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ill 


Ex  Libris 
C.  K.  OGDEN 


THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 
LOS  ANGELES 


A     rl     i     p- 


TANKS:   1914-1918 


TANKS 

1914-1918 

THE   LOG-BOOK    OF   A   PIONEER 


BY    LIEUTENANT-COLONEL 

SIR   ALBERT    G.    STERN 

K.B.E.,  C.M.G. 


ILLUSTRATED 


HODDER    AND    STOUGHTON 

LONDON        NEW    YORK       TORONTO 
MCMXIX 


Printed    in     Great     Britain     by 

Richard   Clay   &   Sons,    Limited, 

brunswick  st.,  stamford  st.,  9  e.  1 , 

and  bungay    suffolk 


I) 


TO 
MY   STAFF 


. 


CONTENTS 


OH  A  P. 

I.  THE    IDEA 

II.  EXPERIMENTS 

III.  TRIALS — AND   TRIALS 

IV.  FIRST   ORDERS 
V.  TANKS    IN    ACTION     . 

VI.       PRODUCTION    ON    A    LARGE    SCALE 
VII.       FIGHTING   THE   WAR    OFFICE 
VIII.      THE   WAR   OFFICE   GETS    ITS   WAY 
IX.      THE   ANGLO-AMERICAN   TREATY 
X.      THE   TANKS    GET   THEIR    WAY 
XI.       IN   CONCLUSION 
APPENDIX    I      . 

II  . 

III  . 

IV  . 

v     • 

VI  . 

VII  . 


PA  OF. 

1 

15 
35 

01 
91 
109 
141 
173 
183 
203 
243 
253 
255 
275 
276 
277 
291 
294 


vn 


LIST   OF    ILLUSTRATIONS 


Lieut. -Colonel  Sir  Albert  G.  Stern,  K.B.E.,  C.M.G. 


Rolls-Royce  Armoured  Car       .... 

Armoured  Lorry  with  3-pounder  gun 

Sir  Eustace  Tennyson  d'Eyncourt,  K.C.B. 

One-ton  Pedrail  Machine  as  shown  to  Mr.  Churchill  in  1915 

Big  Wheeler  (Mock  up) 

Greenhithe  Machine 

55  55 

Killen-Strait  Machine 

55  55 

Pedrail  Hand  Machine,  fitted  with  Infantry  Shield 

55  55  55  55  55  55 

Major  W.  G.  Wilson,  C.M.G 

Creeping  Grip  Machines  coupled  together 

,,  „    Machine  .... 

Killen-Strait  Machine  with  wire-cutting  apparatus 

„  „       first  fitted  with  wire-cutting  apparatus 

Mr.  Lloyd  George  and  Mr.  Winston  Churchill 

Pedrail  Machine  built  at  Bath 
Sir  William  Tritton 
Bullock  Track  Machine    . 

5,  55  55  •  • 

Tritton's  Trench-crossing  Machine 

55  55  55  55 

105  H.P.  Tractor 

Major-General  E.  D.  Swinton,  D.S.O 

"  Little  Willie  "  Machine 

"  Mother,"  the  Original  Tank  . 

ix 


Frontispiece 
To  fare  page 


8 
8 
9 
16 
17 
32 
32 
33 
33 
40 
40 
41 
48 
48 
49 

49 
64 
65 
72 
72 
73 
73 
80 
81 
96 
97 


LIST   OF   ILLUSTRATIONS 


Tank  mounting  railway  truck  under  own  power 

Tanks  Attack  in  Thiepval,  1916 

The  kind  of  ground  our  Tanks  had  to  work  on, 
shell -pocked,  1916     . 

Tanks  in  Action       ..... 

T.  E.  Estienne 

The  "  Schneider  "  French  Tank 

The  "  Saint  diamond  "  French  Tank 

Renault  Tanks        ..... 


Brigadier-General   H.   J.   Elles,   C.B.,   D.S.O., 
Information      ..... 


To  fact  page 

104 
105 


everywhere 


Ministry   of 


H.  Ricardo,  Esq.     ..... 

Tank  present  by  Mr.  Eu-Tong-Sen    . 

Mark  IV.  Machine  ..... 

Mark  V.  Machine    ..... 

Scene  on  the  Flanders  Battlefield 

The  state  of  the  ground  is  shown  here,  owing  to  the  heav 
rains.     A  is  seen  half  under  water     . 

Gun-carrying  Tank  .... 

Some  of  the  many  stables  where  our  Tanks  are  housed 

Central  Workshops,  Tanks  Corps.     Tanks  ready  for  use 

Supply  Tank  ..... 

Offensive  on  the  Cambrai  Front.     A  Landship  bringing 
its  prize,  a  5-9  German  naval  gun 

Tanks  out  of  Action         .... 

Lieut. -Colonel  J.  A.  Drain,  U.S.R.  . 
Lieut. -Colonel  J.  C.  F.  Fuller,  D.S.O. 
Tank  Factory,  Neuvy  Pailloux,  France 

Liberty  Tank.     Hull  made  in  England,  shipped  to  America 
and  fitted  with  Liberty  Engine 

A  Tank  going  into  Action  through  our  troops 

Whippet  Tank 

The  Canal  du  Nord.     Tanks  and  wounded  going  through 

Tank    and    prisoners    with    wounded    going    through  the 
cutting  in  the  Canal  du  Nonl     . 


105 
105 
112 
113 
113 
128 

129 
136 
137 
144 
144 
145 

145 
160 
160 
161 
161 
168 

169 
176 
176 
177 
192 
193 
193 

200 
201 
208 
209 

209 


LIST   OF   ILLUSTRATIONS 

Smoke  Bomb  experiments         .... 

>>  5»  »»••••■ 

Tanks  going  forward  to  cross  the  Hindenburg  Line 

J>  >>  >>  J>  >»  >» 

German  Anti-Tank  Rifle.  .... 

A  German  Anti-Tank  Rifle  compared  with  a  British 
German  Tank  ...... 

Ernest  Squires,  Esq.         .... 


XI 

'In  met  page. 

224 
224 
225 
225 
232 
232 
233 
248 


CHAPTER   I 

THE  IDEA 


CHAPTER  I 

THE   IDEA 

August  1914  to  February  1915 

My  experiences  in  the  great  war  may  be  of 
interest  to  a  peaceful  world  in  years  to  come. 

In  July  1914  rumours  of  war  brought  up 
threatening  clouds  in  a  sky  already  darkened 
by  strikes  and  revolutionary  unrest  among  the 
industrial  workers. 

Banking  circles  in  London  were  already  more 
than  cautious,  and  when  the  crash  came  we  had 
anxious  moments.  I  remember  well  attending 
a  meeting  of  bankers  at  the  Bank  of  England, 
under  the  chairmanship  of  Lord  Cunliffe.  Sir 
Edward  Holden  was  the  commanding  figure.  "  I 
must  pay  my  wages  on  Friday,"  he  said,  "  and 
we  must  have  Bank  Holidays  until  enough 
currency  has  been  printed  to  be  able  to  do  so." 
His  advice  was  followed  and  all  the  impending 
disasters  were  averted. 

Here,  I  first  saw  (in  the  war)  the  advantage  of 
a  definite  cure  administered  by  a  strong  man. 

At  this  time,  also,  I  saw  Mr.  Lloyd  George  at 
work.  It  was  on  a  question  of  Bills  of  Exchange. 
We  had  meetings  of  a  committee  under  the  chair- 

3 


4  TANKS 

manship  of  Mr.  Huth  Jackson.  Mr.  Lloyd  George, 
as  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer,  had  issued  a 
proclamation  which  would  not  meet  the  case.  It 
was  a  matter  of  life  and  death  to  a  great  many 
in  the  City.  Mr.  Jackson  had  an  interview  with 
Mr.  Lloyd  George  one  evening.  Before  he  could 
report  to  our  committee  the  next  day,  a  new 
proclamation  had  been  published  making  the 
necessary  alterations. 

Here,  again,  I  learnt  the  advantage  of  a  strong 
man  ready  to  act  and  take  responsibility  in  the 
sudden-changing  conditions  of  war. 

My  two  brothers  were  both  in  the  Yeomanry, 
one  a  Major  in  the  South  Irish  Horse,  the  other 
a  Lieutenant  in  the  Westminster  Dragoons.  I 
had  a  broken  ankle  which  had  always  given  me 
much  trouble  and  prevented  me  from  volunteering 
in  the  ordinary  way.  I  meant,  however,  to  offer 
my  services  to  the  State  in  some  fighting  capacity 
so  soon  as  we  had  tackled  the  many  difficult 
problems  which  arose  in  the  City. 

In  November  I  wrote  to  Mr.  Churchill,  First 
Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  offering  to  provide  and 
equip  an  armoured  car,  with  crew  complete,  to  be 
attached  to  Lieut.  Spencer  Grey's  bombing 
squadron  in  Flanders,  and  received  the  following 
reply  :— 

"  Admiralty, 
"  Whitehall, 

"  December  Mh,  1914. 
"Dear  Sir, 

"  Mr.  Churchill  asks  me  to  say  that  he  has  read 
your  letter  telling  him  that  you  have  offered  to  equip 


THE   IDEA  5 

and  command,  at  your  own  expense,  an  armoured  Car  for 
Squadron-Commander  Spencer  Grey's  aeroplane  unit. 

"  In  reply  the  First  Lord  wishes  me  to  say  that  in 
his  opinion  an  Armoured  Car  would  be  of  little  use  to 
this  unit,  and  that  it  would  be  much  better  if  you  were 
to  arrange  an  interview  with  Captain  Sueter,  the  Director 
of  the  Air  Department  at  the  Admiralty,  and  offer  the 
services  of  the  Car  and  of  yourself  to  the  regular  Armoured 
Car  section  which  is  being  built  up  and  organised  under 
Commander  Boothby  at  Wormwood  Scrubbs. 

"  The  First  Lord  much  appreciates  your  generosity 
in  making  the  offer,  and  feels  sure  that  in  doing  as  he 
suggests  you  would  be  putting  it  to  the  most  effective 
use. 

"  Yours  faithfully, 

"  J.  Masterton  Smith." 

I  saw  Captain  Sueter,  who  was  in  charge  of  the 
Armoured  Car  Division  of  the  R.N.A.S.,  at  the 
Admiralty,  and  was  given  a  commission  as 
Lieutenant,  R.N.V.R.  Commander  Boothby  was 
our  CO.,  and  Major  Hetherington  Transport 
Officer  to  the  Division. 

Major  Hetherington  asked  me  to  join  his  staff 
and  to  work  under  his  Chief  Assistant,  Lieut. 
Fairer-Smith.     I  agreed  to  do  so. 

We  were  stationed  at  Wormwood  Scrubbs,  in 
the  Daily  Mail  Airship  Shed,  and  were  in  process 
of  forming  Armoured-car  Squadrons  and  Motor- 
cycle Machine-gun  Squadrons ;  there  was  no 
accommodation  in  our  camp  and  no  roads,  but 
plenty  of  mud.  The  Airship  Shed  was  our  only 
building . 

Enthusiasm  was  great;  the  personnel  was  full 


6  TANKS 

of  rare  talent,  engineering  and  otherwise,  and 
there  was  nothing  that  wanted  doing  but  we 
could  find  an  expert  among  us  to  do  it.  Dis- 
cipline was  rather  conspicuous  by  its  absence. 
Squadrons  grew  at  a  great  rate,  fully  equipped, 
and,  as  an  American  actor  used  to  sing,  they 
were  "  all  dressed  up  and  no  place  to  go." 

Mr.  Churchill  had  hoped,  as  at  Antwerp,  to 
be  able  to  play  an  important  role  on  the  Belgian 
coast,  co-operating  his  own  land  forces  with  the 
Fleet;  but  the  Army  did  not  appreciate  Mr. 
Churchill's  naval  land  forces,  and  although  he 
had  a  perfect  right  to  send  them  to  Dunkirk, 
which  was  under  the  direction  of  the  Admiralty, 
they  were  never  very  welcome  in  the  zone  of 
the  armies. 

The  Duke  of  Westminster  took  the  first  of 
these  squadrons  to  Flanders,  and  other  squadrons 
quickly  followed,  but  even  the  Duke's  tact  and 
position  and  the  excellent  quality  of  the  squadron 
under  him  could  not  overcome  the  difficulty  of 
being  under  the  Admiralty  while  serving  with  the 
Army.  Still  earlier  than  this,  Armoured  Cars, 
under  Commander  Samson,  had  operated  during 
and  after  the  evacuation  of  Antwerp  from  the 
racecourse  at  Ostcnd. 

Our  fine  naval  land  force  was  well  equipped, 
well  armed,  and  had  a  splendid  personnel,  but 
with  all  the  fighting  on  land  at  the  disposal  of  the 
War  Office  and  not  of  the  Admiralty,  its  officers 
found  that  they  could  only  get  scope  for  it  by 
their  own  personal  efforts,  by  using  their  imagina- 


THE   IDEA  7 

tions  and  the  influence  of  their  friends.  Licut.- 
CommanderBoothbygot  his  squadron  and  Lieut. - 
Commander  Josiah  Wedgwood's  squadron  to  the 
Dardanelles.  Boothby,  Commander  of  Squadron 
1,  one  of  our  best  officers,  and  certainly  one  of  the 
most  delightful,  capable  and  unassuming  of  men, 
was  killed  on  landing.  Josiah  Wedgwood,  the 
most  fearless  of  men  and  a  great  leader,  was  very 
severely  wounded  on  landing. 

Lieut.-Commander  Whittall  took  a  squadron 
to  German  West  Africa,  where  they  were  very 
much  handicapped  by  the  terrain,  but  they  helped 
to  win  a  battle  and  were  thanked  by  both  Houses 
of  Parliament  of  the  Union.  This  squadron 
returned  and,  I  believe,  went  later  to  British  East 
Africa.  Ford  Cars,  on  account  of  their  lightness 
and  high  clearance,  were  most  useful  in  this 
campaign. 

The  Duke  of  Westminster  later  took  a  squadron 
to  Western  Egypt,  with  great  success  against  the 
Senussi.  Commander  Locker  Lampson  got  a 
squadron  to  Russia,  and  all  the  world  has  heard 
of  its  exploits,  operating  from  the  frozen  seas,  in 
Russia,  in  Poland,  and  as  far  south  as  the 
Caucasus. 

The  enthusiasm  of  both  officers  and  men  of  the 
Armoured  Car  Division  was  unbounded.  They 
searched  the  whole  world  for  war.  But  war  in 
France  had  already  settled  down  to  trench 
fighting.  In  France,  Armoured  Cars,  always  an 
opportunist  force,  found  all  opportunities  gone. 

Major    Hetherington,    our    Transport    Officer, 


8  TANKS 

had  distinguished  himself  in  the  early  days  of 
Airships.  He  was  young  and  always  full  of  new 
ideas.  He  had  a  great  knowledge  of  motor- 
cars, although  not  an  engineer,  and  there  was  no 
new  invention  which  he  would  not  eagerly  take 
up  and  push  forward. 

After  discussion  among  certain  officers  and 
civilians  about  the  uselessness  of  Armoured  Cars, 
except  on  roads,  and  the  great  strides  that  had 
been  made  in  light  armour  plate  as  protection 
against  the  German  "  S  "  bullet,  Major  Hethering- 
ton  got  the  Duke  of  Westminster  sufficiently 
interested  in  the  idea  of  a  landship  to  invite  Mr. 
Winston  Churchill  to  dinner. 

Already,  before  this,  at  a  supper  of  three  at 
Murray's  Club,  Hetherington,  James  Radley  and 
myself,  a  proposal  had  been  put  forward  to  build 
a  landship  with  three  wheels,  each  as  big  as  the 
Great  Wheel  at  Earl's  Court.  In  those  days 
we  thought  only  of  crossing  the  Rhine,  and  this 
seemed  a  solution. 

I  also  remember  Hetherington  proposing  to 
fire  shells  at  Cologne  by  having  a  shell  which, 
when  it  reached  the  top  of  its  trajectory,  would 
release  a  second  shell  inside  it,  with  planes 
attached,  and  this  second  shell  would  plane  down, 
making  100  miles  in  all.  It  is  strange  that  the 
Germans  later  tried  and  succeeded  in  firing  about 
eighty  miles,  but  not  in  this  way. 

Mr.  Churchill  came  to  the  dinner  and  was 
delighted  with  the  idea  of  a  cross-country  car. 
Commodore    Sueter,    Lieut. -Commander    Briggs 


ROLLS-ROYCE  ARMOURED    CAR.  (p.  6) 


***m 


ARMOURED    LORRY   WITH    3-POUNDER   GUN.   (p.  6) 

Photos  :    Capt.  S.  Walter. 


SIR  EUSTACE    I  l.NNN  son  D'EYNCOURT,  K  C.B    i/\   11) 


Photo     I .  Ki  sssi  i  &  Son. 


THE   IDEA  9 

and    Major    Hetherington    made    the    following 
suggestion  : — 

"  It  may  be  briefly  described  as  a  cross-country 
Armoured  Car  of  high  offensive  power. 

"  It  consists  essentially  of  a  platform  mounted  on 
three  wheels,  of  which  the  front  two  are  drivers  and 
the  stern  wheel  for  steering,  armed  with  three  turrets, 
each  containing  two  4-inch  guns,  propelled  by  an  800  H.P. 
Sunbeam  Diesel  Set,  electric  drive  to  the  wheels  being 
employed.  The  engines,  as  well  as  the  guns  and  maga- 
zines, would  be  armoured,  but  not  the  purely  structural 
part,  which  would  be  fairly  proof  against  damage  by 
shell  fire  if  a  good  factor  of  safety  were  used  and  super- 
fluity of  parts  provided  in  the  structure. 

"  The  problem  of  design  has  been  cursorily  examined 
by  Air  Department  officers,  and  the  following  rough  data 
obtained  : — 

Armament 3  twin  4-inch  turrets 

with  300  rounds 
per  gun. 

Horse  Power 800,  with  24  hours' 

fuel,  or  more  if 
desired. 

Total  weight 300  tons. 

Armour 3-inch. 

Diameter  of  wheels 40  feet. 

Tread  of  main  wheels   ....     13  feet  4  inches. 

Tread  of  stcering-ivheel       ...     5  feet. 

Over-all  length 100  feet. 

Over-all  width 80  feet. 

Over-all  height 46  feet. 

Clear  height  under  body      .      .      .17  feet. 

Top  speed  on  good  country  road    .     8  miles  per  hour. 

Top  speed  on  bad  country  road     .     4  miles  per  hour. 


10  TANKS 

"  The  above  particulars  must  be  regarded  as  approxi- 
mate and  cannot  be  guaranteed,  owing  to  the  absence, 
in  the  department,  of  technical  knowledge  properly 
applicable  to  this  problem.  These  particulars  are, 
however,  quoted  in  the  belief  that  they  can  be  readily 
worked  to. 

"  The  cross-country  qualities  of  the  machine  would 
appear  to  be  good.  It  would  not  be  bogged  on  any 
ground  passable  by  cavalry.  It  could  pass  over  deep 
water  obstacles  having  good  banks  up  to  20  feet  or  30 
feet  width  of  waterway.  It  could  ford  waterways  with 
good  bottom  if  the  water  is  not  more  than  15  feet  deep. 
It  could  negotiate  isolated  obstacles  up  to  20  feet  high. 
Small  obstacles  such  as  banks,  ditches,  bridges,  trenches, 
wire-entanglements  (electrified  or  not)  it  would  roll  over 
easily.  It  could  progress  on  bottom  gear  through 
woodland  of  ordinary  calibre. 

"  The  greatest  disabilities  of  the  machine  appear  to 
be  as  follows : — It  cannot  cross  considerable  rivers 
except  at  practicable  fords,  which  practically  means 
that  it  cannot  operate  as  a  detached  unit  in  country 
held  by  the  enemy,  where  this  involves  the  systemati- 
cally opposed  crossing  of  big  rivers.  It  can  be  destroyed 
by  sufficiently  powerful  artillery.  It  can  be  destroyed 
by  land  mines. 

"  The  machines  might  on  occasion  do  good  service 
by  destroying  railway  lines  in  the  enemy's  rear,  but  its 
most  important  function  would  appeal  to  be  in  destroy- 
ing the  enemy's  resistance  over  any  region  where  he 
does  not  possess  other  guns  than  field  guns  or  howitzers. 

"  It  would  appear  at  first  sight  that  the  machine 
ought  to  be  more  heavily  armed  and  gunned,  but  con- 
siderations of  the  disproportionate  weight  of  the  guns 
and  of  the  time  of  building  have  resulted  in  the  proposal 
being  reduced  to  the  comparatively  moderate  one 
described  above." 


THE   IDEA  11 

This  was  much  the  same  fantastic  idea  that 
Mr.  H.  G.  Wells  had  developed  in  one  of  his  stories 
years  before. 

Mr.  Churchill  then  set  up  a  Committee  to  study 
the  question,  and  Mr.  Eustace  Tennyson  d'Eyn- 
court,  C.B.,  the  Director  of  Naval  Construction, 
was  appointed  Chairman  on  the  24th  of  February, 
1915.  It  was  to  be  known  as  the  Landship 
Committee. 

Before  this  date  Mr.  Churchill  had  already 
written  his  now  historic  letter  to  Mr.  Asquith  : — 

"  My  dear  Prime  Minister, 

"  I  entirely  agree  with  Colonel  Hankey's 
remarks  on  the  subject  of  special  mechanical  devices  for 
taking  trenches.  It  is  extraordinary  that  the  Army  in 
the  field  and  the  War  Office  should  have  allowed  nearly 
three  months  of  warfare  to  progress  without  addressing 
their  minds  to  its  special  problems. 

"  The  present  war  has  revolutionised  all  military 
theories  about  the  field  of  fire.  The  power  of  the  rifle 
is  so  great  that  100  yards  is  held  sufficient  to  stop  any 
rush,  and  in  order  to  avoid  the  severity  of  the  artillery 
fire,  trenches  are  often  dug  on  the  reverse  slope  of 
positions,  or  a  short  distance  in  the.rear  of  villages,  woods, 
or  other  obstacles.  The  consequence  is  that  war  has 
become  a  short-range  instead  of  a  long-range  war  as  was 
expected,  and  opposing  trenches  get  ever  closer  together, 
for  mutual  safety  from  each  other's  artillery  fire. 

"  The  question  to  be  solved  is  not,  therefore,  the  long 
attack  over  a  carefully  prepared  glacis  of  former  times, 
but  the  actual  getting  across  100  or  200  yards  of  open 
space  and  wire  entanglements.  All  this  was  apparent 
more  than  two  months  ago,  but  no  steps  have  been 
taken  and  no  preparations  made. 


12  TANKS 

"  It  would  be  quite  easy  in  a  short  time  to  fit  up  a 
number  of  steam  tractors  with  small  armoured  shelters, 
in  which  men  and  machine  guns  could  be  placed,  which 
would  be  bullet-proof.  Used  at  night,  they  would  not 
be  affected  by  artillery  fire  to  any  extent.  The  cater- 
pillar system  would  enable  trenches  to  be  crossed  quite 
easily,  and  the  weight  of  the  machine  would  destroy  all 
wire  entanglements. 

"  Forty  or  fifty  of  these  engines,  prepared  secretly  and 
brought  into  positions  at  nightfall,  could  advance  quite 
certainly  into  the  enemy's  trenches,  smashing  away  all 
the  obstructions,  and  sweeping  the  trenches  with  their 
machine-gun  fire,  and  with  grenades  thrown  out  of  the 
top.  They  would  then  make  so  many  points  oVappuis 
for  the  British  supporting  infantry  to  rush  forward  and 
rally  on  them.  They  can  then  move  forward  to  attack 
the  second  line  of  trenches. 

"  The  cost  would  be  small.  If  the  experiment  did  not 
answer,  what  harm  would  be  done  ?  An  obvious 
measure  of  prudence  would  have  been  to  have  started 
something  like  this  two  months  ago.  It  should  certainly 
be  done  now. 

"  The  shield  is  another  obvious  experiment  which 
should  have  been  made  on  a  considerable  scale.  What 
does  it  matter  which  is  the  best  pattern  ?  A  large 
number  should  have  been  made  of  various  patterns; 
some  to  carry,  some  to  wear,  some  to  wheel.  If  the  mud 
now  prevents  the  working  of  shields  or  traction  engines, 
the  first  frost  would  render  them  fully  effective.  With 
a  view  to  this  I  ordered  a  month  ago  twenty  shields  on 
wheels,  to  be  made  on  the  best  design  the  Naval  Air 
Service  could  devise.  These  will  be  ready  shortly,  and 
can,  if  need  be,  be  used  for  experimental  purposes. 

"  A  third  device,  which  should  be  used  systematically 
and  on  a  large  scale,  is  smoke  artificially  produced.  It 
is  possible  to  make  small  smoke  barrels  which,  on  being 


THE   IDEA  13 

lighted,  generate  a  great  volume  of  dense  black  smoke, 
which  could  be  turned  off  or  on  at  will.  There  are  other 
matters  closely  connected  with  this  to  which  I  have 
already  drawn  your  attention,  but  which  are  of  so  secret 
a  character  that  I  do  not  put  them  down  on  paper. 

"  One  of  the  most  serious  dangers  that  we  are  exposed 
to  is  the  possibility  that  the  Germans  are  acting  and 
preparing  all  these  surprises,  and  that  we  may  at  any 
time  find  ourselves  exposed  to  some  entirely  new  form  of 
attack.  A  committee  of  engineering  officers  and  other 
experts  ought  to  be  sitting  continually  at  the  War  Office 
to  formulate  schemes  and  examine  suggestions,  and  I 
would  repeat  that  it  is  not  possible  in  most  cases  to  have 
lengthy  experiments  beforehand. 

"  If  the  devices  are  to  be  ready  by  the  time  they  are 
required,  it  is  indispensable  that  manufacture  should 
proceed  simultaneously  with  experiments.  The  worst 
that  can  happen  is  tha't  a  comparatively  small  sum  of 
money  is  wasted. 

"  Yours  etc., 

"Winston  S.  Churchill." 


CHAPTER   II 
EXPERIMENTS 


S<-> 

on 


BIG    U  IIEELKK    iM      I    I    p      i/..    IS, 


CHAPTER   II 

EXPERIMENTS 

March  1915  to  September  1915 

The  first  proposals  put  before  the  Committee 
came  from  the  Pedrail  Transport  Company  of 
Fulham.  In  December  1914  this  Company  had 
written  to  Mr.  Churchill  drawing  his  attention 
to  a  one-ton  Pedrail  machine  which  it  had  already 
constructed.  This  machine  Mr.  Churchill  in- 
spected on  the  Horse  Guards  Parade  on  February 
16th,  1915. 

On  March  28th  he  confirmed  his  instructions 
to  construct  twelve  Pedrails  and  six  16-foot 
Bigwheel  Landships.  The  Pedrails  were  to  be 
designed  by  Colonel  R.  E.  Crompton  and  his 
assistant  Mr.  Legros,  working  from  the  design 
of  the  Fulham  Company's  machine.  The  con- 
structional work  was  placed  in  the  hands  of  the 
Metropolitan  Carriage  Wagon  and  Finance  Com- 
pany, Ltd. 

Colonel   Crompton   was   the   well-known   civil 

and  mechanical  engineer.     He  had  seen  service 

in   the    Crimean    War,    and    during    the    South 

African  War  was  engaged  on  mechanical  traction 

problems. 

c  17 


18  TANKS 

At  the  time  of  the  formation  of  the  Committee 
he  was  acting  as  Consulting  Engineer  to  the 
Road  Board,  which,  at  the  request  of  the  Ad- 
miralty, very  kindly  released  him  in  order  that 
he  might  devote  his  attention  to  the  Landship 
problem.1 

The  Bigwheel  Landships  were  to  be  designed 
by  Mr.  William  Tritton  of  Messrs.  Foster  &  Com- 
pany of  Lincoln,  to  whom  the  order  was  given 
on  March  15th. 

At  this  period  I  was  acting  as  a  Second  Assist- 
ant to  Major  Hetherington.  He  asked  me  to 
come  to  the  Admiralty  to  see  Mr.  d'Eyncourt, 
who  wanted  some  one  to  drive  the  business  for- 
ward as  Secretary.  Mr.  d'Eyncourt  said  he 
would  be  pleased  with  the  arrangement.  Hitherto, 
Mr.  P.  Dale  Busscll,  of  the  Admiralty  Contract 
Department,  had  been  acting  as  Secretary  and 
had  been  responsible  for  orders  and  accounts. 
He  now  became  a  member  of  the  Committee, 
and  later  joined  me  at  the  Ministry  of  Munitions 
as  my  deputy.  He  rendered  invaluable  service 
from  the  start,  until  he  was  called  to  the  Air 
Board,  by  very  special  request  of  the  Minister, 
to  run  their  contracts  in  February  1917. 

When  I  took  over  the  duties  of  Secretary  of 
the  Landship  Committee  in  April  1015,  Mr. 
d'Eyncourt  was  directing  the  affairs,  assisted  by 
Major  Hetherington,  who  carried  out  his  instruc- 
tions, with  Colonel  Crompton  as  engineer. 

On    March    20th    Colonel    Crompton,    Major 

1    His  appointment  terminated  on  August  31st,  1915. 


EXPERIMENTS  19 

Hcthcrington  and  I  started  for  Neuve  Chapellc 
to  study  and  measure  the  captured  German 
trenches.  On  arrival  we  discovered  that  Neuve 
Chapelle  had  been  lost,  and  we  had  to  return  to 
England. 

The  question  of  armour  was  of  great  importance. 
Lieut.  Kenneth  Symcs,  who  had  been  in  charge 
of  the  building  of  the  bodies  for  the  Armoured 
Cars,  was  in  charge,  and  remained  responsible  for 
all  armour-plate  until  October  1917. 

The  original  protection  used  by  the  Armoured 
Cars  under  Lieut. -Commander  Samson  consisted 
of  two  quarter-inch  steel  plates  with  an  inch 
board  between  them.  Even  the  German  "  S  " 
bullet  penetrated  this  as  if  it  were  butter. 

Under  the  care  of  Lieut.  Symes,  assisted  later 
by  Lieut.  W.  E.  Rendle,  the  light  armour-plate 
made  great  strides,  with  the  result  that,  in  the 
end,  the  Tanks  hardly  worried  even  about  the 
German  Armour  Piercing  Bullet. 

We  tested  a  large  number  of  patent  materials. 
We  never  argued.  Lieut.  Symes's  test  was 
always  sufficient — "  just  round  the  corner  with 
a  German  rifle  !  " 

Messrs.  Beardmore  gave  most  valuable  help, 
making  numerous  test  plates  and  experiments 
under  the  Manager  of  their  Armour-plate  Depart- 
ment, Mr.  T.  M.  Service.  It  is  impossible  to 
speak  too  highly  of  their  help. 

In  June  Mr.  Churchill  was  leaving  the  Admir- 
alty. Progress  up  till  then  had  not  been  suf- 
ficiently   marked.     What    had    been    done    was 


20  TANKS 

explained  in  a  report  which  we  were  then  asked 
to  make. 

Admiralty  Land  ships 

These  Landships  were  at  first  designed  to  transport  a 
trench-taking  storming  party  of  fifty  men  with  machine- 
guns  and  ammunition ;  the  men  standing  in  two  ranks 
at  each  side,  and  protected  by  side  armour  of  8  mm. 
thickness  and  roof  armour  of  6  mm.  These  vehicles 
were  40  feet  long  by  13  feet  wide.  The  whole  of  the 
gear,  engine  and  caterpillar  supports  were  in  the  centre, 
allowing  the  side  platforms  on  which  the  men  stand  to 
be  only  18  inches  above  the  ground  level. 

After  a  visit  to  France  it  was  found  that  these  long 
ships  could  not  be  easily  steered  round  the  narrow 
points  and  sharp  road  bends  found  in  the  villages  close 
behind  the  firing  line.  The  design  was  altered  as 
follows  : — 

The  vehicle  was  cut  into  two  halves  at  mid  length 
and  articulated  together  by  a  special  form  of  joint ; 
on  account  of  the  increase  of  thickness  of  armour,  found 
necessary  by  the  increased  penetrating  power  of  the 
German  bullet,  from  8  mm.  to  12  mm.,  the  height  of 
the  side  armour  was  reduced  to  4  feet  6  inches.  This 
compelled  that  the  troops  carried  should  be  seated.  The 
improved  arrangement  reduces  the  target  presented  to 
the  artillery  fire  and  has  some  other  advantages. 

In  the  new  design  the  side  armour  is  hinged  at  the 
top  and  is  arranged  so  that  it  can  be  swung  outwards 
in  separate  panels  or  as  a  whole ;  when  in  this  position 
an  armoured  skirt  falls  down  to  a  low  level  to  give 
protection  to  the  man  working  at  the  removal  of  wire 
entanglements.  Both  the  side  and  the  front  armour 
is  loopholcd  for  rifle  and  machine-gun  fire. 

At  first  it  was  intended  to  adopt  the  only  available 
English  form  of  caterpillar  called  the  "  Pedrail,"  but 


EXPERIMENTS  21 

on  subsequent  examination  it  was  found  that  this 
system  had  not  been  well  developed  for  the  larger  size 
demanded  for  these  Landships,  and  a  well-known  and 
tried  form  of  caterpillar,  called  the  "  Creeping  Grip  " 
system,  has  been  ordered  from  America,  and  the  first  of 
these  are  expected  to  arrive  shortly. 

Preliminary  experiments  made  on  the  marshes  near 
Greenhithe  have  shown  that  the  "  Creeping  Grip " 
type  of  caterpillar  is  well  suited  for  this  work,  and 
sufficiently  substantial  in  construction  to  stand  all  the 
hard  usage  it  is  likely  to  receive  other  than  absolute 
destruction  by  shell  fire. 

The  driving  power  for  twelve  of  the  Landships  is  well 
in  hand.  In  each  case  it  consists  of  a  pair  of  Rolls 
Royce  engines,  which  for  their  reliability  and  silence 
in  working  appear  to  be  without  doubt  the  best  existing 
type  of  engine,  and  it  would  have  been  impossible  to 
develop  any  new  type  of  engine  of  equal  merit  within 
a  reasonable  time. 

As  it  appeared  very  important  that  the  Landships 
should  be  double-enders,  that  is  to  say,  capable  of 
working  with  equal  facility  in  both  directions,  the 
whole  are  fitted  with  special  type  of  reversing  gear. 

The  engines  are  well  in  hand,  and  a  supply  for  four 
ships  have  been  inspected  and  are  already  on  point  of 
delivery  to  the  Metropolitan  Carriage  Wagon  and 
Finance  Company,  Ltd.,  who  are  carrying  out  the 
contract  for  the  constructional  work. 

The  work  of  the  design  and  the  preparation  of  the 
working  drawings  is  now  practically  complete,  with 
the  exception  of  a  few  details  connected  with  steering. 
The  design  of  details  relating  to  the  armament,  and  to 
certain  adjuncts,  those  which  it  is  believed  must  be 
attached  to  the  Landships  to  render  them  efficient  in 
every  way,  are  yet  under  consideration.  Among  them 
are  the  following  : — 


22  TANKS 

1.  The  best  appliances  to  adopt  for  the  removal  of 
such  obstructions  as  wire-entanglements. 

2.  The  form  of  mechanically  worked  trench -cutting 
device  to  be  attached  to  the  front  of  the  Landships  to 
enable  them  to  dig  themselves  in  as  rapidly  and  as 
silently  as  possible;   and 

3.  The  class  of  armament  required  for  grenade  throw- 
ing or  for  projecting  high  explosives  from  points  near 
the  enemy's  trenches,  or  the  class  of  gun  or  howitzers, 
to  be  mounted  on  them  in  case  they  are  required  to 
carry  armament  fitted  for  more  distant  bombardment. 

At  a  meeting  under  the  presidency  of  Mr. 
Churchill  on  June  8th  we  explained  that  the 
"  Creeping  Grip "  tractors  mentioned  in  the 
report  had  been  ordered  from  Chicago  and  in- 
spected by  our  engineer  out  there,  Lieut.  Field, 
in  order  that  we  might  carry  out  necessary 
experiments  with  a  lighter  track  than  the 
Pedrail. 

The  necessity  of  obtaining  information  from 
G.H.Q.  about  probable  field  obstructions  and 
the  difficulties  to  be  overcome  by  Landships  was 
again  discussed,  and  wc  agreed  to  approach, 
first,  the  Director  of  Fortifications  and  Works 
at  the  War  Office,  General  Scott  Moncrieff.  At 
this  meeting,  also,  we  decided  to  cancel  Mr. 
Tritton's  16-feet  wheel  Landship,  for  military 
reasons.  It  would  have  offered  too  large  a 
target  to  the  enemy. 

On  June  16th  Mr.  d'Eyncourt  asked  mc  to 
reorganise  the  Committee  on  business  Lines.  This 
was  done  and  approved  by  Mr.  d'Eyncourt, 


EXPERIMENTS  23 

Mr.  A.  J.  Balfour  now  became  First  Lord  of 
the  Admiralty,  and  there  was  some  doubt 
whether  he  would  continue  the  work,  which  would 
become  purely  military.  Our  doubts  were  soon 
set  at  rest. 

On  the  22nd  of  June  Mr.  Balfour  approved 
that  the  experimental  work  should  proceed,  as 
it  was  the  policy  of  the  late  Board  and  could 
not  be  abandoned  without  much  loss.  He  also 
preferred  not  to  take  credit  for  any  special 
schemes  of  the  late  First  Lord,  and  requested 
Mr.  Churchill  to  continue  to  interest  himself  in 
the  Committee. 

At  this  period  no  Government  Department 
would  provide  any  office  accommodation  for  us, 
so  on  June  21st,  1915,  I  took  an  office  at  my 
own  expense  at  83,  Pall  Mall,  and  installed  in 
it  my  entire  organisation,  which  consisted  of 
myself  and  Mr.  Percy  Anderson,  at  that  time  a 
petty  officer  in  the  Armoured  Car  Division. 

A  controversy  raged  on  this  subject  for  six 
months  between  the  Admiralty,  the  Ministry  of 
Munitions  and  the  Office  of  Works. 

The  Admiralty  referred  to  it  as  a  troublesome 
case,  and  informed  the  Office  of  Works  that  a 
temporary  Lieut.  Albert  G.  Stern,  R.N.V.R., 
had  straightway  proceeded  to  take  an  office  for 
himself  at  83,  Pall  Mall,  and  apparently  did  not 
understand  the  subtleties  of  the  procedure  in 
the  Civil  Service. 

On  June  23rd  the  Landship  Committee  was  in 
possession  of : — 


24  TANKS 

(1)  One  Killen-Strait  Tractor  at  the  Armoured  Car 

Headquarters  at  the  Clement  Talbot  Works, 
Barlby  Road; 

(2)  Two  Giant  Creeper  Grip  Tractors  at  the  works  of 

Messrs.  McEwan,  Pratt  &  Company,  Ltd., 
Burton-on-Trent,  which  were  to  be  coupled 
together  for  experiments ; 

(3)  Two  Diplock  experimental  one-ton  wagons ; 

(4)  An  experimental  ground  at  Burton-on-Trent. 

At  Burton-on-Trent  we  had  Lieut.  W.  G. 
Wilson.  He  was  the  well-known  engineer  of  the 
firm  of  Wilson-Pilcher  (a  pioneer  firm  in  motor- 
car construction),  and  later  of  Messrs.  Armstrong, 
Whitworth  &  Company.  As  a  lieutenant  in  the 
Armoured  Car  Squadron  he  had  helped  in  the 
construction  of  these  cars,  both  the  light  car 
and  the  heavy  car,  which  was  armed  with  the 
3-pounder  naval  gun.  He  was  now  supervising 
the  experiments  at  Burton-on-Trent. 

The  Committee  was  also  engaged  in  the  con- 
struction of  two  Land  Battleships,  one  on  Diplock 
pedrails  and  the  other  on  the  special  Creeper 
Grip  tracks  made  in  America. 

Successful  experiments  had  been  carried  out 
with  the  Killen-Strait  Tractor  for  cutting  barbed 
wire,  and  experimental  shields  were  being  fitted 
on  the  1|  ton  Pedrail  machines  as  a  protection 
for  advancing  infantry.  General  Scott  Moncriefi' 
wrote  to  the  Committee  : — 

"  We  think  there  should  be  at  the  bows  of  the  Land- 
ship  on  either  side  one  2-pounder  Pom-Poni  to  deal 
With  machine-gun  emplacements. 


EXPERIMENTS  25 

"  That  armament  should  be  supplemented  by  two 
machine-guns  placed  further  back,  somewhat  on  the 
lines  of  the  broadside  fire  of  ships. 

"  Loopholes  for  musketry  fire  would  be  required 
everywhere  of  course. 

"  The  above  represents  the  view  of  the  General  Staff 
here,  but  it  may  be  modified  in  detail.  However,  if 
the  details  of  the  structures  are  arranged  on  this  basis, 
it  may  be,  I  dare  say,  possible  to  introduce  slight 
modifications  later." 

The  2-pounder  Pom-Pom  referred  to  above 
was  made  by  Vickers  Maxims  and  was  an  anti- 
aircraft gun.  The  3-pounder  naval  gun  had,  up 
to  now,  not  been  found  suitable  for  the  destruc- 
tion of  houses  and  small  forts,  but  orders  had 
been  given  for  high  explosive  shells  for  it,  as  the 
Committee  considered  it  would  be  the  more 
suitable  gun  for  its  purposes. 

A  mortar,  already  used  in  France,  was  now 
at  Barlby  Road.  It  was  thought  that  it  might 
be  suitable  for  destroying  buildings  and  forts. 
This  mortar  threw  a  50-pound  shell  750  yards 
and  a  25-pound  shell  2000  yards.  The  shell  was 
loaded  with  high  explosive  and  had  been  found — 
especially  the  50-pounder — very  destructive  in- 
deed. The  Committee,  however,  were  of  opinion 
that  the  slowness  of  fire  and  the  fact  that  the 
mortar  was  stationary  would  make  it  unsuitable 
for  the  Landships. 

At  this  stage  it  was  considered  advisable  to 
request  the  War  Office  to  arrange  for  their 
representative  to  attend  our  Committee  Meetings 


26  TANKS 

in  order  to  help,  with  their  experience  and 
criticism,  the  Committee's  plans  for  armour  and 
armament,  and  the  erection  of  obstacles  at  the 
experimental  ground  at  Burton-on-Trent. 

Mr.  Balfour  had  asked  Mr.  Churchill  to  continue 
to  act  as  Chairman  of  the  Committee.  At  the 
same  time  the  Admiralty  handed  over  the  control 
to  the  War  Office,  who  appointed  General  Scott 
Moncrieff  Chairman. 

I  now  had  three  chairmen,  Mr.  Churchill, 
General  Scott  Moncrieff,  and  Mr.  d'Eyncourt. 
General  Scott  Moncrieff  helped  wherever  he  could 
and  never  interfered  with,  or  obstructed,  the 
pioneers  who  were  struggling  with  this  problem 
of  constructing  an  armoured  car  that  could 
cross  all  sorts  of  country,  German  trenches  and 
perpendicular  parapets,  a  problem  which  was 
said  to  be  insoluble  by  nearly  every  technical 
expert  on  traction,  and  which  the  pioneers  very 
nearly  gave  up  as  hopeless. 

On  the  29th  of  June  the  War  Office  and  the 
Admiralty  at  last  joined  forces,  although  this 
had  been  opposed  by  Mr.  Churchill  since  the 
start. 

There  was  little  to  show  at  this  period,  and  in 
order  to  raise  enthusiasm  amongst  the  Army 
section  I  arranged  for  a  display  of  different 
experimental  apparatus  at  the  Armoured  Car 
Headquarters  on  June  30th. 

The  piece  de  resistance  was  wire-cutting  by  the 
Killen-Strait  Tractor  with  torpedo  wire-cutters. 
Amongst  those  present  \\<  n-  Mr.  Lloyd  George, 


EXPERIMENTS  27 

Mr.  Winston  Churchill,  Mr.  d'Eyncourt,  Sir 
Frederick  Black,  Major-General  Scott  Moncrieff, 
Colonel  W.  D.  Bird,  Colonel  H.  C.  L.  Holden 
and  Brigadier-General  Jackson. 

Mr.  Stokes  of  Ransomes  &  Rapier  had  shown 
me  the  Stokes  gun  on  Clapham  Common,  which 
was  being  used  as  an  experimental  ground  by 
General  Louis  Jackson,  Head  of  Trench  Warfare 
at  the  Ministry  of  Munitions,  and  I  had  attended 
several  private  trials  and  was  much  impressed 
by  the  gun.  I  knew  that  Mr.  Lloyd  George, 
now  Minister  of  Munitions,  was  coming  out  to 
see  our  trials,  and  so  arranged  with  Mr.  Stokes 
to  have  his  gun  at  our  old  headquarters  at 
Wormwood  Scrubbs  ready  to  fire  for  his  benefit. 
Mr.  Stokes  had  already  convinced  me  of  the 
impossibility  of  getting  the  War  Office  to  take 
up  the  gun. 

Mr.  Lloyd  George  saw  it  fired  with  at  least 
three  shells  in  the  air  at  the  same  time  and  was 
much  impressed.  He  said  to  Mr.  Stokes,  "  How 
long  would  it  take  to  manufacture  1000  of  these 
guns  ?  "  Mr.  Stokes  replied,  "  It  depends  whether 
you  or  I  try  to  make  them."  Anyhow,  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  gave  an  order  for  1000  of  these  guns, 
which  have  been  one  of  the  features  of  the  war. 
That  is  one  more  debt  of  gratitude  which  the 
nation  owes  to  Mr.  Lloyd  George. 

On  the  2nd  of  July,  Squadron  20  of  the  Royal 
Naval  Armoured  Car  Division,  later  to  become 
famous  as  the  "  wet  nurse "  of  Tanks,  was 
placed,   for  this   work,   under   the   direction   of 


28  TANKS 

Mr.  d'Eyncourt.  The  officers  of  the  Squadron 
were :  Squadron-Commander Hetherington,  Lieut. - 
Commander  R.  W.  McGrath,  Lieut.  W.  G.  Wilson, 
Lieut.  K.  Symes  and  Lieut.  A.  G.  Stern.  Others 
were  now  added  to  it.  The  Squadron  was 
at  Burton-on-Trent,  and  Squadron-Commander 
Hetherington  remained  in  command.  He  had 
Lieut.-Commander  Fairer-Smith,  Lieut.  W.  P. 
Wilson  and  Lieut.  W.  G.  Wilson  as  section 
leaders  and  three  sub-lieutenants  to  make  the 
full  complement  allowed  for  the  Landship  Squad- 
ron. I  was  to  continue  to  act  as  Secretary  and 
attend  to  the  execution  of  the  instructions  of  the 
Committee,  and  Lieut.  Symes  was  attached  for 
the  special  work  on  armour  plate.  Lieut.-Com- 
mander McGrath  was  shortly  afterwards  appointed 
Second-in- Command,  instead  of  Lieut.-Comman- 
der Fairer-Smith,  and  when  Major  Hetherington 
rejoined  the  Air  Service  early  in  1916,  he  took 
the  command  and  held  it  until  the  end  of  the 
war.  Squadron  20,  which  at  this  date  in  1915 
numbered  less  than  fifty,  was  by  the  end  of  the 
war  at  least  twelves  times  as  large. 

This  force,  at  a  time  when  the  Army  could 
spare  no  officers  and  men,  tested  and  shipped 
all  the  Tanks,  carried  out  all  experiments,  includ- 
ing the  first  great  experiment  at  Hatfield  Park, 
and  rendered  most  valuable  service  in  numerous 
ways.  This  it  continued  to  do  until  the  end  of 
the  war. 

In  July,  the  Metropolitan  Carriage,  Wagon  and 
Finance  Company  asked  to  be  released  from  their 


EXPERIMENTS  29 

contract  to  build  the  Pcdrail  machine,  and  the 
contract  was  transferred  to  Messrs.  Foster  & 
Company  at  Lincoln. 

Colonel  Crompton  had  put  an  enormous  amount 
of  work  into  his  Pedrail  design,  but  it  had  now 
to  be  abandoned  owing  to  its  great  weight.  We 
were  faced  with  the  fact  that  our  original  designs 
were  both  failures,  and  we  had  to  set  to  work 
again. 

The  Pedrail  material  and  the  chains  which 
had  been  specially  manufactured  were  subse- 
quently sold  to  the  Trench  Warfare  Department, 
who  had  in  view  the  building  of  a  machine  for 
carrying  "  Flammenwerfer "  up  to  the  enemy 
lines.  The  construction  of  this  machine  was 
carried  out  by  a  firm  at  Bath,  the  engines  being 
supplied  by  the  Astor  Engineering  Company. 
As  certain  mechanical  defects  developed,  I  believe 
that  nothing  further  was  done  in  the  matter. 

On  July  29th  Mr.  Tritton  was  instructed  to 
build  a  machine  incorporating  an  armoured 
body,  the  9-foot  Bullock  extended  track  and 
the  105  H.P.  Daimler  engine  and  transmission. 

The  machine  was  constructed  as  far  as  possible 
out  of  the  parts  at  Mr.  Tritton's  disposal.  The 
two  9-foot  bullock  tracks,  the  105  H.P.  Daimler 
engine,  the  worm  case,  and  the  gear  box  were 
the  same  that  had  already  been  used  for  the 
heavy  howitzer  tractors.  The  body  was  made 
of  boiler  plate,  so  as  to  get  the  weight  correct, 
but  the  turret,  though  of  the  correct  weight, 
was  a  dummy,  and  would  not  revolve.     The  total 


30  TANKS 

gross  weight  of  the  machine  was  about  eighteen 
tons,  and  the  height  to  the  top  of  the  turret 
from  the  ground  10  feet  2  inches.  The  length 
of  the  tracks  used  on  this  machine  were  such 
that  its  power  of  crossing  a  sheer-sided  trench 
was  limited  to  a  trench  four  feet  wide.  Its 
speed  was  three-quarters  of  a  mile  an  hour 
trench-crossing  and  two  miles  an  hour  when  not 
negotiating  severe  obstacles.  The  steering  was 
by  a  hand  wheel  operating  two  4  foot  6  inch 
steering-wheels  carried  on  a  tail  projecting  six 
feet  behind  the  body  of  the  vehicle.  The  arma- 
ment consisted  of  one  2-pounder  automatic  gun, 
with  about  800  rounds  of  ammunition,  one 
•303  Maxim,  and  several  Lewis  or  Hotchkiss 
automatics,  to  be  fired  through  the  port-holes. 

Mr.  Tritton  had  all  along  been  most  anxious 
to  help.  He  had  spent  his  time  and  money  in 
every  way,  and  had  already  built  for  Admiral 
Bacon  the  100  H.P.  tractors  for  pulling  the 
15-inch  howitzers  and  a  trench-crosscr.  Besides 
the  16-foot  Wheeler  design,  he  had  put  forward 
an  electrical  Wheeler  Machine  operated  by  cables, 
which  had  also  been  turned  down. 

Lieut.  W.  G.  Wilson  continued  to  help  him 
and  to  act  as  Inspector  for  the  Committee. 

The  machine  was  first  tried  on  September  Cth 
in  Messrs.  Foster's  yard.  Certain  mechanical 
defects  showed  themselves,  but,  on  the  19th  of 
September,  the  first  trial  over  trenches  took 
place  on  a  lull  outside  Lincoln  before  Mr. 
d'Eyncourt,  Mr.  E.  Moir,  who  was  head  of  the 


EXPERIMENTS  31 

recently  formed  Inventions  Department  of  the 
Ministry  of  Munitions,  Colonel  E.  D.  Swinton, 
Deputy  Secretary  to  the  Committee  of  Imperial 
Defence,  Major  Hetherington  and  myself. 

This  trial  gave  great  satisfaction. 

Already,  in  August,  before  this  trial  was  held, 
Mr.  Tritton  and  Lieut.  Wilson  had  started  to 
draw  out  a  machine  on  the  same  lines  but  of 
stronger  material  and  better  design.  On  August 
26th  Mr.  Tritton,  Lieut.  Wilson  and  I  viewed 
the  full-sized  wooden  model  of  this  machine. 
It  was  known  as  the  "  Tritton  "  Machine  and 
later  as  "  Little  Willie."  On  the  same  day,  at 
a  meeting  at  the  White  Hart  Hotel,  Lincoln, 
we  discussed  fresh  requirements  which  we  had 
just  received  from  the  War  Office.  They  asked 
that  the  machine  should  be  able  to  cross  a  trench 
5  feet  wide  with  a  parapet  4  feet  6  inches  high. 
Lieut.  Wilson  and  Mr.  Tritton  thereupon  started 
work  on  a  type  designed  to  do  this.  It  would, 
they  told  me,  require  a  60-foot  wheel. 

The  contour  of  this  sized  wheel  became  more  or 
less  the  shape  of  the  underside  of  the  new  machine, 
which  was  called  first  the  "  Wilson  "  Machine, 
then  "  Big  Willie  "  and  finally  "  Mother." 

"83,  Pall  Mall,  S.W. 
"September  3rd,  1915. 

"  Dear  Tritton, 

"  This  is  a  private  communication  to  you  :  I 
have  also  written  to  Wilson. 

"  It  is  of  the  utmost  importance  that  we  get  on  with 
the  type  known  as  the  '  Wilson.'     If  it  is  a  question  of 


32  TANKS 

draughtsmen  or  designers  we  cannot  allow  any  lack  of 
assistance  to  stand  in  the  way  of  our  immediate  progress. 
"  Please  let  me  have  a  confidential  note  from  you 
as  to  how  we  can  speed  this  matter  up. 

"  c  Tritton  '   Model 

"  With  reference  to  the  gun  in  the  turret :  the  ship 
will  probably  want  to  use  its  gun  at  an  angle  of  45  degrees 
pointing  forward,  upward  or  downward  when  crossing 
irregular  ground  and  not  on  the  flat,  therefore  it  is 
necessary  to  be  able  to  shift  the  gun  forward  as  far  as 
possible.  It  does  not  appear  to  me  to  be  a  difficult 
thing  to  run  this  on  rails  from  the  centre,  where  it  is 
now,  right  forward. 

"  I  am  also  informed  that  it  is  not  so  necessary  to 
protect  the  men  from  shrapnel,  therefore  a  shield  cover- 
ing the  front  and  the  sides  and  the  top  partially  seems 
to  me  to  be  sufficient. 

"  I  shall  be  very  pleased  to  hear  from  you  on  the 
matter. 

"  Yours  faithfully, 

"  Albert  G.  Stern." 

This  machine,  to  all  intents  and  purposes,  was, 
and  remains,  the  Heavy  Tank  of  to-day,  Mark  V. 
But  there  were  many  difficulties  to  overcome. 
Endless  experiments  had  to  be  made  to  produce 
a  satisfactory  track. 

Now  that  we  had  progressed  so  far,  after  six 
months  of  secret  experiments,  excitement  was 
intense  to  achieve  a  successful  Landship.  Mr. 
d'Eyncourt,  Mr.  Tritton,  Major  Hethcrington, 
Lieut.  Wilson,  Lieut.  Symes,  Mr.  Anderson  and 
I  were  all  straining  every  nerve  to  succeed.     It 


GREENHITHE   MACHINE,   (p.   21) 


GREENHITHE   MACHINE,   (p.  21) 


KILLEN-STRAIT  MACHINE,    (p.   24) 


KILLEN-STRAIT  MACHINE     {p    24) 


Photo   -  Capl    S.  Walti  r. 


EXPERIMENTS  33 

was  the  track  that  eluded  us.  Mr.  d'Eyncourt 
turned  down  a  proposed  track  of  Balata  Belting, 
and  once  more  our  hopes  sank.  Then,  on 
September  22nd,  I  received  the  following  tele- 
gram from  Lincoln. 

"  Stern,  Room  59 ;  83,  Pall  Mall. 

"  Balata  died  on  test  bench  yesterday  morning. 
New  arrival  by  Tritton  out  of  Pressed  Plate.  Light 
in  weight  but  very  strong.     All  doing  well,  thank  you. 

"  Proud  Parents." 

This  was  the  birth  of  the  Tank. 


CHAPTER  III 

TRIALS— AND   TRIALS 


CHAPTER   III 

TRIALS — AND    TRIALS 

September  1915  to  February  1916 

I  have  already  spoken  of  the  impossibility  of 
finding  any  Government  Department  which  would 
give  us  accommodation.  That  was  only  one  of 
our  many  difficulties.  We  encountered  opposition 
from  all  quarters.  Manufacturers  did  not  like 
our  type  of  work.  It  was  all  experimental  and 
meant  continual  cancelling  of  orders.  Then,  in 
July,  the  Ministry  of  Munitions  took  over  all 
inventions  in  connection  with  land  warfare,  and 
the  Admiralty,  quite  rightly,  was  unwilling  to 
provide  the  men  for  these  experiments.  This 
meant  the  loss  of  Squadron  20,  and  without 
Squadron  20  all  our  experiments  and  transport 
would  have  stopped. 

In  August  the  whole  of  the  Armoured  Car 
Division  was  disbanded,  and  on  the  18th  of  that 
month  the  following  order  was  issued  : — 

"  Will  you  please  inform  the  President  of  Landships 
Committee  that,  in  accordance  with  instructions  re- 
ceived from  the  Admiralty,  No.  20  Squadron  is  being 
recalled  to  Headquarters  with  a  view  to  transfer  of 
officers  and  men  to  the  Army  or  Air  Service." 

37 


38  TANKS 

At  the  same  time  Squadron  20  got  its  sailing 
orders. 

'  You  are  to  return  with  your  Squadron  to  Head- 
quarters at  9.30  a.m.  on  Friday  next,  20th  inst.,  to 
bring  with  you  all  gear  and  stores  which  have  not  been 
purchased  by  the  Landships  Committee.  All  officers 
and  men  are  to  be  present." 

This  disbandment  was  stopped  by  the  per- 
sonal intervention  of  Mr.  d'Eyncourt.  It  was 
one  of  the  many  occasions  on  which  he  saved 
the  Landships  (and  future  Tanks)  from  ex- 
tinction. 

I  also  made  a  personal  request  to  the  Minister 
of  Munitions,  and  was  told  by  him  that  the 
Admiralty  informed  him  that  the  order  was  to 
be  disregarded. 

On  August  19th  Mr.  d'Eyncourt  wrote  to  the 
Second  Sea  Lord  as  follows  : — 

"  Officers  and  men  of  Squadron  20  (Armoured  Car 
Division)  who  have  been  detailed  for  duty  under  the 
Landships  Committee,  have  been  offered  the  choice  of 
joining  the  Army  and  have  refused. 

"  In  view  of  this  it  appears  that  there  can  be  no 
objection  to  the  request  of  the  Minister  of  Munitions 
being  granted ;  otherwise  the  work  on  the  landships 
will  come  to  an  immediate  standstill." 

The  Second  Sea  Lord  replied  on  the  same 
date  : — 

"  I  have  approved  as  above,  and  all  tools,  etc., 
required  by  the  Committee  should  be  left  with  them 
until  other  arrangements  can  be  made." 


TRIALS -AND   TRIALS  39 

Towards  the  end  of  September  another  attempt 
was  made  to  get  rid  of  Squadron  20,  and  in  the 
end  an  arrangement  was  made  which  was  set  out 
by  the  Admiralty  in  a  document  on  October  1st. 
The  Landships  Committee  of  the  Admiralty  was 
to  take  its  instructions  as  to  type,  armament  and 
protection  from  the  War  Office,  was  to  carry  on 
the  designing  and  constructing  as  far  as  was 
desirable,  was  then  to  hand  over  the  work  to 
the  Ministry  of  Munitions,  and  was,  for  this 
purpose,  to  make  use  of  the  personnel,  transport 
and  supplies  which  were  at  its  disposal — that  is 
to  say,  No.  20  Squadron  of  the  R.N.A.S. 

On  the  20th  of  October  the  First  Lord,  Mr. 
Balfour,  approved  the  minute. 

Mr.  Macnamara  then  suggested,  for  secrecy's 
sake,  to  change  the  title  of  the  Landships  Com- 
mittee. Mr.  d'Eyncourt  agreed  that  it  was  very 
desirable  to  retain  secrecy  by  all  means,  and 
proposed  to  refer  to  the  vessel  as  a  "  Water 
Carrier."  In  Government  offices,  committees 
and  departments  are  always  known  by  their 
initials.  For  this  reason  I,  as  Secretary,  con- 
sidered the  proposed  title  totally  unsuitable.  In 
our  search  for  a  synonymous  term,  we  changed 
the  word  "  Water  Carrier  "  to  "  Tank,"  and  be- 
came the  "  Tank  Supply,"  or  "  T.S."  Committee. 
This  is  how  these  weapons  came  to  be  called 
'  Tanks,"  and  the  name  has  now  been  adopted 
by  all  countries  in  the  world. 

Although  the  Ministry  of  Munitions  had  now 
taken  over  from  the  Admiralty  all  inventions 


40  TANKS 

which  were  to  be  used  solely  for  military  pur- 
poses, it  was  arranged  that  the  Landships  Com- 
mittee should  continue  as  hitherto  under  the 
chairmanship  of  Mr.  d'Eyncourt,  and  that  pro- 
gress should  be  reported  periodically  to  Mr. 
Moir  of  the  Munitions  Inventions  Department. 
Mr.  Moir  was  at  all  times  most  helpful.  He 
refrained  from  interfering  in  a  development 
which  was  now  in  full  swing.  Under  this  new 
arrangement  the  Commanding  Officer  of  Squad- 
ron 20  took  command  of  the  Ministry  of  Munitions 
Experimental  Ground  at  Wembley  and  gave  all 
the  necessary  help  for  all  experiments  carried 
out  there.  This  included  all  "  Flammenwerfer  " 
or  flame  projectors,  and  many  other  experiments 
of  the  Trench  Warfare  Department.  This  was 
a  very  satisfactory  arrangement.  We  were  look- 
ing for  an  experimental  ground,  when  I  found 
General  Louis  Jackson,  Director  of  Trench  War- 
fare, with  a  ground  and  no  men.  We  had 
Squadron  20  but  no  ground.  So  we  united,  with 
a  large  saving  of  money  to  the  nation ;  but  there 
were  several  hurdles  of  red  tape  to  negotiate 
before  the  thing  was  done. 

