The problem of the Pacific in the twentieth century

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THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

THE PROBLEM OF

THE PACIFIC IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY

By GENERAL n'. GOLOVIN

IN COLLABORATION WITH ADMIRAL A. D. BUBNOV

TRANSLATED BY C. NABOKOFF
INTRODUCTION BY HAROLD WILLIAMS

NEW YORK
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS

1922

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612234

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FOREWORD

The object of this book is to disclose to the
reader the essence of the problem of the Pacific.
In no other sphere of human activities are
people as prone to nourish illusions as in the
domain of phenomena affecting the common-
wealth as a whole. To nourish such illusions
is, however, as dangerous an error as to approach
a precipice blindfolded. For this reason the
author has aimed chiefly at restricting himself
to the realm of realities in dealing with the
problem of the Pacific. One of these realities
is the necessity of all international agreements
being backed by actual force. We may deplore
this fact the more bitterly that mankind has
but recently suffered such heavy losses in blood
and treasure ; but such is the present condition
of the world, and it must be taken into account,
more especially in a treatise, for such is the
primary principal of positive science in search of
the truth. The realities of so vast a problem as
that of the Pacific can only be understood if the
investigator embraces the entire field of social,
economic, political and military conditions
appertaining to the problem. The view has

6 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

recently become prevalent that he who speaks
of military power is a " militarist." This, how-
ever, is as great a fallacy as the reverse assertion
that he -who talks of nothing but peace is a
" pacifist."

- Truth, even bitter truth, is better than the
most high-minded fallacy.

The author has visited Japan, Siberia, China,
the Philippines, the Malay States, and Hawaii
in 1919 and 1920, and his personal impressions
and investigations form the basis of the present
book. The list of works which he has perused
in the course of his investigation of the problem
of the Pacific is hereto appended.

The author wishes to acknowledge his debt to
Admiral A. T>. Bubnov, who has contributed
Chapters VII — X. Admiral Bubnov took part
in the Russo-Japanese War, was Professor of the
Naval Staff College at Petrograd, and Chief of
the Naval Section of the Staff of the Supreme
Commander-in-Chief in the Great War. The
Admiral is an authoritative student of the
questions of naval strategy discussed in the
chapters that belong to his pen.

The author also has to thank Mr. C. Nabokoff,
the late Russian Charge d' Affaires in London,
for undertaking the translation of his book.

CONTENTS

PAGE
FOREWORD 5

INTRODUCTION ■. . . 9

CHAPTER

I. THE ROUTES OF JAPANESE SETTLERS . . . 13

II. THE ECONOMIC CONDITION OF PRESENT-DAY JAPAN 25

m. THE POLITICAL ASPECT OP MODERN JAPAN . . 36

IV. japan's POLICY IN KOREA 48

V. japan's POLICY IN CHINA 55

VI. THE FUTURE CONFLICT IN THE PACIFIC . . 81

VII, THE NAVAL FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES

AND OF JAPAN IN THE PACIFIC ... 96

VIII. THE STRATEGICAL CONDITIONS OF NAVAL WAR-
FARE IN THE PACIFIC 121

IX. THE STRATEGICAL CONDITIONS OF WAR BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN IN THE
WESTERN PACIFIC 160

X. THE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF POLITICAL

GROUPINGS IN THE PACIFIC . . . .171

XI. THE BEARING OF RUSSIA AND OF HER FAR
EASTERN DOMINIONS UPON THE PROBLEM OF
THE PACIFIC 197

XII. THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE . . . .214

7

8 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

PAGB

APPENDIX I. — BIBLIOGRAPHY 244

APPENDIX II. — EXTRACTS FROM THE TREATY FOR THE

LIMITATION OF NAVAL ARMAMENTS . . . .246

APPENDIX III. — THE 21 DEMANDS . . . 255

INTRODUCTION

The author of the following work, General
Nikolai Nikolaievich Golovin, is one of the
most distinguished Russian officers of the new
school who did so much to increase the efficiency
of the Russian Army during the period between
the Russo-Japanese War and the Great War.
As professor of tactics for many years in the
Military Academy, or Staff College in St. Peters-
burg, he maintained a consistent struggle against
the old deadening spirit of routine, brought
into the work of the school modern methods
and broad and progressive ideas and insisted
on a thoroughly scientific outlook on military
problems. A brilliant pupil of Marshal Foch's,
he profited in all his work by the lessons of
his master.

At the beginning of the Great War, General
Golovin commanded the regiment of Grodno
Hussars. In the course of the fighting he received
shell-shock. Later he was transferred to the staff
of General Lechitsky's Army as Quartermaster-
General (Director of Operations), and in 1916, as
Chief of Staff of the Seventh Army, he was largely
responsible for the success of General Brusilov's

10 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

advance against the Austro-Hungarian Army.
During the latter period of the war General
Golovin was Chief of Stafi on the Rumanian
Front, and after the break-up of the Army and
the Bolshevist Revolution he retired to Odessa,
where he lived in obscurity until the victory
of the Allies and the opening up of the Black
Sea enabled him to come to Western Europe.

In 1919 General Golovin acted for some time
in Paris as Assistant Military Representative of
Admiral Kolchak and General Denikin for
Europe, and later in the year went to Siberia
to assume the post of Chief of Staff in Admiral
Kolchak's Army. He had hardly entered upon
his duties, however, when he was laid low by
a serious illness, and had to go to Japan to
recruit. While he lay ill, Kolchak's Army broke
up and the Bolsheviks overran Siberia.

The present work is based on the results of
General Golovin's close observation of the Pacific
situation in the period immediately following on
the war. His observation has a quality of fresh-
ness and objectivity. A trained scientific mind,
after being immersed for several years in the
strategic problems of the war and the tangled
and harassing problems of the Russian Revolu-
tion, with all its startling revelations of the
inner structure of the State and society, was
directed upon that new and remarkable situation

INTRODUCTION 11

in the Pacific which recently attracted the
anxious attention of the Powers assembled in
the Washington Conference. The decisions of
the Conference have thrown some light on the
problem of the Pacific, and have somewhat
diminished its complexity and its dangers. None
the less, the problem presents a new and highly
interesting phase in the world's development,
and General Golovin's objective account of the
factors involved is of particular interest at the
present moment. Some readers may not agree
with all the author's conclusions, but they will
at least recognise the value of his first-hand
observations and of his skilful marshalling of
the facts on the basis of which the situation
may be judged. The Washington Conference,
beneficial as many of its decisions are, has done
little more than mark and fix in certain general
political agreements the main outlines of the
problem. It has by no means laid to rest those
swiftly growing forces, political and economic,
which are thrusting this problem more and more
urgently upon the attention of the world.
General Golovin's work may be recommended
to the reader as an important contribution to
the study of the rapid changes in national values
and the confused clash of national ambitions
on the Asiatic shores of the Pacific.

HAROLD WILLIAMS.

THE PKOBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

IN THE

TWENTIETH CENTURY

CHAPTER I

THE ROUTES OF JAPANESE SETTLERS

The great Russian Professor of Chemistry,
Mendeleiev, wrote, not long before his death,
a remarkable book entitled Towards the Under-
standing of Russia. His conclusions are based
entirely upon the data of the first All-Russian
census of 1897. Discussing the density of the
population of the greater part of European
Russia (except the North — the provinces of
Archangel, Vologda and Olonetzk), he writes :
" The vast majority of the population of Euro-
pean Russia is in the same position as that
which obtained three or four centuries ago in
most European countries. That position caused
certain historical events — religious wars, rebel-
lions, revolutions, the advent of Napoleon, etc. —
and such an impetus for emigration that America
and the African shores rapidly became colonised
by European settlers. Some of the events which

13

14 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

are taking place in Russia are undoubtedly
occasioned by the position in which we are now
placed." These lines were written in 1906,
immediately after the disastrous Japanese War
and the Revolution of 1905.

Only fifteen years have elapsed, and Russia
found herself involved in a fresh war, and later
in civil war provoked by the Bolsheviks. At
present the country is faced with the prospect
of the slow death of tens of millions of her
people.

Mendeleiev's powerful scientific brain struck
the basic cause which determines all events,
irrespective of the outward diversity of their
manifestations. There is no other means of
foretelling the future. If you wish to acquire
knowledge of the general character of a locality,
you must rise to a certain height. The outward
appearance of events, as a rule, completely
absorbs the attention of the contemporaries and
prevents them from perceiving the true cause
which underlies these events. And yet the
movements that occur in the arena of history
are but waves rolling on the surface, driven
into motion by unseen forces. Individual leaders,
party programmes, the ideological foundations
of political aspirations and the national conflicts
which they engender are but different com-
binations of the component parts of social life.
Thus the pictures in the kaleidoscope change
rapidly at the slightest touch of the hand that
moves it. The diversity and mobility of the
social phenomena which we witness prevent us

ROUTES OF JAPANESE SETTLERS 15

from seeing the fundamental causes that produce
these combinations.

The complex international problem which has
now arisen in the Pacific is due primarily to
the excess of the population in Japan. Accord-
ing to the census of 1920 the islands of Japan
(of which the main are Nippon, Shikoku, Kiu-
shiu and Jesso) — a total area of 148,756 square
miles — have a population of 55,961,140. In
other words, 375 per square mile, a density
almost equal to that of the British Isles and
almost double that of France. One must of
course bear in mind that an acre of rice can
feed a greater number of people than an acre
of Russian rye, and that a mere comparison
of figures is not therefore convincing. There
are, however, other indications of the density
of the population of Japan. Although she is
essentially an agricultural country she is com-
pelled to import foodstuffs. Thus in 1919 Japan
imported food to the value of 250,000,000 yen.
The masses of the population are dependent
upon the rice crop, because the area under
cultivation cannot be increased. A rise in the
prices of rice provokes popular risings (rice-
riots).

Nippon is the most densely populated island.
In the region of Kioto and Osaka there are
over 1,000 inhabitants to the square mile. In
the region of Yokohama and Nogaia over 750.
On the remainder of Nippon and on the other
islands except Jesso, there are about 500 to the
square mile.

16 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

The territory of the Northern island, Jesso,
is more than one-tenth of the total area of Japan
and it has only sixty-five people per square mile.
Here we are confronted with a fact which
affords an important clue for the solution of
the problem of the routes which Japanese
settlers are endeavouring to follow.

In the course of thousands of years the Japanese
people has grown in a kind of enclosure formed
by three islands : Nippon, Shikoku, and Kiu-shiu.
It is only during the last fifty years that Japan
began to colonise Jesso, where about 1,500,000
people have been sent. Competent authorities
have long since noticed that Japanese emigration
towards the North has been very slow, and have
come to the conclusion that extensive Japanese
emigration is possible only to countries South
of the forty-fifth parallel.

The experience of the colonisation of Southern
Sakhalien is another striking proof of the diffi-
culties encountered by Japan in her endeavours
to colonise the North. This territory was ceded
to Japan by Russia in 1905. In fifteen years,
in spite of many efforts, the population there
has reached the insignificant figure of 75,000,
of whom only 17,000 actually inhabit the island,
while the rest only come to Sakhalien for the
summer. It is to be noted that Jesso and
Sakhalien offer another fundamental condition
which the Japanese people cannot renounce.
The Japanese is essentially an islander ; he is
organically bound to the sea, to its industries
and climate.

ROUTES OF JAPANESE SETTLERS 17

For this reason the argument which is to be
found in some American and English papers
concerning the possibiUty of Japanese settle-
ments in Siberia is based upon a total
misconception of the realities of the situation.
As long as Japan is sufficiently strong to safe-
guard her expansion as a fully developed Power,
she will never accept such a solution. The
Far Eastern possessions of Russia may prove
useful to Japan in many ways, but we repeat :
the colonisation of Siberia is not the goal towards
which Japan is striving. The emigration of the
Japanese to North America began in 1900.
The majority of these immigrants settle on the
shores of the Pacific, and chiefly in California.
The waves of the Yellow race that have washed
the American shores of the Pacific have caused
the United States to ponder. The Yellow
people, efficient and laborious agriculturists
with an infinitely lower standard of life than
the natives, and consequently ready to accept
a lower wage, proved dangerous competitors on
the general labour market. Since the spring of
1905 the San Francisco Chronicle started a cam-
paign against Japanese immigration, an
" Asiatics' Exclusion League " was formed
which demanded the repatriation of the
Japanese, or at least the prohibition of any
further influx. Public opinion compelled the
State of California to enact local laws directed
against the Japanese. In 1908 the children of
Japanese immigrants were excluded from public
schools. The Anti-Japanese attitude of the

2

18 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

State of California was to a certain extent
mitigated by the conciliatory influence of Presi-
dent Roosevelt. At the same time, the Federal
Government insisted at Tokio that Japanese
emigration to the United States should cease.
During the negotiations for the Trade Agreement
of 1908 with the United States, Japan undertook
to restrict her emigration. The significance of
this pledge, which has become widely known as
the " Gentlemen's Agreement," was so explained
by a Japanese authority {The Japan Year Book,
Tokio, 1919-1920) :—

" In 1908 the School Board of San Francisco
decided to segregate Japanese children. This
action the Japanese residing in America, the
Japanese Government, and the people resented.
In connection with this, strong opposition to
Japanese immigration manifested itself on the
Pacific coast. So threatening v/as the agitation
that legislation prohibiting Japanese labour
immigration was imminent. To avert the enact-
ment of these laws, which the Japanese considered
humiliating, they, in the ' Gentlemen's Agree-
ment,' undertook to satisfy America by regulating
immigration. It may be asked why America
should think of excluding the Japanese or what
right she had to do so. When the treaties were
revised in 1894 America expressly reserved the
right to legislate on questions relating to immigra-
tion. At that time comparatively few Japanese
had crossed over to America, but the Chinese
question had in its adjustment caused much
trouble, and America carefully guarded her rights

ROUTES OF JAPANESE SETTLERS 19

against the day when the Japanese might begin
to crowd the Pacific States. The Japanese
may have imagined the time would never come
when that clause would be called into service,
but it was a powerful weapon in the hands of
American legislators, and the ' Gentlemen's
Agreement ' could not be most welcome to Japan.
Three years later (1911), when the treaty between
Japan and America expired, this question, of
course, had to be confronted, and was disposed
of in the following way : the objectionable
clause in the treaty of 1894 reserving the right
to legislate on immigration restriction does not
appear in the new treaty, nor is mention made
of it in the body of the treaty. It was, however,
appended to the treaty as a protocol. When
the treaty came before the Senate for ratification,
the following declaration by the Japanese
Ambassador was read : ' In proceeding this day
to the signature of a treaty of commerce and
navigation, the undersigned has the honour to
declare that the Imperial Japanese Government
are fully prepared to maintain with equal effec-
tiveness the limitation and control which they
have for the past three years exercised in respect
of labour emigration to the United States.'
Without this declaration, or its equivalent, the
Senate would have rejected the treaty."

In spite of this " Gentlemen's Agreement "
the Anti-Japanese movement in the States
bordering upon the Pacific acquired a new im-
petus in 1909. In January, 1913, over forty
Anti-Japanese laws were passed by the State

20 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

of California (E. Hovelaque, Le Japon, Paris,
1921, p. 326). In February, 1921, the " Gentle-
men's Agreement " was confirmed, and yet the
restrictions imposed upon Japanese emigrants
grew. And the Japanese are only admitted to
the United States as students or tourists. Aus-
tralia followed the lead of the United States and
prohibits Japanese immigration into sparsely
inhabited territories.

The Japanese strongly resent these restrictions.
At the Versailles Congress, under the pressure of
public opinion in Japan, her representatives en-
deavoured to raise the question of the equality
of races. Many references were made at that
Congress to high humanitarian ideals, but the
Congress, nevertheless, refrained from discussing
this question. The matter of the equality of
the Yellow and White races thus became one of
those principles deeply affecting national senti-
ment which have always been solved in history
only by the force of arms. The present-day
discussions are but the rumblings of the distant
thunder of the coming storm — the impending
struggle between the Yellow and the White
races. The Pacific and the countries bordering
upon the ocean will be the arena of this gigantic
struggle.

Japanese Westward immigration meets ob-
stacles of a different kind.

After the Russian War of 1904-1905 Japan
became the mistress in Korea. In 1910 she
openly annexed that country. Japan, however,
found in Korea a normal density of the popula-

ROUTES OF JAPANESE SETTLERS 21

tion — about 200 to the square mile. At the
same time the Koreans, who are loth to renounce
their national independence, are strongly opposed
to the newcomers. In spite of the Draconian
regime established by the Japanese Government,
Japanese settlers dare not live outside the
towns.

China presents still greater diilficulties to
Japanese immigration. Here the population is
still more dense than in Korea, and is still more
hostile towards the intrusion of the Japanese.
Of all the regions of China the most favourable
conditions obtain in Southern Manchuria. Mon-
golia, although thinly populated, is as unsuitable
for Japanese immigration as Siberia.

The average increase of the population of
Japan varies from 15-99 (in 1913) to 12*79
(in 1920) per thousand per annum. In other
words, the average increase amounts to 700,000
a year ; in seventy years the population would
thus be doubled. At the close of the twentieth
century Japan will have a population of
130,000,000. Even if immigration into Korea
and Manchuria were greatly intensified, these
countries could not make room for more than
a few millions. Where, then, are the tens of
millions to be diverted as they swell the popula-
tion of the Japanese Archipelago ? There is one
direction — southwards, to the long string of
islands along the Pacific coast of Asia, stretching
towards Australia and throwing out detached
groups into the ocean.

Although the island of Formosa, captured by

22 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

Japan in 1895, proved rather a narrow field for
immigration owing to the density of the popula-
tion (about 280 to the square mile) further in
that direction there are ample opportunities.

This route leads towards the Philippines
Archipelago — over 7,000 islands with a terri-
tory of about 114,000 square miles (three-
fourths of Japan). The population of the
Philippines is 10,000,000 — about eighty-seven to
the square mile. There are likewise thousands of
islands in the East Indian Archipelago, the
territory of which is 714,000 square miles (five
times the size of Japan), with a scarcer popula-
tion than the Philippines. Counting without
the thickly populated island of Java, the average
is twenty to the square mile in the East
Indies. New Guinea and the surrounding islands
have just over one million people on a terri-
tory of 311,000 square miles (less than thirty-
five per square mile). The innumerable small
islands of the Pacific — totalling 75,000 miles,
have also just over a million. Lastly, the
southern extremity of the Asiatic continent is
more thinly populated than China, Korea and
Japan. In French Indo China there are sixty
people to the square mile, thirty-four in Siam
and seventy-five in the Malay Peninsula.

Japanese writers and diplomatists are wont
to dwell upon the necessity for Japan to struggle
in order to find a place under the sun. They
are, however, reticent on the point that Japan
will of course choose the place that suits her
best. The southern route leads to these best

ROUTES OF JAPANESE SETTLERS 23

places. Here the Japanese agricultural labourer
will remain in the country of rice — a condition
which is absolutely necessary for Japanese
immigration en masse. Also, Japan would find
here political advantages of paramount import-
ance. Over 90 per cent of the population of
the Philippines and of the East Indian Archi-
pelago belong to the Malay race. Like the
negroes, the Malay people have not as yet shown
any ability to create stable national common-
wealths, and the many tribes into which the
race is divided offer an infinitely more pliable
material for " Japanisation " than the races
which Japan would encounter in other directions.
To a certain degree, they may meet with opposi-
tion to absorption from the natives of the
Philippines. But even in these islands there
is no solid national organism. The " Filipinos "
also consist of several tribes which speak different
dialects. Of these tribes the most numerous
are the following : The Visayans (42 per cent)
inhabiting the Visayan Islands in the centre
of the Archipelago ; the Tagalogs (19 per cent)
inhabiting the central part of Luzon with Manilla
as the capital. The Tagalogs are the most
advanced and politically influential tribe ; the
Ilocanos (10 per cent) occupying the north-
west of Luzon ; the Bicols (7 per cent) ; the
Pangasinas (5 per cent) ; the Sagayans (2 per
cent) who also inhabit Luzon. Apart from
these main tribes, there are the Zambalans, the
Negritos, the Moros, the Igorots, the Ifugaos,
the Kalingas, etc. Some of them are still

24 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

primitive savages. The influence of the United
States may perhaps contribute to the growth of
culture and to the creation of a " PhiHppine
people," but this would require a very lengthy
period of penetration — at least several decades.
At present the Philippine tribes are utterly
unable to withstand the armed aggression of
Japan, much less to resist, as the Koreans are
doing, the Japanisation that would follow upon
their conquest by Japan. Their fate in such
an emergency is not open to doubt. They
would be completely absorbed by their victors.

These conditions allow the Empire of the
Rising Sun to cast its glances southwards, not
only in search of convenient space for peaceful
emigration, but also as a ground for further
expansion of its power.

The Philippines are the first obstacle on the
path of a " Great Japan " extending from the
Behring Sea to the Indian Ocean. Should the
power of Japan extend uninterruptedly across
the Pacific, she would cut off Eastern Asia from
the ocean and would thus dominate all the
Yellow races. No one will be able to compel
Japan to make such agreements as the " Gentle-
men's Agreement." Japan would be in the
position not only to guarantee the full freedom
of Yellow emigration, but to open new routes
for mass emigration.

CHAPTER II

THE ECONOMIC CONDITION OF PRESENT-
DAY JAPAN

Impressed by the power of European technique,
Japan emerged in the latter part of the nineteenth
century from her cultural isolation. Her leaders
and their followers began, with tremendous
energy, to emulate the strongest aspects of the
civilisation of the White race hitherto strange
to her.

Upon entering this new path, Japan was
compelled to devote her serious attention to
the task of solving the economic difficulty
caused by the narrow limits of her territory.
The Government of regenerated Japan applied
all its energies to the promotion of industry
and maritime trade. In 1877, her exports and
imports totalled 50,000,000 yen. Within ten
years, this figure was doubled (97,000,000).

The end of the nineteenth and the beginning
of the twentieth centuries constitute a period
of clearly defined Imperialism in the history
of the White race. All the strong Powers of
Europe were striving towards the rapid political
seizure of markets. Quite naturally, Japan fol-
lowed the example of her teachers, and as early

2S

26 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

as in 1894 she attacked China. Her victory
gave her Formosa and marked the beginning
of her invasion of Korea and Southern Manchuria.
Japan, however, encountered the opposition of
Russia, and the latter deprived her of the fruits
of victory in Southern Manchuria and occupied
Port Arthur. Yet the gates to the Asiatic
continent were thus opened, and Japan stood
in China on the same footing as the " White "
Powers, while the Korean markets practically
passed into her possession. In 1897, Japan's
foreign trade was trebled and reached the amount
of 328,000,000 yen.

By defeating Russia in the war of 1904-5,
Japan removed her opponent from the path
of her Imperialism and became the sole mistress
in Korea and in Southern Manchuria. Her
foreign trade was trebled once again, and in 1907
amounted to 927,000,000 yen.

The outbreak of war in Europe in 1914 suddenly
placed Japan in an exceptional position. All the
resources and efforts of the Great European
Powers and of America were directed towards
the struggle against Germany. Not only did
Japan acquire a free hand in the Far East, but
the belligerents required her exports. In the
year 1915 alone Japan supplied Russia with
arms and munitions to the value of 200,000,000
yen. The total of the orders placed in Japan
by the Allies exceeded 1,000,000,000 yen. The
requirements of the belligerents obviously were
not limited to military supplies. Japanese
industries worked for increased demands in

PRESENT ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 27

every direction. The excess of exports over
imports in Japan during the war can be counted
in milliards of yen. These tremendous demands
caused the rapid establishment of new industrial
concerns and the hurried development of the
existing ones. The Bank of Japan (Nippon
Ginko) reckoned that in the first quarter of
1916 the total investment in new enterprises
amounted to 660,000,000 yen, and in the first
quarter of 1917 870,000,000 yen were spent on
the development of existing concerns. On
December 5, 1918, the paper Jiji stated that
from 1914 till November, 1919, the capital
invested in industrial development amounted
to 3,000,000,000 yen.

The tonnage of the mercantile fleet also grew
rapidly. In 1908 it was 1,500,000 tons, and
in 1918 it exceeded 3,000,000 tons.

These exceptionally favourable circumstances
do not, however, constitute a healthy condition
for the conversion of the country to industrialism,
especially as the growth of industry and com-
merce had been stimulated by the success of
Japan's policy of conquest.

Gold flowed in an interrupted stream into
the chests of Japan. From 300,000,000 yen in
1914 the Japanese gold reserve grew to
1,600,000,000 yen in 1918. Speculation assumed
gigantic proportions. The profits of joint-stock
companies were colossal. The yearly dividends
of most shipping and transport companies
reached 60 per cent. Other business concerns
also made similar profits. Japanese millionaires.

28 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

who before the war were but a handful, can now
be counted by the thousand.

In a word, the war has enriched the Exchequer
and the Capitahsts.

On the other hand, the welfare of the masses
has not improved. The Japanese Liberal Party
(Sei-yu-kai) which advocated the extension of
suffrage, succeeded in reducing the value of
property entitling to a vote from fifteen yen —
yearly tax on landed property — to three yen.
As a result, 2,860,000 voters gained access to
the polls.

Instead of increasing their wealth, the masses
of the people were impoverished during the
war.

The influx of gold into the country resulted
in a rise in the cost of living. The prices of
rice, fish, clothing, fuel rose 250-300 per cent.
The Government published in August, 1921,
the following interesting figures : —

The Monthly Cosi? of Living — in Yen.

1914.

1920.

Rent

Rice

Other goods

Fuel

Clothing

Travelling

Other exDenses

13-64

11-46

16-09

5-61

16-10

2-46

4-82

20-93
50-17
48-47
16-74
75-54
3-94
11-20

63-08

208-99

PRESENT ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 29

Meanwhile, wages did not increase considerably
for the same period. In 1920, the average pay
of an ordinary workman varied from 2*50 to
3 "00 yen a day.

Thus Japan has tasted alongside with the
sweetness of rapidly growing industrialism the
bitter fruits of capitalism. Labour troubles,
hitherto unknown in Japan, compelled the em-
ployers to agree to increased wages. In the first
nine months of 1921 there have been sixty- three
strikes affecting over 2,000 men each. The
biggest strike occurred in Kobe, where tens of
thousands of workmen went on strike. It lasted
over a month, whereas all previous strikes
hardly survived ten days. Another novel feature
of the strike was the procession of over 30,000
workmen which marched through the streets
of Kobe in perfect order, thus displaying their
solid organisation. One of the leaders of the
Labour movement in Japan, Sudzuki, thus
comments upon that strike : "A strike similar
to the Kobe one would have been smashed by
the Government a few years ago. I consider
that the Government has been wise in refraining
from such action, as it would only have embittered
the conflict between the workmen and the
capitalists."

The Japanese Government will have to
acknowledge the justice of the workmen's
demands and to insist upon a considerable
increase of the standing wage.

A rise in wages will, of course, increase the
cost of production, and this will have an ill

30 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

efiect upon the Japanese industries. The ab-
normal conditions of the development of these
industries in the last few years have exercised
an unhealthy influence upon production, favoured
by the temporary absence of all competition;
the Japanese merchants, in their pursuit of
easy profits, did not hesitate to lower the quality
of their goods to a level which was hardly toler-
able. When goods manufactured in Europe
and in America re-appear on the market, the
Japanese goods cannot compete with them.
This is clearly illustrated by the following
fact : In 1918, 52 per cent of the total imports
into China came from Japan. In 1919, Japan's
share fell to 40 per cent, and in 1920 to 30
per cent.

With the end of the European War, the
general conditions suddenly underwent a drastic
change which was all to the detriment of Japan.
The gates of Europe and America, which had
been open wide for Japanese industries, began
to close. France prohibited the imports of
Japanese silks. Other Powers — and especially
the United States, who is also suffering from
economic depression as a result of the war —
are trying to protect their own industries by
raising import duties. A striking example is
provided by the following figures : In 1919,
Japanese exports to the United States amounted
to 828,000,000 yen. In 1920, they fell to
565,000,000.

The general balance of trade undergoes a change
unfavourable to Japan.

PRESENT ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 31

In Tens of Millions of Yen.

Years.

Exports.

Imports.

Total.

Balance.

In£.

1916

113

76

189

37

1917

160

104

264

66

1918

196

167

363

29

1919

210

217

428

7

1920

195

234

329

39

The economic conditions did not improve in
1921. The balance is higher on account of
the fall in imports as well as in exports, in other
words, of a general depression.

This industrial depression has led to several
bankruptcies. The economic crisis affects the
working masses in that they lose the only advan-
tage they had enjoyed during the war, namely —
the increased demand for labour. Now that
many factories have been closed, the numbers
of workmen required for the maintenance of
industry have fallen 40 per cent since 1919.

The depression in the economic life which
followed after the war is an evil from which
the whole world is suffering. The Powers of
Europe and of America are likewise affected.
But the industries of these countries have grown
in conditions more healthy than those of Japan :
the latter, like a hot-house plant grown in artificial
surroundings, is less capable of withstanding
acute atmospheric changes.

The Japanese Government is therefore tempted
to give further impetus to its Imperialistic policy.

32 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

This consideration should be borne in mind in
examining the realities of the situation which
has now arisen in the Pacific.

In the next chapters the question will be
discussed whether Japan can be expected to
renounce her tendencies in spite of the economic
crisis with which she is now confronted and will
continue to face for some time to come, and
whether she will really enter upon the new path
leading to the stabilisation of peaceful inter-
course between nations on the basis of complete
abandonment of the method of exploitation of
one nation by another.

Suffice it to indicate here that the temptation
is strong indeed. To the west of Japan, two
of her neighbours, Russia and China, are for
the time being in a state of utter prostration,
devastated by civil war.

The Russian lands east of Lake Baikal are
not, perhaps, a very tempting market, owing to
the scarcity of the population. ^ China, on the

1 According to the investigations of the Russian Central
Statistical Committee recorded in 1915, the figures were as
follows : —

Provinces. Population.

Yakutsk 76,000

Transbaikalia 971,700

Amur 264,500

Maritime 631,600

Kamtchatka 41,400

Sakhalien 15,000

Asstuning that in the last six year's owing to natural growth
and to immigration from Russia and Western Siberia under
Bolshevik pressure the population cannot have increased beyond
one and a half millions, the total in 1921 would not exceed 3*5
millions.

PRESENT ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 33

other hand, affords a rich field for the Imperial-
istic policy of Japan. Mr. Rockhill, formerly
United States Minister in Peking, and a great
student of China, estimates the population of
China in 1912, without Tibet and MongoHa,
at 325,000,000.

The importance of China to Japan from the
economic point of view is enhanced by the
following significant fact : —

Japan needs raw material. Apart from
foodstuffs,^ she requires cotton,^ oil and coal, and
the greatest handicap to her industries is that
they depend upon foreign iron and steel.

Japan's output of ores, including that of
Korea, amounts to some 329,000 tons, equivalent
to 160,000 tons of pig iron. As against this
small output, Japan consumed in 1917, 1,300,000
tons of steel and pig iron. In the next few
years Japan's requirements will rise to 2,000,000
tons per annum.

Before the European War, iron and steel
were imported from Great Britain and Belgium.
Since 1914, the United States became the chief
importer. In ^^1914-17, Japanese shipbuilding

1 Imports in Millions of Yen.

1919. 1920.

Rice 162 18

Beans 35 48

Sugar 358 60

In 1920 there was in Japan an exceptionally good harvest of

rice.

2 Imports of cotton occupy the first place in the total amount
of imports. In 1919 cotton was imported to the value of 668
million yen, and in 1920, 721 milHon.

3

34 THE PEOBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

lived on these American supplies. But in June,
1917, the United States placed an embargo
upon steel, and Japanese shipbuilding and other
industries found themselves in a critical position.
At that moment Japan was building ships
totalling 300,000 tons. The American embargo
put a check upon this industry.

Kawakami, a Japanese writer, says in his work
Japan and the World Peace : " The American
embargo on steel has given strength to the
national desire, already understood by the leaders
of industry, to acquire independence from the
metallurgic factories abroad for Japanese indus-
tries. This desire has been changed into a
national watchword."

Japan's dependence on the imports of iron is
the Achilles tendon of her military power. Having
created a first - class Army and Navy, Japan
can confidently challenge any Great Power in
Europe or America on sea and on land. Her
tactical strength is very great. And yet she
cannot embark upon a war without ensuring
her supplies of iron, as the struggle would
otherwise be hopeless.

Given the general ImperiaUstic tendency of
Japan's policy, the lack of iron and coal of the
quality required for metallurgic works is in
itself an incentive sufficiently powerful to induce
Japan to seize territory on the Asiatic continent.

The present-day condition of Japan is complex,
because to further her Imperialistic policy she
would have to come into an open conflict with
other Powers, and especially with the United

PRESENT ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 35

States. A vicious circle appears to arise. In
order to promote her Imperialistic aims, Japan
requires iron. And in order to seize iron, she
must needs follow an Imperialistic policy.

This vicious circle can only be broken in the
near future by the following means : —

As economic conditions in Japan preclude the
possibility of successfully competing in armaments
with the United States, Japan must arrest the
tempo of these armaments at all costs. This
would give Japan a breathing space in which to
complete her economic, and more especially her
metallurgic, preparations for the war, while
masking these preparations by the clever moves
of her diplomacy. When these preparations are
completed, she will start a " preventive " war
without giving her more powerful and rich
neighbours the chance of bringing their
armaments to the necessary proportions.

CHAPTER III

THE POLITICAL ASPECT OF MODERN

JAPAN

The Japanese Revolution of the middle of the
nineteenth century which opened a new era
for regenerated Japan was prompted by the
desire of the popular masses for the restoration
of Imperial Power. This pecuUar trait of the
Japanese Revolution is often overlooked by
Europeans who are incHned to apply their own
European standards to the social Hfe of the

East.

Every political revolution entails social changes.
So it was in Japan, where the Revolution affected
class distinctions. It completely destroyed the
old feudal system in the country. It should,
however, be borne in mind that the fundamental
process which provoked the Revolution differed
from that which brought about the French
Revolution of the end of the eighteenth century,
and the Russian Revolution of 1917.

I would venture to describe the process which
took place in Japan in the middle of the nine-
teenth century as the desire of the people to
break through the boundaries of the islands
into which it had been driven from time imme-

36

THE MODERN POLITICAL ASPECT 37

morial and which had become too narrow.
The feehng of national self-preservation inspired
the nation, with ever-growing intensity, to create
a strong and united commonwealth. Even a
superficial study of history cannot fail to prove
that whenever a strong nation comes into conflict
with its neighbours, such struggles produce
internal changes aiming at the establishment of
a strong and centralised Power. Thus the Roman
Republic proclaimed a dictatorship in times of
war. Thus the Moscovite State, which fought
for deliverance from the Tartar yoke, evolved
the autocracy of the Russian Czars. When
the German nation found itself in straitened
bonds in Central Europe, it created a strong
Imperial Power. And so it was in Japan. It is
the same social process, and only from that
point of view can the inner meaning of the events
that are taking place in that country be fully
understood.

The penetration of Europeans into Japan was
the spark that lit the fire of national energy
and provoked the process described above.

The forcible opening of several Japanese ports
for European trade disturbed the quietude of
the country of the Rising Sun, and disclosed
the importance which was the direct result of
its long cultural isolation. The people, slighted
in their national pride, assassinated Shiogun-li-
Kamon, who signed in 1858, under pressure
from Europeans and against the will of the
Mikado, the pact which opened the Japanese
ports to Europeans. That was the beginning

38 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

of the casting off of the Shiogunate. When you
study the history of Japan, you are confronted
with an apparent paradox ; the downfall of
the Shiogunate is effected according to the
watchwords : " Respect the Emperor " and
" Down with the White barbarians," while at
the same time the leaders of the Revolution
preach persistent adaptation of the material
culture of these very barbarians.

The paradox, however, is only an apparent
one. The inner logic of the movement is clear
to those who would understand the psychology
of the Japanese people.

On my last journey across the Pacific, I heard
the following explanation of the national Japanese
boxing jiu-jitsu from an old professor of the
sport :

" When Europeans fight, they always
endeavour to set their own strength against
that of their opponent. The Japanese jiu-
jitsu teaches first of all to endeavour to use
the opponent's strength against him." He
illustrated the idea by the following example :
" Two boxers are trying to bring one another
down. Their efforts are made in opposite direc-
tions. The boxer who applies the jiu-jitsu
method will at first offer some resistance to
his opponent, in order to induce him to put
all his strength into the task of mastering the
forthcoming obstacle. If the boxer then suddenly
swerves from the direction taken by his opponent
and hits him in the back, he will inevitable force
him to fall. By this method you add your

THE MODERN POLITICAL ASPECT 39

opponent's strength to your own and may
therefore win in spite of being the weaker of
the two." This fervent adept of jiu-jitsu
eloquently expounded the idea that the Japanese
sport was not only a method of physical fighting,
but a whole system of philosophy. He is, of
course, perfectly right. That is the doctrine of
the Japanese struggle in all its manifestations.
That is why those who made a revolution in
the name of the deliverance from White barbar-
ians were the first to apply all their energies
to the task of adopting all the powerful traits
these barbarians had shown. In studying the
foreign policy of Japan, her strategy and tactics,
one detects the appUcation of the methods of
jiu-jitsu.

In 1889, a Constitutional Government was
formed in Japan. Marquess Ito was its founder.
In selecting a model for his work, he did not
look to the truly democratic Constitutions of
Great Britain, the United States, or France,
but chose the German Constitution. There was
so much in common between the strivings of
Japan and of Germany for the creation of
a strongly centralised Power.

