Skip to main content

Full text of "Three treatises. The first concerning art. The second concerning music, painting, and poetry. The third concerning happiness"

See other formats 


\ Cabinet  P'  ' 1 

77.0  :28<  . ^ ' 

^ under  j 
. lu  gazette 

On  y tr  jip  Lout  ce  qui  concer-  | 
ne  la  librairi©  ancienne  , I 
iiouvelleet  etrangere,  cartes, 
plans  et^  autres  gravures ; i 

papiers  a ecrire , a dessiu  ^ ^ 

et  aiitres. 

Encres  cfe  toutes  coaleurs  et 
de  la  chine,  plumes,  crayons, 
cires  a cacheter  et  a graver, 
canifs  , registres  , carnets  et 
autres  objets  de  bureaux. 

Tableaux  des  di  vers  eg  e coles. 


airecci. 
vaeren 
pan  j 


■ I 


■ 

I 

-'I 

: k 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2017  with  funding  from 
Getty  Research  Institute 


https://archive.org/details/threetreatisesfiOOharr_0 


THREE 


TREATISES. 

The  First 

Concerning  ART. 

The  Second 

Concerning  MUSIC, 
PAINTING,  and  POETRY. 


The  Third 

Concerning  HAPPINESS. 


By  J.  H. 


LONDON: 

Printed  by  H.  Woodfall,  Jun. 

For  J.  Nourse,  without  Temple- Bar  and 
P.  Vaillant,  facing  Southampton-Jireet 
in  the  Strand, 


M.dcc.xli  V. 


r ■ 


I 


1 


\ ' 


* 


Advertifement  to  the  Reader. 


N the  Treatifes  here  publijhed^  there 


JL  is  the  following  ConneBion.  T^he  firft 
treats  of  Art  in  its  mofl  comprehenjive 
Ideay  when  conjidered  as  a Genus  to  many 
fubordinate  Species.  7he  fcond  confders 
three  of  thefe  fubordinate  Species^  whofe 
Beauty  and  Elegance  are  well  known  to 
all,  The  lajl  treats  of  that  Arty  which 
refpeBs  the  ConduB  of  Human  LifCy  and 
which  may  jujlly  be  ^aluedy  as  of  all  Arts 
the  mofi  hnportanty  if  it  can  truly  lead 
us  to  the  End  propofed. 


TREATISE  the  FirSt'T 

CONCERNING 

ART, 

A 

DIALOGUE 

T O T H E 

Right  Honourable  the  EARL  of 


S HJ  FtE  spu  RT. 


■) 


CONCERNING 


A R T, 

A 

D I A L O G U E 

To  the  Right  Honourable  the 

Earl  of  Shaftesbury. 

My  Lord, 

^ g '"^HE  following  Is  a ConYerfatlon 
S in  its  kind  fomewhat  uncom- 
M mon,  and  for  this  reafon  I have 
remembered  it  more  minutely  than  I could 
imagine.  Should  the  fame  Peculiarity  prove 
a Reafon  to  amufe  your  Lordfhip,  I fhall 
think  myfelf  well  rewarded  In  the  Labour 
of  reciting.  If  not,  you  are  candid  enough 
to  accept  of  the  Intention,  and  to  think 
there  is  fome  kind  of  Merit  even  in  the 
Sincerity  of  my  Endeavours.  To  make  no 
longer  Preface,  the  Fad:  was  as  follows. 

B 2 


A 


Concerning  ART, 

A F R I E N D from  a diftant  Country  hav^ 
ing  by  chance  made  me  a Vifit,  we  were 
tempted  by  the  Serenity  of  a chearful  Morn- 
ing in  the  Spring,  to  walk  from  S — r — m 
to  fee  Lord  P-’-mir-’-rke's  at  The 

Beauties  of  Gardening,  Architecture,  Paint- 
ing, and  Sculpture  belonging  to  that  Seat, 
were  the  Subjedt  pf  great  Entertainment  to 
my  Friend ; Nor  was  I,  for  my  own  part, 
iefs  delighted  than  he  was,  to  find  that  our 
Walk  had  fo  well  anfwpred  his  Expectations, 
We  had  given  a large  Scope  to  our  Curioli- 
ty,  when  we  left  the  Seat,  and  leifiirely  be-? 
gan  our  return  towards  hpme, 

And  here,  rny  Lord,  in  paffing  over  a 
few  pleafant  Fields,  commenced  the  Con- 
verfation  which  I am  to  tell  you,  and  which 
fell  at  firft,  as  was  natural,  on  the  many 
curious  Works,  which  had  afforded  us  both 
fo  elegant  an  Amufepient.  This  led  us  in- 
fenfibly  to  difcourfing  upon  ART,  for  we 
both  agreed,  that  whatever  we  had  been 
g.dmiring  of  Fair  and  Beautiful,  could  all  be 

referred 


'A  Dialogue. 


5 


referred  to  no  other  Caufe.  And  here,  I 
well  rerriember,  I called  upon  my  Friend 
to  give  me  his  Opinion  upon  the  meaning 
of  the  Word  ART  : A Word  it  was  (I 
told  him)  in  the  Mouth  of  every  one  ^ but 
for  all  that,  as  to  its  precife  and  definite  Idea, 
this  might  ftill  be  a Secret ; that  fo  it  was  in 
fadt  with  a thoUfand  Words  befide,  all  no 
lefs  eorhmon,  and  equally  familiar,  and  yet 
dl  of  them  equally  vague  and  undetermined* 
To  this  he  anfwered.  That  as  to  the  pre^ 
tife  and  definite  Idea  of  Art,  it  was  a Que^ 
ftion  of  fome  Difficulty,  and  not  fo  foon  to  be 
refolved ; that,  however,  he  could  not  con- 
ceive a more  likely  Method  of  coming  to 
know  it,  than  by  confidering  thofe  feverd 
Particulars,  to  each  of  which  we  gave  the 
Name.  It ‘is  hardly  probable,  faid  he^ 
that  Mufic,  Painting,  Medicine,  Poetry, 
Agriculture,  and  fo  many  more  fhould  be 
all  called  by  one  common  Name^  if  there  was 
not  fomething  in  each^  which  was  common  to 
all.  It  fhould  feem  fo,  replied  I.  What 

then,  faid  he,  fhall  we  pronounce  this  to 
be  ? At  this,  I remember,  I was  under 
B 3 fome 


6 Concerning  ART, 

fome  fort  of  Hefitation.  Have  Courage, 
cried  my  Friend,  perhaps  the  Cafe  is  not 
fo  defperate.  Let  me  aflc  you  — Is  MedL 
cine  the  Caufe  of  any  thing  ? Y es  furely, 

faid  I,  of  Health.  And  Agriculture, 
of  what  ? Of  the  plentiful  Growth  of 
Grain,  And  Poetry,  of  what?  Of 
Plays,  and  Satires,  and  Odes,  and  the  like. 

And  is  not  the  fame  true,  faid  he,  of 
Mufic,  of  Statuary,  of  Architedture,  and,  in 
Ihort,  of  every  Art  whatever  ? I confefs, 

faid  I,  it  feems  fo.  Suppofe  then,  faid 
he,  we  fhould  fay.  It  was  common  to  every 

Art  to  he  a Caufe, Should  we  err  ? I 

replied,  I thought  not.  Let  this  then, 
faid  he,  be  remembered,  that  all  Art  isCauCe. 

I promifed  him  it  fhould. 

But  how  then,  continued  he,  all  Art 
he  Caufe ^ is  it  alfo  true,  that  all  Caufe  is 
Art  ? At  . this  again  I could  not  help 

hefitating.  You  have  heard,  faid  he, 
without  doubt,  of  that  Painter  famed  in 
Story,  who  being  to  paint  the  Foam  of 
a Horfe,  and  not  fucceeding  to  his  Mind, 

threw 


Dialogue.  7 

threw  his  Pencil  at  the  Pifture  in  a Fit 
of  Paffion  and  Defpair,  and  produced  a 
Foam  the  moft  natural  imaginable.  Now, 
what  fay  you  to  thfe  Fad:  ? Shall  we  pro- 
nounce Art  to  have  been  the  Caufe  ? By 

no  means,  faid  1.  What,  faid  he,  if  in- 
ftead  of  Chance^  his  Hand  had  been  guided 
by  mere  Compnljio?2^  himfelf  diffenting  and 
averfe  to  the  Violence  ? Even  here,  re- 
plied I,  nothing  could  have  been  referred  to 
his  Art.  But  what,  continued  he,  if  in- 
ftead  of  a cafual  "Throw ^ or  hwolunt ary  Com- 
pulJion^hchsidL  willingly deliberately  dired- 
ed  his  Pencil,  and  fo  produced  that  Foam, 

which  Story  fays  he  failed  in  ? Would 

not  Art  here  have  been  the  Caufe  ? I 
replied,  in  this  cafe,  I thought  if  would. 

It  jfhould  feem  then,  faid  he,  that  Art 
implies  not  only  Caufe^  but  the  additional 
Requifite  of  Intention^  Reafon^  Volition^  and 
Conjcioujnefs ; fo  that  not  every  Caufe  is  Art^ 
but  only  voluntary'  or  intentional  Caufe, 

So,  faid  I,  it  appears. 

B 4 


And  , 


8 


Concerning  ART, 


And  fliall  we  then,  added  he,  pronounce 
e^oery  intentional  Caufe  to  be  Art  ? I fee 
no  reafon,  faid  Ij  why  not.  Conlider, 
faid  he ; Hunger  this  Morning  prompted 
you  to  eat.  You  were  then  the  Caufe ^ 
and  that  too  the  intentional  Caufe^  of  con- 
fuming  certain  Food : And  yet  will  you 
refer  this  Confumption  to  Art  ? Did  you 
chew  by  Art  ? Did  you  fwallow  by  Art  ? 

No  certainly,  faid  I.  So  by 

opening  your  Eyes,  faid  he,  you  are  the 
intentional  Caufe  of  Seeing,  and  by  llretch- 
ing  your  Hand,  the  intentional  Caufe  of 
Feeling;  and  yet  will  you  affirm,  that 
thefe  things  proceed  from  Art  ? I fhould 

be  wrong,  faid  I,  if  I did : For  what  Art 
can  there  be  in  doings  what  every  ojie  is  able 
to  do  by  mere  TVill^  and  a fort  of  uninjirudled 
Injlin^  ? You  fay  right,  replied  he,  and 
the  reafon  is  manifeft.  Were  it  otherwife, 
we  fliould  make  all  Mankind  univerfal  Ar- 
tifls  in  every  Angle  Aftion  of  their  Lives. 
And  what  can  be  a greater  Abfurdity  than 
this  ? I confefled  that  the  Abfurdity  ap- 
peared 


A Dialogue. 


9 


peared  to  be  evident.  But  if  nothing 
then,  continued  he,  which  'we  do  by  Com-* 
fuljioriy  or  without  intending  it,  be  Art ; and 
not  even  what  we  do  intentionally^  if  it  pro- 
ceed from  mere  Will  and  uninjiru5ted  In- 
ftindl  5 what  is  it  we  have  left  remaining, 
where  Art  may  be  found  converfant  ? Or 
can  it  indeed  poffibly*be  in  any  thing  elfe, 
than  in  that  which  we  do  by  Ufe^  FraBice^ 
Experie7icey  and  the  like,  all  which  are  born 
with  no  one,  but  which  are  acquired  all 
afterward  by  Advances  unperceived.  I, 
can  think,  faid  I,  of  nothing  elfe.  Let 
therefore  the  Words  Habit  and  Habitual^ 
faid  he,  reprefent  this  Requifite,  and  let  us 
fay,  that  Art  is  not  only  a Caufcy  but  an 
intentional  Caufey  and  not  only  an  inten-- 
tionaJ  Caufey  but  an  intentional  Caufe  found-- 
ed  in  Habit y or,  in  other  Words,  an  habi^ 
tual  Caufe.  You  appear,  faid  I,  to  argue 

rightly. 

But  if  Art,  faid  he,  be  what  we 
have  now  afferted,  fomething  learnt  and 
acquired-,  if  it  be  alfo  a thing  hitejitmial 

or 


lo  Concerning  ART, 

or  wlunfaryy  and  not  governed  either  by 

Chance  or  blind  Necejjity If  this,  I fay, 

be  the  Cafe,  then  mark  the  Confequences. 

And  what,  faid  I,  are  they  ? The 
firft,  faid  he,  is,  that  no  Events^  in  what  we 
call  the  natural  Worldy  muft  be  referred  to 
Art^y  fuch  as  Tides,  Winds,  Vegetation, 
Gravitation,  Attraction,  and  the  like.  For 
thefe  all  happen  by  ftated  Laws  ^ by  a curi- 
ous Necejjity y which  is  not  to  be-withftood, 
and  where  the  nearer  and  immediate  Caufes 
appear  to  be  utterly  unconfcious.  I con- 
fefs,  faid  I,  it  feems  fo.  In  the  next 
place,  continued  he,  we  muft  exclude  all 
thofe  admired  Works  of  the  Animal  Worldy 
which,  for  their  Beauty  and  Order,  we  me-^ 
tapborically  call  artificial.  The  Spider’s 
Web,  the  Bee’s  Comb,  the  Beaver’s  Houfe, 
and  the  Bird’s  Neft,  muft  all  be  referred  to 
another  Source* — For  who  can  fay,  thefe 
ever  learnt  to  be  thus  ingenious  ? or,  that 
they,  were  ignorant  by  NaturCy  and  knowing 
only  by  Education?  None  furely,  re- 
plied I.  But  we  have  ftill,  faid  he,  a 
higher  Confideration,  And  what,  faid  I, 


IS 


^Dialogue.  i i 

is  that?  It  is,  anfwered  he,  this 

Not  even  that  Divine  Power ^ which  gave 
Form  to  all  things,  the7t  aBedhy  Art^  when 
it  gave  that  Form.  For  how,  continued 
he,  can  that  Intelligence,  which  has  all 
Perfection  ever  in  Energy^  be  fuppofed  to 
have  any  Power,  not  original  to  its  Nature  ? 
How  can  it  ever  have  any  thing  to  learUy 
when  it  knows  all  from  the  Beginning ; or, 
being  perfeCt  and  complete^  admit  of  what 
is  additional  and  fecondary?^  I fhould 
think,  faid  I,  it  were  impoffible.  ' If  fo, 
faid  he,  then  Art  can  never  be  numbered 
among  its  Attributes : For  all  Art  is  fome- 
thing  learnt^  fomething  fecondary  and  ac-* 
quiredy  and  never  original  to  any  Being,’ 
which  pofleffes  it.  So  the  Fad:,  faid  I, 
has  been  eftablifhed. 

If  this  therefore,  continued  he,  be  true ; 
if  Art  belong  not  either  to  the  Divine^ 
Nature,  the  Brute  Nature,  or  the  Inanimate 

Nature, to  what  Nature  fhall  we  fay  it 

does  belong  ? I know  not,  faid  I,  unlefe 
it  be  to  the  Human,  You  are  right,  faid 

he; 


12  Concerning  ART, 

he  1 for  every  Nature  elfe  you  perceive  is 
either  too  excellent  to  want  it.  Or  too  bafe  tO  be 
capable  of  it,  Befide,  except  the  Human, 
what  other  Nature  is  there  left  ? Or  where 
elfe  can  we  find  any  of  the  Arts  already 
inftanced,  or  indeed  whatever  others  we 
may  now  fancy  to  enumerate?  Who  are 
Statuaries,  but  Men  ? Who  Pilots,  who 
Muficians?  This  feems,  replied  I,  to 
be  the  Fa£t. 

Let  us  then,  continued  he,  lay,  not 
only  that  Art  is  a Caufe^  but  that  it  is 
Man  becoming  a Caufe ; and  not  only  Man, 
but  Man  intending  to  do  what  is  going  to 
be  donCy  and  domg  it  alfo  by  Habit  fo 
that  its  whole  Idea,  as  far  as  we  have 
hitherto  conceived  it,  is  ^ ^ Man  becoming 
a Caufe y Intent io?2al  and  Habit uaL  I con- 

fefs,  faid  I,  it  has  appeared  fo. 

And  thus,  faid  he,  have  you  had  exhi- 
bited a fort  of  a Sketch  of  Art.  Y ou  muft  re^ 
member  however,  it  is  but  a Sketch : there 
is  Hill  fomething  wanting  to  make  it  a 

finifiied 


-^Dialogue.  13 

finiflied  Piece.  I begged  to  know  what 
this  was.  In  order  to  that,  replied  he, 
I cannot  do  better,  than  remind  you  of  a 
Paffage  in  your  admired  Horace.  It  is  con*^ 
CQxnmg  Alfenus  I who  (if  you  remember) 
he  tells  us,  though  his  Tools  were  laid 
afide,  and  his  Shop  fhut  up,  was  ftill  an 
Artift  as  much  as  ever.— r-- 

- — Alfenus  njafer  omni 
AbjeBo  injlrumento  Artis y claufaq-y  tabernd^ 

Sutor  erat I remember, 

faid  I,  the  Paffage, ' but  to  what  purpofe  is 
it  quoted  ? Only,  replied  he,  to  fhew 
you,  that  I fhould  not  be  without  Prece- 
dent, were  I to  affirm  it  not  abfolutely  ne- 
ceffary  to  the  being  of  Art,  that  it  fhould 
be  Man  aBually  becoming  a Caiife ; but  that 
it  was  enough,  if  he  had  the  Power  or  Capa-> 
city  of  fo  becoming.  Why  then,  faid  I, 
did  you  not  fettle  it  fo  at  firfl:  ? Becaufe, 
replied  he.  Faculties,  Powers,  Capacities 
(call  them  as  you  will)  are  in  them- 
felves  abftrad:  from  Adlion,  but  obfcure  and 
hidden  things.  On  the  contrary,  Energies 
find  Operations  lie  open  to  the  Senfes,  and 

cannot 


14  Concerning  ART, 

cannot  but  be  obferved,  even  whether  we 
"will  or  no.  And  hence  therefore,  when 
firft  we  treated  of  Art,  we  chofe  to  treat  of 
it,  as  of  a thing  only  in  Energy.  Now  we 
better  comprehend  it,  we  have  ventured 
fomewhat  farther.  Repeat  then,  faid  I, 
if  you  pleafe,  the  Alteration,  which  you 
have  made.  At  firfl:,  anfwered  he,  we 
reafoned  upon  Art,  as  if  it  was  only  Man 
ciBually  becoming  a Caufe  intentional  and 
habitual.  Now  we  fay  it  is  a Power  in 
Man  of  becoming  fuch  Caufe;  and  that, 
though  he  ^ be  not  actually  in  the  Exercife  of 
fuch  a Power,  I told  him,  his  Amend- 
ment appeared  to  be  juft. 

There  is  too  another  Alteration,  added 
he,  which,  for  the  fake  of  Accuracy,  is 
equally  wanting ; and  that  is  with  refped:  to 
the  Epithet,  Intentional  or  Voluntary,  And 
what,  faid  I,  is  that  ? We  have  agreed 
it,  replied  he,  to  be  neceffary,  that  all  Art 
fhould  be  under  the  Guidance  of  Intejition 
or  Volition^  fo  that  no  Man  adting  by  Com- 
fulfion^  or  by  Chance^  ftiould  be  called 


an 


^Dialogue.  15 

an  Artiji.  We  have.  Now  tho’ 
this,  faid  he,  be  true,  yet  it  is  not  fufficient. 
We  muft  limit  this  Intention  or  Volition  to 
a peculiar  Kind.  For  were  every  little 
Fancy,  which  we  may  work  up  into  Habit, 
a fufficient  Foundation  to  conftitute  an  Art, 
we  fhould  make  Art  one  of  the  lowell  and 
moft  defpicable  of  things.  The  meanell 
Trick  of  a common  Juggler  might,  in  fuch 
cafe,  entitle  a Man  to  the  Charafter  of  an 
Artift.  , I confeffed,  without  fome  Limi- 
tation, that  this  might  be  the  Confequencc. 
But  how  limit  Intentions  to  a Kind  or 
Species  ? What  think  you,  replied  he, 
if  we  were  to  do  it,  by  the  Number  and 
Dignity  of  the  Precepts^  which  go  to  the 
directing  of  our  Intentions?  You  muft 
explain,  faid  I ; for  your  Meaning  is  ob- 
fcure.  Are  there  not  Precepts,  replied  he, 
in  Agriculture,  about  Ploughing  and  Sow- 
ing ? Are  there  not  Precepts  in  Archi- 
tedfure,  about  Orders  and  Proportions  ? 
Are  there  not  the  fame  in  Medicine,  in 
Navigation,  and  the  reft?  There  are. 

And  what  is  your  Opinion  of  thefe 

feveral 


1 6 Concerning  ART, 

fevcral  Precepts  ? Are  they  arbitrary  ani 
capricious ; or  rational  and  Jleady  ? Are 
they  the  Inve?2tions  of  a Day  ; or  well- 
approved  by  long  Experience  ? I told  him, 
I Ihould  confider  them  for  the  moft  as 
rational,  fteady,  and  well-approved  by  long 
Experience.  And  what,  continued  he, 
lhall  we  fay  to  their  Number  ? Are  they 
few  ? Or  are  they  not  rather  fo  numerouSy 
that  in  every  particular  Art,  fcarce  any 
comprehend  them  all,  but  the  feveral  Ar- 
tifts  themfelves ; and  they  only  by  length 
of  time,  with  due  Attendance  and  Appli- 
cation ? I replied.  It  feemed  fo. 
Suppofe  then  We  were  to  pronounce,  that 
to  every  Art  there  was  a Syjiem  of  fuch 
various  a7id  well-approved  Precepts : Should 
we  err  ? No  certainly.  And  fuppofe 
we  fhould  fay,  that  the  Inteiition  of  every 
Artijly  in  his  feveral  Art,  was  directed  by 
fuch  a Syftem  : Would  you  allow  this  ? 
Surely.  And  will  not  this  limiting  of 
Intentions  to  fuch  only,  as  are  fo  diredled, 
fufficiently  diftinguifli  Art  from  any  thing 
elfe  which  may  refeinble  it  ? — — In  other 

words^ 


"A  Dialogue;  tj 

Words,  Is  it  likely,  under  this  Diftinftion,' 
to  be  confounded  with  other  Habits  of  a 
trifling,  capricious  and  inferior  Kind  ? 

I replied,  I thought  not. 

Let  us  then  fee,  faid  he,  and  colledt' 
all  that  we  have  faid,  together.  We  hav6 
already  agreed,  that  the  Power  of  aSling 
after  a certain'  manner  is  fufBcient  to  con*' 
ftitute  Art,  without  the  adtually 'Operating 
agreeably  to  that  Powers  And  We  have 
BOW  farther  held  the  Intentions  of  every 
Artift  to  be  direfted  by  a Syjiem  of  various 
and  well-approved  Precepts,  Befides  all  this,’ 
We  fettled  it  before,  that  all  Art  was  founded 
in  Habit  • and  was  peculiar  to  Man  ^ and 
was  feen  by  becoming  the  Caufe  of  feme  Ef- 
feB,  It  fhould  feem  then,  that  the  whole 
Idea  of  Art  was  this— —An  HABiTUAir’ 
Power  in  Man  oE  becoming  the 
Cause  of  some  Effect,  accord* 

ING  TO  A SVSTEM  OF  VARIOUS 
AND  WELL- APPROVED  PrECEPTSJ 

I 

I replied,  That  his  Account  appeared 
to  be  probable  and  juft* 

G §.  2; 


Concerning  A R T, 


i8 


§.  2.  And  nowthen>  continued  he,  as  we 
have  gone  thus  faf,  and  have  fettled  between 
us  what  we  believe  Art  to  be ; fhall  we  go  a 
little  farther,  or  is  your  Patience  at  an  end  ? 

Oh ! no,  replied  I,  not  if  any  thing  be 
left.  We  have  walked  fo  leifurely,  that  much 
remains  of  our  Way ; and  I can  think  of  no 
Method,  how  we  may  better  amufe  ourfelves. 

My  Friend  upon  this  proceeded  with  fay- 
ing, that  if  Art  were  a Caufe^  (as  we  had 
agreed  it  was)  it  muft  be  the  Caufe  of  fome^ 
thing.  Allow  it,  faid  I,  And  if  it  be 
the  Caufe  of  fomething^  it  muft  have  a Sub- 
jeB  to  operate  on.  For  every  Agent  has  need 
of  its  Patient  % the  Smith  of  his  Iron,  the 
Carpenter  of  his  Wood,  the  Statuary  of  his 
Marble,  and  the  Pilot  of  his  Ship. 

I anfwered.  It  was  true.  If  then, 
faid  he,  the  Subjeds  of  particular  Arts  be 
thus  evident : What  Idea  fhall  we  form  of 
that  miiverfal  SubjeB^  which  is  common  to  all 
Art?  At  this  Queftion,  it  muft  be  con-^ 
felTed,  I was  a little  embarafled. 


This 


A Dialogue;  19 

This  induced  him  to  afk  me,  How  many 
forts  of  Subjects  I allowed  of  ? Here  I 
could  not  help  helitating  again.  There 

is  nothing,  continued  he,  fo  difficult  in  the 
Qi^ftion.  .You  muft  needs  perceive,  that 
«//  Natures  whatever  can  be  but  either  con^ 
tingent  or  necejfary.  This  may  be,  re- 
plied I i but  even  yet  I do  not  comprehend 
you.  Not  comprehend  me!  faid  he  j 
then  anfwer  me  a Queftion  : Can  you  con- 
ceive any  Medium  between  Motion  and  No^ 
Motion^  between  Change  and  No-Change  ? 

I replied,  I could  not.  If  not,' 
can  you  conceive  any  thing  in  the  whole 
Order  of  Beings  which  muft  not  be  either 
liable  to  thefe,  or  not  liable  ? Nothing,  ' 
Call  thofe  things  therefore,  faid  he,' 
which  are  liable  to  Change  and  Motion,  con- 
tingent Natures  ^ and  thofe,  which  are  not 
liable,  necejfary  Natures:  And  thus  you 
have  a Divifon,  in  which  all  things  are 
eluded.  We  have  fo,  faid  I. 

C 2 In 


20 


Concerning  A R T, 


^ In  which  therefore,  faid  he,  of  thefe  Na-^ 
tures  fhall  we  feek  for  this  common  Subjedi  of 
Art  ?■  To  this,  I told  him,  I was  unabk 
to  ahfwer.  Refledt,  faid  he,  a little. 
We  have  found  Art  to  be  a Caufe. 

We  have.  And  is  it  not  ejfential  to 
'every  Caufe  to  operate  ? or  can.it  be  a Caufe, 
and  be  the  Caufe  of  nothing  ? Impoffible. 

V/herever  therefore  there  is  Caufcy 
there  is  neceffarily  implied  fome  Operation. 

There  is.  And  can  there  poffibly 
be  Operation^  without  Motion  and  Change  ? 

There  cannot.  But  Change  and 
'Motion  muft  needs  ho  - incompatible  with 
what  is  necejfary  and  immutable.  They 
muft.  So  therefore  is  Caufe.  It  muft. 

And  fo  therefore  Art.  It  muft. 

Truth  therefore,  faid  he,  and  Know- 
ledge ; Principles  and  Demonftrations ; the 
general  and  intelledlual  Eflences  of  Things ; 
in  fliort,  the  whole  immutable  and  necejfary 
Nature  is  no  part  of  it  reducible  to  a Subject 
of  Art.  It  feems  fo,  faid  I. 


Ip 


A Dialogue. 


21 


If  therefore  Art,  faid  he,  have  nothing 
p to  do  with  the  Jleady^  abjiraB^  and  ne- 
cejfary  Nature^  it  can  have  only  to  do' 
with  the  tranjienfy  the  particular^  and' 
contingent  one.  ’Tis  true,  faid'  I;  for 
there  is  no  other  left.  And  fhall  we 
then  fay,  ^replied  he,  it  has  to  do  with  all 
contingent'^2Xsixt'$^  exifting  in  the  Univerfe  ? 

For  aught,  replied  I,  which  to  me  ap- 
pears contrary.  What  think  you,  faid 
he,  of  thofe  Contingents  of  higher  Order  ? 
fuch  as  the  grand  Planetary  Syftem;  the 
Succeffion  of  the  Seafons ; the  regular  and 
uniform  Courfe  of  all  fuperior  Natures  in 
the  Univerfe  ? Has  Art  any  Ability  to 
intermeddle  here  ? No  certainly,  faid  I. 

Thefe  fuperior  Contingents  then, 
fwhicb  move  without  Interruption^  are,  it 
feems,  above  it.  They  are. 

And  fhall  we  fay  the  fame  of  thofe  of  lower 
fort ; thofe,  whofe  Courfe  we  fee  often  inter^ 
rupted ; thofe,  which  the  Strength  and  Cun-- 
ning  of  Man  are  able  to  influence  and  con-  ' 
troulf  Give  Inftances,  faid  I,  of  what 
C 3 yoix 


22  Concerning  ART, 

you  mean.  I mean,  faid  he,  Earth, 
Water,  Air,  Fires  Stones,  Trees;  Ani- 
mals s Men  .themfelves.  Are  thefe  Con- 
tingents within  the  reach  of  Art,  or  has 
Art  here  ho  Influence  ? I ihould  think, 
faid  I,  a very  great  one. 

If  this,  continued  he,  be  true,  it  fhould 
feena  that  the  common  or  universai. 
Subject  of  Art  was-— all  those  con- 
TiNQENT  Natures,  which  lie  within 
THE  REACH  OF  THE  HuMAN  PoWERS 
TO  INFLUENCE,  I acknowledge,  faid 
it  appears  fo. 

Thus  far  then,  faid  he,  we  have  ad^ 
Vanced  with  tolerable  Succefs.  We  have 
gained  fome  Idea  of  Art^  and  fome  Idea  of 
its  Subject,  Our  Inquiry,  on  the  whole, 

has  informed  us,  that  Art  is  an  habi^ 

tual  Power  in  Man  of  becoming  a certain. 
Caufe^'--  and  that  its  Subject  is  — every 
fuch  contingent  Nature^  which  lies  within  the 
reach  of  the  human  Powers  to  infuence. 

§•  3- 


A Dialogue. 


23 


§.  3 . *Tis  true,  fald  I,  this  appears  to  have 
been  the  Refult  of  our  Inquiry,  and  a full 
and  ample  one  it  feems  to  have  been. 

A long  one,  replied  he,  if  you  pleafe,  but 
not  a full  and  ample  one.  Can  any 
thing,  faid  I,  be  wanting,  after  what  you 
have  faid  already?  Certainly,  replied 
he,  a great  deal.  We  have  talked  much 
indeed  of  Art^  confidered  as  a Caufe ; and 
much  of  the  SubjeB^  on  which  it  operates  | 
but  what  moves  thefe  Operations  to  com* 
menccy  and  where  it  is  they  endy  thefe  are 
Topicks,  which  we  have  as  yet  little 
thought  of.  I begged  him  then,  that 
we  might  now  confider  them. 

He  was  willing,  he  faid,  for  his  part,’ 
and  immediately  went  on  by  afking,  What 
I thought  was  the  Beginning  of  Art  ? 
I mean,  faid  he,  by  Beginningy  that  Caufe 
for  the  fake  of  which  it  operates,  and  which 
being  fuppofed  awayy  Men  would  be  never 
moved  to  follow  it.  To  this,  I told  him, 
I was  unable  to  anfwer.  You  will  not 
C 4 think 


24  Concerning  A R 

think  it,  faid  he,  fo  difficult,  when  you 
have  a little  more  eonlidered.  Reflect 

with  yourfelf Was  it  not  the  Ahfence 

of  Health,  which  excited  Men  to  cultivate 
the  Art  of  Medicine  ? I replied,  it  was. 

What  then,  faid  he,  if  the  Human 
Body  had  been  fo  fair  perfeB  and  felf-. 
fujicienf^  as  never  to  have  felt  the  Vicijjt’- 
tudes  of  IVell  and  III:  Vv^ould  not  then  tliis 
Art  have  been  wholly  unknown  ? 

I replied,  I thought  it  would.  And 
what,  faid  he,  if  we  extend  this  Perfedtion 
9.  degree  farther,  and  fuppofe  the  Body  not 
only  xhmMalthfuly  but  withal  fo  robufty  as 
to  have  felt  iio  Uneafinefs  from  all  Jncle-^ 
tnencies  of  Weather:  Would  not  then  the 
Arts  of  Building  alfo  and  Clothing  have 
been  as  ufelefs,  as  that  of  Medicine  ? 

J replied.  It  feemed  they  would.  But 
what,  faid  he,  if  we  bound  not  this  Per-^ 
^ feftion  of  ours  even  here  ? What  if  we 
fuppofe,  that  not  only  Things  merely  necef- 
fcLryy  but  that  thofe  alfo  conducive  to  Ele^^ 
game  and  Enjoyment  were  of  courfe  all 
Implied  in  the  Conftitution  of  Human  Na-* 
* ^ ture^ 


A Dialogue.  25 

ture;  that  they  were  all  Jleady]  conjlant; 
and  independant  from  without^  and  as  in- 
feparable  from  our  Being,  as  Perlpiring,  or 
Circulation : In  fuch  cafe,  would  not  the 
Arts  of  Mufic,  Painting  and  Poetry,  with 
every  other  Art  paffing' under  the  Denomi- 
nation of  Elegant^  have  been  as  ufelefs,  as 
we  have  held  thofe  others  of  Medicine, 
Clothing,  and  Architedlure  ? I replied. 
It  feemed  they  would.  It  was  then  the 
Abfence  of  Joys,  Elegancies,  and  Amufe- 
ments  from  our  Confitution^  as  left  by 
Nature y which  induced  us  to  feek  them  in 
thefe  Arts  of  Elegance  and  Entertainment. 

It  was.  And  what,  faid  he,  are 
Joys,  Elegancies,  Amufements,  Health, 
Robuftnefs,  with  thofe  feveral  other  Objedis 
cf  Defrey  whofe  Abfence  leads  to  Arty  but  fo 
many  different  Names  of  that  complex  Being 
called  Good,  under  its  various^  and  multi-r 
formy  and  popular  Appearances  f ' I re*’ 
plied,  It  feemed  fo, 

If  this  then,  faid  he,  be  granted.  It 
Should  feem  that  the  Beginning  or  Prin^ 

cipk 


26  Concerning  ART, 

ciple  of  Art  was  the  Abfence  of  fomefhing 
thought  Good  5 becaufe  it  has  appeared  that 
it  is  for  the  fake  of  feme  fuch  abfenf  Good 
that  every  Art  operates ; and  becaufe,  if 
we  fuppofe  no  fuch  Abfence  to  have  been^ 
we  Jhould  never  have  known  any  Art^ 

J confefs,  faid  I,  it  feems  fo. 

But  how  then,  continued  he?  If  it  be 
true  that  all  Art  implies  fuch  Principle^ 
is  it  reciprocally  true,  that  every  fuch 
Principle  fliould  imply  Art  ? I fee  no 
reafon,  faid  I,  why  not,  Conlider, 
faid  he.  It  might  be  thought  a Good  by 
fome  perhaps,  to  be  as  ftrong  as  thofe 
Horfes,  which  are  ploughing  yonder  Field  j 
to  be  as  tall  as  thofe  Elms,  and  of  a Nature 

as  durable, Yet  would  the  Abfence  of 

Goods,  like  fhefe,  lead  to  Art  ? Or  is  it  not 
abfurd  to  fuppofe,  there  fhould  be  an  Art 
of  Impojfibilites  ? Abfurd,  faid  I,  cer- 
tainly. If  fo,  faid  he,  when  we  define 
" the  Beginning  or  Principle  of  Art,  it  is  not 
enough  to  call  it  the  Abfeitce  of  femething 
thought  Good^  unlefs  we  add^  that  the  Good 

be 


^Dialogue.  27 

he  a Good  PoJ]ible\  a TChing  attainable  by 
Man ; a "Thing  relative  to  Human  Lifcy  and 
conjijlent  with  Human  Nature : Or  does  not 
this  alfo  appear  a Requifite  ? I replied, 

J thought  it  did, 

But  ftill,  continued  he Is  it  a fuf-» 
ficient  Motive  to  Art,  that  the  Good  dejired 
fliould  be  attainable In  other  Words, 
does  every  Abfence  of  Good  attainable  lead 
to  Arty  or  is  our  Account  ftill  too  loofey  and 
in  need  of  ftridter  Determination  ? 

Of  none,  faid  I,  which  appears  to  me* 
Refleft,  faid  he  5 there  are  fome  of  the  pof 
fble  Goods  fq  obvious  and  ealy,  that  e^ery 
Man,  in  an  ordinary  State  of  common  na--* 
tural  Perfebliony  is  able  to  acquire  them, 
without  Labour  or  Application.  You  will 
hardly  deny  but  that  a fair  Apple,  tempting 
to  eat,  may  be  gathered;  or  a clear  Spring, 
tempting  to  drink,  may  be  drank  at,  by 
the  mere  Suggeftiqns  of  Will  and  unin^ 
frudied  Infindl,  I granted,  they  might. 
It  would  be  therefore  impertinent, 
. jfaid  he,  to  fuppofe  that  Goods,  like  thefe^ 

Ihould 


28  Concerning  ART, 

fhould  lead  to  Art,  becaufe  Art  would  be 
fuperfuous^  and  in  no  relpect  neceffary. 
Indeed,  faid  I,  It  feems,  fo. 

If  therefore,  faid  he,  neither  ImpoJJibles 
lead  to  Art^  becaufe  of  fuch  there  can  be  no 
Art ; nor  Things  eafly  pojjible^  becaufe  in 
fuch  Nature  can  do  without  Art : what  is  it 
we  have  left,  to  which  we  may  refer  it  ? 
Or  can  it  indeed  be  to  any  other  than  to  that 
middle  Clafs  of  Things^  which,  however  pof- 
iible,  are  ftill  not  fo  eafy,  but  to  be  beyond 
the  Powers  of  Will,  and  Inftindt  unin- 
ftrudled  ? I replied,  It  feemed  fo. 

That  there  are  many  fuch  things,  faid  he, 
js  evident  paft  doubt.  For  what  Man 
would  pay  Artifts  fo  largely  for  their  Arts, 
were  he  enabled  by  Nature  to  obtain  what- 
ever he  defired  ? Or  who  would  ftudy  to 
be  {killed  in  Arts,  were  Nature’s  original 
Powers  to  be  in  all  relpefts  fufftcient  ? 

I told  him,  It  was  not  likely, 

It  fhould  feem  then,  faid  he,  according 
to  this  Rsafoningj  that  the  Beginning,  Mch 

tive^ 


//W,  or  Principle  of  Art ; that  Caufe^  *which 
firft  moved  it  to  ABion^  and,  for  the  fake 
of  which  its  feveral  Operations  are  exerted, 
is — the  Want  or  Absence  of  some- 
thing APPEARING  Good  5 relative  to 
Human  Life,  and  attainable  by 
Man,  but  superior  to  his  natural 

AND  UNINSTRUCTED  FACULTIES. 

I replied,  I could  not  deny,  but  that  the 
Account  appeared  probable/ 

§.  4.  Let  this  then,  faidhe,  fufEce,asto 
the  Beginning  of  Art.  But  how  fhall  we 
defcribe  its  End  ? What  is  it  we  fhall  pro- 
nounce this  ? My  Anfwer,  I replied, 
muft  be  the  fame  as  often  already ; which 
was  indeed,  that  I could  not  refolve  the 
Queftion.  It  fhould  feem,  faid  he, 

not  fo  difficult,  now  we  have  difcovered 
what  Beginning  is.  For  if  Beginning  and 
End  are  Contraries  and  oppofed,  it  is  but 
to  invert^  as  it  were,  the  Notion  of  Begin- 
ning, and  we  gain  of  courfe  the  Notion  of 
End.  I alked  him,  In  what  manner  ? 

Thus,  faid  he,  the  Beginning  of  Art  has 

been 


3d  Concerning  ART, 

been  held  to  be  fomefhing^  which^  if  fuppofed 
away^  Men  would  be  never  moved  to  apply  to 
Art.  By  Inverfon  therefore  the  End  of  Art 
muft  be  fomethingy  which^  while  fuppofed 
away^  Men  will  never  ceaje  applying  to  Art  ^ 
becaufe,  were  they  to  ceafe,  while  the  End 
was  wanting,  they  would  ceafe  with  Im- 
perfeftion,  and  their  Performance  would  be 
incomplete.  To  this  I anfwered,  That 
the  Account,  however  true,  was  by  far  too 
general,  to  give  me  much  Intelligence. 

He  replied.  If  it  was,  he  would  endea- 
vour to  be  more  particular.  And  what, 
continued  he,  fhould  we  fay,  that  every 
Art,  according  to  its  Genius,  will  of  courfe 
be  accomplijhed  either  in  fome  Energy^  or  in 
fome  Work ; that,  befides  thefe  two,  it  can 
be  accomplifhed  in  nothing  elfe ; and  con- 
fequently  that  one  of  thefe  miiji  of  necejfty  be 
its  End ? I could  not  here  but  anfwer 

him  with  a Smile,  That  the  Matter  was 
now  much  obfcurer  than  ever.  I find 
then,  laid  he,  it  is  proper  we  lliould  be  more 
explicit  in  our  Inquiries,  and  deduce  our 

Reafon- 


A Dialogue. 


31 

Reafonings  from  fome  clearer  Point  of 
View.  I told  him,  It  was  quite  necef- 
fary,  if  he  intended  to  be  intelligible. 

Thus  then,faidhe.  You  will  grant,  that 
X every  Arty  being  a Caufcy  mujl  be  produbtive 
of  fome  Effedt-y  for  inftance,  Mulic,  of  a 
Tune  j Dancing,  of  a Dance  j Architefture, 
of  a Palace;  and  Sculpture,  of  a Statue. 

’Tis  allowed,  faid  I.  You  will 
grant  alfo,  faid  he,  that  in  thefe  ProduBiom 
they  are  all  accomplijhed  and  ended:  Or,  in 
other  words,  that  as  Mufic  produces  a Tune, 
fo  is  it  ended  and  accompliflied  in  a Tune; 
and  as  Sculpture  produces  a Statue,  fo  is  it 
ended  and  accompliflied  in  a Statue. 

^Tis  admitted,  faid  I.  Now  thefe  Pro-^ 
dudions,  continued  he,  if  you  will  examine, 
are  not  like  Units  or  Mathematical  Points 
, but,  on  the  contrary,  all  confjl  of  a certain 
Number  of  PartSy  from  whofe  accurate  Or- 
der  is  derived  their  Beauty  and  PerfeBion^ 
For  example;  Notes,  ranged  after  fuch  a 
manner,  make  a Tune  in  Mulic ; and 
Limbs,  ranged  after  fuch  a manner,  make  a 

Statue 


Concerning  ART, 

Statue  or  a Pidure.  I replied,  They  did^ 
If  then  the  ProdudiionSy  continued  he, 
of  every  Art  thus  confift  of  certain  Parts^ 
it  will  follow,  that  thefe  Parts  will  be  either 
€o-exiJlenty  or  not;  and  if  not  co-exijlenty 
then  of  courfe  fuccejjive,  Affift  me, 
feid  I,  by  another  Inftance,  for  you  are 
growing  again  obfcure*  Co-exiflenty  re- 
plied hej  as  in  a Statue,  where  Arms,  Legs^ 
Body,  and  Head  all  fnbjijl^  together  at  one  in^- 
dividual  Injiant : SucceJJivCy  as  in  a Tune 
Dance,  where  there  is  no  fuch  Co-exiftence^ 
but  where  fome  Parts  are  ever  pajjing  away*^ 
and  others  are  ever  fucceeding  them. 

Can  any  thing  be  faid  to  exijly  faid  I, 
whofe  Parts  are  ever  pajjing  away  ? 

Surely,  replied  he,  or  how  elfe  exift  Years 
and  Seafons,  Months  and  Days,  with  their 
common  Parent y Pime  itfelf  ? - — Or  indeed 
what  is  Human  Lifcy  but  a Compound  of 
Parts  thus  fleeting ; a Compound  of  various 
and  multiform  ABionSy  which  fucceed  each 
other  in  a certain  Order  I The  Faft, 
faid  I,  appears  fo. 


This 


A DiALOGUU; 


33 


This  then,  continued  he,  being  the  cafe,’ 
and  there  being  this  Difference  in  Produc- 
tions, call  every  ProdudiioTty  the  Parts  of 
which  exijl  fuccejjively^  and  whofe  Nature 
hath  its  Being  or  EJfence  in  a Pranfition^  call 
it,  what  it  really  is,  a Motion  or  an  Energy— 
Thus  a Tune  and  a Dance  are  Energies; 
thus  Riding  and  Sailing  are  Energies;  and 
fo  is  Elocution,  and  fo  is  Life  itfelf.  On 
the  contrary,  call  every  Productions  whofe 
Parts  exijl  all  at  once^  and  whofe  Nature  de-^ 
pends  net  on  a Pranfition  for  its  EJfencCs  call 
it  a Work,  or  "Thing  done^  not  Energy 

or  Operation. Thus  a Houfe  is  aWork, 

a,  Statue  is  a Work,  and  fo  is  a Ship,  and^ 
fo  a Pidure.  I feem,  laid  I,  to  compre- 
hend you. 

If  then  there  be  no  Productions ^ faid  he, 
but  muft  be  of  Parts^  either  co-exijient  or 
fuccejjive's  and  the  one  of  thefe  be,  as  you 
perceive,  a Works  and  the  other  be  an 
Energy's  it  will  follow,  there  will  be  no 
Productions  but  will  be  either  a Work  or  an 
D Energy. 


34  Concerning  A R T, 

Energy.  There  will  not^  faid  1.  But 
QVtryArf^  faid  he,  you  have  granted,  is 
dccomplijhed  and  ended  in  what  it  produces  t 
I replied,  I had.  And  there  are 
no  ProduBions^  but  Works  or  Energies  ? 
None. 

It  will  follow  then,  faid  he,  that  every 
Art  will  be  accomplished  and  ended 
IN  A Work  or  Energy. 

T o this  I anlwered.  That  his  Reafoning 
I could  not  impeach  ; but  that  ftill  the  Di- 
llinftion  of  Work  and  Energy  was,  what  I 
did  not  well  comprehend.  There  are 
feveral  Circumftancesy  faid  he,  which  will 
ferve  fufficiently  to  make  it  clear .> 

I begged  he  would  mention  fome. 

Thus  then,  faid  he— —When  the  Pro- 
dudtion  of  any  Art  is  an  Energy^  then  the 
Perfection  of  the  Art  can  be  only  perceived 
during  that  Energy.  For  inftance,  the  Per- 
fection of  a Mufician  is  only  known,  while 
he  continues  playing.  But  when  the  Pro- 
duction 


A Dialogue. 


35 

dudlion  of  any  Art  is  a Worky  then  is  not  the 
Perfection  vifble  during  the  Energy y hut  only 
after  it.  Thus  the  Perfedlion  of  the  Sta- 
tuary is  not  feen  during  his  Energies  as  a 
Statuary,  but  when  his  Energies  are  over ; 
when  no  Stroke  of  the  Chizzel  is  wanting, 
but  the  Statue  is  left,  as  the  Refult  of  all, 

’Tis  true,  faid  L 

Again,  continued  he, in  confe-^’ 

quence  of  this,  where  the  Produftion  is  an 
Energy^  there  the  Production  is  of  Necefjity 
co-eval  with  the  Artif  , For  how  £hould 
the  Energy  furvive  the  Man ; the  Playing 
remain,  when  the  Mufician  is  dead  ? But 
where  the  Production  is  a Worky  then,  is 
there  no  fuch  Necefity,  The  Work  may  well 
remain,  when  the  Artift  is  forgotten  5 there 
being  no  more  reafon,  that  the  Statue  and 
the  Artift  ftiould  be  co-eval,  than  the  Man 
and  the  rude  Marble,  before  it  received  a 
regular  Figure.  You  feem  now,  faid  I, 
to  have  explained  yourfelf* 


D 3 


If 


36 


Concerning  A R T, 


. If  then,  faidhe,  Work  and  Energy" 
be  made  intelligible  TermSy  yotf  cannot  but 
perceive  the  Truth  of  what  we  before  af- 

ferted that  every  Arty  according  to  its 

GeniuSy  mujl  needs  be  accomplijhed  in  one  of 
thefe  5 thaty  except  in  thefe  twOy  it  can  be  ac-^ 
complijhed  in  nothing  elfe^y  and  confequently 

that  ONE  OF  THESE  MUST  OF  NECESSITY 

BE  ITS  End.  I anfwered,  That  the 
Reafoning  appeared  juftly  deduced.  So 
much  then,  replied  he,  for  the  Ending  or 
Accomplijhment  of  Art ‘y  and  fo  much  alfo 
for  a long,  and,  I fear,  an  intricate  Difqui- 
fition. 

§.5.  He  had  no  fooner  faid  this,  than  I 
was  beginning  to  applaud  him  ^ elpecially 
on  his  having  treated  a Subje<fl:  fo  copioufly, 
darted,  as  it  were,  by  Chance,  and  without 
any  apparent  Preparation.  But  I had  not 
gone  far,  before  he  interrupted  me,  by  fay- 
ing, That  as  to  my  Praifes  they  were  more 
than  he  deferved  5 that  he  could  pretend  to 
no  great  Merit  for  having  been,  as  I called 

it. 


A Dialogue. 


37 


it,  fo  copious,  when  he  had  fo  often  before 
thought,  on  what  at  prefent  we  had  been 
talking.  In  fhort,  fays  he,  to  tell  you  a 
Secret,  I have  been  a long  time  amufing 
myfelf,  in  forming  an  ElTay  upon  this  Sub- 
jedl.  I could  not  here  forbear  reproach- 
ing him,  for  having  hitherto  concealed  his 
Intentions.  My  Reproaches  produced  a fort 
of  amicable  Controverfy,  which  at  length 
ended  in  his  offering.  That,  to  make  me 
fome  amends,  he  would  now  recite  me  (if 
I pleafed)  a fmall  Fragment  of  the  Piece ; 
a Fragment,  which  he  had  happened  acci- 
dentally to  have  about  him.  The  Propofal, 
on  my  part,  was  willingly  accepted,  and 
without  farther  Delay,  the  Papers  were 
produced. 

A s to  the  Performance  itfelf,  it  muff  be 
confeffed,  in  point  of  Stile,  it  was  fomewhat 
high  and  florid,  perhaps  even  bordering 
upon  an  Excefs.  At  the  time  however  of 
recital,  this  gave  me  lefs  Offence,  becaule 
it  feemed,  as  it  were,  to  palliate  the  Drynefs 
of  what  had  paffed  before,  and  in  fome  fort 
D 3 to 


38  Concerning  ART, 

to  fupply  the  Place  of  an  Epilogue  to  our 
Conference.  Not  however  to  anticipate, 
he  began  reading  as  follows. 

‘^OArt!  Thou  Praife  of  Man^  and 
Ornament  of  Human  Life  I PoffelTed  of 
Thee,  the  meaneft  Genius  grows  deferv-^ 
ing,  and  has  a juft  Demand  for  a Portion 
of  our  Efteem.  Devoid  of  Thee,  the 
Brighteft  of  our  Kind  lie  loft  and  ufelefs, 
and  are  but  poorly  diftinguiflied  from 
“ the  moft  Defpicable  and  Bafe.  When 
we  inhabited  Forefts  in  common  with 
Brutes,  nor  other  wife  known  from  theni 
than  by  the  Figure  of  our  Species ; Lhou 
taughteft  us  to  aflert  the  Sovereignty  of  our 
Nature^  and  to  affume  that  Empire,  for 
which  Providence  intended  us.  Thou^ 
fands  of  Utilities  owe  their  Birth  to  Thee 5 
thoufands  of  Elegancies,  Pleafures,  and 
Joys,  without  which  Life  itfelf  would  be 
but  an  infipid  Pofleffion. 

^^WiDE  and  extenfive  is  the  Reach 
pf  thy  Dominion.  No  Element  is 

“ there 


A Dialogue. 


39 


there  either  fo  violent  or  fo  fubtle^  fo  yield-* 
ing  or  fo  JluggiJh^  as  by  the  Powers  of  its 
Nature  to  be  fuperior  to  thy  Diredlion. 
Thou  dreadeft  not  the  fierce  Impetuofity 
of  Fire,  but  compelleft  its  Violence  to 
be  both  obedient  and  ufeful.  By  it  Thou 
fofteneft  the  ftubborn  Tribe  of  Minerals, 
fo  as  to  be  formed  and  moulded  into 
Shapes  innumerable.  Hence  Weapons,  ^ 
Armour, , Coin ; and  previous  to  thefe, 
and  other  Thy  Works  and  Energies^ 
hence  all  thofe  various  Tools  and  Inftru- 
ments,  which  empower  Thee  to  proceed 
‘‘  to  farther  Ends  more  excellent.  Nor  is 
the  fubtle  Air  lefs  obedient  to  Thy 
Power,  whether  Thou  willed:  it  to  be  a 
“ Minifter  to  our  Pleafure,  or  Utility.  At 
Thy  Command  it  giveth  Birth  to  Sounds, 
which  charm  the  Soul  with  all  the  Powers 
of  Harmony.  Under  thy  Inflrudtion  it 
moves  the  Ship  o’er  Seas,  while  that 
yielding  Element,  where  otherwife  we 
fink,  even  Water  itfelf  is  by  Thee 
‘‘  taught  to  bear  us ; the  vaft  Ocean  to  pro- 
mote  that  Intercourfe  of  Nations,  which 
D 4 Igno- 


40  Concerning  ART, 

Ignorance  would  imagine  it  was  deftined 
to  intercept.  To  fay  how  thy  Influence  is 
feen  on  Earth,  would  be  to  teach 
the  meaneft,  what  he  knows  already. 
Suffice  it  but  to  mention  Fields  of  Arable 
and  Failure  5 Lawns  and  Groves,  and 
Gardens,  and  Plantations^  Cottages,  Vil- 
lages,  Caftles,  Towns;  Palaces,  Temples, 
and  Ipacious  Cities, 

Nor  does  thy  Empire  end  in  SubjeBs 
thus  in^animate.  Its  Power  alfo  extends 
thro’  the  various  Race  of  Animals, 
who  either  patiently  fubmit  to  become 
thy  Slaves,  or  are  fure  to  find  Thee  an  ir- 
refiftible  Foe.  The  faithful  Dog,  the 
patient  Ox,  the  generous  Horfe,  and  the 
mighty  Elephant,  are  content  all  to  re- 
ceive  their  Inftrudions  from  Thee,  and 
readily  to  lend  their  natural  Jnjiindts  or 
Strength^  to  perform  thofe  Offices,  which 
thy  Occafions  call  for.  If  there  be  found 
any  Species,  which  are  ferviceable  when 
dead.  Thou  fuggefteft  the  Means  to  in- 
ll  veftigate  and  take  them.  If  any  be  fo 

favage, 


-/^Dialogue.  41 

” favage,  as  to  refufe  being  tamed ; or  of 
Natures  fierce  enough,  to  venture  an  At- 
tack ; Thou  teacheft  us  to  fcorn  their 
brutal  Rage ; to  meet,  repel,  purfue,  and 
« conquer. 

And  fuch,  O Art  ! is  thy  amazing 
Influence,  when  Thou  art  employed  only 
on  thefe  inferior  SubjeBs ; on  Natures  In- 
animate^  or  at  beft  IrrafionaL  But  when- 
e’er  Thou  choofefl:  a Subjelt  more  noble^ 
and  fetteft  to  the  cultivating  of  Mind 
itfelf,  then  ’tis  Thou  becomeft  truly  ami- 
“ able  and  divine ; the  ever  flowing  Source 
“ of  thofe  fublimer  Beauties,  of  which  no 
Subjebi  but  Mind  alone  is  capable.  Then 
“ ’tis  Thou  art  enabled  to  exhibit  to  Man- 
kind  the  admired  Tribe  of  Poets  and  of 
Orators ; the  facred  Train  of  Patriots  and 
of  Heroes  5 the  godlike  Lift  of  Philofo- 
phers  and  Legiflators;  the  Forms  of  - 
‘‘  tiious  and  equal  Politics,  where  private 
“ Welfare  is  made  the  fame  with  public  \ 
“ where  Crowds  themfelves  prove  dif- 

“ interefted 


42  Concerning  ART, 

interefted  and  brave,  and  Virtue  is  made 
a national  and  popular  Charadteriftic. 

“Hail!  facred  Source  of  all  thefc 
“ Wonders  ! ^hyfelf  inftrudl  me  to  praife 
“ Thee  worthily,  thro*  whom,  whate’er 
“ we  do,  is  done  withElegance  and  Beauty ; 
without  whom,  what  we  do,  is  ever  grace- 

“ lefs  and  deformed. ^Venerable  Power  ! 

“ By  what  Name  lhall  I addrefs  Thee  r 
“ Shall  I call  Thee  Ornament  of  Mind ; 

or  art  Thou  more  truly  Mind  itfelf? — 
“■’Trs  Mind  Thou  art,  moftperfedt 
“ Mind  y not  rude,  untaught,  but  fair  and 
polilhed  y in  fuch  Thou  dwelleft,  of  fuch 
“ Thou  art  the  Form  y nor  is  it  a Thing 
“ more  poffible  to  feparate  Thee  from  fuch, 
“ than  it  would  be  to  feparate  Thee  from 
“ thy  own  Exiftence.” 

My  good  Friend  was  now  arrived  to  a 
very  exalted  Pitch,  and  was  purfuing  his 
Panegyric  with  great  Warmth  and  Fluency ; 
when  we  entered  the  Suburbs,  our  Walk 

being 


^ D I A L 0 G U E.  ^ 43 

being  near  finiflied.  The  People,  as  we 
went  along,  began  to  look  at  us  with^Sur- 
prize ; which  I,  who  was  lefs  engaged, 
having  leilure  to  obferve,  thought  ’twas 
proper  to  admonilh  my  Friend,  that  he 
fhould  give  pver.  He  immediately  ceafed 
reading ; put  his  Papers  up  j and  thank’d 
me  for  flopping  him  at  fo  feafpnable  a 
Time, 

§.  6.  What  remained  of  our  Difeourfe 
pafled  oif  with  lefs  Rapture,  and  was  in.-» 
deed  no  more,  than  a kind  of  fliort  Re-» 
capitulation. 

H E obferved  to  me,  that  pur  Inquiries 
had  furniflied  out  an  Anfwer  to  four  diffe- 
rent Queflions,  For  thus,  faid  he,  if  it  be 
alked  us,  Whaf  Art  is  f We  have  to 

Anfwer,  it  is — an  habitual  Power  in 

Many  of  becoming  the  Caufe  of  fome  Effedly 
according  to  a Syfem  of  various  and  welU 
approved  Precepts.  If  it  be  afked  us.  On 
what  Subjedi  Art  operates  ? We  can  anfwer. 
On  a contingent^  which  is  within  the  reach 

of 


44  ‘ Concerning  ART, 

cf  the  Human  Powers  to  influence.  If  it  be 
afked  us,  For  what  Reafon^  for  the  fake  of 
what  Art  operates  ? We  may  reply,  For 
the  fake  of  fome  abfent  Goody  relative  to  Hu’- 
man  Lifcy  and  attainable  by  Many  but  fupe- 
perior  to  his  natural  and  uninflruEled  FacuU 
ties.  Laftly,  if  it  be  alked.  Where  ’tis  the 
Operations  of  Art  end"!  We  may  fay. 
Either  in  fome  Energy  y or  in  fome  Work. 

H E added.  That  if  he  were  not  afraid  of 
the  Imputation  of  Pedantry,  he  could  be 
almoft  tempted  to  fay.  That  we  had  been 
confidering  Art,  with  refpedl  to  thofe  four 
CaufeSy  fo  celebrated  once  among  Profellbrs 
in  the  Schools.  By  thefe,  upon  Inquiry,  I 
found  that  he  meant  certain  CaufeSy  called 
the  ^Eflicienty.  the  Materialy  the  % Finals 
‘and  the  ||  FormaU 

But 

* P.  17.  f P.  22.  t P.  28, 29. 

P P-  34j  3^- 


A Dialogue. 


45  . 

But  here,  without  farther  explaining, 
he  begged  for  the  prefent  that  we  might 
conclude,  being  fufficiently,  as  he  faid, 
fatigued  with  the  Length  of  what  had 
pafled  already.  The  Requeft  was  reafon- 
able  I could  not  but  own,  and  thus  ended 
our  Cgnverfation,  and  foon  after  it  our 
Walk, 


rhe  E N D, 


TREATISE  the  Second  : 


DISCOURSE 

O N 

MUSIC, 

PAINTING, 

AND 

POETRY. 


( 49  ) 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  the  First. 

INTRODUCTION Befjgn  and 

Dijlribution  of  the  Whole  — Preparation 
for  the  following  Chapters, 


CHAPTER  the  Second. 

On  the  SubjeBs^  which  Painting  imitates — 
On  the  SubjeBs^  which  Mufic  imitates^’---’- 
Comparifon  of  Mufic  with  Painting, 

CHAPTER  the  Third. 

On  the  Subjecls  which  Poetry  unit  at es^  but 
imitates  only  thro'  natural  Media^  or  mere 

Sounds Comparifon  of  Poetry  in  this 

Capacity^  firfl  with  Paintings  then  with 
Mufic, 

E CHAP- 


50 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  the  F o u r t 

On  fhe  Suije^fs  which  Poetry  imitates^  not 
by  mere  Sounds  or  natural  Media^  but  by 
Words  fignificant ; the  SubjeBs  being  fuch^ 
to  which  the  Genius  of  each  of  the  other  two 
Arts  is  mpft  perfedlly  adapted, — Its  Coni’- 
parifon  in  thefe  SubjeBs^  firfi  with  Paint^ 
ing^  then  with  Mufic* 


CHAPTER  the  Fifth. 

On  the  SubjeBs^  which  Poetry  imitates  by 
Words  fignificant,  being  at  the  fame  tim-e 
Subjects  not  adapted  to  the  Genius  of  either 
of  the  other  Arts,——  The  Nature  of  thefe 

' SubjeBs, The  Abilities  of  Poetry  to 

imitate  them,’ — — Comparifon  of  Poetry  in 
refpeB  of  thefe  SubjeBs^  frfl  with  Pa^tr 
ingy  then  with  Mufic, 


CHAP- 


CONTENTS. 


SI 


CHAPTER  the  Sixth. 

On  Mufx  conjidered  not  as  an  Imitation^  but 
as  deriving  its  Efficacy  from  another 

Source, On  its  joint  Operation  by  this 

means  with  Poetry, j^n  ObjeBion  to 

Mufc  folved, The  Advantage  arifng  to 

ity  as  well  as  to  Poetry^  from  their  being 
united, Conclufon, 


E 2 


A 


> 


V 

> \ 


I 


( S3  ) 

A 


DISCOURSE 


O N ■ 

MUSIC,  PAINTING, 
and  POETRY. 


CHAP,  I. 

IntroduBion. Dejign  and  Diflribntion  of 

the  Whole, — Preparation  for  the  following 
Chapters, 


L L Arts  have  this  in  common,  Ch.  I. 
' that  they  refpeB  Uurnaji  Life, 

Some  contribute  to  its  NeceJJl^ 
ties^  as  Medicine  and  Agriculture;  others 
to  its  Elegance^  as  Mulic,  Painting,  and 
Poetry. 


Now", 


54 


A DiscouJ^se  on  MUSIC, 


Ch.  I.  Now,  with  refpeft  to  thefe  two  diffe-* 
rent  Species^  the  necejfary  Arts  feem  to  have 
been  prior  in  time ; if  it  be  probable^  that 
Men  confulted  how  to  live  and  to  fupport 
themfehes^  before  they  began  to  deliberate 
how  to  render  Life  agreeable.  Nor  is  this 
indeed  unconfirmed  by  Fad:,  there  being 
BO  Nation  known  fo  barbarous  and  ignorant, 
as  where  the  Rudiments  of  thefe  necejfary 
Arts  are  not  in  fome  degree  cultivated. 

' And  hence  poflibly  they  may  appear  to  be 
the  more  excellent  and  worthy^  as  having 
claim  to  a Preference^  derived  from  their 
Seniority, 

The  Arts  however  of  Elegance  cannot 
be  faid  to  want  Pretenfions,  if  it  be  true, 
that  Nature  framed  us  for  fomething  more^ 
than  mere  Exifence,  Nay,  farther,  if  Well-- 
being  be  clearly  preferable  to  Mere-^being^ 
and  this  without  it  be  but  a thing  contemp- 
tible, they  may  have  reafon  perhaps  to 
afpire  even  to  a Superiority.  But  enough 
of  this,  to  come  to  our  Purpofe, 

§.  2. 


PAINTING  and  POETRY. 


§.  2.  The  befign  of  this  Difcourfe  Is  to 
treat  of  Music,  Painting,  and  Poetry  j 
to  confider  in  what  they  agree^  and  in 
what  they  differ  ^ and  which,  upon  the 

WHOLE,  is  more  EXCELLENT  THAN  THE 
©THER  TWO. 

In  entering  upon  this  Inquiry^  It  is  firft 
to  be  obferved,  that  the  Mind  is  made 
Gonfcious  of  the  natural  World  and  its  Af- 
fedtions,  and  of  other  Minds  and  their 
AfFedtions,  by  the  feveral  Organs  of  the 
Senfes  (aj.  By  the  fame  Organs^  thefe  Arts 
exhibit  to  the  Mind  Imitations^  and  imitate 
either  Parts  or  Afedlions  of  this  natural 
E 4 World, 


(a)  1^0  explain  fome  future  Obfervatlons,  it  will 
be  proper  here  to  remark,  that  the  Mind  from  thefe 
Materials  thus  brought  together  ^ and  from  its  own  Ope^ 
rations  on  them^  a?2d  in  confequence  of  them,  becomes 

fraught  with  Ideas and  that  many  Minds  ft 

fraught,  by  a fort  ^Compact  affigning  to  each  Idea 
fome  Sound  to  be  its  Mark  or  Symbol,  were  the 
firjl  Inventors  and  Founders  ^Language. 


56  ^Discourse  MUSIC, 

Ch.  1.  Worldy  or  elfe  the  Paffions,  Energies,  and 
other  AfFedlions  of  Minds,  There  is  this 
Difference  however  between  thefe  Arts  and 
Nature that  Nature  paffes  to  the  Percipient 
thro’  all  the  Senfes  > whereas  thefe  Arts  ufe 
07ily  two  of  them,  that  of  Seeing  and  that 
of  Hearing.  And  hence  it  is  that  the  fen* 
fible  OhjeBs  or  Media^  thro’  which  (k)  they 
imitate,  can  be  fuch  only^  as  thefe  two  Senfes 
sffe  framed  capable  of  perceiving ; and  thefe 
Media  are  Motion^  Sounds  Colour^  and 
Figure. 

Paint- 


0)  To  prevent  Confufion  it  mufl  be  obferved, 
that  in  all  thefe  Arts  there  is  a Difference  between 
the  fenftbk  Media ^ thro*  vjhich  they  imitate^  and  the 
Subjedfs  imitated.  The  fenfible  Media,  thro’  which 
they  imitate’,  mull  be  always  relative  to  that  Senfe^ 
by  which  the  particular  Art  applies  to  the  Mind ; but 
the  Subject  imitated  may  be  foreign  to  that  Senfe^  and 
beyond  the  Power  of  its  Perception,.  Painting,  for  in- 
fiance,  (as  is  fhewn  in  this  Chapter)  has  no  fenfible 
AlediaA^'to^  which  it  operates,  except  Colour  and 
Figure : But  as  to  Subjedfs.,  it  may  have  Motions, 
Sounds,  moral  AfFedlions  and  Adlions ; none  of  which 
are  either  Colours  or  Figures.,  but  which  however  are 
all  capable  of  being  imitated  thro'  them.  See  Chapter 
the  fecond.  Notes  {c)y  (d). 


PAINTING  and  POETRY. 


57 


Painting,  having  the  Eye  for  its  Or-  Ch.  I. 
gany  cannot  be  conceived  to  imitate,  but  ’”^~^ 
thro’  the  Media  of  vijible  Objedis.  And 
farther,  its  Mode  of  imitating  being  always 
motionlefsy  there  muft  be  fubftradted  from 
thefe  the  Medium  of  Motion.  It  remains 
then,  that  Colour  and  Figure  are  the  only 
Media,  thro’  which  Painting  imitates. 

Music,  paffing  to  the  Mind  thro’ the 
^ Organ  of  the  Ear^  can  imitate  only  by 
Sounds  and  Motions. 

Poetry,  having  the  Ear  alfo  for  its 
Organ y as  far  as  Words  are  conlidered  to  be 
no  more  than  mere  Sou?jdsy  can  go  no  fur- 
ther in  Imitating,  than  may  be  performed 
by  Sound  and  Motion.  But  then,  as  thefe 
its  Sounds  fta?2d  by  ^ CompaB  for  the  various 
IdeaSy  with  which  the  Mind  is  fraught^  it  is 
enabled  by  this  means  to  imitate,  as  far  as 

Lan^ 


* See  Note  (a)  Peige 


58 


Discourse. MUSIQ 


Ch,  I.  Language  can  exprefs ; and  that  ’tis  evident 
will,  in  a manner,  include  all  things. 


Now  from  hence  may  be  feen,  how 
thefe  Arts  ^agree^  and  how  they  differ. 

They  agree^  by  being  ^//Mimetic, 

or  Imitative. 

The  Y differ,  as  they  imitate  by  different 
Media  y Painting,  hy  Figure  and  Colour  y 
Music,  hy  Sound  2inA  Motion  y Painting 
and  Music,  hy  Media  which  are  Natural y 
Poetry,  for  the  greater  Part,  by  a Medium^ 
which  is  Artijicial  (c). 

As 


(c)  A Figure  painted,  or  a Compofition  of  Mu- 
fical  Sounds  have  always  a natural  Relation  to  that, 
ef  which  they  are  intended  to  be  the  Refemhlance,  But 
a Defcription  in  Words  has  rarely  any  fuch  natural 
Relation  to  the  feveral  Ideas,  of  which  thofe  Words  are 
the  Symbols.  None  therefore  underftand  the  Defcrip^ 
tion,  but  thofe  who  fpeak  the  Language.  On  the  con- 
trary, Mufical  and  Pidure-Imitations  are  intelligible 
to  all  Men, 


Why 


PAINTING  and  POETRY, 


59 


§.  3.  As  to  that  Art,  which  upon  the  Ch.  1. 
whole  is  moji  excellent  of  the  three ; it  muft  be 
obferved,  that  among  thefe  w2inom  Media 
of  imitating,  fome  will  naturally  be  ac- 
curate, fome  lefs ; fome  will  bejt  imitate  one 
Subjedt;  fome,  another.  Again,  among 
the  Number  of  Subjects  there  will  be  natu- 
rally alfo  a Diiference,  as  to  Merit  and  De- 
merit. There  will  be  fome  fublime^  and 
fome  low ; fome  copious^  and  fome  Jhort  > 
fome  pathetic^  and  others  void  of  PaJJion-, 
fome  formed  to  infruSl^  and  others  not  ca- 
pable of  it. 

Now,  from  thefe  two  Circumftances ; 
that  is  to  fay,  from  the  Accuracy  of  tlM 
Imitation^  and  the  Merit  of  the  SubjeSI 
hnitatedy  the  Queftion  concerning  which 
Art  is  moft  excellent^  muft  be  tried  and  de- 
termined. 