It  was  about  this  time — July  1915 — when  we 
were  struggling  with  the  mechanical  problem  and 
fighting  to  be  allowed  to  exist,  that  Colonel 
Swinton,  by  chance,  discovered  us.  Years  ago — 
I  believe  in  1908,  or  perhaps  a  little  earlier — he 
or  his  friend  Captain  Tulloch,  who  was  an  expert 
on  ballistics  and  high  explosives,  put  before  the 
military  authorities  ideas  of  mechanical  warfare 


Pedrail  Hand  Machine  fitted  with  Infantry  Shield,    (p.  24) 


■ 


Pedrail  Hand  Machine  fitted  with  Infantry  Shield,  (p.  24) 


Photos:  Capt.  S.  Walter 


MAJOR  W    G    \\  LLSON,  C  M.G.  (p.  24) 


Photo:  Wnriimi  &  Sons,  Birmingham 


TRIALS -AND  TRIALS  41 

which,  I  am  told,  are  still  filed  at  the  War  Office. 
At  the  beginning  of  the  war  he  again  put  for- 
ward his  ideas,  this  time  at  G.H.Q.,  France. 
They  were  sent  in  to  the  War  Office,  and  there 
the  experts  decided  that  from  a  technical  and 
manufacturing  point  of  view  the  weapons  which 
he  proposed  were  impossible.  They  would  take 
such  a  long  time  to  design  that  the  war  would  be 
over  before  any  could  be  manufactured. 

He  was  now  to  play  an  important  part  in 
getting  the  military  authorities  to  take  up  the 
idea  of  Tanks.  With  his  keen  sense  of  humour, 
his  understanding  of  the  value  of  propaganda, 
his  intimate  knowledge  of  the  War  Office  and  all 
its  mysterious  ways,  and  with  his  exceptional 
position  as  Deputy  Secretary  to  the  Committee 
of  Imperial  Defence,  he  was  able  to  push  forward 
our  schemes  and  to  cut  short  all  sorts  of  red  tape 
for  us.  It  was  largely  owing  to  his  efforts  that 
the  Army  took  up  Tanks  and  developed  the 
tactics  rapidly  enough  to  make  it  impossible  for 
the  German  Army  ever  to  catch  us  up. 

He  asked  me  to  go  and  see  him  at  the  Com- 
mittee of  Imperial  Defence. 

"  Lieut.  Stern,"  he  said,  "  this  is  the  most 
extraordinary  thing  that  I  have  ever  seen.  The 
Director  of  Naval  Construction  appears  to  be 
making  land  battleships  for  the  Army  who  have 
never  asked  for  them,  and  are  doing  nothing  to 
help.  You  have  nothing  but  naval  ratings  doing 
all  your  work.  What  on  earth  are  you?  Are 
you  a  mechanic  or  a  chauffeur?  " 


42  TANKS 

"  A  banker,"  I  replied. 

"  This,"  said  he,  "  makes  it  still  more  mys- 
terious." 

It  was  Colonel  Swinton  who  got  the  Prime 
Minister  to  call  an  inter-departmental  Committee 
on  August  28th. 

This  Committee  went  very  thoroughly  into  the 
whole  question  of  procedure  in  connection  with 
future  experiments  with  Landships,  and  as  a 
result  many  difficulties  which  we  had  hitherto 
experienced  were  swept  away. 

The  following  letter  from  Mr.  d'Eyncourt 
explains  itself : — 

"73,  Cadogan  Square,  S.W., 

"August  29th,  1915. 

"  My  dear  Stern, 

"  Many  thanks  for  your  letter  and  copy  of 
agenda;  the  conference  has  distinctly  cleared  the  air 
and  put  the  whole  thing  on  a  sounder  footing.  I'm 
glad  you  had  a  good  talk  with  Swinton ;  you  seem  to 
have  arranged  it  very  well,  and  I  now  hope  we  shall  be 
able  to  go  on  steadily  without  more  tiresome  inter- 
ruptions. 

"  I  hope  Foster  is  getting  on  well  and  will  be  able  to 
push  on  the  new  design  also. 

'  We  must  be  very  careful  about  secrecy,  especially 
in  conveying  the  things  to  Wembley,  and  in  keeping 
everything  quiet  there;  we  should  have  a  high  fence 
put  round,  and  all  the  men  of  Squadron  20  must  be 
trustworthy  and  specially  warned  about  talking. 

"  Foster's  people  should  also  be  warned ;  will  you 
write  him  a  letter  impressing  the  importance  of  secrecy? 
J  think  I  did  speak  to  him  about  it,  but  another  letter 
won't  do  any  harm. 


TRIALS— AND   TRIALS  43 

"  I  shall  be  at  Admiralty  again  on  Wednesday. 
"  I  am  keeping  your  letter  as  a  minute  of  the  Con- 
ference. 

"  Very  sincerely  yours, 

"E.  H.  T.  d'Eyncourt." 

Secrecy  for  our  new  weapons  was  all-important. 
Everybody  connected  was  sworn  to  secrecy.  Any- 
body suspected  of  talking  was  threatened  with 
internment  under  D.O.R.A.  Ladies  sometimes 
were  found  to  have  heard  something  about  us, 
and  had  to  be  visited  and  told  it  would  cost 
thousands  of  lives  if  the  secret  reached  the 
enemy.  Flying  men  had  to  be  forbidden  to  fly 
over  the  Tank  grounds.  It  was  easy  to  stop  all 
talk  amongst  those  who  knew  of  the  start  of  our 
enterprise  by  informing  them  that  our  efforts  had 
entirely  failed  and  that  we  had  lost  our  jobs, 
which  they  were  only  too  ready  to  believe. 

On  September  20th  I  arranged  for  Lieut. 
Symes  to  bring  by  motor  lorry  the  complete 
full-sized  model  of  "  Mother "  to  the  Trench 
Warfare  Experimental  Ground  at  Wembley,  the 
Headquarters  of  Squadron  20,  and  on  Sep- 
tember 22nd  orders  were  given  to  Mr.  Tritton, 
of  Foster's,  to  continue  working  on  the  design  of 
"Mother"  with  all  dispatch,  but  not  to  stop 
rebuilding  the  first  type  called  "  Little  Willie." 

The  Director  of  Staff  Duties  at  the  War  Office, 
Colonel  Bird,  now  informed  the  Commander-in- 
Chief  of  the  British  Army  in  the  Field  that  a 
wooden  model  of  the  proposed  Landship  would 
be   ready   for   inspection    on    Wednesday,    Sep- 


44  TANKS 

tember  29th,  and  asked  him  to  send  representa- 
tives. This  meeting  took  place,  and  there  were 
present  Mr.  d'Eyncourt,  Major  Hetherington, 
Lieut.  W.  G.  Wilson,  Lieut.  Stern  and  Lieut. 
K.  P.  Symes  of  the  Committee;  Major  Segrave, 
Colonel  Bird  and  Colonel  Holden  of  the  War 
Office;  Colonel  Harvey,  Major  Dryer  and  Major 
Guest  from  G.H.Q.,  France;  Colonel  Goold 
Adams  and  Captain  Hopwood  from  the  Ord- 
nance Board;  Brig.-General  Jackson,  Mr.  Moir, 
Captain  Tulloch,  Captain  Acland,  Mr.  Tritton 
and  Colonel  Swinton.  All  expressed  their  satis- 
faction with  the  display,  but  there  were  others 
not  so  well  pleased.  The  minutes  of  the  meeting 
were  duly  circulated  to  all  concerned,  and  General 
Von  Donop  strongly  expressed  his  disapproval 
of  the  procedure  which  had  been  adopted.  He 
viewed  with  dismay  the  fact  that  the  War  Office, 
the  Committee  of  Imperial  Defence  and  the 
Admiralty  were  all  mixed  up  in  deciding  this 
question.  He  was  also  somewhat  annoyed  that 
he  should  have  been  asked  to  provide  guns  and 
ammunition  when  he  had  not  been  consulted  as 
to  their  pattern. 

The  officials  concerned  generally  were  getting 
rather  sceptical  about  the  progress  of  our  Com- 
mittee, and  on  September  30th  I  gave  Mr.  Tritton 
instructions  to  carry  on  with  all  possible  speed 
the  construction  of  "  Mother." 

In  the  design  of  this  machine,  with  the  track 
running  over  the  top,  the  difficulty  was  the  posi- 
tion of  the  guns,  and  Mr.  d'Eyncourt  gave  me 


TRIALS -AND  TRIALS  45 

instructions,  which  I  forwarded  to  Mr.  Tritton 
on  October  5th,  giving  the  size  of  the  opening  of 
the  "  sponsons,"  1  which  would  carry  one  gun 
on  each  side  of  the  proposed  ship,  and  the  weight 
of  the  gun-carriage,  of  the  base-plate,  and  of 
the  holding-down  ring  and  shield.  These  two 
sponsons,  which  carried  two  guns  and  shields, 
were  to  weigh  in  all  about  three  tons. 

At  this  time  it  had  not  been  finally  decided 
what  gun  we  should  have,  although  the  sponsons 
were  designed  to  carry  the  6-pounder.  A  2*95 
inch  mountain  gun  was  borrowed  from  Woolwich 
and  proved  satisfactory,  but  it  was  impossible 
to  get,  so  in  the  end  the  6-pounder  naval  gun 
was  adopted,  Admiral  Singer  having  told  us 
that  he  was  ready  to  release  a  number  of  these 
guns.  Thus  another  vital  difficulty  was  over- 
come by  the  Admiralty. 

At  the  end  of  October  Foster's  workmen  were 
leaving  the  firm.  It  had  frequently  applied  to 
the  Government  for  war  badges  for  them,  but 
had  never  been  able  to  get  them,  and  now,  owing 
to  the  great  secrecy  of  the  work  on  which  the 
men  were  employed,  their  comrades  thought 
that  they  were  not  doing  war  work.  I  found  it 
impossible  to  obtain  the  badges,  until  at  last  I 
went  to  the  offices  of  the  War  Badge  Depart- 
ment in  Abingdon  Street  and  threatened  to  take 

1  A  sponson  is  a  structure  projecting  beyond  the  side  of 
a  Tank  or  Ship  in  which  a  gun  is  placed.  This  projection 
is  necessary  to  enable  the  gun  to  be  fired  clear  of  the  side, 
directly  ahead  or  astern. 


46  TANKS 

them  by  force   with   the   aid   of  Squadron   20. 
Thereupon  a  sack  of  badges  was  delivered. 
On  October  29th  Mr.  Tritton  wrote  to  me  : — 

"  I  am  very  grateful  to  you  for  the  trouble  you  have 
taken  in  the  matter,  and  I  feel  I  must  congratulate  you 
on  the  promptness  with  which  you  have  overcome  the 
entanglement  of  red  tape  which  is  apparent  in  Abingdon 
Street." 

On  November  22nd  the  first  of  the  tracks  for 
"  Little  Willie  "  was  completed  and  ran  in  the 
shop  on  its  own  axle.  On  account  of  the  shortage 
of  material,  the  second  track  could  not  be  com- 
pleted till  later.  "  Mother's  "  hull  was  expected 
to  be  in  the  erecting  shop  the  next  day,  and  the 
engine  and  gearing  were  well  on  the  way  to 
completion.  Owing  to  a  shortage  of  links,  no 
approximate  promises  for  completion  were  given, 
but  a  promise  was  expected  at  the  end  of  the 
week. 

On  December  3rd  the  first  trials  of  "  Mother  " 
took  place  at  Lincoln,  and  were  very  successful 
indeed.  It  was  hoped  to  have  a  machine  on  the 
road  by  December  20th,  and  to  bring  it  to  London 
for  the  trials  a  fortnight  later. 

Mr.  d'Eyncourt  also  wished  to  have  a  6-pounder 
gun  fired  from  the  finished  Tank  in  order  to  see 
what  effect  it  would  have  on  the  sponson,  the 
frame,  and  the  crew.  "  Mother  "  was  therefore 
moved  to  a  lonely  field  within  a  mile  of  Lincoln 
Cathedral.  The  night  before  Major  Hethcrington 
and  I  motored  up  with  the  ammunition,  which 


TRIALS -AND  TRIALS  47 

was  solid,  armour-piercing,  6-pounder  shell. 
Early  next  morning,  everything  being  ready, 
Major  Hetherington  fired  the  first  shot.  There 
was  a  misfire,  and  while  we  were  examining  the 
breech  the  gun  went  off  itself.  No  one  knew 
where  the  shell  had  gone.  We  feared  the  worst. 
Lincoln  Cathedral  was  in  danger  !  But  after  two 
hours  spent  with  a  spade  the  shell  was  found 
buried  in  the  earth,  to  the  great  relief  of  us  all. 

It  was  quite  clear  that  the  Experimental 
Ground  at  Wembley  was  not  sufficiently  private 
for  these  very  secret  trials  which  we  intended 
now  to  carry  out,  so  Mr.  d'Eyncourt  and  I 
started  very  early  one  morning  looking  for  a 
suitable  place  north  of  London,  and  finally  saw 
Lord  Salisbury's  agent  at  Hatfield,  Mr.  McCowan. 
We  selected  a  certain  part  of  the  park  for  the 
trial,  and  Mr.  McCowan  gave  us  every  facility. 
Lord  Salisbury  afterwards  gave  the  necessary 
permission. 

For  the  lighter  armament  of  the  Tanks  we 
tried  every  machine-gun  to  see  which  was  the 
most  suitable — the  Lewis  gun,  the  Hotchkiss 
gun,  the  Vickers  and  the  Madsen,  which  were 
all  lent  to  us  by  Colonel  Brown  of  the  Enfield 
Lock  Small  Arms  Factory.  The  Hotchkiss  was 
eventually  selected. 

Colonel  Swinton  was  convinced  that  there  was 
a  great  future  for  Mechanical  Warfare,  and  in 
order  that  everything  should  be  ready,  if  the 
experiments  were  successful,  he  had  arranged 
for   an    Inter-Departmental    Conference    of   the 


48  TANKS 

Committee  of  Imperial  Defence  to  be  held  on 
December  24th. 

This  Committee  was  held  and  recommended 
that,  if  and  when  the  Army  Council  (after  inspec- 
tion of  the  final  experiments  on  the  Land 
Cruisers)  decided  that  they  would  be  useful  to 
the  Army,  the  provision  of  these  machines 
should  be  entrusted  to  a  small  executive  Supply 
Committee — which  for  secrecy's  sake  should  be 
called  the  "  Tank  Supply  Committee  " — to  come 
into  existence  as  soon  as  the  decision  of  the  Army 
Council  was  made ;  that  in  order  to  carry  out  its 
work  with  the  maximum  of  dispatch  and  the 
minimum  of  reference,  it  should  have  full  power 
to  place  orders  and  correspond  direct  with  any 
Government  departments  concerned;  that  it 
should  be  composed  of  those  who  had  hitherto 
carried  on  the  work,  and  that  the  War  Office 
should  take  the  necessary  steps  to  raise  a  body 
of  suitable  men  to  man  the  Land  Cruisers. 

The  Committee  made  its  recommendations 
in  great  detail,  of  which  the  above  is  only 
a  resume,  and  these  recommendations  were 
submitted  to  the  Admiralty,  which  agreed  to 
give  every  facility  :  (1)  By  lending  Mr.  d'Eyn- 
court,  who  had  an  intimate  knowledge  of  all 
that  had  been  done,  and  who  expressed  his 
willingness  to  give  all  the  assistance  he  could; 
(2)  by  supplying  6-pounder  guns;  (3)  by  trans- 
ferring the  officers  and  men  of  Squadron  20  to 
the  Army. 

The   first  Tank,  "  Mother,"    was   finished   on 


CREEPING  GRIP  MACHINES  COUPLED  TOGETHER,   (p.  25) 


Photo:  Ernest  Abrahams. 


CREEPING  GRIP  MACHINE,    (p.   25) 


Killen-Strait   Machine  fitted  with  Wire  Cutting  Apparatus,  (p.  26) 


ff 


Killen-Strait   Machine,    first  fitted  with  Wire  Cutting  Apparatus 
Mr.  Lloyd  George  and   Mr    Winston  Churchill,  {p.  26) 


Photos  :  Capt    S.  Wai  i  i  r. 


TRIALS -AND   TRIALS  49 

January  26th,  1916,  and  sent  by  train  to  Hatfield 
Station,  where  it  was  unloaded  in  the  middle  of 
the  night  and  driven  up  to  the  special  ground  in 
Hatfield  Park.  A  detachment  of  Squadron  20, 
under  the  Command  of  Major  Hetherington,  had 
previously  been  sent  to  Hatfield. 

Large  numbers  of  the  3rd  (Mid  Herts)  Battalion 
Herts  Volunteer  Regiment  and  a  company  of 
Engineers,  lent  by  the  War  Office,  helped  to  dig 
the  necessary  trenches  for  the  trials,  the  first  of 
which  took  place  on  the  29th  of  January,  1916. 

The  following  were  present — 

E.  H.  Tennyson  d'Eyncourt,  Esq.,  C.B. 

General  Sir  G.  K.  Scott  Moncrieff,  K.C.B.,  CLE. 

Rear-Admiral  F.  C.  T.  Tudor,  C.B. 

Rear- Admiral  Morgan  Singer,  C.  B. 

Brigadier-General  L.  C.  Jackson,  C.M.G. 

Brigadier-General  H.  C.  Nanton,  C.B. 

Brigadier-General  Hill,  C.B. 

Colonel  R.  E.  Crompton. 

Colonel  W.  D.  Bird,  C.B.,  D.S.O. 

Colonel  Harrison,  R.A. 

Colonel  F.  B.  Steel. 

Lieut.-Colonel  M.  Hankey,  C.B. 

Lieut. -Colonel  E.  D.  Swinton,  D.S.O. 

Lieut.-Colonel  W.  Dally  Jones. 

Lieut.-Colonel  Byrne. 

Lieut.-Colonel  G.  H.  S.  Browne. 

Lieut.-Colonel  Byron,  R.E. 

Lieut.-Colonel  Matheson,  R.E. 

Commodore  Murray  F.  Sueter,  C.B. 

Major  Lindsay. 

Major  S.  T.  Cargill,  R.E. 

Captain  T.  G.  Tulloch.  ■ 

E 


50  TANKS 

Captain  C.  A.  Bird,  RA. 

Flight-Commander  H.  A.  Nicholl. 

Lieut. -Commander  P.  B.  Barry. 

Dr.  C.  Addison. 

F.  Kellaway,  Esq.,  M.P. 

P.  Dale  Bussell,  Esq. 

Sir  Charles  Parsons. 

Mr.  McCowan  (Agent  to  Lord  Salisbury). 

Mr.  W.  A.  Tritton. 

Mr.  Yeatman. 

Mr.  Broughton  "| 

Mr.  Starkey       \  of  Messrs.  Foster  and  Company. 

Mr.  Sykes  J 

Major  Hetherington. 

Lieut.  W.  G.  Wilson. 

Lieut. -Commander  R.  W.  McGrath. 

Lieut.  K.  Symes. 

Lieut.  W.  P.  Wilson. 

Lieut.  G.  K.  Field. 

Lieut.  A.  G.  Stern. 

The  Programme  of  the  First  Trial  was  as 
follows  :: — 

TANK  TRIAL 

Description  of  a  "  Tank  " 

This  machine  has  been  designed,  under  the  direction 
of  Mr.  E.  H.  T.  d'Eyncourt,  by  Mr.  W.  A.  Tritton  (of 
Messrs.  Foster  of  Lincoln)  and  Lieut.  W.  G.  Wilson, 
R.N.A.S.,  and  has  been  constructed  by  Messrs.  Foster  of 
Lincoln.  The  conditions  laid  down  as  to  the  obstacle 
to  be  surmounted  were  that  the  machine  should  be  able 
to  climb  a  parapet  4  feet  six  inches  high  and  cross  a 
gap  5  feet  wide. 


TRIALS -AND  TRIALS  51 

Over-all  Dimensions 

Feet.         Inches. 

Length 31  3 

Width  with  sponsons 13  8 

„       without  sponsons 8  3 

Height 8  0 

Protection 
The  conning-tower  is  protected  generally  by  10  mm. 
thickness  of  nickel  steel  plate,  with  12  mm.  thickness  in 
front  of  the  drivers.  The  sides  and  back  ends  have 
8  mm.  thickness  of  nickel-steel  plate.  The  top  is 
covered  by  6  mm.  thickness  of  high  tensile  steel  and 
the  belly  is  covered  with  the  same. 

Weight 

Tons.         Cwts. 

Hull          21  0 

Sponsons  and  guns 3  10 

Ammunition,  300  rounds  for  guns  and 
20,000  rounds  for  rifles  (removable  for 

transport  purposes) 2  0 

Crew  (8  men) 0  10 

Tail  (for  balance) 1  8 


Total  weight  with  armament,  crew, 

petrol  and  ammunition       ...     28  8 

Horse  Power  of  engines      .      .      .     105  H.P. 

Number  of  gears 4  forward,  2  reverse. 

r  f  mile, 
Approximate  speed  of  travel  on      J  1|  miles, 

gear 1  2|  miles,  and 

[  4  miles  per  hour. 

Armament 
Two  6-pounder  guns,  and 
Three  Automatic  rifles  (1  Hotchkiss  and  2  Madsen). 


52  TANKS 

Rate  of  Fire 

6-pounder,  15  to  20  rounds  per  minute. 
Madsen  gun,  300  rounds  per  minute. 
Hotchkiss  gun,  250  rounds  per  minute. 

Notes  as  to  Steel  Plate  obtained  from 
Experiments  Made 

Nickel-Steel  Plate 

12  mm.  thickness  is  proof  against  a  concentrated 
fire  of  reversed  Mauser  bullets  at  10  yards  range,  normal 
impact. 

10  mm.  thickness  is  proof  against  single  shots  of 
reversed  Mauser  bullets  at  10  yards  range  normal 
impact. 

8  mm.  thickness  is  proof  against  Mauser  bullets  at 
10  yards  range,  normaj  impact. 

High  Tensile  Steel  Plate 

G  mm.  thickness  will  give  protection  against  bombs 
up  to  1  lb.  weight  detonated  not  closer  than  6  inches 
from  the  plate. 

N.B. — It  is  proposed  to  cause  the  detonation  of  bombs 
away  from  the  top  of  the  Tank  by  an  outer  skin  of 
expanded  metal,  which  is  not  on  the  sample  machine 
shown. 

PROGRAMME   OF  TRIALS 

Reference  to  Sketch,  Plan  and  Sections  1 

The  trial  will  be  divided  into  three  parts,  I.,  II.,  and 
III. 

Part  I.— Official  Test 

1.  The  Machine  will  start  and  cross  (a)  the  obstacle 
specified,  i.  e.  a  parapet  4  feet  G  inches  high  and  a  gap 
5  feet  wide.     This  forms  the  test  laid  down. 
1  Appendix  No.  7. 


TRIALS -AND   TRIALS  53 

Part  II. — Test  approximating  to  Active  Service 

2.  It  will  then  proceed  over  the  level  at  full  speed 
for  about  100  yards,  and  take  its  place  in  a  prepared 
dug-out  shelter  (b)  from  which  it  will  traverse  a  course 
of  obstacles  approximating  to  those  likely  to  be  met 
with  on  service. 

3.  Climbing  over  the  British  defences  (c)  (reduced  for 
its  passage),  it  will — 

4.  Pass  through  the  wire  entanglements  in  front ; 

5.  Cross  two  small  shell  craters,  each  12  feet  in  dia- 
meter and  6  feet  deep ; 

6.  Traverse  the  soft,  water-logged  ground  round  the 
stream  (d),  climb  the  slope  from  the  stream,  pass  through 
the  German  entanglement. 

7.  Climb  the  German  defences  (e). 

8.  Turn  round  on  the  flat  and  pass  down  the  marshy 
bed  of  the  stream  via  (d)  and  climb  down  the  double 
breastwork  at  (/). 

Part  III. — Extra  Test  if  required 

9.  The  "  tank  "  will  then,  if  desired,  cross  the  larger 
trench  (h)  and  proceed  for  half  a  mile  across  the  park 
to  a  piece  of  rotten  ground  seamed  with  oil  trenches, 
going  down  a  steep  incline  on  the  way. 

"  January  27th,  1916." 

The  day  after  this  first  trial  Mr.  d'Eyncourt 
wrote  to  Lord  Kitchener : — 

"  January  30th,  1916. 

"My  Lord, 

"  As  the  head  of  the  Admiralty  Committee 
entrusted  with  the  design  and  manufacture  of  a  trial 
machine  to  cross  the  enemy  trenches,  carrying  guns 
large  enough  to  destroy  machine-guns,  and  to  break 
through  wire  entanglements  whilst  giving  protection  to 
its  own  crew — conditions  laid  down  by  the  War  Office 


54  TANKS 

— I  now  have  the  honour  to  report  that  after  much 
experimental  work  and  trying  several  types,  we  have 
produced  a  machine  complete  with  armament  which 
amply  fulfils  all  the  requirements. 

"  This  machine  has  had  a  satisfactory  preliminary 
trial  at  Hatfield  and  proved  its  capacity,  and  I  trust 
your  Lordship  may  be  able  to  come  there  and  see  a 
further  trial  on  Wednesday  afternoon  next,  February 
2nd,  when  you  will  have  an  opportunity  of  judging  of 
its  qualities  yourself. 

"  I  have  had  some  experience  in  the  production  of 
war  material  for  H.M.  Navy,  and  I  am  convinced  that 
the  machine  you  will  see  is  capable  of  doing  its  work — 
work  never  before  accomplished — and  though  as  the 
first  really  practical  one  of  its  kind,  it  can  no  doubt  be 
improved  and  considerably  developed,  yet  as  time  is  so 
important,  and  it  will  take  three  or  four  months  to 
produce  them  in  sufficient  numbers,  I  venture  to  recom- 
mend that,  to  prevent  delay,  the  necessary  number  be 
ordered  immediately  to  this  model  without  serious 
alteration.  While  these  are  being  manufactured  we 
could  proceed  with  the  design  and  production  of  more 
formidable  machines  of  improved  type,  with  such 
modifications  as  your  Lordship  might  approve. 
"  I  have  the  honour  to  be,  etc.  etc., 

"  E.  H.  T.  cI'Eyncourt. 

"  Field  Marshal, 

"The  Right  Hon.  Earl  Kitchener,  War  Office." 

On  February  2nd,  1916,  the  second  trial  of  the 
machine  took  place,  when  the  following  were 
present : — 

Field-Marshal  the  Right  Hon.  H.  II.  Earl  Kitchener  of 
Khartoum,  K.G.,  Cx.C.B.,  O.M.,  G.C.S.I.,  G.C.M.G., 
G.C.I.E.  (Secretary  of  State  for  War). 

The  Right  Hon.  A.  J.  Balfour,  M.P. 


TRIALS -AND  TRIALS  55 

The  Right  Hon.  D.  Lloyd  George,  M.P. 

The  Right  Hon.  R.  McKenna,  M.P. 

E.  H.  Tennyson  d'Eyncourt,  C.B. 

Vice-Admiral    Sir   Frederick   T.    Hamilton,    K.C.B., 

c.v.o. 

Sir  W.  Graham  Greene,  K.C.B. 

Commodore  D.  M.  de  Bartolome,  C.B. 

The  Right  Hon.  G.  Lambert,  M.P. 

Brigadier-General  C.  E.  Corkran,  C.M.G. 

Major-General  Butler. 

Major-General  Sir  S.  B.  Von  Donop,  K.C.B.  (Master 
General  of  the  Ordnance). 

Major-General  H.  G.  Smith,  C.B. 

Lieut.-General  Sir  John  S.  Cowans,  K.C.B.,  M.V.O. 
(Quarter-Master  General  to  the  Forces). 

Brigadier-General  H.  C.  Nanton,  C.B. 

General  Rudyear. 

Lieut.-General  Sir  W.  R.  Robertson,  K.C.B.,  K.C.V.O., 
D.S.O.  (Chief  of  the  Imperial  General  Staff). 

Major-General  R.  D.  Whigham,  C.B.,  D.S.O.  (Deputy- 
Chief  of  the  Imperial  General  Staff). 

Brigadier-General  F.  B.  Maurice,  C.B.  (Director  of 
Military  Operations). 

Bt.  Lieut.-Colonel  A.  A.  G.  FitzGerald,  C.M.G. 
(Private  Secretary  to  Secretary  of  State  for  War). 

The  Hon.  E.  FitzGerald. 

Colonel  H.  E.  F.  Goold  Adams,  C.M.G. 

Lieut.-Colonel  G.  L.  Wheeler. 

Lieut.-Colonel  C.  Evans,  C.M.G. 

Colonel  A.  Lee,  M.  P. 

Major  C.  L.  Storr. 

Major  Segrave. 

Major  H.  O.  Clogstoun,  R.E. 

Captain  T.  G.  Tulloch. 

Dudley  Docker,  Esq. 

Major  Greg. 

J.  Masterton  Smith,  Esq. 


56  TANKS 

Lieut. -Colonel  M.  Hankey,  C.B. 
Lieut.-Colonel  E.  D.  Swinton,  D.S.O. 
Mr.  F.  Skeens. 
Major  T.  G.  Hetherington. 
Lieut.  W.  G.  Wilson. 
Lieut. -Commander  R.  W.  McGrath  . 
Lieut.  K.  Symes. 
Lieut.  W.  P.  Wilson. 
Lieut.  Donnelly. 
Lieut.  G.  K.  Field. 
Mr.  W.  A.  Tritton. 
Lieut.  A.  G.  Stern. 

The  Right  Honourable  H.   H.   Asquith,   M.P.,   was 
unable  to  attend. 


Colonel  Hankey  arranged  for  Mr.  McKenna, 
Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer,  to  travel  down  to 
the  Hatfield  trials  in  my  car.  I  explained  to 
him  our  ideas  of  Mechanical  Warfare  and  its 
value  in  the  saving  of  life  and  shells.  After 
the  trials  Mr.  McKenna  said  that  it  was  the 
best  investment  he  had  yet  seen,  and  that  if 
the  military  approved,  all  the  necessary  money 
would  be  available. 

Mr.  Balfour,  amongst  others,  took  a  ride  in 
the  Tank,  but  was  removed  by  his  fellow- 
Ministers  before  the  machine  tried  the  widest  of 
the  trenches.  This  was  a  trench  more  than  nine 
feet  wide  which  Lord  Kitchener  wished  to  see  it 
cross,  but  which  it  had  never  attempted  before. 

As  Mr.  Balfour  was  being  removed  feet  first 
through  the  sponson  door  he  was  heard  to  re- 
mark that  he  was  sure  there  must  be  some  more 
artistic  method  of  leaving  a  Tank  ! 


TRIALS -AND  TRIALS  57 

Sir  William  Robertson  was  well  satisfied  with 
the  machine.  He  left  the  ground  early,  owing  to 
pressing  business,  but  before  he  went  he  told  me 
that  orders  should  be  immediately  given  for  the 
construction  of  these  machines. 

General  Butler,  who  was  at  this  time  Deputy 
Chief  of  the  General  Staff  to  Sir  Douglas  Haig  at 
the  Front,  asked  how  soon  he  could  have  some 
of  them  and  what  alterations  could  be  made.  I 
told  him  that  no  alterations  could  be  made  if  he 
wished  any  machines  that  year,  except  to  the 
loop-holes  in  the  armour-plate. 

On  February  8th  His  Majesty  the  King  visited 
Hatfield,  when  a  special  demonstration  was 
arranged.  He  took  a  ride  in  the  Tank,  and  said 
afterwards  that  he  thought  such  a  weapon 
would  be  a  great  asset  to  the  Army  possessing 
a  large  number. 

A  few  days  later  Mr.  d'Eyncourt  wrote  to 
Mr.  Churchill,  now  a  Colonel  at  the  Front : — 

"■Admiralty,  S.W. 

"February  14th,  1916. 

"  Dear  Colonel  Churchill, 

"  It  is  with  great  pleasure  that  I  am  now  able 
to  report  to  you  the  success  of  the  first  landship 
(Tanks  we  call  them).  The  War  Office  have  ordered 
one  hundred  to  the  pattern  which  underwent  most 
successful  trials  recently.  Sir  D.  Haig  sent  some  of 
his  staff  from  the  front.  Lord  Kitchener  and  Robertson 
also  came,  and  members  of  Admiralty  Board.  The 
machine  was  complete  in  almost  every  detail  and  fulfils 
all  the  requirements  finally  given  me  by  War  Office. 
The  official  tests  of  trenches,  etc.,  were  nothing  to  it, 
and  finally  we  showed  them  how  it  could  cross  a  9  feet 


58  TANKS 

gap  after  climbing  a  4  feet  6  inches  high  perpendicular 
parapet.  Wire  entanglements  it  goes  through  like  a 
rhinoceros  through  a  field  of  corn.  It  carries  two 
6-pounder  guns  in  sponsons  (a  naval  touch),  and  about 
300  rounds;  also  smaller  machine-guns,  and  is  proof 
against  machine-gun  fire.  It  can  be  conveyed  by  rail 
(the  sponsons  and  guns  take  off,  making  it  lighter)  and 
be  ready  for  action  very  quickly.  The  King  came  and 
saw  it  and  was  greatly  struck  by  its  performance,  as 
was  every  one  else;  in  fact,  they  were  all  astonished. 
I  wish  you  could  have  seen  it,  but  hope  you  will  be  able  to 
do  so  before  long.  It  is  capable  of  great  development, 
but  to  get  a  sufficient  number  in  time,  I  strongly  urged 
ordering  immediately  a  good  many  to  the  pattern  which 
we  know  all  about.  As  you  are  aware,  it  has  taken 
much  time  and  trouble  to  get  the  thing  perfect,  and  a 
practical  machine  simple  to  make;  we  tried  various 
types  and  did  much  experimental  work.  I  am  sorry  it 
has  taken  so  long,  but  pioneer  work  always  takes  time, 
and  no  avoidable  delay  has  taken  place,  though  I  begged 
them  to  order  ten  for  training  purposes  two  months 
ago.  After  losing  the  great  advantage  of  your  influence 
I  had  some  difficulty  in  steering  the  scheme  past  the 
rocks  of  opposition  and  the  more  insidious  shoals  of 
apathy  which  are  frequented  by  red  herrings,  which 
cross  the  main  line  of  progress  at  frequent  intervals. 

"  The  great  thing  now  is  to  keep  the  whole  matter 
secret  and  produce  the  machines  all  together  as  a 
complete  surprise.  I  have  already  put  the  manufac- 
ture in  hand,  under  the  aegis  of  the  Minister  of  Munitions, 
who  is  very  keen ;  the  Admiralty  is  also  allowing  me  to 
continue  to  carry  on  with  the  same  Committee,  but 
Stern  is  now  Chairman. 

"  I  enclose  photo.  In  appearance,  it  looks  rather 
like  a  great  antediluvian  monster,  especially  when  it 
comes  out  of  boggy  ground,  whicli  it  traverses  easily. 
The  wheels  behind  form  a  rudder  for  steering  a  course, 


TRIALS -AND  TRIALS  59 

and  also  ease  the  shock  over  banks,  etc.,  but  are  not 
absolutely  necessary,  as  it  can  steer  and  turn  in  its 
own  length  with  the  independent  tracks. 

"  In  conclusion,  allow  me  to  offer  you  my  congratulations 
on  the  success  of  your  original  project  and  wish  you  all 
good  luck  in  your  work  at  the  front. 

"  E.  H.  T.  d'EYNcouRT. 
"  Colonel  W.  S.  Churchill, 
"  6th  Royal  Scots  Fusiliers, 
"  B.E.F.,  Fiance." 

Colonel  Churchill  replied  about  a  week  later, 
saying  how  pleased  he  was  and  that  he  would 
like  to  see  the  machine.  I  wrote  on  March  3rd, 
saying  we  could  show  it  him  at  Lincoln. 

As  a  result  of  the  trials,  Rear- Admiral  F.  C.  B. 
Tudor,  the  Third  Sea  Lord,  reported  : — 

"  I  am  convinced,  if  these  Tanks  are  to  be  built  in 
any  reasonable  time,  it  can  only  be  done  by  putting  the 
matter  in  the  hands  of  an  independent  executive  com- 
mittee with  authority  to  order  material  and  incur 
expenditure  up  to  a  fixed  limit. 

"  I  saw  the  demonstration  in  Hatfield  Park  on  29th 
inst.  and  was  much  impressed;  the  Tank  carried  out 
the  official  test  with  the  greatest  ease  and  also  many 
other  seemingly  impossible  tasks ;  in  fact,  it  is  probably 
the  only  solution  of  the  stalemate  of  trench  warfare. 

"  To  my  mind  the  right  course  would  be  to  put  in 
hand  fifty  machines  exactly  similar  to  the  experimental 
'  Tank '  immediately,  spreading  the  orders  for  the 
various  parts  required  over  a  large  number  of  firms,  as 
we  have  done  in  the  case  of  submarine  engines,  and  at 
the  same  time  get  out  fresh  designs  for  a  much  larger 
tank,  perhaps  three  times  the  length,  with  3  feet  pro- 
tection over  fore  part,  the  armament  weights  being  not 
necessarily  increased. 


60  TANKS 

"  Such  a  machine  would  have  no  difficulty  in  crossing 
heavily-traversed  trenches  from  any  line  of  approach, 
without  fear  of  capsizing ;  in  fact,  there  is  practically 
no  limit  to  the  development  of  this  class  of  machine, 
except  the  cost." 

This  was  brought  before  the  Admiralty  Board, 
concurred  in  by  Mr.  Balfour  and  Admiral  Jack- 
son, and  the  congratulations  of  the  Board  to  the 
Director  of  Naval  Construction  were  stamped 
and  signed  by  Sir  William  Graham  Greene. 

Finally,  the  Army  Council  wrote  to  the  Ad- 
miralty on  February  10th  : — 

"  Sir, 

"  I  am  commanded  by  the  Army  Council  to 
request  that  the  Lords  Commissioners  of  the  Admiralty 
will  convey  the  very  warm  thanks  of  the  Army  Council 
to  Mr.  E.  H.  T.  d'Eyncourt,  C.B.,  Director  of  Naval 
Construction,  and  his  Committee,  for  their  work  in 
evolving  a  machine  for  the  use  of  the  Army,  and  to 
Mr.  W.  A.  Tritton  and  Lieut.  W.  G.  Wilson,  R.N.A.S., 
for  their  work  in  design  and  construction.  I  am  to 
state  that  their  efforts  in  this  connection  have  been 
highly  appreciated  by  the  Army  Council. 

"  I  am  to  add  that  the  work  of  the  officers  and  men 
of  No.  20  Squadron,  R.N.A.S.,  in  assisting  by  construct- 
ing trenches,  etc.,  in  the  experimental  work  necessary 
to  the  production  of  the  machine  has  been  of  valuable 
service. 

"  I  am,  Sir, 

"  Your  obedient  Servant, 

"  B.  B.  Cubitt." 

The  thanks  of  the  War  Office  arc  thoroughly 
well-deserved,  wrote  Mr.  Balfour. 


CHAPTER  IV 
FIRST    ORDERS 


CHAPTER    IV 

FIRST      ORDERS 

February  1916  to  September  1916 

After  the  trial  at  Hatfield,  Lord  Kitchener 
asked  me  to  go  to  the  War  Office  as  Head  of 
the  Department  which  the  Inter-Departmental 
Conference  of  the  Committee  of  Imperial  Defence 
had  recommended  should  be  set  up  for  the  pro- 
duction of  Tanks.  I  saw  Major  Storr,  Lord 
Kitchener's  Secretary,  and  later  had  two  inter- 
views with  Sir  Charles  Harris,  the  Assistant 
Financial  Secretary  of  the  War  Office. 

In  the  meantime  Mr.  Lloyd  George  sent  for 
me  and  asked  me  if  I  would  go  to  the  Ministry 
of  Munitions.  I  told  him  that  Lord  Kitchener 
had  already  asked  me  to  go  to  the  War  Office, 
and  he  replied  that  it  was  not  a  matter  for  the 
War  Office  but  for  the  Ministry  of  Munitions. 
I  said  that  I  was  willing  to  undertake  the  pro- 
duction of  Tanks  in  quantity  within  six  months, 
but  could  only  do  so  if  given  special  powers. 
Mr.  Lloyd  George  then  asked  me  to  write  out 
a  Charter  which,  if  approved,  he  would  sign. 
With  the  aid  of  Colonel  F.  Browning  of  the 
Ministry  of  Munitions,  and  Mr.  P.  Dale  Bussell, 

63 


64  TANKS 

I  drafted  the  following  Charter,  which  gave  me 
exceptional  powers.  It  was  signed  by  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  on  February  12th,  1916,  subject  to  one 
paragraph  being  approved  by  Mr.  Sam  H.  Lever, 
who  was  at  that  time  Assistant  Financial 
Secretary. 

"  The  Minister  of  Munitions  has  had  under  con- 
sideration the  report  of  the  Inter-Departmental 
Committee  on  the  question  of  Tank  Supply. 

"  The  Minister  considers  that  now  the  question  of 
design  has  been  settled  and  it  has  been  decided  to 
arrange  for  earliest  possible  supply  of  100  Tanks,  the 
matter  becomes  one  of  supply  which  falls  within  the 
province  of  the  Ministry  of  Munitions  to  arrange. 

"  As,  however,  the  Admiralty  Committee  has  carried 
out  the  whole  of  the  experimental  construction  and  is 
fully  acquainted  with  the  details  necessary  for  the  pro- 
duction of  a  large  number  of  Tanks,  the  Minister  agrees 
with  the  First  Lord  that  the  Committee  should  now 
become  a  Committee  attached  to  the  Department  of 
Minister  of  Munitions  and  should  carry  on  the  work 
and  arrange  for  the  manufacture  of  the  machines  re- 
quired as  an  executive  body  working  directly  under  the 
Minister  of  Munitions. 

"  The  composition  of  the  Committee  will  be  as  shown 
on  attached  sheet,  and  the  Admiralty  has  agreed  to 
allow  Admiralty  members  of  the  Committee  to  under- 
take these  duties.  Mr.  d'Eyncourt,  Director  of  Naval 
Construction,  has  consented  to  continue  to  super- 
intend the  technical  and  experimental  work  of  the 
Committee. 

"  The  Minister  accordingly  authorises  the  Committee 
to  arrange  manufacture  of  these  machines,  placing  orders 
with  contractors  as  necessary  and  corresponding  direct 


frf%^ 


SIR    WILLIAM   TRITTON.   if.  30) 


FIRST   ORDERS  65 

with  any  Government  Department  concerned,  also  to 
incur  any  necessary  expenditure  in  connection  with 
engagement  and  remuneration  of  inspecting  or  other 
staff,  experimental  work,  travelling  and  other  incidental 
expenses.  The  Committee  shall  have  the  final  decision 
in  all  matters  connected  with  the  manufacture  and 
inspection  of  these  machines,  and  shall  have  full  power 
to  depute  to  any  one  of  their  number  any  specific  duties 
concerned  with  the  above,  and  also  to  add  to  their 
number  if  necessary.  The  Minister  of  Munitions  will 
grant  all  facilities  required  by  the  Committee  for  supply 
of  labour  and  material  to  the  Contractors  for  the  Tanks. 
All  payments  for  this  work  shall  be  made  solely  on  the 
certificate  of  the  Committee  which  shall  be  accepted 
as  full  and  sufficient  authority  by  all  Departments  con- 
cerned, and  an  imprest *  of  £50,000  is  to  be  at  once 
placed  at  the  Committee's  disposal  for  the  experi- 
mental work. 

"  D.  L.  G. 

"  12/2/16." 

The  original  constitution  of  the  Tank  Supply 
Committee  was  as  follows  : — 

Lieut.  A.  G.  Stern,  R.N.A.S.,  Director  of  Naval 
Construction's  Committee  (Chairman). 

E.  H.  T.  d'Eyncourt,  Esq.,  C.B.,  Director  of  Naval 
Construction. 

Lieut. -Colonel  E.  D.  Swinton,  D.S.O.,  R.E.,  Assistant 
Secretary,  Committee  of  Imperial  Defence. 

1  "  I  concur  subject  to  the  word   '  imprest '   being 
changed  to  '  authorisation.' 

"  Sam  H.  Lever, 
"D.  of  F. 

"12/2/16." 

F 


66  TANKS 

Major  G.  L.  Wheeler,  R.A.,  Director  of  Artillery's 
Branch,  War  Office. 

Lieut.  W.  G.  Wilson,  R.N.A.S.,  Director  of  Naval 
Construction's  Committee. 

Lieut.  K.  Symes,  R.N.A.S.,  Director  of  Naval  Con- 
struction's Committee. 

P.  Dale  Bussell,  Esq.,  Director  of  Naval  Con- 
struction's Committee,  Contract  Department, 
Admiralty. 

A  day  or  two  later  Lieut. -Colonel  Byrne  and 
Captain  T.  G.  Tulloch  of  the  Ministry  of  Munitions 
were  added  to  the  Committee. 

The  Committee  formed,  Mr.  Lloyd  George  then 
told  me  to  get  rooms  for  it  at  the  Ministry  of 
Munitions.  Secrecy  was  the  essence  of  Tanks. 
In  all  the  business  of  the  Landship  Committee, 
and  afterwards  the  Tank  Supply  Department, 
everything  possible  was  done — and  successfully — 
to  keep  the  Tanks  a  secret.  This  resulted  in 
many  difficult  situations.  When  I  went  across 
to  the  Ministry  to  get  rooms  after  my  interview 
with  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  I  was  refused,  and  my 
whole  Department  treated  as  a  joke,  owing  to 
the  fact  that  we  were  not  allowed  to  explain 
what  our  business  was.  As  a  result  I  was  forced 
to  appropriate  rooms,  as  the  following  minute 
from  Sir  Frederick  Black  (at  that  time  Director- 
General  of  Munitions  Supply)  to  Sir  Arthur  Lee, 
the  Parliamentary  Military  Secretary,  will  show. 

"  I  understand  that  rooms  have  been  appropriated 
in  this  building  by  Lieut.  Stem  and  other  members  of 


FIRST  ORDERS  67 

the  '  Tank  '  Committee  in  accordance  with  an  intimation 
from  the  Minister's  Private  Secretary. 

"  I  am  now  asked  whether  this  staff  is  working  as  a 
Committee  merely  housed  in  this  building  or  whether 
they  are  considered  to  be  part  of  our  organisation  and 
their  correspondence  handled  accordingly. 

"  I  do  not  know  whether  any  recent  change  has 
taken  place  in  the  duties  or  composition  of  this  Com- 
mittee which  has  been  sitting  at  the  Admiralty  and 
I  believe  has,  or  had,  War  Office  representatives  upon 
it,  but  so  far  as  I  am  aware  no  representative  of  the 
Ministry. 

"  Colonel  Lee  will  remember  consulting  with  Director- 
General  of  Munitions  Supply  some  short  time  ago  when 
an  inquiry  was  made  as  to  whether  the  supply  of  the 
mechanisms  which  the  Committee  was  experimenting 
with  could  be  taken  over  with  advantage  by  this 
Department  of  the  Ministry. 

"  After  a  joint  consultation  and  some  talk  with  the 
Secretary  of  the  Committee,  the  opinion  was  formed 
that  the  mechanisms  in  question  had  practically  little 
or  no  affinity  with  our  work. 

"  I  understand  that  the  Committee  has  expended 
large  sums  of  money  and  we  have  not  hitherto  been 
associated  with  their  work. 

"Is  it  now  intended  that  this  Department  shall 
assume  definite  responsibility  for  supply  ?  If  so  arrange- 
ments will  be  proposed  and  the  question  of  technical 
responsibility — i.  c.  whether  the  Director-General  of 
Munitions  Design  is  associated  with  that  side  of  the 
work — will  need  to  be  settled." 

Sir  Arthur  Lee  replied  : — 

"  I  have  discussed  this  curious  situation  with  Lieut. 
Stern,  and  he  has  sent  me  the  attached  copy  of  the 


68  TANKS 

'  Charter '  which  the  Minister  handed  to  him.  It  appar- 
ently relieves  you  of  any  responsibility  with  regard 
to  the  business  of  the  '  Tank  Committee.'  " 

To  this  Sir  Frederick  Black  wrote  : — 

"  In  order  that  effect  may  be  given  to  the  Minister's 
instructions  in  regard  to  facilities  for  supply  of  materials, 
I  propose  to  issue  a  confidential  office  memorandum  to 
Deputy  Directors-General  and  Directors." 

On  Saturday,  February  12th  (the  day  on 
which  the  Charter  was  signed),  all  preparations 
having  already  been  made,  orders  were  tele- 
phoned and  telegraphed  to  Messrs.  W.  Foster  & 
Company,  of  Lincoln,  and  the  Metropolitan 
Carriage  Wagon  and  Finance  Company  to  start 
the  production  of  100  machines.  Orders  were 
also  given  to  Mr.  P.  Martin  of  the  Daimler 
Company  to  supply  120  engines  by  the  end  of 
June.  Complete  drawings  and  other  details  were 
available,  and  a  contract  was  arranged  on 
Tuesday,  February  15th,  at  Birmingham. 

Messrs.  Beardmore,  Messrs.  Vickers,  Ltd.,  and 
Messrs.  Cammell  Laird  &  Company,  agreed  to 
produce  the  necessary  armour-plate.  Owing  to 
transport  difficulties  in  Glasgow,  Squadron  20 
were  instructed  to  send  at  once  two  light  lorries 
with  drivers  to  assist  the  armour  plate  firms. 

Although  the  order  was  placed  for  Tanks 
which  were  to  be  proof  against  both  German 
"  S "  and  armour-piercing  bullets,  the  Com- 
mittee had  already  in  view  a  Tank  which  should 
also  be  proof  against  armour-piercing  shell.     On 


FIRST   ORDERS  69 

February  14th,  the  following  letter  was  sent  to 
the  War  Office  :— 

"  I  write  to  say  that  the  Tank  Supply  Committee, 
as  recommended  by  the  Conference,  with  some  slight 
modification,  has  been  constituted,  the  Minister  of 
Munitions  having  signed  the  Charter  for  its  consti- 
tution under  him  on  Saturday,  February  12th,  when 
informed  that  the  War  Office  were  writing  to  demand 
the  supply  of  100  machines.  Orders  for  the  engines 
and  some  other  parts  of  the  machines  were  sent  out 
by  telegraph  and  telephone  the  same  day. 

"  2.  The  Tank  Supply  Committee,  in  addition  to 
proceeding  at  once  with  the  construction  of  the  100 
machines  ordered  according  to  the  sample  inspected, 
has  at  its  disposal  a  considerable  sum  of  money  for 
experimental  work  which  will  be  carried  on  separate 
from  the  construction  of  the  100  machines,  and  without 
in  any  way  delaying  their  production. 

"  3.  As  you  know,  the  machine  approved  and  now 
being  produced  is  furnished  with  bullet-proof  protec- 
tion alone.  The  Tank  Supply  Committee,  however, 
propose  to  try  and  evolve  another  and  superior  type 
of  machine,  and  the  lines  upon  which  their  experiments 
are  going  are  the  following  : — 

"  To  produce  a  Tank  which  will  not  be  only  bullet- 
proof, but  will  be  armoured  so  as  to  be  proof  against 
the  high  explosive  shell  from  German  field-guns,  and 
also  the  projectiles  fired  by  the  small  calibre  quick- 
firing  artillery  which  it  is  believed  the  enemy  may 
bring  against  them. 

"4.  So  far  as  can  be  seen  at  present,  to  fulfil  this 
requirement  will  necessitate  thicker  armour  or  a  double 
skin  of  armour,  which  will  largely  increase  the  weight  to 
be  carried.  This  may  or  may  not  mean  a  larger  machine, 
but  it  will  entail  engines  of  greater  power  than  those 


70  TANKS 

used  at  present.  It  is  doubtful,  however,  if  the  climbing 
capabilities  of  the  machine,  or  its  speed,  will  be  much  in- 
creased. It  is  not  known  whether  the  improved  machine 
should  carry  6-pounder  guns  as  the  present  type,  or 
whether  an  attempt  should  be  made  to  carry,  say,  field- 
guns,  or  even  something  larger. 

"  5.  Since  this  heavier  machine  is  in  its  embryonic 
state  and  the  ideas  are  at  present  entirely  fluid,  it  will 
be  of  great  assistance  to  the  Tank  Supply  Committee  to 
know  upon  what  lines  the  General  Staff  consider  the  de- 
velopment of  a  superior  machine  should  proceed.  The 
following  heads  for  this  information  are  suggested  : — 

"  (a)  The  nature  of  the  attack  against  which  the  armour 

is  to  be  constructed. 
"  (b)  The  armament  which  the  machine  should  carry. 
"  (c)  The  speed  to  be  attained. 
"  (d)  The  climbing  powers. 

All  the  above  subject  to  the  conditions  that  they  are 
mechanical  possibilities." 

The  War  Office  replied  : — 

"  I  am  directed  to  send  you  replies  to  the  questions 
contained  in  the  memorandum  as  follows  : — 

M  Q.  1.  The  nature  of  the  attack  which  the  armour 
should  be  capable  of  resisting? 

"  A.  1.  Field-gun  fire. 

"  Q.  2.  The  armament  which  the  machine  should 
carry  ? 

"  A .  2.  No  increase  on  present  pattern. 

"  Q.  :5.  The  speed  to  be  attained? 

"  A.  8.  Top  speed  six  miles  per  hour. 

"  Q.  4.  The  climbing  power? 


FIRST  ORDERS  71 

"  A.  4.  To  be  capable  of  crossing  a  ditch  10  to  12  feet 
wide  with  a  parapet  6  feet  high  and  trench 
4  feet  6  inches  wide  on  the  far  side. 

"  I  am  to  add  that  it  is  important  that  the  machine 
should  not  be  increased  in  size  to  any  great  extent  and 
the  height  should  be  kept  down.  If  the  reply  to  Q.  3 
and  4  involves  any  large  increase  in  size  the  additional 
speed,  etc.,  should  be  dropped." 

The  first  Report  of  the  Tank  Supply  Depart- 
ment, dated  Monday,  February  28th,  sixteen 
days  after  it  was  created,  gives  some  idea  of 
how  the  business  was  tackled. 

"  February  15th. — Offices  in  Hotel  Metropole  occupied. 

"  February  16th. — First  Committee  Meeting  for  con- 
struction of  100  Tanks  and  experimental  work  for 
type  of  machine  embodying  improvements  laid 
down  by  the  War  Office. 

Main  Contracts 

"Tanks. — The  construction  of  100  Tanks  has  begun 
under  arrangements  with  Messrs.  Foster  &  Com- 
pany, Ltd.,  of  Lincoln  (25),  and  the  Metropolitan 
Carriage  Wagon  and  Finance  Company,  Ltd.  (75). 

"Armour  Plates. — Orders  have  been  given  to  Messrs. 
Cammell  Laird  &  Company,  Ltd.,  Sheffield,  Messrs. 
Vickers,  Ltd.,  Sheffield,  and  Messrs.  Beardmore  & 
Company,  Ltd.,  Glasgow.  Plates  have  already 
been  rolled  and  are  in  course  of  transit  for 
machining. 

"  Guns. — Negotiations  are  in  progress  for  supply  of 
200  6-pounder  Q.F.  guns  by  Admiralty  working  in 
conjunction  with  the  Deputy  Director  General  (D). 

"  Machine-guns. — 400    Hotchkiss    machine-guns  have 


72  TANKS 

been  asked  for.  Decision  as  to  stocks  and  clips 
still  to  be  decided.    Anticipate  no  difficulties. 

"  Recoil  Mountings  for  Gun  Shields. — Negotiations  for 
the  manufacture  of  these  are  in  progress. 

"  Ammunition. — 100,000  rounds  6-pounder  ammunition 
required  (85,000  rounds  high  explosive  reduced 
charge  and  15,000  case  shot).  Drawings  have 
been  handed  to  Deputy  Director-General  (A) 
Department  for  high  explosive  shells :  drawings 
of  case  shot  not  yet  to  hand.  Anticipate  great 
difficulties. 

"  Periscojoes. — Two  suitable  periscopes  and  telescopes 
for  gims  are  under  construction  for  early  delivery." 

Lieut.  Symes  had  been  made  responsible  for 
the  supply  and  inspection  of  all  armour-plate; 
the  Admiralty  agreed  to  lend  their  inspector  to 
overlook  the  construction  of  the  Daimler  engines ; 
Lieut.  Wilson  agreed  that  he  would  be  able  to 
supervise  the  work  of  the  Metropolitan  Company 
at  Wednesbury  and  of  Messrs.  Foster  &  Company 
of  Lincoln,  and  Mr.  F.  Skeens  was  lent  to  the 
Committee  from  the  Admiralty  by  Mr.  d'Eyncourt 
for  armament  work,  and  later  elected  a  member 
of  the  Committee. 

The  Admiralty  now  found  that  they  were 
unable  to  provide  more  than  100  guns  of  the  200 
promised,  and  an  order  for  100  guns  was  given 
to  Messrs.  Armstrong,  Whitworth  &  Company; 
100,000  shells  were  also  ordered,  and  after  a 
discussion  whether  black  powder  or  high  ex- 
plosive should  be  used,  it  was  decided  to  use 
black  powder. 

The  use  of  case  shot  which  we  had  suggested 


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FIRST  ORDERS  73 

was  turned  down  by  the  War  Office,  and  this  is 
interesting,  since  it  was  again  proposed  some 
twelve  months  later,  was  adopted  and  found 
most  satisfactory  in  the  battles  of  1918. 

Colonel  Wheeler  reported  that  Madsen  guns 
would  not  be  available,  but  it  would  be  possible 
to  supply  Hotchkiss  and  Lewis  guns.  With 
these  changes  in  our  first  suggestions  wTe  went 
on  with  the  work. 

Early  in  March,  Colonel  Swinton  was  ap- 
pointed to  the  command  of  the  Corps  which  was 
to  man  the  Tanks.  It  was  to  be  part  of  the 
Motor  Machine-gun  Corps.  Later  on,  it  changed 
its  name  to  Heavy  Branch,  Machine-gun  Corps, 
and  still  later  to  Tank  Corps.  I  had  held  a 
commission  as  Lieutenant,  R.N.V.R.,  but  was 
transferred  to  the  Motor  Machine-gun  Corps  as 
a  major  on  March  6th,  1916.  In  fact,  I  was 
very  kindly  given  the  first  commission  by  Colonel 
Swinton  in  his  new  Corps.  Shortly  afterwards, 
Major  Wilson,  Captain  Symes  and  Lieut.  Rendle 
were  appointed  and  placed  under  my  orders. 
The  reason  for  calling  the  Corps  Heavy  Branch, 
M.G.C.,  was  to  deceive  the  enemy  and  the 
inquisitive. 

A  camp  was  taken  near  Bisley,  and  Lieut.- 
Colonel  Bradley,  D.S.O.,  put  in  charge.  Most 
of  the  officers  and  men  who  were  drafted  had 
but  a  very  vague  idea  of  what  they  had  to  do, 
and  the  whole  of  the  Heavy  Branch  was  generally 
known  as  the  "  hush-hush  "  crowd. 

Colonel   Swinton   and   Colonel   Bradley   spent 


74  TANKS 

days  going  round  to  the  various  O.T.C.s  all  over 
the  country  picking  out  young  officers  with  the 
necessary  qualifications  to  act  as  Tank  Com- 
manders, and  no  men  were  taken  who  had  not  a 
good  experience  of  motors. 

The  original  organisation  was  authorised  to 
consist  of  fifteen  companies.  Each  company  was 
to  have  two  sections  of  six  Tanks  each,  and  the 
strength  of  a  company  to  be  fifteen  officers  and 
106  men. 

Colonel  Swinton's  intention  was  that  as  soon 
as  the  men  had  done  a  certain  amount  of  ele- 
mentary training,  he  would  form  three  battalions, 
each  consisting  of  five  companies,  and  it  was 
with  this  idea  that  all  the  preliminary  training 
was  carried  out.  In  this,  as  in  many  other 
matters  in  the  early  days  of  Tanks,  Colonel 
Swinton's  first  views  have  been  proved  right  by 
subsequent  events.  The  organisation  which  was 
in  use  in  the  Tank  Corps  from  January  1917, 
was  battalion  organisation,  each  battalion  con- 
sisting of  three  companies  of  twenty-five  Tanks, 
but  Colonel  Swinton's  proposed  arrangement 
was  rejected  by  G.H.Q.,  France,  as  soon  as  the 
establishment  was  sent  out  by  the  War  Office 
for  their  approval.  They  stated  that  they  did 
not  want  battalions,  but  that  the  company  was 
to  be  the  tactical  unit,  and  that  companies  must 
consist  of  twenty-five  Tanks  each. 

