Three dialogues between Hylas and Philonous

HP.EE DIALOGUES

BETWEEN

LAS HND PHILONOXJS

BERKCLCY

GEORGE BERKELEY.

(1685-1753.^
From an Engraving by T. Cooke.

THREE DIALOGUES

HYLAS AND PHILONOUS

GEORGE BERKELEY

REPRINT EDITION

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THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY

LONDON AGENTS

KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRUBNER & Co., LTD.
1906

Annex

EDITOR'S PREFACE.

THE bulk of the introductory matter requisite to an understand-
ing of Berkeley's Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Phi-
lonous has already been given in the Preface to his Principles of
Human Knowledge (No. 48 of the Religion of Science Library),
which is supposed to be in the hands of the reader, and to which
he is referred. It remains for us in this place simply to supply a
few general characterisations and to refer again to Berkeley's re-

WHITEHALL, DEAN BERKELEY'S RESIDENCE IN RHODE ISLAND.

lations to Hume and to modern psychology. We also take advan-
tage of this opportunity to reproduce two illustrations of Berkeley's
Rhode Island home, which will impart a human interest to our
little work, and bring it nearer to our American readers. It was
in Rhode Island that Alcifhron was composed, — dialogues "better
fitted than any in our language to enable the English reader to
realise the charm of Cicero and Plato. ... In Rhode Island, Ber-

iv

PREFACE.

keley was accustomed to study in an alcove among the rocks on
that magnificent coast, in a region where he had exchanged the
society of the philosophers and men of letters of London and Paris
for a solitude occasionally broken by the unsophisticated mission-
aries of the New England plantations, who travelled great dis-
tances to converse with him."1

The Three Dialogues Between ffylas and Philonous, which
were first published in London, in 1713, 2 have been styled by Pro-

BERKELEY'S ALCOVE, HANGING ROCKS, RHODE ISLAND.
In this alcove parts of Alciphron are said to have been composed.

fessor Fraser "the gem of British metaphysical literature." He
says : ' ' Berkeley's claim to be the great modern master of Socratic

1 Quoted from Prof. A. Campbell Eraser's The Works of George Berkeley,
four volumes, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1871. The illustrations of Berkeley's
Rhode Island home here reproduced have also been taken from this admir-
able and careful work, .which is the authoritative and definitive edition of
Berkeley's writings, and to which the reader is referred for an exhaustive
study of Berkeley's philosophy and life.

S A second edition appeared in 1725 ; a third, with additions in 1734. This
was the last in the author's life-time.

PREFACE. V

dialogue rests, indeed, upon Alcifhron, which surpasses the con-
versations between Hylas and Philonous in expression of individ-
ual character, and in general dramatic effect. Here the conversa-
tional form is adopted merely as a convenient way of treating the
chief objections to the theory of Matter which is contained in the
Principles of Human Knowledge. But the clearness of thought
and language, the occasional coloring of fancy, and the glow of
practical human sympathy and earnestness that pervade the subtle
reasonings by which the fallacies of metaphysics are inexorably
pursued through these discussions, place the following Dialogues
almost alone in the modern metaphysical library. Among those
who have employed the English language, except perhaps Hume
and Ferrier, none approach Berkeley in the art of uniting deep
metaphysical thought and ingenious speculation with an easy,
graceful, and transparent style. Our surprise and admiration are
increased when we recollect that this charming production of rea-
son and imagination came from Ireland, at a time when that coun-
try was scarcely known in the world of letters and philosophy."

The contents of the three Dialogues, which are a popular
presentation of the Principles, and were written in refutation of
the objections that had been raised to the new doctrine of sensible
as distinguished from absolute things, propounded in the earlier
work, may be briefly summarised as follows :

The First Dialogue aims to show the repugnancy or contra-
dictory nature of the philosophical dogma of the absolute existence
of a material reality or world-in-itself, independent of a perceiving
or conceiving mind; the argument being that under no circum-
stances can such a material world be perceived either immediately
or mediately. The Second Dialogue seeks to show that the exist-
ence of this metaphysical, supersensible world of matter also can-
not be reached by inference, that is, cannot be demonstrated. The
Third Dialogue is devoted to the refutation of objections; for
example, that the new doctrine is skeptical ; that, with absolute
material substance, it also implicitly disproves the existence of
absolute spiritual substance, that is to say, of the ego ; etc., etc.

The last-named objection, the most important of all. was an-
swered by Berkeley in a passage inserted in the third edition (see
page 93 et seq.), considered by Professor Fraser the most remark-
able in the Dialogues, but in our opinion one of the weakest.
Professor Fraser says: "It is, by anticipation, Berkeley's answer
to Hume's application of the objections to the reality and possibil-

VI PREFACE.

ity of Absolute or Unknown Matter, to che reality and possibility
of the Ego or Self of which we are aware through memory, as
identical amid the changes of its ideas or successive states."

As a fact, Berkeley's system leads logically to the conclusion
which he seeks to controvert in this passage. Hylas truly re-
marks : "Notwithstanding all you have said, to me it seems that,
according to your own way of thinking, and in consequence of your
own principles, it should follow that you are only a system of
floating ideas, without any substance to support them. Words are
not to be used without a meaning. And, as there is no more mean-
ing in spiritual Substance than in material Substance, the one is
to be exploded as well as the other." (Page 95.)

Berkeley answers: " How often must I repeat, that I know or
am convinced of my own being ; and that / myself am not my
ideas, but somewhat else, a thinking, active principle that per-
ceives, knows, wills, and operates about ideas," etc., p. 95.

Subjectively, the force of this answer depends entirely upon
one's personal point of view. But the fact remains that both
Hylas and Hume have been upheld by modern scientific psychol-
ogy1 in their rejection of an ego-entity, and that Berkeley in his
contention has not. Perhaps this is the only element lacking, to
have made Berkeley's system a perfect spiritualistic theological
monism. Nevertheless, its beauty and consistency reposed entirely
on the arbitrary hypothesis of existence in God, on the intervention
of a deus ex machina, and it stood in this respect on the same
footing and met the same destiny, as Malebranche's Occasionalism
and Leibnitz's Pre-established Harmony.

THOMAS J. McCoRMACK.

LA SALLE, ILL.

ISee Ribot, Dittafts of Personality, Chicago, The Open Court Pub. Co.

THREE

DIALOGUES

BETWEEN

Hylas and PMlonous.

The Defign of which

Is plainly to demonftrate the Reality and
Perfection of Humane Knowlege, the In-
corporeal Nature of the Soul, and the Im-
mediate Providence of a DEITY:

In Oppofition to

SCEPTICS and ATHEISTS

ALSO,

To open a METHOD for rendering the
SCIENCES more eafy, ufeful, and
compendious.

By George Berkeley^ M. A.
Fellow of 7r/#/Vy-College,
Dublin.

LONDON:

Printed by G. James, for HENRY CLEMENTS,
at the Half-Moon, in S. Paul's Church-
yard. MDCCXIII.

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

THE

LORD BERKELEY OF STRATTON,

MASTER OF THE ROLLS IN THE KINGDOM OF IRELAND,

CHANCELLOR OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER, AND

ONE OF THE LORDS OF HER MAJESTY'S MOST

HONOURABLE PRIVY COUNCIL.

MY LORD,

The virtue, learning, and good sense which are
acknowledged to distinguish your character, would
tempt me to indulge myself the pleasure men natu-
rally take in giving applause to those whom they es-
teem and honour: and it should seem of importance
to the subjects of Great Britain that they knew the
eminent share you enjoy in the favour of your sover-
eign, and the honours she has conferred upon you,
have not been owing to any application from your
lordship, but entirely to her majesty's own thought,
arising from a sense of your personal merit, and an
inclination to reward it. But, as your name is pre-
fixed to this treatise with an intention to do honour to
myself alone, I shall only say that I am encouraged
by the favour you have treated me with, to address
these papers to your lordship. And I was the more
ambitious of doing this, because a Philosophical Trea-

2 DEDICATION.

tise could not so properly be addressed to any one as
to a person of your lordship's character, who, to your
other valuable distinctions, have added the knowledge
and relish of Philosophy.

I am, with the greatest respect,

My Lord,

Your lordship's most obedient and
most humble servant,

GEORGE BERKELEY.1

1 Not published in the third edition, of 1734.

THE PREFACE.1

THOUGH it seems the general opinion of the
world, no less than the design of nature and
providence, that the end of speculation be Practice,
or the improvement and regulation of our lives and
actions ; yet those who are most addicted to specula-
tive studies, seem as generally of another mind. And,
indeed, if we consider the pains that have been taken
to perplex the plainest things — that distrust of the
senses, those doubts and scruples, those abstractions
and refinements that occur in the very entrance of the
sciences ; it will not seem strange that men of leisure
and curiosity should lay themselves out in fruitless
disquisitions, without descending to the practical
parts of life, or informing themselves in the more ne-
cessary and important parts of knowledge.

Upon the common principles of philosophers, we
are not assured of the existence of things from their
being perceived. And we are taught to distinguish
their real nature from that which falls under our sen-
ses. Hence arises Scepticism and Paradoxes. It is
not enough that we see and feel, that we taste and
smell a thing : its true nature, its absolute external
entity, is still concealed. For, though it be the fic-
tion of our own brain, we have made it inaccessible
to all our faculties. Sense is fallacious, reason defec-

IThis Preface was omitted by the author in the edition of 1734.

4 PREFACE.

tive. We spend our lives in doubting of those things
which other men evidently know, and believing those
things which they laugh at and despise.

In order, therefore, to divert the busy mind of
man from vain researches, it seemed necessary to in-
quire into the source of its perplexities ; and, if pos-
sible, to lay down such Principles as, by an easy so-
lution of them, together with their own native evi-
dence, may at once recommend themselves for genuine
to the mind, and rescue it from those endless pursuits
it is engaged in. Which with a plain demonstration
of the Immediate Providence of an all-seeing God,
and the natural Immortality of the soul, should seem
the readiest preparation, as well as the strongest mo-
tive, to the study and practice of virtue.

This design I proposed in the First Part of a trea-
tise concerning Principles of Human Knowledge, pub-
lished in the year 1710. But, before I proceed to
publish the Second Part, I thought it requisite to
treat more clearly and fully of certain Principles laid
down in the First, and to place them in a new light.
Which is the business of the following Dialogues.

In this treatise, which does not presuppose in the
reader any knowledge of what was contained in the
former, it has been my aim to introduce the notions I
advance into the mind in the most easy and familiar
manner ; especially because they carry with them a
great opposition to the prejudices of philosophers,
which have so far prevailed against the common sense
and natural notions of mankind.

If the principles which I here endeavour to propa-
gate are admitted for true, the consequences which, I
think, evidently flow from thence are, that Atheism
and Scepticism will be utterly destroyed, many intri-

PREFACE. 5

cate points made plain, great difficulties solved, sev-
eral useless parts of science retrenched, speculation
referred to practice, and men reduced from paradoxes
to common sense.

And, although it may, perhaps, seem an uneasy
reflexion to some that, when they have taken a circuit
through so many refined and unvulgar notions, they
should at last come to think like other men ; yet, me-
thinks, this return to the simple dictates of nature,
after having wandered through the wild mazes of phi-
losophy, is not unpleasant. It is like coming home
from a long voyage : a man reflects with pleasure on
the many difficulties and perplexities he has passed
through, sets his heart at ease, and enjoys himself
with more satisfaction for the future.

As it was my intention to convince Sceptics and
Infidels by reason, so it has been my endeavour
strictly to observe the most rigid laws of reasoning.
And, to an impartial reader, I hope it will be mani-
fest that the sublime notion of a God, and the com-
fortable expectation of Immortality, do naturally arise
from a close and methodical application of thought —
whatever may be the result of that loose, rambling
way, not altogether improperly termed Free-thinking,
by certain libertines in thought, who can no more en-
dure the restraints of logic than those of religion or
government.

It will perhaps be objected to my design that, so
far as it tends to ease the mind of difficult and useless
inquiries, it can affect only a few speculative persons ;
but, if by their speculations rightly placed, the study
of morality and the law of nature were brought more
into fashion among men of parts and genius, the dis-
couragements that draw to Scepticism removed, the

6 PREFACE.

measures of right and wrong accurately denned, and
the principles of Natural Religion reduced into regu-
lar systems, as artfully disposed and clearly connected
as those of some other sciences : there are grounds to
think these effects would not only have a gradual in-
fluence in repairing the too much defaced sense of
virtue in the world ; but also, by showing that such
parts of revelation as lie within the reach of human
inquiry are most agreeable to right reason, would dis-
pose all prudent, unprejudiced persons to a modest
and wary treatment of those sacred mysteries which
are above the comprehension of our faculties.

It remains that I desire the reader to withhold his
censure of these Dialogues till he has read them
through. Otherwise he may lay them aside, in a mis-
take of their design, or on account of difficulties or
objections which he would find answered in the sequel.
A treatise of this nature would require to be once
read over coherently, in order to comprehend its de-
sign, the proofs, solution of difficulties, and the con-
nexion and disposition of its parts. If it be thought
to deserve a second reading, this, I imagine, will
make the entire scheme very plain ; especially if re-
course be had to an Essay I wrote some years since
upon Vision, and the Treatise concerning the Prin-
ciples of Human Knowledge — wherein divers notions
advanced in these Dialogues are farther pursued, or
placed in different lights, and other points handled
which naturally tend to confirm and illustrate them.

THREE DIALOGUES

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS, IN OPPOSI-
TION TO SCEPTICS AND ATHEISTS

THE FIRST DIALOGUE

Philonous.

GOOD morning, Hylas : I did not expect to find
you abroad so early.

HyL It is indeed something unusual; but my
thoughts were so taken up with a subject I was dis-
coursing of last night, that finding I could not sleep,
I resolved to rise and take a turn in the garden.

Phil. It happened well, to let you see what inno-
cent and agreeable pleasures you lose every morning.
Can there be a pleasanter time of the day, or a more
delightful season of the year? That purple sky, those
wild but sweet notes of birds, the fragrant bloom upon
the trees and flowers, the gentle influence of the rising
sun, these and a thousand nameless beauties of nature
inspire the soul with secret transports ; its faculties
too being at this time fresh and lively, are fit for these
meditations, which the solitude of a garden and tran.
quillity of the morning naturally dispose us to. But
I am afraid I interrupt your thoughts : for you seemed
very intent on something.

HyL It is true, I was, and shall be obliged to you
if you will permit me to go on in the same vein ; not

8 THE FIRST DIALOGUE

that I would by any means deprive myself of your
company, for my thoughts always flow more easily in
conversation with a friend, than when I am alone :
but my request is, that you would suffer me to impart
my reflexions to you.

Phil. With all my heart, it is what I should have
requested myself if you had not prevented me.

Hyl. I was considering the old fate of those men
who have in all ages, through an affectation of being
distinguished from the vulgar, or some unaccountable
turn of thought, pretended either to believe nothing
at all, or to believe the most extravagant things in
the world. This however might be borne, if their
paradoxes and scepticism did not draw after them
some consequences of general disadvantage to man-
kind. But the mischief lieth here ; that when men of
less leisure see them who are supposed to have spent
their whole time in the pursuits of knowledge pro-
fessing an entire ignorance of all things, or advancing
such notions as are repugnant to plain and commonly
received principles, they will be tempted to entertain
suspicions concerning the most important truths, which
they had hitherto held sacred and unquestionable.

Phil. I entirely agree with you, as to the ill ten-
dency of the affected doubts of some philosophers,
and fantastical conceits of others. I am even so far
gone of late in this way of thinking, that I have quitted
several of the sublime notions I had got in their
schools for vulgar opinions. And I give it you on my
word, since this revolt from metaphysical notions, to
the plain dictates of nature and common sense, I find
my understanding strangely enlightened, so that I can
now easily comprehend a great many things which
before were all mystery and riddle.

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 9

Hyl. I am glad to find there was nothing in the
accounts I heard of you.

Phil. Pray, what were those?

Hyl. You were represented in last night's conver-
sation, as one who maintained the most extravagant
opinion that ever entered into the mind of man, to
wit, that there is no such thing as material substance
in the world.

Phil. That there is no such thing as what Philos-
ophers call material substance, I am seriously per-
suaded : but, if I were made to see anything absurd
or sceptical in this, I should then have the same rea-
son to renounce this that I imagine I have now to re-
ject the contrary opinion.

Hyl. What ! can anything be more fantastical,
more repugnant to common sense, or a more manifest
piece of Scepticism, than to believe there is no such
thing as matter?

Phil. Softly, good Hylas. What if it should prove,
that you, who hold there is, are, by virtue of that
opinion, a greater sceptic, and maintain more para-
doxes and repugnances to common sense, than I who
believe no such thing?

Hyl. You may as soon persuade me, the part is
greater than the whole, as that, in order to avoid ab-
surdity and Scepticism, I should ever be obliged to
give up my opinion in this point.

Phil. Well then, are you content to admit that
opinion for true, which, upon examination, shall ap-
pear most agreeable to common sense, and remote
from Scepticism?

Hyl. With all my heart. Since you are for raising
disputes about the plainest things in nature, I am
content for once to hear what you have to say.

IO THE FIRST DIALOGUE

Phil. Pray, Hylas, what do you mean by a sceptic?

Hyl. I mean what all men mean, one that doubts
of everything.

Phil. He then who entertains no doubt concerning
some particular point, with regard to that point can-
not be thought a sceptic.

Hyl. I agree with you.

Phil. Whether doth doubting consist in embracing
the affirmative or negative side of a question?

Hyl. In neither ; for whoever understands English
cannot but know that doubting signifies a suspense be-
tween both.

Phil. He then that denieth any point, can no more
be said to doubt of it, than he who affirmeth it with
the same degree of assurance.

Hyl. True.

Phil. And, consequently, for such his denial is no
more to be esteemed a sceptic than the other.

Hyl. I acknowledge it.

Phil. How cometh it to pass then, Hylas, that you
pronounce me a sceptic, because I deny what you
affirm, to wit, the existence of Matter? Since, for
aught you can tell, I am as peremptory in my denial,
as you in your affirmation.

Hyl. Hold, Philonous, I have been a little out in
my definition ; but every false step a man makes in
discourse is not to be insisted on. I said indeed that
a sceptic was one who doubted of everything ; but I
should have added, or who denies the reality and
truth of things.

Phil. What things? Do you mean the principles
and theorems of sciences? But these you know are
universal intellectual notions, and consequently inde-

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. TI

pendent of Matter ; the denial therefore of this doth
not imply the denying them.

Hyl. I grant it. But are there no other things?
What think you of distrusting the senses, of denying
the real existence of sensible things, or pretending to
know nothing of them. Is not this sufficient to de-
nominate a man a sceptic?

Phil. Shall we therefore examine which of us it is
that denies the reality of sensible things, or professes
the greatest ignorance of them ; since, if I take you
rightly, he is to be esteemed the greatest sceptic?

Hyl. That is what I desire.

Phil. What mean you by Sensible Things?

Hyl. Those things which are perceived by the
senses. Can you imagine that I mean anything else?

Phil. Pardon me, Hylas, if I am desirous clearly
to apprehend your notions, since this may much
shorten our inquiry. Suffer me then to ask you this
farther question. Are those things only perceived by
the senses which are perceived immediately? Or,
may those things properly be said to be sensible which
are perceived mediately, or not without the interven-
tion of others?

Hyl. I do not sufficiently understand you.

Phil. In reading a book, what I immediately per-
ceive are the letters, but mediately, or by means of
these, are suggested to my mind the notions of God,
virtue, truth, &c. Now, that the letters are truly
, sensible things, or perceived by sense, there is no
doubt : but I would know whether you take the things
suggested by them to be so too.

Hyl. No, certainly; it were absurd to think God or
virtue sensible things, though they may be signified

12 THE FIRST DIALOGUE

and suggested to the mind by sensible marks, with
which they have an arbitrary connexion.

Phil. It seems then, that by sensible things you
mean those only which can be perceived immediately
by sense?

Hyl. Right.

Phil. Doth it not follow from this, that though I see
one part of the sky red, and another blue, and that
my reason doth thence evidently conclude there must
be some cause of that diversity of colours, yet that
cause cannot be said to be a sensible thing, or per-
ceived by the sense of seeing?

Hyl. It doth.

Phil. In like manner, though I hear variety of
sounds, yet I cannot be said to hear the causes of
those sounds?

Hyl. You cannot.

Phil. And when by my touch I perceive a thing to
be hot and heavy, I cannot say, with any truth or pro-
priety, that I feel the cause of its heat or weight?

Hyl. To prevent any more questions of this kind,
I tell you once for all, that by sensible things I mean
those only which are perceived by sense, and that in
truth the senses perceive nothing which they do not
perceive immediately: for they make no inferences.
The deducing therefore of causes or occasions from
effects and appearances, w*hich alone are perceived
by sense, entirely relates to reason.

Phil. This point then is agreed between us — that
sensible things are those only which are immediately per-
ceived by sense. You will farther inform me, whether
we immediately perceive by sight anything beside
light, and colours, and figures ; or by hearing, any-
thing but sounds ; by the palate, anything beside

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 13

tastes ; by the smell, beside odours ; or by the touch,
more than tangible qualities.

Hyl. We do not.

Phil. It seems, therefore, that if you take away all
sensible qualities, there remains nothing sensible?

Hyl. I grant it.

Phil. Sensible things therefore are nothing else but
so many sensible qualities, or combinations of sensible
qualities?

Hyl. Nothing else.

Phil. Heat is then a sensible thing?

Hyl. Certainly.

Phil. Doth the reality of sensible things consist in
being perceived? or, is it something distinct from
their being perceived, and that bears no relation to
the mind?

Hyl. To exist is one thing, and to be perceived is
another.

Phil. I speak with regard to sensible things only :
and of these I ask, whether by their real existence you
mean a subsistence exterior to the mind, and distinct
from their being perceived?

Hyl. I mean a real absolute being, distinct from,
and without any relation to their being perceived.

Phil. Heat therefore, if it be allowed a real being,
must exist without the mind?

Hyl. It must.

Phil. Tell me, Hylas, is this real existence equally
compatible to all degrees of heat, which we perceive ;
or is there any reason why we should attribute it to
some, and deny it to others? and if there be, pray let
me know that reason.

Hyl. Whatever degree of heat we perceive by

14 THE FIRST DIALOGUE

sense, we may be sure the same exists in the object
that occasions it.

Phil. What ! the greatest as well as the least?

Hyl. I tell you, the reason is plainly the same in
respect of both : they are both perceived by sense ;
nay, the greater degree of heat is more sensibly per-
ceived ; and consequently, if there is any difference,
we are more certain of its real existence than we can
be of the reality of a lesser degree.

Phil. But is not the most vehement and intense
degree of heat a very great pain?

Hyl. No one can deny it.

Phil. And is any unperceiving thing capable of
pain or pleasure?

Hyl. No certainly.

Phil. Is your material substance a senseless being,
or a being endowed with sense and perception?

Hyl. It is senseless without doubt.

Phil. It cannot therefore be the subject of pain?

Hyl. By no means.

Phil. Nor consequently of the greatest heat per-
ceived by sense, since you acknowledge this to be no
small pain?

Hyl. I grant it.

Phil. What shall we say then of your external ob-
ject ; is it a material Substance, or no?

Hyl. It is a material substance with the sensible
qualities inhering in it.

Phil. How then can a great heat exist in it, since
you own it cannot in a material substance? I desire
you would clear this point.

Hyl. Hold, Philonous, I fear I was out in yielding
intense heat to be a pain. It should seem rather,

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 15

that pain is something distinct from heat, and the
consequence or effect of it.