Ito's Constitution presupposes the Divine origin
of the Mikado's power. The Emperor, of his
own free will, summons the representatives of
the people to take part in the legislation, but
he remains the sole source of power. ^ The

* Article 4 from the Japanese Constitution. — " The Emperor
is the head of the Empire, combining in himself the rights of
Sovereignty and exercising them according to the provisions
of the present Constitution."

40 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

Ministers are responsible to the Emperor, not
to Parliament. In times of war or civil strife
the Emperor may suspend the laws embod ed
in the second chapter of the Constitution which
determine the civic rights of his subjects. The
Emperor has the right to declare war and to
make peace. Characteristically enough, the
strength of the Army and Navy in peace time
and the expenditure for the maintenance of
these forces are determined by the Emperor. ^

The following lines give an idea of the autocratic
and unrepresentative character of the Japanese
Government, and disclose the manner in which
the power is concentrated in the hands of a
military and civil bureaucracy without any
parliamentary checks :

Article 7 of the Constitution reads : " When
the Imperial Diet has not voted on the Budget,
or when the Budget has not been brought into
actual existence, the Government shall carry
out the Budget of the preceding year." Thus
the control of the public purse is placed outside
the scope of the powers of the Diet.

The reforms which were carried out in 1919
by the Hara Cabinet did not materially alter
the situation. The land tax, the payment of
which gave the suffrage, was reduced to three

1 Article 12. — " The Emperor determines the organisation
and peace standing of the Army and Navy."

Article 67. — " Those already fixed expenditures based by the
Constitution upon the powers appertaining to the Emperor
and such expenditures as may have arisen by the effect of law,
or that appertain to the legal obligations of the Government,
shall be neither rejected nor reduced by the Imperial Diet with-
out the concurrence of the Government."

THE MODERN POLITICAL ASPECT 41

yen, and this caused the number of voters to
increase from 1,460,000 to 2,860,000. Universal
suffrage would have given the vote to about
13,000,000 men. Hara's hberal reforms have
thus left more than 10,000,000 men without
suffrage.

The Marquess Ito's Comments upon the
Constitution offer a key to the understanding
of the spirit of the Japanese Constitution. The
Comments are the political Bible of all leading
circles in Japanese politics. Based as it is
upon the regenerated Shintoist religion, Ito's
doctrine reaffirms the religious attitude towards
the sacred person of the Mikado, the Son of
the Sun, who embodies in himself and his ancestor
the soul of Japan herself.

The spreading of the main principles of Ito's
Comments forms the basis of all school teaching
in Japan, towards which the main energy of the
Government of regenerated Japan is directed.
In the Japanese schools, religious worship of
the Mkado is coupled with the intense fostering
of national militarism. In 1873, the number
of children educated in schools was 40 per cent ;
in 1900, 90 per cent. ; and in 1915, 99J per cent.
Naturally, in these circumstances religion and
education work hand-in-hand for the spreading
of an influence which no Japanese can escape.

In that respect a great effort is required for
the European to understand the psychology of
the Japanese people. Not merely prejudices,
but our European logic have to be discarded.

The strength of the spirit described above

42 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

was manifested in the following incident. The
Emperor Mutzuhito died on July 20, 1912.
Marshal Nogi, who was in command of the
Army besieging Port Arthur in the Russo-
Japanese War, decided to accompany his
sovereign to the abode of the everlasting Sun.
At the sound of the first salvo of guns that
announced to the subjects of the Mikado the
beginning of the funeral ceremony, Nogi com-
mitted hara-kiri. His aged wife followed his
example. It is significant that Marshal Nogi,
who had espoused all the intricacies of the
German military doctrine, had preserved intact
all the sentiments of a Japanese Samurai.

Another striking fact.

Owing to the enormous losses Japan had
suffered in the siege of Port Arthur, Marshal
Nogi failed to acquire popularity which would
have otherwise been enjoyed by the conqueror
of the stronghold that had been for decades
the object of the ambition of the Japanese
people. When Nogi landed in Japan, the crowds
at the pier met him in dead silence. After his
suicide, Nogi became the most popular hero
of the war of 1904-5. Admiral Togo and
Marshal Oyama, who were the victors over
the Northern Colossus, receded to the back-
ground before the shade of the Samurai who
had remained faithful to the traditions of the
people. The small house where the tragedy
was enacted is a place of constant worship in
the same degree as the most revered shrines.

The process which led to the establishment

THE MODERN POLITICAL ASPECT 43

of a strong central Power likewise created in
Japan an elemental movement for the increase
of territory. Japanese Imperialism is not an
invention of a handful of politicians, or of chau-
vinistic political parties. It is the expression
of the spirit of modern Japan. It has led to
the creation of an original Government organ.
Alongside with the Cabinet and the Parlia-
mentary machine which attract the attention
of Europeans, there is the " Privy Council,"
the so-called " Genro." Its members are drawn
from the same aristocratic clans which had
been leaders in the Revolution : Satzuma, Cochu,
Kizen, Tosa. As a matter of fact, foreign policy
is directed by the " Genro." Even now, no
Cabinet can free itself from the tutelage of the
*' Genro." This body has many means, besides
its intimate connection with the Mikado, for
maintaining its influence. For example, only
Lieutenant-Generals and Vice-Admirals can be
Ministers of War and of the Navy, and these ranks
are bestowed chiefly upon the clans Satzuma
and Cochu. When members of the " Genro "
come to the conclusion that the policy of the
Cabinet is not conducted upon the lines which
they favour, and when other methods fail, the
" Genro " secretly instructs the Ministers of
War and of the Navy to resign from the Cabinet :
at the same time, all other possible candidates
are also secretly forbidden to enter the Cabinet.
In these circumstances, foreign policy must
needs be in the hands of the military party,
whether avowedly or covertly. No Govern-

44 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

ment can recede from the Imperialistic path ;
it can only change its fa9ade.

From 1873 till 1894, the Government was in
the hands of the statesmen who were engaged
in the internal reorganisation of the country,
and were also preparing the annexation of Korea
and of China. From 1894, when the new era
began of victorious wars with China and Russia,
the military party was in power almost unin-
terruptedly and openly. This lasted till the
fall of the Terauchi Cabinet in 1918. The
victory of the Allies over Germany exercised
the world over the effect of strengthening
democratic tendencies. Japan did not escape
this influence, and the Hara Cabinet came
into power. Hara was one of the leaders of
the Liberal Party Seiyukai which fought for
the extension of suffrage. Hara, nicknamed " the
first Commoner," did not belong to the Japanese
aristocracy or to the military party. But he
was unable to cast off the yoke of that party.
As a matter of fact, Hara, although he did not
profess the rabid chauvinism of the military
party, was also an Imperialist with regard to
China and Korea. As a journalist he always
preached the doctrine of " Asia for the Asiatics,"
which meant, of course, a free hand for Japan
in Korea and China. Against the European
cries of " The Yellow Peril " he launched
the watchword of " The White Peril." Hara
has now perished from the assassin's dagger.
We shaU never know the real cause of that
murder.

THE MODERN POLITICAL ASPECT 45

The masses of the Japanese people are warlike.
The brilliant victories which they achieved over
the Chinese and the Russians have but stimulated
these natural sentiments. In that respect, the
attitude of the Japanese people can be likened
to the spirit of Germany before the war of
1914.

The Japanese are extremely fond of all
manifestations of external power. In 1905, the
Japanese Government consented to send repre-
sentatives to the Peace Conference at Portsmouth.
Although Admiral Togo's naval victories had
removed every possible menace to the Japanese
islands, the fine achievements of the Japanese
Army had failed to produce decisive results on
land. Manchuria was too remote from the vital
centres of Russia, but the gradual strengthening
of the Russian Army was threatening to upset
the strategical balance in favour of Russia.
The Peace of Portsmouth gave Japan a free
hand in Manchuria and delivered Korea and
Southern Sakhalien into her hands. Apart from
the economic advantages of such a peace, the
strategical results were far-reaching. By the
occupation of Korea and of Southern Sakhalien,
Japan made a large step forward towards the
conversion of the Japanese Sea into an inland
sea.

This result, however obvious to specialists,
was not fully perceived by the masses. The
latter wanted to have a striking acknowledgment
of Russia's defeat in her acceptance of the demand
for an indemnity. They knew that Japan

46 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

was unable to compel Russia to accept these
terms, and they therefore accused their repre-
sentatives of treason. Baron Komura, the chief
Plenipotentiary who signed the Portsmouth
Treaty, had to conceal the date of his return to
Japan. The Mikado had to cover the treaty
by his own sacred personal authority and to
declare in a manifesto that he considered the
terms of peace as " honourable and adequate."

It would be a mistake to deny that continued
close intercourse with European culture may
affect the spiritual development of Japan.
European scepticism will sooner or later serve
to destroy the mystic halo which now surrounds
the person of the Japanese Ruler. Also, condi-
tions may arise which will threaten the present-
day structure of the central Power. The negative
aspects of capitalism have already given rise
to an opposition movement among the workmen.
The governing circles will presumably make the
necessary concessions in due time, but one thing
is certain — in spite of all their wisdom, they will
not surrender power without a fight. They
have an excellent expedient for retaining their
authority with the masses : successful foreign
policy which always flatters the conceit of the
masses, and an improvement of the economic
prosperity of the people at the expense of its
weaker neighbours. Thus, the social movements
which may be anticipated in the near future
will also at first strengthen the Imperialism of
Japan.

One is tempted to recall the comparison

THE MODERN POLITICAL ASPECT 47

between present-day Japan and the Germany
of the end of the nineteenth century and the
beginning of the twentieth. In both instances
a psychology arises which results in " might "
being stronger than " right." Given such
a psychology, any agreement signed by Japanese
diplomats can but be a " scrap of paper " if
there is not such power behind it as would
suffice to compel Japan to carry out the
agreement.

CHAPTER IV

JAPAN'S POLICY IN KOREA

It is the misfortune of the Korean people that
they should have been the first nation that
stood in the path of Japanese penetration into
the Asiatic continent. Not even forty-three
centuries of historical existence could save the
Korean people from the endeavour of its power-
ful neighbour to absorb their national entity.

The methods applied by Japan in pursuing
that end are highly instructive, as they disclose
the future that is in store for other peoples who
may lie across the path of Japanese expansion.

In the first place, Japan having defeated
China in 1894-95, compelled her to renounce
the protectorate of Korea and to recognise the
latter' s independence. In the second stage, which
began after Japan's victory in the Russian war
of 1904-05, Japan proclaimed her own protec-
torate of Korea. The third stage was reached
in 1910 when Japan annexed Korea.

These are the three acts of the drama through
which the Korean nation has lived. All the
political and administrative steps taken by Japan
in Korea represent the methodical realisation
of the plan of the absorption of the weaker
nation by the stronger one.

48

JAPAN'S POLICY IN KOREA 49

Immediately after the conclusion of the Treaty
of Portsmouth which gave Japan a free hand
in Korea, the Korean Army was reduced to
ten battalions, then to 1,500 men, and finally
completely disbanded. Civil administration,
railways, postal services, telegraphs, customs —
were seized by Japan. After the annexation
the process of " Japanisation " of Korea was
started and conducted with the utmost energy.
The Korean flag is prohibited.^ All that might
remind the Korean people of their national
existence is carefully eliminated. Education is
strictly controlled by Japan. The Japanese
language is declared the dominant and official
language. Even religion is interfered with.
Japan implants Shintoism and the Japanese
interpretations of Confucius and Buddha, and
grants privileges to those Koreans who accept
such doctrines.

In justice to the Japanese it must be admitted
that they have done a great deal in Korea in
respect of material culture. Since the annexation,
400 miles of railway have been built, and 16,000
miles of telegraph wire ; the harvest of rice
and of other cereals has been doubled, sani-
tation in the towns has greatly improved,
tramways introduced, etc. The traveller in
Korea cannot fail to be impressed by these
changes.

The Korean people, however, are groaning
under the Japanese yoke. The Press is under

* The very name of the country, " Korea," is replaced by
" Chosen."

4

50 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

severe censorship. The country is covered with
a network of secret police which is watching
every slightest manifestation of the Korean
national spirit. The Koreans, always a weak
people, are hopelessly crushed under the chains
by which they are fettered. All revolts are put
down by the Japanese with implacable severity.
The Koreans retaliate for oppression by terror-
istic crimes, which lead, of course, to renewed
repression and to the system of government
terrorism.

The Korean political leaders endeavoured to
appeal to the European Powers, but their plead-
ings addressed to the Hague Tribunal were
of no avail. In 1919, under the impression
of President Wilson's fourteen points, in which
the principle of self-determination was pro-
claimed, representatives of the Korean people
sent a new appeal to the nations of Europe and
America. But the victors who sat at Versailles
and promised to make a just peace, remained
deaf to this cry of despair.

How modest the wishes of the Korean people
are can be gauged from the appeal to the world
which we quote below. This appeal was signed
in 1919 by the leaders of all religious and cultural
groups in Korea. This document is most inter-
esting and is probably unique. It bears the
signatures of representatives of three different
religions, namely :

(1) The leaders of the so-called "Tien Tao
Hui," or " Heaven- Worshippers " ;

JAPAN'S POLICY IN KOREA 51

(2) The representatives of the Y.M.C.A. and

of the Methodist and Protestant Churches
in Korea;

(3) The representatives of the Buddhist priest-

hood in Korea.

Manifesto of the Korean People issued to the
World on March 1, 1919.

*' We, the Korean Nation, hereby declare the
independence of Korea before all nations, assum-
ing that this will be generously recognized by
them.

" We declare this with the united voice of
twenty million people in the name of Justice
and Humanity. We are no mean people, having
a long history as a distinctive, integrative, self-
governing nation through the course of forty-
three centuries. It is a most solemn duty for
us to secure the right of free and perpetual
development of our own national character and
ability, adapting ourselves to the principles of
the reconstruction of the world.

"It is nearly ten years since we were for the
first time in our history put under the yoke
of another nation, and made a victim of the
cursed militaristic Imperialism of the old world.
Since then, how much our spiritual development
has been hampered, our national dignity injured !
And how many opportunities have been lost to
make a contribution to the civilisation of the
world !

Oh, fellow-citizens ! The most urgent and

a

52 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

the greatest duty for us is to secure our national
independence, in order to wipe out the past
resentment, to get rid of the present sufferings,
to remove the future threatenings, to stir up
the national spirit and vitality so long suppressed
under the unjust regime of Japan, and to leave
our children eternal freedom and perfect happi-
ness instead of the bitter and shameful inheri-
tance of to-day. We shall fight to the last drop
of blood in the great cause of liberty.

" We do not blame Japan for breaking treaties
in which so often and so solemnly she promised
to guarantee the independence of Korea. Nor
do we complain of her for calling our land a
colony and treating us as slaves. It is unneces-
sary for us to find faults in others. We do not
mean to take such a measure as to avenge our-
selves upon Japan. All we desire to do is to
right wrongs done to us, not by the Japanese
nation, but by a few of her statesmen who were
led by the * old ' aggressive policy.

" See the actual outcome of the annexation
which was made in 1910 without the free consent
of the peoples concerned. A bitter and irrecon-
cilable animosity is growing deeper and deeper
between these two peoples, though it has been
glossed over with a tranquil appearance caused
only by heavy pressure, and by a series of so-
called statistics, most of which have nothing to
do with our welfare. It is clear that the two
nations must and ought to enter into a new
relation for good friendship in order to enjoy
permanent happiness and to avoid further perils

JAPAN'S POLICY IN KOREA 53

on both sides. Moreover, in the matter of
maintaining the peace of the Far East the inde-
pendence of Korea is not without deep signi-
ficance. It is not only because the injustice
which subdued twenty million people of Korea
must prove a source of incessant alarm, but
because any further occupation by Japan of
Korea is likely to provoke more suspicion and
fear against Japan in the minds of four hundred
million people of China ; whereas true friendly
relations between the two peoples are the only
basis upon which any eternal peace of the East
can possibly be established. Could any inter-
national peace be expected without the perfect
harmony of the Eastern Nations ? Hence we
are assured that the independence of Korea is
worthy of universal consideration and approval.

" Ah ! a new epoch is opening before us.
The age of Might is gone, and the age of Right
has come. The history of mankind will hence-
forth shine with the glorious light of the new
civilisation led by the spirit of humanity which
has been fostered through all ages past. We
have no hesitation and no fear in marching on
towards our goal, as we are now at a new turn
of the world and a fresh start of the universe.
We shall live. We shall be free. We shall enjoy
the Heaven-given happiness. We shall do our
best as a member of the family of the nations
in rendering any service called for to promote
the peace and civilisation of the world.

" We have arisen now ! Justice is with us.
Righteousness is leading us ! All citizens, male

54 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

and female, young and old, have risen up from
the gloomy dungeon to push their way into the
bright Freedom. Our forefathers inspire us,
and the world supports us. Go on, fellow-
citizens !

The Representatives of The Korean
National Independence Union."

CHAPTER V

JAPAN'S POLICY IN CHINA

The idea of domination over China has long
since been deep-rooted in Japan. As the weak-
ness of China was revealed, and the consciousness
of Japan's own strength grew, this idea was
transformed into one of those popular yearnings
which have always led to long periods of stubborn
struggle.

It is quite obvious that 300,000,000 Chinese
people cannot be " annexed " with their ancient
and profound culture by so elementary a process
as mere conquest. As we have demonstrated in
the preceding chapter, even the 17,000,000 of
Koreans are not being so easily absorbed by
Japan. In order to reach her goal, Japan
follows the methods borrowed from her " White "
masters, and which they had conceived in the
days of Imperialistic policy.

The seizure of China's outlets to the sea is the
first step towards the economic subjugation of
China. It leads to the capture of the maritime
transport and to the control of China's foreign
trade.

In Tientsin, Shanghai and Hong-Kong, the Euro-
peans form a barrier to the intercourse between

55

56 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

the outward world and the three main regions
of Central China with their capitals, Peking,
Hankow, Nanking, Wu-chang, Nan-iang and
Canton. In the beginning of the twentieth
century the Europeans likewise seized Kiao
Tchao (Germany), Wei-hai-wei (Great Britain),
and Kwang-chow-wan (France). Since 1900, the
" concert " of foreign Powers controlling the
foreign trade of China was joined on equal terms
by Japan.

This, however, did not satisfy the latter's
secret aspirations. In accordance with the prin-
ciples of jiu-jitsu, she marches alongside her
White competitors while carefully preparing such
a condition of affairs as would allow her to reap
the harvest of the " White " endeavour at the
most convenient time.

Japan's strategical manoeuvre consists in
placing herself between the points seized by
the Europeans and the ocean, thus cutting
them off from the outer world. The entire
policy of Japan towards China is a methodical,
logical fulfilment of this plan.

In 1874, under the excuse of obtaining com-
pensation of the murder of a few Japanese in
the islands of Riu-Kiu, Japan forced China to
cede these islands. As a result of the war of
1894-5 Japan obtained Formosa and the Pes-
cador islands, and penetrated into Korea. After
the Russian War of 1904-5 she gained a firm
footing in Korea and in the Liaodun peninsula.
The seizure of the latter was dictated not only
by the desire to dominate in Southern Man-

JAPAN'S POLICY IN CHINA 57

churia, but also to control the outlets into the
Yellow Sea of the Northern part of Central
China. Taking advantage of the Great War,
Japan seized Shantung in 1914. At the same
time, she took every possible step in order to
gain exclusive influence in the Chinese province
of Fu-Kien. When all this is accompHshed, it
may be taken for granted that the Northern
and Central parts of Central China will be
strategically blocked. Liaodun and Shantung
are the first line which ensures such domination.
Korea, the Riu-Kiu islands, Formosa and the
Pescador islands are the second line.

The consequences of such a contingency are
self-evident : All maritime routes will be in
the hands of Japan. The application to these
routes and to the ports of the principle of the
" open door " will depend upon the goodwill
of Japan. When Japan chooses openly to de-
nounce that principle and to defend her hegemony
in China by the force of arms, she will find
herself placed in exceptionally favourable con-
ditions with regard to strategical bases against
the competitors whom she will be ousting, as
well as against China in the event of the latter
trying independently to oppose the aggressive
policy of Japan.

The tenacity with which the Japanese are
pursuing this plan of blocking the northern and
central parts of Central China is further illus-
trated by their conduct during the Great
War.

The Japanese diplomats never fail to assert

58 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

that Japan's participation on the side of the
Entente was dictated by idealistic motives. They
. declare that the Country of the Rising Sun
opposed German militarism and remained true
to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The facts,
however, point in a different direction. On
August 14, 1914, Japan sent an ultimatum to
Berlin in which the aims of the war are clearly
indicated : Germany must cede to Japan her
rights in Shantung. Had Germany yielded,
there would have been no excuse for going to
war.

In November, 1914, Tsing-Tao, the fortified
centre of the German colony of Kiao-Tchao,
capitulated to the Japanese troops.

The ruler of China, Yuanshikai, offered to
Japan the assistance of Chinese troops for the
purpose of expelling the Germans from the
territory of the Celestial Empire. The Chinese
troops, with the aid of the British and the
Japanese, might have blockaded Tsing-Tao, and
the fate of the stronghold would have been
sealed. No sacrifice would have been made by
Japan. But she declined the offer, effected
a landing, not near Tsing-Tao, but at a
distance of 250 miles in Lungkhou. Under
the pretence of military operations, Japan
seized not only the German colony of Kiao-
Tchao, but the entire railway Tsinanfu-Tsing-
Tao.

Having declined the participation of China in
the military operations, Japan thus gave her own
diplomats an excuse for going back on their

JAPAN'S POLICY IN CHINA 59

previous declarations that Germany was being
driven out of Tsing-Tao in order to restore
the sovereign rights of China. The Japa-
nese ultimatum to China of May 7, 1915,
states : —

" From the military and economic point of
view the importance of Kiao-Tchao is so great
that Japan has made tremendous sacrifices in
blood and money for its conquest. Japan there-
fore acknowledges no obligation to restore Kiao-
Tchao to China."

The casualties of Japan in the occupation of
Kiao-Tchao were 336 killed and 1,180 wounded,
apart from the 280 men who went down in
a small cruiser sunk by the Germans. Suffice
it to compare these figures with the milHons
of Russian, French and British killed in
the war in order to answer the question
whether Japan can seriously claim that her
rights have been bought at the price of her
sons' blood.

We have already alluded to the strategic
interests of Japan in Shantung. " Economic "
interests mean nothing else than the seizure of
the fruits of all the previous work of Germany
in that region. " Economically " it is a rich
booty. The Germans had invested enormous
sums of money in the exploitation of Chinese
concessions. They built the harbour, the Tsi-
nanfu-Tsing-Tao railway, and began to explore
the coal mines of Fantze and Hungchan and the
iron ore of King-Hn Chen. They forced China
to grant a series of other concessions which

60 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

practically gave them full possession of the rich
province of Shantung.

Another method which is applied nowadays
by strong nations with a view to subjugating
weak ones is to obtain the monopoly of building
and exploiting railways. The railway policy
which is based upon that secret aim is a kind
of " peace-time strategy."

Victory over Russia in 1904-5 gave Japan
the southern branch of the Chinese Eastern
railway. Immediately after the Portsmouth
Treaty, Japan began to develop the railways
in Southern Manchuria, and linked them up
with the railway system of Korea. Southern
Manchuria was thus secured for Japan.

The Tsinanfu-Tsing-Tao railway seized by
Japan on the excuse of military operations
against Kiao-Tchao not only ensures Japanese
domination in Shantung, but affords Japan the
possibility of approaching at Tsi-nan one of
the two railway lines connecting Peking with
the valley of the Yantze-Kiang.

In September 1918 Japan hastened to compel
China to grant fresh railway concessions in
order that the Peace Conference be faced with
accomplished facts. Although they did not
quite succeed, still the secret Chino-Japanese
agreements on railway concessions in Man-
churia, Mongolia and Shantung, signed on Sep-
tember 24 and 28, 1918, are very interesting.
They are a vivid illustration of the motives
which underlie the Japanese policy and strategy
in China.

tlAPN«2

If* 1 •

t«»

«•»

JAPAN'S POLICY IN CHINA 61

By these agreements Japan obtains the right
to build and exploit what she calls the " four
railways in Manchuria and Mongolia " : —

1. Kaiyan-Ghirin.

2. Chan-Chung-Taonan.

3. Taonan-Jehol.

4. Jehol to one of the ports in the Yellow

Sea beyond the Chinese wall.

When the reader glances at these lines on
the affixed map, he will immediately see that
the possession of these lines not only gives
Japan new territories in Manchuria, Mongolia
and Chihli, but constitutes a stepping stone
towards the strategic encircling of Peking from
the north.

In Shantung Japan obtained concessions for
the building of the lines Tsinanfu-Shuntch and
Kao-mi-Hsu-tchao. A new glance at the map
will show that Peking is cut off from the south.
These lines, like two outstretched arms, embrace
the two lines connecting Peking with the valley
of the Yantzekiang. At the same time Japan
approaches through Shuntch the province of
Shensi, which is the richest of all the Chinese
provinces in iron and coal.

There was a significant detail : the agree-
ment was signed by the Chinese Minister
at Tokyo, not on behalf of the Peking Govern-
ment, but in the name of the Minister of
Railways.

The following is the list of iron, coal and

62 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

copper mines with up-to-date technical equip-
ment in various provinces of Central China ^: —

Provinces. Iron. Coal. Copper.

Shensi 9 34 3

Shantung 8 29 —

Hupeh 2 10 7

Chihli 1 48 2

Ho-Han — 28 —

Kiang-si — 14 —

Anh-wei — 8 —

Hunan — 3 —

Kiang-su — 2 —

Sze-chwan — 1 3

Kweichow — — 2

Yunnan — — 44

20 177 61

It has been mentioned in one of the preceding
chapters that Japanese industries needed iron.
The desire to obtain the necessary supplies of
iron is thus perfectly legitimate. Japan's endea-
vour to acquire concessions for the production
of iron and coal is not, therefore, a proof of the
Imperialism of her policy. But, as the French
saying goes, Le ton fait la chanson. Japan is
trying to get hold of the entire iron industry
of China. She is doing so by the veiled seizure
of political and administrative control of the
respective provinces of China. To Europe and
America this is presented under the guise of
the nebulous formula of " special interests in
the regions of China adjacent to Japan." Man-
churia and Shantung are first in that list. When
Japan succeeds, she will have deprived China

1 These data relate to 1915.

JAPAN'S POLICY IN CHINA 63

of one half of the latter's iron mines. With
that end in view Japanese diplomacy will soon
begin to argue as convincingly as ever that the
provinces of China further east, Shensi, Hupeh,
Chihli, etc., are likewise " adjacent." The
Celestial Empire will then be deprived of all
its iron and of the greater part of its coal. Not
only would Japan be strengthened strategically
for the coming struggle against the " white
barbarians," but China would be entirely in
her hands.

In 1911 a revolution broke out in China
which put an end to the Imperial power, but
has failed so far to establish a stable and united
Government. Civil war, with all its conse-
quences, has completely ruined China. A favour-
able atmosphere has thus been created for
secret intrigues of any foreign power intent
upon exploiting the internal weakness of China.
Japan has taken full advantage of this situation.
By bribing the adventurers who rise to power
in China, Japan obtains economic concessions
and influences the policy and administration of
that country. At a very low price, in the shape
of securities for loans granted by her banks, she
obtains exclusive rights on railways and other
concessions. In grasping the natural riches of
China she has recourse to the methods of an
usurer. This can be illustrated by the following
fact : in 1918 Japan acquired from China as
a security for a loan of 30,000,000 yen the right
to exploit all the mineral riches and forests in
the provinces of Ghirin and Heilungchiang. The

64 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

territory of these two Manchurian provinces is one
and a half times the size of France. Japan does
not shrink from concluding such deals behind
the back of the Peking Government and signs
agreements with individual Ministers and Gover-
nors. This paves the way to bribery of currupt
Chinese officials on a large scale. In his book
Russia as an American Problem, Mr. J. Spargo
says (pp. 155-56) : —

" Agents of the Japanese Government pre-
pared elaborate lists of Chinese officials, civil
and military, their habits, debts, financial inter-
ests, and so on. If a Chinese official needed
money for any purpose he was almost certain
to be approached by a Japanese agent, or some
Chinese intermediary, suggesting how the neces-
sary money could be readily obtained. Some-
times this took the form of a bribe disguised
as a personal ' loan.' Sometimes a contract
would be let in such a manner that the impe-
cunious official was made a nominal partner and
enabled to draw big dividends. In other cases
the contractor had to pay rich commissions to
the official acting as ' agent ' for the Japanese
corporation in whose name the contract was
made. One of the most common methods was
to induce public officials to raise large loans in
Japan for public works, giving local revenues
or concessions as security, and to appropriate
large sums for themselves. In this way, not
only was China undermined through the cor-
ruption of her officials, but, at the same time,
Japan secured control of immense economic

JAPAN'S POLICY IN CHINA 65

interests in China, a veritable mortgage upon
her future."

Japan applies the same methods in dealing
with the middle and lower grades of the Chinese
administration. Her firms always manage to
have at their disposal wagons and ships which
they refuse to lend, on the plea of these wagons
and ships being engaged for the transport of
the goods of other Powers. A great many goods
of Japanese manufacture escape the Chinese
customs. A position is thus created, which was
described by a passing observer in the following
sentence : " My investigations entitle me to
assert that there is a secret system which gives
Japanese goods special privileges denied to those
of all other countries " {Christian Science Monitor,
August 30, 1918).

In spite of China's energetic protests, Japan
organises on an extensive scale the contraband
supply of opium. This traffic is extremely
profitable to the Japanese farmers, who cultivate
the plant.

In granting loans and armaments to various
Chinese generals who have grown like fungi on
the unhealthy soil of protracted civil war, Japan
is preventing the establishment of a stable and
united Chinese Government. Japan fans the
enmity which has developed ever since the
beginning of the revolution between the North
and the South of China. A glance at the map
will show that by this manoeuvre Japan is
separating from Peking the provinces (of which
Canton is the political centre) that are at present

5

66 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

outside the sphere of her influence. By this
strategical coup Japan reduces the part of
China which she is intent upon exploiting as
a beginning.

We give below a li^t of the loans granted by-
Japan to China in 1918. This list discloses with
sufficient clearness the real nature and aims of
Japanese policy in China. ^

* Japanese Secket Loans to China in 1918.

Yen.

1. Jan. Mitsui Bussan Kaisha to the Central

Government on the Bureau of Engraving

and Printing 2,000,000

2. „ Yokohama Specie Bank's share of Group

Bank advance for flood rehef 200,000

3. ,, Mitsui Bussan Kaisha to Mihtary Governor

of ChiH for miUtary purposes 1,000,000

4. „ Second advance on Second Reorganisation

Loan by the Yokohama Specie Bank. . . . 10,000,000

5. „ Japanese Syndicate to Rebel Government

of the Province of Hunan 20,000,000

6. ,, Yokohama Specie Bank to the Central

Government for suppression of plague 1,000,000

7. Loan to the Province of Fukien for general
piu-poses 1,000,000

8. ,, Mitsui Bussan Kaisha to Chilhli Province

for purchase of yarn for spinners for flood

rehef 1,000,000

9. ,, Tai-heiKtimeiSyndicate to Central Govern-

ment for purchase of arms 14,000,000

10. „ Second loan to Bank of Communication

made by Bank of Chosen, Bank of Taiwan

and Industrial Bank 20,000,000

11 Apr. Chosen Group of Banks to Telegraph Ad-
ministration for extension of lines 20,000,000

12. ,, Loan to Fengtien Province made by the

Bank of Chosen 3,000,000

13. Feb. Loan to Shihpingkai-Chengchiatim Railway

made by Specie Bank 2,600,000

14. „ Nan j in Railway Loan between Nanchang

and Kiukiang 100,000

15. Apr. Wireless Loaa 3,000,000

JAPAN'S POLICY m CHINA 67

The campaign of 1914 on the European theatre
of war showed that the struggle against Ger-
many would be long-drawn, and would require
an effort such as none of the Powers had anti-
cipated. This was taken into account by the
Japanese strategists and politicians. On Janu-
ary 18, 1915, the Japanese Minister at Peking,
without any preliminary negotiations, presented
to the Chinese Government " twenty-one de-
mands," ^ which in reality were but an extensive
scheme of Japanese penetration into Shantung,
Fukien and the valley of the Yantzekiang, as
well as the extension of the rights of Japan in
Manchuria and Mongolia. The so-called " fifth
group " of demands, which was kept secret.

Yen.

16. May Loan to Chilhli Province by the Chosen

Bank 1,000,000

17. June Kinin-Huaining Railway Loan by Banks

of Chosen, Taiwan and Industrial Bank of

Japan 20,000,000

18. „ Loan to Shensi Province 2,000,000

19. „ Yokohama Specie Bank of Hupeh Province 1,000,000

20. „ Okura Forestry Loan made by Industrial

Bank of Japan and the Chosen Group of

Banks 30,000,000

21. July Kirin Forestry Loan made by Industrial

Bank of Japan and the Chosen Group of

Banks 30,000,000

22. „ Second Re-organisation Loan — third ad-

vance 10,000,000

23. „ Loan on Yu Kan Iron Mines, Kiangsi Pro-

vince 3,000,000

24. Sept. Loan to Shantimg Province 1,500,000

25. Oct. Peking Telephone Loan 5,000,000

26. „ Manchurian and Mongolian Railway Loan 40,000,000

27. Nov. Shantimg Railway Loan 26,000,000

28. „ Military Agreement Loan 20,000,000

29. Dec. Peking-Suiyan Loan 4,000,000

* The twenty -one demands are given in Appendix III.

68 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

was nothing else than an mfringement upon the
sovereignty of China.

On May 7th, Japan presented another ulti-
matum, and China acceded to most of the
claims included in the first part of the January
" demands " (those that were made public).
In her refusal to agree to the secret demands
China was supported by the European Govern-
ments and by the United States, who brought
pressure to bear upon the Government at Tokyo.

The secret clauses of the " twenty-one de-
mands" were the following: —

1. The Chinese Government shall employ in-
fluential Japanese advisers in political, financial
and military affairs.

2. Japanese hospitals, temples and schools in
the interior of China shall be granted the right
of owning land.

3. Inasmuch as the Japanese Government and
the Chinese Government have had many cases
of dispute between Japanese and Chinese police,
the settlement of which caused no little mis-
understanding, it is for this reason necessary
that the police departments of important places
in China shall be jointly administered by Japan-
ese and Chinese, or that the police departments
of such places shall employ numerous Japanese,
so that they may at the same time help to make
plans for improvement of the Chinese police
service.

4. China shall purchase from Japan a fixed
amount of munitions of war (say 50 per cent or

JAPAN'S POLICY IN CHINA 69

more) of what is needed by the Chinese Govern-
ment, or there shall be established in China a
Sino- Japanese jointly operated arsenal. Japan-
ese technical experts are to be employed, and
Japanese material is to be purchased.

5. China agrees to grant Japan the right of
constructing

(a) A railway connecting Wuchang with

Kiukiang and Nanchang.

(b) A railway between Nanchang and Han-

chow.^

(c) A railway between Nanchang and Chao-

chou.

6. If China needs foreign capital to work
mines, build railways and construct harbour-
works (including dockyards) in the province
of Fukien, Japan shall be first consulted. ^

7. China agrees that Japanese subjects shall
have the right of missionary propaganda in China.

Had China accepted these conditions she would
practically cease to exist as an independent
State. Japan would have acquired sovereign
control over China. By seizing the armaments
of China, Japan would have deprived her of
the possibility of ever defending her interests
against any future aggressive designs of her
neighbour.

* These railways are indicated on Map, No, 2.

2 It is interesting to compare this point with the point in
the demands that were made pubHc " that the Chinese Govern-
ment should pledge itself not to cede or lease to a Third Power
any harbour or bay along the coast of China."

70 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

Mr. Putnam Weale, in his book, The Fight
for the Republic in China^ is right when he con-
siders that these terms were designed to admin-
ister the coup de grace to the independence and
integrity of China. " Not only is a new sphere
— the Fukien Province — indicated ; not only is
the mid-Yangtse, from the vicinity of Kiukiang,
to serve as the terminus for a system of Japanese
railways, radiating from the great river to the
coasts of South China ; but the gleaming knife
of the Japanese surgeon is to aid the Japanese
teacher in the great work of propaganda ; the
Japanese monk and the Japanese policeman are
to be dispersed like skirmishers throughout the
land . . . ; Japanese advisers are to give their
necessary advice in finance, in politics, in every
department — foreshadowing a complete and all-
embracing political control. Never was a more
sweeping programme of supervision presented,
and small wonder if the Chinese when they
learned of this climax, exclaimed that the fate
of Korea was to be their own." These demands
were, indeed, " a more vicious assault on Chinese
sovereignty than the Austrian ultimatum to
Serbia of July 1914."

Japanese do not care to recall these points.
Pamphlets edited in Japan in defence of her
policy in China and Korea make but a passing
mention of these points, and state that these
were included as a diplomatic ruse in order to
induce China to accept the first section of the

twenty-one demands " which dealt with Japan's

special interests in China." The impartial

JAPAN'S POLICY IN CHINA 71

student will hardly agree with this naive excuse.
Logic will compel him to come to the conclusion
that the " twenty-one demands " embody all
the Japanese scheme for domination over China
which Japan has been pursuing and will pursue
in the future.

