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HKXEDICTTS SPINOZA

K-KOM A PORTRAIT IN THK COLLECTION OF HON. MAYER SULZBERGER

OF PHILADELPHIA
nv COURTIS'S OF MESSRS. kink a WAONALLS

THE PRINCIPLES OF

Descartes' Philosophy

BENEDICTUS DE SPINOZA

(the philosopher's earliest work)

TRANSLATED FROM THE LATIN,

WITH AN INTRODUCTION

HALBERT HAINS BRITAN, Ph.D.

CHICAGO
THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY

LONDON AGENTS

Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., L/td.

1905

LIBRARY of CONGRESS

Two Copies Received

NOV 18 1905

*)t*.s; lyes

CLASS Ox XXc. No.
COPY B.

~7wir

by
THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING CO.

CHICAGO

As a token of gratitude for his kindness and
for his help, I dedicate this book

Professor George M. Duncan, LL.D.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION.

PAGK

The Significance of Spinoza's Early Writings . i
The Publication of " The Principles of Descartes'

Philosophy " iii

The Geometrical Method, its Purpose .... ix

The Geometrical Method the Outcome of Deduction xiii

Deduction and the Concept of God xix

Spinoza's Idea of God, influenced by His Early Life xx

The Early Influence of Descartes' Philosophy . xxiii
An Analysis of the Concept of God found in the

Cogitata Metaphysical

The Eternity of God xxv

There is but One God xxviii

The Greatness of God xxix

The Immutability of God xxx

The Simplicity and Life of God xxxi

The Omniscience of God xxxii

The Will of God xxxv

The Power of God xxxviii

/ ...

The Concurrence of God xxxvm

God's Attributes identified xl

The Necessity under which God Acts .... xli

God's Determinism leads to Pantheism .... xlvi

Spinoza a " Rationalist " Iii

Descartes' Dualism . Hv

Three Factors turning Spinoza to Pantheism: . fix
(i) His Allegiance to Deduction,

(2) His Idea of God,

(3) The Influence of Descartes' Philosophy.
Deduction, the Source of the Weakness of Spino-
za's System Ixvi

Problem of Evil lxvii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Determinism lxviii

Was Kant influenced by This Early Work of

Spinoza? Ixxi

The Principal Truth in Spinoza's Pantheism . . lxxv
Its Influence in the Main Current of Philosoph-
ical Truth Ixxvi

Its Influence on Art lxxyiii

Preface of Dr. Meyer i

the principles of descartes' philosophy

part i.

Prolegomenon ti

Definitions : Thought, Idea, Substance, Mind, Body,

God, etc 20

Axioms 22

The Fundamental Principle of All Knowledge . . 23

Axioms taken from Descartes 25

God's Existence demonstrated ... 30

The Attributes of God 41

Whatever is clearly conceived is True 46

Other Attributes of God 51

Extended Substance 54

part 11.

concerning the physical world.

Definitions 57

Axioms and Lemmata 60

The Essential Nature of Matter 63

Concerning Motion 69

God the Cause of Motion 79

Moving Bodies tend to move in Straight Lines ... 81

The impact of Moving Bodies 87

part hi.

Introduction 107

A Postulate 109

Definitions and Axioms 111

The First Division of Matter 112

TABLE OF CONTENTS

APPENDIX.

THE COGITATA METAPHYSICA.

PART I.

PAGE

Chapter I. Division of Being 115

Chapter II. Essence, Existence, Idea and Power Ex-
plained 120

Chapter III. The Terms Necessary, Contingent, Im-
possible and Possible Explained 124

Chapter IV. Concerning Duration and Time . . . 129
Chapter V. Concerning Opposition, Order, etc. . . . 130
Chapter VI. Concerning Unity, Truth and Goodness 131

part 11.

Chapter I. Concerning the Eternity of God
Chapter II. Concerning the Unity of God .
Chapter III. Concerning the Greatness of God
Chapter IV. Concerning God's Immutability
Chapter V. Concerning the Simplicity of God
Chapter VI. Concerning the Life of God
Chapter VII. Concerning the Understanding of
Chapter VIII. Concerning God's Will
Chapter IX. Concerning the Power of God .
Chapter X. Concerning Creation ....
Chapter XL Concerning the Concurrence of God
Chapter XII. Concerning the Human Mind

God

139
142

143
146
148
150
152
156

159
161
168
170

PREFACE

This translation, undertaken at the suggestion of
Professor George M. Duncan of Yale University, has
been made from the Latin text of Vloten's and Land's
Benedict de Spinoza Opera, 1895. A careful study of
this work such as a translator must needs make has
convinced me that more attention should be given to
the early writings of Spinoza for the help they give
in understanding his Pantheism. By this means, by
seeing how his ideas followed naturally if not always
quite logically, from personal factors, and from Des-
cartes' philosophy, some of the most obscure points
in his system of philosophy are materially elucidated
and explained. But a historical or genetic study of
any subject today needs no apology. The only re-
markable thing about this is that so little attention
has been given to this method of clearing up the ob-
scurities of Spinoza's thought.

In my introduction I have not attempted to make
an exhaustive analysis of the work translated so much
as I have endeavored to fasten the attention upon some
of the points which throw light upon Spinoza's Pan-
theism. Little reference is made to Part II. or to
Part III. of the Principles because they treat of mat-
ter that has but little importance in understanding the
Ethics. And the contents of Part I. being better pre-
sented in the Cogitata Metaphysica, we have confined
our analysis mainly to the appendix. If some added
light is thrown upon the two or three points to which

PREFACE

we have especially directed our attention, and the pos-
sibilities of this method of studying Spinoza's thought
are made clear, the main purpose of this book will have
been attained. In obtaining a better translation for
certain passages help has sometimes been found by
consulting the standard Histories of Philosophy such
as Erdmann's, Kuno Fisher's, and Ueberwig's as well
as Torrey's and Veitch's translation of Descartes'
works, and Elwes' translation of the earlier
works of Spinoza. My thanks are also due to Pro-
fessor Duncan for his suggestion upon some points,
and to Professor C. R. Melcher of Hanover College
for reading over a portion of my MSS.

HALBERT HAINS BRITAN.
Hanover, Indiana, January, 1905.

INTRODUCTION

§ I. In Histories of Philosophy Spinoza's name
stands inseparably associated with Pantheism if it has
not become practically synonymous with that term.
His earlier writings, therefore, are of value primarily
for the light they throw upon his later thought. While
it is true that some of them have intrinsic worth, for
the most part it is because they illumine the mysteries
of his mystical Pantheism that these early writings
are preserved and read. We need not hesitate to say
that this is pre-eminently true of the Principles of
Descartes' Philosophy translated below. At the very
beginning of this work we are confronted with the
assertion that this professes to be only a new, a more
logical presentation of the truth which Descartes had
already set forth with such admirable clearness.
Nevertheless, as we hope will appear, while the con-
tent of this work may not be absolutely essential for
understanding Spinoza's Ethics, it is still far too im-
portant to be neglected.

It has long been a tacit assumption that Spinoza's
system of philosophy is found complete in the Ethics,
that since this was the latest, most mature product of
his thought there is little need to refer to anything out-
side of this work in order to understand his svstem of
Pantheism. Such an assumption, however, would be
very difficult to justify, for, while it is true that the
Ethics contains the outline of a theory of reality and of
human experience, it is not in mastering the outline
that the trouble appears. The chief difficulty in under-
standing the Ethics is not in mastering the broad out-

ii INTRODUCTIOX

lines of its doctrines, but in gaining clear and adequate
conceptions of the terms in which the thought is ex-
pressed. This, together with the unusual method of
treatment, are the cruces which the average student
of Spinoza finds hardest to overcome. As far as the
general plan of the work is concerned, the one all inclu-
sive idea first, and then the descent to particular ideas
and objects, this need offer no serious occasion for
stumbling, if it is but remembered that this work is
the product of a deductive age and of a deductive logic.
The difficulties of Spinoza's terminology and the ap-
parent grotesque inaptitude of the geometrical method,
can largely be removed by a genetic or historical study
of his system. The fundamental conceptions of the
Ethics were the outcome of years of earnest, patient,
careful study and their full content cannot be appre-
ciated by reading over the terse language in which
they are defined in their mathematical setting. To
appreciate them we must know something of their
actual development and of the ideas with which they
were habitually associated. Unless we can by this
historical investigation get into the atmosphere of his
thought, as it were, his .main tenets must of necessity
seem artificial and remain obscure.

So, also, by such a study we will derive the most
important aid in understanding and even in appre-
ciating that most generally reprehended feature of the
Ethics, the method in which it is expressed.

The importance of this historical study of Spinoza
is recognized in some of the more recent writers on
this ethical system. Joachim hints at it while Pro-
fessor Duff gives this as one of three essentials for
the mastery of Spinoza's Pantheism.1 The soundness

1 Joachim, A Study of The Ethics of Spinoza. Duff. Spino-
za's Political and Ethical Philosophy.

INTRODUCTION iii

of such an opinion cannot be questioned ; concepts that
require years to form cannot be fully contained in any
brief and formal definition. The more radical the
idea (and some of Spinoza's possess this attribute in
no small degree) the more important this historical
study becomes for understanding its full significance,
and the more fundamental the concept, the more es-
sential it is that we do not neglect any help that we
may have in fully understanding that on which so
much depends.

§ 2. The work on Descartes' philosophy translated
below, the earliest of all his writings, was published
in 1663 under rather unusual circumstances. It was

\ the only work to which Spinoza ever subscribed his
name, and yet he warns us that we must not accept this
as an expression of his own belief. The story of its

) composition and publication is as follows : Spinoza
about the year 1662-3 had a pupil to whom he was
teaching Descartes' philosophy, being at that time
unwilling to impart his own opinions to any one ex-
cept to a few of his special friends with whom he
was accustomed to discuss his philosophical views.
Well founded conjecture makes this pupil to be Albert
Burgh, who, being in later years converted to the
Roman Catholic faith, takes his former instructor se-
verely to task for his heresies. Be this as it may, the
fact remains that the " Principles of Descartes' Philoso-
phy " was not meant to be an expression of Spinoza's
own belief at the time it was written. Not wishing
his own opinions to be known at that time he con-
ceives the plan of teaching his pupil the philosophy
of Descartes, which he could do conscientiously and
without any unpleasant results to himself. This work
was written, therefore, more to conceal than to ex-

iv INTRODUCTION

press his own belief. Spinoza, as it seems, solely for
the benefit of his pupil, had put the second part of the
Principles in geometrical form. Some of his phil-
osophical friends, seeing this, and being impressed
with the method in which it was expressed asked him
to put the first and third parts in the same form,
and, appending the Cogitata Metaphysial, to permit
the whole to be published. This Spinoza readily con-
sented to do, if some one of them would go over the
work perfecting the phraseology, and would write a
preface explaining that this work was not meant to
be an expression of his own belief, but that it was a
faithful presentation of the philosophy of Descartes,
either what he had said explicitly or that which could
logically be inferred from his premises.

Thus we are forewarned lest we should accept the
propositions given below as an expression of Spinoza's
own thought. Some of the positions taken, we are
told in this Preface, do express his own belief, but
there are others to which he holds exactly the contrary
opinion. We are not at liberty, therefore, to subscribe
Spinoza's name to all that is said in this work but
must sift out as best we can that with which he agreed
from that which he rejected.

Dr. Ludwig Meyer, a physician in Amsterdam, and
a man intimately acquainted with Spinoza's opinions,
gladly agreed to write such a preface as Spinoza de-
sired, and this is given as an introduction to the work
in question. Spinoza immediately set to work and in
two weeks' time had the first part also in geometrical
form and sent it to be published with the rest. Another
reason why he entrusted its publication to his friend
was that he had left Amsterdam in 1660 on account
of persecution and was at this time dwelling in Rheins-

INTRODUCTION v

burgh, near Leyden. The following letter to Olden-
burgh gives us his own version of the publication of
the work :

Distinguished Sir:—

I have at length received your long wished for
letter, and am at liberty to answer it. But before I
do, I will briefly tell you what has prevented my re-
plying before. When I removed my household goods
here in April, I set out for Amsterdam. While
there certain friends asked me to impart to
them a treatise containing, in brief, the second
part of the principles of Descartes treated geo-
metrically, together with some of the chief points
treated in metaphysics, which I had formerly
dictated to a youth, to whom I did not wish
to teach my own opinions openly. They further re-
quested me, at the first opportunity, to compose a
similar treatise on the first part. Wishing to oblige
my friends I at once set myself to the task, which I
accomplished in a fortnight, and handed over to them.
They then asked leave to print it, which I readily
granted on the condition that one of them should,
under my supervision, clothe it in more elegant phrase-
ology, and add a little preface warning readers that
I do not acknowledge all the opinions there set forth
as my own, in as much as I hold the exact contrary to
much that is there written, illustrating the fact by one
or two examples. All this the friend who took charge
of the treatise promised to do, and this is the cause for
my prolonged stay in Amsterdam. Since I returned
to this village I have hardly been able to call my time
my own, because of the friends who have been kind
enough to visit me. At last, my dear friend, a moment

vi ■ INTRODUCTION

has come when I can relate these occurrences to you,
and inform you why I allow this treatise to see the
light. It may be that on this occasion some of those
who hold the foremost positions in my country will be
found desirous of seeing the rest of my writings,
which I acknowledge to be my own, they will thus take
care that I am enabled to publish them without any
danger of infringing the laws of the land. If this be
as I think, I shall doubtless publish at once ; if things
fall out otherwise, I would rather be silent than ob-
trude my opinions on men, in defiance of my country,
and thus render them hostile to me. I therefore hope,
my friend, that you will not chafe at having to wait a
short time longer ; you shall then receive from me the
treatise printed, or the summary of it you ask for.
If meanwhile you would like to have one or two copies
of the work now in the press I will satisfy your wish
as soon as I know of it and of means to send the book
conveniently.1

Thus by Spinoza's own words we are told that this
work is not meant for an expression of his own be-
lief. It was written, ostensibly, for the benefit of his
pupil, but really that he might not be required to
teach him his own opinions. His reticence in express-
ing his own belief can be readily understood if we re-
member what sacrifices he was willing to make for the
sake of undisturbed meditation and how his opinions
only a few years before, when but verbally expressed,
had brought down upon him the wrath and curses of
the Jewish synagogue, and a persecution that drove
him from Amsterdam to the little village of Rheins-
burgh. In order that he might not be compelled to

1 Letter XIII. Elwes' Trans. Spinoza's Works.

INTRODUCTION vii

express his own belief he resorts to the expedient of
teaching his pupil not his own but Descartes' phil-
osophy.

From this hesitancy in expressing his own opinions
we infer that even at this early period Spinoza had
already departed from the philosophy of Descartes,
which as far as the concept of God was concerned,
was comparatively orthodox. It is doubtful if Spinoza
ever followed Descartes very far in his opinions. The
great service of Descartes in the development of phil-
osophy was to establish the firm basis of epistemo-
logical truth, while Spinoza's interests were along an
entirely different line. When we remember that pre-
vious to his study of Descartes Spinoza had already
spent some time in the study of Theology, and that
his main interest was always in the concept of God,
it is a question whether he ever followed the teachings
of his illustrious predecessor further than to accept
certain metaphysical distinctions which Descartes had
pointed out with his usual perspicuity. Spinoza's
earliest reflection was upon the nature of God. Both
his early training and taste and the ultra deductive
nature of his thinking demanded that it should be so.
Just what the specific nature of his reflections were
we can infer from the second of his published works,
the Theologico-Political Treatise. He well knew that
the conclusions to which he was coming would hardly
receive a kind reception in a world where religious
toleration either in act or thought was scarcely known.
Therefore he preferred, as he told Oldenburgh in the
letter quoted above, to remain forever silent rather
than to obtrude his opinions upon men not willing to
receive them.

For the purposes of our consideration two points

viii INTRODUCTION

stand out above all others in importance in the work
which it is our purpose to examine. These are the
form in which Spinoza chooses to remold Descartes'
philosophy, and the constant and emphatic stress laid
upon the concept of God. It is not too much to say
that in these two thoughts which appear in definite
form in this the earliest of Spinoza's works, we find
the principal causes which led him to accept Panthe-
ism as the most satisfactory theory of God and of the
World. Though the opinions expressed in the Prin-
ciples, as we have seen, are not always Spinoza's own
belief, the significance of this work is by no means
destroyed. More significant than any new item of
truth in this presentation of the Cartesian philosophy
is the method employed in presenting it ; and more
significant than any novelty in the discussion of the
attributes of God is the constant stress laid upon this
idea as the fundamental concept of Philosophy. More
than any other factor, and possibly more than all other
factors combined, these two facts, the geometrical
method and this concept of God, explain his Panthe-
ism. Let it be granted, then, that this work, the
Principles of Descartes' Philosophy, is an expression
of Descartes' thought rather than of his own, still we
have by no means destroyed nor hardly impaired its
usefulness as a means to a fuller understanding of
Spinoza's philosophy. The purpose of his employment
of the geometrical method, and its general significance,
is not at all changed by the fact that he used it first to
present not his own but Descartes' philosophy. The
important thing is that he did actually employ at this
early period, the method of geometry to express not
mathematical but philosophical truth. What we are
interested in discovering- is not the demonstrable cer-

INTRODUCTION ix

tainty of his propositions, this we have given over
long ago, but his purpose in using this method, how
he justified his action and whither its employment
logically leads. In our consideration of the geomet-
rical method, therefore, no restrictions whatever are
imposed by the apparently disconcerting fact that the
Principles is primarily an expression of Descartes'
philosophy.

And yet, while this work is so truly an expression of
the Cartesian philosophy, we shall find both in the
Principles and more especially in the Co git at a ample
expression of Spinoza's own belief to enable us to see
his point of departure from the philosophy of Descar-
tes, and to understand why he turned not to Theism
but to Pantheism as a conception of the World-
Ground. As we proceed we shall find elements which,
taken in connection with some of the metaphysical ten-
ets of Spinoza's early reflections, led him logically
and, as it seems, almost necessarily to a pantheistic
conception of God. Sufficient data will also be found
to throw much light upon the content of this, the most
fundamental as well as the most difficult concept of
his philosophy, the idea or concept of God.

§ 3. The geometrical method in Spinoza's Ethics
has long been to students of that work both a stumb-
ling-block and foolishness. To the modern mind in-
grained with scientific principles and prejudices the
method of geometry seems utterly inapt and unfitted
for the presentation of philosophical truth. It can but
be of the greatest importance, therefore, if we can
learn from this early work, our only precedent in
Spinoza's writings for the method used in the Ethics,
just why Spinoza used the geometrical method in the
Principles. And this is our sole chance for learning

x INTRODUCTION

why he employed this method ; there is little help to be
gained by even the most careful study of the Ethics
alone. When he wrote that work, Spinoza's opinions
and habits of thought had so far become crystalized
that he did not introduce any comment that would
serve to make this point clear. Our answer to this
question, therefore, must be found in the work below
or it will not be found at all.

When we turn, now, to the Principles to consider
the method in which it is presented we are soon forced
to the conclusion that this geometrical method was
not employed because Spinoza thought he could thus
present an irrefragable body of truth. He did not use
this method- because of the apodeictic character of its
proof. This is conclusively shown by the fact that he
used the method alike to present propositions in which
he believed and those to which as he said he held the
exactly opposite opinion. In the latter cases the proof
is no less rigid, the argument no less logical than when
he has given propositions which held his hearty as-
sent. Let us then get this idea firmly fixed in our
minds, that Spinoza did not regard the geometrical
method, either in the work translated below or in the
Ethics, as an apodeictic demonstration of the opinions
he thus expresses. Such an opinion is flatly contra-
dicted in his first use of this method, and we have no
reason for believing that it was in any way different in
the case of its later use. Whatever his purpose may
have been, it was not to present by its use a philosoph-
ical system that would not win, but compel assent. Not
a little of the difficulty in understanding the Ethics
arises from the failure to properly comprehend the
purpose of the method in which it is presented. So
long as we think of it as a presentation of truth as in-

INTRODUCTION xi

dubitable as geometry, and yet as general as philo-
sophical principles must needs be, so long will we be-
come entangled in the meshes and fail to see the true
significance of the matter contained in these unyielding
forms.

But if it is true as we have said that Spinoza did
not employ the geometrical method for the sake of its
unassailable cogency, wherein was its virtue? If it
could be used, as was indisputably the case, to prove
error as well as truth, propositions which were directly
opposed to his belief, as well as propositions in which
he firmly believed, why was it used at all? And why
did Spinoza's friends see such virtue in it that they
requested the immediate publication of every frag-
ment of Descartes' philosophy which Spinoza had put
in this form? The answer to these questions which
apply primarily to the Principles will throw a flood
of light upon the Ethics.

To state it briefly, Spinoza's purpose in employing
the geometrical method was pedagogical not philo-
sophical. That is, he put the Principles of Descartes
in this close form of Proposition and Demonstration
not to establish the truth of the conclusions but that
the pupil whom he was instructing in that system
might more readily and more clearly comprehend what
Descartes was endeavoring to establish. Truth and
error did not enter into his consideration at all, for he
used the same form and the same kind of proof to
express what he disbelieved as well as what he re-
garded as true. The circumstances under which
the " Principles of Descartes' Philosophy " was written
absolutely preclude any other conclusion. When
Spinoza began this work he apparently had no idea
of publication, but it was done solely for the benefit of

xii INTRODUCTION

his pupil to whom he was teaching the Cartesian phi-
losophy. So far as there was any justification for a
new presentation of the truth which Descartes had al-
ready so well expressed it was in the method alone.
What advantage could it be to repeat the same con-
clusions, relying always upon the same argument if
it was not to present in a clearer way what were not
otherwise so easily comprehended? Spinoza put Des-
cartes' Principles in geometrical form because he
believed that was the form best adapted to the re-
quirements of his pupil's mind. His purpose was to
present the conclusions of Descartes in their most log-
ical form so that they might be easiest learned and
most thoroughly understood. This method, therefore,
was not employed as a method of proof, for Spinoza, at
that time, was not interested in that, but in order that
he might be in his presentation strictly logical and con-
sistently pedagogical. Considered in this way the
difficulty in reconciling the discrepancy between the
method Spinoza employed, and his position upon some
of the propositions given, disappears. The method is
true and sound but the premises upon which the
conclusions are grounded were not well taken. This
fact, however, does not destroy the value of this
method in presenting logically and pedagogically a
conclusion be it never so weak when judged upon the
grounds of belief and well reasoned judgment. There
is a clear and a forceful way to present a seeming
truth as well as that which is indubitable. Hence, we
affirm that the only possible virtue in the geometrical
method was its conformity to the demands of the think-
ing mind. It was pedagogically a superior method of
presenting conclusions logically to the mind. That
this same purpose was the chief one that led Spinoza

INTRODUCTION xiii

to employ this method in the Ethics is the logical in- -
ference. Although his other works had not been
written under this form, when he comes to write what
he regarded as his last and master work he returns to
this method. This time he is to express only what he
firmly believed, but can we think that he was dogmatic
enough to think that his conclusions must forever re-
main indisputable? Such a conclusion is not in har-
mony with his catholic sympathies and even temper.
But here as in the former case the most satisfactory
conclusion is, that this was the most direct method of
expressing his opinions, and above all it was in accord
with the great principles of Mediaeval Logic.

§ 4. In order to appreciate Spinoza's motives in
using the geometrical method, and to see its cogency
we must remember that this was an age of deduction. «
If we are seeking the real causes that led Spinoza to
believe in this method and to accept it as the best form
in which to express not only mathematical but philo-
sophical truth, we will find it in the fact that at this
time the old Aristotelian Logic dominated his mind
completely. The leaven which Bacon had introduced
into the world of reflective thought had not leavened
the whole, but Spinoza still held to Deduction as the
great Organon of truth. For him the warrant for
truth was rational not empirical. Explanations of
phenomena were deductive not inductive. The proof
of any proposition did not consist in an appeal to facts
empirically obtained, but in a syllogistic deduction from
premises previously, and better known. The whole
tenor of thought on the continent was still deductive,
and whatever did not conform to this method was
illogical and untrue.

In confirming Spinoza in this belief the influence of

xiv INTRODUCTION

Descartes was important. He had proven that in-
dubitable truth does not lie in the field of objective
experience but in the subjective assertion that I, a
thinking being, exist. Philosophy must begin with
an assertion that cannot be doubted and then proceed
to build a system founded upon this truth. According
to his formula Epistemology must precede Meta-
physics. The next step was to establish the verity
of God in order that we might be justified in our be-
lief in the external world. Such was the position of
philosophic thought when Spinoza began to reflect
upon the problems of human experience. There was
no serious attention paid to the Novum Organum of
Bacon but Spinoza took his problem from the old
scholastics and with this, their ideas of logical, me-
thodical proof.

Instead of accepting the conclusions of Descartes
as the starting point, viz., his cogito ergo sum, and
his proof of God's veracity, by which empirical knowl-
edge is made credible, and employing the method of
Bacon to build upon this foundation already laid,
Spinoza turns back a step and begins anew the
impossible task of deducing the world in thought.
Instead of following the role of an humble learner in
a world whose mysteries are unfathomable he aspired
to be a system maker in the most didactic way. The
task he imposed upon himself was the old task of de-
ductive thought. Individual facts of human experi-
ence were not data on which conclusions could be
based, but phenomena to be explained by deducing
them from some primary, and fundamental principle.
The world was not something to be taken as it is and
studied empirically, but it was regarded as a problem
to be explained dialectically. Spinoza was dominated

INTRODUCTION xv

completely by this deductive ideal of truth. His idea
of philosophical explanation was deductive, his logic
was deductive, his proof was deductive, hence his
method also was deductive. When this fact is suffici-
ently emphasized and consistently remembered we
may still regret the method Spinoza used in the Ethics,
but we must commend his strict adherence to the prin-
ciples of Mediaeval Logic. In this dry, stilted form of
Axiom, Definition, Proposition, Demonstration, and
Corollary, deductive logic reaches the height of con-
sistency.

From the standpoint of deductive thought, therefore,
and this is the point of view from which it was used,
the geometrical method, we venture to affirm, was the
most logical presentation of truth, mathematical or
philosophical, that could be made. It was wellnigh if
not perfectly in accord with the strictest demands of
Deduction and seemed so at first sight to those accus-
tomed to the logic of that time. It seems stiff and un-
natural to us because we are so inured to the modern
method of science that anything out of harmony with
this seems artificial and unreal. With our eyes fastened
upon individual facts as the starting point and general
principles as the goal, to follow Spinoza we must run
with our eyes behind us. What he saw ahead we
see behind, and what we look forward to as the goal
of philosophical explanation he had accepted as the
starring point of reflection. So complete is the in-
version that there is no way to harmonize his method
with present ideas of proof and logical procedure.
Reconciliation is impossible ; either we must give up
one and cling to the other, or we must reject the one
in toto and rely wholly upon the other. While he ac-
cepts the most fundamental principles as true and tries

xvi INTRODUCTION

to show how the phenomena of experience result from
these, we accept the facts of experience as the primary
truths, and correlating and analyzing these, seek for
more general conclusions. The rigidity of deductive
logic, therefore, gave rise to this method and instead of
being censured for his application of this method of
geometry in philosophy Spinoza should be commended,
for his close conformity to the principles of the thought
of his time. If Deduction is the correct Organon of
truth, and we must ground our belief not on observa-
tion and experiment but upon some rational principle,
then the geometrical method is the most logical and
consistent form in which to present philosophical truth.
Mathematics, a deductive science, has not discarded
this method and never will. And just as soon as we
can get the deductive point of view, Spinoza's method
will not seem artificial nor inapt, but perfectly logical
and perfectly suited to the purposes for which it was
employed. But from the modern standpoint it will
always be regarded as an attempt to commensurate
what is incommensurable.

To Spinoza's associates, however, men accustomed
to the deductive point of view the geometrical method
used in this early work did not seem strange or inapt.
On the other hand, to them this method, as soon as
it appeared, appealed as a great improvement even
over the sunclear method of Descartes, and they at
once sought to have him put the remainder of Des-
cartes' Principles in this form and allow it to be pub-
lished. From the Preface of Dr. Meyer we might in-
fer that they considered this an infallible method of
presenting truths ; but this is not essential. All that
we now wish to show is that to minds whose thoughts
were habitually deductive, the geometrical method ap-

INTRODUCTION xvii

plied to philosophy did not seem artificial nor inappro-
priate, but well devised and the best possible method
of presenting any truth logically and forcibly.

We thus come to the real causes that led Spinoza
to make use of the geometrical method in his philo-
sophical system. He believed that this method was
pedagogically the correct one because he believed de-
duction was the correct way to establish truth. It
matters but little whether we say that Spinoza believed
the method of geometry was the best method to pre-
sent truth to the learning mind, because it conformed
so perfectly to the principles of deduction, or whether
we say because Deduction is the Organon of truth
the geometrical method is the acme of logical consist-
ency. The truth that we wish to make clear is that the
geometrical method had its real causes in Deduction,
and the immediate occasion of its use in a desire to
conform strictly to the requirements of the mental
processes of the student. Spinoza was correct in his
reasoning, therefore, and abundantly justified in his
use of this method. It was the climax of logical pur-
pose and failed to receive the approval of succeeding
ages not from any weakness in itself nor because it was
ill applied, but because the whole process of thought
has been reversed. Had Deduction retained its hold
upon the minds of the thinking few, Spinoza's inno-
vation would have been praised as it has since been
censured.

Reference to this early work of Spinoza, then, offers
a very considerable aid in understanding the method
of the Ethics. We have found the purpose, I believe,
he had in view when he employed it both in his earliest
and in his latest works. As we have seen he certainly
did not regard this method in the nature of a proof of

xviii INTRODUCTION

the positions taken in the Principles, and we find no
reason for believing that he did in the Ethics. Be-
sides, in this last work his purpose was practical rather
than speculative- or theoretical. He did not give his
life to meditation like Descartes, primarily for the
sake of truth, but ultimately that he might point out
to man the way of blessedness and peace. His purpose
was, as the title of the work indicates, ethical not
metaphysical. He uses demonstration in his work and
yet not for the sake of the demonstration but that he
might convince. With his logical mind, so little in-
fluenced by prejudice of any kind, conviction followed
demonstration, and he thought that it was always so.
However, Spinoza did not depend upon this method to
produce conviction in his readers but upon the truth in
the premises from which he started. The geometrical
method would enable others to see clearly what he had
learned through years of reflection. If once we under-
stand why it was used, that it rested upon an implicit
faith in scholastic logic, and that it was the crowning
attempt of a logical mind to conform absolutely to the
strictest demand of this iron-clad reason, there need
be but little difficulty in following his argument and
to some degree at least in appreciating his presenta-
tion. But to do this the essential thing is to get rid just
as far as we can of our scientific prejudices, and grasp
the problem as it was envisaged by Spinoza, with its
mediaeval atmosphere. Otherwise the method will re-
main, as it seems at first, an incomprehensible appli-
cation of geometrical method to subject matter which
has no relation at all to the form into which it is put.
But remembering that that was a deductive age, even
philosophical truth, we see, was thought to be not dis-
similar to the mathematical truth which geometry ade-

INTRODUCTION xix

quately demonstrates. Back of Spinoza's attempt to
apply the geometrical method to philosophy was the
more fundamental attempt to make philosophy as truly
deductive as geometry. This method, therefore, was
the logical method, the method best adapted to the
thought of the age, or as we have expressed it above,
it was used because of its pedagogical correctness.

§ 5. Spinoza's complete reliance upon Deduction as
the true order of all methodical thought and of proof,
calls attention to another thought of fundamental im-
portance in understanding his philosophy. Instead of
building upon the great conclusion of Descartes ac-
cording to the method of the Novum Organum he
turns back to the long tried logic of the Scholastics and
seeks by a more perfect adherence to the principles
of their logic to deduce a system and explain experi-
ence, and, Pantheism is the result. To be true to
Deduction, and it was Spinoza's purpose to be per-
fectly so, the starting point for reflective thought must
be a concept which includes all that is to be deduced.
The logical starting point of Spinoza's system, there-
fore, is with the concept of God. Since the attempt is
to be made to follow in thought the plan of creation
the first step will be to learn everything possible of the
Creator. So in the Ethics we find Spinoza, true to the
demands of deductive thought, dividing his work ex-
actly the reverse of what modern philosophical treat-
ment demands. In Part I. he treats of God, in Part II.
of the Origin and then the nature of mind and then in
Part III. of its affects, etc. Before we study the mind
we must study God, before we study its nature we
must study its origin. In every way the order is just
the reverse of that followed today in attempts to solve
the mysteries of Reality or to understand Experience.

xx INTRODUCTION

And yet from his point of view his order is the only
logical one. Attention has been called to these facts
to show the supreme logical importance of this concept
of God, in Spinoza's philosophical system. His thought
so hinges upon this idea for the reasons we have just
mentioned, that its mastery is the prerequisite for an
intelligent comprehension of the main tenets of his
Pantheism. If we wish to understand why Spinoza's
reflection led him from a Deistic conception of God
to Pantheism rather than to Theism, or if we wish to
adequately appreciate the truth in Pantheism we must
preface our study with the closest investigation pos-
sible of the idea of God. The key that has not yet
been used for such study is the historical develop-
ment of that idea. We cannot appreciate Spinoza's
definition of God, for example, unless we are ac-
quainted with some of the prior conceptions of sub-
stance and with the various attempts to explain Des-
cartes' Dualism. Nor can we — and this is the region
in which our inquiry lies — appreciate or rightly com-
prehend the attributes of Spinoza's God unless we see
how his ideas on this subject developed from the more
orthodox theology of a previous period.

§ 6. In order to get the true starting point of
Spinoza's ideas concerning God we should remember
that he had in his veins five thousand years of Mon-
otheism. A Jew by birth and early training, the pure
Monotheism of the Hebrew people would be his ear-
liest conception of God. Soon after completing the
usual Jewish course of study, with its emphasis upon
this idea, he turned his attention to Jewish theology
and for some time was a diligent student of that branch
of study. His opinions, therefore, were more than in-
cidently influenced by the theology of the Jewish re-

INTRODUCTION xxi

ligion. The influence of this study, however, did not
seem to confirm him in his earlier, filial acceptance of
the religion of his fathers. On the other hand we
know that for his opinions, when still at an early age,
he was excommunicated for heresy from the syna-
gogue and anathematized with all the opprobrious
epithets of that body. The ground of his dissent is
not hard to see. His philosophic mind, so free at all
times from passion or prejudice, demanded a broader
conception of God than the Jewish religion as ordinar-
ily interpreted supplied. The limited love of God,
the unsympathetic, uncharitable pride that led the Jews
to regard themselves as the chosen people of God
would repel a mind of Spinoza's temperament. The
very exclusiveness in which the Hebrews so delighted,
the special favor which they claimed as their peculiar
birthright from God, was opposed to unprejudiced, re-
flective thought, as it was also to the principles of
Christian truth. Philosophy demands a human broth-
erhood that includes both Jew and Gentile, Barbarian
and Greek. But such a brotherhood presupposes the
Fatherhood of God. Such a conception, however, was
opposed to the traditions of the Hebrew people ; while
they might acknowledge Jehovah as the creator of all
people, His love and special care were for their nation
alone. The history of this people is one long story
where the safety and welfare of the Hebrews was
placed above every humanitarian consideration. In
the Thcolo gico-P olitical Treatise, published only a few
years later than The Principles of Descartes' Philos-
ophy, etc., we see how strongly this exclusiveness of
the Jews affected his thought. In the opening words
of Chapter III. we have these words : " Every man's
true happiness and blessedness consists solely in the

xxii INTRODUCTION

enjoyment of what is good, not in the pride that he
alone is enjoying it to the exclusion of others. He
who thinks himself the more blessed because he is
enjoying benefits which others are not, or because he
is more blessed or more fortunate than his fellows,
is ignorant of true happiness and blessedness, and the
joy which he feels is either childish or envious and
malicious. For instance, a man's true happiness con-
sists only in wisdom and the knowledge of the truth,
not at all in the fact that he is wiser than others or that
others lack such knowledge ; such considerations do not
increase his wisdom or true happiness.

Whoever, therefore, rejoices for such reasons, re-
joices in another's misfortune, and is, so far malicious
and bad, knowing neither true happiness nor the peace
of the true life." x

Beneath this trenchant criticism of the Jewish re-
ligion there is an implied stricture upon the Jewish
idea of God. A God who would answer to their de-
mands for special favor at the expense of other nations,
was not a God in whom Spinoza could believe. The
philosophical and rationalistic bias of his mind de-
manded a God in every attribute, perfect, and in every
expression of his power infinite. Thus he was early
led to see the inconsistencies of the traditional Jewish
conception of God and to seek an idea of Him free
from personal or national prejudices and in closer ac-
cord with the highest demands of his rational nature.
And as he understood these demands, they required a
God of more universal providence than the ordinary
conception of Jehovah. With this dissent from the
Jewish idea of God we find also an attitude of mind
which we know today under the term "higher criti-
1 Spinoza's Works, Elwes' Translation, Vol. I.

INTRODUCTION xxiii

cism." The influence of this spirit, best seen in the
treatise mentioned before, was to lead Spinoza away
from the Jehovah of the Jewish belief to a more ra-
tionalistic conception of His nature. In the study of
theology Spinoza had been led to examine this belief
closely and critically, with the consequent separation
from much of their most cherished belief. Through-
out his early study of Jewish theology he was actuated
by the most liberal interpretation of scriptural dogma.
Thus while in that theology there were elements of
monotheism, which we know Spinoza thus far accepted,
there were also in the traditional side of that teaching
ground for a most determined dissent.

We know, too, that Spinoza was also more or less
influenced by the Christian concept of God ; in all his
published work the New Testament is accorded an
equal place with the Old as an expression of the Word
and Will of God.

However, since the Jewish and the Christian con-
cepts of God are practically the same, judged from the
philosophical point of view, we need not pause to em-
phasize this fact. All that we need to note is that it
was from this concept that his later ideas developed.

§ J. The other element in Spinoza's early life that
shaped his thought and determined the character of
his philosophy, was the widely prevalent doctrines of
Descartes. So far, almost all that we have seen has
been a spirited dissent from the current ideas of his
time without any very definite constructive tenets to
replace those he was so rapidly rejecting. But this
was but a clearing away of the debris preparatory to
the structure soon to be begun. In giving positive
character to his new ideas and in turning his thoughts
from a purely theological to a constructive philosoph-

xxiv INTRODUCTION

ical character the Cartesian philosophy has its place.
It was to this work that he turned after his reflection
led him to part with the synagogue and so give over
his special work in theology. Much has already been
written upon Descartes' influence upon Spinoza, and
yet there is one aspect of it that has not been suffi-
ciently noted. This, however, is hardly to be won-
dered at for it is an aspect which the study of Spinoza's
earliest writings alone reveals. It was not the Dualism
of Descartes that had the earliest influence upon Spin-
oza ; neither was it any other of the ontological tenets or
conclusions of the system that first interested him.
But as we see by reference to the main theme in his
early discussion of Descartes' philosophy, the thought
that first appealed to him and stamped itself upon his
thought indelibly, was Descartes' concept of God.
Whether this continued to be of prime importance or
not in moulding his opinions it was the first great
factor to gain his serious attention. This was made
all but inevitable by Spinoza's previous interests and
study, which, we have seen, were from the first con-
cerned with questions relating to God. His earliest
interest, therefore, would be to get the opinions of
Descartes upon those topics in which he was already
interested. And not only would his interests be cen-
tered in this subject, but it would be along this line
that he could be most directly and most potently in-
fluenced. It is important, therefore, that we get
clearly before us Descartes' idea of God, in order that
we may see how Spinoza's opinions were influenced
by contact with his theory of the Absolute Being.
The question for us to answer, if we wish to under-
stand his Pantheism, is, how did he pass logically from
these earlier views to the more radical, and heterodox

INTRODUCTION xxv

opinions found in the Ethics? We must turn, then,
to a consideration of Descartes' ideas concerning God
as they were understood by Spinoza.

§ 8. Descartes' conception of God, as Spinoza un-
derstood it, we find most clearly expressed in the Cogi-
tata Metaphysica, an essay upon certain metaphysical
subjects, given as an appendix to the " Principles of
Descartes' Philosophy." The essay itself suggests
the importance of the concept of God in Spinoza's
mind, for the whole of the second part is given up
entirely to this one idea and a good part of Part I. is
really a prolegomenon to these thoughts. So while
this discussion is far more independent of Descartes'
order than is the " Principles," we know that Spinoza
wrote it more as an expression of Descartes' belief
than as his own at the time it was written. Still we
might say for the most part there is in Spinoza's lan-
guage the ring of conviction, and in his earlier years
he would probably have accepted even a greater pro-
portion of it as his own belief. But be this as it may,
we find in it a wealth of suggestive matter upon the
idea of God. And this matter if used aright will
throw much light upon Spinoza's later thought. In
order to get as much help as possible in understanding
Spinoza's concept of God, we shall notice this essay
rather carefully.