This  meant  altering  the  whole  of  the  organisa- 
tion on  which  the  Corps  had  worked  at  Bisley. 
Each  company  consisted  of  four  sections,  eacli 


FIRST  ORDERS  75 

under  the  command  of  a  captain,  with  six  sub- 
alterns, commanding  the  six  Tanks  in  the  section. 
The  total  strength  of  a  company  was  28  officers 
and  255  other  ranks.  The  companies  were  com- 
manded by  Majors  Tibbetts,  McLlennan,  Holford 
Walker,  Summers,  Nutt  and  Kyngdon. 

From  March  until  about  the  middle  of  June 
all  training  was  done  at  Bisley.  It  consisted,  in 
addition  to  the  ordinary  recruits'  training,  of 
machine-gun  and  6-pounder  work,  and  the  Navy 
was  very  helpful  in  allowing  a  considerable 
number  of  both  officers  and  men  to  be  put 
through  special  courses  on  the  6-pounders  at  the 
Naval  Gunnery  School  at  Whale  Island. 

The  question  of  protecting  the  Tank  against 
shell  fire  was  now  taken  up,  and  a  double  skin 
was  tried.  It  was  discovered  that  a  1-inch  plate, 
with  half  the  metal  stamped  out,  giving  it  the 
weight  of  iVinch  plate,  and  placed  one  foot  in 
front  of  the  ordinary  armour  plate  of  the  Tank, 
would  detonate  a  German  high  explosive  shell 
and  prevent  any  damage.  These  experiments, 
however,  proved  of  no  practical  value  for  the 
Tanks,  owing  to  the  difficulties  of  construction. 

In  the  middle  of  March  Mr.  Glynn  West, 
Controller  of  the  Shell  Department,  was  unable 
to  obtain  the  regulation  steel  for  the  common 
pointed  shell.  He  proposed  using  carbon  steeJ, 
which  is  of  slightly  less  penetrating  power,  and 
this  was  approved. 

Colonel  Swinton  at  this  time  ordered  a  full- 
sized  model  of  a  Tank  mounted  on  a  rocking 


76  TANKS 

platform,  in  order  to  train  his  men  to  the  peculiar 
motion  of  the  Tank.  This  was  built  by  the 
Department  but  never  used. 

For  the  object  of  guiding  the  Tank  into  action 
small  signalling  balloons,  the  shape  of  observation 
balloons,  were  ordered. 

Magnetos  for  the  engines  were  ordered  from 
America.  This  was  the  only  part  of  the  Tank 
which  was  not  English,  and  later  on,  when  the 
home  industry  was  developed,  the  magnetos  also 
were  made  in  England. 

Prismatic  peep-holes  on  the  Tanks  were  fitted, 
but  these  were  later  discarded  owing  to  the 
danger  from  breaking  glass. 

On  the  3rd  of  April  the  order  for  100  Tanks 
was  increased  to  150,  50  to  carry  6-pounder  guns 
and  100  to  carry  machine-guns,  and  a  week  later 
the  order  was  changed  to  75  of  each  armament. 
Tests  were  now  started  by  Lieut.  Symes  with  a 
German  field-gun  on  a  2-inch  high  tensile  plate. 

The  Committee  took  up  other  ideas  besides 
Tanks.  It  designed  a  mechanical  carriage  for 
5-inch  howitzers  and  60-poundcrs,  a  carriage  to 
take  the  gun,  its  ammunition  and  its  crew,  and 
its  design  was  approved  in  April.  It  also  built 
an  experimental  plough  for  laying  telephone 
wires.  One  of  our  reasons  for  working  on  other 
things  besides  Tanks  will  be  seen  later. 

In  France  they  were  most  anxious  for  the 
coming  of  the  Tanks,  and  a  letter,  dated  April 
26th,  from  Colonel  Swinton  to  General  Butler, 
informs  Sir  Douglas  Haig  of  the  dales  for  delivery. 


FIRST   ORDERS  77 


"  My  dear  General, 

"  Your  letter  of  the  21th  instant  reached  me 
to-day.  Thanks  for  the  promise  of  the  R.E.  officer.  I 
am  looking  forward  to  his  arrival. 

"  About  delivery,  I  know  how  anxious  the  Commander- 
in-Chief  and  you  are  to  get  some  machines  at  an  early 
date,  and  all  of  us  here  are  equally  anxious  to  expedite 
things  in  every  possible  way. 

"  When  I  saw  Sir  Douglas  Haig  on  Friday,  the  14th, 
the  idea  was  if  possible  to  have  some  machines  over  in 
advance  by  the  middle  of  June  (not  the  1st).  I  said  that 
I  feared  it  was  not  possible,  but  I  deferred  giving  a  final 
answer  until  I  saw  Stern,  who  had  the  manufacturers' 
progress  charts. 

"  On  Monday,  the  17th,  when  you  saw  Stern  and  me 
together  we  said  that  to  get  any  machines  over  by  the 
middle  of  June  would  not  be  possible,  but  that  we  were 
doing  all  we  could  to  shove  on  with  the  production. 

"  In  regard  to  this  matter,  upon  which  so  much  de- 
pends, it  is  best  to  be  categorical  as  to  what  we  expect  can 
or  cannot  be  done,  and  so  to  avoid  disappointment  and 
the  reversal  of  plans. 

"  By  1st  June. 

"  No  machines  will  be  ready  and  no  crews. 

"  By  1st  July. 

"  Some  practically  finished  machines  will  have  been 
delivered  at  home  which  will  be  in  a  fit  state  to  move 
and  so  to  instruct  men  to  drive,  but  owing  to  their  design 
they  will  not  be  fit  to  take  the  field,  even  if  they  are 
manned  by  machine-guns  and  armed  with  M.G.  supplied 
in  France. 

"  In  regard  to  this  I  shall  be  able  to  give  more  definite 
information  in  four  weeks'  time. 

"  By  1st  August. 

"The   Supply   Committee   informs   me   that   all  the 


78  TANKS 

machines  will  be  ready  and  some  will  already  have  been 
shipped  to  France — strikes  and  acts  of  God  excepted. 

"  The  number  of  crews  that  will  be  trained  will  depend 
on  the  rate  at  which  the  machines  are  received  during 
July,  but  I  anticipate  that  crews  for  seventy-five  '  Tanks  ' 
will  be  fully  trained  in  any  case. 

"  Stern  leaves  to-night  for  a  tour  of  the  works,  after 
which  we  shall  be  in  possession  of  more  positive  informa- 
tion, but  it  will  certainly  not  alter  the  position  on  June  1st 
or  July  1st. 

"  As  regards  the  trial,  the  War  Office  has  just  arranged 
to  take  up  our  ground  at  Thetford,  and  is  arranging  for 
troops  to  be  sent  there  to  dig  our  manoeuvre  ground.  I 
anticipate  that  by  the  middle  of  June,  or  the  latter  half, 
we  shall  have  some  partially  finished  Tanks  down  there 
which  have  been  rushed  there  as  soon  as  they  are  capable 
of  movement,  to  train  men  to  drive.  As  soon  as  there  is 
anything  to  see  there  I  will  give  ample  warning,  so  that 
you  can  come  over  and  frame  your  own  ideas  on  the  things. 

"  I  am  afraid  this  letter  does  not  contain  what  you 
would  have  liked  to  hear,  but  it  is  the  cold  truth  and 
shows  the  real  situation." 


Other  people  were  also  very  anxious  to  obtain 
Tanks — but  not  the  kind  we  were  building. 
The  secret  of  our  work  was  very  well  kept  in  the 
Ministry  of  Munitions,  not  even  the  Inquiry 
Office  being  in  possession  of  the  true  facts. 
This  had  its  disadvantages,  however,  and  caused 
us  unnecessary  work,  for  very  frequently  wc 
had  inquiries  from  enthusiastic  manufacturers 
of  gas,  oil  and  water  tanks,  who  were  anxious 
to  secure  orders  in  their  own  particular  lines. 

On  one  occasion  a  Staff  Officer  at  the  War 


FIRST  ORDERS  79 

Office  rang  us  up  and  asked  if  we  were  the 
"  Tank  "  Department.  On  being  told  that  we 
were,  he  asked  when  delivery  of  his  oil  tanks  might 
be  expected.  He  was  politely  informed  that  we 
could  not  tell  him,  as  we  were  not  building  oil 
tanks.  He  then  asked  what  sort  of  tanks  we 
were  interested  in — gas  or  water — and  on  re- 
ceiving the  reply  that  we  were  interested  in 
neither,  he  got  very  much  annoyed  and  banged 
his  telephone-receiver  down. 

On  May  15th  it  was  decided  that  the  Tanks 
should  be  numbered,  the  6-pounder  Tanks  from 
500  to  574,  the  machine-gun  Tanks  from  800 
to  874,  and  that,  as  a  disguise,  all  should  have 
painted  on  them  in  Russian  characters,  "  With 
care  to  Petrograd." 

Two  experiments  were  now  made  to  protect 
the  roof  of  the  Tanks  against  bombs,  one  with 
splinter  proof  mattresses  such  as  are  used  on 
battleships,  the  other  with  expanded  metal. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  in  the  first  battles  a  wood 
and  wire  penthouse  roof  was  used,  and  thought 
to  be  unnecessary.  After  that  no  special  device 
was  tried. 

Luminous  tape  was  prepared  which,  laid  on 
the  ground,  was  to  guide  the  Tanks  to  their 
positions  at  night.  The  men  who  acted  as  Tank 
guides  were  also  provided  with  electric  lights  on 
their  backs,  red  and  green,  by  means  of  which 
they  signalled  at  night  to  the  driver  which  way 
to  turn. 

The  Tank  Supply  Department  also  supplied 


80  TANKS 

the  Tank  Corps  with  its  tractors  and  workshop 
wagons,  which  were  specially  designed  for  them 
and  built  by  Messrs.  Foster  of  Lincoln. 

On  June  5th  it  was  decided  to  paint  the  Tanks 
light  grey. 

We  now  had  Tanks  available  for  training  the 
men  of  the  Corps,  and  Colonel  Swinton  had 
succeeded  in  getting  lent  to  him  a  part  of  Lord 
Iveagh's  estate  at  Thetford,  in  Norfolk.  A 
large  number  of  men  of  the  Royal  Engineers 
were  sent  there  and  dug  an  exact  copy  of  a  part 
of  the  line  in  France,  and  the  Royal  Defence 
Corps  sent  up  two  battalions  who  guarded  every 
entrance  to  the  ground,  which  was  about  five 
miles  square.  No  one  was  allowed  to  go  in 
without  a  pass,  and  prominent  notices  explained 
to  the  public  that  it  was  a  dangerous  explosive 
area.  A  story  was  current  at  the  time  among 
the  local  population  that  an  enormous  shaft 
was  being  dug  from  which  a  tunnel  was  to  be 
made  to  Germany.  Here  in  the  middle  of  June 
two  of  the  six  companies  arrived  and  began  to 
train  with  six  Tanks  each.  This  training  went 
on  until  the  middle  of  August.  Several  dis- 
plays were  given  there  during  the  summer,  and 
live  6-pounder  shells  were  used.  The  King,  Mr. 
Lloyd  George  and  Sir  William  Robertson  were 
among  those  who  saw  our  displays,  and  in  June 
Colonel  Estienne,  who  later  on  was  to  command 
the  French  Tanks,  visited  the  camp. 

There  was  great  difficulty  and  delay  in  making 
the    6-pounder    armour-piercing    shell,    and    we 


FIRST  ORDERS  81 

finally  discovered  that  the  Japanese  had  some 
25,000  shells  which  were  originally  made  by 
Armstrongs.  These  were  shipped  back  to  Eng- 
land for  our  use. 

On  June  5th  I  saw  General  du  Cane,  Director- 
General  of  Munitions  Design,  and  General  Headlam 
with  reference  to  the  new  60-pounder  Gun- 
carrying  Tank,  and  it  was  decided  that  modified 
drawings  should  be  pressed  forward  with  all 
haste.  We  were  unable,  at  the  time,  to  get  any 
further  orders  for  Tanks,  and  we  wanted  to  keep 
our  works  busy  and  avoid  discontinuity  of 
production. 

Communication  with  a  Tank  was  one  of  the 
greatest  troubles,  and  at  this  time  experiments 
were  made  with  a  daylight  signalling  lamp,  with 
wireless  and  with  semaphores. 

On  June  19th  it  was  decided  to  design  and  build 
a  Tank  capable  of  resisting  field-guns.  Mr. 
Tritton  had  already  got  out  certain  designs,  and 
experiments  were  carried  out  at  Shoebury  with 
Beardmore  plates  of  1  inch,  1|  inches,  and  2 
inches  thickness.  An  order  was  given  to  the 
Daimler  Company  to  construct  at  once  a  double 
105  H.P.  engine  for  this  heavy  Tank.  It  was, 
however,  never  completed.  Mobility  was  thought 
to  be  a  surer  defence  than  heavy  armour. 

On  June  19th  a  model  of  the  new  gun-carrying 
machine  was  placed  before  the  Ordnance  Com- 
mittee and  its  principle  explained.  Major  Wilson 
and  Major  Greg  of  the  Metropolitan  Company 
were   also   present.     Instructions   were   received 


82  TANKS 

from  the  Minister,  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  on  the 
16th  of  June  to  proceed  with  the  construction  of 
fifty  of  this  type  of  machine.  A  committee  was 
formed  to  deal  with  this  question.  It  consisted 
of  Major  Stern  (Chairman),  Mr.  d'Eyncourt, 
Colonel  Evans,  Major  Wilson,  Captain  Symes, 
Lieut.  Holden  and  Major  Dryer  (representing  the 
Ordnance  Committee).  Colonel  Goold  Adams, 
Director-General  of  Munitions  Inventions,  agreed 
to  help. 

Mr.  Norman  Holden,  who  had  been  invalided 
out  of  the  service  after  being  severely  wounded 
in  the  armoured  car  attack  on  the  Peninsula  of 
Gallipoli,  joined  my  staff  as  my  deputy  at  this 
time. 

Lieut. -Colonel  Solomon  J.  Solomon,  R.E.,  now 
undertook  to  camouflage  the  Tanks,  and  was 
supplied  with  several  tons  of  paint. 

About  this  time  Sir  Arthur  Conan  Doyle  was 
writing  to  the  Press  and  pointing  out  that  un- 
necessary casualties  were  caused  by  making 
frontal  attacks  on  German  machine-guns  with 
unprotected  infantry.  He  suggested  that  light 
armour  should  be  worn,  and  that  the  authorities 
were  wasting  lives  by  not  using  it. 

Mr.  Montagu  asked  me  to  see  him  and  to  show 
him  that  we  were  doing  something  still  better  to 
protect  the  infantry  by  mechanical  means  from 
mechanical  guns.  He  was  very  much  interested 
in  our  developments. 

From  that  time  I  kept  in  close  touch  with 
him,  knowing  his  great  knowledge  of  the  history 


FIRST  ORDERS  83 

of  war.  I  told  him  that  our  idea  was  that  once 
we  had  Tanks  in  large  numbers  we  could  bring 
back  the  element  of  surprise  which  was  now 
entirely  lacking  in  the  attack.  Although  he 
believed  in  mechanical  warfare,  he  doubted  this. 
He  doubted  it  until  the  battle  of  Cambrai  in 
November  1917,  when  he  wrote  to  me  : — 

"  Windlesham, 
"  Crowborough, 
"  Sussex, 

"  November  22nd. 
My  dear.  Stern, 

"  I  think  your  tactical  ideas  have  been  brilliantly 
vindicated  by  this  battle,  and  that  you  should  have  warm 
congratulations  from  all  who  know  the  facts. 

"  Yours  very  truly, 

"  A.  Conan  Doyle." 

It  was  rumoured  at  this  time,  also,  that  in- 
formation was  leaking  out  from  Birmingham,  and 
twelve  men  and  one  woman,  who  were  working 
for  a  Swiss  company  at  the  Metropolitan  Works, 
were  closely  watched.  One  of  the  men  wished 
to  return  to  Switzerland,  but  was  interned. 

I  was  pressing  all  the  time  for  further  orders, 
but  on  the  10th  of  July  a  letter  was  sent  to  the 
Director  of  Staff  Duties  by  Brigadier-General 
Burnett  Stuart  from  G.H.Q.,  France,  asking 
that  further  orders  should  be  delayed.  He 
wrote  : — 

"It  is  hardly  possible  to  decide  now,  with  the  know- 
ledge at  our  disposal,  whether  more  Tanks  should  be 
ordered  or  the  type  changed. 


84  TANKS 

"  Before  any  judgment  can  be  formed  it  will  be  neces- 
sary to  see  at  least  twenty  Tanks  fully  equipped  and 
manned,  functioning  in  accordance  with  some  definite 
tactical  scheme.  It  will  also  be  necessary  to  view  the 
French  experiments,  which  they  have  informed  us  that 
they  propose  to  hold  shortly  with  their  Tanks. 

"  Can  you  say,  please,  for  how  long  a  decision  may 
be  deferred  without  endangering  the  continuity  of 
manufacture  ?  " 

This  letter  was  sent  on  to  Colonel  Swinton,  who 
wrote  back  on  July  12th  : — 

"  The  reply  to  the  question  in  the  last  paragraph  of 
the  letter  from  G.H.Q.,  France,  which  was  enclosed,  is 
as  follows  :  The  decision  as  to  a  further  supply  of  Tanks, 
if  it  is  affirmative,  should  be  immediate. 

"  As  regards  the  manufacture  it  is  a  question  of  engines, 
guns,  gun  mountings,  gun  ammunition  and  various  small 
parts.  The  absolute  continuity  of  supply  is,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  already  broken,  but  so  far  the  skilled  men  have 
not  been  dispersed. 

"  There  is  one  other  point  in  regard  to  the  matter  to 
which  I  have  not  made  any  allusion,  and  that  is  the  question 
of  the  provision  of  personnel.  So  far  the  Heavy  Section 
has  been  able  to  obtain  a  very  good  class  of  man — one 
quite  above  the  average; — but  I  rather  imagine  that  the 
source  of  supply  is  to  some  extent  exhausted.  In  the 
event  of  the  supply  of  more  Tanks,  therefore,  we  cannot 
count  on  obtaining  men  of  the  stamp  necessary  from  the 
open  market,  and  to  man  a  special  Corps,  as  the  Heavy 
Section  is,  with  the  personnel  of  inferior  quality  would  be 
fatal.  The  work  needs  men  of  some  education,  a  mechani- 
cal bent,  good  physique  and  intelligence.  In  the  event 
of  the  development  of  this  branch  being  required  I  would 
suggest  that  the  most  satisfactory  way  of  obtaining  the 


FIRST   ORDERS  85 

personnel  would  be  to  transfer  the  personnel  of  some 
existing  unit  which  is  trained  in  somewhat  similar  duties 
to  the  Heavy  Section;  for  instance,  men  of  the  Royal 
Marine  Artillery  would,  I  think,  be  eminently  suitable 
for  duty  with  the  Heavy  Section,  as  they  are  trained  in 
gunnery,  machine-gunnery  and  in  machinery.  I  refer 
to  this  subject  because  it  is  germane  to  that  of  time.  If 
more  Tanks  are  to  be  constructed  it  will  be  essential  to 
take  the  requisite  number  of  men  en  bloc  from  some 
existing  formation,  and  that  at  the  same  time  as  it  is 
decided  to  increase  the  Heavy  Section. 

"  Further  I  would  add  that  an  early  decision  is  neces- 
sary, because  any  increase  in  the  number  of  Tanks  will 
necessitate  a  tremendous  expansion  of  the  ancillary 
services  connected  with  the  maintenance  and  repair  of 
the  unit,  the  importance  of  which  we  are  only  just  beginning 
to  be  in  a  position  to  gauge." 

About  this  time  I  found  it  very  difficult,  as  a 
Supply  Department,  to  work  with  a  Committee, 
some  of  whom  wished  every  point  referred  to 
them.  After  reflection  I  decided  that  the  only 
way  to  work  successfully  was  to  turn  it  into  an 
Advisory  Committee.  At  a  meeting  of  the  Com- 
mittee I  proposed  this.  I  explained  that  I  and 
my  Department  could  alone  be  held  responsible 
on  questions  of  supply,  that  the  different  members 
of  the  Committee  had  been  appointed  for  their 
very  special  knowledge  on  particular  subjects 
and  had  given  invaluable  advice  individually, 
and  that  it  was  the  name  of  "  Supply  Committee  " 
alone  that  had  caused  any  misunderstanding  as 
to  the  duties  of  its  members.  The  resolution 
was  carried  unanimously  and  was  approved  by 


86  TANKS 

the  Minister  of  Munitions,  Mr.  Montagu.  I  was 
then  appointed  Director  of  the  Tank  Supply 
Department,  with  Lieut.  Norman  Holden  as  my 
assistant,  and  the  powers  and  duties  of  the  Com- 
mittee were  transferred  to  me.  Mr.  d'Eyncourt 
agreed  to  act  as  Chief  Adviser  on  all  technical 
and  experimental  matters,  and  Mr.  P.  Dale 
Bussell  to  assist  in  matters  of  general  organisation 
and  procedure. 

At  the  end  of  July  we  were  told  that  the  War 
Office  proposed  to  send  a  few  Tanks  out  to 
France  at  once.  They  were,  however,  in  such  a 
state  of  repair  that  it  would  take  two  months  at 
least  to  get  them  ready. 

I  immediately  went  down  with  Colonel  Sykes 
to  the  Repair  Shop  Unit  of  the  Heavy  Branch 
of  the  Machine-gun  Corps  at  Thetford  and  found 
that  it  was  totally  inadequate  to  cope  with  the 
work  of  tuning  up  the  Tanks  in  a  hurry.  In 
those  days  the  machinery  and  skill  needed  for 
taking  off  the  track  were  not  developed  in  any 
way. 

I  returned  to  the  War  Office  and  told  them 
that  I  would  guarantee  to  have  all  the  machines 
put  in  order  within  ten  days.  Then  I  went  to 
Birmingham  and  asked  for  volunteers  from  the 
employees  of  the  Metropolitan  Carriage  WTagon 
and  Finance  Company  to  get  the  Tanks  ready 
within  a  week  to  go  to  France. 

I  told  them  that  the  accommodation  and  food 
would  be  difficult  to  find,  but  without  the  slightest 
hesitation  Mr.  Wirrick  of  the  Metropolitan  Com- 


FIRST   ORDERS  87 

pany  and  forty  men  started  for  Thctford.  They 
were  billeted  by  the  Chief  Constable.  The  diffi- 
culty was  the  food.  The  Army  could  not  supply 
it.  I  therefore  went  to  Colonel  Thornton,  General 
Manager  of  the  Great  Eastern  Railway,  and  he 
immediately  put  a  restaurant  car  on  a  siding  at 
the  camp,  and  fed  the  men  until  the  work  was 
done.     It  took  them  less  than  ten  days. 

This  is  only  one  of  the  instances  of  the  magnifi- 
cent patriotism  and  unselfishness  of  the  in- 
dustrial workers,  who  were  ready  to  labour  night 
and  day  for  the  Tanks,  from  the  making  of  the 
first  experimental  machine  until  the  Armistice 
was  signed  in  November  1918. 

Meanwhile,  Mr.  d'Eyncourt  and  I  saw  Sir 
William  Robertson.  We  were  most  anxious  that 
the  Tanks  should  not  be  used  until  they  had 
been  produced  in  large  numbers.  We  urged  him 
to  wait  until  the  spring  of  1917,  when  large 
numbers  would  be  ready.  I  also  wrote  to  the 
Minister  of  Munitions  : — 

"  August  3rd,  1916. 

"  I  beg  to  refer  to  our  conversation  regarding  the  order 
for  150  Tanks.  My  Department  was  originally  given  an 
order  to  produce  150  Tanks  with  necessary  spares,  and  I 
was  under  the  impression  that  these  would  not  be  used 
until  the  order  had  been  completed,  therefore  the  spares 
would  not,  in  the  ordinary  way,  be  available  until  the 
150  machines  were  completed. 

"  From  the  conversations  I  have  had  with  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  and  General  Sir  William  Robertson,  and  informa- 
tion received  from  Colonel  Swinton,  I  believe  it  is  in- 


88  TANKS 

tended  to  send  small  numbers  of  these  machines  out  at 
the  earliest  possible  date,  and  I  beg  to  inform  you  that 
the  machines  cannot  be  equipped  to  my  satisfaction  before 
the  1st  of  September.  I  have  therefore  made  arrange- 
ments that  100  machines  shall  be  completed  in  every 
detail,  together  with  the  necessary  spares,  by  the  1st  of 
September.  This  is  from  the  designer's  and  manufac- 
turer's point  of  view,  which  I  represent. 

"  I  may  add  that  in  my  opinion  the  sending  out  of 
partially  equipped  machines,  as  now  suggested,  is  courting 
disaster." 

I  had  seen  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  the  Secretary 
of  State  for  War,  and  he  heartily  agreed  with 
me,  but  on  the  other  side  it  was  urged  that  the 
heavy  casualties  in  the  Somme  offensive  of  July 
1st,  the  want  of  success  against  the  German  lines 
since  then,  and  the  approach  of  winter  without 
any  appreciable  advance  having  been  made,  all 
tended  to  lower  the  moral  of  the  troops,  and  it 
might  therefore  be  necessary  to  use  these  new 
weapons  in  order  to  raise  it  again.  Our  reasons 
for  desiring  to  wait  until  the  spring  were  under- 
stood, but  we  must  be  prepared  to  throw  every- 
thing we  had  into  the  scale.  The  slightest 
holding  back  of  any  of  our  resources  might, 
at  the  critical  moment,  make  the  difference 
between  defeat  and  victory.  Such  were  the 
arguments  used. 

The  French  also  had  begged  us  to  delay  until 
their  own  Tanks  were  ready  for  action.  M.  J.  L. 
Breton,  the  Under-Secretary  of  State  for  Inven- 
tions, had  pressed  M.  Thomas,  their  Minister  of 


FIRST   ORDERS  89 

Munitions,  to  build  Tanks  in  large  numbers; 
he  was  very  anxious  that  the  French  should 
share  in  the  first  surprise,  and,  when  this  was 
impossible,  urged  that  they  should  continue  to 
build  as  rapidly  as  possible.  It  was  on  September 
28th,  just  after  the  first  Tank  battle,  that  he 
wrote : — 

"  I  think  it  is  now  unnecessary  to  labour  the  imperative 
need  for  pressing  forward  with  the  construction  of  our 
offensive  caterpillar  machines  as  quickly  as  ever  it  is 
possible  to  do  so. 

"  The  English,  by  using  prematurely  the  engines  which, 
to  their  credit,  they  constructed  much  more  rapidly  than 
ourselves,  have  debarred  us  of  the  use  of  the  element  of 
surprise,  which  should  have  enabled  us  easily  to  pierce 
the  enemy's  lines,  though  they  have  more  or  less  rendered 
us  the  service  of  convincing  even  the  most  sceptical  and 
most  red-tape  bound." 

He  urged  his  views  again  in  a  letter  of  October 
20th  :— 

"  It  seems  to  me  more  than  ever  indispensable  to  take 
steps  towards  pushing  on  with  the  construction  of  more 
powerful  machines,  better  armed,  and,  above  all,  more 
heavily  armoured. 

"The  heart-breaking  precipitation  of  the  English  in 
prematurely  using  their  machines,  before  we  were  in  a 
condition  to  deliver  to  the  enemy  the  decisive  blow — 
which  putting  into  the  line  several  hundred  of  our  machines 
would  have  enabled  us  to  do — unfortunately  no  longer 
allowed  us  to  anticipate  the  effect  of  the  element  of  surprise, 
which  would  have  been  irresistible." 

At  the  beginning  of  September,  Mr.  Montagu 


90  TANKS 

saw  Sir  Douglas  Haig  himself,  and  found  him 
most  sympathetic  in  hearing  the  views  of  those 
who  were  working  and  thinking  and  inventing  at 
home,  but  he  held  out  little  hope  of  keeping  the 
Tanks  until  the  spring.  They  would  have  to  be 
used  that  autumn  and  used  soon. 

So  it  was  arranged.  The  Tanks  at  Thetford 
were  entrained  at  night  and  taken  by  rail  to 
Avonmouth.  There  they  were  shipped  to  Havre, 
taken  to  a  village  near  Abbeville  and  from  there 
sent  up  to  a  point  fifteen  miles  behind  the  line. 
Moving  Tanks  was  in  those  days  a  very  difficult 
business.  The  sponsons,  each  weighing  35  cwt. 
(gun  included),  had  to  be  unbolted  and  put  on 
separate  trucks,  and  in  that  journey  from  Thet- 
ford to  the  front  Tanks  and  sponsons  were 
loaded  and  unloaded  five  times.  The  first  party 
of  the  men  of  the  Heavy  Machine-gun  Corps 
crossed  to  France  on  August  13th.  Other  parties 
followed,  and  on  September  15th,  seven  months 
after  the  first  order  was  given  by  Mr.  Lloyd 
George,  the  Tanks  went  into  action. 


CHAPTER  V 
TANKS   IN  ACTION 


CHAPTER  V 

TANKS   IN   ACTION 

September  1916  to  October  1916 

The  Tanks  were  already  in  France  and  waiting 
to  go  into  battle,  but  the  secret  had  been  well 
kept,  how  well  was  shown  by  a  thing  that  hap- 
pened on  the  very  morning  in  September  when 
I  was  leaving  for  the  Somme  for  the  first  Tank 
action. 

A  civil  servant,  an  Assistant  Secretary,  came 
to  see  me  on  this  eventful  morning  just  as  I  was 
starting. 

He  told  me  that  as  my  Department  was  of  no 
real  importance,  since  he  had  no  knowledge 
what  it  was,  he  had  arranged  that  during  the 
next.  Sunday  all  my  papers  and  drawings  were 
to  be  moved  out  into  a  small  flat  in  a  back  street 
opposite  the  Hotel  Metropole. 

This  was  no  time  to  argue ;  my  train  left  in  a 
few  minutes ;  once  more  the  famous  Squadron  20 
to  the  rescue.  I  told  him  that  the  Depart- 
ment could  not  move,  as  it  was  concerned  in 
matters  of  the  greatest  national  importance, 
and  would  require  before  long  a  very  large 
building  of  its  own.  This  had  no  effect  on  him, 
so  I  gave  instructions  to  one  of  my  officers  in 

93 


94  TANKS 

his  presence  to  put  an  armed  guard  on  my  office 
while  I  was  away,  and  to  resist  any  attack. 
Should  he  make  an  attempt  he  was  to  be  arrested, 
taken  to  Squadron  20's  headquarters  at  Wemb- 
ley, tied  to  a  stake  for  twenty-four  hours  and  the 
reason  carefully  explained  to  all  and  sundry, 
especially  newspaper  reporters. 

Fortunately  for  him  no  attempt  was  made, 
but  on  my  return  we  were  offered,  amongst 
other  buildings,  the  Colonial  Institute  and  the 
Union  Club.  Finally,  we  took  Nos.  14,  17  and 
19,  Cockspur  Street,  and  even  these  blocks  of 
buildings  proved  too  small. 

I  arrived  late  at  night  on  September  16th  at 
Beauquesne,  Advanced  Headquarters,  and  found 
that  an  old  friend  of  mine,  Major  A.  H.  Wood, 
was  Town  Major.  Here  I  met  Colonel  Elles, 
who  originally  came  to  Hatfield  for  the  B.E.F., 
and  from  him  I  learnt  of  the  great  victory  of 
the  Tanks  the  day  before. 

In  this,  their  first  battle,  forty-nine  Tanks  were 
used,  but  of  these  seventeen  did  not  reach  their 
starting-point.  They  were  either  ditched  on 
the  way  or  broke  down  through  mechanical 
trouble.  The  ground  over  which  the  remaining 
thirty- two  attacked  had  been  heavily  "  crumped  " 
in  places,  but  the  weather  had  been  fine  and  dry, 
so  that  the  ground  was  not  unfavourable.  The 
tactical  idea  for  their  use  was  that  they  should 
work  in  sub-sections  of  two  or  three  machines 
against  strong  points. 

Every  Tank  was  given  Hie  route  that  it  was  to 


TANKS   IN   ACTION  95 

follow,  and  the  time  that  it  was  to  leave  the 
starting-point.  In  most  cases  this  was  half  an 
hour  before  zero,  which  was  fixed  for  dawn,  so 
that  the  Tanks  should  reach  the  German  trenches 
five  minutes  ahead  of  the  infantry. 

The  risk  of  these  tactics  was  that  the  Tanks, 
by  starting  before  the  infantry,  might  pre- 
maturely draw  the  enemy's  fire,  but  this  risk  it 
was  decided  to  take.  When  our  own  barrage 
came  down  on  the  enemy's  front  line  it  left 
lanes  free  from  fire,  and  by  these  lanes  the  Tanks 
were  to  advance. 

The  seventeen  that  worked  with  the  15th 
Corps  were  the  most  successful.  Their  starting- 
points  were  round  Delville  Wood,  and  eleven  of 
them  crossed  the  German  trenches.  One  gave 
great  help  to  the  infantry  when  held  up  by  wire 
and  machine-gun  fire  before  Flers  itself.  Its 
commander  put  it  across  the  trench,  which  he 
raked  with  his  fire,  then,  travelling  along  behind 
the  trench,  he  captured  300  prisoners. 

Another  Tank  pushed  into  Gueudecourt  and 
attacked  with  its  6-pounders  a  German  field 
battery  of  the  same  calibre  as  our  18-pounders. 
It  destroyed  one  gun,  and  was  then  hit  and  caught 
fire.  Only  two  of  its  crew  got  back,  but  the 
total  casualties  of  the  Tank  crews  were  very 
small. 

Altogether,  of  the  thirty-two  which  reached 
their  starting-points,  nine  went  ahead  of  the 
infantry,  causing  great  loss  to  the  enemy;  nine 
more,  though  the  infantry  got  ahead  of  them, 


96  TANKS 

did  good  work  in  demolishing  strong  points 
where  the  enemy  still  held  out.  The  remaining 
fourteen  broke  down  or  were  ditched.1 

On  Sunday,  the  17th,  Sir  Douglas  Haig  ap- 
peared in  front  of  General  Butler's  offices  and 
congratulated  Colonel  Swinton  and  me.  He 
said,  "  We  have  had  the  greatest  victory  since 
the  battle  of  the  Marne.  We  have  taken  more 
prisoners  and  more  territory,  with  comparatively 
few  casualties.  This  is  due  to  the  Tanks. 
Wherever  the  Tanks  advanced  we  took  our 
objectives,  and  where  they  did  not  advance  we 
failed  to  take  our  objectives."  He  added : 
"  Colonel  Swinton,  you  shall  be  head  of  the 
Tank  Corps;  Major  Stern,  you  shall  be  head  of 
the  Construction  of  Tanks.  Go  back  and  make  as 
many  more  Tanks  as  you  can.     We  thank  you." 

A  few  days  later  Mr.  d'Eyncourt  and  I  were 
received  by  Sir  Douglas  Haig.  He  again  said, 
"  Go  home  and  build  as  many  Tanks  as  you  can, 
subject  to  not  interfering  with  the  output  of  air- 
craft and  of  railway  trucks  and  locomotives,  of 
which  we  are  in  great  need." 

At  last  our  contention  had  been  proved.  We 
had  always  been  convinced  that  mechanics 
applied  to  war  would  save  life,  just  as  mechanics 
applied  to  industry  saved  labour;  that  since 
there  were  limits  to  human  endurance  we  must 
use  steel  instead  of  flesh  and  muscles,  and  that 

1  I  have  an  interesting  relic  of  the  battles  of  the  Tanks 
on  the  Sol  nine.  Sec  Mr.  Ashincad  liartlett's  letter  in 
Appendix  I. 


TANKS   IN   ACTION  97 

the  only  way  to  meet  the  machine-gun  was  with 
armour-plate. 

That  day  I  motored  to  Amiens  for  lunch  with 
Major  Wood  and  went  to  Bray-en-Somme,  where 
the  Tanks  were  parked  at  a  place  called  "  The 
Loop"  —  new  Tanks  and  battered  Tanks  to- 
gether. I  met  my  brother,  Major  Stern,  and 
Colonel  Thynne,  in  command  of  a  composite 
regiment  of  South  Irish  Horse  and  Wiltshire 
Yeomanry,  and  took  them  over  to  see  the  Tanks, 
which  had  created  an  immense  sensation.  We 
met  the  cavalry  returning  from  the  battle  front. 
They  had  not  been  used.  The  lesson  had  still 
to  be  learnt  that  until  the  Tanks  could  overwhelm 
the  machine-gunners  there  could  be  no  chance 
for  the  cavalry. 

I  dined  with  General  Butler  at  his  mess,  and 
left  by  car  for  Paris  on  Monday  morning,  Sep- 
tember 18th,  at  9  a.m.,  with  General  Butler  and 
Colonel  Swinton,  to  see  what  the  French  were 
doing  in  the  way  of  Tanks. 

We  arrived  in  Paris  in  time  for  lunch,  saw  the 
first  French  Tank  at  Marly  and  General  Estienne, 
the  first  Commander  of  the  French  Tank  Corps 
(Artillerie  chars  d'assaut). 

After  dinner  we  motored  to  Boulogne,  arriving 
about  2  a.m.  There  a  destroyer  was  awaiting 
us.  It  was  not  supposed  to  leave  until  day- 
break, but  Captain  Evans,  of  South  Pole  fame, 
took  us  on  board  at  once,  and  we  reached  Folke- 
stone within  an  hour.  London  we  reached  by 
car  before  nine  o'clock  on  Tuesday  morning. 

H 


98  TANKS 

At  10.30  a.m.  I  had  a  meeting  at  the  War 
Office  with  the  Secretary  of  State  for  War, 
Mr.  Lloyd  George,  General  Butler,  General  Whig- 
ham,  and  Dr.  Addison,  representing  the  Minister 
of  Munitions  (Mr.  Montagu,  the  Minister  of 
Munitions,  was  abroad  at  the  time). 

At  this  meeting  General  Butler  said  that  Sir 
Douglas  Haig  required  1000  Tanks  to  be  con- 
structed at  once.  After  discussion  it  was  de- 
cided that  this  should  be  done,  and  orders  were 
immediately  placed  with  the  manufacturers. 
This  order  meant  the  building  of  30,000  tons  of 
armoured  vehicles,  besides  at  least  1000  6- 
pounder  guns  and  6,000  machine-guns. 

The  mere  tactical  record  of  what  the  Tanks 
did  at  Flers  and  Gueudecourt  gives  no  idea  of  the 
moral  effect  of  the  first  appearance  of  this  new 
and  strange  weapon.  It  astonished  and  terrified 
the  enemy.  It  astonished,  delighted  and  amused 
its  friends.  War  Correspondents  vied  with  each 
other  to  find  the  vivid,  unexpected  word  that 
would  do  justice  to  its  half-terrible,  half-comic 
strangeness  (and  yet  give  away  no  secrets),  and 
the  humorists  of  the  battalions  sharpened  their 
wits  on  it.  They  communicated  their  gaiety, 
through  their  letters,  to  the  people  at  home. 
The  j oiliest,  most  fantastic  of  them  all  was  a 
letter  from  a  soldier  to  his  sweetheart,  which 
appeared  in  the  newspapers  at  the  time.  It 
could  not  be  left  out  of  a  book  on  Tanks. 

"  They  can  do  up  prisoners  in   bundles  like  straw- 


TANKS   IN   ACTION  99 

binders,  and,  in  addition,  have  an  adaptation  of  a 
printing  machine,  which  enables  them  to  catch  the 
Huns,  fold,  count,  and  deliver  them  in  quires,  every 
thirteenth  man  being  thrown  out  a  little  further  than 
the  others.  The  Tanks  can  truss  refractory  prisoners 
like  fowls  prepared  for  cooking,  while  their  equipment 
renders  it  possible  for  them  to  charge  into  a  crowd 
of  Huns,  and  by  shooting  out  spokes  like  porcupine 
quills,  carry  off  an  opponent  on  each.  Though  '  stuck- 
up,'  the  prisoners  are,  needless  to  say,  by  no  means 
proud  of  their  position. 

"  They  can  chew  up  barbed  wire  and  turn  it  into 
munitions.  As  they  run  they  slash  their  tails  and  clear 
away  trees,  houses,  howitzers,  and  anything  else  in  the 
vicinity.  They  turn  over  on  their  backs  and  catch 
live  shells  in  their  caterpillar  feet,  and  they  can  easily 
be  adapted  as  submarines;  in  fact,  most  of  them 
crossed  the  Channel  in  this  guise.  They  loop  the 
loop,  travel  forwards,  sideways  and  backwards,  not 
only  with  equal  speed,  but  at  the  same  time.  They 
spin  round  like  a  top,  only  far  more  quickly,  dig 
themselves  in,  bury  themselves,  scoop  out  a  tunnel, 
and  come  out  again  ten  miles  away  in  half  an 
hour." 

A  little  later  on  I  took  Mr.  Wells  to  Birming- 
ham to  show  him  how  his  idea  had  at  last  been 
realised.  He  wrote  an  article  on  what  he  saw, 
prophesying,  as  only  he  could,  what  would 
come  of  these  new  weapons,  and  urging  that  the 
factories  should  not  be  robbed  of  the  men  who 
could  build  them.  At  the  time  the  article  was 
forbidden  by  the  Censor.  I  will  quote  from  it 
his  description  of  the  Tanks.  It  was  one  of  the 
earliest  authentic  descriptions  written  at  a  time 


100  TANKS 

when  so  much  was  appearing  in  print  that  was 
entertaining  but  untrue. 

"  October,  1916. 
"  Tanks 

"  The  young  of  even  the  most  humble  beasts  have 
something  piquant  and  engaging  about  them,  and  so  I 
suppose  it  is  in  the  way  of  things  that  the  land  iron- 
clad, which  opens  a  new  and  more  dreadful  and  de- 
structive phase  in  the  human  folly  of  warfare,  should 
appear  first  as  if  it  were  a  joke.  Never  has  any  such 
thing  so  completely  masked  its  wickedness  under  an 
appearance  of  genial  silliness.  The  Tank  is  a  creature 
to  which  one  naturally  flings  a  pet  name ;  the  five  or 
six   I   was    shown    wandering,    rooting,   and    climbing 

over  obstacles,  round  a  large  field  near  X ,  were  as 

amusing  and  disarming  as  a  litter  of  lively  young  pigs. 

"  In  a  little  while  there  will  probably  be  pictures  of 
these  things  available  for  the  public;  in  the  mean- 
while, I  may  perhaps  give  them  a  word  of  description. 
They  are  like  large  slugs;  with  an  underside  a  little 
like  the  flattened  rockers  of  a  rocking  horse;  slugs 
between  20  and  40  feet  long.  They  are  like  flat-sided 
slugs,  slugs  with  spirit,  who  raise  an  inquiring  snout, 
like  the  snout  of  a  dogfish,  into  the  air.  They  crawl 
upon  their  bellies  in  a  way  that  would  be  tedious  to 
describe  to  the  inquiring  specialist.  They  go  over  the 
ground  with  the  sliding  speed  of  active  snails.  Behind 
them  trail  two  wheels  supporting  a  flimsy  tail,  wheels 
that  strike  one  as  incongruous  as  if  a  monster  began 
kangaroo  and  ended  doll's  perambulator.  These  wheels 
annoy  me.  They  are  not  steely  monsters;  they  are 
painted  the  drab  and  unassuming  colours  that  are 
fashionable  in  modern  warfare,  so  that  the  armour 
seems  rather  like  the  integument  of  a  rhinoceros.  At 
the   sides  of   the  head   project   armoured  cheeks,  and 


TANKS   IN   ACTION  101 

from  above  these  stick  out  guns  that  look  very  like 
stalked  eyes.  That  is  the  general  appearance  of  the 
contemporary  Tank. 

"  It  slides  on  the  ground ;  the  silly  little  wheels 
that  so  detract  from  the  genial  bestiality  of  its  appear- 
ance dandle  and  bump  behind  it.  It  swings  round 
about  its  axis.  It  comes  to  an  obstacle — a  low  wall,  let 
us  say,  or  a  heap  of  bricks — and  sets  to  work  to  climb 
with  its  snout.  It  rears  over  the  obstacle,  it  raises  its 
straining  belly,  it  overhangs  more  and  more,  and  at 
last  topples  forward ;  it  sways  upon  the  heap,  and  then 
goes  plunging  downwards,  sticking  out  the  weak  counter- 
poise of  its  wheeled  tail.  If  it  comes  to  a  house  or  a 
tree  or  a  wall,  or  such  like  obstruction,  it  rams  against 
it  so  as  to  bring  all  its  weight  to  bear  upon  it — it  weighs 
some  tons — and  then  climbs  over  the  debris.  I  saw  it, 
and  incredulous  soldiers  of  experience  watched  it  at 
the  same  time,  cross  trenches  and  wallow  amazingly 
through  muddy  exaggerations  of  shell  holes.  Then  I 
repeated  the  tour  inside. 

"  Again  the  Tank  is  like  the  slug.  The  slug,  as 
every  biological  student  knows,  is  unexpectedly  com- 
plicated inside.  The  Tank  is  as  crowded  with  inward 
parts  as  a  battleship.  It  is  filled  with  engines,  guns 
and  ammunition,  and  in  the  interstices,  men. 

''  You  will  smash  your  hat,'  said  Colonel  Stern. 

" '  No,  keep  it  on,  or  else  you  will  smash  your 
head.' 

"  Only  Mr.  C.  R.  W.  Nevinson  could  do  justice  to 
the  interior  of  a  Tank.  You  see  a  hand  gripping  some- 
thing; you  see  the  eyes  and  forehead  of  an  engineer's 
face;  you  perceive  that  an  overall  blueishness  beyond 
the  engine  is  the  back  of  another  man.  '  Don't  hold 
that,'  says  some  one.  '  It  is  too  hot.  Hold  on  to  that.' 
The  engines  roar,  so  loudly  that  I  doubt  whether  one 
could  hear  guns  without ;  the  floor  begins  to  slope,  and 


102  TANKS 

slopes  until  one  seems  to  be  at  forty-five  degrees  or 
thereabouts;  then  the  whole  concern  swings  up,  and 
sways  and  slants  the  other  way.  You  have  crossed  a 
bank.  You  heel  sideways.  Through  the  door,  which 
has  been  left  open,  you  see  the  little  group  of  engineers, 
staff  officers  and  naval  men  receding  and  falling  away 
behind  you.  You  straighten  up  and  go  uphill.  You 
halt  and  begin  to  rotate.  Through  the  open  door,  the 
green  field  with  its  red  walls,  rows  of  worksheds  and 
forests  of  chimneys  in  the  background,  begins  a  steady 
processional  movement.  The  group  of  engineers  and 
officers  and  naval  men  appears  at  the  other  side  of  the 
door  and  further  off.  Then  comes  a  sprint  downhill. 
You  descend  and  stretch  your  legs. 

"  About  the  field  other  Tanks  are  doing  their  stunts. 
One  is  struggling  in  an  apoplectic  way  in  the  mud  pit 
with  a  cheek  half  buried.  It  noses  its  way  out  and  on 
with  an  air  of  animal  relief. 

"  They  are  like  jokes  by  Heath  Robinson.  One 
forgets  that  these  things  have  already  saved  the  lives 
of  many  hundreds  of  our  soldiers  and  smashed  and 
defeated  thousands  of  Germans. 

"  Said  one  soldier  to  me  :  '  In  the  old  attacks  you 
used  to  see  the  British  dead  lying  outside  the  machine- 
gun  emplacements  like  birds  outside  a  butt  with  a 
good  shot  inside.     Now,  these  things  walk  through.'  " 

That  no  time  should  be  wasted  and  that  both 
the  French  and  we  should  get  the  best  results, 
I  decided  to  arrange  for  a  conference  in  Paris  at 
which  all  our  engineers  should  meet  all  the 
French  engineers  engaged  on  Mechanical  War- 
fare, and  further  that  the  whole  party  should  go 
to  the  Front  to  inspect  our  Tanks  and  see  the 
results  of  the  battle.     Mr.  Lloyd  George  gave  me 


TANKS   IN   ACTION  103 

a  letter  to  his  friend,  M.  Thomas,  the  French 
Minister  of  Munitions. 

The  development  of  Mechanical  Warfare  in 
France  was  due  very  largely  to  two  men :  on  the 
military  side,  to  General  Estienne;  on  the 
civilian  side,  to  M.  J.  L.  Breton,  Under-Secretary 
of  State  for  Inventions. 

General  Estienne  was  a  great  believer  in  the 
small  Tank  which  could  be  quickly  carried  by 
lorry  to  the  battle-field,  for  attack  or  counter- 
attack, and  the  first  French  Tanks  constructed 
by  the  two  big  French  armament  firms  of 
Schneider  and  St.  diamond  were,  like  our 
experimental  machine  at  Lincoln,  merely  steel 
boxes  placed  on  copies  of  the  Holt  track.  When 
tried  they  did  not  prove  a  success.  General 
Estienne  then  consulted  M.  Louis  Renault, 
famous  for  the  Renault  motor-car,  and  he  de- 
signed and  produced  in  thousands  a  light  Tank 
which  played  a  big  part  in  Marshal  Foch's  great 
counter-attack  in  July,  1918.  None  of  the 
French  Tanks  were  able  to  cross  large  trenches, 
such  as  our  Tanks  could  cross  (the  Schneider  and 
the  St.  diamond,  owing  to  their  design,  the 
Renault,  owing  to  its  small  size) ;  but  in  the 
battle  of  July,  1918,  fought  on  ground  where 
the  Germans  at  the  end  of  their  advance  had  had 
little  time  to  fortify  themselves,  they  were  not 
called  upon  to  cross  specially-prepared  trenches 
such  as  the  Hindenburg  Line. 

Besides  General  Estienne,  with  his  great  mili- 
tary   experience    and    enthusiasm,    Mechanical 


104  TANKS 

Warfare  in  France  owed  much  to  the  officers 
under  him,  notably  Commandant  H.  Michel, 
Capitaine  de  Poix,  and,  later,  General  Monhover 
and  Capitaine  Communeau. 

Nor  would  the  larger  development  of  Tanks  in 
France  ever  have  taken  place  had  it  not  been  for 
the  broad-minded  enthusiasm  and  intelligence  of 
Colonel  Aubertin,  who  was  in  charge  of  all  Tank 
matters  at  the  French  War  Office,  under  M. 
Clemenceau,  the  Minister  of  War.  He  eliminated 
all  "  red  tape  "  and  worked  most  loyally  and 
enthusiastically  with  ourselves  and,  later  on,  with 
the  Americans  also.  His  deputy,  Capitaine  Par- 
ville,  reflected  the  qualities  of  his  chief. 

It  was  an  undertaking  to  get  everybody 
assembled  and  transported  to  the  Front,  espe- 
cially civilians,  with  all  the  restrictions  imposed 
both  in  the  French  and  English  zones.  However, 
before  the  end  of  the  week  (September  23rd)  our 
party  had  started  for  Paris.  It  consisted  of 
Mr.  d'Eyncourt,  Captain  Holden,  Commander 
McGrath,  Captain  Symcs,  Major  Wilson,  Mr. 
Skeens,  and  Major  Buddicom ;  Mr.  Tritton  of 
Messrs.  Foster;  Mr.  Brackenbury  and  Colonel 
Hadcock  of  Messrs.  Armstrong,  Whitworth;  Mr. 
Searle,  representing  the  Daimler  Company;  Mr. 
E.  Squires,  Major  Greg  and  Mr.  Stockton  of  the 
Metropolitan  Carriage  Wagon  &  Finance  Com- 
pany, and  myself.  The  day  before,  the  War 
Office  agreed  to  my  being  made  temporary 
Lieut. -Colonel,  with  authority  to  wear  badges  of 
rank  on  going  to  France. 


t 


Tanks  attack  in  Thiepval,   1916.    (p    95) 


The  kind  of  ground  our  Tanks  had  to  work  on.    Everywhere  shell-pocked,  191C.  (p.  95) 


Tanks  in    Vcti 


TANKS   IN   ACTION  105 

We  arrived  in  Paris  and  saw  the  French  Tanks. 
We  met  General  Mouret  and  General  Estienne. 
We  met  the  representatives  of  the  two  French 
firms,  M.  Deloulle  and  M.  Brillie  of  Schneider, 
and  Dr.  Laurens  Dutilh  and  Colonel  Remailho  of 
St.  diamond.  We  visited  the  Schneider  factory 
at  St.  Ouen  near  Paris. 

It  was  very  strange  that  at  the  Conference 
between  the  English  and  French  engineers  at 
Marly,  on  the  Tank  ground  there,  it  was  dis- 
covered that  few  of  the  Frenchmen  could  talk 
English  and  few  of  the  English  could  talk  French, 
but  both  could — up  to  a  certain  point — talk 
German,  and  it  was  by  means  of  this  language 
that  they  made  each  other  understood. 

On  September  26th,  very  early  in  the  morning, 
we  set  out  by  car,  an  Anglo-French  party  of 
thirty-five,  for  the  Loop  where  the  Tanks  were 
parked.  At  Amiens  we  lunched,  and  there  I  had 
enormous  difficulties  with  the  A.P.M.  getting 
White  Passes  for  the  whole  party.  In  the  end 
we  reached  the  Loop,  inspected  the  Tanks  and 
saw  one  of  them  give  an  exhibition  of  crossing 
a  deep  road.  I  arrived  back  in  London  on 
Thursday,  the  28th  of  September. 

In  order  to  get  going  on  the  big  order,  we  had 
to  increase  the  armour-plate  capacity,  and  in 
addition  to  Beardmore,  Cammell  Laird  and 
Vickers,  we  brought  in  Edgar  Allen,  Armstrong 
Whitworth,  Firth's  and  Hadfields. 

The  chief  difficulty  in  producing  Tanks  in 
numbers  was  to  get  engines,  and  we  at  once  took 


106  TANKS 

steps  to  find  engines  in  America  of  the  necessary 
horse-power.  Our  efforts  were  not  successful, 
and  an  arrangement  was  made  with  the  Daimler 
Company  to  supply  us. 

On  October  16th  a  further  100  Tanks  were 
ordered  to  keep  the  factories  going  until  the 
design  for  the  1000  had  been  settled. 

The  order  for  gun-carrying  Tanks  was  now 
reduced  from  fifty  to  forty-eight,  the  remaining 
two  being  made  into  Labour-Saving  Salvage 
machines  for  Tanks,  fitted  with  cranes  on  top. 

In  order  to  build  the  first  Tanks  without  any 
avoidable  delay,  it  had  been  necessary  to  use 
only  existing  designs  of  engines  and  transmissions. 
Consequently,  the  transmission  was  not  ideal, 
the  steering  being  done  by  putting  a  brake  on 
the  differential  of  the  old  105  H.P.  tractor. 
When  it  was  seen  that  the  Tanks  were  a  success, 
I  decided  that  every  transmission  that  had  any 
possible  chance  of  success  should  be  built  experi- 
mentally. On  the  3rd  of  October  the  orders 
were  given.  Mr.  Tritton  was  to  carry  out  an 
idea  of  his  own,  a  double-engine  Tank  (known  as 
the  "Whippet"),  which  was  to  be  steered  by 
accelerating  one  engine  or  the  other ;  the  Daimler 
Company  were  to  construct  a  petrol  electric 
transmission  of  their  own ;  Mr.  Merz  was  to 
design  and  build  an  ordinary  electrical  tramway 
transmission,  with  the  British  Wcstinghousc; 
Mr.  Wilson,  with  Messrs.  Vickers,  was  to  build  a 
Williams-Janney  hydraulic  transmission ;  the 
Ilcle-Shaw    Company   their   hydraulic  transmis- 


TANKS   IN   ACTION  107 

sion;  the  Metropolitan  Company  Major  Wilson's 
epicyclic  and  also  Wilkin's  system  of  multiple 
clutches ;  and  the  French  St.  diamond  Company 
arranged  to  have  their  petrol  electric  transmission 
fitted  into  a  hull  which  I  was  to  send  them. 
This  made  eight  in  all. 

The  total  order  was  now  for  1250  Tanks.  It 
was  an  immense  order  to  get  placed.  Large 
grants  had  to  be  made  by  the  Treasury  to  extend 
the  factories  for  the  production  of  engines,  guns, 
armour-plate,  steel  castings  and  other  things. 
New  factories  had  to  be  erected  for  the  assembly 
of  Tanks. 

It  was  about  this  time  that  I  took  Mr.  Wells 
down  to  Birmingham,  and  he  wrote,  in  the 
article  from  which  I  have  already  quoted,   "  I 

saw  other  things  that  day  at  X .     The  Tank  is 

only  a  beginning  in  a  new  phase  of  warfare.  Of 
these  other  things  I  may  only  write  on  the 
most  general  terms.  But  though  Tanks  and 
their   collaterals   are   being   made  upon   a   very 

considerable  scale  in  X ,  already  I  realised  as  I 

walked  through  gigantic  forges  as  high  and  mar- 
vellous as  cathedrals,  and  from  workshed  to 
workshed  where  gun-carriages,  ammunition  carts, 
and  a  hundred  such  things  were  flowing  into 
existence  with  the  swelling  abundance  of  a 
river  that  flows  out  of  a  gorge,  that  as  the  demand 
for  the  new  developments  grew  clear  and  strong, 
the  resources  of  Britain  are  capable  still  of  a 
tremendous  response." 

Then,  on  October  10th,  I  received  an  official 


108  TANKS 

instruction  from  the  Army  Council  cancelling 
the  order  for  1000  Tanks. 

All  the  manufacturers  who  had  had  any 
experience  of  the  methods  of  the  Tank  Depart- 
ment up  till  then,  had  worked  with  the  greatest 
enthusiasm.  This  sudden  cancellation  came  as 
a  thunderbolt.  I  immediately  went  to  see  Mr. 
Lloyd  George,  the  Secretary  of  State  for  War. 
He  said  that  he  had  heard  nothing  of  the  instruc- 
tion. I  told  him  that  I  had,  with  enormous 
difficulty,  started  swinging  this  huge  weight,  and 
that  I  could  not  possibly  stop  it  now.  I  told 
him  that  he  could  cancel  my  appointment,  but 
he  could  not  possibly  get  me  to  cancel  the  orders 
I  had  placed.  Sir  William  Robertson,  the  Chief 
of  the  Imperial  General  Staff,  then  appeared,  and 
Mr.  Lloyd  George  said  that  he  could  not  under- 
stand how  this  order  could  be  cancelled  without 
his  knowledge,  since  he  was  President  of  the 
Army  Council.  He  asked  me  to  tell  Sir  William 
Robertson  what  I  had  told  him.  This  I  did. 
Excusing  myself  owing  to  pressure  of  work,  I 
then  left  the  room. 

The  order  for  the  production  of  1000  Tanks 
was  reinstated  next  day. 


CHAPTER  VI 
PRODUCTION  ON   A   LARGE   SCALE 


CHAPTER  VI 

PRODUCTION   ON   A   LARGE   SCALE 

October  1916  to  April  1917 

The  business  of  the  Department  now  became 
more  varied,  and  as  the  need  for  absolute  secrecy 
no  longer  existed,  our  name  of  T.S.  Department 
(for  up  to  this  time,  not  even  the  word  Tank  was 
used)  disappeared.  I  was  made  Director-General 
of  the  Department  of  Mechanical  Warfare  Supply, 
with  Mr.  P.  Dale  Bussell  and  Captain  Holden  as 
Deputy  Directors-General.  Sir  E.  H.  Tennyson 
d'Eyncourt,  K.C.B.,  and  the  Hon.  Sir  Charles 
Parsons,  K.C.B.,  became  Chief  Technical  Advisers. 
Sir  William  Tritton  was  appointed  Director  of 
Construction,  and  Major  W.  G.  Wilson,  Director 
of  Engineering. 

Other  changes  had  taken  place.  Colonel  Swin- 
ton  had  returned  to  his  duties  at  the  Committee 
of  Imperial  Defence.  Colonel  Elles  now  com- 
manded the  Tanks  at  the  Front,  and  General 
Anley,  who  had  commanded  a  brigade  in  the  Mons 
retreat,  now  took  command  of  them  in  England. 
He  had  a  keen  sense  of  humour.  One  day  a 
bombastic  Lieut. -Colonel  of  Tanks  came  into  my 
office  when  the  General  was  there.  "  When 
shall   I   get   my   Tanks  ? "    said   the   bombastic 

in 


112  TANKS 

officer.  "  The  Commander-in-Chief  is  awfully 
annoyed  that  I  have  not  got  any  yet." 

"  This,"  said  the  General,  turning  to  me, 
"  reminds  me  of  the  fly  on  the  elephant's  trunk 
apologising  for  its  weight." 

It  was  General  Anley  who  started  the  famous 
Tank  Camp  at  Wool.  It  was  splendidly  organised, 
and  the  Tank  Corps,  under  his  command,  became 
a  fine,  well-disciplined  force.  We  who  were 
building  the  Tanks  had  every  encouragement  and 
help  from  him,  and  were  all  very  sorry  when  he 
was  appointed  to  a  command  in  Egypt. 

Complete  secrecy  had  had  grave  disadvantages, 
but  now  that  we  were  beginning  to  be  known,  we 
found  others  that  before  we  had  escaped.  One 
was  a  great  increase  in  our  correspondence.  We 
received  letters  at  this  time  from  men  of  all 
nationalities  all  over  the  world,  not  only  sending 
suggestions  for  the  improvement  of  Tanks  but 
making  claims  that  the  writers  were  the  inventors 
of  them.  This  is  one  of  the  letters  from  a  claim- 
ant. It  was  addressed  to  the  King's  Secretary, 
Christal  Palace,  London. 

"  Thursday, 

"May  Z\stt  1917. 

