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YUGOSU

TITO'S COMMUNISM

Tito jr

COMMUNISM

By JOSEF KORBEL

The University of Denver Press

Digitized by tine Internet Archive

in 2009 with funding from

Boston Library Consortium IVIember Libraries

http://www.archive.org/details/titoscommunismOOko

TITO'S COMMUNISM

Printed in the United States of America

TO THE YUGOSLAV PEOPLE

who often in their tormented history

have shed blood for the common cause

of freedom' and democracy ^

which have been denied to them

FOREWORD

The story of the fighting in Yugoslavia during World
War II has been narrated by several writers. More recently, the
struggle of the Yugoslav Communists, led by Marshal Tito,
against the Cominform has attracted attention of students of
international affairs, especially of those of the Balkans. Less at-
tention has been paid to the people of Yugoslavia in this crucial
period of their history.

This book attempts to describe the life of the Yugoslav peo-
ple under communism, the practices of the Communist govern-
ment of Marshal Tito in the fields of internal and external poli-
tics, economics, and culture. In this sense, it is hoped that it
may contribute to the study of communism in general. It also
tries to throw new light on the real background of the conflict
between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

To write the book in English was not an easy task for some-
one whose mother-tongue is Czech. It is thanks to Mrs. Mary
G. Markham's invaluable work that I have overcome this ob-
stacle. I would like to extend to her my deep gratitude.

I also wish to express my sincere thanks to the Rockefeller
Foundation which facilitated the preparation of this book
through a grant to the Social Science Foundation of the Uni-
versity of Denver. My gratitude goes also to Professor Philip
E. Mosely, Director, The Russian Institute, Columbia Univer-
sity, and to Dr. Ben M. Cherrington, Director, Social Science
Foundation, University of Denver, for their helpful advice; to
Dr. Harrison S. Thomson, Professor, University of Colorado,
and editor of the Jourfzal of Central European Affairs, for hav-
ing read the manuscript; and to Professor Allen DuPont Breck
of the University of Denver for his friendly cooperation. Need-
less to say, their assistance does not imply any responsibility for
the contents of this book.

My wife has gone with me through all the labor, from the
beginnings of the manuscript to the preparation of the index.

JK
vi

CONTENTS

Foreword vi

Return to Belgrade 1

Two Warriors 7

The Communists Take Over 12

Meeting Old Friends 18

Republic vs. Monarchy 2 J

The People's Republic 38

One Country — ^Multiple Nationalities 49

The Party and Its Leaders 62

Daily Life ^ 94

Press and Radio 126

Arts AND Sciences 134

Religion 146

The Opposition Silenced 159

-Politics and the Law 172

Nationalization of Industry 187

Planned Agriculture 194

The Five Year Plan 207

The Financial Pattern 232

Markets, Salaries, Prices 245

Foreign Trade 253

Foreign Policy 263

The Heresy 286

The Crucial Struggle 309

Postscript 344

Appendix 1 348

Appendix 2 351

Index 358

NOTE ON PRONUNCIATION

Most of the proper names in this book appear in their
original spelling. Consonants are pronounced roughly as
follows: c as ts; c and c as tch', s as sh; z as 5 (in treasure) ;
dz or dj as ;.

VUl

RETURN TO BELGRADE

It was the end of September, 1945, when an old German
Junker, captured at the Prague airport, made its first trip to
Belgrade. I was a passenger, on my way to begin duty as
Czechoslovak Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordi-
nary to Yugoslavia. It was a strange feeling to be circling over
Belgrade after four years of war.

My wife and I were met at the airport by only one official
of the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry. It was a modest welcome.
We soon started for the city, passing many heavily loaded
trucks rushing noisily along bad pavements. Serbian peasants
walked slowly beside their peasant wagons. Scores of tin coffins
were being taken somewhere.

We reached the center of the city, every corner of which
I had known well. I wasn't prepared for what I saw. Could
six years, even with four of them war years, really change a

2 TITO'S COMMUNISM

city so much? Here had been the railroad station. Now there
were only piles of rubble; a temporary wooden roof tried un-
successfully to conceal the ruins. The Military Academy was
gone and many other buildings had been destroyed by German
and Allied bombs. There were wide, vacant areas where for-
merly small houses had been crowded together in the narrow
streets of this semi-oriental town. Everywhere there were grass-
covered heaps of bricks from destroyed houses.

I was struck by a feverish activity amid the destruction.
People were at work repairing streets and buildings and con-
structing new ones. Among these workers there were many
women and even some children. They looked undernourished
and flimsily clothed. Cripples seemed to be everywhere. Many
soldiers were in the streets, some in uniform, some with just
military caps showing the Bolshevik star. We noticed a con-
siderable number of luxurious American cars.

The Legation, at which we soon arrived, although it had
been lucky enough to escape the bombing, had not escaped
German pillaging. During the war the High Command of the
German Army for the Balkan theater of operations had occu-
pied the building. The tapestry, the pictures, the rugs, and the
furniture had disappeared with the Command; only oflSce equip-
ment was left behind.

My thoughts turned, naturally, to my friends whom I had
known before the war.

I had been here from 1937 to 1938 as the Press Attache
to the Czechoslovak Legation. After Munich I was withdrawn
at the request of Prime Minister Stojadinovic, who did not
like my contacts with the democratic leaders of the opposition.

The government in Prague was only too glad to comply
with this demand, as my service with the Czechoslovak For-
eign Office had to be terminated. Berlin had already ordered
that no "Benesite" be allowed to continue his diplomatic career.

Again, in March, 1939, when my country was occupied
by the Germans, my first thought for safety went to Yugo-
slavia. A fortnight later I escaped from Czechoslovakia with
my wife and baby, and found temporary refuge with my
Yugoslav friends.

My function as Press Attache in Yugoslavia began during

RETURN TO BELGRADE 3

the rule of Prince Paul. I took part in organizing lectures
about Czechoslovak history and literature and in arranging
the showing of Czechoslovak cultural films. The halls were
always packed and the meetings never ended without friendly
demonstrations. Czechoslovakia and her President, Edvard
Benes, were highly praised and applauded and not a single
occasion was missed by the crowds to associate themselves with
the cause of democracy.

Also, during the period when I was Press Attache I used to
meet the leaders of the democratic opposition. This had to be
arranged secretly. I conversed often with Dragoljub Jovano-
vic, the talented and courageous professor with a peasant fol-
lowing. We used to meet in the apartment of Gustave Aucou-
turier, the director of the Balkan branch of the late Havas
agency, and one of the top experts on Balkan politics. There
I met also Milan Gavrilovic, the chairman of the Serbian
Peasant party. The official function of Milan Grol at the
University of Kolarac made it possible to visit him from time
to time without arousing suspicion. I enjoyed talking with
this cultured philosopher of democracy and leader of the
Democratic party. I learned a great deal from Misa Trifuno-
vic, the chairman of the Serbian Radical party.

I never failed to visit privately the leader of the Croat
Peasant party and the Croat nation, Vlatko Macek, whenever
I went to Zagreb. The conversations with him enlightened
me about the profound abyss which existed between Croats
and Serbs. He was the master of the situation in Croatia.
His party had organized its own police, administration, and
even courts which were dutifully attended by Croat defend-
ants and plaintiffs, while the courts and administrative institu-
tions of the state were ignored.

The leading figure of the Independent Democratic Serbian
party in Croatia, Vjeceslav Vilder, and a devoted friend of
my country, was always willing to introduce me into the
intricacies of Yugoslav political life. Archbishop Alois Stepinac
was, as he assured me, not only the shepherd of his devoted
Catholic children but also the protagonist of an intensive Croat
nationalism.

In Slovenia I Hstened to the open-minded liberal, Albert

4 TITO'S COMMUNISM

Kramer, and the Catholic leader, Anton Korosec, who never
failed to picture the discouragement of the struggle between
the liberals and deeply rooted CathoHc clericaUsm. They
found themselves united only in a common front against the
centralized poHcy of Belgrade.

In April, 1937, the President of Czechoslovakia paid an
official visit to Prince Paul. The democratic population made
this an occasion to show their sentiments to the world. Though
not a single announcement was made by official quarters about
the coming state visit, people were prepared to receive Dr.
Benes with feelings of friendship and admiration.

A delegation of the students of Belgrade University (who
were always ready to strike against the government) came
to see me. It was led by Lola Ribar, a talented student orator,
who was discovered only two years later to be an important
member of the Communist party. The delegation wanted to
know the exact time of Dr. Benes' arrival so that they could
mass in one place and, as Ribar told me, "take Dr. Benes out
of his car and carry him on our shoulders through the streets
of Belgrade." They did not succeed in securing the informa-
tion about his arrival, but the news spread, and the peasants
from the vicinity of Belgrade tried to give the President of
Czechoslovakia a special welcome. However, they were stopped
on all roads and trains en route to the capital.

The Belgrade police managed the visit so well that the
public did not see this chief representative of an alUed country
at all. He was lodged securely in the old Royal Palace, which
was surrounded by a high wall. "When he had to take the
salute in the march past the Yugoslav Army, the platform
was erected especially for this purpose in an adjacent street
and a hole broken through the Palace wall so that he had
only to walk from the Palace garden to see the marching
troops and then was confined again to the official world.

The international sky was darkened by increasingly heavy
clouds and the Yugoslav population was more and more anxious
to manifest its feelings. In December, 1937, Yvon Delbos, the
French Foreign Minister, made an official visit to Belgrade.
This time, the adherents of democratic ideals were better pre-
pared to receive the distinguished representative of France.

RETURN TO BELGRADE 5

Thousands of them waited at the station and, despite severe
poUce control, succeeded in unfolding hitherto hidden placards
with slogans: "Long live France, Long Hve democracy." Mov-
ing slowly but irresistibly like a heavy avalanche through the
streets of Belgrade, they shouted, "Long live the Alliance with
France and the Little Entente," and "Down with the govern-
ment of Fascists!"

I was preparing a message for my government about the
reception of Delbos, when I heard some clamoring outside.
I stepped to the balcony of the Legation and was greeted by
a crowd of five hundred young people carrying French and
Czechoslovak flags, shouting, "Long live Dr. Benes and Czecho-
slovak democracy," and "Down with Prince Paul and Stojadi-
novic's fascism." The first was a tribute to my country, but
the second a demonstration against the recognized government
and its responsible officers. I could not withdraw and ofFend
friends. I could not greet them and offend my host, the Yugo-
slav government, either. I stood like a statue for several min-
utes. Suddenly, a truck packed with poHce rushed to the
place and opened fire against the demonstrators. I saw some-
one drop like a log. The crowd dispersed, but the tension
continued to mount and remained high.

The war was approaching the Balkans. The democratic
masses of Yugoslavia suffered from the defeat of France in
June, 1940, as if it were their own defeat. The Communists
called the war imperialistic. The government circles were wor-
ried about what would happen next. Trying to calm the in-
satiable imperialism of Berlin, they agreed to sign a pact with
Hitler. But the proud Serbian fighters revolted on the mem-
orable day of March 27, 1941, under the leadership of an
airman. General Dusan Simovic. The treacherous government
of D. Cvetkovid was quickly disposed of, Prince Paul fled
abroad, and the other two regents, Radenko Stankovi^ and
Ivo Perovic, accepted the change of regime with relief.
(Prince Paul lived in exile in the Union of South Africa. Stan-
kovic and Perovic were arrested by Tito's Partisans in 1945,
and in August, 1949, were sentenced to twelve and eleven years
of prison respectively.)

6 TITO'S COMMUNISM

Young King Peter took over the fate of the country. Yugo-
slavia has "found its soul," declared Winston Churchill in the
British Parliament. The whole democratic world greeted this
revolutionary move enthusiastically, for it heralded new and
regenerated strength in a nation which never had missed an
opportunity to face and fight tyrants.

TWO WARRIORS

But the enthusiasm soon disappeared.

On April 6, 1941, Belgrade was heavily strafed by German
bombers. General panic seized the undefended town, and streams
of refugees poured out of the city. The army was disorganized
and technically ill-prepared. Its concentrations were an easy
target for the experienced Luftwaffe. The Croat units refused
to fight. General chaos prevailed. The capitulation came only
a fortnight after the invasion of Yugoslavia began.

It was not sufficient that the majority of the nation was
eager to fight the enemy which marched in from Austria,
Italy, Bulgaria, and Hungary. The Yugoslav state completely
broke down. The German master knew well all its weaknesses.
The country was forcibly divided into several parts. The west-
ern part, Slovenia, was shared between Germany and Italy,
and disappeared from the maps prepared in German geographic

8 TITO'S COMMUNISM

institutes. The small Slovenian nation was to be eradicated
from the world. Croatia was declared to be an independent
state which seemingly satisfied the nationaHstic aspirations of
the Croatian chauvinists, led by Ante PaveUc. Serbia was ad-
ministered by the German-controlled Serbian, General Milan
Nedid, but parts of it were given to Hungary and Bulgaria.
Dalmatia and Montenegro were allotted to Rome and the whole
country was occupied by German or Italian troops.

The local traitors put their armed units at the disposal of
the Germans: the Serbian Army of General Nedic; security
units of Dimitrij Ljotic; the Croat Army of Pavelic; the Croat
home defense and Ustase, which was a miHtary and police
organization similar to the Nazi Brown Shirts; the Slovenian
Army of Rupnik, and many other small groups.

National and rehgious differences had always formed a
deep abyss between the peoples of Yugoslavia. The problem
of Croat-Serbian antagonism grew through the bewilderment
and cruelties of war into great dimensions. The intolerant re-
lations between the two Christian religions of the CathoHc
Croats and the Orthodox Serbs intensified the separation.

Soon after the official capitulation of the Yugoslav Army
a name hitherto unknown was on the Ups of everyone; that
of Colonel Draia Mihajlovic, an officer of the Royal Yugoslav
Army. Only a few people knew that he had watched with
anxiety, long before the war broke out, the poor morale and
the technical unpreparedness of the army and that he had
criticized the pro-German policy of the Yugoslav governments.
He was an ardent ally of the West. I met him in Prague in
1936 when he was Military Attache to the Yugoslav Legation
in Czechoslovakia.

This man refused to lay down arms and started to organize
a resistance movement led by officers loyal to the Crown and
to the Allied cause. There was no village in Serbia which would
have refused to offer him hiding from the German soldiers
and local Quislings. There was no house or peasant family
that did not long to give him food. Dra:za, as everybody called
him, moved across Serbia like an uncrowned monarch. The
officials of villages and smaller towns were at his disposal and
what Draia ordered was done. He organized something re-

TWO WARRIORS 9

sembling a regular army, recruiting youngsters and giving them
training. But then he sent them home again, as it was difl&cult
to maintain a huge army in the wild mountains.

After costly clashes with the German Army, for which
the civilian population paid heavily, Draia decided not to
fight the enemies, unless attacked, but to prepare for the time
when a simultaneous blow could be delivered to the Nazis
by the Allies from outside and his soldiers from within.

This fundamental matter of strategy gave birth to a con-
flict with another man who suddenly appeared on the scene.
His name was Tito. He was not known to the masses. Only
a few people knew he was the top leader of the Yugoslav Com-
munists. Tito's rigid appearance offered a warning contrast to
the bespectacled, professorial figure of Draza, who, in his ro-
mantic devotion to the King, ordered that he and his followers
should not shave their beards until their monarch returned to
his liberated country.

These two men met twice in the autumn of 1941. One
was the King's obedient oflficer, the other a Communist leader.
Draza had behind him a considerable body of officers and
soldiers, and the whole Serbian countryside was under his com-
mand. Tito had organized around himself some few hundreds
of Communist agitators, members of the party who were
spread all over Yugoslavia in small groups. They were ail
fanatically devoted to the idea of communism, and their su-
preme commander was in Moscow.

Draza and Tito had fundamentally different views about
the strategy of war against the Germans. Draza did not want
to seek armed clashes which would cost the lives of many of
his unarmed fellow countrymen. Tito was firm in his opinion
that the enemy should be harassed wherever there was an oppor-
tunity and he insisted on a common Yugoslav front formed
by all Yugoslav nationaHties.

The two leaders could not agree. They did not meet again,
but before long their followers met daily on battlefronts,
fighting each other and unleashing a fratricidal civil war.

Tito's movement grew from the underground. Small groups
of unarmed Communist Partisans operated in the country and
in the towns. No risk was too great to prevent them from

10 TITO'S COMMUNISM

seizing arms on any occasion. Their number was soon aug-
mented by newcomers. The fighting in the country grew in
intensity.

It happened that villages changed hands several times. A
case is known where a village was occupied forty times by
different fighting groups. First the Germans would massacre
innocent civilians because a Partisan group had attacked a
German column passing through the village the previous day.
Then the Ustase would come and murder every sympathizer
of Tito and Draza. When the village was taken by Mihajlovic's
men, the killing of the Partisans and Ustase followed, but
other Partisans would come and dispose of all their opponents.
The suffering of the civiHan population was severe and the
people lived in constant fear.

On October 20, 1944, the victorious Marshal of Yugoslavia,
Josip Broz Tito, entered the capital. Beside him marched his
comrades of the Red Army. By then his army had been in-
creased by many thousand soldiers, mainly Croats who joined
Tito's movement after the capitulation of Italy in the summer
of 1943. The oflScers were seasoned Partisans, covered with
the glory of forest fighting during those four long, exhausting
years. Much of the country had been Uberated and placed
under the administration of local committees which were a
version of the Russian local Soviets. Tito organized the political
life and administration of regions as soon as they were freed.

For the citizens of Belgrade, the date of Tito's entry into
the city should have been a day of deliverance. They looked,
however, with fear and doubt at the fanatical faces of their
liberators. Tito now enjoyed immense authority, and among
some people certainly a considerable amount of respect also. The
town was in his hands; its inhabitants were full of expectancy.

The nation was worn out. According to official statistics,
1,700,000 patriots laid down their Hves before the altar of
freedom — a heavy toll for a nation of 16,000,000. No historian
will be able to ascertain how many were killed in action by
the enemy from abroad, or how many fell in bloody fratricidal
strife.

Thousands of villages had been wiped out or badly damaged,
hundreds of bridges torn up, railroad tracks smashed, ancient

TWO WARRIORS 11

forests destroyed, mines inundated, and factories demolished.
Hunger was a faithful companion of disease. Economic calamity
was multiplied by financial chaos resulting from six different
currencies becoming worthless over night.

Ruins and blood — those were the raw materials out of which
a new Yugoslavia was to be constructed.

THE COMMUNISTS TAKE OVER

Peace was officially declared in Yugoslavia on the
day of the general armistice, VE Day, May 8, 1945. This
does not mean, however, that the fighting and the shooting
stopped altogether. Masses of Ustase who were aware of their
crimes and the fate they must expect, and thousands of Mihaj-
lovic's Cetnici were moving about in the country or hiding in
forests. There were regions in Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia which
were under their control for a long time after the war, but
they were gradually cleared by the Yugoslav Army and police.

The fighting between the armed forces of Germany and
Tito's Partisans had hardly finished when another struggle
started. It was a struggle for entrenching and strengthening
'the political power of the Communist party.

At first, pohtical Hfe in postwar Yugoslavia was based on
the agreement which Marshal Tito, as chairman of the National

THE COMMUNISTS TAKE OVER 13

Liberation Committee, signed with Dr. Ivan Subasic, the Prime
Minister of the exiled Yugoslav Royal Government, on De-
cember 7, 1944 (Appendix 1). The purpose of this agreement
was to provide a democratic regime in the country after the
war, and to form a provisional representative government
composed of democratic parties which would ensure political
hberties and conduct free, democratic elections.

The principles embodied in this agreement were endorsed
at Yalta by the highest international authorities at that time,
the Big Three. A solemn declaration, issued on February 13,
1945, and signed by Franklin D. Roosevelt, Joseph Stalin,
and Winston Churchill, said,

"We have agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and Dr.
§ubasic that the agreement between them be put into effect
immediately, and that a new government be formed on the
basis of that agreement. We also recommend that as soon as
the new government has been formed it should declare that:

"1. The Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation
(AVNOJ) should be extended to include the members of the
last Yugoslav Parliament {SkupUina) who have not compro- ,
mised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus form-
ing a body to be known as a temporary Parliament, and

"2. Legislative Acts passed by the Assembly of National
Liberation will be subject to subsequent ratification by a Con-
stituent Assembly."

This agreement of the Big Three was nothing but a recom-
mendation for the Yugoslav politicians. But since the docu-
ment carried the signatures of the three war leaders and post-
war policy makers it was a document of a very categorical
nature.

There was another international agreement signed at Yalta
which directly concerned Yugoslavia. This did not have the
form of a recommendation but was a very definite obligation
of an international character to those who put their signatures
to it. This document, "Declaration on Liberated Europe,"
bound the governments of the United States, the Soviet Union,
and Great Britain to help the liberated nations of Europe form
widely representative and democratic governments and carry
out free elections. This Declaration was not respected by Soviet

14 TITO'S COMMUNISM

Russia; in fact, she did everything to destroy the representative
and freely elected governments of European countries and to
make future free elections impossible.

In the case of Yugoslavia, none of the quoted agreements
were fulfilled. It is true that a new provisional government
was constituted in Yugoslavia, on March 7, 1945. It was
headed by Tito and composed of his Communist adherents
and five representatives of the democratic elements: Dr. Ivan
Subasic and Dr. Juraj Sutej for the Croat Peasant party; Dr.
Milan Grol for the Democratic party; Sava Kosanovic for
the Democratic Independent party; and Dr. Drago Marusic
for the Slovene Liberals. The last two had been in poUtical
solidarity with Tito since the war. According to the agreement,
the King was to stay abroad until the nation decided the
future form of the state, whether it should be a repubhc or
a monarchy. His prerogatives were transferred to three royal
regents.

This government, however, lasted only a short time. Before
very long the three democratic members of the government
resigned. Minister Grol sent a long letter to Marshal Tito in
which he maintained that the agreement, signed in December,
1944, and the Yalta declarations were not being observed and
that there was no freedom in Yugoslavia. He, therefore, wished
to resign. This letter was never published (Appendix 2 ) .

After a short period, two more resignations followed. In
October, a short official announcement informed the nation
that Dr. Subasic and Dr. Sutej, the only two Croats of non-
Communist convictions in the government, had left the govern-
ment. The reasons for their decision were similar to those of
Dr. Grol.

From that moment on, the rule of the country was fully
in the hands of the Communist party while a few insignificant
non-Communists who were willing to toady to the new regime
helped the Communist government. After the resignation of
the three democratic members of the government, the govern-
mental propaganda machine unleashed a ferocious attack against
them, accusing them of plotting with reactionary circles abroad,
usually in the United ^ States, whose orders, it was said, they
obeyed.

THE COMMUNISTS TAKE OVER IS

This kind of charge has since been repeated in all other
satellite countries wherever the Communists resolved to liqui-
date the democratic leaders, not only poHtically, but if prac-
ticable, also physically. It worked in the cases of Nikola Petkov
in Bulgaria, of Ferencz Nagy in Hungary, of JuHu Maniu in
Rumania, of Stanislav Mikolajczyk in Poland, and of the twelve
democratic ministers in Czechoslovakia. Democratic politi-
cians in the countries behind the Iron Curtain were silenced
by execution or jail, or forced to seek refuge abroad in exile.

The government of Yugoslavia was called the government
of the National Front. This expression was a cunning device
of the Communists. It was created during the time of the
German menace, long before the war started. The Communist
parties in Europe, trying to fuse with the SociaHst parties in
order finally to absorb them, agitated for the formation of the
popular front which would lead to the creation of a govern-
ment of National Front. The attempt succeeded only in
France and there for only a short and uneasy period.

This version of a National Front reappeared again during
the war after Russia was attacked by Germany. Commutiists
of all European countries appealed to masses for the establish-
ment of a National Front against the enemy. The expression
had popular appeal in all occupied countries because it aroused
everybody, regardless of his poHtical creed, to rally under the
banner of all-national interests for the common cause of
freedom.

In Yugoslavia the Communist party followed the same
poHtical tactics. It never mentioned its program or aims. The
Partisan movement was stressed as an all-Yugoslav national
movement. Everybody who was willing to fight the enemy
was welcomed in Tito's ranks. Never was it admitted that
the eventual aim of the group was to bring about the triumph
of communism in Yugoslavia.

Even during the first two years after the war the Yugoslav
Communists avoided emphasis on the merits of the Communist
Partisans in the liberation of the country and on the role of
the Communist party in state affairs. The leading power was
supposed to be the National Front.

The National Front was an all-embracing organization. It

16 TITO'S COMMUNISM

administered the local communities, it organized meetings,
directed the redemption of wheat, constructed roads and rail-
ways, presented the candidates for the local and the national
elections. The National Front spoke on behalf of the nation.
In fact, it seemed that this description corresponded with the
reality. Millions of people were members of the various Na-
tional Front organizations — men, women, young people and
even children. It was the Communist party which directed
all the National Front activities and ordered people, through
local Communist secretaries, to join the National Front.

In theory, there were and still are several poHtical parties
organized within the National Front: the Communist party
of Yugoslavia, the Republican party, the apostates of the
Serbian Peasant party, the apostates of the National Peasant
party, the apostates of the Independent Serbian Democratic
party, the Croat Peasant RepubHcan party (which forcibly
liquidated the only representative Croat party of Madek who
is now in exile in the United States) , the apostates of the Demo-
cratic party, and the apostates of the forgotten SociaUst party,
which dissolved itself in the middle of 1948. It will be no-
ticed that the number of apostates is overwhelming, a fea-
ture which has characterized the strategy of Communist par-
ties, in Yugoslavia and in many other countries as well. To
split the democratic forces. Communists encouraged some
second-rate members of democratic parties to join the gov-
ernment, and the parties then divided into two wings. The
purpose was achieved; the democratic elements were consid-
erably weakened and the all-national character of the govern-
ment was seemingly achieved. Then, the real democratic wings
of the opposition parties were accused of reaction and plotting
with American capitaHsts against the legitimate governments
and the parties were dissolved or silenced.

According to the Yugoslav law, every political party was
obliged to apply to the Ministry of Interior for a license. All
parties did so, even the old traditional parties such as the
Radical Serbian party and Democratic party. Licenses were
issued to them. But I never heard that any one of them ever
organized a meeting.

In the autumn of 1945, the Democratic party of Dr. Grol

THE COMMUNISTS TAKE OVER 17

began to publish a weekly, Detnokratija. An insufficient
quantity of paper was allotted to permit daily publication.
There was no preventive censorship in Yugoslavia. But it hap-
pened regularly that, after the pubHcation of a questionable
issue of Demokratija, the Belgrade poHce confiscated thousands
of copies in the streets, tearing the papers from the hands of
vendors. To demonstrate the power of the government and
the "wish of the nation," quantities of confiscated numbers
were often burned in the streets of Belgrade. After some few
numbers of Demokratija were published, the typesetters of
the paper, who were compulsorily organized into Communist-
governed trade unions, decided "spontaneously" not to print
this reactionary publication, and it was so announced officially.
The paper did not appear again.

The same fate met another opposition paper, this time in
Croatia. It was the Narodni Glas (National Voice). Of this
paper, only one number appeared, in the autumn of 1945, and
again the typesetters refused to continue its printing. The
voice of the democratic opposition has not been heard since.

Curiously enough, the only party which did not apply
for its license was the Communist party of Yugoslavia.

MEETING OLD FRIENDS

This was the Yugoslavia to which I returned to take
up my new diplomatic assignment.

Before departing for Belgrade, I was received by the
President of the Republic, Dr. Edvard Benes. "Keep your
eyes open," he told me. "Personally, I have little confidence
in Tito. He is, above all, a Communist who succeeds in con-
cealing his real aims by temporary nationalistic propaganda.
Return frequently to Prague and, whenever you arrive, call
on me. I am greatly interested in Yugoslavia; she will again
play an important role in European politics. Don't write down
anything of confidential character; the Soviet Embassy would
have it the day after your report arrives in the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. You understand now the reason for asking
you to report to me orally." These words of Dr. Benes gave
me grave concern.

MEETING OLD FRIENDS 1?

Soon after my arrival I began to look for my former
friends, especially those who were now either with the Tito
government or in its service.

My first call was on Vladimir Ribnikar. He came from
an old Serbian family which had founded in Belgrade a daily
paper, PoUtika, which had grown into a newspaper of national
importance and influence because of its adherence to the prin-
ciples of democracy and freedom. On the front page of
PoUtika, next to the title, were the names of Vladimir's prede-
cessors— his grandfather, his father, and his uncle who had
died bravely during the Balkan wars and World War I.
Vladimir, or Vlada, as friends used to call him, was co-
proprietor of PoUtika and its editor-in-chief before the war.
His wife was a Czech. Our families had been close friends
before the war, and our children had played together. Hardly
a single day passed without a telephone call from one to the
other of us, and we customarily met in our homes at least
once a week. I had no doubts about his democratic leanings;

After the German invasion, Ribnikar was arrested but
finally secured his release and, with his wife, joined the Partisan
movement. Tito was glad to have this man with him. He
rightly valued the name he bore. Later, in liberated Yugo-
slavia, Ribnikar was entrusted with the Portfolio of Culture
and Schools and when the government was constituted, he was
appointed Chairman of the Committee for Arts and Culture.
KQs position was not one of full ministerial rank but was,
nevertheless, of great importance.

I phoned him some twenty minutes after our arrival. He
had known I was coming. When I mentioned that my wife
would return to Prague in two days, he proposed that he tele-
phone me later in the day to arrange a time for our reunion.
But he never called.

One week later I telephoned again. His wife was ill, he
told me, and was awaiting an operation. I sent her a bouquet
of flowers and asked her husband to give me a ring when
the operation was safely over so that I could greet her. She
never thanked me, and I was never invited to see her.

On the afternoon of the day of my arrival, a functionary
of the Czechoslovak colony came to see me. We had known

20 TITO'S COMMUNISM

each other before the war. He was a good man, I felt. He
entered my room with some embarrassment. The conversation
was vague and dull. Then, suddenly he took up courage and
questioned me, "Are you a Communist, Mr. Minister?"

"God knows I am not," I replied laughing. His face bright-
ened into a relieved smile and he stood up to leave the room.
He said only, "That is enough for today, my dear friend," and
disappeared.

In the evening, a very good friend of mine came to see me.
The conversation lasted till four o'clock in the morning. He
told me about his experience during the occupation of Serbia
and of his joining the governmental service. He was not a
Communist but defended Tito vigorously, giving as his reasons
how badly Yugoslavia had been run before the war and how
seriously everybody was working now. I was glad to hear all
this because I believed in his democratic faith and esteemed his
judgment.

The first shock came the following day. Newspapers pub-
lished the official announcement of my arrival. A teacher whom
I had known very well in the old days rushed to see me. We
had hardly exchanged a word of what we had done during
the war when he began a passionate monologue, "Do you
realize what has happened in this country? You will soon find
out for yourself. Have you seen people with coffins on your
way here? Do you know what those coffins are for? Those
people are Serbian peasants who are going to the other side of
the river, to the region of Srem, to dig up and take home
the corpses of their sons, if they ever succeed in finding them.
One hundred thousand children, between fourteen and eighteen,
were driven there by the Communists, unprepared, completely
untrained to take part in the last offensive, and tens of thousands
of them were massacred by German machine guns. For this,
somebody will pay, one day," he said, and continued without
waiting for any reply or question on my part.

"In prewar times, we criticized our bourgeoisie for its irre-
sponsible behavior, for its way of living. Have you seen the
big American limousines being driven through the streets?
They carry the representatives of the new, better, people's
democracy — ministers, generals, party secretaries, and their

MEETING OLD FRIENDS 21

'comradesses,' as we must now call our wives. They live apart
in the villas they took from the former owners; they shop in
special canteens at minimum prices, have plenty of servants
and their incomes are beyond any control. This last week,
I was not able to give my three children anything more than
dry potatoes. Yet I work like a slave and have the highest
possible salary. Women and children have to work Voluntarily'
on the construction of public buildings, roads, and factories, and
we all must devote part of our Sundays to aiding them in this
enthusiastic labor drive for our beloved leader and father of
the nation, Josip Broz Tito, about whom we know nothing —
where he was born, who his parents were, and what he did
before he started this business of Communist Partisans."

I could not believe it.

Another shock followed immediately. I heard that a very
good friend of mine, Niko Bartulovic, had been shot by the
Partisans because he worked with Mihajlovic and had been
accused of collaboration with the Germans. He was a distin-
guished writer and, before the war, editor of a fortnightly
review. During World War I he was arrested by the Germans
for siding with the Allies. He was a proven Yugoslav patriot,
a real democrat, and a man of personal integrity beyond a
shadow of doubt. Issues of his paper were often confiscated
because of criticism of the pro-German policy of Prince Paul.
This man, a reactionary and a traitor!

On the other hand, the best friend of Bartulovic and a
writer of recognized abiUty, I. Andric, who had been Deputy
Foreign Minister to the pro-German government of Stojadinovic
and Yugoslavia's last Ambassador to Hitler, was now the
Chairman of the Communist-controlled organization of Yugo-
slav writers. This was beyond my comprehension.

Later on I found that there were among the government
people former adherents of fascism and even members of Usfase
gangs. I found that some former Communists were outside
and some real reactionaries inside; that reliable friends had
become spies.

The presentation of my credentials went off according to
official routine. It was in this period that the prerogatives of
the King, who had now postponed his return until the wish

22 TITO'S COMMUNISM

of the nation could be ascertained, were transferred provisionally
to three royal regents. One of them, Dr. Ante Mandic, a Croat,
had played a more dignified role during the creation of Yugo-
slavia, thirty years before, than he now did in his present posi-
tion. The second, Dusan Sernec, a Slovene, had been the Gov-
ernor of Slovenia under the dictatorship of King Alexander.
The third, Srdjan Budisavljevic, a Serb, had been one of the
outstanding figures of Yugoslavia's poHtical life for more than
thirty years, always a good democrat and a very good-hearted
man. He was the Chairman of the Independent Democratic
Serbian party, the democratic record of which was very high.
He must have realized into what an untenable position he had
been drawn, trying to represent the King in a Communist
administration.

Soon I established contact with members of the government,
high oflScials, and generals. The theme of these discussions was
always the same: all praised highly the man who had led them to
victory and each of them became passionately descriptive
when telling of his own war experience. Then followed the
statement that Socialist Yugoslavia was preparing for a tre-
mendous effort to repair the war damage and to march briskly
up the road to prosperity. A note of consolation followed at
the end of each of these discussions: "You Czechs have not
yet achieved as much as we have in our people's democracy.
But do not worry; one day it will come and you will estabhsh
a really democratic regime as well."

After these preliminary lessons, the day was fixed for my
audience with the Prime Minister, Marshal of Yugoslavia, Josip
Broz Tito. I drove to his palace in which Prince Paul, the
Royal Regent, had lived before the war. Prince Paul had had
to leave abruptly in March, 1941, but five years later I still found
traces of his love for paintings in the palace. French impres-
sionists of the most bourgeois period of France gave an atmos-
phere of intimacy to the spacious rooms in which the Com-
munist ruler now lived.

The Marshal's aide-de-camp awaited me in the hall. In the
next room, I was welcomed by the Marshal's famous dog. Tiger.
I almost slipped and fell on the gHttering floor but Tiger did
not bark, a fact which I considered evidence of Tiger's con-

MEETING OLD FRIENDS 23

fidence in me and of the good impression I had made upon him.

The Marshal was in his customary uniform and high boots.
He was considerably fatter and smaller than his pictures had
indicated. It took some time to get him talking in a conver-
sation which was only moderately cordial. Talk turned to
Hungary, a point of friction between the foreign policies of
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Czechoslovakia had territorial
claims against Hungary and wanted to transfer her own Hun-
garian minority to Hungary. Tito objected to this poHcy which,
in his opinion, was driving the Hungarians into the hands of
the capitaHstic West and helping the conservative elements to
gain in power in Hungary.

"Piistory will show," he said, "who was right, you or we,"
leaving no doubts that the judgment was to be in favor of
Yugoslavia.

Ironical fate, however, prepared a disappointing turn for
both Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia only three years later:
Hungary became Communist but anti-Titoist and Czecho-
slovakia was compelled to retain the Hungarian minority.

My experience based on first personal contacts was sub-
stantially enriched when soon after my arrival I was invited to
a reception at which Tito was the host. There were five hun-
dred guests. Uniforms were in the majority. Ladies wore
street-length dresses and no make-up. They looked rather
rough. Almost all of the guests were Partisans, proud of their
warrior past and scornful of the gaieties and fancies of the
western feminine world. Only the diplomats wore black ties
and their ladies long dresses.

I was in the company of some Yugoslav generals when,
suddenly, my former friend Ribnikar and his Czech wife
passed. I was shocked by her appearance. This once elegant
woman, who had used a good deal of make-up and had worn
the most expensive dresses, lopked shabby and weary. Her
face was gray, her lips pale, her hair greasy. This time she
could not avoid seeing me. Without giving a single word of
welcome, she burst out, "Don't count me any more among
Czechs. I have become a Yugoslav. The spirit of the Partisans
has infiltrated me completely, and I have forgotten my Czech
ancestors."

24 TITO'S COMMUNISM

The generals were surprised by this tactless remark and I
felt ashamed. I succeeded in answering, "I am sorry to hear
this, but we have in our country so many good women that
we can gladly make a present to our Yugoslav friends."

I left the reception soon. I began to grasp the meaning of
various remarks which had been made to me concerning the
reservations felt by official Communist circles in Yugoslavia
for the still democratic government of Czechoslovakia.

REPUBLIC VS. MONARCHY

I HAD ARRIVED IN BELGRADE, AT THE END OF SEPTEMBER,

1945, just as the election campaign for the Constituent Assem-
bly was beginning. This body was to decide whether the
country would continue to be a monarchy or would be pro-
claimed a republic. It was to provide, as well, a new Consti-
tution for the people.

Every day there were meetings in factories and every eve-
ning in other places. People were obUged to attend them.
Every Sunday demonstrations on a large scale were arranged.
In larger towns there was not a single house or wall which
was not painted with big slogans. Secretaries of the National
Front did not ask the owner of the house whether he was
wilHng to have the walls of his home used for this propaganda,
or whether he agreed with it. The Czechoslovak Legation,
situated in the center of Belgrade, was painted with inscriptions.

26 TITO'S COMMUNISM

I ordered them removed but the following day they appeared
again.

Groups of young people marched daily through the streets
of Belgrade from early morning till late at night shouting
slogans. Newspapers and radio stations carried pictures and
speeches of these "national rejoicings," emphatically stressing
that all this was an expression of the free will of the nation.

School children were told that their parents were going to
choose the leadership of the country and the issue was whether
it would be led by Marshal Tito, whom boys and girls were
taught to adore, or by "the rotten, cowardly King of Karad-
jordjevid." They were instructed to Hsten to what their
parents talked about so that "the old reactionary, dying world
could not annihilate the great values of the national liberation
movement." Fathers and mothers became afraid to speak freely
to their children or in their presence.

In one family a tragedy almost occurred when a boy came
home from school one day and insisted that his name should
be changed. He even threatened to denounce the family for
being against Tito if the father did not agree. The son said
that children in the school attacked him as a Royalist and
anti-Titoist and threw stones at him shouting, "Necemo
kralja!" (""We do not want the King!") The boy's name was
Kralj (King).

In the villages the campaigning was somewhat different.
On Sunday mornings the agitators came from the towns and
waited for the villagers in front of the church until the service
was over when they began to speak against reactionaries. Peas-
ants dared not leave the meeting because they would be
branded as reactionaries.

As in other Balkan countries, the young people were accus-
tomed to gather on Sunday afternoons in an open space to
dance. Now the entertainment was often interrupted by the
sudden appearance of a man who made a short speech, saying
that there was no time for dancing when people ought to be
working on reconstruction projects, and that the elections
would show where everybody stood.

Rumors were spread about the country that those who
would not vote would be deprived of their land. Soldiers were

REPUBLIC VS. MONARCHY 17

given trucks to drive through towns and villages in order to
shout threats to reactionaries. This was only six months after
the war when the army was composed of many Partisans, and
many people still feared even their appearance.

The agitation was concentrated on the main issue: mon-
archy or republic. "With the first, all evils were associated;
with the latter, all advantages. The National Front organized
meetings and made proclamations, but the whole campaign
was planned and manned by the Communist Politburo;

During the days before the election the atmosphere was
thick with hatred. One could not escape the drum-fire of
the propaganda. The thousands of flags, placards, slogans,
political songs, speeches, and articles must have wrought fear
in everyone's mind and led the people to abandon any idea
of expressing their views freely. "Down with the King! Down
with Grol! Down with black reaction! Down with the mon-
archy! Long live Tito! The nation will vote for Tito and
the republic!" Those were the slogans which gave the tone to
the campaign.

The King and the democratic poUticians had no oppor-
tunity to answer these attacks. According to the Tito-Suba-
sic agreement, young King Peter had no right to return to
the country "until the people have pronounced their decision
in this respect." But there was not a single person who would
have dared to say a word in his favor against this avalanche
of anti-monarchist propaganda. The democratic opposition
was deprived of every means of expressing its opinion and
of defending its political program. It had no newspapers and
it did not arrange any meetings, although in theory it could
do so, because in this atmosphere of coercion and intimida-
tion such a meeting would have been smashed by the Partisans,
or people would have been afraid to attend it.

Under the circumstances the opposition decided not to
take part in the election, and thus to demonstrate to the
whole world that it was only a farce. Many observers and
other democrats argued whether this was a wise decision
and whether it did not facilitate the Communist efforts to
arrange and secure complete victory. Some were of the opinion
that it was a major poUtical mistake. But there is little doubt

28 TITO'S COMMUNISM

that under the psychological pressure to which the voters were
exposed, only a few would have had the courage to vote for
the democratic candidates. The consequences would have been
very unfavorable for them, and thus the strength of the Na-
tional Front would have been only confirmed in this false man-
ner.

People felt that not only the question of monarchy or
repubhc but something much more serious and important was
at stake.

One Sunday, I went to see some friends in a village in
Vojvodina, a place with a mixed population of Slovaks, Serbs,
and Hungarians. I met a teacher whom I had known before
the war. I remembered he had been a Communist fellow
traveler, very radical and against the prewar political regime.
The discussion turned naturally at once to the election. I
expected the teacher would be enthusiastic about Tito. But to
my great surprise he said, "I am sure you think I am a Com-
munist. It is true I sympathized with the Communist move-
ment before the war, and I was even against the democratic
opposition as I reproached them for not fighting persistently
enough against our fascists.

"But things have turned out quite differently from the way
I expected. You will certainly not suspect me of being for
the King. But this is not the issue. Something more important
is at stake — liberty. I do not say that the monarchy would
give us more freedom, and if I could choose freely, I would
prefer a republic. But it is fooHsh to simplify the matter in
this way. I was against the regimes before the war, because
I wanted democracy first of all. Now I can see that we have
another dictatorship. And what makes me crazy is that we are
going to vote for it.

"During the war I saw many tragedies in this district. When
the Hungarian Army occupied us, many Hungarians in our
country denounced the Serbs and Slovaks and thousands of
these innocent people were massacred. To my great surprise,
there were among the Hungarian traitors people whom I had
considered always very progressive, and among the persecuted
Serbian and Slovak famiUes were many whom I had considered
reactionary bourgeois peasants who, I thought, would be willing

REPUBLIC VS. MONARCHY 29

to collaborate with anybody who would not touch their prop-
erty. But they turned out to be patriots and the others traitors.

"This was not all, however. After the war, many of the
Hungarian traitors started to serve the Communist party, and
today they boss the district, run the administration and, as
judges, even condemn our people for collaboration with the
enemy. But many Serbian families whose sons and fathers
were killed by the Hungarians are today branded as reaction-
aries. I can't take it. Black is white and white is black. For
twenty years I have been persecuted by the royal regimes as
a Communist and sent forcibly from one school to another until
I ended up in this forgotten corner of the county. But now,
I am on the same platform with those who secretly would like
to see the King return. I know that the coming election does
not concern the question of king or no king, but the question
of certain slavery or a very sHght hope of freedom. And the
tragedy is that we all are going to vote for slavery."

I discussed the pre-election situation with Marshal Tito
when I met him on October 13. He said, "We shall have to
face many difficulties. Just now the opposition in Bulgaria is
developing a campaign which was initiated abroad to make
our policy in Macedonia impossible, though we had agreed to
solve this question with good- will and frankness.

"Similarly, our opposition and foreign elements try to make
our election impossible. Subasic resigned on the instruction which
he received from abroad. But I do not expect any direct dip-
lomatic intervention. So far we have not received any diplo-
matic note. The opposition's tactics are transparent. However,
we shall carry the election through, and at this moment we
cannot make any radical concessions. Subasic objected, saying
I did not keep the agreement. That is not true. We have given
to the nation a democratic electoral law and the opposition
can take part in the election freely. It prefers, however, to
abstain because it realizes that it would lose.

"I admit that we are committing mistakes, many mistakes,
but that is only natural in a period of revolution. Our people
are afraid that they might lose the great values which they
acquired in the difficult struggle that lasted four years. "We
are doing our best to put the wrong things right and we must

30 TITO'S COMMUNISM

endeavor to remove those subordinate organs which are com-
mitting injustices. Subasic reproaches me that we are proceed-
ing too severely in Croatia and that there is no 'freedom from
fear.' But we can only deal strictly with the Ustase, who
have committed the most terrible crimes in history, and it is
only just if a criminal is afraid that he will be punished and
does not enjoy 'freedom from fear.' The old Yugoslavia cannot
return and people do not want it. I do not know what would
happen, but I think that Yugoslavia would cease to exist if
the opposition came to power. Therefore, there is no intrigue,
no intervention from outside which could compel us to postpone
the election."

One can see that Marshal Tito fully realized that his govern-
ment was only provisional from the point of view of interna-
tional law and that the change from monarchy to republic
would require international recognition. He was rather sur-
prised that there was no official intervention on the part of the
Allied powers.

The Soviet Ambassador Sadcikov shared Tito's view on the
political situation. I saw him on the previous day. His opin-
ion disclosed that at that time, only six months after the war,
he considered the international and internal poHtical questions
from a purely Soviet angle. "The western Allies are very dis-
satisfied with the Yugoslav government," he told me. "First,
they thought that it would lose its position if and when Grol
resigned and if he went independently to election.

"When they found out that the opposition had no public
support and that it would lose the election, they reached an
agreement with Subasic that he should resign, too. As you
know, the Allies granted recognition to the Yugoslav govern-
ment on the basis of the Tito-Subasic agreement, mentioned
also in the Yalta Declaration. When Subasic now declares
that the agreement was not fulfilled by Tito, the Allies may
take it as a pretext not to recognize the government which will
come out of the election. They could even go as far as to
break off diplomatic relations. The truth, however, is that
before his resignation Subasic never protested that the agree-
ment had not been fulfilled. On the contrary, he agreed with
all the laws, including the electoral law, which the government

REPUBLIC VS. MONARCHY 31

had prepared and for which the Parliament voted. If he gives
as the reason for his resignation that Tito did not keep his
promise, it only reveals that he is acting upon instructions from
abroad.

"I am convinced that the government will not retreat, that
it will carry the election through and will not shrink even
from the possible consequences after the election. It enjoys
the full support of the masses and also of the Soviet government."

Though Sadcikov and Tito were only sHghtly worried about
comphcations which might arise if the West did not recognize
the election, the Yugoslav people were expecting an intervention
with certainty. Every evening they turned to the Voice of
America and the BBC. They read in every bit of news that
Washington and London were following the situation very
closely and that they were resolved to evoke the articles of the
Yalta Declaration.

The election for the Constituent Assembly was based on two
laws, about the electoral Ksts and the election. From a formal
point of view, both laws would stand, on the whole, the most
severe examination and could be compared with an electoral law
of any truly democratic country.