Phil. Upon putting your hand near the fire, do
you perceive one simple uniform sensation, or two
distinct sensations?

Hyl, But one simple sensation.

Phil. Is not the heat immediately perceived?

Hyl. It is.

Phil. And the pain?

Hyl. True.

Phil. Seeing therefore they are both immediately
perceived at the same time, and the fire affects you
only with one simple, or uncompounded idea, it fol-
lows that this same simple idea is both the intense
heat immediately perceived, and the pain ; and, con-
sequently, that the intense heat immediately per-
ceived, is nothing distinct from a particular sort of
pain.

Hyl. It seems so.

Phil. Again, try in your thoughts, Hylas, if you
can conceive a vehement sensation to be without pain
or pleasure.

Hyl. I cannot.

Phil. Or can you frame to yourself an idea of sen-
sible pain or pleasure, in general, abstracted from
every particular idea of heat, cold, tastes, smells? &c.

Hyl. I do not find that I can.

Phil. Doth it not therefore follow, that sensible
pain is nothing distinct from those sensations or ideas,
— in an intense degree?

Hyl. It is undeniable ; and, to speak the truth, I
begin to suspect a very great heat cannot exist but in
a mind perceiving it.

l6 THE FIRST DIALOGUE

Phil. What! are you then in that sceptical state of
suspense, between affirming and denying?

HyL I think I may be positive in the point. A
very violent and painful heat cannot exist without the
mind.

Phil. It hath not therefore, according to you, any
real being?

Hyl. I own it.

Phil. Is it therefore certain, that there is no body
in nature really hot?

Hyl. I have not denied there is any real heat in
bodies. I only say, there is no such thing as an in-
tense real heat.

Phil. But, did you not say before that all degrees
of heat were equally real ; or, if there was any differ-
ence, that the greater were more undoubtedly real
than the lesser?

Hyl. True : but it was because I did not then con-
sider the ground there is for distinguishing between
them, which I now plainly see. And it is this : — be-
cause intense heat is nothing else but a particular
kind of painful sensation ; and pain cannot exist but
in a perceiving being ; it follows that no intense heat
can really exist in an unperceiving corporeal sub-
stance. But this is no reason why we should deny
heat in an inferior degree to exist in such a substance.

Phil. But how shall we be able to discern those
degrees of heat which exist only in the mind from
those which exist without it?

Hyl. That is no difficult matter. You know the
least pain cannot exist unperceived ; whatever, there-
fore, degree of heat is a pain exists only in the mind.
But, as for all other degrees of heat, nothing obliges
us to think the same of them.

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 17

Phil. I think you granted before that no unper-
ceiving being was capable of pleasure, any more than
of pain.

Hyl. I did.

Phil. And is not warmth, or a more gentle degree
of heat than what causes uneasiness, a pleasure?

Hyl. What then?

Phil. Consequently, it cannot exist without the
mind in an unperceiving substance, or body.

Hyl. So it seems.

Phil. Since, therefore, as well those degrees of
heat that are not painful, as those that are, can exist
only in a thinking substance; may we not conclude
that external bodies are absolutely incapable of any
degree of heat whatsoever?

Hyl. On second thoughts, I do not think it is so
evident that warmth is a pleasure, as that a great de-
gree of heat is a pain.

Phil. I do not pretend that warmth is as great a
pleasure as heat is a pain. But, if you grant it to be
even a small pleasure, it serves to make good my
conclusion.

Hyl. I could rather call it an indolence. It seems
to be nothing more than a privation of both pain and
pleasure. And that such a quality or state as this
may agree to an unthinking substance, I hope you
will not deny.

Phil. If you are resolved to maintain that warmth,
or a gentle degree of heat, is no pleasure, I know not
how to convince you otherwise, than by appealing to
your own sense. But what think you of cold?

Hyl. The same that I do of heat. An intense de-
gree of cold is a pain ; for to feel a very great cold, is
to perceive a great uneasiness : it cannot therefore

l8 THE FIRST DIALOGUE

exist without the mind ; but a lesser degree of cold
may, as well as a lesser degree of heat.

Phil. Those bodies, therefore, upon whose appli-
cation to our own, we perceive a moderate degree of
heat, must be concluded to have a moderate degree
of heat or warmth in them ; and those, upon whose
application we feel a like degree of cold, must be
thought to have cold in them.

Hyl. They must.

Phil. Can any doctrine be true that necessarily
leads a man into an absurdity?

Hyl. Without doubt it cannot.

Phil. Is it not an absurdity to think that the same
thing should be at the same time both cold and warm?

Hyl. It is.

Phil. Suppose now one of your hands hot, and
the other cold, and that they are both at once put
into the same vessel of water, in an intermediate
state ; will not the water seem cold to one hand, and
warm to the other?

Hyl. It will.

Phil. Ought we not therefore, by our principles,
to conclude it is really both cold and warm at the
same time, that is, according to your own concession,
to believe an absurdity?

Hyl. I confess it seems so.

Phil. Consequently, the principles themselves are
false, since you have granted that no true principle
leads to an absurdity.

Hyl. But, after all, can anything be more absurd
than to say, there is no heat in the fire?

Phil. To make the point still clearer ; tell me
whether, in two cases exactly alike, we ought not to
make the same judgment?

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. IQ

Hyl. We ought.

Phil. When a pin pricks your finger, doth it not
rend and divide the fibres of your flesh?

Hyl. It doth.

Phil. And when a coal burns your finger, doth it
any more ?

Hyl. It doth not.

Phil. Since, therefore, you neither judge the sen-
sation itself occasioned by the pin, nor anything like
it to be in the pin ; you should not, conformably to
what you have now granted, judge the sensation oc-
casioned by the fire, or anything like it, to be in the
fire.

Hyl. Well, since it must be so, I am content to
yield this point, and acknowledge that heat and cold
are only sensations existing in our minds. But there
still remain qualities enough to secure the reality of
external things.

Phil. But what will you say, Hylas, if it shall ap-
pear that the case is the same with regard to all other
sensible qualities, and that they can no more be sup-
posed to exist without the mind, than heat and cold?

Hyl. Then indeed you will have done something
to the purpose ; but that is what I despair of seeing
proved.

Phil. Let us examine them in order. What think
you of tastes — do they exist without the mind, or no?

Hyl. Can any man in his senses doubt whether
sugar is sweet, or wormwood bitter?

Phil. Inform me, Hylas. Is a sweet taste a par-
ticular kind of pleasure or pleasant sensation, or is it
not?

Hyl. It is.

20 THE FIRST DIALOGUE

Phil. And is not bitterness some kind of uneasi-
ness or pain ?

Hyl. I grant it.

'Phil. If therefore sugar and wormwood are un-
thinking corporeal substances existing without the
mind, how can sweetness and bitterness, that is, pleas-
ure and pain, agree to them?

Hyl. Hold, Philonous, I now see what it was de-
luded me all this time. You asked whether heat and
cold, sweetness and bitterness, were not particular
sorts of pleasure and pain ; to which I answered sim-
ply, that they were. Whereas I should have thus
distinguished : — those qualities, as perceived by us,
are pleasures or pains ; but not as existing in the ex-
ternal objects. We must not therefore conclude ab-
solutely, that there is no heat in the fire, or sweetness
in the sugar, but only that heat or sweetness, as per-
ceived by us, are not in the fire or sugar. What say
you to this?

Phil. I say it is nothing to the purpose. Our
discourse proceeded altogether concerning sensible
things, which you defined to be, the things we imme-
diately perceive by our senses. Whatever other quali-
ties, therefore, you speak of, as distinct from these, I
know nothing of them, neither do they at all belong
to the point in dispute. You may, indeed, pretend to
have discovered certain qualities which you do not
perceive, and assert those insensible qualities exist in
fire and sugar. But what use can be made of this to
your present purpose, I am at a loss to conceive. Tell
me then once more, do you acknowledge that heat
and cold, sweetness and bitterness (meaning those
qualities which are perceived by the senses), do not
exist without the mind ?

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 21

HyL I see it is to no purpose to hold out, so I give
up the cause as to those mentioned qualities. Though
I profess it sounds oddly, to say that sugar is not
sweet.

Phil. But, for your farther satisfaction, take this
along with you: that which at other times seems sweet,
shall, to a distempered palate, appear bitter. And,
nothing can be plainer than that divers persons per-
ceive different tastes in the same food ; since that
which one man delights in, another abhors. And how
could this be, if the taste was something really in-
herent in the food?

HyL I acknowledge I know not how.

Phil. In the next place, odours are to be consid-
ered. And, with regard to these, I would fain know
whether what has been said of tastes doth not exactly
agree to them? Are they not so many pleasing or dis-
pleasing sensations?

HyL They are.

Phil. Can you then conceive it possible that they
should exist in an unperceiving thing?

HyL I cannot.

Phil, Or, can you imagine that filth and ordure
affect those brute animals that feed on them out of
choice, with the same smells which we perceive in
them?

HyL By no means.

Phil. May we not therefore conclude of smells, as
of the other forementioned qualities, that they cannot
exist in any but a perceiving substance or mind.

HyL I think so.

Phil. Then as to sounds, what must we think of
them : are they accidents really inherent in external
bodies, or not?

22 THE FIRST DIALOGUE

Hyl. That they inhere not in the sonorous bodies
is plain from hence; because a bell struck in the ex-
hausted receiver of an air-pump sends forth no sound.
The air, therefore, must be thought the subject of
sound.

Phil. What reason is there for that, Hylas ?

Hyl. Because, when any motion is raised in the
air, we perceive a sound greater or lesser, according
to the air's motion ; but without some motion in the
air, we never hear any sound at all.

Phil. And granting that we never hear a sound
but when some motion is produced in the air, yet I
do not see how you can infer from thence, that the
sound itself is in the air.

Hyl. It is this very motion in the external air that
produces in the mind the sensation of sound. For,
striking on the drum of the ear, it causeth a vibra-
tion, which by the auditory nerves being communi-
cated to the brain, the soul is thereupon affected with
the sensation called sound.

Phil. What ! is sound then a sensation ?

Hyl. I tell you, as perceived by us, it is a partic-
ular sensation in the mind.

Phil. And can any sensation exist without the
mind?

Hyl. No, certainly.

Phil. How then can sound, being a sensation, ex-
ist in the air, if by the air you mean a senseless sub-
stance existing without the mind?

Hyl. You must distinguish, Philonous, between
sound as it is perceived by us, and as it is in itself;
or (which is the same thing) between the sound we
immediately perceive, and that which exists without
us. The former, indeed, is a particular kind of sen-

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHlLONOUS. 23

sation, but the latter is merely a vibrative or undula-
tory motion in the air.

Phil. I thought I had already obviated that dis-
tinction, by the answer I gave when you were apply-
ing it in a like case before. But, to say no more of
that, are you sure then that sound is really nothing
but motion?

Hyl. I am.

Phil. Whatever therefore agrees to real sound,
may with truth be attributed to motion?

Hyl. It may.

Phil. It is then good sense to speak of motion as
of a thing that is loud, sweet, acute, or grave.

Hyl. I see you are resolved not to understand me.
Is it not evident those accidents or modes belong
only to sensible sound, or sound in the common ac-
ceptation of the word, but not to sound in the real and
philosophic sense ; which, as I just now told you, is
nothing but a certain motion of the air?

Phil. It seems then there are two sorts of sound —
the one vulgar, or that which is heard, the other phi-
losophical and real?

Hyl. Even so.

Phil. And the latter consists in motion?

Hyl. I told you so before.

Phil. Tell me, Hylas, to which of the senses, think
you, the idea of motion belongs? to the hearing?

Hyl. No, certainly ; but to the sight and touch.

Phil. It should follow then, 'that, according to
you, real sounds may possibly be seen or felt, but
never heard.

Hyl. Look you, Philonous, you may, if you please,
make a jest of my opinion, but that will not alter the
truth of things. I own, indeed, the inferences you

24 THE FIRST DIALOGUE

draw me into, sound something oddly ; but common
language, you know, is framed by, and for the use of
the vulgar : we must not therefore wonder, if expres-
sions adapted to exact philosophic notions seem un-
couth and out of the way.

Phil. Is it come to that? I assure you, I imagine
myself to have gained no small point, since you make
so light of departing from common phrases and opin-
ions ; it being a main part of our inquiry, to examine
whose notions are widest of the common road, and
most repugnant to the general sense of the world.
But, can you think it no more than a philosophical
paradox, to say that real sounds are never heard, and
that the idea of them is obtained by some other sense?
And is there nothing in this contrary to nature and
the truth of things?

Hyl. To deal ingenuously, I do not like it. And,
after the concessions already made, I had as well
grant that sounds too have no real being without the
mind.

Phil. And I hope you will make no difficulty to
acknowledge the same of colours.

Hyl. Pardon me : the case of colours is very dif-
ferent. Can anything be plainer than that we see
them on the objects?

Phil. The objects you speak of are, I suppose,
corporeal Substances existing without the mind?

Hyl. They are.

Phil. And have true and real colours inhering in
them?

Hyl. Each visible object hath that colour which
we see in it.

Phil. How! is there anything visible but what we
perceive by sight?

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 25

Hyl. There is not.

Phil. And, do we perceive anything by sense which
we do not perceive immediately?

Hyl. How often must I be obliged to repeat the
same thing? I tell you, we do not.

Phil. Have patience, good Hylas ; and tell me
once more, whether there is anything immediately
perceived by the senses, except sensible qualities. I
know you asserted there was not ; but I would now
be informed, whether you still persist in the same
opinion.

Hyl. I do.

Phil. Pray, is your corporeal substance either a
sensible quality, or made up of sensible qualities?

Hyl. What a question that is ! who ever thought
it was?

Phil. My reason for asking was, because in saying,
each visible object hath that colour which we see in it,
you make visible objects to be corporeal substances ;
which implies either that corporeal substances are
sensible qualities, or else that there is something be-
side sensible qualities perceived by sight : but, as
this point was formerly agreed between us, and is still
maintained by you, it is a clear consequence, that
your corporeal substance is nothing distinct from sen-
sible qualities.

Hyl. You may draw as many absurd consequences
as you please, and endeavour to perplex the plainest
things ; but you shall never persuade me out of my
senses. I clearly understand my own meaning.

Phil. I wish you would make me understand it
too. But, since you are unwilling to have your notion
of corporeal substance examined, I shall urge that
point no farther. Only be pleased to let me know,

26 THE FIRST DIALOGUE

whether the same colours which we see exist in exter-
nal bodies, or some other.

Hyl. The very same.

Phil. What! are then the beautiful red and purple
we see on yonder clouds really in them? Or do you
imagine they have in themselves any other form than
that of a dark mist or vapour?

Hyl. I must own, Philonous, those colours are not
really in the clouds as they seem to be at this dis-
tance. They are only apparent colours.

Phil. Apparent call you them? how shall we dis-
tinguish these apparent colours from real ?

Hyl. Very easily. Those are to be thought ap-
parent which, appearing only at a distance, vanish
upon a nearer approach.

Phil. And those, I suppose, are to be thought real
which are discovered by the most near and exact sur-
vey.

Hyl. Right.

Phil. Is the nearest and exactest survey made by
the help of a microscope, or by the naked eye?

Hyl. By a microscope, doubtless.

Phil. But a microscope often discovers colours in
an object different from those perceived by the unas-
sisted sight. And, in case we had microscopes mag-
nifying to any assigned degree, it is certain that no
object whatsoever, viewed through them, would ap-
pear in the same colour which it exhibits to the naked
eye.

Hyl. And what will you conclude from all this?
You cannot argue that there are really and naturally
no colours on objects : because by artificial manage-
ments they may be altered, or made to vanish.

Phil. I think it may evidently be concluded from

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 27

your own concessions, that all the colours we see with
our naked eyes are only apparent as those on the
clouds, since they vanish upon a more close and ac-
curate inspection which is afforded us by a micro-
scope. Then, as to what you say by way of preven-
tion : I ask you whether the real and natural state of
an object is better discovered by a very sharp and
piercing sight, or by one which is less sharp?

Hyl. By the former without doubt.

Phil, Is it not plain from Dioptrics that micro-
scopes make the sight more penetrating, and repre-
sent objects as they would appear to the eye in case
it were naturally endowed with a most exquisite sharp-
ness?

Hyl It is.

Phil. Consequently the microscopical representa-
tion is to be thought that which best sets forth the
real nature of the thing, or what it is in itself. The
colours, therefore, by it perceived are more genuine
and real than those perceived otherwise.

Hyl. I confess there is something in what you say.

Phil. Besides, it is not only possible but manifest,
that there actually are animals whose eyes are by na-
ture framed to perceive those things which by reason
of their minuteness escape our sight. What think
you of those inconceivably small animals perceived
by glasses? must we suppose they are all stark blind?
Or, in case they see, can it be imagined their sight
hath not the same use in preserving their bodies from
injuries, which appears in that of all other animals?
And if it hath, is it not evident they must see particles
less than their own bodies, which will present them
with a far different view in each object from that
which strikes our senses? Even our own eyes do not

28 THE FIRST DIALOGUE

always represent objects to us after the same manner.
In the jaundice every one knows that all things seem
yellow. Is it not therefore highly probable those ani-
mals in whose eyes we discern a very different texture
from that of ours, and whose bodies abound with dif-
ferent humours, do not see the same colours in every
object that we do? From all which, should it not
seem to follow that all colours are equally apparent,
and that none of those which we perceive are really
inherent in any outward object?

Hyl. It should.

Phil. The point will be past all doubt, if you con-
sider that, in case colours were real properties or
affections inherent in external bodies, they could ad-
mit of no alteration without some change wrought in
the very bodies themselves : but, is it not evident
from what hath been said that, upon the use of micro-
scopes, upon a change happening in the humours of
the eye, or a variation of distance, without any man-
ner of real alteration in the thing itself, the colours of
any object are either changed, or totally disappear ?
Nay, all other circumstances remaining the same,
change but the situation of some objects, and they
shall present different colours to the eye. The same
thing happens upon viewing an object in various de-
grees of light. And what is more known than that
the same bodies appear differently coloured by candle-
light from what they do in the open day? Add to
these the experiment of a prism which, separating the
heterogeneous rays of light, alters the colour of any
object, and will cause the whitest to appear of a deep
blue or red to the naked eye. And now tell me whether
you are still of opinion that every body hath its true
real colour inhering in it ; and, if you think it hath, I

BETWEEN. HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 2Q

would fain know farther from you, what certain dis-
tance and position of the object, what peculiar texture
and formation of the eye, what degree or kind of light
is necessary for ascertaining that true colour, and dis-
tinguishing it from apparent ones.

Hyl. I own myself entirely satisfied, that they are
all equally apparent, and that there is no such thing
as colour really inhering in external bodies, but that
it is altogether in the light. And what confirms me
in this opinion is that in proportion to the light col-
ours are still more or less vivid ; and if there be no
light, then are there no colours perceived. Besides,
allowing there are colours on external objects, yet,
how is it possible for us to perceive them ? For no
external body affects the mind, unless it acts first on
our organs of sense. But the only action of bodies
is motion ; and motion cannot be communicated other-
wise than by impulse. A distant object therefore can-
not act on the eye, nor consequently make itself or its
properties perceivable to the soul. Whence it plainly
follows that it is immediately some contiguous sub-
stance, which, operating on the eye, occasions a per-
ception of colours : and such is light.

Phil. How ! is light then a substance ?

Hyl. I tell you, Philonous, external light is noth-
ing but a thin fluid substance, whose minute particles
being agitated with a brisk motion, and in various
manners reflected from the different surfaces of out-
ward objects to the eyes, communicate different mo-
tions to the optic nerves ; which, being propagated to
the brain, cause therein various impressions; and
these are attended with the sensations of red, blue,
yellow, &c.

30 THE FIRST DIALOGUE

Phil. It seems then the light doth no more than
shake the optic nerves.

Hyl. Nothing else.

Phil. And, consequent to each particular motion
of the nerves, the mind is affected with a sensation,
which is some particular colour.

Hyl. Right.

Phil. And these sensations have no existence with-
out the mind.

Hyl. They have not.

Phil. How then do you affirm that colours are in
the light ; since by light you understand a corporeal
substance external to the mind?

Hyl. Light and colours, as immediately perceived
by us, I grant cannot exist without the mind. But,
in themselves they are only the motions and configu-
rations of certain insensible particles of matter.

Phil. Colours, then, in the vulgar sense, or taken
for the immediate objects of sight, cannot agree to
any but a perceiving substance.

Hyl. That is what I say.

Phil. Well then, since you give up the point as to
those sensible qualities which are alone thought col-
ours by all mankind beside, you may hold what you
please with regard to those invisible ones of the phi-
losophers. It is not my business to dispute about
them ; only I would advise you to bethink yourself,
whether, considering the inquiry we are upon, it be
prudent for you to affirm — the red and blue which we
see are not real colours, but certain unknown motions ana
figures, which no man ever did or can see, are truly so.
Are not these shocking notions, and are not they sub-
ject to as many ridiculous inferences, as those you
were obliged to renounce before in the case of sounds?

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 31

Hyl. I frankly own, Philonous, that it is in vain to
stand out any longer. Colours, sounds, tastes, in a
word all those termed secondary qualities, have cer-
tainly no existence without the mind. But, by this
acknowledgment I must not be supposed to derogate
anything from the reality of Matter or external ob-
jects ; seeing it is no more than several philosophers
maintain, who nevertheless are the farthesf^imagin-
able from denying Matter. For the clearer under-
standing of this, you must know sensible qualities are
by philosophers divided into primary and secondary.
The former are Extension, Figure, Solidity, Gravity,
Motion, and Rest. And these they hold exist really
in bodies. The latter are those above enumerated ;
or, briefly, all sensible qualities beside the Primary,
which they assert are only so many sensations or ideas
existing nowhere but in the mind. But all this, I
doubt not, you are apprised of. For my part, I have
been a long time sensible there was such an opinion
current among philosophers, but was never thoroughly
convinced of its truth until now.

Phil. You are still then of opinion that extension
and figures are inherent in external unthinking sub-
stances?

Hyl. I am.

Phil. But what if the same arguments which are
brought against Secondary Qualities will hold good
against these also?

Hyl. Why then I shall be obliged to think, they
too exist only in the mind.

Phil. Is it your opinion the very figure and exten-
sion which you perceive by sense exist in the outward
object or material substance?

Hyl. It is.

32 THE FIRST DIALOGUE

Phil. Have all other animals as good grounds to
think the same of the figure and extension which they
see and feel?

Hyl. Without doubt, if they have any thought at
all.

Phil. Answer me, Hylas. Think you the senses
were bestowed upon all animals for their preservation
and well-being in life? or were they given to men
alone for this end ?

Hyl. I make no question but they have the same
use in all other animals.

Phil. If so, is it not necessary they should be en-
abled by them to perceive their own limbs, and those
bodies which are capable of harming them?

Hyl. Certainly.

Phil. A mite therefore must be supposed to see
his own foot, and things equal or even less than it, as
bodies of some considerable dimension ; though at
the same time they appear to you scarce discernible,
or at best as so many visible points?

Hyl. I cannot deny it.

Phil. And to creatures less than the mite they will
seem yet larger?

Hyl. They will.

Phil. Insomuch that what you can hardly discern
will to another extremely minute animal appear as
some huge mountain?

Hyl. All this I grant.

Phil. Can one and the same thing be at the same
time in itself of different dimensions?

Hyl. That were absurd to imagine.