This 


Why  it  is  faid  that  Poetry  is  not  univerfally^  but 
Qnly  for  the  greater  part  artificial,  fee  below,  Chapter 
the  Third,  where  what  Natural  Force  it  has,  is  ex- 
amined and  eftimated. 


6o 


A Discourse  on  MUS I Q 

Ch.  I.  This  however  cannot  be  done,  without 
L.— ^ gj-  Particulars,  that  fo  there  may 

be  formed,  on  every  part,  juft  and  accurate 
Comparifons. 

To  begin  therefore  with  Painting. 


CHAP, 


PAINTING  andVOETKY. 


6i 


C H A P.  II, 

On  the  SubjeBSy  which  Painting  imitates. — - 
On  the  SubjeBs^  which  Mujic  imitates. — - 
Comparifon  of  Mujic  with  Painting. 

The  fittest  Subjects  forCLIL’ 
Painting,  are  all  fuch  Things’'"'"*'^^^ 
and  Incidents,  as  are  ^ peculiarly  cba-- 
raBerifedbyPiGJj'Si'E.'and  Colour. 

Of  this  kind  are  the  whole  Mafs  (a)  of 
Phings  inanimate  and  vegetable  fuch  as  • 

Flowers,  Fruits,  Buildings,  Landfkips 

The  various  Tribes  of  Animal  Figures-^  fuch 

as  Birds,  Beafts,  Herds,  Flocks The 

Motions  and  Sounds  peculiar  to  each  Animal 

Species, 


* P.  57. 

(a)  The  Reafon  is,  that  thefe  things  are  almoll 
wholly  known  to  us  by  their  Colour  and  Figure.  Be- 
lides,  they  are  as  motionlefsy  for  the  moft  part,  in 
JFfaturc^  as  in  the  Imitation. 


62 


Discourse  on  MUSIC, 

Ch.  II.  Species,  when  accompanied  with  Conjigura^ 
tions^  which  are  obvious  and  remarkable  ( b j— 
The  Human  Body  in  all  its  Appearances  (as 
Male,  Female;  Young,  Old;  Handfome, 
Ugly ;)  and  in  all  its  Attitudes^  (as  Lying, 
Sitting,  Standing,  &c,)  ^ The  Natural 

Sounds  peculiar  to  the  Human  Species,  (fuch 
as  Crying,  Laughing,  Hollowing,  &c,)  (c)-- 
All  Energies^  Paffions^  and  Affedlions  of  the 

Souly 


(b)  Instances  of  this  kind  are  the  Flying  of 
Birds,  the  Galloping  of  Horfes,  the  Roaring  of  Lions, 
the  Crowing  of  Cocks.  And  the  Reafon  is,  that 
though  to  paint  Motion  or  Sound  be  impoffible^j^t  the 
Motions  and  Sounds  here  mentioned  having  an  im- 
mediate and  natural  Connediion  with  a certain  vifibl$ 
Configuration  of  the  Parts^  the  Mind,  from  a 
Profpe^  of  this  Configuration,  conceives  infienjibly  that 
which  is  concomitant ; and  hence  ’tis  that,  by  a fort  of 
Fallacy,  the  Sounds  and  Motions  appear  to  be 
painted  alfio.  On  the  contrary,  not  fo  in  fiuch  Mo- 
tions, as  the  Swimming  of  many  kinds  of  Filh  ; or 
in  fiuch  Sounds,  as  the  Purring  of  a Cat ; becaufe  here 
is  no  fuch  fipecial  Configuration  to  be  perceived. 

(c)  The  Reafon  is  of  the  fame  kind,  as  that 
given  in  the  Note  immediately  preceding ; and  by 
the  fame  Rule,  the  Obfervation  muft  be  confined  to 
natural  Sounds  only.  In  Language,  few  of  the  Speaker^ 
know  the  Configurations^  which  attend  it. 


PAINTING  md  POETRY. 


63 


Soidy  being  in  any  degree  more  intenfe  or  Ch.  II. 
violeyit  than  ordinary  {d)  — All  Aciions 

and  Events^  whofe  Integrity  or  Wholenefs 
depends  upon  a fl:^rt  and  fdf-evident  Sue- 

ceffion  of  Incidents  (^e) Or  if  the  Sue- 

ceffion  be  extended,  th^nfuch  Adions  at 
lead,  whofe  Incidents  are  all  along^  during 
that  SucceJJiony  jimilar  (f)  — — All  ABions^ 
which  being  qualified  as  above,  open  them- 

felves 


(d)  The  Reafon  is  ftill  of  thfe  fame  kind,  vt%, 
from  their  Vifibk  Eifeds  on  the  Body.  They  natu- 
rally produce  either  to  the  Countenance  a particular 
Rednefs  or  Palenefs , or  a particular  Modification  of  its 
Mufcles ; or  elfe  to  the  Limbs,  a particular  Attitude, 
Now  all  thefe  Elfeds  are  folely  referable  to  Colour 
and  Figure,  the  two  grand  fenfible  Media,  peculiar 
to  Painting.  See  Raphael' % Cartoons  of  St.  Paid  at 
Athens,  and  of  his  ftriking  the  Sorcerer  Ely  mas  blind : 
See  alfo  the  Crucifixion  of  Polycrates,  and  the  Suf- 
ferings of  the  Conful  Regulus,  both  by  Salvator  Rofa, 

(e)  F o R of  neceffity  every  Picture  is  a Puntfum 
^emporis  In  s t a n t . 

fy)  Such,  for  inftance,  as  a Storm  at  Sea ; whofe 
Incidents  of  Vifion  naay  be  nearly  all  included  in  foam- 
ing Waves,  a dark  Sky,  Ships  out  of  their  ered 
Pofiure,  and  Men  hanging  upon  the  Ropes.— 


Or 


64  ^ Discourse  on  MUSIC, 

Ch.  11.  felves  into  a large  Variety  of  Circumftances* 
concurring  all  in  the  fame  Point  of  I’ime  (g) 
— All  Adlions  which  are  known^  and 
known  unherfally^  rather  than  Adlions 
newly  invented^  or  known  but  to  few  {h). 

And 


Or  as  a Battle ; which  from  Beginning  to  End  pre- 
fents  nothing  elfe,  than  Blood,  Fire,  Smoak,  and 
Diforder.  Now  fuch  Events  may  be  well  imitated 
all  at  once  ; for  how  long  foever  they  laft,  they  are 
but  Repetitions  of  the  fame, 

(g)  For  Painting  is  not  bounded  in  Exten- 
sion, as  it  is  in  Duration.  Befides,  itfeems 
true  in  every  Species  of  Compofition^  that,  as  far  as 
Perplexity  and  Confufion  may  be  avoided,  and  the 
Wholenefs  of  the  Piece  may  be  preferved  clear  and  in- 
telligible ; the  more  ample  the  Magnitude^  and  the 
greater  the  Variety^  the  greater  alfo,  in  proportion, 
the  Beauty  and  Perfection,  Noble  Inftances  of  this 
are  the  Pidures  above-mentioned  in  Note  (d). 
See  Jrifot,  Poet,"  cap.  7.  'o  J'e  dv'lm  (pv'a-iv  th 
7rpo(,y[/^iXT(^  cp(^,  dil  y.h  &c.  See  alfo  CharaCieri- 
ficks^  V.  I.  p.  143.  and  Bojfu^  B.  i.  cap.  i6.  UAchille 
AHomere  eft  ft  grandy  See, 

(h)  The  Reafon  is,  that  a Pidure  being  (as  has 
been  faid)  but  a Point  or  Inftanty  in  a Story  well 
known  the  Spe^Stator’s  Memory  will  fupply  the  pre- 
vious and  the  fiibfequent.  But  this  cannot  be  done, 

where 


PAINTING  POETRY.  6j 


And  thus  much  as  to  the  Subjedls  ofCh.  II. 

Painting. 

§.  2.  In  Music,  the  fittest  Sub- 
jects OF  Imitation  are  all  fuch  Things 


where  fuch  Knowledge  is  wanting.  And  therefore  it 
may  be  juftly  queftioned,  whether  the  mod  cele- 
brated Subjeds,  borrowed  by  Painting  from  Hiftory, 
would  have  been  any  of  them  intelligible  thro"  the 
Medium  of  Painting  only^  fuppofing  Hiftory  to  have 
been  ftlent,  and  to  have  given  no  additional  Information, 

I T may  be  here  added,  that  Horace^  conformably 
to  this  Reafoning,  recommends  even  to  Poetic  Imi- 
tation a known  Story,  before  an  unknowtu 

------ — Tuque 

Pediius  Ili^cum  carmen  deducis  in  adfus, 

fi  proferres  ignota,  indidaq;  primus. 

Art,  Poet,  V.  laS* 

% 

And  indeed  as  the  b'eing  underfood  to  others , either 
Hearers  or  Spedators,  feems  to  be  a common  Requi- 
fte  to  all  Mimetic  Arts  whatever ; (for  to  thofe,  who 
underftand  them  not,  they  are  in  facft  no  Mimetic 
Arts)  it  follows,  that  Perfpicuity  muft  be  EJfential  to 
them  all  and  that  no  prudent  Artift  would  negledl, 
if  it  were  poflible,  any  juft  Advantage  to  obtain  this 
End.  Now  there  can  be  no  Advantage  'greater,  than 
the  Noicriety  of  the  Subject  imitated, 

F 


66 


'^  Discourse  on  MUSIC, 


Ch.  II.  and  Incidents,  as  are  moji  eminently  ^ cha- 
ra^erifed  by  Motion  and  Sound. 


Motion  may  be  either  Jlow  or  fwifty 
even  or  uneven^  broken  or  continuous. 
Sound  may  be  either  foft  or  loudy  high  or 
low.  Wherever  therefore  any  of  thefe  Spe- 
cies of  Motion  or  Sound  may  be  found  in 
an  eminent  (not  a moderate  or  mean ) degree^ 
there  will  be  room  for  Musical  Imitat- 

TION. 

Thus,  in  the  Natural  or  Inanimate 
Worldy  Music  may  imitate  the  Glidings, 
Murmurings,  Toflings,  Roarings,  and  other 
Accidents  of  Watery  as  perceived  in  Foun- 
tains, Catarafts,  Rivers,  Seas,-  —The 
fame  of  Thunder- — the  fame  of  Winds,  as 
well  the  ftormy  as  the  gentle,  — In  the 
Animal  Worldy  it  may  imitate  the  Voice  of 
jfbme  Animals,  but  chiefly  that  of  hnging 

Birds, -It  may  alfo faintly  copy  fome  of 

their  Motions. — In  the  Human  Kindy  it  can' 

alfo 


A 


PAINTING  and  POETRY. 

alfo  Imitate  fome  Motions  (i)  and  bounds 
and  of  Sounds  thofe  mojl  perfedily^  which 
are  expreffive  of  Grief  Anguifo  (1). 

And  thus  miich  as  to  the  Subjefts^ 
which  Mufic  imitates; 

§.3.  It  remains  then,  that  we  compare 
thefe  two  Arts  together.  And  here  in- 
deed, as  to  Mufical  Imitation  m general^  it 
mufl  be  confeffed  that  — as  it  can,  from  its 
Genius,  imitate  ojily  Sounds  and  Motions-- 
as  there  are  not  many  Motions  either  in  the 
F 2 Animal 


(i)  A s the  tFalk  of  the  Ghnt  Pofypbe/ke^  in  the 
Paftoral  of  Jds  md  Galatea, ----See  what  ample  Stridil 
he  takesy  &c. 

(k)  As  the  Shouts  of  a Multitude,  in  the  Corona- 
tion Anthem  of,  God  fave  the  Kingy  &c. 

(l)  The  Reafon  is,  that  this  Species  of  Muilcsj 
Imitation  moji  nearly  approaches  Nature,  For  Griefs 
in  mofl  Animals,  declares  itfelf  by  Sounds^  which  are 
not  unlike  to  long  Notes  in  the  Chromatic  Syjlem, 
Of  this  kind  is  the  Chorus  of  BaaFs  Priefts  in 
the  Oratorio  of  Deborah^  Doleful  Tidings^  hm  y$ 
mundy  &c. 


68  Discourse  on  MUSIC, 

Ch.  II.  Animal  or  iii  the  Inanimate  World,  which 
are  exclujively  peculiar  even  to  any  Species^ 

and  fcarcely  any  to  an  Individual- as 

there  are  no  Natural  Sounds,  which  cha- 
radierife  at  leaft  lower  than  a Species  (for 
the  Natural  Sounds  of  Individuals  are  in 

every  Species  the  fame ) farther,  as 

Mufic  does  but  imperfedlly  imitate  even 

thefe  Sounds  and  Motions  (m) On  the 

contrary,  as  Figures,  Poftures  of  Figures, 
and  Colours  charadterife  not  only  every  fen- 
fMe  Species^  but  even  every  Individual ; and 
for  the  moft  part  alfo  the  various  '^Energies 
and  PaJJions  of  every  Individual  — and 
farther,  as  Painting  is  able,  with  the  highejl 
Accuracy  and  ExaBncfs^  to  imitate  all  thefe 
Colours  and  Figures  5 and  while  Mufical 

Imita- 


^ See  Note  (d)  of  this  Chapter, 

(m)  The  Reafon  is  from  the  Dijftmilitude  he- 
tween  the  Sounds  and  Motions  of  Nature^  and 
thofe  of  Mufic,  Muftcal  Sounds  are  all  produced 
from  Even  Vibration,  mofl;  Natural  from  Uneven ; 
Mufical  Motwis  are  chiefly  Definite  in  their  Meafurc, 
mofr  Natural  are  Indefimite^ 


PAINTING  and  POETRY. 


Imitation  pretends  at  moji  to  no  more,  than  Ch, 


the  railing  of  Ideas  Jirnilar^  itfelf  afpires  to 

raife  Ideas  the  very  fame in  a word,  as 

Painting,  in  refpedt  of  its  Subjedls^  is  equal 
to  the  Jioblejl  Part  of  Imitation,  the  imw 
tating  regular  Actions  conffing  of  a Whole 
and  Farts  \ and  of  fuch  Imitation,  Mufic  is 

utterly  incapable from  all  this  it 

muft  be  confefled,  that  Musical  Imita- 
tion IS  GREATLY  BELOW  THAT  OF 

Painting,  and  that  at  bejl  it  is  but  an 
imperfed:  thing. 

As  to  the  Ffficacy  therefore  of  Music, 
it  muft  be  derived  from  another  Source, 
which  muft  be  left  for  the  prefent,  to  be 
confidered  of  hereafter 

There  remains  to  be  mentioned  Imi- 
tation by  Poetry. 


\ 


^ Ch.  VI. 


70 


A Discourse  on  MUSIC, 


CHAR  III. 

On  the  SuhjeSis  which  Poetry  imifafeSy  hut 
imitates  only  thro*  natural  Media^  or  mere 
Sounds; — -'-'--‘Comparifon  of  Poetry  in* this 
Capacity y frjl  with  Paintingy  then  with 
Mufe. 

Ch.IIL'l^OETIC  Imitation  includes  every. 
A thing  in  ity  which  is  performed  either  by 
Picture-Imitation  or  Musical;  for 
its  Materials  are  Wordsy  and  Words  arc 
y Symbols  by  Compact  of  all  Ideas, 

Farther  as  Words ^ belide  their  being 
Symbols  by  Compad:^  are  alfo  Sounds  *vari- 
mjly  diflinguifbed  by  their  Aptnefs  to  be 
rapidly  or  fbwly  pronounced,  and  by  the 
refpedive  Prevalence  of  MuteSy  Liquidsy  or 
Vowels  in  their  Compofition ; it  will  follow 
that,  befide  their  CompaB-Relationy  they 

will 

Hu.  I ..  .Ml.  , I .....  I I mil  

2 See  Note  (a)  Chap.  L 


PAINTING  and  POETRY. 


71 

will  have  likewife  a Natural  Relation  to  all  Ch.  III. 
fuch  Things,  between  which  and 
felves  there  is  any  Natural  Refemblanceo 
Thus,  for  inllance,  there  is  a Natural  Re-^ 
femblance  between  all  forts  of  harjh  and 
grating  Sounds.  There  is  therefore  (ex- 
clufive  of  its  Signification)  a Natural  Rela- 
tion between  the  Sound  of  a vil^  Hautboy, 
and  of  that  Verfe  in  * Virgil^ 

Stridenti  miferum  Jiipuld  difperdere  Carmenl 

or  of  that  other  in  Milton^ 

Grate  on  their  Scrannel  Pipes  of  wretched 
Straw. 

So  alfo  between  the  fmooth  fwift  Gliding  of 
'a  River,  and  of  that  Verfe  in  ||  Horace, 

-r— at  ilk 

Labitur,  ^ labetur  in  Qum  ^olubilis  cevum. 

And  thus  In  part  even  Poetic  Imitation 
has  its  Foundation  in  Nature.  But  then 
F 4 this 


* Ed.  3.  ver.  27.  f In  his  Lycidas. 
11  Epift.2,  1 1.  V.  42,  43. 


72  A Discourse  on  MUSIC, 

Ch. III. this  Imitation  goes  not  far;  and  taken 
without  the  Meaning  derived  to  the  Sound$ 
from  Compact ^ is  but  little  intelligible^  how- 
ever perfed  and  elaborate. 

§.2.  If  therefore  Poetry  be  compared 
with  Painting,  in  refped  of  this  its 
merely  Natural  and  Inartificial  Referii- 

blance,  it  may  be  juftly  faid  that In  as 

much  as  of  this  fort  of  Refemblanee, 
Poetry  (like  Mufic)  has  no  other  Sources, 

than  thofe  Ixo  of  Sound  and  Motion — 

m as  Hiiich  as  it  often  wants  thefe  Sources 
themfelves  (for  Numbers  of  Words  neither 
i)ave^  nor  can  have  any  Refemblanee  to 
thofe  Jdeas^  of  which  they  are  the  Sym^ 

hols ) in  as  much  as  Natural  Sounds 

and  Motions,  which  Poetry  thus  imitates, 
are  themfelves  but  ^ loofe  and  indefinite  Ac-- 
ddents  of  thofe  Suhjedls^  to  which  they 
belong,  and  confequently  do  but  loofely  and 
indefinitely  charaderife  them — — laftly,  in 
as  much  as  Poetic  Sounds  and  Motions  do 

but 


PAINTING  and  POETRY. 


but  family  refemble  thofe  of  Nature^  which  Ch.III. 
are  themfelves  confeiTed  to  be  fo  imperfeB 

and  vague -—From  all  this  it  will 

follow  (as  it  has  already  followed  of  Mufic) 

that Poetic  Imitation  founded 

IN  MERE  Natural  Resemblance  is 
MUCH  inferior  TO  THAT  OF  PAINT- 
ING, and  at  bejl  but  very  imperfeB. 

§.  3.  As  to  the  Preference,  which  fuch 
Poetic  Imitation  may  claim  before 
Musical,  or  Musical  Imitation  be- 
fore THAT ; the  Merits  on  each  Side  may 
appear  perhaps  equal  They  both  fetch 
their  Imitations  from  ‘f'  Sound  and  Motion^ 

Now  Music  feems  to  imitate  Nature  bet- 
ter as  to  Motion^  and  Poetry  as  to  Sound. 

The  Reafonis^  that  in  Motiom  (a)  Mufic 

has 


t R 57- 

(a)  Music  has  no  lefs  than  five  different  Length 
pf  Notes  in  ordinary  ufe,  reckoning  from  the  Semi- 
brief tg  the  Semi-quaver  5 all  which  may  be  mff 

' nitefy 


74 


A Discourse  on  MUSIC, 


Ch.III.  has  a greater  Variety ; and  in  Sounds^  thofe 
of  Poetry  approach  nearer  to  Nature  (b). 


If  therefore  in  Sound  the  one  have  the 
Preference,  in  Motion  the  other ^ and  the 
Merit  of  Sound  and  Motion  be  fuppofed 
nearly  equal ; it  will  follow,  that  the 
Merit  of  the  two  Imitations 

WILL  BE  NEARLY  EQ^AL  ALSO. 


nitely  compounded^  even  in  any  one  Time,  or  Mea- 

fure Poetry,  on  the  other  hand,  has  but  two 

Length  or  ^antities^  a long  Syllable  and  a Jhort^ 
(which  is  its  Half)  and  all  the  Variety  of  Verfe  arifes 
Irom  fuch  Feet  and  Metres,  as  thefe  two  Species  of 
Syllables,  by  being  compounded,  can  be  made  produce. 

(b)  Musical  Sounds  are  produced  by  even 
Vibrations,  which  fcarcely  any  Natural  Sounds  are — 
on  the  contrary,  Words  are  the  Produdl  of  uneven 

Vibration,  and  fo  are  moji  Natural  Sounds 

Add  to  this,  that  Words  are  far  more  numerous,  than 
Mufical  Sounds,  So  that  Poetry,  as  to  Imitation  by 
Sound,  feems  to  exceed  Muhc,  not  only  in  nearnefi 
of  Refemblame,  but  even  in  Variety  alfo. 


CHAR 


PAINTING  and  PQETRY, 


CHAP.  IV, 

(p;;  the  SubjeBs  which  Poetry  imitates^  not 
' by  mere  Sounds  or  natural  Media,  but  by 
Words  fignificant ; the  Subjebls  at  the  fame 
time  being  fuch^  to  which  the  Genius  of  each 
pf  the  other  two  Arts  is  moft  perfedtly 
adapted, — Its  Comparifon  in  thefe  SubjeSis^ 
frjl  with  Paintings  then  with  Mufic. 


The  Mimetic  Art  of  Poetry  hasCh.IV. 

been  hitherto  confidered,  as  fetch- 
ing its  Imitation  from  mere  Natural  Re- 
femblance.  In  this  it  has  been  fhewn 
much  inferior  to  Painting,  and  nearly 
equal  to  Music. 


It  remams  to  be  confidered,  what  its 
Merits  are,  when  it  imitates  not  by  mere 
Natural  Sound,  but  by  Sound  fgnificant  j 
by  Words,  the  compact  Symbols  of  all  kinds 
of  Ideas.  From  hence  depends  its  genuine 

Fosce. 


7&  A Discourse  on  MUSIC, 

Ch.IV.  Force.  And  here,  as  it  is  able  to  find 
Sounds  expreflive  of  every  Idea,  fo  is  there 
no  Subjedi  either  of  Pifture-Imitation,  or 
Mufical,  to  which  it  does  not  afpire  ^ all 
Things  and  Incidents  whatever  being,  in  a 
manner,  to  be  defcribed  ’by  Words. 

Whether  therefore  Poetry,  in  this 
its  proper  Sphere^  be  equal  to  the  Imitation  of 
the  other  two  Arts,  is  the  Queftion  at  pre- 
fent,  which  comes  in  order  to  be  difcuffed. 

Now  as  SubjeBs  are  infinite ^ and  the 
other  two  Arts  are  not  equally  adapted  to 
imitate  it  is  propofed,  firfi:  to  compare 
Poetry  with  them  in  fuch  Subjects,  to 
which  they  are  mofi  perfedlly  adapted, 

§.2.  To  begin  therefore  with  Paint- 
ing. A Subject,  in  which  the  Power 
of  this  Art  may  be  772ofi  fully  exerted, 
(whether  it  be  taken  from  the  Inanmate^ 
or  the  Animal^  or  the  Moral  World)  muft 
be  a Subject,  which  is  principally  and 
emmently  charadlerifed  by  certain  Colours^ 

Figures^ 


PAINTING  and  POETRY,.  77 

FigureSy  and  Pojlures  of  Figures whofe  Ch.  IV. 

Co?7tprehenfon  depends  not  on  a Succejfion  of  '^  '^'^ 
Events  ^ or  at  leafy  if  on  a SucceJJiony  on  a 
fhort  and felf-evident  one-— -which  admits  a 
large  Variety  of  fuch  CircumfanceSy  as  all 
concur  in  the  fame  individual  Pomt  of  Fime^ 
and  relate  all  to  one  principal  ABion^ 

As  to  fuch  a Subjedl  therefore In  as 

much  as  Poetry  is  forced  to  pafs  thro* 
the  Medium  of  CompaBy  while  Painting 
applies  immediately  thro’  the  Medium  of 
Nature ; the  one  being  underftood  to  all, 
the  other  to  the  Speakers  of  a certain  Lan- 
guage ^ only in  as  much  as  Natural 

Operations  mull  needs  be  more  affeBingy 

than  Artificial  in  as  much  as  Painting 

helps  our  own  rude  Ideas  by  its  owny  which 
are  confiimmate  and  wrought  up  to  the  Per- 
fection of  Art  3 while  Poetry  can  raife  7io  . 
other  (a)  than  what  every  Mind  is  furnifhed 

with 

* Note  (c)  58* 

(a)  When  we  read  in  Milton  of  Eve,  that 
Grace  was  in  all  her  StepSy  Heav'n  in  her  Eye y 
In  etfry'Gefcure  Dignity  and  Love  3 

vve 


7?  A Discourse  m MUSIQ 

Ch^IV.  with  before — -in  as  much  as  Painting  fhews 
all  the  minute  and  various  concurrent  Cir^ 
cumfances  of  the  Event  in  the  fame  indivi- 
dual Point  of  Time,  as  they  appear  in 
Nature -y  while  Poetry  is  forced  to  want 
this  Circumftance  of  Intelligibility,  by 
being  ever  obliged  to  enter  into  fome  de- 
gree of  Detail-- — in  as  much  as  this  Detail 
creates  often  the  Dilemma  of  either  be- 
coming tediouSy  to  be  clear  5 or  if  7iot 
tediouSy  then  obfcure  -- — laftly,  in  as  much 
as  all  Imitations  more  f milary  more  imme-- 

diatCy 


we  have  an  Image  7tot  of  that  Eve,  which  Milton 
conceived,  but  of  fuch  an  Eve  onlyy  as  every  one, 
hy  his  own  proper  GeniuSy  is  able  to  reprefent,  from 
refledling  on  thofe  IdeaSy  which  he  has  annexed  to 
thefe  feveral  bounds.  The  greater  Part,  in  the  mean 
time,  have  never  perhaps  bellowed  one  accurate 
Thought  upon  whatGr^^r^,  Heaven y Lovey  Dignity 
mean  5 or  ever  enriched  the  Mind  with  Ideas  of 
Beauty,  or  afked  whence  they  are  to  be  acquired, 
and  by  what  Proportions  they  are  conjiituted.  On 
the  contrary,  when  we  view  Eve  as  painted  by  an 
able  Painter y we  labour  under  no  fuch  Difficulty  j 
becaufe  we  have  exhibited  before  us  the  better  Con-- 
£ options  of  an  Artist  y thQgenum  Ideas  of  perhaps  t 
Titian  or  sRaphael^ 


PAINTING  W POETRV.  79 

- dkte,  and  more  intelligible^  are  preferable  Ch.  IV. 
to  thofe  which  are  lefs  foj  and  for  the 
Reafons  above,  the  Imitations  of  Poetry 
are  lefs  Jimilar,  lefs  immediate,  and  lefs  /«- 
than  thofe  of  Painting- — From 
ALL  THIS  it  will  follow,  that -i-  IN  ALL 
Subjects,  where  Painting  cam 

FULLY  EXERT  ITSELF,  THE  IMITA- 
TIONS OF  Painting  are  superiors 
TO  those  of  Poetry,  and  gonse- 
QJJENTLY  IN  ALL  SUCH  SUBJECTS 

THAT  Painting  has  the  Prefe-^ 

RENCE. 

§.  3.  And  now  to  compare  Poetry 
with  Music,  allowing  to  Mujic  the  fame 
Advantage  of  a well-adapted  S\i\d]e&.,  -w\Ach 
has  already  been  allowed  to  Painting  in  A? 
Gomparifon  juft  preceding.- 

What  fuch  a Subject  is,  has  already 
been  * defcribed.  And  as  to  Preference,  if 

mull 


* See  Chap,  II.  §.  2, 


2<y  A Discourse  on  MUSIC, 

Ch.  IV.  mull  be  confeffed,  that In  as  much  as 

Musical  Imitations,  tho’  Natural^ 
afpire  not  to  raife  the  fame  Ideas,  but  only 
Ideas  analogous 3 while  Poetic 

Imitation,  tho’  Artificial^  raifes  Ideas 

the  very  fame in  as  much  as  the  Definite 

and  Certain  is  ever  preferable  to  the  Indefi- 
nite  and  Uncertain  y^nd  that  more  elpeci- 
ally  in  Imitations^  where  the  principal  • 
(b)  Delight  is  in  recognizing  the  Thing 

imitated 


!i  P.  68,  69. 

(h)  That  there  is  an  eminent  Delight  in  thh 
Recognition abftrad  from  any  thing 
pleafing  in  the  Subjetf  recognized^  is  evideht  from 

hence that,  in  all  the  Mimetic  Arts,  we  can  be 

highly  charmed  with  Imitations^  at  whofe  Originals  in 
Nature  we  are  Jhocked  and  terrified.  Such,  for  in- 
ftance,  as-Dead  Bodies,  Wild  Beaifrs,  and  the  like. 

The  Caufe,  afllgned  for  this,  feems  to  be  of 
the  following  kind.  We  have  a Joy,  not  only  in 
the  Sanity  and  Perfection,,  but  alfo  in  the  juf  and  na- 
' tural  Energies  of  our  feveral  Limhs  and  Faculties, 
And  hence,  among  others,  the  foy  in  Reasoning  j 
as  being  the  E?2ergy  of  that  principal  Faculty,,  our  In- 
tellect or  Understanding.  This  Joy  ex- 
tends, not  only  to  the  Wife,  but  to  the  Multitude. 
Por  all  Men  have  an  Averfgn  to  Ignorance  and  Error ; 

andl 


I>AINTING  W POETRY.  8i 

imitated — it  will  follow  from  hence  that — Ch.  IV. 
EVEN  IN  Subjects  the  best  adapted 
TO  Musical  Imitation,  the  Imita- 
tion OF  Poetry  will  be  still  more 

EXCELLENT; 


and  in  fome  degree,  however  moderate,  are  glad  to 
learn  and  to  inform'  themfelves. 

Hence  therefore  the  Delight^  anfihg  from  thefe 
Imitations ; as  we  are  enabled,  in  each  of  them,  to 
exercife  the  Reasoning  Faculty;  and,  hy  com- 
paring the  Copy  v/ith  the  Architype  in  our  Minds,  to 
infer  that  THIS  is  such  a thing;  and  that, 
ANOTHfeR;  a Fa<51:  remarkable  among  Children, 
even  in  their  firft  and  earlibfr  Days. 


To,  T£  G-vfx(pvrov  ro7g 

'jraiJws  £5"!,  T8TW  J'ltxCpEp^art  rm  aAAcoy  ort 

^i/x?]7i)cwmToy  Ir*,  not)  rtxg  fxoiBwng  TrOisTTOCi  iix 

fAtfAYKTlOO^  m?  TT^COraj*  7^  TO  ^OCl^ElV  ToTg 

''TrdvTOc^,  XriiAiTov  te  TaT»  to  a-VfA.j3ocivov  stt]  rm 

yoc^  dvrtx  KvTntijDoog  o'^w/xev,  rt^rm  rx^  slkovx^  rx<: 
jw.aA»f“04  rix.^iQcc(ASVxgy  p^af^o^ei)  S-eco^vvrBg*  olov 

T£  fA0^(pxg  Tcov  dy^iuTa,Tcov^  7^  vex^m,  ’^AtTiov 

Tariff  ort  (xocvBxveiv  a ^ovov  roTg  (pi?iocro(pcig 
aAAa  ^ roig  aAAoif  ofAoitjcg  * aAA*  Itt]  xoivm^- 

CIV  auTa.  Aid  ydp  Taro  rag  eixovxg  o^mngy 

ou  cvf^[3xim  ^eco^^VTxg  jxccvS’dvEiv  cuXXoyi^i^xiy 
Ti  ixxrov*  oiov,  oTi  IxiTv^,  Arifr.  Poct.  C.4, 


G CHAP, 


82 


A D iscouRSE  on  MUSIC, 


CHAP.  V. 

On  the  SubjeBs  which  Poetry  imitates  by 
JVords  Jignijicant^  being  at  the  fame  time 
Subjedts  not  adapted  to  the  Genius  of 

either  of  the  other  Arts Phe  Nature  of 

thofe  SubjeBs "Phe  Abilities  of  Poetry 

to  imitate  them- Comparifon  of  Poetry 

in  thefe  Subjedls,  firft  with  Pamtingy 
then  with  Mufc. 


Ch.V.  ^ I HE  Mimetic  Art  of  Poetry 
A has  now  been  confidered  in  two 
Views—^Firftj  as  imitating  by  mere  natural 
Media  ^ and  in  tliis  it  has  been  placed  on  a 
level  with  Music,  but  much  inferior  to 

Pa  I n t I n g It  has  been  lince  con- 

ildered  as  imitating  thro’  Sounds  fgnificant 
by  CompaBy  and  that  in  fuch  Subjedts  re- 
fpedlively,  where  Painting  and  Music 
have  the  fulleft  Power  to  exert  themfelves. 

Here 


PAINTING  W POETRY, 


Here  to  Painting  it  has  been  held  inferior^  Ch 
but  to  Mufic  it  has  been  preferred.  ' 

It  remains  to  be  confidered what 

other  SubjeBs  Poetry  has  left,  to  which  the 
Genius  of  the  other  two  Arts  is  npt  fo  per^ 
feBly  adapted — -How  far  Poetry  is  able  to 

imitate  them and  whether  from  the 

FerfeBion  of  its  Imitation,  and  the  Nature 
of  the  Subjefts  themfelves,  it  ought  to  be 
called  no  more  than  equal  to  its  Sifter  Arts ; 
or  whether,  on  the  whole,  it  ftiould  not 
rather  be  called  fuperior. 

§.2.  To  begin,  in  the  firft  place,  by 
comparing  it  with  Painting. 

The  SubjeBs  of  Poetry^  to  which  the 

Genius  of  Painting  is  not  adapted^  are 

all  Adlions,  whofe  (a)  Whole  is  of  fo 
G 2 • lengthefied 


(a)  For  ajuft  and  accurate  Defcription  of  TFhok- 
nefs  and  Unity ^ fee  Ariji.  Poet.  Ch.  7 & 8.  and  Bojfuy 
his  heft  Interpreter,  in  his  Treatife  on  the  Epic  Poem. 
B.  11.  ch.  9,  10,  n. 


84  A Discourse  on  MUSIC, 

Qh.N .lengthened  a Duration,  that  no  Point  of 
Time ^ in  any  part  of  that  Whole,  can  be 
given  for  Painting neither  in  its  Be- 
ginnings which  will  teach  what  is  Subfe- 
qiient's  nor  in  its  End,  which  will  teach 
what  is  Previous  •,  nor  in  its  Middky  which 
will  declare  both  the  Previous  and  the  Sub- 

feque72t. Alfo  all  Subjedts  fo  frainedi  as 

to  lay  open  the  internal  Conflitution  of  Man^ 
and  give  us  an  Infight  into  (b)  Charadlers^ 
MannerSy  PaJfonSy  and  Sentiments. 

The 


{h)  For  a Defcription  of  Character,  Tee  be- 
low, Note  (c)  oi  this  Chapter. 

As  for  Manners,  it  may  be  faid  in  general, 
that  a certain  Syjiem  of  them  makes  a Charatfer ; and 
that  as  thefe  Syhems,  by  being  differently  compounded^ 
make  each  a different  Charadler,  fo  is  it  that  one 
Man  truly  differs  from  another. 

Pa  s s I o N s are  obvious  \ Pity^  Feary  Anger y kc. 

Sentiments  are  difcoverable  in  all  thofe 
Things,  which  are  the  proper  Bufmefs  and  End  of 
Speech  Discourse.  The  chief  Branches  of 
this  End  arg  to  Affert  and  Prove ; to  Solve  and  Re- 
fute I to  exprefs  or  excite  Paffions  5 to  amplify  In- 
cidents, 


PAINTING  and  POETRY. 


85 


The  Merit  of  thefe  Subjedls  Is  obvious.  Ch.  V. 
They  muft  neceifarily  of  all  be  the  moft 
affe6ting-y  the  moft  improving and  fuch 
of  which  the  Mind  has  the  JlrongeJl  Com-* 
prehenjion. 

For  as  to  the  affeEfing  Part if  It  be 

true,  that  all  Events  more  or  lefs  affedt  us, 
as  the  Suhje5ts^  which  they  relpeft,  are 
more  or  lefs  nearly  related  to  us;  then 
fiirely  thofe  Events  muft  needs  be  moft  af- 
feBing^  to  whofe  SuhjeBs  we  are  of  all  the 
moft  intimately  related.  Now  fuch. is  the 
Relation,  which  we  bear  to  Mankind ; and 
Men  and  Human  Aftions  are  the  Subjedts, 
here  propofed  foir  Imitationp 

G 3 As 


cidents,  and  to  dim'inijh  them.  ’Tis  in  thefe 
things  therefore,  that  we  muft  look  for  Sentiment, 

Ariji,  Poet.  c.  19. yaxloi  rm  Aiocvotccv 

raula,  oVa  vtto  ra  Aoj/a  7rcc^(Z(rxsuoc(T9^voit,  Msfijf 
J'l  Ta^wv,  TO,  7f  aTTO^Einvuvcciy  ro  Ai'Ejv,  to' 


86 


A Discourse  on  MUSIC, 


Ch.  V.  As  to  Improvement there  can  be  none 

furely  (to  Man  at  leaft)  fo  great,  as  that 
which  is  derived  from  a juft  and  decent 
Reprefentation  of  Human  Manners^  and 
Sentiments,  For  what  can  more  contribute 
to  give  us  that  Majler’-Knowledge  ( c with- 
out 


r N n © I S A T T O N.  But  farther, 
befides  obtaining  this  moral  Science  from  the  Con- 
templation of  Human  Life ; an  End  common  both  to 
Epic,  Tragic,  and  Comic  Poetry  5 there  is  a pecu- 
liar End  to  Tragedy^  that  of  eradicating  the  PafTions 
of  Pity  and  Fear. 

cTTii^oi'ocg  rsXstocg  — eAes  Cpo^a  Trs^odvacrx  rw 
Twy  roi^Toov  xaOa^qy.  Arift.  Poet.  c.  6. 

Tragedy  is  the  Imitation  of  an  Adiion  important  and 
perfect.,  thro'*  Pity  and  Fear  working  the  Purga- 
tion OF  SUCH-LIKE  PaSSIONS. 

There  are  none,  ’tis  evident,  fo  devoid  of  thefe 
tv/o  Pajfions.,  as  thofe  perpetually  converfant.,  where 
the  Occafions  of  them  are  moft  frequent ; fuch,  for 
inflance,  as  the  Military  Men,  the  ProfeiTors  of 
Medicine.,  Chirurgery.,  and  the  like.  Their  Minds, 
by  this  Intercourfe,  become  as  it  were  callous'.,  gain- 
ing an  Apathy  by  Experience.^  wTich  no  Theory  can 
ever  teach  them. 

Now 


PAINTING  W POETRY.  87 

out  which,  all  other  Knowledge  will  prove  Ch.  V. 
of  little  or  no  Utility  ? 

G 4 As 


Now  that,  which  is  wrought  in  thefe  Men  by 
the  real  Difajiers  of  Life^  may  be  fuppofed  wrought 
in  others  by  the  Fictions  of  Tragedy  5 yet  with  this 
happy  Circumftance  in  favour  of  Tragedy,  that, 
without  the  Difaflers  being  real^  it  can  obtain  the 
fame  End. 

I T muft  however,  for  all  this,  be  confelTed,  that 
an  Effedl  of  this  kind  cannot  reafonably  be  expeded, 
except  among  Nations,  like  the  Athenians  of  old, 
who  lived  in  a perpetual  Attendance  upon  thefe 
Theatrical  Reprefentations.  For  ’tis  not  a fingle  or 
occafional  Application  to  thefe  Paffions,  but  a con^ 
Jlant  and  uninterrupted^  which  alone  can  lejfm  or  re- 
move them. 

It  would  be  improper  to  conclude  this  Note, 
without  obferving,  that  the  Philofopher  in  this 
place  by  Pity  means  not  Philanthropy,  Na- 
tural Affediion^  a Readinefs  to  relieve  others  in  their 
Calamities  and  Difrefs  5 but,  by  Pity^  he  means  that 
Senseless,  Effeminate  Consternation, 
tvhich  feizes  weak  Minds ^ on  the  fudden  Profpedl  of  a7iy 
^hing  difaflrous ; which,  in  its  more  violent  Effecfls, 
is  feen  in  Shriekings^  Swoonings^  &c.  a Paflion,  fo  for 
from  laudable,  or  from  operating  to  the  Good  of 
others,  that  it  is  certain  to  deprive  the  Party,  who 
labours  under  its  Infruence,  of  all  Capacity  to  do  tk^ 
leaf  good  Gftce, 


88 


A D iscouRSE  on  MUSIC, 


Ch.  V.  As  to  our  ComprehenJiGn there  is  no^ 

thing  certainly,  of  which  we  have  fo  Jlrong 
Ideas,  as  of  that  which  happens  in  the 
Morale  or  Human  World.  For  as  to  the 
hiternal  Party  or  A5iive  Principle  of  the 
Vegetable y we  know  it  but  obfcurely  ^ becaufe 
there  we  can  difcover  neither  PaJJiony  nor 
Senfation,  In  the  Animal  World  indeed 
this  Principle  is  more’feen,  from  the  Paf- 
Jions  and  Senfations  which  there  declare 
themfelves.  Yet  all  ftill  refts  upon  the 
mere  Evidence  of  Sejife  upon  the  Force 
only  of  external  and  unajjijled  Experience, 
IBut  in  the  Moral  or  Human  World,  as  we 
have  a Medium  of  Hno^dedge  ^ far  mors 
accurate  than  this  5 fo  from  hence  it  is, 
that  we  can  comprehend  accordmgly. 

With  regard  therefore  to  the  various 
EventSy  which  happen  herCy  and  the  vari- 
ous CaufeSy  by  which  they  are  produced — r 
in  other  Words,  of  all  Charadlers,  Manners, 
Human  Paffions,  and  Sentiments;  belides 
|he  FvHence  of  Senfcy  v/e  have  the  higheji 

Evidence 


PAINTING  and  POETRY.  89 
Evidence  additional,  in  having  an  exprefs  Ch.  V. 


Confcioufnefs  of  fomething  Jimilar- within-, 
of  fomething  homogeneous  in  the  Recefles  of 
our  own  Minds-,  in  that,  which  conftitutes 
to  each  of  us  his  true  and  real  Self. 

Th  E SE-  therefore  being  the  Subjefts,  not 
adapted  to  the  Genius  of  Painting.^  it  comes 
next  to  be  confidercd,  how  far  Poetry  can 
imitate  them^ 

And  here,  that  it  hsiS  Abilities  clearly 
equal.^  cannot  be  doubted;  as  it  has  that 
for  the  Medium  of  its  Imitation,  through 
which  Nature  declares  herfelf  in  the  fame 
^ Subjedts,  For  the  Sentiments  in  real  Life 
are  only  known  by  Men’s  ^ Difcourfe. 
And  the  CharaBers^  Manners^  and  Pajjions 
of  Men  being  the  Prompters  to  what  they 
fay ; it  muft  needs  follow,  that  their  Dif 
courfe  will  be  a corf  ant  Specinmi  of  thofe 
CharaBers^  Manners  and  Pajjions. 


Format 


90 


Discourse  on  MUSIC, 


Ch,  V.  ^ Format  enim  Natura  prius  nos  inf  us  ad 
omnem 

Forfunarum  habitum ; juvat^  aut  impellit  ad 
tram : 

Pojl  efFert  Animi  Motus,  Interprete 
Lingua* 


• Not  only  therefore  Language  is  an  ade^ 
quate  Medium  of  Imitation,  but  in  Senti-^ 
meats  it  is  the  only  Medium  5 and  in  Man'-^ 
ners  and  Fajjions  there  is  no  other,  which 
can  exhibit  them  to  us  after  that  deary 
precife  and  definite  Way^  as  they  in  Nature 
ftand  alotted  to  the  various  forts  of  Men, 
and  are  found  to  conftitute  the  feveral  Cha^ 
raders  of  each  (d)^ 

§•  3- 


^ Hor.  de  Jrte  Poet,  v.  108/ 

(d)  It  is  true  indeed  that  (befides  what  is  done 
by  Poetry)  there  is  fome  Idea  of  Charadler^  which 
even  Painting  can  communicate.  Thus  there  is  no 
doubt,  but  that  fuch  a Countenance  may  be  found  by 
Painters  for  Mneas^  as  would  convey  upon  view  a 

mildy 


PAINTING  WPOETRY, 


91 


§.  3.  To  compare  therefore  Poetry^  in  Ch.  V. 
thefe  SuhjeBs^  with  Painting- — In  as  much 
as  no  Subjects  of  Painting  are  * wholly  fu- 

perior 


* P.  57,  58.  75,  76. 

mild^  humane^  and  yet  a brave  Difpofition.  But 
then  this  Idea  would  be  vague  and  general.  It  would 
be  concluded,  only  in  the  grofs,  that  the  Hero  was 
Good,  As  to  that  Syftem  of  Qualities  peculiar  to 
Mneas  only,  and  which  alone  properly  conjlitutes  his 
true  and  real  Charatfer^  this  would  ftill  remain  a 
Secret,  and  be  no  way  difcoverable.  For  how  de- 
duce it  from  the  mere  Lineaments  of  a Countenance  ? 
Or,  if  it  were  deducible,  how  few  Spectators  would 
there  be  found  fo  fagacious  ? ’Tis  here  therefore, 
that  Rccourfe  muft  be  had,  not  to  Painting,^  but  to 
Poetry,  So  accurate  a Conception  of  Character  can 
be  gathered  only  from  a Succejfion  of  various^  and  yet 
confijient  Adlions  ; a Succeffion,  enabling  us  to  conjec- 
ture,^ what  the  Perfon  of  the  Drama  will  do  in  the 
future^  from  what  already  he  has  done  in  the  pajf. 
Now  to  fuch  an  Imitation,  Poetry  only  is  equal -j 
becaufe  it  is  not  bounded,^  like  Painting,,  to  Jhort,  and, 
as  it  were, Events,  but  may  imitate  Subjects 
of  any  Duration  whatever.  See  Arijl,  Poet,  cap.  6. 

*^Eri  {J'e  ^60?  p-h  to  roivrovy  0 ^yiXoT  rriv  Trpoxl^cinv 
OTToHJi  Tiq  Irtv,  £V  OiV  J'JJAoV,  li  TT^GXi^ilTXl  ^ 

(pfjysi  0 See  alfo  the  ingenious  and  learned 

Book  4.  ch.  4. 


2 


92  A Discourse  on  MUSIC, 

Ch.  V.  perior  to  Poetry  j while  the  Subjefts,  here 
defcribed,  far  exceed  the  Power  of  Paint- 
ing— —in  as  much  as  they  are  of  all  Sub- 
jcfts  the  moft  •f*  affedtingy  and  improvingy 
and  fuch  of  which  we  have  the  flrongejl 

Comprehenfon ^further,  in  as  much  as 

Poetry  can  mojl  J accurately  imitate  them — 
in  as  much  as,  befides  all  Imitation,  there 
is  a Charm  in  Poetry,  arifing  from  its  very 
Plumbers  (e)\  whereas  Painting  has  Pre- 
tence 


+ P.  85, 

J P.  89, 

(e)  That  there  is  a Charm  in  Poetry y arifing 
from  its  Numbers  only,  may  be  made  evident  from 
the  five  or  fix  firft  Lines  of  the  Paradife  Loji ; where, 
without  any  Pomp  of  Phrafe,  Sublimity  of  Senti^ 
ment,  or  the  leajl  Degree  of  Imitatiariy  every  Reader 
muft  find  himfelf  to  be  fenfibly  delighted ; and  that, 
only  from  the  graceful  and  fimple  Cadence  of  the 
NumberSy  and  that  artful  Variation  of  the  Cafura  or 
Paufcy  fo  eflential  to  the  Harmony  of  every  good 
Poem. 

A N Englijh  Heroic  Verfe  confifts  of  ten  Semipeds^ 
or  Half-feet.  Now  in  the  Lines  above-mentioned 


PAINTING  and  POETRY. 


tcnce  to  no  Charm,  except  that  of  Imita-  Ch.  V’. 

tion  only laftly,  (which  will  foon  be 

* {hewn)  in  as  much  as  Poetry  is  able  to 
ajfociate  Mujic^  as  a mofl  powerful  Ally ; 
of  which  Affiftance^  Painting  is  utterly  in- 
capable  From  all  this  it  may  be 

fairly  concluded,  that Poetry  is  not 

only  Equals  but^  that  it  is  in  fadi  far  Su- 
perior TO  ITS  Sister  Art  of  Paint- 
ing. 

§.  4.  But  if  it  exceed  Painting  in  Sub- 
jeBsy  to  which  Painting  is  not  adapted ; no 
doubt  will  it  exceed  Music  in  SubjeBs  to 

Mufic 


* Chap,  VI. 

the  Paufes  are  varied  upon  different  Semipeds  in  the 
Order,  which  follows ; as  may  be  feen  by  any,  who 
will  be  at  the  Pains  to  examine 


Paradise  LosTj  B.  I. 


Verfe  i 

3 (has  its  Paufe 

4 I fall  upon 


iSemiped  7 

4 


94  ^ Discourse  MUSIC, 

not  adapted.  For  here  it  has  been 
preferred^  even  in  thofe  Subjefts,  which 
have  been  held  adapted  the  bejl  of  all, 

§.  5.  Poetry  is  therefore,  on  the 

WHOLE,  MUCH  SUPERIOR  TO  EITHER  OF 
THE  OTHER  Mimetic  Arts  ^ it  having 
been  Jhewn  to  be  equally  excellent  in  the 
.*f*  Accuracy  of  its  Imitation;  and  to 
imitate  Subjects,  which  far  surpass, 
AS  well  in  t Utility,  as  in  ||  Dig- 
nity. 


* Ch.  IV.  §.  3,  + P.  89.  t P*  86. 

II  See  p.  83,  84.  atid  p.  64,  Nete  (g).  See  alfi 

P*  59* 


PAINTING  and  POETRY. 


95 


CHAP.  VI. 

On  Mujic  conjidered  not  as  an  Imitation,  but 
as  deriving  its  Efficacy  from  another 

Source, On  its  joint  Operation^ , by  this 

meanSy  with  Poetry, An  Objediion  to 

Mufc  folved, The  Advantage  arifing  to 

ity  as  well  as  to- Poetry y from  their  being 
united, Conclufon, 


IN  the  above  Difcourfe,  Music  hasCh.VL 
been  mentioned  as  an  ^Ally  to  Poetry. 

It  has  alfo  been  faid  to  derive  its  ^ Efficacy 
from  another  SourcCy  than  Imitation,  It 
remains  therefore,  that  thefe  things  be  ex- 
plained. 


Now,  in  order  to  this,  it  is  firft  to  be  [ 

obferved,  that  there  are  various  AffiebiionSy  \ 

which  may  be  raifed  by  the  Power  of  I 


* 93- 


t P.  69. 


A Discourse  on  MUSIG, 

Yl,MuJic.  There  are  Sounds  to"  make  us 
chearful^  or  fad\  martialy  or  tender  \ and 
fo  of  almoft  every  other  Affeftion,  which 
we  feel. 

It  is  alfo  further  obfervable,  th^t  there 
is  a reciprocal  Operation  between  our  Af- 
feBionSy  and  our  Ideas ; fo  that,  by  a fort 
of  natural  Sympathy y certain  Ideas  neceffa- 
rily  tend  to  raife  in  us  certain  AffeBions ; 
and  thofe  AffeBionSy  by  a fort  of  Co'ilnter- 
Operation,  to  raife  the  fame  Ideas.  Thus 
Ideas  derived  from  Funerals,  Tortures, 
Murders,  and  the  like,  naturally  generate 
the  Aifeftion  of  Melancholy.  And  when, 
by  any  Phyjical  CaufeSy  that  AffeBion  hap^ 
pens  to  prevail,  it  as  naturally  generates  the 
iame  doleful  Ideas. 

And  hence  it  is  that  Ideas y derived 
from  et^ternal  Caufes,  have  at  difere72f 
times,  upon  the  fame  Perfon,  fo  different 
an  Elfed:.  If  they  happen  to  fuit  the 
Affedtions,  which  prevail  withifty  then  is 
their  Impreflion  mojl  fenfibky  and  their  Effedl 


PAINTING  and  POETRY. 


moji  lajling.  If  the  contrary  be  true,  then  Ch.  VI. 
is  the  EfFed:  contrary.  Thus,  for  inftance, 
a Funeral  will  much  more  affed  the  fame 
Man,  if  he  fee  it  when  melancholy,  than 
if  he  fee  it  when  chearful. 

Now  this  being  premifed,  it  will  fol- 
low, that  whatever  happens  to  be  the 
JffeBion  or  Difpojition  of  Mind,  which 
ought  naturally  to  refult  from  the  Genius 
of  any  Poem^  the  fame  probably  it  will  be 
in  the  Power  of  fome  Species  of  Mujtc  to 
excite.  But  whenever  the  proper  AffeBion 
prevails,  it  has  been  allowed  that  then  all 
kindred  Ideas^  derived  from  external  Caufes, 
make  the  moJl  fenjible  ImpreJJion.  The 
Ideas  therefore  of  Poetry  muft  needs  make 
the  moft  fenfible  Impreffion,  when  the 
(a)  Affedions,  peculiar  to  them,  are  al- 
ready 


(a)  Quintilian  elegantly,  and  exadlly  appofite 

to  this  Reafoning,  fays  of  Mufic Namque  ^ 

VQce  ^ modulatione  grandia  elate^  jucunda  dulciter^ 

mcdfrau 


H 


A D ISCOURSE  on  MUSIC, 

VL  ready  excited  by  the  Mufic.  For  here  a 
double  Force  is  made  co-operate  to  one  End. 
A Poet,  thus  ajjijled^  finds  not  an  Audience 
in  a Temper,  averfe  to  the  Genius  of  his 
Poem,  or  perhaps  at  beft  under  a cool 
difference ; but  by  the  Preludes,  the  Sym- 
' phonies,  and  concurrent  Operation  of  the 
Mufic  in  all  its  Parts,  rouzed  into  thofe 
^ery  Affediions^  which  he  would  moil 
defire. 

An  Audience,  fo  difpofed,  not  only  em- 
brace with  Pleafure  the  Ideas  of  the  Poet, 
when  exhibited } but,  in  a manner,  even 
anticipate  them  in  their  feveral  Imagina- 
tions, The  Superftitious  have  not  a more 
previous  Tendency  to  be  frightned  at  the 
fight  of  Spedres,  or  a Lover  to  fall  into 
Raptures  at  the  fight  of  his  Miftrefs ; than 
a Mind,  thus  tempered  by  the  Power  of 

Mufic, 


moderata  Uniter  canity  totaq\  arte  confentit  cum 
eorum,  quae  dicuntur,  Affectibus.  Injl,  Orator. 
L I.  cap.  10, 


PAINTING  and  POETRY. 


99 


Muiic,  to  enjoy  all  Ideas,  which  are  fuitable  Ch.  VI. 
to  that  Temper. 

And  hence  the  genuine  Charm  of 
Mulic,  and  the  Wonders^  which  it  works, 
thro’  its  great  Profeflbrs  (b).  A Power, 
which  confifts  not  in  Imitations,  and  the 
railing  Ideas ; but  in  the  railing  Affe5iions^ 
to  which  Ideas  may  correlpond.  There 
are  few  to  be  found  fo  infenlible,  I may 
even  fay  fo  inhumane,  as  when  good 
Poetry  is  justly  set  to  Music, 
not  in  fome  degree  to  feel  the  Force  of 
fo  amiable  an  Union,  But  to  the  Mufes 
Friends  it  is  a Force  irrejijiible^  and  pene- 
H 2 trates 


(h)  Such,  above  ^11,  is  George  Frederick  Handel i 
whofe  Genius,  having  been  cultivated  by  continued 
Exercife,  and  being  itfelf  far  the  fublimefl  and  moft 
univerfal  now  known,  has  juftly  placed  him  with 
out  an  Equal,  or  a Second.  This  tranfient  Tefti- 
mony  could  not  be  denied  fo  excellent  an  Artift, 
from  whom  this  Treatife  has  borrowed  fuch  emi- 
nent Examples,  to  juftify  its  AiTcrtions  in  what  it 
has  offer’d  concerning  Mufic. 


lOO 


A D ISCOURSE  on  MUSIC, 

Ch.VI.  trates  into  the  deepeft  Receffes  of  the 
^ Soul, 

^ Pedius  inaniter  angif^ 

Irritate  mulcet^  falfts  terroribm  impiety 

§.2.  Now  this  is  that  Source y frorrl 
whence  Mufic  was  ‘f*  faid  formerly  to  de- 
' rive  its  greatefl  Efficacj.  And  here  indeed, 
not  in  (c)  Imitation,  ought  it  to  be  chiefly 
cultivated.  On  this  account  alfo  it  has 
been  called  a J powerful  Ally  to  Poetry. 
And  farther,  ’tis  by  the  help  of  this  Rea- 
soning, that  the  Objediion  is  folved,  which 
is  raifed  againfl:  the  Singing  of  Poetry  (as 
in  Opera’s,  Oratorio’s,  &c,)  from  the  want 

of 


^ Horat,EpiJl,  i,  1.2.  v.  211. 
t P.  69.  % P.  93. 

Jc)  For  the  narrow  Extent  and  little  Efficacy  of 
Music,  confidered  as  a Mimetic  or  Imitative 
Art,  fee  Ch.  II.  §.  3. 


PAINTING  and  POETRY.- 


lOI 


of  Probability  and  Refemblance  to  Nature,  Ch,Vl. 
To  one  indeed,  who  has  no  mufical  Ear, 
this  Objedtion  may  have  Weight.  It  may 
even  - perplex  a Lover  of  Mufic,  if  it  hap- 
pen to  furprize  him  in  his  Hours  of  In- 
difference, But  when  he  is  feeling  the 
Charm  of  Poetry  fo  accompanied,  let  hini 
be  angry  (if  he  can)  with  that,  which 
ferves  only  to  intereft  him  more  feelingly 
in  the  Subjedt,  and  fupport  him  in  a 
Jlronger  and  more  earnefi  Attention ; which 
enforces,  by  its  Aid, ' the  feveral  Ideas  of 
the  Poem,  and  gives  them  to  his  Imagi- 
nation with  unufual  Strength  and  Gran- 
deur. He  cannot  furely  but  confefs,  that 
he  is  a Gainer  in  the  Exchange,  when 
he  barters  the  want  of  a Angle  Proba- 
bility, that  of  Pronunciation  ( a thing 
merely  arbitrary  and  every  where  different) 
for  a noble  Heightening  of  Affections  which 
are  fuitable  to  the  Occafion,  and  enable  him 
to  enter  into  the  Subjedl  with  double 
and  Enjoyment, 


H 


3 


1 


102  A Discourse  on  MUSIC, 

Ch.VL  §,3,  From  what  has  been  faid  It  is 
^ evident,  that  thefe  two  Arts  can  never  be 
fo  powerful  Jingly^  as  when  they  are  pro-- 
perly  united.  For  Poetry^  when  alone, 
muft  be  neceffarily  forced  to  nvqfte  many 
of  its  richeft  Ideas^  in  the  mere  railing  of 
AfFedions,  when,  to  have  been  properly 
relilhed,  it  fhould  have  found  thofe  Af- 
feftions  in  their  higheft  Energy.  And 
Mufic^  when  alone,  can  only  raife  Affec^- 
tionsy  which  foon  languifh  and  decayy  if 
not  maintained  and  fed  by  the  nutritive 
Images  of  Poetry.  Yet  muft  it  be  re^ 
membered,  in  this  Union,  that  Poetry  ever 
have  the  Precedence ; its  ^ Utility y as  well 
as  Dignityy  being  by  far  the  more  con- 
fiderable. 

§.  4,  And  thus  much,  for  the  prefent, 
as  to  jf*  Music,  Painting,  and  Poetry  ; 

the 


^ Ch.  V,  a.  p.  83, 
t P 55^ 


PAINTING  and  POETRY. 


103 

the  Circumftances,  in  which  they  agree ^ Cli.VI. 
and  in  which  they  differ  ^ and  the  Pre-  ’ 

FERENCE,  DUE  TO  ONE  OF  THEM  ABOVE 
THE  OTHER  TWO. 


rhe  END. 


114 


TREATISE  the  Third: 


CONCERNING 

HAPPINESS, 

A 

DIALOGUE. 


CONCERNING 


HAPPINESS, 

A 

DIALOGUE. 


PART  the  First. 


y.  H.  to  F.  s. 


ATURE  feems  to  treat  Man,  PartL 
as  a Painter  would  his  Difciple, 
to  whom  he  commits  the  Out- 
Llnes  of  a Figure  lightly  Iketched,  which 
the  Scholar  for  himfelf  is  to  colour  and 
cornplete.  Thus  from  Nature  we  derive 
Scnfes,  and  Paffions,  and  an  Intellect, 
which  each  of  us  for  himfelf  has  to  model 
into  a Charader,  And  hence  (the  reverfe 

of 


io8  Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

Part  1.  of  every  Species  befide)  Human  Charafters 
alone  are  infinitely  various ; as  various  in- 
deed, as  there  are  Individuals  to  form 
them.  Hence  too,  the  great  Diverfity  of 
Syftems,  and  of  Dodtrines,  refpedling  the 
Laws,  and  Rules,  and  Condudl  of  Human 
Life, 

’T I s in  the  Hiftory  of  thefe,  my  Friend, 
you  have  fo  fuccefsfully  employed  yourfelf. 
You  have  been  ftudious  to  know,  not  fo 
much  what  Greeks^  Romans^  or  Barbarians 
have  done ; as  what  they  have  reafonedy  and 
what  they  have  taught.  Not  an  Epicure 
has  more  Joy  in  the  Memory  of  a deli- 
cious Banquet,  than  I feel  in  recolledfing, 
what  we  have  difeourfed  on  thefe  Sub- 
jedts. 

And  here  you  cannot  forget  (for  we 
were  both  unanimous)  the  Contempt,  in 
which  we  held  thofe  fuperficial  Cenfurers, 
who  profefs  to  refute,  what  they  v/ant 
even  Capacities  to  comprehend.  Upon  the 
Faith  of  their  own  Boafting  (could  that  be 

credited) 


L4  Dialogue.  ’ 109 

credited)  Sentiments  are  expofed,  Opinions  Part  I. 
demoliftied,  and  the  whole  Wifdom  of’ 
Antiquity  lies  vanquifhed  at  their  Feet. 

Like  Opera  Heroes,  upon  their  own  Stage, 
they  can  with  eafe  difpatch  a Lion,  or  dif- 
comfit  a whole  Legion,  But  alafs  ! were 
they  to  encounter,  not  the  Shadow,  but 
the  Subftance,  what  think  you  would  be 
the  Event  then  ? — Little  better,  I fear,  than 
was  the  Fortune  of  poor  Priam^  when  the 
feeble  Old  Man  durft  attack  the  Youthful 
Pyrrhus, 

^ Pelum  imhelle  fine  i5iu 

Conjecit : rauco  quod  protenus  cere  repulfum^ 

Et  fummo  Clypei  nequicquam  umbone  pependit ^ 

Among  the  many  long  exploded  and 
obfolete  Syftems,  there  was  one,  you  may 
remember,  for  which  I profeffed  a great 
Efteem.  Not  in  the  leaft  degree  con- 
vinced by  all  I had  heard  againft  it,  I 

durft 


* Mneid,  1.  2.  v.  544, 


no 


Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

Part  I.  durfl  venture  to  affirm,  that  no  Syftem 
was  more  plaujible  * that  grant  but  its 
Prhiciples^  and  the  rejl  followed  of  courfe  j 
that  none  approached  nearer  to  the  Per- 
feBion  of  our  own  Religion,  as  I could 
prove,  were  there  occafion,  by  Authority 
not  to  be  coritroverted.  As  you,  I knew, 
were  the  Favourer  of  an  Hypothefis  fome- 
what  -f*  different ; fo  I attempted  to  flip- 
port  my  own,  by  reciting  you  a certain 
Dialogue.  Not  fucceeding  however  fo 
happily  in  the  Recolleffion,  as  I could 
wiffi,  I have  fince  endeavoured  to  tran- 
fcribe,  what  at  that  time  I would  have  re- 
hearfed.  The  Refult  of  my  Labour  is  the 
following  Narrative,  which  I commit  v/ith 
Confidence  to  your  Friendihip  and  Can- 
dour, 

§.  2.  *Twas  at  a time,  when  a certain 
Friend,  whom  I highly  value,  was  my 
Gueft.  We  had  been  fitting  together, 

enter- 


t Viz.  the  Platonic, 


A Dialogue. 


Ill 


entertaining  ourfelves  with  Shakefpear.  Part  I. 
Among  many  of  his  Charafters,  we  had ' 
looked  into  that  of  Woolfey,  How  foon, 
fays  my  Friend,  does  the  Cardinal  in  Dif- 
grace  abjure  that  Happinefs,  which  he  was 
lately  fo  fond  of?  Scarcely  out  of  Office, 
but  he  begins  to  exclaim 

^ Vain  Pomp  and  Glory  of  the  World!  Ihateye* 

So  true  is  it,  that  our  Sentiments  ever  vary 
with  the  Seafon  ^ and  that  in  Adverfity  we 
are  of  one  Mind,  in  Prolperity,  of  another. 

As  for  his  mean  Opinion,  faid  I,  of 
Human  Happinefs,  ’tis  a Truth,  which 
fmall  Refledtion  might  have  taught  him  long 
before.  There  feems  little  need  of  Diflrefs 
to  inform  us  of  this,  I rather  commend 
the  feeming  Wifdom  of  that  Eaflern  Mo- 
narch, who  in  the  Affluence  of  Profperity, 
when  he  was  proving  every  Pleafure,  was 
yet  fo  fenfible  of  their  Emptinefs,  their  In- 
fufficiency  to  make ' him  happy,  that  he 

pro- 


* SnAKESPEAR’jf  Hcury  the  Eighth. 


1 12  Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

Part  I.  proclaimed  a Reward  to  the  Man,  who 
fhould  invent  a new  Delight.  The  Re- 
ward indeed  was  proclaimed,  but  the  De- 
light was  not  to  be  found.  If  by 

Delight,  faid  he,  you  mean  fome  Goodi 
fomething  conducive  to  real  Happinefs it 
might  have  been  found  perhaps,  and  yet 
not  hit  the  Monarch’s  Fancy. 

Is  that,  faid  I,  poffible  ? ^Tis  poffible, 
replied  he,  tho’  it  had  been  the  Sovereign 

Good  itfelf- And  indeed  what  wonder  ? 

Is  it  probable  that  fuch  a Mortal,  as  an 
Eaftern  Monarch ; fuch  a pamper’d,  flat- 
ter’d, idle  Mortal  y Ihould  have  Attention, 
or  Capacity  to  a Subjefl:  fo  delicate?  A 
Subject,  enough  to  exercife  the  Subtleft 
and  moil  Acute  ? 

W HAT  then  is  it  you  efleem,  faid  I,  the 
Sovereign  Good  to  be  ? It  fhould  feem,  by 
your  Reprefentation,  to  be  fomething  very 
uncommon.  Aik  me  not  the  Qi^Hion, 
faid  he,  you  know  not  where  ’twill  carry 
us.  Its  general  Idea  indeed  is  eafy  and 
plains  but  the  Detail  of  Pa?'ticulars  is 

perplex’d 


A DiALOGtJEi 


pet^ple^’d  and  long— Paffions,  and  OpI-  Part  I. 

nions  for  eVer  thwart  us a Paradox 

appears  in  almoft  every  Advance.  Befides, 
did  our  Inquiries  fucceed  ever  fo  happily, 
the  very  Subject  itfelf  is  always  enough  to 
give  me  Pain.  That,  replied  I,  feeftis 
a Paradox  indeed.  ’Tis  not,  faid  he, 

from  any  Prejudice^  which  I have  con- 
ceived agaiiift  it ; fof  to  Man  I efteem  it 
the  nobleft  in  the  World.  Nor  is  it  for 
being  a Subjedt,  to  which  my  Genius  does 
not  lead,  me ; for  no  Subjcft  at  all  times 
has  more  employ’d  my  Attention.  But 
the  Truth  is,  I can  fcarce  ever  think  on  it^ 
but  an  unlucky  Story  ftill  occurs  to  my 
Mind.  “ A certain  Star-gazer,  with  his 
‘‘  Telefcope,  was  once  viewing  the  Moon ; 

and  defcribing  her  Seas,  her  Mountains, 

“ and  her  Territories.  Says  a Clown  to 
“ his  Companion,  Let  him  fpy  what  he 
“ pleafes  ^ we  are  as  near  to  the  MooUi 
“ he  and  all  his  Brethren^'  So  fares  it 
alafs  ! with  thefe,  our  moral  Speculations. 
Pradtice  too  often  creeps^  where  Theory 
can  foar.  The  Philofopher  proves  as  weak^ 

1 as 


1 14  Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

Part  L as  thofe,  whom  he  mojl  contemns.  A mortl- 
fying  Thought  to  fuch  as  well  attend  it. 

Too  mortifying,  replied  I,  to  be 
long  dwelt  on.  Give  us  rather  your  ge- 
neral Idea  of  the  Sovereign  Good.  This  is 
eafy  from  your  own  Account,  however  in- 
tricate the  Detail. 

Thus  then,  faid  he,  fince  you  are  fo 
urgent,  ’tis  thus  that  I conceive  it.  The 
Sovereign  Good  is  that,  the  Pos- 
session OF  WHICH  RENDERS  US  HaPPY. 

And  how,  faid  I,  do  we  polTefs  it  ? 
Is  it  Senfual^  or  InfelleBnal?  There 

you  are  entering,  faid  he,  upon  the  Detail, 
This  is  beyond  your  Q^ftion.  Not 

a fmall  Advance,  faid  I,  to  indulge  poor 
Curiofity  ? Will  you  raife  me  a Third:,  and 
be  fo  cruel  not  to  allay  it  ? ’Tis  not, 

replied  he,  of  my  railing,  but  your  own. 
Belides  I am  not  certain,  Ihould  I attempt 
• to  proceed,  whether  you  will  admit  fuch 
Authorities^  as  ’tis  poffible  I may  vouch. 

That,  faid  I,  muft  be  determined 
, by  their  Weight,  and  Charader.  Sup- 
.Y  pofe. 


A Dialogue.’ 


pofe,  faid  he,  it  fhould  be  Mankind;  PartL 
the  whole  Human  Race,  Would  you  not 
think  it  fomething  ftrange,  to  feek  of  thofe 
concerning  Good,  who  purfiie  it  thou-- 
fand  Ways^  and  many  of  them  contra- 
didtofy  ? I confefs,  faid  I,  it  feems  fo* 

And  yet,  continued  he,  were  there 
a Point,  in  which  fuch  Dijfentients  ever 
agreed^  this  Agreement  be  no  mean 

Argument  in  favour  of  its  Truth  and  "Jujl- 
nefs.  But  where,  replied  I,  is  this 
Agreement  to  be  found  ? 