In the electoral Hsts, which constituted the legal basis for
ballot rights, were inscribed all Yugoslav citizens regardless of
sex who had reached eighteen years of age. Members of Par-
tisan units or the National Liberation Army had the ballot
right whatever their age (Article 3). Excluded from this
right were persons who had been members of armies of enemy
occupation or their local supporters; those who had fought ac-
tively against the National Army of Liberation and the Allies;
members of the German organization Kulhi-rbtmd and of Fascist
organizations, including members of their families; active func-
tionaries of Quisling organizations; persons who had volun-
tarily helped the enemy; and, finally, persons who had been
deprived by a tribunal of civiHan and political rights (Article

4).

Thus the law refused the basic poHtical right to vote to
whole families if one member was guilty of collaboration with
the enemy.

32 TITO'S COMMUNISM

The provisions of Article 4 of the electoral law assigned
to the local Communist secretaries the duty of inquiring as to
the pohtical reliability of the voters. They entered every house
and apartment and investigated the past of every potential
voter. They asked about his whereabouts during the war, and
if he or a member of his family had not served in the Liberation
Army or had not given active support to it in some form, it
was left to the arbitrary will of the Communist secretary to
decide whether his name would be inscribed in the ballot register.
If the voter did not succeed in proving his political integrity,
the whole family was branded pubHcly as reactionary.

On October 11, the Central Ballot Commission announced
that 8,020,671 voters were listed and only 253,108 persons had
been deprived of this right. This means that not more than
3.06% of the voters were excluded from voting. The regime
wanted to convince the world that the democratic provisions
of the law were strictly adhered to. But it is generally known
that the official announcement did not correspond with the
facts. There were, in fact, whole villages where the only voters
were some few functionaries of the National Front.

Other articles of the electoral law guaranteed the secrecy
of the vote. Others provided for freedom of speech and pro-
hibited any intimidation. They estabhshed a legal basis for the
control of free balloting by estabHshing impartial commissions
which would supervise the balloting. But these were rules in
theory only; they were not observed in practice.

It would be wrong to judge the integrity of elections in
any Balkan country according to the standard to which the
people in western countries have been accustomed. Even before
the war, the governments of those countries took advantage
of organizing elections. The party which had the Ministry of
Interior in its control had a chance to "convince" the popula-
tion through local administrators that it would be advanta-
geous to vote for the government party. The governments
exploited all the technical and material means which they had
at their disposal to take a lead in the electioneering campaign.

But even under such circumstances, the elections were free
in the sense that people had, first, the opportunity to choose
one list or one candidate among several; and, second, that they

REPUBLIC VS. MONARCHY 33

did not need to be afraid of consequences which they and their
families would have to face if they voted for the opposition.

This cannot be said for the election which took place in
the Yugoslavia of Marshal Tito.

The opposition parties were eUminated by psychological
pressure; their leaders refrained from taking part in the elec-
tion. Thus, people were given the choice to vote only for the
governmental list of the National Front candidates, or to ex-
press their dissatisfaction by not going to the polls. At the
last moment, to create the impression of securing for everyone
a free and alternative choice, the government introduced a
non- governmental ballot-box and voters were told that if
they did not agree with the program of the National Front or
its candidates, they had the right and means to express their
discontent by dropping the ballot-ball in this box. But the
propaganda machinery did not fail to make it clear that only
reactionaries and enemies of the progressive, democratic Yugo-
slavia could vote in this way. The box became popularly
known as a "bhnd urn" (Corava kuiija) .

Under these circumstances, people went to vote on No-
vember 11, 1945.

Fxpm the early hours on Sunday, the day of the election,
groups of Partisans marched through the streets shouting that
every democrat votes for the National Front and every reac-
tionary stays at home. This was a very eloquent invitation for
everybody to participate in voting.

The voter going to the polls had no list of candidates in
his hands. Often, he did not know for whom he was going
to vote. The names of the candidates were announced -only
in the newspapers. As a high percentage of voters were illiterate,
all voters were given a rubber ballot instead of a candidates'
list. This technique was actually used before the war as well.

But this time, the voter was properly instructed that he
should first approach the urn provided with the inscription
"National Front," put his hand deeply into the wooden urn,
pull it out closed, then go to the "blind urn" and do the same.
Before each urn stood either a member of the national militia

34 TITO'S COMMUNISM

or an official of the National Front who repeated with the
proper emphasis that "this is the urn for the National Front
and the other is the 'bUnd urn.' " The whole act was watched
by the members of the election commission, composed exclu-
sively of National Front functionaries, who also counted the
number of votes after the election was finished. There were
places where the "blind urn" was distinctly different from
the National Front urn, and if the rubber ballot was dropped
in the first it could be heard.

Soldiers took a very active part in the voting. They went
to the polls in formations and even in trucks. I did not under-
stand why soldiers on a nice Sunday should drive to voting
places in trucks until that evening when I heard a drunk cor-
poral in a small Belgrade inn boast that he had cast his vote
not only in Belgrade but also at two other places in the vicinity.

The name of every voter was checked on the electoral list
when he arrived. Since people were urged to fulfill their duty
as soon as possible, the election commission soon knew who
had abstained. In many places, especially in the villages, the
national militia went from one house to another to urge the
citizens to go and vote.

In such an atmosphere and under such circumstances it
was not surprising that the government list succeeded in receiv-
ing from 80 to 99 per cent of the votes in individual districts.
It probably was not even necessary to falsify the results of
the voting, though technically nothing would have been easier
to do. People were mentally and even physically tired, and
they went to the polls without thinking of casting their
votes in the "blind urn." Everybody was aware that any
sign of opposition either by abstention from voting or by
dropping the rubber ballot into the "blind urn" might mean
losing his job or at least his ration card. It would have meant
an open struggle against the state authorities and an invitation
to them to make the opponents' lives unbearable.^

^A new election was held on March 26, 1950. Its course and result were the
same as four years earlier. Although an electoral reform provided for nomination
of candidates who would be supported by a minimum of 100 people from at least
half of the localities of an electoral district, not a single list was submitted of candi-
dates who did not belong to the National Front. The election was as totalitarian as
before and procured for the Communist government 94.23 per cent of the votes.

REPUBLIC VS. MONARCHY 3 5

The ofl&cial result of the election was naturally celebrated
by the press as the greatest victory of the nation over reaction
and was greeted as unmistakable proof that the nation stood
firmly behind Marshal Tito and rejected the return of the King
to his country. The rule of the dynasty of Karadjordjevic
was over.

Five days after the election Marshal Tito declared to the
foreign and Yugoslav journalists that "everybody could con-
vince himself before and during the election that rumors about
violence and terror on the part of the state organs and members
of the National Front were untruthful and maHcious ....
everybody had been free to vote or not to vote. . . ."

Sixteen million people knew that this statement was not
true, but no one dared challenge it.

The leading Communists themselves reaHzed that this was
a grandiose deception, but as they had been taught to use
any means to achieve their Communist aims they did not care
what the percentage of votes given to their party or to the
National Front would have been if the election had really
been free and democratic. The newly elected ParHament had
the mandate to change the form of the state, to declare a
new constitution and to give legal sanction to totalitarian
methods of rule. The gate for an uncontrolled Communist
regime was wide open and all over Yugoslavia there was not
a single person who could have raised his voice to protest that
this was not a Parliament of the nation but a gathering of
four hundred men and women who were chosen for clapping
and pre-arranged ovations for the self-imposed leader of the
nation, Josip Broz Tito, and his Communist party.

Two days after the results of the election were made offi-
cially public, an artist came to see me and characterized the
freedom of the election in these words: "You know that I
hate communism just as much as fascism and nazism, and
you have even sometimes reproached me, saying I failed to
understand the fundamental changes which the war has brought.
But you can imagine how free the election was and how
many people voted spontaneously for the National Front if
even I cast my vote for the government. But I am sure this
cannot last." Then he added, "Now, I must rush home. I

36 TITO'S COMMUNISM

want to listen to London. I am sure the Allies will not recog-
nize this comedy. You will see that they will announce that
they are not going to grant recognition to this repubUc of
Marshal Tito."

This man expressed the last hopes of Yugoslav democrats
who expected salvation to come from Washington and London.

The State Department expressed its reserve toward the
election. In a diplomatic note of December 25, 1945, it
asked the government of Yugoslavia to accept responsibihty
for the international obligations of the previous Yugoslav gov-
ernments and to confirm the existing agreements and con-
ventions between the United States and Yugoslavia. Only in
case of a declaration in this sense was the United States gov-
ernment ready to accredit its ambassador to the new Yugoslav
government.

In the same note the State Department expressed its con-
viction that the nation of Yugoslavia had the right to expect
the fulfillment of the Yalta Declaration about political rights,
but that these rights had not been respected and the election
did not give the possibility of a free choice of national rep-
resentatives.

The opening of diplomatic relations with the new regime
did not mean, according to the diplomatic note, the sanction
of the policy of this regime or its methods.

In times when certain moral and political values were still
respected and obligations in international relations fulfilled,
such a diplomatic note would have stirred public opinion, and
the government to which it was addressed would have had
something to worry about. But in the jungle which the Nazis
and Fascists have planted in the international world and which
the Communists cultivated with such masterly care, the note
of the State Department was nothing but a document which
gave a clear conscience to the authors and a contemptuous
laugh to those to whom it was addressed.

The government of Yugoslavia was firmly established. All
the western powers recognized it tacitly or explicitly. The
regime was strengthened in its internal and external position.
It could now begin with full vigor the extermination of the
remnants of liberalism and of any organized opposition and

REPUBLIC VS. MONARCHY 37

bring about the realization of the Communist program. This
was an historic moment. The Yugoslav election and its inter-
national acceptance were a signal to all Communist parties
behind the Iron Curtain that they could follow the Yugoslav
example without fear of opposition.

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

It must have been clear to every observer that there
was no hope for young King Peter, who lived in exile, to
return to his native country. As expected, the election resulted
in a clear victory for the idea of a Communist republic.

There had been for many years among the Serbian in-
telhgentsia a strong tendency to discard the Karadjordjevi6
dynasty and to establish a repubKc. Many Yugoslav demo-
crats had been dissatisfied under the rule of King Alexander
between 1928 and 1934. They would have preferred a republic.

Among the Croatians the same feeHng was almost gen-
eral. They had no sentimental ties with the dynasty which
was so closely linked with the history of the Serbian nation.
They resented deeply that the King one-sidedly supported
the tendencies of the Serbian hegemony. The largest Croat
party, representing practically the whole Croat nation, adhered

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC 39

to a republican program as formulated by its leader, Stephan
Radic, during World War L As to the Slovenes, they had no
bias in the question of the dynasty, and they lacked any
tradition in sympathy for a monarchy.

But young King Peter had won the admiration of everyone
by his courageous and patriotic stand against the Germans in
March, 1941. At that time the prestige of the Karadjordjevic
dynasty stood very high. It fell sHghtly again when King
Peter married a princess of the Greek court in London.

During the war the Serbian fighters used to say, "Never
in history was a good Serbian king separated from his nation,
and especially from his army, in moments of fighting for
liberty. This time, we are passing through the most terrible
period of our struggle for freedom, and for the dynasty itself,
and Peter is happy and gay somewhere in England and even
marries a Greek princess. He should be with us on the
battlefield."

However, as my friend the teacher said, the issue was not
a monarchy or a republic when the people went to the polls,
and as far as the Serbs were concerned the King's popularity
was again high in 1945. Their sentiments were expressed with
the characteristic Serbian political wit when inscriptions ap-
peared overnight in the Belgrade streets: "We want the King
even if he is not good." ("Hocemo kralja iako ne valja.")

The great and historical day for the proclamation of the,
republic was fixed for November 29, 1945. The poHtical ma-
chinery was all set up. Tito and his followers had seen to that.

In November, 1942, sixty-five delegates had met at Bihad
and elected the first Anti-Fascist Committee of the National
Liberation of Yugoslavia, AVNOJ. A year later 208 delegates
at a meeting in a Bosnian town, Jajce, put down the principles
of a future republic. The AVNOJ declared that Yugoslavia
would be built up on the basis of a federation and would guar-
antee the equality of all the nations: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia,
Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The AVNOJ
was constituted as the central organ of the national liberation
movement and its highest legislative body. It elected a Presidium
composed of one chairman, five deputy chairmen, two secre-
taries, and forty members. The Presidium had the power to

40 TITO'S COMMUNISM

nominate a Committee of National Liberation entrusted with
the functions of a government. Marshal Tito was its head and
it was composed of six Serbians, five Croats, four Slovenes, one
Montenegrin, and one Bosnian Mussulman. There were no
tested democrats, nor widely known names among them, though
the Communists did not have a majority. The structure of
these legislative and executive bodies clearly indicated that they
were shaped after the Soviet Constitution.

The Congress at Jajce also formulated its attitude toward
the Yugoslav government in exile and toward the question
of the dynasty. It declared that it deprived the government in
exile of the rights of a legitimate government and of the right
to represent the nations of Yugoslavia abroad. This prin-
ciple was to be applied to any government which would be
newly constituted abroad against the will of the Yugoslav
people who were represented, according to the Jajce declara-
tion, by the AVNOJ. King Peter II was forbidden to return
home until the country was completely liberated, when it would
be possible by a free expression of the will of the nation to
decide the question of the monarchy.

This declaration of Jajce put heavy pressure upon the King
and his government, as did the supreme interest of the Allies to
see the Yugoslav fighting front united. As a result, in the
summer of 1944, the Yugoslav Premier in exile, Subasic, went
to visit Marshal Tito. He negotiated with him the basic prin-
ciples of collaboration between the two factions, the national
liberation movement in the country and the Yugoslav govern-
ment outside. Tito made the concession of recognizing the
right of Subasic's government to represent the country abroad,
while the latter expressed its respect for Tito's committee to
administer the liberated territory.

Aware of the difficulties which he might encounter when
the question of international recognition of his future gov-
ernment would be posed, Tito met Subasic again in December,
1944, and signed a secret agreement with him which would
facilitate the transfer of power from the wartime institutions
to a regular government. According to this agreement a
Regents Council, subject to the approval of Tito's committee
and Subasic's government, was to be appointed by the King

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC 41

to represent him until he could return to the country. The
temporary government was to guarantee human and political
rights and to safeguard private property.

This was a prelude to negotiations with the Allies who
blessed the agreement and recommended its realization at Yalta,
in February, 1945. The King hesitated but also expressed his
consent after some pressure from the British Foreign Office.

In March, 1945, some Yugoslav politicians in exile returned
to liberated Belgrade. Headed by Subasic they joined Marshal
Tito, whose Committee of National Liberation was transformed
into a provisional government and AVNOJ into a Provisional
Parliament.

Today it is clear that Tito skillfully handled the Allied
governments and his Yugoslav partners in London in order
to prepare his way to exclusive power. In Yugoslavia the
democratic ministers were poHtically isolated and the country,
to all practical purposes, was run by Communists. The election
had given them victory and had prepared the way for the
declaration of the Communist repubUc.

Belgrade was flooded with flags and people on the great
day. Peasants from neighboring villages, wearing their national
costumes, were brought by special trucks to town, adding to
the solemnity of the moment a colorful gaiety. Every shop-
window was decorated and not a one was without pictures of
Tito and Stalin.

That evening the National Theater gave a festive perform-
ance of a Croat national play about Matija Gubec, an heroic
figure of the sixteenth century who raised the banner of the
peasants' revolt against the feudalistic oppressors. The analogy
was obvious. When the Gubec of the present time. Marshal
Tito, entered the theater, everybody stood up and the wild
applause and rhythmical shouts of "Tito, Tito, Tito," reverber-
ated throughout the hall. The sentiments of the official au-
dience consisting of all the ministers, officers of the army,
high officials, and party functionaries, were turned into an
ecstasy of fanaticism. Whenever Gubec on the stage spoke

42 TITO'S COMMUNISM

about the struggle for freedom, the performance was inter-
rupted by a new wave of applause addressed to the Gubec in
the box.

The diplomatic missions were present. After the perform-
ance, with half an hour's notice, they were informed that the
newly elected Parliament would meet at midnight to consider
a matter of special importance.

Thirty minutes after midnight, on November 29, 1945,
exactly two years after the session of Jajce, the President of
the Provisional Parliament opened the session. He was Dr.
Ivan Ribar. People who remembered the old days of royal
Yugoslavia could not dissociate this picture from another session
of the Yugoslav Constituent Assembly, twenty-five years ago,
when the same man solemnly took the oath of allegiance to
the Karadjordjevic dynasty and defended vigorously its hered-
itary rights to the throne against the Communist members
of Parliament.

According to the rules of procedure, the chairmanship was
handed over to the oldest member of the lower House, Babic.
He was a martial-looking man of eighty, with a typical Serbian
white mustache, dressed in a colorful national costume. Cer-
tainly a very impressive figure to lead the Parliament at such
an historical meeting. But just at the moment when I was
being impressed by this representative old man, a Yugoslav
whispered in my ear, "This Babic has been a member of many
royal Parliaments. Today, he presides over a session of re-
publicans. I am sure he will be the chairman again when the
monarchy is restored. He is a tough bird and he will live
another twenty years."

In the Council of Nationalities (a sort of Senate) another
octogenarian took up the chairmanship. He was the founder
and leader of the Republican party, J. Prodanovic, who had
been fighting for the idea of a Yugoslav republic for a quarter
of a century. This honest and respectable man must have been
deeply satisfied at that great midnight performance when his
lifelong struggle for a republic was crowned with success, even
though it was brought about by the Communists. Many demo-
crats were misled by the sight of Prodanovic, one of the finest
spirits of prewar Serbia and postwar royal Yugoslavia, serving

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC 43

now as one of the Deputy Prime Ministers and sitting next to
Marshal Tito. Later on, he saw for himself that he was nothing
but a tool in the Communists' hands. His activities were
Hmited to intercessions with the Minister of Interior on behalf
of his former friends who came into conflict with the secret
police. I used to see him from time to time in his villa and
he spoke to me frankly about the disappointment he had
experienced. He died in 1948.

The night session of the Parliament was devoted to proce-
dural matters and most of the time was devoted to an enthu-
siastic welcome to Marshal Tito. Everyone present, the gallery
included, stood up when he entered the hall and applauded
for endless minutes, shouting slogans. The chiefs of the
diplomatic missions were in the diplomatic boxes. The Soviet
Ambassador took the lead in a completely unusual pro-
cedure by joining in the applause. The western ambassadors
stood up, watching this spectacle emotionlessly. All Slav dip-
lomats followed the path of their Soviet leader. I abstained,
but on the following day I was told that it had not passed
unnoticed. This extraordinary habit of the galleries to applaud
with the House became quite a political aflFair and the satellite
diplomats enthusiastically joined in whenever attacks against
the reactionary or western imperiaUsts were "on the agenda."

I issued instructions to the members of my Embassy that
they might applaud when Marshal Tito appeared in the House
but not during the discussion. The counselor of the Embassy,
who was a Communist and was attached to my office to watch
my activities, resented my ruling very strongly and reported
it to Prague. But I silenced him and later succeeded in get-
ting him to leave the Embassy service after I discovered that
he inherited "the old bourgeois custom" of smuggling money
illegally out of the country and of trading on the black market.

The celebrations reached their peak on November 29. From
the early hours of the morning groups of young people marched
through the streets of the capital singing revolutionary songs
and dancing the national dance Kolo. In the afternoon, the
Parliament met to declare the birth of the republic. To give
to the proceedings a cynical political flavor it was arranged

44 TITO'S COMMUNISM

that the Serbian members, representing the traditionally mo-
narchic nation, would present a draft of a declaration which
blamed the Karadjordjevic dynasty for all the misfortunes
through which the Yugoslav nation had passed. It attacked
King Peter for having fled when the country was occupied by
the enemy during the war, leaving the nation to its fate.

On the basis of this, and in agreement with the "freely
expressed will" of all the nations of Yugoslavia, the Constituent
Assembly decided: "(1) 'The Democratic Federative Yugo-
slavia' " (as the country's official and provisional title had
been so far) "is proclaimed under the name 'The Federal Peo-
ple's Repubhc of Yugoslavia' .... (2) by this decision the
monarchy in Yugoslavia is definitely abrogated, and Peter the
Second, Karadjordjevic, with the whole dynasty of Karad-
jordjevic, is deprived of all rights which he and the dynasty
of Karadjordjevic had."

King Peter the Second was in London on that day when
he was deprived of his prerogatives and citizen's rights. He
issued a declaration in which he labeled Tito's government as
a tyranny and promised to continue to defend the interests
of his country. But he was far away from his nation while
his opponents were in the center of the scene and had the reins
of power firmly in their hands.

Oddly enough, however, there was a Karadjordjevic in
Belgrade who declared himself a republican and gave full sup-
port to Tito. He was Peter's uncle, Prince George. He was
the oldest son of King Peter the Liberator, and as such, an
hereditary prince and the pretender to the throne. His story
is still veiled in secrecy. King Peter thought that his first son,
who had a weak mind, had no qualities of a ruler and had
confined him to a castle with no contact with the outside world
for some twenty-five years. If the Partisans brought liberty
to anyone, it was certainly to Prince George. He was allotted
a house and even a car and given full freedom to circulate in
the streets of Belgrade. Fishermen saw him almost every day
on the banks of the Sava River, and I beUeve he still continues
to live harmlessly as a loyal republican.

I thought that the ovations which took place in the Par-
liament the previous night could not possibly be exceeded. I was

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC 45

wrong. What I witnessed on the occasion of the reading of
the dethronizatioii act and the bill of the republic was some-
thing of a dehrium of enthusiasm and devotion to Marshal
Tito which reminded me of a medieval religious frenzy. Marshal
Tito was acclaimed again and again, all the members of Par-
liament jumping to their feet repeatedly. The slogan "Tito-
Republic" was chanted with fanatical adoration which, ac-
companied with a rhythmical clapping, gave an impression
that those present were in an hysterical trance. Marshal Tito
had to calm the masses.

Then prominent speakers, representing each of the six fed-
eral republics, took the floor and pledged wholehearted sup-
port to the draft declaration of their Serbian colleagues. Each
speech was convincingly approved by protracted applause.
Finally, first by acclamation and then by individual signatures,
the Parliament approved the draft.

The same scene developed in the Council of Nationalities.
Then both Houses met in a common session and the chairman
announced, to no one's surprise, that the "Declaration of the
Republic" was accepted by unanimous vote. The celebration
culminated in the singing of the national anthem "Hail, Slavs."

The proceedings were transmitted over all Yugoslav radio
stations and the new republic was greeted in all larger garrisons
by artillery salvos. This was a sign for general rejoicing. Dark-
ness was slowly covering Belgrade when fireworks started. The
illuminations lighted the faces of the young dancers and their
picturesque groups. The night offered a calming balm to older
people, most of whom felt that their world and hopes had
gone, perhaps forever.

The official circles continued to celebrate the occasion in
the evening in the former royal palace, which was now the
residence of Marshal Tito. He was the host to some five hundred
guests: diplomats, politicians, and men of arts. The United
States Ambassador, Richard Patterson, Jr., and the British
Ambassador, Sir Ralph Stevenson, told me they considered the
Yugoslav government's decision as rather inconsiderate. I spoke
also at some length with my prewar friend, Dragoljub Jova-
novic, who was one of the members of the newly elected Par-
liament. He dropped the first words of doubt. "I am certainly

46 TITO'S COMMUNISM

glad that we have a republic," he told me, "but I am very
much worried that the leaders will lose their heads and think
that everything has been won. You saw the scenes in the Par-
liament this afternoon. It was, in fact, a very sad show. These
people will not fulfill their duties as legislators. They will just
follow the government's orders. As far as I am concerned, I
am not ready to approve of anything bHndly and I shall go
into open opposition if I find that they only want to make us
tools of the Communist party."

Tito felt that some opposition would appear within the
ranks of the National Front and declared in an interview for
the London Times that he was sure "that opposition would
come from some parties which form the National Front . . .,"
and that, though "the country needs the unity of the National
Front in basic questions, it does not mean that we expect an
automatic agreement and unanimity of all its members." But
this declaration was made for the consumption of the West,
the economic aid of which was very much needed. In No-
vember, 1945, subtle tactics were still required. D. Jovanovic
was true to his words and in 1947 went into open opposition.
But not for long, for he was accused of high treason and
put in jail.

The cornerstone of the repubHc having been laid, the next
step to be taken was to give the country a new constitution.
The text was drafted by the government, published, and all
organizations and individuals were invited to discuss it and
send amendments to Belgrade. This procedure must have im-
pressed everybody as very democratic.

I read the Constitution with great care and found it was
a perfect law providing for all the ideals for which mankind,
and the Yugoslav nation in particular, have been striving for
centuries. I still felt that here was a chance to build up a
state which could lead all the Balkan countries and serve as
an example to show how many intricate problems of this
harassed part of Europe could be solved to the satisfaction of
all concerned.

These are the principles of the new Constitution, which

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC 47

was adopted on January 31, 1946: The Federal People's Re-
public of Yugoslavia is a community of nations with equal
rights in which all powers come from and belong to the people
who elect their organs on the basis of a general, equal, direct,
and secret ballot. Every act of the state authorities must be
based on law. National minorities enjoy the right of a free
cultural development. Private property and enterprise are
guaranteed and can be Umited only by law. The land belongs
to those who cultivate it. The state defends and helps especially
the poor and middle peasant. All human and poUtical rights
are guaranteed. All citizens are equal. The state especially
protects the interests of mothers and children. The freedom
of conscience and religion are guaranteed; marriage and family
enjoy the protection of the state; the freedom of expression and
personal integrity are guaranteed. Nobody can be imprisoned
for more than three days without a judge's intervention. The
integrity of the home and the secrecy of letters are guaranteed.
The tribunals are independent. There is universal military serv-
ice. The freedom of scientific and cultural work is guaranteed.

The forefathers of the United States could not have ob-
jected to any article of this part of the Yugoslav Constitution,
wherein the authors strictly respected all the rules of political
and human freedom.

The second part of the Constitution frames the establish-
ment and the organization of the country's public organs. It
enumerates the central organs of the Yugoslav federation and
fixes their powers. These include matters of national interest.
All other public activities are left to the organs of the individual
republics.

The People's Assembly (Narodna Skupstina) of the Fed-
eral People's Republic of Yugoslavia is the supreme representa-
tive body of the country's sovereignty with the exclusive rights
of legislation. It is composed of two Houses, the Federal
Council and the Council of Nationalities. In the first House
every 50,000 voters^ are represented by one member; in the
second House, individual republics and autonomous regions
are represented, each republic by thirty, each autonomous

^An electoral reform of January, 19 50, reduced this number to 40,000.

48 TITO'S COMMUNISM

province by twenty, and each autonomous region by fifteen
representatives. Both Houses are equal and their term of service
is four years. The members of the ParHament enjoy the right
of immunity.

The central executive body is the government appointed
by the People's Assembly, to which it is also responsible for
its activities. There are two kinds of federal ministries, those
which administer the country in a central capacity, as the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Foreign Trade, and
those which act through the corresponding organs of the re-
pubUcs. These repubHcs have their own local ParUaments,
consisting of one House only, and their governments. Similarly,
the autonomous regions have their legislative and executive
bodies as well. Villages, towns, and districts are administered
by National Committees. All legislative organs and the National
Committees are elected. The tribunals are separated from the
executive. They are appointed by the legislature. Public attor-
neys see that the laws are respected.

These are the principal provisions of the new Constitution.
They are certainly democratic and should have opened broad
avenues to a fair and just rule of the country.

ONE COUNTRY — MULTIPLE
NATIONALITIES

The Constitution: The Federal People's Republic of Yugo-
slavia is a federal people's state, republican in form, a com-
munity of people, equal in rights who, on the basis of the
right to self-determination, including the right of separa-
tion, have expressed their will to live together in a federative
state. (Article 1)

The Yugoslav Constitution opens with the solemn
declaration of equality among the nations assembled in the
Yugoslav republic. It follows the Soviet example and pursues
the idea of self-determination to the point that any Yugoslav
nation is given the right to leave the community of Yugoslavia
and, acting according to its wish, declare its independence or
join a neighboring country.

It is a matter of opinion to what extent a country like
Yugoslavia, composed of different but still very closely linked
nations, should be federalized. The Yugoslavs have never

50 TITO'S COMMUNISM

agreed on this question and endless struggles among political
parties have been going on for long and exhausting years,
weakening the structure of the state and finally leading to its
breakdown, on the day of the German attack in April, 1941.

History and historical reminiscences are not the purpose
of this book. But to understand the present position of Marshal
Tito and to be able to pronounce judgment about the vitality
of the solution as offered by his government, one has to be
aware of the complexity of the problem of nationality as it
has developed throughout history.

Since the Middle Ages, the South Slavs of Europe have
lived separately and under different foreign domination. The
Serbs began to regain their independence in 1804, wresting it
from the oppressive rule of the Turks. The Croats and
Slovenes were subjugated by the Austro-Hungarian Empire
until 1918. Centuries of separate development and their dif-
ferent geographical positions have impressed upon them
different national characteristics.

The Serbs are members of the Serbian Orthodox church,
yet are not deeply religious. The Croats and Slovenes are
devoted Catholics. The Serbs write in the Cyrillic alphabet,
the Slovenes in the Latin alphabet. While the Croat and Serbian
languages can be considered practically the same, with the
exception of the alphabet, the Slovenes have a language of their
own. The Slovenes understand Serbian, because in prewar
Yugoslavia they were obliged to learn it in school, but the
Serbs would not ordinarily be able to speak with a Slovene
or read Slovenian.

The temperament of the people in the different states is
also different. The Serbs lived under the influence of the
Orthodox Orient and fought for their independence for cen-
turies in costly battles against the Turks, Hungarians, Germans,
Bulgarians, and Austrians. They hold freedom and independence
in high esteem. The Serbian peasant is in substance very
democratic, yet authoritative within the circle of his own
family, which is the product of a long tradition of the patri-
archal system. He was raised in the democratic unity of the
village against the Turkish oppressor.

Having gained their national independence a hundred and

MULTIPLE NATIONALITIES 51

fifty years ago, the Serbs have developed a healthy apprecia-
tion of their own state and have, therefore, a good sense for
a positive, creative policy. On the other side, they tend to have
a domineering spirit and press their own poHcy upon other
people. The methods of their public activities have been in-
fluenced by their previous oriental poHtical associations. The
degree of their culture and civiHzation left them behind their
western brothers.

The Croats, and especially the Slovenes, have grown up in
close association with western habits and culture. They are
industrious, considerate, and their material standards are higher;
those of the Slovenes remarkably high. Under German-
Austrian and Hungarian domination, they employed methods
of passive resistance, in the form of opposition and abstention
in the Parliaments in Vienna and Budapest, to gain their ends.
After 1918 they were faced with problems arising out of self-
rule which could not be satisfactorily solved by the same
methods as those used against a foreign rule.

Though closely linked together by common blood and
ideals, the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes are distinctly different
nations. History divided them in temperament, religion and
culture, in material standards, and in the approach to daily life.

World War I brought the Yugoslav nations together. The
twenty-three years of independence which followed, however,
were not sufficient to erase all their differences or to unite them
fully in support of a common state. Many Serbian politicians,
supported by the Serbian national dynasty of Karadjordjevic,
continued to live and act according to the old pan-Serbian
ideology. In the nineteenth century the aim of the government
had been unity of all Serbs; now, in an independent Yugo-
slavia, it tried to establish Serbian rule over the other merriber
nations.

The Croat representatives adhered to the out-moded methods
of separatism. In this they disclosed a serious lack of states-
manship, which required a new, positive approach toward the
problem of relations between the Yugoslav nations. They
were in a constant state of preparedness, as if Yugoslavia were
not their own state, but was a power to be feared.

The Slovenes constantly quarrelled among themselves. They

52 TITO'S COMMUNISM

could not agree about the basic concepts of life, some holding
to the narrowly religious view, others taking a broader, more
liberal attitude. In questions of Yugoslav interests as a whole
they were often induced to advance a third position which
benefited from the differences arising between the Serbs and
the Croats.

Thus, the old religious and cultural problems of the Serb
and Croat nations became, after the founding of Yugoslavia
in 1918, the most pressing problem of the new Yugoslav state.
They even threatened the existence of the state itself. The
Serbs were unwilling to solve them by reasonable concessions;
the Croats were uncompromising in their struggle to estabHsh an
autonomous Croatia. The leading party in this struggle, the
Croatian Peasant party, led first by Stephan Radic and later
by Vlatko Macek, had the support of practically the entire
Croat nation. The dictatorship of King Alexander, introduced
in 1929, did not ease the situation. The Croatian Peasant
party established de facto a Croatian state within the Yugoslav
state, defying loyalty to the public authorities.

In August, 1937, the half -recognized democratic Serbian
parties in opposition reached an understanding with Macek.
This should have opened broad avenues to cooperation and
understanding. But as this was an agreement between oppo-
sition parties it never became a reality, though undoubtedly
it represented the wish of the majority of the Yugoslav popu-
lation.

In the spring of 1939, the shrewd politician Dragisa
Cvetkovic, under the pressure of a critical international situa-
tion, managed to sign an agreement with Macek who even
joined the newly formed government. But it proved to be
too late. The first stroke from aggressive Germany broke down
the country in April, 1941. Many Croats followed, not un-
willingly, the orders of Hitler and founded their own state,
Independent Croatia, under the leadership of the traitor Ante
Pavelic, who had been for many years in the service of the
Italian Fascists and German Nazis.

MULTIPLE NATIONALITIES 53

The Partisans of Marshal Tito raised the slogan "Brother-
hood and unity" against the Croat Ustase, who wiped out
thousands of Serbian famiHes, and against the nationalistic and
passionate resentments of the Serbs. These two words expressed
the political program of equaUty of nations in a new Yugo-
slavia. They certainly appealed to everybody whose political
judgment was not overshadowed by momentous sentiments.

Some adversaries accused Tito, because he was a Croat,
of basing his movement on the Croat nation. But they were
wrong. Tito defended himself against this accusation by prov-
ing that the Partisan movement started in Serbia. Also, he
proved that after the attacks of Mihajlovic forced his with-
drawal from Serbia and Montenegro to Bosnia and Dalmatia
the majority of the officers and soldiers who took part in the
withdrawal were Serbians and Montenegrins. Only after the col-
lapse of Italy in 1943, did the Croatian miHtia and other Croats
join the Partisan Army in large numbers. This brought a change
in the numerical relations of the nationalities in Tito's Army.

It was certainly to Tito's credit that he succeeded in saving
Yugoslavia as a federated state. Who knows whether this
would have been achieved had other political parties had the
responsibility of administering the country, which had been
so deeply involved in a fratricidal war. Among the political
parties which formed the Yugoslav government in exile, there
was no common program for solving the problem of nationalities.

"Brotherhood and unity" was, therefore, a good and profit-
able slogan. Under Tito the country was divided into six federal
states: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Monte-
negro, and Macedonia. Two autonomous regions, Kosovo-Meto-
hija and Vojvodina, were created within Serbia. This division
.was met with strong objections from the Serbs. While wilHng
to recognize the national individuality of the Croats and Slo-
venes, they could not accept the idea of a separate Montenegrin
nation. The Montenegrins proudly called themselves Serbs,
and even today it would be difficult to find people of the
older generations who would say they are Montenegrin. Only
young Communists accept and propagate the theory of a
Montenegrin nation.

54 TITO'S COMMUNISM

The same applies, to some extent, to the Macedonian
nation. Macedonia has been, in modern history, more or less,
a geographical expression. People who were natives of this
part of the Balkan Peninsula Hved in old Serbia, or Yugo-
slavia, in Greece, and in Bulgaria. Many of them spoke the
local language, sometimes called Macedonian. They lived on
the crossroad of many foreign interests and were successively
exposed to Turkish, Greek, Serbian, and Bulgarian pressure.

After World War I, some of the Macedonian minority rep-
resentatives in Yugoslavia proposed the idea of joining Bul-
garia, and some of those who lived in Bulgaria or Greece wanted
to join one of the other two neighbors. The separatist move-
ment in every part of Macedonia, whether Yugoslav, Bulgarian,
or Greek, was strong, but it had no common program.

Many people in Macedonia, therefore, consider themselves
either Bulgarians or Serbs. The latter, whether in Macedonia
or elsewhere, strongly resent the creation of the Macedonian
federal state as a separate unit, claiming they liberated the South
Serbs from the Turkish yoke in the bloody Balkan war of 1912.

Macedonia had never had a literary language but one is now
being propagated under the government of the Communists.
There is only a small local intelligentsia, so teachers from other
parts of Yugoslavia have to teach in the national Macedonian
schools and at the newly founded Macedonian University.

The founding of a federal Macedonian state has actually
become a hindrance to Tito's republic. Recently the Comin-
form found in the eternal Macedonian problem a fine oppor-
tunity for subversive activity against the Yugoslav Communist
government. The Cominform has started to foment a sepa-
ratist movement in the Yugoslav part of Macedonia and to
spread propaganda for joining Bulgarian Macedonia in order
to create an independent Macedonia aimed against Tito's Yugo-
slavia.

The Serbs also object to the formation of the autonomous
regions of Vojvodina and Kosovo-Metohija. They claim that
Tito, who is a Croat, by decreeing special Montenegrin and
Macedonian nations and by creating federal or autonomous
units in regions inhabited mainly by Serbs, wants to break up
the Serbian nation and weaken its resistance to communism.

MULTIPLE NATIONALITIES 55

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the inhabitants are Serbs or Croats
by origin. Piistory has divided them according to reHgious
faith into Mussulmans, Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats.
There are even exceptional cases of Catholic Serbs and Ortho-
dox Croats. In order to avoid the dispute as to whether Bosnia-
Herzegovina should form a part of Serbia or Croatia or should
be divided between the two, Tito founded a separate federal
republic. This was probably the correct solution, justified his-
torically by the fact that the country had been annexed by
the Austro- Hungarian Empire in 1908 and administered
separately from either Serbia or Croatia.

It would be almost impossible even for a well-trained
scholar equipped with all the historical, linguistic, religious, and
sociological background to offer a solution which should be the
basis of a federation of a country in which history has created
such a labyrinth of ideas. The problem of national individuality,
being a question of feehngs and sentiments, is bound to remain
a serious political controversy in Yugoslavia for many years to
come. The question now is what progress has the government
of Marshal Tito made toward solving this intricate problem.

As far as the Serbo-Croat problem is concerned, the Consti-
tution gave the Croat nation full satisfaction by establishing a
federal state. All the Yugoslav nations were granted equaUty
of rights. There are no laws in Yugoslavia which make any
national discrimination.

It is a fact that people are called upon to take up positions,
not according to their nationality, but according to their nat-
ural inclinations and qualifications. Thus, one finds many
Montenegrins among army officers, because the Partisan move-
ment in Montenegro started very early after Yugoslavia was
invaded, and the Montenegrins distinguished themselves . by
courage and attained high rank in the Yugoslav Army of Libera-
tion. In the field of economics there are a considerable number
of Slovenes, because they are better in business and adminis-
tration than other Yugoslavs. In both cases, the number of
Montenegrin officers and Slovenian economists is in great dis-
proportion to their nations' numerical strength.

In practice, the rights and duties of everyone are measured
only by the form and scope of his utility to the regime. If one

56 TITO'S COMMUNISM

comes into conflict with the Communist order, its laws or policy,
then it matters little whether he is a Slovene, a Croat, or Serb.
In this sense, at least, all are equal in the eyes of the government.

But if there is no national discrimination, there is a discrimi-
nation based on political affiliation. The nation is now divided
into two categories: the ruHng Communists and the rest of the
nation, or 97 per cent of the population. If anyone attains
membership in the Communist party, he is considered reliable,
regardless of his nationality. Thus, political reliabiHty has be-
come a mark of division in Communist Yugoslavia.

But the Serbo-Croat problem has not been solved. The
present Yugoslav leaders like to say, "The problem was solved
in time of war. The nations of Yugoslavia fought side by
side against the common external and internal enemy. Their
'unity and brotherhood' is not only a slogan but it is a reality
which was forged in the trenches and sealed by common
blood. The old prejudices have disappeared and people have
learned to think in a different way. The problem does not
exist any more and nobody mentions it."

"Nobody mentions it," is correct. No newspaper will print
a single word about the Serbo-Croat problem and no politi-
cian will speak about it publicly. The program of unity and
brotherhood is practiced in a way which even in the old days
would have been considered proof of Serbian hegemony. Sol-
diers are sent to serve in units regardless of their nationality.
Serbian and Montenegrin officers are stationed in Croatia;
Slovenes are in high posts in Belgrade; Yugoslav youth, coming
from all parts of the country, are beating the path of unity
and brotherhood by common work on public constructions.

There is reason to believe, however, that the Serbo-Croat
problem still exists in all its fatality and tragedy and probably
in a measure which surpasses what was known in prewar times.
It has ceased to be a question of power politics or a dispute be-
tween political parties, but it has grown to a national estrange-
ment of serious dimensions.

There are still many Serbian families who remember the
mass murder of tens of thousands of Serbs committed by the
Croatian Ustase. There are many Croats who throw the same
accusation against the Serbs, alleging that the Serbian Cetnici

MULTIPLE NATIONALITIES 57

of Draia Mihajlovid killed masses of innocent Croats. The
heritage of the civil war still hangs heavily over the relations
between the two nations. People do not speak about it, be-
cause their minds are concentrated on problems of their daily
life. What used to be a matter of passionate discussions seems
to be buried by worries for daily bread. But it does not mean
that the problem has been solved or forgotten.

Meanwhile, another phenomenon of a dangerous nature
is gaining ground. There are politically-minded people in every
part of Yugoslavia, who are seriously beginning to be con-
vinced that the founding of the Yugoslav state thirty years
ago was a fatal error.

I have met Serbs whom I know as sensible people who have
told me that the continuation of Yugoslavia is out of the
question when Hberation comes. They say, "The Croats were
convinced, by the very creation of Yugoslavia, that we op-
pressed them. It may be true. Well, let them go wherever they
want. Old Serbia was a good country. We had several tra-
ditional political parties; we had good, rather progressive laws
and a Serbian national dynasty. We had had the experience
of running our own state for more than a hundred years.

"But for twenty years, after the First World War, we
went downhill because of constant diflficulties with the Croats.
During the Second World War the Croats massacred so many
of our people that there are streams of Serbian blood flowing
between Serbia and Croatia. We cannot and we shall not
forget it.

"Now, in new Yugoslavia, the Serbian element is being
constantly weakened. The Croatian Communists threw our
lads into the last offensive against the Germans to have them
killed by the thousands.

"Tito, as a Croat, is trying to disintegrate the Serbian
nation by artificially creating Montenegrin and Macedonian
nations; by giving special autonomous status to the Serbian
regions of Vojvodina and Kosovo; by compelling the Orthodox
church to found a special, independent Macedonian Orthodox
church; and by doing the same in Montenegro, though the
Serbian Orthodox church's jurisdiction was for centuries ex-
tended over all these regions.

58 TITO'S COMMUNISM

"Wliy didn't he give an autonomous status to the vast
regions of Dalmatia and Slavonia, which would be more justified
historically? Because, while weakening the Serbian element, he
wants to strengthen the Croatian rule. We have paid heavily
for twenty years of association with the Croats. There is no
sense in the constant dispute as to who is better oflf in Yugo-
slavia, the Serbs or the Croats. We have become strange to
each other. It will be to our benefit, and perhaps to the Croats'
as well, if we separate after communism is overthrown. "We
prospered in old Serbia and we shall prosper again."

These ideas were heard frequently in Belgrade and they did
not come only from people of the older generation who were
inclined to overestimate and oversimphf y Serbian self-sufficiency.
They came also from young Serbian students.

Similar words were uttered in Croatia. People would tell
me, "Look at the Serbs. They have in their hands the police,
organized by the Serb Rankovic; Djilas governs the whole
field of culture, and Popovic the army. Here in Croatia, many
Serbs joined the Partisans and as such have returned to important
jobs in the administration, in the police, in the factories,
bossing us again. It is the old story in a red edition. The
Ceinici killed thousands of our people. We do not need the
Serbs. We have been living in this space for a thousand years,
and though the independent Croatia during the war was a Ger-
man and Fascist creation, it left its traces among the people
who feel we can succeed as a state of our own. It will be
much better to separate from the Serbs when Tito's regime
falls."

I had no occasion to speak about the same subject with the
Slovenes, but I have heard that some of them have a non-
Yugoslav conception of their national future and would prefer
to join some kind of a Central European federation which they
expect to be founded when freedom returns to that part of
the world.

These thoughts reveal the seriousness of the situation in
Yugoslavia. They prove that the idea of a united Yugoslavia
is far from being deeply rooted in the minds and hearts of
the Yugoslav people and that the Serbo-Croat problem still
exists in full strength.

MULTIPLE NATIONALITIES 59

There is no unity among the Yugoslav leaders living in
exile, and marked tendencies even of separatism are appearing
among them. These separatist incHnations are only strengthened
by popular support for the idea of a future federalization of
Europe. Some of the political exiles, however, attach a some-
what pecuhar and dangerous interpretation to the plan of
European federation as if it meant inviting every nation to
break with its old associations and enter the future common-
wealth of European countries as an independent, national en-
tity. This is a trend of mind which involves grave dangers
for the future consoHdation and peace of Europe.

Not only Tito's Yugoslavia but all Communist countries
proudly claim to have succeeded in solving the problem of
nationahties and minorities. They point to the example of the
Soviet Union, asserting that some 150 Soviet nations Hve peace-
fully together. They criticize the democratic governments of
the West, saying they have been unable to find a satisfactory and
just solution to their countries' nationaUty problems.

By giving equaHty to all the minorities in their countries,
the Communists claim before the world that only their sys-
tem is able to pacify the nations. Overnight, according to
them, the Serbo-Croat problem in Yugoslavia is no more; the
Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Serbian minorities Hve happily in
Rumania; the same applies to the Greek minority in Bulgaria,
to the Slovaks and Yugoslavs in Hungary, and the Hungarians
in Czechoslovakia. One single order was suflScient to brush
aside problems which have worried generations. The explana-
tion for this seemingly great accomplishment is simple: The
Communist party has become a common denominator and a
practice has been estabHshed whereby what is not mentioned
does not exist.

There have been numerous national minorities in Yugoslavia.
The strongest, the German, was liquidated during the war.
They numbered some 700,000 people. A number of them
were killed in fighting and the bulk of them fled with the
retreating Germans, fearing the revengeful sentiments of the
Yugoslav nation. The rest of them, some 80,000 who did not

60 TITO'S COMMUNISM

succeed in escaping, were confined to camps where many of
them died from hunger and severe cold. Out of some 500,000
Hungarians who lived in Yugoslavia before the war 200,000
left for Hungary, and according to Tito's explanation given to
me, "those who stayed behind were small peasants and the
working proletariat who were on the whole loyal to Yugo-
slavia."

There are some 500,000 Rumanians living along the eastern
border of Yugoslavia, 140,000 Czechs and Slovaks, and an
unspecified number of Bulgarians, Albanians, Greeks, and
Turks. They are all Yugoslav citizens. The territorial gains
on the western border brought to Yugoslavia Italians, the
number of whom has not yet been ofl&cially given.

Before the war, the royal Yugoslav governments treated
the minorities harshly. The Hungarian and German minori-
ties, however, displayed a complete lack of loyalty to the
country and when Yugoslavia was attacked they proved to be
treacherous Fifth Columnists.

The new Yugoslavia of Marshal Tito offered the rights of
national equality to all minorities, and in Article 13 of the
Constitution confirmed "the right and defense of their cultural
development and free use of their language." They enjoy
their own schools and theaters; they have their own newspapers;
their representatives sit in the Parliament, and their members
take active part in public administration.

But a simple glance into the situation would show that
the national minorities are given freedom only to serve Com-
munist aims. Children are taught in Hungarian, Czech, or
any other minority language only the things which are in
accordance with the Communist ideology; theaters have to
follow the directives coming from Communist quarters; their
newspapers merely echo the Communist daily Borha; their
politicians give full support to the Politburo; civil servants
must produce evidence of their political reliability. Commun-
ist ideology is the final aim. If you are willing to serve it,
you can use whatever language you choose.

