Skip to main content

Full text of "The thoughts of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus"

See other formats 


m 


j  the 

I  liversity  of 
Connecticut 

libraries 


III 

ru'„lu,r-ror.uV,    THOUGHTS 


AUREL 
EMPEROR 


=,153    000b3=i=il    b 


I-    J  K 
UJ     .0 


E 


) 


THE    THOUGHTS 


OF 


THE    EMPEROR 
MARCUS    AURELIUS    ANTONINUS. 


THE    THOUGHTS 


OF 


1^^ 


THE   EMPEROR 


Marcus  Aurelius  Antoninus. 


Ml 


TRANSLATED  BY  GEORGE  LONG. 


BOSTON: 

LITTLE,    BROWN,  AND    COMPANY. 

1890. 


John  Wilson  and  Son,  Cambridge. 


PREFACE. 


I  HAVE  carefully  revised  the  Life  and  Philosophy 
of  Antoninus,  in  which  I  have  made  a  few  correc- 
tions, and    added  a  few  notes. 

I  have  also  made  a  few  alterations  in  the  transla- 
tion where  I  thought  that  I  could  approach  nearer  to 
the  author's  meaning  ;  and  I  have  added  a  few  notes 
and  references. 

There  still  remain  difficulties  which  I  cannot  remove, 
because  the  text  is  sometimes  too  corrupt  to  be  under- 
stood, and  no  attempt  to  restore  the  true  readings 
could  be  successful. 

George  Long. 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE 

Biographical  Sketch i 

Philosophy  of  Marcus  Aurelius  Antoninus       33 

The  Thoughts 8[ 

Index  of  Terms 285 

General  Index      289 


BIOGRAPHICAL    SKETCH 


OF 


MARCUS   AURELIUS  ANTONINUS. 


IVyT  ANTONINUS  was  born  at  Rome,  a.  d.  121,  on 
•  the  26th  of  April.  His  father,  Annius  Verus, 
died  while  he  was  praetor.  His  mother  was  Domitia 
Calvilla,  also  named  Lucilla.  The  Emperor  T.  Anto- 
ninus Pius  married  Annia  Galeria  Faustina,  the  sister 
of  Annius  Verus,  and  was  consequently  the  uncle  of 
M.  Antoninus.  When  Hadrian  adopted  Antoninus 
Pius  and  declared  him  his  successor  in  the  empire, 
Antoninus  Pius  adopted  both  L.  Ceionius  Commodus, 
the  son  of  Aelius  Caesar,  and  M.  Antoninus,  whose 
original  name  was  M.  Annius  Verus.  Antoninus  then 
took  the  name  of  M.  Aelius  Aurelius  Verus,  to  which 
was  added  the  title  of  Caesar  in  a.  d.  139  :  the  name 
Aelius  belonged  to  Hadrian's  family,  and  Aurelius  was 
the  name  of  Antoninus  Pius.  When  M.  Antoninus 
became  Augustus,  he  dropped  the  name  of  Verus  and 
took  the  name  of  Antoninus.  Accordingly  he  is  gen- 
erally named  M.  Aurelius  Antoninus  or  simply  M. 
Antoninus. 

I 


2  BIOGRAPHICAL    SKETCH. 

The  youth  was  most  carefully  brought  up.  He 
thanks  the  gods  (i.  17)  that  he  had  good  grandfathers, 
good  parents,  a  good  sister,  good  teachers,  good  asso- 
ciates, good  kinsmen  and  friends,  nearly  everything 
good.  He  had  the  happy  fortune  to  witness  the  ex- 
ample of  his  uncle  and  adoptive  father  Antoninus  Pius, 
and  he  has  recorded  in  his  work  (i.  16  ;  vi.  30)  the 
virtues  of  this  excellent  man  and  prudent  ruler.  Like 
many  young  Romans  he  tried  his  hand  at  poetry  and 
studied  rhetoric.  Herodes  Atticus  and  M.  Cornelius 
Fronto  were  his  teachers  in  eloquence.  There  are 
extant  letters  between  Fronto  and  Marcus,^  which 
show  the  great  affection  of  the  pupil  for  the  master, 
and  the  master's  great  hopes  of  his  industrious  pupil. 
M.  Antoninus  mentions  Fronto  (i.  11)  among  those 
to  whom  he  was  indebted  for  his  education. 

When  he  was  eleven  years  old,  he  assumed  the 
dress  of  philosophers,  something  plain  and  coarse, 
became  a  hard  student,  and  lived  a  most  laborious, 
abstemious  life,  even  so  far  as  to  injure  his  health. 
Finally,  he  abandoned  poetry  and  rhetoric  for  philoso- 
phy, and  he  attached  himself  to  the  sect  of  the  Stoics. 
But  he  did  not  neglect  the  study  of  law,  which  was  a 
useful  preparation  for  the  high  place  which  he  was 
designed  to  fill.  His  teacher  was  L.  Volusianus 
Maecianus,  a  distinguished  jurist.  We  must  suppose 
that  he  learned  the  Roman  discipline  of  arms,  which 
was  a  necessary  part  of  the  education  of  a  man  who 

1  M.  Cornelii  Frontonis  Reliquiae,  Berlin,  1816.  There  are 
a  few  letters  between  Fronto  and  Antoninus  Pius. 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.       3 

afterwards  led  his  troops  to  battle  against  a  warlike 
race. 

Antoninus  has  recorded  in  his  first  book  the  names 
of  his  teachers,  and  the  obligations  which  he  owed  to 
each  of  them.  The  way  in  which  he  speaks  of  what 
he  learned  from  them  might  seem  to  savor  of  vanity 
or  self-praise,  if  we  look  carelessly  at  the  way  in  which 
he  has  expressed  himself;  but  if  any  one  draws  this 
conclusion,  he  will  be  mistaken.  Antoninus  means  to 
commemorate  the  merits  of  his  several  teachers,  what 
they  taught,  and  what  a  pupil  might  learn  from  them. 
Besides,  this  book,  like  the  eleven  other  books,  was  for 
his  own  use ;  and  if  we  may  trust  the  note  at  the  end 
of  the  first  book,  it  was  written  during  one  of  M. 
Antoninus'  campaigns  against  the  Quadi,  at  a  time 
when  the  commemoration  of  the  virtues  of  his  illus- 
trious teachers  might  remind  him  of  their  lessons  and 
the  practical  uses  which  he  might  derive  from  them. 

Among  his  teachers  of  philosophy  was  Sextus  of 
Chaeroneia,  a  grandson  of  Plutarch.  What  he  learned 
from  this  excellent  man  is  told  by  himself  (i.  9).  His 
favorite  teacher  was  Q.  Junius  Rusticus  (i.  7),  a  phi- 
losopher, and  also  a  man  of  practical  good  sense  in 
public  affairs.  Rusticus  was  the  adviser  of  Antoninus 
after  he  became  emperor.  Young  men  who  are  des- 
tined for  high  places  are  not  often  fortunate  in  those 
who  are  about  them,  their  companions  and  teachers ; 
and  I  do  not  know  any  example  of  a  young  prince 
having  had  an  education  which  can  be  compared  with 
that   of   M.  Antoninus.      Such   a   body  of   teachers 


4  BIOGRAPHICAL   SKETCH. 

distinguished  by  their  acquirements  and  their  charac- 
ter will  hardly  be  collected  again ;  and  as  to  the 
pupil,  we  have  not  had  one  like  him  since. 

Hadrian  died  in  July  a.  d.  138,  and  was  succeeded 
by  Antoninus  Pius.  M.  Antoninus  married  Faustina, 
his  cousin,  the  daughter  of  Pius,  probably  about  a.  d. 
146,  for  he  had  a  daughter  born  in  147.  He  received 
from  his  adoptive  father  the  title  of  Caesar,  and  was 
associated  with  him  in  the  administration  of  the  state. 
The  father  and  the  adopted  son  lived  together  in  perfect 
friendship  and  confidence.  Antoninus  was  a  dutiful 
son,  and  the  emperor  Pius  loved  and  esteemed  him. 

Antoninus  Pius  died  in  March,  a.  d.  161.  The  Sen- 
ate, it  is  said,  urged  M.  Antoninus  to  take  the  sole 
administration  of  the  empire,  but  he  associated  with 
himself  the  other  adopted  son  of  Pius,  L.  Ceionius 
Commodus,  who  is  generally  called  L.  Verus.  Thus 
Rome  for  the  first  time  had  two  emperors.  Verus 
was  an  indolent  man  of  pleasure,  and  unworthy  of  his 
station.  Antoninus  however  bore  with  him,  and  it  is 
said  that  Verus  had  sense  enough  to  pay  to  his  col- 
league the  respect  due  to  his  character.  A  virtuous 
emperor  and  a  loose  partner  lived  together  in  peace, 
and  their  alliance  was  strengthened  by  Antoninus  giv- 
ing to  Verus  for  wife  his  daughter  Lucilla. 

The  reign  of  Antoninus  was  first  troubled  by  a  Par- 
thian war,  in  which  Verus  was  sent  to  command  ;  but 
he  did  nothing,  and  the  success  that  was  obtained  by 
the  Romans  in  Armenia  and  on  the  Euphrates  and 
Tigris  was  due  to  his  generals.      This  Parthian  war 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.       5 

ended  in  a.  d.  165.  Aurelius  and  Verus  had  a  triumph 
(a.  D.  166)  for  the  victories  in  the  East.  A  pestilence 
followed,  which  carried  off  great  numbers  in  Rome  and 
Italy,  and  spread  to  the  west  of  Europe. 

The  north  of  Italy  was  also  threatened  by  the  rude 
people  beyond  the  Alps  from  the  borders  of  Gallia  to 
the  eastern  side  of  the  Hadriatic.  These  barbarians 
attempted  to  break  into  Italy,  as  the  Germanic  nations 
had  attempted  near  three  hundred  years  before ;  and 
the  rest  of  the  life  of  Antoninus,  with  some  intervals, 
was  employed  in  driving  back  the  invaders.  In  169 
Verus  suddenly  died,  and  Antoninus  administered  the 
state  alone. 

During  the  German  wars  Antoninus  resided  for  three 
years  on  the  Danube  at  Carnuntum.  The  Marcomanni 
were  driven  out  of  Pannonia  and  almost  destroyed  in 
their  retreat  across  the  Danube  ;  and  in  a.  d.  i  74  the 
emperor  gained  a  great  victory  over  the  Quadi. 

In  a.  D.  175,  Avidius  Cassius,  a  brave  and  skilful 
Roman  commander  who  was  at  the  head  of  the  troops 
in  Asia,  revolted  and  declared  himself  Augustus.  But 
Cassius  was  assassinated  by  some  of  his  officers,  and 
so  the  rebellion  came  to  an  end.  Antoninus  showed 
his  humanity  by  his  treatment  of  the  family  and  the 
partisans  of  Cassius ;  and  his  letter  to  the  Senate,  in 
which  he  recommends  mercy,  is  extant.  (Vulcatius, 
Avidius  Cassius,  c.   12.) 

Antoninus  set  out  for  the  East  on  hearing  of  Cassius' 
revolt.  Though  he  appears  to  have  returned  to  Rome 
in  A.  D.  1 74,  he  went  back  to  prosecute  the  war  against 


6  BIOGRAPHICAL   SKETCH. 

the  Germans,  and  it  is  probable  that  he  marched 
direct  to  the  East  from  the  German  war.  His  wife 
Faustina,  who  accompanied  him  into  Asia,  died  sud- 
denly at  the  foot  of  the  Taurus,  to  the  great  grief  of 
her  husband.  Capitolinus,  who  has  written  the  Hfe 
of  Antoninus,  and  also  Dion  Cassius  accuse  the  em- 
press of  scandalous  infidelity  to  her  husband  and  of 
abominable  lewdness.  But  Capitolinus  says  that  An- 
toninus either  knew  it  not  or  pretended  not  to  know 
it.  Nothing  is  so  common  as  such  malicious  reports 
in  all  ages,  and  the  history  of  imperial  Rome  is  full  of 
them.  Antoninus  loved  his  wife,  and  he  says  that  she 
was  ''  obedient,  affectionate,  and  simple."  The  same 
scandal  had  been  spread  about  Faustma's  mother,  the 
wife  of  Antoninus  Pius,  and  yet  he  too  was  perfectly 
satisfied  with  his  wife.  Antoninus  Pius  says  after  her 
death  in  a  letter  to  Fronto  that  he  would  rather  have 
lived  in  exile  with  his  wife  than  in  his  palace  at  Rome 
without  her.  There  are  not  many  men  who  would 
give  their  wives  a  better  character  than  these  two  em- 
perors. Capitolinus  wrote  in  the  time  of  Diocletian. 
He  may  have  intended  to  tell  the  truth,  but  he  is  a 
poor,  feeble  biographer.  Dion  Cassius,  the  most  ma- 
lignant of  historians,  always  reports  and  perhaps  he 
believed  any  scandal  against  anybody. 

Antoninus  continued  his  journey  to  Syria  and  Egypt, 
and  on  his  return  to  Italy  through  Athens  he  was  ini- 
tiated into  the  Eleusinian  mysteries.  It  was  the  prac- 
tice of  the  emperor  to  conform  to  the  established  rites 
of  the  age,  and  to  perform  religious  ceremonies  with 


MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.  7 

due  solemnity.  We  cannot  conclude  from  this  that 
he  was  a  superstitious  man,  though  we  might  perhaps 
do  so  if  his  book  did^not  show  that  he  was  not.  But 
this  is  only  one  among  many  instances  that  a  ruler's 
public  acts  do  not  always  prove  his  real  opinions.  A 
prudent  governor  will  not  roughly  oppose  even  the 
superstitions  of  his  people ;  and  though  he  may  wish 
that  they  were  wiser,  he  will  know  that  he  cannot 
make  them  so  by  offending  their  prejudices. 

Antoninus  and  his  son  Commodus  entered  Rome  in 
triumph,  perhaps  for  some  German  victories,  on  the 
23d  of  December,  a.  d.  176.  In  the  following  year 
Commodus  was  associated  with  his  father  in  the  em- 
pire, and  took  the  name  of  Augustus.  This  year  a.  d. 
177  is  memorable  in  ecclesiastical  history.  Attains 
and  others  were  put  to  death  at  Lyon  for  their  adhe- 
rence to  the  Christian  religion.  The  evidence  of  this 
persecution  is  a  letter  preserved  by  Eusebius  (E.  H. 
v.  I  ;  printed  in  Routh's  Reliquiae  Sacrae,  vol.  i.  with 
notes).  The  letter  is  from  the  Christians  of  Vienna 
and  Lugdunum  in  Gallia  (Vienne  and  Lyon)  to  their 
Christian  brethren  in  Asia  and  Phrygia ;  and  it  is  pre- 
served perhaps  nearly  entire.  It  contains  a  very  par- 
ticular description  of  the  tortures  inflicted  on  the 
Christians  in  Gallia,  and  it  states  that  while  the  per- 
secution was  going  on,  Attains,  a  Christian  and  a  Ro- 
man citizen,  was  loudly  demanded  by  the  populace 
and  brought  into  the  amphitheatre  ;  but  the  governor 
ordered  him  to  be  reserv^ed,  with  the  rest  who  were  in 
prison,  until  he  had  received  instructions   from  the 


8  BIOGRAPHICAL   SKETCH. 

emperor.  Many  had  been  tortured  before  the  gov- 
ernor thought  of  applying  to  Antoninus.  The  impe- 
rial rescript,  says  the  letter,  was  that  the  Christians 
should  be  punished,  but  if  they  would  deny  their  faith, 
they  must  be  released.  On  this  the  work  began  again. 
The  Christians  who  were  Roman  citizens  were  be- 
headed ;  the  rest  were  exposed  to  the  wild  beasts  in 
the  amphitheatre.  Some  modern  writers  on  ecclesi- 
astical history,  when  they  use  this  letter,  say  nothing 
of  the  wonderful  stories  of  the  martyrs'  sufferings. 
Sanctus,  as  the  letter  says,  was  burnt  with  plates  of 
hot  iron  till  his  body  was  one  sore  and  had  lost  all 
human  form ;  but  on  being  put  to  the  rack  he  recov- 
ered his  former  appearance  under  the  torture,  which 
was  thus  a  cure  instead  of  a  punishment.  He  was 
afterwards  torn  by  beasts,  and  placed  on  an  iron  chair 
and  roasted.     He  died  at  last. 

The  letter  is  one  piece  of  evidence.  The  writer, 
whoever  he  was  that  wrote  in  the  name  of  the  Gallic 
Christians,  is  our  evidence  both  for  the  ordinary  and 
the  extraordinary  circumstances  of  the  story,  and  we 
cannot  accept  his  evidence  for  one  part  and  reject 
the  other.  We  often  receive  small  evidence  as  a  proof 
of  a  thing  which  we  believe  to  be  within  the  limits  of 
probability  or  possibility,  and  we  reject  exactly  the 
same  evidence,  when  the  thing  to  which  it  refers,  ap- 
pears very  improbable  or  impossible.  But  this  is  a 
false  method  of  inquiry,  though  it  is  followed  by  some 
modern  writers,  who  select  what  they  like  from  a  story 
and  reject  the  rest  of  the  evidence ;   or  if  they  do  not 


MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.  9 

reject  it,  they  dishonestly  suppress  it.  A  man  can 
only  act  consistently  by  accepting  all  this  letter  or 
rejecting  it  all,  and  we  cannot  blame  him  for  either. 
But  he  who  rejects  it  may  still  admit  that  such  a  letter 
may  be  founded  on  real  facts ;  and  he  would  make 
this  admission  as  the  most  probable  way  of  accounting 
for  the  existence  of  the  letter :  but  if,  as  he  would 
suppose,  the  writer  has  stated  some  things  falsely,  he 
cannot  tell  what  part  of  his  story  is  worthy  of  credit. 

The  war  on  the  northern  frontier  appears  to  have 
been  uninterrupted  during  the  visit  of  Antoninus  to 
the  East,  and  on  his  return  the  emperor  again  left 
Rome  to  oppose  the  barbarians.  The  Germanic  peo- 
ple were  defeated  in  a  great  battle  a.  d.  179.  During 
this  campaign  the  emperor  was  seized  with  some  con- 
tagious malady,  of  which  he  died  in  the  camp  at  Sir- 
mium  (Mitrovitz)  on  the  Save,  in  Lower  Pannonia,  but 
at  Vindebona  (Vienna)  according  to  other  authorities, 
on  the  1 7th  of  March,  a.  d.  180,  in  the  fifty-ninth  year 
of  his  age.  His  son  Commodus  was  with  him.  The 
body  or  the  ashes  probably  of  the  emperor  were  car- 
ried to  Rome,  and  he  received  the  honor  of  deifica- 
tion. Those  who  could  afford  it  had  his  statue  or 
bust ;  and  when  Capitolinus  wrote,  many  people  still 
had  statues  of  Antoninus  among  the  Dei  Penates  or 
household  deities.  He  was  in  a  manner  made  a  saint. 
Commodus  erected  to  the  memory  of  his  father  the 
Antonine  column  which  is  now  in  the  Piazza  Colonna 
at  Rome.  The  bassi  rilievi  which  are  placed  in  a 
spiral  line  round  the  shaft  commemorate  the  victories 


10  BIOGRAPHICAL   SKETCH, 

of  Antoninus  over  the  Marcomanni  and  the  Quadi, 
and  the  miraculous  shower  of  rain  which  refreshed  the 
Roman  soldiers  and  discomfited  their  enemies.  The 
statue  of  Antoninus  was  placed  on  the  capital  of  the 
column,  but  it  was  removed  at  some  time  unknown, 
and  a  bronze  statue  of  St.  Paul  was  put  in  the  place  by 
Pope  Sixtus  the  fifth. 

The  historical  evidence  for  the  times  of  Antoninus 
is  very  defective,  and  some  of  that  which  remains  is 
not  credible.  The  most  curious  is  the  story  about  the 
miracle  which  happened  in  a.  d.  i  74,  during  the  war 
with  the  Quadi.  The  Roman  army  was  in  danger  of 
perishing  by  thirst ;  but  a  sudden  storm  drenched  them 
with  rain,  while  it  discharged  fire  and  hail  on  their 
enemies,  and  the  Romans  gained  a  great  victory.  All 
the  authorities  which  speak  of  the  battle  speak  also  of 
the  miracle.  The  Gentile  writers  assign  it  to  their 
gods,  and  the  Christians  to  the  intercession  of  the 
Christian  legion  in  the  emperor's  army.  To  confirm 
the  Christian  statement  it  is  added  that  the  em- 
peror gave  the  title  of  Thundering  to  this  legion ; 
but  Dacier  and  others  who  maintain  the  Christian 
report  of  the  miracle,  admit  that  this  tide  of  Thun- 
dering or  Lightning  was  not  given  to  this  legion 
because  the  Quadi  were  struck  with  lightning,  but 
because  there  was  a  figure  of  lightning  on  their 
shields,  and  that  this  title  of  the  legion  existed  in  the 
time  of  Augustus. 

Scaliger  also  had  observed  that  the  legion  was  called 
Thundering  {Kepavvo/36\o^,  or  Kepawocfiopo^)  before  the 


MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.  I  I 

reign  of  Antoninus.  We  learn  this  from  Dion  Cassius 
(Lib.  55,  c.  23,  and  the  note  of  Reimarus),  who  enu- 
merates all  the  legions  of  Augustus'  time.  The  name 
Thundering  or  Lightning  also  occurs  on  an  inscription 
of  the  reign  of  Trajan,  which  was  found  at  Trieste. 
Eusebius  (v.  5),  when  he  relates  the  miracle,  quotes 
Apolinarius,  bishop  of  HierapoLs,  as  authority  for  this 
name  being  given  to  the  legion  Melitene  by  the  em- 
peror in  consequence  of  the  success  which  he  obtained 
through  their  prayers  ;  from  which  we  may  estimate 
the  value  of  xApolinarius'  testimony.  Eusebius  does 
not  say  in  what  book  of  Apolinarius  the  statement 
occurs.  Dion  says  that  the  Thundering  legion  was 
stationed  in  Cappadocia  in  the  time  of  Augustus. 
Valesius  also  observes  that  in  the  Notitia  of  the  Impe- 
rium  Romanum  there  is  mentioned  under  the  com- 
mander of  Armenia  the  Praefectura  of  the  twelfth 
legion  named  "Thundering  Melitene;"  and  this  po- 
sition in  Armenia  will  agree  with  what  Dion  says  of 
its  position  in  Cappadocia.  Accordingly  Valesius 
concludes  that  Melitene  was  not  the  name  of  the 
legion,  but  of  the  town  in  which  it  was  stationed. 
Melitene  was  also  the  name  of  the  district  in  which 
this  town  was  situated.  The  legions  did  not,  he  says, 
take  their  name  from  the  place  where  they  were  on 
duty,  but  from  the  country  in  which  they  were  raised, 
and  therefore  what  Eusebius  says  about  the  Melitene 
does  not  seem  probable  to  him.  Yet  Valesius,  on  the 
authority  of  Apolinarius  and  Tertullian,  believed  that 
the  miracle  was  worked  through  the  prayers  of  the 


12  BIOGRAPHICAL   SKETCH. 

Christian  soldiers  in  the  emperor's  army.  Rufinus 
does  not  give  the  name  of  MeUtene  to  this  legion, 
says  Valesius,  and  probably  he  purposely  omitted  it, 
because  he  knew  that  Melitene  was  the  name  of  a 
town  in  Armenia  Minor,  where  the  legion  was  sta- 
tioned in  his  time. 

The  emperor,  it  is  said,  made  a  report  of  his  vic- 
tory to  the  Senate,  which  we  may  believe,  for  such 
was  the  practice ;  but  we  do  not  know  what  he  said 
in  his  letter,  for  it  is  not  extant.  Dacier  assumes  that 
the  emperor's  letter  was  purposely  destroyed  by  the 
Senate  or  the  enemies  of  Christianity,  that  so  honora- 
ble a  testimony  to  the  Christians  and  their  religion 
might  not  be  perpetuated.  The  critic  has  however 
not  seen  that  he  contradicts  himself  when  he  tells  us 
the  purport  of  the  letter,  for  he  says  that  it  was  de- 
stroyed, and  even  Eusebius  could  not  find  it.  But 
there  does  exist  a  letter  in  Greek  addressed  by  An- 
toninus to  the  Roman  people  and  the  sacred  Senate 
after  this  memorable  victory.  It  is  sometimes  printed 
after  Justin's  first  Apology,  but  it  is  totally  uncon- 
nected with  the  apologies.  This  letter  is  one  of  the 
most  stupid  forgeries  of  the  many  which  exist,  and  it 
cannot  be  possibly  founded  even  on  the  genuine  re- 
port of  x\ntoninus  to  the  Senate.  If  it  were  genuine, 
it  would  free  the  emperor  from  the  charge  of  perse- 
cuting men  because  they  were  Christians,  for  he  says 
in  this  false  letter  that  if  a  man  accuse  another  only  of 
being  a  Christian,  and  the  accused  confess,  and  there 
is  nothing  else  against  him,  he  must  be  set  free ;  with 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.      1 3 

this  monstrous  addition,  made  by  a  man  inconceivably 
ignorant,  that  the  informer  must  be  burnt  ahve.^ 

During  the  time  of  Antoninus  Pius  and  Marcus 
Antoninus  there  appeared  the  first  Apology  of  Justi- 
nus,  and  under  M.  Antoninus  the  Oration  of  Tatian 
against  the  Greeks,  which  was  a  fierce  attack  on  the 
established  religions ;  the  address  of  Athenagoras  to 
M.  Antoninus  on  behalf  of  the  Christians,  and  the 
Apology  of  Melito,  bishop  of  Sardes,  also  addressed 
to  the  emperor,  and  that  of  Apolinarius.  The  first 
Apology  of  Justinus  is  addressed  to  T.  Antoninus  Pius 
and  his  two  adopted  sons  M.  Antoninus  and  L.  Verus  ; 
but  we  do  not  know  whether  they  read  it.^  The  sec- 
ond Apology  of  Justinus  is  entitled  "  to  the  Roman 
Senate  ; "  but  this  superscription  is  from  some  copyist. 
In  the  first  chapter  Justinus  addresses  the  Romans. 
In  the  second  chapter  he  speaks  of  an  affair  that  had 
recently  happened  in  the  time  of  M.  Antoninus  and 

1  Eusebius  (v.  5)  quotes  Tertullian's  Apology  to  the  Roman 
Senate  in  confirmation  of  the  story.  TertuUian,  he  says,  writes 
that  letters  of  the  emperor  were  extant,  in  which  he  declares 
that  his  army  was  saved  by  the  prayers  of  the  Christians  ;  and 
that  he  "threatened  to  punish  with  death  those  who  ventured 
to  accuse  us."  It  is  possible  that  the  forged  letter  which  is 
now  extant  may  be  one  of  those  which  TertuUian  had  seen,  for 
he  uses  the  plural  number,  "letters."  A  great  deal  has  been 
written  about  this  miracle  of  the  Thundering  Legion,  and  more 
than  is  worth  reading.  There  is  a  dissertation  on  this  supposed 
miracle  in  Moyle's  Works,  London,  1726. 

2  Orosius,  VII.  14,  says  that  Justinus  the  philosopher  pre- 
sented to  Antoninus  Pius  his  work  in  defence  of  the  Christian 
religion,  and  made  him  merciful  to  the  Christians. 


14  BIOGRAPHICAL   SKETCH. 

L.  Verus,  as  it  seems ;  and  he  also  directly  addresses 
the  emperor,  saying  of  a  certain  woman,  "  she  ad- 
dressed a  petition  to  thee  the  emperor,  and  thou  didst 
grant  the  petition."  In  other  passages  the  writer 
addresses  the  two  emperors,  from  which  we  must 
conclude  that  the  Apology  was  directed  to  them. 
Eusebius  (E.  H.  iv.  i8)  states  that  the  second  Apol- 
ogy was  addressed  to  the  successor  of  Antoninus  Pius, 
and  he  names  him  Antoninus  Verus,  meaning  M.  An- 
toninus. In  one  passage  of  this  second  Apology  (c. 
8),  Justinus,  or  the  writer,  whoever  he  may  be,  says 
that  even  men  who  followed  the  Stoic  doctrines,  when 
they  ordered  their  lives  according  to  ethical  reason, 
were  hated  and  murdered,  such  as  Heraclitus,  Muso- 
nius  in  his  own  times,  and  others ;  for  all  those  who 
in  any  way  labored  to  live  according  to  reason  and 
av^oided  wickedness  were  always  hated ;  and  this  was 
the  effect  of  the  work  of  daemons. 

Justinus  himself  is  said  to  have  been  put  to  death 
at  Rome,  because  he  refused  to  sacrifice  to  the  gods. 
It  cannot  have  been  in  the  reign  of  Hadrian,  as  one 
authority  states ;  nor  in  the  time  of  Antoninus  Pius, 
if  the  second  Apology  was  written  in  the  time  of 
M.  Antoninus ;  and  there  is  evidence  that  this  event 
took  place  under  M.  Antoninus  and  L.  Verus,  when 
Rusticus  was  praefect  of  the  city.^ 

1  See  the  Martyrium  Sanctorum  Justini,  &c.,  in  the  works 
of  Justinus,  ed.  Otto,  vol.  ii  559.  "Junius  Rusticus  Praefectus 
Urbi  erat  sub  imperatoribus  M.  Auielio  et  L.  Vero,  id  quod 
liquet  ex  Themistii  Orat.  xxxiv  Dindorf.  p.  451,  et  ex  quodam 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.      I  5 

The  persecution  in  which  Polycarp  suffered  at 
Smyrna  belongs  to  the  time  of  M.  Antoninus.  The 
evidence  for  it  is  the  letter  of  the  church  of  Smyrna 
to  the  churches  of  Philomelium  and  the  other  Chris- 
tian churches,  and  it  is  preserved  by  Eusebius  (E.  H. 
IV.  15).  But  the  critics  do  not  agree  about  the  time 
of  Polycarp's  death,  differing  in  the  two  extremes  to 
the  amount  of  twelve  years.  The  circumstances  of 
Polycarp's  martyrdom  were  accompanied  by  miracles, 
one  of  which  Eusebius  (iv.  15)  has  omitted,  but  it 
appears  in  the  oldest  Latin  version  of  the  letter,  which 

illorura  rescripto,  Dig.  49.  i.  i,  §2"  (Otto).  The  rescript 
contains  the  words  "  Junium  Rusticum  amicum  nostrum  Prae- 
fectum  Urbi."  The  Martyrium  of  Justinus  and  others  is  writ- 
ten in  Greek.  It  begins,  "  In  the  time  of  the  wicked  defenders 
of  idolatry  impious  edicts  were  published  against  the  pious 
Christians  both  in  cities  and  country  places,  for  the  purpose  of 
compelling  them  to  make  offerings  to  vain  idols.  Accordingly 
the  holy  men  (Justinus,  Chariton,  a  woman  Charito,  Paeon, 
Liberianus,  and  others)  were  brought  before  Rusticus,  the  prae- 
fect  of  Rome  " 

The  Martyrium  gives  the  examination  of  the  accused  by 
Rusticus.  All  of  them  professed  to  be  Christians.  Justinus 
was  asked  if  he  expected  to  ascend  into  heaven  and  to  receive 
a  reward  for  his  sufferings,  if  he  was  condemned  to  death.  He 
answered  that  he  did  not  expect :  he  was  certain  of  it.  Finally, 
the  test  of  obedience  was  proposed  to  the  prisoners  they  were 
required  to  sacrifice  to  the  gods.  All  refused,  and  Rusticus 
pronounced  the  sentence,  which  was  that  those  who  refused 
to  sacrifice  to  the  gods  and  obey  the  emperor's  order  should 
be  whipped  and  beheaded  according  to  the  law.  The  martyrs 
were  then  led  to  the  usual  place  of  execution  and  beheaded. 
Some  of  the  faithful  secretly  carried  off  the  bodies  and  depos- 
ited them  in  a  fit  place. 


l6  BIOGRAPHICAL   SKETCH. 

Usher  published,  and  it  is  supposed  that  this  version 
was  made  not  long  after  the  time  of  Eusebius.  The 
notice  at  the  end  of  the  letter  states  that  it  was  tran- 
scribed by  Caius  from  the  copy  of  Irenaeus,  the  disciple 
of  Polycarp,  then  transcribed  by  Socrates  at  Corinth ; 
*'  after  which  I  Pionius  again  wrote  it  out  from  the 
copy  above  mentioned,  having  searched  it  out  by  the 
revelation  of  Polycarp,  who  directed  me  to  it,"  &c. 
The  story  of  Polycarp's  martyrdom  is  embellished  with 
miraculous  circumstances  which  some  modern  writers 
on  ecclesiastical  history  take  the  liberty  of  omitting.-^ 

In  order  to  form  a  proper  notion  of  the  condition 
of  the  Christians  under  M.  Antoninus  we  must  go 
back  to  Trajan's  time.  When  the  younger  Pliny  was 
governor  of  Bithynia,  the  Christians  were  numerous  in 
those  parts,  and  the  worshippers  of  the  old  religion 
were  falling  off.  The  temples  were  deserted,  the  fes- 
tivals neglected,  and  there  were  no  purchasers  of  vic- 
tims for  sacrifice.  Those  who  were  interested  in  the 
maintenance  of  the  old  religion  thus  found  that  their 
profits  were  in  danger.  Christians  of  both  sexes  and 
of  all  ages  were  brought  before  the  governor,  who  did 

1  Conj-ers  Middleton,  An  Inquiry  into  the  Miraculous  Pow- 
ers, &c.  p.  126.  Middleton  says  that  Eusebius  omitted  to  men- 
tion the  dove,  which  flew  out  of  Polycarp's  body,  and  Dodwell 
and  Archbishop  Wake  have  done  the  same.  Wake  says,  "  I 
am  so  little  a  friend  to  such  miracles  that  I  thought  it  better 
with  Eusebius  to  omit  that  circumstance  than  to  mention  it 
from  Bp.  Usher's  Manuscript,"  which  manuscript  however,  says 
Middleton,  he  afterwards  declares  to  be  so  well  attested  that 
we  need  not  any  further  assurance  of  the  truth  of  it. 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.      1/ 

not  know  what  to  do  with  them.  He  could  come  to 
no  other  conclusion  than  this,  that  those  who  con- 
fessed to  be  Christians  and  persevered  in  their  reli- 
gion ought  to  be  punished  ;  if  for  nothing  else,  for  their 
invincible  obstinacy.  He  found  no  crimes  proved 
against  the  Christians,  and  he  could  only  characterize 
their  religion  as  a  depraved  and  extravagant  super- 
stition, which  might  be  stopped  if  the  people  were 
allowed  the  opportunity  of  recanting.  Pliny  wrote 
this  in  a  letter  to  Trajan  (Plinius,  Ep.  x.  97).  He 
asked  for  the  emperor's  directions,  because  he  did  not 
know  what  to  do.  He  remarks  that  he  had  never 
been  engaged  in  judicial  inquiries  about  the  Chris- 
tians, and  that  accordingly  he  did  not  know  what  to 
inquire  about  or  how  far  to  inquire  and  punish.  This 
proves  that  it  was  not  a  new  thing  to  examine  into  a 
man's  profession  of  Christianity  and  to  punish  him  for 
it.^  Trajan's  rescript  is  extant.  He  approved  of  the 
governor's  judgment  in  the  matter,  but  he  said  that 
no  search  must  be  made  after  the  Christians ;  if  a 
man  was  charged  with  the  new  religion  and  convicted, 
he  must  not  be  punished  if  he  affirmed  that  he  was 
not  a  Christian  and  confirmed  his  denial  by  showing 
his  reverence  to  the  heathen  gods.     He  added  that  no 

1  Orosius  (vii.  12)  speaks  of  Trajan's  persecution  of  the 
Christians,  and  of  Pliny's  application  to  him  having  led  the  em- 
peror to  mitigate  his  severity.  The  punishment  by  the  Mosaic 
law  for  those  who  attempted  to  seduce  the  Jews  to  follow  new 
gods  was  death.  If  a  man  was  secretly  enticed  to  such  new 
worship,  he  must  kill  the  seducer,  even  if  the  seducer  were 
brother,  son,  daughter,  wife,  or  friend.     (Deut.  xiii.) 


1 8  BIOGRAPHICAL   SKETCH. 

notice  must  be  taken  of  anonymous  informations,  for 
such  things  were  of  bad  example.  Trajan  was  a  mild 
and  sensible  man ;  and  both  motives  of  mercy  and 
policy  probably  also  induced  him  to  take  as  little  no- 
tice of  the  Christians  as  he  could,  to  let  them  live  in 
quiet  if  it  were  possible.  Trajan's  rescript  is  the  jfirst 
legislative  act  of  the  head  of  the  Roman  state  with 
reference  to  Christianity,  which  is  known  to  us.  It 
does  not  appear  that  the  Christians  were  further  dis- 
turbed under  his  reign.  The  martyrdom  of  Ignatius 
by  the  order  of  Trajan  himself  is  not  universally  ad- 
mitted to  be  an  historical  fact.-^ 

In  the  time  of  Hadrian  it  was  no  longer  possible  for 
the  Roman  government  to  oyerlook  the  great  increase 
of  the  Christians  and  the  hostility  of  the  common  sort 
to  them.  If  the  governors  in  the  provinces  were  will- 
ing to  let  them  alone,  they  could  not  resist  the  fanati- 
cism of  the  heathen  community,  who  looked  on  the 
Christians  as  atheists.  The  Jews  too,  who  were  settled 
all  over  the  Roman  Empire,  were  as  hostile  to  the 
Christians  as  the  Gentiles  were.^  With  the  time  of 
Hadrian  begin  the  Christian  Apologies,  which  show 
plainly  what  the  popular  feeling  towards  the  Christians 

1  The  Martyrium  Ignatii,  first  published  in  Latin  by  Arch- 
bishop Usher,  is  the  chief  evidence  for  the  circumstances  of 
Ignatius'  death. 

2  We  have  the  evidence  of  Justinus  (ad  Diognetum,  c.  5) 
to  this  effect :  "  The  Christians  are  attacked  by  the  Jews  as  if 
they  were  men  of.  a  different  race,  and  are  persecuted  by  the 
Greeks ;  and  those  who  hate  them  cannot  give  the  reason  of 
their  enmity." 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.      1 9 

then  was.  A  rescript  of  Hadrian  to  Minuciiis  Funda- 
niis,  the  Proconsul  of  Asia,  which  stands  at  the  end  of 
Justin's  first  Apology,  instructs  the  governor  that  in- 
nocent people  must  not  be  troubled,  and  false  accu- 
sers must  not  be  allowed  to  extort  money  from  them  ; 
the  charges  against  the  Christians  must  be  made  in 
due  form,  and  no  attention  must  be  paid  to  popular 
clamors ;  when  Christians  were  regularly  prosecuted 
and  convicted  of  illegal  acts,  they  must  be  punished 
according  to  their  deserts ;  and  false  accusers  also 
must  be  punished.  Antoninus  Pius  is  said  to  have 
published  rescripts  to  the  same  effect.  The  terms  of 
Hadrian's  rescript  seem  very  favorable  to  the  Chris- 
tians ;  but  if  we  understand  it  in  this  sense,  that  they 
were  only  to  be  punished  like  other  people  for  illegal 
acts,  it  would  have  had  no  meaning,  for  that  could 
have  been  done  without  asking  the  emperor's  advice. 
The  real  purpose  of  the  rescript  is  that  Christians 
must  be  punished  if  they  persisted  in  their  belief,  and 
would  not  prove  their  renunciation  of  it  by  acknowl- 

1  And  in  Eusebius  (E.  H.  iv.  8,  9).  Orosius  (vii.  13)  says 
that  Hadrian  sent  this  rescript  to  Minucius  Fundanus,  pro- 
consul of  Asia,  after  being  instructed  in  books  written  on  the 
Christian  religion  by  Quadratus  a  disciple  of  the  Apostles,  and 
Aristides  an  Athenian,  an  honest  and  wise  man,  and  Serenus 
Granius,  In  the  Greek  text  of  Hadrian's  rescript  there  is 
mentioned  Serenius  Granianus,  the  predecessor  of  Minucius 
Fundanus  in  the  government  of  Asia. 

This  rescript  of  Hadrian  has  clearly  been  added  to  the 
Apology  by  some  editor.  The  Apology  ends  with  the  words  : 
0  (pi\ov  Tu>  0eco,  Tovro  yeveadco. 


20  BIOGRAPHICAL   SKETCH. 

edging  the  heathen  rehgion.  This  was  Trajan's  rule, 
and  we  have  no  reason  for  supposing  that  Hadrian 
granted  more  to  the  Christians  than  Trajan  did. 
There  is  also  printed  at  the  end  of  Justin's  first  Apol- 
ogy a  rescript  of  Antoninus  Pius  to  the  Commune 
of  Asia  (to  KOivbv  Trj<5  'Acrtas) ,  and  it  is  also  in  Eusebius 
(E.  H.  IV.  13).  The  date  of  the  rescript  is  the  third 
consulship  of  Antoninus  Pius.-^  The  rescript  declares 
that  the  Christians  —  for  they  are  meant,  though  the 
name  Christians  does  not  occur  in  the  rescript  —  were 
not  to  be  disturbed  unless  they  were  attempting 
something  against  the  Roman  rule ;  and  no  man  was 

1  Eusebius  (E.  H.  iv.  12),  after  giving  the  beginning  of 
Justinus'  first  Apology,  which  contains  the  address  to  T.  An- 
toninus and  his  two  adopted  sons,  adds:  "The  same  emperor 
being  addressed  by  other  brethren  in  Asia  honored  the  Com- 
mune of  Asia  with  the  following  rescript."  This  rescript, 
which  is  in  the  next  chapter  of  Eusebius  (E.  H.  iv.  13),  is  in 
the  sole  name  of  Caesar  Marcus  Aurelius  Antoninus  Augustus 
Armenius,  though  Eusebius  had  just  before  said  that  he  was 
going  to  give  us  a  rescript  of  Antoninus  Pius.  There  are 
some  material  variations  between  the  two  copies  of  the  re- 
script besides  the  difference  in  the  title,  which  difference  makes 
it  impossible  to  say  whether  the  forger  intended  to  assign  this 
rescript  to  Pius  or  to  M.  Antoninus. 

The  author  of  the  Alexandrine  Chronicum  says  that  Marcus, 
being  moved  by  the  entreaties  of  Melito  and  other  heads  of  the 
church,  wrote  an  Epistle  to  the  Commune  of  Asia  in  which  he 
forbade  the  Christians  to  be  troubled  on  account  of  their  re- 
ligion. Valesius  supposes  this  to  be  the  letter  or  rescript 
which  is  contained  in  Eusebius  (iv.  13),  and  to  be  the  answer  to 
the  Apology  of  Melito,  of  which  I  shall  soon  give  the  substance. 
But  Marcus  certainly  did  not  write  this  letter  which  is  in  Euse- 
bius, and  we  know  not  what  answer  he  made  to  Melito. 


MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.  21 

to  be  punished  simply  for  being  a  Christian.  But  this 
rescript  is  spurious.  Any  man  moderately  acquainted 
with  Roman  history  will  see  by  the  style  and  tenor 
that  it  is  a  clumsy  forgery. 

In  the  time  of  M.  Antoninus  the  opposition  be- 
tween the  old  and  the  new  belief  was  still  stronger, 
and  the  adherents  of  the  heathen  religion  urged  those 
in  authority  to  a  more  regular  resistance  to  the  in- 
vasions of  the  Christian  faith.  Melito  in  his  Apology 
to  M.  Antoninus  represents  the  Christians  of  Asia  as 
persecuted  under  new  imperial  orders.  Shameless  in- 
formers, he  says,  men  who  were  greedy  after  the  prop- 
erty of  others,  used  these  orders  as  a  means  of  robbing 
those  who  were  doing  no  harm.  He  doubts  if  a  just 
emperor  could  have  ordered  anything  so  unjust ;  and 
if  the  last  order  was  really  not  from  the  emperor,  the 
Christians  entreat  him  not  to  give  them  up  to  their 
enemies.^     We  conclude  from  this  that  there  were  at 

1  Eusebius,  iv.  26  ;  and  Routh's  Reliquiae  Sacrae,  vol.  i. 
and  the  notes.  The  interpretation  of  this  Fragment  is  not  easy. 
Mosheim  misunderstood  one  passage  so  far  as  to  affirm  that 
Marcus  promised  rewards  to  those  who  denounced  the  Chris- 
tians ;  an  interpretation  which  is  entirely  false.  Melito  calls 
the  Christian  religion  "  our  philosophy,"  which  began  among 
barbarians  (the  Jews),  and  flourished  among  the  Roman  sub- 
jects in  the  time  of  Augustus,  to  the  great  advantage  of  the 
empire,  for  from  that  time  the  power  of  the  Romans  grew  great 
and  glorious.  He  says  that  the  emperor  has  and  will  have  as 
the  successor  to  Augustus'  power  the  good  wishes  of  men,  if 
he  will  protect  that  philosophy  which  grew  up  with  the  empire 
and  began  with  Augustus,  which  philosophy  the  predecessors 
of  Antoninus  honored  in  addition  to  the  other  relidons.     He 


22  BIOGRAPHICAL   SKETCH. 

least  imperial  rescripts  or  constitutions  of  M.  Anto- 
ninus which  were  made  the  foundation  of  these  perse- 
cutions. The  fact  of  being  a  Christian  was  now  a 
crime  and  punished,  unless  the  accused  denied  their 
religion.  Then  come  the  persecutions  at  Smyrna, 
which   some  modern  critics  place   in  a.  d.    167,   ten 


further  says  that  the  Christian  religion  had  suffered  no  harm 
since  the  time  of  Augustus,  but  on  the  contrary  had  enjoyed  all 
honor  and  respect  that  any  man  could  desire.  Nero  and 
Domitian,  he  says,  were  alone  persuaded  by  some  malicious 
men  to  calumniate  the  Christian  religion,  and  this  was  the  ori- 
gin of  the  false  charges  against  the  Christians.  But  this  was 
corrected  by  the  emperors  who  immediately  preceded  Antoni- 
nus, who  often  by  their  rescripts  reproved  those  who  attempted 
to  trouble  the  Christians.  Hadrian,  Antoninus'  grandfather, 
wrote  to  many,  and  among  them  to  Fundanus  the  governor  of 
Asia.  Antoninus  Pius,  when  Marcus  was  associated  with  him 
in  the  empire,  wrote  to  the  cities  that  they  must  not  trouble  the 
Christians  ;  among  others,  to  the  people  of  Larissa,  Thessalo- 
nica,  the  Athenians,  and  all  the  Greeks.  Melito  concluded 
thus  :  "  We  are  persuaded  that  thou  who  hast  about  these  things 
the  same  mind  that  they  had,  nay  rather  one  much  more  hu- 
mane and  philosophical,  wilt  do  all  that  we  ask  thee."  —  This 
Apology  was  written  after  A.  D.  169,  the  year  in  which  Verus 
died,  for  it  speaks  of  Marcus  only  and  his  son  Commodus. 
According  to  Melito's  testimony,  Christians  had  only  been 
punished  for  their  religion  in  the  time  of  Nero  and  Domitian, 
and  the  persecutions  began  again  in  the  time  of  M.  Antoninus, 
and  were  founded  on  his  orders,  which  were  abused,  as  he 
seems  to  mean.  He  distinctly  affirms  "that  the  race  of  the 
godly  is  now  persecuted  and  harassed  by  fresh  imperial  orders 
in  Asia,  a  thing  which  had  never  happened  before."  But  we 
know  that  all  this  is  not  true,  and  that  Christians  had  been 
punished  in  Trajan's  time. 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.      23 

years  before  the  persecution  of  Lyon.  The  governors 
of  the  provinces  under  M.  Antoninus  might  have  found 
enough  even  in  Trajan's  rescript  to  warrant  them  in 
punishing  Christians,  and  the  fanaticism  of  the  people 
would  drive  them  to  persecution,  even  if  they  were 
unwilUng.  But  besides  the  fact  of  the  Christians  re- 
jecting all  the  heathen  ceremonies,  we  must  not  forget 
that  they  plainly  maintained  that  all  the  heathen  re- 
ligions were  false.  The  Christians  thus  declared  war 
against  the  heathen  rites,  and  it  is  hardly  necessary  to 
observe  that  this  was  a  declaration  of  hostility  against 
the  Roman  government,  which  tolerated  all  the  vari- 
ous forms  of  superstition  that  existed  in  the  empire, 
and  could  not  consistently  tolerate  another  religion, 
which  declared  that  all  the  rest  were  false  and  all  the 
splendid  ceremonies  of  the  empire  only  a  worship  of 
devils. 

If  we  had  a  true  ecclesiastical  history,  we  should 
know  how  the  Roman  emperors  attempted  to  check 
the  new  religion ;  how  they  enforced  their  principle  of 
finally  punishing  Christians,  simply  as  Christians,  which 
Justin  in  his  Apology  affirms  that  they  did,  and  I  have 
no  doubt  that  he  tells  the  truth ;  how  far  popular 
clamor  and  riots  went  in  this  matter,  and  how  far 
many  fanatical  and  ignorant  Christians  —  for  there  were 
many  such  —  contributed  to  excite  the  fanaticism  on 
the  other  side  and  to  imbittei  the  quarrel  between  the 
Roman  government  and  the  new  religion.  Our  extant 
ecclesiastical  histories  are  manifestly  falsified,  and  what 
truth  they  contain  is  grossly  exaggerated ;  but  the  fact 


24  BIOGRAPHICAL   SKETCH. 

is  certain  that  in  the  time  of  M.  Antoninus  the  hea- 
then populations  were  in  open  hostihty  to  the  Chris- 
tians, and  that  under  Antoninus'  rule  men  were  put  to 
death  because  they  were  Christians.  Eusebius,  in  the 
preface  to  his  fifth  book,  remarks  that  in  the  seven- 
teenth year  of  Antoninus'  reign,  in  some  parts  of  the 
world,  the  persecution  of  the  Christians  became  more 
violent,  and  that  it  proceeded  from  the  populace  in 
the  cities  ;  and  he  adds,  in  his  usual  style  of  exaggera- 
tion, that  we  may  infer  from  what  took  place  in  a 
single  nation  that  myriads  of  martyrs  were  made  in 
the  habitable  earth.  The  nation  which  he  alludes  to 
is  Gallia ;  and  he  then  proceeds  to  give  the  letter  of 
the  churches  of  Vienna  and  Lugdunum.  It  is  proba- 
ble that  he  has  assigned  the  true  cause  of  the  perse- 
cutions, the  fanaticism  of  the  populace,  and  that  both 
governors  and  emperor  had  a  great  deal  of  trouble 
with  these  disturbances.  How  far  Marcus  was  cogni- 
zant of  these  cruel  proceedings  we  do  not  know,  for 
the  historical  records  of  his  reign  are  very  defective. 
He  did  not  make  the  rule  against  the  Christians,  for 
Trajan  did  that ;  and  if  we  admit  that  he  would  have 
been  willing  to  let  the  Christians  alone,  we  cannot 
affirm  that  it  was  in  his  power,  for  it  would  be  a  great 
mistake  to  suppose  that  Antoninus  had  the  unlimited 
authority  which  some  modern  sovereigns  have  had. 
His  power  was  limited  by  certain  constitutional  forms, 
by  the  Senate,  and  by  the  precedents  of  his  prede- 
cessors. We  cannot  admit  that  such  a  man  was  an 
active  persecutor,  for  there  is  no  evidence    that   he 


MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.  25 

was,^  though  it  is  certain. that  he  had  no  good  opinion 
of  the  Christians,  as  appears  from  his  own  words.'-^     But 

1  Except  that  of  Orosius  (vii.  15),  who  says  that  during 
the  Parthian  war  there  were  grievous  persecutions  of  the 
Christians  in  Asia  and  Gallia  under  the  orders  of  Marcus 
(praecepto  ejus),  and  "many  were  crowned  with  the  martyr- 
dom of  saints." 

2  See  XI.  3.  The  emperor  probably  speaks  of  such  fanatics 
as  Clemens  (quoted  by  Gataker  on  this  passage)  mentions. 
The  rational  Christians  admitted  no  fellowship  with  them. 
"Some  of  these  heretics,"  says  Clemens,  "show  their  impiety 
and  cowardice  by  loving  their  lives,  saying  that  the  knowledge 
of  the  really  existing  God  is  true  testimony  (martyrdom),  but 
that  a  man  is  a  self-murderer  who  bears  witness  by  his  death. 
We  also  blame  those  who  rush  to  death ;  for  there  are  some, 
not  of  us,  but  only  bearing  the  same  name,  who  give  themselves 
up.  We  say  of  them  that  they  die  without  being  martyrs,  even 
if  they  are  publicly  punished  ;  and  they  give  themselves  up  to 
a  death  which  avails  nothing,  as  the  Indian  Gymnosophists 
give  themselves  up  foolishly  to  fire."  Cave,  in  his  primitive 
Christianity  (ii.  c.  7),  says  of  the  Christians  :  "  They  did  flock 
to  the  place  of  torment  faster  than  droves  of  beasts  that  are 
driven  to  the  shambles.  They  even  longed  to  be  in  the  arms 
of  suffering.  Ignatius,  though  then  in  his  journey  to  Rome  in 
order  to  his  execution,  yet  by  the  way  as  he  went  could  not  but 
vent  his  passionate  desire  of  it :  '  Oh  that  I  might  come  to  those 
wild  beasts  that  are  prepared  for  me  ;  I  heartily  wish  that  I 
may  presently  meet  with  them ;  I  would  invite  and  encourage 
them  speedily  to  devour  me,  and  not  be  afraid  to  set  upon  me 
as  they  have  been  to  others ;  nay,  should  they  refuse  it,  I  would 
even  force  them  to  it ;  '  "  and  more  to  the  same  purpose  from 
Eusebius.  Cave,  an  honest  and  good  man,  says  all  this  in 
praise  of  the  Christians  ;  but  I  think  that  he  mistook  the  mat- 
ter. We  admire  a  man  who  holds  to  his  principles  even  to 
death;  but  these  fanatical  Christians  are  the  Gymnosophists 
whom  Clemens  treats  with  disdain. 


26  BIOGRAPHICAL   SKETCH. 

he  knew  nothing  of  them  except  their  hostiUty  to  the 
Roman  rehgion,  and  he  probably  thought  that  they 
were  dangerous  to  the  state,  notwithstanding  the  pro- 
fessions false  or  true  of  some  of  the  Apologists.  So 
much  I  have  said,  because  it  would  be  unfair  not  to 
state  all  that  can  be  urged  against  a  man  whom  his 
contemporaries  and  subsequent  ages  venerated  as  a 
model  of  virtue  and  benevolence.  If  I  admitted  the 
genuineness  of  some  documents,  he  would  be  alto- 
gether clear  from  the  charge  of  even  allowing  any  per- 
secutions ;  but  as  I  seek  the  truth  and  am  sure  that 
they  are  false,  I  leave  him  to  bear  whatever  blame  is 
his  due.^  I  add  that  it  is  quite  certain  that  Antoninus 
did  not  derive  any  of  his  ethical  principles  from  a  re- 
ligion of  which  he  knew  nothing.^ 

There  is  no  doubt  that  the  Emperor's  Reflections  — 
or  his  Meditations,  as  they  are  generally  named  —  is  a 
genuine  work.  In  the  first  book  he  speaks  of  himself, 
his  family,  and  his  teachers ;  and  in  other  books  he 
mentions  himself.  Suidas  (v.  MapKo?)  notices  a  work 
of  Antoninus  in  twelve  books,  which  he  names  the 
"conduct  of  his  own  life;"   and  he  cites  the   book 

1  Dr.  F.  C.  Baur,  in  his  work  entitled  "  Das  Christenthum 
und  die  Christliche  Kirche  der  drei  ersten  Jahrhunderte,"  &c., 
has  examined  this  question  with  great  good  sense  and  fairness, 
and  I  "believe  he  has  stated  the  truth  as  near  as  our  authorities 
enable  us  to  reach  it. 

'-^  In  the  Digest,  48,  19,  30,  there  is  the  following  excerpt 
from  Modestinus :  ."  Si  quis  aliquid  fecerit,  quo  leves  hominum 
animi  superstitione  numinis  terrerentur,  divus  Marcus  hujus- 
modi  homines  in  insulam  relegari  rescripsit." 


MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.  2/ 

under  several  words  in  his  Dictionary,  giving  the  em- 
peror's name,  but  not  the  title  of  the  work.  There 
are  also  passages  cited  by  Suidas  from  Antoninus  with- 
out mention  of  the  emperor's  name.  The  true  title 
of  the  work  is  unknown.  Xylander,  who  published  the 
first  edition  of  this  book  (Zurich,  1558,  8vo,  with  a 
Latin  version),  used  a  manuscript  which  contained 
the  twelve  books,  but  it  is  not  known  where  the  man- 
uscript is  now.  The  only  other  complete  manuscript 
which  is  known  to  exist  is  in  the  Vatican  library,  but 
it  has  no  title  and  no  inscriptions  of  the  several  books  : 
the  eleventh  only  has  the  inscription  MdpKov  avTOKpd- 
Topo<;  marked  with  an  asterisk.  The  other  Vatican 
manuscripts  and  the  three  Florentine  contain  only  ex- 
cerpts from  the  emperor's  book.  All  the  tides  of  the 
excerpts  nearly  agree  with  that  which  Xylander  prefixed 
to  his  edition,  Map/cou  'AvTojvivov  KvroKpdropoq  rwi/  cts 
kavTov  IBi(^\ia  i(3.  This  title  has  been  used  by  all  sub- 
sequent editors.  We  cannot  tell  whether  Antoninus 
divided  his  work  into  books  or  somebody  else  did  it. 
If  the  inscriptions  at  the  end  of  the  first  and  second 
books  are  genuine,  he  may  have  made  the  division 
himself. 

It  is  plain  that  the  emperor  wrote  down  his  thoughts 
or  reflections  as  the  occasions  arose ;  and  since  they 
were  intended  for  his  own  use,  it  is  no  improbable 
conjecture  that  he  left  a  complete  copy  behind  him 
written  with  his  own  hand ;  for  it  is  not  likely  that  so 
diligent  a  man  would  use  the  labor  of  a  transcriber  for 
such  a  purpose,  and  expose  his  most  secret  thoughts 


28  BIOGRAPHICAL   SKETCH. 

to  any  other  eye.  He  may  have  also  intended  the 
book  for  his  son  Commodus,  who  however  had  no 
taste  for  his  father's  philosophy.  Some  careful  hand 
preserved  the  precious  volume ;  and  a  work  by  An- 
toninus is  mentioned  by  other  late  writers  besides 
Suidas. 

Many  critics  have  labored  on  the  text  of  Antoninus. 
The  most  complete  edition  is  that  by  Thomas  Gataker, 
1652,  4to.  The  second  edition  of  Gataker  was  super- 
intended by  George  Stanhope,  1697,  4to.  There  is 
also  an  edition  of  1704.  Gataker  made  and  sug- 
gested many  good  corrections,  and  he  also  made  a 
new  Latin  version,  which  is  not  a  very  good  specimen 
of  Latin,  but  it  generally  expresses  the  sense  of  the 
original,  and  often  better  than  some  of  the  more  recent 
translations.  He  added  in  the  margin  opposite  to 
each  paragraph  references  to  the  other  parallel  pas- 
sages ;  and  he  wrote  a  commentary,  one  of  the  most 
complete  that  has  been  written  on  any  ancient  author. 
This  commentary  contains  the  editor's  exposition  of 
the  more  difficult  passages,  and  quotations  from  all 
the  Greek  and  Roman  writers  for  the  illustration  of  the 
text.  It  is  a  wonderful  monument  of  learning  and 
labor,  and  certainly  no  Englishman  has  yet  done  any- 
thing like  it.  At  the  end  of  his  preface  the  editor 
says  that  he  wrote  it  at  Rotherhithe  near  London  in  a 
severe  winter,  when  he  was  in  the  seventy- eighth  year 
of  his  age,  1651,  —  a  time  when  Milton,  Selden,  and 
other  great  men  of  the  Commonwealth  time  were  liv- 
ing; and  the  great  French  scholar  Saumaise  (Salma- 


MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.  29 

sius),  with  whom  Gataker  corresponded  and  received 
help  from  him  for  his  edition  of  Antoninus.  The 
Greek  text  has  also  been  edited  by  J.  M.  Schultz, 
Leipzig,  1802,  8vo  ;  and  by  the  learned  Greek  Ada- 
mantinus  Corais,  Paris,  1816,  8vo.  The  text  of  Schultz 
was  republished  by  Tauchnitz,  1 8  2 1 . 

There  are  English,  German,  French,  Italian,  and 
Spanish  translations  of  M.  Antoninus,  and  there  may 
be  others.  I  have  not  seen  all  the  English  transla- 
tions. There  is  one  by  Jeremy  Collier,  1702,  8vo, 
a  most  coarse  and  vulgar  copy  of  the  original.  The 
latest  French  translation  by  Alexis  Pierron  in  the  col- 
lection of  Charpentier  is  better  than  Dacier's,  which 
has  been  honored  with  an  Italian  version  (Udine, 
1772).  There  is  an  Italian  version  (1675)  which  I 
have  not  seen.  It  is  by  a  cardinal.  ^'  A  man  illus- 
trious in  the  church,  the  Cardinal  Francis  Barberini 
the  elder,  nephew  of  Pope  Urban  VIII.,  occupied  the 
last  years  of  his  life  in  translating  into  his  native  lan- 
guage the  thoughts  of  the  Roman  emperor,  in  order 
to  diffuse  among  the  faithful  the  fertilizing  and  vivify- 
ing seeds.  He  dedicated  this  translation  to  his  soul, 
to  make  it,  as  he  says  in  his  energetic  style,  redder 
than  his  purple  at  the  sight  of  the  virtues  of  this  Gen- 
tile "  (Pierron,  Preface). 

I  have  made  this  translation  at  intervals  after  having 
used  the  book  for  many  years.  It  is  made  from  the 
Greek,  but  I  have  not  always  followed  one  text ;  and 
I  have  occasionally  compared  other  versions  with  my 
own.     I  made  this  translation  for  my  own  use,  because 


30  BIOGRAPHICAL    SKETCH. 

I  found  that  it  was  worth  the  labor ;  but  it  may  be 
useful  to  others  also,  and  therefore  I  determined  to 
print  it.  As  the  original  is  sometimes  very  difficult 
to  understand  and  still  more  difficult  to  translate,  it  is 
not  possible  that  I  have  always  avoided  error.  But  I 
believe  that  I  have  not  often  missed  the  meaning,  and 
those  who  will  take  the  trouble  to  compare  the  trans- 
lation with  the  original  should  not  hastily  conclude 
that  I  am  wrong,  if  they  do  not  agree  with  me.  Some 
passages  do  give  the  meaning,  though  at  first  sight 
they  may  not  appear  to  do  so  ;  and  when  I  differ  from 
the  translators,  I  think  that  in  some  places  they  are 
wrong,  and  in  other  places  I  am  sure  that  they  are. 
I  have  placed  in  some  passages  a  f,  which  indicates 
corruption  in  the  text  or  great  uncertainty  in  the 
meaning.  I  could  have  made  the  language  more 
easy  and  flowing,  but  I  have  preferred  a  ruder  style 
as  being  better  suited  to  express  the  character  of  the 
original ;  and  sometimes  the  obscurity  which  may  ap- 
pear in  the  version  is  a  fair  copy  of  the  obscurity  of 
the  Greek.  If  I  should  ever  revise  this  version,  I 
would  gladly  make  use  of  any  corrections  which  may 
be  suggested.  I  have  added  an  index  of  some  of  the 
Greek  terms  with  the  corresponding  English.  If  I 
have  not  given  the  best  words  for  the  Greek,  I  have 
done  the  best  that  I  could ;  and  in  the  text  I  have  al- 
ways given  the  same  translation  of  the  same  word. 

The  last  reflection  of  the  Stoic  philosophy  that  I 
have  observed  is  in  Simplicius'  Commentary  on  the 
Enchiridion  of  Epictetus.     Simplicius  was  not  a  Chris- 


MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.  3  I 

tian,  and  such  a  man  was  not  likely  to  be  converted 
at  a  time  when  Christianity  was  grossly  corrupted. 
But  he  was  a  really  religious  man,  and  he  concludes 
his  commentary  with  a  prayer  to  the  Deity  which  no 
Christian  could  improve.  From  the  time  of  Zeno  to 
Simplicius,  a  period  of  about  nine  hundred  years,  the 
Stoic  philosophy  formed  the  characters  of  some  of  the 
best  and  greatest  men.  Finally  it  became  extinct, 
and  we  hear  no  more  of  it  till  the  revival  of  letters  in 
Italy.  Angelo  Poliziano  met  with  two  very  inaccurate 
and  incomplete  manuscripts  of  Epictetus'  Enchiridion, 
which  he  translated  into  Latin  and  dedicated  to  his 
great  patron  Lorenzo  de'  Medici,  in  whose  collection  he 
had  found  the  book.  Poliziano's  version  was  printed 
in  the  first  Bale  edition  of  the  Enchiridion,  a.  d.  153 i 
(apud  And.  Cratandrum).  Poliziano  recommends  the 
Enchiridion  to  Lorenzo  as  a  work  well  suited  to  his 
temper,  and  useful  in  the  difficulties  by  which  he  was 
surrounded. 

Epictetus  and  Antoninus  have  had  readers  ever 
since  they  were  first  printed.  The  little  book  of  x\n- 
toninus  has  been  the  companion  of  some  great  men. 
Machiavelli's  Art  of  War  and  Marcus  Antoninus  were 
the  two  books  which  were  used  when  he  was  a  young 
man  by  Captain  John  Smith,  and  he  could  not  have 
found  two  writers  better  fitted  to  form  the  character 
of  a  soldier  and  a  man.  Smith  is  almost  unknown 
and  forgotten  in  England,  his  native  country,  but  not 
in  America,  where  he  saved  the  young  colony  of  Vir- 
ginia.    He  was  great  in  his  heroic  mind  and  his  deeds 


32  BIOGRAPHICAL   SKETCH. 

in  arms,  but  greater  still  in  the  nobleness  of  his  char- 
acter. For  a  man's  greatness  lies  not  in  wealth  and 
station,  as  the  vulgar  believe,  nor  yet  in  his  intellec- 
tual capacity,  which  is  often  associated  with  the  mean- 
est moral  character,  the  most  abject  servility  to  those 
in  high  places,  and  arrogance  to  the  poor  and  lowly ; 
but  a  man's  true  greatness  lies  in  the  consciousness  of 
an  honest  purpose  in  life,  founded  on  a  just  estimate 
of  himself  and  everything  else,  on  frequent  self-exami- 
nation, and  a  steady  obedience  to  the  rule  which  he 
knows  to  be  right,  without  troubling  himself,  as  the 
emperor  says  he  should  not,  about  what  others  may 
think  or  say,  or  whether  they  do  or  do  not  do  that 
which  he  thinks  and  says  and  does. 


THE    PHILOSOPHY 


OF 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS. 


TT  has  been  said  that  the  Stoic  philosophy  first 
showed  its  real  value  when  it  passed  from  Greece 
to  Rome.  The  doctrines  of  Zeno  and  his  successors 
were  well  suited  to  the  gravity  and  practical  good 
sense  of  the  Romans ;  and  even  in  the  Republican 
period  we  have  an  example  of  a  man,  M.  Cato 
Uticensis,  who  lived  the  life  of  a  Stoic  and  died 
consistently  with  the  opinions  which  he  professed. 
He  was  a  man,  says  Cicero,  who  embraced  the  Stoic 
philosophy  from  conviction ;  not  for  the  purpose  of 
vain  discussion,  as  most  did,  but  in  order  to  make 
his  life  conformable  to  the  Stoic  precepts.  In  the 
wretched  times  from  the  death  of  Augustus  to  the 
murder  of  Domitian,  there  was  nothing  but  the  Stoic 
philosophy  which  could  console  and  support  the  fol- 
lowers of  the  old  religion  under  imperial  tyranny  and 
amidst  universal  corruption.  There  were  even  then 
noble  minds  that  could  dare  and  endure,  sustained 
by  a  good  conscience  and  an  elevated  idea  of  the 
3 


34  PHILOSOPHY. 

purposes  of  man's  existence.  Such  were  Paetus 
Thrasea,  Helvidius  Priscus,  Cornutus,  C.  Musonius 
Rufus/  and  the  poets  Persius  and  Juvenal,  whose 
energetic  language  and  manly  thoughts  may  be  as 
instructive  to  us  now  as  they  might  have  been  to 
their  contemporaries.  Persius  died  under  Nero's 
bloody  reign ;  but  Juvenal  had  the  good  fortune  to 
survive  the  tyrant  Domitian  and  to  see  the  better 
times  of  Nerva,  Trajan,  and  Hadrian.^  His  best 
precepts  are  derived  from  the  Stoic  school,  and  they 
are  enforced  in  his  finest  verses  by  the  unrivalled 
vigor  of  the  Latin  language. 