Phil. But, from what you have laid down it follows
that both the extension by you perceived, and that
perceived by the mite itself, as likewise all those per-

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 33

ceived by lesser animals, are each of them the true
extension of the mite's foot ; that is to say, by your
own principles you are led into an absurdity.

Hyl. There seems to be some difficulty in the
point.

Phil. Again, have you not acknowledged that no
real inherent property of any object can be changed
without some change in the thing itself?

Hyl. I have.

Phil. But, as we approach to or recede from an
object, the visible extension varies, being at one dis-
tance ten or a hundred times greater than at another.
Doth it not therefore follow from hence likewise that
it is not really inherent in the object ?

Hyl. I own I am at a loss what to think.

Phil. Your judgment will soon be determined, if
you will venture to think as freely concerning this
quality as you have done concerning the rest. Was
it not admitted as a good argument, that neither heat
nor cold was in the water, because it seemed warm to
one hand and cold to the other?

Hyl. It was.

Phil. Is it not the very same reasoning to conclude
there is no extension or figure in an object, because
to one eye it shall seem little, smooth, and round,
when at the same time it appears to the other, great,
uneven, and angular?

Hyl. The very same. But does this latter fact
ever happen ?

Phil. You may at any time make the experiment,
by looking with one eye bare, and with the other
through a microscope.

Hyl. I know not how to maintain it, and yet I am

34 THE FIRST DIALOGUE

loath to give up extension, I see so many odd conse-
quences following upon such a concession.

Phil. Odd, say you? After the concessions already
made, I hope you will stick at nothing for its oddness.1
But, on the other hand, should it not seem very odd,
if the general reasoning which includes all other sen-
sible qualities did not also include extension? If it
be allowed that no idea nor anything like an idea can
exist in an unperceiving substance, then surely it fol-
lows that no figure or mode of extension, which we
can either perceive or imagine, or have any idea of,
can be really inherent in Matter ; not to mention the
peculiar difficulty there must be in conceiving a ma-
terial substance, prior to and distinct from extension,
to be the substratum of extension. Be the sensible
quality what it will — figure, or sound, or colour ; it
seems alike impossible it should subsist in that which
doth not perceive it.

Hyl. I give up the point for the present, reserving
still a right to retract my opinion, in case I shall here-
after discover any false step in my progress to it.

Phil. That is a right you cannot be denied. Fig-
ures and extension being despatched, we proceed next
to motion. Can a real motion in any external body
be at the same time both very swift and very slow?

Hyl. It cannot.

Phil. Is not the motion of a body swift in a recip-
rocal proportion to the time it takes up in describing
any given space? Thus a body that describes a mile
in an hour moves three times faster than it would in
case it described only a mile in three hours.

Hyl. I agree with you.

1 The remainder of the present paragraph was not contained in the first
and second editions.

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 35

Phil. And is not time measured by the succession
of ideas in our minds?

Hyl. It is.

Phil. And is it not possible ideas should succeed
one another twice as fast in your mind as they do in
mine, or in that of some spirit of another kind?

Hyl. I own it.

Phil. Consequently, the same body may to another
seem to perform its motion over any space in half the
time that it doth to you. And the same reasoning
will hold as to any other proportion : that is to say,
according to your principles (since the motions per-
ceived are both really in the object) it is possible one
and the same body shall be really moved the same way
at once, both very swift and very slow. How is this
consistent either with common sense, or with what
you just now granted?

Hyl. I have nothing to say to it.

Phil. Then as for solidity; either you do not mean
any sensible quality by that word, and so it is beside
our inquiry : or if you do, it must be either hardness
or resistance. But both the one and the other are
plainly relative to our senses : it being evident that
what seems hard to one animal may appear soft to
another, who hath greater force and firmness of limbs.
Nor is it less plain that the resistance I feel is not in
the body.

Hyl. I own the very sensation of resistance, which
is all you immediately perceive, is not in the body,
but the cause of that sensation is.

Phil. But the causes of our sensations are not
things immediately perceived, and therefore not sen-
sible. This point I thought had been already deter-
mined.

36 THE FIRST DIALOGUE

Hyl. I own it was ; but you will pardon me if I
seem a little embarrassed : I know not how to quit
my old notions.

Phil. To help you out, do but consider that if ex-
tension be once acknowledged to have no existence
without the mind, the same must necessarily be granted
of motion, solidity, and gravity — since they all evi-
dently suppose extension. It is therefore superfluous
to inquire particularly concerning each of them. In
denying extension, you have denied them all to have
any real existence.

Hyl. I wonder, Philonous, if what you say be true,
why those philosophers who deny the Secondary Qual-
ities any real existence, should yet attribute it to the
Primary. If there is no difference between them, how
can this be accounted for?

Phil. It is not my business to account for every
opinion of the philosophers. But, among other rea-
sons which may be assigned for this, it seems prob-
able that pleasure and pain being rather annexed to
the former than the latter may be one. Heat and cold,
tastes and smells, have something more vividly pleas-
ing or disagreeable than the ideas of extension, figure,
and motion affect us with. And, it being too visibly
absurd to hold that pain or pleasure can be in an un-
perceiving Substance, men are more easily weaned
from believing the external existence of the Secondary
than the Primary Qualities. You will be satisfied
there is something in this, if you recollect the differ-
ence you made between an intense and more mod-
erate degree of heat ; allowing the one a real exist-
ence, while you denied it to the other. But, after all,
there is no rational ground for that distinction ; for,
surely an indifferent sensation is as truly a sensation

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 37

as one more pleasing or painful ; and consequently
should not any more than they be supposed to exist
in an unthinking subject.

Hyl. It is just come into my head, Philonous, that
I have somewhere heard of a distinction between ab-
solute and sensible extension. Now, though it be
acknowledged that great and small, consisting merely
in the relation which other extended beings have to
the parts of our own bodies, do not really inhere in
the Substances themselves ; yet nothing obliges us to
hold the same with regard to absolute extension, which
is something abstracted from great and small, from
this or that particular magnitude or figure. So like-
wise as to motion ; swift and slow are altogether rela-
tive to the succession of ideas in our own minds. But,
it doth not follow, because those modifications of mo-
tion exist not without the mind, that therefore abso-
lute motion abstracted from them doth not.

Phil, Pray what is it that distinguishes one mo-
tion, or one part of extension, from another? Is it
not something sensible, as some degree of swiftness
or slowness, some certain magnitude or figure peculiar
to each?

Hyl. I think so.

Phil. These qualities, therefore, stripped of all
sensible properties, are without all specific and nu-
merical differences, as the schools call them.

Hyl. They are.

Phil. That is to say, they are extension in general,
and motion in general.

Hyl. Let it be so.

Phil. But it is a universally received maxim that
Everything which exists is particular. How then can

38 THE FIRST DIALOGUE

motion in general, or extension in general, exist in
any corporeal Substance?

Hyl. I will take time to solve your difficulty.

Phil. But I think the point may be speedily de-
cided. Without doubt you can tell whether you are
able to frame this or that idea. Now I am content to
put our dispute on this issue. If you can frame in
your thoughts a distinct abstract idea of motion or
extension ; divested of all those sensible modes, as
swift and slow, great and small, round and square,
and the like, which are acknowledged to exist only in
the mind, I will then yield the point you contend for.
But, if you cannot, it will be unreasonable on your
side to insist any longer upon what you have no no-
tion of.

Hyl. To confess ingenuously, I cannot.

Phil. Can you even separate the ideas of extension
and motion from the ideas of all those qualities which
they who make the distinction term secondary?

Hyl. What! is it not an easy matter to consider
extension and motion by themselves, abstracted from
all other sensible qualities? Pray how do the mathe-
maticians treat of them ?

Phil. I acknowledge, Hylas, it is not difficult to
form general propositions and reasonings about those
qualities, without mentioning any other; and, in this
sense, to consider or treat of them abstractedly. But,
how doth it follow that, because I can pronounce the
word motion by itself, I can form the idea of it in my
mind exclusive of body? Or, because theorems may
be made of extension and figures, without any men-
tion of great or small, or any other sensible mode or
quality, that therefore it is possible such an abstract
idea of extension, without any particular size or fig-

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 39

ure, or sensible quality, should be distinctly formed,
and apprehended by the mind ? Mathematicians treat
of quantity, without regarding what other sensible
qualities it is attended with, as being altogether in-
different to their demonstrations. But, when laying
aside the words, they contemplate the bare ideas, I
believe you will find, they are not the pure abstracted
ideas of extension.

Hyl. But what say you to pure intellect? May not
abstracted idea be framed by that faculty?

Phil. Since I cannot frame abstract ideas at all, it
is plain I cannot frame them by the help of pure in-
tellect; whatsoever faculty you understand by those
words. Besides, not to inquire into the nature of
pure intellect and its spiritual objects, as virtue, rea-
son, God, or the like, thus much seems manifest, that
sensible things are only to be perceived by sense, or
represented by the imagination. Figures, therefore,
and extension, being originally perceived by sense,
do not belong to pure intellect : but, for your farther
satisfaction, try if you can frame the idea of any fig-
ure, abstracted from all particularities of size, or even
from other sensible qualities.

Hyl. Let me think a little I do not find that I

can.

Phil. And can you think it possible that should
really exist in nature which implies a repugnancy in
its conception?

Hyl. By no means.

Phil. Since therefore it is impossible even for the
mind to disunite the ideas of extension and motion
from all other sensible qualities, doth it not follow,
that where the one exist there necessarily the other
exist likewise?

40 THE FIRST DIALOGUE

Hyl. It should seem so.

Phil. Consequently, the very same arguments
which you admitted as conclusive against the Secon-
dary Qualities are, without any farther application of
force, against the Primary too. Besides, if you will
trust your senses, is it not plain all sensible qualities
coexist, or to them appear as being in the same place?
Do they ever represent a motion, or figure, as being
divested of all other visible and tangible qualities?

Hyl. You need say no more on this head. I am
free to own, if there be no secret error or oversight in
our proceedings hitherto, that all sensible qualities
are alike to be denied existence without the mind.
But, my fear is that I have been too liberal in my
former concessions, or overlooked some fallacy or
other. In short, I did not take time to think.

Phil. For that matter, Hylas, you may take what
time you please in reviewing the progress of our in-
quiry. You are at liberty to recover any slips you
might have made, or offer whatever you have omitted
which makes for your first opinion.

Hyl. One great oversight I take to be this — that I
did not sufficiently distinguish the object from the sen-
sation. Now, though this latter may not exist without
the mind, yet it will not thence follow that the former
cannot.

Phil. What object do you mean? The object of
the senses?

Hyl. The same.

Phil. It is then immediately perceived?

Hyl. Right.

Phii. Make me to understand the difference be-
tween what is immediately perceived, and a sensation.

Hyl. The sensation I take to be an act of the mind

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 4!

perceiving ; besides which, there is something per-
ceived ; and this I call the object. For example, there
is red and yellow on that tulip. But then the act of
perceiving those colours is in me only, and not in the
tulip.

Phtl. What tulip do you speak of? Is it that
which you see?

Hyl. The same.

Phil. And what do you see beside colour, figure,
and extension?

Hyl. Nothing.

Phil. What you would say then is that the red and
yellow are coexistent with the extension; is it not?

Hyl. That is not all ; I would say they have a real
existence without the mind, in some unthinking sub-
stance.

Phil. That the colours are really in the tulip which
I see is manifest. Neither can it be denied that this
tulip may exist independent of your mind or mine;
but, that any immediate object of the senses — that is,
any idea, or combination of ideas — should exist in an
unthinking substance, or exterior to all minds, is in
itself an evident contradiction. Nor can I imagine
how this follows from what you said just now, to wit,
that the red and yellow were on the tulip you saw,
since you do not pretend to see that unthinking sub-
stance.

Hyl. You have an artful way, Philonous, of divert-
ing our inquiry from the subject.

Phil. I see you have no mind to be pressed that
way. To return then to your distinction between sen-
sation and object; if I take you right, you distinguish
in every perception two things, the one an action of
the mind, the other not.

42 THE FIRST DIALOGUE

Hyl. True.

PhiL And this action cannot exist in, or belong to,
any unthinking thing ; but, whatever beside is implied
in a perception may?

Hyl. That is my meaning.

Phil. So that if there was a perception without
any act of the mind, it were possible such a percep-
tion should exist in an unthinking substance?

Hyl. I grant it. But it is impossible there should
be such a perception.

Phil. When is the mind said to be active?

Hyl. When it produces, puts an end to, or changes,
anything.

Phil. Can the mind produce, discontinue, or change
anything, but by an act of the will?

Hyl. It cannot.

Phil. The mind therefore is to be accounted active
in its perceptions so far forth as -volition is included in
them?

Hyl. It is.

Phil. In plucking this flower I am active ; because
I do it by the motion of my hand, which was conse-
quent upon my volition ; so likewise in applying it to
my nose. But is either of these smelling?

Hyl. No.

Phil I act too in drawing the air through my
nose; because my breathing so rather than otherwise
is the effect of my volition. But neither can this be
called smelling : for, if it were, I should smell every
time I breathed in that manner?

Hyl. True.

Phil. Smelling then is somewhat consequent to all
this?

Hyl. It is.

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 43

Phil. But I do not find my will concerned any
farther. Whatever more there is — as that I perceive
such a particular smell, or any smell at all — this is in-
dependent of my will, and therein I am altogether
passive. Do you find it otherwise with you, Hylas?

Hyl. No, the very same.

Phil. Then, as to seeing, is it not in your power
to open your eyes, or keep them shut ; to turn them
this or that way?

Hyl. Without doubt.

Phil. But, doth it in like manner depend on your
will that in looking on this flower you perceive white
rather than any other colour? Or, directing your open
eyes towards yonder part of the heaven, can you avoid
seeing the sun? Or is light or darkness the effect of
your volition?

Hyl. No certainly.

Phil. You are then in these respects altogether
passive?

Hyl. I am.

Phil. Tell me now, whether seeing consists in per-
ceiving light and colours, or in opening and turning
the eyes?

Hyl. Without doubt, in the former.

Phil. Since therefore you are in the very percep-
tion of light and colours altogether passive, what is
become of that action you were speaking of as an in-
gredient in every sensation? And, doth it not follow
from your own concessions, that the perception of
light and colours, including no action in it, may exist
in an unperceiving substance? And is not this a plain
contradiction?

Hyl. I know not what to think of it.

Phil. Besides, since you distinguish the active and

44 THE FIRST DIALOGUE

passive in every perception, you must do it in that of
pain. But how is it possible that pain, be it as little
active as you please, should exist in an unperceiving
substance? In short, do but consider the point, and
then confess ingenuously, whether light and colours,
tastes, sounds, &c., are not all equally passions or
sensations in the soul. You may indeed call them ex-
ternal objects, and give them in words what subsist-
ence you please. But, examine your own thoughts,
and then tell me whether it be not as I say?

HyL I acknowledge, Philonous, that, upon a fair
observation of what passes in my mind, I can discover
nothing else but that I am a thinking being, affected
with variety of sensations; neither is it possible to
conceive how a sensation should exist in an unper-
ceiving substance. But then, on the other hand, when
I look on sensible things in a different view, consider-
ing them as so many modes and qualities, I find it
necessary to suppose a material substratum, without
which they cannot be conceived to exist.

Phil. Material substratum call you it? Pray, by
which of your senses came you acquainted with that
being?

HyL It is not itself sensible ; its modes and qual-
ities only being perceived by the senses.

Phil. I presume then it was by reflection and rea-
son you obtained the idea of it?

Hyl. I do not pretend to any proper positive idea
of it. However, I conclude it exists, because qual-
ities cannot be conceived to exist without a support.

Phil. It seems then you have only a relative notion
of it, or that you conceive it not otherwise than by
conceiving the relation it bears to sensible qualities?

Hyl. Right.

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 45

Phil. Be pleased therefore to let me know wherein
that relation consists.

Hyl. Is it not sufficiently expressed in the term
substratum or substance?

Phil. If so, the word substratum should import
that it is spread under the sensible qualities or acci-
dents?

Hyl. True.

Phil. And consequently under extension?

Hyl. I own it.

Phil. It is therefore somewhat in its own nature
entirely distinct from extension?

Hyl. I tell you, extension is only a mode, and
Matter is something that supports modes. And is it
not evident the thing supported is different from the
thing supporting?

Phil. So that something distinct from, and exclu-
sive of, extension is supposed to be the substratum of
extension?

Hyl. Just so.

Phil. Answer me, Hylas. Can a thing be spread
without extension ? or is not the idea of extension
necessarily included in spreading?

Hyl. It is.

Phil. Whatsoever therefore you suppose spread
under anything must have in itself an extension dis-
tinct from the extension of that thing under which it
is spread ?

Hyl. It must.

Phil. Consequently, every corporeal substance
being the substratum of extension must have in itself
another extension, by which it is qualified to be a sub-
stratum : and so on to infinity? And I ask whether
this be not absurd in itself, and repugnant to what

46 THE FIRST DIALOGUE

you granted just now, to wit, that the substratum was
something distinct from and exclusive of extension?

Hyl. Aye, but, Philonous, you take me wrong. I
do not mean that Matter is spread in a gross literal
sense under extension. The word substratum is used
only to express in general the same thing with sub-
stance.

Phil. Well then, let us examine the relation im-
plied in the term substance. Is it not that it stands
under accidents?

Hyl. The very same.

Phil. But, that one thing may stand under or sup-
port another, must it not be extended?

Hyl. It must.

Phil. Is not therefore this supposition liable to the
same absurdity with the former?

Hyl. You still take things in a strict literal sense ;
that is not fair, Philonous.

Phil. I am not for imposing any sense on your
words: you are at liberty to explain them as you
please. Only, I beseech you, make me understand
something by them. You tell me Matter supports or
stands under accidents. How ! is it as your legs sup-
port your body?

Hyl. No ; that is the literal sense.

Phil. Pray let me know any sense, literal or not
literal, that you understand it in. ... How long must
I wait for an answer, Hylas?

Hyl. I declare I know not what to say. I once
thought I understood well enough what was meant by
Matter's supporting accidents. But now, the more I
think on it the less can I comprehend it ; in short I
find that I know nothing of it.

Phil. It seems then you have no idea at all, neither

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 47

relative nor positive, of Matter; you know neither
what it is in itself, nor what relation it bears to acci-
dents?

Hyl. I acknowledge it.

Phil. And yet you asserted that you could not con-
ceive how qualities or accidents should really exist,
without conceiving at the same time a material sup-
port of them?

Hyl. I did.

Phil. That is to say, when you conceive the real
existence of qualities, you do withal conceive some-
thing which you cannot conceive?

Hyl. It was wrong I own. But still I fear there is
some fallacy or other. Pray what think you of this?
It is just come into my head that the ground of all
our mistake lies in your treating of each quality by it-
self. Now, I grant that each quality cannot singly
subsist without the mind. Colour cannot without ex-
tension, neither can figure without some other sensible
quality. But, as the several qualities united or blended
together form entire sensible things, nothing hinders
why such things may not be supposed to exist with-
out the mind.

Phil. Either, Hylas, you are jesting, or have a very
bad memory. Though indeed we went through all
the qualities by name one after another ; yet my argu-
ments, or rather your concessions, nowhere tended
to prove that the Secondary Qualities did not subsist
each alone by itself ; but, that they were not at alt
without the mind. Indeed, in treating of figure and
motion we concluded they could not exist without the
mind, because it was impossible even in thought to
separate them from all secondary qualities, so as to
conceive them existing by themselves. But then this

48 THE FIRST DIALOGUE

was not the only argument made use of upon that oc-
casion. But (to pass by all that hath been hitherto
said, and reckon it for nothing, if you will have it so)
I am content to put the whole upon this issue. If you
can conceive it possible for any mixture or combina-
tion of qualities, or any sensible object whatever, to
exist without the mind, then I will grant it actually to
be so.

Hyl. If it comes to that the point will soon be de-
cided. What more easy than to conceive a tree or
house existing by itself, independent of, and unper-
ceived by, any mind whatsoever? I do at this present
.time conceive them existing after that manner.

Phil. How say you, Hylas, can you see a thing
which is at the same time unseen?

Hyl. No, that were a contradiction.

Phil. Is it not as great a contradiction to talk of
conceiving a thing which is unconceived?

Hyl. It is.

Phil. The tree or house therefore which you think
of is conceived by you?

Hyl. How should it be otherwise?

Phil. And what is conceived is surely in the mind?

Hyl. Without question, that which is conceived is
in the mind.

Phil. How then came you to say, you conceived a
house or tree existing independent and out of all minds
whatsoever?

Hyl. That was I own an oversight ; but stay, let
me consider what led me into it. — It is a pleasant mis-
take enough. As I was thinking of a tree in a solitary
place where no one was present to see it, methought
that was to conceive a tree as existing unperceived or
unthought of — not considering that I myself conceived

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 49

it all the while. But now I plainly see that all I can
do is to frame ideas in my own mind. I may indeed
conceive in my own thoughts the idea of a tree, or a
house, or a mountain, but that is all. And this is far
from proving that I can conceive them existing out of
the minds of all Spirits.

Phil. You acknowledge then that you cannot pos-
sibly conceive how any one corporeal sensible thing
should exist otherwise than in a mind?

Hyl. I do.

Phil. And yet you will earnestly contend for the
truth of that which you cannot so much as conceive ?

Hyl. I profess I know not what to think ; but still
there are some scruples remain with me. Is it not
certain I see things at a distance? Do we not per-
ceive the stars and moon, for example, to be a great
way off? Is not this, I say, manifest to the senses?

Phil. Do you not in a dream too perceive those or
the like objects?

Hyl. I do.

Phil. And have they not then the same appearance
of being distant?

Hyl. They have.

Phil. But you do not thence conclude the appari-
tions in a dream to be without the mind?

Hyl. By no means.

Phil. You ought not therefore to conclude that
sensible objects are without the mind, from their ap-
pearance or manner wherein they are perceived.

Hyl. I acknowledge it. But doth not my sense
deceive me in those cases?

Phil. By no means. The idea or thing which you
immediately perceive, neither sense nor reason in-
forms you that it actually exists without the mind.

50 THE FIRST DIALOGUE

By sense you only know that you are affected with
such certain sensations of light and colours, &c. And
these you will not say are without the mind.

Hyl. True : but, beside all that, do you not think
the sight suggests something of outness or distance?

Phil. Upon approaching a distant object, do the
visible size and figure change perpetually, or do they
appear the same at all distances?

Hyl. They are in a continual change.

Phil. Sight therefore doth not suggest or any way
inform you that the visible object you immediately
perceive exists at a distance,1 or will be perceived
when you advance farther onward ; there being a con-
tinued series of visible objects succeeding each other
during the whole time of your approach.

Hyl. It doth not; but still I know, upon seeing
an object, what object I shall perceive after having
passed over a certain distance : no matter whether it
be exactly the same or no : there is still something of
distance suggested in the case.

Phil. Good Hylas, do but reflect a little on the
point, and then tell me whether there be any more in
it than this : — From the ideas you actually perceive
by sight, you have by experience learned to collect
what other ideas you will (according to the standing
order of nature) be affected with, after such a certain
succession of time and motion.

Hyl. Upon the whole, I take it to be nothing else.

Phil. Now, is it not plain that if we suppose a
man born blind was on a sudden made to see, he
could at first have no experience of what may be sug-
gested by sight?

1 See the "Essay towards a New Theory of Vision," and its "Vindica-
tion. "—AUTHOR, 1734.

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 51

Hyl. It is.

Phil. He would not then, according to you, have
any notion of distance annexed to the things he saw ;
but would take them for a new set of sensations ex-
isting only in his mind?

Hyl. It is undeniable.