To what extent the minorities in Yugoslavia welcome the
new Communist regime has been convincingly shown by a
widespread desire among them to return to their motherlands.

MULTIPLE NATIONALITIES 61

As Yugoslavia was the first country with a Communist gov-
ernment, her minorities were suddenly obsessed by a desire
to return home. Not only was their sincere love for the mother-
land revived, as often happens in periods of trial and revolu-
tions, but they felt that they could save themselves from the
cruelties of communism by returning to a country which had
not yet succumbed.

When, however, all Central European countries were com-
munized, the enthusiasm of the national minorities in Yugo-
slavia to return to their native land disappeared. They felt
that they would have to expect the same fate of proletarization
in their motherlands as well.

The conflict between Tito's Yugoslavia and the other coun-
tries of the Soviet bloc have put the national minorities in all
these states in a deUcate and compHcated position. Every
country claims that its minority inhabitants have remained
faithful to it; the Hungarians, Bulgarians, Czechoslovaks, and
Rumanians in Yugoslavia to Marshal Tito; the Serbs and Croats
living in Hungary and Rumania, to the anti-Tito governments
in Budapest and Bucharest, and so on. Both camps accuse each
other of oppression of national minorities.

The Cominform countries try to use the minorities in Yugo-
slavia for subversive actions against Tito's government, and
the latter tries to spread Titoism in other countries through
the Yugoslavs living abroad.

All this would be an amusing spectacle of inconsistencies in
Communist politics if it were not tragic for the people con-
cerned, for they do not know any more to whom they belong.

THE PARTY AND ITS LEADERS

The activities of every public institution, the work
in factories and oflfices, and the life of every private individual
are controlled by the Communist party of Yugoslavia. It is
the party, which, in fact, prepares laws, instructs the ministers
how to act, determines the sentences of courts, directs and
controls the economic process, conducts culture and the arts,
rewards and punishes, promotes and demotes. The party has
members in public administration, the army, courts, oj0&ces, and
factories. It is a homogeneous body made up of people with
uniform ideas based on the same school of thought and action,
subordinated to an iron discipline and sovereignly governed
by the Central Committee of the party headed by the all-pow-
erful nine members of the PoHtburo.

The history of the Yugoslav Communist party is still not
fully known. The archives of the secret poUce of the old royal

THE PARTY AND ITS LEADERS 63

Yugoslav governments could disclose many details, but those
would not be sources of impartial information. Tito himself
gave a nine-hour expose at the Fifth Congress of the party, in
July, 1948, about the development of the Socialist and Commu-
nist movements in Yugoslavia. But he should not be blamed
if his description was neither full nor always corresponded with
the facts.

The Communist party of Yugoslavia was founded in April,
1919. As all other Communist parties in most eastern Euro-
pean countries, it was in opposition not only to the legitimate
government but to the existence of the state itself. At its
Second Congress, in 1920, it declared itself for the struggle
for a Soviet RepubHc of Yugoslavia. It was a strong party.
In the election of the same year, it gained fifty-four seats
in the Constituent Assembly. Some poHtical writers claim that
it obtained many votes not only among the working class and
intellectuals, but also among the separatist elements of Mace-
donia, the irredentists of the Hungarian and defeated German
minorities in Yugoslavia, which were all united with the Com-
munists by a common hatred of the existence of newly created
Yugoslavia. The party was dissolved in 1921, after the Com-
munists were blamed for an attempt upon the Ufe of King
Alexander.

A period of illegality and hardship began. It lasted no
less than twenty-five years. The local organizations were dis-
banded, the leaders arrested. The ranks of the party thinned
out and underwent, as have all Communist parties, a process
of tumult and change as ordered by the Moscovite Third
Communist International. Leaders were accused of factionary
opportunism and deviation and teams were liquidated accord-
ing to the Moscow needs of the moment. Some party con-
gresses were held in Vienna (at that time the Central European
center of Bolshevik subversive activities), in Prague, and in
Dresden; others were held secretly on Yugoslav soil. The lead-
ing agitators were in hiding, first in Yugoslavia, then in Aus-
tria or Czechoslovakia, and from time to time they passed
through severe examination and schooling in Moscow.

In 1930 and 1931, as Tito puts it, "The life of the party in
the country ceased to exist." Then a period of underground

64 TITO'S COMMUNISM

activities, limited to a few industrial centers only, followed.
In 1937, the leader, Gorkic, was liquidated and it was at this
time that the hitherto unknown Josip Broz Tito was ordered
by Moscow to take over the function of the Secretary-General
of the party and to get rid of all members of the PoUtburo and
form a new leadership.

These were years of hardship for the adherents of the
Communist party of Yugoslavia. Only a fanatical beUef in
the Communist ideology, courage, and self-imposed discipUne
could have helped to overcome so many obstacles. According to
some sources, the party had, before the outbreak of war, only
4,000 organized members whose names were kept in strict
secrecy.

Almost all Communist leaders had had long experience in
Yugoslav prisons. Tito was imprisoned for five years. Ran-
kovic for eight, Mosa Pijade for twelve, Djilas for five, and
Hebrang (now in disgrace, again in prison, and perhaps
liquidated) for twelve years.

World "War II was a signal for the Yugoslav Communists
to begin an aggressive and open struggle for their ideology.
Up to June 22, 1941, when the German Army attacked the
motherland of communism, Russia, they systematically under-
mined the morale of the Yugoslav nation, declaring the struggle
of democratic Europe for survival was an imperialistic war
with which the nations of Europe had nothing in common.
They did not take part in the national uprising of the Serbian
people on the historical day of March 27, 1941, when the pro-
German government was disposed of and the national govern-
ment of Dusan Simovic took over. (Only later, in 1946, they
began to claim to be the leaders of the March events.)

But on the day of the German attack on Russia the Yugo-
slav Communists, in accord with their comrades all over the
world, found that the imperialistic war had suddenly changed
into "a struggle for national existence and the liberation of
nations, the defeat of nazism and the installation of democracy
and freedom."

The Yugoslav Communists reorganized their ranks, and
leaders returned from exile or from Moscow. Others were
freed from prisons or appeared after years of hiding. The

THE PARTY AND ITS LEADERS 65

party grew through fighting. It started to organize the Par-
tisan movement from beneath, beginning with small groups
of two or three Communists. The groups became army units,
and finally a regular army consisting of several hundred
thousand seasoned soldiers took part in the fighting under
the leadership of the Communist officers. Every unit was
under the control of Communist political commissars. Accord-
ing to official data, 91,000 people participated in the struggle
for national liberation in 1941, and the number grew until
in 1945 it had reached 793,000. Though the real figure of
Tito's Partisans was considerable there is every reason to believe
the official figure to be greatly exaggerated.

In the towns and villages which they liberated the Com-
munists at once organized the pubHc administration which
was entrusted to local National Committees. A Communist
secretary of the local community was actually in control of
the place.

Good Partisans who showed promising talents either in
fighting or political schooling were sent to special courses to
receive an ideological and military education.

Well-trained agitators were sent among the population,
behind the enemy lines. They penetrated systematically into
different institutions and succeeded in getting them under their
control, until finally there was not a single branch of political,
army, economic, and cultural life which was not infiltrated
by these relentless fighters for communism. All this was done
"on behalf of the nation," and the adherence to the Com-
munist party or the final aim of a Communist rule was never
mentioned. This was the first and one of the most important
points of the theory of Communist tactics which the young
agitators were repeatedly reminded to observe.

Whatever was the political issue and as inacceptable as
were the cruel and deplorable means through which the Com-
munist party liquidated its opponents, one thing does stand
out. That is the courage of these men who did not impose any
limits on self-sacrifice and risks of life. They followed one idea
and one aim only: communism and its total victory.

The discipline of the members of the Communist party
contained no uncertainty or doubt. It belonged to the basic

66 TITO'S COMMUNISM

principles of the Communist organization and of every Com-
munist. This discipline with its ruthlessness explains many
successes which the Communist parties have achieved in Europe.
It also accounts for their victories over democratic movements
which lacked adherents as fanatically devoted, vaUant, miUtant,
and disciplined.

I once met a Croat woman, a Communist, who told me
this: "I had a son who was a wonderful boy. He was a Com-
munist, too, and naturally, a Partisan. One evening he was
ordered to lead a small group of soldiers through the enemy
lines. He decided to go by another way which he considered
safer and quicker. But all of them were killed, with the
exception of my son. He returned to his unit alone. He knew
that a death sentence was awaiting him from the party tri-
bunal. He went to his commander to ask to be allowed to
express his last wish before the court pronounced the sentence.
Do you know what he asked for? He wished to be shot on
the spot by his best friend. The comrade did not hesitate to
meet the last wish of my son. When I met this friend after
the war, I thanked him for the last service he did to my boy."

Later, I found that innumerable tragedies of a similar nature
occurred when the iron law of Communist discipline was vio-
lated. A wife was shot because she returned to her comrade-
husband though she knew that married couples were not al-
lowed to serve in the same army units. A soldier met his death
before a firing squad because he took one slice of bread more
than was his right.

Minister Leskovsek and some other members of the present
Yugoslav government could give many examples from their
experiences when they found it necessary to punish the slightest
breach of discipline by death. They had executed the sentences
themselves and they liked to speak about them, looking upon
their military past with limitless pride and considering those
acts of discipline the highest virtues of a real Communist.

The organization of the Communist party, its status, high-
est officers and number of members were secrets until the summer
of 1948. Even after the war, the party remained a half illegal
and half secret institution. This fact served in the spring of
the same year as a good pretext for Moscow to attack the Com-

THE PARTY AND ITS LEADERS 67

munist party of Yugoslavia. It was because of this Cominform
accusation that the Minister of Interior and one of the main
party secretaries, Alexander Rankovic, gave the following fig-
ures about membership, at the Fifth Congress, in July, 1948:
The party entered the war with 12,000 members, out of which
only 3,000 survived. During the war and after, the number
rose to 141,066 and, on July 1, 1948, there were 468,175
members, 51,612 candidates, and 331,940 members of the
Yugoslav Communist youth organization called SKOJ. During
the war 50,000 members of the party and a much greater
number of SKOJ died.

Regarding the social division, Rankovic disclosed that 29.53
per cent of the party membership came from workers; 49.14
per cent from peasants; 14.38 per cent from intellectuals and
6.68 per cent from other classes. In the army, 89.8 per cent
of the ofl&cers were Communists and among the N.C.O., 70.4
per cent Communists. Out of all the officers there were only
4.1 per cent from the former Royal Army. Out of 524 mem-
bers of the Federal ParHament, 404 were organized Commu-
nists while out of 1,062 members of the local ParHaments of the
individual state republics, only 170 were not organized Com-
munists.

This was an enhghtening revelation and showed how mis-
leading had been the propaganda that claimed the Yugoslav
government and legislative institutions were representing an all-
National Front.

If one compares the building up of the Communist party
of Yugoslavia with other Communist parties one finds that,
while these were products of the secretariats and agitation
based mainly on class struggle, the Yugoslav party, as it stands
today, is a product of the fighting in the war. It is above all
a militant party, the ranks of which were steeled in the fire
of four years' Partisan fighting. It is a selective party and
membership means honor which brings not only responsibility
but many advantages, as well.

In Czechoslovakia, for instance, at the time when the Com-
munist party was competing with the democratic parties in
free elections, the party tried to gain members by all kinds
of pressure — bribery, promises, and denunciation of those who

68 TITO'S COMMUNISM

entered another party. Everybody was welcomed to the ranks
of the Czechoslovak Communists. The result is that the party
there is morally rotten. In Yugoslavia, it takes years before
anyone is accepted as a member and his poHtical reliabiUty must
be beyond any doubt. But once the door into this organiza-
tion is open to a thoroughly tested candidate, he enjoys the
privileges belonging to the selected class. He receives a better
salary, better clothing, better food, and a promising career
glitters before his ambitious eyes. The party realizes that the
existence of the Communist state depends on the iron backbone
of Communist members, and it is, therefore, its conviction that
those people with whom the Communist system stands and
falls are entitled to special treatment.

The leaders of the party live in a luxury of which no min-
ister of a democratic country could ever dream.

There is a district in Belgrade called Dedinje. It lies in
the hilly suburbs of the city, and it is practically the only place
with refreshing grass and trees in this dusty, greenless capital.
I believe there was not a single house in that part of the town
before World War I. After 1918, when the King started to
build his palace there, many Yugoslav ministers and nouveau-
riches constructed their villas in the vicinity. Dedinje became
an exclusive part of the town with handsome boulevards, a
beautiful park, and huge villas, many of them built in an ugly
combination of half western, half oriental style. The life of
political, high business, and financial circles was ornamented
with officers of the Royal Guards, the good-looking virile
Serbians. An atmosphere of gaiety prevailed there as among
all well-to-do families of a bourgeois monarchy.

Dedinje was the only place where one could breathe in the
dry heat of Belgrade summers. Below the hills of Dedinje the
townspeople lived in dirty houses and no less dirty streets, but
the atmosphere was as gay as up in Dedinje. Tasty wines and
colorful, sentimental national songs kept people awake until
late at night.

The Communist revolution brought about a profound
change in the life of the capital. The nostalgic voices of women

THE PARTY AND ITS LEADERS 69

(pevacice) singing of the legends of the heroic fighting of Serb-
ian forefathers have grown silent. The popular eating and
drinking places are almost empty, wine is of a poor quality,
and on the whole, this city of gaiety, often irresponsible and too
frivolous, has turned into a sad, silent town of worries and un-
certainty.

Only Dedinje has continued to be as merry as in the old days.
Yet there is a fundamental change there, too. The occupants
of the villas are different. Houses and property were confiscated,
the former owners being accused of collaboration with the
enemy. This was probably justified in many cases as there
was undoubtedly a bad lot among them. Now the district is
reserved almost exclusively for members of the Yugoslav gov-
ernment, high functionaries of the party, and generals. Some
diplomats are still allowed to share the advantages of this
beautiful part of the city.

The leaders of the party live in isolation. Very little is
known about their private lives. They all work very hard,
from early morning till late at night, and their comrade-wives
are usually employed in government offices. When invited to
a dinner, they are seldom accompanied by their wives; when
they are hosts, their wives are usually absent. The meals are
ordered from the central, state-owned hotel. They never speak
about their children or private affairs and seldom mention
public topics other than politics and economics. They are
all passionate hunters and allow themselves time for hunting
and shooting.

The furnishings of their apartments or villas have not been
changed. The taste of the former owners is preserved in objets
d'art, old paintings, a Bosnian Turkish style corner, and other
such individual preferences. But the picture of the Kang has
been replaced by that of Marshal Tito.

Automobiles are a passion of the Communist leaders. Hun-
dreds of luxurious American cars rush through the streets of
Belgrade at a crazy speed, and not a single day passes without
some serious accident occurring. The Partisan drivers do not
know how to handle a powerful machine; they are not tech-
nically-minded but they are pleased by the feeling that they
control a motor which gives them the satisfaction of power.

70 TITO'S COMMUNISM

In summer, open sport cars are substituted for the big limou-
sines. They are bought in Switzerland or in Italy for prices
many times higher than the normal market price.

This picture is a sad contrast to the daily Hfe of ordinary
citizens. The latter walk slowly along the streets of the city,
worn out, silent, badly clothed. The tramways are overcrowded
and it is a typical sight in Belgrade to see youngsters hanging
on both sides of the tramways like grapes.

The greatest possible secrecy surrounds the non-ofl&cial Hfe
of Marshal Tito. He is the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia and
Minister of National Defense. He is the Commander-in-Chief
of the Yugoslav forces. But, above all, he is the Secretary-
General of the Communist party of Yugoslavia, confirmed in
this key position in 1948, after the breach with the Cominform.

His authority is built up by every possible means of totali-
tarian propaganda and the party machine. Mythology could
not have veiled the Greek gods with so extensive a myth of
almightiness. Children in schools, boys and girls organized in
pioneer corps, youngsters in summer camps are taught to love,
admire, and respect Tito with a fanatical devotion.

His war leadership is praised in hundreds of popularized
songs which are sung all over the country and adapted to accom-
pany ancient national dances. The legend of crossing the
Romania mountains is celebrated in a song which continues on
indefinitely and you can hear it in the streets of Belgrade, in
the romantic villages of Dalmatia, in the huts of Montenegro,
in factories in Slovenia — everywhere.

Tito is the supreme teacher, the beloved father, the heroic
leader of the nation. He is "a violet white, and we shall be
with him all right," as one popular song says with a slightly
comical touch. School children would shout on any occasion
the appealing slogan: "Tito belongs to us and we belong to
Tito." Adults would yell at any meeting, "With Tito in war,
with Tito in peace." "Hero Tito" has been repeated a million
times.

Streets, mines, factories, and towns are named after him.
It is a bitteF irony that the Montenegrin town of Podgorica,
which was during one period of the civil war a nest of Mihaj-

THE PARTY AND ITS LEADERS 71

lovic's "Fascist and reactionary" elements opposing stubbornly
the Communist onslaughts, was renamed Titograd.

It is a part of the tactics of the party to make Tito an
inaccessible ruler over millions of people. As in fairy tales, he
suddenly appears and everything is settled. As in ancient
monarchies, he is painted as a person of generous heart who
loves children and helps poor people and rights injustices. Tito
is the only Yugoslav leader who speaks openly about hardships
brought upon the peasants by the regime. This serves to create
the impression that he is well-informed about the daily worries
of his fellow-countrymen and that he has their interests at
heart.

When at Belgrade, Marshal Tito has two houses at his dis-
posal. He receives official visitors in the White Palace where
Prince Paul used to live. Nothing has changed in this palace
in the eight years since Prince Paul left. But nothing has
changed either in the other building where Tito spends most
of his time. It is a private villa on Rumunska Street, surrounded
by a thick wall. It is here that the most important decisions
of the Politburo are made. Two strong guards stand at the
main gate and others patrol the neighboring buildings. There
are guards also in the garden and at the entrance to the villa.
The moment a visitor enters the gate the next guard is notified
by telephone of his arrival.

The villa is rather modest for an all-powerful person like
Tito and the furnishings have not been changed. An ironic note
is created by an old bourgeois lounge in which are kept the
scores of presents bearing the sign of the Red Star which Tito
has received from different organizations.

Tito is almost a charming host. He likes to smile, which
is not the usual case for a Marxist, and knows how to talk
about other things than the Five Year Plan. He is always
properly dressed and cleanly shaven, which is not a rule in a
Communist world. He wears a simple uniform when at work,
but at official receptions his breast shines with orders of merit,
among which the "Soviet Order of Victory" and the "Hero
of the Soviet Union" used to be most cherished. Western
bourgeois ladies would envy his big diamond solitaire, but not
the Yugoslav Partisan women who have only contempt for

72 TITO'S COMMUNISM

such decadent interests. Yet they look at Tito with love and
respect and would never approach him without being asked.

Tito has his meals served on gold plates. His wines are
specially selected. He is a passionate hunter, rides horseback,
fishes, and swims, accompanied only by the closest friends and
by the chief of his bodyguard, Colonel 2;eielj.

Tito likes to show his friendly visitors the stable erected in
the garden. Here he takes personal care of his four horses
which he rode during the Partisan fighting but which are now
old and crippled and live quietly on their past merits. He
has constructed a bowling alley in the garden and he invited
me once to join in a game. I took the ball in my left hand.
Tito remarked that I was left-handed, and I replied that I had
been a leftist ever since I was born. When I threw the ball, Tito
exclaimed, "But just look at it. It goes suspiciously to the right!"

Tito's language is simple, whether at public meetings or in
official conversations with distinguished representatives from
other countries. Besides his native tongue, Croatian, he speaks
German fluently, which he learned as a young man, and also
perfect Russian, which he mastered in his five-year sojourn
in the Soviet Union. During the war he started to learn
English, but he could not use it in conversation with western
diplomats. Sometimes I used to serve as interpreter for Tito
and the American, British, and French Ambassadors at various
social occasions. Later Tito acquired a considerable knowledge
of English.

There is no official biography of Tito to give details about
his past. He was born on May 2 5, 1892, in the small village of
Klance, in Zagorje, the poorest region of Croatia. His name was
Josip Broz. He started early to earn his own living as a brick-
layer and later as a metal worker. During World War I, he
had to join the Austro-Hungarian Army but at the first oppor-
tunity went over to the Russian side. He took part in the
October Revolution in 1917, and after the war stayed in
Moscow for five years. He was an ardent believer in com-
munism and passed through the Moscow school of Marxist
ideology.

He married a Russian by whom he had a son, 2arko. Noth-
ing is heard today in Belgrade about his first wife, who, it is

THE PARTY AND ITS LEADERS 73

believed, died somewhere in Russia. The boy was brought up
in Russia, where a turbulent revolutionary spirit had driven
the father. He had only Russian schooling and during the
war fought in the Red Army, losing his left hand in the defense
of Moscow, in the fateful winter of 1941. He is now about
twenty-seven years of age.

When the son returned to Jugoslavia, after the war, he
hardly spoke any Croatian. Like his father, he had married a
Russian. They have one child, born recently.

The son is a collector of automobiles, and a crazy driver,
too. He rushes through the lively towns, handling the car
masterfully with one hand. When the government of Czecho-
slovakia presented Tito with a specially equipped car of Czech
production, a Tatra, the father handed it over to his son to
test it. As the car is easily overturned at great speed, I was
constantly worried that the crazy, one-handed driver would
be found some day under the wrecked car, which event would
have stopped the Czechoslovak export of cars to Yugoslavia
altogether. When the son received a present from the Czech
Skoda factories, a small handy car, he just gave it to the officers
of the Guard without getting into it. It was too small for him.

Tito has another child born during the Partisan fighting.
But no one in the wider circles knows who the mother is, or
even whether she is alive. Tito never appears in the company of
women. Once, at a theater performance, a dark, nice-looking
woman sat next to the wife of Tito's son. People said it was
Tito's wife. Another story goes that the mother of the second
child suddenly appeared in Belgrade, energetically threw Tito's
other wife out of the palace and decided to stay. Tito was im-
pressed and did not protest.

Life and the Moscow Marxist school taught Tito to be hard.
After his five years in Russia, he returned to Yugoslavia
without his family and worked in the illegal Communist party.
He was arrested several times, and spent five years in prisons.
He also traveled in Central Europe contacting other Commu-
nist leaders, using different names, one of them Walter and
another one, Tito.

Different interpretations have been attached abroad to this
strange pseudonym, Tito. People with panicky inclinations

74 TITO'S COMMUNISM

even explained that it was composed of the initial letters of the
words, "Third International Terroristic Organization." The
Partisans popularized Tito's abiUty of leadership and sense of
organization by saying he used to give orders and say in
Croatian: "You will do this, you this, you this." ("Ti ces da
uradis to, ti to, ti to,") Thus he was nicknamed Tito. There
is really nothing mysterious about his name. A small child
in Croatia may be called "tito" just as in America he is called
"sonny." Tito picked it up for his illegal activities and re-
tained it for later official purposes.

"When the Civil War broke out in Spain, Tito recruited
Yugoslav Communists for the International Brigade fighting
against General Franco. He never went to Spain himself, as is
sometimes wrongly stated.

It can be said about Tito that he led the tormented Ufe
of a typical revolutionary. He came out of years of hiding
the day Russia was attacked by Germany, in June, 1941, took
up the banner of communism and started to organize the
Partisan movement. Since then, his story has not been veiled
in secrecy, but has been written by his able propagandists in
daily notes to be changed, one day, into a legend about the
superhuman courage of the national hero of Yugoslavia, Marshal
Josip Broz Tito.

And Tito is a courageous man, indeed. He often appears
in public, for every sort of occasion. Every year, in summer,
he leaves the capital and makes an extensive tour of different
parts of the country. He speaks to country people, visits their
homes, inspects the construction of public buildings, spends
hours with young people working on the construction of rail-
roads, receives numerous delegations at his summer residence in
the Slovenian Alps or on the island Brioni, and makes long
speeches to the crowds.

He takes these risks as a part of his business, and this form
of public approach appeals to the uninformed pubHc. I say
uninformed because people don't know that every public appear-
ance of Tito is prepared beforehand with minutest detail by
the secret police. The party secretary knows every inhabitant
of the street or of the village which has been entrusted to his

THE PARTY AND ITS LEADERS 75

control. He watches well every move of his master, but even
more closely those of the people.

When Tito passes through the streets of Belgrade on his
way to a meeting or to the theater or to ParHament, his heavy
car is surrounded by armed bodyguards who drive in small
cars in front of him, beside him, and behind him. They travel
at a great speed and the front car pushes every passing car
aside. Cars going in the opposite direction are compelled to
stop or to run onto the sidewalk.

If there is a large gathering, as the celebration of May Day
or a military parade, a huge platform is erected on a spot in
the center of the city. Wide space around is cleared several
days before the event takes place and the platform is carefully
guarded so that no unknown person can approach it. In the
early hours of the day, the inhabitants of all the houses on
several streets surrounding the place are ordered to leave their
apartments and soldiers take their places. The windows must
be closed and on the roofs and at every window stand soldiers.
No private citizen is allowed within hundreds of yards of the
platform. Tito arrives exactly one minute before the perform-
ance starts, passing through some side street. Then, the parade
begins. Thousands of people pass the platform shouting: "Tito
is ours and we are Tito's," "We love our leader," et cetera.

The diplomatic missions at Belgrade are only rarely honored
by Tito's presence. Before the deterioration of relations between
the West and East, in 1945, and at the beginning of 1946,
Tito used to accept, once a year, the invitation of the Amer-
ican, British, and French Ambassadors for official receptions.
But after the world was divided into two blocs, diplomatic Hfe
in Belgrade also split into two camps, and Marshal Tito visited
only the Embassies of the eastern bloc, first of all, the Embassy
of the Soviet Union. This practice underwent a change later
when another split occurred, this time within the Communist
family itself. Since the Cominform assault against the Com-
munist party of Yugoslavia, Tito has not gone either to the
satellite Embassies or to the Soviet Embassy. But on July 4,
1950, he was guest of the American Ambassador, George
V. Allen.

76 TITO'S COMMUNISM

The last time Tito was my guest, something very unex-
pected happened. It was on October 28, 1947, the Czecho-
slovak national hoHday. He usually did not attend big recep-
tions, and on this occasion I was told by his office that he would
not be able to come as he would be out of Belgrade. The recep-
tion was set for five o'clock in the afternoon.

At four o'clock, however, Tito's chief waiter suddenly
appeared in our kitchen and his two aides brought baskets of
food and drinks. My wife ran excitedly into my office, telUng
me the news and adding that when she asked the waiter what
the meaning of his arrival was, he answered he had been sent
to the Embassy and did not know whether the Marshal would
be coming. The explanation came a few minutes later. The
first secretary of our Embassy, a Party Communist, raiig up
to tell me that a colonel of the secret poUce had come to see
him to ask him about the reliabiUty of the Embassy officials
and to inform him confidentially that Tito would attend the
reception. I telephoned the office of the Marshal and it was
confirmed. Meanwhile the building was already full of de-
tectives and officers.

Tito came exactly at five. How improvised the visit was
could be seen, also, from the fact that the other ministers ar-
rived much later and were surprised to meet their boss. Tito
was served exclusively by his own waiter with his own sand-
wiches and wine. My wife resented it strongly. She wanted
to offer the guest some of the Czech national food, frank-
furters, but the chief waiter refused to serve them. My wife
then served Tito the frankfurters herself and he liked them so
much that he asked for a second helping. Nothing happened
to him, but the waiter was our deadly enemy ever after.

If Tito has been built up as an all-powerful figure in
Yugoslavia, it has happened because he is the oldest member
of the Politburo and because he concentrated in himself more
than any other Yugoslav Communist the qualities of military
and authoritarian leadership. This, however, does not mean
that Tito alone governs the country and the party. Three
other members of the PoUtburo are in the internal machinery

THE PARTY AND ITS LEADERS 77

of the party and are probably as powerful as Tito. It is an
association of four men: Tito, Kardelj, Djilas, and Rankovic.
For the external world it is always Tito whose decisions are
final, but there is good reason to doubt whether that is the
case in the secret sittings in Dedinje when these four comrades
converse together till early morning about problems of the
country and the world.

Edvard Kardelj is the most important man in the Yugoslav
government. His is the post of Tito's deputy and foreign
minister. As a Slovene he has a sense for administration and
understands better than anyone else the system of bureaucracy
which, in a Sociahst system, is compHcated beyond the Hmits
of human imagination.

Though not yet forty years of age, Kardelj is considered as
the most mature figure in Yugoslav Communist politics. He
formulates the program of the party, based, of course, on
Marxism and Leninism, the theory of which he has mastered
to perfection. He has always directed Yugoslav foreign poUcy,
but he preferred to do so behind the scene up until the
summer of 1948 when he became, also oflScially, Minister of
Foreign Affairs. After the break with the Cominform, the
Yugoslav Comm^unist party wanted to have the best man avail-
able in that office, through which coded messages come and go.
At international meetings, such as the Peace Conference in Paris
in 1946, and at some General Assemblies of the United Nations,
Kardelj led the Yugoslav delegation and knew how to speak
for hours in a Molotov-like emotionless manner to defend his
country's case. He is a scholarly, bespectacled Marxist who
speaks calmly and impresses his listeners with his knowledge
and seriousness.

In the party, Kardelj is one of the three secretaries, Djilas
and Rankovic being the other two, a»d Tito is the General-
Secretary. Kardelj enjoys the respect of the rank and file, but
he does not possess the personal attraction which Tito has
and, therefore, is far from being as popular among the Com-
munist members.

Kardelj has several other official and party assignments
besides the above office. He is, of course, a member of both
the central and Slovenian Parliaments and has several functions

78 TITO'S COMMUNISM

in different top organizations. His wife was a Partisan during
the war and is now a member of the central ParHament in
Belgrade. But I never heard her speak in public.

Milovan Djilas, another member of the Big Secret Four,
is considered the most radical in matters of Marxism and for-
eign pohcy. Up until the Cominform conflict he enjoyed
great favor with Stalin. His native country is Montenegro,
which has wild mountains and still wilder manners. Even
today when the Communist regime boasts about having put
aside the old differentiation between men's and women's rights,
a woman is still considered as an inferior creature in Montenegro.

When a boy is born, the proud Montenegrin peasant father
goes from one local inn to another and informs everyone,
"I have a son." Greetings are exchanged, toasts of rakija
(whisky) held high and sometimes a few shots are fired to
celebrate the fact that a soldier was born. If, however, the
mother gives birth to a girl, it is considered a major catastrophe
in the family. The father stays at home for several days and
when friends come in to ask what happened, the peasant says,
"She has a child."

Yet Djilas himself did not seem to be very unhappy when
his wife bore him a daughter, in 1947. He was my guest
shortly after the event and when I asked why his wife did not
come with him, he said, "According to the old Montenegrin
tradition I should say that Mitra has a child." When I pro-
posed a toast he said, "Well, I'll join you, but if you were not
a diplomat I would take this as an offense. As I have, however,
to deal with diplomatic people, I have to behave, I suppose."

Djilas is the enfant terrible in Yugoslav politics and in
the party. He is completely informal even in the company
of Tito whom he calls in a familiar way "old man," ("Start") .
He is thirty-seven years old. Before the war he studied at the
University of Belgrade but I think that he devoted more time
to studying Marxism than law and spent more time in under-
ground agitation than on the University premises. He also had
five years of experience in Yugoslav royal prisons and four
years of fighting in the Partisan movement.

Djilas is like a Russian Bolshevik. He never wears a hat,
but always a cap, and puts on a necktie only for diplomatic

THE PARTY AND ITS LEADERS 79

receptions which he hates to attend. That is the only occasion
when he wears long trousers, considering high boots as more
fitting for a Bolshevik leader. But, curiously enough, his
jackets are cut by the best tailor and of an English material
of the best quaHty. He does not miss any occasion to go shoot-
ing and hunting and possesses a large collection of guns. His
dog is a specialty; he is not only an excellent chaser but he is
also trained to run after tennis balls and to find them in the
most entangled bushes which surround his master's spacious villa
at Dedinje. Another of Djilas' weaknesses is watches.

Djilas, also, likes to drive automobiles. One can see him
daily speeding through the streets of Belgrade when he goes
to Madejra, the central building of the Communist party of
Yugoslavia. He does not keep the traffic regulations and likes
to tell a story about himself of how he saw a man in the middle
of the most frequented crossroad of the capital, called inci-
dentally London, signaled him to get out of his way, and only
after having missed him narrowly, found that it was a traffic
policeman.

Djilas and his wife are an interesting couple. She is not
just the wife of a minister. She is Mitra Mitrovic, Minister of
Education of the government of Serbia, a gay young woman,
intelligent and enthusiastic about waltzing. She met Djilas in
her student years and in the party. She also spent four years
in the forests, fighting as a Partisan. Even today she does not
want her Partisan past to be forgotten.

To official parties Mitra Mitrovic comes simply dressed,
usually in an English suit. She spurns any feminine make-up
and is aware that other Communist women see in her an
example. She never wears evening clothes and likes to point
out that her women followers do not wear them either.

On one occasion I invited her to a dinner but she did not
attend. Later, she explained to me that I invited her together
with her comrade-husband and that she was accustomed to
accept only invitations addressed to her as Mitra Mitrovic.

There has been a lot of speculation about who will take the
mantle of Tito's leadership, time and politics permitting. My
guess would be Djilas, for reasons described below.

Djilas seems to have in the government the modest position

80 TITO'S COMMUNISM

of Minister without Portfolio. In fact, he is the most im-
portant person in anything connected with propaganda and
culture. He issues daily directives to the Yugoslav press through
the Communist party propaganda center called AGITPROP.
He watches the pubHshing programs of the state-owned pubUsh-
ing companies and there is no theater or operatic piece which
could appear on a stage without his approval. He controls
schools and universities, which are his specialties.

As a member of the Big Secret Four, Djilas has decisive
influence in the ideological line of the party and in all matters
of internal and external policy. He is an impressive speaker.
From time to time he writes articles of importance, signed
or unsigned, for the party paper Borba. Articles answering
the Cominform accusations against the Communist party of
Yugoslavia were from his pen. He has been working for a
long period on an epistle of several volumes deaUng with the
life and struggle of the Communist party, based on his personal
story.

Djilas is undoubtedly a man of high intelligence. When
he accompanied Marshal Tito on his official visit to Prague, in
March, 1946, he sat at the luncheon given by the President
of Czechoslovakia, Dr. E. Benes, on the latter's left. After
the luncheon. Dr. Benes told me that Djilas was the only
Communist leader he knew of who dared to think inde-
pendently. I think Dr. Benes was right. Djilas is an uncom-
promising Communist but he does not like to conceal from
himself the situation as it really is, which most Communists do.

He told me once that he was well aware that the election, in
which the government received 85 per cent of the popular
vote, did not reflect public feelings and that people voted for
the National Front because they were tired and did not want
to be bothered by the consequences if they abstained from
going to the polls or exposed their opposition in another way.
In the correspondence which Stalin exchanged with Tito, ac-
cusing him of deviation from the Marxist theory, Djilas was
attacked on the grounds that he had criticized the behavior
of the Red Army in Yugoslavia in time of war, and in com-
parison allegedly had said that the morale of the British Army
had been much higher than that of the Red Army. Although

THE PARTY AND ITS LEADERS 81

Djilas denied this grave sin, the suspicion suggests his habit
of independent thought and expression.

There is another Hne in Djilas' character. He is radical in
his Communist belief and brutal in its execution. He does
not count victims scrupulously if he decides to march on to
achieve an aim. No sacrifice of other people is too great for
him to score a victory for communism. In this only one man
equals him. It is Alexander Rankovic, called by his Communist
comrades Marko.

Alexander Rankovic is nearing forty years of age. He
comes from a poor family and started his career as a tailor.
He became a party member as a young man and spent the
"obligatory" five years in the jails of royal Yugoslavia. Like
Djilas, Rankovic also finished the Partisan war with the rank
of Lieutenant General.

Rankovic has married recently for the second time. His
first wife was killed in the Civil War and left behind a small
boy. The second marriage was performed secretly and although
Comradess Rankovic appears at official gatherings, she is always
in the company of other Partisan women and never with
her husband.

Very Httle is known about Rankovic's official duties, and
still less, about his private activities. He is Minister of Interior
and since the break with the Cominform is one of the Deputy
Prime Ministers.

Any police state could envy Yugoslavia her Minister of In-
terior. Rankovic commands the poHce — the militia — but more
important, he directs the secret police, called the Organization
for Protection of the Nation (OZNA), and since 1947 the
Office of State Security (UDB). Through this secret institution
Rankovic controls every local party organization, the political
trends in every factory, office, village and town, in fact, in
every household. He has his men in the army, in the kitchens
and among the servants of the diplomatic corps. This system
of basic control is supervised by another net of control, so that
controlling officials are themselves subjected to another control,
and so on, till the pyramid reaches Rankovic himself.

Rankovic started his career as Minister of Interior by a
ruthless eradication of opponents and soon after he had taken

82 TITO'S COMMUNISM

oflEce his methods succeeded in capturing the chief enemy,
Draza Mihajlovic, who had refused to leave the country after
the war and had continued to have scattered groups of his
Cetnici in the deep forests.

Personally, Rankovic is a somber figure. He speaks very
little, is emotionless and enigmatic — a perfect Minister of In-
terior in a totalitarian state. The mere mention of his name
makes one shiver.

These four men, Tito, Kardelj, Djilas, and Rankovic, rep-
resent the top leadership in the Communist party of Yugo-
slavia, and the inner circle of the Politburo itself. They never
appear in public together, probably for security reasons. They
never leave the capital together. But they spend hours to-
gether in Tito's private villa at Dedinje, discussing, planning,
making decisions.

There were many visitors from abroad who tried to see
in Tito's milder appearance some signs of humanity and possi-
bilities of a better understanding with him. I never believed
that any special advantages came from this personal charm of
Tito. It is well balanced by the straightforward actions of
Djilas, by the coldness of Rankovic and the severe, theoretical
background of Kardelj. Each of them has his own temperament
and their functions are divided accordingly. Communism and
Communist methods of thinking and acting are common to all
of them. Their actions are not based on personal inchnations
but on decisions of the four men taken together, and whether
in this or that case Tito or Djilas or the other two are chosen
to intervene, it is the result of agreement among all of them.
Nothing is left to improvisation or coincidence. The western
world should be aware of this coldminded machinery of Com-
munist thinking where no human approach opens avenues for
real and better understanding.

It is not, therefore, Tito alone who governs the country.
This is not a Fuehrer principle as in Nazi Germany when
Hitler listened to opinions of politicians and generals, but, at
the end, he himself made the decisions and took on the responsi-
bilities. It is a system of oligarchy in a modern sense in which
all power is concentrated in the hands of a small group whose
decisions are collective. It is for reasons of propaganda only

THE PARTY AND ITS LEADERS 83

that a single person is built up for the outside world as a
legendary, almighty figure.

The Quadrumvirate of Tito, Djilas, Kardelj, and Rankovic
is enframed in the highest institution of the party hierarchy, in
the Pohtburo of the Communist party of Yugoslavia. There
are five other men who have reached this top in the party
ladder. With the exception of the Minister for Heavy Industry,
the Slovene worker and old revolutionary, Franje Leskovsek,
they were elected to these highest party posts only in July,
1948. Lieutenant General Ivan Gosnjak is unknown to the
larger public but it is through him that the party controls the
army. He is Deputy Minister for National Defense. Another
member of the Politburo is Blagoje Neskovic, who was Serbian
Prime Minister up until the break with the Cominform and
is now one of the Deputy Prime Ministers and Chairman of the
Central Commission of Control.

Two names of the remaining five members of the Polit-
buro deserve to be mentioned separately. The first is Mosa
Pijade. M. Pijade, nearing seventy, is a veteran of the Com-
munist movement in Yugoslavia. It may be because of the
twelve years which he spent in prison that he was not liquidated
in the numerous purges through which the party went before
the war. His influence, though considerable, is often overesti-
mated abroad. It certainly does not equal the power of the
members of the Quadrumvirate. Tito honors him by calUng
him "Mosa, the old criminal." When in prison, he translated
Marx's Kapital. In his brief periods at liberty, he used to
paint and he keeps his paintings in his villa. He does not now
have time, however, to cultivate his hobby. Through him, the
party controls over 400 members of the Yugoslav central Par-
liament. No act of Parhament can be passed without his sig-
nature.

Mosa's wife is a teacher at a high school and very active in
different party organizations, especially in women's move-
ments. They have a daughter who aspires to be an actress but
apparently has not had much success as she was assigned to a
local, second-rate theater only.

The other man who has been very much in the foreground
of public affairs is Boris Kidric, not more than thirty- seven

84 TITO'S COMMUNISM

years of age. Elidric is a Slovene and a descendant of a well-
to-do family. His father was professor of Slavic studies at the
University of Ljubljana and is now President of the Academy
of Science. The young man studied chemistry but preferred
to join the Communist movement and went through the usual
school of underground hiding, Moscow training, prisons and
illegal crossing of frontiers. He has a respectable Hbrary of
Marxist literature and a good knowledge of it, too.

After the war he was the Prime Minister of Slovenia and
the party's secretary of that region. He distinguished himself
by the ruthless organization of his country's administration. I
spent two days with him in the Slovenian Alps where he wanted
me to take part in shooting. But as the weather was bad, we
went to the castle Brdo, which previously belonged to Prince
Paul. To satisfy his shooting inclinations, he had the guard
throw empty bottles into the lake and shot them with rifles of
different caliber, a revolver, and even a machine gun, with
amazing exactness. On that occasion I found Kidric to be a
man of high intelligence, enormous energy and drive. I felt
that this was the coming man.

Not long afterwards, in the spring of 1946, Kidric disap-
peared from public life. He was sent to Moscow to study the
methods of Soviet economy and Five Year Plans and, that sum-
mer, was appointed Chairman of the Economic Council and
Minister of Industry. Then, his star started to rise quickly. He
took the office from A. Hebrang, who fell into disgrace, and
reorganized the administration of the vast economic apparatus.
Later, he took over from Hebrang also the Central Commission
for Planning and thus succeeded in concentrating in his hands
more power over the economic life of the country than any
other member of the Yugoslav government. The Ministry of Fi-
nance, of Agriculture, of Foreign Trade and all the economic
ministries of the individual federal units were under his com-
mand.

Kidric works day and night. He believes in the mathema-
tical precision of scientific socialism and has no doubts but that
everything can be achieved with perfect organization. He
makes people work like slaves. He enjoys the feeling of the
vast power he possesses and exploits labor in a way that no cap-

THE PARTY AND ITS LEADERS 85

italist would ever dare to do. He annihilates without a moment
of hesitation everyone who would dare to raise his voice against
his Five Year Plan. He speaks in the Parliament, at public meet-
ings, he writes articles, and all his speeches and writings are
thoroughly based on quotations from Marxist and Leninist liter-
ature.

He prefers to work at home, using a dictaphone, which is
an exception in that part of the world. He also takes advan-
tage of other technical means which offer expediency of work.
He gives orders only by telephone and telegraph. His energy
seems to be inexhaustible.

I had to negotiate with him rather often. He preferred
night visits in his villa to the cold atmosphere of his oflEce or to
the formal meetings of a commission. Discussions lasted usually
till the early hours of the morning and alcohol was always a
necessary prerequisite to satisfying negotiations.

All Kidric's good features, however, were overshadowed by
cruelty, which he used as his main weapon and without hesita-
tion; this man was ready to use any means which he believed
would lead him to victory in his Marxist economic world.

In this gallery of Communist leaders in Yugoslavia two
names deserve special mention — Andrija Hebrang and Sreten
2;ujovic.

Both were members of the Politburo; Hebrang spent twelve
years in prison and !Zujovic, five. Hebrang lost his eye in fight-
ing with Usfase when he tried to escape from jail. !Zujovic was
seriously ill from suffering during the war.

Hebrang was made Minister of Industry and Chairman of
the Economic Council and later Chairman of the Central Com-
mission for Planning, but Kidric ousted him and made him
Minister of the newly founded and unimportant Ministry of
Light Industry. IZujovic was Minister of Finance. In May, 1948,
both were unexpectedly "relieved from functions." IZujovic
was even deprived of his rank of Lieutenant General which he
gained in four years of Partisan fighting as Tito's deputy in
the high command. The public was amazed and had no explana-
tion for this sensational reverse. It did not know that both for-
mer ministers were put in jail.

Had there been no conflict between Tito and Stalin, the

i6 TITO'S COMMUNISM

Yugoslavs would probably be ignorant even today about the
real reason for the sudden decline of these two old and worthy
members of the PoUtburo.

The Kremlin exploited the difficulties which Tito had with
Hebrang and IZujovic and in its accusation of the Yugoslav
Communist party asserted that they were both expelled from
the party because they opposed the anti-Soviet pohcy of Tito.

The Yugoslav Politburo denied these allegations by pubhsh-
ing two sentences which the Politburo had passed against He-
brang and !Zujovic. In the spring of 1946, a special party com-
mission was created to investigate Hebrang's activities during
the war and his personal conflict with Tito. The conclusion of
the commission was that Hebrang had behaved like a coward
and had even offered collaboration to the Ustase. Ideologically,
he had showed himself a "factionary" who followed a devia-
tionist hne within the party. He was punished by "severe re-
buke" and dismissed from the Ministry of Industry and the
Economic Council.

At the beginning of 1948, Hebrang was accused again. This
time for sabotage of the economic policy. !Zujovic joined him.
They were tried by the party for lack of belief in the reality of
the Five Year Plan, for careless administration of their offices
and for factionary incHnations which undermined the unity of
the party. The consequence was their expulsion from the party,
termination of their ministerial offices, and arrest.

In November, 1950, !^ujovic was released from prison, after
having recanted — in the usual way. In a letter pubhshed by the
Yugoslav newspapers he acknowledged the error of following
a pro-Russian policy and of wishing to see Yugoslavia become
a Soviet republic. This is an interesting admission because ac-
cording to the original accusation IZujovic was not imprisoned
for siding with the Soviet Union.

Some lines should be reserved for Colonel General Koda
Popovic. He is not among the first Yugoslav Communists, but
he is a member of the Central Committee of the party and
above all the Chief of the General Staff. He is small but always
elegant and wears a mustache. He is a curious man. He comes
from a wealthy Serbian family and as a student preferred to
study surrealism in arts and literature. He speaks French per-

THE PARTY AND ITS LEADERS 87

fectly. Before the war he flirted with communism as an intel-
lectual but one day took it seriously and joined the International
Brigade in Spain. In the Partisan fighting he commanded dif-
ferent units and was promoted to the rank of General. After
the war he was appointed Chief of Staff.

When I paid my first official visit to General Popovic, he
impressed me by a keen interest in literature and music. I
stayed two hours and when leaving remarked how encouraging
it was to speak with a general about the arts. He answered
frankly, "If we spoke about military affairs, you might find
out that I do not understand them."

On the thirtieth anniversary of the Soviet revolution, a big
reception was given at the Soviet Embassy in Belgrade. As
usual, Tito and some of his closest associates and the Slav Am-
bassadors celebrated the occasion in a separate room. Many
toasts were exchanged and many drinks consumed. General
Popovic played the violin and I admired his talent. He stopped
playing, sat down beside me and, looking sharply into my eyes,
started in his perfect French, though he always used to speak
Serbian with me, "Mon Ambassadeur, vous me sous-estimez.
You have always underestimated my knowledge and qualities.
You have been here long enough to give me an opportunity to
observe you and now I can tell you that I have no confidence
in you. I give you another two years but no more."

I was amazed but replied quickly in a counterattack, "Mon
cher General, do you realize that you have said all this to an
Ambassador who represents an Allied country? It is a serious
thing and I am going to report it at once to my government."

He realized suddenly he had disclosed something he never
should have disclosed, and tried to retreat. But I insisted, "Gen-
eral, you have said *A,' now you must say 'B'; I urge it most
emphatically."