He  anfwered  me  by  afking.  What  if 
it  fhould  appear,  that  there  were  certain 
Original  Characteristics  and  Pre- 
conceptions OF  Good,  which  were  Na- 
tural, Uniform  and  Common  to  all 
Men  ; which  all  recognized -in  their  various 
Purfuits-y  and  that  the  Difference  lay  only 
in  the  applying  them  to  Particu- 
lars ? This  requires,  faid  I,  to  be 

illuftrated.  As  if,  continued  he,  a 

Company  of  Travellers,  in  fome  wide 
Foreft,  were  all  intending  for  one  City, 
I 2 but 


1 1 6 Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

Part  L but  each  by  a Rout  peculiar  to  hiitifelf^ 
The  Roads  indeed  would  be  various^  and 
many  perhaps  falfe ; but  all  who  travelled, 
would  have  one  End  in  view.  ’Tis 

evident,  faid  I,  they  would.  So  fares 
it  then,  added  he,  with  Mankind  in  pur- 
fuit  of  Good.  The  Ways  indeed  are  Many^ 
but  what  they  feek  is  One* 


For  inllance  : Did  you  ever  hear  of 
any,  who  in  purfuit  of  their  Goody  were 
for  living  the  Life  of  a Bird,  an  Infedt,  or 
a Fifli  ? None,  And  why  not  ? 

It  would  be  inconMent,  anfwered  I, 
with  their  Nature.  You  fee  then, 

faid  he,  they  all  agree  in  this that  what 

they  purfue,  ought  to  be  conjijienty  and 
agreeable  to  their  proper  Nature.  So 

ought  it,  faid  I,  undoubtedly.  If  fo, 
continued  he,  one  Pre-conception  is  dif- 
covered,  which  is  common  to  Good  in  gene- 
ral  It  is,  that  all  Good  is  fuppofed  fome- 

thing  agreeable  to  Nature.  This  in- 

deed, replied  I,  feems  to  be  agreed  on  all 
hands. 


But 


A D I A I,  O G U E, 


117 


But  again,  fald  he, Is  there  a Man  Part  I. 

fcarcely  to  be  found  of  a Temper  fo  truly 
mortified,  as  to  acquiefce  in  the  lowejl^  and 
jhortejl  Necejfaries  of  Life  ? Who  aims  not, 
if  he  be  able,  at  fomething  farther ^ fome- 
thing  better  ? I replied.  Scarcely  one. 

Do  not  Multitudes  purfue,  faid  he, 
infinite  Objeds  of  Defire,  acknowledged, 
every  one  of  them,  to  be  in  no  relpedt 
Necejfaries  ? Exquifite  Viands,  deli- 

cious Wines,  fplendid  Apparel,  curious  Gar^ 
dens;  magnificent  Apartments  adorned  with 
Pidtures  and  Sculpture  j Mufic  and  Poetry, 
and  the  whole  Tribe  of  Elegant  Arts  ? 

’Tis  evident,  faid  I.  If  it  be, 
continued  he,  it  fliould  feem  that  they  all 
confidered  the  Chief  or  Sovereign  Goody  not 
to  be  that,  which  conduces  to  bare  Exifience 
or  mere  Being ; for  to  this  the  Necejfaries 
alone  are  adequate,  I replied  they  were. 

But  if  not  this,  it  muft  be  fomewhat 
conducive  to  thaty  which  is  fuperior  to  mere 
Being.  It  muft.  And  what,  con- 
tinued he,  can  this  be,  but  JVell-Behig? 

I 3 Well- 


1 1 8 Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

Parti.  Well-Being,  under  the  various  Shapes,  in 
which  differing  Opinions  paint  it  ? Or  can 
you  fuggeft  any  thing  elfe  ? I replied, 
I could  not.  Mark  here,  then,  con^ 
tinned  he,  another  Pre-conception^  in  which 

they  all  agree  the  Sovereign  Good  is 

fomewhat  conducive^  not  to  mere  Beings  but 
to  Well-Being,  I replied.  It  had  fo  ap- 
peared. 

Again,  continued  he.  What  Labour, 
what  Expence,  to  procure  thofe  Rarities, 
which  our  own  poor  Country  is  unable  to 
afford  us  ? How  is  the  World  ranfackjpd  to 
its  iitmoft  Verges,  and  Luxury  and  Arts 
imported  froni  every  Qmrter  ? : — — - Nay 

more  — How  do  we  baffle  Nature  herr 

felf ; invert  her  Order  3 feek  the  Vegetables 
of  Spring  in  the  Rigours  of  Winter,  and 
Winter’s  Ice,  during  the  Heats  of  Sum- 
mer ? I replied,  We  did.  And 
what  Difappointrnent,  what  Remorfe,  when 
Endeavours  fail  ? ’Tis  true.  If  this 
then  be  evident,  faid  he,  it  fflould  feem, 
that  whatever  we  delire  as  pur  Chief  and 

Sove- 


A Dialogue. 


119 


Sovereign  Good^  is  fomething  which^  as  far  Part  I, 
as  pojjible^  we  would  accommodate  to  all  Places 
and  Times,  I anfwered.  So  it  appeared. 

See  then,  faid  he,  another  of  its  Cha-- 
radlerijiics^  another  Pre-conception, 


But  farther  ftill What  Contefts  for 

Wealth  ? What  Scrambling  for  Property  ? 
What  Perils  in  the  Purfuit ; what  Sollicitude 

in  the  Maintenance  ? And  why  all  this  ? 

To  what  Purpofe^  what  End^——Oc  is  not 
the  Reafon  plain  ? Is  it  not  that  Wealth 
may  continually  procure  us,  whatever  we 
fancy  Good  5 and  make  that  perpetual^ 
which  would  otherwife'  be  tranfient  ? 

I replied.  It  feemed  fo.  Is  it  not  far- 
ther defired,  as  [applying  us  from  ourfelves*^ 
when,  without  it,  we  muft  be  beholden  to 
the  Benevolence  of  others^  and  depend  on 
their  Caprice  for  all  that  we  enjoy  ? 

"Tis  true,  faid  I,  this  feems  a Reafon.  ^ 


A G A I N~— Is  not  Power  of  every  degree 
^s  much  contefled  for,  as  Wealth  ? Are  not 
Magiftracies,  Honours,  Principalities,  arid 
I 4 Empire, 


120 


Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

Part  I.  Empire,  the  Subjefts  of  Strife,  and  ever- 
lafting  Contention  ? I replied,  They 
were.  And  why,  faid  he,  this?  To 

obtain  what  End  ? -— Is  it  not  to  help  us, 
like  Wealth,  to  the  PoJfeJJion  of  what  we 
defined  Is  it  not  farther  to  afcertain^  to 
fecure  our  Enjoyments;  that  when  others 
would  deprive  us,  we  may  be  Jirqng  enough 
to  refji  themf  J replied,  It  was. 

Or  to  invert  the  whole — -—Why  arc 
there,  who  feek  Recedes  the  moft  diftant 
and-  retired  ? fly  Courts  and  Power,  and 
fubtnit  to  Parctmony  and  Obfcurity  ? Why 
all  this,  but  from  the  fame  Intention  ? 
From  an  Opinion  that  /mail  Poffeffions, 

ufed  moderately,  are  permanent r-that 

larger  Pofleflions  raife  Envy,  and  are  more 
frequently  invaded  r-rrr-r  fhat  the  Safety  of 
Power  a?id  Dignity  is  more  precarious^  than 
that  of  Retreat  \ and  that  therefore  they 
have  chofen,  what  is  mofi  eligible  upon  the 
whole  ? It  is  not,  faid  I,  improbable^^ 
that  they  adl  by  fome  fuch  Motive. 


Do 


A Dialogue, 


I2I 


Do  you  not  fee  then,  continued  he,  two  Parti, 
or  three  more  Fre-conceptions  of  the  v.— 
reign  Goody  which  are  fought  for  by  all,  as 
Effential  to  conflitute  it  ? And  what,  , 
faid  I,  are  tbefe  ? That  it  fhould 
not  he  tranjienty  nor  derived  from  the 
Will  of  others y nor  in  their  Power  to  take 
away ; but  be  durabky  felf-derived^  and  (if 
I may  ufe  the  JExpreffion)  indeprivable^ 

I confefs,  faid  I,  it  appears  fo.  . 

But  we  have  already  found  it  to  be  con^ 
fidered,  as  fomething  agreeable  to  our  Nature ; 
conducivcy  not  to  mere  Being,  but  to  Welh 
Being ; and  what  we  aim  to  have  accommo^ 
date  to  all  Places  and  Times,  We  have. 

There  may  be  other  Charafteriftics, 
faid  he,  but  thefe  I think  fufficient.  Sec 
then  its  Idea  j behold  it,  as  colledted  from 
the  Origtnaly  Natural^  and  Univerfal  PrCf 
conceptions  of  all  Mankind,  The  Sove- 
reign Good,  they  have  taught  us,  ought 

to  be  fomething Agreeable  to  our 

Nature  3 Conducive  to  Well-Being  3 

Accom- 


122 


Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

Parti.  Accommodate  to  all  Places  and 
Times  5 Durable,  Self-derived,  and 
Indeprivable.  Your  Account,  faid  I, 
appears  juft. 

It  matters,  continued  he,  little,  how 

they  err  in  the  Application if  they  covet 

that  as  agreeable  to  Nature^  which  is  in  it- 

felf  moft  Contrary- if  they  would  have 

that  as  Durable^  which  is  in  itfelf  moft 

Tranfient that  as  Independent^  and  their 

own,  which  is  moft  precarious  and  Servile, 
’Tis  enough  for  us,  if  we  know  their 
Aim — — enough,  if  we  can  difeover,  ^what 

^tis  they  propofe the  Means  and  Method 

may  be  abfurd^  as  it  happens.  I an- 

fwered.  Their  Aim  was  fufficient  to  prove 
what  he  had  afferted, 

’Tis  true,  replied  he,  ’tis  abundantly 
fufficient.  And  yet  perhaps,  even  tho*  this 
w’ere  ever  fo  certain,  it  would  not  be  al- 
together foreign,  were  we  to  examine, 
hov/  they  aft  5 how  they  fucceed  in  ap- 
plying thefe  U?iiverfals  to  Particular  Sub- 


A Dialogue.  123 

je5ts.  Should  they  be  found  juft  in  the  Part  L 

Application,  we  need  look  no  farther 

The  true  Sovereign  Good  would  of  courfe 
be  Plain  and  Obvious and  we  fhould  have 
no  more  to  do,  than  to  follow  the  beaten 
Road.  ’Tis  granted,  replied  I.  But 
what  if  they  err"^  Time  enough  for 

that,  faid  he,  when  we  are  fatisfied  that 
they  do.  We  ought  firft  to  inform  our- 
felves,  whether  they  may  not  poffibly  be 
in  the  Right.  I fubmitted,  and  begged 
him  to  proceed  his  own  Way. 

§.  3.  Will  you  then,  faid  he,  in  this 
Difquifition  into  Human  Conduct,  allow 
me  this  — That  fuch,  as  is  the  Species 
of  Life,  which  every  one  choofes-,  fuch  Is 
his  Idea  of  Happinefs^  fuch  his  Conception 
of  the  Sovereign  Good  ? I feem,  faid  I, 
to  comprehend  You,  but  fliould  be  glad 
You  would  illuftrate.  His  Meaning, 

he  anfwered,  was  no  more  than  this 

If  a Man  prefer  a Life  of  Indujlry,  ’tis  be- 
caufe  he  has  an  Idea  of  Happinefs  in  Wealth 
if  he  prefers  a Life  of  Gaiety y ’tis  from  a 

like 


124 


Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

Parti,  like  Idea  concerning  Pleafure,  And  the 
famcy  we  fay,  holds  true  in  every  other 
Inftance.  I told  him.  It  nauft  cer-^ 

tainly. 

And  can  you  recolledl,  faid  he,  any 
Life,  but  what  is  a Life  of  Bujinefsy  or  of 
Leifure  ? I anfwered,  None.  And 
is  not  the  great  End  of  Bujtnefs  either 
Power y or  Wealth?  It  is.  Mull 
not  every  Life  therefore  of  Bujinefsy  be 
either  Political  or  Lucrative  ? It  mull. 

Again Are  not  IntelleSi  and  Senfey 

the  Soul's  leading  Powers  ? They  are. 

And  in  Leifure  are  we  not  ever 
fceking,  to  gratify  oney  or  the  other  ? 

We  are.  Mull  not  every  Lfe  there- 

fore of  Leifure  be  either  Pleafurabky  or 
Contemplative  ? If  you  confine  Pleafure, 
faid  I,  to  Senfey  I think  it  necelfarily  mull. 

If  it  be  not  fo  confinedy  faid  he,  we 
confound  all  Inquiry ^ Allow  it^ 

Mark  then,  faid  he,  the  two  grand 
Qeneray  the  Lives  of  Business  and  of 

Leisure 


A Dialogue.  125 

Leisure -mark  alfo  the  fubordinate  PartL 

Species-y  the  Political  and  Lucra-^”'^'^ 
TivE,  the  ContemplAI"!  vE  and 

Pleasurable Can  you  think  of  any 

other,  which  thefe  will  not  include  ? 

I replied,  I knew  of  none.  "Tis  pof- 
fible  indeed,  faid  he,  that  there  may  be 
other  Lives  framed,  by,  the  blending  of 
thefe,  two  or  more  of  thetn,  together. 

But  if  we  feparate  with  Accuracy,  we 
fhall  find  that  here  they  all  terminate* 

I replied,  fo  it  feemed  probable. 

If  then,  continued  he,  we  would  be 
cxadt  in  our  Inquiry,  we  muft  examine 
thefe  four  LiveSy  and  mark  their  Confe-^ 
quentes.  ’Tis  thus  only  we  fhall  learn, 
how  far  thofe,  who  embrace  them,  find 
that  Good  and  Happinefsy  which  we  know 
they  all  purfue,  I made  anfwer.  It 

feemed  neceffary,  and  I fliould  willingly 
attend  him. 

§.4.  To  begin  then,  faid  he,  with  the 
Political  Life.  Let  us  fee  the  Good, 

ufually 


126  Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

Parti,  ufually  fought  after  here.  To  a private 
Man^  it  is  the  Favour  of  fome  Prince,  or 
Commonwealth  i the  Honours  and  Emo- 
luments derived  from  this  Favour ; the 
Court  and  Homage  of  Mankind  * the 
Power  of  commanding  others— —-To  a 
Prince,  it  is  the  fame  Things  nearly,  only 
greater  in  Degree  5 a larger  Command  ^ a 
flridler  and  more  fervile  Homage ; Glory, 

Conqueft,  and  extended  Empire Am  I 

right  in  my  Defcription  ? I replied, 
I thought  he  was.  Whether  then,  faid 
he,  all  this  deferve  the  Name  of  Good  or 
not,  I do  not  controvert.  Be  it  one,  or 
the  other,  it  affeds  not  our  Inquiry.  All 

that  I would  aik  concerning  it,  is  this 

Do  you  not  think  it  a Good  (if  it  really 
be  one)  derived  from  Foreign  and  External 
Caufes  ? Undoubtedly,  replied  I. 

It  cannot  come  then  from  ourfelves,  or  be 
felf-derived.  It  cannot.  And  what 
lhall  we  fay  as  to  its  Duration  and  Stabi- 
lity ? Is  it  fo  firm  and  lafiing^  that  we  can- 
not be  deprived  of  it  ? I fhould  imagine, 
faid  I,  quite  otherwife.  You  infift  not 

then, 


A Dialogue.  127 

then,  faid  he,  on  my  appealing  to  Hijlory.  Part  I. 
You  acknowledge  the  Fate  of  Favourites, 
of  Empires,  and  their  Owners.  I re- 
plied, I did. 

If  fo,  faid  he,  it  fliould  feem  that  this 
Political  Goody  which  they  feek,  correfponds 
not  to  the  PrC’-conceptions  of  being  Durable^ 
and  Indeprivable,  Far  from  it.  But 
it  appeared  juft  before,  not  to  be  felf- 
derived.  It  did.  You  fee  then, 
faid  he,  that  in  three  of  our  Pre-conceptions 
it  intirely  fails.  So  indeed,  faid  I,  it 
appears. 

But  farther,  faid  he We  are  told  of 

this  Goody  that  in  the  Poffejfon  it  is  attended 
with  Anxiety^  and  that  when  lofy  it  is 
ufually  lofi  with  Ignominy  and  Idifgrace  ^ 
nay,  often  with  Profecutions  and  the  bit- 
tereft  Refentments;  with  Mulcts,  with 
Exile,  and  Death  itfelf.  ’Tis  frequently, 
faid  I,  the  Cafe.  How  then,  faid  he, 
can  it  anfwer  that  other  Pre-cojiceptioriy  of 
contributing  to  our  Well-Being  ? Can  that 

contribute 


1 28  Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

Part  I.  contribute  to  Well  - Beings  whofe  Confe^ 
quences  lead  to  Calamity^  and  whofe  Pre-- 
fence  implies  Anxiety  ? This,  it  muft  be 
confeffed,  faid  I,  appears  not  probable. 

But  once  more,  faid  he There 

are  certain  Habits  or  Difpojitions  of  Mmdy 
called  Sincerity,  Generofity,  Candour, 
Plain-dealingj  Juftice,  Honour,  Honeily, 
and  the  like.  There  are.  And  it  has 
been  generally  believed,  that  thefe  are 
agreeable  to  Nature,  Affiiredly. 

But  it  has  been  as  generally  believed,  that 
the  Political  Good^  we  fpeak  of,  is  often  not 
to  be  acquired  but  by  HabitSy  contrary  to 
thefe  y and  which,  if  thefe  are  Naturaly 
muft  of  neceffity  be  unnatural.  What 
Habits,  faid  I,  do  you  mean  ? Flattery, 
anfwered  he,  Diffimulation,  Intrigue:  upon 
occafion,  perhaps  Iniquity,  Falfhood,  and 
Fraud.  ’Tis  poffible  indeed,  faid  I, 
that  thefe  may  fometimes  be  thought  necef- 
fary.  How  then,  faid  he,  can  that 

Good  be  agreeable  to  Nature y which  cannot 
be  acqiiiredy  but  by  Habits  contrary  to 

Nature  ? 


A Dialogue. 


129 


JSIature?  Your  Argument,  faid  I,  Parti, 

feems  juft, 

If  then,  faid  he,  we  have  reafoned 
rightly,  and  our  Concluftons  may  be  de- 
pended on  -y  it  fhould  feem  that  the  sup- 
posed Good,  which  the  Political  Life 
purfueSy  correfponds  nofy  in  any  Injiancey  to 
cur  Pre-conceptions  of  the  Sovereign  Good. 

I anfwered.  So  it  appeared. 

§.  5.  Let  us  quit  then,  faid  he,  theP^?//- 
tical Lifey  and  pafs  to  the  Lucrative,  The 
Obje<ft  of  this  is  Wealth.  Admit  it. 

And  is  it  not  too  often,  faid  he,  the 
Cafe,  that  to  acquire  thisy  we  are  tempted 
to  employ  fome  of  thofe  HabitSy  which  we 
, have  juft  condemned  as  Such, 

I mean,  as  Fraud,  Falfliood,  Injuftice,  and 
the  like  ? It  muft  be  owned,  faid  I, 
too  often. 

Besides,  continued  he What  fhall 

I we  fay  to  the  Efeeniy  the  Fi'iendfipy  and 
{ Love  of  Mankind?  Are  they  worth  having? 


( 

i 


130  Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

Parti.  Is  it  agreeable^  think  you,  to  Nature^  to 
endeavour  to  deferve  them  ? Agreeable, 
faid  I,  to  Nature,  beyond  difpute.  If 
fo,  then  to  merit  Hatred  and  Contempty 
faid  he,  muft  needs  be  contrary  to  Nature. 

Undoubtedly.  And  is  there  any 
thing  which  fo  certainly  merits  Hatred  and 
Contempty  as  a mere  Lucrative  Lifcy  Ipent 
in  the  uniform  Purliiit  of  Wealth? 

I replied,  I believed  there  was  nothing* 
If  fo,  faid  he,  then  as  to  correjpond'^ 
ing  with  our  Pre-conceptions y the  Lucrative 
Goody  in  this  refped,  fares  no  better  than 
the  Political  It  appears  not* 

And  what  diall  we  fay  as  to  Anxiety? 
Is  not  both  the  Pojfejjion  and  Purfuit  of 
Wealth,  to  thofe  who  really  love  it,  ever 
anxious?  It  feems  fo.  And  why 
anxiouSy  but  from  a Certainty  of  its  Injla- 
bility  \ from  an  Experience,  how  obnoxious 
it  is  to  every  crofs  Event ; how  eafy  to  be 
loft  and  transfer^d  to  others,  by  the  fame 
Fraud  and  Rapine,  which  acquired  it  to 
Qurfelves  ? — —This  Is  indeed  the  triteft  of 

all 


A Dialogue;  131 

ail  Topics.  The  Poets  and  Orators  have  Part  I.’ 
long  ago  exhaufted  it.  ^Tis  true,  faid  I, 
they  have*  May  we  not  venture  then, 
faid  he,  upon  the  whole,  to  pafs  the  fame 
Sentence  on  the  Lucrative  Life,  as  We 

have  already  on  the  Political that  it 

pro^ofes  not  A Good,  correfpondent  to  thofe 
Pre-conceptionSy  by  which  we  would  all  be 
governed  in  the  Good,  which  we  are 
allfeeking?  I anfwered,  We  might 
juftly. 

§.6.  If  then  neither  the  Lucrative 
Life^  nor  the  Political^  faid  he,  procure 
that  Good  which  we  delire  : lhall  we  feek 
it  from  the  Pleasurable?  Shall  we 
make  Pleasure  our  Goddefs? 

, — i — Pleafure^ 

WhofJi  Love  attends^  and  foft  Dejire^  and 
Words 

Alluringy  apt  the  JleadieJi  Heart  to  bend. 

So  fays  the  Poet,  and  plaufible  his  Doc-’ 
rine.  Plaufible,  faid  I,  indeed. 

" K 2 Let 


cn 


2 Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

Parti.  Let  It  then,  continued  he,  be  a plea^ 
furable  World ; a Race  of  harmlefs^  loving 
Animals  % an  Elyfian  Temperature  of  Sun- 
fhlne  and  Shade.  Let  the  Earthy  in  every 
garter ^ ref^ble  our  own  dear  Country  j 
where  never  was  a Froft,  never  a Fog, 
* never  a Day,  but  was  delicious  and  ferene. 

I was  a little  embarralTed  at  this  un- 
expedled . Flight,  'till  recolledling  myfelf, 
I told  him,  (but  ftill  with  fome  Surprize) 
that,  in  no  degree  to  difparage  either  my 
Country  or  my  Countrymen,  I had  never 
found  Either  fo  exquilite,  as  he  now 
fuppofed  them.  There  are  then  it 

feems,  faid  he,  in  the  Natural  Worlds 
and  even  in  cur  own  beloved  Country, 
fuch  things  as  Storms^  and  Tempers  5 as 
pinching  Colds^  and  fcorching  Heats. 

I replied.  There  were.  And  confe* 

quent  to  thefe^  Difeafe^  and  Famine ^ and 
infinite  Calamities.  There  are. 

And  in  the  Civil  or  Human  World,  we 
have  Difcord  and  Contention  3 or  (as  the 

Poet 


^DiALOGtJE. 


133 

Part  I. 


Poet  better  * dcfcribes  it) 

Cruel  RevengCy  and  rancorous  De/pitCy 
Dijloyal  Treafony  and  heart-burning  Hate. 

We  have.  Alafs  ! then,  poor 

Pleafure  ! Where  is  that  Good,  accommo- 
date to  every  Thne ; fuited  to  every  Place  5 
felf-derivedy  not  dependent  on  Foreign  Ex- 
ternal Caufesf  Can  it  be  Pleasure,  on 
fuch  a changeabky  fuch  a turbulent  Spoty  as 
this  ? I replied,  I thought  not. 

And  what  indeed,  were  the  Worlds 
faid  he,  modelled  to  a Temperature  the  moji 
exadl?  Were  the  Rigours  of  the  Seafons 
never  more  to  be  knov/n  j nor  Wars,  De- 
vaftations.  Famines  or  Difeafes  ? Admit- 
ting all  this,  (which  we  know  to  be  im- 
pojjible)  can  we  find  ftill  in  Pleafure  that 
lengthened  Durationy  which  we  confider  as 
an  EJfentialy  tp  conftitute  the  Sovereign 

Good  ? Afk  the  Glutton,  the  Drinker, 

K 3 the 


* Spencer’s  Fairy  ^igmy  B.  2.  Cant.  7.  Stanz.  22. 


134  Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

Part  1.  the  Man  of  Gaiety  and  Intrigue,  whether 
‘"*'*'‘'***^  they  know  any  Enjoymeitt^  not  to  be  can- 
celled by  Satiety  ? Which  does  not  haftily 
pafs  away  into  the  tedious  Intervals  of  In- 
difference ? Or  yielding  all  this  too, 

(which  we  know  cannot  be  yielded)  where 
are  we  to  find  our  Goody  how  poffefs  it  in 
Age  ? In  that  Eve  of  Life,  declining  Age, 
when  the  Power  of  Senfey  on  which  all  de- 
fendsy  like  the  fetting  Sun,  h gradually  for- 
faking  us  ? 

I SHOULD  imagine,  faid  I,  that  Pleafure 
was  no  mean  Adverfary,  lince  you  em- 
ploy, in  attacking  her,  lb  much  of  your 
Rhetoric,  Without  heeding  what  I faid, 
he  purfued  his  Subject  — — Belide,  if  this 
be  our  Goody  onv  Happinefsy  and  our  End^ 
to  what  purpofe  PowerSy  which  bear  no 

Relation  to  it  ? Why  Memory  ? Why 

Reafon  ? Mere  Senfation  might  have  been 
a«  esquiftCy,  had  we  been  Flies  or  Earth- 
worms— —Ox  can  it  be  proved  otherwife  ?. 

I replied,  I could  not  lay.  No  Ani- 

maly  continued  he,  pffffes  its  Facidties  in 


'vatn. 


A D I A L b G TJ  X.35 

vain.  And  ihall  Man  derive  no> Good  Parti, 
from  his  hefty  his  moft  eminent'^  From 
That,  which  of  all  is  peculiar  to  himfelf  ? 

For  as  to  Growth  and  Nutritiony  they  arc 
not  wanting  to  the  meaneft  Vegetable ; and 
for  Senfes,  there  are  Animalsy  which  per- 
haps exceed  us  in  them  alU 

§.7,  This  feems,  laid  I,  no  mean  Ar- 
gument in  favour  of  Contemplation. 

The  Contemplative  Life  gives  Reafon 
all  the  Scope,  which  it  can  defire.  And 
of  all  Lives,  anfwered  he,  would  it  furely 
be  the  beft,  did  we  dwell,  like  Milton^ 

Uriely  in  the  &un's  bright  Circle,  Then 
might  we  plan  indeed  the  moft  Romantic 
Kind  of  Happinefs,  Stretch’d  at  Bale, 
without  Trouble  or  Moleftation,  we  might 
pafs  our  Days,  contemplating  the  Uni- 
verfe ; tracing  its  Beauty ; loft  in  Wonder ; 
ravilhed  with  Ecftacy,  and  1 know  not 

what But  here  alafs ! on  this  fublunarVy 

this  turbulent  Spot,  (as  we  called  it  not 
long  fince)  how  little  is  this,  or  any  thing 

like  it,  pradlicahk  f Fogs  arife,  which 

' K 4 dim 


136  Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

Part  I.  dim  our  Profpedls — the  Cares  of  Life  per- 

petually  moleft  us Is  Contemplation  fuited 

to  a Placcy  like  this  ? It  mull  be  owned, 
faid  I,  not  extremely.  How  then  is  it 
the  Sovereign  Goody  which  Ihould  be  Ac- 
commodate to  every  Place  ? I replied. 
It  feemed  not  probable. 

But  farther,  faid  he Can  we  enjoy 

the  Sovereign  Goody  and  be  at  the  fame 
time  vexedy  and  agitated  by  Pajjion  ? Does 
not  this  feem  a Paradox  ? I anfwered. 
It  did.  Suppofe  then  an  Event  were  to 
happen — not  an  Inundationy  ov  Maffacre — 
but  an  Acquaintance  only  drop  a difrefpedl- 
ful  Word-y  a Servant  chance  to  break  a 
favourite  Piece  of  Furniture — What  would 

inftru(5l  us  to  endure  this  ? Contempla- 

tiony  Theory,  Abllraftions  ? Why  not, 
faid  I ? No,  replied  he  with  Warmth, 
(quoting  the  Poet)  not 

« ^ho*  all  the  Stars 

Thou  knewf  by  Name  5 and  all  the  Etherial 
Powers,  For 


* Par,  Lojiy  B,  12.  v.  576. 


I. 

!j 

A Dialogue.  ^ 137 

For  does  not  Experience  teach  us,  abun-  Part  i, 
dandy  teach  us,  that  our  deepeft  Philofo- 
phers,  as  to  Temper  and  Behaviour y are  as 
very  Children  for  the  moft  part,  as  the 
meaneft  and  moft  illiterate  ? A little  more 
Arrogance  perhaps,  from  Prefumption  of 
what  they  know,  but  not  a grain  more  of 
Magnanmityy  of  Candour  and  calm  Indu-- 
ranee. 

You  are  fomewhat  too  fevere,  faid  I, 
in  cenlliring  of  all.  There  are  better  and 
worfe  among  Them,  as  among  Others. 

The  Difference  is  no  way  propor- 
tionedy  faid  he,  to  the  ^antity  of  their 
Knowledge  5 fo  that  whatever  be  its  Caufe,  . 
it  can’t  be  imputed  to  their  Speculations. — 
Befides,  can  you  really  imagine,  we  came 
here  only  to  Think  ? Is  A5iing  a Circum- 
ftance,  which  is  foreign  to  Our  CharaBer  ? 

Why  then  fo  many  Social  AffeBionSy 

which  all  of  us  feel,  even  in  fpite  of  our- 
felves  ? Are  we  to  fupprefs  them  All,  as 
ufelefs  and  unnatural?  The  Attempt, 
replied  I,  muft  needs  be  found  impracti- 
cable. 


J38  Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

Part  I.  cable.  Were  they  once  fupprejjedy  faid 
he,  the  Confequences  would  be  fomewhat 
ftrange.  We  fhould  hear  no  more  of  Fa^ 
ther.  Brother,  Hutband,  Son,  Citizen,  Ma- 
glftrate,  and  Society  itfelf.  And  were  this 
ever  the  Cafe,  ill  (I  fear)  would  it  fare 
with  even  Contemplation  itfelf.  It  would 
certainly  be  but  bad  Speculating^  among 
iawlefs  Barbarians Unaffociated  Ani- 
mals  where  Strength  alone  of  Body  was 

' to  conftitute  Dominion^  and  the  Conteft 
canre  to  be  (as  ^ Horace  defcribes  it) 

-rr-r-  glandem  atque  cubilia  propter , 
Ufiguibus  & pugnis^  dein  fujiibus 

" Bad  enough^  replied  I,  of  all  con-» 

fclence. 

It  fhould  feem  then,  faid  he,  that  not 
even  the  best  Contemplative  Life, 
however  noble  its  ObjeBy  was  agreeable 
to  our  present  Nature,  or  conjijlenf 

with 


* Sat.  3.  1.  I.  V.  99j 


A Dialogue. 


J39 


with  our  prefenf  Situation.  I confefs.  Part 
faid  you  appear  to  have  proved  fo. 

But  if  this  be  allowed  true  of  the 
the  moft  Excellent  5 what  fhall  we  fay  to 
the  Mockery  of  Monkery  i the  Farce  of 
priars^  the  ridiculous  Mumraery  of  being 
fequeftred  in  a Cloyfler  ? Tjii§  furely  is  top 
low  a Thing;  even  to  merit  an  Examina- 
tion. I have  no  Scruples  here,  faid  I, 
you  need  not  wafte  your  Time. 


§.8.  If  that,  faid  he,  be  your  Opinion, 
let  us  look  a little  backward.  For  pur 
Memory's  fake  it  may  be  proper  to  reca- 
pitulate. I replied,  'Twould  be  highly 

acceptable.  Thus  then,  faid  he 

We  have  examined  the  four  grand  Lives^ 
which  we  fipd  the  Generality  of  Men  em- 
brace j the  Lucrative^  and  the  Political-^ 
the  Pleafurabky  and  the  Contemplative. 

And  we  have  aimed  at  proving  that 

to  fuch  a Being  as  Man,  with  fuch  a Body^ 
fuch  Affeldions^  fuch  Senfes,  and  fuch  an  In- 

telleB r- placed  in  fuch  a World,  fubje5l 

fo  fuch  IncidenU — not  one  of  tbefe  Lives  is 

pro- 


140  ' Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

Part  produBive  of  that  Good,  which  we  find  all 
Men  to  recognize  thro'  the  fame  uniform 
Pre-conceptions  ; a7td  which  thro'  one  or 
other  of  thefe  Lives  they  all  of  them  purfue, 

§.  9.  You  have  juflly,  faid  I,  collefted 
the  Sum  of  your  Inquiries.  And 

happy,  faid  he,  fliould  I think  it,  were 
they  to  terminate  here.  I afked  him. 

Why  ? Becaufe,  replied  he,  to  in- 

finuate  firft,  that  all  Mankind  are  in  the 
wrong;  and  then  to  attempt  afterwards, 
to  fhew  one's  felf  only  to  be  right ; is  a 
Degree  of  Arrogance,  which  I would  not 
willingly  be  guilty  of.  I ventured  here 
to  lay.  That  I thought  he  need  not  be  fo 

diffident that  a Subjed,  where  one's 

own  Interefi  appeared  concerned  fo  nearly^ 
would  well  juftify  every  Scruple^  and  even 
the  fevered:  Inquiry,  There,  faid  he, 

you  fay  fomething there  you  encourage 

me  indeed.  For  what?— — Are  we  not 
cautioned  againft  Comiterfeits^  even  in  Mat- 
ters of  meaneft  Value  ? If  a Piece  of  Metal 
be  tender’d  us,  which  feems  doubtful,  do 


we 


A Dialogue*  .141 

We  not  hefitate  ? Do  we  not  try  it  the  Part  I. 
TCeJly  before  we  take  it  for  Current"? — And 
is  not  this  deem'd  Prudence?  Are  we  not 

cenfured,  if  we  a6l  otherwife  ? How 

much  more  then  does  it  behove  us  not  to 
be  impofed  on  here?  To  be  diffident  and 
fcrupuloufly  exafl:,  where  Impojiure^  if  once 
admitted,  may  tempt  us  to  a far  worfe  Bar- 
gain, than  ever  Glaucus  made  WithDio?ned ? 

What  Bargain,  faid  I,  do  you  mean  ? 

The  Exchange,  replied  he,  not  of 
Gold  for  Brafsy  but  of  Good  for  Evil^  and 

of  Happinefs  for  Mifery But  enough  of 

this,  lince  you  have  encouraged  me  to 
proceed— We  are  feeking  that  Goody  which 
we  think  others  have  not  found.  Permit 
me  thus  to  purfue  my  Subjed:,  « 

§.  10.  Every  Being  on  this  our  Ter^ 
rejirial  Dwellings  exifts  encompajled  with 
infinite  ObjeBs  5 exifts  among  Animals  tamCy 
and  Animals  wild-,  among  Plants  and  Ve- 
getables of  a thoufand  difierent  Q^lities; 
among  Heats  and  Colds,  Tempefls  and 
Calms,  the  Friendffiips  and  Dilcords  of 

betei'o- 


. r42 


Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

Part  I.  heterogeneous  Elements  - — What  fay  you  ? 
Are  all  thefe  Things  exadtly  the  fame  to  \i ; 
or  do  they  differ^  think  you,  in  their  Ef^ 
fe5ts  and  Confequences?  They  differ, 

faid  I,  widely*  Some  perhaps  then, 

faid  he,  are  Apt^  Congruous^  and  Agreeable 
to  its  Natural  State.  I replied,  They 

were.  Others  are  In-apty  Incongruous^ 
and  Difagreeable.  They  are. 

And  others  again  are  Indifferent*  They 
are^ 

It  fhould  feem  then,  faid  he,  if  this  be 
allowed,  that  to  every  individual  Beings 
without  the  leafi  Exception^  the  whole  Mafs 
of  "Tbrngs  Externaly  from  the  greatejl  to  the 
7nearLefy  food  in  the  Relations  of  either 
Agreeable^  Difagreeahky  or  Indifferent. 

I replied.  So  it  appeared. 

But  tho’  this,  continued  he,  be  true 
in  the  general^  ’tis  yet  as  certain  when  we 
defcend  to  Particulars,  that  what  is  Agrees 
Me  to  one  Species  is  Difagreeable  to  another ; 
and  not  only  fo,  but  perhaps  Indifferent  to 


A Dialogue.  143 

.a  third.  Inftances  of  thk  kind,  he  faid.  Part  L 
were  too  obvious  to  be  mentioned. 

I REPLIED,  ’Twas  evident.  Whence 
theri^  faid  he,  this  'Oiverfity  ? — . It  cannot 
arife  from  the  Externals  for  Water  is 
equally  Water ^ whether  to  a Man^  or  to  a 
Fift)-^  whether,  operating  on  the  one,  it 
fuffocatey  or  on  the  other > it  give  Life  and 
Vigour-.  I replied.  It  was.  So  is 
Fire,  faid  he,  the  fame  Fire,  however 
Various  in  its  Coniequcnces  5 whether  it 
harden  or  fofteHy  give  Fleafure  or  Pain* 

I replied.  It  was.  But  if  this  Z)/-* 

Verfityy  continued  he,  be  not  derived  from 
the  Externals^  whence  can  it  be  elfe  ? 

Or  can  it  poffibly  be  derived  otherwife  thaa 
from  the  peculiar  Confitutiony  from  the 
Natural  State  of  every  Species  itfelf  ? 

I replied,  It  appeared  probable. 

Thus  then,  faid  he,  is  it  that  Every 
particular  Species  /r,  itfelf  to  itfelfy  the 
Meafure  of  all  Things  in  the  Univerfe — that 
as  Things  vary  in  their  Relatwis  to  /V,  they 

• vary 


144  Concerning  HAPPINESS,  'i 

Part  L vary  too  in  their  Value and  that  if  theiri^ 

Value  be  ever  doubtful^  it  can  no  way  he  ad-- 
jujiedy  but  by  recurring  with  Accuracy 
the  Natural  State  of  the  Species ^ and  tO  ' 
thofe  feveral  Relations^  which  fuch  a State, 
of  courfe  creates.  I anfwered,  He  ar- 
gued juftly. 


§.  II  . To  proceed  then,  faid  he — Tho*  i 
it  be  true,  that  every  Species  has  a Natural . 
State y as  we  have  afferted  ; it  is  not  true, 
that  every  Species  has  a Senfe  or  Feeling  of 
it.  This  Feeling  or  Senfe  is  a Natural , 
Eminence  or  Prerogativey  denied  the  Vege-  ' 
table  and  Inanimatey  and  imparted  only  to  , 
the  Animal  I anfwered.  It  was. 


And  think  you,  continued  he,  that  as 
many  as  have  this  Senfe  or  Feelmg  of  a 
Natural  State,  are  alie7tated  from  it,  or  in-  | 
different  to  it  ? Or  is  it  not  more  probable,  'i 
that  they  are  welUaffeBed  to  it  ? 
Experience,  faid  I,  teaches  us,  how  well 
they  are  all  alFedled.  You  are  right, 

replied  he.  For  what  would  be  more 

abfurd. 


A Dialogue. 


HS 


abfiird,  than  to  be  indifferent  to  their  own  Part  L 
Welfare ; or  to  be  alienated  from  It,  as  tho’ 

’twas  Foreign  and  Unnatural?  I replied. 
Nothing  could  be  more.  But,  con- 
tinued hej  if  they  are  njoell-affedled  to  this 
their  proper  Natural  States  it  fhould  feem 
too  they  muft  be  welUaffeBed  to  all  thofe 
Externals i which  appear  apty  congruous y and 
agreeable  to  it.  I anfwered.  They 

muft.  And  if  fo^  then  ill-affeBed  or 

averfe  to  fiich,  as  appear  the  contrary. 

They  muft.  And  to  fuch  as  appear 

indifferent^  indifferent.  They  muft. 

But  if  this,  faid  he^  be  allowed,  it 
will  follow,  that  in  confequencc  of  thefe 
AppearanceSy  they  will  think  fome  Exter-- 
nals  worthy  of  Purfuit\  fome  worthy  of 
Avoidance -y  and  fome  worthy  of  neither^ 

’Twas  probable,  faid  I,  they  ftiould. 


Hence  then,  faid  he,  another  Divif on 
of  Things  external ; that  is,  into  Purfuabky 
Avoidabky  and  Indifferent — a Divifion  only 
belonging  to  Beings  Senftive  and  Ani?natey 
becaufe  all,  below  thefe y can  avoid 

L nor 


Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

I.  nof  purftie,  I replied.  They  could 

^not. 

iFy  then,  faid  he,  Man  be  allowed  in 
the  Number  of  thefe  SenfJive  Beings,  this 

Divifion  will  affedt  Man or  to  explain 

more  fully,  the  whole  Mafs  of  things  exter- 
nal will^  according  to  this  Divifion^  exijl 
to  the  Human  Species  in  the  Relations  of  Pur- 
fuable^  Avoidable^  and  Indifferent,  I re- 
plied, They  would. 

Should  we  therefore  delire,  faid  he, 
to  know  what  thefe  things  truly  are,  we 
muft  firft  be  informed,  what  is  Man's 
truly  Natural  Constitution.  For 
thus,  you  may  remember,  'twas  fettled  not 
long  lince  — that  every  Species  was  its  own 
Standard,  and  that  when  the  Value  of 
Phings  was  doubtfid,  the  Species  was  to  be 
f udied^y  the  Relations  to  be  deduced,  which 
were  confequent  to  it  5 and  tn  this  manner 
the  Value  of  Phings  to  be  adjufed  and  afcer- 
tained,  I replied.  We  had  fo  agreed 
it.  I fear  then,  faid  he,  we  are  en- 

gaged 


A Dialogue/ 


H7 


gaged  in  a more  arduous  Undertaking,  a Part  I. 
Talk  of  more  Difficulty,  than  we  were  at 

firft  aware  of But  For  tuna  Fortes  — we 

muft  endeavour  to  acquit  ourfelves  as  well 
as  we  are  able. 


§.  12.  That  Man  therefore  has  a 
! Body^  of  a Figure  and  internal  Structure 
peculiar  to  itfelf ; capable  of  certain  De- 
grees of  Strength,  Agility,  Beauty,  and  the 
like;  this  I believe  is  evident,  andffiardly 
wants  a Proof.  I anfwered,  I was 

willing  to  own  it.  That  he  is  capable 
too  of  Pleafure  and  Pain ; is  poffefs’d  of 
Senfes^  Affedlions^  Appetites^  and  Averjions-y 
this  alfo  feems  evident,  and  can  fcarcely  be 
denied.  - I replied,  ’Twas  admitted. 

We  may  venture  then  to  range  Him 
in  the  Tribe  of  Animal  Beings. 

I replied.  We  might. 

And  think  you,  faid  he,  without  Society, 
you  or  any  Man  could  have  been  bo?'n? 

Moft  certainly  not.  Without 

Society,  when  born,  could  you  have  been 
L 2 brought 


148  Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

Part  I.  brought  to  Maturity  ? Moft  certainly 
‘"*'^'*^***^  not.  Had  your  Parents  then  had  no* 

Social  Affeblions  towards  you  in  that  feri-^ 
lorn  State,  that  tedious  Infancy,  (fo  much 
longer  than  the  longejl  of  other  Animals) 
you  muft  have  inevitably  perifhed  thro' 
Want  and  Inability.  I muft.  You 
perceive  then  that  to  Society  you,  and 
every  Man  are  indebted,  not  only  for  the 
Beginning  of  Beingy  but  for  the  Continue- 
ance,  * We  are.^ 

Sut^POSE  then  we  pafs  from^  this  Birth 
and  Infancy  of  Man,  to  his  Maturity  and 
Perfedlion’^^—  Is  there  any  AgCy  think  you, 
fo  felffufficientj  as  that  in  it  he  feels  no 
Wants?  What  Wants,  anfwered  I, 

do  you  mean  ? In  the  firft  and'  prin- 

cipal place,  faid  he,  that  of  Food-y  then 
perhaps  that  of  Raiment  % and  after  this, 
a Dwellmg,  or  Defence  againft  the  Wea- 
ther, Thefe  Wants,  replied  I,  are 

furely  Natural  at  all  Ages.  And  is  it 

not  agreeable  to  Naturey  faid  he,  that  they 
Ihould  at  all  Ages  be  fupplied?  AP 

furedly. 


A Dialogue.  149 

furedly.  And  is  it  not  more  agreeable  Part  I. 
to  have  them  well  fupplied,  than  ///?  ^ 

It  is.  And  mpjl  agreeable,  to  have 

them  bejl  fiipplied  ? _ . Certainly. 

If  there  be  then  any  one  State,  better  than 
all  others^  for  the  fupplying  thefe  Wants ; ^ 
this  State^  of  all  others^  muft  needs  be  moji 
JSfatural^  It  muft,. 

And  what  Supply^  faid  he,  of  thefe 
Wants,  ftiall  we  efteem  the  meanefi^  which, 
we  can  conceive  ? — Would  it  not  be  feme- 
thing  like  this  ? Had  we  nothing  beyond 
Acorns  for  Food ; beyond  a rude  Skin,  for 
Raiment  ^ or  beyond  a Cavern,  or  hollow; 

Tree,  to  provide  us  with  a Dwelling  ? 

Indeed,  faid  I,  this  would  be  bad  enough* 

And  do  you  not  imagine,  as  far  as 
this^  we  might  each  fupply  ourfehes^  tho’ 
we  lived  in  Woods,  mere  folitary  Savages? 

I replied,  I thought  we  might. 

Suppose  then,  continued  he,  that  our 
Supplies  were  to  be  7nended---r-ios:  inftance, 
that  we  were  to  exchange  Acorns  for 
L 3 Bread—. 


j^o  Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

Parti.  Bread — Would  our  Savage  Charafter  be 
llifEcient  here  ? Muft  we  not  be  a little 
better  difeiplined  ? Would  not  fome  Art 
be  requifite  ? The  Baker's^  for  example. 

It  would.  And  previoufly  to 

the  Baker’s,  that  of  the  Miller  ? It 

would.  And  previoujly  to  the  Miller’s, 
that  df  the  Hujbandman?  It  would. 

Three  Arts  then  appear  necejfary^ 
even  upon  the  lowejl  Eftimation.  ’Tis 
admitted. 

But  a Queftion  farther,  faidhe— Gan 
the  Hufbandman  work,  think  you,  with-5 
out  his  Tools?  Mufl  he  not  have  his 
Plough,  his  Harrow,  his  Reap-hook,  and 
the  like  ? He  muft.  And  muft  not 
thofe  other  Artifts  too  be  furniflied  in  the 
fame  manner  ? They  muft.  And 
whence  muft  they  be  furniftied  ? From 
their  own  Arts  ? — Or  are  not  the  making 
Tools,  and  the  ufing  them,  two  different 
Occupations  ? I believe,  faid  I,  they 
are.  You  maybe  convinced,  continued 
he,  by  fmall  Recolledlion.  Does  Agricul- 
ture 


^Dialogue.  151 

iiire  make  its  own  Plough,  its  own  Harrow  ? Part  I. 
Or  does  it  not  apply  to  other  Arts^  for  all 
Neceffaries  of  this  kind  ? It  does. 

Again Does  the  Baker  build  his  own 

Oven  y or  the  Miller  frame  his  own  Mill  ? 

It  appears,  faid  I^  no  part  of  their 
Bulinefs, 

Wh  AT  a Tribe  of  Mechanics  then,  faid 
he,  are  advancing  upon  us  ? — ^-Smiths,  Car- 
penters, Mafons,  Millwrights  — - — and  all 
thefe  to  provide  the  Jingle  Necejjary  of 
Bread,  Not  lefs  than  feven  or  eight  Arts, 
we  find,  are  wanting  at  the  feweji.  It 
appears  fo.  And  what  if  to  the  pro- 
viding a.  comfortable  Cottage^  and  Raiment 
fuitable  to  an  indufirious  Hindy  we  allow  a 
dozen  Arts  more  ? It  would  be  eafy,  by 
the  fame  Reafoning,  to  prove  the  Number 
double.  I admit  the  Number,  faid  I, 
mentioned. 

If  fo,  continued  he.  It  fliould  feem,  that 
towards  a tolerable  Supply  of  the  three  Pri- 
mary and  Common  NeceJjarieSy  Foody  Raiment ^ 

L 4 and 


152  CoKc:rmng  HAPPINESS, 

Part  I.  and  a Dwellings  not  lefs  than  twenty  Arts 
were^  on  the  loweji  Account^  requijite. 

It  appears  fo. 

And  Is  one  Man  equal,  think  you,  to 
the  Exercife  of  thefe  twenty  Arts  ? If  he 
had  even  Genius^  'which  wc  can  fcarce  Ima- 
gine, is  it  poffible  he  Ihould  fin4  Leifure  ? 

I replied,  I thought  not.  If  fo, 
then  a folitary^  unfocial  State  can  never  fupply 
tolerably  the  common  Necefaries  of  Life, 

It  cannot. 


But  what  if  we  pafs  from  the  Neceffor. 
Ties  of  Life,  to  the  Elegancies  ? To  Mulic, 

Sculpture,  Painting  and  Poetry  ? What 

if  we  pafs  from  all  Arts^  whether  Neceffary 
or  Elegant^  to  the  large  and  various  Tribe 
of  Sciences  ? To  Logic,  Mathenlatics,  Aftro^ 
nomy,  Phylics  ? ^ — Can  one  Man,  imagine 
you,  mafter  all  this  ? Abfurd,  faid  I,  im- 
poffible.  And  yet  in  this  Cycle  of  Sciences! 

andArtSy  feem  included  all  the  Comfort Sy 
^ well  as  Ornaments  of  Life  3 included  all 

|:onducive,  either  to  Beings  or  to  Well-Being, 

.....  ... 


A Dialogue. 


153 


It  muft  be  confeffed,  faid  I,  it  has  Part  I. 
the  Appearance. 

What  then,  faid  he,  muft  be  done? 

In  what  manner  inuft  we  be  fupplied?  ^ 

I anfwered,  I knew  not,  unlefs  we 
made  a Dijiribution  — Let  one  exercife  one 
Art ; and  another  a different  — Let  this 
Man  ftudy  fuch  a Science  5 and  that  Man^ 

another  Thus  the  whole  Cycle  (as  you 

call  it)  may  be  carried  eafily  into  Perfec- 
tion. ’Tis  true,  faid  he,  it  may;  and 
every  Individual,  as  far  as  his  own  Art  or 
Science^  might  be  fupplied  completely^  and  as 
well  as  he  could  wifti.  But  what  avails  a 
Supply  in  a fingle  Inftance  ? What  in  this 
cafe  are  to  become  of  all  his  numerous  other 
Wantst  You  conceive,  replied  I,  what 
I would  have  faid,  but  partially.  My 
Meaning  was,  that  Artifl  trade  with  Ar^ 
tifi ; each  fupply  where  he  is  deficient , by 
isxchanging  where  he  aboujids-,  fo  that  a 
Portion  of  every  thing  may  be  difperfed 
f hroughout  all,  Y ou  intend  then  a StatCj 

faid 


154  Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

Part  I.  faid  he,  of  Commutation  and  Traffic, 

I replied,  I did. 


. If  fo,  continued  he,  I fee  a new  Face 
of  things.  The  Savages,  with  their  Skins 
and  their  Caverns,  difappear,  In  their  place 
I behold  a fair  Community  riling.  No  longer 
Woods,  no  longer  Solitude,  but  all  is  Social^ 
Civile  and  Cultivated  — And  can  we  doubt 
any  farther,  whether  Society  be  Natural?  Is 
not  this  evidently  the  State^  which  can  bejl 
fupply  the  Primary  Wants  ? It  has  ap- 
peared fo.  And  did  we  not  agree 

fome  time  lince,  that  this  State^  whatever 
we  found  it,  would  be  certainly  of  all  others 
the  mof  agreeable  to  our  Nature?  We 
did.  And  have  we  not  a'dded,  lince 
this,  to  the  Weight  of  our  Argument,  by 
palling  from  the  Necef'ary  Arts  to  the  Ele^ 
gant'y  from  the  Elegant ^ to  the  Sciences? 

We  have,  The  more,  faid  he, 
we  conlider,  the  more  llaall  we  be  con- 
vinced, that  All  thefcy  the  noblell  Honours 
and  Ornaments  of  the  Human  Mind,  with^> 
out  that  LeifurCy  that  ExperwicCy  that  Emu- 

latioiiy 


Dialogue,  155 

lation^  that  Reward^  which  the  Social  State  Part  I. 
alone  we  know  is  able  to  provide  them, 
could  never  have  found  ExiJlencCy  or  been 
in  the  leaft  recognized.  Indeed,  faid  I, 

I believe  not. 

Let  it  not  be  forgot  then,  faid  he.  In 
favour  of  Society^  that  to  it  we  owe,  not 
only  the  Beginning  and  Continuation^  but 
the  Well-Beings  and  (if  I may  ufe  the  Ex- 
preffion)  the  very  Elegance^  and  Rationality 
of  our  Exifence,  I anfwered.  It  ap- 

peared evident. 

And  what  then,  continued  he? — If 
Society  be  thus  agreeable  to  our  Nature^  is 
there  nothing,  think  you,  within  us,  to  ex- 
cite and  lead  us  to  it  ? No  Impulfe^  no  Pre- 
paration of  Faculties!  It  would  be 

ftrange,  anfwered  I,  if  there  fhould  not. 

’Twould  be  a Angular  Exception^ 
faid  he,  with  refpedl  to  all  other  herding 
Species — Let  us  however  examine — Pity, 
Benevolence,  Friendlhip,  Love  ^ the  general 
Diflike  of  Solitude,  and  Defire  of  Com- 
pany; 


156  ’ Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

Part  L pany ; are  they  Natural  AffeBions^  which 
come  of  themjehes ; or  are  they  taught  us  by 
Arty  like  Mulic  and  Arithmetic? 

I fliould  think,  replied  I,  they  were  Na-^ 
turaly  becaufe  in  every  Degree  of  Men  fome 
Traces  of  them  may  be  difcovered. 

And  are  not  the  Pow^s  and  Capacities  of 
Speechy  faid  he,  the  fame  ? Are  not  all 
Men  naturally  formed,  to  exprefs  their  Sen-^ 
f intents  by  fome  kind  of  Language  ? I re^ 
plied.  They  were. 

If  then,  faid  he,  thefe  feveral  Powers^ 
and  Difpoftions  are  Naturaly  fo  fhould  feem 
too  their  Exercife.  Admit  it.  And 
if  their  Exercifey  then  fo  too  that  Statey 
where  alone  they  can  be  exercifed.  Ad- 
mit it.  And  what  is  this  Statey  but  the 
Social?  Or  where  elfe  is  it  poffible  to  con- 
verfcy  or  ufe  our  Speech  ^ to  exhibit  Adlions 
of  Pity,  Benevolence;  Friendlhip  or  Love ; 
to  relieve  our  Averfion  to  Solitude y or  gratify 
pur  Defre  of  being  with  others  ? I re*^ 
plied.  It  could  be  no  where  elfe. 


Yoi; 


A Dialogue, 


You  fee  then,  continued  he,  a Prepa--  Part  1. 
ration  of  Faculties  is  not  wanting.  We  are 
fitted  with  Powers  and  Dilpolitions,  which 
have  only  Relation  to  Society  > and  which, 
out  of  Society,  can  no  where  elfe  be  exercifed^ 

I replied.  It  was  evident.  Y ou  have  feen 

too  the  fuperior  Advantages  of  the  Social 
State y above  all  others.  I have. 

Let  this  then  be  remember’d,  faid  he,' 
throughout  all  our  fiiture  Reafonings,  re- 
member’d as  a firrt  Principle  in  our  Ideas 
of  Humanity y i^2X  Man  by  Nature  is  truly 
a Social  Animal.  - I promifed  it 
fhould. 

§.13.  Let  us  now,  faid  he,  examine, 
what  farther  we  can  learn  concerning  Him. 

As  Social  indeed.  He  is  diftinguiflied  from 
the  Solitary  and  Savage  Species -y  but  in  no 
degree  from  the  reft,  of  a milder  and  more 
friendlyN^Xxsxt.  ’Tis  true,  replied  I,  He  is 
not.  Does  He  then  differ  no  more  from 

thefe 


158  Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

Part  I.  thefe  feveral  Social  Species,  than  they,  each 
of  them,  differ  from  one  another  ? Mnft  we 
range  them  ally  and  Man  among  the  rejty 
under  the  fame  cotnmon  and  general  Genus  ? 

I fee  no  Foundation^  faid  I,  for 
making  a Diftindion. 

Perhaps,  faid  he,  there  may  be  none ; 
and  'tis  poffible  too  there  may.  Conlider 
a little  — Do  you  not  obferve  in  all  other 
Species,  a Similarity  among  Ijidivi duals’? 
a fiirprizing  LikenefSy  which  runs  thro'  each 
F articular?  In  one  Species  they  are  all 
Bold ; in  another,  all  Timorous ; in  one  all 
Ravenously  in  another,  all  Gentle.  In  the 
Bird-kind  only,  what  a Uniformity  of  Voiccy 
in  each  Species,  as  to  their  Notes ; of  Ar- 
chitedlurey  as  to  building  their  Neils ; of 
Foody  both  for  themfelves,  and  for  fup- 
porting  their  young  ? ’Tis  true,  faid  I. 

And  do  you  obferve,  continued  he, 
the  fame  Similarity  among  Men  ? Are  thefe 
all  as  Uniformy  as  to  their  Sentiments  and 
Anions  ? I replied,  By  no  means. 


One 


^ Dialogue,  159 

Part  I. 

One  Queftion  more,  faid  he,  as  to  the 
Character  of  Brutes,  if  I may  be  allowed 
the  Expreffion — Are  thefe^  think  you,  what 
we  behold  them^  by  Nature  or  otherwife? 

Explain,  faid  I,  your  Q^ftion,  for 
I do  not  well  conceive  you.  I mean, 

replied  he,  is  it  by  Nature  that  the  Swallow 
builds  her  Neft,  and  performs  all  the  Offices 
of  her  Kind  : Or  is  fhe  taught  by  Art^  by 
DifcipUney  or  Cujlom?  She  afts,  re- 
plied I,  by  pure  Nature  undoubtedly. 

And  is  not  the  fame  true,  faid  he,  of  e^ery 
other  Bird  and  Bead:  in  the  Univerfe  ? 

It  is.  No  wonder  then,  continued  he, 
as  they  have  fo  wife  a Governefs,  that  a 
uniform  Rule  of  ABion  is  provided  for  each 
Species.  For  what  can  be  more  worthy  the 
Wifdom  of  Nature^  than  ever  to  the  fajjie 
Subjlances  to  give  the  fame  Law  f It  ap- 

pears, faid  I,  reafonable. 

But  what,  continued  he,  fliall  we  fay 
as  to  Man  ? Is  He  too  actuated  by  Nature 
purely  ? I anfwered,  Why  not  ? 


If 


l6o  tloncerning  HApPINESS,^ 

Part  I.  If  He  be,  replied  Ke^  ’tis  ftrange  in  Nature^ 
u relpecl  to  Man  alone ^ ihe  fliould 

follow  fo  different  a Conduit.  The  Particu- 
lars in  other  Species,  we  agree,  fhe  renders 
Uniform-,  but  inOur* s, gw tvy Particular  feems 
a fort  of  Model  by  himfelf  If  Nature,' 
laid  I,  do  not  aituate  us^  what  can  we  fup-’ 
pofe  elfe  ? hxQ  Local  Cufoms,  faid  he^ 
iure  ? Are  the  Polities  and  Religions  of  par- 
licular^Nations,  Nature  ? Are  the  LxampleSi 
which  are  fet  before  us;  the  Preceptors 
who  inftruil  us ; the  Company  and  Friends^ 
> -With  whom  we  converfe^  all  Nature  f 

No  furely,  faid  L And  yet,^  faid  he^ 

"^tls  evident  that  by  thefe^  and  a thoufand 
incidental  Gircumftancesf  equally  foreign  to 
Nature,  otir  Adtions^  and  Manners,  and 
Charaiters  are  adjufted.  Who  then  can 
imagine,  we  are  adluated  by  Nature  only  f 
1 confefs,  faid  Ij  it  appears  con- 
trary; 

You  fee  then^  faid  he,  one  remarkable 
bifinBion  between  Man  and  Brutes  in  ge- 
neral  In  the  Brute^  Nature  does  all ; in 

Man. 


^ Dialogue. 


i6i 


Man^  but  Part  only, 
faid  I. 


*TIs  evident,  Part  I; 


But  farther;  continued  he Let  us 
tonfider  the  Powers^  or  FacultieSy  poffelTed 
by  each— -Suppofe  I was  willing  to  give  a 
Brute  the  fame  InJiru6lioni  which  we  give 
a Man,  A Parrot  perhaps^  or  Ape,  might 
arrive  to’  fome  fmall  Degree  of  Mimicry  i 
but  do  you  think,  upon  the  whole,*  they 
would  be  much  profited  or  altered? 

' I replied,  J thought  not.  And  do  you 
perceive  the  fame^  faid  he,  with  relped:  to 
Man  ? Or  does  not  Experience  fhew  us  the 
very  reVerfe  ? Is  not  Education  capable  of 
moulding  us  into  any  thing  — of  making 
us  greatly  Goody  or  greatly  Bady  greatly 
Wifcy  or  greatly  Abfurd?  The  Fait, 
faid  I,  is  indifputabki 


MarIc  then;  laid  he,  the  Difference 
between  Human  Powers  and  Brutal — The 
Leading  Principle  of  Brutes  appears  to  tend 
in  each  Species  to  one  fingle  Purpofe — to  this, 
in  general,  it  uniformly  arrives  j and  here. 


M 


i62  Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

Part  I.  in  general,  it  as  uniformly  flops — it  needs  no 
precepts  or  Difcipline  to  inftruft  it  j nor 
will  it  eafily  be  changed^  or  admit  a differ 
rent  DireBion.  On  the  contrary,  the  Lead- 
ing Principle  of  Man  is  capable  of  infinite 

DireBions is  convertible  to  all  forts  of 

Purpofes^ — ^equal  to  all  forts  of  SubjeBs 

negleded,  remains  ignorant,  and  void  of 
every  Perfedlion — cultivated,  becomes 
adorned  with  Sciences  and  Arts — -can  raife 
us  to  excel,  not  only  Brutes^  but  our  own 
Kind — with  relpedl  to  our  other  Powers  and 
Faculties,  can  inftrudt  us  how  to  ufe  them, 
as  well  as  thofe  of  the  various  Natures^ 

, which  we  fee  exifting  around  us.  In  a 
word,  to  oppofe  the  two  Principles  to  each 
other — -The  Leading  Principle  of  Man^  is 
Multiform^  Originally  UninfiruBedy  Pliant 
and  Docil — the  Leading  Principle  of  Brutes 
is  Uniformy  Originally  InfiruBed'y  but,  in 
moft  Inftances  afterward,  Infiexible  and 

Indocil Or  does  not  Experience  plainly 

(hew,  and  confirm  the  Truth  of  what  wc 
affert  ? I made  anfwer.  It  did. 


A Dialogue.' 


163 


You  allow,  then,  faid  he,  tht  Human  Parti. 
Principle,  and  the  Brutal^  to  be  things  of 
different  Idea.  Undoubtedly.  Do 
they  not  each  then  deferve  a different  Ap- 
pellation ? I fhould  think  fo.  Sup- 
pofe  therefore  we  call  the  Human  Principle 
I Reason;  and  the  Brutal^  Instinct: 

I would  you  objedt  to  the  Terms  ? I re- 
j plied,  I fhould  not.  If  not,  continued 
j he,  then  Reafon  being  peculiar  to  Man^  of 
j all  the  Animals  inhabiting  this  Earth,  may 
ij  we  not  affirm  of  Him,  by  way  of  Diffinc- 
ii  tion,  that  He  is  a Rational  Animal? 
j I replied.  We  might  juftly. 

i 

Let  this  too  then  be  remember’d,  faid 
n he,  in  the  Courfe  of  our  Inquiry,  that  Man 
I h by  Nature  a Rational  Animal. 

I promifed  it  fhould. 

§.  14.  In  confequence  of  this,  faid  he,  as 
often  as  there  is  Occafion,  I fhall  appeal  as 
• well  to  Reafon^  as  to  Nature y for  a Standard. 

What,  faid  I,  do  you  mean  hy  Nature? 

\ M 2 Its 

! 


I ' • ’ 

I 164  Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

I Part  I.  Its  Meanings,  replied  he,  are  many 
I j various.  As  it  flands  at  prefent  op- 

I pofed,  it  may  be  enough  perhaps  to  fay, 

[I  that  Nature  is  thafy  which  is  the  Caufe  of 

every  things  except  thofe  things  aloney  which  i 
j are  the  immediate  EffeBs  of  Reafon,  In  'I 

other  words,  whatever  is  not  Reafony  or  _ 
I the  EffeS  of  Reafon,  we  would  confider  as  ' 

Naturey  or  the  Effedl  of  Nature.  I an-  -i 
fwered,  as  he  fo  diflinguifhed  them,  I ! 
thought  he  might  juftly  appeal  to  either,  si 

And  yet,  contintied  he,  there  Is  a fe- S 
markable  Difference  between  the  Standard  .P 
of  , and  ‘ that  of  Nature -,^2^  Diffe- £ 

rence,  which  at  no  time  we  ought  to  for-  ; 
get.  What  Difference,  faid  I,  do  you 
mean  ? ^Tis  this,  anfwered  he  — In  ^ 
Naturey  the  Standard  is  fought  from  among  | 
the  Many ; in  ReafoUy  the  Standard  is  fought  | 
from  among  theK’^z^;.  You  muft  ex- 
plain,  faid  I,  your  Meaning,  for  I mull 
confefs  you  feem  obfcure.  i 

'1 

Thus  ^ 


A Dialogue. 


Thus  then^  fald  he Suppofe,  as  an  Parti. 

Anatomift,  you  were  feeking  the  Strufture 

of  fome  internal  Part To  difcover  this, 

would  you  not  infpedt  a Number  of  Indi- 
viduals ? I fhould.  And  would  you 
not  inform  yourfelf,  what  had  been  dif- 
covered  by  others  ? • I fhould.  And 
fuppofe,  after  all,  you  fliould  find  a MuU 
titude  of  Inftances  for  one  Structure,  and  a 
few  fngular  for  a different : by  which 
would  you  be  governed  ? By  the  Mul- 
titude, faid  I,  undoubtedly.  Thus  then 
continued  he,  in  Nature  the  Standard^  you 
fee,  exifs  among  tjoe  Many^  I replied, 

It  had  fp  appeared, 

And  what,  faid  he,  were  we  to  feek 
the  Perfedion  of  Sculpture,  or  of  Paint- 
ing ? Where  fhould  we  inquire  then  ? — 

- Among  the  numerous  common  Art’fis,  or 
among  the  few  and  celebrated  ? Among 
the  Few,  faid  I.  . What  if  we  were  to 
feek  the  Perfedion  of  Poetry,  or  Oratory — 

Where  then  ? Among  the  Few  fiill. 

M 3 What 


1 66 
Part  I. 


Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

What  if  we  were  to  feek  the  Per- 
fedlion  of  true  Argument,  or  a found 

Logic Where  then  ? Still  among 

the  Few.  And  is  not  true  Argument, 
or  a found  Logic,  one  of  Reafon's  greateft 
PerfeSions?  It  is.  You  fee  then, 
continued  he,  whence  the  Standard  of 

Reafon.is  to  be  fought ’Tis  from  among 

the  Few^  as  we  faid  before,  in  contradi- 
ftindlion  to  the  Standard  of  Nature. 

I confefs,  faid  I,  it  appears  fo. 

And  happy,  faid  he,  for  us,  that  Provi- 
dence has  fo  ordered  it happy  for  us,  that 

what  is  Rationaly  depends  not  on  the  Multi- 
tude ; or  is  to  be  tried  by  fo  pitiful  a Teft,  as 
the  bare  counting  of  Nofes.  ’Tis  bappy, 

iaid  I,  indeed— -But  whence  pray  the  Dif- 
ference ? Why  are  the  Many  to  determine 
in  Nature y and  the  Few  only,  in  Reafon  ? 

To  difcufs  this  at  large,  faid  he, 
would  require  fome  time.  It  might  in- 
fenfibly  perhaps  draw  us  from  our  prefent 
Inquiry.  I will  endeavour  to  give  you  the 
Reafon,  in  as  few  words  as  poffible ; which 
fhould  they  chance  to  be  obfeure,  be  not 

too 


A Dialogue. 

too  felicitous  for  an  Explanation. 

I begged  him  to  proceed  his  own  way. 

The  Cafe,  faidhe,  appears  to  be  this — > 
In  Natural  Works  and  Natural  Operations, 
we  hold  but  one  Efficient  Caufe^  and  that 
confummately  wife.  This  Caufe  in  every 
Species  recognizing  what  is  beji^  and  work^ 
ing  ever  uniformly  according  to  this  Idea  of 
PerfeBion^  the  ProduBions  and  Energies^  in 
every  Species  where  it  afts,  are  for  the 
moft  part  fmilar  and  exaidlly  correfpondent. 
If  an  Exception  ever  happen,  it  is  from 
fome  hidden  higher  Motive^  which  tran-^ 
feends  pur  Comprehenfion,  and  which  is 
feen  fo  rarely^  as  not  to  injure  the  general 
Rule^  or  render  it  doubtful  and  precarious. 
On  the  contrary,  in  the  Produftions  and 
Energies  of  Reafon^  there  is  not  one  Caufe 
but  infinite— many  indeed,  as  there  arc 
Agents  of  the  Human  Kind.  Hence  Truth 
being  but  one^  and  Error  being  mfoiite^  and 
Agents  infinite  alfo : what  wonder  they 
{hould  oftener  mifs,  than  hit  the  Mark  ? — r 
that  Multitudes  fliould  fail,  where  one  alone 
M 4.  fuc-^ 


167 
Part  I. 


i68  Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

Part  L fucceeds,  and  Truth  be  only  the  Pofleffion 
the  chofen^  fortunate  Few"?  You 
fecm  to  have  explained  the  Difficulty, 
faid  I,  with  fufficient  Perfpicuity. 