Phil. But, to make it still more plain : is not dis-
tance a line turned endwise to the eye?

Hyl. It is.

Phil. And can a line so situated be perceived by
sight?

Hyl. It cannot.

Phil. Doth it not therefore follow that distance is
not properly and immediately perceived by sight?

Hyl. It should seem so.

Phil. Again, is it your opinion that colours are at
a distance?

Hyl. It must be acknowledged they are only in
the mind.

Phil. But do not colours appear to the eye as co-
existing in the same place with extension and figures?

Hyl. They do.

Phil. How can you then conclude from sight that
figures exist without, when you acknowledge colours
do not ; the sensible appearance being the very same
with regard to both ?

Hyl. I know not what to answer.

Phil. But, allowing that distance was truly and
immediately perceived by the mind, yet it would not
thence follow it existed out of the mind. For, what-
ever is immediately perceived is an idea: and can
any idea exist out of the mind?

Hyl. To suppose that were absurd : but, inform

52 THE FIRST DIALOGUE

me, Philonous, can we perceive or know nothing be-
side our ideas?

Phil. As for the rational deducing of causes from
effects, that is beside our inquiry. And, by the senses
you can best tell whether you perceive anything which
is not immediately perceived. And I ask you, whether
the things immediately perceived are other than your
own sensations or ideas? You have indeed more than
once, in the course of this conversation, declared
yourself on those points ; but you seem, by this last
question, to have departed from what you then
thought.

Hyl. To speak the truth, Philonous, I think there
are two kinds of objects : — the one perceived immedi-
ately, which are likewise called ideas ; the other are
real things or external objects, perceived by the me-
diation of ideas, which are their images and represen-
tations. Now, I own ideas do not exist without the
mind ; but the latter sort of objects do. I am sorry I
did not think of this distinction sooner; it would
probably have cut short your discourse.

Phil. Are those external objects perceived by
sense, or by some other faculty?

Hyl. They are perceived by sense.

Phil. How! is there anything perceived by sense
which is not immediately perceived?

Hyl. Yes, Philonous, in some sort there is. For
example, when I look on a picture or statue of Julius
Caesar, I may be said after a manner to perceive him
(though not immediately) by my senses.

Phil. It seems then you will have our ideas, which
alone are immediately perceived, to be pictures of ex-
ternal things : and that these also are perceived by

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 53

sense, inasmuch as they have a conformity or resem-
blance to our ideas?

Hyl. That is my meaning.

Phil. And, in the same way that Julius Caesar, in
himself invisible, is nevertheless perceived by sight;
real things, in themselves imperceptible, are per-
ceived by sense.

Hyl. In the very same.

Phil. Tell me, Hylas, when you behold the picture
of Julius Caesar, do you see with your eyes any more
than some colours and figures, with a certain sym-
metry and composition of the whole?

Hyl. Nothing else.

Phil. And would not a man who had never known
anything of Julius Caesar see as much ?

Hyl. He would.

Phil. Consequently he hath his sight, and the use
of it, in as perfect a degree as you?

Hyl. I agree with you.

Phil. Whence comes it then that your thoughts
are directed to the Roman emperor, and his are not?
This cannot proceed from the sensations or ideas of
sense by you then perceived ; since you acknowledge
you have no advantage over him in that respect. It
should seem therefore to proceed from reason and
memory: should it not?

Hyl. It should.

Phil. Consequently, it will not follow from that in-
stance that anything is perceived by sense which is
not immediately perceived. Though I grant we may,
in one acceptation, be said to perceive sensible things
mediately by sense — that is, when, from a frequently
perceived connexion, the immediate perception of
ideas by one sense suggest to the mind others! per-

54 THE FIRST DIALOGUE

haps belonging to another sense, which are wont to
be connected with them. For instance, when I hear
a coach drive along the streets, immediately I per-
ceive only the sound ; but, from the experience I have
had that such a sound is connected with a coach, I
am said to hear the coach. It is nevertheless evident
that, in truth and strictness, nothing can be heard but
sound ; and the coach is not then properly perceived
by sense, but suggested from experience. So like-
wise when we are said to see a red-hot bar of iron ;
the solidity and heat of the iron are not the objects of
sight, but suggested to the imagination by the colour
and figure which are properly perceived by that sense.
In short, those things alone are actually and strictly
perceived by any sense, which would have been per-
ceived in case that same sense had then been first
conferred on us. As for other things, it is plain they
are only suggested to the mind by experience, grounded
on former perceptions. But, to return to your com-
parison of Caesar's picture, it is plain, if you keep to
that, you must hold the real things or archetypes of
our ideas are not perceived by sense, but by some in-
ternal faculty of the soul, as reason or memory. I
would therefore fain know what arguments you can
draw from reason for the existence of what you call
real things or material objects. Or, whether you re-
member to have seen them formerly as they are in
themselves ; or, if you have heard or read of any one
that did.

Hyl. I see, Philonous, you are disposed to raillery;
but that will never convince me.

Phil. My aim is only to learn from you the way to
come at the knowledge of material beings. Whatever
we perceive is perceived immediately or mediately :

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 55

by sense ; or by reason and reflection. But, as you
have excluded sense, pray shew me what reason you
have to believe their existence ; or what medium you
can possibly make use of to prove it, either to mine
or your own understanding.

Hyl. To deal ingenuously, Philonous, now I con-
sider the point, I do not find I can give you any good
reason for it. But, thus much seems pretty plain,
that it is at least possible such things may really exist.
And, as long as there is no absurdity in supposing
them, I am resolved to believe as I did, till you bring
good reasons to the contrary.

Phil. What ! is it come to this, that you only be-
lieve the existence of material objects, and that your
belief is founded barely on the possibility of its being
true? Then you will have me bring reasons against
it : though another would think it reasonable the proof
should lie on him who holds the affirmative. And,
after all, this very point which you are now resolved
to maintain, without any reason, is in effect what you
have more than once during this discourse seen good
reason to give up. But, to pass over all this ; if I
understand you rightly, you say our ideas do not exist
without the mind ; but that they are copies, images,
or representations, of certain originals that do?

Hyl. You take me right.

Phil. They are then like external things?

Hyl. They are.

Phil. Have those things a stable and permanent
nature, independent of our senses ; or are they in a
perpetual change, upon our producing any motions in
our bodies, suspending, exerting, or altering, our fac-
ulties or organs of sense?

Hyl. Real things, it is plain, have a fixed and real

56 THE FIRST DIALOGUE

nature, which remains the same notwithstanding any
change in our senses, or in the posture and motion of
our bodies ; which indeed may affect the ideas in our
minds, but it were absurd to think they had the same
effect on things existing without the mind.

Phil. How then is it possible that things perpetu-
ally fleeting and variable as our ideas should be copies
or images of anything fixed and constant? Or, in
other words, since all sensible qualities, as size, figure,
colour, &c., that is, our ideas, are continually chan-
ging upon every alteration in the distance, medium,
or instruments of sensation ; how can any determinate
material objects be properly represented or painted
forth by several distinct things, each of which is so
different from and unlike the rest ? Or, if you say it
resembles some one only of our ideas, how shall we
be able to distinguish the true copy from all the false
ones?

Hyl. I profess, Philonous, I am at a loss. I know
not what to say to this.

Phil. But neither is this all. Which are material
objects in themselves — perceptible or imperceptible?

Hyl. Properly and immediately nothing can be
perceived but ideas. All material things, therefore,
are in themselves insensible, and to be perceived only
by our ideas.

Phil. Ideas then are sensible, and their archetypes
or originals insensible?

Hyl. Right.

Phil. But how can that which is sensible be like
that which is insensible? Can a real thing, in itself
invisible, be like a colour; or a real thing, which is not
audible, be like a sound? In a word, can anything

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 57

be like a sensation or idea, but another sensation or
idea?

Hyl. I must own, I think not.

Phil. Is it possible there should be any doubt on
the point? Do you not perfectly know your own
ideas?

Hyl. I know them perfectly ; since what I do not
perceive or know can be no part of my idea.

Phil. Consider, therefore, and examine them, and
then tell me if there be anything in them which can
exist without the mind? or if you can conceive any-
thing like them existing without the mind?

Hyl. Upon inquiry, I find it is impossible for me
to conceive or understand how anything but an idea
can be like an idea. And it is most evident that no
idea can exist without the mind.

Phil. You are therefore, by our principles, forced
to deny the reality of sensible things ; since you made
it to consist in an absolute existence exterior to the
mind. That is to say, you are a downright sceptic.
So I have gained my point, which was to shew your
principles led to Scepticism.

Hyl. For the present I am, if not entirely con-
vinced, at least silenced.

Phil. I would fain know what more you would re-
quire in order to a perfect conviction. Have you not
had the liberty of explaining yourself all manner of
ways? Were any little slips in discourse laid hold
and insisted on? Or were you not allowed to retract
or reinforce anything you had offered, as best served
your purpose? Hath not everything you could say
been heard and examined with all the fairness imagin-
able? In a word, have you not in every point been
convinced out of your own mouth? and, if you can at

58 THE FIRST DIALOGUE

present discover any flaw in any of your former con-
cessions, or think of any remaining subterfuge, any
new distinction, colour, or comment whatsoever, why
do you not produce it ?

Hyl. A little patience, Philonous. I am at present
so amazed to see myself ensnared, and as it were im-
prisoned in the labyrinths you have drawn me into,
that on the sudden it cannot be expected I should
find my way out. You must give me time to look
about me and recollect myself?

Phil. Hark ; is not this the college bell ?

Hyl. It rings for prayers.

Phil. We will go in then, if you please, and meet
here again to-morrow morning. In the meantime,
you may employ your thoughts on this morning's dis-
course, and try if you can find any fallacy in it, or in-
vent any new means to extricate yourself.

Hyl. Agreed.

THE SECOND DIALOGUE.

Hylas.

I BEG your pardon, Philonous, for not meeting you
sooner. All this morning my head was so filled
with our late conversation that I had not leisure to
think of the time of the day, or indeed of anything
else.

Philonous. I am glad you were so intent upon it,
in hopes if there were any mistakes in your conces-
sions, or fallacies in my reasonings from them, you
will now discover them to me.

Hyl. I assure you I have done nothing ever since
I saw you but search after mistakes and fallacies,
and, with that view, have minutely examined the
whole series of yesterday's discourse : but all in vain,
for the notions it led me into, upon review, appear
still more clear and evident ; and, the more I consider
them, the more irresistibly do they force my assent.

Phil. And is not this, think you, a sign that they
are genuine, that they proceed from nature, and are
conformable to right reason? Truth and beauty are
in this alike, that the strictest survey sets them both
off to advantage ; while the false lustre of error and
disguise cannot endure being reviewed, or too nearly
inspected.

Hyl. I own there is a great deal in what you say.

60 THE SECOND DIALOGUE

Nor can any one" be more entirely satisfied of the truth
of those odd consequences, so long as I have in view
the reasonings that lead to them. But, when these
are out of my thoughts, there seems, on the other
hand, something so satisfactory, so natural and intel-
ligible, in the modern way of explaining things that,
I profess, I know not how to reject it.

Phil. I know not what way you mean.

Hyl. I mean the way of accounting for our sensa-
tions or ideas.

Phil. How is that?

Hyl. It is supposed the soul makes her residence
in some part of the brain, from which the nerves take
their rise, and are thence extended to all parts of the
body; and that outward objects, by the different im-
pressions they make on the organs of sense, commu-
nicate certain vibrative motions to the nerves ; and
these being filled with spirits propagate them to the
brain or seat of the soul, which, according to the va-
rious impressions or traces thereby made in the brain,
is variously affected with ideas.

Phil. And call you this an explication of the man-
ner whereby we are affected with ideas ?

Hyl. Why not, Philonous; have you anything to
object against it ?

Phil. I would first know whether I rightly under-
stand your hypothesis. You make certain traces in
the brain to be the causes or occasions of our ideas.
Pray tell me whether by the brain you mean any sen-
sible thing.

Hyl. What else think you I could mean ?

Phil. Sensible things are all immediately perceiv-
able ; and those things which are immediately per-
ceivable are ideas ; and these exist only in the mind.

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 6l

Thus much you have, if I mistake not, long since
agreed to.

HyL I do not deny it.

Phil. The brain therefore you speak of, being a
sensible thing, exists only in the mind. Now, I would
fain know whether you think it reasonable to suppose
that one idea or thing existing in the mind occasions
all other ideas. And, if you think so, pray how do
you account for the origin of that primary idea or
brain itself?

HyL I do not explain the origin of our ideas by
that brain which is perceivable to sense, this being it-
self only a combination of sensible ideas, but by an-
other which I imagine.

Phil. But are not things imagined as truly in the
mind as things perceived?

Hyl. I must confess they are.

Phil. It comes, therefore, to the same thing ; and
you have been all this while accounting for ideas by
certain motions or impressions of the brain, that is,
by some alterations in an idea, whether sensible or
imaginable it matters not.

HyL I begin to suspect my hypothesis.

Phil. Besides spirits, all that we know or conceive
are our own ideas. When, therefore, you say all ideas
are occasioned by impressions in the brain, do you
conceive this brain or no? If you do, then you talk
of ideas imprinted in an idea causing that same idea,
which is absurd. If you do not conceive it, you talk
unintelligibly, instead of forming a reasonable hy-
pothesis.

HyL I now clearly see it was a mere dream. There
is nothing in it.

Phil. You need not be much concerned at it; for

62 THE SECOND DIALOGUE

after all, this way of explaining things, as you called
it, could never have satisfied any reasonable man.
What connexion is there between a motion in the
nerves, and the sensations of sound or colour in the
mind? Or how is it possible these should be the effect
of that?

Hyl. But I could never think it had so little in it
as now it seems to have.

Phil. Well then, are you at length satisfied that
no sensible things have a real existence ; and that you
are in truth an arrant sceptic?

Hyl. It is too plain to be denied.

Phil. Look ! are not the fields covered with a de-
lightful verdure? Is there not something in the woods
and groves, in the rivers and clear springs, that
sooths, that delights, that transports the soul? At
the prospect of the wide and deep ocean, or some
huge mountain whose top is lost in the clouds, or of
an old gloomy forest, are not our minds filled with a
pleasing horror? Even in rocks and deserts is there
not an agreeable wildness? How sincere a pleasure
is it to behold the natural beauties of the earth ! To
preserve and renew our relish for them, is not the veil
of night alternately drawn over her face, and doth she
not change her dress with the seasons? How aptly
are the elements disposed ! What variety and use in
the meanest productions of nature ! What delicacy,
what beauty, what contrivance, in animal and vege-
table bodies ! How exquisitely are all things suited,
as well to their particular ends, as to constitute oppo-
site parts of the whole ! And, while they mutually
aid and support, do they not also set off and illustrate
each other? Raise now your thoughts from this ball
of earth to all those glorious luminaries that adorn

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 63

the high arch of heaven. The motion and situation
of the planets, are they not admirable for use and
order? Were those (miscalled erratic) globes ever
known to stray, in their repeated journeys through
the pathless void? Do they not measure areas round
the sun ever proportioned to the times? So fixed, so
immutable are the laws by which the unseen Author
of nature actuates the universe. How vivid and ra-
diant is the lustre of the fixed stars ! How magnifi-
cent and rich that negligent profusion with which they
appear to be scattered throughout the whole azure
vault ! Yet, if you take the telescope, it brings into
your sight a new host of stars that escape the naked
eye. Here they seem contiguous and minute, but to
a nearer view immense orbs of light at various dis-
tances, far sunk in the abyss of space. Now you must
call imagination to your aid. The feeble narrow sense
cannot descry innumerable worlds revolving round
the central fires ; and in those worlds the energy of
an all-perfect Mind displayed in endless forms. But,
neither sense nor imagination are big enough to com-
prehend the boundless extent, with all its glittering
furniture. Though the labouring mind exert and
strain each power to its utmost reach, there still stands
out ungrasped a surplusage immeasurable. Yet all
the vast bodies that compose this mighty frame, how
distant and remote soever, are by some secret mech-
anism, some divine art and force, linked in a mutual
dependence and intercourse with each other, even with
this earth, which was almost slipt from my thoughts
and lost in the crowd of worlds. Is not the whole
system immense, beautiful, glorious beyond expres-
sion and beyond thought ! What treatment, then, do
those philosophers deserve, who would deprive these

64 THE SECOND DIALOGUE

noble and delightful scenes of all reality? How should
those Principles be entertained that lead us to think
all the visible beauty of the creation a false imaginary
glare? To be plain, can you expect this Scepticism
of yours will not be thought extravagantly absurd by
all men of sense?

Hyl. Other men may think as they please ; but for
your part you have nothing to reproach me with. My
comfort is, you are as much a sceptic as I am.

Phil. There, Hylas, I must beg leave to differ from
you.

Hyl. What ! have you all along agreed to the prem-
ises, and do you now deny the conclusion, and leave
me to maintain those paradoxes by myself which you
led me into? This surely is not fair.

Phil. I deny that I agreed with you in those no-
tions that led to Scepticism. You indeed said the
reality of sensible things consisted in an absolute exist-
ence out of the minds of spirits, or distinct from their
being perceived. And, pursuant to this notion of
reality, you are obliged to deny sensible things any
real existence : that is, according to your own defini-
tion, you profess yourself a sceptic. But I neither
said nor thought the reality of sensible things was to
be defined after that manner. To me it is evident,
for the reasons you allow of, that sensible things can-
not exist otherwise than in a mind or spirit. Whence
I conclude, not that they have no real existence, but
that, seeing they depend not on my thought, and have
an existence distinct from being perceived by me,
there must be some other mind wherein they exist. As
sure, therefore, as the sensible world really exists, so
sure is there an infinite omnipresent Spirit, who con-
tains and supports it.

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 65

Hyl. What ! this is no more than I and all Chris-
tians hold ; nay, and all others too who believe there
is a God, and that He knows and comprehends all
things.

Phil. Aye, but here lies the difference. Men com-
monly believe that all things are known or perceived
by God, because they believe the being of a God ;
whereas I, on the other side, immediately and neces-
sarily conclude the being of a God, because all sen-
sible things must be perceived by him.

Hyl. But so long as we all believe the same thing,
what matter is it how we come by that belief?

Phil. But neither do we agree in the same opin-
ion. For philosophers, though they acknowledge all
corporeal beings to be perceived by God, yet they at-
tribute to them an absolute subsistence distinct from
their being perceived by any mind whatever, which I
do not. Besides, is there no difference between say-
ing, There is a God, therefore He perceives all things,
and saying, Sensible things do really exist; and, if they
really exist, they are necessarily perceived by an infinite
mind: therefore there is an infinite mind, or God? This
furnishes you with a direct and immediate demon-
stration, from a most evident principle, of the being
of a God. Divines and philosophers had proved be-
yond all controversy, from the beauty and usefulness
of the several parts of the creation, that it was the
workmanship of God. But that — setting aside all help
of astronomy and natural philosophy, all contempla-
tion of the contrivance, order and adjustment of things
— an infinite mind should be necessarily inferred from
the bare existence of the sensible world, is an advan-
tage to them only who have made this easy reflexion,
that the sensible world is that which we perceive by

66 THE SECOND DIALOGUE

our several senses ; and that nothing is perceived by
the senses beside ideas ; and that no idea or arche-
type of an idea can exist otherwise than in a mind.
You may now, without any laborious search into the
sciences, without any subtlety of reason, or tedious
length of discourse, oppose and baffle the most stren-
uous advocate for Atheism ; those miserable refuges,
whether in an eternal succession of unthinking causes
and effects, or in a fortuitous concourse of atoms ;
those wild imaginations of Vanini, Hobbes, and Spi-
noza : in a word, the whole system of Atheism, is it
not entirely overthrown, by this single reflexion on
the repugnancy included in supposing the whole, or
any part, even the most rude and shapeless, of the
visible world, to exist without a mind? Let any one
of those abettors of impiety but look into his own
thoughts, and there try if he can conceive how so
much as a rock, a desert, a chaos, or confused jumble
of atoms ; how anything at all, either sensible or im-
aginable, can exist independent of a mind, and he
need go no farther to be convinced of his folly. Can
anything be fairer than to put a dispute on such an
issue, and leave it to a man himself to see if 'he can
conceive, even in thought, what he holds to be true
in fact, and from a notional to allow it a real exist-
ence?

Hyl. It cannot be denied there is something highly
serviceable to religion in what you advance. But do
you not think it looks very like a notion entertained
by some eminent moderns, of seeing all things in God?

Phil. I would gladly know that opinion : pray ex-
plain it to me.

Hyl. They conceive that the soul, being immate-
rial, is incapable of being united with material things,

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 67

so as to perceive them in themselves ; but that she per-
ceives them by her union with the substance of God,
which, being spiritual, is therefore purely intelligible,
or capable of being the immediate object of a spirit's
thought. Besides, the Divine essence contains in it
perfections correspondent to each created being ; and
which are, for that reason, proper to exhibit or repre-
sent them to the mind.

Phil. I do not understand how our ideas, which
are things altogether passive and inert, can be the
essence, or any part (or like any part) of the essence
or substance of God, who is an impassive, indivisible,
purely active being. Many more difficulties and ob-
jections there are which occur at first view against
this hypothesis ; but I shall only add that it is liable
to all the absurdities of the common hypothesis, in
making a created world exist otherwise than in the
mind of a Spirit. Beside all which it hath this pe.
culiar to itself; that it makes that material world
serve to no purpose. And, if it pass for a good argu-
ment against other hypotheses in the sciences that
they suppose nature or the Divine wisdom to make
something in vain, or do that by tedious roundabout
methods which might have been performed in a much
more easy and compendious way, what shall we think
of that hypothesis which supposes the whole world
made in vain?

Hyl. But what say you, are not you too of opinion
that we see all things in God? If I mistake not, what
you advance comes near it.

Phil. [Few men think, yet all have opinions.
Hence men's opinions are superficial and confused.
It is nothing strange that tenets, which in themselves
are ever so different should nevertheless be confounded

68 THE SECOND DIALOGUE

with each other by those who do not consider them
attentively. I shall not therefore be surprised if some
men imagine that I run into the enthusiasm of Male-
branche ; though in truth I am very remote from it.
He builds on the most abstract general ideas, which I
entirely disclaim. He asserts an absolute external
world, which I deny. He maintains that we are de-
ceived by our senses, and know not the real natures
or the true forms and figures of extended beings; of
all which I hold the direct contrary. . So that upon
the whole there are no principles more fundamentally
opposite than his and mine. It must be owned that,]i
I entirely agree with what the holy Scripture saith,
"That in God we live and move and have our being."
But that we see things in His essence, after the man-
ner above set forth, I am far from believing. Take
here in brief my meaning. — It is evident that the
things I perceive are my own ideas, and that no idea
can exist unless it be in a mind. Nor is it less plain
that these ideas or things by me perceived, either
themselves or their archetypes, exist independently
of my mind ; since I know myself not to be their
author, it being out of my power to determine at
pleasure what particular ideas I shall be affected with
upon opening my eyes or ears. They must therefore
exist in some other mind, whose will it is they should
be exhibited to me. The things, I say, immediately
perceived are ideas or sensations, call them which you
will. But how can any idea or sensation exist in, or
be produced by, anything but a mind or spirit? This
indeed is inconceivable ; and to assert that which is
inconceivable is to talk nonsense: is it not?

I What precedes in this paragraph did not appear in the first and second
editions.

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 69

Hyl. Without doubt.