"Well," he said, "I have my files about you."

I replied, "That's all right; I have my files as well."

"But it is my duty, you will understand, and is a part of
my ligitimate activities to follow the life of diplomats here.
You are in a foreign country and if you have some documents,
it can only be the result of illegitimate contacts," he cleverly
remarked.

88 TITO'S COMMUNISM

As I still insisted upon an explanation, he offered to come
to dine with me the following day "to discuss the thing in a
clear atmosphere."

The conversation lasted five hours, the following evening.
Popovic gave me a long lecture on communism and then passed
on to more concrete matters: "You know that I recently have
been on an official visit to your country. I must say that I was
highly disappointed. I saw that your political situation is not
settled. Too many parties are taking part in poHtical hfe. In
foreign policy you have not decided whether you will go with
the West or with us, and there is no campaign of hatred against
western imperialism in your press which should systematically
educate the nation for the war which is inevitable. You will
understand that all this must deeply worry me as Chief of Staff
of an Allied army."

At the end I insisted upon receiving an answer to my ques-
tion of the previous day. He tried to evade it but when I re-
peated my wish he finally said, "But did you not find my answer
in what I told you about the situation in your country? If
you still want a straightforward explanation, then, here it is:
I can have confidence only in a Communist, which you are not."
The explanation satisfied me completely.

Around these top leaders of the Communist party of Yugo-
slavia thousands of Communist politicians and functionaries are
concentrated. The Prime Ministers of individual federal repub-
lics are usually secretaries of the Communist parties in these
countries. They are followed by other Ministers, Generals, fac-
tory directors, teachers, public employees, functionaries, jour-
nalists, local secretaries, members of the party. They all passed
through the same school, they are one brain, from top to bot-
tom. They think in the same way, they act in the same way,
even if they do not get special orders on how to deal with daily
problems. It is one single team. Democracies do not and can-
not have such a team.

In this way, Communists of lower ranks show their qualities
and abilities and a group is being slowly formed which will take
over the leadership some day, if the regime lasts. One can al-
ready see the names emerging out of darkness and secrecy which
are systematically prepared for promotion: the present Prime

THE PARTY AND ITS LEADERS 89

Minister of Croatia, V. Bakaric, though gravely ill; Director
of the propaganda oflSce, Vladimir Dedijer; Colonel Vlahov,
Tito's aide and temporarily one of the deputy foreign ministers;
the brilliant Dr. Ales Bebler, Deputy Foreign Minister, a widely
known figure abroad as a talented speaker at international con-
ferences and United Nations General Assemblies; General Sveto-
zar Vukmanovic-Tempo, the chief political commissar of the
army and Minister of Mines; General Stefan Mitrovic in the
Ministry of the Interior; and others.

The life of the second and third class party functionaries is
rather sober, though far from being modest and self-renouncing.
They like to eat well, to have nice apartments or villas, to travel
in comfortable sleepers and American cars. No other members
of the Yugoslav community can afford such Uving.

Yet all these material privileges have not affected the Com-
munist morals of these lower oflScials. They do not drink much
and personally are incorruptible, a virtue which was not usual
in the old days of royal Yugoslavia. They work very hard, day
and night, and they have only one interest and one devotion, to
work for the party. If they are not at their desks in the offices
or in factories or with their army units, they are taking part in
different meetings, analyzing daily internal and international
questions. The Communist education never stops.

Every important event is first judged by the Politburo. Then
instructions go down to district party organizations and from
them to local secretaries. Whatever happens in the world, the
secretary of the party in the smallest village is told how to re-
act. Thus, party thought reaches into the last hut in Mace-
donia and even peasants in the most remote corners of the coun-
try have to take part in this ideological and political education.

There is no private life for Communist party members.
Women who fought as Partisans during the war work in offices
and different institutions. Their children are taken care of in
children's homes or by personnel chosen by the state. There is
no member of the party who would not give the last of his
energy to the sacred task of working for the party.

What are the financial means of the Communist party of

90 TITO'S COIVIMUNISM

Yugoslavia? Nobody knows. Party functionaries do not speak
about it and no paper publishes information about it. But it
is a fact that the party organizes meetings, pubHc gatherings
and demonstrations, constructs huge platforms, authorizes the
preparation of hundreds of drapes and flags, maintains a large
personnel and many buildings, pubUshes many daily papers,
booklets and books which do not bring in much money. All
this costs bilhons of dinars.

The membership fees and obUgatory deductions which are
taken from the employees for the benefit of the party cannot
cover the budget for such activities. Yet the party has limitless
financial means. It is not difficult to provide them in a society
where the state and the party mean the same thing, where no
pubhc control of state finances exists and the state budget pre-
sented yearly to the Parhament is nothing but a review of global
figures and where the accountant and cashier are the same per-
son or institution.

The methods of work of the Communist party are veiled in
secrecy; only its results are seen and felt. In pohtics, cultural
Hfe, and the press nothing is left to coincidence. At meetings
the same language is used, in papers the same terminology is
used. Theaters, music, books serve one idea only — communism.
The confidential character of the government and the party is
strictly respected, which is a new feature in Balkan politics. Per-
sonal interests and private worries are pushed aside. All power,
whether pohtical, economic, mihtary, or in the field of propa-
ganda, is concentrated in the party and specifically in the hands
of a few leaders. They have every means to declare sovereignly
as truth whatever they wish and suppress whatever they want
to. People who disagree have no opportunity to express their
opinion pubhcly. Such methods make it possible to control
every phase of Yugoslav hfe.

In no democratic state is there so much talking about the
nation as in a Communist state, though in a democracy where
a government is based on free elections it would be justifiable to
speak at least on behalf of the majority of the nation.

In Communist Yugoslavia everything is done "on behalf of
the nation." The word "nation" is used and abused thousands
of times a day. There is no speech or article in which this ex-

THE PARTY AND ITS LEADERS 91

pression is omitted. The Republic of Yugoslavia is national;
state authorities are called national; factories are national. "On
behalf of the nation" railroads are constructed; "on behalf of
the nation" meetings are convoked.

In "reactionary, capitalistic, and imperialistic countries"
the term "poHce" is used to designate the institution which main-
tains pubhc order. And as in a really democratic state the police
serve the public, the term has no ominous flavor. In people's
democracies this word was struck out of vocabularies. In Yugo-
slavia, the word police is forbidden and when people are being
arrested, it is done "on behalf of the nation," by national militia,
and they are sentenced by national courts and "on behalf of the
nation" as well. Yet when a militiaman appears in a street, the
citizenry has every reason to be afraid.

High officials of the party, however, in wooing their own
ranks do not deceive themselves that they are acting actually
according to the wish of the nation. It is one of the basic laws
of communism to assume the nation's support. This is done
by seeing that nobody has an opportunity to object. Commu-
nists have only disdain for the old-fashioned aim of democrats
who seek support and confidence of broad masses. From the
moment the Communists seize power, it is immaterial to them
whether their poHcy is popular or not. The policy stands if it
serves their Communist aims, and that fact convinces them of
its final benefits to the nation. Everything else is subordinated
to it.

Communists who have gone through a good Marxist school
are substantially different people from those who have been edu-
cated in democracy. They are contemptuous of values created
and cherished by long traditions. The idea of personal honor
and civilian pride is strange to them. They discard any ideal-
istic and reHgious approach to the problems of life. A ma-
terialistic conception based on Marxist teaching is a philosophy
perfect enough to explain any historical event and to find a
solution for any problem of our day. They speak a different
language and they have developed a different system of think-
ing and evaluating events from those of the western world.

These people have nothing but contempt for democracy
and hatred for democratic leaders. They have created a world

92 TITO'S COMMUNISM

of their own and are intolerant toward others' beliefs. If they
use the words "democracy," "freedom," "nation" as do people
of western civilization, they are doing so for two reasons. First,
to deceive the broad masses because they know that mankind
has been fighting for hundreds of years for these eternal values
which are so dear to it. They are aware that these expressions
appeal to people and that they would not gain the sympathies
of the uninformed if they developed in their agitation the old
line of Lenin's dictatorship of proletariat. Therefore, they have
(Substituted for it the term "National Front" which serves as
a cover to hide the activities of the party. Secondly, they use
the words "democracy" and "freedom" because they attach to
them a different meaning from what people ordinarily do. Ac-
cording to the Marxist theory, there cannot be democracy and
freedom in a liberal economy. True democracy and freedom are
achieved only in a Communist country, in a people's democracy.

A word or two should be said about the non-Communist
politicians who actively support Tito's government. They are
many and it is a sad story to speak about them. They do not
enjoy public confidence, but rather are looked upon with con-
tempt. People can understand that a Communist who has
fought for long years to achieve the victory of his ideology is
satisfied with the result of his struggle. But they cannot forgive
someone who believed in democracy and joined a Communist
government for purely personal ambitions.

In Yugoslavia there are in this group of politicians people
with names which have meant a lot in the modern history of
Yugoslavia. The President of the Presidium of the People's As-
sembly, Ivan Ribar, who exerts formally powers similar to a
head of the state, leads this rather unenviable gallery. His of-
fice is high, his esteem low, his influence nil.

The same applies to Vladimir Simic, the Chairman of the
Federal Council, and his brother Stanoje Simic who was Yugo-
slavia's post-war Minister of Foreign Affairs and tried to be
more radical than the Communist ministers themselves. Before
the war, Stanoje Simic served as diplomat for any government
of the old regimes, no matter how dictatorial, how Fascist or

THE PARTY AND ITS LEADERS 93

reactionary they were. This did not prevent him from serving
the Communists even more humbly.

Two other names can be mentioned only with feelings of
sadness and shame. One is Alexander BeHc, President of the
Serbian Academy of Science; he is an old man now but not so
old as not to remember that he used to organize and help Rus-
sian refugees who fled before the Red terror after the October
Revolution, and that he was often the guest of King Alexan-
der and supervisor of the young King Peter's education. It is
painful to hear his beautiful Serbian language in the service of
anti-cultural ideology. The poet, Vladimir Nazor, from Croatia,
belongs to the same category. He is old and enjoys being the
President of the Croatian Parliament, but I was told that he
had sung the praises of the Fascist Quisling, Ante PaveHc, at
the beginning of the war.

DAILY LIFE

When in Belgrade, on Sundays I used to go for short
excursions. Sometimes I stopped with a peasant family whom I
had known for a long time. When the father wanted to talk
politics he sent his children out of the room. Once his wife told
him, "Milan, I don't think you are doing well in sending the
children out of the room. They know you want to talk about
things we do not want them to hear. They may tell it to their
Communist teacher. You had better stop and if you wish to
speak freely I am sure the Ambassador will be glad to have you
visit him in his Embassy."

After that he used to come to the Embassy from time to
time. On one occasion he ^topped overnight and we talked till
early morning. He was a typical Serbian peasant, a figure which
one often finds among peasants of eastern Europe who stick to
their land, do not like to live in towns but have a nice library

DAILY LIFE 95

at home and read a lot during the long and monotonous even-
ings in winter. He was a well-read man, a kind of self-made
philosopher. The conversation was so interesting that I took
notes on it the following day.

"I am getting old and I try to control myself, and perhaps
it is because of my age that I cannot accept this communism.
I often return in thought to the past, which seems to me to
have been better. But I am certainly not a reactionary or a
capitalist. There are few people who have worked harder than
I. I do not object to social reforms. On the contrary, I wel-
come them, and I think they are necessary and inevitable. But
one thing I am not willing to sacrifice for any kind of social
progress — ^my personal freedom.

"I do not object when the local authorities come to me and
tell me that I must sell to the state the bigger part of my har-
vest. I understand that if there are regions where people scarcely
manage to live, I have to help the country and the government
supply them and not sell only to those who have enough money
to pay. But what I detest is when I tell a Communist fellow
who enters my house with an arrogant look that I cannot give
him more than ten tons of wheat because I have no more, yet
he continues to insist and shouts at me that I am a swindler, a
reactionary, and a black marketeer. If there is no mutual con-
fidence there can be no cooperation.

"I think the Communists hate the past because they subcon-
sciously feel that it gave to many people a certain degree of
satisfaction, and that there are still many of them who remember
better times. They can easily falsify a long past history by con-
fiscating old books and by writing their own history books.
But every grown person would laugh if they wrote that the
Yugoslav peasants, in the last fifty years, had gone through, only
suffering and privation. I realize that we are inclined to ideal-
ize our immediate past, as everybody does in diflEcult times, but
that is one more reason why Communists constantly attack
that past.

"Another point: take science. When I want to send a tele-
gram, I go to the post office. I have no idea what this invention
is based on but my relatives in town receive my message in two
hours' time. I have introduced electricity into my house. To

96 TITO'S COMMUNISM

plow my fields, I share a tractor with my neighbors. When my
cow falls ill, I call a veterinary, he pumps some liquid into it
and it is all right. All this is the result of scientific freedom,
and we take it for granted.

"Our Communists drive in cars, they have radio sets, they
journey by airplane, and they overlook the fact that all this is
the fruit of the hated Hberalism. All factories which must
work for them today are only a product of hberaHsm.

"But what have they given to me? I shall tell you: When I
want to speak as I think, I have to go to you, in a foreign Em-
bassy. I cannot speak freely in my own house. That is what
the Communists have done for me."

These words were spoken from the bottom of the peasant's
heart.

Yugoslav citizens are humiliated by being deprived of their
privacy. Their Hves are controlled day and night, even their
family Ufe. Every town is divided into districts, which are
a higher organizational set-up for the supervision of local or
street or house secretaries. These secretaries are selected by the
Communist party from its ranks or from the servile National
Front and have the task of constantly watching everybody
who hves in or enters their area of control. They visit fami-
lies and inquire into every detail of their Hves.

In villages where there are only a few members of the
party, a secretary has all the inhabitants under his control,
and sometimes even two or three villages. He is given appropri-
ate communication facilities to appear unexpectedly at different
places.

In larger places the street secretary is in charge of organi-
zing street conferences which take place almost every day. He
visits each family and announces the subject of the discussion.
It takes place in turn in a home or in a courtyard and it con-
cerns daily political matters. Participation is obligatory, and it
consists mainly of old women and men who are unable to go to
work. Somebody of the local Communist secretariat takes the
lead and speaks about current internal or international prob-
lems or reads a headline of the Communist paper Borba. At
the end, he invites people to take part in the discussion. They
usually keep obstinately silent. One or two local agitators are

DAILY LIFE 97

sometimes present to help in the "discussion" by uttering some
strong words about western imperiaUsm, capitalistic exploita-
tion, and black marketeeriiig reactionaries. After two hours the
conference is over. The secretary can report to his superiors
that he had a very successful meeting. Its participants return
to their homes, fed up because their precious time was taken
away from them. Children and housekeeping suffer from it.
Thus a double Communist aim has been achieved by the con-
ference: people were given a political lecture and family life
was disrupted.

This is not the only kind of local conferences. Problems of
greater importance are discussed at meetings organized by secre-
taries of blocks or districts. If the significance of an event and
the political reaction to it have to be emphasized by a convinc-
ing demonstration, a mass meeting of the whole town is organ-
ized, in which thousands of people take part. This can be done
with a few hours' notice. The secretaries order people under
their command to leave home and go to a meeting place, the
trade union functionaries issue similar orders in factories and
offices, and within two hours the whole town is on its feet. It
happens that a considerable number of participants do not
know for what cause they are going to demonstrate until they
reach the meeting place and the first speaker takes the floor.

Men and women working in factories and oflSces are also
obliged to attend lectures. These are lectures of a higher political
standard. At the end of the working day, the workers must
remain at their posts while their superiors, or men especially
trained for lecturing on theoretical problems, read the speech
which has been thoroughly prepared or approved by the Com-
munist propaganda center, AGITPROP. The slogans and the
tone of all of these conferences are the same; to praise Marshal
Tito and the Communist party of Yugoslavia and to spread hat-
red toward the West and its democratic institutions. Since Tito's
break with the Cominform, another bold subject has been added:
to defend Tito's stand against Moscow.

A special Communist school is organized for the higher
ranks of the members of the party. Its work is secret and its
existence is never mentioned in public. Its pupils are taught
the Marxist theory, introduced into the practical questions of

98 TITO'S COMMUNISM

politics and economics. They are given lectures on the political,
military, and revolutionary strategy and tactics of the Com-
munist party. The lecturers are the top leaders: Kardelj, Djilas,
Kidric, Generals Gosnjak, Popovic, and Vukmanovic-Tempo.

A teacher acquaintance of mine told me that he had been
ordered to speak at a district meeting about colonial exploita-
tion. He showed me the text of the speech he had made. It
was full of abusive terminology. I remarked that he had per-
haps gone too far and that certain basic laws of political morale
should never be given up. He burst into anger, "I can see you
still do not understand our problems. I was given the text pre-
pared by AGITPROP to read. Had I refused I would have
been thrown out of the school and my three children would
have had nothing to eat from tomorrow onward. Anyhow
90 per cent of those who had to listen to my speech knew that
I did not mean it."

Here is the text of a leaflet distributed to convince people
individually to attend and participate in local meetings:

Comrade . . . [the name and address follows]. Our
Yugoslav Army, adorned with glory, has brought us, to-
gether with the invincible Red Army, freedom and that
most precious right, the opportunity to build our future
by ourselves through the National Committees. Through
the committees and the block organizations we can make
secure all the successes gained in bloody battles. In these
committees the highest authority, as you know, is the
secretariat of the block. Our secretariat of the block
XXII was founded several months ago and has held con-
ferences at which questions of individual and general
Interests were discussed. In these activities the secretariat
of the block has been supported by many inhabitants of
the block. However, it is necessary to emphasize the fact
that the presence of the citizens and their active partici-
pation could have been better, since this is asked of us for
our common task and purpose. It may be that the aim and
importance of these meetings are not known to everyone,
but also, there are people who consider it beneath their
dignity to take part in these conferences and to have con-
tact with poor and less educated citizens. This is to be
condemned, because the presence of everybody is requested.
It is the greatest sin for anyone not to participate in these

DAILY LIFE 99

meetings, whatever the reason. Our work can benefit the
whole community if we consult together about the in-
terests of the nation.

The secretariat of the block decided at its last meeting
to address this appeal to you, to invite you to a close
collaboration, to give up two hours every second Satur-
day in the month for our common cause and to take part
in the conferences at which the most important internal
and general questions will be discussed and solved in a
friendly way. By your presence you will prove that you
value the freedom which has been brought to us by our
vaUant army, which even today continues to fight cour-
ageously to destroy our enemy, the Nazi tyranny. The
fighters at the front need all kinds of help and this help
we have to give them. The kind and quantity of this help
is decided at the conferences of the block secretariats, and
also in the committees. Today, when by quick and de-
cisive actions the social injustice under which broad
masses have su£Fered is being righted, nobody, including
you, can stay out as a calm observer, but everybody has
to work. "All for one, one for all." Let everybody give
everything of himself. We expect you on the 28 th of
this month in the building of Obilicev venae No. 27-III.

The presence of every man and woman is necessary.

Your absence, after this appeal, will be kept in evidence
and will be marked in the files [author's itaUcs] ; we beUeve
that this is neither your wish nor ours.

Death to fascism — freedom to people!
Signed: The Secretariat of XXII Block
Chairman

Bozo Vujadinovic

This appeal was issued on April 25, 1945, when the war was
still going on in the western regions of Yugoslavia. Though it
started in a mild tone, it ended with a threat to people who
would not comply with it. As this form of invitation did not
produce the expected effect, it was abandoned and the street
secretaries applied other methods of compelling people to take
part in the conferences and meetings.

I traveled on one occasion by train from Belgrade to Ljubl-
jana. Since the train was two hours late in the morning at
Zagreb, a mass of people rushed to get seats. I noticed a girl

100 TITO'S COMMUNISM

apparently exhausted and ill who had no strength to fight for
a place. I took her to my compartment but the conductor
wanted to throw her out because she did not have a first class
ticket. Then we went to the restaurant car and she started to
cry. She was ill and because of her illness she said she had re-
ceived a fortnight's leave to recover on the coast. She feared
all she had gained was now lost because she had to wait the
whole night standing in an overcrowded waiting room. The
door had been locked to let a special train of Marshal Tito pass
through.

She worked in a Slovenian factory and described how hard
people had to work. "We had a one-hour break for lunch," she
said, "and once somebody came with a suggestion that it could
be shortened to thirty minutes so that we could get home earlier
or be able to shop. Everybody agreed with the proposition, as
lunches were quickly over and people had nothing to do for
the rest of the period. But when we referred the idea to the
secretary of our trade union, he was surprised at the remark
that we had nothing to do after lunch, and said that the free
time could be used for reading from Marx and Lenin. Next
day at the conference he put the proposition to the workers and,
just imagine, not a single voice was raised against it. Three
thousand workers bowed before one party secretary. Since
then, we read the Marxist theory at lunch time."

The culminating point of "spontaneous" expression of the
will of the nation is a mass manifestation arranged on May Day
or on other occasions when the Communist party of Yugoslavia
considers it particularly important to demonstrate before the
nation and the world its power and the devotion of the masses
to Marshal Tito.

After such a mass performance, on one occasion, I met at
the reception in Tito's palace, Mr. Platts-Mills, a member of
the British House of Commons. He spoke about the parade
with boundless delight. He told me, "Never in my life have
I seen such enthusiasm in a gathering. Marshal Tito is really
beloved by his nation. Everybody wants to see him, to catch
his wonderful smile, to prove to him how devotedly he is ready
to follow him anywhere he is ordered. One could read from
people's faces all the happiness they felt at seeing Tito, and es-

DAILY LIFE - 101

pecially the youngsters, they really belong to him. There must
have been some 200,000 people at the manifestation. I must
say that I would not succeed in getting a tenth of this number
of silly Enghshmen to attend my meeting."

Then I said, "Do you know that almost all the peasants
whom you saw this morning were brought to town by special
army trucks? That all these masses who started to march past
Tito at 9:00 a.m. had to be at fixed places at 4:00 a.m.? Men
were told the previous day in their offices and factories that
they would take part in the march as members of their trade
union organizations, boys and girls with their schools or pioneer
organizations, professors, painters, actors, singers as members
of their trade unions, and the rest of the population were told
house by house by the street secretaries to be on hand. Those
hundreds of flags, standards, and inscriptions were prepared
by the secretariat of the Communist party and distributed be-
fore the march began. Every group was headed by two or
three members of the party who memorized slogans and when
they came before Tito's platform, they started to shout. Every-
one else joined in; they were afraid not to."

I have seen many of these demonstrations as it was my
official duty. And this one had been a truly mass performance.
At the beginning I also was impressed. It is remarkable that
it is possible to concentrate hundreds of thousands of people
in a place against their will, with relatively very simple means,
and to get them to take an active part in expressing political
sympathies for a political leader whom they actually and thor-
oughly dislike.

I had an opportunity to observe a May Day gathering at
Dubrovnik, the well-known Adriatic port, which was con-
sidered to be the most "reactionary" town in Yugoslavia. But
even these "reactionaries" attended the meeting in some tens
of thousands and did not fail to shout: "Long live Tito and the
Communist party! Down with black reaction." I found that
the slogans on the placards and standards were the same as in
Belgrade, Zagreb, or Ljubljana, though these towns were hun-
dreds of miles apart. Not only the slogans but even their
melody and rhythm were the same.

After such an occasion a "reactionary" came to see me and

102 TITO'S COIVIMUNISM

told me that he also went with his trade union to manifest his
love for Tito. "But I had a rather bad afternoon," he told me.
"After the parade a cousin of mine came to visit us. She is
a student at the university and went with others to manifest
for *a progressive, free, and Socialist science.' She told us
proudly that she did not shout the slogans. We considered it
an act of high courage, but my old mother is worried that I
will lose my job tomorrow."

Another feature of the "free will of the nation" is the so-
called voluntary work.

The war considerably disrupted communications in Yugo-
slavia and many factories and houses were either destroyed or
severely damaged. The nation had to face a tremendous task
of reconstruction which alone would require a great effort on
the part of labor. However, the government was more ambi-
tious than to heal the wounds of destruction only. It enlarged
the task of the nation by an additional aim to industrialize the
country in five years according to a Five Year Plan. New fac-
tories were to be constructed, new mines opened, new roads,
public buildings, and theaters built. For such a vast program
an army of hundreds of thousands of laborers would be re-
quired, and to pay their wages would be a great burden on the
state's financial resources. It was impossible to have the neces-
sary labor overnight in an agricultural and primitive country
such as Yugoslavia and to pay the workers adequately. But it
had to be provided for.

Throughout the country a big drive for voluntary work
started. First, the heavy barrage of the propaganda machinery
— newspapers and radio — prepared the nation for the task.
The Communist members formed groups of voluntary work-
ers who started to work on a public project after their daily
duties. Then, the street secretaries took a step further. They
visited their "clients" and told them that the street next door
or a public building would be repaired and that everybody
would certainly be eager to help. Women and some children
appeared on sites, digging and handing along bricks. The prop-
aganda men followed, taking pictures and publishing them as

DAILY LIFE 103

examples of patriotic duty. More people joined in. But it still
had the character of improvisation.

After the first experiments, the voluntary work was prop-
erly organized. School children went to work under the con-
trol of their teachers, workers sacrificed Sundays, and the street
secretaries proudly led their followers — women, who left their
work in the kitchen. Results could be seen very soon. The de-
bris was cleaned up and new buildings were constructed with
amazing speed. And the government did not have to pay a
single cent for it.

In the spring of 1947, the National Committee of Belgrade
suddenly started to reconstruct the main street of the capital,
Terazije. This was not the most urgent task of public works,
for the street was in relatively good order. But the provincial
fountains disappeared and the pavement was torn up. Thou-
sands of voluntary workers were busy day and night and the
noise of the machines did not let people in the vicinity sleep.
In one month a beautiful, new, wide boulevard was built,
worthy indeed of a capital.

Only on May Day, when masses of people marched along
the boulevard and gymnasts, cyclists, and motorists performed
their feats before Marshal Tito, did everybody understand why
the work had to be finished so hastily. It was done in the pre-
scribed period, but it did not withstand the next winter. Under
the first frost the new pavement was torn to pieces. It had to
be redone and this time not by voluntary groups of students
and women, but by skilled workers.

Voluntary work became one of the most important factors
of the political and economic life in Yugoslavia. People were
organized in groups called work brigades, and went to work
with flags, singing. Their commanders appealed to them to
increase their efforts. The best brigades were given an ofi&cial
title, "Shock Brigades," and the most efficient individuals,
"Shock Troopers." These were honorary rewards bestowed
upon them in the presence of other brigades or other workers,
and their names were widely quoted and their pictures pub-
hshed in every daily paper to serve as an example worthy of
being followed.

The main task of the voluntary work was alloted to the

104 TITO'S COMMUNISM

youth. In 1946, a new railway, Brcko-Banovici, was con-
structed, some 100,000 youngsters taking part. They were so
successful that they were given a bigger task in 1947: to build
a railroad in Bosnia between Sarajevo and Samac, 150 miles long.

The terrain was exceedingly difficult. The railroad had to
pass through mountains, to bridge deep valleys; rocks had to
be removed and tunnels pushed through. The authors of the
plan, in the Ministry of Communications, originally thought
the work would take two years. The plan was handed over to
the central organization of the Yugoslav youth. Its leaders
offered to finish the task in one year, i.e., in one season, and to
hand it over for public use on November 29, the anniversary of
the republic.

The work started on April 1, after the snow had disap-
peared. The work brigades were composed of boys and girls
between fourteen and twenty years of age. They came from all
regions of the country and from all sections of the population.
They erected their own wooden barracks, administration and
conference halls. Individual brigades and barracks were scat-
tered all along the projected track. The barracks' walls were de-
corated with Tito's pictures, and flags were hoisted outside.

The leadership of the youth decreed a six-hour working
day but the boys and girls proposed to work seven hours instead.
It was hard work in an exhausting southern sunshine. Rocks
had to be dynamited, stones and dirt excavated, the soil fixed
and gravelled, railroad ties and tracks put down. All this was
done by young people, the majority of whom were not accus-
tomed to heavy physical work.

The spirit of competition was introduced to increase the
effort even more. Individuals competed among themselves and
brigades with each other. This appealed to the mentality of
the youngsters. They did not mind exhaustion. They wanted
to be first on the list of rewarded working commandos. Every-
thing was done, therefore, not at a normal speed, but in haste.
Girls were hardly strong enough to carry stones, but they ran
with them. Boys rushed with wheelbarrows loaded with heavy
mud, to return as quickly as possible. It was like a motion pic-
ture going at abnormal speed.

I spent two days visiting different sections of the railroad

DAILY LIFE 105

construction and traveled along fifty miles of the railroad
tracks. The lads were poorly clothed. One could hear only the
noise of the machines. The young people did not talk to one
another. There was nothing but work; work at a killing speed.
I stopped at several places to see their barracks. They were very
clean. I chatted with some of the young people. Everybody
told me in an apathetic manner he liked to be on the pruga
(railroad track), as they called it.

I was asked to speak to two or three groups when they re-
turned to their barracks. I expressed admiration for their ef-
fort. They answered with trained slogans: "Tito-pruga-Tifo-
pruga, Stalin-Tito-Benes, or Tito-Komunisticka partija." There
was no spontaneous enthusiasm, and the slogans had no con-
nection with my address.

After seven hours of work they went to a meal which other
young men or women had prepared for them. It consisted of
bread, beans or potatoes with gravy, and once or twice a week
a piece of meat was added.

The brigades from abroad working at the pruga came
from all European countries and the expeditions were organized
by Communist-led youth organizations. These brigades worked
only six hours and spent much time becoming acquainted with
their Yugoslav colleagues. The quality and quantity of their
food was much better. The foreign brigades were delighted by
their rather romantic experiences and returned home as the
most enthusiastic supporters of Tito's Yugoslavia.

After the physical work was finished, the rest of the day
was spent in meetings or social gatherings conducted by young
Communist leaders. The latter would lead the singing of po-
litical songs. They would begin to dance the national dance,
Kolo, to the accompaniment of an endless song with the re-
frain: "We shall build the pruga before the end of this sum-
mer." Soon, other boys and girls joined in and then the whole
camp was transformed into the picturesque scene of a joyful
gathering.

The second part of the day was also used for teaching
Marxism. This was, I think, the largest political school of the
world. Three hundred thousand young people went through
it and the fee was one or two months "voluntary," unpaid labor,

106 TITO'S COMMUNISM

which would have taken years for skilled laborers and cost mil-
lions. Pruga grew — one brigade left and another arrived.

In the company of some Yugoslav youth leaders, I arrived
at a tunnel construction called Vranduk, a tunnel to be some
1,300 meters (four-fifths of a mile) long, in very difficult
rocky country. At the time of my visit the work was in its
last stages. From the depth of the tunnel we could hear the
steam-rollers, drilling machines, and iron carts. The artificial
light radiated over the toiling and sweating bodies of the young
working commandos. The air was heavy with dust and bad
odors. I asked my guide if there were not many cases of acci-
dents. He answered, "No, there have been only a few, but it
happens that the boys sometimes faint. When the cutting of
the tunnel was nearing its end, every working brigade wanted
to make the final push, because it was announced there would
be special celebrations and rewards for those who pushed it
through. They knew that all the newspapers would write about
the victorious, heroic brigade. Every brigade worked so fever-
ishly in the last days that we had to drive them out by violence
as the majority of the boys could not hold out and fainted at
work." The guide was very proud of his boys.

The rail construction was completed in a record period of
seven months. The first train passed through three weeks be-
fore the time schedule, decorated with flowers and with the en-
thusiastic Communist organizers of the pruga on board. Masses
of people were called out to welcome the train at every station.
There were many speeches praising the Yugoslav youngsters
for their achievement for the republic and Marshal Tito. These
young people left the work as trained machinists, mechanics,
and engineers. Thousands of young country boys went straight
to factories as experts after having given to the nation millions
of working hours for nothing.

The work was "voluntary." Students were told that if they
did not take part in the construction during their holidays, they
would not be allowed to continue in their studies either at high
schools or universities. Others were threatened with the loss of
their ration cards. Factories accepting newcomers asked first
whether the applicant for a job had the title of a udarnik

DAILY LIFE 107

(working commando). If the applicant had no certificate that
he had been at the rail construction, he was turned away.

It seems that some Yugoslav leaders were disturbed by this
strenuous effort on the part of their youth, for in February,
1948, Marshal Tito declared that it would be unjust to put too
heavy tasks upon the Yugoslav youth in the future. But the
warning was forgotten and that spring the agitation directed at
the young people was resumed.

According to the newspapers, 60,000 boys and girls parti-
cipated in voluntary work on the construction of the highway,
Belgrade-Zagreb; 50,000 were engaged in making the new dis-
trict of Belgrade; and 10,000 in building a new factory near
the capital. Besides these big projects the youth worked on
many local constructions of minor importance. In contrast to
the railroad Sarajevo-^amac, in which youth from all corners
of the country participated, in 1948 their work was closer to
their homes, and even greater numbers participated.

That year a new Belgrade was planned by the dictators. The
old city had been built on the right bank of the confluence of
the Danube and Sava Rivers. There were almost no houses on
the other side because it is sandy and it was considered un-
necessarily expensive to invest in a building program on that
side of the river.

The war brought considerable damage to the old town.
Many small houses constructed along shabby and narrow streets
without any town-planning were smashed by bombing. Wide
spaces were left after the debris had been cleared and opened
possibilities for a new, well-planned building program.

The first task was to provide people with Uving space. Be-
fore the war the capital had 250,000 inhabitants. But there
was an increase of administrative functions in Belgrade after
the war and this brought in many new people. Newly con-
structed factories added more. Besides, many of the refugees
who had come in did not wish to return to destroyed homes
or to places where no relatives remained alive. So the city
after the war had 450,000 inhabitants.

They lived under appalling conditions. A decree was issued
entitling each person to one room, but even this modest re-
quirement could not solve the housing problem. I knew of

108 TITO'S COMMUNISM

cases where five families, each consisting of sevejal members,
lived in a five-room flat. But the Communist government was
not interested in easing the fate of the population which, in a
town like Belgrade, still consisted mainly of middle-class fam-
ilies. Though much repair work was done and new buildings
constructed, these were mainly public administration edifices.

Tito was obsessed with the idea of a new Belgrade. He liked
to speak about the new city which would rise on the sandy
banks of the Danube and mark the era of his rule for posterity.
In the Five Year Plan a respectable figure of 130 bilhon dinars
(2.6 billion dollars) was reserved for the realization of this
idea. It was allotted for the construction of such pubHc rep-
resentative buildings as the central building of the Communist
party of Yugoslavia, government offices, the central Parlia-
ment (though the present house was built only twelve years
ago) and later on, for an opera house and a big hotel. The
preparatory work started in 1947 and the youth were to have
a large share in this personal project of Marshal Tito.

I traveled through almost all of Yugoslavia. Everywhere I
saw feverish work.

A Yugoslav Communist leader told me frankly what was
the real significance of these mass actions organized for the
youth. "It is, of course, very useful from the economic point
of view," he said, "to have built a railroad which links the
existing communication system with a Bosnian region where we
expect to develop the center of our heavy industry, and it is
a considerable economy for the state budget if this can be done
by people who do not require any compensation.

"Far the most important thing, however, is the poUtical
purpose. At the pruga young people from all parts of Yugo-
slavia meet. If they had not been given this opportunity, they
would not have seen any other part of our country perhaps
throughout their lives. At the pruga boys and girls of all
nationalities, shepherds with students, and children of all kinds
of families live together and thus they help to create real broth-
erhood and equality among the different sections of our nation
and to build a real democracy of a classless society.

"Then another point: In the villages we do not succeed in
including everybody within our political education. We lack

DAILY LIFE 109

people, and distances are considerable. Our instructors cannot
cover the whole, area and thus many young people escape our
education. This is one of our greatest problems. In the towns
we have somehow managed to get the poHtical schooHng organ-
ized and have practically solved that question. But the village
is stubborn and the primitive conditions prevaiHng in the coun-
try do not make the task easier. At the pruga we have all of
them together. For one or two months they belong wholly to
us, and this gives us a unique opportunity to educate them sys-
tematically in political affairs. They return home or to other
places properly coached and become active factors in spreading
our pohtical ideas. This aspect of the pruga far exceeds its
economic importance."

To sum up the Ufe of Yugoslav youngsters: They go to
school from six to fourteen years of age. In this period they
receive the basic political education and in the pioneer organi-
zations, a militant political schooHng. From the age of four-
teen Yugoslav boys and girls either go to work, where the trade
unions take over their "education," or they continue their stu-
dies. During holidays or free time they join the "voluntary"
working brigades.

For the women of Yugoslavia, the Communists have organ-
ized the AF2 (The Anti-Fascist Front of Women). This or-
ganization was born during the war. The leaders of the National
Liberation Movement organized women in liberated territory
to help in the struggle against the external and internal enemies.
They provided the army with food, they transported the mili-
tary equipment to the front, they served in sanitary units, and
many of them took an active part in fighting. Some became
fanatical Communists and did not hesitate to undertake the
most difficult task assigned them by the high command. They
were promoted to the ranks of officers of the Partisan Army, and
in every larger town today you can meet quite a number of
women officers, proudly wearing the uniform, often decorated
with high orders of war merits. Many of their faces are hard
and many of them appear ill.

I witnessed a very sad scene when shopping in a Belgrade

no TITO'S COMMUNISM

shop. A Partisan woman standing near me suddenly started
to cry and scream. The next moment she fell to the floor
and tossed about as in an epileptic attack. In a minute or
two it was over and she disappeared. The shopkeeper told
me that such incidents happened often and explained that they
were a consequence of the war where those women had seen
acts of brutality which caused them still to suffer from shock.

Many Partisan women were crippled in the war, and it is
very common to see a girl of twenty limping along the streets
of Belgrade. These disabled women live near the city in a special
home.

Partisan women work in many ofl&ces and different party
and National Front institutions. They never speak about fam-
ily life or children. If they have children, they leave their edu-
cation to the pioneer organizations. The women serve the party
and Marshal Tito with the same zeal as men.

The Anti-Fascist Front of Women functions very similarly
to the youth organizations or other mass institutions of the Na-
tional Front. It is headed by Communists, and in general it
mobilizes material and physical resources which a woman can
offer to the Communist cause. It organizes meetings and collects
contributions. It takes care of the special political education of
women and thus puts several milHon Yugoslav women firmly
under the control of the government.

At the Second Congress of the AF2;, held in Belgrade in
January, 1948, Marshal Tito emphasized the importance of
women's organizations for the nation, praised their achieve-
ments during the war and their important role in the National
Liberation Movement. He appealed for a greater number to
take part in the work in factories and offices. He addressed
words of criticism to those who thought their task was finished
when the war was over, feeling they had no more obligations
to work for the benefit of the community or to be politically
active. He invited women to educate their children in the spirit
of the new Yugoslavia, so that they might become good citi-
zens worthy of their country. He finished his speech with the
standard Communist sentence: "It is hatred for the warmongers
which will be the rallying force of progressive people all over
the world in the struggle for peace."

DAILY LIFE 111

After the Marshal had concluded his speech the women burst
into an ovation of open adoration. Those who belonged to the
Partisan Army looked at him with a kind of rapture and pas-
sionate love. In the speeches which followed Tito's appeal, the
women were urged to give all their strength to hasten the re-
construction of the country and the fulfillment of the Five
Year Plan. They were asked to educate their children in a So-
cialist spirit.

Women's contribution to public works was considerable.
In 1947, the women of Serbia gave 748,151 working hours to
the nation by taking part in the regulation of rivers and chan-
nels and in the construction of schools and homes of culture.
This figure, however, is very low in comparison with the achieve-
ment of the women of the other nationaHties in Yugoslavia, and
it would indicate that the women of Serbia are more stubborn
in opposition to the voluntary work and to the regime.

The women of the Croatian capital, Zagreb, devoted
1,204,597 hours to construction of the highway to Belgrade.
Women in the backward and poor country of Bosnia-Herze-
govina, where the majority of families live from hand to mouth,
with days passing when they do not see a single cent, gave
25,706,140 working hours for the benefit of public interests.

One of the most pressing needs from which the Yugoslav
families suffered was a constant lack of money. Women did
not have the means to buy essential clothing for their child-
ren, nor to provide some decent clothes for themselves. Most
of their evenings were spent mending and altering children's
dresses. It was a problem to buy needles and thread, and they
usually got them for black market prices. When the situation
was at its worst, they sold pieces of silver or furniture or china.
It was often impossible to provide milk or eggs for their, small
children, and when they could they had to pay twenty dinars
(forty cents) for one egg and twelve dinars (twenty-four
cents) for one pint of milk.

It used to be a tradition among Yugoslav families to gather
often in one of their homes, and the hostess was always anxious
to serve the guests her best. Their hospitality was prodigious.
Once a year, on the day of a family's patron saint, the Serbian
families celebrated their Slava and all their close as well as

112 TITO'S COMMUNISM

distant friends came to congratulate them on the happy hoHday.
The celebration sometimes lasted three days, and food, wines,
and coffee were in abundance. In the new Yugoslavia this tra-
dition has been almost abandoned because Yugoslav women
have nothing to serve their guests, and also because people are
so busy they cannot spend time for leisure. It has now become
a common feature for the newspapers to pubhsh long columns
of announcements by the families who choose not to celebrate
their Slava. The older people feel greatly humiliated.

The women who did not work in factories or offices or who
did not have small children did not get clothing coupons or
rationing cards. The general proletarization of the nation was
more apparent with women than with men. The men were
somewhat better provided for because they all worked and re-
ceived coupons and sometimes special suits for work. The wo-
men as a whole were shabbily dressed and lost interest in dress-
ing properly. Psychologically, women who were at home suf-
fered more under the totaKtarian and Communist regime than
did the men who met people at work and found some distraction
in fulfilling their duties.

With these new conditions family life underwent a deep
change. The home was full of worries and fear. Men returned
home from their work usually late in the evening to a very
poor dinner. The wives had to exert considerable effort to ob-
tain even a low quaUty food.

The Hfe of the family in a Communist state would deserve
a special study. Based on mutual love and understanding, self-
sacrifice and morale, the family wovild be philosophically op-
posed to the Communist ideology. So the family is actually a
danger to communism. It is in the family circles where people
develop their private interests and devote time to their hobbies.
It is the authority of parents which exercises a profound in-
fluence on children. It is in the family that ideas flow freely.

But the Communist party needs and wants the whole of
the human being — its body and soul as well. It wants all of
one's time. It ignores and suppresses human feeling and senti-
ment. Love is for Communists a discarded weakness of bour-
geoisie. The parents represent an unwelcome authority which
may endanger the sovereign authority of the party. Children

DAILY LIFE 113

must know only one superior and that is the party. And so
the ancient morale of family life has to be destroyed.

The pages which follow are devoted to a description of the
life of various classes of society in Yugoslavia — the workers,
the middle class, and the free professions. The largest class of
the Yugoslav population, the peasants, because it is closely
linked to the policy of the government in agriculture, will be
dealt with in a later chapter.

The Marxist theory bases the rule of a Communist govern-
ment upon the proletariat and considers the workers as its back-
bone. One would suppose that once the Marxists have achieved
victory in seizing power, they would ensure a world of paradise
for workers.

For decades, workers have been told that capitalists exploit
them, refusing to give them the basic conditions of a decent
life, abusing their financial power to dominate them, exposing
them to crises of unemployment, rewarding their hard work
with low salaries and driving them, on the whole, into a life
without freedom and honor.

Many workers believed that communism could assure them
of what they were rightly longing for in some countries — a
better way of living, a freedom from want. Large numbers of
European workers were organized for many years in the Com-
munist party, and they were ready to strike against govern-
ments and employers. They understood the value of the party
discipline and of the slogan "in unity is strength." They were
wilHng to risk and sacrifice to help their Communist leaders
achieve victory.

In the democratic and progressive countries of Europe the
trade unions were powerful organizations in defending the in-
terests of the working class and influencing social progress.
More than fifty years of their history have witnessed many re-
markable struggles for social justice.

Before World War I, they headed the workers' movement
to fight for political freedom. When democracy emerged from
the struggle, victorious against oppressive German and Austro-
Hungarian imperialism, the trade unions, affiliated with Socialist

114 TITO'S COMMUNISM

(non-Communist) parties, concentrated their activities mainly
in the social field. They left to the democratic parties the task
of guarding the fruits of poUtical democracy. They achieved
many improvements in wages, in sanitation, and in other work-
ing conditions, and when normal negotiations with the govern-
ment or the employer did not succeed, they took up the most
powerful weapon of the working class — they went on strike-
To make the use of this weapon most effective and to achieve
as complete a stoppage of work as possible, the trade unions
possessed means to pay subsidies to the strikers.

The position and the role of the trade unions in a Commu-
nist country has changed fundamentally. I have not seen or
read about an instance in which the trade unions in a Com-
munist country have publicly raised the question of wages or
other material interests of the workers. Never have they asked
the workers to go on strike, and one of the most characteristic
features of the Communist regimes is that strikes never take
place there. They would be considered an act of sabotage of
the Socialist economy.

I know of an exceptional case in a Czechoslovak factory
near Prague. The workers did not realize that the Communist
putsch in February, 1948, meant working without the right
of protest, and they prepared a strike to achieve better wages-
It happened soon after the Communists seized power in that
country. The police locked all the gates of the factory and
surrounded it. They turned off the electricity and the heat.
For three days and nights they left the strikers shut in the fac-
tory premises without food or water. Then, emissaries were
sent and an ultimatum was put to the strikers: to resume work
at once unconditionally, or to be arrested. The workers ac-
cepted the first proposition offered them, after three days of
starvation and cold; the leaders of the strike were put in jail
and all the workers had to pay a high fine. The strike was not
organized by the trade unions and was never mentioned in the
newspapers.

In eastern Europe the function of the trade unions is now
different from what it formerly was and what it still is in the
democratic countries. In a Communist country the trade unions
have become most ardent supporters of the governmental policy.

DAILY LIFE US

and they serve as one of the agencies of the Communist party
to achieve the highest possible working effort.

Before the war the workers in Yugoslavia had many rea-
sons for not being satisfied with a government which did not
give them a fair deal and often pursued an anti-social policy.
The trade unions enjoyed small power, and there were periods
when they did not represent the interests of the working class
but bowed willingly before the government's whips. The vic-
tory of communism did not change much this negligible in-
fluence of the trade unions. The leaders were changed, of
course. Mr. Salaj, who Hved for years in Moscow, was installed
to lead them. But his position is Hke that of a high party func-
tionary. He has to take orders from the PoHtburo, and his
vast organization, embracing several hundreds of thousands
of workers and employees, fulfills the same task as the National
Front or the Anti-Fascist Front of Women, or the organiza-
tion of the Yugoslav youth: it takes part in organizing meet-
ings and lectures and exerts a constant pressure to make
people work more. It issues declarations and has annual mass
meetings, but there has not been an instance when a declara-
tion has been issued stating: "We workers of Yugoslavia de-
mand this or that, and the trade unions stand solidly behind
this claim."

The life of Yugoslav workers is better than that of other
sections of the Yugoslav population, however. They receive a
larger quantity of food, especially the hard-working people;
they can buy certain commodities cheaper, and from time to
time extra working suits and shoes are sold to them; they re-
ceive cheap meals in the factory cafeterias; if they are skilled
laborers, their wages are comparable to salaries paid high offi-
cials of the public administration. But they have to work, very
hard and if they have some money left, there is hardly any-
thing to buy with it to improve their standard of living.

Not only laborers but every employed person is obliged to
be a member of the trade unions. Employees of the public ad-
ministration, teachers, actors, members of the artisan cooper-
atives, professors — all sections of the population who are in
one way or another paid by the state or by any of its institu-
tions, have to be organized in the trade unions, which have

116 TITO'S COMMUNISM

complete control over their activities. This once powerful or-
ganization of the working class has become a police force.