"  Sir, 

"  I  Wright  Having  discoved  the  first  Tank 
Pattern  now  hused  at  the  War  and  Dementions  for  huse 
I  sent  it  to  the  Admarality  wich  brought  it  out  i  have  not 
received  enything  for  same  Pattern  and  Dementions  for 
huse  I  feel  i  should  have  recived  Something  for  same 
unles  mistake  as  been  made  Patterns  Advertsed  for  in 
I'uper.     God  Save  the  King." 


tf/tyen 


-M- 


7TO 


(p.  97.) 


Photo  :  Sartony,  Paris. 


THE  "SCHNEIDER"  FRENCH  TANK     {p.    103) 

Permission  of  Schneider  &  Co.,  France. 


THE  "  SAINT  CHAMOND  "  FRENCH    l\NK     (/    103) 


PRODUCTION  ON  A  LARGE  SCALE     113 

During  these  days,  when  we  were  just  starting 
production  on  a  large  scale,  we  had  rather  a 
shock  when  we  received,  from  the  highest  author- 
ity in  the  Ministry,  a  minute  which  said,  "  The 
opinion  has  been  expressed  that  the  time  has 
been  reached  when  new  factories  cannot  generally 
be  expected  to  begin  production  in  time  to  be  of 
service  in  this  war,  and  that  the  building  of 
further  new  factories  should  not  therefore  be 
sanctioned." 

However,  we  did  not  allow  this  to  interfere 
with  our  work,  and  Mr.  Montagu,  the  Minister 
of  Munitions,  gave  us  every  help.  Like  Mr. 
Lloyd  George,  he  believed  in  Mechanical  Warfare 
and  was  ready  to  fight  for  it. 

I  paid  many  visits  to  the  Front  with  General 
Butler  to  discuss  the  question  of  design,  and  in 
November  a  meeting  was  held  with  General 
Davidson  of  G.H.Q.,  General  Anley  and  Colonel 
Elles,  at  which  it  was  arranged  that  the  first  150 
machines  which  had  been  completed  should  be 
called  Mark  I.,  and  of  the  100  which  had  been 
ordered  to  keep  the  factories  going,  fifty  should 
be  Mark  II.,  and  the  second  fifty  Mark  III.  Mark 
II.  was  to  have  no  tail,  but  spuds  on  the  track 
plates,  and  new  cast-iron  rollers.  Mark  III.  was 
to  have  thicker  armour,  but  otherwise  be  the  same 
as  Mark  II.  Mark  IV.,  of  which  1000  were  to  be 
built,  was  to  have  the  Lewis  gun  instead  of  the 
Hotchkiss.  Its  petrol  tank  was  to  be  at  the  back 
instead  of  inside.  It  was  to  have  wider  shoes, 
thicker  armour  all  over,  and  the  sponsons,  which 


114  TANKS 

had  hitherto  been  carried  to  the  battlefield 
separately  on  trucks,  were  to  be  carried  on  the 
machine  and  made  to  swing  in  when  travelling  by 
railroad. 

An  officer  of  the  Tank  Corps,  who  had  once 
been  in  charge  of  the  Lewis  Gun  School  at  St. 
Omer,  was  responsible  for  the  decision  to  use  the 
Lewis  gun  instead  of  the  Hotchkiss.  He  insisted 
on  it  against  the  advice  of  the  experts  in  Tanks, 
who  knew  that  the  vulnerability  of  the  outer 
cover  of  the  Lewis  gun  and  the  size  of  its  barrel 
made  it  very  unsuitable  for  using  in  a  loophole. 
In  the  following  year  experience  in  the  field 
proved  us  to  have  been  right.  The  Tank  Corps 
told  us  that  they  could  not  go  into  battle  with 
the  Lewis  gun  in  the  front  loop-hole,  and  that 
until  we  could  make  the  necessary  alterations 
to  put  back  the  Hotchkiss  gun,  no  Tank  actions 
could  be  fought. 

I  said  at  this  meeting  that  the  first  heavy 
machine  with  2-inch  armour  would  be  ready 
for  trial  towards  the  end  of  January,  and  if  it 
were  decided  to  proceed  with  the  manufacture, 
the  rest  would  be  available  about  September, 
1917. 

I  then  brought  forward  a  suggested  type  of 
light  machine  with  two  engines  designed  by 
Sir  William  Tritton.  This  was  the  Whippet. 
General  Davidson  and  Colonel  Elles  agreed  that 
it  would  probably  be  very  useful.  If  any  large 
quantity  of  these  machines  was  required  for  next 
year  it  was  necessary  to  order  the  engines  at  once. 


PRODUCTION  ON   A  LARGE  SCALE     115 

I  asked  that  an  early  decision  should  be  given  in 
order  that  I  could  obtain  5000  engines. 

At  this  meeting,  I  also  pointed  out  to  General 
Davidson  that  we  ought  to  have  a  member  of  the 
Army  Council  or  some  high  official  appointed  to 
the  Committee  to  give  decisions  for  the  War 
Office,  and  it  was  agreed  that  when  any  important 
questions  in  connection  with  design,  output  or 
dates  of  delivery  should  arise,  Lieut. -Colonel 
Stern,  General  Anley,  Colonel  Elles,  a  represent- 
ative of  the  General  Staff,  France,  and  a  repre- 
sentative of  the  War  Office  should  attend.  A 
meeting  could  be  convened  by  any  one  of  the 
above  representatives  under  the  Chairmanship 
of  Colonel  Stern.  It  was  agreed  also  that  Major 
Knothe  should  act  as  Technical  Liaison  Officer 
between  Colonel  Elles,  General  Anley  and  Colonel 
Stern. 

At  a  meeting  on  Saturday,  November  25th, 
Mr.  Martin  of  the  Daimler  Company  undertook 
to  deliver  engines  as  follows  : — 

January 20  a  week. 

February 28  ,, 

March 35 

April 40  „ 

rising  to  sixty  engines  a  week  in  May. 

The  question  of  responsibility  for  inspection 
and  design  was  settled  at  a  meeting  with  Major 
General  Bingham,  Director-General  of  Munitions 
Design,  Sir  Sothern  Holland,  Director-General  of 
Inspection  of   Munitions,    and   Mr.    E.    Phipps, 


116  TANKS 

Secretary  of  the  Ministry  of  Munitions.  In  the 
usual  way  the  inspection  would  have  come  under 
Sir  Sothern  Holland,  and  the  design  under  Major 
General  Bingham,  but  as  the  Tanks  were  still  in 
such  an  experimental  stage,  it  was  agreed,  at  the 
request  of  the  War  Office,  that,  for  the  present, 
all  Tanks,  accessories  and  spares  should  be  manu- 
factured and  tested  by  the  Mechanical  Warfare 
Department  of  the  Ministry  of  Munitions. 

A  suggestion  that  the  Army  Council  should 
be  consulted  on  specifications  before  they  were 
approved,  and  that.no  change  should  be  made 
without  reference  to  them,  was  not  adopted,  as  it 
was  contrary  to  the  principle  of  the  division  of 
functions  between  the  Ministry  of  Munitions  and 
the  War  Office,  but  it  was  agreed  that  all  require- 
ments and  suggestions  made  by  the  Army  Council 
should  be  incorporated  in  the  designs  at  the 
earliest  opportunity. 

I  was  continually  pressing  for  still  larger 
orders  for  Tanks,  and  in  October  I  wrote  to 
Mr.  Montagu  to  say  that  we  must  now  decide 
whether  the  order  for  1000  Tanks  for  the  following 
year  was  sufficient. 

I  told  him  that  the  Russian,  French  and  Belgian 
Governments  had  asked  if  the  British  Govern- 
ment could  supply  them  with  Tanks,  and  that  I 
thought  that  our  capacity  for  production  should 
be  immediately  increased  to  150  Tanks  a  week. 
I  also  said  that  many  defences  against  Tanks  had 
been  suggested,  but  that  the  real  defence  was 
another  Tank.     We  had  to  decide  now  whether 


PRODUCTION  ON  A  LARGE   SCALE     117 

every  Tank  should  not  have  a  gun  of  sufficient 
power  to  smash  Tanks. 

The  Russian  Government  was  not  asking  only 
if  we  could  build  Tanks  for  it.  I  was  pressed,  at 
the  same  time,  by  the  War  Office  to  give  plans  of 
the  Tanks  to  Russia.  I  opposed  this  most  strongly, 
and  put  it  off  from  time  to  time  by  saying 
that  I  was  too  busy  to  get  these  drawings  ready. 
I  was  convinced,  by  the  nature  of  the  questions 
asked,  that  the  request  really  came  from  Germany. 
Russia  could  have  no  need  for  detailed  drawings, 
either  for  offence  or  defence.  She  could  not  need 
them  for  offence,  because  even  with  the  plans,  she 
had  not  the  means  to  build  Tanks.  She  could 
not  need  them  for  defence,  firstly  because  the 
Germans  had  no  Tanks  to  use  on  the  Eastern 
Front,  and  secondly,  because  if  they  had,  we 
could  give  Russia  sufficient  information  about 
defence  against  Tanks  without  sending  drawings 
of  them.  However,  the  Intelligence  Department 
of  the  War  Office  was  very  insistent,  so,  in 
consultation  with  the  Minister  of  Munitions  and 
Sir  Eustace  d'Eyncourt,  it  was  decided  to  give 
the  War  Office  a  child's  drawing  and  incorrect 
details.  I  am  convinced  they  found  their  way 
into  the  hands  of  the  German  General  Staff. 

Now,  and  always,  we  had  difficulties  with  the 
War  Office  about  men.  Although  the  officers  in 
my  Department  had  volunteered  for  active  service 
and  some  of  them  had  been  in  action,  although 
they  were  all  doing  work  of  the  greatest  military 
importance  and  paying  continual  visits  to  the 


118  TANKS 

Front,  yet  it  was  very  nearly  impossible  to  get 
any  military  acknowledgment.  Although  Lieut. 
Holden,  Lieut.  Rendle  and  Lieut.  Anderson  were 
taking  a  leading  part  in  the  development  of 
Mechanical  Warfare,  and  were  recommended  by 
the  Minister  for  promotion  on  the  20th  of  Sep- 
tember, 1916,  Lieut.  Holden  only  received  pro- 
motion in  October  1918,  while  Lieut.  Rendle 
and  Lieut.  Anderson  remained  unpromoted  to  the 
end  of  the  war. 

This  was  not  the  only  difficulty.  In  the 
early  days  we  found  it  very  hard  to  get  any  staff 
at  all,  for  the  Army  refused  to  allow  us  men  of 
military  age.  It  was  very  necessary,  however, 
that  we  should  secure  the  services  of  a  good 
transport  officer  to  superintend  the  transport  of 
Tanks  from  the  manufacturers  to  Tank  Head- 
quarters in  France,  a  man  with  business  experi- 
ence and  a  man  of  the  world.  I  asked  Mr. 
George  Grossmith  if  he  would  undertake  this 
work.  He  was  over  military  age,  but  jumped 
at  the  idea  of  being  able  to  help  in  any  way  and 
accepted  at  once.  He  was  given  a  commission 
in  the  R.N.V.R.  under  the  Admiralty,  and  did 
valuable  work  from  the  time  of  his  joining  up  in 
November,  1916,  till  the  date  of  the  Armistice. 
Since  he  was  an  actor,  many  attacks  were  made 
on  him  by  jealous  people.  It  was  on  the  occasion 
of  one  of  these  attacks  that  I  was  called  to  the 
Admiralty  to  explain  what  he  was  doing  for  my 
Department.  I  told  them,  and  his  work  was 
heartily  approved.     The  official  whom  I  saw  sent 


PRODUCTION   ON   A  LARGE   SCALE     119 

for  the  file  of  papers  relating  to  his  commission. 
He  told  a  clerk,  who  had  been  at  the  Admiralty 
some  forty  years,  to  look  it  up.  "  Under  what 
heading?"  said  the  clerk.  "Ministry  of  Muni- 
tions," was  the  reply.  "  Did  you  say  Ministry 
of  Musicians?"  said  this  clerk  of  forty  years' 
experience,  looking  very  puzzled. 

At  a  Conference  held  at  the  War  Office  on 
November  23rd,  1916,  at  which  Sir  Douglas  Haig 
was  present,  I  raised  the  question  of  the  imme- 
diate release  from  the  colours  of  men  required 
for  the  building  of  Tanks.  I  said  that  I  had 
handed  in  a  list  of  the  names  of  these  men  to 
the  Labour  Supply  Department,  and  that  the 
matter  was  urgent.  Mr.  Montagu  told  me  that 
the  Labour  Supply  Department  of  the  Ministry 
of  Munitions  was  responsible,  and  that  he  would 
ask  Mr.  Stephenson  Kent  to  see  to  the  speedy 
release  of  these  men,  numbering  something  like 
300  in  all.  General  Whigham,  on  behalf  of  the 
War  Office,  promised  to  expedite  the  matter.  Sir 
Douglas  Haig  agreed  that  it  was  urgent. 

The  general  conclusion  reached  at  this  Con- 
ference was  : — 

1.  Tanks  are  required  in  as  large  numbers  as  possible. 

2.  It  is  important  to  get  as  many  as  possible  before 

May. 

3.  It  is  very  important  to  consider  and  adopt  improve- 

ments in  design  from  time  to  time,  but  almost 
any  design  now  is  likely  to  be  better  than  no 
Tank. 

4.  It  is  highly  desirable  that  no  other  supply  should 


120  TANKS 

be  interfered  with.  If  it  is  necessary  to  do  so  in 
order  to  fulfil  the  requirements,  G.H.Q.  should 
be  informed  through  the  proper  channels  before 
any  action  is  taken. 

In  September  there  had  been  a  great  technical 
controversy  at  the  meeting  with  the  French 
experts  in  Paris.  The  petrol  electric  transmission 
which  was  in  operation  in  the  St.  diamond 
machine  attracted  me  very  much,  for  it  gave 
greater  ease  in  changing  speed,  though  at  the 
price  of  greater  weight.  At  this  time  all  the 
experts  were  against  me,  but  later  in  the  year 
G.H.Q.  made  such  urgent  demands  for  Tanks 
that,  in  order  not  to  lose  time,  I  gave  orders  to 
the  Daimler  Company  on  January  5th,  1917,  for 
600  sets  of  petrol  electric  gear  wdth  a  low  gear  of 
three  and  a  half  miles  an  hour,  and  a  changing 
speed  gear  of  five  miles  an  hour.  The  machine 
had  not  yet  been  tested,  but  this  wTas  to  prevent 
any  delay  should  the  trial  machine  be  a  success. 

On  Friday,  January  12th,  the  Daimler  Petrol 
Electric  machine  was  tested  at  climbing  out  of 
shell  holes  in  competition  with  a  Mark  I. 
6- pounder  machine.  Both  machines  were  loaded 
up  to  the  full  with  ammunition  and  so  forth, 
and  the  results  clearly  showed  that  the  Daimler 
Petrol  Electric  was  unable  to  pull  out  of  the 
shell  hole  except  by  a  succession  of  jolts,  produced 
by  bringing  the  brushes  back  to  a  neutral  position, 
raising  the  engine  up  to  1800  revolutions  and  then 
suddenly  shifting  the  brushes  up  to  the  most 
advantageous  position.     This  resulted  in  a  maxi- 


PRODUCTION  ON  A  LARGE  SCALE     121 

mum  current  of  from  900  to  1000  amperes,  and 
all  agreed  that  it  was  unsatisfactory.  So  after 
a  great  controversy  and  many  tests  the  Petrol 
Electric  machine  was  rejected  as  untrustworthy, 
and  all  orders  were  cancelled. 

In  January  1917  Major  Uzielli  was  sent  to  me 
by  General  Elles  to  ask  the  exact  dates  for  the 
delivery  of  the  Tanks.  I  said  that  the  arrival  of 
machines  in  France  depended  on  so  many  things, 
that  it  was  impossible  to  promise  an  exact  date, 
but  that  from  the  first  week  in  March  we  ought 
to  have  from  twenty  to  thirty  a  week,  which 
would  take  six  days  in  passage.  The  inevitable 
delays  were  due  to  the  difficulty  in  getting 
material,  the  possibility  of  breakdown  in  testing, 
and  delay  in  transit. 

I  said  that  I  was  strongly  of  the  opinion  that 
it  was  exceedingly  risky  to  make  any  arrange- 
ments for  putting  Tanks  into  the  line  before  we  had 
a  large  supply  at  Tank  Headquarters  in  France. 

On  January  29th,  1917,  Squadron  20  undertook 
the  testing  of  all  machines  before  shipment  to 
France. 

Towards  the  end  of  1916,  Mr.  d'Eyncourt  and  I 
were  very  much  troubled  about  the  future  of 
Mechanical  Warfare.  G.H.Q.,  France,  and  the 
War  Office  had  their  hands  full  in  these  strenuous 
times,  but  we  pioneers  in  Mechanical  Warfare 
knew  that,  to  develop  it  to  its  greatest  extent, 
we  must  have  the  military  views  of  the  tactics  of 
Tanks  at  least  twelve  months  beforehand,  in  order 
to  get  the  right  design  and  production.     We  had 


122  TANKS 

been  told,  too,  that  there  was  a  great  probability 
that  no  more  Tanks  would  be  required. 

Having  tried  every  other  means,  we  at  last 
went  to  the  Prime  Minister,  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  and 
handed  him  a  memorandum  explaining  the  develop- 
ment and  present  position  of  Mechanical  Warfare. 

We  reminded  him  that  on  February  2nd,  1916, 
our  first  Tank  had  passed  all  the  tests  laid  down 
by  the  Army  Council.  The  value  of  the  Tank  had 
still  remained  in  doubt  until  the  battle  of  Sep- 
tember 15th,  but  G.H.Q.  had  then  unreservedly 
accepted  this  type  of  warfare.  The  main  criti- 
cisms after  that  battle  were  that  the  Tank  got 
bellied,  or  stuck,  and  that  it  could  not  keep  up 
with  the  infantry,  so  that  either  it  had  to  start 
first,  in  which  case  the  German  barrage  prevented 
the  advance  of  the  infantry,  or  if  it  started  at  the 
same  time  the  infantry  got  ahead  of  it. 

We  explained  the  improvements  which  since 
then  had  been  made.  We  pointed  out  that  now 
the  Tanks  were  more  easily  transportable ;  that 
they  were  in  a  marked  degree  better  at  overcoming 
the  most  difficult  wet  and  muddy  ground;  that 
experiments  were  being  made  and  were  now 
drawing  to  a  conclusion  for  lighter  loading, 
thicker  armour-plate  and  ease  of  control,  and  that 
the  machinery  was  much  more  trustworthy  and 
durable. 

Mr.  Lloyd  George  then  called  a  meeting  of  the 
War  Cabinet,  at  which  representatives  of  the 
Imperial  General  Staff  and  Sir  Eustace  d'Eyncourt 
and  I  were  present.     The  Cabinet  agreed  to  my 


PRODUCTION  ON   A  LARGE   SCALE     123 

suggestion  that  a  meeting  should  be  held  at  the 
War  Office  between  representatives  of  the  War 
Office  of  the  English  and  French  General  Staffs, 
English  and  French  commanders  of  Tanks,  and 
English  and  French  designers  of  Tanks,  and  that 
this  meeting  should  take  place  after  they  had 
viewed  the  trials,  with  all  the  new  types  of  Tanks, 
which  were  to  be  carried  out  at  our  experimental 
ground  at  Oldbury  early  in  March. 

It  was  clear  at  this  time  that  if  Mechanical 
Warfare  was  to  make  any  real  progress,  an  engine 
bigger  than  the  105  H.P.  would  be  necessary. 
Unfortunately,  the  Aircraft  Production  Depart- 
ment were  seizing  every  possible  source  of  supply. 
They  had  the  first  claim.  WTe  were  not  allowed, 
for  example,  any  aluminium  for  our  engines. 
Mechanical  Warfare,  in  fact,  was  not  yet  acknow- 
ledged as  a  necessity.  I  tried  to  persuade  the 
Daimler  Company  to  design  a  new  engine,  but 
they  were  already  fully  taken  up  with  work  for 
the  Air  Department.  The  problem  before  me  was 
to  have  ready  in  advance  a  new  engine  of  greater 
H.P.,  and  to  have  it  in  sufficient  quantities  to 
meet  all  possible  demands  for  an  increase  in  the 
number  of  Tanks. 

I  found  a  well-known  designer  in  internal 
combustion  engines,  Mr.  H.  Ricardo,  who  under 
the  directions  of  Mr.  Bussell  (my  deputy)  and  with 
the  assistance  of  my  officers,  found  a  certain 
number  of  gas-engine  firms,  which  the  Air  Depart- 
ment had  considered  unsuitable  and  had  rejected. 
These  firms  were  got  together  under  my  presi- 


124  TANKS 

dency  and  agreed  to  work  jointly  and  produce  an 
engine  to  be  specially  designed  by  Mr.  Ricardo, 
an  engine  of  150  H.P.,  using  no  aluminium  or  high 
tensile  steel.  As  soon  as  Mr.  Ricardo  had  got 
out  the  designs,  I  submitted  them  to  Mr.  Dugald 
Clark,  one  of  the  greatest  authorities  in  the  world 
on  internal  combustion  engines,  who  considered, 
after  examining  the  designs,  that  I  was  justified  in 
ordering  700  of  these  engines  before  one  had  been 
constructed  for  test. 

On  February  5th,  1917,  a  conference  was  held 
in  the  room  of  the  Minister  (Dr.  Addison),  at  which 
were  present : — 

The  Master  General  of  the  Ordnance; 

General  Sir  David  Henderson  ; 

General  Butler ; 

Mr.  Percy  Martin ; 

Sir  W.  Weir; 

Mr.  S.  F.  Edge; 

Colonel  Holden ; 

Colonel  Foster ; 

Mr.  Herbert  and 

Colonel  Stern. 

General  Henderson  asked  that  I  should  be 
prevented  from  employing  five  special  firms  in 
making  700  Ricardo  engines,  in  anticipation  of 
Tanks  which  had  not  yet  been  ordered.  I  said 
that  I  had  ordered  these  engines  with  foresight 
to  prevent  the  shortage  of  engines  for  tanks 
such  as  they  were  now  experiencing  with  air- 
craft.    In  spite  of  this,  the  Committee  approved 


PRODUCTION   ON   A  LARGE   SCALE     125 

his  resolution.  However,  I  took  no  notice  of  it. 
We  continued  the  building  of  the  700  engines,  and 
in  order  not  to  stop  the  continuity  of  manufacture, 
I  gave  an  order  for  another  700.  The  first  of  the 
initial  700  had  not  yet  been  tested,  but  we  believed 
in  them. 

On  March  3rd,  the  exhibition  took  place  at 
Oldbury,  Birmingham,  on  the  ground  belonging 
to  Squadron  20,  of  all  the  experimental  machines 
which  I  had  ordered  immediately  after  the  Battle 
of  the  Somme,  1916.  The  full  programme  and  the 
names  of  those  present  is  given  in  Appendix  II. 

The  day  after  this  display  the  meeting  ar- 
ranged by  the  War  Cabinet  was  held  at  the  War 
Office  to  discuss  the  tactics  of  the  future  design 
of  Tanks,  and  there  were  present  representatives 
of  the  French  General  Staff,  War  Office,  French 
Headquarters  Staff,  the  officer  commanding  Eng- 
lish Tanks,  the  officer  commanding  French  Tanks, 
M.  Breton  (representing  the  French  Ministry  of 
Inventions)  Sir  E.  d'Eyncourt  and  myself. 

At  this  Conference  the  present  value  of  Mechan- 
ical Warfare  and  the  future  value  of  improved 
machines  were  acknowledged  by  all  the  military 
authorities.  The  French  feeling  about  it  was 
expressed  in  a  letter  which  M.  Thomas,  the 
French  Minister  of  Munitions,  wrote  to  Dr. 
Addison  on  March  10th  : — 

"  My  dear  Minister  and  Colleague, 

"  The  Under-Secretary  of  State  for  Inventions 
whom  you  were  good  enough  to  invite  to  come  to 
England  in  order  to  assist  at  the  trials  of  the  new  type 


126  TANKS 

of  Tanks  prepared  by  your  Technical  Department  and 
at  the  Conferences  which  were  to  follow  the  trials,  has 
given  me  an  account  both  of  the  extreme  interest  of 
these  trials,  which  you  desired  that  representatives  of 
France  should  witness,  and  of  the  very  cordial  reception 
which  he  had  from  you. 

"  I  have  already  had  the  opportunity  of  reading  the 
report  of  the  mission  which  I  sent  at  your  request  to 
accompany  the  Under-Secretary  of  State  for  Inventions. 
I  am  extremely  happy  to  note  the  brilliant  success  of 
the  researches,  as  a  result  of  which,  very  shortly,  the 
British  armies  will  be  equipped  with  a  weapon  from 
which  a  great  deal  has  already  been  expected,  and  I  have 
the  honour  to  thank  you  for  the  courtesy  extended  to 
the  members  of  this  mission  by  the  British  Government 
and  by  their  British  comrades  and  colleagues. 

"  I  appointed  to  take  part  in  this  mission,  in  addition 
to  the  technical  officers,  a  certain  number  of  the  principal 
engineers  of  munition  workshops.  I  note  that  they 
have  greatly  profited  from  the  experiments  of  which  they 
have  been  witnesses.  I  hope  that  the  information  which  they 
may  have  been  able  to  give  to  your  technical  officers  may 
have  proved  equally  valuable  to  them.  I  am  delighted 
to  see  a  continuance  and  an  extension  in  the  domain  of 
experiment  of  that  collaboration  which,  in  one  way  or 
another,  has  existed  from  the  very  beginning. 

"  I  am  particularly  pleased  that  the  Under-Secretary 
of  State  for  Inventions  should  have  had  the  opportunity 
of  entering  into  personal  relations  with  yourself  and 
with  the  officers  of  your  Ministry  who  are  specially 
concerned  with  Research  and  Invention. 

'  You  were  good  enough  to  point  out  to  him  certain 
directions  in  which  researches  in  common  might  be  made. 
From  this  co-operation  I  anticipate  the  happiest  results. 

"  Please  accept  the  best  assurance  of  my  highest 
consideration. 

"Albert  Thomas." 


PRODUCTION  ON  A  LARGE  SCALE     127 

On  the  same  day  that  the  Conference  with  the 
French  was  held,  another  Conference  at  the  War 
Office  decided  that  there  should  be  nine  battalions 
of  seventy-two  Tanks  each,  with  another  352  as 
first  reinforcements,  making  1000  in  all.  The 
Commander-in-Chief  also  asked  for  200  Light 
Tanks  to  be  delivered  by  July  31st.  I  said  that 
there  was  no  possibility  of  delivering  any  Tanks 
for  this  fighting  season  except  the  1000  which 
had  already  been  ordered,  but  that  the  question 
of  the  improvement  in  design  and  production 
must  be  considered  at  once  if  the  large  numbers 
which  I  saw  would  be  required  in  the  early  part 
of  1918  were  to  be  ready  in  time. 

On  March  12th,  I  wrote  to  Dr.  Addison  : — 

"  As  Director-General  of  the  Department  which  has 
been  responsible  for  the  design  and  which  has  produced 
every  Tank,  I  have  persistently  opposed  the  premature 
employment  of  Tanks  this  year.  Also  the  employment 
of  practice  Tanks,  i.e.,  Marks  I.,  II.  and  III.  in  action 
this  year. 

"  At  the  War  Office  Meeting  last  Sunday,  General 
Butler  assured  me  that  sixty  machines  of  Mark  I.,  II.  and 
III.,  which  are  being  kept  in  France  ready  for  action  only 
as  a  temporary  measure,  and  which  are  really  practice 
machines,  will  be  returned  for  training  purposes  as  soon 
as  they  can  be  replaced  by  the  delivery  of  Mark  IV. 
machines.  (Mark  L,  II.  and  III.  are  practice  machines, 
and  Mark  IV.  is  the  new  fighting  machine;  twenty-five 
of  the  above  sixty  machines  are,  I  believe,  being  sent 
from  Wool,  and  will  be  returned  to  Wool.) 

"  I  consider  it  more  than  unwise  to  use  practice  Tanks 
in  action  under  any  circumstances.  They  have  all  the 
faults  that  necessitated  the  design  of  last  year  being 


128  TANKS 

altered  to  the  present  design  of  Mark  IV.  In  addition, 
the  training  of  the  men  is  being  delayed  by  this  action. 
Their  failure  will  undoubtedly  ruin  the  confidence  of  the 
troops  in  the  future  of  Mechanical  Warfare. 

"  For  the  sake  of  sixty  machines,  the  whole  future  of 
thousands  of  Tanks  will  be  most  unjustifiably  prejudiced. 

"  I  wish  also  to  point  out  that  even  when  Mark  IV. 
machines  are  delivered,  taking  Mechanical  Warfare  as  an 
enterprise,  it  is  a  most  uneconomical  expenditure  of 
our  resources  to  use  them  before  we  have  large  numbers, 
and  the  necessary  central  workshops  ready  in  operation. 

"  As  the  war  proceeds  and  our  losses  in  men  accumu- 
late, necessity  will  force  us  more  and  more  into  labour- 
saving  devices,  which  will  take  their  place  in  warfare 
as  they  have  in  commerce. 

"  All  care  should  be  taken  to  foster  the  development 
of  this  new  weapon,  with  the  greatest  caution.  How- 
ever excellent  the  design  of  a  ship,  without  a  rudder 
she  will  be  wrecked.  I  believe  Mechanical  Warfare, 
without  prudence,  will  share  a  like  fate." 

At  the  beginning  of  March,  Mr.  Eu  Tong  Sen, 
a  member  of  the  Federal  Council  of  the  Malay 
States,  offered  £6000  for  the  purchase  of  a  Tank, 
which  the  Army  Council  gratefully  accepted  on 
behalf  of  His  Majesty's  Government.  The  Tank 
selected  was  one  built  by  Messrs.  Foster  & 
Company  at  Lincoln,  and  had  a  plate  put  on  it 
with  the  following  inscription  : — 

"  Presented  to  H.  M.  Government  by  Mr.  Eu  Tong 
Sen,  member  of  the  Federal  Council  of  the  Malay  States, 
on  March  10th,  1917." 

All  Chinese  ships  and  boats,  large  or  small, 
have  a  large  "  eye  "  painted  at  each  side  of  the 


BRIGADIE  R   GE  M  RA1     II     |     l  LI  ES,  C.B.,    D.S.O. 

Mmi  .try  ol    Infoi  mation)     (p.   Ill) 


From  a  painting  6j    Majot  Sir   William  Orpen,  A  ]<  A 


PRODUCTION  ON  A  LARGE   SCALE     129 

bow.  The  Chinese  explanation  of  the  custom 
is,  "  No  have  eyes,  how  can  see  ? "  It  seemed 
only  right  that  this  "  Landship,"  also,  should 
see,  and  accordingly  an  eye  was  painted  on  each 
side  of  its  bow. 

In  due  course  it  was  sent  overseas,  and  was 
first  commanded  by  2nd  Lieut.  J.  M.  Oke,  and 
christened  "  Fly-Paper."  Before  the  Cambrai 
battles  in  November  1917  it  was  re-christened 
"  Fan-Tan,"  and  in  these  battles  was  commanded 
by  Lieut.  H.  A.  Aldridge.  It  was  in  the  first 
day's  battle  at  Cambrai,  and  reached  its  objec- 
tives, doing  good  work  at  Pam  Pam  Farm  and 
on  the  road  leading  to  Masnieres.  On  the  27th 
it  went  into  battle  at  the  village  of  Fontaine- 
not re-Dame.  The  fighting  in  the  streets  was 
deadly.  The  upper  windows  of  the  houses  were 
full  of  German  machine-gunners,  and  the  6- 
pounder  guns  of  the  Tank  did  great  execution 
among  them.  All  its  crew  were  wounded,  some 
severely,  and  the  Commander  was  struck  in  the 
eye.  Notwithstanding,  they  brought  the  Tank 
back  to  the  rallying-point. 

After  this  it  was  commanded  by  2nd  Lieut.  J. 
Munro,  and  was  re-numbered  6/36.  It  was  with 
its  Battalion,  with  the  6th  Corps,  during  the 
great  German  attack  in  the  spring  of  1918,  and 
took  part  in  all  the  fighting  while  we  were  on  the 
defensive.  It  was  finally  handed  in  to  workshops 
on  June  19th,  1918. 

The  suggestion  has  already  been  made  that 
it  should  be  presented  to  the  Malay  States  as  a 

K 


130  TANKS 

memento  of  the  Great  War,  and  of  the  generosity 
of  Mr.  Eu  Tong  Sen. 

In  April  1917,  at  the  time  of  the  Battle  of 
Arras,  I  was  invited  to  Tank  Headquarters  for  a 
conference,  and  my  diary  of  that  period  may  be 
of  interest : — 

"  April  13th. 

"  I  was  met  by  General  Elles,  Major  Fuller,  Lieut. - 
Colonel  Uzielli,  Lieut.  Foote,  Major  Butler,  Lieut. 
Molesworth  and  Colonel  Searle.  There  was  great  news 
of  the  battle.  Tanks  had  taken  Thelus  (Vimy),  the 
villages  of  Tilloy,  Neuville  Vitasse,  Monchy  le  Preux, 
Riencourt,  Herdicourt ;  two  tanks  were  cut  off  and 
captured,  owing  to  no  infantry  support. 

"  The  proposed  programme  for  the  stay  was  as 
follows  : — 

Workshop  Camp. — Saturday. 

Battle  front  north  of  Arras. — Sunday. 

Ditto,  south  of  Arras. — Monday. 

Technical  meeting  with  General  Butler. — Tuesday. 
General  Baker  Carr's  brigade  had  been  into  action. 

The  general  impression  was  that  the  men  and  officers 
were  magnificent. 

At  the  start  of  the  battle,  some  brigadiers  did  not 
want  Tanks  for  fear  of  drawing  fire  on  their  troops,  but 
all  begged  for  them  afterwards. 

Five  machines  got  bogged  going  into  action.  Ditching 
still  the  trouble. 

Must  have  a  guard  for  the  Lewis  gun. 

"  April  Uth. 
"  I   arrived    at    Bermicourt  on  the   evening  of  the 
13th,  together  with    Captain   Saundcrson,   Lieut. -Com- 
mander   Barry,    Lieut.    Shaw,    Captain    Symes,    Major 
Wilson,  and  Lieut.  Thorncycroft. 


PRODUCTION   ON  A  LARGE  SCALE     131 

"  Major  Fuller  gave  a  lecture  on  what  the  Tanks  had 
done,  and  illustrated  his  remarks  on  a  blackboard.  He 
mentioned  that  the  greatest  difficulty  was  the  bringing 
up  of  supplies  of  petrol,  water  and  ammunition  to  the 
Tanks  in  action.  Among  other  things  they  had  to 
bring  up  20,000  gallons  of  petrol,  and  to  have  four 
dumps  and  two  lots  of  500  men  each  carrying. 

"  I  visited  Headquarters  workshops.  There  were  six 
buildings,  to  be  later  increased  to  nine.  There  was  only 
one  workshop  building,  and  all  repairs  were  done  in 
hangars,  one  large  and  two  smaller. 

"  In  the  afternoon  I  saw  a  machine  fitted  with 
wooden  spuds,  using  a  spare  new  engine  for  experimental 
purposes. 

"  April  15th. 
"  I  motored  to  Arras  with  General  Elles,  Colonel 
Uzielli,  Major  Wilson,  and  Captain  Saunderson.  We 
changed  into  a  light  car,  put  on  steel  and  gas  helmets 
and  went  through  the  old  German  lines,  and  got  out  at 
Beaurains,  which  was  totally  destroyed.  We  walked  up 
Telegraph  Hill  and  through  the  Harp,  and  saw  all  the 
Tank  tracks,  also  one  Tank  which  had  been  hit  by  a 
shell.  The  driver  had  his  head  taken  off.  No  damage 
was  done  to  the  machine  except  to  the  front  plate  and 
petrol  tank.  We  saw  many  dead  Bosch es  lying  about, 
also  very  deep  dug-outs.  On  reaching  Tilloy,  saw 
German  shrapnel  bursting  between  us  and  Monchy  le 
Preux,  also  gas  shells.  Saw  there  a  German  cupola 
(the  same  as  in  Invalides,  Paris)  on  a  carriage,  with 
shafts  for  three  horses,  which  had  been  captured  by  the 
French. 

'  We  returned  to  Arras,  where  I  found  my  old  friend 
Sidney  Charrington  in  command  of  C.  Battalion.  He 
said  that  the  Tanks  had  done  magnificently. 

"  We  motored  to  Noyelle  Vion,  and  there  saw  an 


132  TANKS 

old  friend,  General  Haldane,  Lord  Loch  and  General 
Tulloch.  They  said  that  the  Tanks  had  done  splendidly 
and  had  taken  Tilloy,  Monchy  and  Eviancourt.  General 
Haldane  said  he  would  write  to  the  Adjutant-General 
telling  him  what  a  success  the  Tanks  were. 

"  Returning  in  the  evening,  Harry  Dalmeny  rang  up 
and  invited  General  Elles  and  myself  to  dine  at  General 
Allenby's  chateau  with  General  Bols,  General  Lecky, 
and  General  Sillem. 

"  General  Allenby  said  he  had  not  believed  in  Tanks 
before,  but  now  thought  it  was  the  best  method  of 
fighting,  and  would  not  like  to  attack  without  them. 

"  April  16th  and  17th. 

"  I  talked  with  General  Elles  in  the  morning,  and  at 
about  twelve  o'clock  left  for  headquarters  of  the  18th 
Corps,  Hautville,  with  Captain  Saunderson,  to  see  my 
brother,  a  Major  in  the  South  Irish  Horse.  I  found  that 
he  was  at  Pas,  where  I  arrived  at  three  o'clock.  We 
had  a  very  excellent  lunch  of  bully  beef  and  biscuits. 
I  had  an  appointment  with  General  Butler  at  4.30,  so 
had  to  leave  in  a  hurry.  We  met  a  lot  of  cavalry  on  the 
return  journey,  by  way  of  Doullens  and  St.  Pol,  and 
arrived  at  5.15.  General  Butler  did  not  turn  up  until 
6.30,  when  a  Conference  was  held  with  General  Elles, 
Major  Wilson,  Captain  Saunderson  and  Captain  Symes. 

"  April  18th. 

"  A  technical  meeting  was  held  in  the  workshops. 
Snowing  hard  at  lunch  time.  Arrived  in  Paris  at  eight 
o'clock,  after  a  four  and  three-quarter  hour's  trip  via 
Hesdin. 

"  Lunched  with  Captain  Lcisse,  and  at  3.30  met 
Captain  Marais,  A.D.C.  to  Colonel  Girard. 

"  At  0.30  handed  drawings  to  M.  Breton. 


PRODUCTION   ON   A  LARGE   SCALE     133 

"  April  19th. 
"  Went  to  Marly. 

"  April  20th  and  21st. 

"  I  lunched  with  Mr.  Lloyd  George  at  the  Hotel 
Crillon;  Lord  Esher,  Sir  Maurice  Hankey  and  three 
other  Generals  were  also  present.  I  met  General 
Maurice,  the  D.M.O.  at  the  War  Office,  after  lunch. 

"  I  got  the  passes  extended  and  started  for  St . 
Chamond.  Spent  Saturday  at  St.  Chamond  and  saw 
our  Tanks,  fitted  with  their  petrol  transmission,  ascend 
a  hill  of  55°. 

"  April  22nd. 

"  Returned  to  Paris.     Saw  Colonel  Girard. 

"  April  23rd. 
"  Major  Wilson,  Captain  Saunderson  and  I  were 
entertained  at  lunch  at  Quai  d'Orsay  by  the  Minister 
of  Inventions,  M.  Breton,  General  Mouret,  General 
Estienne,  Colonel  Challiat,  etc.,  and  in  the  evening  were 
entertained  by  Colonel  Romailho  at  Rest  Viel  to  meet 
all  the  Tank  experts.  General  Estienne  explained  the 
first  battle  with  French  Tanks,  the  Schneider  Tanks,  at 
Juvencourt.  They  were  not  a  great  success,  getting 
ditched  very  easily  and  being  quickly  set  on  fire  by 
high  explosive  shells. 

"  April  2Mh. 

"  Motored  with  Major  Wilson  and  Captain  Saunderson 
to  Amiens;  arrived  at  1.30  and  lunched  with  General 
Butler;  went  at  2.45  to  house  in  Rue  Gloriette. 
General  Wilson,  Duncannon,  Field  Marshal  Sir  Douglas 
Haig,  General  Davidson,  and  Sassoon  arrived.  Shortly 
afterwards,  Nivelle  and  his  staff  arrived.  Haig  and 
Nivelle  had  a  long  conference.  Afterwards  all  had  a 
talk  for  half  an  hour.  Haig  then  asked  me  in  and 
Butler  joined  us.    Haig  said  that  he  would  do  anything 


134  TANKS 

to  help  me;  that  a  division  of  Tanks  was  worth  ten 
divisions  of  infantry,  and  he  probably  underestimated 
it ;  told  me  to  hurry  up  as  many  Tanks  as  I  could,  not  to 
wait  to  perfect  them,  but  to  keep  sending  out  imperfect 
ones  as  long  as  they  came  out  in  large  quantities, 
especially  up  till  August.  He  said  the  Tanks,  after 
aeroplanes,  were  the  most  important  arm  of  the  British 
Army,  as  they  were  such  tremendous  life-savers.  He 
asked  who  at  the  War  Office  did  not  believe  in  them. 
I  replied  that  the  A.G.'s  department  recruited  my  men. 
He  agreed  that  it  must  be  stopped.  He  then  congratu- 
lated me  and  thanked  me. 

"  Left  for  Boulogne  en  route  for  England." 

During  this  visit  I  had  a  discussion  with  the 
officers  of  the  Tank  Corps  about  driving,  and 
said  that  the  skill  of  the  driver  had  much  to  do 
with  the  success  of  a  Tank,  and  that  a  good 
driver  could  get  a  great  deal  out  of  a  Tank 
which  was  not  mechanically  perfect. 

I  challenged  the  Tank  Corps  to  a  race  between 
Squadron  20  which  was  testing  the  Tanks  for  my 
Department,  and  any  crew  chosen  from  the 
whole  of  the  Tank  Corps,  in  one  of  their  Tanks, 
over  any  course  they  liked  to  select.  I  said  that 
I  would  back  my  fellows  to  beat  the  others  for 
£100.  The  challenge  was  accepted  but  not  the 
bet,  and  the  following  letter  from  General  Ellcs 
explains  the  result : — 

"  Dear  Stern, 

"  This  by  Weston,  whose  visit  has  been  most 
useful.  His  crew  knocked  ours  by  one  and  a  half 
minutes  out  of  sixteen  minutes;  but  give  us  a  month, as 


PRODUCTION   ON   A  LARGE   SCALE     135 

stipulated,  and  I  shall  be  seriously  inclined  to  take  your 
money. 

"  Searle  back  yesterday;  tells  me  that  the  help  he  got 
from  your  fellows  was  quite  immense.  Indeed,  the  results 
are  amazing,  and  we  are  all  very  grateful. 

"  Yours  sincerely, 

"Hugh  Elles." 

To  these  hurried  notes  in  my  diary  can  now 
be  added  a  more  connected  account  of  the  part 
which  the  Tanks  played  at  Arras. 

Sixty  in  all  of  Mark  I.  and  Mark  II.  went  into 
action.  They  did  not  take  there  the  leading 
part  which  they  took  in  later  battles,  by  concen- 
trated attacks  on  single  objectives,  but  were 
distributed  among  the  different  Corps  for  minor 
"  mopping  up  "  operations. 

As  early  as  January  the  Tank  reconnaissances, 
preparation  of  supply  dumps,  tankodromcs  and 
places  of  assembly  had  begun.  At  this  time 
there  were  no  Supply  Tanks  in  existence,  and  all 
supplies  had  to  go  forward  by  hand.  It  was 
reckoned  that  each  Supply  Tank  would  have 
saved  a  carrying  party  of  300  or  400  men.  In 
all  these  preparations  there  was  only  one  serious 
mishap.  The  night  before  the  attack  a  column 
of  Tanks  was  moving  up  from  Achicourt  by  the 
valley  of  the  Crinchon  stream.  The  surface  of 
the  ground  was  hard,  but  underneath,  in  places, 
it  was  a  morass.  This  was  only  discovered  when 
six  Tanks  broke  through  the  crust  into  mud  and 
water.  After  hours  of  labour  they  were  got  out, 
but  too  late  to  take  part  in  the  first  attack. 


136  TANKS 

Up  to  the  day  before  the  attack  the  weather 
had  been  fine,  but  in  the  early  morning  of  that 
day  came  a  storm  of  rain  and  snow.  It  was  bad 
for  the  infantry  but  worse  for  the  Tanks.  On  the 
heavily  "  crumped  "  ground  of  the  Vimy  Ridge, 
now  soaked  with  rain,  they  could  not  operate  at 
all,  and  were  withdrawn  to  the  fighting  further 
south.  Here  they  were  more  successful,  but 
played  no  very  great  part  in  the  first  day  of 
the  attack,  partly  because  of  the  bad  state  of  the 
ground,  partly  because  of  the  rapidity  of  the 
infantry's  advance. 

It  was  on  the  third  day,  April  11th,  that  their 
chance  came.  That  day  three  important  Tank 
attacks  were  made.  The  first  was  made  against 
the  village  of  Monchy-le-Preux,  which  was  not 
only  strongly  fortified,  but  from  its  ridge  domi- 
nated the  surrounding  country.  It  was  a  tactical 
point  of  extreme  importance.  Six  Tanks  advanced 
against  it.  Three  were  put  out  of  action  on  the 
way,  but  the  other  three  reached  the  village  and 
enabled  the  infantry  to  occupy  it. 

Monchy  captured,  the  cavalry  moved  forward. 
By  all  accounts  the  Germans  were  now  thoroughly 
demoralised,  but  so  long  as  they  had  a  few  steady 
machine-gunners  who  stuck  to  their  posts,  any 
effective  cavalry  advance  was  impossible.  Only 
the  Tanks  could  have  cleared  the  way,  and  it  was 
the  lack  of  a  Tank  reserve  to  fill  the  places  of 
those  put  out  of  action  which  gave  the  Germans 
time  to  restore  their  defence. 

The  same  day,  on  another  part  of  the  battle- 


H.    RICARDO,    ESQ.   [p.   1-?J) 


Photo:    H.  Walter  Barnett  &  Co.,  Ltd. 


PRODUCTION   ON  A  LARGE  SCALE     137 

field,  four  Tanks  worked  down  the  Hindenburg 
Line,  penetrated  into  the  country  beyond,  and  for 
over  eight  hours,  unsupported  by  infantry,  fought 
the  Germans  wherever  they  found  them,  killing 
great  numbers.  In  the  end  all  four  returned 
safely  to  their  own  lines. 

The  third  Tank  attack  of  the  day  was  the 
most  interesting,  although  the  operation  as  a 
whole  did  not  succeed.  It  was  delivered  against 
Bullecourt,  and  for  the  first  time  Tanks  were 
given  the  principal  part.  Although  the  opera- 
tion failed,  and  it  was  found  impossible  to  hold 
what  the  Tanks  and  infantry  had  captured,  it 
was  made  clear  that  the  Tanks  could  do  those 
things  for  which  until  then  massed  artillery  had 
been  thought  to  be  indispensable.  They  could 
cut  the  wire  and  they  could  protect  the  infantry 
with  a  mobile  barrage  in  place  of  the  creeping 
barrage  of  the  guns. 

The  results  of  the  Conference  at  Tank  Head- 
quarters with  General  Butler  and  General  Elles, 
on  April  16th  and  17th,  should  also  be  given  in 
more  detail.  We  talked  over  the  improvements 
suggested  by  the  experience  of  the  battle,  and  I 
said  that  whatever  could  be  done  to  improve 
Mark  IV.  during  the  summer  would  be  done,  but 
that  I  had  a  design  with  me  which  I  hoped  would 
meet  all  demands.  It  was  for  a  Mark  VI.  Tank, 
an  improved  Mark  V.  This  drawing  I  left  with 
them. 

General  Butler  then  laid  down  the  three  types 
of  machines  required  : — 


138  TANKS 

1.  The  Heavy  Tank,  a  Tank  which,  owing  to  its  weight, 

must  have  a  special  railway  truck  to  convey  it. 

2.  The  Medium  Tank,  which  can  travel  on  a  standard 

train  in  France. 

3.  The  Light  Tank,  which  can  travel  on  a  lorry. 

I  told  him  that  I  already  had  a  complete 
wooden  model  of  the  Mark  VI.,  which  would  be 
ready  by  the  30th  April,  with  a  real  Ricardo 
engine  in  it.  This  would  embody  all  the  improve- 
ments required,  greater  speed,  lighter  loading  and 
more  ease  of  control.  I  also  put  forward  the 
"  Whippet,"  which  has  already  been  explained. 

It  was  arranged  that  a  Conference  should  be 
held  in  London  on  April  30th  to  decide  on  the 
programme  needed  at  once — not  in  preparation 
for  next  year's  requirements,  but  to  keep  con- 
tinuity of  progress  in  design  and  output.  This 
Conference  was  to  decide  on  our  future  policy, 
which  must  be  governed  by  the  demands  of  the 
Flying  Corps  and  Motor  Traction,  both  of  which 
necessarily  took  precedence  of  Tanks. 

I  suggested  that  lorries  might  be  got  from 
America.  Her  lorries  were  second  to  none, 
whereas  her  big  engines  and  flying  engines  were 
not  sound  enough  for  our  special  enterprises. 

General  Butler  suggested  that  the  establishment 
of  540  would  be  enough.  I  replied  that  wc  ought 
to  try  to  make  progress;  unless  we  increased,  we 
should  go  back.  I  thought  wc  could  probably 
produce  300  a  month  of  the  Heavy  Tank,  and  that 
1000  ought  always  to  be  kept  in  commission  as 
war  establishment. 


PRODUCTION   ON  A  LARGE  SCALE     139 

General  Butler  then  queried  the  capacity  of  the 
country  for  spare  parts,  but  Major  Wilson  ex- 
plained that  we  were  taking  measures  to  eliminate 
the  great  wear  and  tear  both  by  better  design  and 
better  material.  I  cited  the  commercial  success 
of  the  motor-bus,  which  originally  suffered  from 
stupendous  wear  and  tear. 

The  question  of  armour-plate  was  discussed 
with  Captain  Symes.  General  Butler  suggested 
Uralite,  but  Captain  Symes  explained  that  the 
best  protection  was  to  have  armour-plate  of  the 
proper  thickness. 

Finally,  General  Butler  said  that  he  would  tell 
the  Adjutant  General  of  the  value  of  the  Tanks, 
and  the  necessity  of  allowing  us  to  have  the  men 
we  needed. 


CHAPTER   VII 

FIGHTING   THE   WAR  OFFICE 


CHAPTER  VII 

FIGHTING   THE   WAR   OFFICE 

May  1917  to  September  1917 

On  returning  from  France  I  wrote  to  General 
Butler : — 

"  Firstly,  I  wish  to  say  how  splendidly  I  consider 
the  Tanks  have  been  handled  and  manned  in  the  last 
engagement — a  veritable  triumph  of  training  and 
organisation.  But  this  is  not  the  object  of  this  letter. 
It  is  to  ask  you  if  the  Commander-in-Chief  could  write 
officially  to  the  Army  Council  informing  them  of  the 
value  of  the  Tank  as  an  established  unit  of  his  armies. 
My  reason  is  that,  owing  to  the  great  secrecy  adopted 
in  the  early  days,  it  is  still  looked  upon  as  a  surprise 
experiment  which,  after  the  original  surprise,  has 
practically  no  future. 

"  If  the  Commander-in-Chief  could  write  a  letter 
to  the  Minister  of  War  as  head  of  the  Army  Council 
and  ask  him  to  transmit  it  to  the  Ministry  of  Munitions 
it  would  give  the  Tanks  in  England  the  serious  position 
which  he  would  undoubtedly  wish  them  to  have,  and 
lighten  the  burden  of  those  toiling  for  you  at  home." 

As  a  result  of  this  letter,  Sir  Douglas  Haig 
wrote  a  letter  to  Lord  Derby,  the  Secretary  of 
State  for  War,  in  which  he  said  that  the  im- 

143 


144  TANKS 

portance  of  Tanks  was  firmly  established  and 
that  there  should  be  a  special  department  at 
the  War  Office  to  look  after  them. 

On  May  1st  Lord  Derby  called  a  meeting  at 
the  War  Office  at  which  were  present  General 
Sir  Robert  Whigliam,  the  Deputy  Chief  of  the 
Imperial  General  Staff,  General  Sir  Neville 
Macready,  the  Adjutant-General,  General  Furse, 
the  Master-General  of  the  Ordnance,  General 
Butler,  Dr.  Addison,  the  Minister  of  Munitions, 
Sir  Eustace  d'Eyncourt  and  myself. 

After  Sir  Douglas  Haig's  letter  had  been  read 
it  was  decided  that  a  Tank  Committee  should 
be  established,  with  two  representatives  of  the 
Ministry  of  Munitions,  the  Master-General  of 
the  Ordnance  (representing  the  War  Office),  a 
General  (representing  the  Heavy  Section  of  the 
Machine-gun  Corps)  and  a  Chairman,  who  should 
be  a  General,  not  under  the  rank  of  Major-General, 
with  experience  of  fighting  at  the  Front. 

On  May  4th  I  saw  Lord  Derby  and  suggested 
that  the  Committee  which  had  been  proposed 
on  May  1st  would  be  quite  unsuitable,  and  that 
we  ought  to  have  a  Committee  of  people  who 
could  devote  their  whole  time  to  Tanks.  The 
essential  requirements  were  Tactics,  Personnel 
and  Material.  Therefore  one  person  should  de- 
vote his  entire  time,  with  agents  both  at  Wool 
and  in  France,  to  looking  a  Iter  Tactics,  another 
to  Personnel,  while  Liu;  Ministry  of  Munitions 
would  look  after  the  desigD  and  manufacture. 
This  should  be  the   nucleus  of  the  Committee, 


MARK  IV.  MACHINE    (p.  137) 


■      -  ■*  -  - 


''mw& 


MARK  V.  MACHINE  </.  137) 


Photos:  Bridge  Studios  Ltd. 


Scene  on  the  Flanders  Battlefield      (p.  156) 


British  OFFICIAL. 


The  state  of  the  ground  is  shown 
here,  owinj,'  to  the  heavy  rains. 
A  tank   is  seen  ball    under  water    (p.   156) 


I '.  It  I   I   I  S  I  I     <  >  |    I 


FIGHTING  THE   WAR   OFFICE      145 

and  other  people  could  be  added  as  the  War 
Office  thought  fit. 

Lord  Derby  was  inclined  to  agree  with  me  and 
said  he  would  get  something  written  out.  He 
suggested  that  the  Parliamentary  Secretary  would 
probably  be  a  good  man  for  a  Chairman.  As 
soon  as  he  had  drafted  something,  he  would  send 
for  me  to  discuss  the  matter  again. 

Although  we  had  at  this  time,  and  were  to  have 
later,  enormous  difficulties  with  the  War  Office, 
we  were  still  on  the  best  of  terms  with  them, 
as  the  following  letter  from  General  Furse  will 
show. 

"  My  dear  Stern, 

"  I  tried  to  get  you  on  the  telephone  this 
evening  to  tell  you  how  delighted  I  was  to  hear  that 
those  extra  plates  had  been  pushed  off  to  France  to- 
day for  the  Mark  IV.s.  That  is  really  a  fine  performance, 
especially  in  this  filthy  time  of  strikes.     Bravo  !  " 

The  Committee  was  appointed,  with  General 
Capper  as  Chairman.  A  month  before  he  had 
never  seen  a  Tank. 

At  the  first  meeting  I  spoke  as  follows  :— - 

"  Sir  Douglas  Haig  told  me  on  April  24th  that  the 
Tank  had  been  established  as  one  of  the  most  im- 
portant arms  of  the  British  Expeditionary  Force,  that 
it  was  a  great  life-saver,  and  that  battles  could  not  be 
won  without  huge  losses  except  with  Tanks. 

''  This  new  arm  is  making  very  rapid  progress.  In 
191G  we  produced  150  Tanks;  in  1917  we  shall  produce 
1500  Tanks;   in  1918  we  can  produce  6000  Tanks. 

"  I  do  not  believe  that  the  standard  organisation  of 


146  TANKS 

the  War  Office  can  be  imposed  on  this  development 
without  great  injury.  The  connection  between  the 
Fighting  Tanks  in  France  and  the  Department  responsible 
for  design,  supply  and  development,  must  be  direct  and 
instantaneous.  What  possible  advantage  can  accrue 
from  the  passage  of  ideas  and  requirements  through 
numerous  Departments  of  the  War  Office  ? 

"  I  wish  to  suggest  that  the  rapid  development  can 
be  achieved  by  the  appointment  of  a  Director-General 
of  all  military  Tanks  in  England  and  abroad,  solely 
responsible  for  everything  to  do  with  Tanks,  except 
when  detailed  for  action  in  the  field.  Major-General 
Capper  has  already  been  appointed  General  in  Command 
of  Tanks,  but  to  my  mind  he  requires  these  powers. 
His  position  as  regards  Tanks  should  be  similar  to  the 
position  which  Sir  Eric  Geddes  held  in  England  and 
abroad  with  regard  to  railways. 

"  The  Director-General  of  military  Tanks  should 
leave  all  questions  of  design,  manufacture,  supply, 
inspection,  labour,  materials  and  transport  to  the 
Mechanical  Warfare  Supply  Department,  and  should 
communicate  his  requirements  direct  to  the  Director- 
General  of  that  Department,  and  he  should  approve  the 
design  of  Tanks  before  manufacture. 

"  The  duties  of  the  Director-General  of  Mechanical 
Warfare  Supply  should  be  : — 

1.  Research. 

2.  Design. 

3.  Supply. 

4.  Transport. 

5.  Storage. 

6.  Repair,  including  Central  Workshops  at  home 

and  abroad. 

7.  Spare  Parts. 

8.  Any  special  Tank  Stores. 

9.  Inspection. 


FIGHTING  THE   WAR  OFFICE     147 

"  By  this  organisation,  the  users  and  producers  would 
be  directly  in  touch,  and  full  information  would  be 
available  at  any  moment,  without  passing  through 
unnecessary  Departments. 

"  The  fighting  force  could  inspect  and  take  over  from 
the  suppliers  at  the  Central  Workshops,  at  home  and 
abroad,  Tanks  ready  for  action. 

"  The  study  of  wear  and  tear,  spare  parts,  salvage, 
repairs,  rebuilding,  at  home  and  abroad,  would  be 
simplified  by  being  in  the  hands  of  one  organisation." 

These  were  the  proposals  which  I  made  to  the 
Committee,  but  this  new  organisation  appeared 
to  Sir  Eustace  d'Eyncourt  and  me  to  be  so 
dangerous  to  the  free  development  of  Mechanical 
Warfare  that  on  the  18th  of  May  I  wrote  a 
Memorandum  to  the  Prime  Minister  and  the 
Minister  of  Munitions  (Dr.  Addison).  It  was  a 
long  document,  setting  out  all  the  cases  in  which 
the  War  Office  had  disregarded  expert  advice 
with  regard  to  Tanks,  only  to  find  that  the 
experts  were  right. 

After  describing  the  new  arrangement,  the 
Memorandum  went  on  : — 

"  The  military  authorities,  who  have  not  grown  up 
with  this  new  development,  and  who  do  not  know  the 
reasons  for  the  different  advantages  and  disadvantages 
which  go  to  make  a  Tank,  are  disregarding  more  and 
more  expert  opinion. 

"  For  instance,  the  original  Tanks,  Mark  I.,  were 
fitted  with  the  Hotchkiss  machine-gun,  and  the  employ- 
ment of  this  gim  was  only  decided  on  after  very  ex- 
haustive investigation  and  consideration  of  the  special 
circumstances  of  Tank  warfare. 


148  TANKS 

"  On  the  23rd  November,  1916,  at  a  special  meeting 
the  military  authorities  decided  that  the  Hotchkiss 
machine-gun  be  abandoned,  and  the  Lewis  gun  be  sub- 
stituted. This  decision  was  reached  against  the  advice 
of  the  Mechanical  Warfare  Supply  Department. 

"  At  a  series  of  meetings  again  held  by  the  military 
and  reported  on  by  a  Committee  on  the  6th  May,  1917, 
it  was  decided  that  the  Lewis  gun  was  useless  in  a 
Tank,  and  that  the  Hotchkiss  gun  was  the  only  gun 
that  could  be  used.  The  result  is  that  once  more  a 
change  has  to  be  made,  but  too  late  to  make  the  altera- 
tion as  it  should  be  made,  and  this  year's  Tanks  will 
carry  converted  Lewis  gun  loopholes  and  Hotchkiss 
ammunition  in  racks  and  boxes  provided  for  Lewis 
guns. 

"  Originally,  it  was  considered  by  the  Mechanical 
Warfare  Supply  Department  that  male  and  female 
Tanks  in  equal  numbers  was  the  best  arrangement.  In 
the  winter  of  1916-17  the  military  experts  decided 
on  the  proportion  of  one  male  to  two  females.  Last 
week  they  again  changed  their  ideas  to  three  males  to 
two  females,  and  there  are  insufficient  6-pounder  guns 
for  this  purpose. 