The  best  two  expounders  of  the  later  Stoical  phi- 
losophy were  a  Greek  slave  and  a  Roman  emperor. 
Epictetus,  a  Phrygian  Greek,  was  brought  to  Rome, 
we  know  not  how,  but  he  was  there  the  slave  and 
afterwards  the  freedman  of  an  unworthy  master,  Epa- 
phroditus  by  name,  himself  a  freedman  and  a  favorite 

1  I  have  omitted  Seneca,  Nero's  preceptor.  He  was  in  a 
sense  a  Stoic,  and  he  has  said  many  good  things  in  a  very  fine 
way.  There  is  a  judgment  of  Gellius  (xil.  2)  on  Seneca,  or 
rather  a  statement  of  what  some  people  thought  of  his  philoso- 
phy, and  it  is  not  favorable.  His  writings  and  his  life  must  be 
taken  together,  and  I  have  nothing  more  to  say  of  him  here. 
The  reader  will  find  a  notice  of  Seneca  and  his  philosophy  in 
"  Seekers  after  God,"  by  the  Rev.  F.  W.  Farrar.  Macmillan 
and  Co. 

2  Ribbeck  has  labored  to  prove  that  tnose  Satires,  which 
contain  philosophical  precepts,  are  not  the  work  of  the  real, 
but  of  a  false  'Juvenal,  a  Declamator.  Still  the  verses  exist, 
and  were  written  by  somebody  who  was  acquainted  with  the 
Stoic  doctrines. 


MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.  35 

of  Nero.  Epictetus  may  have  been  a  hearer  of  C. 
Musoniiis  Rufus,  while  he  was  still  a  slave,  but  he 
could  hardly  have  been  a  teacher  before  he  was 
made  free.  He  was  one  of  the  philosophers  whom 
Domitian's  order  banished  from  Rome.  He  retired 
to  Nicopolis  in  Epirus,  and  he  may  have  died  there. 
Like  other  great  teachers  he  wrote  nothing,  and  we 
are  indebted  to  his  grateful  pupil  Arrian  for  what  we 
have  of  Epictetus'  discourses.  Arrian  wrote  eight 
books  of  the  discourses  of  Epictetus,  of  which  only 
four  remain  and  some  fragments.  We  have  also 
from  Arrian's  hand  the  small  Enchiridion  or  Manual 
of  the  chief  precepts  of  Epictetus.  There  is  a  valu- 
able commentary  on  the  Enchiridion  by  Simplicius, 
who  lived  in  the  time  of  the  emperor  Justinian.^ 

Antoninus  in  his  first  book  (i.  7),  in  which  he  grate- 
fully commemorates  his  obligations  to  his  teachers, 
says  that  he  was  made  acquainted  by  Junius  Rusticus 
with  the  discourses  of  Epictetus,  whom  he  mentions 
also  in  other  passages  (iv.  41  ;  xi.  34,  36).  Indeed, 
the  doctrines  of  Epictetus  and  Antoninus  are  the 
same,  and  Epictetus  is  the  best  authority  for  the 
explanation  of  the  philosophical  language  of  Anto- 
ninus and  the  exposition  of  his  opinions.  But  the 
method  of  the  two  philosophers  is  entirely  different. 
Epictetus  addressed  himself  to  his  hearers  in  a  con- 

1  There  is  a  complete  edition  of  Arrian's  Epictetus  with  the 
commentary  of  Simplicius  by  J.  Schweighacuser,  6  vols.  Svo. 
1799,  1800.  There  is  also  an  English  translation  of  Epictetus 
by  Mrs.  Carter. 


2,6  PHILOSOPHY. 

tinuous  discourse  and  in  a  familiar  and  simple  man- 
ner. Antoninus  wrote  down  his  reflections  for  his 
own  use  only,  in  short,  unconnected  paragraphs,  which 
are  often  obscure. 

The  Stoics  made  three  divisions  of  philosophy,  — 
Physic  (^(jivcTLKov) ,  Ethic  (tjOlkov),  and  Logic  (XoytKoi/) 
(viii.  13).  This  division,  we  are  told  by  Diogenes, 
was  made  by  Zeno  of  Citium,  the  founder  of  the 
Stoic  sect,  and  by  Chrysippus ;  but  these  philosophers 
placed  the  three  divisions  in  the  following  order, — 
Logic,  Physic,  Ethic.  It  appears,  however,  that  this 
division  was  made  before  Zeno's  time,  and  acknowl- 
edged by  Plato,  as  Cicero  remarks  (Acad.  Post.  i.  5). 
Logic  is  not  synonymous  with  our  term  Logic  in  the 
narrower  sense  of  that  word. 

Cleanthes,  a  Stoic,  subdivided  the  three  divisions, 
and  made  six,  —  Dialectic  and  Rhetoric,  comprised 
in  Logic ;  Ethic  and  Pohtic ;  Physic  and  Theology. 
This  division  was  merely  for  practical  use,  for  all 
Philosophy  is  one.  Even  among  the  earliest  Stoics 
Logic,  or  Dialectic,  does  not  occupy  the  same  place 
as  in  Plato  :  it  is  considered  only  as  an  instrument 
which  is  to  be  used  for  the  other  divisions  of  Phi- 
losophy. An  exposition  of  the  earlier  Stoic  doc- 
trines and  of  their  modifications  would  require  a 
volume.  My  object  is  to  explain  only  the  opinions 
of  Antoninus,  so  far  as  they  can  be  collected  from  his 
book. 

According  to  the  subdivision  of  Cleanthes,  Physic 
and  Theology  go  together,  or  the  study  of  the  nature 


MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.  37 

of  Things,  and  the  study  of  the  nature  of  the  Deity, 
so  far  as  man  can  understand  the  Deity,  and  of  his 
government  of  the  universe.  This  division  or  sub- 
division is  not  formally  adopted  by  Antoninus,  for,  as 
already  observed,  there  is  no  method  in  his  book ; 
but  it  is  virtually  contained  in  it. 

Cleanthes  also  connects  Ethic  and  Politic,  or  the 
study  of  the  principles  of  morals  and  the  study  of  the 
constitution  of  civil  society ;  and  undoubtedly  he  did 
well  in  subdividing  Ethic  into  two  parts.  Ethic  in  the 
narrower  sense  and  Politic ;  for  though  the  two  are 
intimately  connected,  they  are  also  very  distinct,  and 
many  questions  can  only  be  properly  discussed  by 
carefully  observing  the  distinction.  Antoninus  does 
not  treat  of  Politic.  His  subject  is  Ethic,  and  Ethic 
in  its  practical  application  to  his  own  conduct  in  life 
as  a  man  and  as  a  governor.  His  Ethic  is  founded 
on  his  doctrines  about  man's  nature,  the  Universal 
Nature,  and  the  relation  of  every  man  to  everything 
else.  It  is  therefore  intimately  and  inseparably  con- 
nected with  Physic,  or  the  nature  of  Things,  and  with 
Theology,  or  the  Nature  of  the  Deity.  He  advises  us 
to  examine  well  all  the  impressions  on  our  minds 
(cfiavTaa-iat)  and  to  form  a  right  judgment  of  them, 
to  make  just  conclusions,  and  to  inquire  into  the 
meanings  of  words,  and  so  far  to  apply  Dialectic ;  but 
he  has  no  attempt  at  any  exposition  of  Dialectic,  and 
his  philosophy  is  in  substance  purely  moral  and  prac- 
tical. He  says  (viii.  13),  "Constantly  and,  if  it  be 
possible,  on  the  occasion  of  every  impression  on  the 


38  PHILOSOPHY. 

soul,^  apply  to  it  the  principles  of  Physic,  of  Ethic, 
and  of  Dialectic :  "  which  is  only  another  way  of 
telling  us  to  examine  the  impression  in  every  possible 
way.  In  another  passage  (in.  ii)  he  says,  "To  the 
aids  which  have  been  mentioned,  let  this  one  still  be 
added  :  make  for  thyself  a  definition  or  description 
of  the  object  (t6  ^ai/rao-ToV)  which  is  presented  to 
thee,  so  as  to  see  distinctly  what  kind  of  a  thing  it 
is  in  its  substance,  in  its  nudity,  in  its  complete  en- 
tirety, and  tell  thyself  its  proper  name,  and  the  names 
of  the  things  of  which  it  has  been  compounded,  and 
into  which  it  will  be  resolved."  Such  an  examination 
implies  a  use  of  Dialectic,  which  Antoninus  accord- 
ingly employed  as  a  means  towards  establishing  his 
Physical,  Theological,  and  Ethical  principles. 

There  are  several  expositions  of  the  Physical,  Theo- 
logical, and  Ethical  principles,  which  are  contained  in 
the  work  of  Antoninus ;  and  more  expositions  than  I 
have  read.  Ritter  (Geschichte  der  Philosophic,  iv. 
241),  after  explaining  the  doctrines  of  Epictetus,  treats 
very  briefly  and  insufficiently  those  of  Antoninus.    But 

1  The  original  is  iirl  TrdTrjs  (pavraa-ias.  We  have  no  word 
which  expresses  ^avTaaia,  for  it  is  not  only  the  sensuous  ap- 
pearance which  comes  from  an  external  object,  which  object  is 
called  TO  (pavracrTov,  but  it  is  also  the  thought  or  feeling  or  opin- 
ion which  is  produced  even  when  there  is  no  corresponding 
external  object  before  us.  Accordingly  everything  which  moves 
the  soul  is  (pavraarbv,  and  produces  a  (pavraaia. 

In  this  extract  Antoninus  sa3'S  (pvicoXoye^u^  iradoXoydv,  dia- 
X€KTiK€V€a6ai.  I  have  translated  iradokoyelv  by  using  the  word 
Moral  (Ethic),  and  that  is  the  meaning  here. 


MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.  39 

he  refers  to  a  short  essay,  in  which  the  work  is  done 
better.^  There  is  also  an  essay  on  the  Philosophical 
Principles  of  M.  Aurelius  Antoninus  by  J.  M.  Schultz, 
placed  at  the  end  of  his  German  translation  of  An- 
toninus (Schleswig,  1799).  With  the  assistance  of 
these  two  useful  essays  and  his  own  diligent  study  a 
man  may  form  a  sufficient  notion  of  the  principles  of 
Antoninus ;  but  he  will  find  it  more  difficult  to  ex- 
pound them  to  others.  Besides  the  want  of  arrange- 
ment in  the  original  and  of  connection  among  the 
numerous  paragraphs,  the  cormption  of  the  text,  the 
obscurity  of  the  language  and  the  style,  and  sometimes 
perhaps  the  confusion  in  the  writer's  own  ideas,  — 
besides  all  this,  there  is  occasionally  an  apparent  con- 
tradiction in  the  emperor's  thoughts,  as  if  his  princi- 
ples were  sometimes  unsettled,  as  if  doubt  sometimes 
clouded  his  mind.  A  man  who  leads  a  life  of 
tranquillity  and  reflection,  who  is  not  disturbed  at 
home  and  meddles  not  with  the  affairs  of  the  world, 
may  keep  his  mind  at  ease  and  his  thoughts  in  one 
even  course.  But  such  a  man  has  not  been  tried. 
All  his  Ethical  philosophy  and  his  passive  virtue 
might  turn  out  to  be  idle  words,  if  he  were  once 
exposed  to  the  rude  realities  of  human  existence. 
Fine  thoughts  and  moral  dissertations  from  men  who 
have  not  worked  and  suffered  may  be  read,  but  they 
will  be  forgotten.     No  religion,  no  Ethical  philosophy 

1  De  Marco  Aurelio  Antonino  ...  ex  ipsius  Commenta- 
riis.  Scriptio  Philologica.  Instituit  Nicolaus  Bachius,  Lipsiae, 
1S26. 


40  PHILOSOPHY. 

is  worth  anything,  if  the  teacher  has  not  hved  the 
''hfe  of  an  apostle,"  and  been  ready  to  die  "the 
death  of  a  martyr."  "  Not  in  passivity  (the  passive 
affects)  but  in  activity  he  the  evil  and  the  good  of 
the  rational  social  animal,  just  as  his  virtue  and  his 
vice  lie  not  in  passivity,  but  in  activity"  (ix.  i6). 
The  emperor  Antoninus  was  a  practical  moralist. 
From  his  youth  he  followed  a  laborious  discipline, 
and  though  his  high  station  placed  him  above  all 
want  or  the  fear  of  it,  he  lived  as  frugally  and  tem- 
perately as  the  poorest  philosopher.  Epictetus  wanted 
little,  and  it  seems  that  he  always  had  the  little  that 
he  wanted  and  he  was  content  with  it,  as  he  had  been 
with  his  servile  station.  But  Antoninus  after  his 
accession  to  the  empire  sat  on  an  uneasy  seat.  He 
had  the  administration  of  an  empire  which  extended 
from  the  Euphrates  to  the  Atlantic,  from  the  cold 
mountains  of  Scotland  to  the  hot  sands  of  Africa ;  and 
we  may  imagine,  though  we  cannot  know  it  by  ex- 
perience, what  must  be  the  trials,  the  troubles,  the 
anxiety,  and  the  sorrows  of  him  who  has  the  world's 
business  on  his  hands,  with  the  wish  to  do  the  best 
that  he  can,  and  the  certain  knowledge  that  he  can 
do  very  httle  of  the  good  which  he  wishes. 

In  the  midst  of  war,  pestilence,  conspiracy,  general 
corruption,  and  with  the  weight  of  so  unwieldy  an 
empire  upon  him,  we  may  easily  comprehend  that 
Antoninus  often  had  need  of  all  his  fortitude  to  sup- 
port him.  Tlie  best  and  the  bravest  men  have  mo- 
ments of  doubt  and  of  weakness ;  but  if  they  are  the 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.      4 1 

best  and  the  bravest,  they  rise  again  from  their  de- 
pression by  recurring  to  first  principles,  as  Antoninus 
does.  The  emperor  says  that  hfe  is  smoke,  a  vapor, 
and  St.  James  in  his  Epistle  is  of  the  same  mind ; 
that  the  world  is  full  of  envious,  jealous,  malignant 
people,  and  a  man  might  be  well  content  to  get  out 
of  it.  He  has  doubts  perhaps  sometimes  even  about 
that  to  which  he  holds  most  firmly.  There  are  only 
a  few  passages  of  this  kind,  but  they  are  evidence  of 
the  struggles  which  even  the  noblest  of  the  sons  of 
men  had  to  maintain  against  the  hard  realities  of  his 
daily  life.  A  poor  remark  it  is  which  I  have  seen 
somewhere,  and  made  in  a  disparaging  way,  that  the 
emperor's  reflections  show  that  he  had  need  of  con- 
solation and  comfort  in  life,  and  even  to  prepare  him 
to  meet  his  death.  True  that  he  did  need  comfort 
and  support,  and  we  see  how  he  found  it.  He  con- 
stantly recurs  to  his  fundamental  principle  that  the 
universe  is  wisely  ordered,  that  every  man  is  a  part 
of  it  and  must  conform  to  that  order  which  he  cannot 
change,  that  whatever  the  Deity  has  done  is  good, 
that  all  mankind  are  a  man's  brethren,  that  he  must 
love  and  cherish  them  and  try  to  make  them  better, 
even  those  who  would  do  him  harm.  This  is  his 
conclusion  (11.  17):  "What  then  is  that  which  is 
able  to  conduct  a  man?  One  thing  and  only  one. 
Philosophy.  But  this  consists  in  keeping  the  divinity 
within  a  man  free  from  violence  and  unharmed,  su- 
perior to  pains  and  pleasures,  doing  nothing  without 
a  purpose   nor   yet    falsely  and   with    hypocrisy,   not 


42  PHILOSOPHY. 

feeling  the  need  of  another  man's  domg  or  not  doing 
anything ;  and  besides,  accepting  all  that  happens  and 
all  that  is  allotted,  as  coming  from  thence,  wherever 
it  is,  from  whence  he  himself  came ;  and  finally  wait- 
ing for  death  with  a  cheerful  mind  as  being  nothing 
else  than  a  dissolution  of  the  elements  of  which  every 
living  being  is  compounded.  But  if  there  is  no  harm 
to  the  elements  themselves  in  each  continually  chang- 
ing into  another,  why  should  a  man  have  any  appre- 
hension about  the  change  and  dissolution  of  all  the 
elements  [himself]  ?  for  it  is  according  to  nature ;  and 
nothing  is  evil  that  is  according  to  nature." 

The  Physic  of  Antoninus  is  the  knowledge  of  the 
Nature  of  the  Universe,  of  its  government,  and  of 
the  relation  of  man's  nature  to  both.  He  names 
the  universe  (i)  tCjv  oXwv  ovaia,  vi.  i),^  ''the  universal 

1  As  to  the  word  ovala,  the  reader  may  see  the  Index.  I 
add  here  a  few  examples  of  the  use  of  the  word  ;  Antoninus 
has  (v.  24),  7}  crvfiTToiaa  ovcrLa,  ^' the  universal  substance."  He 
says  (xii.  30  and  iv.  40),  "  there  is  one  common  substance  " 
(ovjia),  distributed  among  countless  bodies.  In  Stobaeus 
(torn.  I.  lib.  I,  tit.  14)  there  is  this  definition,  ovaiav  5e  cpaaiv 
tQ)v  'ovTUiv  cLTravToop  T7]v  irpibTrjv  v\r]u.  In  VIII.  ii,  Antoninus 
speaks  of  to  ovaiwdes  Kai  vXlkoi^,  "  the  substantial  and  the  ma- 
terial ; "  and  (VII.  10)  he  says  that  "everything  material" 
{evvXop)  disappears  in  the  substance  of  the  whole  (rrj  twv  oXojv 
ovala).  The  ovaia  is  the  generic  name  of  that  existence  which 
we  assume  as  the  highest  or  ultimate,  because  we  conceive  no 
existence  which  can  be  co-ordinated  with  it  and  none  above  it. 
It  is  the  philosopli^r's  "substance  :"  it  is  the  ultimate  expres- 
sion for  that  which  we  conceive  or  suppose  to  be  the  basis, 
the  being  of  a  thing.     "From  the  Divine,  which  is  substance 


MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.  43 

substance,"  and  he  adds  that  ''reason"  (Aoyo?)  gov- 
erns the  universe.  He  also  (vi.  9)  uses  the  terms 
''universal  nature  "  or  "  nature  of  the  universe."  He 
(vi.  25)  calls  the  universe  "the  one  and  all,  which 
we  name  Cosmos  or  Order"  (Kocrfxoi).  If  he  ever 
seems  to  use  these  general  terms  as  significant  of  the 
All,  of  all  that  man  can  in  any  way  conceive  to  ex- 
ist, he  still  on  other  occasions  plainly  distinguishes 
between  Matter,  Material  things  (vXrj,  vXlkov),  and 
Cause,  Origin,  Reason  (ama,  airtiLSes,  kayos)}     This 

in  itself,  or  the  only  and  sole  substance,  all  and  everything 
that  is  created  exists'"  (Svvedenborg,  Angelic  Wisdom,  19S). 

1  I  remark,  in  order  to  anticipate  any  misapprehension, 
that  all  these  general  terms  involve  a  contradiction.  The 
"one  and  all,"  and  the  like,  and  "the  whole,"  imply  limita- 
tion. "One"  is  limited;  "all"  is  limited;  the  "whole"  is 
limited.  We  cannot  help  it.  We  cannot  find  words  to  ex- 
press that  which  we  cannot  fully  conceive.  The  addition  of 
"  absolute  "  or  any  other  such  word  does  not  mend  the  matter. 
Even  the  word  God  is  used  by  most  people,  often  uncon- 
sciously, in  such  a  way  that  limitation  is  implied,  and  yet  at 
the  same  time  words  are  added  which  are  intended  to  deny 
limitation.  A  Christian  martyr,  when  he  was  asked  what  God 
was,  is  said  to  have  answered  that  God  has  no  name  like  a 
man;  and  Justin  says  the  same  (Apol.  ii.  6),  "the  names 
Father,  God,  Creator,  Lord,  and  Master  are  not  names,  but 
appellations  derived  from  benefactions  and  acts."  (Compare 
Seneca,  De  Benef.  iv.  8.)  We  can  conceive  the  existence 
of  a  thing,  or  rather  we  may  have  the  idea  of  an  existence, 
without  an  adequate  notion  of  it,  "  adequate "  meaning  co- 
extensive and  coequal  with  the  thing.  We  have  a  notion  of 
limited  space  derived  from  the  dimensions  of  what  we  call  a 
material  thing,  though  of  space  absolute,  if  I  may  use  the  term, 
we  have  no  notion  at  all ;   and  of  infinite  space  the  notion  is 


44  PHILOSOPHY. 

is  conformable  to  Zeno's  doctrine  that  there  are  two 
original  principles  (dp^aO  of  all  things,  that  which 
acts  {to  ttolovv)  and  that  which  is  acted  upon  (to 
Trdcrxov).  That  which  is  acted  on  is  the  formless 
matter  (vXtj)  :  that  which  acts  is  the  reason  (Aoyos), 
God,  who  is  eternal  and  operates  through  all  matter, 
and  produces  all  things.  So  Antoninus  (v.  32) 
speaks  of  the  reason  (A.oyo?)  which  pei-vades  all  sub- 
stance (ova-La),  and  through  all  time  by  fixed  periods 
(revolutions)  administers  the  universe  (to  ttuv)  .  God 
is  eternal,  and  Matter  is  eternal.  It  is  God  who  gives 
form  to  matter,  but  he  is  not  said  to  have  created 
matter.  According  to  this  view,  which  is  as  old  as 
Anaxagoras,  God  and  matter  exist  independently,  but 
God  governs  matter.  This  doctrine  is  simply  the 
expression  of  the  fact  of  the  existence  both  of  matter 
and  of  God.  The  Stoics  did  not  perplex  themselves 
with  the  insoluble  question  of  the  origin  and  nature 
of  matter.-^     Antoninus  also  assumes   a  beginning  of 

the  same,  —  no  notion  at  a)! ;  and  yet  we  conceive  it  in  a  sense, 
though  I  know  not  how,  and  we  believe  that  space  is  infinite, 
and  we  cannot  conceive  it  to  be  finite. 

1  The  notions  of  matter  and  of  space  are  inseparable.  We 
derive  the  notion  of  space  from  matter  and  form.  But  we 
have  no  adequate  conception  either  of  matter  or  of  space. 
Matter  in  its  ultimate  resolution  is  as  unintelligible  as  what 
men  call  mind,  spirit,  or  by  w^hatever  other  name  they  may 
express  the  power  which  makes  itself  known  by  acts.  Anax- 
agoras laid  down  the  distinction  between  intelligence  [povs]  and 
matter,  and  he  said  that  intelligence  impressed  motion  on 
matter,  and  so  separated  the  elements  of  matter  and  gave  them 
order",    but  he  probably   only  assumed  a  beginning,  as   Sim- 


MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.  45 

things,  as  we  now  know  them ;  but  his  language  is 
sometimes  very  obscure.  I  have  endeavored  to  ex- 
plain the  meaning  of  one  difficult  passage  (vii.  75, 
and  the  note). 

Matter  consists  of  elemental  parts  (o-rotx^ta)  of 
which  all  material  objects  are  made.  But  nothing  is 
permanent  in  form.  The  nature  of  the  universe,  ac- 
cording to  Antoninus'  expression  (iv.  36),  "loves 
nothing  so  much  as  to  change  the  things  which  are, 
and  to  make  new  things  like  them.  For  everything 
that  exists  is  in  a  manner  the  seed  of  that  which  will 
be.  But  thou  art  thinking  only  of  seeds  which  are 
cast  into  the  earth  or  into  a  womb  :  but  this  is  a  very 
vulgar  notion."  All  things  then  are  in  a  constant  flux 
and  change  :  some  things  are  dissolved  into  the  ele- 
ments, others  come  in  their  places  ;  and  so  the  "  whole 
universe  continues  ever  young  and  perfect  "  (xii.  23). 

Antoninus  has  some  obscure  expressions  about  what 

plicius  says,  as  a  foundation  of  his  philosophical  teaching. 
Empedocles  said,  "The  universe  always  existed."  He  had  no 
idea  of  what  is  called  creation.  Ocellus  Lucanus  (i,  §  2) 
maintained  that  the  Universe  (r6  irdv)  was  imperishable  and 
uncreated.  Consequently  it  is  eternal.  He  admitted  the  ex- 
istence of  God  ;  but  his  theology  would  require  some  discus- 
sion. On  the  contrary,  the  Brachmans,  according  to  Strabo 
(p-  7^3,  ed.  Cas.),  taught  that  the  universe  was  created  and 
perishable ;  and  the  creator  and  administrator  of  it  pervades 
the  whole.  The  author  of  the  book  of  Solomon's  Wisdom  says 
(xi.  17)  :  •'  Thy  Almighty  hand  made  the  world  of  matter  with- 
out form,"  which  may  mean  that  matter  existed  already. 

The  common  Greek  word  which  we  translate  "  matter  "  is 
ij\r].     It  is  the  stuff  that  things  are  made  of. 


46  PHILOSOPHY. 

he  calls  "seminal  principles"  (^a-n-epfiaTiKol  Xoyot). 
He  opposes  them  to  the  Epicurean  atoms  (vi.  24), 
and  consequently  his  "  seminal  principles "  are  not 
material  atoms  which  wander  about  at  hazard,  and 
combine  nobody  knows  how.  In  one  passage  (iv.  21) 
he  speaks  of  living  principles,  souls  (xl/vxal)  after  the 
dissolution  of  their  bodies  being  received  into  the 
"  seminal  principle  of  the  universe."  Schultz  thinks 
that  by  "  seminal  principles  Antoninus  means  the 
relations  of  the  various  elemental  principles,  which 
relations  are  determined  by  the  Deity  and  by  which 
alone  the  production  of  organized  beings  is  possible." 
This  may  be  the  meaning ;  but  if  it  is,  nothing  of  any 
value  can  be  derived  from  it.^  Antoninus  often  uses 
the  word  "Nature"  (<^vcrt?),  and  we  must  attempt 
to  fix  its  meaning.  The  simple  etymological  sense 
of  </)vcrts  is  "  production,"  the  birth  of  what  we  call 
Things.  The  Romans  used  Natura,  which  also  means 
"  birth  "  originally.  But  neither  the  Greeks  nor  the 
Romans  stuck  to  this  simple  meaning,  nor  do  we. 
Antoninus  says  (x.  6)  :  "  Whether  the  universe  is 
[a  concourse  of]  atoms  or  Nature  [is  a  system],  let 
this  first  be  established,  that  I  am  a  part  of  the  whole 

1  Justin  (Apol.  II.  8)  has  the  words  Kara  (nrep/ii.aTLKou  X^yov 
fxepos,  where  he  is  speaking  of  the  Stoics  ;  but  he  uses  this  ex- 
pression in  a  peculiar  sense  (note  11).  The  early  Christian 
writers  were  familiar  with  the  Stoic  terms,  and  their  writings 
show  that  the  contest  was  begun  between  the  Christian  ex- 
positors and  the-  Greek  philosophy.  Even  in  the  second 
Epistle  of  St.  Peter  (11.  i,  v.  4)  we  find  a  Stoic  expression, 
IVa  5td  Toirwv  yhrjcrOe  Oelas  kolvwvoI  cpvcreojs. 


MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.  47 

which  is  governed  by  nature."  Here  it  might  seem 
as  if  nature  were  personified  and  viewed  as  an  active, 
efficient  power ;  as  something  which,  if  not  independ- 
ent of  the  Deity,  acts  by  a  power  which  is  given  to 
it  by  the  Deity.  Such,  if  I  understand  the  expression 
right,  is  the  way  in  which  the  word  Nature  is  often 
used  now,  though  it  is  plain  that  many  writers  use  the 
word  without  fixing  any  exact  meaning  to  it.  It  is 
the  same  with  the  expression  Laws  of  Nature,  which 
some  writers  may  use  in  an  intelHgible  sense,  but 
others  as  clearly  use  in  no  definite  sense  at  all.  There 
is  no  meaning  in  this  word  Nature,  except  that  which 
Bishop  Butler  assigns  to  it,  when  he  says,  "  The  only 
distinct  meaning  of  that  word  Natural  is  Stated,  Fixed, 
or  Settled  ;  since  what  is  natural  as  much  requires  and 
presupposes  an  intelligent  agent  to  render  it  so,  /.  e. 
to  effect  it  continually  or  at  stated  times,  as  what  is 
supernatural  or  miraculous  does  to  effect  it  at  once." 
This  is  Plato's  meaning  (De  Leg.  iv.  715)  when  he 
says  that  God  holds  the  beginning  and  end  and  mid- 
dle of  all  that  exists,  and  proceeds  straight  on  his 
course,  making  his  circuit  according  to  nature  (that 
is,  by  a  fixed  order)  ;  and  he  is  continually  accom- 
panied by  justice,  who  punishes  those  who  deviate 
from  the  divine  law,  that  is,  from  the  order  or  course 
which  God  observes. 

When  we  look  at  the  motions  of  the  planets,  the 
action  of  what  we  call  gravitation,  the  elemental  com- 
bination of  unorganized  bodies  and  their  resolution, 
the  production  of  plants  and  of  living  bodies,  their 


48  niiLOSOPHY. 

generation,  growth,  and  their  dissolution,  which  we 
call  their  death,  we  observe  a  regular  sequence  of 
phenomena,  which  within  the  limits  of  experience 
present  and  past,  so  far  as  we  know  the  past,  is  fixed 
and  invariable.  But  if  this  is  not  so,  if  the  order  and 
sequence  of  phenomena,  as  known  to  us,  are  subject 
to  change  in  the  course  of  an  infinite  progression,  — 
and  such  change  is  conceivable,  —  we  have  not  dis- 
covered, nor  shall  we  ever  discover,  the  whole  of  the 
order  and  sequence  of  phenomena,  in  which  se- 
quence there  may  be  involved  according  to  its  very  na- 
ture, that  is,  according  to  its  fixed  order,  some  variation 
of  what  we  now  call  the  Order  or  Nature  of  Things. 
It  is  also  conceivable  that  such  changes  have  taken 
place,  —  changes  in  the  order  of  things,  as  we  are  com- 
pelled by  the  imperfection  of  language  to  call  them, 
but  which  are  no  changes ;  and  further  it  is  certain 
that  our  knowledge  of  the  true  sequence  of  all  actual 
phenomena,  as  for  instance  the  phenomena  of  genera- 
tion, growth,  and  dissolution,  is  and  ever  must  be  im- 
perfect. 

We  do  not  fare  much  better  when  we  speak  of 
Causes  and  Effects  than  when  we  speak  of  Nature. 
For  the  practical  purposes  of  life  we  may  use  the 
terms  cause  and  effect  conveniently,  and  we  may  fix 
a  distinct  meaning  to  them,  distinct  enough  at  least  to 
prevent  all  misunderstanding.  But  the  case  is  differ- 
ent when  we  speak  of  causes  and  effects  as  of  Things. 
All  that  we  know  is  phenomena,  as  the  Greeks  called 
them,  or  appearances  which  follow  one  another  in  a 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.      4g 

regular  order,  as  we  conceive  it,  so  that  if  some  one 
phenomenon  should  fail  in  the  series,  we  conceive 
that  there  must  either  be  an  interruption  of  the  series, 
or  that  something  else  will  appear  after  the  phenom- 
enon which  has  failed  to  appear,  and  will  occupy  the 
vacant  place ;  and  so  the  series  in  its  progression  may 
be  modified  or  totally  changed.  Cause  and  effect 
then  mean  nothing  in  the  sequence  of  natural  phe- 
nomena beyond  what  I  have  said ;  and  the  real  cause, 
or  the  transcendent  cause,  as  some  would  call  it,  of 
each  successive  phenomenon  is  in  that  which  is  the 
cause  of  all  things  which  are,  which  have  been,  and 
which  will  be  forever.  Thus  the  word  Creation  may 
have  a  real  sense  if  we  consider  it  as  the  first,  if  we 
can  conceive  a  first,  in  the  present  order  of  natural 
phenomena ;  but  in  the  vulgar  sense  a  creation  of  all 
things  at  a  certain  time,  followed  by  a  quiescence  of 
the  first  cause  and  an  abandonment  of  all  sequences 
of  Phenomena  to  the  laws  of  Nature,  or  to  the  other 
words  that  people  may  use,  is  absolutely  absurd. ^ 


1  Time  and  space  are  the  conditions  of  our  thought;  but 
time  infinite  and  space  infinite  cannot  be  objects  of  thought, 
except  in  a  very  imperfect  way.  Time  and  space  must  not  in 
any  way  be  thought  of  when  we  think  of  the  Deity.  Sweden- 
borg  says,  "  The  natural  man  may  believe  that  he  would  have 
no  thought,  if  the  ideas  of  time,  of  space,  and  of  things  mate- 
rial were  taken  away;  for  upon  those  is  founded  all  the  thought 
that  man  has.  But  let  him  know  that  the  thoughts  are  limited 
and  confined  in  proportion  as  they  partake  of  time,  of  space, 
and  of  what  is  material;  and  that  they  are  not  limited  and  are 
extended,  in  proportion  as  they  do  not  partake  of  those  things  ; 

4 


50  PHILOSOPHY. 

Now,  though  there  is  great  difficulty  in  understand- 
ing all  the  passages  of  Antoninus,  in  which  he  speaks 
of  Nature,  of  the  changes  of  things  and  of  the  econ- 
omy of  the  universe,  I  am  convinced  that  his  sense  of 
Nature  and  Natural  is  the  same  as  that  which  I  have 
stated ;  and  as  he  was  a  man  who  knew  how  to  use 
words  in  a  clear  way  and  with  strict  consistency,  we 
ought  to  assume,  even  if  his  meaning  in  some  passages 
is  doubtful,  that  his  view  of  Nature  was  in  harmony 
with  his  fixed  belief  in  the  all-pervading,  ever  present, 
and  ever  active  energy  of  God.  (ii.  4  ;  iv.  40  ;  x.  i  ;  vi, 
40  ;  and  other  passages.  Compare  Seneca,  De  Benef. 
IV.  7.     Swedenborg,  Angelic  Wisdom,  349-357.) 

There  is  much  in  Antoninus  that  is  hard  to  under- 
stand, and  it  might  be  said  that  he  did  not  fully  com- 
prehend all  that  he  wrote  ;  which  would  however  be 
in  no  way  remarkable,  for  it  happens  now  that  a 
man  may  write  what  neither  he  nor  anybody  can  un- 
derstand. Antoninus  tells  us  (xii.  10)  to  look  at 
things  and  see  what  they  are,  resolving  them  into  the 
material  (vXyj),  the  casual  (atnov),  and  the  relation 
(avacjiopd) ,  or  the  purpose,  by  which  he  seems  to  mean 
something  in  the  nature  of  what  we  call  effect,  or  end. 
The  word  Cause  {alria)  is  the  difficulty.  There  is  the 
same  word  in  the  Sanscrit  {Jietu)  ;  and  the  subde  phil- 
osophers of  India  and  of  Greece,  and  the  less  subtle 
philosophers  of  modern  times,  have  all  used  this  word, 
or  an  equivalent  word,  in  a  vague  way.  Yet  the  con- 
since  the  mind  is  so  far  elevated  above  the  things  corporeal 
and  worldly"  (Concerning  Heaven  and  Hell,  169). 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.      5  I 

fusion  sometimes  may  be  in  the  inevitable  ambiguity 
of  language  rather  than  in  the  mind  of  the  writer,  for 
I  cannot  think  that  some  of  the  wisest  of  men  did 
not  know  what  they  intended  to  say.  When  Anto- 
ninus says  (iv.  36),  "that  everything  that  exists  is  in 
a  manner  the  seed  of  that  which  will  be,"  he  might  be 
supposed  to  say  what  some  of  the  Indian  philosophers 
have  said,  and  thus  a  profound  truth  might  be  con- 
verted into  a  gross  absurdity.  But  he  says,  "  in  a 
manner,"  and  in  a  manner  he  said  true ;  and  in  an- 
other manner,  if  you  mistake  his  meaning,  he  said 
false.  When  Plato  said,  ''  Nothing  ever  is,  but  is  al- 
ways becoming"  (aet  ytyi/erai),  he  delivered  a  text, 
out  of  which  we  may  derive  something ;  for  he  de- 
stroys by  it  not  all  practical,  but  all  speculative  notions 
of  cause  and  effect.  The  whole  series  of  things,  as 
they  appear  to  us,  must  be  contemplated  in  time,  that 
is  in  succession,  and  we  conceive  or  suppose  intervals 
between  one  state  of  things,  and  another  state  of  things 
so  that  there  is  priority  and  sequence,  and  interval, 
and  Being,  and  a  ceasing  to  Be,  and  beginning  and 
ending.  But  there  is  nothing  of  the  kind  in  the 
Nature  of  Things.  It  is  an  everlasting  continuity 
(iv.  45;  VII.  75).  When  Antoninus  speaks  of  gen- 
eration (x.  26),  he  speaks  of  one  cause  (atrta)  acting, 
and  then  another  cause  taking  up  the  work,  which  the 
former  left  in  a  certain  state,  and  so  on  ;  and  we 
might  perhaps  conceive  that  he  had  some  notion  like 
what  has  been  called  "the  self-evolving  power  of 
nature ;  "    a  fine  phrase   indeed,  the  full  import  of 


52  PHILOSOPHY. 

which  I  beUeve  that  the  writer  of  it  did  not  see,  and 
thus  he  laid  himself  open  to  the  imputation  of  being 
a  follower  of  one  of  the  Hindu  sects,  which  makes 
all  things  come  by  evolution  out  of  nature  or  matter, 
or  out  of  something  which  takes  the  place  of  Deity, 
but  is  not  Deity.  I  would  have  all  men  think  as  they 
please,  or  as  they  can,  and  I  only  claim  the  same  free- 
dom which  I  give.  When  a  man  writes  anything,  we 
may  fairly  try  to  find  out  all  that  his  words  must  mean, 
even  if  the  result  is  that  they  mean  what  he  did  not 
mean ;  and  if  we  find  this  contradiction,  it  is  not  our 
fault,  but  his  misfortune.  Now  Antoninus  is  perhaps 
somewhat  in  this  condition  in  what  he  says  (x.  26), 
though  he  speaks  at  the  end  of  the  paragraph  of  the 
power  which  acts,  unseen  by  the  eyes,  but  still  no  less 
clearly.  But  whether  in  this  passage  (x.  26)  he  means 
that  the  power  is  conceiv^ed  to  be  in  the  different  suc- 
cessive causes  (atrt'at),  or  in  something  else,  nobody 
can  tell.  From  other  passages,  however,  I  do  collect 
that  his  notion  of  the  phenomena  of  the  universe  is 
what  I  have  stated.  The  Deity  works  unseen,  if  we 
may  use  such  language,  and  perhaps  I  may,  as  Job 
did,  or  he  who  wrote  the  book  of  Job.  "  In  him  we 
live  and  move  and  are,"  said  St.  Paul  to  the  Athenians  ; 
and  to  show  his  hearers  that  this  was  no  new  doctrine, 
he  quoted  the  Greek  poets.  One  of  these  poets  was 
the  Stoic  Cleanthes,  whose  noble  hymn  to  Zeus,  or 
God,  is  an  elevated  expression  of  devotion  and  phi- 
losophy. It  deprives  Nature  of  her  power,  and  puts 
her  under  the  immediate  government  of  the  Deity. 


MARCUS   AURELIUS,  ANTONINUS.  53 

"  Thee  all  this  heaven,  which  whirls  around  the  earth, 
Obeys  and  willing  follows  where  thou  leadest. 
Without  thee,  God,  nothing  is  done  on  earth, 
Nor  in  the  ethereal  realms,  nor  in  the  sea, 
Save  what  the  wicked  through  their  folly  do." 

Antoninus'  conviction  of  the  existence  of  a  divine 
power  and  government  was  founded  on  his  perception 
of  the  order  of  the  universe.  Like  Socrates  (Xen. 
Mem.  iv.  3,  13,  &c.),  he  says  that  though  we  cannot 
see  the  forms  of  divine  powers,  we  know  that  they 
exist  because  we  see  their  works. 

"To  those  who  ask,  Where  hast  thou  seen  the 
gods,  or  how  dost  thou  comprehend  that  they  exist 
and  so  worshippest  them  ?  I  answer,  in  the  first  place, 
that  they  may  be  seen  even  with  the  eyes ;  in  the 
second  place,  neither  have  I  seen  my  own  soul,  and 
yet  I  honor  it.  Thus  then  with  respect  to  the  gods, 
from  what  I  constantly  experience  of  their  power, 
from  this  I  comprehend  that  they  exist,  and  I  ven- 
erate them."  (xii.  28,  and  the  note.  Comp.  Aris- 
totle de  Mundo,  c.  6  ;  Xen.  Mem.  i.  4,  9  ;  Cicero, 
Tuscul.  I.  28,  29  ;  St.  Paul's  Epistle  to  the  Romans, 
I.  19,  20  j  and  Montaigne's  Apology  for  Raimond  de 
Sebonde,  11.  c.  12.)  This  is  a  very  old  argument, 
which  has  always  had  great  weight  with  most  people, 
and  has  appeared  sufficient.  It  does  not  acquire  the 
least  additional  strength  by  being  developed  in  a 
learned  treatise.  It  is  as  intelligible  in  its  simple 
enunciation  as  it  can  be  made.  If  it  is  rejected, 
there  is  no  arguing  with  him  who  rejects  it :  and  if  it 


54  PHILOSOPHY. 

is  worked  out  into  innumerable  particulars,  the  value 
of  the  evidence  runs  the  risk  of  being  buried  under  a 
mass  of  words. 

Man  being  conscious  that  he  is  a  spiritual  power 
or  an  intellectual  power,  or  that  he  has  such  a  power, 
in  whatever  way  he  conceives  that  he  has  it,  —  for  I 
wish  simply  to  state  a  fact,  —  from  this  power  which 
he  has  in  himself,  he  is  led,  as  Antoninus  says,  to 
believe  that  there  is  a  greater  power,  which,  as  the  old 
Stoics  tell  us,  pervades  the  whole  universe  as  the 
intellect^  (vov?)  pervades  man.     (Compare  Epictetus' 

1  I  have  always  translated  the  word  vods,  "  intelligence  "  or 
"  intellect."  It  appears  to  be  the  word  used  by  the  oldest 
Greek  philosophers  to  express  the  notion  of  "  intelligence  " 
as  opposed  to  the  notion  of  *'  matter."  I  have  always  trans- 
lated the  word  X670S  by  "  reason,"  and  XoyiKos  by  the  word 
"  rational,"  or  perhaps  sometimes  "  reasonable,"  as  I  have 
translated  voepos  by  the  word  "  intellectual."  Every  man  who 
has  thought  and  has  read  any  philosophical  writings  knows  the 
difficulty  of  finding  words  to  express  certain  notions,  how  im- 
perfectly words  express  these  notions,  and  how  carelessly  the 
words  are  often  used.  The  various  senses  of  the  word  Xuyo^ 
are  enough  to  perplex  any  man.  Our  translators  of  the  New 
Testament  (St.  John,  c.  i.)  have  simply  translated  6  Xoyos  by 
"  the  word,"  as  the  Germans  translated  it  by  "  das  Wort ;  " 
but  in  their  theological  writings  they  sometimes  retain  the 
original  term  Logos.  The  Germans  have  a  term  Vernunft, 
which  seems  to  come  nearest  to  our  word  Reason,  or  the 
necessary  and  absolute  truths  which  we  cannot  conceive  as 
being  other  than  what  they  are.  Such  are  what  some  people 
have  called  the  laws  of  thought,  the  conceptions  of  space  and 
of  time,  and  axioms  or  first  principles,  which  need  no  proof 
and  cannot  be  proved  or  denied.  Accordingly  the  Germans 
can  say,  "  Gott  ist  die  hochste  Vernunft,"  the   Supreme  Rea- 


MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.  55 

Discourses,  i.  14  ;  and  Voltaire  a  Mad".  Necker,  vol. 
Lxvii.  p.  278,  ed.  Leqiiien. ) 

God  exists  then,  but  what  do^we  know  of  his 
nature?  Antoninus  says  that  the  soul  of  man  is 
an  efflux  from  the  divinity.  We  have  bodies  like 
animals,    but    we    have    reason,    intelligence,    as    the 

son.  The  Germans  have  also  a  word  Verstand,  which  seems 
to  represent  our  word  "  understanding,"  "  intelligence,"  "  in- 
tellect," not  as  a  thing  absolute  which  exists  by  itself,  but  as 
a  thing  connected  with  an  individual  being,  as  a  man.  Ac- 
cordingly it  is  the  ca])acity  of  receiving  impressions  (Vorstel- 
lungen,  (pxvTaaiai),  and  forming  from  them  distinct  ideas 
(Begriffe),  and  perceiving  differences.  I  do  not  think  that 
these  remarks  will  help  the  reader  to  the  understanding  of 
Antoninus,  or  his  use  of  the  words  vods  and  \6yos.  The  em- 
peror's meaning  must  be  got  from  his  own  words,  and  if  it 
does  not  agree  altogether  with  modern  notions  ;  it  is  not  our 
business  to  force  it  into  agreement,  but  simply  to  find  out 
what  his  meaning  is,  if  we  can. 

Justinus  (ad  Diognetum,  c.  vii.)  says  that  the  omnipotent, 
all-creating,  and  invisible  God  has  fixed  truth  and  the  holy, 
incomprehensible  Logos  in  men's  hearts ;  and  this  Logos 
is  the  architect  and  creator  of  the  Universe.  In  the  first 
Apology  (c.  XXXII.)  he  says  that  the  seed  {airkpixa)  from  God 
is  the  Logos,  which  dwells  in  those  who  believe  in  God.  So 
it  appears  that  according  to  Justinus  the  Logos  is  only  in  such 
believers.  In  the  second  Apology  (c.  viii.)  he  speaks  of  the 
seed  of  the  Logos  being  implanted  in  all  mankind;  but  those 
who  order  their  lives  according  to  Logos,  such  as  the  Stoics, 
have  only  a  portion  of  the  Logos  [Kara  aireptxariKod  Xoyov 
yuepos),  and  have  not  the  knowledge  and  contemplation  of  the 
entire  Logos,  which  is  Christ.  Swedenborg's  remarks  (Angelic 
Wisdom,  240)  are  worth  comparing  with  Justinus.  The  mod- 
ern philosopher  in  substance  agrees  with  the  ancient;  but  he  is 
more  precise. 


56  PHILOSOPHY. 

gods.  Animals  have  life  {^xv)}  ^^^  ^^^^^  ^^'^  ^^^^ 
instincts  or  natural  principles  of  action :  but  the 
rational  animal  man  alone  has  a  rational,  intelligent 
soul  (^l/vxv  A-oytK^,  voepd).  x^ntoninus  insists  on  this 
continually :  God  is  in  man/  and  so  we  must  con- 
stantly attend  to  the  divinity  within  us,  for  it  is  only 
in  this  way  that  we  can  have  any  knowledge  of  the 
nature  of  God.  The  human  soul  is  in  a  sense  a 
portion  of  the  divinity,  and  the  soul  alone  has  any 
communication  with  the  Deity ;  for  as  he  says  (xii.  2)  : 
"  With  his  intellectual  part  alone  God  touches  the 
intelligence  only  which  has  flowed  and  been  derived 
from  himself  into  these  bodies."  In  fact  he  says  that 
which  is  hidden  within  a  man  is  life,  that  is,  the  man 
himself.  All  the  rest  is  vesture,  covering,  organs,  in- 
strument, which  the  living  man,  the  reaP  man,  uses 

1  Comp.  Ep.  to  the  Corinthians,  i.  3.  17,  and  Jan.es  iv.  8, 
"  Draw  nigh  to  God  and  he  will  draw  nigh  to  you." 

2  This  is  also  Swedenborg's  doctrine  of  the  soul.  "As  to 
what  concerns  the  soul,  of  which  it  is  said  that  it  shall  live 
after  death,  it  is  nothing  else  but  the  man  himself,  who  lives 
in  the  body,  that  is,  the  interior  man,  who  by  the  body  acts 
in  the  world  and  from  whom  the  body  itself  lives  "  (quoted 
by  Clissold,  p.  456  of  "  The  Practical  Nature  of  the  Theo- 
logical Writings  of  Emanuel  Swedenborg,  in  a  Letter  to  the 
Archbishop  of  Dublin  (Whately),"  second  edition,  1859;  a 
book  which  theologians  might  read  with  profit).  This  is  an 
old  doctrine  of  the  soul,  which  has  been  often  proclaimed,  but 
never  better  expressed  than  by  the  "  Auctor  de  Mundo,"  c.  6, 
quoted  by  Gataker  in  his  "  Antoninus,"  p.  436.  The  soul  by 
which  we  live  and  have  cities  and  houses  is  invisible,  but  it 
is  seen  by  its  works ;  for  the  whole  method  of  life  has  been 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.      57 

for  the  purpose  of  his  present  existence.  The  air  is 
universally  diffused  for  him  who  is  able  to  respire  ;  and 
so  for  him  who  is  willing  to  partake  of  it  the  intelli- 
gent power,  which  holds  within  it  all  things,  is  diffused 
as  wide  and  free  as  the  air  (viii.  54).  It  is  by  living 
a  divine  life  that  man  approaches  to  a  knowledge  of 
the  divinity.^     It  is  by  following  the  divinity  within, 

devised  by  it  and  ordered,  and  by  it  is  held  together.  In  like 
manner  we  must  think  also  about  the  Deity,  who  in  power  is 
most  mighty,  in  beauty  most  comely,  in  life  immortal,  and  in 
virtue  supreme :  wherefore  though  he  is  invisible  to  human 
nature,  he  is  seen  by  his  very  works."  Other  passages  to  the 
same  purpose  are  quoted  by  Gataker  (p.  382).  Bishop  Butler 
has  the  same  as  to  the  soul  :  "  Upon  the  whole,  then,  our 
organs  of  sense  and  our  limbs  are  certainly  instruments,  which 
the  living  persons,  ourselves,  make  use  of  to  perceive  and 
move  with."  If  this  is  not  plain  enough,  he  also  says :  "  It 
follows  that  our  organized  bodies  are  no  more  ourselves,  or 
part  of  ourselves,  than  any  other  matter  around  us."  (Compare 
Anton.  X.  38.) 

1  The  reader  may  consult  Discourse  V.  "  Of  the  existence 
and  nature  of  God,"  in  John  Smith's  "  Select  Discourses." 
He  has  prefixed  as  a  text  to  this  Discourse,  the  striking  pas- 
sage of  Agapetus,  Paraenes.  §  3  :  "  He  who  knows  himself  will 
know  God ;  and  he  who  knows  God  will  be  made  like  to  God  ; 
and  he  will  be  made  like  to  God,  who  has  become  worthy 
Gocl ;  and  he  becomes  worthy  of  God,  who  does  nothing  un- 
worthy of  God,  but  thinks  the  things  that  are  his,  and  speaks 
what  he  thinks,  and  does  what  he  speaks."  I  suppose 
that  the  old  saying,  "  Know  thyself,"  which  is  attributed  to 
Socrates  and  others,  had  a  larger  meaning  than  the  narrow 
sense  which  is  generally  given  to  it.  (Agapetus,  ed.  Stephan. 
Schoning,  Franeker,  1608.  This  volume  contains  also  the 
Paraeneses  of  Nilus.) 


58  PHILOSOPHY. 

cat/xoji/  or  0€6<i,  as  Antoninus  calls  it,  that  man  comes 
nearest  to  the  Deity,  the  supreme  good ;  for  man  can 
never  attain  to  perfect  agreement  with  his  internal 
guide  (^To  y^ye^ovLKov) .  "  Live  with  the  gods.  And 
he  does  live  with  the  gods  who  constantly  shows  to 
them  that  his  own  soul  is  satisfied  with  that  which 
is  assigned  to  him,  and  that  it  does  all  the  daemon 
{^aijXMv)  wishes,  which  Zeus  hath  given  to  every 
man  for  his  guardian  and  guide,  a  portion  of  himself. 
And  this  daemon  is  every  man's  understanding  and 
reason  "    (v.  27). 

There  is  in  man,  that  is  in  the  reason,  the  intelli- 
gence, a  superior  faculty  which  if  it  is  exercised  rules 
all  the  rest.  This  is  the  ruling  faculty  {to  ip/eixoviKov) , 
which  Cicero  (De  Natura  Deorum,  11.  11)  renders  by 
the  Latin  word  Principatus,  ''  to  which  nothing  can 
or  ought  to  be  superior."  Antoninus  often  uses  this 
term  and  others  which  are  equivalent.  He  names 
it  (vii.  64)  "  the  governing  intelligence."  The  gov- 
erning faculty  is  the  master  of  the  soul  (v.  26)- 
A  man  must  reverence  only  his  ruling  faculty  and 
the  divinity  within  him.  As  we  must  reverence  that 
which  is  supreme  in  the  universe,  so  we  must  rever- 
ence that  which  is  supreme  in  ourselves  ;  and  this  is 
that  which  is  of  like  kind  with  that  which  is  supreme 
in  the  universe  (v.  21).  So,  as  Plotinus  says,  the 
soul  of  man  can  only  know  the  divine  so  far  as  it 
knows  itself.  In  one  passage  (xi.  19)  Antoninus 
speaks  of  a  man's  condemnation  of  himself  when 
the   diviner  part   within   him   has   been   overpowered 


MARCUS    AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.  59 

and  yields  to  the  less  honorable  and  to  the  perishable 
part,  the  body,  and  its  gross  pleasures.  In  a  word, 
the  views  of  Antoninus  on  this  matter,  however  his 
expressions  may  vary,  are  exactly  what  Bishop  Butler 
expresses  when  he  speaks  of  "  the  natural  supremacy 
of  reflection  or  conscience,"  of  the  faculty  "  which 
surveys,  approves,  or  disapproves  the  several  affections 
of  our  mind  and  actions  of  our  lives." 

Much  matter  might  be  collected  from  Antoninus  on 
the  notion  of  the  Universe  being  one  animated  Being. 
But  all  that  he  says  amounts  to  no  more,  as  Schultz 
remarks,  than  this  :  the  soul  of  man  is  most  intimately 
united  to  his  body,  and  together  they  make  one  ani- 
mal, which  we  call  man ;  so  the  Deity  is  most  inti- 
mately united  to  the  world,  or  the  material  universe, 
and  together  they  form  one  whole.  But  Antoninus 
did  not  view  God  and  the  material  universe  as  the 
same,  any  more  than  he  viewed  the  body  and  soul  of 
man  as  one.  Antoninus  has  no  speculations  on  the 
absolute  nature  of  the  Deity.  It  was  not  his  fashion 
to  waste  his  time  on  what  man  cannot  understand.^ 
He  was  satisfied  that  God  exists,  that  he  governs  all 
things,  that  man  can  only  have  an  imperfect  knowl- 
edge of  his  nature,  and  he  iflust  attain  this  imperfect 
knowledge  by  reverencing  the  divinity  which  is  within 
him,  and  keeping  it  pure. 

From  all   that   has   been   said,   it   follows   that   the 

1  **  God,  who  is  infinitely  beyond  the  reach  of  our  narrow 
capacities  "  (Locke,  Essay  concerning  the  Human  Understand- 
ing, II.  chap.  17). 


60  PHILOSOPHY. 

universe  is  administered  by  the  Providence  of  God 
(TTpovoia),  and  that  all  things  are  wisely  ordered. 
There  are  passages  in  which  Antoninus  expresses 
doubts,  or  states  different  possible  theories  of  the 
constitution  and  government  of  the  universe ;  but 
he  always  recurs  to  his  fundamental  principle,  that 
if  we  admit  the  existence  of  a  deity,  we  must  also 
admit  that  he  orders  all  things  wisely  and  well  (iv. 
27  ;  VI.  I  ;  IX.  28 ;  xii.  5  ;  and  many  other  passages). 
Epictetus  says  (i.  6)  that  w^e  can  discern  the  provi- 
dence which  rules  the  world,  if  we  possess  two  things, 
—  the  power  of  seeing  all  that  happens  with  respect 
to  each  thing,  and  a  grateful  disposition. 

But  if  all  things  are  wisely  ordered,  how  is  the 
world  so  full  of  what  we  call  evil,  physical  and 
moral?  If  instead  of  saying  that  there  is  evil  in 
the  worki,  we  use  the  expression  which  I  have  used, 
^'what  we  call  evil,"  we  have  partly  anticipated  the 
emperor's  answer.  We  see  and  feel  and  know  im- 
perfectly very  few  things  in  the  few  years  that  we  live, 
and  all  the  knowledge  and  all  the  experience  of  all 
the  human  race  is  positive  ignorance  of  the  whole, 
which  is  infinite.  Now,  as  our  reason  teaches  us  that 
everything  is  in  some  way  related  to  and  connected 
with  every  other  thing,  all  notion  of  evil  as  being  in 
the  universe  of  things  is  a  contradiction  ;  for  if  the 
whole  comes  from  and  is  governed  by  an  intelligent 
being,  it  is  impossible  to  conceive  anything  in  it  which 
tends  to  the  evil  or  destruction  of  the  whole  (viii.  55  ; 
X.  6).     Everything  is  in  constant  mutation,  and  yet 


MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.  6 1 

the  whole  subsists.  We  might  imagine  the  solar  sys- 
tem resolved  into  its  elemental  parts,  and  yet  the 
whole  would  still  subsist  ''  ever  young  and  perfect." 

All  things,  all  forms,  are  dissolved  and  new  forms 
appear.  All  living  things  undergo  the  change  which 
we  call  death.  If  we  call  death  an  evil,  then  all 
change  is  an  evil.  Living  beings  also  suffer  pain,  and 
man  suffers  most  of  all,  for  he  suffers  both  in  and  by 
his  body  and  by  his  intelligent  part.  Men  suffer  also 
from  one  another,  and  perhaps  the  largest  part  of 
human  suffering  comes  to  man  from  those  whom  he 
calls  his  brothers.  Antoninus  says  (viii.  55),  "Gen- 
erally, wickedness  does  no  harm  at  all  to  the  universe  ; 
and  particularly,  the  wickedness  [of  one  man]  does  no 
harm  to  another.  It  is  only  harmful  to  him  who  has 
it  in  his  power  to  be  released  from  it  as  soon  as  he 
shall  choose."  The  first  part  of  this  is  perfectly  con- 
sistent with  the  doctrine  that  the  whole  can  sustain  no 
evil  or  harm.  The  second  part  must  be  explained  by 
the  Stoic  principle  that  there  is  no  evil  in  anything 
which  is  not  in  our  power.  What  wrong  we  suffer 
from  another  is  his  evil,  not  ours.  But  this  is  an  ad- 
mission that  there  is  evil  in  a  sort,  for  he  who  does 
wrong  does  evil,  and  if  others  can  endure  the  wrong, 
still  there  is  evil  in  the  wrong-doer.  Antoninus 
(xi.  18)  gives  many  excellent  precepts  with  respect 
to  wrongs  and  injuries,  and  his  precepts  are  practical. 
He  teaches  us  to  bear  what  we  cannot  avoid,  and  his 
lessons  may  be  just  as  useful  to  him  who  denies  the 
being  and  the  government  of  God  as  to  him  who  be- 


62  PHILOSOPHY. 

lieves  in  both.  There  is  no  direct  answer  in  Antoni- 
nus to  the  objections  which  may  be  made  to  the  ex- 
istence and  providence  of  God  because  of  the  moral 
disorder  and  suffering  which  are  in  the  world,  except 
this  answer  which  he  makes  in  reply  to  the  supposition 
that  even  the  best  men  may  be  extinguished  by  death. 
He  says  if  it  is  so,  we  may  be  sure  that  if  it  ought 
to  have  been  otherwise,  the  gods  would  have  ordered 
it  otherwise  (xii.  5).  His  conviction  of  the  wisdom 
which  we  may  observe  in  the  government  of  the  world 
is  too  strong  to  be  disturbed  by  any  apparent  irregu- 
larities in  the  order  of  things.  That  these  disorders 
exist  is  a  fact,  and  those  who  would  conclude  from 
them  against  the  being  and  government  of  God  con- 
clude too  hastily.  We  all  admit  that  there  is  an 
order  in  the  material  world,  a  Nature,  in  the  sense  in 
which  that  word  has  been  explained,  a  constitution 
(Karao-Keury),  what  we  call  a  system,  a  relation  of  parts 
to  one  another  and  a  fitness  of  the  whole  for  some- 
thing. So  in  the  constitution  of  plants  and  of  animals 
there  is  an  order,  a  fitness  for  some  end.  Sometimes 
the  order,  as  we  conceive  it,  is  interrupted  and  the 
end,  as  we  conceive  it,  is  not  attained.  The  seed, 
the  plant,  or  the  animal  sometimes  perishes  before  it 
has  passed  through  all  its  changes  and  done  all  its 
uses.  It  is  according  to  Nature,  that  is  a  fixed  order, 
for  some  to  perish  early  and  for  others  to  do  all  their 
uses  and  leave  successors  to  take  their  place.  So  man 
has  a  corporeal  and  intellectual  and  moral  constitution 
fit  for  certain  uses,  and  on  the  whole  man  performs 


MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.  6]^ 

these  uses,  dies,  and  leaves  other  men  in  his  place. 
So  society  exists,  and  a  social  state  is  manifestly  the 
natural  state  of  man,  —  the  state  for  which  his  nature 
fits  him,  and  society  amidst  innumerable  irregularities 
and  disorders  still  subsists ;  and  perhaps  we  may  say 
that  the  history  of  the  past  and  our  present  knowl- 
edge give  us  a  reasonable  hope  that  its  disorders 
will  diminiih,  and  that  order,  its  governing  principle 
may  be  more  firmly  established.  As  order  then,  a 
fixed  order,  we  may  say,  subject  to  deviations  real  or 
apparent,  must  be  admitted  to  exist  in  the  whole 
nature  of  things,  that  which  we  call  disorder  or  evil, 
as  it  seems  to  us,  does  not  in  any  way  alter  the  fact  of 
the  general  constitution  of  things  having  a  nature  or 
fixed  order.  Nobody  will  conclude  from  the  exist- 
ence of  disorder  that  order  is  not  the  rule,  for  the  ex- 
istence of  order  both  physical  and  moral  is  proved 
by  daily  experience  and  all  past  experience.  We 
cannot  conceive  how  the  order  of  the  universe  is 
maintained  :  we  cannot  even  conceive  how  our  own 
life  from  day  to  day  is  continued,  nor  how  we  perform 
the  simplest  movements  of  the  body,  nor  how  we  grow 
and  think  and  act,  though  we  know  many  of  the  con- 
ditions which  are  necessary  for  all  these  functions. 
Knowing  nothing  tJien  of  the  unseen  power  which  acts 
in  ourselves  except  by  what  is  done,  we  know  nothing 
of  the  power  which  acts  through  what  we  call  all  time 
and  all  space ;  but  seeing  that  there  is  a  nature  or 
fixed  order  in  all  things  known  to  us,  it  is  conform- 
able to  the  nature  of  our  minds  to  believe  that  this 


64  PHILOSOPHY. 

universal  Nature  has  a  cause  which  operates  continu- 
ally, and  that  we  are  totally  unable  to  speculate  on  the 
reason  of  any  of  those  disorders  or  evils  which  we  per- 
ceive. This  I  believe  is  the  answer  which  may  be 
collected  from  all  that  Antoninus  has  said.-^ 

The  origin  of  evil  is  an  old  question.  Achilles  tells 
Priam  (Hiad,  24,  527)  that  Zeus  has  two  casks,  one 
filled  with  good  things,  and  the  other  with  bad,  and 
that  he  gives  to  men  out  of  each  according  to  his 
pleasure ;  and  so  we  must  be  content,  for  we  cannot 
alter  the  will  of  Zeus.  One  of  the  Greek  commen- 
tators asks  how  must  we  reconcile  this  doctrine  with 
what  we  find  in  the  first  book  of  the  Odyssey,  where 
the  king  of  the  gods  says,  Men  say  that  evil  comes  to 
them  from  us,  but  they  bring  it  on  themselves  through 
their  own  folly.  The  answer  is  plain  enough  even 
to  the  Greek  commentator.  The  poets  make  both 
Achilles  and  Zeus  speak  appropriately  to  their  several 
characters.  Indeed,  Zeus  says  plainly  that  men  do 
attribute  their  sufferings  to  the  gods,  but  they  do  it 
falsely,  for  they  are  the  cause  of  their  own  sorrows. 

Epictetus  in  his  Enchiridion  (c.  27)  makes  short 
work  of  the  question  of  evil.  He  says,  "  As  a  mark  is 
not  set  up  for  the  purpose  of  missing  it,  so  neither 

1  Cleanthes  says  in  his  Hymn :  — 

"  For  all  things  good  and  bad  to  One  thou  formest, 
So  that  One  everlasting  reason  governs  all." 

See  Bishop  Butler's  Sermons.  Sermon  XV,,  "  Upon  the  Igno- 
rance of  Man." 


MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.  6$ 

does  the  nature  of  evil  exist  in  the  universe."  This 
will  appear  obscure  enough  to  those  who  are  not 
acquainted  with  Epictetus,  but  he  always  knows  what 
he  is  talking  about.  We  do  not  set  up  a  mark  in 
order  to  miss  it,  though  we  may  miss  it.  God,  whose 
existence  Epictetus  assumes,  has  not  ordered  all  things 
so  that  his  purpose  shall  fail.  Whatever  there  may  be 
of  what  we  call  evil,  the  nature  of  evil,  as  he  expresses 
it,  does  not  exist ;  that  is,  evil  is  not  a  part  of  the 
constitution  or  nature  of  things.  If  there  were  a 
principle  of  evil  (ypx^)  ^^  ^^^  constitution  of  things, 
evil  would  no  longer  be  evil,  as  Simplicius  argues,  but 
evil  would  be  good.  Simplicius  (c.  34,  [27])  has  a 
long  and  curious  discourse  on  this  text  of  Epictetus, 
and  it  is  amusing  and  instructive. 

One  passage  more  will  conclude  this  matter.  It 
contains  all  that  the  emperor  could  say  (11.  11)  :  ''To 
go  from  among  men,  if  there  are  gods,  is  not  a  thing 
to  be  afraid  of,  for  the  gods  will  not  involve  thee  in 
evil ;  but  if  indeed  they  do  not  exist,  or  if  they  have 
no  concern  about  human  affairs,  what  is  it  to  me  to 
live  in  a  universe  devoid  of  gods  or  devoid  of  provi- 
dence ?  But  in  truth  they  do  exist,  and  they  do  care 
for  human  things,  and  they  have  put  all  the  means  in 
man's  power  to  enable  him  not  to  fall  into  real  evils. 
And  as  to  the  rest,  if  there  was  anything  evil,  they 
would  have  provided  for  this  also,  that  it  should  be 
altogether  in  a  man's  power  not  to  fall  into  it.  But 
that  which  does  not  make  a  man  worse,  how  can  it 
make  a  man's  hfe  worse  ?     But  neither  through  igno- 


66  PHILOSOPHY. 

ranee,  nor  having  the  knowledge  but  not  the  power  to 
guard  agamst  or  correct  these  things,  is  it  possible 
that  the  nature  of  the  universe  has  overlooked  them ; 
nor  is  it  possible  that  it  has  made  so  great  a  mistake, 
either  through  want  of  power  or  want  of  skill,  that 
good  and  evil  should  happen  indiscriminately  to  the 
good  and  the  bad.  But  death  certainly  and  life, 
honor  and  dishonor,  pain  and  pleasure,  all  these 
things  equally  happen  to  good  and  bad  men,  being 
things  which  make  us  neither  better  nor  worse. 
Therefore  they  are  neither  good  nor  evil." 