In Part II. of the Cogitata, the part that treats
more specifically of God and his attributes, there are
twelve chapters and all except one discuss some char-
acteristic of His being. The first chapter discusses
the eternity of God. What is said concerning this
attribute depends upon the distinction, that must first
be made clear, between essence and existence, and be-
tween the essence of created objects and the essence of

xxvi INTRODUCTION

God Himself. " Essence," he says, " is nothing else
than the mode by which created objects are compre-
hended in the attributes of God. * * * Exist-
ence is the essence of things considered in themselves
apart from God, and is attributed to things after
they have been created by God." 1 The difference be-
tween essence and existence in created or finite objects
then is this: The essence of an object concerns its
reality, not merely as an individual thing, but as it
stands related to its primary or efficient cause. This
term lays the emphasis upon the ontological nexus be-
tween an object and the Absolute Being, and, does not,
therefore, consist in any sensible quality or attribute.
The term existence is not so fundamentally ontological.
When using this term no question is raised as to the
connection between an object and God, but it is re-
garded simply as an object of our cognitive experience.
I do not regard it in its relation to Nature, but in its
relations to me as an intelligent subject. The first
term regards its ontological reality, the second its
sensuous nature ; the former expresses its relation to
and dependence upon the Absolute, the latter its re-
lation to me a cognitive, knowing subject.

The other point necessary to understand the Eternity
of God is the distinction between the essence and ex-
istence of created objects and the essence and exist-
ence of uncreated substance or of God. As appears
from the definitions just given, in created objects or
in all things except God these terms must be distin-
guished. But in God this* ground of difference disap-
pears and His essence, His existence, and, indeed. His
understanding, His will, His decrees, etc., are one.
There is not one fact that can be used to support our

1 Cogitata Metaphysial, Pt. I., Chap. II.

INTRODUCTION xxvli

belief in the existence of God, that does not have an
equal importance as an expression of some truth con-
cerning His essence. In a Being absolutely infinite
each attribute enfolds all the others so that as objective
facts they are indistinguishable. This is a proposition
to which we may well give the most serious attention
for it not only serves to make clear what is said con-
cerning the eternity of God, but it is a principle which,
we shall see, led Spinoza toward his conception of an
impersonal God.

With this distinction between essence and existence
kept in mind we find no difficulty in understanding the
eternity of God. Duration pertains only to the exist-
ence of objects, not to their essence. It relates to the
sensible qualities of objects and is cognized by our
powers of sense perception. Eternity, on the other
hand, belongs to the infinite essence of things, and
therefore can belong properly but to God. Duration
and eternity are wholly distinct, and each sni generis.
Duration applies only to created objects, i. e. to ob-
jects, the essence of which is not in themselves but in
God, while the latter term applies only to a Being
whose essence is wholly self-contained. The temporal
idea, the essential one in duration, is not so funda-
mental in the term eternity. The latter term since it
relates to an attribute of God, embraces by implication
all the attributes of God. Therefore, though created
objects should have existed from the beginning, coeval
with God, we could not ascribe eternity to them unless
their existence was self-contained and necessary.
The real ground of distinction, is not temporal there-
fore, but an essential, ontological differentiation be-
tween substance that is self-contained, necessary, and
absolute, and substance that is contingent and depend-

xxviii INTRODUCTION

ent. Eternity can be predicated of God alone, not,
however, merely because He has existed for an in-
finite time, but because He is the one necessary, abso-
lute, self-contained, eternal Being.

From what has been said it follows that the present
existence of an object does not insure or even imply
its future being. This depends upon its essence, and
its essence in turn depends upon God. We today are
wont to assume that having the bare "stuff" of the
world once given the rest is easily explainable by nat-
ural physical law. As both Descartes and Spinoza
saw the problem it was not so simple. But back of
every object and of every event stands the power of
God. His concurrence is necessary in order that these
objects may exist even for a moment. In every case
there is a submerging of the finite in the infinite, an
absolute dependence of every created object upon the
power and will of God. So dependent becomes the
finite, and so absolute the infinite that we may well
ask ourselves if this did not help to turn Spinoza to-
ward his later conception of God and the world. But
this thought will appear again before we finish our in-
vestigation into Descartes' idea of God.

The other point of interest to us in this discussion of
duration and eternity is, that it is one step toward
a complete identification of the attributes of God, which
leads finally to the necessary or determined character of
all of God's acts and decrees. But this, too, will be-
come clearer further on, so we need do no more than
call attention to it here.

In Chapter II. of the second part of the Cogitata
Metaphysial the following argument is given to prove
that there is but one God. Since omniscience is a nec-
essarv attribute of God, if there were many Gods each

INTRODUCTION xxix

one must have a perfect understanding of all things.
Each god, therefore, must understand perfectly him-
self and all the other gods besides. But under such
conditions the cause of all perfection would not be
self-contained in God, but would exist partly in Him-
self and partly in another. This, however, is contrary
to the concept of God. Therefore, there is but one
God.

The significance of this proof does not lie in the
truth it professes to establish ; to one who did not al-
ready believe in monotheism this argument would not
be convincing. Nor does any cogency appear unless
we accept the method of deductive logic, and acknowl-
edge the power of the mind to form a priori, a concept
of God which must be true. It is interesting to us
here because it is so strictly in accord with the deduc-
tive character of thought at that time and because it
shows how all philosophy and all truth is contained in
this one central idea of God. It foreshadows Spinoza's
attempt to derive a whole system of philosophy, and to
explain a world of experimentive facts, by drawing
upon this concept of God. Besides this, there is the im-
plied truth, more positively affirmed in another place,
that God's omniscience is nothing but self knowledge.
He does not know an objective world as we do, but His
knowledge is simply knowledge of His own will, and
of His decrees. From this one idea all things are to
be deduced, and it is not hard to pass from this knowl-
edge of things in God, to their existence in Him, which
is the usual formula for Pantheism.

The next attribute of God discussed is His greatness.
This cannot be predicted of God so far as we regard
Him as an absolutely perfect or infinite Being, but only
as He is regarded as the efficient cause of the world

xxx IXTRODUCTION

around us. It is hardly correct to assign magnitude
at all to infinity, for any assignable magnitude what-
ever before infinity pales to insignificance and is lost.
However, the world is a manifestation of the power of
God, hence since He appears in the effect we may in-
fer His nature as " first " cause. The cause must be
adequate for the effect. Since, therefore, there is no
object by which He may be limited or determined, in '
this respect we may properly apply this term to His
being. When we use this term to describe His being,
however, we are regarding the objects in which His
power is manifested more than His own true character.
As a "first" cause He is great but per se He is in-
finite.

The fourth attribute discussed is the immutability
of God. In this chapter we are told that God is un-
changeable and absolutely so. All changes arise
either from some external cause, the subject being
either willing or unwilling, or from some internal
cause. God is not changed by an external cause for
He is Himself the cause of all things and can be
changed by none of them. Neither is there in God
any self-caused change, for all changes that depend
upon the will of the subject arise from an attempt to
pass to a more perfect state of being. But this is im-
possible in God who is in every way absolutely per-
fect. God, therefore, is immutable.

The inferences to be drawn from this conclusion
are far reaching and for our purposes exceedingly im-
portant. Practically, there is little difference between
an unchangeable God, and a God whose acts are all
determined ; as far as the external world is concerned
there is no difference at all. There is no more direct
way to universal Determinism than to affirm, as is

INTRODUCTION xxxi

done in this discussion, that God is the sole cause of
all being, both that it is, and what it is, and that He
is unchangeable, that His decrees are eternal. If
God is the efficient cause of all being, not in a general
way being simply its creator, but in a concrete, re-
sponsible way determining the act of every object, we
have granted all the determinism in Nature that
Spinoza's system demands. And if we agree with
this Cartesian philosophy so far as to say that God's
understanding, and power, and will, and decrees, are
one, and that He is unchangeable we have little more
to admit to be in agreement with Spinoza's teaching
concerning the determined nature of all of God's de-
crees. The ground for distinguishing between an ab-
solute, unchangeable God, and a God whose thoughts
and acts are necessarily what they are, is hard- to de-
fine. In the first case the sequence of events is fixed
because God in His infinite wisdom has foreseen all
contingencies and foreordained those changes which
best accord with His will ; in the latter case the result
is the same, but God's decrees and the changes in na-
ture are conceived to be determined, as it were, by
some hypostasized necessity.

The matter given in Chapters V. and VI. is so purely
of scholastic interest that we will do no more than
note it, for the sake of completeness, in the briefest
possible way. In the first of these two chapters we
are told that God is not a composite but a simple Be-
ing. This conclusion rests upon the distinction intro-
duced in the first paragraph between " real " and
" modal " and " rational " being. All composite being'
must be composed of some one combination of these
three forms. But God is not thus composite, there-
fore, etc.

xxxii , INTRODUCTION

The sixth chapter speaks of the life of God, and the
prime object is to secure a definition broad enough to
include the life of plants and animals as well as the
life of men and the life of God. After showing that
two from Aristotle are unsatisfactory he gives the
following: "Life is the force by which objects pre-
serve their own being." *

In striking contrast to the two chapters just noted
the contents of the following three are replete with
suggestion and worthy of the most careful considera-
tion : Omniscience, the first attribute of God dis-
cussed, throughout the whole development of the
monotheistic idea of God has always been regarded as
one of His most Godlike attributes. From the re-
flective or philosophical point of view well may it be
given this place of prime importance. Upon this at-
tribute all the other attributes depend. Without om-
niscience omnipotence is nerveless, His will and His
decrees are blind and even His love has lost half its
virtue. For philosophy, therefore, God's omniscience
assumes the importance of a postulate. Correlated
with this in importance follows a discussion of the
will of God. For its bearing, therefore, upon
Spinoza's universal Determinism it yields in impor-
tance to no other attribute.

His remarks in this chapter upon the problem of
good and evil, another vital question in Pantheism,
also call for consideration for we find here in this
chapter the germs of Spinoza's later position in the
Ethics. But we turn now to notice these points more
specifically.

God's omniscience, as we are now almost ready
to infer, is not a conclusion warranted by induction

1 Cogitata Metaphysial. Pt. II., Ch. VI.

INTRODUCTION xxxiii

but a truth deduced from the idea of an absolutely
perfect God. God is a being absolutely and infinitely
perfect. Omniscience is a mark of such perfection.
Therefore, God is omniscient. This attribute is thus
established as are all His others, purely deductively.
God's knowledge, however, is not like ours, derived
through logical processes of thought, either inductive
or deductive, but is direct, immediate and infallible.
Human knowledge is of two kinds, knowledge of ob-
jective facts and knowledge of subjective states. Des-
cartes had shown that our knowledge of the external
world depends upon the veracity of God; that He is
by nature so true that it would be contrary to His
character to create us so that our senses are constantly
deceiving us in their account of the objective world.
Knowledge of self, on the other hand, is true and cer-
tain whether God be a deceiver or not. Indeed, so
certain is the starting point of his philosophy, his
cogito ergo sum that God Himself, we are told, could
not deceive me in this one thing. So long as I do
not go beyond my own conscious states therefore, my
knowledge is indubitable and sure. God's knowledge,
as far as it is comparable to finite, human understand-
ing, is like this latter kind. God even in His om-
niscience does not pass from His own being, but His
knowledge is all knowledge of Self. As Spinoza says
in the second paragraph of this Chapter VII : " Porro
ex perfectione Dei etiam sequitur, ejus ideas non
terminari, sicuti nostrae, ab objectis extra Deum po-
sitis." Based upon this distinction of Descartes be-
tween the character of knowledge of one's own sub-
jective states, and a knowledge of the external world,
God's knowledge is wholly of His own being. It
therefore has the directness, the completeness, and the

xxxiv INTRODUCTIOX

certainty of self-consciousness. He is the " first '
and sole cause of all things, therefore, the world is
contained in His understanding. The world of cre-
ated things is but a visible expression of His thought,
or as it is forcibly stated, " He is Himself the object
of His knowledge, indeed He is that knowledge." *

This conclusion, logically developed, leads us far
toward Pantheism. There is a great deal more than
a mere epistemological truth, implicated in its terse as-
sertion. Besides this, it contains a whole system of
ontology. If God's knowledge is of Himself alone
and not of the external world, either His understand-
ing is imperfect or all things are in some way con-
tained in Him. The latter alternative is, of course,
the one Spinoza accepts. But this connection between
God and the world cannot be simply that between an
object and its creator unless it is assumed that crea-
tion is always in progress but never complete. In
other words, this conception of the understanding of
God requires that the power and the presence of God
in nature today be just as real and just as vital as it
was when Nature was being created. We need not be
content, however, with our own inference, for this is
exactly the position we will find maintained when we
come to notice the chapter on the concurrence of God.
This conclusion, therefore, if consistently maintained
is the death-knell to all deistic conceptions of God,
and leads either to Theism or to the more literal doc-
trines of Pantheism. It demands a relation between
God and the world so close that Deism utterly fails
to supply it. The world does not perdure by virtue of
some property of inert stuff and God is not a Dcus ex
machina. To satisfy this conclusion, therefore, we
1 Cogitata Mctaphysica, Pt. II., Chap. VII.

INTRODUCTION xxxv

must turn either to the idealistic conception of Theism
or to the mystical, materialistic identification of God
and the world in Pantheism. Just which of these it
will be, or why it was the latter, we will see depend-
ed upon factors to be noted later on.

It will be worth while to mention, since the subject
occurs in this chapter, God's knowledge of good and
evil. God, we are told, must know these since He is
the cause of their being and since they could not ex-
ist even for a moment without His concurrence.
These terms, however, are not distinctions grounded
in reality, but they arise as the mind consciously com-
pares one object with another. The ground of their
reality, therefore, is not in God but in the human mind.
Thus the ontological character of these terms is de-
stroyed, and the way is paved for Spinoza's doctrine
of the relativity of good and evil as it is taught in his
latest work.

God's will, by which He chooses to love Himself,
follows from His infinite understanding of His own
being. But how this will differ from His understand-
ing or His essence we cannot say. This distinction
which we recognize in the attributes of God is not a
distinction in God Himself, but arises from the char-
acter of the human mind. It is, as it is called else-
where, a distinction of reason. Objectively or in God
Himself, His understanding, His power, His essence,
and His will are one.

It is interesting, too, that Spinoza, in this connec-
tion, makes special mention of the word personality
which theologians had introduced to make this dis-
tinction clear. But, he says, while he was not ig-
norant of the term itself he was wholly unable to get
its meaning or to give it any connection that would

xxxvi INTRODUCTIOX

help to explain the difficulty. From the later devel-
opment of his thought we are compelled to agree with
him in this and to admit that he was unable to har-
monize the term with his thought. The subject is
worthy of consideration, for it perhaps will help us
somewhat to understand his impersonal God. The
essential element in personality is intelligent agency,
or rational free will. But Spinoza, for the reasons
we have already mentioned and others which we shall
find as we proceed, could recognize but one agency,
that is God. One of the signal defects of Pantheism
is just this, that it fails to recognize this fundamental
truth concerning man's nature, the fact of his free
agency. It is easy to understand why this was so ;
Spinoza's reflection we must remember began not
with the direct testimony of all our conscious experi-
ence, but with the concept of God, a being whose at-
tributes were swallowed up in His infinity. Wrapped
up as he was in this concept of God, God considered
primarily as a " first cause," he was never able to
descend logically to the idea of free finite beings. A
God whose power and decrees could be hampered in
the least by the action of moral agents was not a God
absolute in the way Deduction demanded that its Ab-
solute should be. This absoluteness of God, insisted
upon from first to last, excluded from his system the
existence of free, rational, beings. Such an idea was
not included in the concept of God, hence it could not
be derived through deduction nor reconciled with this
concept when found externally. His strict adherence
to deductive logic did not in this case at least allow
him to surreptitiously introduce into his philosophy
what was not logically deduced from his premises.
Nor can we wonder at his dilemma. One of the most

INTRODUCTION xxxvii

difficult problems theology or philosophy has ever
known is just upon this point. It is the problem of evil ;
it is the mystery of freedom ; it is the problem of the one
and many ; it is the sphinx of philosophy. Spinoza
encountered it and solved it logically, but merely shift-
ed the contradiction to another place where it has since
been speedily found and shifted again and again. We
have an example, therefore, in connection with this
word of the drift of all his thought, how in everything
he was urged on by his logical consistency and his
early opinions, to the system of his mature age.

Another significant feature of this early chapter on
the wTill of God is found in some further remarks upon
the problem of evil. It is, as we have learned now to
expect, in accordance with the eternal, absolute, char-
acter of God that this problem is solved. As was seen
in the chapter upon the understanding of God, good
and evil are terms relative to human thought. We
might, perhaps, reconcile in some way this statement
with the ethical character of God, but when we are
told as we are now that it is only in a very figurative
sense that we can say that God approves of some acts
and disapproves of others, our last hope of regarding
God as an ethical being is destroyed and we are on the
verge of Pantheism. Destroy the ground of the dis-
tinction of good and evil in the Absolute, making it
purely relative to human thought, and there is left to
God only those attributes which Pantheism emphasizes,
His understanding, and His power. If it be true that
all things good and evil alike express God's infinite
understanding, that they are determined by His will
and preserved by His power, and above all that no
moral distinctions are made by God, we must radically
change our concept of His being. With these propo-

xxxviii INTRODUCTION

sitions granted the change must almost necessarily be
toward the concept Spinoza gives us in the Ethics.

The purport of Chapter IX. concerning the power
of God, is to show that His power is commensurate
with His understanding, and that in respect to His
decrees, all things are necessary. It cannot be said
that some things are contingent and others necessary,
but if God is in all things absolute and, if by His
power and by His decrees the world is what it is, then
all things without any exception are forever deter-
mined to be as they are. Nothing can be except as
God has willed that it should be. If now it be asked
whether God has determined that the world should
be as it is from free choice, Descartes answers this
question in the affirmative. This position, however, is
plainly one with which Spinoza would not and could
not agree. It is a statement out of harmony with his
belief and even hardly reconcilable with the conclusions
to which these chapters are leading us. The identifica-
tions of God's attributes as it is insisted upon makes
this impossible. If God's understanding, and His
power, and His essence and His will are one. His
decrees are as absolute, and as necessary as His under-
standing or His power.

The next chapter (Chapter X.), since it presents no
new facts concerning the nature of God, need not delay
us here. Merely referring the reader to the transla-
tion of the chapter given below, we pass on to the last
attribute of God discussed in the Cogitata.

This attribute Spinoza, using a Cartesian term, calls
the concurrence (concursits) of God. This term he
uses to express the conserving power which God at all
times manifests in the world. With this attribute the
chain which establishes an indissoluble connection be-

INTRODUCTION xxxix

tween God and nature both in its manifestations of
mind, and in its manifestations of matter, is complete.

So vital is this connection that the world is, as it
were, created anew every single moment of its exist-
ence. Or, to express the thought in another way,
God's power and His presence in the world at all times
is no whit less real or less powerful than it was in the
act of the first creation. Created objects do not have
in themselves the power of existence, or of determining
any of their actions. But all things depend, and
depend absolutely upon the power and the presence of
God for their reality and for their continuance of
being. Thus, as Spinoza restates the philosophy of
Descartes we encounter propositions that are almost if
not quite pantheistic. They are, to say the least, so
anti-deistic that Deism can no longer in the face of so
powerful a refutation, be maintained. This conception
of God must yield place to a concept that lays more
stress upon the vital necessity of God's constant pres-
ence in the world. Theism, or Pantheism, therefore,
becomes the only tenable hypothesis of the World
Ground. Why Spinoza rejected Theism and accepted
Pantheism as the more rational conception we shall
now proceed to inquire.

Although at the time this work was written Spinoza
had doubtlessly advanced further toward Pantheism
than this discussion indicates, still, we have every rea-
son to believe that only a few years earlier than this
he held essentially the position we have outlined. The
conception of God we have given was Spinoza's view
of the Cartesian philosophy, which system he studied
and at an early date partially accepted. It is our
purpose to see, so far as we can, why he rejected his
earlier concept of God, and accepted Pantheism as

xl INTRODUCTION

a more logical, more satisfactory conception. It is of
but little moment, therefore, whether it was a few
months earlier or a few months later that his mind
left the opinions we have presented and started on an
independent course. The essential thing is that he at
one time accepted the opinions here expressed, and, as
we believe and hope to show, found in them elements
that led him finally to the conception of God found in
the Ethics. Beside this, there is, in the different points
presented, in the order in which they are arranged as
well as in the general method of treatment, a reflection
of Spinoza's own thought showing through his at-
tempted concealment.

Especially is this true in the Cogitata Metaphysica
which is a less formal treatment than the first Part of
the " Principles " where the same subject is discussed.
Although there are cases, even here, where Spinoza's
opinions are directly opposed to the view presented,
there are others where he is expressing his own con-
viction.

Recalling, then, the points we have noted in this
brief review of the concept of God we ask, are there
any general principles involved that will help us to
understand Spinoza's Pantheism ; why he came to ac-
cept that idea of God, and what its essential doc-
trines are? In answer to this inquiry we at once
assert that there are. Throughout our examination of
this essay, point after point has appeared, all converg-
ing toward Pantheism. In connection with almost
every attribute of God discussed some truth has been
found which plainly suggested, if it did not demand,
a pantheistic idea of God.

§ 9. One of the things that was insisted upon from
the beginning, was the identification of all divine attri-

INTRODUCTION xli

butes in God. Although for human thought it is nec-
essary for us to speak of God's understanding, or of
His power, or of His decrees, or of His will, this is a
necessity arising from the modes of finite thought not
from the true character of God. In Himself God
knows no such distinctions. His understanding is His
will, and His power is identical with his decrees. In
God as He really is, His attributes are one and indis-
tinguishable. The perfection of the one implies the
presence and perfection of all the others, so that any
attempt to conceive of the existence of one apart from
all the others is hopelessly futile. We may note, too,
in this connection, that this idea of the indistinguishable
unity of God's attributes is Spinoza's idea, not Des-
cartes's. We are told in the Preface of Dr. Meyer
that Spinoza did not believe with Descartes that the
will is something distinct from the understanding,
much less that it has the freedom which Descartes
maintained that it possesses.1 The logical inferences
that follow from this identification, therefore, may be
accepted without reserve, and we may point to it as a
factor that helped to determine Spinoza's later thought.
§ 10. The most important deduction to be drawn
from this identification of God's attributes, is the de-
termined or necessary character of all His decrees and
acts, and the consequent impersonal nature of His
being. If it be true, as Spinoza constantly assumes,
that God is in every attribute absolutely perfect, does
this complete perfection involve a greater freedom or
a greater necessity ? Is a king by virtue of his power
more free in his acts, or more constrained by the ac-
companying necessities of his position ? Descartes held
that God's perfection brought infinite freedom, that He

1 See Preface, p. 7.

xlii INTRODUCTION

was not determined by His infinite understanding or
by His infinite will. Spinoza, on the other hand, holds
that if God's understanding is absolute, and His under-
standing and His decrees are one, this complete knowl-
edge of every contingency binds Him to one course of
action. For as there can be but one absolutely per-
fect Being, so His perfection must be of just one kind.
It is just as necessary that the attributes of such a
Being should be just what they are, as that they should
be contained in His nature. Intelligence does impose
obligations, and a perfect understanding of every cause,
and every factor involved, if all nature is one, demands
that in every case the result shall be just that one
thing.

This necessity, however, is not external. The nature
of God is absolute, and He cannot be changed or even
influenced except by His own understanding. But be-
cause He is determined not by an external force, but by
His own nature, it does not follow that He is less
determined or that His actions are less necessary. On
the other hand, there is no compulsion so absolute as
that coming from within. From the nature of the case
this is the only compulsion that God can know. Com-
ing as it does, then, from God's nature, it is so far a
perfectly harmless tenet, for it only affirms that God
is God, and that Nature is a faithful, a necessary ex-
pression of His being.

It will be worth our while at this point to inquire
a little further into the nature of the compulsion under
which God acts as it follows from this early discussion
of Spinoza. Our conclusions on this subject, it is evi-
dent, must rest upon the attributes assigned to God, so
we need but to recall what has been said to make this
point clear. Good and evil we were told are terms

INTRODUCTION xliii

relative to human thought, and God knows them only
in this connection.1 The same thought is further em-
phasized when we hear that God does not regard some
acts with favor and others with disfavor.2 These
terms arise as we, comparing one object with another,
find one adapted to our welfare, and another opposed
to our interests. All things alike, whether we regard
them as good or evil, express God's infinite understand-
ing and His will, for they could not exist for a single
moment without His concurrence. It follows, there-,
fore, that God does not know good and evil apart from
the human mind, that they are not real but rational
distinctions. These are not terms that are connected
with the essence of objects, but are merely forms of
human thought. God, therefore, is not constrained by
considerations of this kind, and the necessity under
which he acts is not a moral necessity. God does not
know the force of moral obligation. While He is de-
termined by His nature, it is not His nature considered
as a moral Being.

Excluded from obedience to supreme moral princi-
ples as the guiding motive in God's government of the
world, we turn to intellectual considerations to see if
there can be such a thing as intellectual or logical com-
pulsion. A previous knowledge of the Ethics leads
us to expect that it will be in this attribute of God
that we shall find the necessity that makes all of His
acts determined. Not only do we find intellectual ele-
ments regarded as the highest expression of God's per-
fection the source of His blessedness, but it was a fa-
vorite tenet of Descartes accepted by Spinoza that
whatever is clearly and distinctly perceived must be

1 Vid. supra, p. xxxv.

2 Ibid p. xxxvii.

xliv INTRODUCTION

true. In some way the connection between clear logi-
cal thought and Reality is so vital that what is thus
clearly understood must exist. This, too, not with
God's thought, but with finite human thought. If
such a statement can be made of our fallible human
thought, how much greater the necessity between God's
infinite understanding and the real sequence of Na-
ture's changes. We are often told today and with a
good measure of truth, that it is only because of our
ignorance of causes that we regard some things as
necessary and some as contingent. Spinoza antici-
pated this argument of modern Materialism and car-
ried this thought years ago to its logical conclusion :
with God there is perfect, absolute understanding of all
things, and this understanding determines His decrees,
which are not less absolute than is His foreknowledge.
So far as God's knowledge is absolute, it will determine
what all things shall be, nay, what they must be, if
God is to retain His absolute character. Any devia-
tion from this prescribed cause, or any failure in the
least part of the fore-ordained sequence destroys the
whole order of Nature. In a universe where there are
so many factors, where action and reaction assume
such a multitude of directions and inter-relations, noth-
ing less than infinite understanding could have planned
it all, and nothing less than absolute conformity to that
knowledge could preserve it. Just as it has been
shown that there can exist but one absolutely perfect
being, so it might be shown that there is but one abso-
lutely perfect plan for nature. Perfection of knowl-
edge is just as singular as perfection of being, and
there could no more be two perfect plans for nature
Jhan there could be two absolute divinities.

Such would be the logical inferences by which Spin-

INTRODUCTION xlv

oza might pass from the premises of Descartes to the
deterministic idea of God found in his own mature
thought. There are elements in the Cartesian phil-
osophy, which, harmless though they seem, lead us at
once and directly to some of the tenets of Pantheism.
Of this nature are the inferences that follow from this
identification of the attributes of God. And there can
be but little doubt that Spinoza when he wrote the
Cogitata Metaphysica recognized these truths and was
deeply influenced by them. Though he gives us a very
faithful presentation of Descartes' thought still he has
presented the argument whether consciously or not, so
that it shows us the nature of his own reflection and
forecasts his later thought. If we allow our minds to
move at all from the positions as they are given we
must reject Descartes' assertion that God is absolutely
free and believe with Spinoza that He is determined
by the absolute character of His being.

We need not, however, stand aghast at this proposi-
tion, for when it is said that God's acts are all deter-
mined, since they are determined not by an external
force, but by the necessities of His infinite understand-
ing, we only in this assert that God is true to His
nature and that His decrees are the decrees of infinite
wisdom. Far from being a confession of fatalism,
therefore, this proposition, strange as it may sound, is
intellectual opinionism of the strongest type. God's
acts are necessary, not, however, because of any exter-
nal compulsion, but because the requirements of His
intelligence demand an unchanging invariable se-
quence of events. However, a God who acts, nay, is
compelled to act in accordance with His infinite under-
standing, may be a God who can justly claim our
adoration and love. I say may be, for while this con-

xlvi INTRODUCTION

fortuity to the requirements of an absolute intelligence
is one of the demands of Godhood, there are others
which are considered by the human mind to be not less
but even more important. And if these are not present
as guiding principles of His decrees there will be
wanting in His nature that which the human soul re-
quires in its God.

§ ii. Having seen the nature of the Determinism
under which God rests, we are now at the point where
we may raise the question whether this Determinism
by destroying the personal nature of God is a direct
step toward the God of Spinoza's Pantheism. Since
God is determined not by an external force, but by the
necessities of such a fundamental mental requirement
as intelligence, it seems possible to entertain the hope
that under this kind of necessity we may yet maintain
the Personality of God. For surely to act always in
accord with the demands of intelligence is a personal
trait devoutly to be hoped for. Our hope, however,
will be short lived, for as we have suggested above
intelligence though it be absolutely perfect and com-
plete, is not the sole attribute of God ; and a doctrine
of the Absolute that is based upon this attribute alone
cannot satisfy the more exacting requirements of a
philosophical conception of God. It is a truth estab-
lished by all historical investigation and by psycholog-
ical analysis, that a people's conception of God reflect
their best ideals of culture and of growth. God is, in
some general way, the sum total of their ideals, of
mental and moral virtue. To limit the attributes of.
God to intellectual elements merely, or even to make
this the matter of prime importance at once circum-
scribes our ideas of virtue, and limits human endeavor
and human attainment to this kind of development.

INTRODUCTION xlvii

We need no better illustration of this point than that
furnished by Spinoza's own system. For there the
fundamental attribute of God, if we may use that term
where each attribute is infinite and all are one, is His
infinite understanding. Perfectly logically, therefore,
he makes the end of human endeavor, the highest eth-
ical good, the Summum Bonum, to be this intellectual
comprehension of Nature as of God. Spinoza's sys-
tem might be judged, therefore, and judged rightly by
showing how meagerly or how completely it contains
those elements which are included under the term " per-
sonality." For we may rest assured that a people will
not transcend, in their general plane of living, the ideals
they have included in their best conception of God.
We do not need, however, to resort to indirect methods
to get Spinoza's view concerning God's ethical nature.
For we have already seen that according to the " Cogi-
tata '' good and evil are terms relative to human
thought, and in no way connected with the essence
of things. Thus by a word we are prohibited from
attributing to God any of those qualities which are
almost universally regarded as the foundation of char-
acter and of true personality. Good and evil do not
exist apart from finite thought, and have no foundation
in Reality or God. The attributes of personality that
arise from ethical elements must, therefore, be denied.
God's decrees are not determined or even influenced
by these considerations.

Another line of thought will further show us how
the personal character of God is lost and how Spinoza
was turned to the impersonal God of Pantheism. We
have noted above how the different attributes of God
are identified and become, in Him, indistinguishable.
As far as its effect upon His personal nature is con-

xlviii INTRODUCTION

cerned it is a matter of little importance whether these
attributes be identified or be denied. In the latter
case they are destroyed through denial, in the former
they are swallowed up in God's infinity. In either
case all similarity to our best conceptions of Personal-
ity are destroyed. However much we dislike the
charge of " anthropomorphism " we have no other way
in which to interpret phenomena philosophically.
Hence while it may be perfectly true that these attri-
butes are closer related to one another than in man,
each one necessarily implying all the others to their
full perfection, still when it is said that they are all
identified and indistinguishable, our language is either
meaningless or it affirms that God has lost all those
attributes connoted by the term " personal." If God's
understanding, His essence, His will, His power and
His decrees are one, what, we may well ask, is the char-
acter of God. Eliminating as far as possible the non-
common elements we come finally to the absoluteness of
each attribute as the one common factor. His under-
standing is absolute, His power is absolute, his decrees
are absolute; the logicalresult of this absolute charac-
ter of God's attributes is Absolutism or Determinism
that includes in an unvarying sequence, every event in
nature, whether it be physical or whether it be mental
or moral. So absolute is His nature that God Himself
is bound by the necessity of His attributes.

This absoluteness in God's nature, this Determinism
in the heart of Reality is not the less impersonal be-
cause it rests upon an infinite intelligence. It is true
that understanding is an attribute of Personality, but
all materialistic philosophers will admit that there is
intelligence in nature's laws. Otherwise the world
were no cosmos, and all philosophy were futile and

INTRODUCTION xlix

vain. The question at issue between Theism and
Materialism is not whether intelligence is manifested
in nature, whether nature is not everywhere and al-
ways conformable to Law. This fact is, especially in
our day of Science, accepted without one dissenting
voice. For if there is no reason in the world it is use-
less to attempt rational explanations of the world's
phenomena. Mere chance is by hypothesis inexplic-
able. And to contend that the universe is a mere con-
course of atoms without Law is an absurdity that no
one would have the mental bravado to assert. There
are laws in nature, laws that can be expressed in
rational terms and understood by rational beings.
The only question is, how shall we explain the pres-
ence of mental regulations in matter? How shall
we interpret this complete obedience of matter to
laws that can only be expressed or understood in
the light of intelligence? For so entirely is matter
amenable to law that not one atom in all nature ever
mistakes its duty, or ever refuses, however unusual
the position in which it is placed, to comply instantly
with the demands of the laws under which it acts.
That this is true, the Materialist will affirm even more
vehemently than the Theist. For, while the latter may
believe that miraculous manifestations of God's power
are not incompatible with the world order, the Mate-
rialist guards the sanctity of " Natural Law " with the
jealousy of desperation. In his case, if it is once
even in the most trivial way inoperative the chain is
broken and the whole order is destroyed. The differ-
ence between Theism and Materialism is found in the
explanation offered for these facts. Theism maintains
that this Natural Law arises from the Creator of the
world, a Personal Being. Materialism would show

1 INTRODUCTIOX

and have us believe that this rational element in nature
does not originate in a personal Agent or God, but is
somehow included in the very constitution of inani-
mate matter. Materialism recognizes the element of
law in nature, the guiding power of certain rational
principles, and yet does not feel constrained by this fact
to assert that it comes from a personal Absolute. It is
not sufficient, therefore, to establish the personal char-
acter of God, to say that His acts and His decrees are
an expression of absolute intelligence. If God is a
personal being, something more than an infinite under-
standing must be attributed to Him as principles which
influence Him in His government of the world.

Should we inquire more specifically what these prin-
ciples must needs be, we would soon come to the con-
clusion that what is demanded is that God should be
an ethical as well as intellectual Being. I can respect
or stand in awe of a Being whose understanding and
whose power are infinite, but I cannot love a God who
is not Love, and I cannot adore a Being insensible to
considerations of such vital importance to me as good
and evil. The highest demand of the religious mind is
that its God should be an ethical Spirit ; and the phil-
osophical conception of Personality requires that this
concept should include all of those factors which, by
reflective thought are held to constitute the essential
nature of the human mind. It is impossible, therefore,
to have any adequate conception of Personality with-
out including in it, as one of its most essential factors,
a supreme regard for ethical elements. Hence the few
remarks made concerning good and evil in Chapters
VII. and VIII. of the Cogitata Metaphystca are ex-
tremely significant. The position there taken helps us
to understand how Spinoza was led to reject the more

INTRODUCTION li

orthodox conception of God and to find the only satis-
factory Absolute in the God of his Pantheism. By this
denial of the ethical attributes of God, by making good
and evil wholly relative to human thought and human
desire, all moral qualities in God are destroyed, and
we have then, as the highest determining force in God's
nature, this intellectual understanding of cause and ef-
fect which, we have seen, does not in any true sense
demand that He should be a personal Being. Hence,
even in this early discussion of God, we find the way
open for the impersonal Absolute, which is the basis of
Spinoza's Pantheism. We have given here a thought,
which alone logically developed and its implied infer-
ences regarded, precludes Theism, and consequently
supports the conception of God found in the Ethics.

The full import of what has just been said concern-
ing the necessary or determined character of God's de-
crees, and the consequent impersonal nature of the Ab-
solute escapes us unless it is taken in connection with
the deductive character of Spinoza's thought. We
have already shown that from the earliest period of his
reflection Spinoza's interest centered in the concept of
God. Not, however, altogether for the intrinsic inter-
est of that subject, but partly as the starting point of
his constructive system. A deductive philosophy re-
quires as its starting point a concept which includes all
that is to appear in the system. But why or how ap-
pear? From logical or intellectual necessity. It de-
mands first an absolute God. And if the system is log-
ically carried out no truth will be recognized which
does not follow in this necessary way from the prem-
ises previously laid down. If the premises are once
fixed, determined, the inferences at once follow by in-
tellectual necessity and are as necessary as the princi-

Hi INTRODUCTION

pies from which they are deduced. Thus when Spin-
oza accepted Deduction as the great Organon of truth
and the geometrical method as the most consistent
method of presentation, his philosophy is at once strait-
ened to the requirements of that method. As the con-
clusions in geometry follow from a logical or rational
necessity, so nature is just what it is because of a
similar intellectual necessity. Spinoza was dominated
through and through with this deductive nature of
thought so that he believed it was the image of reality.
What was necessary logically, was necessary in reality.
To follow Spinoza in his reasoning this truth must be
always kept in mind.

Having shown how the conception of God given in
the " Cogitata " was such as to turn Spinoza's mind
toward Pantheism, and how also it prepared the way
for the impersonal Absolute of that system, we turn
now to notice some of the more particular factors, that
had part in this result. A consideration of these will
further show us how Spinoza, when his ideas of the
absolute supremacy of God in nature had made im-
possible his acceptance of any deistic theory of God,
turned not to Theism but to the more radical, more
materialistic absolute of Pantheism.

§ 12. Spinoza seems to have been from the begin-
ning a rationalist. The universal doubt of Descartes
had probably some influence in this direction, at least
so far as to make Spinoza wary of accepting as true
that which could not be supported by the logic on which
he relied. Deduction, depending as it does not upon
empirical verification but upon rational premises and
logical inference, prepares the way for the rejection of
everything that does not admit of this kind of proof.
To establish the truth of any proposition, therefore, his

INTRODUCTION liii

sole reliance was upon reason. This early rationalism
was in all probability the immediate cause of his breach
with the Jewish synagogue. In the " Theologico-Po-
litical Treatise ' written only a few years after the
Principles the result of this critical spirit is manifest
and we see how he was led away from the more ortho-
dox conception of God. With a spirit akin to the
ultra critical spirit of our present day, he proceeds
to sift all the claims of the supernatural in the Scrip-
tures, and in the end rejects everything that shows the
touch of a hand other than nature. In the chapter
on miracles, he thus states his purpose : " I will show,"
he says,

I. ' That nature cannot be contravened, but that
she preserves a fixed and immutable order, and at the
same time I will explain what is meant by a miracle.

II. c That God's nature and existence, and conse-
quently His providence cannot be known from mira-
cles, but that they can all be much better perceived
from the fixed and immutable order of nature.

III. " That by the decrees and volitions, and conse-
quently the providence of God, Scripture (as I will
prove by Scriptural examples) means nothing but na-
ture's order following necessarily from her eternal
laws." 1

These statements, the result of a few added years of
reflection upon the nature of God, reveal the character
of Spinoza's early thought. His critical, rationalistic
mind had not only led him to reject the Jewish and the
Christian doctrine of Inspiration and of Miracles, but
had now caused him to give up his belief in a personal
God. The import of these words is deep and unmis-
takable. There is a complete surrender of all Liber-

1 Spinoza's Works, Elwes' Trans., p. 82.

liv INTRODUCTION

tarianism and an unqualified acceptance of Determin-
ism. His early anthropomorphic conception of God
was now supplanted by the conception that appears
later in the Ethics. God's providence and care appear
not in special manifestations of His power, but in the
presence of universal, invisible laws. The very per-
sonal fact of a special display of wisdom or of power, is
made impossible by the sway of principles that know
no exception to their uniform control. All things are
determined, following from an absolute necessity.
And instead of a God whose attitude toward men and
whose character permits of miraculous expressions of
His love and His wisdom, God has 'become a being
impossible to know except through a study of His
eternal decrees, the laws of Nature, and impossible to
love except with a purely intellectual love. When
Spinoza published this Treatise, therefore, in 1670,
but seven years after the first appearance of the Prin-
ciples, his conception of God and of God's relation to
the world were essentially pantheistic.

§ 13. Another reason why Spinoza's thought turned
not to Theism but to Pantheism, is the fact that Theism
is by nature idealistic, while Pantheism is half, if not
entirely materialistic. Theism regards God as a spirit-
ual, personal Being immanent in nature and yet tran-
scending her every form. While every object and
every action have their cause in God, His presence is
not a sensible but a metaphysical fact. This doctrine
is the doctrine of mind in matter, of the ideal in the
real, of the spiritual in the corporeal. It is evident that
we have come face to face with the great problem
which Descartes so clearly stated for subsequent phil-
osophy, the relation of the physical and the psychical.
In order to effect the close relation between God and

INTRODUCTION lv

the world, Pantheism is distinctly opposed to the
idealism of Theism. It is impossible to assert the
primacy of spirit and remain in Pantheism. On the
other hand this doctrine so far does away with the dis-
tinction between body and spirit as to make them co-
relative attributes of one and the same substance, name-
ly God. The extended world, Pantheism asserts, is as
truly and as essentially a part of God as the world of
thought. But this will be better seen if we turn back
for a few minutes to see the condition of the problem
as it was handed down to Spinoza.