"  In  consultation  with  the  expert  advice  of  Mechanical 
WTarfare,  it  was  decided  by  the  military  authorities 
that  100  Tanks  in  France  and  100  Tanks  in  England 
were  necessary  for  training  purposes.  On  this  de- 
cision, Tanks  were  manufactured  with  mild  steel  plates 
instead  of  armour-plates,  without  the  improvements 
required  for  fighting.  This  decision  was  only  arrived 
at  after  very  full  discussion  and  after  the  question  of 
this  large  number  of  Tanks  necessary  for  training 
purposes  had  been  very  severely  criticised  by  the  Prime 
Minister  and  Sir  Eustace  d'Eyncourt,  but  the  military 
authorities  stated  that  it  was  absolutely  necessary  to 
have  this  number  of  training  Tanks.     Shortly  after  this, 


FIGHTING  THE   WAR   OFFICE      149 

the  military  authorities  decided  to  use  sixty  of  these 
training  Tanks  for  fighting  purposes. 

"  The  reason  given  for  using  these  practice  machines 
was  that  the  output  of  machines  was  late.  The  military 
authorities,  though  crying  out  for  an  early  delivery 
of  Tanks,  have  never  given  the  Mechanical  Warfare 
Supply  Department  the  assistance  they  required.  At 
the  same  moment  that  the  Director-General  of  the 
Mechanical  Warfare  Supply  Department  was  called 
before  the  War  Cabinet  on  March  22nd  to  answer  for 
the  delay  of  one  month  in  the  delivery  of  Tanks,  the 
War  Office  had  made  an  agreement  with  the  Ministry 
of  Munitions,  dated  16th  March,  1917,  that  the  two 
munitions  which  the  Army  required  most  urgently 
were  aeroplanes  and  guns.  ...  At  a  meeting  with 
Sir  Douglas  Haig,  the  Minister  of  Munitions,  General 
Whigham,  General  Davidson,  and  Sir  Eustace  d'Eyn- 
court,  on  November  23rd,  1916,  I  stated  quite  clearly 
that  to  produce  the  Tanks  according  to  my  proposed 
programme,  I  should  require  about  2000  workmen. 

"  Instead  of  my  getting  these  men,  after  repeated, 
continual,  and  continuous  demands,  men  are  being 
taken  from  the  works,  and  only  275  out  of  the  2000 
have  been  supplied. 

"  The  military  authorities,  being  aware  of  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief's demand,  had  not  put  this  Department 
in  a  protected  category,  and  it  is  only  after  repeated 
demands  to  General  Butler,  and  a  visit  to  Sir  Douglas 
Haig  last  month  (April  24th)  at  Amiens,  that  the 
Mechanical  Warfare  Supply  Department  now  appears 
on  the  same  list  with  Guns  and  Aeroplanes,  and  is  thus 
protected. 

"  The  withdrawal  of  these  training  Tanks  for  fighting 
purposes  has  resulted  in  a  lack  of  trained  men,  and 
great  delay  in  training  the  men,  on  which  the  whole 
success  of  Mechanical  Warfare  depends,  has  resulted. 


150  TANKS 

"  The  lack  of  training  has  also  been  due  to  a  shortage 
of  essential  Spare  Parts ;  a  Schedule  was  laid  down  by 
the  military  authorities  in  January  on  a  much  reduced 
scale  to  that  suggested  by  the  Mechanical  Warfare 
Supply  Department,  and  two  months  later  certain 
categories  were  multiplied  by  thirty." 

I  then  quoted  from  my  letter  to  the  Minister 
of  Munitions  of  March  12th,  protesting  against 
the  premature  employment  of  Tanks.1 

The  Memorandum  went  on  : — 

"  The  military  authorities  again  disregarded  Technical 
Advice,  at  a  meeting  on  Spare  Parts  at  the  Ministry 
of  Munitions,  in  the  Minister's  room,  at  which  the 
Master-General  of  the  Ordnance,  Sir  Eustace  d'Eyncourt, 
General  Anley,  Colonel  Searle  and  Mr.  Percy  Martin 
were  present  (April  3rd,  1917).  At  this  meeting,  which 
had  been  called  as  a  result  of  complaints  to  the  War 
Council,  the  military  authorities  laid  down  that  they 
required  the  same  number  of  Spare  Parts  for  Training 
Machines  per  100  as  for  Fighting  Machines  per  100. 
I  pointed  out  to  them  that  the  Fighting  Machine  was, 
compared  with  a  Training  Machine,  a  projectile,  and 
that  after  going  into  action  it  would  hardly  require 
any  Spare  Parts;  in  other  words,  that  Training  Tanks 
would  require  Spare  Parts,  but  Fighting  Machines 
would  require  spare  Fighting  Machines.  The  technical 
side  was  overruled,  and  Spare  Parts  were  ordered  in 
quantities  which  are  overtaxing  the  whole  Steel  Castings 
capacity  of  this  country. 

"  The   technical    advice   that   these   machines   were 

worth  200  per  cent,  or  300  per  cent,  more  on  dry  ground 

than  on  wet  ground  was  also  disregarded.     I  explained 

that  the  wear  necessitating  the  large  number  of  Spares 

1  See  p.  127. 


FIGHTING  THE   WAR   OFFICE      151 

was  due  to  wet  winter  weather  (namely,  mud),  and 
would  be  largely  reduced  by  summer  weather,  and 
mudguards,  which  were  being  fitted.  The  advice  was 
unheeded.  A  letter  dated  May  10th,  from  the  Heavy 
Branch,  France,  states  that  all  estimates  for  Spares  for 
Fighting  Tanks,  estimated  on  March  10th  and  con- 
firmed at  the  meeting  on  3rd  April  above-mentioned, 
are  to  be  halved,  except  the  six  Steel  Castings  which 
had  been  demanded  in  enormous  quantities.  These 
demands  are  reduced,  in  the  case  of  four  of  them  to 
one-sixth,  and  in  the  case  of  two  of  them  to  one- 
fourth.  The  total  weight  of  the  demand  of  April  3rd, 
covering  1600  machines  over  a  period  of  eight  months, 
was  10,500  tons,  the  amended  estimate  of  May  10th 
for  the  same  number  of  machines  over  the  same  period 
is  3400  tons. 

"  The  advice  that  Tanks  in  quantity  are  essential 
to  the  success  of  an  action  in  Mechanical  Warfare  has 
also  been  disregarded. 

"  The  preparations  being  made  by  the  Ministry  of 
Munitions  should  result  in  the  shipment  of  between 
40,000  and  50,000  tons  of  Tanks  during  the  fighting 
season  this  year.  The  military  authorities  have  pro- 
vided a  single  Central  Workshop,  one  centre  for  the 
reception  of  this  mighty  host.  This  is  against  technical 
advice.  The  Central  Workshop  at  the  Front,  which  we 
understood  was  to  be  used  for  running  repairs,  is  now 
being  used  for  the  reconstruction  of  new  types  of 
machines  such  as  '  Supply  Tanks '  and  '  Signalling 
Tanks.' 

"  General  Anley  was  appointed  General  in  Command 
of  the  Tanks  in  England,  and  the  Mechanical  Warfare 
Supply  Department  made  arrangements  for  his  offices 
to  be  next  door  to  the  Mechanical  Warfare  Supply 
Department.  It  was  arranged  that  general  demands 
from   France  for  Spares,  Tank  Stores,  etc.,  from  the 


152  TANKS 

Tank  Corps  should  come  direct  through  the  General 
to  the  Mechanical  Warfare  Supply  Department,  and  be 
shipped  direct  by  the  organisation  of  the  Mechanical 
Warfare  Supply  Department,  which  ships  Tanks  and 
Tank  stores,  under  control  of  its  own  officers  and  men, 
to  the  Tank  Headquarters  in  France.  Now,  it  is 
proposed  to  divert  this  through  all  sorts  of  channels  in 
the  War  Office.  Instances  can  be  quoted  by  which 
the  time  taken  in  receiving  a  demand  and  fulfilling 
it  under  the  new  regime  means  endless  delay. 

"  The  present  suggestion  to  put  Mechanical  Warfare 
on  the  above  basis  at  the  War  Office  is,  in  my  opinion, 
ill-considered  and  fatal  to  the  success  and  progress  of 
Mechanical  Warfare. 

"  It  is  proposed  that  two  members  of  the  Ministry 
of  Munitions,  a  member  of  the  War  Office,  and  a  member 
of  the  Heavy  Section  should  meet  under  the  Presidency 
of  a  General  not  below  the  rank  of  a  Major-General. 
Major-General  Capper  has  now  been  appointed  Adminis- 
trative Commander  of  all  the  Tank  Forces,  and  is,  I 
believe,  on  Sir  Douglas  Haig's  Staff,  and  also  Chairman 
of  the  Tank  Committee. 

"  I  wish  once  more  to  put  forward  that,  in  my  opinion, 
this  Committee,  to  be  successful,  must  be  put  on  a 
proper  footing,  and  I  consider  it  essential  that  the 
Chairman,  Major-General  Capper,  must  be  a  member 
of  the  Army  Council,  and  that  the  members  of  the 
Committee  should  devote  their  entire  time  to  Mechanical 
Warfare  and  be  responsible  to  the  Chairman  for  the 
different  branches  which  go  to  make  up  Mechanical 
Warfare,  viz.  : — 

"1.  Personnel. 

"  There  should  be  a  member  responsible  to  the 
Chairman  for  complete  knowledge  of  require- 
ments, and  the  study  generally  of  personnel  for 


FIGHTING   THE   WAR   OFFICE        153 

Tanks  both  in   France  and   England,  with   a 
liaison  with  French  Tanks. 

"  2.  Tactics. 

"  Another  member  should  study  the  question  of 
Tactics  in  co-operation  with  the  Tank  Force 
in  France  and  the  Tank  Force  in  England,  and 
have  complete  information  ready  for  the 
Committee,  with  a  liaison  with  French  Tanks. 

3.  Supply  and  Design. 

"  All  knowledge  of  supply  and  design  should  be 
concentrated  in  Lieut. -Colonel  Stern  and  Sir 
Eustace  d'Eyncourt,  representing  the  Ministry 
of  Munitions.  The  Mechanical  Warfare  Supply 
Department  are  in  liaison  with  the  French 
Department  on  Tanks  Design  and  Supply. 

"  The  Committee  to  consist  of  five  members,  three 
to  be  appointed  by  the  Army  Council,  to  devote  their 
entire  time  to  Mechanical  Warfare;  the  Chairman  to 
be  a  member  of  the  Army  Council;  the  two  members 
from  the  Ministry  of  Munitions,  representing  Supply 
and  Design,  to  be  appointed  by  the  Minister  of  Munitions, 
subject  to  the  approval  of  the  Army  Council. 

"  In  this  way,  the  Chairman  of  the  Committee  would 
have  a  permanent  organisation  with  first-hand  informa- 
tion on  the  Personnel,  Tactics,  Manufacture  and  Design 
of  Tanks,  and,  as  a  member  of  the  Army  Council,  would 
be  in  a  position  to  furnish  the  Army  Council  with  the 
latest  information  on  all  these  points  whenever  required. 

"  This  Committee  should  be  the  recognised  authority 
for  submitting  recommendations  as  to  the  Tactical 
employment  of  Tanks  and  other  Mechanical  Warfare 
Stores,  and  should  advise  on  the  Numbers,  Training  and 
Equipment  of  Crews,  and  on  anti-Tank  expedients. 
The   Committee   should   be   empowered   to   give   final 


154  TANKS 

decisions  (subject  only  to  approval  by  the  Secretary 
of  State  for  War  and  the  Minister  of  Munitions)  on  all 
matters  appertaining  to  design  and  equipment  of  Tanks 
(whether  for  Fighting,  Signalling,  Gun-carrying,  Supply 
or  other  purposes) ;  to  Transport  and  Storage  of 
Mechanical  Warfare  Stores,  to  repairs,  including  Central 
and  Mobile  Workshops ;  to  Spare  Parts  and  any  special 
Stores,  and  to  Inspection. 

"  The  Mechanical  Warfare  Supply  Department  have 
hitherto  carried  out  the  Experiments,  Design,  Construc- 
tion, Inspection,  Storage,  and  Transportation.  Their 
Contract  and  Finance  Sections  have  been  under  the 
Director-General,  subject  to  the  supervision  of  the  heads 
of  these  Departments  in  the  Ministry  of  Munitions, 
who  have  their  representatives  in  this  Department.  This 
system  has  proved  entirely  successful,  and  no  faults 
have  been  found  by  the  Finance  and  Contracts  Branches 
of  the  Ministry  of  Munitions  except  that  it  differs  from 
the  procedure  in  other  Departments,  namely,  that  the 
local  control  of  Contract  and  Finance  Departments, 
though  supervised  by  the  Ministry  of  Munitions,  is 
directly  under  the  Director-General  of  the  Mechanical 
Warfare  Supply  Department.  The  systems  adopted 
by  this  Department  are  used  in  the  most  up-to-date 
and  successful  businesses  in  the  world,  and  have  been 
approved  by  the  different  authorities  of  the  Ministry  of 
Munitions. 

"The  question  of  Transportation,  Storage  and  In- 
spection, as  above,  should  be  left  to  the  discretion  of 
this  Committee  to  decide.  My  reasons  for  stating  this 
are  that  Mechanical  Warfare  is  in  a  process  of  great 
expansion  and  development,  with  violent  and  continual 
changes,  and  it  would  be  fatal  to  try  and  impose  on 
this  new  enterprise  the  hard  and  fast  rules  governing 
standard  Army  Stores.  Of  course,  it  is  understood  that 
the  formation  of  this  Committee  and  the  powers  given 


FIGHTING  THE   WAR  OFFICE      155 

to  it  are  a  temporary  measure  for  this  and  next  year's 
production. 

"  If  these  recommendations  are  approved,  I  see  every 
hope  of  carrying  out  the  big  programme  which  is  on 
order  this  year,  and  the  programme  which  has  been 
foreshadowed  for  next  year,  but  unless  the  new  organisa- 
tion is  formed  on  these  lines,  with  the  flexibility  sug- 
gested, I  see  no  possibility  of  carrying  out  either  this 
or  next  year's  programme." 

This  document  I  signed,  and  Sir  Eustace 
d'Eyncourt  added  his  signature  as  concurring 
in  everything  that  I  had  said. 

In  my  covering  letter  to  Dr.  Addison,  I  ex- 
plained that  the  Memorandum  did  not  concern 
supply,  but  concerned  the  whole  question  of 
mechanics  as  applied  to  warfare. 

The  Prime  Minister  arranged  for  a  date  for 
the  discussion  of  this  Memorandum  by  the  War 
Cabinet.  It  had  caused  a  sensation  amongst 
the  Chiefs  at  the  War  Office,  that  any  one  should 
dare  to  question  their  ruling,  especially  a  junior 
officer.  Then  General  Capper  came  to  see  me. 
He  told  me  that  Sir  William  Robertson  wished 
me  to  withdraw  the  Memorandum,  and  said  all 
the  things  which  I  had  criticised  would  be  at- 
tended to  and  altered.  In  consequence  of  this, 
although  the  Memorandum  had  been  circulated 
to  all  the  Ministers  concerned,  I  withdrew  it, 
with  the  result  that  nothing  was  done  towards 
making  the  alterations  which  I  had  suggested. 

I  waited  two  months,  and  then,  on  July  23rd, 
1917,  I  wrote  again  to  the  Prime  Minister  and  to 


156  TANKS 

the  Minister  of  Munitions,  urging  that  the  Com- 
mittee as  set  up  was  the  wrong  sort  of  body  to 
control  the  construction  of  Tanks. 

Next  day  I  wrote  again  to  the  Prime  Minister 
on  another  and  very  important  matter,  the 
tactical  use  of  Tanks.  The  military  authorities 
had  agreed  to  make  it  a  rule  that  they  would  not 
use  Tanks  where  the  weather  and  ground  con- 
ditions were  very  bad.  In  spite  of  this,  in  spite 
of  the  fact  that  the  designers  and  builders  had 
told  them  that  over  very  heavily  crumped,  soft, 
muddy  country  Tanks  were  practically  useless, 
they  had  been  using  them  in  the  mud  at  Pass- 
chendaele,  and  now  it  seemed  likely  that  the 
Army  would  cancel  all  orders  for  Mechanical 
Warfare. 

In  these  circumstances  I  wrote  : — 

"  On  January  25th,  I  had  the  honour  of  submitting 
to  the  Prime  Minister  a  Memorandum  for  consideration 
(copy  of  which  is  enclosed)  re  Mechanical  Warfare  and 
the  necessity  of  having  a  joint  conference  on  Tactics. 

"  As  a  result  of  a  discussion  before  the  War  Cabinet 
between  the  General  Staff,  Sir  Eustace  d'Eyncourt  and 
myself,  a  meeting  was  held  at  the  War  Office  on 
March  4th. 

"  My  suggestions  in  this  Memorandum  were  : — 

1.  Tanks  must  not  be  used  over  heavily  crumped 

areas. 

2.  Tanks  should  be  used  in  large  quantities. 

3.  Tanks  should  support  Tanks. 

"  Since  that  date,  we  have  fought  battles  at  which 
Tanks  have  assisted  at  Arras,  Messines  and  Ypres. 


FIGHTING  THE   WAR   OFFICE      157 

"  I  now  propose  to  visualise  the  development  of 
tactics,  both  enemy  and  ally,  since  August  1914,  generally, 
and  especially  in  relation  to  Tanks  and  Mechanical 
Warfare. 

"  1st  Stage. 

"  Swift  shock-attack  and  counter-attack.  German 
invasion  of  Belgium  and  France,  ending  in  their  defeat 
at  the  Battle  of  the  Marne.  Here  is  the  end  of  mobile 
warfare. 

"  2nd  Stage. 

Trench  Warfare 

"  Defensive. — A  long  single  line  defended  by  wire, 
machine-guns  and  quick-firing  field-guns. 

"  Offensive.  —  Mass  attack  which  failed  —  Neuve 
Chapelle  and  Loos. 

"  At  this  point  the  thinkers  (both  German  and  Allied) 
saw  that  some  new  method  of  war  must  be  adopted  to 
break  defences  which  defied  any  hitherto  known  weapons. 

"  The  Germans  developed  gas,  with  the  idea  of  over- 
coming these  defences  by  asphyxiation. 

"  The  Allies  developed  an  armoured  vehicle  immune 
from  wire  and  machine-gun  fire,  and  capable  of  crossing 
trench  defences. 

"  Both  have  failed  to  win  decisive  battles  for  the 
same  reason,  owing  to  lack  of  the  big  idea,  lack  of 
patience  to  wait  until  a  new  engine  of  war  and  its 
tactics  could  be  fully  prepared,  organised  and  tested. 

"  3rd  Stage. 

"  The  Battle  of  the  Somme  in  September. 

"  Offensive. — The  tactics  of  blasting  the  front  lines 
of  the  enemy  by  means  of  masses  of  guns  and  ammuni- 
tion, were  adopted. 

"  The  advantages  claimed  were  the  protection  of  our 


158  TANKS 

infantry  advance  and  the  killing  of  the  enemy  in  order 
to  break  through  the  single  line. 

"  Defensive. — The  Germans  immediately  began  to 
appreciate  our  new  offensive  tactics  and,  by  adopting 
numerous  lines  of  trenches,  gradually  improved  their 
tactics  as  an  antidote. 

"  They  hold  one  or  two  lines  very  lightly,  which  are 
entirely  obliterated  by  our  massed  fire.  This  fire  makes 
it  practically  impossible  for  our  infantry,  Tanks  or  guns 
to  operate.  The  result  is  that  the  enemy  is  safe  from 
further  attack  until  we  have  repaired  the  damage,  but 
their  guns,  which  are  now  placed  further  back  out  of 
our  counter-battery  range,  create  havoc  among  our 
advance  troops  who  hold  the  newly-taken  trenches 
unprotected. 

"  The  change  in  German  tactics  is  clearly  demon- 
strated by  the  number  of  guns  captured  by  vis  : — 

200  at  the  Battle  of  Arras ; 
40  ,,     ,,        ,,       „  Mcssines; 

and  a  small  number  at  the  Battle  of  Ypres. 

"  I  think  from  the  foregoing  it  is  clear  that  to  win 
a  decisive  battle,  a  gradual  development  from  one 
form  of  attack  by  increasing,  or  perhaps  decreasing, 
slightly  the  power  of  one  arm  of  the  force  cannot  pro- 
duce the  desired  result.  These  changes  can  easily 
be  countered  by  the  defence.  A  total  change  of  tactics  is 
necessary — a  surprise  which  the  defence  cannot  deal  with. 

"  We  still  have  that  power  of  surprise  in  our  hands. 

"  Accumulate  Tanks  and  continue  to  do  so  until 
you  have  thousands,  well-trained  and  well-organised 
tactically  into  an  efficient,  self-contained  mechanical 
army.  Continue  to  use  a  few  at  the  Front,  if  it  is 
considered  necessary  to  hoodwink  the  German  Command. 

"  Press  propaganda  might  also  deceive  the  Germans 
in  proclaiming  the  failure  of  Mechanical  Warfare. 


FIGHTING  THE   WAR  OFFICE      159 

"  Make  this  effort  a  great  enterprise  of  its  own. 

"  Several  types  of  Tanks  will  have  to  be  incorporated 
as  the  different  new  designs  are  introduced. 

"  Finally  this  great  force  would  consist  of  brigades 
of  Tanks  of  different  designs,  each  organised  for  its 
own  particular  role ;  all  organised  under  one  head,  who 
would  be  responsible  for  a  Mechanical  Army  (trained 
with  its  complement  of  artillery  and  infantry,  etc., 
until  ready  to  complete  its  task)  to  win  a  decisive 
battle. 

"  All  arrangements  for  organisation,  transport,  etc., 
to  be  under  this  single  head." 

Here  is  a  letter  from  a  very  important  Staff 
Officer  to  whom  I  sent  this  Memorandum  : — 

"  It  is  all  a  question  of  thinking  big  and  thinking 
ahead  and  then  behaving  with  sanity,  holding  fast  to 
the  principles  of  war  and  selecting  your  theatre  of 
operations  according  to  your  weapon,  or  constructing 
your  weapon  according  to  your  theatre.  There  are 
two  theatres  to  consider:  Flanders  and  Cambresis. 
The  first  has  mud  and  the  second  wide  and  deep  trenches. 
As  I  cannot  imagine  any  one  choosing  Flanders  again, 
our  difficulties  may  be  spanning  power.  This  requires 
very  careful  consideration. 

"  The  mud  here  is  beyond  description.  I  have  never 
seen  anything  like  it  either  on  the  Somme  or  the  Ancre. 
The  worst  is  our  guns  have  destroyed  the  drainage 
system  in  the  valleys,  and  little  streams  are  now  exten- 
sive swamps.  Under  our  fire  Belgium  is  going  back  to 
its  primeval  condition  of  a  water-logged  bog. 

"  We  can  win  the  war  if  we  want  to,  we  won't  if  we 
continue  as  at  present — so  at  least  I  think." 

On  July  27th  Sir  Eustace  d'Eyncourt  and  I 
ceased  to  attend  the  meetings  of  the  Tank  Com- 


160  TANKS 

mittee.  We  found  that  the  three  military  mem- 
bers, who  a  month  before  had  never  even  seen 
a  Tank,  laid  down  all  rulings  even  with  regard 
to  design  and  production.  They  were  in  the 
majority,  and  we  could  do  nothing.  That  day 
I  wrote  to  the  Prime  Minister : — 

"  A  crisis  has  arisen  in  the  relations  between  the 
War  Office  and  the  Ministry  of  Munitions  re  the  progress 
and  development  of  Mechanical  Warfare,  namely,  de- 
sign and  production.  ...  I  continually  pressed  the 
War  Office  that  they  should  establish  a  special  Depart- 
ment of  Tanks  at  the  War  Office,  with  whom  my 
Department  could  deal  as  a  link  between  the  fighting 
and  production  sides.  The  War  Office  has  set  its  face 
against  this  most  resolutely. 

"  I  have  had  to  visit  nearly  every  Department  of 
the  War  Office  on  all  sorts  of  vital  questions  and, 
naturally,  with  most  unsatisfactory  results.  .  .  .  The 
Committee  is  now  interfering  in  design  and  production, 
which,  if  allowed  to  continue,  will  result  in  chaos  and 
disaster.     I  refuse  to  allow  this. 

"  To  put  the  matter  on  a  proper  basis  is  a  most 
simple  matter.  Those  conversant  with  the  whole  sub- 
ject should  be  consulted,  and  the  empty  prejudices  of 
the  War  Office  cleared  away. 

"  The  proposition  must  be  clearly  stated  and  an  organ- 
isation formed  to  suit  the  case,  not  some  old  dug-out 
organisation  which  suits  no  modern  requirements  at  all. 

"  There  are  two  portions  of  this  development — one 
fighting  and  training,  and  the  other  design  and  pro- 
duction. For  the  former,  a  Director-General  of  Tanks, 
a  member  of  the  Army  Council  with  a  Department  at 
at  the  War  Office  is  essential.  This  Department  must 
have  '  G,'  '  Q,  and  '  A  '  branches  as  in  the  Royal 
Flying  Corps. 


GUN-CARRYING   TANK.   (p.  165) 


GUN-CARRYING    TANK.   [p.   165) 


Photos.:   Bridge  Studios,  Ltd. 


---'-*"     .-      •-.-•   ■••-' 


Some    of  the  many  stables  where  our  tanks  are   housed     {p.    190) 


Central   Workshops,  Tank  Corps.    Tanks  ready  for  issue      [p.  190) 


Hun  isii    ( in  k  i.w. 


FIGHTING  THE   WAR   OFFICE      161 

"  We  already  have  a  Director-General  of  Mechanical 
Warfare  for  the  second  portion. 

"  As  Design  and  Tactics  are  so  nearly  allied  in 
Mechanical  Warfare,  there  should  be  a  connecting  link 
in  the  form  of  a  purely  Advisory  Committee,  consisting 
of  (War  Office)  Director-General  of  Tanks  and  Deputy 
Chief  of  General  Staff,  (Ministry  of  Munitions)  Director- 
General  of  Mechanical  Warfare,  Chief  Technical  Adviser, 
with  a  neutral  Chairman  to  give  advice  on  questions  of 
general  policy. 

"  We  are  ahead  of  any  army  in  the  world  in  Mechanical 
Warfare. 

"  This  is  due,  after  the  initial  decision  of  Mr.  Churchill, 
to  the  pioneers  of  the  work,  namely,  the  Mechanical 
Warfare  Department  of  the  Ministry  of  Munitions  and 
the  assistance  of  the  Admiralty. 

"  All  the  experimental  work  and  testing,  etc.,  is  done 
by  Naval  men  lent  by  the  Admiralty.  The  War  Office 
refuse  all  assistance. 

"  For  the  progress  of  a  great  technical  enterprise  of 
this  sort  the  experimental  and  technical  branches  are 
all  important  and  need  a  number  of  technical  officers — 
younger  men,  who  have  the  technical  training. 

"  The  War  Office  refuse  all  these  demands,  refuse 
proper  rank  to  those  officers  doing  good  work  for  this 
Department,  making  their  positions  quite  impossible. 
On  the  one  side  the  War  Office  ask  for  complete  co- 
operation with  the  Front,  re  design,  etc.,  and  then 
make  it  practically  impossible  for  me  to  send  technical 
men  over  by  refusing  commissions  and  suitable  rank  to 
those  who  hold  commissions. 

"  All  the  technical  men,  consequently,  go  into  the 
Flying  Corps,  where  their  cases  are  treated  with  con- 
sideration and  common  sense.  If  it  was  not  for  the 
Admiralty  lending  my  Department  some  400  to  500 
men  for  experimental  and  testing  work,  and  giving  my 

M 


162  TANKS 

technical  officers  honorary  commissions,  I  doubt  if  the 
Tanks  would  ever  have  been  produced  in  large  numbers. 

"  Sir  Douglas  Haig  thanked  me  at  the  Battle  of  the 
Somrae,  September  17th,  1916,  for  the  part  we  had 
played  in  producing  the  Tanks,  which  were  responsible 
for  the  greatest  victory  they  had  had  since  the  Battle 
of  the  Marne,  and  mentioned  in  dispatches  Captain 
Holden,  the  Deputy  Director-General  of  the  Mechanical 
Warfare  Supply  Department,  Major  W.  G.  Wilson, 
Director,  Captain  K.  Symes,  Director,  and  Lieut.  W. 
Rendle,  Assistant  Director. 

"  These  officers  all  hold  high  positions  in  my  Depart- 
ment. I  have  requested  time  after  time  that  they 
should  be  promoted  to  the  rank  consistent  with  their 
duties.  They  all  joined  up  for  the  War,  at  or  soon 
after  the  outbreak.  They  are  continually  going  to 
the  Front,  but  the  War  Office  refuses,  and  General 
Capper  refuses  them  all  promotion." 

When  I  had  written  this,  I  had  an  interview  with 
the  D.C.I.G.S.,  Sir  Robert  Whigham,  who  told  me 
that  it  was  intended  to  form  a  Tank  Department 
at  the  War  Office  on  the  lines  I  had  suggested. 

I  added  a  note  to  my  Memorandum  saying 
that  I  had  heard  this  was  to  be  done,  and  urging 
that  if  it  were  done  we  should  need  also  an 
Advisory  Committee  to  guide  the  War  Office  on 
all  questions  of  main  requirements  and  other 
important  questions  such  as  tactics  and  training 
in  relation  to  design.  This  Committee,  I  sug- 
gested, should  consist  of  : — 

D.C.I.G.S.,  Major-Gcneral  Sir  Robert  Whigham. 
D.G.,  T.C.,  Major-Gencral  Sir  J.  E.  Capper. 
D.G.,  M.W.D.,  Lieut.-Colonel  A.  G.  Stem. 


FIGHTING  THE   WAR  OFFICE      163 

Chief  Technical  Adviser,  Sir  E.  H.  T.  d'Eyncourt. 

It  should  be  clearly  laid  down  that  the  War  Office 
give  the  Ministry  of  Munitions  their  requirements  of  the 
main  programme  on  the  advice  of  the  Committee  as  to 
type,  but  that  the  Ministry  of  Munitions  must  be 
entirely  responsible  for  design,  production,  supply  and 
transport,  as  hitherto. 

The  Director-General  of  Tanks  should  deal  with  the 
Mechanical  Warfare  Department,  through  his  "  Q " 
Branch,  for  all  details  of  design,  manufacture,  and 
supply  of  Tanks,  both  armament  and  equipment. 

The  technical  staff  of  this  Tank  Department  at  the 
War  Office  should  be  included  in  the  "  Q  "  Branch 
(T.  3). 

Every  effort  should  be  made  to  discover  and  adopt 
methods  of  complete  liaison  with  the  righting  and 
training  forces.  It  is  suggested  that  a  certain  number  of 
officers  from  these  centres  be  attached  for  seven  or 
fourteen  days  at  a  time  continuously  throughout  the 
year  to  the  Mechanical  Warfare  Experimental  Grounds, 
and  every  facility  should  be  given  to  the  Mechanical 
Warfare  Department  Officers  to  visit  the  front  and  home 
camps  as  at  the  present  time. 

The  War  Office  should  recognise  that  the  Mechanical 
Warfare  Department  is  exceptionally  and  intimately 
related  in  these  stages  of  development  with  the  fighting 
force  and  assumes,  in  certain  of  its  Departments,  an 
absolutely  military  character,  and  that,  subject  to  the 
usual  approval,  commissions  and  promotions  should  be 
granted,  where  necessary,  in  the  Tank  Corps. 

While  we  were  fighting  for  the  proper  manage- 
ment, and  even  for  the  very  existence  of  Tanks, 
at  home,  the  following  special  order  appeared 
in  France,  showing  what  they  were  capable  of 
doing  : — 


164  TANKS 

"  The  following  Summary  of  the  action  of  Tank  F.41 
{Fray  Benthos),  on  the  22nd  to  2Uh  August,  is  published 
for  the  information  of  all  Ranks  : — 

"  F.  41,  accompanied  by  the  Section  Commander, 
crossed  our  lines  on  the  22nd  at  4.45  a.m.,  near  Spree 
Farm  and  proceeded  eastwards  with  the  Objectives 
Somme  Farm — Gallipoli — Martha  House.  The  Tank 
engaged  and  cleared  Somme  Farm.  When  in  action 
against  Gallipoli  the  Tank  commander  was  wounded, 
and  while  the  section  commander  was  taking  his  place, 
the  Tank  became  ditched.  The  Tank  continued  in 
action,  and  our  infantry  entered  Gallipoli  and  went 
forward  to  the  north  of  it.  At  this  time  a  hostile 
counter-attack  developed,  driving  our  troops  back  and 
regaining  Gallipoli.  Within  sight  of  the  Tank  the 
counter-attack  was  dealt  with  and  broken  by  6-pounder 
and  Lewis-gun  fire;  heavy  casualties  were  inflicted. 
F.  41  was  now  isolated. 

"  As  our  infantry  were  firing  on  the  Tank  from  the 
rear,  thinking  it  had  been  captured  by  the  enemy,  the 
sergeant  succeeded  in  getting  back  to  them  and  informed 
them  that  we  still  occupied  the  Tank  and  would  hold  out. 

"  During  the  22nd,  the  night  22nd-23rd,  the  23rd, 
the  night  23rd-24th,  and  the  day  of  the  24th,  the 
officers  and  crew,  though  all  wounded,  maintained  their 
position,  although  heavily  sniped  by  day  and  attacked 
each  night.  During  these  attacks  the  enemy  actually 
got  on  top  of  the  Tank  and  brought  a  machine-gun  up 
at  very  close  range  without  effect. 

"  At  9  p.m.  on  the  evening  of  the  24th,  the  crew 
having  maintained  themselves  for  sixty-two  hours,  500 
yards  in  advance  of  and  out  of  touch  with  our  line,  and 
having  been  seventy-two  hours  in  the  Tank,  decided  to 
evacuate.     This  was  successfully  done. 

"  Casualties.  —  Officers,  2  wounded;  other  ranks, 
1  killed  4  wounded." 


FIGHTING  THE  WAR  OFFICE      165 

At  this  time  also  the  Gun-carrier  Tank  went 
into  action  with  great  success. 

Mr.  Churchill  had  now  become  Minister  of 
Munitions,  but  things  were  still  unsettled.  There 
was  no  final  authority  on  the  Army  side.  There 
was  a  General  at  the  Front  and  a  General  in 
London,  and  a  General  at  the  Training  Camp  at 
Wool,  and  no  one  had  authority  in  all  three 
places.  So  we  went  on  for  some  weeks,  and  on 
the  19th  September  I  wrote  to  Mr.  Churchill : — 

"  Lack  of  action  and  lack  of  decision  will  most 
assuredly  ruin  the  chances  of  Mechanical  Warfare  for 
1918. 

"  I  have  discussed  the  possibilities  of  Mechanical 
Warfare  with  the  General  Staff,  and  I  think  they  agree 
with  me  that  Mechanical  Warfare  on  a  small  scale  is 
waste  of  treasure  and  effort. 

"  Every  day  and  every  hour  that  passes  renders 
Mechanical  Warfare  on  a  large  scale  for  1918  more 
improbable. 

"  On  July  23rd,  you  informed  me  that  after  a  pre- 
liminary study  generally  of  the  Ministry  you  would 
investigate  the  position  of  Mechanical  Warfare.  It  is 
now  two  months  since  that  date.  Immediate  action 
must  be  taken." 

I  then  repeated  my  suggestions  for  an  Ad- 
visory Committee,  and  went  on  to  describe  how 
the  existing  Committee  worked  : — 

"  It  has  five  members ;  the  two  members  of  the 
Ministry  of  Munitions  have  the  experience  and  know- 
ledge of  developing  Mechanical  Warfare  since  February 
1915,  and  have  been  responsible  for  the  production  of 


166  TANKS 

some  30,000  tons  of  Tanks  within  a  year,  with  hardly 
a  complaint  considering  that  it  is  an  absolutely  new 
development. 

"  This  Committee  has  three  members  who  had  never 
been  in  a  Tank  till  a  few  months  ago  when  this  Committee 
was  appointed. 

"  Every  detail  goes  through  this  Committee,  it  in- 
structs our  best  drawing-office  to  be  filled  up  with 
priority  of  a  design  which  we,  the  experts,  do  not 
approve,  with  resultant  delay  to  real  progress;  it  fails 
to  take  the  necessary  action  and  risks  which  a  head  of 
enterprise  must  take  at  all  hours  of  the  day. 

"  Since  its  existence,  it  has  done  nothing  to  further 
Mechanical  Warfare,  one  of  the  most  technical  of  all 
war  developments.  This  country  is  pre-eminent  in 
Mechanical  Warfare,  by  reason  of  Mr.  Lloyd  George  and 
Mr.  Montagu  deputising  to  the  experts  and  allowing  no 
red  tape  or  out-of-date  formulas  to  clog  the  wheels  of 
progress. 

"  The  Ministry  of  Munitions'  representatives,  Sir 
Eustace  d'Eyncourt  and  myself,  as  all  our  protests  were 
unheeded,  ceased  to  attend  the  Committee,  but,  at  the 
urgent  request  of  Sir  Arthur  Duckham,  are  again 
attending. 

"  Complete  chaos  is  the  result  of  this  ill-advised 
and  ill-considered  enterprise,  the  Tank  Committee.  I 
shudder  to  think  of  the  harvest  which  you  will  reap 
next  year  if  this  is  allowed  to  continue." 

On  September  21st  I  wrote  a  further  Memo- 
randum to  Mr.  Churchill : — 

"  At  the  request  of  Sir  William  Robertson,  the 
C.I.G.S.,  I  explained  the  latest  Tank  developments  and 
showed  him  the  new  one-man  transmission  at  our 
Experimental  Ground. 


FIGHTING  THE   WAR  OFFICE      167 

"  After  a  lengthy  discussion  I  gather  that  he  agrees 
that  the  science  of  Mechanical  Warfare  has  reached  a 
point  when  mechanical  cavalry  in  large  quantities,  in 
conjunction  with  other  arms,  have  a  better  chance  than 
any  known  weapon  of  winning  a  decisive  battle. 

"  We  believe  that  we  have  the  design  of  such  a 
machine. 

"  He  agrees  that  all  our  resources  for  manufacture 
of  Tanks  should  be  devoted  to  the  production  of  fighting 
Tanks. 

"I  wish  to  again  draw  attention  to  my  minute  of 
24/7/17.1 

"  Here  I  suggested  that  a  Tank  effort  should  be  a 
great  enterprise  of  its  own,  all  organised  under  one 
head.  Now  I  suggest  a  still  greater  effort :  let  a  great 
General  organise  our  effort  in  conjunction  with  the 
Americans  and  the  French ;  my  Department  can 
organise  the  production  in  conjunction  with  the  Allied 
Generals. 

"  My  Department  could  give  all  the  drawings,  specifi- 
cations and  our  experience,  and  foster  the  allied  output. 

"  England  could  probably  produce  some  2000  machines 
of  this  type  by  July  1st,  America  probably  4000,  France 
perhaps  500. 

"  This  would  give  the  Allies  an  overwhelming  power 
for  victory  to  which  no  antidote  at  present  exists. 

"  Secrecy  is  essential." 

On  the  29th  of  September,  1917,  Mr.  Churchill 
called  a  meeting  of  the  Imperial  General  Staff  of 
the  War  Office,  the  General  Staff  in  France  and 
the  Commanders  of  the  Tanks  at  the  Front  and 
in  England. 

General  Butler  desired  an  entirely  new  pro- 

1  The  minute  on  Tank  Tactics.     See  p.  156. 


168  TANKS 

gramme.  He  said  that  the  number  of  Tanks 
got  out  depended  on  the  number  of  men  available, 
and  Sir  Douglas  Haig  estimated  that  there  would 
be  only  18,500  men  available.  He  asked  also 
that  Mark  V.s  should  replace  Mark  IV. s,  and 
that  as  few  as  possible  of  Medium  A  (the  Whippet) 
should  be  made.  Some  "  Supply  "  Tanks  would 
be  required,  but  he  did  not  say  how  many.  It 
was  decided  to  meet  again  on  October  10th. 

The  priority  at  this  time  was  Aeroplanes  first, 
Guns  and  Ammunition  second,  Mechanical  Trans- 
port third,  Locomotives  fourth,  and  Tanks  fifth. 

On  the  4th  October  the  following  recommenda- 
tions were  put  forward  to  Mr.  Churchill  by  Sir 
Arthur  Duckham,  Ministry  of  Munitions,  Member 
of  Council  for  Tanks  : — 

"  Tanks 

"  The  situation  at  present  may  be  summarised  as 
follows  : — 

"  Both  the  design  and  supply  of  Tanks  have  been 
in  the  hands  of  the  Mechanical  Warfare  Supply  Depart- 
ment, and  they  were  the  only  people  who  had  any 
direct  knowledge  on  the  subject  of  Tanks  until  supplies 
were  in  the  hands  of  the  Army.  Through  the  use  of 
Tanks  in  battle  and  also  through  their  use  over  old 
battlefields  for  the  purpose  of  training,  the  officers  in 
France  are  acquiring  an  actual  knowledge  of  the  use 
and  deficiencies  of  Tanks  greater  than  that  possessed 
by  the  Mechanical  Warfare  Supply  Department.  Mean- 
while, the  M.W.S.D.  has  realised  that  the  design  of 
Tank  now  being  manufactured  suffers  from  consider- 
able disabilities,  and  they  have  made  radical  improve- 
ments in  design  to  meet  these.     The  War  Office  during 


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FIGHTING  THE  WAR  OFFICE      169 

training  with  Tanks  at  Wool  are  also  finding  troubles 
and  are  taking  steps  to  overcome  them,  quite  apart  from 
the  M.W.S.D.,  or  the  armies  in  France.  Thus  there 
are  three  different  bodies  making  trials  and  doing 
experimental  work  without  any  proper  co-ordination. 

"  It  has  been  necessary  to  form  in  the  War  Office 
a  Department  under  a  Director-General  to  control  the 
requirements  for  and  use  of  Tanks,  and  the  supply 
and  training  of  the  personnel.  An  effort  was  made  to 
control  the  general  design  of  the  Tanks  required  by  a 
Committee  of  the  War  Office  on  which  the  M.W.S.D. 
was  represented  by  Colonel  Stern  and  Sir  Eustace 
d'Eyncourt,  but  the  Tank  Corps  in  France  was  not 
represented  at  all.  This  arrangement  has  proved  un- 
workable, as  the  Committee  not  only  considered  the 
general  specification  but  also  endeavoured  to  control 
working  designs.  I  have  discussed  matters  with  Generals 
Whigham,  Capper  and  Elles,  and  also  with  Colonel 
Stern  and  Sir  Eustace  d'Eyncourt,  and  I  have  obtained 
a  general  agreement  in  the  following  scheme  : — 

"  That  the  existing  Committee  be  dissolved  and  a 
new  one  set  up  composed  of  : — 

"  Major-General  Capper  (Chairman). 

"  General  Elles,  Tank  Corps,  France,  or  his  nominee 

from  his  staff. 
"  Colonel  Stern,  D.G.M.W.S.D. 
"  Sir  Eustace  d'Eyncourt. 

"  This  Committee  should  meet  fortnightly  in  France 
and  England  in  turn  and  its  duties  should  be  : — 

(a)  To  discuss  the  requirements  and  possibilities  of 

supply  of  Tanks  and  formulate  programmes. 

(b)  To  advise  on  what  line  experimental  work  shall 

take  and  where  it  shall  be  carried  out. 

(c)  To  discuss  tactics  as  affecting  design. 


170  TANKS 

(d)  To  arrange  for  a  close  liaison  between  the  users 
of  the  Tanks  and  the  producers. 

"  Only  general  specification  as  affected  by  con- 
ditions at  the  Front  would  be  discussed  and  settled  by 
the  Committee,  actual  design  would  be  carried  out 
entirely  by  the  M.W.S.D. 

"  Liaison  would  be  obtained  as  follows  : — 

(a)  By  providing  a  representative  of  the  M.W.S.D. 

with  an  office,  an  assistant  and  a  clerical  staff 
at  the  head  repair  shops  in  France. 

(b)  By  a  representative  of  the  Tank  Corps  in  France 

and  a  representative  of  the  Tank  Department 
of  the  War  Office,  being  members  of  the  Design 
Committee  of  the  M.W.S.D." 

On  the  8th  October  a  meeting  was  held  under 
the  presidency  of  Mr.  Churchill,  with  repre- 
sentatives of  the  War  Office  and  Ministry  of 
Munitions,  when  it  was  decided  to  adopt  Sir 
Arthur  Duckham's  recommendations. 

On  October  14th  General  Foch  sent  a  message 
to  me  that  he  wished  to  inspect  the  latest  de- 
velopment of  Mechanical  Warfare.  I  took  him 
down  to  our  Experimental  Ground  at  Dollis 
Hill  and  showed  him  Mark  V.,  which  was  the 
latest  type  of  heavy  Tank,  manoeuvring  and 
crossing  wide  trenches.  He  also  saw  the  Gun- 
carrier.  He  congratulated  me  on  the  wonder- 
ful improvements  and  said,  "  You  must  make 
quantities  and  quantities.  We  must  fight 
mechanically.  Men  can  no  longer  attack  with  a 
chance  of  success  without  armoured  protection." 

Instead,   however,   of  orders  being  given  for 


FIGHTING  THE   WAR   OFFICE      171 

thousands  of  Tanks,  as  I  had  hoped,  Mr.  Churchill 
told  me  that  the  requirements  for  the  Army  for 
1918  were  to  be  1350  fighting  Tanks.  This  I 
determined  to  fight  with  every  means  in  my 
power,  and  I  told  Mr.  Churchill  so.  I  then  had 
an  interview  with  Sir  William  Robertson,  Chief 
of  the  Imperial  General  Staff,  and  told  him  that 
the  proposed  preparations  for  1918  were  wholly 
and  entirely  inadequate.  Sir  William  Robertson 
replied  that  this  seemed  pretty  straight.  I  re- 
plied that  it  was  meant  to  be  straight. 

Sir  William  Robertson  was  extremely  polite  and 
shook  hands  with  me  when  I  left. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE  WAR  OFFICE  GETS  ITS  WAY 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE    WAR   OFFICE   GETS   ITS   WAY 

October  1917  to  November  1917 

On  the  11th  of  October  I  asked  for  an  inter- 
view with  Mr.  Churchill  in  order  to  put  my 
views  before  him,  for  he  appeared  to  be  taking 
the  advice  of  the  War  Office  and  not  of  the 
pioneers  of  Mechanical  Warfare.  I  told  him  that 
I  had  served  three  Ministers  of  Munitions,  that 
I  had  had  the  confidence  and  support  of  all 
three  (Mr.  Lloyd  George,  Mr.  Montagu  and  Dr. 
Addison),  that  as  a  result  I  had  done  efficient  work, 
and  that  without  his  confidence  I  could  not  make 
a  success  of  Mechanical  Warfare.  He  replied 
that  I  had  his  confidence,  but  that  the  War  Office 
wanted  a  change  made.  The  War  Office,  he  said, 
accused  me  of  lumbering  them  up  with  useless 
Tanks  at  the  Front  and  of  wasting  millions  of  the 
public  money.  Here  I  asked  him  to  go  slowly, 
as  I  wished  to  take  down  this  astounding  state- 
ment. In  the  opinion  of  the  War  Office,  he  said, 
there  had  been  a  total  failure  in  design,  no  pro- 
gress had  been  made,  all  the  money  spent  on 
Tanks  had  been  wasted,  and  the  belief  in  Mechan- 
ical Warfare  was  now  at  such  a  low  ebb  that  they 
proposed  to  give  it  up  entirely.     Mr.  Churchill 

175 


176  TANKS 

paid  me  flattering  compliments,  and  said  that 
the  country  would  reward  me  suitably  for  my 
great  services. 

I  told  him  that  I  had  fought  against  the  forces 
of  reaction  from  the  day  when  the  order  for  1000 
Tanks  was  cancelled  by  the  Army  Council  without 
the  knowledge  of  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  although  he 
was  Secretary  of  State  for  War,  and  as  a  result 
of  my  protest  was  reinstated  the  next  day ;  that 
time  after  time  we  had  saved  the  War  Office 
from  wasting  millions  of  money  and  going  entirely 
wrong,  and  that  our  advice  had  finally  been 
taken  in  each  case  in  correction  of  the  War 
Office's  original  action ;  I  challenged  Mr.  Churchill 
to  produce  a  single  case  where  I  had  done  any- 
thing to  prevent  progress  and  a  free  play  of  ideas, 
and  I  gave  him  two  examples  of  the  way  in  which 
I  had  worked.  The  transmission  in  the  first 
Tanks  was  not  very  satisfactory.  Immediately 
after  the  first  Tank  battle  on  the  Somme  I  had 
put  in  hand  every  possible  design  of  transmis- 
sion, that  we  might  discover  the  best.  Again,  on 
March  7th,  1917,  I  proposed  to  Dr.  Addison  to 
take  over  Sir  William  Tritton  and  Messrs.  Foster's 
factory  solely  for  experimental  work,  but  Dr. 
Addison  was  unable  to  agree  to  this,  as  the  future 
of  Tanks  was  at  that  time  too  doubtful. 

So  our  interview  ended. 

On  October  15th  I  was  told  by  Sir  Arthur 
Duckham  that  three  Generals  at  the  War  Office 
had  asked  for  my  removal.  In  this  connection  I 
will  quote  a  letter  received  on  the  same  day  from 


;*>:: 


•■'■  4 


TANKS    OUT    OF   ACTION.   (/>.    795) 


^■i^A&S^/ 


TANKS    OUT   OF   ACTION.    (/>.   795) 


Photos,  by  E.  Northev,  Esq. 


I  II  I    I     <  OLONEL    |     \    DR  UN,  U  S.R     p.   197) 


Photn  :   Marion  N  i 


THE   WAR  OFFICE   GETS   ITS   WAY     177 

the  G.O.C.,  Tanks  in  France,  giving  his  views  on 
what  the  Department  was  doing  for  him  : — 

"  You  deserve  a  bar  to  your  C.M.G. ;  and,  seriously, 
we  are  extremely  obliged  to  all  of  you  for  your  very 
prompt  action. 

"  Now  we  are  very  anxiously  depending  on  you  to 
solve  two  main  conundrums  which  confront  us  : — 

(a)  A  device  to  get  the  Mark  IV.  and  Mark  V.  Tanks 

over  a  wide  trench,  and 

(b)  Some  very  simple  dodge  by  which  we  may  be 

able  to  put  on   the   unditching  gear  from 
the  inside  of  the  Tank. 

"  We  are  trying  a  hook  which  is  placed  on  a  ring  fixed 
either  to  a  spud  or  to  a  track  link  between  two  wooden 
spuds.  This  hook  is  put  on  by  hand  through  the  aper- 
ture in  the  manhole,  which  we  have  enlarged  to  the 
breadth  of  the  machine  for  the  purpose. 

"  The  weather  has  been  ghastly  lately,  and  the  battle 
conditions  are  very  trying,  with  all  this  rain  and  wet." 

The  whole  trouble  with  the  War  Office  was  that 
I  had  pressed  for  a  large  programme  of  Tanks — 
at  least  4000 — for  the  fighting  of  1918,  but  the 
Committee,  against  which  we  had  continually 
protested,  with  its  War  Office  majority  of  Generals 
who  knew  nothing  of  Tanks,  had  overruled  me. 
Now,  at  a  time  when  the  decisions  of  experts  were 
absolutely  necessary  in  preparation  for  1918,  and 
when  it  was  clear  to  us  that  enormous  quantities 
of  Tanks  were  needed,  the  War  Office  programme 
was  for  1350  Tanks.  Mr.  Churchill  told  me  that 
he  agreed  with  Sir  Eustace  d'Eyncourt  and  me 


178  TANKS 

that  quantities  of  Tanks  were  necessary  for  1918, 
but  as  Minister  of  Munitions  he  could  not  argue 
with  the  Generals  at  the  War  Office  about  their 
requirements ;  his  business  simply  was  to  supply 
what  they  wanted.  This  appeared  to  us  a  crying 
shame.  We  knew  the  thousands  of  casualties 
that  the  Tanks  had  already  saved  in  the  attacks 
on  the  German  machine-gun  positions. 

Next  day  Sir  E.  d'Eyncourt  and  I  asked  for 
an  interview  with  Mr.  Churchill.  He  refused  to 
see  Sir  E.  d'Eyncourt,  and  told  me  that,  with 
regret,  he  had  decided  to  appoint  a  new  man  in 
my  place,  and  therefore  there  was  no  object  in 
discussing  the  situation.  He  added  that  he  was 
in  power,  and  therefore  it  was  his  responsibility, 
and  that  he  had  taken  the  advice  of  the  Council 
member,  Sir  Arthur  Duckham.  I  told  him  that 
I  would  not  resign,  as  I  believed  it  to  be  against 
the  public  interest,  but  that  he  could  dismiss  me. 

Next  day  I  received  the  following  letter  from 
him  : — 

"  Ministry  of  Munitions, 

"  Whitehall  Place,  S.W., 

"  October  16th,  1917. 

"  Dear  Colonel  Stern, 

"  As  I  told  you  in  our  conversation  on  Friday, 
I  have  decided,  upon  the  advice  of  the  Member  of  Council 
in  whose  group  your  department  is,  and  after  very 
careful  consideration  of  all  the  circumstances,  to  make 
a  change  in  the  headship  of  the  Mechanical  Warfare 
Supply  Department. 

"  I  propose,  therefore,  to  appoint  Vice-Admiral  Sir 
Gordon  Moore  to  succeed  you,  and  this  appointment  will 
be  announced  in  the  next  two  or  three  days. 


THE   WAR   OFFICE   GETS   ITS   WAY     179 

"  I  shall  be  glad  to  hear  from  you  without  delay 
whether  those  other  aspects  of  activity  in  connection 
with  the  development  of  Tanks  in  France  and  America, 
on  which  Sir  Arthur  Duckham  has  spoken  to  you, 
commend  themselves  to  you. 

"  Meanwhile  I  must  ask  you  to  continue  to  discharge 
your  duties  until  such  time  as  you  are  relieved. 
"  Yours  very  truly, 

"  Winston  S.  Churchill." 

I  had  an  interview  with  Sir  Arthur  Duckham 
on  the  same  day,  and  he  told  me  that  Mr. 
Churchill  was  unable  to  persuade  the  War  Office 
to  have  a  larger  number  of  Tanks,  but  that  as  he 
was  a  believer  in  Mechanical  Warfare,  it  was  his 
opinion  that  America  should  be  persuaded  to  arm 
herself  with  the  necessary  number  of  Tanks  for 
next  year's  fighting. 

He  told  me  that  Mr.  Churchill  considered  it 
my  duty,  as  the  War  Office  did  not  wish  to  develop 
Mechanical  Warfare  on  a  large  scale,  to  under- 
take its  development  among  the  Allies,  and  chiefly 
the  Americans.  At  this  time  I  also  saw  the  Prime 
Minister,  and  said  that  I  was  willing  to  undertake 
any  duties  which  the  country  might  call  upon 
me  to  perform.  On  October  25th  Mr.  Churchill 
wrote  to  me  as  follows  : — 

"  I  was  very  glad  to  hear  from  you  yesterday  that 
you  are  ready  to  undertake  the  new  appointment  of 
Commissioner  for  Mechanical  Warfare  (Overseas  and 
Allies)  Department,  which  I  am  now  in  a  position  to 
offer  you.  I  need  scarcely  say  that  I  should  not  have 
offered  you  this  new  appointment  if  I  had  not  full  con- 


180  TANKS 

fidence  in  your  ability  to  perform  its  duties  satisfac- 
torily. You  should  settle  the  questions  which  may  arise 
in  regard  to  your  staff  with  Admiral  Moore  and  Sir 
Arthur  Duckham.  They  will,  I  am  sure,  have  every 
desire  to  meet  your  wishes  and  requirements.  But  at 
the  same  time  I  rely  upon  you  not  to  ask  for  more 
assistance  than  is  absolutely  necessary.  Recommenda- 
tions as  to  the  status  and  emoluments  of  any  officers 
upon  your  staff  should  be  made  through  the  Member 
of  Council  in  whose  group  your  department  lies.  It 
seems  to  me  that  your  first  duty  will  clearly  be  to  get 
into  touch  with  the  American  Army  and  discuss  with 
General  Pershing,  or  his  officers,  what  steps  we  should 
take  to  assist  them  with  the  supply  of  Tanks. 

"  Perhaps  I  may  take  the  opportunity  of  your  assump- 
tion of  new  duties  and  responsibilities  to  convey  to  you 
on  behalf  of  the  Ministry  of  Munitions  a  sincere  appre- 
ciation of  the  services  which  you  have  rendered  to  the 
Tanks  in  the  earlier  stages  of  their  development.  No 
one  knows  better  than  I  the  difficulties  and  antagonisms 
with  which  you  had  to  contend  or  the  personal  force 
and  determination  with  which  you  overcame  them. 

"  The  fact  that  at  this  period  in  the  history  of  the 
Tank  development  I  have  found  it  necessary  to  make  a 
change  in  personnel  is  in  no  sense  a  disparagement  of 
the  work  you  have  done  successfully  in  the  past,  and  I 
can  only  hope  that  you  will  continue  to  apply  to  your 
new  duties  the  same  qualities  of  energy  and  resource 
which  have  already  proved  so  valuable,  and  not  allow 
yourself  to  be  discouraged  by  the  changes  which  it  has 
been  thought  necessary  to  make. 

"  In  spite  of  what  you  said  tome  yesterday1  evening, 
I  still  propose  to  submit  your  name  to  the  Prime  Minister 
for  inclusion  in  the  forthcoming  honours  list.     I  think 

1  Mr.  Churchill  had  s.iid  the  night  before  that  he  was 
putting  my  name  in  for  an  honour,  and  I  had  refused  it. 


THE  WAR  OFFICE   GETS  ITS  WAY    181 

this  would  only  be  right  and  proper  so  far  as  you  are 
concerned,  and  that  it  would  be  helpful  to  you  in  the 
new  work  which  you  are  undertaking.  Unless  I  hear 
from  you  to  the  contrary  my  recommendation  will  go 
forward. 

"  I  enclose  a  formal  statement  of  your  new  appoint- 
ment and  its  duties." 

On  October  29th  I  accepted  the  position.  On 
the  same  day  I  warned  Mr.  Churchill  once  more 
that  the  progress  of  design  and  the  output  of  the 
Tanks  would  most  surely  suffer.  In  the  mean- 
time Admiral  Sir  A.  G.  H.  W.  Moore  had  been 
appointed  the  Controller  of  the  Mechanical 
Warfare  Department. 

Up  to  the  date  of  his  appointment  Admiral 
Moore  had  never  even  seen  a  Tank. 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE  ANGLO-AMERICAN  TREATY 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE   ANGLO-AMERICAN   TREATY 

November  1917  to  January  1918 

As  soon  as  the  United  States  had  entered  the 
war,  in  the  spring  of  1917,  I  had  called  on  the 
American  Military  Attache  in  London,  Colonel 
Lassiter,  and  asked  him  to  come  and  see  our 
Tanks  at  the  Experimental  Ground,  which  he 
did.  At  that  time  he  was  the  sole  military 
representative  of  the  United  States  in  London 
and  was  fully  occupied  with  all  sorts  of  questions 
of  war  equipment,  so  that  he  was  unable  to  devote 
any  of  his  time  to  the  question  of  Tanks. 

Sir  Eustace  d'Eyncourt  determined,  therefore, 
to  see  whether  we  could  not  arouse  the  enthusiasm 
of  the  Americans  by  getting  the  Navy  and 
the  Ambassador  to  see  the  Tanks.  In  June 
Mr.  Page,  Admiral  Sims  and  Admiral  Mayo, 
with  some  forty  naval  officers,  came  to  the 
Experimental  Ground  at  Dollis  Hill.  They  were 
delighted  with  what  they  saw.  Admiral  Mayo 
thought  that  the  Tank  was  the  very  weapon 
for  the  Marines,  and  Mr.  Page  told  me  that  he 
would  cable  to  President  Wilson  that  he  con- 
sidered it  a  crime  to  attack  machine-guns  with 
human    flesh   when    you    could   get    armoured 

185 


186  TANKS 

machines,  and  machines,  too,  which  he  would 
never  have  believed  capable  of  performing  the 
feats  actually  carried  out  that  day  before  him. 

As  a  result  of  this  Colonel  Lassiter  once  more 
interviewed  me.  He  said  that  the  Tanks  must 
be  for  the  Army,  not  the  Marines,  and  agreed  to 
cable  for  a  technical  expert  to  be  sent  over  from 
the  United  States.  This  technical  expert  was 
Major  H.  W.  Alden,  who  arrived  on  October 
the  3rd. 

Now,  at  the  beginning  of  November,  having 
fought  in  vain  for  the  greatest  possible  develop- 
ment of  Mechanical  Warfare  in  this  country,  I 
took  up  my  new  post  and  set  to  work  to  see 
what  could  be  done  with  our  Allies. 

Mr.  Churchill  had  given  me  the  following 
letter  to  General  Pershing  and  a  similar  letter 
to  M.  Loucheur,  Minister  of  Munitions  of  the 
French  Government : — 

"  My  dear  General  Pershing, 

"  The  bearer  of  this  letter,  Colonel  Stern,  has 
been  appointed  by  me  Commissioner  of  Mechanical  War- 
fare (Overseas  and  Allies)  Department,  and  proposes 
to  establish  an  office  in  Paris  in  connection  with  his 
appointment. 

