  and  to  the  utmoil  of  their 
Power,  could  produce  nothing  but  a  State 
of  the  utmoft  Confufion  and  Diibrder ; 
bccaufe  this  is  fuppofed  and  allowed  to 
have  been  the  State  of  Things  previoufly 
to  the  Agreemenf  of  the  Two  Principles : 
and  then  without  fuch  Agreement,  every 
Thing  muft  have  been  ftill  in.  Confufion, 
and  different  from  what  we  fee  at  pre- 
fent J  and  therefore  were  it  polTible  that 
this  Account  of  Things  could  be  the 
Truth,  yet  it  would  do  the  Atheijl  no 
Service,  unlefs  he  would  allow  the  Exi- 
gence of  Beings  that  ad  upon  Choice, 
which  he  always  fteadily  denies,  and 
while  he  does  fo,  can  have  no  Right  to 
any  Advantage  from  this  Bjpcthejis, 

If  it  be  faid,  That  fuch  an  Accom- 
modation is  confident  with  NecefTity, 
and  that  a  good  Principle  is  necelfarily 

determined 


Sermon  V.  137 

determined  to  fuch  an  Accommodation, 
as  a  Mixture  of  Good  and  Evil  is  bet- 
ter than  no  Good  at  all  ;    the  Anfwer 
is,    That   fuch  a   Determination    muft 
be  the  Efted  of  Choice   and  of  a  Free- 
dom  of  ading,  and  not  of  any  abfolute 
Neceflity  of  the  Nature  of  the  Being; 
becaufe  the  Operations  of  a  Being  that 
ads  from  a  Neceflity  of  Nature,  will 
always  be  as  invariable  as    its  Nature  ; 
and  therefore  if  they  both  aded  from  a 
Neceflity  of  their  Natures,   the  EfTed 
of  their  acting    muft    be     always  the 
fame,  and  no  Room  for  Variation,  which 
this  Accommodation  fuppofes.  'Tis  true, 
the  Jtheiji  allows  Men  the    fame  Pow- 
er of  tranfading  with  each   other  for 
their  mutual  Benefit,    and    yet   denies 
them  a  Liberty  of  Adion :    but  I  am 
perfuaded    they   would  not    perfift    in 
denying    fuch  mutual  Agreements    be- 
tween   Men,    to  be    an    Argument  of 
Choice  and  Freedom,  if  they  could  fee 
any  Poffibility  of  reconciling    Liberty 
with  their  Material  Scheme.    For  they 
cannot  but   fee   a   Difference    between 
]Moral  and  Phyficai  Motives,   between 

being 


1  q8  Sermon    v, 

being  moved  to  a£b  by  a  Reafon,  and 
being  forced  into  Action  by  an  exter- 
nal Impolfe  ;  and  that  this  Difference 
exilb  in  the  Nature  of  Things,  and 
therefore  they  would  never  have  made 
them  to  be  the  fame,  if  they  could  have 
fetched  them  both  from  Matter,  and 
yet  fuppofed  any  Difference  between 
them.      But, 

T  o  proceed,    If  the    Atheift  finding 
he  can  make  no  Advantage  of  this  ima- 
ginary   Accommodation    between     the 
Two  Principles  for  a  Solution   of  the 
prefent  Difficulty,  fliould  rather  take  up 
with  another,  which  the  fame  Mr.  Bnyie 
propofes    in  the  Title  Paulkians^   viz,. 
That  the  Good  Principle  oppofes  with 
all  its  Might  and  without  ceafing  the 
Sin    and   Mifery    of  the    Creature ; 
but  that  the  Evil  Principle  ading  on 
its  Side  with  all  its  Strength  inOp- 
pofition  to  it,   there  refults  from  this 
continual  Shock   of  the  Two    Prin- 
ciples, that  Mixture  of  Good  and  Evil 
which   we  fee  every  where,    as   the 
Action  and  Reaction  of  two  contrary 
Qualities  produces  a  third  Quality  par- 

"  taking 


Sermon     v.  139 

^^  taking  of  the  Nature  of  both  : "  If,  I 
fay,  he  has  any  Hopes  fcom  this  Way 
of  folving  the  Difficulty,  we  will  fhew, 
that  tliis  cannot   be  the  true  one,    Be- 
caufc  fuppofing  fuch  a  Conflia  between 
Two  contrary   Principles,    if  they  did 
not,  as   I  have   already  obferved,  turn 
all  into  Confufion,  then  the  Confequence 
would  be,  that  there  muft  be  an  equal 
Mixture    of   Good    and    Evil   running 
thro'  all  Things ;  whereas  if  this  were 
the  Cafe,    there  muft  be  an  invariable 
and  uniform    Appearance  of  Good  and 
Evil;   the  Mixture  of  Good  and  Evil 
muft    be    the  fame   in   every    Part  of 
Space,    as  well  as  every  Part  of  Time, 
b^caufe  it  pi*oceeds  from  Two  contrary 
Caufes  ading  necefTarily  and  to  the  ut- 
'moft  of  their  Powers  ;  and  therefore  no 
Reafon  can  be  given  why  their  AQrion 
and  Reaftion,   or   the  Refult  of  them, 
fhould   not  be  the  fame  ^n  every  Part 
of  the  infinite  Space,  their  Powers  be-- 
ing   fuppofed  to  be  equal.    But   if  the 
fame  Qiiantity  of  Good  and  Evil  had 
been  blended    together    from  Eternity, 
-and  uniformly  diHufed  thro'  the  Infinite 
-  ■  Extenfiouj 


140  Sermon   V. 

Extenfion,  there  could  have  hcQn  no 
fuch  Thing  as  human  Condud  or  Wif^ 
dom,  no  PofTibility  of  chufing  the  lefs 
Evils  or  Inconveniencies  to  avoid  great-» 
cr  ones;  becaufe  the  Inconveniences 
muft  be  equal  which  Way  foever  we 
aQ:,  i£  the  Evil  be  equal  or  as  much 
in  every  Part  of  Infinite  Space  as  the 
Good  is» 

Away  then  with  all  the  Maxims 
of  Wifdom  which  Men  have  hitherto 
pretended  to  diflinguifh  themfelves  by, 
i£  the  fame  Degree  of  Evil  muft  be 
cxpc8:ed,  2.Q:  as  wifely  as  we  will.  But 
if  the  real  State  of  Things  proves  9 
that  there  js  more  evil  in  one  Way  of 
afting  than  in  another,  this  fhews  that 
the  Mixture  of  Good  and  Evil  did  not 
proceed  from  Two  contrary  Principles 
acting  neceflarily ;  but  froni  One  Free 
and  Intelligent  Being,  that  has  judi- 
cioufly  annexed  different  Degrees  of  Evil 
or  Inconvenience  to  different  Ways  of 
afting,  in  order  to  make  a  Trial  of  our 
good  Senfe  in  chufing  the  leaft  Inconve- 
niences. In  this  Way  of  accounting  for 
Good  and  Evil,  we  can  fyppofe  them 

mixed 


Sermon   v.  141 

mixed  together,    and  yet  leave  Room 
for  the  Exercife  of  good  Senfe  :  Becaufe 
a  Being   that  ads   not   from   any  Ne- 
ceflity  of  Nature,  but  with  every  De- 
gree of  Freedom    which    is  confiftent 
with  aQ:ing  wifely,    may  fo  order  the 
Conftitution  of  Things,  as   to  leave  it 
in  the  Power  of  fome  Beings,  if  not  en- 
tirely to    feparate  the  Evil  from    the 
Good,  yet,  at  leaft,  when  there  are  dif- 
ferent Degrees  of  Evil,  to  take  the  lejffer : 
Whereas   if  Good  and   Evil   proceeded 
from  two  diflerent  and  contrary  Caufes 
ading  neceffarily  with  all  their  Force, 
it  could  never  be  in  the  Power  of  any 
particular  Beings,  fuch  as  Men,  to  alter 
fo     far   the   Original     Conftitution    of 
Things  as  to  take  Good  without  taking 
an  equal  Portion    of  Evil ;    becaufe  it 
cannot  be  fuppofed,  that  what  has  been 
joyned  together  by  two   infinite  Pow- 
ers, can  pofTibly  be  feparated  by  Man. 
But   lince  all  the  World  allows   a  Dif- 
ference  between  wife  and  foolifli  Con- 
duQ:,  the  Appearance  of  Good  and  Evil 
fuch  as  it  really  is,   cannot  pofTibly  be 

reconciled 


14.2  Sermon    V. 

reconciled  by  an  Hypothefis  of  Two  con* 
trary  Principles  a8:ing  neceflarily. 

Again,   as  Wifdom   and  Folly  are 
not   reconcileable  with   Two  contrary 
Principles  afting  necefTarily;  fo  neither 
will  the  linequal  Allotment  of  Good  and 
Evil   to    fome  Sorts  of  Men,  receive  a 
Solution  from  Two  contrary  Pi'inciples ; 
for  Beings  that  a6t  necefTarily,  it  mufl 
be  granted,   cannot    be   Refpefters    of 
Perfons,  but  muft  difperfe  their  Favours 
or   Refentments     promifcuoufly  to   all 
that  come   in  the  Way  of  them,  and 
not  fingle  out  particular  Perfons  for  that 
Purpofe.   This  is  fo  plain  a  Dedutlion 
from  the  Atheipck  Scheme,  that  Lucre- 
tius could   not  deny  it ;  and  therefore 
when  he  comes  to  that  Part  of  Na- 
ture which  relates  to  the  Difpenfation 
of  Good  and  Evil,  he  plainly  gives  lip 
the  Caufe  of  Atheifm^   in  acknowledg- 
ing that   this  was  not  to  be  accounted 
for  by   any  Laws  of  mere  Matter  and 
Motion ;  for  Ipeaking  of  the  Misfortunes 
of  great  Men,  of  which  the  Hiftories  of 
all  Times   had   furnifhed  great  Num- 
bers of  Inftanccs^  he  drops  his  Atoms, 

aud" 


Sermon     v.       143 

and  has  Recourfe  to  I  know  not  what 
hidden  Power  that  took  a  Delight  in 
making  a  Jeft  of  all  human  Grandeur. 
%)Jc^ue  adeo  res  humanxs  vis  ahdita  quadam 
Ohterity  dr  fulchros  fafces  jUvafyue  jecures^ 
^roculcare  i^  ludibrio  fthl  habere  videtur  *. 
We  may  by  •  the  Way  obferve,  That 
Lucretius  does  here  the  fame  Thing  for 
which  he  and  other  Atheifis  have 
thought  fit  to  laugh  at  the  Religious 
Man  \  becaufe  his  Material  Caufes  were 
found  by  him  not  fufficient  to  anfwer 
this  ?h^nomenon  of  Nature,  he  is  con- 
tented to  take  Refuge  in  an  unknown 
Caufe,  a  ®-M  ^  ^MX*f'"fj  and  yet  when 
we  have  recourfe  to  a  God,  they  wii! 
allow  it  no  better  a  Name  in  us  than 
a  Cloak  for  our  Ignorance.  But  if  the 
Atheifl  v/ould  declare  as  fairly  with 
regard  to  feveral  other  ^ImmnmiA  as 
Lucretius  has  done  in  this  particular 
one,  he  would  find  as  much  Want  of 
a  G  o  D  for  extricating  him  out  of 
other  Difficulties,  as  Lucretim  did  hi  tliis 
concernino:  sood  and  Evil, 

If 

*  Liicrr-r    lib-  5, 


144^         Sermon    v. 

If  the  Religious  Man  meets  with 
ibme  Difficulties  in  reconciling  the 
Misfortunes  of  great  and  good  Men 
with  a  Good  Being,  yet  nothing 
has  been  thought  clearer  than  that 
Something  befides  the  necefTary  Laws 
of  Matter  and  Motion  njull:  have  had 
a  Hand  in  human  Affairs.  There  was 
always  fo  much  feeming  Caprice, 
fuch  Inconftancy,  and  Changes  fo  fud- 
den,  and  fo  unaccountable  in  the  Hi- 
ftory  of  great  Men,  particularly  of  fuch 
as  had  been  great  and  good  Men,  th  at 
it  has  been  always  thought  necefTary  to 
have  Recourfe  to  fome  Agent  that  go- 
verns all  Events  with  perfeft  Freedom, 
and  not  to  Matter  in  Motion,  whofe 
Laws  were  too  fteady  and  too  regular 
to  account  for  them.  For  'twas  eafily 
feen  that  the  Workings  of  NecefTary 
Agents  mull  be  as  unchangeable  as 
their  Natures.  And  therefore  a  more 
regular  Courfe  of  human  Affairs  than 
the  prefent,  mufl  have  arifen  from  the 
Adion  of  a  Being  or  Beings  that 
brought  Things  about  from  a  Necef- 
fity  of  Nature. 

Thus 


Sermon    V. 

Thus  we  fee  the  Jtheift  is  never 
the  nearer  towards  giving  himfelf  Sa- 
tisfaction concerning  Good  and  Evil, 
when  he  exchanges  Religicn  for  Atheifm  : 
but  if  he  deals  fairly  with  himfelf,  he 
will  only  find  this  Difference,  That 
whereas  he  tumbled  at  fome  Appear- 
ances of  Evil  which  he  could  not  re? 
concile  with  Goodnefs  or  the  Exiftence 
of  a  Good  Principle,  he  muft  now  fee 
every  Solution  he  can  give  of  this 
Fhammenon  upon  the  Foot  of  Atheijm^ 
plainly  impoflible  to  be  th-e  Truth, 


H$ 


L 


S  E  R  M. 


'J.-  .-^fcg^jsfea* 


SERMON   VI. 

Acts  XVII.  28. 

For  in  Him  we  live^  and 
mo'Ve^  and  have  our  Be- 
ing. 


147 


HESE  Words  are  Part  of 
a  Speech  St.  Faul  made 
upon  Mirs-YiiW  at  Athem 
in  Juftification  of  himfeif 
againil  the  Charge  of  en- 
deavouring to  introduce  a  new  Reli- 
gion into  that  City ;  he  tells  them , 
That  he  had  Preached  no  ftrange  Gods, 
but  the  very  fame  God  whom  they  them- 
fclyes  \vorJhipped,  under  the  Title  of 
L  z  tlie 


Sermon    VI. 

(he  Unknown  God,  tho'  they  were 
entirely  ignorant  of  his  Nature,  as 
was  plain  by  their  ereQ:ing  Temples  to 
Him  for  his  Habitation  and  Refidence. 
Whereas  himfelf  had  ereded  this  {late- 
ly Frame  of  the  Univerfe,  and  there- 
fore could  never  be  in  Want  of  a  Room 
or  Place  to  dwell  in ;  neither  could  He 
want  the  Afliftance  of  Men  for  making 
Him  Altars  and  Images,  for  that  He 
had  given  Life  and  Breath  to  thofe  ve- 
ry Men  by  whofe  Skill  and  Workman- 
lliip  they  pretended  to  honour  Him. 
We  find  by  the  i8th  Verfe,  that  the 
Epicureans  made  a  Part  of  our  Apo- 
ftle's  Congregation,  for  they  went  along 
with  him  from  the  Market-place,  where 
-they  had  been  Difputing,  to  the  Areo- 
fagus,  Thefe  Men  had  wilfully  mif- 
taken  the  Nature  of  G  o  d,  and  impi- 
oufly  ftripp'd  the  Deity  of  all  the 
Privileges  that  had  been  univerfally  al- 
lowed to  belong  to  it ;  for  the  God  of 
Epicurus  had  no  Hand  in  ,  the  making 
the  World,  he  neither  moved  the  Mat- 
ter of  the  World,  nor  directed  its  Mo- 
rions, he  was  neither  concerned  in  the 

Inanimate 


Sermon    vi.  I49 

Inaminate  nor  Animate  Part  of  it,  and 
muft  be  therefore  fliut  out  of  all.  For 
as  to  the  Motion  of  Matter,  from  Whence 
all  its  Variety  arifes,  that  was  fuppofed 
by  them  to '  have  been  Eternal ;  and 
as  for  Life,  that  was  nothing  more 
than  the  particular  Organifation  or 
Structure  of  the  Parts,  fuch  as  is  feen  iil 
Animals ;  which  Organifation  too  was 
entirely  owing  to  Chance  or  Fortune, 
without  the  leaft  Interpofition  of  their 
Gods. And  as  to  the  Nature  of  their  Gods, 
we  find  by  Democritus  (from  whom 
Epicurus  took  a  great  Part  of  his  Ph^- 
lofophy)  that  they  were  beholden  to 
Matter  for  their  Exigence ;  for  he  fup- 
pofes  them  to  be  nothing  but  the  I- 
mages  of  Objefts,  which  according  to 
his  Way  of  Thinking,  were  continually 
flying  off  from  all  Corporeal  Objefts ; 
as  appears  by  lully  ^.  Had  this  been 
the  real  Truth  of  the  Cafe,  a  Worfhip, 

L  3  fuch 


.*  Democritus  qui  turn  imagines  earumque  Circu- 
,,  ki^s  in  Deorum  Numero    refert.    Cicer.  de  Nacura 
peorum.  i,ib,  i.  p,  :S. 


Sermon    VI. 

fuch  as  that  at  Athens  by  Images,  had 
been  worthy  enough  of  fuch  imaginary 
Beings,  or  rather  more  than  they  de- 
ferved  :  But  St.  Paul  tells  them,  That 
this  was  to  miH-ake  entirely  the  Na- 
ture of  G  o  D ;  for  that  He  was  the 
fole  Caufe  of  all  Things,  and  the  fole 
Giver  of  all  our  Powers  of  Adion ; 
for  that  'twas  in  Him  We  all  of  us 
both  lived,  and  moved,  and  had  our 
Beings. 

Having  already  confidered  fome  of 
the  moft  material  Objeclions  which  the 
Infidel  is  wont  to  urge  againft  the  Be- 
ing of  a  God,   and  fliewn    that    they 
cannot   be  a  good  Reafon  for  denying 
Him,  becaufe  the  Appearance  of  Things 
will  neceflarily  require  the  Exiftence  of 
fuch    Powers   and    Properties    as    we 
afcribe  to  Him,    and  which  the  Atheiji 
pretends  to  find  Fault  with  ;  I  am  now 
to  reprefent  fome  of  the  Arguments  on 
which  the  Religious  Man  grounds  his 
Belief  of  a  God,  drawn  from  the  moft 
confiderable  Phenomena  in   Nature,  fuch 
as  Motion,  Thought,  and  the  Oi'der  of 
Things,  ^\Mc\\VUio  calls  the  Ti<iO'  k^  Kuh2<. 

I 


S  E  R  iM  O  N     VT.  I  5  I 

I  will  begin  with  that  of  Motion,  and 
Ihew,  That  there  is  no  pofTible  Way 
of  accounting  for  its  Exigence,  unlefs 
we  will  admit  a  G  o  d,  or  which  is  the 
fame  Thing  to  the  Jiheifl,  a  Being  di- 
{tmdi  from  JVlatter,  and  yet  aSing 
upon  it« 

There  are  but  three  pofRble  Y/ays 
of  accounting   for   Motion,    either   by 
fupppfing  that  there  has    been  an    in- 
finite Succeflion  of  Impulfes   communi- 
cated from  one  Body  to  another  from 
Eternity,  without   any  adive  Principle 
either    />  Matter  or  without  It ;  or  that 
there  is  an  A8:ive  Principle  in  Matter, 
that  it  is  Self-aclive,  and  Motion  eilen- 
tial  to  it,  or  elfe  that  there  is  fonie  Be- 
ing   diftinci:  from  Matter,   that   is  the 
Caufe  of  its  Motion.   I  will  (hew,  that 
neither  of   the   two   firft  ^Yays  of  ac- 
counting for  Motion,    can  poiTibly  be 
the  Trath ;  and  therefore  that  the  Caufe 
of  Motion,  muft  be  fome  Being  diftind 
from  Matter,  the  fame  Being,  which 
our  Apoftle    made    the  Subjed  of  his 
Difcourfe    to  the    Athemans^    the  God 
that    made    Heaven    and  Earth;     the 
L  4  fole 


1^2  Sermon   VI. 

idle  Giver  of  Life  and  Animal  Motion, 
for  that  'tis  in  Him  we  live,  and  have 
a  Power  of  moving  ourfelves.    And, 

i/,  A  N  infinite  Succeffion  of  Im- 
pulfes  without  an  Active  or  Moving 
Principle,  will  never  give  Birth  to  Mo- 
tion, becaufe  this  would  be  to  bring  an 
Effect  upon  the  Stage  without  the  Help 
of  a  Caufe.  And  yet  abfurd  as  this  is, 
Sjfinofa  was  able  to  give  no  better  an 
Account  of  Motion,  or  at  leaft  thought 
this  to  be  better  than  to  fuppofe  with 
fome,  That  Motion  was  a  necefTary  At- 
tribute of  Matter.  And  tho'  all  the 
"World  agrees.  That  in  a  finite  Time 
'tis  abfurd  to  fuppofe  an  Eifed  without 
a  Caufe,  which  mufl:  be  the  Cafe,  if 
Motion  was  not  an  eflential  Attribute 
of  Matter  ;  yet  Spinofa,  would  never  un- 
dertake to  fliew  how  an  infinite  Time 
would  make  any  Senfe  of  it ;  and  there- 
fore always  avoided  giving  a  dire(Et 
Anfwer,  when  he  was  prefb'd  by  his 
Friends  to  explain  how  Matter  could 
ever  come  into  Motion,  if  Motion  was 
neither  elfential  to  Matter,  nor  proceed- 
ed from  any  external  Caufe.     This  laft 

he 


Sermon    VL  153 

he  could  never  own  without  giving  up 
the  Caufe  o^  Atheifm^2ind  therefore  would 
never  fpeak  plainly  to  this  Point,  as 
appears  by  the  Sixty-third  and  follow- 
ing Epiftles  m  his  Poftliumous  Works. 
This  Behaviour  of  Sfwofa\  makes  it 
reafonable  to  believe,  that  he  himfelf 
would  have  given  up  his  Account  of 
Motion,  if  he  could  have  faved  his 
Scheme  and  his  Reputation.  And  as 
Toland  too  has  thought  fit  to  rejed  it 
as  indefenfible,  I  fhall  take  no  farther 
Notice  of  it,  but  proceed  to  the  other 
Atheipck  Account  of  Motion,  which 
ToUnd  thinks  will  be  fuiiicient,  with- 
out troubling  the  Supreme  Being, 
viz.  That  Motion  is  efTential  to  all 
Matter,  and  Aftion  as  much  an  Attri- 
bute of  Matter,  as  Extenlion  or  Soli- 
dity ;  and  confequently,  every  Atom  of 
Matter  is  necclTarily  Self-moving,  or 
adlive  from  the  NecefTity  of  its  own 
Nature. 

The  World    has  had  fo  flrong  an 
Opinion  of  the    natural    Ina^livity   of 
Matter,   that  Sphofa  had  not  Courage 
Enough  to  oppofe  it;  but  ToUf/d  fi tid- 
ing 


1^4-  Sermon  VI- 

ing  Atheifm  was  not  tenable,  if  Matter 
was  really  Inadive,  was  refolved  to  try 
whether  he  could  not  defend  its  Acti- 
vity, as  the  only  Refuge  left  for  the 
finking  Caufe  of  Atbajm,  The  Argu- 
ments he  makes  ufe  of  to  prove  the 
Activity  of  Matter,   are  thefe : 

ly?,  '^  B  EC  Aus  E,  he  fays,  Motion, 
"  as  well  as  Extenfion  and  Solidity,  is 
"  included  in  our  Idea  of  Matter ;  that 
"  whenever  we  feparate  Motion  from 
^'  Matter  in  our  Idea  of  it,  'tis  only  a 
"  partial  Confideration  of  it,  or  an  ab- 
"  fi:ra£led  Notion  of  the  Mind ;  and 
"  therefore  no  more  a  Proof  that  Mat- 
"  ter  can  exift  without  Motion,  than 
"  that  Mathematical  Lines,  Surfaces 
"  and  Points,  have  any  Exiftence  in 
"  Nature,  becaufe  they  are  in  the 
*'  Heads  of  Mathematicidns, 

2dly^  Another  Reafon  he  urges 
for  the  Activity  of  Matter,  is,  "  Be- 
*'  caufe  in  Fad  all  Matter  is  in  Mo- 


*'  tion. 


A  THIRD  Reafon  is  this :  "  That 
*^  tho'  there  fliould  be  fome  Objedi- 
"  ons   againft  it,   that    much   greater 

**  ones 


Sermon    vi.  155 

*^  Ones  would  lie  againft  an  External 
"  Mover  of  Matter. " 

In  anfwer  to  thefe  Arguments  of 
his   I  will  fhew, 

ift-,  That  our  Idea  of  Matter,  when 
we  leave  Motion  out  of  it,  is  no  ab- 
ftraOied  Notion  of  the  Mind,  but  a 
compleat  and  adequate  Idea  of  it. 

2dty^  That  tho'  all  Parts  of  Mat- 
ter were  in  Motion,  it  would  not  fol- 
low that  Motion  was  an  elfential  At- 
tribute of  Matter. 

5%,  That  the  Adivity  of  Mat- 
ter is  inconfiflent  with  fome  Appear- 
ances in   Nature. 

^thly^  That  the  Obje8:ions  againfl 
God's  being  the  Author  of  Motion, 
are  not  fuch  as  fhould  difcourage  any- 
rational  or  unbyafs'd  Perfon  from  ac* 
knowledging,  That  'tis  in  G  o  d  we 
live,  and  have   our  Animal  Being. 

i/,  I  am  to  fhew.  That  our  Idea 
of  Matter  without  Motion,  is  not  a 
partial  Confideration  of  Matter,  but  a 
compleat  Idea  of  it. 

The  Reafon  which  has  always  deter- 
mined the  >Yorld  to  look  out  for  a  Caufe 

of 


Sermon   VI. 

of  Motion  extrinfical  to  Matter,was  this : 
Tho'  they  could  eafily  conceive  it  ca- 
pable of  being  moved  and  divided ; 
yet  the  conceiving  it  to  be  undivided^ 
undiverfified,  and  unmoved ,  was  a 
more  fimple  Notion  of  Matter,  than 
the  conceiving  it  divided  and  moved. 
This  being  firfl  in  Order  of  Nature, 
and  an  adequate  Conception  of  it  too, 
they  thought  it  neceffary  to  enquire 
and  give  themfelves  an  Account  how 
it  came  out  of  this  State,  and  by  what 
Caufes  Motion,  from  whence  this  Di- 
verfity  in  Matter  arofe,  could  come 
into  the  World  ?  Defcartes ,  altho' 
he  allowed  the  Infinity  of  Matter  as 
well  as  ToUffd,  was  yet  fenfible  that 
even  this  would  not  alter  the  Nature 
of  Matter,  nor  the  Idea  that  every 
Body  had  of  its  Inactivity,  and  there- 
fore could  fee  no  other  Way  of  alter- 
ing its  primitive  Idea,  and  reconciling 
it  with  the  Motion  of  Matter,  but  by 
introducing  another  Infinite  Being,  'viz. 
a  God  that  had  fufficient  Power  to 
roufe  Matter  out  of  that  fleepy,  in- 
a^ive  State  in  whicli    its  Original  Idea 

had 


Sermon    vi.         157 

had  reprefented  it.  And  ToUnd^ 
would  have  found  himfelf  under  the 
iame  Neceflity  of  admitting  a  God 
for  the  Mover  of  Matter,  if  he  had 
not  endeavoured  to  impofe  upon  his 
Reader  by  confounding  Divifibihty  and 
Mobility,  with  actual  Divifion  and  an 
a£live  or  moving  Power,  as  we  fhall 
fee  prefently.  For  he  acknowledges,  that 
the  true  Conception  of  Matter  is  this : 
That  it  is  every-where  the  fame,  and 
only  diverfified  by  Motion;  fo  as  by 
his  own  ConfeiTion,  the  conceiving 
Matter  in  Motion,  is  a  departing  from 
that  Unity  of  Subftance,  that  Samenefs 
of  Nature  in.  which  our  Ideas  repre* 
fent  it  to  us.  For  all  Diverfifications 
of  Matter  muft  of  Necellity  be  fo 
many  Removes  from  the  natural  Unity 
and  Identity  of  Matter,  according  to 
his  Conception  of  it. 

Aristotle,  who  was  confeifedly 
the  beft  Reafoner  among  the  Ancients, 
and  not  thought  to  be  at  all  preju- 
diced in  Favour  of  Religion,  is  yet  ve- 
ry clear  in  this  Point :  in  his  firfl:  Book 
of  the  Met/ifhyfukSj  cap,  3.  he  condemned 

thofc 


158 


Sermon    vi. 

thofe  who  ftop'd  fhort  at  the  material 
Caufe  of  Generations  and  Corruptions, 
without    looking    after    the    Efficient 
Caufe.     "  For,  fays  he,  altho'  all  Cor- 
"  ruptions   and    Generations,   are  vari- 
"  cully    produced    from   Beings    more 
"  or  lefs  compounded,    yet   'tis    necef- 
*^  fary  to   enquire.  How  this  happens, 
^'  and  what    is   the  Caufe?    For    the 
"  Subject  of  all  thefe    Changes  cannot 
*^  poffibly  change  itfelf,  "jU.  The  Wood 
"  and  the  Brafs   cannot  be  the  Caufes 
^  that   one  of  them   is    turned   into  a 
"  Bed,  the  other  into   a  Statue ;  "  but 
"  Something  elfe  muft    be  the  Caufe 
"  of  thefe  Changes.     But    to  enquire 
"  after  this,  is  to  enquire  after  a  Prin- 
"  ciple  of  Motion,  or  fome  Being  that 
"  has  a  Power   of   beginning   Motion, 
"  and  communicating  it  to  Matter  *. " 
For  he  could  fee   nothing  in   the  Idea 
of  Matter,    that  would    qualify   it  for 
a6:ing  upon   itfelf    Mr.  Hajle  'm    voce 
hmci^^us^  confefTes,  "  That  our  Idea  of 

"  Matter 


!.  Vid.  Ariflot.  Metaphyfic.     Lib.  i.   can.  3. 


Sermon    vl 

*'  Matter  is  compleat  when  it  repre- 
"  fents  nothing  to  us  but  Extenfion 
"  and  Solidity,  and  that  Motion  is  not 
^*  included  in  it,  but  is  a  perfect  exo- 
^'  tick,  a  foreign  Idea,  that  has  no 
'^  more  relation  to  Matter ,  than 
^'  Thought  or  .  Underftanding.  "  The 
Evidence  againft  the  Adivity  of  Mat- 
ter from  its  Idea,  is  fo  clear  and 
ftrong,  that  one  would  hardly  have  ex- 
pected that  this  Idea  fliould  have  been 
prefsM  into  a  contrary  Service ,  and 
made  to  ipeak  m  behalf  of  the  Adi- 
vity  of  Matter.  And  yet  Mr.  ToUnd 
has  attempted  to  prove  Matter  an 
adive  Being  from  its  Idea. 

As  17?,  "  From  the  Divifibility  of 
"Matter,  which  always  makes  a  Part 
''  of  our  Idea  of  Matter.       And, 

2dlyy  "  Because  our  Idea  of  Mat- 
"  ter  always  contains  fome  Quahty  or 
"  other,  which  necelTarily  fuppofes  Mo- 
"  tion.  " 

ifty  Fp.om  the  Divifibility  of  Matter, 
his  Argument  from  hence  is  founded 
upon  this ;  becaufe,  as  he  fuppofes,  we 
caiinoi;    conceive    Divifibility    without 

Motion; 


i6o  Sermon   VI. 

Motion  j  therefore  we  cannot  conceive 
Matter  which  is  always  conceived  as 
divifible,  without  conceiving  Motion  as 
infeparable  from  Matter.  But  this  is 
plainly  to  make  Mobility  or  the  Capa- 
city of  receiving  Motion,  and  Motion 
itfelf,  or  the  Vis  moirix,  to  be  one  and 
the  fame  Ideas.  For  altho',  mdted^  we 
cannot  conceive  Matter  to  be  adually 
divided,  without  adding  Motion  to  our 
Idea  of  Matter ;  yet  nothing  more  than 
a  Capacity  of  receiving  Motion  is  ne- 
celTary  to  the  making  up  our  Idea  of 
Divifibility  :  But  this  laft  has  a  plain 
and  evident  DiiHnftion  in  our  Concep- 
tions of  Things  from  the  former.  For 
we  can  conceive  a  Thing  to  be  divifi- 
ble, tho'  it  never  fhould  be  adually 
divided  ;  and  when  we  conceive  Mat- 
ter as  divifible,  we  at  the  fame  Time 
as  well  fuppofe  it  capable  of  continuing 
in  an  undivided  State,  as  of  changing  it 
into  a  divided  one.  And  therefore  Mo- 
tion is  not  necefTarily  included  m  our 
Idea  of  Divifibility.  And  confqquently 
to  fay,  That  Divifibility  makes  a  Pare 
of  our  Idea  of  Matter,  would  be  no 

Proof 


Sermon    VI.  i6i 

Proof  that  Motion  too  muft  belong  to 
our  Idea  of  it. 

But  Toland  goes  further  ,  and 
would  prove,  That  Motion  muft  ne- 
ceiTarily  be  included  in  the  Divifibihty 
of  Matter ;  becaufe  whatever,  is  divi- 
fible,  mufl:  have  within  itfelf  a  Power 
of  dividing  itfelf;  for  thus  he  fpeaks  in. 
his  Letter  concerning  Motion  *  ;  *'  li^ 
"  fays  he,  there  was  no  Internal  Ener- 
**  gy.  Matter  would  be  incapable  of 
"  Alteration  or  Divilion. "  But  this  can 
never  be  proved  by  him,  unlefs  he 
takes  it  for  granted,  that  there  is  no- 
thing in  Nature  befides  Matter  ;  which 
would  be  to  beg  the  Queftion  in  Dil^ 
pute  between  us  and  tho  Athttft:  For 
'tis  plain  if  any  Thing  befides  Matter 
had  an  Exiftence,  he  might  have  con- 
ceived Matter  to  be  divifible  without 
thinking  of  the  internal  Energy  of  Mat- 
ter, becaufe  Matter  would  be  as  truly 
divifible,  altho'  we  fuppos'd  it  divided 
by  fomething  '  elfe,  as  if  we  fuppos'd 
it  divided  by  itfelf,  and  the  Idea  of 
M  Divifibility 

•  Page    194. 


Sermon    VI. 

Divifibility  would  be  exadly  the  fame 
in  either  Cafe.     As    to   what  he  fays,> 
^*  That  Motion  is  contained  in  our  Idea 
**  of  Matter :   Becaufe  .1 

s^/j/,  "  \V  E  can  never  form  an  Ideaj 
".  of  Matter  devoid  of  all  Qualities  ;^ 
"  and  all  Qualities  are  an  EHed  of 
^^  Motion ;  confequently  Motion  is  not 
"  to  be  feparated  from  our  Idea  of 
*'  Matter : "  If  by  Idea,  he  means  an 
Image  or  what  may  be  an  Objed  of 
our  Senfes,  'tis  agreed,  that  in  this 
Senfe  we  can  form  no  Idea  of  Matter 
divefted  of  all  Qualities ;  but  this  is  to 
fay  nothing  more  than  this,  That  we 
can't  form  an  Image  of  a  Thing  which 
has  no  Image,  or  is  no  ObjeQ:  of  our 
Senfes;  but  ftill  the  Idea  of  folid  Ex- 
tendon  remains  a  diftinO:  Idea  from 
that  of  Motion,  and  therefore  from  all 
the  Qualities  that  are  a  Confequence 
of  Motion ;  which  ihews  tliat  there  is 
nothing  in  tlie  Nature  of  the  Thing 
that  fliould  have  hinder'd  Matter 
from  exifting  without  Motion.  And 
Toland  himfeif  acknowledges,  "  That 
^'  Motion  is   not  included  in  the  Idea 

"  of 


Sermon    VI.  1^6^ 

"  of  Extenfion,  nor  any  ways  dedu- 
"  cible  from  it  ^. "  And  therefore  if 
we  can  have  any  Idea  of  Solidity,  a 
foh'd  extended  Subftance  may  be  con- 
ceived to  exift  without  Motion,  or 
without  any  Quahties  that  fhall  affedl 
our  Senfes.  Whereas  there  is  no  con- 
ceiving Matter  to  exift  without  Soh'* 
dity  and  Extenfion,  which  fliews  them 
to  he  efTential  to  Matter,  and  at  the., 
fame  time  fl:iews  Motion  to  be  not  ef- 
fentiaL  And  therefore  he  has  plainly 
beg'd  the  Qiieftion  in  Difpute,  in  cid- 
dmg  to  the  Idea  of  Matter  a  new  At- 
tribute, without  any  Proof  tliat  'tis 
one. 

He  was  fenfible  that  the  univcr- 
fal  Belief  of  a  Cljaos,  was  an  ugly  Ar- 
gument againft  him ,  and  therefore 
takes  fome  Pains  ia  ridiculing  the  feve- 
ral  Methods  the  Ancients  took  of  bring- 
ing  Matter  out  of  that  Confufion,.  m 
which  all  Things  were  fuppofed  to  b* 

while  the  Chaos  lafted.    But  how  ridi- 

»•■ 

M  2  culous 


■:e  /;.":•  Letf;r  emarnlnz  Mstimi, 


1 64  Sermon 

culous  foever  their  Schemes  might  be^ 
yet  this  is  evident,  that  they  could  and 
did  conceive  Matter  to  have  an  Ex- 
igence altho^  unmoved,  and  of  courfe 
without  any  of  thofe  Qualities  that  re- 
fult  from  the  Movement  of  Matter. 
Ovid  ia  defcribing  the  Chaotick  State, 
tells  us,  "  That  there  was  no  Kind 
'^  of  Diverfity,  but  the  fame  Face  of 
^^  Things  thro'  the  infinite  Extenfion.^  " 
That  the  whole  was  rudis  mdigeftac[ue 
moleSy  nee  quiccj^uam  ntft  fondus  iners.  By 
which  the  Poet  intended  to  exprefs 
the  lazy  and  ftupid  State  ia  which 
Matter  lay  during  the  Chaos ^  and  till 
the  Chaotick  Matter  began  to  be  ftirr'd. 
Mr.  Ba.yle  was  as  much  out  of  Humour 
with  the  Account  that  Ovid  had  given 
of  the  ancient  Opinion  concerning  a 
Chaos^  as  ToU'/fd^  and  therefore  un- 
'^feafonably  falls  out  with  the  Defcrip- 
^on  he  has   given  us  of  it.    That  he 

may 


*  Ante  mare  Sc  terras,  8c  quod  tcgit  omnia  Coc- 

[lum, 
Unus  erat  toto   Naturx  yultus  in  orbe, 
Qucm  dixere  Chaos.  OviH.Metamor.  L.  J. 


?i 


Sermon    VI.  i6^ 

may  make  his  Account  inconfiftent  with 
itfelf,  Ovid  is  brought  in  reprefenting 
all  the  Variety  in  Nature  as  if  it  had 
an  aftual  Exiftence,  before  there  was 
any  fuch  Thing  as  Motion;  when  he 
fays,  fpeaking  of .  the  Chaotick  State, 
Frigida  fugnxbmt  calidis,  ■  humentia  jtccis, 
moUia  cum  duris^  l^c,  and  yet  he  had 
jufl  before  told  us,  that  the  Whole  was 
an  homogeneous  Subftance ,  Vmis  trat 
Natura  vtdtm  ;  whereas  what  Ovid  fays 
is  very  confident.  He  fuppofes  the 
QhAos  ta  be  an  homogeneous  Subltance, 
which,  upon  its  being  moved,  was  di-» 
verfified  into  Bodies  of  very  diJerent 
Natures,  and  not  that  any  fuch  Di- 
verfity  had  any  other  than  a  poffible 
Exiftence,  till  it  was  moved.  And  if 
Mr.  BiiyU  had  not  been  prejudiced  a- 
gainft  a  Qhnos^  it  ought  to  Jiave  pafs'cl 
with  him  for  a  fine  Piece  of  Imagery, 
when  the  Poet  reprefents  the  Change 
that  was  made  hy  Motion,  that  Earth, 
Air,  Fire  and  Water,  which  had  been 
hitherto  blended  together,  were  then 
feparated  from  each  other.  For  the 
beft  Philoi©phers  are  agreed,  That  all 
M  I  Matter 


1 66  Sermon    Vl 

Matter  is  really  the  fame,    and  that  all^j 
the  Diverfity  that  appears  in  it,  is  ow- 
ing to  Motion.     And  thtreibre  a  Pcet 
might  well   reprefent   the   fimple    and 
uniform  Face  of  Matter,  as  containing 
within  itfelf  all  thefe  Diverfities,   even 
before  it    was   moved,  becr^ufe  it  was 
capable    of  receiving  them  ;    without,  i 
fuppofing  them   to  have  had  an  adlual; 
Exigence    till  tlie  Chaos  was   put  into,i 
Motion :  which  is   enough   to  clear  tlie>t 
Poet  from  the  Inconfiftency  which  Mr^| 
Bajle  would  charge    upon  liim^  and  at ' 
the  fame  time  to  fatisfy  us,   that   the 
Ancients  had   a  Conception    of  Matter 
as    an    uniform   Being    before    it   was 
moved.     And    confeqaently,    that   To-- 
Ufid's  Conceiving  Faculty  was  very  dc- 
fectiv'c,  if  he  could  not  conceive  Mat- 
ter without  Motion.      But, 

2^/;,  I  AM  to  flicw  the  Weakncfs 
of  another  Argument  he  brings  for 
the  Adivity  of  Matter,  viz,.  "  That 
**  in  Fad  all  Matter  is  in  Motion." 
And  fuppofing  it  true,  it  would  not 
follow  that  iVlotion  was  an  eilenti- 
af  Attribute  of  Matter,  For  ii  Mo- 
tion 


Sermon    VL'  i6y 

tion  is  not,  as  we  have  alrea<ly  fhewni'' 
included  in  oar  Idea  of  Matter,  but  we 
can   as  well  conceive  it   at  Reft  as  in 
Motion;  altho'  there  fnould  be  no  Bo- 
dies perfedly  at  Reft,  it  w^ould  not  yet 
follow  that  Motion  is  efT^ntial  to  Mat- 
ter;  but  on  the  contrary,  for  this  very 
Reafon,  {viz.  That  Motion  is  not  con- 
tained in  the  Idea  of  Mutter)  v/e  ought 
to  look  fomewhere  elfe  than  in  Matter 
for  a  Caufe  of  its  Motion ;  and  as  'tis 
proved   to   be  foreign  to  our  Idea,   to 
look  abroad  for  a  Powerful  Gaufe,  fuch 
as  God,  that  had  imprefs'd  Motion  up- 
on Matter.   But  ToUnd  lays  Strefs  upon 
this  Argument,    and   fays  *,    "  Seeing 
"  every    Part  of  Matter  is   always  in 
"  Motion,    you    fhould    conclude  that 
"  Motion  is  eiTential  to  the  Whole,  for 
"  the  fame  Reafon  that  you  think  Ex- 
"  tenfion  to  be  fo ;  becaufe  every  Part 
*'  is  extended. "     But  the  Cafe  fure  is 
very  different  between  Motion  and  Ex- 
tenfion,  becaufe  Extenfion  is  confelledly 
included  in  cur  Idea  of  Matter,  where- 
M  4  as 

*    Page    2c*, 


i68  Sermon    VI. 

as  Motion  is  not  fo.  Befides,  if  Tehnci 
reafons  juftly,  the  Univerfality  of  Mo- 
tion can  be  no  Proof  of  its  being  ef- 
fential  to  Matter,  becaufe  he  allows 
the  Centripetal  Force  to  be  univerfal, 
and  belonging  to  all  Bodies ;  for  he 
defcrFoes  it  thus :  "  'Tis  that  by  which 
"all  the  Bodies  of  the  Earth  are  drawn 
*''.  or  tend  towards  its  Centre,  as  all 
"others  to  the  proper  Centres  of  their 
"  Motions.  ^  "  And  yet  he  does  not 
allow  that  particular  Determination, 
which  we  call  Gravity,  to  be  effentiai  to 
Matter  ,  and  therefore  Motion  may  be- 
long to  every  Part  of  Matter,  and  not 
be  eflential  to  it ;  it  may  be  univerfal, 
and  yet  proceed  from  an  external  Caufe 
that  has  moved  the  Whole.    But, 

'^dlj^  That  Motion  cannot  be  ef- 
fential  to  Matter,  may  be  made  plain 
from  thefe  Three  Reafons. 

ifty  Because  there  could  be  no 
fuch  Things  in  the  World  as  Bodies 
or  any  Concretions  of  Matter  •,  which 
would  render  the  Face  of  Things  quite 

diiferent 

'--  1  Page  ic5. 


Sermon  vi-  1^9 

different  from  what  it  appears  at  prc,- 

Q-dly,  Because  there  would  be  no 
Variation  as  to  the  Quantity  of  Motion, 
1^  all  Matter  was  Self-a£tive ;  and  yet 
we  think  it  very  evident  that  the  Quan- 
tity of  Motion  does  and  muft  conti- 
nually vary. 

^^/j,  A  THIRD  Reafon  that  demon- 
ftrates  the  InaQiivity  of  Matter ,  isy 
That  Bodies  of  equal  Bulk  or  whofe 
Surfaces  are  equal,  do  yet  weigh  un- 
equally. 

i/,  Because  there  could  be  no 
fuch  Things  in  the  World  as  Concre- 
tions of  Matter,  if  Matter  was  felf- 
adive.  The  prefent  Face  of  Matter 
appears  to  us  to  be  divided  into  Mther^ 
and  an  infinite  Number  of  large  Com- 
binations of  Matter  floating  in  that 
jEther ;  whereas  if  Matter  had  been 
felf-aftive,  it  could  never  have  concre- 
ted into  fuch  Globes  as  thofe  of  the 
fix'd  Stars,  Planets  and  Comets;  but 
mufl:  have  every-where  appeared  in.  the 
higheft  State  of  Fluidity,  as  fine  as  the 
prefent  4^ther  in  which  they  fwim.  For 

if 


fjo  Sermon   VI. 

if  Motion  were  elTential  to  Matter,  it 
mull  belong  to  every  the  fmalleft  Part 
of  Matter,   and    confequently    muft  be  : 
equally  fpread  thro'  the  whole  Mafs  of  l 
Matter,  and  then  no  pofTible  Reafon  to 
be  given  why   fome   Parts   of  A4atter 
iliould    be  more  divided  than    others, 
llnce    every   Atom  of  Matter  muft  e- 
qually   partake  of  the  dividing  Princi- 
ple.   This  fhews   that  there  can  be  no 
Reafon  given  upon  this  Hypothefs,  why 
the  dividing   Eifed    of  Motion  fhould '' 
ever  ceafe   till  Matter    was  ground  (b 
fmall  as   to   be  incapable  of  any  fur- 
ther    Divifion  ;     the    Confequence  of 
which   would  be    a  World  not    at  all 
like    what   we  hve  in;    and    therefore 
ours   can    never   be  accounted  for    by 
any   fuch    Scheme  as   Toiand^  ;      but 
the     AfTiftance     of    a    God    will  be 
necelTary    for   moving    the    Matter  of 
the  Univerfc,  if  we  pretend  to  account 
for  the    Diverfity    that   is    feen  in  the 
different  Portions  of  Matter.      But, 

idiy^  A  Second  Reafen  why  Mat- 
t-cr  cannot  be  felf-adive,  is  this ;  Ee- 
caufe    there ,  could  be  no  Variation  as, 

to 


.ZiOi-'QV 


Sermon  VI.  17 1 

to  the' Qtiantity  of  Motion,  no  increaf- 
ing  nor  lelTening  tli£  Qijantity  of  it ; 
for  i!^  Motion  be  elTential  to  every 
Particle  of  Matter,  no  one  Particle  of 
Matter  can  any  otherwife  lofe  its  Mo- 
tion, but  by  lofing  its  Being  in  the 
Univerfe ;  and  yet  we  think  it  very 
evident,  that  the  Qiiantity  of  Motion 
does,  and  muft  continually  diminifh. 
'Tis  certain  the  greateft  Philofopher 
that  ever  this  Globe  produced,  is  ful- 
ly perfuaded  that  Motion  muft  vary, 
that  'tis  Generable  and  Corruptible: 
"  But,  lie  fays,  what  by  the  Tena- 
"  city  of  fluid  Bodies,  the  Wearing  of 
"  their  Parts,  and  the  neccfTary  im-  ' 
^^  pairing  of  the  elaftick  Force  in  fo- • 
"  lid  Bodies,  the  Quantity  of  Motion 
"  muft  diminifh  rather  than  encreafe, 
^^  unlefs  the  Lois  of  Motion  be  repair- 
"  ed  by. an  A(^ive  Being  that  can 
''  fupply  thofe  LciTes  *. "  And  'tis 
certain,  that  he  is  fupported  in  his 
Perfuafion  by  a  plain  Matter  of  Fad, 
as   in  the  Cafe  of  two  hard  Bodies  of 

equal 

■■ 

*  Newton's  Opdcks. 


172  Sermon   VI. 

equal  Force,  that  are  not  elafticaljwhen 
fuch  Bodies  meet  together,  they  Jofe 
all  the  Motion  they  were  before  pof- 
feiTed  of.  And  if  this  be  true,  the  next 
Enqui/y  to  be  made,  is.  What  be- 
comes of  this  Morion  or  adive,  im- 
pulfive  Force?  If  it  cannot  be  dif- 
perfed  among  the  Parts  of  fuch  Bodies, 
'tis  plain,  that  then  all  the  Motion  is 
entirely  funk  and  loft.  That  it  cannot 
be  To  difperfed,  is  as  plain ;  becaufe 
the  Parts  of  fuch  Bodies  are  incapable 
of  any  tremulous  Motion  for  Want  of 
Elafticity ;  and  if  it  fhould  be  denied 
that  the  Parts  of  thofe  Bodies  would 
lofe  the  Motion  of  their  Wholes,  there 
is  this  plain  Argument  againft  it,  That 
it  would  then  follow,  that  Bodies  per- 
fedly  hard  and  elaftical  would  refle£l: 
with  a  double  Force,  vtz,  the  Force 
arifing  from  the  Elafticity,  and  more- 
over ail,  or  at  leaft,  part  of  the  original, 
direO:  Force  ;  which,  as  the  very  Learn- 
ed Dr.  Samuel  Clark  has  obferved  in 
his  Letters  to  Leibmzy  is  contrary  to 
Experience. 

I   CA  K^ 


Sermon    VL  173 

I  CANNOT   but   obferve   by  way  of 
Inference    from    the  lofs   of  Inanimate 
Motion,  that  as  the  Original   Laws   of 
Motion  could   never  have  taken  Place; 
or  had  any  Being   in  the  World,  unlefs 
there  did  Exift  fomething   Superior  to 
Matter  that  had  ImprefTed  thofe  Laws 
of  Motion  upon  it ;  fo  thofe  Laws  could 
never  have  continued,  unlefs  there  were 
an  Active  Being   in  Nature,  that  was 
always  ready  to  Exert  upon  Matter  a 
certain  Force  or  Adivity,  in  proporti- 
on  as    the    Motion   was    diminifhed ; 
which  proves  the  Exiftence  of  a   Be- 
ing,   that  not  only  gave    Motion  to 
Matter,    but   alfo  of   a    Being     that 
ftill  continues  conftantly  to  repair    the 
weakning    by  Time  of  the    firll  Im- 
preflion  of  Motion.  And  this  fhews  the 
Neceflity  of  admitting  a  Governour  of 
the  World,  who  by  his  Providence  may 
Interpofe  in  the  prefervation  of  it,   as 
well  as  of  an  Original  Author  of  Motion, 
and  of  this  World,  which  is  an  EtTeQ: 
of  a  wonderful  Direction  of  that  Mo- 
tion.   From  whence   it   follows,   Thar 
the  Notion  of  fome  Perfons  who    be- 
lieve 


174  Sermon    vi. 

b'eve  that  God  had  ImprefTed  a  cer- 
tain Quantity  of  Motion  upon  Matteif 
at  the  Creation,  and  then  left  it  to  fliift 
for  itfelf,  beheving  this  to  be  a  fufficf- 
ent  Account  of  the  Appearances  of 
Things,  cannot  polTibly  be  true ;  be- 
caufe  we  have  already  fliewn,  that  the 
Qiiantity  of  Motion  muft  necelTarily  di- 
minifb,  unlefs  there  was  fome  A6i:ive 
Being  that  could  conjlamly  keep  it 
up  in  the  fame  State  and  Condition. 
And  if  the  Inanimate  Part  of  the 
World  could  not  have  been  preferved 
in  Motion  without  the  continued  Acti- 
on of  fome  Being  putting  forth  its 
Force  according  to  thofe  Original 
Laws  of  Motion,  mucli  lefs  could  the 
Bodies  of  Plants  and  Animals ,  which 
are  vaftly  the  moft  confiderable  Parts 
of  our  Earth  be  formed  and  preferv- 
ed by  Matter  directed  at  fir  ft  accord- 
ing to  any  whatever  Laws  of  Motion. 
From  hence  too  it  appears,  that  God 
does  not  acl  as  an  Anima,  Mtirdi^  not 
as  a  Part,  but  as  a  Governor  of  ths 
World  ;  becaufe  fuch  a  Being  would  be 
nothing    but   Fate  and  Nature,  which 

can 


S  E  R  M  O  NT     VI.  175 

can  never  be  reconciled  with  the  ap- 
parent Diminution  of  the  Quantity  of 
Motion  in  the  Univerfe;  as  Fate  or 
Nature  muft  always  a6t  to  the  utmoft 
of  their  Powers ;  and  therefore  it  tlie 
Effe(9:  of  their  Activity  could  be  at 
any  Time  abated,  it  could  never  be 
reftored  or  repaired  egain.  Confe- 
quently  we  have  gained  a  Being  that 
not  only  made  the  World,  and  efta- 
blifhed  at  the  Beginning  the  Laws  by 
which  it  fliould  for  the  future  be  go- 
verned ;  but  alfo  a  B  e  i  n  g  that  ilill 
watches  over  his  Workmanfhip,  repairs 
any  Failures  in  it^  and  continues  it  in 
its  State  as  long  as  He  thinks  fit: 
Which  is  the  Religious  Man's  Notion 
ofaGoD,  a  Being  that  is  not  far 
from  any  of  us  ;  For  'tis  />  Him  we 
live,  movBy  and  have  our  Beings, 


SERM. 


Ki)^  ■ 


SERMON  VII 

Acts  XVII.  28. 

Fbr  in  Him  we  live^  and 
move^  and  have  our  Be- 
ing. 


177 


AVING  already  ibewri  , 
That  if  we  will  not  admit  a 
God  for  a  mover  of  Mat- 
__  ter,  there  will  be  only 
thefe  two  poflible  Ways  of  accounting 
for  its  being  in  the  World,  either  ik 
fuppofing  an  Infinite  Series  of  Impulfes 
or  Communications  of  Motion  from  one 
Part  of  Matter  to  another,  without  a- 
ny  Original  Caufe  of  thofe  Impulfes, 
N  which. 


Sermon  VII. 

which  is  fuppofing  an  EfFed  without  fup- 
pofing  any  Caufe  of  that  Effe£l :  Or, 

2dly^  That  Motion  is  an  efTential 
Attribute  of  Matter,  and  therefore  all 
Matter  an  adive  Being. 

In  anfwer  to  the  fuppos'd  A6livity 
of  Matter,  I  proposed  to  fhew, 

i/,  Th  AT  our  Idea  of  Mattel',  is 
a  compleat  and  adequate  Conception  of 
it  when  we  leave  Motion  out  of  it. 

2dly^  That  it  would  not  follow, 
that  Matter  was  an  adive  Being,  were 
it,  never  fo  true,  that  every  Particle  of 
Matter  was  in  Motion.      And 

j^/j,  That  the  Aftivity  of  Matter 
js  inconfiflent  with  fome  Appearances 
^.Nature:    As, 

ijt^  With  the  great  Diverfity  that 
appears  in  the  Face  6f  Nature,  that 
fome  Parts  of  Matter  are  condensed 
into  folid  Bodies,  and  others  in  a  high 
Degree  of  Rarcfadion  ;  whereas  if  Mat- 
y^  was  felf-aclive,  the  Whole  muft  ne- 
ceifarily  be  reduced  into  the  fmalleft 
Particles  into  which  Matter  is  capable 
of  being  divided.    A  llcond   Reafon  I 

avc,    why  Motion   could    not  be   an 

ejOfential 


^^ 


Sermon  VII.  179 

efTentkl  Attribute  of  Matter  was,  be- 
caufe  there  could  then  be  no  Variati- 
on as  to  the  Quantity  of  Motion  in  the 
Univerfe,  and  yet  'twas  evident  that 
the  Qtiantity  of  it  muft  gradually  di^ 
minifh,  unlefs  its  LofTes  were  conftant- 
ly  .repaired  by  fome  adive  Being* 
Thus  far  I  proceeded  in  the  laft  Dif* 
courfe. 

A  3d  Reafonby  which  I  propofed  to 
ihew  the  Ina6livity  of  Matter  was  from 
hence,  That  Bodies  of  equal  Bulk  or 
whofe  Surfaces  are  equal,  do  yet  weigh 
unequally;  for  if  there  is  no  account- 
ing for  this  Ph.-znomenorf^  without  fuppo-^ 
fing  the  heavier  Body  to  contain  more 
Matter  than  the  lighter  one  of  the 
fame  Bulk,  then  'tis  plain,  that  Mat- 
ter muft  be  an  inaftive  Being,  fince 
the  encreafing  the  Quantity  of  Matter 
ifl  any  Body,  tho'  there  be  no  encreafe 
of  its  Surface,  by  which  its  Motion 
might  be  retarded,  {hall  encreafe  the 
Difficulty  of  putting  it  into  Motion; 
This  very  Argument  will  hang  as  a 
Milftohe  upon  the  Neck  of  the  Jtheifly 
as  it  makes  it  impoflible  to  reconcile  this 
N  a  Fh^nomerion 


180  ^^^^^^  Sermon  VII. 

Fh^nomenon  of  Nature  with  the  Me- 
chanical Laws  of  Motion,  which  is  all 
that  the  hjfidel  has  to  depend  upon  for 
the  Support  of  his  Hypothefts.  For  'tis 
certain  that  all  Mechanical  Caufes  do 
a6l  in  proportion  to  the  Surfaces  of 
the  Particles  that  they  ad  upon  ;  where- 
as 'tis  as  certain,  that  Gravity,  whate- 
ever  be  the  Caufe  of  it,  afts  propor- 
tionally to  the  Quantity  of  folid  Matter, 
without  any  regard  to  the  Superficies 
of  the  Bodies ;  fo  as  Bodies  which  are 
the  fame  in  Bulk,  fliall  be  very  diffe- 
rent in  their  Weight.  Lucretius  faw 
plainly  that  there  was  no  accounting 
for  the  different  Gravity  of  Bodies  of 
equal  Bulk,  without  having  recourfe  to 
a  y^acufdntj  and  fuppofing  a  greater  Quan- 
tity of  Matter  in  the  heavier  Body.  He 
indeed,  very  weakly  fuppofes  Gravity 
to  be  an  inherent  Quality  m  Matter, 
•and  that  all  Bodies  had  a  natural  Ten- 
dency downwards,  tho'  we  are  fure 
there  could  be  no  fuch  thing  as  down- 
ward or  upward  in  an  infinite  Space, 
But  however,  he  faw  evidently  that  the 
general  Activity  of  Matter,  which  he 

believed 


Sermon    VII.  i8r 

believed  as  well  as  ToU^d,  would  not 
account  for  tJiis  Ph^mmenorf^  without  ad- 
mitting another  Principle  of  Adion, 
'viz..  Gravity;  he  believed  his  Atoms 
had  been  in.  Motion  from  JEternity,  but 
did  not  think  that  Motion  fufficient  to 
account  for  the  different  Gravitation  of 
Bodies  towards  a  Centre  ^. " 

L  E  T  us  now  fee  how  Toh^d  would 
derive  this  peculiar  AffeQiion  of  Matter, 
viz,  of  moving  towards  a  Centre,  from 
the  general  Adion  of  Matter ;  or  how 
he  would  account  for  the  umqual  Re* 
fiftance  of  Bodies  of  equal  Bulk.  It  will 
quickly  appear  that  he  is  fo  far  froni 
being  able  to  derive  Gravity  from  the 
N  2  general 


*  Denique  cur  alias  aliis  pr^fliare  videmus 
Pondere  res  rebus,  nihilo  majore  figura. 
Nam  fi  tantundem  eft  in  Laiiacglomere  quantum 
Corporis   in  Plumbo  eft,    tantundem  penderc 

fpar  eft, 
Corporis  Officium  eft  quoniam  premere  omnia 

[deorfum  : 
Ergo  quod  magnum  eft  xque,  leviufque  videtur , 
Nimirum   Plus  efle  fibi  declarat  Inanis  : 
At  contra  gravius  plus  in  fg  Corporis  efleu 
yidq  Liucretium.  Lib.  I, 


1 82  Sermon  vil. 

general  Adion  of  Matter,  that  this  ve-; 
ry  Gravity  proves  to  a  Demonfl ration 
tlie  Inadivity  of  Matter.  'Tis  plain, 
as  I  have  ah'eady  obferved,  that  all 
Mechanical  Caufes  ad  by  Contad,  and 
upon  the  Surface  of  Bodies ;  and  'tis  as 
plain,  that  Gravity  acts  quite  other- 
wife,  and  afteds  the  folid  Contents  of 
Bodies,  by  penetrating  the  very  Sub- 
fiances  of  them,  and  therefore  can  ne- 
ver be  produced  by  the  general  Adion 
of  Matter,  becaufe  that  is  fuppos'd  to 
ad  fuperficially  ,  as  all  Mechanical 
Caufes  are  wont  to  do.  But  fuppo- 
fing  it  polTible  to  derive  Gravity  from 
the  general  Adion  of  Matter,  which 
ToUnd  aims  at,  it  would  do  him  no  Ser- 
vice, becaufe  he  cannot  avoid  making 
an  increafe  of  Gravity,  and  confequent- 
ly  of  Refiftance  to  Motion,  to  depend 
upon  an  increafe  of  Matter :  For  he 
fuppofes  the  Centripetal  Force  to  be, 
not  indeed  as  Lucretius^  a  Qtiality  inhc- 
rent  in  Matter,  but  one  of  the  Modes 
of  ABion  in  general,  or  a  particular 
Determination  of  the  general  Adivity 
of  IVJatter,  .    Let  it    be  foj  lince  'tis 

evident 


Sermon  VII.  if ^ 

evident,  that  the  Quantity  of  Motion 
in  the  Body  muft  be  the  Sum  of  the 
Motive  Forces  of  all  the  Particles  of 
Matter  that  are  in  that  Body ;  i[  this 
Centripetal  Force  be  only  a  particular 
Determination  of  the  general  Adion  of 
Matter  ,  there  would  be  no  giving 
a  Reafon  why  the  Quantity  of  that 
Force,  or  of  that  particular  Deter- 
mination too,  fhould  not  be  computed 
after  the  fame  manner ;  and  be  the 
Sum  of  all  the  felf- moving  Atoms  in 
any  Body ;  the  Confequence  of  which 
would  be,  That  whenever  we  obferved 
two  Bodies  of  equal  Bulk  and  Gravi- 
tating unequally,  or  tending  towards  a 
Centre  with  unequal  Force ,  if  we 
would  account  for  fuch  a  Fh^mmemn 
confidently  with  Tolan^s  Account  of 
Gravity,  we  muft  fay,  that  one  of  the 
Bodies  had  a  greater  Number  of  the  Self- 
moving  Atoms  than  the  other,  which 
necelTarily  fuppofes  in  the  lighter  Body 
a  Space  void  of  Matter,  which  levels 
one  of  the  ftrongeft  Retrenchments  of 
the  Infidel^  vtz.  The  Infinity  of  Matter, 
^uA  at  the  fame  time  its  Adivity  :  Be- 
N  4  c^jUfe 


1^4  Sermon    VII. 

caufe  Experience  tells     us,    That    the 
more    weighty    any  Body  is,  tho'  no- 
tiling  be  added  to  its  Bulk,    the  more 
it  reiilb  to  Motion  ;  whereas  if  Matter 
was  an    adive  Being,    an    increafe  of 
its   Quantity  could   never-  increafe  itsr'i 
Refifbance,  unlefs  its  Surface,  by  which 
alone   Bodies    could    be  retarded,   was 
increafed    too.    All   that  ToLt?id  has  to 
fay  for  ,  himfelf,  is,   *'  That   this  Difte- 
"  rence  of  Refiftance  in  Bodies  of  equal 
'^  Bulk,  may  poiGTibly  arife  from  the  dif- 
"  ferent  internal  Contexture  of  thofe  Bo- 
^'  dies  "  ;  and  all  the  Reafon  for  fuch  a 
Sufpicion  is  drawn  from  the  great  Re- 
finance that  fome  Fluids  are  obferved 
tQ  make    above  others,    altho'  of  near 
the  fame    fpecifick  Gravity,  and  confe- 
quently  near  the  fame  Quantity  of  Mat- 
ter ;    which  can  be   refolved    into  no- 
thing, but  a  Difference  in  the  internal 
Contexture    of   fuch  Fluids :    But  this 
Plea  can  have  Force  only    in  fuch  Bo- 
dies as  are  not  equally  fluid.  For  what- 
ever be  the  Figure  of  the  Internal  Parts 
of  Fluids,  if  they  are  equally  devoid  of 
Tenacity,  their  Force  ^f  Jlefiftance  to 


Sermon    Vll.         18$ 

any  particular  Determination  as  well  as 
the  abfolute  Force  of  Motion,  can  be 
only  the  Sum  of  the  Forces  of  the  Self- 
moving  Particles  in  thofe  Bodies.  And 
therefore  if  a  Cubical  Inch  of  Water,  and 
the  fame  Qiiantity  of  Quick-filver,  which 
are  fluid  Bodies,  and  free  from  Tenacity, 
did  really  contain  the  fame  Number  of 
Self-moving  Particles,  whatever  were 
the  Figure  of  thofe  Particles,  they  would 
€c[ually  refill:  to  any  Change  that  fhould 
be  made  of  the  Determination  of  their 
Motion.  But  as  Experience  fhews  this 
to  be  falfe;  confequently,  that  fluid 
which  makes  the  greateft  Refifl:ance  to 
Motion,  mufl:  have  the  greatefl:  Quan- 
|:ity  of  Mattel- ;  and  then  the  different 
internal  Contexture  of  Bodies  will  not 
account  for  their  different  Weights,  nor 
clear  Matter  from  the  Imputation  of 
being  inactive.       But, 

^thly^  I  AM  now  to  fhew.  That  the 
Objeftions  againft  God's  being  the 
Author  of  Motion,  are  not  fuch  as  fliould 
diicourage  any  rational  and  unbiafs'd 
Perfon  from  acknowledging,  that  'tis  in 
God   we    live    and  have  our  animal 

Being. 


i86  Sermon   VII. 