Since the time of Descartes, if never before, one of
the fundamental problems of philosophy has been to
explain the relation between mind and matter. Des-
cartes stated this problem so clearly that those who
immediately followed him had their whole philosophy
characterized largely by the position they held upon
this subject. How are mind and matter related?
How do they react upon one another when apparently
there are no grounds of inter-relation? The starting
point of Descartes' system, his Cogito ergo sum is the
primal truth of Epistemology because in it all traces of
this question have been eliminated, and it is an assertion
that applies wholly to the realm of thought. This
predication, therefore, was untainted by any of the
doubts that gather round the still unsolved problem of
the relation between the psychical and the physical.
However, the whole problem of philosophy is not episte-
mological, but there are metaphysical problems as well.
And the fact that by eliminating all sensuous elements
Descartes had gained a foothold on Reality, but served
to emphasize the contrast between the world of mind
and the world of matter. To put the matter succinctly,
Descartes found an antithesis between mind and matter

lvi INTRODUCTION

which came to be not only a fundamental problem in
his philosophy, but a distinction that served as a
ground of separation for those who immediately fol-
lowed him. In endeavoring to formulate a rational
theory concerning the relation of mind and matter Des-
cartes, Geulincx, Malebranche, and Spinoza, each takes
a characteristic position which is the key to his system
of philosophy. So vital did this point continue to be
after Descartes had once stated it, that these four men
gave their best efforts to find a satisfactory solution
for its perplexities. Descartes taught that God is in-
finite thought, and that the human mind participates in
His absolute character. He is not, however, infinite
extension of which finite objects are but modes, but His
essential nature is mental, not corporeal. Geulincx
held that thought and extension are both modes of two
disparate substances. The distinction between his phil-
osophy and the philosophy of Spinoza, therefore, lies
in the fact that mind and matter are not modifications
of the same substance but of two separate substances.
Malebranche was in accord with Descartes and Geu-
lincx so far as to affirm that bodies are modes of in-
finite extension, but minds, on the other hand, instead
of being modes of infinite thought, have a substantial
existence.1

Spinoza, too, accepted this dualism of Descartes as a
fundamental philosophical truth and embodied it as one
of the cardinal principles of his system. One of his
purposes also was to find a theory of Reality that
would explain the interaction of such disparate sub-
stances as mind and matter. He recognized a world
of mental phenomena and an extended world. His ex-
planation of their interaction, however, was not that

1 Cf. Erdmann's History of Phil., Vol. TI, p. 31.

INTRODUCTION lvfi

of any of the three men whose position we have just
stated. Neither Descartes, who was in this an idealist,
nor Geulincx, nor Malebranche, dared to maintain an
equality of importance between these two aspects of
substance, but primacy was with them uniformly
ascribed to mind. Spinoza, of them all, maintained
that thought and extension are two correlated attri-
butes of one and the same infinite substance, *. e.,
God. His position upon this point, the solution of
Cartesian Dualism by thus making mind and matter
not two substances but two attributes of one substance,
not only differentiates his philosophy from that of the
men whose position we have noted, but it states a fun-
damental truth of Pantheism. While the others, as we
have already seen, one in one way, one in another, at-
tributed a certain primacy to mind, Spinoza boldly cor-
relates these two worlds and makes them equally an
expression of the power and presence of the one abso-
lute God. With him the physical world is just as truly
and just as profoundly a manifestation of God's being
as the most idealistic principles of the rational world.
There is but one true Substance, whose attributes as
modes are thought and extension. The former attri-
bute is no more essential to God's being than the latter,
for both are infinite attributes and both express funda-
mental truth concerning His nature. Spinoza's ex-
planation of Cartesian Dualism, therefore, was a direct
step toward Pantheism. He accepts the distinction but
interprets it so that it harmonizes perfectly with the
demands of the logic he had already adopted, and with
his belief concerning the supreme importance of the
concept of God. Thus Spinoza accepted the only ex-
planation of the Cartesian Dualism that would make
his Pantheism possible. The supremacy of mind

lviii INTRODUCTION

over matter means some form of Deism or Theism.
The primacy of matter means Materialism. The cor-
relation of the two as attributes or modes of one Sub-
stance is Pantheism.

Thus while Descartes established the basis for a
sound Epistemology, his Dualism, the antithesis be-
tween thought and extension, opened the way for
Pantheism or even for Materialism. Of course these
beliefs were never favored in his own mind, but the
metaphysical principles involved, variously interpreted,
did lead to these more radical conceptions of Reality.
Had Spinoza merely reversed the assertion of his pred-
ecessors and affirmed that not mind but matter is the
cause of all phenomena, he would have become a
materialist. But this he could not do ; he was too firm
a believer in the substantial nature of thought, and in
the power of logic, to ever make this of secondary im-
portance. On the other hand this supreme confidence
in reason, this natural inclination toward rationalism,
led him to deny all manifestations of supernatural
power, and to rely exclusively upon the natural
sequence of events for all knowledge of God's nature
and of His decrees. Nature, therefore, in all her
physical forms, and especially in her laws, becomes a
matter of the highest importance to philosophy.
Spinoza, therefore, influenced on the one hand by his
belief in the absolute character of logic, and on the
other by his belief in the uniformity of natural
sequence, could affirm the primacy of neither mind nor
matter, but must make them necessarily correlated
forms of Reality. The person who refuses, as Spinoza
did, all miraculous expressions of divine power as
highly improbable if not actually impossible, must sup-
port his philosophy by showing some very close con-

INTRODUCTION lix

nection between physical phenomena and God. For
this, the rather artificial explanation of Deism will not
suffice. But, on the other hand, the person who
accepts the invariable sequence of nature without pos-
sibility of intervention by any cause whatever, as the
fundamental postulate of philosophy, must deny the
ideality of God's being as it is represented in Theism.
For in whatever form antitheistic theories may appear
in the last analysis they will be found to base their
argument upon this unyielding sequence in the natural
world, upon the necessity of all physical acts. So it
has always been, and so it will doubtless remain.
Hence, because Spinoza could not accept exclusively
either the interpretation of Theism or of Materialism,
he could do nothing else than combine the essential
features of both in his theory of a pantheistic Ontology.
§14. We have found in our investigation, therefore,
three factors which have concurred to turn Spinoza's
thought from a deistic conception of God to Pantheism.
.No one of them alone, perhaps, would have been suf-
ficient to produce his radical departure from the
philosophy of his time ; but the three taken together
with cumulative force make any other cosmic theory
than Pantheism almost impossible. He gave as we
have seen an unqualified allegiance to the old Aris-
totelian Logic, as the true Organon of truth. Deduc-
tion is the only true method of determining truth.
Some concept must needs be found, therefore, which
connects all being. Since from it all things are to be
deduced, in it all things must be contained. Such a
concept as this Spinoza found in his pantheistic con-
cept of God. Far from being criticised for his attempt
to find one idea in which the whole world is contained,
he deserves praise for the clear insight into the demands

Ix INTRODUCTION

of this method and for his attempt to satisfy them.
If criticised at all it should be for the vanity of his
attempt and for the failure to see the value of the
Novum Organum which for forty years had been be-
fore the world. Deduction demanded this concept of
God, not as its goal, but as the very starting point of its
functioning, the postulate of its truth. And in no
small degree Spinoza by the iron-bound apodeictic char-
acter of this logic, was led to a belief in a God of sim-
ilar character. As induction permeates and influences
all our ideas to-day, so deduction then cast its influence
over every concept of philosophy.

The second point we have noted in our discussion
which gave shape to Spinoza's thought is this concept
of God. So close is the connection between deduction
and this idea that it is almost impossible to conceive
of the former, when it is to be used to establish a
philosophic system, without the latter. In this con-
nection they are true complements of one another. We
have already seen that this idea of God, was historic-
ally considered a fundamental idea in Spinoza's reflec-
tion ; we can now see that it was made so necessarily
by his close allegiance to deduction and by his strict
conformity to scholastic logic. This concept of God,
however, was not discovered out of hand, ready-
made, but was the product of years of careful
thought, and of definite, though little investigated
causes. Logically this concept was prior to Pantheism
as a system, and largely determined just what the
main tenets of that philosophy must be. To under-
stand fully just what Pantheism is, therefore, we
have had recourse to the historical development of
the idea of God, and sought to show how certain
ideas in the more orthodox conception, with but a

INTRODUCTION lxi

slight modification may become quite pantheistic.
God's absolute power makes Him the sole cause of all
being, and the absolute character of His decrees is
Determinism. So absolute is the character of God,
and so vital the connection between His being, and
the existence and essence of all objects that Deism is
at once declared insufficient. Since in effect the
world is created anew every moment, God's presence
and His power in nature must be as real as the objects
themselves. It is not so, however, according to the
deistic hypothesis, so that theory of God's being is at
once rejected, and Theism, Materialism or Panthe-
ism must be the true conception of His being.

It was just at this critical point, when Spinoza's
beliefs were in the plastic state, that the influence of
Descartes' philosophy came in to give them definite
character and to throw his mind irrevocably toward
Pantheism. This effect is, as we have suggested,
prepared for by his rationalism, and yet this alone
might as well have led to Materialism as to Theism.
But as the Dualism of Descartes was interpreted and
explained by Spinoza, there was no other concept of
God that could so well satisfy the logical demands of
this explanation as Pantheism. Spinoza retained the
dualistic distinction of Descartes and this made
urgent some theory that would recognize the rights
of both of these phases of reality. Since from the
rationalistic character of his early thought Spinoza
was led to reject all supernatural expressions of God's
power, he could find the power of God only in the
laws of nature. God is present in every form of the
objective world, and not one change can be found in
nature that is not determined by His eternal decrees.
This is but another way to say that Spinoza was

Ixii INTRODUCTION

through and through a strict determinist. But the
root of Determinism is found in the observed sequence
of physical change and in the belief in the inviolable
character of nature's laws. Our knowledge of the
Absolute, therefore, he would maintain, cannot rest
upon miraculous manifestations of God's power, but
must be gained through an investigation of the laws
that are uniformly governing the natural world.
God is revealed in every object and in every act of
nature, not merely in special cases when the laws of
the physical world seem to be controverted and for
the time of none effect. If we would know the nature
of God, therefore, we must turn to the laws of the
physical and the mental world and find there an ex-
pression of His wisdom and His power. There is
more truth, he would say, revealed concerning the
nature of God in the law of gravitation than in any
special manifestation of His presence in which men
have ever believed. And so far as mere intelligence
is concerned he would unquestionably be correct. If
we would know of God's wisdom and of His power
and of His decrees we must study the works of His
creation ; these are the visible, the tangible expression
of the wisdom and the power we seek. Such are the
claims of the natural world ; a world where physical
law stands thus far upon an equality with the laws of
thought. While they are not strong enough to estab-
lish a materialistic conception of God, they are far
too cogent to be ignored or made of little effect. Ma-
terialism would in many respects fulfill most perfectly
the demands of these considerations. For not only
does it recognize these laws of the physical world as
the direct expression of the Absolute, but it affirms
that they are the one source of all. This, however,

INTRODUCTION lxiii

was further than Spinoza could go ; he could not sub-
scribe to this and retain his belief in the Dualism
which Descartes had so clearly established. Instead
of mind being merely an epiphenomenon of matter as
Materialism affirms, Descartes and Spinoza both held
that it is one of the attributes of Substance. Material-
ism expressed but one phase of the truth. Substance
is not merely Extension, but Thought as well. All
that was essential in Materialism Spinoza found as
well provided for in Pantheism. And the idealism of
Theism, the spiritual nature of God, is also included
in this pantheistic concept. Thus the Dualism of
Nature is maintained, although as Deduction demands,
and as the logical requirements of thought importune,
the absolute unity of Nature is provided for. Mind
and matter are two attributes of the same Substance,
namely God. Pantheism alone of all philosophies can
maintain this literal unity and still recognize this
duality.

§ 15. It is time that we attempt now, in concluding
our argument, to gather up the threads to see whether
when woven together they support our contention, and
help to make clear Spinoza's Pantheism. Was this
philosophy a true development somewhat sporadic per-
haps but still a development from definite, definable
antecedents, or did it Pallas-like spring from the
troubled brain of Spinoza fully ordered and complete?
If the latter our work has been useless and we should
commend students of Spinoza to a study of his Ethics
alone. But if it is a development, a logical growth
from premises Spinoza did not formulate and from
personal factors not wholly under his control then we
can still affirm however inadequate our analysis has
been, that some such method as this is essential for a

lxiv INTRODUCTION

sympathetic or even for a just appreciation of
Spinoza's philosophy.

In the first place we undertook to show that the
geometrical method, first used in the work that has
called for this discussion, was not considered an in-
fallible method of argumentation. It does not follow
that everything that can be put in mathematical
form is true. But Spinoza believed, and here we get
to the root of the matter, that all logical thought and
all proof is identical in character to the mental
processes of geometry. It follows, therefore, that the
most logical presentation of truth will be the accepted
presentation of geometry. But the truth of geometry
does not depend upon this form, it is used merely
because of its logical consistency. So the geometrical
method as used in the Ethics does not insure certainty
of argument ; it is used simply because of its peda-
gogical soundness, just as some use the Socratic, some
the kindergarten method. They seem to be justified
by the general character of the processes of thought.

The second point was the extremely broad, the
extremely important idea of God. Here we have en-
deavored to show how Spinoza's peculiar ideas de-
veloped more or less logically from causes easily
ascertainable but not on that account less potent. His
first idea of God was the Jewish conception, the ordi-
nary Deism of Scholasticism. But there was in
Spinoza beside this deep never dying interest in this
idea of God, what we have called a rationalistic ele-
ment, that soon led him to reject not only the Jewish
conception of Jehovah but also the deistic conception
of mediaeval philosophy.

But underneath all this, as the ultimate source of his
heresy, the real cause of his heterodoxy was his un-

INTRODUCTION lxv

shaken faith in Deduction as the true method of proof
and the right method of thought. His fault, if fault
it was, was that he accepted completely the logic of
his times ; his sin if sin it was, was that he carried out
more logically than had ever been done before the
principles of this logic, never hesitating to draw his
conclusions, never blanching at the outcome. Even
if his system is doomed to philosophical disapproba-
tion the man himself stands out a hero in intellectual
prowess and in his devotion to the truth. He was not
simply a disciple of deductive reasoning but by his
logical consistency, by carrying out the principles of
such thought as they had never been carried out before,
by a devotion to the syllogism that never faltered from
fear nor weakened in warmth, he deserves the title,
the saint of Deduction.

The next problem to which we directed our atten-
tion was to show that the fundamental tenets of Pan-
theism are the logical outcome of the principles that
underlie Spinoza's thought. The two points we
singled out for special remark were the impersonal
character of the Absolute and the Determinism which
stands over all things. So absolute is the conception
of God which a consistent Deduction demands that
all His ethical attributes are lost sight of in the su-
perior importance (superior from the logical stand-
point) of the more dynamic attributes of cause and
effect, and logical coherency. The concept of God,
the ultimate source of the world of experience, does
not contain in any available form the idea of free
finite wills, so the essential idea of personality is de-
stroyed. But on the other hand the demands of strict
logic such as Spinoza used, necessitate a Determinism
just as universal, just as invariable as the Determin-

Ixvi INTRODUCTION

ism of the Ethics. When we sought for the character
of this Determinism we saw that it could not be an
external force, or hypostasized necessity, but must,
therefore, arise from the attribute of God Himself.
Physical necessity it could not be, and moral necessity
God does not know, hence it could only be the logical
necessity of self expression. Thus we have bridged
over as it seemed to us the gap between Spinoza's
thought and the current philosophy of his time, at least
far enough to see that his Pantheism has its roots
deeply seated in the thought of preceding years, and
needs this connection clearly pointed out for an ade-
quate appreciation of the obscure points in this system.
The definitions are clearer and richer, his ideas more
easily understood, and their arrangement more logical
than if we study the system merely content-wise.
The sources of strength and the causes of error, when
the system is thus envisaged, both stand out in clearer
perspective, and with a different emphasis, than if in-
vestigated in the usual way. In conclusion we shall
pause to point out some of the points of weakness and
some of the profound truth to which this historical
method calls special attention.

§ 1 6. Turning first to the weaknesses to which this
genetic study specially directs our thought we find
them to cluster around the term Deduction. This we
have seen above is the great underlying principle, the
true cause of the use of the geometrical method, and
inferentially implies if it does not absolutely demand
a determined sequence of events in nature. More
than any one thing, therefore, this word exposes and
explains the vulnerable points of Spinoza's Pantheism.
His purpose, which he in large measure accomplished,
was to remain always true to the principles of De-

INTRODUCTION lxvii

duction. And his close adherence to this kind of logic,
and to the scholastic idea of truth and valid proof
led him to embrace in his system much that is artificial
and unreal. The particular tenets that have excited the
vituperative and cutting criticism of his opponents
very largely arose from this cause. The reasons for
this are not hard to see : in the first place Deduction
if logically carried out sets before philosophy an ideal
which is by nature impossible for finite intelligence.
The human mind cannot formulate a system a priori
which must be true. Human reason even in its most
absolute claims cannot thus set the bounds of Reality.
However true it may be that there is " logic in nature/'
and that the world is " hung on principles," this does
not guarantee that what is clearly conceived must be
true. To assert this is to claim for the human mind
creative power. The bare logical necessities of
thought are too abstract, too general to serve as a cer-
tain basis upon which to construct a theory of Reality.
Dialectics as a method of system building always leads
to hopeless confusion and to contradiction of empir-
ical truth. Of this truth the history of thought fur-
nishes abundant illustration. On the other hand
there are certain questions, which, while they are
known only too well, cannot be explained satisfactorily
to reason. Such for example are the problems of Evil
and of Freedom. Before these questions the human
mind realizes its impotency and stands humbly before
that which transcends its mightiest endeavors.

§ 17. Spinoza's position upon these two questions,
the problem of evil and the problem of human free-
dom, was profoundly influenced if it was not wholly
determined by the deductive character of the time in
which he lived. As we have already shown, Deduc-

lxviii INTRODUCTION

tion demands, as its starting point, a concept that
includes in itself a complete system of thought.
Nothing can logically be deduced which is not poten-
tially contained. And truth is established when it is
shown that the given proposition follows logically
from the premises previously laid down. Spinoza
with his idea of one, perfectly absolute God could not
reconcile with this concept, either the current concep-
tion of evil, or of human freedom. If God is abso-
lute, and if everything is determined by His under-
standing and His will, then good and evil are alike
expressions of His wisdom and His power. What
we know as evil is just as truly an expression of God's
will as that which we regard as good. Reasoned out
in this way, beginning not with the facts of experience
but with the idea of an absolute God, and establishing
each proposition by deductive proof, there is little
chance to come to any other conception concerning
the true character of evil. If evil as well as good
exists by God's concurrence and by express decrees of
His will, the ontological basis for a distinction be-
tween them is destroyed, and their relativity to human
thought it established. But if it be true that God has
no regard for ethical distinctions He is not an ethical
being. In this way we find the significance of Panthe-
ism as a religion reduced to a minimum, and its logical
superiority its sole claim to consideration.

§ 1 8. Spinoza's Determinism, also, was made neces-
sary by his strict adherence to the deductive method of
his time. Induction begins with isolated facts, and
theoretically, at least, with no preconceived theory to
account for them. The mind is as open to one conclu-
sion as to another. It is in this way, as Positivism
affirms, that we may establish a system of certain

INTRODUCTION lxix

truth, and free ourselves from all prejudices and as-
sumptions. But with Deduction, especially when such
demands are made upon it as must be made for the
accomplishment of the purpose to which Spinoza set
himself, we must postulate that nature and thought
are in the closest allegiance with one another. It is
absolutely required before we begin, that we believe
that " what is clearly and distinctly conceived is true."
It were folly to construct a system of thought, and
to assert that this is an explanation of experience
unless, in some way, we are confident that our system
constructed upon logic, is a faithful presentation of
the actual facts in nature. Thus, while from the
standpoint of Epistemology there is no incompatibility
between Induction and Determinism, in Deduction
there is an implicit demand for that fixed sequence
in nature which is the ground of all deterministic phi-
losophy. Unless Nature is herself logical it is useless
to offer a logical explanation of her phenomena. If
Deduction is to be the measure of truth it is imperative
that nature should be a closed series with no possible
intervention from without. This Spinoza provided
for by the absolute nature which he ascribed to God.
In every change in the physical world no matter how
trivial or apparently commonplace, and in every
thought and deed of men, whatever its ethical nature,
God's hand is seen supreme ; they are both what they
are solely by His will and through His power. Thus,
in nature as Deduction would envisage it, there is no
place left for human Freedom. To leave anything to
the arbitrament of the human will, as irrational and as
wilful as it often is, is to introduce into the world
causes whose effects if not counterbalanced might
wreck the universe.

lxx INTRODUCTION

Beside this, Freedom is not primarily a rational in-
ference, but a datum of experience. We do not reason
ourselves into a belief in this attribute of the human
mind, but we experience it in the constant selection of
elements in our intellectual processes as well as in the
more debated field of moral choice. The man who
takes life as it comes with but little reflection upon
his experience accepts the postulate of moral Freedom
as he accepts the fact that he can think of this thing
or of that, or that he can go to his usual work to-day
or remain at home. The reason that Freedom vs.
Determinism has been, throughout the history of re-
flective thought, one of the most debated of questions,
and the question on which the final word has never
been said, is not alone because it is of such importance
for morality, but because it is also a question that im-
plicates the whole problem of empirical and a priori
factors in experience. This does not mean, however,
that there is a necessary opposition or incompatibility
between them, but it does imply that before the prob-
lem of Freedom can be solved we must find some
satisfactory hypothesis concerning the relation of em-
pirical and a priori elements in experience. Spinoza
not appreciating the force of empirical facts, but seek-
ing constantly for the ignis fatuus of deductive proof,
would not accept this testimony of consciousness, un-
less it were confirmed in the manner he thought neces-
sary. But thus envisaged there was but one solution
of the problem. Beginning as he did with the abso-
lute character of God as the postulate of further reflec-
tion, he could not bridge over the chasm to freedom in
the human mind. Indeed, when the question was con-
sidered in the light in which he saw it there was little
desirability and no imperative need that man should

INTRODUCTION lxxi

be free. Determinism unifies the world better, it helps
us to believe in the power of logic more, and it pre-
pares the way for a deductive philosophy more directly
than to grant to finite beings this attribute of infinity.
Hence, we see that the two points most criticised in
Spinoza's Ethics, his doctrine of evil and the fatalistic
Determinism that he championed, have their origin in
the deductive logic which he accepted as the true
Organon of truth, and which he upheld, be it said to
his credit, in such a strict consistent way. We have
already spoken of the geometrical method which
Spinoza used and shown how it, too, was used in the
interest of Deduction. We only name it again to call
attention to the fact that so far as it was the result
of this way of considering truth its weaknesses, too,
arose from this same source of error that we have
found at the root of the two concepts just discussed.

§ 19. Turning now from the weaknesses to which
our historical study of Spinoza has called special atten-
tion, we pass on to consider some of the significant
truths that are found when his system is thus envis-
aged. And first, we shall raise the question whether
Kant himself may not have been influenced by this
early work of Spinoza. In the first part of the
Cogitata Metaphysica there are some distinctions
clearly made of such a character that it leads us to
ask whether it is not probable that Kant had read
this essay and received from it suggestions for his
Transcendental Philosophy. While there is no direct
or positive evidence that such is the case, some of the
positions which Spinoza here maintains are so palp-
ably the logical antecedents of the Kantian Transcen-
dentalism that they awaken interest in the question,
and provoke a further inquiry into the justice of the

lxxii INTRODUCTION

comparison. It may be worth our while, therefore,
to point out the main points of similarity between
these two men, in almost every point so dissimilar to
one another.

Spinoza begins this essay, the Cogitata, by a chapter
in which he seeks to make clear the difference between
real being (ens reale) , fictitious being (ens Hctuin),
and being of the reason (ens rationis)} Being is de-
fined as " all that which, when it is clearly and dis-
tinctly conceived, we find to exist or at least to be able
to exist." Under this definition chimera, fictitious
being, and being of reason are not real. Being of
reason is "nothing but a mode of thinking which is
of service in retaining, or explaining, or in imaging
out ideas." To enable us to retain our ideas we have
such terms or beings of reason as genus, species, etc. ;
for explaining our ideas we have time, number, meas-
ure, and others ; those that help us to image out our
ideas are such terms of negation as blindness, extrem-
ity, limit, shades, etc.

But before we affirm a similarity between these
terms and the transcendental elements of the " Aes-
thetic " and of the " Analytic," it will be well to see
just how closely these modes of thinking correspond
to the a priori elements in the Kantian philosophy.
The distinction which Kant made in the elements of
phenomena was between its matter, that part which
comes through the senses, and its form, that part
which causes the manifold of empirical elements to
be perceived in a certain order. The matter of any
phenomenon is given a posteriori, but its form is
a priori. Kant recognized these two elements in every

1This last is a somewhat awkward phrase, but rational
being, the only smooth translation, would he ambiguous.

INTRODUCTION Ixxiii

phenomenon, the empirical factors derived from ex-
tramental objects through the mind's sensibility, and
the subjective factors that make experience possible
by referring this manifold of sense to these forms of
thought. Spinoza's terminology was widely different;
that which comes from the external world he calls
real, that which the mind creates in order to further
its intellectual demands is called modes of thinking
{modi cogitandi). Spinoza did not analyse this dis-
tinction at all, but he did set forth the distinction upon
which Kant later founded his system of Transcen-
dentalism. Spinoza did not even use this distinction
in his later thought, but in the Cogitata it is found, a
vein just noted and then neglected until it was redis-
covered by Kant and astonished the whole philosophic
world by the wealth its working revealed. All that
we desire to do is to show that Spinoza recognized the
fact that there are certain fundamental ideas derived
not from the external world but forms of the mind's
own making. But even this would not be worth men-
tion were it not for the further significant fact that
there is apparently more than an accidental coincidence
between the particular ideas Spinoza thus enumerates
and the Kantian categories.

The first object to which Kant addresses himself in
the " Critique of Pure Reason " was to prove the sub-
jectivity of Time and Space. Though Spinoza's argu-
ment is not similar his conclusion is identical with
that of Kant. Time is a concept necessary, not for
every single intuition as Kant would say, but for
understanding the whole sequence of intuitions. But
whether for the one reason or the other the result is
the same ; time is not an " affect " of being but a form
or mode of thought. Measure another one of Spinoza's

lxxiv INTRODUCTION

ideas of reason used to explain experience by a sim-
ilar argument to that used in connection with time,
would provide for the subjectivity of time. Thus we
would have in this essay the " Transcendental Aes-
thetic " complete. Time and Space by implication are
not something externally real, but forms of thought
necessary to explain experience.

Beside these elements of the " Transcendental Aes-
thetic " there are several of the categories of Kant
placed in the list of being of reason. Number, the
third one of the ideas Spinoza names in his enumera-
tion, is practically identical with the Kantian categories
of quantity. . The terms " possible " and " contingent '
though not given with the others are plainly regarded
as subjective and suggest the categories of relation.
Besides all this we find also that Spinoza in this dis-
cussion makes use of that most distinctly Kantian of all
Kantian terms " transcendental."1 In popular usage,
we are told, unity, the true and the good, the examples
he gives of transcendental terms, are considered to be
attributes inherent in the objects themselves. Spinoza's
purpose is to show that these are not real affects of be-
ing but ideas of reason. Taking each one up separate-
ey he would show that they arise from subjective
causes. In other words Spinoza would show that
those attributes usually called transcendental are not
noumenal or real but of a subjective origin, a use of
the term that suggests very powerfully the Kantian
use of the word. So far as the distinction between
the manifold of sense and the subjective elements of
experience are concerned, therefore, Spinoza seems in
these passages to insist upon it in such a way that we
may well raise the inquiry we have suggested. It is

1 Vid. Cogilata Mctaphysica. Pt. I., Chaps. V. and VI.

INTRODUCTION lxxv

far from an improbability, therefore, that Kant who
seemed by his keen criticism of Pantheism well ac-
quainted with Spinoza's system may have received
some valuable suggestions from this early work.

In the Ethics Spinoza apparently made little use of
this distinction between subjective necessities of
thought and ideas having origin in the attributes of
external objects. In no part of this work is the dis-
tinction set forth in such clear-cut terms as in this early
essay. But on the other hand, the later work con-
tains as one of its most essential truths this antithesis
between thought and extension. And more specifically
one of the prime tenets of Pantheism rests upon this
distinction between what is externally real and what
is mentally required. His doctrine of good and evil
we have seen depends upon this distinction. Good
and evil have their causa essendi, not in the external
world but in the way the human mind regards them.
Apart from this, however, there is little in the Ethics
to illustrate the importance of the distinction made in
the Cogitata.

§ 20. But the most important truth of Spinoza's
system, the truth which Pantheism emphasized with
such commendable persistency is not one upon which
questions and doubts can arise. It is a truth which,
in the development of. philosophical belief, stands out
in bold relief; it marks a well defined stage in philo-
sophic thought, and did not merely suggest, but it
determined the trend of succeeding opinion. The
thought to which we refer is the closer bond that
Spinoza established between God and the world. As
we have already pointed out, even in his early thinking,
Spinoza assigned such a supreme value to the concept
of God, and made the world so completely dependent

lxxvi INTRODUCTION

upon His power and presence, that Deism was
doomed. We have seen, too, why it was that Spinoza's
ideas assumed this particular form. From the earliest
times he accepted Deduction as the true method of
determining truth, and looked to the concept of God
as the source of all being and all truth. Thus this
vital connection between God and nature becomes a
dominant thought throughout Spinoza's reflections.
Since to the end he was the devoted champion of De-
duction, and since the idea of God increased rather than
decreased in importance, in the Ethics as well as in the
Cogitata this thought remains the greatest, grandest
truth of his philosophy. It only remains to see how it
has appeared and reappeared in different forms in suc-
ceeding years.

In the main current of philosophic thought since
Spinoza's time the influence of this truth of God's
immanence in nature has been uninterrupted. Phi-
losophy soon saw how vital was this truth, and though
it has been modified in form, it has never been rejected.
The German Rationalistic School accepted it boldly,
and the followers of Kant incorporated it in various
ways in their teachings. Even the recent tendencies
toward Materialism are manifestations which show
most forcibly, if illogically, that Nature cannot be
divorced from God. The place which nature holds in
human experience is far too important to allow it to be
treated in the unreflective manner of Deism. However
radical some of the theories of the Absolute which have
arisen since Spinoza's chief work was published, they
have not sinned against the principal truth he wished to
emphasize and returned to a deistic conception of God.
And as our knowledge of the world and of its wonder-
ful laws is increasing through the giant strides of

INTRODUCTION lxxvii

science, we can but reaffirm this same truth. God is
in the world and His presence is just as necessary and
just as real in the world to-day as when the heavens
and the earth were first created. Science is not out-
growing this idea, but growing into it more and more.
The fact that there is sometimes an atheistic tendency
in those who devote their lives to this work is not due
to the nature of that work, but to a failure to compre-
hend the full significance of the study in which they
are engaged. So wonderful, so universal, so mighty
are the truths that thus stand revealed, that they im-
agine there is no greater grander truth than that which
they have found. They would feign assert that those
Laws are the highest work of the Divine, nay, that
they are themselves the only Absolute.

This thought that God is. in the world, not merely
over it or above it, therefore, by determining our con-
ception of God and of Nature, leads us to the very
heart of Ontology. But more than this, it has opened
our eyes to see the true significance of the cosmological
argument for the existence of God. If this thought
is true, God is not far away but even nigh to every
one of us ; His spirit is in the world on every hand
sustaining and directing it, and in the development or
evolution of material forms and psychical powers we
have a direct manifestation of His presence, and His
power. Until this truth was recognized, and Spinoza
deserves the credit for making it evident, Philosophy
must needs rely, as we know it actually did, upon some-
form of ontological argument for the being and at-
tributes of God. The proof for His being and the
argument for His attributes, until this truth is accepted,
had to be found in the a priori deductive method of
which Spinoza was a consummate master. But when

lxxviii INTRODUCTION

it is known that God stands as the eminent cause of
every act, the soul of every form of nature, nature
acquires a new dignity and a new worth. Under this
conception the intelligence here shown becomes
the wisdom of God, the purposes and teleology of the
external wrorld become the purposes and teleology of
God, and the evolution of nature in her various stages
of development becomes the unfolding of the great
World Plan of God. It is only as we believe this
truth, only as we rely upon the truth which Spinoza
presented in his bold formal way that we can put confi-
dence in this cosmological argument for God's being.
But when it is known that God stands each moment
as the cause, the real soul of every form of nature,
nature is filled with meaning, and becomes the great
source book for Philosophy as well as the text-book
for Science. Henceforth, all the truth which the sci-
ences discover, as well as the no less significant, though
less demonstrable truths which the poet and the artist
find, and the reflections of the philosopher, all conspire
to reveal the real nature of the world and of God
Henceforth, Philosophy as well as Science must be
thus far inductive. We learn of God as we study His
works.

§ 21. But there is another field beside that of Phi-
losophy in which Spinoza's influence has been pro-
foundly felt. Strange as it may seem at first sight
there was something in Spinoza's cold, calculating,
almost fatalistic philosophy that appealed strongly to
the poetic mind since his time. Goethe and Lessing. in
Germany, and Coleridge and Wordsworth in England
are but the most striking examples of an influence in
this field of art, that has extended even clown to the
present time. In some way they found, in his system.

INTRODUCTION lxxix

more than the chaste beauty of a philosophic truth ; un-
der the forbidding exterior of his method, and the more
formidable tenets of the fatalism the system suggested,
they found a truth pulsating with all the warmth and
color and life of an artistic thought. It is needless to
say that this truth was the one we have just seen was
so powerful in shaping later Philosophy. God's actual
presence in nature, His immanence in the forms of life
He has created, and is continually preserving, is a
truth not less important for the Philosophy of the
Beautiful than for Ontology.

Spinoza, then, unknowingly emphasized a vital
aesthetic truth ; or rather, the truth for which he de-
serves the credit of first making emphatic, is capable
of an aesthetic envisagement. Pantheism, notwith-
standing its formality and the radical character of some
of its tenets, furnishes to Philosophy a conception that
not only converts the world from Deism to Theism,
but a conception that also animates nature and gives
its every form a significance and an ideal beauty that
could never be found under the older conception of
God, and of His relation to the world. Without the
acceptance and appreciation of this truth, viz., the
presence of the ideal in the real, the universal in the
particular, the divine in the human, the infinite in the
finite, the richest and the real significance of nature is
not seen. But with an appreciation of the truth im-
plicated in Spinoza's Pantheism, there comes an en-
largement of the world aesthetically, that has by no
means been compassed in the last hundred years, either
poetically or from the standpoint of the artist. Under
this conception of nature the world around us on every
side and in every form is filled with possibilities for
artistic charm and beauty as various and as deep as

lxxx INTRODUCTION

the emotions of the soul itself. Indeed, nature thus
becomes a direct expression of the mind and soul of
God Himself. Beauty no longer consists, as the Greeks
believed, in a harmonious relation of parts, mere form,
nor must we rely entirely upon the human form as
the mediaeval painters thought, for an expression of
emotional elements. But now, when we believe as
Spinoza taught, that God is in these forms of nature,
landscape, some little scene of water or of wood, may
represent some truth of life, and picture some deep
emotion of the heart of man. With our feet planted
upon this truth as a ground rock of our philosophy
we have an outlook upon beauties never before pic-
tured so vividly nor so truly. The world which was
before conceived as a mechanism — not without beauty
it is true but still a mechanism — now throbs with the
life and the emotions of the mind it represents. Man
does not descend, to become a brother to the insensible
clod, but the world in its organic and in its inorganic
forms is raised up to man. Nature is no longer merely
what we see and hear and touch, the mere sequence
of cause and effect, but under this new conception it
is all we feci and love and enjoy. Nature becomes a
mine of aesthetic truth as inexhaustible as infinity ; the
world becomes a grand picture that reflects in a divine
way the deepest emotions and aspirations of the soul
itself. It was for this reason that Spinoza's system,
though set forth in the most abstract formal way, ap-
pealed to the poetic mind. It was not because Panthe-
ism was wholly satisfactory, because none of its tenets
do violence to truth, that it was so heartily accepted
by the men whose names we have mentioned above.
They probably did not appreciate or even care for his
logic, but they did perceive or feel that down beneath

INTRODUCTION lxxxi

this forbidding exterior there was the warm glow of a
vital aesthetic truth. It was only as Wordsworth ap-
preciated this truth, only as he realized the indwelling
in nature of the divine spirit, that he could write :

" To me the meanest flower that blows can give
Thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears."

In Literature we have examples of immortal pictures
taken from regions supernal. Virgil and Dante and
Milton have each found in that realm and painted with
their poetic art, pictures that bid fair to defy oblivion.
Spinoza sketched with a few bold strokes a picture
even more impressively sublime in the immensity of its
conception. Pantheism or God become visible is per-
haps the most stupendous, the most daring picture that
man has yet conceived. Its depth has by no means
yet been fathomed or its possibilities appreciated by the
Art of the past. But the truth of God's presence in the
world, the lasting fruit of Spinoza's reflection, in a
more refined, conservative form remains to-day a
thought necessary for the highest interpretation of Art
as well as essential truth of Ontology. It was this
idea of God's immanence in nature and its rich accom-
paniment of aesthetic suggestion that explains Spinoza's
influence over much of the world's poetry since his
time. Lessing and Goethe, and Coleridge and Words-
worth, and poets and artists even to the present have
appreciated this aesthetic truth and incorporated much
of it in their more refined expressions. But they are
only producing in the concrete that which Spinoza
conceived abstractly, or toning down to milder shades
that which he had sketched in boldest form.

LUDWIG MEYER

THE WORTHY READER.

S. P. D.

It is admitted by all who have any claims to superior
intelligence that the method of mathematics, viz., the
method by which conclusions are demonstrated from
definitions, postulates, and axioms is the best method
of obtaining and imparting truth. And rightly so ; for
as certain knowledge of an unknown object can only
be obtained through facts previously known, there
must of necessity be certain premises on which the
whole superstructure of human knowledge rests, pro-
vided it does not fall of its own weight, or succumb
to some slight attack from without. No one who has
paid any attention to the noble study of mathematics
can doubt its definitions or postulates or axioms. For
definitions are but a very open explanation of the terms
and names under which the subject is discussed, and
the postulates and axioms of mathematics, or the gen-
eral ideas of the mind, cannot be denied by any one
who understands the use of his vocabulary.

Nevertheless mathematicians are almost the only
ones committed to such a method. Others employ a
method radically different from this, namely, a method
where the end is attained through definitions and

2 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

logical division interspersed with numerous questions
and explanations. For almost all believe, and many
well informed persons have asserted that this method
is peculiar to mathematics and should be abjured in
all other branches of study. Therefore they, in their
discussions, are unable to offer apodeictic proof, but
are compelled to reason by analogy and from probable
evidence. They produce a whole medley of ponderous
volumes in which nothing is established with certainty,
but which are full of contending views ; what is in one
place asserted is presently, and for a similar reason,
denied. So much so that the mind eager for eternal
truth, when it had hoped to find the tranquil expanse
of its own desire, and crossing this with propitious
speed to gain the haven of true cognition, finds itself
on a tempestuous sea of thought tossed about and
overcome, surrounded by storms of contending belief,
and lost amid waves of uncertainty, without hope of
rescue.

There are some, however, who, regretting this
wretched plight of Philosophy, in order that they may
leave to posterity some studies beside mathematics
established with absolute certainty, have departed from
the ancient method to this new path, arduous though
it be. Some of these have put into literary form the
philosophy now accepted and accustomed to be taught
in the schools ; others have set in order new systems
elaborated through their own reflection. Although for
years the task was undertaken in vain, at length that
splendid star of our century Rene Descartes arose,
who, after he had made clear the mathematical truth
that was inaccessible to the ancients, and everything
desired by his contemporaries, also discovered this fun-
damental principle of all knowledge. By means of

PREFACE 3

this truth he was able to elaborate and establish many
things with mathematical certainty. To any one who
attends to his writings, which cannot be too highly
praised, this will be as evident as the midday sun.

Although the philosophical writings of this incom-
parable man contain a method of demonstrating mathe-
matics, it is not the method found in Euclid and in
other geometries. Descartes' method, which he called
Analysis and maintained was the best way to discover
truth, was widely different from this. In the end of
his ' Response to the Second Objection," he recog-
nizes two kinds of apodeictic demonstration. The one,
Analysis, which he showed to be the true method, by
which truth is discovered methodically and as it were
a 'priori; the other by Synthesis, the method in which
a long series of definitions, and premises and axioms,
and theorems, and problems is used so that if anything
is denied in the conclusion, it is immediately shown to
have been contained in the premises. By this means
assent is extorted from the reader however unwilling
or unyielding he may be.

Granted, however, that truth may be established
beyond all chance of doubt by these two methods, still
they do not have an equal value. For many plainly
unlearned in mathematical knowledge and so wholly
ignorant of the method by which such truth is discov-
ered (analysis), and by which it is set in order (syn-
thesis), are not only unable to teach this truth to others
but are unable to follow it for themselves. Whence it
happens that many who have made his opinions and
dogmas only a matter of memory, carried away by
some thoughtless attack or influenced by the authority
of others, have defamed the name of Descartes, and,
when a discussion of these things arises, since they

PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

cannot demonstrate anything, garrulously repeat what
has always been ascribed to the Peripatetic Philosophy.
Wherefore, in order that this state of affairs might be
improved, I have often desired that some one, alike
skilful in Analysis and Synthesis, well versed in the
writings of Descartes, and thoroughly master of his
philosophy, might give his attention to this work and
what he has put in analytic form remold in synthetic
order and demonstrate in the more familiar forms of
geometry. I myself, although fully conscious of my
unfitness for that task, have often been inclined to
undertake it. Other occupations, however, have filled
my time and prevented me from acting on my desire.