Phil. But, on the other hand, it is very conceiv-
able that they should exist in and be produced by a
Spirit ; since this is no more than I daily experience
in myself, inasmuch as I perceive numberless ideas ;
and, by an act of my will, can form a great variety of
them, and raise them up in my imagination : though,
it must be confessed, these creatures of the fancy are
not altogether so distinct, so strong, vivid, and per-
manent, as those perceived by my senses, which latter
are called real things. From all which I conclude,
there is a Mind which affects me every moment with all
the sensible impressions I perceive. And, from the va-
riety, order, and manner of these, I conclude the
Author of them to be wise, powerful, and good, beyond
comprehension. Mark it well ; I do not say, I see things
by perceiving that which represents them in the in-
telligible Substance of God. This I do not under-
stand; but I say, the things by me perceived are
known by the understanding, and produced by the
will of an infinite Spirit. And is not all this most
plain and evident? Is there any more in it than what
a little observation of our own minds, and that which
passeth in them, not only enableth us to conceive,
but also obligeth us to acknowledge?

Hyl. I think I understand you very clearly ; and
own the proof you give of a Deity seems no less evi-
dent than surprising. But, allowing that God is the
supreme and universal Cause of all things, yet, may
there not be still a third nature besides Spirits and
Ideas? May we not admit a subordinate and limited
cause of our ideas? In a word, may there not for all
that be Matter?

Phil. How often must I inculcate the same thing?

70 THE SECOND DIALOGUE

You allow the things immediately perceived by sense
to exist nowhere without the mind ; but there is noth-
ing perceived by sense which is not perceived imme-
diately : therefore there is nothing sensible that exists
without the mind. The Matter, therefore, which you
still insist on is something intelligible, I suppose ;
something that may be discovered by reason, and not
by sense.

Hyl. You are in the right.

Phil. Pray let me know what reasoning your belief
of Matter is grounded on ; and what this Matter is in
your present sense of it.

Hyl. I find myself affected with various ideas,
whereof I know I am not the cause ; neither are they
the cause of themselves, or of one another, or capable
of subsisting by themselves, as being altogether in-
active, fleeting, dependent beings. They have there-
fore some cause distinct from me and them : of which
I pretend to know no more than that it is the cause of
my ideas. And this thing, whatever it be, I call Matter.

Phil. Tell me, Hylas, hath every one a liberty to
change the current proper signification attached to a
common name in any language? For example, sup-
pose a traveller should tell you that in a certain coun-
try men pass unhurt through the fire ; and, upon ex-
plaining himself, you found he meant by the word
fire that which others call water : or, if he should as-
sert that there are trees that walk upon two legs,
meaning men by the term trees. Would you think
this reasonable?

Hyl. No, I should think it very absurd. Common
custom is the standard of propriety in language. And
for any man to affect speaking improperly is to per-
vert the use of speech, and can never serve to a better

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 71

purpose than to protract and multiply disputes where
there is no difference in opinion.

Phil. And doth not Matter, in the common current
acceptation of the word, signify an extended, solid,
moveable, unthinking, inactive Substance?

HyL It doth.

Phil. And, hath it not been made evident that no
such substance can possibly exist? And, though it
should be allowed to exist, yet how can that which is
inactive be a cause ; or that which is unthinking be a
cause of thought? You may, indeed, if you please, an-
nex to the word Matter a contrary meaning to what is
vulgarly received ; and tell me you understand by it
an unextended, thinking, active being, which is the
cause of our ideas. But what else is this than to play
with words, and run into that very fault you just now
condemned with so much reason ? I do by no means
find fault with your reasoning, in that you collect a
cause from the phenomena : but I deny that the cause
deducible by reason can properly be termed Matter.

HyL There is indeed something in what you say.
But I am afraid you do not thoroughly comprehend
my meaning. I would by no means be thought to
deny that God, or an infinite Spirit, is the Supreme
Cause of all things. All I contend for is, that, sub-
ordinate to the Supreme Agent, there is a cause of a
limited and inferior nature, which concurs in the pro-
duction of our ideas, not by any act of will or spiritual
efficiency, but by that kind of action which belongs to
Matter, viz., motion.

Phil. I find you are at every turn relapsing into
your old exploded conceit, of a moveable, and conse-
quently an extended, substance existing without the
mind. What! have you already forgotten you were

72 THE SECOND DIALOGUE

convinced, or are you willing I should repeat what
has been said on that head? In truth this is not fair
dealing in you, still to suppose the being of that which
you have so often acknowledged to have no being.
But, not to insist farther on what has been so largely
handled, I ask whether all your ideas are not perfectly
passive and inert, including nothing of action in them.

HyL They are.

Phil. And are sensible qualities anything else but
ideas ?

Hyl. How often have I acknowledged that they
are not.

Phil. But is not motion a sensible quality?

HyL It is.

Phil. Consequently it is no action?

Hyl. I agree with you. And indeed it is very plain
that when I stir my finger it remains passive ; but my
will which produced the motion is active.

Phil. Now, I desire to know, in the first place,
whether, motion being allowed to be no action, you
can conceive any action besides volition : and, in the
second place, whether to say something and conceive
nothing be not to talk nonsense : and, lastly, whether,
having considered the premises, you do not perceive
that to suppose any efficient or active cause of our
ideas, other than Spirit, is highly absurd and unrea-
sonable ?

Hyl. I give up the point entirely. But, though
Matter may not be a cause, yet what hinders its being
an instrument subservient to the supreme Agent in the
production of our ideas?

Phil. An instrument say you ; pray what may be
the figure, springs, wheels, and motions, of that in-
strument?

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 73

Hyl. Those I pretend to determine nothing of,
both the substance and its qualities being entirely un-
known to me.

Phil. What! You are then of opinion it is made
up of unknown parts, that it hath unknown motions,
and an unknown shape?

Hyl. I do not believe that it hath any figure or
motion at all, being already convinced, that no sen-
sible qualities can exist in an unperceiving substance.

Phil. But what notion is it possible to frame of an
instrument void of all sensible qualities, even exten-
sion itself?

Hyl. I do not pretend to have any notion of it.

Phil. And what reason have you to think this un-
known, this inconceivable Somewhat doth exist? Is
it that you imagine God cannot act as well without
it ; or that you find by experience the use of some
such thing, when you form ideas in your own mind ?

Hyl. You are always teasing me for reasons of my
belief. Pray what reasons have you not to believe it?

Phil. It is to me a sufficient reason not to believe
the existence of anything, if I see no reason for believ-
ing it. But, not to insist on reasons for believing,
you will not so much as let me know what it is you
would have me believe ; since you say you have no
manner of notion of it. After all, let me entreat you
to consider whether it be like a philosopher, or even
like a man of common sense, to pretend to believe
you know not what, and you know not why.

Hyl. Hold, Philonous. When I tell you matter is
an instrument, I do not mean altogether nothing. It
is true, I know not the particular kind of instrument;
but, however, I have some notion of instrument in gen-
eral, which I apply to it.

74 THE SECOND DIALOGUE

Phil. But what if it should prove that there is
something, even in the most general notion of instru-
ment, as taken in a distinct sense from cause, which
makes the use of it inconsistent with the Divine at-
tributes?

Hyl. Make that appear and I shall give up the
point.

Phil. What mean you by the general nature or no-
tion of instrument?

Hyl. That which is common to all particular in-
struments composeth the general notion.

Phil. Is it not common to all instruments, that
they are applied to the doing those things only which
cannot be performed by the mere act of our wills ?
Thus, for instance, I never use an instrument to move
my finger, because it is done by a volition. But I
should use one if I were to remove part of a rock, or
tear up a tree by the roots. Are you of the same
mind? Or, can you shew any example where an in-
strument is made use of in producing an effect imme-
diately depending on the will of the agent ?

Hyl. I own I cannot.

Phil. How therefore can you suppose that an all-
perfect Spirit, on whose will all things have an abso-
lute and immediate dependence, should need an in-
strument in his operations, or, not needing it, make
use of it? Thus, it seems to me that you are obliged
to own the use of a lifeless inactive instrument to be
incompatible with the infinite perfection of God; that
is, by your own confession, to give up the point.

Hyl. It doth not readily occur what I can answer
you.

Phil. But, methinks you should be ready to own
the truth, when it hath been fairly proved to you. We

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PH1LONOUS. 75

indeed, who are beings of finite powers, are forced to
make use of instruments. And the use of an instru-
ment sheweth the agent to be limited by rules of an-
other's prescription, and that he cannot obtain his end
but in such a way, and by such conditions. Whence
it seems a clear consequence, that the supreme un-
limited Agent useth no tool or instrument at all. The
will of an Omnipotent Spirit is no sooner exerted than
executed, without the application of means — which, if
they are employed by inferior agents, it is not upon
account of any real efficacy that is in them, or neces-
sary aptitude to produce any effect, but merely in
compliance with the laws of nature, or those condi-
tions prescribed to them by the First Cause, who is
Himself above all limitation or prescription whatso-
ever.

Hyl. I will no longer maintain that Matter is an
instrument. However, I would not be understood to
give up its existence neither ; since, notwithstanding
what hath been said, it may still be an occasion.

Phil. How many shapes is your Matter to take?
Or, how often must it be proved not to exist, before
you are content to part with it? But, to say no more
of this (though by all the laws of disputation I may
justly blame you for so frequently changing the sig-
nification of the principal term) I would fain know
what you mean by affirming that matter is an occa-
sion, having already denied it to be a cause. And,
when you have shewn in what sense you understand
occasion, pray, in the next place, be pleased to shew
me what reason induceth you to believe there is such
an occasion of our ideas?

Hyl. As to the first point : by occasion I mean an

76 THE SECOND DIALOGUE

inactive unthinking being, at the presence whereof
God excites ideas in our minds.

Phil. And what may be the nature of that inactive
unthinking being?

Hyl. I know nothing of its nature.

Phil. Proceed then to the second point, and assign
some reason why we should allow an existence to this
inactive, unthinking, unknown thing.

Hyl. When we see ideas produced in our minds
after an orderly and constant manner, it is natural to
think they have some fixed and regular occasions, at
the presence of which they are excited.

Phil. You acknowledge then God alone to be the
cause of our ideas, and that He causes them at the
presence of those occasions.

Hyl. That is my opinion.

Phil. Those things which you say are present to
God, without doubt He perceives.

Hyl. Certainly ; otherwise they could not be to
Him an occasion of acting.

Phil. Not to insist now on your making sense of
this hypothesis, or answering all the puzzling ques-
tions and difficulties it is liable to : I only ask whether
the order and regularity observable in the series of
our ideas, or the course of nature, be not sufficiently
accounted for by the wisdom and power of God ; and
whether it doth not derogate from those attributes, to
suppose He is influenced, directed, or put in mind,
when and what He is to act, by an unthinking sub-
stance? And, lastly, whether, in case I granted all
you contend for, it would make anything to your pur-
pose, it not being easy to conceive how the external
or absolute existence of an unthinking substance, dis-
tinct from its being perceived, can be inferred from

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 77

my allowing that there are certain things perceived
by the mind of God, which are to Him the occasion
of producing ideas in us?

Hyl. I am perfectly at a loss what to think, this
notion of occasion seeming now altogether as ground-
less as the rest.

Phil. Do you not at length perceive that in all
these different acceptations of Matter, you have been
only supposing you know not what, for no manner of
reason, and to no kind of use?

Hyl. I freely own myself less fond of my notions
since they have been so accurately examined. But
still, methinks, I have some confused perception that
there is such a thing as Matter.

Phil. Either you perceive the being of Matter im-
mediately, or mediately. If immediately, pray inform
me by which of the senses you perceive it. If medi-
ately, let me know by what reasoning it is inferred
from those things which you perceive immediately.
So much for the perception. Then for the Matter it-
self, I ask whether it is object, substratum, cause, in-
strument, or occasion? You have already pleaded for
each of these, shifting your notions, and making Mat-
ter to appear sometimes in one shape, then in an-
other. And what you have offered hath been disap-
proved and rejected by yourself. If you have anything
new to advance I would gladly hear it.

Hyl. I think I have already offered all I had to
say on those heads. I am at a loss what more to
urge.

Phil. And yet you are loath to part with your old
prejudice. But, to make you quit it more easily, I
desire that, beside what has been hitherto suggested,
you will farther consider whether, upon supposition

78 THE SECOND DIALOGUE

that Matter exists, you can possibly conceive how you
should be affected by it? Or, supposing it did not
exist, whether it be not evident you might for all that
be affected with the same ideas you now are, and con-
sequently have the very same reasons to believe its
existence that you now can have?

Hyl. I acknowledge it is possible we might per-
ceive all things just as we do now, though there was
no Matter in the world ; neither can I conceive, if
there be Matter, how it should produce any idea in
our minds. And, I do farther grant you have entirely
satisfied me that it is impossible there should be such
a thing as Matter in any of the foregoing acceptations.
But still I cannot help supposing that there is Matter
in some sense or other. What that is I do not indeed
pretend to determine.

Phil. I do not expect you should define exactly
the nature of that unknown being. Only be pleased to
tell me whether it is a Substance — and if so, whether
you can suppose a substance without accidents ; or,
in case you suppose it to have accidents or qualities,
I desire you will let me know what those qualities are,
at least what is meant by Matter's supporting them?

Hyl. We have already argued on those points. I
have no more to say to them. But, to prevent any
farther questions, let me tell you I at present under-
stand by Matter neither substance nor accident, think-
ing nor extended being, neither cause, instrument,
nor occasion, but something entirely unknown, dis-
tinct from all these.

Phil. It seems then you include in your present
notion of Matter nothing but the general abstract idea
of entity.

Hyl. Nothing else, save only that I superadd to

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 79

this general idea the negation of all those particular
things, qualities, or ideas, that I perceive, imagine,
or in anywise apprehend.

Phil. Pray where do you suppose this unknown
Matter to exist?

Hyl. Oh Philonous! now you think you have en-
tangled me ; for, if I say it exists in place then you
will infer that it exists in the mind, since it is agreed
that place or extension exists only in the mind : but I
am not ashamed to own my ignorance. I know not
where it exists ; only I am sure it exists not in place.
There is a negative answer for you. And you must
expect no other to all. the questions you put for the
future about Matter.

Phil. Since you will not tell me where it exists, be
pleased to inform me after what manner you suppose
it to exist, or what you mean by its existence?

Hyl. It neither thinks nor acts, neither perceives
nor is perceived.

Phil. But what is there positive in your abstracted
notion of its existence?

Hyl. Upon a nice observation, I do not find I have
any positive notion or meaning at all. I tell you
again, I am not ashamed to own my ignorance. I
know not what is meant by its existence, or how it ex-
ists.

Phil. Continue, good Hylas, to act the same in-
genuous part, and tell me sincerely whether you can
frame a distinct idea of Entity in general, prescinded
from and exclusive of all thinking and corporeal be-
ings, all particular things whatsoever.

Hyl. Hold, let me think a little 1 profess,

Philonous, I do not find that I can. At first glance,
methought I had some dilute and airy notion of pure

80 THE SECOND DIALOGUE

Entity in abstract ; but, upon closer attention, it hath
quite vanished out of sight. The more I think on it,
the more am I confirmed in my prudent resolution of
giving none but negative answers, and not pretending
to the least degree of any positive knowledge or con-
ception of Matter, its where, its how, its entity, or any-
thing belonging to it.

Phil. When, therefore, you speak of the existence
of Matter, you have not any notion in your mind?

Hyl. None at all.

Phil. Pray tell me if the case stands not thus : — at
first, from a belief of material substance, you would
have it that the immediate objects existed without the
mind ; then that they are archetypes ; then causes ;
next instruments ; then occasions : lastly, something in
general, which being interpreted proves nothing. So
Matter comes to nothing. What think you, Hylas, is
not this a fair summary of your whole proceeding?

Hyl. Be that as it will, yet I still insist upon it,
that our not being able to conceive a thing is no argu-
ment against its existence.

Phil. That from a cause, effect, operation, sign,
or other circumstance there may reasonably be in-
ferred the existence of a thing not immediately per-
ceived ; and that it were absurd for any man to argue
against the existence of that thing, from his having
no direct and positive notion of it, I freely own. But,
where there is nothing of all this ; where neither rea-
son nor revelation induces us to believe the existence
of a thing ; where we have not even a relative notion
of it ; where an abstraction is made from perceiving
and being perceived, from Spirit and idea : lastly,
where there is not so much as the most inadequate or
faint idea pretended to : I will not indeed thence con-

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 8 1

elude against the reality of any notion, or existence
of anything ; but my inference shall be, that you mean
nothing at all ; that you employ words to no manner
of purpose, without any design or signification what-
soever. And I leave it to you to consider how mere
jargon should be treated.

Hyl. To deal frankly with you, Philonous, your
arguments seem in themselves unanswerable ; but
they have not so great an effect on me as to produce
that entire conviction, that hearty acquiescence, which
attends demonstration. I find myself still relapsing
into an obscure surmise of I know not what, matter.

Phil. But, are you not sensible, Hylas, that two
things must concur to take away all scruple, and work
a plenary assent in the mind ? Let a visible object be
set in never so clear a light, yet, if there is any imper-
fection in the sight, or if the eye is not directed to-
wards it, it will not be distinctly seen. And, though
a demonstration be never so well grounded and fairly
proposed, yet, if there is withal a stain of prejudice,
or a wrong bias on the understanding, can it be ex-
pected on a sudden to perceive clearly and adhere
firmly to the truth? No, there is need of time and
pains : the attention must be awakened and detained
by a frequent repetition of the same thing placed oft
in the same, oft in different lights. I have said it
already, and find I must still repeat and inculcate,
that it is an unaccountable licence you take, in pre-
tending to maintain you know not what, for you know
not what reason, to you know not what purpose. Can
this be paralleled in any art or science, any sect or
profession of men? Or is there anything so bare-
facedly groundless and unreasonable to be met with
even in the lowest of common conversation? But,

82 THE SECOND DIALOGUE

perhaps you will still say, Matter may exist ; though
at the same time you neither know what is meant by
Matter, or by its existence. This indeed is surprising,
and the more so because it is altogether voluntary,
you not being led to it by any one reason ; for I chal-
lenge you to shew me that thing in nature which
needs matter to explain or account for it.

Hyl. The reality of things cannot be maintained
without supposing the existence of Matter. And is
not this, think you, a good reason why I should be
earnest in its defence?

Phil. The reality of things ! What things, sensible
or intelligible?

Hyl. Sensible things.

Phil. My glove, for example?

Hyl. That or any other thing perceived by the
senses.

Phil. But to fix on some particular thing ; is it not
a sufficient evidence to me of the existence of this
glove, that I see it, and feel it, and wear it? Or, if
this will not do, how is it possible I should be assured
of the reality of this thing, which I actually see in this
place, by supposing that some unknown thing, which
I never did or can see, exists after an unknown man-
ner, in an unknown place, or in no place at all? How
can the supposed reality of that which is intangible
be a proof that anything tangible really exists? Or,
of that which is invisible, that any visible thing, or,
in general of anything which is imperceptible, that a
perceptible exists? Do but explain this and I shall
think nothing too hard for you.

Hyl. Upon the whole, I am content to own the
existence of Matter is highly improbable ; but the di-

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 83

rect and absolute impossibility of it does not appear
to me.

Phil. But, granting Matter to be possible, yet,
upon that account merely, it can have no more claim
to existence than a golden mountain or a centaur.

Hyl. I acknowledge it ; but still you do not deny
it is possible ; and that which is possible, for aught
you know, may actually exist.

Phil. I deny it to be possible ; and have, if I mis-
take not, evidently proved, from your own conces-
sions, that it is not. In the common sense of the
word Matter, is there any more implied than an ex-
tended, solid, figured, moveable substance existing
without the mind ? And have not you acknowledged,
over and over, that you have seen evident reason for
denying the possibility of such a substance?

Hyl. True, but that is only one sense of the term
Matter.

Phil. But, is it not the only proper genuine re-
ceived sense? and, if Matter in such a sense be proved
impossible, may it not be thought with good grounds
absolutely impossible? Else how could anything be
proved impossible ? Or, indeed, how could there be
any proof at all one way or other, to a man who takes
the liberty to unsettle and change the common signifi-
cation of words?

Hyl. I thought philosophers might be allowed to
speak more accurately than the vulgar, and were not
always confined to the common acceptation of a term.

Phil. But this now mentioned is the common re-
ceived sense among philosophers themselves. But,
not to insist on that, have you not been allowed to
take Matter in what sense you pleased? And have
you not used this privilege in the utmost extent, some-

84 THE SECOND DIALOGUE

times entirely changing, at others leaving out or put-
ting into the definition of it whatever, for the present,
best served your design, contrary to all the known
rules of reason and logic? And hath not this shifting,
unfair method of yours spun out our dispute to an
unnecessary length ; Matter having been particularly
examined, and by your own confession refuted in each
of those senses ? And can any more be required to
prove the absolute impossibility of a thing, than the
proving it impossible in every particular sense that
either you or any one else understands it in?

Hyl. But I am not so thoroughly satisfied that you
have proved the impossibility of matter, in the last
most obscure abstracted and indefinite sense.

Phil. When is a thing shewn to be impossible?

Hyl. When a repugnancy is demonstrated between
the ideas comprehended in its definition.

Phil. But where there are no ideas, there no re-
pugnancy can be demonstrated between ideas?

Hyl. I agree with you.

Phil. Now, in that which you call the obscure in-
definite sense of the word Matter, it is plain, by your
own confession, there was included no idea at all, no
sense except an unknown sense, which is the same
thing as none. You are not, therefore, to expect I
should prove a repugnancy between ideas, where there
are no ideas: or the impossibility of Matter taken in
an unknown sense, that is, no sense at all. My busi-
ness was only to shew you meant nothing; and this
you were brought to own. So that, in all your vari-
ous senses, you have been shewed either to mean
nothing at all, or, if anything, an absurdity. And if
this be not sufficient to prove the impossibility of a
thing, I desire you will let me know what is.

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 85

Hyl. I acknowledge you have proved that Matter
is impossible ; nor do I see what more can be said in
defence of it. But, at the same time that I give up
this, I suspect all my other notions. For surely none
could be more seemingly evident than this once was :
and yet it now seems as false and absurd as ever it
did true before. But I think we have discussed the
point sufficiently for the present. The remaining part
of the day I would willingly spend in running over in
my thoughts the several heads of this morning's con-
versation, and to-morrow shall be glad to meet you
here again about the same time.

Phil. I will not fail to attend you.

THE THIRD DIALOGUE.

Philonous.

rT~VELL me, Hylas, what are the fruits of yesterday's
JL meditation? Hath it confirmed you in the same
mind you were in at parting? or have you since seen
cause to change your opinion?

HyL Truly my opinion is that all our opinions are
alike vain and uncertain. What we approve to-day,
we condemn to-morrow. We keep a stir about knowl-
edge, and spend our lives in the pursuit of it, when,
alas ! we know nothing all the while : nor do I think
it possible for us ever to know anything in this life.
Our faculties are too narrow and too few. Nature
certainly never intended us for speculation.

Phil. What! say you we can know nothing, Hy las?

Hyl. There is not that single thing in the world
whereof we can know the real nature, or what it is in
itself.

Phil. Will you tell me I do not really know what
fire or water is?

Hyl. You may indeed know that fire appears hot,
and water fluid; but this is no more than knowing
what sensations are produced in your own mind, upon
the application of fire and water to your organs of
sense. Their internal constitution, their true and real
nature, you are utterly in the dark as to that.

THE THIRD DIALOGUE 87

Phil. Do I not know this to be a real stone that I
stand on, and that which 1 see before my eyes to be a
real tree?