In Yugoslavia, as in every Communist country, there is a
group of out-classed people. These are the former middle class.
Their numbers amount to tens of thousands. They used to be
high government officials before the war, factory owners, small
businessmen, managers, engineers, whose knowledge and experi-
ence the government refuses to take advantage of because it
does not believe they would work loyally. They are unem-
ployed and walk aimlessly in the streets of the cities, living
from day to day. They make their living by selling their mo-
bile property.

When I arrived in Yugoslavia and had to furnish the Em-
bassy, I was advised to see some private homes, the families in
which were selling their belongings. My wife visited several of
those formerly rich families. In big apartments several families
were crowded together and the owner lived in one or two rooms
among a heap of furniture, china, linen, rugs, and pictures.
Among them were very precious pieces of tapestry, classic
French lounges, and objets d'art.

Once my wife went to see a family at lunch time. They
were sitting around a beautiful old table at a simple meal of
beans served on Sevres china. My wife felt embarrassed and
wanted to leave. But the lady told her, "Do have a look and
don't bother about our lunch; if you could buy just a small
thing you would make it possible for us to add a piece of meat
to our beans tomorrow."

My wife's dressmaker used to have a big salon before the
war, with many employees. In 1946 it was reduced to one room
and the dressmaker had no help. She told my wife that she
needed none because there was very little work for her, and
that she would almost die from hunger if a wife of a minister
did not give her some work from time to time. My wife asked
her who the lady was, because as a rule, the Yugoslav women
of the new high class society did not wear elegant dresses.

The dressmaker said, "I cannot tell you; it is a secret. She
brings her own yard goods, a first-class French material, and
her own thread. She can get it only by some irregular, illegal

DAILY LIFE 117

way, but I have to charge her a very low, legal price for my
work; otherwise she would denounce me."

In the professions things are no better.

There has always been a shortage of doctors in Yugoslavia.
The war brought the problem to a critical point; the number
of physicians had decreased and because the universities had
been closed during the war by the Germans, as being the seat
of anti-German activities, they had not provided any new doc-
tors. But the number of cases requiring medical care increased
alarmingly after the war. Besides over 1,700,000 people who
died in the fighting, many returned home crippled or ill.
Tuberculosis increased. The inhabitants of some regions were
undernourished. Mortality in general was high and so also was
the birth rate.

The government put a lot of effort into improving the
sanitary service. It founded new hospitals, regulated the study
of medicine, took care of the education of hospital nurses,
opened local dispensaries, and did a remarkable work. But
there were still not enough doctors.

According to official figures, in 1948 there were only 4,100
doctors in Yugoslavia. The census taken in March of the same
year showed there were 15,751,953 persons in the country,
which means that there was on the average one doctor for each
3,842 inhabitants. Certain mountainous districts had no doc-
tors at all. Even in the capital, Belgrade, there was such a short-
age it sometimes took several days before a doctor was free to
see a patient. The hospitals were overcrowded although only
serious cases of illnesses were accepted for hospitalization. Many
patients had to lie in the corridors.

This situation indicates the seriousness of the problem of
medicine in Yugoslavia. Yet, under the present regime, the
work of doctors is not only the most difficult, it is also unbear-
ably exhausting. They are overworked and badly paid. I
know of cases where doctors arose every morning at five o'clock,
went to a hospital to which they were assigned, could receive
their private patients only late in the afternoon, and could
visit patients in their homes only in the evening. Their sal-
aries in the hospitals were low, from 3,000 to 4,000 dinars (60

118 TITO'S COMMUNISM

to 80 dollars) monthly, from which taxes and "voluntary" con-
tributions were deducted, and their private honorarium for a
visit to the patient's home was fixed by the law up to 100 dinars
(two dollars). We shall see in another chapter what can be
bought for this income which, in general, does not exceed the
salary of higher governmental officials. It is not only insuf-
ficient, but it is also humiliating.

There are hundreds of automobiles running in Belgrade, all
state-owned. They are used by the government or the army or
the party to make the work and life of the officials, officers, and
functionaries more efficient and more agreeable. But the doc-
tors don't have cars and you can see them in Belgrade streets
carrying their bags in hot summer weather or in the muddy
winter time.

When I was ill, a doctor from the university came to see
me. The moment he sat down the discussion started. "It is an
exception that I have put on a necktie," he said. "I do not
wear one when lecturing."

I did not understand and he went on to explain, "It would
be considered a sign of anti-social feelings and I would be ex-
posed to the danger of an attack by Communist students. I
might even be expelled from the university as an anti-social
element. It is ridiculous.

"I receive 5,000 dinars (100 dollars) a month and besides
lecturing at the university, I am responsible for a large depart-
ment in the clinic which does not pay me anything. A col-
league of mine, who is a Communist, governs the whole faculty
and though it can be impartially ascertained that his scientific
education and qualification are under average, he is paid twice
as much as I am because he is a party member. He has an auto-
mobile, a large apartment, and lives well. I am in such financial
difficulties that I have no money to buy scientific books. Ac-
cording to the party I am an anti-social element.

"When the students take their examinations, those who
are Communists do not fail to emphasize their privileged posi-
tion, and I must confess that I am afraid to let them fail. This
is a crime that we are committing against the nation. In a few
years time when the old generation of doctors will have gone,
this policy will prove to be fatal for the health of the nation."

DAILY LIFE 119

When I asked the doctor, after the visit had come to an end,
how much I owed him, he repHed, "According to the regula-
tions I am entitled to get 100 dinars but I leave it to you, or
better still, don't pay me at all."

The regime has succeeded in proletarizing the profession
of doctors in its endeavor to create a classless society. As a re-
sult, it has caused doctors to run away from their responsibili-
ties. Medicine is connected with politics and they feel that un-
der the constant control of Communist doctors or secretaries,
they are exposed to discrimination and punishment.

Much the same is the experience of hospital nurses. There
is, according to official statistics, one nurse for three doctors.
As many of the older nurses are members of religious orders
they are considered the blackest reactionaries and are perse-
cuted by the Communist administration of the hospital and
often threatened even by Communist patients. I was told of
a case when a Partisan was not satisfied with the treatment he
received, and he threatened to send the nurse to prison, accus-
ing her of being anti-Communist and wanting to harm him.

The government of Yugoslavia is aware that it must some-
how solve the problem of the shortage of doctors in the country.
According to the Five Year Plan, a number of new hospitals
will be constructed, and it is assumed that the planned univer-
sity education will yield 2,500 new doctors. Every graduate
of medicine will be sent by the government to a place chosen
by the state authorities. In 1948, a law was in preparation
which would make all doctors available for the medical services
of the state, making it a duty to work in hospitals and dispen-
saries as employees of the state. The Minister of Public Health
told me that it was the intention of the government to abolish
the private practice of medicine altogether.

In order to help the health of the nation the government
ordered many doctors in big towns to serve in country hospi-
tals. Doctors were sent to places hundreds of miles away from
their homes and families. They were ordered to stay one year.
When this period of service was nearing its end, the Commu-
nist directors of the hospitals tried to convince the doctors to
remain for another year.

120 TITO'S COMMUNISM

The following case happened: In a country hospital a doc-
tor from Belgrade was preparing to return to his home. The
director had not succeeded in convincing him to stay on. Two
days before the doctor's departure a girl died in the children's
ward of the hospital. The director immediately seized upon
this occasion to place the responsibility for the death of the
child on the departing doctor, and he threatened him with
police action. The director added that he would be willing to
reconsider if the doctor decided to continue his work in the
hospital for another year. Aware of all the diflSculties and dan-
gers which he would have to face if he were accused of neglecting
his duties, the doctor accepted the deal.

In Yugoslavia there is a law requiring employed persons to
be insured against illness. Half of the insurance fee has to be
paid by the employer and half by the employee. The fee is
very high; in case of 1,000 dinars monthly income, it amounts
to 260 dinars. But the doctors are so overworked that people,
influenced by previous experience, generally beUeve the doctor
will take better care of them if they come as private patients,
rather than insured patients. I know of several cases of Yugo-
slav employees who, when ill, preferred to see a doctor pri-
vately, even though a considerable sum had been deducted
every month from their salaries for the insurance fee.

The fate of lawyers in Yugoslavia is no better than that of
the other free professions. I do not want to defend them for
their behavior before or during the war. Their profession, be-
cause of its nature, connected many of them closely to those
employers whose war-time record was not always good and
who, before the war, abused economic liberties at the expense
of other people. Hundreds of Yugoslav lawyers were arrested
after the war for collaboration with the enemy, and others were
deprived of the right to continue their practice.

In 1948, in the whole of Yugoslavia there were not more
than 1,600 lawyers. Though in a Communist state the legal
profession is considered to be parasitic, the government was
faced soon after with the consequences of the purge; people
appeared before district courts without a lawyer, because there
were none. The courts had difficulty finding lawyers for de-
fendants in cases where the law required the presentation of

DAILY LIFE 121

the case by a lawyer. The Minister of Justice met the prob-
lem by issuing a decree estabHshing the minimum number of
lawyers in every district court and, on the basis of this, the
Chamber of Lawyers dispatched its members all around the
country.

According to the law concerning lawyers, promulgated in
December, 1946, their function was defined as "to help the
state authorities in the right application of the law and in the
strengthening of the juridical order in the state." It is up to
the public attorney to define arbitrarily these ideas. If the
lawyer does not offer to "help the state authorities," as required
by the pubUc attorney, he does not fulfill properly and con-
scientiously his function, and he may be deprived of the right
to continue his work. It was on the basis of this law that the
Chamber of Lawyers struck hundreds of its lawyers from its
list by a simple decision of its Communist-controlled committee.

It happened in the case of a poHtical trial that a lawyer tried
to defend his client to the best of his abihties. Though his de-
fense efforts were not reported in the newspapers, he was nev-
ertheless severely attacked. The press reminded him of his duties
in the new Socialist state, stressing the fact that he belonged
to the old world and did not grasp the change which had oc-
curred in Yugoslavia, which required a lawyer to follow a dif-
ferent approach to his task from that which he had used in
reactionary Yugoslavia.

The aim of such public warning was achieved. Since then,
lawyers have done everything possible to avoid defending a
case in which politics were involved even indirectly, or in which
the other side was known to belong to Communist ranks. In
political trials the court appointed lawyers for the cases and
their interventions were usually limited to their mere presence
or only to formal questions.

In cases of civilian disputes, lawyers are exposed to risks
of a different nature. One of them told me, "I had a very
simple case of defending a peasant who accused a miller of
cheating him. "When the process was over I asked my cHent
to pay me what I was entitled to get according to the rules. He,
however, threatened to denounce me to the authorities, alleging
I had tried to cheat him and had asked to be paid more than

122 TITO'S COMMUNISM

was the legal tariflf. And he was not a Communist. He just
wanted to exploit the situation. This is the moral consequence
of our progressive, Socialist system. I would rather be paid
nothing than be involved in such complications." (According
to news reports,^ there has been a change in the position of law-
yers in the past two years. They are now more active in defend-
ing their clients.)

Other professions are faced with the same demands, the
same restrictive regulations. Managers and engineers in state-
owned factories, higher officials in an office or a state store are
reluctant to make decisions. Mistakes are inevitably committed,
but they are not explained as lack of experience or knowl-
edge, but as lack of good will, and often people are accused of
sabotaging the new order of Yugoslavia.

I received a visit from a Czechoslovak woman in Yugoslavia
whose husband, an architect, had been condemned to five years
in prison for collaboration with the Germans. She told me
that after two years in jail he had been sent to supervise the
construction of a public building. She begged that her hus-
band be given permission to leave the country and go to
Czechoslovakia. She explained that he was not actually released
from prison but ordered to serve the term of the remaining
three years by working on the building. When I remarked
that it would be impossible for me to ask for her husband's re-
lease because he was a Yugoslav citizen, she reiterated that he
would prefer to return to jail. "In the prison," she said, "he
can be sure that he cannot be accused of commiting an act of
sabotage, but on the site, if anything happens he will be held
responsible and put on trial again and the five years in prison
may change into ten years, or something worse."

This is the plight of all experts in new Yugoslavia. They are
assigned to very responsible positions but they are actually
afraid of them if they are not members of the Communist
party. For this reason it has become a general practice that
even minor decisions are left to the Communist officials.

Minister B. Kidric, who governs the Yugoslav economic life,
tried to simplify the administration of industry and on one oc-

'M. S. Handler, New York Times, January 29, 1951.

DAILY LIFE 123

casion issued instructions that orders should be given by tele-
phone. It did not take one week before general chaos resulted.
The officials did not take the orders down properly and mistakes
followed. "When the superiors tried to trace them, they were
unable to find who gave the telephone order, who received it,
and what its original content was. Minister Kidric had to with-
draw his order as people were reluctant to comply with it. They
were running from responsibilities.

The Communist theory puts great emphasis on criticism and
auto-criticism. The press and the Communist speakers hked to
stress that Stalin was the author of this theory.

In a Communist country this theory of criticism is not en-
visaged as an instrument of discussion and cooperation. It is
reserved to members of the Communist party. People who do
not belong to the privileged Communist party are excluded in
advance. Any criticism coming from their ranks would be re-
ceived under the assumption that it is not honestly meant and
that its motives are based on a negative attitude toward the
Communist system. I do not know of a case in which a non-
Communist would have dared to raise his voice at a meeting
or in the newspapers against any political institution or even
express an opinion on purely technical or economic questions
concerning production in Yugoslavia. He knows the conse-
quences: he would be accused of reactionary thinking and of
the intention to sabotage the Five Year Plan. As there are
468,000 organized Communists in Yugoslavia out of almost
sixteen million inhabitants the right of criticism is, in practice,
reserved to 3 per cent of the population. Ninety-seven per cent
are silenced in matters of vital importance.

The Communists are invited constantly to criticize. By
the rank and file, this notion is understood as an appeal to
watch the non -Communists and denounce them whenever sus-
picious of their motives. The majority of them lack knowledge
of economic or technical problems and, thus, in practice the in-
struction to criticize turns into a non-professional, political ac-
cusation.

Communists are very serious in fuUfilling their duties and

124 TITO'S COMMUNISM

try continually to improve their system, maintaining, of course,
the. basic methods and ideologies of communism. Self-criti-
cism is aimed at improving their own ranks and if a Communist
commits a mistake, and the party orders him to repent it pub-
licly, he; is expected to do so as a service to the party.

, This is a very noble theory. But in practice very definite
limits are put u{)on its use. The case of Ministers Hebrang and
!^ujovic was a convincing demonstration that even among the
highest circles of the Communist hierarchy, the application of
Stalin's theory was most rigidly restricted. Both ministers were
members of the PoHtburo of the Yugoslav Communist party
and as such, expressed their doubts in secret sittings of the
Politburo as to the practicability of the Five Year Plan. They
were assumed to understand something about it, as Hebrang
was ; the economic dictator of Yugoslavia before Kidric took over
from him the Ministry of Industry and the chairmanships of
the Economic Council and of the Central Commission for
Planning, ^ujovic was the Minister of Finance.

In May, 1948, they were accused of factionary tendencies
and in the accusation which the Politburo brought against
them, and which was later published, one could read that, be-
sides other crimes, they sabotaged constantly the Five Year
Plan, criticizing some of its provisions and showing a lack of
confidence in the abilities of the Yugoslav nation. A criticism
expressed two years earlier was turned against them when the
majority of the Politburo members found it desirable to get
rid of them for other, quite different, reasons. What was con-
sidered as a primary duty of a good Communist served later
as a proof that they were bad Communists, and they were
chased out of the party and put in jail.

This practice of criticism and auto-criticism is called, in
Communist language, party democracy.

I discussed the question of democracy with a general who
was one of the top organizers of the political education of the
Yugoslav Army. He was the chief poHtical commissar of the
Fourth Army. One would suppose that he would know by
heart not only the main ideas of Marxism but be well-informed
on general political ideology as well. He expressed himself
severely about the political situation in Czechoslovakia, which

DAILY LIFE 125

at the time of the discussion was still a democratic country. "I
do not agree with the poHcy of your government," he said.
"You have too many parties and each party has its own press;
it organizes its own meetings and even presents its own list
of candidates at the elections. Look at the situation in Yugo-
slavia. It is much better. The Communist party decides every-
thing. Its members decide the poHcy of the government, they
lead in Parliament, in the army, in pubHc administration, on
the collective farms, in industry — everywhere. As they act on
behalf of the nation and in the interest of the nation, it is a
democracy, a real democracy. It is a dictatorship of democracy."
A simple Yugoslav tells you, on the other hand, "I do not
want to live in fear from the moment I wake till I fall asleep;
I do not want to be afraid that what I am doing or not doing
will lead me or my family into trouble. I want to live and
work in peace. I want to read what I wish and to say what I
feel and I want to educate my children in accordance with my
conscience. This is how I understand democracy."

PRESS AND RADIO

Two OF THE MOST POWERFUL WEAPONS OF A COMMUNIST

regime are the press and the radio. In Communist Yugoslavia
they both either belong to, or are under the direct control of,
the Communist party.

I have lived in the press world for many years. As Press
Attache and as a broadcaster I became familiar with the tech-
niques of this kind of work. This gave me a good background
to study the methods of totahtarian propaganda.

The Yugoslav Communists, as all Communists, attack the
press and radio of the western countries as servants of capital-
ism; they deny that they are free. According to them, the news-
paper and radio companies defend the interests of Wall Street
and the City (of London).

The Communists maintain that it is only their press which
gives free information about current affairs and provides the
right political education.

126

PRESS AND RADIO 127

In Yugoslavia the organization of the sources of information
is strictly centralized. There is only one agency through which
a Yugoslav paper can receive information. It is the telegraph
agency, TANJUG. Any kind of news, whether from the
country or from abroad, must pass through this agency. Its
central office is in Belgrade and branches are in every capital
of the six republics. The news coming from abroad can be
handled by the Belgrade office only. It has its correspondents
in the most important capitals of the world and receives the
services of big agencies. No newspaper is allowed to subscribe
to any foreign agency independently.

The chiefs of individual departments of the TANJUG are
Communists. They receive daily instructions at conferences ar-
ranged for them by the AGITPROP, the central office of Com-
munist propaganda, under the supreme control of Minister
Djilas. Any matter of major importance is referred to AGIT-
PROP separately. Confidential directives are issued as to which
news should be specially publicized and which should be sup-
pressed.

On the basis of these instructions TANJUG issues daily
bulletins which are distributed to the newspapers and these con-
tain only material which the editors are allowed to publish. In-
structions are added on what page the news must appear, under
which title and even in which type. Either the AGITPROP or
TANJUG writes the commentaries and then usually orders
them published as original articles of the newspaper. Only sel-
dom do editors write articles and if they show such initiative,
they do not fail to ask the AGITPROP for its approval.

News coming from abroad which is not favorable to the
policy of Yugoslavia is printed on a special bulletin of TAN-
JUG— a red bulletin — ^which is sent to high governmental cir-
cles and editors-in-chief for their private reading only. All in-
formation of this kind, which is generally published in the
newspapers abroad, is considered highly secret in Yugoslavia.

The Communist party of Yugoslavia issues its official daily
paper, Borba. It is printed in Serbian and Croatian and distri-
buted all over the country. According to official figures some
700,000 copies are printed daily. All technical facilities are
used in publishing this newspaper to show its superiority over

128 TITO'S COMMUNISM

any other daily. It is printed in a modern printing house to
which the Germans, in 1938, gave the machinery when they
were buying the sympathies of Fascist Premier Stojadinovic,
and provided his newspaper, Vreme, with this equipment.

From time to time in Yugoslavia there may be a scarcity
of paper which has to be imported from abroad; however,
Borba never suffers from shortages. Also it is distributed by
the air lines, the service of which is not alloted to other papers.
It is given every advantage to become the only leading source
of daily Communist information, because it is poUtically most
important and provides a regular income to the party. Large
advertisements coming from state-owned shops and other com-
mercial and industrial state institutions contribute to the pa-
per's income.

In almost every Yugoslav town there exists a local Com-
munist paper the standard of which is low. To a great extent it
reprints news from Borba, according to the instructions of the
TANJUG. These reprints are often published after a delay
of two or three days. The service of TANJUG is poorly
equipped technically, and the distances between individual
towns are considerable.

The delay in publishing news has become characteristic of
the Communist press. It is a common occurrence for speeches
by foreign politicians or important news from abroad to be
pubHshed several days late. The delay is caused by the AGIT-
PROP which makes a careful study of each speech or news
item and then carefully prepares the text for pubUcation. The
aim of informing the nation as quickly as possible is not con-
sidered.

In every larger town there are also newspapers belonging,
theoretically, to the National Front or sometimes to a National
Front party. With the exception of Politika, published in Bel-
grade, which used to be a daily newspaper of nation-wide in-
fluence, other papers are of minor significance. Their content
does not differ from that of the Communist party newspapers.
The AGITPROP uses them as channels for the Communist
propaganda. Prominent scientists or intellectuals are often in-
structed to write articles in these non-Communist papers to
create the impression that they support the Communist policy.

PRESS AND RADIO 129

On some occasions they print commentaries which the party
does not want to support fully but which it still considers use-
ful to have expressed.

These rules of the "free" press of Yugoslavia under Marshal
Tito are very strict. They may, however, often serve as a
guide for the experienced reader, who has no access to impar-
tial information, in judging the signij&cance of the material pub-
lished and in guessing forthcoming developments.

The case of Minister Hebrang was illustrative. His quarrel
with Tito, dating from 1946, was never mentioned in the news-
papers. At that time nobody knew what was going on behind
the scene. A systematic reader of the newspapers, however,
found that Hebrang's speeches had started to appear on the
third or fourth pages, giving the first indication that something
was not in order. Later, Hebrang was transferred to the newly
founded Ministry of Light Industry and finally in May, 1948,
"relieved of the function" of this ministry, as the official an-
nouncement said. People who were able to interpret the Com-
munist terminology realized that he was politically liquidated.
Two months later his arrest was announced.

If a picture of a politician is published on the first page, one
may be sure that the man is very important in the Communist
hierarchy, regardless of the public function he performs. If
his picture is shifted one day to another page, the man is going
downhill.

The speeches and pictures of Marshal Tito can be published
only on the first page. This rule must be strictly observed. Up
to the break of the Yugoslav Communist party with the Com-
inform, it applied also to the Soviet leaders — Stalin, Molotov,
and Vishinsky. Stalin's picture continued to enjoy this privilege
for a certain time after the break, as the Yugoslav leaders felt
that they could retain his sympathies and find, through him,
their way back into the good graces of the Cominform. When,
however, his picture was dropped from the front page, it was
a certain sign that the Yugoslav hope for reconciliation had
evaporated.

The Communist newspapers, as a source of information, are
strongly one-sided. The speeches of Communist leaders of the
Soviet Union used to be published fully, and as they often took

130 TITO'S COMMUNISM

several hours to deliver, they covered three or four pages of
the newspaper. The speeches of Molotov or Vishinsky or Grom-
yko or even less important Soviet personalities before the United
Nations, were regularly published. The same applied to those
of Dimitrov, Bierut, and even the Albanian Communist leader,
Enver Hoxha. When, however. President Truman or other
western world statesmen spoke, either nothing appeared in the
Yugoslav papers or a short extract was provided with appro-
priate titles or comments about "American capitaUsm." Since
the conflict with the Cominform, this has changed. The Soviet-
bloc leaders no longer enjoy front page publicity and the news
about "western capitalism" is somewhat less conspicuous.

Everything in the press serves the Communist policy and
is meant to educate for communism and to support Commu-
nist aims. According to the instructions from the AGITPROP,
this educational campaign concentrates periodically on stand-
ard issues. One week a campaign is launched against western
imperialism; another time a crusade against illiteracy of the
country is waged; then all efforts are turned to support of the
Five Year Plan. Soon each subject is dropped as if it had dis-
appeared and the problem were solved. Later on, it is brought
up again.

A friend told me once, "If I were deported to an island
where there was no living soul, and I was completely cut off
from the outside world but was allowed to receive Borba, 1
would not know what was going on in the world. I would
know, however, what was wrong in our country. These people
from TANJUG have taught me to read 'between the lines' in
newspapers."

Official Yugoslav circles and the Communists declare that
there is no interfering censorship in Yugoslavia. Technically,
this is true. No censorship is necessary in a country in which
every bit of information has to pass through a central agency
before it is distributed to the press and in which no original
articles are written without a "spontaneous" consultation with
the AGITPROP. Newspapermen have actually ceased to be
journalists and have been changed into a kind of machine
which gives the news only a technical shape. Many of them
are aware of the humiliation through which they have had to

PRESS AND RADIO 131

pass. In fact, the majority of the Yugoslav journalists are not
Communists. Biit it is sufficient to have a Communist at the
head of every newspaper and a Communist secretary in the
paper's trade union to guarantee that there will be no leakage
of news which does not fit into the picture of Communist
propaganda.

Communist politicians attack the "press magnates" of the
western newspapers. But there is no magnate in the western
countries who has such power and influence as Minister Djilas,
who exercises limitless control over hundreds of Yugoslav pe-
riodicals of all kinds. He is doing so "on behalf of the nation"
while a western magnate is said to "exploit and abuse the na-
tion.

I had continual difficulties with the Yugoslav press. It was
my official duty to see that my country was properly presented
in Yugoslavia, and I was dissatisfied because the Yugoslav press
scarcely mentioned what was happening in Czechoslovakia. The
reason was political. Up until February, 1948, when the Com-
munists forcibly turned my country into a "people's demo-
cracy," Czechoslovakia was considered by the Yugoslav Com-
munists as a half reactionary country because its government
was composed not only of Communists but also of democratic
parties. Therefore no favorable information was published
about it, though it was an allied country. News of an economic
nature was not published because the readers would see that
there was steady progress in production, and prosperity in
general, in a country which was not Communist. This would
be a contradiction of the Communist preachment that all non-
Communist countries are doomed to economic bankruptcy.

There was a woman employed at the Czechoslovak Em-
bassy as assistant Press Attache who was the daughter of Kle-
ment Gottwald, the Chairman of the Czechoslovak Commu-
nist party, later the Prime Minister, and now President of
Czechoslovakia. Curiously enough, the fact that she was mar-
ried to a Yugoslav who held a high official position in the Yugo-
slav foreign service did not hamper her employment in the
Czechoslovak diplomatic service. I was sure that she would tell
her husband everything that happened in the Embassy, and I

132 TITO'S COMMUNISM

used this channel whenever I wanted the Yugoslavs to get "con-
fidential" information. She divorced her husband later and
married Alexej Cepicka, the Minister of National Defense in the
Communist government of Czechoslovakia and one of the most
hated men, who was responsible for the persecution of many
patriots.

I entrusted the daughter of Mr. Gottwald with the special
task of preparing for the Yugoslav press news about Czecho-
slovakia and I made it known to the editors that the material
which was being sent them was written by somebody who
could not possibly be suspected of trying to smuggle in "half
reactionary information." She did the work for six months
but with no success; not a single piece of news edited by her
and supplied by the Embassy was published.

When I complained about it to Mr. Velebit in the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, he pretended that the press in Yugoslavia
was free and independent and that he could not do anything.
I decided to visit "the Communist press magnate," Djilas, and
put before him all the material which the Embassy had written
in vain. Djilas was powerful and frank enough not to have
to play up the story about the independence of the Yugoslav
press; he seemed to accept my arguments and promised to give
adequate instructions immediately. I was agreeably surprised
when the following day his deputy, Vladimir Dedijer, came to
see me and we agreed upon many things regarding the increase
of pubhcity about Czechoslovakia in the Yugoslav press. Two
months later, he came to see me again and proudly showed me
the statistics of the AGITPROP giving Czechoslovakia first
place in publicity. The articles were all quotations of the
Czechoslovak Communist press attacking the democratic par-
ties.

The Communist control of the radio is even simpler than
that of the press. There are radio stations in every capital of
the six republics and as they are also owned by the state, their
supervision does not present any difficulties. I know, however,
that only a few people turned on their sets to listen to the news
given by the Yugoslav radio. They turned the dial to the Voice
of America coming from New York and to the BBC from
London, and to Paris. There was hardly any family which did

PRESS AND RADIO 135

not listen regularly to the broadcasts from abroad, the only
source of general information. This news spread quickly in the
town, often in exaggerated, optimistic versions, expressing the
hopes for the future to which these people clung.

ARTS AND SCIENCES

An American friend asked me one day to tell him
something about various Yugoslav schools I had visited. I had
to shrug my shoulders and point out that there is a great dif-
ference between the attitude of a Yugoslav school adminis-
trator and that of his American counterpart. In Tito's country
(as throughout eastern Europe )you don't just drop in and
look at a school. It is most difficult to get permission to visit
classes, and the would-be visitor finds himself answering ques-
tions about his intentions, his background, and what he wants
to do with the precious information he might receive. A deep-
lying suspicion of investigators and their purposes lurks in the
mind of Yugoslav officialdom and hinders even the most ordi-
nary sort of interest in educational affairs.

The Constitution of the Federal People's Republic of Yugo-
slavia guarantees freedom of arts and sciences, and offers state

134

ARTS AND SCIENCES 135

support for the development of national culture. Schools and
cultural institutions are made accessible to all classes of society.
All schools are state-owned, and private schools can only be es-
tablished according to a special law and under the control of
the government.

Throughout Tito's state, attention is concentrated on the
education of youth. Considerable sums are reserved in the na-
tional budgets and in the budgets of individual states for edu-
cation. According to official information the number of schools
increases constantly. Every federal state has its own Ministry
of Education, whose activities are coordinated by a Central
Committee of Schools and Sciences which has its seat in the
capital. General ideological directives and textbooks alike come
from this center. Although the leadership of this office is in
the hands of a non-Communist, V. Ribnikar, the party itself
is the supreme arbiter of all questions concerning culture, sci-
ence, and education. Propaganda Chief Milovan Djilas is the
real fountainhead of the Yugoslav educational system.

Textbooks in a totalitarian country have always served as
a convincing proof of the complete lack of freedom in mat-
ters of science and education. According to the tenets of his-
torical materialism, such historical notions that events are con-
ditioned also by moral, spiritual, and idealistic factors must be
swept aside, leaving only the "solidly material" basis of so-
ciety.

Textbooks in history must give this one-sided interpretation
of the past and ignore all others completely. The "return to
the past" which we have all seen in Russia, since the meanings
of history have been adapted to the theory of historical ma-
teriaHsm, has not yet been paralleled in Yugoslavia. It is little
wonder that the Yugoslav Communists fail to find any inspira-
tion and encouragement in the history of any of the compon-
ent peoples. They cannot accept the idea that people were ever
satisfied before communism was introduced, and they are com-
mitted to the philosophy that only communism can give happi-
ness and prosperity to mankind.

Such textbooks are nothing but booklets of Communist
teachings. Thus, Yugoslav children have no impartial knowl-
edge of the famous epochs of their history. The relentless

136 TITO'S COMMUNISM

struggles of their forefathers for Uberation are interpreted
solely as a class struggle of slaves against external and internal
exploiters. Real life began for the Yugoslav nation only in
1941 when Tito and his Partisans opened the great fight for
communism. Small children have to learn in detail the five
counter-offensives which Tito's army launched against the
German attacks, but they know nothing about their famous
rulers and about the struggle for nationalism in the past, unless
it is some off-hand remark about royal drunkards and tyrants.

It is not so much what children are taught about the past
as what they are told about present-day Yugoslavia and the
outside world, that should cause us to be concerned with the
consequences of such education. The classroom has become a
barrack for political training. Children are being intoxicated
by the vtythus of Marshal Tito, the Communist party, and the
Partisans. Nothing appeals to children more than legends about
heroes; nothing creates greater love and devotion. The Com-
munists know well the power of the legend, and they constantly
portray the lives of their forefathers in darkest black, contrast-
ing the past with the present, when the country is said to be
marching along the bright road of communism, led by the
father of his country and the greatest teacher of the nation,
to a happy and prosperous future.

Such political indoctrination is enriched by uniforms which
have always attracted the minds of children. Summer camps
take care of their health and energy. Children take part in mass
meetings and parades, and their enthusiasm is satisfied if they
can see their hero. Marshal Tito.

Children are often instructed by Communist teachers to
watch what their parents do or say at home. Such children
are praised as the founders of the greater Yugoslavia which is
to come, even though it creates in them a feeling of superiority
toward their parents. This is not to say the majority of Yugo-
slav teachers are Communists. On the contrary, they, like the
Yugoslav clergy, are closely linked with the simple village folk
from which they sprang. They speak privately with parents
about the common problems of education. But under the terms
and methods of Communist control, one or two teachers in
each building are the real masters of the whole institution.

ARTS AND SCIENCES 137

Political control is stronger in the high schools. Only those
students who take part in public works are allowed to attend
these institutions. Here they are taught the Marxist theory and
grow up into militant members of the Communist community.
From time to time, the class struggle finds its expression in pub-
lic denunciation of children of the former bourgeoisie: they
are attacked by one or two Communist students who are mem-
bers of the Communist Youth Organization of Yugoslavia,
and "according to the wishes of all students" they are expelled
from school.

University students are equally well regulated. Only pu-
pils who can present a certificate that they have participated
in summer "voluntary work" can enter the university or con-
tinue their studies. Students are not allowed to choose freely
the school which they would like to attend or the course which
they would like to pursue. The Five Year Plan has estimated
the number of doctors, engineers, teachers, and lawyers which
the state will need by 1951. Accordingly, students are told
which courses they must undertake in order that a reasonable
distribution of experts will exist when the Five Year Plan
comes to an end. Needless to say, the universities are not only
professional schools, but institutions for the teaching of Marx-
ism above all. Professors and students are under the firm control
of one or more Communist professors and a few Communist
students. In public demonstrations they act as one body.

In Yugoslavia the student has always stood in the first ranks
of the struggle for liberty, progress, and democracy; he has
built a living tradition in popular movements. During the war,
many of these students were attracted by the nationalism of
Tito's program, and some of them became Communists. Since
that time, many of them have felt that they were betrayed, but
they are overcome by the hopelessness of their position since
the regime is firmly entrenched. The Communist government
now claims to have all the students behind it, but that is not a
fact.

Many university students feel that for the present they can
be silenced, but they know that their old fighting spirit is not
dead. They still remember the fight of their older friends and
brothers. They are, thus, not easy material to be molded. It is

138 TITO'S COMMUNISM

in the generations of elementary and high school students that
Tito's work is most effective.

Illiteracy has always been one of Yugoslavia's greatest prob-
lems, and here the new government has worked hard. In such
regions as Montenegro, Bosnia, and Macedonia, ilUteracy had,
before the war, reached more than 70 per cent. Even in Bel-
grade eleven people out of every hundred could not read or
write. The government launched a strenuous campaign against
illiteracy and organized courses among soldiers and peasants to
teach them this basic condition of knowledge. Youngsters and
old people participated by the thousands. By spring, 1950, the
government claimed to have liquidated ilhteracy in Montenegro
completely.

The drive was a tremendous one. Most of us who were in
the capital were greatly impressed with this work, and felt
that here was one area in which the government must be com-
mended.

I set out to see what the people felt about the results of the
"New Learning." One village teacher came to see me, and
heard me praise the government's drive against illiteracy. He
said, "But you are completely mistaken, Mr. Ambassador. I
had to teach the course in our village. It was attended by my
old parents, and a miracle happened; my people who are over
sixty can now read and write a bit. But the moment the course
was over they had to subscribe to Borba, the Communist daily.

"They can't read what they would Hke to because they
haven't enough money to buy the old classics, and anyhow they
are not accustomed to read books. Thus they are bound to read
Communist papers and then to attend the party conferences and
take part in the discussions over the newspaper articles. Don't
you see the purpose of this 'education' which gives the gift of
reading to simple people? They are taught to read because the
government can work better on a person who can read their
teaching than on people who cannot. I assure you that my old
folks were much happier when they did not know how to read
than now when they have to consume the daily dose of Com-
munist propaganda."

ARTS AND SCIENCES 139

Literature and the fine arts are well developed in Yugoslavia.
I know of no city in western Europe which has as many book-
shops as there are in Belgrade. In every street you find not one
but several shop-windows shining through the night and dis-
playing the works of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin, in Serbian and
Russian, books of a political nature, fiction based on Partisan
fighting, even poetry based on the Five Year Plan.

A good deal of space is devoted to technical works on en-
gineering and building, which are, incidentally, the only books
in foreign language which may be sold. Some foreign books
with an "acceptable" point of view can be bought at Jugoknji-
ga, which has its bookshop at the best corner of the central
avenue in Belgrade, outfitted in the best "Fifth Avenue" man-
ner. This state-owned center has a monopoly on the import
of foreign literature and newspapers and on the export of
Yugoslav books and papers. Private book stores have been
gradually liquidated or absorbed by the state.

Every book is scrupulously censored before it can be pub-
lished. The prices of books are high, and the intelligentsia can
hardly afford to buy them. Yet, the number of bookshops
would indicate that all the printed material is consumed some-
how. The secret is that political (and some non-political) lit-
erature is distributed by the trade unions in factories and of-
fices to people who are coerced into buying them.

The Embassies of the United States, Great Britain, France,
the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia established read-
ing rooms in Belgrade and in some other cities. They displayed
books and pictures which showed the Hfe of their respective
countries and which were not of a directly pohtical character.
These displays were usually crowded by local people. Before the
conflict broke out between the Yugoslav Communists and Mos-
cow, the western embassies had difficulty in keeping their read-
ing rooms open. Since then, however, the government has for-
bidden the Russian and satellite embassies to display anything
which would support a hostile attitude to the Tito regime.

Yugoslavia is a country of music. Her people have beauti-
ful songs which used to be heard in the old days in the gay
local taverns in towns and villages, in forests and fields. Al-
most all of this folk-music has stopped. The government feels

140 TITO'S COMMUNISM

that songs about kings and knights, about love and nature are
compounded of bourgeois reaction and sentimentality. The
new music concerns itself with the feats of Tito and his Parti-
sans, and is composed specifically for the purpose of instilling
communism and party loyalty. The old folks are distressed to
see the national sevd dinky (love songs) disappear and to see
them replaced by songs glorifying the new order, aimed, in
a large part, against all they hold dear.

Yugoslav music is strong and active, the product of a young
and promising musical tradition. Zagreb and Belgrade are
centers of a good deal of musical activity. The opera in Bel-
grade is one of the best in Central Europe and the Balkans, and
its philharmonic orchestra brings to the people performances
of a considerably high standard. Many of the young people
who perform here have been trained in the fine schools of
Prague. They work with unselfish enthusiasm. It was sheer
delight for me to find that the audiences were well trained in
music and critical appraisal and that they were spontaneously
grateful for good music.

The dictates of communism are applied to music as well
as to the other arts. The director of music, Oskar Danon, is
a young conductor of average talents but of exemplary service
to Tito in the resistance movement, where he fought in the ranks
of the Partisans and composed several songs about Tito.

There is no opera in the world which could exist without
classical Italian compositions, and the Yugoslav opera has ob-
served this common rule. But the greatest attention is paid to
Russian compositions. Even these, however, have been changed
to conform to current political necessities. One example of
this was the opera A Liff for the Tsar, by the Russian coml-
poser Glinka, in which there were several scenes portraying the
spiritual life of the Russian church. These were all deleted,
without respect to musical harmony or the logic of operatic
structure. It did not matter that the opera was written some
150 years ago about a theme several centuries old. The new
order required a different approach, and this new transcription
presented the opera as an apotheosis of Russian patriotism and
heroism, even to the changing of the name to that of the hero,
the Russian muzik (peasant farmer), Ivan Susanin.

ARTS AND SCIENCES 141

There are other cases of intervention in musical hfe. The
name of Peter Konjevic is well known to music lovers through-
out Europe. He is a composer of considerable talent, and after
the war he was appointed director of the Academy of Music in
Belgrade. Long before the war, he had begun work on an opera
which he finished in 1928. He was dissatisfied with the result
of several years of intellectual and artistic toiling and put the
work aside. After the war he returned to it, and in 1947 pre-
sented the opera to the Belgrade public. Called The Knight of
TLeta, the libretto was based on an old Montenegrin ballad from
the thirteenth century, and contained ecclesiastical processions
and religious scenes of the times.

The first performance was unusually successful: the mu-
sic was modern, powerful, and beautiful. Every Yugoslav must
have been proud that out of the inexhaustible sources of the
nation's history and talents an original musical composition
of great power could be evoked which would give the world
a glimpse of his nation's culture. The atmosphere in the corri-
dors was one of enthusiasm and admiration, even though the
audience was composed mostly of privileged civil servants and
officers who could secure tickets for the special occasion.

The next day, when the unforgettable tunes were still echo-
ing in the ears of the audience, there appeared an anonymous
article in the official organ of the Communist party. The au-
thor attacked the composer and the opera itself, charging that
the libretto approved of the reactionary figure of the Prince,
that it revived the darkness of Orthodox mysticism and better-
forgotten medieval religious notions. Here was a composer who
was cultivating the blackest reaction in the musical world and
trying to smuggle it on to the Belgrade theatrical scene. There
was not one word about the music itself, nothing about the or-
chestra and the chorus, not a word of expert criticism, merely
an ideological dictum, considering its politics and its economic
background. Since then the opera has been given only once,
and that to a selected number of the party's chief officials, who
decided that The Knight of Xeta should be removed from the
boards. A few weeks later the author was transferred from his
important position to a secondary place as secretary of the mu-
sical department of the Serbian Academy of Science and Art.

142 TITO'S COMMUNISM

The concerts in the cities of Yugoslavia belong to the finest
expressions of the cultural greatness of her people, and most
cities have a permanent philharmonic orchestra. Concerts are
always sold out, and they are attended by simple folk who
usually go straight from the office to the music halls, spending
a relatively large amount of their income for fine music.

The philharmonic orchestra of Belgrade merits a great deal
of admiration. It is composed mainly of artists who are, at the
same time, members of the National Opera, and who, there-
fore, have hardly a free evening during the week. Their
income is far below standard, and one can see that they are
overworked and poorly clothed. Yet the orchestra ranks high
among Balkan symphony orchestras.

With very few exceptions, no western conductor was in-
vited to present his work to the audience. An exception was
made in 1947 when a Spanish conductor, whose inadequate
qualifications were balanced by the fact that he was an adherent
of the Spanish government in exile, was invited to Belgrade.
Another conductor, a Rumanian Communist with the famous
name of Mendelssohn, appeared long enough to give a disas-
trous performance. Although many professional musicians are
well aware of the results of this domination of the state over
musical production, their opposition is limited by the fact that
their source of income is directly dependent on their acquies-
cence to the party line.

In February, 1948, the whole world read with astonishment
about the severe judgment which the Russian government
passed on the works of Shostakovitch, Khachaturian, and other
musicians who were accused of following an anti-national and
decadent western interpretation of harmony and musical com-
position. The musicians of Yugoslavia were more amazed than
others, because for three years they had been urged to study
and perform the works of these Russian composers and to give
them preference over any other compositions. They were now
told that Shostakovitch was a bad, cosmopolitan musician who
had abandoned his national background. The musicians of
Yugoslavia were at a loss to understand the meaning of such a
complete shift of policy, and many believed that this single event
has harmed international communism in Yugoslavia.

ARTS AND SCIENCES 143

The Yugoslav theater has never had a high level of per-
formance, suflFering as it did from provinciaHsm and amateur-
ism. It lacked good producers and was handicapped by the
absence of creative and cultured criticism. Since the war, how-
ever, this art, too, has known the pruning-hook of official
censorship. Old classical plays have been generally discarded,
and the few texts of Moliere and Ostrovski have been reshaped
so as to cast ridicule on the "bourgeois reactionary class of so-
ciety." Other than these, the principal works were those of
Russian playwrights, whose productions remained more like
pohtical meetings and agitations than sohd theatrical works.

Tickets are sold through the trade union organizations,
and it is almost impossible to buy a seat in the usual way. Work-
ers and administrative officials know that when they are asked
to attend a performance, they are asked to perform as well.
When the play reaches its climax they applaud vigorously so
that the house turns into a well-disciplined political arena.

The government has selected two Yugoslav playwrights from
prewar times, because Tito's experts felt they expressed the
mood of his government. The Serbian author of comedies,
Branislav Nusic, was especially valuable, as he exposed the
"upper crust" of Belgrade society, and the Slovenian author,
Ivan Cankar, praised Hberalism and attacked the politics of the
clerical party. Both are now dead, but certainly they would be
surprised to find that their works are in the service of the
Communist state.

The situation in the Yugoslav motion picture industry is
similar to that of other arts. The business of making pictures
is new, and is still passing through the inevitable diseases that
accompany childhood. There are a few domestic films, all based
on Partisan warfare and party ideology, which are of rather
poor workmanship. Foreign film distribution was, up to 1948,
strictly Hmited to Russian exports, as the films of the western
countries were considered to be reactionary and of poor quality.
Needless to say, all theaters, film studios, operas are state-owned.

By world standards, Yugoslavs, such as Ivan Mestrovic, liv-
ing now in the United States, have produced great art in sculp-
ture. There is, however, no single private individual in Yugo-
slavia who could afford to buy a picture or a piece of sculpture;

144 TITO'S COMMUNISM

only governmental ofl&ces and state institutions are customers
of these arts. The painters and sculptors have to produce ac-
cordingly works of "Socialist realism." Every work has to fit
in with Socialist purpose: no impressionist scenery or "dead
nature" can comply with this order. Thus, paintings carry
the themes of a bombed village, the construction of bridges,
the killing of Germans, Partisan fighting.

This does not mean that the majority of artists are Com-
munists. Sentimentally they have remained faithful to the na-
tion of which they are a part. In 1947, the Soviet government
sent a representative collection of Russian paintings for exhibit
in Belgrade. Many painters felt they were humiliated to have
to see and praise the examples of "Socialist reaUsm" which has
been prominent in Russia for years. They felt that this type of
art would lead to the negation of all arts and to the ruination
of free and creative work.

But the Yugoslav artists have to live. Their standard of
living depends on their loyalty to the regime and on their ad-
herence to the party and the arbiters of music and the arts:
Oskar Danon for music, Radovan Zogovic for literature, Augus-
tiniJic for sculpture, Vuco for motion pictures. They are well
paid and with other devoted political friends are rewarded by
high artistic prizes which are distributed among them every
year. Those artists who have not succumbed to pressure have
to live in poverty, pursuing an heroic internal struggle against
the curse of "Socialist reaHsm."

The break between Stalin and Tito brought an important
change in the educational and cultural Ufe of Yugoslavia.

Towards the end of 1949, the Central Committee of the
Yugoslav Communist party ordered the revision of textbooks
to eliminate any counter-revolutionary conception of sociahsm.
Kardelj, speaking to the Academy of Science in Slovenia, at-
tacked Soviet science for its stagnation and dead dogmatism,
with anti-dialectical and anti-scientific tendencies.

Russian films were not imported and Communist artists
from other countries ceased to appear in Yugoslavia. A few
cultural contacts were established with the western world;
musicians came in from the West, and Yugoslav artistic groups
were allowed to appear in Switzerland, France, England and

ARTS AND SCIENCES 145

elsewhere. The British Embassy in Belgrade, headed by Sir
Charles Peake, has been successful in providing a lecturer in
English Uterature for the University of Belgrade.

This change in cultural orientation of the Yugoslav Com-
munists from the previous unlimited acceptance of the Soviet
culture to interest in cultural contacts with the West, as limited
and opportunistic as they may be, is not one of the unimport-
ant consequences of Tito's break with Stalin.

RELIGION

The Constitution: Freedom of conscience and freedom of
religion are guaranteed to citizens. The church is separate
from the state. Religious communities whose teaching
is not contrary to the Constitution are free in their reli-
gious ceremonies. ReUgious schools for the education of
priests are free and are under the general supervision of the
state. The abuse of the church and of reUgion for poUtical
organizations on a religious basis is forbidden. The state
may extend material assistance to religious communities.
(Article 25)

The Christmas tradition is deeply ingrained in the
hearts of people in eastern Europe and they used to celebrate
it as did other Christians in the world. Even politicians and po-
litical parties stopped disputing for a moment, and newspapers
carried leading articles appealing to the fine sentiments of all
people to bring peace, love, and tolerance into the world. The
atmosphere was solemn and inspiring.