I was very glad to know, therefore, that our author
had put into geometrical form, for a pupil whom he
was teaching Descartes' philosophy, the entire second
Part of the Principles and a part of the third, together
with some important questions and difficulties usually
discussed in Metaphysics, and not yet discussed by
Descartes ; and that he had consented, at the urgent
request of his friends, that these, corrected and revised
by himself, should be published. I, therefore, approv-
ing this purpose, offered my services, if he had any
need of them, in helping to publish the work. I asked
and even urged him that he should put the first Part
into similar form and let it precede the two already
done, in order that the work might be complete and
therefore more intelligible. Although for good reasons
he did not wish to do this, he was unwilling to refuse
his friends or to neglect anything which might be done
for the benefit of the reader. He entrusted to my care
the entire management of the publication since he had
departed from the city into the country and was unable
to be present.

PREFACE 5

This is what we offer you, therefore, dear reader, in
this little volume : viz., the first and second Parts of
Descartes' Principles of Philosophy, together with a
fragment of the third, to which we have added under
the name of an appendix the Cogitata Metaphysica of
our author. But when we speak of the first Part of
the Principles, and the title of the book suggests the
same thought, we do not wish it understood that all
that Descartes has said in this is here presented demon-
strated in geometrical order, but only that preferable
terms have been selected and those principles which
Descartes treated in his Meditations, which relate more
particularly to Metaphysics. Those matters which are
only of logical interest, however, or which Descartes
expressed for their historical value, he has omitted.
That he might the more easily effect this end our
author, so far as the order is concerned, has trans-
posed almost all that Descartes had put into geometrical
form in the end of his " Response to the Second
Objection." This he did by placing all of Descartes*
definitions first and by inserting propositions of his
own ; by placing the axioms not together with his
definitions, but a part of them after the fourth propo-
sition ; finally by omitting those not needed and by
changing the order so that they might more easily be
understood. It did not escape the notice of our author
that these axioms might be demonstrated in the manner
of theorems (as Descartes also held, Postulate 7.) and
might even properly be classed as propositions. We,
indeed, urged him to do this, but the amount of work
with which he was employed only left him two short
weeks in which to complete the work. For this reason
he was unable to satisfy his own and our desire, but
merely adding a brief explanation in place of the

6 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

demonstration, he postponed until another time the
complete and perfected volume, if perchance after this
imperfect edition a new one should be demanded. To
this end we shall urge him to complete the third Part
concerning the visible world. (Of this we have added
the fragment our author had completed, for we were
unwilling that the reader should be deprived of any
part of his work, however small.) To better accom-
plish his purpose, certain propositions concerning the
nature of fluid bodies had to be inserted in Part II.
For my part, I shall urge him to speedily complete
the work.

Not only in regard to the axioms, but also in
demonstrating the propositions and in other conclu-
sions our author often differs from Descartes ; for
example, the term apodeictic is used in a widely dif-
ferent sense. However, let no one think that he
wished to correct that most illustrious man in these
things, but only that he did this in order to retain the
current order and not increase the number of axioms
unduly. For this and for many reasons he was com-
pelled to demonstrate many things which Descartes
had stated without demonstration and to add much
that he had omitted.

Nevertheless, I wish it to be noted first of all that
in all of these Parts, viz., in the first and second
Parts of the Principles and in the fragment of the
third, as well as in the Cogitata Metaphysica, our
author is merely expressing the opinions of Descartes
with their demonstrations so far as they are found in
his writings or as they logically follow from his
premises. For when he promised to teach a pupil
the philosophy of Descartes it was a matter of prin-
ciple with him not to depart in the least from his

PREFACE 7

opinions or to teach anything that did not follow from
his dogmas, or was contrary to them. Wherefore,
let no one think that he is teaching here his own
opinions or only what he approves. Although he ad-
judges certain things to be true, he affirms that others
are opposed to his belief. Many things he rejects as
false, from which he holds a far different opinion.
Of this nature, to mention only one from many, are
those conclusions concerning the Will, Schol. Prop.
15, Part I., and Chapter 12, Part II. of the Appendix,
although they seem to be proved with painstaking
care. For he did not think that the Will was some-
thing distinct from Intellect, much less endowed with
such freedom. For in these assertions, as is evident
from his dissertation concerning method Part 4,
Meditation 2, and in other places, Descartes merely
affirms and does not prove that the human mind is
an absolute thinking substance. Although our author
indeed admits that there is a thinking substance in
Nature, he denies that this constitutes the essence of
the human mind. He believed that in the same way
that there are no limits to Extension, so Thought is
in no way determined. And as the human body is
not absolute, but its extension is determined accord-
ing to natural laws of motion and of rest, so also the
mind or human spirit is not absolute but is determined
through ideas by natural laws of thought. These, we
ought to conclude are given when the body begins to
exist. From this definition it is easy to show that
the Will and the Intellect cannot be distinguished,
much less, as Descartes affirmed, can we say that the
Will is endowed with liberty. To say that it is the
faculty of affirming or of denying is wrong, for to
affirm or to deny is only a form of idea. Indeed, those

8 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

faculties, as Intellect, Desire, etc., ought to be placed
in the list ,of fictitious thoughts, or at least of those
ideas which men have because of their powers of ab-
straction, as for example, with humanity, lapidity, etc.

Reference must also be made to another point which
was prominent in the mind of Descartes, namely,
that this or that surpasses human knowledge. For it
must not be thought that our author states this as his
own opinion. He believed that all these things, and
even many things more- subtle and more sublime, could
not only be clearly and distinctly conceived by us, but
even readily explained if only the human mind were
led in the way which Descartes opened up and made
possible for investigating truth and for acquiring
knowledge. Therefore the principles of knowledge
which Descartes set forth and the philosophy based
upon these do not suffice for solving all those extreme-
ly difficult problems which relate to metaphysics, but
others are required if we desire the intellect to sound
the depths of cognition.

And finally, to bring our preface to an end, we wish
the reader to know that these papers are published for
no other purpose than to discover and to impart truth,
and to incite in men a desire for a true and a sincere
philosophy. So let every one, having been diligently
warned, before he undertakes to read this work, deter-
mine to correct as far as possible certain typographical
errors which have crept in, and to insert the omissions
in order that he may receive the full benefit which we
earnestly desire for every reader. For these obstacles,
as any one can readily see, may easily prevent the force
of the demonstration and the thought of the author
from being easily seen.

AD LIBRUM. ■

Ingenio seu te natum meliore vocemus,

Seu de Cartesii fonte renatus eas,
Parve Liber, quidquid pandas, id solus habere
Dignus, ab exemplo laus tibi nulla venit.
Sive tuum spectem genium, seu dogmata, cogor

Laudibus Auctorem tollere ad astra tuum.
Hactenus exemplo caruit, quod praestitit ; at tu

Exemplo haud careas, obsecro, parve Liber ;

Spinozae at quantum debet Cartesius uni,

Spinoza ut tantum debeat ipse sibi.

—J. B., M.D.1

1 Probably by J. Bresser, M. D.

The Principles of Philosophy Demonstrated
by the Method of Geometry.

Part I.

PROLEGOMENON.

Before giving these propositions and their demon-
stration it seems best to recall briefly why Descartes
came to doubt all things, how he discovered the
fundamental principle of all knowledge, and finally how
he liberated himself from this universal doubt. All of
this we would have put in mathematical order if we
had not thought that such prolixity would have im-
peded our understanding of these things which
should be seen as clearly as though presented in a
picture.

In order to proceed with his investigation with the
utmost caution Descartes was compelled :

i. To lay aside all prejudices.

2. To find the fundamental truth on which all
knowledge rests.

3. To discover the cause of error.

4. To understand everything clearly and distinctly.

In order to accomplish the first three points he
doubted all things, not, however, as a sceptic who
doubts merely for the sake of doubting, but in order
to free his mind of all prejudices, so that he might
find at length the firm and certain truth on which
all knowledge rests. By using this method, such a

12 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

truth, if any such existed, could not escape him. For
this principle must he so clear that it needs no proof,
and cannot under any circumstances be doubted ; every
demonstration must presuppose it. Such a truth he
found after a long period of doubt. And after he
had once gained this truth it was not difficult to dis-
tinguish the true from the false, or to detect the cause
of error. And thus he could be on his guard lest he
accept anything doubtful and false for what is certain
and true.

To accomplish the last point, viz., to understand
everything clearly and distinctly, his principal rule was
to examine separately all the simple ideas from which
all others are composed. For when he clearly and dis-
tinctly understood these simple ideas, he was enabled
to understand m the same thorough way, all others into
which they entered as component parts. Having
prefaced our remarks with these few words we shall
proceed with our purpose as stated above, namely, to
explain why he doubted everything, how he found
the fundamental truth of all knowledge, and how he
extricated himself from the difficulties of these doubts.
r , . . In the first place he calls attention to

Concerning his tint- r

versai doubt. z\\ 0f those things perceived through
the senses, the heavens, the earth and all external ob-
jects. So also, even concerning those things which
he thought to be most certain he doubted, because he
knew that his senses had sometimes deceived him,
and in sleep he had often persuaded himself that many
things existed in which he later found he had been
deceived. And finally because he had heard com-
petent witnesses affirm that they sometimes felt pain in
limbs recently lost. It was not without reason, there-
fore, that he doubted everything even the existence of

PART I 13

his own body. Hence from all these reasons he was
able to conclude that sense perception is not a certain
foundation for knowledge (all that the senses give may
well be called in doubt), but certainty rests upon some
more indubitable principle than this. To investigate
further he next notices the universal attributes of cor-
poreal matter, as extension, form, quantity, etc., as well
as all mathematical truth. Although these seem more
certain than the objects of sense perception, neverthe-
less, he finds a cause for doubting them as well. Some
err even in these, and beside there is an old idea that
God, who is omnipotent, and has created us with our
present faculties, has perhaps so made us that we are
deceived even in those things which seem most certain.
These are the causes that led him to' doubt all things.

In order to find the fundamental
The discovery of truth in knowledge, he afterward in-

the fundamental . . .

principle of all quired whether all things which are
subjects of cognition could be doubted,
if perchance there wTas anything which he had not yet
called in question. Doubting in this way he believed
that if anything was found, which, for none of the
reasons given above, should be doubted, this might
be considered the foundation on which all knowledge
rests. And although, as it now seemed he had doubted
everything (for he had called in question all that the
senses give, and all that comes from the understand-
ing), there was something left the certainty of which
had not been doubted, namely, he himself who was
doubting. Not, however, so far as he consisted of
head or hands or other bodily members, for he had
doubted the existence of these, but even while he was
doubting he was thinking, etc. Carefully examining
this fact he found that for no reason whatever could it

i4 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES- PHILOSOPHY

be doubted, for, whether waking or sleeping^ if think-
ing at all he must therefore exist. And even though he
and others might fall into error, since they were in
error they must exist. Nor could he conceive of a
creator so skilful in deceit that he could deceive him
about this truth. For if it is supposed that he is de-
ceived, it must also be supposed that he exists. Fin-
ally, whatever reason for doubt may be conceived, there
is none which does not at the same time make one more
certain of his own existence. Indeed the more argu-
ments that can be assigned as cause for doubt the more
there are which convince him of his own existence.
So true is this that whoever begins to doubt will never-
theless exclaim, "I doubt, I think, therefore I am"

In this truth he finds the ground of all knowledge
as well as the measure of all other truth, viz.. What-
ever is as el early and distinctly perceived as this is true.

That nothing but this Cogito ergo sum can be the
fundamental truth in all knowledge is evident from
what has already been said. Concerning this it should
be noted in the first place, that it is not a syllogism
in which the major premise is omitted. If it were,
the premise cogito ought to be better known than the
conclusion, ergo sum. And if this were so the ergo
sum would not be the foundation of all knowledge.
Beside it would not be a certain conclusion, for its
truth depends upon universal premises which the
author had called in question. Therefore Cogito ergo
sum is one proposition equivalent to the statement
ego sum cogitans.

To avoid confusion hereafter (for the matter ought
to be thoroughly understood), we must know what
we are. For if I clearly understand this our essence

PART I 15

will not be confused with other things. To deduce
this from what precedes our author thus proceeds :

He now recalled all those opinions formerly held,
as for example, that his mind was something very
fine in texture, like the wind, or fire, or air, interplaced
with the coarser particles of the body ; and that his
body was better known than his mind and could be
more clearly perceived. These opinions he now saw
were at variance with what he had discovered. For
he could doubt the existence of his body, but not his
reality so far as he was a thinking being. Beside
this, the body could not be clearly and distinctly known
and therefore, according to his own dictum, should
be rejected as non-existent. Therefore, since the body
cannot be accepted as pertaining to his essence, so
far as it is known, he further inquires what there is
about his being which compels him to believe in his
own existence. Such things were these : that he had
determined to be on his guard lest he be deceived;
that he had desired to understand so many things;
that he had doubted everything he was not able to
know; that he had affirmed only one thing at a time ;
that he had denied all else, and even rejected it as false ;
that he had conceived many things though reluctantly ;
and finally that he had considered many things as
though derived from the senses. Since his existence
was so evidently bound up with each one of these
actions, and since none of them belonged to the things
which he had doubted, and finally since they all may
be considered as forms of thought, it follows that these
are all true and pertain to his nature. So when he
said cogito these modes of thought were all implied,
viz., to doubt, to understand, to affirm, to deny, to zirish,
to be unwilling, to imagine, and to feel.

16 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

Some distinctions must here be noted that will have
importance when we come to discuss the distinction
between mind and body, (i) That modes of clear
and distinct thought may be known even when some
things are still in doubt. (2) That we render a clear
and a distinct concept obscure and confused when we
ascribe to it something concerning which we are still
in doubt.

Finally, in order that he might be
His liberation from certain and remove all doubt from

doubt.

those things he had called in question,
he further proceeds to inquire into the nature of a
perfect Being and whether such a Being exists. For
when he has discovered that this Being, by whose
power all things are created and preserved and to
whose nature it would be repugnant to be a deceiver,
exists, then he has removed that reason for doubt
which is found in the fact that he was ignorant of
the cause of his existence. For he knew that the
power of discerning the true from the false would
not have been given to him by a God of perfect good-
ness and truth in order that he might be deceived.
Mathematical truth, therefore, and all other of like
certainty cannot be doubted. To remove other causes
for doubt he inquires next why it is we sometimes
fall into error. For when he discovered how error
arose, and that we use our free will to assert what we
perceive only confusedly, he concluded straightway
that we could avoid error by withholding assent from
that which is seen only indistinctly.

As every one has the power of inhibiting the will
he can easily restrain it to the limits of the understand-
ing. And since in youth we form many prejudices
from which we free ourselves only with difficulty, he

PART I 17

enumerates and examines separately all of our simple
ideas to assist us in casting these prejudices aside.
His object was to determine what was clear and what
was obscure in each. Thus he was able to distinguish
the clear from the obscure and to form clear and dis-
tinct ideas. By this means he easily found the real
distinction between mind and body ; what was clear
and what obscure in those ideas derived from the
senses ; and finally how sleep differs from waking.
When this was done he could doubt no longer concern-
ing the waking life, nor could he be deceived by his
senses. In this way he was able to free himself from
all his recent doubt.

Before I close this part of the discussion it seems
that some satisfaction should be given to those who
argue, that since it is not known that God exists per se
it is impossible for us ever to know that God does exist.
For from uncertain premises (and we have said that
all things are uncertain so long as we are ignorant of
our origin), nothing can be concluded with certainty.

In order to remove this difficulty Descartes re-
sponded in this fashion ; although we do not know
whether the creator of our nature has created us so
that we are deceived in those things which seem most
certain, nevertheless, we cannot doubt those things
we understand clearly and distinctly, so long as we
attend merely to them. But we only doubt those
things previously demonstrated, and now recalled to
memory, when we no longer attend closely to the
reasons from which they were deduced, v/hich per-
chance are even forgotten. Therefore, though we
cannot know directly that God exists, but must learn
this by deduction, still, we are able to know this cer-
tainly, provided we attend very accurately to the prem-

18 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

ises from which the conclusion is deduced. Vid. Prin.
Pt. I. Art. 13, and Response to Second, Obj. No. 3,
and end of Med. 5.

But since this reply is not sufficient we will offer
another. We saw above, when speaking of the evi-
dence and certainty of our existence, that this was
found in the fact that, consider what we will, we
meet no argument for doubt which does not at the
same time convince us of the certainty of our exist-
ence. This is true whether we consider our own
nature, or conceive of God as a skilful deceiver, or
adduce some extraneous reason for doubt. For ex-
ample, considering the nature of a triangle, though
we are now compelled to believe that its three angles
are equal to two right angles we are not forced to
the conclusion that this is really true if perchance we
are deceived by our Creator. In the same 'way we
deduce the certainty of our existence. We are not
compelled to believe that under any conditions the
three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles.
On the contrary we find reason for doubt, for we have
no idea of God which compels us to believe that it is
impossible for God to deceive us. It is equally easy
for one who has no true conception of God to think
that he is a deceiver or that he is not. So for those
who have no right conception of a triangle it is equally
easy for them to think that the sum of the angles is
equal to two right angles, or that it is not. There-
fore, we grant that we cannot be absolutely certain
of anything except of our own existence, however
closely we attend to the proof, until we have a clear
concept of God which compels us to affirm (in the same
way that the concept of a triangle compels us to affirm
that the sum of its angles is equal to two right

PART I 19

angles) that he is perfectly true in His being. But
we deny that we are unable to come to any certain
knowledge of the external world. For, as now ap-
pears, the whole matter hinges upon this, viz., whether
we can form such a concept of God that it is not as
easy for us to think of Him as a deceiver as to believe
that He is perfectly true in His being. When we
obtain such a concept as this, all cause for doubting
mathematical truth is removed. For, when we con-
sider how the doubt of this affects our own existence,
if we doubt this still we ought not to even affirm our
own existence. If now having obtained this concept
of God we consider the nature of a triangle we are
compelled to affirm that the sum of its three angles is
equal to two right angles ; or if we consider the nature
of God, and this also compels us to affirm that He is
perfectly true and the author and continual preserver
of our being, we are not deceived. Nor is it less im-
possible for us to think when we once have obtained
this idea of God (which we suppose to be already
found), that He is a deceiver, then when we consider
the nature of a triangle to think that the sum of its
angles is not equal to two right angles. As we can
form such an idea of a triangle although we are not
certain that God is not deceiving us, so we can form
this idea of God, although we do not. know whether
or not He is deceiving us. And, provided only that
we have such an idea of God, however it may have
been obtained, it is sufficient to remove all doubt.

This point having been made clear I shall remark
upon this difficult proposition : we can be certain of
nothing not merely as long as we are ignorant of God's
existence (for I have not yet spoken of this), but as
long as we do not have a clear and a distinct idea of

20 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

His being. Hence if any one should desire to oppose
our conclusions, his argument should be as follows :
We cannot be certain of anything so long as we have
no clear and distinct idea of God. But we cannot
have a clear and a distinct idea of God as long as we
do not know whether or not he is deceiving us.
Therefore we cannot be certain of anything as long
as we do not know whether or not our Creator is
deceiving us, etc. To this I reply by conceding the
major premise but, denying the minor. For we have
a clear and a distinct idea of a triangle although we
do not know whether or not God is deceiving us.
And in the same way we have a clear and a distinct
idea of God as I have already shown, and, therefore,
cannot doubt His existence, nor any mathematical
truth.

Our prefatory remarks being thus completed we
proceed now to the main pr6blem.

DEFINITIONS.

I. Under the term thought (cogitatio) I compre-
hend all mental phenomena of which we are imme-
diately conscious.

Thus volition, understanding, imagination and sense
perception are all forms of thought. I have added
the term immediately to exclude phenomena which
directly depend upon and follow from these mental
states. Thus voluntary motion arises as the direct
result of some form of thought but is not itself a
mental state.

II. By the term idea (idea) I understand any
form of thought of which we are conscious through
immediate perception.

I cannot express anything in words, therefore, with-

PART I 21

out thus making it certain that I have some idea which
these words are meant to signify. Therefore I would
even call the images depfcted in phantasy, ideas, not,
however, so far as they are corporeal, i. e.? as they
affect some portion of the brain, but only so far as
they affect the mind in that portion of the brain.

III. By the objective reality of an idea, / under-
stand the object represented by the idea.

In the same manner I may speak of objective per-
fection, or of an objective art, etc. For whatever we
perceive in the objects of our ideas are objective in
the ideas themselves.

IV. These characteristics are said to be formally
(formaliter) contained in the objects of our ideas
when they really are just as we perceive them-. They
are said to be eminently (eminenter) contained when
they are not just as zee perceive them but so great that
they can easily supply what we perceive.

Note that when I say a cause eminently contains the
perfection of its own effect, I mean that the cause
contains the perfection of the effect more completely
than the effect itself. Vid. Ax. 8.

V. Every object to zvhich belongs as to a subject,
some property, or quality, or attribute, or through
zvhich some things which we perceive exist, or of which
we have some real idea is called substance.

Properly speaking, indeed we have no other idea
of substance than that it is an object in which either
formally or eminently something else exists which we
perceive, or that it is objective in something apart
from our ideas.

VI. Substance in which thoughts are immediately
present, is called mind.

I use the term mind (mens), rather than spirit

22 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

(animus), for the latter term is equivocal, often being
used to mean a corporeal object.

VII. Substance, which is the immediate subject of
extension, and of accidents, which presupposes forms of
extension as figure, position, and motion, etc., is called
body (corpus).

Whether mind and body are one and the same sub-
stance will be inquired into later.

VIII. Substance which we know to be perfect in
the highest degree, and in which nothing can be con-
ceived implying a defect or limitation, is called God.

IX. When we say that something is contained in
the nature of the thing itself or in its concept, it is the
same as to affirm that this is true.

X. Substances are said to be distinct when the one
can exist alone and apart from others.

We have here omitted the Postulates of Descartes be-
cause we were unable to deduce any conclusions from
them in what is to follow. Nevertheless, we earnestly
ask the reader that he does not fail to carefully read
them over and give them his earnest attention.

AXIOMS.

I. The knowledge and certainty of an unknown
object depends upon the cognition of objects pre-
viously known.

II. There are reasons for doubting the existence
of our own bodies.

(This was shown in the Prolegomenon, so may be
placed here as an axiom.)

III. If our being comprises anything beside mind
and- body it is not so well known as these.

(These axioms, it should be noted, do not affirm

PART I 23

objective existence, but only deal with objects as a part
of our mental life.)

Proposition I.

We cannot be absolutely certain of anything until
we know that we really exist.

DEMONSTRATION.

This proposition is self-evident. For he who does
not know that he exists, cannot know that he is affirm-
ing or denying. It should be noted, too, that although
we affirm and deny many things that have no refer-
ence to our existence, nevertheless unless this fact is
accepted as indubitable all things are in doubt. — Q.
E. D.

Proposition II,
The proposition ego sum is self-evident.

demonstration.

If you deny that it is self-evident, it can be known
only through some truth, prior to the proposition ego
sum (per. Ax. 1), which is absurd (per Ibid.).
Therefore it is self-evident. — Q. E. D.

Proposition III.

The primary truth is not that I am a corporeal being,
neither is this fact self-evident.

demonstration.
There are some reasons for doubting the existence
of our bodies (Vid. Ax. 2). Hence (per Ax. 1)

-4 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

we must derive this truth through something pre-
viously and more indubitably known. Therefore, the
primary truth is not that I am a corporeal being nor
is this fact self-evident. — O. E. D.

Proposition IV.

Ego sum is the primary fact in cognition only so
far as I am a thinking being.

DEMONSTRATION.

The assertion that I am a corporeal being is not the
primary fact in cognition (per Prop. III.) ; neither am
I certain of my existence except as I am mind and
body. For if I comprise in my being any thing beside
mind and body, it is not so well known to me as body
(per Ax. 3). Therefore ego sum is the primary fact
of cognition only so far as I am a thinking being.
-Q. E. D.

COROLLARY.

From the last proposition it is evident that the mind
is better known than the body. (For a fuller explana-
tion, see Art. 11 and 12, Part I. of the Principles.)

SCHOLIUM.

Every one is certain that he affirms, he denies, he
doubts, he understands, he imagines, etc., or that he is
a doubting, an understanding, an affirming — in a
word — a thinking being. This truth no one can
doubt. Therefore the proposition cogito, or sum
cogitans, is the fundamental truth of all Philosophy.
And, since for certain knowledge nothing more can be
demanded or desired than that we deduce all things

PART I 25

from certain premises so that all our conclusions are
as certain as our premises, it follows that all that we
deduce from our principle so that if we doubt the
conclusion we must also doubt the premises, must be
held to be perfectly true. In order to proceed as
cautiously as possible, in the beginning I shall admit
to be of equal certainty only those things which we
perceive in ourselves so far as we are thinking beings.
As, for example, that one desires this or that, that one
has certain ideas, and that one thing contains more per-
fection than another ; namely, that which contains ob-
jective perfection of substance is far more perfect
than that which contains only objective perfection of
some accident. Finally, that that is the most perfect
substance which contains the highest degree of perfect
being. These things, I say, are not only all as clear
as our first principle but, perhaps, are even more cer-
tain. For they not only affirm that we think but that
we think in this particular way. And we shall find,
when we come to test them, that they are not only
indubitable, but that we cannot doubt their verity
without doubting the fundamental truth of all knowl-
edge. For example, if some one should say he is in
doubt whether something can arise from nothing, he
might also doubt his own existence even when he is
thinking. For if I can affirm that something can exist
without a cause I can, by the same right, affirm that
thought may exist without a cause and that I think
although I am nothing. Since this is impossible I
cannot believe that something can arise from nothing.
Leaving these matters for the present, it seems neces-
sary, in order to proceed, to add to the number of
Axioms we have already given. In the end of his
" Response to the Second Objection," Descartes has

26 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

given certain truths as axioms, and I could not wish
to be more accurate than he. Nevertheless, in order
to preserve the order now begun, and to render them
a little clearer, I shall attempt to show how they de-
pend one upon the other and all upon the principle
Ego sum cogitans, or that they are all as certain as
this truth.

axioms
Taken from- Descartes.

IV. There are different degrees of reality or being.
For substance has more reality than accidents or mode ;
and infinite substance than finite. So, too, there is
more objective reality in the idea of substance than in
the idea of accident ; and in the idea of infinite sub-
stance than in the idea of finite substance.

This axiom is known as true from a consideration
of those ideas of which we are certain because they
are modes of thought. For we know how much
reality or perfection the idea of substance affirms of
substance and how much the idea of mode affirms of
mode. And since this is true we know that the idea
of substance contains more objective reality than the
idea of its accidents, etc. (Vid. Schol. Prop. 4).

V. A thinking being, if it were possible, would
immediately add to itself any attribute of perfection in
which it was lacking.

Every one observes this in himself so far as he is
a thinking being; therefore (per Schol. Prop. 4) we
know that this is true. And for the same reason we
are equally certain of the inference.

VI. In the idea or concept of everything, existence

PART I 27

either as possible or necessary is contained (Vid.
Axioms of Descartes, No. 10).

In the concept of God or an absolutely perfect being,
existence is necessary. For otherwise it would be im-
perfect which is contrary to the hypothesis.

VII. No object or quality of an object already
existing can exist without some existing object as the
cause of its existence.

In the Scholium to Prop. 4. I have shown that this
axiom is equal in truth to the proposition Ego sum
cogitans.

VIII. Whatever reality or perfection an object con-
tains, this exists either formally (formaliter) or emi-
nently (eminenter) in its primary or adequate cause.1

By the term eminently I mean that the cause con-
tains the perfection of the effect more fully than the
effect itself. By the term formally I mean that the
cause and the effect contain the perfection to a like
degree.

This axiom depends upon the previous ones. For
if it is supposed that there is less perfection in the
cause than in the effect we have a result without a
cause, and this is absurd (per Ax. 7).

Therefore nothing can be the cause of a given effect
except that in which is contained eminently or at least
formally, all the perfection found in the effect.

IX. The objective reality of our ideas requires a
cause in which this same reality is not only objectively
contained, but one in which it is found formally,, or
eminently.

Although this axiom is evident to all, many misuse
it. For when some one forms some new idea every-
one wishes to know why he did so. When they can

1 Cf. Veitch's Descartes, p. 268, and Note p. 281.

28 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

assign some cause that contains formally or eminently
all the perfection found in the concept they are content.
Descartes has sufficiently explained this in his example
of a machine (Vid. Prin. of Phil, Pt. L, Art. iy). So
also if one inquires from whence man derives the ideas
of his own thought and body, he finds that they are de-
rived from himself. He discovers that he formally or
at least constantly contains all that these ideas objec-
tively contain. Therefore if one has some idea which
contains more objective reality than he himself contains,
impelled by reason he would seek some other cause
outside of himself which formally or eminently con-
tains all the perfection he is seeking to understand.
Nor would any one ever assign any other reason for
doing this than that he had conceived this with equal
clearness and distinctness and that he had compre-
hended the truth of this axiom as it depends directly
upon those preceding it. Namely (per Ax. 4), dif-
ferent degrees of reality or being are given in our
ideas; and (per Ax. 8) for these degrees of perfec-
tion, some cause with equal perfection is required.
But since these degrees of reality in our ideas are not
merely in thought, but represent something in sub-
stance and its modes, in a word, so far as they arc
considered as images of things, it clearly follozcs that
no other cause for this can be assigned than that all
the reality they objectively contain is contained either
formally or eminently in reason. This we have shown
above and it is evident to all.

I11 order to make this perfectly clear I will illustrate
with one or two examples. If one should see two
books (for example, one written by a great philosopher
and another by an uncultured man) writ! en in the
same hand, and should consider not the meaning of the

PART I 29

words, i. e., the mental images they represent, but only
the delineation of the characters in which the thoughts
are expressed, he would discover no dissimilarity. So
he would not be led to look for different authors for
the books but would believe they were written by
the same person and with a common end in view.
But attending not to this but to the meaning of the
words and of the discussions he woidd Hud great dif-
ferences, and would conclude that they certainly had
a different origin. He would find that the sense of
the words being considered, that is, the concepts they
represent, the one is far more perfect than the other.
I speak here of the first cause of the books. Although
as is evident the one might even have been derived
from the other.

We may illustrate further by the statue of some
leader. Here, if we attend only to the material used
we will find no cause for seeking a different sculptor for
this, and for some copy. Indeed, nothing hinders us
from thinking that the first is a copy of the second,
this again of a third and so on ad infinitum. // the
material alone is considered we do not need a separ-
ate cause for each. But if we consider the statue as
a statue we are immediately compelled to seek a first
cause which contained cither formally or eminently
all that is presented to us. I do not see that this
axiom requires any further elucidation or confirma-
tion.

X. No lesser cause is required for the conservation
of an object than for its first creation.

Because at the present time we are thinking it does
not at all follow that we must continue to think. Our
concept of thought does not contain nor involve neces-
sary existence. For I can clearly conceive of thought

30 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

although I suppose that it docs not exist. (This every
one knows from his own experience so far as he is
a thinking being). But since the nature of any cause
ought to contain and involve in itself the perfection
of its effect (per Ax. 8), it follows that there is some-
thing in ourselves or without us (as yet we do not
know which) zvhose nature involves necessary exist-
ence. And this something is the primary cause of
our thought both of its beginning and its continuance.
For, although our thought began to exist, its nature
and essence does not imply a necessary existence any
more than it did before it began to be. It is there-
fore preserved in its existence by the same force that
determined that it should exist. What we here affirm
of thought is true also for every thing whose essence
does not involve a necessary existence.

XL Nothing exists of which we may not ask, what
is the cause (or reason) of its existence. (Vid. Ax. I.
of Descartes).

If anything positive exists we cannot say that it
exists without a cause (per Ax. y). Therefore zee
must assign some positive cause for its existence. This
may be external, i. e., some cause outside of the object
itself, or internal, i. c, something comprel\endcd in
the nature and definition of the object.

Four Propositions Taken From Descartes.

Proposition V.

God's existence is known merely from the consid-
eration of his nature.

demonstration.

It is equivalent to saying- that a thing is true to say
that it is contained in its nature or in its concept.

PART I 31

(per Def. 9). The concept of God includes necessary
existence. Therefore it is true to say that he has a
necessary existence in Himself, or that He exists.
- Q. E. D.

SCHOLIUM.

Many important truths follow from this proposition.
Indeed upon this truth alone, namely, that existence
belongs to the nature of God, or that the concept of
God involves a necessary existence as that of a triangle
that the sum of its angles is equal to two right
angles, or again that His existence and His essence
are eternal truth, depends almost all our knowledge
of God's attributes by which we are led to a love of
God (or to the highest blessedness). Therefore it is
extremely desirable that the human race should some-
time consider this. I confess that there are certain
prejudices which make this truth hard to see. But if
any one with earnest purpose, impelled by the love of
truth and its utility, wishes to examine into this, we
recommend that he consider what is given in Medita-
tion V. and in the end of his " Response to the Sec.
Obj.," and also, what we have said of Eternity in
Ch. I. Pt. II. of our Appendix. He would then under-
stand very clearly, nor could he doubt that we do
have an idea of God which is indeed the foundation
of human blessedness ; he would see clearly that the
idea of God differs greatly from that of other objects;
He would see, when he understands the essence and
existence of God, that he differs toto genere from all
other things. But there is no need to detain the reader
longer.

32 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

Proposition VI.

The existence of God may be demonstrated a pos-
teriori from this, viz., that we possess this idea of
such a Being.

DEMONSTRATION.

The objective reality of anything requires a cause
apart from our ideas, in which cause this reality is
not only objective, but in which it is contained either
formally, or eminently (per. Ax. 8). We have the
idea of God, and the objective reality of this idea
as it is not in our minds either formally or eminently
cannot be anywhere but in God himself. Therefore
this idea of God as we have it requires God for its
cause and He, therefore, exists.

SCHOLIUM.

There are certain ones who say they have no idea
of God, although, as they affirm, they love and worship
him. And although you place before their eyes the
definition and attributes of God, you have accom-
plished nothing. No more, by Hercules, than if you
should attempt to teach a man blind from birth the
different colors as we see them. Indeed, we ought
to give their words very little attention unless we wish
to consider them as a new species of animal half way
between man and the lower beasts. In what way
do I attempt to set forth the idea of anything except
by giving a definition and explaining its attributes?
Indeed when we are discussing the idea of God, it is
not so much that men deny the words as that they
are unable to form some image corresponding to these
words.

PART I 33

Then it should be noted that Descartes when he
cites Axiom 4 to show that the objective reality of
the idea of God is not in us either formally or emi-
nently, supposes that every one knows that he is not
infinite substance nor perfect in knowledge or power,
etc. This he was justified in doing, for whoever
thinks at all knows that there are many things- he does
not understand clearly and distinctly, and that he is
even in doubt in regard to much that he sees.

Finally it should be noted that there are not many
gods, as clearly follows from Axiom 8, but only one
as we have shown in Proposition II. of this part and
in Pt. II., Chapter II., of our Appendix.

Proposition VII.
The existence of God is demonstrated in the fact
that we, having the idea of existence, also exist.

SCHOLIUM.

To prove this proposition Descartes laid down two
axioms, viz., (1) "Whatever is able to do that which
is more difficult is able to do that which is less so.
(2) It is greater to create or (per Ax. 10) conserve
substance than attributes or properties of substance."
What he meant by these I do not know. For these
terms are not used absolutely but only in respect to a
definite cause.1

So one and the same thing at the same time, in
respect to different causes may be easy or difficult.
If you call that difficult which requires more exertion,

1 If you wish an example, consider the spider which easily
spins its web, but for man this would be almost impossible.
On the other hand, men easily do many things which perhaps
are impossible for angels.

34 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

and that easy which requires less in the same case, as
for example, the force which sustains fifty pounds
could sustain twenty-five with double ease, clearly the
axiom would not be true ; neither does it demonstrate
what he intended it should. For when he said, 'If
I have the power of preserving myself I have the
power also of giving to myself all the works of per-
fection which I lack' (for that would require only as
great power) ; I would concede that this energy used
for self-preservation might be able to do many other
things far more easily if I did not need it for conserv-
ing myself. But so long as I use this energy for
self-preservation, I deny that it is possible to use it
for accomplishing other things, though they be never
so easy. This is clearly evident from our example.
Nor does he take away the difficulty by saying, that
as I am a thinking being I shall know this necessarily,
for I employ all my strength in preserving myself
which is the reason I do not give myself the attributes
of perfection which I lack. For (although we are
not now discussing this, but only how the necessity
of this proposition follows from this axiom) if I know
this I would be greater and perhaps would require, for
preserving myself in such perfection, greater power
than I now possess. And then I do not know that
it is any greater task to create (or to conserve) sub-
stance than attributes, i. e., to speak clearly and more
philosophically, I do not know but that substance re-
quires all the virtue and essence by which it conserves
itself, to conserve its attributes. But we leave this and
will inquire, as this worthy author intended we should,
into what is meant by the terms "easy" and " diffi-
cult." I clo not think that by any means 1 could per-
suade myself that he understood bv the term " diffi-

PART I 35

cult" that which is impossible (and so could not be
conceived as existing), and by the term "easy" that
which implies no contradiction (and so is easily con-
ceivable). Although in the Third Meditation and in
the observation he seems to mean that when "he says :
" Nor ought I to think that those things which are
wanting in my nature are more difficult to acquire than
the powers which I now possess. For, on the con-
trary, it is manifestly far more difficult for me as a
being or a thinking substance to arise from nothing
than, etc." For this is not in keeping with the words
of the author nor consonant with his ability. And,
indeed, though for the present I shall overlook it,
between the possible and the impossible, or between
that which is conceivable and inconceivable there is no
relation, just as there is none between something and
nothing. Power does not quadrate better with that
which is impossible than creation and generation with
non-being; such terms are not capable of relationship.
Beside this it should be remembered that I can compare
and understand only those things of which I have a
clear and a distinct concept. I cannot conclude, there-
fore, that one who is able to do impossible things is
able also to do that which is possible. I ask what
conclusion is this? If any one can square a circle he
can also make a circle whose radii are not equal ; or
if one can endue nothing with the qualities of matter
he can also produce something from nothing. As I
have said there is no analogy, or relation, or means
of comparison between such terms. Any one who
reflects upon this even a little can clearly see that this
is true. Therefore I believe that something else was
meant by the ingenious Descartes. Considering the
second axiom given above, Descartes seemed to mean

36 PRINCIPLES OP DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

by the terms greater and more difficult that which was
more perfect, and by the opposite terms that which
was less perfect. This also certainly seems obscure.
It is the same difficulty found above, and I deny here,
as there, that he who has power to do the greater
thing has power also at the same time to do the lesser.
According to the above proposition this must be
granted. Then when he says "it is greater to create
or conserve substance than its attributes," we cannot
understand by attributes that which is formally con-
tained in substance and only distinguished from it by
reason. For then it would be the same thing to create
substance as to create attributes. For the same reason
we cannot think that he meant the properties of sub-
stance. This follows necessarily from its essence and
definition, much less can we understand by this, how-
ever, as he seemed to wish, the properties and at-
tributes of some other substance ; as for example, if I
say that because I have the power of conserving my-
self, a thinking, finite substance, so I have the power
of giving to myself all the perfection of infinite sub-
stance which differs by its whole essence from me.
For the power or essence by which I conserve my
being differs toto genere from the power and essence
by which absolute or infinite substance conserves
itself. The power and properties of infinite substance
are not differentiated per se but only by reason ; 2 so
(while I may concede that I conserve myself), if I
wish to think that I have the power to give to myself
all the perfection of infinite substance I suppose noth-
ing else than that I have the power to annihilate my

2 It may be noted here that the power by which substance
conserves itself is nothing but its essence and only differs
from that in name. Which we will clearly show when in the
Appendix we discuss the nature of God.

PART I 37

being and to create infinite substance anew. Which
clearly presupposes more than that I am able to con-
serve the finite substance of my being. If then none
of these interpretations can be given to the terms
attributes or properties, nothing remains but the qual-
ities which are eminently contained in the substance
(as this or that thought which I clearly see are want-
ing in me). Not, however, what some other substance
eminently contains ; for these attributes even though
wanting in me are not imperfections so far as I am con-
sidered to be a thinking being. This, then, which
Descartes wished" to infer from his axioms does not
logically follow; namely, that if I have the power to
conserve myself, I have the power also of giving to
myself all the marks of perfection of the Absolute
Being. This is evident from what has been said. But
to avoid confusion, and to make the matter more cer-
tain, it seems best to demonstrate the following Lem-
mata first and give the demonstration of the seventh
proposition afterward.

Lemma I.

An object of a higher degree of perfection, by virtue
of this fact involves a fuller existence and a greater
necessity of existence. Conversely, that which by
nature involves a greater necessity of existence, is
more perfect.

DEMONSTRATION.

Existence is contained in the idea or concept of
every object (per Ax. 6). Let us suppose A to be
an object with ten degrees of perfection. I say that
this object involves more existence than if it is sup-

38 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

posed to contain but five. For, as we cannot affirm
existence of nothing (Vid. Schol. Prop. 4), as we
detract from the perfection of a concept and conceive
its content to approach zero as its limit, so much* do
we detract from its possible existence. If we conceive
this degree of perfection to be infinitely diminished,
even to zero, it will contain no existence, or but an
"absolutely impossible one. On the other hand if we
increase this degree of perfection to infinity we con-
ceive that it has the highest possible existence and so
to be absolutely necessary. This was the first point
to be proven. Then, as I am by no means able to
separate these two (as appears from Ax. 6 and the
whole of Pt. I.) it clearly follows that the other is
likewise true.