Being.  The  Difficulties  that  are  raifed 
againil:  G  o  p's  being  the  Author  of  Mo- 
tion, are  thefe  : 

I/?,  "  That    we    cannot    conceive 

'"  how    an  Immaterial  Being,     fuch 

"  as  G  o  D  is  fuppofed  to  be,  could  ad 

"  upon  Mattel",  confequently,  how   He 

*'•  lliould  move  it. 

2^//,  "That  if  it  were  poflible 
"  for  Him  to  be  the  Author  of  Moti- 
*'  on,  there  would  be,  as  ToUnd  thinks, 
^'  this  evil  Confequence  attending  fuch 
"  a  Suppofition,  that  God  muft  be  the 
*'  fole  Caufe  of  all  the  Evil  and  Wick- 
^'  ednefs  that  is  committed  by  Men; 
"  'twill  then  be  God  that  adually 
"  moves  the  Tongue  of  a  iying  WiUtejs^ 
"  the  HAnd.  And,  T> agger  of  a  Murder tr, " 

The  firft  Objedion  is  grounded  up- 
on this,  "  That  nothing  but  Matter 
"  can  move  Matter.  This  is  proved 
thus;  "  That  the  Mobility  of  Matter, 
"  or  its  Capacity  of  receiving  Motion, 
*^  is  wholly  founded  upon  its  Impene- 
"  trability  or  Refiftance ;  by  the  Means 
"  of  which  'tis  •  qualified  for  hindring 
M  any  thing  from  coming  into  its  Place 

''  tiU 


Sermon   vil.  187 

'•  till   'tis  removed  out  of  it ;  and  con- 
^'  fequently,    the  Adive  Principle  muft 
"  be    a  Material    or  Solid  Being,    be- 
"  caufe  Matter  could  make  no  Refift- 
"  ance  to  the  Action  of  a  Being  that 
*'  was  not  Material,  and  therefore  could 
*f'not  be  moved  by  it,    as  there   can 
"  be    no  Adion   without    a  Readion 
"  or  Refiftance    on   the  Part  of  Mat- 
"  ter.  "    In  anfwer  to  this  it  may  be 
faid, .  that   tho'    this  Argument    fliould 
hold  good  in  all  the  Mechanical  Com- 
munications of  Motion  from  one  Par- 
cel of  Matter  to  another,  yet  it  would 
prove  nothing  to  the  Purpofe   in   the 
Prefent  Cafe,     unlefs  it   was   big  with 
another  Proof,    z'iz.    That  all  Caufes 
muft   be  Mechanical  Ones.    Suppoling 
the  Exiftence  of  fuch  a  Thing  as  Mo^ 
tion,    which  our  Atheifis  will  not   ven- 
ture to  deny,  we  have  made  it  evident 
that    an    Infinite    Series    of     Impulfes 
without  any   Original  Caufe    of  thofe 
Impulfes   is    a  plain  ImpoiFibility    and 
dired    Nonfenfe  ,    and    alfo    that   the 
Self-Adivity    of    Matter    is  not    only 
repugnant    to    the     Conceptions    we 

have 


1 88  Sermon  vii. 

have  of  it,  but  is  inconfiftent  with 
fome  Appearances  in  Nature :  And 
tlierefore  tho'  we  could  not  give  a 
fatisfaftory  Anfwer  to  thofe  Objedions 
againll:  an  Immaterial  Agents  being 
the  Author  of  Motion,  it  would  by- 
no  Means  follow  that  he  was  not. 
When  Zs»o  was  raifing  Difficulties  a- 
gainft  the  PofTibility  of  Motion,  a  Man 
m  Company  with  him  rofe  up  and 
walk'd  ;  this  has  been  always  look'd 
upon  as  a  fufficient  Anfwer,  tho''  no 
particular  Solution  was  given  of  the 
Objedions.  If  there  are  but  Three 
poffible  Ways  of  accounting  for  Mo- 
tion, and  Two  of  them  be  evidently 
talfe,  we  fhall  have  as  good  Evidence 
for  the  Third's  being  the  true  Account 
of  Motion,  as  the  Man  that  walk'd. 
had  for  the  Exiftence  of  Motion.  And 
therefore  how  difficult  foever  it  may 
be  to  conceive  the  Aclion  of  an  Im-^ 
material  Being  upon  a  Material  One^ 
yet  as  there  is  no  other  poffible  Way 
left,  every  unbyafs'd  Pcrfon  muft  and 
ought  to  have  Recourfe  to  a  God^ 
for   a   Solution  of    this  ?h4f?umem-f?. 

But 


Sermon  VII.  1 89 

But  farther  we  have  ihtn  already 
that  there  is  a  Principle  of  Adion 
in  Virtue  of  which  Bodies  aQ:  upon 
one  another  in  a  different  Manner  from 
what  they  would  do  by  the  Mecha- 
nical Laws  of  Motion,  'viz,.  Gravita- 
^On.,  Whatever  be  the  Caufe  of  this 
A&ion,  the  Fa£t  is  evident  ,  that  it 
penetrates  the  folid  Subftances  of  Bo* 
dies,  and  therefore  its  Action  cannot 
be  founded  upon  the  Impenetrability 
of  Matter,  or  the  Refiftance  it  makes 
to  it  ;  it  going  beyond  the  Surface 
of  Bodies.  Whereas  the  Argument  a- 
gainft  an  Immaterial  Being's  afting 
upon  Matter  is  founded  upon  this  Sup- 
pofition,  that  there  can  be  no  Afti- 
on  upon  Bodies  but  by  Contad  or 
Striking  upon  the  Surfaces ,  and  the 
confequent  Refiftance  that  Body  makes 
to  fuch  a  Shock  or  Impulfe  ;  which 
being  evidently  falfe,  the  Argument 
drawn  from  it  »can  be  of  no  Mo- 
ment. 

But  this  is  not  all;  when  we  come 
to  confider  the  Matter  clofely,  I  am 
perfuaded  we  fliall  find  as  much  Dif- 
ficulty 


ipO  S  E  R  xM  O  NT     VII. 

ficulty   in  conceiving  how  Matter  aQ:s 
upon  Matter ,    as   in    conceiving  how 
an   Immaterial    Subftance    fhould    a£l 
upon  a  Material  One :  For  I   will  ven- 
ture to  referr   it   to   any    unprejudic'd 
Perfon,    whether    he   cannot   as    eafily 
conceive     that    an     Immaterial  Being 
may    a£l    upon  Matter  without   Cor- 
poreal   Contad  5     as   that  an  Impulfe 
upon  a  Part  of  the  Body  fhould  move 
the  whole  Body ;  for  nothing  can  ac- 
count   for    this,    but  the    Adhefion  of 
the    Parts   of    Body   to    each    other , 
which    is   as    much  beyond  our  Con- 
ception    of    the    divifible    Nature    of 
Matter,    as   the  Adion  of  Immaterial 
upon  Material;     and  the  Difficulty  of 
conceiving  it  would  encreafe  upon  our 
Hands,   if  we  fhould  fuppofe  with  To- 
hnd  that   every  Particle  of  Matter  was 
Self-adive  ;  becaufe  then,  as  we  before 
obferved,    all    Matter    muft  neceffarily 
be  in  the  higheft  Stat©  of  Fluidity,  and 
confequently    the    Particles  of  Matter 
could  have  little  or  no  Union  with  one 
another. 

2dly,  The 


Sermon  vii.         191 

2^/7,  The  other  Obje8:ion  agaiiift 
God's  being  the  Author  of  Motion,  is 
this;  "  That  then  He  muft  be  the 
"  fole  Caufe  of  all  the  immoral  Actions 
"  that  Men  are  fuppos'd  to  be  guilty 
"  of;  As  when  a  Man  bears  falfe  Wit- 
^*  nefs,  it  is  not  the  Man  that  bears  falfe 
*'  Witnefs,  but  God  that  gives  Moti- 
'*  on  to  his  Tongue  ;  when  lie  commits 
"  Murder,  it  is  God  that  does  it,  be- 
"  caufe  'tis  God  that  moves  his  Hand 
"  and  the  Dagger  by  which  he  com- 
"  mits  this  Ad. "  Whatever  Strength 
there  is  in  this  Obje£i:ion,  it  muft  entire- 
ly rely  upon  the  Truth  of  this  Suppo- 
fition,  That  if  God  were  the  Origi- 
nal Author  of  Motion,  nothing  elfe,  no 
other  Being  whatfoever  could  have  this 
Power  of  moving  Matter :  And  the  Rea- 
fon  of  this  muft  be,  either  becaufe  this 
is  a  Power  which  is  ia  the  Nature  of 
the  Thing  incommunicable,  as  much -fo 
as  necefTary  Exiftence  and  Independence, 
or  at  leaft,  that  'tis  fuch  a  Power  as 
Man  is  incapable  of  receiving  :  If  nei- 
ther of  thefe  be  true,  this  Objedion. 
muft  amount  to  nothing. 

As 


ip2  Sermon   VII. 

A  s  to  the  firft  Reafon  ;  If  we  con- 
tended for  a  Power  of  ading  as  we 
pleasM ,  where  and  as  long  as  we 
pleas'd,  and  this  independently  of  God, 
we  might  be  thought  to  plead  for  a 
Power  which  could  not  be  difpofed 
of,  becaufe  there  cannot  be  two  or 
more  Independent  Beings ,  no  more 
than  there  can  be  two  or  more  Gods : 
But  if  when  we  contend  for  a  Power 
of  Self-motion  in  Man,  we  only  mean 
a  finite  or  limited  Power,  confined  to 
.  a  fmall  Portion  of  Matter,  and  wholly 
depending  upon  the  firft  Mover 
for  its  Continuance,  no  Reafon  can  be 
given  why  fuch  a  Power  as  this  may 
not  be  CO  mmunicated.  And  therefore 
Mr.  Bajle  need  not  have  put  on  fuch 
an  Air  of  Concern,  as  he  affeds  to 
do  *  at  the  Hypothefis  of  free  Agents  ; 
as  it  the  admitting  fuch  particular 
Self-movers  muft  neceffarily  exclude 
an  Univerfal  Mover.  He  brings  aa 
Inltance    from     the  Chinefe ,     among 

which 


*  In  voce  Spinofa. 


S  E  R  M  O  M     VII. 

which  People    the  Behef  it    feems  of 
many  Self-movers  had  this  EfFeO: ;  the 
firft  Univerfal   Mover   being  wholly 
left  out  of  their  Syftem   of  Religion. 
But  then  it  muft  be  cbferved,  That  the 
Belief  of  Free  Beings  had  not  this  Effea, 
till  they  had  fo  far  funk  the  Notion  of 
a  G  o  D^  as  to  make  Him  only  an  Jm- 
ma  Mundi^  that  was  acted  upon  by  Mat- 
ter, as  our  Souls  are  a£led  upon  by  our 
Bodies ;    and  had  raifed   the  particular 
Souls,  that  animated  the  feveral  Parts  of 
the  World,    to  fuch    an    Height,  as  to 
be  almoft    entirely    independent    upon 
Him ;    which   is   the  Chinefe  Philofophy^ 
&s  Mr,  Lormere  allures  us.  But  folong  as 
'tis  acknowledged,  that  the  Self-moving 
Power  is  derived  from  God,    and  de^. 
pends  upon  Him   for  its  Continuance ; 
fo  long  as  'tis  confelTed,  that  in  Him  we 
live,  and  move,  fo  long  there  can  be  no 
Fear  of  fliutting  out  a  G  o  d,  from  our 
taking  in  free  Agents.     And  I  am  per- 
fuaded  Mr.  BajU  ^  would  have  fccn  no 
Danger  to  Religion  from  free  Agency 
'f  this  had  not     threatned  his  darling 
5_^ ^  Notion 

!  B.7/f's  Diftionary,  Voce  Splnofa, 


193 


194-  Sermon  VIL 

Notion  of  a  Principle  of  Evil ;  for  he 
could  eafily  fee  that  all  his  Arguments 
drawn  from  the  Moral  Evil  that  ap- 
pears in  the  World,  muft  lofe  much  of 
their  Force,  if  once  Free  Agents  were 
allowed  of;  becaufe  then  God  might 
be  the  Original  Caufe  of  Motion,  and 
yet  not  the  Caufe  of  Moral  Evil,  of  the 
wicked  Ads  committed  by  Men,  or 
of  the  blafphemous  Words  they  fome- 
times  utter.      But, 

2^/;,  As  to  the  other  Reafon,  That 
granting  fome  Degree  of  this  Power 
might  be  communicated,  that  yet  Man 
would  be  a  SubjeQ:  incapable  of  re- 
ceiving any  fuch  Power ;  'tis  confeiTed, 
that  God  cannot  give  any  Powers  or 
.  QuaUties  to  a  Being  that  are  inconfillent 
with  that  Nature  which  He  has  already 
given  it,  and  that  fuch  a  Being  would 
be  incapable  of  receiving  them;  that 
Axiom  in  Phdojophj  being  very  true, 
Quicqmd  recifitur^  Ad  modum  Reciphntis 
rectpuur ;  therefore  that  God  could  not 
give  to  Matter  a  Power  of  moving  it- 
ielf,  becaufe  Matter  is  naturally  and 
cflbntially  Inadtive;  aad  confequently  the 

com- 


Serm  on  viK  195 

communicating  fuch  ^d'^  Power  to  it, 
would  be  deftroying  its  Nature,  and 
making  it  ceafe  to  be  what  it  is.  And 
if  Man  was  altogether  a  Material  Being, 
the  Argument  might  be  a  juft  one ;  but 
as  we  have  already  fhewn,  That  the 
Author  of  Motion  cannot  be  a  Mate- 
rial Being,  the  Athetjl  will  never  be  able 
to  prove,  that  there  cannot  exifl:  other 
Beings  befides  him  that  are  not  Mate- 
rial, and  which  may  therefore  be  ca* 
pable,  tho'  Matter  be  not,  of  receiving, 
from  G  o  D  a  Power  of  moving  them^ 
felves,  or  of  beginning  Motion. 

The  Jfheift  wiW  perhaps  fay,  That 
if  the  Immateriality  of  an  Infinite  Be- 
ing be  conceiveable,  yet  not  the  Im- 
materiality of  a  Finite  or  Limited  one ; 
becaufe  'tis  not  eafy  to  fee  what  an  Im- 
material Being  fhould  be  limited  or 
confined  by,  nor  what  fhould  give  it 
any  particular  Locality,  or  ieparate  orie 
Immaterial  Being  from  another;  that 
if  we  fuppofe  them  to  be  diftinguifhed 
from  one  another  by  the  different  Sy- 
ftems  of  Matter  that  they  animate ;  we 
ihall  be  forced  to  fuppofe  fomething  ve- 
O  2  ry 


1^6  Sermon    VII- 

ry  unintelligible,  becaufe  Matter  is  per- 
fectly heterogeneous  to  Immaterial  Be- 
ing :  And  whatever  is  fuch,  can  have 
no  kind  of  Relation  to  it,  and  there- 
fore not  that  of  terminating  its  EfTence, 
and  by  necefTary  Confequence  we  mull 
be  miftaken  in  accounting  for  human 
Adlions  by  an  Immaterial  Principle, 
and  then  'tis  already  granted,  that  God 
mufl:  be  the  fole  Caufe  of  all  a  Man's 
Actions,  and  therefore  of  his  wicked 
ones  too. 

To  avoid  the  Force  of  this  Argu* 
ment,  fome  have  fallen  into  a  Notion  of 
an  Anima,  MunU  that  informed  the  Bo- 
dies of  all  Animals,  and  confequently, 
that  all  that  which  wc  call  particular 
Souls,  was  really  one  and  the  fame 
Soul;  that  the  Difference  in  different 
Individuals,  was  not  a  real,  but  only  a 
feeming  Difference ;  that  it  was  every 
where  the  fame  numerical  Soul  that 
animated  the  feveral  particular  Syftcms 
of  Matter,  all  the  different  Bodies  of 
Individuals.  But  this  was  getting  clear 
of  one  Difficulty  at  the  expence  of  a 
much  greater  one.     For  if  we  have  any 

clear 


SeRxMon   VII?  197 

c:Iear  Ideas,  they  are  certainly  thofe 
which  concern  Identity.  And  yet  no- 
thing can  be  more  evident  than  this, 
That  whatever  it  is  that  thinl^s  in  fe- 
veral  Individuals,  it  cannot  be  one  and 
the  fame  in  all  of  them,  becaufe  th^t 
which  thinks  in  each  Individual,  thinks 
only  for  itfelf,  and  knows  nothing  of 
what  palfes  in  another,  and  therefore 
cannot  be  the  fame  in  both  of  them, 
no  more  than  in  two  Atoms  of  Mat- 
ter, one  of  them  can  be  the  fame  witfj 
the  other.  For  Confcioufnefs  will  be 
as  neceHary  to  the  Identity  of  a  Thinkr 
ing  Being,  as  the  fame  Particles  of  Mat- 
ter can  be  to  conftitute  the  fame  Ma- 
rerial  Being. 

B  u  T  in  anfwer  to  the  Difficulties  of 
fuppofing  Souls  to  be  immaterial,  and 
yet  feparate  or  diftinO:  Portions  of  Im- 
materiality, it  would  be.  fuificient  to 
fay,  that  Immaterial  Beings  may  be 
feparated  from  each  other,  tho'  we  could 
not  conceive  what  it  was  that  fnouki 
bound  or  feparate  them  ;  becaufe  the 
narrow  Faculties  of  our  Minds  cannot 
be  fuppofed  to    take    m    all    poilibk 

:.  O   I  ModC| 


ipS  We  r  m  o  n  VII. 

Modes  of  Being.    This  I  fay  would  be 
a  fufficient  Anfwer   to   this  Difficulty; 
for  a  Difficulty  that  owes  all  its  Strength 
to  our  Weaknefs,  can  never  be  a  good 
Argument.     If   it    could  be  one,  then 
the  Difficulty  of  conceiving  the  Action 
of   Immaterial    upon    Material,  would 
fufficiently     prove    that    there    neither 
was  nor  could  be  any  fuch  Thing,  and 
yet   we  have  already  (hewn  it  muft  be 
true    with  regard   to    One  Immaterial 
Being,  'viz'.  G  o  d  5  and  no  one  will 
pretend  to  fay,  that  there  is  any  more 
Difficulty  in  conceiving  the  Limitation 
of  Immaterial  Beings,  than  there  is  in 
conceiving    this  very  A6lion  of  Imma- 
teriil  upon  Material.  The  hmited  Nature 
therefore  of  an  human  Soul  ought   no 
more  to  be  urged  as  a  Proof  of  its  being 
Material,  than  its  a£ling  upon  an  hu« 
man  Body  be  brougiit  as  an  Argument 
to  prove  it  a  Body  too.    Since  then  the 
Sc>ul  may   be  immaterial,  confequcntly 
God   may    have     communicated  to  it 
a  Pov/cr  of  Seh- morion :  and  then  Man 
and  n'jt  God,  will  be  the  immediate 
Caufe  of  all   the  evil  Adions  that  are 

com-- 


Sermon  VII.  ipp 

committed  by  him,  and  none  of  thofe 
ill  Confequences  will  attend  the  Sup- 
pofition  of  God's  being  the  Original 
Author  of  Motion,  which  W^^^feemed 
to  be  afraid  of.  And  then  too  he  might 
have  exchanged  his  fingular  Opinioa 
concerning  the  effential  AOiivitY  of  Mat- 
ter, for  the  Religious  one  wliich  n^akcs 
God  the  Caufe  of  its  Motion. 

I  H  A  V  E  infifted  the  longer  upon  this 
Point  of  Motion,  becaufe  if  I  have  well 
proved,  That  there  is    no  introducing 
Motion  into  the  World  without  admit- 
ting a  Being  diftinO;  from  Matter,  the 
Atheift  muft  then  be   contented  to  give 
over    all  Speculations   concerning   the 
Nature   of  the    Univerfe,    and   of  the 
Caufes  of  that  Variety  we  fee  in  it  j  for 
no  body  will  mind  fuch    an    Empirick 
in  PhHofophy^    as  pretends  to  furnifh  us 
with  a  World,    when    he    knows   not 
where  to  look  for  a  Being  that  would 
be  able   to  move  the  Materials  out  of 
which   he  is  to  raife  the  Fabrick  of  it. 
For  this  is  plainly  to  introduce  an  Efied 
without  being  able  to  afTign  a  Caufe  of 
thatEffed.. 

O  4  F  K  O  M 


200  S  E  R  MO  N     Vll- 

From  the  Poflibility of  God's  com- 
municating  to  fome  Beings,  as  Men,  a 
Power  of  beginning  Motion,    I  cannot 
but    obferve    the   Hazard    which  the  j 
Jtheijl  runs,  i^  he  fhould  be  mxftaken^' 
in  his  Clock-work  Scheme,  and  he  and 
the  reft  of  his  Fellow-Creatures  lliould 
prove  to  be  fomething  more  than  mere 
Mechanifm  ;  becaufe  if  he  had  a  Power, 
of  direding  any   of  his  Adions  with 
Freedom,  he  mjght  be  accountable  for 
his   Behaviour  in  fuch  Adiorfs,  if  there ; 
was  any  Being  that    could    and  would 
take   account  of  them.    Tliis  Propofi- 
^ion  carries  with  it  fo  much  Evidence,'> 
that  I  beheve  the  Atkeiji  will  not  yen-." 
ture  to  difpute  it. 

I  HAVE  already  fhewn,  That  there 
muft  he   a  Principle  oi  Motion  diftind 
from  Matter ;  that  fome    Appearances 
m .  Nature  prove  to  a  Dernonftration^; 
that  this  Principle  of  Motion  does  not* 
acl  as   an  Anma,  Muniii-,  but  with  the 
utmoft   Freedom ;   and   therefore   may ' 
take  Account    of  the  Athetfih   Eeliavi* 
pur,  if  by  Freedom  of  ailing  he  is  qua-^i 
lified  to  give  fuch    Account.      It  vyilf 

there- 


Sermon  VII.  201 

therefore  very  much  concern  him  to 
be  well  affured,  notwithftanding  we 
have  fhewn,  That  there  are,  and  muft 
be  Caufes  that  ad  not  by  any  Laws  of 
Meclianifm,  that  yet  Man  does;  and 
yet  if  there  are  other  th^n  Mechanical 
Caufes  upon  our  Earth,  the  Jtheiji  can- 
not deny  that  Man  may  put  in  as  fair 
as  any  Thing  whatever  for  being  one 
of  them ;  and  therefore  he  may  do  well 
to  confider  which  way  he  can  poflibly 
fatisfy  himfelf  that  he  is  not  one  of 
them.  Efpecially  too  when  every  Man 
thinks  he  feels  within  himfelf  in  many 
of  Iiis  Adions  a  Power  of  beginning 
Motion  at  Pleafure,  and  independently 
of  any  external  Mover.      But, 

2dlyy  Jf  the  DiiBculties  a,ttending 
fhe  Religious  Scheme  of  Gqd's  being 
the  Author  of  Motion,  be  fuch  as  may 
f  eafonably  be  accounted  for ;  the  Seep- 
ick  too  may  do  well  to  conlider,  whe* 
ther  his  mere  doubting  what  is  true 
or  falfe  on  account  of  thofe  Difficulties, 
will  be  a  fuificient  Juftification  of  hin^ 
for  not  embracing  Rehgion.  Whether 
he  ought  not  rather   to  enter    into  a 

carq- 


202  Sermon   VII. 

careful  Review  of  thofe  ObjeQ:ions,  for 
Fear  his  Inclination  to  doubt  of  every 
Thing  might  have  tempted  him  to  tak« 
for  DiiBculties  thofe  which  are  not 
really  fuch.  The  Lazy  Part  of  Man- 
kind, who  have  fome  Wit  and  lefs 
Learning,  defpairing  to  gain  any  Credit 
hy  forming  Schemes  that  would  give 
fome  tolerable  Account  of  Things,  have 
in  all  Ages  chofe  the  much  eafier  Task 
of  puzzling,  than  of  clearing  up  any 
Thing.  They  do  not  pretend  to  tell 
you,  as  the  Atheifi  does,  how  the  Mat- 
ter of  the  Univerfe  may  be  ftirred  with- 
out the  AfTiftance  of  a  God  ;  but  on- 
ly, "  That  there  are  fo  many  Difii- 
"  culties  in  accounting  for  Motion  ei- 
*^  ther  with  or  without  a  God,  that 
*'  they  cannot  fee  which  Side  of  the 
*'  Qaeftion  preponderates;  and  there- 
"  fore  hope  they  may  be  juftified  in 
^'  Doubting  where  the  Truth  lies." 
Tho'  I  fhould  think  that  rejeding  Re- 
ligion when  a  Man  pretends  not  to  fee 
any  thing  elfe  to  be  true,  fhould  be 
more  Criminal,  than  rejeQ:ing  Religioa 
becaufe  a  Maa  fees,  or  thinks   he  fees 

fome 


Sermon  VII. 

fome  other  Thing  to  be  the  Truth, 
and  confequently,  the  Sceptick  will  not 
run  lefs  Hazard  than  the  Atheifi^  if  his 
doubting  concerning  Religion,  as  well  as 
the  other's  pofitive  Denial  of  it,  ihould 
at  laft  prove  to  be  ill-grounded.  Perhaps 
the  Security  which  both  of  them  might 
promife  themfelves,  fuppofing  them  to 
be  miftaken  m  denying  or  doubting  the 
Exiftence  of  a  Firft  Mover  diftind  from 
Matter,  would  be  this :  That  altho' 
there  fhould  exift  fuch  an  Original  Caufe 
of  Motion,  yet  it  might  not  be  an  In- 
telligent Being,  and  therefore  they  fhould 
be  fafe,  as  it  could  take  no  Cognizance 
of  what  they  were  doing  here.  But  I 
believe  it  would  be  hard  enough  for  any 
Man  to  conceive  Freedom  without  Intel- 
ligence. 'Tis  poflible  indeed  to  conceive 
an  Intelligent  Being  without  Freedom 
of  A(9:ion ;  but  there  is  no  conceiving 
how  a  Being  fhould  ad  freely  without 
knowing  what  it  does,  and  why  it  does 
any  Thing;  but  the  Intelligence  of  the 
Supreme  Be  in  g  will  be  made  evident, 
when  we  come  to  fiaew,  that  Matter 
cannot  be  the  Subjed  of  Intelligence. 

S  E  R  M. 


203 


3 


// 

.'li 


20 


5 


SERMON  VIII. 

Acts   XVII.  28. 

For  in  Him  we  live^  and 
movCy  and  have  our  Be- 
ing. 


AVING  already  fhewrt, 
That  there  is  no  intro- 
ducing Motion  into  the 
World  without  the  Help 
of  a  Being  diftinQ:  from 
Matter,  it  would  be  plain 
enough  that  without  fuch  a  Being,  no 
fuch  Thing  as  Thought  or  Intelligence 
could  ever  have  had  an  Exiftence  in  the 
World.  For  if  Motion  be  necefTary  for 
the  making  Matter  an  Intelligent  Being, 

as 


2o6         Sermon   VIII. 

as  it  muft  be  i£  Spinofas  or  Hohbs\  No- 
tion of  Perception,  which  places  it  m 
the  Adion  and  Re-afbion  of  Bodies 
upon  one  another,  were  the  Truth,  then 
Intelligence  could  not  be  an  elTential 
Attribute  of  Matter,  unlefs  Motion  was 
fo  too ;  and  therefore  muft  have  fome 
external  Caufe  of  its  Being  :  This,  I 
fay,  would  be  fufficient  to  fhew,  That 
Spinofa*s  Notion  concerning  the  Exiftence 
of  Intelligence,  is  altogether  unphilofo- 
phical ;  becaufe  in  fuch  Cafe,  Cogita- 
tion would  be  made  to  arife  from  no- 
thing, unlefs  he  could  believe  this  great 
Abfurdity,  viz.  That  Thought  andEx- 
tenfion  were  the  fame  Thing,  or  that 
Extenfion  whether  in  Motion  or  at  Reft 
was  endued  with  aftual  Perception : 
Altho'  if  we  can  judge  at  all  of  the 
Nature  of  Intelligence  from  our  own 
Perceptions ,  we  muft  obferve  the 
Action  of  external  Obje^ls  to  be  ne- 
pellary  to  our  having  any  actual  Per* 
cep:ion  of  what  palfes  without  us. 
Tolmd  was  fo  fenfible  of  the  Force  of 
this  Reafoning,  that  m  his  Difcourfe 
coucetiUac^  Motion,  he  gives  up  Spwofii 

as 


Sermon  vill.        207 

as  a  Perfon,  that  upon  this  Account  Is 
not  %o  be  defended.  "  The  Spn*oftp^ 
fays  he,  "  have  afforded  Matter  of  Tri- 
"  umph-to  the  Spirttudtjts^  (for  fuch  he 
calls  the  Believers  of  a  Go  d)  "  by  ac* 
"  knowledging  the  Inadivity  of  Mat*' 
"  ter ;  for  m  this  they  were  fo  unphilo- 
"  fophical  as  to  aflign  an  Effect  with- 
^*  out  aay  Caufe  of  it ;  as  in  the  Cafe 
"  of  Cogitation,  when  they  made  it 
^'  to  belong  to  all  Matter,  and  yet  al- 
"  lowed  Matter  to  be  naturally  with- 
*^  out  Motion  or  inadive  ^.  "  And 
yet  as  unphilofophical  as  it  is  to 
make  Thought  arife  from  ftill  or  in- 
adive  Matter,  it  will  prefently  appear 
that  thofe  have  not  much  the  Advan- 
tage, who  are  forced  to  pump  Senfe 
and  Intelligence  out  of  fenfekfs  and 
unintelligent,  tho'.  adive  Matter.  Yet 
ToUnd  mull:  do  this,  or  elfe  with  us 
confefs,  That  there  is  fome  Eternal, 
Intelligent  Being  that  is  the  Caufe 
of  all  the  Intelligence  which  is  feen  in 
Mankind. 

For 
*-"■  . - 

*  S««  hi§  Leuer  concerning  Motion. 


2oB  Sermon   VIII. 

For  there  are  but  three  poffible 
Ways  of  accounting  for  the  Exigence 
of  Thought  or   Intelligence  : 

i/,  E I T  H  E  R  by  fuppofing  it  an 
eflential  Attribute  of  Matter,  as  much 
fo  as  Extenfion  or  Solidity ;  which  is 
the  Way  S^inofA  and  Mr.  Hobbs  liave 
taken.      Or, 

2dlj^  In  fuppofing  that  'tis  not  ef- 
fential  to  Matter,  but  is  an  EffeQ:  of 
tht  Motion  of  Objects  on  fome  parti- 
cular Arrangement  of  the  Parts  of 
Matter ;  fuch  as  is  feen  in  the  Bodies 
of  Animals.      Or, 

idlj.  That  there  is  in  all  Intelli* 
gent  Beings  a  Principle  diftind  from 
Matter,  and  of  a  different  Nature,  from 
whence  Thought  or  Intelligence  does 
arife;  which  is  the  Opinion  of  the 
Religious  Man.  Mr.  Lock^  indeed,  fup- 
pofes  a  fourth  Way  of  accounting  for 
Intelligence  :  "  That  tho'  Matter  was 
"  a  thoughtlefs  and  fenfelefs  Being,  and 
"  no  Difpofition  of  the  Parts  of  it,  how 
*^  curioufly  foever  they  might  be  put 
"  together,  would  ever  naturally  rife 
**  up  into  Thought  and  Underllanding, 

"  and 


Sermon  VIII.  209 

"  and  tho'  there  was  no    Principle   of 
*'  Thought  in.  Man  diftind  from  Mat- 
*'  ter;   that   yet  God  by   his  infinite 
"  Power    might  fuperadd    a  Thinking 
"  Quality    to   Body  or  Matter.  "    But 
were  this  poflTible,   it  would    do    the 
Atheift   no  Service,   becaufe  it  fuppofes 
the  Being  of  a  G  o  d  as  neceffary  to  the 
producing  fuch  an  EffeQ:  upon  Matter 
as  that  of  Intelligence ;  or  if  it  could  at 
all  favour   him,    it   muft   then  fall  in 
with  the  fecond  Way  of  accounting  for 
Thought,  viz.  That  fuch  a  Qiiality  as 
Thought  might  foffibly  arife  from  Mat- 
ter difpofed   in  fuch   a  Manner  as  are 
the  Bodies  of  Animals,  there  being  no- 
thing in    the    Nature  of  Matter  that 
fhould  make    it  incapable    of  receiving 
Intelligence,   and    confequently,   if  the 
Bodies  of    Animals    could    be    formed 
without  tlic    Help  of    a    God,  there 
would   be  no  Want  of  Him  in  account- 
ing for  that  Thought  and   Intelligence 
which  belongs  to  thofe  Bodies.  But  this, 
fo  far  as  the  Jtheifi  is  concerned  in  it,  is 
exactly  the  fame  with  the  fecond  Way  of 
^•accounting  for  Intelligence  ;  and  there- 

P  fore 


2IO  Sermon  VIII. 

fore  I  fliall  pafs  it  over  without  any 
farther  Remark. 

And  proceed  to  a  Confideration  of 
the  two  Atheiftick  Accounts  of  Intelli- 
gence, and  ill  Oppofition  to  them  ;  1 
will  fhew,  That  Intelligence  cannot  be 
an  eifential  Attribute  of  Matter,  nor 
an  E&B.  of  any  peculiar  Structure  of  the 
Parts  of  a  fenfelefs  Being,  fuch  as  Matter 
is  fuppofed  to  be  by  the  fecond  Scheme. 

i/,  That  Intelligence  cannot  be 
elTential  to  Matter. 

That  which  gave  Spimfa  the  Har- 
dinefs  of  advancing  the  EiTentiality  of 
Thought  to  Matter  was,  That  he 
thought  he  could  not  be  difproved  ia 
his  Alfertion,  becaufe  we  did  not  fuf- 
ficiently  know  the  Nature  of  Intelli- 
gence to  determine  concerning  the  Sub- 
ject of  Thought ;  or  to  fay  what  Sort 
of  Being  it  mull  be  that  is  capable  of 
having  fuch  a  Quality ;  and  therefore 
Matter  might  be  the  Subje£l:  of  it,  for 
any  thing  we  could  fay  to  the  contra- 
ry. But  the  Aniwer  to  this  is  plain; 
Tho'  I  do  not  know  all  I  could  wifli 
concerning  Thought  and  the  Subjedl  of 

it; 


SfeRMON    VIII.  211 

it;  yet  I  may  know  that  Thought  is 
not  Extenfion ;  which  is  enough  for 
t)ur  prefent  Parpofe :  Becaufe  I  fhall 
Jliew,  That  it  muft  be  Extenfion,  if  it 
be  an  efTential  Attribute  of  Matter. 
I  may  be  certain,  I  fay,  that  Thought 
cannot  be  Extenfion ;  becaufe  to  affirrti 
this,  would  be  juft  as  if  \^e  fliould  af- 
firm, that  any  Confequence  of  Extenfi- 
on, fuch  as  a  Triangular  or  Square  Fi- 
gure, and  the  Perception  that  the  Mind 
has  of  fuch  a  Figure,  were  the  farrib 
Thing;  but  the  Ideas  of  the  Trine  Di- 
menfion  and  Thought,  are  fo  evident- 
ly different,  that  the  Things  reprefeiit- 
ed  by  thofe  Ideas  cannot  poffibly  be  the 
fame,  unlefs  all  our  Perceptions  are  mere 
Deceptions;  and  then  'tis  to  no  Piif- 
pofe  to  argue  at  all.  But  'tis  the  5f^^- 
tkky  not  the  Atheijl  that  pretends  to  de- 
fend himfelf  in  this  Way,  whereas  the 
latter  always  brings  Reafons,  fuch  as 
they  are,  in.  Support  of  a  contrary 
Scheme  to  the  Religious  one.  It  mufl: 
then  be  granted  me,  that  Thought  and 
Extenfion  cannot  be  the  fame  Thing, 
and   therefore    we  are  only  to  fhew, 

P  2  That 


212  Sermon  VIII. 

That  Spimfa's  Notion  of  Thought's  be- 
ing eflential  to  Matter,  does  by  necef^ 
iary  Confequence  make  Thought  and 
Extenfion  the  fame  Thing. 

That  there   can  be  no  real  Diffe- 
rence between  them,  may  be  made   e- 
vident  by  this  one  Confideration,  That 
fuppofing  them    really  different,  one  of 
them   mufl    arife    from    Nothing  ;   for 
both  Thought  and  Extenfion  cannot  be 
neceiTarily  exiftent,   if  there   be  a  real 
Difference   between    them,    any   more' 
than   there    can    be    two    Neceffarily- 
exiilent  Beings,  which  Spimfa^    as  welt 
as  we,  denies  :  And  yet  by  this  Scheme 
of  Things,  Thought  cannot  be  a  Mode 
of  Extenfion,  or  derivable  from  it,  but 
muft  be  equally   Self-exiftent  with  Ex- 
tenfion.   Spinofa  indeed  pretends  to  af- 
fert.    That  the  fame  Numerical    Sub- 
ftance  may  have  an  infinite  Number  of 
efTential  Attributes,    and    of   thefe    he 
names   particularly   Thought  and    Ex- 
tenfion,  as  different    Attributes    of  the 
fame  Subftance.    But  if  the  Difference 
he  means,   be   a  real,    and  not  a  no- 
tional, or   at  lead  a  modal  Difference, 

the 


S  E  R  M  O  ]Sr    VIII.  2  I  3 

the  Subftances  or  Subje£ls  of  thofe  dif- 
ferent Attributes  muft  be  different  too, 
otherwife  he  deftroys  the  Foundation 
of  all  our  Reafoning,  which  is  laid  in 
this  Axiom ^  That  thofe  Things  which 
agree  with  a  third,  muft  agree  among 
themfelves :  And  therefore  if  Thought 
and  Extenfion  were  fo  united  together 
as  to  conftitute  the  fame  ElTence  or  Be- 
ing, and  not  different  Beings,  they  muft 
be  the  fame  in  Reality,  and  not  diffe- 
rent from  one  another,  any  more  than 
the  fame  Subftance  can  differ  from  it- 
felf.  For,  if  every  Part  of  Matter  be 
endued  with  Perception,  and  every 
Part  of  it  extended,  unlefs  Extenfion 
^nd  Thought  be  of  the  fame  Nature, 
or  one  of  them  a  Mode  of  the  other, 
it  will  be  impoffible  to  conceive  how 
they  fhould  conftitute  the  fame  Sub- 
ftance or  Being  •  there  being  no  Room 
left  for  a  real  Difference,  when  the 
Whole  and  every  Particle  of  Matter  is 
fuppofed  to  be  both  extended  and  in- 
telligent. 

That  which  led   Sfinofa   into  this 

Miftake  was,  his  confounding  "notional 

V  \  Attributes 


214  Sermon  VIII. 

Attributes  with  real  ones ;  as  appears 
from  what  he  fays  in  one  of  his  Epiftles 
in  thefe  Words :  Quod  autew  addisy  nos  ex 
dejimtione  cujufqae  ret  co^Jiderata  unicam 
t  ant  urn  proPrietcttem  deducere  valere^  locum 
habet  in  rebus  fim^liciffimis  vel  entibus  ra^ 
tionisy  at  non  in  redibus.  Nam  ex  hoc  folo 
quod  Deum  defnio  effe  ens  ad  cuius  Ef- 
Jentiam  prtinet  Exifientia^  plures  ejus  pro- 
prietates  concludo ,  nempe  quod  neceffario 
exijiit^  quod  fit  Unicus^  Inrniutahilis^  Infini" 
tuSy  i^c,  Et  ad  hunc  modum  plura  alia^ 
ExempU  ajferre  pojfem  qua  imprdjentiarum 
omitto  ^.  But  there  is  nothing  plainer 
than  that  thofe  Attributes  of  G  o  d  he 
has  inftanced  in ,  and  which  he  calls 
Properties,  do  no  otherwife  differ  from 
each  other,  than  as  any  other  abftract- 
ed  Notions  of  Mind  do  differ  from  one 
another.  For  the  Onenefs  of  God,  his 
Immutabihty  and  Infinity  ,  are  Pro- 
perties neceffarily  flowing  from  a  Ne- 
ceilarily-exiftent  Nature ,  and  cannot 
poiTibly  be  feparated  from  fuch  a  Na- 
ture 


*  vide  Spinofje   Epiftol,  78.   p.  598,  599. 


Sermon  VIII.  215 

ture    without    deftroying    it.     Which 
lliews  them  to   be    only  partial  Cohfi, 
derations,   and  not  really  difTerent  At- 
tributes of  the  Divine  Nature.     Thus 
for  Inftance,    the  Exigence  of  the  Di- 
vine Nature  may  be  confidered  without 
;  Vegard    to  Time  or  Place  ;  but    this  is 
.  plainly  a  partial  Confideration,  becaufe  in- 
finite Time    and  infinite  Place,    are  the 
liecellary  Confequences  of    fuch  an  Exi- 
gence,  and  therefore  cannot    be    really 
feparated  from  it.  Thus  then  it  appears 
by  thefe  Inftances   which   Spiaofa     has 
brought    for  the  Support  of  his   Opi- 
nion, that   he   did    not  diftinguifli   be- 
tween   real    and    notional     Attributes. 
And  therefore  that  he  has  not  proved 
it  poflible  for  Thought  and  Extenfioa 
to  be  Attributes  of  the  fame  Subflance, 
fuppofing  them  really  different. 

But  as  our  prcfent  Unbelievers  feem 
more  inchned  to  depend  upon  the  fe^ 
cond  Account  of  Intelligence,  I  fhall 
proceed  to  conuder  how  the  Jtheifi 
defends  it,  and  what  Arguments  may 
be  brought  for  the  Support  of  it.  All 
the  Arguments  tliat  can  b.e  brought  to. 
P  4  defend 


2i6  Sermon   VIIL 

defend  fucli  a  Suppofition  as  that  whicli 
makes  Thought  to  be  Figure  and  Mo- 
tion^ or  to  arife  from  them,  will  be  re- 
duced to   thefe  :      Either, 

ifiy  That  we  are   ignorant  of  thcs 
Nature  of  Thought  m  rvhat   it  confifls  p^ 
and  therefore   it  may    be  for  all    we' 
know    only   Matter   curioufly   put  to^9. 
gether,    as  in    the  Bodies  of  Animals, 
and  we  know  not  all  the  Effects  that 
may  arife  from  Matter  in  Alotion,  and 
therefore  Thought  may  be  one  of  them ; 
that  the  Difference  between  Thought  and 
Figure  can  be  no  good  Argument  againfb 
it,  becaufe   we    find    certain   Qualities, 
fuch  as  Colours,  Sounds  and  Taftes,   to 
be  produced  by  the  different  Motions 
and    Figures   of  Bodies,   and   therefore 
why  not  the  Thoughts  of   the  Mind, 
which  are    no  more  unlike    to  Figure 
and  Motion  than  thefe  are.      Or,         \ 

Q.dlyy  I T  may  be  faid  that  there 
is  as  much  Difficulty  in  conceiving 
that  Corporeal  Motions  fhould  excite 
different  Ideas  by  a£ting  upon  an  Im- 
material Subftance ,  'viz.  that  certain 
Motions  in  ObjeQ:s  Ihould  be  the  Reafon 

of 


Sermon  VIIL  217 

of  there  being  conftantly  certain  Senfa- 
tions  in  an  Immaterial  Being,  as  that 
Thought  fhould  arife  from  fome  parti- 
cular Situation  of  the  Parts  of  Matter ; 
and  therefore  where  the  Difficulties  are 
equal,  a  Man  may  be  at  Liberty  to 
take  which  Side  of  the  Queftion  he 
pleafes. 

I N  anfwer  to  the  firft  Argument  ^r. 
That  we  are  ignorant  of  the  Nature 
of  Thought,  and  know  not  all  the  Ef- 
fe8:s  that  may  arife  from  Matter  in 
Motion  ;  We  fay,  That  we  may  know 
enough  of  the  Nature  of  Thought,  and 
the  Nature  of  Body  (without  knowing 
every  Thing  belonging  to  either)  which 
may  fatisfy  us,  That  Thought  cannot 
poflibly  arife  from  Matter  or  Body, 
manage  it  as  cunningly  as  you  will. 
What  Tu/lj  has  faid  in  his  TufcuUr/  Quc- 
ftions  in  Anfwer  to  a  like  ObjeOrion, 
will  be  a  juft  Anfwer  to  this.  An  ft 
omnia,  ad  Intelltgendum  non  habeo  quA  hci^ 
here  vellem^  ne  its  quidem  qu£  habeo  mihi  uti 
licehh  ?  Becaufe  we  are  ignorant  of  Ibme 
Things  which  would  much  enlighten 
the  Subjed,  it  does  not  therefore  fure 

follow 


3i8  Sermon  viii. 

follow  that   we  may  not  make  ufe  of 
vliat  we  do  underll:and  concerning  it. 
If  we  do  not  know  what  Thought  or 
Perception  is,  nor  know  all  the  Effeds 
that   may  poflibly.  arife  from    all  the 
polTible  Ways  of  putting  Matter  toge- 
ther; yet  we   may   know  fo  much  of 
the  Nature  of  Thought  and  Figure,  as 
to  fee   that    Thought    is  not  mere  Fi- 
gure, nor  a  mere  Paifion  or  Reception 
of   the  Motion    of  Bodies.    And   then 
who    fhall    hinder    us   from    declaring 
what  we  do  know  of  it,  for  this  Rea- 
ibn  only,    Becaufe    we   do   not    know 
every    Thing   belonging  to    it.    I  lay^ 
We    may  know  that    Thought  is  not 
Figure,     altho'  we     know    not    every 
Thing   belonging  to  Thought  and  Fi- 


gure. 


I  ft  B  E  c  A  u  s  E  in  our  Conceptions 
pf  Things,  according  to  which  we  can- 
not help  Judging,  we  find  a  real  Differ 
rence  between  Thought  and  Figure,  or 
between  local  Motion  and  the  Percep^ 
tion  of  that  Motion ;  and  yet  unlefs 
Thought  be  Figure  and  Motion,  it  will 
be   impoflible    for   any  Man   alive  to 

conceive 


Sermon    VIII.         219 

conceive  that  Thought  fhould  arife  from 
either  or  both  of  them.  If  Extenfion 
or  Matter  was  a  Thinking  Being,  we 
might  then  indeed  conceive  that  irom 
a  more  or  lefs  curious  Arrangement  of 
the  Parts  of  Body,  might  arife  more 
or  lefs  perfed  Ways  of  Thinking  *, 
ftronger  or  fainter  Degrees  of  Percep- 
tion and  Senfation.  But  thefe  Men 
grant  Matter  as  Matter,  to  be  as  ftu- 
pid  and  fenfelefs  as  we  could  wifh  for. 
They  acknowledge,  that  there  is  no 
more  Excellency  in  the  Atoms  that 
compofe  the  Eyes,  Ears  and  Nofe  of 
a  Man,  than  there  is  in  any  other 
Atoms  that  enter  into  the  Compofi- 
tion  of  Bodies  that  are  the  farthefl  re- 
moved from  any  Thing  like  Life  or 
Perception,  and  yet  would  vainly  pre- 
tend from  a  good  Management  of 
thofe  Atoms  to  derive  Thought  and 
Senfation.  But  let  them  prepare  Mat- 
ter as  they  will,  fo  long  as  they  con- 
ftfs  it  to  be  without  Thought,  they 
muft  have  good  Luck  if  they  make 
any  Body  believe,  that  a  fingle  Thought  . 
can  ever  be   drawn  out  of  her,    Mr. 


220  Sermon   VIII. 

Bajile  confelTes,  "  That  all  thofe  who 
*'  deny  the  Di{]:inQ:ion  between  Soul 
^'  and  Body,  talk  childilhly,  unlefs  they 
^*  fuppofe  the  whole  World  to  be  ani- 
^^  mated  or  endued  with  Underftand- 
"  ing. "  And  therefore  in  his  Opinion, 
there  is  no  conceiving  the  Exiftence  of 
Tliinking  Beings,  fuppofing  the  Soul  to 
be  material,  unlefs  we  believe  all  Mat- 
ter to  be  furnifhed  with  Thinking.  And 
both  Spinofa  and  Hobhs^  who  could  nei- 
ther ot  them  endure  the  Belief  of  Im- 
material Beings,  were  plainly  forced  to 
take  Shelter  in  fuch  a  monftrous  Doftrine 
as  the  efTential  Intelligence  of  Matter,  be- 
caufe  they  faw  there  was  no  conceiving 
how  the  bare  Movement  of  the  Parts 
of  Matter  fhould  ever  produce  Thought, 
if  there  was  originally  no  fuch  Thing 
as  Thought  in  Matter.  For  he  that 
fays  he  can  fuppofe  the  meer  Difpofi- 
tion  of  the  Organs  of  an  human  Bo- 
dy fhall  make  a  Subftance  to  become 
thoughtful  that  had  never  Thoughj; 
te.ore,  fays  what  is  impoflible  for  hira;. 
or  any  Man  alive  to  conceive.  For 
then  he  mull:  make  the  Difpofition   gf 

the 


Sermon  viii.        22r 

the  Organs  of  an  human   Body  to  be 
Thought,   altho'  every  Body   elfe   fees 
it  can  amount    to    nothing  more   than 
local    Motion  differently  modified    ac- 
cording to   the  Structure   of  thofe  Or- 
gans, as  the  Movements  in  a  Clock  or 
Watch   are  regulated  by    the  Difpofi- 
tion  of  its  Wheels.     But  no    Body  has 
ever  ventured  to  affirm,  That  he  could 
clearly   conceive  local  Motion  alone  to 
be  fufficient   to  make  a  Subftance  de- 
void of  all  Thought  and  every  Senti- 
ment, to  pafs  into  adlual  Thought,   or 
that  any  Subftance  could  poiTibly  pafs 
from     a    Privation    of    all   Thought 
to  adual  Thought,    merely   by   being 
moved.    Becaufe  this  would  be  to  fay, 
That  a  Change  of  the  Situation  of  the 
Parts  of  Matter,  was  a  Senfe  of  Plea- 
furc  and  Pain,  an  Idea  of  Moral  Virtue, 
of  Truth  or  Falfhood,  an  Affirming  or 
Denying  a  Propofition,  tho'  at  the  fame 
time  we  are  fure  we   know   fully  the 
Nature  and  EITence  of  Change  of  Situa- 
tion, without  conceiving  any   thing  of 
Senfe  or  Perception  as  belonging  to  it. 
And  therefore  if  an  evident  Difference 

in 


^22  Sermon  VIii. 

in  our  Ideas  will  prove  any  Difference 
in  the  Things  themfelves  of  which  they 
are  the  Ideas,  Thought  cannot  be  Mo- 
tion or  Figure,  nor  Motion  or  Figure 
be  Thought. 

Aristotle,  after  he  had  as  he 
thought  fufficiently  provided  by  the 
Help  of  his  Four  Elements  for  all  the 
Variety  that  appears  in  the  Corporeal 
World,  when  he  came  to  Thought,  he 
prefently  faw  that  his  Elements  would 
never  help  him  out,  becaufe  mix  them 
together  in.  any  Proportions  he  would, 
he  iaw  no  Likelihood  of  getting  a  fingle 
Thought  out  of  them.  And  therefore, 
as  Tully  tells  us,  he  faw  himfelf  under  a 
NecefTity  of  fupplying  the  Deted  of  his 
Four  Elements  by  adding  a  fifth  to 
them,  out  of  which  he  might  extrad 
all  the  Faculties  of  the  Soul.  Arijioteles 
cum  qtiatfior  ilia  not  a  gemrit  frincifiorui^t 
ejfet  complexus  e  quibus  ommx  orireni'ur^ 
QuintAm  quandam  Naturam  cenfet  ejf&^  c 
qua  fit  mens.  Cogitare  cnim  i3'  povide^e 
&  difcere,  &  docere,  &  invenirc  alt  quid , 
i^  tarn  muUa  alia  memmjfey  a-mare^  odif-^ 
fe  ;  cuverej  timere  •    tf^gi^  Ixuri,    H£c  & 

fimili4 


S  E  R  M  O  N    VIII. 

fmlia  eorum  in  horum  quatuor  geHerum 
nullo  inejfe  putat,  TufcuL  Q^xft.  And 
therefore  the  Arijiotelians  as  they  be- 
lieved Beafts  to  be  Thinking  Animals, 
would  not  truft  to  the  mere  Organi- 
zation of  their  Bodies  for  an  Account 
o?  their  Thinking  •  but  contrived  for 
them  a  fubft'antial  Form  entirely  diftinO: 
from  the  Arrangement  of  the  Parts  of 
their  Bodies,  which  fhould  be  the  Caufe 
of  their  Thinking;  for  this  fubftan- 
tial  Form,  according  to  them,  was  nei- 
ther Matter  nor  Body,  nor  compofed 
of  Matter.  The  Carte fians  who  on  the 
contrary  fuppofed  Beafts  to  be  barely 
Material  Beings,  would  not  allow  them 
to  be  Thinking  Beings,  or  to  have  any 
real  Senfe  of  Joy  or  Grief,  Pleafure  or 
Pain  :  So  impoilible  did  it  appear  to 
both  thofe  Seds  of  Plnlofophy  to  refolve 
Thought  into  mere  Organization,  or  to 
make  it  a  Mode  of  Extenfion.  We  may 
by  the  Way  obferve,  that  our  modern 
Atheift  does  actually  aiErm  Cogitation, 
Underftanding  and  Volition,  to  be  no- 
thing but  local  Motion  or  Mechanifm 
in  the  inward  Parts   of  the  Brain  and 

Heart ; 


223 


224  SeRxMON     VIII. 

Heart;  whereas  the  Epicureans  went 
no  farther  than  afTerting  them  to  be 
caufed  by  Motion;  but  Hill  thought 
Motion  and  Cogitation  to  be  different 
Things. 

The  fingular  Notion  which  Des 
Cartes  advanced  concerning  Brutes,  That 
all  their  Aftions,  tho'  fome  of  them 
looked  like  an  Effed  of  Thinking,  were 
yet  nothing  but  the  Movements  of  a 
Macliine ;  and  the  Succefs  this  Opi- 
nion met  with  in  the  World,  did  pro- 
bably give  our  prefent  Athetfi  theHar- 
dinefs  of  affirming,  That  all  Kind  of 
Thought  was  nothing  but  Motion  in  a 
proper  StruQ;ure  of  the  Parts  of  Body. 
And  it  muft  be  confelTcd,  That  if  his 
Notions  concerning  the  Actions  of  Brutes 
were  true,  there  would  be  a  plaufible 
Reafon  for  refolving  all  the  Faculties 
of  an  human  Mind  into  mere  Mecha- 
nifm ;  for  altho'  he  did  not  allow  Brutes 
Xo  be  Thinking  Beings,  yet  fo  long  as 
their  Actions  have  an  Appearance  of 
good  Senfe,  if  fuch  Appearances  may 
be  refolved  into  the  Powers  of  Mecha- 
nifm,  there  would  be  no  great  Diffi- 
culty 


Sermon  VIII.  225 

culty    in.     Accounting   for    the  Opera- 
tions  of  Iiuman  Thought  by  the  Help 
of  a.  more  curious  and  elaborate  Orga- 
nization j   fuch  as    that   of  an    human 
Brain.      For   if    fuch    Appearances    of 
Thought,  as  thofe  in  Brutes,  might  be 
nothing  but  Motion,    why  might  not 
Refledion,  and  fuch  other  A(Els  of  the 
-Mind  by  which  we  are   wont  to  di- 
ftinguifli  ourfelves  from  Brutes,  be  per- 
formed by  Motion  too  ?   But  I  am  per- 
fuaded  the  more  we  confider  this  Mat- 
ter,  the  more  it   will    appear    impof- 
fible  that  Thought  fliould  be  Motion, 
or  even  that  it  fhould  be  drawn  out  of 
any  Conlfruftion  oF  Matter  by  the.  Help 
of  any  Degree  of  Motion  whatfoever, 
unlefs  a  Way  could   be    found    out  for 
furnifhing   Matter    with    the    Gift   of 
Thinking.    For    fo   long  as  Matter  or 
Extenfion  has  not  that  Gift,  the  Jfheijl 
will  be  forced  to  father  upon  it  a  Brat 
that  has  not  any  the  lead  Refemblance 
to  its  Parent,  to  affign  an  Effed  to  a 
Caufe  that  has  no  Kind  of  Relation  to 
ft,     We    fee    an    evident    Dependence 
that  the   Divifibility    of    Matter     has 
(^  upon 


226  Sermon   VIII. 

upon  folid  Extenfion,  we  fee  in  this 
Extenfion  a  Reafon  a  prw  t  of  all  that 
Variety  of  Figures  that  Matter  is  ca- 
pable of  receiving,  and  of  all  the  Me* 
chanical  Quahties  which  depend  upon 
its  Figure.  But  the  Atheift  no  more 
than  we  can  fee  any  Kind  of  Con- 
nexion, or  any  Dependence  of  Thought 
upon  Figure  or  upon  Extenfion  in  any 
Shape  whatever.  And  therefore  here 
is  a  Vhanomenon  in  Nature  for  the  Ex- 
illence  of  which,  upon  the  Foot  of  A- 
thetfm^  no  Reafon  can  Be  given. 

I  c  A  N  fee  no  Way  the  Athei(l  has 
left  for  retaining  his  Opinion  of  Thought 
depending  upon  the  Organization  of  the 
Parts  of  Body,  if  he  muft  acknowledge, 
tliat  there  is  no  Kind  of  Refemblance 
between  Thought  and  Figure;  unlefs  he 
fiiould  fay.  That  in  tliis  he  fuppofes 
nothing  more  inconceivable  than  what 
the  Religious  Man  fuppofes,  when  he 
afcribes  to  G  o  d  Effeds  that  have  no 
Kind  of  Similitude  to  Him  :  And  fuch 
confefTedly  are  all  Material  Eflfefts,  that 
'tis  as  hard  to  conceive  that  Matter 
fliould    be  derived    from  Thought,  as 

that 


Sermon    vill.  227 

that  Thought  fliould  be  wrought  out 
of  Matter.  But  the  Anfwer  to  this 
will  be  eafy;  for  the  ReHgious  Man 
does  not  fuppofe  Material  EffeQ:s  to 
have  flowed  from  God  as  from  an 
emanative  Caufe,  but  to  have  been 
brought  by  Him  into  Being  from  No- 
thing ',  and  therefore  is  not  obliged  to 
look  out  for  any  Refemblance  between 
the  Caufe  and  the  Effefl: ;  whereas  the 
Jtheiji^  rejeding  all  creative  Power, 
mufl  look  out  for  fuch  a  Caufe  of  the 
Exiftence  of  Beings  as  may  have  fome 
Kind  of  Refemblance  with  the  Effects 
depending  upon  it.  Otherwife  he  muft 
introduce  Beings  into  the  World  with- 
out a  fufficient  Reafon  for  their  Ex- 
igence. 

He  will  perhaps  fay,  That  Colours, 
Sounds  and  Taftes,  are  produced  by 
Matter  and  Motion,  and  yet  that  there 
is  as  little  Refemblance  between  thefe 
Qualities  and  the  Figure  of  Bodies,  as 
there  is  between  Thought  and  Figure. 
And  this  would  be  a  juft  Objection,  if 
Matter  and  Motion  did  really  produce 
Colours  and  Sounds ;  but  thefe  are  in. 
0^2  the 


228  Sermon  VIII 

the  Bodies  themfelves  nothing  more 
tlian  different  Degrees  of  Motion  a- 
rifing  from  the  different  Contexture 
of  thofe  Bodies.  Whatever  goes  be- 
yond this,  has  no  real  Exiftence  in  the 
Bodies,  but  is  only  a  Cloathing  which 
the  Mind  puts  upon  thefe  Motions, 
which  Motions  are  nothing  more  than 
an  occafional  Caufe  of  the  Mind's  re- 
ceiving fuch  or  fuch  Ideas. 

Having  now  fhewn  from  the 
Ideas "  Xve  have  of  Matter  and 
Thought,  that  there  is  no  Poflibility 
of  drawing  Thought  out  of  Matter, 
I  will  now  proceed  to  fhew.  That 
the  Unity  and  Simplicity  of  Thought, 
and  the  Continuance  of  one  and  the 
lame  Thinking  Being  for  many  Years 
together,  which  we  mufl  all  of  us  con- 
fels  to  be  true,  can  never  be  reconciled 
either  with  the  Compound  Nature  of 
Matter,  or  with  the  continual  Changes 
to  which  all  Material  Compofitions  are 
fubje£t :  I  fay  therefore, 

2dly^  That  Unity  of  Thought,  by 
which  we  find  all  our  Senfations  united 
m  one  Thinking  Being,  could  never  a- 

-  rife 


Sermon  VIII.  229 

rife  from  any  Compound  Subftance, 
fuch  as  Matter,  and  every  Conftruftion 
of  Matter  is  known  to  be ;  and  therefore 
tlio'  we  did  not  know  all  that  we  could 
\vi[\i.  for  concerning  the  Nature  and 
SubjeQ:  of  Cogitation ;  yet  fo  long  as 
we  may  know  that  a  fingle  Principle, 
fuch  4s  that  of  Thought  is,  cannot  be 
an  Effed  or  Refult  from  the  A61:ion  of 
any  Compound  Being,  we  may  venture 
with  all  our  Ignorance  of  the  Nature 
of  the  Soul  to  affirm ,  That  human 
Thought  was  not  caufed  either  by  Ex- 
tenfion  or  by  the.  Figure  of  an  hu- 
man Body. 