The  Ethical  part  of  Antoninus'  Philosophy  follows 
from  his  general  principles.  The  end  of  all  his  philo- 
sophy is  to  live  conformably  to  Nature,  both  a  man's 
own  nature  and  the  nature  of  the  universe.  Bishop 
Butler  has  explained  what  the  Greek  philosophers 
meant  when  they  spoke  of  living  according  to  Nature, 
and  he  says  that  when  it  is  explained,  as  he  has  ex- 
plained it  and  as  they  understood  it,  it  is  "  a  manner 
of  speaking  not  loose  and  undeterminate,  but  clear 
and  distinct,  strictly  just  and  true."  To  live  accord- 
ing to  Nature  is  to  live  according  to  a  man's  whole 
nature,  not  according  to  a  part  of  it,  and  to  reverence 
the  divinity  wdthin  him  as  the  governor  of  all  his 
actions.  "  To  the  rational  animal  the  same  act  is  ac- 
cording to  nature  and  according  to  reason"^  (vii.  ii). 
That  which  is  done  contrary  to  reason  is  also  an  act 

1  This  is  what  Juvenal  means  when  he  says  (xiv.  321), — 
"  Nunquam  aliud  Natura  aliud  Sapientia  elicit." 


MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.  6/ 

contrary  to  nature,  to  the  whole  nature,  though  it  is 
certainly  conformable  to  some  part  of  man's  nature, 
or  it  could  not  be  done.  Man  is  made  for  action,  not 
for  idleness  or  pleasure.  As  plants  and  animals  do 
the  uses  of  their  nature,  so  man  must  do  his  (v.  i). 

Man  must  also  live  conformably  to  the  universal 
nature,  conformably  to  the  nature  of  all  things  of 
which  he  is  one ;  and  as  a  citizen  of  a  political  com- 
munity he  must  direct  his  life  and  actions  with  refer- 
ence to  those  among  whom,  and  for  whom,  among 
other  purposes,  he  lives.^  A  man  must  not  retire  into 
soUtude  and  cut  himself  off  from  his  fellow-men.  He 
must  be  ever  active  to  do  his  part  in  the  great  whole. 
All  men  are  his  kin,  not  only  m  blood,  but  still  more 
by  participating  in  the  same  intelligence  and  by  being 
a  portion  of  the  same  divinity.  A  man  cannot  really 
be  injured  by  his  brethren,  for  no  act  of  theirs  can 
make  him  bad,  and  he  must  not  be  angry  with  them 
nor  hate  them  :  "  For  we  are  made  for  co-operation, 
like  feet,  like  hands,  like  eyelids,  like  the  rows  of  the 
upper  and  lower  teeth.  To  act  against  one  another 
then  is  contrary  to  nature  ;  and  it  is  acting  against 
one  another  to  be  vexed  and  to  turn  away"  (ii.  i). 

Further  he  says  :  "  Take  pleasure  in  one  thing  and 
rest  in  it  in  passing  from  one  social  act  to  another 
social  act,  thinking  of  God  "  (vi.  7).  Again  :  *'  Love 
mankind.  Follow  God  "  (vii.  31).  It  is  the  charac- 
teristic of  the  rational  soul  for  a  man  to  love  his 
neighbor  (xi.  i).  Antoninus  teaches  in  various  pas- 
1  See  VIII.  52;  and  Persius  ill.  66. 


68  PHILOSOPHY. 

sages  the  forgiveness  of  injuries,  and  we  know  that  he 
also  practised  what  he  taught.  Bishop  Butler  remarks 
that  ''this  divine  precept 'to  forgive  injuries  and  to 
love  our  enemies,  though  to  be  met  with  in  Gentile 
moralists,  yet  is  in  a  peculiar  sense  a  precept  of  Chris- 
tianity, as  our  Saviour  has  insisted  more  upon  it  than 
on  any  other  single  virtue."  The  practice  of  this  pre- 
cept is  the  most  difficult  of  all  virtues.  Antoninus 
often  enforces  it  and  gives  us  aid  towards  following  it. 
When  we  are  injured,  we  feel  anger  and  resentment, 
and  the  feeling  is  natural,  just,  and  useful  for  the  con- 
servation of  society.  It  is  useful  that  wrong-doers 
should  feel  the  natural  consequences  of  their  actions, 
among  which  is  the  disapprobation  of  society  and  the 
resentment  of  him  who  is  wronged.  But  revenge,  in 
the  proper  sense  of  that  word,  must  not  be  practised. 
"The  best  way  of  avenging  thyself,"  says  the  emperor, 
"  is  not  to  become  hke  the  wrong-doer."  It  is  plain 
by  this  that  he  does  not  mean  that  we  should  in  any 
case  practise  revenge ;  but  he  says  to  those  who  talk 
of  revenging  wrongs.  Be  not  like  him  who  has  done 
the  wrong.  Socrates  in  the  Crito  (c.  lo)  says  the 
same  in  other  words,  and  St.  Paul  (Ep.  to  the 
Romans,  xii.  17).  "When  a  man  has  done  thee  any 
wrong,  immediately  consider  with  what  opinion  about 
good  or  evil  he  has  done  wrong.  For  when  thou  hast 
seen  this,  thou  wilt  pity  him  and  wilt  neither  won- 
der nor  be  angry"  (vii.  26).  Antoninus  would  not 
deny  that  wrong  natufally  produces  the  feeling  of 
anger  and  resentment,  for  this  is  imphed  in  the  recom- 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.      69 

mendation  to  reflect  on  the  nature  of  the  man's  mind 
who  has  done  the  wrong,  and  then  you  will  have 
pity  instead  of  resentment ;  and  so  it  comes  to  the 
same  as  St.  Paul's  advice  to  be  angry  and  sin  not ; 
which,  as  Butler  well  explains  it,  is  not  a  recommen- 
dation to  be  angry,  which  nobody  needs,  for  anger  is 
a  natural  passion,  but  it  is  a  warning  against  allowing 
anger  to  lead  us  into  sin.  In  short  the  emperor's 
doctrine  about  wrongful  acts  is  this  :  wrong- doers  do 
not  know  what  good  and  bad  are  :  they  offend  out  of 
ignorance,  and  in  the  sense  of  the  Stoics  this  is  true. 
Though  this  kind  of  ignorance  will  never  be  admitted 
as  a  legal  excuse,  and  ought  not  to  be  admitted  as  a 
full  excuse  in  any  way  by  society,  there  may  be  griev- 
ous injuries,  such  as  it  is  in  a  man's  power  to  forgive 
without  harm  to  society ;  and  if  he  forgives  because 
he  sees  that  his  enemies  know  not  what  they  do,  he  is 
acting  in  the  spirit  of  the  sublime  prayer,  "  Father, 
forgive  them,  for  they  know  not  what  they  do." 

The  emperor's  moral  philosophy  was  not  a  feeble, 
narrow  system,  which  teaches  a  man  to  look  directly 
to  his  own  happiness,  though  a  man's  happiness  or 
tranquilhty  is  indirectly  promoted  by  living  as  he  ought 
to  do.  A  man  must  live  conformably  to  the  universal 
nature,  which  means,  as  the  emperor  explains  it  in 
many  passages,  that  a  man's  actions  must  be  conform- 
able to  his  true  relations  to  all  other  human  beings, 
both  as  a  citizen  of  a  political  community  and  as  a 
member  of  the  whole  human  family.  This  implies, 
and  he  often  expresses  it  in  the   most  forcible  Ian- 


70  PHILOSOPHY. 

guage,  that  a  man's  words  and  action,  so  far  as  they 
affect  others,  must  be  measured  by  a  fixed  rule,  which 
is  their  consistency  with  the  conservation  and  the  in- 
terests of  the  particular  society  of  which  he  is  a 
member,  and  of  the  whole  human  race.  To  live  con- 
formably to  such  a  rule,  a  man  must  use  his  rational 
faculties  in  order  to  discern  clearly  the  consequences 
and  full  effect  of  all  his  actions  and  of  the  actions  of 
others  :  he  must  not  live  a  life  of  contemplation  and 
reflection  only,  though  he  must  often  retire  within 
himself  to  calm  and  purify  his  soul  by  thought,^  but 
he  must  mingle  in  the  work  of  man  and  be  a  fellow 
laborer  for  the  general  good. 

A  man  should  have  an  object  or  purpose  in  life, 
that  he  may  direct  all  his  energies  to  it ;  of  course  a 
a  good  object  (ii.  7).  He  who  has  not  one  object 
or  purpose  of  life,  cannot  be  one  and  the  same  all 
through  his  life  (xi.  21).  Bacon  has  a  remark  to 
the  same  effect,  on  the  best  means  of  "  reducing  of 
the  mind  unto  virtue  and  good  estate ;  which  is,  the 
electing  and  propounding  unto  a  man's  self  good  and 
virtuous  ends  of  his  life,  such  as  may  be  in  a  reason- 
able sort  within  his  compass  to  attain."  He  is  a 
happy  man  who  has  been  wise  enough  to  do  this 
when  he  was  young  and  has  had  the  opportunities ; 
but  the  emperor  seeing  well  that  a  man  cannot  always 
be  so  wise  in  his  youth,  encourages  himself  to  do  it 
when  he  can,  and  not  to  let  life  slip  away  before  he 

1  Ut  nemo  in  sese  tentat  descendere,  nemo.  —  Persius, 
IV.  21. 


MARCUS   AURELIUS    ANTONINUS.  7 1 

has  begun.  He  who  can  propose  to  himself  good 
and  virtuous  ends  of  Ufe,  and  be  true  to  them,  cannot 
fail  to  live  conformably  to  his  own  interest  and  the 
universal  interest,  for  in  the  nature  of  things  they  are 
one.  If  a  thing  is  not  good  for  the  hive,  it  is  not 
good  for  the  bee  (vi.  54). 

One  passage  may  end  this  matter.  ^'  If  the  gods 
have  determined  about  me  and  about  the  things 
which  must  happen  to  me,  they  have  determined  well, 
for  it  is  not  easy  even  to  imagine  a  deity  without  fore- 
thought ;  and  as  to  doing  me  harm,  why  should  they 
have  any  desire  towards  that?  For  what  advantage 
would  result  to  them  from  this  or  to  the  whole,  which 
is  the  special  object  of  their  providence?  But  if  they 
have  not  determined  about  me  individually,  they  have 
certainly  determined  about  the  whole  at  least ;  and 
the  things  which  happen  by  way  of  sequence  in  this 
general  arrangement  I  ought  to  accept  with  pleasure 
and  to  be  content  with  them.  But  if  they  determine 
about  nothing  —  which  it  is  wicked  to  believe,  or  if 
we  do  believe  it,  let  us  neither  sacrifice  nor  pray  nor 
swear  by  them,  nor  do  anything  else  which  we  do  as  if 
the  gods  were  present  and  lived  with  us  ;  but  if  how- 
ever the  gods  determine  about  none  of  the  things 
which  concern  us,  I  am  able  to  determine  about  my- 
self, and  I  can  inquire  about  that  which  is  useful ; 
and  that  is  useful  to  every  man  which  is  conformable 
to  his  own  constitution  (/carao-Kevr/)  and  nature.  But 
my  nature  is  rational  and  social ;  and  my  city  and 
country,  so  far  as  I  am  Antoninus,  is  Rome ;  but  so 


72  PHILOSOPHY. 

far  as  I  am  a  man,  it  is  the  world.  The  things  then 
which  are  useful  to  these  cities  are  alone  useful  to 
me  "  (VI.  44). 

It  would  be  tedious,  and  it  is  not  necessary  to  state 
the  emperor's  opinions  on  all  the  ways  in  which  a 
man  may  profitably  use  his  understanding  towards 
perfecting  himself  in  practical  virtue.  The  passages 
to  this  purpose  are  in  all  parts  of  his  book,  but  as 
they  are  in  no  order  or  connection,  a  man  must  use 
the  book  a  long  time  before  he  will  find  out  all  that  is 
in  it.  A  few  words  may  be  added  here.  If  we  ana- 
lyze all  other  things,  we  find  how  insufficient  they  are 
for  human  life,  and  how  truly  worthless  many  of  them 
are.  Virtue  alone  is  indivisible,  one,  and  perfectly 
satisfying.  The  notion  of  Virtue  cannot  be  consid- 
ered vague  or  unsettled,  because  a  man  may  find  it 
difficult  to  explain  the  notion  fully  to  himself,  or 
to  expound  it  to  others  in  such  a  way  as  to  prevent 
cavilling.  Virtue  is  a  whole,  and  no  more  consists  of 
parts  than  man's  intelligence  does ;  and  yet  we  speak 
of  various  intellectual  faculties  as  a  convenient  way  of 
expressing  the  various  powers  which  man's  intellect 
shows  by  his  works.  In  the  same  way  we  may  speak 
of  various  virtues  or  parts  of  virtue,  in  a  practical 
sense,  for  the  purpose  of  showing  what  particular  vir- 
tues we  ought  to  practice  in  order  to  the  exercise  of 
the  whole  of  virtue,  that  is,  as  much  as  man's  nature 
is  capable  of. 

The  prime  principle  in  man's  constitution  is  social. 
The  next  in  order  is  not  to  yield  to  the  persuasions 


MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.  'J -^ 

of  the  body,  when  they  are  not  conformable  to  the 
rational  principle,  which  must  govern.  The  third  is 
freedom  from  error  and  from  deception.  ''  Let  then 
the  ruling  principle  holding  fast  to  these  things  go 
straight  on  and  it  has  what  is  its  own"  (vii.  55). 
The  emperor  selects  justice  as  the  virtue  which  is  the 
basis  of  all  the  rest  (x.  11),  and  this  had  been  said 
long  before  his  time. 

It  is  true  that  all  people  have  some  notion  of  what 
is  meant  by  justice  as  a  disposition  of  the  mind,  and 
some  notion  about  acting  in  conformity  to  this  dispo- 
sition ;  but  experience  shows  that  men's  notions  about 
justice  are  as  confused  as  their  actions  are  inconsis- 
tent with  the  true  notion  of  justice.  The  emperor's 
notion  of  justice  is  clear  enough,  but  not  practical 
enough  for  all  mankind.  "  Let  there  be  freedom 
from  perturbations  with  respect  to  the  things  which 
come  from  the  external  cause ;  and  let  there  be  jus- 
tice in  the  things  done  by  virtue  of  the  internal  cause, 
that  is,  let  there  be  movement  and  action  terminating 
in  this,  in  social  acts,  for  this  is  according  to  thy 
nature"  (ix.  31).  In  another  place  (ix.  i)  he  says 
that  "he  who  acts  unjustly  acts  impiously,"  which  fol- 
lows of  course  from  all  that  he  says  in  various  places. 
He  insists  on  the  practice  of  truth  as  a  virtue  and  as 
a  means  to  virtue,  which  no  doubt  it  is  :  for  lying 
even  in  indifferent  things  weakens  the  understanding ; 
and  lying  maliciously  is  as  great  a  moral  offence  as  a 
man  can  be  guilty  of,  viewed  both  as  showing  an  habit- 
ual disposition,  and  viewed  with    respect  to  conse- 


74  PHILOSOPHY. 

quences.  He  couples  the  notion  of  justice  with 
action.  A  man  must  not  pride  himself  on  having 
some  fine  notion  of  justice  in  his  head,  but  he  must 
exhibit  his  justice  in  act,  like  St.  James's  notion  of 
faith.     But  this  is  enough. 

The  Stoics,  and  Antoninus  among  them,  call  some 
things  beautiful  (/caXa)  and  some  ugly  (ato-xpa),  and 
as  they  are  beautiful  so  they  are  good,  and  as  they  are 
ugly  so  they  are  evil,  or  bad  (ii.  i).  All  these  things, 
good  and  evil,  are  in  our  power,  absolutely  some  of  the 
stricter  Stoics  would  say ;  in  a  manner  only,  as  those 
who  would  not  depart  altogether  from  common  sense 
would  say ;  practically  they  are  to  a  great  degree  in 
the  power  of  some  persons  and  in  some  circumstances, 
but  in  a  small  degree  only  in  other  persons  and  in 
other  circumstances.  The  Stoics  maintain  man's  free 
will  as  to  the  things  which  are  in  his  power ;  for  as  to 
the  things  which  are  out  of  his  power,  free  will  ter- 
minating in  action  is  of  course  excluded  by  the  very 
terms  of  the  expression.  I  hardly  know  if  we  can 
discover  exactly  Antoninus'  notion  of  the  free  will  of 
man,  nor  is  the  question  worth  the  inquiry.  What  he 
does  mean  and  does  say  is  inteUigible.  All  the  things 
which  are  not  in  our  power  (dTrpoatpera)  are  indiffer- 
ent :  they  are  neither  good  nor  bad,  morally.  Such 
are  life,  health,  wealth,  power,  disease,  poverty,  and 
death.  Life  and  death  are  all  men's  portion.  Health, 
wealth,  power,  disease,  and  poverty  happen  to  men, 
indifferently  to  the  good  and  to  the  bad  ;  to  those 
who  live   according  to  nature  and  to  those  who  do 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.      75 

not.^  "  Life,"  says  the  emperor,  ''  is  a  warfare  and 
a  stranger's  sojourn,  and  after  fame  is  oblivion " 
(11.  17).  After  speaking  of  those  men  who  have  dis- 
turbed the  world  and  then  died,  and  of  the  death  of 
philosophers  such  as  Heraclitus  and  Democritus,  who 
was  destroyed  by  lice,  and  of  Socrates  whom  other 
lice  (his  enemies)  destroyed,  he  says :  "  What  means 
all  this?  Thou  hast  embarked,  thou  hast  made  the 
voyage,  thou  art  come  to  shore ;  get  out.  If  indeed 
to  another  life,  there  is  no  want  of  gods,  not  even 
there.  But  if  to  a  state  without  sensation,  thou  wilt 
cease  to  be  held  by  pains  and  pleasures,  and  to  be  a 
slave  to  the  vessel  which  is  as  much  inferior  as  that 
which  serves  it  is  superior :  for  the  one  is  intelligence 
and  Deity;  the  other  is  earth  and  corruption"  (iii.  3). 
It  is  not  death  that  a  man  should  fear,  but  he  should 
fear  never  beginning  to  live  according  to  nature 
(xii.  I ) .  Every  man  should  live  in  such  a  way  as  to 
discharge  his  duty,  and  to  trouble  himself  about  noth- 
ing else.  He  should  live  such  a  life  that  he  shall 
always  be  ready  for  death,  and  shall  depart  content 
when  the  summons  comes.     For  what  is  death ?     "A 

1  **  All  events  come  alike  to  all :  there  is  one  event  to  the 
righteous  and  to  the  wicked :  to  the  good  and  to  the  clean  and 
to  the  unclean,"  &c.  (Ecclesiastes,  ix.  v.  2) ;  and  (v.  3),  "This 
is  an  evil  among  all  things  that  are  done  under  the  sun,  that 
there  is  one  event  unto  all."  In  what  sense  "evil"  is  meant 
here  seems  rather  doubtful.  There  is  no  doubt  about  the  em- 
peror's meaning.  Compare  Epictetus,  Enchiridion,  c.  i.,  &c. ; 
and  the  doctrine  of  the  Brachmans  (Strabo.  p.  713,  ed.  Cas.)  : 
dyadbv  de  tj  KaKbv  /xrjdh  ehai.  tQiv  crvfx^acvdvTuv  dvdpuTOis. 


y6  PHILOSOPHY. 

cessation  of  the  impressions  through  the  senses,  and 
of  the  puihng  of  the  strings  which  move  the  appetites, 
and  of  the  discursive  movements  of  the  thoughts,  and 
of  the  service  to  the  flesh"  (vi.  28).  Death  is  such 
as  generation  is,  a  mystery  of  nature  (iv.  5).  In  an- 
other passage,  the  exact  meaning  of  which  is  perhaps 
doubtful  (ix.  3),  he  speaks  of  the  child  which  leaves 
the  womb,  and  so  he  says  the  soul  at  death  leaves  its 
envelope.  As  the  child  is  born  or  comes  into  life  by 
leaving  the  womb,  so  the  soul  may  on  leaving  the 
body  pass  into  another  existence  which  is  perfect.  I 
am  not  sure  if  this  is  the  emperor's  meaning.  Butler 
compares  it  with  a  passage  in  Strabo  (p.  713)  about 
the  Brachmans'  notion  of  death  being  the  birth  into 
real  life  and  a  happy  life,  to  those  who  have  philoso- 
phized ;  and  he  thinks  Antoninus  may  allude  to  this 
opinion.^ 

Antoninus'  opinion  of  a  future  life  is  nowhere  clearly 
expressed.  His  doctrine  of  the  nature  of  the  soul  of 
necessity  implies  that  it  does  not  perish  absolutely,  for 
a- portion  of  the  divinity  cannot  perish.^  The  opinion 
is  at   least  as  old   as   the  time  of  Epicharmus  and 

1  Seneca  (Ep.  102)  has  the  same,  whether  an  expression  of 
his  own  opinion,  or  merely  a  fine  saying  of  others  employed  to 
embellish  his  writings,  I  know  not.  After  speaking  of  the  child 
being  prepared  in  the  womb  to  live  this  life,  he  adds,  *'  Sic  per 
hoc  spatium,  quod  ab  infantia  patet  in  senectutem,  in  alium 
naturae  sumimur  partum.  Alia  origo  nos  expectat,  alius  rerum 
status."     See  Ecclesiastes,  xii.  7  ;  and  Lucan,  i.  457  :  — 

"  Longae,  canitis  si  cognita,  vitae 
Mors  media  est." 


MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.  JJ 

Euripides  ;  what  comes  from  earth  goes  back  to  earth, 
and  what  comes  from  heaven,  the  divinity,  returns  to 
him  who  gave  it.  But  I  find  nothing  clear  in  Antoni- 
nus as  to  the  notion  of  the  man  existing  after  death  so 
as  to  be  conscious  of  his  sameness  with  that  soul  which 
occupied  his  vessel  of  clay.  He  seems  to  be  per- 
plexed on  this  matter,  and  finally  to  have  rested  in 
this,  that  God  or  the  gods  will  do  whatever  is  best, 
and  consistent  with  the  university  of  things. 

Nor,  I  think,  does  he  speak  conclusively  on  another 
Stoic  doctrine,  which  some  Stoics  practised,  —  the  an- 
ticipating the  regular  course  of  nature  by  a  man's  own 
act.  The  reader  will  find  some  passages  in  which 
this  is  touched  on,  and  he  may  make  of  them  what  he 
can.  But  there  are  passages  in  which  the  emperor 
encourages  himself  to  wait  for  the  end  patiently  and 
with  tranquillity ;  and  certainly  it  is  consistent  with  all 
his  best  teaching  that  a  man  should  bear  all  that  falls 
to  his  lot  and  do  useful  acts  as  long  as  he  lives.  He 
should  not  therefore  abridge  the  time  of  his  usefulness 
by  his  own  act.  Whether  he  contemplates  any  possi- 
ble cases  in  which  a  man  should  die  by  his  own  hand, 
I  cannot  tell ;  and  the  matter  is  not  worth  a  curious 
inquiry,  for  I  believe  it  would  not  lead  to  any  certain 
result  as  to  his  opinion  on  this  point.  I  do  not  think 
that  Antoninus,  who  never  mentions  Seneca,  though 
he  must  have  known  all  about  him,  would  have  agreed 
with  Seneca  when  he  gives  as  a  reason  for  suicide,  that 
the  eternal  law,  whatever  he  means,  has  made  noth- 
ing better  for  us  than  this,  that  it  has  given  us  only 


78  PHILOSOPHY. 

one  way  of  entering  into  life  and  many  ways  of  going 
out  of  it.  The  ways  of  going  out  indeed  are  many, 
and  that  is  a  good  reason  for  a  man  taking  care  of 
himself.^ 

I  Happiness  was  not  the  direct  object  of  a  Stoic's  Ufe. 
'There  is  no  rule  of  life  contained  in  the  precept  that 
a  man  should  pursue  his  own  happiness.  ^Many  men 
think  that  they  are  seeking  happiness  when  they  are 
only  seeking  the  gratification  of  some  particular  pas- 
sion, the  strongest  that  they  have.  The  end  of  a  man  is, 
as  already  explained,  to  live  conformably  to  nature,  and 
he  will  thus  obtain  happiness,  tranquillity  of  mind-,  and 
contentment  (iii.  12;  viii.  i,  and  other  places).  Asa 
means  of  living  conformably  to  nature  he  must  study 
the  four  chief  virtues,  each  of  which  has  its  proper 
sphere  :  wisdom,  or  the  knowledge  of  good  and  evil ; 
justice,  or  the  giving  to  every  man  his  due ;  fortitude, 
or  the  enduring  of  labor  and  pain ;  and  temperance, 
which  is  moderation  in  all  things.  By  thus  living  con- 
formably to  nature  the  Stoic  obtained  all  that  he  wished 
or  expected.  His  reward  was  in  his  virtuous  life,  and 
he  was  satisfied  with  that.  Some  Greek  poet  long  ago 
wrote  :  — 

"  For  virtue  only  of  all  human  things 
Takes  her  reward  not  from  the  hands  of  others. 
Virtue  herself  rewards  the  toils  of  virtue." 

Some  of  the  Stoics  indeed  expressed  themselves  in 
very  arrogant,  absurd  terms,  about  the  wise  man's  self- 

1  See   Plinius   H.   N.  11.',    c.  7;    Seneca,  De  Provid.  c  6.  ; 
and  Ep.  70  :  "  Nihil  melius  aeterna  lex,"  &c. 


MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.  79 

sufficiency ;  they  elevated  him  to  the  rank  of  a  deity.^ 
But  these  were  only  talkers  and  lecturers,  such  as 
those  in  all  ages  who  utter  fine  words,  know  little  of 
human  affairs,  and  care  only  for  notoriety.  Epictetus 
and  Antoninus  both  by  precept  and  example  labored 
to  improve  themselves  and  others  ;  and  if  we  discover 
imperfections  in  their  teaching,  we  must  still  honor 
these  great  men  who  attempted  to  show  that  there  is 
in  man's  nature  and  in  the  constitution  of  things  suffi-  . 
cient  reason  for  living  a  virtuous  life.  /It  is  difficult 
enough  to  live  as  we  ought  to  live,  difficult  even  for 
any  man  to  live  in  such  a  way  as  to  satisfy  himself,  if 
he  exercises  only  in  a  moderate  degree  the  power  of 
reflecting  upon  and  reviewing  his  own  conduct ;  and 
if  all  men  cannot  be  brought  to  the  same  opinions  in 
morals  and  religion,  it  is  at  least  worth  while  to  give 
them  good  reasons  for  as  much  as  they  can  be  per- 
suaded to  accept. 

1  J.  Smith  in  his  Select  Discourses  on  "  the  Excellency  and 
Nobleness  of  True  Religion"  (c.  vi.)  has  remarked  on  this 
Stoical  arrogance.  He  finds  it  in  Seneca  and  others.  In 
Seneca  certainly,  and  perhaps  something  of  it  in  Epictetus ; 
but  it  is  not  in  Antoninus. 


THE    THOUGHTS 


OF 


MARCUS   AURELIUS  ANTONINUS. 


I. 

TIj^ROM  my  grandfather  Verus  ^   [I  learned]   good 
morals  and  the  government  of  my  temper. 

2.  From   the   reputation  and   remembrance  of  my 
father,^  modesty  and  a  manly  character. 

3.  From  my  mother,^  piety  and  beneficence,  and 
abstinence,  not  only  from   evil  deeds,  but  even  from 

^  Annius  Verus  was  his  grandfather's  name.  There  is  no 
verb  in  this  section  connected  witli  the  word  "  from,"  nor  in  the 
following  sections  of  this  book  ;  and  it  is  not  quite  certain  what 
verb  should  be  supplied.  What  I  have  added  may  express  the 
meaning  here,  though  there  are  sections  which  it  will  not  fit. 
If  he  does  not  mean  to  say  that  he  learned  all  these  good  things 
from  the  several  persons  whom  he  mentions,  he  means  that  he 
observed  certain  good  qualities  in  them,  or  received  certain 
benefits  from  them,  and  it  is  implied  that  he  was  the  better  for 
it,  or  at  least  might  have  been ;  for  it  would  be  a  mistake  to 
understand  Marcus  as  saying  that  he  possessed  all  the  virtues 
which  he  observed  in  his  kinsmen  and  teachers. 

2  His  father's  name  was  Annius  Verus. 

3  His  mother  was  Domitia  Calvilla,  named  also  Lucilla. 

6 


^SJC^t 


82  THOUGHTS.  [Book  I. 

evil    thoughts ;  and  further,  simpUcity   in   my  way  of 
living,  far  removed  from   the  habits  of  the  rich. 

4.  From  my  great-grandfather/  not  to  have  fre- 
quented public  schools,  and  to  have  had  good  teachers 
at  home,  and  to  know  that  on  such  things  a  man 
should  spend  liberally. 

5.  From  my  governor,  to  be  neither  of  the  green 
nor  of  the  blue  party  at  the  games  in  the  Circus,  nor 
a  partisan  either  of  the  Parmularius  or  the  Scutarius 
at  the  gladiators*  fights ;  from  him  too  I  learned  en- 
durance of  labor,  and  to  want  little,  and  to  work  with 
my  own  hands,  and  not  to  meddle  with  other  people's 
affairs,  and  not  to  be  ready  to  listen  to  slander. 

6.  From  Diognetus,^  not  to  busy  myself  about  trifling 
things,  and  not  to  give  credit  to  what  was  said  by 
miracle- workers  and  jugglers  about  incantations  and 
the  driving  away  of  daemons  and  such  things ;  and 
not  to  breed  quails  [for  fighting],  nor  to  give  myself 

1  Perhaps  his  mother's  grandfather,  Catilius  Severus. 

2  In  the  works  of  Justinus  there  is  printed  a  letter  to  one 
Diognetus,  whom  the  writer  names  "  most  excellent."  He  was 
a  Gentile,  but  he  wished  very  much  to  know  what  the  religion 
of  the  Christians  was,  what  God  they  worshipped,  and  how  this 
worship  made  them  despise  the  world  and  death,  and  neither 
believe  in  the  gods  of  the  Greeks  nor  observe  the  superstition 
of  the  Jews ;  and  what  was  this  love  to  one  another  which  they 
had,  and  why  this  new  kind  of  religion  was  introduced  now 
and  not  before.  My  friend  Mr.  Jenkins,  rector  of  Lyminge  in 
Kent,  has  suggested  to  me  that  this  Diognetus  may  have  been 
the  tutor  of  M.  Antoninus. 


Book  I.]    MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.  83 

up  passionately  to  such  things  ;  and  to  endure  freedom 
of  speech ;  and  to  have  become  intimate  with  philoso- 
phy; and  to  have  been  a  hearer,  first  of  Bacchius, 
then  of  Tandasis  and  Marcianus  ;  and  to  have  written 
dialogues  in  my  youth ;  and  to  have  desired  a  plank 
bed  and  skin,  and  whatever  else  of  the  kind  belongs 
to  the  Grecian  discipline. 

7.  From  Rusticus  ^  I  received  the  impression  that 
my  character  required  improvement  and  discipline; 
and  from  him  I  learned  not  to  be  led  astray  to  sophis- 
tic emulation,  nor  to  writing  on  speculative  matters, 
nor  to  delivering  little  hortatory  orations,  nor  to  show- 
ing myself  off  as  a  man  who  practises  much  discipline, 
or  does  benevolent  acts  in  order  to  make  a  display ;  and 
to  abstain  from  rhetoric,  and  poetry,  and  fine  writing ; 
and  not  to  walk  about  in  the  house  in  my  outdoor 
dress,  nor  to  do  other  things  of  the  kind ;  and  to  write 
my  letters  with  simplicity,  like  the  letter  which  Rusti- 
cus wrote  from  Sinuessa  to  my  mother ;  and  with  re- 
spect'to  those  who  have  offended  me  by  words,  or 
done  me  wrong,  to  be  easily  disposed  to  be  pacified 

^  Q.  Junius  Rusticus  was  a  Stoic  philosopher,  whom  Anto- 
ninus valued  highly,  and  often  took  his  advice  (Capitol.  AI. 
Antonin.  III). 

Antoninus  says,  rots  'ETTi/crT^ret'ois  viroixv-qaacnv,  which  must 
not  be  translated,  "  the  writings  of  Epictetus,"  for  Epictetus 
wrote  nothing.  His  pupil  Arrian,  who  has  preserved  for  us 
all  that  we  know  of  Epictetus,  says,  ravra  i-rretpadrju  virofji.v7}[xa,TaL 
ifiavTcp  dLa<pv\d^ai  ttjs  eKdvov  diapolas  [Ep.  ad  Cell.). 


84  THOUGHTS.  [Book  I. 

and  reconciled,  as  soon  as  they  have  shown  a  readi- 
ness to  be  reconciled ;  and  to  read  carefully,  and  not 
to  be  satisfied  with  a  superficial  understanding  of  a 
book ;  nor  hastily  to  give  my  assent  to  those  who  talk 
overmuch ;  and  I  am  indebted  to  him  for  being  ac- 
quainted with  the  discourses  of  Epictetus,  which  he 
communicated  to  me  out  of  his  own  collection. 

8.  From  Apollonius  ^  I  learned  freedom  of  will  and 
undeviating  steadiness  of  purpose ;  and  to  look  to 
nothing  else,  not  even  for  a  moment,  except  to  reason  ; 
and  to  be  always  the  same,  in  sharp  pains,  on  the  oc- 
casion of  the  loss  of  a  child,  and  in  long  illness  ;  and  to 
see  clearly  in  a  living  example  that  the  same  man  can 
be  both  most  resolute  and  yielding,  and  not  peevish  in 
giving  his  instruction  ;  and  to  have  had  before  my  eyes  a 
man  who  clearly  considered  his  experience  and  his  skill 
in  expounding  philosophical  principles  as  the  smallest 
of  his  merits ;  and  from  him  I  learned  how  to  receive 
from  friends  what  are  esteemed  favors,  without^  being 
either  humbled  by  them  or  letting  them  pass  unnoticed. 

9.  From  Sextus,^  a  benevolent  disposition,  and  the 
example  of  a  family  governed  in  a  fatherly  manner, 
and  the  idea  of  living  conformably  to  nature ;  and 
gravity  without  affectation,  and  to  look  carefully  after 

1  Apollonius  of  Chalcis  came  to  Rome  in  the  time  of  Pius  to 
be  Marcus'  preceptor.     He.  was  a  rigid  Stoic. 

2  Sextus  of  Chaeronea,  a  grandson  of  Plutarch,  or  nephew, 
as  some  say  ;  but  more  probably  a  grandson. 


Book  I.]     MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.  85 

the  interests  of  friends,  and  to  tolerate  ignorant  persons, 
and  those  who  form  opinions  without  consideration  :  f 
he  had  the  power  of  readily  accommodating  himself 
to  all,  so  that  intercourse  with  him  was  more  agreeable 
than  any  flattery ;  and  at  the  same  time  he  was  most 
highly  venerated  by  those  who  associated  with  him  : 
and  he  had  the  faculty  both  of  discovering  and  order- 
ing, in  an  intelligent  and  methodical  way,  the  principles 
necessary  for  Ufe ;  and  he  never  showed  anger  or  any 
other  passion,  but  was  entirely  free  from  passion,  and 
also  most  affectionate ;  and  he  could  express  appro- 
bation without  noisy  display,  and  he  possessed  much 
knowledge  without  ostentation. 

10.  From  Alexander^  the  grammarian,  to  refrain 
from  fault-finding,  and  not  in  a  reproachful  way  to  chide 
those  who  uttered  any  barbarous  or  solecistic  or  strange- 
sounding  expression  ;  but  dexterously  to  introduce  the 
very  expression  which  ought  to  have  been  used,  and 
in  the  way  of  answer  or  giving  confirmation,  or  joining 
in  an  inquiry  about  the  thing  itself,  not  about  the  word, 
or  by  some  other  fit  suggestion. 

1 1 .  From  Fronto  ^  I  learned  to  observe  what  envy 
and  duplicity  and  hypocrisy  are   in  a  tyrant,  and  that 

^  Alexander  was  a  Grammaticus,  a  native  of  Phrygia.  He 
wrote  a  commentary  on  Homer ;  and  the  rhetorician  Aristides 
wrote  a  panegyric  on  Alexander  in  a  funeral  oration. 

2  M.  Cornelius  Fronto  was  a  rhetorician,  and  in  great  favor 
with  Marcus.  There  arc  extant  various  letters  between  Marcus 
and  Fronto. 


86  THOUGHTS.  [Book  I. 

generally  those  among  us  who  are  called   Patricians 
are  rather  deficient  in  paternal  affection. 

12.  From  Alexander  the  Platonic,  not  frequently 
nor  without  necessity  to  say  to  any  one,  or  to  write 
in  a  letter,  that  I  have  no  leisure ;  nor  continually  to 
excuse  the  neglect  of  duties  required  by  our  relation 
to  those  with  whom  we  live,  by  alleging  urgent 
occupations. 

13.  From  Catulus,^  not  to  be  indifferent  when  a 
friend  finds  fault,  even  if  he  should  find  fault  without 
reason,  but  to  try  to  restore  him  to  his  usual  disposi- 
tion ;  and  to  be  ready  to  speak  well  of  teachers,  as  it 
is  reported  of  Domitius  and  Athenodotus  ;  and  to  love 
my  children  truly. 

14.  From  my  brother  ^  Severus,  to  love  my  kin,  and 
to  love  truth,  and  to  love  justice ;  and  through  him 
I  learned  to  know  Thrasea,  Helvidius,  Cato,  Dion, 
Brutus ;  ^  and  from  him  I  received  the  idea  of  a  polity 
in  which  there  is  the  same  law  for  all,  a  polity  admin- 
istered with  regard  to  equal  rights  and  equal  freedom 

« 

1  Cinna  Catulus,  a  Stoic  philosopher. 

2  The  word  brother  may  not  be  genuine.  Antoninus  had  no 
brother.  It  has  been  supposed  that  he  may  mean  some  cousin. 
Schultz  in  his  translation  omits  "  brother,"  and  says  that  this 
Severus  is  probably  Claudius  Severus,  a  peripatetic, 

3  We  know,  from  Tacitus  {Annal.  xiii.,  xvi.  21;  and  other 
passages),  who  Thrasea  and  Helvidius  were.  Plutarch  has 
written  the  lives  of  the  two  Catos,  and  of  Dion  and  Brutus. 
Antoninus  probably  alludes  to  Cato  of  Utica,  who  was  a 
Stoic. 


Book  L]     MARCUS   AURELIUS    ANTONINUS.  8/ 

of  speech,  and  the  idea  of  a  kmgly  government  which 
respects  most  of  all  the  freedom  of  the  governed  ;  I 
learned  from  him  also  f  consistency  and  undeviating 
steadiness  in  my  regard  for  philosophy  ;  and  a  disposi- 
tion to  do  good,  and  to  give  to  others  readily,  and  to 
cherish  good  hopes,  and  to  believe  that  I  am  loved  by 
my  friends ;  and  in  him  I  observed  no  concealment  of 
his  opinions  with  respect  to  those  whom  he  condemned, 
and  that  his  friends  had  no  need  to  conjecture  what 
he  wished  or  did  not  wish,  but  it  was  quite  plain. 

15.  From  Maximus  ^  I  learned  self-government, 
and  not  to  be  led  aside  by  anything ;  and  cheerfulness 
in  all  circumstances,  as  well  as  in  illness  ;  and  a  just 
admixture  in  the  moral  character  of  sweetness  and 
dignity,  and  to  do  what  was  set  before  me  without 
complaining.  I  observed  that  everybody  believed 
that  he  thought  as  he  spoke,  and  that  in  all  that  he 
did  he  never  had  any  bad  intention  ;  and  he  never 
showed  amazement  and  surprise,  and  was  never  in  a 
hurry,  and  never  put  oif  doing  a  thing,  nor  was  per- 
plexed nor  dejected,  nor  did  he  ever  laugh  to  disguise 
his  vexation,  nor,  on  the  other  hand,  was  he  ever 
passionate  or  suspicious.  He  was  accustomed  to  do 
acts  of  beneficence,  and  was  ready  to  forgive,  and  was 

1  Claudius  Maximus  was  a  Stoic  philosopher,  who  was 
highly  esteemed  also  by  Antoninus  Pius,  Marcus'  predeces- 
sor. The  character  of  Maximus  is  that  of  a  perfect  man.  (See 
VIII.  25.) 


88  "  THOUGHTS.  [Book  I. 

free  from  all  falsehood ;  and  he  presented  the  appear- 
ance of  a  man  who  could  not  be  diverted  from  right, 
rather  than  of  a  man  who  had  been  improved.  I 
observed,  too,  that  no  man  could  ever  think  that  he 
was  despised  by  Maximus,  or  ever  venture  to  think 
himself  a  better  man.  He  had  also  the  art  of  being 
humorous  in  an  agreeable  way.f 

1 6.  In  my  father^  I  observed  mildness  of  temper, 
and  unchangeable  resolution  in  the  things  which  he 
had  determined  after  due  deliberation ;  and  no  vain- 
glory in  those  things  which  men  call  honors ;  and  a 
love  of  labor  and  perseverance ;  and  a  readiness  to 
listen  to  those  who  had  anything  to  propose  for  the 
common  weal ;  and  undeviating  firmness  in  giving 
to  every  man  according  to  his  deserts ;  and  a  knowl- 
edge derived  from  experience  of  the  occasions  for 
vigorous  action  and  for  remission.  And  I  observed 
that  he  had  overcome  all  passion  for  boys;  and  he 
considered  himself  no  more  than  any  other  citizen  ;  ^ 
and  he  released  his  friends  from  all  obligation  to  sup 
with  him  or  to  attend  him  of  necessity  when  he  went 
abroad,  and  those  who  had  failed  to  accompany  him, 
by  reason  of  any  urgent  circumstances,  always  found 
him  the  same.  I  obsen^ed  too  his  habit  of  careful 
inquiry  in  all  matters  of  deliberation,  and  his  persis- 

1  He  means  his  adoptive  father,  his  predecessor,  the  Em- 
peror Antoninus  Pius.     Compare  vi.  30. 

2  He  uses  the  word  KOLVovoij/xoavur].     See  Gataker's  note. 


Book  I.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.  89 

tency,  and  that  he  never  stopped  his  investigation 
through  being  satisfied  with  appearances  which  first 
present  themselves ;  and  that  his  disposition  was  to 
keep  his  friends,  and  not  to  be  soon  tired  of  them, 
nor  yet  to  be  extravagant  in  his  affection ;  and  to  be 
satisfied  on  all  occasions,  and  cheerful ;  and  to  fore- 
see things  a  long  way  off,  and  to  provide  for  the  small- 
est without  display ;  and  to  check  immediately  popu- 
lar applause  and  all  flattery ;  and  to  be  ever  watchful 
over  the  things  which  were  necessary  for  the  adminis- 
tration of  the  empire,  and  to  be  a  good  manager  of 
the  expenditure,  and  patiently  to  endure  the  blame 
which  he  got  for  such  conduct ;  and  he  was  neither 
superstitious  with  respect  to  the  gods,  nor  did  he 
court  men  by  gifts  or  by  trying  to  please  them,  or  by 
flattering  the  populace ;  but  he  showed  sobriety  in  all 
things  and  firmness,  and  never  any  mean  thoughts  or 
action,  nor  love  of  novelty.  And  the  things  which 
conduce  in  any  way  to  the  commodity  of  life,  and  of 
which  fortune  gives  an  abundant  supply,  he  used  with- 
out arrogance  and  without  excusing  himself;  so  that 
when  he  had  them,  he  enjoyed  them  without  affecta- 
tion, and  when  he  had  them  not,  he  did  not  want 
them.  No  one  could  ever  say  of  him  that  he  was 
either  a  sophist  or  a  [home-bred]  flippant  slave  or  a 
pedant  ;  but  every  one  acknowledged  him  to  be  a 
man  ripe,  perfect,  above  flattery,  able  to  manage  his 
own  and  other  men's  affairs.     Besides  this,  he  hon- 


90  THOUGHTS.  [Book  I. 

ored  those  who  were  true  philosophers,  and  he  did 
not  reproach  those  who  pretended  to  be  philosophers, 
nor  yet  was  he  easily  led  by  them.  He  was  also  easy 
in  conversation,  and  he  made  himself  agreeable  with- 
out any  offensive  affectation.  He  took  a  reasonable 
care  of  his  body's  health,  not  as  one  who  was  greatly 
attached  to  life,  nor  out  of  regard  to  personal  appear- 
ance, nor  yet  in  a  careless  way,  but  so  that  through 
his  own  attention  he  very  seldom  stood  in  need  of 
the  physician's  art  or  of  medicine  or  external  appli- 
cations. He  was  most  ready  to  give  without  envy  to 
those  who  possessed  any  particular  faculty,  such  as 
that  of  eloquence  or  knowledge  of  the  law  or  of 
morals,  or  of  anything  else ;  and  he  gave  them  his 
help,  that  each  might  enjoy  reputation  according  to 
his  deserts ;  and  he  always  acted  conformably  to  the 
institutions  of  his  country,  without  showing  any  affec- 
tation of  doing  so.  Further,  he  was  not  fond  of 
change  nor  unsteady,  but  he  loved  to  stay  in  the  same 
places,  and  to  employ  himself  about  the  same  things ; 
and  after  his  paroxysms  of  headache  he  came  imme- 
diately fresh  and  vigorous  to  his  usual  occupations. 
His  secrets  were  not  many,  but  very  few  and  very 
rare,  and  these  only  about  public  matters ;  and  he 
showed  prudence  and  economy  in  the  exhibition  of 
the  public  spectacles  and  the  construction  of  public 
buildings,  his  donations'  to  the  people,  and  in  such 
things,  for  he  was  a  man  who  looked  to  what  ought 


Book  L]     MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.  9I 

to  be  done,  not  to  the  reputation  which  is  got  by  a 
man's  acts.  He  did  not  take  the  bath  at  unseason- 
ble  hours ;  he  was  not  fond  of  building  houses,  nor 
curious  about  what  he  ate,  nor  about  the  texture  and 
color  of  his  clothes,  nor  about  the  beauty  of  his 
slaves.-^  His  dress  came  from  Lorium,  his  villa  on 
the  coast,  and  from  Lanuvium  generally.^  We  know 
how  he  behaved  to  the  toll- collector  at  Tusculum  who 
asked  his  pardon  ;  and  such  was  all  his  behavior. 
There  was  in  him  nothing  harsh,  nor  implacable,  nor 
violent,  nor,  as  one  may  say,  anything  carried  to  the 
sweating  point ;  but  he  examined  all  things  severally, 
as  if  he  had  abundance  of  time,  and  without  confu- 
sion, in  an  orderly  way,  vigorously  and  consistently. 
And  that  might  be  applied  to  him  which  is  recorded 
of  Socrates,^  that  he  was  able  both  to  abstain  from, 
and  to  enjoy,  those  things  which  many  are  too  weak 
to  abstain  from,  and  cannot  enjoy  without  excess. 
But  to  be  strong  enough  both  to  bear  the  one  and  to 
be  sober  in  the  other  is  the  mark  of  a  man  who  has 
a  perfect  and  invincible  soul,  such  as  he  showed  in  the 
illness  of  Maximus. 

17.  To  the  gods   I   am  indebted  for  having  good 
grandfathers,    good    parents,    a    good    sister,    good 

1  This  passage  is  corrupt,  and  the  exact  meaning  is  uncertain. 

2  Lorium  was  a  villa  on  the  coast  north  of  Rome,  and  there 
Antoninus  was  brought  up,  and  he  died  there.  This  also  is 
corrupt. 

3  Xenophon,  Memorab.  i.  3.  15. 


92  THOUGHTS.  [Book  I. 

teachers,  good  associates,  good  kinsmen  and  friends, 
nearly  everything  good.  Further,  I  owe  it  to  the 
gods  that  I  was  not  hurried  into  any  offence  against 
any  of  them,  though  I  had  a  disposition  which,  if 
opportunity  had  offered,  might  have  led  me  to  do 
something  of  this  kind ;  but,  through  their  favor, 
there  never  was  such  a  concurrence  of  circumstances 
as  put  me  to  the  trial.  Further,  I  am  thankful  to  the 
gods  that  I  was  not  longer  brought  up  with  my  grand- 
father's concubine,  and  that  I  preserved  the  flower  of 
my  youth,  and  that  I  did  not  make  proof  of  my  viril- 
ity before  the  proper  season,  but  even  deferred  the 
time ;  that  I  was  subjected  to  a  ruler  and  a  father 
who  was  able  to  take  away  all  pride  from  me,  and  to 
bring  me  to  the  knowledge  that  it  is  possible  for  a 
man  to  live  in  a  palace  without  wanting  either  guards 
or  embroidered  dresses,  or  torches  and  statues,  and 
such-like  show ;  but  that  it  is  in  such  a  man's  power 
to  bring  himself  very  near  to  the  fashion  of  a  private 
person,  without  being  for  this  reason  either  meaner  in 
thought,  or  more  remiss  in  action,  with  respect  to  the 
things  which  must  be  done  for  the  public  interest  in 
a  manner  that  befits  a  ruler.  I  thank  the  gods  for 
giving  me  such  a  brother,^  who  was  able  by  his  moral 
character  to  rouse  me  to  vigilance  over  myself,  and 
who  at  the  same  time  pleased  me  by  his  respect  and 

1  The  emperor  had  no  brother  except  L.  Verus,  his  brother 
by  adoption. 


Book  I.]       MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.  93 

affection ;  that  my  children  have  not  been  stupid  nor 
deformed  in  body ;  that  I  did  not  make  more  pro- 
ficiency in  rhetoric,  poetry,  and  the  other  studies,  in 
which  I  should  perhaps  have  been  completely  en- 
gaged, if  I  had  seen  that  I  was  making  progress  in 
them ;  that  I  made  haste  to  place  those  who  brought 
me  up  in  the  station  of  honor,  which  they  seemed 
to  desire,  without  putting  them  off  with  hope  of  my 
doing  it  some  other  time  after,  because  they  were 
then  still  young ;  that  I  knew  Apollonius,  Rusticus, 
Maximus ;  that  I  received  clear  and  frequent  impres- 
sions about  living  according  to  nature,  and  what  kind 
of  a  life  that  is,  so  that,  so  far  as  depended  on  the 
gods,  and  their  gifts,  and  help,  and  inspirations, 
nothing  hindered  me  from  forthwith  living  according 
to  nature,  though  I  still  fall  short  of  it  through  my 
own  fault,  and  through  not  observing  the  admonitions 
of  the  gods,  and,  I  may  almost  say,  their  direct 
instructions ;  that  my  body  has  held  out  so  long  in 
such  a  kind  of  life  ;  that  I  never  touched  either 
Benedicta  or  Theodotus,  and  that,  after  having  fallen 
into  amatory  passions,  I  was  cured,  and,  though  I  was 
often  out  of  humor  with  Rusticus,  I  never  did  any- 
thing of  which  I  had  occasion  to  repent ;  that,  though 
it  was  my  mother's  fate  to  die  young,  she  spent  the 
last  years  of  her  life  with  me  ;  that,  whenever  I 
wished  to  help  any  man  in  his  need,  or  on  any  other 
occasion,  I  was  never  told  that  I  had  not  the  means  of 


94  THOUGHTS.  [Book  I. 

doing  it ;  and  that  to  myself  the  same  necessity  never 
happened,  to  receive  anything  from  another;  that  I 
have  such  a  wife/  so  obedient,  and  so  affectionate, 
and  so  simple  ;  that  I  had  abundance  of  good  mas- 
ters for  my  children ;  and  that  remedies  have  been 
shown  to  me  by  dreams,  both  others,  and  against 
blood  spitting  and  giddiness  ^  .  .  .  ;  and  that,  when  I 
had  an  inchnation  to  philosophy,  I  did  not  fall  into 
the  hands  of  any  sophist,  and  that  I  did  not  waste  my 
time  on  writers  [of  histories],  or  in  the  resolution  of 
syllogisms,  or  occupy  myself  about  the  investigation 
of  appearances  in  the  heavens ;  for  all  these  things 
require  the  help  of  the  gods  and  fortune. 
Among  the  Quadi  at  the  Granua.^ 

1  See  the  Life  of  Antoniu2is. 

2  This  is  corrupt. 

3  The  Quadi  lived  in  the  southern  part  of  Bohemia  and 
Moravia ;  and  Antoninus  made  a  campaign  again«t  them. 
(See  the  Life.)  Granua  is  probably  the  river  Graan,  which 
flows  into  the  Danube. 

If  these  words  are  genuine,  Antoninus  may  have  written  this 
first  book  during  the  war  with  the  Quadi.  In  the  first  edition 
of  Antoninus,  and  in  the  older  editions,  the  first  three  sections 
of  the  second  book  make  the  conclusion  of  the  first  book. 
Gataker  placed  them  at  the  beginning  of  the  second  book. 


Book  II.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.  95 


II. 


T3EGIN  the  morning  by  saying  to  thyself,  I  shall 
meet  with  the  busybody,  the  ungrateful,  arro- 
gant, deceitful,  envious,  unsocial.  All  these  things 
happen  to  them  by  reason  of  their  ignorance  of  what 
is  good  and  evil.  But  I  who  have  seen  the  nature 
of  the  good  that  it  is  beautiful,  and  of  the  bad  that  it 
is  ugly,  and  the  nature  of  him  who  does  wrong,  that  it 
is  akin  to  me,  not  [only]  of  the  same  blood  or  seed, 
but  that  it  participates  in  [the  same]  intelligence  and 
[the  same]  portion  of  the  divinity,  I  can  neither  be 
injured  by  any  of  them,  for  no  one  can  fix  on  me 
what  is  ugly,  nor  can  I  be  angry  with  my  kinsman, 
nor  hate  him.  For  we  are  made  for  co-operation,  like 
feet,  like  hands,  like  eyelids,  like  the  rows  of  the 
upper  and  lower  teeth. ^  To  act  against  one  another, 
then,  is  contrary  to  nature ;  and  it  is  acting  against 
one  another  to  be  vexed  and  to  turn  away. 

2.  Whatever  this  is  that  I  am,  it  is  a  little  flesh 
and  breath,  and  the  ruling  part.  Throw  away  thy 
books ;  no  longer  distract  thyself :  it  is  not  allowed ; 
but  as  if  thou  wast  now  dying,  despise  the  flesh ;  it 

1  Xenophon,  Mem.  11.  3.  18. 


96  THOUGHTS.  [Book  11. 

is  blood  and  bones  and  a  network,  a  contexture  of 
nerves,  veins,  and  arteries.  See  the  breath  also,  what 
kind  of  a  thing  it  is ;  air,  and  not  always  the  same, 
but  every  moment  sent  out  and  again  sucked  in. 
The  third,  then,  is  the  ruling  part ;  consider  thus  : 
Thou  art  an  old  man ;  no  longer  let  this  be  a  slave, 
no  longer  be  pulled  by  the  strings  like  a  puppet  to 
unsocial  movements,  no  longer  be  either  dissatisfied 
with  thy  present  lot,  or  shrink  from  the  future. 

3.  All  that  is  from  the  gods  is  full  of  providence. 
That  which  is  from  fortune  is  not  separated  from 
nature  or  without  an  interweaving  and  involution 
with  the  things  which  are  ordered  by  providence. 
From  thence  all  things  flow;  and  there  is  besides 
necessity,  and  that  which  is  for  the  advantage  of  the 
whole  universe,  of  which  thou  art  a  part.  But  that 
is  good  for  every  part  of  nature  which  the  nature  of 
the  whole  brings,  and  what  serves  to  maintain  this 
nature.  Now  the  universe  is  preserved,  as  by  the 
changes  of  the  elements  so  by  the  changes  of  things 
compounded  of  the  elements.  Let  these  principles 
be  enough  for  thee ;  let  them  always  be  fixed  opin- 
ions. But  cast  away  the  thirst  after  books,  that  thou 
mayest  not  die  murmuring,  but  cheerfully,  truly,  and 
from  thy  heart  thankful  to  the  gods. 

4.  Remember  how  long  thou  hast  been  putting  off 
these  things,  and  how  often  thou  hast  received  an 
opportunity   from    the    gods,    and    yet    dost    not  use 


Book  II.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.  97 

it.  Thou  must  now  at  last  perceive  of  what  uni- 
verse thou  art  a  part,  and  of  what  administrator  of 
the  universe  thy  existence  is  an  efflux,  and  that  a 
Hmit  of  time  is  fixed  for  thee,  which  if  thou  dost 
not  use  for  clearing  away  the  clouds  from  thy  mind, 
it  will  go  and  thou  wilt  go,  and  it  will  never  return. 

5.  Every  moment  think  steadily  as  a  Roman  and 
a  man  to  do  what  thou  hast  in  hand  with  perfect 
and  simple  dignity,  and  feeling  of  affection,  and  free- 
dom, and  justice,  and  to  give  thyself  relief  from  all 
other  thoughts.  And  thou  wilt  give  thyself  relief  if 
thou  doest  every  act  of  thy  life  as  if  it  were  the  last, 
laying  aside  all  carelessness  and  passionate  aversion 
from  the  commands  of  reason,  and  all  hypocrisy,  and 
self-love,  and  discontent  with  the  portion  which  has 
been  given  to  thee.  Thou  seest  how  few  the  things 
are,  the  which  if  a  man  lays  hold  of,  he  is  able  to 
live  a  life  which  flows  in  quiet,  and  is  like  the  exist- 
ence of  the  gods ;  for  the  gods  on  their  part  will 
require  nothing  more  from  him  who  observes  these 
things. 

6.  Do  wrong  ^  to  thyself,  do  wrong  to  thyself,  my 
soul;  but  thou  wilt  no  longer  have  the  opportunity 
of  honoring  thyself.  Every  man's  life  is  sufficient. f 
But  thine  is  nearly  finished,  though  thy  soul  rever- 

1  Perhaps  it  should  be,  "  thou  art  doing  violence  to  thyself," 
v^pi^ecs,  not  v^pi^e. 


98  THOUGHTS.  [Book  1 1. 

ences  not  itself,  but    places  thy  felicity  in  the  souls 
of  others. 

7.  Do  the  things  external  which  fall  upon  thee 
distract  thee?  Give  thyself  time  to  learn  something 
new  and  good,  and  cease  to  be  whirled  around. 
But  then  thou  must  also  avoid  being  carried  about 
the  other  way;  for  those  too  are  triflers  who  have 
wearied  themselves  in  life  by  their  activity,  and  yet 
have  no  object  to  which  to  direct  every  movement, 
and,  in  a  word,  all  their  thoughts. 

8.  Through  not  observing  what  is  in  the  mind  of 
another  a  man  has  seldom  been  seen  to  be  unhappy  ; 
but  those  who  do  not  observe  the  movements  of  their 
own  minds  must  of  necessity  be  unhappy. 

9.  This  thou  must  always  bear  in  mind,  what  is 
the  nature  of  the  whole,  and  what  is  my  nature,  and 
how  this  is  related  to  that,  and  what  kind  of  a  part 
it  is  of  what  kind  of  a  whole,  and  that  there  is  no 
one  who  hinders  thee  from  always  doing  and  saying 
the  things  which  are  according  to  the  nature  of  which 
thou  art  a  part. 

10.  Theophrastus,  in  his  comparison  of  bad  acts  — 
such  a  comparison  as  one  would  make  in  accordance 
with  the  common  notions  of  mankind  —  says,  like  a 
true  philosopher,  that  the  offences  which  are  com- 
mitted through  desire  are  more  blamable  than  those 
which  are  committed  through  anger.  For  he  who  is 
excited    by  anger  seems   to   turn   away   from   reason 


Book  II.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.  99 

with  a  certain  pain  and  unconscious  contraction ; 
but  he  who  offends  through  desire,  being  over- 
powered by  pleasure,  seems  to  be  in  a  manner 
more  intemperate  and  more  womanish  in  his  offences. 
Rightly,  then,  and  in  a  way  worthy  of  philosophy,  he 
said  that  the  offence  which  is  committed  with  pleas- 
ure is  more  blamable  than  that  which  is  committed 
with  pain ;  and  on  the  whole  the  one  is  more  like 
a  person  who  has  been  first  wronged  and  through 
pain  is  compelled  to  be  angry;  but  the  other  is 
moved  by  his  own  impulse  to  do  wrong,  being  car- 
ried towards  doing  something  by  desire. 

1 1 .  Since  it  is  possible  ^  that  thou  mayest  depart 
from  life  this  very  moment,  regulate  every  act  and 
thought  accordingly.^  But  to  go  away  from  among 
men,  if  there  are  gods,  is  not  a  thing  to  be  afraid  of, 
for  the  gods  will  not  involve  thee  in  evil ;  but  if  indeed 
they  do  not  exist,  or  if  they  have  no  concern  about 
human  affairs,  what  is  it  to  me  to  live  in  a  universe 
devoid  of  gods  or  devoid  of  providence  ?  But  in  truth 
they  do  exist,  and  they  do  care  for  human  things,  and 
they  have  put  all  the  means  in  man's  power  to  enable 
him  not  to  fall  into  real  evils.  And  as  to  the  rest,  if 
there  was  anything  evil,  they  would  have  provided  for 
this  also,  that  it  should  be  altogether  in  a  man's  power 

1  Or  it  may  mean,"  since  it  is  in  thy  power  to  depart ;  "  which 
gives  a  meaning  somewhat  different. 

2  See  Cicero,  Tuscul.   i.  49. 


100  THOUGHTS.  [Book  II. 

not  to  fall  into  it.  Now  that  which  does  not  make  a 
man  worse,  how  can  it  make  a  man's  life  worse? 
But  neither  through  ignorance,  nor  having  the  knowl- 
edge but  not  the  power  to  guard  against  or  correct 
these  things,  is  it  possible  that  the  nature  of  the  uni- 
verse has  overlooked  them ;  nor  is  it  possible  that  it 
has  made  so  great  a  mistake,  either  through  want  of 
power  or  want  of  skill,  that  good  and  evil  should  hap- 
pen indiscriminately  to  the  good  and  the  bad.  But 
death  certainly,  and  life,  honor  and  dishonor,  pain  and 
pleasure,  —  all  these  things  equally  happen  to  good 
men  and  bad,  being  things  which  make  us  neither  bet- 
ter nor  worse.  Therefore  they  are  neither  good  nor 
evil. 

12.  How  quickly  all  things  disappear,  —  in  the  uni- 
verse the  bodies  themselves,  but  in  time  the  remem- 
brance of  them.  What  is  the  nature  of  all  sensible 
things,  and  particularly  those  which  attract  with  the 
bait  of  pleasure  or  terrify  by  pain,  or  are  noised 
abroad  by  vapory  fame  ;  how  worthless,  and  contemp- 
tible, and  sordid,  and  perishable,  and  dead  they  are,  — • 
all  this  it  is  the  part  of  the  intellectual  faculty  to  ob- 
ser\'e.  To  observe  too  who  these  are  whose  opinions 
and  voices  give  reputation  ;  what  death  is,  and  the 
fact  that,  if  a  man  looks  at  it  in  itself,  and  by  the 
abstractive  power  of  reflection  resolves  into  their  parts 
all  the  things  which  present  themselves  to  the  imagi- 
nation in  it,  he  will  then  consider  it  to  be  nothing  else 


Book  II.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.        IGI 

than  an  operation  of  nature ;  and  if  any  one  is  afraid 
of  an  operation  of  nature,  he  is  a  child.  This,  how- 
ever, is  not  only  an  operation  of  nature,  but  it  is  also 
a  thing  which  conduces  to  the  purposes  of  nature. 
To  observe  too  how  man  comes  near  to  the  Deity,  and 
by  what  part  of  him,  and  when  this  part  of  man  is  so 
disposed!  (vi.  28). 

13.  Nothing  is  more  wretched  than  a  man  who 
traverses  everything  in  a  round,  and  pries  into  the 
things  beneath  the  earth,  as  the  poet  ^  says,  and  seeks 
by  conjecture  what  is  in  the  minds  of  his  neighbors, 
without  perceiving  that  it  is  sufficient  to  attend  to  the 
daemon  within  him,  and  to  reverence  it  sincerely. 
And  reverence  of  the  daemon  consists  in  keeping  it 
pure  from  passion  and  thoughtlessness,  and  dissatis- 
faction with  what  comes  from  gods  and  men.  For  the 
things  from  the  gods  merit  veneration  for  their  excel- 
lence ;  and  the  things  from  men  should  be  dear  to  us 
by  reason  of  kinship ;  and  sometimes  even,  in  a 
manner,  they  move  our  pity  by  reason  of  men's  igno- 
ance  of  good  and  bad ;  this  defect  being  not  less 
than  that  which  deprives  us  of  the  power  of  distin- 
guishing things  that  are  white  and  black. 

14.  Though  thou  shoul4est  be  going  to  live  three 

thousand  years,  and  as  many  times  ten  thousand  years, 

still  remember  that  no  man  loses  any  other  life  than 

this  which  he  now  lives,  nor  lives  any  other  than  this 

1  Pindar,  in  the  Theaetetus  of  Plato.     See  xi.  i. 


102  THOUGHTS.  [Book  II. 

which  he  now  loses.  The  longest  and  shortest  are 
thus  brought  to  the  same.  For  the  present  is  the 
same  to  all,  though  that  which  perishes  is  not  the 
same ;  t  ^  and  so  that  which  is  lost  appears  to  be  a 
mere  moment.  For  a  man  cannot  lose  either  the 
past  or  the  future  :  for  what  a  man  has  not,  how  can 
any  one  take  this  from  him  ?  These  two  things  then 
thou  must  bear  in  mind ;  the  one,  that  all  things  from 
eternity  are  of  like  forms  and  come  round  in  a  circle, 
and  that  it  makes  no  difference  whether  a  man  shall 
see  the  same  things  during  a  hundred  years,  or  two 
hundred,  or  an  infinite  time ;  and  the  second,  that 
the  longest  liver  and  he  who  will  die  soonest  lose  just 
the  same.  For  the  present  is  the  only  thing  of  which 
a  man  can  be  deprived,  if  it  is  true  that  this  is  the 
only  thing  which  he  has,  and  that  a  man  cannot  lose  a 
thing  if  he  has  it  not. 

15.  Remember  that  all  is  opinion.  For  what  was 
said  by  the  Cynic  Monimus  is  manifest :  and  manifest 
too  is  the  use  of  what  was  said,  if  a  man  receives  what 
may  be  got  out  of  it  as  far  as  it  is  true. 

16.  The  soul  of  man  does  violence  to  itself,  first 
of  all,  when  it  becomes  an  abscess,  and,  as  it  were, 
a  tumor  on  the  universe,  so  far  as  it  can.  For  to  be 
vexed  at  anything  which  happens  is  a  separation 
of  ourselves  from  nature,  in  some  part  of  which  the 
natures  of  all  other  things  are  contained.     In  the  next 

1  See  Gataker's  *iote. 


Book  II.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.        IO3 

place,  the  soul  does  violence  to  itself  when  it  turns 
away  from  any  man,  or  even  moves  towards  him  with 
the  intention  of  injuring,  such  as  are  the  souls  of  those 
who  are  angry.  In  the  third  place,  the  soul  does  vio- 
lence to  itself  when  it  is  overpowered  by  pleasure  or 
by  pain.  Fourthly,  when  it  plays  a  part,  and  does  or 
says  anything  insincerely  and  untruly.  Fifthly,  when 
it  allows  any  act  of  its  own  and  any  movement  to  be 
without  an  aim,  and  does  anything  thoughtlessly  and 
without  considering  what  it  is,  it  being  right  that  even 
the  smallest  things  be  done  with  reference  to  an  end ; 
and  the  end  of  rational  animals  is  to  follow  the  reason 
and  the  law  of  the  most  ancient  city  and  polity. 

17.  Of  human  life  the  time  is  a  point,  and  the  sub- 
stance is  in  a  flux,  and  the  perception  dull,  and  the 
composition  of  the  whole  body  subject  to  putrefaction, 
and  the  soul  a  whirl,  and  fortune  hard  to  divine,  and 
fame  a  thing  devoid  of  judgment.  And,  to  say  all  in 
a  word,  everything  which  belongs  to  the  body  is  a 
stream,  and  what  belongs  to  the  soul  is  a  dream  and 
vapor,  and  life  is  a  warfare  and  a  stranger's  sojourn, 
and  after-fame  is  oblivion.  What  then  is  that  which 
is  able  to  conduct  a  man?  One  thing,  and  only  one, 
philosophy.  But  this  consists  in  keeping  the  daemon 
within  a  man  free  from  violence  and  unharmed,  supe- 
rior to  pains  and  pleasures,  doing  nothing  without  a 
purpose,  nor  yet  falsely  and  with  hypocrisy,  not  feeling 
the  need  of  another  man's  doing  or  not  doing  any- 


104  THOUGHTS.  [Book  II. 

thing;  and  besides,  accepting  all  that  happens,  and 
all  that  is  allotted,  as  coming  from  thence,  wherever  it 
is,  from  whence  he  himself  came  ;  and,  finally,  waiting 
for  death  with  a  cheerful  mind,  as  being  nothing  else 
than  a  dissolution  of  the  elements  of  which  every 
living  being  is  compounded.  But  if  there  is  no  harm 
to  the  elements  themselves  in  each  continually  chang- 
ing into  another,  why  should  a  man  have  any  appre- 
hension about  the  change  and  dissolution  of  all  the 
elements?  For  it  is  according  to  nature,  and  nothing 
is  evil  which  is  according  to  nature. 