Let  us  then  go  back,  laid  he,  and  re- 
colledt  ourfelves ; that  we  may  not  forget, 
what  ’tis  we  are  feeking.  I replied, 
Moft  willingly.  We  have  been  feek- 
ingj  continued  he,  the  Sovereign  Good,  In 
confequence  of  this  Inquiry,  we  have  dif- 
covered: — -that  all  Things  whatever  exiji  to 
the  Human  Species  in  the  Relations  of  either 
Turfuabky  Avoidable y or  Indifferent,  To 
determine  thefe  Relations  with  Accuracy, 
we  have  been  fcrutinizing  the  Human 
Nature  | and  that,  upon  this  known 
Maxim,  that  every  Species  was  its  own 
proper  Standard  3 and  that  where  the  Value 
of  Thmgs  was  dubiouSy  there  the  Species  was 
to  be  fudiedy  and  the  Relatiofis  to  be  deducedy 
which  naturally  flow  from  it.  The  Refult 
of  this  Scrutiny  has  been  — — that  \ve  have 
firft  agreed  Man  to  be  a Social  Animal ; 
and  lince,  to  be  a Rational,  So  that  if  wc 


can 


A Dialogue,  169 

jcan  be  content  with  a defcriptive,  concife  Part  I, 
Sketch  of  Human  Nature^  it  will  amount 
to  thisr-— that  Man  is  a Social  Ra-^ 
TioNAL  Animal,  I anfwered,  It 
had  appeared  fo. 

§.  15.  If  then,  faid  he,  we  purfue  our 
Difquifitions,  agreeably  to  this  Idea  of  Hu- 
man Nature,  it  will  follow  that  all  Things 
will  be  Purfuabky  Avoidable^  and  Indiffe^ 
rent  to  Man^  as  they  refpedt  the  Being 
and  Welfare  of  fuch  a Social^  Rational 
Animal  I replied,  They  muft; 

Nothing  therefore  in  the  firft  place, 

Slid  he,  can  be  Purfuable,  which  is 
jiruBive  of  Society.  It  cannot. 

Adis  therefore  of  Fraud  and  Rapine,  and 
all  acquired  by  them,  whether  Wealth, 
Power,  Pleafure,  or  any  thing,  are  evir 
dently  from  their  very  Charadler  not  fit 
to  be  purfued.  They  are  not. 

But  it  is  impoflible  not  to  purfue  many 
filch  things,  unlefs  we  are  furnifhed  with 
fome  Habit  or  Difpofition  of  Mind,  by 

which 


170  Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

Part  I.  which  we  are  induced  to  render  to  all  Men 
their  own,  and  to  regard  the  Welfare,  and 
Intereft  of  Society.  It  is  impoffible. 

But  the  Habit  or  Difpojition  of  ren-~ 
dering  to  all  their  own^  and  of  regarding 
the  Welfare  and  Intereft  of  Society,  is 
Justice.  It  is.  We  may  there- 
fore fairly  conclude,  that  Nothing  is  natu-^ 
rally  Purfuable^  but  what  is  either  correfpon’* 
dent  to  fufice^  or  at  leaf  not  contrary^ 

I confefs,  faid  I,  fo  it  appears, 

But  farther,  faid  he-—  ’Tis  poffible  we 
may  have  the  beft  Difpolition  to  Society ; 
the  moft  upright  Intentions  \ and  yet  thro’ 
Want  of  Ability  to  difcern,  and  know  the 
Nature  of  Particulars,  we  may  purfue 
many  things  inconfiftent,  as  well  with  our 
Private  Intereft,  as  the  Public.  We  may 
even  purfiie  what  is  Right y and  yet  purfue 
it  in  fuch  a manner,  as  to  find  our  Endea- 
vours fruitlefsy  and  our  Purpofes  to  fail, 
I anfwered,  ’Twas  pofiiblc. 

But  this  would  ill  befit  the  Character  of  a 
Rational  Animal.  It  would.  It  is 

necef- 


A Dialogue.  171 

neceffary  therefore,  we  fhould  be  furnlflied  Part  t 
with  fome  Habit  or  Faculty y inftrufting  us 
how  to  difcern  the  real  Difference  of  all 
ParticularSy  and  fuggefting  the  proper 
Means,  by  which  we  may  either  avoid  or 
obtain  them.  It  is.  - And  what  is 
this,  think  you,  but  Prudence  ? 

I believe,  faid  I,  it  can  be  no  other. 

If  it  be,  faid  he,  then  ’tis  evident  frorri 
this  Reafoning,  that  Nothing  is  purfuabkj 
which  is  not  correfpondent  to  Prudence. 

I replied,  He  had  Ihewn  it  could  not. 

But  farther  ftill,  laid  he — ’TIs  pofliblc 
we  may  neither  want  Prudence^  nor  Jufice 
to  dired:  us ; and  yet  the  Impulfes  of  Appe-^ 
they  the  Impetuofties  of  Refe?itmenty  the 
Charms  and  Allurements  of  a thoufand  flat- 
tering Objedls,  may  tempt  us,  in  Ipite  of 
ourfelves,  to  purfue  what  is  both  Impru-- 
denty  and  Unjuji.  They  may.  But 
if  fo,  ’tis  necelTary,  would  we  purliie  as 
becomes  our  CharaBery  that  we  fliould  be 
furnifhed  with  fome  Habity  which  may 
moderate  our  Excffes ; which  may  temper 


our 


tj2  Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

Part  I.  our  Adions  to  the  Standard  of  a S^ocial 
^Y\d  to  the  Intereft  and  Welfare,  not 
of  a Part,  but  of  the  ffhle  Man. 
Nothing,  faid  I,  more  neceffaiy.  And 
what,  faid  he,  can  we  call  this  Habits  but 
the  Habit  of  Temperance  ? You 

name  It,  faid  I,  rightly.  If  you  think 
fo,  replied  he,  then  Nothing  can  be  Pur^ 
fiiable^  which  is  720t  either -corn efpondent  to 
Temperance^  or  at  leajl  not  contra^'y. 

I replied,  So  it  feemed, 

On  ce  more,  continued  he,  and  we  have 
done— ’Tis  pofTible  that  not  ovAjRelhttfnent 
and  Appetite^  not  only  the  Charms  and  Ah 
lurements  of  external  Objeds,  but  the  Terr^ 
rors  too,  and  Dread  of  them  may  ?narr  the 
Redlitude  of  our  Purpofes.  ’Tispoffible, 

Tyranny  and  Superftition  may  af- 
fail  us  on  one  hand ; the  Apprehenfions  of 
Ridicule,  and  a Faife  SJoame  on  the  other— ^ 
’Tis  expedient,  to  withftand  thefe,welhould 
be  armed  with  fome  Habits  or  our  wdfeft 
bed  Purfuits  may  elfe  at  all  times  be  de- 
feated. They  may.  And  what  is 

that 


A DiALOGuii.  175 

that  generous,  manlike  and  noble  Habit ^ Part  I. 
which  fetS'  us  at  all  times  above  Fear  and 
Danger^,  what  is  it  but  Fortitude? 

I replied.  It  was  no  other.  If  fo 

then,  continued  he,  befides  our  former 
Conclufions,  Nothing  farther  can  be  Pur-^ 
fuabky  as  our  Inquiries  now  have  fliewn 
us,  which  is  not  either  correfpondent  to  For-- 
titude^  or  at  leaf  not  contrary,  I admits 
faid  I,  it  is  not^ 

Observe  then,  faid  he,  the  Sum,  the 

Amount  of  our  whole  Reafoning No-^ 

thing  Js  truly  Purfuable  to  fuch  an  Animal  as 
Man^  except  what  is  correfpondent^  or  at 
leaf  not  contrary^  to  Justice,  Prudence, 
Temperance  and  Fortitude.  I al^ 
low,  faid  I,  it  appears  fo.  * But  if  no^ 
thing  Purfuable^  then  nothing  Avoidable  or 
Indifferent^  but  what  is  tried  and  eftimated 
after  the  fame  manner.  For  Contraries  are 
ever  recognized  throl  the  fa772e  Habits  one 
with  another.  The  fame  Logic  judges  of 
Truth  and  Falfhood;  the  fime  Mufical 
Art,  of  Concord  and  Difeord.  So  the  fame 

Mental 


174  Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

Part  I.  Mental  Habitudes^  of  Things  Avoidable  and 
^’“*‘''***^  Purfuable,  I replied.  It  appeared  pro- 
bable. 

T o how  unexpedted  a Conclufion  then, 
faidhe,  have  our  Inquiries  infenfibly  led 

us  ? In  tracing  the  Source  of  Human 

Adlion,  we  have  eftablifhed  it  to  be  thofe 
Four  Grand  Virtues,  which  are 
efteemed,  for  their  Importance,  the  very 
H INGES  OF  ALL  MoRALITY. 

We  have. 

But  if  fo,  it  fhould  follow,  that  aZ/^, 
whofe  Purfuings  and  Avoidings  are  go- 
verned by  thefe  Virtues^  is  that  True  and 
Rational  Lifey  which  we  have  fo  long 
been  feeking ; that  Lifey  where  the  Value 
of  all  things  is  jufily  meafured  by  thofe  Rela^ 
tionSy  which  they  bear  to  the  Natural  Frame 
and  real  Conflitution  of  Mankind — in  fewer 
Words,  A Life  of  Virtue  appears  to 
be  THE  Life  according  to  Na- 
It  appears  fo. 

But 


ture. 


A Dialogue. 


J7S 


But  in  fuch  a Life  every  Purfuity  every  Part  I. 
Avoi dingy  (to  include  all)  every  Action  will 
€>f  courfe  admit  of  being  rationally  jujlijied^ 

It  wilL  But  Thaty  which  being 

DonCy  admits  of  a Rational  fujtificationy  is 
the  ElTence  or  genuine  Charadter  of  an 
Office  y or  Moral  Duty*  For  thus  long 
ago  it  has  been  defined  by  the  beft  ^ Au- 
thorities, Admit  it.  If  fo,  then 
A Life  according  to  Virtue,  is 
A Life  according  to  Moral 
Offices  or  Duties.  It  appears 
fo.  But  we  have  already  agreed  it,  to 
be  a Life  according  to  Nature,  Wc 
have.  Obferve  then:  A Life  ac- 

cording to  Virtue,  according 
TO  Moral  Offices,  and  accord- 
ing TO  Nature,  mean  all  the 
SAME  Thing,  tho’  varied  in  the  Ex- 
preffion.  Your  Remark,  faidi,  feems 
juft. 

§•  15* 


* By  Tully  in  his  Offices,  and  by  other  Authors 
of  Antiquity. 


176  Cmcerni-dg  HAPPINESS^ 

Parti.  §.  16.  We  need  never  therefore,^  re-^ 

plied  he,  be  at  a lofs  how  to  chufe,  tha’ 
the  Objefts  of  Choice  be  ever  fo  infinite 
and  diverfified.  As  far  as  nothing  is 
confflent  with  fuch  a Life  and  fuch  a Cha- 
racter^ we  may  jiiftly  fet  Exiftence  before 
Death  3 prefer  Health  to  Sicknefs  3 Inte- 
grity of  the  Limbs,  to  being  maimed  and 
debilitated  3 Pleafiire  to  Pain  3 Wealth  to 
Poverty  3 Fame  to  Difhonouri  Free  Go^ 
vernment  to  Slavery  3 Power  and  Magi- 

ftracy,  to  Subjedlion  and  a private  State 

Univerfally,  whatever  tends  either  to  Beings 
or  to  Well-Beings  we  may  be  juftified,  v/hen^ 
we  prefer  to  whatever  appears  the  con-^ 
trary.  And  when  our  feveral  Energies, 
exerted  according  to  the  Virtues  above, 
have  put  us  in  Pofleflion  of  all  that  we 
require : what  then  can  there  be  wanting 
to  complete  our  Happinefs  3 to  render  our 
State  perfectly  confonajit  to  Nature  3 cr  to 
give  us  a more  Sovereign  Goody  than  that 
which  we  now  enjoy  ? Nothing,*  re- 
plied I,  that  I can  at  prefent  think  of, 

Therj; 


1 


A Dialogue,  177 

There  would  be  nothing  indeed,  laid  Parti, 
he,  'were  our  Energies  never  to  fail  % were 
^//our  Endeavours  to  be  ever  crowned  with 
due  Suceefsi  But  fuppofe  the  contrary--- 
Suppofe  the  worjl  Succefs  to  the  mojl  up-- 
right  C6nduB\  to  the  wifeil:  P^eftimde  of 
Energies  and  Aftions.  T is  poffible,  nay 
Experience  teaches  us  ’tis  too  often  fact, 
that  not  only  the  Purfuers  of  what  is  con- 
trary to  Nature^  but  that  thofe  who  purfue 
nothing  but  what  is  JlriEily  congruous  to  if^ 
may  mifs  of  their  Aims ^ and  be  frujlratecl 
in  their  Endeavours,  Inquifitors  and  Monks 
may  deteft  them  for  their  Virtue,  and 
purfue  them  with  all  the  Engines  of 
Malice  and  Inhumanityi  Without  thefe, 

Pefts  may  afflifl:  their  Bodies ; Inunda- 
tions overwhelm  their  Property;  or  what 
is  worfe  than  Inundations,  either  Ty- 
rants, Pirates,  Heroes,  or  Banditti.  They 
may  fee  their  Country  fall,  and  with 
it  their  braved:  Countrymen ; themfelves 
pillaged,  and  reduced  to  Extremities,  or 
■ N perilhing 


jyS  Concerning  H A P I N E S 


Parti,  perifliing  with  the  reft  in  the  general 
Maffacre^ 

^ cadit  & Ripheus^juJliJJimus  unus 
' fuit  in  "Teucrisy  & fervantijjimus  cequii 

It  muft  be  owned,  faid  I,  this  has  too  often; 
been  the  Cafe. 

Ok  grant j continued  he,  that  thefe 

greater  Events  never  happen that  the 

Part  allotted  us,  be  not  in  the  Tragedy  of 
Life,  but  in  the  Comedy, > Even  the  Comic 

Diftrefes  are  abundantly  irkfome 

Domeftic  Jars,  the  ill  Offices  of  Neigh- 
bours^— — Sufpicions,  Jealouftes,  Schemes  . 

defeated —The  Folly  of  Fools;  the 

Knavery  of  Knaves ; from  which,  as  Mem--^ 
bers  of  Society,  ’tis  impoffible  to  detach 
ourfelves. 


Where 


'A  Dialogue, 


179 


Where  then  fhall  we  turn,  or  what  Part  I. 
have  we  to  imagine  r W e have  at  length 
placed  Happiness,  after  much  Inquiry,  in 
ATTAINING  the  primary  and jujl  Requififes 
of  our  Nature^  by  a Conduct  fuitable  to  Virtue 
and  Moral  Office,  But  as  to  correfponding 
'with  our  Pre-conceptions  (which  we  have 
made  the  Teft)  does  this  Syftem  correfpond 
better,  than  thofe  others^  which  we  have 
rejefted  ? Has  it  not  appeared  from  various 
Fadts,  too  obvious  to  be  dilputed,  that  in 
many  l^imes  and  Places  it  may  be  abfolutely 
unattainable  ? That  in  many,  where  it 
exifts,  it  may  in  a moment  bt  cancelled^  and 
put  irretrievably  out  of  our  Power,  by 
Events  not  to  be  ref  fled?  If  this  be  certain, 
and  I fear  it  cannot  be  queftioned,  our 
fpecious  long  Inquiry,  however  accurate 
we  may  believe  it,  has  not  been  able  to 
fhew  us  a Good,  of  that  Chai'adter  which 
we  require;  a Good  .Durable,  Indepri^ 
vable,  and  Accommodate  to  every  Circum^ 

fance — --Far  from  it Our  Speculations 

o N 2 (I 


i8or  Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

Part  I.  (I  think)  rather  lead  us  to  that  low  Opinion 
of  Happinefs,  which  you  may  remember 
you  * expreffed,  when  we  firft  began  the 
Subjed:.  They  rather  help  to  prove  to  us, 
that  inftead  of  a Sovereign  Goody  'tis  the^ 
more  probable  Sentiment,  there  is  no  fuch 
Good  at  alh  I Ihould  indeed,-  faid  I, 

fear  fo.  For  where,  continued  he, 

' lies  the  Difference,-  whether  we  purfue 
what  is  congruous  to  Nature^  or  not  con- 
gruous 3 if  the  Acquifition  of  one  be  as  dtf- 
jiculty  as  of  the  other y and  the  PoJJ'eJJion  of 
both  equally  doubtful  and  precarious"^  If 
Ccefar  fall,  in  attempting  his  Country’s 
Ruin  3 and  Brutus  fare  no  better,  who  only 
fought  in  its  Defence  ? It  muft  be 

owned,  faid  I,  thefe  are  melancholy  Truths, 
and  the  Inftances,  which  you  alledge,  too 
well  confirm  them. 

W E were  in  the  midft  of  thefe  ferious 
Thoughts,  defcanting  upon  the  Hardfhips 

and 


I 


A Dialogue, 


i8i 


and  Miferies  of  Life,  when  by  an  Inci-  Part  L 
dent,  not  worth  relating,  our  Speculations 
were  interrupted.  Nothing  at  the  time, 

I thought,  could  have  happened  more  un- 
luckily — ^ — our  Queftion  perplexed  r—-  its 
Ifliie  uncertain  — r-  and  myfelf  impatient  to 
know  the  Event.  Neceffity  however  was 
not  to  be  refifted,  and  thus  for  the  prefent 
our  Inquiries  were  ppftponed. 


- r 


N 3 


C O N- 


i 


- . • > 

CONCERNING 

H AP  P I NE  S S, 

A 


DIALOGUE, 


PART  the  Second, 


RUT  US  perijhed  untimely^  ^a'WPartll. 
Caefar  did  no  7nore — Thefe  Words 
J was  repeating  the  next  day  to 
myfelf,  when  my  Friend  appeared,  and 
chearfully  bade  me  Good-Morrow.  I could 
not  return  his  Compliment  with  an  equal 
Gaiety,  being  intent,  fomewhat  more  than 
ufual,  on  what  had  paffed  the  day  before. 

Seeing  this,  he  propofed  a Walk  into  the 
Fields.  The  Face  qf  Nature,  faid  he, 
will  perhaps  difpel  thefe  Glooms.  No 
Afliftance,  on  my  part,  diall  be  wanting, 

N 4 you 


1 84  Concernipg  HAPPINESS, 

Part  11.  you  may  be  alTured.  I accepted  his  Pro- 
pofal  5 the  Walk  began  ; an4  our  forrner 
Converfation  infenlibly  renewed. 

Brutus,  faid  he,  perijked  untimely^  and 
Casfar  did  no  more 'Twas  thus,  as  I re- 

member, not  long  iince  you  were  expref- 
iing  yourfelf.  And  yet  fuppofe  their  For- 
tunes to  have  been  exactly  parallel - 

Which  would  you  have  preferred  ? Would 
you  have  been  Ccejar  or  Brutus  ? 
JBrutus^  replied  I,  beyond  all  controverfy. 
He  afked  me.  Why  ? Where  was  the  Dif- 
ference, when  their  Fortunes,  as  we  now 
fuppofed  them,  were  confidered  as  the  fame? 

There  feems,  faid  I,  abftrad:  from 
p[iQiv  Fortunes,  fomething,  I know  not  what, 
intrinjically  preferable  in  the  Life  and  Cha- 
rafter  of  Brutus.  If  that,  faid  he,  be 

true,  then  moft  we  derive  it,  not  from  the 
Succefs  of  his  &ideavours,  but  from  their 
^ruth  and  ReBitude.  He  had  the  Comfort 
to  be  confcious,  that  his  Caufe  was  a juft 
pne,  ’Twas  impoffible  the  other  fhould 

have 


A Dl  ALOQUE.  185 

/ iiave  any  fuch  Feeling.  I,  believe,  Part  IJ. 

faid  I,  you  have  explained  it. 

Suppose  then,  continued  he,  (*tis  but 
merely  an  Hypothefis)  fuppofe,  I fay,  we 
were  to  place  the  Sovereign  Good  in  fuch 

ciRedlitude  of  ConduB in  the  Conduct 

merely^  and  not  in  the  Event.  Suppofe 
we  were  to  fix  our  Happiness,  not  in  the 
aBual  Attainment  of  that  Health,  that  Per- 
fedlion  of  a Social  State,  that  fortunate 
Concurrence  of  Externals,  which  is  con- 
gruous to  our  Nature,  and  which  we  have 
a Right  all  to  purfue ; but  folely  fix  it  in 
the  mere  Doing  whatever  is  correfpondeiit 
to  fuch  an  End^  even  tho’  we  never  attain, 
or  are  near  attaining  k.  In  fewer  words — 

What  if  v/e  make  our  Natural  State  the 
Standard  only  to  determine  our  ConduB  5 and 
place  our  Happinefs  in  the  ReBitude  of  this 

ConduB  alone? On  fuch  an  Flypothefis 

(and  we  confider  it  as  nothing  farther)  we 
fhould  not  want  a Good  perhaps,  to  cor-^ 
refpond  to  our  Pre-conceptions ; for  this,  ’tis 
pvident,  would  be  correfpondent  to  them 

all 


1 86  Concerning  HAPPINESS,  J 

. a 

Wzct  11.  alL  Your  Doftrine,  replied  I,  is  fo  a 

new  and  ftrange,  that  tho’  you  been  copi-  fl 
ous  in  explaining,  I can  hardly  yet  coni'  1 
prehend  you.  j 

f 

I T amounts  all,  faid  he,  but  to  this — ^ || 
Place  your  Happinefs^  where  your  Praife  i 
is.  I afked,  Where  he  fuppofed 

plat  ? Not,  replied  he,  in  the  Plear 

fiires  which  you  feel,  more  than  your  ^ 
Difgrace  lies  in  the  Pain — -—not  in  the  - 
cafup  Prolperity  of  Fortune,  more  than 

your  Difgrace  in  the  cafual  Adverlity ^ 

but  in  juft  complete  Adiion  throughout  every 
Part  of  Life^  what  ever  be  the  Face  of  \ 
Things y whether  favoiirable  or  the  con-:  1 
trar'^.  f 

■ . t' 

But  why  then,  faid  I,  {wdi  Accuracy 
about  Externals  ? So  much  Pains  to  be  in- 
form.ed,  what  are  Purfuable^  what  Avoid-’, 
able  ? It  behoves  the  Pilot,  replied  he, 

.to  know  the  Seas  and  the  Winds;  the 
Nature  of  Tempefts,  Calms  and  Tides. 
They  are  the  Subjedls^  about  which  his  Art 

is 


A Dialogue^ 


187 


is  converfant.  Without  a juft  Experience  Part  IL 
of  them,  he  can  never  prove  himfelf  an 
Artiji,  Yet  we  look  not  for  his  Reput  ac- 
tion either  in  fair  Gales,  or  in  adverfe^ 
but  in  the  Skifulnefs  of  his  ConduEi^  be  thefe 
Events  as  they  happen.  In  like  manner 
fares  it  with  this  the  Moral  Artift.  He,  for 

a Subjedi^  has  the  Whole  of  Human  Life ? 

Health  and  Sicknefs ; PlealUre  and  Pain ; 
with  every  other  poffible  Incident,  which 
can  befal  him  during  his  Exiftence.  If  his 
Knowledge  of  all  thefe  be  accurate  and 
exaft,  fo  too  muft  his  Condu5ly  in  which 
we  place  his  Happinefs.  But  if  this  Know^ 
ledge  be  defective,  muft.  not  his  ConduB  be 
defedive  alfo  ? _ I replied,  So  it  ftiould 
feem,  And  if  his  Condud,  then  his 

Happinefs  ? ’Tis  true. 


You  fee  then,  continued  he,  eventho* 
Externals  were  as  nothing  j tho’  ’twas  true, 
in  their  own  Nature,  they  were  neither 
Good  nor  Evil ; yet  an  accurate  Knowledge 
of  them  is,  from  our  Hypothecs,  abfolutely 

tiecejfary. 


HAPPINESS, 
Indeed,  faid  I,  you  have 

He  continued Inferior  Artifts  may  be 

at  a ftand,  becaufe  they  want  Materials, 
From  their  Stubbornefs  and  IntraBabilityy 
they  may  often  be  difappointed.  But  as 
long  as  Life  is  pafling,  and  Nature  con- 
tinues to  operate,  the  Moral  Artiji  of  Life 
has  at  all  times,  all  he  defires.  He  can 
never  w'ant  a Subje5l  fit  to  exercife  him  in 
his  proper  Calling;  and  that,  with  this 
b^appy  Motive  to  the  Conftancy  of  his 
Endeavours,  that,  the  crofier,  the  harlher, 
the  more  untoward  the  Events^  the  greater 
his  Praifey  the  more  illuilrious  his  RepUr 
tation^ 

All  this,  faid  I,  Is  true,  and  cannot  be 
denied.  But  one  Circumftance  there  ap- 
pears, where  your  Similes  feem  to  fail. 
The  Praife  indeed  of  the  Pilot  we  allow 
to  be  in  his  ConduB ; but  ’tis  in  the  Succefs 
of  that  Conduit,  where  we  look  for  his 
Happinefs.  If  a Storm  arife,  and  the  Ship 

be 


88 


Concerning 


Part  II4  neceffary. 
proved  it^ 


J Dialogue^  189 

I be  loft,  we  call  him  not  happy ^ how  well  Part  II. 
■ foever  he  may  have  condudled.  ’Tis  then 
only  we  congratulate  him,  when  he  has 
reached  the  defired  Haven.  Your 

Diftindion,  faid  he,  is  juft.  And  ’tis  here 
• lies  the  nobk  Prerogative  of  Moral  Artijlsy 

above  all  others But  yet  I know  not  how 

to  explain  myfelf,  I fear  rny  Doftrine  will 
appear  fo  ftrange.  You  may  proceed, 
faid  I fafely,  fince  'you  advance  it  but  as  art 
Hypothefs. 

Thus  then,  continued  he ThtEnd 

in  others  Arts  is  ever  difiant  and  removed. 

It  confifts  not  in  the  mere  ConduB^  much 
lefs  in  a fngle  Energy ; but  is  the  juft  Re- 
Cult  of  many  Energies^  each  of  which  are 
elfential  to  it.  Hehce^  by  Obftacles  un- 
avoidable, it  may  often  be  retarded:  Nay 
more,  may  be  fo  embaralfed,  as  never  pof 
Jibly  to  be  attained.  But  in  the  Moral  Af^t 
of  Life,  the  very  Conduct  is  the  End; 
the  very  ConduB^  I fay,  itfelf,  throughout 
every  its  772inuteft  Energy ; becaufe  each  of 
thefe,  however  mmute^  partake  as  truly  of 

ReBitudey 


19^  Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

Part  II.  Rectitude y as  the  largefl  Combination  of  them^ 
when  conlidered  colledtively.  Hence  of 
all  Arts  is  this  the  only  one  perpetually 
complete  in  every  Infant y becaufe  it  needs 
iiot,  like  other  Arts,  Hime  to  arrive  at  that 
Perfeftion,  at  which  in  every  Inf  ant  ’tis 
arrived  already.  Hence  by  Duration  it  is 
not  rendered  either  more  or  lefs  perfedli 
Completion y like  Truth,  admitting  of  no 
Degrees,  and  being  in  no  fenfe  capable  of 
either  Intenfon  or  Remifion.  And  hence 
too  by  neceffary  Connexion  (which  is  a 
greater  Paradox  than  all)  even  that  Happi-^ 
nefs  or  Sovereign  Goody  the  End  of  this 
Moral  Art,  is  itfelf  too^  in  every  Inf  ant  y 
Confummate  and  Complete ; is  neither  heigh- 
tened or  diminijbed  by  the  Qi^ntity  of  its 
Durationy  but  is  the  fame  to  its  Enjoyers, 
for  a Moment  or  a Century^ 


Upon  this  I fmiled.  He  afked  me 
the  Reafon.  ’Tis  only  to  obferve,  faid  I, 

the  Courfe  of  our  Inquiries A new  Hy- 

pothefis  has  been  advanced Appearing 

fomewhat  ftrange,  it  is  defired  to  be  ex- 
plained--^ 


'A  Dialogue. 


191 


plained—— You  comply  with  the  Requeft,  Part  It 
and,  in  purfuit  of  the  Explanation,  make 
it  ten  times  more  obfeure  and  uninfeUigibky 
than  before.  ’Tis  but  too  often  the 
Fate,  faid  he,  of  us  Commentators.  But 
you  know  in  fuch  cafes  what  is  ufually 
done.  When  the  Comment  will  not  ex- 
plain the  Text,  we  try  whether  the  Text 
will  not  explain  itfelf.^  This  Method,  ’tis 
poffible,  may  affift  us  here.  The  Hypo- 
thefis,  which  we  would  have  illuftrated, 

was  no  more  than  this -That  the  Sove-^ 

reign  Good  lay  in  Redlitude  of  ConduB ; and 
that  this  Good  correfponded  to  all  our  Pre-^ 
conceptions.  Let  us  examine  then,  whether, 
upon  trial,  this  Correfpondence  will  appear 
to  hold>  and,  for  all  that  we  have  advanced 
fince,  fuffer  it  to  pafs,  and  not  perplex  us. 

Agreed,  faid  I,  w;illingly,  for  noW 
I hope  to  comprehend  you. 

§.  2.  Recollect  then,  faid  he.  Do  you 
not  remember  that  one  Pre-conception  of  the 
Sovereign  Good  was,  to  be  accomf?iodate  to 
all  Times  and  Places  ? I remember  it. 

And 


igz  Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

Part  IL  And  is  there  any  T^ime^  or  any 

whence  ReBitude  of  ConduB  may  be  ex- 
cluded? Is  there  not  a right  Adtion  in 
Proiperity,  a right  Aftion  in  Adverfity  ? — - 
May  there  not  be  a decent^  generous,  and 
laudable  Behaviour ^ not  only  in  Peace,  in 
Power,  and  in  Health;  but  in  War,  in 
' Oppreffion,  in  Sicknefs  and  in  Death  ? 

There  may^ 

And  what  fhall  we  fay  to  thofe  oihe^ 

Pre-conceptions to  being  Durable^  Self- 

derivedy  and  Indeprivable  ? Can  there  be 
any  Good  fo  DUrabky  as  the  Power  of  al- 
ways doing  right  ? Is  there  any  Good  con- 
ceiveable,  fo  intirely  beyond  the  Power  of 
others  ? Or,  if  you  hefitate,  and  are  doubt- 
ful, I would  willingly  be  informed,  into 
what  Circumftances  may  Fortune  throw  a 
brave  and  honeft  Man,  where  it  fhall  not 
be  in  his  Power  to  aB  bravely  and  honefly  ? 
If  there  are  no  fuch,  then  ReBitude  of  Con- 
duBy  if  a Good^  is  a Good  Indeprivable, 

I confeS,  faid  I,  it  appears  fo. 


But 


A Dialogue. 


^93 


But  farther,  fald  he — Another  Pr^- Part II. 
conception  of  the  Sovereign  Good  was,  to  be  ^ 
Agreeable  to  Nature.  It  was.  And 
can  any  thing  be  more  agreeable  to  a 
Rational  and  Social  Animal^  than  Rational 
and  Social  Conduct  ? Nothing.  But 
Redlitude  of  Conduct  is  with  us  Rational  and 
Social  ConduSl.  It  is. 

Once  more,  continued  he-— Another 
Pre-conception  of  this  Good  was,  to  be  Con^ 
ducive^  not  to  Mere-being,  but  to  Well* 
being.  Admit  it.  And  can  any 
thing,  believe  you,  conduce  fo  probably  to 
the  Well-being  of  a Rational  Social  Animal, 
as  the  right  Exercife  of  that  Reafon^  and  of 
thofe  Social  AffeBions  ? Nothing. 

And  what  is  this  fame  Exercife^  but  the 
highejl  ReBitude  of  ConduB  ? Certainly. 

§.3.  You  fee  then,  faidhe,  how  well 
our  Hypothefis,  being  once  adrhitted,'  tal- 
lies with  our  Original  Pre-conceptions  .of 
the  Sovereim  Good,  I replied,  it  in- 

O deed 


194  Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

Part  11.  deed  appeared  fo,  and  could  not  be  denied. 

who,  think  you,  ever  dreamt  of  a 
Happinefs  like  this  ? A Happinefs  depen- 
dent, not  on  the  Succefs^  but  on  the  Aim  ? 

Even  common  and  ordinary  Life, 
replied  he,  can  furnilh  us  with  Examples. 
Aik  of  the  Sportfman  where  lies  his  En- 
joyment ? Aik  whether  it  be  in  the  Pof- 
fejjion  of  a flaughter’d  Hare,  or  Fox  ? He 
would  rejed:,  with  Contempt,  the  very 
Suppofition — He  would  tell  you,  as  well 
as  he  v^as  able,  that  the  Joy  was  in  the 
Furfuit — in  the  Difficulties  which  are  ob- 
viated; in  the  Faults,  which  are  retrieved; 
in  the  Condudi  and  Diredion  of  the  Chace 
thro*  all  its  Parts — that  the  Completion  of 
their  Endeavours  was  fo  far  from  giving 
them  Joy,  that  inftantly  at  that  Period  all 
their  Joy  was  at  an  end.  For  SpOrtf- 
men,  replied  I,  this  may  be  no  bad  Rea- 
foning.  It  is  not  the  Sentiment,  faid  he, 

of  Sportfmen  alone.  The  Man  of  Gal- 
lantry net  unoften  has  been  found  to  think 
after  the  fame  manner. 


— Meus 


A Dialogue.  195 

^ Mens  ejl  amor  huic  nam  Part  11; 

T^ranjvolat  in  medio  pojifa^  & fugientiacaptat, 

To  thefe  we  may  add  the  Tribe  of  Buil- 
ders and  Projeflrors,  Or  has  not  your  own 
Experience  informed  you  of  Numbers, 
who,  in  the  Building  and  Laying-out^  have 
expreffed  the  higheft  Delight ; but  fliewn 
the  utmoft  Indifference  to  the  Refult  of  their 
Labours,  to  the  Manfion  or  Gardens,  when 
once  finifhed  and  complete  ? ^ 

The  Truth,  faid  I,  of  thefe  Examples 
is  not  to  be  difputed.  But  I could  wifh 
your  Hypothelis  had  better  than  thefe  to 
fupport  it.  In  the  ferious  View  of  Happi- 
nefsy  do  you  ever  imagine  there  were  any, 
who  could  fix  it  (as  we  faid  before)  not 
on  the  Succefsy  but  on  the  Aim? 

More,  even  in  this  light,  faid  he,  than 
perhaps  at  firft  you  may  imagine.  There 
are  Inftances  innumerable  of  Men,  bad  as 
well  as  goody  who  having  fixed,  as  their 
Aimy  a certain  ConduB  of  their  own,  have 
O 2 fo 

* Hor.  Sat,  H.  L.  I.  V.  107. 


196  Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

Part  II.  fo  far  attached  their  Welfare  and  Happinefs 
to  it,  as  to  deem  all  Events  in  its  Profecu- 
tion,  whether  fortunate  or  unfortunate,  to 
be  mean,  contemptible,  and  not  worthy  their 
Regard,  I called  on  him  for  Examples. 

What  think  you,  faid  he,  of  the  Af- 
faffin,  who  flew  the  firfl:  Prince  of  Orange ; 
and  who,  tho’  brought  by  his  Condudt  to 
the  mofl:  exquifite  Tortures,  yet  confeious 
. cf  what  he  had  doney  could  bear  them  all 
unmoved?  Or  (if  you  will  have  a better 
Man)  what  think  you  of  that  llurdy  Romany 
who  would  have  difpatched  Porfenna ; and 
who,  full  of  his  Defign,  and  fuperior  to 
all  Events,  could  thrufl:  a Hand  into  the 
Flames  with  the  fteadiefl:  Intrepidity  ? 

I replied.  That  thefe  indeed  were  very  un- 
common Inilances* 

Attend  too,  continued  he,  to  Epi-‘ 
curus  dying,  the  Founder  of  a Philofophy, 

little  favouring  of  Enthujiafm T’his  I 

write  you  (fays  he,  in  one  of  his  Epiilles) 
while  the  laji  Day  of  Life  is  paffng^  and 

that 


A Dialogue.  197 

^ that  a Happy  One.  I'he  Pains  indeed  ^Part  II. 
my  Body  are  not  capable  of  being  heigh-- 
tened.  Tet  to  thefe  we  oppofe  that  Joy  of 
the  Souly  which  arifes  from  the  Memory 

of  our  pajl  Speculations'' Hear  him, 

conlbnant  to  this,  in  another  Place  affert- 
ing,  that  a Rational  Adverfty  was  better 
than  an  Irrational  Profperity, 

And  what  think  you  ? — Had  he  not 
placed  his  Good  and  Happinefs  in  the  fup- 
pofed  Rediitude  of  his  Opinions^  would  he 
not  have  preferred  Profperity^  at  all  rates, 
to  Adverfty  ? Would  not  the  Pains,  of 
which  he  died,  have  made  his  Happinels 

perfedt  Mifery  ? And  yet,  you  fee,  he 

difowns  any  fuch  thing.  The  Memory  of 
his  paft  Life,  and  of  his  Philofophical  In- 
ventions were,  even  in  the  Hour  of  Death 
it  feems,  a Counterpoife  to  fupport  him. 

It  muft  be  owned,  faid  I,  that  you 
appear  to  reafon  juftly. 

Pass  from  Epicurus^  continued  he,  to 
Socrates.  What  are  the  Sentiments  of  that 
O 3 divine 


198  Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

Part  11.  divine  Man,  fpeaking  of  his  own  unjuft 
Condemnation  ? 0 Crito^  fays  he,  if  it 

“ be  pleajing  to  the  Gods  this  way\  then  be 

“ it  this  way''  And  again “ Anytus 

and  Melitus,  I grants  can  kill  me ; but 
to  hurt  or  injure  mCy  is  beyond  their 
‘‘  Pcnver,"  It  would  not  have  been  be- 
yond it,  had  he  thought  his  Welfare  de- 
pendent on  any  thing  they  could  do ; for 

they  were  then  doing  their  worft — 

Whence  then  was  it  beyond  them? 

Becaufe  his  Happinefs  was  derived  not 
from  without,  but  from  within ; not  from 
the  Succefsy  which  perhaps  was  due  to  the 
Redlitude  of  his  Life,  but  from  that  Redli^ 
tude  alone,  every  other  thing  difregarded. 
He  had  not,  it  feems,  fo  far  renounced  his 
own  Dodtrine,  as  not  to  remember  his 

former  V/ords  5 that “ To  whom  ever 

‘ ‘ all  things,  conducive  to  Happinefs,  are  de- 
rived  folely,  or  at  leaf  nearly  from  him-- 
felf  and  depend  ?20t  on  the  Welfare  or 
Adverfty  of  others,  from  the  Variety  of 
whofe  Condition  his  (nvn  miijl  vary  alfo : 
He  it  is,  who  has  prepared  to  himfelf  the 

“ moft 


A Dialogue. 


199 

“ mojl  excellent  of  all  Lhes — He  it  is^  who  Part  II. 
is  the  Temperate^  the  Prudenty  and  the 

Brave He  it  isy  whoy  when  Wealth  or 

Children  either  come  or  are  taken  awayy 
will  bejl  obey  the  Wife  Man's  Precept — i- 
For  neither  will  he  be  feen  to  grievcy  nor 
to  rejoice  in  excefsy  from  the  Trujl  and 
Confidence  which  he  has  repofed in  himfelfj\ 

---Y o\i  have  a Sketch  at  leaft  of  his  Mean- 
ing, tho’  far  below  his  own  Attic  and  truly 
elegant  Expreffion.  I grant,  faid  I, 

your  Example ; but  this  and  the  reft  are 
but  Angle  Inftances.  What  are  three  or 
four  in  Number,  to  the  whole  of  Hu- 
man Kind  ? 


If  you  are  for  Numbers,  replied  he, 
what  think  you  of  the  numerous  Race  of 
Patriots,  in  all  Ages  and  Nations,  who  have 
joyfully  met  Death,  rather  than  defert  their 
Country,  when  in  danger  ? They  muft 
have  thought  furely  on  another  Happinefs 
than  Succefsy  when  they  could  gladly  go, 
where  they  faw  Death  often  inevitable. 
Or  what  think  you  of  the  many  Martyrs 
O 4 for 


200  Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

Part  II.  for'  Syftems  wrong  as  well  as  right,  who 
*“"*"'''**^  have  dared  defy  the  worft,  rather  than 
fwerve  from  their  Belief?  You  have 

brought  indeed,  faid  I,  more  Examples 
than  could  have  been  imagined. 

Besides,  continued  he,  what  is  that 
Comfort  of  a Good  Conscience,  cele- 
brated to  fuch  a height  in  the  Religion’ 
which  we  profefs,  but  the  Joy  arifing  from 
a Confcience  of  right  Energies  •y  a Con- 
fcience  of  having  done  nothing,  but  what 
is  confonant  to  our  Duty  ? I replied. 
It  indeed  appeared  fo. 

Even  the  Vulgar,  continued  he,  re- 
cognize a Good  of  this  very  Charafter, 
when  they  fay  of  an  Undertaking,  tho*  it 
fucceed  noty  that  they  are  contented 'y  that 
they  have  done  their  befy  and  can  accufe 
themfelves  of  nothing.  For  what  is  this, 
but  placing  their  Content y their  Goody  their 
fJappinefsy  not  in  the  Succefs  of  Endeavours, 
but  in.  the  Rectitude  ? If  it  be  not  the 
Reditude  which  contents  them,  you  muft 

> tell 


A Dialogue. 


20  f 


tell  me  what  ’tis  elfe.  It  appears,  Part  II. 
replied  I,  to  be  that  alone, 

I HOPE  then,  continued  he,  that 
tho*  you  accede  not  to  this  Notion  of 
Happinefs,  which  I advance;  you  will  at 
leaft  allow  it  not  to  be  fuch  a Paradox,  as 
at  firft  you  feemed  to  imagine.  That 
indeed,  replied  I,  cannot  be  denied  you. 

§.  4.  Granting  me  this,  faid  he,  you 
encourage  me  to  explain  myfelf- — ^We  have 
fuppofed  the  Sovereign  Good  to  lie  in  ReBi-- 
tiide  of  ConduB.  We  have.  And 
think  you  there  can  be  Redtitude  of  Con- 
duft,  if  we  do  not  live  confjlently  ? 

In  what  Senfe,  faid  I,  would  you  be  un^ 
derftood?  To  live  mifjiently^  faid  he, 
is  the  fame  with  me,  as  To  live  agreeably  to 
fome  one  fingle  and  confonant  Scheme^  or  Pur-- 
pofe.  Undoubtedly,  faid  I,  without  this^ 
there  can  be  no  Reftitude  of  Conduft. 

All  ReBitude  Condudt  then,  you  fay, 
implies  fuch  Confflence.  It  does. 

And  does  all  Cojififience^  think  you,  imply 

fuch 


202 


Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

Part  II.  fuch  ReBitude  ? I alked  him,  Why 
not  ? ’Tis  poflible,  indeed  it  may, 

faid  he,  for  aught  we  have  difcovered  yet 
to  the  contrary.  But  what  if  it  fhould 
be  found  that  there  may  be  numberlefs 
Schemes,  each  in  particular  confident  with 
itfelfy  but  yet  all  of  theni  different^  and 
fome  perhaps  contrary  ? There  may,  you 
know,  be  a confijlent  Life  of  Knavery,  as 
well  as  a conjijient  Life  of  Honefty^  there 
may  be  a uniform  Praftice  of  Luxury,  as 
well  as  of  Temperance,  and  Abllemiouf- 
nefs.  Will  the  Confiftence,  common  to  all 
of  thefe  LiveSy  render  the  ConduB  in  each, 
right  ? It  appears,  faid  I,  an  Abfur- 
dity,  that  there  fhould  be  the  fame  Refti- 
tude  in  two  Contraries.  If  fo,  faid  he, 

we  mull  look  for  fomething  more  than 
mere  Confifence^  when  we  fearch  for  that 
ReBitudey  which  we  at  prefent  talk  of 
A conffent  Life  indeed  is  requilite,  but 
that  alone  is  not  enough.  We  mufl  de- 
termine its  peculiar  Species,  if  we  would 
be  accurate  and  exaft.  It  indeed  ap- 
pears, faid  I,  necelTary. 


Nor 


'A  Dialogue. 


203 


N o R is  any  thing,  continued  he,  more  Part  II. 
eafy  to  be  difcuffed.  For  what  can  that 
peculiar  Confijience  of  Life  be  elfe,  than  a 
Life,  whofe  feveral  Parts  are  not  only  con- 
fonant  to  each  other y but  to  the  Nature 
alfo  of  the  Being,  by  whom  that  Life 
has  been  adopted  ? Does  not  this  Iqft  De- 
gree of  Confiftence  appear  as  requilite  as 
the  former?  I anfwered,  It  could  not 

be  otherwife. 

You  fee  then,  faid  he,  the  true  Idea 
of  right  Condudt.  It  is  not,  merely  To 
live  confflently  j but  ’tis  To  live  confjiently 
with  Nature.  Allow  it. 

But  what,  continued  he  ? Can  we  live 
confflently  with  Naturey  and  be  at  a lofs 
how  to  behave  ourfelves  ? We  cannot. 

And  can  we  know  how  to  behave 
ourfelves,  if  we  know  nothing  of  what 
befals  US;  nothing  of  thofe  Things  and 
EventSy  which  perpetually  furround,  and 
affedtus?  We  cannot.  You  fee 

then. 


204  Concerning  HAPPINESS, 


Part  11.  then,  continued  he,  how  we  are  again 
fallen  infenfibly  into  that  Doftrine,  which 
proves  the  Neceffity  of  fcrutinizingy  and 
knowing  the  Value  of  Externals.  I re- 
plied, ’Twas  true.  If  you  aflent,  faid  he, 
to  this,  it  will  of  courfe  follow,  that,  To 
live  confiftently  with  Nature^  is.  To  live 
agreeably  to  a juft  Experience  of  thofe  Things, 
which  happen  around  us.  It  appears  fo. 

But  farther  ftlll,  faid  he.— Think  you 
any  one  can  be  deemed  to  live  agreeably 
to  fuch  Experience,  if  he  feledi  not,  as 
far  as  poffible,  the  things  moft  congruous 
to  his  Nature  ? He  cannot.  And  by 
the  fame  Rule,  as  far  as  poffible,  muft  he 
not  rejedi  fuch  as  are  contrary^  He 
muft.  And  that  not  occafionally,  as 
Fancy  happens  to  prompt;  but  fteadily, 
conftantly,  and  without  Remiffion. 

I fliould  imagine  fo.  You  judge,  faid 
, he,  truly.  Were  he  to  afl:  otherwife  in 
the  le^ft  inftance,  he  would  falfify  his 
Profeffions;  he  would  not  live  according 
to  that  Experience,  which  we  now  fup- 

pofe 


A Dialogue, 


205 


pofe  him  to  pofTefs, 
would  not. 


I replied.  He  Part  IL 


It  fliould  feem  then,  faid  he,  from 
hence,  as  a natural  Confequence  of  what 
we  have  admitted,  that  the  EJJence  of 
right  ConduB  lay  in  Selection  and 
Rejection.  So,  faid  I,  it  has  ap- 
peared. And  that  fuch  SeleBion  and 
RejeBion  fliould  be  confonant  with  our  pro-- 
per  Nature.  "Tis  true.  And  be 
Jleady  and  perpetual^  not  occafional  and  in- 
terrupted. "Tis  true.  But  if  this  be 
the  Effence  of  Right  ConduBy  then  too  it 
is  the  ElTence  of  our  Sovereign  Good ; for 
in  fuch  Condudl  we  have  fuppofed  this 
Good  to  confift.  We  have. 


See  then,  faid  he,  the  Refult  of  our 
Inquiry. — The  Sovereign  Good,  as 
conftituted  by  ReBitude  of  ConduBy  has,  on 
our  flrifteft  Scrutiny,  appeared  to  be  this — 
To  LIVE  PERPETUALLY  SELECTING,  AS 
FAR  AS  POSSIBLE,  WHAT  IS  CONGRUOUS 

TO  Nature,  and  rejecting  what  is 


CON- 


2o6  Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

Part  IL  CONTRARY,  MAKING  OUR  EnD  THAT 

Selecting  and  that  Rejecting  only. 
’Tis  true,  faid  I,  fo  it  appears. 


§.5.  Before  we  haften  then  farther, 
faid  he,  let  us  flop  to  recolledt,  and  fee 
whether  our  prefent  Conclufions  accord 
with  our  former. — .We  have  now  liippofed 
the  Sovereign  Good  to  be  Rectitude  of  Con-- 
and  this  Conduct  we  have  made  con- 
fift  in  a certain  SeleBing  and  RejeBing, 

We  have.  And  do  you  not  imagine 

that  the  SeleBing  and  Rejediing^  which  we 
propofe,  as  they  are  purely  governed  by 
the  Standard  of  Nature^  are  capable  in 
every  inftance  of  being  rationally  juf  if  ed? 

I replied,  I thought  they  were. 

But  if  they  admit  a rational  fufification^ 
then  are  they  Moral  Offices  or  Duties -y 
for  thus  ^ you  remember  yefterday  a Moral 
Office  was  defined.  It  was.  But 
if  fo,  Tb  live  in  the  Practice  of  them,  will 

be 


^ Sup.  p.  175. 


A Dialogue, 


207 

be  To  live  in  the  Difcharge  of  Moral  Offices.  Part  II, 
It  will.  But  To  live  in  the  Dif 
charge  of  thefe^  Is  the  fame  as  Living  ac^ 
cording  to  Virtue^  and  Living  according  to 
Nature,  It  is.  So  therefore  is. 

Living  in  that  SeleBion^  and  in  that  Rejec- 
tion^ which  we  propofe.  It  Is. 

W E need  never  therefore  be  at  a lols, 
faid  he,  for  a Defcriptlon  of  the  Sove- 
EEiGN  Good.- We  may  call  it,  Rec- 
titude OF  Conduct. If  that  be  too 

contrafted,  we  may  enlarge  and  fay,  ’tis— 

To  LIVE  PERPETUALLY  SELECTING  AND 

Rejecting  according  to  the  Stan- 
dard OF  our  Being.— If  we  are  for 
ftill  different  Views,  we  may  fay  ’tis— — 

To  LIVE  in  the  Discharge  of  Mo- 
1 RAL  Offices — To  live  according  to 
i Nature — —To  live  according  to 

I Virtue To  live  according  to 

I Just  Experience  of  those  Things, 

^ which  happen  around  us. Like 

' fome  finifhed  Statue,  we  may  behold  it 
every  way;  ’tis  the  fame  Objeft,  tho* 

varioully 


2o8  Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

Part  IL  varioiifly  viewed ; nor  is  there  a View, 
but  is  natural,  truly  graceful,  and  en- 
gaging- 

§.6.  I CANNOT  deny,  faid  I,  but 
that  as  you  have  now  explained  it,  your 
Hypothefis  feems  far  more  plaufible,  than 
when  firft  it  was  propofed.  You  will 

believe  it,  faid  he,  more  fo  ftill,  by  con- 

fidering  it  with  more  Attention. In  the 

firft  place,  tho’  perhaps  it  efteem  nothing 
really  Good  but  Virtue,  nothing  really 
Evil,  but  Vice,  yet  it  in  no  manner 
takes  away  the  Difference^  and  DiJiinEiion 
of  other  Things.  So  far  otherwife,  it  is 
for  eftabliftiing  their  Diftinftion  to  the 
greateft  Accuracy.  For  were  this  negled:- 
ed,  what  would  become  of  SeleBion  and 
Rejediion^  thofe  important  Energies,  which 
are  its  very  Soul  and  Eflence  ? Were  there 
no  Difference,  there  could  be  no  Choice. 

"Tis  true,  faid  I,  there  could  not. 

Again,  faid  he.  It  is  no  meagre,  mor- 
tifying Syftem  of  Selff  denial — It  fupprefles 

no 


A Dialogue^ 


209 

no  Social  and  Natural  AfFedllons,  nor  takes  Part  II. 

away  any  Social  and  Natural  Relations^ v— J 

It  prefcribes  no  Abftainings,  no  Forbear- 
ances out  of  Nature ; no  gloomy,  fad,  and 
lonely  Rules  of  Life,  without  which  ’tis 
evident  Men  may  be  as  honeft  as  withy 
and  be  infinitely  more  ufeful  and  worthy 

Members  of  Society, It  refufes  no  Plea- 

fure,  not  inconfiflent  with  "Temperance 

It  rejedls  no  Gain,  not  inconfiflent  with 
fufice — — Univerfally,  as  far  as  Virtue 
neither  forbids  nor  difuades^  it  endeavours 
to  render  Life,  even  in  the  mofi  vulgar 
Acceptation,  as  chearful,  joyous,  and  eafy 
as  poflible.  Nay,  could  it  mend  the  Condi- 
tion of  Exiftence  in  any  the  mofi  trivial  Cir- 
cumftance,  even  by  adding  to  the  amplefi: 
Polfefllons  the  poorefi:  meaneft  Utenfil,  it 
would  in  no  degree  contemn  an  Addition 

even  fo  mean.  Far  other  wife It  would 

confider,  that  to  neglefl:  the  lead:  Acqui- 
fition,  when  fairly  in  its  power,  would 
be  to  fall  fhort  of  that  perfect  and  accurate 
Condudty  which  it  ever  has  in  view,  and 
on  which  alone  all  depends^ 

P 


And 


210 


Concerning  HAPPINESS, 


Part  II.  'And  yet,  tho’  thus  exad  in  every  the 
minutell:  Circumftance,  it  gives  us  no  Soli- 
citude as  to  what  Rank  we  maintain  in 
Life.  Whether  noble  or  ignoble,  wealthy 
or  poor ; whether  merged  in  Bulinefs,  or 
confined  to  Inadivity,  it  is  equally  conjijient 
with  every  Condition^  and  equally  capable 
of  adorning  them  all.  Could  it  indeed 
choofe  its  own  Life,  it  would  be  always 
that,  where  mofl:  focial  Affedions  might 
extenfively  be  exerted,  and  moft  done  to 
contribute  to  the  Welfare  of  Society.  But 
"if  Fate  order  otherwife,  and  this  be  de- 
nied ; its  Intentions  are  the  fame,  its  En- 
deavours are  not  wanting  5 nor  are  the 
Social^  Rational  Powers  forgotten,  even  in 
Times  and  Circumftances,  where  they  can 
leaft  become  confpicuous. 

\ 

I T teaches  us  to  conflder  Life^  as  one 
great  important  Drama^  where  we  have 
each  our  Part  allotted  us  to  ad.  It  tells 
us  that  our  Happhiefs,  as  A5lors  in  this 
Drama^  confifls  not  in  the  Length  of  our 

Part, 


A Dialogue. 


211 


Part,  nor  in  the  State  and  Dignity^  but  in  Part  II. 
ithey^,  the  decent y and  the  natural  Fer^ 

! formance^ 

If  its  Aims  are'fuccefsful,  it  is  thankful 
to  Providence.  It  accepts  all  the  Joys,  de- 
rived from  their  Succefsy  and  feels  them  as 
• fully,  as  thofe  who  know  no  other  Happi- 
: nefs.  The  only  Difference  is,  that  having 
a more  excellent  Good  in  view,  it  fixes  not, 
like  the  Many,  its  Happinefs  on  Succefs 
1 alone,  well  knowing  that  in  fuch  cafe,  if 
Endeavours  faily  there  can  be  nothing  left 
i behind  but  Murmurings  and  Mifery.  On 
the  contrary,  when  this  happens,  ’tis  then 
; it  retires  into  itfelf,  and  reflefting  on  what 
is  Fairy  what  is  Laudable  and  Ho?ieJi  (the 
truly  beatific  VifioUy  not  of  mad  Fnthufiafisy 
but  of  the  Calm,  the  Temperate,  the  Wife 
I and  the  Good)  it  becomes  fuperiour  to  all 
{ Events  5 it  acquiefces  in  the  Confcioufnefs  of 
5 its  own  Rectitude  5 and,  like  that  Manfion 
( founded,  not  on  the  Sands,  but  on  the 
Rock,  it  defies  all  the  Terrors  of  Tempefl 
and  Inundation. 

P ^ , §•  7' 


I 


212 


Concerning  HAPPINESS, 


Part  II.  §.  7.  Here  he  paufed,  and  I took  the 
Opportunity  to  obferve,  how  his  Subjedt 
had  warmed  him  into  a degree  of  Rap- 
ture ; how  greatly  it  had  raifed  both  his 
Sentiments  and  his  Stile.  No  wonder, 
faid  he.  Beauty  of  every  kind  excites  our 
Love  and  Admiration ; the  Beauties  of 
' Art,  whether  Energies  or  Works ; the 
Beauties  of  Nature,  whether  Animal  or 
Inanimate.  And  ihall  we  expedl  lels  from 
this  Supreme  Beauty ; this  morale  mental^ 
and  original  Beauty  \ of  which  all  the  reft 
are  but  as  "Types  or  Copies? Not  how- 

ever by  high  Flights  to  lofe  Sight  of  our 
Subjeft,  the  whole  of  what  we  have  ar- 
gued, may  be  reduced  to  this— - 

All  Men  pursue  Good,  and  would 
be  happy ^ if  they  knew  how  3 not  happy 
for  Minutes,  and  miferable  for  Hours,  but 
happy y if  poffible,  thro*  every  Part  of  their 
Exifence.  Either  therefore  there  is  a 
Good  of  this  fteady  durable  Kind,  or  there 
is  none.  If  7ione^  then  all  Good  muft  be 

tranfent 


I 

Dialogue.  213 

tranfient  and  uncertain ; and  if  fo,  an  Oh-  Part  II. 
jeB  of  loweji  Value^  which  can  little  de- 
ferve  either  our  Attention,  or  Inquiry.  But 
if  there  be  a better  Good^  fuch  a Good  as 
we  are  feeking ; like  every  other  thing,  it 
\ mujl  be  derived  from  fome  Caufe ; and  that 
> Caufe  muft  be  either  external^  internal^  or 
I mixt^  in  as  much  as  except  thefe  three, 

I there  is  no  other  poffible.  Now  a fteady^ 

I durable  Good^  cannot  be  derived  from  an 

[external  Caufe,  by  reafon  all  derived  from 
Externals  muft  fuBuate,^  as  they  fiuBuate. 
j By  the  fame  Rule,  not  from  a Mixture  of 
the  Two ; becaufe  the  Part  which  is  external 
will  proportionally  defroy  its  EJfence,  What 
• then  remains  but  the  Caufe  internal -y  the 
very  Caufe  which  we  have  fuppofed,  when 
we  place  the  Sovereign  Good  in  Mind-,  in 
ReBitude  of  ConduB-,  in  juft  SeleBing  and 
RejeBing?  There  feems  indeed  no 

other  Caufe,  faid  I,  to  which  we  can  pof- 
fibly  affign  it. 

Forgive  me  then,  continued  he, 

Ihould  I appear  to  boaft— — We  have 
P 3 proved. 


214  Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

Part  11.  proved,  or  at  leaft  there  is  an  Appearance 
have  proved,  that,  either  there  is  no 
Good  except  this  of  our  own \ or  that ^ if 
there  be  any  other ^ 'tis  not  worthy  our  Re-^ 
gard.  It  muft  be  confeffed,  faid  I, 

you  have  faid  as  much,  as  the  Subjeft  feems 
to  admit. 

§,  8.  By  means  then,  faid  he,  of  our 
Hypothefis,  behold  one  of  the  faireft,  and 
moft  amiable  of  Objefts,  behold  the 
TRUE  AND  PERFECT  Man  : that  Or- 
nament of  Humanity ; that  Godlike  Being; 
who,  without  regard  either  to  Pkafure  or 
Pain^  iminfluenced  equally  by  either  Profpe^ 
rity  or  Adverfty^  fuperiour  to  the  World  and 
its  befi  and  worfi  Events^  can  fairly  reft  his 
All  upon  the  ReBitude  of  his  own  ConduB ; 
can  conftantly^  and  uniformly ^ and  manfidly 
maintain  it  \ thinkmg  that^  and  that  alojie^ 
wholly  fufticient  to  make  him  happy. 

And  do  you  ferioufly  believe,  faid  I, 
there  ever  was  fuch  a Character  ? And 
what,  replied  he,  if  I fhould  admit,  there 

?ie'Vcr 


A Dl  ALOGUE.  215 

never  was,  is,  or  will  be  fuch  a Char  abler  F — Part  II. 
that  we  have  been  talking  the  whole  time 
of  a Being,  not  to  be  found ; 

Afaultlefs  Monjler,  which  the  World  ne'er  faw  ? 

Suppofing,  I fay,  we  admit  this,  what  then? 

Would  not  your  Syftem  in  fuch  a cafe, 
faid  I,  a little  border  upon  the  chimerical  ? 

I only  afk  the  Queftion.  You  need 

not  be  fo  tender,  he  replied,  in  exprefling 
yourfelf.  If  it  be  falfe,  if  it  will  not  in- 
dure  theTefl:,  I am  as  ready  to  give  it  up, 
as  I have  been  to  defend  it.  He  mufl:  be  a 
poor  Philofopher  indeed,  who,  when  he  fees 
^ruth  and  a Syjiem  at  variance,  can  ever 
be  felicitous  for  the  Fate  of  a Syftem. 

But  tell  me,  I pray Do  you  objedl 

to  mine,  from  its  Perfeblion,  or  from  its  . 
ImperfebtionF  From  its  being  too  excel- 
lent for  Human  Nature,  and  above  it ; or 
from  its  being  too  bale,  and  below  it  ? 

It  feems  to  require,  faid  I,  a Perfeblion, 
to  which  no  Individual  ever  arrived. 

That  very  'Tra^ifcendence,  faid  he,  is  an 
P 4 Argu- 


2 1 6 Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

Part  11.  Argument  on  its  behalf.  Were  it  of  a 
Rank  inferior,  it  would  not  be  that  Per-^ 
fedion,  which  we  feek.  Would  you 

have  it,  faid  I,  beyond  Nature  ? If  you 

mean,  replied  he,  beyond  any  particular  or 
individual  Nature^  moft  undoubtedly  I 
would.” — As  you  are  a Lover  of  Painting, 
you  lhall  hear  a Story  on  the  Subjed. 

In  ancient  days,  while  Greece  was 
flourilhing  in  Liberty  and  Arts,  a cele- 
brated  Painter,  having  drawn  many  ex- 
cellent  Pidures  for  a certain  free  State, 
and  been  generoufly  and  honourably  re- 
warded  for  his  Labours,  at  laft  made 
an  Offer  to  paint  them  a Helen^  as  a 
Model  and  Exemplar  of  the  moft  ex- 
quifite  Beauty.  The  Propofal  was  rea- 
dily  accepted,  when  the  Artift  informed 
them,  that  in  order  to  draw  07ie  Fair, 
’twas  neceffary  he  fhould  contemplate 
ma?iy.  He  demanded  therefore  a Sight 
of  all  their  fineft  W omen.  The  State, 
to  affift  the  Work,  afiented  to  his  Re- 
qneft.  They  were  exhibited  before 

him  j 


A Dialogue,  217 

« him  ; he  feledled  the  moft  beautiful ; Part  II. 
and  from  thefe  formed  his  Heleriy  more  ’ 
beautiful  than  them  all.’’ 

1 

\ 

You  have  heard  the  Fad,  and  what 

are  we  to  infer? Or  can  there  be  any 

other  Inference  than  this that  the  Stan- 

dard of  PerfeBion^  with  refpedi  to  the 
Beauty  of  Bodies^  was  not  (as  this  Artift 
thought)  to  be  difcovered  in  any  Individually 
hut  being  difperfed  by  Nature  in  Portions 
throl  the  many^  was  from  thence y and  thence 
onlyy  to  be  collected  and  recognized'? 

It  appears,  faid  I,  he  thought  fo.  The 
Pidure,  continued  he,  is  loft,  but  we  have 
Statues  ftill  remaining.  If  there  be  Truth 
in  the  Teftimony  of  the  beft  and  faireft 
Judges,  no  Woman  ever  equalled  the  De- 
licacy of  the  Medicean  VenuSy  nor  Man  the 
Strength  and  Dignity  of  the  Farnhefian 
Hercules.  ’Tis  generally,  faid  I,  fo 

believed. 

And  will  you,  faid  he,  from  this  unpa- 
falelled  and  tranfeendent  Excellence,  deny 

thefe 


2x8  Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

Part  II.  thefe  V/orks  of  Art  to  be  truly  and  ftriftly 
Natural?  ' Their  Excellence,  replied  I, 
muft  be  confefled  by  All;  but  how  they 
can  be  c^Jled  fo  ftridly  Natural^  I muft 
own  a little  ftartles  me.  That  the 

Limbs  and  their  Proportions^  faid  he,  are 
feledled  from  Nature^  you  will  hardly  I 
believe  doubt,  after  the  Story  juft  related. 

I replied,  ’Twas  admitted.  The 
Parts  therefore  of  thefe  Works  are  Na-- 
turaL  They  are.  And  may  not 
the  fame  be  afferted,  as  to  ^^ArrangC’- 
ment  of  thefe  Parts  ? Muft  not  this  too 
be  natural^  as  ’tis  analogous  we  know  to 
Nature  ? It  muft.  If  fo^  then 

is  the  JVhoky  Natural  So  indeed, 

faid  I,  it  ihould  feem.  It  cannot,  re- 
plied he,  be  other  wife,  if  it  be  a Fadl  be- 
yond dilpute,  that  the  Whole  is  nothing 
more,  than  the  Parts  under  fuch  Arrangement. 

Enough,  faid  I,  you  have  fatisfied  me. 

If  I have,  faid  he,  it  is  but  to  transfer 
what  we  have  afferted  of  this  fubordinate 
Beauty,  to  Beauty  of  a higher  Order it  is 

but 


A Dialogue. 


219 

but  to  pafs  from  the  External  to  the  Part  IL 
Moral  and  InternaL  For  here  we  fay,  by 
parity  of  Reafon,  that  no  where  in  any 
particular  Nature  is  the  perfect  CharaSler 
to  be  feen  intire.  Yet  one  is  brave  % an-» 
other  is  temperate^  a third  is  liberal and 
a fourth  is  prudent.  So  that  in  the  Multi^ 
tude  of  mixed  imperfedl  CharaBerSy  as  be- 
fore  in  the  Multitude  of  i^perfeB  Bodies^  is 
cxpreffed  that  Idea,  that  Moral  Stan- 
PARD  of  Perfection,  by  which  all  are 
tried  and  compared  to  one  another,  and  at 
laft  upon  the  whole  are  either  juftified  or 

condemned that  Standard  of  Perfedlion, 

which  cannot  be  but  mof  Natural^  as  it  is 
purely  colledled  from  Individuals  of  Na^ 
turey  and  is  the  Teft  of  all  the  Merit  to 
which  they  afpire.  I acknowledge, 

faid  I,  your  Argument. 

I might  add,  faid  he,  if  there  were 
Occafion,  other  Arguments  which  would 
furprize  you.  I might  inform  you  of  the 
natural  Pre-eminence,  and  high  Rank  of 
Specific  Ideas -y — that  every  Individual  was 
2 but 


220 


Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

Part  11. but  their  7ype^  or  Shadow; that  the 

Mind  or  IntelleEi  was  the  Region  of  Pof- 

fbles ; that  what  ever  is  PoJJible^  to  the 

Mind  adlually  Is ; nor  any  thing  a Non-- 
entity^  except  what  implies  a Contradict 
tion  that  the  genuine  Sphere  and  ge- 
nuine Cylinder,  tho’  Forms  perhaps  too 
perfebi^  ever  to  exijl  conjoined  to  Matter^ 
were  yet  as  true  and  real  Beings,  as  the 
grojfeji  ObjeBs  of  Senfe ; were  the  Source  of 
Infinite  Truths^  which  wholly  depend  on 
them,  and  which,  as  Truths,  have  a Being 
moft  unalterable  and  eternal.  But  thefe  are 
Reafonings,  which  rather  belong  to  another 
Philofophy ; and  if  you  are  fatisfied  with- 
out them,  they  are  at  beft  but  fuperfluous. 

He  waited  mot  for  niy  Anfwer,  but 
proceeded  as  follows.  ’Tis  thus,  faid 
he,  have  I endeavoured,  as  far  as  in  my 
power,  to  give  you  an  Idea  of  the  perfect 
Character : a Character,  which  I am  neither 
fo  abfurd,  as  to  impute  to  myfelf ; nor  fo 
rigorous  and  unfair,  as  to  require  of  others. 
We  have  propofed  it  only,  as  ’an  Exem- 
2 PLAR 


A Dialogue. 


^21 


PLAR  OF  Imitation,  which  tho’  A/c/^^PartlL 


we  think  can  eqml^  yet  All  at  leaft  may 

follow an  Exemplar  of  Imitation,  which 

in  proportion  as  we  approach,  fo  we  ad- 
vance proportionably  in  Merit  and  in 

Worth an  Exemplar,  which,  were  we 

moiifelfijhy  we  fhould  be  Fools  to  rejed:  5 if 
it  be  true,  that  to  be  Happy y is  the  ultimate 
Wijh  of  us  ally  and  that  Happinefs  and  Moral 
Worth  fo  reciprocally  correfpond,  that  there 
can  be  no  Degree  of  the  oney  without  an 
equal  Degree  of  the  other.  If  there  be 
Truth,  faid  I,  in  your  Reafonings,  it  can- 
not certainly  be  otherwife. 

He  continued,  by  faying The  Pro^ 

ficiency  of  SocrateSy  and  indeed  of  every 
honeft  Man,  was  fufhcient  to  convince  us, 
could  we  be  fteadfaft  to  our  Purpofe,  that 
fome  Progrefs  at  leaf  might  be  made  toward 
.this  PerfeBion — How  far,  we  knew  not — 

The  Field  was  open The  Race  was  free 

and  common  to  All Nor  was  the  Prize, 

as  ufual,  referved  only  to  the  Firft^  but 
All,  who  run,  might  depend  on  a Reward, 


having 


222 


Conceniing  HAPPINESS, 

Part  II.  having  the  Voice  of  Nature,  would  they 
liflen,  to  alTure  them, 

^ Nemo  ex  hoc  numero  mihi  non  donatm 
abibit. 

§.  9.  Here  he  paufed,  and  left  me  to 
meditate  on  what  he  had  fpoken.  For 
fbme  time  we  palTed  on  in  mutual  Silence, 
till  obferving  me  on  my  part  little  inclined 
to  break  it.  What,  faid  he,  engages  you 
with  an  Attention  fo  earneft  ? I was 

wondering,  faid  I,  whence  it  fliould  hap- 
pen, that  in  a Difcourfe  of  fuch  a nature, 
you  fhould  fay  fo  little  of  'Religion^  of 
Providence^  and  a Deity.  I have  not, 
replied  he,  omitted  them,  becaufe  not  in-- 
• timately  united  to  Morals  5 but  becaufe  what 
ever  we  treat  accurately,  fhould  be  treated 
feparately  and  apart.  Multiplicity  of  Mat- 
ter naturally  tends  to  Confufion.  They  are 
weak  Minds  indeed,  which  dread  a ra- 
tional Sufpence ; and  much  more  fo,  when 
in  the  Event,  it  only  leads  to  a furer  Know- 

ledge. 


* i?LNEID.  1.  V.  V.  305. 


A Dialogue.  223 

ledge,  and  often  ftrengthens  the  very  Sub-  Part  IL 
jed,  on  which  we  fulpend.  Could  I how- 
ever  repeat  you  the  Words  of  a venerable 
Sage,  (for  I can  call  him  no  other)  whom 
once  I heard  diflerting  on  the  Topic  of 
Religion,  and  whom  ftill  I hear,  when 
ever  I think  on  him;  you  might  accept 
perhaps  my  Religious  Theories  as  candidly, 
as  you  have  my  Moral.  I prelTed  him 
to  repeat  them,  with  which  he  willingly 
complied. 