Note I. Although many things are said to exist
necessarily simply because the cause producing them
is given we do not now speak of such objects; but
only of that necessity and possibility which follows
from the mere consideration of the nature and essence
of the thing itself, no reason being held as to its cause.

Note II. We do not here speak of beauty and other
marks of perfection which men from ignorance and
tradition are accustomed to esteem as such. But by
perfection I understand only so much reality or being.
As for example, I perceive that there is more reality
in substance than in modes or qualities. And so far,
I know clearly that there is necessity, and a more per-
fect existence in the first than in the latter tzvo, as is
evident from Axioms 4 and 6.

COROLLARY.

Hence it follows that that which absolutely involves
a necessary existence is perfect Being, or God.

PART I 39

Lemma II.

He who has the power of conserving himself, in-
volves, by his nature, a necessary existence.

DEMONSTRATION.

Whoever has the power of conserving himself has
also the power of self-creation (per Ax. 10), that is,
(as all will readily concede), he needs no external
cause of his existence, but his own nature is sufficient
cause that he should exist, either problematically or
necessarily. But not problematically; for (according
to what I have shown in. Ax. 10) from the mere fact
of existence it does not follow that an object will con-
tinue to exist ; this being contrary to the hypothesis.
Therefore necessarily : that is, his nature involves
existence. Q. E. D.

DEMONSTRATION

Of Proposition VII.

If I had in myself the power of self-conservation
I would by nature have a necessary existence (per
Lemma II.), and (per Co-roll. Lemm. I.) ; my nature
would contain all the attributes of perfection. But as
a thinking being I am certain that there are many im-
perfections in me (per Schol. Prop. 4) as that I doubt,
I desire, etc. Therefore I do not have the power of
self-conservation, nor can I say that I choose thus
to limit my being for this is clearly opposed to Lemma
I. and to what I actually experience in myself. (Per
Ax.5).

Since then it is impossible for me to exist ex-
cept as I am conserved, as long as I exist, I must
exist either by my own power (provided I possess such

40 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

power), or by the power of another. But I exist (per
Schol. Prop. 4) and yet have not the power of self-
conservation as is now positively proven. Therefore
I am conserved by another ; but not by a being who
does not possess the power of self-conservation (for
the same reason that I myself do not possess this
power) ; therefore by some being who has this power,
i. e. (per Coroll. Lemm. I.) by one whose nature
involves a necessary existence, and contains all per-
fection which I recognize as belonging to an absolutely
perfect being. Therefore this perfect being, i. e., God,
exists. Q. E. D.

COROLLARY.

God is able to do all that we clearly understand,
just as we so understand it.

DEMONSTRATION.

This all follows from the preceding Proposition.
For it was proven that God does exist from this, viz.,
that it is necessary for some being to exist in whom
is found all the perfection we can clearly conceive.
Moreover, there is in us the idea of some power so
great that by it alone all things exist which are under-
stood by me as possible, the heavens, the earth and
all other things. Therefore with God's existence all
of these statements are likewise proven.

Proposition VIII.
Mind and body are essentially different.

DEMONSTRATION.

Whatever wc clearly conceive, can be realized by
God just as we so conceive it (per Coroll. of the pre-

PART I 41

ceding). But we clearly conceive of mind, a thinking
substance (per Def. 6) apart from body, i. e. (per
Def. 7), apart from extended substance (per Props.
3 and 4) ; and vice versa body apart from mind (as
all will concede). Therefore, through divine power
mind can exist apart from body and body apart from
mind.

Substances which can exist the one apart from the
other are essentially different (per Def. 10) ; body
and mind are substances (per Defs. 5, 6, 7) which
can so exist ; therefore they are essentially different.

See Prop. 4 of Descartes in the end of his Response
to the Second Objection; and also what is found in
Pt. I. of the Principles, Arts. 22-29. F°r I consider
that these things here do not give the value of the
work.

Proposition IX.
God is omniscient.

DEMONSTRATION.

If you deny it, then God either knows nothing or
only a certain limited amount. But to understand
some things and be ignorant of others implies a lim-
itation to God's perfection, which is absurd (per Def.
8). If God understands nothing, it either indicates
in God a want of intelligence and involves in Him, as
in men who understand nothing, an imperfection,
which is impossible with God (Ibid.), or it indicates,
which is also repugnant to the idea of His being, that
He understands only some things. But if intelligence
is so denied to Him it is impossible for Him to create
intellect (per Ax. 8). Since intellect is clearly and
distinctlv conceived bv us, God is able to be its cause

42 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

(per Coroll. Prop. 7). Therefore, it is far from
being the case that He understands only some things,
this being opposed to God's perfection. Therefore,
God is omniscient. Q. E. D.

SCHOLIUM.

Although it must be conceded that God is incor-
poreal, as will be proven in Proposition i67 this does
not mean only that all perfection of extension is want-
ing in Him, but only that the imperfections of exten-
sion must not be attributed to Him. The same is true
of God's intelligence, as all, who wish to be above the
rank and file of philosophers, will readily admit. This
will be further explained in our Appendix, Pt. II.,
ch. 7.

Proposition X.

Whatever perfection is found in God arises from
His own being.

i«^'

If you deny it, let it be supposed that there is some
perfection in God which does not have its source in
Himself. Either it would be in God by virtue of itself
or by virtue of something apart from God. But if its
cause was in itself it would have a necessary, or at
least a problematical existence (per Lemma TI. Prop.
7), and so far (per Coroll. Lemma I. Ibid.), have some
absolute perfection and (per Def. 8) thus be God.
If, therefore, we say that there is some perfection in
God whose cause is itself, we affirm that it arises from
God O. E. D. Put if it has arisen from some other
source than God, then He is not an absolutely perfect
hciner, which is contrary to Def. 8. Therefore what-

PART I 43

ever perfection is found in God arises from His own
being. Q. E. D.

Proposition XL
There are not many gods.

DEMONSTRATION.

If you deny this, conceive, if possible, that there are
many gods, for example A and B. Then necessarily
(per Prop. 9) A as well as B wTill be omniscient; that
is, A will understand all things himself and B, and
likewise B will understand himself and A. But since
A and B exist necessarily (per Prop. 5), the cause of
the truth and the necessity of the idea of B which A
has is B himself; and likewise the cause of the truth
and the necessity of the idea of A in B is in A him-
self. Therefore there will be some perfection in A
that is not self-caused, and likewise with B. And so
far A and B would not be gods. Therefore there is
only one God. Q. E. D.

It should be noted here that because there is some-
thing which in itself involves a necessary existence as
does God's being, He is the only being of whom this
is true, as any one who reflects carefully will clearly
see. I might also demonstrate this, but it is evident
in all that I have shown in this Proposition.

Proposition XII.

All existing things are conserved by God's power
alone.

DEMONSTRATION.

If you deny this, let it be supposed that something
conserves itself. Then (per Lemma II. Prop. 7) its

44 PRINCIPLES OP DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

nature involves necessary existence. And so (per
Coroll. Lemma I. Prop. 7), it would be God, and there
would be more than one God, which is absurd (per
Prop, supra). Therefore, nothing exists which is not
conserved by God's power alone. Q. E. D.

COROLLARY I.

God is the Creator of all things.

DEMONSTRATION.

God (per the preceding) conserves all things, i. e.
(per Axiom 10), he has created all things and is
continually creating them.

COROLLARY II.

Objects have in themselves no essence which is the
cause of God's knowledge of them.

DEMONSTRATION.

Since God's perfection is self-derived (per Prop.
10), objects can have no self-caused essence which
could be the cause of God's knowledge of them. On
the other hand, since God has created all things, not
from other objects, but by the mere fiat of His will,
(per Prop. 12 with Coroll.), and since He knows no
other power beside His own (for so I define creation),
it follows that before creation nothing existed, and that
God is the cause of the essence of all things. 0. E. D.

It may be noted, also, that this corollary is evident
from the fact that God is the cause or creator of all
things (per Coroll. T.), and that the cause must con-
tain in itself all the perfection of the effect (per Ax-
iom 8).

PART I 45

COROLLARY III.

It clearly follows, therefore, that God does not, prop-
erly speaking, perceive or form precepts, for His un-
derstanding is not determined by any external object,
but all things arise from Himself.

COROLLARY IV.

God's causality is prior to the essence and existence
of things. This clearly follows from Corollaries I.
and II. above.

Proposition XIII.

God is never a deceiver, but in all things is perfectly
true.

demonstration.

We can attribute nothing to God in which we find
any imperfection (per Ax. 8).1 All deception (as is
evident) or desire of deceiving, arises either from
malice or fear. Fear, moreover, presupposes a limited
power ; malice a privation of some good. No decep-
tion, therefore, can be ascribed to God, a being omnipo-
tent and of perfect goodness, but on the contrary, it
must be agreed that He is in no way a deceiver. Q.
E. D. See " Response to Second Objection," num-
ber 4.

1 1 have not put this down as an Axiom with the others, as
I could not see the need of so doing. I do not use it except
in demonstrating this proposition, and also, while we have not
yet proved God's existence I did not wish to assume anything
as true which I could not deduce from the primary truth Ego
sum as I said in Scholium Prop. 4. Further, I have not
given among the others the definitions of malice and fear for
no one is ignorant of them, and I do not use them except in
this place.

46 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

Proposition XIY.
Whatever we clearly and distinctly conceive, is true.

DEMONSTRATION.

The faculty we possess of discerning the true from
the false (as every one finds in himself and is evident
from all that has been said) has been created by God
and is continually conserved by Him (per Prop. 12
and Coroll.), that is (per the above), by a Being of
absolute truth and not a deceiver. Neither has He
given to us (as every one knows) any power of with-
holding assent to what we thus clearly conceive.
Wherefore if we are deceived in this, we are deceived
in everything by God, and He is a deceiver, which, by
the above, is absurd. Therefore, whatever we clearly
and distinctly conceive is true. Q. E. D.

SCHOLIUM.

Since those things to which we are constrained to
assent when we clearly and distinctly conceive them
are necessarily true ; and since we have the power of
withholding assent from those things which are ob-
scure and doubtful, and not derived from certain prem-
ises (as every one understands from his own experi-
ence), it clearly follows that we are able to be on our
guard lest we fall into error and are deceived (which
will be made clearer as we proceed). We may. in
this manner, determine in ourselves to affirm nothing
which we do not clearly and distinctly conceive, or
which is not deduced from certain premises.

PART I 47

Proposition XV.
Error is nothing positive.

DEMONSTRATION.

If error were something positive, God would be its
cause, and by Him it would continually be procreated
(per Prop. 12). But this is absurd (per Prop. 13).
Therefore error is nothing positive. Q. E. D.

SCHOLIUM.

Since error is nothing positive in man, its cause will
be merely the lack of a correct use of our freedom
(per Schol. Prop. 14). We cannot say, therefore,
that God is the cause of error in any sense, except as
we say the absence of the sun is the cause of dark-
ness, or as we say that God is the cause of blindness
in a child having all his faculties except sight. For
He has given to us understanding for a few things
only. In order that it may be clearly understood how
error depends entirely upon the misuse of the will,
and how we may be able to avoid all error, we will
call to mind the different modes of thought which we
have, viz. : All modes of conception (as sensation,
imagination, and pure cognition) and of volition (as
desire, aversion, affirming, denying, and doubt) ; for
all forms of thought may be referred to these two
classes.

Concerning these things it may be noted: 1. That
so far as mind knows objects clearly and distinctly
and assents to them, it cannot be deceived (per Prop.
14) ; and also so far as it knows things and does not
assent to them. For, although I can conceive of a

48 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

winged horse, it is certain that I do not fall into error
as long as I do not assent to the proposition that such
a creature exists, or even while I am in doubt about
it. And since to assent is nothing else than to deter-
mine the will, it follows that error depends entirely
upon the use of the will.

As now more evidently appears, it should be noted :
2. That we not only have the power of assenting to
those things which we clearly and distinctly conceive,
but also of assenting to things conceived in some other
way. For our will is determined by no limits. If
one but consider for a moment it will be evident that
if God should choose to give us infinite knowledge
there would be no necessity for bestowing upon us a
more ample power of volition in order that we might
approve all that would be known under such condi-
tions. But the power we now possess would be suffi-
cient for assenting to infinite things. From this we
learn that we give our assent to many things not de-
duced from certain principles. And further, it is evi-
dent that if knowledge extended as far as the power of
volition, or if we could not exercise our power of vo-
lition beyond the limits of understanding, or finally,
if we could but keep volition within the bounds of
knowledge, we should never fall into error (per Prop.

14).

We do not have the power of attaining- the first two
conditions, however, for that would imply that the
will was not created infinite in its nature and the under-
standing finite. The third condition alone remains,
viz., whether we have the power of limiting the action
of volition to the limits of the understanding. Since
the will is free to determine itself, it follows that we
have the power of restricting this faculty of assent

PART I 49

within the limits of understanding. So, also, we can
prevent ourselves from falling into error. Whence
it is perfectly evident that whether or not we fall into
error depends entirely upon the use we make of our
free will. That our will is free is demonstrated in
Art. 39, Pt. I. of the Principles, and in Meditation 4,
and in our Appendix, the last chapter, it is also clearly
shown. Although it is true that when we clearly and
distinctly conceive something we cannot withhold as-
sent, this necessity of assent does not depend upon
some defect in the will, but upon its freedom and per-
fection. For to assent to the truth is a mark of per-
fection in us, as is sufficiently evident in itself; neither
is the will ever more perfect or more free than when
it directly determines itself. If it were possible for
the mind so to do, it would give to itself this same
perfection, viz., to assent necessarily to what is clearly
and distinctly conceived. Wherefore it is far from
being the case, that because we are not indifferent in
comprehending truth, we know we are less free. On
the other hand, we know that the more indifferent we
are under such conditions the less freedom we possess.
It only remains to show how, in regard to man,
error is privation, and in regard to God mere nega-
tion. This we will easily see if we consider first, that
seeing many things beside those which we understand
clearly, we are more perfect than if we did not perceive
them. This is evident because, if it be supposed that
we are able to conceive nothing clearly and distinctly,
but only confusedly, we would have nothing more
perfect than these confused concepts, neither would
anything further be desired. Under such conditions,
to assent to what we perceive only in a confused way,
so far as the act is concerned, would be the perfect

50 PRINCIPLES OP DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

thing to do. This will be evident to any one, if, as
above, he supposes that it is repugnant to human na-
ture to know anything clearly or distinctly. For
though he does not attain to clearness in his knowl-
edge, it is far better to assent to what is perceived
only confusedly, and thus to exercise his freedom,
than to remain indifferent, that is, as will be shown,
to remain in a lower degree of freedom. If we wish
to appeal to experience and utility, we will find that
daily experience teaches this same truth.

Since, therefore, all our modes of thought, consid-
ered in themselves, are perfect, the source of error is
not in the understanding. But if we consider the
different forms of volition as they differ from one
another, some are found to be more perfect than
others, for there are some that show less indifference
of will, that is, are more free. We know, also, that
as long as we give our assent to what is not clearly
and distinctly known, we are rendering ourselves the
more unfit to discern the true from the false. And
thus we do not possess the highest liberty. There-
fore, to assent to what is only obscurely perceived, so
far as it is anything positive, is not in itself an imper-
fection or error. But it deprives us of the highest
freedom for which we are fitted. All imperfection of
error, therefore, consists in the privation of the high-
est form of liberty and is called error. It is called
privation because it deprives us of some perfection
which is consonant with our nature. It is called error
because, from our own fault, we are without that per-
fection which we might possess, did we but keep, as
far as possible, volition within the bounds of knowl-
edge. Since error in men, therefore, is nothing else
than a privation of the perfect use of freedom, it fol-

PART I 51

lows that this freedom is not connected with any fac-
ulty which man has obtained from God, nor even in
the operation of a faculty so far as it depends upon
God. Nor can we say that He has deprived us of a
more perfect knowledge with which, in order that we
should not fall into error, He might have endowed
us. For no one has a right to demand anything of
God, nor has an object any properties except those
which God of His own free will has given it. Noth-
ing existed before the will of God, nor, as we will
clearly show in chaps. 7 and 8 of our Appendix, can
anything be conceived to have existed. God, there-
fore, has no more deprived us of a fuller understand-
ing, or of the faculty of a more perfect knowledge,
than He has deprived the circle of the properties of
the globe or its periphery of the properties of the
sphere.

Since, then, nothing in our powers, however con-
sidered, reveals any imperfection in God, it clearly
follows that error in man is nothing but privation;
but relative to God as its cause, it is not privation,
but negation.

Proposition XVI.
God is incorporeal.

DEMONSTRATION.

Matter is the immediate subject of motion (per
Def. 7) ; therefore, if God is corporeal, He may be
divided into parts. This, however, since it involves
an imperfection, it is absurd to affirm.

52 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

ANOTHER PROOF.

If God were corporeal, He might be divided into
parts (per Def. 7). Now, either each part would be
able to subsist per se or it would not. If the former,
each part would be similar to other things erected by
God and constantly conserved by His power (per
Prop. 10 and Ax. 11). These parts would then per-
tain no more to the nature of God than do other
created objects, as is evident from Prop. 5. But if
each part exists by its own power, they would each
involve a necessary existence (per Lemma II. Prop.
7), and consequently would be a perfect being (per
Coroll. Lemma II. Prop. 7). But this also is absurd
(per Prop. II.). Therefore God is incorporeal. Q.
E. D.

Proposition XVII.
God is simple being (ens simplissimum).

DEMONSTRATION.

If God were composite in His nature, these parts,
as all will readily concede, should be prior, even down
to the most insignificant one, to the nature of God,
which is absurd (per Coroll. 4, Prop. 12). There-
fore God is simple being. O. E. D.

COROLLARY.

Hence it follows that God's understanding, His vo-
lition, His decrees and His power are only distinctions
of reason.

PART I 53

Proposition XVIII.
God is unchangeable.

DEMONSTRATION.

If God were changeable, He would not change in
part, but His whole essence would change (per Prop.
7). But God's essence is necessarily what it is (per
Props. 5, 6 and 7) ; therefore God is unchangeable.
Q. E. D.

Proposition XIX.
God is eternal.

demonstration.

God is a perfect being (Def. 8), and therefore nec-
essarily exists. If we attribute only a limited exist-
ence to Him these limits must be known, if not by us,
by God Himself (per Prop. 9), who is omniscient.
But then God who is omniscient (per Def. 8), would
know no existence beyond these limits, which is ab-
surd (per Prop. 5). Therefore God does not have a
limited but an infinite existence, which we call eter-
nity. (Via*. Chap. I., Fart II., of our App'cndix.)
God, therefore, is eternal. 0. E. D.

Proposition XX.
God has preordained everything from eternity.

DEMONSTRATION.

Since God is eternal (per Prop. 19), His under-
standing is eternal because it pertains to His eternal

54 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES PHILOSOPHY

essence (per Coroll. Prop. 7). Hence His under-
standing, and His will, and His decrees are one (Ibid.)
Therefore when we say God knows all things from
eternity, we say also that He has willed, and decreed
them from eternity. Q. E. D.

COROLLARY.

From this proposition it follows that God is un-
changeable in all His works.

Proposition XXI.

Extended substance has three dimensions, length,
breadth and depth. We are united with each of these
three.

DEMONSTRATION.

Extended substance, so far as we clearly understand
it, does not pertain to the nature of God (per Prop.
10). It can, however, be created by God (per Coroll.
Prop. 7, and per Prop. 8). Then we clearly and dis-
tinctly perceive (as every thinking person knows) that
extended substance produces in us titulations or pain
and other similar sensations or ideas, at times even
contrary to our desires. If we attempt to find some
other cause of our sensations, as for example God or
an angel, we immediately destroy the clear concept
which we had before. Therefore (Vid. demonstration
Prop. 14 and Schol. Prop. 15), as long as we properly
attend to our perceptions and do not admit what is not
clearly and distinctly known, we lose our indifference
and are led to admit that extended substance alone is
the cause of our sensations. So, also, we will see and
admit that extended things were created and exist by

PART I 55

God's power. In this we are clearly not deceived
(per Prop. 14 with Schol.). Therefore it is truly
affirmed that extended substance has length, and
breadth, and depth, which was the first point.

And further, as I have already proven, we observe
great differences between our various sensations, as
for example, when I say I perceive or see a tree; or
when I say I am thirsty, or suffer, etc. It is evident
that I cannot see or understand the reasons for these
differences, unless I know that as a being, I am united
to certain portions of matter and not to others. When
I understand this clearly, and there is no other way
to know it, it is evident that I am united to a certain
part of matter. This was the second point, and it is
now proven. Q. E. D.

Note. — Unless the reader considers himself merely
as a thinking being and free from his body, and lays
aside as (prejudices all the reasons he has heretofore
held as proving the existence of the body, he will a/-
tempt in vain to understand this demonstration..

The Principles of Philosophy Demonstrated
by the Method of Geometry.

Part II.

A Postulate.

It is only asked here that each one attend as accu-
rately as possible to his concepts in order to be able
to distinguish the clear from the obscure.

DEFINITIONS.

I. Extension is that which consists of three dimen-
sions. We do not understand by the term the act of
extending or anything else distinct from quantity.

II. By substance we understand that which de-
pends only upon the concurrence of God for its exist-
ence.

III. An Atom as a part of matter, by nature is in-
divisible.

IV. That is indefinite, the limits of which, if it
has any, cannot be investigated by the human mind.

V. A vacuum is extension without corporeal sub-
stance.

VI. Space is distinguished from extension only
by the reason ; in reality they are one and the same
thing. See Art. 10, Pt. II. of the Principles.

VII. That which we understand to be divisible, is
divisible, at least potentially.

58 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

VIII. Local motion is the transference of a particle
of matter or of a body from the vicinity of other con-
tiguous bodies considered as in a state of rest, to the
vicinity of others.

This definition Descartes used to explain local mo-
tion. In order to understand this rightly it should be
noted :

1. That by a particle of matter he understood all
that which is transferred at the same time, although
it may itself be composed of many parts.

2. That to avoid confusion in this definition he
spoke only of that which is always in moving bodies,
viz., transference, lest, as has often happened, this be
confused with the force or action which transfers
them. This force or action, it is generally believed,
is required only for motion and not for rest, which
belief is plainly wrong. For, as is self-evident, the
same force is required to give to a body at rest a cer-
tain velocity as is required to bring the same body
with that given velocity to rest. This is proved also
by experience. Almost the same force is used in
starting a ship at rest in quiet water as in suddenly
stopping it when in motion. Plainly this force would
be the same except that we are assisted in retarding
the motion of the ship by the weight and viscosity of
the retarding water.

3. That, he says, the transference is made from
the vicinity of contiguous bodies to the vicinity of
others and not from one place to another. For place
(as he himself explained Art. 13, Pt. 2) is not some-
thing in the object, but it depends upon our thought,
so much so that the same body may be said at the same
time to change its place and not to change it ; but not
at the same time to be transferred from the vicinity of

PART II 59

contiguous bodies and not to be transferred. For
only one body at the same moment of time can be
contiguous to the same moving body.

4. That he did not say absolutely that a transfer-
ence was made from the vicinity of contiguous bodies,
but only so far as they were considered to be at rest.

For in order that the body A be
transferred from the body B at rest,
the same force is required whether
in this direction or in that. This is
evident from the example of a boat aground or on
the sand in shallow water. For in order that the
boat may be moved an equal force must be exerted
against the boat and against the ground. Therefore
the force by which bodies are moved is expended
equally on the moving body and on the one at rest.
The action and the reaction are equal. If the boat is
moved from the sand, the sand is likewise moved from
the boat. If, of bodies which are mutually separated,
the one to this place, the other to that, we attribute
equal motion, then regard one of them as at rest, it is
because the same action is in one as in the other.
Then also even to bodies which are regarded by all
as at rest, e. g., the sand from which the boat is sep-
arated, we are compelled to attribute to this a motion
equal to the motion of the boat ; for, as we have shown,
the same action is required in the one part as in the
other, and the transposition is reciprocal. But this
is too much at variance with the common way of
speaking. In truth, although, those bodies from
which others are separated are regarded as at rest
and are also said to be so, nevertheless we affirm that
everything in the moving body on account of which
it is said to be moving is also in the body at rest.

oo PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

5. Finally, from the definition it is evident that
every body has for itself its own one proper motion,
since only in regard to contiguous quiet bodies is it
said to recede. Nevertheless, if a moving body is a
part of other bodies having other motions, we clearly
see that it is also able to participate in these as well.
But because so many things can not easily be under-
stood, nor will all recognize this, it will suffice to con-
sider that alone which is peculiar to each body. See
Art. 31, Pt. 2, Principles.

IX. By a circle of moving bodies we understand
such an arrangement that when one is impelled by the

impulse of another the last imme-
diately touches the first one of the
series ; although the line described
by the motion of these bodies may
plainly be contorted.

AXIOMS.

To non-being there are no properties.

II. Whatever can be detracted from an object,
without destroying the completeness of that object,
does not constitute its essence ; that which, when
taken away, destroys the object does constitute its es-
sence.

III. As to hardness sense indicates nothing else,
nor do we clearly and distinctly know more than that
the parts of hard bodies resist the motion of our
hands.

IV. Whether two bodies are mutually approaching
one another, or whether receding, they occupy the
same amount of space.

V. A particle of matter, whether it gives way to
or resists another, does not lose its character.

PART II 61

VI. Motion, rest, form, and similar ideas cannot
be conceived without the concept of extension.

VII. Beside the sensible qualities of bodies, noth-
ing remains except extension and its affects as given
in Part I. of the Principles.

VIII. One space or portion of extension is no
greater than another.

IX. All extension can be divided, at least, in
thought. Concerning the truth of this axiom no one
can doubt who has learned even the elements of math-
ematics. For the space between a given circle and
its tangent can always be divided by an infinite num-
ber of greater circles. Which is also true as regards
the asymptote of the hyperbole.

X. No ends of extension or space can be con-
ceived except as another space is conceived to imme-
diately follow such limits.

XL If matter were manifold and one part did not
immediately touch the other, each part would neces-
sarily be comprehended under limits beyond which no
matter is given.

XII. A very minute body easily recedes before the
motion of our hands.

XIII. One space does not penetrate another, nor is
the one greater than the other.

XIV. If the tube A is of equal length with C, but
^IfiSSCSE} C is twice as large as A, then if

-^==^====5^, some liquid flows through A with
C^^^msS^s? double the velocity of that which
passes through C, in the same time an equal amount
will have passed through each. And if, in an equal
time, an equal quantity has passed through each, the
velocity through A will be double that of C.

XV. Things which agree in a third part agree in

62 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

the whole. And things which are each double a third
part are equal to one another.

XVI. Matter which is moved in different ways
has at least as many divided parts as there were degrees
of swiftness observed at any given time.

XVTI. A straight line is the shortest distance be-
tween two points.

XVIII. A body A moving from C toward B, if re-
q g pelled by a contrary impulse, will

^-y move along the same line toward C.

XIX. Bodies having motions in opposite direc-
tions, when they come in contact, undergo some
change.

XX. Variation in any object proceeds from a
stronger force.

XXI. If when body i is moved toward body 2 and
impels it, and body 8 from this im-

^ pulse is moved toward 1, bodies 1,
2, 3, etc., cannot be in a straight
line. But all of them from 1 to 8
compose a complete circle (Vid. Def. 9).

lemma 1.

Where there is extension or space, there from neces-
sity substance also exists.

DEMONSTRATION.

Extension or space (per Ax. 1) cannot be pure
nothing; therefore it is an attribute which must be
attributed to something. But not to God (per Prop.
16, Part I.) ; therefore to some object which needs
only God's concurrence for its existence (per Prop. 12,
Part I.), that is (per Def. 2), to substance. O. E. D.

PART II

LEMMA II.

We clearly and distinctly conceive of rarefaction
and condensation. We would not concede, however,
that a body occupies more space under rarefaction
than tinder condensation.

DEMONSTRATION.

We can have a clear and a distinct concept of these
because we can conceive that the parts of a body mu-
tually recede, or mutually approach one another.
Therefore (per Ax. 4), they will not occupy more or
less space. If the parts of some body, for example
a sponge, are compressed the bodies between the parts
will be occupied. What we can thus clearly perceive
occupy less space than before (per Ax. 4). And if,
again, the body expands and the pores are filled by
some body, there is a rarefaction, but no more space
will be occupied. What we can thus clearly perceive
by the senses in the case of the sponge, we can con-
ceive by the understanding to be true with all bodies,
although the pores of these cannot be perceived by our
senses. Therefore, rarefaction and condensation are
clearly conceived, etc. Q. E. D.

It seemed best to give this at this place in order to
overcome these prejudices concerning space, rarefac*
tion, etc., and in order that the mind may be ready to
understand what follows.

Proposition I.

Although hardness, weight, and the other sensible
qualities of a body be removed, the whole nature of
that body will nevertheless remain.

64 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

DEMONSTRATION.

In the hardness of this stone, for example, sense
indicates nothing to us, nor can we clearly and dis-
tinctly conceive anything, except that its parts resist
the movements of our hands (per Ax. 3). There-
fore (per Prop. 14, Part I.), hardness is nothing but
this. If that body were pulverized into very small
particles, these parts would easily give way (per Ax.
12) ; nevertheless, they do not lose the nature of the
body (per Ax. 5). Q. E. D.

In regard to weight and to other sensible qualities,
the same demonstration is valid.

Proposition II.

The nature of body or matter (corporis sive mate-
riae) consists in extension alone.

DEMONSTRATION.

The nature of body is not destroyed by the loss of
sensible qualities (per Prop. 1 above) ; therefore
these do not constitute its essence (per Ax. 2). Noth-
ing remains except extension and its affects (per Ax.
7). Therefore, if extension is destroyed, nothing will
remain which pertains to the nature of body, but it
is destroyed; therefore (per Ax. 2), the nature of
body consists in extension alone. 0. E. D.

COROLLA RY.

Space and Body are the same.

PART II 65

DEMONSTRATION.

Body and extension are the same (per the preced-
ing) ; space and extension are the same thing (per
Def. 6) ; therefore (per Ax. 15), space and body are
the same. Q. E. D.

SCHOLIUM.

Although we have said 1 that God is omnipresent
we do not believe that God is extension, that is, (per
the preceding) body. His omnipotence pertains
only to his power and his concurrence by which all
things are conserved. So far, therefore, His om-
nipresence refers no more to extension or body than
to angels or to the human mind. It should be noted,
too, that when we say His power is everywhere we
do not exclude His essence : for where His power is,
there His essence is also (Coroll. Prop. 17, Part I.).
We would exclude corporeality, that is, God is not
everywhere in some corporeal power, but in divine
essence, which is common in the preservation of ex-
tension and in thinking being (Prop. 17, Part I.).
These He would not be able to perfectly conserve if
His power or essence were corporeal.

Proposition III.
It is a contradiction to say that a vacuum exists.

DEMONSTRATION.

By a vacuum is meant extension without corporeal
substance (per Def. 5), that is (per Prop. 2), body
without body, which is absurd.

*Vid. Appendix, Pt. II., Chaps. III. and IX.

06 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

For a fuller explanation of this proposition, and to
correct the prejudices men have concerning a
vacuum, Articles 17 and 18, Part II. of the " Princi-
ples," should be read. In these it is noted more espe-
cially that bodies between which nothing intervenes
necessarily touch one another, and, also, that there are
no properties to non-being.

Proposition IV.

One particle of a body occupies at one time no more
space than a'nother ; conversely, the same space at a
given time will contain no more of one body than of
another.

DEMONSTRATION.

Space and body are the same thing (per Coroll.
Prop. 2) : therefore when we say that one portion of
space is no larger than another (per Ax. 13) we
affirm that a body cannot occupy more space in one
place than in another, which was the first point to
be proved.

Further, from the fact that space does not differ
from body, it follows, that when we say that a body
cannot occupy more space in one place than in another,
we likewise affirm that the same space cannot contain
more of one body than another. Q. E. D.

COROLLARY.

Bodies which occupy an equal amount of space, as
for example some gold and some brass, have an equal
amount of matter or of corporeal substance.

PART II 67

DEMONSTRATION.

Corporeal substance does not consist in hardness,
e. g. of gold, nor in softness, e. g. of brass, nor in
any sensible quality (per Prop. 1, above), but- in ex-
tension alone (per Prop. 2 above). Moreover, since
by hypothesis there is an equal amount of space or
(per Def. 6) of extension in the one as in the other,
there is a like amount of corporeal substance.
Q. E. D.

Proposition V
There are no Atoms.

DEMONSTRATION.

By their nature atoms are indivisible parts of mat-
ter (per Def. 3). But since the nature qf matter
consists in extension (per Prop. 2 above), which by
nature is divisible, however small the part (per Ax.
9 and Def. 7), it follows that any part of matter,
however small, is divisible. That is, there are no
atoms or indivisible parts of matter. Q. E. D.

SCHOLIUM.

The question of atoms has always been a great and
an intricate one. Some affirm that atoms must exist
because one infinity cannot be greater than another ;
and if two bodies, A and one double the size of A,
are divisible to infinity by the power of God, who
understands their infinite parts in one intuition, they
can actually be so divided. Therefore, as it is said,
since one infinity is no greater than another, one part
of A will be equal to one double its size, which is

68 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

absurd. Then they ask also, whether a part divided
half way to infinity would still be infinite, and
whether it would be equal or unequal, and other
things of this kind. To this question Descartes re-
plied that we ought not to reject what we properly
understand on account of other things which surpass
our understanding, and which consequently cannot
adequately be conceived. Infinity and its properties
are beyond the power of the human intellect, which
is by nature finite. It would, then, be improper to
reject as false what we clearly and distinctly con-
ceive, or to doubt this because we do not understand
the infinite. Hence, Descartes held that those things
which have no limits, such as the extension of the
world or the divisibility of a part of matter, should
be called indefinite. See Art. 26, Part I. Principles.

Proposition VI.

Matter is indefinitely extended, and is the same
throughout the heavens and the earth.

DEMONSTRATION.

Point I. No limit to extension or matter can be
conceived (per Prop. 2 above) except as we conceive
of another space, that is (per Def. 6), extension or
matter immediately following this (per Ax. 10), and
so on indefinitely ; which was the first point to be
proved.

Point II. The essence of matter consists in ex-
tension (per Prop. 2 above), and this is indefinite

(per Point I.). That is (per Def. 4), it cannot be
conceived to be bounded by any limits; therefore

(per Ax. 1 1 "), it is not manifold in its nature but every-

PART II 69

where one and the same ; which was the second point
to be proved.

SCHOLIUM.

We have already discussed the nature and essence
of matter. In the last Proposition to Part I. we
showed that matter created by God's power exists, as
it is conceived by us, and from Proposition 12 of the
same part it follows that it is conserved by the same
power that created it. Also, in the last Proposition to
Part I. we showed that so far as we are thinking
beings, we are united to some part of matter. Hence,
we are certain that all the changes in matter are real,
which we, by the contemplation of matter, perceive
as possible. As, for example, that matter is divisible
or capable of motion, that there may be a transfer-
ence of some parts of matter from one place to an-
other, which, indeed, we clearly and distinctly know,
provided we understand that other parts take the place
of those which are moved. This division and motion
is conceived by us in infinite modes, hence an infinite
variation of matter is conceived as possible. I say that
these things are clearly and distinctly conceived by us
(as was clearly explained in Part I. of the Principles)
so long as they are regarded as modes of extension, and
not as objects apart from extension. And although
some philosophers conceive of many forms of motion,
we only admit that there is local motion. For it is evi-
dent to us, who admit only what is clearly and distinctly
perceived, that extension is capable only of local mo-
tion, neither can any other form be imagined.

Zeno, indeed, it is said, for various reasons denied
that there was motion in space (motum localum),
which assertion the cynic Diogenes refuted in a char-

70 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

acteristic way, namely, by walking about in the school
where Zeno was teaching, and thus disturbing his
pupils. When he was asked by a certain listener
to stop his walking he began to find fault with him
by saying : " Why do you thus dare to refute the
teaching of your master?" But lest any one, per-
chance, deceived by this argument of Zeno, should
think that the senses show anything to us, as for ex-
ample motion, which is at variance with the under-
standing, so that the mind is deceived about those
things, which, by the help of the intellect are perceived
clearly and distinctly, I shall give his principal rea-
sons, and show that these are only supported by false
prejudices; namely, because he had no true concept of
matter.

In the first place it is said that he argued that if
there is motion in space, the motion of a body moving
in a circle with the greatest possible speed does not
differ from a body at rest ; and this is absurd, there-
fore, that also. Consequently, he affirmed this.
That body is at rest, all of whose parts constantly re-
main in the same place ; but all the parts of a body
moving in a circle with the greatest possible velocity
constantly remain in the same place. Therefore, etc.,

This, it is said, he explained by the
example of a wheel, for example
A, B, C. Which, if it moves with
a certain velocity about its center,
the point A will move more rapidly
through the points B and C than
if it rotated more slowly. Let it be
supposed for example, that when moving slowly for an
hour, the point A occupies the same point as when it
began. Tf it moves with double this velocity, in a half-

PART II 71

hour it will occupy the same point, and if with a ve-
locity four times as great, then in a quarter of an hour.
If, now, we conceive that the velocity is increased to in-
finity, and the time to be diminished even to a mo-
ment, then the point A, moving with this infinite
velocity every moment, or continually, will be in the
place from which it began to move. So far it will
always remain in the same place. And this, which is
true of the point A, is also true of every other point
of the wheel. Therefore, all points of a body moving
with the highest velocity remain in the same place.

Indeed, as I would reply, it should be noted that this
is more an argument against infinite motion than
against motion itself. We shall not, however, inquire
whether Zeno argued rightly, but rather would detect
those prejudices on which the whole argument rests
so far as he thought this to annul the idea of motion.
In the first place it is supposed that a body may be
conceived to be moving so fast that a greater velocity
is impossible. Then, again, it is supposed that time
is composed of moments, as some think that quantity
is made up of indivisible points. Both suppositions
are false. For we are not able to conceive of a motion
than which there can be no greater. It is contrary to
reason to think there is a motion, however small the
line it describes, so rapid that no more rapid one can
be given. The same thing holds true in regard to
slowness. For it implies that we can conceive of a
motion so slow that a slower one can not be given.
Concerning time also, which is a measure of motion,
we affirm that the same thing is true, and that it is
contrary to reason to think of a time so short that no
shorter can be given. All of which, as we will prove,
follows from the words of Zeno. Let it be supposed,

72 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

therefore, as he said, that the wheel A, B, C, rotates
with such speed that the point A at all moments is
in the point A from which it moves. I say that I can
clearly conceive that this swiftness is indefinitely in-
creased and these moments of time to be diminished
in inverse ratio. For let it be supposed that while
the wheel A, B, C, is rotating, another wheel, D, E,
F, (which I suppose half as large as the other), is
made to rotate by the chord H. Since the wheel D,
E, F is only half the size of A, B, C, it is evident
that the first one will rotate twice as fast as the latter.
Then if the wheel A, B, C is supposed to have the
motion of D, E, F, the movement of D, E, F will be

four times the original motion of A, B, C. And if
we suppose this motion of D, E, F to be given to A,
B, C, the motion of D, E, F will be eight times the
motion of our original wheel. And so on to infinity.
This is perfectly evident from the very concept of
matter. For as we have proven the essence of mat-
ter consists in extension or in space always divisible.
There is no motion except- in space. We showed also
that the same part of matter cannot occupy two points
of space at the same time. This would be equal to
saying that one part of matter is equal to another pari
twice its size. Therefore, if a particle of matter is
moved it is moved through some space. This space,
and the time that serves to measure this as well, how-

PART II 73

ever small they be conceived to be, will always be
divisible. Q. E. D.

We turn now to another argument of the same
nature. If a body is moved, does it move in the place
in which it is, or in some other? It does not move
in the place where it is, for if it is any where it is
necessarily at rest. Neither can it move in a place
where it is not. Therefore, a body does not move.
This argument is plainly similar to the first, for it
also supposes that there is a time given than which
there can be no smaller. For if you reply that a body
does not move in the place it is, but from that place to
another, he will ask whether it does not also move
through the intervening places. We reply by mak-
ing a distinction — if through the term was we un-
derstand to be at rest then we deny that the body was
at any of the places through which it moved : but if by
was existence is meant, then we say that it necessarily
existed in that point although it was moving. But he
would also ask whether it existed any where while
it was moving. We reply, if he meant to ask whether
the body remained in any one place, that it did not;
but if he wished to ask whether it changed its position,
we reply that it has, through all the points in the given
distance. Then he would inquire whether it could
occupy, and move from a point at the same moment
of time. To this we reply by making another dis-
tinction. If by a moment of time he understands a
duration so short that no shorter is conceivable, as
was shown above, he asks a question that is not in-
telligible, and hence unworthy of reply.

But if he take time in the true sense explained
above, however small the duration assigned, it will
never be so small that a body may not both occupy it

74 PRINCIPLES OP DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

and be moving at the same time. This is evident to
any one who considers the matter. For it is evident,
as we said above, that he supposes a time given than
which no smaller is possible. Hence, he proves
nothing.

Beside these two there is another argument of Zeno
which, together with its refutation, is given in
Descartes (Vol. I. " Epis./5 last letter but one).