This  in  Carnuntum.^ 


1  Carnuntum  was  a  town  of  Pannonia,  on  the  south  side  of 
the  Danube,  about  thirty  miles  east  of  Vindobona  (Vienna). 
Orosius  (vii.  15)  and  Eutropius  (viii.  13)  say  that  Antoninus 
remained  three  years  at  Carnuntum  during  his  war  with  the 
Marcomanni. 


Book  III.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.       I05 


III. 


T^  ^E  ought  to  consider  not  only  that  our  Hfe  is 
daily  wasting  away  and  a  smaller  part  of  it 
is  left,  but  another  thing  also  must  be  taken  into  the 
account,  that  if  a  man  should  live  longer,  it  is  quite 
uncertain  whether  the  understanding  will  still  con- 
tinue sufficient  for  the  comprehension  of  things,  and 
retain  the  power  of  contemplation  which  strives  to 
acquire  the  knowledge  of  the  divine  and  the  human. 
For  if  he  shall  begin  to  fall  into  dotage,  perspiration 
and  nutrition  and  imagination  and  appetite,  and  what- 
ever else  there  is  of  the  kind,  will  not  fail ;  but  the 
power  of  making  use  of  ourselves,  and  filling  up  the 
measure  of  our  duty,  and  clearly  separating  all  appear- 
ances, and  considering  whether  a  man  should  now 
depart  from  life,  and  whatever  else  of  the  kind  abso- 
lutely requires  a  disciplined  reason,  —  all  this  is  al- 
ready extinguished.  We  must  make  haste,  then,  not 
only  because  we  are  daily  nearer  to  death,  but  also 
because  the  conception  of  things  and  the  understand- 
ing of  them  cease  first. 

2.  We  ought  to  observe  also  that  even  the  things 
which   follow   after   the    things   which    are    produced 


I06  THOUGHTS.  [Book  III. 

according  to  nature  contain  something  pleasing  and 
attractive.  For  instance,  when  bread  is  baked  some 
parts  are  spHt  at  the  surface,  and  these  parts  which 
thus  open,  and  have  a  certain  fashion  contrary  to  the 
purpose  of  the  baker's  art,  are  beautiful  in  a  manner, 
and  in  a  peculiar  way  excite  a  desire  for  eating.  And 
again,  figs,  when  they  are  quite  ripe,  gape  open ;  and 
in  the  ripe  olives  the  very  circumstance  of  their  being 
near  to  rottenness  adds  a  peculiar  beauty  to  the  fruit. 
And  the  ears  of  corn  bending  down,  and  the  lion's 
eyebrows,  and  the  foam  which  flows  from  the  mouth 
of  wild  boars,  and  many  other  things,  —  though  they 
are  far  from  being  beautiful  if  a  man  should  examine 
them  severally,  —  still,  because  they  are  consequent 
upon  the  things  which  are  formed  by  nature,  help  to 
adorn  them,  and  they  please  the  mind ;  so  that  if  a 
man  should  have  a  feeling  and  deeper  insight  with 
respect  to  the  things  which  are  produced  in  the  uni- 
verse, there  is  hardly  one  of  those  which  follow  by 
way  of  consequence  which  will  not  seem  to  him  to 
be  in  a  manner  disposed  so  as  to  give  pleasure.  And 
so  he  will  see  even  the  real  gaping  jaws  of  wild  beasts 
with  no  less  pleasure  than  those  which  painters  and 
sculptors  show  by  imitation ;  and  in  an  old  woman 
and  an  old  man  he  will  be  able  to  see  a  certain 
maturity  and  comeHness ;  and  the  attractive  loveli- 
ness of  young  persons  he  will  be  able  to  look  on  with 
chaste  eyes ;  and  many  such  things  will  present  them- 


BooKlII.j      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.       10/ 

selves,  not  pleasing  to  every  man,  but  to  him  only 
who  has  become  truly  familiar  with  Nature  and  her 
works. 

3.  Hippocrates,  after  curing  many  diseases,  himself 
fell  sick  and  died.  The  Chaldaei  foretold  the  deaths 
of  many,  and  then  fate  caught  them  too.  Alexander 
and  Pompeius  and  Caius  Caesar,  after  so  often  com- 
pletely destroying  whole  cities,  and  in  battle  cutting 
to  pieces  many  ten  thousands  of  cavalry  and  infantry, 
themselves  too  at  last  departed  from  life.  Hera- 
clitus,  after  so  many  speculations  on  the  conflagration 
of  the  universe,  was  filled  with  water  internally  and 
died  smeared  all  over  with  mud.  And  lice  destroyed 
Democritus ;  and  other  lice  killed  Socrates.  What 
means  all  this?  Thou  hast  embarked,  thou  hast 
made  the  voyage,  thou  art  come  to  shore  ;  get  out. 
If  indeed  to  another  life,  there  is  no  want  of  gods, 
not  even  there ;  but  if  to  a  state  without  sensation, 
thou  wilt  cease  to  be  held  by  pains  and  pleasures, 
and  to  be  a  slave  to  the  vessel,  which  is  as  much 
inferior  as  that  which  serves  it  is  superior  :f  for  the 
one  is  intelligence  and  deity ;  the  other  is  earth  and 
corruption. 

4.  Do  not  waste  the  remainder  of  thy  life  in 
thoughts  about  others,  when  thou  dost  not  refer  thy 
thoughts  to  some  object  of  common  utility.  For  thou 
losest  the  opportunity  of  doing  something  else  when 
thou  hast  such  thoughts   as   these,  —  What  is  such  a 


I08  THOUGHTS.  [Book  III. 

person  doing,  and  why,  and  what  is  he  saying,  and 
what  is  he  thinking  of,  and  what  is  he  contriving, 
and  whatever  else  of  the  kind  makes  us  wander  away 
from  the  observation  of  our  own  ruling  power.  We 
ought  then  to  check  in  the  series  of  our  thoughts 
everything  that  is  without  a  purpose  and  useless,  but 
most  of  all  the  over-curious  feeling  and  the  malig- 
nant ;  and  a  man  should  use  himself  to  think  of  those 
things  only  about  which  if  one  should  suddenly  ask. 
What  hast  thou  now  in  thy  thoughts?  with  perfect 
openness  thou  mightest  immediately  answer,  This  or 
That ;  so  that  from  thy  words  it  should  be  plain  that 
everything  in  thee  is  simple  and  benevolent,  and  such 
as  befits  a  social  animal,  and  one  that  cares  not  for 
thoughts  about  pleasure  or  sensual  enjoyments  at  all, 
nor  has  any  rivalry  or  envy  and  suspicion,  or  any- 
thing else  for  which  thou  wouldst  blush  if  thou 
shouldst  say  that  thou  hadst  it  in  thy  mind.  For  the 
man  who  is  such,  and  no  longer  delays  being  among 
the  number  of  the  best,  is  like  a  priest  and  minister 
of  the  gods,  using  too  the  [deity]  which  is  planted 
within  him,  which  makes  the  man  uncontaminated 
by  •  pleasure,  unharmed  by  any  pain,  untouched  by 
any  insult,  feeling  no  wrong,  a  fighter  in  the  noblest 
fight,  one  who  cannot  be  overpowered  by  any  passion, 
dyed  deep  with  justice,  accepting  with  all  his  soul 
everything  which  happens  and  is  assigned  to  him  as 
his  portion;    and    not   often,  nor  yet   without  great 


Book  TIL]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.       lOQ 

necessity  and  for  the  general  interest,  imagining  what 
another  says,  or  does,  or  thinks.  For  it  is  only  what 
belongs  to  himself  that  he  makes  the  matter  for  his 
activity;  and  he  constantly  thinks  of  that  which  is 
allotted  to  himself  out  of  the  sum  total  of  things,  and 
he  makes  his  own  acts  fair,  and  he  is  persuaded  that 
his  own  portion  is  good.  For  the  lot  which  is  as- 
signed to  each  man  is  carried  along  with  him  and 
carries  him  along  with  it.|  And  he  remembers  also 
that  every  rational  animal  is  his  kinsman,  and  that 
to  care  for  all  men  is  according  to  man's  nature ; 
and  a  man  should  hold  on  to  the  opinion  not  of  all, 
but  of  those  only  who  confessedly  live  according  to 
nature.  But  as  to  those  who  live  not  so,  he  always 
bears  in  mind  what  kind  of  men  they  are  both  at 
home  and  from  home,  both  by  night  and  by  day,  and 
what  they  are,  and  w^ith  what  men  they  live  an  im- 
pure life.  Accordingly,  he  does  not  value  at  all  the 
praise  which  comes  from  such  men,  since  they  are 
not  even  satisfied  with  themselves. 

5.  Labor  not  unwillingly,  nor  without  regard  to 
the  common  interest,  nor  without  due  consideration, 
nor  with  distraction ;  nor  let  studied  ornament  set  off 
thy  thoughts,  and  be  not  either  a  man  of  many  words, 
or  busy  about  too  many  things.  And  further,  let  the 
deity  which  is  in  thee  be  the  guardian  of  a  living 
being,  manly  and  of  ripe  age,  and  engaged  in  matter 
political,  and  a  Roman,  and  a  ruler,  who  has  taken 


no  THOUGHTS.  [Book  III. 

his  post  like  a  man  waiting  for  the  signal  which  sum- 
mons him  from  life,  and  ready  to  go,  having  need 
neither  of  oath  nor  of  any  man's  testimony.  Be 
cheerful  also,  and  seek  not  external  help  nor  the 
tranquillity  which  others  give.  A  man  then  must 
stand  erect,  not  be  kept  erect  by  others. 

6.  If  thou  findest  in  human  life  anything  better 
than  justice,  truth,  temperance,  fortitude,  and,  in  a 
word,  anything  better  than  thy  own  mind's  self-satis- 
faction in  the  things  which  it  enables  thee  to  do 
according  to  right  reason,  and  in  the  condition  that 
is  assigned  to  thee  without  thy  own  choice ;  if,  I  say, 
thou  seest  anything  better  than  this,  turn  to  it  with 
all  thy  soul,  and  enjoy  that  which  thou  hast  found  to 
be  the  best.  But  if  nothing  appears  to  be  better 
than  the  Deity  which  is  planted  in  thee,  which  has 
subjected  to  itself  all  thy  appetites,  and  carefully 
examines  all  the  impressions,  and,  as  Socrates  said, 
has  detached  itself  from  the  persuasions  of  sense,  and 
has  submitted  itself  to  the  gods,  and  cares  for  man- 
kind ;  if  thou  findest  everything  else  smaller  and  of 
less  value  than  this,  give  place  to  nothing  else,  for 
if  thou  dost  once  diverge  and  incline  to  it,  thou  wilt 
no  longer  without  distraction  be  able  to  give  the 
preference  to  that  good  thing  which  is  thy  proper 
possession  and  thy  own ;  for  it  is  not  right  that  any- 
thing of  any  other  kind,  such  as  praise  from  the 
many,  or  power,  or    enjoyment    of  pleasure,   should 


Book  III.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.        Ill 

come  into  competition  with  that  which  is  rationally 
and  politically  [or,  practically]  good.  All  these 
things,  even  though  they  may  seem  to  adapt  them- 
selves [to  the  better  things]  in  a  small  degree,  obtain 
the  superiority  all  at  once,  and  carry  us  away.  But 
do  thou,  I  say,  simply  and  freely  choose  the  better, 
and  hold  to  it.  —  But  that  which  is  useful  is  the 
better.  —  Well,  then,  if  it  is  useful  to  thee  as  a  rational 
being,  keep  to  it ;  but  if  it  is  only  useful  to  thee  as 
an  animal,  say  so,  and  maintain  thy  judgment  with- 
out arrogance  :  only  take  care  that  thou  makest  the 
inquiry  by  a  sure  method. 

7.  Never  value  anything  as  profitable  to  thyself 
which  shall  compel  thee  to  break  thy  promise,  to  lose 
thy  self-respect,  to  hate  any  man,  to  suspect,  to  curse, 
to  act  the  hypocrite,  to  desire  anything  which  needs 
walls  and  curtains  :  for  he  who  has  preferred  to 
everything  else  his  own  intelligence  and  daemon  and 
the  worship  of  its  excellence,  acts  no  tragic  part,  does 
not  groan,  will  not  need  either  solitude  or  much  com- 
pany ;  and,  what  is  chief  of  all,  he  will  live  without 
either  pursuing  or  flying  from  [death]  ;  ^  but  whether 
for  a  longer  or  a  shorter  time  he  shall  have  the  soul 
enclosed  in  the  body,  he  cares  not  at  all :  for  even  if 
he  must  depart  immediately,  he  will  go  as  readily  as 
if  he  were  going  to  do  anything  else  which  can  be 
done  with  decency  and  order;  taking  care  of  this 
1  Comp.  IX.  3. 


112  THOUGHTS.  [Book  III. 

only  all  through  life,  that  his  thoughts  turn  not  away 
from  anything  which  belongs  to  an  intelligent  animal 
and  a  member  of  a  civil  community. 

8.  In  the  mind  of  one  who  is  chastened  and  puri- 
fied thou  wilt  find  no  corrupt  matter,  nor  impurity, 
nor  any  sore  skinned  over.  Nor  is  his  life  incom- 
plete when  fate  overtakes  him,  as  one  may  say  of  an 
actor  who  leaves  the  stage  before  ending  and  finishing 
the  play.  Besides,  there  is  in  him  nothing  servile, 
nor  affected,  nor  too  closely  bound  [to  other  things], 
nor  yet  detached^  [from  other  things],  nothing  wor- 
thy of  blame,  nothing  which  seeks  a  hiding-place. 

9.  Reverence  the  faculty  which  produces  opinion. 
On  this  faculty  it  entirely  depends  whether  there  shall 
exist  in  thy  ruling  part  any  opinion  inconsistent  with 
nature  and  the  constitution  of  the  rational  animal. 
And  this  faculty  promises  freedom  from  hasty  judg- 
ment, and  friendship  towards  men,  and  obedience  to 
the  gods. 

10.  Throwing  away  then  all  things,  hold  to  these 
only  which  are  few ;  and  besides,  bear  in  mind  that 
every  man  lives  only  this  present  time,  which  is  an 
indivisible  point,  and  that  all  the  rest  of  his  life  is 
either  past  or  it  is  uncertain.  Short  then  is  the  time 
which  every  man  lives,  and  small  the  nook  of  the 
earth  where  he  lives ;  and  short  too  the  longest  post- 
humous fame,  and  even  this  only  continued  by  a  suc- 

1  VIII.  34. 


Book  III.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.        II3 

cession  of  poor  human  beings,  who  will  very  soon  die, 
and  who  know  not  even  themselves,  much  less  him 
who  died  long  ago. 

II.  To  the  aids  which  have  been  mentioned  let  this 
one  still  be  added  :  Make  for  thyself  a  definition  or 
description  of  the  thing  which  is  presented  to  thee,  so 
as  to  see  distinctly  what  kind  of  a  thing  it  is  in  its 
substance,  in  its  nudity,  in  its  complete  entirety,  and 
tell  thyself  its  proper  name,  and  the  names  of  the 
things  of  which  it  has  been  compounded,  and  into 
which  it  will  be  resolved.  For  nothing  is  so  produc- 
tive of  elevation  of  mind  as  to  be  able  to  examine 
methodically  and  truly  every  object  which  is  pre- 
sented to  thee  in  life,  and  always  to  look  at  things  so 
as  to  see  at  the  same  time  what  kind  of  universe  this 
is,  and  what  kind  of  use  everything  performs  in  it, 
and  what  value  everything  has  with  reference  to  the 
whole,  and  what  with  reference  to  man,  who  is  a 
citizen  of  the  highest  city,  of  which  all  other  cities  are 
like  families ;  what  each  thing  is,  and  of  what  it  is 
composed,  and  how  long  it  is  the  nature  of  this  thing 
to  endure  which  now  makes  an  impression  on  me, 
and  what  virtue  I  have  need  of  with  respect  to  it, 
such  as  gentleness,  manliness,  truth,  fidelity,  sim- 
plicity, contentment,  and  the  rest.  Wherefore,  on 
every  occasion  a  man  should  say :  This  comes  from 
god ;   and   this   is   according  to   the   apportionment  t 

and  spinning  of  the  thread  of  destiny,  and  such-like 

8 


114  THOUGHTS.  [Book  III. 

coincidence  and  chance ;  and  this  is  from  one  of  the 
same  stock,  and  a  kinsman  and  partner,  one  who 
knows  not,  however,  what  is  according  to  his  nature. 
But  I  know  ;  for  this  reason  I  behave  towards  him 
according  to  the  natural  law  of  fellowship  with 
benevolence  and  justice.  At  the  same  time,  however, 
in  things  indifferent  ^  I  attempt  to  ascertain  the  value 
of  each. 

12.  If  thou  workest  at  that  which  is  before  thee, 
following  right  reason  seriously,  vigorously,  calmly, 
without  allowing  anything  else  to  distract  thee,  but 
keeping  thy  divine  part  pure,  as  if  thou  shouldst  be 
bound  to  give  it  back  immediately;  if  thou  boldest 
to  this,  expecting  nothing,  fearing  nothing,  but  satis- 
fied with  thy  present  activity  according  to  nature, 
and  with  heroic  truth  in  every  word  and  sound  which 
thou  utterest,  thou  wilt  live  happy.  And  there  is  no 
man  who  is  able  to  prevent  this. 

13.  As  physicians  have  always  their  instruments 
and  knives  ready  for  cases  which  suddenly  require 
their  skill,  so  do  thou  have  principles  ready  for  the 
understanding  of  things  divine  and  human,  and  for 
doing  everything,  even  the  smallest,  with  a  recol- 
lection of  the  bond  which  unites  the  divine  and 
human  to  one  another.  For  neither  wilt  thou  do 
anything  well  which  pertains  to  man  without  at  the 

1  Est  dt  horiim  quae  media  appellamus  grande  discrimen.  — 
Seneca,  Ep.  82. 


Book  III.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.       II5 

same  time  having  a  reference  to  things  divine ;  nor 
the  contrary. 

14.  No  longer  wander  at  hazard;  for  neither  wilt 
thou  read  thy  own  memoirs/  nor  the  acts  of  the 
ancient  Romans  and  Hellenes,  and  the  selections 
from  books  which  thou  wast  reserving  for  thy  old 
age.^  Hasten  then  to  the  end  which  thou  hast  be- 
fore thee,  and,  throwing  away  idle  hopes,  come  to 
thy  own  aid,  if  thou  carest  at  all  for  thyself,  while 
it  is  in  thy  power. 

15.  They  know  not  how  many  things  are  signified 
by  the  words  stealing,  sowing,  buying,  keeping  quiet, 
seeing  what  ought  to  be  done  ;  for  this  is  not  effected 
by  the  eyes,  but  by  another  kind  of  vision. 

16.  Body,  soul,  intelligence  :  to  the  body  belong 
sensations,  to  the  soul  appetites,  to  the  intelligence 
principles.  To  receive  the  impressions  of  forms  by 
means  of  appearances  belongs  even  to  animals ;  to 
be  pulled  by  the  strings^  of  desire  belongs  both  to 
wild  beasts  and  to  men  who  have  made  themselves 
into  women,  and  to  a  Phalaris  and  a  Nero  :  and  to 
have  the  intelligence  that  guides  to  the  things  which 

1  viro/xui'jfiaTa  :  or  memoranda,  notes,  and  the  like.     See  i.  17. 

2  Compare  Fronto,  ii.  9  ;  a  letter  of  Marcus  to  Fronto,  who 
was  then  consul :  "  Feci  tamen  mihi  per  hos  dies  excerpta  ex 
libris  sexaginta  in  quinque  tomis."  But  he  says  some  of  them 
were  small  books. 

^  Compare  Plato,  De  Legibus,  l.  p.  644,  otl  radra  ret  wdOr) 
etc. ;  and  Antoninus,  ii.  2 ;  vii.  3 ;  xii.  19. 


Il6  THOUGHTS.  [Book  III. 

appear  suitable  belongs  also  to  those  who  do  not  be- 
lieve in  the  gods,  and  who  betray  their  country,  and 
do  their  impure  deeds  when  they  have  shut  the  doors. 
If  then  everything  else  is  common  to  all  that  I  have 
mentioned,  there  remains  that  which  is  peculiar  to 
the  good  man,  to  be  pleased  and  content  with  what 
happens,  and  with  the  thread  which  is  spun  for  him ; 
and  not  to  defile  the  divinity  which  is  planted  in  his 
breast,  nor  disturb  it  by  a  crov\d  of  images,  but  to 
preserve  it  tranquil,  following  it  obediently  as  a  god, 
neither  saying  anything  contrary  to  the  truth,  nor 
doing  anything  contrary  to  justice.  And  if  all  men 
refuse  to  believe  that  he  lives  a  simple,  modest,  and 
contented  life,  he  is  neither  angry  with  any  of  them, 
nor  does  he  deviate  from  the  way  which  leads  to  the 
end  of  life,  to  which  a  man  ought  to  come  pure,  tran- 
quil, ready  to  depart,  and  without  any  compulsion 
perfectly  reconciled  to  his  lot. 


Book  IV.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.       II7 


IV. 


npHAT  which  rules  within,  when  it  is  according  to 
nature,  is  so  affected  with  respect  to  the  events 
which  happen,  that  it  ahvays  easily  adapts  itself  to  that 
which  is  possible  and  is  presented  to  it.  For  it  re- 
quires no  definite  material,  but  it  moves  towards  its 
purpose,^  under  certain  conditions,  however;  and  it 
makes  a  material  for  itself  out  of  that  which  opposes 
it,  as  fire  lays  hold  of  what  falls  into  it,  by  which  a 
small  light  would  have  been  extinguished  :  but  when 
the  fire  is  strong,  it  soon  appropriates  to  itself  the 
matter  which  is  heaped  on  it,  and  consumes  it,  and 
rises  higher  by  means  of  this  very  material. 

2.  Let  no  act  be  done  without  a  purpose,  nor  other- 
wise than  according  to  the  perfect  principles  of  art. 

3.  Men  seek  retreats  for  themselves,  houses  in  the 
country,  sea-shores,  and  mountains ;  and  thou  too  art 
wont  to  desire  such  things  very  much.  But  this  is  al- 
together a  mark  of  the  most  common  sort  of  men,  for 
it  is  in  thy  power  whenever  thou  shalt  choose  to  retire 
into  thyself.     For  nowhere  either  with  more  quiet  or 

1  Trpos  Ttt  7)yov/j.€ua,  literally  "  towards  that  which  leads." 
The  exact  translation  is  doubtful.     See  Gataker's  note. 


Il8  THOUGHTS.  [Book  IV. 

more  freedom  from  trouble  does  a  man  retire  than  into 
his  own  soul,  particularly  when  he  has  within  him  such 
thoughts  that  by  looking  into  them  he  is  immediately 
in  perfect  tranquillity ;  and  I  affirm  that  tranquillity 
is  nothing  else  than  the  good  ordering  of  the  mind. 
Constantly  then  give  to  thyself  this  retreat,  and  renew 
thyself;  and  let  thy  principles  be  brief  and  fundamen- 
tal, which,  as  soon  as  thou  shalt  recur  to  them,  will  be 
sufficient  to  cleanse  the  soul  completely,  and  to  send 
thee  back  free  from  all  discontent  with  the  things  to 
which  thou  returnest.  For  with  what  art  thou  discon- 
tented? With  the  badness  of  men?  Recall  to  thy 
mind  this  conclusion,  that  rational  animals  exist  for 
one  another,  and  that  to  endure  is  a  part  of  justice, 
and  that  men  do  wrong  involuntarily;  and  consider 
how  many  already,  after  mutual  enmity,  suspicion, 
hatred,  and  fighting,  have  been  stretched  dead,  re- 
duced to  ashes ;  and  be  quiet  at  last.  —  But  perhaps 
thou  art  dissatisfied  with  that  which  is  assigned  to  thee 
out  of  the  universe.  —  Recall  to  thy  recollection  this 
alternative ;  either  there  is  providence  or  atoms  [for- 
tuitous concurrence  of  things  ]  ;  or  remember  the  ar- 
guments by  which  it  has  been  proved  that  the  world 
is  a  kind  of  poUtical  community  [and  be  quiet  at 
last] .  —  But  perhaps  corporeal  things  will  still  fasten 
upon  thee.  —  Consider  then  further  that  the  mind 
mingles  not  with  the  breath,  whether  moving  gendy 
or  violently,  when  it  has  once  drawn  itself  apart  and 


Book  IV.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS    ANTONINUS.       II9 

discovered  its  own  power,  and  think  also  of  all  that 
thou  hast  heard  and  assented  to  about  pain  and  pleas- 
ure [and  be  quiet  at  last] .  —  But  perhaps  the  desire 
of  the  thing  called  fame  will  torment  thee.  —  See  how 
soon  everything  is  forgotten,  and  look  at  the  chaos 
of  infinite  time  on  each  side  of  [the  present],  and 
the  emptiness  of  applause,  and  the  changeableness 
and  want  of  judgment  in  those  who  pretend  to  give 
praise,  and  the  narrowness  of  the  space  within  which 
it  is  circumscribed  [and  be  quiet  at  last].  For 
the  whole  earth  is  a  point,  and  how  small  a  nook 
in  it  is  this  thy  dwelling,  and  how  few  are  there  in 
it,  and  what  kind  of  people  are  they  who  will  praise 
thee. 

This  then  remains  :  Remember  to  retire  into  this 
little  territory  of  thy  own,i  and  above  all  do  not  dis- 
tract or  strain  thyself,  but  be  free,  and  look  at  things 
as  a  man,  as  a  human  being,  as  a  citizen,  as  a  mortal. 
But  among  the  things  readiest  to  thy  hand  to  which 
thou  shalt  turn,  let  there  be  these,  which  are  two. 
One  is  that  things  do  not  touch  the  soul,  for  they  are 
external  and  remain  immovable  ;  but  our  perturbations 
come  only  from  the  opinion  which  is  within.  The 
other  is  that  all  these  things,  which  thou  seest,  change 
immediately  and  will  no  longer  be ;  and  constantly 
bear  in  mind  how  many  of  these  changes  thou  hast 

1  Tecum  habita,  noris  quam  sit  tibi  curta   supellex.  —  Per- 
sins,  IV.  52. 


I20  THOUGHTS.  [Book  IV. 

already  witnessed.     The    universe   is  transformation : 
life  is  opinion. 

4.  If  our  intellectual  part  is  common,  the  reason 
also,  in  respect  of  which  we  are  rational  beings,  is  com- 
mon :  if  this  is  so,  common  also  is  the  reason  which 
commands  us  what  to  do,  and  what  not  to  do  ;  if  this 
is  so,  there  is  a  common  law  also ;  if  this  is  so,  we  are 
fellow- citizens  ;  if  this  is  so,  we  are  members  of  some 
political  community  ;  if  this  is  so,  the  world  is  in  a  man- 
ner a  state.-^  For  of  what  other  common  political  com- 
munity will  any  one  say  that  the  whole  human  race  are 
members?  And  from  thence,  from  this  common 
political  community  comes  also  our  very  intellectual 
faculty  and  reasoning  faculty  and  our  capacity  for  law ; 
or  whence  do  they  come  ?  For  as  my  earthly  part  is 
a  portion  given  to  me  from  certain  earth,  and  that 
which  is  watery  from  another  element,  and  that  which 
is  hot  and  fiery  from  some  peculiar  source  (for  nothing 
comes  out  of  that  which  is  nothing,  as  nothing  also 
returns  to  non-existence),  so  also  the  intellectual  part 
comes  from  some  source. 

5.  Death  is  such  as  generation  is,  a  mysteiy  of  na- 
ture ;  composition  out  of  the  same  elements,  and  a 
decomposition  into  the  same ;  and  altogether  not  a 
thing  of  which  any  man  should  be  ashamed,  for  it  is 
not  contrary  to  [the  nature  of]  a  reasonable  animal, 
and  not  contrary  to  the  reason  of  our  constitution. 

1  Compare  Cicero  De  Legibus,  i.  7. 


Book  IV.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.        12  1 

6.  It  is  natural  that  these  things  should  be  done  by 
such  persons,  it  is  a  matter  of  necessity ;  and  if  a  man 
will  not  have  it  so,  he  will  not  allow  the  fig-tree  to  have 
juice.  But  by  all  means  bear  this  in  mind,  that  within 
a  very  short  time  both  thou  and  he  will  be  dead  ;  and 
soon  not  even  your  names  will  be  left  behind. 

7.  Take  away  thy  opinion,  and  then  there  is  taken 
away  the  complaint,  "  I  have  been  harmed."  Take 
away  the  complaint,  "  I  have  been  harmed,"  and  the 
harm  is  taken  away. 

8.  That  which  does  not  make  a  man  worse  than  he 
was,  also  does  not  make  his  life  worse,  nor  does  it 
harm  him  either  from  without  or  from  within. 

9.  The  nature  of  that  which  is  [universally]  useful 
has  been  compelled  to  do  this. 

10.  Consider  that  everything  which  happens,  hap- 
pens jusdy,  and  if  thou  observest  carefully,  thou  wilt 
find  it  to  be  so.  I  do  not  say  only  with  respect  to  the 
continuity  of  the  series  of  things,  but  with  respect  to 
what  is  just,  and  as  if  it  were  done  by  one  who  assigns 
to  each  thing  its  value.  Observe  then  as  thou  hast  be- 
gun ;  and  whatever  thou  doest,  do  it  in  conjunction 
with  this,  the  being  good,  and  in  the  sense  in  which  a 
man  is  properly  understood  to  be  good.  Keep  to  this 
in  every  action. 

1 1 .  Do  not  have  such  an  opinion  of  things  as  he 
has  who  does  thee  wrong,  or  such  as  he  wishes  thee  to 
have,  but  look  at  them  as  they  are  in  truth. 


122  THOUGHTS.  '  [Book  IV. 

12.  A  man  should  always  have  these  two  rules  in 
readiness ;  the  one  to  do  only  whatever  the  reason  of 
the  ruling  and  legislating  faculty  may  suggest  for  the 
use  of  men  ;  the  other,  to  change  thy  opinion,  if  there 
is  any  one  at  hand  who  sets  thee  right  and  moves  thee 
from  any  opinion.  But  this  change  of  opinion  must 
proceed  only  from  a  certain  persuasion,  as  of  what  is 
just  or  of  common  advantage,  and  the  like,  not  be- 
cause it  appears  pleasant  or  brings  reputation. 

13.  Hast  thou  reason?  I  have.  —  Why  then  dost 
not  thou  use  it  ?  For  if  this  does  its  own  work,  what 
else  dost  thou  wish? 

14.  Thou  hast  existed  as  a  part.  Thou  shalt  disap- 
pear in  that  which  produced  thee ;  but  rather  thou 
shalt  be  received  back  into  its  seminal  principle  by 
transmutation. 

15.  Many  grains  of  frankincense  on  the  same  altar  : 
one  falls  before,  another  falls  after ;  but  it  makes  no 
difference. 

16.  Within  ten  days  thou  wilt  seem  a  god  to  those 
to  w^hom  thou  art  now  a  beast  and  an  ape,  if  thou 
wilt  return  to  thy  principles  and  the  worship  of 
reason. 

17.  Do  not  act  as  if  thou  wert  going  to  live  ten 
thousand  years.  Death  hangs  over  thee.  While  thou 
livest,  while  it  is  in  thy  power,  be  good. 

18.  How  much  trouble' he  avoids  who  does  not 
look  to  see  what  his  neighbor  says  or  does  or  thinks. 


Book  IV.]      MARCUS 'AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.       1 23 

but  only  to  what  he  does  himself,  that  it  may  be  just 
and  pure ;  or,  as  Agathon  |  says,  look  not  round  at 
the  depraved  morals  of  others,  but  run  straight  along 
the  line  without  deviating  from  it. 

19.  He  who  has  a  vehement  desire  for  posthumous 
fame  does  not  consider  that  every  one  of  those  who 
remember  him  will  himself  also  die  very  soon ;  then 
again  also  they  who  have  succeeded  them,  until  the 
whole  remembrance  shall  have  been  extinguished  as 
it  is  transmitted  through  men  who  foolishly  admire 
and  perish.  But  suppose  that  those  who  will  remem- 
ber are  even  immortal,  and  that  the  remembrance  will 
be  immortal,  what  then  is  this  to  thee  ?  And  I  say  not 
what  is  it  to  the  dead,  but  what  is  it  to  the  living. 
What  is  praise,  except  t  indeed  so  far  as  it  has  f  a  cer- 
tain utility?  For  thou  now  rejectest  unseasonably  the 
gift  of  nature,  clinging  to  something  else  .  .  .  f. 

20.  Everything  which  is  in  any  way  beautiful  is 
beautiful  in  itself,  and  terminates  in  itself,  not  having 
praise  as  part  of  itself.  Neither  worse  then  nor  better 
is  a  thing  made  by  being  praised.  I  affirm  this  also 
of  the  things  which  are  called  beautiful  by  the  vulgar, 
for  example,  material  things  and  works  of  art.  That 
which  is  really  beautiful  has  no  need  of  anything; 
not  more  than  law,  not  more  than  truth,  not  more 
than  benevolence  or  modesty.  Which  of  these  things 
is  beautiful  because  it  is  praised,  or  spoiled  by  being 
blamed?     Is  such  a  thing  as  an  emerald  made  worse 


124  THOUGHTS.  [Book  IV. 

than  it  was,  if  it  is  not  praised  ?  or  gold,  ivory,  purple, 
a  lyre,  a  little  knife,  a  flower,  a  shrub? 

2  1.  If  souls  continue  to  exist,  how  does  the  air 
contain  them  from  eternity?  —  But  how  does  the 
earth  contain  the  bodies  of  those  who  have  been 
buried  from  time  so  remote?  For  as  here  the  muta- 
tion of  these  bodies  after  a  certain  continuance,  what- 
ever it  may  be,  and  their  dissolution  make  room  for 
other  dead  bodies,  so  the  souls  which  are  removed 
into  the  air  after  subsisting  for  some  time  are  trans- 
muted and  diffused,  and  assume  a  fiery  nature  by 
being  received  into  the  seminal  intelligence  of  the 
universe,  and  in  this  way  make  room  for  the  fresh 
souls  which  come  to  dwell  there.  And  this  is  the 
answer  which  a  man  might  give  on  the  hypothesis 
of  souls  continuing  to  exist.  But  we  must  not  only 
think  of  the  number  of  bodies  which  are  thus  buried, 
but  also  of  the  number  of  animals  which  are  daily 
eaten  by  us  and  the  other  animals.  For  what  a  num- 
ber is  consumed,  and  thus  in  a  manner  buried  in 
the  bodies  of  those  who  feed  on  them  !  And  never- 
theless this  earth  receives  them  by  reason  of  the 
changes  [of  these  bodies]  into  blood,  and  the  trans- 
formations into  the  aerial  or  the  fiery  element. 

What  is  the  investigation  into  the  truth  in  this 
matter?  The  division  into  that  which  is  material 
and  that  which  is  the  cause  of  form  [the  formal]. 
(VII.  29.) 


Book  IV.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.       125 

22.  Do  not  be  whirled  about,  but  in  every  move- 
ment have  respect  to  justice,  and  on  the  occasion  of 
every  impression  maintain  the  faculty  of  comprehen- 
sion [or  understanding] . 

23.  Everything  harmonizes  with  me,  which  is  har- 
monious to  thee,  O  Universe.  Nothing  for  me  is 
too  early  nor  too  late,  which  is  in  due  time  for  thee. 
Everything  is  fruit  to  me  which  thy  seasons  bring,  O 
Nature  :  from  thee  are  all  things,  in  thee  are  all  things, 
to  thee  all  things  return.  The  poet  says,  Dear  city  of 
Cecrops  ;  and  wilt  not  thou  say,  Dear  city  of  Zeus  ? 

24.  Occupy  thyself  with  few  things,  says  the  phi- 
losopher, if  thou  wouldst  be  tranquil.  —  But  consider 
if  it  would  not  be  better  to  say,  Do  what  is  neces- 
sary, and  whatever  the  reason  of  the  animal  which 
is  naturally  social  requires,  and  as  it  requires.  For 
this  brings  not  only  the  tranquillity  which  comes 
from  doing  well,  but  also  that  which  comes  from 
doing  few  things.  For  the  greatest  part  of  what  we 
say  and  do  being  unnecessary,  if  a  man  takes  this 
away,  he  will  have  more  leisure  and  less  uneasiness. 
Accordingly,  on  every  occasion  a  man  should  ask 
himself.  Is  this  one  of  the  unnecessary  things?  Now 
a  man  should  take  away  not  only  unnecessary  acts, 
but  also  unnecessary  thoughts,  for  thus  superfluous 
acts  will  not  follow  after. 

25.  Try  how  the  life  of  the  good  man  suits  thee, 
the  hfe  of  him  who  is  satisfied  with  his  portion  out 


126  THOUGHTS.  [Book  IV. 

of  the  whole,   and    satisfied  with  his  own   just  acts 
and  benevolent  disposition. 

26.  Hast  thou  seen  those  things?  Look  also  at 
these.  Do  not  disturb  thyself.  Make  thyself  all 
simpHcity.  Does  any  one  do  wrong?  It  is  to  him- 
self that  he  does  the  wrong.  Has  anything  happened 
to  thee  ?  Well ;  out  of  the  universe  from  the  begin- 
ning everything  which  happens  has  been  apportioned 
and  spun  out  to  thee.  In  a  word,  thy  life  is  short. 
Thou  must  turn  to  profit  the  present  by  the  aid  of 
reason  and  justice.     Be  sober  in  thy  relaxation. 

27.  Either  it  is  a  well-arranged  universe^  or  a 
chaos  huddled  together,  but  still  a  universe.  But 
can  a  certain  order  subsist  in  thee,  and  disorder  in 
the  All?  And  this  too  when  all  things  are  so  sepa- 
rated and  diffused  and  sympathetic. 

28.  A  black  character,  a  womanish  character,  a 
stubborn  character,  bestial,  childish,  animal,  stupid, 
counterfeit,  scurrilous,  fraudulent,  tyrannical. 

29.  If  he  is  a  stranger  to  the  universe  who  does 
not  know  what  is  in  it,  no  less  is  he  a  stranger  who 
does  not  know  what  is  going  on  in  it.  He  is  a  run- 
away, who  flies  from  social  reason ;  he  is  blind,  who 
shuts  the  eyes  of  the  understanding ;  he  is  poor,  who 
has  need  of  another,  and   has  not  from  himself  all 

1  Antoninus  here  uses  the  'word  Koa/jLos  both  in  the  sense  of 
the  Universe  and  of  Order ;  and  it  is  difficult  to  express  his 
meaning. 


Book  IV.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.        12/ 

things  which  are  useful  for  hfe.  He  is  an  abscess 
on  the  universe  who  withdraws  and  separates  him- 
self from  the  reason  of  our  common  nature  through 
being  displeased  with  the  things  which  happen,  for 
the  same  nature  produces  this,  and  has  produced 
thee  too  :  he  is  a  piece  rent  asunder  from  the  state, 
who  tears  his  own  soul  from  that  of  reasonable  ani- 
mals, which  is  one. 

30.  The  one  is  a  philosopher  without  a  tunic, 
and  the  other  without  a  book :  here  is  another  half 
naked  :  Bread  I  have  not,  he  says,  and  I  abide  by 
reason  —  and  I  do  not  get  the  means  of  living  out 
of  my  learning,!  and  I  abide  [by  my  reason] . 

31.  Love  the  art,  poor  as  it  may  be,  which  thou 
hast  learned,  and  be  content  with  it ;  and  pass 
through  the  rest  of  life  like  one  who  has  intrusted 
to  the  gods  with  his  whole  soul  all  that  he  has, 
making  thyself  neither  the  tyrant  nor  the  slave  of 
any  man. 

32.  Consider,  for  example,  the  times  of  Vespasian. 
Thou  wilt  see  all  these  things,  people  marrying, 
bringing  up  children,  sick,  dying,  warring,  feasting, 
trafficking,  cultivating  the  ground,  flattering,  obsti- 
nately arrogant,  suspecting,  plotting,  wishing  for  some 
to  die,  grumbling  about  the  present,  loving,  heaping 
up  treasure,  desiring  consulship,  kingly  power.  Well, 
then,  that  life  of  these  people  no  longer  exists  at  all. 
Again,  remove  to  the  times  of  Trajan.     Again,  all  is 


128  THOUGHTS.  [Book  IV. 

the  same.  Their  life  too  is  gone.  In  Hke  manner 
view  also  the  other  epochs  of  time  and  of  whole 
nations,  and  see  how  many  after  great  efforts  soon 
fell  and  were  resolved  into  the  elements.  But  chiefly 
thou  shouldst  think  of  those  whom  thou  hast  thy- 
self known  distracting  themselves  about  idle  things, 
neglecting  to  do  what  was  in  accordance  with  their 
proper  constitution,  and  to  hold  firmly  to  this  and 
to  be  content  with  it.  And  herein  it  is  necessary  to 
remember  that  the  attention  given  to  everything  has 
its  proper  value  and  proportion.  For  thus  thou  wilt 
not  be  dissatisfied,  if  thou  apphest  thyself  to  smaller 
matters  no  further  than  is  fit. 

33.  The  words  which  were  formerly  familiar  are 
now  antiquated :  so  also  the  names  of  those  who 
were  famed  of  old,  are  now  in  a  manner  antiquated, 
Camillus,  Caeso,  Volesus,  Leonnatus,  and  a  little  after 
also  Scipio  and  Cato,  then  Augustus,  then  also  Ha- 
drianus  and  Antoninus.  For  all  things  soon  pass 
away  and  become  a  mere  tale,  and  complete  oblivion 
soon  buries  them.  And  I  say  this  of  those  who  have 
shone  in  a  wondrous  way.  For  the  rest,  as  soon  as 
they  have  breathed  out  their  breath,  they  are  gone, 
and  no  man  speaks  of  them.  And,  to  conclude  the 
matter,  what  is  even  an  eternal  remembrance?  A 
mere  nothing.  What  then  is  that  about  which  we 
ought  to  employ  our  serious  pains?  This  one 
thing,    thoughts    just,    and    acts    social,    and    words 


Book  IV.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.        1 29 

which  never  lie,  and  a  disposition  which  gladly  ac- 
cepts all  that  happens,  as  necessary,  as  usual,  as  flow- 
ing from  a  principle  and  source  of  the  same  kind. 

34.  Willingly  give  thyself  up  to  Clotho  [one  of  the 
fates],  allowing  her  to  spin  thy  thread  t  into  whatever 
things  she  pleases. 

35.  Everything  is  only  for  a  day,  both  that  which 
remembers  and  that  which  is  remembered. 

36.  Observe  constantly  that  all  things  take  place  by 
change,  and  accustom  thyself  to  consider  that  the  na- 
ture of  the  universe  loves  nothing  so  much  as  to 
change  the  things  which  are  and  to  make  new  things 
like  them.  For  everything  that  exists  is  in  a  manner 
the  seed  of  that  which  will  be.  But  thou  art  thinking 
only  of  seeds  which  are  cast  into  the  earth  or  into  a 
womb  :   but  this  is  a  very  vulgar  notion. 

37.  Thou  wilt  soon  die,  and  thou  art  not  yet  simple, 
nor  free  from  perturbations,  nor  without  suspicion  of 
being  hurt  by  external  things,  nor  kindly  disposed 
towards  all ;  nor  dost  thou  yet  place  wisdom  only  in 
acting  justly. 

38.  Examine  men's  ruling  principles,  even  those  of 
the  wise,  what  kind  of  things  they  avoid,  and  what 
kind  they  pursue. 

39.  What  is  evil  to  thee  does  not  subsist  in  the  rul- 
ing principle  of  another ;  nor  yet  in  any  turning  and 
mutation  of  thy  corporeal  covering.  Where  is  it  then  ? 
It  is  in  that  part  of  thee  in  which  subsists   the   power 

9 


I30  THOUGHTS.  [Book  IV. 

of  forming  opinions  about  evils.  Let  this  power  then 
not  form  [such]  opinions,  and  all  is  well.  And  if  that 
which  is  nearest  to  it,  the  poor  body,  is  cut,  burnt, 
filled  with  matter  and  rottenness,  nevertheless  let  the 
part  which  forms  opinions  about  these  things  be  quiet  j 
that  is,  let  it  judge  that  nothing  is  either  bad  or  good 
which  can  happen  equally  to  the  bad  man  and  the 
good.  For  that  which  happens  equally  to  him  who 
lives  contrary  to  nature  and  to  him  who  lives  accord- 
ing to  nature,  is  neither  according  to  nature  nor  con- 
trary to  nature. 

40.  Constandy  regard  the  universe  as  one  living 
being,  having  one  substance  and  one  soul ;  and  ob- 
serve how  all  things  have  reference  to  one  perception, 
the  perception  of  this  one  living  being ;  and  how  all 
things  act  with  one  movement ;  and  how  all  things 
are  the  co-operating  causes  of  all  things  which  exist ; 
observe  too  the  continuous  spinning  of  the  thread  and 
the  contexture  of  the  web. 

41.  Thou  art  a  little  soul  bearing  about  a  corpse,  as 
Epictetus  used  to  say   (i.  c.  19). 

42.  It  is  no  evil  for  things  to  undergo  change,  and 
no  good  for  things  to  subsist  in  consequence  of 
change. 

43.  Time  is  like  a  river  made  up  of  the  events 
which  happen,  and  a  violent  stream  ;  for  as  soon  as  a 
thing  has  been  seen,  it  is  carried  away,  and  another 
comes  in  its  place,  and  this  will  be  carried  away  too. 


Book  IV.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.        I31 

44.  Everything  which  happens  is  as  famiUar  and 
well  known  as  the  rose  in  spring  and  the  fruit  in  sum- 
mer; for  such  is  disease,  and  death,  and  calumny, 
and  treachery,  and  whatever  else  delights  fools  or 
vexes  them. 

45.  In  the  series  of  things,  those  which  follow  are 
always  aptly  fitted  to  those  which  have  gone  before  : 
for  this  series  is  not  like  a  mere  enumeration  of  dis- 
jointed things,  which  has  only  a  necessary  sequence, 
but  it  is  a  rational  connection  :  and  as  all  existing 
things  are  arranged  together  harmoniously,  so  the 
things  which  come  into  existence  exhibit  no  mere  suc- 
cession, but  a  certain  wonderful  relationship  (vi.  ;^S  ; 
VII.  9  ;  VII.   75,  note). 

46.  Always  remember  the  saying  of  Heraclitus,  that 
the  death  of  earth  is  to  become  water,  and  the  death 
of  water  is  to  become  air,  and  the  death  of  air  is  to 
become  fire,  and  reversely.  And  think  too  of  him 
who  forgets  whither  the  way  leads,  and  that  men  quar- 
rel with  that  with  which  they  are  most  constantly  in 
communion,  the  reason  which  governs  the  universe ; 
and  the  things  which  they  daily  meet  with  seem  to 
them  strange  :  and  consider  that  we  ought  not  to  act 
and  speak  as  if  we  were  asleep,  for  even  in  sleep  we 
seem  to  act  and  speak ;  and  that  t  we  ought  not,  like 
children  who  learn  from  their  parents,  simply  to  act 
and  speak  as  we  have  been  taught.f 

47.  If  any  god  told  thee  that  thou  shalt  die  to-mor- 


132  THOUGHTS.  [Book  IV. 

row,  or  certainly  on  the  day  after  to-morrow,  thou 
wouldst  not  care  much  whether  it  was  on  the  third 
day  or  on  the  morrow,  unless  thou  wast  in  the  highest 
degree  mean-spirited ;  for  how  small  is  the  differ- 
ence. So  think  it  no  great  thing  to  die  after  as  many 
years  as  thou  canst  name  rather  than  to-morrow. 

48.  Think  continually  how  many  physicians  are  dead 
after  often  contracting  their  eyebrows  over  the  sick ; 
and  how  many  astrologers  after  predicting  with  great 
pretensions  the  deaths  of  others  ;  and  how  many  phi- 
losophers after  endless  discourses  on  death  or  immor- 
tality ;  how  many  heroes  after  killing  thousands ;  and 
how  many  tyrants  who  have  used  their  power  over 
men's  lives  with  terrible  insolence,  as  if  they  were  im- 
mortal; and  how  many  cities  are  entirely  dead,  so 
to  speak,  Helice  ^  and  Pompeii  and  Herculanum,  and 
others  innumerable.  Add  to  the  reckoning  all  whom 
thou  hast  known,  one  after  another.  One  man  after 
burying  another  has  been  laid  out  dead,  and  another 
buries  him ;  and  all  this  in  a  short  time.  To  con- 
clude, always  observe  how  ephemeral  and  worthless 
human  things  are,  and  what  was  yesterday  a  little  mu- 
cus, to-morrow  will  be  a  mummy  or  ashes.  Pass  then 
thro^igh  this  little  space  of  time  conformably  to  nature, 
and  end  thy  journey  in  content,  just  as  an  olive  falls 

1  Ovid,  Met.  xv.  293  :  —  , 

*'  Si  quaeras  Helicen  et  Burin  Achaidas  urbes, 
Invenies  sub  aquis.  " 


Book  IV.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.        1 33 

off  when  it  is   ripe,  blessing  nature  who  produced  it, 
and  thanking  the  tree  on  which  it  grew. 

49.  Be  hke  the  promontory  against  which  the  waves 
continually  break,  but  it  stands  firm  and  tames  the 
fury  of  the  water  around  it. 

Unhappy  am  I  because  this  has  happened  to  me? 
Not  so,  but  happy  am  I,  though  this  has  happened  to 
me,  because  I  continue  free  from  pain,  neither  crushed 
by  the  present  nor  fearing  the  future.  For  such  a 
thing  as  this  might  have  happened  to  every  man ;  but 
every  man  would  not  have  continued  free  from  pain 
on  such  an  occasion.  Why  then  is  that  rather  a  mis- 
fortune than  this  a  good  fortune  ?  And  dost  thou  in 
all  cases  call  that  a  man's  misfortune  which  is  not  a 
deviation  from  man's  nature?  And  does  a  thing  seem 
to  thee  to  be  a  deviation  from  man's  nature,  when  it  is 
not  contrary  to  the  will  of  man's  nature  ?  Well,  thou 
knowest  the  will  of  nature.  Will  then  this  which  has 
happened  prevent  thee  from  being  just,  magnanimous, 
temperate,  prudent,  secure  against  inconsiderate  opin- 
ions and  falsehood ;  w^ill  it  prevent  thee  from  having 
modesty,  freedom,  and  everything  else,  by  the  pres- 
ence of  which  man's  nature  obtains  all  that  is  its  own? 
Remember  too  on  every  occasion  which  leads  thee  to 
vexation  to  apply  this  principle  :  not  that  this  is  a  mis- 
fortune, but  that  to  bear  it  nobly  is  good  fortune. 

50.  It  is  a  vulgar,  but  still  a  useful  help  towards 
contempt  of  death,  to  pass  in  review  those  who  have 


134  THOUGHTS.  [Book  IV. 

tenaciously  stuck  to  life.  What  more  then  have  they 
gained  than  those  who  have  died  early?  Certainly 
they  lie  in  their  tombs  somewhere  at  last,  Cadicianus, 
Fabius,  Julianus,  Lepidus,  or  any  one  else  like  them, 
who  have  carried  out  many  to  be  buried,  and  then 
were  carried  out  themselves.  Altogether  the  interval 
is  small  [between  birth  and  death]  ;  and  consider 
with  how  much  trouble,  and  in  company  with  what 
sort  of  people,  and  in  what  a  feeble  body  this  interval 
is  laboriously  passed.  Do  not  then  consider  life  a 
thing  of  any  value. t  For  look  to  the  immensity  of 
time  behind  thee,  and  to  the  time  which  is  before  thee, 
another  boundless  space.  In  this  infinity  then  what  is 
the  difference  between  him  who  lives  three  days  and 
him    who   lives    three  generations  ?  ^ 

51.  Always  run  to  the  short  way  ;  and  the  short 
way  is  the  natural :  accordingly  say  and  do  everything 
in  conformity  with  the  soundest  reason.  For  such  a 
purpose  frees  a  man  from  trouble,  j  and  warfare,  and 
all  artifice  and  ostentatious  display. 

1  An  allusion  to  Homer's  Nestor,  who  was  living  at  the  war 
of  Troy  among  the  third  generation,  like  old  Parr  with  his  hun- 
dred and  fifty-two  years,  and  some  others  in  modern  times  who  • 
have  beaten  Parr  by  twenty  or  thirty  years  if  it  is  true  ;  and  yet 
they  died  at  last.  The  word  is  rpLyeprjuiov  in  Antoninus.  Nestor 
is  named  rpiyepoov  by  some  writers  ;  but  here  perhaps  there  is  an 
allusion  to  Homer's  Teprji>ioi  in-wora  'Nearup. 


Book  v.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.         I35 


T  N  the  morning  when  thou  risest  unwillingly,  let  this 
thought  be  present,  —  I  am  rising  to  the  work  of 
a  human  being.  Why  then  am  I  dissatisfied  if  I  am 
going  to  do  the  things  for  which  I  exist  and  for  which 
I  was  brought  into  the  world?  Or  have  I  been  made 
for  this,  to  lie  in  the  bed-clothes  and  keep  myself 
warm  ?  —  But  this  is  more  pleasant.  —  Dost  thou  exist 
then  to  take  thy  pleasure,  and  not  at  all  for  action  or 
exertion?  Dost  thou  not  see  the  little  plants,  the 
little  birds,  the  ants,  the  spiders,  the  bees  working 
together  to  put  in  order  their  several  parts  of  the 
universe?  And  art  thou  unwilling  to  do  the  work  of 
a  human  being,  and  dost  thou  not  make  haste  to  do 
that  which  is  according  to  thy  nature  ?  —  But  it  is 
necessary  to  take  rest  also.  —  It  is  necessary.  How- 
ever, Nature  has  fixed  bounds  to  this  too  :  she  has 
fixed  bounds  to  eating  and  drinking,  and  yet  thou 
goest  beyond  these  bounds,  beyond  what  is  sufficient ; 
yet  in  thy  acts  it  is  not  so,  but  thou  stoppest  short  of 
what  thou  canst  do.  So  thou  lovest  not  thyself,  for  if 
thou  didst,  thou  wouldst  love  thy  nature  and  her  will. 
But  those  who  love  their  several  arts  exhaust  them- 


136  THOUGHTS.  [BookV. 

selves  in  working  at  them  unwashed  and  without  food  ; 
but  thou  valuest  thy  own  nature  less  than  the  turner 
values  the  turning  art,  or  the  dancer  the  dancing  art, 
or  the  lover  of  money  values  his  money,  or  the  vain- 
glorious man  his  little  glory.  And  such  men,  when 
they  have  a  violent  affection  to  a  thing,  choose  neither 
to  eat  nor  to  sleep  rather  than  to  perfect  the  things 
which  they  care  for.  But  are  the  acts  which  concern 
society  more  vile  in  thy  eyes  and  less  worthy  of  thy 
labor  ? 

2.  How  easy  it  is  to  repel  and  to  wipe  away  every 
impression  which  is  troublesome  or  unsuitable,  and 
immediately  to  be  in  all  tranquillity. 

3.  Judge  every  word  and  deed  which  are  according 
to  nature  to  be  fit  for  thee ;  and  be  not  diverted  by 
the  blame  which  follows  from  any  people  nor  by 
their  words,  but  if  a  thing  is  good  to  be  done  or 
said,  do  not  consider  it  unworthy  of  thee.  For  those 
persons  have  their  peculiar  leading  principle  and  fol- 
low their  peculiar  movement ;  which  things  do  not 
thou  regard,  but  go  straight  on,  following  thy  own 
nature  and  the  common  nature ;  and  the  way  of  both 
is  one. 

4.  I  go  through  the  things  which  happen  according 
to  nature  until  I  shall  fall  and  rest,  breathing  out  my 
breath  into  that  element  out  of  which  I  daily  draw 
it  in,  and  falling  upon  that  earth  out  of  which  my 
father  collected  the  seed,  and  my  mother  the  blood. 


Book  v.]      MARCUS   AURELTUS   ANTONINUS.         1 3/ 

and  my  nurse  the  milk ;  out  of  which  during  so 
many  years  I  have  been  suppHed  with  food  and 
drink ;  which  bears  me  when  I  tread  on  it  and  abuse 
it  for  so  many  purposes. 

5.  Thou  sayest,  Men  cannot  admire  the  sharpness 
of  thy  wits.  —  Be  it  so  :  but  there  are  many  other 
things  of  which  thou  canst  not  say,  I  am  not  formed 
for  them  by  nature.  Show  those  quahties  then  which 
are  altogether  in  thy  power,  sincerity,  gravity,  endu- 
rance of  labor,  aversion  to  pleasure,  contentment 
with  thy  portion  and  with  few  things,  benevolence, 
frankness,  no  love  of  superfluity,  freedom  from  trifling, 
magnanimity.  Dost  thou  not  see  how  many  quali- 
ties thou  art  immediately  able  to  exhibit,  in  which 
there  is  no  excuse  of  natural  incapacity  and  unfitness, 
and  yet  thou  still  remainest  voluntarily  below  the 
mark?  or  art  thou  compefled  through  being  defec- 
tively furnished  by  nature  to  murmur,  and  to  be 
stingy,  afnd  to  flatter,  and  to  find  fault  with  thy  poor 
body,  and  to  try  to  please  men,  and  to  make  great 
display,  and  to  be  so  restless  in  thy  mind  ?  No,  by 
the  gods ;  but  thou  mightest  have  been  delivered 
from  these  things  long  ago.  Only  if  in  truth  thou 
canst  be  charged  with  being  rather  slow  and  dull 
of  comprehension,  thou  must  exert  thyself  about  this 
also,  not  neglecting  it  nor  yet  taking  pleasure  in  thy 
dulness. 

6.  One    man,    when    he    has    done    a    service    to 


138  THOUGHTS.  [BookV. 

another,  is  ready  to  set  it  down  to  his  account  as 
a  favor  conferred.  Another  is  not  ready  to  do  this, 
but  still  in  his  own  mind  he  thinks  of  the  man  as  his 
debtor,  and  he  knows  what  he  has  done.  A  third 
in  a  manner  does  not  even  know  what  he  has  done, 
but  he  is  like  a  vine  which  has  produced  grapes,  and 
seeks  for  nothing  more  after  it  has  once  produced 
its  proper  fruit.  As  a  horse  when  he  has  run,  a  dog 
when  he  has  tracked  the  game,  a  bee  when  it  has 
made  the  honey,  so  a  man  when  he  has  done  a  good 
act,  does  not  call  out  for  others  to  come  and  see, 
but  he  goes  on  to  another  act,  as  a  vine  goes  on  to 
produce  again  the  grapes  in  season.  —  Must  a  man 
then  be  one  of  these,  who  in  a  manner  act  thus 
without  observing  it  ?  —  Yes.  —  But  this  very  thing 
is  necessary,  the  observation  of  what  a  man  is  doing : 
for,  it  may  be  said,  it  is  characteristic  of  the  social 
animal  to  perceive  that  he  is  working  in  a  social 
manner,  and  indeed  to  wish  that  his  social  partner 
also  should  perceive  it.  —  It  is  true  what  thou  sayest, 
but  thou  dost  not  rightly  understand  what  is  now 
said  :  and  for  this  reason  thou  wilt  become  one  of 
those  of  whom  I  spoke  before,  for  even  they  are  mis- 
led by  a  certain  show  of  reason.  But  if  thou  wilt 
choose  to  understand  the  meaning  of  what  is  said, 
do  not  fear  that  for  this  reason  thou  wilt  omit  any 
social  act. 

7.  A  prayer  of  the  Athenians  :   Rain,  rain,  O  dear 


Book  v.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.         1 39 

Zeus,  down  on  the  ploughed  fields  of  the  Athenians 
and  on  the  plains.  —  In  truth  we  ought  not  to  pray 
at  all,  or  we  ought  to  pray  in  this  simple  and  noble 
fashion. 

8.  Just  as  we  must  understand  when  it  is  said. 
That  Aesculapius  prescribed  to  this  man  horse-exer- 
cise, or  bathing  in  cold  water,  or  going  without  shoes, 
so  we  must  understand  it  when  it  is  said,  That  the 
nature  of  the  universe  prescribed  to  this  man  disease, 
or  mutilation,  or  loss,  or  anything  else  of  the  kind. 
For  in  the  first  case  Prescribed  means  something 
like  this  :  he  prescribed  this  for  this  man  as  a  thing 
adapted  to  procure  health ;  and  in  the  second  case 
it  means.  That  which  happens^  to  [or  suits]  every 
man  is  fixed  in  a  manner  for  him  suitably  to  his 
destiny.  For  this  is  what  we  mean  when  we  say 
that  things  are  suitable  to  us,  as  the  workmen  say  of 
squared  stones  in  walls  or  the  pyramids,  that  they  are 
suitable,  when  they  fit  them  to  one  another  in  some 
kind  of  connection.  For  there  is  altogether  one  fit- 
ness [harmony].  And  as  the  universe  is  made  up 
out  of  all*  bodies  to  be  such  a  body  as  it  is,  so  out 
of  all  existing  causes  necessity  [destiny]  is  made  up 
to  be  such  a  cause  as  it  is.  And  even  those  who 
are  completely  ignorant  understand  what  I  mean ; 
for  they  say,  It   [necessity,  destiny]    brought  this  to 

1  In  this  section  there  is  a  play  on  the   meaning  of  avjj.- 


140  THOUGHTS.  [Book  V. 

such  a  person. — This  then  was  brought  and  this  was 
prescribed  to  him.  Let  us  then  receive  these  things, 
as  well  as  those  which  Aesculapius  prescribes.  Many 
as  a  matter  of  course  even  among  his  prescriptions 
are  disagreeable,  but  we  accept  them  in  the  hope 
of  health.  Let  the  perfecting  and  accomplishment 
of  the  things  which  the  common  nature  judges  to  be 
good,  be  judged  by  thee  to  be  of  the  same  kind  as 
thy  health.  And  so  accept  everything  which  hap- 
pens, even  if  it  seem  disagreeable,  because  it  leads 
to  this,  to  the  health  of  the  universe  and  to  the  pros- 
perity and  felicity  of  Zeus  [the  universe].  For  he 
would  not  have  brought  on  any  man  what  he  has 
brought,  if  it  were  not  useful  for  the  whole.  Neither 
does  the  nature  of  anything,  whatever  it  may  be,  cause 
anything  which  is  not  suitable  to  that  which  is  directed 
by  it.  For  two  reasons  then  it  is  right  to  be  content 
with  that  which  happens  to  thee ;  the  one,  because 
it  was  done  for  thee  and  prescribed  for  thee,  and 
in  a  manner  had  reference  to  thee,  originally  from 
the  most  ancient  causes  spun  with  thy  destiny;  and 
the  other,  because  even  that  which  comes  severally 
to  every  man  is  to  the  power  which  administers  the 
universe  a  cause  of  felicity  and  perfection,  nay  even 
of  its  very  continuance.  For  the  integrity  of  the 
whole  is  mutilated,  if  thou  cuttest  off  anything  what- 
ever from  the  conjunction  and  the  continuity  either 
of  the   parts  or  of  the  causes.     And  thou   dost  cut 


Book  V.J      MARCUS   AURELIUS   AXTOXINX'S.        141 

off,  as  far  as  it  is  in  thy  power,  when  thou  art  dissat- 
isfied, and  in  a  manner  triest  to  put  anything  out  of 
the  way. 

9.  Be  not  disgusted,  nor  discouraged,  nor  dissatis- 
fied, if  thou  dost  not  succeed  in  doing  ever}thing 
according  to  right  principles,  but  when  thou  hast 
failed,  return  back  again,  and  be  content  if  the 
greater  part  of  what  thou  doest  is  consistent  with 
man's  nature,  and  love  this  to  which  thou  retumest ; 
and  do  not  return  to  philosophy  as  if  she  were  a 
master,  but  act  like  those  who  have  sore  eyes  and 
apply  a  bit  of  sponge  and  egg,  or  as  another  applies 
a  plaster,  or  drenching  \sith  water.  For  thus  thou 
wilt  not  fail  tot  obey  reason,  and  thou  wilt  repose 
in  it.  And  remember  that  philosophy  requires  only 
the  things  which  thy  nature  requires;  but  thou 
wouldst  have  something  else  which  is  not  according 
to  nature.  —  It  may  be  objected.  Why,  what  is  more 
agreeable  than  this  [which  I  am  doing]  ?  —  But  is 
not  this  the  very  reason  why  pleasure  deceives  us? 
And  consider  if  magnanimity,  freedom,  simplicity, 
equanimity,  piety,  are  not  more  agreeable.  For  what 
is  more  agreeable  than  wisdom  itself,  when  thou 
thinkest  of  the  security  and  the  happy  course  of  all 
things  which  depend  on  the  faculty  of  understanding 
and  knowledge? 

10.  Things   are   in   such   a  kind   of  envelopment 
that   they  have   seemed    to   philosophers,   not   a   few 


142  THOUGHTS.  [Book  V. 

nor  those  common  philosophers,  altogether  unintel- 
ligible ;  nay  even  to  the  Stoics  themselves  they  seem 
difficult  to  understand.  iVnd  all  our  assent  is  change- 
able ;  for  where  is  the  man  who  never  changes  ? 
Carry  thy  thoughts  then  to  the  objects  themselves, 
and  consider  how  short-lived  they  are  and  worthless, 
and  that  they  may  be  in  the  possession  of  a  filthy 
wretch  or  a  whore  or  a  robber.  Then  turn  to  the 
morals  of  those  who  live  with  thee,  and  it  is  hardly 
possible  to  endure  even  the  most  agreeable  of  them, 
to  say  nothing  of  a  man  being  hardly  able  to  endure 
himself.  In  such  darkness  then  and  dirt,  and  in  so 
constant  a  flux  both  of  substance  and  of  time,  and 
of  motion  and  of  things  moved,  what  there  is  worth 
being  highly  prized,  or  even  an  object  of  serious 
pursuit,  I  cannot  imagine.  But  on  the  contrary  it 
is  a  man's  duty  to  comfort  himself,  and  to  wait  for 
the  natural  dissolution,  and  not  to  be  vexed  at  the 
delay,  but  to  rest  in  these  principles  only :  the  one, 
that  nothing  will  happen  to  me  which  is  not  conform- 
able to  the  nature  of  the  universe ;  and  the  other, 
that  it  is  in  my  power  never  to  act  contrary  to  my 
god  and  daemon :  for  there  is  no  man  who  will 
compel  me  to  this. 

1 1 .  About  what  am  I  now  employing  my  own  soul  ? 
On  every  occasion  I  must  ask  myself  this  question, 
and  inquire,  What  have  I  now  in  this  part  of  me  which 
they  call  the  ruling  principle  ?  and  whose  soul  have  I 


Book  v.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.         I43 

now,  —  that  of  a  child,  or  of  a  young  man,  or  of  a  fee- 
ble woman,  or  of  a  tyrant,  or  of  a  domestic  animal,  or 
of  a  wild  beast  ? 