'Tis  evident  that  Man  is  one,  not 
many  Thinking  Beings ;  that  amidft  all 
his  various  Senfations  and  Perceptions, 
there  is  fome  one  fingle  Principle  that 
is  the  Subjed  of  all  of  them  j  'tis  plain 
too,  that  there  is  fomething  in  Man, 
which  thinks  and  contrives  for  the 
Benefit  of  his  whole  Syftem ;  from 
whence  nothing  can  be  more  evident 
than  that  there  muft  be  a  Principle 
of  Individuation,  whatever  it  be,  that 
joyns  certain  Parts   of  the  hunian  jpa- 


30  Sermon    Vlll. 

brick  together,    and  which  thinks  and 
ads  confonantly  for   the  Ufe    and  Pur- 
pofe  of  thofe  Parts :  That  there  muft  be 
Ibmething   ia    our  Compofition  like  to 
what  I  have   already  defcribed,  cannot 
be  deny'd     by   any   Body.    The  only 
Enquiry    that     wants  to    be  made,  is, 
Whether    Matter   in  any  Shape  is  ca- 
pable of  ading  as  a  Principle  of  Indivi- 
duation ?  And  we  are  fure  that  'tis  utter- 
ly incapable  for  any  fuch  Employment ; 
becaufe  which  ever   Atheiftick  Scheme 
we  take,  the  Principle  of  Confcioufnefs 
would  be  a  Compound  Being.     For,  to 
begin    with    SpKoja\    Scheme,    which 
makes  every  Particle  of  Matter  to   be 
Cogitative,  'tis   plain  there  muft  be  as 
many  Thinking  Beings  in  Man  as  there 
are  Particles  in   an  human  Body,  unlefs 
the  Spmcfifi  would  attempt  to  fhew  us 
a  Way  by  which  an  infinite  Number  of 
confcious  Parts  of  Matter  may  be  melt- 
ed do  vn  into  one  confcious  Part.     For 
notwithilanding  the   Union  of  Parts  in 
a  Com]')oand,  the  Parts  ftill  remain  as 
diflferent  irom   each  other  as  ever,  and 
tlierefore    there  mufl   be  good  Reafon 

for 


Sermon  vill.  231 

for  believing  that  the  Thoughts  of 
thofe  Parts  of  Matter  could  be  no 
more  united  than  the  Parts  themfelves. 
And  as  to  the  Government  of  the  hu- 
man Fabrick,  it  would  be  neceffary  for 
the  Spmfijt  to  fhew  how  all  the  Atoms 
of  an  human  Body  were  perfuaded  tq 
chufe  one  Atom,  and  inveft  it  with  a 
Power  of  Ading  for  the  whole,  and 
what  it  is  that  hinders  them  from  re- 
calling their  Grant,  and  a£ling  fepa- 
rately  ?  Till  thefe  Queftions  are  an- 
fwered,  S^tnofa  will  appear  to  have 
built  a  fingle  Thinking  Principle  upon 
a  very  precarious  Foundation.  As  he 
has  never  thought  fit  to  give  us  any 
Satisfaction  in  thefe  Inquiries,  his 
Scheme  mull:  defervedly  pafs  for  a 
groundlefs  and  filly  Account  of  Things 
in  this  Particular. 

The  other  Scheme,  which  would 
derive  Thought  from  fome  particu- 
lar  Organization  of  the  Parts  of  Mat- 
ter, is  liable  to  the  fame  Inconveni- 
ence. For  every  Organization  of  Mat- 
ter, being  a  Compofition  of  Matter,,, 
will  for  that  Reafon  be  unable  to, 
Q,  4  furaift 


232  Sermon  VIII. 

furnllli  us  with  a  finglc  Confcious 
Being.  7"////;  liippofes  them  to  be 
mere  Blockheads  that  h^ve  advanced 
a  Compounded  Being  into  a  Principle 
of  human  Thought.  la  animi  Cogniticne 
dubitare  non  poljumusy  nifi  flane  tn  Phji' 
fuis  flumbei  jumus^  quin  mhil  fit  ammis 
admixtum,  nihil  comretum^  nihil  copula^ 
tum^  nihil  duplex,  Tufcul.  Qu^xfl,  And 
the  Reafon  is  plain ;  becaufe  if  the 
Principle  of  Thinking  was  a  Being 
compounded  of  Parts,  all  thofe  Parts, 
as  I  have  already  obferved,  being  the 
Subjed  of  Thinking,  would  conltitute 
as  many  Confcious  Beings  as  there  are 
Parts  that  conftitute  the  Thinking  Prin- 
ciple. For  the  Union  of  Parts  in  a 
Compound,  is  not  an  Union  clofe  e- 
nough  to  produce  Unity  of  Thought  ; 
this  will  neceilarily  require  the  ftrid- 
eft  of  all  Unions,  viz,,  that  by  which 
Beings  are  united  into  a  Samenefs  or 
Iden  ity.  Any  Unity  Icfs  than  this, 
would  never  make  a  Man  feel  as  he 
does ,  that  all  his  Perceptions  have 
a  Relation  to  one  and  the  lame  Think- 
ing Being. 

That 


Sermon    viil.         233 

That  fucli  an  Union  as  that  of 
Identity,  is  necellary  to  account  for 
Unity  of  Thought,  is  evident  from  this 
Confideration,  That  without  fuch  an 
Unity  in  the  Principle  of  Thinking,  we 
could  never,  for  Inftance,  fee  the  whole 
of  any  ObjeO:  whatfoever ;  becaufe  if  the 
Soul  was  a  Being  compounded  of  many 
Parts,  every  Part  would  only  receive 
a  Part  of  the  Image  of  an  Objed,  and 
no  Part  would  receive  the  Whole,  and 
confequently  a  Man  could  have  no 
Image  of  the  Whole  of  an  Objeft,  un- 
lefs  the  Parts  of  the  Soul  could  com- 
municate ro  each  other  their  Part  of 
the  Image.  But  there  is  no  Ground 
for  fuch  a  Suppofition ;  becaufe  'tis  cer- 
tain, that  when  any  folid  Body  is  put 
into  Motion,  every  Part  of  the  Body 
retains  a  certain  Degree  of  Motion  ia 
Proportion  to  its  Bulk,  without  com- 
municating that  Degree  of  Motion  to 
any  of  the  other  Parts  of  the  fame 
Body.  The  Athdff^  who  owns  the  Re- 
lation between  Thought  and  Motion, 
cannot  except  againft  this  Argument, 
nor  fhew  any  Reafon  why  one  Part  of 

Matter 


234  Sermon^  viii. 

Matter  fhould  communicate  to  an- 
other Part  its  Share  of  Thought,  when 
there  are  no  fuch  Communications  of 
Motion  from  the  Parts  of  Body  to  each 
other.  But  fuppofing  it  polTible  that 
the  whole  Image  of  an  Objtd  might 
be  imprefs'd  upon  every  one  of  thofe 
Parts  that  are  the  Subjed  of  Think- 
ing, there  would  be  this  Inconvenience 
attending  fuch  a  Suppofition ;  that  we 
muft  admit  an  Abfurdity,  and  fome- 
thing  harder  to  conceive  than  the  Do- 
Qrine  of  the  Schoolmen,  which  the 
At  hi  ft  is  wont  to  laugh  at,  'vtz.  That 
the  Soul  or  perceptive  Faculty  would 
be  then  tot  a  in  to  Oy  o*  tor  a  in  [if/gu'/i  par- 
tihus.  For  in  this  Cafe  there  would  be 
a  double  Image  of  every  Objeft ,  for 
every  Atom  that  conftitutes  the  Sub- 
jecl  of  Thinking ,  would  have  the 
whole  Image  of  the  Object,  and  all 
the  Atoms  taken  together,  would  have 
the  fame  whole  Image  too ;  which 
is  plainly  fuperfluous  or  needlefs ,  as 
Well  as  'tis  inconceiveable.  If  the 
Atheifl  looks  upon  this  as  Nonfenfe  m 
a  Schoolman,    when  'tis  applied  to  an 

immaterial 


Sermon  VIII.  235 

Immaterial  Soul,  he  ought  to  give  a 
Reafon  why  it  fhould  not  pafs  for 
fuch  in  him,  when  he  applies  it  to  a 
Material  one.  He  ought  to  fhew,  That 
a  Reprefentation  of  Objeds  twice  over, 
is  impertinent  in  the  one  Cafe,  but  not 
{0  in  the  other ;  that  the  one  is  con- 
ceivable in  a  divifible  Subject,  but  not 
fo  in  an  indivifible  one,  which  an  im- 
material Soul  is  fuppofed  to  be.  When 
he  has  done  this,  we  will  acknowledge 
that  a  Compound  Being,  fuch  as  Mat- 
ter is,  may  be,  for  all  that  we  have 
faid  to  the  contrary,  the  true  Princi- 
ple of  Thought. 

Before  I  leave  the  Atheift^  I  can- 
not but  obferve  his  unfair  Dealing, 
when  he  pretends  the  Difficulty  of 
conceiving  fome  Powers  afcribed  to 
God,  as  a  Reafon  for  his  rejecting  Re- 
ligion, and  yet  at  the  fame  time  fub- 
mitting  quietly  to  the  Drudgery  of 
believing  fome  of  the  moft  incredible 
Things  in  the  World.  This  Particular 
of  Intelligence  will  furnifh  me  with  a 
plain  Inftance  of  it,  if  we  do  but  take 
Notice   of  his  Method  of  extrading  it 

out 


2^6  Sermon  VIII. 

out  of  Matter.     He  defires    only  Mo- 
tion and   a  little  Curiofity  in  the  Com- 
pofition   of  Matter,    and   then   he    has 
gotten    Intelligence,    tho'     he    knows 
Motion,  before  it    came   into    fuch   a 
Compofition  as  that  of  an  human  Body, 
had  no  Senfe  at   all;   He   knows   too, 
that    every   Configuration     of    Matter 
without  Motion   is    as  fenfelefs  as  any 
Thing  that  is  mof?  fo  ;    and  this  Man 
fo  hard   to  beheve  any   thing  of  Reli- 
gion, can  believe  that  a  Compofition  of 
Matter  and  Motion  fhall  be    Thought 
and  good  Senfe,    tho'  feparately    there 
is  not  a  Grain  of    Senfe    in    either    of 
them.     He  can  believe  one  Sort  of  Fi- 
gure to  be  nothing  more  than   a  Ter- 
mination of  Extenfion,  but  another  Fi- 
gure   befides    this    Ihall  be    an  Aft  of 
Senfation,     by   which    it  perceives    its 
own  Exigence,  and  that  of  the  Figures 
that  furround  it ;    that  if  Matter  hap- 
pens to   fall   into   the  Shape  of  Nerves 
and  Bones,  then  Thought   fhall  imme- 
diately  Ikrt  out  of  them ;    but  if  you 
mix  up     Matter  in  any    other  Shape, 
'twill    be  nothing  but  fenfelefs  Matter, 

and 


SeR  mo  NT    VIII.  237 

and  not  a  fingle  Thought  to  be  got 
out  of  her.  He  can  believe  one  Sort 
of  Motion  to  be  nothing  but  bare 
Change  of  Situation,  when  another  Sort 
of  Motion  fhall  be,  befides  this,  an  Ad  of 
Joy  or  Grief,  of  Hope  or  Truft  in  God, 
He  would  be  thought  to  be  more  nice 
and  fcrupulous  in  Examining  into  the 
Bottom  of  every  Queftion  than  other 
People ;  and  'tis  for  this  Reafon  he  can- 
not go  fuch  Lengths  in  believing  as  the 
Religious  Man.  And  yet  this  very  Cau- 
tious Perfon  can  eafily  fee  that  a  Be- 
ing made  up  of  infinite  Parts,  may  be 
the  Caufe  of  the  moft  fimplc  Thing  in 
Nature,  viz.  Perfonality  ;  That  the 
Union  of  the  Parts  of  Matter,  is  the 
fame  Sort  of  Union  as  that  by  which 
all  our  Senfations  are  united  into  one 
Thinking  Perfon.  He  can  beheve  as  we 
have  juft  now  feen,  that  a  Material,  Di- 
vifible  Soul  may  be  tot  a  in  toto,  &  tot/t 
in  ftnguUs  pan^^us ;  and  yet  can  fee  no- 
thing but  unintelligible  Jargon  in  it,  if  . 
a  Schoolman  oflers  to  apply  it  to  a 
Soul  that  is  not  Material  or  Divifible  . 
into  Parts.    But  I  am  perfuaded  thefe 

will 


238  Sermon   vill. 

will  appear  to  be  Articles  of  Belief  of 
fo  hard  a  Digeftion,  that  the  Jtheiji 
muft  not  pretend  to  defend  his  Infi- 
delity by  objeding  Difficulties  m  Re- 
ligious Belief. 

Now  to  the  KJng  Eternal^  Immortal^ 
Inviftble^  the  Onely  Wife  G  O  d,  he 
all  Honour  dnd  Glory  for  ever  and 
ever.    Amen.     . 


SERM. 


2  39 


SERMON  IX. 


Acts  XVII.  28. 

For  in  Him  we  livCy  and 
move  J  and  have  our  Be- 
ing. 

N  the  precedent  Difcourfc 
I  have  fhewed,  That  the 
Unity  of  Thought  by  which 
all  our  Senfations  are  uni- 
ted into  one  Thinking  Be- 
ing, and  by  which  we  are  conicious 
to  ourfelves  that  we  are  not  many, 
but  one  Thinking  Being,  could  never 
be  reconciled  with  the  Compound  and 

DiviTibie 


24.0  Sermon    ix. 

Divifible  Nature  of  Matter ;  and  there- 
fore not  with  any  Conftrudion  of  Mat- 
ter whatfoever. 

I  COME  now  to  ofler  another  Ar- 
gument, why  Thought  cannot  be  an 
Effect  of  any  Compofition  of  Matter. 
Becaufe  we  fee  the  Confcioufnefs  of 
being  the  fame  Thinking  Being,  not 
only  continued  with  all  the  particular 
Scnfations  of  the  Body,  but  even  car- 
ried thro'  all  the  Changes  of  Figure  or 
Organization,  that  muft  happen  to  the 
Body,  in  the  different  Stages  of  a  Man's 
Life.  The  Man  fliall  be  confcious  to 
himfelf  that  he  is  the  fame  Thinking 
Being,  for  Inftance,  at  this  prefent, 
that  he  was  Forty  Years  ago  ;  or  as 
far  as  his  Memory  will  carry  him  back- 
wards to  any  diftant  Part  of  his  Life 
already  pafs'd.  Thofe  who  place  Think- 
ing in  every  Particle  of  Matter,cannot  tell 
how  'tis  poffible  to  continue  the  fame 
Thinking  Being  for  even  Twenty  Years 
together,  in  which  Time  and  much  Ms^ 
any  Amtowifi  can  tell  us  there  will  be 
a  Sett  of  Atoms  wholly  new,  and  not 
one  of  the  old  ones  left  j  and  yet  the 

Man 


Sermon    IX.  24.1 

Man  is  fully  perfuaded  that  he  is  ftlll 
the  JAme  Thinking  Being  he  was,  and 
not  mother;  a6ts  accordingly,  blames  or 
commends  himielf  for  what  he  did 
fome  Years  ago,  as  much  as  he  does 
for  his  prefent  A£lions.  The  Athtijt  of 
this  Kind  will  be  obliged  to  fliew  how 
the  iame  Confcioufnefs  can  be  preferved 
in  a  total  Change  of  the  Subjed  of 
Thinking,  when  that  is  wholly  fpent, 
and  not  one  Particle  of  it  left.  Any 
one.  but  himfelf  would  from  hence 
conclude,  that  the  Subjed  of  Thought 
muft  be  fome  Permanent  Being  ,  and 
therefore  not  Matter  or  Body,  which 
are  always  changing  and  ihifting  the 
Scene. 

I F  it  be  faid,  That  Confcioufnefs  of 
being  the  fame  Perfon,  depends  upon 
our  Memory,  aud  that  our  Memory 
may  deceive  us,  that  we  may  imagine 
that  we  have  thought,  and  confider- 
ed  thus  or  thus^  but  we  may  be  mi- 
llaken  ;  we  might  be  confcious  of  that 
as  a  Truth ,  which  was  perhaps  no 
more  than  a  Dream ;  and  we  may  be 
confcious  too  of  that  as  a  pafs'd  Dream, 
.    R  which 


242  Sermon   ix. 

which  was  perhaps  never  fo  much  as 
drearn'd  of.  Suppofing  all  this  to  be 
true,  that  we  are  not  really  the  fame 
Thinking  Being  that  we  were  fome 
Years  ago,  but  only  think  that  we  are 
fuch;  yet  the  Atheifi  would  be  obliged 
to  fhew  fome  probable  Reafon  of  a 
Man's  thinking  himfelf  to  be  the  fame 
Perfon,  when  he  is  not  fuch.  And  this 
I  believe  would  prove  as  great  a  Dif- 
ficulty as  the  other;  for  when  the 
Subjed  of  Thought  is  wholly  chang- 
ed (as  we  fuppofe)  and  a  new  one 
fucceeds,  there  can  be  no  more  Rea- 
fon for  a  Man's  being  confcious  of 
what  was  done  by  his  former  lelf, 
than  there  would  be  for  his  being  con- 
fcious of  what  was  done  by  any  other 
Perfon  in  the  World.  His  prefent 
Self  would  have  no  more  Relation  or 
Acquaintance  with  his  former  one, 
than  it  would  have  with  the  mod 
diftant  Man  upon  Earth,  of  whofe 
Thoughts  he  neither  knows  nor  pre- 
tends   to    know    any  Thing. 

And  as  to  the  fecond  Account  of 
folving  human  Thought  by  the  peculiar 

Organization 


Sermon     ix.  243 

Organization  of  an  human  Body.^  this 
will  as  little  account  for  the  Samenefs 
of  Perfon  in  the  different  Stages  of  Life 
as  the  former ;  for  thofe  who  make 
Thought  to  depend  upon  the  particu- 
lar Arrangement  of  the  Parts,  muft  al- 
low, that  the  Diiference  in  a  Man's 
Opinions,  in  his  IncHnations  and  Paf- 
fions,  will  depend  upon  the  Difference 
of  Organization ;  and  yet  a  Man 
when  he  lias  changed  his  Opinions 
and  Thoughts  of  Things ,  and  has 
quite  different  Inclinations  from  what 
he  had  before,  is  yet  fully  perfuaded  that 
he  is  if  ill  one  and  the  fame  Perfon 
with  him  who  held  thofe  different  Opi- 
nions, with  him  who  had  Inclinations 
different  from  his  prefent  ones.  The 
Obje£ls  that  move  the  Paflions  and  In- 
clinations of  Children,  are  ufually  very 
different  from  the  Obje6ls  tha  tdelight 
-the  fame  Child  when  grown  up  into 
a  Man ;  and  yet  the  Child  and  the 
Man,  for  all  this  Difference,  are  uni- 
ted into  the  felf-fame  Perfon ;  if  we 
fliould  compare  a  Man  of  the  greateft 
natural  Abihties  that  ever  was,  fup- 
R  2  pofe 


244-  S  E  R  M  O  N      IX. 

pofe  C^far  with  himfelf  when  Five 
Years  old  (for  fo  far  backwards  a  Man's 
Memory  may  polTibly  carry  him  into 
the  Childifh  Part  of  his  Life,  and  we 
have  already  feen  that  the  Confcioufnefs 
of  being  the  fame  Perfon,  reaches  as  far 
as  the  Memory  can  acquaint  us  with 
what  was  done  by  ourfelves)  I  fay,  if 
we  fliould  compare  the  Man  Cafar  with 
himfelf  at  Five  Years  of  Age,  there 
would,  be  as  much  Difference  between 
the  Spirit  and  Underftanding,  the  Paf- 
fions  and  Affedions  of  the  Boy  and  the 
Man,  as  there  would  be  between  C^- 
far  the  Man  and  another  Man:  And 
yet  the  Boy  and  the  Man,  with  all  their 
different  Sentiments  are  acknowledged 
to  have  been  the  fame  Perfon.  But 
this  would  be  impolTible,  if  Organiza- 
tion was  the  Subject  of  Perfonality,  be- 
caufe  then  every  Change  in  the  Orga* 
nization,  muft  of  NecefTity  produce  a 
Change  of  Perfon ;  for  I  will  ddy  any 
Man  to  conceive  it  poflible,  that  the 
Subject  of  Perfonality  fliall  be  changed, 
and  yet  the  Perfon  continue  the  fame. 
There  being  no  poffiblc  Reafon  to  be 

given, 


S  E  R  MO  N      IX.  245 

given,  why  Two  Men,  confidered  as 
Perfons,  fhould  be  really  diflcreiit  from 
each  other,  but  becaufe  the  Subje6^  of 
Perfonality  is  not  the  fame  in  both  of 
them :  Which  fhews  to  a  Demonflration 
that  the  Subjed  of  Thought  in  Men, 
muft  be  fomething  that  is  Steddy  and 
Permanent,  not  any  Compofition  of 
Matter  which  is  perpetually  changing. 
According  to  the  Religious  Man's 
Scheme  of  Things,  this  Diverfity  of  Opi- 
nions and  Pradices  in  the  different  Parts 
of  Life,  is  very  conceivable  by  fuppofing 
fome  Alteration  made  in  thofe  Organs 
of  Senfe,  by  the  Means  of  which  the 
Soul  has  Notice  conveyed  to  it  of  what 
pafTes  without  it.  This,  I  fay,  would 
be  eafy  enough  to  conceive,  were  there v 
no  Difficulty  in  conceiving  the  Union  of 
an  Immaterial  Being  with  one  that  is 
Material,  no  Difficulty  in  imagining 
what  thofe  Bands  and  Ligaments  fliould 
be,  that  could  faften  together  a  Pair 
that  are  fo  little  hke  one  another,  that 
there  is  not  any  one  Qiiality  or  Fea- 
ture, any  one  Difpofition,  internal  or 
external,  in  which  they  referable  one 
R  ^  another; 


2^6  Sermon    ix. 

another ;  and  yet  to  find  that  whenever 
Body  is  affected  by  external  Objeds,  that 
Pfyche  conceives  aThought,  as  if  Body  was 
th^Naturd  Parent  of  that  Thought ;  that 
from  the  Motion  or  Agency  of  Matter 
in.    an  human  Body,    Thought    jfhould 
^s  certainly   and   fteddily    arife,    as  if 
Thought  was    the   genuine  Off-fpring 
of  Matter,  and  its  Motion  the  real  and 
entire  Caufe  of  that  EffeO:  :    Thefe  'tis 
acknowledged    are    great   Difficulties  ; 
and  come  now  in  Courfe  to  be  confi- 
dered   with   the  fecond  Argument  by 
which    the    Atheifl   is  wont    to  juftify 
himfelf,  viz,   ^^  That  there  is  as  much 
"  Difficulty  in  conceiving   that  Corpo- 
"  real  Motions    fhould    conftantly   ex- 
"  cite  different  Ideas  by   aQing   upon 
"  an   Immaterial   Subftance,    viz.  that 
"  certain  Motions  in  Objeds  fliould  be 
"  the   Reafon  of  there    being   certain 
"  Senfations  in  an  Immaterial  Being ; 
"  as   that  Thought    lliould  arife    from 
"  fome  particular  Situation  of  the  Parts 
"  of  Matter.  "    And    yet  we    cannot 
allow   this  Difficulty    to    be  a  fuffici- 
ent  Reafon  for  rcjeding  an  Immaterial 

Soul: 


Sermon    ix.  H7 

Soul  •,    becaufe  we  find    by  Experience 
that    there    are    many    Difficulties    in 
Nature,  which  the   Aiheifl  muft   allow 
as    well   as   we.    For    he  muft  grant 
Something   to    be    Infinite,    and    then 
there  muft  be  fome  Effeds  flowing  from 
the  Adion  of  an  Infinite  Power,    that 
will  not  fall  within  the  Cognizance  or 
View  of  a  limited  Underftanding ;  and 
therefore  the  faireft  Way  of  Determin- 
ing, when  there  is  a  Neceffityof  Deter- 
mining one  Way  or  other,  is  to  weigh 
the   Difficulties  on  both  Sides,  and  fee 
which    preponderates,    and    determine 
ourfelves  accordingly.     And  then  1  am 
fure   the   Jtheijt  will  gain   nothing  by 
this   Obje8:ion;   for  if  we  have  fhewn 
it    to     be    impoflible    that     Thought 
fhould  be  Figure  or  Motion,  or  fhoukl 
arife  from  either   feparately,    or  from 
both  together,  or  that  it  fliould  be  an 
elTential  Attribute  of  Matter,  and  that 
there  is  no  other  poflible  Way  of  Ac- 
counting   for  Intelligence,   unlefs   they 
will  admit  an  Immaterial  Soul ;    there 
can  be  no  Reafon  for  fufpending  a  De- 
termination in.  fuch  a  Cafe  oa  account 
R  4  9.( 


248 


Sermon    ix. 

of  any  Difficulties  in  conceiving  the 
Adion  of  Material  upon  Immate- 
rial. 

But  the  S^eptick  will  perhaps  put  the 
Obie8:ion  in  this  manner  ;  "  That  the 
"  Diificulty  of  conceiving  the  Opera- 
*^  tion  of  Material  upon  Immaterial, 
"  muft  be  at  leaft  as  great  as  that  of 
"  conceiving  Thought  to  arife  from 
"  the  A6lion  of  Matter  or  Body ;  be- 
''  caufe  fuppofing  the  lafl:  to  be  incon- 
*'  ceivable,  'tis  no  more  fo  than  the 
"  former,  which  no  Body  pretends  to 
"  underftand  ;  and  if  the  Inconceivable- 
"  nefs  of  it  be  no  Reafon  for  rejeding 
"  the  Action  of  Material  upon  Imma- 
'^  terial,  neither  ought  the  Inconceiv- 
''  ablenefs  of  Thought's  arifing  from 
^^  Matter,  be  a  Reafon  for  our  rejefliing 
"  a  Material  Soul ;  becaufe  Matter  be- 
*'  ing  Infinite,  many  Effecls  may  arife 
"  from  it  that  a  Finite  Being  can- 
"  not  conceive;  and  then.  Why  not 
"  Thought  ?  If  we  think  ourfelves  fure 
^'  that  Thought  is  not  Figure  and 
"  Motion ;  we  may  be  as  fure  that 
^\  Matter  can    have    nothing     to  do 

"  with 


Sermon    ix.  249 

<^  with  what  is  not  Matter.  Confequently 
**  the  Difficulties  being  equal,  the  Scfp^ 
"  tick  will  fay,  there  can  be  no   fuffi- 
^^  cient    Reafon    for   determining    this 
"  Queftion  either  Way.  " 
■In   Anfwer    to     this,    'Tis    granted 
that  we  can    no    more     conceive   the 
Adion   of  Material   upon   Immaterial, 
than  the  producing  Thought  from  Fi- 
gure and  Motion,  that  is,  we  can  con- 
ceive   neither    of  them  ;    fo   far    then 
they  fhall  be  equal.   But  this   is  not  all, 
we  aiGfert  not  only  that  we  cannot  con- 
ceive the  Production  of  Thought  from 
Figure  and  Motion,   but  alfo  that  we 
are    fure   'tis   impoflible   it  fliould  be 
produced  merely  from  Figure  and  Mo- 
tion ;     and  this  we  are    perfuaded   of, 
not  becaufe  fuch  a  Thing  is  out  of  the 
Limits  of  our  Conceptions,  which  the 
Scevtick\    Objection    drawn     from   the 
Infinity  of  Matter  fuppofes ;  but  becaufe 
we  fee  in  fuch  an  Affertion  a  manifeft 
Repugnance   or    ContradiOiion    to  our 
Conceptions,  as  I  have  already  fliewn  *. 

But 


See  Sermon  VIII- 


^6  S  E  R  M  O  N     IX. 

But  I  will  defy  the  Sce^ick  to  fhew~ 
fuch  a  Repugnance  in  the  AQ:ion  of  Ma- 
terial upon  Immaterial ;  for  lince  we  have 
proved  ^,  That  the  Principle  of  Motion 
cannot  be  a  Material  Being,  thence  it 
muft  follow,  that  an  Immaterial  Being 
does,  and  mud  ad  upon  a  Material 
one.  And  if  Immaterial  may  ad  upon 
Material,  I  am  fure  it  can  never  be 
proved  impoflible,  that  Matter  Ihould 
ad  upon  that  which  is  not  Matter, 
For  it  can't  be  denied,  that  we  may  as 
eafily  conceive  Matter  to  ad  upon  that 
which  is  not  Matter,  as  that  what  is  not 
Matter  fliould  ad  upon  Matter:  We  can 
as  eafily  conceive  that  Thought  fhould 
be  a  Confequence  of  the  Motion  of  Body 
upon  an  Immaterial  Soul,  as  that  Mo- 
tion in  Body  fhould  be  a  Confequence 
of  VolttKmy  which  is  the  jt^pfojtd  Adi- 
pn  of  an  Immaterial  Being  upon  a 
Material  one.  This  being  plain,  a  fair 
Examiner  would  conclude ,  tho'  he 
j^oes  not  underftand  how  'tis,  that  the 
Adion  of  Matter    or   Body   upon  the 

Soul 

'   See  Sermon  VI. 


Sermon   IX.  251 

Soul  depended  upon  the  arbitrary  Dif- 
pofition  of  that  God,  who  tho'  Im* 
material  Himfelf,  does  move  Matter*;' 
and  was  therefore  able  to  unite  Ma- 
terial and  Immaterial  in  fuch  a  Man- 
ner, that  the  Motions  of  the  former 
/liould  affect  the  latter;  and  not,  as 
the  Atheift  pretends,  that  fuch  a  Dif- 
ficulty as  this  hinders  him  from  feeing 
that  fome  Simple  Being,  {exempt  from 
thofe  Changes  which  Matter,  and  eve- 
ry Organization  of  Matter  is  fubjed 
to)  is  the  Caufe  of  Perfonality,  or  the 
Samenefs  of  a  Thinking  Being.  We 
have  then  gained  the  Exigence  of  fome- 
thing  in.  Man  that  is  not  Material,  viz. 
an  Immaterial  Soul. 

From  whence  we  may  obferve, 
That  the  Atheifi  is  deprived  of  the 
principal  Advantage  he  propofed  to  him- 
fdf  in  quitting  Religion.  We  are  told 
by  the  Epieuream,  That  the  cliief  Aim 
they  had  in  quitting  Religion,  was  to 
free  themfelves  from  any  Solicitude 
and  anxious  Fears  concerning  a  fijture 
State,  as  appears   by  Ftrgil  and  Lr^cre- 

tms» 


2^2  Sermon    IX- 

tins  *  When  our  modern  Freethinker 
quotes  with  PlealiKe  thefe  or  fuch- 
like  PafTagcs,  we  may  fairly  believe 
him  to  be  fwayed  by  the  fame  Mo- 
tive ;  but  'tis  evident  he  can  never  free 
himfelf  upon  any  rational  Grounds  from 
fuch  Fears.  For  if  the  Principle  of  Think- 
ing cannot  be  a  Being  of  a  Compound 
Nature,  he  ought  to  tell  us,  and  fa- 
tisfy  himfelf  if  he  can,  what  can  alter 
iuch  a  B^ing,  and  make  it  leave  off 
Thinking  as  fopn  as  his  Corporeal  Stru- 
Q:ure  becomes  unfit  for  continuing  any 
longer  the  Vital  Funftions.  We  can 
cafily  conceive  that  the  Union  of  the 
Parts  of  a  Compound  Being,  fuch  as 
an  human  Body,  may  be  broken ;  the 
Parts  dibbaiid  and  take  diilercnt  Routs, 
and  aiterwards  appear  in  another  Form, 

by 


*  Felix  qui  potuit  rcrum  cngnofcere  caufas, 
Atque  metus  omnes   &  inexorabile  fatum 
Subjecit  pedibus,  ftrepitumque  Achcrontis  avari..' 
VirgH.  (ji€on.  Lib.  2.  v.  49O;., 
Et  metus  illefbras  praeceps  Acherontis  agendus 
Fuiidicus,  humanam  qui  turbat  Vitam. 

Liicret.  Lib.  ■\. 


Sermon    ix.        253 

hy  joyning  together  in  a  different  man- 
ner, and  compofing  fome  new  Syftem 
with  different  Qualities :  Becaufe  fuch 
Parts,  notwithftanding  their  Union,  are 
really  different  from  each  other  ,  and 
therefore  will  be  capable  of  exifting 
apart  from  each  other ;  whereas  there 
is  no  conceiving  any  real  Difference 
in  a  fimple  Subftance  :  Therefore  as 
fuch  it  muft  be  incapable  of  putting 
on  another  Form,  or  being  divefted 
of  any  Qualities  that  'tis  naturally  pof- 
fefs'd  of,  and  then  the  Diffolution  of 
the  Parts  of  an  human  Body  will  ne- 
ver infer  a  Total  Ceffation  of  Thought 
in  fuch  a  Being  as   Man. 

If  it  be  faid  that  fince  a  Defeat  in 
certain  Organs  of  the  Body  fhall  caufe 
a  Diforder  and  a  Diffemper  in  our 
Thinking  Faculty,  why  fhould  not  a 
Total  Deftrudion  of  all  the  Organs 
bring  on  the  Death  of  the  Thinking 
Being,  or  a  Total  Ceffation  of  its 
Thinking  ;  or  i[  an  Original  or  Acci- 
dental Fault  in  any  one  of  the  Inftru- 
ments  of  Senfe,  fuch  as  thofe  of  fee- 
ing and  hearing,  Ilaall  make  us  incapa- 
ble 


^zj.  Sermon    IX. 

ble  of  having  any  Thoughts  concern- 
ing Colours  and  Sounds,    or  make  us 
incapable  of  receiving  any  further  No- 
tices concerning  the  vifible  or  audible 
Qualities    of   Bodies ;     therefore    why 
fliould  not  the  entire  Deftrudion  of  all 
the  Organs  of  Senfe  put  a  final  End  to 
all  our  Thoughts :  It  will  be  a  iuffici- 
ent  Anfwer  to   this  Objection,   if  we 
fay  that  the    Dependence    which    the 
Principle  of   Thought    has    upon    the 
Body    in  its   Operations    of    thinking 
while  'tis    united  to  it,  can  never   be 
fo  good   a  Proof  of   its  totally  ceafing 
with  the  Body,     as   the  Simplicity   of 
the  thinking  Principle  will  be  to  prove 
that  it  has  no  feparable  Parts,  by  whofe 
Separation  from  each  other,  the  whole 
might  be  fuppofed    (as    in  Compound 
Beings)  to  exchange  its  thinking  Qua- 
lity   for   another    that   was   not   fucli. 
And    therefore    the    DifTolution    of  a 
Compound  Being,  fuch  as    an  Human 
•  Body,  can  never  give    the  Jtheifi  any 
reafonable    Grounds   for  believing   the 
Extinction  of  a  Simple   Being,  fuch  as 
the  Principle    of    Thought   is   already 

proved 


Sermon    ix.  2$$ 

proved  to  be.  And  as  he  allows  not 
any  Annihilations  of  Beings,  he  will 
never  be  able  to  tell  us  by  what 
Means  the  thinking  Principle  in  Man 
Ibould  lofe  its  Faculty  of  thinking. 
Thus  then  the  Atheift  feems  to  be  en- 
tirely difappointed,  when  he  hopes  by 
throwing  off  Religion  to  get  quit  of 
the  Fears  of  an  After-ftate. 

2.diy^  Granting  the  Spinofift  for 
once  that  the  Confcioufnefs  of  a 
Man's  being  the  fame  Perfon  or  think- 
ing Being  in  all  the  different  Parts  of 
his  Life,  may  be  reconciled  with  the 
Flux  Nature  of  Body,  with  the  conti- 
nual Changes  of  its  Materials;  giving 
him  even  this  I  fay  to  make  the  beft 
he  can  of  it^  I  am  confident  that  up- 
on fecond  Thoughts  he  would  not 
thank  me  for  this  Conceflion :  For  he 
will  then  be  as  little  able  to  fecure 
himfclf  againft  the  Fears  of  Evil  in 
an  after-State  as  he  would  be  by  be- 
lieving a  God;  becaufe  there  will 
be  no  deftroying  Thought  even  m  this 
Cafe  by  deftroying  the  Body.  For 
fuppofing  Thought  to    be    Extenfion, 

then 


2^6  Sermon    IX. 

then  the  Diffolution  of  the  Body  at 
Death  could  by  no  Means  put  an  End 
to  its  thinking ,  any  more  than  it 
could  to  its  Extenfion :  And  notwith- 
ftanding  the  Separation  of  the  Parts 
of  an  human  Body  when  'tis  corrupted, 
yet  all  the  Particles  ftill  continue  to 
be  extended  Subftances,  and  therefore 
thinking  Subftances,  if  Thought  be 
Extenfion ,  and  Extenfion  Thought. 
And  then  fuch  thinking  Subftances, 
may  be  obnoxious  to  as  great  or 
greater  Evils  and  Miferies  in  another 
State  than  they  are  in  this.  For  when 
the  Corporeal  Particles  that  compofe 
our  Atheifi  are  feparated  at  his  Death, 
they  muft  ftill  retain  a  Senfe  of  Plea- 
fure  and  Pain,  or  be  capable  of  re- 
ceiving either,  if  every  Atom  of  Mat- 
ter be  thoughtful ;  and  he  cannot  be 
fo  weak  as  to  think  that  no  other 
Atoms ,  but  thofe  that  form  the 
Thoughts  of  a  Man,  can  be  malici- 
ous, and  do  him  a  Mifchief.  And  then 
there  may  be  many  Thinking  Subftan- 
ces in  the  Air  and  elfewhere,  that  may 
be  as  well  qualified  to  do  him  a  Mif- 
chief 


Sermon    IX.  257 

chief  in  the  future  State,  as  the  Atoms 
that  compofe  the  Thoughts  of  Men  are 
in  this  prefent  One. 

I  F  he  fays  that  the  Thinking  Atoms, 
of  which  his  dead  Carcafs  will  confift, 
can  have  no  more  relation  to  him  than 
the  Atoms  of  any  other  dead  Body,  and 
therefore  that  he  fhall  not  be  afteded 
by  any  Sufferings  of  theirs ;  I  would  then 
ask  him  the  Reafons  he  has  for  believ- 
ing fo,  fo  long,  I  mean,  as  he  believes 
that  the  fame  Confcious  Being  fhall  con- 
tinue in  a  Man  for  Seven,  or  twice  Se- 
ven Years;  and  yet  every  Body  knows, 
that  in  fuch  a  Diftance  of  Time,  there 
is  not  perhaps  a  fingle  Atom  left  of  the 
old  ones.  If  after  all  thefe  Changes 
the  Man  ftill  feels  to  his  Grief,  that 
he  is  the  fame  Man  now  in  a  Fit  of 
the  Gout,  fuppofe,  that  he  was  Ten 
Years  pafl  in  a  Fever ;  what  Security 
can  the  Atheift  have  that  Death  will 
put  an  End  to  his  Troubles  ?  Why  not 
rather  fear,  that  his  dead  Body  may  en- 
ter into  the  Compofition  of  fome  other 
Syftem  of  Thinking  Matter  ;  and  he  be- 
come as  fenfible  of  the  Good   or  Evil 

S  that 


258  Sermon   iXc 

that  fliall  befal  fuch  a  Syfterriy  as  he  is 
of  what  befals  his  prefent  Frame  ?  I 
muft  aiErm  this  to  be  as  conceivable, 
as  that  every  Atom,  in  a  Man's  Body 
fhoutd  be.  changed,  and  yet  the  fame 
Perfon  or  Thinking  Being  continue ; 
foppofing  the  Atheijfs  Scheme  a  true 
one,  'viz.  That  human  Thought  liath 
no  other  Caufe  of  its  Beings  befides 
the  perpetual  Changes  in  the  Particles 
that  compofe  an  human  Body.  Thus 
we  fee  that  giving  the  Spmofift  what  he 
contends  for,  he  is  yet  as  far  as  ever 
from  gaining  v/hat  he  chiefly  aimed 
at,  and  which  he  could  not  hope  for 
in  Religion,  'uiz.  Reft  and  Impunity 
after  he  is  dead. 

But  perhaps  the  other  Account  of 
Thought,  wliich  places  it  in  a  particu- 
lar Organization,  may  be  efpoufed  by 
fome  Perfons  as  a  better  Security 
againft  the  Apprehenfions  oi  Evil  in 
another  World ;  as  they  thinJi  the  De- 
ftrudion  of  that  particular  Organization 
muft  carry  with  it  a  total  Extindion  of 
Thought,  and  confequently  of  Confci- 
oiifnefs,    Becaufe  if  the  Soul  be  nothing 

more 


Sermon     ix.  259 

more  than  what  Diceanhus  beheved  it, 
'viz,  A  Body  confifting  of  Parts  of  fuch 
a  particular   Figure    as  is  neceffary  to 
Life  ^,  when  the  Body  lofes  that  Figure 
which  is  neceffary  to  its  Life,  the  Pow- 
er  of  Thinking  muft    be  entirely  loft 
with  it.     But   even    here,   fafe    as  the 
Atheifi  thinks   himfelf,  while  he  endea- 
vours   to    avoid    the    Immortality   of 
Thought  by  denying  that  it  is  an  effen- 
tial  Attribute  of  Body,  is  not  fo   near 
a  total  CeiTation   of   Thought    as    he 
hopes  for.    For  he  muft  allow  Thought 
to  be  one  of  the  Modifications  which 
Body  is  capable  of  receiving ;  and  then 
he  muft  acknowledge,  that  there  is  no 
deftroying   any    Mode,   without    pro- 
ducing another  of  the  fame  Kind  ;  be- 
caufe  it  fares  thus  with   all  the  Modes 
of  Body  with  which  we  are  acquaint- 
ed ;  for   the  Corruption   of  one  Mode 
is  always  the  Generation  of  another  of 

S  2  the 


Nee  quidquam  nld  corpus  ka  figuratum,  uc 
temperatione  Naturx  vlgeat  §<:  fentlat.  Vid.  Ci- 
CTO  Tufcul.  Qugpft. 


26o  Sermon  IX. 

the  fame  Sort;  as  we  fee  the  difchargw 
ing  of  one  Colour,  is  an  introdu£i:ion 
to  another ;  the  lofs  of  one  Figure  the 
gain  of  another.  If  it  be  faid,  That 
Motion  is  a  Mode,  and  may  be  total- 
ly extinguiflied,  and  therefore  why  not 
Thought  ?  I  anfwer.  That  Motion  is 
not  a  Mode  which  depends  upon  Bo- 
dy or  any  Attribute  of  Body  for  its 
Production,  but  upon  a  Caufe  wholly 
different  from  and  foreign  to  it,  as  IjV 
have  already  fliewn  *  ;  whereas  Thought 
is  fuppofed  by  the  Atheiji  to  be  entire- 
ly derived  from  the  Body,  and  there- 
fore muft  either  depend  upon  fome  At- 
tribute of  Body,  or  proceed  from  no- 
thing. But  of  all  fuch  Modes  as  are 
founded  upon  the  efTcntial  Attributes  of 
any  Subftance,  and  derive  their  Moda- 
lity from  thence,  it  will  be  always  moft 
true  to  affirm,  that  you  only  Change 
one  Mode  for  another  of  the  fame  Sort, 
but  no  more  deftroy  them  all,  than  you 
can  deftroy  the  effential  Attributes  from 
whence  they   flow.    And  therefore  tho" 

that 

■'  See  Sermon  VL 


Sermon    IX. 

that  particular  Way  or  Mode  of  Think- 
ing which  belongs  to  the  human  Fa- 
brick  may  ceafc,  yet  we  can  fee  no 
Reafon  why  all  Sort  of  Thinking  fliould 
be  extinguifhed  with  it,  any  more  than 
.why  the  Extinction  of  one  particular 
Figure  in  Body  fliould  draw  after  it 
the  Deftrudion  of  all  Figure,  which 
we  know  to  be  impolTible  without  an 
utter  Annihilation  of  the  Body.  This 
Reafoning  would  equally  hold  tho' 
Thought  was  hot  a  Mode  of  Extenfion, 
but  of  fome  unknown  Attribute  of 
Matter,  becaufe  it  would  be  no  more 
poflible  to  deftroy  a  Mode  of  that  un-? 
known  Attribute  without  generating  an- 
other, than  it  would  be  in  the  Cafe 
of  Extenfion. 

But  then  the  Jthelfi  will  fay,  That 
a  different  Mode  will  have  no  concern 
with  him,  and  he  cannot  be  aifedecl 
by  any  Sentiments  of  Pain  that  his  Bo- 
dy may  be  afFe£led  with  in  another 
State.  I  will  allqw  him  to  be  as  pofi- 
tive  in  this  as  he  pleafes,  when  he  is 
able  to  tell  me  (I  mean  upon  any  Foot 
of  Afhsifm)  what  'tis  makes  him  to  be 
.•?  I  th^ 


'261 


4(52  Sermon     IX- 

tlie  fume  Pcrlbn  at  this  Time,  wlicn  he 
htlicvcs    Matter    or  the   World    to  be 
the  fuprcmc  and  onely  Bcin:';,  with  that 
fcir  who  perhaps  tbrmerly   luhevcd,  as 
we  do,  an  Intelhgcnt  Being  that  created 
the  Woild.     What  it  is  that  makes  him 
believe    himl'eU'    as  mucli  concerned  in 
tlie   Pleal'ure    and   Pains  of  the  Ibrmer 
Pa  lib  of  hi:»  Life,  as  in  thofe  oi'  tlie  pre* 
feut    1 'ime,  tlio*  many  confiderable  Al- 
terations may  have  happened  in  his  in- 
ternal and  external  Fabrick.    When  he 
can    reconcile  this  Samenefs    of  Perfon 
with  all  the  Changes  that  his  Body  has 
undergone  in    a  Courle  oi'  many  Years, 
it  will   be    then    time  to    grant,    that 
the  Thoughts  of  the  ilead  Perlbn  may 
have  no  Concern  with  thofe   of  the  liv- 
ing one.     Till  then,  tlie  Jthcf/i  by  this 
Scheme,  no  more  than  the  SfinDftft^  will 
be  able  by  any  lair  Dednd ions  from  his 
own  Principles  to  fecure  himfelf  againft 
the  Pears  of  Evil  in  a  future  State,  lincc 
we  have  already  fcen  he  cannot  prove 
a   total    Ceiruion    of  Thought     after 
Death,    nor    icll     us  what    C>hange    of 
Or^nisiatioii  will  ctrtuiiiiy  ildtroy  Con- 

icioufncfs 


Sermon    ix. 

fcioufneCi.  Or  that  fucli  a  Change  as 
that  at  our  Deaths,  imill  iiccciUrily 
do  it,  fo  long  as  lie  allows  ConHiour*.. 
nefs  to  keep  pace  witli  all  the  Changes 
that  iiappc'u  to  a  Man  in  a  long  c\^ 
tended    Lilc.  '.. 

Thus  then  the  Atht'ijl  mull  be  a 
moft  unhappy  Creature,  when  he  can- 
not live  without  God  in  this  Wt)rld, 
but  he  mull  be  witliout  Hopes  too  of 
being  at  Reft  when  he  is  out  of  it. 


263 


s  ^ 


S  E  R  M. 


26$ 


SERMON    X. 

Romans    I.  22. 

Trofeffing  themfelves  to    he 
Wije^  they  became  Fools, 


HESE  Words  were  de- 
figned  by  St.  Paul  againft 
thofe  who  frequented  the 
Schools  of  the  Philofo- 
""  phers  ,  and  yet  did  not 
leave  off  the  AfTemblies  of  the  Hea- 
then Temples,  where  God  was  wor- 
fbipped  m  an  Image  or  Similitude  of 
a  Man  ,  or  what  was  more  unwor- 
thy of  Himfelf,  a  Bird  or  Beaft,  or 
Qven  a  Reptile  or  creeping  Thing,  as 
*    ■  we 


366  Sermon'    X. 

we  find  by  the  23^  Verfe.    No  doubt 
thefe  Men  richly  deferved  this  Cenfure 
of  St.  Paul\   'viz.  That  notwithftand- 
ing  all    the  Learning  of  the  Schools, 
their  ConduQ:    fbewed  them  to   be  as 
ignorant  of  the  Nature  of  G  o  d  as  any 
of  the  meanell  of  the  Vulgar,    whilfl; 
they  joyned  with  them  in  paying  Ho- 
nour  to  fuch    ridiculous    Reprefentati- 
ons  of  the  Deity.    And  yet   I   can- 
not   help    beheving    that    the  School 
of   Epicurus    in    St.  PauPs  Days,    and 
their    Succelfors  the    Sfinofjls  in  ours, 
have  a  much  better  Title  to  this  Cen- 
fure   of  our  Apoftle,     than  any  other 
Sed  or   Sort  of  Men  that  either   now 
are,  or  ever  were  in  the  World  ;    and 
that    they   have    not    fhewn    ftronger 
Marks   of  Ignorance  and  Folly  in  any 
one  Point  of  their  Philojojjh)/,  than  when 
they    endeavour    to    account    for  the 
curious    Contrivance    of    this    World, 
without    the    Help   of    a    Contriving 
Agent.  ' 

The  Athsift\  Way  of  Rearing  up 
the  World  is  thus  :  He  fuppofes  the 
whole   Material  World,     fuch   as  we 

and 


Sermon   X.  2^7 

find  it,  to*  be  the  onely  God  oi'  Necef* 
farily-exiftent    Being;    that  the    whole 
Frame   of  Things,    the    Heavens,   the 
Earth,  and  the  regular  Order  in  which 
they  appear   to   us,    proceeded    as   an 
Eiied  from  the    unguided,    but  necefi^ 
fary  Laws  of  Motion   from    Eternity  ^ 
That  the  feveral    Species  of  Animals^^' 
as  well   as   the  Inanimate  Parts  of  the" 
World,  and  even  Rational  Beings,  fueh' 
as   Men,    did   all  fpriiig  up  from  thefe 
unguided  Motions. 

The  Alchjmtfis  with  their  Philofo- 
pher's  Stone ,  may  pafs  for  fober  and 
ferious  Perfons  wlien  compared  with 
thefe  Men ;  for  they  pretended  only  to 
the  Secret  of  moving  Matter  in  fuch  a 
Manner  as  to  tranfmute  it  into  Gold ; 
but  thefe  People  pretend  to  give  us  a 
World  full  of  Contrivance  and  Curio- 
fity  merely  by  the  Help  of  Motion, 
tho'  there  iliall  be  no  Body  to  dired 
that  Motion.  For  tho'  Spimfa  fuppofed 
his  Matter  to  be  furnifhed  with  Un- 
derstanding, yet  he  did  not  allow  it  to 
make  ^ny  Ule  of  its  Underftanding  in 
direding  any  of  its  Motions ;  for  thth 

are 


268  Sermon    X. 

are  fuppofed  by  him  to  be  the  Necef- 
fary  Laws  of  Matter  in  Motion :  Where- 
as the  Chymift^  Matter  that  was  to  make 
Gold  was  managed  by  an  Intelligent 
Agent,  and  'tis  pofTible  to  fuppofe  a 
proper  Motion  among  the  feyeral  Per 
grees  of  Motion  might  be  given  it. 
but  the  Atheijl  has  left  his  Matter  to 
fhift  fqr  itfelf,  he  allows  it  may  be 
ftirred,  tho'  he  cannot  tell  by  what,  or 
hy  whom,  as  we  have  already  feen  *  ; 
but  however,  he  will  have  no  Senfe  or 
Wifdom  to  ftand  by,  either  to  diftri- 
bute  proper  Quantities  of  Motion,  or  to 
direO:  the  Line  they  were  to  defcribe; 
and  yet  he  is  confident  that  this  regu- 
lar and  orderly  Frame  of  Things  fhall 
arife  from  fuch  undirefted  Motions,  an 
admirable  Conceit !  as  the  Author  of  the 
Characierijlicks  fays,  helieve  it  who  can. 

And  yet  this  Man  pretends  to  be 
fhocked  at  Difficulties  in  religious  Be^ 
lief,  at  the  fame  time  as  he  fees  na 
Difficulty  in  Rearing  up  this  World 
without   any  Affillance.    The    greater. 

the 

*  See  Serm.    VI. 


Sermon    X.  269 

the  Undertaking,  the  greater,  I  fuppofe, 
is  the  Share  of  Credit  he  propofes  to 
himfelf ;  but  fure  I  am,  his  Share  of 
Credit  will  dwindle  into  that  of  the 
Wife  Men  in  my  Text,  who  frofeffing 
themfdves  ivi/e^  became  Fools,  For  none 
but  a  Fool  would  offer  to  confound 
the  Differences  between  Wifdom  and 
Folly,  Senfe  and  no  Senfe,  Contrivance 
and  Chance ,  or  uncontriving  Necef- 
fity.  For  i^  unguided  Motions  fhall 
execute  as  regular  a  Piece  of  Work, 
and  as  well  fitted  for  anfwering  any 
Ends  or  Purpofes,  as  thole  that  are  di- 
re6led  by  the  befl  Senfe,  we  have  then 
nothing  left  us  whereby  to  judge  what 
makes  the  Difference  between  good 
Senfe  and  no  Senfe,  between  Wifdom 
and  Folly.  If  it  were  poffible  for  us  to 
be  miftaken  in  the  Nature  of  Thought 
and  Motion ;  yet  as  the  Atheijl  will  not 
fay,  that  all  Motions  are  wife,  and  di-' 
reeled  by  good  Senfe,  we  will  ask  him, 
how  he  diftinguifhes  thofe  that  are  fucii, 
from  others  ?  If  he  judges  by  their 
Effefts,  fo  may  we  too  ;  and  I  would 
willingly    ask  him,    Whether    he  can 

give 


270  S  E  R  M  O  ISf      X. 

give  us  any  better  Criteria  to  help  us  in 
difl-inguifliing  them,  than   thefe?  That 
fuch  ^yorks  are  an  Effect  of  Motions 
guided  by  Underftanding,  as  difcover  a 
Regularity    in  them,  and   a  Propriety 
or  Fitnefs  to  anfwer  fome  End  or  Pur- 
pofe ;   efpecially  if  we  fee  a   great  Di- 
verfity  in  thofe  Works,  and  yet  much 
Curiofity  in  them ;   in  thefe  Cafes  we 
are   apt  to   judge    them   to  belong  to 
fome  Mafterly  Hand*      Thefe   are  our 
Ways  of  Judging,  when  we  determine 
whether  any  Thing  is  a  Work  of  Ar^ 
contrived  by  fuch  Intelligent  Beings  as; 
we  GonfelTedly  are  ;   or  whether  'tis  on- 
ly a  Quantity    of   Matter    heaped  up 
without  any  kind  of  Order,  and  unfit  to 
anfvver  any  particular  Purpofe.     Thefe 
are  the  Rules  by  which  we  are  willing 
to  try  the  Works  of  Nature,  and  the 
Athei(l  mull:  be    contented  with   them, 
unlefs  he  will  give   us  a  Reafbn,  Why 
in  a  Work  of  Art  thefe  fhall    be  Indi- 
cations  of  Thought  and  Contrivance, 
and  none  in  a  Work  of  Nature  ? 

All  that  the  Atheifi  fays,  comes  to 
this,  "  That  the   Greateft  and  Beft  of 

'•'  all 


Sermon    x.  27 

''i  all  Beiogs,  in  the  Religious  Man's 
"  Opinion,  is  no  Eifci^  of  Wifdom  or 
"  Contrivance;  and  therefore  why  muft 
'^  the  World,  which  he  believes  the 
"  greateft  and  beft  of  all  Beings,  be 
"  an  Eifed  of  any  Thought  or  Defign; 
*',  altho'  particular  Works  do  arife  from 
"  the  Agency  of  fome  Thinking  Be* 
f^  ings.  That  the  Religious  Man  be- 
«?  lieves  G  o  d  to  be  the  moft  Accom- 
*^  plifhed  Being,  and  yet  that  He 
".  owes  not  his  AccompUfhments  to 
*^  any  Wifdom  or  Contrivance,  but  is 
"  Necefliarily  what  He  is ;  .  and  there- 
of fore,  Why  may  not  the  Curiofity 
f^  ia  the  Works  of  Nature  be  an  Et- 
f'  fed  of  NecelTity,  tho'  lels  perfe£l 
"  Works,  fuch  as  thofe  of  Art,  be  an 
f  Effed  of  Thought  and  Counfel. " 

Let  us  fee  then,  whether  the  EvI* 
dence  for  the  Frame  of  the  World's 
proceeding  from  Neceflity,  be  fufficient 
to  out-weigh  the  Evidence  for  its  be- 
ing the  Contrivance  of  fome  Intelligent 
Being.  And  fince  the  only  Argument 
he  brings  againft  the  Appearances  of 
Thought  and  Intelligence  in  the  Works 

of 


272  Sermojst   X. 

of  Nature,  is,  that  the  Frame  of  the 
World  rnAy  be  the  NeceiTarily-exiftent 
Being  :  If  I  can  fliew,  That  there  is 
no  Ground  for  fuch  a  Suppofition,  that 
the  Appearances  of  Nature  do  argue 
the  Caufe  of  them  to  have  aded  ar- 
bitrarily, and  difpofed  of  Matter  with 
the  utmoft  Freedom,  it  muft  then  fol- 
low, that  if  there  be  any  Thing  Hkc 
Wifdom  or  Contrivance  in  the  Fabrick 
of  the  World,  thcfe  ,  and  not  Ne- 
ceflity,  are  the  true  Caufes  of  it.  I 
will  therefore  fhew, 

i/,  That  the  Frame  of  the  World 
cannot  have  its  Exiftence  from  Ne- 
ceflity. 

2^/;,  That  there  are  plain  Sig- 
natures of  Wifdom  and  good  Senfe  m 
thofe  Parts  of  the  World  with  which' 
we  are  belt  acquainted;  and  therefore 
that  it  mult  have  been  the  Effed  of 
fome  Wife   and  Intelligent  Being. 

i}/,  That  the  Frame  of  the  World 
cannot  have  its  Exiftence  from  a  Necef- 
fity  of  Nature,  and  that  for  thefe  two 
Reafons. 

ly?,  Because 


Sermon     X.  273 

ly?,  B  E  c  AU  s  E  no  Compound  Be- 
ing (fuch  as  the  World  is)  can  have 
NecefTary  Exiftence. 

2dlj,  Because  there  are  evident 
Marks  of  a  free  and  arbitrary  Difpo- 
fal  in  its  Conftitution :  Such  an  arbitra- 
ry Difpofal,  I  mean,  as  is  confillent 
with  good  Senfe. 

i/?,  B  E  c  A  u s  E  no  Compound  Be- 
ing (fuch  as  the  World  is)  can  have 
NecelTary  Exiflence. 

The  Atheijlh  Argument,  That  as 
God  is  fuppofed  by  the  Religious 
Man  to  be  the  moft  Accomplilhed  of 
all  Beings  in  Point  of  Wifdom,  and  yet 
to  be  no  Effed  of  Wifdom,  that  there- 
fore there  may  be  great  Appearances  of 
Wifdom  without  any  original  Cauie  of 
that  Wifdom,  will  amount  to  no  more 
than  this ;  That  there  muft  be  Some- 
thing Wife  and  Intelligent  from  the 
Neceflity  of  its  own  Nature,  or  with- 
out any  Original  Caufe  of  its  Wifdom. 
'Tis  agreed,  That  there  muft  be  fuch 
a  Being,  otherwife  there  could  be  no 
fuch  Thing  as  Wifdom ;  but  the  Que- 
ftion  between    us    and    the  Athdfi   is^ 

T  What 


274  Sermon    X. 

what  Sort  of  Being  this  muft  be ;  and 
whether  Matter  in  its  various  Com- 
pofitions,  iiich  as  the  Frame  of  the 
Univerfe  is  made  up  of,  can  be  that 
Wife  and  Intelligent  Being  ?  and, 
Whether  it  could  look  fo  much  like 
a  Produ£^ion  of  Wifdom  and  Contri-* 
vance  as  it  does,  if  it  were  the  real 
.Parent  of  Wifdom,  and  owed  that 
Wifdom  to  nothing  but  the  Neceflity 
of  its  own  Nature  ?  The  Being  that 
the  Religious  Man  fuppofes  to  be  Ne- 
ceiTarily-exiftent,  is  a  moft  Simple  Be- 
I N  G,  and  whofe  Nature  is  for  that 
Reafon  not  fubjed  to  Change  or  Al- 
teration»  The  Atheijlh  NecefTarily-ex- 
iftent  Being,  is  a  Compound  one,  a 
Being  capable  of  receiving  all  manner 
of  Changes,  fuch  as  Matter  and  all 
its  Compofitions  are  ^  for  Spinofa  allows 
all  the  Modes  of  Being  under  which 
Matter  appears  (as  well  as  the  Sub- 
ilance  of  Matter  abftrafted  from  any- 
particular  Mode  of  Exiftence)  to  be  the 
NeceiTarily-exiftent  Being  ;  and  fo  muft 
all  who  affirm  the  Frame  of  the  World 
-  t<3L_be    NecelTarily-exiilent.       But  the 

Religious 


S  E  R  M  O  N     X.  >2  7  5 

Religious  Perfon  is  perfiiaded,  that  a 
Compound  Being,  or  any  Being  that  is 
capable  of  receiving  different  Modes 
of  Being,  can  never  be  reconciled  with 
the  Idea  of  NeceflTary  Exiftence;  be- 
caufe  every  Compofition  in  a  Coni- 
pound  Being  may  be  conceived  by  us 
capable  of  being  changed  into  fome 
other,  that  {hall  be  entirely  different 
from  what  it  was.  And  tlierefore  no 
one  Compofition  can  be  truly  and  pro- 
perly NecejTary ;  unlefs  a  Poffibility  of 
being  or  not  being ,  were  confiftemt 
with  Neceility.  Spimfa  faw  there  was 
no  Avoiding  the  Force  of  this  Rtalbn- 
ing,  and  that  there  was  no  defending 
Matter  unlefs  he  could  make  her' a 
Simple  Being  :  And  therefore  he  entire- 
ly alter'd  the  received  Notion  of  its  being 
divifible  and  changeable ;  tho'  without 
Reafon,  as  I  have  already  proved  ^^:, 
thinking  it  would  be  eafier  to  perfuade 
the  World  even  to  alter  their  Notion 
of  Matter,  than  to  make  them  believe 
that  any   Compofition  of  Being  could 

T  2  be         ' 

*  See  Sermon  IV. 


276  Sermon   X. 

be  a  fufficient  Support    for   Neceflary 
^  Exiftence. 

2dly^  The  Frame  of  the  World  can*- 
not-  be  the  NecelTarily-exiftent  Being, 
becaufe  there  are  evident  Marks  of  a 
free  and  arbitrary  Difpofal  in  its  Con- 
ftitution,  fuch  an  arbitrary  Difpofal,  I 
mean,  as  is  confident  with  good  Senfe. 
If  there  was  one  uniform  Appearance 
of  Bodies  m  the  Infinite  Space,  if  all 
the  Compofitions  of  Matter  were  ex- 
a(5lly  of  the  fame  Bulk,  and  did  all  ex- 
adly  defcribe  the  fame  Motions  ;  there 
would  be  an  Appearance  that  would 
much  better  refemble  NecefTity,  than 
the  prefent  Face  of  Things ;  tho'  even 
this  would  not  prove  thefe  Magnitudes, 
and  thefe  Motions  to  be  necelTary  ;  be- 
caufe there  miglit  be  conceived  very 
different  Combinations  of  Matter  float- 
ing in  an  infinite  Space,  very  different 
Lines  of  Motion,  and  yet  equally  uni- 
form ;  therefore  none  of  them  could  be 
abfolutely  neceffary  :  becaufe,  as  I  have 
already  proved,  whatever  exiils  from 
a  Neceffity  of  Nature,  cannot  be  con- 
ceived to    be  any  Thing   but  what  it 

is. 