I wish here to remind the reader that my argument
is opposed to the reasonings of Zeno ; and that as far
as he argued from reason not from sense, he followed
the argument of Diogenes. Nor does sense ever give
any truth to the inquirer, except the mere phenomena
of Nature, whose causes he is impelled to investigate ;
never does it show anything to be false which the
understanding clearly comprehends as true. So we
believe, and so far this is our Method : — to demon-
strate the things we set forth, by reasons clearly and
distinctly perceived by the understanding ; holding
to these, whatever the senses may give that seems
contrary to this ; which, as we have said, can only de-
termine the understanding as it inquires about this or
that, but cannot prove the falsity of anything which
is clearly and distinctly perceived.

Proposition VII.

No body moves to the place of another, except as
that other moves into the position of some other.

DEMONSTRATION.1

If you deny this, let it be supposed, if possible, that
a body A take the position of a body B, and is equal

1 Vid. Fig-. Prop. seq.

PART II

to it, and also that B does not recede from its place.
Then the space which before only contained B (by
hypothesis) will contain A and B, and so twice as
much corporeal substance as it before contained.
Which (per Prop. 4 of this Part) is absurd. There-
fore, no body can take the place of another, etc.
Q. E. D.

Proposition VIII.

When some body takes the place of another, at the
same moment the place left by the one is occupied by
another which is immediately contiguous to it.

SB=

wm.

DEMONSTRATION.

If the body B moves toward D, either the bodies
A and C mutually approach and touch one another,
or they do not. If they mutually approach and are
contiguous the question is conceded. If they do not
approach one another, but the space left by B lies

between them, then (per Coroll.
Prop. 2 supra, and Coroll. Prop.
4) some body equal to B lies be-
tween. But (per hypothesis) not
B : therefore, some other body,
which at the same moment takes
its place. But since it is at the
same moment it is no other than the one immediately
contiguous (per Schol., Prop. 6). There it was
shown that there can not be motion from one place
to another which does not require a duration than
which a shorter may always be conceived. Hence,
it follows that the space of the body B cannot be
occupied at the same moment by a body which must

76 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

be moved from some other position. Therefore, only
the body immediately contiguous to B can occupy this
space at the given moment. 0. E. D

SCHOLIUM.

Since the parts of matter are really distinct from
one another (per Art. 6i, Part I. Principles), one
part can exist apart from the other (per Coroll.
Prop. 7, Part I.) and they are not dependent upon one
another. Therefore, all the fancies about sympathy
and antipathy should be rejected as false. And
further, since the cause of an effect must be positive
(per Ax. 8, Part I.) we can not say that the cause
of motion is a vacuum, but that it is due to the im-
pulse of some other body.

COROLLARY.

In all motion the zvholc circle of bodies is moved.

DEMONSTRATION

At the moment when body i takes the place of body
2, this one must move into place of body 3, etc. (per
Prop. 7). Then at the moment when 1 is occupying

the place of 2, the place it formerly
held must (per Prop. 8) be filled
by some other body, for example
by 8, or some other body contigu-
ous to I. But since this can only come from the im-
pulse of another body (per Schol. sup.) which is here
supposed to be 1, the series cannot lie in a straight
line (per Ax. 2t) but (per Def. 9) describes a com-
plete circle. O. E. D.

PART II

Proposition IX.

// a circular canal, A, B, C, is filled with water or
with some other fluid, and at A the canal is four times
as broad as at B, when the water (or liquid) at A
begins to move toward B, the water at B will move
four times as fast as the water at A.

DEMONSTRATION.

When the water at A moves
toward B, the water at C, which
is contiguous to A, takes its
place (per Prop. 8) ; then from
B an equal quantity must replace
that at C. (per eanclem). There-
fore (per Ax. 14), it will move
four times as fast. Q. E. D.
What we have just said concerning circular chan-
nels is also true of all unequal spaces through which
water is forced. For the proof would be the same in
all such cases.

Lemma.

If two semicircles are described from the same cen-
ter, as for example A and B, the distance between
them is equal at all points. But if they are described

from different centers as are C and D. the distance
between them is unequal at all points. This is evident
from the definition of the circle.

78 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

Proposition X.

A fluid body moving through the channel A, B, C,
changes its velocity by indefinite degrees.

DEMONSTRATION.

(Vid. Figure to Prop. IX). The space between A
and B is unequal at all points (per Lemm. sup.) ;
therefore (per Prop. 9) the velocity with which a fluid
moves through this channel is everywhere unequal.
And since we can conceive that the space between A
and B to be indefinitely divided (per Prop. 5), the
inequalities also will be indefinitely changing and also
(per Prop. 9) the motion by indefinite degrees. Q.
E. D.

Proposition XL

In the matter which passes through the channel A,
B, C, there is a division into indefinitely small parts.

DEMONSTRATION.

(Vid. Fig. Prop. 9). The matter flowing through
A, B, C, has a motion changing by indefinite degrees
(per Prop. 10) ; therefore (per Ax. 16) its parts must
be indefinitely divided O. E. D. See also Articles 34
and 35, Part II. " Principles."

SCHOLIUM.

We have already spoken of the nature of motion.
Tt behooves us here to inquire into its cause, which
is twofold : the primary or general cause, which is the
cause of all the motion in the world, and then more
specifically, how does it happen that particular objects

PART II 79

which have no motion, acquire it. Regarding the gen-
eral cause of motion it is clear, since we ought not to
admit anything except what is clearly and distinctly
perceived (per Prop. 14, Pt. I. and Schol. Prop. 17,
Pt. II.), and since we understand no other cause except
God (the creator of matter), that no other general
cause of motion can be admitted except God. And
what we have said of motion is also true of rest.

Proposition XII.
God is the 'principal cause of motion.

DEMONSTRATION.

See the Scholium just given.

Proposition XIII.

God by his pozver conserves the same quantity of
motion and rest which he once gave to matter.

demonstration.

Since God is the cause of motion and of rest (per
Prop. 12), he conserves these by the same power by
which he also created them (per Ax. 10 Pt. I.), and
indeed with the same amount of power (per Coroll.
Prop. 20, Pt. I.) Q. E. D.

SCHOLIUM.

I. Although, in Theology, it is said that God does
many things because He is pleased to do so, and to
show His power to man, since these acts are known
only through divine revelation, they should not be
admitted into the body of philosophical truth where

80 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

reason is the criterion of truth, lest Theology and
Philosophy become confused.

II. Although motion is nothing but a mode of a
moving body, nevertheless, it has a certain definite
quantity. How this is possible will appear below.
See Art. 36, Pt. II. of the " Principles."

Proposition XIV.

Every object, so far as it is simple and individual
considered in itself alone, has a certain unchanging
quantity.

To many this proposition is, as it were, an axiom ;
nevertheless we will give a demonstration of its truth.

DEMONSTRATION.

Since an object can exist in a certain state only by
the concurrence of God (per Prop. 12, Pt. I.), and
since God is unchanging in all His works (per Coroll.
Prop. 20, Pt. I.), if we consider no external causes
(i. e., particular ones) but consider the object in itself,
it must be admitted that its quantity always remains
the same. O. E. D.

COROLLARY.

A body when once in motion will continue to mo:'c
unless hindered by some external forces.

DEMONSTRATION.

This is evident from the preceding Proposition.
Nevertheless for correcting certain prejudices concern-
ing motion read Articles 37 and 38, Part IT. " Prin-
ciples."

PART II 81

Proposition XV.

Every moving body, in itself, tends to move in a
straight line not in a curved one. This proposition
might be given as an axiom but I will demonstrate it
from the preceding ones.

DEMONSTRATION.

Motion since it has God alone as its cause (per Prop.
12, Pt. II.) has in itself no power of existence (per
Ax. 10, Pt. I.), but is, as it were, procreated every
single moment by God (per that which was demon-
strated with the axiom just cited). Therefore, as long
as we consider the mere nature of motion we cannot
attribute to it, as pertaining to its nature, a duration
so great that a greater may not be conceived. But
if it is said that it pertains to the nature of a mov-
ing body to move in a curved line, a longer duration is
attributed to the nature of motion than if it is sup-
posed to be the nature of motion to move in a straight
line (per Ax. 8). Since (as we have already demon-
strated) we cannot assign such a duration to the
nature of motion, we cannot suppose that it is in the
nature of a moving body to move in a curved line
but it must tend to move in a straight line. O. E. D.

SCHOLIUM.

To many, perhaps, this demonstration will not seem
to prove that a moving body tends to describe a straight
line rather than a curved one, for no straight line can
be assigned so small that there may not be a smaller
either curved or straight, neither is there any curved
line so small that there may not also be another curved

82 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

one still smaller. Although I have considered these
objections I do not consider them to be valid. For
we have based our conclusion upon the universal
essence of these lines, not upon the quantity of each
or accidental differences. But that I may not in this
demonstration render obscure what is clear, I refer the
reader to the definition of motion, which affirms nothing
of motion except a transference of one part of matter
from one vicinity to the position of others, etc. This
is true so far as we conceive of a simple trans-
ference, that is, that this is made in a straight line.
So far as we go beyond this we assign something to
motion which is not in the definition and so far does
not pertain to its nature.

Corollary.

From this it follows that every body moving in a
curved line is continually deflected from the line which
it tends to follow. This is done by some external
force (per Prop. 14, Pt. II.).

Proposition XVI.

Every body moving in a circular orbit, as for ex-
ample a stone in a sling, tends constantly to move off
at a tangent.

DEMONSTRATION.

A body moving in a circumference is continuously
restrained by some external force from moving in a
straight line (per Coroll., Prop. XV. Pt. II.). When
this ceases to act the body at once moves off in a
straight line (per Prop. 15). T say also, that a body
describing a circle continually tends to move off at a

PART II

tangent. For, if you deny it let it be supposed that

the stone, for example, in
the sling at B, does not
tend to follow the line
BD, but some other line,
either within or without
the circle, for example,
BF. Or the line BG
(which I understand inter-
sects the line BH, drawn
from the center of the circle at B and makes
with it an angle equal to the angle FBFI), if it is
supposed that the sling is moving from C toward B.
But if the stone moving from L to B at B, tends to
move in the line BF, then (per Axiom 18) when the
sling moves from C toward B, it should tend to move
toward K, not toward G, which is contrary to the
hypothesis. And since there is no line that can be
drawn through the point B except the tangent AD,
which keeps the angles DBH, and ABH equal, there
is no line except this tangent able to fulfil the hypo-
thesis, when the sling is moving either from L to B
or from C to B. Therefore no other line except the
tangent can be drawn on which the body tends to move.
Q. E. D.

ANOTHER DEMONSTRATION.1

In place of a circle let the hexagon A, B, H, be
inscribed in a circle and a body C be at rest on one
side AB. Then let the ruler DBE (one end fixed at
D and the other end free) be moved about the center
D, continually intersecting the line AB. It is evident
that if the ruler DBE, while it is thus conceived

1 The letter A at the intersection of the circle and the hexa-
gon between B and G is omitted in the Latin text.

84 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

to move meet some body at C, when the ruler inter-
sects the line AB at a right angle it will tend to

move C in the line FBAG
toward G, that is, along the
line AB produced indefinite-
ly. Indeed, since we can con-
sider the number of sides of
the polygon to be increased ad
libitum, it can be affirmed of
any figure whatever that can
be inscribed in a circle that
when a body C at rest on one
of its sides, is impelled by a ruler fixed at the center,
when the angle found by the side of the polygon and
the ruler is a right angle, the body will tend to move
in the line of that side indefinitely produced.

Let us conceive instead of the hexagon a polygon
of an infinite number of sides (that is, the circle ac-
cording to the definition of Archimedes) ; then it is
clear that wherever the ruler shall come in contact
with the body C, it would always meet it at a right
angle. Hence it would never come in contact with C,
without C at the same time tending- to move in the
line of that side produced. Any side whatever when
produced will lie wholly outside the figure, and this
side indefinitely produced is the tangent of one side
of the figure of an infinite number of sides, that is, of
a circle. Therefore if we think of sling moving in a
circle in place of the ruler the stone will constantly
tend to move in a tangent to that circle. Q. E. D.

77 should be noted that this demonstration ean be ap-
plied to any curved figure.

PART II

Proposition XVII.

Every body moving in a circle tends to move from
the center of the circle it describes.

DEMONSTRATION.

As long as a body is moving in a circular path, so
long is it held in its course by some external force ;
this force being removed it at once begins to move

off at a tangent (per the
above) all of whose points
except that which touches the
circle fall outside of the circle
(per Prop. 16, Lib. 3, Ele-
ments), and so are further
removed from the center of
its path. Therefore, when
the stone in the sling EA, is at the point A it will
tend to move along a straight line whose points are
all further from the center E than those of the circum-
ference LAB. This is to do nothing else than to
recede from the circle which it is describing. O.
E. D.

Proposition XVIII.

// some body A is moved against another body B at
rest, and B acquires no motion from the impact, then
A has lost none of its motion but retains all it had
before.

demonstration.

If you deny it, let it be supposed
that A has lost some of its motion
but has not transferred it to another
body as, for example, B. If this happens there will be
less motion in Nature than before which is absurd (per

86 PRINCIPLES OP DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

Prop. 13). The demonstration in respect to the rest in
B is the same.1 Therefore if no motion is transferred
B will be in the same state of rest and A will retain
the same amount of motion. Q. E. D.

Proposition XIX.

Motion, considered in itself, by its own determina-
tion moves in a given direction; nor is there any need
for a moment of rest before it can change its direction
or be repelled.

DEMONSTRATION.

Let it be supposed as in the preceding proposition
that a body A is moved directly against B and im-
peded by B but that B is not moved. Therefore (by
the above) A will retain all of its motion, nor does it
remain at rest even for a moment. Nevertheless when
it moves it does not move in the same direction as
before, for it is supposed to be impeded by the body
B. Therefore its motion remaining entire and its
prior determination being lost it will move in some
other direction (per what was said in Chap. 2,
Diopt.) ; and so far (per Ax. 2) determination does
not pertain to the essence of motion, nor is a moving
body when repelled at rest at any time. Q. E. D

COROLLARY.

Hence it follows that motion is not the opposite of
motion.

1 Spinoza throughout this work attributes quantity to rest
or quietude just as he docs to motion; a body may have a
certain amount of rest as well as a certain amount of motion.

PART II 87

Proposition XX.

// a body A meet a body B and they move on to-
gether the gain of motion in B and the loss of motion
in A are equal.

DEMONSTRATION.

If you deny it, let it be supposed
that B acquires less motion from A
than A loses. Then that quantity of
motion must be added or substracted from the total
motion in Nature, which is absurd (per Prop. 13
above). Since therefore, B can acquire neither more
nor less motion than A loses it must receive just what
is lost by A. Q. E. D.

Proposition XXL

// a body A is twice as great as B and moves with
an equal velocity, it will have twice the motion of B
or a force for retaining a motion equal to that of B.

DEMONSTRATION.

Let it be supposed, for example, that in place of A
there are two Bs that is (by hypothesis) A is divided
into two equal parts. Each one then has the same
inertia and (by hypothesis) the force in each is equal.
If now these two parts are joined together their
velocity remaining the same there will be a body A
whose force and quantity will be equal to two Bs or
double that of one B. Q. E. D.

This follows also from the definition of motion, for
zvhen a larger body is moved there is more matter
separated from the surrounding matter. There is,

88 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

therefore, more of a separation, that is (per Def. 8)
more motion. See also Def. VIII.

Proposition XXII.

If a body A is equal to another body B and moves
with twice the velocity of B, the force or motion in A
is also double that of B. (Vid. Fig. Prop. 20).

DEMONSTRATION.

Let it be supposed that B, when it first received a
certain force acquired a velocity of four degrees. If
it is not acted upon by some external force it will con-
tinue to move with the same velocity (per Prop. 14).
Suppose now, that by a new impulse it receives a new
force equal to that which it first received. It will
thus acquire four other degrees of velocity beside
those that it had before, which (per the same Prop.)
it will retain. Thus it will be moving with twice
its former velocity, or with the velocity of A, and
have double its former force or a force equal to that
of A. Therefore the motion in A is double that in B.
Q. E. D.

It should be noted here, that by force (vis) we
understand the quantity of motion. This, in bodies of
equal size, will vary according to the velocity, for in a
given time the distance by which equal bodies arc
separated from those tangent to them varies with the
velocity. Therefore those moving more swiftly have
more motion (per Def. 8). In bodies at rest by the
force of resistance we understand the quantity of rest.
From which follow:

PART II 89

Corollary I.

The more slowly bodies move, the more they par-
take of rest, for bodies having a greater velocity
meeting those which have less force, resist more and
are not separated so far from bodies immediately con-
tiguous to them.

Corollary II.

// a body A moves with double the velocity of a
body B which is twice as large as A, they contain an
equal amount of motion and force.

demonstration.

If B is twice as large as A, but A moves with twice
the velocity of B, and C is only half as large as B and
moves only half as fast as A (per Prop. 21), B will
have twice the force of C and A will have twice the
motion of C (per Prop. 22). Therefore (per Ax. 15)
B and A have an equal motion, for the motion of each
is double that of the third body C. Q. E. D.

Corollary III.

From these corollaries it follows that motion must
be distinguished from velocity. For we can conceive
of bodies which have an equal velocity, but one of
them having more motion than the other (per Prop.
21). And on the other hand, bodies with an unequal
velocity may have an equal motion (per Coroll.
II. above). This, also, is evident from the definition
of motion which is nothing but the transference of
one body from the vicinity, etc.

It should be noted that this corollary is not at vari-

90 PRINCIPLES OP DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

ancc with the first. For velocity is conceived in two
ways: Either so far as a body in a given time is
further or nearer removed from those bodies imme-
diately contiguous to it, and so far partakes more or
less of rest, or so far as in a given time it describes
a longer or a shorter line and so far is distinguished
from motion.

I might add other propositions to explain more fully
Proposition 14, in regard to other points, as we have
done in regard to motion. But it is sufficient to read
Art. 43, Part II. of the Principles, and to add one
Proposition only in order to understand what follows.

Proposition XXIII.

When the modes of a body arc forced to suffer
change, this change is always, under the circumstances,
a minimum one.

DEMONSTRATION.

This proposition follows sufficiently clearly from
Prop. 14.

Proposition XXIV — Rule 1.

// tzvo bodies, for example A and B (vid. Fig. Prop.
20) are equal, and are moving toward one another
with equal velocity, when they meet each will be re-
flected in an opposite direction without any loss of
velocity.

In this hypothesis it is evident that in order that
this opposition may be removed, either they must both
be reflected in opposite directions or one must take the
other on with it. For they are opposed (inly in regard
to their determination, not as to their motion.

PART II 91

DEMONSTRATION.

Since A and B are mutually approaching one an-
other they must suffer some change (per Ax. 19).
But since the motion of the one is not opposed to the
motion of the other (per Coroll. Prop. 19) they do
not necessarily lose any of their motion (per Ax. 19).
Therefore, the change is in their determination alone.
But we can not say that the determination of only
one, e. g. B, is changed unless A, by which it was
changed, is supposed tx> be stronger (per Ax. 20).
This, however, is contrary to the hypothesis. There-
fore, since a change in the determination of only one
is impossible, it will be in both, A and B being de-
flected in opposition directions (per what was said in
ch. 2, Dioptric), each retaining its original motion.
Q. E. D.

Proposition XXV — Rule 2.

If they are unequal in mass, namely, B being greater
than A {yid. Fig. Prop. 20) other things being as
before, then A alone will be deflected and each will
move with its former velocity.

demonstration.

Since it is supposed that A is less than B, it will
have less force than B. And, since in this hypothesis
as in the last, the opposition is only in their deter-
mination, as we showed above, the variation therefore
will be in their determination alone. It will be merely
in A and not in B (per Ax. 20). Therefore, A alone
will be reflected in an opposite direction by the greater
body B, its former velocity being returned. Q. E. D.

92 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

Proposition XXVI.

// the mass and velocity are unequal, for example
B twice as large as A (via7. Fig. Prop. 20), but A
moving with double the velocity of B, other things
being as before, both will be reflected in opposite di-
rections, and each will retain its former velocity.

DEMONSTRATION.

Since A and B are moving toward one another, and
according to hypothesis the motion in one is equal to
that in the other (per Coroll. 2, Prop. 22) ; therefore,
the motion of the one is not opposed to the motion of
the other (per Coroll., Prop. 19). This hypothesis,
therefore, is so far similar to the hypothesis of Propo-
sition 24, and by the same demonstration A and B will
be reflected in opposite directions by retaining each its
former motion. Q. E. D.

COROLLARY.

From the three preceding Propositions it is evident
that in order that a body be moved the determination
of that body requires a force equal to its motion.
Whence, it follows that a body which has lost more
than half of its determination and more than half of
its motion suffers more change than one which has
lost all of its determination.

Proposition XXVII — Rule 3.

// A and B arc equal in mass, but B moves a little
more rapidly than A, not only is A reflected back in
an opposite direction, but B gives to it one-half of its

PART II 93

excess of motion, and both move in the same direction
with an equal velocity.

DEMONSTRATION.

A (by hypothesis) is opposed to B not only by its
determination, but also by its slowness, so far as it
partakes of the nature of rest (per CorolL, Prop. 22).
Whence, although it is reflected in an opposite direc-
tion and its determination is changed, all of its oppo-
sition (contrarietas) is not destroyed. Therefore (per
Ax. 19), there ought to be a variation both in its de-
termination and in its motion. But since by hypo-
thesis, B moves faster than A, B will have a greater
force than A (per Prop. 22). Therefore, the change
proceeds from B to A, which will be reflected in an
opposite direction, which was the first point to be
proved.

Then, so long as A moves more slowly than B, it
will be opposed to B (per CorolL 1, Prop. 22). Conse-
quently there ought to be a variation in A until it
moves with a velocity equal to B's (per Ax. 19). But
in this hypothesis it is not impelled by some stronger
force so that it should move more rapidly than B.
Since it is impelled by B, it can not move slower than
that body, nor can it move faster : therefore, it must
move with a velocity equal to B's.

Further, if B gave less than one-half of its excess
of velocity to A, A would move slower than B ; if
more than one-half, then faster, which as we have
shown, is absurd. Therefore, the variation will con-
tinue until B has given one half of its excess of
velocity to A, which B would therefore lose. So, also,
they will both move without any opposition with an
equal velocity in the same direction. Q. E. D.

94 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

COROLLARY.

It follows, that a body moving with a greater
velocity has the more determination, so that it tends
the more to move in a straight line ; and, on the
other hand, a body moving more slowly has less de-
termination.

SCHOLIUM.

Lest the reader confuse the force of determination
(vim determinationis) with the force of motion
(vi motus), it seems best to explain these terms. If
now the bodies A and C are equal, and are moving
toward one another with an equal velocity, they will

be deflected back (per
£\ Prop. 24), each retaining
/ its former velocity. If
there is a body C at B and
it moves obliquely toward
A its determination is less
than its motion equaling
^~^ the line B D or the line C

JL A. Therefore, although

L4'i the motion in the two cases

is the same, the force of
determination of C moving directly toward A is
greater than the force of determination of C mov-
ing obliquely from B toward A in the ratio of AB to
CA. Since it is here supposed that A and B move
with an equal velocity, the time B consumes in moving
from B to A or A C, which measures its opposition to
A, will be to A's time as B A to A C. When the body
C, moving from B along the line B A, strikes A, it will
be deflected along the line of A B/ B' being on B C

PART II 95

produced so that B' C is equal to B C. And since the
motion of the two bodies is equal the time B consumes
in traversing the perpendicular distance A C is greater
than the time of A in moving an equal distance or, to
such a degree it is opposed to the determination of A,
which is the stronger. In order that the determination
of C moving from B toward A, may be equal to the de-
termination of C (or from the hypothesis, to A), it is
necessary that the motion from B be to the motion
from C as B A is to C A. Then when it strikes the
body A obliquely, A will be reflected back to A' and
B toward B', each retaining its former velocity. But
if B is as much greater than A as the line B A than
C A, then B will repel A toward A' and give of its
motion until the motion of B is to the motion of A as
the line B A is to C A, and by losing the motion which
it has transferred to A it will proceed in the direction
it was first moving. For example, if the line A C is
to the -line A B as I to 2, and the motion of A to the
motion of B as 1 to 5, then B will give to A one de-
gree of motion, and will repell it in an opposite direc-
tion, while B, having lost one-fifth of its motion, will
move on in the same direction as before.

Proposition XXVIII — Rule 4.

If a body A (vid. Fig., Prop. 2/), a little larger
than B, is at rest, it will not be moved however great
the velocity of B, but B will be deflected at an angle
retaining its former motion.

Note. — Of these bodies there is opposition of three
kinds : One when the one meets the other and they
both move on with an equal velocity ; the second when
one is reflected in an opposite direction the other re-

96 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

maining at rest ; the third when one is deflected from
its course and gives some part of its motion to the
body at rest. There is no fourth kind as is seen from
Prop. 13. Therefore it will be evident (per Prop.
23) that conformable to our hypothesis the least pos-
sible change occurs in these bodies.

DEMONSTRATION.

If B moves A, until both move with the same
velocity, it must give from its own motion (per Prop.
20) all that A acquires and consequently would lose
more than half of its motion (per Prop. 21) as well
as more than half of its determination (per Coroll.,
Prop. 27). So far (per Coroll., Prop. 26) it under-
goes more change than if it lost all of its determina-
tion. And if A loses a part of its rest, but not so
much that it moves with a velocity equal to B's, then
the opposition of the two bodies is not destroyed. For
A, so far as it partakes of rest, will be opposed to the
motion of B, and so far B will be deflected from its
course and will lose all of its determination and that
part of its motion which it has given to A. And this
also is a greater change than if it had lost its deter-
mination alone. The change, therefore, under our
hypothesis, since it is in the determination alone, is
the least possible that can come in these bodies, and
therefore (per Prop. 23) the only possible one. O.
E. D.

It should be noted that in the demonstration of this
Proposition, and it holds true likewise in other places,
that we have not cited Prop. 19, where it was dem-
onstrated, that the entire determination of a body may
change, the motion remaining the same. Neverthe-
less this should be remembered in order that the force

PART II 97

of this argument may be seen. For in Prop. 23 we
do not say that the variation is the least absolutely,
but the least possible under the given conditions.
That such a change as this is possible, that is, a change
in the determination alone, is evident from Props. 18
and 19 with the Corollary.

Proposition XXIX — Rule 5.

If there is a body A, less than B, at rest (vid. Fig.
Prop. 30.), then, however slowly B moves toward A,
B will give such a portion of its motion to A that they
will move on together (Read Art. 50, Part II.
Principles) .

In this rule, as in the preceding, there are three
possible cases by which their opposition may be
destroyed. We will show that under this hypothesis
there is the least possible change in these bodies, and
so (per Prop. 23) this is the only variation.

DEMONSTRATION.

By hypothesis, B transfers to A (per Prop. 21) less
than half of its motion, and (per Coroll., Prop. 17)
less than half of its determination. But if B did not
carry A on with it, but should be reflected in an oppo-
site direction, it would lose all of its determination
and there would be a greater variation (per Coroll.,
Prop. 26). And much greater even, if it should lose
all of its determination, and at the same time a part
of its motion, as is supposed in the third case.
Therefore, the change under our hypothesis is the
least possible. Q. E. D.

q8 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

Proposition XXX-t-Rule 6.

If a body A, at rest, is exactly equal to B, a body
moving toward it, zvhen B strikes A, A will be im-
pelled and B repelled.

Here, as in the preceding, there are three possible
cases, and we will show that the resulting change is
the least possible.

DEMONSTRATION.

If the body B should take A with it until both move
with an equal velocity, then the motion in each would
be the same (per Prop. 22) and (per Coroll., Prop.

2j) B would lose half of its de-
termination and half of its motion
(per Prop. 20). If B is repelled in
an opposite direction it will lose all
of its determination but retain all its motion (per
Prop. 18). In the latter case the change is
equal to that of the former (per Coroll., Prop.
26). But neither of these is possible, for if
A remains at rest and still changes the determina-
tion of B, it must needs (per Ax. 20) be greater
than B, which is contrary to the hypothesis. And if
B act on A until both move together with an equal
velocity, B is greater than A, which is also contrary
to the hypothesis. Since neither of these results is
possible, the third case must be the result, namely, that
B impels A a little, and is repelled by A. O. E. D.
Read Art. 51, Part II. of the Principles.

PART II 99

Proposition XXXI — Rule 7.

// B and A {yid. Fig. above) are moving in the
same direction, A a little more slozvly than B, which
is following, so that it will impinge on A, and if A
is greater than B, but the excess in magnitude is not
equal to B's excess of velocity, then B will give a
part of its velocity to A, so that they will move on
together. But if the excess of motion in B does not
equal the excess of magnitude in A, then B will be
reflected back, each retaining its former velocity.

See Art. 52, Part of II. of the Principles. Here, as
above, there are three possible cases.

DEMONSTRATION.

Point one : B, which is supposed to be stronger
than A, cannot be reflected in an opposite direction
(per Props. 21 and 22, and Ax. 20). Therefore, since
B is stronger than A it will move A on with it so that
the two advance together, for as appears from the pre-
vious proposition, there is less change in this way than
in any other.

Point two : Since here B is not so strong as A it
can not move A (per Props. 21 and 22), neither (per
Ax. 20) can it give it any of its motion. Therefore
(per Coroll., Prop. 14), it will retain its former mo-
tion. Not, however, in the same direction, for it is
supposed to be impeded by A. Therefore (per what
was said in Chap 2, Diopt.), it will be reflected in
an opposite direction, each body retaining its former
motion (per Prop. 18). O. E. D.

It should be noted that here, as in the preceding-
propositions, we have assumed as proven that every

'.' VI

ioo PRINCIPLES OP DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

body meeting another by which it is absolutely im-
peded, advances no further in its former direction,
but on the contrary, is reflected in an opposite direc-
tion. To understand this read Chapter 2 of the Diopts.

SCHOLIUM.

For explaining the changes of bodies which are
mutually impelled we have so far considered two
bodies as though separated from all others, no account
being taken of other impinging bodies. For we will
consider the state and changes of those in place of the
bodies by which they are impinged on all sides.

Proposition XXXII.

If a body B is impinged on all sides by moving
particles which tend to move it in all directions, as
long as there is no other cause it will remain un-
moved.

DEMONSTRATION.

This proposition is self-evident : for if a body is
moving from the impulse of corpuscles coming from
a certain direction, the corpuscles which move it im-
pel it with greater force than others coming from
other parts, and striking it are unable to produce a
sensible effect (per Ax. 20). But this is contrary to
the hypothesis.

Proposition XXXIII.

Conditions being as in the last Proposition, a body
B can be moved in a certain direction by a force how-
ever small.

PART II 101

DEMONSTRATION.

Since, by hypothesis, B is at rest, and the particles
contiguous to it are in motion, these particles (per
Prop. 28) in touching B are repelled, each one re-
taining its former velocity. B, therefore, is being
continually left by those particles contiguous to it, and
no action is required for separating it from those
particles which come in contact with it (according to
what was remarked concerning Def. 8). Therefore,
however small the external force impinging on B, it
is still greater than that required to retain B in its
position (for we have shown that there is no force
in the bodies immediately tangent to B), and which,
added to the impact of the particles moving in the same
direction, is not greater than the impact of particles
moving in an opposite direction (for we suppose that
these particles are acting equally on all sides.)
Therefore (per Ax. 20), any external force, however
small, will move B in a certain direction. O. E. D.

Proposition XXXIV.

A body B, the conditions being as above, can not
be moved with a velocity greater than the velocity of
the body impelling it, although the particles of that
body may be moving much more rapidly.

DEMONSTRATION.

The corpuscles which, together with the external
force, impel B in a certain direction, although they
move much more rapidly than the external force is
able to move, nevertheless, since (by hypothesis) they
hive no greater force than those particles which tend

102 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

to drive B in another direction, all strength of their
determination is used in resisting these, and hence
(per Prop. 32) they give no acceleration to the body.
Therefore, since there are, according to supposition,
no other elements or causes except this external force,
nor does it receive acceleration from any other bodies
except this external force, it can not be moved with
a greater velocity than the impulse of this body.
O. E. D.

Proposition XXXV.

When a body B is so moved by an external force,
it receives the greater part of its motion from those
bodies which immediately surround it, and not from
an external force.

DEMONSTRATION.

The body B, however large it is supposed to be,
will be moved by the continued impulse of a body
however small (per Prop. 33). Let us suppose that
B is four times as large as an external body by which
it is moved. Since (by the preceding Proposition)
both will move with an equal velocity there will be
four times as much motion in B as in the body by
which it is impelled (per Prop. 21). Therefore (per
Ax. 8, Part I.), it does not receive the principal part
of its motion from this external force. And since
no other factors are present except those bodies by
which it is continually being impelled (for B is sup-
posed to be at rest), it receives the greater part of its
motion from these bodies continually acting upon it
and not from some external force, O. E. D.

Let it be noted here that we cannot say, as above,

PART II 103

that the motion of particles coming from one direc-
tion is needed to counterbalance the motion of parts
coming from an opposite direction. For bodies mov-
ing toward one another (as is here supposed) with
an equal motion are opposed to one another in their
determination alone and not in their motion1 (per
Coroll. Prop. 19) ; hence when resisting one another
they are opposed only in their determination and not
in their motion. Beside B cannot receive from
circumjacent bodies any determination and consequent-
ly no increase of velocity so far as it is distinguished
from motion. It does, however, receive motion ; there-
fore, some adventitious force being present, it must
needs be moved by these particles as we have shown
in this Proposition, and this is clear also from the
method by which we demonstrate Proposition 33.

Proposition XXXVI.

// some body, for example my hand, moves with a
uniform- motion in any direction so that it in no way
resists any bodies, nor do any bodies in any way resist
it, in the space through which it moves the bodies must
necessarily be moving in all directions and with a
velocity equal to that of my hand.

DEMONSTRATION.

A body can move through no space that is not a
plenum (per Prop. 3). That is, the space through
which my hand is moving is filled with bodies which
move under the condition given above. If you deny

1 See Proposition 24 of this book, where it was demonstrated
that bodies resisting one another are opposed only in their
determination and not in their motion.

104 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

it let it be supposed that they are at rest or are mov-
ing in some other way. If they were at rest they
necessarily resist the motion of the hand (per Prop.
14) until its motion is communicated to them so that
they move in the same direction and with a velocity
equal to that of my hand (per Prop. 20). But it is
supposed in the hypothesis that they do not resist.
Therefore, they are moving, which is the first point
to be proved. These bodies must be moving in all
directions. If you deny it let it be supposed that
they do not move in one direction, say from A to B.
If, therefore, the hand is moving from A to B it
will necessarily meet with moving particles (according
to what has just been said and according to hypo-
thesis) with a different determination from the deter-
mination of the hand. Therefore, they would resist
it (per Prop. 14) until they are moved in the same
direction as the hand itself (per Prop. 24 and Schol.
Prop. 27). And since (by hypothesis) they do not
resist the hand, they will be moving in the same direc-
tion, which was the second point.

Again, these bodies in whatever direction they move,
will all have an equal velocity. For if it be supposed
that they do not move with an equal velocity, let it
be supposed that those which move from A toward B,
do not have as great a velocity as those which move
from A toward C.
C Therefore, if the hand moves from

A to B with the same velocity as the
bodies moving from A to C (for it
-B is supposed to be able to move with an
equal velocity in any direction without resistance), the
bodies moving from A toward B will resist the hand
until they move with the hand with an equal velocity

PART II 105

(per x Props. 14 and 31). But this is contrary to
hypothesis. Therefore they will move in all directions
with an equal velocity, which was the third point.

Finally, if these bodies do not move with an equal
velocity to the hand, the hand moves either slower or
faster than they. If the former the hand would resist
the bodies which are following it in the same direc-
tion (per Prop. 31) ; if these particles move slower
than the hand, then they will resist the hand, both
cases being contrary to our hypothesis. Therefore,
since the hand does not move slower or faster than
the particles it must move with a velocity equal to
that of the particles amid which it moves. Q. E. D.

If you inquire why with an equal degree of velocity,
I would reply that it is not with a velocity absolutely
equal. Sec Schol. Coroll. Prop. 27. If then you
would ask whether the hand while, for example, it
was moving front A to B would not resist those par-
ticles at that time moving from B to A, read Prop. 33,
■in which you will see that the force of these bodies is
equalized by the force cf bodies moving from A to B
(for by the third part of this demonstration this force
is equal to that).

Proposition XXXVII.

If some body, A for example, can be moved in a
certain direction by a force however small, it is neces-
sarily surrounded by bodies which are all moving with
equal velocity in all directions.

DEMONSTRATION.

This body A is surrounded on all sides by bodies
(per Prop. 6), which are moving in all directions with
an equal velocity. For if they were at rest the body A

io6 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

(as is supposed), could not be moved in a given direc-
tion by a force however small, but only by a minimum
force which was able to move A together with the
bodies which immediately surround it (per Ax. 20).
Then if the bodies by which A is surrounded are
moved in one direction with a greater force than in
another, for example, from B to C than from C to B,

since as we have already shown it is
(j\^- — surrounded on all sides by moving

bodies, it will necessarily be moved
along the line from B to C (per Prop. 30). Hence
a force however small would not suffice to move A
from C to B, but one sufficient to overcome this excess
of motion toward B would be required (Ax. 20).
Therefore these bodies must be moving in all direc-
tions with an equal force.

SCHOLIUM.

Since these things are true of fluid bodies, it follows
that fluid bodies are those which are divided into
minute parts, which are moving in all directions with
equal velocity. And, although these particles cannot
be seen even T)y the eye of a lynx, still the truth of
what we have thus demonstrated cannot be denied.
For, in Propositions 10 and 11 it was shown that the
subtlety of nature is so great that it cannot be known
(I shall not say by the senses). Beside, as was also
shown above, since bodies only by their rest resist
other bodies, and as the senses tell us hardness is
nothing else than the resistance the parts of a body
offer to our hands, we conclude that those bodies are
hard whose particles are, with regard to another at
rest, and near together.

Read Articles 54, 55, and 56, Part TT. Prin.

The Principles of Philosophy Demonstrated
by the Method of Geometry.

Part III.

The universal principles of nature having been pre-
sented, we must proceed now to explain those things
which follow from them. But since the things which
follow from these principles are more than can ever be
known, and since we are not determined by them to
one thing rather than another, first of all a brief history
should be given of the principal phenomena whose
causes we are to investigate. This you have in
Articles 5 to 15, Part III. of the Principles. And from
Articles 20 to 40 the hypothesis is expressed which
Descartes deemed best fitted not only to explain the
phenomena of the world, but also for investigating
their natural causes.

The best way to understand the nature of plants or
of men is to see how they arise and develop from
their germ cells. Principles perfectly simple and easily
known should be found from which we can demon-
strate that the heavens, the earth, and all the visible
world could have arisen as from cells, although we
know full well that they have not actually done so.
For in this way we will explain their nature much
better than if we only describe them.

I say that we are seeking for principles which are
simple and easily known. Unless such are found we
do not desire any at all. For we are only adding

107

io8 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

the first principles to what has been given in order
that the nature of these things may more easily be
known, and that we may, according to the method
of mathematics, advance from what is perfectly clear
to that which is more obscure, and from the simple
to what is more complex.

Therefore, we said that we are seeking the prin-
ciples from which we might demonstrate that the
heavens, the earth, etc., could have arisen. We are
not seeking merely the causes which are sufficient, for
explaining the phenomena of the heavens as is now
and then done by astronomers. But we are seeking
for those principles which will lead us to a knowledge
of all those things in the earth (for we believe that
all those things which we observe in the earth should
be included in the phenomena of nature). In order
that these may be found, the following points should
be observed in a valid hypothesis :

I. That (considered in itself alone), it implies no
contradiction.

II. That it should be as simple as possible.

III. That what follows from it may be easily
known.

IV. That all things observed in all nature can be
deduced from it.

Finally, we said, that we might assume an hypo-
thesis from which, as from a cause we are able to
deduce the phenomena of nature although we know
that these phenomena have not thus arisen. In order
that this may be understood I will give an example.
If a person should find on a paper the curved line
which we call a parabola and wished to investigate
its nature it would make no difference whether he
regarded it as first cut from some cone and then placed

PART III 109

upon the paper, or whether he regarded it as generated
from the movement of two straight lines, or as derived
in some other way. In whatever way he conceives
it to have been generated, he wishes to demonstrate
all the properties of the parabola from it. Indeed,
although he knows that it was made from the cone,
he will be free to assign some other cause which seems
to him better adapted to explain all its properties.
So also in order to explain the forms of nature we
may assume any hypothesis at will, provided we de-
duce from it, through mathematical inference, all the
phenomena of nature. And, what is even more
worthy of note, we can scarcely assume anything, from
which we may not, perhaps with more labor, through
the laws of nature given above, deduce the same
results. For since in accordance with these laws,
matter assumes successively all the forms of which
it is capable, if we consider these forms in order we
will come finally to the form in which the world
exists. We need not fear, therefore, the error of a
false hypothesis.

A POSTULATE.

We ask that it be conceded that, in the beginning,
all matter of which the visible world is composed
was divided by God into particles as nearly as possible
equal to one another. These particles, however, from
which now the heavens and the stars are composed
were not spherical, for a number of spheres joined
together do not fill up the space they occupy ; but they,
small in size, were fashioned in some other way.
These particles had in them just as much motion as
there is in the world to-day and they were all moving
with an equal velocity. Not only did single particles

no PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

mutually separate from one another move about their
own center as if they composed a fluid body, such as
we think the heavens to be, but there are many mov-
ing together around certain other points, equally re-
mote and like disposed and now the centers of fixed
bodies ; then also, there were some around other points
which equal the number of the planets. And so they
compose as many vortices as there are stars in the
world. Vid. Fig. Art. 47, Part III. of the Principles.