12.  What  kind  of  things  those  are  which  appear 
good  to  the  many,  we  may  learn  even  from  this.  For 
if  any  man  should  conceive  certain  things  as  being 
really  good,  such  as  prudence,  temperance,  justice, 
fortitude,  he  would  not  after  having  first  conceived 
these  endure  to  listen  to  anything  t  which  should  not 
be  in  harmony  with  what  is  really  good.f  But  if  a 
man  has  first  conceived  as  good  the  things  which 
appear  to  the  many  to  be  good,  he  will  listen  and 
readily  receive  as  very  applicable  that  which  was  said 
by  the  comic  writer,  f  Thus  even  the  many  perceive 
the  difference. t  For  were  it  not  so,  this  saying  would 
not  offend  and  would  not  be  rejected  [in  the  first 
case],  while  we  receive  it  when  it  is  said  of  wealth, 
and  of  the  means  which  further  luxury  and  fame,  as 
said  fitly  and  wittily.  Go  on  then  and  ask  if  we 
should  value  and  think  those  things  to  be  good,  to 
which  after  their  first  conception  in  the  mind  the 
words  of  the  comic  writer  might  be  aptly  applied,  — 
that  he  who  has  them,  through  pure  abundance  has 
not  a  place  to  ease  himself  in. 

13.  I  am  composed  of  the  formal  and  the  mate- 
rial; and  neither  of  them  will  perish  into  non-exist- 
ence, as  neither  of  them  came  into  existence  out  of 
non-existence.     Every  part   of  me   then  will  be   re- 


144  THOUGHTS.  [BookV. 

duced  by  change  into  some  part  of  the  universe,  and 
that  again  will  change  into  another  part  of  the  uni- 
verse, and  so  on  forever.  And  by  consequence  of 
such  a  change  I  too  exist,  and  those  who  begot  me, 
and  so  on  forever  in  the  other  direction.  For  noth- 
ing hinders  us  from  saying  so,  even  if  the  universe 
is  adminstered  according  to  definite  periods  [of 
revolution] . 

14.  Reason  and  the  reasoning  art  [philosophy]  are 
powers  which  are  sufficient  for  themselves  and  for 
their  own  works.  They  move  then  from  a  first  prin- 
ciple which  is  their  own,  and  they  make  their  way  to 
the  end  which  is  proposed  to  them ;  and  this  is  the 
reason  why  such  acts  are  named  Catorth6seis  or  right 
acts,  which  word  signifies  that  they  proceed  by  the 
right  road. 

15.  None  of  these  things  ought  to  be  called  a 
man's,  which  do  not  belong  to  a  man,  as  man.  They 
are  not  required  of  a  man,  nor  does  man's  nature 
promise  them,  nor  are  they  the  means  of  man's 
nature  attaining  its  end.  Neither  then  does  the  end 
of  man  lie  in  these  things,  nor  yet  that  which  aids  to 
the  accomplishment  of  this  end,  and  that  which  aids 
towards  this  end  is  that  which  is  good.  Besides,  if 
any  of  these  things  did  belong  to  man,  it  would  not 
be  right  for  a  man  to  despise  them  and  to  set  himself 
against  them ;  nor  would  a  man  be  worthy  of  praise 
who  showed  that  he  did  not  want  these  things,  nor 


Book  v.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.         145 

would  he  who  stinted  himself  in  any  of  them  be  good, 
if  indeed  these  things  were  good.  But  now  the  more 
of  these  things  a  man  deprives  himself  of,  or  of  other 
things  like  them,  or  even  when  he  is  deprived  of  any 
of  them,  the  more  patiently  he  endures  the  loss,  just 
in  the  same  degree  he  is  a  better  man. 

16.  Such  as  are  thy  habitual  thoughts,  such  also 
will  be  the  character  of  thy  mind ;  for  the  soul  is 
dyed  by  the  thoughts.  Dye  it  then  with  a  continuous 
series  of  such  thoughts  as  these  :  for  instance,  that 
where  a  man  can  live,  there  he  can  also  live  well. 
But  he  must  live  in  a  palace ;  well  then,  he  can  also 
live  well  in  a  palace.  And  again,  consider  that  for 
whatever  purpose  each  thing  has  been  constituted, 
for  this  it  has  been  constituted,  and  towards  this  it  is 
carried ;  and  its  end  is  in  that  towards  which  it  is 
carried ;  and  where  the  end  is,  there  also  is  the 
advantage  and  the  good  of  each  thing.  Now  the 
good  for  the  reasonable  animal  is  society ;  for  that  we 
are  made  for  society  has  been  shown  above.-^  Is  it 
not  plain  that  the  inferior  exist  for  the  sake  of  the 
superior?  But  the  things  which  have  life  are  superior 
to  those  which  have  not  life,  and  of  those  which  have 
hfe  the  superior  are  those  which  have  reason. 

17.  To  seek  what  is  impossible  is  madness  :  and  it 
is  impossible  that  the  bad  should  not  do  something  of 
this  kind. 


10 


146  THOUGHTS.  [Book  V. 

18.  Nothing  happens  to  any  man  which  he  is  not 
formed  by  nature  to  bear.  The  same  things  happen 
to  another,  and  either  because  he  does  not  see  that 
they  have  happened,  or  because  he  would  show  a 
great  spirit,  he  is  firm  and  remains  unharmed.  It  is 
a  shame  then  that  ignorance  and  conceit  should  be 
stronger  than  wisdom. 

19.  Things  themselves  touch  not  the  soul,  not  in 
the  least  degree  ;  nor  have  they  admission  to  the  soul, 
nor  can  they  turn  or  move  the  soul :  but  the  soul 
turns  and  moves  itself  alone,  and  whatever  judgments 
it  may  think  proper  to  make,  such  it  makes  for  itself 
the  things  which  present  themselves  to  it. 

20.  In  one  respect  man  is  the  nearest  thing  to  me, 
so  far  as  I  must  do  good  to  men  and  endure  them. 
But  so  far  as  some  men  make  themselves  obstacles  to 
my  proper  acts,  man  becomes  to  me  one  of  the  things 
which  are  indifferent,  no  less  than  the  sun  or  wind  or 
a  wild  beast.  Now  it  is  true  that  these  may  impede 
my  action,  but  they  are  no  impediments  to  my  affects 
and  disposition,  which  have  the  power  of  acting  con- 
ditionally and  changing :  for  the  mind  converts  and 
changes  every  hindrance  to  its  activity  into  an  aid  ; 
and  so  that  which  is  a  hindrance  is  made  a  further- 
ance to  an  act ;  and  that  which  is  an  obstacle  on  the 
road  helps  us  on  this  roM. 

2 1 .  Reverence  that  which  is  best  in  the  universe ; 
and  this  is  that  which  makes  use   of  all  things   and 


Book  v.]         MARCUS   AURELIUS    ANTONINUS.       1 47 

directs  all  things.  And  in  like  manner  also  reverence 
that  which  is  best  in  thyself;  and  this  is  of  the  same 
kind  as  that.  For  in  thyself  also,  that  which  makes 
use  of  everything  else  is  this,  and  thy  life  is  directed 
by  this. 

22.  That  which  does  no  harm  to  the  state,  does  no 
harm  to  the  citizen.  In  the  case  of  every  appearance 
of  harm  apply  this  rule  :  if  the  state  is  not  harmed  by 
this,  neither  am  I  harmed.  But  if  the  state  is  harmed, 
thou  must  not  be  angry  with  him  who  does  harm  to 
the  state.     Show  him  where  his  error  is. 

23.  Often  think  of  the  rapidity  with  which  things 
pass  by  and  disappear,  both  the  things  which  are  and 
the  things  which  are  produced.  For  substance  is  like 
a  river  in  a  continual  flow,  and  the  activities  of  things 
are  in  constant  change,  and  the  causes  work  in  infinite 
varieties;  and  there  is  hardly  anything  which  stands 
still.  And  consider  this  which  is  near  to  thee,  this 
boundless  abyss  of  the  past  and  of  the  future  in  which 
all  things  disappear.  How  then  is  he  not  a  fool  who 
is  puffed  up  with  such  things  or  plagued  about  them 
and  makes  himself  miserable  ?  for  they  vex  him  only 
for  a  time,  and  a  short  time. 

24.  Think  of  the  universal  substance,  of  which  thou 
hast  a  very  small  portion ;  and  of  universal  time,  of 
which  a  short  and  indivisible  interval  has  been  as- 
signed to  thee ;  and  of  that  which  is  fixed  by  destiny, 
and  how  small  a  part  of  it  thou  art. 


148  THOUGHTS.  [Book  V. 

25.  Does  another  do  me  wrong?  Let  him  look  to 
it.  He  has  his  own  disposition,  his  own  activity.  I 
now  have  what  the  universal  nature  wills  me  to  have ; 
and  I  do  what  my  nature  now  wills  me  to  do. 

26.  Let  the  part  of  thy  soul  which  leads  and  gov- 
erns be  undisturbed  by  the  movements  in  the  flesh, 
whether  of  pleasure  or  of  pain ;  and  let  it  not  unite 
with  them,  but  let  it  circumscribe  itself  and  limit  those 
afl'ects  to  their  parts.  But  when  these  affects  rise  up 
to  the  mind  by  virtue  of  that  other  sympathy  that 
naturally  exists  in  a  body  which  is  all  one,  then  thou 
must  not  strive  to  resist  the  sensation,  for  it  is  natural : 
but  let  not  the  ruling  part  of  itself  add  to  the  sensa- 
tion the  opinion  that  it  is  either  good  or  bad. 

27.  Live  with  the  gods.  And  he  does  live  with 
the  gods  who  constantly  shows  to  them  that  his  own 
soul  is  satisfied  with  that  which  is  assigned  to  him, 
and  that  it  does  all  that  the  daemon  wishes,  which 
Zeus  hath  given  to  every  man  for  his  guardian  and 
guide,  a  portion  of  himself.  And  this  is  every  man's 
understanding  and  reason. 

28.  Art  thou  angry  with  him  whose  armpits  stink? 
art  thou  angry  with  him  whose  mouth  smells  foul  ? 
What  good  will  this  anger  do  thee  ?  He  has  such  a 
mouth,  he  has  such  armpits  :  it  is  necessary  that  such 
an  emanation  must  come  from  such  things ;  but  the 
man  has  reason,  it  will  be  said,  and  he  is  able,  if  he 
takes  pains,  to  discover  wherein  he  offends ;    I  wish 


Book  v.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.        1 49 

thee  well  of  thy  discovery.  Well  then,  and  thou  hast 
reason  :  by  thy  rational  faculty  stir  up  his  rational  fac- 
ulty; show  him  his  error,  admonish  him.  For  if 
he  Hstens,  thou  wilt  cure  him,  and  there  is  no  need  of 
anger.      [  t  Neither  tragic  actor  nor  whore,  j]^ 

29.  As  thou  intendest  to  live  when  thou  art  gone 
out,  ...  so  it  is  in  thy  power  to  live  here.  But  if 
men  do  not  permit  thee,  then  get  away  out  of  life,  yet 
so  as  if  thou  wert  suffering  no  harm.  The  house  is 
smoky,  and  I  quit  it.^  Why  dost  thou  think  that  this 
is  any  trouble?  But  so  long  as  nothing  of  the  kind 
drives  me  out,  I  remain,  am  free,  and  no  man  shall 
hinder  me  from  doing  what  I  choose ;  and  I  choose 
to  do  what  is  according  to  the  nature  of  the  rational 
and  social  animal. 

30.  The  intelligence  of  the  universe  is  social.  Ac- 
cordingly it  has  made  the  inferior  things  for  the  sake 
of  the  superior,  and  it  has  fitted  the  superior  to  one 
another.  Thou  seest  how  it  has  subordinated,  co-ordi- 
nated, and  assigned  to  everything  its  proper  portion, 
and  has  brought  together  into  concord  with  one  an- 
other the  things  which  are  the  best. 

^  This  is  imperfect  or  corrupt,  or  both.  There  is  also  some- 
thing wrong  or  incomplete  in  the  beginning  of  S  29,  where 
he  says  ws  e^eXdwv  ^fjv  dLauofj,  which  Gataker  translates  "as  if 
thou  wast  about  to  quit  life  ;"  but  we  cannot  translate  e^eXOu^u 
in  that  way.  Other  translations  are  not  much  more  satisfactory. 
I  have  translated  it  literally  and  left  it  imperfect. 

2  Epictetus,  I.  25.  18. 


150  THOUGHTS.  [BookV. 

31.  How  hast  thou  behaved  hitherto  to  the  gods, 
thy  parents,  brethren,  children,  teachers,  to  those  who 
looked  after  thy  infancy,  to  thy  friends,  kinsfolk,  to  thy 
slaves  ?  Consider  if  thou  hast  hitherto  behaved  to  all 
in  such  a  way  that  this  may  be  said  of  thee,  — 

"  Never  has  wronged  a  man  in  deed  or  word." 

And  call  to  recollection  both  how  many  things  thou 
hast  passed  through,  and  how  many  things  thou  hast 
been  able  to  endure  and  that  the  history  of  thy  hfe  is 
now  complete  and  thy  service  is  ended ;  and  how 
many  beautiful  things  thou  hast  seen ;  and  how  many 
pleasures  and  pains  thou  hast  despised ;  and  how 
many  things  called  honorable  thou  hast  spurned ;  and 
to  how  many  ill-minded  folks  thou  hast  shown  a  kind 
disposition. 

32.  Why  do  unskilled  and  ignorant  souls  disturb 
him  who  has  skill  and  knowledge?  What  soul  then 
has  skill  and  knowledge?  That  which  knows  begin- 
ning and  end,  and  knows  the  reason  which  pervades 
all  substance,  and  through  all  time  by  fixed  periods 
[revolutions]  administers  the  universe. 

33.  Soon,  very  soon,  thou  wilt  be  ashes,  or  a  skele- 
ton, and  either  a  name  or  not  even  a  name  ;  but  name 
is  sound  and  echo.  And  the  things  which  are  much 
valued  in  life  are  empty  and  rotten  and  trifling,  and 
[like]  little  dogs  biting  one  another,  and  little  children 
quarrelling,    laughing,  and   then   straightway  weeping. 


Book  v.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.         151 

But  fidelity  and   modesty  and  justice   and   truth  are 

fled 

Up  to  Olympus  from  the  wide-spread  earth. 

Hesiod,  IVor/cs,  etc.  v.  197. 

What  then  is  there  which  still  detains  thee  here,  if  the 
objects  of  sense  are  easily  changed  and  never  stand  still, 
and  the  organs  of  perception  are  dull  and  easily  receive 
false  impressions,  and  the  poor  soul  itself  is  an  exha- 
lation from  blood?  But  to  have  good  repute  amid 
such  a  world  as  this  is  an  empty  thing.  Why  then 
dost  thou  not  wait  in  tranquilHty  for  thy  end,  whether 
it  is  extinction  or  removal  to  another  state?  And 
until  that  time  comes,  what  is  sufficient?  Why,  what 
else  than  to  venerate  the  gods  and  bless  them,  and  to 
do  good  to  men,  and  to  practise  tolerance  and  self- 
restraint  ;  ^  but  as  to  everything  which  is  beyond  the 
hmits  of  the  poor  flesh  and  breath,  to  remember  that 
this  is  neither  thine  nor  in  thy  power. 

34.  Thou  canst  pass  thy  life  in  an  equable  flow  of 
happiness,  if  thou  canst  go  by  the  right  way,  and 
think  and  act  in  the  right  way.  These  two  things  are 
common  both  to  the  soul  of  God  and  to  the  soul  of 
man,  and  to  the  soul  of  every  rational  being  :  not  to  be 
hindered  by  another ;  and  to  hold  good  to  consist  in 

1  This  is  the  Stoic  precept  av'exov  koX  d7re%ov.  The  first  part 
teaches  us  to  be  content  with  men  and  things  as  they  are.  The 
second  part  teaches  us  the  virtue  of  self-restraint,  or  the  gov- 
ernment of  our  passions. 


152  THOUGHTS.  [Book  V. 

the  disposition  to  justice   and  tlie  practice  of  it,  and 
in  this  to  let  thy  desire  find  its  termination. 

35.  If  this  is  neither  my  own  badness,  nor  an  effect 
of  my  own  badness,  and  the  common  weal  is  not  in- 
jured, why  am  I  troubled  about  it,  and  what  is  the 
harm  to  the  common  weal? 

36.  Do  not  be  carried  along  inconsiderately  by  the 
appearance  of  things,  but  give  help  [to  all]  according 
to  thy  ability  and  their  fitness ;  and  if  they  should 
have  sustained  loss  in  matters  which  are  indifferent,  do 
not  imagine  this  to  be  a  damage  ;  for  it  is  a  bad  habit. 
But  as  the  old  man,  when  he  went  away,  asked  back 
his  foster-child's  top,  remembering  that  it  was  a  top, 
so  do  thou  in  this  case  also. 

When  thou  art  calling  out  on  the  Rostra,  hast  thou 
forgotten,  man,  what  these  things  are  ?  —  Yes  ;  but 
they  are  objects  of  great  concern  to  these  people  — 
wilt  thou  too  then  be  made  a  fool  for  these  things? 
I  was  once  a  fortunate  man,  but  I  lost  it,  I  know  not 
how.  —  But  fortunate  means  that  a  man  has  assigned 
to  himself  a  good  fortune  :  and  a  good  fortune  is  good 
disposition  of  the  soul,  good  emotions,  good  actions.^ 

1  This  section  is  unintelligible.  Many  of  the  words  may  be 
corrupt,  and  the  general  purport  of  the  section  cannot  be  dis- 
covered. Perhaps  several  things  have  been  improperly  joined 
in  one  section.  I  have  translated  it  nearly  literally.  Different 
translators  give  the  section, a  different  turn,  and  the  critics 
have  tried  to  mend  what  thev  cannot  understand. 


Book  VI.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.        1 53 


VI. 


'T^HE  substance  of  the  universe  is  obedient  and 
compliant ;  and  the  reason  which  governs  it 
has  in  itself  no  cause  for  doing  evil,  for  it  has  no  malice, 
nor  does  it  do  evil  to  anything,  nor  is  anything  harmed 
by  it.  But  all  things  are  made  and  perfected  accord- 
ing to  this  reason. 

2.  Let  it  make  no  difference  to  thee  whether  thou 
art  cold  or  warm,  if  thou  art  doing  thy  duty ;  and 
whether  thou  art  drowsy  or  satisfied  with  sleep ;  and 
whether  ill-spoken  of  or  praised ;  and  whether  dying 
or  doing  something  else.  For  it  is  one  of  the  acts  of 
life,  this  act  by  which  we  die  :  it  is  sufficient  then  in 
this  act  also  to  do  well  what  we  have  in  hand  (vi.  22, 

28). 

3.  Look  within.  Let  neither  the  peculiar  quality  of 
anything  nor  its  value  escape  thee. 

4.  All  existing  things  soon  change,  and  they  will 
either  be  reduced  to  vapor,  if  indeed  all  substance  is 
one,  or  they  will  be  dispersed. 

5.  The  reason  which  governs  knows  what  its  own 
disposition  is,  and  what  it  does,  and  on  what  material 
it  works. 


154  THOUGHTS.  [Book  VI. 

6.  The  best  way  of  avenging  thyself  is  not  to  be- 
come Uke   [the  wrong-doer]. 

7.  Take  pleasure  in  one  thing  and  rest  in  it,  in 
passing  from  one  social  act  to  another  social  act, 
thinking  of  God. 

8.  The  ruling  principle  is  that  which  rouses  and 
turns  itself,  and  while  it  makes  itself  such  as  it  is  and 
such  as  it  wills  to  be,  it  also  makes  everything  which 
happens  appear  to  itself  to  be  such  as  it  wills. 

9.  In  conformity  to  the  nature  of  the  universe  every 
single  thing  is  accomplished ;  for  certainly  it  is  not  in 
conformity  to  any  other  nature  that  each  thing  is  ac- 
complished, either  a  nature  which  externally  compre- 
hends this,  or  a  nature  which  is  comprehended  within 
this  nature,  or  a  nature  external  and  independent  of 
this  (XI.  I  ;  VI.  40;  VIII.  50). 

10.  The  universe  is  either  a  confusion,  and  a 
mutual  involution  of  things,  and  a  dispersion,  or  it 
is  unity  and  order  and  providence.  If  then  it  is  the 
former,  why  do  I  desire  to  tarry  in  a  fortuitous  com- 
bination of  things  and  such  a  disorder?  and  why  do 
I  care  about  anything  else  than  how  I  shall  at  last 
become  earth  ?  and  why  am  I  disturbed,  for  the  dis- 
persion of  my  elements  will  happen  whatever  I  do? 
But  if  the  other  supposition  is  true,  I  venerate,  and 
I  am  firm,  and  I  trust  in  him  who  governs  (iv.  27). 

11.  When  thou  hast  been  compelled  by  circum- 
stances to  be  disturbed  in  a  manner,  quickly  return 


Book  VI.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.        1 55 

to  thyself,  and  do  not  continue  out  of  tune  longer 
than  the  compulsion  lasts ;  for  thou  wilt  have  more 
mastery  over  the  harmony  by  continually  recurring 
to  it. 

12.  If  thou  hadst  a  step-mother  and  a  mother  at 
the  same  time,  thou  wouldst  be  dutiful  to  thy  step- 
mother, but  still  thou  wouldst  constantly  return  to 
thy  mother.  Let  the  court  and  philosophy  now  be 
to  thee  step-mother  and  mother :  return  to  philoso- 
phy frequently  and  repose  in  her,  through  whom  what 
thou  meetest  with  in  the  court  appears  to  thee  tol- 
erable, and  thou  appearest  tolerable  in  the  court. 

13.  When  we  have  meat  before  us  and  such  eat- 
ables, we  receive  the  impression  that  this  is  the 
dead  body  of  a  fish,  and  this  is  the  dead  body  of  a 
bird  or  of  a  pig;  and  again,  that  this  Falernian  is 
only  a  little  grape-juice,  and  this  purple  robe  some 
sheep's  wool  dyed  with  the  blood  of  a  shell-fish : 
such  then  are  these  impressions,  and  they  reach  the 
things  themselves  and  penetrate  them,  and  so  we 
see  what  kind  of  things  they  are.  Just  in  the  same 
way  ought  we  to  act  all  through  life,  and  where  there 
are  things  which  appear  most  worthy  of  our  appro- 
bation, we  ought  to  lay  them  bare  and  look  at  their 
worthlessness  and  strip  them  of  all  the  words  by 
which  they  are  exalted.  For  outward  show  is  a  won- 
derful perverter  of  the  reason,  and  when  thou  art 
most  sure  that  thou  art  employed  about  things  worth 


156  THOUGHTS.  [Book  VI. 

thy  pains,  it  is  then  that  it  cheats  thee  most.     Con- 
sider then  what  Crates  says  of  Xenocrates  himself. 

14.  Most  of  the  things  which  the  multitude  admire 
are  referred  to  objects  of  the  most  general  kind,  those 
which  are  held  together  by  cohesion  or  natural  organi- 
zation, such  as  stones,  wood,  fig-trees,  vines,  olives. 
But  those  which  are  admired  by  men,  who  are  a  little 
more  reasonable,  are  referred  to  the  things  which  are 
held  together  by  a  living  principle,  as  flocks,  herds. 
Those  which  are  admired  by  men  who  are  still  more 
instructed  are  the  things  which  are  held  together  by 
a  rational  soul,  not  however  a  universal  soul,  but 
rational  so  far  as  it  is  a  soul  skilled  in  some  art,  or 
expert  in  some  other  way,  or  simply  rational  so  far 
as  it  possesses  a  number  of  slaves.  But  he  who 
values  a  rational  soul,  a  soul  universal  and  fitted  for 
poHtical  Hfe,  regards  nothing  else  except  this;  and 
above  all  things  he  keeps  his  soul  in  a  condition 
and  in  an  activity  conformable  to  reason  and  social 
life,  and  he  co-operates  to  this  end  with  those  who 
are  of  the  same  kind  as  himself 

15.  Some  things  are  hurrying  into  existence,  and 
others  are  hurrying  out  of  it ;  and  of  that  which  is 
coming  into  existence  part  is  already  extinguished. 
Motions  and  changes  are  continually  renewing  the 
world,  just  as  the  uninterrupted  course  of  time  is 
always  renewing  the  infinite  duration  of  ages.  In 
this  flowing  stream  then,  on  which  there  is  no  abiding. 


BookVL]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.       I57 

what  is  there  of  the  things  which  hurry  by  on  which 
a  man  would  set  a  high  price?  It  would  be  just  as 
if  a  man  should  fall  in  love  with  one  of  the  sparrows 
which  fly  by,  but  it  has  already  passed  out  of  sight. 
Something  of  this  kind  is  the  very  life  of  every  man, 
like  the  exhalation  of  the  blood  and  the  respiration 
of  the  air.  For  such  as  it  is  to  have  once  drawn  in 
the  air  and  to  have  given  it  back,  which  we  do  every 
moment,  just  the  same  is  it  with  the  whole  respira- 
tory power,  which  thou  didst  receive  at  thy  birth 
yesterday  and  the  day  before,  to  give  it  back  to  the 
element  from  which  thou  didst  first  draw  it. 

16.  Neither  is  transpiration,  as  in  plants,  a  thing 
to  be  valued,  nor  respiration,  as  in  domesticated 
animals  and  wild  beasts,  nor  the  receiving  of- impres- 
sions by  the  appearances  of  things,  nor  being  moved 
by  desires  as  puppets  by  strings,  nor  assembling  in 
herds,  nor  being  nourished  by  food ;  for  this  is  just 
like  the  act  of  separating  and  parting  with  the  useless 
part  of  our  food.  What  then  is  worth  being  valued  ? 
To  be  received  with  clapping  of  hands?  No.  Nei- 
ther must  we  value  the  clapping  of  tongues ;  for  the 
praise  which  comes  from  the  many  is  a  clapping  of 
tongues.  Suppose  then  that  thou  hast  given  up  this 
worthless  thing  called  fame,  what  remains  that  is 
worth  valuing  ?  This,  in  my  opinion  :  to  move  thy- 
self and  to  restrain  thyself  in  conformity  to  thy  proper 
constitution,  to  which  end  both  all  employments  and 


158  THOUGHTS.  [BookVT. 

arts  lead.  For  every  art  aims  at  this,  that  the  thing 
which  has  been  made  should  be  adapted  to  the  work 
for  which  it  has  been  made ;  and  both  the  vine- 
planter  who  looks  after  the  vine,  and  the  horse- 
breaker,  and  he  who  trains  the  dog,  seek  this  end. 
But  the  education  and  the  teaching  of  youth  aim  at 
something.  In  this  then  is  the  value  of  the  education 
and  the  teaching.  And  if  this  is  well,  thou  wilt  not 
seek  anything  else.  Wilt  thou  not  cease  to  value 
many  other  things  too?  Then  thou  wilt  be  neither 
free,  nor  sufficient  for  thy  own  happiness,  nor  without 
passion.  For  of  necessity  thou  must  be  envious, 
jealous,  and  suspicious  of  those  who  can  take  away 
those  things,  and  plot  against  those  who  have  that 
which  is  valued  by  thee.  Of  necessity  a  man  must 
be  altogether  in  a  state  of  perturbation  who  wants 
any  of  these  things ;  and  besides,  he  must  often  find 
fault  with  the  gods.  But  to  reverence  and  honor  thy 
own  mind  will  make  thee  content  with  thyself,  and 
in  harmony  with  society,  and  in  agreement  with  the 
gods,  that  is,  praising  all  that  they  give  and  have 
ordered. 

17.  Above,  below,  all  around  are  the  movements  of 
the  elements.  But  the  motion  of  virtue  is  in  none  of 
these  :  it  is  something  more  divine,  and  advancing  by 
a  way  hardly  observed,  it  goes  happily  on  its  road. 

18.  How  strangely  men  act !  They  will  not  praise 
those  who  are  living  at  the  same  time  and  living  with 


Book  VI.]       MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.       I  59 

themselves ;  but  to  be  themselves  praised  by  posterity, 
by  those  whom  they  have  never  seen  or  ever  will  see, 
this  they  set  much  value  on.  But  this  is  very  much 
the  same  as  if  thou  shouldst  be  grieved  because  those 
who  have  lived  before  thee  did  not  praise  thee. 

19.  If  a  thing  is  difficult  to  be  accomplished  by 
thyself,  do  not  think  that  it  is  impossible  for  man  : 
but  if  anything  is  possible  for  man  and  conformable 
to  his  nature,  think  that  this  can  be  attained  by  thy- 
self too. 

20.  In  the  gymnastic  exercises  suppose  that  a 
man  has  torn  thee  with  his  nails,  and  by  dashing 
against  thy  head  has  inflicted  a  wound.  Well,  we 
neither  show  any  signs  of  vexation,  nor  are  we  of- 
fended, nor  do  we  suspect  him  afterwards  as  a 
treacherous  fellow;  and  yet  we  are  on  our  guard 
against  him,  not  however  as  an  enemy,  nor  yet  with 
suspicion,  but  we  quietly  get  out  of  his  way.  Some- 
thing like  this  let  thy  behavior  be  in  all  the  other 
parts  of  life  ;  let  us  overlook  many  things  in  those 
who  are  like  antagonists  in  the  gymnasium.  For  it 
is  in  our  power,  as  I  said,  to  get  out  of  the  way, 
and  to  have  no  suspicion  nor  hatred. 

21.  If  any  man  is  able  to  convince  me  and  show 
me  that  I  do  not  think  or  act  right,  I  will  gladly 
change ;  for  I  seek  the  truth,  by  which  no  man  was 
ever  injured.  But  he  is  injured  who  abides  in  his 
error  and  ignorance. 


l60  THOUGHTS.  [Book  VI. 

2  2.  I  do  my  duty :  other  things  trouble  me  not; 
for  they  are  either  things  without  Ufe,  or  things  with- 
out reason,  or  things  that  have  rambled  and  know 
not  the  way. 

23.  As  to  the  animals  which  have  no  reason,  and 
generally  all  things  and  objects,  do  thou,  since  thou 
hast  reason  and  they  have  none,  make  use  of  them 
with  a  generous  and  liberal  spirit.  But  tow^ards  hu- 
man beings,  as  they  have  reason,  behave  in  a  social 
spirit.  And  on  all  occasions  call  on  the  gods,  and 
do  not  perplex  thyself  about  the  length  of  time  in 
which  thou  shalt  do  this ;  for  even  three  hours  so 
spent  are  sufficient. 

24.  Alexander  the  Macedonian  and  his  groom  by 
death  were  brought  to  the  same  state ;  for  either 
they  were  received  among  the  same  seminal  prin- 
ciples of  the  universe,  or  they  were  alike  dispersed 
among  the  atoms. 

25.  Consider  how  many  things  in  the  same  indi- 
visible time  take  place  in  each  of  us,  —  things  which 
concern  the  body  and  things  which  concern  the  soul : 
and  so  thou  wilt  not  wonder  if  many  more  things, 
or  rather  all  things  which  come  into  existence  in 
that  which  is  the  one  and  all,  which  we  call  Cosmos, 
exist  in  it  at  the  same  time. 

26.  If  any  man  should  propose  to  thee  the  ques- 
tion, how  the  name  Antoninus  is  written,  wouldst 
thou  with  a  straining  of  the  voice  utter  each  letter? 


Book  VI.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.        l6l 

What  then  if  they  grow  angry,  wilt  thou  be  angry 
too?  Wilt  thou  not  go  on  with  composure  and 
number  every  letter?  Just  so  then  in  this  hfe  also 
remember  that  every  duty  is  made  up  of  certain 
parts.  These  it  is  thy  duty  to  observe,  and  without 
being  disturbed  or  showing  anger  towards  those  who 
are  angry  with  thee  to  go  on  thy  way  and  finish  that 
which  is  set  before  thee. 

27.  How  cruel  it  is  not  to  allow  men  to  strive  after 
the  things  which  appear  to  them  to  be  suitable  to 
their  nature  and  profitable  !  And  yet  in  a  manner 
thou  dost  not  allow  them  to  do  this,  when  thou  art 
vexed  because  they  do  wrong.  For  they  are  cer- 
tainly moved  towards  things  because  they  suppose 
them  to  be  suitable  to  their  nature  and  profitable  to 
them.  —  But  it  is  not  so.  —  Teach  them  then,  and 
show  them  without  being  angry. 

28.  Death  is  a  cessation  of  the  impressions  through 
the  senses,  and  of  the  pulling  of  the  strings  which 
move  the  appetites,  and  of  the  discursive  movements 
of  the  thoughts,  and  of  the  service  to  the  flesh 
(II.  12). 

29.  It  is  a  shame  for  the  soul  to  be  first  to  give 
way  in  this  life,  when  thy  body  does  not  give  way. 

30.  Take  care  that  thou  art  not  made  into  a 
Caesar,  that  thou  art  not  dyed  with  this  dye ;  for  such 
things  happen.  Keep  thyself  then  simple,  good,  pure, 
serious,   free   from   affectation,   a   friend   of  justice,  a 


l62  THOUGHTS.  [Book  VI. 

worshipper  of  the  gods,  kind,  affectionate,  strenuous 
in  all  proper  acts.  Strive  to  continue  to  be  such  as 
philosophy  wished  to  make  thee.  Reverence  the 
gods,  and  help  men.  Short  is  life.  There  is  only 
one  fruit  of  this  terrene  life,  —  a  pious  disposition  and 
social  acts.  Do  everything  as  a  disciple  of  Anto- 
ninus. Remember  his  constancy  in  every  act  which 
was  conformable  to  reason,  and  his  evenness  in  all 
things,  and  his  piety,  and  the  serenity  of  his  counte- 
nance, and  his  sweetness,  and  his  disregard  of  empty 
fame,  and  his  efforts  to  understand  things ;  and  how 
he  would  never  let  anything  pass  without  having  first 
most  carefully  examined  it  and  clearly  understood 
it ;  and  how  he  bore  with  those  who  blamed  him 
unjustly  without  blaming  them  in  return ;  how  he 
did  nothing  in  a  hurry ;  and  how  he  listened  not  to 
calumnies,  and  how  exact  an  examiner  of  manners 
and  actions  he  was ;  and  not  given  to  reproach  peo- 
ple, nor  timid,  nor  suspicious,  nor  a  sophist ;  and 
with  how  little  he  was  satisfied,  such  as  lodging,  bed, 
dress,  food,  servants ;  and  how  laborious  and  pa- 
tient ;  and  how  he  was  able  on  account  of  his  sparing 
diet  to  hold  out  to  the  evening,  not  even  requiring 
to  relieve  himself  by  any  evacuations  except  at  the 
usual  hour;  and  his  firmness  and  uniformity  in  his 
friendships ;  and  how  he  tolerated  freedom  of  speech 
in  those  who  opposed  his  opinions ;  and  the  pleasure 
that    he  had  when    any  man    showed    him  anything 


Book  VI.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.        1 63 

better ;  and  how  religious  he  was  without  superstition. 
Imitate  all  this,  that  thou  mayest  have  as  good  a  con- 
science, when  thy  last  hour  comes,  as  he  had  (i.  16). 

31.  Return  to  thy  sober  senses  and  call  thyself 
back ;  and  when  thou  hast  roused  thyself  from  sleep 
and  hast  perceived  that  they  were  only  dreams  which 
troubled  thee,  now  in  thy  waking  hours  look  at  these 
[the  things  about  thee]  as  thou  didst  look  at  those 
[the  dreams]. 

32.  I  consist  of  a  httle  body  and  a  soul.  Now 
to  this  little  body  all  things  are  indifferent,  for  it  is 
not  able  to  perceive  differences.  But  to  the  under- 
standing those  things  only  are  indifferent  which  are 
not  the  works  of  its  own  activity.  But  whatever 
things  are  the  works  of  its  own  activity,  all  these 
are  in  its  power.  And  of  these  however  only  those 
which  are  done  with  reference  to  the  present ;  for 
as  to  the  future  and  the  past  activities  of  the  mind, 
even  these  are  for  the  present  indifferent. 

^^.  Neither  the  labor  which  the  hand  does  nor 
that  of  the  foot  is  contrary  to  nature,  so  long  as  the 
foot  does  the  foot's  work  and  the  hand  the  hand's. 
So  then  neither  to  a  man  as  a  man  is  his  labor  con- 
trary to  nature,  so  long  as  it  does  the  things  of  a 
man.  But  if  the  labor  is  not  contrary  to  his  nature, 
neither  is  it  an  evil  to  him. 

34.  How  many  pleasures  have  been  enjoyed  by 
robbers,   patricides,   tyrants. 


1 64  THOUGHTS.  [Book  VI. 

35.  Dost  thou  not  see  how  the  handicraftsmen 
accommodate  themselves  up  to  a  certain  point  to 
those  who  are  not  skilled  in  their  craft,  —  neverthe- 
less they  cling  to  the  reason  [the  principles]  of 
their  art,  and  do  not  endure  to  depart  from  it?  Is 
it  not  strange  if  the  architect  and  the  physician  shall 
have  more  respect  to  the  reason  [the  principles]  of 
their  own  arts  than  man  to  his  own  reason,  which  is 
common  to  him  and  the  gods? 

36.  Asia,  Europe,  are  corners  of  the  universe ;  all 
the  sea  a  drop  in  the  universe ;  Athos  a  little  clod 
of  the  universe  :  all  the  present  time  is  a  point  in 
eternity.  All  things  are  little,  changeable,  perishable. 
All  things  come  from  thence,  from  that  universal 
ruling  power  either  directly  proceeding  or  by  way  of 
sequence.  And  accordingly  the  Uon's  gaping  jaws, 
and  that  which  is  poisonous,  and  every  harmful  thing, 
as  a  thorn,  as  mud,  are  after- products  of  the  grand 
and  beautiful.  Do  not  then  imagine  that  they  are 
of  another  kind  from  that  which  thou  dost  venerate, 
but  form  a  just  opinion  of  the  source  of  all  (vii.  75). 

37.  He  who  has  seen  present  things  has  seen  all, 
both  everything  which  has  taken  place  from  all  eter- 
nity and  everything  which  will  be  for  time  without 
end  ;  for  all  things  are  of  one  kin  and  of  one  form. 

^S.  Frequently  consider  the  connection  of  all 
things  in  the  universe  and  their  relation  to  one 
another.      For   in   a   manner    all   things    are   impli- 


Book  VI.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.        l6$ 

cated  with  one  another,  and  all  in  this  way  are 
friendly  to  one  another ;  for  one  thing  comes  in 
order  after  another,  and  this  is  by  virtue  of  the  f 
active  movement  and  mutual  conspiration  and  the 
unity  of  the  substance  (ix.  i). 

39.  Adapt  thyself  to  the  things  with  which  thy 
lot  has  been  cast :  and  the  men  among  whom  thou 
hast  received  thy  portion,  love  them,  but  do  it  truly 
[sincerely] . 

40.  Every  instrument,  tool,  vessel,  if  it  does  that 
for  which  it  has  been  made,  is  well,  and  yet  he  who 
made  it  is  not  there.  But  in  the  things  which  are 
held  together  by  nature  there  is  within,  and  there 
abides  in,  them  the  power  which  made  them ;  where- 
fore the  more  is  it  fit  to  reverence  this  power,  and 
to  think,  that,  if  thou  dost  live  and  act  according  to 
its  will,  everything  in  thee  is  in  conformity  to  intelli- 
gence. And  thus  also  in  the  universe  the  things  which 
belong  to  it  are  in  conformity  to  intelligence. 

41.  Whatever  of  the  things  which  are  not  within 
thy  power  thou  shalt  suppose  to  be  good  for  thee 
or  evil,  it  must  of  necessity  be  that,  if  such  a  bad 
thing  befall  thee,  or  the  loss  of  such  a  good  thing, 
thou  wilt  not  blame  the  gods,  and  hate  men  too, 
those  who  are  the  cause  of  the  misfortune  or  the 
loss,  or  those  who  are  suspected  of  being  likely  to 
be  the  cause ;  and  indeed  we  do  much  injustice 
because  we  make  a  difference  between  these  things 


l66  THOUGHTS.  [Book  VI. 

[because  we  do  not  regard  these  things  as  indif- 
ferent f].^  But  if  we  judge  only  those  things  which 
are  in  our  power  to  be  good  or  bad,  there  remains 
no  reason  either  for  finding  fault  with  God  or  standing 
in  a  hostile  attitude  to  man.^ 

42.  We  are  all  working  together  to  one  end,  some 
with  knowledge  and  design,  and  others  without  know- 
ing what  they  do ;  as  men  also  when  they  are  asleep, 
of  whom  it  is  Heraclitus,  I  think,  who  says  that  they 
are  laborers  and  co-operators  in  the  things  which 
take  place  in  the  universe.  But  men  co-operate  after 
different  fashions :  and  even  those  co-operate  abun- 
dantly, who  find  fault  with  what  happens  and  those 
who  try  to  oppose  it  and  to  hinder  it ;  for  the  uni- 
verse had  need  even  of  such  men  as  these.  It 
remains  then  for  thee  to  understand  among  what 
kind  of  workmen  thou  placest  thyself;  for  he  who 
rules  all  things  will  certainly  make  a  right  use  of 
thee,  and  he  will  receive  thee  among  some  part 
of  the  co-operators  and  of  those  whose  labors  con- 
duce to  one  end.  But  be  not  thou  such  a  part  as 
the  mean  and  ridiculous  verse  in  the  play,  which 
Chrysippus  speaks  of.^ 

1  Gataker  translates  this  "because  we  strive  to  get  these 
things,"  comparing  the  use  of  dtacpepeadai  in  V.  i,  and  X.  27, 
and  IX.  38,  where  it  appears  that  his  reference  should  be  XI.  10. 
He  may  be  right  in  his  interpretation,  but  I  doubt. 

2  Cicero,  De  Natura  Deorum.  iii.  32. 
2  Plutarch,  adversus  Stoicos,  c.  14. 


Book  VI.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.        1 6/ 

43.  Does  the  sun  undertake  to  do  the  work  of  the 
rain,  or  Aesculapius  the  work  of  the  Fruit-bearer  [the 
earth]  ?  And  how  is  it  with  respect  to  each  of  the 
stars,  are  they  not  different  and  yet  they  work  together 
to  the  same  end? 

44.  If  the  gods  have  determined  about  me  and 
about  the  things  which  must  happen  to  me,  they  have 
determined  well,  for  it  is  not  easy  even  to  imagine  a 
deity  without  forethought ;  and  as  to  doing  me  harm, 
why  should  they  have  any  desire  towards  that?  for 
what  advantage  would  result  to  them  from  this  or  to 
the  whole,  which  is  the  special  object  of  their  provi- 
dence? But  if  they  have  not  determined  about  me 
individually,  they  have  certainly  determined  about  the 
whole  at  least,  and  the  things  which  happen  by  way  of 
sequence  in  this  general  arrangement  I  ought  to  accept 
with  pleasure  and  to  be  content  with  them.  But  if 
they  determine  about  nothing, —  which  it  is  wicked  to 
believe,  or  if  we  do  believe  it,  let  us  neither  sacrifice 
nor  pray  nor  swear  by  them,  nor  do  anything  else  which 
we  do  as  if  the  gods  were  present  and  lived  with  us, — 
but  if  however  the  gods  determine  about  none  of  the 
things  which  concern  us,  I  am  able  to  determine 
about  myself,  and  I  can  inquire  about  that  which  is 
useful ;  and  that  is  useful  to  every  man  which  is  con- 
formable to  his  own  constitution  and  nature.  But  my 
nature  is  rational  and  social ;  and  my  city  and  country, 
so  far  as  I  am  Antoninus,  is  Rome,  but  so  far  as  I  am 


1 68  THOUGHTS.  [Book  VI. 

a  man,  it  is  the  world.     The   things  then  which   are 
useful  to  these  cities  are  alone  useful  to  me. 

45.  Whatever  happens  to  every  man,  this  is  for  the 
interest  of  the  universal :  this  might  be  sufficient. 
But  further  thou  wilt  observe  this  also  as  a  general 
truth,  if  thou  dost  observe,  that  whatever  is  profitable 
to  any  man  is  profitable  also  to  other  men.  But  let 
the  word  profitable  be  taken  here  in  the  common 
sense  as  said  of  things  of  the  middle  kind  [neither 
good  nor  bad]. 

46.  As  it  happens  to  thee  in  the  amphitheatre  and 
such  places,  that  the  continual  sight  of  the  same  things, 
and  the  uniformity  make  the  spectacle  wearisome,  so 
it  is  in  the  whole  of  life ;  for  all  things  above,  below, 
are  the  same  and  from  the  same.     How  long  then? 

47.  Think  continually  that  all  kinds  of  men  and 
of  all  kinds  of  pursuits  and  of  all  nations  are  dead,  so 
that  thy  thoughts  come  down  even  to  Phihstion  and 
Phoebus  and  Origanion.  Now  turn  thy  thoughts  to 
the  other  kinds  [of  men].  To  that  place  then  we 
must  remove,  where  there  are  so  many  great  orators, 
and  so  many  noble  philosophers,  Heraclitus,  Pythago- 
ras, Socrates ;  so  many  heroes  of  former  days,  and  so 
many  generals  after  them,  and  tyrants ;  besides  these, 
Eudoxus,  Hipparchus,  Archimedes,  and  other  men  of 
acute  natural  talents,  great  minds,  lovers  of  labor, 
versatile,  confident,  mockers  even  of  the  perishable 
and  ephemeral  life  of  man,  as  Menippus   and  such  as 


BookVL]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.        169 

are  like  him.  As  to  all  these  consider  that  they  have 
long  been  in  the  dust.  What  harm  then  is  this  to 
them ;  and  what  to  those  whose  names  are  altogether 
unknown?  One  thing  here  is  worth  a  great  deal,  to 
pass  thy  life  in  truth  and  justice,  with  a  benevolent 
disposition  even  to  liars  and  unjust  men. 

48.  When  thou  wishest  to  delight  thyself,  think  of 
the  virtues  of  those  who  live  with  thee ;  for  instance, 
the  activity  of  one,  and  the  modesty  of  another,  and 
the  liberality  of  a  third,  and  some  other  good  quality 
of  a  fourth.  For  nothing  delights  so  much  as  the 
examples  of  the  virtues,  when  they  are  exhibited  in 
the  morals  of  those  who  live  with  us  and  present 
themselves  in  abundance,  as  far  as  is  possible.  Where- 
fore we  must  keep  them  before  us. 

49.  Thou  art  not  dissatisfied,  I  suppose,  because 
thou  weighest  only  so  many  litrae  and  not  three  hun- 
dred. Be  not  dissatisfied  then  that  thou  must  live  only 
so  many  years  and  not  more  ;  for  as  thou  art  satisfied 
with  the  amount  of  substance  which  has  been  assigned 
to  thee,  so  be  content  with  the  time. 

50.  Let  us  try  to  persuade  them  [men].  But  act 
even  against  their  will,  when  the  principles  of  justice 
lead  that  way.  If  however  any  man  by  using  force 
stands  in  thy  way,  betake  thyself  to  contentment  and 
tranquillity,  and  at  the  same  time  employ  the  hindrance 
towards  the  exercise  of  some  other  virtue ;  and  re- 
member   that    thy   attempt   was   with   a   reservation 


I/O  THOUGHTS.  [Book  VI. 

[conditionally],  that  thou  didst  not  desire  to  do  im- 
possibilities. What  then  didst  thou  desire  ?  —  Some 
such  effort  as  this. —  But  thou  attainest  thy  object, 
if  the  things  to  which  thou  wast  moved  are  [not] 
accomplished,  t 

51.  He  who  loves  fame  considers  another  man's 
activity  to  be  his  own  good  ;  and  he  who  loves  pleas- 
ure, his  own  sensations  ;  but  he  who  has  understanding 
considers  his  own  acts  to  be  his  own  good. 

52.  It  is  in  our  power  to  have  no  opinion  about 
a  thing,  and  not  to  be  disturbed  in  our  soul ;  for 
things  themselves  have  no  natural  power  to  form  our 
judgments. 

53.  Accustom  thyself  to  attend  carefully  to  what  is 
said  by  another,  and  as  much  as  it  is  possible,  be  in 
the  speaker's  mind. 

54.  That  which  is  not  good  for  the  swarm,  neither 
is  it  good  for  the  bee. 

55.  If  sailors  abused  the  helmsman,  or  the  sick  the 
doctor,  would  they  listen  to  anybody  else ;  or  how 
could  the  helmsman  secure  the  safety  of  those  in  the 
ship,  or  the  doctor  the  health  of  those  whom  he 
attends  ? 

56.  How  many  together  with  whom  I  came  into  the 
world  are  already  gone  out  of  it. 

57.  To  the  jaundiced  honey  tastes  bitter,  and  to 
those  bitten  by  mad  dogs  water  causes  fear ;  and  to 
little  children  the  ball  is  a  fine  thing.     Why  then  am 


Book  VI.]       MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.       I/I 

I  angry  ?  Dost  thou  think  that  a  false  opinion  has  less 
power  than  the  bile  in  the  jaandiced  or  the  poison  in 
him  who  is  bitten  by  a  mad  dog? 

58.  No  man  will  hinder  thee  from  living  according 
to  the  reason  of  thy  own  nature  :  nothing  will  hap- 
pen to  thee  contrary  to  the  reason  of  the  universal 
nature. 

59.  What  kind  of  people  are  those  whom  men  wish 
to  please,  and  for  what  objects,  and  by  what  kind  of 
acts?  How  soon  will  time  cover  all  things,  and  how 
many  it  has  covered  already. 


172  THOUGHTS.  [Book  VII. 


VII. 


TX  7HAT  is  badness?  It  is  that  which  thou  hast 
often  seen.  And  on  the  occasion  of  every- 
thing which  happens  keep  this  in  mind,  that  it  is  that 
which  thou  hast  often  seen.  Everywhere  up  and  down 
thou  wilt  find  the  same  things,  with  which  the  old  his- 
tories are  filled,  those  of  the  middle  ages  and  those  of 
our  own  day ;  with  which  cities  and  houses  are  filled 
now.  There  is  nothing  new :  all  things  are  both 
familiar  and  short-lived. 

2.  How  can  our  principles  become  dead,  unless  the 
impressions  [thoughts]  which  correspond  to  them  are 
extinguished?  But  it  is  in  thy  power  continuously 
to  fan  these  thoughts  into  a  flame.  I  can  have  that 
opinion  about  anything  which  I  ought  to  have.  If 
I  can,  why  am  I  disturbed?  The  things  which  are 
external  to  my  mind  have  no  relation  at  all  to  my 
mind.  —  Let  this  be  the  state  of  thy  affects,  and  thou 
standest  erect.  To  recover  thy  life  is  in  thy  power. 
Look  at  things  again  as  thou  didst  use  to  look  at 
them  ;  for  in  this  consists  the  recovery  of  thy  life. 

3.  The  idle  business  of  show,  plays  on  the  stage, 
flocks  of  sheep,  herds,  exercises  with  spears,  a  bone 


BookVIL]     MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.       173 

cast  to  little  dogs,  a  bit  of  bread  into  fishponds, 
laborings  of  ants  and  burden-carrying,  runnings  about 
of  frightened  little  mice,  puppets  pulled  by  strings 
—  [all  alike] .  It  is  thy  duty  then  in  the  midst  of 
such  things  to  show  good  humor  and  not  a  proud 
air  j  to  understand  however  that  every  man  is  worth 
just  so  much  as  the  things  are  worth  about  which  he 
busies  himself. 

4.  In  discourse  thou  must  attend  to  what  is  said, 
and  in  every  movement  thou  must  observe  what  is 
doing.  And  in  the  one  thou  shouldst  see  immedi- 
ately to  what  end  it  refers,  but  in  the  other  watch 
carefully  what  is  the  thing  signified. 

5.  Is  my  understanding  sufficient  for  this  or  not? 
If  it  is  sufficient,  I  use  it  for  the  work  as  an  instru- 
ment given  by  the  universal  nature.  But  if  it  is  not 
sufficient,  then  either  I  retire  from  the  work  and  give 
way  to  him  who  is  able  to  do  it  better,  unless  there  be 
some  reason  why  I  ought  not  to  do  so ;  or  I  do  it  as 
well  as  I  can,  taking  to  help  me  the  man  who  with  the 
aid  of  my  ruling  principle  can  do  what  is  now  fit  and 
useful  for  the  general  good.  For  whatsoever  either  by 
myself  or  with  another  I  can  do,  ought  to  be  directed 
to  this  only,  to  that  which  is  useful  and  well  suited  to 
society. 

6.  How  many  after  being  celebrated  by  fame  have 
been  given  up  to  oblivion ;  and  how  many  who  have 
celebrated  the  fame  of  others  have  long  been  dead. 


1/4  THOUGHTS.  LBookVII. 

7.  Be  not  ashamed  to  be  helped ;  for  it  is  thy  busi- 
ness to  do  thy  duty  Hke  a  soldier  in  the  assault  on  a 
town.  How  then,  if  being  lame  thou  canst  not  mount 
up  on  the  battlements  alone,  but  with  the  help  of  an- 
other it  is  possible  ? 

8.  Let  not  future  things  disturb  thee,  for  thou  wilt 
come  to  them,  if  it  shall  be  necessary,  having  with 
thee  the  same  reason  which  now  thou  usest  for  present 
things. 

9.  All  things  are  implicated  with  one  another,  and 
the  bond  is  holy ;  and  there  is  hardly  anything  uncon- 
nected with  any  other  thing.  For  things  have  been 
co-ordinated,  and  they  combine  to  form  the  same 
universe  [order].  For  there  is  one  universe  made  up 
of  all  things,  and  one  god  who  pervades  all  things, 
and  one  substance,^  and  one  law,  [one]  common 
reason  in  all  intelligent  animals,  and  one  truth;  if 
indeed  there  is  also  one  perfection  for  all  animals 
which  are  of  the  same  stock  and  participate  in  the 
same  reason. 

10.  Everything  material  soon  disappears  in  the  sub- 
stance of  the  whole ;  and  everything  formal  [causal] 
is  very  soon  taken  back  into  the  universal  reason ; 
and  the  memory  of  everything  is  very  soon  over- 
whelmed in  time. 

1 1 .  To  the  rational  animal  the  same  act  is  accord- 
ing to  nature  and  according  to  reason. 

1  "  One  substance,"  p.  42,  note  i. 


BookVII.]     MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS,       1 75 

12.  Be  thou  erect,  or  be  made  erect  (in.  5). 

13.  Just  as  it  is  with  the  members  in  those  bodies 
which  are  united  in  one,  so  it  is  with  rational  beings 
which  exist  separate,  for  they  have  been  constituted 
for  one  co-operation.  And  the  perception  of  this  will 
be  more  apparent  to  thee  if  thou  often  sayest  to  thy- 
self that  I  am  a  member  [/xeXo?]  of  the  system  of 
rational  beings.  But  if  [using  the  letter  ;-]  thou 
sayest  that  thou  art  a  part  [/xepo?],  thou  dost  not  yet 
love  men  from  thy  heart ;  beneficence  does  not  yet 
dehght  thee  for  its  own  sake ;  ^  thou  still  doest  it 
barely  as  a  thing  of  propriety,  and  not  yet  as  doing 
good  to  thyself.  • 

14.  Let  there  fall  externally  what  will  on  the  parts 
which  can  feel  the  effects  of  this  fall.  For  those  parts 
which  have  felt  will  complain,  if  they  choose.  But  I, 
unless  I  think  that  what  has  happened  is  an  evil,  am 
not  injured.     And  it  is  in  my  power  not  to  think  so. 

15.  Whatever  any  one  does  or  says,  I  must  be 
good  ;  just  as  if  the  gold,  or  the  emerald,  or  the  purple 
were  always  saying  this.  Whatever  any  one  does  or 
says,  I  must  be  emerald  and  keep  my  color. 

16.  The  ruling  faculty  does  not  disturb  itself;  I 
mean,  does  not  frigliten  itself  or  cause  itself  pain.t 
But  if  any  one  else  can  frighten  or  pain  it,  let  him  do 
so.     For  the  faculty  itself  will  not  by  its  own  opinion 

1  I  have  used  Gataker's  conjecture  KaraXrjKTiKQs  instead  of 
the  common  reading  A'ara\7?7rTiKws :  compare  iv.  20;  ix.  42. 


176  THOUGHTS.  [Book  VII. 

turn  itself  into  such  ways.  Let  the  body  itself  take 
care,  if  it  can,  that  it  suffer  nothing,  and  let  it  speak, 
if  it  suffers.  But  the  soul  itself,  that  which  is  subject 
to  fear,  to  pain,  which  has  completely  the  power  of 
forming  an  opinion  about  these  things,  will  suffer 
nothing,  for  it  will  never  deviate  t  into  such  a  judg- 
ment. The  leading  principle  in  itself  wants  nothing, 
unless  it  makes  a  want  for  itself;  and  therefore  it  is 
both  free  from  perturbation  and  unimpeded,  if  it  does 
not  disturb  and  impede  itself. 

17.  Eudaemonia  [happiness]  is  a  good  daemon,  or 
a  good  thing.  What  then  art  thou  doing  here,  O 
imagination?  Go  away,  I  entreat  thee  by  the  gods,  as 
thou  didst  come,  for  I  want  thee  not.  But  thou  art 
come  according  to  thy  old  fashion.  I  am  not  angry 
with  thee  :  only  go  away. 

18.  Is  any  man  afraid  of  change?  Why,  what  can 
take  place  without  change?  What  then  is  more 
pleasing  or  more  suitable  to  the  universal  nature? 
And  canst  thou  take  a  bath  unless  the  wood  under- 
goes a  change?  and  canst  thou  be  nourished,  unless 
the  food  undergoes  a  change?  And  can  anything 
else  that  is  useful  be  accomplished  without  change? 
Dost  thou  not  see  then  that  for  thyself  also  to  change 
is  just  the  same,  and  equally  necessary  for  the  univer- 
sal nature  ? 

19.  Through  the  universal  substance  as  through  a 
furious  torrent  all  bodies  are  carried,  being  by  their 


Book  VII.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.      1 77 

nature  united  with  and  co-operating  with  the  whole, 
as  the  parts  of  our  body  with  one  another.  How 
many  a  Chrysippus,  how  many  a  Socrates,  how  many 
an  Epictetus  has  time  already  swallowed  up  !  And 
let  the  same  thought  occur  to  thee  with  reference  to 
every  man  and  thing  (v.  23  ;  vi.  15). 

20.  One  thing  only  troubles  me,  lest  I  should  do 
something  which  the  constitution  of  man  does  not 
allow,  or  in  the  way  which  it  does  not  allow,  or  what 
it  does  not  allow  now. 

2 1 .  Near  is  thy  forgetfulness  of  all  things ;  and 
near  the  forgetfulness  of  thee  by  all". 

22.  It  is  pecuhar  to  man  to  love  even  those  who 
do  wrong.  And  this  happens,  if  when  they  do  wrong 
it  occurs  to  thee  that  they  are  kinsmen,  and  that  they 
do  wrong  through  ignorance  and  unintentionally,  and 
that  soon  both  of  you  will  die ;  and  above  all,  that 
the  wrong-doer  has  done  thee  no  harm,  for  he  has 
not  made  thy  ruling  faculty  worse  than  it  was  before. 

23.  The  universal  nature  out  of  the  universal  sub- 
stance, as  if  it  were  wax,  now  moulds  a  horse,  and 
when  it  has  broken  this  up,  it  uses  the  material  for  a 
tree,  then  for  a  man,  then  for  something  else ;  and 
each  of  these  things  subsists  for  a  very  short  time. 
But  it  is  no  hardship  for  the  vessel  to  be  broken  up, 
just  as  there  was  none  in  its  being  fastened  together 
(VIII.  50). 

24.  A  scowling  look  is  altogether  unnatural ;  when 


178  THOUGHTS.  [BookVJI. 

it  is  often  assumed/  the  result  is  that  all  comeliness 
dies  away,  and  at  last  is  so  completely  extinguished 
that  it  cannot  be  again  lighted  up  at  all.  Try  to 
conclude  from  this  very  fact  that  it  is  contrary  to 
reason.  For  if  even  the  perception  of  doing  wrong 
shall  depart,  what  reason  is  there  for  living  any 
longer  ? 

25.  Nature  which  governs  the  whole  will  soon 
change  all  things  which  thou  seest,  and  out  of  their 
substance  will  make  other  things,  and  again  other 
things  from  the  substance  of  them,  in  order  that 
the  world  may  be  ever  new   (xii.  23). 

26.  When  a  man  has  done  thee  any  wrong,  im- 
mediately consider  with  what  opinion  about  good 
or  evil  he  has  done  wrong.  For  when  thou  hast 
seen  this,  thou  wilt  pity  him,  and  wilt  neither  won- 
der nor  be  angry.  For  either  thou  thyself  thinkest 
the  same  thing  to  be  good  that  he  does  or  another 
thing  of  the  same  kind.  It  is  thy  duty  then  to  par- 
don him.  But  if  thou  dost  not  think  such  things 
to  be  good  or  evil,  thou  wilt  more  readily  be  well 
disposed  to  him  who  is  in  error. 

27.  Think  not  so  much  of  what  thou  hast  not 
as  of  what  thou  hast :  but  of  the  things  which  thou 
hast  select  the  best,  and  then  reflect  how  eagerly 
they  would  have  been  sought,  if  thou  hadst  them 
not.      At   the    same    time,  however,  take   care    that 

1  This  is  corrupt. 


Book  VII.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.      1 79 

thou  dost  not  through  being  so  pleased  with  them 
accustom  thyself  to  overvalue  them,  so  as  to  be 
disturbed  if  ever  thou  shouldst  not  have  them. 

28.  Retire  into  thyself.  The  rational  principle 
which  rules  has  this  nature,  that  it  is  content  with 
itself  when  it  does  what  is  just,  and  so  secures 
tranquillity. 

29.  Wipe  out  the  imagination.  Stop  the  pulling 
of  the  strings.  Confine  thyself  to  the  present.  Un- 
derstand well  what  happens  either  to  thee  or  to 
another.  Divide  and  distribute  every  object  into 
the  causal  [formal]  and  the  material.  Think  of  thy 
last  hour.  Let  the  wrong  which  is  done  by  a  man 
stay  there  where  the  wrong  was  done  (viii.  29). 

30.  Direct  thy  attention  to  what  is  said.  Let  thy 
understanding  enter  into  the  things  that  are  doing 
and  the  things  which  do  them   (vii.  4). 

31.  Adorn  thyself  with  simplicity  and  modesty,  and 
with  indifference  towards  the  things  which  lie  be- 
tween virtue  and  vice.  Love  mankind.  Follow  God. 
The  poet  says  that  law  rules  all  —  j  And  it  is  enough 
to  remember  that  law  rules  allf  ^ 

32.  About  death :  whether  it  is  a  dispersion,  or 
a  resolution  into  atoms,  or  annihilation,  it  is  either 
extinction  or  change. 

^$.     About   pain :    the   pain   which    is  intolerable 
carries  us  off;    but   that  which   lasts  a  long  time  is 
^  The  end  of  this  section  is  unintelligible. 


l80  THOUGHTS.  [BookVH. 

tolerable ;  and  the  mind  maintains  its  own  tran- 
quillity by  retiring  into  itself,!  and  the  ruling  fac- 
ulty is  not  made  worse.  But  the  parts  which  are 
harmed  by  pain,  let  them,  if  they  can,  give  their  opin- 
ion about  it. 

34.  About  fame  :  look  at  the  minds  [of  those  who 
seek  fame],  observe  what  they  are,  and  what  kind 
of  things  they  avoid,  and  what  kind  of  things  they 
pursue.  And  consider  that  as  the  heaps  of  sand 
piled  on  one  another  hide  the  former  sands,  so  in 
life  the  events  w^hich  go  before  are  soon  covered 
by  those  which  come  after. 

35.  From  Plato  :  ^  The  man  who  has  an  elevated 
mind  and  takes  a  view  of  all  time  and  of  all  sub- 
stance, dost  thou  suppose  it  possible  for  him  to 
think  that  human  life  is  anything  great?  It  is  not 
possible,  he  said.  —  Such  a  man  then  will  think  that 
death  also  is  no  evil.  —  Certainly  not. 

36.  From  Antisthenes  :  It  is  royal  to  do  good  and 
to  be  abused. 

37.  It  is  a  base  thing  for  the  countenance  to  be 
obedient  and  to  regulate   and  compose  itself  as  the 
mind  commands,  and  for  the  mind  not  to  be  regu 
lated  and  composed  by  itself. 

38.,  It  is  not  right  to  vex  ourselves  at  things, 
For  they  care  nought  about  it.^ 

1  Plato,  Pol.  VI.  4S6. 

2  From  the  Bellerophon  of  Euripides. 


Book  VII.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.      l8l 

39.  To  the  immortal  gods  and  us  give  joy. 

40.  Life  must  be  reaped  like  the  ripe  ears  of  corn. 
One  man  is  born ;  another  dies.^ 

41.  If  gods  care  not  for  me  and  for  my  children, 
There  is  a  reason  for  it. 

42.  For  the  good  is  with  me,  and  the  just.^ 

43.  No  joining  others  in  their  wailing,  no  violent 

emotion. 

44.  From  Plato :  ^  But  I  would  make  this  man 
a  sufficient  answer,  which  is  this  :  Thou  sayest  not 
well,  if  thou  thinkest  that  a  man  who  is  good  for 
anything  at  all  ought  to  compute  the  hazard  of  life 
or  death,  and  should  not  rather  look  to  this  only  in 
aU  that  he  does,  whether  he  is  doing  what  is  just  or 
unjust,  and  the  works  of  a  good  or  a  bad  man. 

45.  ^For  thus  it  is,  men  of  Athens,  in  truth  :  wher- 
ever a  man  has  placed  himself  thinking  it  the  best 
place  for  him,  or  has  been  placed  by  a  commander, 
there  in  my  opinion  he  ought  to  stay  and  to  abide 
the  hazard,  taking  nothing  into  the  reckoning,  either 
death  or  anything  else,  before  the  baseness  [of  de- 
serting his  post]. 

1  From  the  Hypsipyle  of  Euripides.  Cicero  (Tuscul.  iir. 
25)  has  translated  six  lines  from  Euripides,  and  among  them 
are  these  two  lines,  — 

"  Reddenda  terrae  est  terra  :  turn  vita  omnibus 
Metenda  ut  fruges  :  Sic  jubet  necessitas." 

2  See  Aristophanes,  Acharnenses,  v.  661. 
^  From  the  Apologia,  c.  16. 


1 82  THOUGHTS.  [Book  VII. 

46.  But,  my  good  friend,  reflect  whether  that 
which  is  noble  and  good  is  not  something  different 
from  saving  and  being  saved ;  for  f  as  to  a  man 
hving  such  or  such  a  time,  at  least  one  who  is  really 
a  man,  consider  if  this  is  not  a  thing  to  be  dismissed 
from  the  thoughts  :  f  and  there  must  be  no  love  of 
life  :  but  as  to  these  matters  a  man  must  intrust  them 
to  the  Deity  and  believe  what  the  women  say,  that 
no  man  can  escape  his  destiny,  the  next  inquiry  being 
how  he  may  best  live  the  time  that  he  has  to  live.i 

47.  Look  round  at  the  courses  of  the  stars,  as 
if  thou  wert  going  along  with  them ;  and  constantly 
consider  the  changes  of  the  elements  into  one  an- 
other, for  such  thoughts  purge  away  the  filth  of  the 
terrene  Hfe. 

48.  This  is  a  fine  saying  of  Plato  :  ^  That  he  who 
is  discoursing  about  men  should  look  also  at  earthly 
things  as  if  he  viewed  them  from  some  higher  place ; 
should  look  at  them  in  their  assemblies,  armies,  agri- 
cultural labors,  marriages,  treaties,  births,  deaths,  noise 
of  the  courts  of  justice,  desert  places,  various  nations  of 
barbarians,  feasts,  lamentations,  markets,  a  mixture  of 
all  things  and  an  orderly  combination  of  contraries. 

1  Plato,  Gorgias,  c.  68  {512).  In  this  passage  the  text  of 
Antoninus  has  eareov,  which  is  perhaps  right  ;  but  there  is  a 
difficulty  in  the  words  [xr]  yap  toOto  jueu,  to  ^iji^  birocrovdr]  xpoJ^ov 
rivye  ws  d\r]Ouis  dvdpa  eareov  €(ttI,  /cat  ov,  &.C.  The  conjecture 
evKTeov  for  eareov  does  not  mend  the  matter. 

2  It  is  said  that  this  is  not  in  the  extant  writings  of  Plato. 


BookVIL]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.      1 83 

49.  Consider  the  past,  —  such  great  changes  of  po- 
litical supremacies ;  thou  mayest  foresee  also  the 
things  which  will  be.  For  they  will  certainly  be  of 
like  form,  and  it  is  not  possible  that  they  should 
deviate  from  the  order  of  the  things  which  take  place 
now ;  accordingly  to  have  contemplated  human  life  for 
forty  years  is  the  same  as  to  have  contemplated  it  for 
ten  thousand  years.     For  what  more  wilt  thou  see  ? 