Sermon   X.  277 

is.  But  the  prefent  Face  of  Things  has 
ajl  imaginable  Variety ;  inftead  of  one 
vail  Syftem  confifting  of  a  great  Num- 
ber of  uniform  Bodies  with  a  Sun  at 
the  Centre  of  it,  we  have  probably  a 
prodigious  Number  of  Syftems,  as  .ma- 
ny as  there  are  fix'd  Stars,  with  fuch  a 
Star,  as  we  have  a  Sun,  at  the  Centre 
of  each  of  them ;  and  yet  we  can  fep 
nothmg  in  the  Nature  of  Matter  that; 
fhould  determine  it  into  this  great  Di^ 
verfity  of  Syftems,  rather  than  into 
one.  The  Syftem  of  which  our  Earth 
is  a  Part  might  have  been  different 
from  what  it  is,  it  might  have  been 
bigger  or  lefs  than  it  is,  as  Space  is  in- 
finite, and  nothing  but  Will  and  Ple4- 
fure  can  be  a  Reafon  of  the  Dimenfions 
of  oursy  or  of  any  other  Syftem.  No 
other  Reafon  can  be  given  for  the  par^ 
ticular  Number  of  Planets,  and  of  their 
different  Magnitudes  in  this  Syftern  \ 
nor  why  forae  of  them  have  more,  pr 
thers  fewer,  Satellites  attending  upon 
them ;  and  if  we  were  as  capable  of 
Judging  of  any  of  the  other  Syftems, 
as  we  are  of  our  own,  we  Ihould  pro- 
T  ^  ■      babl|V 


278  Sermon    X. 

bably  find  great  Differences  in  all  thefe 
Refpeds  from  ours;  but  to  confine 
ourfelves  to  our  own  of  which  we  have 
fome  Knowledge,  we  will  confider  the 
different  Odks  in  which  the  Planets  and 
Comets  of  our  Syftem  nnove ;  the  one 
move  in  Elliptical^  the  other  in  Parah' 
lical  Figures :  'Tis  evident,  that  the 
moving  Force,  imprefs'd  upon  Bodies 
that  defcribe  fuch  different  Orbits^  muft 
be  different  too ;  and  'tis  as  evident 
tliat  fuch  a  Diverfity  can  have  no  Foun^ 
dation  in  Neceffity;  but  muft  be  re- 
folved  into  the  free  Agency  of  fome  Be- 
ing who  thought  fit  to  imprefs  a  great- 
er Quantity  of  Motion,  or  more  of  the 
Projedile  Force  upon  fome  Parcels  of 
Matter  than  He  did  ijpon  others. 

A  G  A I N,  we  muft  never  look  for  a 
Reifon  ia  Neceflity  of  the  Earth's 
moving  about  its  Axis  m  a  Motion 
oblique  to  its  JEc[uator  ;  becaufe  we  are 
fure  that  the  moft  fimple  and  the  moft 
obvious  Motion  had  been  in  an  Orbit 
that  was  parallel  to  it ;  and  that  its 
Motion  upon  the  Ecliptick  is  a  Devia- 
tion  from    that  fimple   Motion;    and 

therefore 


Sermon    X.  279 

therefore  the  Atheiji  ought  to  give  a 
Reafon  why  the  Earth  muft  needs  have 
been  of  fuch  an  outward  Form,  or  have 
I'uch  a  Difference  in  its  inward  Con- 
texture, as  might  be  the  Caufe  of  the 
Obliquity  of  its  Annual  Motion  to  its 
Diurnal.  But  I  am  perfuaded  he  will 
never  find  any  thing  like  a  Reafon  for 
it,  till,  with  us,  he  looks  for  it  in  fome 
Free  and  Intelligent  Caufe  that  was 
pleafed  to  contrive  it  in  this  Manner. 
I  do  not  pretend  to  fay,  That  any  Va- 
riation from  the  prefent  Appearance  of 
Things,  would  have  been  for  the  bet- 
ter. But  that  fuch  a  Suppofition  would 
carry  with  it  no  Repugnance  to  our 
Conceptions  of  Things,  and  that  wo 
cannot  fee  any  Reafon  for  fuch  a  Di- 
verfity,  unlefs  we  refolve  it  into  the 
Will  and  Pleafure  of  fome  Being  who 
made  fuch  Divifions  of  Matter,  and 
gave  them  fuch  Motions,  when  Mat- 
ter was  equally  fufceptihle  of  any 
other. 

I  K  N  o  w  Spinopi  in  the  fixteenth  Pro- 

fo fit  ion  of  his  Poft  humous  Works  ^    would 

e^ideavour  to  account  for  all    the  Di- 

T  4  Yerfity 


28o  Sermon    x. 

verfity  in  the  World  by  Neceflity,  when 
he  fays,  £jc  neceffitate  *Divind  Nature  In* 
finite  injirdtis  modis  (hoc  efl,  ommA  qu£  fub 
Intellecium    cadere  pojfu^/t)    Jequi    dehent. 
That  is,  that  all  Poflibility    of  Being 
muft  of  Neceflity  flow  from  the  Divine 
Nature ;   confequently  all  that  Variety 
of  Concretions,  and  Diverfity  of  Mo- 
tions,  which  we  have  inflanced  in  as 
Arguments  of  Freedom,  would  be  the 
Ei^eds  of  Neceffity ;     but    let    us  fee 
how  he  proves   this ;    why,    he  refers 
us    to    his  fixth  Definition    in  the  fame 
Book,  in  which  he  defines  God  to  be 
a  Being  that  confifts  of  an  infinite  Num- 
ber of   Attributes    that    are    different 
from  one   another  ;    from   which  Infi- 
nity of  Attributes,    by  necelTary    Con- 
fequence,  muft  arife  an  Infinity  of  Things 
infinitely  varied  in  the  Manner  of  their 
Exiftence,    He  does  not  tell  us  how  a 
Simple  Being   may    have   many  Attri- 
butes really  differing  from  one  another, 
nor  whether  thefe   different  Attributes 
are  not    beholden  to  Motion  for  their 
Exiftence,   which  would   be  fuppofing 
Matter  to  have  been  always  in  Motion, 

altho'' 


Sermon   X.  281 

altho'  we  have  already  feen  that  S^^ 
n^fa.  would  never  give  an  Anfwer  to 
thofe  who  ask'd  him,  How  it  came  in- 
to Motion  *  ?  But  to  let  that  pafs ;  fup- 
pofing  Matter  to  be  infinitely  moved, 
or  la  infinitely  various  Degrees,  yet  no 
one  can  give  a  Reafon  why  this  parti- 
cular Variety  of  Beings  fhould  be  more 
necelTary  than  any  other.  For  if  eve- 
ry PofTibility  of  Being  muft  arife  from 
the  Motion  of  Matter  infinitely  varied, 
then  the  prefent  Frame  of  the  World 
muft  contain  in  it  all  that  Variety 
which  'tis  pofTible  to  conceive  ;  and  yet 
nothing  is  plainer  than  that  the  Mind 
of  Man  does  conceive  it  pofTible,  that 
the  Order  of  Beings  might  have  hteu 
different  from  the  prefent  one.  And 
yet  I  would  not  have  the  Atheift  quit 
his  Neceffity  to  take  up  with  Chance, 
as  fomething  that  would  be  better  qua- 
lified to  account  for  this  Variety  ;  be- 
caufe  Chance  is  a  Word  that  fignifies 
nothing  but  the  Ignorance  of  him  that 
makes  Ufe  of  it,  and  can  have  no  Sig- 
nification 

*  See  Sermon    VI. 


Sermon    X. 

nification  nor  Ufe  in.  a  Philofophical  Ac- 
count of  Things ;  for  if  the  Motions  of 
Matter  be  not  direded  by  a  Free  Be- 
ing, they  muft  be  pure  Mechanical  Ne^ 
cefTity,  or  neceflary  Confequences  of 
Matter  in  Motion,  which  leaves  no 
Room  for  Epicurus^  Fortuitous  Con- 
courfe  of  Atoms. 

Having  now  fhewn,  That  the  great 
Variety  which  appears  in  Nature  could 
not  proceed  from  NecefTity,  but  muft 
be  the  EfFe6t  of  fome  Being  that  afts 
with  Freedom;  it  muft  be  perfedly 
unreafonable  to  Doubt  whether  that 
Agent,  who  freely  produced  tliis  Va- 
riety, be  a  Wife  and  Intelligent  Being,^ 
if  we  can  obferve  as  ftrong  Appear* 
ances  of  Thought  and  Contrivance  m 
the  Works  of  Nature,  as  we  do  iri 
thofe  Artificial  ones  which  do  confef- 
fedly  owe  their  Birth  to  fome  Intelli- 
gent Beings.  The  Rules  we  have  of 
diftinguifhing  Works  of  Art  from  thofe 
which  are  merely  the  EffeQ:  of  Chance-. 
or  a  blind  NecelTity,  are  thefe:  That 
there  be  a  Regularity  in  the  Work, 
and  a  Fitnefs   to  anfwer  fome  End  or 

Purpofe. 


Sermon    x.  2.83 

Purpofe.  Whenever  we  find  thefe,  we 
never  hefitate  in  pronouncing  them  to 
be  the  Work  of  fome  Being  that  knew 
what  he  did,  and  why  he  did  it.  The 
Atheijl  himfelf,  fince  his  beloved  Ne- 
ceflity  will  not  help  him  out,  muft  al- 
low this  to  be  a  fair  Way  of  proving 
the  Wifdom  of  the  Maker  of  the 
World,  or  elfe  be  fo  Ridiculous  as  to 
believe  that  there  may  be  fuch  a  Thing 
as  Art  without  an  Artificer.  I  fhall 
therefore  proceed  to  ihew 

2^/r,  That  if  we  Judge  of  the 
World  by  the  Rules  now  mentioned, 
wc  cannot  avoid  difcovering  many  Sig- 
natures of  Wifdom  and  good  Senfe  in 
thofe  Parts  of  it  with  which  we  are 
beft  acquainted.  I  am  fenfible  this  Ar- 
gument has  been  fo  often  and  fo  tho- 
roughly urged  againft  the  Inpdd  by 
many  of  thofe  Learned  Perfons  who 
have  Preached  thefe  Le£i:ures,  that  I 
fhould  have  entirely  pafs'd  it  over,  but 
that  it  compleats  the  Proof  of  Un- 
reafonablenefs  upon  the  hfidel,  if  he 
defends  himfelf  by  any  Difficulties  in 
"Religious  Belief  j  becaufe  the  Difficulty 
-^^'^'  himfe^ 


284  S  E  R  M  O  K      X. 

himfelf  lies  under,  will  appear  to  be  no 
Ipfs  than  that  of  Believing,  that  there 
is  neither  Thought  nor  Contrivance  in 
a  World,  vi^hich  every  Body  elfe  fee^ 
to  be  mofl  Artificial.  However,  what 
I  have  to  fay  upon  it,  fhall  be  in  a  few 
Words,  by  offering  aninftance  or  two 
of  Regularity  in  the  Works  of  Nature, 
^nd  plain  Indications  of  Thought  and 
Defign  in  adapting  thofe  Works  to  cer- 
tain Ends  and  Ufes. 

The  firft  Inftance  I  Ihall  mention, 
is.  The  Annual  Motion  of  the  Earth, 
by  Means  of  which  every  Part  of  the 
Earth  receives  as  proper  Degrees  of 
Heat  for  the  Plants  and  Animals  of 
that;  Part,  as  if  this  Motion  had  been 
contrived  on  Purpofe  by  the  beft  Un- 
derftanding.  As  I  have  already  fliewn, 
that  the  Obliquity  of  the  Earth's  An- 
nual Motion  about  the  Sun,  to  its  Div 
urnal  one  about  its  Axis,  muft  have 
fgme  Free  Agent  for  the  Caufe  of  it, 
it  being  Nonfenfe  to  fay,  That  this 
particular  Obliquity  was  neceffary, 
when  there  are  lb  many  other  Degrees 
of  Obliquity  befides  this  particular  one ; 

Iwiil 


SfiRAlON     X.  28$ 

I  Will  now  Ihew,  That  it  muft  have 
for  its  Caufe  a  Wife  and  Contriving 
Being  that  faw  the  Confequences  of 
every  other  Degree  of  Obh'quity,  and 
pitched  upon  this,  as  what  wbuld  be 
fitted  for  the  feveral  Animals  that  were 
to  be  difperfed  over  the  Face  of  the 
whole  Earth.  That  fome  Degree  of 
Obliquity  would  be  more  beneficial  to 
the  Inhabitants  of  this  Earth  in  gene- 
ral than  none,  cannot  be  denied,  with- 
out Denying  that  the  different  Seafons 
of  the  Year  are  a  Benefit,  or  that  thofe 
Plants  and  Animals  that  hve  near  the 
Poles  would  fare  as  well,  and  receive 
as^  comfortable  a  Share  of  Heat,  with- 
out a  Summer  as  with  one.  For  'tis 
evident  if  its  Annual  Motion  had  httn 
parallel  with  its  Diurnal  one,  we  muft 
have  wanted  the  VicilFitudes  of  the 
Seafons  of  Summer  and  Winter  ;  ii  it 
had  been  much  Icfs  oblique  than  it  is, 
the  Inhabitants  near  the  Foles  would 
have  received  little  Benefit  from  the 
Summer ;  and  if  it  had  been  much 
more  oblique  to  the  jEquator  than  it  is 
at  prefen  t,the  Heat   muft  have  been 

much 


286  Sermon    X. 

much  greater  in  the  Torrid  T^ne  fjian 
it  is  now.  And  if  the  Ancients  thought 
it,  fuch  as  it  is,  to  be  incapable  of  re- 
ceiving Inhabitants  by  Reafon  of  the 
extream  Heat,  they  would  have  liad 
much  more  Reafon  for  fuch  a  Belief 
upon  an  Increafe  of  the  Obliquity  of 
the  Earth's  Annual  Motion.  But  if  no 
Declination  at  all,  or  any  other  De- 
gree of  it,  that  fhould  differ  much  from 
what  we ,  have  at  prefent,  muft  have 
h^^n  worfe  for  the  Plants  and  Animals 
m  general  than  it  is ;  we  can  have 
no  Pretence  to  look  any  where  for  the 
Caufe  of  this  exact  Contrivance  of  the 
Earth's  Motion,  but  in  the  Fore-thought 
of  fome  Wife  and  Intelligent  Being. 
He  that  will  do  otherwife,  will  £n4 
hi mfelf  reduced  to  the  Neceflity  of  Af- 
ferting,  with  hucretius^  That  the  Eye 
w^as  not  defignedly  contrived  for  ad- 
mitting the  Rays  of  Light,  nor  tlie  Ear 
for  receiving  the  tremulous  Motions  of 
Bodies,  tho'  an  Organ  well  fitted  for 
that  Purpofe,  nor  the  Air,  tho'  aMf- 
dium  well  fitted,  for  conveying  thofe 
tremulous  Motions  to  it.    And  as  the 

modern 


Sermon    x.  287 

modern  Atheift  will  confefs  this  to  be 
ridiculous  upon  the  Epicurean  Foot  of 
Chance,  fo  it  will  be  equally  ridiculous- 
to  affirm,  that  this  particular  Degree  of 
Obliquity  in  the  Earth's  Annual  Motion, 
(altho'  there  are  fo  many  other  De- 
grees of  Obliquity  which  our  Earth 
might  have  been  equally  capable  of  re- 
ceiving) was  the  Produce  of  a  blind 
Neceffity. 

ndly^  Another  Inftance  I  fhall 
give  of  Fore-thought  and  Contrivance, 
is,  the  Natural  Oeconomy  of  the  World, 
by  which  a  fufficient  Provifion  is  made 
for  that  vaft  Family  of  Animals  that  dwell 
upon  the  Face  of  the  Earth.  If  we  had 
found  our  Globe  filled  with  a  Variety 
of  Animals,  and  the  Quantity  of  Provi- 
fion for  Food  and  Maintenance  no  ways 
anfwerable  to  fuch  a  Number,  or  if 
there  were  Food  enough,  that  thofe 
Animals  had  not  Skill  enough  to  find 
out  fuch  Food  as  would  be  proper 
for  the  Support  of  their  Lives,  we 
fhould  judge  aright,  ii  we  concluded 
they  came  here  by  Chance  or  Necef- 
fity.    But  if  we   find    that    nothing  is 

wanting 


Sermon     X. 

wanting  for  the  Suppott  of  fo  large  a 
Family  of  Creatures  as  there  are  upon 
our  Earth,  fuch  a  Variety  of  feveral  Sorts 
of  Food  as  fully  anfwers  the  Occafions  of 
fuch  different  Kinds  of  Creatures,  and 
that  all  thefe  Kinds,  whether  living  in 
the  Air,  the  Water,  or  the  Earth,  have 
a  great  Sagacity  in  finding  out  each 
their  proper  Food,  which  is  undeniably 
the  Truth  of  the  Matter ;  and  was 
long  ago  taken  Notice  of  as  an  Argu- 
ment of  Senfe  and  Contrivance  *;  we 
mult  confefs)  that  there  mufi:  have  btQii 
fome  Underftanding  Being  that  had 
computed  what  Qiiantity  of  Food  would 
be  neccffary  for  their  Maintenance, 
and  had  alfo  furnilhed  them  with  pro- 
per Inftinds  for  finding  out  in  a  wide 
World  fuch  Food,  and  fuch  Accom- 
modations, 


*  Vide  Tull.  de  Natura  Deorum,  Lib.  2.  p.  2o5. 
bnvicf.  Paftuni  anlmalibus  large  &c  coplofe  Na- 
tura eum  qui  culque  aptus  erat  comparavlt.  /i?ki 
a  little  further^  Dedit  eadein  Natura  belluis  &  fen- 
fum  St  appeticum,  ut  altcro  conatum  habcrent  ad 
Naturales  partus  capcfTcndos,  altero  fecernerent  pe* 
ftifera  a  falutaribus.   p.  207. 


Sermon    X.  289 

modations,  as  would  be  fitteft  for 
them ;  or  if  all  this  will  not  amount 
to  a  Proof  of  Fore-thought  and  goocl 
Senfe,  we  muft  for  ever  defpair  of  find- 
ing any  fuch  Thing,  and  muft  believe 
that  a  Fleet  or  an  Army  of  Men  may 
be  as  well  provided  with  all  Necef* 
faries,  fo  as  nothing  fliall  be  want- 
ing, whether  we  computed  and  pro- 
portioned the  Supplies  to  the  Num- 
ber of  the  People,  and  the  Time  that 
either  was  to  be  out  upon  Duty ;  or 
whether  no  Confideration  was  had  be- 
forehand what  would  be  needful  for 
fuch  Numbers,  and  for  fuch  a  Time  t 
But  i[  this  be  ridiculous  to  the  lafl: 
Degree,  we  cannot  but  joyn  with  the 
*  PjAlmiji  in  adoring  and  admiring 
God's  Wifdom  in  the  Contrivance  of  our 
Earth,  v/here  we  find  all  well  adjuftcd 
to  the  Occafions  of  the  Creatures  that 
were  to  inhabit  it,  and  fay  with  him* 
0  L.  o  R  D,  how  njanifoid  are  thy  Works ! 
in  Wijdom  hajl  The  ft  made  them  all ;  The 
Earth  */  full  of  Thy  Riches,  <So  is  this 
U  great 


;4,   '.K,    -7,  ire 


2po  Sermon    X? 

great  And  wide  Sea^  nhercin  are  Thinz^s  creep' 
ing  innumerable^  both  jm all  and  qreat  Beafls, 
Theje  wait  all  upon  Ihee :  that  Thou  mayjl 
give  them  their  Meat  in  due  Seifon  ;  That 
Thou  givefi  them,  thej gather  :  Thou  openeft 
Thine  Handy   they  are  filled   jvith  Good.  For 
we  ftill  fee  the  fame  good  Provifion  hold- 
ing out  for  the  Ufe  of  the  Animal  Race, 
without    any    confiderable    Diminution 
from  what  it  was  in  the  Pfalmijt\  Days  j 
tho'    fome  Thoufands   of  Years    have 
pafsM  fince  the  Ffalmifi  made  this  Ob- 
iervation,  yet    the   Stock  of  Provilions 
has  not  failed  ,    and   the  Eyes    of  all  do 
ftill,  as  well   as  then,   wait    upon  God, 
and    He  giveth   them  their    Meat   in  due 
Seafon,    The  Inftances  of  Wifdom  and 
Contrivance .  are  as  many  as  the  Things 
of  the  World  ;  \i  we  cannot  find  out  all 
the  Ufes  they  ferve  for,  we  fliould  be 
fo   fair  as  to  acknov/ledge.    That  fuch 
Things  may  have  proper  Ufes,  tho'  we 
know  not  what  they  are.    This  I  think 
is   rcafonable,    fo   long    as  we  cannot 
deny,  that    there     are    many    Things 
which  do  as  regularly   tend  to  a  cer- 
taia  End  and  Furpofe,   as  if  they  had 

been 


Sermon    X?  291 

been  formed  and  contrived  for  fuch  an 
End  by  the  bed  Underftanding.  In 
fuch  Cafe  our  not  knowing  the  Ufes 
of  fome  Works  of  Nature,  ought  to 
pafs  for  no  Proof  of  any  Thing,  un- 
lefs  it  be  of  our  own  Ignorance ;  and 
we  might  as  well  argue,  that  there 
is  ho  Contrivance  in  the  Works  of 
human  Art,  becaufe  perhaps,  the  Ani- 
mals below  us  cannot  difcover  our  In^ 
tention  in  the  Contrivance  of  them,  as 
that  there  was  no  Intention  or  Dc- 
fign  in  the  Works  of  Nature,  only 
becaufe  v/e  cannot  always  find  what  it 
was. 

Having  now,  by  the  Help  of 
Motion,  Intelligence,  and  the  Regular 
Hty  of  the  VYorld^  evidently  proved, 
That  there  muft  be  fome  Powerful, 
Wife,  and  Intelligent  Being  diiferent 
from  Matter,  the  Atheift  mufl  be  con- 
tented to  come  into  the  Number  of 
thofe  Perfons  which  my  lext  v/as  fit- 
ted for,  who  profefilng  themfelves  to  be 
v/ifer  and  more  knowing  than  others, 
were  yet  k>  unfortunate  as  to  make 
s^ao  other  Difcoveries  but  that  of  their 
aasci  U  2  own 


V 


292  SeR  NiON"  '  t.1 

Own  Folly.  For  whilft  he  pretends 
feme  Difficulties  in  Religious  Belief,  as 
t\\Q  Reafon  of  his  leaving  us,  he  is,  as 
I  have  already  fhewn,  contented  to 
take  up  with  much  greater  ones  ia 
avoiding  them,  and  can  give  no  tole- 
rable Account  of  the  moft  remarkable 
Thdnomena  in  Nature,  fuch.  as  Mo- 
tion, Intelligence,  and  the  regular  Va-' 
ficty  that  appears  in  the  Univerfe ; 
and  therefore  muft  have  fuffered  him- 
felf  to  be  byafs'd  by  Prejudices  while 
he  was  examining  the  Queftion  in  dif- 
pute  between  us;  the  Confequence  of 
which  will  be,  That  he  cannot  fe- 
cure  himfelf  from  the  Apprehenfions 
of  Punifliment  from  the  Hands  of 
Thnt  God,  whom  he  has  wilfully  de- 
nied. For  I  have  already  fliewn.  That 
a  Man  may  be  culpable  for  his  Er- 
rors and  Miftakes,  if  he  has  not  taken 
due  CaVe  to  avoid  them  ,  but  has  fuf- 
fered himfelf  to  be  fwayed  by  any 
Padion  or  Inclination,  or  any  other 
Motive  beiides  a  fincere  Love  for  the 
Truth  *.  The  only  Refuge  he  ha!j 
left 


Sermon    X. 

left  muft  be  this ;  That  tho'  there  be 
a  Wife  and  Powerful  Being,  that 
at  firft  created,  and  does  fiill  govern 
and  direO:  the  Natural  World  ,  yet 
he  fees  no  Reafon  for  believing,-  that 
He  has  any  Regard  to  the  Mord  World, 
to  the  Virtues  and  Vices  of  Men,  or 
to  their  Religious  Behaviour  here ;  that 
there  is  no  fuch  Things  in  Nature  as 
Vertue  and  Vice,  Honefty  and  Bafe- 
nefs ;  or  if  there  be,  that  Go  d  will 
take  no  Notice  of  them.  What  Grounds 
there  are  for  fuch  a  Suppolition,  will 
be  confidered  in  the  following  Dif- 
courfe. 


293 


•nflj 


V  I         S  E  R  M. 


29S 


SERMON    XI. 


Isaiah    V.  20. 


W^o  unto  them  that  call  Evil 
Good,  and  Good  Evil ;  that 
put  Darknefs  for  Eighty 
and  Light  for  Darknefs ) 
that  put  Bitter  for  Sweety 
and  Sweet  for  Bitter. 


HE  Petfons  here  mentioned 

were  not  Speculative  Atheijts, 

but  only  very  wicked  Livers, 

that  endeavoured  to  conceal 

their  own  bad  A£lions  by  the  pretence  of 

fome  good  and  laudable  Deliga  they  had 

in  their  View ;    and   would    therefore 

\}  4  pais 


296  Pk  R  M  O  N      XI. 

pafs  thcni  upon  the  World  for  Atts  of 
Virtue  and  Goodnefs,  whereas  the  rea^ 
ly  good  Ads  of  others,  by  their  Mif- 
reprefentation  of  them,  pafs'd  for  either 
Ads  of  Weaknefs  or  Wickednefs.  They 
were  not  hardy  enough  to  deny  "a 
real  Difterence  between  Good  and 
Evil,  Light  and  Darknefs,  Bitter  and 
Sweet ;  they  only  endeavoured  to  put 
off  their  own  Deeds  of  Darknefs^  for 
fuch  as  would  bear  the  Light,  and  die 
niceil  Obfervation ;  and  the  Aclions  of 
their  Adverfaries,  tho'  they  had  never  fo 
fair  an  Appearance,  for  fuch  ^  would 
not  bear  to  be  look'd  upon,  or  abide 
the  Teft  of  a  careful  Infpedion.  Tiieir 
ovfj  Ads  of  Injufticc ,  how  bitter  fo- 
ever  to  thofe  who  -fulTcr'd  by  them, 
muft  be  taken  for  Ads  of  Kind  nets, 
and  the  Effeds  of  Sweetnels  of  Tem- 
per ;  whiiil:  the  mod:  indulgent  and 
beft  natured  Ads  of  other  People  fliall 
pals  with  them  for  a  bitter  and  mali- 
cious Defign  of  Cheating  and  Ruining 
TVlcn.  ..  :, 

:^  'Tis    true,  the  Charader    of  tdicfe 
'Men  does  not  come  up  to  that  of  oiir 


Sermon    Xl  2f7 

Hohbiji ;  becaiiTe  tho'  they  did  in  Rea- 
lity confound  all  the  Diftindions  of 
Moral  Good  and  Evil;  yet  they  did 
not  offer  to  tell  the  World,  as  the  H&b^ 
liji,  with  great  Gravity  pretends  to  do^ 
That  there  was  no  Difference  between 
Virtue  and  Vice ;  much  lefs  did  they 
undertake  a  ferious  Defence  of  fo  mon- 
ftrous  a  Propofition  :  But  neither  any 
facred  or  profane  Author  would  furnifh 
me  with  a  Ttxt  or  a  Motto  that  would 
exadly  anfwer  this  Charader  of  our 
Hobbift\  becaufe  there  was  generally 
more  Modelty  in  the  World,  before  A> 
made  his  Appearance  in  it.  For  he 
fcorns  to  palliate  his  Faults,  or  to  im* 
pofe  upon  the  World  by  making  them 
pafs  for  Virtues,  but  openly  and  aloud 
maintains,  That  there  are  no  Faults, 
or  any  fuch  Differences  n\  Nature 
as  thofe  of  Virtue  and  Vice,  in  the 
ufual  Meaning  of  thofe  Words;  and 
that  nothing  deferves  fuch  Names, 
initwhat  is  profitable  or  unprofitable, 
plealant  or  unpleafant ;  that  whoever 
talks  of  an  unprofitable  or  unpleafant 
Clood,  or  a  profitable  and  pleafant  EviJ; 
^?    ,   *  talk^  . 


S  E  R  M  O  N    XL 

taJksr  rNonfenfc,  has  no  Meaning  in 
what  he. fays,  but  utters  mere  Sounds 
without  any  Signification  beioaging  to 
them,  i 

I  HAVE  akeady  fhewn  the  Necef- 
(ity  of  admitting  a  Wife  and  Intelli- 
gent Being  that  concerns  himfeif  in 
the  Government  of  the  Natural  World, 
in  keeping  up  that  Order  which  He  at 
firft  deligned,  and  does  continually  exe- 
cute ;  there  are  many  who  profefs  to  be- 
lieve this,  true,  and  yet  pretend,  "  Tiiat 
"  they  cannot  fee  the  fame  Evidence 
''  for  his  concerning  himfelf  with  the 
*'  Behaviour  o^ Moral  Agents  ;  and  think 
"  that  God  does  not  mind  which  Way 
''  Things  go  in  the  Moral  World ;  they 
*^  are  contented  to  believe  that  he  has 
^V  taken  all  proper  Care  in  ordering 
*'.and  contriving  the  Motions  of  Na- 
"  turd  Agents^  and  in  feeing  them  fully 
*'  executed  according  to  his  firil:  De- 
"  fign;  but  that  a  Moral  Ag<r/t  having' 
"  received  from  Him  a  Freedom  of 
'*  Acting  as  he  pleafes,  whenever  hc*> 
'^  a£ts  freely,  he  ads  in  purfuance  oS 
"  tliat  Nature  which  He  has  given 
•  *'i  "  him. 


Sermon    xt  295^, 

«f  him,  and  his  Aftions  are  equally  agree- 
''  able  to  him,  whether  properly  Free' 
"  or  Licentious,   morally  Good  or  mo-' 
"  rally  Evil."    The    Reafons  by  which 
they  pretend  to  Support  this  Opinion;^ 
are  thefe  : 

■  I//;  "  That  they  cannot  fee  any 
"  biSerence  between  Moral  Good  and 
"  Evil,  Virtue  and  Vice.     Or, 

^dly,  *Mf  there  (hould  be  fuch  a 
"  DiiTerence,  they  are  fure  that  God 
"  would  not  concern  himfelf  about  the 
"  Behaviour  of"  Mord  Agents^  becaufe 
"they  cannot  obferve  Him  making  a-^ 
"  ny  DiPiinaion  by  Rewards  and  Pu-^'. 
"  nifliments,  between  the  Obfervance 
"  or  not  Obfervance  of  what  is  called 
"  Moral  Good.  " 

As  to  the  firft  of  thefe  :  *'  They  are 
"  perfuaded  that  there  is  no  fuch  Thing 
"  in  Nature  as  Virtue  or  Vice,  but  that 
^'  'tfs  merely  the  Fafbion  and  Fancy  of 
''  People,  becaufe  it  varies  m  different 
"  Countries  ,  and  at  different  Times : 
''  that  Legiflators  have  always  made  the 
"  Publick  Utility,  fuch  as  it  appeared 
^^  to  them,  the  only  Rule  of  their  Laws. 

''  This 


300  Sermon    XL 

^^y.This  they  think  cannot  be  doubted  ; 
"  becaufe  when  'twas  beheved  that  the 
^'  Publick  might  be  better  ferved  by 
"  the  Breach  of  a  Law  of  Moral  Ho- 
"  neily,  they  made  no  Scruple  of  en* 
"  'couraging  the  Subjed,  to  break  it. 
"  Confequeiitly,  Utility  is  the  only  Rule 
".  whereby  to  judge  of  Moral  Ho- 
*^  neffy  :  And  therefore  no  fuch  Thing 
"  as  Moral  Good ,  when  it  differs 
^^  from  the  Natural  Good  ;  but  it  lofes 
^^  its  Nature  from  the  Time  it  ceafes 
"  to  be  Profitable,  and  becomes  Evil 
"  or  Unprofitable.  Which  fhews  Ho- 
*'  nefty  or  Virtue,  when  defer  ted  by 
*'  Utility,  to  be  an  empty  Name  that 
"  has  no  Exiftence  in  Nature,  and  a 
*'  fit  Subjeft  for  none  but  a  Stoick,  who 
*\  knew  little  of  Nature,  and  was  al- 
''  ways  talking  againft  it;,  to  fpend  his 
"  Time  upon.  "  K 

But  for  all  this  Objection,  the  Re- 
ligious Man  aiiirms  Virtue  to  be  Vir- 
tue in  Adverfity,  even  when  the  Pra- 
ikice  of  it  is  Unprofitable  to  us  ;  and 
Vice  to  be  Vice,    tho'  we  outwardly 

thi'i.v^ 


^Sermon    XI.         got 

thrive  and  feem  to  be  Gainers  by  it: 
And  for  thefe  Reafons  : 

i/,  Because  if  we  fuppofe  the 
Exiftence  of  Intelligent  Beings,  fuch 
Beings  I  mean,  as  can  compare  one 
Thing  with  another,  and  underjimd  as 
well  as  feel  Differences,  the  different 
Circumftances  of  Perfons  will  necefla- 
ril7  make  a  Difference  in  the  Charader 
of  their  Anions,  with  regard  to  the 
Judgment  of  fuch  Intelligent  Beings. 

2dlj^  Because  thofe  who  have  con- 
fidered  the  Nature  of  human  Adions 
with  the  moft  Care,  fuch  as  Philofophers 
and  Legiflators,  have  built  their  Rules 
and  Laws  upon  the  Suppofition  of  there 
being  fuch  a  Difference  in  Nature. 

^^/j,  Because  thofe  who  leaft  of 
all  obferve  Moral  Differences  in  their 
Praftice,  but  referr  all  to  Pleafure  or 
Profit,  cannot  but  confefs  a  Difference 
in  fome  Cafes. 

i/?,  Because  fo  long  as  there  are 
fuch  Intelligent  Beings,  as  can  compare 
one  Thing  with  another,  and  under- 
jU/id  as  well  as  feel  Differences  ;  tlie 
different  Circumffances  of  Perfons  will 

neceffariiy 


502  Sermon  xi. 

n^ceffarily  make  a  Difference  in  the 
Charader  of  their  Aftions,  with  Re- 
gard to  the  Judgment  of  fuch  Intelli- 
gent Beings.  The  great  Fallacy  of  the 
HoihijPs  Argument  lies  in  this  :  That 
they  confider  a  Man  only  as  capable  of 
receiving  the  Ideas  of  Pleafure  and 
Pain,  Convenience  or  Inconvenience^ 
without  confidering  him  as  a  Rational 
Being  that  by  comparing  one  Thing 
with  another,  and  obferving  how  far 
they  agree,  and  wherein  they  difagree, 
may  take  Notice  of  other  Differences, 
which  his  Reafon  affures  him  to  be  as 
real  as  thofe  of  Pleafure  and  Pain,  Con- 
venience and  Inconvenience.  That  the 
Animals  inferior  to  Man  difcover  no- 
thing in  the  Nature  of  Things  beyond 
the  Pleafure  and  Pain  they  receive  from 
them,  may  be  probable  enough ;  becaufe 
we  do  not  find  they  have  luch  a  Pow^ 
er  as  Man  has,  of  comparing  their  Ideas 
with  one  another,  and  of  forming  Com- 
plex ones,  fuch  as  are  thofe  con- 
cerning Moral  Truths  ;  or  of  forming 
general  Propofitions  from  any  reflex 
Ad  of  the  Mind  upon  particular 
;:;!Vf:i;?i:    -;  Things  j 


^- 


S  E  R'M  O  N     XL  503 

Things ;  but  to:  ait  IntelleQ:ual  Being 
furniflied  with  fuch  Powers  of  Mind, 
wliich  Man  confelTedly  is,  we  affirm, 
that  tliere  muft  appear  to  be  what  we 
call  Moral  as  well  as  Natural  Differences 
antecedent  to  all  pofitive  Laws  made 
concerning  them ;  becaufe  the  different 
Circumftances  of  Things  and  Perfons 
muft  neceffarily  make  a  Difference  iii 
human  Adions,  altho'  the  Material  or 
Natural  Adion  confidered  by  itielf, 
and  without  Regard  to  thofe  Circum- 
ftances, be  exa(Sly  the  fame.  For  it 
cannot  be  denied  that  different  Cir- 
camftances  will  neceffarily  make  the 
Relations  of  Perfons  to  each  other  real- 
ly different,  and  muft  therefore  fo  far 
alter  the  Nature  of  any  Adion,  as  to 
give  it  a  different  Chara<Eler;  as  fo^ 
Inftance,  The  AQiion  by  which  we  put 
an  End  to  a  Man's  Life,  may  be  va- 
ried very  much  by  the  Circumftances 
of  the  Perfon  whofe  Life  we  take 
away;  as,  Whether  he  be  an  innocent 
Man,  or  whether  I  had  been  much 
obliged  to  him,  or  there  were  none  of 
tliefe  Cortfiderations,  but  I  did  it  for 
■:  <^»iui  A  preferving 


304.  S  £  R  xM  O  N      Xt 

preferving  my  own  Life ;  tho'  the  Adi- 
on  be  the  fame  in  either  Gafe,  con- 
fidercd  as  the  taking  away  the  Life 
of  a  Man;  yet  fure  every  one  muft 
fee  a  Difference  between  taking  away 
another  Man's  Life  for  the  Prefer- 
vation  of  his  own ,  and  ,  taking  it 
away  from  a  Man  that  has  done  him 
no  Hurt  at  all,  nor  given  any  Indi- 
cation of  any  fuch  Intention ;  much 
more,  if  he  has  always  been  a  great 
Benefactor  and  a  Friend  to  him.  Thefe 
Differences  in  Cafes,  Reafon  by  diftin- 
guifhing  Circumftances  does  difcover  to 
us ;  and  fo  long  as  there  are  fuch  Ra- 
tional Agents  as  Men,  Reafon  will  make 
fuch  Difcover ies,  let  the  Hobbiji  wink 
as  hard  as  he  pleafes.  And  vye  have  a  re- 
markable Proof  of  it  in  VAninus^  vi^ho  gave 
ftronger  Evidence  of  his  being  a  fincere 
Atheift^  than  any  of  the  Brother  Atheijls 
(ince  have  cared  to  give  us ;  for  tho'  he 
might  have  faved  his  Life  by  renounc- 
ing thofe  Atheiftick  Opinions  he  was 
charged  with,  yet  he  chofe  rather  to 
die,  than  to  do  fo  mean  and  unworthy 
an  Ad,  as  to  deny  or  difown  what  he 

himfelf 


S  E  R  xM  O  N     XI.  30$ 

himfelf  believed  to  be  true.    Atheift  as 
he  was,  he   could  not  avoid  giving  his 
Teftimony  againft  our  Hohbift,  and  ac- 
knowledging,   "  That  a  Man  may  be 
"  in  fucli  Circumftances  of  Life,  as  ihall 
"  make   him  guilty  of  a  bafe  and  di^- 
"  honeft  Adi  in  faving  his  own  Life. " 
And  therefore  that  there  may  be  fuch 
Things  in  Nature  as  Honour  and  Ho- 
iieif y,  Bafenefs  and  Cowardice,  abftrad- 
ing  from  all  Confiderations  of  Pleafure 
and  Profit.     The   labouring  a  Point  fo 
plain  as  this,  might  look   like  a  Mifre- 
prelentation  of  our  modern  Atheifl^    if 
Mr.  Hobbs  had  not  told  us  ^,    "  That 
**  all   t\\Q  natural  Right    God  has  to 
^  our  Obedience,  is  founded  upon  this ; 
*^  That  his  Power   is  infinite,  and  that 
"  all  our   Obligations  to   obey   Him  m 
"  Virtue  of  the  Law  of  Nature,    arife 
"  from  this,  that   his  Power  is  irrefift- 
"  able."     The  Confequence    of  which 
mud  be.  That  in  a  State  of  Nature  we 
can  be  under  no  Obligation  to  Him  or 
any  other  Being   on  account  of  Juftice 

X  or 

:-    .,       ;  ilobbs,  De   Give,    pag.  ^Jo,  z6i- 


^o6  Sermon   XI. 

or  Gratitude  for  the  Benefits  of  Crea» 
'.tion,  and  Prefervation  of  our  Beings;, 
or  for  any  other  Reafon,  but  only  this  • 
plain  one,  That  we  cannot  help  it.  I 
cannot  fee  any  Thing  the  -Hubkift  can 
with  any  tolerable  Shew  of  Senfe  anfwer 
to  the  Arguments  I  have  already  urg'd 
againll  him,  unlefs  it  be,  That  our  con- 
ceiving fuch  Moral  Differences  in'hu--^ 
man  Aftions,  will  not  prove  their  reat'. 
Exigence  in  Nature ;  as  the  Mind  of 
Man  is  capable  of  forming  Complex- 
Ideas,  that  liave  no  Exiftence  out  of  the 
Mind ;  and  that  Moral  Differences  muft 
be  fuch,  becaufe  if  they  had  a  real  Ex- 
iftence in  Nature,  there  could  be  no 
more  Difpute  about  them,  than  there 
is  about  Pleafure  and  Pain.  But  our 
Anfwer  is.  That  the  Cafes  are  not  pa- 
rallel; becaufe  Pleafure  and  Pain  are 
felt  and  judged  by  our  Senfes,  without 
any  Want  of  Refledion  to  affure  us  of 
their  Difference,  and  therefore  all  Per- 
fons  whether  wife  or  unwife,  are  equal- 
ly affeded  by  them ;  but  the  Beauty  of 
Virtue,  and  the  Deformity  of  Vice,  will 
require  feme  Degree  of  Reafofling  from 

us. 


Sermon     XL  307 

lis,  if  we  would  difcover  them  ;  and  yet 
this  Reafoning  of  ours   does   not  make 
thefe  DiiTerences,  but  finds  them  what 
they  are  in  Nature.     For  no  Man  fure 
will  allow   it  to  be  a    good  Argument 
to  prove  there  is  no  fuch  Thing  in  Na- 
ture as  Symmetry  and  Proportion,  be- 
caufe  all   Perfons  are  not   equally  aflpe- 
6:ed  by  them,  or  becaufe  fome  Perfons 
fhall   admire   that    which    has  neither 
Juftnefs  nor  Elegance.     And  why  then 
fhould  it   be  an  Argument  againfl:  the 
Difference  between   Vertue    and  Vice, 
that   all  Perfons  are   not  equally  fenfi- 
ble  of  the  Beauty  of  one,  and  the  Ugli- 
nefs  of  the  other ;   but  that  fome  fhall 
have   fo  corrupted    a  Tafte,    as  to  fee 
as   much   Beauty  in    the    one   as  the 
other?  The  internal  CharaO:ers  of  Mind, 
as  well  as   the  external  Proportions  of 
Body,    will  continue  to  be  whaf  tliey 
are,  notwithftanding  any  wrong  Judg- 
ments we  may  make  of  them  ;    for  the 
Nature    of  Things  is  inflexible,    wdiat- 
ever  Thoughts  w^e  entertain  of   them. 
What'  the  Author  of  the  Cktra^criftkks 
lias  faid   on  this  Occafion  is  very  juft:, 
X  2  in 


308  Sermon    XI. 

ia  thefe  Words :  "  Should  a  Writer  up- 
"  on  Mf^fick  (addreifing  himfelf  to  the 
Lovers  of  that  Art)  "  declare  to  them, 
"  that  the  Meafure  or  Rule  of  Har- 
^'  mony  was  Caprice  or  Will,  Humour 
^*  or  Fafliion,  'tis  not  very  Hkely  he 
"  flaould  be  heard  with  great  Atten- 
"  tion,  or  treated  with  real  Gravity ; 
*'  for  Harmony  ;is  Harmony  by  Na- 
'•'  ture ,  let  Men  judge  ever  fo  ridf- 
<'  culoufly  of  Mujick  ;  fo  is  Symmetry 
^'  and  Proportion  founded  ftill  in  Na- 
"  ture,  let  Mens  Fancy  prove  ever  fo 
^'  barbarous  or  Gothick  in  their  Ar- 
"  chite8:ure,  Sculpture,  or  whatever 
"  other  defigning  Art :  'Tis  the  fame 
"  Cafe,  lays  he,  where  Life  and  Man- 
•*'  ners  are  concerned,  the  fame  Num- 
"  bers,  Harmony  and  Proportion,  have 
*'  Place  in  Morals,  and  are  difcoverable 
"  in  4:he  Characters  of  Mankind  *.  " 
If  this  Author  has  Reafoned  truly,  the 
Hobbifi^s  Denial  of  Moral  Differences 
will  be  no  better  a  Proof  of  there  being 
no  fuch  Things  in  Nature,  than  ignorant 

Perfons 


*  Chai-aftcrlfticks,  Vol.   i.    p.   ^j}. 


Sermon    XL  509 

Ferfons  not  difcovering  the  juft  Propor- 
tions of  any  Work,  would  be  a  Proof 
that  there  is  no  fuch  Thing  in  Na- 
ture as  Proportion;  for  fince  there  is 
and  muft  be  a  wrong  as  well  as  a  right 
Taile  in  judging  of  the  internal  Charar 
^ers  of  the  Mind,  as  well  as -of  the 
Proportions  and  Figures  of  Bodies,  the 
vitiated  Tafte  of  a  Hohbifl  ought  to  pafs 
for  no  better  an  Argument  againft  Ethi^ 
Gal  Truth,  than  the  Gothick  Tafte  of 
an  illiterate  Perfon  be  taken  as  an  Evi- 
dence againft  the  Truth  of  any  other 
Science. 

2dly^  Those  who  have  confidered 
human  Nature  with  the^  moft  Exacl- 
nefs,  fuch  as  Philofophers  and  Legilla- 
tors,  have  formed  their  Ethical  and 
Political  Schemes  upon  the  Suppofl- 
on  of  Moral  Differences  in  Nature. 
And 

17?,  Of  the  Philofophers,  there  was 
none  of  them  of  any  Note,  without  ex- 
cepting' even  Epcurus  himfelf,  who  did 
not  agree  in  prefcribing  Vertue,  as  that 
which  would  beft  of  all  alleviate  th? 
Miferies  that  human  Nature  is  fubjed' 

X  ^  to, 


Sermon     Xi. 

to,  and,  generally  fpeaking,  procure  for 
it  all  that  Happinefs  which  it  was  ca- 
pable of  receiving.  They  all  of  them 
obfcrved  that  there  were  two  principal 
Motives  of  human  Adions,  viz,.  Rea- 
fon  and  Appetite,  together  with  all  the 
Train  of  PalTions  accompanying  thofe 
Appetites  ;  they  obferved  that  thefe  laft 
did  often  incline  us  to  purfue  either  im- 
proper Objeflts,  or  proper  Obje6ls  in  an 
improper  or  undue  Manner  ;  but  that 
there  was  another  Principle  of  human  Ac- 
tions, ^V^.  Reafon  or  good  Senfe  ;  which 
wheni  t  prevailed  and  could  be  hearkned 
to,  would  direct  what  Objects  ought  to 
be  courted,  and  in  what  Degree ;  that 
as  the  former  Motive  inclined  us  to 
take  the  Agreeable,  as  the  Way  to  true 
Happinefs,  -fo  this  laft  difcovered  a 
more  excellent  Rule  of  A6lion.  Wc 
cannot  polTibly  miftake  their  Meaning, 
becaufe  we  fee  the  whole  Defign  of 
their  Ethical  Treatifes  turned  upon  pro- 
moting the  Influence  of  this  Rational 
Principle,  and  becaufe  we  find  them 
always  making  Honefty  or  Moral 
Good,  the  Rule  of  this  Principle,  which 

is 


Sermon    xi.  ^U 

Is  taking    for  granted,  That  the  Hap- 
pinefs  of  Man,  confidered  as  a  Rational 
Creature,  was  no  other  wife  attainable, 
but  by  hearkning  to  Reafon ,    and  that 
there  was  no   Truth,   Reafon  Or  good 
Senfe,  feparate  from  Virtue.  The  ^toicks 
were  fo  far  from  being   of  Mr.  Hohk\ 
Opinion,    that  there    was    nothing    in 
Nature    but  Pleafant  and    Unpleafant, 
Convenient  and  Inconvenient,  that  they 
.would  not  allow   thefe  even  a  Share  m 
making  up  human  Happinefs ;  but  that 
the  Happinefs  of  Man  confifted  in  his 
haying  fo  reduced   his  Appetites,  as  to 
be  able  to  hve  without  them  ;    and  to 
be  contented  with   the   ra  b'  I'/^ri/,   by 
which  they  meant  the  Praftice  of  Vir- 
tue,   which   was  always    in    a   Man's 
Power,  as  'tis  always  in  his  Power  to 
be   an  honeft  Man,   tho'    not   to  be  a 
rich  Man  or  at  his  Eafe.    Even  tlie  £- 
ficuream  themfelves,  who  firft  pretend- 
ed to    make  Men  happy  by    refcuing 
them  from  the  Fear  of  the  Gods,   and 
from  the Reftraints  which  KQligionthen 
laid  upon  them,  were  fo  far  from  ta- 
king off  thofe  Reftraints  which  Virtue 
X  4  lavs 


Sermon    XL 

lays  upon  Men,  that,  as  the  Lcarnet} 
Dean  of  Norwich  tells  us,  they  acknow- 
ledged Virtue  to  be  the  only  Way 
that  leads  to  all  that  Happinefs  wloicli 
the  Life  of  Man  is  capable  of  receiv- 
ing *  ;  and  'tis  certain,  the  good  Dean 
did  not  fpeak  too  favourable  of  them, 
if  what  Laeretius  fays  of  Epicurus  in 
his  Life  be  true  -!-.  He  owned,  "  There 
"  could  be  no  fuch  Thing  as  Pleafure, 
(in  which  he  made  the  Happinefs  of 
human  Life  to  confiil,)  "  without  Vir- 
"  tue.  That  bodily  Pleafures  or  Free- 
"  dom  from  Pain,  were  among  the 
<^  ri.  ctAAct,  which  might  be  feparated 
"  from  Happinefs ;  but  Virtue  was  m. 
"  feparable  from  it :  That  Pleafure  and 
"  Profit  were  Things  of  a  change- 
"  able  Nature  ,  Bf«T*\  fuch  as  were 
^'  fomctimcs  Good  for  a  Man,  and 
"  fometimes  Evil,  according  to  the  Dif- 

"  cretion 


*  Pride.^'jx    Connexion.     P^nt  I.  f.  454 
Sed.   138.  ■  ' 


Sermon    XL  ^13 

"  cretlon  of  the  Man  that  enjoyed 
"  them;  but  Virtue  was  always  Good 
"  for  him.  "  So  far  was  Epicurus  froilf 
denying  Moral  Differences ;  which  ought 
to  ihame  our  Atheijls^  who  would  fub- 
vert  the  original  Nature  of  Things,  in 
order  to  gratify  their  bafe  Appetites ; 
and  therefore,  as  the  before  mentioned 
Learned  Dean  expreffes  himfelf,  "  Tho* 
^*  our  modern  Infidels  build  their  impi- 
^'  ous  Dodrines  upon  Epicurus^s  Philofo- 
**  phy ;  (they  both  agreeing  to  make 
all  Things  fpring  from  Matter  in  Mo- 
tion, without  taking  in  a  Powerful  and 
Wile  Being  to  move  Matter,  and  di- 
rect its  Motion)  ^*  yet  they  cannot  their 
"  immoral  and  wicked  Lives."  And 
therefore  muft  be  inexcufable,  while 
they  pretend  not  to  fee  any  Difference 
between  Virtue  and  Vice,  tho'  the 
Beauty  of  the  one,  and  the  Deformity 
of  the  other,  were  acknowledged  by  all 
thofe  Jtheifts,  who  lived  under  a  Reli- 
gion in  which  Virtue  and  Vice  were 
^        '  not 


■•-5 


I  Ibidem.  Par:  I-  p.  434 


314.  Sermon   XL 

not  near  fo  truly  defcribed,  as  tliey  are 
p  oiir  Chriftian  Religion-      But, 

2dlj^  I  AM  to  £hew,  That  all  Legi- 
flators  or  Founders  of  Free- States  have 
fuppofed  the  Obligation  to  be  juil:  and 
honell,  as  the  Foundation  of  their  feve- 
ral  Conftitutions,  and  the  beft  Supports 
of  them.  It  cannot  be  denied  that  Le- 
giflators  were  Perfons  fufiiciently  qua- 
lified for  Deciding  this  Queflion,  as 
they  are  fuppofed  to  have  been  as  well 
acquainted  with  the  Springs  of  human 
Adions  as  any  Perfons  whatever.  That 
they  took  for  granted  there  was  fuch 
a  Thing  in  Nature,  as  Moral  Honefty, 
and  believed  that  the  World  too  was 
of  the  fame  Opinion,  is  evident  from 
hence,  That  they  depended  more  upon 
the  Confent  of  the  People  than  upon 
Force  (the  only  Support  of  Tyrannical 
Governments)  for  the  Prefervation  and 
Continuance  of  their  Eftabliflimentii  : 
But  every  Body  fees  that  the  Confent 
of  the  People  could  never  be  a  Founda- 
tion for  a  durable  Society,  unlefs  they 
fuppoled  the  People  prepofTefs'd  with  an 
Opinion,  Tliat    this    Confent    of  theirs 

once 


Sermon   Xtl  9;i§ 

once  made,  hkd  laid   them   under  an 
Obligation  of  continuing  it ;  which  they 
could  have  no  Reafon  to  believe,   un- 
lefs  they  fuppofed  them  under  an  Obli- 
gation of  keeping  their  Word ,    even 
wiiilft  they  were  m  a  State  of  Nature, 
or  before   they  met  together,  and  had 
given  their  Confent.  The  Hohhift  fup- 
pofes  them  obhged  by  Virtue  of  their 
Com  pad,  but  that  antecedently  to  this 
Bargain  made   with    their   Governor, 
there  was  no  Obligation    upon   any  of 
them    to    be  faithful  or  jull :    becaufe 
there  was  no  fuch  Thing  as  Faith  or 
Juftice    in   Nature,     the  Obligation  to 
Pradice  thefe  being  to  be  fetched  en- 
tirely  from    the   voluntary  Agreement 
we  made  at  our  fir  ft  entring  into  So- 
ciety.   But  fuppofing  the  ancient  Foun- 
ders of  States  to  be  perfuaded,  as  Mr. 
Hobbs  pretended  to  be,  That  there  was 
no  fuch   Thing   as  Faith    or   Jullice, 
Breach  of  Promife   or  Iniquity,   before 
the  Laws  of  Societies  had  made  fuch  a 
Diftindion    m    human   Aftions,     they 
muft  fee  that  Men  would  be  no  more 
obliged  by  any  Confent  they  had  given, 
-■  or 


Sermon    XL 

or  any  Promifes  they  had  made,  ei- 
ther to  continue  their  Confent,  or  to 
make  good  their  Promifes,  than  if  they 
liad  done  nothing  at  all  of  either  5  for 
it  would  be  impoflible  in  the  Nature 
of  the  Thing,  that  by  any  Ad  of  theirs 
they  fhould  lay  themfelves  under  an 
Obligation,  becaufe  fuch  an  Ad:  would 
be  made  in  a  State  of  Nature,  when 
'tis  fuppofed  there  was  no  Difference 
between  Faithfulnefs  and  Unfaithfulnefs, 
breaking  of  Promifes,  and  keeping 
them :  And  therefore  their  Confent  be- 
ing given  at  a  Time,  when  they  were 
under  no  Obligation  of  keeping  their 
Word,  they  cannot  be  obliged  to  make 
good  what  they  had  confented  to. 
This  is  fo  evident,  that  had  the  Foun- 
ders of  Free  States  believed  as  Mr. 
HcUf,  they  cannot  be  fuppofed  weak 
enough  to  have  laid  any  Strcfs  upon 
the  Peoples  Promifes :  but  as  we  are 
fure  they  did,  and  thought  them  tlie 
beft  Security  of  their  Ellablifhments, 
we  cannot  doubt  whether  moral  Diffe- 
rences were  acknowledged  in  their 
Times  as  Obligatory,  even  before  any 

pofitivc 


Sermon   xt  pi 

pofitive  Conftitutions    were    made  by 
them.    And  if  Mr.  Hobhs  had  not  been 
the  worft  Politician   in   the  World,  he 
would  have  kept  his  Thoughts  to  him- 
felf,  and  not  taken  away  the  ftrongeft 
Supports  of  thofe  Societies,  which  the 
Ancients  thought  to  be  the   only  So- 
cieties  worth   preferving ;    and  left  us 
the  Poflibility    of  only  fach,    as  none 
that    had  either  Courage  or   Honefty 
^vould  care  to  be  concerned  in. 
■^    But  it  may  be  faid,  That  fome  of 
the  ancient  Legiflators  could  not  believ« 
there  was  any   Juftice    or  Injuftice  in- 
dependent of  pofitive  Conftitutions,  be- 
caufc  they   gave   Impunity,  and   even 
Encouragement  to  the  Breach  of  fomie 
Moral  Laws :    an  Inftance  of  which  is 
feen  in  Lycurgti-s^  the  Spartan  Legiflator, 
by  whofe  Laws    a  Licence  was  given 
to    young    People    of    robbing    their 
Neighbours,    if  they  could  do  it  with- 
out being  difcovered  ;   and  this  Licence 
was    given    by   him   as  a    Means   of 
iharpening    the    Wits  of  the    Spartan 
Youth,    and    making  them    fitter   for 
Out-witting  their  Neighbouring  States : 

Here 


8  S  E  R  M  O  N      XL 

Here  it  Ihould  feem  that  Equity  and 
Honefty  were  forced  to  give  way  to 
an  Appearance  of  Publick  Utility. 

In  Anfwer    to    this   Objedion,  we 
fay,  That  the   making  Laws   concern- 
ing Property,  is  making  Laws  concern- 
ing a  Thing  which  is  allowed   to  be 
of  a  Changeable   and  Pofitive  Nature: 
And  as  no  Body  doubts,  that  a  Legi- 
flator  may  take  away  Part  of  a  Man'^ 
Property  for  the  Support  of  the   Pub- 
lick  ;  fo  Lycurgus  might   think  it  lawful 
or  equitable  for   him,  without  offend- 
ing againft  the  Eternal  Rules  of  Right 
and  Wrong,  to  fubjeO:  the  Properties  of 
particular  Perfons  to  fuch  an  Inconve- 
nience   as    this ,    for    obtaining    what 
he  imagined   would    be  a  Publick  Ser- 
vice.     But, 

idly.  The  laft  Aft  of  Lycurgus  be- 
fore he  left  Sfma^  evidently  fliews  that 
he  was  fully  perfuaded  of  the  Obliga- 
tion of  one  Law  of  Nature,  'viz.  Of 
performing  a  Religious  Promife ,  at  leaft, 
he  believed  that  the  People  of  Sparta. 
were  univerfally  of  that  Opinion  :  for 
in  order  to   make  his  Laws  perpetual, 

as 


Sermon    xi.  319 

as  Plutarch  tells  us  ^,  He  gathered  all 
the  People  together,  and  perfuaded  them 
to  bind  themfelves  by  an  Oath  not  to 
alter  his  Laws,  till  he  fhould  return 
again ;  which  he  never  intended.  This 
would  have  been  a  very  weak  Contri- 
i^ance,  unlefs  he  fuppofed  the  Sp^rtam 
thought  themfelves  obliged  by  their 
Promifes.  For  if  there  was  no  Diffe- 
rence in  Nature  between  keeping  one's 
Word,  and  breaking  it,  there  would  be  '■ 
no  Reafon  to  fear  the  Difpleafure  of 
the  Gods  for  doing  what  was  in  its 
own  Nature  indifferent ;  and  therefore 
he  could  not  be  fo  weak  a  Man,  as 
to  believe  they  would  obferve  their 
Oaths  when  he  was  gone,  if  he  had. 
not  been  well  affured  that  his  Spartans 
did  univerfally  believe  there  was  fuch 
a  Thing  as  Faith  and  Honour,  before 
he  had  given  them  a  Being  by  his 
Laws. 

'*  idlyy  Th  o  s  E  who  leafl:    of  all  ob- 
ferve  Moral  Diiierences  in  their  Prac- 
tice, and  referr  all  toPleafure  or  Pro- 
fit, 

*  Plutarch  in  Vita  Lycurgi. 


Sermon    XL 

fit,  cannot  but  confefs  a  Difference  id 
ibme  Cafes ;  for  if  tHey  can  have  their 
Pleafure  or  Profit  as  well  by  obferving 
the  Rules  ofEqukyy  as  other  wife,  there 
are  Few  that  would  not  choofe  to 
have  them  in  ah  honeft  Way;  fcarce 
any  Man  of  the  moll  vitiated  Tafte, 
would  choofe  to  have  what  he  wifhed 
for  by  injuring  his  Neighbour,  if  he 
might  have  it  as  well  without  hurt- 
ing him.  If  at  any  Time  there  have 
been  particular  Perfons  that  have  wan- 
tonly injured  their  Fellow-Creatures, 
they  have  been  wont  to  pafs  under  the 
Chara£ter  of  Monfters.  The  Unbeliev- 
.  er  ought  to  aflign  fome  Reafon  of  this 
conftant  Appearance  in  Behalf  of  what 
we  call  Virtue;  for  if  the  Reafon  of 
this  Fhdnomenon  is  to  be  drawn  from 
hence,.  Either  that  the  Reafon  of  Man 
difcovers,  even  to  the  mofl  vicious  Per- 
fon,  a  Fitnefs  and  Unfitnefs  of  Things 
abftrafted  from  Pleafure  and  Profit, 
and  which  he  cannot  avoid  taking  ]s^o- 
tice  of  when  his  own  Pleafure  and 
Profit  are  not  concerned ;  or  that  there 
is  an  Inclination  in  the  human  Species 

which 


Sermon    xi.         321 

which  moves  it  to  AQ:s  of  Benevolence 
and  Good-nature ,  when  not  checked 
by  private  Intereft  »  which  ever  of  thefe 
be  affigned  as  the  Caufe  of  this  Ap^ 
pearance,  it  will  ftill  be  a  ftrong  Proof 
of  a  Difference  in  the  Nature  of  Things. 
For  if  Rational  Creatures  in  Virtue  of 
their  Reafon  difcover  any  fuch  Things^ 
they  muft  have  as  good  a  Foundation 
in  Nature  as  the  Reafon  of  Rational 
Agents ;  or  if  Inclination]  leads  them  to 
fuch  a  Behaviour,  fo  long  as  this  Incli- 
nation appears  to  be  almofl:  Univerfal 
admitting  very  few  Exceptions,  nothing 
lefs  than  the  Nature  of  Things  can  be 
a  Caufe  fufficient  of  fo  regular  and  ex- 
tenfive  an  Effed:. 

There  is  one  other  DiiBculty,  which 
is  fometimes  raifed  againil:  the  Proof 
of  Moral  Differences,  which  is,  That 
granting  fuch  Differences  do  indeed 
appear  to  us,  yet  they  may  not  ap- 
pear  fuch  to  the  Supreme,  Intelligent 
Being  J  that  is,  That  Truth,  Juliice 
and  Goodnefs,  may  appear  otherwife 
to  God  than  they  do  to  us  Men:  and 
they  pretend  to  fupport  this  Opinion  of 
Y  theirs, 


Sermon     XL 

theirs,  in  this  Manner :  That  the  Na- 
ture and  Perfedions  of  G  o  d  are  Incom- 
prehenfible,  liis  "Ways  are  in  the  Deep, 
and  ]iis  Footfteps  not  known  ;  and  there- 
fore what  may  be  juft  and  equitable  in 
Our  Opinions,  may  not  be  fo  according 
to  the  Judgment  He  forms  of  Things; 
confequently,  the  hfdel  will  fay.  Let  it 
be  never  fo  certain  that  fome  Things 
do  appear  to  us  Morally  Good,  others 
Evil ;  yet  till  it  appears  that  God 
judges  of  them  as  we  do,  we  may  ftill 
be  fafe,  altho'  we  do  not  practice  agree- 
ably to  thofe  Differences  as  apprehend- 
ed by  us.  And  they  pretend  to  be 
confirmed  in  this  Belief,  becaufe  they 
cannot  fee  God  making  any  vifible 
Diftin61:ion  between  Good  and  Bad 
Men. 