Hyl. Know? No, it is impossible you or any man
alive should know it. All you know is, that you have
such a certain idea or appearance in your own mind.
But what is this to the real tree or stone? I tell you
that colour, figure, and hardness, which you perceive,
are not the real natures of those things, or in the least
like them. The same may be said of all other real
things or corporeal substances which compose the
world. They have none of them anything of them-
selves, like those sensible qualities by us perceived.
We should not therefore pretend to affirm or know
anything of them, as they are in their own nature.

Phil. But surely, Hylas, I can distinguish gold,
for example, from iron : and how could this be, if I
knew not what either truly was?

Hyl. Believe me, Philonous, you can only distin-
guish between your own ideas. That yellowness, that
weight, and other sensible qualities, think you they
are really in the gold? They are only relative to the
senses and have no absolute existence in nature. And
in pretending to distinguish the species of real things,
by the appearances in your mind, you may perhaps
act as wisely as he that should conclude two men
were of a different species, because their clothes were
not of the same colour.

Phil. It seems, then, we are altogether put off
with the appearances of things, and those false ones
too. The very meat I eat, and the cloth I wear, have
nothing in them like what I see and feel.

Hyl. Even so.

Phil. But is it not strange the whole world should

88 THE THIRD DIALOGUE

be thus imposed on, and so foolish as to believe their
senses? And yet I know not how it is, but men eat,
and drink, and sleep, and perform all the offices of
life, as comfortably and conveniently as if they really
knew the things they are conversant about.

Hyl. They do so : but you know ordinary practice
does not require a nicety of speculative knowledge.
Hence the vulgar retain their mistakes, and for all
that make a shift to bustle through the affairs of life.
But philosophers know better things.

Phil. You mean, they know that they know nothing.

Hyl. That is the very top and perfection of human
knowledge.

Phil. But are you all this while in earnest, Hylas;
and are you seriously persuaded that you know noth-
ing real in the world? Suppose you are going to
write, would you not call for pen, ink, and paper, like
another man ; and do you not know what it is you call
for?

Hyl. How often must I tell you, that I know not
the real nature of any one thing in the universe? I
may indeed upon occasion make use of pen, ink, and
paper. But, what any one of them is in its own true
nature, I declare positively I know not. And the same
is true with regard to every other corporeal thing.
And, what is more, we are not only ignorant of the
true and real nature of things, but even of their exist-
ence. It cannot be denied that we perceive such cer-
tain appearances or ideas ; but it cannot be concluded
from thence that bodies really exist. Nay, now I think
on it, I must, agreeably to my former concessions,
farther declare that it is impossible any real corporeal
thing should exist in nature.

Phil. You amaze me. Was ever anything more

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 89

wild and extravagant than the notions you now main-
tain : and is it not evident you are led into all these
extravagances by the belief of material substance? This
makes you dream of those unknown natures in every-
thing. It is this occasions your distinguishing be-
tween the reality and sensible appearances of things.
It is to this you are indebted for being ignorant of
what everybody else knows perfectly well. Nor is
this all : you are not only ignorant of the true nature
of everything, but you know not whether any thing
really exists, or whether there are any true natures at
all ; forasmuch as you attribute to your material beings
an absolute or external existence, wherein you sup-
pose their reality consists. And, as you are forced in
the end to acknowledge such an existence means
either a direct repugnancy, or nothing at all, it fol-
lows that you are obliged to pull down your own hy-
pothesis of material Substance, and positively to deny
the real existence of any part of the universe. And
so you are plunged into the deepest and most deplor-
able Scepticism that ever man was. Tell me, Hylas, is
it not as I say?

Hyl. I agree with you. Material substance was no
more than an hypothesis, and a false and groundless
one too. I will no longer spend my breath in defence
of it. But, whatever hypothesis you advance, or what-
soever scheme of things you introduce in its stead, I
doubt not it will appear every whit as false : let me
but be allowed to question you upon it. That is, suf-
fer me to serve you in your own kind, and I warrant
it shall conduct you through as many perplexities and
contradictions, to the very same state of Scepticism
that I myself am in at present.

Phil. I assure you, Hylas, I do not pretend to

9O THE THIRD DIALOGUE

frame any hypothesis at all. I am of a vulgar cast,
simple enough to believe my senses, and leave things
as I find them. To be plain, it is my opinion that the
real things are those very things I see and feel, and
perceive by my senses. These I know, and, finding
they answer all the necessities and purposes of life,
have no reason to be solicitous about any other un-
known beings. A piece of sensible bread, for instance,
would stay my stomach better than ten thousand
times as much of that insensible, unintelligible, real
bread you speak of. It is likewise my opinion that
colours and other sensible qualities are on the objects.
I cannot for my life help thinking that snow is white,
and fire hot. You indeed, who by snow andyfrr mean
certain external, unperceived, unperceiving substances,
are in the right to deny whiteness or heat to be affec-
tions inherent in them. But I, who understand by
those words the things I see and feel, am obliged to
think like other folks. And, as I am no sceptic with
regard to the nature of things, so neither am I as to
their existence. That a thing should be really per-
ceived by my senses, and at the same time not really
exist, is to me a plain contradiction ; since I cannot
prescind or abstract, even in thought, the existence
of a sensible thing from its being perceived. Wood,
stones, fire, water, flesh, iron, and the like things,
which I name and discourse of, are things that I
know. And I should not have known them but that
I perceived them by my senses ; and things perceived
by the senses are immediately perceived ; and things
immediately perceived are ideas ; and ideas cannot
exist without the mind ; their existence therefore con-
sists in being perceived ; when, therefore, they are
actually perceived there can be no doubt of their ex-

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. QI

istence. Away then with all that Scepticism, all those
ridiculous philosophical doubts. What a jest is it for
a philosopher to question the existence of sensible
things, till he hath it proved to him from the veracity
of God ; or to pretend our knowledge in this point
falls short of intuition or demonstration ! I might as
well doubt of my own being, as of the being of those
things I actually see and feel.

Hyl. Not so fast, Philonous: you say you cannot
conceive how sensible things should exist without the
mind. Do you not?

Phil. I do.

Hyl. Supposing you were annihilated, cannot you
conceive it possible that things perceivable by sense
may still exist?

Phil. I can ; but then it must be in another mind.
When I deny sensible things an existence out of the
mind, I do not mean my mind in particular, but all
minds. Now, it is plain, they have an existence ex-
terior to my mind ; since I find them by experience to
be independent of it. There is therefore some other
mind wherein they exist, during the intervals between
the times of my perceiving them : as likewise they did
before my birth, and would do after my supposed an-
nihilation. And, as the same is true with regard to
all other finite created spirits, it necessarily follows
there is an omnipresent eternal Mind, which knows and
comprehends all things, and exhibits them to our view
in such a manner, and according to such rules, as He
Himself hath ordained, and are by us termed the laws
of nature.

Hyl. Answer me, Philonous. Are all our ideas per-
fectly inert beings? Or have they any agency included
in them?

Q2 THE THIRD DIALOGUE

Phil. They are altogether passive and inert.

Hyl. And is not God an agent, a being purely ac-
tive?

Phil. I acknowledge it.

Hyl. No idea therefore can be like unto, or repre-
sent the nature of God?

Phil. It cannot.

Hyl. Since therefore you have no idea of the mind
of God, how can you conceive it possible that things
should exist in His mind? Or, if you can conceive
the mind of God, without having an idea of it, why
may not I be allowed to conceive the existence of
Matter, notwithstanding I have no idea of it ?

Phil. As to your first question : I own I have prop-
erly no idea, either of God or any other spirit ; for
these being active, cannot be represented by things
perfectly inert, as our ideas are. I do nevertheless
know that I, who am a spirit or thinking substance,
exist as certainly as I know my ideas exist. Farther,
I know what I mean by the terms / and myself; and I
know this immediately or intuitively, though I do not
perceive it as I perceive a triangle, a colour, or a
sound. The Mind, Spirit, or Soul is that indivisible
unextended thing which thinks, acts, and perceives.
I say indivisible, because unextended ; and unextended,
because extended, figured, moveable things are ideas ;
and that which perceives ideas, which thinks and
wills, is plainly itself no idea, nor like an idea. Ideas
are things inactive, and perceived. And Spirits a sort
of beings altogether different from them. I do not
therefore say my soul is an idea, or like an idea.
However, taking the word idea in a large sense, my
soul may be said to furnish me with an idea, that is,
an image or likeness of God, though indeed extremely

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 93

inadequate. For, all the notion I have of God is ob-
tained by reflecting on my own soul, heightening its
powers, and removing its imperfections. I have, there-
fore, though not an inactive idea, yet in myself some,
sort of an active thinking image of the Deity. And,
though I perceive Him not by sense, yet I have a no-
tion of Him, or know Him by reflexion and reason-
ing. My own mind and my own ideas I have an im-
mediate knowledge of; and, by the help of these, do
mediately apprehend the possibility of the existence
of other spirits and ideas. Farther, from my own
being, and from the dependency I find in myself and
my ideas, I do, by an act of reason, necessarily infer
the existence of a God, and of all created things in
the mind of God. So much for your first question.
For the second : I suppose by this time you can an-
swer it yourself. For you neither perceive Matter
objectively, as you do an inactive being or idea ; nor
know it, as you do yourself, by a reflex act ; neither
do you mediately apprehend it by similitude of the
one or the other ; nor yet collect it by reasoning from
that which you know immediately. All which makes
the case of Matter widely different from that of the
Deity. J

Hyl. You say your own soul supplies you with
some sort of an idea or image of God. But, at the
same time, you acknowledge you have, properly speak-
ing, no idea of your own soul. You even affirm that
spirits are a sort of beings altogether different from
ideas. Consequently that no idea can be like a spirit.
We have therefore no idea of any spirit. You admit
nevertheless that there is spiritual Substance, although

1 The four following paragraphs were not contained in the first and sec-
ond editions.

94 THE THIRD DIALOGUE

you have no idea of it ; while you deny there can be
such a thing as material Substance, because you have
no notion or idea of it. Is this fair dealing? To act
consistently, you must either admit Matter or reject
Spirit. What say you to this?

Phil. I say, in the first place, that I do not deny
the existence of material substance, merely because I
have no notion of it, but because the notion of it is
inconsistent; or, in other words, because it is repug-
nant that there should be a notion of it. Many things,
for aught I know, may exist, whereof neither I nor
any other man hath or can have any idea or notion
whatsoever. But then those things must be possible,
that is, nothing inconsistent must be included in their
definition. I say, secondly, that, although we believe
things to exist which we do not perceive, yet we may
not believe that any particular thing exists, without
some reason for such belief : but I have no reason for
believing the existence of Matter. I have no imme-
diate intuition thereof : neither can I immediately
from my sensations, ideas, notions, actions, or pas-
sions, infer an unthinking, unperceiving, inactive Sub-
stance, either by probable deduction, or necessary
consequence. Whereas the being of my Self, that is,
my own soul, mind, or thinking principle, I evidently
know by reflexion. You will forgive me if I repeat
the same things in answer to the same objections. In
the very notion or definition of material Substance,
there is included a manifest repugnance and incon
sistency. But this cannot be said of the notion of
Spirit. That ideas should exist in what doth not per-
ceive, or be produced by what doth not act, is repug-
nant. But, it is no repugnancy to say that a perceiv-
ing thing should be the subject of ideas, or an active

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. Q5

thing the cause of them. It is granted we have neither
an immediate evidence nor a demonstrative knowl-
edge of the existence of other finite spirits ; but it will
not thence follow that such spirits are on a foot with
material substances : if to suppose the one be incon-
sistent, and it be not inconsistent to suppose the
other ; if the one can be inferred by no argument, and
there is a probability for the other; if we see signs
and effects indicating distinct finite agents like our-
selves, and see no sign or symptom whatever that
leads to a rational belief of Matter. I say, lastly,
that I have a notion of Spirit, though I have not,
strictly speaking, an idea of it. I do not perceive k
as an idea, or by means of an idea, but know it by re-
flexion.

Hyl. Notwithstanding all you have said, to me it
seems that, according to your own way of thinking^
and in consequence of your own principles, it should
follow that you are only a system of floating ideas,
without any substance to support them. Words are
not to be used without a meaning. And, as there is
no more meaning in spiritual Substance than in material
Substance, the one is to be exploded as well as the
other.

Phil. How often must I repeat, that I know or am
conscious of my own being; and that I myself ^.va. not
my ideas, but somewhat else, a thinking, active prin-
ciple that perceives, knows, wills, and operates about
ideas. I know that I, one and the same self, perceive
both colours and sounds : that a colour cannot per-
ceive a sound, nor a sound a colour : that I am there-
fore one individual principle, distinct from colour and
sound ; and, for the same reason, from all other sen-
sible things and inert ideas. But, I am not in like

96 THE THIRD DIALOGUE

manner conscious either of the existence or essence
of Matter. On the contrary, I know that nothing in-
consistent can exist, and that the existence of Matter
implies an inconsistency. Farther, I know what I
mean when I affirm that there is a spiritual substance
or support of ideas, that is, that a spirit knows and
perceives ideas. But, I do not know what is meant
when it is said that an unperceiving substance hath
inherent in it and supports either ideas or the arche-
types of ideas. There is therefore upon the whole no
parity of case between Spirit and Matter.

Hyl, I own myself satisfied in this point. But, do
you in earnest think the real existence of sensible
things consists in their being actually perceived? If
so; how comes it that all mankind distinguish be-
tween them? Ask the first man you meet, and he
shall tell you, to be perceived is one thing, and to exist
is another.

Phil, I am content, Hylas, to appeal to the com-
mon sense of the world for the truth of my notion.
Ask the gardener why he thinks yonder cherry-tree
exists in the garden, and he shall tell you, because he
sees and feels it ; in a word, because he perceives it
by his senses. Ask him why he thinks an orange-tree
not to be there, and he shall tell you, because he does
not perceive it. What he perceives by sense, that he
terms a real being, and saith it is or exists; but, that
which is not perceivable, the same, he saith, hath no
being.

Hyl. Yes, Philonous, I grant the existence of a sen-
sible thing consists in being perceivable, but not in
being actually perceived.

Phil. And what is perceivable but an idea ? And

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. Q7

can an idea exist without being actually perceived?
These are points long since agreed between us.

HyL But, be your opinion never so true, yet surely
you will not deny it is shocking, and contrary to the
common sense of men. Ask the fellow whether yon-
der tree hath an existence out of his mind : what an-
swer think you he would make?

Phil. The same that I should myself, to wit, that
it doth exist out of his mind. But then to a Christian
it cannot surely be shocking to say, the real tree, ex-
isting without his mind, is truly known and compre-
hended by (that is, exists in) the infinite mind of God.
Probably he may not at first glance be aware of the
direct and immediate proof there is of this; inasmuch
as the very being of a tree, or any other sensible
thing, implies a mind wherein it is. But the point
itself he cannot deny. The question between the Ma-
terialists and me is not, whether things have a real
existence out of the mind of this or that person, but,
whether they have an absolute existence, distinct from
being perceived by God, and exterior to all minds.
This indeed some heathens and philosophers have
affirmed, but whoever entertains notions of the Deity
suitable to the Holy Scriptures will be of another
opinion.

Hyl. But, according to your notions, what differ-
ence is there between real things, and chimeras formed
by the imagination, or the visions of a dream, since
they are all equally in the mind ?

Phil. The ideas formed by the imagination are
faint and indistinct ; they have, besides, an entire de-
pendence on the will. But the ideas perceived by
sense, that is, real things, are more vivid and clear;
and, being imprinted on the mind by a spirit distinct

98 THE THIRD DIALOGUE

from us, have not the like dependence on our will.
There is therefore no danger of confounding these
with the foregoing : and there is as little of confound-
ing them with the visions of a dream, which are dim,
irregular, and confused. And, though they should
happen to be never so lively and natural, yet, by their
not being connected, and of a piece with the preced-
ing and subsequent transactions of our lives, they
might easily be distinguished from realities. In short,
by whatever method you distinguish things from chi-
meras on your scheme, the same, it is evident, will
hold also upon mine. For, it must be, I presume, by
some perceived difference ; and I am not for depriv-
ing you of any one thing that you perceive.

Hyl. But still, Philonous, you hold, there is noth-
ing in the world but spirits and ideas. And this, you
must needs acknowledge, sounds very oddly.

Phil. I own the word idea, not being commonly
used for thing, sounds something out of the way. My
reason for using it was, because a necessary relation
to the mind is understood to be implied by that term ;
and it is now commonly used by philosophers to de-
note the immediate objects of the understanding. But,
however oddly the proposition may sound in words,
yet it includes nothing so very strange or shocking in
its sense ; which in effect amounts to no more than
this, to wit, that there are only things perceiving, and
things perceived ; or that every unthinking being is
necessarily, and from the very nature of its existence,
perceived by some mind ; if not by a finite created
mind, yet certainly by the infinite mind of God, in
whom "we live, and move, and have our being." Is
this as strange as to say, the sensible qualities are not
on the objects : or that we cannot be sure of the ex-

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 99

istence of things, or know anything of their real na-
tures, though we both see and feel them, and perceive
them by all our senses?

Hyl. And, in consequence of this, must we not
think there are no such things as physical or corporeal
causes ; but that a Spirit is the immediate cause of
all the phenomena in nature? Can there be anything
more extravagant than this?

Phil. Yes, it is infinitely more extravagant to say
a thing which is inert operates on the mind, and which
is unperceiving, is the cause of our perceptions, with-
out any regard either to consistency, or the old known
axiom, Nothing can give to another that which it hath
not itself.^- Besides, that which to you, I know not
for what reason, seems so extravagant is no more
than the Holy Scriptures assert in a hundred places.
In them God is represented as the sole and imme-
diate Author of all those effects which some heathens
and philosophers are wont to ascribe to Nature, Mat-
ter, Fate, or the like unthinking principle. This is
so much the constant language of Scripture that it
were needless to confirm it by citations.

Hyl. You are not aware, Philonous, that, in making
God the immediate Author of all the motions in na-
ture, you make Him the Author of murder, sacrilege,
adultery, and the like heinous sins.

Phil. In answer to that, I observe, first, that the
imputation of guilt is the same, whether a person
commits an action with or without an instrument. In
case therefore you suppose God to act by the media-
tion of an instrument, or occasion, called Matter, you
as truly make Him the author of sin as I, who think

1 The words of this sentence from " without " to the end were omitted
from the last edition.

IOO THE THIRD DIALOGUE

Him the immediate agent in all those operations vul-
garly ascribed to Nature. I farther observe that sin
or moral turpitude doth not consist in the outward
physical action or motion, but in the internal devia-
tion of the will from the laws of reason and religion.
This is plain, in that the killing an enemy in a battle,
or putting a criminal legally to death, is not thought
sinful ; though the outward act be the very same with
that in the case of murder. Since, therefore, sin doth
not consist in the physical action, the making God an
immediate cause of all such actions is not making Him
the Author of sin. Lastly, I have nowhere said that
God is the only agent who produces all the motions in
bodies. It is true I have denied there are any other
agents besides spirits ; but this is very consistent with
allowing to thinking rational beings, in the produc-
tion of motions, the use of limited powers, ultimately
indeed derived from God, but immediately under the
direction of their own wills, which is sufficient to en-
title them to all the guilt of their actions.

Hyl. But the denying Matter, Philonous, or cor-
poreal Substance ; there is the point. You can never
persuade me that this is not repugnant to the uni-
versal sense of mankind. Were our dispute to be de-
termined by most voices, I am confident you would
give up the point, without gathering the votes.

Phil. I wish both our opinions were fairly stated
and submitted to the judgment of men who had plain
common sense, without the prejudices of a learned
education. Let me be represented as one who trusts
his senses, who thinks he knows the things he sees
and feels, and entertains no doubts of their existence ;
and you fairly set forth with all your doubts, your par-
adoxes, and your scepticism about you, and I shall

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. IOI

willingly acquiesce in the determination of any indiffer-
ent person. That there is no substance wherein ideas
can exist beside spirit is to me evident. And that the
objects immediately perceived are ideas, is on all hands
agreed. And that sensible qualities are objects imme-
diately perceived no one can deny. It is therefore evi-
dent there can be no substratum of those qualities but
spirit ; in which they exist, not by way of mode or prop-
erty, but as a thing perceived in that which perceives
it. I deny therefore that there is any unthinking sub-
stratum of the objects of sense, and in that acceptation
that there is any material substance. But if by material
substance is meant only sensible body, that which is
seen and felt (and the unphilosophical part of the
world, I dare say, mean no more), then I am more
certain of matter's existence than you or any other
philosopher pretend to be. If there be anything which
makes the generality of mankind averse from the no-
tions I espouse, it is a misapprehension that I deny
the reality of sensible things : but, as it is you who
are guilty of that and not I, it follows that in truth
their aversion is against your notions and not mine. I
do therefore assert that I am as certain as of my own
being, that there are bodies or corporeal substances
(meaning the things I perceive by my senses) ; and
that, granting this, the bulk of mankind will take no
thought about, nor think themselves at all concerned
in the fate of those unknown natures and philosoph-
ical quiddities which some men are so fond of.

Hyl. What say you to this? Since, according to
you, men judge of the reality of things by their senses,
how can a man be mistaken in thinking the moon a
plain lucid surface, about a foot in diameter; or a

IO2 THE THIRD DIALOGUE

square tower, seen at a distance, round ; or an oar,
with one end in the water, crooked?

Phil. He is not mistaken with regard to the ideas
he actually perceives, but in the inferences he makes
from his present perceptions. Thus, in the case of
the oar, what he immediately perceives by sight is
certainly crooked ; and so far he is in the right. But,
if he thence conclude that upon taking the oar out of
the water he shall perceive the same crookedness ; or
that it would affect his touch as crooked things are
wont to do : in that he is mistaken. In like manner,
if he shall conclude from what he perceives in one
station, that, in case he advances towards the moon
or tower, he should still be affected with the like ideas,
he is mistaken. But his mistake lies not in what he
perceives immediately and at present (it being a mani-
fest contradiction to suppose he should err in respect
of that), but in the wrong judgment he makes con-
cerning the ideas he apprehends to be connected with
those immediately perceived : or, concerning the ideas
that, from what he perceives at present, he imagines
would be perceived in other circumstances. The case
is the same with regard to the Copernican system.
We do not here perceive any motion of the earth :
but it were erroneous thence to conclude, that, in case
we were placed at as great a distance from that as we
are now from the other planets, we should not then
perceive its motion.

Hyl. I understand you ; and must needs own you
say things plausible enough : but, give me leave to
put you in mind of one thing. Pray, Philonous, were
you not formerly as positive that Matter existed, as
you are now that it does not?

Phil. I was. But here lies the difference. Before,

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. IO3

my positiveness was founded, without examination,
upon prejudice; but now, after inquiry, upon evi-
dence.

Hyl. After all, it seems our dispute is rather about
words than things. We agree in the thing, but differ
in the name. That we are affected with ideas from
without is evident ; and it is no less evident that there
must be (I will not say archetypes, but) powers with-
out the mind, corresponding to those ideas. And, as
these powers cannot subsist by themselves, there is
some subject of them necessarily to be admitted,
which I call Matter, and you call Spirit. This is all
the difference.

Phil. Pray, Hylas, is that powerful being, or sub-
ject of powers, extended?

Hyl. It hath not extension ; but it hath the power
to raise in you the idea of extension.

Phil. It is therefore itself unextended ?

Hyl. I grant it.

Phil. Is it not also active?

Hyl. Without doubt : otherwise, how could we at-
tribute powers to it?