50.  That  which  has  grown   from  the  earth  to  the 

earth, 
But  that  which  has  sprung  from  heavenly  seed, 
Back  to  the  heavenly  realms  returns.^ 
This  is  either  a  dissolution  of  the  mutual   involu- 
tion  of  the    atoms,    or    a   similar    dispersion   of  the 
unsentient  elements. 

51.  With  food  and  drinks  and  cunning  magic  arts 
Turning  the   channel's   course  to   'scape   from 

death.2 

The  breeze  which  heaven  has  sent 
We  must  endure,  and  toil  without  complaining. 

52.  Another  may  be  more  expert  in  casting  his 
opponent ;  but  he  is  not  more  social,  nor  more 
modest,  nor  better  disciplined  to  meet  all  that  hap- 
pens, nor  more  considerate  with  respect  to  the  faults 
of  his  neighbors. 

1  From  the  Chrysippus  of  Euripides. 

2  The  first  two  lines  are  from  the  Supplices  of  Euripides, 
V.  1 1 10. 


1 84  THOUGHTS.  [Book  VIL 

53.  Where  any  work  can  be  done  conformably  to 
the  reason  which  is  common  to  gods  and  men,  there 
we  have  nothing  to  fear ;  for  where  we  are  able  to  get 
profit  by  means  of  the  activity  which  is  successful  and 
proceeds  according  to  our  constitution,  there  no  harm 
is  to  be  suspected. 

54.  Everywhere  and  at  all  times  it  is  in  thy 
power  piously  to  acquiesce  in  thy  present  condi- 
tion, and  to  behave  justly  to  those  who  are  about 
thee,  and  to  exert  thy  skill  upon  thy  present  thoughts, 
that  nothing  shall  steal  into  them  without  being  well 
examined. 

55.  Do  not  look  around  thee  to  discover  other 
men's  ruling  principles,  but  look  straight  to  this,  to 
what  nature  leads  thee,  both  the  universal  nature 
through  the  things  which  happen  to  thee,  and  thy  own 
nature  through  the  acts  which  must  be  done  by  thee. 
But  every  being  ought  to  do  that  which  is  according 
to  its  constitution ;  and  all  other  things  have  been 
constituted  for  the  sake  of  rational  beings,  just  as 
among  irrational  things  the  inferior  for  the  sake  of 
the  superior,  but  the  rational  for  the  sake  of  one 
another. 

The  prime  principle  then  in  man's  constitution  is 
the  social.  And  the  second  is  not  to  yield  to  the  per- 
suasions of  the  body,  —  for  it  is  the  peculiar  office  of 
the  rational  and  intelligent  motion  to  circumscribe  itself, 
and  never  to  be  overpowered  either  by  the  motion  of 


Book  VII.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.      1 85 

the  senses  or  of  the  appetites,  for  both  are  animal ; 
but  the  intelhgent  motion  claims  superiority,  and  does 
not  permit  itself  to  be  overpowered  by  the  others. 
And  with  good  reason,  for  it  is  formed  by  nature  to 
use  all  of  them.  The  third  thing  in  the  rational 
constitution  is  freedom  from  error  and  from  de- 
ception. Let  then  the  ruling  principle  holding  fast 
to  these  things  go  straight  on,  and  it  has  what  is  its 
own. 

56.  Consider  thyself  to  be  dead,  and  to  have  com- 
pleted thy  life  up  to  the  present  time ;  and  live  ac- 
cording to  nature  the  remainder  which  is  allowed 
thee. 

57.  Love  that  only  which  happens  to  thee  and  is 
spun  with  the  thread  of  thy  destiny.  For  what  is 
more  suitable? 

58.  In  everything  which  happens  keep  before  thy 
eyes  those  to  whom  the  same  things  happened,  and 
how  they  were  vexed,  and  treated  them  as  strange 
things,  and  found  fault  with  them  :  and  now  where  are 
they?  Nowhere.  Why  then  dost  thou  too  choose  to 
act  in  the  same  way ;  and  why  dost  thou  not  leave 
these  agitations  which  are  foreign  to  nature  to  those 
who  cause  them  and  those  who  are  moved  by  them ; 
and  why  art  thou  not  altogether  intent  upon  the  right 
way  of  making  use  of  the  things  which  happen  to 
thee?  For  then  thou  wilt  use  them  well,  and  they  will 
be  a  material  for  thee  [to  work  on] .     Only  attend  to 


1 86  THOUGHTS.  [Book  VII. 

thyself,  and  resolve  to  be  a  good  man  in  every  act  which 
thou  doest :  and  remember  .  .  .^ 

59.  Look  within.  Within  is  the  fountain  of  good, 
and  it  will  ever  bubble  up,  if  thou  wilt  ever  dig. 

60.  The  body  ought  to  be  compact,  and  to  show 
no  irregularity  either  in  motion  or  attitude.  For  what 
the  mind  shows  in  the  face  by  maintaining  in  it  the 
expression  of  intelligence  and  propriety,  that  ought  to 
be  required  also  in  the  whole  body.  But  all  these 
things  should  be  observed  without  affectation. 

61.  The  art  of  Ufe  is  more  like  the  wrestler's  art 
than  the  dancer's,  in  respect  of  this,  that  it  should 
stand  ready  and  firm  to  meet  onse'ts  which  are  sudden 
and  unexpected. 

62.  Constantly  observe  who  those  are  whose  appro- 
bation thou  wishest  to  have,  and  what  ruling  princi- 
ples they  possess.  For  then  thou  wilt  neither  blame 
those  who  offend  involuntarily,  nor  wilt  thou  want  their 
approbation,  if  thou  lookest  to  the  sources  of  their 
opinions  and  appetites. 

63.  Every  soul,  the  philosopher  says,  is  involuntarily 
deprived  of  truth ;  consequently  in  the  same  way  it  is 
deprived  of  justice  and  temperance  and  benevolence 
and  everything  of  the  kind.     It  is  most  necessary  to 

1  This  section  is  obscure,  and  the  conclusion  is  so  corrupt 
that  it  is  impossible  to  give  any  probable  meaning  to  it.  It  is 
better  to  leave  it  as  it  is  than  to  patch  it  up,  as  some  critics  and 
translators  have  done. 


Book  VII.]     MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.       1 8/ 

bear  this  constantly  in  mind,  for  thus  thou  wilt  be 
more  gentle  towards  all. 

64.  In  every  pain  let  this  thought  be  present,  that 
there  is  no  dishonor  in  it,  nor  does  it  make  the  govern- 
ing intelligence  worse,  for  it  does  not  damage  the 
intelligence  either  so  far  as  the  intelligence  is  rational  ^ 
or  so  far  as  it  is  social.  Indeed  in  the  case  of  most 
pains  let  this  remark  of  Epicurus  aid  thee,  that  pain  is 
neither  intolerable  nor  everlasting,  if  thou  bearest  in 
mind  that  it  has  its  limits,  and  if  thou  addest  nothing 
to  it  in  imagination  :  and  remember  this  too,  that  we 
do  not  perceive  that  many  things  which  are  disagree- 
able to  us  are  the  same  as  pain,  such  as  excessive  drow- 
siness, and  the  being  scorched  by  heat,  and  the  having 
no  appetite.  When  then  thou  art  discontented  about 
any  of  these  things,  say  to  thyself  that  thou  art  yield- 
ing to  pain. 

65.  Take  care  not  to  feel  towards  the  inhuman  as 
they  feel  towards  men.^ 

66.  How  do  we  know  if  Telauges  was  not  superior 
in  character  to  Socrates?  For  it  is  not  enough  that 
Socrates  died  a  more  noble  death,  and  disputed  more 
skilfully  with  the  sophists,  and  passed  the  night  in  the 

1  The  text  has  vXiktj,  which  it  has  been  proposed  to  alter  to 
XoyLKT],  and  this  change  is  necessary.  We  shall  then  have  in 
this  section  XoyiK-f]  and  kolvcovikt)  associated,  as  we  have  in  s.  68 
XoyLKT]  and  ttoXltlkt),  and  in  s.  72. 

2  I  have  followed  Gataker's  conjecture  oi  airdvdpojToi  instead 
of  the  MSS.  reading  ol  ou'dpuiroL. 


l88  THOUGHTS.  [Book  VII. 

cold  with  more  endurance,  and  that  when  he  was  bid 
to  arrest  Leon  ^  of  Salamis,  he  considered  it  more  no- 
ble to  refuse,  and  that  he  walked  in  a  swaggering  way 
in  the  streets  ^  —  though  as  to  this  fact  one  may  have 
great  doubts  if  it  was  true.  But  we  ought  to  inquire 
what  kind  of  a  soul  it  was  that  Socrates  possessed,  and 
if  he  was  able  to  be  content  with  being  just  towards 
men  and  pious  towards  the  gods,  neither  idly  vexed  on 
account  of  men's  villany,  nor  yet  making  himself  a 
slave  to  any  man's  ignorance,  nor  receiving  as  strange 
anything  that  fell  to  his  share  out  of  the  universal,  nor 
enduring  it  as  intolerable,  nor  allowing  his  understand- 
ing to  sympathize  with  the  affects  of  the  miserable 
flesh. 

67.  Nature  has  not  so  mingled  f  [the  intelligence] 
with  the  composition  of  the  body,  as  not  to  have 
allowed  thee  the  power  of  circumscribing  thyself  and 
of  bringing  under  subjection  to  thyself  all  that  is  thy 
own ;  for  it  is  very  possible  to  be  a  divine  man  and  to 
be  recognized  as  such  by  no  one.  Always  bear  this 
in  mind  ;  and  another  thing  too,  that  very  little  indeed 
is  necessary  for  living  a  happy  life.  And  because 
thou  hast  despaired  of  becoming  a  dialectician  and 
skilled  in  the  knowledge  of  nature,  do  not  for  this  rea- 

1  Leon  of  Salamis.  See  Plato,  Epist.  7  ;  Apolog.  c.  20 : 
Epictetus,  IV.  I,  160;  IV.  7,30. 

2  Aristophan.  Nub.  i()2.  oti  ^pet^dvei.  r  iv  ralai.v  68ols  /cat 
Tcb  6<pda\fiil3  Tapa^dWeL. 


BooKVir.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.     189 

son  renounce  the  hope  of  being  both  free  and  modest, 
and  social  and  obedient  to  God. 

68.  It  is  in  thy  power  to  Hve  free  from  all  compul- 
sion in  the  greatest  tranquillity  of  mind,  even  if  all  the 
world  cry  out  against  thee  as  much  as  they  choose, 
and  even  if  wild  beasts  tear  in  pieces  the  members  of 
this  kneaded  matter  which  has  grown  around  thee. 
For  what  hinders  the  mind  in  the  midst  of  all  this 
from  maintaining  itself  in  tranquillity  and  in  a  just 
judgment  of  all  surrounding  things  and  in  a  ready  use 
of  the  objects  which  are  presented  to  it,  so  that  the 
judgment  may  say  to  the  thing  which  falls  under  its 
observation:  This  thou  art  in  substance  [reality], 
though  in  men's  opinion  thou  mayest  appear  to  be  of 
a  different  kind ;  and  the  use  shall  say  to  that  which 
falls  under  the  hand  :  Thou  art  the  thing  that  I  was 
seeking ;  for  to  me  that  which  presents  itself  is  always 
a  material  for  virtue  both  rational  and  political,  and  in 
a  word,  for  the  exercise  of  art,  which  belongs  to  man 
or  God.  For  everything  which  happens  has  a  rela- 
tionship either  to  God  or  man,  and  is  neither  new 
nor  difficult  to  handle,  but  usual  and  apt  matter  to 
work  on. 

69.  The  perfection  of  moral  character  consists  in 
this,  in  passing  every  day  as  the  last,  and  in  being 
neither  violently  excited  nor  torpid  nor  playing  the 
hypocrite. 

70.  The  gods  who  are  immortal  are  not  vexed  be- 


190  THOUGHTS.  [Book  VII. 

cause  during  so  long  a  time  they  must  tolerate  contin- 
ually men  such  as  they  are  and  so  many  of  them  bad  ; 
and  besides  this,  they  also  take  care  of  them  in  all 
ways.  But  thou,  who  art  destined  to  end  so  soon,  art 
thou  wearied  of  enduring  the  bad,  and  this  too  when 
thou  art  one  of  them? 

71.  It  is  a  ridiculous  thing  for  a  man  not  to 
fly  from  his  own  badness,  which  is  indeed  pos- 
sible, but  to  fly  from  other  men's  badness,  which  is 
impossible. 

72.  Whatever  the  rational  and  political  [social] 
faculty  finds  to  be  neither  intelligent  nor  social,  it 
properly  judges  to  be  inferior  to  itself. 

73.  When  thou  hast  done  a  good  act  and  another 
has  received  it,  why  dost  thou  still  look  for  a  third 
thing  besides  these,  as  fools  do,  either  to  have  the 
reputation  of  having  done  a  good  act  or  to  obtain 
a  return? 

74.  No  man  is  tired  of  receiving  what  is  useful. 
But  it  is  useful  to  act  according  to  nature.  Do  not 
then  be  tired  of  receiving  what  is  useful  by  doing 
it  to  others. 

75.  The  nature  of  the  All  moved  to  make  the  uni- 
verse. But  now  either  everything  that  takes  place 
comes  by  way  of  consequence  or  [continuity]  ;  or 
even  the  chief  things  towards  which  the  ruling  power 
of  the  universe  directs  its  own  movement  are  gov- 
erned by  no  rational   principle.     If  this  is  remem- 


Book  VII.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.       191 

bered,    it    will    make    thee    more    tranquil    in    many 
things  (vi.  44  ;    ix.  28).^ 

1  It  is  not  easy  to  understand  this  section.  It  has  been 
suggested  that  there  is  some  error  in  ^  aXoyicrra,  &c.  Some 
of  the  translators  have  made  nothing  of  the  passage,  and  they 
have  somewhat  perverted  the  words.  The  first  proposition 
is,  that  the  universe  was  made  by  some  sufficient  power.  A 
beginning  of  the  universe  is  assumed,  and  a  power  which 
framed  an  order.  The  next  question  is,  How  are  things  pro- 
duced now  ?  Or,  in  other  words,  by  what  power  do  forms 
appear  in  continuous  succession  ?  The  answer,  according  to 
Antoninus,  may  be  this:  It  is  by  virtue  of  the  original  con- 
stitution of  things  that  all  change  and  succession  have  been 
effected  and  are  effected.  And  this  is  intelligible  in  a  sense, 
if  we  admit  that  the  universe  is  always  one  and  the  same,  a 
continuity  of  identity;  as  much  one  and  the  same,  as  man 
is  one  and  the  same,  —  which  he  believes  himself  to  be,  though 
he  also  believes  and  cannot  help  believing  that  both  in  his 
body  and  in  his  thoughts  there  is  change  and  succession. 
There  is  no  real  discontinuity  then  in  the  universe ;  and  if 
we  say  that  there  was  an  order  framed  in  the  beginning  and 
that  the  things  which  are  now  produced  are  a  consequence 
of  a  previous  arrangement,  we  speak  of  things  as  we  are 
compelled  to  view  them,  as  forming  a  series  or  succession  ; 
just  as  we  speak  of  the  changes  in  our  own  bodies  and  the 
sequence  of  our  own  thoughts.  But  as  there  are  no  intervals, 
not  even  intervals  infinitely  small,  between  any  two  supposed 
states  of  any  one  thing,  so  there  are  no  intervals,  not  even 
infinitely  small,  between  what  we  call  one  thing  and  any  other 
thing  which  we  speak  of  as  immediately  preceding  or  fol- 
lowing it.  What  we  call  time  is  an  idea  derived  from  our 
notion  of  a  succession  of  things  or  events,  an  idea  which  is 
a  part  of  our  constitution,  but  not  an  idea  which  we  can  sup- 
pose to  belong  to  an  infinite  intelligence  and  power.  The 
conclusion  then  is  certain  that  the  present  and  the  past,  the 
production  of  present  things  and  the  supposed  original  order, 


ig2  THOUGHTS.  [Book  VII. 

out  of  which  we  say  that  present  things  now  come,  are  one; 
and  the  present  productive  power  and  the  so-called  past  ar- 
rangement are  only  different  names  for  one  thing.  I  suppose 
then  that  Antoninus  wrote  here  as  people  sometimes  talk 
now,  and  that  his  real  meaning  is  not  exactly  expressed  by  his 
words.  There  are  certainly  other  passages  from  which  I  think 
that  we  may  collect  that  he  had  notions  of  production  some- 
thing like  what  I  have  expressed. 

We  now  come  to  the  alternative :  '*  or  even  the  chief 
things  .  .  .  principle."  I  do  not  exactly  know  what  he  means 
by  TO,  KvpidjraTa,  "  the  chief,"  or  "  the  most  excellent,"  or 
whatever  it  is.  But  as  he  speaks  elsewhere  of  inferior  and 
superior  things,  and  of  the  inferior  being  for  the  use  of  the 
superior,  and  of  rational  beings  being  the  highest,  he  may 
here  mean  rational  beings.  He  also  in  this  alternative  as- 
sumes a  governing  power  of  the  universe,  and  that  it  acts  by 
directing  its  power  towards  these  chief  objects,  or  making  its 
special,  proper  motion  towards  them.  And  here  he  uses  the 
noun  (opfiT))  "movement,"  which  contains  the  same  notion  as 
the  verb  (Chp/xTjae)  "  moved,"  which  he  used  at  the  beginning 
of  the  paragraph,  when  he  was  speaking  of  the  making  of  the 
universe.  If  we  do  not  accept  the  first  hypothesis,  he  says, 
we  must  take  the  conclusion  of  the  second,  that  the  "chief 
things  towards  which  the  ruling  power  of  the  universe  directs 
its  own  movement  are  governed  by  no  rational  principle."  The 
meaning  then  is,  if  there  is  a  meaning  in  it,  that  though  there 
is  a  governing  power  which  strives  to  give  effect  to  its  efforts, 
we  must  conclude  that  there  is  no  rational  direction  of  any- 
thing, if  the  power  which  first  made  the  universe  does  not  in 
some  way  govern  it  still.  Besides,  if  we  assume  that  anything 
is  now  produced  or  now  exists  without  the  action  of  the 
supreme  intelligence,  and  yet  that  this  intelligence  makes  an 
effort  to  act,  we  obtain  a  conclusion  which  cannot  be  recon- 
ciled with  the  nature  of  a  supreme  power,  whose  existence 
Antoninus  always  assumes.  The  tranquillity  that  a  man  may 
gain  from  these  reflections  must  result  from  his  rejecting  the 
second  hypothesis,  and  accepting  the  first,  —  whatever  may  be 


Book  VII.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTOxMNUS.      I93 

the  exact  sense  in  which  the  emperor  understood  the  first. 
Or,  as  he  says  elsewhere,  if  there  is  no  Providence  which 
governs  the  world,  man  has  at  least  the  power  of  governing 
himself  according  to  the  constitution  of  his  nature ;  and  so  he 
may  be  tranquil,  if  he  does  the  best  that  he  can. 

If  there  is  no  error  in  the  passage,  it  is  worth  the  labor  to 
discover  the  writer's  exact  meaning —  for  I  think  that  he  had 
a  meaning,  though  people  may  not  agree  what  it  was.  (Com- 
pare IX.  28.)  If  I  have  rightly  explained  the  emperor's 
meaning  in  this  and  other  passages,  he  has  touched  the  solu- 
tion of  a  great  question. 


13 


94  THOUGHTS.  [BooKVlIl. 


VIII. 

T^HIS  reflection  also  tends  to  the  removal  of  the 
desire  of  empty  fame,  that  it  is  no  longer  in 
thy  power  to  have  lived  the  whole  of  thy  life,  or  at 
least  thy  life  from  thy  youth  upwards,  like  a  philoso- 
pher; but  both  to  many  others  and  to  thyself  it  is 
plain  that  thou  art  far  from  philosophy.  Thou  hast 
fallen  into  disorder  then,  so  that  it  is  no  longer  easy 
for  thee  to  get  the  reputation  of  a  philosopher ;  and 
thy  plan  of  life  also  opposes  it.  If  then  thou  hast 
truly  seen  where  the  matter  lies,  throw  away  the 
thought,  How  thou  shalt  seem  [to  others],  and  be 
content  if  thou  shalt  live  the  rest  of  thy  life  in  such 
wise  as  thy  nature  wills.  Observe  then  what  it  wills, 
and  let  nothing  else  distract  thee ;  for  thou  hast  had 
experience  of  many  wanderings  without  having  found 
happiness  anywhere,  —  not  in  syllogisms,  nor  in  wealth, 
nor  in  reputation,  nor  in  enjoyment,  nor  anywhere. 
Where  is  it  then?  In  doing  what  man's  nature  re- 
quires. How  then  shall  a  man  do  this?  If  he  has 
principles  from  which  come  his  affects  and  his  acts. 
What  principles?  Those  which  relate  to  good  and 
bad :  the  belief  that  there  is  nothing  good  for  man 


Book  VIII.]     MARCUS   AURELIUS    ANTONINUS.       I95 

which  does  not  make  him  just,  temperate,  manly, 
free ;  and  that  there  is  nothing  bad  which  does  not 
do  the  contrary  to  what  has  been  mentioned. 

2.  On  the  occasion  of  every  act  ask  thyself,  How 
is  this  with  respect  to  me?  Shall  I  repent  of  it? 
A  little  time  and  I  am  dead,  and  all  is  gone.  What 
more  do  I  seek,  if  what  I  am  now  doing  is  the  work 
of  an  intelligent  living  being,  and  a  social  being,  and 
one  who  is  under  the  same  law  with  God? 

3.  Alexander  and  Caius^  and  Pompeius,  what  are 
they  in  comparison  with  Diogenes  and  Heraclitus 
and  Socrates  ?  For  they  were  acquainted  with  things, 
and  their  causes  [forms],  and  their  matter,  and  the 
ruling  principles  of  these  men  were  the  same  [or 
conformable  to  their  pursuits].  But  as  to  the  others, 
how  many  things  had  they  to  care  for,  and  to  how 
many  things  were  they  slaves  ! 

4.  [Consider]  that  men  will  do  the  same  things 
nevertheless,  even  though  thou  shouldst  burst. 

5.  This  is  the  chief  thing  :  Be  not  perturbed,  for  all 
things  are  according  to  the  nature  of  the  universal ; 
and  in  a  little  time  thou  wilt  be  nobody  and  nowhere, 
like  Hadrianus  and  Augustus.  In  the  next  place,  hav- 
ing fixed  thy  eyes  steadily  on  thy  business  look  at  it, 
and  at  the  same  time  remembering  that  it  is  thy  duty 
to  be  a  good  man,  and  what  man's  nature  demands, 

1  Caius  is  C.  Julius  Caesar,  the  dictator;  and  Pompeius  is 
Cn.  Pompeius,  named  Magnus. 


196  THOUGHTS.  [Book  VIII. 

do  that  without  turning  aside ;  and  speak  as  it  seems 
to  thee  most  just,  only  let  it  be  with  a  good  disposition 
and  with  modesty  and  without  hypocrisy. 

6.  The  nature  of  the  universal  has  this  work  to  do, — 
to  remove  to  that  place  the  things  which  are  in  this, 
to  change  them,  to  take  them  away  hence,  and  to 
carry  them  there.  All  things  are  change,  yet  we  need 
not  fear  anything  new.  All  things  are  familiar  [to  us]  ; 
but  the  distribution  of  them  still  remains  the  same. 

7.  Every  nature  is  contented  with  itself  when  it 
goes  on  its  way  well ;  and  a  rational  nature  goes  on 
its  way  well  when  in  its  thoughts  it  assents  to  nothing 
false  or  uncertain,  and  when  it  directs  its  movements 
to  social  acts  only,  and  when  it  confines  its  desires 
and  aversions  to  the  things  which  are  in  its  power,  and 
when  it  is  satisfied  with  everything  that  is  assigned  to 
it  by  the  common  nature.  For  of  this  common  nature 
every  particular  nature  is  a  part,  as  the  nature  of  the 
leaf  is  a  part  of  the  nature  of  the  plant ;  except  that 
in  the  plant  the  nature  of  the  leaf  is  part  of  a  nature 
which  has  not  perception  or  reason,  and  is  subject  to 
be  impeded  ;  but  the  nature  of  man  is  part  of  a  nature 
which  is  not  subject  to  impediments,  and  is  intelligent 
and  just,  since  it  gives  to  everything  in  equal  portions 
and  according  to  its  worth,  times,  substance,  cause 
[form],  activity,  and , incident.  But  examine,  not  to 
discover  that  any  one  thing  compared  with  any  other 
single  thing  is  equal  in  all  respects,  but  by  taking  all 


EookVIII.]     MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.      197 

the  parts  together  of  one  thing  and  comparing  them 
with  all  the  parts  together  of  another. 

8.  Thou  hast  not  leisure  [or  ability]  to  read.  But 
thou  hast  leisure  [or  ability]  to  check  arrogance  :  thou 
hast  leisure  to  be  superior  to  pleasure  and  pain :  thou 
hast  leisure  to  be  superior  to  love  of  fame,  and  not  to 
be  vexed  at  stupid  and  ungrateful  people,  nay  even  to 
care  for  them. 

9.  Let  no  man  any  longer  hear  thee  finding  fault 
with  the  court  hfe  or  with  thy  own   (v.   16). 

10.  Repentance  is  a  kind  of  self- reproof  for  having 
neglected  something  useful ;  but  that  which  is  good 
must  be  something  useful,  and  the  perfect  good  man 
should  look  after  it.  But  no  such  man  would  ever 
repent  of  having  refused  any  sensual  pleasure.  Pleas- 
ure then  is  neither  good  nor  useful. 

1 1 .  This  thing,  what  is  it  in  itself,  in  its  own  consti- 
tution? What  is  its  substance  and  material?  And 
what  its  causal  nature  [or  form]  ?  And  what  is  it  do- 
ing in  the  world  ?     And  how  long  does  it  subsist  ? 

12.  When  thou  risest  from  sleep  with  reluctance, 
remember  that  it  is  according  to  thy  constitution  and 
according  to  human  nature  to  perform  social  acts,  but 
sleeping  is  common  also  to  irrational  animals.  But 
that  which  is  according  to  each  individual's  nature  is 
also  more  peculiarly  its  own,  and  more  suitable  to  its 
nature,  and  indeed  also  more  agreeable  (v.  i). 

13.  Constantly,  and,  if  it  be  possible,  on  the  occa- 


198  THOUGHTS.  [Book  VIII. 

sion  of  every  impression  on  the  soul,  apply  to  it  the 
principles  of  Physic,  of  Ethic,  and  of  Dialectic. 

14.  Whatever  man  thou  meetest  with,  immediately 
say  to  thyself :  What  opinions  has  this  man  about  good 
and  bad?  For  if  with  respect  to  pleasure  and  pain 
and  the  causes  of  each,  and  with  respect  to  fame  and 
ignominy,  death  and  life,  he  has  such  and  such  opin- 
ions, it  will  seem  nothing  wonderful  or  strange  to  me 
if  he  does  such  and  such  things ;  and  I  shall  bear  in 
mind  that  he  is  compelled  to  do  so.^ 

15.  Remember  that  as  it  is  a  shame  to  be  surprised 
if  the  fig-tree  produces  figs,  so  it  is  to  be  surprised  if 
the  world  produces  such  and  such  things  of  which  it 
is  productive ;  and  for  the  physician  and  the  helms- 
man it  is  a  shame  to  be  surprised  if  a  man  has  a  fever, 
or  if  the  wind  is  unfavorable. 

16.  Remember  that  to  change  thy  opinion  and  to 
follow  him  who  corrects  thy  error  is  as  consistent  with 
freedom  as  it  is  to  persist  in  thy  error.  For  it  is  thy 
own,  the  activity  which  is  exerted  according  to  thy 
own  movement  and  judgment,  and  indeed  according 
to  thy  own  understanding  too. 

17.  If  a  thing  is  in  thy  own  power,  why  dost  thou  do 
it?  but  if  it  is  in  the  power  of  another,  whom  dost 
thou  blame,  —  the  atoms  [chance]  or  the  gods  ?  Both 
are  foolish.     Thou  mus,t  blame  nobody.     For  if  thou 

1  Antoninus  v.  16.     Thucydides,  in,  10;  ev  ydp  t<2  StaXXdcr- 
(TovTi.  rrjs  yvuifi-qs  Kal  ai  diatpopal  tQv  'ipywv  KadiaravTai. 


BookVIII.1     MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.     199 

canst,  correct  [that  which  is  the  cause]  ;  but  if  thou 
canst  not  do  this,  correct  at  least  the  thing  itself;  but 
if  thou  canst  not  do  even  this,  of  what  use  is  it  to  thee 
to  find  fault?  for  nothing  should  be  done  without  a 
purpose. 

18.  That  which  has  died  falls  not  out  of  the  universe. 
If  it  stays  here,  it  also  changes  here,  and  is  dissolved 
into  its  proper  parts,  which  are  elements  of  the  uni- 
verse and  of  thyself.  And  these  too  change,  and 
they  murmur  not. 

19.  Everything  exists  for  some  end, —  a  horse,  a  vine. 
Why  dost  thou  wonder?  Even  the  sun  will  say,  I  am 
for  some  purpose,  and  the  rest  of  the  gods  will  say 
the  same.  For  what  purpose  then  art  thou,  —  to  enjoy 
pleasure  ?     See  if  common  sense  allows  this. 

20.  Nature  has  had  regard  in  everything  no  less  to 
the  end  than  to  the  beginning  and  the  continuance, 
just  like  the  man  who  throws  up  a  ball.  What  good  is 
it  then  for  the  ball  to  be  thrown  up,  or  harm  for  it  to 
come  down,  or  even  to  have  fallen  ?  and  what  good  is 
it  to  the  bubble  while  it  holds  together,  or  what  harm 
when  it  is  burst?  The  same  may  be  said  of  a  light 
also. 

21.  Turn  it  [the  body]  inside  out,  and  see  what 
kind  of  thing  it  is ;  and  when  it  has  grown  old,  what 
kind  of  thing  it  becomes,  and  when  it  is  diseased. 

Short  lived  are  both  the  praiser  and  the  praised, 
and  the  rememberer  and  the  remembered  :    and  all 


200  THOUGHTS.  [Book  VIII. 

this  in  a  nook  of  this  part  of  the  world  ;  and  not  even 
here  do  all  agree,  no,  not  any  one  with  himself:  and 
the  whole  earth  too  is  a  point. 

2  2.  Attend  to  the  matter  which  is  before  thee, 
whether  it  is  an  opinion  or  an  act  or  a  word. 

Thou  sufferest  this  justly  :  for  thou  choosest  rather 
to  become  good  to-morrow  than  to  be  good  to-day. 

23.  Am  I  doing  anything?  I  do  it  with  reference 
to  the  good  of  mankind.  Does  anything  happen  to 
me?  I  receive  it  and  refer  it  to  the  gods,  and  the 
source  of  all  things,  from  which  all  that  happens  is 
derived. 

24.  Such  as  bathinj^  appears  to  thee,  —  oil,  sweat, 
dirt,  filthy  water,  all  thjngs  disgusting,  —  so  is  every 
part  of  life  and  everything. 

25.  Lucilla  saw  Verus  die,  and  then  Lucilla  died. 
Secunda  saw  Maximus  die,  and  then  Secunda  died. 
Epitynchanus  saw  Diotimus  die,  and  then  Epityncha- 
nus  died.  Antoninus  saw  Faustina  die,  and  then 
Antoninus  died.  Such  is  everything.  Celer  saw 
Hadrianus  die,  and  then  Celer  died.  And  those 
sharp-witted  men,  either  seers  or  men  inflated  with 
pride,  where  are  they,  —  for  instance  the  sharp-witted 
men,  Charax  and  Demetrius  the  Platonist  and  Eudae- 
mon,  and  any  one  else  like  them?  All  ephemeral, 
dead  long  ago.  Some  indeed  have  not  been  remem- 
bered even  for  a  short  time,  and  others  have  become 
the  heroes  of  fables,  and  again  others  have  disappeared 


Book  VIII.]     MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.     201 

even  from  fables.  Remember  this  then,  that  this  httle 
compound,  thyself,  must  either  be  dissolved,  or  thy 
poor  breath  must  be  extinguished,  or  be  removed  and 
placed  elsewhere. 

26.  It  is  satisfaction  to  a  man  to  do  the  proper 
works  of  a  man.  Now  it  is  a  proper  work  of  a  man 
to  be  benevolent  to  his  own  kind,  to  despise  the  move- 
ments of  the  senses,  to  form  a  just  judgment  of  plausi- 
ble appearances,  and  to  take  a  survey  of  the  nature  of 
the  universe  and  of  the  things  which  happen  in  it. 

27.  There  are  three  relations  [between  thee  and 
other  things]  :  the  one  to  the  body  ^  which  surrounds 
thee ;  the  second  to  the  divine  cause  from  which  all 
things  come  to  all ;  and  the  third  to  those  who  live 
with  thee. 

28.  Pain  is  either  an  evil  to  the  body — then  let 
the  body  say  what  it  thinks  of  it — or  to  the  soul; 
but  it  is  in  the  power  of  the  soul  to  maintain  its  own 
serenity  and  tranquillity,  and  not  to  think  that  pain 
is  an  evil.  For  every  judgment  and  movement  and 
desire  and  aversion  is  within,  and  no  evil  ascends  so 
high. 

29.  Wipe  out  thy  imaginations  by  often  saying  to 
thyself:    Now  it  is  in  my  power  to  let  no  badness  be 

1  The  text  has  aiTiov,  which  in  Antoninus  means  "form," 
"  formal."  Accordingly  Schultz  recommends  either  Valkenaer's 
emendation  d77eto;',  "  body,"  or  Cora'is'  auiidnov.  Compare 
XII.  13;  X.  38. 


202  THOUGHTS.  [Book  Vlll. 

in  this  soul,  nor  desire,  nor  any  perturbation  at  all ; 
but  looking  at  all  things  I  see  what  is  their  nature, 
and  I  use  each  according  to  its  value.  —  Remember 
this  power  which  thou  hast  from  nature. 

30.  Speak  both  in  the  senate  and  to  every  man, 
whoever  he  may  be,  appropriately,  not  with  any  affec- 
tation :  use  plain  discourse. 

31.  Augustus'  court,  wife,  daughter,  descendants, 
ancestors,  sister,  Agrippa,  kinsmen,  intimates,  friends, 
Areius,^  Maecenas,  physicians,  and  sacrificing  priests, 
—  the  whole  court  is  dead.  Then  turn  to  the  rest,  not 
considering  the  death  of  a  single  man  [but  of  a 
whole  race],  as  of  the  Pompeii;  and  that  which  is 
inscribed  on  the  tombs,  — The  last  of  his  race.  Then 
consider  what  trouble  those  before  them  have  had 
that  they  might  leave  a  successor;  and  then,  that 
of  necessity  some  one  must  be  the  last.  Again,  here 
consider  the  death  of  a  whole  race. 

32.  It  is  thy  duty  to  order  thy  life  well  in  every 
single  act ;  and  if  every  act  does  its  duty  as  far  as 
is  possible,  be  content ;  and  no  one  is  able  to  hinder 
thee  so  that  each  act  shall  not  do  its  duty.  —  But 
something  external  will  stand  in  the  way.  —  Nothing 
will  stand  in  the  way  of  thy  acting  justly  and  soberly 
and   considerately.  —  But  perhaps  some  other  active 

1  Areius  ("Apeios)  was  a  philosopher,  who  was  intimate  with 
Augustus;  Sueton.  Augustus,  C.  89;  Plutarch,  Antoninus,  80 ; 
Dion  Cassius,  51,  c.  16. 


Book  VIII.]    MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.     203 

power  will  be  hindered.  —  Well,  but  by  acquiescing 
in  the  hindrance  and  by  being  content  to  transfer 
thy  efforts  to  that  w^hich  is  allowed,  another  oppor- 
tunity of  action  is  immediately  put  before  thee  in 
place  of  that  which  was  hindered,  and  one  which 
will  adapt  itself  to  this  ordering  of  which  we  are 
speaking. 

^^.  Receive  [wealth  or  prosperity]  without  arro- 
gance ;  and  be  ready  to  let  it  go. 

34.  If  thou  didst  ever  see  a  hand  cut  off,  or  a  foot, 
or  a  head,  lying  anywhere  apart  from  the  rest  of  the 
body,  such  does  a  man  make  himself,  as  far  as  he 
can,  who  is  not  content  with  what  happens,  and 
separates  himself  from  others,  or  does  anything  un- 
social. Suppose  that  thou  hast  detached  thyself  from 
the  natural  unity,  —  for  thou  wast  made  by  nature 
a  part,  but  now  thou  hast  cut  thyself  off,  —  yet  here 
there  is  this  beautiful  provision,  that  it  is  in  thy 
power  again  to  unite  thyself.  God  has  allowed  this 
to  no  other  part,  after  it  has  been  separated  and  cut 
asunder,  to  come  together  again.  But  consider  the 
kindness  by  which  he  has  distinguished  man,  for  he 
has  put  it  in  his  power  not  to  be  separated  at  all 
from  the  universal;  and  when  he  has  been  sepa- 
rated, he  has  allowed  him  to  return  and  to  be  united 
and  to  resume  his  place  as  a  part. 

35.  As  the  nature  of  the  universal  has  given  to 
every  rational  being  all  the  other  powers  that  it  has,t 


204  THOUGHTS.  [Book  VIII. 

SO  we  have  received  from  it  this  power  also.  For  as 
the  universal  nature  converts  and  fixes  in  its  pre- 
destined place  everything  which  stands  in  the  way 
and  opposes  it,  and  makes  such  things  a  part  of 
itself,  so  also  the  rational  animal  is  able  to  make 
every  hindrance  its  own  material,  and  to  use  it  for 
such  purposes  as  it  may  have  designed.^ 

36.  Do  not  disturb  thyself  by  thinking  of  the  whole 
of  thy  life.  Let  not  thy  thoughts  at  once  embrace 
all  the  various  troubles  which  thou  mayest  expect  to 
befall  thee  :  but  on  every  occasion  ask  thyself,  What 
is  there  in  this  which  is  intolerable  and  past  bearing? 
for  thou  ^.'  ilt  be  ashamed  to  confess.  In  the  next 
place  remember  that  neither  the  future  nor  the  past 
pains  thee,  but  only  the  present.  But  this  is  reduced 
to  a  very  little,  if  thou  only  circumscribest  it,  and 
chidest  thy  mind  if  it  is  unable  to  hold  out  against 
even  this. 

37.  Does  Panthea  or  Pergamus  now  sit  by  the 
tomb  of  Verus?^  Does  Chaurias  or  Diotimus  sit  by 
the  tomb  of  Hadrianus?  That  would  be  ridiculous. 
Well,  suppose  they  did  sit  there,  would  the  dead 
be  conscious  of  it?  and  if  the  dead  were  conscious, 

1  The  text  is  corrupt  at  the  beginning  of  the  paragraph,  but 
the  meaning  will  appear  if  the  second  XoyiKdv  is  changed  into 
o\u}v'.  though  this  change  alone  will  not  establish  the  gram- 
matical  completeness  of  the  text. 

2  <«  Verus  "  is  a  conjecture  of  Saumaise,  and  perhaps  the 
true  reading. 


BookVIH.]    MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.      205 

would  they  be  pleased?  and  if  they  were  pleased, 
would  that  make  them  immortal?  Was  it  not  in 
the  order  of  destiny  that  these  persons  too  should 
first  become  old  women  and  old  men  and  then  die? 
What  then  would  those  do  after  these  were  dead? 
All  this  is  foul  smell  and  blood  in  a  bag. 

^8.  If  thou  canst  see  sharp,  look  and  judge  wisely,! 
says  the  philosopher. 

39.  In  the  constitution  of  the  rational  animal  I 
see  no  virtue  which  is  opposed  to  justice ;  but  I  see 
a  virtue  which  is  opposed  to  love  of  pleasure,  and 
that  is  temperance. 

40.  If  thou  takest  away  thy  opinion  about  that 
which  appears  to  give  thee  pain,  thou  thyself  standest 
in  perfect  security.  —  Who  is  this  self?  —  The  reason. 
—  But  I  am  not  reason.  —  Be  it  so.  Let  then  the 
reason  itself  not  trouble  itself.  But  if  any  other  part 
of  thee  suffers,  let  it  have  its  own  opinion  about 
itself  (vii.  16). 

41.  Hindrance  to  the  perceptions  of  sense  is  an 
evil  to  the  animal  nature.  Hindrance  to  the  move- 
ments [desires]  is  equally  an  evil  to  the  animal 
nature.  And  something  else  also  is  equally  an  im- 
pediment and  an  evil  to  the  constitution  of  plants. 
So  then  that  which  is  a  hindrance  to  the  intelligence 
is  an  evil  to  the  intelligent  nature.  Apply  all  these 
things  then  to  thyself.  Does  pain  or  sensuous  pleas- 
ure affect  thee?     The  senses  will  look  to  that.     Has 


206  THOUGHTS.  [Book  VIII. 

any  obstacle  opposed  thee  in  thy  efforts  towards  an 
object?  If  mdeed  thou  wast  making  this  effort  abso- 
lutely [unconditionally,  or  without  any  reservation], 
certainly  this  obstacle  is  an  evil  to  thee  considered 
as  a  rational  animal.  But  if  thou  takest  [into  con- 
sideration] the  usual  course  of  things,  thou  hast  not 
yet  been  injured  nor  even  impeded.  The  things 
however  which  are  proper  to  the  understanding  no 
other  man  is  used  to  impede,  for  neither  fire,  nor 
iron,  nor  tyrant,  nor  abuse,  touches  it  in  any  way. 
When  it  has  been  made  a  sphere,  it  continues  a 
sphere  (xi.  .12). 

42.  It  is  not  fit  that  I  should  give  myself  pain, 
for  I  have  never  intentionally  given  pain  even  to 
another. 

43.  Different  things  delight  different  people ;  but 
it  is  my  delight  to.  keep  the  ruling  faculty  sound 
without  turning  away  either  from  any  man  or  from 
any  of  the  things  which  happen  to  men,  but  looking 
at  and  receiving  all  with  welcome  eyes  and  using 
everything  according  to  its  value. 

44.  See  that  thou  secure  this  present  time  to  thy- 
self: for  those  who  rather  pursue  posthumous  fame 
do  not  consider  that  the  men  of  after  time  will  be 
exactly  such  as  these  whom  they  cannot  bear  now ; 
and  both  are  mortal.  And  what  is  it  in  any  way  to 
thee  if  these  men  of  after  time  utter  this  or  that  sound, 
or  have  this  or  that  opinion  about  thee  ? 


BookVIII.]    MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.      20/ 

45.  Take  me  and  cast  me  where  thou  wilt;  for 
there  I  shall  keep  my  divine  part  tranquil,  that  is, 
content,  if  it  can  feel  and  act  conformably  to  its 
proper  constitution.  Is  this  [change  of  place]  suf- 
ficient reason  why  my  soul  should  be  unhappy  and 
worse  than  it  was,  depressed,  expanded,  shrinking, 
affrighted?  and  what  wilt  thou  find  which  is  suf- 
ficient reason  for  this  ?  ^ 

46.  Nothing  can  happen  to  any  man  which  is  not  a 
human  accident,  nor  to  an  ox  which  is  not  according 
to  the  nature  of  an  ox,  nor  to  a  vine  which  is  not  ac- 
cording to  the  nature  of  a  vine,  nor  to  a  stone  which 
is  not  proper  to  a  stone.  If  then  there  happens  to 
each  thing  both  what  is  usual  and  natural,  why  shouldst 
thou  complain  ?  For  the  common  nature  brings  noth- 
ing which  may  not  be  borne  by  thee. 

47.  If  thou  art  pained  by  any  external  thing,  it  is 
not  this  thing  that  disturbs  thee,  but  thy  own  judgment 
about  it.  And  it  is  in  thy  power  to  wipe  out  this 
judgment  now.  But  if  anything  in  thy  own  disposition 
gives  thee  pain,  who  hinders  thee  from  correcting  thy 
opinion?  And  even  if  thou  art  pained  because  thou 
art  not  doing  some  particular  thing  which  seems  to 
thee  to  be  right,  why  dost  thou  not  rather  act  than 

1  dpeyofievT]  in  this  passage  seems  to  have  a  passive  sense. 
It  is  difficult  to  find  an  apt  expression  for  it  and  some  of  the 
other  words.  A  comparison  with  XI.  12,  will  help  to  explain 
the  meaning. 


208  THOUGHTS.  [Book  Vlll. 

complain  ?  —  But  some  insuperable  obstacle  is  in  the 
way  ?  —  Do  not  be  grieved  then,  for  the  cause  of  its 
not  being  done  depends  not  on  thee.  —  But  it  is  not 
worth  while  to  live,  if  this  cannot  be  done.  —  Take  thy 
departure  then  from  life  contentedly,  just  as  he  dies 
who  is  in  full  activity,  and  well  pleased  too  with  the 
things  which  are  obstacles. 

48.  Remember  that  the  ruling  faculty  is  invincible, 
when  self-collected  it  is  satisfied  with  itself,  if  it  does 
nothing  which  it  does  not  choose  to  do,  even  if  it  re- 
sist from  mere  obstinacy.  What  then  will  it  be  when 
it  forms  a  judgment  about  anything  aided  by  reason 
and  deliberately?  Therefore  the  mind  which  is  free 
from  passions  is  a  citadel,  for  man  has  nothing  more 
secure  to  which  he  can  fly  for  refuge  and  for  the  future 
be  inexpugnable.  He  then  who  has  not  seen  this  is 
an  ignorant  man ;  but  he  who  has  seen  it  and  does 
not  fly  to  this  refuge  is  unhappy. 

49.  Say  nothing  more  to  thyself  than  what  the  first 
appearances  report.  Suppose  that  it  has  been  reported 
to  thee  that  a  certain  person  speaks  ill  of  thee.  This 
has  been  reported ;  but  that  thou  hast  been  injured, 
that  has  not  been  reported.  I  see  that  my  child  is 
sick.  I  do  see  ;  but  that  he  is  in  danger,  I  do  not  see. 
Thus  then  always  abide  by  the  first  appearances,  and 
add  nothing  thyself  from  within,  and  then  nothing 
happens  to  thee.  Or  rather  add  something  like  a  man 
who  knows  everything  that  happens  in  the  world. 


BookVIIL]    MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.      209 

50.  A  cucumber  is  bitter  —  Throw  it  away.  —  There 
are  briers  in  the  road  — Turn  aside  from  them.  — This 
is  enough.  Do  not  add,  And  why  were  such  things 
made  in  the  world  ?  For  thou  wilt  be  ridiculed  by  a 
man  who  is  acquainted  with  nature,  as  thou  wouldst  be 
ridiculed  by  a  carpenter  and  shoemaker  if  thou  didst 
find  fault  because  thou  seest  in  their  workshop  shav- 
ings and  cuttings  from  the  things  which  they  make. 
And  yet  they  have  places  into  which  they  can  throw 
these  shavings  and  cuttings,  and  the  universal  nature  has 
no  external  space  ;  but  the  wondrous  part  of  her  art  is 
that  though  she  has  circumscribed  herself,  everything 
within  her  which  appears  to  decay  and  to  grow  old 
and  to  be  useless  she  changes  into  herself,  and  again 
makes  other  new  things  from  these  very  same,  so  that 
she  requires  neither  substance  from  without  nor  wants 
a  place  into  which  she  may  cast  that  which  decays. 
She  is  content  then  with  her  own  space,  and  her  own 
matter,  and  her  own  art. 

51.  Neither  in  thy  actions  be  sluggish  nor  in  thy 
conversation  without  method,  nor  wandering  in  thy 
thoughts,  nor  let  there  be  in  thy  soul  inward  conten- 
tion nor  external  effusion,  nor  in  life  be  so  busy  as 
to  have  no  leisure. 

Suppose  that  men  kill  thee,  cut  thee  in  pieces,  curse 
thee.     What  then  can  these  things  do  to  prevent  thy 
mind  from  remaining  pure,  wise,  sober,  just?     For  in- 
stance, if  a  man  should  stand  by  a  limpid  pure  spring, 
14 


2IO  THOUGHTS.  [Book  VIII. 

and  curse  it,  the  spring  never  ceases  sending  up  pota- 
ble water ;  and  if  he  should  cast  clay  into  it  or  filth,  it 
will  speedily  disperse  them  and  wash  them  out,  and 
will  not  be  at  all  polluted.  How  then  shalt  thou  pos- 
sess a  perpetual  fountain  [and  not  a  mere  well]  ?  By 
forming  f  thyself  hourly  to  freedom  conjoined  with 
contentment,  simplicity,  and  modesty. 

52.  He  who  does  not  know  what  the  world  is,  does 
not  know  where  he  is.  And  he  who  does  not  know 
for  what  purpose  the  world  exists,  does  not  know  who 
he  is,  nor  what  the  world  is.  But  he  who  has  failed  in 
any  one  of  these  things  could  not  even  say  for  what 
purpose  he  exists  himself.  What  then  dost  thou  think 
of  him  who  [avoids  or]  seeks  the  praise  of  those  who 
applaud,  of  men  who  know  not  either  where  they  are 
or  who  they  are? 

53.  Dost  thou  wish  to  be  praised  by  a  man  who 
curses  himself  thrice  every  hour  ?  wouldst  thou  wish  to 
please  a  man  who  does  not  please  himself?  Does  a 
man.  please  himself  who  repents  of  nearly  everything 
that  he  does? 

54.  No  longer  let  thy  breathing  only  act  in  concert 
with  the  air  which  surrounds  thee,  but  let  thy  intelli- 
gence also  now  be  in  harmony  with  the  intelligence 
which  embraces  all  things.  For  the  intelligent  power  is 
no  less  diffused  in  all  parts  and  pervades  all  things  for 
him  who  is  willing  to  draw  it  to  him  than  the  aerial 
power  for  him  who  is  able  to  respire  it. 


Book  VIII.]    MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.      211 

55.  Generally,  wickedness  does  no  harm  at  all  to  the 
universe  ;  and  particularly  the  wickedness  [of  one  man] 
does  no  harm  to  another.  It  is  only  harmful  to  him 
who  has  it  in  his  power  to  be  released  from  it  as  soon 
as  he  shall  choose. 

56.  To  my  own  free  will  the  free  will  of  my  neigh- 
bor is  just  as  indifferent  as  his  poor  breath  and  flesh. 
For  though  we  are  made  especially  for  the  sake  of  one 
another,  still  the  ruling  power  of  each  of  us  has  its  own 
office,  for  otherwise  my  neighbor's  wickedness  would 
be  my  harm,  which  God  has  not  willed  in  order  that 
my  unhappiness  may  not  depend  on  another. 

57.  The  sun  appears  to  be  poured  down,  and  in  all 
directions  indeed  it  is  diffused,  yet  it  is  not  effused. 
For  this  diffusion  is  extension  :  Accordingly  its  rays 
are  called  Extensions  [aKxti/e?]  because  they  are  ex- 
tended [aTTo  Tov  iKTavea-Oai]}  But  one  may  judge 
what  kind  of  a  thing  a  ray  is,  if  he  looks  at  the  sun's 
light  passing  through  a  narrow  opening  into  a  darkened 
room,  for  it  is  extended  in  a  right  line,  and  as  it  were 
is  divided  when  it  meets  with  any  solid  body  which 
stands  in  the  way  and  intercepts  the  air  beyond ;  but 
there  the  light  remains  fixed  and  does  not  ghde  or  fall 
off.  Such  then  ought  to  be  the  outpouring  and  dif- 
fusion of  the  understanding,  and  it  should  in  no  way 
be  an  effusion,  but  an  extension,  and  it  should  make 
no  violent  or  impetuous  collision  with  the  obstacles 

1  A  piece  of  bad  etymology. 


212  THOUGHTS.  [Book  VIII. 

which  are  in  its  way ;  nor  yet  fall  down,  but  be  fixed, 
and  enlighten  that  which  receives  it.  For  a  body 
will  deprive  itself  of  the  illumination,  if  it  does  not 
admit  it. 

58.  He  who  fears  death  either  fears  the  loss  of  sen- 
sation or  a  different  kind  of  sensation.  But  if  thou 
shalt  have  no  sensation,  neither  wilt  thou  feel  any 
harm ;  and  if  thou  shalt  acquire  another  kind  of  sensa- 
tion, thou  wilt  be  a  different  kind  of  living  being  and 
thou  wilt  not  cease  to  live. 

59.  Men  exist  for  the  sake  of  one  another.  Teach 
them  then  or  bear  with  them. 

60.  In  one  way  an  arrow  moves,  in  another  way  the 
mind.  The  mind  indeed,  both  when  it  exercises  cau- 
tion and  when  it  is  employed  about  inquiry,  moves 
straight  onward  not  the  less,  and  to  its  object. 

61.  Enter  into  every  man's  ruling  faculty;  and  also 
let  every  other  man  enter  into  thine.^ 

-i  Compare  Epictetus,  in.  9,   12. 


Book  IX.]       MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.      213 


IX. 


T  T  E  who  acts  unjustly  acts  impiously.  For  since 
the  universal  nature  has  made  rational  ani- 
mals for  the  sake  of  one  another  to  help  one  another 
according  to  their  deserts,  but  in  no  way  to  injure 
one  another,  he  who  transgresses  her  will  is  clearly 
guilty  of  impiety  towards  the  highest  divinity.  And 
he  too  who  lies  is  guilty  of  impiety  to  the  same  di- 
vinity ;  for  the  universal  nature  is  the  nature  of  things 
that  are ;  and  things  that  are  have  a  relation  to  all 
things  that  come  into  existence.^     And  further,  this 

1  "  As  there  is  not  any  action  or  natural  event,  which  we 
are  acquainted  with,  so  single  and  unconnected  as  not  to  have 
a  respect  to  some  other  actions  and  events,  so  possibly  each 
of  them,  when  it  has  not  an  immediate,  may  yet  have  a  remote, 
natural  relation  to  other  actions  and  events,  much  beyond  the 
compass  of  this  present  world."  Again  :  "  Things  seemingly 
the  most  insignificant  imaginable  are  perpetually  observed  to 
be  necessary  conditions  to  other  things  of  the  greatest  impor- 
tance ;  so  that  any  one  thing  whatever  may,  for  aught  we 
know  to  the  contrary,  be  a  necessary  condition  to  any  other." 
—  Butler's  Analogy,  Chap.  7.  See  all  the  chapter.  Some 
critics  take  ra  virdpxovTa  in  this  passage  of  Antoninus  to  be 
the  same  as  rh  8vTa:  but  if  that  were  so,  he  might  have  said 
irpbs  &\\r}\a  instead  of  irpds  to.  inrdpxouTa.  Perhaps  the  mean- 
ing of  Trpos  TO,  virapxovTa  may  be  "to  all  prior  things."  If  so, 
the  translation  is  still  correct.     See  vi.  38. 


214  THOUGHTS.  [Book  IX. 

universal  nature  is  named  truth,  and  is  the  prime 
cause  of  all  things  that  are  true.  He  then  who  lies 
intentionally  is  guilty  of  impiety  inasmuch  as  he  acts 
unjustly  by  deceiving;  and  he  also  who  Hes  un- 
intentionally, inasmuch  as  he  is  at  variance  with 
the  universal  nature,  and  inasmuch  as  he  disturbs 
the  order  by  fighting  against  the  nature  of  the 
world ;  for  he  fights  against  it,  who  is  moved  of 
himself  to  that  which  is  contrary  to  truth,  for  he 
had  received  powers  from  nature  through  the  ne- 
glect of  which  he  is  not  able  now  to  distinguish 
falsehood  from  truth.  And  indeed  he  who  pursues 
pleasure  as  good,  and  avoids  pain  as  evil,  is  guilty 
of  impiety.  For  of  necessity  such  a  man  must  often 
find  fault  with  the  universal  nature,  alleging  that  it 
assigns  things  to  the  bad  and  the  good  contrary 
to  their  deserts,  because  frequently  the  bad  are  in 
the  enjoyment  of  pleasure  and  possess  the  things 
which  procure  pleasure,  but  the  good  have  pain  for 
their  share  and  the  things  which  cause  pain.  And 
further,  he  who  is  afraid  of  pain  will  sometimes  also 
be  afraid  of  some  of  the  things  which  will  happen 
in  the  world,  and  even  this  is  impiety.  And  he 
who  pursues  pleasure  will  not  abstain  from  injustice, 
and  this  is  plainly  impiety.  Now  with  respect  to  the 
things  towards  which  the  universal  nature  is  equally 
affected,  —  for  it  would  not  have  made  both,  unless 
it  was  equally  affected  towards  both,  —  towards  these 


[Book  IX.      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.       215 

they  who  wish  to  follow  nature  should  be  of  the 
same  mind  with  it,  and  equally  affected.  With  re- 
spect to  pain,  then,  and  pleasure,  or  death  and  life, 
or  honor  and  dishonor,  which  the  universal  nature 
employs  equally,  whoever  is  not  equally  affected  is 
manifestly  acting  impiously.  And  I  say  that  the 
universal  nature  employs  them  equally,  instead  of 
saying  that  they  happen  alike  to  those  who  are  pro- 
duced in  continuous  series  and  to  those  who  come 
after  them  by  virtue  of  a  certain  original  movement 
of  Providence,  according  to  which  it  moved  from  a 
certain  beginning  to  this  ordering  of  things,  having 
conceived  certain  principles  of  the  things  which  were 
to  be,  and  having  determined  powers  productive  of 
beings  and  of  changes  and  of  such  like  successions 

(VII.  75)- 

2.  It  would  be  a  man's  happiest  lot  to  depart 
from  mankind  without  having  had  any  taste  of  ly- 
ing and  hypocrisy  and  luxury  and  pride.  However, 
to  breathe  out  one's  life  when  a  man  has  had 
enough  of  these  things  is  the  next  best  voyage,  as 
the  saying  is.  Hast  thou  determined  to  abide  with 
vice,  and  has  not  experience  yet  induced  thee  to 
fly  from  this  pestilence?  For  the  destruction  of  the 
understanding  is  a  pestilence,  much  more  indeed 
than  any  such  corruption  and  change  of  this  at- 
mosphere which  surrounds  us.  For  this  corruption 
is  a  pestilence  of  animals  so  far  as  they  are  animals ; 


2l6  THOUGHTS.  [Book  IX. 

but  the  other  is  a  pestilence  of  men  so  far  as  they 
are  men. 

3.  Do  not  despise  death,  but  be  well  content  with 
it,  since  this  too  is  one  of  those  things  which  nature 
wills.  For  such  as  it  is  to  be  young  and  to  grow  old, 
and  to  increase  and  to  reach  maturity,  and  to  have 
teeth  and  beard  and  gray  hairs,  and  to  beget  and 
to  be  pregnant  and  to  bring  forth,  and  all  the  other 
natural  operations  which  the  seasons  of  thy  life  bring, 
such  also  is  dissolution.  This,  then,  is  consistent 
with  the  character  of  a  reflecting  man,  —  to  be  neither 
careless  nor  impatient  nor  contemptuous  with  respect 
to  death,  but  to  wait  for  it  as  one  of  the  operations 
of  nature.  As  thou  now  waitest  for  the  time  when 
the  child  shall  come  out  of  thy  wife's  womb,  so  be 
ready  for  the  time  when  thy  soul  shall  fall  out  of  this 
envelope.^  But  if  thou  requirest  also  a  vulgar  kind 
of  comfort  which  shall  reach  thy  heart,  thou  wilt  be 
made  best  reconciled  to  death  by  observing  the  ob- 
jects from  which  thou  art  going  to  be  removed,  and 
the  morals  of  those  with  whom  thy  soul  will  no  longer 
be  mingled.  For  it  is  no  way  right  to  be  offended 
with  men,  but  it  is  thy  duty  to  care  for  them  and 
to  bear  with  them  gently ;  and  yet  to  remember  that 
thy  departure  will  not  be  from  men  who  have  the 
same  principles  as  thyself.  For  this  is  the  only  thing, 
if  there  be  any,  which  could  draw  us  the  contrary 
1  Note  I  of  the  Philosophy,  p.  76. 


Book  IX.]       MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.      217 

way  and  attach  us  to  life,  —  to  be  permitted  to  live 
with  those  who  have  the  same  principles  as  ourselves. 
But  now  thou  seest  how  great  is  the  trouble  arising 
from  the  discordance  of  those  who  live  together,  so 
that  thou  mayst  say,  Come  quick,  O  death,  lest  per- 
chance I,  too,  should  forget  myself. 

4.  He  who  does  wrong  does  wrong  against  himself. 
He  who  acts  unjustly  acts  unjustly  to  himself,  because 
he  makes  himself  bad. 

5.  He  often  acts  unjustly  who  does  not  do  a  cer- 
tain thing ;  not  only  he  who  does  a  certain  thing. 

6.  Thy  present  opinion  founded  on  understanding, 
and  thy  present  conduct  directed  to  social  good,  and 
thy  present  disposition  of  contentment  with  every- 
thing which  happens  t  —  that  is  enough. 

7.  Wipe  out  imagination :  check  desire :  extin- 
guish appetite  :  keep  the  ruling  faculty  in  its  own 
power. 

8.  Among  the  animals  which  have  not  reason  one 
Hfe  is  distributed ;  but  among  reasonable  animals 
one  intelligent  soul  is  distributed  :  just  as  there  is 
one  earth  of  all  things  which  are  of  an  earthy  nature, 
and  we  see  by  one  light,  and  breathe  one  air,  all  of 
us  that  have  the  faculty  of  vision  and  all  that  have 
life. 

9.  All  things  which  participate  in  anything  which 
is  common  to  them  all  move  towards  that  which  is 
of  the  same  kind  with  themselves.     Everything  which 


2l8  THOUGHTS.  [Book  IX. 

is  earthy  turns  towards  the  earth,  everything  which  is 
Hquid  flows  together,  and  everything  which  is  of  an 
aerial  kind  does  the  same,  so  that  they  require  some- 
thing to  keep  them  asunder,  and  the  apphcation  of 
force.  Fire  indeed  moves  upwards  on  account  of 
the  elemental  fire,  but  it  is  so  ready  to  be  kindled 
together  with  all  the  fire  which  is  here,  that  even 
every  substance  which  is  somewhat  dry  is  easily 
ignited,  because  there  is  less  mingled  with  it  of  that 
which  is  a  hindrance  to  ignition.  Accordingly,  then, 
everything  also  which  participates  in  the  common 
intelligent  nature  moves  in  like  manner  towards  that 
which  is  of  the  same  kind  with  itself,  or  moves  even 
more.  For  so  much  as  it  is  superior  in  comparison 
with  all  other  things,  in  the  same  degree  also  is  it 
more  ready  to  mingle  with  and  to  be  fused  with 
that  which  is  akin  to  it.  Accordingly  among  animals 
devoid  of  reason  we  find  swarms  of  bees,  and  herds 
of  cattle,  and  the  nurture  of  young  birds,  and  in  a 
manner,  loves ;  for  even  in  animals  there  are  souls, 
and  that  power  which  brings  them  together  is  seen 
to  exert  itself  in  the  superior  degree,  and  in  such 
a  way  as  never  has  been  observed  in  plants  nor  in 
stones  nor  in  trees.  But  in  rational  animals  there 
are  political  communities  and  friendships,  and  families 
and  meetings  of  people ;  and  in  wars,  treaties,  and 
armistices.  But  in  the  things  which  are  still  superior, 
even  though   they  are   separated   from   one   another, 


Book  IX.J      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.       2ig 

unity  in  a  manner  exists,  as  in  the  stars.  Thus  the 
ascent  to  the  higher  degree  is  able  to  produce  a  sym- 
pathy even  in  things  which  are  separated.  See,  then, 
what  now  takes  place ;  for  only  intelligent  animals 
have  now  forgotten  this  mutual  desire  and  inclination, 
and  in  them  alone  the  property  of  flowing  together 
is  not  seen.  But  still,  though  men  strive  to  avoid 
[this  union],  they  are  caught  and  held  by  it,  for  their 
nature  is  too  strong  for  them ;  and  thou  wilt  see 
what  I  say,  if  thou  only  observest.  Sooner,  then, 
will  one  find  anything  earthy  which  comes  in  contact 
with  no  earthy  thing,  than  a  man  altogether  sepa- 
rated from  other  men. 

10.  Both  man  and  God  and  the  universe  produce 
fruit ;  at  the  proper  seasons  each  produces  it.  But 
and  if  usage  has  especially  fixed  these  terms  to  the 
vine  and  like  things,  this  is  nothing.  Reason  produces 
fruit  both  for  all  and  for  itself,  and  there  are  pro- 
duced from  it  other  things  of  the  same  kind  as  reason 
itself. 

1 1 .  If  thou  art  able,  correct  by  teaching  those  who 
do  wrong ;  but  if  thou  canst  not,  remember  that  in- 
dulgence is  given  to  thee  for  this  purpose.  And  the 
gods,  too,  are  indulgent  to  such  persons  ;  and  for  some 
purposes  they  even  help  them  to  get  health,  wealth, 
reputation  ;  so  kind  they  are.  And  it  is  in  thy  power 
also ;  or  say,  who  hinders  thee  ? 

12.  Labor  not  as  one  who  is  wretched,  nor  yet  as 


220  THOUGHTS.  [Book  IX. 

one  who  would  be  pitied  or  admired  :  but  direct  thy 
will  to  one  thing  only,  —  to  put  thyself  in  motion  and 
to  check  thyself,  as  the  social  reason  requires. 

13.  To-day  I  have  got  out  of  all  trouble,  or  rather 
I  have  cast  out  all  trouble,  for  it  was  not  outside,  but 
within  and  in  my  opinions. 

14.  All  things  are  the  same,  familiar  in  experience, 
and  ephemeral  in  time,  and  worthless  in  the  matter. 
Everything  now  is  just  as  it  was  in  the  time  of  those 
whom  we  have  buried. 

15.  Things  stand  outside  of  us,  themselves  by  them- 
selves, neither  knowing  aught  of  themselves,  nor  ex- 
pressing any  judgment.  What  is  it,  then,  which  does 
judge  about  them  ?     The  ruling  faculty. 

16.  Not  in  passivity  but  in  activity  he  the  evil  and 
the  good  of  the  rational  social  animal,  just  as  his  vir- 
tue and  his  vice  lie  not  in  passivity  but  in  activity.-^ 

1 7.  For  the  stone  which  has  been  thrown  up  it  is 
no  evil  to  come  down,  nor  indeed  any  good  to  have 
been  carried  up   (viii.  20). 

18.  Penetrate  inwards  into  men's  leading  principles, 
and  thou  wilt  see  what  judges  thou  art  afraid  of,  and 
what  kind  of  judges  they  are  of  themselves. 

19.  All  things  are  changing:  and  thou  thyself  art 
in  continuous  mutation  and  in  a  manner  in  continuous 
destruction,  and  the  whole  universe  too. 

1  Virtutis  omnis  laus  in  actione  consistit.  —  Cicero,  De  Oif. 
I.  6. 


Book  IX.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.       221 

20.  It  is  thy  duty  to  leave  another  man's  wrongful 
act  there  where  it  is   (vii.   29;  ix.  ;^S). 

21.  Termination  of  activity,  cessation  from  move- 
ment and  opinion,  and  in  a  sense  their  death,  is  no  evil. 
Turn  thy  thoughts  now  to  the  consideration  of  thy  life, 
thy  life  as  a  child,  as  a  youth,  thy  manhood,  thy  old 
age,  for  in  these  also  every  change  was  a  death.  Is 
this  anything  to  fear  ?  Turn  thy  thoughts  now  to  thy 
life  under  thy  grandfather,  then  to  thy  life  under  thy 
mother,  then  to  thy  life  under  thy  father ;  and  as  thou 
findest  many  other  differences  and  changes  and  ter- 
minations, ask  thyself,  Is  this  anything  to  fear?  In 
like  manner,  then,  neither  are  the  termination  and  ces- 
sation and  change  of  thy  whole  life  a  thing  to  be 
riraid  of. 

22.  Hasten  [to  examine]  thy  own  ruling  faculty  and 
that  of  the  universe  and  that  of  thy  neighbor :  thy 
own  that  thou  mayst  make  it  just :  and  that  of  the 
universe,  that  thou  mayst  remember  of  what  thou  art 
a  part ;  and  that  of  thy  neighbor,  that  thou  mayst  know 
whether  he  has  acted  ignorantly  or  with  knowledge, 
and  that  thou  mayst  also  consider  that  his  ruling  fac- 
ulty is  akin  to  thine. 