In  Anfwer  to  the  firft  Part  of  the 
Objection,  we  fay.  That  how  in- 
comprehenfible  foever  the  Nature  of 
the  Supreme  Being,  and  his  Man- 
ner of  Thinking,  may  be  to  us,  yet 
as  we  have  proved,  That  the  Morality 
of  human  Anions  is  founded  upon 
the  Nature  of  Things,  upon  the  Fitnefs 

or 


Sermon    XI. 

or  Unfitnefs  which     Things    evidently 
appear  to  us  to  have  in  their   Relation 
to  each  other,  if  we  could  be  fuppofed 
to  miftake    when   we   judge  according 
to  fuch  Evidence,  and  that  Things  ap- 
peared   quite    different   to    God  than 
they  did   to  us ,   it  would  be  beft  for 
us   to  leave  off  Reafoning   upon    any 
Kind  of  Truth  whatever,   and  content 
ourfelves,  as   fome  of  the  Antients  did, 
with  the  bare    Appearances  of  Things. 
For  if  thofe  Relations  of  Things  which 
are  the  Foundation  of  Moral  DiiTerences, 
appear    to  us  with   as  ftrong  an  Evi- 
dence, as   any  Thing  ofwhofe  Nature 
and  Exiftence  we  think  ourfelves  mod 
afTured,  we  muft  then    believe  them  to 
be  really   fuch   as  they    appear  to  us, 
or  elfe  be  contented  to  doubt  of  every 
other  Kind  of  Truth,  as  well  as  Religious 
Truth.     And    then  the  AtheijVs  Safety 
will  lie  m  this ;  That  Men  are  always 
deceived  :   Wliich  may  be  true  enough 
with  Regard  to  himfelf  and  his  Friends, 
while  they   mifpend  their  Time  in.  ac- 
CQunting  for  Things  by  Chance  or  Ne- 
Y  2  ceiTity: 


324  Sermon    XI. 

cejfTity  ;  but  I  am  perfuaded  the  reft  of 
the  World  will  conclude  that  Caufe  to 
be  a  very  bad  one,  which  cannot  be 
defended  without  giving  up  the  Truth 
of  our  Faculties.  For  let  there  be  ne- 
ver fo  much  Difference  between  the 
Perfection  of  God's  Knowledge  and 
that  of  ours;  yet  'tis  pilain,  our  Know- 
ledge, as  far  as  it  reaches,  miift  be 
real ;.  or  elfe  there  will  be  no  fuch 
Thing  as  human  Knowledge. 

A  s  to  the  fecond  Part  of  the  dbje- 
Gion,  That  God  makes  no  vifible  Di- 
ftindion  of  Good  and  Bad  Men ;  which 
they  think  a  good  Proof,  that  He  does 
not  judge  of  Good  and  Evil  as  we  do : 
In  Anfwer  to  it,  I  will  fhew, 

^dl)^  That  God  may  have  fuch 
Apprehenfions  of  Virtue  and  Vice  as 
we  have,  (abating  for  the  Difference 
between  a  perfeQly  Wife  Being,  and 
a  Being  whofe  Knowledge  reaches  to 
few  Things)  and  yet  not  make  any 
greater  Diftindion  between  the  Good 
and  the  Bad,  than  what  we  fee  at 
prefent.  The  Ujidely  as  I  have  al- 
ready 


Sermon    xi. 

ready  proved  *,   cannot    be  fufe  that 
he  fliall  not  continue  to  Think  after  he  is 
dead,  and  be  confcious  too  of  his  being 
the  fame    Thinking  Perfon    he    was ; 
and  therefore   he  can    never   be    fare 
that   this  Life   is  not  a  State  of  Pro- 
bation for  another ;  and  then   he   may 
be   a  Sufferer    afterwards,     tho'    not 
now,  by  his  Infidelity.     For  it   is  not 
at  all  inconfiftent  with  the  Notions  we 
have  of  Holinefs,  that  a  Holy  Be  ik  g 
Ihould    permit   Wickednefs    to    thrive 
for    a  Time,  and  Goodnefs  to   be  the 
Sufferer ,  fuppofmg   a  Time   to  come 
when  the  Good   and  Bad  fhall  be   vi- 
fibly  diftinguillied  by  Rewards  and  Pu- 
nifhments ;  unlefs  any  Man  could  prove 
it  inconfiftent  with  Goodnefs  to  make 
a   Trial  of  the  Behaviour  of  Free  A^ 
gents,   (which  no    Body    I  think   will 
offer  to  fay. )    For   'tis  certain  an  ex- 
act   Difcrimination   of  the   Good   and 
the  Bad  by  Rewards  and  Punifhments, 
would  not  be  confiflent  with  any  State 
pf  Probation :  i[  the  Wicked  conftantfy 
Y  ^  met 

r  Sec  Sermon    IX, 


32(5  Sermon   xi. 

met  with  Vengeance  from  Heaven  for 
Ads  of  Wickednefs,  who  would  dare 
to  be  wicked?  And  what  Merit  in 
being  otherwife?  Which  is  Reafon 
enough  for  a  Good  Being's  not  ma- 
king any  fuch  Difference,  altho'  there 
be  a  real  Diiierence  between  Virtue 
and  Vice,  and  altho'  this  Difference  ap- 
pears fi/ch  to  the  Supreme  Bei  ng  as 
it  does  to  us.  We  ought  rather  to  judge 
from  God's  making  no  Diil:inQ:ion  at 
prefent  between  Good  and  Bad  Men, 
that  He  intends  to  do  it  fome  other 
Time.  That  'tis  only  delayed  for  the 
prefent,  becaufe  fuch  a  Diftindion  would 
not  ferve  the  Purpofes  of  trying  how 
Free  Agents  would  behave  themfelves ; 
but  that  when  the  Time  of  Trial  fliould 
be  over,  which  will  be  at  our  leaving 
this  World,  that  then  Virtue  fliould 
meet  with  that  Happinefs  that  natu- 
rally belongs  to  it,  and  Vice  the  Evil 
and  Mifery  which  are  its  proper  Por- 
tion. Thefe  are  fuch  necelfary  Confe- 
quences  from  the  different  Natures  of 
Good  and  Evil,  and  from  their  being  ap- 
prehended as  fuch  by  the  Supreme  B  e- 


Sermon    XI. 

iNG,  that 'tis  as  impolTible  that  it  Chould 
be  otherwife,  as  that  Bitter  fl:ould  have 
the  fame  Efleds  as  Sweety  or  Srveet  as 
Bitter ;  Light  as  Darknefs,  or  Darkmfs  as 
Light:  And  therefore  God's  Forbear- 
ance of  Sinners  at  prefent,  is  no  reafon- 
able  Ground  for  the  Atheift  to  build 
any  fuch  Hopes  upon,  as  tho'  it  muft 
dwajs  fare  as  well  with  him,  as  it  does 
now. 


327 


Y  4        S  E  R  M. 


329 


SERMON    XII. 

John    XV.  24. 

If  I  had  not  done  among  them 
the  W^orks  which  none  0- 
ther  tjMan  did^  they  had 
not  had  Sin. 


a 


God, 
in  the 
of  our 


N  the   foregoing    Difcourfe 

I  proved,  That    the  Beha^ 

viour   of  fuch  a  Moral  A- 

gent  as  Man,  could  not  be 

indifferent  in    the  Sight  of 

becaufe  there  is  a  real  Difference 

Nature  of  Things  between  fome 

Moral  Adions,   and  others  of 

them, 


330  Sermon  Xll. 

them,  between  thofe  we  call  virtuous, 
and  the  vicious  ones:  and  that  fuch  a 
Difference  muft  appear  to  the  Supreme 
Being.  The  Confequence  of  which 
will  be,  That  it  concerns  every  Man 
that  has  a  Regard  to  his  own  Wel- 
fare, to  inform  himfelf  what  Behaviour 
will  be  moft  agreeable  to  Him;  and 
what  will  be  difpleafing  to  Him.  And 
as  he  has  heard  of  many  Perfons  who 
pretend  to  have  received  Inftru^tions 
from  Heaven,  in  order  to  tell  Men  what 
Behaviour  God  would  require  at  their 
Hands,  to  examine,  Whether  there  be 
not  Truth  in  the  Pretcnfions  of  fome 
or  other  of  them. 

I N  Anfwer  to  this,  the  Infidel  fays, 
"  He  has  no  Reafon  to  concern  himfelf 
"  in  any  Pretenfions  to  Revelation,  be- 
caufe  he  is   perfuaded,      .    . 

i/,  "  T  H  A  T  there  can  be  no  ratio-? 
"  nal  Proof  -  given  of  any  Revelation 
"  from  Heaven.  ;  ^ 

2dly,  That  if  there  were  any  Means 
"  of  proving,  that  a  Perfon  had  receiv- 
"  ed  Authority  from  G  o  d  to  difcover 
^*  fome  Truths   to  Mankind,    that  all 

"  fuch 


Sermon    XII.  qc^i 

"  fuch  Difcoveries  would  be  ufelefs  or 
"  imnecefTary ;  and  therefore  cannot 
"  come  from  God,  becaufe  He  does 
"  nothing  in  vain,  or  without  great 
'^  and  good  Reafons. 

-^dly^  "  Because  there  have  been 
"  lb  many  Pretences  to  Revelation,  and 
"  all  of  them  pretending  to  have  been 
"  fupported  by  the  extraordinary  Pow- 
*'  er  of  God,  that  there  is  no  finding 
"  which  of  them  is  the  true  one,  i( 
''  any  fuch  were. " 

As  to  the  firft  Argument  againft  Re- 
velation, '^  That  there  can  be  no  Ra- 
"  tional  Proof  made  of  any  Revelation 
"  from  Heaven  ;  they  fupport  it  thus: 
"  That  the  Nature  or  Goodnefs  of  the 
"  Dodrine  which  a  Man  pretends  to 
"  have  received  from  Heaven,  will  ne- 
''  ver  of  itfelf  prove  its  Extraclion  to  be 
"  from  thence ;  becaufe  the  fame  good 
"  Dodrines  have  been  taught  by  tliofe 
^^  who  never  pretended  to  any  Reve- 
^' Jation,  as  well  as  by  thofe  that  did; 
"  and  therefore  that  the  only  Means 
"  left  of  proving  a  Perfon  to  be  a 
"  Teacher  commillioned   from  Above, 

"  muif 


33^  Sermon  XII. 

"  muft  be  his  doing  fome  uncommon 
*^  Works  in  Proof  of  his  Commiflion, 
**  which  cannot  poflibly  be  done  by 
"  any  Powers  that  are  lodged  in  Na- 
"  ture ;  by  the  mere  Power  of  Man,  or 
"  of  any  Agent  inferior  in  Power  to 
*'  G  o  D  himfelf. "  But  the  Spinofift  fays, 
*'  That  extraordinary  and  uncommon 
*^  Works  are  as  much  the  Efiefts  of 
"  fome  Powers  of  Nature,  tho'  un- 
*'  known  to  us,  as  thofe  that  are  the 
^*  moft  common,  and  for  that  Reafon 
^*  better  known  to  us ;  confequently, 
"  whenever  they  happen ,  they  will 
"  never  prove  that  the  Perfon  by 
"  whom  they  feem  to  be  done,  was 
"  impowered  by  God,  That  the  Ar- 
"  gument  here  ufed  by  our  Saviour 
"  to  prove  his  Divine  MilFion,  drawn 
^*  from  the  uncommon  Works  He  had 
"  done  among  them,  as  being  more 
"  and  greater  than  any  other  Per- 
**  fon  had  pretended  to  before  him, 
"  might  be  a  good  Argument  to  the 
"  "^ews ,  and  make  them  worthy  of 
*'  Blame  in  not    accepting  Him  upon 

"  fuch 


Sermon    Xil.  333 

"  fucli  an  Evidence ,  becaufe  they 
^'  muft  acknowledge  fuch  uncommon 
"  Works  to  be  a  good  Proof  of  a 
"  Divine  Miflion,  their  Religion 
"  being  founded  upon  fuch  Kind  of 
^*  Works ;  That  Origen  himfelf  thought 
*^  our  Saviour  chofe  to  come  among 
*'  the  Jews  rather  than  any  other  Na- 
*'  tion,  becaufe  they  having  been  ufed 
"  to  Miracles,  would  be  more  eafily 
"  convinced  by  comparing  our  Savi- 
"  our's  Works  with  what  they  had 
"  heard  of  ^.  But  that  in  themfelves 
"  they  really  prove  nothing  but  our 
**  Ignorance  of  the  Powers  of  Nature ; 
*'  and  therefore  can  never  prove,  to  a 
*^  Perfon  not  prepofTefs'd  in  Favour  of 
**  Miracles,  that  God  is  any  more  con- 
"  cerncd  in  producing  them,  than  He 
'*  is  in  any  the  mod  common  Appear- 
"  ances  of  Nature. ''  For  S^inofa  plain- 
ly 


*  Contra  Celfum.    Lib.  2.  p.   jj. 
A/a,  <niT8    J^'    oifjLou  )df   lif    'Iwa"?/      J»   a^Ko% 


334  Sermon  Xli. 

ly  places  miraculous  FaQ:s  to  the  Ac- 
count of  Mens  Ignorance  of  the  Works 
of  Nature,  in  thefe  Words  :  MiracuU 
t^  ignorantiam  fro  aquipollentihm  fumpCu 
And  he  gives  this  Reafon  for  his  ma- 
king Miracles  and  Ignorance  to  be 
equivalent  Terms  ;  Quia  ij  qui  Dei  Ex- 
iflentiam  S"^  Religionem  miraculii  adftruere 
conmtnr^  rem  oh  four  urn  per  alt  am  magis 
ohfcuram  i^  quam  maxim e  ignorant 
{viz,  the  Powers  of  Nature)  ojlendere 
volunt^  atque  ita  novum  argumentandi  ge^ 
nus  adferunt ,  redigendo  fcilicet  non  ad 
impoffibile^  ut  aiunt  ^  fed  ignorantiam  '|\ 
That  is,  "  We  pretend  to  prove  the 
"  Truth  of  certain  Propofitions,  of 
*^  which  we  can  judge  by  our  Rea- 
'^  fon,  by  certain  wonderful  Fafts  of 
"  whofe  Caufes  we  are  not  able  to 
"  judge  at  all,  and  therefore  mtift 
"  be  lefs  known  than  the  Propofitions* 
"  which  they  are  intended  to  prove." 
From  thence  he    inferrs,   "  That  Mi- 

"  racles, 


t  Epift.  ;3- 


SerxMOn    XII.  535 

"  racles,  the  Caufes  of  which  are  iin- 
"  known  to  us  ,  can  never  be  a  Proof 
*^  of  any  Thing,  unlefs  it  were  pof- 
"  fible  or  allowable  to  enhghten  an 
"  obfcure  Propofition  by  another  that 
''  was  equally  or  more  obfcure  than 
"  itfelf.  "  This  is  the  chief  Difficulty  by 
which  the  Unbeliever  pretends  to  de- 
fend himfe4f  in  not  believing  any  Thing 
of  our  Chriftian  Revelation. 

However  Spnofa  being  aware  that 
he  might  be  prelTed  with  fome  extraor- 
dinary Fa£ls  mentioned  in  the  Go/pels^ 
fuch  as  railing  Lazarus  to  Life,  after 
he  muft  needs  have  been  dead,  having 
lain  Four  Days  in  the  Grave  ;  and  our 
Saviour's  own  Refurreftion,  after 
He  had  been  known  to  be  really  dead 
by  vaft  Numbers  of  Perfons,  who 
were  Spectators  at  hjs  Crucifixion  ;  and 
by  great  Numbers  who  faw  him  alive 
after  his  Refurredion  ;  that  fuch  Facts 
as  thefe  feemed  to  exceed  all  the  Pow- 
ers of  Nature,  and  therefore  that  Mi- 
racles would  not  be,  as  he  had  fup- 
pofed,  an  Argument  whofe  Strength 
lay    only   in   our     Ignorance   of    the 

Powers 


33<^  S  E  R  xM  O  N     XIL 

Powers  of  Nature  ^  He  goes  on  to 
fay  farther ,  "  That  if  fome  Fads 
*'  be  related  in  the  Gofpelsy  which  do 
"  truly  exceed  all  the  Powers  of  Na- 
'^  ture,  fuch  Fads  were  not  real,  but 
*'  ia  Appearance  only.  "  Oldenburg  had 
prefs'd  him  to  declare  what  he  thought 
of  the  Inftantaneous  Cures,  and  the  re- 
ftoring  of  dead  Bodies  to  Life  again, 
of  which  the  Writers  of  the  Go/pels 
take  Notice,  whether  thofe  could  be 
the  Effeds  of  fome  occult  Powers  of 
Nature,  if  really  performed;  or  whe- 
ther he  thought  they  were  to  be  ta- 
ken in  a  figurative  Senfe,  or  that  the 
Relators  of  thefe  Fads  intended  to  im- 
pofe  upon  us.  Spinofa.  would  not  take 
Refuge  in  the  laft  of  thefe  ;  but  frank- 
ly owns,  "  That  he  could  not  deny 
*'  them  to  be  in  earnefl:  in  the  Accounts 
"  they  had  given  us  of  thefe  Extraor- 
*•  dinary  Works.  "  The  Air  of  Simpli- 
city, and  a  plain  Sincerity  which  ap- 
pears in  their  manner  of  Writing,  ex- 
torted tliis  Confeflion  from  him  ;  and 
therefore  he  grants  in   his  Anfwer  to 

Oldenhurg, 


Sermon    Xli.  337 

OUenhoarg  ^,  "  That  the  Difciples  of 
^*  our  Lord  were  as  fully  perfuaded  that 
"  they  faw  their  Lord  after  his  Refur- 
"  region,  and  at  his  Afcenfion,  as  they 
"  were  of  having  ever  feen  Him  du- 
"  ring  his  Life-time ;  but  that  they  were 
"  deceived  in  believing  thofe  Appear- 
"  ances  of  their  Lord  after  his  Death 
*^  to  have  been  real;  or  any  thing 
"  more  than  Impofitions  upon  their 
*'  Senfes. " 

I  w  I L  L  therefore  (hew  i/,  That  the 
Extraordinary  Works  related  in  the 
Gofpels,  fuppofing  them  for  the  pre- 
lent  to  have  been  really  performed, 
would  be  a  fufficient  Proof  of  a  Divine 
MiiTion. 

2My,  That  the  Difciples  of  our 
Lord  were  well  qualified  for  judging, 
whether  fome  of  thefe  wonderful  Works 
were  realij^  and  not  in  Appearance  only^ 
done ;  and  confequently  their  Teftimo- 
ny  concernirg  fuch  Miraculous  Paxils, 
would  be  as  credible  a  Teftimony,  as 
it  "would  have  been  concerning  any 
Z  other 

*  la  eadem  Epiftoli- 


338  Sermon   XIL 

other  Matters  of  FatEt,  of  which  we 
are  able  to  affign  a  Natural  Caufe; 
and  then  a  Revelation  or  Divine  Mif- 
fion  may  be  made  evident  and  credible 
to  Men. 

1/ ,  That  the  Wonderful  Works 
related  in  the  Go/pels,  fuppofing  them 
for  the  prefent  to  have  been  really 
wrought,  would  be  a  fuiEcient  Proof 
of  a  Divine  MiflTion. 

But  before  I  proceed  to  the  Proof 
of  this  Propofition,  it  may  not  be  a- 
mifs  to  fbew  the  PofTibility  of  fuch 
Works  being  done,  as  thofe  our  Savi- 
our appeals  to.  in  my  Text,  and  yet 
of  not  being  the  Effeds  of  fome  Pow- 
ers of  Nature.  For  thofe  who  deny 
the  Authority  of  Miracles,  do  even  de- 
ny the  Poflibility  of  them,  when  con- 
fidered  as  Works  done  by  fome  Power 
or  other ,  fuperior  to  Nature,  and  add- 
ing freely  upon  Nature.  But  the  Rea- 
fon  of  their  Denying  them,  is  built  up- 
on a  Suppofition,  which  is  a  mere  beg- 
ging the  Qtieition  in  Difpute  between 
us  and  the  Atheiji-^  'viz.  That  God 
is  a  NecefTary  Agent,    and  therefore 

the 


Sermon     XII.  339 

the  Laws  of  Motion  muft  be  neceffa- 
rily  what  they  are;  for  then  it  would 
be  true  indeed,  that  all  the  Effeds  of 
thofe  Laws  would  be  equally  natural, 
tho'  perhaps  not  equally  common,  or 
coming  fo  often  under  human  Obfer- 
vation  :  And  then  fuch  extraordinary 
Occurrences,  when  they  happened,  muft 
be  as  much  the  Effeds  of  the  Powers 
of  Nature  as  any  of  thofe  that  are 
moft  common.  But  we  fuppofe,  and 
have  already  proved,  That  the  Motions 
of  Matter  are  by  no  means  neceflarily 
fuch  as  they  are ;  but  depend  upon  an 
Intelligent  and  Free  Being,  who  mo- 
ved Matter  as  He  thought  fit:  And 
tho'  He  chufes  an  uniform  Manner 
of  ading  upon  Matter  ,  according  to 
what  we  call  the  Laws  of  Matter  ia 
Motion;  yet  there  can  be  no  Diffi- 
culty ia  conceiving  that  He  may  ad 
otherwife  if  He  pleafes,  as  well  as  we 
can  conceive  that  He  might  have  at 
firft  imprefs'd  different  Powers  upon 
Matter  from  the  prefent  ones;  which 
cannot  be  doubted  while  the  Principle 
of  Gravifafion  that  ads  upon  Matter , 
Z  2  is 


54-0  Sermon   xii- 

is  not  eflential  to  it ;  for  then  'tis  plain, 
there  can  be  no  abfolute  Neceffity  in 
the  Nature  of  Matter  for  its  gravita- 
ting at  all,  much  lefs  for  its  gravitating 
according  to  thefe  Lavi^s,  by  which  our 
Experience  tells  us  it  now  does ;  and 
then  there  can  be  no  Difficulty  in  con- 
ceiving that  God  may  change  them 
for  a  jhort  Time  as  well  as  for  a  long  one, 
which  makes  all  the  Difference  between 
Miracles  or  Works  produced  only  up- 
on extraordinary  Occafions,  and  fuch  as 
are  the  Effe£ts  of  the  fettled  Courfe  of 
Nature ;  for,  according  to  the  Religious 
Man's  Scheme,  the  Laws  of  Nature 
are  nothing  more  than  certain  Rules 
which  God  has  freely  propofed  to 
himfelf,  according  to  which  He  would 
ufually  ad  upon  or  move  Matter ; 
which  ihews  tliere  could  be  no  Foun- 
dation for  queftioning  the  Poflibility  of 
Miracles,  without  taking  it  for  grant- 
ed that  there  was  no  fuch  Thing  as 
a  Free  Agent,  or  a  Being  that  ads  up- 
on Choice.  It  being  then  not  impof->' 
fible  that  fuch  Works  fhould  have  been 
performed,  as  are  related  in  the  Gofpeh 

altho' 


Sermon    xii.  341 

altho'  they  were  not  an  EffeQ:  of  any 
Natural  Powers  of  Matter  in  Motion  : 

I  COME  now  to  fhew  that  fuch 
extraordinary  Works,  fuppofing  them  tq 
be  done,  will  be  a  fuiKcient  Proof  of  a 
DiWne  Miflion;  for  thefe  Two  Rea- 
fons  : 

i/,  Because  they  could  not  be  the 
natural  Effeds  of  any  Laws  of  Nature 
whatever. 

2Mj,  Because  they  could  not  be 
done  by  any  inferior  Agents  indepen- 
dently of  G  o  D  :  For  the  only  Reafons 
that  can  be  polTibly  given,  why  the  Ex- 
traordinary Works  related  in  the  Gofpeh^ 
Ihould  not  prove,  that  the  Perfon  who 
appeared  to  work  them,  was  impow- 
erred  by  G  o  d,  and  therefore  fent  by 
Him,  muft  be  either  becaufe  thefe 
Works  were  as  much  the  Effedls  of 
Natural  Caufes,  as  any  other  not  fo 
much  taken  Notice  of,  becaufe  not  fo 
ufual ;  or  that  they  might  be  perform- 
ed by  fome  invifible  Agents  fuperior  in 
Power  to  Man,  tho'  vaftly  inferior  to 
God. 

Z  ^  i/.  The  re 


342  Sermon    XII. 

i/,  There  is  no  Ground  for  fup-i 
pofing  that  the  extraordinary  Works 
related  in  the  Go/pels^  as  performed  by 
our  Saviour,  were  the  natural  Ef- 
fe6:s  of  any  Laws  of  Nature  unknown 
to  Men;  becaufe  if  they  were  fuch, 
no  Reafon  can  be  given, 

i/,  Why  no  more  of  them  are 
produced.       And, 

2dlyj  Because  fuppofing  them  to 
be  fo  ',  yet  how  fhould  our  Saviour 
come  to  the  Knowledge  of  them  ?  Since 
they  are  fuppofed  to  be  unknown  to 
Men. 

ift,  I  fay,  That  the  Works  we  are 
told  to  have  been  done  by  our  Savi- 
our, could  not  be  the  Effeds  of  any 
Laws  of  Nature;  becaufe  no  Reafoa 
can  be  given  why  no  more  of  them 
are  produced.  'Tis  certain,  if  we  take 
in  all  the  fretended  as  well  as  red  Refur- 
redions  of  dead  Bodies,  with  which  the 
Hiftory  of  Mankind  will  furniih  us, 
that  they  are  exceeding  few  in  Num- 
ber ;  and  if  we  leave  out  thofe  that 
want  a  due  Atteftation,  their  Number' 
will   be  much   fmaller.    That  Nature 

Ihould 


Sermon   XII.  343 

fLould  be  many  Hundreds  of  Years,  I 
may  fay,  many    Thoufands,   in    bring- 
ing   forth  the  RefurreQ:ion  of   a  dead 
Man;  and  yet  that  this  fliould   be  as 
natural  a  Produd  of  hers,  as  the  Birth 
of  a  Man,  which    happens  every  Day, 
is  what  no  Body  fure  can  be  perfuaded 
to  believe.     As  natural  as  the  common 
Way  of  propagating  Mankind  is,  yet  if 
there  had  been  very  few  Inftances  of 
its  Succefs  in  many    Ages,  we   (hould 
fcarce  have  judged  the  Productions  in 
that  Way  a  Work  of  Nature  ;   becaufe 
there  is  no  fuppofing  any  Thing  to  be 
the   real    Caufe   of  an  Effed,    when  it 
fcarce  ever  produces  that  Effect.     'Tis 
not  doubted  that  a  real  Caufe  may  be 
fometimes  defeated  by  the  contrary  a6:- 
ings  of  other  Caufes  ;  but  that  it  liiould 
be  almoft  always  fo,  is  what  ca^  ncr 
ver  be  reconciled  with  thofe  Signatures 
of  Wifdom  and  Contrivance,  which  ap- 
pear in  all  thofe  Parts  of  Nature,  with 
which  we  are  beft  acquainted  ^.     An^ 
tho'  the  Mheifl  will  not  allow  them  to 
Z  4  be 

*  See  Serm.    X. 


344-  Sermon   xil. 

be  the  Products  of  an  Intelligent  Be-" 
IN G,  yet  he  will  not  deny  that  there 
is  any  Regularity  in  the  Productions  of 
Nature,  or  that  generally  fpeaking,  na- 
tural Caufes  do  produce  their  proper 
EiTeds ;  but  no  Body  will  fay  there  can 
be  regular  Produdlions,  when  the  Caufes 
of  thofe  Productions  fliall  fail  a  Million 
of  times  for  once  fucceeding. 

I  DO  not  deny  that  many  natural 
EffeiCts  may  have  pafsM  upon  the  World 
for  Prodigies,  becaufe  Men  have  not 
been  always  careful  in  obferving  the 
"Workings  of  Nature,  and  that  more  ac- 
curate Inquiries  have  juftly  enough 
thrown  many  of  them  out  of  the  Num- 
ber of  fuch  Works  as  exceeded  its  Pow- 
er :  That  many  Things,  if  feldom  taken 
Notice  of,  have  pafs'd  upon  the  World 
for  Prodigies  or  fuper-'hatural  Effeds  in 
fome  illiterate  Ages,  which  are  now  ac- 
counted for  by  the  ordinary  Laws  o£ 
Nature.  But  then  'tis  alfo  to  be  con- 
fidered,  that  it  has  not  been  for  Want 
of  obferving  the  Nature  of  ^ead  Bodies, 
that  the  RefurreClion  of  fucli  Bodies 
has  pafs'd   for   a  Prodigy ,     but    be- 

qaufe 


Sermon    xil.  345 

caufe  Men  were  well  afTured  by  a  con- 
tinued Obfervation  of  them,  that  it  was 
not  the  Nature  of  fuch  Bodies  to  fpring 
out  of  their  Graves,  as  Corn  does  out 
of  the  Ground  ;  and  becaufe  in  all  their 
Obfervation  and  Reading,  they  had  met 
with  exceeding  few  Inllances  of  this 
Nature,  and  therefore  rightly  judged, 
that  Nature  was  not  qualified  for  ma- 
king dead  CarcafTes  to  fpring  out  of 
the  Ground.  For  whatever  occult  Qua- 
lities there  may  be  ia  the  Nature  of 
Things,  yet  they  might  eafily  fee  that 
if  any  Thing  fell  out  dire£lly  contrary 
to  the  conftant  and  fettled  Courfe  of 
Things,  or  that  a  dead  Body  fliould 
become  a  livif^g  one,  inftead  of  a  //V- 
ffig  Body  becoming  a  dead  one,  that 
this  could  not  be  a  mere  Effed  of  the 
Laws  of  Nature  ;  but  muft  have  fome 
Caufe  fuperior  to  thofe  Laws,  that  was 
able  to  ad  upon  Matter  in  a  different 
Manner  from  wliat  was  ufual.  Some 
Caufe  that  had  chofen  to  acl  for  the 
moft  Part  upon  Matter  in  an  uniform 
Manner,  and  yet  referved    to  itfelf  a 

Liberty, 


34^  Serimon    XII. 

Liberty,   upon  fome  Occafions,   of  de- 
parting from  that  Rule.      But, 

2i/j,  Supposing  fome  of  thofe  Ex- 
trordinary  Works  which  feemed  to  be 
done  at  our  Saviour's  Command, 
becaufe  they  appeared  immediately  up- 
on his  Speaking,  as  in  his  Inftantaneous 
Cures  of  Blind,  Lame,  and  Sick  People ; 
fuppofing,  I  fay,  thefe  to  have  been 
merely  EfFeds  of  fome  fecret  Laws  or 
Powers  ia  Nature,  there  ftill  remains 
a  great  DiiBculty  ia  accounting  for  thefe 
Miracles,  and  that  is.  How  our  Sa- 
viour could  know,  when  thefe  un- 
known Powers  would  exert  themfelves  ? 
He  foretold  before  his  Death,  That  af- 
ter he  had  been  laid  in  his  Grave,  He 
Ihould  rife  out  of  it  the  third  Day. 
Taking  it  for  granted,  that  the  Refur- 
redion  of  a  Man  falls  within  the  Com- 
pafs  of  the  Powers  of  Nature,  tho'  un- 
known to  us,  becaufe  they  feldom  ap- 
pear, it  would  be  natural  to  ask  this 
Qucftion,  How  our  Saviour  could 
know  that  the  Laws  of  Nature  would 
be  ready  to  reftore  a  dead  Body  to 
Life  again  juft  at  that  Time  v/hcn  He 

had 


Sermon    xil.  347 

had  foretold  He  ihould  rife  again? 
There  had  been  Millions  and  Millions, 
of  Bodies,  that  had  lain  very  quiet  in 
their  Graves  for  many  Ages,  and  no 
Hiftorical  Obfervations  could  pofTibly 
Jiave  furnillied  our  Saviour  with  any 
Light,  whereby  to  difcover  when  Na- 
ture would  be  ftrong  enough  to  raife 
a  dead  Body;  becaufe  the  Inftances 
mufl:  have  been  too  few  to  afford  any 
Ground  for  forming  a  Judgment  upon 
them.  When  He  raifed  Lazarus  out  of 
his  Grave,  it  feems  to  be  as  impofTible 
that  he  fliould  know  that  Nature  would 
have  Power  to  reflore  him  to  Life 
again  juft  at  that  Time  when  he  called 
to  him  to  come  out  of  his  Grave,  as  . 
it  would  be  for  a  mere  Man  by  liis 
own  Natural  Powers,  to  reftore  a  dead 
Body  to  Life  again.  So  again.  What 
could  have  induced  our  Saviour  to 
have  attempted  the  giving  Sight  to  a 
Perfon  that  had  been  blind  from  his 
Birth,  had  He  trufted  to  the  Powers 
of  Nature  for  the  Succefs  of  that  Ope- 
ration ?  When  there  had  not  been  at 
that  Time  one  Inftance  from   the  Crea^ . 

tioa 


^48  Sermon    XIL 

tion  of  the  World,  of  a  Perfon's  Seeing 
that  had  been    born   bh'nd  ;   Swce  the 
World  begitn  was   it   not    heard^   that  any 
Maff  opened  the  Eyes  of  one  that  was  born 
blind  ^.     How  our  Saviour  fhould  be 
poilefs'd  of  a  Piece  of  Knowledge  which 
no  Body  has  ever  had  either  before  or 
fince  his  Time,  and  is  confefs'd  by  the 
Spinoftjl  to  be   a  Secret  which    he  pre- 
tends not  to  fathom,  is  what  he  ought 
to  give  fome  Account   of.    Till    fuch 
Time,  we  have  a  Right  to  infift  upon 
it,  That  thofe  Inftantaneous  Cures  our 
Saviour  performed  upon  the  Perfon 
born  blind,  upon  the  Dumb  and  Deaf, 
upon  the  Sick    of  various  Diftempers, 
and  even  upon  fuch  as  were  really  dead, 
fhould  be    taken  for  fome   uncommon 
Exercifes   of  the  Power  of  God,  and 
not    for  any  Natural  Effe£i:s  of  certain 
Powers  of  Nature. 

2dly^    Having    fhewn    that    fome 
Miraculous    Works  mentioned    in  our 
Gofpels,   fuppofing   them   to  have  been 
really  performed,  could  not  be  the  Ef- 
fects 

*  John  IX.  32, 


SeR  MOIST    xil.  349 

fe£ls  of  any  Powers  of  Nature,  I  am 
now  to  flaew,  That  fuch  Works  could 
not  be  performed  by  any  Agents  infe- 
rior to  God  ;  and  for  this  plain  Rea- 
on,  Becaufe  fome  of  them,  as  for  In- 
ftance,  the  raifing  a  Body  to  Life  that 
has  been  once  really  dead,  requires  as 
great  a  Power  as  the  giving  Life  at 
firfl:  to  fuch  a  Body.  For,  if  we  can 
judge  at  all ,  it  will  require  as  great 
a  Power  to  reftore  a  Piece  of  Matter 
to  Life  again,  when  that  Organization 
is  fpoiled  which  was  necefTary  to  Life, 
tho'  it  had  been  before  animated,  as  to 
animate  any  Parcel  of  Matter,  that  ne- 
ver had  any  of  the  Organs  necelTary 
for  Life.  And  therefore  the  fame  Pow- 
er, which  could  re-animate  a  Body  that 
was  reduced  to  an  inanimate  State, 
would  be  fufficient  for  animating  any 
^  Part  of  Matter  whatfoever.  But  what- 
ever Extraordinary  Works  may  be  done, 
whether  really  or  in  appearance,  by  any 
Invifible  Agents  inferior  to  the  Supreme 
Being,  yet  fo  long  as  the  Daft  be- 
lieves him  to  be  the  Maker  of  the 
World,  and  of  all  Things  that  are  con- 
tained 


g^o  Sermon    XII. 

tamed  in  it,  he  cannot  believe  any  In- 
feriour  Beings  to  have  a  natural  Power, 
or  a  Power  independent  upon  God,  of 
making  any  new  Species  of  Animals, 
or  of  forming  any  Individuals  out  of 
lifelefs  Matter,  of  the  fame  Species  with 
the  prefent  ones  of  God's  making  \  be- 
caufe  a  Power  lodged  in  any  Hands 
different  from  thofe  of  the  Creator, 
of  encreafing  the  Number  of  Animals 
in  any  other  way  than  of  His  Appoint- 
ment, would  be  inconfiftent  with  the 
Oeconomy  of  the  World,  and  the  Fit- 
nefs  of  Provifions,  both  with  Regard 
to  the  Qiiantity  and  Quality  of  them, 
for  the  Ufe  of  fuch  Animals.  For  there 
is  no  conceiving  how  there  fhould  be 
fuch  an  exa6^  Adjuftment  of  Provifions 
for  the  Animate  Part  of  the  World,  as 
I  have  already  fhewn  there  is  ^,  with- 
out fuppofing  that  there  was  fome  In- 
telligent Being,  who  had  calculated 
what  Qiiantity  of  Provifions  would  be 
neceifary  for  fupplying  the  AVants  of 
fuch- -a  Number  of  Animals,  as  He  in- 
tended 


Sc»  Sermon    X 


Sermon    xii.  351 

tended  fhould  dwell  upon  the  Face  of 
the  Earth.  And  it  cannot  be  fup- 
pofed  that  God  would  furnilh  any  of 
his  Creatur'es  with  a  Power  of  difturb- 
ing  his  own  Plan,  and  making  it  un- 
becoming his  Wifdom  to  execute. 

If  there  have  been  any  Inftances 
pretended  of  the  Exercife  of  fuch  a 
Power  by  inferior  Agents  without 
G  0  d's  AfTiftance,  becaufe  in  Oppofition 
to  Him ;  as  in  the  Cafe  of  the  JEgyp. 
^Un  Magicians,  and  of  A^ollonim\  raif. 
xng  a  Lady  to  Life  in  Rome  when  Ihe 
was   carrying  to  the  Funeral  Pile  : 

I  Answer,  That  as  to  ih^  Inflance 
of  the  Magicians,  there  is  no  Evidence 
that  their  Performances  were  more  thaa 
Delufory  or  in  Appearance :  The  Works 
which  they  did,  as  well  as  Mofes,  were 
thefeTwo;  the  turning  their  Rods  in- 
to Serpents,  and  bringing  Frogs  upon 
the  Land  of  %/? :  Thefe  are  the  on- 
ly Wonders  performed  hy  the  JEgypUns, 
that  have  any  Pretence  to  the  making 
any  of  the  AnimAte  Kind  :  And  yet 
neither  of  thefe  Inftances  will  prove, 
that  they  had  a  Power   of  giving  Life 

to 


352  Sermon    xil. 

to  Lifelefs  Matter.  For  as  to  the  firft, 
njiz.  the  Converfion  of  their  Rods  into 
Serpents ;  we  have  no  Reafon 'to  think 
that  this  was  a  real  Change  or  Con- 
verfion into  a  living  Creature ;  becaufe 
we  finc{  that  AAYon\  Rod,  after  it  had 
beeji  at  two  different  Times  converted 
into  a  Serpent ;  this  fame  Rod,  I  fay, 
was  ever  after  called  by  the  Writer  of 
the  Book  of  Exodusy  a  Rod  or  Wand, 
and  employed  to  the  Purpofes  of  a 
Rod  '?-,  The  Rod  which  was  turned  into  a 
Serfenty  Jbdt  thou  take'  in  thine  Hand, 
and  Verfe  17,  'tis  employed  as  a  Rod  to 
fmite  upon  the  Waters;  Chap.  viii.  16.. 
it  was  ufed  in  fmiting  the  Duft  of  tht 
Land.  So  as  after  it  had  been  twice 
a  Serpent,  it  refumed  its  primitive  Na^- 
ture  of  a  Rod,  and  this  too  without 
the  Help  of  any  miraculous  Change,  ^s 
far  as  appears  by  the  Hiftory ;  and 
feems  to  have  continued  in  that  State 
ever  after.  But  however  it  might  have 
been  with  Jaronh  Rod,  yet  had  the 
Magicians  Converfion  of  their  Rod   in- 

t6 

*   Exodiif,  Chap.  IV.  and  Chap.  VH.  y.  JS- 


Sermon    XIL  353 

to  a  Serpent,  been  a  real  Change,  it 
would  be  hard  to  give  a  Reafon,  why 
they  were  not  able  to  form  Lice  out 
of  the  Diift,  as  well  as  a  Serpent  out 
of  tJieir  wooden  Wand :  For  as  to  the 
firft  of  thefe,  the  Magicians  immediate- 
ly cry\i,  as  foon  as  they  faw  it,  That 
it  XV AS  the  Finger  of  GoD,  and  did  not 
pretend  to  any  Thing  like  it.  And  yet 
no  Body  will  pretend  to  fee  more 
Difficulty  in  animating  Duft  than  m 
giving  Ufe  to  a  Piece  of  dead 
Wood. 

As  to  the  fecond  Inftance,  the  Scri- 
ptures fay  nothing  of  Frogs  being  made 
by  the  Incantations  of  the  Magicians,  ^ 
but  only  that  they  brought  them  out 
of  the  Water  upon  the  Land ;  which 
certainly  may  be  done  without  the 
Power  of  forming  fuch  Animals  as 
Frogs.  The  laft  Inftance  is  that  of 
Apollonius  of  Ty.tna^  railing  a  Lady  to 
Life  that  had  been  carried  cut  for 
dead.  The  Account  which  Vhihjlratus 
gives  of  it,  tiio'  he  was  well  inclined 
to  do  all  the  Honour  he  could  to 
Apc!loniu<j  ihevvs  it  to  be  very  doubC» 
A  a  fal, 


354  Sermon   XII. 

ful,  whether  the  Lady  was  really  dead 
or  only  in  a  Trance.  "  For,  fays  he, 
'"  whether  there  was  any  Spark  of  Life 
"  left  in  her,  which  her  Phyficians  did 
'^  not  perceive,  or  whether  flie  was 
"  really  dead,  Is  a  Matter  of  Doubt 
^'  not  only  to  me,  but  was  fuch  to 
"  thofe  who  were  prefent  when  JpoU 
"  lomus  feemed  to  bring  her  to  Life 
"  again  *".  And  therefore  this  Inftanc'e, 
any  more  than  the  former,  will  never 
have  "Weight  enough  to  prove,  that 
any  inferior  Agents  have  a  Power,  in- 
dependent of  God,  of  giving  Life,  or 
making  new  Individuals.  Confequent- 
ly,  it  cannot  invalidate  my  Proof  of  a 
Divine  Miffion,  drawn  from  the  Exer- 
cife  of  fuch  a  Power  as  that  of  giving 
Life  to  a  dead  Body. 


If 


rj&^Tyx"^/*'-      Philoftrat.  de  vita  Apollonii   Tyan. 
Lib.  IV.  cap.  45- 


SerxMOn    XII.  35$ 

If  we  may  believe  Mr.  Bayle  ^j, 
Spimfa  hlmkli  acknowledged ,  if  lie 
could  have  believed  the  Matter  of  Fa6t 
of  LazATus^s  being  raifed  to  Life  again, 
after  he  had  been  really  dead,  that  lie 
would  have  given  up  his  Syflem  of 
infidelity,  owned  our  -Saviour's  Mif- 
fion  to  have  been  from  (j  o  d,  and  em- 
braced the  Chriftian  Faith.  Mr.  Bayle. 
tells  us,  That  Spimfa  confelTed  tliis  tp. 
fome  of  his  moft  intimate  Friends.  We^ 
cannot  doubt  whether  Sfinofa  had  hear^ 
of  the  Account  that  Phlofiratus  has 
given  of  Jpollonius  raifing  a  Rcm^i»Ld.dy 
to  Life ;  whether  he  believed  any  moi'e 
of  this  than  he  did  of  our  Saviour's 
raifing  Lazarus  to  Life  5  yet  thus  much 
may  be  inferred  from  this  ConfefTion  of 
his,  which  is  all  I  want  it  for  at  pre- 
fent,  That  if  good  Proof  could  be  made 
of  any  fuch  Fad,  it  would  be  a  good 
Evidence  of  a  Divine  Million. 

Having   finilhed  the  Proof  of  Mi- 
racles, and  fliewn,    That  fome  of  the 
Works   which   our  Saviour  is    faid 
A  a   2  to 

*  Bayle  Hil^or.  DIft.  voce  Splnofa. 


>  (Y  JIa    a  o  h 

3$<5       .;f{^9f!;SERM0N     XII. 

to    have  done,    could   not  be  the  B& 
fe£ls  of  any  Powers  of  Nature,    nor  of 
any  Agent  inferior  to  G  o  d, 
*'T  AM  to  fhewj^^^^/j,  That  the  Dif- 
ciples  of  our  L ok d  were  quali%dNfor 
judging,    Whether    fucli    Works  v<m^ 
really  done   or  not;    particularly  v?it;Ji 
Regard  to  his  Refurrection,  that    they 
were  able  to  judge,  whether  it  was  Kedy 
or  only  in  Appearance,   For  I  canijot  find 
that  Spinafa  doul^ted,  whether  the  Apo- 
ftles  were   fincere  Perfons  ,   and  fpoke 
what  themfelves    believed  to   be  true. 
The  ObjeOiion  which  0/^;;^//r_^  had  made 
to  him  upon  this  Head,  and  his  Anfwer 
to  it ,   fuppofes    him  fatisHed   of  their 
Sincerity :   For  thus  he  fays  ^^  At  'Sees 
Apoflolos  omms  ommno  credidijfey  quodChru 
(itis  a  morte  refurrexerit^  quod  ego  fion  mgo^ 
And  he  fays  farther  t,  "  That  the  Cir- 
"  cumftancesofour  Saviour's  Appearing 
'*  to  his  Difciples  were  fo  ftrong,  that  he 
*'  does  not  only  fay,  that  they  believed 
f^  what  they  reported  of  his  Appearing  to 
*'  them  J  but  that  even  Infddi  would  have 

"  thought 

*  Eplft.  23.  t  Ibid.  25. 


Sermon   Xii.  357 

*^  dioughl:  they  had  feen  him,  if  they  had 
"  been  prefent  in  thofe  Places  in  which 
"  He  appeared  to  his  Difciples.  "     Fa^eor 
quidtm  banc  viz,,  Kefurre^ionem^  iis'narrari 
circumftamiSy  ut  negtire  npn  fojjimus  ipfos 
Evangeliflas  credidijfe  Cljfijli  corpus  refu^r 
rexfjfe,  &  quod  df>  hfidelibus  etiam  potuijfep 
VfdeHy  f  -  una  in  iis  locis  adfuiffent  in  qui^ 
bus  i^fe  Chrijlus   difcipuUs  app^ruif.     This 
I  think  is  fpeaking  fully  in  Behalf  of  the 
Sincerity  of  our  W itnejOTes,    and  of  tlie 
Motives  too  of  their  Belief  in  the  Re- 
furreftion ;   tho'  after  all  thefe  Concef- 
fions,  he  will  have  it,  that  the  Difciples 
might    be  deceived,   aiid  take  an  Ap- 
pearance for  a  Truth,  *  I  have  therefore 
nothing  more  to  do,  but  to  flaew  from 
th^  Circumftances    they    give   of  this 
Fad,  that   they  could  .not  be  deceived 
as    to   the  Fad    of  the  Refurredion ; 
that  they  muft  have  been  able  to  di- 
^iftinguifh    their    real  Mafter  from  his 
Sj-Cyhoft  or  Apparition. 
tr     In  the  Morning   immediately    after 
(.the  Sabbath  was  over,   certain  Women 
r  went  with  Spices  to  embalm  our  Sa- 
viour's Body ;  when  they  carae  to.  the 
.^^^^    3  Sepulchre. 


3$8  Sermon   Xll; 

Sepulchre,  they  found  the  Stone  rolled 
away,  tho'  they  could    not  imagine  by 
whom ;    they    went    into    the    Grave, 
and  were  in  a  great  Confternation  upon 
not  finding  cur  Saviour's  Body  there ; 
they  went  and  told  this  to  Two  of  his 
Difciples,  who  went   to  the  Sepulchre, 
and   found   what  the  Women  had  told 
them  to  be  true  ;  no  Bodj  there,   only 
the  Burying-Cloaths  to  be  found.  Thus 
far  then  mufl  be  evident  to  them,  That 
the  Body   was   not   in  the  Sepulchre, 
whatever  was    the  Caufe    of   its  Re- 
moval :  This   is  a  Matter  of  Fad,  of 
which  no  Body  will  deny  they  might 
be  good  WitnelTes  :    The  only  Difficul- 
ty that  can  be  made,  is,   Whether  the 
Appearances  of  our    Saviour   to  his 
Difciples   were  real^   or  only    imagimty. 
It  muft  be  obferved,  from  the  Account 
which  all  our  Evangelifts    give  of  this 
Matter,  that  the  Difciples  were  fa  far 
from  being  credulous,  or  ready  to  be- 
lieve that  their  Mafter  was  rifen,  that 
they  all  rejedcd  the  Story  of  the  Wo- 
men, concerning  his  being  rifen  to  Life, 
as2n  idle  Tale;  They  might  therefore 
.^  A  be 


Sermon    XIL  359 

be  capable  of  being  good  WitneiTes, 
when  they  witneffed  agdnft  their  Pre* 
judices.  But  let  us  fee  what  Reafons 
prevailed  upon  them,  prejudiced  as  they 
were,  to  believe  that  He  was  really  ri- 
{Qn ;  and  whether  fuch  Reafons  would 
not  have  determined  any  Reafonable 
Man  to  believe  as  they  did.  They  faw 
him  at  feveral  Times,  knew  thzt  He 
was  exaftly  Hke  that  Perfon,  whoiti 
they  faw  t'other  Day  hanging  upon  a 
Crofs  :  They  heard  him  talk  often  with 
them,  they  knew  'twas  fo  hke  their 
Mailer's  Voice,  that  they  did  not  doubt 
they  as  really  heard  him  talk,  after 
He  was  dead,  as  they  had  done,  while 
He  was  alive ^  and  as  if  the  Teftimo- 
ny  of  two  of  their  Senfes  was  not  a 
fufficient  Proof  of  his  being  their  ol(| 
Mafter ,  One  of  them ,  viz,  Thomas 
was  fo  incredulous,  that  he  declared' 
he  would  not  believe  it  was  really  his 
Mafter,  unlefs  he  might  not  only  fee 
in  his  Hands  the  Marks  of  the  Nails, 
with  which  the  Jews  had  faftned  them 
to  the  Crofs,  hut  alio  thrujihis  fingers 
into  the  Hc^leSf  and  thrufi  his  Hand  into 
A  a   4  hh 


3<5o  S  E  R  M  O  N      XII. 

his  Sid^j  that  had  been  wounded  by  the 
Spear.    Thomas  was  gratified  in  all  this,; 
and  convinced  that  it  was  not  an  Appa- 
rition that  only  counterfeited  the  Afped 
and  Voice  of  his  Mafter,  but  really  and 
truly  his  Mafler  raifed   to  Life  again ; 
for  by  touching  and  handling  his  Mafter, 
he  had  a  farther  Evidence  that  it  was  hisi 
Mafter,  and  not  an  Apparition,  becaufe- 
fuch  h/tve  not  fk^j  and.  Boim^  as  Thomas 
found    his  Mafter    had,    and  therefore 
cried  out   for   Joy,    My  Lo  r  d^  ^nd.  my 
God.    He  did  not  appear  to  his  Dif- 
ciples   once,    twice,   or   thrice,   but  a 
great  many  Times  before  his  Afcenfion ; 
and   thefe  Appearances  were  not  fhort 
and  tranfient,  but  in  fome  of  them  H« 
ftaid  lb  long  with  them,  as  to  eat  and 
drink  with  them ;  fo  as  they  had  fuf- 
ficient  Opportunities,  and  Time  enough 
for  examining,  whether  it  was  He   or 
not;   and    at  laft    they   faw  the  fame 
Perfcn   whom  they  had  fo  o^ten  feen, 
parted  from    them,    and   afcending  up 
into    Heaven.     If   after   all  this   Evi- 
dence ,  thefe  Witneffes  were  deceived, 
we   mull  give   up  the   Teftimony  of 

the 


Sermon   XH-         5^5% 

the  Senfes  as  not.  td  be  depended  on 
in  any  Cafe  whatever;  and  die  Sfin(Mt. 
fift  might,  if.  he  had  pleafedj  with  >as 
good  Reafon  have  faid,  That  the  Dil^ 
ciples  of  our  L  o  ii  d  were  deceived  in 
believing  their  Mafter  was  any  Thing- 
more  than  a  Man  i»  Jpi>earance  only  evejf 
before  Crucifixion ;  'till  he  is  pleafed  to 
tell  us  what  Sort  of  Evidence  he  would 
have  infifted  upon,  which  theApoftles- 
had  not.  ;  Lrct 

I T  will  not  be  fufficient  to  fay,  That 
I  have  allowed  tjie  Magicians  Rods  to 
be  only  in  Appearance  turned  into  Ser- 
pents, and  yet  no  doubt  the  Standers 
by  were  as  fully  perfuaded  that  the 
Rods  were  really  become  Serpents,  as 
the  Apoftles  were  that  they  faw  their 
Lord,  when  they  faw  his  j4pparmo;i>y 
Becaufe  we  don't  find  that  the  Standers 
by  were  difficult  in  believing  the  Con- 
verfion  of  the  Magicians  Rods,  and 
therefore  not  careful  in  examining; 
whether  it  was  fo  or  not.  Whereas 
in  this  Inftance  of  the  Refurreftion,  Kjs 
Difciples  were  averfe  to  beheving  ii 
true,  and  therefore  nice  in  thbir  Exi- 
^''  mination :    . 


^62  Sermon  XII. 

mination ;  they  had  feveral  Opportu- 
nities at  different  Times  of  feeing  our 
Saviour  ;  whereas  this  Converfion  of 
the  Magicians  Rod  was  once  made,  and 
quickly  deftroycd  by  Aaron's  Rod,  fo 
Ijhat  there  was  not  much  Time  allowed 
for  examining  the  Truth  of  that  Ap- 
pearance;  and  there  was  no  Necellity 
for  Mofds\  difcovering  that  the  Change 
was  not  rul ;  becaufe  their  Rods  being 
made  to  difappear  by  Aaron's  Rod,  was 
a  fu&ient  Confutation  of  the  Power 
\yj  which  the  Magicians  a8:ed,  altha' 
the  Converfion  in  both  Cafes  had  been 
only  m     ifpearance. 

If  it  be  faid,  That  had  our  Saviour 
really  rifen  with  the  fame  Body  He 
laid  down  in  the  Grave,  the  Two  Dif- 
cipies  of  his  whom  He  joyned  as  they 
were  travelling  to  Emmaus^  muft  have 
fenown  iiim,  becaufe  they  both  faw 
Jiini,  ?jid  hctd  a  long  Difcourfe  with 
him.  Our  Anfwer  is,  That  St.  Mark 
|;ells  us,  our  Saviour  appeared  to 
them  i*  Wif^  i^oe(pir,  in  a  different  Drefs 
from  what  thofe  Difcipies  had  been 
>\fed  to  fee  hiro  in  j  as  He  appeared  at 

another 


Sermon    Xll.  ^6^ 

another  Thtie  to  Mary  Magdalen  in  the 
Habit  of  a  Gardmer.  That  it  often 
happens  that  we  do  not  know  out 
moft  intimate  Friends,  when  they  have 
difguis'd  themfelves  with  a  Defign  to 
he  concealed  from  us ;  efpecially  if  we 
meet  them  at  a  Place  or  Time,  when  and 
wikre  we  not  only  did  not  expeffc  to 
fee  them,  but  were  fully  perfuaded  they 
were  at  that  Time  in  another  Place; 
\^hich  was  plainly  the  Cafe  of  the  Two 
Difciples  with  Regard  to  our  Sa- 
viour: For  notwithftanding  the  Re- 
port the  Women  had  made  to  them  of 
his  being  living,  they  feem  to  have 
fcelieved  nothing  of  the  Matter,  and 
therefore  could  have  no  Thoughts 
of  meeting  upon  the  Road  a  Perfon 
whom  they  did  not  believe  to  be  alive : 
And  then  'tis  very  poflible,  they  might 
entertain  no  Sufpicion  of  its  being  their 
MaJIer^  altho'  the  Perfon  tliey  faw  and 
converfed  with,  might  very  much  re- 
femble  him,  both  in  his  Afped  and  his 
Voice.  And  therefore  nothing  can  be 
inferred  from  this  Fad,  to  the  Preju- 
dice of  a  red  Refurredioji :  Nothing 

that 


364  Sermon    XII. 

that  ought  to  hinder  us  from  coticlu-' 
ding,  That  if  after  thofe  frequent  Occa- 
iSons  which  the  Difciples  of  our  LoRi^i^' 
hdid  of  feeing  Him,  of  eating  and  drink- 
ing with  Him,  of  handling  Him  after 
|iis  Refurredion,  their  Teftimony  of 
of  his  being  alive  might  ftill  be  falfe ; 
they  muft  have  been  Deceivers,,  and  be- 
lieved nothing  themfelves  of  the  Fads 
they  tell  us :  But  Sj/inofa  has.  already 
acquitted  them  from  any  Defign  of  im-» 
poling  upon  us  ;  confequently,  our  Sa- 
.viouR  muft  have  really  rifen  ^gain, 
and  not  iti  Jppearame  only  :  But  by  «S'^/- 
yjofa^s  Confeflion,  fuch  a  Faft  exceeding 
all  the  Powers  of  Nature,  muft  have 
God  for  its  Author.  Which  is  enough 
to  fhew,  That  fome  uncommon  Works 
may  be  a  good  Proof  of  a  Divine  Mifr 
fion :  and  therefore  that  it  cannot  be  a 
good  Reafon  for  refufing  a  feir  Exami^ 
nation  to  any  Revelation,  to  plead,  Tljat 
there  is  no  other  Way  of  Proving  it 
fuch,  but  by  fome  Extraordinary  or  yn^ 
common  Works. 


HOUMfLC 


moSi 


3<^5 


SERMON  XIII. 


ijc 


I  Cor.  X  21. 


'.•••■'ii! 


For  after  that,  in  the  Wif 
dom  of  God,  the  World 
hy  JVifdom  knew  not  God,* 
it  pJeafed  God  iy  the 
fooUjhnefs  of  Preaching  to 
fave  them  that  believe. 

HE  Dcfign  of  our  Apoftle 
in  this    Chapter    was,   to 
mortify  fome  Perfons,  who 
at   that  Time  pretended  to 
'*'  defpife  the  Chriitian  Reli- 
gion,  becaufe  of  its  Plainnefs  and  Sim- 
plicity.   Befides  many  other  Exceptions 
"^"they  madcagainftitj  fuch  as  the  mean 

Eftate 


'^66         Sermon    xili. 

Eftate  of  its  firft  Author  ,  and  his ' 
dying  fo  much  like  a  common  Male-^ 
fador,  they  were  not  a  little  offended 
at  it,  becaufe  its  Profeffors  did  not 
give  their  Dodrines  the  Air  and  Turn 
of  the  Schools,  nor  proved  them  from 
any  of  the  then  admired  Principles  of 
Truth;  but  required  Men  to  take  them 
upon  the  Credit  and  Authority  of  one 
Jesus,  whom  they  affirmed  to  have 
been  fent  on  Purpofe  by  God  to  pub- 
lifh  them  to  the  World:  They  expe- 
fted  to  have  had  the  Immortality  of 
the  Soul,  a  Refurredion,  and  fuch-like 
Doctrines  made  out  to  them  from  Prin- 
ciples of  Reafon  and  Philofophy ;  for,  as 
the  Apoftle  tells  us.  They  fought  after 
Wifdom^  v.  22.  with  which  goodly  Title 
they  were  wont  to  dignify  their  Spe- 
culations in  Philofophy ;  but  when  they 
found  the  Apoftles  were  Perfons  alto- 
gether unacquainted  with  any  of  their 
Syftems,  the  then  reputed  Standards  of 
Truth  and  good  Senfe ;  and  that  they 
chiefly  infilled  upon  the  Authority  of 
their  Master,  they  flighted  their 
Preacliing,  as  fit  only  for  the  Enter- 
tainment 


Sermon    XIII.       ^5/ 

tainment  of  the  illiterate  and  credulous 
Part  of  Mankind  J  the  Authority  of  a 
Mailer,  efpecially  of  One  that  came  to 
ib  bad  an  End,  appeared  to  them  to 
be  no  better  than  Foolifhnefs,  or  foohfh 
Talking.  Christ  crucified ^  to  the 
Greeks  FooUfhuejs^  v.  2j.  As  an  An- 
fwer  to  this  Way  of  Reafoning,  St.  Faul 
tells  them,  That  if  Chriftianity  was  FooU 
ifhmjs,  it  was  only  fuch  to  thofe  who 
perifhed  by  rejefting  it ;  but  as  to  thofe 
who  embraced  it,  it  was  the  Power  of 
God,  and  the  Wifdom  of  God  :  And 
as  a  Proof  of  the  Truth  of  what  he 
faid,  he  bids  his  Corinthians  ask  thefe 
vain  Men,  What  they  with  all  their 
Wifdom  had  done  towards  bringing  the 
World  to  a  true  Senfe  of  Religion,  and 
whether  they  could  fhew  any  fuch  Ef- 
fects of  their  Inftrudions,  as  were  eve- 
ry Day  produced  by  the  Preaching  of 
the  Gofpel  ?  Where  is  the  Wife  ?  Where  is 
the  Scribe  ?  Where  is  the  Difiuter  of  this 
Ags^  Hath  not  God  made  foolifh  the 
Wifdom  of  this  World  ?  v.  iK>.  Of  which 
he  gives  an  undeniable  Inllance,  Tlmt 
after  all  their  Attempts,   and  all  their 

boafted 


368  Sermon    XilL 

boafted  Wifdom,  they  were  not  got  fo 
far  as  to  know  the  ObjeQ:  of  their  Wor- 
fliip  aright ;  or,  allowing  fome  Few  of 
them  to  have  had  juft  Notions  of  the 
Deity,  that  yet  they  were  never  able 
to  propagate  any  of  them  among  the 
Reft  of  the  World.  And  therefore  as 
the  Way  of  Wifdom  and  Knowledge 
had  not  fufliciently  anfwered  the  Pur- 
pofes  of  informing  the  Bulk  of  Man- 
kind in  their  Duty,  he  tells  them, 
God  was  pleafed  to  proceed  with  Men 
after  a  new  Method,  and  to  bring  them 
to  Himfelf  and  an  holy  Life,  without 
profound  Kj^owledge^  in  a  Way  of  Be- 
lieving, For  after  that,  in  the  Wtfdom  of 
God,  the  World  by  Wifdom  knew  not  God, 
it  f  leafed  Gob  hy  the  Foolijhnefs  of  Preach^ 
ing  to  fave  them  that  believe. 

From  the  Text  thus  explained,  I 
fhall  take  an  Occafion  of  comparing  to- 
gether thefe  two  different  Ways  of  In- 
Itrudion,  by  Faith,  and  Reafon :  And 
after  having  eftablifhed  the  Reafonable- 
nefs  of  fubmitting  to  the  Inftruiiions 
of  Faith ,  fhew,  That  this  is  on  ma- 
ny Accounts  better  fitted  for  Teaching 

Men 


Sermon-  Xlll.  3^9 

Men  their  Duty,  and  the  Principles  that 
enforce  ky  than  Reafon  or  Phiiofophy : 
And  coiifequendy)  tho'  the  Nature  and 
Will  of  God,  as  far  as  is  necelTary  to 
be  known,  was  diiccverable  (as  the  D^// 
fays])  by  Natural  Light ;  yet  a  Reve- 
lation might  be  of  great  Ufe  to  Man- 
kind ;  and  therefore  fuch  a  Method  of 
Inftrudion  not  unworthy  or  unbecom* 
ing  the  Wifdom  of  G  o  d. 