The  Speaker,  faid  he,  whofe  Words  I 
am  attempting  to  relate,  and  whom  for 
; the  prefent  I name  "TheophiluSy  was  of  a 
Charafter  truly  amiable  in  every  part. 

When  young,  he  had  been  fortunate  in  a 
liberal  Education ; had  been  a Friend  to 
I the  Mufes,  and  approved  himfelf  fuch  to 
i the  Public.  As  Life  declined,  he  wifely 
! retired,  and  dedicated  his  Time  almoft 
‘ wholly  to  Contemplation.  Yet  could  he 
never  forget  the  Mufes,  whom  once  he 
I loved.  He  retained  in  his  Difeourfe  (and 
I fo  in  the  Sequel  you  will  foon  find)  a large 
1 Portion 

j 

! 


224  Concerning  HApPINESS, 

Part  11.  Portion  of  that  rapturous,  anti-profaic  Stile^ 
in  which  thofe  Ladies  ufually  choofe  to  ex- 
prefs  themfelves. 

W E were  walking,  not  (as  now)  in  the 
chearful  Face  of  Day,  but  late  in  the  Even- 
ing, when  the  Sun  had  long  been  fett.  Cir- 
cumftances  of  Solemnity  were  not  wanting 
to  affedl  us  5 the  Poets  could  not  have 

feigned  any  more  happy  a running 

Stream,  an  ancient  Wood,  a ftill  Night, 

and  a bright  Moonfhine. 1,  for  my  own 

part,  induced  by  the  Occafion,  fell  infenfibly 
into  a Reverie  about  Inhabitants  in  the 
Moon.  From  thence  I wandered  to  other 
heavenly  Bodies,  and  talked  of  States  there, 
and  Empires,  and  I know  not  what.  ■ 

Who  lives  in  the  Moon,  faid  he,  is 
perhaps  more  than  we  can  well  learn.  ’Tis 
enough,  if  we  can  be  fatisfied,  by  the  help 
of  our  beft  Faculties,  that  Intelligence  is  not 
confined  to  this  little  Earth,  which  we  in- 
habit; that  tho' Men  were  not,  the  World 
would  not  want  Spectators,  to  contemplate 

, its 


A Dialogue.  225 

its  Beauty,  and  adore  the  Wifdom  of  its  Part  II. 

Author, 

This  whole  Universe  itfelf  is  but 

ONE  City  or  Commonwealth 

a Syjlem  of  Subjlances  varioufly  formed, 
and  varioufly  aBuated  agreeably  to  thofe 

Forms a Syflem  of  Subfiances  both 

immenfely  great  and  fmall,  'Rational, 
Animal,  Vegetable,  and  Inanimate. 

As  many  Families  make  one  Village; 
many  Villages  one  Province,  many  Pro- 
vinces  one  Empire;  fo  many  Empires, 
Oceans,  Wafles  and  Wilds,  combined, 
compofe  that  Earth  on  which  we  live. 

“ Other  Combinations  make  a Planet  or  a 
Moon;  and  thefe  again,  united,  make 
“ one  Planetary  Syflem.;  What  higher 
Combinations  fubfifl, . we  know  not. 

“ Their  Gradation  and  Afcent  ’tis  impof- 
“ fible  we  fhould  difcover.  Yet  the  ge- 
nerous  Mind,  not  deterred  by  this  Im-' 
menfity,  intrepidly  palTes  on,  thro’  Re- 
''  gions  unknown,  from  greater  Syflem 
9w  !!  to 


226  Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

Part  II.' to  greater,  till  it  arrive  at  that  greatejiy 
^*“''V***^«  where  Imagination  flops,  and  can  ad- 
vance  no  farther.  In  this  lafl,  this 
mighty,  this  flupendous  Idea,  it  beholds 
the  Universe  itfelf,  of  which  every 
Thing  is  a Part,  and  with  relpedl  to 
which  not  the  fmalleflAtom  is  either 
foreign  or  detached. 

Wide  as  it's  Extent,  is  the  Wifdom 
of  its  Workmanfliip,  not  bounded  and 
narrow,  like  the  humbler  Works  of  Art. 
Thefe  are  all  of  Origin  no  higher  than 
Human,  We  can  readily  trace  them  to 
their  utmofl  Limit,  and  with  accuracy 
difcern  both  their  Beginning  and  their 
End.  But  where  the  Microfcope  that 
can  fliew  us,  from  what  Point  Wifdom 
begins  in  Nature  ? Where  the  Telefcope 
that  can  defcry,  to  what  Infinitude  it 
extends  ? The.  more  diligent  our  Search, 
the  more  accurate  our  Scrutiny,  the 
more  only  are  we  convinced,  that  our 
Labours  can  never  finifli  ^ that  Subjefls 

inex- 


A Dialogue.  227 

inexiiauftible  remain  behind,  ftill  un- Part  II. 
‘‘  explored.  -v-^ 

“ Hence  the  Mind  truly  wife,  quit- 
ting  the  Study  of  Particulars,  as  know- 
ing  their  Multitude  to  be  infinite  and  in^^ 
comprehenfible,  turns  its  intelledlual  Eye 
to  what  is  general  and  comprehenliye, 
and  thro'  Generals  learns  to  fee,  and  re- 
cognize  what  ever  exifts. 

It  perceives  in  this  view,  that  every 
Subftance,  of  every  degree,  has  its  Na- 
‘‘  ture,  its  proper  Make,  Conftitution  or 
Form,  by  which  Vi  aBs,  and  by  which 
it  fuffers.  It  perceives  it  fo  to  fare  with 
every  natural  Form  around  us,  as  with 
thofe  Tools  and  Inftruments,  by  which 
Art  worketh  its  Wonders.  The  Saw  is 
deftined  to  one  Ad;  the  Mallet,  to  an- 
other;  the  Wheel  anfwers  this  Purpofe; 
and  the  Lever  anfwers  a different.  So 
Nature  ufes  the  Vegetable,  the  Brute, 
and  the  Ratiofial,  agreeably  to  the  proper 
Form  and  Cojifiitution  of  every  Kj7id.  The 

« Vegetable 


I 


228 

Part  II.  “ 


<C 

cc 

cc 

cc 

cc 

cc 

cc 

cc 

cc 

cc 

cc 

cc 

cc 

cc 

cc 

cc‘ 

cc 

cc 

cc 


Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

Vegetable  proceeds  with  perfedP  Injenji- 
bility.  The  Brute  polTelTes  a Senfe  of 
what  is  pleafurable  and  painful,  but  flops 
at  mere  Senfation^  and  is  unable  to  go  far- 
ther. The  Rational^  like  the  Brute,  has 
all  the  Powers  of  mere  Senfation^  but  en- 
joys fuperadded  a farther  tranfcendent  Fa-- 
culty^  by  which  it  is  made  confcious,  not 
only  of  what  it  feelsy  but  of  the  Powers 
themfelveSy  which  are  the  Sources  of 
thofe  very  Feelings;  a Faculty^  which 
recognizing  both  itfelf  and  all  Things 
elfe^  becomes  a Canon,  a Corredlor,  and 
a Standard  TJniverfaL 

Hence  to  the  Rational  alone  is  im- 
parted that  Master-Science,  of  what 
they  are,  where  they  are,  and  the  End 
to  which  they  are  deflined. 

Happy,  too  happy,  did  they  know 
their  own  Felicity;  did  they  reverence 
the  Dignity  of  their  own  fuperior  Cha- 
ra(fler,  and  never  wretchedly  degrade 
themfelves  into  Natures  to  them  fubor- 

dinate. 


A Dialogue. 


229 

dinate.  And  yet  alafs ! ’tis  a Truth  too  Part  II. 
certain,  that  as  the  Rational  only  are 
fufceptible  of  a Happinefs  truly  excel- 
lent,  fo  thefe  only  merge  themfelves 
‘‘  into  Miferies  part  Indurance, 

Assist  us  then.  Thou  Power 
Divine,  with  the  Light  of  that  Rea- 
SON,  by  which  Thou  lighteneft  the 
World ; by  which  Grace  and  Beauty  is 
diffufed  thro’  every  Part,  and  the  Wel- 
fare  of  the  Whole  is  ever  uniformly  up-r 
held ; that  Reafon,  of  which  our  own  is 
but  a F article  or  Sparky  like  fome  Pro- 
methean  Fire,  caught  from  Heaven  above. 

So  teach  us  to  know  ourfelves^  that  we 
may  attain  that  Knowledge,  which 
alone  is  worth  attaining.  Check  our 
“ vain,  our  idle  Refearches  into  the  Laws, 
and  Natures,  and  Motions  of  other  Be- 
“ ings,  till  we  have  learnt  and  can  prac- 
“ tife  thofe,  which  peculiarly  refpeft  our- 
felves.  Teach  us  to  be  fit  Adlors  in 
that  general  Drama,  where  Thou  haft 
allotted  every  Being,  great  and  fmall,  its 
0^3  pro- 


230 
Part  IL 


Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

proper  Part^  the  due  Performance  of  which 
is  the  only  End  of  its  Exiftence. 

‘‘Enable  us  to  curb  Desire  within 
“ the  Bounds  of  what  is  Natural  Enable 
“ us  even  to  fufpend  it,  till  we  can  employ 
“it  to  our  Emolument.  Be  our  firjl 
Work,  to  have  efcaped  from  wrong  Opi- 
“ 7iion^  and  bad  Habit that  the  Mind, 
“ thus  render'd  fincere  and  incorrupt,  may 
“ With  Safety  proceed  to  feek  its  genuine 
Good  and  H^ppinefs. 

“ When  we  are  thus  prevloufly  ex- 
“ ercifed,  thus  duly  prepaied,  let  not  our 
“ Love  there  flop,  where  it  firft:  begins  \ 
“ but  infenfibly  conduit  it,  by  thy  invi- 
“ fible  Influence,  from  lower  Objeits  to 
“ higher,  till  it  arrive  at  that  Supreme^ 
“ where  only  it  can  find  what  is  adequate 
“ and  full.  Teach  us  to  love  Thee,  and 

“ Thy  Divine  Administration 

“ to  regard  the  Univerfe  itfelf  as  our  true 
“ and  genuine  Country,  not  that  little  ca- 
fual  Spot,  where  we  firft  drew  vital 

Air. 


-^Dialogue.  231 

Air.  Teach  us  each  to  regard  Himfelf^  Part  II. 
but  as  a Part  of  this  great  Whole  ; 
a Part  which  for  its  Welfare  we  are  as 
patiently  to  relign,  as  we  refign  a Angle 
Limb  for  the  Welfare  of  our  whole 
“ Body.  Let  our  Life  be  a continued 
Scene  of  Acquiescence  and  of  Grati- 
TUDE  'y  of  Gratitude,  for  what  we  enjoy-y 
‘‘  of  Acquiefcence,  in  what  we  fuffer ; as 
both  can  only  be  referable  to  that  con- 
catenated  Order  of  Events,  which  can- 
not  but  be  bejly  as  being  by  Thee  ap- 
proved  and  chofen. 

In  as  much  as  Futurity  is  hidden 
‘‘  from  our  Sight,  we  can  have  no  other 
Rule  of  Choicey  by  which  to  govern  our 
Condudl:,  than  what  feems  confonant  to 
the  Welfare  of  our  own  particular  Na-- 
tures.  If  it  appear  not  contrary  to  Duty 
“ and  moral  Office,  (and  how  fliould  we 
judge,  but  from  what  appears?)  Thou 
canft  not  but  forgive  us,  if  we  prefer 
‘‘  Health  to  Sicknefs;  the  Safety  of  Life 
“ and  Limb,  to  Maiming  or  to  Death. 

Q_4  But 


232  Concerning  HAPPINESS, 


Part  II. 


‘‘  But  did  we  know  that  thefe  Incidents, 
or  any  other  were  appointed  us  \ were 
‘‘  fated  in  that  Order  of  incontroulable 
‘‘  Events,  by  which  Thou  preferveft  and 
adorneft  the  Whole : it  then  becomes 
“ our  Duty,  to  meet  them  with  Magna- 
nimity^  to  co-operate  with  Chearfulnefs 
in  what  ever  Thou  ordaineft;  that  fo 
we  may  know  no  other  Will,  than  thine 
alone,  and  that  the  Harmony  of  our 
^5  particular  Minds  with  thy  Univerfal, 
may  be  fteady  and  uninterrupted  thro’ 
''  the  Period  of  our  Exigence. 


Yet,  fince  to  attain  this  Height,  this 
“ tranfeendent  Fleight,  is  but  barely  pof- 
fible,  if  poffible,  to  the  moil  perfedl 
“ Humanity:  regard  wliat  within  us  is 
Congeinal  to  Hhcc',  raife  us  above  our- 
felves,  and  warm  iis  into  Enthufiafm, 
But  let  our  Enthuiiafm  be  fuch,  as  befits 
the  Citizens  of  Tliy  Polity ; liberal, 
gentle,  rational,  and  humane-— not  fucli 
as  to  debafe  us  into  poor  and  wretched 
Slaves,  as  if  Thou  wert  our  Tyrant, 
o ‘‘  not 


A Dialogue. 


233 


not  our  kind  and  common  Father  j Part  II. 


much  lefs  fuch  as  to  transform  us  into 
favage  Beajis  of  Prey^  fallen , gloomy, 
dark  and  fierce  5 prone  to  perfecute,  to 
“ ravage,  and  deftroy,  as  if  the  Luft  of 
‘‘  Maflacre  could  be  grateful  to  thy  Good- 
nefs.  Permit  us  rather  madly  to  avow 
Villany  in  thy  Defiance,  than  impioufly 
to  aflert  it  under  colour  of  thy  Service. 
Turn  our  Mind's  Eye  from  every  Idea 
of  this  Charadter ; from  the  Servile,  Ab- 
jedt,  Horrid  and  Ghaftly,  to  the  Gene- 
rous.  Lovely,  Fair  and  Godlike. 

Here  let  us  dwells be  here  our 

Study  and  Delight.  So  fliall  we  be  en- 
abled,  in  the  filent  Mirrour  of  Conteni’- 
^ plation^  to  behold  thofe  Forms^  which 

‘‘  are  hidden  to  Human  Eyes that  ani- 

mating  Wisdom,  which  pervades  and 

“ rules  the  Whole that  Law  irrefiftible, 

immutable,  fupreme,  which  leads  the 
Willing,  and  compels  the  Averfe,  to  co- 
operate  in  their  Station  to  the  general 
Welfare-^ — that  Magic  Divine,  which 


234 

Part  II.  “ 


C< 

cc 

€C 

it 

<c 

(C 

€C 

tc 

(Li 

€i 

ii 

iC 

ii 

€i 

ii 

it 

a 

a 

«c 

a 


Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

by  an  Efficacy  paft  Comprehenfion,  can 
transform  every  Appearance,  the  moft 
hideous,  into  Beauty,  and  exhibit  all 
Things  Fair  and  Goo-d  to  Thee, 
Essence  Increate,  who  art  of 
purer  Eyes^  than  ever  to  behold  Iniquity. 

Be  thefe  our  Morning,  thefe  our 
Evening  Meditations  — with  thefe  may 

our  Minds  be  unchangeably  tinged 

that  loving  Thee  with  a Love  moft  dif- 
interefted  and  lincere^  enamoured  of 
thy  Polity,  and  thy  Divine  Admi- 
nistration ; welcoming  every  Event 
with  Chearfulnefs  and  Magnanimity,  as 
being  bejl  upon  the  Whole,  becaufe  or- 
dained of  Thee)  propofing  nothing  of 
ourfelves,  but  with  a Referve  that  Thou 
permitteft ) acquiefcing  in  every  Obftruc- 
tion,  as  ultimately  referable  to  thy  Pro- 
vidence  in  a word,  that  working  this 

Condudt,  by  due  Exercife,  into  perfed 
Habit -y  we  may  never  murmur,  never 
repine ) never  mifs  what  we  would  ob- 
tain, or  fall  into  that  which  we  would 

‘‘  avoid ) 


A Dialogue, 


235 


avoid  j but  being  happy  with  that  tran-  Part  II. 
fcendent  Happinefs^  of  which  no  one 
can  deprive  us ; and  bleft  with  that  Di- 
vine  Liberty^  which  no  Tyrant  can  aii- 
noy;  we  may  dare  addrefs  Thee  with 
« pious  Confidence,  as  the  PhilGfophic  Bard 
« of  old. 


Condu5i  me^  Phou^  of  Beings  Caufe  Divine^ 
Where-e're  Tm  defin'd  in  thy  great  De/ign. 
“ A5live  I follow  on : for  Jhould  my  Will 
Reffy  Tm  impious -y  but  mufi  follow  filL 

In  this  manner  did  TheophiluSy  faid  he, 
purfue  the  Subjeft,  to  which  I had  led 
him.  He  adorned  his  Sentiments  with 
Expreffions  even  more  fplendid,  than  I 
have  now  employed.  The  Speaker,  the 
Speech,  the  happy  Circumftances  which 
concurred,  the  Night’s  Beauty  and  Still- 
nefs,  with  the  Romantic  Scene  where  we 
were  walking,  all  together  gave  the  Whole 
fuch  an  Energy  and  Solemnity,  as  ’tis  im- 
poffible  you  fliould  feel  from  the  Coldnefs 
of  a bare  Recital.  I,  continued  he,  for 

my 


2 


236  Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

Part  II.  my  own  part,  returned  home  fenfibly 
touched,  and  retained  the  ftrongeft  Feel- 
ings of  what  I had  heard,  till  the  follow- 
ing Morning.  Then  the  Bufinefs  of  the 
Day  gently  obliterated  all,  and  left  me  by 
Night  as  little  of  a Philofopher,  as  I had 
ever  been  before. 

§.  10.  And  is  it  poflible,  faidi,  fofoon 
to  have  forgotten,  what  feems  fo  ftriking 
and  fublime,  as  the  Subjeft  you  have  been 
now  treating?  ’Tis  Habit,  replied 

he,  is  all  in  all.  'Tis  Pra^ice  andExer^ 
cifcy  which  can  only  make  us  truly  any  thing. 
Is  it  not  evidently  fo,  in  the  moft;  com- 
mon vulgar  Arts  ? Did  mere  Theory  alone 
ever  make  the  meancft  Mechanic  ? And 
is  the  Supreme  Artijl  of  Life  and  Manners 
to  be  formed  more  eafily,  than  fuch  a 
one  ? Happy  for  us,  could  we  prove  it  near 
fo  eafy.  But  believe  me,  my  Friend,  good 
Things  are  not  fo  cheap.  Nothing  is  to 
be  had  gratis^  much  lefs  that  which  is  moft 
valuable. 


Yet 


A Dialogue. 


237 


Yet  however  fgr  our  Comfort,  we  have  Part  II. 
this  to  encourage  us,  that„  tho’  the 
culty  of  acquiring  Habits  be  great  and 
painful,  yet  nothing  fo  eafy,  fo  pleafant, 
as  their  ’EjiergieSy  when  once  wrought  by 
Exercife  to  a due  Standard  of  Perfedtion. 

I know  you  have  made  fome  Progrefs  in 
Mufic.  Mark  well  what  you  can  do,  as  a 
Proficient  this  way— Y ou  can  do  that,  which 
without  Habit,  as  tnuch  exceeds  the  wifeft 
Man,  as  to  walk  upon  the  Waves,  or  to 
afeend  a Cliff  perpendicular.  You  can 
even  do  it  with'  Facility ; and  (left  you 
fhould  think  I flatter)  not  you  yourfelf 
alone,  but  a thoufand  others  befide,  whofe 
low  Rank  and  Genius  no  way  raife  them 
above  the  Multitude.  If  then  you  are  fo 
well  alTured  of  this  Force  of  Habit  in  one 
Inftance,  judge  not  in  other  Inftances  by 
your  own  prefent  Infufficiency,  Be  not 
fhocked  at  the  apparent  Creatnefs  of  the 
perfeB  Moral  CharaBer^  when  you  com- 
pare it  to  the  Weaknefs  and  ImperfeBion  of 
your  own.  On  the  contrary,  when  thefe 

dark^ 


23 8 Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

PartIL  dark,  thefe  melancholy  Thoughts  affail 
you,  immediately  turn  your  Mind  to  the 
Confideration  of  Habit,  Remember  how 
eafy  its  Energies  to  thofe,  who  pojjefs  it ; 
and  yet  how  impraBicable  to  fiich,  as  pof^ 
fefs  it  not, 

I T mufl:  be  owned,  faid  I,  that  this  is 
a Satisfadlion,  and  may  be  fome  kind  of 
Affiftance  in  a melancholy  Hour.  And 
yet  this  very  Dodlrine  naturally  leads  to 
another  Objedlion. — Does  not  the  Difficulty 
of  attaining  Habit  too  well  fupport  a certain 
Affertion,  that,  defend  Virtue  as  we  wili^ 
*tis  but  a Scheme  of  Self  denial? 

By  Self-denial^  faid  he,  you  mean,  I 

fuppofe,  fomething  like  what  follows 

Appetite  bids  me  eat ; Reafon  bids  me  for- 
bear  If  I obey  Reafon,  I de?iy  Appetite; 

and  Appetite  being  a Part  of  myfelf  to 
deny  it,  is  a Self-denial.  What  is  true  thus 
in  Luxury^  is  true  alfo  in  other  Subjedls ; is 
evident  in  Matters  of  Lucre,  of  Power,  of 
Refentment,  or  whatever  elfe  we  purfue 

by 


A Dialogue;  239 

by  the  Didlate  of  any  PafTion.  You  Part  II. 
appear,  faid  I,  to  have  ftated  the  Objeftion 
■ juftly. 

To  return  then  to  our  Inftance,  faid  he, 
of  Luxury.  Appetite  bids  me  eat ; Reafon 

bids  me  forbear If  I obey  Reafony  I deny 

Appetite and  if  I obey  Appetite y do  I not 

deny  Reafon  ? Can  I a6t  either  wayy  'withr- 
out  rej elding  one  of  them  ? And  is  ‘ not 
Reafon  a Part  of  myfelf  as  notorioufly  as 
Appetite  ? 

Or  to  take  another  Example — I have 
a Depofite  in  my  Hands.  Avarice  bids 
me  retain — Confcience  bids  me  reftore.  Is 
there  not  a reciprocal  Defiialy  let  me  obey 
which  I will?  And  is  not  Confcience  a Part 
of  mey  as  truly  as  Avarice? 

Poor  Self  indeed  muft  be  denied, 
take  which  Party  we  will.  But  why 
fhould  Virtue  be  arraigned  of  thwarting  it, 

more  than  Vice  her  contrary  ? Make  the 

moft  of  the  Argument,  it  can  come  but  to 

tliis — 


Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

. this If  Self-denial  be  an  Objeftion  to 

Virtue^  fo  is  it  to  Vice If  Self-denial  be 

no  Objection  to  Vice^  no  more  can  it  be  to 
Virtue.  A wonderful  and  important  Con- 
clulion  indeed  ! 

He  continued  by  faying,  that  the  Soul 
of  Man  appeared  not  as  a fngle  Faculty^  but 
as  compounded  of  many that  as  thefe  Fa- 

culties were  not  always  in  perfed:  Peace 
one  with  another,  fo  there  were  few  Ac- 
tions which  we  could  perform,  where  they 
would  be  all  found  to  concur.  What  then 

are  we  to  do  ? Sulpend  till  they  agree  ? 

Abfurd,  impoffible. Nothing  therefore 

can  remain,  but  to  weigh  well  their  feveral 
Pretenlions^  attend  to  all,  that  each  has 
to  offer  in  its  behalf  3 and  finally  to  purfue 
the  Didates  of  the  Wifefl  and  the  Befl. 
This  done,  as  for  the  Sef-denial^  which 
we  force  upon  the  reft  3 with  regard  to  our 
own  CharaBer^  ftis  a Matter  of  Honour 

and  Praife with  regard  to  the  Faculties 

deniedy  ftis  a Matter  of  as  fmall  Weight,  as 
1^0  contemn  the  Noife  and  Clamours  of  a 

mad 


A DlAtOGUE.  241 

mad  and  fenfelcfs  Mob,  in  deference  to  the  Part  II. 
fober  Voice  of  the  worthier,  better  Citi- 
zens.  And  what  Man  could  be  juftified, 
ftiould  he  reje<3:  thefc,  and  prefer  a Rabble  ? 

§.  10.  In  this  place  he  paufed  again, 
and  I took  occafion  to  acknowledge,  that 
my  Objeftion  appeared  obviated.  As  the 
Day  advanced  apace,  he  advifed  that  We 
might  return  home;  and  walking  along 
leifurely,  thus  refumed  to  himfelf  the  Dif* 
courfe. 

' I dare  fay,  continued  he,  you  have  fecn 
many  a wife  Head  fhake,  in  pronouncing 
that  fad  Truth,  honjo  we  are  governed  all  by 

Interest. And  what  do  they  think 

fliould  govern  us  elfe  ? Our  Lofs,  our 

Damage,  our  Dijinterejl  ? Ridiculous 

indeed ! We  fhould  be  Idiots  in  fuch  cafe, 
more  than  Rational  Animals.  The  only 
Queftion  is,  where  Intereji  truly  lies : for  if 
this  once  be  well  adjufted,  no  Maxim  can 
be  more  harmlefs. 

« I 


R 


24a 


Concerning  HAPPINESS, 


PartIL  I find  myfelf  exifting  upon  a little 
a Spot,  fbrrounded  every  way  by  an  im- 

menfe  unknown  Expanlion. ^-Where 

“ am  I ? What  fort  of  Place  do  I 
inhabit  ? Is  it  exaftly  accommodated, 
in  every  Inftance,  to  my  Convenience  ? 
“ Is  there  no  Excefs  of  Cold,  none  of 
Heat,  to  offend  me  ? Am  I never  an- 
noyed  by  Animals,  either  of  my  own 
kind,  or  a different  ? Is  every  thing 
“ fubfervient  to  me,  as  tho’  I had  ordered 

all  myfelf  ? No — nothing  like  it 

the  fartheft  from  it  poffible. The 

World  appears  not  then  originally  made 
for  Hit  private  Convenience  of  me  alone? — 
“ It  docs  not.— But  is  it  not  poffible  fo  to 
‘‘  accommodate  it,  by  my  own  particular 

“ Induftry? If  to  accommodate  Man 

‘‘  and  Beaff,  Heaven  and  Earth,  if  this  be 
“ beyond  me ; 'tis  not  poffible. — What 
“ Confequence  then  follows  ? Or  can 
“ there  be  any  other  than  this — ^^if  I feek 
‘‘  an  Interefl  of  my  own^  detached  from  that 

u of 


243 


A Dialogue. 

I 

of  others  y I feek  an  Interefl  which  is  chi-  Part  11. 
meric al^  and  can  never  have  Exijience  ? -v-— ^ 

How  then  muft  I determine  ? Have 
‘‘  I no  Intereft  at  all  ? — If  I have  not,  I 
“ am  a Fool  for  flaying  here,  ’Tis  a 
‘‘  fmoaky  Houfe,  and  the  fooner  out  of 
it,  the  better. ~’But  why  no  Interefl? — » 

‘‘  Can  I be  contented  with  none,  but  one 
“ feparate  and  detached  ? — Is  a Social 
‘‘  Interest  joined  with  others  fuch  an 
‘‘  Abfurdity,  as  not  to  be  admitted  ? The 
Bee,  the  Beaver,  and  the  Tribes  of  herd- 
ing  Animals,  are  enough  to  convince 
me,  that  the  thing  is,  fome  where  at 
leafy  poffible.  How  then  am  I affured, 

that  ’tis  not  equally  true  of  Man  ?— 

‘‘  Admit  it ; and  what  follows  ? — If  fo, 
then  Honour  and  Justice  are  my 
Interest — then  the  whole  Train 
OF  Moral  Virtues  are  my  Inte- 
“ REST;  voithout  fome  Portiofi  of  which y 
««  not  even  ’Thieves  can  fnaintain  Society, 

R 2 


But 


244 


Concerning  HAPPINESS, 

Part  II.  “But  farther  ftill — I flop  not  here— 
I purfue  this  Social  Intereji^  as  far  as  I 
can  trace  my  feveral  Relations.  I pafs 
from  my  own  Stock,  my  own  Neigh- 
bourhood,  my  own  Nation,  to  the  whole 
Race  of  Mankind^  as  difperfed  through- 
out  the  Earth. — Am  I not  related  to  them 
ally  by  the  mutual  Aids  of  Commerce ; 
by  the  general  Intercourfe  of  Arts  and 
‘‘  Letters;  by  that  common  Nature y of 

which  we  all  participate? Again 

I muft  have  Food  and  Clothing. 

Without  a proper  genial  Warmth, 

‘‘  I inftantly  perifh. Am  I not  rela- 

ted,  in  this  view,  to  the  very  Earth 
“ itfelf  ? To  the  diftant  SuHy  from 
whofe  Beams  I derive  Vigour?  To  that 
ftupendous  Courfe  and  Order  of  the  inf-- 
niteNojl  of  Heaven  y by  which  the  Times 
and  Seafons  ever  uniformly  pafs  on  ?— — 
€<  Were  this  Order  once  confounded,  I 
could  not  probably  furvive  a Moment ; 
fo  abfolutely  do  I depend  on  this  common 
**  neral  Welfare. 


What 


A Dialogue. 


245 


What  then  have  I to  do>  but  to  Part  IL 
enlarge  Virtue  into  Piety? 
only  Honour  and  JuJlice^  and  v/hat  I 
**  owe  to  Man,  is  my  LjtereJi  5 but  Gratis 
tude  alfo,  Acquiefcence^  Kejignation^  Ado- 
“ ration^  and  all  I owe  to  this  gr.t2X  Polity ^ 

“ and  its  greater  Governor,  our  com- 
MON  Parent. 

But  if  all  thefe  Moral  and  Di- 
VINE  Habits  be  my  Interest,  I 
need  not  furely  feek  for  a better.  I 
“ have  an  Intereft  compatible  with  the 

Spot  on  which  I live 1 have  an  In- 

“ tereft  which  may  exift,  without  altering 
“ the  Plan  of  Providence  j without  mend- 
“ ingy  or  marring  the  general  Order  of 
‘‘  Events — I can  bear  what  ever  happens, 

“ with  manlike  Magnanimity ; can  be 
contented,  and  fully  happy  in  the  Goody 
which  I poffefs ; and  can  pafs  thro’  this 
turbid,  this  fickle,  fleeting  Period,  with- 
“ out  Bewailings,  or  Envyings,  or  Mur- 
” murings,  or  Complaints,’’ 


ANi> 


Concerning  HAPPINESS, 


And  thus,  my  Friend,  have  you  my 
Sentiments,  as  it  were  abridged ; my  Sen- 
timents on  that  Subjed:,  which  engages 
every  one  of  us.  For  who  would  be  un- 
happy ? Who  would  not,  if  he  knew 
how,  enjoy  one  perpetual  Felicity  ? Who 
are  there  exifting,  who  do  not  at  every 
inftant  feek  it  ? ’Tis  the  Wifh,  the  Em- 
ploy, not  of  the  Rational  Man  only,  but 
of  the  Sot,  the  Glutton,  the  very  loweft 
of  our  Herd,  For  my  own  Syftem,  whe- 
ther a juft  one,  you  may  now  examine, 
if  you  think  proper.  I can  only  fay  on 
its  behalf,  if  it  happen  to  be  erroneous, 
’tis  a grateful  Error,  which  I cherilh  and 
am  fond  of.  And  yet  if  really  fuch,  I 
lliall  never  deem  it  fo  facred,  as  not  wil- 
lingly, upon  Convidlion,  to  refign  it  up  to 
Truth, 

Little  pafs’d  after  this  worth  rela- 
ting. We  had  not  far  to  w^alk,  and  we 
..fell  into  common  Topics,  Yet  one  Obfer- 

vation 


A Dialogue. 


247 

vation  of  his  I muft  not  omit.  ’TwasPartll, 

what  follows. When  we  are  once, 

faid  he,  well  habituated  to  this  chief, 
this  MORAL  Science,  then  Logic 
and  Physics  become  two  profitable 
AdjunSls:  Logtc^  to  fecure  to  us  the 
PolTelRon  of  our  Opinions;  that,  if  an 
Adverfary  attack,  we  may  not  bafely  give 
them  up : Phyjics^  to  explain  the  Rcafon 
and  Oeconomy  of  Natural  Events,  that 
we  may  know  fomething  of  that  Univerfe, 
where  our  Dwelling  has  been  appointed 
us.  But  let  me  add  a Saying  (and  may 
its  Remembrance  never  efcape  you)  while 
you  find  this  great,  this  Majler-Science 
•wanting^  value  Logic  but  as  Sophijiry^  and 
Phyjics  but  as  Raree-Jhew ; for  both,  afliire 
yourfelf,  will  be  found  nothing  better. 

’Twas  foon  after  this  that  our  Walk 
ended.  With  it  ended  a Converfation, 
which  had  long  engaged  us ; and  which, 
according  to  my  Promife,  I have  here  en- 
deavoured to  tranfcribe. 


THE  END. 


' .,  _ ..'yyy-'y^ 

;:■ : 'j ' : 

■:  ■ >>■  ^ ’ 


\-r.S:  ti 

■ ■•■i  > 


i 


. '■„  ,-. 


Advertifement  to  the  Reader. 


E Author  has  chofen  to  feparate  all 
^ Notes  from  his  firji  and  third  Trea~ 
tifeSy  and  thus  fubjoin  them  to  the  Endy 
becaufe  thofe  Threat ifeSy  being  written  in 
Dialoguey  from  their  Nature  and  Genius 
admit  not  of  Interruption,  One  of  his 
Reafons  for  adding  Notes  waSy  to  give 
Weight  to  his  AJfertions  from  the  Autho- 
thority  of  antient  Writers,  But  his  chief 
and  principal  Reafon  was,  to  excite  (if 
pojjible)  the  Curiofty  of  Reader Sy  to  exa- 
mine with  flriHer  Attention  thofe  valuable 
Remains  of  antient  Literature.  Should 
he  obtain  this  Endy  he  Jhall  think  his 
Labours  (Juch  as  they  are)  abundantly 
rewarded. 


NOTES 


O N 

TREATISE  the  Firft; 

CONCERNING 

A R T. 

Note  I.  p.  6.  All  art  is  Cause.] 

maxume  proprium^  creare  iff  glgnere.  Cic. 
de  Nat.  Deor.  1.  2.  c.  22. 

•n-a,(Toc  TTfpt  'ym(Tiv,  All  Art  is  employed  in  Produc- 
tion^ that  is,  in  making  fomething  to  he,  Arijiot, 
Ethic.  Nicom,  1.  6.  c.  4. 

The  ahfive  efficient  Caufes  have  been  ranged 
and  enumerated  after  different  manners.  In  the 
fame  Ethics,  they  are  enumerated  thus — yci^ 

^oxao'iv  slv(x,i  (pvcTic^  t\i  Jg  vs?, 

TT^v  TO  ol  avOpwVy.  The  fever al  Caufes  appear  to  be 
Nature,  Neceffity,  and  Chance ; and  befides  thefe.  Mind 
or  Intelle5l^  and  zvhatever  operates  by  or  thro"*  Man. 
1.3.  c.  3.  The  Paraphraft  Andronicus  in  explaining 
this  laft  Paffage,  nay  to  J*/  avSpwTrs,  adds  oiou 
V a A At]  TIC  Tz-pa^jfj  as  for  injlance  Art,  or  any  other 
human  AEtion. 


Alex- 


252  NOTES  on  Treatise  the  Firjl. 


Alexander  Aphrgdisiensis  fpeaks  of  effi- 
cient Caufes  as  follows  : ’AAAa  jcupjw?  aina 

'TTQiYiriytoi^  (pva-iq  te,  TTpoctipscn^.  The 

Caufes^  which  are  ftriSfly  and  properly  efficient  y are 
Nature  y Arty  and  each  Man's  particular  Choice  of  Action, 
vtpi  p.  160.  B.  £ch’t*  Aid* 

In  what  manner  Art  is  diftinguiflied  from  the  reft 
of  thefe  efficient  Caufes,  the  fubfequent  Notes  will 
attempt  to  explain. 


Note  II.  p.  6.  Of  that  Painter  famed 
IN  Story,  ^c.]  See  Faler.  Max,  1.  8.  c.  ii. 


Note  III.  p.  12.  Art  is  Man  becoming 
A Cause,  Intentional  and  Habitual.]  Ari^ 
fiotky  in  his  Rhetoricy  thus  accurately  enumerates 
all  the  poflible  manners,  either  diredt  or  indi- 
redl,  in  which  Mankind  may  be  faid  to  ail  or 
do  any  thing,  jjdvlig  TTpalrycrt  TcdvTOCy  roc  y^lvy 
» J'i  dvlvg*  roc  J't  ccvl^g'  rcov  fxh  bv  /t/,r  aula?, 
roc  fch  ^loc  rix*iv  TTpcclmiriy  roc  J'l  Ig  'oivocj^xrig*  ruv 
djocyaug,^  roc  jSia,  rd  (pvarr  core  TrdvloCy 
croc  [Mn  J'i  du]^g  Trpd'lrvtriy  rd  fiVy  dico  rv^ng'  rd  ^iy 
(pvir£i*  rd  J'e  ^ipc,  *'0(roi  dvl^gy  nod  Zv  dvloi 

dilioiy  rd  fAv  £0®?,  rd  xocl  rd  f/.h  ^id 

Xoyiria^v  rd  J'£  dXoy'if'ov,  sg'i  Je  v fAv 

/xala  Xoyn  dycxh^ dXoyoi 

i^yvi  3cdi  £7ri0iijU,fa,  urs  Trdvloc  oroc  n-^ocIraa-iVy  ocvocy- 
an  TT^dlrtiv  dll^g  I't/Iqo*  $id  Tup^»jv,  ^id  QlocVy  ^td 

(p\j(riVy 


NOTES  on  Treatise  the  Firjl. 

(p'JO'lVf  £00?,  AoJ^JiTjUOV,  OujU,o\,  CTTiSu* 

fAlXV. 

All  Men  do  all  Things  either  of  themfelves^  or  not  of 
themfelves.  The  Things  which  they  do  not  of  themfelveSy 
they  do  either  by  Chance^  or  from  NeceJJityy  and  the 
Things  done  from  Neceffty^  they  do  either  by  Compulfion^ 
which  is  External  Necejity^  or  by  Nature^  which  is 
Internal,  So  that  all  Things  whatfoevery  which  Men 
do  not  of  themfelveSy  they  do  either  by  Chance^  or  from 
Compulfiony  or  by  Nature, 

Again  y the  Things  ^ which  they  do  of  themfelves ^ and 
of  which  they  are  themfelves  properly  the  CaufeSy  feme 
they  do  thro'  Cujiom  and  acquired  Habits  others  thro* 
original  and  natural  Defer e.  Farther^  the  Things  done 
thro'  natural  Defercy  they  do  either  thro*  fetch  Defer t 
ajfefled  by  Reafeuy  or  thro*  fuch  Defer e devoid  of  Reafen. 
If  it  be  ajfefeed  by  Reafen^  then  it  ajfumes  the  Denomi^ 
nation  of  Will ; — on  the  contrary  y the  irrational  Defer es 
are  Anger  and  Appetite, 

Hence  it  appears  that  all  Things  whatever y which 
Men  doy  they  necejfarily  do  thro*  one  of  thefe  feven 
Caufesy  either  thro'  Chance,  Compulfeony  Naturey  Cu- 
fiom,  Willy  Anger,  Appetite,  Arijl,  Rhet,  1,  i. 

C.  10. 

It  remains,  agreeably  to  this  Enumeration,  to 
confider  with  which  of  thefe  Caufes  we  ought  to 
arrange  Art.  ' 

As  to  Chance,  it  may  be  obferved  in  general 
of  all  Cafual  Events,  that  they  always  exclude  Inten* 
tion  or  Defegn : But  Intention  and  Defegn,  are  from 

Art 


253 


254  notes  on  Treatise  the  FirJI, 

Art  infeparable.  Thus  is  the  Difference  between 
Art  and  Chance  manifeft. 

As  to  External  Compulsion,  we  have  it 

thus  defcribed J's,  s 77  That  h 

an  Ati  of  Compulfion^  the  efficient  Principle  of  which  is 
from  without^  independent  of  the  Doer.  Ethte.  Nic, 
1.  3.  c.  I.  Again,  in  the  fame  Treatife,  1.  6. 
c.  4.  we  are  told  of  the  Works  of  Art^  that  they 
are  fuch,  coi'  v do^ri  h Iw  the  efficient  Principle 

of  which  is  in  the  Doer  or  Agent.  Thus  therefore  is 
Art  diflinguifhed  from  Compulfton. 

These  two  Caufes,  Chance  and  Compulfion^  are 
rnentioned  and  confidered  in  the  Dialogue,  Pages  6 
, and  7. 

Nature,  or  rather  Natural  Necessity,  is 
that  Caufe,  thro’  which  we  breath,  perfpire,  digeft, 
circulate  our  Blood,  ^c.  JVill^  Anger and  Appetite y 
are  (as  already  obferved)  but  fo  many  Species  of 
Natural  Desire,  confidered  either  as  affifled  by 
Reafon,  or  elfe  as  devoid  of  it.  Now  tho’  Natural 
Defire  and  Natural  Neceffiity  differ,  becaufe  in  the 
one  we  adf  fpontaneoufly  y in  the  other  not  fpontane- 
Quflyy  yet  both  of  them  meet  in  the  common  Genus 
of  Natural  Power.  Moreover  this  is  true  of  all  Na- 
tural Power y that  the  Power  itfelf  is  prior  to  any 
Energies  or  Ad:s  of  that  Power.  ’Oj  £>cN  ttqK- 

xdytig  l^slvy  ^ TroXXocKig  dy.iscroity  rdg  ocio'^wsig  lAaeO- 
fASVy  dxA  dvccTTuKiV^ 

y-ivot  For  [to  inflance  in  the  natural  Powers 

of  Senfation]  it  was  not  from  often  feelngy  and  often 

hearingy 


NOTES  on  Treatise  the  Firjl. 

hiaring^  that  we  acquired  thofe  Senfes ; hut  on  the  eon- 
trary^  being  firji  pojfejfed  of  them^  we  then  ufed  them^ 
not  through  any  Ufe  or  Exercife  did  we  come  to  pojfefs 
them,  Ariji.  Ethic.  1.  2.  c.  i. 

Now  the  C9ntrary  to  this  is  true  in  the  cafe  of 
any  Powers  or  Faculties  not  natural^  but  acquired  by 
Cujiom  and  Vfage.  For  here  there  are  many  Ener- 
gies and  Aits^  which  muft  neceffarily  precede  the 
Exiftence  of  fuch  Power  or  Habit^  it  being  evident 
(as  is  faid  in  the  fame  Chapter)  that  lye  7wv 
ivs^'ysiuv  dll  yiyvovloii^  from  fimilar  and  homoge- 
neous Energies.,  it  is  that  Habits  are  obtained.  So 
again,  in  the  fame  Place,  a hi  Tromv^ 

rdvla,  TTcMsg  y.ocv^dlvoy.tv*  oTov  diKohfxSy'lsi  dmddofJt.oi 
ymvlxiy  Koc)  Kt^a^if’oci,  P'hePhings  which 

we  are  to  do  by  having  learnt we  learn  by  doing.  Thus 
by  building  Men  become  Builders^  and  by  pratiifng  Mufc 
they  become  Mufuians. 

Thus  therefore  is  Art  diftinguilhed  from  all 
Natural  Power  of  Man,  whether  Natural 
Necejfty.,  Will.,  Anger.,  or  Appetite.  But  Art  has 
been  already  diftinguilhed  from  Chance  and  Com- 
pulsion. So  that  being  clearly  not  the  fame  with 
fix  of  thofe  feven  Caufes  by  which  all  Men  do  all 
Things,  it  muft  needs  be  referred  to  the  feventhy 
that  is,  to  Custom  or  Habit. 

It  muft  be  obferved,  the  natural  Caufes  or  Powers 
in  Man,  confidered  as  diftineft  from  Art,  are  treated 
in  the  Dialogue,  Pages  8 and  9, 


255 


And 


256  NOTES  'oh  Treatise  the  Firjl. 

And  iiow  as  we  have  fhewii  Art  to  be  a certain 
Caufe  working  in  Mah^  it  reffiaifts  to  (hew  how  it  ii 
diftinguifhed  from  thofe  other  Caufis  befide  Man.^  which 
we  fuppofe  to  operate  in  the  Univerfe.  Thefe  are 
either  fuch  Caufe s as  are  below  him,  like  the  Vegeta^ 
true  Power^  which  operates  in  Vegetables,  the  Sen* 
fitive  in  Animals;  or'elfe  fuch  Caufetz^  2x0  above 
him,  like  God,  and  whatever  is  elfe  of  Intelligence 
more  than  human. 

The  Causes  below  us  may  be  all  included  in 
the  common  Genus  of  Nature;  and  of  Nature 
may  fay  univerfally,  as  well  of  Nature  without  us 
^ as  within  us,  that  its  feveral  Operations-^  contrary  to 
thofe  of  Art,  are  not  in  the  leaf  degree  derived  from 

Cufiom  or  Ufage.  Thus  the  Author  above  cited 

’OuiJ'w  Tcoy  (pucsi  o'fl'jjv  aAAwf  oTou  0 

(pC(T£i  xaijo)  ay  uvu 

uv  {^v^lccKig  dvjov  t9i^v  riq  uvit)  piTrluv,  TO  TTV^ 

•Acclw,  None  of  thofe  Things,  vuhich  are  what  they  are  by 
Nature,  can  be  altered  by  being  accufomed.  Thus  a Stone, 
which  by  Nature  is  carried  downward,  can  never  be 
accufomed  to  mount  upward,  no  not  tho*  any  one 
Jhould  ten  thoufand  times  attempt  it  by  throwing  the 
Stone  upward.  The  fame  may  be  faid  of  accufoming 
Fire  to  move  downward.  Ethic.  Nicom.  1.  2.  c.  i. 
Again,  in  the  Works  of  Nature,  fuch  as  Trees, 
Animals,  and  the  like,  the  efficient  Principle  is  vi- 
tally united  to  the  Subjects,  wherein  it  operates. — 
h dvloTg  £%8(r»  rixuloc  rm  Ethic.  Nicom.  1.  6. 

c.  4.  But  in  the  Works  of  Art,  fuch  as  Statues  or 
Houfes,  the  efficient  Principle  is  difunited  from  the 
Subjedis,  and  exifts  not  in  the  Things  done  or  made, 

but 


257 


N O T E'S  on  Treatise  the  Firjl. 

but  in  the  Doer  or  Artljl — wv  h tw 

&AAa  {/.^  Iv  7w  TToinfxEvu,  Ethic.  Nic.  1.  6.  t.  4*  It 
is  indeed  pofTible  that,  even  in  Works  of  Jrt^  the 
Subject  and  efficient  Caufe  may  be  united^  as  in  the 
Cafe  of  a Phyfician  becoming  his  own  Patient,  and 
curing  himfelf.  But  then  it  rnufl  be  remembered 
that  this  Union  is  jcam  merely  acci-- 

dental^  and  no  way  effiential  to  the  conftituting  of 
Art,  confidered  as  Art.  By  this  therefore  is  A r t 
clearly  diftinguilhed  from  Nature,  whofe  Defi- 
nition informs  us  that  it  is  — rig  koc,)  ocilicc 

xtvfkS’ai  Ti^E^AEiv  Ev  w VTrdpysi  Trpwlojf,  xaS’  du]o 

y.7]  xoild  Tvi^Qs^mg,  A certain  Principle  or  Caufe  of 
moving  and  ceafing  to  move.,  in  fome  Suhjedi  wherein 
fuch  Principle  exifs  immediately.,  effientially,  and  not 
way  of  Accident.  Arift.  Natur.  Aufc.  1.  2.  c.  i. 


The  Cau  s e s,  which  are  of  Rank  superioUr 
to  Man.,  fuch  as  the  Deity,  can  have  nothing 
to  do  with  Art,  becaufe  being  (as  is  laid  in  the 
Dialogue,  p.  ii.)  perfedl  and  complete,  and  knowing 
all  from  the  Beginning,  they  can  never  admit  of  what 
is  additional  and  fecondary.  Art  therefore  can  only 
belong  to  Beings,  like  Men,  who  being  imperfetf 
know  their  Wants,  and  endeavour  to  remove  them 
by  Helps  fecondary  and  fubfequent.  It  was  from  a 
like  Confideration  that  Pythagoras  called  himfelf  a 
Philosopher,  that  is  to  fay  (according  to  his  own 
Explication  of  the  Name)  a Lover  and  Seeker  of 
what  was  wife  and  'good,  but  not  a Poflelfor, 
which  he  deemed  a Charader  above  him.  Con- 
fonant  to'  this  we  read  in  Platons  Banquet,  Gfu)» 
S 


NOTES  on  Treatise  theFirJi, 

CptAo(ro(p£r,  ernGuf^sT  (ro(pog  ym^oci*  fr* 

&c.  No  Gob  philofophizes^  or  defires  to  become 
wifie^  FOR  He  is  so  already.  Nor^  if  there 
he  any  other  Being  wife^  doth  he  philofiophize  for  the 
fame  Reafon.  On  the  other  handy  neither  do  the  Indocil 
philofophize ; for  this  is  the  Misfortune  of  Indocilityy 
without  being  virtuousy  good  or  prudenty  to  appear  to 
onefef  fufficknt  in  all  thefe  Refpedls.  In  general  there- 
forey  he  who  thinketh  himfelf  in  no  wanty  defireth 
not  thaty  which  he  thinks  himfelf  not  to  need.  Who 
iheny  faid  Socrates  to  Diotimay  (the  Speaker  of  this 
Narration)  Who  are  those  who  philoso- 
phize, if  they  are  neither  the  Wife  nor  the  hidocil? 
That  (replied  (he)  may  be  now  confpicuous  even  to  a 
Child.  They  are  those  of  middle  Rank, 

BETWEEN  THESE  EXTREMES.  Plat.  p.  203. 

tom.  3.  Edit.  Serrani. 


Here  we  fee  (agreeably  to  what  is  faid  in  the 
Dialogue,  pages  ii.  and  12.)  that  as  to  acquired 
or  fecondary  HabitSy  fome  Beings  are  too  excellent 
for  themy  and  others  too  bafe  y and  that  the  Deity 
above  all  is  in  the  Number  of  thofe  tranfcen- 
denty  and  is  thus,  as  a Caiifcy  diftinguifhed  from 
Art. 

There  are,  befides  the  Deity  and  Nature  now 
fpoken  of,  certain  other  external  Caufes,  which  are 
mentioned  in  the  firft  Note  as  diftind  from  Art ; 
namely  Chance  and  Necejfity.  But  of  thefe  hereafter, 
wlv'n  we  conlider  the  Subjelt  of  Art. 


Not5 


NOTES  on  Treatise  the  Fir  ft. 

Note  IV.  ^ 13.  Faculties,  Powers, 

ARE  OBSCURE  AND  HIDDEN  ThINGS ENER- 

GIES AND  Operations  lie  open  to  the 
Se-NSES.J  ’Ei  (J's  Xiym  ri  exacr'ov  Ta1wv,  oTcv 
'll  TO  voyfjixov^  5)  ri  to  dii^yfjixov^  TT^ol^pv  tTricr- 

XSTtIsOV^  Tt  TO  VOSJV,  XOi)  Tl  TO  d^d.VS^Oil*  TT^O- 
Isocci  ya^  xccl  (TCclpEr'^pcci  TTfiO^  ^y.oi.q  Twv  cuua|a£Coy 
lifTi  di  ivipysixi,  Tr^oEvJvy^dvoi’j.sv  ydp  ddjxTq^  xxl 
ja;  ^nvdfxeiq  diTo  Ittivo^ixbv,  If  we  are  to  ex- 

plain what  each  of  thefe  things  are^  as  for  inflance^  what 
the  intelligent  Principle^  what  the  fenfitive^  we  mufi 
frft  inquire  what  it  is  to  thinks  what  to  fee^  hear^  and 
ufe  the  Senfes,  For  with  refpeli  to  us  Men,  the 
Energies  aj^e  prior  and  more  evident  than 
the  Powers,  becaufe  it  is  in  the  Energies  we  are 
frft  cmverfant^  and  comprehend  the  Powers  from  them, 
Themift.  in  lib.  2.  de  Anima,  p.  76.  Edit.  Ald.Fol. 

Note  V.  p.  15.  Are  there  not  Pre- 
cepts, b’f.]  Vid.  Plat,  in  Min.  tom.  2.  p.  316, 
17.  Edit,  S err  an. 

As  to  thofe  low  Habits  here  mention’d,  from 
which  we  diftinguilh  Art  by  the  Number  and  Dignity 
of  its  Precepts,  they  fall  in  general  under  tlie  Deno- 
mination of  Ma7aioT£X,J^/a,  of  which  ^intilian  gives 
the  following  Account.  Mx1<xio1sx^id  quoque  ejl 
quesdam^  id  ef^  fupervacua  Artis  Imitatio^  quce  nihil 
fane  nec  boni  nec  mali  habeat^  fed  va?tum  laborem : 
qualis  illius  fuit^  qui  grana  ciceris^  ex  [patio  diftante 
miffa^  in  acum  continuo  iA  fne  frufratione  infer ebat : 
quem^  cum  fpeblajfet  Alexander y donajjl  didtur  ejujdem 
S 2 Ugu-^ 


259 


z6o 


NOTES  t?//  Treatise  theFirft.^ 

leguminh  modio,  ^od  quldem  pramium  fuit  illo  opere 
dignijjimum,  Inft.  Orat.  1.  2.  c.  20. 

Note  VI.  p.  17.  An  Habitual  Power  in 
Man  of  becoming  the  Cause  of  some  Ef- 
fect, ACCORDING  TO  A SySTEM  OF  VARIOUS 
AND  WElLL-APPROVED  PrECEPTS ] 

The  Peripatetic  Definition  of  Aft  is  yMd 
AoT«  TroiTfliKv  aa  efficient  Habit ^ joined  with 

found  and  true  Reafon,  Ariftot.  Ethic.  Nic.  1.  6.  c.  4. 

The  ^toic  Definition,  as  we  find  it  in  ^ext, 
Empir.  adverfus  Logicos^'^^,  392.  is,  £>c 

XOcloiXilll'SCOV  IfysyUfAVOitTf/dvCiOV  TT^oV^t)  T£A(^  £vp(^^v}rov 
rm  Iv  Tw  pM.  ' Thus  tranflated  by  Cicero  in  Dio- 
demes  de  Grammat.  L 2.  Ars  eji  Perceptionum  exerci- 
tatarum  colledtioj  ad  mum  exitum  vita  utilem  perti- 
nentium.  And  again  by  ^intilian^  Inft.  Orat.  1.  2. 
c.  18.  Artem  con  ft  are  ex  perceptionibus  confentientibus 
itf  coexercitatis  ad  finem  utilem  vita.  The  fame  De- 
finition is  alfo  alluded  to  in  the  Academics  of  Cicero, 

1.  2.  c.  7.  where  it  is  faid Ars  vero  qua  poteji 

effie,  nifi  qua  non  ex  una,  aut  duabus,  fed  ex  multis  animl 
perceptionibus  conjiat? 

There  is  a third  Definition  of  Art  cited  by 
^intilian  in  the  fame  place,  and  afcribed  by  him  to 
Cleanthes — Ar^  eft  potejias  via.  ( id  eft,  or  dine ) efficient. 

Now  if  we  compare  thefe  Definitions  with  that 
in  the  Dialogue,  we  fhall  find  them  all  to  correfpond. 
The  Habitual  Power  in  Man  of  becoming  the  Caufe  of 
feme.  Effiedi,  is  the  fame  as  TroivliKri  in  the 

Peripa- 


26i 


NOTES  on  Treatise  the  Firjl. 

Peripatetic  Definition.  According  to  a Syjlem  of  vari- 
ous and  well-approved  Precepts^  is  'the  fame  as  ^{\(^ 
Xoy>s  For  found  and  true  Reafon  muft  needs 

be  the  Bafis  of  all  fuch  Precepts^ 

Again,  as  to  the  fecond  Definition— The  Words 
Xornfji^oc  y.odlcx,Xrii\;suv  [a  Syjlem  of  Comprehenfions^  or  of 
certain  and  evident  Truths']  correfpond  to  the  latter 

Part  of  the  Definition  in  the  Dialogue According 

to  a Syfem  of  various  and  well-approved  Precepts.  The 
Word  [that  is  to  fay,  worked  in  hy 

Habit  and  Excercife]  correfponds  to  the  firft  Part, 
that  Art  is  a Caufe  founded  in  Habit,  And  the  reft 
^c.  that  is  to  fay,  a Syfem  which 
has  refpedi  to  fome  ufeful  and  ferviceahle  End  or  Purpofe 
in  Human  Life]  fhews  the  Syftem  here  mentioned 
to  regard  Pradfice  and  Adiion^  not  Theory  and  Specu 
lation.  And  thus  does  it  correfpond  with  the  Defi- 
nition of  the  Dialogue,  where  it  is  faid  that  Art  is 
an  Habitual  Power  not  of  merely  contemplating  and 
knowing.,  but  of  becoming  the  Caufe  of  fome  Effedt, 
It  is  not  indeed  exprefied  in  the  Dialogue,  that  this 
Effe<5t  has  refpe<5l  to  the  Utility  of  Hutnan  Life.,  be- 
caufe  this  latter  Circumfance  is  referved  to  the  Defi- 
nition of  the  final  Caufe  of  Art,  given  page  29. 

As  to  the  third  Definition  of  Art,  poteflas  via 
effciens,  a Power  operating  ?nethodically.,  it  may  be 
obferved,  that  by  being  called  an  operating  Power,  it 
is  diftinguiihed  from  Powders  purely  fpeculative  ; and 
as  it  is  faid  to  operate  methodically , or  hi  a Road  and 
regular  Procefs.,  it  is  diftinguiihed  from  Chance  as 
w?ll  as  blind  NcceJJity.  And  thus  far  it  coirefponds 
S 3 with 


NOTES  on  Treatise  the  Firft, 

with  what  is  offer’d  in  the  Dialogue.  But  it  doe<? 
not  appear  from  this  Definition,  v/hether  the  Power 
therein  mentioned  be  Original  and  Natural^  or  Se- 
tondary  and  Habitual^  becaufe  Powers  of  either  fort 
may  operate  methodically.  And  perhaps  Cleanthes 
intended  not  to  diftinguilh  fo  far,  but  took  Art  in 
that  larger  and  more  general  Senfe,  adopted  fome- 
times  by  the  Stoics  j as  when  they  defcribe  Nature 
herfelf  to  be, a riu^  o>Ico  Tr^bg  j/mcriv, 

an  artificial  Fire^  proceedmg  methodically  to  Production 
or  Creation-  For  it  is  not  to  be  im.agined,  they  in- 
tended by  this  to  infmuate  that  Nature  was  a Firey 
which  had  learnt  by  Flabit  fo  to  operate.  On  the 
contrary,  by  artificial  it  is  probable  they  intended 
no  more  than  foine  adtive  efificient  Prbicipley  working 
with  Reafion^  Order y and  Method  ^ of  which  Principle 
they  confider’d  Fire  to  be  the  proper  eft  Vehicle,  as 
being  of  all  Bodies  the  mofr  finbtUy  and  that  into 
wdiich  the  refr  are  all  ultimately  refolvable.  Vide 
Diog.  Laert.  1.  7.  Sedt-  156.  Cic.  de  Nat,  Deor. 
I.  2.  c.  22. 

Note  VII.  page  22.  It  should  seem  that 

THE  COMMON  OR  UNIVERSAL  SUBJECT  OF  Art 

WAS All  those  contingent  Natures; 

WHICH  LIE  WITHIN  THE  REACH  OF  HuMAN 

Powers  to  influence.] 

The  Cause  here  treated  is  the  Material, 
the  "'TAv,  or  or  to  8 yivdldt  rt 

hv7rd^'/rcv]^. 

Of  3.  Contingent y we  have  the  following  Defihi- 

fron  — hFdi(^£dtoci^  5^  TO  lvu£)(pg(,iVOVy  OV 


NOTES  c«  Treatise  theFlrfl. 

TiSal©^  S i^cti 

^ Me  t?T  aj^uvjcTov.  / call  that  a Co  ntingent,  which 
not  being  necejfary^  hut  being  fuppofed  to  he^  there  will 
follow  nothing  impojfihle  from  fuch  Suppofition.  Arift. 
Anal,  prior.  1.  i.  c.  13. 

That  this  is  true  in  Works  of  Arty  is  evident. 
It  is  not'  necef  ary y that  a given  Fragment  of  fuch  a 
Rock  (hould  affume  the  Figure  of  Hercules:  but 
there  follows  nothing  mpojftbley  if  we  fuppofe  it  fo 
figured.  ’Tis  for  this  reafon,  that  the  huhjeSt  of 
Art  is  in  the  Dialogue  called  a Contingent, 

But  however,  to  explain  the  whole  of  what  is 
faid  in  this  Place,  it  is  neceffary  to  go  backward, 
and  deduce  what  we  would  fay  from  fome  remoter 
Confiderations. 

The  Peripatetics  held  the  End  or  Aim  of  their 
Philofophy  to  be  the  difcovering  and  knowing  the 
’AfX^>  the  primary  and  creative  Principle  of  all 
Tubings,  They  purfued  this  Inquiry,  by  beginning  their 
Contemplation  from  thofe  things,  which  are  to  us  firft 
in  the  Order  of  our  Comprehenfion,  and  fo  afcend- 
ing  gradually  to  that  which  is  truly  firjly  in  the  real 
Order  of  Beings. 

• The  firft  and  original  Ohjebfs  of  our  Comprc- 
henfion  are  thofe  nearer  and  more  immediate, 
VIZ.  the  Objehfs  of  Senfcy  with  which  we  are  fur- 
rounded  on  every  Side.  Theft  Objehis  we  perceive 
to  be  all  in  motion  ; and  the  Motions  are  multiform^ 
various y and  often  to  each  other.-  The  Con-^. 

S 4 fequences 


263 


264 


NOTES  on  Treatise  the  Firjl. 

fequences  of  this  we  perpetually  behold.  By  fuch 
Motions  we  fee  that  not  only  the  mere  local  Site  of 
thefe  Beings  is  changed,  but  their  very  and 
Figure^  and  ^alities',  n^  more  than  this,  even 
the  Beings  themfelves  are  made  to  feparate  and  perijh^ 
while  new  Beings  arife  from  the  Re-afTemblage  of  the 
fcattered  Parts,  which  Parts  different  Motions  can  as 
well  concrete^  as  difunite.  The  Beings  or  ObjeSls  of  the 
Gharader  here  defcribed,  the  Peripatetics  denoted  un- 
der the  common  Appellation  of  the  ra  7^ 

(pS-cc^ld^  the  Beings  tnoving  and  corruptible. 

From  thefe  moving  and  perijhable  Objedls^  they 
paffed  to  thofe  fublimer  and  more  tranfcendent  Obje^s 
of  Senfe^  which  they  faw  adorn  the  Heavens.  Here 
likewife  they  difcovered  Motion ; but  then  this  Mo- 
tion was  uniform  and  conjlant  \ affedling  not  the  Be-- 
ings  moved^  fave  in  the  relation  of  local  Site.  As 
therefore  they  beheld  no  Change  in  the  Form  and 
EJfence  of  thefe  Beings,  they  deemed  them  {upon 
their  Hypothefis)  incorruptible.,  and  out  of  them  efta- 
blifhed  another  Clafs  of  Beings,  that  is  to  fay,  the 
-ra  y.ocl  the  Beings  moving  and  in- 

corruptible. 

From  thefe  fublimer  Objedis  of  Senfe.,  they 
paffed  to  Objedis  of  pure  Intelledi  ; to  Bodies  devoid 
of  all  Motion,  and  of  all  ^ality,  fave  that  in- 
feparabie  one  of  Figure ; fuch  Bodies  for  infrance 
as  the  Cube,  the  Sphere,  and  the  reft  of  Bo- 
dies mathematical.  From  mathematical  Bodies,  and 
the  Fruths  refulting  from  them,  they  paffed  to 
the  Contemplation  of  Fruth  in  general ; to  ^he 
Soul,  and  its  Powers  both  of  Intuition  and  Syl- 

Icgization ; 


NOTE  S on  Treatise  theFirJl. 

logization  ; to  Being  mlverfal^  and  above  both  Time 
and  Place  j and  thus  at  lafl:  to  that  fupreme  Caufe^ 
the  great  Principle  of  the  whole,  which  is  ever  the 
fame^  immutable  and  eternal.  The  feveral  Objebls  of 
this  intellectual  Comprehenfton  they  Ailed  not  merely 
a(p9^p1x,  but  ol(p9(zfJoc  xj  Beings  incorrup- 

tible and  immoveable. 

In  this  manner  did  the  Peripatetics  Ipeculate.- 
And  hence  was  it  they  eAablifhed  to  themfelves  three 

Species  of  Philofophical  Employment one  about 

Beings  motionlefs  and  eternal  j another,  about  Beings 
moveable  and  eternal'^  and  a third,  about  Beings 
moveable  and  perijhable.  The  firft  they  held  the 
proper"  Employment  of  the  Metaphyfician ; the  two 
laft  of  the  AJlronomer  and  the  Naturaliji. 

Afo'  Tr^ccyfAOclsTui*  v dwfflo'u'  ^ 

TTf^i  jweu,  ol(pB‘oi^'lov  11  J'f,  'nno]  m 

(pBocfA,  Idcirco  Tres  funt  TraCiationes  \ una^  de  im- 
mobili  i altera  de  eo<,  quod  moveiur  quidem^  fed  ejl 
interitus  expers\  tertia  de  rebus  ^ interitui  obnoxiis. 
Ariftot.  Natural.  Aufc.  1.  2.  c.  7.  Aio  r^sTg  oilt 
'Traoi’yy.OilsTocf  i (pBxfx’  Cr 

TTSOl  XlVlif/,£VXy  (Z(p^xplx  Ci'  11  TTf^i  X'/AvTllx  ^ 

Themijiii  Paraphrafis  in  loc. 

This  threefold  Subject  of  Philofophic  Inquiry 
is  elegantly  explained  in  the  following  PalVage. 
Tt  cl's  to'  t£A(^  £r*l  Tr\g  ^A^irolsXiXvg  (pitiO(roplccg  ; 

Pxfi'J  on  yvcovxi  TKV  TTOCvluV  '*>?y  TCOV  TTCCVT'XV 

^ripti^s^yov  dirUv^  rvv  de]  u(rx'Jlcog  sy^vcrxv*  diro- 


2.66 


NOTES  Tre  AT iSE  Firjl. 

^eUwtrt  7rav\u:v  duui/.Gt\iiv'  Ik£it>vc 

ra  ■n-mla  Tra^aytSat,  TiW  Js  ra  ayovlx 
fiV  TKTO  to'  tsA©^  ; (poc^/Xv  on  ^ ^i^cKTy-OcXioc  rm  ev 
p/^cuw  fAslcclSoX'^  uVa^p^oulwy*  loioiVToc  ifi  roc 

El/  yEV£(Tii  (p^ofiix.  cc'To  Tiiluv,  §i'2  ^scTcov  ^a<« 

^sf^alixcov,  dvizfo^usv  iocvl^t;  ettI  roc  ub)  wroculoog 
S^ovloc  * loioivlcc  20  TOi  OV^CCViOC*  KOc)  yVoO,  jU,£Ta 
TOi?  atTLCfjcxT^g  yV/a?,  £7rl  T>?y  Tr^'Jo'JrtV  ttccvIoov  a^p^'/v. 
IToicr'ri;  xiviicrsws’,  kccT  ^(tiocv  yVri?,  ^ xa7a  ttojoi;, 
? xoi7a  roTToVy  roc  fjch  Iv  ysvirsi  ^ (pB'oox  xocloc  Trocroiv 
7{iiri(Tiv  xivu'Jloii  'roc  h ov^dvioc  xccl^  fjcovrjv  r'^v  xccl^  tottov. 
Aio  Bvrdxloog  q^bve^v  octto  tcov  ttoAut^ottw?  Xm/OCEVUV 
eit\  rcz  Kocjd  ^iccv^  ^ fj.Qvnv  Xii/ncrtv  xivs/ucEvoi,  yrw? 

£VI  THN  AKINHTON  KAl  AEI  nSAT- 
rnx  EXOT2AN  APXFIN.  A,w^oy»»  slg  ro^g 
ncclnyc^i'ocg^  p.  I2.  Edit.  Venet.  8vo,  1545. 


The  Author  of  the  Dialogue  has  had  Reference 
to  this  threefold  Divifion  of  Subjedfs.^  as  may  be  feen 
in  that  Part  of  his  Dialogue,  which  gives  occafion 
to  the  prefent  Comment.  He  has  chofen  however 
to  flile  the  ’Ojoayia,  or  Heavenly  Bodies  rather 
Continge?its  of  higher  Order  than  Beings  necejfary.,  as 
imagining  the  former  to  be  their  truer  Charader. 


It  may  be  here  added,  that  the  Peripatetics  con- 
fined ^uVj-:  or  Nature y for  the  moll  part,  to  this 
Earth  of  our’s,  where  they  confidered  her  as  the 
aP/ive  Principle  of  Life  in  Plants  and  Animals.  Hence 
therefore  they  did inguilhed  not  her  from  thofe 

of  Art^  by  their  Necejfty  (for  the  Effedts  of  both 
they  treated  as  contingeiit)  but  from  the  Caufe  in 
2 Natural 


NOTES  on  Treatise  the  Firji.  267 

Natural  Subjecfls  operating  within^  in  Artificial  with- 
€uty  as  has  been  already  oberved,  p.  256,  257. 

I T may  be  farther  added,  that  they  placed  thefe 
Efi^eSls  of  Art  and  Nature^  and  indeed  all  other 
Contingents  whatever,  in  a middle  Rank  between 
Things  Necejfiary^  and  Things  Impojfiihle.  The  Rea- 
fon  was  evident.  Things  NecejJ'ary  could  not  but 
be ; Things  ImpoJJible  could  not  be  ; but  Contingents 
were  ra  hvcci  Itvai,  that  is,  were 

equally  fiufceptlhle  both  of  Being  and  Non-beings 

But  yet  tho’  all  Contingents  admitted  on  their 
Hypothefis  both  of  Being  and  Non-being,  yet  they 
juppofed  fome  to  have  a greater  Tendency  to  Ex- 
ifkAce,  and  others  to  have  a lefs.  The  fird:  Species 
of  thefe  they  ftiled  rd,  cog  sttI  to  ttoaO  the  ^Things 
which  happen  for  the  mofi  part ; the  Lad:,  td  W 
b^ccrloif,  the  Things  which  happen  lefs  frequently. 