This hypothesis considered in itself implies no con-
tradiction; for it attributes nothing to matter except
divisibility and motion, which we have already dem-
onstrated to really exist in matter. And since we
have shown that matter is indefinite, and the earth and
the heavens are one and the same, we can suppose
without a trace of contradiction, that these modifica-
tions are in all matter.

Then this hypothesis is a very simple one, because
there is no irregularity or dissimilarity in the particles
into which matter was divided at the beginning, nor
in their motion. For these reasons this hypothesis is
also very easy to understand. This is evident also
from the fact that in this hypothesis nothing is assigned
to matter except that which is known to any one from
the concept of matter alone, namely, divisibility and
motion in space.

We shall attempt to show, as far as it may be done
and in the following order, that all that we observe in
nature can be deduced from this alone. In the first
place we will deduce the fluidity of the heavens from
this postulate and explain how this is the cause of
light. Then we shall proceed to consider the nature
of the sun and those things which are observed in

PART III in

the fixed stars. Afterward we shall speak of comets
and of the planets and their phenomena.

DEFINITIONS.

I. By the Equator (per Eclipticam) we understand
that part of a rotating body, which as it turns on its
axis, describes the greatest circle.

II. By the Poles we understand those parts of a
rotating body most remote from the Equator, or which
describe minimum circles.

III. By the Conatus to move (conatum ad motum)
we do not understand some form of thought, but only
that a part of matter is so placed and impelled to
move that, if it is not impeded by some external cause,
it will really move somewhere.

IV. By an Angle we understand that part of a body
which extends beyond its spherical form.

AXIOMS.

I. A number of spheres joined together cannot fill
the space they occupy.

II. A portion of matter divided into angular parts
requires more space, if these parts each move about
its own center, than if they are all at rest and the sides
of all are immediately and mutually tangent to one
another.

III. A smaller part of matter is easier divided by
a given force than a larger one.

IV. Parts of matter moving in the same direction
which do not in this motion recede from one another,
are not really divided.

ii2 PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

Proposition I.

The parts into which matter was first divided are
not spherical but angular.

DEMONSTRATION.

In the beginning all matter was divided into equal
and similar parts (per Postulate). Therefore (per
Ax. i and Prop. 2, Part II.) they are not spherical
but (per Def. 4) thus far angular. Q. E. D.

Proposition II.

The force which causes the particles of matter to
move about their own centers, also causes the angles
of these particles to be worn away.

DEMONSTRATION.

In the beginning all matter was divided into equal
and angular parts, (per Postulate and Prop. 1). If the
angles were not- worn away when they began to move
around their centers, all matter would occupy (per
Ax. 2) more space than if they were at rest. But
this is absurd (per Prop. IV., Part II). Therefore
their angles begin to wear away as soon as they began
to move. Q. E. D.

APPENDIX

CONTAINING

COGITATA METAPHYSICA,

In which are briefly discussed some questions

and difficulties which occur in regard to

Being and its Affects, God and His

Attributes, and the Human

Mind.

BENEDICTUS DE SPINOZA,

Amsterdam.

113

APPENDIX

CONTAINING

COGITATA METAPHYSICA.

Part I,

In which some points relating to Being and its Affects
are briefly explained.

Chapter I.

Concerning Real Being, Fictitious Being, and Being

of Reason.

Concerning the definition of knowledge (Scientia)
I shall say nothing, not even of the knowledge of the
things here discussed. I shall only attempt to explain
some obscure points in those authors who write on
Metaphysics.

We shall begin, therefore, with

Definition of Being, by which I mean, all of that

which, when it is clearly and distinctly

conceived is found to exist necessarily, or at least to be

able to exist.

From this definition, or, if you pre-

Chu^Z'anf%°eAng fer> from this description, it follows

reaieason are not ^at chimeras, fictitious being and

being of the reason can in no way be

called real. For chimeras 1 by their nature do not

1 By chimera is understood a being which by nature involves
a contradiction as is clearly shown in Chapter III.

no THE COG1TATA METAPHYSICA

exist. Fictitious being precludes any clear and distinct
concept, because man by his mere power of Freedom,
not unknowingly as in false concepts, but advisedly
and intelligently, connects what he wishes to connect,
and dissociates what he will. Finally, being of reason
is nothing except a mode of thought which pertains
most properly to the intellect, viz., to retention, to
understanding, and to the imagination. It should
here be noted that by mode of thought we mean, as
was explained in Schol. Prop. Pt. L, all forms of
mental states as understanding, joy, imagination, etc.

That there are certain modes of
in what zvay objects thought which serve the purpose of

are retained in . . - . r - . , ,

memory. retaining objects firmly in the mind,

and of recalling them when we wish,
is evident to all who use the well-known rule of
memory; viz., that by which, for retaining anything
in memory and impressing it upon the mind, it is asso-
ciated with some other thing familiar to us, either
by name, or because of its contiguity with that object.
In this way philosophers have reduced all natural
objects to certain classes called genera, species, etc.,
and to these they refer all new objects as they are met.

Then, for explaining things we have
Z"«E£ Zlal also modes of thought derived by com-
paring one object with another. Such
modes as these are time, number, measure, etc. Of
these time serves for explaining duration, number for
discrete quantities, and measure for continuous quan-
tity.

Finally since we have become accus-

Uiml&ne™linll lomcd to picture all of those things

which we understand, even the images
of our fancy at times, it happens that we imagine non-

PART I 117

being positively, as an image of some real being. For
mind considered as a thinking being has no more
power to affirm than to deny. And since to imagine is
only to perceive the traces in the brain produced by
the movement of the spirits, which in turn are caused
by the stimulation of the senses by an external object,
such a sensation can only be a confused affirmation.
Hence we imagine all the forms of thought which the
mind uses for denying as blindness, the limits or
termini, the end, shade, etc., are beings.
„, , . , It is thus evident that such modes

Why beings of

reason are not of thought are not ideas of things, nor

ideas of th/Ut£[S

but are so can they, in any possible way be so

considered. . ., , rT^1 . . .

considered. I hey have no object,
which necessarily exists, as the source of the idea, nor
could such an object possibly exist. The reason such
forms of thought are so often held for ideas of things
is that they arise so directly from real things, that
those who do not very carefully attend to their thought
readily confuse such forms of thought with the things
themselves. For this cause also, they give names to
these ideas as if they signified some real extra-mental
object, which being, or rather non-being, they call
beings of the reason.

It is easy to see how inapt is the

It is not correct to ,. . . ......... -r» • • 1

divide Being into division which divides lieing into real

real being and 1 • , j * • r ,1 tt>

being of reason, being and being of the reason, hor
they divide Being into being and non-
being or into being and a mode of thought. How-
ever, I do not wonder that philosophers sometimes fall
into these verbal or grammatical errors. For they
judge objects from the names and not names from the
objects.

u8 THE COGITATA METAPHYSICA

in what seme Those who sav that being of the

being of the J °

reason may be reason is nothing, however, are not

called nothing, m °

and in what less in error. If you seek for some

sense YCQ.I

meaning for these terms apart from
the mind you find nothing; but if we understand by
the term a mode of thought, then it signifies something
real. For if I ask what a species is, I only inquire
for the nature of that form of thought as something
real and to be distinguished from other modes. These
modes of thought, moreover, cannot be called ideas,
nor can they be said to be true or false, just as love,
e. g., cannot be called true or false but only good or
evil. So when Plato said that " man is a biped with-
out feathers," he did not err more than if he had said
that man is a rational animal. For Plato knew that
man was a rational animal as well as he knew the
other. He merely put man into a certain class, so
that when he wished to reflect upon man by recurring
to the class in which he had been classified he would
come immediately to recognize certain characteristics
as belonging to his nature. Aristotle, indeed, made
a grave mistake if he thought that Plato in this defi-
nition attempted to express the essence of human
nature. Whether Plato did well we may question, but
this is not the place to discuss that.

From all that has been said above

In our investigation . f .

of things, real it appears that there is no conformity

being must not . ... , , . f

be confused with between real being and being of rea-
being of reason. gon^ Therefore, it is easily seen how

seduously we must be on our guard lest we confuse
the two. For it is one thing to inquire into the nature
of things and quite another to inquire into the nature
of the modes of thought under which they are per-
ceived. If we do not keep this distinction clear we

PART I 119

will be unable to understand modes of perception, or
the nature of things in themselves. But what is more
important, since this affects so many things, is that
this is the reason we often fall into such great error.

It should be noted also that many

I11 what way being . --,'..

of reason and confuse being of reason and fictitious

fictitious being . . „.. . . , . .

are distinguish- being. 1 hey think that the one is
equal to the other because neither has
an extra-mental existence. But if they would con-
sider the definitions of each, great and important dif-
ferences would be found, not only in respect to their
cause, but in their nature apart from their cause.

For we affirm that fictitious being is nothing but
two terms connected by the mere act of volition with-
out any dependence upon reason. Being of reason
does not depend upon the will alone nor is it formed
by terms, as is evident without a rational connection
between them, from the definition itself. If one should
ask, therefore, whether fictitious being, or being of
reason is real it should be answered that it is wrong
to divide all being into real being and being of reason.
The question is fundamentally wrong for it presup-
poses that all being is divided into real being and being
of reason.
~, >• • • * But to return to the proposition

1 lie division of if

Being. from which we seem to have digressed.

From the definition of Being or, if you prefer, from its
description, it is now easily seen that Being should not
be divided into Being which, because of its own nature
necessarily exists, or Being whose essence involves
existence, and into Being whose essence involves only
a possible existence. This last is divided into Sub-
stance and Modes, the definitions of which are given in
the Principles of Phil, Pt. I., Articles 51, 52 and 56.

120 THE COGITATA METAPHYSICA

We need not, therefore, repeat them here. In regard
to this, however, and I say it deliberately, I wish it to
be noted that Being is divided into Substance and
Modes, not into Substance and Accidents. For Acci-
dent is nothing but a mode of thought and exists only
in regard to this. For example, when I say that a tri-
angle is moved the motion is not a mode of the triangle
but of the body moved. Therefore, in respect to the
triangle motion is only an accident but in respect to
the body it is real being or mode ; for motion cannot
be conceived without a body but it may without a
triangle.

Further, in order that we may the better understand
what has been said and what is to follow, we will
attempt to explain briefly what is meant by the terms
essence, existence, idea, and power. We are the more
urged to do this by the ignorance of those who do not
recognize the distinction between essence and exist-
ence, or if they do recognize it still confuse the terms
essence with the terms idea or power. Therefore, in
order to help them and to make the matter plain we
attempt to explain this as clearly as possible.

Chapter II.

What should be understood by the terms Essence,
Existence, Idea and Power.

In order that it may be known what content to give
to these four terms, it is necessary that we should
understand clearly what may be said of uncreated sub-
stance, or God. Namely:

PART I 121

I. That God eminently contains
All created things all that is formally contained in created

are eminently

contained in God. things, that is, Grod has certain at-
tributes in which these created things
are more eminently contained than in the things them-
selves. (Vid. Pt. I. Ax. 8, and Coroll. I. Prop. 12 >.
For example, we can clearly conceive of extension
without existing objects, and thus, since it has no
power of existence in itself, we have shown that it
was created by God (Prop. 21, Pt. I.). And, since
there must be as much perfection in the cause as there
is in the effect, it follows that God contains all the
perfection of existence. But since we find later that
extended matter is divisible, that is, that it contains
a mark of imperfection, we cannot, therefore, attribute
extension to God. We are thus compelled to admit
that God has some attribute more excellent than all
the perfection of matter and thus contains (Schol.
Prop. 9, Pt. I.) what the defects of matter cannot
supply.

2. God understands Himself and all other objects;
that is, He holds all things objectively, in Himself
(Pt. I. Prop. 9)

3. God is the first cause of all things, and works
from an absolute freedom of will.

From these things it is evident what

understood by we must understand bv these four

iZTInd "™?" terms. In the first place Essence in

nothing else than that mode by which

created objects are comprehended in the attributes of

God; an idea is Idea so far as all things are objectively

contained in the idea of God ; Power is so called in

respect to the power of God, by which, by an absolute

freedom of will He was able to create everything that

122 THE COGITATA METAPHYSICA

exists ; finally, existence is the essence of things
apart from God, and, considered in itself alone, is
attributed to things after they have been created by
God.

These four terms From this {t is evident that these

are not distin- four terms are not to be distinguished

guished the one &

from the other except in created objects; in God, in

except m created

objects. no way can they be differentiated.

For we cannot conceive that God is in the power of
another, and His existence, and His understanding
are not to be separated from His essence.

From what has been said we can

A reply to certain j-i i , . • ,■

questions con- readily reply to certain questions

Essenc8e.G°dS which have been asked- Sucll> f°r

example, are the following: Whether
essence is different from existence; and if different, is
it something diverse from idea; and if different from
idea, does it comprehend something extra-mental;
which last follows from necessity. To the first in
regard to distinction we would reply, that essence in
God is not different from existence, indeed the one
cannot be conceived without the other. In other
things essence differs from existence, for the one may
be conceived without the other. To the second point
we respond, that things which can be clearly and dis-
tinctly conceived as extra-mental are something differ-
ent from idea. But then it is asked, whether that
which is extra-mental exists in itself alone, or whether
it has been created by God. To this we reply, that
formal essence does not exist by its own power, nor
even when created. These two conditions presup-
pose that the object exists in fact ; but they depend
upon the divine essence alone, in which all things are
contained. So far we would assent to the opinion of

PART I 123

those who affirm that the essence of things is eternal.
Again it may be asked, How can we understand the
essence of things, when God's nature is not yet known;
for all things, as we have just said, depend upon the
nature of God. To this I reply that it is possible
from the fact that things are now actually created.
For if things were not yet created I would concede
that it would be impossible until we had an adequate
knowledge of God's nature. In the same way it is
impossible, indeed more impossible then for us to
know the orderly nature of the applications of a para-
bola whose nature is not yet known.

Although the essence of non-exist-

Why the author in . . 1 1 1 • ,1

his definition of ing modes is comprehended in the

essence Tcfevs to 1 i* 1 1 1 1 *

the attributes of substance oi these modes, and their
God' real essence is these substances, never-

theless we desire to refer them to God in order to ex-
plain the essence of modes and of substances in general
terms, and because the essence of modes was not in
substance prior to creation and we are seeking for an
eternal essence.

I do not think it worth while to re-
Why the definitions fute those authors who think difTer-

of others are m

not examined. ently from us, or even to examine their
definitions or descriptions of essence
and existence ; this would only make what is clear
more obscure. What, indeed, is better known than
the meaning of essence or existence? How can we
give a definition of anything which does not at the
same time explain its essence?

Finally, if any philosopher is yet in
HTJtlfxfZc^rT doubt whether essence and existence

between essence

and existence can are distinguishable in created objects,

easily be seen. ° J

he need not take much trouble to re-

124 THE COGITATA METAPHYSICA

move that doubt. For if he will merely approach
some statue or object of wood, he will see how he
conceives of the object not yet existing in a certain
manner, and how he knows that it is really existing.

Chapter III.

Concerning those things which are Necessary, Im-
possible, Possible, and Contingent.

The nature of being as being hav-
What is here ing been explained we would next con-

understood by • ■, r •. rr t. i

the Affects sider some of its affects. It may be

remarked here, that by affects we
understand what Descartes termed attributes (Pt. I.
Prin. Phil. Art. 52). For being, considered merely
as being does not affect us as substance. Wherefore
it must be explained by some attribute which is recog-
nized only by reason. Wherefore I cannot wonder
enough, at the extreme subtlety of those who, not
without deleterious consequences to truth, try to find
some middle ground between being and nothing. But
I will not delay to refute this error, seeing that it
fades into their own vain subtlety when they attempt
to give a definition of the affects.

We then take up the matter at once
DeAffec°tl °f the and say : The affects of being are cer-
tain attributes under which we conic
to understand the essence or existence of every single
thing, which attributes, however, are only distinguish-
able by reason. I shall attempt here to explain cer-
tain things about these (for I do not assume that all
understand this thoroughly) and to separate by proper
terms those things which are not the affects of being.

PART I 125

First I shall discuss what is meant by necessary and
impossible.

There are two ways in which a tiling

In how many ways

a thing may be may be said to be necessary or impos-

SOltl to \)€ 1\€C€Sm

sary or impos- sible, viz., in respect to its essence or
its cause. In respect to His essence
we know that God necessarily exists. For His essence
cannot be conceived without existence. From the
implicated essence of chimeras they cannot exist. In
respect to their cause, things, i. e., materials, are either
impossible or necessary. For if we merely regard
their essence, it is possible to clearly conceive of that
without their existence. Therefore, they cannot exist
by the power and necessity of their own essence but
only by the power of their cause, viz., God the
creator of all things. If, thus, it is the divine decree
that something should exist, it exists from necessity,
or if less than this, it will be impossible for it to exist.
For it is a self-evident fact that that which has no
cause, internal or external, for its existence, cannot
possibly exist. And an object under this hypothesis
is so conceived that it cannot exist by the power of
its own essence, by which I mean an internal cause,
nor by the divine decree, the one external cause of all
things. Whence it follows that objects under such
condition cannot exist at all.

It should be noted: I. A chimera
a chimera is right- because it exists neither in the intel-

ly called a mere , ,, . . . , ,,

verbal being. lect nor in the imagination is rightly

called a mere verbal being ; for we can

only express this idea in words. For example, we use

the words " a square circle/' expressing it in words,

but we are by no means able to imagine it, much less

126 THE C0G1TATA METAPHYSICA

to understand it. Therefore chimera is only a word
and cannot be numbered among the affects of being.

2. We must remember that not only
°hF*£%£. does the existence of all created things

7romeXGoTlce depend upon God's decree, but their
essence and nature as well. This will
be clearly shown in Part II. below. Whence it follows
that created objects have no necessity in themselves,
for their essence is not self derived. No more do
they exist by their own power.

3. Finally, it should be noted that

TI[erJatedSSol%'cts is tne necessity of created objects, such
derived from as we £nc| there from the power of

their cause, and "

relates to their the cause, is either in respect to their

essence or exist- *■ _

ence. in God essence or to their extension. These

these two things . t

are not to be two must be distinguished in created

distinguished. 1 . rT,1 . . .

objects. I he one depends upon the
eternal laws of nature, the other upon the series and
the order of its causes. In God whose essence and
existence are the same, necessity of essence is equiva-
lent to necessity of existence. Whence it follows that
if we conceive of the whole order of Nature we will
find that many things cannot exist whose nature we
conceive clearly and distinctly, that is, whose nature
is such of necessity. For we find that it is equally
impossible for such things to be, as for example we
know that it is impossible for a great elephant to pass
through the eye of a needle. Nevertheless the nature
of each is clearly conceived.

Therefore things of this nature do not exist except
chimeras, which we are able neither to imagine nor
to understand.

PART I 127

So much concerning necessity and
Possibility and con- impossibility ; to which it seems best
alhctPo™ 'things, t° add a few remarks concerning what
is possible and what is contingent.
For by some, these two terms are considered affects
of things, although, in truth, they are nothing more
than defects of our intellect. This I shall clearly show
after I have explained what should be understood by
these terms.

A thing; is said to be possible when

What is possible, ° . L

what is contin- ive understand its efficient cause, out
do not know zvhether it is determined.
Therefore, we may consider that to be possible which
is neither necessary or impossible. If now we attend
merely to the essence of a thing and not to its cause,
we say it is contingent ; that is, when we consider
any things between the extremes God and chimeras.
This is true, for from a part of their essence we find
no necessity of existence in these things as in God,
nor impossibility of existence as in chimeras. If any
one wishes to call that contingent which I call possible
and possible what I call contingent I shall not contra-
dict him. For I am not accustomed to dispute about
mere names. It will be sufficient if it is only admitted
that these arise not because of something real, but
only because of defects of our perception.

If any one chooses to deny this his

Possible and con- . 1 . . , ■c-.i

tingent only sig- error may be pointed out with little
our understand- trouble. For if he will consider Na-
mg' ture and how it all depends upon God,

he will find nothing contingent. That is, he will find
nothing, which, from a part of the object is able to
exist and not exist, or, as it is generally expressed, the
contingent is the real. This is evident, also, from

128 THE COGITATA METAPHYSICA

what was said in Ax. 10, Pt. I. namely, that no more
power was needed to create the world than to con-
serve it. Therefore no created object does anything
by its own power for the same reason that it did not
begin to exist by its own power. From which it fol-
lows that nothing has been created except by the power
of the Cause which has created all things, namely, the
power of God, who by His concurrence procreates
everything every single moment. And since nothing
exists except by divine power alone, it is easily seen
that the world as produced by God's decree is such as
he wished it to be. So, too, since there is no change or
inconstancy in God (per Prop. 18 and Coroll. Prop.
20, Pt. I.), those things which He now produces, He
has decreed from eternity that they should be pro-
duced. Then since nothing more is needed for their
existence than God's decree that they should exist, it
follows that the necessity of the existence of all created
things has existed from eternity. Nor can we say
that these things are contingent since God might have
decreed otherwise. For since in eternity there are no
effects of time neither a future nor a past, it follows
that God did not exist before that decree, so that he
was able to decree something else.

Whatever pertains to the freedom
The reconciliation 0f the human will, which we have said

of our Freedom

with the predes- is free ( Schol. Prop. 1 5, Pt. I.), that

tination of God's 1

will surpasses also is conserved by the concurrence

human under- . ^, , ■>, . ,. .

standing. of God. Nor is there any man who

wishes or does anything who does not
do as God has decreed from eternity that he should
choose or act. In what way this is possible, human
freedom being preserved, man is unable to understand.
Since we clearly conceive this, our ignorance of how

PART I 129

it can be should not lead us to reject this truth. For
we clearly and distinctly understand, if we consider
our nature, that we are free in our actions, and we
deliberate about many things simply because we choose
to do so. And on the other hand if we consider the
nature of God in the way we have indicated, we see
clearly and distinctly that all things depend upon Him
and that nothing exists except as it has been decreed
from all eternity. In what way the human will can
be thus procreated by God so that it retains its free-
dom, we do not know. Indeed, there are many things
which surpass our comprehension, and yet we know
that they are so ordained by God ; as for example, that
there is a real division of matter into indefinite parts,
which was sufficiently proven in Proposition 11, Part
II. although we do not understand how such a divi-
sion can be. These two motions, viz., possible and
contingent, which we use in place of the thing known,
only signify a defect of our knowledge about the
existence of the given object.

Chapter IV.

Concerning Duration and Time.

Because above, we have divided

What Eternity is. , . • « . •,

being into being whose essence in-
volves existence, and being whose essence involves
only a possible existence, there arises the distinction
between eternity and duration. Concerning eternity
we will speak at length below. Here we would only
say that it is an attribute tinder which zve conceive the

infinite existence of God. Duration is

What Duration is. .. , , . .

an attribute under which we conceive

130 THE COGITATA METAPHYSICA

the existence of created objects so far as they perse-
vere in their own actuality.

From which it clearly follows that

What Time is. , j. . . . . r .

duration is distinguished from the
whole existence of an object only by the reason. For,
however much of duration you take away from any
thing, so much of its existence do you detract from it.
In order to determine or measure this we compare this
with the duration of those objects which have a fixed
and a certain motion, and this comparison is called time.
Therefore, time is not an affect of things but only a
mode of thought or, as we have said, a being of rea-
son ; it is a mode of thought serving to explain dura-
tion. It should be noted under duration, as it will be
of use when below we are discussing eternity, that it is
conceived as greater or less, as it were, composed of
parts and then not only as an attribute of existence
but as the very essence of existence.

Chapter V.

Concerning Opposition, Order, etc.

Because we compare objects one with another, there
are certain notions that arise, which, however apart
from the things themselves are only modes of thought.
This is very evident, since, when we attempt to con-
sider them as objects apart from forms of thought
we hold the one for the other and render clear con-
cepts obscure. Such notions are the following, viz.,
Opposition, Order, Relation, Diversity, Connection,
Conjunction, and other similar ideas. These, I say.
are perceived by us with sufficient clearness provided
we do not conceive of them as something in the essence

PART I 131

of things, but only as modes of thought by which we
can more easily retain these objects in memory and
imagine them. Therefore, I do not think it necessary
to speak further of this but pass to those terms com-
monly called transcendental.

Chapter VI.

Concerning Unity, Truth and Goodness.

By almost all metaphysicians these terms are held
to be affects of being. For, they say, all being is
one, true and good, although no one knows about
this. By examining each one of these terms sepa-
rately we shall be able to understand their proper use.

We will begin with the first, viz.,

What Unity is. TT • r^-, . ., . . r

Unity, this term, they say, signifies
some extra-mental reality. But what this adds to
reality they are unable to say. Which sufficiently
shows that they confuse being of reason with real
being, so that what is perfectly clear becomes obscure.
We, on the other hand, would say that unity is in no
way to be distinguished from the thing itself, and
that it adds nothing to being. But it is only a mode
of thought by which we separate one thing from an-
other, when they are similar or for some reason occur
together

To the term Unity we oppose the

What Plurality is, term Plurality, which clearly adds

ZYlayhV?Jd nothing to things but is only a mode

to be one, andjn £ bought which assists us in under-

what sense sui o

generis. standing the objects of our experience.

Nor do I see that anything remains

to be said concerning a matter as self-evident as this.

132 THE COGITATA METAPHYSICA

We may add, however, that God so far as we separate
Him from other objects may be said to be one. But
so far as we think of His nature as many-sided He
cannot be called simple Unity (unum et unicum). If
we examine the matter more accurately, we can show
that God is improperly called simple unity. But this
is not of sufficient importance to make it worth the
discussion ; it is a matter that affects not the reality
but the names. Therefore we pass to the second
point and explain what we mean by ' false.'

In order to properly understand the
u/un •, +„.,* *1a terms true and false we will begin

Whac is True and ' o

what is false as AVith their signification from which it

generally under- °

stood and as will appear that they are not names

understood by

philosophers. of qualities in the things themselves

nor attributes at all except rhetorically.
Since general usage first fixed their meaning, and
they were only used afterward by philosophers, it
seems best to inquire for their primary significance.
Especially is this necessary since other sources from
the very nature of language, are wanting. The sig-
nificance of true and false seemed to have first arisen
from narration. That narration was true which was
in accord with the facts which it concerned ; that was
false which was not in accord with the facts of the
case. This use of these terms was then borrowed by
philosophers for denoting the correspondence of the
idea with the thing it represents, and the contrary.
Therefore, that idea is said to be true which repre-
sents the thing, as it is in itself. That idea is false
which does not so represent its object. For ideas are
nothing else than mental narratives or histories of na-
ture. Afterward these are metaphorically applied to
other things. As for example, that gold is true or

PART I 133

false, as if we thought that gold which we perceive
might tell us what was in itself, or what is not.

Wherefore those who believe that

True is not a . t ,

transcendental true is a transcendental term, or an
affect of being, are plainly deceived.
For we only apply this term to things improperly, or
if you prefer, rhetorically.

If you inquire further what truth
H°trueTXah dT/er.a « but a true idea, you do the same
thing as to ask what whiteness is ex-
cept a white object.

Concerning the cause of the true and the false we
have already spoken ; therefore nothing remains to be
noted which would be worth the while, if writers,
" seeking a knot in the bulrushes," did not so far en-
tangle themselves in similar folly that they are unable
to extricate themselves.

The properties of truth or of a true

What are the Prop- idea are i I. That it is clear and dis-

Certitude iT not tinct. 2. That it is beyond all doubt,

%n t mgs. or^ -n a worcjj tnaf- jt js certain. Those

who seek for certainty in the things themselves are
deceived in the same way as when they seek there for
truth. Although we say a thing is uncertain, we rhe-
torically take the object for the idea, and in the same
way we say that a thing is doubtful. Unless, per-
chance, we understand by uncertainty, contingency or
the thing which makes us uncertain or doubtful. But
there is no need to delay about this point. Therefore
we proceed to the third point and will explain what is
meant by this term and its opposite.

An object considered in itself is
Good and Evil only neither good nor evil, but only in re-

relative terms. .

spect to another being, which it helps

134 THE COGITATA METAPHYSICA

to acquire what is desired, or the contrary. Indeed,

the same thing at the same time may be both good

and evil in respect to different things. For example,

the council of Ahithophel to Absalom is called good in

the Sacred Scriptures. But it was the worst possible

to David, whose destruction it would have caused.

So there are many things which are good, but not good

for all. Health is good for man, but neither good nor

evil to senseless matter or to plants, to which it does

not apply. God is called perfectly good because He

preserves all things. He conserves all things by His

concurrence, and no greater mark of goodness could

be found than this. Nor is there any absolute evil,

as is also evident in itself.

Those who seek for some metaphysi-
al v some conceive . . . . . i 11 * r r

of a metaphysical cal good which shall be free from
relativity are laboring under a misap-
prehension of the case. They confuse a distinction of
Reason with a distinction of Reality or Modality.
They distinguish between the thing itself, and its con-
atus, by which each object is conserved, although
they do not know what they mean by the term conatus.
For these two things, although they are distinguished
by reason, or by words, which fact deceives them,
are not to be distinguished in the thing itself.

In order to understand this we will
How the thing notice a very simple example. Mo-

itself, and the . • 1 ,1 r ., ,r

conatus by which tion has the power of preserving itself

every object en- • , . , 1 • 1 1 •

deavors to con- Vl statu quo; this power clearly is
pZ7entSsifate',1 are nothing else than the motion itself,
g°uished!stt" l- e-> it is m tne nature of motion to

do so. If I say that in A there is
nothing else than a certain amount of motion, it fol-
lows that as long as I consider only this body A, I

PART I 135

must consider it as moving. For if I should say that
it has lost its power of motion, I necessarily attribute
something else to it than that which, from the hypothe-
sis, it possessed, and through this, it has lost its power
of motion. If this reason seems obscure — ■ well then
we will concede that this conatus of self-movement is
something more than the laws and nature of motion.
If, therefore, you suppose this conatus to be a meta-
physical good, from necessity you must suppose that
this conatus will have in it a conatus of self-preserva-
tion, and this another, and so on to infinity, than which
I do not know anything more absurd. The reason
some distinguish between the conatus of an object
and the thing itself is this, namely, because they find
in themselves the desire of conserving themselves,
they imagine the desire is present in everything.
Whether God could Moreover, it is asked whether God

gZd,bbeeforealled COuM haVe beei1 Called g°°d bef°re

creation. creation. From our definition it would

seem that we could not predicate such an attribute as
belonging to God, for we said that a thing considered
in itself alone can neither be said to be good or evil.
This will seem absurd to many ; but for what reason
I do not know. We attribute many things of this
kind to God, which, before creation, could not exist
except potentially ; as for example, when He is called
Creator, Judge merciful, etc. Wherefore similar ar-
guments should be allowed us here.

And further, as good and evil are
Infe™non TreiaHve] only relative terms, so also is perfec-

%absoiute.scn5e ^on» un^ess we take perfection for the
essence of the thing; in this sense, as
we have said before, God has infinite perfection, that
is infinite essence, and infinite being.

136 THE COGITATA METAPHYSICA

It is not my intention to say much more. For the
remaining remarks, which pertain to general meta-
physics, I believe, are sufficiently well known. It is
not worth while, therefore, to carry the discussion
further.

COGITATA METAPHYSICA,

Part II.

Wherein are briefly explained some points concern-
ing God and His Attributes, and concerning the Hu-
man Mind.

137

Chapter I.

Concerning the Eternity of God.

We have said above that in Nature nothing is given
except substance and modes. Therefore it will not
be expected that we shall say here anything about
substantial forms, or real qualities ; for these terms,
as well as other similar ones, are plainly inapt. We
divide substance into two general heads, namely, Ex-
tension and Thought. Thought is either created, the
human mind, or uncreated, i. e., God. God's exist-
ence we have above demonstrated a posteriori, that is,
from the idea which we have of God, and a priori, or
from His essence as the cause of His being. But,
although we have already briefly considered His at-
tributes, as the dignity of the argument requires, we
will here repeat these and explain them more fully,
and at the same time endeavor to answer certain ques-
tions bearing upon the subject.

The chief attribute, the one to be
DTjZeiStonGot considered before all others, is the
Eternity of God. This term we em-
ploy to explain His duration. Or, rather, as we can-
not predicate duration of God, we say He is eternal.
For, as we noted in the first part of this discussion,
duration is an affect of existence not of the essence
of things. And since God's existence is His essence,
we cannot say that duration belongs to Him. For
whoever predicates duration as one of God's attributes

i39

i4o THE COGITATA METAPHYSICA

differentiates between His existence and His essence.
Nevertheless, there are those who ask if God has not
existed longer than from the time of Adam, and this
seems to them to be perfectly evident since they be-
lieve that duration in no way is derived from God.
But these persons beg the question ; for they assume
that God's essence is to be distinguished from His
existence. They demand to know whether God, who
existed before the creation of Adam, has not existed
for a longer time than from the creation to the pres-
ent. They attribute, therefore, a longer duration to
God than to individual objects, as if they suppose that
He is continually created by Himself. Did they not
distinguish between God's essence and His existence,
they would never attribute duration to God, since du-
ration does not correspond to the essence of things.
No one would say that the essence of a circle or a
triangle, so far as it is eternal truth, has endured for
a longer time than from the creation of Adam. Fur-
ther, since duration is constantly conceived of as greater
or less, or as consisting of parts, it clearly follows
duration cannot be attributed to God. For qs His
being is eternal, i. e., there is no past or future to His
nature, when we find that we cannot attribute dura-
tion to Him we have shown that our concept of God is
true. If we attribute duration to God, we separate
into parts what is infinite by nature and cannot be con-
ceived except as infinite.

The reason some authors attribute

Why some authors . . ~, , -,-. -

attribute Juration duration to God, is : i. Because they
attempt to explain eternity without
considering the nature of God ; as if eternity could
be understood apart from the divine essence, or, in-
deed, as if it was anything except this. This error

PART II 141

arose from the fact that because of a defective termin-
ology, we have been accustomed to attribute eternity
to things whose essence is different from their exist-
ence. As, for example, when we say that the world
has existed from eternity, although this is not implied ;
and also that the essence of things is eternal, although
we do not think of the things as even existing.

2. Because they do not attribute duration to things
except so, far as they are conceived to be under con-
tinual change, and not as we do, only so far as their
essence is to be distinguished from their existence.

3. Finally, because they distinguish between God's
essence and His existence just as in the case of created
objects. These mistakes are at the basis of their error.
The first error was a misapprehension of the nature
of eternity, which was thought to be some form of
duration. In the second, they could not easily dis-
tinguish between the duration of created objects and
the eternity of God. Lastly, they distinguished be-
tween God's essence and His existence, and attributed
duration to God, as we have said, as though it were
an affect of existence.

In order to better understand what

What eternity is. 11 • 1 1 • 1

eternity really is and why it cannot be
conceived apart from the essence of God, we should
remember what has already been said, viz., that all
created objects or all things except God Himself ex-
ist by the power and essence of God, not by virtue of
their own essence. Hence the present existence of
objects is not the cause of their future existence, but
rather the immutability of God. So when we say that
God has created an object we are compelled to believe
that He will conserve it or continue His act of crea-
tion. From this we conclude: I. That created ob-

142 THE COGITATA METAPHYSICA

jects are said to exist because existence is not a part
of their essence. We cannot affirm existence of God,
for the existence of God is God Himself. So, also,
concerning His essence. Hence, while created objects
have duration, God does not. 2. Created objects,
while they have a present duration and existence, do
not have in themselves a future duration or existence,
for this must be continually given to them. This,
however, is not true of the essence of created objects.
Indeed, since His existence and His essence are one,
we cannot attribute a future existence to God. For
we must attribute to Him now what He has always
had. Or, to speak more properly, an infinite exist-
ence pertains to God in the same way as an infinite
intelligence. This infinite existence I call eternity.
This can be attributed to God alone, not to created ob-
jects, even though they have no end. So much con-
cerning eternity. I shall say nothing of the necessity
of God's being, for after we have demonstrated His
existence from His essence this would be useless.
Hence we proceed to unity.

Chapter II.

Concerning the Unity of God.

We have often wondered at the futile arguments
by which some have sought to establish the unity of
God. For example, such as the following: "If one
being is able to create the world, more than one would
be superfluous ; and, if all things work toward some
end, they must have a common source." Other sim-
ilar arguments might be mentioned where proof is
sought from relative or extrinsic elements. Since

PART II 143

such ideas are sometimes held, we shall, in the follow-
ing order, and as clearly and as briefly as possible,
give our demonstration.
• . . , Among the attributes of God we

God is a single

being. enumerate perfect knowledge, and add

that His perfection all arises from His own being.
But if you say that there are many Gods or perfect
beings, all of them must be omniscient. It would not
be sufficient for each one merely to know himself.
For as each is omniscient he must understand all other
beings as well as himself. From which it would fol-
low that the omniscience of each depends partly upon
himself and partly upon another. Therefore such a
being would not be absolutely perfect. That is, God
would not be a being who derives all of his perfection
from Himself. But we have already shown that God
is in every way perfect and that He exists by virtue
of His own power. From which we conclude that
God is one being. For if there were many gods it
would follow that the absolutely perfect being would
have an imperfection, which is absurd. So much con-
cerning the unity of God.

Chapter III.

Concerning the greatness of God.

We said above that finite or im-
'yTaheiZfinHe, perfect being cannot be conceived, ex-
tnrea'tiat Sense cePt we ^rst nave some concept of in-
finite and perfect being, i. e., of God.
Therefore God alone can be said to be absolutely in-
finite, since He alone possesses an infinite perfection.
He may be called great, however, or interminable, so

144 THE COGITATA METAPHYSICA

far as we think that there is no being able to impose
limitations upon Him. From which it follows that
the infinity of God — an inapt expression — is some-
thing essentially positive. For, so far as we conceive
Him to be infinite, so far we have reference to His
essence or His absolute perfection. The greatness of
God is but a relative term ; it is not used when we
consider God as an absolute or perfect being, but only
so far as He is considered as a " first cause." Here,
although He may not be perfect except in respect to
the creation of the world, nevertheless He is to be
considered great. For no being can be conceived,
and consequently there is no being more perfect than
God by which He can be limited or measured. (Con-
cerning this see Ax. 9, Pt. I.).

There are some authors who, when
What is generally they speak of the greatness of God,

understood by the .

greatness of God. seem to attribute quantity to Him.
They do this because from this attri-
bute they wish to conclude that God is everywhere
present. As if they thought that, were God not in
every place He is limited. This is even more appar-
ent in the reasons they adduce to show that God is
infinite or great (for they confuse these terms). If
God, they say, is actus puriis, as from necessity He is,
He is everywhere present and infinite ; for if He is
not in every place either He is not able to be wherever
He wishes or from necessity (N. B.) He must be
moved. From this it is evident that they attribute
greatness to God under the concept of quantity. From
the properties of extension they look for their argu-
ments for affirming the greatness of God, which is
absurd.

PART II 145

If now you ask us how we prove

God is proven to be , ~ . . ,

everywhere that God is everywhere present, we

respond that this has already been

clearly proven above, when we showed that nothing

could exist even for a single moment unless procreated

continually by the power of God.

Before we can fully understand the

God's omnipresence . . ~ -

cannot be omnipresence ot God, we must under-

stand the nature of the divine Will.
For by this all things have been created, and are con-
tinually preserved. Since this is beyond the limits of
human knowledge, it is impossible to explain His om-
nipresence.

There are some who think that

God S £Y6(lt'Vl&SS

sometimes said to God's greatness is three-fold, namely,

be threefold. tt • ±. • tt* • tt-

He is great in His essence, in His
power, and in His efficacy. But this is nonsense, for
they distinguish between God's essence and His
power.

Others affirm the same thing more
Gou\t1£k* ""' openly when they say that God is
essence fr°m h%s everywhere in power, but not in es-
sence. As if God's power could be
distinguished from His other attributes or from His
infinite essence, when it is nothing else but this. For
if it were anything but this it would either be some-
thing created or some accident of the divine essence,
without which He could still be conceived. But these
suppositions are both absurd. If it were something
created it would need God's power to be conserved,
and so a progression to infinity would be given. But
if it were some accident of His being, God would not
be a simple being, which is contrary to what was
demonstrated above.

146 the cogitata metaphysica

Nor can his Finally, by the greatness of His effi-

ommpresence. caCy tjiey w's|1 to understand some-
thing beside the essence of God by which all things
are created and conserved. Which is clearly a great
absurdity, and one into which they fall, because they
confuse the divine intellect and the human, and com-
pare God's power with the power of kings.

Chapter IV.

Concerning God's Immutability.

By the term change we here understand all that
variation which can be given, the essence of the object
remaining the same. In general, this signifies the
disintegration of the object, not absolutely, but at
least incipiently; as when we say that turf is changed
into ashes, or that men are changed into beasts. Phi-
losophers have been accustomed to use another term
for signifying this, viz., transformation. But we are
here speaking of a change which is not a transforma-
tion, as when we say the rock has changed its color,
character, etc.