I felt deeply depressed during my first Christmas in Bel-
grade after the war. There was not a trace of Christmas in the

146

RELIGION 147

capital. The streets, which had looked joyful in prewar Christ-
mas seasons, were no different now than on ordinary days. The
shop windows were without Christmas decorations; people
walking in the streets did not carry the customary parcels; only
lighted candles in a window here and there disclosed that the
Christmas tradition was still aUve. The newspapers did not
even mention the hoHdays.

I remarked on the situation to some of my Czech friends.
They were glad to comment that the Communist paper in
Prague, Kude Prdvo, had pubUshed on its front page a draw-
ing of Bethlehem and a poem by a well-known Communist poet,
adoring Christ the Creator. They tried to console themselves
by the optimistic belief that the Czechoslovak Communists
were not following the anti-reHgious Communist agitation, and
that they, even while keeping the Communist creed, were not
completely estranged from national and human sentiments.
This was in 1945. But at that time the Czechoslovak Commu-
nists had to compete with the democratic parties of the country
for popularity in the nation. They realized how deeply the
whole nation was attached to the Christmas tradition, and they
could not disregard it. It was a matter of opportunistic trad-
ing with the nation's religious feelings. The moment they
seized power, the Christmas tradition was abandoned.

In Communist Yugoslavia, Christmas was not celebrated as
a holiday. Workers were told that they could stay home for
one day if they wished, but they were warned that their sal-
aries would be reduced accordingly. Notes were taken about
those who dared to stay at home in spite of the warning.

In 1947, the Communist government had to retreat before
the unspoken but deep public indignation over the complete
ignoring of Christmas in the preceding years. It instructed the
newspapers to pubHsh articles and some literary contributions,
but their content was of a negation of Christmas rather than
its celebration.

Religious education in Yugoslavia is entrusted mainly to
the Serbian Orthodox church and to the Roman Catholic
church.

148 TITO'S COMMUNISM

The Serbs, Montenegrins, and Macedonians, approximately
7,000,000 in population, are Orthodox. Their church has played
an important role in their tormented history. It maintained
their Christian feelings and supported their national conscious-
ness against the Turkish oppression. It was one of the most
faithful guardians of national traditions and is, therefore, con-
sidered to be a national church. An Orthodox priest in a Serb-
ian village would not limit his activities to church ceremonies,
but would visit families and give them counsel in matters of
daily life. He would sing and drink with them, talk politics,
share their pleasures and sorrows. He would not be so anxious
about their religious upbringing, leaving the reHgious education
to a rather liberal conception of creed and would not insist on
a deep piety. ClericaHsm is strange to the Serbian Orthodox
church. Yet toward the Catholics, it is intolerant and full of
mistrust.

During the war, the Serbian Orthodox church refused to
collaborate with the Germans. The Nazis tried to induce it
by threats and concessions but neither worked. The Patriarch,
Gavrilo, was first interned in Serbia and after a definite failure
on the part of the Germans to gain his support he was moved to
Germany to a concentration camp. Similar was the fate of
some of the other high dignitaries. Many Orthodox priests
joined the movement of Draia Mihajlovic and fought with
rifles in hand.

After the war, people waited with anxious interest to see
how the relations between the government of Marshal Tito and
the church would develop. Knowing that any reconciliation
with the Catholic church was out of the question, Tito tried
at the beginning to overlook "the sins" of the Orthodox clergy
which had openly associated itself with Mihajlovic. The prob-
lem of the Serbian church was not publicly mentioned for some
time. But the Patriarch's deputy. Metropolitan Josip, who acted
in behalf of the absent head of the church, made clear his atti-
tude toward the new regime the moment Tito victoriously en-
tered the capital in October, 1944. He did not pay him the
customary ofl&cial visit, and the two men never met.

After having found that appeasement was impossible, the
government took steps to split the unity of the church. It

RELIGION 149

initiated the foundation of a separate Orthodox church of Mace-
donia, gaining the support of some local priests, and tried to
do the same in Montenegro. It ordered MetropoHtan Josip,
whose diocese was Macedonia, not to return. But the Metro-
pohtan and the Assembly (Sahor) of the Serbian Orthodox
church emphatically rejected the Macedonian separatist design.

A hard blow against the church was executed when, accord-
ing to the Land Reform Law promulgated in the summer of
1945, each parish was deprived of its land exceeding thirty-five
hectares. The land used to be the main source of income to cov-
er the expenses of church activities. As a consequence of the
land reform, the church became entirely dependent on private
donations from the very poor population.

In the summer of 1947, Patriarch Gavrilo returned from
exile to Belgrade. It seems that the government negotiated his
return or was at least informed about it, preferring probably
to have the head of the Orthodox Serbian church at home un-
der its control rather than letting him spread hostile activities
abroad. Gavrilo made an official visit to Marshal Tito who re-
turned it a few days later. The papers carried pictures on the
front pages and the official communique spoke about the cordial
atmosphere which prevailed throughout the conversation. In
December, 1947, Patriarch Gavrilo took the floor at the Slav
Congress in Belgrade and to the astonishment of many Serbs
spoke in a friendly manner about Slav Russia, Stalin, and Tito.
At the Assembly of the Church, however, he fully endorsed the
activities of his deputy who was known to be strongly anti-
Communist. This was published in the internal bulletin distri-
buted only to churchmen so that the masses of faithful re-
ceived the one-sided impression of pictures of Tito and Gavrilo
in a cordial chat. Only a few people knew that the visits lacked
friendliness, and that the Patriarch spoke severely about the
conditions in Yugoslavia and about the standing of the Ser-
bian Orthodox church. It became clear that he had begun a
high game with the authorities of the state.

The government did not stay behind in this game. One of
the few adherents of Tito from the ranks of the Orthodox
church, Prota Smiljanic, in December, 1947, initiated, undoubt-
edly at the request of the government, a congress of Orthodox

150 TITO'S COMMUNISM

clergymen who founded "The Association of Serbian Ortho-
dox Ministers of the People's Republic of Serbia." It declared
its task was to collaborate closely with the authorities of the
state and to bring all Orthodox churchmen into the common
national effort of fulfilHng the Five Year Plan.

High official circles of the church condemned this docile ac-
tion of a dissident group and considered it as undisciplined and
damaging to the interest of the church. But this official point
of view did not reach the broad masses, because the newspapers
did not publish anything about it. They did, however, report
widely the declaration of the dissidents.

I had an opportunity to speak with Patriarch Gavrilo only
once. It was not the custom for members of diplomatic mis-
sions to make visits to the heads of the church, as such visits
would have been interpreted poHtically. But I was offered a
special opportunity which in itself is characteristic of the situ-
ation of the church in Communist countries.

In Czechoslovakia there is a small community of the Ortho-
dox church. After World War I, when it was founded, it asked
the Serbian Orthodox church to be its patron and after that
became subject to its jurisdiction. The relations between the
two communities were very cordial and brotherly. During the
war, the Czech branch behaved in an exemplary way and its
bishop, Gorazd, was sentenced to death by the Germans. After
the liberation, relations between the two were renewed but the
Russian Orthodox church presented to the Czechs the idea that
it would be more appropriate if the Czech Orthodox church
were released from the jurisdiction of the Serbs and went over
to the Russian church. The Czechs opposed the suggestion and
so did the Serbs. The Soviets, of course, wanted to have a dir-
ect influence on the church in Czechoslovakia and did not like
the development in the Orthodox church in Yugoslavia.

Before long, official interventionists stepped in and a group
of the Czech Orthodox clergymen, under the pressure of the
Communist Minister of Education, Zdenek Nejedly, accepted
a resolution asking for the change of jurisdiction. The Serbs
did not want to yield under pressure and wanted to know what
the real wish was of the Czechs. At this moment the matter was
referred to official quarters and I was instructed to explain the

RELIGION 151

position of the Czechoslovak government to Patriarch Gavrilo.

This brought me to the head of the Serbian Orthodox
church on a morning in November, 1947, at the time when
Czechoslovakia was the last country of the Soviet bloc still re-
sisting the Communist terror and enjoying democratic Hberties.
I was not yet seated when the old, long-bearded Patriarch start-
ed the monologue. "You Czechoslovaks are happy people. There
is freedom in your country and everybody can worship freely.
I am sorry to be unable to say the same about Yugoslavia. I
returned from abroad to take over the leadership of the eccles-
iastic aflFairs. According to some promises made me, I hoped
that there would be an improvement in the situation of our
church. The facts are different, however. These gentlemen
[i.e., the government] promise one thing but they have some-
thing different in their minds, and they act differently. There
were cases when demonstrations were organized against our
bishops and some of them cannot work at their posts and are
compelled to live here in Belgrade. In Montenegro a church
was dynamited and blown up, under the pretext that it is ne-
cessary to build a house of culture on the same spot. Before the
war my patriarchial office used to have 150 officials; today we
can sustain only ten. MetropoUtan Josip cannot return to his
diocese in Skoplje, and government circles want to found in
Macedonia and in Montenegro a special local church.^ It is sug-
gested we change our name to the Yugoslav Orthodox church.
This is an impossible situation. We have been in existence for
two thousand years and we cannot allow ourselves to be treated
in such a way.

"In the summer there were some American ministers here
and they gave declarations to the press that religion enjoys full
freedom in Yugoslavia. They wanted me to receive them. I
sent a message to them that they should have come before
they gave untruthful statements to the press. Not long ago,
I received the Archbishop of York and the Dean of Canter-
bury. I told both of them what my opinion was about the
situation.

^In summer, 1950, after the Patriarch's death, the government did succeed in
convincing the Serbian Orthodox church to found a separate church in Macedonia,
and in October, 1950, the United Press correspondent reported from Belgrade that
the new Patriarch, Vikentije, declared to him that "Full religious freedom prevails
in the country."

152 TITO'S COMMUNISM

"I believe in the great mission of the Slavs. It is the first
time in history that the Slavs are offered a unique opportunity
to become a leading factor in the world, but they must know
how to use this occasion. They must never abandon Christian-

The visit of the American clergymen which was mentioned
by the Patriarch was a pecuUar and somehow a very sad affair.

In the first half of 1947, the Yugoslav Ambassador in Wash-
ington, Sava Kosanovic, shrewdly arranged for an excursion of
a group of ministers of different Protestant denominations to
see Yugoslavia, to convince themselves that there are no restric-
tions on religious freedom in his country. The visitors arrived
in July. Their visit was widely publicized and no effort was
spared on the part of the government for the group to see dif-
ferent regions of deeply religious Slovenia and Croatia. In
every village they saw fine, very attractive old churches. The
visitors were especially impressed in mountainous Slovenia by
the picturesque scenes of small churches dominating every hill.
One of the churchmen even remarked that it was not a healthy
sign to see so many churches in a relatively poor country and
that this fact actually served to prove that the old regimes built
them for the CathoUc church, to keep it loyal to their non-demo-
cratic governments.

The visiting Americans saw that the church services were
crowded and they spoke to some priests. No one told them that
the Catholic church did not enjoy full freedom and no one com-
plained that he was not free to serve the mass. The visitors were
not alarmed by the attention which the official Yugoslav circles
paid them by giving them the constant company of represen-
tatives of the government.

This experience led the naive American clergymen to be-
lieve that full religious liberty reigned in Yugoslavia. They
gave enthusiastic statements to the Yugoslav press which pub-
lished them on the first page carrying large pictures of the min-
isters' appearance in different towns and of their audience with
Marshal Tito.

The Communists were delighted with the obvious success
of the visit and scornfully laughed at the American victims
of the clever Communist arrangements. But the Catholics of

RELIGION 1J3

Yugoslavia were deeply depressed and felt they were being
abandoned by the outside religious world.

The Croats and Slovenes are 100 per cent Catholic. They
number approximately 5,300,000. The church means every-
thing to them. They have been educated for hundreds of years
in piety, being -deeply and truly rehgious. They cherish an
unhmited respect for the Roman Catholic church and its priests.

After World War I, the Cathohc church in Yugoslavia
associated itself with a narrow-minded and provincial Croat
nationahsm. I spent two hours with the head of the Croatian
Catholics, Archbishop Alois Stepinac, in 1937, in his palace in
Zagreb. He impressed me deeply by his cultivated, spiritual
outlook. He certainly had the right to claim to be a good Yugo-
slav, being one of the few Croats who had fought as volunteers
along with the Serbian brothers on the Dobrudja front in 1915.
Yet, his Croat national feeHngs overshadov/ed the other aspects
of the complicated problems of Yugoslavia and Central Europe
and the Balkans. Already at that time the threat of Nazi
Germany was very grave.

The Communists assert that during the last war the Cathohc
church helped the Germans and the treacherous Quislings,
and they blame Archbishop Stepinac for having given full
support to these activities. The Catholic church, on the other
side, has praised the behavior of the Croat dignitaries during
the period of occupation. The complexity of the situation is
shown by the fact that the mass baptizing of the Serbs in
Croatia, which saved them from the massacres executed by the
Ustase, was severely resented by one part of the Serbian people,
while it was explained by the other part as a deed of Christian
love.

In Slovenia, the Catholic creed and piety have been most
deeply ingrained. In the political sphere the priests have been
involved in a constant and exhausting struggle between the
liberal and the clerical elements of the country. During the
war, it is said, the Catholics were divided into one group
which sided with the Partisans, another which backed the
local anti-Partisan forces, and still another which remained

154 TITO'S COMMUNISM

passive. Abroad, the Slovenian Catholics were represented by
a well-known Catholic leader, Miha Krek.

The Communist government of Marshal Tito was aware
of the power of the Catholic church in Croatia and Slovenia.
It rightly felt that religion and the church were the most
dangerous enemy of communism, and that this hostihty was
centered in the CathoUc regions of Yugoslavia in the militant
and uncompromising character of the CathoUc church.

After the liberation of Croatia and Slovenia, the Partisan
Army and civil authorities launched a campaign of persecu-
tion against the Catholic priests; many of them were shot and
still more were arrested. Archbishop Stepinac was among
those put in prison. But Tito saw that this rough treatment
would only add to the glory and respect which the church
enjoyed in the nation and so he tried another plan.

When he first visited Zagreb, he ordered Archbishop
Stepinac to be released from prison and in a public speech
he promised the Catholics full freedom of religion. At the
same time he announced his far-reaching aim of breaking the
universahty of the Catholic church and hinted that the Croat
Catholics would serve their teaching better if they gave up
their international character and refused to be influenced from
abroad, and instead, based their activities on a national basis.
The rejection of this suggestion was foreseen and soon the
short interlude of calm was shattered by a new wave of perse-
cution. Church services were often interrupted by riots ar-
ranged by local Communists; priests were physically molested
in the streets and churches; and the press unleashed a brutal
campaign of slander against the CathoHc church, the Vatican,
and the Catholic priests.

The church answered with an emphatic defense of its rights
and of religion. It was led by Archbishop Stepinac and all
the other bishops of Croatia and Slovenia. In September,
1945, the bishops issued a pastoral letter, putting their case be-
fore their followers.

The letter outlined the areas in which the CathoUc church
had most sorely felt Communist oppression, and called for
correction of these wrongs as the only hope for creating "a
constant internal peace in our state." The bishops accused

RELIGION 155

the government of sentencing to death for alleged pohtical
and military crimes 501 Catholic priests, among them twenty-
eight from the Franciscan Monastery at Siroki Breg not one
of whom "had ever had a rifle in his hands, nor fought against
the army of national liberation." Admitting that some priests
could be justly accused of "sinning against the sacred law of
Christian justice," they branded as calculated propaganda
the majority of the government's accusations against the priest-
hood, and deplored the vacancies created in the parishes by
the internment of so many.

Of the hundreds of Catholic publications circulated before
the war, not one is published today, said the bishops. And,
they asked, if lack of paper was the reason for revoking the
licenses (as the government claimed), what of the confiscation
from the Archbishop's palace of several wagonloads of paper
belonging to the CathoHc press?

Another grievance was the closing of the Catholic private
high schools and many of the CathoHc institutions maintained
for the children of the working class. The introduction of
legal civil marriage offended the church; charitable works
were interfered with. The land reform confiscated so much
land belonging to the church that what it retained "is in-
sufficient to maintain seminaries, the central Bishop offices,
cathedrals, churches, and the clergy." Here, the bishops
pointed out, their objection was to the arbitrary use of force
in taking land rather than to the principle of land reform.

Finally, disclaiming any intent "to provoke a struggle
against the government of this state," the letter demanded, for
the sake of

peace and the healing of the wounds of war in our state
.... complete freedom for the Catholic press and for the
Catholic schools, and the teaching of religion in all classes
of the elementary and high schools; freedom for Catholic
philanthropic activities and respect for the Catholic mar-
riage; as well as the restitution of the Catholic institutions
which were taken away from the church.

The government of Yugoslavia did not react at once to
this severe attack by the CathoHc bishops and tried to conceal
it from the wider pubHc. When, however, the clergy did not

156 TITO'S COMMUNISM

retreat before the threats of the local Communist secretaries
and read the pastoral letter from the pulpits of almost all
churches, and when the letter was distributed in thousands of
copies all over the country, the government felt that it could
not keep silent.

The Communist party considered it necessary to engage
Marshal Tito actively and publicly in the fight. At the end
of October, 1945, all Yugoslav papers pubHshed Tito's article
"About the Pastoral Letter." In his long article Marshal Tito
antagonistically reproached the Catholic bishops for taking such
a deeply hostile attitude toward the new federal Yugoslavia.
He asked them why they did not issue a similar message against
the mass murders of the Serbs in Croatia during the govern-
ment of Pavelic and the Germans, since they were willing
to sacrifice their lives in the fight against the new democratic
Yugoslavia — against the overwhelming majority of the Yugo-
slav nation. They were ready, the Marshal accused, for any
sacrifice to save their land and personal interests, yet the bishops
were spreading hatred among the population, although there
was complete freedom of religion. He stressed that he never
promised any concessions to the representatives of the church
on the account of the nation, and concluded,

I would not like this to be understood as a warning, but I
must bring to your attention that there exist laws which
forbid the spreading of chauvinism and disunion and the
endangering of the results of our great liberation struggle.
These laws must be respected by everybody who has the
good of his country at heart.

From that moment on, the open fight between the Catholic
church and the Communist government was resumed. The
newspapers began a systematic attack on the Catholic priests,
bringing reports and pictures of their anti-national behavior in
time of war and preparing the ground for a decisive blow.
The Catholic priests continued to preach the words of the
Gospel. Archbishop Stepinac preached in the old Gothic Ca-
thedral in Zagreb against atheistic communism and the anti-
spiritual philosophy of materialism. His prayers were spread
over the country in thousands of leaflets.

Marshal Tito tried to stop this dangerous development by

RELIGION 157

steps which were meant to save the face of the government
and silence the Archbishop at the same time. As he told me,
and as it was admitted later publicly, he suggested to the Vatican
representative in Belgrade, Nuncius Monseigneur Hurley, that
the Vatican withdraw the Archbishop, warning him that other-
wise he would be tried and material compromising the Catholic
church would be made known to the public. It seems that
Tito's counsellors in canon law did not tell him that there is
no provision which could remove an Archbishop, and anyhow,
the Catholic church would not have done it as this would have
been interpreted as admission of guilt and a retreat.

After the failure of this diplomatic attempt to remove
the audacious dignitary, the government took the usual step
of Hquidation of enemies. In autumn, 1946, Archbishop Step-
inac was arrested and placed on trial. He was accused of
treachery committed in the war by collaboration with the
Germans and the Quisling Croatian government of Pavelic
and of approving the cruelties of the U stale against the civilian
population. His defense was as bold and courageous as his
preaching. He did not shrink before the threats. The court
which was presided over by a young Communist judge, whose
Jewish mother Stepinac personally had saved from the Nazi
fury, condemned him to sixteen years of hard labor in prison.^

Since then, very little has been heard about the struggle
of the Catholic church and the government, though it has
gone on silently as it inevitably has to. No prominent priest
gave support to the Communists, with the one exception of
Monseigneur Rittig. But every Catholic in Yugoslavia knew
that this same gentleman served King Alexander and many
anti-Croat governments before the war. His present loyalty
to Tito was not esteemed either.

It would seem that the believers of any denomination in
Yugoslavia are not limited in attendance of religious services.
The churches are always crowded to full capacity and visited
more than ever before. Yet, it is not a freedom of conscience
and religion. People are afraid to pray for those whom they
love, and they are aware of the fundamentally anti-Christian

^In the fall of 1950, Marshal Tito indicated his readiness to release the Arch-
bishop if he renounced his bishopric office.

158 TITO'S COMMUNISM

government to which they are compelled to express their loyalty.
Religion is taught only in the elementary schools and in order
to make the number of children who wish to attend the
classes of religion as small as possible, parents are asked to sign
a paper that it is their wish that their child attend them. It
is an act of courage to do so. Children are obliged to participate
in different political meetings, as the manifestations on May
Day, but they cannot freely celebrate Christmas and other
church holidays. On such occasions schools are ordered to take
pupils for an excursion to prevent their going to church.

THE OPPOSITION SILENCED

There were two important trials in Yugoslavia con-
cerning people whom the government considered to be the
two greatest war criminals. One took place in Zagreb in Sep-
tember, 1946, with Archbishop Alois Stepinac, and the other
in Belgrade in June, 1946, with General Draia Mihajlovic. The
first was condemned to sixteen years in prison, the latter to
death.

This chapter, however, is not concerned with trials based
on crimes allegedly committed against the Partisans during the
war, but with sentences which were passed against those who
trespassed against the new Yugoslavia of Marshal Tito, once
it was estabHshed.

At the beginning of 1947, eight Yugoslav citizens were put
on trial for spying for a foreign secret service, for supplying

159

160 TITO'S COMMUNISM

an Embassy with mendacious information, and for collaborat-
ing with the enemy during the war. The leader of the accused
group was an octogenarian, Misa Trifunovic, the chairman of
the Serbian Radical party and a former Prime Minister of the
Yugoslav government in exile. According to the indictment,
they were charged with contacts with the American Embassy
in Belgrade; with the first Counsellor of the Embassy, Harold
Shantz; with the Deputy Agricultural Attache, Pridonoff; and
with Lieutenant Kasuvick, the aide to the Naval Attache. It
was said that the defendants were giving false information
about the political and economic conditions in Yugoslavia,
about shooting of citizens, concentration camps, removing of
economic experts from the pubHc administration, about a
government of terror, continuation of the Partisan war, about
Marxist courses, education of the youth in the spirit of the
Hitlerjugend, about the terror in elections.

It is impossible for a person who is not acquainted with
the real substance and details of these accusations to judge
the accuracy of facts about the alleged activities of the de-
fendants. But one sees what kind of activities or contacts can
be considered a grave crime in a Communist country.

In a democratic country, it is a matter of normal life that
diplomats have contacts with the population of the country
to which they have been accredited. It belongs to the ele-
mentary duties of a diplomat to cherish these contacts and
have many friends who would help him in getting better ac-
quainted with the Hf e, customs, and local peculiarities, and to
give him an opportunity to inform larger sections of the
population about the conditions prevailing in his own country.
In the last thirty years, more and more emphasis, has been
placed on this part of a diplomat's mission.

In a democratic country a diplomat does not need to try
to elicit questions from a private individual. The press dis-
closes to him, if carefully read, a great deal. Specialized eco-
nomic periodicals publish news about the country's production,
exports and imports, employment, social conditions, and the
like, and they accompany them with comments. No private
individual can supply an expert diplomatic oflScer with better
information than the press.

THE OPPOSITION SILENCED 161

For diplomatic missions of the Soviet Union and other
Communist states nothing is easier than to establish wide con-
tacts with whomever they wish in democratic countries. Com-
munist poHticians living in such countries consider it their
duty and highest honor to be in close, open and secret, contact
with the Communist diplomats.

In a Communist country the diplomats are cut oflf from
any normal contacts with the non-official world and from any
normal source of information. The press avoids mentioning
anything which would give a foreign observer an indication
of affairs which are considered confidential. An atmosphere
of distrust and fear prevails.

In Yugoslavia the diplomatic corps lived almost isolated
from the outside world. The western diplomats were careful
not to endanger private individuals by inviting them to their
homes or by speaking with them outside.

The French Ambassadress had a small dog which she
wanted to breed. She knew of somebody in the country who
owned a dog of the same kind. She visited him, and the owner
was summoned to the poUce the following day and kept in
jail for some time.

After her arrival in Belgrade my wife visited some friends
whom she knew before the war. They were very pleased to
see her, but after a few minutes told her frankly that it would
be better if she did not come any more. It evoked suspicion
when an automobile with diplomatic signs stood in front of
their home. They were embarrassed by a purely private visit
and kept looking out of the window to see whether anyone
was watching the house. With the exception of official parties,
they preferred not to come to the Embassy either.

The process with M. Trifunovic and other accomplices
served as a warning to every Yugoslav to be careful in seeking
contacts with, or in accepting invitations from, diplomats. Every
Yugoslav fully understood its purpose. The warning was grave.
M. Trifunovic was condemned to eight years in prison but af-
ter some time was released. Three of the other defendants were
condemned to death. The American Embassy was exposed to
a series of offensive articles attacking its illegitimate activities.

162 TITO'S COMMUNISM

Marshal Tito spoke with me about this process and said,
"I brought to the attention of the American Ambassador the
activities of some of his ofl&cials who were in contact with
subversive elements in the country. I gave him a file about
it, to redress it. With good will, it would have been possible
to solve the question in a friendly way. But he did not even
care to answer."

It would seem that the American Embassy in Belgrade
had nothing to hide from Yugoslav pubHc opinion.

It is curious that the Soviet Embassy was even more isolated
from the outside world in Yugoslavia than the diplomatic
missions of the western countries. The reasons were different
in this case. People did not need to worry about safety when
seeing the Soviet Ambassador who was free to seek contacts
with anybody. But he was brought up in a Soviet diplomatic
school which does not care about personal links of diplomatic
officials with private individuals. He relied on information
which he was given from official quarters.

Now, after the conflict of the Communist party of Yugo-
slavia with the Cominform, considerable change has occurred
also in this sphere. People would not dare now to visit the
Soviet Embassy in Belgrade. Such a contact would imme-
diately raise the suspicion that they were plotting with the
Soviets against the Yugoslav government.

At the beginning of 1947, three people were sent to death
and thirty-five to prison after a trial in a southern Serbian
town, Pristina, for having organized armed bands which were
preparing a violent political upheaval in Yugoslavia, this time
with the help of British and Greek "reaction."

In the spring of 1947, Dragoljub Jovanovid, a member of
the Yugoslav Parliament, was arrested. Characteristically
enough, the Yugoslav people were not told anything about it.
Only the foreign correspondents in Belgrade were summoned
to a confidential conference, and they could send the news to
their papers. The Yugoslav newspapers were allowed to publish
it only several months later when the official release announced
that D. Jovanovic was deprived of parliamentary immunity

THE OPPOSITION SILENCED 163

and of the mandate itself, and that he would be tried for a
crime of spying for a foreign power. The Deputy Prime Min-
ister, E. Kardelj, told me in June that Jovanovic was arrested
because he was, according to extensive documentation, in
contact with the American Embassy and the American service
of espionage.

Dragoljub Jovanovic is a Serb about fifty years of age,
born in Pirot, a small town not far away from the Bulgarian
frontier. He is a small unostentatious man. With his thick
spectacles he looks more Hke a professor than a political figure,
though he was, actually, both. As a peasant leader he attracted
masses of his constituency by a popular approach to their prob-
lems, and as a professor of sociology at the Belgrade University
he had a considerable following among the students who looked
to him as to a courageous democrat and an excellent teacher.
He was a man of penetrating intellectual strength.

Jovanovic, for many years, had been one of the leading
members of the Serbian Peasant party, but he did not always
agree with the official leadership of Jovan Jovanovic and Milan
Gavrilovic, which was too static for his restless temperament
and too conservative for his socially progressive opinions.
Finally, he left the party and founded his own, the National
Peasant party. He based its program mainly on the idea of
a progressive peasant policy to improve the material standards
of the peasantry through radical land reforms, a cooperative
system, and social laws. He followed the agricultural policy
of the Soviet Union with great interest and made no secret of
his sympathies toward the Soviets at the time when they were
viewed with hostility by the Royal Yugoslav government.

Politically, however, Jovanovic strictly adhered to his demo-
cratic convictions. His political and intellectual influence sur-
passed the circles of his own party and his popularity became
too dangerous to the dictatorial government of Yugoslavia
under King Alexander. He was deprived of his university
position and sent to confinement for five years, at Sjenica. This
should have been good reason for his acceptance by the post-
war government of Marshal Tito.

His war-time story does not reveal much about his activities.
Tito himself acknowledged, in an article written in 1944 for

164 TITO'S COMMUNISM

the American press, that the group of Jovanovic belonged to
his first political alHes, in the summer of 1941. But later Jovano-
vic was denounced by Tito for his non-participation in the
Partisan war and his complete passivity toward the enemy. It
is true that he did not join the Partisan headquarters and stayed
in hiding somewhere in Serbia.

After the war, the Communist party, aware of Jovanovic's
influence and finding it impossible to brand a man with an un-
mistakable democratic record as a reactionary, accepted his
party into the National Front and assigned to him the function
of the secretary of the National Front of Serbia and made him
a member of the highest representative poHtical body, the
Presidium of the People's Assembly. The Communist leaders
thought that this would be the best way to appease and calm
his rebellious spirit and to let him serve the Communist purposes.

After a short time this proved to be a wrong calculation.
Dragoljub Jovanovic uttered some criticism in Parliament. He
started to object to the government's foreign policy which,
according to his opinion, was directed only toward the Soviet
Union. He also reproached the Communist party of Yugoslavia
for representing its friendship to Russia as a matter of one
party when the friendship should have been represented as
that of the whole Yugoslav nation.

He severely criticized the economic policy of the govern-
ment which carried out far-reaching reforms but did not inform
Parliament and the nation about them. As a member of the
Assembly he could not agree with a practice of the govern-
ment which put the budget before the legislative body in the
most general terms without any specifications and which ex-
pected it would be unanimously accepted after a short fake
debate. He asked consistently and repeatedly for more detailed
information about the economy of the country.

He attacked the government's policy in the sphere of cul-
ture which he considered to be of national importance and not
a matter to serve the objectives of the Communist party alone.

He burst into the most audacious criticism of the judicial
system of the new Yugoslavia, which was actually in the hands
of public attorneys serving the Communist ideology rather
than adhering to the principle of impartial justice.

THE OPPOSITION SILENCED 165

With two other members of the National Peasant party,
Jovanovic finally went into open opposition against the policy
of the Yugoslav government. This was, however, confined
only to parliamentary debates as no newspapers were allowed
to print the speeches he made, and he was forbidden to speak
at public meetings. Only people who were privileged enough
to get a seat in the Parliament knew about Jovanovic's position
and they could hear his statements with much difiiculty as
he was constantly interrupted by other members who tried
to silence him by shouts of "traitor, reactionary, spy, servant
of western imperialists."

The opposition of Jovanovic was not allowed to last for
long, though. As everything in a Communist country is done
"in behalf of the nation" the action against Jovanovic had to
start from below.

So, when Jovanovic, usually called only by his first name,
Dragoljub, returned one day to his constituency at Pirot, where
every child knew him and where he enjoyed great popularity,
a few Communist local agitators made it physically impossible
for him to appear before his political adherents. They com-
pelled him to return to the railway station, mobbed by young-
sters hurling insults at him and pelting him with rotten eggs.
He had to mount the train and return to Belgrade. The fol-
lowing day the newspapers carried a story that the inhabitants
of Pirot were angered at the mere appearance of Dragoljub and
that the national militia had to protect him from the fury
of the people.

A further step followed. People in the Pirot region were
presented with a declaration that Dragoljub was a traitor and
that they did not recognize him any more as their representa-
tive in Parliament. They were asked to sign it. Several
thousands did sign, the majority of them undoubtedly his
adherents of long standing. Once faced with the choice either
of joining in this public persecution or remaining faithful,
with all the consequences which such an act of courage would
have meant for them, they felt that the only thing to do was
to denounce their leader.

Measures which followed were a matter of routine. The
will of the nation had been ascertained, and it was considered

166 TITO'S COMMUNISM

a logical consequence that Jovanovid was no longer worthy
to speak on behalf of his voters. First, his own party, of
which he was the founder and the chairman, excluded him
from its ranks. His closest associates in the executive com-
mittee were compelled to perform this act of shame although
some of them did it gladly to satisfy their ambition to become
the leaders of the party. They later paid the penalty of
complete subservience to the Communist party.

Then, Dragoljub was excluded from the Parliament and
arrested, put on trial and condemned to eight years of prison
for collaboration with a foreign service of espionage and for
serving a foreign power.

The real background of Dragoljub's condemnation was
»'evealed to me by Minister Milovan Djilas, in his usual frank
way. It was shortly before the election for the Parliament in
Italy, in April, 1948, which was considered, and was later
proved, to be of historical importance. I met Djilas and asked
him what would be his guess about the results of the Italian
election. He answered: "I dg not think that the Italian
Communists and Neni's Socialists together will gain 50 per
cent. But if they succeed in receiving only 40 per cent of the
votes it will be a considerable blow to the government. Can
you imagine to what difficulties a government would be exposed
which has against its policy almost one-half of the nation?
It would be a very powerful opposition. We had in our Par-
liament one Dragoljub only and we could not bear him. We
had to silence him."

In the summer of 1947 Yugoslav public opinion was ex-
cited by another political process, this time held in the capital
of Slovenia, Ljubljana. Again a foreign power was involved,
Great Britain. Among the defendants was Professor Furlan, a
man well-known in England from World War II. He had de-
fended Tito and his Partisans against attacks of the Yugoslav
government in exile and had not missed an occasion to popular-
ize Marshal Tito in British political and intellectual society. He
sincerely believed in Tito's democratic convictions, and when
the war was over, was nominated a member of the local Slo-
venian government. After his first disillusionment with gov-
ernmental service, he left the government and his activities

THE OPPOSITION SILENCEl* 167

were limited to university life. He did not keep secret the
contacts he maintained with his old British friends which,
however, in the eyes of the secret police were acts of espionage.
Furlan was condemned to death but the sentence was later
changed to life imprisonment. Some of the other defendants
did not escape the rope. The issue was, as in all other political
cases, to warn every Yugoslav that there was no mercy for
people who cherished contacts, of whatever nature, with the
representatives of western powers.

In January, 1948, a trial was opened in another section of
Yugoslavia, in the capital of the Macedonian Federal RepubHc,
Skoplje. Seventeen men were put on trial for acts of espionage,
for preparations of terroristic actions, and for attempts to
overthrow the constitutional democratic order of Yugoslavia.
Among the defendants were two professors, one minister of
the Orthodox church, one former judge, two teachers, several
ofl&cials, businessmen, and two artisans. The prosecutors had
found out almost three years after the war that these people
had served the Germans and incited the members of the Turkish
minority against the Partisan fighting. Besides, they were ac-
cused of maintaining contacts with a foreign power, Turkey,
supplying the Turkish Consul with false information about
the situation in Yugoslavia, and developing, in agreement with
and aided by the Turkish Ambassador, activities against the
democratic authorities of the new Yugoslavia. They acted, it
was said, on the assumption of an approaching war which
would allow them to stab the Yugoslav Army in its back,
waiting for the invasion of the Americans and the British.
Four defendants were condemned to death and the rest to
jail for terms extending from four to twenty years.

Politically the most sensational trial was held in April,
1948, in Ljubljana. It was the first time in Communist Yugo-
slavia that members of the Communist party had been put on
trial. Fifteen well-proved Communists were accused of col-
laboration with the enemy during the war, of espionage for
western powers, and sabotage of the SociaHst economic order
of the new Yugoslavia. The majority of them had participated
as volunteers on the side of the Loyalists in the Spanish Civil
War, a record which by itself is considered good evidence of

168 TITO'S COMMUNISM

a political creed that can be relied on. Also during World
War II they were all in a concentration camp at Dachau, Ger-
many, where they founded a secret anti-Fascist organization.
After the Hberation, they were assigned to important functions
in the public administration and in the nationahzed industry.
One of them became Deputy Minister of Industry; others,
Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, university
professors, inspector-generals of the economy in Slovenia, etc.

The accusation stated that while in the concentration camp
all fifteen defendants had been in the service of the German
secret pohce, the Gestapo, that they had denounced other im-
prisoned patriots, had participated in the criminal bacteriological
experiments performed on poHtical prisoners, and that their
anti-Fascist organization had served as a cover for their crimes.
After the war, also, they had worked as agents of the British
espionage service which, it was said, had discovered their war-
time activities and threatened to hand them over to the Yugo-
slav authorities if they declined to serve its purposes. Further,
they were said to have sent information to the espionage centers
in Belgrade and in Vienna, Austria, about production and
economic plans in Yugoslavia, and had tried to hinder the
economic reconstruction and rise of Yugoslavia.

The main part of the trial was secret, but the sentence
was pubHc; eleven people were condemned to death and four
to jail to serve terms from twelve to twenty years. The con-
demnation was accompanied by the usual series of articles
attacking the obscure activities of the western powers against
the new, sociaHstic and democratic Yugoslavia.

The first half of 1949 widened the scope of pohtical pro-
cesses in Yugoslavia. Since Marshal Tito and the Communist
party of Yugoslavia have been expelled from the Cominform
and have been engaged in a life-and-death struggle against the
Kremlin, the tide of accusations of spying activities has turned
to the East.

In Macedonia, several Bulgarians were tried and condemned
for serving in the Bulgarian Army during the war and for
committing acts of cruelty against the population of the Yugo-

THE OPPOSITION SILENCED 169

slav part of Macedonia, which had been occupied by Bulgaria.
The Yugoslav authorities had not considered it opportune to
expose these crimes in a public trial when the two people's
democracies Hved in a deep friendship, but these considerations
were dismissed when Premier Georgi Dimitrov of Bulgaria
abandoned the policy of friendship and joined with other Soviet
satellites in attacking the Yugoslav party and Tito's govern-
ment.

Another political trial took place in April, 1949, in Novi
Sad, the capital of the Serbian province, Vojvodina. Again a
Communist power was involved — Hungary. Eight people were
accused of distributing anti-Tito leaflets in Yugoslavia and
spying for Hungary. They had been sent to Yugoslavia by
the Ministry of Interior of the Hungarian government which
was ready to free them of charges of fascism if they would
enroll in an espionage service for Hungary.

In December, 1949, ten Soviet citizens, former refugees,
were sentenced to from three to twenty years of prison for
espionage, on behalf of the Soviet Union. The following month
ten Albanian nationals were brought to trial for espionage,
subversive activities, and terrorism. In the spring, 1950, two
Yugoslav oflEcers, Major General Branko Petricevic and Colonel
Vladimir Dapcevic, were sentenced to twenty years for treachery
and espionage for Russia.

Some people are inclined to conclude from these political
trials held in Yugoslavia or in other Communist countries
that the totalitarian regimes are weakened and perhaps even
threatened by an underground opposition. They beHeve that
the political trials are an expression of a growing activity
against the government. I think they are wrong.

One should not fail to understand the purpose of these
trials. If people are for one reason or another pubUcly
accused and a public trial is held, it is not because the Com-
munists respect the basic principles of justice. The culprits
could be dealt with secretly, as is often the case. But the
pubhcity given from time to time to such trials follows a
distinctly political aim: it serves as a warning addressed to
three sections of public life — to the democrats, showing them
what kind of a fate awaits them if they dare raise their heads;

170 TITO'S COMMUNISM

to the Communists, when party members appear before a
tribunal, showing them that there is no mercy for those who
violate the iron party discipHne; and finally, to the diplomats
and foreign correspondents, showing them that they should
avoid any contacts outside the strictly selected group of ofl&cials
who have been given permission to seek acquaintance with
foreigners.

It is difficult to judge the real background of political
trials because the evidence produced is one-sided. The docu-
ments are not accessible and what is presented to the court is
carefully scrutinized so as not to make public what should
remain a secret of the Communist party. The defense of the
accused people is practically non-existent. The whole pro-
ceeding offers, therefore, a very partial picture.

I am of the opinion that organized opposition to a Com-
munist government within the borders of the country is actually
impossible. The broad masses may be, as they certainly are,
very hostile to the Communist usurpers of power and they
represent potentially a constant and great danger which, at a
moment of a culminating international conflict, might burst
into a national upheaval and finally tear the totaHtarian ma-
chinery to pieces. But in the time when the Communist gov-
ernment feels relatively safe from an external threat, no
organized opposition can grow and turn into a revolt from
the midst of the nations which live under its constant control.
The people can barely crawl under systematic personal and
economic oppression. They are tired and the notion of old
heroism aimed against tyrants, which so often used to fill the
pages of history, has evaporated from the spirits and bodies of
men who have to struggle for their daily life.

Modern techniques have given to a police regime many
advantages in detecting, following, and suppressing any sign
of opposition. In the old days, it was a simple matter for a few
audacious men to prepare secretly and execute an overthrow of
a bad ruler. Their movements passed unnoticed, their where-
abouts being uncontrolled. In modern times, however, rapid
means of communication have given to the police instruments
which facihtate the control of practically every corner of the
country. Administrative measures, enforced by these technical

THE OPPOSITION SILENCED 171

means, make it impossible for any individual to leave a town
and move somewhere else without permission. Otherwise, he
gets involved in a conflict with the law. The political monopoly
of the Communist parties makes it impossible for democratic
politicians to take an active part in public life and keep up the
spirit of discontent. And above all, there are too many rifles
in the hands of the Communists.

By years of practicing oppression, police methods have
been developed to perfection. This has been proved in the
last thirty years by the Fascist regimes in Germany, Italy, and
Spain, by the Communist regime of Soviet Russia, and more
recently by the Communist governments in eastern Europe.

It is a sad and discouraging assertion, but hopes and faith
should not be fed by wishful thinking.

POLITICS AND THE LAW

The Constitution: Citizens are guaranteed inviolability of
person. No person may be detained under arrest for longer
than three days without the written and motivated decision
of a court of law or of a public prosecutor. The maximvmi
period of detention is determined by law. No person may
be punished for a criminal act except by sentence of a
competent court on the basis of the law estabUshing the
competence of the court and defining the oJSfense (Article
28).

The law courts are independent in their dispensing of jus-
tice and mete out justice according to the law. The courts
are separate from the administration in all instances (Arti-
cle 116).

In the early days after the liberation of Yugoslavia,
Lenin's slogan that "splinters fall if a forest is cut down"
came to be a true and dreaded expression. The Partisan police
marched through the streets of Yugoslav towns, and people
were taken into custody without a warrant being issued or
without any reason being given. Revolutionary justice worked

172

POLITICS AND THE LAW 173

at full speed. Hundreds of people disappeared and were never
seen thereafter. Relatives were not told where the alleged
delinquent was nor what had happened to him. Perhaps a Par-
tisan officer would ask a former friend who was not then in
the Partisan movement what he had been doing during the war.
The answer to such a question could well mean disaster for
that friend. The state authorities needed only to receive a letter
reporting that somebody had not behaved properly for that
person to be removed.

In the newspapers and motion pictures official advertise-
ments were published, appeaUng to the nation to help the
national miHtia in finding collaborators. Denunciation was
officially encouraged. In a country where civil war had been
cultivated, hatred and personal vengeance beyond imaginable
Hmits were in full swing.

It is, perhaps, understandable that in cases of political de-
linquency the organs of justice were not always scrupulous in
proving guilt. Political trials are often based on subjective
judgment. But here I have in mind simple cases of justice
where no politics were involved.

Before people accused of a crime succeeded in being brought
to trial, they had to endure a long process of deaHng with
the secret police. The secret police, after the war called OZNA
and now UDB, are an all-powerful institution. People are ap-
prehended in the streets, in offices and factories, in their homes,
usually at night. If they are released, they are afraid to men-
tion their experience. The Constitution says the maximum
detention period is three days, at which time the police must
free the suspect or hand him over to the courts. This clause
has been violated a thousand times, but I do not know of a
case where a Yugoslav citizen appealed against the procedure
of the secret police. There is no lawyer who would dare act
as counselor to a man who is on bad terms with UDB.

Only reliable Communists can be members of UDB. They
are usually Partisans who have proved their devotion to the
party by fighting during the war. They are fanatical believers
in the Communist ideology and endorse fully one of the main
rules of communism: that every means is good and justified
if it serves the aim of Communist teaching.

174 TITO'S COMMUNISM

Members of the secret police are everywhere, in every
branch of life. They are also in every Yugoslav Embassy abroad.
They themselves are above laws.

A Yugoslav of Czech origin used to come to see me regu-
larly once every six weeks at the Embassy. Then he did not
appear for several months. When finally he came again, and
I asked him what he had been doing, he tried to avoid an an-
swer. I felt something must have happened to him. I inc^uired
whether he had been to Czechoslovakia to visit his relatives. He
only smiled and said that he would never get a passport and
permission to travel. I asked him whether he had not been ill.
He touched wood to show that as far as his health was con-
cerned everything was in order. Then, he murmured something
about having had too much work and that he would not be able
to come as often as before. I did not understand this man who
used to be jovial and talkative. He did not come again.

Immediately before my departure from Yugoslavia, almost
two years after I had last seen this man, another Czech friend
of mine came to see me. "Mr. X sent me to speak to you," he
said, "because he did not want you to leave without knowing
why he had not come to see you any more. He had been ar-
rested under the pretext that he had done some smuggling, but
they could not prove anything. The real reason why the secret
police had put him in jail was to frighten him, and then he was
ordered to spy on you as it was known that he used to visit
you. He promised to try but emphasized the fact that he was
no longer on good terms with you, because he disagreed with
your political opinion and, therefore, had interrupted contacts
with you. Before he was released he had to sign a statement
saying he would not tell anybody the reason for his absence.
This is the reason he tried to avoid your questions and why he
did not return any more. But he has sent me to tell you all
this now when you are about to leave as he would not like you
to feel bad about him."

I can tell this story without endangering my friends because
they are in Czechoslovakia now. There are many instances
similar to this, but I cannot tell them for the obvious reason of
the security of the persons concerned.

POLITICS AND THE LAW 175

One day I received a diplomatic note from the Yugoslav
Ministry of Foreign Affairs announcing that "a Czechoslovak
citizen who tried to cross the Yugoslav frontier illegally was
caught and, pending trial, arrested. He tried to escape," the
note said, "but the guard prevented him from doing so. The
Czech used some iron object and a fight started between the
two men. The guard had to use arms and in self-defense killed
him." That was the official communication, and nothing more.

I inquired incessantly whether a protocol had been written
about the death of the Czechoslovak citizen and said if there
had been I wanted to see it immediately, to learn whether the
guard had been summoned to trial and where the corpse of the
victim was. In spite of several queries I never received an an-
swer.

One night a member of UDB attempted to steal money from
a factory. He was discovered by the watchman so took out
his pistol and shot him. When the national miUtia came to ar-
rest him, he shouted, "Comrades, be careful what you are do-
ing, I am an UDB man." Three days later, people saw him
walking in the streets of Zagreb.

Immediately after the liberation of Yugoslavia, many peo-
ple escaped the attention of OZNA because the police regis-
ters had been partly destroyed and were also partly obsolete.
The secret police thus lacked detailed administrative material.
But this did not last for long.

The system of karakferistika soon covered almost all the
inhabitants. During the war, the Partisan authorities intro-
duced this system of identification called "the characteristic."
Anyone who applied for a government job or wanted to travel
had to ask for a recommendation from OZNA. The document
was not given to the applicant but sent to the employer or to
the Ministry of Interior which issued passports and travel docu-
ments.

This system later became a general practice. The karak-
feristika has become an identification paper which the citizen
never sees but which goes with him wherever he moves. At
present it does not list his wartime activities only, but his polit-
ical opinion as well. Finished is the man whose karakteristika
is negative. There is no hope for him to get a job.