Less than three years after this decisive but
abortive effort Japan had succeeded in inducing
China to enter into an agreement for common
military and naval defence. Like the famous
" twenty-one demands," this treaty attracted
but little notice in Europe and America — outside
diplomatic circles — owing to the preoccupations
of war ; but it affords evidence not to be
neglected by those who wish to form an accurate
conception of Japanese political aims. The
agreement was ostensibly concluded, according
to the preamble, " in view of the daily spread
of enemy influence in Russian territory and the
threatened danger to the peace and weal of the
whole Far East." It provided for Sino- Japanese
military co-operation, standardisation of their
plans, transport, communications, and military
codes, and therefore placed Japan virtually in
control of the entire land forces of China. The
naval agreement was in similar terms, the fol-
lowing extracts being particularly illuminating :

" In order to ensure the rapidity and accuracy
of naval operations and transports, the naval
authorities of Japan and China shall exchange
officials who will keep the two departments in
mutual communication and touch. With regard
to the repair of warships, arms, naval machinery.

72 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

etc., and materials necessary for such repairs,
assistance shall be reciprocally afforded as far
as possible. This stipulation holds good with
regard to munitions of war. The Japanese and
Chinese Navies shall establish information bureaux
at such points as may be considered necessary,
and shall exchange the charts and information
necessary for operations. A naval code for
mutual use shall be agreed upon. The present
agreement and the detailed stipulations per-
taining thereto shall not be published either in
Japan or China, but shall be treated as naval
secrets."

Both the military and naval agreements were
to lose their validity on the termination of state
of war between Japan and China, on the one
side, and Germany and Austria on the other.
That condition has since been fulfilled, but it
is evident from the notes addressed to Japan
by the Peking Government during the autumn
of 1920 that the former had not up to then
withdrawn the troops which it had sent to
occupy military posts in China by virtue of the
defence agreement.

Japan's policy in China is the policy of a
double-faced Janus. One face is astutely hidden
from Europe and America, but that is the face
which represents the real policy pursued by
Japan for the attainment of hegemony over
China. The other face is shown to the foreign
Powers with the sole object of concealing the
true aims of Japanese aspirations as long as
Japan does not consider herself strong enough

JAPAN'S POLICY IN CHINA 73

openly to declare her supremacy. ^ " Shantung
will be restored to China. Japan has not the
slightest intention of infringing upon the sover-
reign rights of China, upon the integrity of her
territory and upon the principle of the ' open
door.' " Such are the official declarations of
Japanese diplomats. The late Prime Minister,
Mr. Hara, and Admiral Kato, Japan's represen-
tative at the Washington Conference, declared
that Japan thought of nothing else than peace-
ful intercourse with her neighbour, but that
constant internal strife in China compelled Japan
to take temporary measures in order to safe-
guard the interests of her subjects, to maintain
trade and to get from China the necessary raw
materials.

In justice to Japan it must be admitted that
the Europeans themselves gave Japan an ex-
ample of duplicity in their Far Eastern policy.
When the strong figure of the Japanese warrior
appeared on the threshold of the peacefully
slumbering Chinese dragon, the European Powers
protested against the Treaty of Simonoseki,
which gave the Liaodun peninsula to Japan.
Immediately afterwards, however, Germany,
Russia, Great Britain and later France seized
Kiao-Tchao, Liaodun, Wei-hai-wei and Kwang-
chow-wan. Such was the example of the defence
of the principle of Chinese sovereignty and of
the inviolability of her territory.

This unscrupulous policy was immediately
reflected in China. In 1900, the Boxer rising

^ H. C. By water. Sea Power in the Pacific, pp. 60-51.

74 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

took place, and the combined expeditionary
forces of the United States, Japan, Russia,
Great Britain and Germany soon mastered China.

During that joint campaign the European
Powers had the opportunity of gauging the
strength of the new Japanese Army.

Having embarked upon the poHcy of " spheres
of exclusive influence " and " territorial con-
cessions," the European Powers naturally took
the next step in seeking to arrive at an agree-
ment for sharing the hegemony in China with
the strongest Power in the Far East — Japan.
Great Britain was the first to enter upon that
path, and concluded an alliance with Japan in
1902, which has been renewed several times since.

Russia having lost the war of 1904-5, made
treaties with Japan in 1907, 1910 and 1916.
France made an agreement with Japan in 1907.

On the whole, the situation that had thus
arisen can be described as follows : Seeing that
a strong plunderer was coveting China, the
European Powers, fearful of losing their share
of the booty, have tried to win over the plun-
derer and to agree with him upon the spoils.
Such a situation proved full of significance.
Japan was indeed a very capable disciple.

We have already alluded to the manner in
which Japan took advantage of the situation
arising out of the World War. Japan succeeded
in making in 1917 a special agreement even
with the United States, the only Power that
had pursued a straightforward policy in China.

On November 2, 1917, Mr. Lansing and Vis-

JAPAN'S POLICY IN CHINA 75

count Ishii signed an agreement in which the
special interests of Japan in China were recog-
nised, especially in the regions adjacent to Japan.
This agreement is the consequence of the United
States becoming a member of the Entente
struggling against Germany, of which Japan
was likewise a member, and of the critical
condition of Russia.

It is true that the principle of the integrity
of China's sovereignty is confirmed in the agree-
ment, as well as the inviolability of her territory
and the principle of the "open door." But
the idea of " special interests " is in obvious
contradiction with these principles.

Japan interpreted this agreement as definitely
giving her a free hand in China. Several days
after the agreement was signed, the Russian
Ambassador in Tokyo, Mr. V. Kroupensky, re-
ported to the Russian Government that " Japan
is manifesting with increasing clearness that
she intends to interpret the recognition of her
special interests in China in the sense that
other Powers are not entitled to any action in
that country without previous consultation with
Japan. Such a state of affairs is tantamount to
the establishment of Japanese control over
China's foreign relations. At the same time,
the Japanese Government attaches no import-
ance to its recognition of the principles of the
open door and of the integrity of China." A
few days later the same Ambassador reported
having had an interview with the Foreign
Minister, Baron Motono, and having gained the

76 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

impression that this statesman was fully aware
of the possibility of future misunderstandings in
respect of the Lansing-Ishii agreement. " Never-
theless," wrote Mr. Kroupensky, " Motono thinks
that by that time Japan will have at her disposal
more efficacious means than the United States of
enforcing the interpretation given hy Japan^^

Japanese diplomacy lost no time in impressing
upon China that henceforward the latter was
entirely in the hands of Japan. With that end
in view the words " special interests " were
translated into Chinese " specially acquired
advantages, i.e. predominance " in the copy of
the Lansing-Ishii agreement presented by the
Japanese Government to the Peking Govern-
ment for information.

The great European War has had one impor-
tant moral consequence. The European Powers
have come to the conclusion that their former
Imperialistic policy inevitably resulted in wars.
The new ideas which tend to bring mankind
nearer to the ideals of peaceful intercourse are
beginning to be perceived, however dimly. There
can be no doubt that Europe and America will
be diverted more than once from that path.
They have already done so at Versailles when
they departed with the connivance of President
Wilson from the Fourteen Points which the
American statesman had been striving to estab-
lish as the foundation of future international
intercourse. It is likewise certain that this was
only a deviation from the right path, not its
abandonment. Mankind is weak and will wander

JAPAN'S POLICY IN CHINA 77

in the darkness for a long while before it finds
the truth. At the dawn of these new inter-
national relations, for which humanity has suffered
and shed rivers of blood such as the world has
never seen, Europe should renounce her Im-
perialistic policy with regard to China and
protect, together with the United States, this
peace-loving people from the plundering appetites
of its warlike neighbour. It should be remem-
bered that Japan did not make the same
sacrifice in the Great War as the European
Powers, The cleansing fire of war never
touched Japan. The situation that was so
favourable to her aspirations had only intensi-
fied them.

It was with this hope that the Chinese repre-
sentatives came to Washington. On November
1 6th, the chief Chinese representative presented
a memorandum to the Conference, in which the
desiderata of China were somewhat vaguely
formulated. 1

^ 1. (a) The Powers engage to respect and observe the terri-
torial integrity and the pohey of the administrative indepen-
dence of the Chinese RepiibHc.

(6) China, upon her part, is prepared to give an under-
taking not to alienate nor lease any portion of her territory or
littoral to any Power.

2. China, being in full accord with the principle of the so-
called "open door," or equal opportunity for the commerce and
industry of all nations having treaty relations with China, is
prepared to accept it and to apply it to all parts of the Chinese
Republic without exception.

3. With a view to strengthening mutual confidence and
maintaining peace in the Pacific and the Far East, the Powers
agree not to conclude between themselves any treaty or agree-
ment directly affecting China or the general peace in these

78 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

In presenting the wishes of China in this
abstract form, the Delegation evidently did not
wish to dot the " i's " and cross the " t's," as
the principles of the integrity of China, of
the "open door," and of the inviolability of
China's sovereignty had more than once been
violated.

In order to put these principles into practice,
all the territorial concessions already obtained
from China in Liaodun, Shantung, Hong Kong,
Kuang-che-wan and other agreements contrary

regions without previously notifying China and giving her an
opportunity to participate.

4. All special rights, privileges, immunities, or commitments,
whatever their character or contractual basis, claimed by any
of the Powers in or relating to China are to be declared, and
all such or future claims not so made known are to be deemed
null and void. The rights, privileges, immunities, and com-
mitments now known or to be declared are then to be examined
with a view to determining their scope and validity, and if
valid to harmonise them with one another and with the prin-
ciples declared by this Conference.

6. Immediately, or as soon as circumstances permit, the
existing limitations on China's political, jurisdictional and
administrative freedom of action are to be removed,

6. Reasonable and definite terms of duration are to be attached
to China's present commitments, which are without time limits.

7. In the interpretation of instruments granting special rights
or privileges, the well-established principle of construction that
such grants shall be strictly construed in favour of the grantors
is to be observed.

8. China's rights as a neutral are to be fully respected in
any future wars to which she is not a party.

9. Provision is to be made for the peaceful settlement of
international disputes in the Pacific and the Far East.

10. Provision is to be made for future conferences to be held
from time to time for the discussion of international questions
relative to the Pacific and Far East as a basis for the deter-
mination of common policies by the signatory Powers in relation
thereto.

JAPAN'S POLICY IN CHINA 79

to the sovereign and administrative rights of
China will have to be revised.

The demand for the abandonment of secret
diplomacy in respect of China and of agreements
between other Powers concerning China is one
of the instruments of defence against the policy
of extortion and of violence. Closely scrutinised,
this demand means : (1) To publish all secret
agreements concluded by Japan with different
governing Chinese authorities in Peking and in
the provinces during the period of unrest and
civil war in China of which Japan took advan-
tage; (2) to put an end to, or at least to
render more difficult, the policy of intrigue and
bribery ; (3) to denounce such treaties as the
Anglo- Japanese Treaty of 1902 and the Russo-
Japanese Treaty of 1916 which represent in
reality agreements between strong Powers for
the exploitation of the weak Power — China.

China, at present in a state of utter debility,
is trying to find a champion in the United States
against powerful Japan, which is watching on
her threshold.

The wishes of China are irreconcilable with
the entire policy of Japan. And yet the repre-
sentative of Japan issued in the first days of
the Conference a short and extremely cleverly
worded communique, the meaning of which is
that the internal affairs of China are China's
own concern, and that the Conference is only
called upon to place her foreign relations on
a proper footing. Japan is anxious to maintain
the happiest relations with China. Japan fully

80 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

endorses the principle of the "open door," and
accepts just and honest competition with all
other nations. Japan will endeavour to come
to an agreement for the cancellation of ex-
territorial rights.

By such declarations Japan is trying once
more to lull the attention of America and Europe,
because as long as China is not cured of its
social strife and has not recovered strength, she
can offer no resistance to Japan's Imperialism.
In order that the just demands of China may
be satisfied, other forces must be brought into
being.

CHAPTER VI

THE FUTURE CONFLICT IN THE PACIFIC

The masses of the German people were con-
vinced in 1914 that right and justice were on
their side. Germany had to offer miUions of
her sons on the altar of war before renouncing
the idea of basing her history upon the prin-
ciple of world hegemony.

In order to lift the veil over the impending
events in the Pacific, we should understand the
viewpoint of the Japanese people. That view-
point has very much in common with the mental
attitude of the German people in the last
few decades preceding the Great War. If we
penetrate that viewpoint, we shall find that
Japan stands on the eve of a long period of
stubborn struggle which can only be stopped by
real, material forces, not by diplomatic negotia-
tions alone.

The motives which will prompt Japan to
engage in the struggle are so deep and so vast
that not one but several wars will have to be
waged before a solution is reached. Let us
illustrate this view by another example from
recent history. The wars of 1864, 1866, 1870-71
and 1914-18 are but links of the chain of events

6 ^

82 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

in the struggle of the German people for expan-
sion in Central Europe.

We find the first links of the same chain in
the East of Asia : the Sino-Japanese Wars of
1874, 1894 and 1900, the Russo-Japanese War
of 1904-5, and the war against Germany in
1914-18. What is the next link ? To answer
that question we must define the Power that
stands first and foremost across the path of
Japanese expansion. Russia, ruined by the Bol-
sheviks, will not be in a position for some time
to come to be a serious opponent. Russia's
temporary weakness, moreover, tends to make
her Far Eastern possessions an easy prey to
Japan. The other two possible adversaries are
Great Britain and the United States.

The interests of Great Britain and Japan in
the Far East are related chiefly to trade with
China. Japan and Great Britain headed the
list of countries trading with China. The British
are mainly interested in dealing with Southern
China and Tibet. An amicable agreement with
Japan as to spheres of influence was therefore
possible, and Great Britain was the first of the
European Powers to enter upon that path in
1902.

Great Britain would have followed that course
even now had the menace to her maritime
routes from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific
and to her Dominions in the Pacific not begun
to loom in the dim distance. Japan, with her
ever-increasing population, is akin to a vessel
which, owing to growing internal pressure, will

THE FUTURE CONFLICT 83

needs begin to disgorge its contents. As we
have pointed out in Chapter I, these contents
will flow in the direction of the islands forming
a chain around the Eastern shores of the Asiatic
Continent, linldng it up with Australia. The
latter foreshadows the impending menace, and
realises that with her population of six millions
she will be unable to stem the tide of that
influx.

Moving in that direction, Japan will come
against the United States in the Philippines.

It is the traditional feature of British foreign
policy skilfully to weaken Britain's rivals by
means of setting other Powers against them, and
to join in the struggle when the forces of these
other Powers prove inadequate.

Thus in the Napoleonic Wars Great Britain
was the most stubborn opponent of the growing
might of France. Great Britain organised and
supported a coalition of European Powers against
Napoleon. Russia, Austria and Prussia drowned
Europe in blood. Great Britain took a minor
part in secondary theatres of war — in Spain and
in Portugal — until fate compelled her to join
in the momentous battle of Waterloo. That,
however, was merely dealing the final blow to
Napoleon.

In the same way, when Germany grew at
the close of the nineteenth century into a serious
competitor. Great Britain did not bind herself
by an alliance with France and Russia, but
joined in an entente cordiale which left her
free to refrain from becoming a partner in an

84 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

active struggle between these two countries
and Germany. We all remember that Great
Britain's decision to join France and Russia
in August 1914 was not taken till the eleventh
hour. Great Britain declared war when the
neutrality of Belgium was violated, and that
was a direct menace to the British Isles.

The lessons of the past seem to justify the
belief that Great Britain will take advantage
of the fact that the United States stands first
in the path of the Japanese expansion, and
will endeavour to hold back as long as possible.
For this reason the conflicting interests of Japan
and the United States in the Pacific, and the
conditions in which the struggle is likely to be
waged, must first be dealt with in this chapter,
in order that we may form an idea of the probable
outcome of the conflict.

The United States needs the Chinese market.
In 1918, out of the total imports into China
the share of the United States was only 13 per
cent., but in the following year it rose to 16 per
cent, and in 1920 amounted to 20 per cent.

For the future, the need of the United States
for the Chinese market is bound to grow. All
the markets of North and South America cannot
suffice for the industries of the United States,
which are developing so rapidly. Suffice it to
recall that the population of all the States of
North and South America, excluding the United
States, is only 80,000,000. The European
market was closed to American goods after the
war owing to the high exchange, and will in

THE FUTURE CONFLICT 85

future be flooded with goods manufactured by-
European industries, as European countries will
defend their markets by the same protectionist
system which the United States has heretofore so
rigorously applied. China, with her 325,000,000,
offers such alluring possibilities as a market
that the United States is not likely to renounce
it easily. China, owing to cheap labour, is also
a splendid field for capital accumulated in the
United States after the war.

Quite apart, therefore, from idealistic motives,
and out of mere practical commonsense, the
United States is compelled to defend the prin-
ciples of Chinese independence, of the integrity
of Chinese territory, and of the " open door."
As long as these principles are professed only
in words and ambiguous diplomatic notes, Japan
will not oppose the United States. Japan, more-
over, is interested for strategical and economic
reasons in gaining time and not showing her
cards. The moment the United States begin
to insist upon the strict application of these
principles, she will have to stand face to face
with the country of the Rising Sun.

Emigration is another question in which the
interests of Japan and the United States clash.
Justice in this matter is on the Japanese side.
Another glance at the map affixed to the first
chapter will convince the impartial reader that
in the east of Asia and in the Japanese islands
there is a dense population of many dozens of
millions, whereas the shores of the Pacific are
but thinly populated by peoples of the " White

86 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

race," who will not " make room " and forego
the advantages which they possess. Are we to
trust the sincerity of those who talk about the
horrors of war and describe it as a relic of the
barbaric past, but who will not surrender of
their own free will any of the privileges they
have acquired by force ? The surplus of the
Japanese population must find room, and Japan
will be fully justified in claiming " a place under
the sun " and demanding the recognition of
the principle of racial equality. It is no longer
an economic question for Japan, but a matter
of national and even racial self-esteem. On
these grounds the Japanese Imperialists hope
to recapture the goodwill of China, who is at
present deeply irritated. After imposing her
yoke upon China, Japan will endeavour to over-
come the instinctive opposition of China by
fanning the flames of racial hatred. It should
be borne in mind that the ground is extremely
favourable, and by working in that direction
Japan will represent her domination as being
a holy war for the rights of the Yellow races.

The United States, whose example will be
followed by Australia and Canada, will not give
in to Japan in the matter of free emigration.
The question of the freedom of Yellow emigra-
tion will not be solved substantially at the
Washington Conference, or at any other subse-
quent Conference. In this matter the United
States will follow the example of Japanese
diplomacy in the Chinese question. Resolutions
and agreements will be full of ambiguities and

THE FUTURE CONFLICT 87

omissions, and every effort will be made to
create a fa9ade that will not shock the Japanese
and yet will " keep the door shut." The ques-
tion of the freedom of emigration is pregnant
with excuses for conflicts in the near future.
It contains the inflammable material which may
blaze up from the slightest spark. The more
remote future, however, is even more menacing.
The longer Japan is prevented from sending
out settlers to suitable countries, the stronger
will the explosion be. The boiler is bound to
explode sooner or later if internal pressure is
not relieved and safety valves remain closed.
The Government circles in Japan will have to
face a dilemma. Either they will have to devise
measures to prevent the increase of the popula-
tion, or they will have forcibly to open the
channels for Japanese emigration. Can there
be any doubt the decision that victorious Japan
will arrive at ? Japan is thus bound to come
into contact with the United States in the
Philippines.

The conflict between the interests of Japan
and of the United States is therefore much
more serious than it may appear to the casual
observer.

The only means of averting war with Japan
in the twentieth century would be for the United
States to evacuate the Philippines and to re-
nounce her interests in Eastern Asia. Is that
possible ? The United States might camouflage
her retreat before the power of the country
of the Rising Sun by granting to the Philippines

88 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

the promised independence, and by afterwards
refusing to defend the islands against their
absorption by Japan. Such a retreat, after all
the sacrifices and expenditure already incurred
would be a heavy blow to the national pride of
the Americans. There has never been a case
in history of such a reversion of policy without
any attempt to solve the question by fighting.
Another circumstance renders the free with-
drawal of the United States from the Philippines
still more improbable : by gaining possession
of the islands, Japan would become the sole
mistress in Eastern Asia.

The policy of " Great Japan " will not alter
its aggressive course, as that would also be against
all historical precedents. Japan will continue
to strive for supremacy in the Pacific. Step
by step she will drive her rivals out of all the
Pacific islands. The United States will be forced
to bid farewell to the Monroe doctrine. " Great
Japan " will be strong enough to make her
voice heard in all matters concerning the Panama
Canal and the Pacific coast of America. That
is, of course, a matter of the remote future. It
Is, however, the object of the present book to
examine the Pacific problem in its entirety.

The United States will not withdraw from
the Philippines. She will have to throw down
the glove. The limitation of naval armaments
does not offer a concrete solution of the problem.
It will not even delay the war, because it is to
the advantage of Japan. We shall discuss this
statement at full length in the next chapter,

THE FUTURE CONFLICT 89

and confine ourselves here to considerations of
general strategy.

Japan cannot compete with the United States
in peace-time armaments. The difference in
economic and technical possibilities is so great
that comparison would be futile. The only
weapon at the disposal of Japan is " preventive
war." And even this weapon Japan is not in
a position to apply for economic reasons men-
tioned above, as well as for strategical reasons
to which we will now turn.

War is the continuation of peace-time policy
by force of arms. Policy will impose the follow-
ing tasks upon the Japanese strategists in the
event of an armed conflict with the United
States : —

1. To ensure Japan a free hand in Northern

China, Korea, and in the Far Eastern
Dominions of Russia.

2. To afford the opportunity of the complete

absorption of China, thus opening the
way for Japanese penetration in the
southern direction.

The first series of tasks is that which Japan
has been and will continue to carry out in the
near future. From the military viewpoint, these
aims can be attained by a mere strategical defence
in the Japanese, the Yellow and the Okhotsk
Seas. The second series constitutes the next
step in Japanese policy, and may become
apparent in a future somewhat more remote.
From the military point of view it differs from

90 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

the first series in that it requires a strategical
advance of which the PhiUppines would be the
objective. The seizure of the Philippines would
be the crowning act of the policy which bends
towards the isolation of China ; all lines connect-
ing China by sea with the outer world would
fall under the control of Japan, and the Chinese
Sea would be encircled. The importance of
the seizure of the Philippines for the opening
of lines of emigration southwards has already
been mentioned.

The problem with which the United States
General Staff will be confronted when politicians
will recognise the impossibility of gaining their
ends will be :

1. To compel Japan to reverse not in words,

but in deeds, her aggressive policy in
China.

2. To defend the Philippines, or reconquer

them if Japan succeeds in seizing the
islands in the first stage of the war.

The defence alone of the Philippines can be
accomplished by strategical defensive. All other
aims can be attained through a strategical
offensive.

This correlation of policy and strategy places
Japan in a more advantageous position than
the United States. It allows Japan to assume
the outward appearance of the " Power that is
attacked " in the event of an armed conflict.
Such is at present the psychology of the popular
masses that they will always be against the Power

THE FUTURE CONFLICT 91

that appears to be the aggressor. In 1870
Bismarck forged the Ems telegram when he
was determined to go to war with France, in
order that the formal declaration of war should
come from that country. He needed this political
blackmail in order to enlist the sympathy of
the masses unable to understand the inner
meaning of events. War can only begin if
one of the Powers is compelled by its policy to
start the offensive. In order to form an idea
of the general strategy of the contemplated
struggle, it is therefore necessary to analyse the
probable strategical offensive plans.

It would seem futile to draw fantastic pictures
worthy of the pen of Mr. H. G. Wells, of millions
of an expeditionary army landing in Japan or
in the United States. Military history knows
of two cases only in which huge armies crossed
the ocean : the British in the Boer War, and
the United States in the Great War. The first
took place in a war with a small nation deprived
of a fleet, and was but an operation for the trans-
port of reinforcements and complements. The
United States Army was sent across the Atlantic
in the Great War in similar circumstances, with
the difference that the operation was carried
out on a larger scale and under the menace
of German submarines. But the main difficulty
characteristic of such expeditions did not exist.
The American troops landed in the rear of the
French and British Armies. Also, in order that
the United States Army might cross the Atlantic
Ocean, an ocean of Russian, French and British

92 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

blood had to be shed. In the future conflict
between the United States and Japan neither
of these States will be in a position to undertake
the objectives which were inherent in European
wars, namely, the destruction of the entire
armed forces of the enemy and the capture of
his capital.

Should Japanese strategy deem it necessary
to adopt an offensive plan, the Philippines
would provide a convenient and easy objective.
Irrespective of the demands of Japanese policy
for the final conquest of the Philippines, an
attack upon these islands would be prompted
by the purely strategical aim of destroying
the only American base in the Western Pacific.

American strategy is not quite so simple.
All possible objectives for an offensive are far
remote from the United States. It might even
appear at first sight that Japan is unassailable.
And so she would and will be if measures are
not taken to remedy one of the most sensitive
spots in her armour.

In the present circumstances a blockade would
be a great danger in Japan.

Japan, as we have already said, has to import
large quantities of raw material for her indus-
tries as well as for feeding her population. Japan
is not alone in that position, but the want of
iron ore places her in conditions of exceptional
difficulty. It is truly the Achilles tendon of
Japan's military might. In war time the demand
for iron and steel naturally becomes much greater
than in peace time. Also, the evolution of

THE FUTURE CONFLICT 93

military science is proceeding in the direction
of a further increase of the armies' need for
metals. We are loth to quote extensively from
the statistics of the last war, but we venture
to mention one typical instance. In the wars
of the nineteenth century it was reckoned that
in order to destroy or permanently disable one
combatant, an amount of shells and cartridges
equal to the average human weight had to be
expended — in other words, about ten stone. In
the last year of the campaign on the Western
front about one ton of ammunition was spent
to every German. In other words, the propor-
tion increased tenfold.

It would be impossible to give in these pages
a complete estimate of all the raw material,
the imports of which would have to be guaranteed
to Japan in the event of going to war. That
vast and intricate task is now being performed
by the Japanese General Staff, and forms an
important part of the general war scheme.
The General Staff will present to the political
leaders of the country a series of demands,
the fulfilment of which will constitute the econ-
omic preparation for the war. These demands
will be formulated in accordance with the exact
data concerning the strength of the Army and
Navy mobilised for the war, with the data
concerning the requirements of the country in
respect of all kinds of raw material and of its
home production : the probable length of the
war will also be taken into account. It is not,
however, necessary to go into the minute details

94 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

of these elaborate calculations in order confi-
dently to assert that Japan will require a rear
OF THE Asiatic Continent in the war with the
United States.

Even in the Russo-Japanese War, when Great
Britain and the United States maintained an
attitude of benevolent neutrality and there was
no naval blockade, Japan, in spite of continued
victories on land and sea, had to seek peace after
eighteen months, because the territory of the
Japanese Islands proved an inadequate econ-
omic BASE.

The following conclusions seem, therefore,

obvious :

1. The blockade is a war measure which is

likely to produce decisive results against
Japan, but with that end in view, Japan
must be cut off from the Asiatic continent.

2. Japan cannot engage in an armed struggle.

against the United States without or-
ganising a solid base on the Asiatic
continent.

The sea will be the main arena on which these
strategical offensive designs will be carried out
by both belligerents. In the last war, naval
operations supplemented, as it were, the conduct
of the war on land. In the coming conflict
between the United States and Japan the opera-
tions of the armies on land will likewise supple-
ment the naval operations. For this reason,
in our analysis of what the relative strength

THE FUTURE CONFLICT 95

of the belligerents would be, we shall deal chiefly
with the relative power of the navies.

The only active method of warfare against
Japan which is at the disposal of the United
States — the blockade — is in itself a slow method.
It should also be remembered that the United
States will not realise her shortcomings in respect
of military preparedness until the war is actually
upon her. .Such is the law of history that every
nation has to pay a price in the blood of its sons
for a real understanding of the science of war.
It is quite possible that the United States may
lose the Philippines in the first days of the war.
That will not induce the country to stop fighting.
With redoubled energy, the United States will
develop her economic and technical might. The
country will make a far greater effort than that
which we witnessed in the Great War. That will
require time, and it is more than likely that the
United States will not be in a position to
blockade Japan efiectively till an arduous and
intense preliminary work, begun after the
declaration of war, is completed. Japan will
thus be compelled to^prepare for a protracted
struggle.

CHAPTER VII

THE NAVAL FORCES OF THE UNITED
STATES AND OF JAPAN IN THE PACIFIC

The sea power of Japan is ever in existence, and
ever present in the Pacific. That ocean has
been its cradle for centuries past, and the Japanese
Fleet is as much at home in the waters of the
Western Pacific as the British Fleet in the waters
of the Eastern Atlantic.

The entire Fleet of Japan has been and always
is a Home Fleet which has but one object — to
keep a firm hold over the strategic keys of the
waters over which the rays of the " Rising
Sun " are spreading.

What is the strength of the United States
Navy which could be despatched to the waters
of the Western Pacific ?

The nearest base of the American Fleet —
Pearl Harbour, in Honolulu — is 5,000 miles dis-
tant from the axis of the Western Pacific — the
line connecting Nagasaki with the Philippines.

When the American Fleet starts from its base
on a long journey of 5,000 miles into the waters
of the Western Pacific, the big battleships whose
scope of action after a voyage of 5,000 miles
would deprive them of the amount of fuel

THE RIVAL NAVAL FORCES 97

necessary for battle, cannot form part of the
fleet. The older the ships, the greater the
chances that their worn-out mechanism would
prove inadequate for immediate battle after a
long cruise. In order not to impair so important
a tactical asset as the speed of the squadron,
the fleet would not include ships of old con-
struction. Destroyers and submarines incapable
of long cruises would likewise stay behind.
Otherwise, the American Fleet would run the
risk of sacrificing quality to quantity, and would
repeat the mistake made by the Russian Govern-
ment in sending Admiral Rojestvensky's squad-
ron to the Pacific during the Russo-Japanese
War. Owing to the inclusion in that squadron
of obsolete ships, its speed was reduced to 10
knots in the Battle of Tsushima, whereas the
best divisions of the squadron could have de-
veloped a speed of 16 knots. Considering that
the average speed of the American Fleet is two
knots lower than the Japanese, it would hardly
be wise to risk further loss of speed. It seems,
therefore, doubtful that ships of a class
inferior to the Wyoming^ light cruisers of
under 30 knots, destroyers under 1,000 tons
and submarines other than of the ocean-
going type, will be seen in the Western
Pacific.

Bearing in mind these facts which determine
the strength of the American Fleet capable
of operating in the waters of the Western Pacific
under normal tactical conditions, let us examine
the relative strength of the American and

7

98 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

Japanese Fleets, such as it was in the beginning
of 1922.

In the Battle of Jutland five German battle-
cruisers of the Dreadnought type fought for
over three hours with six British cruisers of
the same type. The latter were supported in
action by four British super-Dreadnoughts and
three battle-cruisers. The numerical superiority
was obviously on the British side, as well as
the strength in armament. And yet the battle
resulted in the loss of three British battle-cruisers
while the Germans lost only one (on the follow-
ing day).

After the war and the surrender of the German
Fleet the Allies investigated the construction
of the German ships. They found that although
in peace time the German ships appeared to be
weaker than the British, there were certain
details of construction and peculiarities in the
armour which made those ships not only no
weaker than their rivals in battle, but even
stronger. This shows that the actual strength
of the present-day structure of battleships cannot
be accurately gauged, as many details which
are kept secret escape the attention even of
specialists who do not get access to these secrets.
It is particularly difficult to estimate the
material strength of the Japanese Fleet because
published information is very scanty, and details
are concealed under the cover of rigidly observed
secrecy characteristic of the Japanese people.
We may therefore expect many surprises from
the Japanese Fleet in action, such as were dis-

THE RIVAL NAVAL FORCES 99

closed in the German Fleet in the battle of
Jutland.

Technical progress in naval construction is,
of course, a matter of common knowledge,
and details alone are kept secret. It would,
therefore, be a mistake to assume, for example,
that five battleships of a certain type would be
equal in strength to ten ships of the same type
and of approximately the same period of con-
struction. But it would not be safe to assume
that the same ten ships would be stronger than
seven or eight corresponding enemy ships,
especially after the experience of the Jutland
battle.

Until now, in estimating the comparative
strength of fleets, a simple method was applied :
the sum total of ships of a given type was taken
for each fleet and the difference in numbers
was accepted as indicating the relative strength.
This method was quite rational in the days of
sailing ships, as well as during the period of the
so-called " line tactics " of the steamship fleets.
In those days the tactical ideas of the combatants
were limited to the " line ahead" formation, and
their chief concern was to maintain the line un-
broken at all costs.

After the Russo-Japanese War, and especi-
ally after the Great War, naval tacticians have
definitely abandoned this narrow and out-of-
date conception, and have adopted the so-called
" manoeuvring tactics," which give ample scope
for carrying out the plans of the commander-
in-chief, and consist in the manoeuvring in battle

100 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

of several autonomous tactical units (divisions)
composed of a limited number of sister ships.
In this connection the speed of the ships acquires
greater importance, as it is the main feature of
the manoeuvre.

Those who have witnessed the birth and de-
velopment of these tactics in the Japanese
Fleet during the Russo-Japanese War, and have
followed the evolution of the tactical conceptions
of the Japanese Fleet clearly manifested in
Japan's programmes of naval construction, know
that in future battles the Japanese Fleet will
apply the newest methods of manoeuvring tactics.
That which we could only dimly perceive in the
British tactics of the battle of Jutland — the free
movements of independent divisions — will un-
doubtedly be fully and clearly manifested in
the tactics of the Japanese Fleet in future naval
battles.

In forming a comparative estimate of the
strength of the American and Japanese Navies
one should bear in mind the present-day tactics,
and not only compare the numbers of individual
ships, but also of tactical units (divisions) which
these fleets contain. The Japanese Fleet was
formed and continues to be formed into divisions
of four battleships of the same type. This
number is considered in present-day tactics as
the best for manoeuvring and for the concen-
tration of fire in battle. For this reason Japan
has been building her ships in pairs and com-
bining these pairs into divisions. The American
Navy had no definite system in that respect. At

THE RIVAL NAVAL FORCES 101

first the scheme of building ships in pairs seemed
to have been adopted, but it was subsequently
altered when three battleships were built of
the New Mexico type. After building two ships
of the Tennessee type, the United States began
the construction of four ships of the Maryland
type, and has now adopted the system of six ships.

In the first months of 1922 the first line
Japanese Battleship Fleet will consist of two
and a-half divisions : half-division of the Nagato
type, a division of the Fuso type, and a
division of the Kon-go type.

In accordance with the types of battleships
and the requirements of modern tactics, two
and a-half divisions could also be formed of
first line American battleships, a half division
of three battleships — Maryland, California, and
Tennessee, sl division of five battleships : New
Mexico, Mississipi, Idaho, Pennsylvania and
Arizona, and a division of four ships : Nevada,
Oklahoma, New York and Texas. These divi-
sions would be superior in gunfire strength to
the corresponding Japanese divisions, but would
have inferior speed, as is shown in the table
on page 102.

In the table the first line comprises battle-
ships armed with 15 and 14-in. guns, and
the second line battleships armed with 12-in.
guns and more than ten years old. Consider-
ing that the 16-in. gun is nearly 75 per cent
stronger than the 12-in., and that the second
line battleships are not supposed to resist the
fire of 16-in. guns, it must be admitted that in

102 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

COMPARATIVE TABLE OF THE AMERICAN AND
JAPANESE FLEETS AT THE END OF 19 2 L

First-Line Battleships. Capital Forces.
American Fleet. Japanese Fleet.

Maryland

California
Tennessee

Nagato

{

8 16-m. guns
8 torpedo tubes

I. Half-Division.

'8 16-in. guns
2 torpedo tubes
Speed, 21 knots

12 14-in. guns Mutsu Speed, 23 knots
2 torpedo tubes
Speed, 21 knots

New Mexico

Missippi

Idaho

Pennsylvania

Arizona

Nevada
Oklahoma
New- York
Texas

11. Division.

Ise
12 14-in. gtins Hiuga
> 2 torpedo tubes Fuso
Speed, 21 knots Yaniashiro

III. Division.

10 14-in- guns Kon-go
3 torpedo tubes Hi-yei
Speed, 21 knots Hazuma
Kirishima

12 14-in. guns
>6 torpedo tubes
Speed, 23 knots

8 14-in. guns
>8 torpedo tubes
Speed, 21\ knots

Wyoming
Arkansas

Second Line Battleships.

I. Half Division.

■^12 12 -in. guns
J Speed, 21 knots

Setsu

/12 12-in. guns.
\Speed, 21 knots.

II. Division.

Florida
Utah
Delaware
North Dakota^

10 12-in. guns
J> Old model
Speed, 21 knots

a general battle against ships of the first line the
ships of the second line can be of no use. On
the contrary, should they come under the fire

THE RIVAL NAVAL FORCES 103

of the 16-in. guns, they may turn an easy prey
to the enemy.

The second line division of the American
ships of the Florida type, moreover, cannot
operate in the waters of the Western Pacific
because the radius of action of these ships does
not exceed 6,000 miles, not to mention the fact
that they have 12-in. guns of the old pattern
and are inadequately armoured.