Now  as  it  is  evident  that  both  Nature  and  Art 
oftener  obtain  their  End^  than  mifs  it  (for  complete 
Animals  are  more  frequently  born  than  Monllers, 
and  the  Mufician,  if  an  Artid:,  drikes  oftener  the 
right  String  than  the  WTong)  hence  it  was,  that 
they  ranged  the  Effects  of  Nature  and  Art  among 
thofe  Contingents  which  were  td  dg  iirl  to  ttoAu, 
Contingents  of  greater  Frequency.  But  yet  as  thefe 
Efrects  were  not  from  the  Hypothefis  necefjary\  and 
contrary  to  thefe  upon  occafion  happened,  hence  it 
was,  that  whenever  either  Nature  or  Art  became 
Caufes  of  the  td  Itt  sXocrloj^  thofe  rarer  Events.,  in 
fucii  cafe  they  ('Nature  and  ArtJ  were  confidered 

by 


268 


NOTES  oa  Treatise  theFirft. 

by  thcfe  Philofophers  as  a’lnjii  x«1a  (rufipEiSuxs'f 
Caufes  by  way  of  Accident^  and  not  according  to 
their  own  EJJence  and  diftinguifhing  Charabler.  In 
fuch  Inftances  it  v/as  that  they  afTumed  the  Name 
of  T'jxn  or  Fortune  or  Chance, 

T'JX’i  having  moftly  Reference  to  Works  of  Men^ 
dvlofcc%y  to  Works  of  Nature.  The  Inftances 
given  by  Tketiiifius^  in  Cafes  of  Chaiice  and  Fortune.^ 
are  as  follow,  A Tile  falls  from  a Houfe.  The 
End  of  its  falling  is  to  arrive  at  that  lower  Place, 
whither  Nature  would  carry  it  by  the  common  Law 
of  Gravity.  In  falling  it  firikes  and  wounds  a Paf- 
fenger.  This  lafl  Event  is  from  Chance.  Again,  a 
Man  digs  in  his  Garden,  to  plant.  In  digging, 
he  difcovers  a hidden  Treafure.  This  laft  Event  is 
from  Fortune.  And  thus,  adds  Themif  ius^  dvln 

fAv  ccvjr.v  diVicc,  dXXti  A 

xizrd  The  fame  individual  Action  is  the 

Caufe  of  one  Thing  from  its  own  peculiar  Charadlery 
and  of  another  Thingy  by  way  of  Accident.  And  again, 
fiv  ay  Twv  iSTcag  <rvf/,f3ixivovloov  n rm  (pva-tv  v rnv 
TT^odiosat'j  diTccv  Troog  sItteTv,  ccXX*  a xaS"’  dvlrv  . a 
raL^y  '^^oYjXS'BV  0 are  r yJ^auig 

xoilrjVE^^Tjy  dxX^  £i  Xixljd  (ri)u  piPfiKog.  ^—Of  thefe 
Events  we  may  call  Nature  or  Human  Will  in  a man- 
ner  the  Caufe^  but  yet  not  fo  from  themfelveSy  and  ac- 
cording to  their  own  peculiar  Effence ; for  it  was  not 
for  the  Jake  of  what  happened  that  either  the  Pafenger 
went  forth y or  the  Tile  fell  dow^nward,  but  if 
any  thing  it  was  by  Accident.  Themift.  in  lib.  2. 
Natur.  Aufciilt.  p.  26.  Edit._  Aid.  See  alfo  Ariflot^ 
Natur.  Aufeult.  1.  2*  c.  4,  5,  6. 


It 


NOTES  Treatise jF/^.  269 


I T muft  be  here  obferved,  that  nara  (TujwjSfpuxoV 
[fy  accident]  means  in  no  Part  of  thefe  Quotations 
accidental^  as  {landing  for  cafual ; for  this  would  be 
mere  Tautology j as  to  what  is  here  faid  concern- 
ing Chance,  It  means  rather  fomething  by  way 
of  Appendage ; fomething  Adventitious ; in  other 
Words,  it  means  Accident^  as  adhering  to  Subjiance^ 
without  which  it  can  have  no  Beings  tho’  fuppofe  it 
ahfent  or  tahen  away,  the  Nature  of  Subjiance  is  no 
way  affedied.  It  was  in  this  Senfe,  the  Peripatetics 
fuppofed  Chance  and  Fortune  to  be  Accidents  or  Ap^ 
pendages  to  Nature^  and  Mind.  According  there- 
fore to  them,  the  Suppofition  of  Chance  and  Fortune 
was  fo  far  from  excluding  Nature  and  Mind  from 
the  Univerfe,  that  they  demonftrably  proved  their 
Exiftence  in  it.  For  admitting  their  Account  of 
Chance  and  Fortune  to  be  juft ; if  we  grant  the  Acci- 
dents to  exift,  much  more  muft  we  grant  the  Sub- 
jedtSj  and  this  too  with  that  fuperior  Dignity  and 
Priority  of  Exifence^  which  is  evidently  due  to  all 
Subjedls  above  their  Accidents,  Well  therefore  did 
the  Philofopher  conclude  ilrs^ov  rd  ’Auro^arov, 
^ rj  Tu^v  T8  N«,  T7\<;  Subfequent  in  Ex- 

ijience^  Chance  and  Fortune  to  Mind  and 
.Nature,  Arifot.Natur,  Aufc.  1.  2.  c.  6. 

From  what  has  been  faid,  we  fee  the  Reafon  of 
that  Enumeration  of  Caufes  mentioned  in  the  Be- 
ginning of  the  firft  Note,  where  they  are  defcrjbed 
to  be  Necessity,  Nature,  Man,  and  For-^ 

TUNE. 


To 


NOTES  on  Treatise  tlx  Firjl, 


To  Necessity  they  refexred  all  thofe  Things 
and  Events,  which  they  fuppofed  of  necejfary  Ex^ 
ijlence. ; fuch  as  the  Univerfe,  the  Heaveply  Bodies, 
and  their  Motions  j Truth,  and  all  Univerfals, 
together  with  the  or  Principle,,  or  firji  Caufe 

pf  all  fhlnp. 

To  Nature,  Man,  and  Chance,  they  re- 
ferred all,  Cpntingmts  \ to  Nature  and  Man^  obtaining 
their  End^  they  referred  Contingent^  of  greater  Fre- 
qiiency  \ to  the  fame  Caufes,  confidered  as  operating 
befide  their.  Endj  and  thus  becoming  Chance  or  For- 
iu?ie^  they  referred,  thofe  oppofite  Contingents^  of  Ex- 
igence left  ufual. 

And  hence  as  Art  and;  Fortune  were  both  con- 
verfant  abouf  the  fame  Subjects  {viz,  the  Contingent y 
and  not  the  Necejfary and  were  both  referable  to 
the  fame  Origin  ( viz.  Many  becoming  a Caufe,  ei- 
ther defignediy  or  undefignedly ) hence  the  Meaning  of 
that  Verfe,  cited  hy  Arifiotle  from  Agatho  v 

TiX^n  Tu;^'/5y  ^ 

Art  loveth  Fortune^ ; Fortune  loveth  Art, 

A s much  as  if  he  had  faid,  that  thefe  were 
Undred  Powers^  which  amicably  confpired  to  afiift 
each  other  y that  Art  often  helped  Fortune y by  judi- 
cious ConduSi  y and  that  Fortune  often  helped  Arty 
by  lucly  Incidents,  See  Arifot.  Ethic.  Nic.  1.  6.  c.  4. 
More  might  be  cited,  but  we  cannot  lengthen  a 
Note,  which  has  proved,  ’tis  to  be  feared,  too 
long  already. 


Note 


NOTES  Treatise  theFirJl.  2ji 

Note  VIII.  ^p.  23.  I mean,  said  he,  by 

BEGINNINb,  THAT  CaUSE  FOR  THE  SaKE  OF 
WHICH, 

As  the  Cause  here  fpoken  of,  is  that  Caiife 
ufually  called  Final,  it  may  be  afked,  how  it 
comes  in  this  place  to  be  conhdered  as  a Beginning. 

The  Anfwer  is,  that  what  comes  laji  in  Pra^ice^ 

Hands  in  Theory  firft ; or  in  other  Words,  the  Order 
of  Ideas  in  the  IntelleH  of  the  Artift  is  exadly  in- 
vertedy  with  refpedl  to  the  Order  of  his  Energies. 

Thus  Jmmonius^—^o(,^oX\s  ydp  t??  pch 

TO  t£A©^  ytyviroit  dp^v  rv?  Trpa^ew?*  i^irocKiv  cl's 
TY\q  Trpajfw?  TO  teA©^,  dp^v  tv^  ^soopiocg,  oiov  0 
Ot>£oJo]w(^j  i7rirocfe]g  olxov,  Xiysi  koS*  Iocvtov^  Ittstoo^ 
yw  olnov  ZTOl^TCCl  * OTJip  £0  (nii’U70Ca‘l/>lXy  XwAuTiXO'^ 
ofJi.Ppuv  xau/X(j6Ti;v  t»to  il  hK  dv  yivoiro^  yivo- 
fxivng  opo(pvg,  ^E'jteoQev  Iv  app^frat  rrig  ^soopixg.  zrpo- 
Qocivoov  (PvTlV  ’^AAAa  T^TO  dv  yhoiTO,  yi- 
yo^ivoov  Tol'xj^v’  Ztoi  vx.  dv  ymivTOy  f/>‘n  ozTo[^Xri9h- 
TWV  Ge/XEA/wW*  oV  J'e  ^S^sKlOk  ix  dv  j3An9ii£Vy  jUV  o'pUX" 

Gewjus-  Tf}g  y^g.  evT0iv9tx  xfcriXn^ev  'n  ^Ecopioc,  EmuGsy 
»v  dpx^roci  ri  'srpd^ig,  zs-pOTipov  yd^  opvTTst  t>'v  ym* 
ii9'  arw  |3aAAEi  tov  9£p<.£Xiov’  hrcc  iysipsi  rotyyg* 
vg-epGV  Iwiri^ncri  tw  opG(pvVy  nrtg  eV*  teA*!^ 
z!-pd^£'jjg.  >1  f dp^ij  Ts-pd^sug^  teA^  Tvg  9€U)plxg, 

AfxiA.  stg  xxTYiy.  p.  15.  Edit.  Venet.  8vo,  ' - 

For  in  general  the  End  of  Theory  is  the  Beginning 
of  Practice  \ and  fo  reciprocally  y the  End  of  PraPrice^ 

the 


NOT  ES  an  Treatise  theFirJi. 

the  Beginning  of  Theory,  Thus  for  Inftance : An  Ar- 
chlte^j  being  ordered  to  build  a Houfe^  fays  to  himfef^ 
I am  ordered  to  build  a Houfe  ; that  is  to  fay^  a certain 
Defence,,  to  protedl  againf  the  Rains  and  the  Heats, 
But  this  cannot  be  without  a Roof  or  Covering.  From 
this  Point  therefore  he  begins  his  Theory.  He  proceeds 

and  fays But  there  can  be  no  Roof  if  there  be  no 

fValls  y and  there  can  be  no  Waltsy  without  fome  Foun- 
dations ; nor  can  there  be  laid  Foundations ^ without  open- 
ing the  Earth,  At  this  Pointy  the  Theory  is  at  an  End. 
Hence  therefore  commences  the  Practice  or  Adiion.  For 
fir  ft  he  opens  the  Earth ; then  lays  the  Foundation ; then 
raifes  the  Walls  \ and  laftly  puts  on  the  Roof  which 
is  the  End  of  the  Adiion  or  Pradficcy  [but  Beginning 
of  the  Theory']  as  the  Beginning  of  the  Pradlice  was  the 
End  of  the  Theory,  See  alfo  Arijl.  Ethic,  Nicom. 
i-3-  C.3. 

Note  IX.  p.  24.  Was  it  not  the  Abfence  of 
Health,  ^f.]  Fide  Platon,  de  Rep.  1.  i.  tom.  2. 
p.  34^’  T.dit.  Serrani.  *^X2(r7r£^  ^ ’ipoio 

£1  (TOOfJ^XTAy  Eivxi  dOOfj.xTi^  « zrpotrdsiTxi  tIv^' 

ilzTcif  av,  on  ZTocvruzeoLCi  yAv  zepoadCriXi.  did 
rx'j'cx  ^ n TB^vri  IxTpiyrn  v'ov  EpsyAvriy  ort  (Tuyd 

is~f  zro'j?!pd,v,  Jx  E^xpKsT  dvrcp  roArcp  sivoci,  ^uem- 
adrnodumy  inquamy  fi  a me  quarereSy  an  fatis  fit  Corporiy 
ut  fit  Corpus  y an  alia  quapiam  re  indigent : refponderemy, 
omnim  indigere.  Atque  hdc  quidem  de  Caufd  medicina: 
ars  itunc  eft  inventay  quoniam  Corpus  per  fie  profligatum 
efty  neque  ipji  fatis  efty  ut  fit  hujufmodi. 

Note  X.  p.  26..  Or  is  it  not  absurd 

TO  SUPPOSE  THERE  SHOULD  BE  AN  ArT  OF 

Imp  OS- 


273 


NOTES  on  Tk-e AT nt  the  Firjl. 

Impossibilities?]  What  is  here  faid  concerning 
the  Difference  between  thofe  things  for  which  we 
may  poffibly  wijh^  and  thofe  which  we  actually 
purfuey  is  expreffed  in  the  Ethics  of  Arijiotle^  1.  3. 
C.  2*  Tlpoocipeo-ig  [/\v  5/ctp  an  rm  st 

rig  (pocin  ■srpoaipek&cui,  ^oKofyi  ay  slvai.  f3^\n(ng 

J*’  Ig-]  ruv  d^vvc6TCi)v,  oTov  dc^oc'joca-ioig,  T’here  is  indeed 
no  determined  Choice  of  Adiion  with  refpedi  to  Things 
impojfihle  ; and  if  any  one  Jhould  fay  he  had  fo  deter- 
minedy  he  would  appear  to  be  a FooL  But  there  mays 
be  a Willing  or  Longing  after  things  impofible  \ as  for 
infanccy  never  to  die. 

Note  XL  p.  27.  The  Suggestions  of 
Will,  and  uninstructed  Instinct.]  Willy 
jSsXwKj  or  ’'ops^ig  ; uninflrudfed  Infindly 

cpegij  oiKoyir^.  See  before,  Note  IIL 

Note  XII.  p.  29.  The  Want  or  Absence 
OF  something  appearing  good;  relative 
TO  Human  Life,  AND  attainable  by  Man, 

BUT  SUPERIOR  TO  HIS  NATURAL  AND  UNIN- 
STRUCTED Faculties.] 

The  Cause  here  defcribed  is  the  to'  % 

Vvfxa,  or  FINAL. Ariflotk  in  his  PhyficSy  1.  2. 

c.  3.  in  enumerating  the  various  forts  of  Caufes, 

reckons  among  the  reft  to'  dg  to'  ts- 

^ T ayaSov  twu  aAAwv.  to  » iviy.oc  jSeA- 

hrovy  t£A(^  twv  aAAwv  iS-gAst  sivxi.  To  thefe  may 
be  added  that  Caufcy  which  is  conftdered  as  the  Endy 
and  Good  of  all  the  ref.  For  thaty  for  whofe  fake  all 
T the 


274 


N OT  ES  on  Treatise  theFtrJl, 

the  Others  are  deemed  necejfary^  has  jujl  Pretenfms  to 
be  beft^  and  to  be  the  End  of  them  all.  To  this  he 
fubjoins,  confonant  to  what  is  faid  in  the  Dialogue— 
J'iaCpepETw  pxTiJ'Ey  auro  iWm  dyoc^ov  ^ (poctvofxmv 
ccyMv  — Let  it  make  no  Difference  whether  we  call 
this  End^  real  Good^  or  only  apparent  Good.  So  in  the 
Beginning  of  his  Ethics  — Yldaot,  TroitTOi  /xe- 

0|U,oiw?  h Tf  7^  dyoc&S 

7iv^  B(pt£<^txi  ^oxsZ  Alo  y,oiXug  a7rf(pi?vavT0  t dyx^ 
S-ov,  » •sravra  l(pt£Tat.  Every  Art^  and  every  orderly 
Speculation^  fo  likewife  every  Adlion^  and  determined 
Choice  ofPurfuity  appear  all  of  them  to  tend  toward  fomt 
Good.  Well  therefore  have  they  pronounced  Good  tube 
that^  toward  which  all  things  tend. 

In  the  Definition  here  treated,  the  Words  \rela  ' 
tive  to  Human  Life^  exprefs  that  Part  of  the  Stoic 
Definition  of  Art  tI  rjp^^pvrov  ruv  fy 

Tw  ^<w.]  They  were  omitted  in  the  Definition,  p,  17. 
as  more  properly  belonging  to  the  prefent  Defini- 
tion, which  refpe(Jls  Art  in  its  final  Caufe.  Sec 
page  261, 

That  what  is  perfect  and  felf-fufficient  is  above 
the  fecondary  Helps  of  Art  j that  our  own  Weaknefs 
and  Infufficiency  and  the  Profpedl  of  procuring  that  ab~ 
fent  Good,  by  which  we  all  hope  to  fupply  ourfelves, 
where  deficient  j that  this  is  the  Source  not  only  of 
all  Arts.^  but  (joined  to  focial  Affedlion)  is  the 
Origin.,  and  Cement  of  Human  Society;  fee 
(befides  the  Place  here  treated)  pages  ii,  12;  and 
of  the  third  Treatife^  p.  147  to  p.  157. 


Thus 


275 


NOTES  on  Treatise  the  Firfl. 

Thus  the  Poet  in  Stobceus^  p.  515. 

Xpftw  TToivY  rt  « Xpfiw  KEv  ayfupot; 

Need  all  things  taught : What  cannot  Need  invent  ? 

Acre  A ELY  alfo  to  this,  Virgil^  in  his  firft  Georgicy 
having  told  us  of  the  various  Changes  to  the  worfe, 
which  happened  in  the  natural  ^ox\d  immediately 
fubfequent  to  the  Golden  Age,  goes  on  to  enumerate 
the  feveral  Inventions  of  Men,  which  were  the  na- 
tural Refult  of  this  their  newly  indigent  State,  He  at 
lafl  fums  up  the  whole  by  faying 

Turn  varies  venere  artes : labor  omnia  vicit 
ImprobuSy  ^ duris  urgent  in  rebus  ege.stas. 

Where  (according  to  the  Dodrine  in  the  Dia- 
logue) Want  is  made  the  Beginning  or  Origin  of 
Arts.  The  Poet  even  refers  this  Difpenfationy  this 
Introdu(5tion  of  Indigence^  CarCy  and  Solicitudcy  to  the 
immediate  Will  of  Providence,  aefling  for  the 
Good  of  Mankind;  left  Plenty  ftiould  lull  them 
into  floathful  Lethargy y fo  as  to  forget  their  noblejt 
and  mojl  atiive  Faculties. 


Fater  ipfe  colendi 

Hand  facilem  efe  viam  voluity  primu/q-,  per  artem 
Movit  agrosy  curis  acuens  mortalia  cor  day 
Nec  torpere  gravi  pajfus  fua  regna  veterno. 

Note  XIII.  p.  32.  Co-existent,  replied 
HE,  AS  IN  A Statue,  ^c.  Successive,  as  in 
T 2 A 


NOTES  on  Treatise  tbeFirfi, 

A Tune  or  Dance,  6’^.]  This  Divifion  of 
Beings  or  Produ<5lions  we  find  mentioned  by  Jri~ 
Jiotle  in  his  Phyfics^  (1.  3.  c.  8.J  where  explaining 

his  Do(5lrine  concerning  Infinite^  he  fays ’axa* 

Itte)  ro  ftvat,  'K{/.£^cc  eV),  koc)  0 

dyooVy  rtp  ccs]  uXXo  koc]  dxXo  yiv£(Boiiy  aVw  xoci  to 
dis-sipov.  In  as  much  ^7;  Being  /V  manifoldy  fuch  as  is 
the  Being  of  a Day  or  public  Feftivaly  ( which  exiji  by 
continually  becoming  fomething  farther ) fuch  alfo  is  the 
Being  and  Nature  of  Infinite,  The  fame  Sentiment 
foon  after  is  more  fully  explained  and  opened. 

TO  ^TTiipOV  J XoCf/>(3oCVSlVy  Wf  TodV  Tt  * oloV 

d]^^po}zroVy  V oixiccD  * aAA*  cog  -^ixipoc  Xeyelocty  xod  i 
dywy  olg  ro  iivooiy  cog  ^rtoc  rig  yiyovsvy  aAA*  del 
£v  yeverei  xoci  (p9opd.  We  are  not  to  conceive  of  Infi- 
nitCy  as  of  a pofitive  particular  Subfiance,  like  a Man 
or  a Houfe  ; but  rather  as  we  pronounce  Exijlence  of  a 
Day  or  public  Feftivaly  which  have  their  EJfencey  fiot 
as  fenfibky  individual  Subfiances y but  by  a continued 
Procedure  of  Being  a?id  ceafing  to  be,  ^ 

Note  XIV.  p.  32.  ^What  is  Human  Life, 
BUT  A Compound  of  Parts  thus  fleet- 
ing, ^c.]  It  is  not  inelegantly  faid  in  the 

Ethics  fo  often  referred  to *H  ^cov  mp- 

yeid  lig  £fiy  Koc)  txocg~\^  ■srept  rodoroc  xocl  r^lroig 
evspyeTy  cc  xccl  pcooXiToc  dyxurd  * olov  0 y.vj  jwyo-tHoV, 
r'/]  dxoYi  zrepi  rd  yJXviy  0 J'g  (piXoy.x9ijgy  rij  J'tccvoi'x 
wepl  rd  9coop'^y.x'lx  * Je  xxl  rcov  Xofziroov  exxg~^. 
Life  is  a certain  Energy,  and  each  Man  energizes 
about  thofe  Subje^Sy  and  with  thofe  Faculties y for  which 
he  hath  the  greatefi  Affedlion  j the  Muficiany  with  his 

Hearingy 


NOTES  on  Treatise  the  Firjl. 

Hearings  about  Sounds  harmonious ; the  Studious^  with 
his  intelledf^  about  Matters  of  Speculation  ; and  in  like 
manner  each  Man  elfe  of  the  various  forts  befide.  Ethic. 
Nicom.  1.  10.  c.  4. 

Note  XV.  p.  34.  Every  Art  will  be 

ACCOMPLISHED  AND  ENDED  IN  A WoRK  OR 

Energy,]  The  Cause  here  treated  is  the  For- 
mal, called  by  various  Names  ; the  the 

the  Ti  Iri,  the  rb  rl  h sTvui, 

f 

I N the  Beginning  of  the  above-cited  Ethics^  after 
the  Author  has  told  us  that  every  Arty  and  Human 
Adlion  tend  to  fome  Good  or  Endy  he  adds 

Ti;  (poAviixi  Tcov  TiXm  • rd,  fji.lv' yd p sktiv  hspyeioct* 

rd  (J'g  dvrdg^  ’ipyoo  rivd---  But  there  appears  a 
Difference  in  Ends  : For  fome  are  Energies;  fome, 
ever  and  above  thefe  Energies y are  certain  Works. 
In  ^intilian's  Injiitutes  the  fame  Dijiindfiony  with 
refped  to  the  End  of  Arts,  is  mentioned  /.  2. 
<*.  181 

But  here  perhaps  it  may  be  afked,  if  dXXArts  are 
ended  and  accomplilhed  in  fome  Energy  or  TVorky  and 
this  Energy  or  Work  be  almoft  univerfally  that  abfent 
Goody  toward  which  they  all  tend,  and  for  the  fake 
of  which  they  are  all  exerted ; ffor  a Dance y which 
is  an  Energy,  and  a Houfsy  which  is  a Work,  are 
certain  abfent  Goods  or  Pleafures,  for  the  fake  of 
which  certain  Arts  operate)  if  this  be  allowed,  it 
may  be  alked,  whence  then  the  Difference  between 
the  Formal  Caufe  and  the  Fhialy  the  Pinal y as  in 
Note  XIL  it  has  been  already  treated  ? 

T3 


277 


The 


NOTES  on  TREivxisE  the  Firjl^ 


The  Anfwer  to  this  is,  that  they  concur  and  ate 
the  fame.  To  fiv  ri  eo,  Jcai  to  » ivix,<Xy  iv  lo.- 
7he  Formal  Caufe  and  the  Final  are  one.  Arifi, 
Nat.  Aufc.  1.  2.  c.  7.  If  they  differ.,  it  is  (as  Joannes 
Grammaticus  obferves  in  commenting  on  this  Place ) a 
Difference  rather  in  the  Dime  and  Manner  of  our  view- 
ing them,  than  in  their  own  Effence  and  Nature.  It 
may  not  perhaps  be  improper  to  tranfcribe  his  own 
Words,  Tuvlov  tw  aptO/xw  to'  teAo?  xcal  to  t^ 

^i<T£l  [XOVV}  J'nx(p£pOV,  COg  £fp7IT<Xl,  Koil  TW  ^pOVW,  0TlXl> 

fxh  ydp  wg  yivof^svcDy  xocl  y.'^7rw  ov  ^supv^at^  TiXog 
iriv  * OTXv  J'e,  ccg  y£vofAsvoVy  £l^og.  Dhe  End  and 
the  Yorm  are  numerically  the  fam,e^  differing  (as  has 
been  f aid)  /;z  Relation  and  Dime.  For  thus 
the  fame  Thing,  while  confidered  as  in  its  Progrefs  to 
Completion,  but  as  not  yet  complete,  is  fo  long  an  End  ; 
zvhen  confidered  as  adfually  complete,  is  no  longer  an  End, 
but  a Form.  And  thus  is  this  Queftion  one  way 
anfwered,  by  acknowledging  that  thefe  two  Caufes 
co-incide,  and  differ  not  in  their  Effence  or  real 
Charadler,  but  rather  in  the  Time  and  Manner  of 
our  contemplating  them. 

But  there  is  another  Anfwer,  and  that  is  derived 
from  the  twofold  Nature  of  final  Caufes.  According 
to  this  Doctrine,  Arts  have  not  only  a nearer  and 
more  imm-ediate  End,  (as  a Ship  is  the  End  of  Ship- 
building, or  Navigating  the  End  of  Pilotry)  but 
they  have  a fcill  remoter  and  higher  Etid,  a riXo;  Tf- 
?,iKWTcc\ov,  that  is  to  fay,  Man,  Human-Kind,  or 
(in  other  V/ords)  tho.  Utility  or  Elegance  of  Human 
Life.  Thus  the  Stagirite.  ’EryJv  ydp  J'-a* 
il^lg  TiXog  ' ^iyjwg  ydp  to  » iviv.oc.  For  WE  OUR- 
SELVES 


NOTES  on  Treatise  the  Firjl. 

SELVES  alfo  are  in  fome  fort  an  End  ; for  the  final 
Caufe  is  twofold,  Natur.  Aufcult.  1.  2.  c.  2.  If 
therefore  we  have  refpedi  to  this  ultimate  End, 
thefe  two  Caufes  will  be  found  to  differ ^ and  be  really 
diilinc^  from  each  other. 

And  thus  it  is  that  in  fome  refpedls  they  agree y 
and  in  others  they  differ^  according  to  the  above 
Diflindions  eflablifhed  by  this  Philofophy. 

Note  XVI.  p.  38.  O Art  ! Thou  Praise 
OF  Man,  Eufiratiusy  in  the  Beginning  of  his 

Comment  on  the  Ethics  of  Arijiotle^  has  the  follow- 
ing elegant  Encomium  on  Arts,  Aer 
r"oi;  laulw  VTTOcp^m  rov  £v9pcozcrov^  dviTriT'n^svTov  fxi- 
vovlocy  xx\  y(jetpo(Sk  Kxl  d^pvroi^  Twv  dXoym 

aAA*  Iau7w  re  kcc\  olxXoig  S'loc  r^g 

ri  JcalopOav.  ’^Ert  (^6  itc&\  f/.£pn  <ro(pixg  di 

dg  7^v  (pC<riv  p*ijU,8jW£yai,  aou  uXixig  p^pc«/U£va<, 
xal  raulatf  €?3>j  Tsspili^i/Mvoci  • dg  axl  dioc  r^'Jo  juv 
^£iv  dvTccg  Tov  (piXoa-opov  a7ro7r£|U7re<3-aj,  STrslloc  xot,) 
(rdfjt.0^1  ZToXuTTOi^sT  xa)  zjoXvfAeIix.poX(a  (sm^s^sfxmg  d 
dv9pcc-nTog,  ddiroci  xal  ttoAAwv  twv  e^u)9£v  efg  j3oii9eiccVy 
Iva,  'srpo'g  Tw  OrZS’Xdg^  xa)  to  su  ^vv  dveixirodig-ug 
avid  TTspiyivoiloj  xal  per  did  rm  ruv  ^pm^fjem  svdeiav 
dvaaouloirlo,  ’Et  f/>h  »v  rdv  peet^ovoov  ^eooprpedroov 
pAfuo^,  oux  £^ei  xa]  zjpdg  rd  Ixdrloo  xal  rd  ztrpbf  zripi’’ 
ZTotriTiV  .(7WaaT©^  KOcla(p£p£^aiy  V'TrrpelrTna'iv  di  rsyyat 
dvldy  oTcai  rd  Toig  dv^ptczjtvoig  (Tw^aatrt  Ipyd^ovlai 
p^pWijUa,  d(p£Xi([A£voov  Tcdv  ^eipcovaiilovvluv  dvrd 

zrpog  rd  TfAiWTfpa. 


279 


Note 


NOTES  on  Treatise  the  Firjl. 


Note  XVIL  p.  44.  The  Efficient,  the 
Material,  the  Final,  and  the  Formal.] 
That  is  to  fay,  to  Kivwccvy  ^ to  » hsaxy  to 

Thus  in  his  65th  Epiflle.  Caufam  Art- 

Jfoteles  putat  tribus  modis  did.  Prima^  inquit^  caufa 
ejl  ipfci  Materia.,  fine  qua  nihil  potefit  effidi.  Secunda, 
Opifiex.  Pertia^  Forma  quee  unicuique  operi  imponitur, 
tanquam  fiatuat^  nam  hanc  Arijioteles  Idos  (sT^og)  vocat, 
^Mrtct  quoque^  inquit^  his  accedit,  Propojitum  totius 
eperis. 

Quid  filt  hoc^^ aperiam.  Ms  prima  Jlatua  caufia 
ejl : nunquam  enim  fiadia  ejfiet.,  nifii  fiuififiet  id^  ex  quo  ea 
fiunderetur.,  ducereturve.  Secunda  caufia.,  Artifiex  ejl ; 
non  potuijjet  enim  ces  illud  in  habitum  Jlatuee  fiigurariy 
nifit  accejfiijfient  perit^  manus.  Tertia  caufia  ejl  Forma  : 

^ neque  enim  Jiatua  ijia  Doryphoros  aut  Diadumenos  voca- 
retur,  nifit  hcec  illi  ejfiet  imprejfia  fiacies.  ^arta  caufia 
efi,  fiaciendi  Propojitum : nam  nifit  hoc  fiuififiet.,  fiadla  non 
ejjet.  ^id  eji  Propojitum  f ^od  invitavit  arid 
fit  cent,  quod  ille  fiecutus  fiecit.  Vel  pecunia  eJi  hoc.,  Ji 
yendlturus  fiabricavit vel  gloria,  Ji  laboravit  in  no- 
wen  vel  religio,  fit  donum  templo  paravit.  Ergo  & 
hecc  Caufia  eji,  propter  quam  Jit.  An  non  putas  inter 
caufias  fiadli  operis  numerandum,  quo  remoto  fiadlum  non 
eJJ'et  ? 

Aristotle’s  own  W ords  ai'e  as  follovy. 
y.lv  Q-j  rjTTOV  tzdUov  Asysrut  to  e?  s ylviroci  rt 
IvDTvdp'xovT^  • oTcu,  d y^ocX'^iQi;  t»  3^  0 

(plciX'AC,  T5J  T'cT'XV  yiTO,  KXKOV  Fz, 


NOTE  onTRZ&.Ti%^  the  FirJ}.  iSi 

TO  ^ TO  Tzroi^x^nyij.oc  * t8to  eov  o Xoy(^ 

0 T8  t)  SlVXt,  ^ rcc  ThTH  yivYI  * oIoV  T»  TT^iT^V 
TX  duo  wpof  £u,  oAw?  o apt9^^of,  ra  y.s^ri  rx  ci* 

Tw  A03/W.  *'£ti,  o3-fv  71  ap;)(^ii  f^sIxf^oXvi  v zs-piOTn^ 

V 7?  T»f  TlpfpxWeWf  * OiOV  0 ]3&’JA£U (TiZ?,  xC[m*  0 

‘rrxlvpy  T»  Ts>cj;»  * oAw?  to  Trotsy  t«  7rotx/>t£y»,  to 

[xslxpxXXov  Ta  fxslxPxXXoi^svn.  w?  to'  t£A(^  ' 

T«T0  (5^’  eV*  to'  « f^'EHOS  • oTov  Ta  TTSpiWXTsTv  ij  • 

t/  TTspiTTXTsT  ^ <^<xpA£y  Iva  )Co:l  EioroyTEj 

ouroogy  o^op^s^x  XTro.Si^cjoaivxi  to'  umov. 


I N manner  that  may  he  called  a Caufe^  out  of 
which  y exi fling  as  a Fart  of  ity  any  thing  is  made  or 
compounded.  Thus  is  Brafs  the  Caufe  of  a Statue^ 
Silver  of  a Cupy  and  fo  alfo  the  higher  Generay  in 
which  thefe  are  included  [as  Metal,  the  Genus  in- 
cluding Brafs  and  Silver ; Body,  the  Genus  including 
Metal,  ^c.  b’r.]  In  another  wayy  the  Form  and  Ex- 
emplar of  any  thing  is  its  Caufe  \ that  is  to  fayy  in  other 
Words y the  Definition  or  Rationale  of  its  EJfence  [that 
which,  charadlerizing  it  to  be  fuch  a particular  thing, 
diftingui flies  it  from  all  things  elfe]  and  of  this  Ra- 
tionale the  feveral  higher  Genera.  Thus  the  Caufe  of  the 
Diapafon  or  OcStave  is  the  Proportion  of  two  to  ofte  ^ 
and  more  generally  than  thaty  is  Number  ; a?id  is  more- 
over the  feveral  PartSy  out  of  which  this  Definition  is 
formed.  Add  to  this  Caufey  that  other y from  zvhence 
the  original  Principle  of  ChangOy  or  of  Ceafing  to 
change  ; as  for  inflancey  the  Perfon  who  deliberates  is 
the  Caufe  of  thaty  which  refults  from  fuch  Delibera- 
tion ; the  Father  is  the  Caufe  of  the  Son ; and  in  gene- 
ral the  Efficicnty  of  the  thing  offered ; the  Power 
changingy  of  th'a  thing  changed.  Befldes  theje  CaufeSy 

there 


2S2 


NOTES  on  Treatise  theFirJl. 

there  is  that  alfo^  which  is  confidered  as  the  End ; that 
is  to  fay^  the  Caufe^  for  the  fake  of  which  the  thing  is 
done.  Thus  the  Caufe  of  Exercifing  is  Health,  For 
if  it  be  ajked^  IVhy  does  he  ufe  Exercife  ? JVe  fay^ 
To  preferve  his  Health  ; and  having  faid  thus  much, 
we  think  we  have  given  the  proper  Caufe,  Ariftot. 
Natur.  Aufcult.  1.  2.  c.  3. 

Addition  to  NOTE  III. 

The  Peripatetic  Definition  of  Nature,  given 
p.2S^-  tho'  in  fome  degree  illuftrated  p,  266.  yet 
being  flill  from  its  Brevity  perhaps  obfcure,  the  fol- 
lowing Explication  of  it  is  fubjoined. 

In  the  fir  ft  place,  by  Nature  Xhit  Peripatetics 
meant  that  Vital  Principle  in  Plants,  Brutes  and 
Men,  by  which  they  are  faid  to  live,  and  to  be  di- 
ftinguifhed  from  .things  inanimate.  Nature  therefore 
being  another  Name  for  Life  or  a vital  Principle, 
the  firft  AFt  of  this  Principle,  throughout  all  Sub- 
je<5ls,  is  univerfally  found  to  be  of  the  following 
kind  ; namely,  to  advance  the  Subject,  which  it  en~ 
livens,  from  a Seed  or  Embryo  to  fomething  better  and 
more  perfect.  This  Progrejfton,  as  well  in  Plants  as 
in  Animals,  is  called  Growth.  And  thus  is  it  that 
Nature  is  a Principle  of  Motion. — — But  then 
this  Progrejfton  or  Growth  is  not  infinite.  When 
the  Subject  is  m.ature,  that  is,  hath  obtained  its  Com- 
pletion and  perfect  Form,  then  the  Progrejfion  ceafes. 
Here  therefore  the  Bufinefs  of  the  vital  Principle 
becomes  different.  It  is  from  henceforward  no 
longer  employed  to  acquire  a Form,  but  to  preferve 
to  its  Suhjebi  a Form  already  acquired.  And  thus  is 

it 


NOTES  Treatise  theFirfl. 

it  that  Nature  is  2l  Principle  of  Reji^  Stability^  or 
Ceafing  to  move.  And  fuch  indeed  fhe  continues  to 
be,  maintaining,  as  long  as  pojfihle^  the  Form  com- 
mitted to  her  Care,  till  Time  and  external  Caufes  in 
the  firft  place  impair  it,  and  induce  at  length  its 
Dijfolution^  which  is  Death. 

And  thus  has  it  been  (hewn  how  Nature  may 
be  called  a Principle  both  of  Motion  and 
Ceasing  to  move. 

As  to  the  reft  of  the  Definition,  namely  that 
Nature  is  a Principle^  which  inheres  in  its  Sub- 
je(ft  immediately^  ejfentially^  and  not  by  way  of  Acci- 
dent \ no  more  is  meant  by  this,  than  that  the 
Nature  or  Life  in  every  Being,  which  hath  fuch 
Principle,  is  really  and  truly  a Part  of  that 
Being,  and  not  detached  dead  feparate  from  it,  like 
the  Pilot  from  the  Ship,  the  Mulician  from  the  In- 
ftrument.  For  to  thefe  Subje^s  are  thofe  Artijis 
the  Principles  of  Motion  and  Reft.,  yet  do  they  in  no 
Senfe  participate  with  them  of  vital  Sympathy  and 
Union. 


283 


END  NOTES  on  Treatise  ihePirft. 


N O T E S 


O N 

TREATISE  the  Third; 

CONCERNING 

HAPPINESS. 


Note  L p.  107.  Nature  seems  to 
TREAT  Man,  ^c.]  Ut  Phidias potejl  a 
primo  injiituere  fignum^  idque  perficere ; 
potejl  ab  alio  inchoatum  accipere  ^ abfolvere : huic  ejl 
fapientia  fimilis.  Non  enim  ipfa  genuit  hominem^  fed 
accepit  a natura  inchoatum ; hanc  ergo  intuenSy  debet 
injiitutum  illudy  quafi  fignumy  abfolvere.  Cic.  de 
Fin.  IV.  13.  p,  304.  Edit.  Davif. 

Note  II.  p.  113.  Practice  too  often 
CREEPS,  See  p.  136.  and  Note  X. 

Note  III.  p.  114.  The  Sovereign  Good 
IS  that,  the  Possession  of  which  renders 
us  happy.]  Klr,(T£i  ycc^  oi 

By  the  Pojfeffwn  of  Thwgs  good,  are 
z > ike 


286  NOTES  on  Treatise  the  Third. 

the  Happy  made  happy*  Platon.  Conviv,  p.  204. 
tom  2.  Edit.  S errant,  Arrian.  EpiSf.  1.  3.  c.  22* 

P*  453* 

The  Reader  will  be  pleafed  to  obferve,  that,  in 
all  Quotations  from  the  Difrertations  of  EpiSfetus 
colledled  hy  Arrian the  Author  refers  to  the  late 
Edition  in  two  Volumes  ^artOy  publifhed  by  his 
learned  and  ingenious  Friend,  Mr.  UpTOPt, 

Note  IV.  p.  115.  Certain  original 
Characteristics  and  Pre-concep- 
. TioNs,  The  Pre-conceptions  here  fpoken 

of,  are  called  by  the  Latins^  Prcenotiones^  or  Antici- 
pationes  5 by  the  Greeks^  or  ’'Emiuty  with 

the  occafional  Epithets  of  either  xoivc&l,  £/x(p\j]ot^ 
or  (puo-iJca). 

> 

^Tis  evident  that  all  Men,  without  the  leaft 
Help  of  Art,  exert  a kind  of  Natural  Logic ; can  ia 
fome  degree  refute^  and  proue^  and  render  a Reafon. 

Now  this  cannot  be  (as  the  meaneft  Proficient 
in  Logic  well  knows)  without  general  IdeaSy  and 
general  Propofitionsy  becaufe  a Syllogifm  of  Particu- 
lars is  an  ImpofTibility.  There  mufr  be  therefore 
fome  natural  Faculty y to  provide  us  thefe  Generals. 
This  Faculty  cannot  be  any  of  the  SenfeSy  for  they 
all  refpedt  Particulars  only.  Nor  can  it  be  the  rea- 
foning  or  fyllogizing  Faculty  y for  this  does  not  form  fuch 
Generals,  but  ufe  them  when  formed.  There  only 
therefore  remains  thQ  Faculty  that  is  to 

fay,  the  Inductive  Faculty ; the  Faculty,  which  by 
Induction  of  fmilar  Individualsy  forms  out  of  the 
2 particular 


NOTES  on  Treatise  the  I'hird, 

particular  and  the  many  what  is  general  and  one. 
This  Species  of  Apprehenfton  is  evidently  our  firjl 
and  earliejl  Knowledge,  becaufe  all  Knowledge  by 
Reafoning  dates  its  Origin  from  it,  and  becaufe,  ex- 
cept thefe  twoy  no  other  Knowledge  is  poflible. 

A s therefore  every  Ear,  not  abfolutely  depraved, 
is  able  to  make  fome  general  DiJiinSfions  of  Sound  ; 
and  in  like  manner  every  Eye,  with  refpedl  to  Objects 
of  Vifton  y and  as  this  general  Ufe  of  thefe.  Faculties, 
by  being  diffufed  through  all  Individuals,  may  be 
called  common  Hearing,  and  common  Vifion,  as  op- 
pofed  to  thofe  more  accurate  Energies^  peculiar  only 
to  Artijis : fo  fares  it  with  refpedl  to  the  Intelle£i. 
There  are  Truths,  or  Univerfals  of  fo  obvious  a 
kind,  that  every  Mindy  or  Intellebl  not  abfolutely  de- 
praved, without  the  lead  Help  of  Art,  can  hardly 
fail  to  recognize  them.  The  Recognition  of  thefe, 
or  at  lead  the  Ability  to  recognize  them,  is  called 
Common  Sense,  as  being  a Senfi 
common  to  ally  except  Lunatics  and  Idiots, 

Farther,  as  this  Power  is  called  Ko*vo\  Nar, 
fo  the  feveral  Propofitionsy  which  are  its  proper 
Objeds,  are  called  or  Pre-conceptions y as 

being  previous  to  all  other  Conceptions.  It  is  eafy 
40  gather  from  what  has  been  faid,  that  thefe 

muft  htgeneraly  as  being  formed  by  Indu^ion  ; 
as  alfo  naturaly  by  being  common  to  all  Meuy  and 
previous  to  all  Inftrudion.  Hence  therefore  their 
Definition,  ’^Eo  ^ ^ 7rpoA»)\)y»?,  moioc  (poa-tmi  tm'j 
xaOoAa.  ‘‘  A Pre-conception  is  the  ?2aturalAp^ 
prehenfm  of  what  is  general y or  univerfaW  Diog. 

Laert, 


287 


288 


NOTES  on  Treatise  the  Third. 


Laert.  /.  7.  f.  54  SesuKo  Arrian.  EpiSl.  1. 1.  c.  12. 
I.  3.  c.  6.  Cic,  de  Naturd  Dear,  1.  i.  c.  i6>  17. 
Pint,  de  Placit.  Philofoph,  910.  c. 

Note  V.  p.  115. — And  that  the  Dif- 
ference LAY  ONLY  IN  THE  APPLYING  THEM 
TO  Particulars.]  This  was  called  'E'pccpfAoyv 
ruv  -nrpoAji^/fcov  Itt)  — ra?  (puciJca? 

7!TpoXv\p£i^  l(poipy.o^£iv  TOiTg  Itt)  aVtai?, 

Epii^.  1. 1.  c.  22.  p.  1 14, 1 16.  Edit,  Upt,  See  an 
eminent  Inftance,  illuflrating  the  Truth  of  this  Rea- 
foning,  in  the  fame  Author,  /.  4.  c,  i,  p,  545. 

’Evvoi#jw,£y  oTty  &C. 

' Note  VI.  p.  120.  Why  are  there,  who 
SEEK  Recesses,  Multi  autem  ^ funt^  ^ 

fuerunt.^  qui  earriy  quam  dicOy  tranquilitatem  expetenteSy 
a negotiis  publicis  fe  removerlnty  ad  otiumque  perfu- 

gerint. His  idem  propojitum  fuity  quod  regibus  y ut 

ne  qua  re  egerenty  ne  cui  parere7ity  libertate  uterentur  : 
cujus  proprium  eji'  fic  viverey  ut  velis,  ^are  cum 
hoc  commune  fit  potentia  cupidorum  cum  iisy  quos  dixiy 
otiofis : alteri  fe  adipifici  id  pojfe  arbitrantury  fi  opes 
magnas  habeant  5 alteri  fit  contenti  fint  ^ fiuoy  ^ parvo, 
Cic.  de  Offic.  1.  I.  €.20,21. 

Note  VII.  p.  121. — The  Sovereign  Good^ 
they  have  taught  us,  ought  to  be, 

The  original  Pre-conceptions  of  the  Sove- 
reign Good  here  recited,  may  be  juftified  by  the 
following  Authorities,  from  among  many  which  are 
omitted. 


Agreeable 


NOTES  on  Treatise  theT!hird. 


Agreeable  to  Nature. Neque  ulla  alia 

in  rsy  nifi  Natura,  quarendum  ejfe  illud  Sum- 
mum  BONUM,  quo  omnia  referrentur»  Cic.  Acad. 
1.  I.  c.  5.  p.  27.  Edit.  Davif. 

Conducive  to  well-being. — EpiSfetui  c2l\\% 
that  Truth  or  Knowledge^  which  refpe£fs  our  real  Hap^ 
pinefs  dxiidsiav  tijv  zsrfpt  tv;  Bv^oii/u.ovfccc]  the  Truth 
or  Knowledge,  which  regards  not  mere  Living^  but 
which  conduces  to  Living  well  [»  tw  vspi 
ZHN,  aAAa  rvv  7rpo;  to  EY  ZHNJ  Jrrian. 
Epi£t,  1.  I.  c.  4.  p.  28.  Edit.  Upt.  ‘At  xotval  iTzpX 
Uociixovioc;  moioci  — TO  ZHN  KATA  ^TSIN, 
^ Tov  xdjcc  (pvcrtv  ^iov,  E T A AIM  ON  I AN  * 

Ts-po;  THTOi;^  To  ET  ZHN,  to  iZ  ^tsv, 

Tvv  iv^wfocv,  ’ETAAIMONIAN  (pach  iTmi,  Our 
common  Pre-conceptions  concerning  Happiness  call  it 
the  Living  according  to  Nature  5 farther 
than  thisy  they  fay  it  is  Living  or  Exifing  well^  the 
Life  of  well-being.  Alex.  Aphrod.  ttsq]  iLvy, 
p.  157.  Edit.  Jld.  ^ ^ ^ 

Accommodate  to  all  Places  and  Times— 
Antoninus^  fpeaking  of  that  Happinefs^  which  he 
deemed  our  Sovereign  Goody  calls  it  fomething  which 
was  in  our  Power  HANTAXOT  AIHNE- 
KOS,  every  where  and  perpetually. 
1.7.  f.s4. 

Durable  — and  Jndeprivable.  — Nifi  sta<*> 

EILI  lA  FIXO  ^ PERMANENTE  BONO,  BEATUS 

tjfenemo  potefi.  Tufc.  Difp.  1.  5.  c.  14.  p-372.  Edit. 

U Davif 


2g6 


NOTES  on  Treatise  the  Third. 

Davif.  So  immediately  after,  in  the  fame  page — ^ 
An  dublurh  ejl^  quin  nihil  fit  habendum  in  eo  generCy 
quo  ' vita  beat  a completiiVy  fi  id  poffit  amitti  ? nihii 
ehim  intehdreficersy  nihil  exjlinguiy  &c.  Ka»  t/? 
dl\j\Y\  "A  svpoKXy  iiv  0 rv)(fiv  ^ Xiyot 

JCaiWp  >5  Koci<rxpog  (piXog^  oixXx  y^dpcc^,  dvXmg,  -urv- 

pslog^  ccXXoi  rpKTf^^vpicn ; r\  J'’  ETPOIA  ^Tug 
txi^^  TO  AIHNEKEE  ANEMHOAI- 
2TON.  And  what  fiort  ofi  Happinefis  is  thiSy  which 
any  thing  intervening  may  embarrafis ; I fiay  not  Caefar, 
cr  Csefar’^  Friendy  but  a CroWy  a Piper y a Fever y a 
thoufiand  things  bejide?  Happiness  fiurely,  implies 
nothing  fo  muchy  as  Perpetuity  and  being  su- 
perior TO  Hindrance  or  Impediment. 
Arrian.  Epidf.  1.  4.  c.  cp*  p.  585.  Edit.  Upt.  See 
aifo,  /.  2.  c.  II.  227. 

Self-derived. — Atque  hoc  dabitisy  ut  opinory  fii 
modo  Jit  aliquid  ejfie  beatum,  id  oportere  totum 
poNi  IN  poTESTATE  Sapientis:  namy  fii  amitti 
vita  beata  potejly  beata  ejfie  nonpotejl.  Cic.  de  Fin.  1.  2. 
C.  27.  p.  163. — roTg  fiiv  xaT  dxihhi'Xv  jcxKoif  Ivx 
piTl  TTspizji'osr'ip  0 Itt  dvlcp  [ot  Gfoi]  to  ttxv 

sOivlo.  That  Man  might  not^all  into  real  Evils y the 
Gods  have  put  the  whole  in  his  own  Power.  M. 
Ant.  1.2.  f.  II.  Iriv,  0 TCoig  a^Gpw7r(^  ; 

VjjroL^wyAy.l^^cciiJ.ovYi<rxiy  IIANTA  HE  0EAEI 
IIOIEIN,  JcwAufdGai,  avxfHd^£cr9xi.  For 
vjhat  is  ity  that  every  Man  living  fie  eh  ? To  be  fiecurely 
fiixedy  to  be  happ'jy  to  do  all  things  accord- 
ing to  his  own  Will,  not  to  be  hinderedy  not 
to  be  compelled.  Arr.  Epidl.  1.  4.  c.  i.  p.  539,  540. 


Note 


NOTES  on  Tr  EATISE  the  nird. 

Note  VIII.  p.  125.  The  Political  and 
Lucrative,  th e Con te mpl ati ve  and 
Pleasurable.]  This  fourfold  Diftindlion  of 
Lives  is  mentioned  in  Jriftotle's  Ethics^  1.  i.  c.  5. 

Note  IX.  p.  131.  ^“Pleasure 

Whom  Love  attends, 

alluding  to  Horner^  Iliad,  H.  V.  214* 

Note  X*  p.  136.  Suppose  an  Event  were 
TO  happen — not  an  Inundation,  &c.]  ^ee 
Arrian.  Epidt.  1.  4.  c.  4.  which  Chapter  is  peculiarly 
addreflfed  to  the  Seekers  of  Leifurey  Retirement^  and 
Study.  Part  of  it  has  been  already  quoted  p.  290. 

Tig  HuTYi  n ’ivpoioiy  ^ c.  See  alfo  the  fame  Author, 
i.  4.  c.  I.  p.  567.  n^g  dytHsig^  ^c.  and  of  the  . 
Dialogue  here  commented,  p.  113. 

Note  XL  p.  137. — Is  Acting  a Circum- 
stance, ^r.]  Etenim  cognitio  eontemplatioque  na^- 
turre  mama  quodammdo  atque  inchoata  fity  ft  nulla 
aSlio  rerum  confequatur.  Ea  autem  adfio  in  hominurfi 
commodis  tuendis  maaime  terhitur.  Cic.  de  Offic. 
/.  i.  c.  43.  The  whole  Chapter,  as  well  as  the 
Subfequent,  is  well  worthy  of  Perufal. 

Note  XIL  p.  140. — If  a Piece  of  Metal  be 
tendered  us,  ^V.]  Sqq  Arr.  Epi^.  1,  i.  c.  lOi 
p,  no.  ’Oparg  IttI  Td  vojWj’o-jocce']©-’,  &C. 

Note  XIII.  p.  144. — Are  alienated  from 
IT,  OR  ARE  indifferent  TO  IT?]  Placet  hiSy  in- 
quity  quorum  ratio  mihi  prohatury  fmul  atque  natum  fit 
U 2 animal 


^91 


292  NOTES  on  Treatise  theT^hird.  . 

animal  (him  enim  eji  ordiendum)  ipfum  fibi  conciliari^  ^ 
commendari  ad  fe  confervandum^  ^ fuum  Jlatum^  ^ ad 
ea^  qua  confervantia  funt  ejus  Jiatus^  diligenda  ; alienari 
autem  ab  interitu^  iifque  rebus^  qua  interitum  videantur 
afferre,  Cic.  de  Fin.  1.  3.  c.  5.  p.  211.  Edit,  Dav. 
See  alfo  /.  5.  9.  DeOffic,  1.  i.  c.  4. 

TrpeV  aulaV  iv9vg  ^zvo^Aivoi,  Plut,  Mor,  p.  IG38.  b. 

Note  XIV.  p.  155.  Let  it  not  be  forgot 

THEN,  SAID  HE,  IN  FAVOUR  OF  SOCIETY, 

The  whole  Argument  to  prove  Society  natural  to 
Man,  from  p.  147  to  the  page  here  cited,  is  taken 
from  the  fecond  Book  of  Plato'' s Republic,  Sec 
Plat,  tom.  2.  p.  369,  lAc,  Edit,  Serrani, 

Note  XV.  p.  156.  — Are  not  the  Powers 
AND  Capacities  of  Speech,  The  Argu- 

ment in  favour  of  Society,  from  our  being  poflefled 
of  x6y(^^  or  the  /peaking  Faculty,  feems  to  have 
been  much  infilled  on  by  the  beft  Authors  of  Anti- 
quity. ^ 

Atolt  J'e  TToXiTixov  0 ''Av9poi)wi^  fwoy,  'srocG-ri;  fxc- 
XiTTTj^y  xoc)  "UTCiVTt^*  ^doH  jwaAAw,  SiiXov, 

*0'j91v  ug  ^«T?5v  ^ (puVi?  Xoyov  J'g 

fAOVO'J  ^Au9p0d7ir^  £^£t  TWV  ^ccccv,  *H  p>h  XV  (pC^VV  ra 
Ti^sog  xcci  AuTtTtjpa  ig-i  CTiy^sTov  * Jio'  xal  roTg  aAAwf 
xizdpyji  ^ (py(rtg  dvlcov  eAiiAu- 

6fv,  cci3dvs(r9oii  tx  XvTrtjpx  3^  r(Aj\so 

CTiixdivEiv  dxXriXoig,  *0  Xoyog  bit\  to  AtiXxv 

TO  (TU^CpfpOV,  xal  TO  (^Xoc^spov  • wrf  iiOil  TO  ^Uociov, 

xx,l  TO  aJ'ixcv.  Talo  yd^  Trpo'f  too  MxXet  rof? 


293 


NOTES  on  Treatise  the  Third. 

sluQpuzjoig  TO  [xovov  hoc]  xan?,  hoc)  Jixaia  x«i 

fltcTjxa  ai(r6>i(rtv  ’ V ^6  r^TU)v  xotifcovioc  ztoieT  oihiocv 

y.oc]  ‘croAiv.  The  Rea/o»  why  Man  is  a Social  Ani- 
mal than  any  Bee ^ or  any  herding  Species  whatever^ 

is  evident  from  hence.  Nature^  we  fay.^  makes  nothing 
in  vain ; and  Man,  of  all  Animals^  is  only  poffefed  of 
Speech.  Bare  Sound  indeed  may  he  the  Sign  of  what 
is  pleafurahle  or  painful ; and  for  that  reafon  is  it  com^ 
mon  even  to  other  Animals  alfo.  For  fo  far  we  perceive 
even  their  Nature  can  go,  that  they  have  a Senfe  of 
thofe  Feelings,  and  ftgnify  them  to  each  other.  But 
Speech  is  made  to  indicate  what  is  expedient,  and  what 
hurtful,  and  in  confequence  of  this,  what  is  juji  and 
unjujl.  It  is  therefore  given  to  Men,  becaufe  this,  with 
refpeli  to  other  Animals,  is  to  Men  alone  peculiar,  that 
of  Good  and  Evil,  Jufl  and  Unjuji,  they  only  pojfefs  a 
Senfe  or  Feeling,  Now  *tis  the  Participation  or  Com^ 
munity  of  thefe,  which  makes  and  conjiitutes  both  a 
Family,  and  a Polity.  Arijiot,  Polit,  1.  i.  c.  2. 

’Eixovf?  ydi^  Imv  h tj?  tcov  isrpccy/j.ccTuv  [tx 

VOVfJt'XTx]  • OCl  J'i  ipiOVXt  TUV  VOVJ^CCTCOV  ItTiV 

Kxt'  iix  THTO  JfJ'ovrai  VTTO  tv;  (pua-eco;,  7rpo; 

TO  ccvTuv  cvfJt'Cctvnv  r/xaf  aAAiiAoj?  rv;  roc 

vovi^ocrx — -IW  xal  hoivuvsTv  aAAiiAoif,  axl 

eVfXTTOMTSVSTGxi  * XOiVCOVlHOV  yd^  ^COOV  0 ^AvSpCOTT^, 

Ideas  are  Images  of  Things  in  the  Soul ; and  Sounds 
are  declarative  of  thefe  Ideas.  And  for  this  reafon 
were  thefe  Sounds  imparted  to  us  by  Nature,  not  only 
that  we  might  indicate  to  each  other  thefe  Ideas,  but 
that  we  might  be  enabled  to  communicate  and 
LIVE  IN  Associations.  For  Man  is  by  Nature  a 
Social  Animal;  Ammon.ini,  deinterpr.  p.  i6.  b, 
U 3 Thus 


294  NOTES  on  Treatise  thel^hird. 


Thus  Cicero^  fye2ik!\n%  Human  Nature — Ornlm 
apportunitates  kahilitatefque  rellqui  corporis^  modern- 
tlonem  vocis,  or  at  ion  is  vim^  qua  conciliatrix  eft 
human  a maxume  focletatls.  De  Legg.  1.  i.  c.  g. 
p.  35.  Edit.  Davif. 

Again  in  \i\%  Offices ^ed  qua  natura  principia 

fnt  communitaiis  focietatis  humana^  repetendum 
altlus  videtur.  Eft  enim  prhnum^  quod  cernitur  in 
univerfi  generis  humani  focietate.  Ejus  enim  vinculum 
eft  R.atio^  & Or  at  10;  qua  docendo^  difcendo^  com- 
municando.,  difceptandoy  dijudicando.,  conciliat  inter  fs 
homines.,  conjungitque  naturali  quadam  focietate  De 
Ofiic.  1.  I.  c.  16. 


Thus  too  in  his  Treatife  De  Nat.  Deor.  — — Jam 
yero  domina  rernrn  (ut  vos  foletis  dicere)  Eloquendi 
VIS  quam  eft  pr a clar^.,  quamque  divina?  ^a  primum 
efficit^  ut  ea^  qua  ignoramus^  difcere^  ^ ea,  qua  fcimuSy 
alios  docere  poffimus.  Deinde  hac  cohortamur^  hac  per^ 
fuademus^  hac  confolamur  afflidios^  hac  deducimus  per- 
territos  a timore^  hac  geftie'ntes  comprimimuSy  hac  cupi- 
ditates  iracundiafque  refinguimus : hac  nos  juris,  le- 
gum,  urbium  focietate  devinxit : hac  a vita  immani 
& ferd  fegregavit.  De  Nat.  Deor.  1.  2.  c.  59. 

р.  243.  Edit.  Davif.  — See  alfo  ^int.  Inji.  1.  2. 

с.  16.  and  Ale/.  Aphrod.  Tripi  P‘  ?5S’ 

Edit.  Aid. 

Note  XVL  p.  166.  ’Tis  from  among  the 
FEW,^V.]  In  Omni  enim  arte.,  vel  fudio^  vel  quavis 
fcientia.,  vel  in  ipfa  virtute.,  optumum  quodque  rarijft- 
mum.  efl.  Cic.de  Fin.  1.  2.  c.  25.  p.  158*  Edit.Dav. 

Note 


NOTES  on  Treatise  the  Tmrd. 


295 


Note  XVII.  p.  167. — Working  ever  uni- 
formly ACCORDING  TO  THIS  IdEA  OF  PeR- 
FECION,  ^C.] 

Thus  Boethius^  addrefllng  the  Deity, 

0 qui  perpetua  mundum  ratione  guhernaSy 
Terrarum  ccelique  SatoVy  qui  tempus  ab  avo 
Ire  juhesy  Jiabilifque  mahens  das  cunbia  moveri  ; 
^em  non  externce  pepulerunt  fingere  caufce 
Materia fluitantis  opus  ; verum  insita  Summi 
Forma  boni,  livore  carens : TucunSfa  superno 
Duels  ab  EXEMPLO,  pulchrurn  pulcherrimus  ipfe 
Mundum  mente  gerensy  fmillque  in  imagine  formans. 

Confol.  Philof.  1.  3.  Metr.  g. 

Note  XVIII.  p.  167. — From  some  hidden 
HIGHER  Motive,  &e.]  Mwolf  ToivTdk 

[fc.  Toi  TEpara]  (pv(Tiv  hg-lvy  dkXcc  /aev 

(pu(r£i  « (pvtrsiy  uXX<x  'UToc.pcc  (pvciv  • xoc^oXHy 

Kodi  (puasi  xodi  xoctoc  (pvo'iv,  *H  fAv  /AfptJtii  (pu(ng 
|yo\  xoc)  g^ipwiv  (pivysi,  Aio^ 

TSTO  ryj  ^\v  T8  dv9pco7Sjrii  (Pucii,  TO  ripoeg  ^rs  (pva-ii 
lg~\vy  ^Ti  xocrd  (pvTiv  * ryj  iJ’  oXyj  (p^csiy  etteI  rca 

TTCCVr'i  TTOipd  (pociv  (ovdiV  yee^  XOCXOV  iv  TW  TTOtd]])  OVJC 

£0  TToepd  (pvtnVy  dxxd  (pJo-Ei  xx\  xocld  (pvTiv, 
Joannes  Gram,  in  Ariftot.  lib.  2.  Natural  Aufcult. 
Nibi/  enim  fieri  fine  caufici  potefi  r nec  quicquam  fity 
quod  fieri  non  potejl : necy  ji  id  fiaSlum  eft  quod  potuit 
fieri y portentum  debet  videri.  Cic.  de  Divin.  1.  2. 
c.  28.  p.  i8g.  Edit.  Davif. 

U4 


Nots 


296  NOTES  on  Treatise  the  T!hird, 


Note  XIX.  p.  169.  Man  is  a social 
Rational  Animal.]  ^^oyiKov  TroMnxovy 
Xcyixov  xoivwviKov,  XoyiKov  rf/'Spov,  thefe  are 
Defcriptions  of  Humanity^  which  we  meet  in  every 
Page  of  EpiSfetus  and  Antoninus. 

I T feems  indeed  to  have  been  a received  Opinion 
of  old,  that  fo  intimate  was  the  Relation  between 
thefe  tv/o  Attributes.,  that  wherever  there  was  Ra- 
tionality, Sociality  followed  of  courfe.  Thus  Anto- 
ninus   J'e  to  Xoyixov,  fuSuV  TroXmxov,  !•  10. 

f.  2.  And  again,  more  fully — - roww  ttxv  to 

rng  vospag  (pva-scog  tt^oj  to'  (rvyysvlg  ofj^oiug 

crTTiu^si,  V [^c^KXov  * oVw  lg~^  apsilrov  vrapd  rd 
dxXoi,  TctraVw  Trpog  to  <rvyxipvx(r9iXt  rd  oIksIu 
ffVyycAo-^OH  lTOt^.OT£pOV.  1.  9.  f.  9. 

I T is  not  perhaps  foreign  to  the  prefent  Subjedt  to 
obferve,  that  were  the  Eyes  of  any  two  Men  what- 
ever to  view  the  fame  Obje^,  they  would  each,  from 
their  different  Place,  and  their  different  Organization^ 
behold  it  differently,  and  have  a different  Image.  But 
were  all  the  Minds  in  the  Univerfe  to  recognize  the 
fame  Truth,  they  would  all  recognize  it  as  one,  their 
Recognition  would  be  uniform,  and  themfelves  in  a 
manner  would  be  one  alfo.  The  Reafon  is.  Per- 
ception by  the  Senfes  admits  of  more  and  lefs,  better 
and  worfe  ; but  Perception  by  the  Intelledi,  like  Truths 
its  Objedt,  admits  of  no  degrees,  and  is  either  no- 
thing at  all,  or  elfe  total,  uniform,  complete,  and  one. 
Hence  therefore  one  Source  of  the  Society,  and  as  it 

were 


NOTES  e«  Treatise  th  Third. 


were  Communion  of  all  Minds^  confidered  as  Minds, 
namely,  the^Unity  of  Truths  their  common  Objedt. 

Again,  every  juft  and  perfect  Society  ftands  on 
the  Bafis  of  certain  Laws.  But  Law  is  nothing 
more,  than  right  and feen  in  bidding 
and  forbidding.^  according  to  the  Nature  and  Eflence 
of  thofe  Beings,  to  which  it  is  a Law.  If  therefor* 
this  Universe  be  whole,  or  general  Society, 
there  muft  be  fome  common,  general  Law  for 
its  Conduct  and  Welfare ; and  this  Law  muft,  of  con- 
fequence,  be  fome  right  and  perfedl  Reason,  which 
paftes  thro’  all  things,  and  extends  to  every  Part. 
Well  therefore  wiv^X.  Antoninus  fay  in  the  Beginning 
of  this  Note.,  that  every  thing  rational.,  was  of  courfe 
foetal.,  fince  Reason  and  Law  appear  to  be  the 
fame.,  and  Law  to  be  the  Support  and  Bafts  of  all 

Society.  Thus  too  Cicero fequitur.,  ut  eadem fit 

in  his  [fc.  Dus']  qua  humano  generi  Ratio  ; eadem 
Veritas  utrobique  fit ; eademque  Lex,  qua  eji  redii 
praceptio,  pravique  depulfio.  De  Nat.  Deor.  I.  2. 
c.  31.  p.  180.  See  alfo  the  fame  Author  De  Legg, 
i.  I.  c.  85  12,  15.  p.  29,  41,  51.  Edit.  Davif.  De 
Fin.  1.  2.  c.  14.  p.  123.  See  alfo  Diog.  Laert. 
1.  7.  f.  88.  M,  Anton.  1.  5.  c.  16.  1.  6.  c.  23, 
Ariji.  Polit.  as  quoted  in  Note  XV. 

Note  XX.  p.  169.  Nothing  can  be  pur- 
suable,  WHICH  is  destructive  OF  SoCIETY.] 
Si  enim  fic  erimus  affedlt,  ut  propter  fuutn  quifque  emo- 
lumentum  fpoliet,  aut  violet  alterum,  difrumpi  necejje 
ejl  earn,  qua  maxime  efi  fecundum  naturam,  humani 
generis  Societatem.  Cip.  de  Offic.  1.  3.  c.  5. 


Noti 


29S  NOTES  on  Treatise  the  Third. 


Note  XXL  p.  173. — For  Contraries  are 

EVER  RECOGNIZED  THROUGH  THE  SAME  Ha- 
BIT,  Aoxn  o^£  7^  % CX-TTOCTn^  ^ iTTlf^y.Tl  TWy 

svixvilccv,  n dvl'n  shai,  TThere  feems  to  he  one  and  the 
fame  Error ^ and  one  and  the  fame  Science^  with  refpedf 
to  things  contrary,  Arift.  de  Anim.  1.  3.  c.  3.  This 
by  Themifiius^  in  his  Paraphrafe^  is  thus  illuflrated. 
Twy  Ivocvliociv  f^loc.  dcyvoia,  * 0' 

TO  dyoi^o])  dg  (o(pBhiy,ov  yiv(d(TKOiVy  7^  to  iC(Zxov 
OTi  pAa^fpo'y  (rvvi7n'g-a>T0Ci  • 0 zss^]  Gdrspov  s^aTra- 

'IcOjUSV^^  i^CX-TToflcCTOH  7^  TTfpt  OotTfpOV.  Of  ’ThwgS 
contrary  there  is  one  Science,,  and  one  Ignorance,  For 
thus  he->  who  knows  Good  to  be  fomething  beneficial y 
knows  Evil  at  the  fame  time  to  be  fomething  pernicious ; 
and  hey  who  is  deceived  with  refpodl  to  one  of  thefe^  is 
deceived  alfo  ivith  refpeSi  to  the  other. 

Note  XXII.  p.  ^74. — Those  four  Grand 
Virtues,  ^c,']  Stoboeus  having  told  us,  that  of 
the  Virtues  fome  vv^ere  primary y fome  fubordinatey  adds 
— Trpdrocg  J'e  'iilr(X.pocg  ftWt,  (ppbvwtVy  (rwCppoiTUuw,  dv- 
^psiocVy  S'lKdioc-vmv  • xcc)  Tr,v  fvj  (ppdvwiVy  wspl  rd 
xoidriKo'Jliz  ylvST^oii  * rvv  di  (rco(ppocrvvy]v  Tuspl  rdg  dpfxdg 
T8  dv^pooTTn  * rnv  di  dvdpsGvy  Trspl  rdg  VTropxovdg  * rrv 
Es  PixoitoG-dvyjVy  zTipl  rdg  dTrovs/j-'/KTsig,  Ehe  primary  Vir- 
tues are  four-y  Prudence,  Temperance,  Forti- 
tude , and  Justice:  Prudence  is  employed  in  moral 
Offices  y P’emperancey  in  Mens  natuial  Appetites  and 
Furfuits  ;i  Foriitudcy  in  Endurings  j a?id  JuJlice^  in 
Dijlributicns,  Eel.  Ethic,  p.  167. 


That 


'NOTES  on  Treatise  the  Third. 


299 


That  the  Life  according  ^<9  Virtue,  was  deemed 
the  Life  according  Nature,  appears  from  what  is 
laid  by  the  fame  Author,  in  the  Page  following—^ 
TLcctoov  Je  r^roov  ruv  dp/luv  to  rix^  sivoii^  to  dno~ 
AsOwf' (pVTSi  lyidrriv  J'e  t»twv  ^id  toov  jcTicov 

zr(zp£^£(r9cci  Tvf^dvovl a,  rov  dv^pcoTrov.  Tdhe  End  of  all 
thefe  Virtues  is^  to  live  agreeably  to  Nature  ; and  each 
of  them^  by  thofe  Means , which  are  peculiar  to  itfelf  h 
found  to  put  a Man  in  pojfejfon  of  this  End, 

So  likewife  Cicero Etenim  quod  fummum 

honum  a Stoicis  dicitur^  convenienter  naturae  vivere, 
id  habet  hanc,  ut  opinor^  fententiam^  cum  virtutQ 
congruere  femper.  De  Offic.  1.  3.  c.  3. 