176 TITO'S COMMUNISM

In a country in which the highest and only binding rule
is the law of communism, the courts must adapt their inter-
pretation of civil and criminal codices to the needs of the Com-
munist state. Judges are instructed that sentences must not be
in contradiction to the SociaHst form of Hfe.

Once on a holiday in Slovenia, I made the acquaintance of
a Yugoslav judge. He was an ardent Communist. I remarked
that I deplored the practice of the Yugoslav courts and told
him of some instances of outrageous injustice of which I knew
from my own official experience. I tried to convince him that
everything is at stake if elementary principles of justice are not
respected. The answer was a cynical laugh. Then he gave me
a lecture on Marxism and told me that my scruples were the old-
fashioned, bourgeois kind and that I failed to understand the
ideological background of the courts' activities. It is not the
role, as he put it, of a Communist tribunal to find out impar-
tially what is called justice in reactionary countries; its duty
is to contribute to the building up of communism.

Judges themselves are not independent in their office, ac-
cording to this man. Though they pronounce the formal sen-
tences, it is the public attorney who governs the proceed-
ings and instructs the court as to what sentence it should
pronounce.

The Yugoslav public attorney is, according to the Consti-
tution, also an organ which "exercises control over a proper
fulfillment of laws" (Article 124) and who "has the right of
complaint and accusation. . . and the right to apply for the de-
fense of legality" (Article 127). In fact he is an authority to
control the fulfillment of Communist law and to see that Com-
munist interests are respected.

These attorneys are always reliable Communists, often
young fanatics who are not qualified as good jurists but are
devoted entirely to the party. The judge would not dare act
against their proposals.

In the Yugoslav Parliament Dragoljub Jovanovic described
the situation of public attorneys as it existed in Yugoslavia:

It is the task of the public attorney to defend people,
their institutions, property, and their democratic rights and
freedoms. It is within his orbit to follow not only questions

POLITICS AND THE LAW 177

of criminal law but also of civil law ... to watch and
strengthen the conformity to law and to oppose an invalid
decision, whether it comes from a court, ministry, commis-
sion, or committee ... It is his duty to secure a good or-
ganization and functioning of the state administration.
All institutions must open their doors to him and put all
files at his disposal .... In our coimtry the pubHc attor-
ney also fulfills the function of an institution which in
America is called The Supreme Federal Court which esti-
mates the justice of individual laws and gives interpret-
ation of laws .... My question is whether our office of
public attorney is well-prepared for all this work, which
in other countries is carried out by federal courts and state
councils ....

The institution of pubUc attorneys in the present form
is something new. It exists only in the Soviet Union and
with us. But similar mechanisms of distrust existed before
in all regimes which were approaching their fall. At the
end of the Roman Empire all citizens were divided uito
"corporations" so that the state knew where everyone was
and what he was doing. Everywhere delatores were ac-
tive, following everybody in every move, reporting on
what he spoke, thought, and felt. The same happened in
medieval history.

The institution of pubUc attorneys is strange to our
nation when it restores an atmosphere of suppression and
creates a mechanism of distrust .... I want to defend our
regime before the attorney because it does not need him
as long as it does not continue in the tradition of old
regimes which were afraid of the people. I do not ask a
complete aboUtion of the public attorney, but I wish to
see the nation freed from fear of pubHc authorities and at-
torneys freed from fear of the nation.

A nation means much more than our activists think.
There are very few people in our country who are enemies'
of the new state of things and who would not be good
members of our community. Our regime is strong in its
basic forms. It is much stronger than its guardians think
.... It is, therefore, not necessary to keep the whole na-
tion in fear and mutual distrust because of some few per-
sons who, in fact, are not dangerous. The enemies of the
new order are floating on the surface but there is, on the
other hand, something which is deeply ingrained in our

178 TITO'S COMMUNISM

nation, and it is its longing for freedom, for a calm and
quiet life. Our people have a deep desire to be allowed to
work in the daytime and to sleep at night in peace. They
do not want to be accused all the time.

The net of public attorneys is wide. Besides the at-
torney of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia,
there are attorneys in every federal republic, every auto-
nomous region, every district and quarter of town. But
that is not enough. There exists also an institution of so-
called national attorneys. They are in the villages, fac-
tories, offices, institutions, in town streets, in homes, and
in schools. They are voluntary associates of public attor-
neys. The law, however, goes further: national attorneys
can organize around themselves groups of people to help
them in their work.

I thoroughly disagree especially with that part of the
law which takes the investigation of a delinquent from a
court and gives it to the attorney. I admit that it is a step
forward in comparison with the past when rights of inves-
tigation were in the hands of the poHce — and those of us
who were persecuted by the old regimes know what it
meant . . . But our leadership must go another step forward
and leave the whole process of investigation to the courts.

In our judicial system a public attorney represents
more than a party. In all law-suits, he is very powerful,
really all-powerful, and this especially in the courts of to-
day before inexperienced judges who are exposed to the in-
fluence of authorities and more experienced people. In
practice, the public attorney enjoys power with which the
Constitution did not want to entrust him .... There are
many people who perform public functions only formally,
but the real public authority is in the hands of the attor-
ney. He is all-present and almighty. He is jurist, politi-
cian, and artist. He is writer, doctor, and veterinary. He
knows everything and understands everything. He can do
anything and he wants everything. He is a member of
National Committees [local administration] and even a
member of executive committees with full rights. He
has advisoiy voice, it's true, but we know the effect of the
voice of a man with such powers as the attorney has. In
large and small towns, but especially in small communities,
he represents fear and horror. In the eyes of the people,
he represents the state.

POLITICS AND THE LAW 179

Finally, the public attorney has a quaUfication which
is not oflScial but actual. He represents the Party, the
state, the only Party, with a capital "P." There cannot
be opposition to the existence of poUtical parties, even
to a certain party [the Communist party], except under
the condition that it is not the only party. If one says
"party" it means a party to something. Therefore, a party
cannot be alone. It is physically and psychologically im-
possible. In our coimtry public attorneys are, without ex-
ception, members of the Communist party. The law does
not say anything about it, but it is the case in practice.
The institution of pubHc attorneys is similar to a dictator-
ship of one party. It secures a one-party system. I can-
not agree with it, because the one-party system is against
life itself, particularly against the tradition, spirit and
wishes of our nation ....

Dragoljub Jovanovic made this courageous speech in the
Yugoslav Parliament. Two months later in the spring of 1947
he was arrested, deprived of parliamentary immunity, put on
trial, and sentenced to eight years in prison for espionage for
a foreign (i.e., American) power.

It would seem that the work of the courts dealing with
property questions would not be aflfected by political systems
and regimes. But as the Communist theory and policy is deeply
interested in the liquidation of private ownership, courts have
a vast field of activity and a prominent role in the sphere of
property rights.

The Yugoslav government found different ways and means
of liquidating private property without applying the laws of
nationalization and without paying indemnities. Many owners
of factories were proclaimed and sentenced as "collaborators
with the enemy during the war" and their property was confis-
cated. The question whether the collaboration with the enemy
was forced or voluntary was irrelevant. If that question had
been considered the judge would not have been able to forget
that a factory could not work without the participation of
workers.

To accuse a worker of collabo' ition with the Germans
would be against the tactics of the Coxnmunist party which needs

180 TITO'S COMMUNISM

the working class in its revolutionary aims. Yet it must be said
that, not only in Yugoslavia but all over occupied Europe,
workers, who could by idleness have deprived the German war-
machine of military equipment of all kinds, never used strikes
to paralyze or weaken the German miUtary potential.

I do not reproach the workers for not striking against the
Germans; the odds were too heavy against them. But it is only
honest to state facts when all other classes of society in the
countries behind the Iron Curtain are condenmed for their be-
havior during the war.

In Zagreb an owner was accused of using his factory for
the benefit of the German Army. The defendant proved that
from the moment the Germans occupied Yugoslavia he had
not entered his office and that he had Hved in hiding somewhere
in the country. In spite of this he was sentenced and his fac-
tory was confiscated. The sentence was based on the grounds
that he had not fulfilled his patriotic duty which was, accord-
ing to the court, to stay in the factory and sabotage its pro-
duction.

In another case, three firms were asked, shortly after the
war, to present their bids for some work to the state authori-
ties. It was given to the cheapest firm and the other two were
accused of unlawful speculation, the owners put under arrest,
and their property confiscated.

In one region of Croatia, all mill owners were summoned
to the local authorities one day and accused of collaboration.
They were, however, advised that they could escape punish-
ment if they presented their mills as gifts to the state; in that
case they would be rewarded by the state by being appointed
managers of the mills.

I had to deal with questions of property laws officially and
to defend the rights of many Czechoslovak citizens who had
property in Yugoslavia.

There were several thousands of Czechoslovaks who had
moved to Yugoslavia before World War I or shortly after it.
They came as highly qualified workers, artisans, businessmen,
and small industrialists. They brought in their knowledge, dih-
gence, experience, and sometimes small capital. They began to
work humbly but, thanks to their abilities and considerable

POLITICS AND THE LAW 181

production possibilities in a naturally rich but technically un-
developed Yugoslavia, they succeeded in working themselves
up as managers and leading experts in Yugoslav mines and fac-
tories. Also, in many cases they founded their own businesses.
According to Communist terminology, they became bourgeois.

Some factories in Yugoslavia were in the hands of big
Czechoslovak industrial concerns and banks.

During the war these Czechoslovaks Uving in Yugoslavia be-
haved, in general, in an exemplary way. As Czechoslovakia
was occupied by the Germans already in March, 1939, many
Czech proprietors and managers, although in Yugoslavia, were
fired by the Germans long before the latter occupied Yugoslavia
in April, 1941. Many of them returned to Czechoslovakia.

Others devotedly supported the Czechoslovak patriotic
movement which organized secret transports of Czechoslovak
soldiers from Czechoslovakia through Hungary and Yugoslavia
to join the forces of the Czechoslovak Army abroad. Tito's
Partisans also received from them quantities of textiles, shoes,
sugar, and other supplies. Their factories often worked far
below the production capacity in defiance of German orders.

After the war almost all Czechoslovak industrial property
in Yugoslavia was speedily confiscated or put under sequester
of the state.

One day the Czechoslovak Consulate in Ljubljana sent me
a telegram revealing that a big Czechoslovak textile factory had
been confiscated and its two owners sentenced to death in ab-
sentia for collaboration with the enemy. They allegedly manu-
factured textiles for the German Army. I sent a message to
Prague and asked for particulars about the owners. The Czecho-
slovak Consul had not been informed that the trial would take
place nor had he been given the text of the sentence as he should
have been, according to an international custom and a con-
vention signed years ago between Czechoslovakia and Yugo-
slavia.

A few days later, I received a telegram from the Czecho-
slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs informing me that one of the
owners had not been in Yugoslavia for the last twelve years
and that the other had died in a concentration camp in Ger-
many, in the spring of 1941, when Yugoslavia was not yet at

182 TITO'S COMMUNISM

war with the Nazis. Thus, a victim of a concentration camp
was proclaimed collaborator. But these facts did not hinder
the Communist judge from sentencing both former factory
owners to death, because the ownership of a big factory was
at stake.

I protested vehemently against such a procedure and insisted
that an international scandal would come out of this case if the
error was not put right immediately. The answer of Minister
Kadric was, "Don't be angry, Mr. Ambassador, this is a revo-
lutionary justice. It works quickly. I shall put it right." The
sentence was abolished but the factory was still subjected to
confiscation because "if the owners did not collaborate the fac-
tory certainly did." There was no use to argue that the factory
had been under the administration of Germans.

In another case a Czechoslovak was sentenced to ten years
in prison and his factory confiscated. All interventions were
useless. But finally the public attorney proclaimed the solution
by saying, "But do you think that we are interested in your
man? If he gives up his property something can be done." The
following day an application for a revision of the trial was pre-
sented to the court, stating emphatically that the prisoner did
not require the restitution of his property rights. The revision
went as smoothly as could be and the defendant was acquitted
and released.

A Yugoslav law set up a principle that any judicial act com-
mitted under the pressure of the occupying powers was to be
considered null and void and a restitution of the situation as
it existed before should take place. In some Czechoslovak en-
terprises the Germans ordered the owners to "sell" the prop-
erty to a German industrial concern. Later, after the war, it
proved very diflEcult and sometimes impossible to convince the
Yugoslav authorities that they should act according to their
own laws. They insisted that the enterprise was of German
ownership and, therefore, subject to confiscation.

In cases of shareholding companies, it was impossible to
convince the Yugoslavs that it was unjust to confiscate a fac-
tory because a German manager maintained its production while
the shareholders, living somewhere in Czechoslovakia, had no
voice in the activities of their factory.

POLITICS AND THE LAW 183

Another effective way the Yugoslav state became owner of
vast properties was through the institution of the war profit
tax. The law prescribed that any property or increase in prop-
erty which had been gained in time of war should be considered
profit. This war profit was taxed 100 per cent. Special com-
missions were set up in towns and villages to investigate the
war profiteers, put them on trial and pronounce sentences. In
theory, it was possible to appeal to regular courts and, in 1947,
the whole problem was handed over to the competence of courts.

The procedure was simple. People were publicly urged,
in newspapers and motion pictures, to announce the names of
war profiteers. Denunciation flourished. Workers denounced
factory owners and managers; apprentices denounced shop-
keepers; have-nots denounced well-to-do neighbors. Class ha-
tred, one of the most powerful motives of Communist agitation,
grew. Commissions sat permanently. They did not study com-
mercial books and did not hear any experts. Evidence of one
or two witnesses presented by the attorney was suflScient to pro-
nounce a sentence on war profit, often amounting to tens of
millions of dinars. These were fantastic figures. The owner
was unable to pay the tax and the consequence was that the
state confiscated his property. Factories, shops, stores, artisan
workshops came into the insatiable grasp of the Communists.
Day by day in Belgrade one could see private shops closing down
because the owners could not pay the war profit tax.

A Czechoslovak sugar refinery was assessed 120,000,000
dinars of war profit by the commission. The representative of
the owner appealed to a regular court hoping that a tribunal
would have to respect at least the most elementary rules of jus-
tice.

The trial took place. The public attorney presented, his
witnesses — a worker, a coachman, and a railwayman. They had
to prove that the factory had made a big war profit and sold
sugar on the black market. The lawyer of the factory pre-
sented witnesses for the defendant — a director of the factory, an
accountant, another administrative employee — and offered proof
by commercial books and experts that the factory worked be-
low its capacity, that it had made no war profit, and that even

184 TITO'S COMMUNISM

its turnover did not reach the amount described by the commis-
sion as war profit.

The attorney proposed that the court decide about hear-
ing the witnesses of the defendant only after having Hstened
to the witnesses of the attorney. The court accepted his propo-
sition. The factory worker, coachman, and railwayman knew
nothing about the commercial side of the business and they
were able to testify only about things which were of irrelevant
value. But in spite of this, they answered questions under pres-
sure of the attorney so that the factory showed enormous profits.
After hearing them, the court decided that the case was suflS-
ciently clarified and that it was, therefore, not necessary to hear
the witnesses of the defendant. The proof by commercial books
was, according to the court's decision, inadmissible because it
must be assumed that in capitaHstic Yugoslavia and during the
enemy occupation the books were not kept correctly. A few
days later, the sentence was delivered in writing to the Em-
bassy. The war profit tax had been raised from the original
120,000,000 to 160,000,000 dinars. The value of the whole
factory did not amount to this figure.

There were many cases of this kind and to have accepted
the courts' decisions would have meant a loss valued in billions
for the Czechoslovak economy.

I intervened again and again but without success. The Yugo-
slav ministers argued that the courts were independent and the
government would be acting against the Constitution if it tried
to influence their work or change their decisions.

The Czechoslovak government, at that time still democratic,
was aware of its responsibilities to defend the interests of its
citizens. As the Yugoslav government at this period of con-
fiscation of Czechoslovak property wished to negotiate with
the government in Prague a long-term commercial agreement
to secure deliveries for its Five Year Plan, there was a possibility
of linking the Czechoslovak approval of the agreement with a
satisfactory solution of this painful problem of Czechoslovak
property. The governments of Britain, Sweden, and Switzer-
land had made such an agreement.

The Czechoslovak government did not use this opportunity,

POLITICS AND THE LAW 185

however, as it would have been in opposition to the spirit of alli-
ance which Hnked both countries closely together. But when
negotiations for long-term commercial agreement took place
in Belgrade early in 1947, the question of Czechoslovak prop-
erty in Yugoslavia was also thoroughly discussed.

Minister Kidric tried to delay every case by one means or
another. When the conversation reached a crisis, I remarked
that his tenacious attitude could not but influence, in general,
our trade relations with Yugoslavia. He understood. After a
struggle which lasted until four o'clock in the morning he
promised to send me a letter in which he would enumerate the
Czechoslovak factories which would be subsequently released
from confiscation, those from which the war profit tax would
be removed, and he also offered to declare that no new trials
would be set up against Czechoslovak citizens for collaboration
with the enemy.

But the fight was not entirely won. Experience showed
that a promise of an active minister did not offer full guaran-
tee that the promise would be turned into reality. Innumerable
difficulties arose. Local authorities did not receive the instruc-
tions in time. New trials were started. I intervened most em-
phatically, and this time it worked. An order by telephone
was strong enough to stop the proceedings of an "independent"
Yugoslav court in the middle of its work.

The case of the sugar refinery which was ordered to pay
160,000,000 dinars as war profit tax was among those which
Minister Kidric promised to settle by complete aboHtion of the
tax. I urged the renewal of the trial. After a sitting which
did not take more than thirty minutes, a decision was handed
down by which the original sentence was revised and no war
profit tax prescribed at all.

A case from a different sphere: In a large Belgrade hospi-
tal there was a famous chief surgeon. In the catastrophic lack
of doctors in Yugoslavia, this man meant everything for the
health of the capital. He had to perform on the average of
twelve operations a day. Out of the hundreds of operations he
performed in the two years after the war, he had the misfor-
tune to lose seven patients within a short period. He was ac-
cused of having neglected his duties because it was allegedly

186 TITO'S COMMUNISM

found that the instruments were not properly steriUzed. He de-
fended himself vigorously, and a professor at Belgrade Univer-
sity had the courage to write an expert report with the con-
clusion that the accused doctor was not responsible for the
death of seven patients. It did not help. The doctor was sen-
tenced to four years in prison. The case stirred up the spirit
of the town. Everybody criticized it severely.

What was behind this case? The accusation was based on a
denunciation coming from a Communist doctor who worked in
the same hospital and wanted to take over the surgery de-
partment. Because he was a member of the party the court be-
lieved he was right.

A few days after the sentence was passed, I met a doctor and
we discussed the case. " These people do not reaHze what harm
they are doing to the nation and to themselves," he said. "From
now on, we shall be afraid whenever we have to make a de-
cision about a patient. We shall not be sure that a Communist
will not accuse us of wrong treatment of patients. Next time,
if I must recommend whether or not an operation should be
performed, I shall hesitate to do so, and the surgeon will be
most reluctant to perform it."

On February 26, 1951, the Parliament opened debate on a
new criminal law. A voice of criticism was raised for the first
time from the ranks of the Communist party. Vladimir Ba-
karic, the leader of the Communists of Croatia, stressed, accord-^
ing to the New York Times^ the necessity of the law to pro-
tect the rights of citizens before those of the state. He also
criticized the practices of public attorneys. This was an un-
precedented event, but utmost caution is called for not to pre-
cipitate any judgment. The Yugoslav Constitution offers guar-
antees for human rights, but the deliberations of the courts
have been disastrous to them.

IM. S. Handler, February 27, 1951.

NATIONALIZATION OF
INDUSTRY

Before the war, Yugoslavia had less than 16,000,000
inhabitants, about 80 per cent of whom were peasants. The
natural resources were sufficient for the entire population to se-
cure a fairly comfortable Uving. Yugoslavia possesses agricul-
tural regions which are among the most fertile in the world;
other parts of the country, on the contrary, are very poor.
Among the former are Vojvodina, Srem, and Slavonia, while
among the latter are Montenegro, Herzegovina, parts of Bos-
nia, and Dalmatia. Yugoslavia is wealthy in minerals, possess-
ing all the precious raw materials with the exception of good-
quahty coal. Some regions are covered by vast old forests and
throughout the country there are innumerable water resources,
the Danube among them. Yugoslavia has a several-hundred
mile shore on the Adriatic Sea which opens a highway to the
world and also attracts thousands of tourists every year.

187

188 TITO'S COMMUNISM

Yet, the majority of the Yugoslav people have always lived
at a very low standard. Agriculture has been primitive; min-
eral resources have been left unexploited. The explanation can
be found in the history of Yugoslavia. The Serbs were domi-
nated by the Turks until the year 1804, while the other peoples
of Yugoslavia were subjected to Austro-Hungarian domination
until 1918. The oppressors were more interested in keeping the
natural abilities of the oppressed nations latent than in helping
them in cultural, technical, and material development.

The governments of independent Yugoslavia, between 1918
and 1941, are also to be blamed for having neglected the econo-
mic progress of the country. They did not grasp the impor-
tance of industry for the improvement of the population's stand-
ard of living. It was actually foreign capital which opened the
gates to the industriaUzation of Yugoslavia. Big British, French,
Swedish, German, and Czechoslovak firms established branches
or mixed companies, erected factories, and opened mines.
American capital was engaged to a smaller extent.

Parallel with the foreign firms some Yugoslavs, enlightened
by the experience of foreign investors, founded factories. The
foreign companies brought in a number of technical and ad-
ministrative experts and qualified workers under whose guidance
the ranks of domestic qualified labor were formed and grew.
Because of the participation of foreign capital, many technical
values were created on which the present Yugoslavia of Mar-
shal Tito depends.

The war deeply disrupted the economic structure of Yugo-
slavia. Mines were ruthlessly exploited by the Germans and
later inundated either by Tito's Partisans or by the retreating
German Army, und mine installations were demolished. Ships
and port installations were, to a great extent, destroyed. Nu-
merous factories were left in ruins or badly damaged by bomb-
ing or acts of sabotage. Rail bridges were torn down, and
tracks torn out. Rich forests in many sections of Bosnia were
burned. Hundreds of towns and villages were leveled to the
ground. Agricultural reserves were exhausted and a great per-
centage of the country's cattle and horses were killed. The fi-
nancial system was in chaos.

After the war the government authorized an ambitious plan

NATIONALIZATION OF INDUSTRY 189

of reconstruction and no effort was spared to place the coun-
try's economy in a working condition. Railroad bridges and
tracks were temporarily, but quickly, repaired. The work in
many factories was resumed; villages were temporarily built
up and — the greatest miracle — the Yugoslav currency, the di-
nar, escaped the danger of inflation. All these results were
achieved at a tremendous sacrifice and by the laborious efforts
of the population.

Before long, the government set its course toward a So-
cialist economy. The legal basis for the action was provided in
the Constitution: Its fourth chapter deals with the new social
and economic order of the country. According to it the means
of production can be in the hands of the state, cooperatives, or
private individuals. Mines and other mineral resources, and
communications — postal service, telegraph, telephone, radio,
waterways, railways, and airUnes — are all in the hands of the
state. The state arranges the direction of economic life by
elaborating a general economic plan, basing it upon the state
and the cooperative sector of the economy and pursuing a gen-
eral control over the private sector. Private property and enter-
prise are thus guaranteed. The inheritance of private property
is also guaranteed. Nobody is allowed to use the right of private
property to the detriment of the national community. Private
property can be limited or expropriated on the basis of the
law only.

The land belongs to those who work on it. A law fixes the
amount of land which can be owned by a person who is not
a peasant. Under no circumstances can vast agricultural prop-
erties be in the hands of private individuals. The maximum of
privately owned agricultural property is fixed by law.

After the war the Yugoslav government made good use
of the opportunity to avail itself of as much industrial property
as the chaotic situation and its political power allowed. It took
under state administration all foreign property which had to
be abandoned because of the war as well as the property of
Jews who were massacred or deported by the Germans. It con-
fiscated, of course, the property of the Germans. The property

190 TITO'S COMMUNISM

of collaborationists also fell under the action of confiscation,
regardless of its nature or size. All these measures brought a
fundamental change in the legal position of Yugoslav industry.

In a few weeks after the war, the Yugoslav state became
one of the largest owners in the world. It gained mines, fac-
tories, and smaller enterprises valued in the billions of dollars.
But this was only the beginning.

The Yugoslav government came to realize that it couldn't
succeed in taking over all the industry, and especially foreign
factories and mines, without introducing some legal measures
of nationalization.

One day in the autumn of 1946, foreign observers were con-
fused when they read a government decree, according to which
all industrial enterprises were divided into two categories: (1)
Enterprises of state significance. This category included every
object of industry considered by its productive capacity or spe-
cific nature important to the economy of the country as a whole.
(2) Enterprises of repubUcan significance. This category em-
braced almost every factory of local importance. The division
implied the control of production by the central Ministry of
Industry in the first case and by individual ministers of the re-
publics in the second case.

The names of factories were published partly in the central
official organ, partly in the organs of the republics. Nobody
knew at what the government was aiming, and questions were
answered in a way to signify it was a purely administrative
measure to make the control easier. Many factories had been
renamed, usually with some revolutionary title, without the
knowledge of the original owner, so that the tracing of the
fate of the factory became even more difficult.

In December, 1946, Parliament met and in one afternoon
session voted the Law about the Nationalization of Private In-
dustry in the Federal People's RepubHc of Yugoslavia. The
same day, representatives of the government entered all the en-
terprises which a few months ago had been declared of state or
republican significance, and took over, without any previous
notice or any explanation, the management. Now it became
clear what was the purpose of the autumn decree.

Every preparatory step for the nationalization was made in

NATIONALIZATION OF INDUSTRY 191

greatest secrecy. The owners of factories did not know any-
thing about the coming nationalization, and some diplomatic
missions, as far as foreign capital investments were concerned,
were repeatedly assured that the government did not envisage
such a poHcy. The day after the nationahzation was proclaimed,
factory owners read in the newspapers that their factories had
changed ownership overnight. Only a few reliable officials, who
prepared the text of the nationahzation law, knew what was
going on. The executive organs were simply ordered to take
over the management. Even the members of the Parliament,
which is supposed to be the highest legislative body, obtained
the information for what they were asked to vote only at the
moment when they found the text of the bill on their desks.

The government prepared in the same atmosphere of se-
crecy another bill and in April, 1948, put it before ParHament
for adoption. By this law, all credit and insurance companies
were nationaHzed, although previously all finance transactions
and insurance business had been run by the state. Further
on, the law nationaHzed all ships, fishermen's boats with a ton-
nage over fifty tons, transport ships for more than fifty pas-
sengers, all sanitariums, hospitals, spas, printing houses, motion
pictures, storage houses with a capacity of over a hundred
tons, and business cellars with a capacity of over three wagons
of goods. All immovable property of foreigners, including their
houses, was also taken over.

According to the declaration of Minister Kadric, the new
law nationalized 3,100 enterprises, among them 550 hotels and
530 mills, so that according to his declaration, there was no
longer in Yugoslavia an enterprise which had not been taken
into the SociaHst economy.

What was not taken by the nationalization laws, but still rep-
resented a certain economic value, was exposed to a law about
expropriation which gave the government the right to expro-
priate anything in the public interest.

As regards foreign property, the original owners had to
respect the law and they had to be satisfied with the provision
that they would receive indemnity. The interested governments
entered into prolonged negotiations, but so far only the United
States, Swedish, and British governments have succeeded in

192 TITO'S COMMUNISM

concluding agreements based on the idea of a global indemnity.

The laws of nationaUzation Hquidated the last renmants of
private investments in Yugoslavia. But even after the laws
were promulgated small workshops were nationalized, though
according to the law only those factories which were Usted as
enterprises of state or republican significance were subjected
to nationalization. Here again the original owners were assured
that, according to a provision of the nationalization law, in-
demnities would be paid them in due course. According to the
law, indemnity was to be fixed at the sum of actives of the
property on the day of the nationaUzation, and this was to
be exclusively stated by the new owner, the Yugoslav state.
There was another provision by which the state refused to take
any guarantees for the debts of the nationaHzed properties.

Though it would not be right to speak about a class of
capitahsts in Yugoslavia, because the country was industrially
undeveloped, their liquidation hit a considerable portion of the
Yugoslav population; it concerned not only the factory owners
but also owners of small workshops, artisans, and thousands of
employees who could not be depended upon not to sabotage
the nationalized industry and who were therefore deprived
of work.

The newspapers boasted of the government's success and
praised highly this decisive step toward socialization. The town
population, however, did not share the enthusiasm of the gov-
ernment propaganda. It felt that its daily life was getting
more and more closely connected with the state machine.

The fate of the victims of nationaUzation was not enviable.
They were deprived of sources of income, and the monetary
reform had taken from them almost all cash. Today, if they
are not in exile or in prison, they go here and there through
the streets of Belgrade, Zagreb, and Ljubljana trying to spend
the day somehow, without any work or any aim.

If the Communist regime boasts about having removed
any danger of unemployment, it can speak only about the
working class, and even that is not fully correct, as will be
shown later. It certainly does not take into account the un-
known number of people of the middle class who were thrown
out of their shops, workshops, and offices.

NATIONALIZATION OF INDUSTRY 193

Every observer of developments in Yugoslavia must have
been surprised when he read in the declaration of the Comin-
form, in June, 1948, that the Communist party of Yugoslavia
had abandoned the working class and refused to admit that
capitaHsts in Yugoslavia were increasing.

The Yugoslav Communists answered this accusation by
proving, statistically, that the capitalist elements were actually
liquidated. The official organ of the Communist party, Borba,
disclosed figures which otherwise would not have been access-
ible. It said that already in 1945, immediately after the war,
55 per cent of private industry had been nationalized by the
confiscation of the property belonging to collaborationists, 27
per cent had been taken by the state under a forced sequestra-
tion, and only 18 per cent was still allowed to stay in private
hands.

By 1947, after the promulgation of the first law about
nationahzation, 100 per cent of the industry of state or re-
publican significance had been nationalized, 70 per cent of
industry of local significance, all financial institutions, all whole-
sale stores, and 90 per cent of retailers.

By 1948, all industry was in state hands regardless of its
nature or size.

Concerning the handicrafts, 61.5 per cent worked without
any help and 38.5 per cent used both apprentices and paid
workers. The paid workers averaged only one to every two
workshops. All handicrafts were organized as cooperatives.

PLANNED AGRICULTURE

A SPECIAL SECTION OF THE FiVE YeAR PlAN IS DEVOTED TO

agriculture. The principle of a planned cultivation stresses the
obligation of peasants to cultivate products which the govern-
ment considers as most profitable from the point of view of the
national economy. Studies are being undertaken in that respect
and peasants are ordered what to cultivate.

The cultivation of crops for industry (tobacco, sugar beets,
hemp, flax, cotton) is particularly important not only for do-
mestic purposes but especially for export, for which the gov-
ernment plans to import the products of heavy industry. There-
fore, the Five Year Plan instructs the peasants to increase the
production of these crops to 2.4 times what it was before the
war, in 1939. The production of cereals is supposed to be
maintained on smaller areas by a more intensive agriculture.

194

PLANNED AGRICULTURE 195

The Plan counts further on extensive works of ameHoration,
irrigation, the draining of 400,000 hectares (988,400 acres),
reforesting 100,000 hectares (247,100 acres) of land, and on
providing forestry with tractors, trucks, locomotives, electric
saws, funicular railways. The Plan promises a high degree of
mechanization of agriculture by all sorts of agricultural
machines.

It is impossible to evaluate fully, at the moment of writing,
the first results of the Five Year Plan in the agricultural section.
As will be shown later, Yugoslav agriculture is undergoing a
fundamental change in its structure. Naturally, at such a time
there is not much incentive to increase production. However,
the statistics published in the second half of 1947, and em-
bracing the first half of that year, speak about a 100 per cent
fulfillment of the Plan in the field of agriculture.

The main question is how the Yugoslav peasant Hves. What
is his legal and factual position? Is he satisfied, and what is
his attitude toward the far-reaching changes he is passing
through?

As every peasant in the world, the Yugoslav peasant clings
to the land with a deep, exhausting, and often selfish love.
No work is too hard for him if his eyes can see his own fine
wheat. He is an individualist to the bottom of his heart. In
sweat and toil he plows, sows, and harvests.

Politically, the Yugoslav peasant is very intelligent, demo-
cratic, and highly conscious nationally. He is rather reserved
before any new inventions, though not conservative, and in-
ternally he maintains a sentiment of mistrust toward towns
and their population. The conclusion is that the Yugoslav
peasant can only be strongly anti-Bolshevik. How can he
comply with the laws which try to fetter everything for which
he has Hved and worked?

The basic laws of the agricultural life in Yugoslavia are
the Law of Agrarian Reform and Colonization, of August,
1945, and the Law of Agrarian Cooperatives. These laws ema-
nate from the principle that the land belongs to those who are
cultivating it.

After the war the state acquired scores of thousands of
acres of land which belonged to half a million German peasants

196 TITO'S COMMUNISM

who fled with the retreating German Army, and to some two
hundred thousand Hungarian peasants who crossed the frontier
to settle in Hungary before the end of the war. Vast agricul-
tural properties were gained by the confiscation of land be-
longing to big landowners who were declared collaborationists.
All this land was in the most fertile area of Yugoslavia.

More land was acquired by the state by confiscating the big
agricultural and forest estates which were larger than 35
hectares (86.48 acres). It took also the land properties of
banks, industrial enterprises, shareholding companies, cloisters,
religious societies, churches, and foundations, regardless of the
extent of the property. To owners of land who were not
working it, the maximum of 3 to 5 hectares (7.4 to 12.35
acres) only were left. The law allowed the peasant, who was
to cultivate the land by his own and his family's labor, the
maximum of 3 5 hectares (86.48 acres) of land as his personal
property. This policy amounted to a vast confiscation for
which the government did not pay a cent of indemnity.

Out of these areas of land the government created a Land
Fund which served as a basis for its policy of collectivization
of Yugoslav agriculture.

The Yugoslav government did not create, as the Soviets
did, the sovkhozes, i.e., big state-owned estates, though some
smaller estates were run by the Ministry of Agriculture as
model farms. It colonized the evacuated areas by internal
colonizers. It moved families from the poorest and mountainous
regions of Montenegro, Croatia, Bosnia, and Dalmatia, and
settled them in the plains of Vojvodina and Slavonija. In
some parts of the colonized country, the land was formally
given as private property to the newcomers in the maximum
amount of twelve acres; in other parts, the colonizers settled
in a village and formed a kolkhoz (collective farm) to which
the land belonged.

The policy of colonization is one of the most daring acts
of the Yugoslav government. It was a just and good policy
where people, who had had a very low standard of living be-
cause their land was poor and rocky, were brought down from
the mountains to fertile soil, which the war had left unoccupied.

PLANNED AGRICULTURE 197

This policy may pay later when the coming generation will have
become accustomed to the new circumstances.

But the results of the first years of colonization could only
be negative. A mountaineer accustomed to a primitive way
of Uving couldn't take the place of an experienced and hard-
working peasant. He did not like the hard work or the cHmate
of the plains. He did not know how to handle agricultural
machines and he did not appreciate living in clean and well-
built houses, which the former owners had left behind. There
are stories that the Montenegrin colonizers did not know how
to make a fire in a stove, and that they cut a hole in the roof
and built the fire in the middle of the living room.

On the whole, the colonizers felt unhappy in their new
settlement, and many of them secretly returned to their moun-
tain homes because of fear and homesickness.

The inevitable consequences of this kind of colonization
were that vast stretches of land were left uncultivated and that
agricultural production suffered most in regions which were
supposed to give the best results.

The government tried to find a remedy by sending in-
structors to the villages of colonizers, but according to many
reports, that did not help very much because old customs
were too deeply ingrained in their minds. Besides, the instructors
were poHtical agitators rather than agriculturalists.

The government, however, saw the main significance of
the colonization poHcy in another field rather than in that of
agricultural production. In many cases, it gave the land only
formally to the colonizers and the moment they moved in, it
instructed them to join or found cooperatives which were in
fact kolkhozes and did not differ from the Russian pattern
except in name. These cooperatives were meant to be a nucleus
for a general collectivization of the country.

The Communists thought that the cooperative system
would appeal to Yugoslav peasants as it had a good traditional
record. It had been the practice for decades for Yugoslav
peasants to organize themselves in cooperatives in order to buy
more easily agricultural tools, machinery, and other industrial

198 TITO'S COMMUNISM

products; to sell their own products, and to secure better condi-
tions of credit. And so they created buying, selling, and credit
cooperatives.

The new law about cooperatives enlarged the field of
cooperative activities and especially changed their purpose and
aims. The poHcy of selHng, buying, and credit has become
an exclusive right of the state and the original function of
cooperatives has thus become obsolete. They have ceased to
be defenders of the small holders who had formerly used them
to defend themselves from the competition of big estates, from
the unhealthy influence of the town, and from the financially
strong businessmen. They have changed into an institution
which facilitates the state authorities in controlling the peas-
ant's work, his financial position, the results of the harvest,
and the selHng of the agricultural products. The different types
of cooperatives were maintained but their activities are no
longer in the hands of elected officials. The whole control is
manned by Communist secretaries.

To the usual types of cooperatives a new type was added
by the Communist government, the peasant-working coopera-
tive. This has become the organizational basis of the agricul-
tural policy of the government.

According to the law the peasant-working cooperative is
made up of peasants who themselves work the land and bring
a part or the whole of their property as a deposit in the coopera-
tive. So far, there have been four different types of these
peasant-working cooperatives: (1) Peasants to whom land was
entrusted by the Land Fund form a cooperative which is also
formally its owner. The members of the cooperative are en-
titled to work on the land and, at the end of the year, they
divide the profit gained from the selling of the products. They
do not possess any property of their own. This type of co-
operative resembles the Russian kolkhozes and the official propa-
ganda considers them the ideal and most perfect form of a
peasant cooperative. (2) The members of a cooperative work
together on the land belonging to the cooperative, and are
allowed to own a small field or a garden around their house.
This type of cooperative has developed in some regions of
Russia. (3) Peasants give up "voluntarily" the ownership of

PLANNED AGRICULTURE 199

their land in favor of the cooperative which they found. They
all work together, dividing profits exclusively on the basis of the
productivity of their individual work, regardless of how large
their farm was. (4) This type of cooperative differs from the
previous one only by methods of dividing profits which, in
this case, are based on how much land was brought to the
cooperative by a member.

The land reform, colonization, and cooperatives laws
gave the government a powerful weapon, making it possible
to change the structure of Yugoslav agriculture. In Slovenia,
for instance, according to official statistics, 417,199 acres had
been before the war in the hands of 88,500 small holders. That
means that in this mountainous part of the country one family
had, on the average, less than 5 acres of land. This could not
provide a Hving. On the other hand, there were in the country,
1,308 owners of what in Europe are considered large estates,
possessing together 416,850 acres of land, which means an aver-
age of 3 1 7 acres per family. In the fertile regions of Voj vodina,
some people owned more than 2,500 acres, though the fertility
of the country gave a decent standard of living with even 30
to 40 acres.

By the end of 1946, the Land Fund had acquired 1,549,632
acres of land from the German and Hungarian minorities and
from collaborators whose land was confiscated. Out of this
Fund a third, 448,897 acres, was distributed among agricul-
tural workers and the smallest peasants as private property.
This represents an average of two acres for one family which
was insufficient for providing a living. So, this newly created
proletarian peasant had to seek it elsewhere. Other peasants
were not, however, allowed to take him as an agricultural
worker, because the law decreed that every peasant must work
only by himself on his own field. This was the surest way to
create a class of agrarian proletarians who saw their only sal-
vation in creating or joining a kolkhoz which would give them
hope that by the collective cultivation of the land they could
achieve better production.

Two-thirds of the Land Fund property was still free to
be used for the government policy of collectivization. ^This

200 TITO'S COMMUNISM

land was partly distributed among the peasant-working co-
operatives, in other words to kolkhozes, and partly given to the
colonizers. To 65,775 colonizer families were given 3 59,729
acres of land, roughly, 5 acres for one family.

Peasants who owned more than the smallest pieces of land,
but no more than 86.48 acres, had to be, at least temporarily,
calmed by the law which offered them a guarantee of private
ownership. The amount did not exceed in the most fertile
regions an average of 25 acres.

To make the life of individual peasants hard and to ease
the work of cooperatives, the government soon introduced a
number of provisions which made a drastic discrimination in
the policies between the cooperatives and individual peasants.
It gave to the cooperatives various privileges. It provided them
with agricultural machinery, cattle, and chemical needs. It
offered them favorable credit and markets to buy various com-
modities.

What is the life of individual peasants like? After the
Land Reform cut their land down to 86.48 acres, there could
not be any capitaKsts or exploiters among the Yugoslav peasants.
The law does not allow them to hire help, so they are forced
to work hard, very hard.

The Yugoslav peasant is not a master on his own land. He
may be still formally the owner, but a number of laws and
other measures have deprived him of the right to dispose freely
of his property, have ordered him what to cultivate, what
amount to sell to state authorities, and for what price.

In March, 1948, the Yugoslav government published an or-
dinance forbidding any transfer of property rights over im-
movables and any mortgage of immovables without the consent
of the state authorities. The Yugoslav citizen cannot, therefore,
either sell or buy a field or a house; he cannot borrow money;
any change of his material status depends on the good will of
the authorities. Thus, the state has acquired complete control
of the peasants' immovable property.

Foreigners are not allowed to acquire immovables at all.

According to another government decree, the property in

PLANNED AGRICULTURE 201

Yugoslavia of a Yugoslav citizen who has acquired the citizen-
ship of another country is forfeited in favor of the Yugoslav
state without any indemnity. This measure has been directed
against thousands of Rumanians, Bulgarians, Italians, Czechs,
and Slovaks who either emigrated or wanted to emigrate to
their mother countries.

The Yugoslav peasant is not free to move. He is obliged
to stay where he is and to work where he lives. Even if his
material position would allow him to move, he cannot do so
without exposing himself to the loss of his land which, accord-
ing to the Land Reform, can belong only to people who work
on it personally. And he is forbidden to sell it.

Another measure instructs the peasant how to cultivate the
land properly. In 1947, a decree was issued about an obHga-
tory sowing of the land, forbidding the people to let it lie
fallow. The government fixed periods in which every peasant
was obliged to sow his field. Persons who would not comply
with this obligation would be open to condemnation according
to the Law about Forbidden Business, Speculation, and Sabotage,
and their property would be confiscated.

The Yugoslav government also decrees the kind of culti-
vation and demands an obligatory sale of cereals and cattle
for fixed prices to the state authorities.

The government elaborates every year a plan in which it
sets up preliminary figures of agricultural production. Basing
its calculations upon information from local authorities about
the productivity of the soil and technical and other abilities
of the peasants of a certain region, the government prescribes
to each federal republic a quota of production specified for
each branch of agriculture. This general plan goes to the gov-
ernments of the republics which work out the details for
every district, and so it comes down to the village authorities
who tell every peasant in a very clear way how much he is
expected to harvest in wheat, cotton, or other crops; how many
pigs and cows he must have at a prescribed period.

Wheat production is planned in every detail. When the
harvesting is over the peasant is obliged to hand over to the
state authorities a large part of the harvest which he was
expected to raise according to the official figures of production.

202 TITO'S COIVIMUNISM

He receives in return partly cash, partly bonuses for which
he can buy industrial products needed in agriculture. He is
allowed by law to retain a small part of the harvest, but this
does not exceed the bare needs of his family.

This planning and organization of obligatory agricultural
production requires an enormous bureaucratic apparatus. In
the federal, republic, district, and local ofl&ces thousands of
people are employed to work out the plan, and perhaps tens
of thousands are needed to take part in the final disposal of
the harvest. Special attention is devoted to political propaganda.
Agitators of the party travel from one village to another and
they arrange meetings in which they explain to the peasants
the purpose of agricultural planning and obligatory sale. They
try to convince them of the pohtical and economic importance
of these measures and of the practical advantages they bring
to agriculture and the peasants.

The newspapers pubUsh daily information about the deli-
vering of the quota in certain villages and regions. Pictures
are carried of peasants who exceeded the amount of their obli-
gation, and a spirit of competition is introduced to see which
community or region will be first in fulfilling this national duty.

Local political authorities are ambitious to outstrip realities,
and as a consequence the general Plan is often wrong and un-
just. People who work on its elaboration lack, in many cases,
expert knowledge, and then, being educated in Communist
theory, they have a deep mistrust of the peasant. They assume
the peasant would deceive the authorities by submitting too
low figures about the conditions of production and about pro-
duction itself. They proceed, therefore, intentionally one-sided.
They fix the preliminary figures of the harvest too high and
the consequence is that the obligatory quota is too high, sur-
passing reality. The state authorities who work at these plans
do not always make corrections even when the harvest is af-
fected by unfavorable weather or suffers from some unexpected
misfortune. (In 1950, Yugoslavia was hit by a catastrophic
drought which did compel the authorities to reduce the quota.)

I followed the problem of Yugoslav agriculture under Tito's
government with special and systematic attention, because I
considered it the central political problem. I was well informed

PLANNED AGRICULTURE 203

about the situation in the villages. The Czechoslovak minority
in Yugoslavia consisted mainly of peasants. I often used to re-
ceive delegations of Czechs and Slovaks and I often went to
visit the Slovak villages which were not far from Belgrade. I
knew of heartbreaking cases in which honest and industrious
peasants were driven to desperation.

They were instructed to produce wheat in a quantity which
the soil could never yield. No interventions were of use. To
avoid dispute they often handed over to the authorities even
the part of the harvest which they were allowed by law to re-
tain for their family. Or they sold to the state grain which they
were supposed to retain for sowing next season. They knew
their fate if they did not fulfill their duties.

The government admitted that peasants were arrested for
failing to act according to the decree. Accusations of sabotage
were attached to such failures. In fact, thousands of peasants
were arrested at the time of the delivering of the wheat. They
were kept in prison for a fortnight, threatened and tortured,
and then they were released on the condition that in a week's
time they would bring the quantity of wheat which they had
failed to hand over before. If they did not come back, they
were told, they would serve a sentence of one year or more in
prison.

Sometimes it happened that the condemned and condition-
ally released peasant would go to the kolkhoz in the neighbor-
hood and buy the wheat from it, for an illegally high price.
Often he would sell to the kolkhoz his most precious possession,
his horses, to provide the wheat and avoid prison.

The severity of these measures went so far that in some re-
gions the state authorities raised the quota rates several times
regardless of the results of the harvest. They would, for in-
stance, fix the first estimate of production at twelve bushels per
hectare; then they would raise it to twenty- four bushels and
then again to thirty bushels.

Similar measures of control and obligatory quotas were in-
troduced in the raising of cattle and pigs. As, however, this
kind of agricultural production cannot be so easily controlled
as the wheat production, the government often changed its
policy. Once it ordered a quota only to abolish it a few months

204 TITO'S COMMUNISM

later. The frightened peasants were convinced that it was only
a scheme to find out how much they raised. They were, there-
fore, careful not to fall into the trap and did not raise more than
necessary. The result was that the production did not rise and
ordinary consumers suffered from a lack of meat. At the be-
ginning of 1949, the government authorities suddenly confis-
cated the pigs all over the country.

The cooperatives are subjected to a different pohcy. Their
quota obligations are considerably lower than those of indivi-
dual peasants. It is not difficult for them to fulfill their require-
ments. Newspapers and political speakers can praise their ef-
forts and prove to the public that collective farming brings
better results than individual agriculture.

For a long time it was impossible to find out how many
Yugoslav peasants or families had entered the kolkhozes. The
Yugoslav government did not issue any statistics on the sub-
ject. Only occasionally published information would reveal
that the collectivization had been proceeding on a large and ac-
centuated scale.