I  HAVE  already  obferved,  That  the 
Reafons  by  which  .  the  Deiji  pretends 
to  defend  himlelf,  while  he  rejects  Re- 
velation, without  giving  it  a  fair  Hear- 
ing, arc  thefe  : 

i/,  *'  That  there  is  no  proving 
a  Revelation,  but  by  Miracles;  and 
that  Miracles  will  never  prove  any 
Thing  but  .our  own  Ignorance. 
2dly,  ^^  Th  AT  if  they  could  be  made 
to  prove  Something,  they  could  not 
prove  a  Revelation,  becaiife  a  Reve- 
lation would  be  ufelefs,  and  therefore 
cannot  have  God  for  its  Author,  who 
*'  does  nothing  in  vain,  or  without  good 
**  Reafon. 

B  b  jdly,  Be*      . 


370  Sermon   XIII. 

^dly,  "  Because  there  are  fo  ma- 
^*  -ny  Pretences  to  Revelation,  all  of 
"  them  pretending  to  be  fupported  by 
"  the  Extraordinary  Power  of  God, 
^  "  that  there  is  no  difcovering  which 
"  of  them  is  the  true  one,  if  any  fiich 


*'  were." 


These  are  the  Difficulties  which 
hinder  him,  as  he  pretends,  from  be- 
lieving as  we  do. 

•'As  to  the  firft  ofthefe,  I  have  con- 
fidered  it  already  ^.  The  fecond  Difii- 
iculty  they  fupport  by  thefe  two  Rea- 
fons :  I  *  "  Becaufe  Authority  cannot  be 
*^  a  fufficient  Ground  to  form  a  Ra- 
"  tional  AHent  upon.  2.  Becaufe  what- 
"  ever  is  needful  to  be  known  in  Re- 
*•  ligious  Matters,  may  be  found  out 
*'  by  Reafon  and  Difcourfe." 

I  SHALL  therefore  fliew  i/,  That 
Authority  may  be  a  good  Reafon  for 
giving  our  Affent  to  a  Propofition. 

i?^/y.  That  a  Revelation  is  better 
fitted  on  many  Accounts  for  Teaching 
Men  their  Duty,  than  Reafon   or  Phi- 

lofophj. 

*    SecScrra.   XII. 


Sermon   XIII.  37 r 

lofofhy  :  And  therefore  that  'tis  not  un- 
becoming the  Wifdom  of  God  'to 
make  one. 

iff.  The  Reafonablenefs  of  Believing, 
or  the  Reafonablenefs  of  fuch  a  Perfua- 
fion,  as  is  entirely  built  upon  Faith  or 
Authority,  is  to  be  proved.  By  a  Perfuafi- 
on  formed  upon  Fai(h  or  Authority,  in  Di- 
ftindion  from  a  Perfuafion  that  refts  up- 
on Reafon  only  ;  I  mean,  a  Perfuafion, 
That  a  Propofition  is  true,  altho'  our 
Reafon  cannot  difcover  any  necelTary 
Agreement  between  the  Parts  of  the 
Propofition ;  but  believes  them  to  be 
truly  conne8:ed,  becaufe  we  are  told  as 
much;  fo  as  if  God  reveals  a  Propo- 
fition to  us,  which  Natural  Reafon  dif. 
covers  to  be  evidently  and  neceffarily 
true,  as  He  has  done  in  the  Moral  Law ; 
all  fuch  as  do  evidently  perceive  it  to 
be  true,  can't  be  properly  faid  to  take  it 
for  a  Truth  upon  Faith,  or  the  Authority 
of  G  o  D,  but  upon  the  Reafon  and  Evi- 
dence of  the  Thing :  becaufe  where  the 
Proof  is  clear  and  evident,  the  Reafon 
of  Aflent  will  be  refolved  into  its  Evi- 
dence, not  into  the  Authority  of  the 
B  b   2  Perfon 


\ 


2^72  Sermon   XlII. 

Perfon  who  relates  It  to  us  for  a  TrutL 
And  therefore  when  a  certain  f  Au- 
thor tells  us,  ''  We  neither  ought,  nor 
"  can  AfTent  to  any  Propofition,  till  the 
."  Mind  does  thoroughly  underftand,  and 
"evidently  perceive  it  to  be  true;" 
-he  efre£lually  excludes  Authority  from 
being  any  Reafon  of  our  Aflent  j  it  be- 
ing then  only  that  our  AlTent  proceeds 
from  a  Principle  of  Faith,  when  'tis  giv- 
en before  any  fuch  Evidence  appears. 

God  had  left  Mankind,  except  a 
very  fmall  Part,  the  jF^iv/,  almoft  with- 
out any  other  Diredions,  than  what 
Natural  Reafon  could  furnifli  them 
with.  For  excepting  fome  few  Tradi- 
tions, fuch  as  thofe  concerning  the  For- 
mation of  the  Earth,  and  the  Drown- 
ing it  by  a  Deluge  of  Waters,  and  fome 
others,  (which  too  had  the  ufual  Fate 
of  Dodrines  conveyed  in  the  Way  of 
Tradition,  viz,  of  being  fo  confounded 
with  Fable  and  Story,  that  to  difcover 
how  much  of  them  was  true,  what  added 
to  the  Original  Tradition,  was  near  as 

difficult, 

;  ^  II 

t  Chrillianity  not  Myfterious. 


Sermon    XIII.  373 

difficult,  as  it  would  have  been  to  have 
difcovered   thofe  Truths   without     the 
Help  of  any  Tradition  ;)  excepting  fome 
few  Traditions,   whatever   they   found 
put,  was  in  a  Way  of  Reafon  and  Phi- 
iojophy^'  by  fuch  Inferences  as  Keafon  wa^ 
able  to  draw   from  its  own  Principles. 
God  fent  no  Prophets  amongft  them 
to    declare    authoritatively  what    their 
Duty  was,  but  every  one  was  to  find 
it  out  as  well  as  he  could.  Not  but  that 
He  raifed  up  Great  and  Learned  Men, 
fuch  as  many  of  the  Philofophers  in  tlie 
feveral  Seels  were,  to  be  the  Interpre- 
ters of  Duty  to  the  People,  and  perhaps 
aflifted  them  too  in  thofe  great  Difco- 
veries    they  made  concerning  Himfelf, 
and  their  Duty  to  Him  ;  but  then  God 
did  all   this   in  a  Way   of  Reafon   and 
human  Wifdom :    They  never  pretend- 
ed they  had  them  from  G  o  d,  or  urged 
Men  to  the  Belief  of  them  on  that  Ac- 
count ;  the  only  Arguments  they  infill- 
ed on ,  were  fuch  rational  Deductions 
from  the  Nature  of  Things,  as  Reafon 
^nd  Obfervation  might  have  furnifl^ed 
them  \yith.    But    notwithftanding    all 
B  b   ^  their 


374        S'feRMoN  xin. 

th'etr  'wife  Inftruflions,  and   the  Difco- 
veries    made  by  them  concerning   tW 
Object   of  Worfhip;    yet  we    find  th# 
Bulk  of  Mankind  made  fmall  Improve-' 
ments  under  them  •,  for  St.  P^///  tells  us, 
the  World  with  all  its  Wifdom  was  not 
gotten  fo  far,    as    to  know  the  True 
God;  and    therefore    God    obferving 
the  fmall  Proficiency  Men  made  under 
this  Sort  of  Teachers,   was  pleafed  to 
take  it  upon  Himfelf  to  teach  Mankind, 
and  free    them    from   the  Trouble   of 
Searching  what  their  Duty  was,  by  long 
and   elaborate  Dedudions  from  Princi- 
ples of  Reafon ;    that  now  they  fliould 
"rely  upon  his   Credit  for  fucli  Truths 
-as  they  wanted  to  be  fatisfied  in ;  that 
they  fhould  have  His  Authority  for  a 
Proof,  inftead  of  thofe   tedious,  and  of- 
ten Times  flippery  Inferences  from  Rea- 
fon, or  thofe  much  more  uncertain  and 
ill-grounded  Traditions,  which  tverethe 
'beft  Means  they  had  of  coming  at  the 
Knowledge  of  fome  Truths  of  the  great- 
eft  Importance. 

One     would    think    that    Mankind 

fhould    have  received   this  Method   of 

id  a  being 


Sermon    xiil         375 

being  Taught  byGop  with  the  great- 
efl:  Satis&aion,  and  a  due  Senle  of 
their  Obligations  to  G  o  d  their  Teach- 
er ;  that  no  one  iliould  have  puf  Him 
upon  proving  what  He  alTerted,  before 
they  could  beheve  Him  ;  that  his  Ve- 
racity, whom  Natural  Reafon  difcovers 
to  be  too  Wife  to  be  impoled  upon 
flimfelfy  and  too  Good  to  impofe  upoqi 
others^  fliould  have  removed  all  Objer 
Sions  againft  fuch  a  Method  of  Inftru- 
£lion :  And  yet  fame  People  pretend  to 
affure  us,  That  Alfent  given  to  what 
we  don't  thoroughly  underfland,  tho' 
Supported  by  the  greateft  Authority,  is 
repugnant  to  the  Nature  of  a  Rational 
Being  :  That  clear  and  diftiiiQ:  Idea^ 
iire  ;to  the  Underifanding,  what  Light 
and  a  fit  Medium  are  to  the  Eye;  and 
that  a  Man  may  as  well  fee  an  ObjeQ:, 
when  either  of  thefe  are  wanting,  as 
the  Mind  aflent  to  any  Truth,  of  whidi 
|t  has  not  clear  and  dilfin^i  Ideas  : 
Tliat  Authority,  as  fuch,  being  a  Thing 
foreign  to  the  Propofition,  to  which  we 
give  our  Aifent,  and  not  making  it  more 
intelligible  than  it  was  before,  cannot 
B  b   4  therefore 


37^         Sermon    XIII. 

therefore  induce  a  Rational  AITent ;  and 
confequently ,   that    the    Obedience  of 
Faith,  and  Refignation  of  Underftand- 
in^y  fo  much   talk'd   of,   are  a  perfe^ 
Contradiftion  to  the  Nature  of  an  hu- 
man Mind.  '^^ 
I F  tliis  Objedion  were  juft,  it  would 
not  be  eafy  to  make  out  what  the  Apo- 
ftle  contends  for,  viz.  The  Preferable- 
nefs  of  the  Way  of  Faith  above  that  of 
Wrfdomy  for  the  Salvation  of  Mankind. 
For,  li  all  Affent  muft  be  refolved  into 
clear  and  diftin6l  Ideas  as  the  fole  Caufe 
of  it,    and  no  Man  could  Affent,   'till 
he  had  fuch  Ideas ;  there  would  be  no 
Room  left  for  Affenting  upon  a  Princi- 
ple of  Faith ;  for,  as  I  before  obferved, 
all  Propofitions  of  Faith,   properly  fo 
called,    do  fuppofe  that  the  Peribn  to 
whom  they  are  fuch,  does  not  tliorougli- 
ly  underfland  them.     That    all    Affent 
muft    be    grounded    on  fome  Kind   of 
Evidence  or  other,  is  very  certain ;  and 
alfo  that  a  Man  muft  have  a  clear  and 
diftinfl:   Perception  of  the  Senfe  of  a 
Propofition,  before  lie  can  give  any  Af- 
fent to  it  J    otherwife  he  would  Ai^cm 


Sermon    Xllt.         gff 

to  he  knows  not  what:  But  then  it 
does  not  follow  that  a  Man  can't  give 
his  AiTent,  'till  he  is  able  to  iind  out 
thofe  Proofs,  which  ihew  the  Connexi- 
on and  Agreement  between  the  Parts 
of  the  Propofition ;  for  why  may  not 
Authority,  affirming  the  Truth  of 
a  Propofition,  be  a  fuiBcient  Evidence 
to  warrant  our  Ailent  ?  'Tis  true. 
Authority ,  as  fuch ,  does  not  help* 
us  to  underftand  the  Propofition  bet- 
ter than  we  did  before ;  and  yet 
the  Opinion  we  may  have  of  the  Per- 
fon's  "Skill  and  Veracity,  who  tells  us 
tlie  Propofition  is  true,  may  be  to  us, 
who  have  this  Opinion  of  him,  a  pro- 
bable Evidence  of  its  Truth,  and  a  Ra- 
tional Ground  of  Perfuafion.  For  no 
one  can  doubt,  whether  a  Man  may  not 
rationally  enough  give  his  Aifent  to  the 
Truth  of  any  one  Propofition  in  Euclid^ 
if  he  underilands  the  Terms  of  it,  al- 
tho',  being  unacquainted  with  that  Sci- 
ence, he  may  not  be  able  to  demon- 
ftrate  it ;  and  yet  the  only  Ground  of 
his  Affent,  in  luch  Cafe,  would  be  the 
Authority   of  fome  Perfon,    whom  he 

believed 


37^  Sermon  XIIL 

believed  able  to  do  it.  For  the  iarae 
Reafoii,  tho'  we  are  far  from  having 
any  clear  and  diftinft  Ideas  of  a  Re« 
furredion,  and  can  fee  no  Connexion 
between  our  dying  and  rifnig  to  Life 
again,  yet  we  may  Affent  to  this  PrOf 
pofition,  That  the  Dead  fhall  Hve  again, 
i^  we  be  once  fatisfied  that  the  Perfon 
who  tells  us  it  fhall  be  fo,  is  a  Lover 
of  Truth,  and  able  to  conned  the  Parts 
<jf  this  Propofition.  And  therefore  ^ 
clear  and  diftincl  Underilanding  of  a 
Truth,  cannot  be  previoufly  necef- 
fary  to  every  AiTent  of  the  Mind  of 
.  Man. 

If  we  fhould  alfo  confider  the  li* 
mited  Nature  of  our  Faculties ,  that 
they  fall  vaftly  fhort  of  reaching  the 
whole  Extent  of  Being ;  that  there  are 
few  Things  about  which  we  can  cer- 
tainly determine  ;  many  Trutlis  of  great 
Importance  to  us,  for  which  in  a  Way 
of  Reafon  we  fhould  want  evident 
Proofs ;  that  there  are  many  more, 
which  the  Generality  of  Mankind  would 
fcarce  be  capable  of  underftanding , 
for  want  of  Skill  to  ufe  fuch  Proofs  as 

Reafon 


Sermon   XIII. 

Reafon  difcovei"s :  Confidering  ail  this, 
one  might  think  it  no  Injury  done  to 
any  Man's  Underftanding,  i{  he  receiv- 
ed thefe  Truths  in  a  more  certain^  and 
much  eafier  Way,  as  I  fhall  prefently 
fhew,  from  the  Etei*nal  Fountain  of 
Knowledge.  For  no  Body,  I  thinkv 
would  blame  a  Perfon  who  was  fenfi- 
ble  of  a  DeteQ:  in  his  Eye-fight,  for 
believing  the  Report  of  anotlier  upon 
the  Subjed  of  Seeir>g,  if  he  thought 
him  to  be  an  honejR:  Man,  and  to  have 
better  Eyes  than  hrmfelf ;  and  yet  the 
Report  of  fuch  a  Perfon  does  not  help 
him  to  fee  the  Thing  better,  than  he 
did  before.      But, 

■  2%,  I  Proceed  to  fhew  fome  of 
the  Advantages  of  this  Way  of  Teach- 
ing the  World  by  Faith,  above  that  of 
Reafon  :     As, 

i/,  Upon  account  of  its  Certainty; 
Whilil  Mankind  was  left  to  the  Dire- 
Qions  of  Natural  Reafon,  we  meet 
%ith  nothing  but  Uncertainty  and  Ir- 
refolution  about  Truths  of  the  Kigheft 
Concern;  they  were  perpetually  Dif- 
puting  about  the  Origh  of  the  World, 
'-"  fome 


38( 


Sermon    xiii. 

fome  contending  it  owed  its  Original 
to  a  lucky  jumbling  together  of  the 
Parts  of  Matter  :  Others,  That  befidcs 
Matter,  there  was  another  Principle, 
viz.  Mind,  that  a8:uated  Matter,  and 
raifed  it  into  that  beautiful  Order  we 
now  fee  it  in.  Others  not  feeing  how 
the  rnany  Goods  and  Evils  that  he  eve- 
ry where  fo  intermixed,  could,  being  fo 
contrary  in  their  Natures,  proceed  from 
the  fame  Principle,  concluded,  That  be- 
fides  Matter,  there  muft  be  Two  other 
Principles,  One  the  Author  of  all  the 
Good,  and  the  Other  of  all  the  Evil 
m  the  World.  Nor  were  they  lels  at 
a  Lofs  about  the  Government  of  the 
World ;  one,  and  that  no  inconfidera- 
ble  Se£t  of  Philofophers,  leaving  it  to 
the  Guidance  of  Chume  ;  others  to  Fate 
or  Nectffipj  ;  and  others  to  a  G  o  d  or  Free 
Jgent,  The  Generality  of  Men  were 
under  great  Uncertainty  as  to  their  For* 
givenefs,  after  their  having  offended 
the  D  iL  1 T  Y.  Some  hoped  their  Concern 
for  having  done  fo,  and  a  Refolution 
to  beimve  better  for  the  future,  would 
be  fufiicient  to  make  their  Peace  with 

Go  D ; 


Sermon    XIII.  381 

God;    but    the   greateft   Part   would 
not  trufl:  to  this,  without  adding    a  Vi-- 
carious   Death,    as  an  Atonement   for 
their  Faults:    But  whether    either,  or 
both  of  them,  would  be  accepted,  was 
more  than  Reafon  could  inform  them; 
becaufe  it  could  not  appear  that  God 
was    obliged  by  any  of  his  Perfections 
to  accept  of  either  or  of  both  ;  and  fuch 
Things  as  depend  upon   his  Will,  and 
are  Ads  of  Bounty  or  Favour,    cannot 
be  known  'till  He  pleafes  to  reveal  them. 
If  we  look  into  their  Debates  concern- 
ing the  Happinefs  which  God   defigned 
Man  for,  we  fhall  find  them  at  a  great 
Lofs   where  to  fix  it ;   however,    they 
generally  look'd  no  farther  for  it  than 
on  this  Side  the  Grave,  many  of  them 
denying  any  Reward  beyond  this  Life, 
and  the  reft  very  much  doubting  it ;  io 
as  St.  Paul  might  juftly  charge  the  Gen- 
tile World  with  not  knowing  the  True 
God.    For  tho'  fome  of  them  had  ve- 
ry juft  and  honourable  Notions  of  God, 
and  did  difcover  there  was  a  Great  and 
Good  Being,  that  at  firft  made,  and 
does  ftill  govern  the  World :  yet  they 

could 


382  Sermon    XIIL 

could    not,   neither  was   it    likely  that 
they  lliould,  perfuade  the   reft   of  the 
World  to  be  of  their  Mind.     Becaufe 
there  were  feme  Objedions  which  the» 
lay  againft  this  Suppofition,  for  which 
Reafon  was  unable  to  account ;  as  for 
Inftance,  They  could   never   give  any 
Man  a  fatisfaftory  Account  of  the  ma- 
ny Evils,  both  Moral  and  Natural,  that 
were  too  vifible  in  the  World ;  or  recon- 
cile them  with  the  Suppofal  of  a  Good 
and  Gracious  Being  at  the  Helm  of  our 
AjBPairs;  becaufe  they  knew  nothing  of 
the  happy  State  of  the  firft  Parents  of 
Mankind ;  and  that  they  were  deprived 
of  it  for  an  A6t  of  wilRil  Difobedience, 
and  that  our  Mortality,    with   all  the 
Confequences  attending  fuch  a  State,  is 
an  Effed    of  their  Mifmanagement    *. 
For  as  to  the   pre-exiftent  State,   which 
was  the  beft  Account  they  were  able 
to   give  of  this  Difficulty,    no    Proof 
could    be  made    of  it;  and   therefore 
thofe    who   would  not  take    up   their 
Opinions  upon  truft,    chofe    to  afcribe 

the 

*  Rom.  V.  19. 


Sermon   Xlll.         385 

the  Government  of  the  World  to  Fate, 
or  any  Thing  rather  than  God,  upon 
whofe  Goodnefs  they  thought  it  would 
highly  refled,  if  He  had  created  a  Ra- 
tional Being  with  fuch  a  Biafs  to  Evil, 
_and  placed  it  in  fo  uncomfortable  an 
Habitation.  The  Difficulties  attending 
fome  Rehgious  Truths  in  a  Way  of  Rea- 
fon,feem  to  have  determin'd  fome  of  them 
to  the  Way  of  propoling  their  Senti- 
ments as  Matters  difputable  ;  in  which 
Manner  the  Academy  proceeded  with 
their  Scholars.  They  declared  againfi:  all 
Dogmatical  Determinations  in  Matters 
of  Religion,  and  contented  themfelves 
with  examining  the  feveral  Pretences 
of  others,  without  eftablifliing  any  Opi- 
nion of  their  own  upon  more  than  fro^ 
hable  Grounds.  Thus  we  find  Cfcero 
who  was  one  of  the  Learnedefl:  among 
them,  engaging  the  feveral  Seds  of  Phi- 
lofophers  in  a  Difpute  about  the  Nature 
of  the  Gods,  expofing  m  their  Turns 
the  Weaknefs  of  each  of  them,  and  at 
laft  refufing,  tho'  defired  by  Cotu, 
to  tell  us,  what    himfelf  thought  of 

the 


384         Sermon    XIII. 

the  Subjed  *.  We  have  then  the  moft 
confiderable  Man  of  a  Sed  remarkable 
for  Men  of  Abihties,  at  a  Time  too 
when  Learning  and  good  Senfe  were  at 
the  higheft  Pitch  in  Greece  and  Rowe, 
tacitly  giving  up  the  Caufe  .of  Reafon 
and  Philofophy,  as  infufficient  to  in/fire 
any  Man  m  Truths  concerning  God  and 
Religion. 

What  then  could  the  reft  of  the 
World  do,  when  their  greateft  Men 
were  fo  much  divided  in  thefe  Matters  ? 
efpecially  when  thofe  who  had  the 
moft  Truih  on  their  Sides,  made  the 
leafl  Pretences  to  Certainty  ;  we  may 
eafily  imagine  that  but  Few,  j^nd  thofe 
of  very  inquifitive  Tempei's,  would  give 
themfelves  the  Trouble  of  entring  into 
their  Speculations,  that  the  reft  of  the 
World  would  flight  their  Lectures,  as 
defpairing  to  find  where  the  Truth 
lay,  when  they  were  fo  much  divided 
about  it.  And  fo  it  proved ;  their  Di- 
vifions  did  fo  weaken  their  Authority, 
and  the  Influence  which  otherwife  they 

mult 

*  Viue  Lib.  -J.  Ad  fvnem,  de  Natura  Deoruiiu 


Sermon    Xlli:  38^ 

mufl:  have  had,  that  altho'  many  of 
them  were  convinced  of  the  Unity  of 
the  Deity  themillves,  they  were  ne- 
ver able  to  ftop  the  Progrefs  of  Polj- 
theifm^  Of  oblige  the  Government  of  any 
one  State  in  the  World,  to  fet  up  the 
Worfhip  of  the  One  True  God.  They 
were  fo  little  able  to  reform  Mankind 
in  this  Particular,  that  in  St.  Paul's  Time 
their  Difciples  (the  Heathers  World)  ftill 
went  on  in  their  old  Way  of  Worfl7ip  ; 
In  changing  the  Glory  of  the  mcorrupttUe 
God,  into  an  Image  wA^e  like  to  corru^^ 
iihle  Many  and  to  Birds,  and  Four-footed 
^eaflsy  and  Creep/^g  Things  ^.  Whereas 
when  God  Himfelf  undertook  to  teach 
the  World  in  a  Way  of  Faith,  all  Wa- 
vering and  Irrefolution  concerning  his 
Nature  and  Will,  quickly  vaniQi'd.  The 
Apoftles  were  well  agreed  in  publifhing 
the  fame  Dodrines,  and  propofed  them 
to  their  Hearers  as  certain  Truths ;  and 
thofe  that  gave  in  their  Names  hearti- 
ly to  this  New  Inftitution,  Mt  off  all 
Difputes  of  this  Kind,  and  adhered  fted- 
C  c  dily 


Rom. 


[86  S  E  R  xM  O  N     XIII. 

dily  to  what  the  Apoilles  taught  them  ; 
being  fully  perfuaded  that  what  they 
taught  them  was  the  Truth :  The  good 
Efte£ls  of  this  Agreement  quickly  ap- 
peared in  the  wonderful  Succefs  they 
had  in  Propagating  the  Chriftian  Do- 
ftrine ;  Foljthcijm  and  Idolatry  being 
forced  every  where  to  give  Place  to  the 
Worlliip  of  the  One  True  God,  which 
in  a  very  few  Centuries  became  the 
eftabhflied  Worfliip  of  almoft  the  then 
known  World.  And  tho'  the  firlt 
Preachers  of  this  Way  lay  under  great 
Difadvantages,  as  being  of  a  Nation 
that  the  Greeks  and  Romam  look'd  up- 
on as  little  better  than  barbarous,  the' 
they  were  not  verfed  in  the  Ways  of 
Reafoning,  and  the  Arts  of  Perfuafion, 
that  were  then  moft  likely  to  hav^e  re- 
commended their  Do6lrines ;  yet  when 
the  World  came  to  confider  the  Strength 
of  that  Evidence,  which  they  brought 
in  Proof  of  them  ,  and  from  thence 
faw  plainly  that  Truth  was  to  be  found 
amongfl:  them,  which  the  endlefs  Dis- 
putes and  Wrajgliiigs  of  their  great 
Men  had  forbidden    them  to  expert, 

they 


Sermon    XIII.        387 

they  quickly  came  over  to  them,  quit- 
ted all  their  old  Engagements  in  Favour 
of  the  Religion  of  their  Country,  and 
fubmitted  themfelves  to  their  Inftru- 
6i:ions ;  which  was  more  than  the  Phi- 
lofophers,  thofe  great  Mafters  of  Rea- 
foning,  and  who  fo  well  underftood 
the  Art  of  managing  Mens  PalTions, 
could  ever  effe8:.  For,  whatever  Re- 
pute their  Schools  might  have  as  fit 
Places  for  Teaching  Men  the  Rules  of 
human  Wifdom  ;  yet  it  is  plain  from 
the  Multitude  of  their  Oracles,  and 
the  frequent  Recourfe  that  was  had 
to  them  upon  all  Occafions,  that  the 
World  did  not  think  their  Reafonings 
in  Matters  of  Religion  were  much  to 
be  depended  on,  and  that  Faith  was  a 
much  more  certain  Principle  of  Truth. 

Perhaps  it  may  be  thought  I 
have  ufed  an  Argument  that  may  be 
turned  upon  me,  and  upon  that  Faith 
which  'tis  brought  to  defend,  becaufe  it 
does  not  appear  that  there  has  ever 
been  any  better  Agreement  in  O^iraom 
among  Chriftians,  than  there  was  a- 
mong  Heathens )  and  therefore  if  the 
C  c    2  great 


\ 


388  Sermon  XIIL 

great  Diverfity  of  Opinions  amongft 
thern,  be  a  good  Argument  to  prove 
the  Vncertat.-itj  they  were  in,  then  as 
great  a  Difference  amongft  Chriftians, 
ought  in  all  Reafon  to  inferr  as  great 
an  Uncertainty ;  that  the  Hiftories  of 
pafs'd  and  prefent  Times ,  and  the 
large  Catalogues  of  Herefies  that  are 
given  us  by  E^^iphanius,  Philajlrius  and 
others  do  abundantly  [hQW,  that  the 
Difputes  between  Chriftians  concerning 
Articles  of  Religion,  come  not  fhort  of 
thofe  among  Heathens.  That  tho'  the 
Authority  of  Scripture  be  granted,  yet 
the  World  is  never  the  nearer  to  an 
Agreement  in  the  Articles  of  Religion, 
as  is  plain  by  the  infinite  Number  of 
Commentaries  upon  the  fame  Scriptures, 
and  the  conftant  Appeal  of  all  Seds 
of  Chriftians ,  how  oppofite  foever  la 
their  Opinions,  to  the  lame  Holy  Wri- 
tings :  and  therefore  the  Way  of  Faith 
feems  not  to  have  any  great  Advan- 
tages above  that  of  Reafon  on  the 
Score  of  d-rtainty. 

In  Anfwer    to  this,  it  may  be  faid, 
That  as  to  the  Catalogues  of  Herefies 

given 


Sermon    XIII.         389 

given  us  by  the   Ancients,  they  were 
not  much  to  be  relied  upon  ;  that  many 
of  them   were   concerning    Matters  of 
fmall  Confequence,    and   not  belonging 
to  the  Eflence   of  Rehgion,  as   appears 
by  the  Catalogues  themfelves  ;  and  the 
Writers  of  thofe  Times  obfcrve,  That 
People  were  then  very  forward  in  mar 
king  unfair  Reprefentations  of  their  Ad- 
versaries Opinions,  and  calling  every  O- 
pinion  that  differed  from  their  own,  by 
the  odious  Title   of  Herefy.    That  if 
Chriftians  did  differ  about  the  Senfe  of 
fome  Places  of  Scripture  that  contain^ 
ed  Articles  of  Importance,  fuch  as  thofe 
which  concerned   the  InC'Xrrjation  of  the 
Word   in   the    Verfon  of  our   Saviour, 
a  Trinity  in  "Vnttj^  and  fome  other 
difficult  Dodrines  ;  that  yet  as  to  thofe 
Articles    in  which  I  have  charged  the 
Heathens   with    being  very  much    di- 
vided, fuch  as  thofe  concerning  the  Ma- 
K  E  R  and  Governor  of  the  World, 
whether  there  was  any  one  Intelligent 
Being  to   whom  thefe  Titles   did   of 
Right  belong  :  If  there    was,   whether 
He  had  made  any    Provifion   in  fome 
Q  Q    I  othr 


390  Sermon  XIII. 

ether  State  for   fuch  as  had  ferved  Him 
faithfully,   tho'   imperfedllyn  this  :  As 
to  any  of  thefe    Articles,  the  Difputes 
among  fuch   as  profelTed   the  Chriftian 
Religion   were  always    exceeding  few, 
if  compared  with    thofe    amongft  the 
Heathens :    And   no  Chriftian    Se6:    of 
any  Note  at  this  Time,   denies  any  of 
them.     That  thefe    are    of    all   others 
Truths  of   the    greateft    Concern,   as 
without  which  there  could  be  no    fuf- 
ficient  Reafon  for  ferving  God  at  all ; 
for  he  that  cometh  to  G  o  d,  muft   be- 
lieve thefe  two  Things ;    that  He  ii^  and 
that  He  is  a   Rewarder  of  them  that  feek 
Him,    That  the  Belief  of  the  other  Do- 
ctrines of  Religion  is  chiefly  required  of 
us  for  this  very  End,   that   our   Faith 
m  thefe  might  be  more  firm  and  bet- 
ter grounded ;  and  therefore  an  Agree- 
ment amongft  Chriftians,  fo  much  want- 
ed   among  fuch    as    were   under     the 
Guidance  of  Natural  Light,  tho'  it  were 
to  be  found  only  in  thefe  Truths;  yet  if 
we  confider  the    Importance  of  them 
to  Religion,  would  fufiiciently  prove  a 
ReveUtio-a  to    be  better    qualified   for 


Teaching 


Sermon    Xlli.  391 

Teaching  Mankind  the  Principles  and 
Motives  to  Duty,  than  Reafofi  or  Pht- 
lojbphy. 

However,  fuppofing  that  by  De- 
dudions  made  from  Principles  of  Rea- 
Ibn,  the  wiler  and  more  intelligent  Part 
of  the  World  could  have  arrived  at  as 
great  Certainty^  and  been  as  well  a- 
greed  in  thefe  Articles  I  have  now 
mentioned,  as  we  Chriftians  are  hy  the 
Help  of  Revelation ;  yet  ftill  the  Way 
of  Faith  would  be  much  more  efleclual 
towards  a  general  Inltruction  of  the 
World,  than  that  of  Reafon  ;  becaufe  a 
Revelation  teaches  in  a  Method  that  is 
better  fuited  to  the  diiierent  Opportu- 
nities  and  Apprehenfofis  of  Men.  And 
that 

i/,  Because  its  Way  of  Teaching 
is  much  lliorter  and  more  compendi- 
ous than  that  of  Reafon,  therefore  bet- 
ter fitted  for  the  different  Opportunities 
of  Men. 

2dly^  Because  'tis  more  eafy  and 
more  intelligible ;  confequently,  better 
fuited  to  the  different  Degrees  of  Un? 
derilandigg  among  Men. 

C  c    4  i/?,  H-^- 


392  Sermon    XIII. 

ly?,  Because  its  Method  of  Teach- 
ing is  fliorter.  If  we  confider  the  State 
of  Mankind,  we  may  obferve  that  much 
the  greatefc  Part  are  given  up  to  La- 
bour, and  enflaved  to  a  mean  Condi- 
tion, almoft  all  their  Time  and  Pains 
laid  out  in  making  the  necejlTary  Pro- 
vifions  for  Life.  And  therefore  if  we 
would  undertake  to  teach  fuch  Perfons 
their  Duty,  we  mud  ufe  the  fliortefl: 
Method  with  them  that's  pofTible  ^ -, 
but  if  we  compare  together  the  diffe- 
rent Ways  of  Proof  from  Re  a  Jon  and 
from  Faub^  we  fhall  eafily  obferve  that 
any  Truth  will  be  much  fooner  learnt, 
when  'tis  proved  by  an  Argument 
drawn  from  Faith^  than  the  fame  Truth 
would  be  by  Reafo/2 ;  for  if  we  would 
learn  any  Thing  in  the  Way  of  Arguing 
from  Principles  of  Reafon^  we  mulf  be 
oftentimes  content  to  go  Step  by  Step 
thro'  feveral  Confequences,  before  we 
can  arrive  at  our  Conclufion ;  efpeciaUy 
if  the  Truths  we  would  underftand,  be 
of  a  Complex  Nature,  fuch  as  are  thofe 

wliich 

;  Ongen  contra  Celfum.  Lib,  i.  p,  9, 


Sermon  Xlll.  393 

which  concern  our  Duty.  For  before 
we  can  underftand  our  Obligation  to 
any  of  the  Moral  Laws  by  Reafon^  we 
muft  confider  our  own  Natures,  and 
obferve  the  natural  Tendencies  of 
Things  ;  and  from  thefe  inferr  our  Obli- 
gations. As  for  Inftance ;  If  I  would 
underftand  whether  I  am  obliged  to 
be  juft  in  my  Dealings,  Reafon  would 
difcover  it  to  be  fo,  becaufe  Man  is 
naturally  made  for  Society,  and  can't 
live  with  tolerable  Comfort  without  it ; 
and  tlie  World  is  fo  ordered,  that  un- 
lefs  juft  and  fair  Dealings  were  obferved, 
no  Society  could  poftibly  be  kept  up, 
but  would  quickly  end  in  Tumult  and 
Confufion  :  From  thence  I  would  con- 
clude, That  fince God  had  made  Juftice 
fo  necefTary  to  the  Well-being  of  Man- 
kind, that  He  intended  Men  fhould  pra- 
ctice this  Virtue  ;  to  underftand  our 
Obligation  to  this,  or  any  other  Duty 
in  a  Way  of  Faith,  nothing  more  is 
neceflkry,  than  feeing  what  the  Scrip- 
tures, which  are  the  Word  of  God,  de- 
termine m  this  Matter.  There  we  may 
prefently  learn  what   our  Duty  is,  by 

applying 


g94  Sermon  Xiii. 

applying  what  the  Scriptures  fay,  to 
our  own  Cafe,  and  difcover  at  one  View 
what  Reafon  can't  make  evident  to  us, 
'till  it  has  put  us  to  the  Trouble  of 
ranging  our  Thoughts,  and  obferving 
the  Relation  and  Dependence  they  have 
one  upon  another.  This  is  none  of  the 
leaft  Advantages  which  Faith  has  above 
Reafon,  that  it  inftruds  us  in  fo  com- 
pendious a  Method,  that  there  is  no 
Man,  let  his  Circumftances  be  never 
fo  ftrait,  but  may  find  Time  enough  to 
learn  his  Duty. 

2.dly^  As  Faith  teaches  us  in  a  fbort- 
er  Way,  fo  in  a  more  intelligible  one, 
and  which  is  therefore  better  fitted  for 
the  different  Degrees  of  Underftanding 
amongft  Men.  Whiift  there  was  no 
other  Way  of  Teaching  the  World  but 
by  Natural  Reafon,  we  find  the  wifer 
Heathens  were  fo  fenfible  of  the  Diffi- 
culty of  Teaching  Men  their  Duty,  that 
they  would  conftantly  run  thro'  a 
Courfe  of  the  difficult  Parts  of  Know- 
ledge, with  their  Scholars,  before  they 
could  think  them  capable  of  learning 
Morality,     The  Epcurems  required  the 

Knowledge 


Sermon  XIII.  39$ 

Knowledge  of  Natural  Things,  the  PU- 
tomjls  fome  Skill  in  the  Mathematicks^  as 
a  Preparatory  to  their  Ethical  Le£lures. 
They  found   by  Experience  how  little 
the  Generality  of  the  World  could  ap- 
prehend   them,  when  they  were  Rea- 
foning  concerning  the  Supreme  Being, 
and  their  feveral  Duties    to   Him,  and 
therefore  generally  agreed  in  excluding 
the  Bulk    of  Mankind  from  a  PofTibi- 
lity  of  attaining  to  any  great  Degrees 
of  Virtue ;   looking  upon  fuch   only  as 
capable  of  Virtue,  who  were  furnifhed 
with  good  Natural   Abilities,    and  had 
enjoyed  the  Benefits  of  a  hberal  Edu- 
cation ;    but  as   to  all  the  reft  of  the 
"World,   we    find  Sen  ecu  ranking   them 
among  the  Beafts  that  perifli ;  fo  as  by 
their  own  Confeflion,  the  Way  of  K^4- 
fon   could   never    have  done  much  to- 
wards bringing  the  World  to  a  Senfe 
of  their  Duty,  when  they  fhut  out  the 
greateil  Part  of  it  from  a  Capacity  of 
receiving  Benefit  by  it.    And  'tis  eafy 
to  obferve,  that  the  Generality  of  Men 
are  hardly  capable   of  any  other  No- 
tices of  Things,  than  what  are  imprefs'd 

by 


3p5  Sermon    XIII. 

by  the  Objects  of  Senfe  ;  they  have  not 
Skill  enough  to  compare  fimple  Terms 
fb  exactly  with  one  another ,  as  to 
compound  them  into  true  Propofitions, 
and  then  to  inferr  from  every  Propo- 
fition  its  Natural  Confequences  and  De- 
dudions;  nor  vi^hen  they  are  made  for 
them,  always  to  fee  the  Connexion  and 
Force  of  the  Argument.  An  Argument 
that  ftrikes  their  Senfes  fball  much 
more  effectually  convince  them  of  any 
Truth,  than  any  the  moft  exa£l  and 
elaborate  Reafonings  upon  it :  And 
therefore  the  Miracles  performed  by 
our  Saviour  and  his  Apoftles,  did 
quickly  draw  the  Multitude  after  them, 
and  in  a  little  Time  brought  them  in. 
more  Difciples,  than  the  abftrufe  Spe- 
culations of  the  Philofophers  had  ever 
done  before.  For  every  Man  is  able  to 
judge  whether  a  blind  Man  had  been 
reftored  to  his  Sight  •  whether  the  Deaf 
to  their  Hearing,  and  whether  the  Dead 
had  been  raifed  to  Life  again ;  Senfe 
being  the  proper  Judge  in  thefe  Cafes, 
and  then  any  Man,  that  had  either 
feen    Of  heard    of    fuch    Tilings  done, 

would 


Sermon    XIII.  '397 

would  naturally  draw  the  fame  Con- 
clufion  from  them,  as  the  poor  Man  in 
the  Go/pel  did,  when  cured  of  his  blind- 
nefs,  that  the  Perfon  who  had  performed 
that  Cure  muft  be  one  that  came  with 
Power  from  above  ^  //  this  Man  were 
not  of  God  he  could,  do  nothing  *.  Thus 
far  every  Man  will  be  able  to  Reafon, 
let  his  Underftanding  be  never  fo  mean 
or  fhallow.  The  Advantages  of  a  Re- 
velation for  teaching  Men  their  Duty 
would  be  farther  feen,  by  comparing 
the  Pra8:ice  of  Preaching  the  Rehgion 
to  the  People,  as  'tis  done  in  our  Chur- 
ches, with  the  Lectures  of  the  Philo- 
fophers,  or  the  Tnftrudions  of  Pagan 
Priefts  :  Which  will  be  done  in  the 
following  Difcourfe. 
-  I'N  the  mean  Time  this  Obfervation 
naturally  arifes  from  the  Whole,  That 
all  Endeavours  of  undermining  Reve- 
lation, and  weakning  its  Authority, 
are  direO:  Attempts  upon  the  Good 
and  Happinefs  of  Mankind  ;  fince  the 
deftroying   its  Credit,   is   bringing  the 

World 

.*  Johii  ix.  35" 


398  Sermok   XIII. 

World  back  again  to  the  InftruQions 
of  Natural  Reafon ,  which  how  little 
qiiahfied  it  is  for  an  Univerfal  Guide, 
we  have  already  feen.  And  therefore, 
before  any  undertake  to  run-down  Re- 
velation, I  would  beg  of  them  to  con- 
fider  a  few  Things ;  That  they  would 
look  back  upon  former  Times,  thofe 
Times  of  Ignorance ,  which  God  is 
faid  to  have  wink'd  at;  I  would  defire 
them  to  refled  upon  the  extravagant 
Superftitions ,  and  abfurd  Rites  that 
made  the  greateft  Part  of  the  Efta- 
blifhed  Worfliip  of  the  Heathen  Na- 
tions, and  then  I  would  ask  them,  Whe- 
ther it  was  not  greatly  for  the  Ho- 
nour and  Happinefs  of  Mankind,  to  be 
refcued  from  fuch  Errors  as  were  a 
Reproach  and  Scandal  to  human  Na- 
ture ;  and  to  have  a  Rational  Wcrfhip 
and  Religion  in  the  Room  of  'em  ?  And 
whether  'tis  not  highly  probable,  that 
if  the  Credit  of  Revelation  were  once 
deftroyed,  the  World  would  in  a  few 
Ages  return  to  as  bad  a  State  as  that 
in  \vhich  Chriftian  Religion  found  it? 
I  am  fure  they  can't    bring  any  good 

Arguments 


Sermon   xill.         395? 

Arguments  to  prove  it  would  not  be 
fo  j  and  tho'  it  mufl:  be  confefTed,  that 
notwithftanding  Revelation,  the  World 
is  ftill  bad  enough  ;  yet  if  we  compare 
the  Hiftories  of  the  Times  that  were 
before,  with  thofe  that  fucceeded,  we 
Ihall  foon  fee  that  it  has  been  much 
improved  by  it;  as  might  be  fhewn 
in  the  many  irrational  Cuftoms,  and 
obfcene  Rites  of  Worlhip  (fuch  as  thofe 
paid  to  the  Mother  of  the  Gods  ^)  that 
have  been  abolifhed  in  the  feveral  Na- 
tions ,  where  If  has  been  received ; 
when  the  Preachers  of  Natural  Reli- ' 
gion  could  never  prevail  with  the  Peo- 
ple to  part  with  any  of  them. 

From  hence  too  we  may  obferve, 
That  the  Unbeliever  cannot  be  fafe 
from  the  Apprehenfions  of  Punifhment 
in  a  future  State,  while  he  has  no  bet- 
ter Arguments  for  rejecting  our  Chri- 
ftian  Revelation,  than  pleading  the  Dif- 
ficulty of  feeing  what  Ufe  a  Revelation 
could  be  of  to   Mankind. 

S  E  R  M. 

*  Vide  Aug.  de  CIvitate  Dei.  Lib.  2.  cap.  -^,  &  5, 


401 


SERMON  XIV. 


I  Cor.    I.  21* 

For  after  thaty  in  the  Wif- 
dom  of  Go  Dy  the  World 
hyWifdom  knew  not  God, 
it  pJeafed  God  ly  the 
foolijhnefs  of  Preaching  to 
fave  them  that  believe. 

HE    Want   of  a  Revelati- 
on has  been   proved   from 
the  Uncertainty   in  which 
Mankind  was,  with  regard 
to  fuch  Truths  as  it  nearly 
concern'd  every  Body  to  know.    Sucli 
as  thefe ;  Whether  there  were  any  Su- 
preme Intelligent  Being  that  took  no- 
D  d  tice 


402  Sermon  XIV. 

tice  of  the  A£lions  and  Behaviour  of 
Men ;  and  whether,  fuppofing  fuch  an 
ofi^  He  would  forgive  Mens  voluntary 
Miftakes,  upon  their  being  fincerely  con- 
cern'd  for  them,  and  refolving  to  do 
better  for  the  fiiture ;  and  whether  He 
defigned  to  take  any  farther  notice  of 
them  after  they  were  once  dead,  by  re- 
floring  them  to  Life  again,  and  Re- 
warding or  Punifhing  them  for  their 
Behaviour  here.  As  to  all  thefe,  I  have 
already  fliewn,  That  the  World  labour- 
ed under  great  Uncertainties.  I  have 
alfo  proved  the  Infuificiency  of  Reafon 
for^refcuing  Mankind  from  this  Uncer- 
tainty, and  for  inftruding  them  in  their 
Duty,  from  the  Confideration  of  thofe 
diiPerent  Ranks  and  Orders  feen  amongft 
Men  :  That  the  lower  Order,  which  is 
>  tl:^e  J  Generality  of  Men,  is  enflaved  to 
^  mean  Condition,  that  fuch  a  Condition 
will .  not  allow  Time  fulncient  for  Spe- 
culation,, or  for  confidering  in  a  Way 
.q£  Reafi»wlut  their  Duty  was.  That 
hx  a  W^y  pf  Author  it)  Mens  Duty 
igiglit  be  made  much  more  eafy  and 
.intelligible  to  ^  them  than  by  Reafon  or 

Fhilojo^hj, 


SfiRWb^'XlV.  '403 

Vhllofophy,  I  am'  further  to  prove  the 
Ufeftibefs  of  a  Revelation  by  one  Me- 
thod of  Teaching  Men  their  Duty  z^- 
hsf//>  't6 'it,  which  is,  By  Preaching 
that  Rehglon  in  mix'd  AfTemblies,  where 
Perfons  of  all  Degrees  may  meet,  and 
receive  Inftruttion  by  that  which  the 
Vain  Philofophers  in  my  Text  called  the 
Toolijbmfs  of  Freachwg. 

1  AM  not  obliged  to  confider,  Whe- 
ther under  Natural  Religion  the  World 
might  not  have  been  better  taught  than 
they  were,  in  Virtue  of  fuch  Princi- 
ples as  Natural  Reafon  might  have  fug- 
gefted  to  them;  tho'  I  have  already 
Siewn^,  That  Morality  could  not  be 
explained  fo  familiarly  in  a  Philofophi- 
cal  Le8:ure,  as  it  is  in  our  Homilies  or 
bifcourfes  to  the  People;  but  whe- 
ther  in  FaQ,  after  a  Trial  of  Four 
or  Five  Thoufand  Years,  they  did  hit 
upon  fo  good  a  Method  of  Reform- 
ing the  World,  as  this  of  Preaching , 
which  was  introduced  among  us  by 
RevtUtiof?,  The  Excellency  of  this  In- 
^^."  D  d  2  ftitution 
1* • 

"^     SeQ  SeriT).    XIII- 


404 


Sermon     XIV. 

flitution  will  eafily  appear,  if  we  cor^ 
fider  it  as  inviting  all  Sorts  of  Perfons 
ta  come  and  be  Hearers;  and  alfo  the 
Number  of  Places    which   have   been 
ufually  fet  aj)art  for   the    Performance 
of  this  Religious  Exercife.    I  have   al- 
ready obferved,   That  only  Perfons  of 
Letters  or  of  a  liberal   Education,  pre- 
tended to  go  to  the  Schools  of  the  Phi- 
lofophers,   but  now  all  Ranks  of  Men, 
the  loweft    and   moft    indigent   of  the 
People,  all  Ages,  the  Old  as  well  as  the 
Young,  "Women  as  well  as  Men,  have 
always  had  a  free  Accefs  to  thefe  Schools 
for  the  Education  of  a  Chriftian,  I  mean 
our  Churches.    And  if  the  Schools  of 
Philofophers  had    made   their    Le£iures 
as  intelligible   as  our   Sermons',   yet   it 
muft  be  confidered  that  their  Difcourfes, 
fo  far   as   Religion    was   concerned  in 
them,  were   merely   Ethical^   regarding 
Mens  Behaviour  towards  one  another, 
without  concerning    themfelves  to  tell 
the  People  the  Manner  of  Reverence  or 
"Worfhip,  that  would  be  moft  agreeable 
to-  the   Supreme  Being;    they  none 

of 


Sermon    xiv.         4.0$ 

of  them  approved  any  of  the  then  efta- 
biifhed   Ways    of  Addrefling  the    Di- 
vine Being,    and    had   not  Courage 
enough  to  teach  their  Scholars  any  other, 
only  in   general  Terms,  That  the  bell 
Way  of  Worfbipping  Him,  was  to  imi- 
tate Him,  and  that  they  told  them  was 
beft    done  by   ftudying   and  obferving 
his  Laws ;  which  was,  in  other  Words, 
nothing  more  than  perfuading  them  tq 
obferve  Moral    Duties  jon   account   of 
their   Be.iuty   znA  Excellency^  as  being  a 
Tranfcript  of  the  Divine  Nature  ;  with- 
out  prefTing    upon   their  Difciples  the 
Pradice  of  Morality  upon  any  Keligi- 
ous  Motives,    fuch    as  the   Hopes     of 
God's  Favour,    and    the  Fear  of  his 
Difpleafure ;  without  telling  them,  they 
mull:     practice    Virtue,    becaufe  God 
would   reward  them  for  fo  doing,  an(i' 
punifh  them  if  they  did  otherwife.   Ac-' 
cordingly   we  find  fome  of  the  Fathers 
of  the  Church  reproaching   the  Pagans 
with  this  unlawful  Divorce  which  tleir ' 
Philofophers  had  made  of  Religion  from 
Morality,    "  The  Pagan  Philofcphy,    fa^'s. 
D  d    3  LiiciA-r}t}u\ 


4o6f  Sermon   XlV. 

Lic^amus  ^,  ^'  and   ReligioK^    are  Two 
"Things  quite  diftind    one  from   the 
"  other ;  Morality  has  its  particular  Do- 
"  dors,   (  meaning   the    Philofophers ) 
"  who  do  not   teach   the    Manner  of 
"  approaching  the  Gods. "   So  that  had 
the   Ledures    read    in  their    Schools^'? 
been  more  intelHgible  than  our  Sermons,: 
yet  this  Infiitution  would  have  been  in- 
feriour   to  our  VreMhingy   as  one  great 
Branch  of  Rehgion,    ^-/-si.  The  Manner 
of  Addreffing   to    Gqd    in  Rehgious 
Worfhip,    together  with  the  only  folid 
Supports   of  a  Virtuous   Life,   viz.,  A 
Religious  Fear  of  the  Deity,    were 
not  taught  by  them. 

And  as  to  the  Heathen  Priefts, 
whofe  peculiar  Bufinefs  ic  was  to 
teach  the  People  how  to  behave  to- 
wards God;  thefe,  I  fay,  made  no 
Difcourfes  to   the    People    concerning 

their 


"*  Philofophia  5c  religio  Deorum  disjurifta  funt, 
tl  quidem  alij  funt  profefTores  fapieritix  per  quoS 
utiquc  ad  Deos  non  aditur.  Alij  lleliglonis  anti- 
ftites,  per  quos  fapere  non  dlfcitur,  Laftant.  In- 
ftitut.  Lib.  4.  cap.  3. 


their  Duty  to  their   Neighbour;    thcf 

never  gave  themfelves  the  Trouble  to 

teach  Men  the  Rules  of  Virtue  ;    but 

fpent  their  Time  in   performing  S:icriii- 

cal  Rites ,    and  certain  Ceremonies  of 

their  Religion,   and  in  inftrucling  Peo-i ; 

pie  to  follow  the  preicribed  Formulary 

of  external  Devotion.    "  Thofe    (fays 

"  L^cfamus  ^)    who  teach    the   Wor- 

"  fhip  of  the  Gods,  take  no  Notice  of 

*' any  Thing  that    may  ferve  to   regu» 

^^  late    Manners    and    the.  .Condud  of 

^'  Life,  they  do  not  in  the.  leaft  feared 

"  after    Truth,    but  apply    themfelves 

"  only  to  learn  the  Ceremonies  of  Dir 

'^  vine  Worfliip,  which  require  nothing 

"  but    the  MiniHry.  of  tlie  Body,  and 

"in  which  the  Sentiments  of  the  Heart 

"  have    no  Part.  "      And    in   another 

Place  f ,    "  Religion    has    hkewife  its 

^'  Minifters ,    who    do  not    teach    the 

D  d   4  *'  Rules 


*  Nihil  ibi  difleritur  quod  proScjat  ad  mores 
excolendos  vitamque  formandam,  nee  habet  in- 
quificionein  aliquam  Veritatis,  fed  tancumaiodo  ri- 
tuin  colendi,  qui  non  Officio  mentis,  fed  iniaffteriqr 
corporis  coaftac.  Inftitut,  Lib,  4.  cap.  3, 
t  Ibidem. 


4o8        Sermon    XIV. 

"Rules  of  Morality. "  St.  Aufim,m 
has  a  PafTage  to  the  fame  Purpofe,  in 
which  he  challenges  the  Heathens  to 
Ihew  "  any  fuch  Places  as  our  Church- 
"  es,  where  the  Precepts  of  the  Mc- 
"  ral  Law  are  ufually  read  by  the 
"  Priefts,  and  heard  by  the  People, 
\V which,  he  tells  them,  is  the  Cafe 
**  wherever  the  Chriftian  Religion  pre- 
"vails."  .: 

We  have  no  Reafon  to  think  thefe 
Fathers  have  wronged  the  Heathen 
Priefts,  if  we  confider  that  they  could 
not  with  any  Decency  pretend  to  have- 
given  the  People  any  LefTons  of  Mo- 
rality ;  becaufe  they  muft  have  founded" 
very  ill  from  the  Mouths  of  fuch  Per^ 
fons  as  were  obliged,  if  they  would 
talk  confiftently  with  the  Principles .  of 
that  Religion,    to   give    fuch   frightful 

Ideas; 


— ■ in-? 

-  -  .'• 

*  Dicatur  in   quibus    locis  hxc  docentium  Deo- 
rum  folebant  prsecepta  recitarl,    Sc  a  culteribus  c6-7 
rum  populis  frequenter  audiri,  ficut  nos  oftcndimns" 
ad  hoc   Ecclefias  inftitutas,    quaquaverfuni    Religia, 
Chriftiana  Di^ditur.      lib.  2.    cap.  6.    De  Civi- 
uzc  Dei. 


Sermon    XIV.-^        409 

Ideas  of  the  Divinity,  afcribe  to  it  fo 
many  grofs   Imperfedions,  Weakneffes, 
and  even  Vices,  as  v^ould  be  abhorred 
by  any  Man  that;  had  but  a  moderate' 
Senfe  of  Honefty.  *  ^-  '' 

'  But  farther,  if  we  confider  the 
Number  of  Places  fet  apart  for  the 
Performance  of  this  Rehgious  Exercife, 
we  fliall  ftill  find  the  Advantages  to 
lie  on  the  Side  of  a  Revelation ;  thefe 
Places  are  to  be  met  with,  not  only  in 
Cities  and  great  Towns,  but  even  in 
the  meaneft  Villages,  by  which  a  Pro-i' 
vifion  is  made  for  the  Countryman,  as. 
well  as  the  Citizen,  that  he  may  be 
taught  his  Duty,  and  well  skilled  in 
his  Religion,  without  ftirring  out  of 
the  Bounds  of  his  Village  or  Parifh. 
Whereas  the  Schools  of.  the  Philofo- 
phers  were  very  few,  and  thofe  in 
Places  only  where  there  was  on  other 
Accounts  a  great  Refort ;  they  were  not 
enough  difperfed,  as  our  Churches  have 
been  from  the  Beginning  of  Chrifli- 
^nity,  for  the  general  Inftrudlon  of 
Mankind;  fo  that  had  their  Ledures 
been    as  plain    as  pur   Sei^ljapjis ,    tl;^" 

greatefl 


4io  Sermon  XIV* 

greatefl:  Part  of  the  World  could  not 
have  reforted  to  them,  by  reafon  of 
the  Diftance  they  lived  from  thofe 
Schools :  The  lower  Sort  of  People  not 
having  Time  from  their  Trades  and 
Employments,  to  travel  far  for  Inftru- 
6:ion.  I  cannot  forbear  tranfcribing  the 
Words  of  the  moft  Learned  Dr.  Prideaux 
in  his  Connexion  *  upon  this  Occafion" 
^f.As  the  JVjvi-,  fays  he,  had  their  Syna- 
"  gogues,  m  which  the  Law  and  the 
"  Prophets  were  read  unto  them  every 
*'  Sabbath  Day,  fo  the  Chriftians  had 
"  their  Churches,  m  which  from  the 
^^  Beginning  all  the  Dodrines  and  Du- 
*^  ties  of  their  Religion  were  every 
"  Lord's  Day  taught,  inculcated  and 
"  explained  to  them ;  and  by  G  o  d's 
*'  Bleffing  upon  this  Method,  chiefly 
"  was  it,  that  this  Holy  Religion  ilill 
"  bore  up  againft  all  Oppreflions,  and 
**  notwithftanding  the  Ten  Perfecutions 
"  and  all  other  Artifices  and  Methods 
"  of  Cruelty  and  OpprefTion ,  which 
*'  Hell  and  Heathenifm  could  devife  to 

"  fupprefs 

*  Connexion,  PArt  i.  pag.^  309..  _ 


"  fupprefs   it,  grew    up    and  increafed^ 
"  under  them  ;  which   "Julian  the  Jpo-^' 
'^  JUfe  was  fo  fenfible  of,    that  when 
"he  put  all  his  Wits  to  work  to  find 
"  out  new    Methods  for  rellori  ngthe 
^'  Heathen  Impiety,  he  could  not  think 
''  of  any  more  effeaual   for  this    Pur-J 
"  pofe  than  to  employ  his  Philofopher$^ 
"  to  preach  it  up  every  Week  to  the 
"  People,    in  the  fame  Manner  as  the 
"  Minifters    of    the    Gofpel    did     the 
«  Chrift ian  Religion  ^. "    The  Ufe  that 
I  would  make  of  this  Paffage   is,  To 
fhew,  what  Opinion  one  of  the  fubtileft, 
a^  well  as    moll  malicious   Adverfaries,"^ 
that  ever    the   Chriftian   Religion  met 
with,   had  of  this  Way  of   doing  Ser^-^ 
vice  to  any  Religion,   by  Preaching  it 
to    the    People,    as   'tis  done  in   our 
Churches.     Which    is    a  fufficient  An- 
fwer  to  fuch  of  our  Unbelievers,  as  will 
not  allow  it  potable  for  a  Revelatioa 
to  be  of  any    Ufe  or   Service  to  Man- 
kind. 

But 

■*  Gregory  Nazianzen  Oratio  contra  Ji'.lianum. 


412  Sermon    XIV. 

,  JBu  T  then,  if  a  Revelation  be  realljf 
of  fuch  Ufe  to  Mankind,  it  may  be 
a^k'd,  Why  there  have  not  been  more 
Preachers  of  it,  fo  that  all  the  World 
niight  have  had  the  Benefit  of  it  ?  and 
•  in  particular ,  Why  the  Chriftian  Re- 
ligion was  confined  to  the  Rom apj  Em- 
pire,  or  at  leafl  not  extended  much 
farther?  That  as  God  is  acknowledg- 
ed to  be  the  Common  Father  of 
All,  and  no  Refpecter  of  Perfons  or  Na- 
tions, if  this  Religion  had  God  for  its 
Author,  it  would  have  been  communi- 
cated to  the  Vpper  as  well  as  the  Lorn- 
er  Jfia,  to  the  Chine fe  and  Tartars^  as 
well  as  to  thofe  Parts  of  Afia  which 
were  m  the  Roman  Empire,  or  border- 
ing upon  it ;  to  the  Urge  Continent  of 
Amertcay  as  well  as  to  the  fmaller  one 
of  Europe,  The  Want  of  fuch  an  Uni^ 
verfaiity,  has  been  urged  by  a  late  Au- 
thor f,  as  a  fufficient  Reafqn  for  Re- 
jecting any  Revelation,  tho' .  it  comes 
recommended  by  every  other  Proof  that 
can  be  defired;    and  for  this  Reafon, 

That 


\  Blount's  Mlfcellanics,  p«f  out  by  Gildon. 