Note  XXIII.  p.  174.  That  Life,  where 
THE  Value  of  all  Things  is  justly  mea-^ 
suRED,  b’r.  ] See  pages  143,  146,  168,  203, 
204. 

Note  XXIV.  p.  175. — That,  which  being 

BONE,  ADMITS  OF  A RATINOAL  JUSTIFICA- 
TION.] In  the  Original  it  is 0 zrpoix^h  ’ivXoyov 

dTToXoyKTpt.ov.  Diog.  Laert.  1.  7.  f.  107.  oVep 
ivXoyov  ’(yyi  tw  diroXoylocv.  Sext.  Emp,  Adv, 
Mathem.  1.  7.  Thus  rendered  by  Cicero — Officium  id 
ejfe  dicunty  quod  cur  fadium  fity  ratio  probabilis  reddi 
pojft.  De  Offic.  1.  I.  c.  3.  The  Reafon  of  its 
"Greek  Name,  kMkov,  is  given  by  Simplicius.  Ka- 
^y}Koyld  £0  rd  yivbu.£voc  TtOild  rd  movlcn  liri^dX- 
Xo'jIcc  r — Moral  Offices  are  thofe  things  which  are  done 

agreeably 


300 


N OT  ES  on  Treatise  the  Third. 

agreeably  to  what  is  fittings  and  expedient,  Simplic.  in 
Ench.  c.  37. 

Note  XXV.  p.  176. — And  when  our 
VERAL  Energies,  exerted  according  to 
THE  Virtues  above,  have  put  us  in  pos- 
session OF,b’f.]  This  was  the  of  Happiness, 
adopted  by  the  old  Academy^  or  Platonics,  Secun- 
dum natiiram  viverCy  fie  affeSiumy  ut  optime  affici 
pojjity  ad  naturamque  accommodatijfime,  Cic.  de  Fin. 
1.  5.  c.  9.  p.  370.  The  Peripatetics y who  were 
originally  of  the  fame  School,  held  the  fame,  ’e* 

^ bToOy  70  dv^pccTTivoi;  Ivipysioc  yiyvilcci 

xAl'  dpslviv — rm  dplrfiv  >9  rsKsidldrYiv — 1\>  Qico  TsXuca, 
If  this  be  admitted y it  follows  that  Human  Good  or 
Happiness  is y the  energizing  of  the  Soul  according  to 
the  bejl  and  mojl  confumjnate  Virtuey  in  a perfedl  and 
complete  Life,  Ethic.  Nic.  1.  i.  c.  7.  A perfedi  and 
complete  LifCy  they  explained  to  be  fuch  a Life  as 
was  no  way  deficient  either  as  to  its  Durationy  its  bodily 
Healthy  and  its  being  attended  with  a proper  Competence 
of  external  Goodsy  and  Profperity,  By  the  beji  and 
pwft  confiimmate  Virtue,  they  not  only  meant  that 
Virtue,  which  was  in  its  kind  mod:  perfedl,  but  which 
was  the  Virtue  alfo  of  that  Party  which  is  in  each 
of  us  mofi  excellent.  For  there  are  Virtues  of  the 
Body,  fuch  as  Strength  and  Agility ; and  there  arc 
Virtues  of  the  Senfes,  fuch  as  accurate  Seeing,  ac- 
curate Tafting;  and  the  fame  of  every  Faculty, 
irom  the  loweft  to  that  which  is  fupreme. 

The  fovereign  Good  or  Happinefs  here  fpoken  of, 
is  again  repeated,  in  other  Words,  p,  179.  where  it 

is 


301 


NOTES  o«  Treatise  the  Third. 

is  called,  the  Attaining  the  primary  and  juji  Re- 
quifites  of  our  Nature^  by  a Condu^  fuitable  to  Virtue 
eind  moral  Office, 

The  primary  and  just  Requisites  here 
mentioned,  are  all  Things  requifite  to  the  life  and 
Enjoyment  of  our  Primary  and  Natural 
Perfections.  Thefe  Primary  and  Natural 
PerfeSiiom  mean  the  Natural  Accomplish- 
ments of  both  our  Mind  and  Body.  They 
were  allied  by  the  Latins^  Prima  Natura^  Prima 
fecundum  Naturam  \ by  tht  Greeks y roc  zrpura-  ytxldc 
(pvcrtv^  roc  zrpoorx  rv^g  (Puts cog.  In  them  were  in- 
cluded Health,  Strength,  Agility,  Beauty,  perfect 
Senfations,  Memory,  Docility,  Invention,  ^c.  See 
Stob.  EcL  Eth,  p.  163.  Cic,  de  Fin,  1.  5.  c.  7. 
p.  364.  A,  Cell,  1.  12.  c.  5. 

A like  Sentiment  of  Happinefsy  to  this  here  fpoken 

of,  is  that  mentioned  by  Cicero Virtute  adhibitdy 

frui  PRiMis  a naturd  datis,  De  Fin.  1.2.  c.  il. 
p.  1 13.  ’Tis  there  called  the  Opinion  of  the  old 
AcademicSy  and  Peripatetics,  It  is  again  repeated  by 
the  fame  Author.  Honefe  vivere^  fruentem  rebus 
iisy  quas  prima s homini  natura  conciliet,  Acad, 
i.  2.  c.  42.  p.  240. 

In  is  to  be  obferved  that  Cicero y fpeaking  of  this 
Hypothefis,  fays  that  it  propofed  an  Idea  of  Happi- 
nefSy  which  was  not  properly  in  our  own  Power,  Hoc 
non  ef  pofttum  in  nofrd  abiione : completur  enim  ^ 
ex  e»  genere  viteey  quod  virtute  finitury  dsf  ex  Us  rebus 
qua  fecundum  natura?n  funty  neque  funt  in  ?iofra  po- 
tefate,  De  Fin.  1,  4.  c.  6.  p.  2871^ 

Hence 


/ 


302 


N O T £ 8 on  Tr£atise  the  Third. 


Hence  therefore  the  Deficiency  of  thh  Dac^ 
trine.  However  juftifiable,  however  laudable  its 
Endy  it  could  not  infure  a due  Succefs  to  its  En- 
deavours, And  hence  too  the  Force  of  what  is  ob- 
jected to  it  in  the  Dialogue y from  p,  177.  to  th^ 
End  of  the  firfr  Part. 

Note  XXVI.  p.  1%. — To  place  the  Sove- 
reign Good  in  Rectitude  of  Conduct, 

As  the  Condudi  here  mentioned  implies  a Condu(51: 
under  the  Direction  of  a befitting  Rule  or  Lawy 
and  that,  as  oppofed  to  wrong  Conducfr,  which  has 
either  no  Rule  at  all,  or  at  leaft  one  erroneous ; it 
may  not  be  an  improper  Place  to  inquire,  what  was 
the  antient  Opinion  concerning  Law  universal, 
that  great  and  general  LaWy  which  flood  oppofed  to 
the  municipal  Laivs  of  particular  Cities,  and  Com- 
munities. 

Est  quidem  vera^EXy  redia  ratioy  natures  con^ 
gruenSy  diffufa  in  omneSy  con/lanSy  fempiternay  ques  vocet 

ad  officium  juhendoy  vetando  a fraude  deterreat nec 

erit  alia  lex  Romesy  alia  AtheniSy  alia  nuncy  alia  pojl- 
hac ; fed  & ornnes  genteSy  & omni  tempore  una  lex  y cA 
fempiternay  & immo?-talis  contmehit ; unufque  erit  com- 
munis quafi  magiftery  & imp  er  at  or  omnium  Deus,  Ilk 
hujus  legis  inventory  difceptatory  lator,  Cui  qui  non 
parehity  ipfe  fe  fugiety  ac  naturam  hominis  afpernahitur  ; 
hoc  ipfo  luet  maximas  poenaSy  etiamfi  catera  fupplicia^ 
qnee  putantUTy  effugerit,  Fragm.  Gic.  de  Rep.  I.  3. 

Lex 


KOT£S  on  Treatise  theHhird. 


Lex  ejl  ratio  fumma^  Infita  In  natura^  quce  jubet 
ia  qua  facienda  funt^  prohibetque  contraria.  What 
follows  is  worth  remarking.  Eadem  ratio^  cum  ejl 
in  hominis  mente  confirmata  & confedia^  lex  eji.  Cic. 
de  Legg.  1.  i.  c*  6.  p.  22. 

Again.  Lex  vera  — ratio  ejl  redla  fummi  Jovls« 
To  which  he  fubjoins,  as  above,  Er^o  ut  Ilia  divina 
mens  fumma  lex  ejl ; Ita  cum  In  homlne  eji^  perfedia  ejl 
in  mente  faplentls,  De  Legg.  1.  2.  c.  4, 5.  p.  88. 

’Tis  in  this  Senfe  xh^Apoflle  tells  us  of  the  Gen- 
tiles^ or  Mankind  In  general^  that  they  Jhew  the  Work, 
ef  the  Lavj  written  in  their  Hearts^  their  Confclence 
clfo  bearing  wltnefs^  and  their  Thoughts  the  mean  while 
accufmgy  or  elfe  excufmg  one  another,  Rom.  i.  ii. 

As  Cicero^  in  his  Book  of  Laws  above  cited,  follows 
the  Stoic  Difcipline,  fo  is  it  agreeable  to  their  Rea- 
foning,'  that  he  make  the  original  natural  La  w,  of 
which  we  here  treat,  to  be  the  Sovereign  Rea- 
son OF  THE  Deity  himfelf.  Thus  Chryfippus — 
Ide7n  [fcil.  Chryfippus']  legls  perpetua  ^ aterna  vlm^ 
qua  quafit  dux  vita  ^ magijira  officlorum  Jit^  JovEM 
dicit  ejje,  Nat.  Deor.  1.  i,  0,15.  p.  41. 

So  by  the  fame  Philofophers  in  Laertius^  wc 
are  ordered  to  live  according  to  Kature^ 
lotg  m ixTrccyofivnv  0 0 oo’tts* 

iriv  0 o^OoV  di(Z  zrdvluv  ° 

iv  Tw  AtJ,  xa6»5/f|Uovi  t8tw  t?i?  tcov  ovIcov  (for.  oAwi;) 

ovli,  doing  nothings  forbidden  by  the  Uni- 

VERSAt 


304  NOTES  on  Treatise  the  Third. 

VERSAL  Law,  that  is  to  fay^  by  that  right  Reafon^ 
which  pafleth  thro*  all  Things^  and  which  is  the  s awe 
in  Jove  himfelf^  the  Governor  and  Conductor  of  this 
univerfal  Adminijiration^  Laert.  1.  7.  f.  88. 

Agreeably  to  this  Reafoning,  Plutarch  correds 
thofe,  who  made  a Goddefs,  and  the  AJfeJfor 

cf  Jove  5 for,  fays  he,  0 ZfJ?  ovx.  fxh  rm  At>oi» 
•wd^s^oov^  aAA*  dulo;  Alxv  ^ er*),  vof^oov  ® 

Z7p£(r^v^ccl^  ^ TfActoVa?©^,  Jove  has  not  Alxv  or 
Right  for  his  AJfeJfor^  but  is  himfelf  Plight ^ and 
Justice,  and  of  all  Laws  the  moji  antient 
le/ziPERFECT.  Moral,  p.  781.  B. 

Thus  Antoninus — tiA^  J"!  Xoyixuv  ^wwv,  t» 

sTTiiT^ai  Tw  Tvif  7roXs(ag  7^  TroXiJiiccg  r^g  Tr^str^vJccTrjg 

A05/W  XO61  OfTjytw.  The  End  of  Rational  Animals  is  to 
follow  the  Reason  and  sacred  Law^  that  City 
and  moJi  antient  Polity,  [in  which  all  rational  Beings 
are  included.]  1.  2.  L 16. 

The  moft  fimple  Account  of  this  Law^  which  the 
Stoics  gave,  feems  to  be  that  recorded  by  Stobaus  ; 
according  to  which  they  called  it  Aoj/ov,  o^Oov  Mcc, 
zs^orocxlixov  jwL  ruv  wotJjlfwv,  dTrotyo^svJixov  twv  h 
zroivUm,  Right  Reason,  ordaining  what  is  to  be 
done^  and  forbidding  what  is  not  to  be  done.  Eel. 
Ethic.  178.  See  alfo  the  Notes  of  Tiirnebus  and 
Davis  upon  Cic,  deLegg,  1. 1.  c.  6. 

Having  premifed  thus  much  concerning  Law 
univerfal^  it  remains  to  fay  fomething  of  that  Rec- 
titude OF  Conduct,  which  is  in  this  Part  of  the 

Dialogue 


Notes  on  Treatise  the  Third, 

Dialogue  propofed  as  our  Happinefs.  Rectitude 
OF  Conduct  is  intended  to  exprefs  the  Term 
Kxlo^9co(rig^  which  Cicero  tranflates  retia  Effe^io, 
K'x,']o^9cofX(x  he  tranflates  Return  Fa£ium,  See  Dt 
Fin.  L 3.  c.  14.  p.  242.  Now  the  Definitibn  of  a 
Kcilo^Ooofxa^  was  N0//.8  n Fhtng  com- 

manded  by  Law ; to  which  was  oppofed  oi^diflnfxu^ 
a Sin  or  Offence.^  which  was  defined  NoV-» 
yo^svfxoiy  a Thing  forbidden  by  Law.  Plut.  Mor. 
1037  What  Law  is  here  meant,  which  thus 
commands  or  forbids,  has  been  fhewn  above. 

Hence  therefore  may  be  feen  the  Reafon,  why 
we  have  faid  thus  much  on  the  Nature  and  Idea  of 
Law  univerfal^  fo  intimate  being  the  Union  between 
this  and  right  Condudf^  that  we  find  the  latter  is  no- 
thing more  than  a perfedi  Obedience  to  the  former. 

Hence  too  we  fee  the  Reafon,  why  in  one  view 
it  was  deemed  Happiness,  to  be  void  of  Error  or 
Offence dvoc/xccplvlov  sTvon,  as  we  find  it  in  Arrian, 
Epidt.  1.  4.  c.  8.  p.  633.  For  to  be  thus  inculpable 
was  the  neceffary  Refult  of  Rediitude  of  Condudiy  or 
.rather  in  a manner  the  fame  thing  with  it. 

I cannot  conclude  this  Note^  without  remarking 
on  an  elegant  Allufion  of  Antoninus  to  the  primary 
Signification  of  the  Word  KalopOwcri?,  that  is  to 
fay,  Y.A\di  op6o\,  right  onwards.,  Jlraight  and  direddly 
forwards.  Speaking  of  the  Reajoning  Faculty^  how, 
without  kokifig  farther.,  it  refs  contented  in  its  own 
Energies,  he  adds KaOo  di  TOidvlat 

‘srpu^ng  ovofxd^ovlxiy  JpOoTtjra  rrg  oda 

Tijr  which  Reafon  are  all  Adtions,  of  this 

X Species, 


305 


Ck1> 


o6  N O T E S Treatise  the  I’hird. 

Species y Rectitudes,  as  denoting  the  Diretf-^ 
nefs  of  their  Progrejfion  right  onwards.  1.  5.  f.  14, 
So  again  in  the  fame  Senfe,  Iv^iTccv  -zs-epau/uv,  to  keep 
en^  the  Jiraight  Road.  1.  5.  f.  3-  I.  10.  f.  ii. 

One  would  imagine  that  our  Countryman  Milton 
had  this  Reafoning  in  view,  when  in  his  19th  Son- 
net fpeaking  of  his  own  Blindnefs,  he  fays  with  a 
becoming  Magnanimity, 


Yet  I argue  not 

Jgainjl  Heav^n^s  Hand  or  Will ; nor  hate  one  jot 
Of  Heart  or  Hope ; but  fill  bear  up^  and  feer 
Right  onwards 

The  whole  Sonnet  is  not  unworthy  of  Perufa^ 
being  both  fublime  and  fimple. 

Note  XXVII.  p.  185. — The  mere  doing 
whatever  is  cc^rrespondent  to  such  an 

End,  even  tho’  we  never  attain  it ] 

Thus  Epibfetus  in  Arrian.,  fpeaking  of  Addrefs  to 
Men  in  Power,  and  admitting  fuch  Addrefs,  when 
juftined  by  certain  Motives^  adds  that  fuch  Addrefs 
ought  to  be  made,  without  Admiration,  or  Flattery. 
Upon  this  an  Obje^^lor  demands  of  him,  td-w? 

s iiGy-oci  ; But  how  then  am  1 to  obtain  that^ 
which  I want  ? Philofopher  anfwers,  ’£;/« 

(TQt  on  cJ;  T E TH O E N O 2 * 

TO  (Tccvlip  ujpiTTov  ; Did  I ever 
fay  to  thee.,  that  thou  Jhouldf  go  and  addrefs.,  as  tho' 
ihou  wert  to  succeed^  and  not  rather  with  this  only 
View,  that  thou  rnightf  do  that,  which  is  be- 
coming THY  Character  — And  foon  after, 

whea 


NOTES  Tr  E A T i‘sE  the  Third, 

■when  an  Obje<5lion  is  urged  from  Appearance,  and 
the  Opinion  of  Mankind,  he  anfwers o7(r()' 

§Tt  dvvi^  ycocXog  dyoc^og  yisv  zroisT  ra 

dxxd  T»  nEnPAX0Al  KAAflS;  Knowe/i 
thou  noty  that  a fair  and  good  Man  does  nothing  for  the 
fake  of  Appearance^  hut  for  the  fake  only  of  having 
DONE  WELL  AND  FAIRLY?  Arr.Epi^,  1.  3.  C.  24. 

p.  497,  498.  This  Dohfrine  indeed  feems  to  have 
been  the  Bafis  of  the  Stoic  Morals  \ the  Principle, 
which  included,  according  to  thefe  Philofophers,  as 
'well  Honour  and  Honefty^  as  Good  and  Happinefs. 
Thus  Cicero — Facer e omnia^  ut  adipifcamur  qucs  fecun- 
dum  naturam  fint^  etfi  ea  non  adfequamur,  id  ef'e  & 
honefum^  ^ folum  per  fe  expetendum  ^ fummum  boniirn 
Stoici  dicunt.  De  Fin.  1.  5.  c.  7.  p.  365,  6.  To  this 
is  confonant  that  Sentiment  of  theirs  in  Plutarch  — 
T'/jv  (pucTiy  dvrm  doicc(popov  ilvoci  * 70  J'l  ttj  Cpocrst 
ofjcoXoysTv^  dyc)c9ov——And  again — to'  >cccld  (pva-iv^ 
t£A(^  bIvui  — TOJ  Koc]d  (pucriv^  dJ'i(z(popcc  bIvoci,  Plut. 
Mor,  1060.  D.  E.  See  below.  Note  XXX* 

NoteXXVIII.  p.  185. — What  if  we  make 

OUR  NATURAL  StATE  THE  STANDARD  ONLY 
TO  DETERMINE  OUR  CONDUCT,  ’Tis  in 

this  Senfe  we  find  it  elegantly  faid  in  Plutarch  by  the 
iaft  mentioned  Philofophers — rotxs^cc  rrig  ii^xiaovlxg 

rm  (pv<TiVy  TO  Kccld  (puTiv that  our  natural 

State  a?id what  is  confonant  to  it^  are  theEhi.  m e n t s 
of  Happinefs— 2cs\d  juft  before,  the  fame  natural  State 
is  called  ra  y.aSwovI©^  uA>i  rlig  the 

Source  of  moral  Office  \ and  the  Subject  Mat- 
ter of  Virtue.  Plut.  Mor.  1069.  E.  F.  Atque 
etiam  illud  perfpicuum  efl^  confitui  neceffie  effie  initiumy 
quod  fapientia^  cum  quid  agere  incipiaty  fequatur  ; id- 
• X 2 quo 


3o8  notes  on  Treatise  the  Third. 

que  initium  ejfe  natura  accommodatum : nam  aliter  ap^ 
petitioy^c,  Cic.Acad.  1.  2.  c.  8.  p.  85, 86.  Initia pro- 
poni  mceffe  eJfe  apta  ^ accommodata  natures.^  quorum  ex 
feleSfione  Virtus  poffit  exijiere.  De  Fin.  1.  4.  c.  17. 
p.  316.  Cum  vero  ilia.,  qua  officia  e(fe  dixi,  proficif- 
eantur  ah  initiis  natura ; ea  ad  hac  referri  necejfe  eji  : 
ut  redfe  diet  pojfit,  omnia  officia  eo  referri,  ut  adipifea- 
mur  principia  natura ; nec  tamen  ut  hoc  fit  bo  no  rum 
ULTiMUM  — De  Fin,  1.  3.  c.  6.  p.  217. 

Note  XXIX.  p.  185. AVe  should  not 

WANT  A Good  to  correspond,  ^c.']  Plutarch 
quotes  the  following  Sentiment  of  Chryjippm,  who 

patronized  this  Idea  of  Good Toy  'onpl  aj/afiwv 

xal  Xoyov,  o\  dvlog  Udot/yn  xal 

CVpf.pcCVOTCC%V  .slvoci  (pTidl.  TW  Ctw,  Kodi  fXcUXlT'Oi  TWy 

j/A(puTwy  <x7rj£o-9cn  zrpo^.iirpiccv,  Plut.  Mor.  1041.  E. 

Note  XXX,  p.  187. — Yet  we  look,  not 
TOR  HIS  Refutation,  ^c.~\  What  ^intilian 
fays  of  Rhetoric,  may  with  great  Propriety  be  tranf- 
ferred  to  Morality,  Nofier  orator,  Arfque  a nobis 
finita,  non  funt  pohta  in  eventu.  Tendit  quidem 
ad  vidloriam,  qui  dicit : fed,  cum  bene  dixit,  etiamfi 
non  vincat,  id,  quod  arte  continetur,  effecit,  Nam  ^ 
gubernator  vult  fialvd  nave  in  portum  pervenire : fi 
tamen  tempefiate  fuerit  abreptus,  non  idea  minus  erit 
gubernator,  dicetque  notum  illud ; dum  clavum  redlum 
•‘teneam.  Et  medicus  fanitate7n  agri  petit:  fi  tamen 
aut  valetudinis  vi,  aut  inteiriperantid  agj'i,  aliove  que 
cafiu  furnma  7ion  contingit ; dum  ipfe  oTfmia  fiecundum 
rationem  fecerit,  7nedicina  fine  non  excidit,  Ita  oratori 

bene  dixijfe,  finis  efi.  Na7n  eft  ars  ea in  actu 

pofita,  non  in  eventu.  Inil.  Orat.  1.  2.  c.  17. 

Note 


NOTES  on  Treatise  the  Third. 


Note  XXX.  p.  187.  — He  for  a Subject 

HAS  THE  WHOLE  OF  HuMAN  LlFE,^^-.] 

T8  cc)/cc9^y  ■srpoatpfflTt?  zjoiiz  • T«  jcxyts  ’Grpooiipi(ri^  zjokx, 

T/  Tcc  IkIo;  ; *'TKoci  T?  TsrpoxtpEcrety  zj-epl  aV  aua- 
f~p£PojtA,ivv  Tiu^/Jai  T8  t^ia  ^ xa>c8.  EJJence 
of  Good,  is  a peculiar  Dire^ion  of  Mind’,  and  the 
EJfence  ^ Evil,  is  a peculiar  Dir ediion  alfo.  What 
Externals  ? They  ferve  as  Subjects  to 
the  Mind^s  Diredtion,  from  converfing  with  which  it 
obtains  its  proper  Good  or  Evil*  Arr.  Epidt.  1. 1.  c.  29. 

Again *At  u^Aai,  oi^iol(popoi  * n TCpw*?  dvluy  ovx 

d^i’Cc(pop^,  The  Subjects  are  indifferent,  but  not 
fo  theX^z's.  of  them*  An*.  Epidl.  1.  2.  c.  5. 

Thus  Horace: 

Non  pofftdentem  multa  vocaveris 
Redle  heatum  \ reSlius  occupat 
Nomen  bead,  qui  Deorum 
Muneribus  sapient er  uti, 

Duramqtie  callet  patiperiem  pad, 

Pejufq',  leto  flagidum  timet : 

Non  ille,  ^ c. 

Od.  1.  iv.  9, 

Even  the  Comic  Poet  feems  not  to  have  been 
unacquainted  with  this  Dodlrine  : 

Ch,  ^id  ndrrat?  Cl.  ^id  ille?  mtferum  fe  effe* 
Ch.  Mjfcrum  ? quern  minus  credere  ef  ? 


10  NOTES  0/2  Treatise//6^  Third. 

^lid  relUqui  ejl^  quin  hdbeat  qius  quidem  in  hdmine 
dicuntur  bona  ? 

Parhtis^  patriam  incdlumemy  amicos^  gfnuSy  cognatos^ 
divitias : 

Atque  haec  perinde  funt  ut  illiiis  animus^  qui  ea  pof- 
fidet : 

UTi  fcit^  ei  bona;  £///,  qul  non  utitur  re5ie^ 
mala, 

Heauton.  Ad.  I.  S.  2.  V.  18. 

Note  XXXI.  p.  189.— The  End  in  other 
Arts  is  ever  distant,  &c.]  Sed  in  cateris 
artl'bus  -cum  dicitur  Artificiose,  pojlerum  quodam  modo 
iff  confequens  putandum  eji^  quod  illi  iTriymn^ocliyLO]) 
appellant ; quod  autem  in  quo  Sapienter  dicitur^  id  ad- 
primo  redtijjime  dicitur  : quicquid  enim  a fapiente  pro- 
ficifcitur^  id  continuo  debet  expleturn  ejje  omnibus  fui^ 
partibus ; in  eo  enim  pofitum  eft  id.,  quod  dicimus  eJJe 
expetendum.  Nam ^t  peccatum,  ejl  patriam  prodere^ 
parentes  violare,  fana  depeculari,  qu^  funt  in  effedlu  : 
ftc  timer e,  ftc  mtzrere,  fic  in  libidine  ejfe,  peccatum  ejly 
ftiam  fine  efifediu.  Verum  ut  hcec^  non  in  pofieris  & in 
confequentibus,  fed  in  primis  continuo  peccata  funt : jic 
fa,  qua  proficificuntur  a virtute,  susceptione  prima^ 
non^  perfectione,  redia  fiunt  judicanda,  Cic.  de 
Fin.  1.  3.  c.  9.  p.  228.  Tii  TEAys"  Tvf^dvEi  ['/1  Ao- 

ytyf  oTTis  uv  TO  ry  Qla  XTEpx^  £7rjf-^  * 

ETtI  Kcdi  JttOJCO / VfCO?  XXI  TCOV  roi^TcaVy 

ccrE?r?ig  yiv&lai  n oXn'  Idv  ri  aAA* 

IttI  zrx'fiQg  yNi  ottu  oii/  zrXnpsg  vtodi 

XTTpoTodig  IccSlvi  to  TnpoTc^i))  zjotei'  COT'S  EtTTEi;),  syd 
stTTsy^co  Toi  liJ.cc,  M.  Ant.  1.  II.  f.  I.  Et  quemad- 

modiim 


NOTES  on  Treatise  the  Third, 

modum  opportunitas  (fie  enim  adpellemus  ivnxipiav)  non 
fit  major  produdione  temporh  ( hahent  enim  fuum  mo-- 
dum  quacunque  opportuna  dicuntur)  fic  redfa  effediio, 
(xxjo'p^cca-iv  enim  ita  adpelloy  quoniam  re£ium  fadlum 
nocldp^wfxoc)  redta  igitur  ejfie5iio^  item  convenientia^  de~ 
nique  ipsum  bonum,  quod  in  eo  pofitum  efi  ut  natura 
confentiat^  crefeendi  accejjionem  nullajn  habet.  JJt  enim 
fipportunitas  illa^  fu  hcec  de  quibus  dixi^  non  fiunt  tern-- 
poris  produbiione  major  a : cb  eamque  caufam  Stoicis  non 
videtur  optabilior  nec  magis  expetenda  vita  beata^  fi  fit 
longa^  quam  fi  brevh  : utunturque  fimili^  ut^  fi  cothurni 
lam  ilia  efi  ad  pedem  apte  convenire^  neque  multi  cothurni 
paucis  anteponerentur^  nec  majores  minoribus : fic  quo- 
rum omne  bonum  convenientid  atque  opportunitate  finitur^ 
nec  plura  paucioribuSy  nec  longinquiora  brevioribus  ante- 
ponentur.  Cic.  de  Fin.  1.  3.  c.  14.  p.  242.  See  alfo 
Dio.  Laert.  1.  7.  f.  loi.  M.  Ant.  1.  6.  f.  23.  1.  3. 
f.  7.  Senec.  Epifl.  66. 

■ Note  XXXIII.  p.  191. — Recollect  then, 

SAID  HE,  Do  YOU  NOT  REMEMBER  THAT  ONE. 

Pre-conception,  ^V.]  In  this,  and  the  fubfequen t 
Pages,  the  general  Pre-conceptions  of  Good  are  applied 
to  the  particular  Hypothefis  of  Goody  advanced  in  this 
Treatife,  See  before,  pag.  115,  121,  122. 

Note  XXXIV.  p.  192. And  is  there 

any  Time  or  Place,  whence  Rectitude 
OF  Conduct  may  be  excluded?]  n a N- 
TAXOT  xa)  AIHNEKDS  ittI  <rol  Iriy  axl 

TV  ZTiXp'dTV  (rvf/.^X(r£i  Ivapsriiv,  xxt  roTg  tz-x- 

pdiTiv  xv9poo7roi$  tytxlx  ^i}txi0(r(ivr\v  'uspoo'^i^eT^xi 

M.  Ant.  I,  7,  f.  54. 

X4 


Note 


NOTES  on  Treatise  tbe’Third. 


Note  XXXV.  p.  192. —Where  it  shall 

NOT  BE  IN  HIS  PoWER  TO  ACT  BRAVELY 
AND  HONESTLY.]  ay  fXOi  ttw?  yivYi^ 

lai  ; oTT^q  ay  yh?flat,  cru  dvio  Qro'eiq  xaAwc,  xai 
(TOi  ro  aTTpSay  hlCy^rii^cc.  Arrian.  Epidl.  1.  4* 
C,  10.  p.  650. 

Note  XXXVI.  p.  195.  There  are  In- 
stances INNUMERABLE  OF  MeN  BAD,  AS 
WELL  AS  GOOD,^^.]'  Scc  a long  Catalogue  of 
thefe  in  Cicero's  Tufculan  Difputations ; spartan  Boys ; 
Barbarian  Sages ; Indian  W ives  5 Egyptian  Devotees, 
^c.  itfc.  The  whole  Paffage  is  worth  reading.  Tufc, 
Pifh  !•  5-  c.  27.  p.  400,  401, 

Note  XXXVII.  p.  196. — This  I write  you 
(says  he  in  one  of  HIS  Epistles)  while, 
Tm  fxtxxapii^^  (xyovlsq  jtal  rE?v£v]xioiV 
pav  T?  b/a,  lypix(ppy.£v  vp/AD  'taZra  ■ rpOfdyspicPiE  Tsra-s 
xat  ^vg-EvlspiKOC  VTrsp^oXriv  hx  dnc-r 

AfiTTovla  ra  £y  socvloTg  pisyi^i^g  * (Z'j]t7roip  ETaiJrllo  Je 
zjxci  r^roig  ro  xocjai  i^vyyjv  y^aTpov  etti  t7j  toov  ysyov 
voToov  “nyAv  S'lxXoyiry'^v  yviiyYi—I^io.  Laer.  1.  10.  f.  22. 
Cum  ageremus  vitos  beatum  (sf  eundem  fupremum  dwn^ 
fcribebamus  here.  Tanti  autem  morbi  aderant  veftca  & 
vifeerum.,  ut  nihil  ad  eorum  magnitudinem  poJ]it  acce^ 
dere.  Compenfabatur  tamen  cum  his  omnibus  animi  lie- 
iitia^  quarn  capiebam  nmnorld  ratwium  inventorumque 
nojlrorum  — Cic.  de  Fin.  L 2.  c.  30.  p.  173. 

Soon  after  we  have  another  Sentiment  of  Epietu 
fus^  that  ^ rational  Adverftty  was  better  than  an  irra~ 


NOTES  onliR^ AT  1^1^  the  Third. 


313 


tioml  Profperlty.  The  original  Words  are  — xpnr- 
Tov  Eivxi  evXoyi'rooy  xtv^eTv,  ^ d'Ao'yl^uig 

Dio.  Laert.  1.  10.  f*  135- 

Note  XXXVIII.  p.  198.  O Crito,  if  it  be 
PLEASING  TO  THE  GoDs,  The  three  Quo- 

tations in  this  Page  are  taken  from  Plato ; the  firfr 
from  the  Crito^  quoted  by  Epi5ietus  at  the  End  of 
the  Enchiridion^  and  in  many  other  Places ; the  fe- 
cond  from  the  Apology^  quoted  as  frequently  by  the 
fame  Author;  the  third,  from  the  Menexenm  or 
Epitaph,  Plat.  Opera,  tom.  2.  p.  248.  Edit,  Serraii, 
See  alfo'C/V.  Tufcul,  1.  5.  c.  12. 

Note  XXXIX.  p.  199.  If  you  are  for 
Numbers,  replied  he,  what  think  you  of 
THE  numerous  Race  of  Patriots,  &£.]  Sed 
quid  duces  ^ principes  7iominem\  cum  legiones  fciibat 
Cato  fcepe  alacris  in  eum  locum  profedias^  unde  redituras 
fe  non  arhitrarentur  ? Pari  animo  Lacedamonii  in 
Thcrmopylis  occiderunt : in  quos  Simonides y 

Die  hofpes  Spartrcy  nos  te  hie  vidijfe  jacenteSy 
Pum  fantlis  patria  legibus  obfequimur, 

Tufcul,  Difp.  1. 1,  c.  42.  p.  loi. 

Note  XL.  Ibid, Martyrs  for  Sys- 

tems WRONG,  That  there  may  be  a bigotted 
Objiinacy  in  favour  of  what  is  abfurdy  as  well  as  a 
rational  Conflancy  in  adhering  to  what  is  rights  thofe 
Egyptians  above  mentioned  may  ferve  as  Examples. 
/Egyptiorum  jnorm  quis  ignoret  ? quorum  imbutts  men- 
ies  pravitatis  erroribus  quamvis  carnificifuwi  prius  fubi- 
eriijty  quam  ihim  aiit  afpidetn  ant  feleni  aiit  canetn  aut 

croco- 


314  NOTES  onTR-EATi%-E  theTbird. 

crocodilum  violent:  quorum  etiam  fi  imprudentes  quid- 
piam  fecerint^  pcsnam  nullam  recufent,  Tufcul.  Difp. 
i.  5.  c.  27.  p.  402.  See  before.  Note  XXXVI. 

Note  XLI.  p.  200. — Celebrated  to  such 
A Height,  in  the  Religion,  which  we 
PROFESS,  ’Tis  probable,  that  fome  Analogies 

of  this  fort  induced  a Father  of  the  Church  (and  no 
lefs  a one  than  St.  Jerom ) to  fay  of  the  ^toict^  who 
made  moral  Redtitude  the  only  Good, no- 

stro DOGMATI  IN  PLERISQUE  CONCORDANT. 

Vid.  Menag.  in  D,  Laert.  1.  7.  f.  loi.  p.  300. 
and  Gatak.  Prafat,  in  M.  Anton,  See  alfo  of  this 
Treatife  page  no.  and  below,  NoteJuKlY , 

Note  XLII.  p.  201.  To  live  consistent- 
ly, To  LIVE  CONSISTENTLY  is  here  ex- 

plained to  be  LIVING  ACCORDING  TO  SOME  ONE 
SINGLE  CONSONANT  ScHEME  OR  PuRPOSE  ; and 

our  Good  or  Happiness  is  placed  in  fuch  Con- 
sistence, upon  a Suppofition  that  thofe,  who  live 
inconfifently^  and  v/ithout  any  fuch  uniform  Scheme^ 
are  of  confequence  miferahle,^  unhappy.  To  t£- 
A(^  0 |a.£v  Z'/ivoov  aVw?  dTrioocats^  to  0 fAoXo'yHy.img  * 
T»ro  J'’  I ft  sVa  Xoyo))  (TU[j^(puvov  00;  ruv 

i^dvloov  aoiKoJ'oiifj.oviivloov.  Stob.  Eel.  Ethic. 

p.  171. 

This  Consistence  was  called  in  Greek  o^aoXo- 
in  Latin  Co7ivenientia^  and  Vv^as  fometimes  by 
itfeif  alone  confidered  as  the  End.  Tw  cy.oXoylccy 
xivHdi.  fTvcit.  Stob,  Eel.  Ethic,  p.  172.  See 

alfo  Cic.  de  Fin.  1.  3.  c.  6.  p.  216.  So  alfo  in  the  fame 
lafi  named  Treatife,  c.  7.  p.  220,  — Utenimhifri- 

Giii 


NOTES  on  Treatise  the  Third. 

mi  a£fio^  faltatori  motus^  non  quivis^  fed  certus  quidam 
eji  datiis : fie  vita  agenda  efit  certo  genere  quodam^  non 
quolibet\  quod  genus  conveniens  consentane- 
UMQUE  dieimus.  Nee  enim  gubernationi  aut  medtcina 
fitmilem  fiapientiam  ejfie  arbitrarnur fied  adioni  illi  potius^ 
quani  modo  dixi^  & faltationi ; ut  in  ipfia  arte  infiit^ 
non  foris  petatur  extremum,  artis  efifePlio. 

’T I s upon  this  Principle  we  find  it  a Precept 

in  Cicero’’ s Offices In  primis  autem  conflituen-^ 

dum  eft.,  quos  nos  £sf  quales  effie  velimuSy  ^ in  quo 
genere  vitae 1.  i.  c.  32.  So  likewife  in  the  En- 
chiridion of  EpiSletuSy  c.  33. nvd  rih 

p{Z>cJvpoi  (tocvI'jc  TVTTovy  ov  Itti  TS  (TStZvlu  cov, 

^ dv9pco7rotg  ETrirvfxdvcov,  Ordain  to  thyfielfi fiome  Cha- 
rail er  and  Model  ofi Lificy  which  thou  mayji  maintain  both 
by  thyfielfiy  and  when  thou  art  converfiant  with  Mankind, 

So  much  indeed  was  refled  upon  this  Prin- 
ciple of  Confiifiencey  that  even  to  be  any  thing  con- 
Jifientlyy  was  held  better  than  the  contrary.  Thus 
Epiltetus — ''Evcc  <t£  Je?  avOpcoTToy  fi’yat,  ^ dyoc^ov  ^ 
yiccytov  * ^ to  ^y£'^Qviy,6v  cs  i^spyd^scrdcci  to  (rau1», 

3 rd  Ulo\ It  behoves  thee  to  he  one  uniform 

Man,  either  good  or  bad , either  to  cultivate  thy  own 

Mindy  or  to  cultivate  things  external Arr.  Epid. 

1.  3.  c.  15.  p.  421.  And  more  fully  than  this  does 
he  exprefs  himfelf  in  a Place  fubfequent ; where 
having  firft  counfelled  againft  that  falfe  Complai- 
fance,  which  makes  us,  to  pleafe  Mankind,  forget 
our  proper  Charalfery  and  having  recommended  as 

our  Duty  a Behaviour  contrary,  he  adds Ti  ds 

dp£<T£i  rdvliXy  dTrbiiXmv  Itt)  toc'jxvVoc.*  ysvH 

fTf  ruv  mvoii'hvy  aV  rm  /A0tp(,coy l^id(popx  f 


315 


3i6 


NOTES  on  Treatise  thenird. 


ZJ^O(T(^'TrOC  pu  fxiyvu'lcci  • OV  ^6vC(.(T(ZI  ^ ©fpCTiTVlV  OTTOXpi- 

vxcr^oii  ' AyccfjJfj-vova, — Arr.  Epidt.  1.  4.  c.  2.  p.  580. 
But  if  what  I recommend  thee  do  not  pleafe^  then  turn 
thee  totally  to  all  that  is  contrary ; become  a profligate  of 

the  7nofl  proflitute  kind Characters  fo  different  are 

not  to  be  blended ; thou  canfl  not  aCt  at  once  Therfites 
arid  Agamemnon. 

So  too  Horace: 

-^anto  CONST ANTioR  idem 

In  vitiis^  tanto  levins  mifer^  ac  prior  ilk 
^ui  jam  contento^  jam  laxo  fine  laborat. 

Sat.  7.  1.  2.  V.  18, 

See  alfo  CharaCteidJiics^  V.  i.  p.  131. 

Note  XLIII.  p.  203.  — It  is  not  merely, 
TO  LIVE  consistently;  but  to  live  con- 
sistently wiLH  Nature.]  ri? 

Cleanthes  in  Stob.  Eel.  Eth.  p.  17 1. — 
Co7igruenter  natures  convenienterque  vivere.  Cic.  de 
Fin.  1.  3.  c.  7.  p.  221.  The  firft  Defeription  of 
our  End  fo  live  co7ififtently'\  was  deemed  defective^ 
and  therefore  was  this  Addition  made.  See  Stobaus 
in  the  Place  cited.  Arr.  EpiSt.  1.  3.  c.  i.  p.  352. 

Note  XLIV.  p.  204. To  live  consis- 

tently WITH  Nature  is,  to  live  accord- 
ing TO  just  Experience  of  those  things, 

WHICH  HAPPEN  AROUND  US.]  eVI  TO 

(pvosi  ^ViV  * 0 ora- 

(plrtpov  ^i^Aousnog  '^oir.rro'A^  ro'j  rpoTrov  rvrovy 

Yacv  xzT  £f.c7rEipfxv  rx'j  (pxxrsi  crvfj.^xivdvloov,  Stob.  Ecl. 
Ethic.  171.  Diog.  Laert.  1.  7.  c.  87.  His  verbis 

[fcil. 


NOTES  ci«  Treatise  the  Third. 

ffcil.  vivere  fecundum  naturam']  tria  fignlficari  Stoici 
4icunt,  Unum  ejufmodl.^  vivere  adhibentem  fcientiam 

earum  rerum^  quce  naturd  evemrent De  Fin.  1.  4. 

c.  6.  p.  286.  See  alfo  the  fame  Treatife,  /.  3.  c,  9. 

р.  227.  /.  2.  c.  II.  p.  1 13-  where  ’tis  exprefled — 

Vivere  cum  intelUgentid  earum  rerum.^  qua  naturd  eve^ 
nirent. 

Note  XLV.  p.  205.— To  live  perpetually 

SELECTING,  AS  FAR  AS  POSSIBLE,  WHAT  IS 
CONGRUOUS  TO  NaTURE,  AND  REJECTING 
WHAT  IS  CONTRARY,  MAKING  OUR  EnD  THAT 

Selecting,  and  that  Rejecting  only.] 

*^0  Tf  " AvllTTO.']  TO  T£A©-»  JCSi'tBcCi,  ’Ev 

TW  J'iWEHW?  CCTTXpOiSu'JcCi:  OCl  jOCty  TOC  Kocloc 

(pVClVf  CC7r£X\£y£(T9xi  Je  TOJ  ZTCCpiZ  (P'JCTlV^  hTToXoC^^dvH, 

Clem.  Alex.  Strom.  1.2.  p.  497.  Edit,  Potter,  This 
Sentiment  was  fornetimes  contrasted.^  and  exprefled 

as  follows TO  IvXoyiT’s'iV  h rocTg  IxAoJ/a;? 

fornetimes,  more  concifely  ftill,  by  the  fingle  Term 
TO  IvXoyiriTv.  See  Plutarch  1071,  1072.  Cicers 
joins  this^  and  the  foregoing  Defcriptions  of  Happi- 
nefi.^  together.  Circumfcriptis  igitur  his  fententiiSy 
quas  pofui.,  ^ fi  qua  fmiles  earum  fnt ; relinquitur^ 
ut  fummum  bonmn  ft^  vivere  fcientiam  adhibentem 
earum  rerum^  qua  naturd  evenlant.^  feligentem  qua  fe- 
cundum naturam.^  &’  qua  contra  naturam  funt  rejicien- 
tem.,  id  eft.^  convenienter  cofjgruenterque  natura  vivere, 
De  Fin.  1.  3.  c*  9.  p.  227.  See  alfo  De  Fin,  1.  2. 

с.  II.  p*  ii3»  See  alfo  Diog,  Laert,  1.  7.  c.  88.  — 
^tob.  Eel,  Eth,  17 1. 

Note  XLVI.  p.  207.  To  live  in  the  dis- 
charge OF  MORAL  Offices.]  Jt 

( T£  A(^ 


317 


3i8  notes  on  Treatise  the  Third. 

(pmi]  TO  zrctvlx  rcc  aoSwovla.  iiriTeX^-Jlix 

Laert.  I.  7.  c.  88.  — Stob.  Ed.  Eth.  17 1.  — O^cia 
mnia — fervantem  vivere.  Cic.  de  Fin.  1.  4.  c.  6. 
p.  286. 

Soon  after  we  meet  the  Phrafes — To  live  ac- 
cording TO  Nature  ; To  live  according 
TO  Virtue,  ’o  Z'^’jwv  — rfA©-*  fiVf,  to  o'^oAoj/a- 
fxBvoog  (pu(TBi  ottb^  lr"l  x<%T  ccp/lriv  Laert, 

1.  7.  c.  87. Conf entire  nature  ; quod  ejje  volunt  e 

virtute^  id  eji^  honejiate  vivere — De  Fin.  1.  2.  c.  ii, 
p.  1 13.  Where,  as  has  been  already  obferved  page 
1 74,  and  in  the  Note  likewife  on  the  Place,  we  find 
the  Lives  according  to  Nature  and  Virtue  are  con- 
fidered  as  the  fame. 

However  to  make  this  AfTertion  plainer,  (if  it 
be  not  perhaps  fufficiently  plain  already)  it  may  not 
be  improper  to  confider,  what  Idea  thefe  Philofo-^ 
phers  had  of  Virtu^. 

In  Laertius  (where  he  delivers  the  Sentiments  of 
Zeno  and  his  followers)  Virtue  is  called 

a confiftent  Difpofition  ; and  foon  after, 

zs’STTOtrifABVTi  ZTpog  Tw  o^oKoy'iav  TSTUvlog  ry 

A Mind  formed  to  Confifence  thra"  every  Part  of  Life. 
Laert.  1.  7.  c.  89. 

In  Stobeeus  (according  to  the  Sentiments  of  the 
fame  School)  it  is  called  AiaOfO'i? 
dvl^  ■sTfpl  oAov  70  V Qiov.  A Difpofition  of  Mind^  con-- 
fonant  to  itfelf  throughout  the  whole  of  Life.  Ed.  Eth. 
p.  167. 


So 


NOTES  OT  Treatise  ‘Third. 


3*9 


So  Cicero  in  hhLaws  — Conjlam  ^ perpetua  rath 
•vltiSy  qua  eji  ViRTUS. — 1.  i.  c.  17.  p.  55. 

So  Seneca  in  his  74/Z?  Epiftle Virtus  enim 

CONVENIENT! A conjiat : omnia  opera  ejus  cum  ipfd 
eoncordanty  & congruunt. 

Thus  therefore  Confiftence  being  the  Effence  of 
Virtue^  and  upon  the  Hypothefis  here  advanced^  the 
EfTence  alfo  of  Happinefs  j it  follows  firll:  that  a Vir- 
tuous Life  will  be  a Happy  Life.  But  if  a Happy  one, 
then  of  courfe  a Life  according  to  Nature  ; lince  no- 
thing can  be  Good,  which  is  contrary  to  Nature,  nor 
indeed  which  is  not  confoiiant,  in  ftridleft  manner, 
to  it. 

And  here  (as  a proper  Opportunity  feems  to 
offer)  we  cannot  but  take  notice  of  the  great  Simi- 
litude of  Sentments  j it  may  be  even  faid,  the  Unani- 
mity of  almofl  all  Philofophers,  on  this  important 
Subjed  concerning  Ends,  and  Happiness. 

Those,  whofe  Hypothefs  we  have  followed  in 
this  Dialogue,  fuppofed  it  to  be  Virtue  and  con- 
sistent Action,  and  that  without  regard  to  For- 
tune or  Succefs,  But  even  they,  who  from  their  Hy- 
pothefis made  fame  Degree  of  Succefs  requifte ; who 
refted  it  not  merely  on  right  Astion,  but  on  a Propor- 
tion of  bodily  IVelfare,  and  good  Fortune  concomitant, 
even  thefe  made  right  Action  and  Virtue  to 
be  principal. 


Thus 


320 


NOTES  on  Treatise  the  'Third. 


Thus  Archytas^  according  to  the  Doc5lrine  of  the 

'Pythagorean  School.  '‘EvSxifxocrvvx.  ^p^cri; 

Happinefs  is  the  Ufe  or  Exercife  of  Virtue^ 
attended  with  external  good  Fortune,  Opufc.  Mytho- 
log.  p.  678.  Confonant  to  this  Sentiment,  he  fays 
in  the  Beginning  of  the  fame  Treatife,  0 dyu- 
Sof  dvvp  oxra  Iv^iocg  ivdcctfAoov  ocvdyytug  sflu  * 0 

IjddifAiav,  7^  dyix^og  Iri,  *Phe  good  Man  is  not 

of  necejfity  happy ; [becaufe,  upon  this  Hypothefis, 
external  Fortune  may  be  wanting ;]  but  the  happy  Man 
is  of  necejfity  Good,  [becaufe,  upon  the  fame  Hypo- 
thecs, without  Virtue  was  no  Happinefs.]  Ibid, 

p.  673.  Again ’Ate)  dvdily.x 

iQ]i  xxvdv,  dili  uAav  (naxw?  Is  yd^  dvla  ^pssjxi) 
dlls  (TTrocvl^Qi.  — The  bad  Man  (fays  he)  muft  needs 
at  all  times  be  miferable,  whether  he  have  or  whether  he 
want  the  Materials  of  external  Fortune  \ for  if  he  have 
them,  he  will  employ  them  ill.  Ibid.  p.  696.  Thus 
we  fee  this  Philofgpher,  tho’  he  make  Externals  a 
Requifite  to  Happinefs,  yet  ftill  without  Virtue  he 
treats  them  as  of  no  Importance.  Again — Auo  d'  Xi 
TSfA,vovloii  sv  Tw  • d fsv  (rKv9pco7rolspu,  dv  d rXdyiuv 
'Oh<T(Tsdg  * d J's  sv^isivoVpoc,  rdv  STropsCslo 
NcV"wp.  Tc6U  dv  dpsldv  (pocfM  J'ri?iw9xi  (lege  dyiXtcr9oci, 
Dorice  pro  OsAfrj)  fsv  rdvlocv,  J'Jyao'Oat  cl's  r'f.vav. 
There  are  two  Roads  in  Life  diftinSf  from  each  other ; 
one  the  rougher,  which  the  fuffering  UlyiTes  went  \ the 
other  more  fmooth,  which  was  travelled  by  Neftor. 
How  of  thefe  Roads  (fays  he)  Virtue  de fires  indeed  the 
latter ; and  yet  is  Jhe  not  unable  to  travel  the  former. 
Ibid.  p.  696.  From  which  laft  Sentiment  it  appears, 
that  he  thought  Virtue,  even  in  any  Fortune,  was 
capable  of  producing  at  leafi  fome  degree  ^Happiness. 

As 


NOTES  on  Treatise  the  Third, 


321 


As  for  the  Socratic  Do(5lrine  on  this  SubjecSl,  it 
may  be  fufficiently  feen  by  what  is  quoted  from  it, 
in  the  Dialogue  pag,  198,  199.  And  as  the  Senti- 
ments, there  exhibited,  are  recorded  by  PlatOy  they 
may  be  called  not  only  Socratic^  but  Platonic  alfo. 
However,  leaft  this  friould  be  liable  to  difpute,  the 
following  Sentiment  is  taken  from  Xe?iocrates^  one 
of  Plato's  immediate  Succeflbrs,  in  the  old  Academy 
by  him  founded.  (p-i^trhy  'EvSdifAOVcc  sTvxt 

Tov  7VU  s^ovjoc  (TTru^oAoi))  * rctvlnv  exar’W 

sTmi  Alipova.  Xenocrates  held  that  he  wjjEudaemon, 

Happy,  who  had  a virtuous  Mindy  for  that  the 
Mind  was  every  one's  Daemon  or  Genius.  Ariji.  Top, 
I.  2.  c.  6. 

Here  we  fee  Virtue  made  the  Principle  of 
Happiness,  according  to  the  Hypotheiis  of  the 
Dialogue.  There  is  an  elegant  Allufion  in  the  Paf- 
fage  to  the  Etymology  of  the  Word  ’EuJ'ai'iwwu,  which 
fignifies  both  \Happy'\  and  \^po£'eJfed  of  a good  Ge?iius 
or  Damon ;]  an  Allufion  which  in  tranflating  ’twas 
not  pofTible  to  preferve.  See  below,  Note  LVIII. 

A s for  the  Peripatetic  School^  we  find  their  Idea 
of  Happiness,  as  recorded  by  Laertius y to  be  in  a 
manner  the  fame  with  that  of  the  Pythagorea?is.  It 
was  dpslv?  iv  Clu  TfAs/w  — The  JJfe  or  Exer- 

dfe  of  Virtue  y in  a complete  and  perfect  Life.  Laert. 
1.  5.  c.  30.  We  have  already,  in  Note  XXV,  cited 
the  fame  Dodrine  (tho’  fomewhat  varied  in  Ex- 
preflion)  from  the  Founder  of  the  Peripatetics y 
in  his  firft  Book  of  Ethics,  So  again  we  learn 
from  him———  oTi  nph  ^ Ivlpysiui  A£- 

y ye:^ixi 


< o 


22 


NOTES  on  Treatise  the  7hird. 

yovJai  TO  teA^,  that'tis  certain  Jtf  ions  and  Energies^ 
which  are  to  he  deemed  the  End.  Ethic.  Nic.  1. 1. 

c.  8. And  again — -^Ert  dJln  v tuTrpagia,  t£- 

A(^.  Eor  ^tis  the  very  Retiitude  of  Adiion^  which  is 
itfelf  the  End.  Ibid.  1.  6.  c.  5.  And  again,  'H  lu- 

^atuxov/a,  IvEpysid  rig  in, Happinefs  is  a certain 

Energizing.  1.  9.  c.  9.  And  more  explicitly  than 
all  thefe  PafTages  in  that  elegant  Simile,  /.  i.  c.  8. — 
cl's  oXv[A7rioc(nv  01  xaAAtrot  iVp^upo7a1ot 
f-£(poiv^vlxt^  aAA*  ot  dyoovi^o [aivoi  (tu'tuv  yd^  rivig 
vindriv  •)  STW  Twu  IV  tw  Qico  xaAwu  ccyoi^cov  O I 
nPATTONTES  OP0JQ2  iTTn^oXot  yiyvovloci. 
For  as  in  the  Olympic  Games^  not  thofe  are  crowned^ 
who  are  handfmejl  and  ftrongejl^  hut  thofe  who  combat 
and  contend.,  (for  ^tis  from  among  thefe  come  the  Vitiors  ;J 
fo^  with  refpedi  to  things  laudable  and  good  in  human 
Life^i  ’tis  the  right  ASfors  only  that  attain  the  PoJJeJfton 
of  them.  Nay,  fo  much  did  this  Philofopher  make 
Happinefs,  depend^  on  right  Adtion^  that  tho’  he  re- 
quired fome  Portion  of  Externals  to  that  Felicity^ 
which  he  held  fupreme ; yet  ftill  ’twas  Honour  and  Vir^ 
tue  which  were  its  principal  Ingredients.  Thus  fpeak- 
ing  of  the  Calamities  and  external  Cafualties  of  Life, 
which  he  confelTes  to  be  Impediments  to  a Happinefs 

perfellly  complete^  he  adds o^cog  ^i  iv  r^roig  Jia- 

Kd^TTii  7Q  ynxXoVy  iTrei^dv  rig  lujto'Aw?  TroAActf 

3^  lAgydXocg  drv^iugy  pcj}  S'd  dvixXywlocv^  aAAa  yev^ 
vd^ug  coy  (AsyocXo^v^og,  *£t  J'’  ocrly  di  Ivepyuxi 
Hu^ixi  rng  ^mg^  xaOocTTfp  siTrofxsVy  k^£]g  dv  yLoiJo  ruv 
fACcr^a^ijiiv  * a^iTrdJs  yd^  Trpd^si  rd  juiirrild  3^ 

(pOivXx.  Toy  yd^  ug  xXyj9ug  dyxSou  3^  £p.(Ppovoc  zsd- 
rxg  oiopf.E^x  rdg  rvx,ocg  Ivr^npAO voog  (p£p£<y,  ex  rm 
i7r<x>pp^oylm  del  rd  xdxXiroc  zrpdr'Jsiv  * xoiAditip  3^ 


NOTES  on  Treatise  the  Third. 

^yoc^ov  TW  TJxpo'vli  rpoiTOTTE^u)  p^pwOai  ZToXe. 
fxtucoTtZTiXy  aycvlorof/^ov  Ik  twv  (tjcuIuv  xaA- 

Ai5”oy  Ctto^^ixoc,  TroitTy  rov  dvTov  J^e  rpoirov  ra;  aA- 
A8?  ’Ti'xylTXt;  dn-ccvlx^,  ’Et  J'’  ol^Xi^  f^h  yVg- 

-ttoIe  yevoiT  dv  o And  yet y even  In  fuch  Inci~ 

denUy  the  fair  Principle  of  Honour  and  Virtue  Jhines 
forthy  when  a Man  with  becoming  Calmnefs  endures 
many  and  great  Misfortunes y and  that  not  thro^  Infenfi- 
hility,  but  being  brave  and  magnanimous.  Nay  morey 
if  it  be  truBy  as  we  have  already  affirmed y that  dis 
AbiionSy  which  are  predominant  in  conffituting  a happy 
Lifey  then  can  no  one  he  completely  miferabhy  who  is 
happy  in  his  right  Conduct y becaufe  he  will  never  be  the 
Adior  of  what  is  deteffable  and  bafe.  For  'tis  our  Opi- 
nion that  the  Many  truly  wife  and  goody  endures  all 
.Fortunes  with  becoming  Decency y and  from  whatever 
. happens  to  arifiy  fill  frames  the  fair  eft  Adlions ; like  as 
the  good  Commander  ufes  the  Armyy  which  he  happens  to 
-findy  after  the  manner  moft  agreeable  to  'the  Rules  of 
War  ; and  the  Shoemaker y from  fuch  Skins  as  others 
provide  himy  makes  a ShoBy  the  beft  that  can  be  made 
from  fuch  Materials ; and  fo  in  the  fame  manner  all 
other  Artifts  beftde.  But  if  this  be  truey  then  hcy  who 
is  happy  in  this  Rediitude  of  Genius,  can  in  no  Inftance 
be  truly  and ftridtly  miferable.  Eth.  Nic.  1.  i.  c.  lo. 

As  for  Epicurus y tho*  he  was  an  Advocate  for 
Pleafurcy  yet  fo  high  was  his  Opinion  of  a wife 
and  right  Condudly  that  he  thought  rational  Adver- 
iity  better  than  irrational  Profperity.  See  Dial. 
p.  197.  Hence  too  he  reprefented  that  Pleafurey 
which  he  efteemed  our  Sovereign  Happinefsy  to  be- 
as  infeparable  from  Virtucy  as  Virtue  was  from  that, 

Ovx  TiJ'fW?  l^VVy  UViV  T8  (ppOvfto)^y  XUXu^y  xctl 

Y 2 • 


323 


324 


NOTES  on  Treatise  the  Third. 

^iKocioog  • yVs  (ppov/jixw?,  aocXwg  iccc)  JtJta/coCj  ^vsv  t« 
■‘^^£wg,  ’Tis  impojjible  to  live  pleafurably^  without 
■living  prudently.,  ^and  honourably.,  ajid  jujily  ; or  to  live 
prudently,  and  honourably  and  jujily,  without  living 
pie afur ably.  Epic,  in  Laert.  1.  lo.  f.  132. 

T o conclude  the  whole,  our  Countryman  Tho- 
mas  Hobbes,  though  he  profefledly  explodes  all  this 
Dodlrine  concerning  yet  feems  infenlibly  to 

have  eftablifhed  an  himfelf,  and  to  have  founded 
it  (like  others)  in  a certain  Energy  or  Action. 
For  thus  ’tis  he  informs  us,  in  his  Treatife  called 
Human  Nature,  that  there  can  be  no  Content- 
ment, but  in  Proceeding  and  that  Felicity 
confijieth,  not  Having — -but  in  Prospering. 
And  again,  fome  time  after,  having  admitted  the 
Comparifon  of  Human  Life  to  a Race,  he  imme- 
diately fubjoins But  this  Race  we  muji  fuppofe  to 

have  no  other  Goal,  nor  other  Garland,  but  being 
roliEMOsT  and  it. 

And  thus  much  as  to  the  concurring  Sentiments  of 
Philofophers  on  the  Subjed:  of  Ends,  here  treated. 

Note  XLVII.  p.  208. — Yet  it  in  no  man- 
ner TAKES  AWAY  THE  DIFFERENCE  AND  DI- 
STINCTION OF  OTHER  THINGS.]  Cu?n  cnlm  vir- 
■tutis  hoc  proprium  ft,  earum  rerum,  quce  fecundutn 
natura?n  fmt,  habere  dele.£ium  5 qui  omnia  fic  exaqua- 
verunt,  ut  in  utramque  partem  ita  paria  redderent,  uti 
imlld  feleSiione  uterentur,  virtutem  ipfam  fufulerunt* 
Cic.  de  Fin.  1.  3.  c.  4.  p.  207. 

Quid  autejn  apertius,  quam,  fi  felediio  nulla  ft  ab 
ns  rebus,  qrn^  contra  natura?n  fnt,  earum  rerum  quce 
fint  fecundutn  natuvam,  tollatur  omnis  ea,  qua  queer  a* 

tur 


NOTES  on  Treatise  the  T'hird.  325 

tur  laudeturque  prudentia?  Cic.  de  Fin.  1.  3.  c.  g. 

р.  227. 

Deince PS  explicatur  differentia  rerum:  quam  ft 
non  ullam  effe  diceremus^  confunderetur  omnis  vita^  ut 
ah  Ariftme  j nec  uUum  fapientia  munus  aut  opus  in- 
veniretur^  cum  inter  eas  res,  qua  ad  vitam  degendam 
pertinerent,  nihil  omnino  intereffet ; neque  ullum  delec- 
turn  haberi  oporteret*  Itaque  cum  effet  fatis  confitutuni, 
id  folum  effe  honum  quod  effet  honefum,  ^ id  malum  fo-  • 
lum  quod  turpe  •,  turn  inter  hac  ^ ilia,  qua  nihil  vale- 
tent  ad  heate  mifereve  vivendum,  aliquid  tamen,  quo  dif- 
ferrent,  effe  voluerunt,  ut  effent  eorum  alia  afimahilia, 
alia  contra,  alia  neutrum.  Ibid.  1.  3.  c.  15.  p.  246. 

CjETERA  autem  etfi  nec  hona  nec  mala  effent ; ta- 
men alia  fecundum  naturam  dicebat,  alia  natura  effe 
contraria : iis  ipfis  alia  interjeSla  ^ media  numerabat, 

Acad.  1. 1,  c.  II.  p.  46.  See  Dial.  p.  187. 

• 

Note  XLVIII.  p.  208.  It  suppresses  no 

SOCIAL  AND  NATURAL  AFFECTIONS,  As 

much  has  been  laid  concerning  the  Stoic  Apathy, 
or  Infenfibility  with  refpeSl  to  Faffion,  it  may  not 
be  improper  to  inquire,  what  were  their  real  Senti- 
ments on  this  Subject. 

IlaGi^,  which  we  ufually  render  a Paffion,  is 
always  rendered  by  Cicero,  when  fpeaking  as  a Stoic, 
Perturbatio,  a Perturbation.  As  fuch  therefore  in  the 
firft  place,  we  fay  it  ought  always  to  be  treated. 

The  Definition  of  the  Term  7raG(^,  as  given 
by  thefe  Philofophers,  was  op '.<,71  tranl- 

lated  by  Cicero,  Appetitus  vehementior.  Tufc.  1.  4. 

с.  g.  p.273.  Now  this  Definition  may  be  more 

Y 3 eafily 


NOTES  on  Treatise  the  Third. 

eafily  explained,  if  we  firft  inquire,  what  they  meant 
by  they  defined  to  be  (popa  IttI 

Ti,  a Tendency  or  Motion  of  the  Soul  toward  fomethlng. 
Stob*  Ed.  Ethic,  p.  175.  A 7ra6(^  therefore,  or 
Perturbation  muft  have  been,  according  to  tfieir  De- 
finition, a Tendency  or  Motion  of  the  Soul^  which  was 
excejfive  and  beyond  Bounds,  Stobceus^  from  whom 
this  Definition  is  taken,  in  commenting  upon  it  ob- 
ferves,  a xiyn,  oS£(pvKLjoc  ocX\'  vdv)  ev 

zcrXsovixarfJLM  ^croc  * a yoc^  Juuapxfi,  juaAAou  Ivspysiff. — 
that  Zeno  (its  Author)  does  not  call  a riaO^  fQ?ne- 
thing  capable  by  Nature  to  pafs  into  Excefs^  but  fome^ 
thing  actually  in  Excefs  already^  as  having  its  EJfencey 
ftot  in  mere  Capacity ^ hut  in  Aduality.  Ed.  Eth.  p.  159. 

There  is  another  Definition  of  the  fame  Term, 
which  tnakes  it  to  be  ^ olhoy(^  >9  (pva-iv 

^ Motion  of  the  Soul y irrational  and  contrary  to 
Nature.  D.  Laerf.  *1.  7.  f.  no.  Andronicus  Rhodius 
adds,  to  this  latter  Definition,  the  Words  J'f  uVo- 
waxy  U fim  the  Opinion  of  fomething 

Good  or  Evil,  Ilspl  !!Ǥ.  p.  523.  So  that  its  whole 
Idea  is  as  follows.  A Perturb ation^  or  Stoic  Paffton^ 
is  a Motion  of  the  Souly  irrational  and  contrary  to 
Naturcy  arifing  from  the  Opinion  of  fomething  Good 
or  Evil.  Thefe  lafi:  Words,  founding  the  na9(^ 
or  Perturbation  on  Opiniony  correfpond  to  what  Cicero 
fays,  where  he  gives  it  as  the  Sentiment  of  the 
Stoic  PhilofopherSy  07nnes  perturbationes  judicio  fieri  iA 
opinione.  Tufc.  1.  4.  ,c.  7.  p.  276.  Laertius  mdorms 
us,  that  they  even  made  the  Perturbations  themfelves  to 
he  fudgmcfits.  /SoxC  d,uio7g  rd  xp<a-£i?  mxi, 
Lqert.  1,  7.  f.  in.  He  fubjoins  an  Infiance  to  illuf- 
trate.  ‘Kis  ydi^  (piKx^yvfx  in  Tb  to'  dp- 

yjpio'j 


NO  T E S o«  Treatise  the  Third. 

yifuv  xxAo\  Jmi.  For  thus  (fays  he)  the  Love  of 
Money  is  the  "Judgment  or  Opinion^  that  Money  is  a 
thing  good  and  excellent.  Plutarch  records  the  fame 
Sentiment  of  theirs,  in  a fuller  and  more  ample 
manner.  — Xoy^  ^ ix 

(pdvXvjg  xpltrsug  aipo^poTnrx  ^ pco^»y 

■srpdo-Xa^co!/.  Perturbation  is  a vitious  and  in-^ 
temperate  Reafoning.^  which  ajfumes  Vehemence  and 
Strength  from  bad  and  erroneous  Judgment.  Mor. 
p.  441.  D. 

The  Subftance  of  what  is  faid  above,  feems 
to  amount  to  this ; that  11^9®^,  in  a Stoic  Senfe, 
implied  a Perturbation^  and  not  a PaJJion ; and  that 
fuch  Perturbation  meant  an  irrational  and  violent 
Motion  of  the  Soul^  founded  on  Opinion  or  Judg-^ 
menty  which  was  erroneous  and  faulty. 

Now  from  hence  it  follows,  that  the  Man  of 
PERFECT  Character  (according  to  xh.€\x Hypo^ 
thefts)  muft  of  neceffity  be  Apathetic, 

OR  VOID  OF  Perturbation.  For  fuch  a Cha~ 
radfer^  as  has  been  fhewn,  implies  perfedl  Rediitude 
of  Condudt.  But  perfect  Redlitude  of  Condud  im- 
plies perfcdl  Rediitude  of  Judgment ; and  fuch  Redi- 
tude  of  Judgment  excludes  all  Error  and  wrong  Judg~ 
ment : but  if  Error  and  wrong  Judgment,  then 
Perturbation  of  confequence,  which  they  fuppofe  to 
be  derived  from  thence  alone. 

That  this  was  the  Senfe,  in  which  they  under- 
flood Apathy,  we  have  their  own  Authority,  as 
given  us  by  Laertius*  yoxX  ilvxi  tov 

(ro(pov^  iiol  70  dvifATrloolov  sTvxt,  Laert.  I.  7.  p.  117. 

Y 4 They 


327 


328  NOTES  on  Treatise  theThird. 

T^ey  fay  the  ivife  Man  is  apathetic^  hy  being  fuperior 
to  Error — by  being  fuperior  ^<7  Error,  if  they  may 
be  credited  themfelves ; not,  as  for  the  moft  part 
vve  abfurdly  imagine,  by  being  fuperior  to  all  Senfe, 
and  Feeling^  and  AffeSlion,  The  Sentence  imme- 
diately following  the  foregoing,  looks  as  if  thefe 
Philofophers  had  forefeen,  how  likely  they  were 
to  be  mifunderftood.  Etuat  J'L  aAAov  cc7r£c9v^  tov 

(pizuMv,  iv  iVw  Xsyofx^vov  tw  cclpSTrJu 

There  is  alfo  another  fort  of  Apathetic  Man^  who  is 
bad ; who  is  the  fame  in  CharaSier^  as  the  hard  and 
inflexible.  To  the  fame  Purpofe  Epibietus.  ’Ou  h't 
ycc^  (xe  iTvai  coj  dv^pidvlcCy  cxKkoc,  rdg 

rvjpvvlx  roiq  (pv(nxd^  ^ tViOery?,  dg  eucte^h,  00^  ug 
db£X(pov,  dg  Trotlipot^  dg  ttoXitw.  FoR  I AM  NOT 
TO  BE  Apathetic,  like  a Statue,  but  I am 
withal  to  obferve  Relations^  both  the  natural  and 
adventitious  i as  the  Man  of  Religion^  as  the  Son ^ as 
the  Brother^  as  the  ^-Father as  the  Citizen.  Arr. 
Epia.  1.  3.  c.  2.  p.  359. 