"  I  have  instructed  Colonel  Stern  to  call  upon  you, 
as  I  desire  that  he  should  work  in  the  closest  relations 
with  the  American  authorities.  All  communications 
from  the  Allies  on  questions  of  design,  supply  and 
experiments  in  relation  to  Tanks  are  in  future  to  be 
dealt  with  in  the  first  instance  by  Colonel  Stern,  and,  if 
only  for  this  reason,  it  is  desirable  that  he  should  make 
himself  known  to  you. 


THE  ANGLO-AMERICAN  TREATY    187 

"  The  immediate  object  of  his  visit  is  to  discuss  with 
the  French  and  American  authorities,  as  my  repre- 
sentative, the  general  situation  of  Tanks  and  how  best 
to  develop  their  production.  In  particular  he  pro- 
poses, with  Monsieur  Loucheur's  concurrence,  to  study 
the  possibility  of  finding  a  factory  in  France  in  which 
Tanks  of  a  less  recent  design  than  that  now  in  use  can 
be  converted  into  improved  types.  The  possibility  of 
furthering  the  assembling  and  even  the  construction  of 
Tanks  in  France  for  the  Allies  will  also  be  considered 
by  him  in  consultation  with  the  French  administration. 

"  If  you  would  be  so  good  as  to  accord  to  Colonel 
Stern  an  interview  he  would  be  able  to  explain  to  you 
at  greater  length  the  precise  objects  of  his  mission. 

"  As  you  are  no  doubt  aware,  he  is  one  of  the  pioneers 
of  Mechanical  Warfare,  and  until  assuming  his  present 
appointment  was  responsible  for  the  supply  of  Tanks 
to  the  British  Army. 

"  Yours  sincerely, 

"  Winston  S.  Churchill." 

On  November  11th  I  had  an  interview  with 
General  Pershing  and  his  staff  and  laid  before 
him  our  proposals.  He  was  very  much  in  favour 
of  the  project,  and  said  that  he  would  give  a 
decision  within  a  few  days.  On  November  14th 
he  wired  his  approval. 

A  fortnight  later  I  was  able  to  tell  Mr.  Churchill 
that  I  had  discussed  the  question  of  co-operation 
with  Major  J.  A.  Drain  and  Major  Alden,  repre- 
senting the  U.S.  Army,  and  with  M.  Loucheur, 
representing  the  French  Government,  and  that 
I  had  the  honour  to  make  the  following  pro- 
posals : — 


188  TANKS 

"  (1)  That  a  partnership  of  the  U.S.A.  and  Great 
Britain  should  be  incorporated  for  the  pro- 
duction of  1500  heavy  Tanks  at  the  earliest 
possible  date,  to  be  erected  in  France. 

"  (2)  A  number  of  these  Tanks  should  be  supplied  to 
France  if  she  should  require  them,  in  order  to 
further  the  higher  purpose  of  Allied  unity. 

' '  (3)  It  might  be  convenient  for  France  to  supply  an 
erecting  shop  without  depleting  her  other 
supplies,  but  it  might  be  wiser  in  any  case  to 
build  a  new  erecting  shop. 

"  (4)  No  insuperable  difficulties  can  be  seen  for  the 
joint  supply  of  components;  the  6-pounders, 
ammunition  and  armour  by  Great  Britain ; 
engines,  transmission,  forgings,  chains,  etc., 
by  the  U.S.A. 

"  (5)  The  design  will  be  founded  on  the  British 
experience  with  the  U.S.A.  ideas  and  resources. 
It  will  eliminate  most  of  the  faults  of  the 
present  heavy  Tank  in  H.P.,  loading,  crossing 
power,  namely,  the  fault  of  not  getting  there. 

"  The  following  is  a  rough  comparison  of  the  two 
types  :— 


Mark  IV. 

Liberty  Type 

Power 

.     100  H.P. 

300  H.P. 

Loading 

• 

25  %  lower  than 
Mark  IV. 

Crossing  power 

.     11  feet 

14  feet 

Weight 

.     28  tons 

30  tons 

w  The    Liberty   Type   should    have   a    considerable 
carrying  capacity  in  addition  to  its  fighting  power. 

"  (0)  Major  Alden  will  collaborate  in  making  the 
working  drawings  of  new  design  before  Christ- 
mas   in    London ;     all    facilities    of    English 


THE  ANGLO-AMERICAN  TREATY    189 

engineers,  draughtsmen  and  drawing  offices 
must  be  put  at  his  disposal.  The  design  to 
be  agreed  upon  by  U.S.A.  and  Great  Britain. 

"  (7)  Labour  other  than  skilled  might  be  met  by 
Chinese.  The  French  Authorities  see  no  local 
difficulties  in  accommodating  such  labour. 

"  (8)  It  is  hoped  to  work  up  to  300  Tanks  a  month 
after  April. 

' '  (9)  This  will  be  a  limited  enterprise,  and  therefore  a 
very  high  specified  priority  should  be  given 
by  the  three  Governments  concerned  in  raw 
materials,  labour,  factories  and  transport. 

"  (10)  The  entire  management  must  be  in  the  hands 
of  the  British  and  American  Commissioners, 
jointly  with  the  French  Commissioner,  where 
it  concerns  France. 

"It  is  hardly  necessary  to  point  out  the  great  ad- 
vantages of  international  standardisation  or  unity  of 
manufacture. 

1.  In  production. 

2.  In  repair  and  spares. 

3.  In  progress. 

4.  In  training  and  tactical  use." 

On  November  23rd,  having  had  no  reply  from 
Mr.  Churchill,  I  saw  the  Prime  Minister  and 
explained  to  him  that  the  Americans  had  agreed 
to  build  jointly  with  us  1500  Tanks.  I  said  that 
ten  days  had  passed  without  a  decision,  and  that 
they  were  chafing  at  the  delay. 

Next  day  I  was  informed  by  Sir  Arthur  Duck- 
ham  that  Mr.  Churchill  cordially  approved  my 
scheme  for  co-operation  with  the  Americans,  and 
suggested  that  M.  Loueheur,  French  Minister  of 
Munitions,  should  also  be  a  party  to  the  scheme. 


190  TANKS 

M.  Loucheur  repeated  that  he  could  not  join 
with  us,  as  France  had  neither  men,  machinery, 
nor  material  to  spare. 

On  the  26th  of  November  the  Ministry  of 
Munitions  informed  the  War  Office  that  in 
order  that  the  Allied  Armies  might  be  provided 
with  Tanks  in  adequate  numbers,  there  should 
be  the  greatest  measure  of  co-operation  between 
the  Ministry  of  Munitions  and  the  Departments 
of  the  Allied  Governments  responsible  for  the 
production  of  Tanks.  With  this  end  in  view  a 
new  Department,  known  as  the  Mechanical  War- 
fare (Overseas  and  Allies)  Department,  had  been 
formed,  and  Lieut. -Colonel  A.  G.  Stern,  C.M.G., 
had  been  appointed  to  be  head  of  it,  with  the 
title  of  Commissioner.  The  Department  would 
act  in  accordance  with  the  rules  and  procedure 
prescribed  by  the  Inter-Allied  Council  or  other 
co-ordinating  authority  in  the  United  States  or 
elsewhere,  and  also  of  any  officers  appointed  to 
supervise  all  the  Munitions  Departments  in  Paris. 
A  statement  of  the  Commissioner's  duties  was 
also  forwarded  to  the  War  Office,  with  a  request 
that  the  necessary  notification  be  made  within 
the  War  Office  and  to  G.H.Q.,  France. 

Before  this  had  come  the  news  of  the  battle  of 
Cambrai.  There  for  the  first  time  the  Tanks 
had  fought  as  we  had  always  wished,  across 
good  ground,  without  a  preliminary  bombard- 
ment, and  in  large  numbers — over  400.  With 
their  help  General  Byng  had  won  what  up  to 
that  time  was  the  greatest  victory  of  the  war, 


THE   ANGLO-AMERICAN  TREATY    191 

the  greatest  in  the  territory  gain  and  the  prisoners 
captured,  and  the  greatest  in  its  economy  both 
of  lives  and  ammunition. 

A  Tank  attack  on  such  a  scale  had  meant 
enormous  preparation.  Five  million  rounds  of 
Small  Arms  Ammunition,  165,000  gallons  of 
petrol  and  55,000  lbs.  of  grease  were  a  few  of  the 
things  collected  in  advance  at  the  Tank  dumps. 
Moreover,  the  Tanks  had  for  this  attack  to  be 
fitted  with  a  special  device.  The  span  of  the 
Mark  IV.  was  ten  feet,  and  it  was  known  that 
in  many  places  the  Hindenburg  trenches  were 
twelve  feet  wide.  Great  cylinders  of  brushwood 
were  constructed  4  feet  6  inches  in  diameter  and 
10  feet  long.  Each  of  these  gigantic  fascines 
was  made  up  of  a  number  of  ordinary  fascines 
bound  together  with  chains.  These  chains  were 
drawn  tight  by  two  Tanks  pulling  in  opposite 
directions.  The  fascine  was  carried  on  the  nose 
of  the  Tank  and  could  be  released  by  a  catch 
from  inside,  the  idea  being  that  when  a  Tank 
came  to  a  broad  trench  it  would  fill  it  up  by 
dropping  in  its  fascine,  and  so  cross  over.  In 
the  battle,  however,  it  was  hardly  found  necessary 
to  use  them  at  all. 

Besides  the  Tanks  working  with  the  infantry, 
each  Brigade  had  twelve  Supply  Tanks  or  Gun- 
carriers  and  three  Wireless  Signal  Tanks,  while 
thirty-two  were  fitted  with  towing  gear  and 
grapnels  to  clear  the  wire  along  the  line  by  which 
the  cavalry  were  to  advance.  Four  hundred  and 
twenty-two  Tanks  in  all  went  into  action. 


192  TANKS 

They  deployed  on  a  line  about  1000  yards 
from  the  enemy's  outpost  trenches,  and  at  ten 
minutes  past  six,  in  a  thick  ground  mist  on  the 
morning  of  November  20th,  they  began  to  move 
forward.  General  Elles  led  the  attack  in  the 
centre,  flying  on  his  Tank  the  Tank  Corps  colours.1 
It  was  the  first  British  flag  to  fly  in  the  Hinden- 
burg  Line.  Close  behind  the  Tanks  came  the 
infantry.  For  ten  minutes  they  advanced 
through  the  mist  in  complete  silence.  Then  a 
thousand  guns  behind  the  British  lines  simul- 
taneously opened  fire,  and  their  barrage  of 
shrapnel,  high  explosive  and  smoke  shells  crashed 
down  200  yards  before  the  advancing  Tanks. 

The  success  of  the  attack  was  complete.  The 
enemy  ran  for  it  or  surrendered  with  very  little 
fighting.  Only  at  the  tactical  points  did  they 
make  any  serious  resistance.  In  Lateau  Wood 
there  was  a  duel  between  a  Tank  and  a  5*9 
howitzer.  The  gun  turned  on  the  Tank,  and 
with  its  first  shell  tore  off  most  of  the  right-hand 

1  The  history  of  these  colours  should  be  recorded.  About 
the  middle  of  August,  1917,  General  Elles  and  Colonel 
Hardress-Lloyd  went  to  Cassel.  For  some  time  past  General 
Elles  had  thought  that  the  Tank  Corps  should  have  colours 
like  the  Flying  Corps.  There  at  Cassel  in  a  little  shop  the 
Colours  were  chosen.  The  colour  scheme  was  to  symbolise 
three  things — mud,  fire  or  the  fighting  spirit,  and  green 
field  or  "  good  going  "  ;  for  the  whole  ambition  of  the  Tank 
Corps  was  to  light  its  way  through  the  mud  to  the  green 
fields  beyond.  It  is  interesting,  also,  to  note  that  the  first 
Allied  troops  to  enter  Cologne  were  the  17th  Tank  Armoured 
Car  Battalion,  the  leading  machine  of  which  was  flying  the 
Tank  Corps  colours.  On  reaching  the  Rhine,  the  Hag  was 
run  up  over  the  river. 


LIEUT.  COLONEL  J.  C.   F.   FULLER,  D.S.O.   ip  215) 


Tank  Factory,  Neuvy  Pailloux,  France,     (p.  220) 


Tank  Factory,  Neuvy  Pailloux,  France.    (/     ' '" 


THE   ANGLO-AMERICAN  TREATY    193 

sponson,  but  none  of  the  vitals  were  touched. 
Before  the  gunners  could  reload  the  Tank  was 
on  the  top  of  them  and  had  crushed  the  gun 
down  into  the  surrounding  brushwood. 

Other  Tanks,  meanwhile,  had  topped  the  ridge 
and  were  hurrying  down  into  the  village  of 
Masnieres.  Here  was  a  bridge  over  the  canal. 
It  was  the  way  to  the  next  ridge  and  it  still 
stood.  A  Tank  made  for  it,  but  as  it  neared 
the  middle,  the  bridge  bent  and  broke  and  the 
Tank  was  flung  into  the  canal.  Other  Tanks 
came  up  and  with  their  fire  covered  the  crossing 
of  the  infantry. 

Into  Marcoing  the  Tanks  came  so  quickly 
that  they  shot  down  the  engineers  just  as  they 
were  connecting  up  the  electric  batteries  to  the 
demolition  charges  on  the  main  bridge.  Every- 
where the  hurried  retreat  of  the  Germans  could 
be  traced  by  the  equipment  that  they  had  thrown 
off  as  they  ran. 

While  the  attacking  Tanks  were  driving  the 
German  infantry  before  them,  the  Supply  Tanks 
had  moved  up  to  their  rendezvous;  the  Wire- 
pullers had  cleared  three  broad  tracks  of  all 
wire  so  that  the  cavalry  could  move  forward, 
and  the  Wireless  Signal  Tanks  had  reached 
their  positions.  Ten  minutes  after  the  infantry 
had  entered  Marcoing,  a  Signal  Tank  had  sent 
back  the  news  that  the  village  was  captured. 

In  one  place,  the  ridge  by  the  village  of  Fles- 
quieres,  the  Tanks  unfortunately  got  too  far 
ahead  of  the  infantry.     On  the  crest  they  came 


194  TANKS 

under  heavy  artillery  fire  at  short  range  and 
suffered  heavy  casualties.  Had  the  infantry 
been  close  behind  them  this  loss  would  have 
mattered  less,  but  as  soon  as  the  Tanks  were 
knocked  out  the  German  machine-guns  came  up 
again  among  the  ruins.  Flesquieres  was  not 
taken  until  next  day.  Elsewhere,  Tanks  and 
infantry  worked  in  close  co-operation  and  with 
complete  success. 

By  four  in  the  afternoon  the  battle  was  won, 
and,  so  far  as  the  Tanks  were  concerned,  was 
tactically  finished.  There  were  no  reserves,  and 
all  that  could  be  done  was  to  rally  the  weary 
crews,  select  the  fittest  Tanks  and  patch  up 
composite  companies  to  continue  the  attack 
next  day.  But  next  day  and  the  succeeding 
days  of  attack,  although  notable  things  were 
done,  and  on  the  23rd  Bourlon  Wood  was  bril- 
liantly taken  by  the  40th  Division  working  with 
thirty-four  Tanks  of  the  1st  Brigade,  there  was 
no  longer  the  same  close  co-operation  between 
the  Tanks  and  the  infantry.  New  infantry  had 
come  up  into  the  line. 

That  first  day,  however,  had  shown  what 
could  be  done  when  Tanks  in  numbers  worked  on 
a  scientific  scheme  with  the  infantry.  In  twelve 
hours  on  that  day,  on  a  front  of  13,000  yards, 
the  attacking  force  had  penetrated  the  enemy's 
lines  to  a  depth  of  10,000  yards  and  had  taken 
8000  prisoners  and  100  guns.  The  prisoners 
alone  were  nearly  twice  the  number  of  the 
casualties  suffered  by  the  attacking  troops. 


THE   ANGLO-AMERICAN  TREATY     195 

The  number  of  the  Tank  Corps  engaged  was  a 
little  over  4000 — no  more,  that  is,  than  one 
strong  Infantry  Brigade,  and  that  small  body 
of  men  replaced  the  artillery,  and  made  un- 
necessary the  old  preliminary  bombardment. 
They  did  this  also  against  trenches  of  peculiar 
strength  sited  on  the  reverse  slopes  of  the  main 
ridges,  so  that  direct  artillery  observation  of 
them  was  impossible,  and  protected  by  immensely 
thick  bands  and  fields  of  wire.  It  would  have 
taken  several  weeks  of  bombardment  and  many 
thousands  of  tons  of  ammunition  to  do  what 
the  Tanks  did  in  their  stride,  did  without  any 
warning  to  the  enemy,  and  did  more  effectively. 

Moreover,  once  the  wire  was  broken  and  the 
infantry  was  at  work,  the  Tanks  were  able  to 
work  much  more  closely  with  them  for  their 
protection  than  had  ever  been  found  possible 
for  the  artillery. 

On  November  26th  Sir  Douglas  Haig  wired 
to  the  Mechanical  Warfare  Department :  — 

'  The  Tanks  provided  by  your  Department  have 
rendered  very  valuable  services  in  battle  near 

CamBRAI.      I  BEG  YOU    TO  ACCEPT  AND   CONVEY  TO  ALL 

those  under  you  whose  skill  and  labour  have 
produced  the  tanks  the  grateful  thanks  of  the 
Army  in  France." 

And  in  reply  to  a  telegram  of  congratulations 
to  General  Elles,  I  received  the  following  reply  : — 

"  Very  many  thanks.    It  was  your  battle  too." 


196  TANKS 

On  November  26th  Mr.  Churchill  sent  for  me. 
I  spoke  of  the  great  success  of  the  Tanks  at 
Cambrai,  where  they  had  been  used — as  they 
were  meant  to  be  used — in  quantity  and  without 
any  preliminary  bombardment.  I  reminded  him 
that  not  a  month  ago  the  War  Office  had  accused 
me  of  lumbering  up  the  Front  with  useless  Tanks, 
these  very  400. 

I  once  more  told  him  that  the  present  organisa- 
tion would  never  produce  Tanks  in  quantity  or 
in  time  to  win  the  war  in  1918.  Mr.  Churchill 
asked  what  I  meant  and  who  it  was  I  wished 
to  place  in  charge  of  the  Mechanical  Warfare 
Department.  I  replied  that  I  had  no  wish  to 
place  anybody  in  charge,  but  simply  to  warn 
him  that  the  present  organisation  would  not 
produce  Tanks.  This  warning  I  repeated  in  a 
letter  three  days  later  when  I  wrote  :  — 

"  I  hope  you  will  allow  me  to  express  my  conviction 
that  the  demands  and  preparations  of  the  military 
authorities  with  regard  to  Mechanical  Warfare  for  the 
fighting  season  of  1918  are  entirely  inadequate,  and  that 
changes  which  you  have  made  in  this  Department  at 
1his  critical  time  (and  which  involve  reconsideration 
of  design  and  consequent  loss  of  production)  will  most 
seriously  affect  even  the  efficiency  of  this  programme 
for  next  season's  lighting. 

"  This  is  also  the  considered  opinion  of  my  technical 
and  commercial  advisers." 

On  the  6th  of  December  Mr.  Churchill  gave  his 
approval    to    the    Anglo-American    scheme.      I 


THE   ANGLO-AMERICAN  TREATY     197 

was  appointed  British  Commissioner,  and  Major 
James  A.  Drain  of  the  United  States  Army 
was  to  be  appointed  American  Commissioner. 
The  entire  business  was  to  be  directly  under  the 
Commissioners  and  to  be  called  the  "  Anglo- 
American  Commission." 

Major  Drain  had  been  a  General  in  the  National 
Guard  in  the  States,  and  as  soon  as  his  country 
declared  war  had  come  over  to  France,  where 
he  had  been  serving  in  the  American  Ordnance 
Department.  He  was  a  business  man,  and  a 
man  of  great  breadth  of  view.  He  saw  at  once 
that  we  should  get  the  best  results  if  the  Americans 
adopted  practically  all  our  suggestions  with 
regard  to  design,  tested  as  they  had  been  by 
our  experience  in  the  field,  and  set  themselves 
to  produce  the  intricate  machinery  required  out 
of  their  vast  resources. 

The  general  type  of  design  had  been  settled 
at  a  conference  held  at  G.H.Q.,  France,  on 
December  4th,  at  which  were  present  representa- 
tives of  all  the  fighting  branches  concerned. 
Details  of  design  were  to  be  in  the  hands  of  a 
Committee  under  Major  Drain  and  myself,  con- 
sisting of  Sir  Eustace  d'Eyncourt,  representing 
the  Mechanical  Warfare  Department,  Major  H. 
W.  Alden,  representing  the  American  Govern- 
ment, and  Captain  Green,  representing  the  Tank 
Corps. 

It  had  been  agreed  at  the  many  meetings 
which  had  already  been  held  that  this  programme, 
half  the  components   for  which   were  to   come 


198  TANKS 

from  England  and  half  from  America,  should 
have  priority  after  the  War  Office  programme 
of  1350  Tanks,  and  before  any  extended  War 
Office  programme. 

In  order  that  the  necessary  priority  should 
be  respected,  both  in  England  and  in  America, 
by  the  many  different  Departments  of  the  respec- 
tive Governments  (experience  having  taught  us 
that  this  priority  must  be  over  all  Departments), 
I  invited  the  American  Commissioner  to  meet 
Mr.  Lloyd  George  in  order  that  he  might  suggest 
to  him  that  a  Treaty  be  drawn  up  between  the 
highest  authority  in  America  and  the  highest 
authority  in  this  country.  This  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  agreed  to  do,  and  the  War  Cabinet 
on  January  8th,  1918,  approved  a  Treaty  which 
was  signed  later  by  Mr.  Page,  on  behalf  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  and  Mr.  Balfour  on 
behalf  of  Great  Britain. 

I  give  this  Treaty  in  full.  It  is  an  historic 
document. 

"Agreement  between  tiie  British  and  U.S. 
Governments  for  the  Production  of  Tanks 

"The  Government  of  the  United  States  of  America 
and  the  Government  of  His  Britannic  Majesty,  being 
desirous  of  co-operating  in  the  use  of  their  respective 
resources  for  the  production  of  the  Avar  machine  known 
as  Tanks,  and  having  considered  the  joint  recommenda- 
tion made  to  them  by  Lieut. -CoIoik  1  A.  G.  Stem,  C.M.G., 
and  Major  J.  A. Drain,  U.S. K.,  whom  they  had  appointed 
as  their  Commissioners  to  investigate  the  possibilities 
of  such  joinl  production,  the  undersigned,  duly  author- 


THE   ANGLO-AMERICAN  TREATY    199 

ised  to  that  effect  by  their  respective  Governments, 
have  agreed  upon  the  following  articles  : — ■ 

"  The  above-mentioned  Commissioners  are  authorised 
by  the  respective  Governments — 

"  (1)  To  build  a  factory  in  France,  the  cost  of 
which  and  the  running  thereof  is  to  be  defrayed 
in  equal  parts  by  the  contracting  Governments.  The 
factory  should  be  of  sufficient  capacity  to  produce 
300  completed  Tanks  per  month  and  capable  of 
being  extended  to  produce  at  least  1200  Tanks  per 
month.  The  materials  required  for  the  construction 
of  the  factory  shall  be  obtained  in  France  and  in  Eng- 
land. The  unskilled  labour  for  the  erection  of  the 
factory  shall  be  supplied  by  the  British  Government. 
Skilled  labour  shall  be  supplied  by  the  British  or  by 
the  United  States  Government  as  the  Commissioners 
may  arrange. 

"  (2)  To  arrange  for  the  production  of,  and  to 
produce,  1500  Tanks  during  the  year  1918,  or  as 
many  more  as  may  be  required  and  authorised  by  the 
respective  Governments,  and  to  arrange  for  the  pro- 
vision of  the  components  for  these  Tanks  in  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain  substantially  as  follows  : — 

"  In  the  United  States  :  engines  complete,  with 
starter  and  clutch,  radiator,  fan  and  piping,  silencer, 
electric  lighting,  dynamo  and  battery,  propeller  shaft, 
complete  transmission,  including  main  gear-box,  brakes } 
roller  sprockets,  gear  shifting  and  brake  control,  track 
links  and  pins,  rear  track  sprockets,  hub  and  shafts, 
front  idler  hub  and  shafts,  track  roller,  track  spindles 
and  bushings. 

"  In  Great  Britain  :  bullet  and  bomb-proof  plates, 
structural  members,  track  shoes  and  rollers,  guns, 
machine-guns  and  mountings,  ammunition  racks  and 
ammunition. 

''  (3)  The  respective  Governments  undertake  to  give 


200  TANKS 

the  necessary  priority  in  respect  of  material,  labour, 
shipping,  and  other  requirements  to  enable  the  pro- 
gramme to  be  carried  out  in  the  most  expeditious 
manner. 

"  (4)  It  is  understood  that  the  Tanks  produced  by 
the  factory  are  to  be  allocated  between  the  United 
States,  France  and  Great  Britain  according  to  a  deter- 
mination to  be  reached  later  between  the  Governments 
of  the  three  countries,  provided  that  the  first  600 
Tanks  produced  shall  be  allocated  to  the  United  States 
Government,  and  provided  further  that  the  latter  and  the 
British  Government  shall  each  take  one-half  of  the 
total  number  of  Tanks  produced  not  sold  to  the  French 
Government,  unless  unequal  allocation  between  them 
shall  be  subsequently  agreed  upon. 

' '  (5)  The  price  which  shall  be  charged  to  the  French, 
British  and  United  States  Governments,  should  there 
be  an  unequal  allocation  between  the  two  latter,  shall 
be  £5000  sterling  per  Tank,  which  price  shall  be 
subject  to  adjustment  at  the  close  of  the  operations 
occurring  under  this  Agreement,  and  the  liquidation 
of  all  assets  upon  a  basis  of  actual  cost,  such  actual  cost 
to  include  no  charge  for  overhead  by  either  Government. 

"  (0)  The  capital  necessary  to  carry  out  this  pro- 
gramme shall  be  supplied  in  equal  parts  by  the  British 
and  United  States  Governments.  Expenditure  in  France 
for  labour  and  materials  in  connection  with  the  building 
and  running  of  the  factory  shall  in  the  first  instance 
be  paid  by  the  British  Government.  Materials  pur- 
chased in  Great  Britain  shall  be  paid  for  by  the  British 
Government,  and  those  purchased  in  the  United  States 
of  America  shall  be  paid  for  by  the  United  States 
Government. 

'*  An  adjustment  of  the  account  shall  be  made  every 
six  months. 

ct  (7)  It    is   further   agreed   that   the    United    States 


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THE   ANGLO-AMERICAN  TREATY    201 

Government  shall  replace  the  steel  provided  by  the 
British  Government  for  armour-plate.  The  replacement 
shall  be  in  the  form  of  ship  plates  and  shall  be  made  on 
or  about  the  date  of  delivery  of  armour-plate  to  the 
factory,  on  the  basis  of  ton  per  ton,  the  necessary  allow- 
ance for  difference  in  value  to  be  made  in  the  adjustment 
of  the  accounts. 

"  In  witness  whereof  the  Undersigned  have  signed 
the  present  Agreement  and  have  affixed  thereto  their 
seals. 

"  Done  in  London  in  duplicate  the  22nd  day  of 
January,  1919. 

"  (L.S.)    Walter  Hines  Page. 

"  (L.S.)    Arthur  James  Balfour." 


CHAPTER  X 

THE  TANKS  GET  THEIR  WAY 


CHAPTER  X 

THE    TANKS    GET   THEIR    WAY 

January  1918  to  November  1918 

I  had  succeeded  now  in  increasing  the  prob- 
able supply  of  Tanks  from  the  very  small  number 
of  1350  ordered  by  the  War  Office  by  another 
1500,  but  I  was  far  from  satisfied  that  we  were 
making  the  progress  that  was  necessary.  I  felt 
that  if  the  Germans  started  making  Tanks  they 
would  probably  overhaul  us  rapidly. 

At  this  time  I  received  the  following  letter. 
It  showed  what  the  men  at  the  Front  thought 
of  the  Tanks  :  — 

"  I  will  first  give  you  the  opinion  of  one  of  my  Colonels. 
In  three  years  fighting  on  this  front,  I've  met  no  Bat- 
talion commander  to  equal  him  in  power  of  leadership, 
rapidity  of  decision  in  an  emergency,  and  personal 
magnetism.  I've  met  no  man  who  would  judge  so 
justly  what  an  infantry  soldier  can  and  cannot  do. 

"  He  considers  the  Tank  invaluable  if  properly  handled, 
either  for  the  attack  or  in  defence ;  but  he  realises,  as 
I  think  we  all  do,  that  until  Cambrai,  the  tactical 
knowledge  shown  in  its  employment  was  of  the  meanest 
order. 

"  One  other  valuable  opinion  I've  obtained.  We 
have  now  with  the  Battalion  a  subaltern,  a  man  of 

205 


206  TANKS 

about  thirty — a  very  good  soldier ;  a  resolute,  determined 
kind  of  fellow — who  has  seen  a  good  deal  of  hard  fight- 
ing. He  commanded  a  platoon  in  our  11th  Battalion 
in  the  big  Tank  attack  at  Cambrai,  and  was  in  the  first 
wave  of  the  attack  throughout.  He  tells  me  the  Tanks 
covering  the  advance  of  his  Battalion  functioned  under 
ideal  weather  and  ground  conditions,  were  handled 
with  marked  skill  and  enterprise  in  the  capture  of  the 
first  two  objectives,  covering  an  advance  of  about 
3500  yards.  The  moral  effect  of  the  support  given  by 
the  Tanks  on  the  attacking  infantry  is  very  great. 
He  says  his  men  felt  the  utmost  confidence  in  the  Tanks 
and  were  prepared  to  follow  them  anywhere.  The 
effect  of  the  advancing  line  of  Tanks  on  the  enemy 
infantry  was  extraordinary. 

"  They  made  no  attempt  whatever  to  hold  their 
trenches,  and  either  bolted  in  mad  panic  or,  abandoning 
their  arms,  rushed  forward  with  hands  uplifted  to 
surrender.  As  long  as  the  advance  of  the  Tanks  con- 
tinued— i.  e.  over  the  enemy  trench  system  to  a  depth 
of  from  two  or  three  miles — the  total  casualties  incurred 
by  our  11th  Battalion  (attacking  in  the  first  wave)  were 
four  killed  and  five  wounded,  all  by  shell-fire. 

"  After  the  fall  of  the  second  objective,  the  advance 
ceased  for  some  unexplained  reason.  They  were  told 
some  hitch  about  Flcsquiercs.  The  attack  seemed  to 
lose  purpose  and  direction.  Tanks  on  the  flanks  began 
coming  back.  The  Battalion  was  ordered  to  attack 
live  different  objectives,  and  before  the  necessary  plans 
could  be  communicated  to  subordinate  commanders, 
orders  were  received  cancelling  the  previous  instructions. 
In  a  word,  chaos  prevailed.  The  afore-mentioned  subal- 
tern cannot  speak  too  highly  of  the  work  of  the  Tank 
commanders — nothing  could  exceed  their  daring  and 
enterprise.  He  says  lie  is  absolutely  convinced  that 
infantry,  unsupported  by  artillery,  arc  absolutely  power- 


THE   TANKS   GET   THEIR   WAY     207 

less  against  Tanks,  and  that  no  belt  of  wire  can  be  built 
through  which  they  cannot  break  an  admirable  passage 
for  infantry. 

"  Lastly,  he  makes  no  secret  of  the  fact  that  it  would 
demand  the  utmost  exercise  of  his  determination  and 
resolution  to  stand  fast  and  hold  his  ground  in  the  face 
of  an  attack  by  enemy  Tanks,  carried  out  on  the  same 
scale  as  ours.  I  may  add  that  he  is  a  big,  upstanding 
fellow,  a  fine  athlete,  and  afraid  of  nothing  on  two 
legs. 

"  I  give  you  his  opinions  at  some  length,  because 
they  are  the  ipsissima  verba  of  a  man  qualified  to 
speak  from  personal  practical  experience.  Personally, 
I  believe  the  Tanks  may  yet  play  the  biggest  role  in  the 
war,  if  only  the  Higher  Command  does  not  damn  them 
first  by  giving  them  the  impossible  to  do,  or,  worse  still, 
fail  to  employ  them  in  situations  where  common-sense 
and  past  experience  alike  demand  their  use. 

"  (Two  days  before  the  Hun  attacked  us  at  Bourlon 
Wood  we  lost  three  officers  and  some  seventy  gallant 
fellows  trying  to  mop  up  a  couple  of  enemy  machine- 
gun  nests — a  bit  of  work  a  couple  of  Tanks  could  have 
done  with  certainty  without  the  loss  of  a  man.) 

"  In  the  situation  described  after  the  capture  of  the 
second  objective,  why  should  there  not  have  been  a 
responsible  Staff  Officer — G.S.O.l.  say — right  forward 
in  a  Tank  to  size  up  the  situation  and  seize  opportunity, 
the  very  essence  of  which  is  rapid  decision?  In  the 
early  days  of  the  war,  forgetful  of  the  lessons  of  South 
Africa,  we  put  our  senior  officers  in  the  forefront  of 
the  battle.  Of  late  the  pendulum  has  swung  the  other 
way.  Surely  the  employment  of  a  Tank  for  the  purpose 
outlined  would  enable  us  now  to  strike  the  happy  mean. 

"  In  defence,  as  a  mobile  '  Pill  Box  '  the  possibilities 
of  the  Tank  are  great — any  man  who  has  led  infantry 
4  over  the  top '   knows  the  demoralising  and  disorgan- 


208  TANKS 

ising  effect  of  the  '  surprise  packet '  machine-gun 
nest.  What  more  admirable  type  of  nest  can  be  devised  ? 
Continually  changing  position,  hidden  from  enemy  air- 
craft by  smoke  and  dust  of  battle,  offering  no  target 
for  aimed  artillery  fire. 

' '  Half  the  casualties  we  suffer  in  heavy  fighting  after 
the  initial  attack  come  from  the  carrying  parties  wind- 
ing slowly  in  and  out  through  barrage  fire,  bringing  up 
ammunition  to  the  infantry,  the  Lewis  and  Vickers 
guns ;  all  this  could  be  done  much  more  rapidly, 
surely,  and  with  a  minimum  of  loss,  by  Tanks.  For  the 
future  the  Tanks  should  relieve  the  artillery  of  all 
responsibility  as  regards  wire-cutting.  You  know  you 
can  cross  a  belt  of  wire  over  which  a  Tank  has  passed — 
you  hope  you  can  pass  through  a  wire  belt  on  which 
the  artillery  has  played  for  a  couple  of  days.  As  a 
business  proposition,  a  Tank  at  £5000  will  cut  more 
wire  in  one  journey,  even  assuming  it  does  nothing  else, 
than  2000  shells  at  £5  each,  blazing  away  for  a  day — 
add  the  wear  on  the  life  of  the  gun. 

"  In  attack,  one  of  the  most  difficult  problems  of  the 
infantry  is  to  get  the  Stokes  guns  far  enough  forward, 
with  sufficient  ammunition,  to  come  into  action  against 
machine-guns  or  strong  points  holding  up  the  advance 
unexpectedly.  All  this  could  be  done  by  means  of  a 
Tank  with  ease,  whilst  not  only  the  small  Stokes  gun, 
with  a  range  of  500-600  yards,  can  be  brought  forward, 
but  I  know  of  no  reason  why  the  '  0-inch  '  Stokes,  with 
a  range  of  1200-1000  yards,  should  not  be  brought 
forward  by  the  same  means,  and  be  brought  into  action 
firing  from  the  Tank. 

"  The  Tank  has  only  one  enemy  to  fear — the  high- 
velocity  Tank-gun  firing  aimed  shots  from  forward 
positions.  I  believe  this  danger  can  be  minimised  by 
means  of  escort  aeroplanes  attached  during  an  action 
to  every  Tank,  and   provided  with  smoke  bombs  to 


The  Canal  du  Nord.     Tanks 

and  wounded  going  through.  (/>•  W) 


[SH  Official. 


and   prisoners   with    wounded   going 
through  thecutting  in  the  I  anal  du   Nord    >( 


I'.KI  I  l-IIJ  '  'I  FICIAL 


THE   TANKS   GET   THEIR   WAY     209 

blind  the  gun  position,  if  unable  to  silence  the  gun  by 
machine-gun  fire  or  by  means  of  ordinary  bombs  heavily 
charged. 

**  I  have  tried  to  outline  some  of  the  more  obvious 
uses  for  which  the  Tank  is  so  admirably  suitable.  There 
is  a  well  of  this  information  yet  untapped,  not  in  Staff 
Offices,  but  in  the  minds  of  the  platoon  and  the  company 
commanders  who  have  fought  in  the  first  waves  of  the 
attack  with  the  Tank,  who  have  seen  the  difficulties  it 
has  to  overcome  and  how  it  has  met  them  or  failed,  and 
why. 

"  Nothing  has  yet  been  produced  in  this  war  to  equal 
the  Tank  for  doing  by  machinery  what  has  hitherto  been 
done  by  men.  Nothing  so  well  fitted  to  economise  our 
man-power  and  reduce  the  appalling  wastage  which  has 
hitherto  characterised  our  efforts  in  attack,  with  gain 
instead  of  loss  in  efficiency. 

"  We  want  thousands  of  Tanks,  both  light  and  heavy, 
ranging  from  two  miles  to  eight  miles  per  hour,  armed 
with  machine-guns,  armed  with  Stokes  guns,  unarmed 
and  fast  travelling  for  transport  of  gun  teams  to  emer- 
gency tactical  positions,  and,  lastly,  a  staff  of  trained 
minds  to  define  the  tactics  of  the  Tank — to  refute 
criticisms  based  on  ignorance,  to  collect,  classify  and 
investigate  all  available  information  and  suggestions, 
so  that,  like  an  aeroplane,  every  new  '  edition  '  of  the 
Tank  is  an  improvement  on  the  past. 

"  I  have  written  at  some  length,  but  the  subject  is 
big  and  attractive  enough  to  be  my  excuse." 

On  the  8th  of  January  I  wrote  to  the  Prime 
Minister  as  follows  :  — 

"  We  are  entering  the  fifth  year  of  the  war. 
"  I  have  watched  the  tactical  changes  of   the  armies 
on  the  Western  Front.     Tactics,  born  of  necessity,  such 
p 


210  TANKS 

as  trench  warfare,  the  antidotes  to  trench  warfare,  and, 
again,  the  change  in  methods  of  defence  against  the 
novel  massed  artillery  attacks. 

"  I  have  watched  with  great  care  methods  hitherto 
foreign  to  warfare  used  by  both  sides ;  these  inventions 
failed  to  gain  a  decisive  victory;  they  were  used  by 
both  sides  before  they  had  been  sufficiently  developed 
either  in  efficiency,  quantity,  tactics  or  training. 

"  I  think  that  one  should  try  to  forget  the  past  and 
imagine  that  our  problem  is  the  Western  Front  for  1918, 
oblivious  of  the  past,  except  for  its  military  tactical 
lessons. 

"It  is  clear  to  me  that  neither  the  Allies  nor  the 
Central  Powers  ought  to  be  in  a  position  to  force  a 
decisive  battle  on  this  restricted  front  during  1918. 

"  Neither  side  has  an  overwhelming  superiority  in 
moral,  men,  guns  or  ammunition. 

"  Both  sides  must  try  to  establish  a  superiority  in 
the  line,  and  use  that  as  a  lever  of  advantage. 

"  We  should  play  up  to  the  full,  gamble  to  the  full  on 
any  chance  where  we  lead  the  enemy. 

"  In  aircraft  we  shall  have  no  overwhelming  superiority 
in  design  or  scientific  achievement. 

"  We  have  this  superiority  in  Mechanical  Warfare. 
We  have  in  our  power  weapons  capable  of  killing 
unlimited  numbers  of  the  enemy,  whereas  our  loss  is 
limited. 

'*  A  thousand  Tanks,  with  eight  men  in  a  Tank  and 
six  guns,  make  a  raid  :  the  total  wastage  if  all  are  lost 
is  8000  men.  Sir  Douglas  llaig  has  estimated  that  a 
Tank  in  attack  has  a  value  of  from  300  men  to  a  Bat- 
talion. Here  is  an  attack  of  from,  say,  250,000  to 
500,000  men  carrying  its  own  supplies,  with  no  expendi- 
ture of  shells  except  counter-battery  work,  with  roads 
and  railroads  free  from  the  extravagance  of  a  non- 
mechanical   battle.     There   is   no   limit,   comparatively 


THE  TANKS   GET  THEIR  WAY     211 

speaking,  to  the  casualties  such  a  force  can  inflict  on 
the  enemy. 

"  I  wish  to  suggest  some  arguments  in  favour  of 
Mechanical  Warfare  for  1918  on  the  Western  Front. 

"  There  should  be  four  Mechanical  Armies  at  different 
points  on  the  line  suitable  for  such  warfare,  all  equipped 
and  prepared  to  attack  within  a  few  hours  in  the  form 
of  a  Tank  raid. 

"  These  raids  to  be  an  attack  by  surprise  as  at 
Cambrai,  but  with  strict  orders  that  a  return  should 
be  made  to  our  lines,  obviating  giving  the  enemy  any 
opportunity  of  killing  our  infantry  on  equal  terms,  of 
attacking  a  salient  or  getting  anything  but  a  grave 
disadvantage  in  a  counter-attack  against  our  original 
positions. 

"  My  views  are  that  in  this  way  we  can  kill  Germans 
and  kill  their  moral,  cause  grave  unrest  and  dissatis- 
faction between  the  men  and  their  officers,  between  the 
people  and  the  authorities,  at  their  lack  of  efficiency 
in  not  adopting  so  formidable  a  weapon,  used  in  over- 
whelming quantities  by  an  enemy  originally  quite 
unprepared  for  war. 

"  I  have  painted  a  very  superficial  picture  of  my  ideas 
of  the  effect  on  the  Germans. 

"  Take  the  effect  on  our  troops. 

"  Think  of  the  infantry  appreciating  in  its  own 
delightful  language  the  fact  that  it  is  about  100  to  1 
on  the  Tanks  in  these  raids — really  great  Tank  battles, 
owing  to  the  number  of  guns  and  men  value  of  the  Tanks 
engaged,  and  that  they  can  sit  tight  in  their  trenches 
awaiting  the  German  counter-attack  which  must  be 
carried  out  by  infantry  unprotected  by  armour  against 
mechanical  machine-guns. 

"  The  development  of  this  great  chance  may  strengthen 
the  feeling  in  Germany,  universal  in  the  world,  for  a 
league  of  nations,  by   showing  that  the  military  caste 


212  TANKS 

is  being  beaten  at  its  own  game  and  losing  its  in- 
vincibility. 

' '  If  this  can  be  achieved  by  these  means,  before  we  have 
a  possibility  of  overwhelming  superiority  in  1919,  we  shall 
have  saved  oceans  of  blood  and  mountains  of  misery. 

"  If  in  your  opinion  my  notions  are  in  agreement  with 
the  reality  of  things,  I  wish  to  offer  my  services  to  study 
with  the  Allies  concerned,  and  make  a  detailed  plan,  as 
far  as  possible,  of  such  an  organisation,  complete,  ready 
for  operation. 

"  This  could,  of  course,  only  be  achieved,  with  proper 
powers  and  with  the  complete  goodwill  and  co-operation 
of  the  Army  and  the  War  Office." 

I  heard  later  that  the  Germans  were  building 
large  numbers  of  Tanks.  This  drove  me  to 
make  another  great  effort  to  get  the  War  Office 
to  order  more.  I  communicated  again  with 
the  Prime  Minister,  who  said  that  if  any  group 
of  Ministers  would  support  it,  he  would  be  ready 
to  call  a  War  Cabinet  meeting  in  order  that  I 
could  submit  my  views. 

I  had  the  pleasure  of  knowing  Mr.  William 
Brace,  and  asked  him  if  he  would  bring  the  Labour 
Ministers  of  the  Coalition  to  see  the  Tanks  and 
allow  me  to  explain  to  them  my  views  on  the 
whole  subject.  I  met  Mr.  Brace,  Mr.  George 
Barnes,  Mr.  Hodge,  Mr.  G.  Roberts,  Mr.  Wardlc, 
Mr.  Walsh,  Mr.  Clynes,  and  Mr.  Parker.  After 
seeing  the  Tanks  and  hearing  what  they  had 
done — how  they  had  saved  thousands  of  casual- 
ties— they  agreed  to  put  forward  to  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  the  suggestion  that  a  War  Cabinet  meet- 
ing should  be  held  with  all  concerned  to  press  for 


THE  TANKS   GET  THEIR  WAY     213 

the  building  of  Tanks  to  the  full  capacity  of  the 
country,  subject  to  military  advice  and  without 
interfering  with  the  supply  of  guns  and  shells  or 
with  the  requirements  of  the  Navy  and  merchant 
shipping. 

On  March  8th  this  War  Cabinet  meeting  was 
held.  General  Sir  Henry  Wilson,  the  new  Chief 
of  the  Imperial  General  Staff,  was  present.  He 
gave  examples  of  the  economy  in  men  which 
had  resulted  from  using  the  Tanks.  At  Messines 
twelve  divisions  had  been  employed  on  a  front 
of  16,500  yards,  and  after  the  first  forty-eight 
hours'  fighting  our  casualties  amounted  to  16,000 
and  the  depth  of  our  advance  was  4000  yards. 
At  Cambrai  we  employed  only  seven  divisions, 
supported  by  Tanks,  on  a  front  of  13,000  yards. 
Our  casualties,  after  two  days  fighting,  only 
amounted  to  9500  men,  and  we  gained  in  depth 
no  less  than  9000  yards,  which  meant  approxi- 
mately, with  an  equal  force,  half  the  number  of 
casualties  and  double  the  gain  in  depth.  More- 
over, we  saved  at  Cambrai  a  matter  of  80,000 
tons  of  ammunition. 

The  result  of  this  meeting  was  that  an  extended 
Tank  programme  of  nearly  5000  Tanks  was 
adopted,  and  Mr.  Churchill  was  asked  to  make  the 
arrangements  for  it. 

On  April  Sth  Lord  Milner,  who  up  till  this  time 
had  been  Cabinet  Minister  at  Versailles,  and  was 
now  appointed  Secretary  of  State  for  War,  came 
to  see  me  at  the  offices  of  the  Mechanical  Warfare 
(Overseas  and   Allies)  Department  in   Paris.     I 


214  TANKS 

explained  to  him  the  development  of  Mechanical 
Warfare,  and  told  him  that  the  Tanks  had  great 
power  of  destruction  quite  out  of  proportion  to 
their  own  total  cost  of  humanity,  which  was 
limited  to  eight  men  a  Tank.  I  told  him  that 
at  the  present  time  there  was  no  central  authority 
for  the  development  of  Mechanical  Warfare,  and 
that  I  considered  it  essential,  for  rapid  develop- 
ment nationally,  and  internationally,  that  a 
special  Department,  like  the  Air  Ministry,  should 
be  formed,  and  that  this  Ministry  or  Board  should 
be  managed  by  those  who  had  directed  the 
development  from  the  beginning,  and  were  un- 
trammelled by  the  vested  interests  of  all  the 
established  branches  of  the  War  Office.  In  this 
way,  a  highly  technical  development  could  be 
carried  out  by  a  practical  man  with  the  advice  of 
the  military  authorities. 

I  explained  that  I  had  been  removed  from  my 
position  as  Director-General  of  the  Mechanical 
Warfare  Department  on  the  demand  of  the  War 
Office,  because  I  had  fought  for  the  development 
of  Mechanical  Warfare,  and  told  the  War  Office 
that  their  preparations  for  1918  were  entirely 
inadequate;  that  the  programme  had  now  been 
increased,  too  late,  from  1350  to  nearer  5000; 
that  I  had  fought  for  the  standardisation  of 
Mechanical  Warfare  against  continual  change  of 
design,  and  that  standardisation  was  at  last  to 
be  brought  in  by  August  1918,  again  too  late. 

I  said  that  we  had  fought  our  hardest  to  pre- 
vent inexperienced  officers  from  ruining  the  one 


THE   TANKS   GET   THEIR   WAY     215 

development  in  this  country  in  which  we  had 
outstripped  the  Germans,  but  that  instead  of 
continuing  its  healthy  growth  under  imaginative 
practical  men,  it  had  been  placed  under  the  heel 
of  elderly  service  men,  with  the  usual  results; 
that  the  modern  methods  of  standardisation  and 
efficiency,  untrammelled  by  Army  procedure  and 
prejudice,  had  been  stamped  out;  that  the  rules 
of  the  War  Office  made  a  civilian  ineligible  ever 
to  become  a  soldier  or  to  know  anything  about 
warfare,  and  that  the  Army  Act  was  waved  before 
the  eyes  of  any  junior  officer  who  had  ideas  and 
dared  to  speak  of  them. 

Finally,  I  begged  him  to  see  Sir  Eustace 
d'Eyncourt,  and  to  discuss  the  question  of  some 
proper  authority  to  control  and  develop  Mechani- 
cal Warfare. 

From  this  date  a  new  era  of  progress  started 
for  Mechanical  Warfare  at  the  War  Office,  with 
Sir  Henry  Wilson  as  Chief  of  the  Imperial  General 
Staff  and  General  Harrington  as  Deputy  Chief. 
General  Harrington  believed  in  new  methods 
and  in  Mechanical  Warfare.  He  took  the  greatest 
trouble  to  give  every  assistance.  About  this  time 
I  had  several  interviews  with  him,  and  he  told 
me  that  the  Tank  Corps  was  now  to  be  brought 
into  the  Army  Organisation,  with  the  tactical 
side  under  the  War  Office  branches  concerned. 
Colonel  Fuller  was  to  be  appointed  to  take  charge 
of  Tanks  in  the  Department  of  the  General  Staff. 

I  told  him  that,  in  my  opinion,  design,  pro- 
duction   and    tactics    were    closely    interlocked. 


216  TANKS 

Tacticians  could  not  make  tactics  without  know- 
ing quantities  and  types ;  producers  and  designers 
could  not  make  quantities  until  at  least  a  year 
after  hearing  the  ideas  of  the  tacticians ;  in  fact, 
instead  of  the  designs  and  ideas  being  thought 
out  and  criticised  by  the  military  tacticians,  the 
tacticians,  producers  and  designers  should  sit 
together  and  produce  their  plans  together  for 
consideration  by  the  General  Staff.  General 
Harrington  said  that  everything  would  be  done 
to  ensure  the  success  of  Mechanical  Warfare,  but 
that  owing  to  many  difficulties  in  the  War  Office 
it  would  take  time,  and  at  his  request  I  promised 
that  I  would  cease  from  forcing  the  pace  until  he 
had  brought  out  his  new  scheme. 

All  this  time  I  had  been  working  in  perfect 
accord  with  the  French  military  and  munition 
authorities. 

On  April  24th  General  Estienne's  Chief  Staff 
Officer  informed  me  that  General  Petain  had  asked 
me  to  dine  with  him  at  his  headquarters.  I 
motored  to  Chantilly,  and  met  him  outside  his 
villa  one  hour  before  dinner.  He  told  me  that 
he  was  a  great  believer  in  Mechanical  Warfare, 
and  asked  me,  if  possible,  to  get  powers  from  my 
Government  to  form  one  central  military  school 
and  training-ground  for  an  Inter- Allied  Tank 
Army  at  Chateauroux,  with  camps  for  British, 
French  and  American  troops.  He  and  General 
Foch  were  in  complete  agreement  with  the  scheme, 
and  their  view  was  that  Tanks  were  infantry, 
and  were  absolutely  essential  in  large  numbers. 


THE  TANKS   GET  THEIR  WAY     217 

He  asked  me  to  see  General  Foch  on  the  following 
day,  but  I  had  unfortunately  to  return  to  England 
to  keep  an  important  appointment.  I  very  prob- 
ably would  have  gone  to  see  General  Foch  at 
once,  but  it  was  night-time,  and  no  lights  of  any 
sort  were  allowed  anywhere  near  Amiens,  which 
at  the  time  was  extremely  unhealthy. 

On  arrival  in  England  the  next  morning  I  saw 
Sir  Henry  Wilson,  who  said  he  was  going  to 
France  the  next  day  and  would  propose  the 
matter  to  Sir  Douglas  Haig. 

Subsequently,  although  an  Allied  Camp  for  an 
Inter-Allied  Army  was  not  built,  an  Inter-Allied 
School  for  Tactics  was  started  at  Bourron,  south 
of  Fontainebleau,  where  Battalions  of  Tanks  of 
the  different  Allied  nations  were  stationed  for 
tactical  instruction  by  senior  officers  under  the 
presidency .  of  General  Estienne,  Commander  of 
the  French  Tanks. 

At  a  meeting  at  the  War  Office  on  June  25th, 
General  Capper,  who  had  been  Director-General 
of  Tanks  and  head  of  the  Tank  Committee,  which 
had  proved  a  failure,  resigned;  his  post  was 
abolished,  and  the  question  of  a  new  authority 
to  govern  Mechanical  Warfare  was  fully  discussed. 

Early  in  August,  once  more  there  was  danger 
of  a  Tank  Board  being  formed  at  the  War  Office, 
consisting  of  people  who  had  no  knowledge  of 
Tanks,  and  Sir  Eustace  d'Eyncourt,  Admiral 
Sir  A.  G.  H.  W.  Moore,  Controller  of  Mechanical 
Warfare  Department,  Sir  Percival  Perry,  his 
Deputy  and  I,  put  forward  to  General  Seely  (who 


218  TANKS 

had  become  Deputy  Minister  of  Munitions)  a 
scheme  for  making  a  new  authority  to  deal  with 
Mechanical  Warfare.  Just  as  at  the  War  Office 
a  new  era  of  progress  for  Mechanical  Warfare  had 
started  with  the  advent  of  General  Harrington, 
so  a  new  era  of  progress  started  at  the  Ministry 
of  Munitions  with  General  Seely. 

Already  we  were  beginning  to  see  the  results 
of  the  policy  and  the  changes  which  the  Army 
Council  had  forced  on  Mr.  Churchill.  Produc- 
tion had  declined.  It  had  fallen  below  the  record 
of  200  Tanks  a  month,  which  we  had  achieved  in 
1917,  although  the  Department  now  had  much 
greater  facilities  for  manufacture.  It  was,  in 
fact,  the  one  department  of  munitions  of  war 
which  had  not  shown  a  continuous  increase  in 
output,  and  was  producing  only  half  of  what  it 
had  promised. 

Mr.  Lloyd  George,  who,  in  spite  of  all  his  other 
activities  and  worries,  continued  his  great  interest 
in  Mechanical  Warfare,  once  again  called  a  con- 
ference of  the  War  Cabinet,  as  he  was  anxious 
about  Tanks,  and  wished  to  be  assured  that  we 
should  be  able  to  achieve  the  increased  pro- 
gramme which  had  been  approved  on  March  9th 
after  our  meeting  of  the  day  before.  At  this 
conference  it  was  decided  to  be  absolutely  neces- 
sary to  have  a  strong  board  of  competent  men 
with  the  necessary  authority  to  deal  witli  ques- 
tions both  of  design  and  supply. 

The  scheme  for  a  Tank  Board  was  put  forward 
by  Sir  K.  d'Eyncourt  and  myself  as  follows — 


THE   TANKS   GET   THEIR   WAY     219 

General  Seely,  as  President,  with  Sir  E. 
d'Eyncourt  as  Vice-President,  Mr.  Maclean  (who 
had  succeeded  Admiral  Moore  as  Controller  of 
Production  at  the  Mechanical  Warfare  Depart- 
ment), Colonel  Fuller,  representing  the  General 
Staff,  General  Furse,  representing  the  Army 
Council,  and  myself,  representing  Mechanical 
Warfare  (Overseas  and  Allies).  General  Elles  was 
added  to  the  Board,  and  the  scheme  was  adopted. 
Later  on  Sir  Percival  Perry,  representing  Mechani- 
cal Traction,  and  Admiral  Bacon  of  the  Munitions 
Inventions  Department,  were  also  added  to  the 
Board,  and,  later  still,  General  Swinton. 

The  new  Board  proved  a  very  great  success. 
New  ideas  were  received  with  enthusiasm;  old- 
fashioned  obstructions  found  no  sympathy,  and 
the  programme  for  the  year  of  5000  English  Tanks 
had  every  chance  of  being  completed.  In  addi- 
tion, 20,000  light  tractors,  capable  of  carrying 
about  five  tons  over  any  country,  were  ordered 
and  in  construction.  These,  though  unarmoured, 
would  make  any  army,  both  its  men,  its  munitions, 
and  its  supplies,  very  mobile. 

Before  this,  the  Anglo-American  Commission 
had  settled  to  work.  An  office  and  a  drawing- 
office  had  been  taken  immediately  in  London,  and 
an  office  in  Paris.  After  some  difficulty  and  with 
the  help  of  the  French  Government,  we  had 
found  a  suitable  site  for  our  factory,  and  with  it 
space  for  a  training-ground.  This  was  at  Neuvy- 
Pailloux,  some  200  miles  south  of  Paris,  and  within 
easy  reach  of  the  two  Franco- American  ports  of 


220  TANKS 

St.  Nazaire,  and  Bordeaux.  The  whole  of  the 
material  for  building  it,  the  equipment  and  the 
electrical  power  station  were  bought  from  Eng- 
land. The  work  was  originally  entrusted  to  the 
British  Firm  of  Messrs.  Holland  and  Hannen, 
Ltd.,  working  under  the  direction  of  Sir  John 
Hunter,  Director  of  Factory  Construction  for  the 
Ministry  of  Munitions.  In  August,  however,  the 
work  was  handed  over  to  Messrs.  S.  Pearson  and 
Son,  who  completed  the  construction  in  Novem- 
ber under  the  direction  of  Mr.  F.  J.  Hopkinson. 
Here,  Great  Britain  and  the  States  were  to  build 
between  them  the  1500  super-Tanks,  each  weighing 
forty  tons.  The  whole  of  the  armour,  guns  and 
machine-guns  for  these  Liberty  Tanks  came  from 
Great  Britain,  and  the  engines  and  internal  parts 
from  the  States. 

The  first  Liberty  Tank,  however,  was  put  to- 
gether not  in  France,  but  in  America.  Major 
Holden,  who  had  been  my  second-in-command, 
went  to  America  to  help  in  the  new  development 
of  Tanks  there,  and  in  July  a  hull,  made  in 
England,  was  sent  over  in  order  that  the  engines 
and  gears  which  the  Americans  were  to  supply 
might  be  tested  in  it.  This,  the  first  super-Tank, 
was  completed  by  Captain  L.  R.  Buckendale,  of 
the  United  States  Army,  and  Lieut.  R.  A. 
Robertson,  R.N.V.R.,  who  during  1916  and 
1917  had  superintended  the  whole  of  the  inspec- 
tion of  the  manufacture  of  Tanks  in  England. 

A  great  many  experts  had  doubted  if  it  were 
possible   to   use   the    Liberty    Low   Compression 


THE  TANKS   GET  THEIR  WAY     221 

Flying  Engine  in  a  Tank,  but  it  came  through 
the  very  searching  trials  with  complete  success. 
I  had  the  following  letter  from  Mr.  Stettinius,  the 
U.S.A.  Deputy  Minister  for  War  : — 

"  War  Department, 

"  United  States  of  America, 
"  Paris, 

"  November  2dth,  1918. 

"  Edw.  R.  Stettinius, 
to 

"  LlEUT.-COLONEL  SlR  A.   G.   STERN, 

"  2,  Rue  Edouard  VII. 
"  Paris. 

"  My  dear  Colonel  Stern, 

"  I  have  received  the  following  cablegram  from 
Washington,  which  I  believe  will  be  of  interest  to  you : — 

"'Cable  Number  72. 

"  *Par.  1.  With  reference  to  your  534  par.  4  supple- 
menting our  49  par.  2.  Mark  VIII.  field-tests  in  pro- 
gress. So  far  no  structural  defects.  Machine  makes 
six  miles  per  hour  on  high  and  has  ample  power  for 
climbing.  Has  negotiated  thirteen -foot  trenches  with 
its  parapet  repeatedly.  Leverage  of  track  brake  foot- 
pedal  had  to  be  doubled  to  produce  satisfactory  steer 
ing.  Original  leverage  would  not  lock  one  track  under 
all  conditions.  No  engine  trouble  experienced  in  actual 
Tank  tests.  Reduction  of  width  of  reverse  clutch  slots 
and  placing  mufflers  on  top  have  been  found  necessary, 
as  you  suggested.  Notify  Stern,  London,  England. 
Goethals.' 

"  Yours  very  sincerely, 

"  Edw.  R.  Stettinius, 

"  Special  Representative." 


222  TANKS 

Beside  the  1500  Tanks  which  she  was  building 
jointly  with  us  in  France,  and  which  were  to  be 
distributed  among  the  Allies  according  to  the 
decision  of  the  Versailles  Council,  America  decided 
to  build  another  1500  at  home,  as  well  as  many 
thousands  of  Renault  Tanks.  She  found,  how- 
ever, greater  difficulty  than  she  had  expected  in 
making  the  armour-plate  and  guns,  so  it  was 
arranged  that  the  second  1500  should  also  be 
assembled  at  our  French  factory  on  the  same 
terms  as  the  first,  England  supplying  the  armour- 
plate  and  guns,  America  the  engines. 

I  believe  that  the  joint  working  of  the  Americans 
and  English  in  this  way  is  unique  in  the  history 
of  the  world.  Many  people  had  protested  that 
we  should  never  succeed  in  doing  it  amicably  and 
successfully.  All  their  fears  were  proved  wrong. 
American  and  English  officers  and  civilians* 
men  and  women,  worked  together  in  perfect 
accord.  I  know  of  no  single  instance  of  discord 
among  us,  and  I  know  that  the  whole  of  my  staff 
had  never  throughout  the  war  found  a  finer 
esprit  de  corps  than  inspired  this  enterprise  of  the 
Anglo-American  Tank  Commission. 