23.  As  thou  thyself  art  a  component  part  of  a  social 
system,  so  let  every  act  of  thine  be  a  component  part 
of  social  life.  Whatever  act  of  thine  then  has  no  ref- 
erence either  immediately  or  remotely  to  a  social  end, 
this  tears  asunder  thy  life,  and  does  not  allow  it  to  be 


222  THOUGHTS.  [Book  IX. 

one,  and  it  is  of  the  nature  of  a  mutiny,  just  as  when 
in  a  popular  assembly  a  man  acting  by  himself  stands 
apart  from  the  general  agreement. 

24.  Quarrels  of  little  children  and  their  sports,  and 
poor  spirits  carrying  about  dead  bodies  [such  is  every- 
thing] ;  and  so  what  is  exhibited  in  the  representation 
of  the  mansions  of  the  dead  ^  strikes  our  eyes  more 
clearly. 

25.  Examine  into  the  quality  of  the  form  of  an  ob- 
ject, and  detach  it  altogether  from  its  material  part, 
and  then  contemplate  it;  then  determine  the  time, 
the  longest  which  a  thing  of  this  peculiar  form  is 
naturally  made  to  endure. 

26.  Thou  hast  endured  infinite  troubles  through  not 
being  contented  with  thy  ruling  faculty  when  it  does 
the  things  which  it  is  constituted  by  nature  to  do. 
But  enough  f  [of  this] . 

27.  When  another  blames  thee  or  hates  thee,  or 
when  men  say  about  thee  anything  injurious,  approach 
their  poor  souls,  penetrate  within,  and  see  what  kind  of 
men  they  are.  Thou  wilt  discover  that  there  is  no  rea- 
son to  take  any  trouble  that  these  men  may  have  this 
or  that  opinion  about  thee.  However,  thou  must  be 
well  disposed  towards  them,  for  by  nature  they  are 

1  TO  Trjs  "NeKvias  may  be,  as  Gataker  conjectures,  a  dramatic 
representation  of  the  state  of  the  dead.  Schultz  supposes  that 
it  maybe  also  a  reference  to  the  'NeKvia  of  the  Odyssey  (lib. 

XI.). 


Book  IX.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.        223 

friends.  And  the  gods  too  aid  them  in  all  ways,  by 
dreams,  by  signs,  towards  the  attainment  of  those 
things  on  which  they  set  a  value. f 

28.  The  periodic  movements  of  the  universe  are 
the  same,  up  and  down  from  age  to  age.  And  either 
the  universal  intelligence  puts  itself  in  motion  for 
every  separate  effect,  and  if  this  is  so,  be  thou  con- 
tent with  that  which  is  the  result  of  its  activity ;  or 
it  puts  itself  in  motion  once,  and  everything  else 
comes  by  way  of  sequence  ^  in  a  manner ;  or  indi- 
visible elements  are  the  origin  of  all  things.  —  In  a 
word,  if  there  is  a  god,  all  is  well ;  and  if  chance 
rules,  do  not  thou  also  be  governed  by  it   (vi.  44  ; 

vii.  75)- 

Soon  will  the  earth  cover  us  all :  then  the  earth,  too, 
will  change,  and  the  things  also  which  result  from 
change  will  continue  to  change  forever,  and  these 
again  forever.  For  if  a  man  reflects  on  the  changes 
and  transformations  which  follow  one  another  like 
wave  after  wave  and  their  rapidity,  he  will  despise 
everything  which  is  perishable   (xii.  21). 

29.  The  universal  cause  is  like  a  winter  torrent :  it 
carries  everything  along  with  it.  But  how  worthless 
are  all  these  poor  people  who  are  engaged  in  matters 
political,  and,  as  they  suppose,  are  playing  the  philoso- 

1  The  words  which  immediately  follow  rar  iiraKoXovOriaiv  are 
corrupt.  But  the  meaning  is  hardly  doubtful.  (Compare  Vii. 
75) 


224  THOUGHTS.  [Book  IX. 

pher  !  All  drivellers.  Well  then,  man  :  do  what  na- 
ture now  requires.  Set  thyself  in  motion,  if  it  is  in 
thy  power,  and  do  not  look  about  thee  to  see  if  any 
one  will  observe  it ;  nor  yet  expect  Plato's  Republic  :  ^ 
but  be  content  if  the  smallest  thing  goes  on  well,  and 
consider  such  an  event  to  be  no  small  matter.  For 
who  can  change  men's  opinions?  and  without  a 
change  of  opinions  what  else  is  there  than  the  slavery 
of  men  who  groan  while  they  pretend  to  obey? 
Come  now  and  tell  me  of  Alexander  and  Philippus 
and  Demetrius  of  Phalerum.  They  themselves  shall 
judge  whether  they  discovered  what  the  common  na- 
ture required,  and  trained  themselves  accordingly. 
But  if  they  acted  like  tragedy  heroes,  no  one  has  con- 
demned me  to  imitate  them.  Simple  and  modest  is 
the  work  of  philosophy.  Draw  me  not  aside  to  inso- 
lence and  pride. 

30.  Look  down  from  above  on  the  countless  herds 
of  men  and  their  countless  solemnities,  and  the  in- 
finitely varied  voyagings  in  storms  and  calms,  and  the 
differences  among  those  who  are  born,  who  live  to- 
gether, and  die.  And  consider,  too,  the  life  lived 
by  others  in  olden  time,  and  the  life  of  those  who 
will  live  after  thee,  and  the  life  now  lived  among 
barbarous    nations,   and   how    many   know   not    even 

1  Those  who  wish  to  know  what  Plato's  Republic  is,  may 
now  study  it  in  the  accurate  translation  of  Davies  and 
Vaughan. 


Book  IX.]       MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.      225 

thy  name,  and  how  many  will  soon  forget  it,  and 
how  they  who  perhaps  now  are  praising  thee  will 
very  soon  blame  thee,  and  that  neither  a  posthu- 
mous name  is  of  any  value,  nor  reputation,  nor  any- 
thing else. 

31.  Let  there  be  freedom  from  perturbations  with 
respect  to  the  things  which  come  from  the  external 
cause ;  and  let  there  be  justice  in  the  things  done 
by  virtue  of  the  internal  cause,  that  is,  let  there  be 
movement  and  action  terminating  in  this,  in  social 
acts,  for  this  is  according  to  thy  nature. 

32.  Thou  canst  remove  out  of  the  way  many 
useless  things  among  those  which  disturb  thee,  for 
they  lie  entirely  in  thy  opinion ;  and  thou  wilt  then 
gain  for  thyself  ample  space  by  comprehending  the 
whole  universe  in  thy  mind,  and  by  contemplating 
the  eternity  of  time,  and  observing  the  rapid  change 
of  every  several  thing,  how  short  is  the  time  from 
birth  to  dissolution,  and  the  illimitable  time  before 
birth  as  well  as  the  equally  boundless  time  after 
dissolution  ! 

;^^.  All  that  thou  seest  will  quickly  perish,  and 
those  who  have  been  spectators  of  its  dissolution 
will  very  soon  perish  too.  And  he  who  dies  at  the 
extremest  old  age  will  be  brought  into  the  same 
condition  with  him  who  died  prematurely. 

34.  What  are  these  men's  leading  principles,  and 
about  what  kind  of  things  are  they  busy,  and  for 
15 


226  THOUGHTS.  [Book  IX. 

what  kind  of  reasons  do  they  love  and  honor?  Im- 
agine that  thou  seest  their  poor  souls  laid  bare.  When 
they  think  that  they  do  harm  by  their  blame  or  good 
by  their  praise,  what  an  idea  ! 

35.  Loss  is  nothing  else  than  change.  But  the 
universal  nature  delights  in  change,  and  in  obedience 
to  her  all  things  are  now  done  well,  and  from  eternity 
have  been  done  in  like  form,  and  will  be  such  to 
time  without  end.  What,  then,  dost  thou  say,  —  that 
all  things  have  been  and  all  things  always  will  be 
bad,  and  that  no  power  has  ever  been  found  in  so 
many  gods  to  rectify  these  things,  but  the  world 
has  been  condemned  to  be  bound  in  never  ceasing 
evil   (TV.  45,  VII.   18)  ? 

36.  The  rottenness  of  the  matter  which  is  the 
foundation  of  everything  !  water,  dust,  bones,  filth : 
or  again,  marble  rocks,  the  callosities  of  the  earth ; 
and  gold  and  silver,  the  sediments ;  and  garments, 
only  bits  of  hair ;  and  purple  dye,  blood ;  and  every- 
thing else  is  of  the  same  kind.  And  that  which  is 
of  the  nature  of  breath  is  also  another  thing  of  the 
same  kind,  changing  from  this  to  that. 

37.  Enough  of  this  wretched  life  and  murmuring 
and  apish  tricks.  Why  art  thou  disturbed?  What 
is  there  new  in  this?  What  unsettles  thee?  Is  it 
the  form  of  the  thing?  Look  at  it.  Or  is  it  the 
matter?  Look  at  it.  But  besides  these  there  is 
nothing.     Towards    the   gods    then,   now   become   at 


Book  IX.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.       22/ 

last  more  simple  and  better.     It  is  the  same  whether 
we  examine  these  things  for  a  hundred  years  or  three. 

^8.  If  any  man  has  done  wrong,  the  harm  is  his 
own.     But  perhaps  he  has  not  done  wrong. 

39.  Either  all  things  proceed  from  one  intelhgent 
source  and  come  together  as  in  one  body,  and  the 
part  ought  not  to  find  fault  with  what  is  done  for 
the  benefit  of  the  whole  ;  or  there  are  only  atoms, 
and  nothing  else  than  mixture  and  dispersion.  Why, 
then,  art  thou  disturbed  ?  Say  to  the  ruling  faculty, 
Art  thou  dead,  art  thou  corrupted,  art  thou  playing 
the  hypocrite,  art  thou  become  a  beast,  dost  thou 
herd  and  feed  with  the  rest  ?  ^ 

40.  Either  the  gods  have  no  power  or  they  have 

power.     If,  then,  they  have  no  power,  why  dost  thou 

pray  to   them?     But   if  they   have   power,  why   dost 

thou  not  pray  for  them  to   give  thee  the   faculty  of 

not  fearing  any  of  the  things  which  thou  fearest,  or 

of  not  desiring  any  of  the  things  which  thou  desirest, 

or  not   being  pained   at   anything,   rather   than   pray 

that  any  of  these  things  should  not  happen  or  happen  ? 

for  certainly  if  they  can  co-operate  with  men,  they  can 

co-operate  for  these  purposes.     But  perhaps  thou  wilt 

say  the  gods  have  placed  them  in  thy  power.     Well, 

^  There  is  some  corruption  at  the  end  of  this  section ;  but 
I  think  that  the  translation  expresses  the  emperor's  meaning. 
Whether  intelligence  rules  all  things  or  chance  rules,  a  man 
must  not  be  disturbed.  He  must  use  the  power  that  he  has, 
and  be  tranquil. 


228  THOUGHTS.  [Book  IX. 

then,  is  it  not  better  to  use  what  is  in  thy  power  hke 
a  free  man  than  to  desire  in  a  slavish  and  abject  way 
what  is  not  in  thy  power?  And  who  has  told  thee 
that  the  gods  do  not  aid  us  even  in  the  things  which 
are  in  our  power?  Begin,  then,  to  pray  for  such 
things,  and  thou  wilt  see.  One  man  prays  thus : 
How  shall  I  be  able  to  lie  with  that  woman?  Do 
thou  pray  thus  :  How  shall  I  not  desire  to  lie  with 
her?  Another  prays  thus:  How  shall  I  be  released 
from  this  ?  Another  prays  :  How  shall  I  not  desire 
to  be  released  ?  Another  thus :  How  shall  I  not 
lose  my  little  son  ?  Thou  thus  :  How  shall  I  not  be 
afraid  to  lose  him?  In  fine,  turn  thy  prayers  this 
way,  and  see  what  comes. 

41.  Epicurus  says,  In  my  sickness  my  conversa- 
tion was  not  about  my  bodily  sufferings,  nor,  says  he, 
did  I  talk  on  such  subjects  to  those  who  visited  me ; 
but  I  continued  to  discourse  on  the  nature  of  things 
as  before,  keeping  to  this  main  point,  how  the  mind, 
while  participating  in  such  movements  as  go  on  in 
the  poor  flesh,  shall  be  free  from  perturbations  and 
maintain  its  proper  good.  Nor  did  I,  he  says,  give 
the  physicians  an  opportunity  of  putting  on  solemn 
looks,  as  if  they  were  doing  something  great,  but 
my  life  went  on  well  and  happily.  Do,  then,  the 
same  that  he  did  both  in  sickness,  if  thou  art  sick, 
and  in  any  other  circumstances ;  for  never  to  desert 
philosophy  in  any  events  that  may  befall  us,  nor  to 


Book  IX.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.       229 

hold  trifling  talk  either  with  an  ignorant  man  or  with 
one  unacquainted  with  nature,  is  a  principle  of  all 
schools  of  philosophy ;  but  to  be  intent  only  on  that 
which  thou  art  now  doing  and  on  the  instrument  by 
which  thou  doest  it. 

42.  When  thou  art  offended  with  any  man's  shame- 
less conduct,  immediately  ask  thyself,  Is  it  possible, 
then,  that  shameless  men  should  not  be  in  the  world? 
It  is  not  possible.  Do  not,  then,  require  what  is 
impossible.  For  this  man  also  is  one  of  those  shame- 
less men  who  must  of  necessity  be  in  the  world. 
Let  the  same  considerations  be  present  to  thy  mind 
in  the  case  of  the  knave,  and  the  faithless  man,  and 
of  every  man  who  does  wrong  in  any  way.  For  at 
the  same  time  that  thou  dost  remind  thyself  that  it 
is  impossible  that  such  kind  of  men  should  not  exist, 
thou  wilt  become  more  kindly  disposed  towards  every 
one  individually.  It  is  useful  to  perceive  this,  too, 
immediately  when  the  occasion  arises,  what  virtue 
nature  has  given  to  man  to  oppose  to  every  wrongful 
act.  For  she  has  given  to  man,  as  an  antidote 
against  the  stupid  man,  mildness,  and  against  another 
kind  of  man  some  other  power.  And  in  all  cases  it 
is  possible  for  thee  to  correct  by  teaching  the  man 
who  is  gone  astray;  for  every  man  who  errs  misses 
his  object  and  is  gone  astray.  Besides,  wherein  hast 
thou  been  injured  ?  For  thou  wilt  find  that  no  one 
among    those    against    whom    thou    art    irritated    has 


230  THOUGHTS.  [Book  IX. 

done  anything  by   which  thy  mind  could    be  made 

worse ;    but  that  which   is  evil   to  thee  and   harmful 

has    its    foundation    only    in    the    mind.      And   what 

harm  is  done   or  what   is  there  strange,  if  the  man 

who   has  not   been    instructed   does    the   acts   of  an 

uninstructed  man?     Consider  w^hether  thou  shouldst 

not    rather   blame    thyself,    because    thou    didst    not 

expect  such  a  man  to  err  in  such  a  way.     For  thou 

hadst  means    given  thee    by  thy  reason   to   suppose 

that  it  was  likely  that  he   would  commit  this  error, 

and  yet  thou  hast  forgotten  and  art  amazed  that  he 

has    erred.     But    most    of   all   when  thou    blamest  a 

man  as  faithless  or  ungrateful,  turn  to  thyself.     For 

the  fault  is  manifestly  thy  own,  whether  thou  didst 

trust  that  a  man  who  had  such  a  disposition  would 

keep  his   promise,  or  when   conferring  thy  kindness 

thou  didst  not  confer  it  absolutely,  nor  yet  in   such 

way  as  to  have  received   from    thy  very  act  all  the 

profit.     For  what   more  dost   thou  want  when  thou 

hast  done   a   man  a  service?    art   thou    not    content 

that  thou  hast   done   something   conformable   to   thy 

nature,  and  dost  thou  seek   to  be  paid  for  it?  just 

as  if  the  eye  demanded  a  recompense  for  seeing,  or 

the  feet  for  walking.  For  as  these  members  are  formed 

for  a  particular  purpose,  and  by  working  according  to 

their  several  constitutions  obtain  what  is  their  own ;  1 

i  'ATre'xei  to  tdiov.  This  sense  of  direxeiv  occurs  in  XI.  I, 
and  IV.  49;  also  in  St,  Matthew,  VI.  2,  direxovcn  rbv  fxiadov,  and 
in  Epictetus. 


Book  IX.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.       23 1 

SO  also  as  man  is  formed  by  nature  to  acts  of  be- 
nevolence, when  he  has  done  anything  benevolent 
or  in  any  other  way  conducive  to  the  common  inter- 
est, he  has  acted  conformably  to  his  constitution,  and 
he  gets  what  is  his  own. 


232  THOUGHTS.  lBook  X. 


X. 


T  X  7ILT  thou,  then,  my  soul,  never  be  good  and 
simple  and  one  and  naked,  more  manifest 
than  the  body  which  surrounds  thee?  Wilt  thou 
never  enjoy  an  affectionate  and  contented  disposition  ? 
Wilt  thou  never  be  full  and  without  a  want  of  any  kind, 
longing  for  nothing  more,  nor  desiring  anything,  either 
animate  or  inanimate,  for  the  enjoyment  of  pleasures? 
nor  yet  desiring  time  wherein  thou  shalt  have  longer 
enjoyment,  or  place,  or  pleasant  climate,  or  society  of 
men  with  whom  thou  mayst  live  in  harmony?  but  wilt 
thou  be  satisfied  with  thy  present  condition,  and 
pleased  with  all  that  is  about  thee,  and  wilt  thou  con- 
vince thyself  that  thou  hast  everything,  and  that  it 
comes  from  the  gods,  that  everything  is  well  for  thee, 
and  will  be  well  whatever  shall  please  them,  and  what- 
ever they  shall  give  for  the  conservation  of  the  perfect 
living  being,^  the  good  and  just  and  beautiful,  which 
generates  and  holds  together  all  things,  and  contains 
and  embraces  all  things  which  are  dissolved  for  the 
production  of  other  like  things?     Wilt  thou  never  be 

1  That  is,  God  (iv.  40),  as  he  is  defined  by  Zeno.     But  the 
confusion  between  gods  and  God  is  strange 


BookX.]         MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.      233 

such  that  thou  shalt  so  dwell  m  community  with  gods 
and  men  as  neither  to  find  fault  with  them  at  all,  nor 
to  be  condemned  by  them? 

2.  Observe  what  thy  nature  requires,  so  far  as  thou 
art  governed  by  nature  only  :  then  do  it  and  accept  it, 
if  thy  nature,  so  far  as  thou  art  a  living  being,  shall 
not  be  made  w^orse  by  it.  And  next  thou  must  ob- 
serve what  thy  nature  requires  so  far  as  thou  art  a  liv- 
ing being.  And  all  this  thou  mayst  allow  thyself,  if 
thy  nature,  so  far  as  thou  art  a  rational  animal,  shall 
not  be  made  worse  by  it.  But  the  rational  animal  is 
consequently  also  a  political  [social]  animal.  Use 
these  rules,  then,  and  trouble  thyself  about  nothing 
else. 

3.  Everything  which  happens  either  happens  in 
such  wise  as  thou  art  formed  by  nature  to  bear  it,  or 
as  thou  art  not  formed  by  nature  to  bear  it.  If,  then, 
it  happens  to  thee  in  such  way  as  thou  art  formed  by 
nature  to  bear  it,  do  not  complain,  but  bear  it  as  thou 
art  formed  by  nature  to  bear  it.  But  if  it  happens 
in  such  wise  as  thou  art  not  formed  by  nature  to  bear 
it,  do  not  complain,  for  it  will  perish  after  it  has 
consumed  thee.  Remember,  however,  that  thou  art 
formed  by  nature  to  bear  everything,  with  respect  to 
which  it  depends  on  thy  own  opinion  to  make  it  en- 
durable and  tolerable,  by  thinking  that  it  is  either  thy 
interest  or  thy  duty  to  do  this. 

4.  If  a  man  is  mistaken,  instruct  him   kindly  and 


234  THOUGHTS.  [Book  X. 

show  him  his  error.     But  if  thou  art  not  able,  blame 
thyself,   or  blame  not  even  thyself. 

5.  Whatever  may  happen  to  thee,  it  was  prepared 
for  thee  from  all  eternity;  and  the  implication  of 
causes  was  from  eternity  spinning  the  thread  of  thy 
being,  and  of  that  which  is  incident  to  it  (111.  1 1  ; 
IV.  26). 

6.  Whether  the  universe  is  [a  concourse  of]  atoms, 
or  nature  [is  a  system],  let  this  first  be  established, 
that  I  am  a  part  of  the  whole  which  is  governed  by  na- 
ture ;  next,  I  am  in  a  manner  intimately  related  to  the 
parts  which  are  of  the  same  kind  with  myself.  For 
remembering  this,  inasmuch  as  I  am  a  part,  I  shall  be 
discontented  with  none  of  the  things  which  are  assigned 
to  me  out  of  the  whole ;  for  nothing  is  injurious  to  the 
part  if  it  is  for  the  advantage  of  the  whole.  For  the 
whole  contains  nothing  which  is  not  for  its  advantage  ; 
and  all  natures  indeed  have  this  common  principle, 
but  the  nature  of  the  universe  has  this  principle  be- 
sides, that  it  cannot  be  compelled  even  by  any  exter- 
nal cause  to  generate  anything  harmful  to  itself.  By 
remembering,  then,  that  I  am  a  part  of  such  a  whole, 
I  shall  be  content  with  everything  that  happens. 
And  inasmuch  as  I  am  in  a  manner  intimately  related 
to  the  parts  which  are  of  the  same  kind  with  myself,  I 
shall  do  nothing  unsocial,  but  I  shall  rather  direct  my- 
self to  the  things  which  are  of  the  same  kind  with 
myself,  and  I  shall  turn  all  my  efforts  to  the  common 


BookX.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.        235 

interest,  and  divert  them  from  the  contrary.  Now,  if 
these  things  are  done  so,  Hfe  must  flow  on  happily, 
just  as  thou  mayst  observe  that  the  hfe  of  a  citizen  is 
happy,  who  continues  a  course  of  action  which  is  ad- 
vantageous to  his  fellow- citizens,  and  is  content  with 
whatever  the  state  may  assign  to  him. 

7.  The  parts  of  the  whole,  everything,  I  mean, 
which  is  naturally  comprehended  in  the  universe,  must 
of  necessity  perish ;  but  let  this  be  understood  in  this 
sense,  that  they  must  undergo  change.  But  if  this  is 
naturally  both  an  evil  and  a  necessity  for  the  parts,  the 
whole  would  not  continue  to  exist  in  a  good  condition, 
the  parts  being  subject  to  change  and  constituted  so 
as  to  perish  in  various  ways.  For  whether  did  Nature 
herself  design  to  do  evil  to  the  things  which  are  parts 
of  herself,  and  to  make  them  subject  to  evil  and  of 
necessity  fall  into  evil,  or  have  such  results  happened 
without  her  knowing  it?  Both  these  suppositions,  in- 
deed, are  incredible.  But  if  a  man  should  even  drop 
the  term  Nature  [as  an  efficient  power],  and  should 
speak  of  these  things  as  natural,  even  then  it  would 
be  ridiculous  to  affirm  at  the  same  time  that  the  parts 
of  the  whole  are  in  their  nature  subject  to  change,  and 
at  the  same  time  to  be  surprised  or  vexed  as  if  some- 
thing were  happening  contrary  to  nature,  particularly  as 
the  dissolution  of  things  is  into  those  things  of  which 
each  thing  is  composed.  For  there  is  either  a  disper- 
sion of  the  elements  out  of  which  everything  has  been 


236  THOUGHTS.  [BookX. 

compounded,  or  a  change  from  the  soUd  to  the  earthy 
and  from  the  airy  to  the  aerial,  so  that  these  parts  are 
taken  back  into  the  universal  reason,  whether  this  at 
certain  periods  is  consumed  by  fire  or  renewed  by 
eternal  changes.  And  do  not  imagine  that  the  solid 
and  the  airy  part  belong  to  thee  from  the  time  of  gen- 
eration. For  all  this  received  its  accretion  only  yes- 
terday and  the  day  before,  as  one  may  say,  from  the 
food  and  the  air  which  is  inspired.  This,  then,  which 
has  received  [the  accretion],  changes,  not  that  which 
thy  mother  brought  forth.  But  suppose  that  this 
[which  thy  mother  brought  forth]  implicates  thee 
very  much  with  that  other  part,  which  has  the  peculiar 
quality  [of  change] ,  this  is  nothing  in  fact  in  the  way 
of  objection  to  what  is  said.-^ 

8.  When  thou  hast  assumed  these  names,  good, 
modest,  true,  rational,  a  man  of  equanimity,  and 
magnanimous,  take  care  that  thou  dost  not  change 
these  names ;  and  if  thou  shouldst  lose  them,  quickly 
return  to  them.  And  remember  that  the  term  Ra- 
tional was  intended  to  signify  a  discriminating  attention 

1  The  end  of  this  section  is  perhaps  corrupt.  The  meaning 
is  very  obscure.  I  have  given  that  meaning  which  appears  to 
be  consistent  with  the  whole  argument.  The  emperor  here 
maintains  that  the  essential  part  of  man  is  unchangeable,  and 
that  the  other  parts,  if  they  change  or  perish,  do  not  affect 
that  which  really  constitutes  the  man.  See  the  Philosophy  of 
Antoninus,  p.  56,  note  2.  Schultz  supposed  "  thy  mother  "  to 
mean  nature,  17  cpvais.     But  I  doubt  about  that. 


BookX.]     MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.  23/ 

to  every  several  thing,  and  freedom  from  negligence ; 
and  that  Equanimity  is  the  voluntary  acceptance  of 
the  things  which  are  assigned  to  thee  by  the  common 
nature ;  and  that  Magnanimity  is  the  elevation  of  the 
intelligent  part  above  the  pleasurable  or  painful  sensa- 
tions of  the  flesh,  and  above  that  poor  thing  called 
fame,  and  death,  and  all  such  things.  If,  then,  thou 
maintainest  thyself  in  the  possession  of  these  names, 
without  desiring  to  be  called  by  these  names  by  others, 
thou  wilt  be  another  person  and  wilt  enter  on  another 
life.  For  to  continue  to  be  such  as  thou  hast  hitherto 
been,  and  to  be  torn  in  pieces  and  defiled  in  such  a 
life,  is  the  character  of  a  very  stupid  man  and  one  over- 
fond  of  his  life,  and  like  those  half-devoured  fighters 
with  wild  beasts,  who  though  covered  with  wounds 
and  gore,  still  intreat  to  be  kept  to  the  following  day, 
though  they  will  be  exposed  in  the  same  state  to  the 
same  claws  and  bites. ^  Therefore  fix  thyself  in  the 
possession  of  these  few  names  :  and  if  thou  art  able 
to  abide  in  them,  abide  as  if  thou  wast  removed  to 
certain  islands  of  the  Happy.^     But  if  thou  shalt  per- 

1  See  Seneca,  Epp.  70,  on  these  exhibitions  which  amused  the 
people  of  those  days.  These  fighters  were  the  Bestiarri,  some 
of  whom  may  have  been  criminals  ;  but  even  if  they  were,  the 
exhibition  was  equally  characteristic  of  the  depraved  habits  of 
the  spectators. 

2  The  islands  of  the  Happy,  or  the  Fortunatae  Insulae,  are 
spoken  of  by  the  Greek  and  Roman  writers.  They  were  the 
abode  of  Heroes,  like  Achilles  and  Diomedes,  as  we  see  in  the 


238  THOUGHTS.  LBookX 

ceive  that  thou  fallest  out  of  them  and  dost  not  main- 
tain thy  hold,  go  courageously  into  some  nook  where 
thou  shalt  maintain  them,  or  even  depart  at  once  from 
life,  not  in  passion,  but  with  simplicity  and  freedom 
and  modesty,  after  doing  this  one  [laudable]  thing  at 
least  in  thy  life,  to  have  gone  out  of  it  thus.  In  order, 
however,  to  the  remembrance  of  these  names,  it  will 
greatly  help  thee  if  thou  rememberest  the  gods,  and 
that  they  wish  not  to  be  flattered,  but  wish  all  reasona- 
ble beings  to  be  made  like  themselves ;  and  if  thou 
rememberest  that  what  does  the  work  of  a  fig-tree 
is  a  fig-tree,  and  that  what  does  the  work  of  a  dog  is  a 
dog,  and  that  what  does  the  work  of  a  bee  is  a  bee, 
and  that  what  does  the  work  of  a  man  is  a  man. 

Scollon  of  Harmodius  and  Aristogiton.  Sertorius  heard  of  the 
islands  at  Cadiz  from  some  sailors  who  had  been  there,  and 
he  had  a  wish  to  go  and  live  in  them  and  rest  from  his  troubles 
(Plutarch,  Sertorius,  c.  8).  In  the  Odyssey,  Proteus  told  Mene- 
laus  that  he  should  not  die  in  Argos,  but  be  removed  to  a  place  at 
the  boundary  of  the  earth  where  Rhadamanthus  dwelt  (Odys- 
sey, IV.  565):  — 

"  For  there  in  sooth  man's  life  is  easiest : 
Nor  snow  nor  raging  storm  nor  rain  is  there, 
But  ever  gently  breathing  gales  of  Zephyr 
Oceanus  sends  up  to  gladden  man." 

It  is  certain  that  the  writer  of  the  Odyssey  only  follows  some 
old  legend,  without  having  any  knowledge  of  any  place  which 
corresponds  to  his  description.  The  two  islands  which  Serto- 
rius heard  of  may  be  Madeira  and  the  adjacent  island.  Com- 
pare Pindar,  Ol.  il.  129. 


BookX.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.         239 

9.  Mimi/  war,  astonishment,  torpor,  slavery,  will 
daily  wipe  out  those  holy  principles  of  thine,  f  How 
many  things  without  studyhig  nature  dost  thou  imag- 
ine, and  how  many  dost  thou  neglect  ?  ^  But  it  is  thy 
duty  so  to  look  on  and  so  to  do  everything,  that  at  the 
same  time  the  power  of  dealing  with  circumstances  is 
perfected,  and  the  contemplative  faculty  is  exercised, 
and  the  confidence  which  comes  from  the  knowledge 
of  each  several  thing  is  maintained  without  showing  it, 
but  yet  not  concealed.  For  when  wilt  thou  enjoy  sim- 
plicity, when  gravity,  and  when  the  knowledge  of  every 
several  thing,  both  what  it  is  in  substance,  and  what 
place  it  has  in  the  universe,  and  how  long  it  is  formed 
to  exist,  and  of  what  things  it  is  compounded,  and  to 
whom  it  can  belong,  and  who  are  able  both  to  give  it 
and  take  it  away? 

10.  A  spider  is  proud  when  it  has  caught  a  fly,  and 
another  when  he  has  caught  a  poor  hare,  and  another 
when  he  has  taken  a  little  fish  in  a  net,  and  another 
when  he  has  taken  wild  boars,  and  another  when  he 
has  taken  bears,  and  another  when  he  has  taken  Sar- 
matians.  Are  not  these  robbers,  if  thou  examinest 
their  opinions?^ 

1  Corais  conjectured  /uuaos  "  hatred  "  in  place  of  Mimi,  Ro- 
man plays  in  which  action  and  gesticulation  were  all  or  nearly 
all. 

2  This  is  corrupt.     See  the  edition  of  Schultz. 

3  Marcus  means  to  say  that  conquerors  are  robbers  He 
himself  warred  against  Sarmatians,  and  was  a  robber,  as  he 


240  THOUGHTS.  [Book  X. 

1 1 .  Acquire  the  contemplative  way  of  seeing  how 
all  things  change  into  one  another,  and  constantly 
attend  to  it,  and  exercise  thyself  about  this  part  [of 
philosophy] .  For  nothing  is  so  much  adapted  to  pro- 
duce magnanimity.  Such  a  man  has  put  off  the 
body,  and  as  he  sees  that  he  must,  no  one  knows 
how  soon,  go  away  from  among  men  and  leave  every- 
thing here,  he  gives  himself  up  entirely  to  just  doing 
in  all  his  actions,  and  in  everything  else  that  happens 
he  resigns  himself  to  the  universal  nature.  But  as  to 
what  any  man  shall  say  or  thinic  about  him  or  do 
against  him,  he  never  even  thinks  of  it,  being  himself 
contented  with  these  two  things,  —  with  acting  justly 
in  what  he  now  does,  and  being  satisfied  with  what 
is  now  assigned  to  him ;  and  he  lays  aside  all  distract- 
ing and  busy  pursuits,  and  desires  nothing  else  than  to 
accomplish  the  straight  course  through  the  law,^  and 
by  accomplishing  the  straight  course  to  follow  God. 

12.  What  need  is  there  of  suspicious  fear,  since  it 
is  in  thy  power  to  inquire  what  ought  to  be  done? 
And  if  thou  seest  clear,  go  by  this  way  content,  with- 
out turning  back  :  but  if  thou  dost  not  see  clear,  stop 
and  take  the  best  advisers.  But  if  any  other  things 
oppose  thee,  go  on  according  to  thy  powers  with  due 

says,  like  the  rest      But  compare  the  life  of   Avidius   Cassius, 
c.  4,  by  Vulcatius 

1  By  the  law,  he  means  the  divine  law,  obedience  to  the  will 
of  God. 


BookX.]        MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.       241 

consideration,  keeping  to  that  which  appears  to  be 
just.  For  it  is  best  to  reach  this  object,  and  if  thou 
dost  fail,  let  thy  failure  be  in  attempting  this.  He 
who  follows  reason  in  all  things  is  both  tranquil  and 
active  at  the  same  time,  and  also  cheerful  and 
collected. 

13.  Inquire  of  thyself  as  soon  as  thou  wakest  from 
sleep  whether  it  will  make  any  difference  to  thee  if 
another  does  what  is  just  and  right.  It  will  make  no 
difference  (vi.  32  ;  viii.  55). 

Thou  hast  not  forgotten,  I  suppose,  that  those  who 
assume  arrogant  airs  in  bestowing  their  praise  or  blame 
on  others  are  such  as  they  are  at  bed  and  at  board, 
and  thou  hast  not  forgotten  what  they  do,  and  what 
they  avoid,  and  what  they  pursue,  and  how  they  steal 
and  how  they  rob,  not  with  hands  and  feet,  but  with 
their  most  valuable  part,  by  means  of  which  there  is 
produced,  when  a  man  chooses,  fidelity,  modesty, 
truth,  law,  a  good  daemon  [happiness]    (vii.  17)? 

14.  To  her  who  gives  and  takes  back  all,  to  nature, 
the  man  who  is  instructed  and  modest  says,  Give  what 
thou  wilt  ;  take  back  what  thou  wilt.  And  he  says  this 
not  proudly,  but  obediently,  and  well  pleased  with 
her. 

15.  Short  is  the  little  which  remains  to  thee  of  hfe. 
Live  as  on  a  mountain.  For  it  makes  no  difference 
whether  a  man  lives  there  or  here,  if  he  lives  every- 
where in  the  world  as  in  a  state  [political  community]. 

16 


242  THOUGHTS.  [Book  X. 

Let  men  see,  let  them  know  a  real  man  who  lives  ac- 
cording to  nature.  If  they  cannot  endure  him,  let 
them  kill  him.  For  that  is  better  than  to  live  thus 
[as  men  do]. 

1 6.  No  longer  talk  at  all  about  the  kind  of  man  that 
a  good  man  ought  to  be,  but  be  such. 

1 7.  Constantly  contemplate  the  whole  of  time  and 
the  whole  of  substance,  and  consider  that  all  individual 
things  as  to  substance  are  a  grain  of  a  fig,  and  as  to 
time  the  turning  of  a  gimlet. 

18.  Look  at  everything  that  exists,  and  observe  that 
it  is  already  in  dissolution  and  in  change,  and  as  it 
were  putrefaction  or  dispersion,  or  that  everything  is 
so  constituted  by  nature  as  to  die. 

19.  Consider  what  men  are  when  they  are  eating, 
sleeping,  generating,  easing  themselves,  and  so  forth. 
Then  what  kind  of  men  they  are  when  they  are  im- 
perious t  and  arrogant,  or  angry  and  scolding  from 
their  elevated  place.  But  a  short  time  ago  to  how 
many  they  were  slaves  and  for  what  things ;  and 
after  a  little  time  consider  in  what  a  condition  they 
will  be. 

20.  That  is  for  the  good  of  each  thing,  which  the 
universal  nature  brings  to  each.  And  it  is  for  its  good 
at  the  time  when  nature  brings  it. 

21.  "The  earth  loves  the  shower;"  and  "the 
solemn  ether  loves  ;  "  and  the  universe  loves  to  make 
whatever  is  about  to  be.     I  say  then  to  the  universe, 


BookX.]        MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.       243 

that  I  love  as  thou  lovest.    And  is  not  this  too  said,  that 
"  this  or  that  loves  [is  wont]  to  be  produced?  "  ^ 

22.  Either  thou  livest  here  and  hast  already  accus- 
tomed thyself  to  it,  or  thou  art  going  away,  and  this 
was  thy  own  will ;  or  thou  art  dying  and  hast  dis- 
charged thy  duty.  But  besides  these  things  there  is 
nothing.     Be  of  good  cheer,  then. 

23.  Let  this  always  be  plain  to  thee,  that  this  piece 
of  land  is  like  any  other;  and  that  all  things  here 
are  the  same  with  things  on  the  top  of  a  mountain, 
or  on  the  sea-shore,  or  wherever  thou  choosest  to  be. 
For  thou  wilt  find  just  what  Plato  says.  Dwelling  with- 
in the  walls  of  a  city  as  in  a  shepherd's  fold  on  a 
mountain.  [The  three  last  words  are  omitted  in  the 
translation.]  2 

24.  What  is  my  ruling  faculty  now  to  me?  and  of 
what  nature  am  I  now  making  it  ?  and  for  what  pur- 

1  These  words  are  from  Euripides.  They  are  cited  by  Aris- 
totle, Ethic.  Nicom.  viii.  i.  Athenaeus  (xiii.  296)  and  Sto- 
baeus  quote  seven  complete  lines  beginning  Ipa  /xev  S/n^pov  ya?a. 
There  is  a  similar  fragment  of  Aeschylus,  Danaides,  also  quoted 
by  Athenaeus. 

It  was  the  fashion  of  the  Stoics  to  work  on  the  meanings  of 
words.  So  Antoninus  here  takes  the  verb  (piXel,  "  loves,"  which 
has  also  the  sense  of  "  is  wont,"  "  uses,"  and  the  like.  He  finds 
in  the  common  language  of  mankind  a  philosophical  truth,  and 
most  great  truths  are  expressed  in  the  common  language  of  life  ; 
some  understand  them,  but  most  people  utter  them  without 
knowing  how  much  they  mean. 

'■^  Plato,  Theaet,  174  D.  E.  But  compare  the  original  with  the 
use  that  Antoninus  has  made  of  it. 


244  THOUGHTS.  LBook  X. 

pose  am  I  now  using  it?  is  it  void  of  understand- 
ing? is  it  loosed  and  rent  asunder  from  social  life?  is 
it  melted  into  and  mixed  with  the  poor  flesh  so  as  to 
move  together  with  it? 

25.  He  who  flies  from  his  master  is  a  runaway ;  but 
the  law  is  master,  and  he  who  breaks  the  law  is  a  run- 
away. And  he  also  who  is  grieved  or  angry  or  afraid, f 
is  dissatisfied  because  something  has  been  or  is  or  shall 
be  of  the  things  which  are  appointed  by  him  who  rules 
all  things,  and  he  is  Law  and  assigns  to  every  man 
what  is  fit.  He  then  who  fears  or  is  grieved  or  is 
angry  is  a  runaway.^ 

26.  A  man  deposits  seed  in  a  womb  and  goes  away, 
and  then  another  cause  takes  it,  and  labors  on  it  and 
makes  a  child.  What  a  thing  from  such  a  material ! 
Again,  the  child  passes  food  down  through  the  throat, 
and  then  another  cause  takes  it  and  makes  perception 
and  motion,  and  in  fine,  life  and  strength  and  other 
things ;  how  many  and  how  strange  !  Observe  then 
the  things  which  are  produced  in  such  a  hidden  way, 
and  see  the  power  just  as  we  see  the  power  which  car- 
ries things  downwards  and  upwards,  not  with  the  eyes, 
but  still  no  less  plainly  (vii.  75). 

27.  Constantly  consider  how  all  things  such  as  they 
now  are,  in  time  past  also  were ;    and  consider  that 

^  Antoninus  is  here  playing  on  the  etymology,  of  vofios,  law, 
assignment,  that  which  assigns  {ve/xei)  to  every  man  his 
portion. 


BookX.]      MARCUS  AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.        245 

they  will  be  the  same  again.  And  place  before  thy 
eyes  entire  dramas  and  stages  of  the  same  form,  what- 
ever thou  hast  learned  from  thy  experience  or  from 
older  history ;  for  example,  the  whole  court  of  Hadri- 
anus,  and  the  whole  court  of  Antoninus,  and  the  whole 
court  of  Philippus,  Alexander,  Croesus ;  for  all  those 
were  such  dramas  as  we  see  now,  only  with  different 
actors. 

28.  Imagine  every  man  who  is  grieved  at  anything 
or  discontented  to  be  like  a  pig  which  is  sacrificed  and 
kicks  and  screams. 

Like  this  pig  also  is  he  who  on  his  bed  in  silence 
laments  the  bonds  in  which  we  are  held.  And  con- 
sider that  only  to  the  rational  animal  is  it  given  to 
follow  voluntarily  what  happens  ;  but  simply  to  follow 
is  a  necessity  imposed  on  all. 

29.  Severally  on  the  occasion  of  everything  that 
thou  doest,  pause  and  ask  thyself  if  death  is  a  dread- 
ful thing  because  it  deprives  thee  of  this. 

30.  When  thou  art  offended  at  any  man's  fault, 
forthwith  turn  to  thyself  and  reflect  in  what  like  man- 
ner thou  dost  err  thyself;  for  example,  in  thinking 
that  money  is  a  good  thing,  or  pleasure,  or  a  bit  of 
reputation,  and  the  like.  For  by  attending  to  this  thou 
wilt  quickly  forget  thy  anger,  if  this  consideration  also 
is  added,  that  the  man  is  compelled  :  for  what  else 
could  he  do?  or,  if  thou  art  able,  take  away  from  him 
the  compulsion. 


246  THOUGHTS.  [BookX. 

31.  When  thou  hast  seen  Satyron^  the  Socratic,-|- 
think  of  either  Eutyches  or  Hymen,  and  when  thou 
hast  seen  Euphrates,  think  of  Eutychion  or  Silvanus, 
and  when  thou  hast  seen  Alciphron  think  of  Tropaeo- 
phorus,  and  when  thou  hast  seen  Xenophon,  think  of 
Crito  ^  or  Severus,  and  when  thou  hast  looked  on  thy- 
self, think  of  any  other  Caesar,  and  in  the  case  of  every 
one  do  in  like  manner.  Then  let  this  thought  be 
in  thy  mind,  Where  then  are  those  men?  Nowhere, 
or  nobody  knows  where.  For  thus  continuously  thou 
wilt  look  at  human  things  as  smoke  and  nothing  at  all ; 
especially  if  thou  reflectest  at  the  same  time  that  what 
has  once  changed  will  never  exist  again  in  the  infinite 
duration  of  time.  But  thou,  in  what  a  brief  space  of 
time  is  thy  existence  ?  And  why  art  thou  not  content 
to  pass  through  this  short  time  in  an  orderly  way? 
What  matter  and  opportunity  [for  thy  activity]  art 
thou  avoiding?  For  what  else  are  all  these  things, 
except  exercises  for  the  reason,  when  it  has  viewed 
carefully  and  by  examination  into  their  nature  the 
things  which  happen  in  life  ?     Persevere  then  until  thou 

1  Nothing  is  known  of  Satyron  or  Satyrion  ;  nor,  I  believe,  of 
Eutyches  or  Hymen,  Euphrates  is  honorably  mentioned  by 
Epictetus  (ill.  15,  8;  iv.  8,  17).  Pliny  (Epp,  i.  10)  speaks 
very  highly  of  him.  He  obtained  the  permission  of  the  Em- 
peror Hadrian  to  drink  poison,  because  he  was  old  and  in  bad 
health  (Dion  Cassius,  69,  c.  8). 

2  Crito  is  the  friend  of  Socrates  ;  and  he  was,  it  appears,  also 
a  friend  of  Xenophon.  When  the  emperor  says  ''seen"  {Iddbv), 
he  does  not  mean  with  the  eyes. 


BookX.]       MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.        247 

shalt  have  made  these  things  thy  own,  as  the  stomach 
which  is  strengthened  makes  all  things  its  own,  as  the 
blazing  fire  makes  flame  and  brightness  out  of  every- 
thing that  is  thrown  into  it. 

32.  Let  it  not  be  in  any  man's  power  to  say  truly 
of  thee  that  thou  art  not  simple  or  that  thou  art  not 
good ;  but  let  him  be  a  liar  whoever  shall  think  any- 
thing of  this  kind  about  thee ;  and  this  is  altogether 
in  thy  power.  For  who  is  he  that  shall  hinder  thee 
from  being  good  and  simple  ?  Do  thou  only  deter- 
mine to  live  no  longer  unless  thou  shalt  be  such. 
For  neither  does  reason  allow  [thee  to  live],  if  thou 
art  not  such.^ 

^^.  What  is  that  which  as  to  this  material  [our 
life]  can  be  done  or  said  in  the  way  most  conform- 
able to  reason?  For  whatever  this  may  be,  it  is  in 
thy  power  to  do  it  or  to  say  it,  and  do  not  make 
excuses  that  thou  art  hindered.  Thou  wilt  not  cease 
to  lament  till  thy  mind  is  in  such  a  condition  that, 
what  luxury  is  to  those  who  enjoy  pleasure,  such 
shall  be  to  thee,  in  the  matter  which  is  subjected 
and  presented  to  thee,  the  doing  of  the  things  which 
are  conformable  to  man's  constitution ;  for  a  man 
ought  to  consider  as  an  enjoyment  everything  which 
it  is  in  his  power  to  do  according  to  his  own  nature. 
And  it  is  in  his  power  everywhere.  Now,  it  is  not 
given  to  a  cylinder  to  move  everywhere  by  its  own 
1  Compare  Epictetus,  i.  29,  28. 


248  THOUGHTS.  [Book  X. 

motion,  nor  yet  to  water  nor  to  fire,  nor  to  anything 
else  which  is  governed  by  nature  or  an  irrational 
soul,  for  the  things  which  check  them  and  stand  in 
the  way  are  many.  But  intelHgence  and  reason  are 
able  to  go  through  everything  that  opposes  them, 
and  in  such  manner  as  they  are  formed  by  nature 
and  as  they  choose.  Place  before  thy  eyes  this 
facility  with  which  the  reason  will  be  carried  through 
all  things,  as  fire  upwards,  as  a  stone  downwards,  as 
a  cylinder  down  an  inclined  surface,  and  seek  for 
nothing  further.  For  all  other  obstacles  either  affect 
the  body  only,  which  is  a  dead  thing ;  or,  except 
through  opinion  and  the  yielding  of  the  reason  itself, 
they  do  not  crush  nor  do  any  harm  of  any  kind  ;  for 
if  they  did,  he  who  felt  it  would  immediately  become 
bad.  Now,  in  the  case  of  all  things  which  have  a 
certain  constitution,  whatever  harm  may  happen  to 
any  of  them,  that  which  is  so  affected  becomes  con- 
sequently worse  ;  but  in  the  like  case,  a  man  becomes 
both  better,  if  one  may  say  so,  and  more  worthy  of 
praise  by  making  a  right  use  of  these  accidents.  And 
finally  remember  that  nothing  harms  him  who  is 
really  a  citizen,  which  does  not  harm  the  state ;  nor 
yet  does  anything  harm  the  state,  which  does  not 
harm  law  [order]  ;  and  of  these  things  which  are 
called  misfortunes  not  one  harms  law.  What  then 
does  not  harm  law  does  not  harm  either  state  or 
citizen. 


BookX.]      MARCUS   AURELTUS   ANTONINUS.        249 

34.  To  him  who  is  penetrated  by  true  principles 
even  the  briefest  precept  is  sufficient,  and  any  com- 
mon precept,  to  remind  him  that  he  should  be  free 
from  grief  and  fear.     For  example, — 

"  Leaves,  some  the  wind  scatters  on  the  ground  — 
So  is  the  race  of  men."  ' 

Leaves,  also,  are  thy  children ;  and  leaves,  too,  are 
they  who  cry  out  as  if  they  were  worthy  of  credit 
and  bestow  their  praise,  or  on  the  contrary  curse, 
or  secretly  blame  and  sneer;  and  leaves,  in  like 
manner,  are  those  who  shall  receive  and  transmit  a 
man's  fame  to  after-times.  For  all  such  things  as 
these  "  are  produced  in  the  season  of  spring,"  as  the 
poet  says ;  then  the  wind  casts  them  down ;  then  the 
forest  produces  other  leaves  in  their  places.  But  a 
brief  existence  is  common  to  all  things,  and  yet  thou 
avoidest  and  pursuest  all  things  as  if  they  would  be 
eternal  A  little  time,  and  thou  shalt  close  thy  eyes ; 
and  him  who  has  attended  thee  to  thy  grave  another 
soon  will  lament. 

35.  The  healthy  eye  ought  to  see  all  visible  things 
and  not  to  say,  I  wish  for  green  things ;  for  this  is 
the  condition  of  a  diseased  eye.  And  the  healthy 
hearing  and  smelling  ought  to  be  ready  to  perceive 
all  that  can  be  heard  and  smelled.  And  the  healthy 
stomach  ought  to  be  with  respect  to  all  food  just 
as   the   mill   with    respect  to   all    things    which   it  is 

1  Homer,  II.  vi.  146. 


250  THOUGHTS.  [BookX. 

formed  to  grind.  And  accordingly  the  healthy  un- 
derstanding ought  to  be  prepared  for  everything  which 
happens ;  but  that  which  says,  Let  my  dear  children 
live,  and  let  all  men  praise  whatever  I  may  do,  is  an 
eye  which  seeks  for  green  things,  or  teeth  which  seek 
for  soft  things. 

36.  There  is  no  man  so  fortunate  that  there  shall 
not  be  by  him  when  he  is  dying  some  who  are  pleased 
with  what  is  going  to  happen.^  Suppose  that  he  was 
a  good  and  wise  man,  will  there  not  be  at  last  some 
one  to  say  to  himself,  Let  us  at  last  breathe  freely, 
being  reheved  from  this  schoolmaster?  It  is  true 
that  he  was  harsh  to  none  of  us,  but  I  perceived 
that  he  tacitly  condemns  us.  —  This  is  what  is  said 
of  a  good  man.  But  in  our  own  case  how  many 
other  things  are  there  for  which  there  are  many  who 
wish  to  get  rid  of  us.  Thou  wilt  consider  this,  then, 
when  thou  art  dying,  and  thou  wilt  depart  more  con- 
tentedly by  reflecting  thus  :  I  am  going  away  from 
such  a  life,  in  which  even  my  associates  in  behalf  of 
whom  I  have  striven  so  much,  prayed,  and  cared, 
themselves  wish  me  to  depart,  hoping  perchance  to 
get  some  little  advantage  by  it.  Why  then  should  a 
man  cling  to  a  longer  stay  here?  Do  not  however 
for  this  reason  go  away  less  kindly  disposed  to  them, 

1  He  says  KaKov,  but  as  he  affirms  in  other  places  that  death 
is  no  evil,  he  must  mean  what  others  may  call  an  evil,  and  he 
means  only  "  what  is  going  to  happen." 


Book  X.J      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.        25 1 

but  preserving  thy  own  character,  and  friendly  and 
benevolent  and  mild,  and  on  the  other  hand  not  as 
if  thou  wast  torn  away;  but  as  when  a  man  dies  a 
quiet  death,  the  poor  soul  is  easily  separated  from 
the  body,  such  also  ought  thy  departure  from  men 
to  be,  for  nature  united  thee  to  them  and  associated 
thee.  But  does  she  now  dissolve  the  union?  Well, 
I  am  separated  as  from  kinsmen,  not  however  dragged 
resisting,  but  without  compulsion ;  for  this,  too,  is 
one  of  the  things  according  to  nature. 

37.  Accustom  thyself  as  much  as  possible  on  the 
occasion  of  anything  being  done  by  any  person  to 
inquire  with  thyself,  For  what  object  is  this  man 
doing  this?  But  begin  with  thyself,  and  examine 
thyself  first. 

38.  Remember  that  this  which  pulls  the  strings 
is  the  thing  which  is  hidden  within :  this  is  the 
power  of  persuasion,  this  is  life,  this,  if  one  may 
so  say,  is  man.  In  contemplating  thyself  never  in- 
clude the  vessel  which  surrounds  thee  and  these 
instruments  which  are  attached  about  it.  For  they 
are  like  to  an  axe,  differing  only  in  this,  that  they 
grow  to  the  body.  For  indeed  there  is  no  more 
use  in  these  parts  without  the  cause  which  moves 
and  checks  them  than  in  the  weaver's  shuttle,  and 
the  writer's  pen,  and  the  driver's  whip.^ 

1  See  the  Philosophy  of  Antoninus,  p.  56,  n   2. 


252  THOUGHTS.  [Book  XI. 


XL 


npHESE  are  the  properties  of  the  rational  soul :  it 
sees  itself,  analyzes  itself,  and  makes  itself  such 
as  it  chooses ;  the  fruit  which  it  bears  itself  enjoys,  — 
for  the  fruits  of  plants  and  that  in  animals  which  corre- 
sponds to  fruits  others  enjoy, —  it  obtains  its  own  end, 
wherever  the  Hmit  of  life  may  be  fixed.  Not  as  in  a 
dance  and  in  a  play  and  in  such  like  things,  where  the 
whole  action  is  incomplete  if  anything  cuts  it  short ; 
but  in  every  part,  and  wherever  it  may  be  stopped,  it 
makes  what  has  been  set  before  it  full  and  complete, 
so  that  it  can  say,  I  have  what  is  my  own.  And  fur- 
ther it  traverses  the  whole  universe,  and  the  surround- 
ing vacuum,  and  surveys  its  form,  and  it  extends  itself 
into  the  infinity  of  time,  and  embraces  and  compre- 
iends  the  ^  periodical  renovation  of  all  things,  and  it 
comprehends  that  those  who  come  after  us  will  see 
nothing  new,  nor  have  those  before  us  seen  anything 
more,  but  in  a  manner  he  who  is  forty  years  old,  if  he 
has  any  understanding  at  all,  has  seen  by  virtue  of  the 
uniformity  that  prevails  all  things  which  have  been 
and  all  that  will  be.  This  too  is  a  'property  of  the 
1  T-qu  wepiodtKrjv  iraXtyyeveaiav.     See  V.  13,  32  ;  X.  7. 


Book  XL]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.       253 

rational  soul,  love  of  one's  neighbor,  and  truth  and 
modesty,  and  to  value  nothing  more  than  itself,  which 
is  also  the  property  of  Law.^  Thus  then  right  reason 
differs  not  at  all  from  the  reason  of  justice. 

2.  Thou  wilt  set  little  value  on  pleasing  song  and 
dancing  and  the  pancratium,  if  thou  wilt  distribute  the 
melody  of  the  voice  into  its  several  sounds,  and  ask 
thyself  as  to  each,  if  thou  art  mastered  by  this;  for 
thou  wilt  be  prevented  by  shame  from  confessing  it : 
and  in  the  matter  of  dancing,  if  at  each  movement 
and  attitude  thou  wilt  do  the  same ;  and  the  like  also 
in  the  matter  of  the  pancratium.  In  all  things,  then, 
except  virtue  and  the  acts  of  virtue,  remember  to  ap- 
ply thyself  to  their  several  parts,  and  by  this  division 
to  come  to  value  them  little  :  and  apply  this  rule  also 
to  thy  whole  life. 

3.  What  a  soul  that  is  which  is  ready,  if  at  any  mo- 
ment it  must  be  separated  from  the  body,  and  ready 
either  to  be  extinguished  or  dispersed  or  continue  to 
exist ;  but  so  that  this  readiness  comes  from  a  man's 
own  judgment,  not  from  mere  obstinacy,  as  with  the 
Christians,^  but  considerately  and  with  dignity  and  in 
a  way  to  persuade  another,  without  tragic  show. 

4.  Have  I  done  something  for  the  general  interest  ? 

1  Law  is  the  order  by  which  all  things  are  governed. 

2  See  the  Life  of  Antoninus.  This  is  the  only  passage  in 
which  the  emperor  speaks  of  the  Christians.  Epictetus  (iv. 
7,  6)  names  them  Galilaei. 


254  THOUGHTS.  [Book  XI. 

Well  then  I  have  had  my  reward.  Let  this  always  be 
present  to  thy  mind,  and  never  stop  [doing  such 
good]. 

5 .  What  is  thy  art  ?  To  be  good.  And  how  is  this 
accomplished  well  except  by  general  principles,  some 
about  the  nature  of  the  universe,  and  others  about  the 
proper  constitution  of  man? 

6.  At  first  tragedies  were  brought  on  the  stage  as 
means  of  reminding  men  of  the  things  which  happen 
to  them,  and  that  it  is  according  to  nature  for  things 
to  happen  so,  and  that,  if  you  are  delighted  with  what 
is  shown  on  the  stage,  you  should  not  be  troubled  with 
that  which  takes  place  on  the  larger  stage.  For  you 
see  that  these  things  must  be  accomplished  thus,  and 
that  even  they  bear  them  who  cry  out,^  "  O  Cithae- 
ron."  And,  indeed,  some  things  are  said  well  by 
the  dramatic  writers,  of  which  kind  is  the  following 
especially :  — 

"Me  and  my  children  if  the  gods  neglect, 
This  has  its  reason  too."  ^ 

And  again,  — 

"  We  must  not  chafe  and  fret  at  that  which  happens." 
And,  — 

"  Life's  harvest  reap  like  the  wheat's  fruitful  ear." 
And  other  thinsrs  of  the  same  kind. 


'O^ 


^  Sophocles,  Oedipus  Rex- 
2  See  VII.  41,  38,  40. 


Book  XI.]       MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.      255 

After  tragedy  the  old  comedy  was  introduced,  which 
had  a  magisterial  freedom  of  speech,  and  by  its  very 
plainness  of  speaking  was  useful  in  reminding  men 
to  beware  of  insolence  ;  and  for  this  purpose  too 
Diogenes  used  to  take  from  these  writers. 

But  as  to  the  middle  comedy,  which  came  next,  ob- 
serve what  it  was,  and  again,  for  what  object  the  new 
comedy  was  introduced,  which  gradually  sank  down 
into  a  mere  mimic  artifice.  That  some  good  things 
are  said  even  by  these  writers,  everybody  knows  :  but 
the  whole  plan  of  such  poetry  and  dramaturgy,  to  what 
end  does  it  look? 

7.  How  plain  does  it  appear  that  there  is  not  an- 
other condition  of  life  so  well  suited  for  philosophizing 
as  this  in  which  thou  now  happenest  to  be. 

8.  A  branch  cut  off  from  the  adjacent  branch  must 
of  necessity  be  cut  off  from  the  whole  tree  also.  So 
too  a  man  when  he  is  separated  from  another  man  has 
fallen  off  from  the  whole  social  community.  Now  as 
to  a  branch,  another  cuts  it  off ;  but  a  man  by  his  own 
act  separates  himself  from  his  neighbor  when  he  hates 
him  and  turns  away  from  him,  and  he  does  not  know 
that  he  has  at  the  same  time  cut  himself  off  from  the 
whole  social  system.  Yet  he  has  this  privilege  cer- 
tainly from  Zeus,  who  framed  society,  for  it  is  in  our 
power  to  grow  again  to  that  which  is  near  to  us,  and 
again  to  become  a  part  which  helps  to  make  up  the 
whole.    However,  if  it  often  happens,  this  kind  of  sepa- 


256  THOUGHTS.  [Book  XI. 

ration,  it  makes  it  difficult  for  that  which  detaches  itself 
to  be  brought  to  unity  and  to  be  restored  to  its  former 
condition.  Finally,  the  branch,  which  from  the  first 
grew  together  with  the  tree,  and  has  continued  to  have 
one  life  with  it,  is  not  like  that  which  after  being  cut 
off  is  then  ingrafted,  for  this  is  something  like  what 
the  gardeners  mean  when  they  say  that  it  grows  with 
the  rest  of  the  tree,  but  t  that  it  has  not  the  same 
mind  with  it. 

9.  As  those  who  try  to  stand  in  thy  way  when  thou 
art  proceeding  according  to  right  reason  will  not  be 
able  to  turn  thee  aside  from  thy  proper  action,  so 
neither  let  them  drive  thee  from  thy  benevolent  feel- 
ings towards  them,  but  be  on  thy  guard  equally  in 
both  matters,  not  only  in  the  matter  of  steady  judg- 
ment and  action,  but  also  in  the  matter  of  gendeness 
to  those  who  try  to  hinder  or  otherwise  trouble  thee. 
For  this  also  is  a  weakness,  to  be  vexed  at  them,  as 
well  as  to  be  diverted  from  thy  course  of  action  and  to 
give  way  through  fear ;  for  both  are  equally  deserters 
from  their  post,  —  the  man  who  does  it  through  fear, 
and  the  man  who  is  alienated  from  him  who  is  by  na- 
ture a  kinsman  and  a  friend. 

10.  There  is  no  nature  which  is  inferior  to  art,  for 
the  arts  imitate  the  natures  of  things.  But  if  this  is 
so,  that  nature  which  is  the  most  perfect  and  the  most 
comprehensive  of  all  natures,  cannot  fall  short  of  the 
skill  of  art.     Now  all  arts  do  the  inferior  things  for 


Book  XL]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.      257 

the  sake  of  the  superior ;  therefore  the  universal  na- 
ture does  so  too.  And,  indeed,  hence  is  the  origin 
of  justice,  and  in  justice  the  other  virtues  have  their 
foundation  :  for  justice  will  not  be  observed,  if  we 
either  care  for  middle  things  [things  indifferent],  or 
are  easily  deceived  and  careless  and  changeable  (v. 
16.  30;  VII.  55). 

1 1 .  If  the  things  do  not  come  to  thee,  the  pursuits 
and  avoidances  of  which  disturb  thee,  still  in  a  manner 
thou  goest  to  them.  Let  then  thy  judgment  about 
them  be  at  rest,  and  they  will  remain  quiet,  and  thou 
wilt  not  be  seen  either  pursuing  or  avoiding. 

12.  The  spherical  form  of  the  soul  maintains  its 
figure  when  it  is  neither  extended  towards  any  object, 
nor  contracted  inwards,  nor  dispersed  nor  sinks  down, 
but  is  illuminated  by  light,  by  which  it  sees  the  truth, 
—  the  truth  of  all  things  and  the  truth  that  is  in  itself 
(VIII.  41.  45;  XII.  3). 

13.  Suppose  any  man  shall  despise  me.  Let  him 
look  to  that  himself.  But  I  will  look  to  this,  that  I  be 
not  discovered  doing  or  saying  anything  deserving  of 
contempt.  Shall  any  man  hate  me?  Let  him  look 
to  it.  But  I  will  be  mild  and  benevolent  towards 
every  man,  and  ready  to  show  even  him  his  mistake, 
not  reproachfully,  nor  yet  as  making  a  display  of  my 
endurance,  but  nobly  and  honestly,  like  the  great 
Phocion,  unless  indeed  he  only  assumed  it.  For  the 
interior  [parts]  ought  to  be  such,  and  a  man  ought  to 

17 


258  THOUGHTS.  [Book  XL 

be  seen  by  the  gods  neither  dissatisfied  with  anything 
nor  complaining.  For  what  evil  is  it  to  thee,  if  thou 
art  now  doing  what  is  agreeable  to  thy  own  nature, 
and  art  satisfied  with  that  which  at  this  moment  is 
suitable  to  the  nature  of  the  universe,  since  thou  art  a 
human  being  placed  at  thy  post  in  order  that  what  is 
for  the  common  advantage  may  be  done  in  some  way  ? 

14.  Men  despise  one  another  and  flatter  one  an- 
other ;  and  men  wish  to  raise  themselves  above  one 
another,  and  crouch  before  one  another. 

15.  How  unsound  and  insincere  is  he  who  says, 
I  have  determined  to  deal  with  thee  in  a  fair  way  !  — 
What  art  thou  doing,  man?  There  is  no  occasion  to 
give  this  notice.  It  will  soon  show  itself  by  acts. 
The  voice  ought  to  be  plainly  written  on  the  fore- 
head. Such  as  a  man's  character  is,  f  he  immedi- 
ately shows  it  in  his  eyes,  just  as  he  who  is  beloved 
forthwith  reads  everything  in  the  eyes  of  lovers.  The 
man  who  is  honest  and  good  ought  to  be  exactly 
like  a  man  who  smells  strong,  so  that  the  bystander 
as  soon  as  he  comes  near  him  must  smell  whether 
he  choose  or  not.  But  the  affectation  of  simplicity 
is  like  a  crooked  stick.^  Nothing  is  more  disgrace- 
ful than  a  wolfish  friendship  [false  friendship] .    Avoid 

1  Instead  of  aKaXfiyj  Saumaise  reads  (XKa/x^rj.  There  is  a 
Greek  proverb,  CKafi^bu  ^v\ov  ovdeiror'  dpdov:  "You  cannot 
make  a  crooked  stick  straight." 

The  wolfish  friendship  is  an  allusion  to  the  fable  of  the 
sheep  and  the  wolves. 


Book  XL]       MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.      259 

this  most  of  all.  The  good  and  simple  and  benevo- 
lent show  all  these  things  in  the  eyes,  and  there  is 
no  mistaking. 

16.  As  to  living  in  the  best  way,  this  power  is  in 
the  soul,  if  it  be  indifferent  to  things  which  are  in- 
different. And  it  will  be  indifferent,  if  it  looks  on 
each  of  these  things  separately  and  all  together,  and 
if  it  remembers  that  not  one  of  them  produces  in 
us  an  opinion  about  itself,  nor  comes  to  us  ;  but 
these  things  remain  immovable,  and  it  is  we  our- 
selves who  produce  the  judgments  about  them,  and, 
as  we  may  say,  write  them  in  ourselves,  it  being  in 
our  power  not  to  write  them,  and  it  being  in  our 
power,  if  perchance  these  judgments  have  impercep- 
tibly got  admission  to  our  minds,  to  wipe  them  out ; 
and  if  we  remember  also  that  such  attention  will 
only  be  for  a  short  time,  and  then  life  will  be  at  an 
end.  Besides,  what  trouble  is  there  at  all  in  doing 
this?  For  if  these  things  are  according  to  nature, 
rejoice  in  them  and  they  will  be  easy  to  thee  :  but 
if  contrary  to  nature,  seek  what  is  conformable  to 
thy  own  nature,  and  strive  towards  this,  even  if  it 
bring  no  reputation ;  for  every  man  is  allowed  to 
seek  his  own  good. 

17.  Consider  whence  each  thing  is  come,  and  of 
what  it  consists,!  and  into  what  it  changes,  and  what 
kind  of  a  thing  it  will  be  when  it  has  changed,  and 
that  it  will  sustain  no  harm. 


260  THOUGHTS.  [Book  XI. 

1 8.  [If  any  have  offended  against  thee,  consider 
first]  :  What  is  my  relation  to  men,  and  that  we  are 
made  for  one  another;  and  in  another  respect  I 
was  made  to  be  set  over  them,  as  a  ram  over  the 
flock  or  a  bull  over  the  herd.  But  examine  the 
matter  from  first  principles,  from  this  :  If  all  things 
are  not  mere  atoms,  it  is  nature  which  orders  all 
things  :  if  this  is  so,  the  inferior  things  exist  for  the 
sake  of  the  superior,  and  these  for  the  sake  of  one 
another  (ii.  i  ;  ix.  39  ;  v.  16  ;  iii.  4). 

Second,  consider  what  kind  of  men  they  are  at 
table,  in  bed,  and  so  forth :  and  particularly,  under 
what  compulsions  in  respect  of  opinions  they  are ; 
and  as  to  their  acts,  consider  with  what  pride  they 
do  what  they  do  (viii.  14;  ix.  34). 