Phil. Now let me ask you two questions : First,
whether it be agreeable to the usage either of philos-
ophers or others to give the name Matter to an unex-
tended active being ? And, Secondly, whether it be
not ridiculously absurd to misapply names contrary
to the common use of language ?

Hyl. Well then, let it not be called Matter, since
you will have it so, but some third nature distinct
from Matter and Spirit. For what reason is there
why you should call it Spirit? Does not the notion
of spirit imply that it is thinking, as well as active
and unextended?

104 THE TH1RD DIALOGUE

Phil. My reason is this : because I have a mind to
have some notion of meaning in what I say : but I
have no notion of any action distinct from volition,
neither can I conceive volition to be anywhere but in
a spirit; therefore, when I speak of an active being, I
am obliged to mean a spirit. Beside, what can be
plainer than that a thing which hath no ideas in itself
cannot impart them to me; and, if it hath ideas,
surely it must be a spirit. To make you comprehend
the point still more clearly if it be possible : I assert
as well as you that, since we are affected from with-
out, we must allow powers to be without, in a being
distinct from ourselves. So far we are agreed. But
then we differ as to the kind of this powerful being. I
will have it to be spirit, you Matter, or I know not
what (I may add too, you know not what) third na-
ture. Thus, I prove it to be spirit. From the effects
I see produced I conclude there are actions ; and, be-
cause actions, volitions ; and, because there are voli-
tions, there must be a will. Again, the things I per-
ceive must have an existence, they or their archetypes,
out of my mind : but, being ideas, neither they nor
their archetypes can exist otherwise than in an under-
standing; there is therefore an understanding. But
will and understanding constitute in the strictest sense
a mind or spirit. The powerful cause, therefore, of
my ideas is in strict propriety of speech a spirit.

Hyl. And now I warrant you think you have made
the point very clear, little suspecting that what you
advance leads directly to a contradiction. Is it not
an absurdity to imagine any imperfection in God?

Phil. Without a doubt.

Hyl. To suffer pain is an imperfection?

Phil. It is.

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 1 05

HyL Are we not sometimes affected with pain and
uneasiness by some other being?

Phil. We are.

HyL And have you not said that being is a spirit,
and is not that spirit God?

Phil. I grant it.

HyL But you have asserted that whatever ideas
we perceive from without are in the mind which affects
us. The ideas, therefore, of pain and uneasiness are
in God , or, in other words, God suffers pain : that is
to say, there is an imperfection in the Divine nature,
which, you acknowledge, was absurd. So you are
caught in a plain contradiction.

Phil. That God knows or understands all things,
and that He knows, among other things, what pain
is, even every sort of painful sensation, and what it is
for His creatures to suffer pain, I make no question.
But, that God, though He knows and sometimes
causes painful sensations in us, can Himself suffer
pain, I positively deny. We, who are limited and
dependent spirits, are liable to impressions of sense,
the effects of an external agent, which, being pro-
duced against our wills, are sometimes painful and
uneasy. But God, whom no external being can affect,
who perceives nothing by sense as we do, whose will
is absolute and independent, causing all things, and
liable to be thwarted or resisted by nothing ; it is evi-
dent, such a Being as this can suffer nothing, nor be
affected with any painful sensation, or indeed any sen-
sation at all. We are chained to a body, that is to
say, our perceptions are connected with corporeal
motions. By the law of our nature, we are affected
upon every alteration in the nervous parts of our sen-
sible body ; which sensible body, rightly considered,

106 THE THIRD DIALOGUE

is nothing but a complexion of such qualities or ideas
as have no existence distinct from being perceived by
a mind : so that this connexion of sensations with
corporeal motions means no more than a correspond-
ence in the order of nature between two sets of ideas,
or things immediately perceivable. But God is a pure
spirit, disengaged from all such sympathy or natural
ties. No corporeal motions are attended with the
sensations of pain or pleasure in His mind. To know
everything knowable is certainly a perfection ; but to
endure, or surfer, or feel anything by sense, is an im-
perfection. The former, I say, agrees to God, but
not the latter. God knows or hath ideas ; but His
ideas are not conveyed to Him by sense, as ours are.
Your not distinguishing, where there is so manifest a
difference, makes you fancy you see an absurdity where
there is none.

Hyl. But, all this while you have not considered
that the quantity of Matter hath been demonstrated
to be proportioned to the gravity of bodies. And what
can withstand demonstration?

Phil. Let me see how. you demonstrate that point.

Hyl. I lay it down for a principle that the mo-
ments or quantities of motion in bodies are in a direct
compounded reason of the velocities and quantities of
Matter contained in them. Hence, where the veloci-
ties are equal, it follows the moments are directly as
the quantity of Matter in each. But it is found by
experience that all bodies (bating the small inequali-
ties, arising from the resistance of the air) descend
with an equal velocity ; the motion therefore of de-
scending bodies, and consequently their gravity, which
is the cause or principle of that motion, is proper-

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. IOJ

tional to the quantity of Matter; which was to be
demonstrated.

Phil. You lay it down as a self-evident principle
that the quantity of motion in any body is propor-
tional to the velocity and Matter taken together ; and
this is made use of to prove a proposition from whence
the existence of Mattrr is inferred. Pray is not this
arguing in a circle?

Hyl. In the premise I only mean that the motion
is proportional to the velocity, jointly with the exten-
sion and solidity.

Phil. But, allowing this to be true, yet it will not
thence follow that gravity is proportional to Matter,
in your philosophic sense of the word ; except you
take it for granted that unknown substratum, or what-
ever else you call it, is proportional to those sensible
qualities; which to suppose is plainly begging the
question. That there is magnitude and solidity, or
resistance, perceived by sense, I readily grant ; as
likewise, that gravity may be proportional to those
qualities I will not dispute. But that either these
qualities as perceived by us, or the powers producing
them, do exist in a material substratum; — this is what
I deny, and you indeed affirm, but, notwithstanding
your demonstration, have not yet proved.

Hyl. I shall insist no longer on that point. Do
you think, however, you shall persuade me the nat-
ural philosophers have been dreaming all this while?
Pray what becomes of all their hypotheses and expli-
cations of the phenomena, which suppose the exist-
ence of Matter?

Phil. What mean you, Hylas, by the phenomena?

Hyl. I mean the appearances which I perceive by
my senses.

108 THE THIRD DIALOGUE

Phil. And the appearances perceived by sense, are
they not ideas?

Hyl. I have told you so a hundred times.

Phil. Therefore, to explain the phenomena is to
shew how we come to be affected with ideas, in that
manner, and order wherein they are imprinted on our
senses. Is it not?

Hyl. It is.

Phil. Now, if you can prove that any philosopher
hath explained the production of any one idea in our
minds by the help of Matter, I shall for ever acquiesce,
and look on all that hath been said against it as noth-
ing ; but, if you cannot, it is vain to urge the explica-
tion of phenomena. That a Being endowed with
knowledge and will should produce or exhibit ideas
is easily understood. But, that a Being which is utterly
destitute of these faculties should be able to produce
ideas, or in any sort to affect an intelligence, this I
can never understand. This I say, though we had
some positive conception of Matter, though we knew
its qualities, and could comprehend its existence,
would yet be so far from explaining things, that it is
itself the most inexplicable thing in the world. And
yet, for all this, it will not follow that philosophers
have been doing nothing ; for, by observing and rea-
soning upon the connexion of ideas, they discover the
laws and methods of nature, which is a part of knowl-
edge both useful and entertaining.

Hyl. After all, can it be supposed God would de-
ceive all mankind? Do you imagine He would have
induced the whole world to believe the being of Mat-
ter, if there was no such thing?

Phil. That every epidemical opinion arising from
prejudice, or passion, or thoughtlessness may be im-

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. lOQ

puted to God, as the Author of it, I believe you will
not affirm. Whatsoever opinion we father on Him, it
must be either because He has discovered it to us by
supernatural revelation ; or because it is so evident to
our natural faculties, which were framed and given
us by God, that it is impossible we should withhold
our assent from it. But where is the revelation? or
where is the evidence that extorts the belief of Mat-
ter? Nay, how does it appear, that Matter, taken for
something distinct from what we perceive by our
senses, is thought to exist by all mankind ; or, indeed,
by any except a few philosophers, who do not know
what they would be at? Your question supposes these
points are clear ; and, when you have cleared them, I
shall think myself obliged to give you another answer.
In the meantime let it suffice that I tell you, I do not
suppose God has deceived mankind at all.

Hyl. But the novelty, Philonous, the novelty !
There lies the danger. New notions should always
be discountenanced ; they unsettle men's minds, and
nobody knows where they will end.

Phil. Why the rejecting a notion that hath no
foundation, either in sense, or in reason, or in Divine
authority, should be thought to unsettle the belief of
such opinions as are grounded on all or any of these,
I cannot imagine. That innovations in government
and religion are dangerous, and ought to be discoun-
tenanced, I freely own. But, is there the like reason
why they should be discouraged in philosophy? The
making anything known which was unknown before
is an innovation in knowledge : and, if all such inno-
vations had been forbidden, men would have made a
notable progress in the arts and sciences. But it is
none of my business to plead for novelties and para-

110 THE THIRD DIALOGUE

doxes. That the qualities we perceive are not on the
objects : that we must not believe our senses : that
we know nothing of the real nature of things, and can
never be assured even of their existence: that real
colours and sounds are nothing but certain unknown
figures and motions : that motions are in themselves
neither swift nor slow : that there are in bodies abso-
lute extensions, without any particular magnitude or
figure : that a thing stupid, thoughtless, and inactive,
operates on a spirit : that the least particle of a body
contains innumerable extended parts : — these are the
novelties, these are the strange notions which shock
the genuine uncorrupted judgment of all mankind ;
and being once admitted, embarrass the mind with
endless doubts and difficulties. And it is against
these and the like innovations I endeavour to vindi-
cate Common Sense. It is true, in doing this, I may
perhaps be obliged to use some ambages, and ways of
speech not common. But, if my notions are once
thoroughly understood, that which is most singular
in them will, in effect, be found to amount to no more
than this : — that it is absolutely impossible, and a
plain contradiction, to suppose any unthinking being
should exist without being perceived by a mind. And,
if this notion be singular, it is a shame it should be
so at this time of day, and in a Christian country.

Hyl. As for the difficulties other opinions may be
liable to, those are out of the question. It is your
business to defend your own opinion. Can anything
be plainer than that you are for changing all things
into ideas? You, I say, who are not ashamed to charge
me with scepticism. This is so plain, there is no de-
nying it.

Phil. You mistake me. I am not for changing

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. Ill

things into ideas, but rather ideas into things ; since
those immediate objects of perception, which, accord-
ing to you, are only appearances of things, I take to
be the real things themselves.

Hyl. Things ! you may pretend what you please ;
but it is certain you leave us nothing but the empty
forms of things, the outside only which strikes the
senses.

Phil. What you call the empty forms and outside
of things seem to me the very things themselves. Nor
are they empty or incomplete, otherwise than upon
your supposition that Matter is an essential part of all
corporeal things. We both, therefore, agree in this,
that we perceive only sensible forms: but herein we
differ, you will have them to be empty appearances,
I real beings. In short, you do not trust your senses,
I do.

Hyl. You say you believe your senses ; and seem
to applaud yourself that in this you agree with the
vulgar. According to you, therefore, the true nature
of a thing is discovered by the senses. If so, whence
comes that disagreement? Why, is not the same
figure, and other sensible qualities, perceived all man-
ner of ways? And why should we use a microscope
the better to discover the true nature of a body, if it
were discoverable to the naked eye?

Phil. Strictly speaking, Hylas, we do not see the
same object that we feel ; neither is the same object
perceived by the microscope which was by the naked
eye. But, in case every variation was thought suffi-
cient to constitute a new kind or individual, the end-
less number or confusion of names would render lan-
guage impracticable. Therefore, to avoid this as well
as other inconveniences which are obvious upon a

112 THE THIRD DIALOGUE

little thought, men combine together several ideas,
apprehended by divers senses, or by the same sense
at different times, or in different circumstances, but
observed, however, to have some connexion in na-
ture, either with respect to coexistence or succession ;
all which they refer to one name, and consider as one
thing. Hence, it follows that when I examine by my
other senses a thing I have seen, it is not in order to
understand better the same object which I had per-
ceived by sight, the object of one sense not being per-
ceived by the other senses. And, when I look through
a microscope, it is not that I may perceive more
clearly what I perceived already with my bare eyes ;
the object perceived by the glass being quite different
from the former. But, in both cases, my aim is only
to know what ideas are connected together ; and the
more a man knows of the connexion of ideas, the more
he is said to know of the nature of things. What,
therefore, if our ideas are variable ; what if our senses
are not in all circumstances affected with the same
appearances? It will not thence follow they are not
to be trusted, or that they are inconsistent either with
themselves or anything else ; except it be with your
preconceived notion of (I know not what) one single,
unchanged, unperceivable, real nature, marked by
each name : which prejudice seems to have taken its
rise from not rightly understanding the common lan-
guage of men, speaking of several distinct ideas as
united into one thing by the mind. And, indeed, there
is cause to suspect several erroneous conceits of the
philosophers are owing to the same original : while
they began to build their schemes not so much on no-
tions as words, which were framed by the vulgar,

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 113

merely for conveniency and dispatch in the common
actions of life, without any regard to speculation.

Hyl. Methinks I apprehend your meaning.

Phil. It is your opinion the ideas we perceive by
our senses are not real things, but images or copies
of them. Our knowledge, therefore, is no farther real
than as our ideas are the true representations of those
originals. But, as these supposed originals are in
themselves unknown, it is impossible to know how
far our ideas resemble them ; or whether they resemble
them at all. We cannot, therefore, be sure we have
any real knowledge. Farther, as our ideas are per-
petually varied, without any change in the supposed
real things, it necessarily follows they cannot all be
true copies of them : or, if some are and others are
not, it is impossible to distinguish the former from
the latter. And this plunges us yet deeper in uncer-
tainty. Again, when we consider the point, we can-
not conceive how any idea, or anything like an idea,
should have an absolute existence out of a mind : nor
consequently, according to you, how there should be
any real thing in nature. The result of all which is
that we are thrown into the most hopeless and aban-
doned Scepticism. Now, give me leave to ask you,
First, Whether your referring ideas to certain abso-
lutely existing unperceived substances, as their orig-
inals, be not the source of all this Scepticism? Sec-
ondly, whether you are informed, either by sense or
reason, of the existence of those unknown originals?
And, in case you are not, whether it be not absurd to
suppose them? Thirdly, Whether, upon inquiry, you
find there is anything distinctly conceived or meant
by the absolute or external existence of unperceiving sub-
stances? Lastly, Whether, the premises considered,

114 THE THIRD DIALOGUE

it be not the wisest way to follow nature, trust your
senses, and, laying aside all anxious thought about
unknown natures or substances, admit with the vul-
gar those for real things which are perceived by the
senses?

Hyl. For the present, I have no inclination to the
answering part. I would much rather see how you
can get over what follows. Pray are not the objects
perceived by the senses of one, likewise perceivable
to others present ? If there were a hundred more here,
they would all see the garden, the trees, and flowers,
as I see them. But they are not in the same manner
affected with the ideas I frame in my imagination.
Does not this make a difference between the former
sort of objects and the latter ?

Phil. I grant it does. Nor have I ever denied a
difference between the objects of sense and those of
imagination. But what would you infer from thence?
You cannot say that sensible objects exist unper-
ceived, because they are perceived by many.

Hyl. I own I can make nothing of that objection :
but it hath led me into another. Is it not your opin-
ion that by our senses we perceive only the ideas ex-
isting in our minds?

Phil. It is.

Hyl. But the same idea which is in my mind can-
not be in yours, or in any other mind. Doth it not
therefore follow, from your principles, that no two can
see the same thing? And is not this highly absurd ?

Phil. If the term same be taken in the vulgar ac-
ceptation, it is certain (and not at all repugnant to
the principles I maintain) that different persons may
perceive the same thing ; or the same thing or idea
exist in different minds. Words are of arbitrary im-

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. I 15

position ; and, since men are used to apply the word
same where no distinction or variety is perceived, and
I do not pretend to alter their perceptions, it follows
that, as men have said before, several saw the same
thing, so they may, upon like occasions, still continue
to use the same phrase, without any deviation either
from propriety of language, or the truth of things.
But, if the term same be used in the acceptation of
philosophers, who pretend to an abstracted notion of
identity, then, according to their sundry definitions of
this notion (for it is not yet agreed wherein that phil-
osophic identity consists), it may or may not be pos-
sible for divers persons to perceive the same thing.
But whether philosophers shall think fit to call a thing
the same or no, is, I conceive, of small importance.
Let us suppose several men together, all endued with
the same faculties, and consequently affected in like
sort by their senses, and who had yet never known
the use of language; they would without question,
agree in their perceptions. Though perhaps, when
they came to the use of speech, some regarding the uni-
formness of what was perceived, might call it the same
thing : others, especially regarding the diversity of per-
sons who perceived, might choose the denomination
of different things. But who sees not that all the dis-
pute is about a word? to wit, whether what is per-
ceived by different persons may yet have the term
same applied to it? Or, suppose a house, whose walls
or outward shell remaining unaltered, the chambers
are all pulled down, and new ones built in their place ;
and that you should call this the same, and I should
say it was not the same house : — would we not, for all
this, perfectly agree in our thoughts of the house, con-
sidered in itself? And would not all the difference

Il6 THE THIRD DIALOGUE

consist in a sound? If you should say, We differ in our
notions ; for that you superadded to your idea of the
house the simple abstracted idea of identity, whereas
I did not; I would tell you, I know not what you
mean by the abstracted idea of identity; and should de-
sire you to look into your own thoughts, and be sure

you understood yourself. Why so silent, Hylas?

Are you not yet satisfied men may dispute about iden-
tity and diversity, without any real difference in their
thoughts and opinions, abstracted from names? Take
this farther reflexion with you — that whether Matter
be allowed to exist or no, the case is exactly the same
as to the point in hand. For, the Materialists them-
selves acknowledge what we immediately perceive by
our senses to be our own ideas. Your difficulty, there-
fore, that no two see the same thing, makes equally
against the Materialists and me.

Hyl. But they suppose an external archetype, to
which referring their several ideas they may truly be
said to perceive the same thing.

Phil. And (not to mention your having discarded
those archetypes) so may you suppose an external
archetype on my principles ; external, I mean, to your
own mind ; though indeed it must be supposed to
exist in that mind which comprehends all things ; but
then, this serves all the ends of identity, as well as if
it existed out of a mind. And I am sure you yourself
will not say it is less intelligible.

Hyl. You have indeed clearly satisfied me, either
that there is no difficulty at bottom in this point ; or,
if there be, that it makes equally against both opin-
ions.

Phil. But that which makes equally against two
contradictory opinions can be a proof against neither.

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 117

Hyl. I acknowledge it. But, after all, Philonous,
when I consider the substance of what you advance
against Scepticism, it amounts to no more than this : —
We are sure that we really see, hear, feel ; in a word,
that we are affected with sensible impressions.

Phil. And how are we concerned any farther? I
see this cherry, I feel it, I taste it : and I am sure
nothing cannot be seen, or felt, or tasted : it is there-
fore real. Take away the sensations of softness, mois-
ture, redness, tartness, and you take away the cherry.
Since it is not a being distinct from sensations ; a
cherry, I say, is nothing but a congeries of sensible
impressions, or ideas perceived by various senses:
which ideas are united into one thing (or have one
name given them) by the mind ; because they are ob-
served to attend each other. Thus, when the palate
is affected with such a particular taste, the sight is
affected with a red colour, the touch with roundness,
softness, &c. Hence, when I see, and feel, and taste,
in sundry certain manners, I am sure the cherry ex-
ists, or is real ; its reality being in my opinion nothing
abstracted from those sensations. But if, by the word
cherry, you mean an unknown nature, distinct from all
those sensible qualities, and by its existence something
distinct from its being perceived ; then, indeed, I own,
neither you or I, nor any one else, can be sure it ex-
ists.

Hyl. But, what would you say, Philonous, if I
should bring the very same reasons against the exist-
ence of sensible things in a mind, which j'ou have
offered against their existing in a material substratum?

Phil. When I see your reasons, you shall hear
what I have to say to them.

Hyl. Is the mind extended or unextended?

Il8 THE THIRD DIALOGUE

Phil. Unextended, without doubt.

HyL Do you say the things you perceive are in
your mind?

Phil. They are.

HyL Again, have I not heard you speak of sen-
sible impressions?

Phil. I believe you may.

Hyl. Explain to me now, O Philonous ! how is it
possible there should be room for all those trees and
houses to exist in your mind. Can extended things
be contained in that which is unextended? Or, are
we to imagine impressions made on a thing void of
all solidity? You cannot say objects are in your mind,
as books in your study : or that things are imprinted
on it, as the figure of a seal upon wax. In what sense,
therefore, are we to understand those expressions?
Explain me this if you can : and I shall then be able
to answer all those queries you formerly put to me
about my substratum.

Phil. Look you, Hylas, when I speak of objects as
existing in the mind, or imprinted on the senses, I
would not be understood in the gross literal sense —
as when bodies are said to exist in a place, or a seal
to make an impression upon wax. My meaning is
only that the mind comprehends or perceives them ;
and that it is affected from without, or by some being
distinct from itself. This is my explication of your
difficulty ; and how it can serve to make your tenet
of an unperceiving material substratum intelligible, I
would fain know.

Hyl. Nay, if that be all, I confess I do not see
what use can be made of it. But are you not guilty
of some abuse of language in this ?

Phil. None at all. It is no more than common cus-

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. IIQ

torn, which you know is the rule of language, hath
authorised : nothing being more usual, than for phi-
losophers to speak of the immediate objects of the
understanding as things existing in the mind. Nor is
there anything in this but what is conformable to the
general analogy of language ; most part of the mental
operations being signified by words borrowed from
sensible things ; as is plain in the terms comprehend,
reflect, discourse, &c., which, being applied to the
mind, must not be taken in their gross original sense.

Hyl. You have, I own, satisfied me in this point.
But there still remains one great difficulty, which I
know not how you will get over. And, indeed, it is
of such importance that if you could solve all others,
without being able to find a solution for this, you
must never expect to make me a proselyte to your
principles.

Phil. Let me know this mighty difficulty.

Hyl. The Scripture account of the creation is what
appears to me utterly irreconcilable with your notions.
Moses tells us of a creation: a creation of what? of
ideas? No certainly, but of things, of real things,
solid corporeal substances. Bring your principles to
agree with this, and I shall perhaps agree with you.

Phil. Moses mentions the sun, moon, and stars,
earth and sea, plants and animals. That all these do
really exist, and were in the beginning created by
God, I make no question. If by ideas you mean fic-
tions and fancies of the mind, then these are no ideas.
If by ideas you mean immediate objects of the under-
standing, or sensible things which cannot exist unper-
ceived, or out of a mind, then these things are ideas.
But whether you do or do not call them ideas, it mat-
ters little. The difference is only about a name. And,

I2O THE THIRD DIALOGUE

whether that name be retained or rejected, the sense,
the truth, and reality of things continues the same.
In common talk, the objects of our senses are not
termed ideas but things. Call them so still — provided
you do not attribute to them any absolute external
existence — and I shall never quarrel with you for a
word. The creation, therefore, I allow to have been
a creation of things, of real things. Neither is this in
the least inconsistent with my principles, as is evident
from what I have now said ; and would have been
evident to you without this, if you had not forgotten
what had been so often said before. But as for solid
corporeal substances, I desire you to shew where
Moses makes any mention of them ; and, if they should
be mentioned by him, or any other inspired writer, it
would still be incumbent on you to shew those words
were not taken in the vulgar acceptation, for things
falling under our senses, but in the philosophic ac-
ceptation, for Matter, or an unknown quiddity, with
an absolute existence. When you have proved these
points, then (and not till then) may you bring the
authority of Moses into our dispute.