We  were  helped  by  the  French  Government  in 
very  many  ways.  It  provided  the  greater  part 
of  the  unskilled  labour  for  building  the  factory, 
consisting  of  labour  battalions  of  Annamitcs 
from  Cochin  China. 

I  will  quote  a  letter  from  the  French  Ministry  of 
War  giving  their  views  of  the  enterprise  atNeuvy- 
Paillonx.  It  was  written  after  the  Armistice 
had  been  signed. 


THE   TANKS   GET  THEIR   WAY     223 

"  Republique  Franeaise, 
"  Ministere  de  la  Guerre, 

"  Direction  de  VArtillerie  Sous  Direction 
de  VArtillerie  d'Assaut, 

"Paris,  le  18  Novembre,  1918. 

"  Le  President  du  Conseil, 
"  Ministere  de  la  Guerre, 
to 
"  Anglo-American  Commission, 
"  2,  Rue  Edouard  VII, 
"  Paris. 

"  Confirming  our  telephonic  message,  we  beg  to  state 
that  the  French  armies  will  not  need  now  any  Liberty 
Tanks.  We  wish,  however,  to  receive  two  or  three  of 
these  Tanks  fitted  exactly  as  they  would  have  been  at 
the  Neuvy-Pailloux  Works.  These  would  be  used  for 
experimental  purposes. 

"  We  avail  ourselves  of  this  opportunity  to  declare 
emphatically  that  wc  have  highly  appreciated  the  efforts 
made  by  your  Commission  in  originating  and  pursuing 
the  completion  of  a  very  extensive  work,  which  would 
have  greatly  helped  France  in  its  struggle. 
"  Very  truly  yours, 
"  Aubertin, 

"  Lieutenant-Colonel." 

It  will  give  some  idea  of  the  importance 
of  the  factory  at  Neuvy-Pailloux,  when  I  say 
that  the  output  of  Liberty  Tanks  (with  a  H.P. 
more  than  twice  as  great  as  the  H.P.  in  any 
British  Tank  up  to  that  time)  would  have  been 
as  large,  if  not  larger,  in  the  first  months  of 
1919,  as  the  output  of  the  factories  in  the  whole 
of  England.  Mechanical  Warfare  and  Mechanical 
Transport  were  now  being  developed  on  such  a 


224  TANKS 

scale  that  beyond  doubt  they  would  have  proved 
decisive  had  the  war  continued  into  1919,  but 
before  they  could  be  used  on  a  great  scale  the 
war  was  over,  and  the  Liberty  Tanks  never  went 
into  action. 

While  we  were  preparing  and  building  for  1919 
through  the  summer  and  autumn  of  1918,  the 
Tanks,  in  spite  of  the  blunders  which  had  limited 
and  delayed  the  construction  for  that  year,  were 
playing  a  great  part  in  the  battles  from  Amiens 
to  Mons. 

In  June  and  July,  before  the  great  offensive 
began,  the  Tanks  fought  three  actions.  They 
were  all  three  small  affairs,  but  each  was  note- 
worthy. It  had  been  unfortunate  for  the  Tanks 
that  the  great  success  of  the  first  day's  attack  at 
Cambrai  in  November  1917,  brilliant  in  its  actual 
achievement  and  still  more  brilliant  in  its  promise 
of  what  Tanks  could  do,  had  been  largely  ob- 
scured by  the  unexpected  and  disheartening 
success  of  the  German  counter-attack.  The  three 
actions  of  June  and  July,  small  as  they  were, 
served  to  hearten  those,  and  there  were  some, 
who  had  begun  to  wonder  if  there  was  indeed  a 
future  for  the  Tank. 

The  first  of  these  actions  was  a  raid  near 
Bucquoy,  on  June  22nd.  It  was  carried  out  by 
five  platoons  of  infantry  and  five  female  Tanks, 
and  was  the  first  occasion  on  which  Tanks  had 
attacked  by  night.  It  showed  not  only  that  they 
could  manoeuvre  by  night,  but  that  darkness  was  a 
great  protection  to  them.     The  infantry  was  held 


SMOKE  BOMB  EXPERIMENTS  (/>.  235) 


SMOKE  BOMB  EXPERIMENTS.  (/>.  235) 


Photo:  Bradge  Studios,  Ltd. 


4iCL-<      N»., 


Tanks  going   forward   to  cross  the  Hindenburg  Line.   (p.  237) 


Tanks  going  forward  to  cross  the   Hindenburg   Line.   (p.  237) 


Hfui  ism    Offii  IAL, 


THE   TANKS   GET  THEIR   WAY     225 

up  by  a  heavy  barrage  from  trench  mortars  and 
machine-guns.  Though  reinforced,  it  could  not 
advance,  and  the  Tanks  went  on  and  carried  out 
the  attack  alone.  One  Tank  was  attacked  by  a 
party  of  Germans,  and  its  crew  shot  them  down 
with  revolvers.  In  spite  of  the  heavy  trench 
mortar  fire  not  a  Tank  was  damaged,  and  all 
returned. 

On  July  4th  sixty  Tanks  went  into  action 
with  the  4th  Australian  Division  against  the 
Hamel  spur,  which  runs  from  the  plateau  of 
Villers-Bretonneux  to  the  Somme.  It  was  an 
attack  on  a  front  of  just  over  three  miles,  and 
was  to  be  carried  to  a  depth  of  a  mile  and  a  half. 
Not  only  were  all  the  objectives  reached,  but 
each  was  reached  by  the  time  fixed  in  the  plan 
of  attack.  The  number  of  prisoners  taken, 
1500,  was  more  than  double  the  total  casualties 
of  the  Australians,  while  only  five  of  the  Tanks 
were  hit,  and  the  casualties  of  their  crews  were 
only  sixteen  wounded. 

The  co-operation  between  Tanks  and  infantry 
came  as  near  perfection  as  could  be,  and  the 
Australians  were  finally  convinced  of  the  advan- 
tage of  working  with  Tanks.  The  full  value  of 
that  conviction  appeared  in  the  greater  battles 
that  were  to  come. 

In  this  attack  Mark  V.  Tanks  went  into  action 
for  the  first  time,  and  more  than  justified  all 
expectations  of  them.  They  all  reached  the 
starting-point  in  time.  That,  in  itself,  was  an 
achievement.     It  showed  the  mechanical  superior- 


226  TANKS 

ity  of  the  Mark  V.s  over  the  earlier  types.  Their 
greater  sureness  and  speed  in  manoeuvre  were 
shown  by  the  large  number  of  German  machine- 
guns  that  were  crushed.  Once  a  Tank  had 
passed  over  a  machine-gun  crew  there  was  no 
fear  that  it  would  come  to  life  again  behind  the 
attacking  infantry. 

Since  the  action  was  on  a  small  scale,  there 
had  been  no  need  to  have  an  extended  system  of 
supply  dumps.  Each  Fighting  Tank  carried  with 
it  ammunition  and  water  for  the  infantry,  and 
four  Supply  Tanks  brought  up  the  supplies  for 
the  engineers.  The  four  brought  up  a  load  of 
12,500  lbs.  and  had  delivered  it  within  500  yards 
of  the  final  objective  within  half  an  hour  of  its 
capture.  Four  Tanks  and  the  twenty-four  men 
in  them  had  done  the  work  of  a  carrying  party 
of  1250  men. 

The  same  month  for  the  first  time  British 
Tanks  went  into  action  with  French  infantry. 
This  was  near  Moreuil,  some  miles  north  of 
Montdidicr. 

Three  French  Divisions  attacked  on  a  front  of 
two  miles.  The  Tanks  engaged  were  the  9th 
Battalion  of  the  3rd  Brigade,  seventy-five  Tanks 
in  all,  and  they  worked  with  the  3rd  Division. 
After  the  battle  they  were  inspected  by  General 
Debeney,  commanding  the  First  French  Army, 
were  thanked  by  him  for  the  fine  way  in  which 
they  had  fought,  and  as  a  sign  of  their  comrade- 
ship in  battle  with  the  3rd  Division  were 
presented  with  its  Divisional  badge.     From  that 


THE   TANKS   GET  THEIR   WAY     227 

day  the  men  of  the  9th  Battalion  have  worn  it 
on  their  left  arms. 

On  July  15th  the  last  big  German  attack  was 
launched  against  Chateau  Thierry  and  failed. 
It  left  the  Germans  holding  a  dangerous  salient. 
Three  days  later  Marshal  Foch  made  his  great 
counter-attack  against  the  western  flank  of  this 
salient,  striking  the  first  of  those  Allied  blows 
which  were  to  continue  up  and  down  the  whole 
front  without  intermission,  until  four  months  later 
the  German  Army  could  fight  no  more.  In  this 
first  victory  the  French  Renault  Tanks  played 
a  conspicuous  part. 

Two  days  before  the  German  attack  was  made 
the  Commander  of  the  4th  British  Army,  which 
was  holding  the  line  before  Amiens,  was  asked 
by  G.H.Q.  to  submit  a  plan  of  attack.  On 
August  8th,  the  attack  was  made  on  a  front 
of  ten  miles.  The  attacking  troops  were  the 
Canadian  and  Australian  Corps,  the  3rd  Corps, 
three  Divisions  of  cavalry  and  the  whole  of  the 
Tank  Corps,  except  one  Brigade,  which  was  still 
armed  with  Mark  IV.  machines,  and  was  training 
its  men  on  the  Mark  V. 

As  at  Cambrai,  the  Tanks  led  the  attack  with- 
out any  preliminary  bombardment,  but  with  an 
artillery  barrage  and  a  special  noise  barrage  to 
cover  their  approach.  The  battle  began  at  a 
quarter  to  five,  when  430  Tanks  out  of  the  435 
that  had  been  assembled  went  forward. 

Two  of  the  Brigades  of  Fighting  Tanks  were 
armed  with  Whippets,  ninety  in  all,  and  worked 


228  TANKS 

with  the  cavalry,  and  besides  the  430  Fighting 
Tanks  there  were  numbers  of  others  for  supply 
and  signalling. 

The  attack  came  on  the  German  infantry  as 
a  complete  surprise.  The  Tanks  appeared  above 
it  out  of  the  morning  mist,  and  the  line,  strongly 
held  though  it  was,  broke  before  them  at  once. 
It  was  noticed  that  the  German  machine- 
gunners,  who  had  learnt  already,  in  the  smaller 
actions  of  June  and  July,  that  we  had  a  new 
and  faster  Tank,  were  much  less  tenacious 
than  in  any  previous  battle.  They  did  not  wait 
to  be  crushed  beneath  these  great  machines  of 
thirty  tons  weight  each,  which  came  searching 
for  them  among  the  standing  corn. 

By  the  end  of  the  day  the  attack  had  been 
pressed  to  a  distance  of  over  seven  miles,  but 
when  in  the  evening  the  Tanks  rallied,  it  was  found 
that  100  of  them  had  been  temporarily  put  out 
of  action,  while  the  crews  of  the  rest  were  ex- 
hausted with  the  long  distance  covered  and  the 
August  heat.  Composite  companies  were  hastily 
arranged,  for  there  were  few  reserves. 

Next  day,  when  the  attack  began  again,  145 
Tanks  went  into  action.  The  total  hit  that  day 
was  thirty-nine,  but  in  one  part  of  the  line,  round 
Framcrville,  it  was  only  one  out  of  thirteen.  This 
was  because  the  infantry  fought  very  skilfully  to 
protect  them.  Infantry  and  Tanks  went  forward 
together,  and  the  riflemen  picked  off  the  enemy's 
gunners  as  soon  as  the  Tanks  came  under 
observation  of  the  guns. 


THE   TANKS   GET  THEIR   WAY     229 

On  the  third  day  sixty-seven  Tanks  were 
engaged  and  thirty  were  hit,  and  on  this  day  the 
edge  of  the  old  Somme  battlefield,  pitted  with 
shell  craters,  was  reached. 

On  the  fourth  day  there  was  no  general  attack, 
but  a  number  of  small  operations  against  German 
strong  points  which  still  held  out. 

Within  the  next  few  days  it  was  decided  that 
the  3rd  Army  should  take  up  the  attack  north  of 
the  Somme.  The  battle  of  Amiens  was  at  an 
end.  In  the  four  days  the  4th  Army  had  gone 
forward  from  six  to  twelve  miles  on  a  front  of 
over  twelve  miles,  and  it  now  held  almost  the 
same  line  that  the  French  had  held  on  July  1st, 
1916.  It  had  taken  22,000  prisoners  and  400 
guns.  Of  the  part  played  by  the  Tanks  Sir 
Henry  Rawlinson  spoke  in  a  Special  Order  of 
the  Day :  "  The  success  of  the  operations  of 
August  8th  and  succeeding  days  was  largely  due 
to  the  conspicuous  part  played  by  the  3rd,  4th 
and  5th  Brigades,  and  I  desire  to  place  on  record 
my  sincere  appreciation  of  the  invaluable  services 
rendered  both  by  the  Mark  V.  and  the  Mark  V. 
Star  and  the  Whippets  .  .  .  and  of  the  splendid 
success  that  they  achieved." 

The  battle  had  taught  the  Tank  Corps  some 
new  lessons  and  confirmed  the  old.  It  had 
proved  it  to  be  a  mistake  to  attach  the  Whippets 
to  the  Cavalry.  In  the  approach  marches  they 
could  not  keep  pace  with  it,  in  the  actual  fighting 
they  were  kept  back  by  it.  By  noon  on  the  first 
day  there  was  great  confusion  behind  the  enemy 


230  TANKS 

lines.  The  Whippets  should  then  have  been 
five  or  even  ten  miles  ahead  of  the  infantry, 
spreading  the  confusion  and  frustrating  all 
attempts  to  restore  order.  As  it  was,  they  were 
kept  far  behind  them  by  their  orders  to  support 
the  cavalry,  for  the  cavalry,  unable  to  take  cover 
like  the  infantry,  was  compelled  to  retire  to  a 
flank  or  to  the  rear  before  machine-gun  fire.  The 
Whippets  did  some  hard  and  gallant  fighting, 
but  co-operation  between  Tanks  and  cavalry  was 
proved  to  be  to  the  help  of  neither. 

Another  important  lesson  was  that  while  the 
Tanks  were  the  great  aid  and  protection  of 
infantry  against  machine-guns,  they  themselves, 
fighting  as  they  now  were,  not  across  fortified 
positions,  but  over  open  country,  needed  the 
protection  of  the  infantry  against  artillery  fire. 

These  were  valuable  lessons,  but  the  two 
crying  needs  were  for  still  faster  Tanks,  Tanks 
that  could  have  outstripped  a  retreating  enemy 
and  cut  him  off,  and  for  a  Tank  reserve.  That 
lesson,  which  had  been  taught  us  first  at  Arras 
and  then  at  Cambrai,  but  which  the  War  Office 
had  refused  to  learn,  was  repeated.  The  endur- 
ance of  a  Heavy  Tank  in  action  was  three  days. 
Without  a  general  reserve,  the  real  force  of  the 
Tanks'  blow  was  spent  on  the  first  day.  They 
went  on  afterwards  with  tired  crews,  in  battalions 
hurriedly  re-arranged  and  in  much  diminished 
numbers.  Altogether  in  those  four  days  of  fight- 
ing 688  Tanks  went  into  action  ;  480  had  to  be 
handed  over  to  salvage,   and  of  the  remaining 


THE  TANKS   GET  THEIR  WAY     231 

288,  very  few  were  fit  for  anything  but  a  short 
attack,  and  all  required  a  thorough  overhaul. 
There  was  little  time  for  it.  The  battle  north 
of  the  Somme  was  to  begin  on  August  21st. 
The  enemy  showed  signs  that  he  was  preparing 
to  retire  between  Arras  and  the  Somme.  He 
was  to  be  attacked  before  he  could  do  it. 

The  first  attack  started  between  Moyenville 
and  Beaucourt-sur-Ancre.  Once  more  it  took 
the  enemy  by  surprise.  The  Tanks,  when  they 
crossed  his  first  trenches,  found  candles  still 
burning  in  them  and  a  great  litter  of  papers 
and  equipment  that  he  had  thrown  away.  More- 
over, he  had  adopted  a  new  system  of  defence. 
His  first  line  was  very  lightly  held  and  his  guns 
were  withdrawn.  The  result  was  that  few  were 
overwhelmed  and  captured  in  the  first  surprise 
of  the  attack,  and  that  in  the  second  and  third 
stages  the  Tanks  came  under  very  heavy  fire. 
To  meet  this  new  defence  the  older  Tanks  were 
used  against  the  first  and  second  objectives. 
Then  the  new  Mark  V.s  took  up  the  attack,  and 
then  the  Whippets.  By  the  time  the  second 
objective  was  reached  the  mist  that  had  hidden 
the  first  stages  of  the  attack  began  to  lift.  Each 
Tank  went  forward,  the  centre  of  a  zone  of 
bullets  and  bursting  shells.  The  fire  was  con- 
centrated on  them,  and  the  infantry,  in  conse- 
quence, had  few  casualties. 

Next  day  the  4th  Army  took  up  the  attack 
as  far  southwards  as  the  Somme.  On  August 
23rd  it  spread  south  of  the  Somme.     On  August 


232  TANKS 

26th  northwards  to  Arras.  The  1st,  3rd  and 
4th  Armies  were  now  attacking  on  a  front  of 
thirty  miles,  from  Arras  to  Chaulnes.  This 
battle  was  fought  right  across  the  battlefields 
of  1916  and  1917.  It  lasted  a  fortnight.  It 
took  from  the  Germans  in  captures  alone  53,000 
prisoners  and  470  guns,  and  it  culminated,  on 
September  2nd,  in  the  breaking  of  the  famous 
Drocourt-Queant  line,  which  in  April  1917  we 
had  failed  to  reach.  It  was  an  immensely 
strong  line  protected  by  great  belts  of  wire.  It 
fell  to  the  Tanks  in  a  day.  Except  for  heavy 
anti-Tank  rifle  fire  they  met  with  little  opposi- 
tion—with far  less,  indeed,  than  had  been  ex- 
pected, but  one  company  of  Tanks  alone  destroyed 
over  seventy  German  machine-guns.  The  gunners 
surrendered  as  the  Tanks  approached. 

During  the  fortnight,  except  for  one  or  two 
minor  failures,  every  attack  had  succeeded,  and 
succeeded,  too,  with  casualties  to  the  infantry 
on  a  much  smaller  scale  than  in  previous  attacks. 
The  Tank  Corps  had  moved  up  to  the  battles  of 
Bapaume  and  Arras  straight  from  the  battlefield 
of  Amiens.  They  had  had  scarcely  any  time  for 
repairs,  for  rehearsal  with  the  infantry  or  for 
reconnaissance.  They  had  been  through  a  fort- 
night of  almost  continuous  fighting. 

On  September  4th  all  Tank  Brigades  were  with- 
drawn to  G.H.Q.  reserve  to  refit  and  reorganise. 

Tanks  were  again  in  the  line  twelve  days  later 
and  took  part  in  the  battle  of  Epehy.  They 
fought   that   day    under   a   heavy   gas    barrage, 


German   Anti-Tank    Rifle,  (p.  238) 


Canadian  Official. 


m 

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> 

i 

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* 

i 

• 

< 

i 

i 

H 

1  K< 

t1 

«»• 

I 

'    I    i    i 

A  German  Anti-Tank  Rifle  compared  with  a  British,    (p.  238) 


British  Offh  iai. 


THE   TANKS   GET  THEIR   WAY     233 

which  forced  their  crews  to  wear  their  gas  helmets 
for  more  than  two  hours  on  end.  Then,  on 
September  27th,  began  the  third  of  the  great 
battles,  the  battle  for  the  Hindenburg  defences, 
for  that  zone  of  entrenchments  five  to  ten  miles 
deep,  heavily  wired  and  drawing  added  strength, 
in  front  of  Cambrai  from  the  Canal  du  Nord, 
and  between  Cambrai  and  St.  Quentin  from  the 
Canal  St.  Quentin.  It  was  fought  by  the  1st, 
3rd  and  4th  Armies  over  a  front  of  thirty  miles, 
from  the  Sensee  River  to  St.  Quentin,  and  it 
lasted  fifteen  days. 

The  battle  was  begun  on  September  27th  by 
the  1st  and  3rd  Armies  with  an  attack  towards 
Bourlon  Hill  in  front  of  Cambrai.  Fifty-three 
Tanks  fought  that  day,  some  of  them  over 
nearly  the  same  ground  where  they  had  fought 
in  November  1917.  The  Canal  du  Nord  was  the 
chief  obstacle  before  them,  and  between  Marquion 
and  Bourlon  the  Germans  had  so  far  trusted  in 
it  as  to  prepare  no  special  anti-Tank  defence. 
It  was  a  great  dry  channel  (for  when  the  war 
came  it  was  still  unfinished),  fifty  feet  broad  at 
the  bottom  and  twelve  feet  deep.  Its  banks 
were  steep,  but  to  make  doubly  sure  the  Germans, 
in  places,  had  cut  the  bank  into  a  vertical  wall 
nine  feet  high.  Yet  all  along  the  line  the  Tanks 
crossed  the  canal,  even  climbing  the  nine  foot 
wall.  Bourlon  Hill  was  captured,  and  next  day 
the  infantry  were  on  the  outskirts  of  Cambrai. 

On  September  29th  the  attack  was  taken  up 
by  the  4th  Army  further  south.     The  American 


234  TANKS 

Corps  fought  in  the  centre  with  the  Australian 
Corps.  A  British  Corps  was  on  either  wing. 
The  infantry  were  supported  by  175  Tanks.  It 
was  an  attack  on  a  large  scale,  carefully  planned, 
its  object  being  to  cross  the  Canal  St.  Quentin 
and  force  the  "  Hindenburg  "  defences.  In  the 
northern  half  the  plan  miscarried.  It  miscarried 
because  a  preliminary  attack  the  day  before  had 
only  half  succeeded.  \Yhat  should  have  been 
the  British  front  line  on  the  morning  of  the  big 
attack  was  still  in  German  hands.  There  was 
delay.  The  artillery  barrage  got  far  ahead  of 
the  infantry,  and  the  Americans  who  led  the 
attack  suffered  very  heavy  losses.  The  attack 
failed.  Disaster  also  came  on  the  301st  American 
Tank  Battalion,  which  was  working  with  an 
American  Division.  It  ran  into  an  old  British 
minefield  of  rows  of  buried  trench  mortar  bombs. 
Ten  machines  were  blown  up;  the  whole  bottom 
of  several  of  them  was  torn  away,  and  only  two 
were  able  to  support  the  infantry. 

Further  south  the  Tanks  of  the  4th  and  5th 
Brigades  broke  into  the  Hindenburg  line;  then 
the  morning  mists  began  to  lift  and  it  was  found 
that,  as  a  result  of  the  failure  to  the  north,  the 
flank  and  rear  of  the  attack  were  exposed.  The 
later  objectives  had  to  be  abandoned,  but  several 
Tanks  went  into  action  on  their  own  initiative 
without  artillery  or  infantry  support,  and  though 
they  suffered  heavily  themselves,  saved  the 
infantry  many  casualties. 

On  the  southern  wing,  though  the  attack  was 


THE   TANKS   GET   THEIR   WAY     235 

made  in  a  dense  fog,  it  was  a  complete  success 
and  the  Canal  was  crossed. 

Next  day,  Tanks  were  in  action  with  the  1st 
Army  north  of  Cambrai,  where  they  used  smoke 
clouds  very  successfully  to  hide  themselves  from 
the  German  gunners;  and  on  October  1st,  on  the 
3rd  and  on  the  5th,  they  were  again  attacking 
with  the  4th  Army. 

The  second  phase  of  the  battle  of  Cambrai 
and  St.  Quentin  began  on  October  8th,  when  the 
3rd  and  4th  Armies  attacked  together  on  a  front 
of  eighteen  miles  between  the  two  towns.  Eighty- 
two  Tanks  went  into  action  that  day,  and  at  one 
place  there  was  a  duel  between  Tanks.  The 
Germans  had  captured  from  us  one  male  and 
three  female.  With  these  they  counter-attacked. 
The  male  was  put  out  of  action  at  once  by  a 
6-pounder  shell  fired  from  another  Tank,  and 
one  of  the  females  by  a  shell  from  a  captured 
German  field  gun  fired  by  a  Tank  Section  Com- 
mander. The  other  two  females  turned  and 
fled  when  one  of  their  own  sex  advanced  to 
attack  them.  This  was  the  second  battle  between 
Tank  and  Tank.  The  first  had  been  fought  in 
April  with  equal  success. 

Next  day  the  attack  was  taken  up  again  along 
the  whole  front  of  thirty  miles;  Cambrai  was 
occupied,  and  by  that  evening,  October  9th,  the 
battle  was  over.  The  whole  of  the  Hindenburg 
defences  had  been  captured,  and  the  attempt 
to  hold  them  had  cost  the  Germans,  in  captures 
alone,  600  guns  and  50,000  men. 


236  TANKS 

It  was  not  only  in  Cambresis  that  the  German 
trench  system  was  broken.  The  same  thing  had 
been  done  in  Flanders  by  the  combined  French, 
Belgian  and  British  forces  at  the  battles  of 
Ypres  and  Courtrai,  and  now  along  the  whole 
length  of  their  line  the  British  Armies  followed 
their  retreating  enemy  over  open,  unfortified 
country.  But  the  German  Army,  though  it 
had  lost  its  trench  system,  was  not  yet  broken. 
Its  rearguards  were  armed  with  thousands  of 
machine-guns,  and  they  made  impossible  the 
rapid  pursuit  by  cavalry  which  would  have  turned 
retreat  to  rout.  Only  the  Tanks  could  have 
done  that;  two  Brigades  of  them  might  have 
done  it;  but  now  after  three  months'  continuous 
fighting  very  few  remained,  and  the  Corps  itself 
had  lost  a  third  of  its  personnel. 

The  steady  attack,  the  methodical  pursuit 
continued,  and  a  week  later,  on  October  17th, 
one  Brigade  of  Tanks  went  into  action  with  the 
4th  Army  in  a  combined  British  and  French 
attack,  south  of  Le  Cateau.  The  numerous 
waterways  of  this  flat  country  were  now  the 
chief  defence  of  the  Germans.  At  this  part  of 
the  line  they  were  protected  by  the  river  Scllc, 
which  lay  between  the  two  armies.  To  guide 
the  attacking  Tanks,  tape  was  laid  across  the 
river  at  night  time,  and  it  was  then  discovered 
that  the  Germans  had  dammed  the  stream  in 
places  to  increase  the  difficulties. 

The  morning  of  the  17th  came  with  such  a 
heavy   fog   that   the   Tanks   moved   up   to   the 


THE   TANKS   GET  THEIR   WAY     237 

attack  by  compass  bearings.  Each  Tank  of  the 
twenty-eight  carried  a  "  Crib,"  x  and  with  the 
help  of  these  the  river  was  crossed. 

The  enemy  made  little  resistance.  They  had 
trusted  to  the  streams.  Three  days  later  Tanks 
again  crossed  the  Selle  in  an  attack  north  of 
Le  Cateau.  This  time  the  engineers  built  a  bridge 
for  them.  It  was  built  at  night  and  was  just 
beneath  the  surface  of  the  water,  so  that  it  was 
invisible  to  the  enemy  by  day.  By  this  under- 
water bridge  all  the  Tanks  safely  crossed. 

Two  days  later  thirty-seven  Tanks  took  part 
in  a  moonlight  attack.  It  was  successfully 
carried  through  in  spite  of  mist  and  heavy 
gas  shelling,  and  the  infantry  found  the  Tanks 
as  useful  in  making  a  way  for  them  through  the 
hedges  of  the  unfortified  country  as  through  the 
wire  belts  of  the  trench  zones. 

On  November  4th,  French  and  British  together 
attacked  on  a  thirty-mile  front  from  Valenciennes 
to  the  river  Oise,  and  thirty-seven  Tanks  worked 
with  the  British  infantry.  That  day  two  Supply 
Tanks  also  joined  in  the  battle  near  Landrecies. 
They  were  carrying  forward  bridging  materials, 
when  they  found  the  infantry,  still  on  the  western 
bank  of  the  canal  and  unable  to  advance  because 
of  the  German  machine-guns.  Supply  Tanks 
are  not  meant  for  fighting,  but  these  two  went 

1  This  consisted  of  a  strong  hexagonal-shaped  framework 
of  timber  braced  with  steel  members.  It  was  5  feet 
across  and  10  feet  long,  and  was  used  in  the  same  way  as 
the  "  Fascine,"  but  its  weight  was  only  12  cwt.,  as  compared 
with  the  30  cwt.  of  the  "  Fascine." 


238  TANKS 

at  once  into  action,  and  the  infantry  followed 
them  as  if  they  were  Fighting  Tanks.  The 
machine-gunners  surrendered.  The  canal  was 
crossed. 

The  next  day  eight  Whippets  supported  the 
3rd  Guards  Brigade  in  a  successful  attack  across 
a  difficult  country  of  fences  and  ditches  north 
of  the  Forest  of  Mormal.  This  was  the  last 
action  that  the  Tanks  fought.  The  Corps  was 
now  so  reduced  that  companies  had  taken  the 
place  of  battalions  and  sections  the  place  of 
companies. 

Six  days  later,  when  hostilities  ceased,  the  Corps 
was  busy  trying  to  reorganise  a  fighting  force 
out  of  its  diminished  and  weary  battalions. 

Since  the  430  Tanks  began  the  battle  of  Amiens 
on  August  8th,  there  had  been  ninety-six  days 
of  almost  continuous  fighting.  On  thirty-nine 
days  out  of  the  ninety-six  the  Tank  Corps  had 
been  engaged,  and  1993  Tanks  and  Tank  Armoured 
Cars  had  gone  into  action.  Eight  hundred  and 
eighty-seven  had  been  handed  over  to  salvage, 
but  only  fifteen  of  these  had  been  struck  off 
the  strength  as  altogether  beyond  repair,  while 
214  had  been  repaired  and  returned  to  their 
battalions. 

The  casualties,  compared  with  the  strength  of 
the  Corps,  had  been  heavy.  Five  hundred  and 
ninety-two  officers  were  killed,  wounded,  prisoners 
or  missing  out  of  a  total  of  3  500,  and  25G2  other 
ranks  out  of  a  total  of  8000.  Yet  by  the  standard 
of  the  casualties  of  the  infantry  in  those  battles 


THE   TANKS   GET  THEIR   WAY     239 

which  they  fought  unsupported  by  Tanks,  these 
losses  were  small  indeed.  The  whole  Corps  was 
less  than  the  strength  of  an  infantry  division, 
and  in  those  thirty-nine  days  of  fighting,  in 
which  victorious  armies  had  been  completely 
broken,  it  had  lost  less  than  many  infantry 
divisions,  during  the  battle  of  the  Somme,  had 
lost  in  a  single  day. 

It  is  not  possible  to  compare  those  figures 
with  the  losses  that  the  infantry  would  have 
sustained  had  they  had  to  do  the  work  of  the 
Tanks,  for  the  Tanks  continually  did  what  it 
was  beyond  the  power  of  flesh  and  blood  to  do. 
One  can  only  say  that  if  the  infantry  had  been 
able  to  do  it  at  all  they  would  have  paid  a  price 
in  lives  many  hundred  times  as  great. 

What  did  the  Germans  think  of  the  Tanks? 
It  is  credibly  reported  that  when  Hindenburg 
visited  the  German  Tank  centre  near  Charleroi 
in  February  1918  he  said,  "  I  do  not  think  that 
Tanks  are  any  use,  but  as  these  have  been  made 
they  may  as  well  be  tried."  That  he  said  this 
was  certainly  believed  in  the  German  Tank  Corps, 
which  was  not  much  encouraged  thereby,  and  if 
he  said  it  he  only  repeated  what  Lord  Kitchener 
had  said  of  our  Tanks  three  years  before  when 
he  first  saw  them  at  Hatfield. 

Other  German  Generals  believed  in  them  if 
Hindenburg  did  not,  and  the  Commander  of 
the  17th  German  Army  said  of  them :  "  Our 
own  Tanks  strengthen  the  moral  of  the  infantry 
to   a  tremendous  extent  even   if  used   only  in 


240  TANKS 

small  numbers,  and  experience  has  shown  that 
they  have  a  considerable  moral  effect  on  hostile 
infantry." 

The  great  Allied  attack  had  only  just  begun 
when  the  German  Government  showed  that  it 
recognised  the  growing  danger  of  the  new  weapon. 
Speaking  in  the  Reichstag  for  the  Minister  of 
War,  at  the  time  of  the  battle  of  Amiens,  General 
von  Wrisberg  said,  "  The  American  Armies  need 
not  terrify  us.  We  shall  settle  with  them.  More 
momentous  for  us  is  the  question  of  Tanks." 
Then  just  before  the  end  this  message  from 
The  Prussian  Minister  of  War  was  sent  out : 
"  The  superiority  of  the  enemy  at  present  is 
principally  due  to  their  use  of  Tanks.  We  have 
been  actively  engaged  for  a  long  time  in  work- 
ing at  producing  this  weapon  (which  is  recog- 
nised as  important)  in  adequate  numbers.  We 
shall  then  have  an  additional  means  for  the 
continuance  of  the  war  if  we  are  compelled  to 
continue  it." 

So  one  of  the  last  efforts  to  hearten  the  German 
people  was  a  promise  of  Tanks. 

But  it  is  not  with  any  reluctant  tribute  from  a 
German  that  I  wish  to  end  this  story  of  how  we 
built  the  Tanks.  I  have  already  quoted  the 
British  Commander-in-Chief's  first  words  on 
them  :  "  Wherever  the  Tanks  advanced  we  took 
our  objectives,  and  where  they  did  not  advance 
we  failed  to  take  our  objectives."  His  last 
words,  in  his  dispatch  of  December  21st,  1918, 
are  these  :  — 


THE   TANKS   GET   THEIR   WAY     241 

"Since  the  opening  of  our  offensive  on  8th  August, 
Tanks  have  been  employed  in  every  battle,  and  the 
importance  of  the  part  played  by  them  in  breaking 
the  resistance  of  the  German  infantry  can  scarcely  be 
exaggerated.  The  whole  scheme  of  the  attack  of  the 
8th  of  August  was  dependent  upon  Tanks,  and  ever 
since  that  date  on  numberless  occasions  the  success  of 
our  infantry  has  been  powerfully  assisted  or  confirmed 
by  their  timely  arrival.  So  great  has  been  the  effect 
produced  upon  the  German  infantry  by  the  appearance 
of  British  Tanks  that  in  more  than  one  instance,  when 
for  various  reasons  real  Tanks  were  not  available  in 
sufficient  numbers,  valuable  results  have  been  obtained 
by  the  use  of  dummy  Tanks  painted  on  frames  of  wood 
and  canvas. 

"  It  is  no  disparagement  of  the  courage  of  our  infantry 
or  of  the  skill  and  devotion  of  our  artillery  to  say  that 
the  achievements  of  those  essential  arms  would  have 
fallen  short  of  the  full  measure  of  success  achieved  by 
our  Armies  had  it  not  been  for  the  very  gallant  and 
devoted  work  of  the  Tank  Corps,  under  the  command 
of  Major-General  H.  J.  Elles." 

What  we  had  claimed  that  the  Tanks  could 
do  they  had  done. 


CHAPTER  XI 
IN    CONCLUSION 


CHAPTER  XI 

IN   CONCLUSION 

"  LET   US    NOW   PRAISE   FAMOUS   MEN  " 

One  of  the  results  of  the  secrecy  which  had 
to  be  maintained  about  Mechanical  Warfare  is 
that  the  public  knows  nothing  of  those  men  whose 
genius  designed  Tanks,  whose  enthusiasm  and 
energy  compelled  a  doubting  and  reluctant  War 
Office  to  use  them,  and  whose  skill  in  the  field 
made  them  a  terrifying  weapon. 

The  following  are  the  men  whom  Great  Britain 
has  to  thank  for  its  Tanks,  and  for  the  honour 
of  having  given  to  the  Allied  cause  the  greatest 
invention  of  the  war : — 

Mr.  Winston  Churchill,  who  first  encouraged 
in  a  definite  way  the  new  idea  of  Mechanical 
Warfare  by  appointing  a  Committee  of  the 
Admiralty  to  study  it  and  by  authorising  the 
funds  for  the  Admiralty  to  develop  it. 

Mr.  Lloyd  George,  who  protected  the  idea  from 
destruction  by  the  forces  of  doubt  and  reaction 
on  many  occasions. 

Mr.  Edwin  S.  Montagu,  who  succeeded  Mr. 
Lloyd  George  as  Minister  of  Munitions  and 
worked  for  Mechanical  Warfare  in  the  same 
spirit  of  enthusiasm. 

245 


246  TANKS 

The  Admiralty,  which  encouraged  the  whole 
development.  Without  its  support  and  help 
Tanks  would  never  have  been  produced. 

Sir  Eustace  d'Eyncourt,  who  was  the  real 
father  of  the  Tanks  and  nursed  the  development 
from  the  beginning  to  the  end.  He  on  all  occa- 
sions gave  his  great  technical  knowledge  and 
experience  and  the  weight  of  his  personal  influence 
without  fear  and  without  stint. 

Major  W.  G.  Wilson  and  Sir  William  Tritton, 
who  brought  all  their  experience,  energy,  mechani- 
cal knowledge  and  inventive  genius  to  the  work- 
ing out  of  the  mechanical  details  of  the  Tanks. 

Major  N.  E.  Holden,  who  was  my  loyal  and 
responsible  deputy  and  really  did  all  my  work 
for  three  years. 

Sir  Sigmund  Dannreuther,  Director  of  Finance, 
who  in  his  important  position  gave  Mechanical 
Warfare  invaluable  help.  His  great  intelligence 
and  broad-minded  views  helped  the  development 
from  the  beginning.  Numerous  difficult  problems, 
both  in  the  Mechanical  Warfare  Department 
and  Anglo-American  Commission,  were  submitted 
to  him  and  always  solved. 

Major  K.  P.  Symes,  who  showed  untiring 
energy  and  skill  in  the  development  and  pro- 
duction of  light  armour-plate  without  which  the 
Tanks  would  have  proved  of  little  value,  and 
superintended,  with  Lieut.  W.  E.  Rendle,  the 
whole  production  of  Tanks. 

Major-General  E.  D.  Swinton,  who  gave  the 
War  Office  not  one  moment's  peace  until  they 


IN   CONCLUSION  247 

had  adopted  this  new  method  of  warfare,  and 
who  raised  the  first  Tank  force  and  commanded 
it  in  the  first  Tank  battle  in  September  1916. 

The  Royal  Tank  Corps,  whose  magnificent 
courage  and  esprit  de  corps  were  second  to  none 
in  any  army  in  the  world. 

Major-General  H.  J.  Elles,  who  succeeded 
General  Swinton  and  led  the  Corps  into  action 
at  Cambrai,  and,  with  his  Chief  of  Staff,  Colonel 
J.  F.  C.  Fuller,  was  responsible  for  the  tactics, 
efficiency  and  magnificent  esprit  de  corps  of  the 
Tank  Corps. 

General  Scott  Moncrieff,  who  was  appointed 
Chairman  of  the  Landship  Committee  when 
Mr.  Churchill  left  the  Admiralty. 

Lieut.  Percy  Anderson,  who  from  the  earliest 
days  was  responsible  under  me  for  the  whole  of 
the  organisation  of  the  Mechanical  Warfare 
Department. 

Mr.  L.  W.  Blanchard,  who  was  head  of  my 
drawing-office,  and  showed  not  only  his  excep- 
tional technical  ability  and  experience,  but  un- 
tiring energy  under  most  difficult  circumstances. 

Lieut.  R.  A.  Robertson,  Chief  Inspector  of  all 
Tank  production. 

Lieut.  R.  Spinney,  his  deputy. 

Captain  T.  L.  Squires,  who  was  responsible 
for  the  construction  of  gun-carrying  machines, 
and  who  trained  the  crews  who  took  the  first 
of  this  type  of  Tank  into  action. 

Squadron  20,  R.N.A.S.,  and  Commander 
McGrath,    who   carried   out   all   testing,   experi- 


248  TANKS 

meriting  and  transport  of  the  Tanks  until  the 
end. 

Sir  Charles  Parsons,  who  gave  invaluable  help 
as  Technical  Adviser  to  the  Mechanical  Warfare 
Department. 

Mr.  Dudley  Docker,  Major  Greg,  Mr.  Lincoln 
Chandler,  Mr.  E.  Squires  and  Mr.  Stockton  of 
the  Metropolitan  Carriage  Wagon  and  Finance 
Company,  who  organised  the  production  of  Tanks 
on  that  large  scale  without  which  they  could 
never  have  played  their  decisive  part. 

Sir  William  Beardmore  and  Mr.  T.  M.  Service, 
who  supplied  armour  and  bomb-proof  plates. 

Sir  Robert  Had  field,  to  whom  we  owed  the 
special  steel  which  gave  the  Tanks  their  length 
of  life  and  trustworthiness. 

Mr.  Morgan  Yeatman,  a  genius  in  bridge 
building,  who  was  technical  adviser  on  stresses 
and  strains  in  this  novel  Landship. 

Mr.  Starkey  of  Messrs.  William  Foster  & 
Company  of  Lincoln,  head  draughtsman  under 
Sir  William  Tritton,  who  was  responsible  for 
the  drawings  of  the  first  experimental  and  first 
successful  Tank. 

Mr.  Sykes,  works  manager  of  Fosters,  who 
produced  the  experimental  Tanks  and  was  build- 
ing them  from  that  time  onwards  until  the 
Armistice. 

Sir  George  Hadcock  and  Mr.  II.  I.  Brackenbury 
of  Messrs.  Armstrong,  Whitworth  and  Company, 
who  designed  the  guns  and  gun-mountings,  and 
never  failed  us  in  producing  them  in  enormous 


f 


^ 


ERNEST  SQUIRES,  ESQ.  (p.  248) 


Photo  :  Whitlock  &  Sons,  Birmingham. 


IN   CONCLUSION  249 

numbers  when  the  general  opinion  was  that  such 
production  was  impossible. 

Messrs.  The  Daimler  Company  and  Mr.  Percy 
Martin,  who  never  failed  in  the  supply  of  engines 
up  to  time. 

Engine  Patents,  Ltd.,  and  Mr.  H.  Ricardo, 
who  designed  and  produced  the  Ricardo  engine 
in  thousands. 

All  the  manufacturers,  works  managers,  fore- 
men and  workmen  who,  at  all  times,  willingly 
worked  night  and  day.  I  never  remember  a 
single  instance  of  a  strike  in  any  of  our  Tank 
factories.  No  country  could  be  prouder  than 
this  country  should  be  of  the  work  done  by  the 
men  who  built  the  Tanks. 

Nor  would  the  story  of  the  Tanks  be  complete 
without  a  tribute  to  the  work  done  by  the 
women.  There  was  hardly  any  part  of  the  Tank 
upon  which  women  were  not  employed  before 
the  end  of  the  war. 

In  my  own  department,  Miss  L.  P.  Perot  was 
appointed  Assistant  Director.  This  brought 
forth  from  the  Establishment  Branch  of  the 
Ministry  of  Munitions  a  protest  that  such  an 
appointment  had  never  been  made  before  and 
therefore  could  not  be  approved.  But  the  ap- 
pointment was  made  and  it  was  justified.  To 
her  and  the  thousands  of  women  who  worked 
for  the  Tanks  the  country  owes  its  gratitude, 
as  well  as  to  the  men. 


APPENDICES 


APPENDIX   I 

LETTER   FROM   MR.    ASHMEAD   BARTLETT 

Marlborough  Chambers, 
Jermyn  Street, 

St.  James's,  S.W., 

March  5th,  1918. 

Dear  Stern, 

I  am  sending  you  the  promised  relic — 
namely,  the  (Pyrene)  fire  extinguisher  of  the 
Tank,  H.M.S.  Corunna,  which  I  recovered  from 
her  interior  on  October  7th,  1916.  I  think  I 
was  the  first  person  to  ever  write  a  description 
of  the  Tanks  which  was  allowed  to  appear  in 
the  Press.  I  will  now  quote  from  my  Diary  of 
that  date  : — 

"  I  was  endeavouring  to  get  into  the  village 
of  Combles,  but  was  stopped  by  heavy  shell- 
fire.  I  was  taking  cover  in  a  trench  on  the 
ridge  overlooking  Combles,  when  I  suddenly 
espied  a   strange-looking   object  lying   close   to 

the  Bois  de  (I  cannot  remember  the  name 

of  this  wood,  and  have  no  map  with  me  for  the 
moment),  about  150  yards  away.  I  soon  dis- 
covered with  the  aid  of  my  glasses  that  it  could 
only  be  a  mortally  wounded  Tank.  I  then 
crawled  over  the  shell-shattered  ground  to  the 
spot.  All  around  me  were  evidences  of  a  fearful 
melee ;  the  dead,  still  unburied,  lay  in  hundreds. 

253 


254  APPENDIX   I 

Some  of  the  corpses  had  been  partly  covered  with 
the  earth  which  the  heavy  rains  had  washed  away, 
exposing  the  grinning,  half-decayed,  blackened 
faces  of  the  dead  to  view.  Around  the  Tank 
itself  they  lay  thicker  than  ever,  showing  how 
our  infantry  had  attacked  in  her  wake,  endeavour- 
ing to  obtain  some  shelter  from  the  murderous 
machine-gun  fire  by  crawling  behind  her.  The 
Tank  itself,  H.M.S.  Corunna,  was  lying  totally 
disabled,  having  been  knocked  out  by  a  shell 
which  had  smashed  the  engine;  but  as  there  were 
no  dead  inside,  I  do  not  know  what  became  of 
the  crew.  It  seemed  that  this  Landship  had 
reached  the  edge  of  the  wood  and  made  a  counter- 
attack, for  our  dead  and  the  German  dead  lay 
pell  mell  round  this  iron  monster.  I  crawled 
inside  and  found  the  interior  a  mass  of  mangled 
machinery,  cartridge  belts  and  Hotchkiss  shells. 
.  .  .  The  curious  part  of  visiting  H.M.S.  Corunna 
was  this — I  was  able  to  write  a  description  of  the 
Tanks  which  the  French  Military  Censor  immedi- 
ately passed,  so  that  the  first  account  of  them 
did  not  come  from  the  correspondents  attached 
to  the  British  Army,  but  from  those  attached 
to  the  French.  Passing  along  the  ridge  from 
Combles  to  Hardicourt,  I  discovered  another  of 
our  dying  Tanks  which  had  fallen  in  a  gallant 
attack  on  the  village.  The  shell-fire  was  too 
heavy  for  me  to  approach,  so  I  could  collect  no 
souvenirs  from  it." 

Yours  very  sincerely 

ASHMEAD    BARTLETT. 


APPENDIX  II 

PROGRAMME    OF  TANK   DISPLAY  AT   OLDBURY 
ON   MARCH   3RD,    1917 


SECRET. 


MINISTRY  OF  MUNITIONS.       MINISTERE  DES  MUNITIONS. 


Makoh  3rd,  1917. 


Demonstration 

OF 

EXPERIMENTAL 
TANKS. 


Owing  to  the  Confidential  Nature 
of  this  Pamphlet,  visitors  are  par- 
ticularly requested  to  return  it  to 
the  Officer  stationed  at  the  Gate 
before  leaving. 

A.  G.  STERN, 
Lieut. -Colonel, 
Director -General  W.M.S.D. 


Lb  3  Maes,  1917. 


Seance  de  Demonstration 

DB 

DIVERS   TYPES 
DE   TANKS. 


Ce  Programme  est  confidentiel, 
et  il  est  particulierement  recom- 
mand6  de  le  remettre  a  la  sortie  a 
TOfficier  de  Garde. 

A.  G.  STERN, 
Lieut.-Colonel, 
Directeur-Qeneral  M.W.S.D. 


Particulars  of  Arrangements, 


The  Tanks  will  line  up  in 
front  of  the  Stand  for  General 
Inspection  and  Examination. 


The  Tanks  will  leave  for  end 
of    field,    and   having    lined    up 


PROGRAMME. 


Les  "  Tanks  "  seront  assem- 
blies en  face  du  Pavilion  pour 
une  inspection  generate. 

Les  "  Tanks  "  se  mettront  en 
marche  pour  un  rassemblement 
a    l'extremite    du    champ,    au 


255 


256 


APPENDIX    II 


there,  will  start  simultaneously 
and  cross  the  trenches,  finally 
returning  to  the  starting-point. 

Various  Tanks  will  navigate 
the  large  Shell  Holes  in  front  of 
the  Stand. 


point  de  depart.  Partant  de 
ce  point  les  "  Tanks  "  feront  la 
traversee  des  tranchees  et  re- 
viendront  au  point  de  depart. 

Plusieurs  "  Tanks  "  feront  la 
traversee  des  "  entonnoirs  "  en 
face  du  Pavilion. 


Visitors  are  requested  to  leave 
the  Ground  not  later  than  3 
o'clock. 

The  special  train  for  London 
will  leave  at  3.15  p.m. 


Les  Visiteurs  sont  pries  de 
quitter  le  champ  au  plus  tard  a 
3  hr. 

Le  train  pour  Londres  partira 
a  3  hr.  15. 


Types  Distinguishing  colours 

1.  Original  Standard  Machine        BLACK  (Noir). 

2.  Tritton  Chaser       GREEN  (Vert). 

3.  Williams-Janney  Hydraulic      SKY  BLUE  (Azur). 

4.  Wilson  Epicyclic WHITE  (Blanc). 

5.  Daimler  Petrol-Electric       RED  (Rouge). 

6.  Westinghouse  Petrol-Electric     YELLOW  (Jaune). 

7.  Wilkms's  Multiple  Clutch  PINK  (Rose). 

8.  Gun-carrying  Machine 


LIST  OF  OFFICIALS   PRESENT   AT  DEMONSTRATION 
AT  OLDBURY,  MARCH   3,    1917. 


General  Anley. 
Lieut.  Anderson. 
M.  Breton. 
General  Bingham. 
General  Butler. 
Commander  Boris. 
Lieut.-Commander  Barry. 
Major  Brockiiank. 
M.  Brillie. 
Lieut    Broglie 


Lieut.  Brandon. 
L.  W.  Blanchard. 
Captain  Bussell. 
Lieut.  W.  Bray. 
Captain  Boulton. 
Pay-Master  Bird. 
Colonel  Courage. 
C.  M.  Carter,  Esq. 
Dugald  Clerk,  Esq. 
Lieut. -Colonel  Challeat. 


APPENDIX  II 


257 


M.  Crochat. 

m.  de  la  chatjme. 

Captain  Charteris. 

Lieut.  Cuddy. 

General  Dessino. 

Lieut. -Colonel  Deslandres. 

Lieut. -Colonel  Doumenc. 

Captain  Depoix. 

M.  Dupont. 

A.  Day,  Esq. 

Dudley  Docker,  Esq. 

Dudley  Docker,  Jnr. 

General  Estienne. 

Sir  E.  d'Eyncourt. 

Commodore  Everett. 

Sir.  L.  Worthington  Evans. 

Colonel  Elles. 

Captain  Edwards,  R.N. 

Major  Garrick. 

Major  Greg. 

A.  P.  Griffiths,  Esq. 

Lieut.  Grossmith. 

Lieut.  Gordon. 

Captain  Hope,  R.N. 

Colonel  Sir  M.  Hankey. 

Colonel  Haynes. 

Captain  Holden. 

Captain  Hatfield. 

G.  H.  Humphries,  Esq. 

Lieut.  Hubert. 

General  de  Jongh. 

Captain  de  Jarney. 

Colonel  James. 

General  Kiggell. 

comte  de  chasseloup  laubat. 

Colonel  Lannowe. 

Captain  Leisse. 

Colonel  Hardross  Lloyd. 

Lieut.  R.  Levaique. 

General  F.  B.  Maurice. 

Slr  E.  Moir. 


Colonel  Milman. 

Commander  McGrath. 

J.  Masterton  Smith,  Esq. 

C.  H.  Merz,  Esq. 

M.  Mantoux. 

Captain  Michel. 

Lieut. -Commander  Nogues. 

Colonel  Noot. 

General  Vicomte  de  la  Pan- 

ouse. 
Colonel  Lord  Percy. 
Sir  C.  Parsons. 
Lieut. -Commander  Perrin. 
Lieut.  Robertson. 
Lieut.  Rendle. 
H.  R.  Ricardo,  Esq. 
General  Sir  Herbert  Smith. 
Commandant  Seneschal. 
M.  Sabatier. 
Captain  Sanderson. 
Captain  Symes. 
Colonel  Symon. 
Colonel  Stern. 
Lieut.  Shaw. 
Captain  Stevens. 
Colonel  Searle. 
F.  Skeens,  Esq. 

E.  Squires,  Esq. 
Sir  W.  Tritton. 
Captain  Trelawnay. 
Lieut.  Thornycroft. 
P.  Turner,  Esq. 

F.  J.  Todd,  Esq. 
Captain  Vyvyan,  R.N. 
Lieut. -Commander  Velpry. 
General  Sir  R.  D.  Whigham. 
Sir  Glyn  West. 

Sir  John  Weir. 
A.  Wilson,  Esq. 
Major  Wilson. 
Lieut.  Weston. 


258 


APPENDIX   II 


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APPENDIX  II 


259 


STANDARD  MARK  IV. 


Standard  Machine  No.  1. 


Type  Normal. 


Description.  —  This  is  the 
Standard  machine  that  has 
been  used  in  France,  with 
the  exception  of  a  few  minor 
modifications  and  the  dis- 
carding of  the  tail. 

Power  Unit. — One  6  cylinder 
105  B.h.p.  Daimler  engine, 
running  at  1000  r.p.m. 

Transmission.  —  The  drive  is 
taken  from  the  engine  by  a 
clutch,  through  a  two -speed 
and  reverse  gear  box,  to 
worm  gear  and  differential 
driving  a  cross  shaft;  thence 
it  is  taken  to  each  track  by 
independent  two-speed  gears 
and  chain  to  a  counter  shaft 
on  which  are  mounted  two 
gear  wheels  engaging  with  the 
track  driving  sprockets 


Ce  type  de  machine  est  celui 
dont  nous  nous  sommes  servis 
depuis  son  introduction,  mais 
avec  quelques  modifications, 
dont  la  supression  des  deux 
roues  directrices  est  la  plus 
importante. 

Le  moteur  est  a  six  cylindres  de 
cent  cinq  chevaux  a  mille 
tours  par  minute.  Systeme 
Daimler. 

Transmission. — La  puissance  du 
moteur  passe  par  moyen  d'un 
embrayage  ordinaire  et  un 
changement  de  vitesse  double 
avec  marche  en  arriere,  a  un 
engrenage  a  vis  sans  fin  et 
avec  differentiel,  dont  l'axe 
est  dispose  a  travers  la  ma- 
chine. Cet  axe  porte  a  chaque 
bout  deux  roues  dentees  for- 
mant  un  changement  de  vi- 
tesse a  double  effet.     De  la, 


260 


APPENDIX   II 


Speed  Control. — This  transmis- 
sion provides  for  four  speeds 
forward  and  two  reverse,  but 
necessitates  the  stopping  of 
the  machine  in  order  to  change 
gear. 


Steering. — The  steering  is  carried 
out  by  braking  one  or  other 
side  of  the  cross  shaft  when 
the  differential  lock  is  out,  or 
by  the  independent  use  of 
the  secondary  two-speed  gears. 


Estimated  Speeds. — 
1st  gear,    J  of  a  mile  per  hour. 
2nd     ,,     1 1  miles  per  hour. 
3rd      „     2       „ 
4th      „     4 


Armour. — The  machine  is  pro- 
tected by  armour-plate  vary- 
ing from  6  to  12  mm.  in 
thickness. 

Armament. — Tliis  consists  of 
either  of  two  short  6-pounder 
23  calibre  Q.F.  guns,  and  four 
Lewis  guns,  or  of  six  Lewis 
guns. 


Weight.— The  weight  of  this 
machine  complete  is  about  26 
tons. 

Weight,  horse  power  ratio, 
555  lbs.  per  h.p. 


une  chaine  transmet  l'effort 
a  deux  roues  dentees  qui  s'en- 
gagent  avec  les  roues  dentees 
des  deux  chenilles  qui  se 
trouvent  une  a  chaque  cote 
de  la  machine.  Cela  donne 
a  quatre  vitesses  en  avant, 
et  deux  en  arriere,  mais  l'arret 
du  mouvement  de  la  machine 
est  necessaire  pour  le  change- 
ment  de  vitesse. 
Direction. — La  direction  se  fait 
par  le  freinage  de  la  chenille 
d'un  cote  ou  de  1'autre  pen- 
dant que  le  differentiel  est 
debloqu6,  ou  par  l'emploi  in- 
dependant  des  deux  change- 
ments  supplementaires,  avec 
le  differentiel  bloque. 
Vitesses  Calcul6es. — 

Ire  Vitesse  1-206  kilometres  a 

l'heure. 
2me  Vitesse  2-418  kilometres  a 

l'heure. 
3me  Vitesse  3-219  kilometres  a 

l'heure. 
4me  Vitesse  6-437  kilometres  a 

l'heure. 
Blindage. — Le    blindage    est    de 
6   mm.    a    12   mm.   selon    la 
position. 

Armement. — II  y  a  deux  types 
de  cette  machine  dont  un  est 
arme  de  deux  petits  canons 
a  tir  rapide  portant  un  obus 
de  2-724  kilos,  et  deux  mitrail- 
leuses Lewis,  et  1'autre,  de  six 
mitrailleuses  Lewis  seulement. 

Lo  poids  complet  est  de  26,390 
kilos. 

Poids  du  Tank  pour  un  cheval 
vapour,  252  kilogs. 

Lorsquo  les  deux  chenilles  por- 
tent sur  une  longuour  d'en- 
viron  1  m.  50,  le  poids  pour 
centimetre  carre  est  do  1 
kilog.  600.  Enfoncce  dans  la 
boue  lo  poids  pour  centimetre 
carr6  est  do  400  grammes 
environ. 


APPENDIX   II 


261 


Track  Pressure. — 

Maximum  (5  ft.  ground 
line)  23-1  lbs.  per  sq.  in. 

Minimum  (20  ft.  ground 
line)  5-8  lbs.  per  sq.  in. 


Maximum  poids  supporte  par 
la  chenille  d'une  longueur 
1-524  metres  sur  terre  dure 
par  centimetre  carre  1-6  kilos. 
Enfoncee  dans  la  boue  jus- 
qu'a  6-1  metres  *4  kilos  par 
centimetre  carre. 


TRITTON  CHASER. 


Tritton's  Light  Machine, 
No.  2  (E.M.B.) 

Description. — This  machine  is  an 
attempt  at  meeting  the  re- 
quirements of  the  military 
authorities       for       a       light 


Machine  Legere.    Systeme 
Tritton. 


Cette  machine  est  un  essai  pour 
remplir  toutes  les  conditions 
demandees  par  l'etat-major 
pour   une   vitesse   de   marc  he 


262 


APPENDIX   II 


machine  capable  of  maintain- 
ing    higher    speeds    than    the 
Standard  machine.       Its  twin 
engine  transmission  is  worthy 
of  note. 
Power    Unit. — The    power    unit 
consists  of  two  4-cylinder  50 
h.p.  Tylor  engines. 
Transmission. — (One  set  for  each 
track.)     The    drive    is    taken 
from  the  engine  by  a  clutch 
and    four-speed    and    reverse 
sliding  gear  box  to  worm  gear 
driving  a  divided  cross  shaft, 
thence  by  chain  to  the  rear 
driving    sprocket    as    in    the 
Standard  machine.     A  differ- 
ential   lock    is    provided    by 
sliding    dog    clutches    on    the 
divided  cross  shaft. 
Speed  Control. — The  gear  on  this 
machine  can  be  changed  while 
the  machine  is  in  motion,  by 
operating  first   one   gear   and 
then  the  other. 
Steering. — The  steering  is  carried 
out  by  throttle  control  of  the 
two  engines.     The  engine  on 
the  side   opposite  to  that  to 
which  it  is  desired  to  turn  is 
accelerated,    and     the     other 
throttled. 
Estimated  Speeds. — 

1st  gear,  If  miles  per  hour. 
2nd     „     2J        „ 
3rd      „     4 

4th      ,,      7£         „  „ 

Armour. — Tho  vital  portions  of 
this  machine  are  armoured 
with  9  mm.  plate,  those  not 
directly  exposed  to  enemy's 
fire  being  protected  by  6  mm. 
plate. 
Armament. — The  armament  con- 
sists of  one  Lewis  gun  in  a 
gun  turret. 
Weight. — Tho  weight  of  this 
machine  complete  is  about  12 
ton  i. 