We must ask now whether there is
TToSfpia^f\°n Gol any changeableness in God. For con-
cerning transformation it is not neces-
sary to say anything more than that God exists neces-
sarily ; that is, God cannot be limited in any way, or
be transformed into another God. For as soon as He
is limited there must be other gods, which proposition
we have shown to be absurd.
The causes of ^n order that we may understand

change. more fully what has just been said, we

should remember that all change arises from some

PART II 147

external cause, the subject being willing or unwilling,
or from some internal cause, viz., from the choice of
the subject itself. For example, men are black, or
they grow older and stronger, etc. In the former
case the subject is unwilling, in the latter the sub-
ject himself desires it. To desire to walk, to show
oneself angry, etc., come from internal causes.

Changes of the former kind, name-

God is not changed 1 , 111 1

by any other ly, those produced by some external
ing' cause, are not found in God, for He

alone is the cause of all things, and is not changed
by anything He has made. Beside, created objects
have in themselves no power of existence, and so much
less of causality over other objects. And although in
the Scripture it is said that God is angry and sad on
account of the sins of men, the effect is here taken for
the cause. In the same way wre say that the sun is
stronger and higher in summer than in winter, al-
though it has not changed its position or increased its
power. That such things are often taught in the Sa-
cred Scriptures is seen in Isaiah when he says, ch.
52 \2, accusing the people : " Your iniquities have
separated you from your God."
Nor even by We continue, then, and ask whether

himself. there is any self-caused change in God.

This also we at once deny, for all change that arises
from volition is made in order that the subject may
pass to a better state, which is impossible with a per-
fect being. Such a change only arises as a means of
avoiding something unpleasant or to acquire some
good which is wanting. But neither of these condi-
tions is possible with God. Therefore we conclude
that God is immutable.1

1 Note. — It will be evident, also, that God is immutable,

148 THE COGITATA METAPHYS1CA

It will be noted that I have deliberately omitted
the ordinary forms of change, although to some
degree we have also considered them. For there is
no need to show the impossibility of change in God
in respect to every point, since we have demonstrated
in Prop. 1 6, Part I., that God is incorporeal and that
these ordinary forms of change apply only to matter.

Chapter V.

Concerning the Simplicity of God.

We proceed to the simplicity of
Thtinction°of things God. In order to correctly under-
aJ'rakZT' stan^ this attribute of God we should
recall what Descartes said in the
" Prin. of Phil.,'*' Part L, Arts. 48 and 49, viz., that in
nature we know only substances and their modes.
From this comes the distinction, Arts. 60, 61, and 62,
of things as real and modal, and rational. That is
called real which distinguishes two substances from
one another, whether two different substances, or at-
tributes of the same substance ; as for example,
thought and extension or different parts of matter.
These we know are different because each may be con-
ceived apart from the other, and consequently may so
exist. Modal distinctions are of two kinds, namely,
that between a mode of a substance and the substance
itself, and that between two modes of one substance.
The first we recognize because while one mode may be
conceived without another, neither can exist apart from
the substance whose modes they are ; the second be-
when we have shown that His volition and His understanding
are the same. This might be proven by other arguments also.

PART II 149

cause while substance can be conceived without its
modes, modes cannot be conceived apart from sub-
stance. Finally, a rational distinction is that arising
between substance and its attributes, as, for example,
when duration is distinguished from extension. We
recognize this distinction because substance cannot* be
understood without that attribute.

From these three forms of things

WHons\CHslbhand a11 forms of combination arise. The
how many forms £rst form js ft&t made by the combina-

there are. J

tion of two or more substances, the
attributes being the same, as the combination of bodies,
or the attributes being different, as in man. The sec-
ond class is made by the union of different modes.
The third is not made in reality, but only conceived
as made in order to better understand objects. What
does not come under the first two of these heads is not
composite, but simple in its nature.

From this it may be shown that God
GoposlStc lut Znpie. is n°t composite, but simple being.

For it is a self-evident fact that the
component parts of a composite object are prior in na-
ture to the object itself. Then those substances from
which God is composed are necessarily prior in their
nature to God Himself. Each could then be con-
ceived in itself apart from the concept of God. Each
part, therefore, could exist per se and we would have
as many gods as there are substances from which God
is supposed to be composed. For when each part can
exist per se it must exist by its own power. Under
these conditions (as we have shown in Prop. 7, Pt.
I., where we demonstrated the existence of God) it
will have the power of giving to itself all the perfec-
tion of God. As nothing could be more absurd than

ico THE COGITATA METAPHYSICA

this, we conclude that God is not composite, that is,
made by the coalition and union of substances. The
same conclusion is also evident from the fact that
there are no modes in God's being; for modes arise
from the change of substances (vid. Principles, Pt. I.,
Arf. 56). Finally, if any one wishes to conceive of
some other combination of the essence and of the ex-
istence of things, we will not say him nay. Only he
should remember that there are not two separate
things in God.

We may conclude, therefore, that all

The attributes of ,1 «• ,• ,• ... 1

God are only dis- the distinctions we make in regard to

tingjdshed by tfl attributes of God are not real but

1 eason.

rational distinctions. Let it be under-
stood that such distinctions as I have just made are
distinctions of reason, which may be known from the
fact that such a substance could not exist without* this
attribute. Therefore, we conclude that God is sim-
ple being. We do not care for the other minor dis-
tinctions of the Peripatetics, and proceed, therefore,
to the life of God.

Chapter VI.
Concerning the Life of God.

In order that we may rightly under-

What Philosophers 1 1 • -i r 1 it r /- 1

in general under- stand this attribute of the life of God,

stand by life. •, ,, ...

it is necessary that we explain in gen-
eral what is meant by this term. Here we may ex-
amine first the opinion of the Peripatetics. They un-
derstood by life the continuance of support to the soul
by means of heat (Vid. Aristotle, Bk. L, de Respirat.
8). And, because they had three classes of minds,

PART II 151

viz., vegetative, sensative and intellectual, which they
attribute to plants, animals and men respectively, it
follows that they assume that other objects do not
have life. But they did not dare to say that minds
and God do not possess life. They feared perhaps
lest if they denied life to them they must also deny
death as well. Therefore, Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk.
II., chap. 7, gives another definition of life peculiar
to minds, namely : " Life is the operation of the in-
tellect." In this sense he attributes life to God who
is a cognitive being and is pure activity. We will not
be delayed long to refute these conceptions, for what
pertains to these three kinds of life which they attrib-
ute to plants and animals and men, we have already
shown to be mere fiction. For we showed that there
is nothing in matter except mechanical form and ac-
tion. Moreover, what pertains to the life of God re-
lates no more to an act of the understanding than to
an act of will or any other faculty. But since I ex-
pect no response to what I have said, I pass on and
endeavor to explain what life really is.

Although this term life, by a trans-
Tom7yt ^MJtll f erence of meaning, is often taken to
signify the customs of a people or of
an individual, we shall briefly explain its correct phi-
losophical use. It should be noted that if life is at-
tributed to corporeal things, then nothing is void of
life; but if only to those objects where spirit is united
to body, then only to men or perhaps also to the lower
animals, but not to minds or to God. In truth, since
the term is a broad one, it should doubtlessly be at-
tributed to corporeal objects, to minds united to, and
to minds separated from corporeal body.

152 THE COGITATA METAPHYSICA

Therefore we will understand by

general, and what this term life, the 'power through

it 'is in God. i • i r. • . -± l

which an object preserves its own be-
ing. And although that power in different objects is
very different, we still very properly say that those ob-
jects have life. Moreover, the power by which God
preserves His being is nothing else than His essence.
Therefore they speak most truly, who say that God
is Life. Nor are there wanting theologians who be-
lieve that it was for this very reason that the Jews
when they made a vow swore by living Jehovah, not
by the life of Jehovah, as did Joseph when he swore by
the life of Pharaoh and said the " life of Pharaoh."

Chapter VII.
Concerning the Understanding of God.

Among the attributes of God we

God is omniscient. , ,

nave enumerated omniscience as neces-
sary to His being. For knowledge is an element of
perfection, and God, who is in every way perfect, must
possess this attribute. Therefore knowledge to the
highest degree must be attributed to God, a knowledge
so complete that it allows no ignorance or defect of
intelligence. Were it not so we would have an im-
perfection in the attributes of God and so in God
Himself. From this it follows that God's knowledge
is immediate, and that He does not reason by logical
processes.

And further, from God's perfection,

The objects of f „, ,,

God's knowledge it follows that His ideas are not lim-

are not objects ., . ... . . e

apart from His itcci like ours to objects apart from
Himself. On the contrary, God bv

PART II 153

His own power has created objects existing apart from
Himself, but they were determined by His under-
standing.1 Otherwise they would have their nature
and essence in themselves and would be by nature
prior to God, which is absurd. Certain ones, because
they have not remembered this, have fallen into egreg-
ious blunders. There are some who think that matter
exists in its own power apart from God, and yet co-
eternal with Him, and that God, knowing this, has
merely set it in a reproducing order and impressed
other forms on it from without. Then others believe
that things are by nature necessary, or impossible, or
contingent, and so far as God knows them as con-
tingent is ignorant whether they exist or not. Finally,
others say that God recognizes contingent being from
its environment because, perchance, He has had a long
experience. Beside these, there are other errors of
like nature, to which I might refer were it not useless
to so do. For from what has been said, the falsity of
these is evident.

We revert now to our proposition,

But God himself. . ,

namely, that independent of God there
are no objects of His knowledge, but that He Himself
is the object of His Knowledge, indeed He is that
knowledge. Those who think that the world is the
object of God's knowledge are far less wise than those
who wish some building planned by a great architect
to be considered the object of their knowledge. For
the artificer is compelled to seek for suitable material
outside of himself; but God sought no material out-

*It clearly follows, therefore, that the understanding of
God by which he knows all created objects, and His will and
power which determined them are one and the same thing.

i54 TUE COG IT AT A METAPHYSICA

side of Himself, but things, in essence and in exist-
ence, were made by His understanding or will.
in what way God It may be asked, then, whether God
tinrtfon^of' J" knows evil and sin, and distinction of
reason, etc. reason, etc. We reply that God nec-

essarily must know those things of which He is the
cause. Especially since nothing can exist for a single
moment except by the concurrence of the divine will.
Therefore, since evil and sin are nothing in things,
but only in the human mind as it compares things
with one another, it follows that God does not know
these independent of the human mind. Distinctions
of reason we have said are only modes of thought,
hence they, too, should be known so far as He con-
serves the human mind. Not, however, that God has
such modes of thought in order that He may the more
easily retain what He knows. Provided one carefully
attends to these few remarks, there is no question
that can be asked about God's understanding which
cannot easily be answered.

But meanwhile, we must not over-
God's knowledge of look the error of those who think that

universal s, and of ^* 1 1 , 1 • ± 1

particular truths. God knows nothing except eternal
truth, e. g., angels and the heavens
which they think are by nature without beginning and
without end. Beside, in this world nothing but ideas
are without a beginning and unchanging. They seem
to err from choice and to wish to keep up some ob-
scurity. What, indeed, is more absurd than to deny
God's knowledge of individual things, which cannot
exist for a single moment without His sustaining
power ! Then they maintain that God is ignorant of
things which actually exist, but knows universal?
which do not exist or have any essence apart from

PART II 155

these individual objects. On the contrary, we would
attribute to God a complete cognition of individual
things, but deny the knowledge of universals except
so far as He understands the human mind.

Finally, before ending this discus-

There is but one

simple idea in sion, it seems necessary to give some
answer to those who inquire whether
God has many ideas or only one simple idea. To this
I respond that the idea of God because of which He
is called omniscient is one and simple. For God is
called omniscient only because He has an idea of Him-
self. This idea, or knowledge, since it exists with
God, is nothing else than His essence, nor, indeed,
could it possibly be anything but this.

God's cognition of created objects

What God's knowl- , , . , 1 , -

edge of created cannot properly be said to be knowl-
° Je( edge. For if God so chose, these ob-

jects might have some other essence which has no
place in His cognition of them. Nevertheless, it is
often asked whether His cognition of objects is mani-
fold or simple. To .this we would reply, that this
question is like those which inquire whether God's
decrees and acts of will are one or many ; and whether
God is omnipresent, or whether His concurrence, by
which separate objects are preserved, is the same for
all things. Concerning such questions, as I have al-
ready said, we have no certain knowledge. Yet, in
the same way, we very certainly know that this con-
currence of God, if it is correlated with his omnipo-
tence, must be unitary, although its effect is manifested
in various ways. So also the voluntary acts and de-
crees of God (for we may so call His cognition of the
world), considered as in God, are not many although
through created objects (or better in created objects),

156 THE COGITATA METAPHYSICA

they are variously expressed. Finally, if we consider
the analogy of nature as a whole, we are able to con-
sider it as one being, and consequently the idea or
decree of Natura naturata will be but one.

Chapter VIII.
Concerning God's Will.

We cannot distin- Jfe w{\\ 0f Q0CJ j^y wnich He

gmsh between J

God's essence, chooses to love Himself, follows nec-

His understand-
ing by which He essarily from His understanding, bv

knows Himself, ,

and His will by which He knows Himself. But we

which He 'loves « . n TT. , TT.

Himself. do not know now His essence and His

understanding, by which he knows Himself, differ
from His will, by which he chooses to love Himself.
Nor does the term personality, which theologians use
to explain this, escape our notice. Although we are
not ignorant of the term, we are ignorant of its sig-
nificance, and unable to form any clear and distinct
concept of its content. Nevertheless, we consistently
believe in the beatific vision of God, which is promised
to faithful ones that this would be revealed to them.
God's will and As is sufficiently clear from the

a7objecZld7aen- preceding, God's will and power con-
not be distin- siciered objectivelv cannot be distin-

guished from His J

understanding. guished from His understanding.
For we have made it clear that God has not only
decreed that things should exist, but also what char-
acter they should have, i. e., their essence and existence
depend upon the will and power of God. From this
we see that God's understanding and power, and will,
by which He created and understands, and conserves

PART II 157

or loves the world, cannot be distinguished from one

another except in respect to our understanding.

it is improperly Moreover, when we say that God

said that God 111 • , 1 • • 1 • r 1

hates certain holds certain things in disfavor, and

things and loves ■, .-, .-, • i r

others. loves others, this is spoken figura-

tively, as when the Scriptures say that the earth shall
bring forth men. That God is not angry with any
one, nor loves any one in the sense that people
ordinarily believe, is evident from the Scriptures
themselves. So Isaiah says, and more clearly the
Apostle to the Romans, chapter 9 : "For the children
being not yet born, neither having done any good or
evil, that the purposes of God according to election
might stand, not of works, but of him that calleth,
that the older shall serve the younger, etc." And a
little below : " Therefore, hath he mercy on whom he
will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth.
Thou wilt say then unto me : Why doth he yet find
fault? For who hath resisted his will? Nay, but,
O man, who art thou that repliest against God?
Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it,
Why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the potter
power over the clay, of the same lump to make one
vessel to ho'nor, and another to dishonor ? " etc.
„.y _ , , If then, you ask : Why, then, does

Why God admon- ' J J '

ishes men; why God admonish men? To this it may

He does not save

them without ad- be responded, that God has decreed

monishment ; and . . . , ,

why the wicked from eternity to admonish them at a

are punished. . . . , . , . . , ,

given time in order that those whom
He wished to save might be converted.

If you inquire further : Whether God was not able
to save them without this admonishment, we respond
that He was. Why, then, does He not thus save them,
you might inquire. To this I will reply after you

158 THE COGITATA METAPHYSICA

have told me why He did not make the Red Sea pass-
able without a strong east wind, and why He does not
make things to move without the agency of other
things, and an infinite number of other things which
He does by means of mediating causes. Then you
will ask : Why are the wicked punished, since, because
of their nature, they clearly fulfill the divine decree?
I respond that it is also according to the divine decree
that they should be punished. And if only those
whom we believe to sin from choice should be pun-
ished, why do men attempt to exterminate venomous
serpents? for they only act according to their nature,
nor are they able to do otherwise.

Finally, if there are other things

The Scriptures t . . . ^ , <-,

teach nothing which occur in the sacred Scriptures

which is contrary i • i i »• j

to the Laws of which may be mentioned as points
Nature. worthy of examination this is not the

place to explain them. Here we would merely inquire
into those things which we are able to deduce with
certainty from Natural Reason, and it is sufficient if
we make it evident that the Sacred Pages ought to
teach the same things. For truth is not at variance
with truth, nor do the Scriptures teach the nonsense
that the multitude believe. For if we find anything
in them contrary to the laws of Reason we should
refute that with the same freedom that we refute such
statements in the Koran or the Talmud. However,
there is no reason to think that the Sacred Writings
contain anything opposed to the Natural Reason.

PART 11 159

Chapter IX.
Concerning the Power of God.

We have demonstrated above that

How we should ^ . . TT M1

understand God's God is omnipotent. Here we Will

omnipotence. * -i • n i • i , ,1 •

only briefly explain in what terms this
attribute shall be understood. There are many who
discuss this that do not speak with sufficient fullness.
They say certain things are possible from God's
nature not from His decrees, and that some things are
impossible, others necessary. God's omnipotence has
a place only in regard to possible things. But we,
since we have already shown that all things depend
absolutely upon the decrees of God, say that He is
really omnipotent. And, since we know that He has
decreed certain things from His freedom of will and is
immutable, we conclude that nothing can happen con-
trary to His decrees, and that nothing is impossible
except that which is opposed to the perfection of
God.

Ail things are neces- But perhaps some one will argue
Sth7 deer/es^of %° ^at we ^n<^ some things necessary
God; not some from the decrees of God and others

in themselves,

and others in for some other reason. For example,

respect to these

decrees. that Josiah should burn incense upon

the altars of the idols of Jeroboam. For if we con-
sider merely the will of Josiah, we will adjudge the
thing to be merely possible ; nor can it be said to have
been necessary in any other sense than that the
Prophet had commanded it as being the decree of God.
But that the three angles of a triangle are equal 10
two right angles is self-evident. It is only on account

160 THE COGITATA METAPHYSICA

of man's ignorance that these distinctions are made.
For if men clearly understood the whole order of
Nature they would find all things as determined and
as necessary as Mathematics. But as this is beyond
human power we conceive some things to be merely
possible, others necessary. Therefore, we must either
say that God is powerless, since all things are deter-
mined, or that He is all powerful, and that all neces-
sity rests upon the decrees of God.
if God had made If now, it is asked if God had
NHeUwoJfhaeve' created the world different from its
given us other present order, and what is now truth

powers of under- r

standing. were error, would we still believe the

same things to be true? We would if God left our

nature as it is. But it would also be possible, if He

wished to give us such a nature, as He has indeed

done, for us to understand the nature and laws of

things just as they are planned by God. Indeed, if

we consider God's veracity He ought so to create us.

This is also evident from what we have said above,

namely, that Natura naturata must be considered as

unitary. Whence it follows that man is a part of

Nature, and ought to be in accord with the world

about him. Therefore, from this simplicity of God's

decrees it follows that if God had created things in

some other way He would have so made us that we

would understand them - as they were created. So

while we desire to retain this distinction which

philosophers in general lay down, viz., the power of

God, we are compelled to explain it differently.

How many kinds of We> therefore, divide God's power
power in God. into two classes. His regulative

power, and His absolute power.

PART II 161

God's power is called absolute when

What absolute, • 1 tt- • • 1

what regulative, we consider His omnipotence without

what ordinary . TT. , , , r 1 1 • ,

end wto regard to His decrees. We call it

ex raor mary. regulative when we have regard to
His decrees.

We also say God's power is natural or supernatural.
That is natural by which the world is preserved in its
fixed order. That is called supernatural which causes
something outside of the order of Nature, as for ex-
ample, all miracles, such as various appearance of
angels, etc. Concerning the latter point there is
evidently some room for doubt. Still it would seem
to be a greater miracle if God should always govern
the world by the same fixed and unchanging laws,
than if at times, on account of the foolishness of men,
He should interrupt the laws and order of Nature
which He from free choice has ordained. (This no
one, except he be mentally blind, can deny.) But we
leave this for theologians to discuss.

Finally, there are some other questions often asked
concerning the power of God : For example, whether
God's power extends to events already past ; or
whether He might not have created more objects than
he did? We do not answer these, however, for their
answer is easily seen from what has been said.

Chapter X.

Concerning Creation.

It has already been said that God has created the
world. We shall only attempt here, therefore, to ex-
plain what is meant by the term creation, after which
some opinions on the subject will be carefully ex-
amined. We will begin at the beginning.

162 THE COGITATA METAPHYSICA

We say, therefore, that creation is

What creation is. . , . . , . ,

an operation in which no causes ex-
cept an efficient one concur. Or, a created object is
one which presupposes for its existence nothing
except God.

It should be noted ( I ) that we have
The ordinary defini- here omitted those words which

tion is rejected.

philosophers insert in their definition,
viz., ex nihilo, as if nothing were some matter from
which things are produced. Because they are accus-
tomed to speak in this way, and to think always of
something preceding the given objects, they are not
able, in speaking of creation, to omit this particle ex.
The same thing is true concerning matter. Because
all bodies are seen in some position, and surrounded
by other objects, when they are asked where matter
is, they reply, that it is in some imaginary space.
Therefore, it is clear that they do not consider nothing
as a mere negation of all reality, but believe or im-
agine it to be a something real.

2. It should be noted also, that I
T1e%efained°Perh said in creation no causes concur ex-
cept one efficient one. I might have
said that creation negates or excludes all causes except
this one. I did not choose to do this, however, lest I
should be compelled to respond to those who ask
whether God had no predetermined end in Himself
for the sake of which He created the world. To make
the definition clearer I added that the created object
presupposes nothing except God. For, if God had
predetermined some end it evidently was not inde-
pendent of Him, for there is nothing apart from God
by which His decrees are influenced or changed.

PART II 163

3. It follows from this definition

Accidents and , . , , .

modes were not that accidents and modes were not

created. , •, <■ .■>

created, for they presuppose some
created substance beside God.

4. Finally, it should be noted that

Time or duration . .

did not exist before creation time or duration did

before creation. • . . , ,

not exist, nor can they even be im-
agined. For time is a measure of duration, or rather
it is only a form of thought. Therefore, it not only
presupposes the created world, but it depends espe-
cially upon human thought. Moreover, duration is
limited by the existence of created objects, and hence
began when the world began. I say limited by the
existence of created objects for eternity alone relates
to God as we have shown sufficiently above. Hence,
duration presupposes that the world has been created
or at least that it exists.

It is evident that they who think duration and time
existed before the world was created, are laboring un-
der the same prejudice as they who conceive of space
apart from matter. So much for the definition of
creation.
_, . , , There is no need to repeat what is

The work of creat- r

ing and preserv- g[yen [n Axiom IO, Part I. viz., that

tug the world °

are the same. no more power is needed to create
than to preserve the world. God's work in creating
and preserving the world is the same.

Having recalled this point, we proceed to inquire
first, what is created and what uncreated, and second,
whether what is created has existed from eternity.

To the first inquiry we respond

whCrlatftgS °re briefly, that everything has been created

whose essence is clearly conceived

even without existence, and yet is conceived per se ;

164 THE COGITATA METAPHYS1CA

as e. g., matter of which we have a clear and a distinct
concept when we conceive it under the attribute exten-
sion, whether we think that it exists or not.

But perhaps some one may say that

How God's knowl- . , . .. , , ,

edge differs from we nave clear and distinct knowledge
even when the object does not exist,
and yet attribute this knowledge to God. To this we
reply that we do not say that God's knowledge is like
ours, limited by nature, but is pure activity involving
existence, as we have shown over and over. For we
have shown that God's understanding and will cannot
be distinguished from His power or from His essence
which involves existence.

Nothing independ- Since everything, the essence of
™-eternai°with which does not involve existence, has
Hvn- been created in its existing form and

continually conserved by the power of God, we will not
pause to refute the opinion of those who think that the
world as chaos, or as matter devoid of form, is co-eter-
nal with God, and so far independent of Him. There-
fore we pass on to the second point, and ask whether
what has been created could have existed from eternity.
What is meant by In order to understand the point just

the expression . « . . .

from eternity. raised we must consider the expression
from eternity. For we wish to signify by these words
something different from the eternity of God. By this
expression we now mean duration from the beginning
of duration, or such a duration that although numbers
were multiplied through thousands of years, and this
product again by millions of millions, we would still
be unable to express its magnitude.

Tt is evident that such duration is

The world cannot . „ , . . .

hare existed front impossible ; TOT 11 tllC World COUld liaVC

begun at any fixed time then its dura-

PART II 165

tion were too short to satisfy these conditions.
Therefore, the world cannot have endured from such a
beginning to the present. But perhaps you say since
God is omnipotent nothing is impossible, and He could
have given to the world a duration than which no longer
can be conceived. We reply that God, because He is
omnipotent, would never have given such a duration
to the world. For the very character of duration is
that it can always be conceived as greater or less, as in
the case of number. You may insist, however, that
God has existed from eternity, and since He has per-
dured all this time there is a duration given, so great
that no greater is conceivable. But in this way a dura-
tion composed of parts is attributed to God, which idea
has been refuted sufficiently when we demonstrated
that eternity, not duration, belongs to God. Would
that men might remember this ! For then they could
easily extricate themselves from many arguments and
absurdities, and would turn with the greatest delight
to the blessed contemplation of God. Nevertheless we
proceed to respond to the arguments of those who
attempt to show the possibility of such an infinite
duration from some fixed time in the past.

_ . . In the first place it is said that the

Because God ts

eternal, it does thing produced must be co-existent

not follow that , .

the things he has with its cause. And since God has

created have ex- . « r ■■ •, ,1 re r tt-

isted from existed from eternity the effects of His

etermty. being ought to be eternal. This argu-

ment is supported by reference to the Son of God, who
has existed with the Father from eternity. It is
evident that they confuse eternity with duration, and
only attribute to God a duration from eternity. This
is shown, too, in the example cited. The same eter-
nity which they attribute to the Son of God they think

1 66 THE C0G1TATA METAPHYSICA

can be attributed to created objects. They imagine
time and duration to have been instituted before the
world began, and think of duration apart from created
objects as some think of eternity as independent of
God. That both opinions are wrong is now evident.
So we respond that it is not true that God was able to
communicate His eternity to the world. Neither was
the Son of God created, but was eternal like the Father.
When we say that the Father had begotten the Son
from eternity we only mean that the Father has always
shared His eternity with the Son. .

In the second place it is argued that
if God acts from when God acts from choice, He is not

116 CCS Si t'V iXS IS 11 Ot

infinite in virtue, less powerful than when He acts from
necessity. But if God acts from neces-
sity, since He is infinite in virtue, He must have created
the world from eternity. It is easy to reply to this
argument if we consider its basis. For these same
good men presume that they may hold conflicting ideas
concerning a being of infinite virtue. They conceive
of God, a being of infinite virtue, as acting both from
necessity and from choice. But we deny that God, if
He acts from necessity, is a being of infinite virtue.
Which action is justified, indeed, and must of necessity
be conceded even by those same men when we have
shown that a perfect being must be free, and can only
be conceived as unitary. Should they reply that it is
possible to suppose that God acting from necessity is
still infinite in His virtue, we would reply that we are
not at liberty to suppose this, any more than we are at
liberty to suppose a square circle in order to conclude
that all lines drawn from the center to the circumfer-
ence are not equal. And this, we repeat, is sufficiently
proven from what has been said above. We have

PART II 167

proven that there is no duration that may not be con-
ceived as greater or less or even double as great. If
God acts from free choice it may be created as greater
or less. But if God acts from necessity this by no
means follows. Under the latter supposition only those
things which follow from His nature can be realized,
not an infinite number of hypothetical results. There-
fore, it may be argued in a few words : If God should
create a duration so great that no greater could be
given He necessarily diminishes His own power. And
this is impossible for His essence and His power are
one and the same thing. Therefore, etc., and further,
if God acts from necessity, He must have created a
duration, than which no greater can be conceived.
But had God created such a duration He would not
have been of infinite virtue. For we are always able
to conceive of a duration greater than the one given.
Therefore, if God acts from the necessity of His nature
He is not of infinite virtue.

A point which may be a difficulty

Whence we have a , , ; .. «r . ,,

concept of a du- to some here presents itself, viz., that
TafTany^cVuaiiy although the world has only been
gtven' created some five thousand years, if

our chronology is correct, we are nevertheless able to
conceive of a much greater duration, and this notwith-
standing we have said above that duration depends
upon created objects. The difficulty will disappear
if we remember that our ideas of duration arise not
only as we contemplate created objects, but from re-
flection upon God's infinite power, in creating them.
For we do not think of objects existing per se, but
only through the infinite power of God. Vid. Prop.
12, Pt. I. and Coroll.

Finally lest we consume too much time with these

1 68 THE COGITATA METAPHYSICA

futile arguments, but two things need to be kept in
mind : ( I ) The distinction between duration and
eternity, and (2) that the former without created ob-
jects, and the latter without God are non-intelligible.
These things being kept in mind it is easy to answer
all these arguments. So we need delay no longer upon
this point.

Chapter XL
Concerning the Concurrence of God.

About this attribute of God little or nothing remains
to be said after we have shown that each single mo-
ment God creates things -as if anew. From this we
have shown that objects have no powTer of self deter-
mination or of operation in themselves. And this
holds true in the human will as well as in all other
objects. Then we replied to certain arguments per-
taining to this. And, although many other objections
are often raised, since these relate more especially to
Theology we shall not discuss them here.

Nevertheless, since there are many who admit and
believe in this conserving power of God, but in a
different sense from us, we shall recall what has
already been proven in order that we may detect this
fallacy. We have already clearly shown that present
time has no connection with future time (Yid. Ax.
10, Pt. I.). Provided we consistently remember this.
we shall be able without difficulty to reply to all the
objections of these philosophers.

HZnhactsZse™' But lest we take up this subject

T'act"* tMngs without result we will reply in passing

to the inquiry whether an additional element of God's

PART 11 169

power is needed to begin some action in things. When
speaking of motion this same question appeared and
we then gave our answer. For we said that God con-
stantly preserves the same amount of motion in nature.
If, therefore, we consider the total amount of matter
in motion nothing is added. But in respect to particu-
lar things there is an additional element given. It
does not seem, however, that the same thing can be
said of mental phenomena. For it does not appear
that they are related the one to the other in this way.
Then, finally, since the parts of duration do not have
a casual connection, we speak more truly to say then
that God continually procreates than to say that he
conserves them. Therefore, if man at a particular
moment is free to choose some course of action it must
be said that God at the present time so creates him.
To this it is no objection that the human will is often
determined by external influences, and that all nature
is inter-related and mutually determining. For this
also is so ordained of God. Indeed, nothing deter-
mines the will nor does the will determine anything ex-
cept through the power of God. We confess that we
are ignorant of how this may not be opposed to human
freedom, or how God can ordain this and still preserve
the freedom of man. This we have already admitted.

These are the things I had decided

The ordinary di- .

vision of the at- to say concerning the attributes of

tributes is ^fiovc

of name than of God. No satisfactory division of
them has yet been made. The divi-
sion given by some, who divide God's attributes into
incommunicable and communicable attributes seems
more nominal than real. For the knowledge of God
is no more like human knowledge than the Dogstar is
like a barking dog, and perhaps it is even less similar.

i;o THE COGITATA METAPHYSICS

We would offer this classification :

ThthilVuthor!ion °f There are some attributes which ex-
plain God's essence, and others that tell
nothing of His reality but only explain the modes of
His existence. Of the latter kind are Unity, Eternity,
Necessity, etc. ; of the former Understanding, Volition,
Life, Omnipotence, etc. This division is clear and
perspicuous and comprehends all the attributes of God.

Chapter XII.

Concerning the Human Mind.

We pass now to created substance which we classify
as extended and as thinking substance. By the
former we understand matter or corporeal substance.
By thinking substance we understand only human
minds.

Although angels are also created,

Angels are objects • ,1 ,1 1

for consideration since they are not known by our nat-
fnol \o the °Mcta- tural powers, they should not be re-
physidan. garded in Metaphysics. For their

essence and existence are only known through revela-
tion and so far they pertain only to Theology. Since
the cognition of these beings is so entirely different
from our ordinary form of knowledge the two should
not be confused or classed together. No one should
expect us, therefore, to discuss angels in this connec-
tion.

The human mind We turn, therefore, to the human

SSJ&fiZ 1" mind concerning which a few things
created by God,- remaiii to be said. It will be noted

but how, we do

not know. that we say nothing concerning the

time of its creation, for it is not clear just when it is
created since it can exist without the bodv. But it is

PART II 171

evident that it does not arise by traduction for it would
then have a place only in things already created,
namely in modes of some substance. But substances,
as we have plainly showed above, can be created only
by the power of omnipotence.

We shall add a few words concern-
in what sense the ing immortality. It is evident that we

human soul is r 1 1 • 1

mortal. cannot say ot any created object that

its nature implies that it cannot be
destroyed by the power of God. For he who has the
power of creating an object has also the power of
destroying it. Beside, as we have sufficiently shown
above, no created object has in itself the power to
exist, even for a moment, but in every case is con-
tinually procreated by God.

Although this is all true we all
>InimmortSinSe know that we have no concept of a
destroyed object, as we have of an
object disintegrated or of a generation of modes. For
we can conceive clearly enough of the human organ-
ism being destroyed but not of the annihilation of its
substance. Then philosophy does not inquire what
God by His omnipotence is able to do, but seeks to
determine from nature itself what laws God has really
given to the world. Therefore, what it concludes is
rational and fixed it concludes is so from the laws
of nature. However we would not deny that God is
able to change these laws and all other things as well.
Therefore, when speaking of the soul we do not in-
quire what God is able to do but what follows from
the laws of nature.

Since it is true, as we have abun-
its immortality dantly proven, that substance cannot

demonstrated. .

be destroyed either by its own power,

172 THE COGITATA METAPHYS1CA

or by the power of any other created substance, unless
I am mistaken, it follows that we are compelled to
believe from the laws of nature that the soul is im-
mortal. And if we choose to investigate further, we
can very clearly demonstrate that it is so. For as we
have just shown, it follows from the laws of nature
that the mind is immortal. And these laws of nature
are the decrees of God, appointed by his will, as we
have already made evident. Then beside, these laws
are unchangeable. From all of this we conclude with
certainty that God has revealed His immutable will
concerning man's immortality, not only by revelation,
but also by natural reason.

It is no objection to this opinion, if
GtntreaSryntt but some one should say that at times God

above Nature and sets as^e tJiese natural laws jn work-

God is its author.

ing miracles. For there are many
thoughtful theologians who concede that God does not
act contrary to,, but above the laws of nature. That is,
God has many laws of action which He has not made
known to man ; and these if revealed to man would
seem equally natural with the ones he already knows.
Therefore it is evident that minds are immortal. I
do not see that anything remains to be said concerning
its nature. Nor, indeed, concerning its specific func-
tions is there anything to add unless I respond to the
argument of certain authors who attempt to show that
our sense of perception is not to be accepted as true.

There are some who think thev can
W,ZTin nhJtn)ree. show that the will is not free but

always determined by something from
without. They believe this because they think of the
will as something distinct from the mind, a substance
whose sole nature it is to be indifferent. In order to

PART II 173

remove all confusion on this subject we will explain
the matter in such a way as to easily detect the fallacy
of their arguments.

We have said that the human mind

What the will is. . . . . ,. ,,,

is a thinking object. Whence it fol-
lows that from its nature, and that alone considered,
it is able to do something, viz., to think ; that is, to
affirm and to deny. These forms of thought are de-
termined either by something extra-mental or by the
mind itself. But since the mind is a substance itself
whose essence it is to think, it follows that thought can
and should arise from the mind itself. Those mental
acts which know no other cause than the mind itself,
are called volitions. And the human mind so far as
it is considered as a sufficient cause for producing these
thoughts is called Will.

That the mind, though excited by

There is a Will. , , • ,1

no external object has power to act,
is sufficiently proven by the example of the ass of Buri-
danus. For were a man instead of the ass placed in
such a condition of equilibrium he would be regarded
not as a thinking being but as a most stupid ass if he
perished with thirst or hunger. Then this is evident
also from the fact mentioned above, that we have
willed to doubt everything, and not only to hold as
doubtful those things which can be called in question,
but also to expose what is false. (Vid. Principles of
Descartes, Part I. Art. 39).

Further, it should be remembered

that, although the mind is influenced
by external objects to affirm or deny, it is not com-
pelled even here but retains its freedom. For nothing
has the power of destroying its essence. What it
affirms or denies it is always free to affirm or to deny

174 THE COGITATA METAPHYSICA

as was shown by Descartes in the fourth Meditation.
Therefore, if any one asks why the mind wills this or
that, we reply that it is because the mind is a thinking
being whose very nature it is to wish, or to affirm
or to deny. This is what it means to be a thinking
being.

Having stated our position we will
If fZl wUhbdesirt ^ice some arguments opposed to
such a view. ( i ) Such is the argument :
// the will can choose contrary to the last judgment
of the understanding, if it is able to choose contrary to
that which is best as determined by the understanding,
it is able to choose evil for the sake of its evil.
But this conclusion is absurd. Therefore in the first
place it is evident that they do not understand what
the will is. They confuse it with the desire the mind
has after it affirms or denies something. They were
taught this by their teacher who defined the will as
desire for the sake of some good (appetitum sub ra-
tione boni). We would say on the contrary that the
will is the affirming that this is good or bad, as we
plainly showed when discussing the cause of error,
and found that this arises because the will extends
further than the understanding. If the mind did not
affirm this or that is good, thus exercising its free-
dom, it would not desire it. Therefore we would
reply to this argument by conceding that the mind
cannot choose anything contrary to the last judgment
of the understanding, that is, it cannot choose any-
thing so far as it is unwilling; as is here supposed
when we say that this thing is evil or that the mind
does not choose it. But we deny that it is impossible
for evil to be chosen or be considered good, for this
would be contrary to all experience. For many evil

PART II 175

things are thought to be good and many good things
are considered evil.

2. The second argument is (or the
Nor is it anything, first if you prefer, since the other

except the mind.

amounted to nothing) : If the will is
not determined by the last practical judgment of the
understanding it is self determined. But the will does
not determine itself because in itself and from its na-
ture it is indeterminate." From this they proceed to
argue: "If the will by nature is indifferent to acting
it cannot be determined by itself. That which deter-
mines anything must be determined, and that which is
determined must be indeterminate. But the will con-
sidered as determining itself would be considered both
as determinate and indeterminate. For these oppo-
nents presuppose nothing in the determining will that
is not the same in the will either as determined or as
about to be determined. Nor indeed can anything be
affirmed. Therefore, the will cannot be determined by
itself. But if not by itself then otherwise." These
are the words of Professor Heereboordius of Leyden,1
in which he clearly shows that he understood by voli-
tion not the mind itself, but something else outside of
the mind, a tabula rasa, as it were, free from all forms
of thought and capable of receiving images upon itself.
Or rather as a weight in equilibrium, which, as much
as it is determined at all, from without, may be in-
clined to one side by another weight. Or finally as
something which cannot be understood by the cogni-
tion of any mortal. We have just said, and indeed
shown, that the will is nothing but the mind itself.
That is, it is the thinking being, a being who affirms
and denies. So we find when we consider the nature

1Vid. ejus Meletemata Philosophies, ed. alt. Ltigd. Bat. 1659.

176 THE COGITATA METAPHYSIC.l

of mind that it has an equal power of affirming and
denying. For this, as I have said, is the meaning of
thought. We conclude, therefore, that the mind
thinks, that it has this power of affirming and of deny-
ing. Why then should we seek extra-mental reasons
for doing what is sufficiently explained by the nature
of the mind itself? But you say, "the mind is not
determined more to affirm than to deny ; hence some
extra-mental cause for volition is necessary." But I
argue the contrary ; if the mind were by nature only
capable of affirming (although such a conception is
impossible as long as we conceive of the mind as think-
ing being) so that, however many causes concur, it is
impossible for it to deny anything. Or if it could
neither affirm or deny, it would be able to do neither.
Or, finally, if it had the power, as we have shown it
has, it would be able to do both from its nature alone,
no other cause assisting. This is evidently the case
for all who really give to a thinking being the power
of thought. Those who separate the attribute of
thought from the thing itself from which it is only
distinguished by the reason, denude the thinking being
of all thought and regard what remains as the funda-
mental substance of the Peripatetics. Therefore, I
respond that if they understand by will something
independent of thought, we will concede that their
will is indeterminate. But we deny that the will
is something void of understanding ; on the other
hand, we believe that it is thought, i. e., it is the power
of affirming and of denying. Certainly nothing else
will satisfy the conditions. Then, too, we deny that
even if the will is indeterminate it is therefore de-
spoiled of thought, and can be determined by any
external object except God's infinite power. For to

PART II

177

Why philosophers
confuse mind
with corporeal
things.

conceive of a thinking being without thought is the
same as to conceive of an extended body without
extension.

Finally, there is no need to consider
other arguments, but I shall only say
that opponents of this view confuse the
mind with corporeal objects because
they do not understand the will, or have a clear and a
distinct concept of the mind. As has been said, this
error arises from the fact that words properly used
only to describe corporeal objects have been applied to
spiritual things. For they have been accustomed to
call those bodies indeterminate which are acted upon
by two equivalent external forces acting in opposition
to one another. Therefore, since they think that the
will is indeterminate they seem to think of it as a
body in equilibrium. And, because those bodies have
nothing except what they receive from external causes
(from which it follows that they are always deter-
mined by an external cause), they think that the same
thing is true concerning the will. But as we have
already made sufficiently clear why these things are
so, we shall say no more.

Concerning extended substance we have already
spoken sufficiently and beside these two forms of
created substance we know no others. What pertains
to real accidents and to other qualities has also been
sufficiently criticised nor is there need to take any fur-
ther time in refuting them, so we take our hand from
the table.

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