Hyl. It is in vain to dispute about a point so clear.
I am content to refer it to your own conscience. Are
you not satisfied there is some peculiar repugnancy
between the Mosaic account of the creation and your
notions?

Phil. If all possible sense which can be put on the
first chapter of Genesis may be conceived as consist-
ently with my principles as any other, then it has no
peculiar repugnancy with them. But there is no sense
you may not as well conceive, believing as I do. Since,
besides spirits, all you conceive are ideas ; and the

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 121

existence of these I do not deny. Neither do you
pretend they exist without the mind.

Hyl. Pray let me see any sense you can under-
stand it in.

Phil. Why, I imagine that if I had been present at
the creation, I should have seen things produced into
being — that is become perceptible — in the order pre-
scribed by the sacred historian. I ever before be-
lieved the Mosaic account of the creation, and now
find no alteration in my manner of believing it. When
things are said to begin or end their existence, we do
not mean this with regard to God, but His creatures.
All objects are eternally known by God, or, which is
the same thing, have an eternal existence in His
mind : but when things, before imperceptible to crea-
tures, are, by a decree of God, perceptible to them,
then are they said to begin a relative existence, with
respect to created minds. Upon reading therefore
the Mosaic account of the creation, I understand that
the several parts of the world became gradually per-
ceivable to finite spirits, endowed with proper facul-
ties ; so that, whoever such were present, they were
in truth perceived by them. This is the literal ob-
vious sense suggested to me by the words of the Holy
Scripture : in which is included no mention or no
thought, either of substratum, instrument, occasion,
or absolute existence. And, upon inquiry, I doubt
not it will be found that most plain honest men, who
believe the creation, never think of those things any
more than I. What metaphysical sense you may un-
derstand it in, you only can tell.

Hyl. But, Philonous, you do not seem to be aware
that you allow created things, in the beginning, only
a relative, and consequently hypothetical being : that

122 THE THIRD DIALOGUE

is to say, upon supposition there were men to perceive
them, without which they have no actuality of absolute
existence wherein creation might terminate. Is it not,
therefore, according to you, plainly impossible the
creation of any inanimate creatures should precede
that of man? And is not this directly contrary to the
Mosaic account?

Phil. In answer to that, I say, first, created beings
might begin to exist in the mind of other created in-
telligences beside men. You will not therefore be
able to prove any contradiction between Moses and
my notions, unless you first shew there was no other
order of finite created spirits in being before man. I
say farther, in case we conceive the creation, as we
should at this time a parcel of plants or vegetables of
all sorts produced; by an invisible power, in a desert
where nobody was present — that this way of explain-
ing or conceiving it is consistent with my principles,
since they deprive you of nothing, either sensible or
imaginable; that it exactly suits with the common,
natural, and undebauched notions of mankind ; that
it manifests the dependence of all things on God ; and
consequently hath all the good effect or influence,
which it is possible that important article of our faith
should have in making men humble, thankful, and re-
signed to their Creator. I say, moreover, that, in
this naked conception of things, divested of words,
there will not be found any notion of what you call
the actuality of absolute existence. You may indeed
raise a dust with those terms, and so lengthen our
dispute to no purpose. But I entreat you calmly to
look into your own thoughts, and then tell me if they
are not a useless and unintelligible jargon.

Hyl. I own I have no very clear notion annexed to

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 12$

them. But what say you to this? Do you not make
the existence of sensible things consist in their being
in a mind? And were not all things eternally in the
mind of God? Did they not therefore exist from all
eternity, according to you? And how could that which
was eternal be created in time? Can anything be
clearer or better connected than this?

Phil. And are not you too of opinion, that God
knew all things from eternity?

Hyl. I am.

Phil. Consequently they always had a being in the
Divine intellect.

Hyl. This I acknowledge.

Phil. By your own confession, therefore, nothing
is new, or begins to be, in respect of the mind of God.
So we are agreed in that point.

Hyl. What shall we make then of the creation?

Phil. May we not understand it to have been en-
tirely in respect of finite spirits; so that things, with
regard to us, may properly be said to begin their ex-
istence, or be created, when God decreed they should
become perceptible to intelligent creatures, in that
order and manner which He then established, and we
now call the laws of nature? You may call this a re-
lative, or hypothetical existence if you please. But so
long as it supplies us with the most natural, obvious,
and literal sense of the Mosaic history of the creation ;
so long as it answers all the religious ends of that
great article; in a word, so long as you can assign no
other sense or meaning in its stead ; why should we
reject this? Is it to comply with a ridiculous sceptical
humour of making everything nonsense and unintelli-
gible? I am sure you cannot say it is for the glory
of God. For, allowing it to be a thing possible and

124 THE THIRD DIALOGUE

conceivable that the corporeal world should have an
absolute existence extrinsical to the mind of God, as
well as to the minds of all created spirits ; yet how
could this set forth e'ther the immensity or omnis-
cience of the Deity, or the necessary and immediate
dependence of all things on Him? Nay, would it not
rather seem to derogate from those attributes ?

Hyl. Well, but as to this decree of God's, for mak-
ing things perceptible, what say you, Philonous, is it
not plain, God did either execute that decree from all
eternity, or at some certain time began to will what
He had not actually willed before, but only designed
to will? If the former, then there could be no crea-
tion or beginning of existence in finite things. If the
latter, then we must acknowledge something new to
befall the Deity ; which implies a sort of change : and
all change argues imperfection.

Phil. Pray consider what you are doing. Is it not
evident this objection concludes equally against a
creation in any sense ; nay, against every other act of
the Deity, discoverable by the light of nature? None
of which can we conceive, otherwise than as performed
in time, and having a beginning. God is a Being of
transcendent and unlimited perfections : His Nature,
therefore, is incomprehensible to finite spirits. It is
not, therefore, to be expected, that any man, whether
Materialist or Immaterialisty should have exactly just
notions of the Deity, His attributes, and ways of ope-
ration. If then you would infer anything against me,
your difficulty must not be drawn from the inadequate-
ness of our conceptions of the Divine nature, which
is unavoidable on any scheme, but from the denial of
Matter, of which there is not one word, directly or in-
directly, in what you have now objected.

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 125

Hyl. I must acknowledge the difficulties you are
concerned to clear are such only as arise from the non-
existence of Matter, and are peculiar to that notion.
So far you are in the right. But I cannot by any
means bring myself to think there is no such peculiar
repugnancy between the creation and your opinion :
though indeed where to fix it, I do not distinctly know.

Phil. What would you have? Do I not acknowl-
edge a twofold state of things, the one ectypal or nat-
ural, the other archetypal and eternal? The former
was created in time ; the latter existed from everlast-
ing in the mind of God. Is not this agreeable to the
common notions of divines? Or is any more than
this necessary in order to conceive the creation? But
you suspect some peculiar repugnancy, though you
know not where it lies. To take away all possibility
of scruple in the case, do but consider this one point.
Either you are not able to conceive the creation on
any hypothesis whatsoever ; and, if so, there is no
ground for dislike or complaint against any particular
opinion on that score : or you are able to conceive it;
and, if so, why not on my principles, since thereby
nothing conceivable is taken away? You have all
along been allowed the full scope of sense, imagina-
tion, and reason. Whatever, therefore, you could be-
fore apprehend, either immediately or mediately by
your senses, or by ratiocination from your senses;
whatever you could perceive, imagine, or understand,
remains still with you. If, therefore, the notion you
have of the creation by other principles be intelligible,
you have it still upon mine ; if it be not intelligible, I
conceive it to be no notion at all ; and so there is no
loss of it. And indeed it seems to me very plain that
the supposition of Matter, that is a thing perfectly

126 THE THIRD DIALOGUE

unknown and inconceivable, cannot serve to make us
conceive anything. And, I hope it need not be proved
to you that if the existence of Matter doth not make
the creation conceivable, the creation's being without
it inconceivable can be no objection against its non-
existence.

Hyl. I confess, Philonous, you have almost satisfied
me in this point of the creation.

Phil. I would fain know why you are not quite
satisfied. You tell me indeed of a repugnancy be-
tween the Mosaic history and Immaterialism : but you
know not where it lies. Is this reasonable, Hylas?
Can you expect I should solve a difficulty without
knowing what it is? But, to pass by all that, would
not a man think you were assured there is no repug-
nancy between the received notions of Materialists
and the inspired writings?

HyL And so I am.

Phil. Ought the historical part of Scripture to be
understood in a plain obvious sense, or in a sense
which is metaphysical and out of the way ?

Hyl. In the plain sense, doubtless.

Phil. When Moses speaks of herbs, earth, water,
&c., as having been created by God ; think you not
the sensible things commonly signified by those words
are suggested to every unphilosophical reader?

Hyl. I cannot help thinking so.

Phil. And are not all ideas, or things perceived by
sense, to be denied a real existence by the doctrine of
the Materialist?

Hyl. This I have already acknowledged.

Phil. The creation, therefore, according to them,
was not the creation of things sensible, which have
only a relative being, but of certain unknown natures,

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 127

which have an absolute being, wherein creation might
terminate?

Hyl. True.

Phil. Is it not therefore evident the assertors of
Matter destroy the plain obvious sense of Moses, with
which their notions are utterly inconsistent ; and in-
stead of it obtrude on us I know not what, something
equally unintelligible to themselves and me?

Hyl. I cannot contradict you.

Phil. Moses tells us of a creation. A creation of
what? of unknown quiddities, of occasions, or sub-
stratum? No, certainly; but of things obvious to the
senses. You must first reconcile this with your no-
tions, if you expect I should be reconciled to them.

Hyl. I see you can assault me with my own weap-
ons.

Phil. Then as to absolute existence; was there ever
known a more jejune notion than that? Something it
is so abstracted and unintelligible that you have
frankly owned you could not conceive it, much less
explain anything by it. But, allowing Matter to ex-
ist, and the notion of absolute existence to be as clear
as light, yet, was this ever known to make the crea-
tion more credible? Nay, hath it not furnished the
atheists and infidels of all ages with the most plausible
arguments against a creation? That a corporeal sub-
stance, which hath an absolute existence without the
minds of spirits, should be produced out of nothing,
by the mere will of a Spirit, hath been looked upon
as a thing so contrary to all reason, so impossible and
absurd, that not only the most celebrated among the
ancients, but even divers modern and Christian phi-
losophers have thought Matter co-eternal with the
Deity. Lay these things together, and then judge

128 THE THIRD DIALOGUE

you whether Materialism disposes men to believe the
creation of things.

Hyl. I own, Philonous, I think it does not. This
of the creation is the last objection I can think of;
and I must needs own it hath been sufficiently an-
swered as well as the rest. Nothing now remains to
be overcome but a sort of unaccountable backward-
ness that I find in myself towards your notions.

Phil. When a man is swayed, he knows not why,
to one side of the question, can this, think you, be
anything else but the effect of prejudice, which never
fails to attend old and rooted notions? And indeed
in this respect I cannot deny the belief of Matter to
have very much the advantage over the contrary opin-
ion, with men of a learned education.

Hyl. I confess it seems to be as you say.

Phil. As a balance, therefore, to this weight of
prejudice, let us throw into the scale the great advan-
tages that arise from the belief of Immaterialism, both
in regard to religion and human learning. The being
of a God, and incorruptibility of the soul, those great
articles of religion, are they not proved with the clear-
est and most immediate evidence? When I say the
being of a God, I do not mean an obscure general
cause of things, whereof we have no conception, but
God, in the strict and proper sense of the word; a
Being whose spirituality, omnipresence, providence,
omniscience, infinite power and goodness, are as con-
spicuous as the existence of sensible things, of which
(notwithstanding the fallacious pretences and affected
scruples of Sceptics) there is no more reason to doubt
than of our own being. Then, with relation to human
sciences : in Natural Philosophy, what intricacies,
what obscurities, what contradictions hath the belief

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. I 2Q

of Matter led men into ! To say nothing of the num-
berless disputes about its extent, continuity, homo-
geneity, gravity, divisibility, &c. — do they not pretend
to explain all things by bodies operating on bodies,
according to the laws of motion? and yet, are they
able to comprehend how one body should move an-
other? Nay, admitting there was no difficulty in rec-
onciling the notion of an inert being with a cause, or
in conceiving how an accident might pass from one
body to another ; yet, by all their strained thoughts
and extravagant suppositions, have they been able to
reach the mechanical production of any one animal or
vegetable body? Can they account, by the laws of
motion, for sounds, tastes, smells, or colours, or for
the regular course of things? Have they accounted,
by physical principles, for the aptitude and contri-
vance even of the most inconsiderable parts of the
universe? But laying aside Matter and corporeal
causes, and admitting only the efficiency of an All-
perfect Mind, are not all the effects of nature easy
and intelligible? If the phenomena are nothing else
but ideas; God is a spirit, but Matter an unintelligent,
unperceiving being. If they demonstrate an unlim-
ited power in their cause ; God is active and omnipo-
tent, but Matter an inert mass. If the order, regu-
larity, and usefulness of them can never be sufficiently
admired; God is infinitely wise and provident, but
Matter destitute of all contrivance and design. These
surely are great advantages in physics. Not to mention
that the apprehension of a distant Deity naturally dis-
poses men to a negligence of their moral actions,
which they would be more cautious of, in case they
thought him immediately present, and acting on their
minds, without the interposition of Matter, or un-

J3O THE THIRD DIALOGUE

thinking second causes. Then in metaphysics: what
difficulties concerning entity in abstract, substantial
forms, hylarchic principles, plastic natures, substance
and accident, principle of individuation, possibility of
Matter's thinking, origin of ideas, the manner how
two independent substances so widely different as
Spirit and Matter, should mutually operate on each
other? what difficulties, I say, and endless disquisi-
tions, concerning these and innumerable other the
like points, do we escape, by supposing only Spirits
and ideas? Even the mathematics themselves, if we
take away the absolute existence of extended things,
become much more clear and easy ; the most shock-
ing paradoxes and intricate speculations in those sci-
ences depending on the infinite divisibility of finite
extension, which depends on that supposition. — But
what need is there to insist on the particular sciences?
Is not that opposition to all science whatsoever, that
frenzy of the ancient and modern Sceptics, built on
the same foundation? Or can you produce so much
as one argument against the reality of corporeal things
or in behalf of that avowed utter ignorance of their
natures, which doth not suppose their reality to con-
sist in an external absolute existence? Upon this sup-
position, indeed, the objections from the change of
colours in a pigeon's neck, or the appearance of the
broken oar in the water, must be allowed to have
weight. But these and the like objections vanish, if
we do not maintain the being of absolute external
originals, but place the reality of things in ideas, fleet-
ing indeed, and changeable ; however, not changed
at random, but according to the fixed order of nature.
For, herein consists that constancy and truth of things
which secures all the concerns of life, and distin-

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 131

guishes that which is real from the irregular visions
of the fancy.

Hyl. I agree to all you have now said, and must
own that nothing can incline me to embrace your
opinion more than the advantages I see it is attended
with. I am by nature lazy; and this would be a mighty
abridgment in knowledge. What doubts, what hy-
potheses, what labyrinths of amusement, what fields
of disputation, what an ocean of false learning may be
avoided by that single notion of Immaterialism!

Phil. After all, is there anything farther remaining
to be done? You may remember you promised to
embrace that opinion which upon examination should
appear most agreeable to Common Sense and remote
from Scepticism. This, by your own confession, is
that which denies Matter, or the absolute existence of
corporeal things. Nor is this all ; the same notion
has been proved several ways, viewed in different
lights, pursued in its consequences, and all objections
against it cleared. Can there be a greater evidence
of its truth? or is it possible it should have all the
marks of a true opinion and yet be false?

Hyl. I own myself entirely satisfied for the present
in all respects. But, what security can I have that I
shall still continue the same full assent to your opin-
ion, and that no unthought-of objection or difficulty
will occur hereafter?

Phil. Pray, Hylas, do you in other cases, when a
point is once evidently proved, withhold your consent
on account of objections or difficulties it may be liable
to? Are the difficulties that attend the doctrine of in-
commensurable quantities, of the angle of contact, of
the asymptotes to curves, or the like, sufficient to
make you hold out against mathematical demonstra-

132 THE THIRD DIALOGUE

tion? Or will you disbelieve the Providence of God,
because there may be some particular things which
you know not how to reconcile with it? If there are
difficulties attending fmmaterialism, there are at the
same time direct and evident proofs of it. But for the
existence of Matter there is not one proof, and far more
numerous and insurmountable objections lie against
it. But where are those mighty difficulties you insist
on? Alas! you know not where or what they are;
something which may possibly occur hereafter. If
this be a sufficient pretence for withholding your full
assent, you should never yield it to any proposition,
how free soever from exceptions, how clearly and
solidly soever demonstrated.

Hyl. You have satisfied me, Philonous.

Phil, But, to arm you against all future objections,
do but consider, that which bears equally hard on two
contradictory opinions can be proof against neither.
Whenever, therefore, any difficulty occurs, try if you
can find a solution for it on the hypothesis of the Ma-
terialists. Be not deceived by words ; but sound your
own thoughts. And in case you cannot conceive it
easier by the help of Materialism, it is plain it can be
no objection against Immaterialism. Had you pro-
ceeded all along by this rule, you would probably have
spared yourself abundance of trouble in objecting ;
since of all your difficulties I challenge you to shew
one that is explained by Matter: nay, which is not
more unintelligible with than without that supposi-
tion, and consequently makes rather against than for
it. You should consider, in each particular, whether
the difficulty arises from the non-existence of Matter.
If it doth not, you might as well argue from the in-
finite divisibility of extension against the Divine pre-

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 133

science, as from such a difficulty against Immaterial-
ism. And yet, upon recollection, I believe you will
find this to have been often if not always the case.
You should likewise take heed not to argue on a petitio
principii. One is apt to say, the unknown substances
ought to be esteemed real things, rather than the
ideas in our minds : and who can tell but the unthink-
ing external substance may concur as a cause or in-
strument in the productions of our ideas? But, is not
this proceeding on a supposition that there are such ex-
ternal substances? And to suppose this, is it not beg-
ging the question? But, above all things, you should
beware of imposing on yourself by that vulgar sophism
which is called ignoratio elenchi. You talked often as
if you thought I maintained the non-existence of Sen-
sible Things : whereas in truth no one can be more
thoroughly assured of their existence than I am : and
it is you who doubt ; I should have said, positively
deny it. Everything that is seen, felt, heard, or any
way perceived by the senses, is, on the principles I
embrace, a real being, but not on yours. Remember,
the Matter you contend for is an unknown somewhat
(if indeed it may be termed somewhaf), which is quite
stripped of all sensible qualities, and can neither be
perceived by sense, nor apprehended by the mind.
Remember, I say, that it is not any object which is
hard or soft, hot or cold, blue or white, round or
square, &c. ; — for all these things I affirm do exist.
Though indeed I deny they have an existence distinct
from being perceived ; or that they exist out of all
minds whatsoever. Think on these points ; let them
be attentively considered and still kept in view. Other-
wise you will not comprehend the state of the ques-
tion; without which your objections will always be

134 THE THIRD DIALOGUE

wide of the mark, and instead of mine, may possibly
be directed (as more than once they have been) against
your own notions.

Hyl. I must needs own, Philonous, nothing seems
to have kept me from agreeing with you more than
this same mistaking the question. In denying Matter,
at first glimpse I am tempted to imagine you deny
the things we see and feel : but, upon reflexion, find
there is no ground for it. What think you, therefore,
of retaining the name Matter, and applying it to sen-
sible things? This may be done without any change
in your sentiments : and, believe me, it would be a
means of reconciling them to some persons who may
be more shocked at an innovation in words than in
opinion.

Phil. With all my heart : retain the word Matter,
and apply it to the objects of sense, if you please ;
provided you do not attribute to them any subsistence
distinct from their being perceived. I shall never
quarrel with you for an expression. Matter, or ma-
terial substance, are terms introduced by philosophers ;
and, as used by them, imply a sort of independency,
or a subsistence distinct from being perceived by a
mind: but are never used by common people; or, if
ever, it is to signify the immediate objects of sense.
One would think, therefore, so long as the names of
all particular things, with the terms sensible, substance,
body, stuff, and the like, are retained, the word Matter
should be never missed in common talk. And in phil-
osophical discourses it seems the best way to leave it
quite out : since there is not, perhaps, any one thing
that hath more favoured and strengthened the de-
praved bent of the mind towards Atheism than the
use of that general confused term.

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. 1 35

HyL Well but, Philonous, since I am content to
give up the notion of an unthinking substance exterior
to the mind, I think you ought not to deny me the
privilege of using the word Matter as I please, and
annexing it to a collection of sensible qualities sub-
sisting only in the mind. I freely own there is no
other substance, in a strict sense, than Spirit. But I
have been so long accustomed to the term Matter that
I know not how to part with it. To say, there is no
Matter in the World, is still shocking to me. Whereas
to say There is no Matter, if by that term be meant
an unthinking substance existing without the mind ;
but if by Matter is meant some sensible thing, whose
existence consists in being perceived, then there is
Matter: — this distinction gives it quite another turn ;
and men will come into your notions with small diffi-
culty, when they are proposed in that manner. For,
after all, the controversy about Matter in the strict
acceptation of it, lies together between you and the
philosophers : whose principles, I acknowledge, are
not near so natural, or so agreeable to the common
sense of mankind, and Holy Scripture, as yours.
There is nothing we either desire or shun but as it
makes, or is apprehended to make, some part of our
happiness or misery. But what hath happiness or
misery, joy or grief, pleasure or pain, to do with Ab-
solute Existence ; or with unknown entities, abstracted
from all relation to us? It is evident, things regard
us only as they are pleasing or displeasing : and they
can please or displease only so far forth as they are
perceived. Farther, therefore, we are not concerned ;
and thus far you leave things as you found them. Yet
still there is something new in this doctrine. It is
plain, I do not now think with the philosophers, nor

136 THE THIRD DIALOGUE

yet altogether with the vulgar. I would know how
the case stands in that respect ; precisely, what you
have added to, or altered in my former notions.

Phil. I do not pretend to be a setter-up of new
notions. My endeavours tend only to unite and place
in a clearer light that truth which was before shared
between the vulgar and the philosophers : — the former
being of opinion, that those things they immediately per-
ceive are the real things; and the latter, that the things
immediately perceived are ideas which exist only in the
mind. Which two notions put together, do, in effect,
constitute the substance of what I advance.

Hyl. I have been a long time distrusting my
senses; methought I saw things by a dim light and
through false glasses. Now the glasses are removed
and a new light breaks in upon my understanding. I
am clearly convinced that I see things in their native
forms, and am no longer in pain about their unknown
natures or absolute existence. This is the state I find
myself in at present ; though, indeed, the course that
brought me to it I do not yet thoroughly comprehend.
You set out upon the same principles that Academics,
Cartesians, and the like sects usually do, and for a
long time it looked as if you were advancing their
Philosophical Scepticism ; but, in the end, your con-
clusions are directly opposite to theirs.

Phil. You see, Hylas, the water of yonder foun-
tain, how it is forced upwards, in a round column, to
a certain height ; at which it breaks, and falls back
into the basin from whence it rose : its ascent as well
as descent proceeding from the same uniform law or
principle of gravitation. Just so, the same principles
which, at first view, lead to Scepticism, pursued to a
certain point, bring men back to Common Sense.

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