The experience of all naval battles of the last
years tends to show that the battle is decided
by the newest battleships, whereas the old ones
do not affect the issue. The relative strength
of the contending fleets, and more especially
in the Western Pacific, depends therefore upon
the power of the battleships of the first line.

On the whole, therefore, the relative strength
of the two fleets would be the following : —

American Fleet. Japanese Fleet.

21 Divisions of 12 battleships, 2J Divisions of 10 battleships,

132 heavy guns, 28 torpedo 100 heavy gtins,i 72 torpedo

tubes, 21 knots speed. tubes, 23 knots speed.

In other words, the first line American Fleet
will have the same strength of divisions, two
battleships and approximately one-third of heavy
guns more than the Japanese, but will be weaker
in respect of speed and torpedo tubes. Does
that mean that the American Fleet will be
stronger than the Japanese, and the victory of
the former is assured ? We doubt it. Experi-
ence in the Jutland battle teaches us that a

1 Superiority in 16-in. guns is taken into consideration, the
16-in. guns being estimated 50 per cent stronger than the 14-in.

104 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

certain advantage in ships and guns is not a
decisive factor in battle.

We are not inclined to attribute excessive
importance to the advantage which the Japanese
Fleet possesses owing to its threefold predomi-
nance in torpedo tubes. It should be noted
that the modern torpedo has about the same
range as gunfire, and it is quite likely that it
will be used in battle to the same extent as the
guns. In the Jutland battle both sides made use
of torpedoes, and there is reason to believe
that they were not altogether unsuccessful. The
growing importance of the torpedo for battle-
ships in modern battles has already been recog-
nised by the British Navy, which has given it
the same place of honour as the Japanese Navy.

In discussing the relative strength of the
American and Japanese Fleets, we have
deliberately omitted to mention the question
of armour. The fact is that these navies have
diflEerent systems of armour. The American
system is to protect with very heavy armour
the vitals of the ship, leaving a considerable
portion of her surface unprotected. The
Japanese system is to protect the vitals of the
ship with thinner armour in order to cover the
remainder of the ship with light armour. The
United States adopted her system in accordance
with the experience of peace time (experimenting
on the old battleship San Marcos), The Japanese
system was devised after the experience of the
Russo-Japanese War, which proved that the
extent of armoured surface was more important

THE RIVAL NAVAL FORCES 105

than the weight of the armour. As the Great
War did not provide in that respect any reasons
for altering the conclusions arrived at in the
Russo-Japanese War, the relative merits of both
systems are open to doubt. Coupled, however,
with the higher speed of the Japanese Fleet,
the Japanese system of armour is not unlikely
to give Japan an ascendancy over the American
Fleet, because higher speed will give the Japanese
the opportunity of keeping in battle such dis-
tances as will reduce the importance of the
weight of the armour, whereas the difference
in the extent of armoured surface will remain,
and will influence the result of the battle. Gener-
ally speaking, the advantage in speed is in itself
a strong asset in favour of Japan. The speed
of the main forces of the American Fleet does not
exceed 21 knots, whereas the speed of the
Japanese Fleet reaches 23 knots, and that of
the Third Cruiser Division is as high as 27*5
knots. This advantage enables the Japanese
Fleet not only to keep suitable distances in
battle, but to concentrate its forces against a
given part of the American Fleet, upsetting there-
by the unfavourable balance in ships and guns.
At the same time, the presence in the Japanese
Fleet of a cruiser division with a speed 6 J knots
higher than that of the American ensures the
possibility of the Japanese Fleet carrying out
with impunity all kinds of tactical manoeuvres
in action which the American Fleet will be
unable to parry, as it does not possess a single
division with a speed of over 21 knots.

106 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

This question, however, requires special con-
sideration, and will be discussed below. We
would only remind the reader of the important
part played by the division of battle-cruisers
in the battles of Tsushima and of Jutland.

We now come to the relative strength of the
secondary forces of both Fleets in their present
stage.

Light cruisers who do the reconnoitring and
are " the eyes of the fleet " before the battle,
and during the battle cover the battleships by
repelling the attacks of the enemy destroyers,
play a very important part. The practice of
the last wars and modern tactics show that
normally there should be in a present-day Fleet
no less than one light cruiser to every battle-
ship. The British and Japanese Navies main-
tain that standard. The latter has now ten
light cruisers with a speed of from 26 to 33
knots.

The American Navy is at present very badly
off in regard to light cruisers. As the Japanese
Fleet has divisions of battle-cruisers of 27*5
knots, only such American light cruisers can
operate against the Japanese as have a speed
of at least 28 knots. There are no such cruisers
in the American Navy, because the fastest
cruisers of the type of the Chester do not attain
27 knots. This defect will be remedied in 1922,
when five light cruisers will be commissioned
of the Omaha class of 33 knots. Five cruisers to
twelve battleships of the first line is obviously
an inadequate number.

THE RIVAL NAVAL FORCES 107

The opinion prevails in the American Navy
that the deficiency in Ught cruisers can be
counterbalanced by destroyers. It is true that
in the Great War destroyers sometimes filled
the part of light cruisers. But this produced
favourable results only on limited theatres of
war such as the North Sea, the Baltic and
the Black Sea. In the waters of the Western
Pacific, destroyers cannot replace light cruisers,
because there, speed, a long radius, and a solid
gun platform are of paramount importance.

In the beginning of 1922 the American
Navy has about 300 ocean-going destroyers
which answer the needs of modern battle.
The Japanese Navy has only fifty such
destroyers. It is, of course, impossible to
estimate the numbers of destroyers that will be
in a position to join in the long cruise of the
American Fleet, and will be capable, with their
delicate construction, of taking part in battle
after such a cruise. It may, therefore, be
assumed that the Americans will have a stronger
preponderance in destroyers, which are also
better armed than the Japanese. The effect
of destroyers' action in battle depends, however,
not so much on their quantity as on the pluck
and endurance of their commanders. The record
of the Japanese destroyers in the Russo-Japanese
War is such as has hardly been equalled in naval
history. At any rate, the superiority in the
numbers of destroyers gives the American Fleet
a good weapon of defence against the attacks of
Japanese destroyers and submarines. These

108 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

attacks will be conducted with great vigour and
complete disregard of human life.

The American Navy has over fifty ocean-
going submarines. It is very difficult definitely
to ascertain the number of submarines in the
Japanese Navy capable of operating in the
Western Pacific, because here again we are
confronted with the impenetrable Japanese
secrecy.

Whatever their number may be, it will not
materially affect the relative strength of battle-
ships in action. Submarines have not as yet
reached such perfection in fighting capacity as
would render them useful in a naval action
conducted at a speed of 20 knots. In that
respect they are no great improvement on the
submarines that proved their utter incapacity
in the battle of Jutland.^

The same applies to aircraft — a weapon which
has now become the craze and the fashion.
One cannot help entertaining the fear that
this fashion has many disappointments in store
for those who have exaggerated hopes, when
confronted with realities. Aeroplanes are not
as yet capable of action in all climes and weather
and of hitting fast moving ships with their
bombs. It would, therefore, be premature to
look upon aeroplanes as a decisive weapon in
naval action.

The preceding argument refers chiefly to the

1 The number of submarines will have an important bearing
upon the development of strategical operations on the entire
theatre of war.

THE RIVAL NAVAL FORCES 109

" striking power " of the two fleets. As is
well known, the full effective strength of a fleet
consists not only in its striking power (gunfire,
torpedoes, etc.), but in an equal measure in its
manoeuvring capacity. The latter must also
be examined in detail in order that an accurate
estimate be formed of the relative strength of
the fleets.

The experience of the immortal battle of
Trafalgar has taught us the immense value of
manoeuvre in action. The names of the greatest
naval commanders are coupled with the term
" manoeuvre." " Nelson's Manoeuvre " has been
and will always remain the gospel of naval men
all the world over. " Togo's Manoeuvre," in-
adequately perceptible in the Battle of Tsushima,
was until recently the object of study on the part
of naval experts, and has been superseded by
the brilliant and strong " Beatty Manoeuvre "of
the Jutland battle.

It would, however, be a mistake to assume
that a manoeuvre is the expression of the com-
mander's inspiration only. The history of naval
warfare teaches that famous manoeuvres have
always been preceded by a period of intense
development and crystallisation of tactical ideas.
The entire commanding personnel of the fleet
took part in this development of ideas, and after-
wards produced the gifted Flag Officers and
Captains who surrounded the Commander-in-
Chief as indispensable satellites. Such were,
for example. Nelson's famous and immortal
" Captains."

no THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

Even a Commander-in Chief of exceptional
genius would be helpless without such captains
trained in independent action, because the
manoeuvres of a fleet, in their boldest conception,
imply the free movements in action of several
autonomous divisions. If the Commander-in-
Chief is not assisted by officers in command
of these divisions who are fully conversant with
up-to-date tactical ideas, his plans, however
audacious and inspired, are doomed to failure.

War is naturally the best school for the de-
velopment of tactical ideas and for the training
of capable commanders, and the Wars of Japan
against China and Russia provided this in-
estimable training for the Japanese Navy. The
Chino- Japanese War produced Togo and the
admirals who covered themselves with well-
deserved glory in the Russo-Japanese War. The
latter war produced the admirals who will lead
the Japanese Fleet in future battles. These
admirals are now conducting the development
of the Japanese Navy along the path which will
make it the ideal weapon for the full applica-
tion of the strength of the " manoeuvre."

From the experience of the recent wars the
Japanese admirals have learnt the idea to which
they now adhere that higher speed and strong
cruiser divisions for co-operation with battleshpis
represent the goal which their Navy should
strive to attain. At present, as we have already
shown, the Japanese Fleet has an advantage
in speed of two knots over the American Fleet,
whilst there is one division of battle-cruisers

THE RIVAL NAVAL FORCES 111

to every one and a half division of battleships.
Such an advantage in speed, and such numbers
of battle-cruisers in proportion to battleships, are
considered in modern tactics as sufficient for the
broadest and strongest manoeuvres in action.
The Japanese, however, are not satisfied. Their
*' 8-8-8 " shipbuilding programme contemplates
equalising the numbers of divisions of battleships
and of battle-cruisers in the Japanese Fleet.
This shows the intensity of tactical thought in
the Japanese Navy, and the degree to which
its commanders are inspired by modern methods
of naval action.

The same impulses are not noticeable in the
American Navy. The advantage in speed has
been freely conceded to the Japanese Navy,
and the proportion of battleship and cruiser
divisions is zero. Should one division of battle-
cruisers of the Constellation type enter the line
of the American Fleet, the above-mentioned
proportion would be one-fourth : in other words,
half the proportion existing in the Japanese
Navy. This tends to show that in the American
Navy no great importance was attributed to
the *' manoeuvre " as a factor in battle, and that
the development of tactical ideas had until
recently been completely neglected.^

The Spanish- American War afforded no oppor-
tunities for naval operations. It is, therefore,
natural that no impetus was given for the creation

1 This is likewise confirmed by the vacillating methods of
battleship construction and by the scarcity of light cruisers in
the American Navy.

112 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

of a school of admirals and for the development
of tactical ideas in the Uniited States Navy.

Should, however, brilliant commanders appear
in the United States Navy, even in the absence
of such a school, they will be unable to apply
their knowledge of modern tactics and their
genius to the conduct of battle. For the fact
would remain that the United States Fleet
would have to face the Japanese Fleet, in regard
to manoeuvre, with the same handicap as if, in
regard to " striking power," it were armed with
obsolete and short-range guns.

The Japanese Navy developed in full harmony
all the factors that constitute the power of the
fleet in action, whereas in the United States
Navy one factor only was developed at the
expense of others. For this reason the United
States Navy may be under a disability in action
which may prove fatal if a clever opponent in
forming his plan of action takes full advantage
of this disability.

Taking into consideration all these facts, based
not upon guess-work but upon the experience
of recent wars, the estimate of the relative
strength of the Japanese and United States
Navies tends to show that should they meet in
the Western Pacific, their chances would be
even, not to speak of the strategical conditions
under which a conflict would be waged in these
waters.^

1 Mr. Bywater says (p. 128) : " From the foregoing summary
it will be seen that the modern United States Navy is excep-
tionally strong in heavy armoured ships and exceptionally weak

THE RIVAL NAVAL FORCES 113

Let us now examine the shipbuilding pro-
grammes of the United States and of Japan,
without touching for the present upon the changes
which the Washington Conference may bring about
in that respect. We will endeavour to derive a
few conclusions from such an examination.

We have before us at present two shipbuilding
programmes : the United States programme of
1916 and the so-called " 8-8-8 " Japanese
programme.

The United States programme is intended to
be completed in 1925, the Japanese in 1928.
Both these programmes contemplate the con-
struction of battleships of the " post- Jutland "
type.

Both programmes were alike in that the
battleships were to be armed with 16-in. and
bigger guns and have special protection against
torpedoes.

The battleships, according to both programmes,
were to form the first line in both fleets.

Towards 1925 the following changes were to
take place in both navies : three additional
battleships of the Maryland type, six battle-
ships of the Indiana type, all with twelve 16-in.

in fast ciiiising ships. It has a large but not excessive comple-
ment of destroyers, a limiited number of ocean-going submarines,
and a reserve of auxiliary vessels sufficient to cope with its
requirements in home waters, but wholly inadequate to supply
the bare needs of a fleet operating at a great distance from its
bases. It would appear, therefore, that American naval policy
up to the present has been guided mainly by considerations of
Atlantic and Caribbean strategy ; and that very little attempt
has been made to forestall the contingency of war in the Pacific,
where the conditions would be fundamentally different."

8

114 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

guns, and six battle-cruisers of the Constella-
tion type with seven 16-in. guns and a speed of
33 knots were to be commissioned in the United
States Navy. Four battleships and four battle-
cruisers were to be added to the Japanese Navy.
In other words, the relative strength of the two
fleets in 1925 would be as follows : —

United States Navy. Japanese Navy.

First Line. First Line.

3 Divisions, 16 ships, 152 heavy 2^ Divisions, 10 ships, 84 heavy
guns. guns.

Second Line. Second Line.

2 J Divisions, 11 ships, 124 heavy 2 Divisions, 8 ships, 80 heavy

guns. guns.

Total : 5 J Divisions, 27 ships. Total : 4^ Divisions, 18 ships,

276 heavy guns. 164 heavy guns.

The United States Navy would be stronger
by one whole division, 9 ships and 112 heavy
guns.

In these circumstances, even taking into
account all the considerations mentioned above,
the United States Navy would have better
chances of victory.

Should the United States, however, carry out
her programme of 1916 and build no more
ships after 1925, the relative strength in 1928,
when the Japanese would have completed their
programme, would be entirely different.

The figures would be as follows : —

United States Navy. Japanese Navy.

First Line. First Line.

3 Divisions, 16 ships, 152 heavy 4 Divisions, 16 ships, 148 heavy

guns. guns.

THE RIVAL NAVAL FORCES 115

United States Navy. Japanese Navy.

Second Line. Second Line.

2|^ Divisions, 11 ships, 114 heavy 2 Divisions, 8 ships, 80 heavy
guns. guns.

Total : 5J Divisions, 27 ships, Total : 6 Divisions, 24 ships,
276 heavy guns. 228 heavy guns.

In view of the fact that in 1928 the ships of
the second line in both fleets will be over ten
to twelve years old, that having 14:-in. guns
as against the 16-in. and 18-in. guns of the first
line ships, they would not be able to play a
decisive part in action, we might assume that in
1928 both fleets would be materially of equal
strength.

Such an assumption would, however, be un-
warranted.

Half of the first line Japanese battleships
would have 18-in. guns, which are much more
powerful than the 16-in. guns with which all
the first line battleships of the United States
Navy are armed.

The squadron speed of the Japanese Fleet
would still be two knots higher than that of
the United States Fleet, as the latter would
have to fall into line with the divisions of the
Maryland type, which has a speed of 21
knots. In both lines of the Japanese Fleet
the relative numbers of battleships and battle-
cruisers would be 1x1, in the United States
Fleet — 1 X 3 in the first line and none in the
second line. This seems to justify the contention
that unless the United States succeeds in the

116 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

next seven years in launching new battleships
with 18-in. guns in excess of the programme
of 1916, the Japanese Fleet will be stronger
than the American.

The United States programme of 1916 was
intended to remedy the capital deficiency in
battle-cruisers, thus restoring to a certain degree
the manoeuvring capacity of the United States
Navy.

The Japanese programme is permeated in
every detail with all modem tactical ideas,
and presents in that respect a model of which
the Japanese naval men are justly proud.

We shall now examine the changes which
the " Five Power Agreement " on the limita-
tion of armaments has brought about in the
respective strength of the United States and
Japanese Navies such as it was in the beginning
of 1922.1

As compared with the table quoted above, ^ the
United States has introduced into the first
line two battleships of the West Virginia class
{Maryland) instead of the second line battle-
ships the North Dakota and the Delaware. The
first line is thus strengthened by sixteen 16-in.
guns. Japan has retained in her first line the
battleship Mutzu, and has sacrificed the second
line battleship Setzu.

* Extracts from the " Five Power Agreement " are given in
Appendix No. 102.

* See page 102 of the present chapter.

THE RIVAL NAVAL FORCES 117

The comparative strength of the fleets of
the first line will, therefore, be the following :

The United States Fleet
3 divisions.
14 big battleships.
152 heavy guns.^
32 torpedo tubes.
21 knots.

The Japanese Fleet

2J divisions.

10 big battleships.

96 heavy guns.

72 torpedo tubes.

23 knots.

The United States Fleet of the first line will
be stronger by one half division (ratio 6 to 5),
will have four battleships in excess of the Japanese
(ratio 7 to 5), and an advantage of fifty-four
heavy guns (ratio 3 to 2). The Japanese Fleet will
have twice the number of torpedo tubes, and
what is more important will maintain the signal
advantage of 2 knots in squadron speed. The
paramount feature from the tactical viewpoint
is that the United States Fleet remains without
battle-cruisers.

According to the *' Five Power Agreement,"
four ships are maintained in the second line
of the United States Fleet, whilst there are
none in the Japanese Fleet.

1 The advantage in 16-in. guns is taken into account, and
16 -in. guns are estimated 50 per cent stronger than 14 -in.

118 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

As we have already mentioned, battleships
armed with 12-in. guns, and whose armour
is not intended to withstand the 14-in. and
16-in. enemy guns, cannot play a decisive part
in action against battleships armed with these
calibres. Such obsolete ships as the Utah and
the Florida^ with limited supplies of fuel cannot
at all be taken into account in estimating the
relative strength of the fleets in the Western
Pacific. The advantage of four second line
battleships which the United States possesses is,
therefore, problematical.

Yet the " Five Power Agreement " on the
limitation of armaments is based entirely upon
the tonnage ratio. According to the idea of
the initiators of the Washington Conference, this
ratio was 5 for the United States and 3 for
Japan.

On the strength of the above comparison, we
consider it correct to assert that the actual rela-
tive fighting power of the United States and the
Japanese Fleets is not accurately described by
this ratio. In the Western Pacific this relative
strength approaches the ratio of 4 to 3.

The Japanese representatives at the Washing-
ton Conference requested that the 5 to 3 ratio
be not mentioned in the text of the Agreement.
They did so presumably not so much for con-
siderations of national pride, but because the
tonnage ratio does not express the real relative
strength of naval forces. The Washington Con-
ference began by solemnly proclaiming the
5-5-3 ratio, and ended in shyly eliminating

THE RIVAL NAVAL FORCES 119

this ratio from the text of the Agreement, after
the figures had been skilfully manipulated
by experienced Japanese military and naval
specialists.

The Five Power Agreement also takes tonnage
as a basis for the relative strength of light cruisers,
destroyers and avio-ships. Such a basis is still
less correct in regard to the light forces of the
fleet, because the operation of the latter depends
in a greater degree than the operations of big
battleships upon their bases, owing to the in-
significance of the quantities of fuel they can
carry, as well as to the fragility of their
mechanisms. In the Western Pacific the United
States has very few weak joints d'appui. Her
fleet, therefore, must have a much greater
superiority in light forces than that which she
has secured by the Agreement in order to counter-
balance the activities of the Japanese light forces
which may have many bases and points d'appui
in those waters.

The ratio of submarine craft has not been
established at the Washington Conference. At
the plenary sitting of the Conference on Feb-
ruary 1st, Mr. Hughes, the Chairman of the Con-
ference, said that the question of the limitation
of submarine construction should be dealt with
by the " public opinion of the world," which,
he trusted, would not allow any strengthening
of submarine fleets. We will endeavour to
show in the next chapter that the many well-
equipped Japanese bases in the Far East afford
excellent opportunities to Japan for intensive

120 THE PEOBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

submarine warfare, and that her submarine
fleet will needs be a very powerful weapon.
The endeavour to impose restrictions upon the
activities of submarines which was made by
the Conference in prohibiting attacks upon com-
mercial ships belongs to the realm of platonic
desiderata which every nation will disregard
while defending its existence by armed force.

The above considerations seem to justify our
general conclusion that the main aim of the
Washington Conference of establishing a balance
of power in the Pacific has not been attained
by the Five Power Agreement on the Limitation
of Naval Armaments. It is to be hoped that
the great sacrifices which have been made by
the representatives of the United States with a
view to securing peace in the Pacific will not
lead to the opposite results.

CHAPTER VIII

THE STRATEGICAL CONDITIONS
OF NAVAL WARFARE IN THE PACIFIC

In the days of sailing ships, when there was no
question of coaling stations, and when wooden
vessels, if damaged, were easily repaired without
going into dry docks, the strategical condi-
tions of warfare did not influence the develop-
ment of naval operations or the striking power
of the fleets in the same degree as in our time.
Sailing ships, therefore, had no difficulty in
conducting operations thousands of miles away
from their base. On the other hand, the com-
plex and delicate mechanism of present-day
battleships, and the enormous amount of fuel
needed for their cruises ^ render modern battle

^ In his book, Sea Power in the Pacific, Mr. Bywater quotes
the estimate drawn by an officer of the United States Navy
of the amount of fuel required for the transfer of the United
States Navy (when it has the displacement contemplated in
1925) through the Panama Canal to the Philippines. This
estimate shows that 249,000 tons of coal and 45,000 tons of
oil would be necessary. Of these 129,000 tons of coal and 16,000
tons of oil could be carried in the ships' bunkers. The remaining
120,000 tons of coal and 28,000 tons of oil would have to be
carried in twenty transport ships. According to this calculation,
the fleet would have stores of fuel for ten days' anchorage
after its arrival in the Philippines.

Taking these data into account, and bearing in mind that

121

122 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

fleets closely dependent upon their bases and
deprive them to a great extent of their liberty
of action.

Submarines, mine-fields, aircraft and long-range
guns of the coastal defences hamper the opera-
tions of the fleet, and the movements of its
squadrons depend to a greater extent than ever
before upon the geographical conditions of the
theatre of war which facilitate or hinder, as the
case may be, the use of these new weapons of
naval warfare.

If the fleet can give battle close to its shores,
its action will be more resolute and free because
of the certainty of the damaged battleships
reaching the docks. If the fleet is engaged soon
after leaving its base, the crews will not be tired
by long cruises, the mechanism of the fleet
will be used to the fullest extent, and the ques-
tion of fuel will not be a matter of constant
anxiety in action. If geographical conditions
are such that a region of the theatre of war may
be selected in which submarines, mine-fields,
aircraft and shore batteries can be brought into
action, the striking power of the fleet will be

according to the experience of war the Fleet, in order to have
perfect freedom of action, must have stores sufficient for twenty
days' full speed and ten days' anchorage per month — we find
that for six months' operations the United States Fleet would
require in the Philippines (or any other point in the Western
Pacific) about 1,000,000 tons of coal and 200,000 tons of oil.
These quantities can be lifted in about 200 ships. If, therefore,
the United States Fleet does not possess sufficient stores of
fuel in the Western Pacific, a large fleet of transports will have
to accompany the fleet, severely handicapping its liberty of
action.

NAVAL STRATEGICAL CONDITIONS 123

greatly increased. Naturally a fleet placed in
such strategical conditions would be stronger
than the enemy fleet in which these conditions
would be lacking. In order, therefore, to form
a correct estimate of the fighting sea-power of
any State, one should consider not only the rela-
tive strength of the fleet itself, but also the
strategical conditions in which that fleet is likely
to conduct its operations.

Apart from the Russo-Japanese War, the
bearing of strategical conditions upon the relative
power of the fleet was clearly reflected in Sir
John (now Lord) Jellicoe's well-known report
to the British Admiralty of October 16, 1914.
Discussing in this report the strategical condi-
tions of the North Sea, Sir John Jellicoe comes
to the conclusion that it would be rash to give
battle in the southern part of that sea, because
it is so remote from the British bases that
damaged ships would run the risk of failing to
reach them, while the German Fleet would have,
in the southern part of the North Sea, good
chances of making use of submarines and mine-
fields in action. The British bases are about
500 miles away from the southern part of the
North Sea. When the report was drafted the
British Fleet was nearly one-third stronger than
the German. Thus Sir John Jellicoe considered
that the strategical conditions obtaining in the
southern part of the North Sea deprived the
British Fleet of its advantage over the German
Fleet.

The distinguished Admiral's views were, of

124 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

course, thoroughly justified, and the Lords of
the Admiralty approved his report. ^

Strategical conditions of the theatre of war
which influence the action of the fleets can
be divided into two categories — natural and
artificial.

The natural conditions or the so-called " con-
ditions of military geography," are : the extent
of the theatre of war, the outline of the coast,
the situation and nature of the islands, straits,
narrows and bays, the depth and currents of
the seas, climatic conditions, the presence in
adjacent territories of minerals useful to the
fleet, such as coal, oil, metals, etc. The extent
of the theatre of war affords a basis for calcu-
lating the amount of fuel required by the fleet.
Upon the characteristics of the straits and narrows
depends the possibility of forcing them in war
time. Depths and currents indicate the degree
to which mine-fields may be laid. Climatic
conditions are an essential factor in determining
the scope of aerial operations. The outline and
situation of bays determine the extent to which
the fleet may count upon anchorage on the
theatre of war far from its bases.

The artificial conditions, or the so-called
strategical preparation of the theatre of war are :
the naval bases, the coast defences, the stores.

^ Sir John Jellicoe's apprehensions were not confirmed in
the Battle of Jutland in 1916 because the British Fleet was
then nearly twice as strong as the German, and the action was
fought not in the Southern, but in the Central part of the North
Sea, where strategical conditions were different.

NAVAL STRATEGICAL CONDITIONS 125

arsenals and dry-docks, observation points and
other military requisites.

Naval bases as a rule are divided into three
categories :

1. Arsenal bases provided with ample means
for repairs ; docks for the big battleships ;
large stores ; safe anchorage for the entire fleet,
and strong coastal and naval defences.

2. Operating bases supplied with sufficient
means for repairing the ships after the battle
so as to enable them to reach the arsenals ;
docks for medium and small craft, medium
stores, safe anchorage and sufficient fortifications
to protect the fleet from bombardment without
any co-operation on its part.

3. Points d'appui, strongly fortified, covering
the fleet from the attacks of destroyers, sub-
marines and aircraft, and docks, stores and
arsenals sufficient only for small craft.

Any bay in the theatre of war can be made
a foint d^appui by the fleet, provided the natural
conditions of the bay are convenient. For this
purpose repair-ships, floating docks and trans-
ports with stores are stationed in the bay, and
the entrances to the bay are protected by nets
and batteries of light guns taken from the fleet
in supply ships. ^

Whereas the maintenance and defence of the

1 In the Russo-Japanese War the Japanese Fleet had two
points d'appui in the Korean fiords. In the Great War, France
had such bases in Corfu and at the entrance of the Adriatic.
The British Fleet had a base in Mudros and at the entrance
of the Dardanelles.

126 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

bases of the first two categories are not directly
dependent upon the fleet which, when anchored
at these bases, is itself resting under protection,
the points d^appui have to rely always upon the
fleet, which, whether present or not, is bound
to take every precaution against an enemy
attack upon these points d^appui. In order to
capture the bases of the first two categories,
combined operations on a large scale on sea and
on land are necessary (the siege of Sebastopol,
of Port Arthur, etc.). For the capture of a
point d'appui the landing of a small expeditionary
force, supported by a cruiser squadron, is
sufficient.

Bases and points d'appui as a rule are created
at such points of the theatre of war from which
the fleet can command important strategical
objectives such as straits, maritime routes, main
commercial ports, etc. The greater the number
of bases and important strategical points at
the disposal of the fleet, the more intense and
decisive will be its operations, and the greater the
pressure of its forces on the entire theatre of war.

The experience of the last war teaches us
that the favourable influence of the base upon
the development of naval action ceases when
the fleet is removed to a distance exceeding
500 miles from that base. At such a distance
one can hardly count upon the damaged ships
reaching their base, and the lack of fuel, especi-
ally in regard to destroyers, severely handicaps
the operations. A theatre of war can, there-
fore, be considered as being adequately prepared

(to \/8o T*

i^O JaPdNese Naval Bates
0 1- cl<uiN»ilB4te

^-- «>^ ) 5fVe« of Stiiji*?

/tfO'

NAVAL STRATEGICAL CONDITIONS 127

from the strategical point of view when it is sur-
rounded hy a network of bases less than 500 miles
distant from one another. Coastal defences, apart
from covering the bases, may prevent access to
straits or narrows on the theatres of war.
Coastal batteries, combined with mine-fields,
constitute naval positions which cannot easily
be forced by fleets.^

Bearing in mind the aforesaid theoretical
considerations, let us now examine the strategical
conditions of naval warfare in the Western
Pacific (see Map No. 3).

The waters of the Western Pacific — from the
Behring Sea to the East Indies — can be divided
in respect of the outline of the Asiatic coast,
the situation of the archipelagos and of separate
islands into four regions, four geographical enti-
ties called the Okhotsk, the Japanese, the Yellow
and the Chinese Seas.

The strategical region between the archi-
pelagos— ^Japanese, the Riu Kiu, the Philippines,
the Marian and the Bonin — forms an approach
to these waters from the East. All the shortest
and easiest maritime routes from the Pacific —
from the coast of distant America — cut across
that region into the central part of these waters,
which are of the greatest value from the general
strategical and economic point of view in the
Far East.

^ Such, for example, was the famous German " wet triangle "
in the southern part of the North Sea formed by the fortified
islands Borkimi-Heligoland-Silt, or the Bosphorus and the
Dardanelles.

128 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

The strategical significance of these regions
(theatres of war) is determined by the value
of the political, economic and military conditions
obtaining in these waters and in the countries
washed by them. The Sea of Okhotsk, washing
the rough and uncultivated shores of Siberia, has
a certain economic value owing to its fisheries
and the unexplored mineral riches of Kamtchatka,
as well as a certain strategical importance owing
to its proximity to the shores of rich Alaska.
But the importance of that sea, and its influence
upon the economic and political life of the Far
East, is insignificant in comparison with that of
the other three seas.

The Japanese Sea is of vital importance to
Japan. The heart of the country is in that
sea, and a blow dealt to that region may be a
death blow to Japan. The main maritime routes
connecting the central region of Japanese in-
dustries with its external markets on the Asiatic
continent lead through that sea and the Korean
Straits. The routes connecting Japan with the
two main Asiatic railways, of which Fusan and
Vladivostock are the termini, likewise cross the
Japanese Sea. A menace to the connection of
Japan with these main lines would endanger
the communications of Japan with her
strategical rear in China, Korea and Siberia.
Without that rear, Japan cannot fight or even
live. As long as these communications are safe,
Japan has nothing to fear from a naval blockade.
She cannot receive a mortal blow by means of
cutting her maritime routes in the Yellow Sea

NAVAL STRATEGICAL CONDITIONS 129

and in the Pacific as long as her connection with
the Asiatic continent via the Japanese Sea is
not broken. Japan, therefore, has always en-
deavoured to convert the Japanese Sea into an
inland sea to prevent the appearance and estab-
lishment in these waters of a foreign fleet.

Quite recently, before the Russo-Japanese War
and the annexation of Korea, the position of
Japan in that sea was entirely different from
what it is now. In the centre of that sea, close
to the heart of Japan, there was a strongly
fortified base of the Russian Fleet — Vladivostock.
Based upon that fortress, the Russian Fleet was
in a position to challenge the supremacy of the
Japanese Fleet, and to threaten the communica-
tions of Japan with the continent. The Russo-
Japanese War was waged under that disturbing
menace until the Battle of Tsushima. Two
entrances to that sea most convenient for battle
fleets — the Korean and the Laperouse Straits —
were not in the hands of Japan, because only
one of the shores of these straits was in her pos-
session. After the Russo-Japanese War the
Russian Fleet was driven out of that sea, and
both shores of these two routes came under the
grip of Japan through her occupation of Southern
Sakhalien and of Korea. The Russian collapse
after the last war contributed to the establish-
ment of Japanese influence over the remainder
of the shores of that sea belonging to Russia.
More than half the shores of that sea now belong
to Japan, and the remainder, owing to the
present weakness of Russia, is in such a state

9

130 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

that all the important pomts on the Russian
coast could be occupied by Japan at any moment
without resistance. Vladivostock can therefore
be regarded as a Japanese base, even in the
absence of Japanese forces of occupation.

Access to the Japanese Sea from the north —
the Tartar Straits — geographically inconvenient
for big battleships, is under the complete control
of Japan, especially since the occupation of
Sakhalien. These straits, owing to the excep-
tional narrowness of the channel, can easily be
made impassable even to submarines and des-
troyers. Nicolaievsk, on the Amur, an important
strategical point dominating the entrance to
the Siberian main line of communication — the
Amur River — lies on the coast of these straits.
The important strategical point will be an easy
potential prey to Japan so long as Russia's impo-
tence lasts. Of the three Eastern accesses to
the Japanese Sea, the Tzugar Straits and the
so-called canals of the Mediterranean, owing
to their narrowness, are even more difficult to
force than the Dardanelles proved in the last
war, because up-to-date methods and means
have been applied to their defence. The
Laperouse Straits, broad and more convenient
for the passage of big ships, have the special
advantage in respect of the defence of the
Japanese Sea, of being adaptable to mine-
laying. These mine -fields, protected by the fire
of Japanese batteries on both shores, would
make these straits a strong naval position,
behind which the Japanese Fleet could easily

NAVAL STRATEGICAL CONDITIONS 131

repel the attacks of a superior enemy. The
same favourable conditions for defence exist
in the Korean Straits. The batteries on the
island of Tsushima and on the shores of Japan
and Korea constitute a naval position no less
powerful than that of the Straits of Laperouse.
Also, owing to the fact that Japan has two naval
bases in the Korean Straits — Sassebo and Shinkai
— submarines and aircraft can take an active part
in the defence of the straits. In that respect,
both these straits strongly resemble the famous
German fortified area in the southern part of the
North Sea, which it was considered dangerous
to approach in the Great War.

Any enemy who would endeavour to force
the entrance to the Japanese Sea would have
to risk heavy losses from the coast batteries,
mines, submarines and aircraft. Whatever his
superiority over the Japanese Fleet, he can never
rely upon maintaining this superiority after
forcing the straits. The Japanese Sea is sur-
rounded by a network of Japanese bases. There
are three first-class bases in the sea itself : Sassebo,
Kure and Maitsuru. Every one of these bases
is perfectly equipped for repairs and supplies
for the entire fleet, as well as with docks for
the big battleships. Of these docks there are
two (dry docks) at Sassebo, and one floating
dock is being built for ships of 50,000 tons
displacement. In Kure there are two dry
docks and one in Maitsuru. In addition to
these three main bases, there is a flrst-class
base on the eastern shores of Japan — Yokosuka,

132 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

with two dry docks for big battleships. Ships
damaged in the Japanese Sea can easily be
brought to the dry docks of Yokosuka through
the channels of the Mediterranean. Thus,
after battle eight Japanese battleships (three-
fourths of the present-day Japanese Battle Fleet)
could be put into dry docks simultaneously,
and repairs could be started simultaneously
at four different points. Such an abundance of
docks, repairing stations and private shipbuilding
docks with ample means and working at full
strength, ensures the possibility of the Japanese
Fleet recovering its strength after action very
much quicker than any enemy in the Western
Pacific could ever hope to do. Apart from large
docks, these first-rate bases have plenty of
medium and small docks for light cruisers,
destroyers and submarines. These four main
Japanese bases are strongly fortified, and sup-
plied with all necessary defences against bom-
bardment from sea or air. Apart from these
four main bases there are in the Japanese Sea
two second-class bases — Shinkai and Ominato.
The chief object of these fortified bases is to
provide a base for the naval forces guarding
the Korean and Eastern entrances to the Japanese
Sea. There are at Ominato floating docks for
small craft, and repairing facilities intended for
repairs of battleships prior to their arrival at
the main bases. There are also in the area of
the Japanese Sea a series of points d^appui for
destroyers and submarines. The following four
points are of special strategical importance :

NAVAL STRATEGICAL CONDITIONS 133

on the island of Tsushima, the skerries of
the Korean coast, the skerries of Nagasaki,
Sakhalien and the Kuriles which cover the
accesses to the Laperouse Straits. The network
of these bases and fortifications embracing the
entire region of the Japanese Sea creates particu-
larly favourable strategical conditions for the
defence of the Japanese Sea by the fleet. It
affords the chance of the fleet maintaining a
central position and at the same time easily
diverting its forces to the menaced points of
access. The Japanese Sea is thus in the true
sense of the word an inland sea.