Sermon    Xl^.         413 

"  That  if  no  one  Revelation  has  been 
^  equally  made  known  to  All,  that  none 
"  can  be  wanting  or  needful  to  any, 
"  And  then,  there  being  no  real  Want 
"  of  a  Revelation ,  there  can  be  no 
"  Reafon  for  expeding  any  other- Light 
*'  from  God,  than  what  He  commu- 
"  nicated  to  us  when  He  gave  us  our 
^'  Reafoning  Faculty,  as  He  does  no- 
"  thing  in  vain,  or  gives  any  extraor^ 
^'di/tary  Fowersy  when  i\\Q  ordinary  ones 
.^^:  are  fufficient. " 

I  HAVE  already  fhewn,  That  a  Re- 
velation was   wanting  on   feveral    Ac- 
counts ;  and  therefore  am  only  obliged  to 
fee,  whether  a  partial  Revelation  be  as 
good  an  Argument  to  prove  that  fuch 
a  Religion  cannot  come  from  God,  as 
any  Miracles  or   extraordinary  Works 
would  be  to  prove  that  it  muft  come 
from  Him.     That  the  firfl:    cannot  be 
fo   good  an    Argument    to    invalidate 
2l  Revelation,    as   the  latter  is   to  con* 
frm  it,  is  evident,  becaufe  we  are  fure 
'tis    inconfiftent   with    the    Nature  of 
Go  D  to  exercife  his  Power  in  fo  extra- 
Ordinary  as  Manner,  as  is  that  of  a  Mi- 
racle, 


4H 


Sermon    XIV. 

racle,  in  Behalf  of  a  Falfhood,  (which 
muft    be  the  Cafe,   if  a  falfe  Reh'gion 
was   fupported  by  true  Miracles  *)  as 
'tis  impoliible  that  a  'Being,   whofe 
Charader  is  that  of  a  Lover  of  Truth, 
Ihould,   conliftently  with  its  own  Na- 
turCj  countenance  an  Impofture  or  Falf- 
hooi     Whereas  we  are  fo  far  from  fee- 
ing any  Inconfiftence  with  the  Nature 
of  G  o  D,    altho'  a  Religion   fbould  be 
communicated  to  fome,  and  not  to  o- 
tliers,  that  fuch  Communications  appear 
to  be  mere  Matters  of  Favour,  which 
may  be  granted  or  refufed,  without  af- 
fecting any  Moral  Attribute  of  God  i 
And  then  the  Argument    drawn  from 
the  former  cannot  be  depended  upon  ; 
becaufe  there  is  nothing  for  it  but  the 
Will  and  Pleafure  of  a  Being,   who 
was  not  at  all  reftrained    from  acting 
either  Way ;  whereas  the  latter  depends 
upon  his  Nature,   which  is  necefTarily 
what  it  is ;  and  therefore  the  A6ls  flow- 
ing from  it  as  incapable  of  Change,  a^ 
the    Nature   itfelf  from   which    they 
flow.      But,                                   2d!y, 
— "» ' 

'    -  ■  '   Sre  Sermon  XIL 


Sermon  X1V<         4.!^ 

2dly^  Supposing  it  was  not  a  Mat- 
ter of  mere  Favour ;  yet  i{  it  was  to  be 
communicated  at  fome  Time  or  other  to 
all  Nations,  and  any  Reafon  could  be  gi- 
ven, why  not  to  all  at  the  fame  Time, 
then  no  Argument  could  be  drawn 
from  the  partial  Preaching  of  the  Chri- 
ilian  JReligion,  which  would  afFe£t  its 
Divinity.      But, 

i/,  Altho'  when  we  confider  the 
Uncertainty  Mankind  was  in  with  Re- 
gard to  the  Will  of  G  o  D  ,  we  might 
have  believed  that  Goo  of  his  Good- 
nefs  would,  fome  Time  or  other,  make 
Himfelf  better  known  to  us,  yet  it 
would  be  a  Favour  m  Him  to  go  out 
of  the  common  Courfe  of  his  Providence 
for  any  of  our  Advantages.  The  Light 
of  Reafon  He  had  given  us  for  our  Di- 
rection, and  if  that  fhone  but  darkly^ 
yet  if  God  would  have  been  merciful 
to  fuch  as  made  the  beft  Ufe  of  that  dim 
tf^hty  neither  his  Juftice  nor  Goodnefs 
CQuld  have  been  called  in  queftion,  tho' 
He  had  not  made  any  extraordinary  Com- 
munications of  his  Will  to  Mankind. 
We  can  be  grateful  in  owning  the  Ai- 

vantages 


j\.i6         Sermon    XlV, 

vantages  we  ChrifiUns  have  above  HeA- 
thens   (in  as  much  as  we  are    aflured 
of  Forgivenefs  of  our  Sins  on  Account 
of  the  meritorious  Death  of  our  Savi- 
our, of  which  the  Heathen   could  not 
be  certain)  without   prefuming  to  fay, 
that  God  could  not,  confiftently  with 
his  Attributes,  have  remitted    our  Of- 
fences, and  will  ftill  forgive  thofe,  who 
never  had  the  Gofpel  Preached  to  them, 
without  the  Knowledge  of  fuch  an  A- 
tonement.    We  freely  own  the  Advan- 
tages of  Faith  or  Revelation  for  a  gene- 
ral Inftrudion  of  the  World,  and  yet 
will  not  fay  that  God  has  left  himfelf 
without  a  Witnefs  in  the  heathen  World : 
that  It  was  poflible  for  Men  to  find  out 
the  main  Strokes  of  their  Duty,  and  to 
hope  that  God  would  pardon  upon  Re- 
pentance,   is  Evident  from  many  of  the 
Heathen  Writers  upon  Morality.    If  o- 
thers  of  meaner  Capacities,  and  whofe 
Opportunities  of  Improvement  were  left, 
could  not  flrike  out  their  Duty  in  a  way 
of  Reafon  ;  this  plainly  fliews  that  God 
was  not  obliged  to  give  all  Men  equal 
Abilities  for  underftanding  Natural  Re- 

ligioa, 


Sermon    XIV. 

ligion,  and  therefore  it  can  never  be  a 
good  Argument  againft  a  Revealed  Reli- 
gion, fhould  any  one  argue,  That  'tis  not 
from  God,  becaufe  not  equally  com- 
municated, or  not  giv^en  to  All,  as  well 
as  to  Some.  Since  no  Reafon  can  be 
given,  why  God  ihould  be  at  per- 
fect Liberty  in  diftributing  Natural 
Light  in  various  Degrees  to  different 
Men,  and  different  Nations,  which  will 
not  equally  hold  with  Regard  to  Su^ 
prmtural  Light ,  or  that  fuperadded 
Alfiftance,  in  the  Way  of  a  Revelati* 
on.      But, 

2.dlyj  Supposing  it  was  not  a 
Matter  of  Favour  in  G  o  d  to  make  a 
Revelation  of  our  Duty  ;  yet  if  our 
Chriftian  Revelation  fliall  be  commu- 
nicated to  All  at  fome  Time  or  other, 
and  fome  Reafons  might  be  affigned, 
why  it  fhould  be  communicated  to 
Some  and  not  to  Others ;  then  its  Want 
of  Univerfality  would  not  affeft  its  Divi- 
nity, or  its  having  God  for  its  Author, 
ibr  thofe  who  lay  Strefs  upon  this  Ar- 
gument, muft  take  thefe  Two  Things 
tor  granted,  viz.  That  the  Gofpel  will 
E  e  never 


4(,§ .  Sermon   XIV? 

nev^r  be  univerfally  propagated ;  and 
timt  no  polTible  Reafons  can  be  afligned, 
why  ^11  Nations,  as  well  as  fome^  have 
not  the  Gofpel  communicated  to  them 
at  the  fame  Time,  If  there  is  no  Rea- 
fon  for  taking  either  of  thefe  for  grant- 
ed ;  then  the  whole  Support  of  this  Ob- 
jection is  taken  away. 

As- to  the  firft  of  thefe,  an  Apoftle 
of  our  Saviour's,  St.  Faul  f,  has 
told  xis,  That  the.  Time  will  come, 
vVheii  the  Fulnefs  of  the  Gentiles 
Ihaii  be  brought  into  the  Church  of 
Christ;  and  that  then  the  "Jem  too 
fhould  univerfally  come  into  a  Profef- 
fion  of  our  Chriftian  Religion.  A  Preach- 
er then  of  this  Religion  having  told  us, 
that  this  would  be  the  Cafe^  no  Deifi  can 
with  Reafon  object ,  that  becaufe  the 
Time  is  not  yet  come,  therefore  it  will 
never  come.  If  St.  Paul  had  told  us  the 
precife  Time,  when  this  fliould  be ; 
and  fuch  Time  had  been  elapfed,  we 
muft  have  given  up  this  Argument  con- 
cerning the  Univerfal  Propagation  of  our 

Religion, 

,■  I  iji  %\f  II*,;  III  —  III  I  .      ■  I  II  ,11  — 

:. .'  t  Romans  xi."  ^$, 


Sermon   XIV.  419 

Religion,  and    owned  that  the  Apoftle' 
had   miliaken  our  Saviour's' Meaning* 
But  as  there  are  no  particular  Marks  or  • 
Signatures,   by    which  we    may  judge 
at  what  particular  Time  this  lliould  be. 
brought  to  pafs,  no  Argument  can  be 
fairly  drawn  againft  our  Chriftian  R^^l- 
ligion,    from  its  not   being  as  yet  uni^x 
verfal.    But  then  it  may  be  faid,  That 
if  Revelation  is  a  great  Benefit,  it  can- 
not be  thought,  that  as  the  whole  Earth  > 
is  the  Lord's,  and  the  Fulnefs  thereof 
and  that  He  is  as  much  the  Common: 
Father  of  the  paji  Generations,  as  of 
thofe  which  are  yet  to  come;  it  cannot 
be  thouglit,  that  He  would  have  left  fo 
many  Parts    oi  the  Earth  in  Darknefs- 
for  fo  many  Ages   fince  the  Go/pel  wa$ 
firft    pubiiibed  in  the  Roman   Empirec;- 
but  would  have  long  e'er  this  commu- 
nicated the  G  off  el  to  them.     Our  An- 
fwer  to  this  is,  That  tho'  we  do  not 
pretend    to  tell  the   particular  Reafons 
which    determined   an    infinitely  >Vife 
Being  not   to  fend  his  Apoftles  into 
Chipd^/T^rtary,  or  America^   at  the  fame 
Time  .as.  He  fent   them   over   all  the 
E  e    2  Roman 


.4.20  Sermon  XIV. 

Romm  World  :  Yet  l^  any  probable 
Reafon  can  be  afTigned,  why  it  was  not 
at  the  fame  Time  Preached  to  them, 
thdt  will  be  fujSicient  to  deftroy  the 
Force  of  this  Objedion. 

One  Reafon  why  the  Chriftian  Re- 
ligion was  not  Preached  to  every  Na- 
tion of  the  Earth,  at  the  fame  Time  as 
it  was  to  thofe  who  lived  within  the 
Bounds  of  the  Roman  Empire  or  bor- 
dered upon  it,  might  be.  That  fuch 
Nations  were  not  qualified  for  receiv* 
ing  the  Gojfel  at  that  Time.  All  Law- 
givers have  been  won't  to  fuit  their 
Laws  to  the  Nature  of  the  People  for 
whom  they  defigned  them ;  if  the  Peo- 
ple they  were  to  govern  were  igno* 
rant  and  unpolillied  ,  the  prefcribing 
to  them  at  frjl  the  moft  exad  Rules 
of  Behaviour ,  would  be  Labour  loft 
upon  them,  they  would  be  incapable  of 
bearing  with  them,  and  therefore  re- 
ceive no  Benefit  from  them.  As  their 
Barbarity  wore  off,  fome  Irregularities, 
which  had  been  before  tolerated,  would 
be  then  with  good  Reafon  corrected 
aad  reformed,  according  to  the  ftrifteft 

Rules 


Sermon    XIV.  42 1 

Rules  of  good  Senfe.  The  Great  lie- 
giflator  of*  the  World  feems  to  Imve 
aded  in  this  Manner,  with  Regard  to 
the  Two  Inftitutions  He  gave  by  M?- 
fes  and  by  Christ;  by  the  firft  He 
allowed  of  fome  Things  in  Condefcen- 
lion  to  the  Obftinacy  and  Stupidity  of 
the  Ifraelites,  fuch  as  Divorces  upon  the 
flighteil:  Pretences;  He  enjoyned  many 
carnal  Ordinances,  of  which  the  Pro- 
phet ^  Ezekid  fays,  by  Order  from  God, 
that  they  were  not  good  in  themfelves> 
nor  acceptable  to  Him  on  any  other 
Account,  than  as  they  were  at  tha 
Time  neceflary  to  preferve  them  from 
imitating  the  Fafhions  of  their  Neigh- 
bouring Nations ,  aad  paying  Divine 
Worfhip  to  Stocks  and  Stones.  When 
they  were  well  cured  of  this  Inclination 
to  worfhip  the  Deity  after  the  Man- 
ner of  their  Neighbours,  as  'tis  allow- 
ed on  all  Hands  they  were  before  our 
S  A  V I  o  u  r's  coming  amongft  them.  He 
then  fent  a  Perfon  to  deliver  them  a 
more  perfed  Religion.  When  their 
E  e    3;  Notions 


42  2  S  E  R  ISf  O  N    XIV. 

Notions  concerning  the  Nature  of  the 
Supreme  Being  were  improved  by  the 
fpiritual  Interpretations  jwhich  their  Pro- 
phets from  Time  to  Time-  gave  of  the 
Law  of  ^foJesy  and   by  their   Converfe 
with  the  Greek  Philofophers,  which  ap- 
pears plainly  by  the  Writings  of   thofe 
Jen^s  that   lived  after  the  Bai?jlomfi  Cap- 
tivity, fuch  as  the  Writers  of  the  Book 
oiWifdomy  Ecclejiajiicus,  and  others,  then 
God  fent  his  Son  to  them.,  to  teach  them 
a  more  Spiritual  Worfliip  ;  a  Worfbip  or 
Honour  more  fuitable  to  the  real  Nature 
of  G  o  D,  than  entertaining  Him,  as  they 
bad  hitherto  done,  with  Sheep  and  Oxen, 
which  God  was  pleafed  to  accept    at 
their  Hands,  'till  they  were  capable  of 
knowing  Him   better.     At  this  Time, 
'tis  to  be  particularly  obferved.  That  all 
Nations,   as  well    as  the  Jervsy  viz.  all 
that  lived  within  the  Bounds  of  the  Re- 
v}An  Empire,   or  were   Borderers  up- 
on it,  had  more  or  lefs  profited  by  fre- 
quenting the    Schools    of   the  Philofo- 
phers, and  Reading  their  Eihkd  and  Me- 
taj^hyjicd  Leclures,  in  which  they  treat- 
ed coacerning  the  Nature  of  God,  and 

the 


Sermqn   XIV.         425 

the  Excellency  of  Virtue,  in  a  much 
clearer  Manner  than  any  othsrs^  m  any 
other  Parts  of  the  World,  had  eyer  done 
before  them.  And  tho'  their  Excellent 
Difcourfes  were  not  fufficient  for  peiv 
fuading  People  to  give  up  the  Eftablilh- 
ed  Religion ;  yet  they  prepared  Mens 
Minds  for  receiving  a  better,  when- 
ever it  fhould  come  to  them  well  re- 
commended. 

Whereas  the  other  Parts  pf;,^)B 
World  which  had  no  Commerce  with 
the  RomafjSy  as  far  as  we  know  any 
thing  of  them,  were  perfedly  Barba- 
rous, being  ignorant  of  the  firft  Rudi- 
ments, of  Religion  ;  i£  they  had  any 
Traditions  o£  the  firft  Antiquity,  yet 
they  knew  not  how  to  make  any  \J{q 
of  them,  or  draw  any  ufeful  Conclu- 
flons  from  them,  as  Dr.  Burnet  oh- 
ferves  '^,  Tho'  the  Bd>jloviam  and  £- 
gjptUns  had  been  in-  PofeiTion.qf  ve- 
17  ancient  Traditions  for  many  Ages, 
yet  nothing  of  Ufe  was  ,  drawn  from 
them,  'till  the  Greek  f  hjofophers  uja- 
E  e   4  .^der^oqk 

'   ■.\;:r-.     ,■• — ' — — v^: ;j^i  «>,it: 

*  Archasologia,  cap.  S.  p.  72,  75. 


424^^        Sermon   XI V. 

dertook  them,  of  which  he  gives  one 
remarkable  Inftance,  "  That  tho'  theft 
**  Nations  had  Records  of  all  the  Ecliiffes 
^'  that  had  been  from  the  Beginning  of 
"  the  "World,  yet  they  were  never  a- 
"  ble  to  foretell  an  Eclipje ;  that  this 
"  Difcovery  was  reft-rved  for  Thales^ 
"  who  from  their  Hiftorical  Regiilers 
"  of  ^aft  Eclipjes,  took  the  firft  Hint  of 
"  calculating  the  Timcso!^  future  ones." 
And  therefore  fuch  Perfons  for  Want  of 
improving  their  Minds ,  would  have 
been  incapable  of  relilhing  a  Religion 
fo  perfectly  Rational  as  our  Chriftian ; 
It  would  have  been  cafting  Pearls 
before  Swine,  giving  them  what  they 
would  not  have  thanked  God  for, 
becaufe  too  much  above  their  Way  of 
Thinking. 

As  to  the  AmericmSy  we  know  not 
when  that  Continent  was  firft  peopled, 
or  wb^.ther  it  was  at  all  before  oifr 
Saviour's  Coming ;  for  Garcilajfo  tells 
us  when  the  Spamards  firfl:  came  there, 
they  could  give  no  Account  of  them- 
felves  higher  up  than  Five  Hundred 
Years ,   and  therefore   the  Gofpel   not 

:  ^^::^ii    beins 


Sermon    XIV.         425 

being  preached  in  that  great  Continent 
of  America,  at  the  fame  Time  ,  as  it 
was  in  the  Romm  Empire,  ought  to 
be  no  Objedion  againil  it.  I  need 
not  take  any  Notice  of  the  Objedion, 
as  it  concerns  the  Scjthians  or  Tartars^ 
becaufe  having  none  of  their  Hiftories 
to  inform  us  of  them,  we  are  at  full 
Liberty  to  fuppofe  them  as  barbarous, 
and  as  unqualify 'd  for  receiving  Chri- 
ftianity,  as  we  pleafe. 

The  onely  Nation  which  could 
pretend  to  any  Degree  of  •  Politenels 
at  that  Time,  and  which  had  not  the 
Gofpel  preached  to  them,  were  the 
Chirtefe :  And  yet  how  much  foever 
the  Literature  of  thefe  People  has  been 
cried  up,  'tis  certain  it  was  very 
mean.  'Tis  plain  they  were  very 
poorly  skilled  in  Meuphyficks,  not  hav- 
ing any  Notion  of  a  Supreme  Being; 
^nd  this  cannot  be  doubted.  Since  *  Fa- 
ther 


'  De  fummo  ac  primo  rerum  Authore  fhirjim 
apud  omnes  Silentium ;  quippe  In  tarn  Coplbia 
lingua,  .  ne  nomen  quidem  Deus  habec  Marcini 
Hilloria  Sinica.  Lib.  i. 


42(5 


S/J?  R  M  O  N     XIV. 

tjicr  Martini  who  was  long  jn .  the 
Country  ,  and  well  underftood  thejr 
language,  alTures  us,  "  That  there 
*'  was  not  a  Name  in  the  Qhinefe 
^  Language  which  would  exprefs  the 
^  lowdl  Idea,  which  the  moft  barba- 
"  rous  Nations  had  of  a  God  :  "  And 
the  Synrn  Infcription  ,  difcover'd  in 
1625,  is  a  farther  Proof  of  it :  For  tho' 
there  had  been  Sjrian  MifRonaries  in 
that  Country  for  above  One  Hundred 
Forty-fix  Years,  and  therefore  fome 
of  them  mull:  have  throughly  under- 
wood the  Qhinefe  Language,  yet  when 
they  were  to  ereO:  a  Monument  with 
an  Infcription  for  perpetuating  the  Me^ 
mory  of  their  Mififion  ,  they  were 
forced  to  exprefs  the  Soveraign  f 
'Being  by  the  Syriack  ,  Word  Aloho  :^ 
tho'  every  other  Word  of  the  Infcrip- 
tion is  in  the  Chine fe  Language :  Juft 
as  the  Sfaniards  ufe  the  Word  Dios.XQ^ 
inftruQ:  fuch  of  the  Americans^  who  have 
not  any  Idea  of  a  Go d,  or  any  Word 


*    China  Illuftrata.  Kircheri,  pag.  1: 


/^ 


Sermon  xiv.         ^,2^ 

In  their  Language  by  which  to  exprefs 
it.  And  therefore  if  any  People  were 
difquahfied  for  receiving  fo  excellent 
an  Inrtitution  as  our  Chriftian,  the 
Chweje  mufl  be  of  that  Number,  as 
being  ignorant  of  that  which  is 
prefuppofed  to  every  Revelation,  the 
Being  of  a  God,  or  a  Free,  Intelli- 
gent, and  Powerful  Agent.  Whereas 
the  Greek  Philofophy,  being  fpread  o- 
ver  all  the  Roman  Empire,  had  form- 
ed Mens  Minds  into  a  truer  Way  of 
Thinliing,  and  from  thence  infenfibly 
led  them  into  jufter  Notions  of  Reli- 
gion, than  were  to  be  met  with  in 
thofe  Places  where  it  was  not  known  * 
and  made  them  ready  to  embrace  a 
Rational  Religion  ,  as  foon  as  it  was 
propofed  to  them ;  which  would  be  a 
fuiJicient  Reafon  why  our  Gofpel  fiiould 
be  preached  to  them^  and  not  to  the 
Chinefe^  and  other  barbarous  Nations. 
And  therefore,  for  all  this  terrible  Ob- 
jedion,  a  Revelation  might  have  God 
for  its  Author,  and  be  of  ufe  to  Man- 
kind, tho'  all  Nations  were  not  at  the 
fame  Time  favoured  with  it. 

Haying 


4.28  Sermon    XIV, 

Having  Ihewn  fome  of  the  Ad- 
vantages of  a  Revelation,  and  that  it 
may  be  of  Ufe  to  Mankind,  altho' 
no  one  Revelation  has  as  yet  been 
communicated  to  ^,  and  that  'tis  pof- 
iible  fuch  Evidence  may  be  given  of 
a  Revelation's  being  from  God,  as 
ought  to  fatisfie  every  Reafonable  En- 
cjuirer  ;  nothing  more  feems  to  be 
neceHary ,  befides  proving  that  our 
xXJihriftiurt  is  fupported  by  fuch  Evi- 
dence. 

{;:  In  the  mean  Time  I  flaall  obferve,That 
it  concerns  every  feriousPerfon,  who  does 
not  beheve  God  has  communicated  Him- 
^t\i  by  a  Revelation,  to  examine  care- 
Hilly  into  the  feveral  Pretenfions  to 
Revelations:  For  fince  there  appears 
nothing  unworthy  of  God,  nothing  but 
what  highly  becomes  Him,  as  He  is  a 
Good  and  Gracious  Being,  in  com- 
municating what  would  be  a  Benefit 
to  his  Creatures ;  it  muft  appear  very 
probable,  that  He  has  before  this  Time 
niade  fome  Revelation  fome  where  or 
pther.  As  the  Deiji  has  heard  of  the 
Chriftian  Religion,  \  would  particu- 
larly 


Sermon    XIV. 

iarly  recommend  That  to  his  Confide- 
ration ;  and  he  will,  if  he  be  a  ferious 
Perfon,  think  himfelf  obliged,  before 
he  fettles  himfelf  in  'Delfm^  to  confider 
carefully  the  Nature  and  Force  of  the 
Evidence  by  which  'tis  fupported,  and 
not,  as  a  great  Part  of  our  Ddjis^  re- 
je6;  it  merely  for  fuch  Reafons^  as 
mull  affed  Revelation  in  general.  For 
if  it  were  barely  pofRble,  that  the 
Goodnefs  of  God  might  have  inclined 
him  fome  Time  or  other,  to  fupply 
the  Defers  of  Natural  Light  by  a 
MeiTage  from  Heaven,  it  would  be 
both  our  Duty  and  Interefl:  to  en- 
quire, Whether  he  had  done  fo  or  not, 
and  not  offer  to  flaew  our  Wit  asainft 
the  Ghriftian  Religion,  as  the  Manner 
of  fome  is,  before  they  have  well  con- 
fidered  it,  and  found  any  Thing  in 
either  its  Do£lrines  or  Precepts  that 
is  unbecoming  G  o  d  to  require  of  us.  • 
For  fo  much  Refpe£l  is  due  from  us 
to  every  Thing  that  carries  the  Title  of 
a  Revelation  from  God,  that  we  fbould 
give  it  a  fair  Hearing  before  we  re^ 
je£l  it  J  left  haply  while  we  may  think 

we 


430  S  E  R  M  o  jsr  XlV. 

we  are  Expofing  and  Laughing  at  a< 
Cheat,  we  be  found  in  enrnejl  fighting 
againft  God.  So  much  Regard  is  due 
to  our  own  Intereft,  as  not  to  make 
a  Jeft  of  an  Offer  that  may  be  to 
our  Advantage,  'till  we  were  fure 
tliat  the  Perfon  who  made  the  Of- 
fer m  God's  N^me^  did  it  without 
his  Authority,  We  only  defire  that 
the  Deift  would  not  laugh,  before, 
he  knows  what  'ris  he  laughs  at ; 
and  then  we  are  fure  to  hear  no  more 
from  him  of  the  Religious  Books  ofi[,; 
the  Bramms,  Perfee\  and  Siamefe^  as.  j 
Books  of  Equal  Credit  and  Authority 
with  thofe  of  our  Chriftian  Religion. 
For  I  am  perfuaded  he  cannot  mean, 
that  all  Religions  are  equally  Ratio- 
nal, or  equally  ufefull  to  Mankind,  (be-»jr, 
caufe  if  he  knows  any  Tiling,  he  knows 
they  are  not ;)  but  he  thinks  that  they 
are,  and  muft  be  all  of  equal  Autho- 
rity, one  of  them  as  much  from 
God  as  another,  the  fame  Evidence 
for  one  as  another,  that  is ,  none 
at   all.    And    the    Reafon    given    for 

this 


SeRxMon    XIV.  431 

this,  is  only  this  poor  one,  viz.  That 
there  is  no  diftihguifliing  what  we 
call  Miracles  from  the  meer  EfFe6ls  of 
Natural  Caufes,  and  then  indeed  there 
can  be  no  knowing  when  God  fpeaks, 
when  not.  If  this  be  falfe,  as  I  am 
fully  perfuaded  it  is,  and  havfe  already 
fhewn  it  to  be  fo  in  a  former  Dit 
courfe  ^,  then  the  Deift  will  one  Day 
forely  repent  of  his  having  made  d^ 
Sport  oftheChriftian  Religion,  and  will 
then  call  himfelf  Fool,  for  not  being 
able  to  diftinguifh  between  the  Voice 
of  G  o  D  fpeaking  to  him  in  the  Per- 
fons  of  Christ  and  Lazarus  raifed 
from  their  Graves,  and  when  it  only 
Ipeaks  to  him  m  the  moft  ordinary 
and  common  A8:s  of  his  Providence :  He 
will  then  wifh  he  had  been  fitote  fe- 
rious  in  a  Concern  of  this  Nature, 
and  not  jefted,  when  he  fbotild  have 
foberly  examin'd ,  whether  God  had 
not  fpoken  to  hrm  by  his  So?i ;  xvhe- 

ther 


*  SermoG   XII. 


ij.32  Sermon    XIV. 

tlier  there  was  not  Ibme  Truth  in 
what  St.  Paul  told  the  Corinthians  in 
the  Words  of  my  Text<  that  after  the 
World  had  tired  itfelf  in.  feeking  after 
God  by  the  Help  of  Wifdom  or 
Philofophy,  it  pleafed  God  by  a  Re- 
velation, or  what  fome  at  that  Time, 
and  what  he,  and  his  Brethren  ftill 
call  Foolifhncfs  of  Preachings  to  fave  them 
that  belisvs. 


SERM. 


433 


SERMON    XV. 


2    P  E  T.   I.    l6. 

For  we  have  not  followed 
cunningly  devifed  Fables, 
when  we  made  known  un^ 
to  you  the  power  and  com- 
ing of  our  Lord  Jesus 
C  H  R I  s  T,^^^  were  Eye- 
witnejfes  of  His  kJM^- 


H  E  Writer  of  this  Epiftle  in 

thefe   Words  endeavours  to 

remove  a  Sufpicion,  as  if  he 

and  the  reft  of  his  Brethren 

their    Mafter's  Perfor- 

He  tells  thofe  that  fliould  read 

F  f  this 


had    magnified 
mances. 


434-         Sermon    XV. 

this  Epiftle,  that  they  had  not  drawn 
up,  as  fome  others,  an  artificial  Ac- 
count of  Things,  but  had  given  them  a 
plain  Narrative  of  the  Miraculous  Pow- 
ers which  themfelves  had  feen  their 
Lord  Exercifing.  That  they  had  not, 
as  the  manner  of  fome  was,  dreft  up  a 
Life  with  a  proper  mixture  of  the  Mar- 
'velo^  to  fet  it  off  the  better ;  for  they 
had  told  them  nothing  concerning  our 
Saviqur  but  what  themfelves  had 
been  Eye-witnefles  to.  And  as  another 
of  the  Difcipks  lays  ^,  That  which  we 
have  Ifeardy  which  ive  have  feen  with  our 
Ejes,  which  we- have  looked  upof^y  and  our 
Hands  hdve  handled^  That  which  we  have 
feen  and  heard^  declare  tve  unto  you.  And 
yet  this  plain  and  honeft  Declaration  of 
thefe  Apoftles  will  not  fatisfy  fome  Per- 
fons.  They  will  not  believe  the  Difci- 
pies  ever  faw  any  of  thefe  miraculous 
Works  which,  as  they  pretended,  were 
done  by  their  Malter.  I  have  already 
Ihewn,  that  if  fuch  uncommon  Works, 
as  are  related  in  our  Gofpels,  had  been 

really 

*  \  John.i.  I,  J. 


Sermon  XV.  435 

really  done  by  Him,  they  would  have 
been  a  good  Proof  of  his  Mifiion, 
and  that  the  Religion  He  taught  was 
from  God:  We  have  alfo  feen  *  that 
our  L  o  R  d's  Difciples  could  not  be 
impofed  upon  in  the  Account  they  have 
left  us  of  thofe  uncommon  Works,  by 
taking  JppearAmes  for  Realities.  The  on-^ 
ly  remaining  Difficulty  is,  to  fatisfy 
the  Unbeliever,  That  they  were  Ho- 
neft  Men,  and  believed  their  own  Ac-' 
count.  fij'jd 

-'This  leads  me  to  the  third  Rea- 
ibn  by  which  the  Deift  defends  him- 
felf,  in  not  examining  into  the  Merits 
of  any  Revelation ;  becaufe  there  are  a 
great  many  Pretences  to  Revelation,  and 
no  certain  Criteria  whereby  to  diiiin- 
guilh  the  true  one,  if  any  fuch  were,from 
Impoftures ;  for  that  there  will  be  al- 
ways  Reafon  for  fufpeCbing  Perfons  that 
pretend  to  extraordinary  Communica- 
tions with  Heaven :  That  to  be  the 
Heads  of  a  Religious  Party,  is  a  tempt- 
ing Confideration ;  if  it  meets  with 
F  f   2  wifhed 

■f   See  Sermon  XII, 


43<5         Sermon    XV. 

wifhed  for  Succefs,  Riches  and  Honours 
attend  them  :  And  therefore  the  Tefti- 
mony  of  fuch  Perfons   will  be  always 
fufpicious;    and  then   as  much  Reafon 
for  fufpecting  the  Account  given  by  the 
Apoftles   of  our  Saviour's  Miracles, 
as  the  fabulous  Accounts  contained  in 
other  Religions  ;  "which  if  true,  would 
put   the  Gofpel  upon  a  Level   with  the 
Zs^^f  of  Z^yoajler^  the  Shajlcr  that  con- 
tains the  Religion  of  the  Mian  Bramins^ 
or  any  other  Book  that  pretends  to  be 
Divine.     That    by  the  Confeffion    of 
Proteftants,  the  Succeffors  of  the  Apo- 
ftles have  invented  many  cunningly  de- 
Vifed  Fables  of  Miracles,   and  the  Deifi 
will  not  believe  but  that  the  firft  Wit- 
neffes  to  Chriftianity,  as  well  as   thofe 
that  came  after  them,  might  have  fome 
worldly  Views    in    deceiving   us;    for 
befides  the  Honour  of  being  Heads  of 
a  Party,  they  had  not    much   to  lofe, 
and  were  like  to  have    a  Chance  for 
iiiending   their  Circumftances  of  Life. 

I  WILL  therefore  fhew,  That  the  A- 
poftles,  as  Things  then  were,  could  lie 
under  no  Temptation  of  forging  Mira- 
cles ; 


Sermon  XV.  437 

clcs,  and  that  'tis  altogether  improba- 
ble they  fliould  intend  to  deceive  us, 
by  giving  an  Account  of  Things  that 
they  knew  to  be  falfc ;  becaufe  fuppo- 
fing  their  Account  of  our  Saviour's 
Miracles  to  be  a  falfe  one,  they  would 
have  had  no  Inducement  for  making  a 
Profeflion  of  the  Chriifian  Religion,  as 
they  muft  fee,  if  they  faw  at  all,  that 
the  making  fuch  a  ProfefTion,  would 
make  them  Abundance  of  Enemies, 
that  would  have  fhe  Power,  as  well 
as  the  Will,  to  ill  ufe  them,  and  no 
Profpe6l  of  an  Equivalent  to  balance 
Inconveniences.  Mankind  does  ufually 
balance  the  Chances  for  Proiit  with 
thofe  of  Lofs,  and  fatjsfy  themfelves, 
that  what  they  aim  at ,  is  feafible , 
before  they  will  undertake  it ;  And 
therefore  if  the  Apoftles  were  Deceiv- 
ers, they  muft  have  propofed  to  them- 
felycs  an  Advantage  greater  than  the 
Pains  they  were  to  take,  otherwife 
they  would  have  been  no  better  than 
Fools,  which  they  cannot  be  fuppofed 
to  have  been  by  any  that  look  into 
their  Writings ;  befides,  no  body  ^m 
F  f  5  beheve, 


438 


Sermon  XV. 

believe,  that  a  few  Fools  fhould  be 
able  to  cheat  all  the  Wife  Men  in  the 
World.  But  as  the  State  of  Things 
was  at  that  Time,  there  was  no 
Ground  for  expecting  any  Profit  or 
Advantage  by  Preaching  the  Religion, 
unlefs  the  Generahty  of  thofe  to  whom 
they  Preached  the  Gofpel  received  it, 
and  that  'twas  probable  the  Apoftles 
would  meet  with  fuch  Succefs.  But 
I  will  fhew, 

i/,  That  the  Apoftles  could  not 
poiTibly  exped  to  live  eafy,  unlefs 
they  could  reconcile  the  greateft  Part 
of  thofe,  with  whom  they  lived,  tp 
a  liking  of  the  GofpeL  -^ 

2dl)iy  That  there  was  no  Proba-" 
bility  that  the  Gofpel  would  have  any 
fuch  Succefs  ,  at  leaft  in  their  own 
Times ;  and  who  would  care  to  have 
their  Brains  knock'd  out  for  the  Benefit 
of  they  did  not  know  w^ho,  that  were 
to  fucceed  them  ? 

-t-ii/.  The  Apoftles  could  not  expeft 
to  live^-  eafy,  unlefs  they  could  recon- 
cile the  greatefl  Part  of  thofe  they 
were  obliged   to    converfe  with,  to  a 

liking 


Sermon    XV. 

fiking  of  tKe  GofpeL  The  World  was 
then  divided  in  Point  of  Religion  into 
Jews  and  Gemles,  The  Writers  that 
are  called  profane,  ^o  agree  with  our 
Received  Gofpels^  that  at  the  Time  when 
Chriftianiiy  firfl;  appeared,  the  World^ 
in  Point  of  Religion,  was  divided  into 
Jews,  and  Heathms  or  Fagafis,  With  Re- 
gard to  the  Jews^  the  Apoftles  could  ex- 
ped  nothing  from  them,  but  the  worft 
of  Ufage,  as  they  were  obliged  to  fpeak 
In  the  beft  Manner  of  that  Perfon , 
whom  the  whole  Nation  of  the  Jews 
had  treated  as  a  Malefa£i:or,  and  whofe 
Crucifixion  they  had  been  very  inflru- 
mental  m  procuring.  They  could  not 
therefore  but  think  they  Oiould  draw 
lipon  themfelves  the  utmoft  Difpleafure 
of  the  Jswifh  Government,  ii  they  re- 
fleded  upon  its  Proceedings  ;  efpecially 
if  they  were  to  tell  the  People,  as  Fettr 
did,  That  their  Governors  were  either  fo 
weak,  or  fo  wicked,  as  to  procure  the 
Death  of  that  Perfon,  whom  God  had 
fent  to  be  the  Saviour  of  their  Nation. 
And  yet  the  Apoftles  fpoke  thus  plain- 
ly, and  m  a  publick  Manner;  as  we  fee 
F  ^  4  h 


439 


44-0  Sermon   XV. 

in  the  Acts  of  the  ApoJIles  ^.  The  chiet 
Prieih  and  Elders  miift  fee,  tint  there 
was  no  Way  of  keeping  up  their  Au- 
thority, unlefs  they  could  Silence  thefe 
Perfons.  And  the  Apoftles  muft  fee 
too,  that  they  would  Hick  at  nothing 
to  flop  the  Progrefs  of  this  Se8:.  The 
Apoftles  alfo  could  not  but  know,  that 
a}  People  fo  tenacious  of  the  Ceremo- 
nies of  their  Religion,  would  never  en- 
dure any  Perfons,  if  they  offered  to 
depreciate  them,  or  draw  Men  off  from 
their  Efteem  of  them ;  they  might  rea- 
fonably  fear  their  Master's  Predidion 
would  prove  true,  That  thofe  who 
killed  them,  would  think  that  they  dtd 
G  o  D  good  Service,  The  Account  which 
is  given  of  the  J^jry,  by  fuch  Writers 
as  lived  near  the  Time  when  the  Go- 
fid  was  firfl  Preached ,  fuificiently 
fhews  their  Fondnefs  for  the  Ceremo- 
nies of  their  Religion.  "Juvenal  tells  usj 
That  they  would  not  Ihew  the  moll 
common  A6ls  of  Civility,  fuch  as  the 
putting  a  Man  right,  when  he  was  out 

ef 

*  Chap.   ii.  36. 


Sermon   xv.  441 

of  his  Way ,  or  directing  him  to  a 
Place,  where  he  might  find  Water,  to 
any  but  fuch  as  were  of  the  fame  Re- 
h'gion  ^.  And  we  may  obferve  from 
Horace,  That  they  were  taken  Notice 
oi  in  his  Time,  as  a  Sed  of  Religion 
that  was  moft  induftrious  in  making 
Prolelytes  \,  We  may  eafily  guefs, 
and  fo  might  the  Apoftles,  what  fort 
of  Entertainment  they  were  to  meet 
with  from  a  People  fo  much  wedded 
to  their  own  Religion.  And  tho'  the 
Apoftles  at  jirfl  allowed  Converts  from 
Judaifm  to  retain  many  of  the  Cere- 
monies of  their  Religion,  together 
with  Chriftianity,  and  were  even 
fo  complaifant  to  them,  as  to  o-. 
blige  the  Gentile  Converts  to  abftain 
from  fome  Things  that  were  moft   dK- 

agreeable 


*  Non  monftrare  Vias,    eadcm  nifi  facra   colenti, 
Qujefitum  ad  fontem    folos  deducere    Verpos. 
Juvenal  Sat.  14.  v.  ic],  4. 

t  Ac  veluti  te 
Judaei,  cogcmus  in  hanc  concedere  turbam. 

Horat,  Lib.   i.   Sat.  4.  V- 1-^;^}. 


44^         Sermon    XV* 

agreeable  to  the  Jervs,  fuch  as  the  eating 
Things  that  had  been  offered,  to  Idols,  and 
Blood,  yet  there  was  no  Reafon  to  think 
that  thefe  Allowances  would  fatisfy  the 
Jem  J  becaufe  they  muft  fee  that  the  main 
Part  of  their  Religion  ,  the  Temple- 
Service,  muft  fink,  if  Chriftianity  pre- 
vailed, and  that  the  Apoftles  only  per- 
mitted, without  laying  any  Strefs  up- 
on ,  any  other  Ceremonies  of  their 
Religion. 

J-^N  EITHER  could  the  Apoftles  look 
for  any   better  Quarter  from  the  G^»- 
tiles ;  efpecially  if  they  offered  to  make 
any  Profelytes  from  that  Religion:  They 
muft  foreiee,  that    they   fhould   be  ha- 
ted by  them,  for  making  Profeffion  of 
a  Religion  different  from  their  own,  as 
they  faw  their   own   Countrymen,  the 
Jen?s,  were  univerfally  detefted  by  them 
for  the  fame  Reafon.    And    that  Rea- 
fons  of  State  as  well    as  thofe  of  Re» 
ligion  ,     would    oblige  every    Heathen 
Government   to   fupprefs,  i^  poffible, 
thofe  thdt  oppofed   the  eftablifhed  Su- 
perftition ,     and    to    take    away     the 
Lives  and  Liberties  of  fuch,  as  would 

be 


Sermon    XV.  4^5 

be  judged  by  them  Difturbers  of  the 
State,  for  endeavouring  to  carry  o^ 
Mens  Minds  from  the  Government- 
Worfliip.  And  we  find  in  Fa^t  that 
Chriftians  were  fo  generally  hated  at 
Rome^  when  Chriftianity  firfl:  appeared 
there,  that  when  the  City  was  fet  on 
Fire  by  Nero^  and  the  People  general- 
ly believed  it  was  done  by  his  Order, 
yet  they  were  pleafed  to  fee  the  Chri- 
ftians  fuffer  as  Incendiaries.  For  T^- 
citus  tells  us,  ''  That  when  Nero  laid 
"  the  burning  of  the  City  to  the 
"  Chriftians  Charge,  they  were  not  fo 
"  much  found  Guilty  by  any  Force 
"  of  Evidence,  as  by  the  Univerfal 
"  Abhorrence  which  every  Body  had  of 
"  that  Sort  of  People  ^  ".  People  be- 
lieved them  innocent  as  to  the  Firing 
of  Rome^  and  yet  were  pleafed  to  fee 
them  puniflied  as  Incendiaries :  It  was 
Jiot  much  doubted,  as  Tacitus  tells  us, 
That  Nero  himfelf  was  the  Incendi- 
ary ;  and  yet  the  Averfion  was  fo 
ftrong    againfl:     the    Chriftian$ ,     that 

the 


*  Convifti  odio  humani   Generis.     Tacit,  Annal. 
Lib,   ly. 


444  Sermon  xv. 

the  CompafHon  which  ufually  at- 
tends  upon  the  miferable,  when  they 
are  believed  to  be  innocent ,  could 
not  be  raifed  by  all  their  Sufferings  : 
And  therefore  'tis  plain  whilft  this  A- 
verfion  lafted,  there  could  be  no  Hopes 
for  the  Apoftles  of  living  tolerably 
eafy  with  them.     But, 

2dly^  I  AM  now  to  confid^r  whe- 
ther they  could  have  any  Probability 
of  converting,  at  their  firil:  fetting  out, 
fuch  a  Number  of  Gentiles  and  'Jem  , 
as  would  fecure  them ,  for  the  reft  of 
their  Life,  from  the  Ill-will  of  thofe 
that  continued  in  their  Infidelity ,  and 
reward  them  too  for  the  Pains  they 
had  taken  in  converting  them.  The 
only  Pretence  for  fufpe£ling  the  Apo- 
ftles Honefty  muft  be,  that  they  might 
have  an  Eye  to  the  ProHts  and  Emolu- 
ments, which  many  of  their  SuccejGTors 
met  with.  That  St.  Feter  might  dream 
of  faring  as  well  as  the  beft  of  his 
Succeffors  at  Rome  have  done.  So  For- 
fhyry  would  have  it  thought.  That 
thofe  who  pretended  to  Miracles,  by 
which    he     means   Chriftians  ,     wer^ 

tempted 


Sermon    XV.  44$ 

tempted  b^  a  Profpect  of  Profit  to 
turn  Chriftians  ^.  But  we  have  al- 
ready feen  that  this  could  not  pofli- 
hly  enter  into  their  Heads,  unlefs  they 
believed  they  fhould  quickly  convert 
fuch  Numbers,  as  would  be  able  to 
fupport  them  againft  all  Oppofition. 
But  the  Improbability  of  fuch  quick 
Converfions  will  eafily  appear,  if  we 
confider, 

ifli  The  Nature  of  the  Religion  to 
which  they  were  to  convert  them,  to- 
gether with  the  State  of  Virtue  and 
Vice,  as  it  was  when  they  began  to 
preach  the  Gofpel.    And 

2dlyy  The  Difficulty  of  Impofing 
upon  the  "World  at  that  Time,  when 
they  began  to  preach  the  Gofpel,  by 
falfe  Miracles  or  a  Suppofititious  Re- 
furreftion. 

1/,  Let  us  confider  the  Nature  of 
the  Religion    to    which  they  were  to 

convert 


Homines  ruftlcani  6c  pauperes,  quoniam  ni- 
hil habebant,  Magicis  artlbus  operati  funt  qux- 
i&m  Signa.  Hieron,  Breylarium  Pfalterlj,  Plalm. 
8i. 


44-5         Sermon     XV. 

convert  the  Jeiv  or  Gentile^  and  how 
they  were  difpofed  at  that  Time  for 
receiving  fuch  a  Religion. 

Every  one  knows  the  Difficulty  of 
perfuading  Numbers  of  Men  to  quit 
their  Opinions  in  Religion ;  tho'  they 
be  never  fo  weak  and  indefenlible,  \i 
they  have  been  for  a  long  Time  the 
Religious  Profeflion  of  the  Country 
where  they  live.  And  'tis  as  well 
known  that  the  Difficulty  will  be 
greater,  if  the  Religion  they  are  to  be 
converted  to,  flatters  none  of  the  Vices 
of  Mankind ;  and  the  Difficulty  ftill 
encreafes,  when  the  Perfons  that  are 
to  be  converted  to  fuch  a  Religion, 
are  notorioufly  bad  Livers.  If  this  was 
the  true  State  of  the  Matter,  it  muft 
be  allowed  that  theApoftles,  fuppofing 
them  to  have  common  Underftanding, 
could  not  flatter  themfelves  with  the 
Hopes  of  many  Converts.  That  tlie 
Doctrine  which  the  Apoftles  preached, 
fuch  as  we  have  it  in  the  Gofpels^ 
(and  I  fhall  afterwards  prove  that  we 
have  that  Gofpel  fuch  as  it  was  preach- 
ed 


Sermon    XV. 

ed  by  the  Apoftles  *  )  does  not  in- 
dulge Men  in  any  irregular  Behavi- 
our, how  agreeable  foever  to  thePaf- 
fions  and  Appetites  of  Mankind ,  can- 
not be  denied  by  any  Deifi  that  has 
ever  read  the  Gofpels  ;  they  cannot 
deny  that  the  Gofpel  contains  a  more 
perfed  Morality,  than  ever  appeared 
before  in  the  World  :  And  that  it  re- 
quires the  Prafl:ice  of  every  Thing 
that  delerves  the  Name  of  Virtue,  and 
ibrbids  every  Appetite  and  Paflion  of 
corrupted  Nature  ;  fo  far  I  mean  as 
fuch  Appetite  and  Paflion  are  Effefts 
of  the  Corruption  of  our  Natures.  It 
does  not  allow  Men  to  commute  for 
Internal  Goodnefs  by  External  Perfor- 
mances ;  it  propofes  no  Advantage  to 
any  Body  upon  any  better  Terms , 
than  thofe  of  parting  with  every  vi- 
cious Inclination,  and  becoming  truely 
good  and  virtuous  Perfons.  It  was  a 
meer  Slander  which  Celfus,  and  after- 
wards Julia'/^y  caft  upon  the  Chriftian 
Religion,  as   if  it  drew  People  into  it, 

by 

^  S^e  Sermon  XVI. 


4.48  Sermon    XV. 

by  promiiing  them  an  Expiation  of  all 
Crimes  how  great  foever,  if  they  would, 
only  perform  fome  External  Ads  ^ , 
fuch  as  beating  the  Head,  and  thump- 
ing the  Breaft,  without  any  real  Change 
of  their  Way  of  Life.  For  every  one 
that  reads  our  New  Tejlament  muft  fee, 
that  this  Uft  was  chiefly  infifted  upon 
by  the  Apoftles.  And  "Julian  too,  as 
he  was  once  of  the  Religion,  might 
have  known,  from  the  Twelfth  and 
Thirteenth  Canons  of  the  famous  Coun- 
cil of  Nice^  that  the  Church  in  his 
Time  did  require  a  good  Life,  as  a 
neceflkry  Part  of  Repentance,  and  not 
meerly  thofe  External  Signs  of  it. 
Whatever  Relaxations  may  have  been 
iinc'c  allowed  of,  will  not  at  all  affe£l 
my  Argument,  which  is  drawn  from 
the  Religion  fuch  as  it  was  preached 
by,  the  Jpoftles. 

If  we  look  into  the  State  of  Man- 
Jcind  at  that  Time,  we  fliall  find  the 
J^ivs  fo  attached  to  the  Out-fide  of 
|:heir  Religion ,   that  they   had  almoft 

loit 
■  ■■■  ^  ■     ^  ■     ' 

^  Vide  Juiiii)l-r.c files. 


Sermon   XV.         449 

lofl  the  Spirit  of  it.  Then  there  would 
be  fmall  Hopes  of  perfuading  fuch  Per- 
ibns  to  part  with    their   Ceremonies  , 
the  only  Cloak  for   their  Wickednefs , 
for  a  Religion  that  required  a  fincere 
and  unafFeded   Goodnefs.    And   as  lit- 
tle could  the  Apoftles  hope  for  Succefs 
among  the  Greek f   and  Romans',  for  all 
the  Hiftorians   who   have   left  us  any 
Account  of  thofe  Times,  give  fuch   a 
Charader  of  the  Corruptions  that  ge- 
nerally prevailed    in   them,    as  would 
make    any  Man,   who  had   the    leafl: 
Remains  of  Virtue  left,  to  deteft  them. 
A   Religion  that  enjoins  its  Followers 
to  moderate  their   Defircs  of  Worldly 
Things,  would  never  fuit  the  Tafte  of 
fuch  an  Age.    A  Voluptuous,   Ambiti- 
ous ,  or    Covetous  Man  would  never 
bear  the  Reftraints,   which  the  Gofpel 
lays  upon  Mens  Inclinations  ;  and  there- 
fore the  Apoftles  could   not  expeft  to 
make  many  Profelytes  out  of  this  Kind 
of  People,  and  yet  this  was  the  Gene- 
ral Charader  of  the  Age. 

B  u  T  it  may  be  faid,  that  tho'  the 

Mature  of  the  Religion    was  forbid- 

G  g  ding 


450  Sermon  XV. 

ding  enough  to  a  bad  Liver,  yet  they 
might  flatter  themfelves,  that  it  would 
quickly  make  its  Way  in  the  World, 
by  the  over-bearing  Weight  of  thofe 
aftonilhing  Fafts,  wliich  they  related 
concerning  the  Author  or  firft  Publilher 
of  it,  as  they  knew  Mankind,  efpecially 
the  lower  Part  of  it,  with  whom  tlie 
Apoftles  fucceeded  befl:,  was  always  apt 
to  be  much  affeded  with  Prodigies  and 
marvelous  Relations. 

i  WILL   therefore   fhew,  2^/y,  The 
extreme  Difficulty  which  the  Apoftles 
muft  have  met  with  at  the  Time  when 
they  began  to   preach  the  Goff^^  had 
they   intended    to     impofe    upon    the 
World  by  fdfe  Miracles  or  a  fuppof%tf^ 
iious  Refurredion.    The  Impoftui'es  and 
forged    Miracles,  that   were  pretended 
to  ibme  Ages  after  the  Times  of  the 
Apoftles,  have  led  many  Perfons  into  a 
Sufpicion,  as  if  the  Miracles  which  the 
Apoftles  relate,    as  performed   by  our 
Saviour  and    themfelves,  might  be 
of  the  fame   Sort.    But  'i!l  we  confider 
the  '  different   Circumftances  the  Apo- 
ftles were  in  from  thofe  of  their  Suc- 

celTor^ 


Sermon  XV.  451 

ceiTors,  who  palmed  upon  the  World 
many  cunningly  devifed,  Fables^  we  fhall 
find  that  nothing  was  eafier,  than  for 
them  to  make  the  World  believe,  or 
at  leaft  feem  to  believe,  fi£titious  Mi- 
racles ;  and  nothing  harder  than  for 
the  Apoftles  to  have  fucceeded  with 
fuch  Miracles.  Which  will  be  made 
evident  by  confidering, 

tfi y  The  Circumftances  of  the 
Perfons  that  were  to  carry  on  the 
Cheat,      And, 

2flf/y,  The  People  that  were  to  be 
cheated. 

.  i/,  The  Perfons  that  were  to  car- 
ry  on  the  Cheat.     The   Number  of 
them    was    no    lefs  than    Twelve ;   if 
they  were    to  be    employed  as   Wit- 
nefles  of  a  Matter  of  Fad,  we  would 
not  defire  fewer ;    but  they  were  too 
many  if   they   were    to    be  intrufted 
with  a  Secret.      They  muft    be  mad 
that  Ihould  embark  in  fuch  a  Defign 
with  fo  great  a  Number,  and  believe 
that  a  Secret  could  be  kept  by  fo  many 
Perfons,  when  any  of  them  might  have 
made  his  Fortune  by  betraying  it,  and 
G  g   2  had 


4^2         Sermon    XV. 

had  Reafon  to  fear  Gibbets  and  Croffes 
for  keeping  it.    And  yet  had  any  one 
of  them  been  tempted  by  Promifes  or 
Threatnings  to  difcover  the  Secret,-  the 
Defign  had  been  ruined  beyond  Recove- 
ry, and  all  their  Hopes  of  making  Con- 
verts extinguifhed.    The  Apoftles  there- 
fore   muft  have  been  very  weak  Men, 
inftead  of  being  Crafty   Men,  as  the 
Objedion  fuppofes  them  to  be,  had  they 
built  their  Hopes  of  Succefs  upon  fuch 
a  fandy  Foundation.    Efpecially  too,  if 
we  confider  the  Perfons  themfelves,  as 
well  as  the  Number   of  them.    Men 
who  by  the  Accoutt  they  give  of  them- 
felves, had  all  forfaken  their  Mafter,  as 
loon  as  the  Jemjh  Government  laid  hold 
of  Him ;  even  the  Perfon  that  appeared 
to  have  the    moft  Courage,  and  Love 
for  his  Mafier^  v^hen  he  faw  Him  charg- 
ed with  Capital  Crimes,  for  Fear  of  fuf- 
fering  with  Him,  denied   he  had  any 
Knowledge  of  Him.     Such  Perfons,  I 
lay,  that    had  not  Courage  enough  to 
ftand  by  a  Truth,  cannot  be  fuppofed 
lit  Inftruments  for  carrying  on  a  Cheat : 
As  they  would  la  all  Probability  fqueak, 

as 


Sermon  xv.  453 

as  foon  as  their  Lives  were  in  Dan- 
ger; for  certain  they  could  never  have 
trufted  one  another,  after  they  had  fo 
notorious  a  Proof  of  their  Unfaithful- 
neis  to  their  Mafter ;  For  why  fhould 
they  fuppofe  they  could  ftand  morq 
courageoufly  by  one  another,  than  they 
had  done  by  their  Majiery  whonn  they 
difowned  at  the  firft  approach  of  Dan? 
ger  ?  And  no  Body  can  believe  that  th? 
■  Apoflles  would  have  given  fo  fcandalous 

i  an  Account   of  their    own  Behaviour  , 
had  it  not  been  true. 

"Whereas     thofe   who    afterwards 

counterfeited  Miracles,  if  they  had  the 

Ill-luck  to  be  difcovered,   ran  no   Ha- 

, .  zard   of  either  Life  or  Fortune.    The 

■  Chriftian  Religion  had  then  the  Support 
and  Encouragement  of  the  Civil  Go- 
vernment, and  therefore  whatever  was 
done  in  Favour  of  it,  would  pafs  for 
a  pious  Zeal  for  the  Service  of  G  o  d 
and  Christ:  There  would  be  little 
Reafon  to  fear,  that  thofe  who  were 
concerned  in  the  Cheat,  whatever  their 
Numbers  were,  fhould  make  a  Difco-r 
very  of  it,  becaufe  there  would  be  no 
G  g  J  worl 


it 


454  Sermon  xv. 

worldly  Motives  to  betray  one  another : 
For  if  the  Miracle  fucceeded  ,  they; 
might  hope  to  be  Gainers  by  it ;  and' 
if  it  was  difcovered  ,  they  had  no- 
thing worfe  to  fear,  than  that  fome 
People  might  fay  of  them,  That  they 
had  more  Zjal  t\i2iiiVnderJlandhjg,  And 
therefore  'tis  a  groundlels  Sufpicion 
which  is  drawn  from  the  Counterfeit 
Miracles  of  the  Vlth,  and  following 
Centuries  to  the  Miracles  of  our  S  av  i- 
OUR  and  his  Apoftles.     But, 

2dly^  I F  we  confider  the  People  that 
were  to  be  cheated ,  the  Cafe  of  the 
Apoftles  and  their  Succeffors  was  very 
different. 

ijly  As  the  Perfons  that  were  to  be* 
lieve  their  Account  of  Miracles,  were 
Enemies  to  tlie  Chriftian  Religion. 

2dlfj  As  they  were  better  able  in 
their  Time  to  diftmguifh  fiditious  from 
real  Miracles. 

r-ixAfty  A.S  the  Perfons  that  were  to  be- 
lieve their  Account  of  Miracles,  were 
Enemies  to  the  Chriftian  Religion,  and 
as  fuch^  would  not  eafily  give  Credit  to 
thofe  Miracles  which  were  to  be  the 

chief 


SeRxMON    XV.  4$^ 

chief  Support  of  that  Religion.  It  is 
natural  to  believe  that  thofe  who  ha- 
ted the  Religion,  would  be  no  Friends 
to  Miracles,  becaufe  tliefe  were  to  give 
it  a  Reputation  in  the  World.  The 
Apoftles  who  muft  fee  that  nothing  but 
the  Force  of  Evidence  would  work  upon 
them,  would  have  therefore  little  Reafon 
for  hoping  that  their  Miracles,  if  counter^ 
feit^  Ihould  pais  the  Examination  of 
fuch  prejudiced  Perfons  ;  whereas  thofe 
who  boafted  of  Miracles  in  fome  par* 
tieular  Ages  of  the  Church ,  did  it  a* 
mong  fuch  as  were  Friends  to  Chri* 
ftianity,  and  wifhed  to  liave  the  fame 
Evidence  given  to  it  m  their  Times  | 
as  had  been  m  thofe  of  the  Apoflles^ 
And  therefore  fuch  Perfons  being  pre- 
poffefs'd  in  Favour  of  them,  there  v/ould 
be  little  Difficulty  m  impofing  falfe  Mi* 
racks  upon  them.  They  knew  that 
fuch  Perfons  would  wifii,  for  th^  Ho^ 
|iour  of  the  Religion,  that  their  Mi- 
racles wer-e  true  ones;  and  therefore 
would  not  be  too  curious  in  exami- 
ning,  for  fear  they  fhould  find  it  to  hz 
otherwife  than  they  wilhed  for,  Be^ 
fides,  ^  g  4  o^dly^ 


45^  Sermon  XV, 

2dlj^   There    was    another   Difad- 
vantage  which  the  Apoftles  lay  under, 
which  was  that  they  lived  in  a  difcerning 
and  inquifitive  Age,  that  would  not  take 
Things  upon  Truft,    bccaufe  well  ^ble 
to    diftinguifh    Ft^ions   from  -  Realities, 
When  the  Apoftles  firft  began  to  preach 
the  Gofpel  ,    moft  Parts  of    Learning 
were  in  as  great  a  Degree  of  Perfecti- 
on as  they  had  ever  been  before ;  The 
Inquiries  into    Nature   and    its   feveral 
Powers,  carried  to  a  very  great  Height, 
when  compared  with   fome  fucceeding 
Ages.    And  therefore  the  World  would 
have  been  much  better  qualified  for  dit 
llinguifhing  the  Natural  from  the  Mar-^ 
velous.    The  Apoftles,  confidering  their 
Education,    could  not  hope  to  impofe 
upon  fuch  a  People,  or  if  they  had  been 
fo  vain  to  attempt  it,  muft  have  been 
quickly  convidled  of  an  Impofture.  If  it. 
be  faid  that  they  began  with  the  lower 
Part  of  the  World,  and  made  Converts 
at  iirft  of  fuch   as  were  very  ignorant,^ 
which  Celfus  charges  upon  them  ;    fup-} 
pofing  it  to  be  true,  that  they  at  firft) 
made  Converts  of  only  the  lower  Part;- 

which 


Sermon    XV.  457 

which  yet  is  falfe  ;  it  cannot  be  fup- 
pofed  that  the  upper  Part  of  the  World 
would  fit  idle,  and  let  them  carry  Peo- 
ple ofl'  from  the  Eftablifhed  Worfhip , 
had  they  been  able  to  detect  them  of 
any  Fraud.  We  find  by  P//>j's  Letter 
to  Trajan,  That  the  Great  Men  fpared 
neither  Coft  nor  Pains,  neither  Promifes 
nor  Threats,  to  make  the  Chrifl:ians  con- 
fefs  or  own  a  Clieat.  If  the  Apofl:Ies 
had  been  Men  of  fo  much  Cunning  as 
the  Objection  fuppofes,  they  would  have 
bti^n  difcouraged  from  undertaking  a 
Cheat  in  fo  unfeafonable  a  Time.  The 
proper  Times  for  Impofture  are  Times 
of  Ignorance,  when  any  Thing  unufual 
may  be  made  to  pafs  for  a  ./^^/^  Mi- 
racle, and  Perfons  are  ready  to  believe 
any  Thing  fi:range  that  is  told  them , 
and  the  more  unlikely  to  be  true,  the. 
more  forward  in  beheving.  Such  are 
the  Times  in  which  Fraud  and  Impo-r 
ftures  are  wont  to  thrive,  and  fuch  were 
the  Times,  when  to  the  Shame  of  Chri- 
fliians,  counterfeit  Miracles  crept  into  the 
Church  of  God:  And  the  Hiftorie% 
of  thofe  Times  fliew  that  the.  Pretencesi 
I.        :  ■  to 


^^S  Sermon    XV. 

to  Miracles  were  multiplied,  in  Propoiy 
tion  as  the  Ignorance  of  the  People  en- 
creas'd.  And  therefore  tho'  latter  Ages 
might  carry  on  Cheats  fuccefsfully,  it  does 
not  follow  that  the  Apoftles  could  hope 
to  do  fo  :  Or  becaufe  fome  of  the  Suc- 
ceflbrs  of  St.  Peter  in  a  dark  Age,  might 
make  People  believe  they  work'd  Mira^ 
cles  when  they  did  not,  that  St.  Peter 
in  a  Criticd  Age  might  have  made  the 
World  believe  the  Refurre£lion  of  ouf 
Saviour,  altho'  in  Reality  no  fuch 
Thing  had  been. 

Thus  I  have  fhewn  that  the  Apc^ 
files  could  propofe  no  worldly  Advan? 
tage  to  themfelves  by  embracing  th^ 
Chriftian  Religion  ;  as  they  could  nQ|; 
reafonably  expeCfc  to  make  Converts  of 
the  greateft  Part  of  the  Roman  Em-, 
pire  ,  or  to  get  the  Chriflian  to  be 
the  Eftablifhed  Religion  in  their  own 
Times;  and  that  unlefs  this  could  be 
eiFeded,  they  muft,  inftead  of  Honours 
and  Emoluments ,  exped  the  worft  oif 
Treatment  from  both  "Jerv  and  Gentile^ 
and  tbat  if  they  built  their  Hopes  of 
Succefs  upon  pretending  to  a  Power  of 

working 


Sermon    XV.  459 

\Vorking  Miracles,  that  there  was  not 
any  Likely  hood  they  would  be  able  to 
make  falfe  Miracles  pafs  for  true  Ones, 
with  Perfons  prejudic'd  againft  the  Belief 
of  them.  Such  Perfons  too  as  had  Abili- 
ties fufficient  for  diftinguilliiiig  Kealmes 
from  Impjiures.  Thefe  are  fuch  Diffi- 
culties attending  the  Deifi\  Suppofition 
of  the  Apoftles  being  Deceivers ;  fo  ir- 
reconcilable with  the  ufual  Workings 
of  the  Human  Nature,  that  we  ought 
to  believe  them  fincere  Perfons. 

I F  it  be  faid  that  the  Apoftles  might 
pleafe  themfelves  with  being  Heads  of 
a  Party  ,  and  in  Courfe  efteemM  by 
fuch  as  they  could  bring  into  it ;  which 
h  the  only  poflible  Inducement  left 
them  ;  This  is  fuch  thin  Diet,  as  would 
never  fupport  a  Man  againft  the  Diffi- 
culties which  the  Apoftles  expe^Eted,  and 
adlually  met  with :  For  what  Induce- 
ment would  it  be,  to  be  efteemed  by 
a  fmall  Number  of  Perfons,  almoft  all 
of  them  of  mean  Condition;  and  at 
the  fame  Time  to  be  defpifed  by  the 
reft  of  the  World;  and  not  only 
defpifed  ,     but    perfecuted    even     to 

Death. 