Immediately  before  this,  he  tells  us  in  the 
fame  Chapter,  riaS©-*  olxxtog  J yivslat^  h fj.y] 

opsJfWf  ia^XiOScog  TsrspiTrnrl^a-Tigy 

that  a Perturbation  in  no  other  way  ever  arifes^  but 
either  zuhen  a Defire  is  fruflrated^  or  an  Averfion 
falls  into  that  which  it  would  avoid.  Where  ’tis  ob- 
fervable,  that  he  does  not  make  either  Defire  or 
Averfion  11x9 n,  or  Perturbations.,  but  only  the  Caufe 
of  Perturbations^  when  erroneoufly  conduced. 

Agreeably  to  this,  in  the  fecond  Chapter  of 
the  Enchiridion.,  we  meet  with  Precepts  about  the 
Conducfl  and  Management  of  thefe  two  Affebiions— 

Not 


NOTES  on  Treatise  the  Third. 


329 


Not  a word  is  faid  about  lopping  off  either  ; on  the 
contrary,  Averfion  we  are  directed  how  to  employ 
immediately,  and  Defire  we  are  only  ordered  to  fuf- 
pend  for  the  prefent,  becaufe  we  want  a proper  Sub- 
jed:  of  fit  Excellence  to  excite  it. 

T o this  may  be  added,  what  the  fame  Philofo- 
pher  fpeaks,  in  his  own  Perfon,  concerning  himfelf. 
Arr , EpiSf.  1.  I.  C.  21.  au  opg- 

yooixoci  ExxX/vw  xa1a  (pvtnv-^ — fior  my  party  am 
fiatisfied  and  contentedy  ifi  I can  desire  and  avoid 
agreeably  to  Nature*  He  did  not  remain  it  feems 
dilfatisfied,  till  he  had  eradicated  thefe  AffeSiions^ 
but  he  was  fatisfied  in  reducing  them  to  their  ttatu- 
ral  Ufie* 

In  Laertius  we  read  recorded  for  a Stoic  Senti- 
ment, that  as  the  vitious  Man  had  his  7ra0»j,  or  Per^ 
turhations  3 fo  oppofed  to  thefe,  had  the  Virtuous  his 
’EuTraOfi'at,  his  Eupathies  or  Well-fieelingSy  tranflated 
by  Cicero  Conjlantics,  The  three  chief  of  thefe  were 
3«Ar]<rK,  WiLL,  defined  op£?i?  euAo}/©^,  rational 
Dejire ’EuA^tfi^x,  Caution,  defined  ’^ExxAto-i? 

rational  Averjion ; and  Xi&pa,  Joy,  defined 
fTrapo-jc  rational  Exultation.  To  thefe  three 

ycmQrp2X  Eupathies  belonged  many  fiubordinate  Species ; 
fuch  as  suvotay  dyccTrria-i^y  ajdw?,  TfpJ/t?,  iv(ppo(TVvriy 
IvQvfiiccy^c.  SeeLaert,  1.  7.  f.  115,  116.  Andi'on, 
Rhod.  TTSpl  7ra06OV,  Cic.  Vufic.  1.  4.  C.  6. 

Cicero  makes  CatOy  under  the  Charader  of  a Stoicy 
and  in  explaining  their  Syftem,  ufe  the  following 
Exprefllons.  Pertinere  autem  ad  retn  arbilrantur y in- 
tellegi  natura  fieriy  iit  liberi  a parentibus  amcntur  : a 

quo 


33° 


NOTES  on  Treatise  the  Third. 

quo  initio  profe^am  communem  humani  generis  focie^ 
tatem  perfequuntur,  De  Fin.  1.  3.  c.  19.  The  fame 
Sentiment  of  the  Stoics  is  recorded  by  Laertius, 

^xcr\  J'g  (oi  XrcoiKol)  rm  Trpog  tcc  riyivoc  (piXoropyia,)) 

(pvs'ixw  sivxi  dujoTg Tdey  fay  Parental  Affe6iion  is 

natural  to  them,  1.  7.  f.  120. 

Again,  foon  after,  in  the  fame  Treatife  de  Pint-* 

bus,  ^odque  nemo  in  fumma  folitudine  vitafn  agere 
velit^  ne  cum  infinlta  quide?n  voluptatum  ahundantia  \ 
facile  intellegitury  nos  ad  conjundlionem  congregationem-- 
que  hominum^  ad  naturalem  communitatem  ejfe  natos. 
So  Laertius,  hX>^dl  fxw  Iv  ipyi/^toc  (jpoitr)')  ^idfrslcci 
b (TTrabiztog  * xoivctovtycbg  yd.^  (pvasi^  TTpaxItubg, 
The  virtuo7is  Man  (fay  they,  the  Stoics)  will  never 
be  for  living  in  Solitude  ; for  he  is  by  Nature  facial^ 
and  fwmed  for  Action,  1.  7.  f.  123. 

Again,  Cicero,,  in  the  above-cited  Treatife.  Cunt 
autein  ad  tuendos  confervandofque  homines  hominem 
natum  eJfe  videamus ; confentaneum  eji  huic  natura^ 
ut  fapiens  velit  gerere^  ^ adminijirare  rempublicafn ; 
atque  ut  e natura  vivat,  uxorem  adjungere,  & velle  ex 
ed  liberos.  Ne  amores  quidem  fancies  a fapiente  alienos 

ejfe  arbitrantur , XJt  vero  confervetur  omnis  homini 

erga  hominem  focietas,,  conjunefio,,  caritas ; ^ emolu- 

menta  & detrimenta communia  ejfe  voluerunt.  De 

Fin.  1.  3.  c.  20,  21. 

In  EpiSietus,,  the  leading  Duties,,  or  moral  Offices 
of  Man,  are  enumerated  as  follows.  UoXirive^^ociy 
-cjcciboTroisTa-^cciy  hbv  (TeSsiv,  yovicev  l7ritj.i\s7(j^cHy 
opiyiT^oHy  lK>:Xi'j£iVy  bpixixv,  dCpopiA-piVy  cog  Exacfov 


TUTCOU 


N OTES  on  Treatise  the  Third. 

rirm  ttoisTv,  J?  7r£(pvyioc[xEv,  Arr,  EptSf,  1.  3.  C.  7. 
p.  386.  The  fame  Sentiments  may  be  found  re- 
peated both  in  Stobaus  and  Laertius, 

I (hall  only  add  one  more  Sentiment  of  thefe 
Philofophers^  and  that  is  concerning  Friendjhip,  Af- 

yei{(ri  rm  (piXlccv  iv  f^ovoig  roig  (TTru^ocioi?  slvoct 

They  fay  that  Friendjhip  exijis  among  the  Virtuous  only, 
Laert.  1.  7.  f.  124. 

The  Sum  of  thefe  Rotations  appears  to  be  this  ; 
that  the  Stoics,  in  the  Character  of  their  virtuous 
Man,,  included  rational  Defire^  Averfion^  and  Exul- 
tation ; included  Love  and  parental  AffeSlion  ; Friend- 
Jhipy  and  a general  Charity  ox  Benevolence  to  all  Man- 
kind \ that  they  confidered  it  as  a Duty,,  arifing  from 
our  very  Nature,,  not  to  negledt  the  Welfare  of  pub- 
lic Society,  but  to  be  ever  ready,  according  to  our 
Rank,  to  acfl  either  the  Magiflrate  or  the  private 
Citizen  j that  their  Apathy  was  no  more  than  a 
Freedom  from  Perturbation,  from  irrational  and  ex- 
ceffive  Agitations  of  the  Soul ; and  confequently  that 
the  Jirange  Apathy,  commonly  laid  to  their  Charge, 
and  in  the  demolifhing  of  which  there  have  been 
fo  many  Triumphs,  was  an  imaginary  Apathy,  for 
which  they  were  no  way  accountable. 

Note  XLIX.  p.  209.  It  rejects  no  Gain, 
NOT  inconsistent  WITH  JUSTICE.]  The  Stoics 
were  fo  far  from  rejecfling  Wealth,  when  acquired 
fairly,  that  they  allowed  their  perfect  Man,  for 
the  fake  of  enriching  himfelf,  to  frequent  the  Courts 
of  Kings,  and  teach  Philofophy  for  a Stipend.  Thus 

Plutarch  from  a Treatife  of  Chryfippus Tov  fxh 

<ro(pov 


333 


NOTES  on  Treatise  the  Third, 


(ro{ph  Qoc(ri\eii(n  (ruysVecrSat  (pncrlv  ivsKO,  ^p>?jw,a]Kr^.8*, 
7^  (ro(pis~£^(7Siv  Itt  dpyv^iic — Alor,  p.  1047* 

So  like  wife  the  Stoic  Hecato^  in  his  Treatife  of 
Offices^  as  quoted  by  Cicero,  Sapienth  ejfe^  nihil  con- 
tra mores^  legeSy  injiituta  facientem^  habere  rationem  ret 
familiaris,  Neque  enim  folum  nobis  divites  ejfe  volumusy 
fed  liberisy  propinquity  amicisy  mammeque  reipublic^, 
Singulorum  enim  facultates  & copiesy  divities  funt  civi- 
tatis,  De  Offic.  1.  3.  c.  15. 

Note  L.  p.  209. — Universally  as  far  as 
Virtue  neither  forbids  nor  dissuades,  it 

ENDEAVOURS  TO  RENDER  LiFE,  EVEN  IN  THE 
MOST  VULGAR  ACCEPTATION,  AS  CHEARFUL, 
JOYOUS,  AND  EASY  AS  POSSIBLE.]  Etcnim  quod 
fummum  bo?ium  a Stoicis  dicitury  Convenienter  natures 
‘viverey  id  habet  hanc  { ut  opinor)  fententiamy  Cum  vir- 
tute  congruere  femper : caetera  autem,  quse  fecundum 
naturam  effent,  ita  legere,  fi  ea  virtuti  non  repug- 
narent.  Cic.  de  Offic,  I.  3.  c.  3. 

Alexander  Aphrodisiensis,  fpeaking  of  the 
Stoic  Do(5trine  concerning  the  external  ConveniencieSy 
and  common  Utilities  of  Life,  delivers  their  Senti- 
ment in  the  following  Words — dwa.  hei- 

yjvodv  dpslii^  re  erjy  rnroig  fAOvrjgy  pn^ieTroT 

rbv  <To(pO]>  rm  JtEp/copicrpsyjiy  EALSaj,  £t  eivi  dulu  ^vvoUbv 
rriv  fxeld  ruv  ucKXm  Xoc^eTv.  Suppofing  there  lay  Vir- 
tue on  the  07ie  fdcy  attended  with  thefe  ExteimalSy  and 
Virtue  on  the  other  fidoy  alone  by  herfelfy  the  wife 
Man  would  never  choofe  that  Virtuey  which  was  defitute 
and  ffigky  if  'twas  in  his  power  to  obtain  that  other y 

which 


NOTES  on  Treatise  the  Third. 


333 


which  was  accompanied  with  thefe  Advantages.  Ilfpl 
P*  ^57- 

Note  LL  p.  209. — Nay,  could  it  mend 
THE  Condition  of  Existence — by  adding 

TO  THE  AMPLEST  POSSESSIONS  THE  POOREST, 

MEANEST  Utensil,  it  would  in  no  degree 
CONTEMN,  ^4-.]  — Si  ad  illam  vitam^  quce  cum  vir- 
tute  degatur^i  ampulla  aut  Jlrigilis  accedat^  fumpturum 
fapientem  earn  vitam  potius^  cui  hac  adje^a  fint — De 

Fin.  1.  4.  c.  12.  p.  300. 

Note  LII.  p.  2io--Could  it  indeed  choose 
its  own  Life,  it  would  be  always  that, 

WHERE  MOST  SOCIAL  AFFECTIONS  MIGHT  BE 
EXERTED,  Itemque  magis  eji  fecundum  naturam^ 
pro  omnibus  gentibus  (ft  fieri  pojfit)  confervandis  autju- 
vandis^  maximos  labores  molejiiafque  fufcipere^  imitan- 
tern  Herculem  illum^  quern  hominum  fama^  beneficiorum 
memor.^  in  concilio  ccelefiium  conlocavit ; quam  vivere  in 
folitudine^  non  modo  fine  ullis  molejliis^  fed  etiam  in 
maximis  voluptatibus^  abundantem  omnibus  copiis ; ut 
excellas  etiam  pulchritudine  ^ viribus.  ^ocirca  optmo 
quifque  iff  fplendidijfimo  ingenio  longe  illam  vitam  huic 
anteponit.  Cic.  de  Offic.  1.  3.  c.  5. 

Note  LIII.  ip.  Ibid. It  teaches  us 

TO  CONSIDER  LiFE,  AS  ONE  GREAT  IM- 
PORTANT Drama,  where,  iffc.‘\  Thus. 

Arifio  the  Chian Elvon  o/xoiov  tw  dya^i^ 

ttTTQxpiUyj  lov  (To(poi/  * Of  uvls  0£p(7»T»  ai/]f  * Ayoi^ey.vo-^ 
1/©^  'arpoVcoTTov  ocvoiXocQyi^  IxocTspov  vyraxplvilcui  irpoorr 
xo'vicof.  The  wife  Man  is  like  the  good  Adior  5 %vho^ 
whether  he  ajfums  the  Charaller  of  Therfites  or  Aga- 
memnon, 


334 


NOTES  on  Treatise  the  Third. 

memnon,  a^s  either  of  the  two  Parts  with  a 
coming  Propriety,  D.  Laert.  1.  7.  f.  160. 

This  Comparifon  of  Life  to  2l  Drama  or  Stage- 
play^  feems  to  have  been  a Comparifon  much  ap- 
proved by  Authors  of  Antiquity.  See  EpiSi.  Enchi- 
rid,  c.  17.  and  the  Notes  of  the  late  learned  Editor 
Mr.  Upton,  See  M,  Anton,  1.  12.  f.  36.  and  the 
lAotes  of  Gataker, 

Note  LIV.  p.  211.  — It  accepts  all  the 
Joys  derived  from  their  Success, It 

FIXES  NOT,  LIKE  THE  MANY,  ITS  HAPPINESS 

ON  Success  alone,  One  of  the  wifefl  Rules 
that  ever  was,  with  refpeSi  to  the  Enjoyment  of  external 
good  Fortune^  is  that  deliver’d  by  EpiSfetus ; to  enjoy 
2iy  dg  o(tov  J'gJblat,  in  fuch  manner  as 

it  is  ^iven^  and  for  fuch  Time  as  it  is  giveuy  remem- 
bring  that  neither  of  thefe  Conditions  we  have  the 
Power  to  command.  See  Arr,  Epi£l,  1.  4.  c.  i. 
p.  556.  See  alfo  p.  573.  of  the  fame. 

Note  LV.  Ibid,  On  the  contrary,  when 

THIS  HAPPENS,  ’TIS  THEN  IT  RETIRES  INTO 
ITSELF,  AND  REFLECTING  ON  WHAT  IS  FAIR, 

WHAT  IS  LAUDABLE,  See  before,  p.  322. 

Je  7^  lu  T8T01?  J'iaAa/XTTSi,  &C. 

Note  LVL  p.  212.  All  Men  pursue  Good, 
^r.]  This  is  a Principle  adopted  by  all  the  Stoics j 
and  inculcated  thro’  every  part  of  the  Diflertations 
of  Epi^etus,  Take  an  Example  or  two  out  of  many. 
^i)<ng  au7j)  Travio?,  to  J'jwkejv  to  dyoc^ov^  (pivysiv  to' 
xooHQv  dyoc^S  ^vtymrt^Qv  sVev.  ^Tis  the 

Feature 


335 


NOTES  on'Tvi'EArii'E.  theThird. 

Nature  of  every  one  to  purfue  Good,  and  fly  Evil — - 
for  nothing  is  more  intimately  allied  to  us  than  Good. 
Arr.  Epidt.  1.  4.  c.  5.  p.  606.  Again,  /.  2.  e,  22. 
/>.  313.  Hay  Zcoov  aVcyi  alco?  cJx/iwTai,  wf  tw  i’jTjw 
(ru/tA(f>£povT;,  nothing  is  every  Animal  yo  intimately 
allied^  as  to  its  own  peculiar  Welfare,  In- 
terest. 

So  Cicero » Omnes  enirn  expetimus  utilitatem, 
ad  eamque  rapimur^  nec  facere  aliter  ullo  modo  pojfumus, 
De  Ofiic.  1.  3.  c.  28. 

Note  LVIL  p.  213.  — All  derived  from 
Externals,  must  fluctuate  as  they  fluc- 
tuate.] See  before,  pag,  126, 130, 133. 

Note  LVIIL  Ibid.  — When  we  place  the 
Sovereign  Good  in  Mind — ] D^mon  or 
Genius  means  every  Man’s  particular  Mind,  and 
Reasoning  Faculty.  AoclfAuv — aro?  H Iriv  d 
lycocra  M.  Anton.  1.  5.  p.  27.  Ge^ 

nium  ejfe  uniufcujufque  animum  rationalem ; ^ idea  ejfe 
flngulos  flngulorum — Varro  in  Fragm.  ’Tis  from  this 
Interpretation  of  Genius that  the  Word,  which  in 
Greek  exprefres  Happiness,  is  elegantly  etymolo- 
gized to  mean  a Goodness  of  Genius  or  Mind. 
’EuJai|Uoyia  £5“*  dixlfMcov  M.  Anton.  1-  7.  f.  17. 

See  Gataker  on  the  Place.  The  Sentiment  came 
originally  from  the  old  Academics,  See  before, 
page 

Note  LIX.  p.  214. Behold  the  true 

AND  perfect  Man  : that  Ornament,  &c.] 
^am  gravis  vero^  quam  magniflca,  quam  conjlans  con- 
‘ • ••  ficitur 


336  NOTES  on  Treatise  the  Third. 

ficltur  perfona  fapienth  f cum  ratio  docuerlt^  quod 

honejlum  ejfet^  id  ejfe  folum  honum^  femper  fit  necejfe 
•.£ji  beatus^  vereque  omnia  ijia  nomina  pojfideat^  qms 
inrideri  ab  inperitis  folent.  Regius  enim  appellabitur 
rex^  quam  Tarquinius^  qui  nee  fe  nec  fuos  regere  po- 
tuit : rediius  magijier  populi^  &c.  Cic.  de  Fin.  1.  3. 
c.  22.  p.  269.  £rgo  bicy  quifquis  ejty  qui  moderatione 
conjlantia  quietus  animo  efty  fibique  ipfe  placatus  ; 
tit  nec  tabefcat  molejiiisy  nec  frangatur  timorCy  nec  ft- 
tienter  quid  expetens  ardeat  defiderioy  nec  alacritate 
futili  geftiens  deliquefcat ; is  eft  fapienSy  quern  quari- 
muSy  is  eft  beatus : cui  nihil  humanarum  rerum  aut 
intolerabile  ad  demittendum  animumy  aut  nimis  lata'- 
bile  ad  eeferendum  videri  poteft.  ^id  enim  videatur 
ei  magnum^  ^c,  Tufe.  Difp.  1.  4.  c.  17.  p.  298. 

Note  LX.  p.  215. — Would  not  your  Sys- 
tem IN  SUCH  A Case  a little  border  upon 
THE  Chimerical  ? &c.]  Chryfippus  feems  to 
have  been  fenfible  of  this,  if  we  may  judge  from  a 
PafTage  of  his,  preferved  in  Plutarch,  Ajo'  ax)  iid 
Tfiv  virepCoXw  tste  tcx)  t8  ijeXxcriAxcci 

Q(xoix  XsysiVy  Hal  J xxtoc  rov  auSpw'S'ov  Hal 
'Tw  dv^pccTrtvviv  (pva-iv.  For  this  reafouy  thro"  the  exceft 
five  Greatnefs  and  Beauty  of  what  we  ajferty  we  ap- 
'pear  to  fay  things  which  look  like  FibiionSy  and  not  fuch 
as  are  fuitable  to  Man  and  human  Nature. 
Mor.  1041.  F. 

Note  LXI.  p.  216. In  antient  Days, 

when  Greece,  See  Cfr.  de  Invent.  1.2.  c.  i. 
See  alfo  Maximus  TyriuSy  Dijf.  23.  />.  277.  of  the 
late  Quarto  Edition  5 and  Xenoph,  Memor,  1.  3.  c.  10. 


Note 


NOTES  on  Treatise  the  Third. 

Note  LXII.  p.  2ig. No  where  in  any 

PARTICULAR  NaTURE  IS  THE  PERFECT  CHA- 
RACTER TO  EE  SEEN  INTIRE.]  The  to/Vj them- 
felves  acknowledged,  as  we  learn  ^romClemem  oiAlex^ 
andria^  that  their  o a-opo;.,  or  perfect  Man,  was 
difficult  to  he  found  to  an  exceeding  great  degree  \ cvteC^ 
Trdw  apoJ'px,  Strom,  p.  438.  Sextus  E?npi^ 
ricus  gives  it  as  their  Opinion,  that  they  had  never  as 
yet  found  him^  iw-sx.p*  dvsvpsTa  ovl(^  kxT  aulaj 

(Top^.  Adv.  Phyf.  p.  582.  Edit.  Liphenf. 

What  Sextus  fays,  feems  to  be  confirmed  by 
Cicero.,  who  fpeaking  in  his  Offices  the  Language  of 
a Stoic.,  has  the  following  Expreffions.  Nec  vero^ 
cum  duo  Decii,  aut  duo  Scipiones.,  fortes  viri  commemo- 
rantur,  aut  cum  Fabricius  Ariffiidefue  jufli  nominantur ; 
aut  ab  illis  fortitudinis,  aut  ab  his  juftitier^  tanquam  a 
Sapientibus,  petitur  exemplum,.  Nemo  enim  horum 
SIC  Sapiens  {/?,  ut  Sapientem  volumus  hit  elk gi, 
Nec  i7,  qui  fapientes  hahlti  funt,  ^ nominati,  M.  Cato 
lA  C.  Leslius.,  fapientes  fuerunt ; ne  illi  quidem  feptem  : 
fed  ex  mediorum  officiorum  frequentia  fimilitudinem 
quandam  gerebmt.,  fpeciemque  fapientum.  De  Oific. 
1.  3.  c.  4.  Again,  in  his  Latlius.,  fpeaking  of  the 
fame  confummate  Wifdorn,  he  calls  it,  Sapientia,  quam 
adhuc  mortalis  nemo  ef  confecutus* 

S o too  ^intilian.  ^od  ft  defuit  his  viris  fumma 
virtus.,  fc  qucerentibus,  an  oratores  fuerint,  refpondebo, 
quo  modo  Stoiciy  ft  interrogentur .,  an  Sapiens  Zeno., 
an  Cleanthes,  an  Chryfippus,  refpondeant ; magnos  qui^ 
dem  illos  ac  verier abiles ; non  tamen  id,  quod  natura 

Z minis 


337 


NOTES  Treatise  the7hird. 

minis  fummam  hahet^  confecutos.  Inft.  Orat.  1.  12. 
c.  I.  p.  721,722.  Edit.  Caper. 

So  likewife  Seneca  : Scis,  quern  nunc  bonum  vlrum 
dicam  f Hujus  fecundse  nota,  Nam  ille  alter  for- 
iajfe^  tanquam  phoenix j femel  anno  quingentefmo  nafci- 
tur,  Epift.  42. 

Note  LXIII.  p.  219. — I might  inform  you 

OF  THE  NATURAL  PrE-EMIN ENCE,  AND  HIGH 

Rank  of  specific  Ideas.]  See  Cicero  in  his 
Orator^  near  the  Beginning.  Sed  ego  fic  Jiatuo^  nihil 
ejfe  in  ullo  genere  tarn  pulchrum^  quo  non^  l^c.  ^c.  See 
sdfo  the  Verfes  of  Boethius  before  cited.  Note  XVII. 
p.  295. 

Note  LXIV.  p.  220, 221. — An  Exemplar  of 
Imitation,  which  tho’  none  we  think 

CAN  EQUAL,  YET  ALL  AT  LEAST  MAY  FOL- 
LOW  AN  Exemplar,  ^r.]  Seneca  gives  it  as  a 

general  Confeflion  of  the  greatejl  Philofophers, 
that  the  Dodbrine  they  taught,  was  not  -quemadmo- 
dum  ipft  viverent^  fed  quemadmodum  vivendum  effet. 
De  Vita  beatd^  c.  18. 

. There  appears  indeed  to  be  one  common 
Reasoning  with  refpedl  to  all  Models,  Exem- 
plars, Standards,  Correctors,  whatever  we 
call  them,  and  whatever  the  Subjedis^  which  they 
are  deftined  to  adjuft.  According  to  this  Reafoning, 
if  a Standard  be  lefs  perfedl  than  the  Subjedi  to  be 
adjufted,  fuch  Adjufting  (if  it  may  be  fo  called)  be- 
comes a Detriment,  If  it  be  but  equally  perfedt,  then 


NOTES  on  Treatise  the  ‘Third. 


339 


is  the  Adj  Lifting  fuperfluous.  It  remains  therefore 
that  it  muft  be  more  perfect,  and  that  to  any  Tran- 
fcendence^  any  Accuracy  conceivable.  For  fuppofe  a 
Standard  as  highly  accurate as  can  be  imagined.  If 
the  Subjedts  to  be  adjufted  have  a Nature  fuitabky 
then  will  they  arrive,  by  fuch  Standard,  to  a degree  of 
Perfections  which  thro’  a Standard  lefs  accurate  they 
could  never  pofTibly  attain.  On  the  contrary,  if  the 
Subjeds  be  not  fo  far  capable,  the  Accuracy  of  the 
Standard  will  never  be  a hindrance,  why  they  fhould 
not  become  as  perfects  as  their  Nature  will  admit. 

It  feems  to  have  been  from  fome  Sentiments  of 
this  kind,  that  the  Stoics  adorned  their  o (ro(poV,  or 
perfect  Characters  with  Attributes  fo  far  fuperior  to 
ordinary  Humanity,  iy,sTv(^  dTrpoa--^ 

^svjgs  dvlc^pxvgs  'Twas 

he  was  fortunate  ; Uwas  he  was  above  want ; ’twas  he 
was  felf-fufficient s and  happy  s and  perfect,  Plutarch. 
Mor.  1068.  B.  See  LXIL 

Some  Philofophers  have  gone  fo  far,  as  not  to  reft 
fatisfied  with  the  mof  perfect  Idea  of  Hu?nanitys  hut 
to  fubftitute,  for  our  Exemplars  e\Tn  the  fupreme 
Beings  God  Himself.  Thus  PlatOs  in  his  TheatetuSy 
makes  the  great  Objed  of  our  Endeavours,  to  be 
o/xuwtTK  Tw  Ofw  xcc\<x  TO  J'uvalov,  the  becoming  like  to 
God,  as  far  as  in  our  poiver.  He  immediately  ex- 
plains, what  this  Refemblance  is.  Cl- 

xonov  ^ odiov  juslcc  (ppovwsoog  ysvia-Qon,  It  is  the  be-^ 
corning  juft  and  hofys  along  ivith  Wifdom  or  Prudence, 
Plat.  tom.  I.  p.  176.  Edit.  Serrani. 

Z 2 


The 


340 


NOTES  on  Treatise  the  Hird. 


The  Gofpel  appears  to  faivour  the  fame  Hypdthefis. 
Be  ye  therefore  perfeSf^  even  as  your  Father  which  is  in 
Heaven  is  perfect.  Matt.  v.  48. 

What  has  been  above  faid,  will  be,  ’tis  hoped, 
a fufficient  Apology  for  the  Tranfcendence  of  the  Cha^ 
rader,  defcribed  in  the  Dialogue. 

Note  LXV.  p.  221.  The  Proficiency  of 
Socrates— WAS  sufficient  to  convince  us— 
that  some  Progress,  See  Diog.  Laert. 

I.  7.  C.  91,  p,  420.  j'g  to'  VTTUpJiT^V  SlVOCt 

Tjjy  dpslw — to'  'yivst^Oii  £v  TTpoKOTryi  Tag  TTSpi  X(/oyipoc]nVy 
xj  AioyivWy 

Note  LX VI.  p.  Nor  was  the  Prize, 

AS  USUAL,  RESERVED  ONLY  TO  THE  FIRST; 
BUT  ALL,  WHO  RUN,  MIGHT  DEPEND  UPON  A 

Reward,  having,  Verumut  tranfeundi  fpes 
non  fity  magna  tamen  eji  dignitas  fubfequendi.  Quindl. 
Inft.  1.  12.  II*  p.  760.’  Exigo  itaque  a me.,  non  ut 
optimis  par  ftm^  fed  ut  malis  melior.  Senec.  de  Vita 
beata,  c.  17.  ’OuJ'e  MiAwv  59  o[xcog  ax. 

ccpxiXoj  tS*  cr(jopf.oc1^  * Kporc^,  op^w?  dx 
Tn$  xJweug  * d^''U7rXCdg  aKXa  rivog  r^g  l7rt/A£A£iaf, 

T^v  ccTToyvucriv  twv  ajcpwv,  For  neither 

Jhall  I be  Milo,  and  yet  I negledf  not  7ny  Body ; nor 
Croefus,  and  yet  I negleSl  not  my  Efate ; nor  in  general 
do  we  defijl  from  the  proper  Care  of  any  thing.,  thrcP 
Defpair  of  arriving  at  that  ivhich  is  fupreme.  Arr. 
Epid.  1. 1,  c»2'.  See  alfo  Horat.  Epiji.  i.  I.  i. 
V.  28, 


Note 


NOTE  S on  Treatise  the  T*hird. 


341 


Note  LXVII.  p.  225. — This  whole  Uni-» 

VERSE IS  ONE  CiTY  OR  COMMONWEALTH ] 

'O  THoXig  lg~] ^rr,  EpiSi.  1.  3. 

c.  24.  p.  486.  This  was  a Do(5lrine5  of  which 
Epi£ietus  and  the  Emperor  Marcus  make  perpetual 
mention.  See  of  the  lafl,  /.  12.  / 36. 

So  Cicero.  Unlverfus  hie  mundus  una  civitas  com- 
munis Deorum  atque  hominum  exijiumandus.  De  Legg. 
I.  I.  c.  7.  p.  29.  ^Q^DeFin.  1.  3.  c.  ig.  DeNat, 
Deort  1.  2.  c.  62, 

Note  LXVIII.  p.  227.— ’--Hence  the  Mind 
TRULY  wise,  quitting  THE  StUDY  OF  PAR- 
TICULARS, b’r.]  ThQ  Platonics,  confidering  Sci- 
ence as  fomething  definite,  and  fieady, 

would  admit  nothing  to  be  its  Object,  which  was 
vague,  infinite,  and  pajfitng.  For  this  reafon  they 
excluded  all  Individuals,  or  Objects  of  Sense, 
and  (as  Ammonius  exprefles  it,)  raifed  themfelves,  in 
their  Contemplations,  from  Beings  particular  to  Be- 
ings univerfial,  and  which  as  fuch,  from  their  own 
Nature,  were  eternal  and  definite.  The  whole  Paf- 
fage  is  worth  tranferibing.  E’lpvJon  on  ^ CptAoa-o(p/a, 
yvucrig  TrdvlccV  tcov  ovlcov  yj  ovloc  foV  *E^^Tr](rxv  ot 
(piXo(To(poi,  rlvoc  av  tqottov  'yzvoovloci  Twy  ovloov  l7ng~riy.o- 
V£g  • ^ STTsAii  scopco'J  rcc  xAIcc  fjt.£p(^  J/fV'/iTa  (pdxploo 
oy/a,  £Ti  o£  (ZTTSipcc,  rj  d£  £7rtg~V/^V  ondicevl£  'sreTTf- 
poi(ri/.£voov  If]  yvucTig  (to  yee^  yviofov  uVo  Tr,g 

^ytoTfcof  TS'£piXoc[xQuy£(r^on  * TO  ol^7r£tpov,  cl7r£plXij7rlov') 
dv^yocynv  l(xv]vg  diro  Twy  fA£piyAv  £7rt  rd 

’vyiTTspxTf/.ivx,  *f2,;  ydo  OtiW  0 nx^Twy^ 

Z 3 ’ETTirrV*! 


42  NOTES  0/2  Treatise  the  Third, 

"‘'E'Trir'niJ^n  si'p'yfloii,  Tirixp^  ro  iig  ’ETriroc^iv  xj  ^pov 

rtvcc  zjpooc.y£iV  Twu  Tss'pixyy.ixrm"  raro  J'g  TD'opi^o/j.i^cc 

J'lix  Itc  Tcc  xaOoAa  dvxapofA^';,  Aminofiius  in  hi$ 
Preface  to  Porphyry's  Ifagoge^  p.  14.  Edit.  8vo. 

Consonant  to  this,  Vv^e  learn  ’twas  the  Advice 
of  Plato ^ with  refped  to  the  Progrefs  of  our  Specu- 
lations and  Inquiries^  to  defceni  from  thofe  higher  Ge- 
nera^ zvhich  include  many  fubordinate  Species^  down  to 
the  lowejl  Rank  of  Species^  thofe  which  include  only  In- 
dividuals, But  here  'twas  his  Opinion,^  that  our  InquB 
ries  fould  fiop,^  and,,  as  to  Individuals,,  let  them  wholly 
alone ; becaufe  of  thefe  there  could  not  pofibly  he  any 
Science,  i\},o  h^mooldTm  diro  rm  y£viK0)- 

luTm  Kocllovliz;  zu-ccpsKsXsv/jo  0 JJXd'lcov  'srcy.VEO'Qixi  — -- 
rx  ^£  &.TV£{pd  (pYKTiv  Ipov  * yd^  olv  -cools  ysvsa-^pit 

rkhv  i-Trirriy^nv,  Porphyr.  Ifagog.  c.  2. 

Such  was  the  Method  of  ^;^z/zV;z^ Philofophy.  The 
Faihion  at  prefent  appears  to  be  fomewhat  altered, 
and  the  Bufinefs  of  Philofophers  to  be  little  elfe, 
than  the  colleding  from  every  Quarter,  into 
voluminous  Records,  an  infinite  Number  of  fen- 
ftble^  particular,,  and  unconnected  Fa(5ts,  the  chief  Ef- 
fe(5l  of  which  is  to  excite  our  Admiration.  So  that 
if  that  well-known  Saying  of  Antiquity  be  true, 
't^joas  JP^onder  which  mduced  Men  firf  to  philofophizey 
we  may  fay  that  Philofophy  now  ends,  whence  ori- 
ginally it  began. 

Note  LXIX.  p.  228.  — A Faculty,  which 

RECOGNIZING  BOTH  ITSELF,  AND  ALL  THINGS 
ELSE,  becomes  a CaNON,  A CORRECTOR,  AND 
A StandaPvD  universal.]  See  before,  p.  162. 

In 


V. 


343 


NOTES  on  Treatise  the  Third. 


In  Epidetus^  I.  i.  c.  i.  p.  6.  the 
or  rea fining  Power^  is  called  the  Power  ti  au1)?y 
SsoopacTiZ^  T*  oixXoi,  ttccvIoc,  So  Mcitcui — Ta  Trig 

Ao^jjc^i?  °P^9  loivlw  J'tapOpos  &C.  *The 

Properties  of  the  reafining  Soul  are^  it  beholdeth  itfilf  5 
it  formeth  itfilf  See,  I.  ii.  c.  i.  So  again  Epidtetus^ 

- — UTTEp  juJu  T»  o'pay  dyciiStVy  3^  vti  At<z  VTrlp  dvj^ 
T»  xoil  Twv  (TuyEpJ^wy  tepoV  duloy  vTrlp  xoepTruv 

^npooVy  VTrlp  oivvy  VTrla  iXeem  iv^^ocpifii  tw  * /AEpA- 
i/)]cro  J'’  on  uXXo  ri  croi  JeJw^ce  Kpsirlov  ccTnzuruv  r^roov^ 

70  X,?miX£VQ])  oivTo'lq.y  TO  TO  TVV  CC^ISCV 

sxc^fit  Xoyiiifxsvov,  For  feeing^  for  hearing  .y  and  indeed 
for  Life  itfilf  and  the  various  Means  which  co-operate 
to  its  Support ; for  the  Fruits  of  the  Earthy  for  Wine 
and  Oily  for  all  thefe  things  he  thankful  to  God:  yet  he 
mindful  that  he  hath  given  thee  fomething  elfiy  which 
IS  BETTER  THAN  ALL  THESE;  fimething  ivhich  is 
to  ufe  themy  to  prove  themy  to  compute  the  Value  of 
each.  Arr.  Epid.  1.  2.  c.  23.  p.  321. 


Note  LXX.  p.  '228. That  Master- 

Science,  OF  WHAT  THEY  ARE,  WHERE  THEY 
ARE,  AND  THE  EnD  TO  WHICH,  See  ^/T. 

Epift.  1.2.  c.  24.  p.  337. See  alfo  I.  i.  c.  6. 

p.  36.  and  Perf  Satyr.  3.  v.  66. 


Note  LXXI.  Ibid,  — And  never  wretch- 
edly DEGRADE  THEMSELVES  INTO  NATURES 
TO  THEM  SUBORDINATE.]  StQ  Ar.  EpeU.  1.  I. 

c.  3.  p.  21.  A^drdvTYiv  Tr)y  (TV'yymux'jy  ot  fiv  ^tto- 
xX/vayrec,  Xvxoig  ofioioi  arriroi  xx]  iTrlhuXot 

xal  ^Xccjjspoi*  01  J'e  A£»(r<y,  olypioi  kx\  Gr,piuJ'iis  xxt 

dvny^spoi*  oj  wXefv^  f r/xuv  dxoonsyjc..  See,  Lhro^  this 

Z 4 ■‘iffimty 


344 


NOTES  on  Treatise  theThird, 

Affinity  (he  means  our  Affinity  to  the  Body,  or  bafer 
Part)  fome  of  us^  degenerating^  become  like  Wolves y 
faithlefSy  and  treatherouSy  and  mifchievous  \ others^  like 
Lions ^ fierce y and  fiavage^  and  wild ; but  the  greater  Part 
turn  Foxes y Utile ^ fraudulent y wretched  Animals,  Cum 
dutem  duobus  modisy  id  efity  aut  vi  aut  fraude  fiat  in- 
juria ; frauSy  quafit  vulpeculcoy  visy  leonis  videtur,  Cic. 
de  Offic.  1. 1,  c.  13.  Sec  zMo  Arr,  EpiSl,  I.  2.  c.  9. 
p.  210.  In  our  own  Language  we  feem  to  allude 
to  this  Degeneracy  of  Human  Nature,  when  we  call 
Men,  by  way  of  reproach,  Sheepi/hy  Bearijhy  Hog- 
gijhy  RavenouSy  See, 

Note  LXXII.  p.  229. That  Reason,  of 

WHICH  OUR  OWN  IS  BUT  A PaRTICLE,  OR 

Spark,  ^c.~\ fiiv  Urug  lifiiv 

yteoi  cmcc(Piiq  Tu  Oea',  aVf  acrai,  kou  aTTocr- 

7rdi>7iJ,ocr(x—Arr,Epidl,  1.  I.  C.  14.  p.  81. 0 J'at- 

p-cov,  ov  ladf-cc  'srporocTW  kcc)  ‘^yei^bvix  0 Zsvg 
d7r0  77rix7pAix>  Eaura  * J'e  If’iv  0 lyAr>s  v^g  y,ot\ 

Xoy(^.  Mar.  Ant,  1.  5.  f.  27.  Huilnanus  autem  ani- 
rnuSy  decerptus  ex  mente  divindy  cum  nullo  alio  nifit  cum 
ipfio  Deo  {fit  hoc  fas  ejl  didfu)  comparari  poteji,  Tufc, 
Difp.  1.  5.  c.  13.  p.  371. 

Note  LXXIII.  Ibid. — Fit  Actors  in  that 
GENERAL  Drama,  where  thou  hast  al- 
lotted EVERY  Being,  great  and  small, 
its  proper  Part,  &c.]  See  before,  p,2io.  and 
Hote  LIII.  See  alfo  Arr.  Epidf.  I.  3.  c.  22.  p.  444 — 
2u  H * djvix70Hy  ^c.  The  Paflage  is  fublime 

and  great,  but  too  long  to  be  here  inferted. 


Note 


NOTES  on  the  Third. 


345 


Note  LXXIV.  p.  230.— Enable  us  to  curb 
Desire,  ^c.  Enable  us  even  to  suspend 
IT,  ^c.  Be  our  first  Work  to  have 

ESCAPED,  dffr.]  'sroTE  ■sravTaTrao-ty  opE^fcof, 

7voc  'sroTE  7^  IvXoyug  Ahflaln  for  a titne  fTom 

Defire  altogether^  that  in  time  thou  mayjl  be  able  to 
defiire  rationally,  Arr.  Epic5t.  1.  3.  c.  13.  p.  414. 
Again  the  fame  Author — Siijuspev  — opE^E^  oux  sp^pr- 

cocfxsvy  EXJcXtVEt  -cTpoi;  (J.QV0C  rd  urpoizipsltzcic To  day 

my  Faculty  ofi  Defiire  I have  not  ufied  at  all ; my  Aver^ 
jion  I have  employed  with  refipebl  only  to  things^  which 
are  in  my  power,  1.  4.  c.  4.  p.  588.  See  alfo  Enchir^ 
c,  2,  and  Charabi,  V.  III.  p.  202. 

Horace  feems  alfo  to  have  alluded  to  this  Doctrine : 

Virtus  efil^  vitium  finger e ; ^ fiapientia  prima^ 
Stultitia  caruijje Epifl.  i.  1.  i.  v.  41. 

Note  LXXV.  Ibid, — Let  not  our  Love 
there  stop,  where  it  first  begins,  but 

INSENSIBLY  CONDUCT  IT,  "biQQ  Plat.  Sy??ip, 

p.  210.  tom.  3.  Edit.  Serrani.  Asf  >^«p,  E(p)j,  roy 
o’pGwj  lovrx  ettI  Taro  '5rp«/]t>ta,  app^EcrGa;,  &C. 

Note  LXXVI.  Ibid. — Not  that  little 
CASUAL  Spot,  where,  b’r.]  Arrian,  Epicf, 
1.  I.  c.  9.  p.  51.  Socrates  quidem^  cum  rogaretur^  cu~ 
jatem  fie  efife  diceret.,  Mundanum,  inquit:  totius  e?iiin 
mundi  fie  incolam  & civem  arbitrabatur,  Tufc.  Difp, 
1.5.  t.  37.  p.427. 

Note  LXXVII.  p.  231. — Teach  us  each 
TO  regard  himself,  but  as  a Part  of 

THIS 


46  NOTES  on  AT  1%-E  the  Third. 

THIS  GREAT  Whole;  a Part,  &V.]  IIm? 

Twy  Iktoi;  rivoc  v.cl'v^  (pvG-tv,  &c.  In  what 
Senfe  then  (fays  the  Philcfopher,  fmce  all  is  referable 
to  one  univerfal  Providence)  are  foms  things  called 
agreeable  to  our  Nature.,  and  others  the  contrary  ? The 
Anfwer  is^  They  are  fo  called.,  by  confidering  ourfehes  as 
detached,  and  feparate  from  the  Whole.  For  thus  may 
1 fay  of  the  Foot,  when  confdered  fo  apart,  that  'tis 
agreeable  to  its  Nature,  to  be  clean  and  free  from  Filth. 
But  if  we  confder  it  as  a Foot,  that  is,  as  fomething  not 
detached,  hut  the  Member  of  a Body,  it  will  behoove  it 
both  to  pafs  into  the  Dirt,  and  to  trample  upon  Thorns, 
and  even  upon  occafion  to  be  lopped  off,  for  the  Prefer^ 
vation  of  the  Whole.  Were  not  this  the  cafe,  it  would 
be  no  longer  a Foot.  Something  therefore  of  this  kind 

Jhould  we  conceive  with  refpebl  to  ourfelves. What 

art  thou  f A Man.  If  thou  confder  thy  Being  as 
fomething  feparate  and  detached,  ^tis  agreeable  to 
thy  Nature,  in  this  View  of  Indep evidence,  to  live 
to  extreme  Age,  to  be  rich,  to  be  healthy.  But  if 
thou  cojifider  ihyfclf  as  a Man,  and  as  the  Member  of  a 
certain  Whole  ; for  the  fake  of  that  Whole,  it  will 
dccalionally  behoove  thee,  at  one  while  to  he  fck,  at 
another  while  to  fail  and  rifque  the  Perils  of  Naviga- 
tion, at  another  zvhile  to  be  in  zvant,  and  at  lafl  to  die 
perhaps  before  thy  time.  Jlloy  therefore  doft  thou  bear 
tkefe  Events  impatiently  P Knoivef  thou  not,  that  after 
the  fame  inanner  as  the  Foot  ceafeth  to  be  a Foot,  fo  dof 
thou  too  ceafe  to  be  longer  a Man  ? Arr.  Epidl.  !.  2. 
c.  5.  p.  191. 

Kote  LXXVIII.  p.  231.— -In  as  much  as 

f UTURITY5  filV,  j doY\Kd  fxoi  ^ rd 

reev  to  7'jfp(^diciv  TCOi/  xocrd 

(pVTiU  * 


347 


NOTES  on  Treatise  the  Third. 

ipvtnv  • auToV  ycK^  tJu  0 GeoV  to;«twv  laXeKTixov  Inoi- 
7](r£V  • U (S'e  ys  VjJ'ftV,  on  V0(Ts7v  [XOt  K(X,^£lf/>0C^T0il  VUVy 
y.x\  wpjuwv  ay  £7r’  dvro^'xoc]  yu^  o li  (p^ivoa; 

wp/aa  av  £7ri  to  ■si’/iAyo'Gat,  Jrr.  Epia,  1.  2. 
c.  6.  p.  195.  It  appears  that  the  above  Sentiment 
was  of  Chryftppus,  In  the  tenth  Chapter  of  the  fame 
Booh  we  have  it  repeated,  tho’  in  words  fomewhat 
different.  AjaT«To  >caAwf  Atj/ytriw  oi  (pi?<o(To(po]y 
on^  See. 

Note  LXXIX.  p.  232.  — That  we  may 
KNOW  NO  other  Will,  than  thine  alone, 
AND  that  the  Harmony  of  our  particu- 
lar Minds  with  thy  universal,  

ElVOil  f dulo  T«T0  TW  T8  £V^GitfJt.OV(^  OCpslm  EVpOlOiP 
GTiXV  Tirclvjoi  zrpthlTyfJiXt  xoclix  ttiv  (rvfj(,(puviuv  ts 
zrc'.p’  iKocrip  ^at|W,oy(^  zjpog  tyiv  t»  oAi#  ^aA^- 

g■^v.  The  Virtue  of  a happy  Man^  and  the  Felicity 
of  Life  is  this,  when  all  things  are  tranfa^ed  in 
Harmony  of  a Man's  Genius^  with  the  JVill  of  Him^ 
who  admini ft ers  the  Whole.  Diog.  Laert.  1.  7.  c.  88. 

р.  418.  This  is  what  Epiaetus  calls  rm  dvlv  ^yAv;- 

<Tiv  (Tuvappoo-at  toT;  to  attune  or  har?nonize 

Okie's  Mind  to  the  things ^ which  happen.  DifT.  1,  2. 

с.  14.  p.  242. 

Note  LXXX,  Ibid.  Yet  since  to  at- 
tain this  Height is  but  barely  pos- 
sible, See  before,  page  215,  ^c.  See  alfo 

Holes  LX.  and  LXII. 

Note  LXXXI.  p.  233. — Such  as  to  trans- 
form us  into  Savage  Beasts  of  Prey,  sul- 
len, ^r.]  See  before.  Note  LXXI, 


Not£ 


NOTES  on  Treatise  the  T^bird. 


Note  LXXXII.  p.  233.  That  animating 
Wisdom,  which  pervades,  and  rules  the 
Whole,  This  Power  is  called  by  the  Em- 
peror Marcus — rdv  ^imQvJa  Koyov^  — 

Oi)C0U^:f/>^vlcC  TO  TSTO^V,  1.  5*  3^* 

Note  LXXXIII.  Ihid.  — That  Magic  Di- 
vine, WHICH,  TO  A£ov- 

*1^,  TO  ^7]Xnfvpio'j^  wxa-Qt,  Jiaxapyioc^  ccg 
cJ?  j3opSop(^,  ixsiviov  iTnymipcaloc  twv  (ri^vuv  xal  xa- 
Awu,  [4A  ocvl(2  aAAjVpictt  T»T»,  » crlCffS’,  (pavJd^H* 

dxXoc  Tm  ZTCcvJm  nrviym  iTriXoyii^if,  M.  Ant.  1.  6, 
f.  36. — See  alfo  1.  4,  f.  44.  1.  3.  f.  2.  *'X2(r7rf^  5/a^ 
di,  xojpicoS'iai  (Cpiicrlv)  iTriypoLpt^pf^ocloc.  ysXoToi  (pipatriv^  d 
xa§’  £au7a  ]U£U  £0  (pauAiii,  tw  J'e  oAw  ’usorofj.ocli  ^dpiv 
Tivd  Torpor i9?](riv  * htw?  4^£jfia?  av  au7>!v  locvlvg  tt^v 
xaxjixu,  TOK  (J'’  olxXoig  sx  ‘xy^pfjrd^  is~t.  Chryfip.  apud 
Plutarch,  p.  1065.  D, 

OJde  r;  yiyvslcci  spyov  Itt]  era  AocdpK^uVy 
Oj  r£  y.a,T  di^spiov  ^sTov  WAov,  »V  Itt)  mdvlcOy 
^A^^y  ottojOC  kockoI  a-lpsVpvTiv  dvoiuig^ 

’AAAa  (TO  xai  j^r^picrcroc  STTifo^crai  <zp']ioc  Gstloity 
Kcil  }CO(T[/.s7v  to.  UKOfTIXOC  * Xpl  8 (pjAiSi  (Tol  (plXOO  ifiV, 
’^nh  yd^  iig  £y  aTrotvJix  trvvripfAQxxg  i<Qxd  ^(ZKOiiTiVy 

e'vix.  ytyvs^cci  ’urdcvlm  xdyov  oldv  idvjoyv,  forf.  idvia, 

Cleanthis  Hymn,  apud Steph.  in  PoefiPhilof.  p.  49, 50. 

[The  Reader  will  obferve  that  the  fourth  of  the 
above  Verfes  is  fupplied  by  the  MifcelL  Obfervationes 

CritUay 


notes  o«  Treatise  thelHird.  34-9 

Critics,  V0I.VII.  fromaManufcript  of  at 

Leyden,^ 

KoteLXXXIV.  P..34.-W1TH  thesh  m^av 
OUR  Minds  be  unchangeably  ti  ^ > 



M.  Ant.  1.  S-  f- 16‘ 

.KT  tyvyv  Ibid  — With  a Re- 

Note  LXXXV.  ^^.l^^Enchirid. 

SERVE,  p9’  Seneca  tranf- 

c 2.  M.Ant.  1.4-  ‘-I-  ‘-S-  1 , f 

htJ;  it,  ^^DsBeneficus,  1.  4-  f-  34- 

TwT  tyYXVI  Ibid. — Never  miss  what 

NoteLXXAVI.  iw« 

WHICH  WE  WOULD  AVOID,  i^C-i  f*n« 

.o»  «7r»Turx»»ov,  /xeT  kKX.wv1«  t^EfiTr.Trlu.. 

Epia.  I-  3-  *=•  P' 

Note  LXXXVII.  p.  235. -—Conduct  me. 
Thou,  ^c-] 

>'Ays  P,  » 

•'0;rii»  ®-o6’  'V'” 

•a?  e'4'o;*** 

X««?  J'£V0>E»®', 

Ckanthes  in  Epilf.  S-' 


Thus  tranflated  by  Seneca: 

Due  me,  parens,  eelfsque  dminatcr  poli, 
^mnque  placuit : nulla  parendt  mm  ejt : 


Adfuni 


35° 


NOTES  on  Treatise  the  Third. 

Adfum  impiger»  fac  nolle : comitahor  gemens^ 
Malnfque  patlar^  quod  hono  licuit  pati, 

Epifl.  107. 

Note  LXXXVIII.  p.  236.  ’Tis  Habit,  re- 
plied HE,  IS  ALL  IN  ALL.  ’TiS  PRACTICE 
AND  Exercise,  which  can  only, 

to  the  End  of  the  Paragraph*'] *AAAa  xstoAAt^? 

p^pf ,'sri«paa-x6u5?$’,  xat  mova  ujoKX^  xal 

T/  »u  ; IXTrd^Eig^  on  rm  f/.s'ylr'nv  ri’xyw  utto  oxlym 

Iriv  dTToXccQiTv ; But  (fays  one,  with  refped  to 

the  virtuous  Charadler)  there  Is  need  of  much  Pre- 
paration^ of  much  Labour  and  Learning,  And  what  P 
Doji  thou  expeS  it  Jhould  be  pojfible  (anfwers  the 
Philofopher)  to  obtain^  by  little  Pains^  the  chiefeji 
GREATEST  Art  ? Arr,Epi£i,  1.  i.  c.  20.  p.  III. 

Taup(^  8 ylvslociy  JJ'e  'yewocTog  * 

dxxd  J'gf  p^gt^aacrx^trat,  zcapacrxeuaVa^ctt,  xal  juii  ukv 
zjpoorTTTi^dv  Itt]  rol  zrporwovltx.  No  robuji  and 

mighty  Animal  is  complete  at  once ; nor  inore  is  the  brave 
and  generous  Man,  ’Tis  necejfary  to  undergo  the  fe- 
verejl  Exercife  and  Preparation^  and  not  rajhly  plunge 
into  things^  which  are  no  way  fuitable,  Ejufd. 
DifTert.  I.  i.  c.  2.  p.  18.  See  alfo  the  idimQ  Author , 
L I.  c.  15.  p.  86.  1.2.  c.  14.  p.  243.  Sedutnec 
7nedici^  nee  imperatoreSy  nec  oratoreSy  quamvis  artis 
prcecepta  perceperinty  quidquam  magna  laude  dignum 
fine  ufu  exercitatione  confequi  pofunt : fic  officii 
confervandi  pracepta  traduntur  ilia  quidem  ( ut  facimus 
ipfi  ;J  fed  rei  magnitudo  ufum  quoque  exercitationemque 
defiderat.  Cic.  de  Offic.  1.  i.  c.  18.  ^ ’H0IKH 
Ig  ’^E0OTS  zTEpiyivelcct  * o$£v  xixt  — 

Ethic.  Nicom.  1.  2.  c.  i. 


Note 


NOTES  on  Treatise  the  T!hird, 


Note  LXXXIX.  p.  236.  Nothing  is  to 

BE  HAD  GRATIS,  zrpowoc  ymloci.  Arr, 

Epi6f,  1.  4.  c.  10.  p.  653.  The  fame  Sentiment  is 
often  repeated  by  the  fame  Author, 

Note  XC.  p.  241. We  are  all  go- 
verned BY  Interest,  See  of  the  Dia- 

logue^  p.  212,  246.  See  alfo  Notei  LVI.  and  XCIL. 

Note  XCI.  p.  243. ’Tis  a smoaky 

House,  KocTrvog  e’o  * d'rrip’XOfJ^a.i,  M,  Ant<» 

!.  5.  c.  29.  See  Arr,  Epigf,  1.  i.  c.  25.  p.  129. 

Note  XQll,Ibid.  Is  a social  Interest, 

As  the  Stoics,  above  all  Philofophers,  oppofcd  a 
lazy  inaSfive  Life^  fo  they  were  perpetually  recom- 
mending a proper  regard  to  the  Public^  and  encou- 
raging the  Practice  of  every  focial  Duty.  And  tho* 
they  made  the  original  Sprmg  of  every  particular 
Man’s  Adion,  to  be  Self-love^  and  the  profped  of 
private  Intereji ; yet  fo  intimately  united  did  they 
efteem  this  private  Intereft  with  the  public^  that  they 
held  it  impojfible  to  promote  the  former^  and  not  at 
the  fame  time  promote  the  latter,  ToAvlm  (pva-tv 

T«  XCchcDcivCClTSVy  iVX  [XVi^SllOg  TWV  i^iiOV 

9uv  rvf^dvsiVy  it  ti  it;  ro  xoivov  d(pBXiy.ov 

ZupoapEpvloit  * OVKiri  CCKOiVCOVyfloV  ytv/]iXly  TO 

rarxvloc  aula  bveko.  zs-oieTv.  God  hath  fo  framed  the  Na-‘ 
ture  of  the  rational  Animal,,  that  it  fiould  not  be  able  to 
obtain  any  private  Goods ^ if  it  contribute  not  withal  fome 
thing  profitable  to  the  Community.  Thus  is  there  no  longer 
any  thing  unsocial,  in  doing  all  things  for 
the  sake  of  self.  Arr,Epidi,  1. 1.  c.  19.  p.  106. 

The 


NOTES  on  Ti^e  atise  the  Third. 


The  Peripatetic  Doctrine  was  much  the  fame. 

Iloivjoov  d[^iXX(a[xlvoov  wpog  ro  kocXov,  kcc)  aiocnm- 
IA£WV  ra  KccXXirix,  zrpiz'lTSiVy  xoti.'?  t*  av  zravll  £in 
T(%  jicul  \§lo(.  Ixixr’w  T(x  [^lytroc,  rm  dyx^cavy 

i^TTs^  r dpsrn  roi^Tov  Iri  * tlrs  rov  [/.h  dya^ov^  ^s7 
(plxavrov  sTvoit  * xoii  yd^  auroV  ovricsron  rd  KocXd 
zypdrrcov,  xat  t»V  dxXac  d(p£X7i(7£i,  Were  all  to  aim 
jointly  at  the  fair  Principle  of  Honour^  and  ever  ftrlve 
to  a£l  what  Is  falref  and  moji  laudable^  there  would 
be  to  every  one  In  common  whatever  was  wanting^  and  to 
each  Man  In  particular  of  all  Goods  the  great eji^  If  Vir- 
tue deferve  jujlly  to  be  fo  efteemed.  So  that  the  good  PAan 
is  necejfarlly  a Friend /<?sELFt  For  by  doing  what 
is  laudable^  he  will  always  hlmfdf  be  profited^  as  well 
as  at  the  fame  time  be  beneficial  to  others.  Ethic.  Ni- 
com.  1.  g.  c.  8. 

Note  XCIII.  p.  243. — If  so,  then  Honour 
AND  Justice  are  my  Interests,  ^c,'\  Thus 
Cicero^  after  having  fuppofed  a foclal  common  Interefi 
to  be  the  natural  Intereft  of  Man,  fubjoins  imme- 
diately  ^od fit  Ita  efi<y  una  contlnem.ur  omnes  ^ ea- 

dem  lege  tiatures.  Idque  Ipfium  ft  ita  efi^  certe  violare 
alterum  lege  natures  prohibemur,  De  Offic.  1.  3.  c.  6. 

NoteXCIV.  Ibid. — Without  some  Por- 
tion OF  WHICH  not  even  Thieves,  ^V.] — 
Cujus  (fc.  Juflitics)  tanta  vis  efi^  ut  ne  llli  quidem, 
qui  maleficlo  ^ fcelere  pafcutitur.,  poffint  fine  ulla  par- 
tlcula  jufiities  vivere.  Nam  qul  eorum  culpiatn^  qui 
una  latroclnantur^  furatur  allquid  aut  erlplt^  is  fibi  ne 
in  latrocinio  quldem  relinquit  locum,  llle  autem^  qui 

archie 


353 


NOTES  on  Treatise  the  Third. 

archipirata  dicitur^  nifi  aquabiliter  prcsdam^  ^ e.  De 
Offic.  1.  2.  C.  II. 

’AXA’  eov  dvccfxyi^  (pu<riy.v<;  «V/i?  ttic  jcotvwvjac, 

sTvxt  (pv(r£i  Ta  Jocata,  m >con/ajv/a.  ^'oli 

TO  ^laotiov  (TuvE^p^ft  TW  mimvlxVy  §^Xov  e’ov  Itt)  tw> 
cc^ixu/lxTcov  slvxi  ^oyt^vjuv  ' Je  eictiv  Oi  Knr'xi ' o*j 
j?  TTpoV  aAAi^Ay?  y.0ivu'jlx  itto  J'ixxiOTVvyig  a’oo^'slxi  rng 
Trpo'f  aA^iiAyf,  Ata  te  to  jw^  ttXeovekIeTv  dx- 
XvXag^  7^  ^id  to  fj.v  if/suJ'fcS'a;,  to'  tiux’j  to 

ycpEnlov  to  tx  Tuf^EijocEi/oi  (pvXdcTrEiv, 

TO  ^OllOErv  TOr?  X^EVEg^EpOig^  J'iOt  TxZlx  11  TTpo'c  dXXri- 

Xag  dvJoZg  Koivccvfx  G-'o^x^mi  • wv  Tran  t^vxv1;ov  hg  aj 
^d^iycitri,  ttoi^tiv,  ’Tis  necejfary^  Society  being  natu- 
ral^ that  Justice  Jhould  be  natural  alfo^  by  which 
Society  exijis.  For  that  JuJiice  holds  Society  together^ 
is  evident  in  thofe^  who  appear  of  all  the  mofl  u?ijuji., 
fuch  I mean  as  Robbers  or  Banditti^  whofe  Society 
with  each  other  is  preferved  by  their  fuflice  to  each 
other.  For  by  not  afpiring  to  any  unequal  Shares^  and 
by  never  falfifying^  and  by  fubmitting  to  what  appears 
expedient^  and  by  jujily  guarding  the  Booty  amajfed  to^ 
gether^  and  by  ajftjiing  their  weaker  CompatnonSy  by 
thefe  things  it  isy  that  their  Society  fubftjis ; the  co?itrary 
to  all  which  they  do  by  thofe^  whom  they  injure,  Alex. 
Aphrod.  TTEpt  •^\)X-  P*  I5^*  Edit.  Aid.  See  alfo 
Plat,  de  Repub,  1.  i.  p.  351.  tom.  ii.  Edit,  Serrani, 

Note  XCV.  p.  245.  What  then  have  I 

TO  DO,  BUT  TO  ENLARGE  ViRTUE  INToPlETY  I 

Not  only  Honour, 


A 7k 


All 


354  NOTES  Treatise  the  Third, 


All  manner  of  Events,  which  any  way  affedl  a 
Man,  arife  either  from  within  himfelfy  or  from 
Caufes  independent.  In  the  former  cafe,  he  main- 
tains an  adfive  Part ; in  the  latter,  a pajfive.  The 
active  Part  of  his  Charader  feems  chiefly  to  be  the 
Care  of  Virtue,  for  ’tis  Virtue  which  teaches  us 
what  ^ye  are  to  adf  ov  do the  pajjive  Part  feems  to 
belong  more  immediately  to  Piety,  becaufe  by  this 
we  are  enabled  to  reftgn  and  acquiefce^  and  bear  with 
a manly  Calmnefs  whatever  befals  us.  As  there- 
fore we  are  framed  by  Nature  both  to  adf  and  to 
fuffer^  and  are  placed  in  a Univerfe,  where  we  are 
perpetually  compelled  to  both;  neither  Virtue  nor 
Piety  is  of  itfelf  fufficient,  but  to  pafs  becomingly 
thro’  Life,  we  ftiould  participate  of  each. 

Such  appears  to  have  been  the  Sentiment  of  the 

wife  and  good  Emperor, avwfv  oXov  socvlovy  iiycaio- 

(Tvvyj  f^lv  itg  vp*  h roTg  uX- 

Xoig  (TVfji^ociviitny  ry]  toov  oXuv  (puVft.  Ti  ^ spiT  ti?, 
5 VTroXvrJ^/joii  TTspi  ^ y,tzT  iig 

t!8v  ^dXXsl(x,i^  J'uo  Tvloig  dvjog 

Trpxys'lv  ro  vuv  Trpao-orojUfvov,  piXiiv  ro  vuv  ccttove- 
fjLo/usvov  s»vju- — He  (the  perfedl  Man)  commits  Mm- 
felf  wholly  to  Justice,  and  the  universal  Na- 
ture ; TO  Justice,  as  to  thofe  things  which  are 
done  by  himfelf-,  and  in  all  other  Events^  to  the  Na- 
ture OF  THE  Whole.  TVhat  any  one  will  fay^ 
or  think  about  him,  or  adi  againjl  him,  he  doth  not  fo 
much  as  take  into  confideration ; contented  and  abun- 
dantly fatisfied  with  thefe  two  things,  himfelf  to  do 
JUSTLY  what  is  at  this  infant  doing,  and  to  ap- 
prove 


355 


NOTES  on  Treatise  the  Third. 

PROVE  and  love  what  is  at  this  injlant  allotted  him, 
M.  Anton.  1.  lO.  f.  II.  JJdcvJoi  a ^*<54 

TTipiO^iS  ’iv^V}  IX^iTvy  ^VVXTOCI,  idv  (TOC'JltO 

(P^or/ig  • t«7o  (?£  £Ov,  TT^v  to'  TrapfAOov  xxTocXi7ry]<;^ 

7^  TO  fxiXXoV  iTTirpST^'t};  tJ  TTpOVOia,^  ^ TO  TTXpOV  y.ovov 

dTTB’j^suMipg  TTpog  *OSIOTHTA  AIKAIOSTNHN* 

0(TiOT‘i)TX  [xhy  Hvx  (PiXipg  TO  d.7r0V£IXOpi.£VO7*  col  yoi^  dvlo  ^ 

(pvTig  sfpcpe,  tI  T^'lip  • ^lyixioaur/iv  J'e,  Tvct  eXsvSspcog 
^wp'ig  TTspnrXoyc^g  Xiyvg  ts  t*  dxM^  Trpdiravig  tcc 

'xxld  voy.ov  xxT  ag/av Jll  thofe  things^  at  which 

thou  zviJJoeJi  to  arrive  hy  a Road  round  about,,  thou 
rnayjl  injiantly  peffefs,,  if  thou  doji  not  grudge  them  to 
ihyfelf  \ that  is  to  fay,,  in  other  words,,  if  every  thing 
paji  thou  intirely  quit,  if  the  future  thou  truf  to  Pro- 
vidence, and  the  prefent  alone  thou  adjuf  according  to 
Piety  and  Justice  : according  to  Piety,  that  fo  thou 
mayft  approve,  and  love  what  is  allotted,  (for  whatever 
it  he,  Uwas  Nature  brought  it  to  thee,  and  thee  to  it ; ) ac- 
cording tojuftice,  that  fo  thou  mayf  generoufy  and  zuith- 
tut  Difguife  doth  fpeakthe  Truth,  and  a£i  what  is  confo- 
nant  to  [the  general]  Law,  and  the  real  Value  of  things, 
M.  Ant.  1.  12.  c.  I.  See  alfo  1.  7.  c.  54, 

Note  XCVI.  p. 245. I have  an  Inte- 

rest WHICH  MAY  EXIST,  WITHOUT  ALTER- 
ING THE  Plan  of  Providence  ; without 

MENDING,  ^r.]  naidfuEcS-aj jLliri  to 

vsiv  iy.xg~x  stoo  9iXsiv,  cog  Scc,  To  be  infirudlcd 

that  is  to  fay,  to  learn  fo  to  vcill  all  things,  as  in  fab? 
they  happen.  And  how  do  they  happen  As  He  zvho 
ordains  them,  hath  ordained.  Now  He  hath  ordained 
that  there  fmld  be  Summer  and  f Vinter,  and  Plentv 
A a 2 and 


f 


NOTES  Treatise  the  Third. 

and  Fcrnhie^  and  Virtue  and  Vice^  and  all  manner  of 
Contrarieties  ^ for  the  Harmony  of  the  Whole ; aiid  to 
each  of  us  hath  He  given  a Body\  and  its  Members^ 
and  a Fortune  and  certain  Afociates.  Mindful  there- 
fore of  this  Order ^ ought  we  to  come  for  Infruclion-^ 
not  indeed  how  we  tnay  alter  what  is  already  efahlifoed^ 
(for  that  neither  is  permitted  us^  nor  would  it  *be  better 
fo  to  be  i)  but  hoWy  while  thmgs  continue  around  u$^ 
juft  as  they  are^  and  as  is  their  Nature^  we  may  fill 
preferve  our  Judgment  in  harmony  with  all  that  happens, 
Arr.  Epid.  1.  i.  c.  12.  p.  74, 

Note  XCVII.  p.  246.  Who  would  be  un- 
happy ? Wpio  WOULD  NOT,  IF  HE  KNEW 
HOW,  ENJOY  ONE  PE RPE TUAL  FeLICIT Y ? 

- — rdulv];  (fc.  luJat/xovia?)  ^onrix  ttoIv- 

'Jsg  TTtxvlcx.  TrpdrlofAsv.  ^Fis  for  the  fahe  of  Happinefs^ 
we  all  of  us  do  all  other  things  whatever.  Ethic.  Ni- 

com.  1.  I.  c.  12.  fub.fin, ^-See  before,  of  the 

Dialogue  pages  212,  241.  and  Notes  LVI  and 
XCII. 

Note  XCVIIL  Ibid.  — — If  it  happen  to 

BE  ERRONEOUS,  ’tis  A GRATEFUL  ErROR, 
which  I cherish,  ^V.J  l^a,7rocl7}^ev](x  rivob 

bit  Tcov  SKTog  dwpoatpETcov  Ir**  Trpog 
/ rilj.ag^  lyco  fxh  rm  TauT>]v, 

'^jjleXXov  Evpbccg  :ix'i  ^idasBat.  Were  a 

Man  to  be  d.eceived^  in  having  learnt  concerning  Ex- 
ternals^ that  all  beyond  our  Power  was  to  us  as  nothing ; 
Vfor  my  own  part ^ would  defire  a Deceit.,  which  would 
enable  me  for  the  future  to  live  tranquil  and  un- 
dlfiurhed.  Arr.  Epid.  1,  i.  c.  4.  p.  251. 


Note 


NOTES  on  Treatise  the  Third. 


257 


Note  XCIX.  p.  247. When  we  are 

ONCE,  SAID  HE,  WELL  HABITUATED  TO  THIS 

MORAL  Science,  then  Logic  and  Phy- 
sics BECOME  TWO  PROFITABLE  ADJUNCTS, 

eafque  virtutes,  de  quibus  difputatum  eji^  Dialebti^ 
cam  etiam  adjungunt  ^ Phyficam^  eafque  ambas  vir^ 
tutum  nomine  adpellant : alteram^  quod  habeat  ratio-- 
nem^  ne  cui  faljo  adfentiamur^  neve^  Cic.  de 

Fin.  1.  3.  c.  21.  p.  265. 

The  threefold  Division  of  Philosophy 
into  Ethics,  Phyfcs,  and  Logic,  was  commonly 
received  by  moft  Sedls  of  Philofophers.  See  Laert, 
1.7.  c.  39.  See  alfo  Cicero  in  his  Treatife  de  Legi^ 
bus,  1.  I.  c.  23.  and  in  His  Academics,  1. 1.  c.  5. 
Fuit  ergo  jam  accepta  a Platone  philofophandi  ratio, 
triplex,  ^c.  Plutarch,  de  Placit.  Philof.  p.  874. 


END  of  the  NOTES  Treatise  the  Third, 


P.  304.  1.  6.  for  a'h»?,  read  P.  349.  I,  20. 

for  f\|yO|U,at  oloxv^,  read,  f ^okv'^. 


f 


( 


\ ' 


A ' 


Sf&lfH.  c 

J‘101 


V''