The Yellow Sea plays an exceptionally im-
portant part in the economic life of the Empire
of the Rising Sun. Two of the three main points
giving access to the Chinese markets lie on that
sea : the ports Shanghai and Tien-tsin. The
former is the key to the valley of the Yantse-
kiang, while the latter leads straight to the
capital of China — Peking. Not so very long
ago — fifty years — nearly all the shores of that
sea and the Riu Kiu archipelago which lies at
the entrance to that sea from the east belonged
to the Celestial Empire or to Korea, then under
China's protectorate. From the east, the rocky
island of Kiu Siu, the country of the Rising
Sun stretched out feeble feelers into that sea.

The last fifty years have brought about many
changes. The rays of the " Rising Sun " rose
higher and higher over that sea, and painted red
its " Yellow " shores. At present two-thirds
of the coastal line of the Yellow Sea belong to

134 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

Japan. She holds the southern, eastern and
northern borders formed by Formosa, the Riu Kiu
group and the Korean coast, including Liaodun.
The important strategical regions of Fukien
and Shantung are beginning to assume the
colours of the " Rising Sun." Here Japan is
trying to gain a solid footing on the opposite
bank of the Gulf of Formosa, the main entrance
to the Yellow Sea from the south, and on the
opposite bank of the entrance to the Gulf of
Petchili.

Apart from the main base of the Japanese
Fleet in the Korean Straits — Sassebo — which
spreads its strategical influence as far as Formosa,
Japan possesses a secondary base at Port Arthur
and four fortified points d'appui : in Dalny,
Formosa, the Pescadores, and in Tsin-Tao, not
yet evacuated by the Japanese troops.

These fortified bases are equipped with all the
necessary means for giving shelter to ships
damaged in action, and for repairs which would
allow them to reach the main bases. There are
floating docks and all necessary supplies for
destroyers and submarines. In the Riu Kiu
archipelago and in the Korean skerries the
Japanese submarines and destroyers have many
excellent shelters which would allow them to
develop their operation in that area with great
intensity and resolve. The Japanese bases and
points d'appui in the Yellow Sea are situated
in the points of paramount strategical importance
for that theatre of war. Formosa, with her
fortifications, and the group of the Pescadores,

NAVAL STRATEGICAL CONDITIONS 135

with a point d'appui and mining stations on the
Isle of Bako, command the entrance to the
Yellow Sea, which is of the greatest commercial
importance. Access to the Yellow Sea from the
East is barred by the Japanese Islands, Riu Kiu
and Shikishima. The Japanese submarines and
destroyers, for which many well-equipped shelters
and observation points are to be found on these
islands, can effectively prevent any attempts
at cruising in that neighbourhood. By virtue
of the " Five Power Pact for the Limitation
of Naval Armaments," Japan renounced the
right further to fortify Formosa, the Pescadores,
Riu Kiu and Benin Islands. This " sacrifice "
of Japan has, however, no great strategical
importance in connection with the strategical
plans which may be drawn up by that country
in the event of war breaking out within the next
ten years, because Formosa and the Pescadores
are already sufficiently fortified. The principal
base of the Japanese Fleet — Sassebo — dominates
Shanghai, while Port Arthur dominates the
entrance to the Gulf of Petchili.

The skerries of the Korean coast, with their
many shelters for submarines, destroyers and
aircraft, dominate the longitudinal routes leading
from Shanghai to the Gulf of Petchili. Also,
the coastal waters of China, especially in the
region of Shanghai and of the Gulf of Petchili,
are so deep that minefields can easily be laid.
These minefields may render access to Shanghai
and Tientzin extremely dangerous and difficult,
especially as these minefields can be constantly

136 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

and easily renewed by Japanese mine-layers
based upon the skerries of the Korean coast.

The chief strategical feature of the Yellow
Sea, however, is that no fleet other than the
Japanese can have even a temporary base in
those waters. All the ports, bays and shelters
of any strategical importance whatsoever are
at present on Japanese territory. The enemy
fleet that would attempt to seize or occupy
these ports or bays for its own purposes would
inevitably have to reckon not only with the
Japanese Fleet, but with the Japanese Army
guarding Japanese territory. The ports remain-
ing in the hands of China have practically no
rear. As long as the communications between
Japan and Korea in the Japanese Sea are not
interrupted, nothing can prevent the Japanese
Army — as long as Russia and China remain in
their present state of weakness — from appearing
at any given point of the Chinese coast.

At whatever point of the Chinese coast the
enemy fleet might anchor it will have to antici-
pate a bombardment from the batteries of the
Japanese Army approaching from the mainland.
British Wei-hai-wei would not be spared that
fate. Is it not for this reason that Great Britain
declared at the Washington Conference that she
was going to restore that part to China ?

If the Yellow Sea cannot be described as an
inland sea in the same sense as the Japanese
Sea, it is only due to the fact that the Almighty
in creating the firmament in the midst of the
waters, and in dividing the waters from the

NAVAL STRATEGICAL CONDITIONS 137

waters, did not make the Riu Kiu group more
compact and more impassable for big battle-
ships. Nevertheless, the strategical conditions
created in the Yellow Sea by Japan in the last
fifty years facilitate her naval supremacy in
these waters.

The network of important strategical points
and bases held by Japan in that Sea enables
her submarines and aircraft, assisted by mine-
fields and coastal defences, to develop their
striking power in these waters, whereas the poten-
tial enemy, deprived of any shelter or anchorage,
would have to operate from distant bases. The
importance, from a military viewpoint, of the
strategical conditions created by Japan in the
Yellow Sea is further enhanced by the fact that
the Korean Straits and the Korean mainland
closely connect that theatre of war with the main
impregnable stronghold of Japan — the Japanese
Sea — upon which the entire strategical prepara-
tion of the Yellow Sea is thus based. The coast
of China may, therefore, be attacked not only
by the entire Japanese Fleet, but also by units
of the Japanese Army reaching that theatre of
war by routes independent of the freedom of
the maritime routes of the Yellow Sea.

As a result of this strategical position, Japan
actually stands " on China's doorstep," as was
said at the Washington Conference. She stands
on that doorstep with both feet, and holds in
her iron hand the handle of the "open door."

The Chinese Sea is the " Sea of the Future.*'
As, fifty years ago, Japan looked towards the

138 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

Yellow Sea from the shores of Kiu Siu, so now she
is casting penetrating and rapacious glances in
the direction of this " Sea of the Future " from
her island of Formosa. From there she sees
that powerful Britain commands from Hong
Kong the outlet of Southern China to the sea
and from Singapore the main routes connecting
that sea and the entire Far East with the markets
of the West. In Hong Kong Great Britain has
created a first-class strongly fortified base for
her fleet, possessing large stores, shops and three
dry docks for the largest Dreadnoughts of the
British Fleet. Britain also has a first-class
base at Singapore, with one dry dock for big
battleships.

Hong Kong and Singapore are of enormous
strategical importance to the Chinese Sea, because
they command both main outlets from the north
and from the south. All maritime routes are
therefore at present under the control of Great
Britain. It would appear that in these cir-
cumstances the British Fleet unquestionably
dominates in that sea.

Japan, however, does not fail to notice that
Hong Kong, the mainstay of British power in
that sea, has a highly vulnerable feature. It
is Chinese territory, towards which lies the
immediate rear of Hong Kong. The realisation
of this inherent strategical weakness of Hong
Kong is presumably the reason which prompted
Great Britain to make her " sacrifice " at the
Washington Conference and to renounce further
fortifications in that harbour.

NAVAL STRATEGICAL CONDITIONS 139

From Formosa Japan sees the French fortified
base at Saigon, with its workshops and docks
for small craft. She sees the excellent bays
on the coast of Annam-Kamran and Van Fong
which may serve as anchorages for big fleets,
and which have already attracted the attention
of Japan when Admiral Rojdestvensky's Fleet
anchored there in the Russo-Japanese War.

Finally, from Formosa Japan sees the weak
base, Cavite, which points to the truly pitiable
and insignificant power of the great trans-
Pacific Power, the owner of the Philippines, in
the Chinese Sea.

As a matter of fact, Cavite cannot even be
considered as a base in the strategical sense of
the word. It is rather a mere anchorage, because
its fortifications date from the Spanish domina-
tion, and have now lost their military signifi-
cance. In the port itself, with the exception of
a floating dock for small craft, there are no stores
or shops of any importance. Two other points
in the Philippines, Olongapo and Polloc, are
weaker still in respect of fortifications and
equipment.

That the Philippines are badly equipped as a
base for the fleet is obvious from the fact that
when the United States Fleet visits the islands it
has to be accompanied by transports carrying
fuel and other stores, as well as repair-ships.
This condition of the bases in the Philippines has
several times attracted the attention of the
United States Government. The question of
their equipment and fortification has been re-

140 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

peatedly raised in the course of the last few years,
but has never been solved.

This is, of course, due not so much to financial
difficulties as to the position of strategical dis-
advantage in which the Philippines are placed
in the western waters of the Pacific. Owing to
their remoteness from the United States, the
islands would easily be occupied by an expedi-
tionary Japanese force before any reinforce-
ments reach them. There could, of course, be
no question of serious resistance being made by
the small contingent of 6,000 American troops
supported by 9,000 natives to the well-trained
Japanese Army, and no fortifications could be of
any use. The question of the defence of the
Philippines can only be solved by maintaining
adequate naval forces in the Chinese sea. Taking
into consideration the present strength of the
Japanese Fleet, it may be said that with this
end in view the entire American Fleet would
have to be sent into these waters and the shores
of the United States left bare ; also, several first-
class bases should be erected in the Philippines —
which would cost a great deal of money and
take much time. This is confirmed by the
opinion of a prominent American naval officer,
quoted in By water's book. Sea Power in the
Pacific. This officer wrote : —

" The Philippines are there for Japan when-
ever she likes to take them, and nothing can
prevent her from seizing them when she feels
disposed to do so. As at present circumstanced,
we could do nothing whatever to protect them

NAVAL STRATEGICAL CONDITIONS 141

in time of war. If we were foolish enough to
locate a fleet at Manilla, the history of Port
Arthur would repeat itself, with us in the role
of the Russians. An expeditionary force, con-
sisting of 18-knot transports, guarded by a
squadron of reasonable strength, could from the
southern ports of Japan reach Manilla in three
days, and make itself absolute master of Luzon
before succour could arrive from Hawaii, our
nearest naval base, which is some 5,000 miles
away. Consequently, when the ' rescuing
fleet ' did turn up, it would find the Japanese
flag waving over Manilla, and itself with depleted
bunkers, forced to fight under the most disadvan-
tageous conditions or to beat an ignominious
retreat without standing upon the order of its
going. That is not merely a picture of what
might happen, but of what most assuredly will
happen if war breaks out within the next five
years."

The five years mentioned by the American
officer obviously correspond with the completion
of the vast American shipbuilding programme
of 1916, because the letter was written in 1920.

It would be a mistake to imagine that such
opinions publicly expressed by American naval
authorities are apt to restrain the ambitions
and hopes of Japan in respect of the Chinese
Sea. At the Washington Conference the United
States renounced the right to fortify the Philip-
pines and Guam. Thus the " Five Power Pact "
has definitely established the defencelessness of
the Philippines. (The opinion of the American

142 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

naval officer quoted above undoubtedly reflects
one of the main reasons of the calling of
the Washington Conference at which the United
States aimed at finding a diplomatic solution
of the strategically insoluble problem of the
Philippines.)

The strategical position which Japan now
occupies in the Chinese Sea cannot, however,
be considered sufficiently secure to enable her
to conduct in that sea naval operations on a large
scale in normal strategical conditions devoid of
serious risks.

In the northern part of that sea, Japan pos-
sesses Formosa and the Pescadores. If Hong
Kong dominates the northern outlet from the
Chinese Sea, Formosa and the Pescadores actually
close that outlet, as they are situated in the Gulf
of Formosa.

Although there are several fortified bays on
the island of Formosa, and a base on the island
of Bako in the Pescadores, the Japanese Fleet
cannot be based upon them, because these bays
and bases are mainly suitable for destroj^ers
and submarines. In Formosa and in the Pesca-
dores there is no dock for big battleships,
nor anchorages affording a safe refuge for the
Japanese Battle Fleet. The strategical region —
Formosa and the Pescadores — is well equipped
as a base for submarines and destroyers which
would be in a position to conduct operations in
the Gulf of Formosa, as well as in the northern
part of the Chinese Sea, on an extensive scale as
far as Manilla.

NAVAL STRATEGICAL CONDITIONS 143

Should the poHtical situation compel Japan
to reckon with the possibility of the enemy
Fleet being based on Hong Kong in the event
of naval operations in the northern waters of
the Chinese Sea, the strategical conditions of
warfare would be of much greater advantage
to her enemy, because Hong Kong is in the
extreme north of the Sea, and the nearest base
of the Japanese Fleet — Sassebo — is 1,000 miles
distant. Such is the strategical condition of
Japan in the Chinese Sea to-day, as far as we
can understand it. This, however, does not
mean that it may not be different to-morrow.

Should the Japanese Fleet not be satisfied with
its anchorages in Formosa and in the Pescadores,
it would have excellent bays at its disposal on
the coast of the province of Fukien. If the
Japanese forces may land in Manilla on the fourth
day after their departure in rapid Japanese
transports, these troops may land in Fukien
sooner than that. The Japanese gunners have
learnt in Port Arthur and Tsin Tao quickly to
bring the heaviest guns into position, and there
are special units in Japan fully trained and
equipped for that purpose. Special attention
has been given to the training of these units,
and they have really attained perfection in
every detail. It may be taken for granted that
the Japanese heavy artillery may appear within
a fortnight on the coast of any given bay in the
province of Fukien.

On the fifth day after the huge Japanese
repair ship will have sailed from Japan, accom-

144 THE PKOBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

panied by auxiliary craft and transports with
fuel for the Fleet, she may reach the Fukien
region. We shall then understand the reason
why a floating dock is now being completed at
Sassebo for battleships of 50,000 tons displace-
ment, when there are in the bases of the Japanese
mainland seven dry docks already. That dock
can be towed to any given spot in the region
of Formosa and kept there on the eighth day
after its departure from Japan.

Thus the Japanese Battle Fleet has no base
in the northern part of the Chinese Sea to-day,
but may easily have one within a fortnight.
In that base it would have a large dock, all
necessary supplies and shops on transports,
coastal defences, and a secure rear guarded by
Japanese troops on the territory of impotent
China. The landing of a Japanese expeditionary
force on the coast of Fukien would be of import-
ance if only for the organisation and security
of the rear of the naval base. In the event of
the occupation of the Fukien coast, the Straits
of Formosa would be converted into a strong
naval position closing the main outlet into the
Yellow Sea and providing a strategical base
for the operations of the Battle Fleet in the
northern waters of the Chinese Sea, and in
particular against the Philippines.

That is not all. The Japanese troops in the
Fukien province would threaten the only real
base in the northern waters of the Chinese
Sea — Hong Kong — and would thus render ques-
tionable the sole stronghold of British sea power

NAVAL STRATEGICAL CONDITIONS 145

in that region and the sole base of the potential
allies of Britain. The Chinese Sea, from the
strategical point of view, is the " Sea of the
Future." The rays of the Rising Sun which
are at present but faintly touching the shores
of the Fukien province, may unexpectedly pene-
trate the mist of this future, and light an entirely
different strategical picture than that which we
are at present contemplating.

In order to have finished with the strategical
conditions of naval warfare in the Western
Pacific, we must make a passing reference to
the strategical region, the eastern border of
which is formed by an almost uninterrupted
chain of islands beginning near the shores of
Japan in the region of Yokohama and extending
southwards through the Bonin and Nariana
Islands to the Pelew Islands in the immediate
vicinity of the Philippines.

The strategical region is the advanced theatre
of war, the doorstep towards the main theatre,
the Western Pacific, because it is traversed
by all the maritime routes leading from the
East to the Japanese, Yellow and Chinese Seas.
All these islands, except Guam, which form
the eastern border of this region, and follow the
meridian on a distance of 2,000 miles, belong to
Japan or are under her immediate control (the
islands formerly belonged to Germany, but Japan
received a mandate over them by virtue of the
Versailles Treaty). These islands and the coral
atolls abound in innumerable small bays in
which the Japanese submarines and small craft

10

146 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

reconnoitring and privateering can find safe
refuge.

The very presence of an enormous quantity
of bays and places of refuge in this chain of
islands provides a perfectly safe and invulnerable
base for the Japanese submarines and small
craft, because the enemy cannot occupy all
these bays simultaneously and permanently main-
tain his forces therein. This region is, therefore,
of great strategical value to Japan, and nature
has served Japan well in creating this chain of
islands. As the Japanese Fleet occupies in the
Western Pacific the so-called " central po5^ition "
it must know beforehand, in order to draw up
and carry out strategical operations, what por-
tion of these waters the enemy fleet will be
heading for, and when it is likely to reach them.
Only then can the Japanese Fleet successfully
conduct the strategical defence of the Western
Pacific and compel the enemy fleet to accept
battle immediately after a long cruise, giving
it no chance to rest and replenish its supplies.
As the maritime routes from the East are ham-
pered by this chain of islands, the reconnoitring
craft and observation posts in the islancis, together
with the submarines which, with the aircraft,
would be posted in the channels, would form
so formidable a system of reconnaissance that
the enemy fleet could not pass unnoticed even
at night time. Taking into consideration, there-
fore, the distance between these islands and the
axis of the Western Pacific, it can be taken for
granted that the Japanese Fleet will be informed

NAVAL STRATEGICAL CONDITIONS 147

three days in advance of the approach of the
enemy fleet to the Western Pacific from the
east, and the fast Japanese battle-cruisers which
would immediately follow that fleet would
uninterruptedly give information to the main
forces about the direction of the cruise of
the enemy ships. In three days the Japanese
Fleet can easily be moved from its bases
in the Japanese Sea as far as Manilla — in
other words, perform a strategical " castling."
Obviously the strategical importance of these
islands does not escape the attention of Japan.
In order to give greater stability to the recon-
noitring system, to which the chain of islands
is so favourable, Japan is now doing careful
work in preparing points d^appui in every one
of the three strategical sectors which form that
system. This work is being done on the Bonin
Islands belonging to Japan, on the group Saipan
in the centre of the Marian archipelago, and
in the Bay of Angaur in the middle of the Pelew
Islands which lie on the route of the United
States Fleet to the Philippines. This work
is favoured by the fact that during the German
domination of the Marian and Pelew Islands
similar work was already done, and the Japanese
have only to complete it. This work has, how-
ever, created a certain uneasiness in Europe
and in America, which was reflected in the so-
called Yap controversy. Japan is energetically
protesting against " unfounded " accusations.

Japan argues that the wireless station serves
commercial purposes only, and the stores of

148 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

fuel and convenient harbours are destined only
for commercial fleets. To-day, Japan is right.
But to-morrow, should the thunder of war
sound in the distant neighbourhood of that
region, the Japanese cruisers and submarines
would find a safe refuge in these harbours, and
the wireless stations would work at high pressure,
transmitting to each other and to the Japanese
Fleet valuable intelligence. On the shores of
these harbours batteries would appear of quick-
firing Japanese guns. Thus the peaceful com-
mercial harbours and wireless stations would
soon be converted into points d^appui for a
powerful intelligence system for that region,
and the enemy cruisers that would try to destroy
these wasps' nests would be met by the fire of
the coast batteries.

We do not intend to enter into a detailed
examination of other strategical features of this
region, as these details which would help
specialists to form a conclusion in respect of
the thoroughness and exceptional perfection of
the intelligence system based upon these details
would be outside the scope of this chapter. We
cannot but emphasise, however, with reference to
this region, the strategical importance of battle-
cruisers for the development of naval operations
on a large scale.

No sooner will the danger of war become im-
minent than Japanese battle-cruisers will appear
in these waters and will constitute the mainstay
of the entire intelligence system. Should the
United States Fleet endeavour to destroy this

NAVAL STRATEGICAL CONDITIONS 149

system beforehand, in order to conceal the
approach of its main forces to the Western
Pacific, the American cruisers would inevitably-
come into collision with the Japanese battle-
cruisers and would be either sunk or chased away,
because there are no cruisers in the United States
Navy capable of coping with the Japanese
cruisers. If the reconnaissance system is sup-
ported by battle-cruisers, it can only be destroyed
by the United States Battle Fleet, which would
thus be compelled to reveal itself, whereby the
object of the reconnoitring system would be
attained. The importance of this region is not,
however, limited to reconnoitring purposes. If
the Japanese submarines based upon the islands
of this region do not inflict great losses upon
the Battle Fleet (because the latter in traversing
this region would be strongly protected) they
would remain in the rear of the enemy fleet, and
would be the masters on the main lines of com-
munication, and would sink the ships carrying
fuel and supplies.

The chain of the Caroline and Marshall Islands,
which are also in Japanese possession, joins the
southern part of this strategical region in a per-
pendicular line along the parallels. There are
also favourable conditions on these islands for
submarine bases and for reconnoitring, similar
to the conditions described above. Here as
well, Japan is carrying on the work initiated by
Germany for the establishment of " peaceful
harbours." These " peaceful " harbours on the
island of Ponape in the Garloines and on Jaluit

150 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

in the Marshall group have already served as
points d'appui in the recent war for German
cruisers in the Pacific.

This chain of islands which extends eastwards
along the parallel into the Pacific is of great
strategical importance, because it commands the
flank of the American lines of communication
along about 2,000 miles. All transports heading
for the Western Pacific will have to be menaced
by Japanese submarines based upon these islands
on a line 2,000 miles long. This chain, more-
over, would be most important for reconnoitring
purposes were the United States Fleet to attempt
a long outflanking movement in order to avoid
the advanced theatre of war and to appear sud-
denly in the southern waters of the Chinese
Sea, where it could rest before going into action
and replenish its supplies in friendly waters.
Thanks to this chain, the United States Fleet
cannot carry out this outflanking manoeuvre
without being detected, because these islands
would lie in the immediate vicinity of its course.
Japanese diplomacy has succeeded in obtaining
for Japan possession of these perpendicular chains
of islands which seem to be specially assigned by
nature itself for intense submarine warfare and
for reconnoitring in the approaches to the Western
Pacific. President Wilson has marked the com-
munication lines and operation lines of the
American Navy with a heavy strategical " cross "
in ceding these islands to Japan at the Versailles
Conference.

Let us now examine the position occupied

NAVAL STRATEGICAL CONDITIONS 151

in this complex strategical cobweb of Japanese
islands by the isolated American island of Guam,
lost in their midst.

Owing to its geographical position in the
Pacific, this island might have been of paramount
strategical importance to the United States
Navy. If the latter could count upon this island
as upon a solid base, the strategical operations of
that Navy in the Western Pacific would have
been possible, because the Island of Guam lies
at an equal distance (of 1,500 miles) from the
most important strategical centres of these waters
— the Korean Straits and the Philippines. It
is true that 1,500 miles is too long a distance,
as we know, for a base at Guam to be of real
assistance to the operations of the American
Fleet in the Western Pacific. But it is better
to have a base 1,500 miles distant than to have
it at a distance of 5,000 miles, which is tanta-
mount to its complete absence. We have already
mentioned that the United States Fleet cannot
count upon the Philippines as a base, and have
quoted the views of a distinguished naval officer.
If the United States Fleet were not in a position
to count upon Guam as a base, the only base
left would be Pearl Harbour, in the Hawaii,
which lies at a distance of 5,000 miles from the
Western Pacific. In its present condition, Guam
is not a base for a battle fleet, but only a weak
point d'appzii. It has neither docks nor shops
of any importance, nor coastal defences. Owing
to the great strategical importance of this island,
the question of converting it into a solid base

152 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

for the fleet has been repeatedly raised in the
United States, and corresponding schemes have
been drawn up, but these schemes have remained
on paper. Since the United States has under-
taken not to fortify the island, the question cannot
be raised.

We do not share the view that this island — onl}^
from four to ten miles wide, and not exceeding
the insignificant dimensions of 200 square miles —
can be converted into a well fortified base.
Owing to its narrowness, however powerful its
artillery, the island can be " shot through," as
specialists say, and all the fortifications and the
fleet anchored in its harbours could be subjected
to a severe bombardment from both sides. Much
less could this island constitute a base and a
rallying point for the American Army in its
endeavour to reconquer the Philippines, as some
writers appear to think, by reason of the insig-
nificance of its area and lack of protection against
a heavy bombardment.

Guam is 1,500 miles distant from the centre
of the might of the Japanese Fleet, and 3,300
miles distant from Hawaii, whence assistance
may come. At the same time, it is situated
in the centre of the advanced theatre of war,
in which, as we have already shown, all the
Japanese cruiser strength will be deployed at
the first signal of war, including the battle-
cruisers, as well as the main complement of the
Japanese ocean-going submarine fleet.

In these circumstances, if the island of Guam
is not seized it will be destroyed by a bombard-

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NAVAL STRATEGICAL CONDITIONS 153

ment long before anyone comes to its rescue,
and the entrances to the harbours will be blocked
by loaded steamers — as the Japanese did in Port
Arthur, but with better results because narrow
channels and coral reefs form the entrance to the
harbours of Guam. That is not all. As Guam
is at the top of the angle formed by the crossing
of two chains of islands, all the routes leading
to Guam from the east will be flanked on both
sides by submarines based upon these islands.
Owing to the position of Guam, it seems under-
standable why the United States is loth to
"throw into the sea" huge sums of money —
the cost of converting this island into a first-
class base.

If we now summarise all the foundations
described above of the strategical might of
Japan in the Western Pacific, we shall have a
complete and harmonious idea of the structure
of her " strategical castle."

That strategical castle of the Japanese
Fleet stands on the firm foundations of the
Japanese bases in the central and most important
strategical region embracing the Japanese and
the Yellow Seas. Entrances to that strategical
castle from the north and from the south are in
the firm grip of Japan. At these entrances — in
the north in the region of Nikolaievsk and in
Sakhalien, and in the south in the Fukien pro-
vince— Japan is preparing an outpost for
strategic operations into the seas of Okhotsk
and the Chinese. From the East, entrance to
the strategical castle is guarded by the vast

154 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

advanced theatre of war which stretches its
tentacles deep into the Pacific, and from the
West it is safeguarded by the temporary impo-
tence of Russia and of China.

In the centre of that castle in the region of
the Korean Straits a strong Japanese Fleet is
stationed in impregnable bases, whence it can
rapidly move along the vast strategical network
of its bases and points d'appui towards the
threatened area. There also is the powerful
Japanese Army. Owing to the network of rail-
ways on the continent and the enormous tonnage
of the Japanese Mercantile Fleet, it can support
the operations of the fleet at any given point
of the theatre of war.

Let us now examine the accesses to this
castle available to the prospective enemies
of Japan. The United States may conduct
operations from two weak points d'appui — Guam
and Cavite — ^which are about 1,500 miles dis-
tant from the centre of Japan's might. (These
points, as the Americans themselves recognise,
are inevitably destined to fall into the hands
of Japan in the first days of the war.) Great
Britain can base her operations upon her first-
class harbour. Hong Kong, which, however,
has no rear. Further, there is the American
base. Pearl Harbour, 5,000 miles away, and the
British base, Singapore, 2,000 miles distant.
Everything that is situated nearer is in the hands
of Japan.

The strategical conditions described above
will determine the special features of naval

NAVAL STRATEGICAL CONDITIONS 155

warfare in the Western Pacific. These features
may be thus formulated : —

1. All the fleets of the potential enemies of
Japan are far remote from the theatre of war ;
the initiative will inevitably rest with Japan as
long as these conditions will prevail, and as
long as these fleets are not transferred to a
permanent base in the Western Pacific. Owing
to this initiative Japan will be in a position to
carry out all preparatory operations after the
outbreak of war, i.e. mine-laying, the creation
of naval positions and additional bases, the des-
truction of the enemy's points d'appui, and land-
ings of expeditionary forces in the important
points of the theatre of war, etc., before the enemy
has time to prevent these operations from being
accomplished.

2. Even in the event of the enemy bases in the
Western Pacific not being destroyed, for some
reason or other, by Japan, or not occupied by
her in the preliminary stage of the war, the
remoteness of these points and bases from the
centre of Japan's naval power would compel her
enemies to bring into action much greater forces
than Japan would be in a position to deploy.
The following example will serve as an illustra-
tion of our assertion : —

Let us suppose that two submarines of the
same type and with the same amount of fuel —
one American and the other Japanese — were
to be assigned for the same purpose during the
war of blocking Shanghai. The nearest American
base — the Philippines — is about 1,000 miles dis-

156 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

tant ; two of the nearest Japanese bases for the
submarine — Tsin Tao and the Korean skerries —
are about 250 miles distant from Shanghai.
In order to reach the area of the proposed opera-
tions and to return to her base for fuel, the
American submarine would require about nine
days. If we deduct from the total of the fuel
of the American submarine the quantities needed
for a cruise from and to the base, we get the amount
of fuel she will have at her disposal for the opera-
tion proper. Let us admit that she will have
sufficient fuel to remain in position for three
weeks (as the submarine maintains her position
at low speed, she needs much less fuel for that
purpose than for a long cruise). As we have
taken for granted that the supplies of fuel in
both submarines are identical, the Japanese sub-
marine would maintain herself in position for
another fortnight, as she would spend in that
fortnight the fuel which the American submarine
would require for the to-and-fro cruise to her
distant base.

In other words, three Japanese submarines,
owing to the proximity of their base, can accom-
plish the same war work as five American.

The same relative strength applies to the opera-
tions of the surface fleets of equal strength,
and especially of cruisers, destroyers and small
craft. Should the Philippines and Guam be
destroyed or fall into the hands of Japan, the
farther the other bases and points d'appui of
the American Fleet from the main theatre of
war, the greater number will be required in

NAVAL STRATEGICAL CONDITIONS 157

order to balance the work of the Japanese
Battle Fleet.

3. Owing to the fact that all the convenient
harbours and anchorages in that theatre of war
are in the hands of Japan, or threatened with
seizure in the preliminary stage of the war (as,
for example, the Fukien coast), the enemy fleet
would be unable to improve its strategical posi-
tion, as far as bases are concerned, by seizing
the anchorages nearest to the theatre of war,
because it would inevitably come against the
Japanese Army. With the fall, therefore, of
Guam and the Philippines, the enemy fleet —
considering the insecure position of Hong Kong
— would have to move its base, circumstances
permitting, to the extreme southern corner of
the Western Pacific — to the region of Singapore-
Saigon. That region is 2,000 miles distant from
the centre of naval operations, i.e., even farther
distant than the Philippines or Guam.

4. The vast network of Japanese bases and
points d'appui affords the possibility of the
Japanese High Command developing to the
greatest possible intensity the operations of the
Japanese submarines, aircraft and mine-layers.
Of this possibility the enemies of Japan will
be deprived because the main chance of success
of these auxiliary operations depends upon their
bases, and that question cannot be satisfactorily
solved by the enemies of Japan.

The principal object of these auxiliary forces
would be to weaken the main forces of the enemy
before the decisive battle. The enemy fleet

158 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

would, therefore, run the risk of not going into
action with all its forces intact. At the same
time, the operations of the Japanese Battle
Fleet may be conducted with the greatest pos-
sible determination and stubbornness because
the many docks and shops on the theatre of
war would guarantee to Japan the opportunity
of repairing her ships after battle more speedily
than her enemy could ever hope to do.

5. Specially favourable conditions for recon-
noitring and large quantities of cruisers would
give the Japanese High Naval Command the
certainty that the Japanese Fleet would stand
in no danger of strategical manoeuvres on the
enemy's part, and that the fleet would be kept
informed of the movements of the enemy in
time to allow it to calculate the time required
for carrying out its designs.

The main strategical features of the Far
Eastern theatre of war described above refer
to the entire circle of strategical operations of
the future contest.

We have dealt with the questions of intelli-
gence and initiative, the alpha and omega of
military genius — the questions of main and
auxiliary strategical operations, and of bases.
We have thus gained an idea of the conditions
of the probable decisive battle which crowns
the war. In all those elements of which the
phenomenon of war is composed, Japan has
undisputable and important strategical advan-
tages. Undisputable because these advantages
are created by nature itself in the shape of

NAVAL STRATEGICAL CONDITIONS 159

enormous distances and of the situation of
islands and continents. And Japan has taken
clever advantage of these natural conditions.
She has assured the possession of these natural
advantages by clever strategical preparation
which now allows her formidable Army and Navy
rightly to consider themselves the masters of
the Far East.

CHAPTER IX

THE STRATEGICAL CONDITIONS OF
WAR BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND JAPAN IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC

We have discussed in the preceding chapter the
general strategical conditions of naval warfare
in the Pacific. We shall now turn to the strateg-
ical conditions which would obtain in the event
of war between the United States and Japan,
other Powers remaining neutral. We shall
endeavour to base our argument on strictly
scientific foundations and to refrain from entering
into the region of vague assumptions — an error
which some writers on this subject are occasion-
ally inclined to commit.

It has been pointed out in Chapter VI that
American statesmanship may entrust the General
Staff of the United States Army with the following
objects : —

1. To compel Japan by force to alter her

aggressive policy in China and in
Siberia.

2. To defend the Philippines or to recapture

them in the event of their seizure by
Japan at the outbreak of war.

160

WESTERN PACIFIC CONDITIONS 161

It has likewise been indicated in the same
chapter that the most effective method of
attaining these objects, namely, the capture
of the Japanese mainland by the United States
Army — belongs to the realm of strategical
phantasy.

There are but two means of compelling the
enemy to capitulate — the capture of his main-
land and the strangling of his people through
a blockade. The United States General Staff
would thus have but the last of these two means
at its diposal. A full blockade which would
separate Japan from the Asiatic continent which
Japan needs for her supplies and without which
the country could not live, would sooner or
later force Japan to capitulate.

As the Japanese mainland, however, and the
centre of her power are situated on the islands
of the Japanese Archipelago, it would be neces-
sary first of all to defeat the Japanese Fleet or
to force it to shelter in its base in order to achieve
a full blockade.

The question therefore arises whether the
United States Fleet may hope to defeat the
Japanese Fleet or to compel it to retire to its
bases, taking into account the relative strength
of the two navies as established at the
Washington Conference, as well as the strateg-
ical conditions which would obtain in the
Western Pacific in war time.

The United States Fleet can only reach the
waters of the Western Pacific about a month
after the outbreak of war ; the Japanese Fleet

II

162 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

would have plenty of time for occupying or
destroying all the American points d^appui and
for establishing an extensive system of intelli-
gence and of submarine warfare along the routes
followed by the United States Fleet. The latter
may thus be compelled to accept battle at the
end of a long cruise, when its supplies will be
exhausted, its crews weary, its machinery not
altogether reliable, and when it will have no
hope of being within easy reach of a secure
base to which it might send its damaged ships
or retire for a rest. In action, the fleet would
also feel uneasy about the fate of the many
transport ships carrying the supplies which the
fleet would require after battle in order to
recuperate, because these transports would have
to sail for many hundreds of miles under the
direct threat of Japanese cruisers and submarines.
The heaviest handicap would be, however, the
necessity of accepting battle in the conditions
and within the regions which would be most
advantageous to the Japanese Fleet, which would
also enjoy the advantage of higher speed.

Should the Japanese Fleet choose, for some
reason or other, to refrain from availing itself
of these strategical advantages, in order to
compel the United States Fleet to accept battle
in unfavourable circumstances, and should prefer
to take up an attitude of expectation — even
then the strategical preparedness of the theatre
of war would be exceptionally favourable to
Japan. Should the Japanese Fleet decide to
adopt this attitude, the United States Fleet

WESTERN PACIFIC CONDITIONS 163

would be even more seriously handicapped than
it would have been in open battle.

In order to defeat the Japanese Fleet, or to
compel it to retire to its bases, the United States
Fleet would then have to force the naval positions
barring the access to the Japanese Sea. The
United States Fleet would not be strong enough
to undertake such a task. In the attempt to
force these positions the United States Fleet
would inevitably suffer such heavy losses that
it might be deprived of the material superiority
over the enemy fleet which, as we know
(Chapter VII), is four to three for the Western
Pacific.

A full blockade of Japan, implying a break
through into the Japanese Sea, cannot there-
fore form the basis of the American plan of
campaign against Japan. Unable to break
through into the Japanese Sea, the United
States Fleet might perhaps attempt to cut off
the direct communications between Japan and
China in the Yellow Sea. A base, however,
would be required for the purpose, and we
know that the United States Fleet cannot
secure such a base. Should the United States
Fleet appear at intervals in the Yellow Sea,
such action would only temporarily interrupt
these communications, and Japan would still
be in a position to avail herself of the sheltered
route for small transports along the skerries of
the Korean coast.

As the entire coast of the Yellow Sea would
be within the sphere of the activities of the

164 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

Japanese Army, the United States Fleet would
be unable to establish a base in that sea, and
would have to confine itself to the Chinese Sea,
in which case the blockade of Japan would only
be a distant and ineffective one.

In what measure can a distance blockade
contribute to the solution of the problems which
the policy of the United States may impose
upon her General Staff ?

The strategical conditions with which the
United States Fleet would be confronted in
the Chinese Sea must first be taken into account.
Upon its arrival in these waters, the United
States Fleet may find the Philippines occupied
by the Japanese Army. Guam, the point
d'appui, may likewise be destroyed or disabled
as a base. The United States Fleet may thus
be compelled to reckon with the necessity, in
drawing up strategical plans, of creating a new
base on the theatre of war. Such a base can
only be secured, without the assistance of a large
expeditionary force, in the islands of the Pacific
where there is no Japanese garrison, or where
the strength of that garrison is insignificant.
These islands are about 1,000 miles distant
from the Japanese mainland, and the creation
of a base in any of them would not therefore
widen the strategical scope of action of the United
States Fleet or render the blockade of Japan
more stringent or more efficacious.