Third,  that  if  men  do  rightly  what  they  do,  we 
ought  not  to  be  displeased  :  but  if  they  do  not  right, 
it  is  plain  that  they  do  so  involuntarily  and  in  igno- 
rance. For  as  every  soul  is  unwillingly  deprived  of 
the  truth,  so  also  is  it  unwillingly  deprived  of  the 
power  of  behaving  to  each  man  according  to  his 
deserts.  Accordingly  men  are  pained  when  they  are 
called  unjust,  ungrateful,  and  greedy,  and  in  a  word 
wrong-doers  to  their  neighbors  (vii.  62,  6;^  ;  11.  i  ; 
VII.    26  j    VIII.    29). 

Fourth,  consider  that  thou  also  doest  many  things 
wrong,  and  that  thou  art  a  man  like  others ;  and 
even  if  thou   dost  abstain   from  certain   faults,  still 


Book  XI.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.       26 1 

thou  hast  the  disposition  to  commit  them,  though 
either  through  cowardice,  or  concern  about  reputa- 
tion, or  some  such  mean  motive,  thou  dost  abstain 
from  such  faults   (i.  17). 

Fifth,  consider  that  thou  dost  not  even  understand 
whether  men  are  doing  wrong  or  not,  for  many  things 
are  done  with  a  certain  reference  to  circumstances. 
And  in  short,  a  man  must  learn  a  great  deal  to  enable 
him  to  pass  a  correct  judgment  on  another  man's 
acts  (ix.  38  ;  IV.  51). 

Sixth,  consider  when  thou  art  much  vexed  or 
grieved,  that  man's  life  is  only  a  moment,  and  after 
a  short  time  we  are  all  laid  out  dead  (vii.  58;  iv. 
48). 

Seventh,  that  it  is  not  men's  acts  which  disturb 
us,  for  those  acts  have  their  foundation  in  men's 
ruling  principles,  but  it  is  our  own  opinions  which 
disturb  us.  Take  away  these  opinions  then,  and 
resolve  to  dismiss  thy  judgment  about  an  act  as  if 
it  were  something  grievous,  and  thy  anger  is  gone. 
How  then  shall  I  take  away  these  opinions?  By 
reflecting  that  no  wrongful  act  of  another  brings 
shame  on  thee  :  for  unless  that  w^hich  is  shameful 
is  alone  bad,  thou  also  must  of  necessity  do  many 
things  wrong,  and  become  a  robber  and  everything 
else  (v.  25  ;  vii.  16). 

Eighth,  consider  how  much  more  pain  is  brought 
on  us  by  the  anger   and   vexation  caused    by  such 


262  THOUGHTS.  [Book  XI. 

acts  than  by  the  acts  themselves,  at  which  we  are 
angry  and  vexed   (iv.  39.  49;  vii.  24). 

Ninth,  consider  that  a  good  disposition  is  invin- 
cible if  it  be  genuine,  and  not  an  affected  smile  and 
acting  a  part.  For  what  will  the  most  violent  man 
do  to  thee,  if  thou  continuest  to  be  of  a  kind  dispo- 
sition towards  him,  and  if,  as  opportunity  offers,  thou 
gently  admonishest  him  and  calmly  correctest  his 
errors  at  the  very  time  when  he  is  trying  to  do  thee 
harm,  saying.  Not  so,  my  child  :  we  are  constituted 
by  nature  for  something  else  :  I  shall  certainly  not 
be  injured,  but  thou  art  injuring  thyself,  my  child.  — 
And  show  him  with  gentle  tact  and  by  general  prin- 
ciples that  this  is  so,  and  that  even  bees  do  not  do 
as  he  does,  nor  any  animals  which  are  formed  by 
nature  to  be  gregarious.  And  thou  must  do  this 
neither  with  any  double  meaning  nor  in  the  way  of 
reproach,  but  affectionately  and  without  any  rancor 
in  thy  soul;  and  not  as  if  thou  wert  lecturing  him, 
nor  yet  that  any  bystander  may  admire,  but  either 
when  he  is  alone,  and  if  others  are  present  .  .  .  ^ 

Remember  these  nine  rules,  as  if  thou  hadst  re- 
ceived them  as  a  gift  from  the  Muses,  and  begin  at 
last  to  be  a  man  while  thou  livest.  But  thou  must 
equally  avoid  flattering  men  and  being  vexed  at  them, 
for  both  are  unsocial  and  lead  to  harm.  And  let 
this  truth  be  present  to  thee  in  the  excitement  of 
1   It  appears  that  there  is  a  defect  in  the  text  here. 


Book  XL]       MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.      263 

anger,  that  to  be  moved  by  passion  is  not  manly, 
but  that  mildness  and  gentleness,  as  they  are  more 
agreeable  to  human  nature,  so  also  are  they  more 
manly;  and  he  who  possesses  these  qualities  pos- 
sesses strength,  nerves,  and  courage,  and  not  the 
man  who  is  subject  to  fits  of  passion  and  discontent. 
For  in  the  same  degree  in  which  a  man's  mind  is 
nearer  to  freedom  from  all  passion,  in  the  same  de- 
gree also  is  it  nearer  to  strength  :  and  as  the  sense 
of  pain  is  a  characteristic  of  weakness,  so  also  is 
anger.  For  he  who  yields  to  pain  and  he  who  yields 
to  anger,  both  are  wounded  and  both  submit. 

But  if  thou  wilt,  receive  also  a  tenth  present  from 
the  leader  of  the  [Muses,  Apollo],  and  it  is  this, — 
that  to  expect  bad  men  not  to  do  wrong  is  madness, 
for  he  who  expects  this  desires  an  impossibility.  But 
to  allow  men  to  behave  so  to  others,  and  to  expect 
them  not  to  do  thee  any  wrong,  is  irrational  and 
tyrannical. 

19.  There  are  four  principal  aberrations  of  the  su- 
perior faculty  against  which  thou  shouldst  be  constantly 
on  thy  guard,  and  when  thou  hast  detected  them,  thou 
shouldst  wipe  them  out  and  say  on  each  occasion  thus  : 
This  thought  is  not  necessary :  this  tends  to  destroy 
social  union  :  this  which  thou  art  going  to  say  comes 
not  from  the  real  thoughts  ;  for  thou  shouldst  consider 
it  among  the  most  absurd  of  things  for  a  man  not  to 
speak  from  his  real  thoughts.     But  the  fourth  is  when 


264  THOUGHTS.  [Book  XL 

thou  shalt  reproach  thyself  for  anything,  for  this  is  an 
evidence  of  the  diviner  part  within  thee  being  over- 
powered and  yielding  to  the  less  honorable  and  to  the 
perishable  part,  the  body,  and  to  its  gross  pleasures 
(IV.  24  ;  II.  16). 

20.  Thy  aerial  part  and  all  the  fiery  parts  which  are 
mingled  in  thee,  though  by  nature  they  have  an  upward 
tendency,  still  in  obedience  to  the  disposition  of  the 
universe  they  are  overpowered  here  in  the  compound 
mass  [the  body].  And  also  the  whole  of  the  earthy 
part  in  thee  and  the  watery,  though  their  tendency  is 
downward,  still  are  raised  up  and  occupy  a  position 
which  is  not  their  natural  one.  In  this  manner  then 
the  elemental  parts  obey  the  universal  ;  for  when  they 
have  been  fixed  in  any  place,  perforce  they  remain 
there  until  again  the  universal  shall  sound  the  signal 
for  dissolution.  It  is  not  then  strange  that  thy  intelli- 
gent part  only  should  be  disobedient  and  discontented 
with  its  own  place?  And  yet  no  force  is  imposed  on 
it,  but  only  those  things  which  are  conformable  to  its 
nature  :  still  it  does  not  submit,  but  is  carried  in  the 
opposite  direction.  For  the  movement  towards  injus- 
tice and  intemperance  and  to  anger  and  grief  and 
fear  is  nothing  else  than  the  act  of  one  who  deviates 
from  nature.  And  also  when  the  ruling  faculty  is  dis- 
contented with  anything  that  happens,  then  too  it 
deserts  its  post :  for  it  is  constituted  for  piety  and 
reverence  towards  the  gods  no  less  than  for  justice. 


BooKXr.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.       265 

For  these  qualities  also  are  comprehended  under  the 
generic  term  of  contentment  with  the  constitution  of 
things,  and  indeed  they  are  prior  ^  to  acts  of  justice. 

21.  He  who  has  not  one  and  always  the  same  ob- 
ject in  life,  cannot  be  one  and  the  same  all  through 
his  life.  But  what  I  have  said  is  not  enough,  unless 
this  also  is  added,  what  this  object  ought  to  be.  For 
as  there  is  not  the  same  opinion  about  all  the  things 
which  in  some  way  or  other  are  considered  by  the  ma- 
jority to  be  good,  but  only  about  some  certain  things, 
that  is,  things  which  concern  the  common  interest,  so 
also  ought  we  to  propose  to  ourselves  an  object  which 
shall  be  of  a  common  kind  [social]  and  political.     For 

1  The  word  irpea^vrepa,  which  is  here  translated  "prior," 
may  also  mean  "superior;  "  but  Antoninus  seems  to  say  that 
piety  and  reverence  of  the  gods  precede  all  virtues,  and  that 
other  virtues  are  derived  from  them,  even  justice,  which  in  an- 
other passage  (xi.  10)  he  makes  the  foundation  of  all  virtues. 
The  ancient  notion  of  justice  is  that  of  giving  to  every  one  his 
due.  It  is  not  a  legal  definition,  as  some  have  supposed,  but  a 
moral  rule  which  law  cannot  in  all  cases  enforce.  Besides,  law 
has  its  own  rules,  which  are  sometimes  moral  and  sometimes 
immoral ;  but  it  enforces  them  all  simply  because  they  are  gen- 
eral rules,  and  if  it  did  not  or  could  not  enforce  them,  so  far 
Law  would  not  be  Law.  Justice,  or  the  doing  what  is  just,  im- 
plies a  universal  rule  and  obedience  to  it ;  and  as  we  all  live 
under  universal  Law,  which  commands  both  our  body  and  our 
intelligence,  and  is  the  law  of  our  nature,  that  is,  the  law  of  the 
whole  constitution  of  man,  we  must  endeavor  to  discover  what 
this  supreme  Law  is.  It  is  the  will  of  the  power  that  rules  all. 
By  acting  in  obedience  to  this  will,  we  do  justice,  and  by  conse- 
quence everything  else  that  we  ought  to  do. 


266  THOUGHTS.  [Book  XI. 

he  who  directs  all  his  own  efforts  to  this  object,  will 
make  all  his  acts  alike,  and  thus  will  always  be  the 
same. 

2  2.  Think  of  the  country  mouse  and  of  the  town 
mouse,  and  of  the  alarm  and  trepidation  of  the  town 
mouse.^ 

23.  Socrates  used  to  call  the  opinions  of  the  many 
by  the  name  of  Lamiae,  —  bugbears  to  frighten 
children. 

24.  The  Lacedaemonians  at  their  pubUc  spectacles 
used  to  set  seats  in  the  shade  for  strangers,  but  them- 
selves sat  down  anywhere. 

25.  Socrates  excused  himself  to  Perdiccas^  for  not 
going  to  him,  saying,  It  is  because  I  would  not  perish 
by  the  worst  of  all  ends  ;  that  is,  I  would  not  receive  a 
favor  and  then  be  unable  to  return  it. 

26.  In  the  writings  of  the  [Ephesians]  ^  there  was 
this  precept,  constantly  to  think  of  some  one  of  the 
men  of  former  times  who  practised  virtue. 

27.  The  Pythagoreans  bid  us  in  the  morning  look 
to  the  heavens  that  we  may  be  reminded  of  those 
bodies  which  continually  do  the  same  things  and  in 
the  same    manner   perform  their  work,  and   also  be 

1  The  story  is  told  by  Horace  in  his  Satires  (11.  6),  and  by 
others  since,  but  not  better. 

2  Perhaps  the  emperor  made  a  mistake  here,  for  other  writers 
say  that  it  was  Archelaus,  the  son  of  Perdiccas,  who  invited 
Socrates  to  Macedonia. 

3  Gataker  suggested  'ETiKOvpeicov  for  'E(p€ai(x}u. 


Book  XL]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.       26/ 

reminded  of  their  purity  and  nudity.     For  there  is  no 
veil  over  a  star. 

28.  Consider  what  a  man  Socrates  was  when  he 
dressed  himself  in  a  skin,  after  Xanthippe  had  taken 
his  cloak  and  gone  out,  and  what  Socrates  said  to  his 
friends  who  were  ashamed  of  him  and  drew  back  from 
him  when  they  saw  him  dressed  thus. 

29.  Neither  in  writing  nor  in  reading  wilt  thou  be 
able  to  lay  down  rules  for  others  before  thou  shalt  have 
first  learned  to  obey  rules  thyself.  Much  more  is  this 
so  in  life. 

30.  A  slave  thou  art ;  free  speech  is  not  for  thee. 

31.  And  my  heart  laughed  within. 

Odyssey,  IX.  413. 

32.  And  virtue  they  will  curse,  speaking  harsh  words. 

Hesiod,  Works  and  Days,  184. 
2,1.  To  look  for  the  fig  in  winter  is  a  madman's  act : 
such  is  he  who  looks  for  his  child  when  it  is  no  longer 
allowed  (Epictetus,  iii.  24,  87). 

34.  When  a  man  kisses  his  child,  said  Epictetus, 
he  should  whisper  to  himself,  ''  To-morrow  perchance 
thou  wilt  die."  — But  those  are  words  of  bad  omen.  — 
"No  word  is  a  word  of  bad  omen,"  said  Epictetus, 
"  which  expresses  any  work  of  nature ;  or  if  it  is  so, 
it  is  also  a  word  of  bad  omen  to  speak  of  the  ears  of 
corn  being  reaped  "  (Epictetus,  iii.  24,  Z"^). 

35.  The  unripe  grape,  the  ripe  bunch,  the  dried 
grape  all  are  changes,  not  into  nothing,  but  into 
something  which  exists  not  yet  (Epictetus,  in.  24). 


268  THOUGHTS.  [Book  XI. 

^6.  No  man  can  rob  us  of  our  free  will  (Epictetus, 
III.  22,  105). 

37.  Epictetus  also  said,  a  man  must  discover  an  art 
[or  rules]  with  respect  to  giving  his  assent;  and  in 
respect  to  his  movements  he  must  be  careful  that  they 
be  made  with  regard  to  circumstances,  that  they  be 
consistent  with  social  interests,  that  they  have  regard 
to  the  value  of  the  object ;  and  as  to  sensual  desire, 
he  should  altogether  keep  away  from  it;  and  as  to 
avoidance  [aversion],  he  should  not  show  it  with 
respect  to  any  of  the  things  which  are  not  in  our 
power. 

^8.  The  dispute  then,  he  said,  is  not  about  any 
common  matter,  but   about  being  mad  or  not. 

39.  Socrates  used  to  say.  What  do  you  want, 
souls  of  rational  men  or  irrational  ?  —  Souls  of  rational 
men.  —  Of  what  rational  men,  sound  or  unsound  ?  — 
Sound. — Why  then  do  you  not  seek  for  them?  —  Be- 
cause we  have  them.  —  Why  then  do  you  fight  and 
quarrel  ? 


Book  XII.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.      269 


XII. 


A  LL  those  things  at  which  thou  wishest  to  arrive 
by  a  circuitous  road  thou  canst  have  now,  if 
thou  dost  not  refuse  them  to  thyself.  And  this 
means,  if  thou  wilt  take  no  notice  of  all  the  past, 
and  trust  the  future  to  providence,  and  direct  the 
present  only  conformably  to  piety  and  justice.  Con- 
formably to  piety,  that  thou  mayst  be  content  with 
the  lot  which  is  assigned  to  thee,  for  nature  designed 
it  for  thee  and  thee  for  it.  Conformably  to  justice, 
that  thou  mayst  always  speak  the  truth  freely  and 
without  disguise,  and  do  the  things  which  are  agree- 
able to  law  and  according  to  the  worth  of  each.  And 
let  neither  another  man's  wickedness  hinder  thee,  nor 
opinion  nor  voice,  nor  yet  the  sensations  of  the  poor 
flesh  which  has  grown  about  thee ;  for  the  passive 
part  will  look  to  this.  If,  then,  whatever  the  time 
may  be  when  thou  shalt  be  near  to  thy  departure, 
neglecting  everything  else  thou  shalt  respect  only  thy 
ruling  faculty  and  the  divinity  within  thee,  and  if 
thou  shalt  be  afraid  not  because  thou  must  some 
time  cease  to  live,  but  if  thou  shalt  fear  never  to 
have  begun  to  live  according  to  nature,  —  then  thou 


2/0  THOUGHTS.  [Book  XII. 

wilt  be  a  man  worthy  of  the  universe  which  has 
produced  thee,  and  thou  wilt  cease  to  be  a  stranger 
in  thy  native  land,  and  to  wonder  at  things  which 
happen  daily  as  if  they  were  something  unexpected, 
and  to  be  dependent  on  this  or  that. 

2.  God  sees  the  minds  [ruling  principles]  of  all 
men  bared  of  the  material  vesture  and  rind  and 
impurities.  For  with  his  intellectual  part  alone  he 
touches  the  intelligence  only  which  has  flowed  and 
been  derived  from  himself  into  these  bodies.  And 
if  thou  also  usest  thyself  to  do  this,  thou  wilt  rid 
thyself  of  thy  much  trouble.  For  he  who  regards 
not  the  poor  flesh  which  envelops  him,  surely  will  not 
trouble  himself  by  looking  after  raiment  and  dwelling 
and  fame  and  such  like  externals  and  show. 

3.  The  things  are  three  of  which  thou  art  com- 
posed :  a  httle  body,  a  little  breath  [life],  intelligence. 
Of  these  the  first  two  are  thine,  so  far  as  it  is  thy 
duty  to  take  care  of  them ;  but  the  third  alone  is 
properly  thine.  Therefore  if  thou  shalt  separate  from 
thyself,  that  is,  from  thy  understanding,  whatever 
others  do  or  say,  and  whatever  thou  hast  done  or 
said  thyself,  and  whatever  future  things  trouble  thee 
because  they  may  happen,  and  whatever  in  the  body 
which  envelops  thee  or  in  the  breath  [life],  which 
is  by  nature  associated  with  the  body,  is  attached 
to  thee  independent  of  thy  will,  and  whatever  the 
external  circumfluent  vortex  whirls  round,  so  that  the 


Book  XII.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS,      2/1 

intellectual  power  exempt  from  the  things  of  fate  can 
live  pure  and  free  by  itself,  doing  what  is  just  and 
accepting  what  happens  and  saying  the  truth  :  if  thou 
wilt  separate,  I  say,  from  this  ruling  faculty  the  things 
which  are  attached  to  it  by  the  impressions  of  sense, 
and  the  things  of  time  to  come  and  of  time  that  is 
past,  and  wilt  make  thyself  like  Empedocles'  sphere, 

"All  round  and  in  its  joyous  rest  reposing ; "  ^ 

and  if  thou  shalt  strive  to  live  only  what  is  really 
thy  Ufe,  that  is,  the  present,  —  then  ,thou  wilt  be 
able  to  pass  that  portion  of  life  which  remains  for 
thee  up  to  the  time  of  thy  death  free  from  pertur- 
bations, nobly,  and  obedient  to  thy  own  daemon  [to 
the  god  that  is  within  thee]  (ii.  13,  17;  iii.  5,  6  ; 
XI.   12). 

4.  I  have  often  wondered  how  it  is  that  every  man 
loves  himself  more  than  all  the  rest  of  men,  but  yet 
sets  less  value  on  his  own  opinion  of  himself  than  on 
the  opinion  of  others.  If  then  a  god  or  a  wise  teacher 
should  present  himself  to  a  man  and  bid  him  to  think 
of  nothing  and  to  design  nothing  which  he  would 
not  express  as  soon  as  he  conceived  it,  he  could  not 
endure  it  even  for   a  single  day.^     So    much   more 

1  The  verse  of  Empedocles  is  corrupt  in  Antoninus.  It  has 
been  restored  by  Peyron  from  a  Turin  manuscript,  thus  :  — 

2(^a?pos  KVKXoTepTjS  [xovLrj  TrepLyrjSi'C  yaioiv. 

2  III.  4. 


2/2  THOUGHTS.  [Book  XII. 

respect  have  we  to  what  our  neighbors  shall  think  of 
us  than  to  what  we  shall  think  of  ourselves. 

5.  How  can  it  be  that  the  gods,  after  having  ar- 
ranged all  things  well  and  benevolently  for  mankind, 
have  overlooked  this  alone,  that  some  men,  and  very 
good  men,  and  men  who,  as  we  may  say,  have  had 
most  communion  with  the  divinity,  and  through  pious 
acts  and  religious  observances  have  been  most  inti- 
mate with  the  divinity,  when  they  have  once  died 
should  never  exist  again,  but  should  be  completely 
extinguished  ? 

But  if  this  is  so,  be  assured  that  if  it  ought  to  have 
been  otherwise,  the  gods  would  have  done  it.  For 
if  it  were  just,  it  would  also  be  possible ;  and  if  it 
were  according  to  nature,  nature  would  have  had  it 
so.  But  because  it  is  not  so,  if  in  fact  it  is  not  so, 
be  thou  convinced  that  it  ought  not  to  have  been 
so  :  for  thou  seest  even  of  thyself  that  in  this  in- 
quiry thou  art  disputing  with  the  Deity;  and  we 
should  not  thus  dispute  with  the  gods,  unless  they 
were  most  excellent  and  most  just;  but  if  this  is 
so,  they  would  not  have  allowed  anything  in  the 
ordering  of  the  universe  to  be  neglected  unjustly  and 
irrationally. 

6.  Practise  thyself  even  in  the  things  which  thou 
despairest  of  accomplishing.  For  even  the  left 
hand,  which  is  ineffectual  for  all  other  things  for 
want  of  practice,  holds   the  bridle  more  vigorously 


Book  XII.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.      2/3 

than  the  right  hand ;    for  it  has  been   practised  m 
this. 

7.  Consider  in  what  condition  both  in  body  and 
soul  a  man  should  be  when  he  is  overtaken  by  death ; 
and  consider  the  shortness  of  life,  the  boundless  abyss 
of  time  past  and  future,  the  feebleness  of  all  matter. 

8.  Contemplate  the  formative  principles  [forms] 
of  things  bare  of  their  coverings ;  the  purposes  of 
actions ;  consider  what  pain  is,  what  pleasure  is,  and 
death,  and  fame ;  who  is  to  himself  the  cause  of  his 
uneasiness;  how  no  man  is  hindered  by  another; 
that  everything  is  opinion. 

9.  In  the  application  of  thy  principles  thou  must 
be  like  the  pancratiast,  not  like  the  gladiator;  for 
the  gladiator  lets  fall  the  sword  which  he  uses  and 
is  killed ;  but  the  other  always  has  his  hand,  and 
needs  to  do  nothing  else  than  use  it. 

10.  See  what  things  are  in  themselves,  dividing 
them  into  matter,  form,  and  purpose. 

1 1 .  What  a  power  man  has  to  do  nothing  except 
what  God  will  approve,  and  to  accept  all  that  God 
may  give  him. 

12.  With  respect  to  that  which  happens  conform- 
ably to  nature,  we  ought  to  blame  neither  gods,  for 
they  do  nothing  wrong  either  voluntarily  or  involun- 
tarily, nor  men,  for  they  do  nothing  wrong  except 
involuntarily.     Consequently  we  should  blame  nobody 

(II.  II,  12,  13  ;  VII.  62  ;   18  VIII.  17). 
18 


274  THOUGHTS.  [Book  XII. 

13.  How  ridiculous  and  what  a  stranger  he  is  who 
is  surprised  at  anything  which  happens  in  Hfe. 

14.  Either  there  is  a  fatal  necessity  and  invincible 
order,  or  a  kind  providence,  or  a  confusion  without 
a  purpose  and  without  a  director  (iv.  27).  If  then 
there  is  an  invincible  necessity,  why  dost  thou  resist  ? 
But  if  there  is  a  providence  which  allows  itself  to  be 
propitiated,  make  thyself  worthy  of  the  help  of  the 
divinity.  But  if  there  is  a  confusion  without  a  gov- 
ernor, be  content  that  in  such  a  tempest  thou  hast 
in  thyself  a  certain  ruHng  intelligence.  And  even  if 
the  tempest  carry  thee  away,  let  it  carry  away  the 
poor  flesh,  the  poor  breath,  everything  else ;  for  the 
intelligence  at  least  it  will  not  carry  away. 

15.  Does  the  light  of  the  lamp  shine  without  losing 
its  splendor  until  it  is  extinguished ;  and  shall  the 
truth  which  is  in  thee  and  justice  and  temperance 
be  extinguished  [before  thy  death]  ? 

16.  When  a  man  has  presented  the  appearance  of 
having  done  wrong  [say],  How  then  do  I  know  if 
this  is  a  wrongful  act?  And  even  if  he  has  done 
wrong,  how  do  I  know  that  he  has  not  condemned 
himself?  And  so  this  is  like  tearing  his  own  face. 
Consider  that  he  who  would  not  have  the  bad  man 
do  wrong,  is  like  the  man  who  would  not  have  the 
fig-tree  to  bear  juice  in  the  figs,  and  infants  to  cry, 
and  the  horse  to  neigh,  and  whatever  else  must  of 
necessity  be.     For   what   must  a  man  do  who  has 


Book  XII.]      MARCUS    AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.     275 

such   a  character?     If  then  thou  art  irritable,!  cure 
this  man's  disposition.^ 

17.  If  it  is  not  right,  do  not  do  it :  if  it  is  not  true, 
do  not  say  it.     [For  let  thy  efforts  be — ]  ^ 

18.  In  everything  always  observe  what  the  thing  is 
which  produces  for  thee  an  appearance,  and  resolve 
it  by  dividing  it  into  the  formal,  the  material,  the 
purpose,  and  the  time  within  which  it  must  end. 

19.  Perceive  at  last  that  thou  hast  in  thee  some- 
thing better  and  more  divine  than  the  things  which 
cause  the  various  affects,  and  as  it  were  pull  thee  by 
the  strings.  What  is  there  now  in  my  mind,  —  is  it 
fear,  or  suspicion,  or  desire,  or  anything  of  the  kind 

(V.   II)? 

20.  First,  do  nothing  inconsiderately,  nor  without 
a  purpose.  Second,  make  thy  acts  refer  to  nothing 
else  than  to  a  social  end. 

21.  Consider  that  before  long  thou  wilt  be  no- 
body and  nowhere,  nor  will  any  of  the  things  exist 
which  thou  now  seest,  nor  any  of  those  who  are 
now  living.  For  all  things  are  formed  by  nature  to 
change  and  be  turned  and  to  perish,  in  order  that 
other  things  in  continuous  succession  may  exist 
(IX.    28). 

1  The  interpreters  translate  yopyos  by  the  words  "acer, 
validusque,"  and  "skilful."  But  in  Epictetus  (ii.  16,  20;  III. 
12,  10)  yopyos  means  "  vehement,"  "  prone  to  anger,"  "  irri- 
table." 

2  There  is  something  wrong  here,  or  incomplete. 


2/6  THOUGHTS.  [Book  XII. 

2  2.  Consider  that  everything  is  opinion,  and  opin- 
ion is  in  thy  power.  Take  away  then,  when  thou 
choosest,  thy  opinion,  and  like  a  mariner  who  has 
doubled  the  promontory,  thou  wilt  find  calm,  every- 
thing stable,  and  a  waveless  bay. 

23.  Any  one  activity,  whatever  it  may  be,  when 
it  has  ceased  at  its  proper  time,  suffers  no  evil  be- 
cause it  has  ceased ;  nor  he  who  has  done  this  act, 
does  he  suffer  any  evil  for  this  reason,  that  the  act 
has  ceased.  In  like  manner  then  the  whole  which 
consists  of  all  the  acts,  which  is  our  life,  if  it  cease 
at  its  proper  time,  suffers  no  evil  for  this  reason, 
that  it  has  ceased ;  nor  he  who  has  terminated  this 
series  at  the  proper  time,  has  he  been  ill  dealt  with. 
But  the  proper  time  and  the  limit  nature  fixes, 
sometimes  as  in  old  age  the  peculiar  nature  of  man, 
but  always  the  universal  nature,  by  the  change  of 
whose  parts  the  whole  universe  continues  ever  young 
and  perfect.^  And  everything  which  is  useful  to  the 
universal  is  always  good  and  in  season.  There- 
fore the  termination  of  life  for  every  man  is  no 
evil,  because  neither  is  it  shameful,  since  it  is 
both  independent  of  the  will  and  not  opposed  to 
the  general  interest,  but  it  is  good,  since  it  is 
seasonable,  and  profitable  to  and  congruent  with 
the  universal.  For  thus  too  he  is  moved  by  the 
Deity  who  is  moved  in  the  same  manner  with  the 
1  VII.  25. 


Book  XII.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.     277 

Deity,  and    moved    towards  the   same   things  in  his 
mind. 

24.  These  three  principles  thou  must  have  in  readi- 
ness :  In  the  things  which  thou  doest  do  nothing 
either  inconsiderately  or  otherwise  than  as  justice 
herself  would  act ;  but  with  respect  to  what  may 
happen  to  thee  from  without,  consider  that  it  hap- 
pens either  by  chance  or  according  to  providence, 
and  thou  must  neither  blame  chance  nor  accuse  provi- 
dence. Second,  consider  what  every  being  is  from 
the  seed  to  the  time  of  its  receiving  a  soul,  and  from 
the  reception  of  a  soul  to  the  giving  back  of  the 
same,  and  of  what  things  every  being  is  compounded, 
and  into  what  things  it  is  resolved.  Third,  if  thou 
shouldst  suddenly  be  raised  up  above  the  earth,  and 
shouldst  look  down  on  human  things,  and  observe 
the  variety  of  them  how  great  it  is,  and  at  the  same 
time  also  shouldst  see  at  a  glance  how  great  is  the 
number  of  beings  who  dwell  all  around  in  the  air 
and  the  ether,  consider  that  as  often  as  thou  shouldst 
be  raised  up,  thou  wouldst  see  the  same  things,  same- 
ness of  form  and  shortness  of  duration.  Are  these 
things  to  be  proud  of  ? 

25.  Cast  away  opinion:  thou  art  saved.  Who 
then  hinders  thee  from  casting  it  away? 

26.  When  thou  art  troubled  about  anything,  thou 
hast  forgotten  this,  that  all  things  happen  according 
to  the  universal  nature ;    and   forgotten  this,  that   a 


2/8  THOUGHTS.  [Book  XII. 

man's  wrongful  act  is  nothing  to  thee ;  and  further 
thou  hast  forgotten  this,  that  everything  which  hap- 
pens, always  happened  so  and  will  happen  so,  and 
now  happens  so  everywhere ;  forgotten  this  too,  how 
close  is  the  kinship  between  a  man  and  the  whole 
human  race,  for  it  is  a  community,  not  of  a  Httle 
blood  or  seed,  but  of  intelligence.  And  thou  hast 
forgotten  this  too,  that  every  man's  intelligence  is  a 
god  and  is  an  efflux  of  the  Deity ;  ^  and  forgotten 
this,  that  nothing  is  a  man's  own,  but  that  his  child 
and  his  body  and  his  very  soul  came  from  the  Deity ; 
forgotten  this,  that  everything  is  opinion ;  and  lastly 
thou  hast  forgotten  that  every  man  lives  the  present 
time  only,  and  loses  only  this. 

27.  Constantly  bring  to  thy  recollection  those  who 
have  complained  greatly  about  anything,  those  who 
have  been  most  conspicuous  by  the  greatest  fame 
or  misfortunes  or  enmities  or  fortunes  of  any  kind ; 
then  think  where  are  they  all  now?  Smoke  and  ash 
and  a  tale,  or  not  even  a  tale.  And  let  there  be 
present  to  thy  mind  also  everything  of  this  sort,  how 
Fabius  Catullinus  lived  in  the  country,  and  Lucius 
Lupus  in  his  gardens,  and  Stertinius  at  Baiae,  and 
Tiberius  at  Capreae,  and  Velius  Rufus  [or  Rufus  at 
VeliaJ  ;  and  in  fine  think  of  the  eager  pursuit  of 
anything  conjoined  with  pride ;  ^   and  how  worthless 

1  See  Epictetus,  ir.  8,  9,  etc. 

2  ^er'  olrj<X€us.     Otrjat^  koX  Tv<pos,  Epict.  I.  8,  6. 


Book  XII.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS.     2/9 

everything  is  after  which  men  violently  strain;  and 
how  much  more  philosophical  it  is  for  a  man  in  the 
opportunities  presented  to  him  to  show  himself  just, 
temperate,  obedient  to  the  gods,  and  to  do  this  with 
all  simplicity :  for  the  pride  which  is  proud  of  its 
want  of  pride  is  the  most  intolerable  of  all. 

28.  To  those  who  ask.  Where  hast  thou  seen  the 
gods,  or  how  dost  thou  comprehend  that  they  exist 
and  so  worshippest  them,  I  answer,  in  the  first  place, 
they  may  be  seen  even  with  the  eyes ;  ^  in  the  second 

1  "  Seen  even  with  the  eyes."  It  is  supposed  that  this  may 
be  explained  by  the  Stoic  doctrine,  that  the  universe  is  a  god 
or  living  being  (iv.  40),  and  that  the  celestial  bodies  are  gods 
(viii.  19).  But  the  emperor  may  mean  that  we  know  that  the 
gods  exist,  as  he  afterwards  states  it,  because  we  see  what  they 
do ;  as  we  know  that  man  has  intellectual  powers,  because  we 
see  what  he  does,  and  in  no  other  way  do  we  know  it.  This 
passage  then  will  agree  with  the  passage  in  the  Epistle  to  the 
Romans  (i.  v.  20),  and  with  the  Epistle  to  the  Colossians  (i.  v. 
15),  in  which  Jesus  Christ  is  named  "the  image  of  the  invisi- 
ble god ; "  and  with  the  passage  in  the  Gospel  of  St.  John 
(xiv.  V.  9.) 

Gataker,  whose  notes  are  a  wonderful  collection  of  learning, 
and  all  of  it  sound  and  good,  quotes  a  passage  of  Calvin  which 
is  founded  on  St.  Paul's  language  (Rom.  I.  v.  20) :  "  God  by 
creating  the  universe  [or  world,  mundum],  being  himself  in- 
visible, has  presented  himself  to  our  eyes  conspicuously  in  a 
certain  visible  form."  He  also  quotes  Seneca  (De  Benef.  iv. 
c.  8) :  "  Quocunque  te  flexeris,  ibi  ilium  videbis  occurrentem 
tibi :  nihil  ab  illo  vacat,  opus  suum  ipse  implet."  Compare 
also  Cicero,  De  Senectute  (c.  22),  Xenophon's  Cyropaedia 
(viii.  7),  and  Mem.  iv.  3  ;  also  Epictetus,  i.  6,  de  Providentia. 
I  think  that  my  interpretation  of  Antoninus  is  right. 


280  THOUGHTS.  [BookXII. 

place,  neither  have  I  seen  even  my  own  soul,  and  yet 
I  honor  it.  Thus  then  with  respect  to  the  gods,  from 
what  I  constantly  experience  of  their  power,  from 
this  I  comprehend  that  they  exist,  and  I  venerate 
them. 

29.  The  safety  of  hfe  is  this,  to  examine  everything 
all  through,  what  it  is  itself,  that  is  its  material,  what 
the  formal  part ;  with  all  thy  soul  to  do  justice  and 
to  say  the  truth.  What  remains,  except  to  enjoy  life 
by  joining  one  good  thing  to  another  so  as  not  to 
leave  even  the  smallest  intervals  between? 

30.  There  is  one  light  of  the  sun,  though  it  is  in- 
terrupted by  walls,  mountains,  and  other  things  infi- 
nite. There  is  one  common  substance,^  though  it 
is  distributed  among  countless  bodies  which  have 
their  several  qualities.  There  is  one  soul,  though  it 
is  distributed  among  infinite  natures  and  individual 
circumscriptions  [or  individuals].  There  is  one  in- 
telligent soul,  though  it  seems  to  be  divided.  Now 
in  the  things  which  have  been  mentioned,  all  the 
other  parts,  such  as  those  which  are  air  and  matter, 
are  without  sensation  and  have  no  fellowship  :  and 
yet  even  these  parts  the  intelligent  principle  holds 
together  and  the  gravitation  towards  the  same.  But 
intellect  in  a  peculiar  manner  tends  to  that  which  is 
of  the  same  kin,  and  combines  with  it,  and  the  feeling 
for  communion  is  not  interrupted. 

1  IV.  40. 


Book  XII.]      MARCUS   AURELIUS    ANTONINUS.      281 

31.  What  dost  thou  wish,  —  to  continue  to  exist? 
Well,  dost  thou  wish  to  have  sensation,  movement, 
growth,  and  then  again  to  cease  to  grow,  to  use  thy 
speech,  to  think?  What  is  there  of  all  these  things 
which  seems  to  thee  worth  desiring?  But  if  it  is  easy 
to  set  little  value  on  all  these  things,  turn  to  that  which 
remains,  which  is  to  follow  reason  and  God.  But  it 
is  inconsistent  with  honoring  reason  and  God  to  be 
troubled  because  by  death  a  man  will  be  deprived 
of  the  other  things. 

32.  How  small  a  part  of  the  boundless  and  unfath- 
omable time  is  assigned  to  every  man,  for  it  is  very 
soon  swallowed  up  in  the  eternal !  And  how  small  a 
part  of  the  whole  substance ;  and  how  small  a  part  of 
the  universal  soul ;  and  on  what  a  small  clod  of  the 
whole  earth  thou  creepest  !  Reflecting  on  all  this,  con- 
sider nothing  to  be  great,  except  to  act  as  thy  nature 
leads  thee,  and  to  endure  that  which  the  common 
nature  brings. 

33.  How  does  the  ruling  faculty  make  use  of  itself? 
for  all  lies  in  this.  But  everything  else,  whether  it  is 
in  the  power  of  thy  will  or  not,  is  only  lifeless  ashes 
and  smoke. 

34.  This  reflection  is  most  adapted  to  move  us  to 
contempt  of  death,  that  even  those  who  think  pleasure 
to  be  a  good  and  pain  an  evil  still  have  despised  it. 

35.  The  man  to  whom  that  only  is  good  which 
comes  in  due  season,  and  to  whom  it  is  the  same  thing 


282  THOUGHTS.  [Book  XII. 

whether  he  has  done  more  or  fewer  acts  conformable 
to  right  reason,  and  to  whom  it  makes  no  difference 
whether  he  contemplates  the  world  for  a  longer  or  a 
shorter  time,  —  for  this  man  neither  is  death  a  terrible 
thing  (ill.  7  ;  vi.  23;  x.  20;  xii.  23). 

36.  Man,  thou  hast  been  a  citizen  in  this  great  state 
[the  world]  ;  ^  what  difference  does  it  make  to  thee 
whether  for  five  years  [or  three]  ?  for  that  which  is 
conformable  to  the  laws  is  just  for  all.  Where  is  the 
hardship  then,  if  no  tyrant  nor  yet  an  unjust  judge 
sends  thee  away  from  the  state,  but  nature,  who  brought 
thee  into  it?  the  same  as  if  a  praetor  who  has  em- 
ployed an  actor  dismisses  him  from  the  stage. ■"  —  "  But 
I  have  not  finished  the  five  acts,  but  only  three  of 
them."  —  Thou  sayest  well,  but  in  life  the  three  acts 
are  the  whole  drama;  for  what  shall  be  a  complete 
drama  is  determined  by  him  who  was  once  the  cause 
of  its  composition,  and  now  of  its  dissolution :  but 
thou  art  the  cause  of  neither.  Depart  then  satisfied, 
for  he  also  who  releases  thee  is  satisfied. 


1  II.  16;  III.  II  ;  IV.  29. 

2  III.  8;  XI.  I. 


INDEXES. 


INDEX    OF    TERMS. 


ddtdcpopa  (indifferentia,  Cicero,  Seneca,  Epp.  82)  ;  things  indiffer- 
ent, neither  good  nor  bad  ;  the  same  as  fxeaa. 

aldxpos  (turpis,  Cic),  ugly  ;  morally  ugly, 

aiTia,  cause. 

aiTiCHdes,  ultiov,  to,  the  formal  or  formative  principle,  the  cause. 

aKotvibvTjTos,  unsocial. 

dvacpopd,  reference,  relation  to  a  purpose. 

dvvire^aipiTws,  unconditionally. 

diroppoia,  efflux. 

dirpoalpera,  rd,  the  things  which  are  not  in  our  will  or  power. 

dpxVy  a  f^ist  principle. 

drofioi  (corpora  individua,  Cic),  atoms. 

avrdpKcia  est  quae  parvo  contenta  omne  id  respuit  quod  abundat 
(Cic.)  ;  contentment. 

airdpKTis,  sufficient  in  itself  ;  contented. 

d(popfJi.ai,  means,  principles.  The  word  has  also  other  significa- 
tions in  Epictetus.     Index  ed.  Schweig. 

yiyvo/xeva,  rd,  things  which  are  produced,  come  into  existence. 

baip.wv,  god,  god  in  man,  man's  intelligent  principle. 

diddeais,  disposition,  affection  of  the  mind. 

diaipeo-Ls,  division  of  things  into  their  parts,  dissection,  resolution, 
analysis. 

BiaXeKTLKTi,  ars  bene  disserendi  et  vera  ac  falsa  dijudicandi  (Cic. ). 

5id\v(ns,  dissolution,  the  opposite  of  <rvyKpL<ni. 

didvoia,  understanding  ;  sometimes,  the  mind  generally,  the  whole 
intellectual  power. 

doyp-ara  (decreta,  Cic),  principles. 

dwap-ts  poepd,  intellectual  faculty. 


286  INDEX. 

e-yKpareia,  temperance,  self-restraint. 

€l5os  in  divisione  formae  sunt,  quas  Graeci  etdrj  vocant ;  nostri, 
si  qui  haiec  forte  tractant,  species  appellant  (Cic).  But  elSoj 
is  used  by  Epictetus  and  Antoninus  less  exactly  and  as  a  general 
term,  like  genus.  Index  Epict.  ed.  Schweig.  — 'fis  5^  ye  al 
irpCyraL  ovaiai  irpbs  ra  aXXa  exovaiv,  ovto)  Kal  to  el8os  irpbs  t6 
yhos  "xet*  viroKeLrai  yap  to  etSos  rc^  yeuet,.    (Aristot.  Cat.  c.  5.) 

eip.apiJ.evri  (fatalis  necessitas,  fatum,  Cic),  destiny,  necessity. 

eKK\i<Teis,  aversions,  avoidance,  the  turning  away  from  things  ; 
the  opposite  of  ope^eis. 

tfi'^vxa,  rd,  things  which  have  life. 

ivepyeia,  action,  activity. 

evvoia,  evvoiaL,  notio,  notiones  (Cic),  or  "notitiae  rerum  ;"  no- 
tions of  things.  (Notionem  appello  quam  Graeci  turn  evvoiav, 
turn  TrpdXrjxI/iv,  Cic). 

ev(x}(TLS,  rjy  the  unity. 

eiriaTpocp-q,  attention  to  an  object 

ev6vp.ia,  animi  tranquillitas  (Cic). 

ev/xeves,  to,  evp-eveia,  benevolence  ;  ev/xevr/i  sometimes  means 
well-contented. 

eijvoia,  benevolence. 

e^ovaia,  power,  faculty. 

eiraK6\o6d7)(XLv,  /card,  by  way  of  sequence. 

riyep.oviKov,  to,  the  ruling  faculty  or  part  ;  principatus  (Cic. ). 

6eo}pr}p.aTa,  percepta  (Cic),  things  perceived,  general  principles. 

Kad-qKetv,  to,  duty,  "  officium." 

/caXos,  beautiful. 

Kard\T}\pLs,  comprehension ;  cognitio,  perceptio,  comprehensio 
(Cic). 

KaracTKev/j,  constitution. 

KaTopdibdeis,  KaTopdcbp.aTa  ;  recta,  recte  facta  (Cic. )  ;  right  acts, 
those  acts  to  which  we  proceed  by  the  right  or  straight  road. 

Koa/Jios,  order,  world,  universe. 

Koapios,  6  8\os,  the  universe,  that  which  is  the  One  and  the  All 
(VI.  25). 

KplpLa,  a  judgment. 

Kvpievov,  Tb  hdov,  that  which  rules  within  (iv.  i),  the  same  as  rb 


INDEX.  287 

Tjye/xoutKoy.  Diogenes  Laertius,  vir.,  Zeno.  yjye/jLonKov  de 
dual  TO  KuptdbraTov  rrjs  \pvxv^' 

XoyiKOL,  rd,  the  things  which  have  reason. 

XoycKos,  rational. 

\6yo?,  reason. 

\byos  crirepfxaTLKos,  seminal  principle. 

lx4(Ta,  rd,  things  indifferent,  viewed  with  respect  to  virtue. 

voepos,  intellectual. 

vo/xos,  law. 

vovs,  intelligence,  understanding. 

otr](ns,  arrogance,  pride.  It  sometimes  neans  in  Antoninus  the 
same  as  rvcpos  ;  but  it  also  means  "  opinicn." 

OLKOvofiia  (dispositio,  ordo,  Cic, )  has  sometimes  the  peculiar  sense 
of  artifice,  or  doing  something  with  an  apparent  purpose  differ- 
ent from  the  real  purpose. 

6\ov,  TO,  the  universe,  the  whole  :  i]  tQjv  o\wv  (p^ais. 

8i>Ta,  Td.j  things  which  exist  ;  existence,  being. 

ope^is,  desire  of  a  thing,  which  is  opposed  to  eKKXiai^,  aversion. 

op/j-ri,  movement  towards  an  object,  appetite  ;  appetitio,  naturalis 
appetitus,  appetitus  animi  (Cic). 

odaia,  substance  (vi.  49).  Modern  writers  sometimes  incorrectly 
translate  it  "  essentia."  It  is  often  used  by  Epictetus  in  the 
same  sense  as  vXrj.  Aristotle  (Cat.  c.  5)  defines  ovcria,  and  it 
is  properly  translated  "substantia"  (ed.  Jul.  Pacius).  Por- 
phyrins (Tsag.  c.  2)  :  i]  ovaia  dpuTdTO)  odaa  tQ)  fX7)dev  elvai  wpo 
avTTJs  yiuos  f]u  TO  yeviKdoraTov. 

TrapaKoXovdrjTiKY]  dvvafjLts,  i],  the  power  which  enables  us  to  observe 
and  understand. 

Tretcris,  passivity,  opposed  to  ivipyeca  :  also,  affect. 

irepia-Tdaeis,  circumstances,  the  things  which  surround  us  ; 
troubles,  difficulties. 

TreTrpcofi^uT],  ■r),  destiny. 

Tpoaipeais,  purpose,  free  will  (Aristot.  Rhet.  i.  13). 

irpoatpeTd,  Td,  things  which  are  within  our  will  or  power. 

irpoaLpeTLKov,  to,  free  will. 

trpodea-L'i,  a  purpose,  proposition. 

irpovoi.a  (providentia,  Cic),  providence. 


288  INDEX. 

CTKoiros,  object,  purpose. 

CTTOLxe'tov,  element. 

o-vyKaTadeais  (assensio,  approbatio,  Cic),  assent ;  cvyKaTaOicreLi 
(probationes,  Gellius,  XIX.  i). 

avyKplixara,  things  compounded  (ll.  3). 

(r&YKpiats,  the  act  of  combining  elements  out  of  which  a  body  is 
produced,  combination. 

(TiJudeaLS,  ordering,  arrangement  (compositio). 

<Ti(TTT]fxa,  system,  a  thing  compounded  of  parts  which  have  a  cer- 
tain relation  to  one  another. 

f/\?7,  matter,  material. 

iXiKov,  TO,  the  material  principle. 

vire^alpeais,  exception,  reservation  ;  fxed'  vire^aipeaecjs,  con- 
ditionally. 

VTTodeais,  material  to  work  on  ;  thing  to  employ  the  reason  on  ; 
proposition,  thing  assumed  as  matter  for  argument  and  to  lead 
to  conclusions.  (Quaestionum  duo  sunt  genera  ;  alteram  infini- 
tum, definitum  alteram.  Definitum  est,  quod  virodeaiv  Graeci, 
nos  causam  :  infinitum,  quod  decxLv  illi  appellant,  nos  proposi' 
turn  possumus  nominare.   Cic.   See  Aristot.  Anal.  Post,  i.  c.  2). 

iTTOKei/xeva,  rd,  things  present  or  existing,  Vi.  4  ;  or  things  which 
are  a  basis  or  foundation. 

viro\rj\pLS,  opinion. 

{nrbcTTacns,  basis,  substance,  being,  foundation  (x.  5).  Epictetus 
has  t6  viroaTaTLKov  kol  omiCobe^.     (Justinus  ad  Diogn.  c.  2.) 

{}(f)i(rTaa9ai,  to  subsist,  to  be. 

(paPTacriai  (visus,  Cic.)  ;  appearances,  thoughts,  impressions  (visa 
animi,  Gellius,  XIX.  i)  :  (jyavTaala  earl  T^nrwcris  iu  xpvxfh 

ipavTaa/jLa,  seems  to  be  used  by  Antoninus  in  the  same  sense  as 
(pavTaaia.     Epictetus  uses  only  ^avracria. 

<f)avTa(yT6v,  that  which  produces  a  (pavraaia  :  (pavraarbv  rb 
TeTrairjKos  rrjv  Kpauraaiav  aicrdrjTov. 

<})v<jLs,  nature. 

(pvais,  7}  Twv  oXdjp,  the  nature  of  the  universe. 

i^vxv,  soul,  life,  living  principle. 

^pvxv  XoyiKT),  voepd,  a  rational'  soul,  an  intelligent  soul. 


GENERAL     INDEX. 


*^*  The  paragraphs  (par.)  and  lines  (1.)  are  those  of  the  sections. 


Active,  man  is  by  nature,  ix.  i6. 

Advice  from  the  good  to  be  taken,  vi.  21  ;  viir.  16. 

Affectation,  vii.  60 ;  viii.  30 ;  xi.  18  (par.  9),  19. 

Anger  discouraged,  VI.  26,  27  ;  Xl.  18. 

Anger,  offences  of,  ii.  10. 

Anger,  uselessness  of,  v.  28 ;  viii.  4, 

Appearances  not  to  be  regarded,  v.  36 ;  vi.  3,  13. 

Astonishment  should  not  be  felt  at  anything  that  happens, 

VIII.  15;  XII.  I  (sub  fine),  13. 
Attainment,  what  is  within  everyone's,  vii.  67  ;  vili.  8. 
Attention  to  what  is  said  or  done,  vi.  53;  vil.  4,  30;  Vlll.  22. 

Bad,  the,  11.  r. 
Beautiful,  the,  11.  i. 

Causal.     See  Formal. 

Change  keeps  the  world  ever  new,  vil.  25 ;  viii.  50  (1.  13) ; 

XII.  23  (1.  10). 
Change,  law  of,  iv.  3  (sub  f.),  36,  v.  13,  23;  vi.  4,  15,  36; 

VII.  18;  VIII.  6;  IX.  19,  28  (par.  2),  35;  x.  7,  18;  xii.  21. 
Change,  no  evil  in,  IV.  42. 
Christians,  the,  xi.  3. 
Circle,  things  come  round  in  a,  11.  14. 
19 


290  INDEX. 

Comedy,  new,  xi.  6. 

Comedy,  old,  xi.  6. 

Complaining,  uselessness  of,  Vlll.  17,  50. 

Connection.     See  Universe. 

Conquerors  are  robbers,  x.  10. 

Contentment.     See  Resignation. 

Co-operation.    See  Mankind  and  Universe. 


Daemon,  the,  11.  13,  17  ;  iii.  6  (1.  8),  7, 16  (1. 14) ;  v.  10  (sub  f.) 

27;  XII.  3  (subf.). 
Death,  11,  11,  12,  17  ;  iii.  3,  7  ;  iv.  5 ;  v.  33 ;  vi.  2,  24,  28  ;  vir. 

32;  VIII.  20,  58;  IX.  3,  21  ;  X.  36;  XII.  23,  34,  35. 
Death  inevitable,  in.  3  ;  iv.  3  (1.  19),  6,  32,  48,  50  ;  ^.ZZ\  vi-  47  ; 

VIII.  25,  31. 
Desire,  offences  of,  11.  10. 

Destiny,  III.  11    (1.  19);  iv.  26;  v.  8  (1.8,  etc.),  24;  vii.  57; 
•  X.  5. 

Discontent.     See  Resignation. 

Doubts  discussed,  vi.  10  ;  vii.  75  ;  ix.  28,  39  ;  xii.  5,  14. 
Duty,  all-importance  of,  vi.  2,  22 ;  x.  22. 


Earth,  insignificance  of  the,  iii.  10;  iv.  3  (par.  2,  sub  f.)  ;  vi. 

36;  VIII.  21  ;  XII.  32. 
Earthly  things,  transitory  nature  of,  il.   12,  17  ;  iv.  32,  33,  35, 

48;    V.  23;  VI.  15,  36;  VII.  21,  34;  VIII.  21,25;  X.  18,  31; 

XII.  27. 
Earthly  things,  worthlessness  of,  11.  12  ;  v.  10,  33  ;  vi.  15;  vii. 

3  ;  IX.  24,  36  ;  XI.  2  ;  XII.  27. 
Equanimity,  x.  8. 

Example,  we  should  not  follow  bad,  vi.  6;  vii.  65. 
Existence,  meanness  of,  viii.  24. 
Existence,  the  object  of,  v.  i  ;  viii.  19, 
External  things  cannot  really  harm  a  man,  or  affect  the  soul, 

II.  II   (1.  12)  ;  IV.  3  (sub  i.),  8,  39,  49  (par.  2)  ;  v.  35;  vii. 

64 ;  VIII.  I  (sub  f.),  32,  51  (par.  2) ;  ix.  31  ;  x.  33. 


INDEX.  291 

Failure,  x.  12. 

Fame,  worthlessness  of,  III.  lo;  iv.  3  (1.  34),  19,  33  (1,  10)  ;  v. 

33 ;  VI.  16,  18  ;  VII.  34  ;  VIII.  l,  44 ;   ix.  30. 
Fear,  what  we  ought  to,  Xil.  i  (1.  18). 
Fellowship.     See  Mankind. 
Few  things  necessary  for   a  virtuous  and  happy  life,  ii.  5  ;  in. 

id;  VII.  67  ;  X.  8  (1.  22). 
Flattery,  Xi.  18  (par.  10). 
Formal,  the,  and  the  material,  iv.  21   (par.  2) ;  v.  13  ;  vii.  10, 

29 ;  VIII.  II  ;  IX.  25  ;  xii.  8,  10,  18. 
Future,  we  should  not  be  anxious  about  the  vii.  8  ;  viii.  36; 

XII.  I. 


Gods,  perfect  justice  of  the,  xii.  5  (par.  2). 
Gods,  the,  vi.  44  ;  xii.  28. 
Gods,  the,  cannot  be  evil,  11.  11  ;  vi.  44. 
Good,  the,  11.  i. 


Habit  of  thought,  V.  16. 

Happiness,  what  is  true,  v.  9  (sub  f.),  34 ;  vill.  i  ;  x.  33. 

Help  to  be  accepted  from  others,  vii.  7. 

Heroism,  true,  XI.  18  (par.  10). 

Ignorance.     See  Wrong-doing. 

Independence.     See  Self-reliance. 

Indifferent   things,   ii.    11    (sub   f.) ;    IV.   39;    VI.   32;    ix.    i 

(I.30). 
Individual,  the.     See  Interests. 
Infinity.     See  Time. 
Ingratitude.     See  Mankind. 
Injustice,  ix.  i. 
Intelligent  soul,  rational  beings  participate  in  the  same,  iv.  40 ; 

IX.  8,  9  ;  X.  I  (1.  15)  ;  xii.  26,  30. 
Interests  of  the  whole  and  the  individual  identical,  iv.  23 ;  v.  8 

(1.  29)  ;  VI.  45,  54;  X.  6,  20,  33  (sub  f.)  ;  xii.  23  (1.  12). 


292  INDEX. 

Justice,  V.  34 ;  x.  11 ;  xi.  10. 

Justice  and  reason  identical,  xi.  i  (sub  f.). 

Justice  prevails  everywhere,  iv.  10. 

Leisure,  we  have  ought  to  have  some,  viii.  51. 

Life,  a  good,  everywhere  possible,  v.  16. 

Life  can  only  be  lived  once,  11.  14;  x.  31  (1.  11). 

Life,  shortness  of,  11.  4,  17  ;  in.  10,  14 ;  iv.  17,  48  (sub  f.),  50 ; 

VI.  15.36,  56;  X.  31,  34. 
Life  to  be  made  a  proper  use  of,  without  delay,  11.  4  ;  iii.  i,  14 ; 

IV.  17,  37  ;  vii.  56 ;  VIII.  22 ;  x.  31  (1.  14)  ;  xii.  i  (1.  18). 
Life,  whether  long  or  short,  matters  not,  vi.  49;  ix.  33  ;  xii.  36. 

Magnanimity,  x.  8. 

Mankind,  co-operation  and  fellowship  of,  one  with  another,  11. 
I  (1.  II),  16  ;  III.  4  (sub  f.),    II    (sub  f.)  ;  iv.  4,  33  (sub  f.)  ; 

V.  16  (1.  II),  20;  VI.  7,  14  (subf.),  23,39;  VII.  5,  13,  22,  55; 
VIII.  12,  26,  34,  43,  59;  IX.  I,  9  (sub  f.),  23,  31,  42  (sub  f  ) ; 
x.  36  (1.  16)  ;  XI.  8,  21  ;  Xii.  20. 

Mankind,  folly  and  baseness  of,  v.  10  (1.  9)  ;  ix.  2,3  (1.  13),  29; 

X.  15,  19. 
'  Mankind,  ingratitude  of,  x.  36. 
Material,  the.     See  Formal. 

Nature,  after  products  of,  ill.  2  ;  VI.  36. 

Nature,  bounds  fixed  by,  v.  i. 

Nature,  man  formed  by,  to  bear  all  that  happens  to  him,  v.  18 ; 

VIII.  46. 
Nature,  nothing   evil,  which   is   according  to,  ii.  17   (sub  f.) ; 

VI.  ZZ- 

Nature  of  the  universe.     See  Universe,  nothing  that  happens  is 

contrary  to  the  nature  of  the. 
Nature,  perfect  beauty  of,  in.  2  ;  vi.  36. 
Nature,  we  should  live  according  to,  iv.  48  (sub  f.),  51  ;  v.  3, 

25;  VI.  16  (1.  12)  ;  vii.  15,  55;  VIII.  I,  54;  X.  T,2>- 
New,  nothing,  under  the  sun,  n.  14  (1.  11)  ;  iv.  44;  VI.  -};],  46; 

VII.  I,  49;  VIII.  6;  IX.  14;  X.  27;  XI.  I. 


INDEX.  293 

Object,  we  should  always  act  with  a  view  to  some,  ir.  7,  16 
(1.  12) ;  III.  4 ;  IV.  2;  viir.  17  ;  x.  37  ;  xi.  21  ;  xir.  20. 

Obsolete,  all  things  become,  iv.  23' 

Omissions,  sins  of,  ix.  5. 

Opinion,  iv.  3  (sub  f.),  7,  12,  39;  vr.  52,  57  ;  vii.  2,  14,  16,  26, 
68;  VIII.  14,  29,  40,  47,  49  ;  IX.  13,  29  (1.  9),  32,  42  (1.  21)  ; 
X.  3;    XI.   16,  18;    XII.  22,  25. 

Others'   conduct  not    to   be    inquired    into,   in.  4 ;    iv.    18 ; 

V.  25. 
Others,  opinion  of,  to  be  disregarded,  viii.  i  (1.  9)  ;  x.  8  (1.  12), 

11;   XI.  13;   XII.  4. 

Others,  we  should  be  lenient  towards,  11.  13  (sub  f.)  ;  in.  11 
(sub  f.)  ;  IV.  3  (1.  16) ;  v.  ^^3  (1.  17)  ;  vi.  20,  27  ;  vii.  26,  62, 
63,  70 ;  IX.  II,  27 ;  X.  4 ;  XI.  9,  13,  18  ;  xii.  16. 

Others,  we  should  examine  the  ruling  principles  of,  iv.  ^8  ;  ix. 
18,  22,  27,  34. 

Ourselves  often  to  blame,  for  expecting  men  to  act  contrary  to 
their  nature,  IX.  42  (1.  25). 

Ourselves,  reformation  should  begin  with,  xi.  29, 

Ourselves,  we  should  judge,  x.  30;  xi.  18  (par.  4). 

Pain,  VII.  23,  64  ;  viii.  28. 

Perfection  not  to  be  expected  in  this  world,  ix.  29  (1.  7). 

Perseverance,  v.  9  ;  x.  12. 

Persuasion,  to  be  used,  vi.  50. 

Perturbation,  vi.  16  (sub  f.) ;  vii.  58  ;  ix.  31. 

Pessimism,  ix.  35. 

Philosophy,  v.  9;  vi.  12  ;  ix.  41  (1.  12). 

Pleasure,  he  who  pursues,  is  guilty  of  impiety,  IX.  i  (1.  19). 

Pleasures  are  enjoyed  by  the  bad,  vi.  34;  ix.  i  (1.  23). 

Power,  things  in  our  own,  v.  5,  10  (sub  f.) ;  vi.  32,  41,  52,  58  ; 
VII.  2,  14,  54,  68;  X.  32,  33. 

Power,  things  not  in  our  own,  v.  33  (sub  f.)  ;  vi.  41. 

Practice  is  good,  even  in  things  which  we  despair  of  accom- 
plishing, XII.  6. 

Praise,  worthlessness  of,  III.  4  (sub  f.)  ;  iv.  20 ;  vi.  16,  59;  vii. 
62;  viii.  52,  53;  IX.  34. 


294  INDEX. 

Prayer,  the  right  sort  of,  v.  7  ;  ix.  40. 

Present  time  the  only  thing  a  man  really  possesses,  li.  14;  iir. 

10 ;  VIII.  44  ;  XII.  3  (sub  f.). 
Procrastination.     See  Life  to  be  made  a  proper  use  of,  etc. 
Puppet  pulled  by  strings  of  desire,  il.  2;  in.   16;  vi.  16,28; 

VII.  3,  29;  XII.  19. 

Rational  soul.     See  Ruling  part. 

Rational  soul,  spherical  form  of  the,  viil.  41    (sub  f.) ;  xi.  12; 

XII.  3  (and  see  Ruling  part). 
Reason,  all-prevailing,  v.  32  ;  vi.  i,  40. 
Reason  and  nature  identical,  vii.  11. 
Reason,  the,  can  adapt  everything  that  happens  to  its  own  use, 

v.  20  ;  VI.  8 ;  VII.  68  (1.  13)  ;  viii.  35;  x.  31  (sub  f.). 
Reason,  we  should  live  according  to.     See  Nature. 
Repentance  does  not  follow  renouncement  of  pleasure,  viii.  10. 
Resignation  and  contentment,  ill.  4  (1.  27,  etc.),  16  (1.  10,  etc.) ; 

IV.  23,  31,  y^  (sub  f.),  34  ;  V.  8,  2>Z  (1-  16) ;  vi.  16  (sub  f.), 

44,  49  ;  VII.  27,  57  ;   IX.  37  ;  X.  I,  II,  14,  25,  28,  35. 
Revenge,  best  kind  of,  vi.  6. 
Rising  from  bed,  v.  i  ;  viil.  12. 
Ruling  part,  the,  li.  2  ;  IV.  I  ;  v.  ii,  19,  21,  26;  VI.  14,  35  ;  vii. 

16,  55  (par.  2)  ;  viil.  45,  48,  56,  57,  60,  61  ;  IX.  15,  26;  X.  24, 

33  (1.  16),  38  ;  XI.  I,  19,  20  ;  XII.  3,  14. 


Self-reliance  and  steadfastness  of  soul,iii.  5  (sub  f.),  12  ;  iv.  11, 

29  (1-  5).  49  (par.  i)  ;  v.  3,  34  (1.  5)  ;  vi.  44  (1.  15)  ;  vii.  12, 

15 ;  IX,  28  (1.  8),  29  (sub  f.)  ;  xii.  14. 
Self-restraint,  v.  33  (sub  f.). 
Self,  we  should  retire  into,  iv.  3  (I.  4  and  par.  2) ;  vii.  28,  2>Z> 

59;   VIII.  48. 
Senses,  movements  of  the,  to  be  disregarded,  v.  31   (1.   10)  ; 

VII.  55   (par.  2);   VIII.  26,   39;  X.  8  (1.  9);  xi.  19;   xii.  i 

(1.  II). 
Sickness,  behavior  in,  ix.  41. 
Social.     See  Mankind. 


INDEX.  295 

Steadfastness  of  soul.     See  Self-reliance. 

Substance,  the  universal,  iv.  40;  v.  24  ;  vii.  19,  23;  xii.  30. 

Suicide,  v.  29 ;  viir.  47  (sub  f.) ;  x.  8  (1.  27). 

Time  compared  to  a  river,  iv.  43. 

Time,  infinity  of,  iv.  3  (1.  35),  50  (sub  f.)  ;  v.   24  ;  ix,  32;  xii. 

7,  32- 
Tragedy,  xi.  6. 
Tranquillity  of  soul,  iv.  3  ;  VI.  11 ;  vii.  68  ;  Viii.  28. 

Ugly,  the,  Ti.  1. 

Unintelligible  things,  v.  10. 

Universe,  harmony  of  the,  IV.  27,  45  ;  v.  8  (1.  14). 

Universe,  intimate  connection  and  co-operation  of  all  things  in 

the,  one  with  another,  i[.  3,  9;  iv.  29;  v.  8,  30;  vi.  38,  42, 

43  ;  VII.  9,  19,  68  (sub  f.)  ;  VIII.  7;  ix.  i  ;  x.  i. 
Universe,  nothing  that  dies  falls  out  of  the,  viii.  18,  50  (1.  9)  ; 

X.  7  (1.  18).  ^ 
Universe,  nothing  that  happens  is  contrary  to  the  nature  of  the, 

V,  8,  10  (sub  f.)  ;  VI.  9,  58  ;  VIII.  5 ;  Xll.  26. 
Unnecessary  things,  v.  15. 
Unnecessary  thoughts,  words,  and  actions,  ill.  4 ;  iv.  24. 

Vain  professions,  x.  16;  XI.  15. 

Virtue,  vi.  17. 

Virtue  its  own  reward,  v.  6  ;  vii.  73;  ix.  42  (1.  36) ;  xi.  4. 

Virtue,  omnipotence  of,  iv.  16. 

Virtue,  pleasure  in  contemplating,  vi.  48. 

Whole,  integrity  of  the,  to  be  preserved,  v.  8  (sub  f.). 

Whole,  the.     See  Interests. 

Wickedness  has  always  existed,  vii.  i. 

Wickedness  must  exist  in  the  world,  viii.  15,  50;  ix.  42;  xi. 

18  (par.  11)  ;  xii.  16. 
Worst  evil,  the,  ix.  2  (1.  7). 


296  INDEX. 

Worth  and  importance,  things  of  real,  iv.  33  (sub  f.)  ;  v.  10 

(1.  16) ;  VI.  16,  30  (1.  7),  47  (sub  f.) ;  vii.  20,  44,  46,  58,  66; 

VIII.  2,  3,  5;  IX.  6,  12;  X.  8  (1.  22),  II  ;  XII.  I,  27,  31,  ^^. 
Wrong-doing  cannot  really  harm  anyone,  vii.  22;  viii.  55;  ix. 

42  (1.  19)  ;  X.  13  (par.  i)  ;  xi.  18  (par.  7). 
Wrong-doing  injures  the  wrong-doer,  iv.  26;  ix.  4,  38;  xi.  18 

(par.  3). 
Wrong-doing  owing  to  ignorance,  li.  i,  13;  vi.  27;  Vil.  22,  26, 

62,  63;  XI.  18;  XII.  12. 
Wrong-doing  to  be  left  where  it  is,  vii.  29 ;  ix.  20. 


THE   END.