Weight,  horse  power  ratio, 
268-8  lbs.  per  h.p. 


plus  considerable  que  celle 
du  type  normal. 
Transmission. — La  transmission 
a  moteurs  jumeaux  est  digne 
d'attention.  Ces  moteurs  sont 
a  quatre  cylindres,  systeme 
Tylor,  d'une  puissance  de  60 
chevaux  chaque.  Chaque 
transmission  se  fait  par  em- 
bray  age  et  changement  nor- 
mal a  quatre  vitesses  et  avec 
vis  sans  fin.  Les  deux  arbres 
de  ces  engrenages  sont  dis- 
poses trans versalement  la  ma- 
chine, et  sont  engag6s  comme 
dans  la  machine  normale, 
avec  les  chenilles.  II  y  a  un 
manchon  pour  accoupler  les 
arbres,  ce  qui  reproduit  le 
differentiel  de  la  machine  nor- 
male. II  est  possible  de 
changer  la  vitesse  de  la  ma- 
chine sans  arret  au  moyen 
des  deux  changements,  qu'on 
doit  manipuler  l'un  apres 
l'autre. 
Direction. — La  direction  se  fait 
par  l'intermediaire  des  deux 
soupapes  a  papillons  qui  for- 
ment  un  mecanism  a  actions 
solidaires.  L'acc616ration  du 
moteur  a  gauche  fait  tourner 

la  machine  a  droite,   et  vice 

versa. 
Vitesse  de  marche. — 

Ire     Vitesse     If     milles     par 
heuro  =     2-815  kilometres. 

2me    Vitesse     2£    milles    par 
heure  —  4-023  kilometres. 

3me     Vitesse     4     milles     par 
heure  =  6-437  kilomotres. 

4me    Vitesse    7  J    milles    par 
heuro  =  12-079  kilometres. 
Blindage. — Les     parties     vitales 

sont  protegees  par  un  blindage 

de  9  mm.  et  les  autres  parties 

par  un  do  6  mm. 
Armement. — Uno       mitraillouse 

Lewis   est   montee   dans   une 

tourollo  au-dossus  do  la  ma- 

cliino. 


APPENDIX   II 


263 


Track  Pressure. — 

Maximum  (4  ft.  ground  line) 
13-6  lbs.  per  sq.  in. 

Minimum  (17  ft.  2  in.  ground 
line)  3-2  lbs.  per  sq.  in. 


Poids.—  9,136  kilos. 

Poids  par  cheval,  90-8  kilos. 

Pour  une  portee  de  1  m.  15  le 
poids  est  de  76  kilogs.  par 
centimetre  carre  de  chenille 
qui  est  reduit  a  175  grammes 
lorsque  la  portee  5  met.  25. 


WILLIAMS-JANNEY  HYDRAULIC   GEAR. 


Williams-  Janney 
Hydraulic  Machine,  No.  3. 

Description. — This  machine  is 
fitted  with  the  Williams - 
Janney  hydraulic  transmis- 
sion, in  which  the  working 
fluid  is  oil.  The  pumps  and 
motors  work  on  the  same 
principle,  being  of  rotary  type 
with  cylinders  parallel  to  the 
axis  of  rotation.  Recipro- 
cating motion  is  given  to  the 
pistons  by  means  of  a  disc 
whose  perpendicular  axis  may 
be  inclined  to  the  shaft.     By 


Systeme  Williams- Janney. 

La  machine  fonctionne  par  l'in- 
termediaire  de  l'huile  sous 
pression.  Les  pompes  et  les 
moteurs,  dont  il  y  a  une 
paire  pour  chaque  chenille 
sont  identiques.  Les  cylin- 
dres  sont  disposes  autour,  et 
avec  leurs  axes  parallels  a 
l'axe  de  revolution  de  l'essieu. 
Le  mouvement  va  et  vient  des 
pistons  de  la  pompe  se  produit 
par  l'inclinaison,  d'un  dia- 
phragme  sur  lequel  aboutent 
les  bielles. 


264 


APPENDIX   II 


varying  the  inclination  of  this 
disc  to  the  shaft,  the  stroke 
and  consequently  the  delivery 
of  the  pumps  may  be  altered 
as  occasion  demands.  The 
stroke  of  the  motors  is  invari- 
able. 

Power  Unit. — The  power  unit 
consists  of  single  six -cylinder 
105  B.h.p.  Daimler  engine. 

Transmission. — This  is  hydraulic. 
The  two  pumps  are  arranged 
side  by  side  and  are  driven 
from  the  engine  by  means  of 
a  reduction  gear,  giving  a 
four-to-one  reduction.  The 
two  motors  transmit  the  drive 
through  bevel  gear  and  a 
single  spur  reduction  gear  to  a 
wide  gear  wheel  arranged  in 
between  the  track-driving 
sprockets. 

Speed  Control. — The  speed  con- 
trol is  infinitely  variable  and 
is  carried  out  by  varying  the 
inclination  of  the  discs  in  the 
pumps. 

Steering. — The  steering  is  carried 
out  by  increasing  the  stroke 
of  the  pump  on  the  side 
opposite  to  that  to  which  it 
is  desired  to  turn. 

Estimated  Speeds. — The  speed  is 
infinitely  variable  from  zero 
to  four  miles  per  hour. 

Armour. — Same  as  No.  1. 

Armament. — Same  as  No.  1. 

Weight. — The  weight  of  this 
machine  complete  is  about 
28  tons. 

Weight,  horse  power  ratio, 
597  lbs.  per  h.p. 

Track  Pressure. — 

Maximum     (5     ft.     ground 
line)  24-9  lbs.  por  sq.  in. 

Minimum     (20     ft.     ground 
line)  G-2  lbs.  per  sq.  in. 


La  changement  de  Tangle  de  ce 
diaphragme  controle  la  quan- 
tite  d'huile  livree  par  la 
pompe,  car  la  course  des  pis- 
tons est  variable,  et  controle 
aussi  le  sens  de  la  marche,  et 
les  tours  par  minute  de  l'axe 
du  moteur  a  huile  sous  pres- 
sion. 

Moteur. — Le  moteur  a  essence 
est  de  105  chevaux  Daimler. 

Transmission. — La  transmission 
se  fait  comme  il  est  deja  dit. 
Les  pompes  tournent  a  J  de 
vitesse,  c'est-a-dire  a  250  tours. 

Les  Moteurs  hydrauliques  sont 
engages  par  rintermediaire  des 
roues  coniques  avec  les  roues 
dentees  qui  s'engagent  a  leur 
tour  avec  les  chenilles. 

Controle. — La  vitesse  est  con- 
trol par  1'inclinaison  du  dia- 
phragme. La  direction  se  fait 
par  l'acceleration  d'une  che- 
nille ou  de  l'autre,  moyennant 
1'inclinaison  des  diaphragms 
des  pompes. 

Vitesse. — La  vitesse  vario  de  zero 
jusqu'a  6-437  kilometres  k 
l'heure. 

Blindage,  et  Armement  comme  la 
machine  normale. 

Poids. — Environ  2,420  kilos. 

Proportion  271  kilos  par  cheval. 

Pression  par  centimetre  carr6. 
Maximum  1-75  kilos. 
Minimum  -45  kilos. 


APPENDIX   II 


265 


WILSON'S  EPIGYGLIG  TRANSMISSION. 


HlOS3 


Wilson's   Epicyclic   Gear 
Machine,  No.  4  (E.M.E.) 

Description. — This  transmission 
has  been  designed  to  give  as 
its  chief  object  better  steering 
control,  and  secondly,  to  do 
away  with  the  large  worm 
reduction  gear  as  used  on  the 
Standard  machine.  The  trans- 
mission is  epicyclic  only  in  so 
far  as  the  epicyclic  principle 
is  employed  to  give  good  steer- 
ing control  without  the  use  of 
a  clutch,  combined  with  re- 
duction gearing. 

Power  Unit. — The  power  unit 
consists  of  a  single  six-cylinder 
105  B.h.p.  Daimler  engine. 

Transmission.  —  The  drive  is 
taken  from  the  engine  by  a 
clutch  and  four-speed  and 
reverse  sliding  gear  box  to  a 
bevel  driven  cross  shaft ;  thence 
it    is    taken    to    each    track, 


Systeme  Planetaire 
Wilson. 


Ce  systeme  est  destine  pre- 
mierement  a  augmenter  la 
facilit6  du  controle,  et  & 
supprimer  la  grande  caisse 
avec  roue  helico'idale  de  la 
machine  normale. 

Le  systeme  planetaire  est  em- 
ploye seulement  pour  la  faci- 
lity de  controle,  et  pour  la 
combinaison  avec  une  reduc- 
tion de  vitesse  rendue  possible 
et  non  pour  un  changement 
de  vitesse. 

Le  moteur  est  de  six  cylindres 
105  chevaux  Daimler. 

Transmission. — La  transmission 
se  fait  par  le  moyen  d'un 
embrayage  ordinaire  et  un 
changement  a  quatre  vitesses ; 
un  engrenage  a  roues  coniques, 
oil  se  trouve  l'appareil  pour  la 
marche  en  arriere  (ce  qui  donne 


266 


APPENDIX   II 


through  an  epicyclic  reduction 
gear  independently  operated 
by  means  of  a  brake,  and  by 
chain,  to  a  divided  cross  shaft 
on  which  is  mounted  a  pinion 
engaging  with  a  central  gear 
wheel  between  the  road  chain 
driving  sprockets.  A  differ- 
ential effect  is  obtained  by 
means  of  dog  clutches  on  the 
divided  cross  shaft. 

Speed  Control. — This  transmis- 
sion provides  four  forward 
speeds  and  one  reverse,  to 
operate  any  of  which  it  is 
necessary  to  stop  the  machine. 

Steering. — The  steering  is  carried 
out  by  operating  independently 
the  epicyclic  reduction  gear 
brakes. 

Estimated  Speeds. — 

1st  gear,    £  of  a  mile  per  hour. 
2nd    ,,     l|  miles  per  hour. 
3rd     „     2 
4th     „     4  „         „ 

Armour. — Same  as  No.  1. 

Armament. — Same  as  No.  1. 

Weight. — The  weight  of  this 
machine  complete  is  about 
26  tons. 

Weight,  horse  power  ratio, 
555  lbs.  per  h.p. 

Track  Pressure. — 

Maximum  (5  ft.  ground  line) 
23-1  lbs.  per  sq.  in. 

Minimum     (20    ft.     ground 
line)  5-8  lbs.  per  sq.  in. 


par  consequence  quatre  vi- 
tesses  en  arriere),  et  enfin, 
par  un  essieu  transversal.  A 
chaque  bout  de  cet  essieu  se 
trouve  une  roue  dentee,  qui 
s'engage  avec  l'anneau  ex- 
terieur  du  systeme  planetaire, 
une  chaine  communique  l'ef- 
fort  a  la  chenille  avec  quelques 
modifications  de  la  machine 
normale. 

Le  differentiel  est  supprime  et 
toute  la  puissance  du  moteur 
se  porte  sur  l'autre  chenille. 
C'est  dans  cette  maniere  que 
la  direction  se  fait. 

Vitesse  Calcul6e. — 

Ire   Vitesse    1-206   kilometres 

par  heure. 
2me    Vitesse    2-1     kilometres 

par  heure. 
3me    Vitesse    4-0    kilometres 

par  heure. 
4me    Vitesse    6-8    kilometres 
par  heure. 

Blindage. — Armement  et  Poids 
les  memes  que  dans  la  nor- 
male. 


APPENDIX   II 


267 


DAIMLER  PETROL-ELECTRIC. 


Daimler  Petrol-Electric 
Machine,  No.  5  (E.M.F.) 


Machine  electrique 
Daimler. 


Description. — The  chief  feature 
of  this  transmission  is  the 
entire  absence  of  controllers 
and  external  wiring,  except 
for  the  main  leads  from  the 
generator  to  the  motors.  The 
control  is  entirely  effected  by 
shifting  the  brush  position  on 
the  generator  and  motors, 
arrangements  being  made  to 
prevent  excessive  sparking. 

Power  Unit. — This  consists  of  a 
six-cylinder  Daimler  engine 
fitted  with  aluminium  pistons 
and  a  lighter  flywheel.  The 
normal  speed  is  1400  r.p.m. 

Transmission. — A  single  gener- 
ator coupled  direct  with  the 
engine  supplies  current  to  two 
motors  in  series.  The  inde- 
pendent control  of  each  motor 


Le  trait  le  plus  remarquable  de 
cette  transmission  est  la  sup- 
pression du  controle  et  des 
fils  exterieurs,  sauf  les  con- 
ducteurs  entre  dynamos  et 
moteurs. 

Controle. — Le  contr61e  est  en- 
tierement  gouverne  par  le 
mouvement  des  balais  autour 
de  leurs  collecteurs,  et  sans 
aucun  crachement  au  balais. 

Le  moteur  est  a  essence  avec 
pistons  en  aluminium,  et  un 
volant  plus  leger.  La  vitesse 
normale  est  de  1,400  tours  par 
minute. 

Transmission. — Une  dynamo  ac- 
couplee  au  moteur  fournit 
l'energie  a  deux  moteurs  elec- 
triques  en  s6rie.  Le  controle 
independant  des  moteurs  elec- 


268 


APPENDIX   II 


is  accomplished  by  shifting 
the  brushes.  Each  motor 
drives  through  a  two -speed 
gear  box  to  a  worm  reduction 
gear  and  from  thence  through 
a  further  gear  reduction  to 
the  sprocket  wheels  driving 
the  road  chain  driving  wheels. 
A  differential  lock  is  obtained 
by  connecting  the  two  worm 
wheel  shafts  by  a  dog  clutch. 

Speed  Control. — The  speed  is  in- 
finitely variable  within  limits 
and  is  controlled  by  shifting 
the  brushes  on  the  generator 
and  motors,  the  engine  run- 
ning at  a  governed  speed  of 
1400  r.p.m. 

Steering. — The  steering  is  carried 
out  by  means  of  the  brush 
control  on  the  motors. 

Estimated  Speeds. — This  varies 
from  zero  to  four  miles  per 
hour. 

Armour. — Same  as  No.  1. 

Armament. — Same  as  No.  1. 

Weight. — The  weight  of  this 
machine  complete  is  about 
28  tons. 

Weight,  horse  power  ratio, 
501-8  lbs.  per  h.p. 

Track  Pressure. — 

Maximum  (5  ft.  ground  line) 
24-9  lbs.  per  sq.  in. 

Minimum     (20     ft.     ground 
line)  6-1  lbs.  per  sq.  in. 


triques  se  fait  par  le  mouve- 
ment  des  balais. 

Chaque  moteur  fait  marcher, 
par  rintermediaire  d'un  double 
changement  de  vitesse,  une 
reduction  a  vis  sans  fin,  et 
encore  une  reduction  avec  les 
roues  dentees  de  la  chenille. 

L'action  differentielle  est  ob- 
tenue  par  la  deplacement  d'un 
manchon  d'accouplement  entre 
des  deux  vis  sans  fin. 

La  vitesse  varie  de  zero  a  6-437 
kilometres. 

La  direction  se  donne  par  le 
changement  de  vitesse  des 
deux  chenilles,  selon  l'explica- 
tion  donnee  ci-dessus. 

Blindage. — Armement,  comnie  le 
type  normale. 

Poids  —  28,420  kilos. 

Proportion,  227  kilos  par  cheval. 

Pression  par  centimetre  carre. 
Maximum  1-70. 
Minimum  -43. 


APPENDIX   II 


269 


BRITISH  WESTINGHOUSE  PETROL-ELECTRIC. 


British  Westinghouse 

Petrol-Electric  Machine, 

No.  6  (E.M.G.) 

Description. — In  this  transmis- 
sion two  separate  sets  con- 
sisting of  generator  and  motor 
are  used,  the  two  generators 
being  driven  in  tandem  from 
the  forward  end  of  the  engine ; 
one  exciter  being  used  for 
both  generators. 

Power  Unit. — The  power  unit 
consists  of  the  Standard  six- 
cylinder  Daimler  engine,  run- 
ning at  1200  r.p.m. 

Transmission. — Each  generator 
provides  current  for  its  own 
motor,  which  drives  its  track 
by  double  reduction  spur  gear 
and  chain  drive  to  a  counter 
shaft,  on  which  is  mounted  a 
pinion  engaging  with  a  gear 


Machine  electrique  British 
Westinghouse. 


Dans  cette  machine  il  y  a  deux 
installations  independantes 
composees  chacune  d'un  dyna- 
mo et  un  moteur,  pour  chaque 
chenille.  Une  seule  dynamo 
excitatrice  sert  pour  les  deux 
installations.  Les  deux  dyna- 
mos sont  installees  en  "  serie," 
devant  le  moteur  Daimler  a 
105  chevaux,  qui  est  semblablo 
a  celui  de  la  machine  normale. 

Chaque  dynamo  transmet  l'ener- 
gie  a  son  propre  moteur  et  par 
l'intermediaire  d'une  double 
reduction  a  roues  dentees,  et 
d'une  chaine,  Peffort  est  trans- 
mis  a  la  roue  dentee  de  la 
chenille. 

Le   controle   variable   est  entre 


270 


APPENDIX   II 


wheel    mounted   between    the 
two  track  sprockets. 

Speed  Control. — The  speed  con- 
trol is  infinitely  variable  be- 
tween limits,  and  is  effected 
by  means  of  rheostats  con- 
trolling the  exciter  currents 
to  the  fields,  reversing  being 
carried  out  by  separate  re- 
versing switches  interlocked 
in  such  a  way  that  the  current 
must  be  cut  off  before  the 
switches  can  be  operated. 

Steering. — The  steering  is  carried 
out  on  this  machine  by  oper- 
ating the  motors  indepen- 
dently. 

Estimated  Speeds. — This  varies 
from  zero  to  four  miles  per 
hour. 

Armour. — Same  as  No.  1. 

Armament. — Same  as  No.  1. 

Weight. — The  weight  of  this 
machine  complete  is  about 
28  tons. 

Weight,  horse  power  ratio, 
545-4  lbs.  per  h.p. 

Track  Pressure. — 

Maximum  (5  ft.  ground  line) 
24-9  lbs.  per  sq.  in. 

Minimum     (20    ft.     ground 
line)  6-2  lbs.  per  sq.  in. 


zero  et  6-437  kilometres  et  se 
fait  par  des  rheostats  con- 
trolant  les  champs  electriques 
des  moteurs.  La  marche  en 
arriere  est  controllee  par  un 
manipulateur  inverseur  inde- 
pendant,  a  actions  solidaris6es, 
de  maniere  qu'il  faut  que  le 
courant  soit  interrompu  avant 
que  l'operation  d'inversion  se 
fasse.  La  direction  se  fait 
par  l'op6ration  independante 
des  moteurs. 

Blindage. — Armement       comme 
machine  normale. 

Poids. — 28,420  kilogrammes. 

Proportion  248  kilos  par  cheval. 

Pression  par  centimetre  carre. 
Maximum  1-70. 
Minimum  *43. 


APPENDIX   II 


271 


WILKINS'S  CLUTCH   GEAR. 


Wilkins's  Clutch  Gear 

System  Machine,  No.  7 

(E.M.H.) 

Description. — This  system  of 
gearing  is  designed  with  the 
object  of  providing  a  better 
and  simpler  control  both  for 
steering  and  for  changing 
gear. 

Power  Unit. — One  six-cylinder 
105  B.h.p.  Daimler  engine 
running  at  1000  r.p.m. 

Transmission. — The  drive  is 
taken  from  the  engine  by  a 
bevel  gear  to  a  cross  shaft; 
at  each  end  of  this  cross  shaft 
is  mounted  a  three -speed  and 
reverse  gear  box  in  which  the 
gears  are  engaged  by  means 
of  clutches  so  constructed  that 
it  is  impossible  to  have  two 
gears  engaged  at  the  same 
time.  Thence  the  drive  is 
taken  by  spur  gearing  to   a 


Systeme  Wilkins,  a 
embrayge. 


Ce  systeme  donne  un  contr61e 
superieur  et  en  meme  temps 
plus  simple,  tant  pour  la 
direction  que  pour  le  change - 
ment  de  vitesse.  Moteur 
Daimler  105  chevaux. 

Transmission. — La  transmission 
est  a  roues  coniques,  avec  axe 
transversal,  a  chaque  bout 
duquel  se  trouve  un  engrenage 
a  trois  vitesses  et  marche  en 
arriere,  dont  les  roues  sont 
engag6es  par  des  embrayages 
a  plaques,  de  maniere  qu'il 
est  impossible  que  deux  em- 
brayages soient  engages  en 
meme  temps.  Dans  cet  ap- 
pareil  l'effort  est  transmis  par 
un  autre  axe  transversal  sur 
lequel  est  mont6  un  pignon, 
qui    s'engage    avec    la    roue 


272 


APPENDIX   II 


divided  cross  shaft,  on  which 
is  mounted  a  pinion  engaging 
with  internally  cut  teeth  in 
the  track-driving  sprocket. 
A  differential  lock  is  obtained 
by  means  of  sliding  dog 
clutches  on  the  divided  cross 
shaft. 

Speed  Control. — This  transmis- 
sion provides  three  forward 
speeds  and  one  reverse,  any 
of  which  may  be  engaged 
whilst  the  machine  is  in 
motion. 

Steering. — The  steering  on  this 
machine  is  carried  out  by  en- 
gaging a  lower  gear  in  the 
gear  box  on  the  side  to  which 
it  is  desired  to  turn. 

Estimated  Speeds. — 

1st  gear,  1*0  mile  per  hour. 
2nd     „     1-9  miles  per  hour, 
orci      ,,     o*y       ,,       ,, 

Armour. — Same  as  No.  1. 

Armament. — Same  as  No.  1. 

Weight. — The  weight  of  this 
machine  complete  is  about 
26  tons. 

Weight,  horse  power  ratio, 
555  lbs.  per  h.p. 

Track  Pressure. — 

Maximum  (5  ft.  ground  line) 
23-1  lbs.  per  sq.  in. 

Minimum     (20    ft.     ground 
line)  5-8  lbs.  per  sq.  in. 


interieurement  dentee  de  la 
chenille. 

L' action  different ielle  est  ob- 
tenue  a  volonte  par  le  displace- 
ment d'un  manchon  d'ac- 
couplement  monte  sur  les 
deux  parties  de  l'axe  qui  passe 
a  travers  la  machine.  II  y  a 
trois  vitesses  en  avant,  et  une 
en  arriere. 

Direction. — La  direction  se  fait 
par  l'engagement  de  l'em- 
brayage  de  la  vitesse  inferieure 
d'un  cote  ou  de  l'autre,  selon 
la  direction  voulue. 

Blindage. — Armement  et  poids, 
et  proportion  de  poids,  aussi 
les  pressions  de  chenilles  sont 
identiques  avec  ceux  de  la 
machine  normale. 


APPENDIX   II 


273 


GUN-CARRYING  MACHINE. 


Gun-Carrying  Machine 
No.  8  (G.C.) 


Machine  porteur  de 
canons,  Systeme  G.C. 


Description. — This  machine  car- 
ries either — 

(a)  One  60-pounder  5-in.  gun 

with  carriage,  wheels 
and  64  rounds  of  am- 
munition, or 

(b)  One    6-in.    howitzer   com- 

plete      with      carriage, 

wheels    and    64    rounds 

of  ammunition. 

Either  gun  can  be  fired  from  the 

machine,  or  can  by  a  special 

slipway  be  unshipped  with  its 

carriage  and  mounted  on  its 

wheels.     This     machine     can 

carry    ammunition    alone    up 

to   130  rounds  of  60-pounder 

ammunition  or  130  rounds  of 

6-in.   howitzer  ammunition. 

Power  Unit. — The  power  unit  on 

this  machine  consists  of  a  single 

T 


Cette  machine  est  capable  do 
transporter  ou  un  canon  por- 
tant  un  obus  de  27-2  kilos, 
125  mm.  complet  avec  affut  de 
canon,  roues  demontees,  et 
64  cartouches,  ou  un  obusier 
de  150  mm.  avec  64  car- 
touches. On  peut  tirer  avec  le 
canon  ou  avec  l'obusier  mont6 
en  place  sur  le  porteur. 

Par  le  moyen  d'un  traineau  la 
piece  peut  etre  enlevee  et 
mise  sur  roues.  La  piece 
enlevee  le  porteur  peut  etre 
charge  de  130  obus. 

Transmission.— La  transmission 
est  tres  semblable  a  celle  de  ce 
machine  No.  1. 

La  vitesse  de  marche  est  celle 
de  la  machine  normale. 

La   direction   se   fait   en   partie 


274 


APPENDIX   II 


six-cylinder  105B.h.p.  Daimler 
engine  running  at  1000  r.p.m. 

Transmission. — The  transmission 
on  this  machine  is  very  similar 
to  that  used  in  the  Standard 
Machine  No.  1. 

The  chief  difference  is  that 
the  track  driving  sprockets 
are  wider  and  stronger,  neces- 
sitating a  corresponding  in- 
crease in  the  width  of  the  track 
links. 

Speed  Control. — The  speed  con- 
trol is  the  same  as  the  Stan- 
dard Machine  No.  1. 

Steering. — The  steering  on  this 
machine  is  carried  out  par- 
tially by  means  of  an  ordinary 
steering  wheel  in  front  of  the 
driver's  seat,  which  operates 
the  wheels  of  the  tail,  which 
is  used  on  this  machine,  and 
partially  by  the  independent 
use  of  the  secondary  gears. 

Estimated  Speeds. — 
1st   gear,    £  of  a  mile  per  hour. 
2nd     ,,     l|  miles  per  hour. 

OTQ.         ,,        Z  ,,  ,, 

4th  „  4  „  „ 
Weight. — The  weight  of  this 
machine  complete  with  either 
gun  or  howitzer  and  ammuni- 
tion is  34  tons.  The  machine 
alone  weighs  25  tons. 

Weight,  horse  power  ratio, 
725  lbs.  per  h.p. 
Track  Pressure. — 

Maximum  (4  ft.  3  in.  ground 
line)  35-5  lbs.  per  sq.  in. 

Mininmm     (25     ft.     ground 
line)  6-0  lbs.  per  sq.  in. 


par  rintermediaire  d'une  direc- 
tion ordinaire  d'auto,  mais  les 
roues  directrices  sont  sur  l'ar- 
riere  de  la  machine  au  lieu 
de  sur  le  devant.  C'est  le 
systeme  qu'on  a  supprim6 
dans  les  premieres  machines 
"  Tanks,"  mais  qu'on  a  trouv6 
tres  necessaire  pour  une  ma- 
chine aussi  longue  que  celle-ci. 

La  direction  est  aidee  par  le 
freinage  d'une  chenille  ou 
l'autre,  selon  la  direction  vou- 
lue. 

Poids. — Charge  canon  ou  obusier. 
— Munitions  et  personelle 
35,000  kilos,  net  25,375  kilos. 

Proportion — Poids  a  puissance 
de  cheval  329  kilos. 

Pression  sur  la  chenille. 

Maximum  2-39  kilos  par  centi- 
metre carre. 
Minimum  -42  kilos  par  centi- 
metre carre. 
Longueur    pour    le    minimum 
poids  7-62  m. 


APPENDIX  III 


275 


3 

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Ph 

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QQ 


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cs 

a 
• 

1  Non-combat- 
ant personnel 
is  composed  of 
Woikshop  per- 
sonnel. 

8  Casualties  are 
those  incurred 
in  action  only. 

D 
01. 

3 

c 
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Ph 

8* 

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109 
1,116 

428 

778 

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Strength. 

7,185 

7,999 
8,798 
8,546 

9,232 

9,873 

11,131 

11,747 

10,731 

11,315 
11,064 

M 

a> 

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1,079 
1,162 
1,194 

1,240 
1,355 
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1,709 

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1,783 
1,783 

1,857 
1,857 

1,869 
1,869 

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6,577 

7,750 
8,335 
8,335 

8,528 
8,860 
9,943 

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10,540 

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1,188 
1,233 
1,233 

1,249 
1,289 
1,439 

1,533 
1,533 

1,628 
1,723 

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is 

cu 

H.Q.  Tank  Corps. 
3  Brigades  including  10  Batts. 
Central  Workshops. 
2  Salvage  Coys. 
1    Coy.   and   2   Sections   G.C. 
Tanks. 

1  Brigade  H.Q. 

2  Batts.,  Central  Stores. 

3  Advanced  Workshops,  No.  2 
Coy.  G.C.  Tanks  Completed. 
Salvage  Coys.Benarued  Tank 
Field  Coys. 

No.  13  Tank  Batt. 

No  change. 

No.    17    (Armed    Car)    Tank 

Batt. 
No.  4  Advanced  Workshops. 
Nos.    1   and   2   Tank   Supply 

Coya. 
No.  14  Tank  Batt.,  Nob.  3,  4 

and  5  Supply  Coys. 
No.    13    Tank    Batt.,    No.    5 

Advanced  Workshops,  H.Q. 

Carrier  TJnits. 
No  change. 
No.  16  Tank  Batt.,  Inspection 

of   Tank    Machinery,    H.Q. 

5th  Tank  Brigade. 
H.Q.  6th  Tank  Brigade. 
No.  18  lank  Batt. 

i 

OS 

A 

Existing 

on 

1st  Jan. 

1918. 

Formed 

during 

January. 

F.  d.  Feb. 
,,     Mar. 
»     Apr. 

ii    May. 
„    June. 
„   July. 

»     Aug. 
„     Sept. 

„     Oct. 

276 


APPENDIX  IV 


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APPENDIX  V 

ARTILLERIE   D'ASSAUT 

A  Short  Sketch  of  the  Development 
of  the  French  Tanks 

The  existence  of  the  French  Tank  Corps  was 
due  to  the  untiring  energy  of  one  man. 

On  December  1st,  1915,  Colonel  Estienne,  then 
commanding  the  6th  French  Divisional  Artillery, 
addressed  a  letter  to  the  Commander-in-Chief  of 
the  French  Armies,  in  which  he  expressed  his  firm 
belief  that  it  was  possible  to  construct  an  engine 
of  war  mechanically  propelled  and  protected  by 
armour  which  would  transport  infantry  and  guns 
over  the  battle-fields  on  the  Western  Front. 

This  was  the  result  of  his  work  through  the 
year  1915,  during  which  time  he  had  seen  Holt 
tractors  in  use  with  British  Artillery  Units. 

On  the  12th  of  December,  1915,  he  was  given 
an  interview  at  G.Q.G.  (French  General  Head- 
quarters), where  he  propounded  his  theories,  and 
on  the  20th  he  visited  Paris  and  discussed 
mechanical  details  with  the  engineers  of  the 
Schneider  firm. 

It  was  not,  however,  until  the  25th  of  February, 
1916,  that  the  Under  Secretary's  Department  for 

277 


278  APPENDIX  V 

Artillery  and  Munitions  decided  to  place  an  order 
for  400  armoured  vehicles  with  the  Schneider 
works. 

Colonel  Estienne,  meanwhile,  returned  to  his 
command,  the  3rd  Corps  Artillery,  before  Verdun, 
but  kept  in  touch  with  the  makers  unofficially. 
Here  he  learned,  on  or  about  the  27th  of  April, 
1916,  that  400  other  armoured  vehicles  of  a 
different  type  had  been  ordered  by  the  Under 
Secretary's  Department.  These  were  the  St. 
diamond  type — a  heavier  machine,  with  petrol- 
electric  motive  force. 

In  June  of  this  year  the  Ministry  of  Munitions, 
which  had  been  created  meanwhile,  decided  to 
have  some  one  to  take  charge  of  construction  and 
early  organisation.  An  area  for  experiment  and 
instruction  was  formed  at  Marly-le-Roi  in  July, 
and,  later,  a  depot  for  the  reception  of  stores  at 
Cercottes,  both  being  under  the  control  of  the 
Ministry. 

On  the  30th  of  September  General  Estienne  was 
gazetted  "  Commandant  de  l'Artilleric  d'Assaut 
aux  Armees,"  and  also  appointed  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief's delegate  to  the  Ministry  of 
Munitions  in  matters  connected  with  Tanks.  He 
thus  became  an  official  connecting  link  between 
the  Armies  in  the  field  and  the  organisation  for 
construction.  The  name  "  Artillerie  d'Assaut," 
with  its  contraction  "  A.S.",  came  into  use  at  this 
time,  "S"  being  used  instead  of  a  second  "A" 
for  the  sake  of  euphony. 

In  October  a  training  centre  within  the  Army 


APPENDIX   V  279 

areas  was  established  at  Champlieu,  on  the 
southern  edge  of  the  Forest  of  Compiegne,  and 
it  was  here  that  the  first  Unit  of  Tanks  arrived 
on  the  1st  of  December,  1916.  It  consisted  of 
sixteen  Schneider  Tanks.  During  the  succeed- 
ing months  Schneider  and  St.  Chamond  Units 
continued  to  arrive  at  irregular  intervals,  and  by 
April  1917  nine  Schneider  Companies  and  one 
St.  Chamond  Company  were  ready  for  operations. 
On  the  16th  of  that  month  they  went  into  action 
in  the  ambitious  attack  over  a  wide  front  on  the 
heights  above  the  Aisne.  The  attack  had  been 
postponed  for  two  days,  and  on  the  16th  the 
enemy's  artillery  was  not  mastered.  Eight 
Schneider  Companies  were  used.  Three  Companies 
were  to  operate  between  the  Craonne  Plateau 
and  the  Miette,  and  five  Companies  between  the 
Miette  and  the  Aisne.  The  operation  was  un- 
successful. The  former  Companies  failed  to  get 
into  action,  and  consequently  suffered  heavy 
losses  from  enemy  artillery  which  overlooked 
their  advance  from  the  heights  of  Craonne 
Plateau.  The  latter  Companies  succeeded  in 
crossing  the  second  line  of  the  enemy's  defence 
and  in  reaching  and  even  passing  the  third  line, 
but  although  they  remained  for  a  considerable 
time  in  front  of  the  infantry,  it  was  impossible 
for  the  infantry  to  follow  them,  owing  to  the  very 
heavy  machine-gun  fire.  At  nightfall  the  Tank 
Companies  were  rallied,  having  sustained  serious 
losses  both  in  machines  and  men.  Bodies  of 
infantry  had  been  specially  detailed  to   escort 


280  APPENDIX   V 

Tanks  and  prepare  paths  for  them,  but  their 
training  with  them  had  been  so  short  that  their 
work  was  either  ineffectual  or  not  done  at  all. 
Of  132  Tanks,  seventy-six  remained  either  ditched 
or  mechanically  unfit  in  or  near  the  enemy's  lines. 
Of  these  fifty-seven  were  totally  destroyed. 

On  the  5th  of  May,  one  St.  Chamond  and  two 
Schneider  Companies  took  part  in  a  hurriedly 
prepared  operation  with  the  6th  Army.  The 
Schneider  Companies  led  the  infantry  in  a  suc- 
cessful attack  on  Laffaux  Mill.  Of  the  sixteen 
St.  Chamond  Tanks  detailed  for  the  action,  one 
only  crossed  a  German  trench. 

Between  May  and  October  an  attack  on  the 
west  of  the  Chemin  des  Dames  was  carefully  pre- 
pared by  the  6th  Army.  Special  infantry  was 
attached  to  the  Tank  Corps  as  "  troupes  d'accom- 
pagnement,"  and  lived  with  Tank  Units.  This 
was  rendered  necessary  by  the  inability  of  the 
Tanks  to  cross  large  trenches  unaided. 

The  left  of  the  attack  was  over  the  same  ground 
as  that  of  the  right  in  the  May  attack.  Five 
Companies  took  part  in  the  operation  under  the 
orders  of  Colonel  Wahl,  who  had  recently  been 
appointed  to  command  the  Artillcric  d'Assaut 
with  the  Army.  The  Schneider  Companies  again 
operated  with  success,  while  of  the  St.  diamonds 
only  one  or  two  reached  the  Plateau.  St. 
diamonds  were  again  employed  a  few  days  later, 
but  afforded  the  infantry  no  support.  Of  the 
Tanks  actually  in  these  two  actions  (sixty-three), 
only  eight  were  hit  by  enemy  artillery.  All  Tanks 


APPENDIX   V  281 

were  salved,  together  with  a  few  lost  in  the 
previous  engagement.  It  was  considered  that 
the  action  of  the  Tanks  had  thoroughly  justified 
their  construction. 

Meanwhile,  General  Estienne  had  been  working 
on  the  development  of  a  lighter  Tank.  This  idea 
of  a  light  Tank  first  came  to  him  after  his  visit  to 
England  in  June  1916,  where  he  had  seen  the 
British  Mark  I.  manoeuvre  at  Birmingham.  His 
report,  written  on  his  return,  clearly  showed 
his  desire  for  a  heavy  Tank  to  have  been  to 
a  great  extent  achieved  in  the  machine  he  had 
seen  in  England.  His  idea  of  a  light  Tank  was 
the  development  of  an  earlier  idea  of  attacking 
with  waves  of  skirmishers  in  open  order,  each 
skirmisher  clad  in  armour  and  armed  with  a  rapid- 
firing  weapon.  He  believed  now  that  the  same 
result  might  be  reached  with  a  light  armoured 
vehicle.  These  views  he  laid  before  the  Renault 
firm  in  July  1916,  and  urged  the  Ministry  to 
accept  his  proposed  light  Tank,  but  without 
success.  Complete  designs  were,  however,  pre- 
pared, and  on  the  27th  of  November,  General 
Estienne  was  able  to  propose  to  the  Commander-in 
in-Chief,  Marshal  Joffre,  the  construction  of  a 
large  number  of  light  Tanks  for  future  operations, 
and  to  inform  him  of  the  existence  of  plans  for 
such  a  Tank;  in  fact,  150  had  already  been 
ordered  as  "  Command  "  Tanks  for  the  heavy 
Battalions.  The  first  trial  was  held  on  the  14th 
of  May,  1917.  Still  the  Ministry  were  not  con- 
vinced, and  it  was  not   until   further  trials  had 


282  APPENDIX   V 

taken  place  in  May  that  an  order  for  1,150  Tanks 
was  confirmed.  In  June  the  number  ordered  was 
raised  to  3,500.  In  this  month  a  new  sub-Depart- 
ment of  the  Ministry  of  Munitions  was  formed  to 
deal  specially  with  Tanks,  and  was  called  "  La 
sous  Direction  d'Artillerie  d'Assaut." 

It  was  the  Battle  of  Cambrai  in  November  1917 
which  finally  convinced  the  Ministry  of  the 
potentialities  of  the  Tank.  Their  opposition 
ceased,  and  in  order  to  accelerate  the  output  the 
firms  of  Renault,  Schneider  and  Berliet  were  all 
engaged  in  the  manufacture  of  these  light  Tanks, 
whilst  negotiations  were  opened  with  America 
for  a  further  supply  of  them  and  an  order  placed 
for  1,200. 

In  December  1917  it  was  decided  to  form  thirty 
light  Tank  Battalions,  of  seventy-five  Tanks  each, 
three  of  which  were  to  be  Wireless  Tanks.  For 
the  purposes  of  secrecy  light  Tank  Units  were 
organised  in  an  auxiliary  park  which  the  Ministry 
established  in  December  within  the  precincts  of 
the  existing  centre  at  Champlieu,  but  it  was  not 
until  the  beginning  of  June  1918  that  the  Armies 
began  to  receive  Battalions  for  operations  at  the 
rate  of  one  per  week. 

Orders  for  the  St.  diamond  and  Schneider 
Tanks,  meanwhile,  were  limited  to  400  of  each 
type.  As  they  became  obsolete  a  heavier  type  of 
Tank  was  designed  (C.A.3),  but  only  one  of  these 
was  built.  A  still  heavier  type,  weighing  forty 
tons,  was  given  a  trial  in  the  grounds  of  the  Forges 
et   Chantiers  dc  la  Mediterrannec  in  December 


APPENDIX   V  283 

1917.  It  was  then  decided  to  build  a  Tank  (2.C.) 
weighing  sixty-two  tons,  which  would  in  all 
probability  reach  seventy  tons  by  the  time  it  was 
finished. 

In  March  1918,  when  the  German  offensive 
began,  all  available  Tanks  were  sent  up  behind 
the  3rd  Army  front  as  counter-attack  troops, 
and  in  this  capacity  took  part  in  minor  operations 
for  possession  of  important  tactical  features,  with 
varied  success.  Altogether  thirty-six  Tanks  were 
employed  in  these  local  operations.  Then,  on 
the  27th  of  May,  the  Germans  launched,  between 
Soissons  and  Reims,  the  attack  which  was  aimed 
at  Paris.  On  the  9th  of  June  it  was  extended  to- 
wards the  north  between  Montdidier  and  Noyon. 
The  attack  that  day  fell  on  the  3rd  Army, 
behind  which  four  heavy  Tank  battalions  were 
in  position.  The  first  and  second  lines  soon  gave 
way,  and  troops  detailed  for  counter-attack  were 
absorbed  in  the  battle.  Reinforcements  were 
hurried  up  on  the  10th,  and  General  Mangin 
launched  his  counter-attack  with  Tanks  and 
tired  infantry  on  the  11th.  The  battle  lasted 
till  the  13th.  In  spite  of  serious  difficulties, 
111  out  of  144  Tanks  started  at  zero  hour. 
Losses  in  machines  were  very  heavy  and  casual- 
ties in  personnel  reached  50  per  cent.  Owing  to 
the  good  going,  however,  Tanks  were  able  to 
outdistance  the  infantry  and  succeeded  in  in- 
flicting a  heavy  blow  on  the  enemy.  His  offensive 
at  this  point  was  definitely  broken. 

The  St.  Chamond  and  Schneider  Tanks  were 


284  APPENDIX   V 

now  becoming  rapidly  worn  out,  and  as  further 
construction  of  these  types  had  ceased,  their 
maintenance  became  more  difficult.  In  the 
action  of  June  11th  they  were  at  their  zenith. 
From  that  date  onwards  they  continued  to 
fight  until  they  dropped  by  the  wayside,  and 
gradually  heavy  units  ceased  to  exist,  or  were 
amalgamated  with  the  light.  Finally,  two  Bat- 
talions were  armed  with  the  British  Mark  V. 
Star,  but  these  Battalions  never  went  into  action. 

To  meet  the  attack  on  May  27th,  it  had  been 
decided  to  use  all  available  means,  and  two 
Battalions  of  Renault  Tanks  were  hurried  up  by 
road  to  the  north-eastern  fringes  of  the  Forest 
of  Villers  Cotterets  from  Champlieu,  although 
they  were  intended  originally  solely  for  use  in 
attack.  On  the  31st  of  May  they  first  went  into 
action,  two  Companies  working  with  Colonial 
infantry  on  the  Plateau  east  of  Cravancon  Farm. 
From  this  date  to  the  15th  of  June  these  two 
Battalions  continued  to  act  on  the  defensive  with 
tired  infantry.  Nevertheless,  they  succeeded  in 
preventing  a  further  advance  of  the  German 
Armies. 

By  the  15th  of  June  reinforcements  had  arrived, 
and  operations  were  carried  out  up  to  the  end  of 
the  month  which  enabled  the  line  to  be  straight- 
ened out  and  starting-points  gained  for  any  future 
offensive  on  a  large  scale.  Eighty-five  Renault 
Tanks  were  engaged  during  the  latter  part  of 
June. 

The  next  and  last  attempt  of  the  Germans  to 


APPENDIX   V  285 

break  through  the  Allied  line  was  launched  be- 
tween Chateau  Thierry  and  Reims  on  the  15th 
of  July.  The  attack  was  awaited  with  feverish 
excitement.  First  the  probability  of  an  im- 
pending attack  in  this  sector  became  known, 
then  its  boundaries,  and  finally  the  actual  zero 
hour.  When  the  attack  was  launched  its  weight 
was  wasted  on  evacuated  trenches,  and  it  failed 
completely.  The  moment  for  the  counter-attack 
had  arrived,  and  all  available  Tank  Units,  heavy 
and  light,  were  hurried,  by  road  and  rail,  to  the 
west,  south-west,  and  eastern  sides  of  the  salient 
between  Soissons  and  Reims. 

The  counter-attack  was  launched  on  the  18th 
of  July  with  a  view  to  cutting  off  the  salient,  and 
Tank  Units  in  varying  numbers  were  employed 
with  each  of  the  three  Armies  engaged. 

In  the  10th  Army  area  an  advance  of  five  to 
six  kilometres  was  made,  with  Tanks  always  in 
the  van  of  the  rapidly-tiring  infantry.  On  the 
first  day,  out  of  324  Tanks  available  223  were 
engaged.  On  the  succeeding  day  this  number 
was  reduced  to  105.  One  hundred  were  again 
available  for  action  on  the  21st.  Altogether, 
during  the  five  days'  fighting,  216  Schneider  and 
131  St.  diamond  and  220  Renault  Tanks  fought 
actions,  and  of  this  number  180  were  lost,  while 
the  casualties  in  personnel  were  819. 

In  the  6th  Army  area  an  advance  of  twenty 
kilometres  was  made  during  seven  days'  opera- 
tion, and  forty-three  St.  Chamond  and  230 
Renault    Tanks    fought    actions.      Losses    were 


286  APPENDIX   V 

much  less  serious  owing  to  the  German  ten- 
dency to  retire,  fifty-eight  Tanks  only  being 
disabled,  while  there  were  seventy-five  casualties. 
The  6th  Army  was  afterwards  withdrawn  from 
this  front  owing  to  the  shortening  of  the  line, 
and  next  appears  with  the  Grand  Army  of 
Flanders. 

In  the  5th  Army  area  ninety  Light  Tanks 
fought  actions.  Among  these  was  a  minor  opera- 
tion in  conjunction  with  Units  of  the  22nd 
British  Corps  astride  the  Ardre  River. 

This  operation  had  tremendous  influence  on 
succeeding  operations  owing  to  the  eagerness 
with  which  infantry  commanders  clamoured  for 
Tank  Units,  and  the  consequent  speeding  up  of 
training  and  turning  out  of  new  Battalions. 

From  this  time  new  Battalions  were  made 
available  for  the  forward  area  at  the  rate  of  one 
per  week;  thus  tired  Battalions  withdrawn  on 
the  23rd  and  27th  July  could  almost  immediately 
be  replaced. 

The  British  counter-offensive  opened  on  the 
8th  of  August  in  conjunction  with  the  1st  and 
10th  French  Armies,  and  on  the  8th  and  9th  of 
August  eighty  Tanks  advanced  with  the  infantry 
a  distance  of  eighteen  kilometres  on  the  south  of 
the  Roye- Amiens  Road,  while  thirty  Tanks  made 
a  five-kilometres  advance  near  Montdidier. 

An  attack  on  a  larger  scale  was  made  west  of 
Roye  from  the  16th  to  the  18th  of  July.  Here 
sixty  Renault  and  thirty-two  Schneider  Tanks 
were  engaged.     The  area  of  operations  was  an 


APPENDIX   V  287 

old  battlefield,  and  Tanks  found  great  difficulty 
in  co-operating  with  the  infantry. 

The  next  operation  was  a  continuation  of  the 
10th  Army  offensive,  and  took  place  between  the 
Oise  and  the  Aisne  Rivers.  It  began  on  the 
20th  of  August,  and  continued  intermittently  up 
to  the  3rd  of  September.  On  the  20th  and  22nd 
twelve  Schneider,  twenty-eight  St.  Chamond  and 
thirty  Renault  Tanks  were  engaged  north  of 
Soissons,  and  during  the  week  commencing  the 
28th  of  August  three  Light  Battalions  advanced 
five  kilometres  between  the  Aisne  and  the  Aillette. 
Three  hundred  and  five  Tanks  were  employed 
at  different  times  during  these  operations. 

The  next  operation  in  which  Tanks  were  en- 
gaged was  the  straightening  out  of  the  St.  Mihiel 
salient.  French  Tanks  were  used  both  with  the 
2nd  French  and  American  Armies.  During  the 
two  days'  fighting,  the  12th  and  13th  of  Septem- 
ber, twenty-four  Schneider,  twenty-eight  St. 
Chamond  and  ninety  Renault  Tanks  entered  the 
battlefield. 

On  the  next  day  the  10th  Army  resumed  its 
offensive  east  of  Soissons.  Eighty-five  Renault 
actions  were  fought  during  the  three  days  that 
it  lasted. 

Ten  days  later  a  larger  joint  attack  was  made 
by  the  5th  and  2nd  French  Armies  in  conjunction 
with  the  American  Army,  and  then  the  4th 
Army  attacked  on  a  fifteen  kilometre  front  in 
the  Champagne,  and  employed  during  the  period 
630  Renault  and  twenty-four  Schneider  Tanks. 


288  APPENDIX   V 

The  attack  was  very  difficult  in  its  initial  stages, 
as  it  had  to  be  made  over  highly-organised 
ground,  part  of  which  the  French  had  evacuated 
in  anticipation  of  the  German  attack  on  the 
15th  of  July. 

Meanwhile,  the  2nd  French  and  American 
Armies  attacked  on  a  twelve  kilometre  front  be- 
tween the  Argonne  and  the  Meuse,  and  advanced 
during  the  seven  battle  days  fifteen  kilometres. 
Two  hundred  and  thirty  Renault,  thirty-four 
Schneider  and  twenty-seven  St.  diamond  actions 
were  fought  during  this  advance. 

At  the  urgent  request  of  the  French  Army 
Commander  in  Flanders,  a  Renault  Battalion, 
less  one  Company,  and  some  heavy  Units  were 
sent  to  Dunkirk.  The  3rd  Company  of  this 
Renault  Battalion  had  been  sent  on  detachment 
to  join  General  Franchet  d'Esperey  at  Salonika. 
On  the  30th  of  September  and  on  the  3rd  and  4th 
of  October  fifty-five  Tanks  were  employed  north- 
west of  Roulers,  without  achieving  much  success. 
From  the  14th  to  the  19th  of  October  eight  St. 
Chamond  and  170  Renault  Tank  engagements 
were  fought  during  the  offensive  and  penetrated 
to  a  depth  of  fifteen  kilometres,  but  not  a  few  St. 
Chamond  Tanks  failed  to  negotiate  the  country. 
The  advance  was  continued  on  the  31st  of  the 
month  in  the  direction  of  Thielt,  and  on  that 
and  the  two  succeeding  days  seventy-five  Tank 
engagements  took  place. 

From  the  end  of  September  onwards  operations 
consisted    in    following    up    and    pressing    upon 


APPENDIX   V  289 

a  retiring  enemy  all  along  the  line,  and  small 
engagements  with  a  few  Tanks  took  place  in 
various  sectors. 

To  summarise  the  number  of  individual  Tank 
engagements  during  the  year  1918  :  Renault 
Tanks  fought  3,140  times,  Schneider  473  times, 
and  St.  diamond  375  times,  making  a  total  of 
3,988  actions.  Tanks  were  employed  on  45 
of  the  120  days  between  the  15th  of  July  and 
the  11th  of  November. 

The  figures  available  on  the  1st  of  December, 
1918,  in  regard  to  Tank  losses  were  as  follows  : — 

Renault  Tanks.  Of  the  total  of  2,718  de- 
livered to  the  fighting  Units,  284  remained 
on  the  battlefield  for  salvage,  74  were 
definitely  abandoned,  369  had  been  returned 
to  the  makers  for  reconstruction,  and  1,991 
were  left  available  for  action  with  Units  in 
the  field. 

Schneider  Tanks.  Of  the  400  manufactured, 
only  97  were  still  fit,  while  137  existed  in 
more  or  less  unfit  condition ;  the  remainder 
were  dead  and  buried. 

St.  diamond  Tanks.  Still  fewer  remained  fit 
of  the  original  400.  Seventy-two  laid  claim 
to  be  capable  of  further  fighting,  157  were 
admittedly  on  the  sick  list,  and  the  balance 
had  been  scrapped. 

The  German  military  authorities  admitted 
that  their  discomfiture  on  the  18th  of  July  was 
largely  brought  about  through  the  use  of  "  masses 


290  APPENDIX   V 

of  Tanks,"  and  their  communiques  were  evidence 
of  the  great  influence  that  the  Renault  Tank  had 
upon  the  battle. 

The  General  Commanding-in-Chief  of  the 
French  Armies  addressed  to  the  Artillerie 
d'Assaut,  on  the  30th  of  July,  the  following 
Order  of  the  day,  "  Vous  avez  bien  merite  la 
Patrie,"  while  the  General  Commanding  re- 
ceived the  Cravat  of  the  Legion  d'Honneur,  and 
was  promoted  to  the  rank  of  General  of  Divison 
for  his  great  services  to  his  country. 


APPENDIX   VI 


TANKS    IN    PALESTINE 


In  December  1916,  eight  Tanks  (Marks  I.  and 
II.)  were  sent  out  to  Egypt  to  join  the  Army 
operating  in  Palestine,  with  twenty-two  officers 
and  226  N.C.O.s  and  men.  No  opportunity  was 
given  to  adapt  the  Tanks,  designed  for  use  in 
France,  to  the  very  different  conditions  of  desert 
warfare,  and  though  only  partially  successful, 
they  achieved  a  much  greater  measure  of  success 
than  it  had  seemed  possible  to  hope  for  them. 
This  was  due  to  the  determination  and  very  fine 
spirit  of  their  crews. 

They  went  into  action  first  in  the  Second  Battle 
of  Gaza,  in  the  middle  of  April  1917.  Owing  to 
the  shortness  of  time  there  was  practically  no 
reconnaissance,  and  the  infantry  commanders 
hardly  understood  what  could  and  what  could 
not  be  expected  of  Tanks.  As  a  result  the 
objectives  given  them  were  not  only  very  difficult 
but  too  many.  Eight  machines  were  asked  to  do 
what  in  France  would  have  been  given  to  two 
Battalions.  In  spite  of  this  the  Tanks  did  very 
valuable  work  in  protecting  the  infantry,  although 
they  were  far  too  few  to  make  the  protection 
anything    like    adequate,    for    the    Turks    were 

U2  291 


292  APPENDIX   VI 

equipped  with  hundreds  of  cleverly  hidden 
machine-guns.  What  the  Tanks  could  do  they 
did.  Each  of  the  eight  covered,  on  an  average, 
forty  miles  of  country.  One  was  destroyed  by 
a  direct  hit,  and  another  had  one  of  its  tracks 
broken  by  a  shell  and  was  captured  in  a  Turkish 
counter-attack. 

Seven  months  later  the  Tanks  again  went  into 
action  in  the  Third  (and  victorious)  Battle  of 
Gaza.  A  reinforcement  of  three  Mark  IV.s  had 
been  received,  and  eight  Tanks  went  into  action, 
six  in  the  first  line,  and  two  in  reserve.  They 
operated  with  the  54th  Division  and  the  Indian 
Cavalry  near  the  sea,  and  the  preliminary  recon- 
naissances were  made  on  horseback  and  by 
drifter.  The  Tanks  did  useful  work,  but  not 
all  that  was  asked  of  them,  again  for  the  reason 
that  more  was  asked  than  they  could  possibly 
have  performed.  The  six  first  line  Tanks  had  no 
fewer  than  twenty-nine  objectives  assigned  to 
them. 

The  infantry,  and  not  the  Tanks,  began  the 
attack  at  eleven  at  night  on  November  1st. 
While  this  attack  was  in  progress  the  Tanks  moved 
up  to  their  starting-points,  which  they  reached  by 
half -past  two  in  the  morning,  half  an  hour  before 
their  attack  was  to  begin.  The  moon  had  then 
just  risen,  and  it  had  been  hoped  that  the  Tanks 
would  have  its  light  to  advance  by,  but  a  dense 
haze,  thickened  by  the  smoke  of  the  battle, 
deprived  them  of  this,  and  they  went  forward  on 
compass  bearings. 


APPENDIX    VI  293 

Although  they  did  not  do  all  that  was  expected 
of  them,  the  Tanks  materially  helped  the  infantry. 
Five  of  the  six  reached  their  first  objectives,  four 
reached  their  second,  third  and  fourth,  and  one 
reached  its  fifth  also.  Three  of  the  six  were 
temporarily  out  of  action  before  the  end  of  the 
battle,  and  so  were  the  two  reserve  Tanks  which 
came  up  in  support  an  hour  after  the  action 
began,  both  loaded  with  empty  sand  bags;  and 
these,  unfortunately,  caught  fire.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  casualties  in  personnel  were  very  small, 
one  man  killed  and  two  wounded. 

The  disabled  Tanks  were  repaired  but  they 
were  not  used  again.  What  was  now  wanted  for 
the  difficult  work  of  rounding  up  the  rearguard 
detachments  of  the  retreating  Turkish  army  was 
a  lighter  and  faster  Tank.  A  mission  was  sent 
to  France  to  see  if  a  number  of  Whippets  could 
be  obtained,  but  this  mission  only  reached  Head- 
quarters in  France  on  March  21st,  1918,  the  day 
the  great  German  attack  was  launched.  There 
was  no  possibility  then  of  taking  any  Tanks  from 
the  Western  Front. 

The  Third  Battle  of  Gaza  ended  the  Tank 
operations  in  Palestine.  The  machines  there 
were  handed  over  to  the  Ordnance  Department 
at  Alexandria  and  the  crews  returned  to  England. 


APPENDIX  VII 
"TANK"   TRIAL 


Description  of  "  Tank  " 

This  machine  has  been  designed,  under  the 
direction  of  Mr.  E.  H.  T.  d'Eyncourt,  by  Mr. 
W.  A.  Tritton  (of  Messrs.  Foster,  of  Lincoln)  and 
Lieutenant  W.  G.  Wilson,  R.N.A.S.,  and  has 
been  constructed  by  Messrs.  Foster,  of  Lincoln. 
The  conditions  laid  down  as  to  the  obstacle  to 
be  surmounted  were  that  the  machine  should  be 
able  to  climb  a  parapet  4  feet  6  inches  high  and 
cross  a  gap  5  feet  wide. 

Over-all  Dimensions 

Feet.  Inehea. 

Length  .....     81  S 

Width  with  sponsons     ...     18  8 

,,      without  sponsons  8  3 

Height 8  0 

Protection 

The  conning  tower  is  protected  generally  by 
10  millim.  thickness  of  nickel-steel  plate,  with 
12  millim.  thickness  in  front  of  the  drivers.     The 

294 


APPENDIX   VII  295 

sides  and  back  ends  have  8  millim.  thickness  of 
nickel-steel  plate.  The  top  is  covered  by  6  millim. 
thickness  of  high  tensile  steel,  and  the  belly  is 
covered  with  the  same. 


Weight 

Tons.  Cwt. 

Hull 21  0 

Sponsons  and  guns         .          .  8  10 
Ammunition,  300  rounds  for    guns 

and  20,000  rounds  for  rifles  1    .  2  0 

Crew  (8  men)         .          .          .  0  10 

Tail  (for  balance)            ...  1  8 


Total  weight  with  armament,  crew, 

petrol,  and  ammunition        .     28  8 

Horse-power  of  engines  .  .   105  h.p. 

Number  of  gears  ....       4  forward, 

2  reverse, 
f  mile, 
l|  miles, 


Approximate    speed    of   travel    on 
each  gear       .... 


2 1  miles,  and 
4    miles   per 
hour. 


Armament 
Two  6-pr.  guns,  and 

Three  automatic  rifles  (1  Hotchkiss  and  2 
Madsen). 

Rate  of  Fire 
6-pr.  :    15-20  rounds  per  minute. 
Madsen  gun  :   300  rounds  per  minute. 
Hotchkiss  gun  :   250  rounds  per  minute. 

1  Removable  for  transport  purposes. 


296  APPENDIX   VII 

Notes   as  to  Steel  Plate   obtained  from 
Experiments  Made 

Nickel-Steel  Plate 

12  millim.  thickness  is  proof  against  a  concen- 
trated fire  of  reversed  Mauser  Bullets  at  10  yards 
range,  normal  impact. 

10  millim.  thickness  is  proof  against  single 
shots  of  reversed  Mauser  bullets  at  10  yards 
range,  normal  impact. 

8  millim.  thickness  is  proof  against  Mauser 
bullets  at  10  yards  range,  normal  impact. 

High  Tensile  Steel  Plate 

6  millim.  thickness  will  give  protection  against 
bombs  up  to  1  lb.  weight  detonated  not  closer 
than  6  inches  from  the  plate. 

(N.B. — It  is  proposed  to  cause  the  detonation 
of  bombs  away  from  the  top  of  the  tank  by  an 
outer  skin  of  expanded  metal,  which  is  not  on 
the  sample  machine  shown.) 


Programme  of  Trials 

Reference  to  Sketch,  Plan,  and  Sections 

The   trial    will    be    divided    into   three    parts, 

I,  II,  and  III 


Part  1.— Official  Test 
1.  The    machine   will   start   and   cross   (a)  the 
obstacle    specified,  i.e.  n  parapet    4feet  0  inches 


APPENDIX    VII  297 

high  and  a  gap  5  feet  wide.     This  forms  the  test 
laid  down. 

Part  II. — Test  approximating  to  Active 
Service 

2.  It  will  then  proceed  over  the  level  at  full 
speed  for  about  100  yards,  and  take  its  place  in 
a  prepared  dug-out  shelter  (b),  from  which  it  will 
traverse  a  course  of  obstacles  approximating  to 
those  likely  to  be  met  with  on  service. 

3.  Climbing  over  the  British  defences  (c)  (re- 
duced for  its  passage),  it  will — 

4.  Pass  through  the  wire  entanglements  in 
front ; 

5.  Cross  two  small  shell  craters,  each  12  feet 
in  diameter  and  6  feet  deep; 

6.  Traverse  the  soft,  water-logged  ground  round 
the  stream  (d),  climb  the  slope  from  the  stream, 
pass  through  the  German  entanglement; 

7.  Climb  the  German  defences  (e); 

8.  Turn  round  on  the  flat  and  pass  down  the 
marshy  bed  of  the  stream  via  (d),  and  climb  the 
double  breastwork  at  (f). 

Part  III. — Extra  Test  if  required 

9.  The  "  tank  "  will  then,  if  desired,  cross  the 
larger  trench  (h),  and  proceed  for  half  a  mile 
across  the  park  to  a  piece  of  rotten  ground  seamed 
with  old  trenches,  going  down  a  steep  incline  on 
the  way. 

January  21th,  1916. 


-PLAN 


STR 


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