460         Sermon  XV. 

Death.  "Whatever  Pride  and  Vanity 
there  may  be  in  our  Natures,  yet  no 
Man  of  Common  Senfe  can  think  the 
Efteem  of  a  few  mean  Perfons ,  a  fuf- 
ficient  Recompence  for  being  fcorned 
and  defpifed  by  all  thofe  who  had  any 
Character  for  Reputation  hi  the  World. 
Had  the  Defire  of  Glory  been  their 
Motive  for  Preaching  the  Gofpel,  they 
mufl:  have  been  quickly  difcouraged  , 
when  they  faw  themfelves  treated  with 
greater  Contempt  than  any  other  Sort 
of  Men,  meerly  for  Preaching  it.  They 
mufl:  have  given  over  the  Attempt 
when  they  found  nothing  got  by  it  , 
but  the  Reputation  of  being  Perfons 
that  were  either  mad  or  very  wicked. 
St.  Vaul  tells  us  they  were  looked  up- 
on as  fools  Jar  Chris  t's  Sake  ^,  that 
they  were  expofed  in  the  Theatres  to 
be  a  SfeHacle  to  the  People  f ,  as  pro- 
fane Perfons,  that  were  Enemies  to  all 
Religion  ;  they  were  firft  laugh'd  at, 
?nd  then  put  to  Death.      Thofe  who 

can 


'fM 


-...J 


;^  xCor.  iy.  jo.  i  ihld,  v«r.  9, 


''% 


^ican  believcj  that  any  Perfons  can  be 
tickled  with  fuch  Sort  of  Fame,  may 
^believe  any  Thing:  And  therefore  the 
Deiji  labours  in  vain,  whilft  he  endea- 
^vours  to  perfuade  himfelf  and  others  j 
llhat  the  Apoftles  were  Deceivers. 

The    only  Refuge  left   him  would 
be  this:   That  the  Apoftles   preached 
^no  fuch  Religion  at  the  fame  Time  fet 
down  in  the  Writings  of  the  New  Te^ 
fiametJt^   but   that  the  whole  was  a  fi- 
r  (ftitious  Account  of  Things  and  Perfons, 
3publiflied  fome  Years  after  that  Time, 
'When  it  would  not  be  eafy  to  confute 
the  Publilhers.    But  'tis  impoflible  this 
^'fhould  be  true,     becaufe  if  the    firft 
Publication  of   the  Religion  had  been 
2  fome  Yeai-s  after  that  Time  which  the 
Scriptures  mention,    as  thofe  Scriptures 
exprefsly    fay   the   Gofpel    had    been 
preached  fome  Years  before  this  Publi- 
cation of  it,  and  in  fo  Publick  a  Place 
as  Jerufalem,   the  Metropolis  of  Judea^ 
and  the  Jem  difperfed  over  the  Roman 
Empire ;  every  one  muft  prefently  have 
found  it  to  be  a  Cheat,    becaufe  the 
Jews  could  have  told  them,  they  had 

never 


V 


\62  Sermon    XV. 

never  before  heard  of  any  fuch  Reli- 
gion preached  in  their  Country.  But 
we  are  further  aflurcd  that  the  Gofpel 
was  not  Jirji  preached  fome  Years  after 
the  Time  fet  down  in  the  Kfew  Tefta- 
rnenty  becaule  we  have  an  Heathen  Author 
of  good  Credit,  that  was  born  but  a  few 
Years  after  the  firft  Preaching  of  it ; 
who  fpeaking  of  the  Beginning  of 
Chriftianity  tells  us,  '*  That  the  Au- 
^^  thor  of  this  Sed  was  Christ; 
"  who  m  the  Reign  of  Tiberius  was 
"  put  to  Death  by  Pontius  Pilate^  Go- 
**  vernor  of  Judea^  "  which  agrees 
with  the  Times  given  by  the  Sacred 
Writers:  And  then  he  fays,  "  The' 
*^  it  was  thus  nipped  in  the  Bud  by 
"  putting  the  Author  to  Death,  yet  it 
"  broke  out  anew,  and  fpread  not  on- 
"  \y  through  Judea^  but  reached  even 
"  unto  Rome  itfelf  ^  ".  This  Author 
was  too  exa£t  an  Hiftorian  to  give  a 
felfe  Account  of  the  Original  of  a 
Se6i:,  wliich  was  fo  fiear  his  own  Time. 

But 

"'ji>i''v--'*  'V-  -M  '    *-'->  '■■          -  -i-' 

■  "     —  • I 

*  Tackus  Annal.  Lib.  15. 


Sermon    XV.         463 

But  I  Ihall  fay  no  more  to  this  Ob- 
jeftion  of  the  Deift^  becaufe  it  would 
be  doing  it  too  much  Honour  to  dif- 
cover  all  its  Weakneffes. 

Having   now  fhewn,    That    the 
firft  Preachers  of  the  Gofpel  could  not 
be  Deceivers,    fuppofing  the   Gofpel  to 
have  been  Preached  about  that  Time, 
that  the  Writers  of  the  New   Ttjlament 
tell  us  :   That  the  Reafon  of  the  Thing, 
Ihews  it  muft  have  been  Preached  at 
that  Time .;  that  the  Teftimony  of  an 
Author  that  was  an  Enemy  to  the  Chri- 
ftian  Religion  confirms  it :   Having  alfo 
fhewn   before,    That   if  the  Apoftles 
were  fincere  Perfons,  they  could  not  be 
deceived  in  the  Relation  they  gave  of 
our  Saviour's  Miracles,  by  taking  mere 
Appearances   for    Realities  :     And  that 
fuch     Extraordinary    Works    as    they 
relate,  muft  have  the  immediate  Pow- 
er of  God  for  the  Author  of  them; 
we   have  then  a  folid  Foundation   for 
the  Divine  Authority  of  our  Chriftian 
Religion  to  reft  upon  ;   as  it  cannot  be 
fuppofed  that  God  would  have  Coun- 
tenanced 


4(^4         Sermojst  XV. 

tenanced  it  in.  fo  extraordinary  a  Man- 
ner, if  it  had  not  been  from  Heaven ; 
efpecially  when  the  Religion  itfelf  lays 
Claim  to  fuch  an  Original:  Nothing 
more  can  be  necelTary  for  juftifying  the 
Faith  of  a  Chriftian,  and  at  the  fame 
Time  expofing  the  Unbeliever,  for  ma- 
king Difficulties  in  Religious  Belief  his 
Reafon  for  not  receiving  our  Chriftian 
Revelation,  than  Ihewing  what  AlTu- 
ranee  we  have,  that  the  Writings  of 
the  New  Teftament  or  our  Four  Gofpelsy 
do  contain  a  true  Account  of  the  Chri- 
ftian Religion,  fuch  as  it  was  at  firft 
Preached  by  the  Apoftles.  And  the 
Ground  for  any  Doubt  in  this  Cafe  is, 
Becaufe  many  Perfons  did  put  out  G<?- 
fpels  in  the  Names  of  the  Apoftles,  to 
give  them  the  greater  Credit,  and  per- 
haps thofe  we  have  may  be  of  that 
Sort ;  that  fome  of  thofe  that  have  born 
the  Name  of  an  Apoftle,  have  differed 
in  fome  very  material  Paffages  from  the 
Received  Go/pels*  However,  fuppofing 
the  Books  we  have  were  writ  by  thofe 
whofe  Names   they  bear,    what  Affu- 

rance 


Sermon  XV. 

ranee  have  we  that  many  confiderabie 
Alterations  have  not  been  made  in 
them,  confidering  the  Malice  and  Care- 
hfntfs  of  Tranfcribersj  and  the  Number 
of  Copies  which  have  been  taken,  fince 
the  Originals  of  the  Apoftles  were  firft 
Publiflied.  The  Anfwer  to  thefe  Dif- 
ficulties will  be  feen  in 
Difcourfe. 


the  folbwins 


45$ 


H  h 


S  E  R  M. 


P?  y     ^^  O  { 


;  ^-*J!-.-i^' 


SERMON  XVI. 


467 


2  Pet.  I.  16. 


For  we  have  not  followed 
cunningly  devifed  Fahles^ 
when  we  made  known  un- 
to you  the  power  and  com* 
ing  of  our  Lord  Jesus 
Christ,  but  were  Eye- 
witnejfes  of  His  KjMd-^ 

T  mufl  be  allowed  that  the 
Difciples  of  our  Lord,  as 
they  were  Eye-witnefTes, 
were  beft  able  to  give  us  a 
faithful  Hiftory  of  the  Actions  of  their 
M^Jttr,  And  the  Writers  of  Jpocrjphal 
'■'  '^  '  H  h    2  B.ook^^ 


Sermon  XVI. 

QOU-  Books  plainly    Ihew    the  Opinion   the 
"    ^ye4d  had.  tk^  of-  an  Hiftory-  of-  our^,>, 
Sjhxi  o  u  R,  writ  by:  them  ;  fince  .  they' '' 
knew  no  better   Way  of  gaining  Cre- 
dit to  their    Oofpels  \,     than  -  that  *  t)f 
a&xiag.  the  Name  of  feme  A'poftle    to' 
them  -,    and  as   we  have  proved  them, 
to  be  Honeft  Men,  nothing  more  can 
be  neceifary    for    clearing     our  GofpeU 
fro^^ -^y  -Sufpicipn  of   h^mg' ' stinmhgly  ; 
devij^ed  F4/U\hvit  iliewjng  their  A^vqq^. 
ment  with  what  was  Preached,  by  the 

4/11  .'  '        T    ■'      V.  •',-    v.,i        I     Y^^     -.ff*-* 

Jpofiler.    •  A     .:^         -  .^'^     -■        ..^^ 

I  WILL  therefore  fliew,  f/?,  <\Ehat 
we  have  good  Reafori  to  believe, .  tbat 
thc^PLeceived  Gofpeh  were  either  writ, 
or  allowed  of  by-  fome  Apollle. 

2!!^/)',  Th  AT  "there  is  no  good  Evi-^^. 
denes  that  any  of  the  AjfocrjifhaLGof^els.A 
were  writ  by  that  Apolfle  or  A'pollles, 
whofe  Name  they  bear :  And  how  it 
might  come  to  pafs  that  they  ^ere  re- 
ceived by  fome  ,  as  the  Writings  of  an 
Ap9(tle>  and  yet  be  afterv/ards  rcjecl- 
ed.- 

ijf,  I  AM  to  fliew,  That  we   have 
good  Reafqn  for  believing  that  the  jR^- 

ceivcd 


Se  R  M  a:N     XVL  donJ:  /^6^ 

cehed  Go/pels  were  eitlier  writ, '  or  al- 
lowed of  by  fome  Apoftle.  in  proving* 
this  Propofition, 

I  WILL  fhew  i/,'  That  there  were 
Gofpels  written  from  the  Beginning  of 
Chriftianity,  by  the  Perfons  whofe 
Names  we   have  at   the  Head  of  our 

Goffds,  :■ 

2^/^,  THAT.thQre,  of  them  :^i^hicli 
bear  not  the  Name  of  an  Apoftle,  (as 
Mark  and  Luke)  were  always   fuppofed* 
to  have   been  {qqvi   and  allowed  of  by 
fome  Apoftle. 

^ dly^  T H  A T  ; the^  Gofpvls  which  are 
come  down-  to  our  Times,  were  thdrs^ 
and  not  any  Jpocrjphal  Go/pels, 

jji.  That,  there  were  Gofpels  writ* 
ten  from  the  Beginning  of  Chrillianity. 
by    the  Perfons  whofe  Names  we  have 
at  the  Head  of  our  Gafpds.    This  is  a 
Matter  of  Fad,  and  muft  therefore  be; 
determined   by  fuch  Writers,    as  lived* ' ' 
neareft    to  the  Times   of  their    being 
firft  publifhed.    If  we  can  fhew,  that' 
both  thofe  Heretical  Chriftians,  who  did 
not  in  all  Points  approve  of  thefe  Gdi^^ 
fpflsy  and    made  ufe  of  others^   did  yet 
'  --  H  h   ?  allow 


470  SERMt)N      XVi. 

allow  them  to  be  written  by  thofe  Per- 
fons,  as  well .  as  thoje  Chriftians  who 
made  Ufe  of  no  others,  we  fliall  fuf- 
ficiently  prove  that  thefe  Perfons  did 
write  thofe  Go/pels.  To  begin  with  the 
Orthodox,  or  fuch  as  allowed  them  in  all 
RefpeQ:s  to  be  genuine.  We  find  by 
Iremus  ^,  a  Perfon  curious  in  enquiring 
into  Matters  of  this  Nature,  who  flou- 
rifhed  in  the  lid  Century,  that  St.  Mat^ 
thewput  out  a  Gofpel,  after  him  St.  Mark^ 
tJje»  St.  Luke ,  a^d  laji  of  all  St.  John. 
After  him  Eufehius  ^,  who  took  great 
Pains  in  fearcliing  for  all  Sorts  of  Wri* 
tings  from  the  very  Beginning  of  Chri- 
ftianity,  whether  Friends  or  Enemies, 
tells  us,  That  the  Four  Go/pels  were 
iv  h^oxayys/j^oK^  among  fuch  Books  as 
were  on  all  Hands  allowed  to  be  writ 
by  thofe  Perfons  whofe  Names  are  pre- 
fixed to  them.  It  is  needlefs  to  men- 
tion any  more  Authorities  of  this  Kind, 
becaufe  the  Church   which  ufed  thefe 

Gofpeis, 

"'^y^*  Irenaus  edit.  Mafiuec.  pag.  174/  .  hf.  . 
.i:Eufeb.  I  lift.  Ecclefiaft.  Lib.   3.  cap  «5, 


S E R M ON   xyi.        47 1 

Go/pels,    mufl:    be   fuppofed   to   believe 
them  written  by  thofe  Perfons. 

And  therefore  I  fliall  proceed  to' 
the  Heretical  Chriftians,  whole  Teftimo- 
ny  will  be  more  confiderable,  as  thefe 
Gvfpels  did  in  many  Places  oppofe  fome 
or  other  of  their  particular  Opinions; 
and  yet  we  find  thefe  Go/pels  were  in 
fuch  an  univerfal  Efteem,  that  the  ear-i 
Heft  Hereticks  found  it  neceffary  to  havd 
Recourfe  to  them,  and  to  defend  their 
Opinions  by  the  Authority  of  thefe  Go* 
fpi^^f,  as  Irefjdus  afTures  us  *,  "  That  the 
'"  Authority  of  thefe  Gofpels  is  fo  firni- 
**  ly  Eftablifhed ,  that  even  Heretical 
H  h  4  ''  Chriftians 

(is — : ^„„i^ 

0"' 

*  Tanta  eft  aarem  circa  haec    Evangella  firmltas, 

at  8c  ipfi.  Hxretici  teftimonium  reddant  eis,  Sc  ex 
ipfis  egrediens  unufguifque  eorum  ,  conetur  fuam 
confirmare  doftrinam.  Eblonxl  etenim  eo  Erange- 
lio  quod  eft:  fecundum  Matthscum  folo  utentes,  ex 
iilo  ipfo  convincuncur.  Marcloii  autem  id,  quod  eft: 
fecundum  Lucam,  circumcidens,  ex  his  qux  adhuc 
iervantur  penes  eum,  blafphemus  in  Deum  Often- 
ditur.  Qui  autem  Jefum  feparant  a  Chrifto,  & 
impafllbilem  peiTeveraire  Chriftum,  pafTum  vero  Je- 
fum dicunr,  id  quod  fecundum  Marcum  eft  prxfe- 
rcntes  Evangeliuni :  Hi  auteni  qui  a  Valentino 
fant,  eo  quod  eeft  fecundym  Johannem  plcnuTime  ^ 
ptentes  ad  Oftenfionem  conjugationum  fiiaru^ji,.  Ire* 
hxiis,  pag.:a9o,  ,i^^.,^  f 


472         Sermon    XVL 

^^  Chriftians  could  not  difpute  it,  and 
"  were  contented  to  fupport,  as  well 
^'  as  they  could,  their  particular  Opini- 
''  ons  by  them.  That  the  Ebionites  de- 
**  fended  themfelves  by  St.  Mattherv's 
"  Gofpsl  ;  the  Marcionites  by  that  of 
*'  St.  Luke  :  Another  Herefy  ( whofe 
"  Name  he  does  not  tell  us)  juftified 
"  their  Opinions  by  St*  Mark''s  Gofpel ; 
*'  and  the  Valentima^s  by  that  of  St. 
"  'John  ".  That  thefe  laft  received  St. 
John\  Gofpel^  becaufe  they  thought  the 
Firfl:  Chapter  of  St.  'John  was  a  Con- 
firmation of  their  Notion  of  the  ^Eons 
hwg  in  Pairf.  Thus  we  find  the  mod 
early  Hereticks  endeavouring  to  defend 
themfelves  by  the  Authority  of  thefe 
Gofpels, 

I  A  M  aware  it  has  been  queftion'd, 
whether  the  Ebionites  made  ufe  of  St. 
Matthew's  Gofpel^  or  whether  it  was  an* 
other  Gofpel,  which  was  commonly  cal- 
led according  to  the  Hdrews ;  which  if 
true,  Irenmus  was  deceived  in  faying, 
That  the  Four  Gofpels  were  confirmed 
hy  the  Teftimcny  of  Hereticks  ;  fince 
one  of  them,    ziz,   St.  Matthe)vs  would 

not 


Sermon    xvk         473 

not  have:  had  any  fuch  Confirmation. 
That  we  may  give  a  dillindl  AnTwer 
to  this  Objeftion,  it  muft  be  obferv'd, 
that  if  theGo/j?el  of  St.  Matthew  was 
writ  by  him  in  Hebrew  or  Syriack  (which 
the  earlieil  Writers  affirm)  it  muft  have 
been  for  the  Benefit  of  fuch  Perfons, ,  as 
underftood  thofe  Languages,  and  not  the 
<jretk  :  That  thofe  Perfons  we;:e  the 
'^em  in  Palefime^  that  the  iirft  Con- 
verts to  Chriftianity  were  made  from 
thefe  "Jervs  ;  that  fuch  were  for  fomc 
Time  called  Nat^arens ;  that  the  Ebionites 
were  Sjrlaa.  Jem  too,  and  only  diftin- 
ilguifhed  from  them  by  a  difterent  Name, 
on  account  of  fome  Errors  which  they 
fell  into  ;  that  the  ancient  Eccleiiaftir 
cal  Writers  liave  beheved  the  Go/pel 
ufed  ^  by  the  J^azA/ens  to  be  thq  true 
Goffd  0^  St.  Mafthervy  and  at  the  fame 
Time  tell    us    f ,    That  the  E[?iomtes 

made 

*  Eplphanius  Hsref.  29.  n.  9.  '^t.yjicrt  '^'^l  xjx 
'  ■  MetrSct'To?  ''ivAyy'iKiov  rrx^^'i'^arov  'E/Bgiji/ri.  •' 
t^''t  In  Evangel io  quo  \xx.n\\v\x£  Nivzareni ^  Eh'tmlt£, 
quod  nuper  In  Grxcum  Sermonem  tranftulimus,  quoi 
,_.,  vocatur  a  plerifque  Matthsei  Authenticum.  Hlcron. 
"<^om.  ■  in  Matt.  12.  Idem  in  Catftlog©  Scriptor, 
-'    Ecclefiaft. 


474         Sermon   XVL 

made  ufe  of  the  fame  Gofpel  with  thefe 
Nazarens ;    that  unlefs  the  Nazarem  and 
Ehiotfites  did  make  ufe  of  this  Gofpel  of 
St.  Matthew  in  Hebrew^    we  can   fcarce 
find  any   Chriftians  that    did  ;    but  no 
one  will  believe  that  an  Apoftle  fhould 
write  a  Gofpel  which    no  Body  read  y 
that  unlefs  the  Goffel  ufed  by  thefe  Per- 
fons    was  St.  Matthew^s  Go/pel^    it  muft, 
have  been  entirely   loft  within   a   few 
Years  after  it  was  publiflied.  For  neither 
St.  Jerom  nor  Origm  before  him  were  able^ 
to  find  any  other  Heherv   Gofpel  of  St. 
Matthew^  than  what  was  in  Ufe  amongft 
thefe  Perfons ;    and    it    cannot   be  faid 
that  it  was  neglected,   and  fo  loft  be- 
caufe  no  Body  wanted  it  ',  for  we  are 
certain  that  the   Syrian  or  Syro-Chaldaick 
Language  which  was  called   Hebrew  ^^ 
continued    for    fome  Ages    after    their 
Times,  to  be  the  Language  beft  known 
in  that  Country :  It  being  the  Mother 
Language  of  that  Country,  till  the  Re- 
ligion of  Mahomet  prevailed,  which  was 
long  after  St.  'Jerom  lived.     Befides,  it 


IS 


*  Afts  xxJ.  40. 


h  confefs'd  by  all  V  ^1^^-^  tlifere  tvas   a; 
Gofnl  in  the  nehn\v  or  "^yrmk   m  Ufe; 
among  fome  Chriftians  In  St.  ?er.^'^ 
Time,    and  therefore  the  Hehrexv  Go/pet 
of  St.  Matthew    wouM  not  have  been^ 
^hat  this  Objeaion  fuppofts,  ufelefs.  If 
it  be  ask'd  how  *tis  poffible  the  Gofpd 
iifed    by  the  Nazarefts    and  Womter'9 
fliould   be  generally  reckoned'  in  Etifi^^ 
bittsh  Time  atnong  Apocryphal  Book^^ 
if  it  had  been  really  writ  by  St.  M^f^ 
ihe)V',    the  Anfwer  is,   that  thofe  who 
make  this  ObjeEiion  do  not,   as  Father- 
6Vw<7;^  obferves,  duely    refled  upon  thd 
Original  State  of  Chriftians.     The  Pri- 
mitive Chriftians-  of  Jerufilem  arid   Fd^ 
leflifWy  who  made  ufe  of  this  tiebre^v  Gof. 
pel,  having  not  long  fubftfted  in  their  firft  . 
Eftate,    and  the  others  on  the  contrar)^ 
who  fpake  Greek    being  difpers'd  thro' 
the  whole  Earth,    it  hath  from  thence 
happened   that  the    Greek  Gofpel   ofrt;f 
was   generally    known,   and  therefor^ 
generally  allowed  of  ;  becaufe   all   th^ 
other  Chriftians  had  taken  their  Verfi- 
ons  from  this  Copy.  Whereas  the  ChaU 

daick 


^y6  Sermon  XVI. 

daick  Xongue,    in,  which  the  Gofpel  of 
the  N^nAnnes  was  writ,  was  only  under^-. 
ftood   by  feme  y^:w.     And  befides,  the- 
Nazarenes    who   had  retained     Judaifm^i 
with  Chriflianity^    became  odious  to  theil 
other  Chriftians   who  were  converted 
from  Gentilifmy  and  there  was  an  irre-w., 
concileable  Hatred  between  them  ;  and  ■ 
then  no  wonder  if  fome  Gtntile  Chri- 
ftians were  not  for  allowing  fuch  hatedi.it 
Perfons  the  Honour  of  ufing  St.  Mat-^'-^ 
thetv*s  GofpeL  ri: 

All  then  that  can  be  urged  with  an?-"^- 
fhewof  Reafon,  by  fuch  as  deny  that, 
the  Nazare^/es  and  Ebionites  made  ufe  of  ">7 
the  Hebrew  Go/pel  of  St.  Matthew,   would  ?i 
be  this,  That   thofe    Writers    who  a^A 
firmed  that  St.  Matthew  writ  his  Gofpel 
in  Hebrew y  were  deceived.     And  yet  we^ 
know  that  Papias  -^  in  the  Eaft,    wha  *? 
converfed  with  the  Difciples  of  the  A*^  ^ . 
poftles,  and  was  very  inquifitive  to  know 
what  they  faid  or  did,  tells  us  pofitive- 
ly,  that   St.  Matthew  writ  his  Go/pel  in 
Hebrew  ;  he  fpeaks  of  it  as  a  Matter  of 
'-:■  Faa 

.•   *  Eurebius.  Lib.  3.  cap.  39.  , 


Sermion    xvl  ^Jf 

Facl  that  was  not>  at  that  Time  doubt- 
ed of.     St.  Jremus  in  the  Weft  fays,   St. 
Mauherv,  being  among  the  Hebrews^  writ 
his  Gof^el  m  their  Diale(!il  ^  ;  and  others 
fay  I  "St.  Matthew  writ    it   in  that  Lan- 
guage for  the  Sake  of  fuch  Sjria»  Jews 
converted  to  Chriftianity,    as  were  ig- 
norant of  the  Greek  Tongue  f .  But  for 
all  this  Evidence,   the  many  Additions 
and  /Differences  from  the  Greek  of  St.  . 
Matthew y   found   in  the  Goffel  ufed  by\^ 
the  Nazarenes  and  Ehionitesj   have  made 
many  believe,    that  they  did  not    ufe  j. 
St,  Matthen^'^s  Go/pel.  Whereas  they  ought 
to  confider    (efpecially  as  the  Evidence 
is  fo  ftrong  againft   them)    that  thofe 
Additions  and  Alterations  might  be  ow- 
ing to   the  Cuftom    of   thofe  Times  , 
when  Chriilians   took  a   great  deal  of 
Pains  to  inform  themfelves  of  what  the 
Difciples  of  the  ApolHes  had  learn'd  from 
their  Mafters,  as  appears   by  Papias  || ; 
and  to  preferve   them  would  probably 
put  them  down    between   the   Lines  , 

and 


*  Epiphan.  Hxref.  51.  f  Eufeb.  H.  E.  lib.  3. 

cap.  8.        jj  Euf^b.  lib.  5.  cap.  39, 


47 §         Sermon    XVL 

and  at  the  Margin  of   their  Copy  of 
t;he  Goffely  from  whence  fuch  Interlinea- 
tions and  Margmal  Notes  might  by  De- 
grees flip  into  the  Texty  and  fo  become 
Part  of  the  Gof^d  itfelf.  Many  Alterations 
too  might  have  been  introduced  by  the 
^biom^es  into  their  Copies,  with  a  De- 
lign  to  favour  fome  of  the  pecuh'ar  O- 
pinions  of  their  SeQ:.     I  am  perfuaded 
there  is   more  Probability    that    thofe 
Alterations  which  were  found   in  fome 
Copies  af  St.  Matthem^s   Hebrew  Gofpel'^ 
(as  appears  by  fome  PafTages  St.  ^erom 
has  quoted  from  it,)  might  have  been 
introduced  in  fome  fuch  Way,  than  that 
all  the  Ecclefiaftical  Writers  who  have 
fpoken  of  this  Matter,  even  the  earlieft 
of  them,    fhould  be    deceived  in   thefe 
two   Matters  of  Fa£t,   'ulz..    That  St. 
Matthew  writ  his  Gofpel  in  Hebrew,   and 
that  the  Hebrerv  Go/pel  which  the  Naz,A^ 
renes  and  Ebiomtes  made  ufe  of,  was  St. 
]\fattherv^3  GofpeL    As  to  thofe  who  deny 
^he  firjl  of  thefe,  Grotms  fcruplesnot  to 
fay,  Nullis  ]ujf:ts  de  Caufis  maximum  pix 
^^tiquitatis  Qovfenfiomrf%  repudiant  ^,  ^ 

*  Ccm.  in  Match,   cap.  i.  •:'''• 


S  E  R  M  O  N     XVI.  *479 

pi  But  it  may  be  faid  that  if  thefe 
Hereticks  did  quote  the  Go/pel  of  St. 
Matihtrv,  as^  well  as  the  other  Hereticks 
tJid  the  other  Gofpeis,  that  this  would 
only  prove  that  fuch  Gofpels  with  fuch 
Titles  were  in  their  Times :  But  that 
their  not  receiving  them,  fhould  feem 
to  prove  that  thofe,  which  each  reje£fc- 
ed,  were  not  thought  by  them  to  be 
writ  or  authoriz'd  by  an  ApolHe  ;  that 
they  only  made  ufe  of  them  to  defend 
their  own  Opinions  againft  the  Ortha- 
doxy  who  allowed  them  to  be  writ  by 
thofe  Perfons,  whofe  Names  they  bear. 
The  Anfwer  to  this  is,  That  we  can- 
not find  any  of  thefe  Hereticks  ever 
denied  thefe  Gofpels  being  wrote  by  thofe 
Perfons ,  even  when  they  were  hard 
prefs'd  to  reconcile  their  Opinions  with 
thefe  Gofpels.  If  there  had  been  the 
leaft  Sufpicion  whether  Matthew,  Marky 
Luke  and  Joh^  had  writ  any  Gofpels^ 
there  would  have  been  an  eafy  Anfwer 
to  the  Orthodox,  in  telling  them  that  it 
was  doubtful  whether  the  Gofpels,  which 
oppofed  their  Opinions,  were  writ  by 
-thofe  Perfons.     But  when  the  Church 

prefs'd 


480  Sermon    XVI. 

prefs'd  them  with  PafTages,  drawn  from 
thefe  Go/pels,  they  anfwered  them  ei- 
ther by  giving  a  diflperent  Senfe  to  the 
"Words,  if  they  would  admit  any  ;  or 
by  denying  thofe  Words  to  belong  to 
the  Writer  of  th^  Gofpel  ;  for  fome  of 
them,  as  particularly  the  Marchmtesy 
ftruck  out  of  their  Copies  of  the  Goft^ely 
whatever  was  qffenfive  to  them,  as  we 
have  already  feen  by  he?i£us :  Or  elfe 
they  defended  themfelves  by  quoting 
fome  Apocryphal  Gojptly  which  ia  an 
Age  not  over  Critical ,  they  found  to 
be  of  great  Service  to  them :  for  by 
prefixing  the  Name  of  an  Apoftle  to 
Go/pels  of  their  own  putting  out  in  Fa- 
vour of  their, particular  Opinions,  they 
f^t  up  the  Authority  of  one  Apoftle 
againfl:  another.  This  fliews  that  in  the- 
earliefl:  Times  of  Chriftianity,  when 
their  Spurioufnefs  might  have  been  de-| 
teded,  there  was,  no  PofTibility  of  dif- 
puting ,  whether  Four  Go/pels  were 
writ  by  thofe,  whofe  Names  they- 
bore. 

a-lly^  I  AM  to  fhew  now,  That  fuch 
of  the  Gofptls  Ijs  bear  not  the  Nam^  of 

an 


Sermon*  XVI.  481 

an  Ai^oi\k,'viz,^M^rk'2ini  Lake,  weijb 
always  fuppofed  'to  have  b^en  fqen'  arid 
allowed  of  by  fome  Apoftlc.     To  begin 
with  St.  A^arl'.     He  is  faid  by  Jrenaus  to 
have  been  a  Follower  of  St.  Feter^  and 
an    Interpreter    of  his  Sermons ;    And 
•one  that  was  antienter,  being  a  Contem- 
porary with  the  imnfiediate  Difciples  of 
the  Apoftles ,    ^  Fapas ,    fays,   "  That 
**  Mark,    who    was    Peter^s    Interpre- 
"  ter,  had  written   exaOily  all  that  he 
"  had  retained  in  his  Memory,     with- 
"  out  obferving  the  Order  of  the  Words 
'^  and  Actioiis    of  Jesus  Christ; 
^'  for  he  had  not  himfelf  heard  Jesus 
"  Chris  t,' not  having  followed  Him ; 
*^  but    he    'had    followed     Peter,    who 
'*  Preached  to  the  People,  according  as 
"  their  Neceflities  required.  "      Clemens 
Jlexandrims  tells    us,    That    St.  Mark^ 
who   for    a  long  Time  followed   Feter^ 
put  into  Writing  the  Gofpel    which  Sf. 
Feter   had  Preached  at  (the  Requeft   of 
the  Faithful,  and   that  this  Gcfpel    was 
I  i  approved 


*  Marcus    Interpres    &    Senator  Petri.  Ircnxus, 
pag.  187.    VideEufeb.  Hift.  Ecclef.  Lib.  3.  0.3$?. 


482  Sermon  XVL 

approved  by  St.  ?eter ;   for  the  Truth 
of  which  Eufihfus  brings  not  only  Cle- 
mensj  but  F/tfUs  to  be  his  Vouchers  ^. 
If  in  his  t  Vlth  Book  he   quotes  the 
fame  Clemens  for  faying,  that  Peter  nei- 
ther   approved,  nor   difallowed  of  Sto 
Mark^s  Gofpely  Valefius  in    his  Notes  up- 
on the  Place  tells  us,   That  this  is  eafily 
reconciled;  becaufe    in  the  Vlth  Book 
he  fpeaks  only  of  a  pubiick  Approba- 
tion of  this  Goffely  and  in  the  lid  Book 
of  what  Encouragement  St.  Peter  gave 
to   it    in  private  amongft  his  Friends. 
As  for  St.  Luke^  we  find  by  [Origen  and 
Eufebius^  that  it  was  the   general  Opi- 
nion of  Chriftians,  That  St.  Faul  meant 
his  Gofpely  when  he  faid  of  him,  "  Luke 
*'  the  beloved  Phyfician,    whofe  Praifc 
*'  is  in  the  Gofpel. "    If  this  were  true, 
we  have  the   Approbation  of  an  Apo- 
ftle  given  to  his  Go/pel,  and  an  Anfwer 
to  Amyntor^  when  he  asks  us,    "    Why 
*'  we  do  not  receive  the  Epijiles  oiBar- 
<'  nabas  and  Clemens  among  the  Canoni- 
y  ''  cd 


"    Eufeb.  H.  Ecc.  Lib.  2.  cap.   14. 
t   Eufcb,  Lib,  6.  cap.  14. 


Sermon    XVi.       48^ 

"  cal  Books,  as  wdl-^s  Mark  and. Luke, 
"  fince  the  RvHt  were  as  much  Com- 
*'  panions  and  Fellow-Labourers  with 
"  the  Apoftles  as  the  later?  "  And 
the  Anfwer  is  this;  That  thefe  Gof^eUy 
were  not  only  compofed  by  fuch  as 
had  been  Companions  with  an  Apoflle, 
but  were  aifo  believed,  to  have  received 
the  Allowance  of  fome  Apoftle^  So 
Eufehius  tells  us,  That  'twas  commonly, 
beheved  \  St.  John  look'd  over  the.. 
thrcQGoJpels  oi  Mdnhew,  Mark  and  Luke:, 
,and  approved  of  them.  But  there  is  no 
Evidence  pretended  for  the  Epijlles  of 
Barnabas  and  Clemens  being  approved  by 
any  Apoftles.  Some  have  even  que- 
ftioned,  whether  they  were  the  real  Au- 
thors of  thofe  Epijihs  which  now  bear 
their  Names,  efpecially  of  that  which 
bears  the  Name  of  Bamahas,  And  there- 
fore the  Church  might  have  good  Rea- 
fon  for  receiving  Mark  and  Luke,  and 
not  Qlemtm  and  Bamahas,  into  the  Ca- 
I  i  2  non 


A'^TVfn«"«tf7«,  Eufeb.  Lib.  3,  cap   z^.  pag.  95. 


484.  Sermon    xVL 

non  of  the  Holy  Scriptures  *,,  and  the 
jFaith  of  a  Chriftian  may  be  well 
grounded  which  receives  thefe  Gofpe 
for  a  Part  of  its  Rule,  without  con- 
cerning itfelf  about  the  Epiftles  of  Cle- 
mens and  Barftahas, 

:^dlyy  We  are  now  to  fee,  whether 
the  Go/pels  which  are  come  down  to 
our  Times,  are  really  the  Go/pels  writ 
by  them,  or  only  Apocryphal  Writings, 
with  their  Names  to  them.  And  the 
Reafon  for  fuch  a  Sufpicion  may  be 
grounded  upon  this,  That  if  the  Hebrew 
Gofpel  of  St.  Matthem  could  be  altered 
to  fuch  a  Degree,  and  fo  foon  after  its 
Publifhing,  that  in  the  Time  of  Eufe- 
*  bius  it  was  become  doubtful,  whether  it 
Was -his  Gofpel  or  not;  what  Security 
Gan  we  have ,  who  live  at  a  much 
greater  Diftance  from  the  Time  when 
thefe  Go/pels  were  firll  Publifhed,  that 
our  Gofpels  are  not  as  much  alteredj 
as  the  Hebrew  Gofpel  of  St.  Matthew  was 
in  the  Time  of  Eufebius :  when  the  Al- 
terations were  fo  many,  as  to  make  it 
pafs  with  fcveral  for  an  Apocrjphal  Book, 
entitled,  The  Gofpel  nccordirjg  to  the  He- 
brews. 


Sermon   XVI.  4^$ 

brews.    Our  Anfwer  is,  That  feoolcs  in 
the  Hands  of  the  Gentile  Chriftians,  couid 
not   be  altered  fo  eafily,   as  thofe  that 
were  in  the  Hands  of  only  one  Nation, 
viz.. 'the  converted  Jem^  and  thofe  oa- 
ly  the  converted  Syrian  Jews ;    for  only 
thefe  made  Ufe   of  the  Hehrew  Gofpel 
of  St.  Matthew.    Whereas  thofe  who  read 
the  Gofpel  in  Greek,  were  difperfed  all 
over  the  World ;   confequently,  a  Mul- 
titude of  Copies  in  Places  at  the  great- 
:^€ft    Dirtance  from   one    another:  And 
'therefore  if  any  confiderable  Alterations 
'■"had  been  made  in  om  Place,  they  muft 
'have  been  taken  Notice  of  by  thofe  of 
another  Place,  who  had  none  of  them  in 
their  Copies  of  the  Gofpel.    Befides  the 
Number  of  Copies    in    Parts  very  di- 
ftant  from  each  other,  which  has  always 
heen  the  Cafe  of  our   Greek  Copies  of 
the  Gofpel;   there  have  been  from  the 
Beginning    a    great  Number  of  Tran^ 
(iations  from  the  Greek,  into  the  feveral 
Languages  that  were  commonly  fpoken 
in  the  feveral  Countries  which  made  Pror 
feffion  of  the   Chriftian    Religion.     If 
there  had   beta  any  confiderable  Alte- 
I  i  I  ration? 


Sermon  XYI. 

rations  made  in  our  Greek  Copies  of  the; 
Gofpels,  they  muil  have  been  difcover- 
ed  by  fooie  or  other  of  the  Old  Verfu 
bns.;   as  the   Hebrew   Copy  of  St.  Mat- 
thew was  found  to  be  greatly  altered, 
by  comparing  it  with  the  Greek  Verfion ; 
whereas  the  Greek  Copies  agree  for  the 
'/fwfi    Part    with   all  the  Verfions  that 
iiave  been  made  from  the  Greek :  And 
therefore  we  cannot  doubt  that  the  Go- 
fpels   which    we    receive  as   Canonkd^ 
\vere  the    Gofpels    of   Matthew^    Mark, 
Luke  and  Jolm.    I  fiiall  have  occafion  to 
fpeak  more  particularly  as  to  the  Faith- 
fulnefs   of  our  Copies  of  the  Gofpels  ^ 
in  the  mean  Time, 

I  Proceed  to  the  Second  general 
Head  which   was,    That    thei-c   is  no 
good  Evidence  that  any   of  the  Jpocrjh 
fhal  Gofpels  were  writ  by  that  Apoftle, 
or  thofe  Apoftles,   whofe   Name  they 
bear-,  and   therefore   when  they  give 
any    Accounts   different   from  the  Re- 
ceived  Gofpels,  that  they  are  not   to 
be  regarded.    That  no  good  Evidence, 
can  be  produced  in  Behalf  of  the  Jpch 
i^rypbal  Gofpels,   will  appear,   if  I  can 

prove. 


Sbrmon   XVI.  487 

prove,  i/,  That  they  were  not  takea 
Notice  of  'till  many  Years  after  that  Apo- 
ftle's  Time,  whofe  Writing  they  pre- 
tend  to    be.      Or, 

zdljy  That  if  they  were  quoted 
early  by  fome  Writers,  they  were  not 
quoted  as  the  Writings  of  an  Apoftle. 
The  Author  of  Nazarems  has  exprefs'd 
a  particular  Fondnefs  for  the  pretended 
Gofpel  of  Barnabas^  and  the  Reafon  of 
his  Fondnefs  feems  to  be  its  contradict- 
ing the  Account  our  Cammed  Gofpels 
give  of  our  S  a  v  i  o  u  r's  Death  and  Re- 
iurredlion.  But  'tis  certain,  this  Gofpel 
efcaped  the  Searches  of  Inquifitive  Men, 
fuch  as  Eufebius  and  ^erom^  who  made 
it  their  Bufinefs  to  inform  themfelves  of 
every  Thing  relating  to  Ecclefiaftical 
Antiquity ;  and  was  not  difcovered  'till 
^bove  Four  Hundred  Years  after  it 
muft  have  been  writ,  fuppofmg  St.  Bar- 
mhos  to  have  been  the  Author  of  it.  For 
the  firft  niention  that  ToUnd,  could  find 
to  be  made  of  this  Gofpel,  was  m  the 
Decree  of  Pope  GeUfius^  in  a  Council 
jield  at  Rome  in  the  Year  49  j  *.    But 

I  i    4  I 

I-"  I  ■  — - —  ' 

*  NaxarenuS'  pag.  <J,  7. 


488 


Sermon   XVI. 

I  believe  it  will  fcarce  be  thought  pro- 
babiie,  that  a  Gofpel  writ  by  fo  cele- 
brated a  Perfon  as  St.  Bar»ai?af,  could 
have  lain  hid  for  fo  lor/g  a  Time,  efpe- 
ciaJly  at  a  Time  when  we  are  told, 
that  Chriftians  were  very  inquifitive 
and  defirous  to  learn  any  Particulars 
relating  to  the  Words  and  Actions  of 
our  Saviour.  'Twas  this  ftrong De- 
fire  that  encouraged  Deceivers  to  put 
out  f^iitious  Accounts  of  our  Saviour's 
Words  and  Aftions  under  the  Name 
o£  fome  Apoftles  ;  and  the  fame  Dcfire 
would  never  have  fuftered  a  Gofpel^ 
writ  by  a  Compmion  and  Yellow- Labourer 
with  the  Apoftle,  to  have  lain  in  Ob- 
fcurity  for  fo  long  a  Time  ^.  The 
Author  of  Nasiarent^s  does  not  offer  to 
affign  a  Reafon,  why  this  Gofpel  was 
riot  taken  Notice  of  before  the  Time  of 
GeUCtfUy  o^  of  Damaffi^  at  the  higheft ; 
but  contents  himfelf  with  endeavouring 
to  Ihew,  that  this  Gofpel  might  be  as' 
old  as  the  Times  of  the  Apoftles,  al- 
tho'  it  does  not  agree  with  tht  Camm^ 


*  Naxapcnus.  -pag.  1 7 


Sermon  XVI.  489 

cd  Gofpels  in  this  Particular  concerning 
the  Death  and  Refurre^tion  of  our  Sa- 
viour. And  the  Reafon  given  for 
this  is,  Becaufe  this  Gofpel  is  not  the 
only  old  one,  that  tells  us,  that  Christ 
was  not  really  put  to  Death,  and  there- 
fore that  he  did  not  *'  rife  again  ;  for 
*'  that  the  Cerinthians  and  Carpocratians 
"  did  believe  that  it  was  not  Jesus, 
*'  but  one  of  his  Followers,  very  like 
**  him  in  Perfon,  that  was  crucified  ia 
"  his  Stead ;  and  yet  Cerinthus  was  Con- 
"  temporary  with  Veter  ^  Paid  ^  and 
"  John  ^\  Thus  far  Nazarems.  But 
this  Writer  was  much  deceived  in  ma-» 
king  Cerinthus  to  deny  the  Death  and 
Refurre8:ion  of  Jesus;  for  Iren^us^ 
who  lived  near  the  Time  of  Cerinthus 
was  certainly  a  better  Judge  of  his  O- 
pinions,  than  Efiphanius ,  from  whom 
ToUnd  had  this  Account  of  the  Cerin^ 
thianiy  as  he  lived  at  a  much  greater 
Diftance  from  the  Beginning  of  that: 
Se(^.  But  Irenxus  tells  us,  Cerinthus^ 
Belief  was,  that  before  the   Death  oi" 

Jesus, 

Nazaren.  p-  17- 


45)o  Sermon   XVL 

Jesus, 'Christ  left  hirp,  and  flew 
back  to  Heaven ,  but  that  Jesus 
fuffer'd  Death  and  rofe  again.  In  fne 
autem  revoUfje  Chrifium  de  Jefuy  £ff  Jefum 
pajfum  ejfe  &  refurrexiffe  '(-.  We  fcQ 
then  this  Account  to  be  very  different 
from  that  of  the  Gofpel  of  St.  Barnabas^ 
but  agreeing  with  our  Gofpels  in.  the 
Fa£l  of  the  Death  and  Refurredion  ;  and 
that  this  particular  Circumftance  of  fome 
Qther  Body  being  crucified,  and  not  our 
Saviour,  vi^as  a  Novel  Invention, 
not  heard  of  in  the  Times  neareft  to 
our  Saviour,  either  by  the  Ortho- 
dox or  Hereticks,  and  therefore  a  good 
Proof  that  this  Gofpel  was  writ  fmce 
the  Time  of  Barttabas.    But  i 

sly,  As  to  thofe  Apocryphal  Gofpels 
which  were  taken  notice  of,  and  cited 
by  the  Early  Writers  ;  there  is  no  Evi- 
dence that  they  were  writ  by  thofc 
Apoftles,  whofe  Name  they  bear;  be-* 
caufe  when  they  quote  any  Paflage  out 
of  them,  they  either  fpeak  of  them  as 
Goffels  forged  by  Hereticks  ;    or  elfe  as 

of 

t  Irenjcus,  p.  J 95' 


Sermon    xvI.  491 

of  Books  whofe  real  Authors  were  un- 
known, altho'  the  Title  of  an  Apoftle 
was  prefixed  to  them.  I  do  not  deny 
that  fome  Early  Writers  have  quoted  the 
Epiftle  of  Barnabas^  the  Paftor  of  Hermas^ 
znd  fome  others,  as  the  genuine  Wri- 
tings of  thofe  Authors  ;  but  as  to  any 
Go/pels,  there  were  none  but  our  Four 
Gofpels,  which  had  an  undoubted  Au  - 
thority  ;  it  not  being  queftioned,  whe- 
ther thefe  Gofpels  were  Writ  by  thofe 
Perfons  whofe  Names  they  bear,  as  we 
have  already  feen ;  whereas  every  one 
of  the  other  Gofpels  were  rejeded  by 
fome  or  other  of  the  Hereticks^  and  all  of 
them  by  the  CathoUcksy  as  Spurious 
Pieces.  Thus  Orige^  tells  us  in  his  Firll 
Homily  on  St.  Luke's  Gofpel,  That  the 
^'  Church  has  Four  Gofpels,  but  He- 
**  retieal  Chriftians  many  more ; "  among 
which  are  reckon'd  by  him  the  Gofpel 
according  to  Thomas^  the  Gofpel  by 
St.  Mstthins :  To  thefe  ^  Eufelfius  adds 
that  of  St.  Peter  and  St.  Andrew,  The 
Gofpel  intitled  St.  Feter\  Gofpel  is  alfo 

men- 

*  Ecclef.  Hift.  lib.  3.  ca-p.  ij. 


Sbrmon   XVI. 

mentioned  by  Origen^  but  rejected  by 
him  as  the  f  Work  of  fome  other  Aih 
thor.  If  Ibme  weak  Catholicks  did  for 
fome  Time  take  thefe  for  Gofpels  written 
by  Apoftles,  this  is  no  more  than  what 
commonly  happens  in  all  Forgeries , 
which  will  have  a  Currency,  till  they 
arc  carefully  look'd  into,  efpecially  in 
fuch  Times  as  were  thofe  of  the  Firft 
Ages  of  Chriftianity,  when  the  Perfe- 
cutions  Chriftians  met  with  from  their 
Enemies,  did  not  give  themLeifure  or 
Opportunity  for  enquiring  what  Evi- 
dence there  was  to  fupport  them  ;  and 
therefore  the  Reception  given  them  by 
fome  Chriftians  at  firft  can  be  no  Proof 
of  their  Authority ,  nor  any  Reafon 
why  they  might  not  afterwards  rejedl 
them.  ■  They  might  for  fome  Time 
receive  fuch  Gofpels,  as  the  Writings 
of  Jpoftlesy  and  afterwards  find  them". 
felves  miftaken,  vv'ithout  giving  us  any 
Reafon  for  fufpeding  the  Authority  of 
our  Four  Gofpels  ;  becaufe  Matthew^ 
Mark,  Luke  and  'John  were  from  the  Be- 
ginning 

»i  "  .    ,  > 

t  Tom.  xi.  Cqmment.  in  Match. 


Sermon    xvl.         493 

ginning  univerfdy  allowed  to  be  the 
Authors  of  them.  And  thus "  I  have 
ihewh  that  tfie  Canonical  Gofpels  re- 
ceived by  us  were  the  Gofpels  of  M«f- 
therv^  Mark,  Luke  and  John,  that  both 
the  Gofpels  of  Mark  and  Luke  were  ge- 
nerally thought  to  have  received  the 
Approbation  of  an  Apoftle,  and  'there- 
fore we  may  depend  upon  a  true  Ac- 
count of  the  Chriftian  Religion  in  thefe 
Gofpels.  That  no  cJther  Gofpels  are  to 
be  regarded ,  when  they  differ  from 
.thefe,  whatever  pompous  Titles .  may 
be  at  the  Head  of  them ;  becaufe  no 
good  Evidence,  that  any  of  them  were 
the  Work  of  an  Apoftle.  Therefore 
nothing  more  can  be  necelTary  for  fet- 
tling a  Man's  Faith  ^-  in  the  Chriftian 
Religion  ,  but  to  fhcw  that  notwith- 
ftanding  the  Originals  of  the  Evange- 
lifts  are  loii ,  (  from  which  only  we 
could  hope  for  an  exa£l  Copy  of  thefe 
Gofpels)  and  the  Copies  that  have  been 
ti-anfcribed  from  them  ,  do  differ  in 
many  Particulars  ;  yet  the  Variations 
cither  do  not  affed  any  Thing  necef- 
fary  to  be  believed  or  praftifedj  or  if 

thcv 


494-  Sermon    xvl 

they  doy    the  true  Reading  is  flill  prc-» 
ferved  in  fome  Copy  or  other. 

'T I  s  evident    to  any  one   that    has 
confulted  the  Various  Readings  collcQ:- 
cd  by  Dr.  Mills,  that  a  great  Part  of  them' 
are  meer  Trifles,  that  do  not  aiFed  the 
Senfe  of  the  Writer  of  the  Gofpel,  whicli^ 
foever  Reading  we  take.    That  many 
of  thofc,    which  are  fuppofed  to  have'' 
been  alter'd  by  Djfign,  had  only  a  Re* ' 
lation  to  Mifquotations  of  the  Old  Te- 
ftAmenty  or  to  reconciling  one  Evange- 
lift  with  another,    when  they  thought 
them  to  differ  in  fome  Circumftance  of 
a  Fad ;   or   to   leaving  out  fome  Pa{^ 
iages  which  they   thought   might   be , 
or  they  found  a£lually  were,  perverted 
and  mifunderftood  :    Or  fubftituting  o- 
thers  lefs    liable  to  Exception    in    the 
Room  of  them ;  Or  elfe  the  Alteration 
might  affed  fome   mcejfary  Dodrine  of 
a  Chriftian's  Faith.  To  fome  one  or  o* 
ther  of  thefe  Heads  may  be  reduced 
moft  of  the  Alterations,    that  are  fup- 
pofed  to   have    been    defignedly  made 
in  our  Gofpels.     An  Inftance  of  the  firfi: 
Sort  is  fuppofed  to  be  found  ia  MattL 


Sermon   XVl.         49^ 

xiii.  55.  ThAt  it  might  be  fulfilled  by  the 
Prophet^  I  will  o^en  my  Mouth  in  Para^ 
hies,  8^0.  ^  Porphyry  read  it  in  the 
Copy  he  ufed,  the  Prophet  Ifaiah,  and 
made  it  aa  ObjeQion  againft  the  Evan*, 
gdifk.  And  St.  Jerom  owns  he  found 
ia  fome  Copies  the  Prophet  Ifaiahy  but 
that  Ifjiiah  was  left  out  of  the  greattfi 
Part  of  the  Copies  in  his  Time,  be- 
caufe  no  fuch  Quotation  was  to  be  found 
ia  Jfftiah  ;  for  which  Reafon  he  fays, 
Arbitror  poftea  fabUtum  effe  a  frudentihus 
viris  ^,  An  Inftance  of  altering  to  rQ- 
concile  one  Evangelift  with  another  h 
given  in  the  Time  of  our  Saviour's 
Crucifixion,  which  St.  Mark  fays  was 
the  Third  Hour,  and  ^t.  Jolm  about 
the  Sixth ,  and  yet  'tis  obfcrved,  that 
fome  Copies  of  St.  John  had  the  Third 
Hour,  as  well  as  fome  Copies  of  St. 
Mark  had  the  Si^th  Hour,  jtift  as  the 
Tranfcriber  was  inclined  either  to  bring 
St.  Joh»    to  St.  Marky    or  St.  Mark    to 

St. 


*  Hieron.    Comment,  fuper  Matth.  cap.  13. 
*  See  the  Author  of  the  Commentar>-  o;i  the  7fth 
Pfaltn.      Breviariura  Hieron 


49^         Sermoh  XVI. 

St.  Joh^.    Of  OmifTions,  and  of  fubfti- 
tuting  one  Word  for  another,   the  In- 
ftances  are ,   Luke    xix.    41.    and  Joh» 
vif.  8.     The  firft  is  Christ's  Weep- 
ing   over  Jerufdem ;    this  was  thought 
a  Paffion  unbecoming    our  Saviour 
and  therefore,   as  Epiphanius    tells    us  , 
was ,  left  out   of    thofe    Copies  which 
were  then  thought  moft  corred  ^.    In 
the  other  Place  ofjoh»  vii.  8.  'tis  thought 
that  one  Word    is   fubftituted    in  the 
Place  of  another  :  Our  Saviour  had  told 
his  Difciples,  that  He  would  have   them 
go  to  the  Feaft  of  the  Pajfover,  but  as 
to  Himfelf  that  He  defigned  not  to  go 
thither  ;   and   yet  it  appears  by  the  Se- 
quel of  the  Hiftbry,    that  He  aftually 
did   go.     St.  Jerom  obferves,    that  Por^ 
phyry  had  mark'd  this  PaiTage  as  an  Ar- 
gument of  our  Saviour's  Inconflan- 
cy  J    and    therefore   that    the  i«.    was 

changed 


Epiphanius  in    Ancorato.  cap.  31, 


Sermon    XVL  45)7 

changed  iiito  «^9    to  avoid   the  Force 
of  this  Obje6iion. 

Our  Anfwer  to  all  this  is,  That  no 
Body  ever  denied  there  have  been  fuch 
weak    Perfons    among   Chriflians,    as 
might  alter  their  Copies  of  the  Gofpels 
in  fuch  Places,  as  they  found  themfelves 
unable  to  defend  againft  the  Objedions 
the  Heathens  made  to  them.     But  then 
we  fay,   tliat  there    is   no  Probability 
that  fiich  Alterations  fhould  fo  far  ob- 
tain, as  to  throw  out  the  true  Reading 
in  all  the  Copies  of  the  World.    That 
Copies  of  the  Gofpels  in   the  Original 
were  difpers'd  into  fo  many  Hands,  be- 
fides    the    many  Verfwm  of  thofe  Go- 
spels, that  neither  weak  Cliriftians,  nor 
St„  Jeromes  frttdeM  Man^   would  have  it 
in  their  Power  to  carry  their  Alterati- 
ons into  ail  the  Copies  in  all  tlie  diffe- 
rent and  diftant    Parts  of  the  World* 
And  we  find  it  to  be  true  in  Fad,  that 
in  thefe  Places,  which  are  ilippos'd  to 
have  h^t]i  altered   by  Defign,  xh.Q  ge- 
nuine Reading  is  preferved  at  this  E^y 
^.1  fome  Copy  or  other.    And  tho*  St 
^^^m  fays,  'm  his  Time  Ifxiah  was  \<^h 
JC  k  oul: 


S  E  R  xM  o  N    XVI: 

out  of  moft  Copies  in  Manh.  xiil  J5, 
yet  Kj^/ler  in  his  Edition  of  iW/7/j's  New 
Tefiam^jt  tells  us  of  one  Copy  in  the 
Frefjch  King's  Library  that  has  it  at  this 
Day,  viz.  the  6th  Parifian  ;  as  to  the 
other  Inilances  of  defigned  Alterations, 
we  find  that  which  isjuppofed  to  be  the 
true  Reading,  in  more  Copies  than  are 
thofe  that  Want  it ;  but  if  it  had  been 
otherwife,  as  no  Part  of  a  Chriftian's 
Faith  or  Pradice  would  have  been  af- 
feded  by  not  having  the  true  Read- 
ing of  the  Evanieliji  in  any  of  thefe  In- 
ftances  *, 

I  WILL  proceed  to  confider  the  In- 
ftances  of  defigned  Alterations  in  a  Point 
of  Faith,  as  concerning  the  Divinity  of 
the  Son;  'tis  thought,  that  the  Dif- 
pute  between  the  Orthodox  and  Arians 
was  carried  on  with  fo  much  Warmth, 
that  the  ArUns  altered  their  Copies  m 
fuch  Places  v/liere  Christ  was  called 
God,  or  equalled  to  the  Father,  as 
I  Tim.  iii.  16.  God  maniftfitd  in  the  Flejhy 
this  Ibme  fay,  was  changed  into,  which 
was  mampjted  in  the  flefb  •  to  avoid  the 
Force .c?f  •  tlie . Word  God.    'Tis  certain 

both 


Sermgk    XVI.         499*^ 

both  Readings  were  fupported  by  a 
great  Number  of  Copies ;  which  Ihews 
the  Induftry  of  one  of  the  Parties,  to 
jfupport  its  Opinion.  And  the  famou's 
Text  in  I  'John  v.  7.  of  the  Ihrre  that 
hear  Witnefs  in  Heaven^  is  fuppofed  to 
have  been  put  into  this  £/(/?/^  to  ferye 
Purpofes. 

Tho'  thefe  Inftances  are  not  in  the 
Gofpels,  but  the  Epiftles,  yet  as  the  Gof- 
pels  might  have  been  as  eafily  altered^ 
as  any  of  the  Epiltles  at  that  Time^  I 
think  myfelf  obliged  to  fhew,  that  a 
Chriflian  has  lefs  Reafon  to  fear  find- 
ing the  true  Reading  in  thefe  Inftances 
of  defigned  Alterations ,  than  in  the 
former  Ones  ;  becaufe  the  Alterations 
before  mention'd  were  made  fome  of 
them  much  earlier ,  when  there  were 
fewer  Copies  of  the  Gofpels,  than  there 
were  of  thefe  Epiftles  in  the  Time  of 
thQ  Jriaff  Controverfy.  For  when  J* 
j^ius  firfl  fet  up  his  Doftrine,  Chrifli- 
anity  was  the  Eftablifhed  Religion,  and 
difperfed  over  all  Parts  of  the  Roman 
Empire,  and  confequently  Copies  of  the 
^m  Tejiamem  very  much  multiplied; 
K  k   2  and 


500         Sermon     XVL 

and  it  was  the  Intered  of  either  Side 
to  watch  one  another  ,  that  neither 
fhould  corrupt  the  Witneffes.  And 
therefore  whatever  Inclination  there 
might  be  in  the  Orthodox  or  Arian  to 
alter  the  Scriptures,  it  would  not  be 
in  their  Power ,  at  leaft  in  all  fuch 
Places  as  related  to  this  Controverfy. 
Confequently  every  Chriftian  may  liave 
enough  to  build  his  Faith  upon  in  the 
New  Tejiament^  fuch  as  'tis  brought  down 
to  our  Times.  If  fometimes  there  be 
a  Difficulty  of  determining  among  ma- 
ny, which  is  the  true  Reading,  and  we 
know  not  whether  fome  neceffary  Do- 
ftrine  of  the  Religion  be  not  treated  of 
in  the  Place,  we  need  not  be  follicitous ; 
for  if  it  be  fuchy  we  fliall  find  it  in 
other  Places,  where  there  is  no  Diilicul- 
ty  in  fettling  the  Tpxt ;  becaufe  thofe 
which  are  undoubtedly  the  neceffary 
Doftrines  of  the  Chriftian  Religion,  are 
fo  often  repeated  in  the  New  Teftame?3ty 
fuch  as  we  have  it,  and  fo  clofely  wo- 
ven into  the  very  Body  of  it,  that  there 
would  be  no  removing  any  one  of  them 
out  of  every  Place  of  the  New  Ttfiamenty 

without 


Sermon  XVI.         $oi 

without  fubftituting  another  Sett  of 
Golpds  and  EpilHes  in  the  Room  of 
the  prefent  ones,  as  will  be  evident  to 
every  one  that  makes  the  Experiment 
on  any  one  Article  of  that  which  is 
caird,  the  Jpo  les  Creed :  But  we  have 
already  ihtwnit  to  be  impofiible  that  our 
Gofpels  fhould  be,  as  to  the  main  Part 
of  them,  any  other  tlian  thofc  whicli 
were  writ  by  Matthew,  Mark,  Luke  and 
Joh» ;  and  the  fame  Reafon  will  hold 
as  to  thefe  Epiftles,  which  were  more 
univerfally  fpread,  more  Copies  and 
Tranflations  of  them  in  the  Time  of 
Arius,  than  there  were  of  the  Gofpels, 
when  forac  of  the  Alterations  before 
mentioned  were  made* 

T  H  u  s  I  have  Ihewn  that  there  is 
no  Ground  for  fufpefting,  that  the 
Chriftian  Religion  was  from  the  Be- 
ginning of  it  a  cunningly  devijed  Fxhle^ 
becaufe  thofe  who  firft  Preached  it , 
muft  have  been  fincere  Perfons,  and  alfo 
that  it  cannot  have  been  lb  altered  fince 
their  Time,  as  to  become  one  m  ours ; 
becaufe  whatever  Aherations  may  have 
been  made  in  fome  Copies  by  Tran- 

fcribers, 


5o2         Sermon   XVL 

fcribers,  they  could  not  affe6t  our  ChrU 
itian  Faith,  or  hinder  us   from   receiv- 
ing the  Gofpel,  fuch  as  it  was  Preach- 
ed by  the  Apoftles,  in  all  material  Points. 
And  therefore  whatever  the  Ufdel  may 
think  of  the  Gofpel,   I  doubt  not,  it 
will   appear    to  all  impartial  Enquirers 
to   be   no   lefs    than   a  MeiTage   from 
Heaven  made     known   to  us.,   as   St. 
Feter  expreffes  it,  in  the  Words  of  my 
Tej^f,  by   the  Fower  andComirjg  of  our  Lord 
JesusChrist,    as  of  a  Perfon   ap- 
pointed by  God  to  declare  his  Will  to 
Mankind.,  u    « 

And  now  I  hope  to  have  fully 
Ihewn  the  dangerous  State  of  Infideli- 
ty ;  or  that  all  the  Difficulties  the  Mn- 
believer  pretends  to  raife  again  ft  Reli- 
gious Principles,  cannot  fecure  him  a- 
gainft  the  Apprehenfions  of  Puniflhment 
in  a  future  State ;  we  have  therefore 
nothing  more  -  to  do,  but  to  beg  of 
God,  That  He  would  be  fo  Good  as 
to  incline  the  Heart  of  the  Unbeliever 
to  believe  in  Him  and  his  Son  Jesus 
Christ. 


O 


Sermon   XVI.  503 

"  O  merciful  God,  who  haft  made 
''  all  Men,  and  hateft  Nothing  that 
"  Thou  haft  made,  nor  wouldeft 
*'  the  Death  of  a  Sinner,  but  ra- 
^^  ther  that  he  fhould  be  converted 
"  and  live,  have  Mercy  upon  all 
'*  JewSy  Turks,  Infidels  and  Hereticks  • 

.  '*  and  take  from  them  all  Igno- 
"  ranee,  Hardnefs  of  Heart,  and 

vrr"  Contempt  of  Thy  Word;  and 
"  fo  fetch  them  Home,  blefted 
''Lord,    to    Thy   Flock,    that 

'  "  they  may  be  faved  among  the 
*'  Remnant  of  the    true  Ifraelitesy 

•  *'  and  be  made  one  Fold  under 
"  One  Shepherd,  JesusChrist 
*'  our  Lord,  who  liveth  and  reign- 
*'  eth  with  Thee,  and  the  Holy 
"Spirit,  One  God,  World 
*'  without  End.     Amen^ 

FINIS. 


i