We are thus confronted with an insoluble
strategical problem. In order that the blockade
of Japan be rendered effective even in a small

WESTERN PACIFIC CONDITIONS 165

degree, the base of the United States Fleet
must be brought nearer to Japan. For this
purpose American troops would be required.
They would be required in greater numbers
for the recapture of the Philippines. The United
States would thus be compelled to dispatch vast
forces simultaneously. How is this to be
done ?

There is in the Japanese Fleet a powerful
division of four fast battle-cruisers with which
only the big American battleships can contend.
Transports conveying troops would therefore
be necessarily escorted by no less than half
of the American Battle Fleet, in order to ensure
the safety of the transports against the attacks
of Japanese battle-cruisers. Should the United
States Fleet detach part of its forces as convoys,
the Japanese Fleet — always fully informed owing
to the efficiency of its intelligence service —
would not send the battle-cruisers anywhere
else, but would attack with all its might the
United States naval forces remaining in the
waters of the Far East, and would in all likeli-
hood defeat them, as numerical superiority
would in such a case be on the side of Japan.

The United States would thus have no other
choice than to send the battle-fleet in its entirety
to escort the transports. No sooner, however,
will the United States leave the waters of the
Far East, than the Japanese cruisers will destroy
their bases and all the supplies which will have
been brought to these bases from the United
States. The American Fleet has no base in

166 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

the Far East capable of defending itself on
its own account ; at the same time, the tasks
of defending a temporary base and escorting
transports with troops cannot be performed
simultaneously. The United States Fleet has
therefore no other choice than to remove, in
its course from the shores of the United States
to the Far Eastern theatre of war, both the
transports carrying troops and the transports
constituting its floating base — a total of
several hundreds of ships. The Japanese Fleet
could not hope for any better opportunity of
attacking the United States Fleet conveying
hundreds of transports laden with troops. These
transports must be escorted at a short distance
and cannot be left behind inadequately protected,
as for instance, transports carrying fuel. The
movements of the United States Fleet would be
handicapped by this armada to such a degree
that it would be in a hopeless condition, if
attacked by the Japanese Fleet, should the
former be numerically stronger than it is now.
One need not be a specialist in order to under-
stand that military science is justified in con-
sidering that to escort transports with con-
siderable land forces across a sea that is not
in possession of the convoying power is a
strategical adventure.

The strategical conditions of the theatre of
war thus compel the United States Fleet to
limit its action to a distant blockade which
it will have to carry out while availing itself
of the bases it may secure somewhere in the

WESTERN PACIFIC CONDITIONS 167

islands of the Pacific. How would such a
blockade affect the Japanese troops occupying
the Philippines ?

Owing to ample local supplies, the Japanese
troops would be able to get everything on the
spot. With regard to war material — this would
be brought from Japan in large quantities
before the arrival of the United States Fleet in
the Chinese Sea. Japan, however, would not
require much war material for action in the
Philippines owing to the scarcity of the United
States forces in these islands. The Japanese
troops would easily therefore be maintained in
the Philippines for many months, even in the
event of the islands being cut off from the
Japanese mainland.

Japan herself would not be seriously menaced
by a distant blockade. She would only be cut
off from all intercourse with the American
continent, and her communications with China
across the Yellow Sea would be somewhat
hampered. So long are the distances of the
Pacific and so insignificant the number of
American cruisers that Japan's naval communi-
cations would suffer no greater inconvenience.

A distant blockade is not, therefore, likely to
afford a solution of the problems which the policy
of the United States may impose upon her
armed forces. On the contrary — the war may
serve as an excuse for the occupation of China
by Japan.

The United States Fleet cannot blockade
Japan at a long distance for any length of time.

168 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

Not to speak of the Japanese submarines which
would apply all their strength to the blockade
of the harbours in which the United States
would be anchored — a natural cause will inevit-
ably compel this or the other United States ship
to be put into dock. And there would be no
docks available. As the superiority of the United
States Fleet over the Japanese, as established
by the Washington Conference, is not so very
great, the position of the former in the Chinese
Sea would be imperilled in the event of two or
three ships being out of action owing to the
absence of docks. The Japanese Fleet would
naturally await this propitious moment with
impatience, and would then strive to engage
the United States Fleet in a decisive battle.

The strength of the United States Fleet, as
established by the " Five Power Pact on the
Limitation of Naval Armaments " is insufficient
for the conduct of a war in the Western Pacific
aiming at decisive results. At the outbreak of
war, the United States would have therefore
to proceed immediately to increase the power
of her Navy. For this the United States has
ample possibilities, owing to the immense ship-
building resources of the country. Japan is
well aware of this, and has been recently devel-
oping her shipbuilding concerns, both private
and State-owned, with great energy, and they
have reached at present large dimensions. Until
recently, the weak point of the Japanese ship-
building has been its dependence upon foreign
markets, and especially upon the American,

WESTERN PACIFIC CONDITIONS 169

for metals and machinery. Japan is anxious
to free herself from this dependence and is
devoting her energies to the formation of a
solid base for her shipbuilding industry. By
establishing a " shipbuilding holiday," the Five
Power Pact on the limitation of armaments
enables Japan to divert considerable financial
resources and technical means to the furtherance
of this object. When it is attained, the ship-
building resources of Japan will allow of such
development in war time as to enable her to
maintain a relative strength necessary for oppos-
ing the United States in the Western Pacific.
All the above considerations appear to us
to show that the strategical conditions now
obtaining in the Pacific preclude the possibility
of the United States defending her possessions
in the Far East and her interests in China hy
the force of arms alone. There can hardly be any
doubt that this is well understood by the United
States' leading statesmen and military authori-
ties. And it would seem that the Washington
Conference was called with the object of devising
a diplomatic solution of the national problems
which the United States is conscious of being
unable to solve by force of arms. The United
States hoped that the prestige and influence
she had gained in the world after the Great War
would enable her to ensure the co-operation
of the mighty British Navy and the hospitality
of the British and French naval bases in the
Western Pacific in war time. The United States
thus hoped to alter the strategical conditions

170 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

of that theatre of war in such a manner as to
render impossible a challenge on the part of
Japan, and thus to establish peace in the waters
of the Pacific. In the following chapter we
shall endeavour to appraise the strategical value
to these hopes of American statesmanship.

CHAPTER X

THE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF

POLITICAL GROUPINGS IN THE

PACIFIC

Before the Washington Conference, the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance was the only international
agreement that determined the military and
political conditions in the Western Pacific. This
Alliance was, in fact, nothing else than a diplo-
matic sanction of the Anglo-Japanese hegemony
in the Far East. The military importance of
this Alliance can be gauged from the following
considerations : —

Let us assume that the United States is
compelled to resort to arms in order to solve the
political problems we have discussed in Chapter
VI. What strategical conditions would she be
confronted with in view of the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance ?

Before the United States Fleet could reach
the Far East, the Japanese Fleet could easily
transfer its bases to the Allied British harbours
in the Chinese Sea. This would preclude all
possibility of recapturing the Philippines or
continuing to blockade Japan. That, however,
is not all. From the moment the United States

171

172 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

Fleet would set forth for the Western Pacific,
the entire coast of the United States and the
maritime routes in the Atlantic would be defence-
less, and the very presence in these waters of
the fleet of Japan's Ally, Great Britain, would
inevitably compel the United States to keep
part of her fleet within a short distance of her
shores. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance would thus
give Japan a free hand in the Far East because
the United States Navy would be unable to com-
bine the task of fighting in the Western Pacific
with the defence of the coast, and of the maritime
routes in the Atlantic. For these purposes the
United States would require a fleet stronger
than the combined fleets of Great Britain and
of Japan. In other words, the maintenance
of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance would compel
the United States to adopt the "Two Power
Standard " programme for the development of
her Navy. At the present moment there are
forty capital ships in the Navies of Great Britain
and of Japan as against twenty of the same ships
in the United States Navy. If the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance remains, the United States
will have immediately to start building at least
twenty of these ships.

The peculiar feature of the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance is that it exercises its influence from
the military point of view, even without any
direct interference on Great Britain's part in
a war between the United States and Japan.
There is no need for Great Britain to send her
fleet into the Pacific. Owing to the strategical

THE POLITICO-MILITARY ASPECT 173

conditions secured by Japan in the Far East
and which are supplemented by British bases,
Japan is perfectly capable of dealing alone
with the United States Fleet in the Pacific.
At the same time, should the United States
send her fleet to the Pacific, she could not run
the risk of Great Britain joining in the war on
the side of Japan. The United States would
therefore be compelled to choose between three
alternatives : Either she must renounce once
and for ever her position in the Far East, or
succeed in bringing about the dissolution of
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance ; the third alterna-
tive would be immediately to embark upon
the ruinous policy of the " Two Power Standard."
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance afforded Great
Britain an excellent and convenient opportunity
of counterbalancing the influence of a new
competitor on the international stage, without
shedding his kindred blood or moving the British
Fleet from the Atlantic. The motives must
have been serious indeed that have prompted
Great Britain to renounce this simple and
powerful weapon of international policy.

Had there been no British Dominions in the
Pacific, it is doubtful whether Great Britain
would have denounced her Alliance with Japan,
but the anxiety of these Dominions has caused
the British statesmen seriously to ponder. To
the British Dominions in the Pacific the gigantic
growth of Japan is obvious. They understand
that " movement South- Westwards " is the
watchword of the national Imperialistic policy

174 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

of the Rising Sun. British poHticians, in spite
of being fully absorbed in finding a solution of
the vexed questions relating to the late World
War, could not but be perturbed by the voices
that came from the Dominions.

Very soon after the war had ended, Admiral
Lord Jellicoe, one of the shrewdest British
students of naval strategy, was appointed
Governor-General of New Zealand, and was
entrusted with the task of investigating from
the military viewpoint the degree in which
the fears of the Dominions were justified. Lord
Jellicoe gave a summary of his investigations
in a report addressed to the British Admiralty
in 1920.

Lord Jellicoe points out in this report that
" the interests of Great Britain may require
the presence of important naval forces in the
Pacific in the nearest future."

A full list is further given in the report of
battleships of all classes which will be needed
to " defend the interests of the British Empire."
These numbers of battleships and the percentage
of battleships and battle-cruisers equal the
strength of the Japanese Fleet. The report
indicates the amount of large credits required
for further equipment of the British basis in
the Southern Pacific. The point of paramount
interest in the report, however, is that Lord
Jellicoe emphasises the necessity of converting
Singapore into the centre of British power, and
does not mention Hong Kong (at least not
in the part of the report which has been

THE POLITICO-MILITARY ASPECT 175

published). Lord Jellicoe, presumably, realises
the position in which Hong Kong would be
placed in the event of war with Japan.

British statesmanship is thus faced with the
alternative : to strengthen the position of the
British Dominions in the Pacific by entering
into an alliance with the United States, in which
case Great Britain would have to share with
that country its naval supremacy which has
been for centuries the bulwark of British pros-
perity and power. At the same time, an alliance
with the United States would have the draw-
back of weakening Great Britain's position in
the Atlantic and in Europe at the moment
when such a contingency would be the least
desirable. For an open alliance would create
for Great Britain the obligation and the necessity
of despatching to the Far East, in the event of
war between Japan and the United States, part
of her fleet ; Japan would naturally take
advantage of this contingency and would begin
open hostihties at a moment which would be
the most inopportune for Great Britain. In
the present condition of European affairs, such
a possibility might occur at any moment. The
other alternative would be to maintain the
Alliance with Japan, which would allow Japan
to seize the Philippines and to get ready for
the next stage in her advance towards the
South-West.

There can be no doubt that common sense
and the traditional policy of Great Britain indi-
cate the middle course which she has already

176 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

followed so often and so successfully : not to
commit herself and to have a free hand in case
of war to act in a manner most beneficial to the
interests of Great Britain. The " Four Power
Pact " which Great Britain has signed at the
Washington Conference is drafted in such a way
that it does not impose upon her any obUgation
automatically to take part in the war in the
Pacific. This Pact stipulates that in the event of
a conflict in the Pacific a mediation conference be
held, and Great Britain is thus placed more or less
in the position of a mediator between the United
States and Japan. The former may only hope
to receive armed assistance from Great Britain
in the event of the Conference deciding in favour
of the United States. On the other hand.
Great Britain may maintain friendly relations
with Japan which are so important, especially
in regard to British influence in China. Mean-
while, the Pact does not preclude Japan from
hoping that her late Ally and future mediator
will still remain friendly. The only practical
factor of the " Four Power Pact " is that the
Anglo-Japanese AlHance has not been renewed.
From the mihtary point of view, this merely
means that the United States may count in
the future upon Great Britain remaining neutral.
But mere hopes for neutrality do not suffice,
as war is in itself too stringent a reality. In
order to fight successfully against Japan the
United States cannot rest content with hopes
alone ; she must be certain of the possibility
of using British bases in the Far East and to

THE POLITICO-MILITARY ASPECT 177

count upon the assistance of British battle-
cruisers and h'ght cruisers of which there is a
deficiency in the United States Navy. For this
reason the mere neutrality of Great Britain
does not present a solution of the problem of
the Pacific favourable to the United States, and
marks no improvement in the latter's strategical
position, because it does not guarantee the use
of British bases in the Far East. France well
understands this, and before the Washington
Conference offered to the United States her
base — Saigon — (the well-known Admiral Fournier
wrote a significant article on the subject in
the Matin). Saigon, however, is not a sufficient
base for the United States Navy, as there are no
docks for big battleships, and the harbour itself
is too small.

The question thus arises whether the United
States is justified in assuming that the "Four
Power Pact" affords a key to the solution of
the problem of the Pacific and gives the United
States " a powerful military and political
weapon " against Japan. Also whether the
United States is justified in considering that
the strategical position in the Far East which
she cannot solve alone, can be decided through
Great Britain and France joining in an eventual
war against Japan. The American statesmen
who have summoned the Washington Conference
and directed its deliberations would presumably
answer these questions in the affirmative. It is
difficult to imagine that these statesmen should
have made such heavy sacrifices in sea power

12

178 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

and should have paid so heavy a price for the
" Four Power Pact," prompted by illusions only.
The entire agenda of the Conference, which
began with disarmament, indicate that the main
object of the Conference was to induce Great
Britain to denounce the Alliance with Japan
and to replace it by the " Four Power Pact." The
programme of the Conference aimed at impressing
public opinion with America's sacrifice in the
cause of world peace. The bombshell which
Mr. Hughes threw upon the Conference table
on the opening day did actually blow up the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and did create a world-
wide movement of public opinion in favour of
the United States being given guarantees as
a reward of her magnanimous sacrifice. This
movement has found expression in the " Four
Power Pact."

There are, however, many politicians in the
United States at present who question the
practical value of the guarantees contained in
the "Four Power Pact." These doubts have
already been reflected in the American Senate
and Japan's peculiarly complacent and amiable
attitude towards that Pact is undoubtedly an
ominous sign which tends to confirm American
apprehension. In order to answer the above-
mentioned questions as to whether the promoters
of the Washington Conference were justified
in their hopes, the " Four Power Pact " should
first of all be examined from the military point
of view. The following is the text of the
Pact : —

THE POLITICO-MILITARY ASPECT 179

The United States of America, the British
Empire, the French Republic and the Empire
of Japan, having in view the preservation of the
general peace and the maintenance of their
rights regarding their insular possessions as well
as their insular Dominions in the zone of the
Pacific Ocean, have decided to conclude a treaty.
Towards this end they have appointed pleni-
potentiaries, who have agreed to the following
articles : —

1. The High Contracting Parties agree, in
so far as they are concerned, to respect their
rights regarding their insular possessions, as
well as their insular Dominions in the zone of
the Pacific Ocean. If there should arise between
any of the High Contracting Parties any differ-
ence on any question whatever concerning the
Pacific, and putting in question their rights
hereafter set out, which cannot be settled satis-
factorily through diplomatic channels and which
might threaten to endanger the happy harmony
now existing between them, such Powers are
to invite the other Contracting Parties to meet
in a Conference, to which the whole question
shall be submitted with a view to its consideration
and arrangement.

2. Should the rights hereafter set out be
threatened by the aggressive action of any other
Power, the High Contracting Parties are to
communicate with one another, fully and frankly,
in order to arrive at an understanding as to
the most efficient measures to be taken, jointly

180 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

or severally, to meet the exigencies of the
situation.

3. The present agreement shall remain in force
for ten years from the time it takes effect, and
after the expiration of the said period it shall
continue in force subject to the right of each
of the High Contracting Parties to terminate
it after giving notice twelve months in advance.

4. The present agreement shall be ratified at
the earliest possible date in accordance with
the constitutional methods of the High Contract-
ing Parties. It will come into force upon the
exchange of ratifications which will take place
at Washington. Whereupon the conventions
between Great Britain and Japan, signed at
London on July 13, 1911, will come to an end.

What, then, is the military significance of
the Pact, as a means of maintaining the balance
of power in the Pacific ? We know that the
fundamental reason for the conclusion of the
Pact is that the balance of power in the Pacific
is menaced by the growth of Japan's military
power and by the exceptionally strong position
which she has created for herself in the Western
Pacific. The ultimate, albeit covert aim of the
Pact is therefore to counterbalance the might
of Japan by the combined forces of the other
three parties to the Pact. On the whole, this
covert aim is identical with the aims pursued
by the political understandings between the
European Powers that were striving to counter-
balance the military power of Germany before

THE POLITICO-MILITARY ASPECT 181

the Great War. From the miUtary viewpoint,
however, the difference between the pre-war
political groupings of Powers in Europe and
the "Four Power Pact" is so great that
comparison is almost impossible.

Political groupings directed against Germany —
first and foremost the Franco-Russian Alliance —
had a practical and tangible mihtary bearing.
MiHtary conventions and other definite stipula-
tions formed the basis of all the calculations
of the respective General Staffs.

The diplomatic agreements upon which the
Alliances were based took into account cases
of automatic combined military action of the
Allied Powers, and were supplemented by military
conventions.

Powers were grouped together whose armed
forces were contiguous and were also bordering
upon the forces of Germany. In other words,
these groupings combined Powers already on
the main theatre of war.

Simultaneous action by the combined groups
of Powers was guaranteed not so much by
diplomatic agreements as by the fact that for
every one of these powers the German menace
was in any event a matter of paramount
importance overshadowing all other national
problems.

For all these reasons the political groupings
into which European Powers were divided in
order to counterbalance the military might of
Germany had a definite military meaning which
played a decisive part in the last war.

182 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

What is the military substance of the grouping
of three Powers, Great Britain, France and the
United States, which is concealed in the " Four
Power Pact " ?

1. The United States is the only one of these
three Powers for which the problem of the
Pacific is likely to become in the near future
a matter of paramount and vital interest as
a national question. For Great Britain, this
problem cannot assume the shape of an urgent
and vital national issue for some time to come.
The problem of the Pacific will always be of
lesser importance to her than the problems of
the Atlantic, the Indian Ocean, and of the
Mediterranean, of the waters that wash her own
shores and in which the centre of her political
might is situated. Should a menace to the
interests of Great Britain arise in the Pacific
simultaneously with trouble in Europe, or even
in India, it is to these latter problems that her
attention will be riveted, and she will prefer
to compromise in the Far East pending the
advent of a more favourable moment. Should
the United States be menaced in the Philippines
by Japan whilst India would be threatened by
the foe. Great Britain's choice can easily be
foreseen.

The problem of the Pacific is not of paramount
importance to Great Britain or to France.
A conflict in the Pacific may arise or may be
provoked by Japan at a moment when Great
Britain and France, or any one of these Powers,
are occupied in the Atlantic. For this reason

THE POLITICO-MILITARY ASPECT 183

the grouping of the United States with Great
Britain and France is not in itself a guarantee
of combined military action in the Pacific.
The United States cannot, therefore, have the
assurance that miUtary co-operation will be
forthcoming.

2. The main armed forces and bases of the
United States, Great Britain and France are
not situated on the theatre of war to which
the " Four Power Pact " refers. The main
forces of the United States are at a distance of
from 5-7,000 miles, whereas the British and
French are about 10,000 miles distant. At
the sudden outbreak of war, the main forces of
the United States cannot reach the theatre of
war under one month, and the British and
French under two months after the opening
of hostilities. That is the weakest point
of the grouping from the military point of
view. The United States Fleet may reach the
Western Pacific in a month's time. But in
order not to allow the enemy to attack the
naval forces of the three Powers piecemeal, the
American Navy must wait until it can combine
with the British. Japan would thus have nearly
two months at her disposal for the completion
of all strategical preparations.

All students of the late war remember that
every day, nay, every hour that could be spared
for the rapid preparation of the preliminaries
of war, such as mobilisation, distribution of
troops, the seizure of important strategical points,
etc., added enormously to the strength of the

184 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

respective armies, whereas every moment of
delay, especially in the present days of highly
developed technique, was fraught with the most
dangerous consequences. The advantage that
any Power would possess which would have
a whole month at its disposal for these prepara-
tions is self-evident. Taking into consideration
Japan's opportunities with regard to transport,
bases, etc., we may well surmise that by the time
the combined fleets of Great Britain, France
and the United States will have reached the
theatre of war — they might find that China
has been occupied, the Philippines seized, Cavite,
Guam and Hong Kong disabled. Nature itself
and the long distances weaken the above-
mentioned political grouping strategically, while
adding to the natural military power of their
opponent, and placing into the hands of Japan
one of the strongest weapons of war time.

3. Point 1 of the " Four Power Pact " stipulates
for a diplomatic conference of the Four Signatory
Powers to be convened when a conflict in the
Pacific arises and before the opening of hostilities.
Thus the Pact which, as we have already said,
contains no guarantees of their simultaneous
action, pre-supposes no spontaneous action, or
military sanctions to which there is no allusion
in the Pact. It pre-supposes only a diplomatic
sanction, a conference. It is useless to speculate
on the military bearing of such a sanction.
Military specialists and students of the military
history of all peoples are rather sceptical, how-
ever, in regard to the practical military effect of

THE POLITICO-MILITARY ASPECT 185

diplomatic conferences, and are doubtful as
to the possibility of these conferences bearing
fruit. In the present case such scepticism seems
particularly apt.

As we have already mentioned, two of the
four Powers concerned. Great Britain and France,
would be discussing the conflict in the Pacific,
whilst their paramount interests would lie
10,000 miles away, and those interests might
be at that moment jeopardised. Ample indeed
would be the scope for Japanese diplomacy at
the conference. Even if Japan should fail to
secure the neutrality of Great Britain and France,
or of one of them, at any price, she might easily
induce them to waver and not to render the
United States simultaneous assistance. The mere
fact that the Allies would not come in at the same
time would place a trump card into the hands
of Japan for the obvious reason that complete
harmony of action constitutes the bulwark of
every military coalition.

The three fundamental points described above
appear to us fullj" to illustrate the military
significance of the " Four Power Pact." The
very nature of the political groupings intended
to counterbalance Germany's might precluded
the possibility of any one of these Powers having
to oppose Germany single-handed. But the
nature of the " Four Power Pact " is by no
means such as to preclude the chance of the
United States being isolated in a conflict with
Japan. The chances of such a conflict have
increased after the debate in the United States

186 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

Senate at the end of February, 1922, during the
discussion of the " Four Power Agreement."
As a result of this debate the Foreign Relations
Committee of the Senate voted the so-called
Senator Brandegee's substitute reservation to
the Four Power Treaty reading.

" The United States understands that under
the statement in the preamble or under the
terms of the treaty there is no commitment
to armed forces, no alliance and no obligation
to join in any defence." Reluctance to become
tied by any obligations towards other Powers
has considerably weakened the pledges, already
somewhat conditional, of Great Britain and
France to come to the assistance of the United
States in the event of the latter being attacked
by Japan in the Western Pacific. It is the
immutable rule of life that he who fears to come
to the rescue of others cannot count upon others
helping him. The policy of " splendid isolation "
may be the outcome of broad-minded statesman-
ship, as well as of narrow-minded egoistical
provincialism.

The foregoing lines appear to us to give an
exhaustive answer to the question as to the
soundness of the views of American statesmen
in respect of guarantees offered by the " Four
Power Pact " of balance of power in the Pacific.
We shall now revert to the examination of the
strategical possibilities inherent in the Pact.
In other words, we will endeavour to estimate
the practical value of the participation of Great
Britain and France in a war against Japan.

THE POLITICO-MILITARY ASPECT 187

To what extent would France's participation
in the war affect the issue ?

Generally speaking the French Fleet is
technically equipped for action in the restricted
area of the Mediterranean, but not for wide
oceanic regions. In equipment, armour, gunnery,
etc., France's newest battleships are inferior to
Japanese battleships of the first line. As in
the United States Navy, there are no battle-
cruisers in France, nor has she any light cruisers
of the latest type. There are very few destroyers
and submarines. In other words, the French
Fleet could only reinforce in a small measure
the second line of the United States Fleet, and
could not materially affect the relative strength
of the contending Fleets of Japan and the United
States in the Western Pacific. The participation
of France would somewhat improve the strate-
gical position of the United States Fleet in
respect of bases, as the deserted harbours of
Indo-China and Saigon would then be available.
But, as we have already said, there are no docks
in Saigon. Should the United States Fleet be
able to shelter in the harbours of Indo-China,
it would be nearer to the Japanese naval centre
than if it had only to count upon the islands
of the Pacific for bases. On the whole, however,
the participation of France would not widen the
scope of naval action of the United States Fleet
in the Pacific, and that action would still be
limited to a partial long-distance blockade of
Japan.

In comparison with France, Great Britain

188 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

would be of greater practical strategical value
as an ally of the United States. In the first
place, part of the naval forces of Great Britain
might take part in the war in the Far East.
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that
the entire British Fleet could be sent to the
Pacific. Were the conflict in the Pacific to
arise at a time of peace and quiet in European
politics, yet Great Britain could not send her
fleet to a distance of 10,000 miles away from
the shores of the United Kingdom, not only
by reason of her insular position, but because
the very absence of the British Fleet from
European waters might provoke conflicts in
Europe. The British Fleet could no more be
sent in its entirety to the Pacific than could
the French Army be sent to fight outside Europe,
for example, in Morocco. The presence on the
Continent of Europe of a strong French Army
and of important British naval forces in European
waters is necessary for the strategical balance
of the world.

Taking the above considerations into account
and bearing in mind the conclusions of Lord
Jellicoe's Report, we may assume that Great
Britain is in a position to send to the Pacific
naval forces equal to those of Japan. As the
strength of the British Fleet has been determined
at the Washington Conference by the figure 5,
and that of Japan by the figure 3, it follows
that Great Britain would have to send the main
part of her fleet to the Pacific. Should these
British forces be added to the United States

THE POLITICO-MILITARY ASPECT 189

Fleet, the Japanese Fleet would have no chance
of success in open battle.

Should Great Britain join the war on the
side of the United States, all the British bases
in the Pacific would be available for the American
ships. This would improve the strategical posi-
tion of the United States, as she would have
docks for big battleships at her disposal.

What would be the effect of British par-
ticipation upon the operations of the United
States Fleet ? Great Britain's participation
would not suffice for a successful application
of the most decisive method of winning the war,
namely, the capture of the Japanese mainland.
The next most drastic method would be, as
we have already shown, a complete blockade
by which Japan would be cut off from her
communications with the Continent of Asia.
The first step which would have to be taken
to that end would be the destruction of the
Japanese Fleet. It seems obvious that should
Great Britain join in the war on the side of
the United States and should the British battle-
ships arrive in the waters of the Far East simul-
taneously with the American Fleet, Japan would
not run the risk of giving open battle and would
take up an attitude of watchful expectation
under cover of her powerful naval positions.
Should the Allied Fleets concentrate upon a
thorough blockade of Japan, they would have
to force these fortified positions and to challenge
the Japanese Fleet in an open battle.

This extensive action of the Allied Fleets

190 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

against Japan would take place approximately
on the following lines : —

The Japanese Fleet whose strength, as we
know, is represented by the figure 3, would
be defending strong naval positions barring
the access to the Japanese Sea, and the bases
of that fleet would be in the close neighbourhood.
The Allied Fleets whose strength would be
represented by the figures 4 + 3, would have
to attack these strong positions and would
have a secure base (Singapore) 2,000 miles away
in the rear, for the nearest base. Hong Kong,
cannot, as we know, be considered secure.

In the Great War, the Allied Fleets did not
venture to force the naval position behind
which the German Fleet was sheltered, although
the Allied Fleets were about three times stronger
than the German, and their numerous bases
were only a few miles distant from these positions.
At the same time, the Allies risked forcing the
Dardanelles simply because apart from the one
German cruiser, the Goehen, there were no
other enemy battleships in the Sea of Marmora.
Had they failed to force the Straits, no danger
awaited them. In fact, while the operation
was in progress the Allies noticed that their
losses exceeded their expectations. They there-
fore merely stopped the operations and retired
to their bases in the immediate neighbour-
hood.

In trying to force the entrance to the Japanese
Sea, the Allied Fleets would find themselves in
an altogether different position. Should Japan's

THE POLITICO-MILITARY ASPECT 191

opponents notice, as it happened in the Darden-
nelles, in the course of their operations, that
their losses are excessive — a great misfortune
might befall them. For should they stop the
operation they would have to retire to their
distant base under the threat of the Japanese
Fleet. The latter might easily pursue them
and compel them to accept battle in conditions
of unexampled difficulty.

In the event of the Allied Fleets deciding not
to complete the operations after their first
losses, when their main forces would still be
strong enough to prevent Japan from risking
an open battle, the disabled ships might still
fail to reach their base, as they would have to
be subjected on their way to the base to the
intensive operations of Japanese submarines and
destroyers. It may be taken for granted that
should the first attempt to force the entrances
to the Japanese Sea fail, it will not be repeated,
as the abortive attempt at forcing the Darden-
nelles also was not repeated. The risk of heavy
losses would be too great, and the Allied Anglo-
American Fleet might even lose its numerical
superiority over the Japanese Fleet. The idea
of forcing the German positions in the Southern
waters of the North Sea was not carried out
in the last war, for analogous reasons, in spite
of the fact that the success of such an operation
would have entailed complete cessation of sub-
marine warfare and the destruction of Germany's
sea power by one stroke. As a rule, the risk of
such operations is so great that they are described

192 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

in naval strategy as something akin to strateg-
ical adventure. Operations may be undertaken
on land entailing the risk of heavy losses simply
because these losses can be made good in the
Army with much greater ease than losses in
battleships, and because the issue of modern
war on land is never decided by any battle.
On sea matters are different. If, for example,
the Allies failed to force the Japanese positions
in the Japanese Sea, and suffered such losses
as would allow Japan to challenge them in
open battle, they would stand in great peril,
because should the Japanese Fleet defeat the
Anglo-American, it would mean the establish-
ment of Japanese supremacy in the Pacific
for some time to come. We venture to think
that no British admiral with experience of
the late war, and realising the vital importance
for Great Britain of maintaining the constant
and unbroken hegemony of the British Fleet
would agree to such an operation. We know
how careful Great Britain was to preserve her
naval forces in the Great War ; we know that
although submarine warfare was a deadly menace
to her very existence. Great Britain would not
venture to force the German " wet triangle."
We cannot therefore imagine that Great
Britain would ever undertake the forcing of the
Japanese Sea in order to solve the Far Eastern
question.

We can therefore take it for granted that
a complete blockade of Japan, coupled with the
necessity of breaking through into the Japanese

THE POLITICO-MILITARY ASPECT 193

Sea, cannot form a reasonable basis of the
war plans of the Allied Anglo-American Fleets
against Japan.

There are those who think that a method of
warfare may be applied against Japan which
is commonly described as " fleet in being."
We will touch upon this question because certain
writers, not altogether amateurs in matters of
naval strategy, seem to entertain groundless
hopes with regard to this method and are mis-
leading public opinion, ignorant of the intricacies
of naval strategy, by this would-be scientific
expression. " Fleet in being " is nothing else
than the constant presence of a fleet in a given
theatre of war, alongside with the enemy fleet,
but avoiding battle and hiding in its bases and
behind its fortified positions. " Fleet in being "
gives conditional mastery at sea to the fleet
which may apply this method. In order,
however, to apply it, the fleet must have
a secure base in the theatre of war, and the
strategical influence of the method is, strictly
speaking, confined to the scope of assistance
which a solid base renders to a fleet in action.
In the late war, the British Fleet was in a position
to apply this method against the German Fleet
in the North Sea only because the main and
numerous bases of the British Fleet were situated
in that sea.

When the " fleet in being " method is
successfully applied and conditional mastery
of the sea thus attained, the enemy is deprived
of his surface communications until it defeats

13

194 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

its opponent. That is why the mastery of
the sea is described as conditional.

In order to apply this method in the Japanese
Sea, the enemies of Japan would have to first
of all break through into the Japanese Sea.
Supposing the operation is successful, and the
Japanese Fleet, battered and weakened, shelters
in its many bases and is being repaired. How
will Japan's enemies carry out the " fleet in
being " in the Japanese Sea ? They cannot
acquire bases on the coasts of Japan and of
Korea because these coasts are defended by
the Japanese Army. There remain Vladivostok
and other harbours on the Russian coast. These
harbours, however, owing to the present condition
of Russia, would obviously have fallen into
the hands of Japan and would be occupied
by Japanese troops long before the arrival
of the Allied Fleets in the Far East. The
enemies of Japan would find themselves in
the same position in the Yellow Sea if they
desired to establish conditional mastery on those
waters in order to interrupt Japan's communica-
tions with China. Bases in the Japanese and
in the Yellow Sea being thus bej^ond reach of
the Allied Fleets, they would have to make
a bid for the Chinese Sea, where they have
a first-rate base — Singapore — and anchorages
on the coast of Indo-China.

The participation of Great Britain in a war
against Japan would not, therefore, tend to
broaden the scope of strategical methods of
warfare which would remain the same as in

THE POLITICO-MILITARY ASPECT 195

the event of a single-handed struggle against
Japan. A long-distance naval blockade would
still remain the only weapon. With the assist-
ance of Great Britain, this blockade might be
more effective. In the event of war between
the United States and Japan, the former, owing
to the lack of docks and bases in the Chinese
Sea, would have to leave these waters sooner
or later for repairs. The Japanese troops
occupying the Philippines would thus have the
certainty that their communications with Japan
would sooner or later be re-established. If,
however, the British Fleet is in the Chinese
Sea as Japan's enemy, it can always remain
in that sea, and the blockade of the Philippines
may continue for ever. For this reason it
may be anticipated that should Great Britain
join the United States, Japan would not risk
the occupation of the Philippines.

An Anglo-American alliance would not open
new possibilities of decisive and powerful strategy
against Japan, and the severance of the latter's
communications with the Asiatic Continent would
still remain an unattainable task for her enemies.

On the other hand, Great Britain's participation
in the war would give Japan a free hand in
China. The mere instinct of self-preservation in
the face of a protracted war would compel
Japan to strengthen her rear on the Continent,
and she would have to occupy China in order
to secure food supplies and minerals. The
occupation of China would signify the lasting
supremacy of Japan over that country. The

196 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

participation of Great Britain would be a
guarantee against the seizure of the Philip-
pines, but in the long run would result in the
loss for Great Britain of rich markets in Southern
China, and in the appearance on the Asiatic
Continent, in the immediate vicinity of British
Asiatic possessions, of energetic and active Japan
instead of " sleepy China."

We have already mentioned that fifty years
ago Japan entered upon a cycle of wars, of
which the coming war will be one of the stages
of the development of the Rising Sun according
to the watchword *' Asia for the Asiatics."
Strategically, this next stage is so prepared that
even the combined forces of Great Britain and
of the United States cannot prevent Japan's
occupation of China at the outbreak of war
in the Far East. As Great Britain's participa-
tion in the war would not deal Japan a decisive
blow and could not prevent the occupation of
China by the latter, we venture to think that
American statesmanship at the Washington
Conference was not justified in assuming that
the " Four Power Pact " is capable of restoring
the strategical balance in the Pacific.

The " Four Power Pact " had the narrow
aim of defending the islands of the Pacific,
and it thus indicates to Japan the access to
the next stage of her progress — to the Continent
of Asia.

CHAPTER XI

THE BEARING OF RUSSIA AND OF
HER FAR EASTERN DOMINIONS
UPON THE PROBLEM OF THE
PACIFIC

We have already stated in Chapter I that in
spite of the scarcity of the population of the
Far Eastern Russian dominions, their seizure
by Japan would not solve the problem of finding
room for the surplus population of the Yellow
Empire. We have indicated that many authori-
tative scholars who have studied the customs
and requirements of the Japanese people have
come to the conclusion that the Japanese surplus
population can only settle in countries lying
south of the forty-fifth parallel. But geographical
parallels do not afford sufficient ground for
judging of the climate, and it is necessary to
study the outline of isotherms.

The isotherms of the average annual zero
temperature begin in European Russia north
of Uleaborg, and follow the line of Archangel
and the north of the province of Perm, cross
the Ural mountains towards Tobolsk, Krasno-
yarsk, Habarovsk, and then rise northwards,
crossing the centre of Sakhalien and the Kamt-

197

198 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

chatka peninsula. Alaska, the north-western
territories of Canada and Greenland lie to
the north of that isotherm. The population of
these countries is as follows : —

Alaska 1 to 9 square miles

North Western Canada .... 1 to 60 ,, ,,
Greenland 1 to 60 ,, ,,

All these countries are destined to be thinly
populated. The capacity of these countries for
immigration might be described as amounting
to decimal fractions of one per cent, of the
capacity of Japan, China, Java, and other
rice-growing countries. The capacity of the
above-named northern territories is not, however,
the same everywhere. It is larger as the country
is nearer to the sea. In this respect the Russian
Far Eastern dominion is most unfavourably
situated. Three winter isotherms are indicated
on map No. 5 — the isotherms of the average
temperature for January of 16°, 20°, and 24°
of frost. The second isotherm is the most in-
teresting. It begins in the north of the
Petchora region, descends along the Ural
chain, separating Europe from Asia, continues
towards Tobolsk, Krasnoyarsk, runs along
the southern coast of Lake Baikal, crosses
Manchuria south of the fiftieth parallel, and the
Sikota Alin chain, and, encountering the
moderating influence of the ocean, rises abruptly
to the north along the coast. This isotherm
embraces almost all Russian Far Eastern
dominions, which are therefore bound to remain

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RUSSIA AND THE PROBLEM 199

thinly populated. It should not be forgotten
that the province of Yakutsk is the region of
the heaviest polar frost.

In the twentieth century Japan will stand in
need of finding room for tens of millions of
emigrants. In the Russian Far Eastern dominions
only a small stretch of territory round Vladi-
vostok and a narrow coastal line are fit for
Japanese emigration. The coastal line, moreover,
has even greater disadvantages than Southern
Sakhalien, to which, as we have already men-
tioned, Japan has only sent a few thousands of
settlers in fifteen years.

A thorough study of the question compels
us to repeat what we have said in Chapter I :
Japan will not find room for her surplus popula-
tion in Far Eastern Russia.

In Chapter II we have shown that as a market
for exports of manufactured goods the Russian
Far East likewise does not answer the require-
ments of Japanese industry, because the total
population of the entire territory east of Baikal
does not exceed 3,500,000. But that restricted
market will always remain open to Japanese
goods, because the Far Eastern territory is too
remote from the centres of Russian industry,
and Russia cannot introduce protective tariffs,
as they would produce a rise in the cost of living
and would practically put an end to the economic
development of the country. Japan, therefore,
does not need to exercise poHtical domination
over the Russian Far East in order to capture
the markets.

200 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

The Russian coast of the Japanese and
Okhotsk Seas and of the Behring Straits abounds
in fisheries and furs. Japan requires their
exploitation. Fish is one of the items of staple
food for the Japanese islanders. In the endea-
vour to exploit these industries Japan is not
likely to encounter any resistance on the part
of Russia, because the fisheries have long since
been practically in the hands of Japan. Russia
only protested against destructive methods in
the fur seal fisheries, and the offenders, in this
case, were not so much the Japanese as the
Americans. It may be confidently asserted that
Russia's measures of protection of the fur seals
were advantageous to Japan, because, in the
absence of Russian supervision, Japan is defray-
ing the costs of that supervision. With regard,
therefore, to the exploitation of the fisheries
and furs of the Russian Far East, the interests
of Russia and of Japan do not clash.

The situation is somewhat different in respect
of the exploitation of the rich soil of that
region. The map No. 6 indicates the regions
in which various mines are located. No ex-
haustive survey of the mineral riches of the
Far East has ever been made, so that we
must needs be satisfied with the available
data.

East of Lake Baikal, near the Myssovaia
station, the existence of a rich bed of iron ore
has been ascertained, which is the more important
because there is coal in the immediate neigh-
bourhood. Beds of iron ore have also been

RUSSIA AND THE PROBLEM 201

discovered along the River Baleg, the tributary
of the Shilka, in the Nerchinsk district, and
at a distance of about twelve miles from the
Bay of St. Olga, in the Maritime province.
Iron ore is to be found also in some regions of
the Yakutsch province (along the Rivers Anga
and Batash, the tributary of the Lena, the
Valui, etc.) in the Amur province.

Coal has been discovered in Transbaikalia,
Amur, the Maritime province, and in Sakhalien.
Of these the richest are the Sutchansk and the
Sakhalien mines. ^

Near Lake Baikal there are oil wells and burning
gas. Although the country has not been as
yet properly surveyed, there can be no doubt
that there are plenty of oil beds. They would
be of paramount importance, and their exploita-
tion would prove highly profitable on account
of the scarcity of oil in Asia.

^ The Sutchansk mines are in the Maritime province, to the
north of the Nakhodka Bay, near Vladivostok. The Sutchansk
coal may prove necessary for the development of the metallur-
gical industry within the Sikota-Alin chain, which abounds in
iron ore and other metals — even in the event of the Olguinsk
and other coastal mines being dependent upon the Sakhalien
coal.

The south-western part of Russian Sakhalien is the region
in which the coal industry of the island is most likely to develop
rapidly. The coal mines of Russian Sakhalien are supposed to
be of several hundred million tons. The diversity in the quality
of coal in Sakhalien would allow it to be used for various pxirposes.
Hard coal would be used in gas factories and furnaces, whilst
soft coal and coke would help to develop the iron industry in
the Far East. The mixtxu-e, in certain proportions, of these
kinds of coal makes excellent coal for shipping purposes. In
spite of the primitive nature of the industry, the Sakhalien coal
is known as the beet fuel throughout the Far East.

202 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

There is oil also in Sakhalien. In the moun-
tains of Transbaikalia there is copper, silver,
and manganese ore. The first two metals are to
be found in the Maritime province as well.

The Russian Far Eastern dominions abound
in gold mines. ^

The economic exploitation of the mineral
riches of these regions by Japan does not involve
political supremacy over the territory. Owing
to the scarcity of the population, the local needs
of coal and iron cannot be great, while the

^ The richest of these mines are in the Olekminsk district
of the Yakutsk province, which is situated north of the Tab-
lonov chain, between the rivers Vitim, Lena and Olekma. The
valley of the rivers Bodaido (a tributary of the Vitim), of Great
and Small Patomo (tributary of the Lena), and of Juia, Bogolnak,
Batoiho and Vatch (tributaries of the Olekma) are particularly
rich in gold mines. Gold is here to be found in two or three
layers and in big lumps. But the gold mining industry is
especially arduous on account of the rigorous climate, and frozen
soil, and the high cost of labom- and of supplies. In Trans-
baikalia there is gold almost everywhere ; the richest mines
are in the Bargusinsk district along the rivers Vatimkan, Vitim,
Amanat, Zipa (and their tributaries) and in the Nertchinsk
district. In the latter they are situated along the systems of
the rivers Shilka, Kara, Nerch, Great and Small Urum, Ingoda,
Onon, Unda, Gazimur, Urlungal, etc. The gold mines of the
Amur and Maritime Provinces are in the valleys of the left
tributaries of the Amur. The extreme western group of m.ine8
in the Amur Province lies between the Amur and the Zea in
the neighbourhood of the town of Albasin. The second group
is along the rivers Gilui and Brianta, right tributaries of the
Zea. These mines are particularly rich. The third group is
situated along the river Selendja (left tributary of the Zea)
and the fourth group in the upper Niman (right tributary of
the Burea). The mines of the Amur provinces are rich and
not very deep beneath the surface. There are gold mines in
the Maritime province along the Amun river in the Oud district
and elsewhere. Gold has also been found further north, along
the coast of the Sea of Okhotsk.

RUSSIA AND THE PROBLEM 203

remoteness of the region from the industrial
centres of Russia and high freights caused
mining surveys to be limited almost exclusively
to gold. The iron and coal industries can only
be developed on a large scale to satisfy the
requirements of Japanese industry. Thus this
branch of industry can only be conducted in
close economic connection with Japan. It is
in the direct interest of Russia to work hand
in hand with Japan, because such an economic
policy would be the best means of economically
developing the Russian Far Eastern dominions.
It may be confidently stated that a strong
Russia would see no danger in giving conces-
sions to Japan for the exploitation of coal and
iron, which are necessary for her peaceful
progress, and that such concessions, provided
they are purely economic and not political,
would not be detrimental to the interests of
Russia in these regions. If we revert, however,
from the economic standpoint in discussing this
question (of the coal and iron mining industries)
to the strategical standpoint, we will arrive at
entirely different conclusions.

From the economic viewpoint, the exploita-
tion of the coal and iron mines of China would
offer greater advantages to Japan than that
of the riches of Far Eastern Russia. In the
latter region a start would have to be made,
and first of all a survey. There would be a
scarcity of labour, while in China this question
is simplified by the abundance of available
labour and by its very low cost. But from

204 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

the strategical viewpoint a metallurgical base in
the Russian Maritime region and in Sakhalien
would be much more advantageous. The estab-
lishment of a metallurgical base in the region
of the Sikota-Alin chain would be a lengthy
undertaking. Japan will therefore endeavour
to exploit the iron and coal of Manchuria and
of Central China. But the strategical prepara-
tions will only be completed when Japan will
ensure the supplies of coal and iron for her war
factories from the metallurgical bases situated
in Manchuria and in the Maritime region. In
other words, Japan is making every effort to
use Siberia and China as a general metallurgical
base for her industries, and is also organising
a military metallurgical base in Manchuria and
in the Russian Far East.

In examining the condition of the iron and
coal industries, we are once more confronted
with the question already discussed in the pre-
ceding chapters — the necessity for Japan of
having a base on the Asiatic continent in the
event of hostilities against the United States
and her Allies.

Apart from iron, Japan must import all kinds
of raw materials and food. Rice is first and
foremost among these, because it is the staple
food of the people. Taking into account that
the war with the United States would be a
protracted one, Japan must provide for the
continued activities of her industrial concerns
in war time, and must therefore obtain all neces-
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RUSSIA AND THE PROBLEM 205

the circumstances have compelled Japan to
widen her base southwards, and to include in
it the portion of Central China that touches
the Yellow Sea.

We have pointed out in Chapter VIII that
in order to dominate the Yellow Sea, the
Japanese Fleet must be strongly supported by
the army. The latter would have to prevent
the enemy from taking advantage of any given
point on the Yellow Sea as a temporary base.
With this end in view, the Japanese troops
would have to occupy the respective provinces
of Central China. This objective can only
be reached if all the railways are seized.
The Fusan-Mukden-Tientsin-Tsinanfu-Nankin-
Shanghai line will be the main line upon which
the operations of the Japanese Army in China
will be based. If Japan is in possession of the
Russian coastal region, she will have another
line of communication with the Japanese Sea —
Vladivostok-Nikolsk - Ussuriisk - Pogranichnaia-
Harbin-Mukden-Port Arthur. That line would
allow the Fusan-Mukden line to be quite free of
cargoes for and from Manchuria, and to serve
entirely for the purpose of communications with
Central China.

In Chapter V we have mentioned the Japanese
scheme of the so-called " four railways of Man-
churia and Mongolia." If the reader will draw
an imaginary railway line connecting Yehol
with Peking (see map No. 2), he will discover
a new railway main line starting from Vladi-
vostok, through Pogranichnaia, Harbin, Shan-

206 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

tung, Taonan, Yehol, Peking, Shunch, Hangkow
— encircling the Yellow Sea from the coast.
It should here be noted that the Japanese have
not as yet raised the question of a concession
for the Yehol-Peking railway. They have
drawn their " four railways of Manchuria and
Mongolia " in the shape of a quadrangle, one
corner of which is at Yehol. But strategical
preparations, as a rule, are carefully masked
in peace time, and remind one of a " puzzle "
in which the most amusing bit of the picture
is cut in such a manner as to conceal the true
aspect of the picture as long as possible from
the solver of the puzzle. The Japanese are
past-masters in cutting diplomatic puzzles. Of
this the Washington Conference is another
striking proof.

The strategical value of the second railway
line, running along the coast of the Yellow Sea,
is very great. It allows an encircling move-
ment to be carried out, and the province of
Central China to be occupied. The experience
of the Russo-Japanese War teaches us that
Russia was able to base in Manchuria simultan-
eously about 750,000 troops upon the only
available line — the Trans-Siberian railway.
That line served for purposes of reinforcing and
completing the army, of supplying it with arms
and ammunition, and of special technical means.
The Russian Armies could get other supplies
on the spot. The Japanese Army thrown across
Manchuria into China would be in a similar
position, and the use of the two railway lines

RUSSIA AND THE PROBLEM 207

connected with the Japanese Sea would ensure
an impregnable base for about 1,500,000
Japanese soldiers against the United States and
Great Britain.

The Japanese General Staff must needs fore-
see the necessity of occupying China with
considerable forces, owing to the present acute
animosity of that country towards the " Rising
Sun." Maritime transport will, of course, play
an important part in the operations of the
Japanese Army in China, especially in the
opening stages of the war, when the enemy
fleets will still be far distant. But wise strateg-
ists should foresee unfavourable contingencies
— namely, the possibility of the Japanese Army
in China having to depend solely upon railways
for supplies.

Both the above-mentioned lines will serve for
shipments in both directions. They will carry
from Manchuria and China the raw materials
which Japan, blockaded from the ocean, may
require. The second line crossing the provinces
of Central China remote from the sea will be
of paramount economic importance. South of
Peking it crosses the agricultural region of
China, and approaches the valley of the
Yantse-kiang. The three towns Hang-kow, Hani-
ang, and Wu-chang, the industrial and commer-
cial centres of this, the richest and most thickly
populated part of China, are situated in close
proximity to the tail of that branch. The
metallurgical factories of Haniang (Haniang-
Ping Company) that obtained from Japan a

208 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

loan of 40,000,000 dollars, and are in covert
possession of Japan, are here situated. (This
loan was granted on condition of the supply
of 8,000,000 tons of pig-iron and 15,000,000
tons of iron ore in forty years, beginning in
1914.) Here also are the Chinese arsenal and
gunpowder factory — also in the hands of Japan.
Cotton is grown in that region. The branches
of that line — leading westward (the Japanese
Shunch-Tsinanfu concession) and eastward, will
connect it with the Chinese provinces of Shan-
tung and Shensi — the richest in iron ore.
Should this line be pushed to Canton, Japan
would be able to deal a rapid and decisive blow
at Hong Kong in the event of war against
Great Britain.

The conditions described above seem clearly
to demonstrate how dangerously any menace
to the communications between the Yellow Sea
and China and Manchuria would affect Japan.
We have already alluded to the fact that Japan
would have to reckon with the enmity of China.
Japan, however, has spread over China such a
network of intrigue in order to prolong the
internal chaos and strife, that China would be
unable to act independently. China can only
rise against Japan if supported by a dozen
European army corps. Where could these
troops come from ?

At the outbreak of war two routes would
remain open for a short time : from the south,
across the Chinese Sea, with Hong Kong for a
base. As soon as Japan is aware that a consider-

RUSSIA AND THE PROBLEM 209

able British or American expeditionary force
has been earmarked, she can deal a blow at
Hong Kong in order to capture either the island
itself, or at least Kao-Lun — the opposite coast.
Thus, before the American or the British expedi-
tionary force is in a position to use Hong Kong
as a base, the base would be lost to that force.
Only then would the United States, or Europe,
be in a position to render armed assistance to
impotent China, when the Japanese armies are
drawn towards the north. And this explains
once more the exceptional strategical import-
ance of the presence of Russia north of
Manchuria.

The concentration of Russian troops must be
carried out far away on the continent. That
was the decision of the Russian General Staff
after 1905 in regard to the deployment of Russian
forces in the event of another war with Japan.
The remoteness of the Transbaikalian place
d'armes enables Russia to complete the concen-
tration of her troops before advancing through
Manchuria. Should a Russian army of a million
men (in the Japanese War Russia transported
1,200,000 men along the Siberian railway)
appear in Manchuria, there would be a chance
of a rising in China. A new war with Japan
would be conducted in conditions infinitely more
favourable for Russia than the previous war
of 1904-5. In the event of a Russian victory
Japan would be cut off from China and would
have to evacuate Manchuria. This would deprive
Japan of the main portion of her base on the

14

210 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

Asiatic Continent, and, if coupled with a maritime
hlockadCy would result in a complete blockade, in
other words, in the loss of the war.

That is why we arrive at the general strategical
conclusion that

The United States can defeat Japan
only in alliance with a strong kussia.

Russia is now incapacitated by a grave internal
disease. But the Pacific problem will not be
solved in its entirety in a moment. As we
have already said, it will require a protracted
struggle. Within ten years the position on the
Russian front may undergo a radical change,
because the economic restoration of Russia,
when she has shaken off the yoke of the Third
International, will proceed at a much quicker
pace than is generally anticipated. The very
presence of a strong, albeit peaceful, Russia on
the shores of the Pacific would seriously handicap
the aggressive designs of Japan.

Strategy therefore dictates to Japan the
following measures : —

(1) A strong army.

(2) In the event of an armed conflict with
Russia, the Japanese Army must advance as
far as Lake Baikal in order to block the defile
south of that lake.

At present Japan can mobilise 3,000,000 men.
According to the scheme for the re-organisation
of the Army, Japan will have raised that figure
to 5,000,000 in 1930. Such important forces
would only be required in the event of the
renaissance of a strong Russia. Otherwise Japan

RUSSIA AND THE PROBLEM 211

would not have to place more than 2,500,000
men in the field at the outbreak of war.

In order to forestall Russia in Transbaikalia,
Japan must seize the existing Russian railways
— the Oussouriisk, Chinese Eastern Amur, and
Transbaikalian — the Amur shipping, and must
acquire a concession for the linking up of the
Amur railway with the coast of the Japanese
Sea (Habarovsk — the gulf De-Castri). This
would allow her not only to despatch troops to
Transbaikalia more rapidly, but to form abase for
these troops without straining the Vladivostok-
Nikolsk-Oussouriisk-Pogranitchnaia-Harbin line,
reserving it entirely for communications between
the Japanese Sea and Manchuria and China.

These strategical preparations for a rear in
the Russian Far Eastern dominions open a
wide field for the activities of Japanese policy.

In spite of the state of utter impotence in
which Russia now remains, the political atmos-
phere is rather complex. This complexity arises
from the fact that while a strong Russia would
be a menace to Japan, an alliance with a weak
Russia is a welcome contingency. The Trans-
Siberian is the only pathway to Europe which
would remain open to Japan in the event of a
successful blockade of the Japanese islands by
the United States and her Allies. As Japan
borrows her entire material culture from Europe,
she must preserve a link with that continent.
Even in peace time she cannot do away with
imports of machinery, and that item is first
in the list of imports of manufactured goods.

212 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

In 1919 the imports of machinery and instru-
ments amounted to 90,000,000 yen, and in
1920 reached 111,000,000 yen, while exports of
similar goods in these years amounted to
17,000,000 yen.

At the same time the fact must not be over-
looked that in the conduct of modern war a
great effort of technical and scientific thought is
indispensable. War creates new means of
applying technique ; new methods are being
devised and new weapons invented. Japan
cannot afford to lose the assistance of European
specialists. The Trans-Siberian would form a
link between Japan and Germany and other
European countries, which would not join in
the struggle in the Pacific. For this reason it
would be to the advantage of Japan that Russia
be weakened by influences not emanating from
the " Rising Sun."

The protracted war against Germany proved
extremely advantageous to the country of
the " Rising Sun." Bolshevism in Russia was
another force working to the same end. Here,
however, two complications have arisen : —

(1) Japan does not want Bolshevism to spread
east of Lake Baikal.

(2) Japan does not believe that Bolshevism
can endure in Russia, and does not wish therefore
to deal with that Power in order not to estrange
the patriotic elements in Russia.

The formation of a buffer state east of Lake
Baikal is the contingency that suits Japan best.
That buffer state would have but 3,500,000

RUSSIA AND THE PROBLEM 213

inhabitants. Apart from other reasons by which
this buffer state is doomed to impotence — the
mere fact of its population being very scarce
suffices to show that such a buffer state would
be entirely dependent upon Japan.

What, then, are the forces capable of arresting
the strategical penetration of Japan into
Siberia, a penetration which Japanese diplomacy
was careful to describe at the Washington
Conference as " peaceful penetration."

The United States and her Allies have only
diplomatic means at their disposal. The portent
of international agreements cannot, of course, be
denied. But it should be remembered that, as
history shows, the voice of diplomacy is only
efficacious when it is backed up by real force.
In the question of the Russian Far East, such
a real force can only be provided by regenerated
Russia.

CHAPTER XII

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

We began the study of the Pacific problem by
examining the question of the increasing conges-
tion of the population in Japan. We compared
Japan to a boiler, in which the inner pressure
is constantly increasing and an explosion is
inevitable unless the safety valves are opened
in time. Such an opening of the safety valves
is the discovery of methods of peaceful Japanese
emigration.

The Washington Conference evaded the dis-
cussion of this cardinal point in the Pacific
problem. The programme was as follows : —

(1) Reduction of naval armaments, the basis
of such reductions and their limits to be dis-
cussed.

(2) Regulations for controlling new methods of
warfare.

(3) Reduction of land armaments.

(4) The Pacific and Far East problems,
including questions affecting China, such as :
Territorial integrity, administrative integrity,
the " open door " or equal trading and indus-
trial facilities, the development of railways
(including schemes for the Eastern-Chinese

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE 215

railway), preferential railway rates, and the
position of acquisitions already made.

(5) Siberia : the same questions.

(6) Islands under mandates (provided the
question has not been already settled).

The unwillingness of the leaders of the
Washington Conference to touch the sore spot
in the mutual relations of the White and Yellow
races is to be explained by reasons of a general
character. Mankind has not yet attained to
the actual realisation of " objective justice."
We use the word " objective justice " deliber-
ately, although quite naturally the reader will
think that there can be only one kind of justice.
If we look at the long way which the nations
of the world have passed in the arena of history,
we must confess that each nation is defending
its own *' subjective justice," its own " subjec-
tive conception " of law. It is true that one
cannot help observing that the civilised nations
have come nearer to the conception of objective
justice than the uncivilised nations have done.
Let us hope that continued progress will bring
mankind nearer and nearer to the ideal of truth,
moral righteousness and equality . . . and then
wars will disappear from the pages of history.
This Golden Age of the future at present exists
only in the mind of mankind ; the White
nations, in spite of the fine words about the
horrors of war uttered by their representatives,
will not give up their predominant position in
the world without a struggle. The Yellow race,
the most energetic branch of which — the

216 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

Japanese — came to the front during the second
half of the nineteenth century, is preparing for
a titanic struggle for " a place in the sun,'*
which it really requires.

Of course it would be naive to expect that
the Washington Conference could solve the
problem of the Pacific finally. For this purpose
it would be necessary to educate the whole of
mankind all over again. It might, however,
have been expected that the Washington Con-
ference would avoid imitating the ostrich and
hiding its head at the sight of approaching
danger.

If the Washington Conference were to begin
to open discussion on the question of removing
the obstacles placed by the Pacific States to
Yellow immigration, it would find the right way
to peace in the Pacific.

Listen to what one of the Japanese writers
says, and you will have to acknowledge that
there is a fair amount of truth in his words : *

" When Socialists in Europe and America
pledge themselves to internationalism, they are
thinking only of Europe and America, forgetting
that across the oceans teeming millions are
crying for larger fields of activity. When the
trade unionists of Europe and America speak
of the brotherhood of workers, they are thinking
only of their own race. They complain that
Japanese working men work for low wages,
ignoring that, if the teeming masses of England
or America were bottled in a small archipelago

* Kawakami, Japan and World Peace, pp. 60, 51.

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE 217

as are the Japanese, their wage scale would not
have risen as rapidly as it has. When the
pacifists of Europe and America advocate world-
peace, they seem to mean maintenance of peace
by sustaining the status quo of the relations of
the East and West — by permitting the West
not only to continue its occupation in all parts
of the world of more territory than it is justly
entitled to possess, but also to exclude from
such territory all dark-skinned races, whose
overcrowded home lands afford not only scant
opportunity to their natives, but are themselves
often subject to ruthless exploitation at the
hands of the West."

The evasion of the direct discussion of the
race problem threatens to increase the race
hatred. Already the obstacles placed by America
and Australia to " Yellow immigration " have
removed the controversy from the sphere of
ordinary international disputes to that of world
principles. Japan insists on the White races
acknowledging *' the principle of race equality,"
while, as regards the " Yellow races," she acts
the part of protector against enslavement by
the Whites. It is the secret dream of all
Japanese Imperialists to play that part, and it
must be admitted that they are not mistaken,
and the cry of " Down with the White bar-
barians " may drown the an ti- Japanese feeling
now prevalent in China.

If Japanese immigration were facilitated, the
relations between the races would gradually
improve, while every year the departure of

218 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

emigrants would relieve the congestion in the
land of the Rising Sun.

Owing to the Washington Conference having
evaded the examination of the above-mentioned
fundamental psychological and economic ques-
tion of the Pacific, the Conference could not
accomplish anything decisive and lay the terrible
spectre of the approaching deadly conflict in
the Pacific.

Having evaded the discussion of the funda-
mental point of the Pacific problem, the initiators
of the Washington Conference have thought fit to
give prominence to another no less important
idea, namely, the limitation of armaments.

Disarmament is an old and vexed question
in international relations, the solution of which
has always been doomed to failure.

Without going into the question of the failure
of the Hague Conference in 1898 and the subse-
quent more feeble and less sincere attempts,
we shall only call to mind Wilson's " Fourteen
Points," in which the President of the United
States formulated the conditions under which
the Entente Powers would agree to negotiate
with the Central Powers. Point IV of these
" Fourteen Points " says : —

" Adequate guarantees, given and taken, that
national armaments be reduced to the lowest
point consistent with domestic security."

The author of this point crossed the Atlantic
in order that, at the Versailles Peace Conference,
he might personally take part in the practical
realisation of the reconstruction of the world

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE 219

on the principles he had expounded. On
examination of the results of the Versailles Con-
ference, however, the historian will find pitiful
traces of the realisation of this Fourth Point.
In the peace negotiations it found expression
in the preamble to the compulsory disarmament
of the defeated Powers : "In order to make it
possible to begin the limitation of armaments
of all nations, Germany, Austria, Hungary,
Bulgaria, and Turkey * undertake to observe
the following military, naval, and air regulations
strictly. ..."

The Covenant of the League of Nations
contains as a sort of memento of Wilson's Fourth
Point the very hazy Eighth Clause : " The
members of the League of Nations acknowledge
that the preservation of peace requires a reduc-
tion of the armaments of nations to the lowest
degree compatible with national security and
the protection of international obligations by
means of common action. The Council, taking
into consideration the geographical position and
the conditions of each State, will draw up a
scheme for such a reduction to be examined
and approved by individual Governments. Such
schemes will be examined and revised again
at least every ten years."

The actual results were even more pitiful.
The League of Nations itself was still-born,
and the American Senate was the first to

1 Professor Baron Nolde's article, " The Washington Con-
ference," published in the Sovremenniye Zapiski (Contemporary
Notes), viii. 240.

220 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

repudiate the infant. For the Signatory Powers
of the Versailles Peace Treaty, Clause 8 was
merely an " international " obligation to carry
on a correspondence on the subject of the
" limitations of armaments to the lowest
degree."

Thus all the previous experience of history,
both ancient and recent, precludes any opti-
mism on the subject of disarmament. The
problem is in itself insoluble, as it requires
the preliminary solution of another more diffi-
cult question — it requires what the French
President of the Council of Ministers, in his
declaration at the Washington Conference,
called " moral disarmament." At the same
time, this " moral disarmament " of individual
nations is possible only when all nations will
be prepared, not only in word, but in deed
also, for immediate armed intervention on behalf
of the injured party, even in cases when such
action entails material disadvantage to the
intervening party. At the Washington Confer-
ence a very characteristic episode occurred.
Mr. Briand concluded his speech on the difficulty
France would experience in reducing her Army,
by declaring that he saw only one way of
carrying out the fervent desire of the French
people for a reduction of the burden of arma-
ments, namely, that the United States of
America should conclude a Treaty with France,
undertaking to render her armed assistance in
case of an attack on her by restored Germany.
The American representatives replied in general

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE 221

terms, but evaded a direct answer. Thus at
the very beginning of the Conference they buried,
with their own hands, the question of the limita-
tion of land armaments, which was the third
point of the programme.

Another problem, the solution of which pre-
sents difficulties as grave as that of the limitation
of armaments, is the problem of the control
over new war-weapons.

Mankind has tried several times to arrest the
development of new weapons of warfare, but
these efforts have invariably failed. Thus, for
example, the Hague Conference forbade bomb-
throwing from the air. Since then, technical
science has made to civilisation the precious
gift of the aeroplane, and in the Great War
the belligerents made extensive use of that
engine of destruction for inflicting injury upon
the foe.

In order actually to put into practice the
" control over the application of new war-
weapons " the fundamental condition has to be
fulfilled of the neutral Powers being prepared
to compel the belligerent who infringes upon
the " rules and regulations of war " to stop
these infringements.

Is it possible to anticipate such a consummation
in the present condition of international inter-
course, based almost entirely upon'!," Economic
egoism" ? Recent experience does not encourage
such a belief. The United States joined the
Entente after the Germans had begun the
submarine war and had sunk the Lusitania.

222 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

By so doing, the Germans had directly challenged
the United States. Till then the Central Powers
had been openly breaking all the " rules and
regulations of war." Apart from the moral
principle proclaimed by the United States,
there was a covert motive : from July 1914 till
June 1917 the United States had supplied to
the enemies of Germany armaments to the
value of 53,000,000 francs, and the submarine
blockade instituted by Germany was hitting the
American capitalists very hard.

Real observance of the *' rules and regulations
of war " will only be secured when public opinion
the world over will reach the consciousness of
the obligation for every signatory of an inter-
national agreement to take up arms for the
defence of the injured party " on principle,"
and not only when such intercession is advan-
tageous.

The path is a thorny one indeed. In all
justice it must be admitted that the advent,
after the Treaty of Versailles, of the League of
Nations is a step in the right direction. In
spite of all the shortcomings of this institution,
which owes its birth to the inspiration of Presi-
dent Wilson, it undoubtedly constitutes a new
era in international relations. Yet the United
States has repudiated it when the United States
Senate refused to recognise it. In so doing,
the United States was actuated by the reluctance
to assume any obligations towards Europe, by
a kind of egoistical " insularity." As long as
such egoism prevails, no improvement in inter-

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE 223

national intercourse is possible, because a moral
ideal is only attainable when those who profess
it are prepared to fight for its realisation, and
not merely indulge in speech-making. This is
the inherent fallacy that permeates all the labours
of the Washington Conference, and which will
result in all its decisions concerning the limitation
of submarine warfare and the prohibition of poison
gas belonging to the domain of pious intentions,
with which, as Dante has said, the way to Hell
is paved. In presenting the seven agreements
concluded at the Conference to the Senate,
President Harding said in his address that the
Conference has given rise to a new diplomacy.
Verily, the methods of Europe and of the United
States proved entirely different.

History has given European nations a hard
training in strenuous international competition,
and has caused them to evolve traditions and
methods entirely foreign to the distant Trans-
Atlantic Republic. Surrounded by the seas,
and having for neighbours the weak and sparsely
populated States of Central and South America,
the United States developed in perfect freedom
from the menace of outward aggression. Being
the one and only truly " insular " Power, the
United States have created on their island-
continent a diplomatic tradition and diplomatic
methods of their own, which Europe cannot
fathom.

This isolation and lack of understanding
became apparent when the United States
appeared in the ranks of the enemies of Germany

224 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

at the end of the World War. They came,
helped to win the war, became entangled — in
the person of President Wilson — in the complex
net of European politics. They soon got tired
of trying to disentangle that net ; they withdrew,
with a sigh of relief, and passed the sponge
over Europe, over the victors and the van-
quished. They misunderstood Europe, and
Europe misunderstood them. This was indeed
a colossal and fateful misunderstanding.

The Washington Conference was intimately
connected with that misunderstanding. The
Republicans who replaced President Wilson's
administration realised, as early as during the
Versailles negotiations, and later during the
election, that all that was done in Paris during
the period of liquidation of the Great War
had been badly done, that President Wilson
had acted in a manner distasteful to the United
States, that he had failed to grasp the American
ideal, and had become enmeshed in the tangle
of European diplomacy. Having repudiated the
methods by which Europe was striving to
achieve universal peace and disarmament, the
opponents of the Versailles Treaty in the United
States endeavoured to arrive at the same goal
by different, typically American, ends. They
convened the Washington Conference, which
was conducted in a truly American fashion,
without secret diplomacy, and in the light of a
colossal American publicity.

President Harding and Secretary Hughes
intended the Conference to be a counterpart

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE 225

of Versailles and of the League of Nations,
a conference of *' disarmament " and of the
" establishment of lasting peace."

Has the Conference achieved that purpose ?

We have endeavoured to show that in that
respect the Conference has failed. The comedy
and drama of the world's history have not
changed through the shifting of the stage.

Has the Conference been successful in the
limited sphere of securing peace in the Pacific ?

The leaders of the policy of the United States
began by making certain suggestions which were
subsequently embodied in the " Five Power
Agreement for the Limitation of Armaments."

Has this agreement rendered war in the
Pacific impossible ? Wars were fought before
Dreadnoughts came into being. Wars will not
cease when the numbers of Dreadnoughts will
be reduced.

Has the " Five Power Agreement " rendered
the pursuance of the aggressive policy of Japan
more difficult ?

For the next few years Great Britain, and
still less Japan, cannot compete with the
United States in peace time naval armaments.
By this proposal, the United States are indeed
making a great sacrifice of their only military
advantage over Japan. The nobility and bold-
ness of this " gesture " is undoubted, and is
perhaps unique in the history of mankind.
But will this bring the era of peace anv nearer,
if not in the whole world, at least in the Pacific ?

Public opinion would appear to us to make

15

226 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

one great mistake with regard to the military
power of modern States. It has a firmly rooted
idea that militarism is measured exclusively by
the number of Army corps and Dreadnoughts
kept in times of peace. Now war has become a
struggle in which all the forces of a nation take
part. Together with the preparation of armies
and navies — the external manifestations of a
nation's fighting strength — the question of the
preparation of the whole State has come to the
fore. Therefore the military strength of a State
is now measured not by the peace strength of
the army and navy, but also by the following
factors : the possibility of utilising the maximum
living and material forces of the whole nation
during the war, and the possibility, in case of a
prolongation of the armed struggle, of counter-
acting the economic disorganisation of the
country most effectively. In the case of Japan
— for reasons which we have examined in detail
in the preceding chapters, this side of strateg-
ical preparations assumes a greater importance
than even purely military problems. Therefore
the practical solution of the problem of the
limitation of Japan's armaments must consist,
not in the limitations of her naval forces, but in
the limitation of the possibility of penetration
into the continent of Asia.

By a voluntary limitation of naval construc-
tion for ten years, the United States have
deprived their diplomacy of real power in Far
Eastern questions.

In return for such a gift, the political leaders

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE 227

of Japan have found it possible to make a
number of concessions at the Washington Con-
ference. They have agreed to cancel their
alliance with Great Britain, substituting the
" Four Power Pact." They have also agreed to
make a number of concessions with regard
to the continent of Asia.

Public opinion in the United States will be
greatly mistaken if it sees any actual value in
these concessions. The fact of the matter is
that from the moment the " Five Power Pact "
on the limitation of naval forces was signed,
it was no longer possible to influence what is
now Japan's practical policy in China and
Siberia. Japanese diplomatists will now be faced
only with the problem of maintaining the
outward appearance which will serve best
to conceal the real objects of their policy. In
this respect they have already had plenty of
experience in the past, and they observed
the same tactics in their negotiations at the
Washington Conference.

The fundamental resolutions of the Conference
concerning China are based on the proposal
made by the United States' representative, Mr.
Hughes. Here is the complete text of his
proposal.

" (1) With a view to applying more effectually
the principles of the * open door,' or equality
of opportunity in China, for the trade and
industry of all nations, the Powers, other than
China, represented at this Conference agree : —

" (a) Not to seek, or support their nationals

228 THE PHOBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

in seeking, any arrangement which might
purport to establish in favour of their interests
any general superiority of rights with respect to
commercial or economic developments in any
designated region of China.

*' (b) Not to seek, or support their nationals
in seeking, any such monopoly or preference as
would deprive other nationals of the right of
undertaking any legitimate trade or industry
in China, or of participation with the Chinese
Government in any category of public enterprise,
or which by reason of its scope, duration, or
geographical extent, is calculated to frustrate
the practical application of the principle of
equal opportunity.

"It is understood that this agreement is not
to be so construed as to prohibit the acquisition
of such properties or rights as may be necessary
to the conduct of any particular commercial,
industrial, or financial undertaking, or to the
encouragement of invention and research.

" (2) The Chinese Government takes note of
the above agreement, and declares its intention
of being guided by the same principles in
dealing with applications for economic rights and
privileges from governments and nationals of
all foreign countries, whether they are parties
to the agreement or not.

" (3) The Powers, including China, repre-
sented at this Conference, agree in principle
to the establishment in China of a Board of
Reference, to which any question arising on
the above agreement and declaration may be

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE 229

referred for investigation and report. (A
detailed scheme for the constitution of the
Board shall be framed by the special Conference
referred to in Article 1 of the Convention on
Chinese Customs Duties).

" (4) The Powers, including China, represented
at this Conference agree that any provisions
regarding an existing concession which appear
to be inconsistent with those of another conces-
sion, or with the principles of the above agree-
ment or declaration, may be submitted by the
parties concerned to the Board of Reference,
when established, for the purpose of endeavouring
to obtain a satisfactory adjustment on equitable
terms."

Clause IV of Mr. Hughes' proposal admits
the possibility of revising existing agreements
by means of a Commission which is to be formed.
The French, followed by the Japanese, protested
against this Clause, and the latter was rejected
by the Far Eastern Commission. And yet, if
the policy as regards China is to be really guided
by the principle of her sovereignty, her terri-
torial integrity and the " open door," then it
is impossible to avoid revising the former political
treatise which practically introduced principles
of a directly opposite nature.

This was particularly necessary in regard to
the " twenty-one demands " presented to China
by Japan in January 1915, and which we have
discussed in Chapter V.

The Chinese delegates insisted upon the revision
of these " twenty-one demands," a suggestion

230 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

which the Japanese resisted with equal vigour.
The latter went so far as to hint that the agree-
ment between China and Japan of May 1915,
which followed upon the presentation of the
demands, was an agreement between sovereign
States, and that there was as much ground for
discussing that agreement at the Washington
Conference as there would have been for the
examination of the agreement between the
United States and Cuba. Finally, Mr. Shidehara,
the Japanese Ambassador in Washington,
declared that any discussion of the " twenty-one
demands " at the Washington Conference would
be a breach of international law, and would lead
to no practical results, because Japan had already
receded in 1915 from the " fifth group " of
these demands (the right of appointing political
financial, and military " advisers " in China).
At the same time Mr. Shidehara read the official
declaration of the Japanese Government to the
effect that it intended to respect the sovereignty
of China, the inviolability of her territory, and
would not interfere in the internal affairs of
that country.

The Chinese representatives, who are well
aware of the value of such declarations, did not
consider themselves satisfied, and quite rightly
remarked that the entire spirit of the " twenty-
one demands " was in direct contradiction with
the principles which had always been officially
recognised, and had been once more proclaimed
at the Washington Conference. Yet after the
Japanese representative had made his declara-

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE 231

tion, the matter of the " twenty-one demands "
was dropped.

According to the agreements signed by nine
Powers (Great Britain, the United States, France,
Japan, Italy, China, Belgium, Holland, and
Portugal), these Powers pledge themselves to
respect the sovereign rights of China and the
integrity of her territory, the " open door," the
equality of all nations in matters of railway
policy, and the neutrality of China in the event
of war between them. The Powers have also
agreed upon certain alterations in their customs
policy, have settled the question of wireless
stations in Chinese territory, and have raised
the question of renouncing ex-territorial rights
of foreigners in China. Inasmuch as the " Nine
Power Agreements " do but confirm the principles
of policy in the Far East that had been previously
formally recognised, these agreements can only
serve to ensure a " last'ng peace in the Pacific "
if they are capable of bringing about a change
in the policy practised by these Powers in China.

It is difficult not to be pessimistic in this
respect. Suffice it to dwell upon one of the
problems of practical policy discussed at the
Washington Conference at great length, namely,
the Shantung question, in order to be confirmed
in a pessimistic view.

The United States representatives failed to
secure a discussion of this question by the
Conference as a whole, because the European
Powers that had fought against Germany were
already bound by a promise to support the

232 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

Japanese claims in Shantung. The question was
therefore relegated to direct negotiations between
China and Japan. The Japanese delegates under-
stood perfectly well that in spite of all the
outward independence of their negotiations with
China, in regard to Shantung, the solution of
the difficulty was closely linked up with the
general labours of the Conference. The United
States Senate and the Press gave plainly to
understand that if Japan failed to make conces-
sions, the " Five Power " and " Four Power "
agreements would not be ratified. The Japanese
representatives delayed the solution of the ques-
tion till the last moment, in order to reduce
their concessions to a minimum. At the same
time they very ably endeavoured to confine
themselves to purely formal concessions.

The main point in the actual solution of the
Shantung difficulty was the question of the
evacuation of the Japanese troops and the
possession of the Tsinanfu-Tsintao railway.
Japan was bargaining over every opportunity
for delaying the evacuation, and of maintaining
her representatives in the administration of
that line. At the last sitting but one of the
Conference, Mr. Hughes solemnly declared that
Japan and China had arrived at a settlement
of the Shantung question.

" This Shantung agreement provides for the
return of Kiao Tchao and restoration of all
properties to China with some exceptions, and
the removal of Japanese troops as soon as China
is able to take over their duties, but in any

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE 233

case they must be removed in six months. By
the railway settlement China pays 53,500,000
gold marks plus the Japanese improvements,
this payment to be made in Treasury notes
over a period of fifteen years, but with a redemp-
tion privilege in five years. There will be a
Chinese managing director, with a Japanese
trafiic manager, both Chinese and Japanese
accountants operating jointly."

What is the actual value of the Shantung
settlement ?

Let us remember that when Japan began
operations against the German colony in China
she declared that she was not pursuing any
selfish aims of conquest, and that after the
eviction of the Germans Shantung would be
restored to China. This did not prevent Japan
soon afterwards taking advantage of the pro-
pitious international situation and presenting
her claims to the inheritance of German rights
in Shantung. It is true that the evacuation of
the Japanese troops is mentioned in the agree-
ment, but we should bear in mind that
Japan has many excuses in store for delaying
the withdrawal of her troops from Shantung, or
for landing once more soon after the evacuation.
The Japanese diplomats were well aware of
the necessity of finding such an outward form
for the solution of the Shantung controversy
as would place their hosts at the Washington
Conference in a favourable position in respect
of public opinion in the country, and especially
of the Senate. As we have already said, the

234 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

Republican party had made the Conference a
weapon in its contest with the Democratic
party. Thus from the hands of the RepubHcan
party Japan received a valuable gift — the " Five
Power Agreement "... and yet another one.

In refusing to ratify the Treaty of Versailles,
the United States Senate rendered doubtful the
consent of the United States to the mandate
over the former German possessions in the
Pacific — the Marian, Marshall, and Caroline
Islands — granted to Japan at Versailles. We
have examined in detail the immense strategical
importance of these islands in the future struggle
in the Pacific. As a reward for her " conces-
sions," and after the question of Yap was
settled, Japan has now secured the consent of
the United States to this mandate.

Having received two such valuable gifts,
which greatly enhance the strength of Japan
in the Western Pacific, the Japanese diplomats
have been at pains to paint their Asiatic policy
in such colours as might make it easier for the
Republican party to get the Washington agree-
ments ratified by the Senate. Japan may have
no fear of her concessions preventing her from
pursuing her traditional policy. The continued
disturbances in China and the external impotence
of that country leave many secret weapons,
which never fail, in the hands of the leaders
of the Rising Sun. But the main point is that
from the moment of the signing of the " Five
Power Agreement " the position of Japan will
grow stronger for the next ten years.

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE 235

At the Washington Conference the United
States renounced the possibility of compelling
Japan to alter in the next few years her practical
policy in China. After the Washington Confer-
ence the United States can but entertain the
pious hope that the politicians of the Empire
of the Rising Sun, who will be the masters of
the situation in the Far East, will display a
spirit of peaceful conciliation.

Would such an expectation be likely to be
fulfilled ?

History teaches us that the political appetites
of nations grow as their faith is strengthened
in their own power. The conversion of Presi-
dent Wilson's Fourteen Points into the stipula-
tions of the Versailles Treaty afford the latest
illustration of this truth.

We now turn to the result of the Washington
Conference in respect of the Siberian problem
(point six of the programme).

The Japanese troops first appeared in Siberia
in 1918, under the plea of supporting the Czecho-
slovaks, who had been stranded along the
Siberian railway, and on the excuse of guarding
the stores of war material in Vladivostok. The
armed forces of all the Allies took part in this
intervention. Before they went to Siberia, the
United States Government insisted that all the
Powers should proclaim the integrity of the
sovereign rights of Russia. Japan immediately
(August 2, 1918) confirmed her " open policy of
respect of the territorial integrity of Russia."
Japan promised to withdraw her troops from

236 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

Russian territory as soon as the aims that had
been declared would be achieved, and pledged
herself to leave the sovereignty of Russia intact
in all its aspects, political and military.

In 1920 all the Allied contingents were evacu-
ated from Siberia with the removal of the
Czecho-Slovaks. But the Japanese stayed, and
in 1921 they occupied the Russian port of
Sakhalien, where they proceeded barefacedly
and rapidly to " Japanise." By a series of
regulations issued by the forces of occupation,
the Russians were practically deprived of all
rights of citizenship. Among these regulations
the most striking is the order No. 24 (1921),
which is a blatant infringement upon the elemen-
tary rights of the Russians, reducing them to
the status of " white slaves " to the new masters
of the Far East.

In 1921 the United States protested against
the policy of Japan towards the Far Eastern
Russian territories. In the note of May 31st
the United States declared that the " continued
occupation of strategical centres in Eastern
Siberia, resulting in the doubtful possession of
the port of Vladivostok, the distribution of
troops in Khavarovsk, Nicolaievsk, de Castri,
Mago, Sofisk, and other important points,
the seizure of Russian Sakhalien and the estab-
lishment of a civil administration inevitably
resulting in misconceptions and antagonism,
tended to foster, instead of calming, unrest and
disturbances in that region. Military occupa-
tion as reprisals for the disorders of Nicolaievsk,

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE 237

are not a rightful procedure according to the
accepted canons of international law. Recall-
ing the definite engagements given by Japan
at the time of the dispatch of expeditionary
forces, the United States declared that " neither
now, nor in the future, will the Government
recognise the validity of any claims resulting
from the present occupation, and that the
United States could not sanction any action on
the part of the Japanese Government capable
of infringing upon the existing treaty rights or
the political and territorial sovereignty of Russia."

Japan answered by the usual professions of
the purity of her intentions and allegations of
circumstances which compelled her to continue
the occupation.

These conditions endured until the Washington
Conference began to loom in the distance, and
the " Siberian question," with the same reserva-
tions as in regard to China, was placed on the
agenda.

Shortly before the meeting of the Conference,
on September 19, 1921, the United States
Government officially declared that the absence
of a single recognised government in Russia
imposed upon all the Powers partaking in the
Conference the duty of " moral trusteeship "
of the interests of Russia. This announce-
ment, however noble, did not alter the funda-
mental fact that the Russian Far Eastern
possessions were made an object of discussion
in the absence of their rightful owner — the
Russian people.

238 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

Once again Japanese diplomacy took clever
advantage of the situation. On November 16th,
at the Conference, Japan launched a ballon
d'essai in proclaiming her " peaceful penetra-
tion " into Siberia. The true meaning of this
*' peaceful penetration " could not be disclosed
at the Conference owing to the absence of
suffering Russia. On November 19th a group
of Russian politicians in Washington issued a
statement to the effect that the withdrawal of
Japanese troops from Siberia and Sakhalien
could not be made conditional upon the restoration
of a rightful Russian authority, because the
very presence of the Japanese, who were sup-
porting such men as Semenov and Kalmykov,
undermined the efforts of the Russians at
standing on their feet again, and hindered the
establishment of a constitutional Government.
On December 8th the Japanese delegate, Mr.
Hanihara, made a statement on the Siberian
question, in which he reiterated the previous
conditions for the evacuation. He pointed out
that the Japanese intended to retain Sakhalien
and Nicolaievsk as a guarantee against the
events in Nicolaievsk in 1920 (he mentioned
the connection between these two points under
Russian rule). The remainder of the Russian
territory was to be evacuated as soon as the
Republic of Chita would offer safeguards for the
immunity of the Japanese colony.

It is interesting to note that these promises
of evacuation were made in complete disregard
of the Provisional anti-Bolshevik Government of

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE 239

Vladivostok, headed by Mr. Merkulov, which
had been supported by Japan at the time of its
formation. It was obvious that Japan needed
that Government only as a rival to Chita, a
rival which would have been immediately sur-
rendered to the Bolsheviks as soon as the latter
would accept the conditions offered by Japan.

The Siberian problem was at the bottom of
the programme. It came to the fore at the
Conference in the end of January 1922. Japan
skilfully made this discussion to coincide with a
declaration made in the Japanese Diet by the
Foreign Minister, Count Uchida, who repeated
once more the stale declarations of Japan.
The occupation of the Maritime province was
due to " the necessity of self-protection pure
and simple." Against all evidence, interference
in the internal affairs of Siberia was denied,
and it was alleged that negotiations were in
progress with Chita. This speech was immedi-
ately circulated all over the United States, and
on January 23rd Mr Shidehara made the corres-
ponding solemn declaration at the Conference
to the effect that occupation must continue.
" I am empowered to state that Japan is
determined to respect the territorial integrity
of Russia, and to observe the principle of non-
interference in her internal affairs, as well as
the principle of equal opportunities for all
nations in matters of trade and industry in all
Russian possessions." The Conference was thus
placed before an accomplished fact.

What did the other Powers say to this ?

240 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

In British circles the argument was whispered
that Japan cannot be denied the right of deciding
whether or not there was a threat to her
national safety.

The United States Secretary of State, Mr.
Hughes, declared on behalf of his Government
that he took note of Mr. Shidehara's statement,
which he repeated in a very concise form. It
must be admitted that a certain ambiguity was
here manifested. Japan was not to " absorb "
the fisheries, or indulge in " exclusive exploita-
tion " of the riches of Sakhalien and of the
Maritime Province. The portion of Mr. Hughes's
speech that presents a particular value was
the historical outline of the negotiations between
the United States and Japan, emphasising the
mutual engagements of these two countries
entered upon at the beginning of the AUied
expedition into Siberia. In spite of the Japanese
declarations, Mr. Hughes was bound to admit
that there was a continued " divergence of
opinion," and to express the hope that it may
soon disappear upon the withdrawal of Japan
from Siberia and Sakhalien within the near
future. Failing to reach an unanimous conclu-
sion, the United States merely placed the
Japanese and American declarations on record.

We have dwelt upon this subject merely with
a view to showing the inability of the United
States delegates to find a satisfactory solution
of the problem. We now come to another
vital problem upon the solution of which peace
in the Pacific largely depends.

i

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE 241

The surest means of preventing war is, cer-
tainly, to remove the causes of war.

Should such a radical solution prove impossible,
another method, though not so effective, promises
a temporary respite.

This is the method of compromise, preserving
the strategic balance of power. Modern warfare
is such a calamity to the vanquished nation that
no government would risk commencing a war
without overwhelming chances of success.
Would Germany have risked a war with both
France and Russia if Great Britain had from
the first stated her intention of joining them ?
There are many reasons for supposing that
Germany would have abstained from war, and
agreed to Russia's proposal for the Austro-
Servian conflict to be settled at a Hague
Conference.

Russia's disappearance from the ranks of the
Great Powers not only shook the economic
stability of the world, the restoration of which
is now the recognised aim of politicians and
economists the world over, but her fall also
destroyed the strategic balance.

In Europe this has had the effect of main-
taining France's " watch on the Rhine," though
Germany lies crushed in defeat.

The effects have also been felt in the Pacific.
Japan, freed from the menace of Northern
Manchuria, has been at liberty to pursue her
Imperialist policy. She has the possibility of
extensively preparing a base of operations for
future wars on the continent of Asia, and

16

242 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

heavily inclining the balance of power in her
favour.

The Washington Conference has not found a
permanent solution of the Pacific problem ; it
has not even rendered effective the compromises
to which it confined itself.

That is why the Conference, which gave rise
to great hopes, ended in general disappointment.

The Washington Conference is a piece of
political fireworks engineered by the Republican
Party with the object of influencing public
opinion in the States in their favour. As such,
it is but an illusion. It has burnt itself out,
and darkness is thicker still. Thus in the life
of the individual vanished illusions are followed
by moments of despair.

" But," says the reader, " is there no solution
of the Pacific problem ? "

Our answer is :

" Yes and no ! "

The future struggle in the Pacific will be of
an elemental nature, in the face of which indi-
viduals are powerless. Does this, however,
justify the assumption that humanity may not
strive to mitigate the evil ? Has not mankind
achieved notable victories over the forces of
nature ?

If the Washington Conference has not only
not prevented the possibility of war in the
Pacific, but has not even interrupted the prepara-
tions for war, even greater efforts on the part
of all peace-loving nations are needed. Preven-
tion of a bitter struggle in the Pacific is only

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE 243

possible if the United States work consistently,
and earnestly strive for the regeneration of
China and Russia. However strange it may
seem, especially to the latter, the best guarantee
for the preservation of the present compromises
lies in the restoration of the strategical balance
of power in the Pacific.

Should the Washington Conference induce
public opinion to believe that peace in the
Pacific is now assured, it would assuredly have
the contrary result. Instead of postponing war,
the Conference would serve to bring it nearer.

APPENDIX I

Annual Report on Reforms and Progress in Chosen.

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Political History of Japan. London, 1920.

Bellesort (Andre). Le nouveau Japon. Paris, 1919.

Blue Books respecting the affairs of China, Annual Consular

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By water (C). Sea-Power in the Pacific. London, 1921.
China Year Book (The) (Woodhead and Bell). London, 1920.
Cheng (S. G.). Modern China. Oxford, 1920.

Coleman (F.). Japan Moves North: The Inside Story of the
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Colling (W. F.). Mineral Enterprise in China. London, 1918.
Cynn (H. Hueng-Wo). The Re-birth of Korea. London, 1920.
Danckwortt (P. W.). Siberien xmd seine wirtschaftliche Zukunft.

London, 1915.
Gibbons (H. A.). The New Map of Asia. New York, 1919.

Greenbie (S.). Japan, Real and Imaginary. London and New
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Haushofer (Karl). Das Nippon, Betrachtungen iiber Gross
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1914.

Hirth (F.). Schantung und Kiao-tchao, Miinchen, 1898.

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Hovelaque (Emile). Le Japon. Paris, 1921.

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Japan Year Book (The) (Takenob & Kawakami). Tokio, Annual,

Katsuro Hara. An introduction to the History of Japan. New
York and London, 1920.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 245

Kawakami (K. K.). Japan in World Peace. London, 1920.

Kawakami (K. K.). Japan in World Politics. London, 1917.

Latourette (Kenneth Scott). The Development of Japan. New
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McCarthy (M, J. F.). The Coming Power. London, 1905.

McGovern (W. M.). Modern Japan : Its Political, Military and
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Rottach (Edmond). La Chine Modeme. Paris.

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translation). London, 1907.

Treaties between China and Foreign States. 1917.

APPENDIX II

EXTRACTS FROM THE TREATY FOR
THE LIMITATION OF NAVAL ARMA-
MENT.

The United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy
and Japan ;

Desiring to contribute to the maintenance of the general
peace, and to reduce the burdens of competition in armament ;

Have resolved, with a view to accomplishing these purposes,
to conclude a treaty to limit their respective naval armaments.

CHAPTER I

GENERAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE
LIMITATION OF NAVAL ARMAMENT.

Article I. — The Contracting Powers agree to limit their
respective naval armament as provided in the present Treaty.

Article II. — The Contracting Powers may retain respectively
the capital ships which are specified in Chapter II, Part L On
the coming into force of the present Treaty, but subject to the
following provisions of this Article, all other capital ships, built
or building, of the United States, the British Empire and Japan
shall be disposed of as prescribed in Chapter II, Part 2.

In addition to the capital ships specified in Chapter II, Part 1,
the United States may complete and retain two ships of the
West Virginia class now under construction. On the completion
of these two ships the North Dalcota and Delaware shall be dis-
posed of as prescribed in Chapter II, Part 2.

The British Empire may, in accordance with the replacement
table in Chapter II, Part 3, construct two new capital ships not
exceeding 35,000 tons (35,560 metric tons) standard displacement
each. On the completion of the said two ships the Thunderer,
King George V, Ajax and Centurion shall be disposed of as
prescribed in Chapter II, Part 2.

216

LIMITATION TREATY (EXTRACTS) 247

Abticle III. — Subject to the provisions of Article II, the
Contracting Powers shall abandon their respective capital ship
building programmes, and no new capital ships shall be con-
structed or acquired by any of the Contracting Powers except
replacement tonnage which may be constructed or acquired as
specified in Chapter II, Part 3.

Ships which are replaced in accordance with Chapter II, Part
3, shall be disposed of as prescribed in Part 2 of that Chapter.

Article IV. — The total capital ship replacement tonnage of
each of the Contracting Powers shall not exceed in standard
displacement, for the United States, 525,000 tons (533,400 metric
tons) ; for the British Empire, 625,000 tons (533,400 metric
tons); for France, 175,000 tons (177,800 metric tons); for
Italy, 175,000 tons (177,800 metric tons); for Japan, 315,000
tons (320,040 metric tons).

Article V. — No capital ship exceeding 35,000 tons (35,560
metric tons) standard displacement shall be acquired by, or
constructed by, for, or within the jurisdiction of, and of the
Contracting Powers.

Article VI. — No capital ship of any of the Contracting Powers
shall carry a gun with a calibre in excess of 16 inches (406
millin\etres).

Article VII. — The total tonnage for aircraft carriers of each
of the Contracting Powers shall not exceed in standard displace-
ment, for the United States, 135,000 tons (137,160 metric tons) ;
for the British Empire, 135,000 tons (137,160 metric tons) ; for
France, 60,000 tons (60,960 metric tons) ; for Italy, 60,000 tons
(60,960 metric tons) ; for Japan, 81,000 tons (82,296 metric tons).

Article VIII. — The replacement of aircraft carriers shall be
effected only as prescribed in Chapter II, Part 3, provided,
however, that all aircraft carrier tonnage in existence or building
on the 12th November, 1921, shall be considered experimental,
and may be replaced, within the total tonnage limit prescribed
in Article VII, without regard to its age.

Article IX. — No aircraft carrier exceeding 27,000 tons
(27,432 metric tons) standard displacement shall be acquired
by, or constructed by, for or within the jurisdiction of, any of
the Contracting Powers.

However, any of the Contracting Powers may, provided that
its total tonnage allowance of aircraft carriers is not thereby
exceeded, build not more than two aircraft carriers, each of a
tonnage of not more than 33,000 tons (33,528 metric tons) stan-
dard displacement, and in order to effect economy any of the
Contracting Powers may use for this purpose any two of their

248 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

ships, whether constructed or in course of construction, which
would otherwise be scrapped under the provisions of Article II
The armament of anj'- aircraft carriers exceeding 27,000 tons
(27,432 metric tons) standard displacement shall be in accord-
ance with the requirements of Article X, except that the total
number of guns to be carried in case any of such gtms be of a
calibre exceeding 6 inches (152 millimetres), except anti-aircraft
guns and guns not exceeding 5 inches (127 millimetres), shall
not exceed eight.

Abticle X. — No aircraft carrier of any of the Contracting
Powers shall carry a gun with a calibre in excess of 8 inches
(203 milimetres). Without prejudice to the provisions of Article
IX, if the armament carried includes guns exceeding 6 inches
(152 millimetres) in calibre the total number of guns carried,
except anti-aircraft guns and guns not exceeding 5 inches (127
millimetres), shall not exceed ten. If alternatively the armament
contains no guns exceeding 6 inches (152 millimetres) in calibre,
the number of guns is not limited. In either case the number
of anti-aircraft guns and of guns not exceeding 5 inches (127
millimetres) is not limited.

Article XI. — No vessel of war exceeding 10,000 tons (10,160
metric tons) standard displacement, other than a capital ship
or aircraft carrier, shall be acqmred by, or constructed b3% for,
or within the jm-isdiction of, any of the Contracting Powers.
Vessels not specifically built as fighting ships nor taken in time
of peace under Government control for fighting purposes, which
are emploj'^ed on fleet duties or as troop transports or in some
other way for the purpose of assisting in the prosecution of
hostilities otherwise than as fighting ships, shall not be within
the limitations of this Article.

Article XII. — No vessel of war of any of the Contracting
Powers, hereafter laid down, other than a capital ship, shall
carry a gun with a cahbre in excess of 8 inches (203 millimetres).

Article XIII. — Except as provided in Article IX, no ship
designated in the present Treaty to be scrapped may be recon-
verted into a vessel of war.

Article XIV. — No preparations shall be made in merchant
ships in time of peace for the installation of warlike armaments
for the purpose of converting such ships into vessels of war,
other than the necessary stiffening of decks for the mounting
of guns not exceeding 6-inch (152 millimetres) calibre.

Article XV. — No vessel of war constructed within the juris-
diction of any of the Contracting Powers for a non-Contracting
Power shall exceed the limitations as to displacement and

LIMITATION TREATY (EXTRACTS) 249

armament prescribed by the present Treaty for vessels of a similar
type which may be constructed by or for any of the Contracting
Powers ; provided, however, that the displacement for aircraft
carriers constmcted for a non-Contracting Power shall in no case
exceed 27,000 tons (27,432 metric tons) standard displacement.

Article XVI. — If the construction of any vessel of war for
a non- Contracting Power is undertaken within the jurisdiction
of any of the Contracting Powers, such Power shall promptly
inform the other Contracting Powers of the date of the signing
of the contract and the date on which the keel of the ship is
laid : and shall also communicate to them the particulars
relating to the ship prescribed in Chapter II, Part 3, Section I
(6), (4) and (5).

Article XVII. — In the event of a Contracting Power being
engaged in war, such Power shall not use as a vessel of war any
vessel of war which may be under construction within its juris-
diction for any other Power, or which may have been constructed
within its jurisdiction for another Power and not delivered.

Article XVIII. — Each of the Contracting Powers undertakes
not to dispose by gift, sale or any mode of transfer of any vessel
of war in such a manner that such vessel may become a vessel
of war in the Navy of any foreign Power.

Article XIX. — The United States, the British Empire and
Japan agree that the status quo at the time of the signing of the
present Treaty, with regard to fortifications and naval bases,
shall be maintained in their respective territories and possessions
specified hereunder : —

1. The insular possessions wliich the United States now holds
or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, except (o) those
adjacent to the coast of the United States, Alaska and the
Panama Canal Zone, not including the Aleutian Islands, and
(6) the Hawaiian Islands.

2. Hong Kong and the insular possessions which the British
Empire now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean,
east of the meridian of 110° east longitude, except (a) those
adjacent to the coast of Canada, (6) the Commonwealth of
Axistralia and its territories, and (c) New Zealand.

3. The following insular territories and possessions of Japan
in the Pacific Ocean, to wit : the Kurile Islands, the Benin
Islands, Amami-Oshima, the Loochoo Islands, Formosa and the
Pescadores, and any insular territories or possessions in the
Pacific Ocean which Japan may hereafter acquire.

The maintenance of the status quo under the foregoing provisions
implies that no new fortifications or naval bases shall be estab-
lished in the territories and possessions specified ; that no

250 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

measures shall be taken to increase the existing naval facilities
for the repair and maintenance of naval forces, and that no
increase shall be made in the coast defences of the territories
and possessions above specified. This restriction, however, does
not preclude such repair and replacement of worn-out weapons
and equipment as is customary in naval and military establish-
ments in time of peace.

ABTiciiE XX. — The rules for determining tonnage displacement
prescribed in Chapter II, Part 4, shall apply to the ships of each
of the Contracting Powers.

CHAPTER II.

RULES RELATING TO THE EXECUTION OF THE
TREATY— DEFINITION OF TERMS.

Part I. — Capital Ships which may be Retained by the
Contracting Powers.

In accordance with Article II ships may be retained by each
of the Contracting Powers as specified in this Part.

Ships which may he retained by the United States.
Name. Tonnage.

California

. 32,300

Tennessee

. 32,300

Idaho

. 32,000

New Mexico

. 32,000

Mississippi

. 32,000

Arizona . .

. 31,400

Pennsylvania .

. 31,400

Oklahoma

. 27,600

Nevada . .

. 27,500

New York

. 27,000

Texas . .

. 27,000

Arkansas

. 26,000

Wyoming

. 26,000

Florida . .

. 21,825

Utah

. 21,825

North Dakota .
Delaware

. 20,000
. 20,000

Total tonnage . . . . 500,650

On the completion of the two ships of the West Virginia class
and the scrapping of the North DaTcota and Delaware, as pro-
vided in Article II, the total tonnage to be retained by the United
States will be 625,850 tons.

LIMITATION TREATY (EXTRACTS) 251

Ships which may be retained
Name.
Royal Sovereign
Royal Oak
Revenge
Resolution
Ramillies
Malaya . .
Valiant . .
Barham

Queen Elizabeth
Warspite
Benbow

Emperor of India
Iron Duke
Marlborough
Hood
Renown
Repulse .™
Tiger
Thunderer
King George V

•Til 3i^ • • • •

Centurion

Total tonnage

bij the British Empire.
Tonnage.
25,750
25,750
25,750
25,750
25,750
27,500
27,500
27,500
27,500
27,500
25,000
25,000
25,000
25,000
41,200
26,500
26,500
28,500
22,500
23,000
23,000
23,000

580,450

On the completion of the two new ships to be constructed and
the scrapping of the Thunderer, King George V, Ajax, and
Centurioji, as pro\'ided in Article 11^ the total tonnage to be
retained by the British Empire will be 558,950 tons.

Ships which may be retained by France.

Name.
Bretagne
Lorraine
Provence
Paris

France . .
Jean Bart
Courbet . .
Condorcet
Diderot ...
Voltaire

Tonnage
{metric tons).
. 23,500
. 23,500
23,500
23,500
23,500
23,500
23,500
18,890
18,890
18,890

Total tonnage

221,170

252 THE PKOBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

France may lay down new tonnage in the years 1927, 1929,
and 1931, as provided in Part 3, Section II.

Ships which may be retained by Italy.

Tonnage
Name. (metric tons).

Andrea Doria . .

. 22,700

Caio Duilio

. 22,700

Conte Di Cavour

. 22,500

Giulio Cesare

. 22,500

Leonardo da Vinci

. 22,500

Dante Alighieri

. 19,500

Roma

. 12,600

Napoli . .

. 12,600

Vittorio Emanuele

. 12,600

Regina Elena ...

. 12,600

Total tonnage

.

. 182,800

Italy may lay down new tonnage in the years 1927, 1929 and
1931, as provided in Part 3, Section II.

Ships which may be retained by Japan.
Name. Tonnage.

Mutsu 33,800

Nagato . .
Hiuga
Ise

Yamashiro
Fu-So . .
Kirishima
Haruna . .
Hiyei
Kon-go . .

Total tonnage

33,800
31,260
31,260
30,600
30,600
27,500
27,500
27,500
27,500

301,320

Part 2. — Rules for Scrapping Vessels of War.
The following rules shall be observed for the scrapping of
vessels of war which are to be disposed of in accordance with
Articles II and III.

I. A vessel to be scrapped must be placed in such condition
that it cannot be put to combative use.

II. This result must be finally effected in any one of the
following ways :

(a) Permanent sinking of the vessel ;

(6) Breaking the vessel up. This shall always involve the
destruction or removal of all machinery, boilers and
armour, gmd all deck, side and bottom plating;

LIMITATION TREATY (EXTRACTS) 253

(c) Converting the vessel to target use exclusively. In such

case all the provisions of paragraph III of this Part,
except sub-paragraph (6), in so far as may be necessary
to enable the ship to be used as a mobile target, and
except sub-paragraph (7), must be previously complied
with. Not more than one capital ship may be retained for
this purpose at one time by any of the Contracting Powers.

(d) Of the capital ships which would otherwise be scrapped

under the present Treaty in or after the year 1931,
France and Italy may each retain two sea-going vessels
for training purposes exclusively, that is, as gunnery
or torpedo schools. The two vessels retained by France
shall be of the Jean Bart class, and of those retained by
Italy one shall be the Dante AUghieri, the other of the
Giidio Cesare class. On retaining these ships for the
purpose above stated, France and Italy respectively
undertake to remove and destroy their conning-towers
and not to use the said ships as vessels of war.

CHAPTER III.
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS.

Article XXL — If during the term of the present Treaty the
requirements of the national security of any Contracting Power
in respect of naval defence are, in the opinion of that Power,
materially affected by any change of circumstances, the Con-
tracting Powers will, at the request of such Power, meet in confer-
ence with a view to the reconsideration of the provisions of the
Treaty and its amendment by mutual agreement.

In view of possible technical and scientific developments, the
United States, after consultation with the other Contracting
Powers, shall arrange for a conference of all the Contracting
Powers which shall convene as soon as possible after the expira-
tion of eight years from the coming into force of the present
Treaty to consider what changes, if any, in the Treaty may be
necessary to meet such developments.

Article XXII. — Whenever any Contracting Power shall
become engaged in a war which in its opinion affects the naval
defence of its national sec\u"ity, such Power may after notice
to the other Contracting Powers suspend for the period of
hostilities its obligations under the present Treaty other than
those imder Articles XIII and XVII, provided that such Power
shall notify the other Contracting Powers that the emergency
is of such a character as to require such suspension.

The remaining Contracting Powers shall in such case consult
together with a view to agreement as to what temporary modifi-

254 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

cations, if any, shoiild be made in the Treaty as between them-
selves. Shoxild such consultation not produce agreement, duly
made in accordance with the constitutional methods of the
respective Powers, any one of the said Contracting Powers may,
by giving notice to the other Contracting Powers, suspend for
the period of hostilities its obligations under the present Treaty,
other than those under Articles XIII and XVII.

On the cessation of hostilities the Contracting Powers will
meet in conference to consider what modifications, if any, should
be made in the provisions of the present Treaty.

Article XXIII. — The present Treaty shall remain in force
until the 31st December, 1936, and in case none of the Contracting
Powers shall have given notice two years before that date of
its intention to terminate the Treaty, it shall continue in force
until the expiration of two years from the date on which notice
of termination shall be given by one of the Contracting Powers,
whereupon the Treaty shall terminate as regards all the Con-
tracting Powers. Such notice shall be commiinieated in writing
to the Government of the United States, which shall immediately
transmit a certified copy of the notification to the other Powers
and inform them of the date on which it was received. The
notice shall be deemed to have been given and shall take effect
on that date. In the event of notice of termination being
given by the Government of the United States, such notice shall
be given to the diplomatic representatives at Washington of the
other Contracting Powers, and the notice shall be deemed to
have been given and shall take effect on the date of the communi-
cation made to the said diplomatic representatives.

Within one year of the date on which a notice of termination
by any Power has taken effect, all the Contracting Powers shall
meet in conference.

Article XXIV. — The present Treaty shall be ratified by the
Contracting Powers in accordance with their respective constitu-
tional methods and shall take effect on the date of the deposit
of all the ratifications, which shall take place at Washington as
soon as possible. The Government of the United States will
transmit to the other Contracting Powers a certified copy of the
proces -verbal of the deposit of ratifications.

The present Treatj^, of which the English and French texts
are both authentic, shall remain deposited in the archives of
the Government of the United States, and duly certified copies
thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the other
Contracting Powers.

In faith whereof the above-named Plenipotentiaries have
signed the present Treaty.

Done at the City of Washington the day of 1922.

APPENDIX III
THE 21 DEMANDS

Group 1.— SHANTUNG.

I. — China to assent to any arrangement Japan may make
with Germany relating to the latter's rights and privileges in
Shantung.

II. — China not to cede to a third Power any territory in
Shantung or island on the coast.

III. — China to consent to Japan building a railway from
Chefoo or Lungkow to join the Tsingtau-Tsinanfu Railway.

IV. — China to open certain new treaty ports.

Group 2.— SOUTH MANCHURIA AND EASTERN

MONGOLIA.

V. — China to agree to extend the lease of Port Arthur and
Dalny and the lease of the South Manchiuria and Antung-Mukden
Railways to 99 years.

VI. — Japanese subjects to have the right to lease or own
land for building, trade, manufacture, or farming.

VII. — Japanese subjects to be free to reside and travel and to
engage in business or manufacture of any kind whatsoever.

VIII. — China to agree to grant Japanese subjects the right
of opening mines.

IX. — Japan's assent to be obtained before China

(1) Gives permission to subjects of a third Power to build

railways or make loans ;

(2) Or pledges local revenue for a loan from a third Power.
X. — If China employs political, financial, or military advisers

or instructors, Japan shall first be consulted.

XI. — Control of the Kirin-Changchun Railway to be ceded
to Japan for 99 years.

Group 3.— HANYEHPING COMPANY.

XII. — China to agree to make the Hanyehping Company a
joint Sino -Japanese concern, and China not to dispose of her
share without reference to Japan.

255

256 THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

XIII. — Mines in the neighbourhood of the Hanyehping Com-
pany's properties not to be worked by outside parties without
consent of the Company.

Group 4.

XIV. — China to engage not to cede or lease to a third Power
any harbour, bay, or island on the coast of China.

Group 5.— MISCELLANEOUS.

XV. — China to employ influential Japanese as political,
financial, and military advisers.

XVI. — Japanese hospitals, churches, and schools to be granted
the right to own land in the interior of China.

XVII. — Police in certain important places in China to be
jointly administered, or China to employ in such places numerous
Japanese to improve her organization.

XVIII. — Chma to purchase from Japan a fixed amount — say,
50 per cent. — of the munitions she requires, or to establish a
joint arsenal employing Japanese material and technical experts.

XIX. — China to agree to grant Japan the right to construct
railways connecting Wuchang with Kiukiang and Nanchang,
Nanchang and Hangchow, Nanchang and Chaochow.

XX. — If China needs foreign capital to work mines, build rail-
ways, or construct harbours or docks in Fukien, Japan to be
first consulted.

XXI. — Japanese subjects to have the right of missionary
propaganda in China.

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