Marshal Tito announced in his New Year's message of 1948
to the Yugoslav nation that the Five Year Plan was fulfilled in
the area of cooperatives by 146.4 per cent, and that there were
at that date 10,296 cooperatives of all types in the country. As
far as the peasant-working cooperatives were concerned, the
number of 400 in 1946 was raised to 783 in 1947. The Croatian
Prime Minister, Vladimir Bakaric, announced that at the be-
ginning of 1948 in Croatia there were 143 kolkhozes embracing
2,3 58 families, with the ownership of 33,664 acres of land. This
represented a double increase in comparison with 1946. He
stressed on the same occasion, speaking to a congress of the
peasant-working cooperatives, that members of this type of as-
sociation represented the most progressive, the best educated
section of the agricultural class, and that they formed the most
suitable type for removing the inherited backwardness of agri-
culture.

Under the pressure of the Cominform accusation, the Yugo-
slav propaganda service finally published a booklet in which
the following figures were quoted: In 1945, there were in Yugo-
slavia 31 peasant-working cooperatives, including 1,736 house-

PLANNED AGRICULTURE 205

holds; in 1946, the figures rose to 454 and 25,062 respectively;
in 1947, to 774 and 40,590 respectively; in 1948, to 1,318 and
60,156 respectively; and on May 1, 1949, there were in Yugo-
slavia 4,197 peasant-working cooperatives with 210,920 house-
holds. According to a newspaper report,^ 41 per cent of the
richest land in Yugoslavia, in Vojvodina, was collectivized. The
Communist paper Borba announced in October that by the
middle of September, 1949, there were in Yugoslavia 5,000 peas-
ant-working cooperatives, containing 250,000 households, with
a total of 3,459,400 acres of land. In March, 1950, the Minis-
try of Interior announced that there was at that time 25.9 per
cent of the total arable land in Yugoslavia in the hands of peas-
ant-working cooperatives and state farms. The number of co-
operatives was 6,798, embracing 3 53,872 families.

It is difficult to give credit for accuracy to official Yugoslav
statistics, but it can be at least safely stated that the process of
Communist nationalization of farming has been systematically
pursued.

It is hard to find an explanation for the accusation which
the Cominform addressed to the Yugoslav Communist party
in June, 1948, when it objected to the fact that the Yugoslav
government was giving support to the kulaks and to reactionary
and individual peasantry. This fact only reveals that the real
background of the Cominform outburst against the Yugoslav
comrades lies somewhere else than in the ideological field.

It would be wrong to say that the situation of the Yugoslav
peasants is desperate. Psychologically, it is at best very depress-
ing. But politically, the village is bound to escape much of the
constant control exercised by Communist secretaries in the
larger towns. Materially, the situation has not yet brought
starvation to the peasants.

Poor peasants in the mountains live no better than before.
Nothing has changed in respect to their material standard. If
anything, their misery has been increased by the loss of personal
freedom.

The peasants living on the plains are certainly much worse
off than before the Communists fettered them with a series of
laws and decrees and made their work harder than ever before,

ilslew. York Times, April 20, 1949.

206 TITO'S COMMUNISM

but they can still secure a living. They do not need to suffer
from the lack of essential food as the town population does.
They do acquire some money or commodities other than food
when people living in towns come to them to buy the flour,
butter, and eggs which they do not get with ration cards or
get only in insufficient quantities. The barter system has be-
come a widespread custom and the peasants often prefer to be
paid by clothes, china, glass, and silver. So it happens that a
peasant stores in the garret two or three pianos which he re-
ceived from the townspeople for pigs. On the whole, the Yugo-
slav peasants do not belong to a class which would materially
suffer most.

Yet the Yugoslav peasant is the most obdurate enemy of
the Communist regime. He has a deep suspicion toward any-
body who tries to Hmit his personal freedom. Personal dignity
he cherishes above everything else. He also has a feeling of
greater resistance to the pressure of the authorities than other
sections of the population because the soil is his background.
He knows that the nourishment of the population and the suc-
cess of the government policy in other economic fields depend
upon his work. He can never accept the teaching of commu-
nism because he sees it is against everything that he was taught
to live for. He is aware that an all-out collectivization is the
final aim of the government policy and he will never accept it
spontaneously. But he will not be able to oppose it effectively
because his resistance lacks organization. In that respect he is
in the same position as the townsfolk.

THE FIVE YEAR PLAN

The law about the Five Year Plan of Development
of National Economy of the Federal People's Republic of Yugo-
slavia was prepared politically, organizationally, and technically
for many months before it was published. Its authors were
given basic lessons about economic planning in Moscow. In the
spring of 1946, Boris Kadric, the secretary of the Communist
party of Slovenia and Prime Minister of this province which
was industrially the most developed among the Yugoslav re-
pubhcs, left with a staff of economic and technical experts for
Moscow to study the system of the Soviet economy. The pub-
lic did not know about this trip, which was supposed to be se-
cret. The first news about the idea to run the Yugoslav econ-
omy on the basis of a planned economy was published in June,
1946, when Marshal Tito returned from a three weeks' offi-
cial visit to Moscow, and an official announcement informed the

207

208 TITO'S COMMUNISM

Yugoslav nation that a plan had been prepared for a close eco-
nomic collaboration between Yugoslavia and Soviet Russia.
Shortly afterwards, Kidric left Slovenian local poHtics and was
appointed Minister of Industry in the central government, and
chairman of the even more important Economic Council.

To open a planned economy, it was first necessary to lay
down a certain organizational basis. Late in the spring of 1946,
a Law of the State Economic Plan was promulgated and new
institutions were established and entrusted with the task of
planning. The highest body to prepare and work out the Plan
was the Central Commission of Planning, to which all state au-
thorities and all enterprises were ordered to give any information
which might be required. Within every state government, local
Commissions of Planning were established. The powers of the
Central Commission went so far as to be able to give to any
member of the government an order to suppress any measure
which would be in contradiction to the economic plan.

The Chairman of the Central Commission of Planning, He-
brang, gave me the following information about the Plan: "We
asked every enterprise to supply us with information about its
capacity and the status of production. This gave us basic
figures for our task. Then, we set up aims of production and
fixed the task of individual factories, counting either on their
enlargement or bigger allotment of raw materials and thus, on
an increase of production or, in some cases, according to the
needs of the envisaged plan, on a limitation of production. Then,
we fixed how many new factories would be erected and how they
would be successively opened for production. This was the ba-
sis for elaboration of the Five Year Plan.

"In the second phase, we fixed figures of production in the
individual sections of industry for the whole of Yugoslavia, and
we counted how much of the basic raw materials would be
needed to achieve these figures of production. The result of this
phase of the work gave us general figures of a plan of produc-
tion and consumption of raw materials for the whole country.

"Then, we divided these figures in two categories: one
which concerns the general management of production which
is under the control of the central Ministry of Industry, i.e.,
which is economically, financially," and administratively under

THE FIVE YEAR PLAN 209

the centralized competence of this Ministry, and the other which
concerns production under the competence of the individual re-
publics. To the governments of these republics, we handed an
elaborated plan of production and consumption of basic raw
materials as we envisaged them.

"The whole plan was first worked out for a period of five
years and then divided into individual years according to the
growing production as foreseen by us. With this, the initial
task of the Central Commission of Planning was finished.

"The general managements of the central Ministry of In-
dustry and the individual ministries of the republics then pre-
pared detailed plans within the limits of their competence. They
divided the figures of production and consumption of basic raw
materials among all the enterprises for a period of one month.
Every enterprise received an order stating how much it is pre-
scribed to produce and consume in raw materials during a
month. Every factory then divided this task into daily tasks."

This was the information offered by the author of the Five
Year Plan. It sounded simple and logical.

After one year of intensive work in which hundreds of ex-
perts participated, the Five Year Plan Law was solemnly pro-
claimed on April 28, 1947.

It is a book of economic figures. In its introduction it is
boldly stated that the main purpose of the Plan is to liquidate
the economic and technical backwardness of the country, to
strengthen its economic and defensive power, to aid the Social-
ist development in economic life, and to increase the general
prosperity of the working people.

To be able to judge the magnitude of the Plan it is necessary
to quote at least some of its figures:

The national income has to double, after five years, in 1951,
what it was in 1939, reaching the figure of 25 5 billion dinars
(5.1 billion dollars). The state has to invest in the national
economy 278.3 billion dinars (5.566 billion dollars) in five
years. The value of production in general has to rise from the
prewar 1939 value of 116.3 billion dinars (2.326 billion dol-
lars) to 266.7 billion dinars (5.335 billion dollars). The value
of the industrial production has to rise from the prewar 25.5
billion (.51 billion dollars) to 126 billion dinars (2.52 billion

210 TITO'S COMMUNISM

dollars). The production of coal, for instance, has to rise 273
per cent, oil 450 per cent, pig iron 550 per cent, steel 350 per
cent.

In the area of agriculture, according to the Plan, the pro-
duction of plows must reach, in 1951, the figure of 68,000 and
outstrip the prewar production ten times. Agricultural pro-
duction must rise 20 per cent above the prewar figures.

The Plan further orders the state to see to an uninterrupted
rise in the productivity of labor. It envisages a system of tech-
nical and economic normalization of production. It requires
the most severe economy of raw materials and fuels, and fore-
sees that through all these measures production prices will be
reduced during the five years in all sections of industry, build-
ing industry, and transport from 25 to 40 per cent. The work-
ing masses must be mobiHzed to the highest possible ejBficiency
by methods of competition. Their salaries are to be based on a
system of differentiation. The food rationing of workers and
their housing must be improved and special attention is to be
given to the education of cadres.

The population must be supplied with articles of daily con-
sumption, especially with food, clothing, and shoes. The Plan
envisages the production of eight milUon pairs of shoes a year.
To achieve the fulfillment of this part of the Plan Hght indus-
try factories have to be built.

The production of lard is to increase one and a half times
in comparison with 1939, sugar more than twice, textiles more
than twice, shoes more than two and a half times, and furni-
ture four times. The retail turnover of goods of this kind is
to reach the value of 102 billion dinars (2.04 billion dollars) in
comparison with 5 5 billion dinars (1.1 billion dollars) in 1939.

A new system of distribution must be organized and com-
mercial expenses are to be lowered to 10 per cent under the
retail selling price.

The sum of 5.9 billion dinars (.118 billion dollars) is to be
invested in the construction of new schools and 5.4 billion di-
nars (.108 billion dollars) in the construction of 110 new hos-
pitals.

The Five Year Plan gives a detailed picture of the produc-
tion of the individual branches of the national economy as it

THE FIVE YEAR PLAN 211

was in 1939 and also the figures which are to be achieved in the
last year of the Plan, in 1951. In all sectors a substantial in-
crease is envisaged; in the production of coal 250 per cent,
black metallurgy 344 per cent, colored metallurgy 157 per cent,
electricity production 400 per cent, metallurgical industry 688
per cent, electro-industry 1,000 per cent, chemical industry
911 per cent, building industry 113 per cent. The value of ar-
tisan production must increase 150 per cent.

To achieve these aims a number of power plants are to be
erected; old constructions have to be modernized; new fac-
tories must be built and new production introduced, such as
the production of trucks, tractors, locomotives, boilers, build-
ing machines, tool machines, pipes, synthetic rubber. The min-
ing industry is to be enlarged. Transportation is to be improved
and several thousand miles of new tracks constructed. Sea and
river navigation and air transport must be considerably in-
creased.

The number of quahfied workers must rise from 350,000
in 1946 to 750,000 in 1951.

The material standard of the working population is to be
raised by increasing the value of wages and by lowering the
prices of goods for daily consumption.

Individual enterprises must provide detailed reports about
their work, the production and consumption of raw materials
and fuels, and also must ensure the productivity of the produc-
tion and the lowering of its costs.

The Plan deals separately with the problem of different eco-
nomic standards existing among the republics, and it takes care
of the task of helping the backward regions.

The increase in the standard of living will offer in 1951 the
following picture: the Yugoslav citizen will receive the same
quantity of cereals as he did in 1939, 113 per cent more fats, 215
per cent more oil, 111 per cent more fish and meat, 200 per
cent more textiles, and 200 per cent more shoes.

The production prices in mines must be decreased by 31
per cent in comparison with those of 1946, industry by 25.2
per cent, transportation by 33 per cent, and the productivity
of labor must increase in the same sections of economy by 90

212 TITO'S COMMUNISM

per cent and 66 per cent. (No statistics are given for the section
of transportation.)

Such are the main features and aims of the Five Year Plan.
They certainly represent a revolutionary move in the structure
of Yugoslav economy. An agricultural country is to be trans-
formed in a period of five years into an industrial country. And
it has already been announced that after the fulfillment of the
first Five Year Plan a second and third plan are to follow.

The Plan is concentrated mainly on mines and factories.
Agricultural production is to be intensified but without sub-
stantial investments. The final aim followed by the Plan is to
achieve an economic self-suflSciency in the area of heavy and
light industry and to maintain the self-sufficiency in agricul-
ture as it existed before.

If, in 1951, investments are to amount to 278.3 billion di-
nars and if, as it is envisaged, they represent 27.3 per cent of
the whole national income, the first question which arises is
where will the government get the financial means to cover
such enormous investments?

Yugoslavia does not possess the means of production to
bring about such a vast and universal program of investments.
To raise the production of the mines she needs new installations
which can be provided only from abroad. To improve the ca-
pacity of the ports, to found new factories and enlarge old ones,
she needs tools and machinery of heavy and light industry,
which she, again, has to import. Her own factories for machine
production are small, few, and of low standard. That means
that the Yugoslav Five Year Plan depends almost entirely on
foreign trade.

Lacking, naturally, foreign exchange or gold, Yugoslavia
can provide all these products only by exporting her own prod-
ucts. If the investment program reaches on the yearly average,
5 5.66 billion dinars (1.1132 billion dollars) and its fulfillment
depends almost entirely on import, it is not difficult to discover
the figure the Yugoslav export should have to achieve to cover
the needs of Import. A loan from the West was out of the

THE FIVE YEAR PLAN 213

question before Marshal Tito's conflict with the Cominform.
The eastern countries were unable to offer it to the Yugoslav
government because of their own financial difficulties.

The Yugoslav government does not publish any statistics
about the Yugoslav exports and imports, and it does not pub-
lish any information about the content of trade agreements.
It is, therefore, impossible to state reliably what has been the
Yugoslav export and to what extent it has covered the govern-
ment's needs as envisaged in the Plan. According to some con-
fidential information, it can be stated that in the first two years
of the Plan, in 1947 and 1948, the export did not reach the fig-
ure of 10 billion dinars a year (200 million dollars).^ If the
main part of the huge 5 5 billion dinars a year investment pro-
gram has to be supplied by import, it is not illogical to conclude
that it cannot be fulfilled.

The figures of the Five Year Plan are very impressive but
after one tries to find an answer to this first, most important
question, one doubts whether its authors had both feet on the
ground when they worked out the Plan.

The Plan itself was worked out in a way which lacked re-
sponsible seriousness in an economic field. Mistakes were com-
mitted from the beginning of the preparatory work. I have
learned from people who worked in factories that the first fig-
ures concerning the capacity and actual status of produc-
tion were unrealistic. The Communist managers of the fac-
tories had the ambition to report to Belgrade very high figures,
which were not based on correct and conscientious analyses.
They did not consult the experts of the factory because of lack
of belief in their zeal to see the factory at its best production,
and they gave too high figures of production possibilities and
too low figures of consumption of raw materials, just to meet
the expectations of their bosses in the capital.

The same process of wrong evaluation of the Yugoslav in-
dustry was repeated on a higher level, in the Central Commis-
sion of Planning. Basing their calculations on wrong assump-
tions, the Communist planners raised the figures more, in a

^The New York Times reported on December 6, 1949, that the foreign trade
in 1949 was 20 per cent lower than in 1948 when it reached the figure of 618 mil-
lion dollars.

214 TITO'S COMMUNISM

firm belief that under strong control and organization any-
thing can be achieved. The non-Communist experts were or-
dered to serve as technical administrative staff. I learned from
conversations I had with some of them that they considered the
figures as fantastically exaggerated, but none of the Com-
munist officials asked them for opinions, and they were afraid to
express them voluntarily because of the danger of being ac-
cused of trying to sabotage the Plan.

Another objection is that the authors of the Plan took an
amateurish viewpoint in regard to the problem of labor. They
count on the education of cadres, meaning the education of
qualified workers, technicians, administrators, and tradesmen.
This is again nothing but mere theory. Everybody who has
been connected in any way with industrial life knows that the
secret of expert work lies not only in the theoretical schooling
but in long years of experience.

What other nations achieved in a period of fifty or more
years the Yugoslavs are expected to learn within five years.
All over Yugoslavia courses are arranged to educate in a few
months ordinary workers to be qualified workers, school peo-
ple who have only recently learned to read and write to be ad-
ministrators, and to make out of peasants, who perhaps have
never before seen a machine, leading technicians.

The Plan itself is full of contradictory goals. It is impos-
sible to satisfy several interests and aims from one and the same
source: to improve the standard of living and at the same time
to take away from the population a greater part of the na-
tional income for financing big investment programs, the rent-
ability of which can show itself only after many years; to un-
dertake an obligation for an enormous export in contradiction
to the needs of the home industry, which will be dependent up-
on raw materials to an increasing degree; to build up one fac-
tory after another, without having qualified labor to run them;
to fix high aims for the investment program, without having
any guarantee that the state treasury will have funds to cover
all expenditures; to count on an increased efficiency of labor
and the labor efforts without providing the working class with
the elementary commodities to satisfy their just needs and their
personal interests; to promise a better standard of living while

THE FIVE YEAR PLAN 215

calculating increased export of agricultural products upon
which the standard of living mainly depends.

From all that has been said about its contents and methods
of preparation one can safely state that the Five Year Plan
does not represent a serious work. It is unrealistic.

There is one economic area which is not mentioned in the
Plan, though it represents, from the economic point of view,
another considerable amount of expense. It is the maintenance
of the Yugoslav Army. The government devotes great atten-
tion to this question and maintains a large army. The country
has no military industry of its own worth mentioning, with
exception of the production of rifles, Bren guns, and muni-
tions. Everything else has to be imported.

Any information concerning the army is considered to be
strictly secret, and the import of armaments does not figure in
any trade agreement. Up until spring, 1948, Yugoslavia im-
ported this material from Russia and Czechoslovakia. I did
not know, in my oflScial capacity, with what and for what
Czechoslovakia supplied the Yugoslav Army, as confidential
negotiations were held directly between the representatives of
the two Ministries of National Defense. But I do know that
the Yugoslav generals were insatiable in their demands.

When the Five Year Plan was put before the Yugoslav Par-
liament, Marshal Tito evaluated its ideological and economic
significance in a speech of fundamental importance, and it is
of use to quote it rather extensively:

The government presents to the National Assembly the
Five Year Plan of the industrialization and electrification
of our country. The Plan is a fruit of a thorough and ex- .
hausting work of the Commission of Planning which took
many months. The success of a planned economy is nat-
urally linked with the new social order in the new Yugo-
slavia. Without the existence of this new order, without a
transfer of the means of production from private owner-
ship, without a new democracy, without a real people's
democracy, a planned economy would not be possible ....
What is it that compels us to electrify and industrial-
ize our country? Above all, our country suffered so heavily

216 TITO'S COMMUNISM

during the war that a complete reconstruction without a
powerful industry of our own is simply unthinkable. It
is impossible to restore and reconstruct by buying and im-
porting the needed machines only from abroad. That
would require gigantic financial means and our country
would be subjected to a political and economic dependence
on capitalistic countries. The old Yugoslavia was a semi-
colonial state. She was only an object of exploitation by
capitaUsts of many countries. The former corrupt rulers
of Yugoslavia, headed by the King, distributed the nation-
al richness to various foreign capitalists by giving them
concessions. Consequently, the state and the nation were
becoming poorer and poorer.

Let us have a look at what the situation of Yugoslavia
was from the economic point of view. Up to the war, there
were many capitalists here: German, Aixstrian, Hungarian,
EngUsh, Swedish, French, Belgian, Swiss, American, Ital-
ian, Czech, Dutch, et cetera. I can say that had we done
nothing else but liberate our beautiful country from for-
eign exploitation we would have done more for the people
than all the old politicians have done during their whole
life.

The foreign capitalists invested their capital in our
country in a way which brought them enormous prof-
its ... .

Copper ore, for instance, from the mines of Bor was
not refined here but it was exported to France, and then
we had to buy copper from the French. Later it was found
this copper ore contained a considerable quantity of gold.
This ore was taken away also and the gold extracted in
France. The value of the exported gold was equal to the in-
vested capital and thus the copper ore was gained free. The
same was the situation with the lead and zinc ores from
Trepca which contain silver. In this case, the profit far
exceeded the invested capital.

Or, take the example of petrol. Why were there in
Yugoslavia very few industries for the exploitation of
petrol? Is it because the foreign capitalists did not know
that there is a considerable richness of petrol in the inter-
ior of our country? Shell and Standard Oil, having a
monopoly of petrol, oil, and gasoline in our country wanted
to maintain high prices for the petrol, oil, and gasoline
which they imported from various countries. Therefore,

THE FIVE YEAR PLAN 217

with the help of the corrupt ministers of former regimes
and through the mediation of the Royal family itself, they
made it impossible for naphtha to be exploited in our coim-
try, though they knew exactly where it was.

The textile industry was also, to a great extent, in the
hands of foreigners. The foreign capitalists constructed
for us only weaving-mills, but not spinning-mills. They
had the latter in their own countries and so they sold yarn
to our factories at high prices. Doing this, they made our
industry dependent upon other countries.

The same was the case with the electric power plants
which also were in foreign hands and brought high profits
to foreigners. These power plants depended on foreign
countries because the machines and spare parts had to be
ordered from abroad.

I could continue enumerating many similar cases, but
I think these are enough to see why our country was so
poor and why its industriaUzation is so necessary ....

Our Five Year Plan takes care not only of every sec-
tion of industry but also of the craftsmen and peas-
ants .... Some people are even today of the opinion
that we do not need craftsmanship when building up a
strong industry. They think that this private sector of
production holds back a regular development of Socialist
production. This is a wrong idea. Craftsmanship is use-
ful and necessary for us. In many branches, our industry
will be unable to satisfy all the needs of our nation for a
long time. Our craftsmanship is qualitatively on a very
high level and in view of its specific character we shall sup-
port it so as to develop it further. "We shall organize it
in cooperatives so that it can contribute as much as possi-
ble to the general development of our country.

In the Five Year Plan we further speak about the devel-
opment in agriculture from a system of extensive to a sys- .
tem of intensive agriculture. We shall not progress if we
maintain the old methods of cultivation, as we are told by
those people who, for demagogic reasons, fight against the
industrialization of our country, alleging that by industrial-
ization we neglect our agriculture. To be able to help our
peasants in modernizing agriculture, we have to have the
industries which will produce fertilizers, machines, and
tools. And to have such factories we must first build
heavy metallurgical industries. Wc have to modernize

218 TITO'S COMMUNISM

coal mines, pig iron, and other mines which will supply
foundries and other heavy industry, et cetera. Without
industrialization and electrification we would achieve none
of what I mentioned ....

There have been some reactionary elements who have
tried to undermine, by different methods, the materializa-
tion of the Plan ....

The most ridiculous reactionary elements in our coun-
try are those who do not stop babbling that Yugoslavia
cannot economically prosper without the support of Amer-
ican or English capitalists, that our country will be un-
able to prosper if we do not accept poUtical and economic
subservience to Anglo-Saxon forces ....

The faintheartedness and distrust of those who do not
believe in our own strength and who cry over the difficul-
ties which we have to face when putting the Plan into
force deserve severe criticism. We certainly shall have
many difficulties but we must master them all. I am deeply
convinced that we shall succeed. This conviction is shared
by all those who firmly believe in the creative forces of
our nations — our working citizens. The guarantee that
we can do it lies in what we have done so far in an in-
credibly short period and with very poor means ....

All danger of unemployment among the working class
has passed in our country. The industrialization of the
country will make it possible for himdreds of thousands
of poor citizens and workers to gain a decent living. Our
poor people will not have to go abroad any more to find
work. The industrialization and introduction of a planned
economy in the new Yugoslavia mean for our nations also
a certain improvement in the standard of Uving. In the
capitalistic countries, industriaUzation and an increase in
productivity of work carry misfortune to the working
class; it will be the opposite in our country .... During
the forthcoming five years our industry will need 170,000
new workers who are acquainted with the production
process. That represents twice as many as we have today.
Later on, our economy will need in this period of five years
some 60,000 highly skilled employees, seven times more
than we have today. As far as specialists with university
education are concerned, we shall need 20,000 more than
we have today. To provide these specialists is a very heavy
task, but we must master it. . . .

THE FIVE YEAR PLAN 219

The materialization of the Plan will entirely change
the face of our country. It will not only be richer from
the material point of view but the Plan will make possible
a quick cultural development. We shall have not only more
factories, mines, railroads, machines, good communicaT
tions, cattle, foodstuffs, but we shall also have more
schools, high schools and universities; more scientific in-
stitutions, reconstructed villages, towns, et cetera. . . .
Just as without this Plan, without the industriaUzation
of our covmtry, there would be no prosperity for our na-
tion, so also there would be no basis for our poUtical and
economic independence. It is, therefore, the duty of
every citizen to put forth every effort to help in the task
which we have to face in connection with the Plan. Aware
of all difficulties, we are convinced that with the help of
the whole of our nation we shall accompHsh our goal,
which will lead us to a better and happier future.

After the Five Year Plan had been made public and the
government spokesmen had made their enthusiastic speeches,
the drum-fire of the totalitarian propaganda started to hammer
into everyone's head the significance and advantages of the Plan.
Newspapers, radio, and public lectures every day poured out
information about the figures of the proposed production. The
Plan became the daily theme of conversations in offices and at
home. Poets published verses singing of the Plan and composers
produced apotheoses of labor. A formidable labor drive swept
all over the country.

In towns, public buildings were constructed with amazing
speed, and on the outskirts new factories grew up. Railroad
tracks were laid down and roads built. The atmosphere seemed
to be imbued with an enthusiastic spirit of work. Appeals were
made to workers to put forth a maximum of production, and
factories invited rival factories in different regions of the coun-
try to enter into competition, to see which of them could pro-
duce more. Newspapers published names of individual workers
and factories which succeeded in surpassing the prescribed aim
of production and these workers and factories were rewarded
with an honorary title of udarnik (shock worker). Engineers,

220 TITO'S COMMUNISM

administrative officials, and workers were incited to simplify
and improve production, and the honorary title of novator (in-
novator) was bestowed upon them, while their names were pub-
lished in the papers.

The whole country was seized by a fever of work. An un-
informed observer who followed life only as he saw it on his
walks through the streets or from a train window would have
been deeply impressed and could not have spared admiration.

I visited some factories and had the opportunity to speak
to some engineers and officials who were directly or indirectly
connected with the deliveries of material to Czechoslovakia or
were connected with the installations of Czechoslovak machinery
delivered to the Yugoslav industry. It was not easy to visit
a Yugoslav factory. No foreigner was allowed to enter, and even
as an Ambassador who represented an allied country which had
close trade relations with Yugoslavia, I found it almost impos-
sible to see a factory in operation.

I asked Minister Kidric several times for permission to make
a tour of the Yugoslav factories which had new installations
from Czechoslovakia. He always readily promised to arrange it
for me and suggested that we could go together. He never kept
his promise. Yet I did have the rare opportunity to visit some
factories when I was on official visits to the individual republi-
can governments. I asked local officials to give me an opportu-
nity to address the workers and this made it possible for me to
see the machinery, life in the factories, and to be able to chat
with people there.

Production, as I saw it, was burdened with a heavy bureau-
cratic apparatus. For years and years the Communists, while in
opposition, have criticized the heavy, unproductive system of
state officials in capitalist countries and have used the argument
that workers had to pay high taxes to make it possible for the
government to support large numbers of employees. Now the
Communists have introduced such a system of bureaucracy that
the most unworkable team of non-Socialist officials seems to be
very flexible in comparison with their administration.

Production in Communist Yugoslavia is fettered by endless
regulations about rules of work, production expenses, maxi-
mum consumption of raw materials, fuel, different funds, cal-

THE FIVE YEAR PLAN 221

culations, evidence of the work, etc., etc. One regulation fol-
lowed another, and officials had to study them and adapt the
work accordingly. I know in many cases they failed to under-
stand them, partly because they were not acquainted with the
Marxist terminology, partly because many of them have only
recently learned to write and read. Instead of establishing an
exemplary order in production, the regulations led to increased
chaos in the factories.

In theory, it seems to be worked out logically. Every fac-
tory receives an order stating what it is expected to produce
per month. The superior authorities decide for what prices it
should buy raw materials and fuel, and at what price it should
be allowed to sell its products. In this price are calculated the
production expenses, the profit of the factory which is divided
into various funds, the turnover tax (which is being handed
over to the treasury), the amortization, etc.

The management of the factory divides its monthly task
of production into every-day tasks. Every day it makes note
of what has been achieved in production, what was the con-
sumption of materials, how many workers took part in the pro-
duction, and whether the tasks were fulfilled or possibly sur-
passed. All these data are posted daily on a blackboard so that
the workers can follow the results of their labor. They are also
telegraphed to the Ministry in Belgrade so that Minister Kidric
can proudly say that he knows every evening what was pro-
duced all over Yugoslavia on that day.^ All figures are then
passed over to the Central Commission of Planning which checks
to see whether the Plan is progressing properly. Figures fill the
air and infatuate the minds of all Communists, beginning with
the dictator of Yugoslav economy, Boris Kidric, and ending
with the local controllers of production in every factory.

Nobody knows, I presume, how many people are employed
by this unproductive side of production, which is called evi-
dence, and the real background of which is a constant Commu-
nist control based on a lack of trust in anybody. But local peo-
ple know that in spite of the strictest control and all theoretical

2The centralization of industry was theoretically changed at the beginning of
19 50 when the functions of some ministries in the capital were transferred to local
authorities.

222 TITO'S COMMUNISM

calculations there is considerable disorder in factories. The man-
agement of factories is entrusted to people who, though poli-
tically reliable, do not understand the expert side of running an
enterprise. These political directors are interested mainly in re-
porting to their superiors in the capital that they have achieved
the goal and possibly surpassed it.

There is a general lack of experts of all kinds. Engineers
are overworked. I know of a case in a factory where before
the war fifty-five engineers were employed and now the fac-
tory has to be satisfied with eleven. The rest of them were de-
clared reactionaries whose work would be detrimental to the
factory. Out of twenty technical designers, now only three are
employed. Yet, the factory has to produce, according to theo-
retical figures, more than ever before. The result is constant fear
and comphcations. Technical experts are shirking responsibili-
ties which have been imposed upon them against their will. They
are afraid of punishment if the factory does not fulfill its task.
They leave it, therefore, to the political management to report
about the figures of production, regardless of what the facts
are.

Experts cannot be trained overnight, though there are hun-
dreds of special coiirses to prepare all kinds of qualified work-
ers. Courses for illiterates are organized all over the country.
Great importance is attached to these. The story goes that a
highly qualified engineer once applied for a job. He was asked
to appear before the Communist manager who questioned him
about the schools he had attended. The applicant answered that
he ha4 a degree from the technical faculty of the university at
Prague. The interrogator was not satisfied and asked what other
schools he had attended. The engineer was puzzled and did
not kno\y what to say. Finally, he said he had gone to the high
school ill Belgrade but the manager became impatient and in-
quired further. Then the engineer, quite in despair, said that
he had gone to the elementary school in his village. The mana-
ger was less and less satisfied and exclaimed, "The Technical
School in Prague, high school in Belgrade, elementary school in
your village are all right, but have you had a course for illiter-
ates?" The engineer had to admit that he had not attended a
course and he did not get the job.

THE FIVE YEAR PLAN 223

The great lack of experts was met at least partly by em-
ploying German prisoners. They are employed as qualified
workers, administrators, and technicians. Before the Yugoslav
Communists quarrelled with the Cominform, hundreds of Ger-
man technicians were sent from the Soviet-occupied zone of
Germany to Yugoslavia. Also, the Communist Ministry of In-
terior of Czechoslovakia had a secret arrangement with the
Yugoslav government according to which German technicians
from the Sudetenland, instead of being moved to the Reich,
were given the opportunity to enroll for work in Yugoslavia.
Hundreds of them accepted rather well-paid positions and signed
contracts for five years. There were university professors among
them and general managers of big industrial firms which used
to be in German hands. They took with them the knowledge
of Czechoslovak industry and production secrets. When I dis-
covered this I did everything in my power to stop it, because
it seriously endangered Czechoslovak economic interests.

These Germans were employed in factories, ministries, and
even in the Central Commission of Planning, and thus became
acquainted with Yugoslav plans and the actual situation in Yu-
goslav industry. When I tried, one day, to show Minister Kid-
ric that he was introducing these people to all the secrets of pro-
duction and that he should be aware of the possibility of their
espionage creating a network of spies for the future time when
Germany would again export to the Balkans, he answered with
a cynical smile that he had had this in mind, and that the Yugo-
slav government would know how to deal with these Germans
to make it impossible for them when their contracts expired to
take back to Germany what they had seen and learned in Yugo-
slavia.

I know from reliable sources that these German technicians
spoke about the Yugoslav Five Year Plan and its practical ap-
plication with contempt.

Up until the break with the Cominform, Yugoslav indus-
try worked under the guidance of experts coming from another
country, Russia. Soviet technicians and administrators could
be found in every important office, bringing with them con-
siderable experience from the Russian Five Year Plans. They had
no contact with the outside world and their engagement with

224 TITO'S COMMUNISM

the Yugoslav government was never mentioned in public. When
the Yugoslav Communist party was about to be excommunica-
ted they were withdrawn within twenty-four hours. When,
later on, the correspondence exchanged between Marshal Tito
and Joseph StaUn was pubUshed, it was disclosed that the em-
ployment of the Russian experts was also a point of friction,
though a very small one. Tito complained to Stalin that these
Russians were paid ten times bigger salaries than the Yugoslav
technicians.

Control of people and control of work are among the most
pronounced characteristics of the Communist regime. No per-
son trusts another person, and a scale of control, from the top
to the bottom, installs a system of constant vigilance. This ap-
plies also to industry.

A Communist secretary, who is usually the chairman or sec-
retary of the local trade union organization, watches the work-
ers and other employees. A political manager of the factory
controls the work of the enterprise and all of them are con-
trolled by a special central organ called the Central Commission
of Control. The head of this institution was, until 1948, one
of the "Big Four" men of the Communist party of Yugoslavia,
Edvard Kardelj, which indicates the importance attached to
this oflSce. The members of the Central Commission of Control
enjoy the unhmited right of inspection of all documents in of-
fices and factories. They visit them secretly at night, open the
rooms and desks of officials and take files. Employees coming
to work in the morning often find their desks empty. They
know what happened, and the only thing for them to do is to
wait for an order summoning them for investigation. Parallel-
ing this clandestine form of control is a legal investigation of
files and books lasting many days. On such occasions every-
body in the office and factory trembles in fear of what will be
the result of the Commission's findings.

Also, special control is entrusted to the Communist press.
It is considered very democratic that the press follows produc-
tion and goes after failures and the sinners against the new So-

THE FIVE YEAR PLAN 225

cialist order. Editors of Borha, armed with special identification
cards, have the right to visit any factory unexpectedly and to
inquire about its production, working morale, health conditions,
and poHtical education. The fruits of their studies are then pub-
Ushed in the newspaper, and the management and employees
are either highly praised or severely condemned. In the latter
case, an ofl&cial investigation follows and the people responsible
for lacks are accused before tribunals. The press is proud of
having discovered reactionaries and saboteurs of the Socialist
economy.

Irregularities in the field of production occur in spite of the
Communist enthusiasts. Production, after all, does not depend
upon amateurish zeal and improvisations, but upon the knowl-
edge and devotion to work of hundreds of thousands of work-
ers, technicians, and administrators. These in an overwhelming
majority do not belong to the ranks of the Communist party
and are latently its bitter opponents. All the regulations, con-
trol, mistrust, bad living, poHtical pressure, and physical exploi-
tation have deprived them of personal interest to contribute to
smooth production. When distrubances occur they are not in-
terested in removing them as long as their personal responsibil-
ity is not involved.

In one instance it happened that the management forgot
to order one of the needed raw materials on time and the work
had to stop. Nobody cared because the factory was state-owned
and the non-Communist employees were glad to see that their
Communist manager would have trouble. Or in a factory where
wooden boxes were made, for example, the management did not
order nails in time and so stores of wood lay for weeks in the
open air exposed to rain. Again, in an automobile factory, a
machine for the making of one part was not delivered and in-
stalled and the cars were not finished for months. But in the
statistical reports concerning the Plan these cars were calculated
in and the report said that the Plan had been fulfilled. There
were many cases of a similar nature; machines were idle, workers
were unemployed.

In April, 1948, the Ministry of Communications decided
to raise the tariffs for railroad passengers by 33 per cent and for
freight by 100 per cent, effective at once. Protests started to

226 TITO'S COMMUNISM

pour into the Ministry from every factory, explaining that cal-
culations about production expenditures were made on a cer-
tain basis, including the railway tariffs, and that this unexpec-
ted rise would turn all these calculations upside down. Consul-
tations followed among the higher authorities and finally Minis-
ter Kidric intervened; five days later the decree of the Ministry
of Communications was abolished.

Production in Yugoslavia has been greatly hampered by dis-
turbances in foreign trade. Its increase, as foreseen by the Plan,
depends largely on imports of heavy machinery from abroad.
I know from my official experience about belated deliveries by
Czechoslovak firms which were by contracts bound to export
turbines, sugar refineries, half-finished automobile parts, cables,
and railroad tracks to Yugoslavia. Under socialization they
were unable to keep up their own production, so were from
twelve to eighteen months late in their obligations to Yugoslavia.
It was the same in the case of imports from Russia, Poland, and
Hungary.

Minister Hebrang admitted to me, when he was still in of-
fice, that the government had to face in its economic policy a
serious obstacle, namely, the uncertainty of deliveries from
abroad. But, he said, it planned to eliminate this difficulty by
creating reserves of imported products from which Yugoslav
industry would be supplied in case of delays in imports.

In spite of all the apparent and flagrant obstacles to pro-
duction, which the Communists are unable to remove, the news-
papers daily publish information that this or that factory has
surpassed the Plan by 20 to 30 per cent and it is held up as
an example of Socialist achievement.

Once every six months the Central Commission of Plan-
ning publishes official data about the fulfillment of the Plan
in the most important sections of production. The public was
told that in the first half of 1947 the income of the treasury
was 8 per cent higher than the Plan had foreseen, that industry
and mines fulfilled the Plan up to 97.8 per cent, timber in-
dustry up to 95.1 per cent, agriculture over 100 per cent, and
the plan of investment up to 81.7 per cent. Then a long list
of figures followed, giving the production in 1946 in com-
parison with the production achieved according to the Plan.

THE FIVE YEAR PLAN 227

In many cases the statistics stated that the production had
been raised by 100, 150 to 250 per cent.

However, the report is meaningless if it mentions only by
what percentage the production was raised without giving the
basic figures. It would not have been difficult to raise the
production 100 per cent or more, if in 1946 this was negligible.

In his 1948 New Year message, Marshal Tito announced
that the Plan for the whole of 1947 had been fulfilled by

104 per cent, that the productivity of work had been raised
120 per cent, the mining industry had fulfilled the Plan 104
per cent, the timber industry 93.6 per cent, other industries

105 per cent, state income 101.7 per cent.

There were, however, failures which even the Communist
regime could not conceal if it wished to find a remedy for
them. Marshal Tito mentioned some of them. He criticized
the people, saying they had not taken proper care of the
machines, that they had not always had the right attitude
toward their work, and that they celebrated too many holidays;
the factory administration had not taken care of the workers,
food provisioning had not been good, the service of statistics
had been unbelievably insufficient; there had been much mis-
management in distribution so that it happened that stores were
full of goods but consumers suffered from want, or that in
the winter summer textiles were distributed and in the summer,
winter ones. This was a testimony given by Tito himself.

The break between the Communist party of Yugoslavia and
the Cominform was an almost mortal blow to the Yugoslav Five
Year Plan. Russia and all her satellites started to pursue a
pohcy of economic strangulation of Yugoslavia.

The Yugoslavs were reluctant to admit the failure in plan-
ning and kept the news about the economic blockade by the
East in strict secrecy, still cherishing hopes of reconciliation
with Moscow. At the end of 1948, however, the economic situ-
ation became critical. Many Yugoslav factories were idle and
unemployment was increasing. The Communist theory that
there is no place for unemployment in a Communist economy
proved to be futile. The Politburo felt it necessary to explain
the situation to the confused and puzzled ranks of the party
and to revise the Plan.

228 TITO'S COMMUNISM

In November, 1948, Marshal Tito declared that because of
the hostile attitude of the Soviet bloc, Yugoslavia would have
to seek trade contacts with the western countries, and he com-
plained bitterly that the East was behaving worse toward his
country than toward the capitaHst states. He also indicated
the necessity of revision of the Plan.

In February, 1949, a government order published a Hst
of priorities in the program of industrialization and electrifica-
tion of the country, stressing the need of putting first things
first and dropping secondary objects of the Plan. This meant
continuation in construction of heavy industry and abandon-
ment of the minimum program of improvement in the pro-
duction of consumer goods.

Despite the inevitable consequences of the economic isola-
tion of Yugoslavia from the East, the government maintained
that the program of the Five Year Plan for 1948 had been
fulfilled. In January, 1949, the Central Commission of Plan-
ning announced that in the over- all industry the Plan was
fulfilled by 100.8 per cent, out of which the heavy industry
achieved 97.3 per cent and the Hght industry 103.2 per cent.
The section of agriculture achieved 99 per cent. The industrial
production was 61 per cent higher than in 1947, but no evalu-
ation of these figures was possible because absolute figures
of 1947 production were never pubHshed. At the same time,
the government boldly announced the goal for the production
in 1949 to be 30 per cent higher than it was in the preceding
year.

To defend its stand against Moscow and to explain failures
in production, the Yugoslav Communists disclosed in August,
1949, that the eastern Communist countries had delivered de-
fective machinery to them. Czechoslovakia, it was said, sent
a defective Diesel power plant, Hungary supplied defective
Davy lamps for mines and electric motors; both Czechoslovakia
and Hungary sent to Yugoslavia centrifugal pumps which broke
after one hour of operation; Soviet Russia sent an old, worn-
out centrifugal pump which broke after thirty minutes of work.
The Yugoslav government accused the Cominform countries
of sabotaging Yugoslav industry, aimed at an economic break-
down of the Yugoslav economy.

THE FIVE YEAR PLAN 119

In fact, there was no sabotage in these defective deUveries.
I can testify thatlong before the conflict with the Cominform,
the Yugoslav government complained of the bad quality of
Czechoslovak machinery which was caused by the nationaliza-
tion of Czechoslovak industry. It was a common feature that
under the SociaHst system the quality of production danger-
ously suffered. This was concealed as long as Yugoslavia and
other Communist countries remained friends, but after the
break it turned into a political argument of sabotage.

The western countries were, for poHtical and economic rea-
sons, interested in stepping in and taking the place of the
eastern exporters. Negotiations were opened with the United
States, Britain, France, Italy, Switzerland, and other countries
of the West, and they gave new hope to the Yugoslav govern-
ment to save the Five Year Plan. A wave of optimism brought
back the figures of the Plan which, it was said, would be ful-
filled and even surpassed. According to Marshal Tito's New
Year message of 1950, "we had topped what we planned to
achieve [in 1949], and with our own forces only." But in
December, 1950, Minister Kidric, finding an excuse in the
drought which had fallen upon the country, announced that
the Five Year Plan was being prolonged into a six year plan.
Newspapers informed the public that the structure and target
of the Plan had to be changed and limited to projects of heavy
industry.

One asks, how could the Yugoslav people trust statistics as-
serting the increase of production and the rise of the standard
of living? They know what their daily life brings them.

They do not get even the simplest goods for daily consump-
tion. The Plan has hmited the production of consumer goods
to a minimum in the first years, and it assumes that the stand-
ard of Hving will be held at a very low level; so that the bigger
part of the financial means of the country can be concentrated
upon the construction of heavy industry. But according to the
figures of the Plan, even the production of consumer goods is
supposed to rise steadily.

230 TITO'S COMMUNISM

Information about the situation of Yugoslav economy is
kept strictly secret. Other countries regularly pubUsh statis-
tical data about all sections of economic life. National banks
give figures about the currency and their active and passive
accounts. State authorities pubUsh indexes of prices, salaries^
standards of living, texts of trade agreements, figures of import
and export, reports about the production capacity and the real
production, about labor markets and movement of prices.

No figures of that nature are published in Yugoslavia, or
in Russia, or in other Communist countries. Only a very
limited number of politicians and high state oflScials are ac-
quainted with these figures, which are indispensable for every
economist who wants to analyze the situation.

The Yugoslav government does not publish these figures
for several reasons. First, they would disclose the fact that
the economy of the country is far from being what the propa-
gandists claim; second, they would prove several discrepancies
to which the economy is subjected; and last, the official circles
live in a sphere of secrecy and are afraid that any disclosure
about the national economy would facilitate the work of
enemies of the new Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav officials con-
sider as highly confidential even the simplest information.

One instance is especially characteristic. The district court
in Novi Sad forbade the distribution of a commercial booklet
called Calendar of Vojvodifja. In the pronouncement of sen-
tence it was said that the booklet contained a list of all the
towns and villages in the region of Vojvodina, giving the popu-
lation of each, with addresses and telephone numbers of the
inhabitants; a list of factories and firms with their addresses
and telephone numbers; and further on, a series of advertise-
ments containing information about individual firms' products.

The accused publisher defended himself in vain, insisting
that the book did not disclose any confidential information.
The court decided that "according to the Law about Criminal
Acts against the Nation and the State, no information of that
sort is allowed to be pubHshed as it could be used by the ene-
mies of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia." This
happened on March 21, 1947, and the document bears the
number K 241-47.

THE FIVE YEAR PLAN 231

Failures in a Communist-run industry should not lead to
the conclusion that they must inevitably lead to a final break-
down of Communist economy and possibly even of Communist
regimes. These would be wrong conclusions.

All the privations and mistakes of Communist economy
are balanced by several factors. People are condemned to
constant want and sacrifices. Their needs become very low.
PoHtical and economic power entrusted to a single body —
the Communist government — make it possible to concentrate
on the production of certain products only, and thus results
are finally achieved.

In Russia, many values have been lost through years of
Soviet-planned economy; people have suffered, material has
been wasted, the quaUty of products has been bad, but through
a concentrated effort to produce the most important things,
the Soviet government has succeeded in providing farmers with
tractors, the army with tanks, guns, planes, and rifles, and has
built big industrial centers.

It matters little to the Communist leaders that housewives
cannot have refrigerators, that children have no toys, and that
many people have to wear rags instead of decent clothes and
shoes. The people are promised all good things later on when
the Communist regime is safe from any danger of internal or
external disruption. But from its very nature a dictatorial
regime can never feel safe.

THE FINANCIAL PATTERN

A Communist system of government cannot stop half-
way. Its principles must penetrate all sections of the economic
life of the country. And so, along with the declaration of laws
about the nationalization of industry and the law of the Five
Year Plan, the Yugoslav Communist government prepared
several bills affecting the financial system of Yugoslavia.

In the first two years after the war, Yugoslavia operated
under a state budget, covering the incomes and expenses of
the state administration. Factories which the government took
over either by confiscation or sequestration financed their
own production and were administered as private firms, though
under the control of public authorities.

Immediately after the war, the government concentrated
all its efforts on avoiding inflation and financial chaos, to

232

THE FINANCIAL PATTERN 2 3 3

which all the other Balkan and almost all the Central Euro-
pean countries had succumbed. Its efforts were crowned by
success. The new currency, the dinar, though not a recog-
nized international currency of high and stable value, developed
into good money on the internal market of Yugoslavia, and
the population trusted its value. At first the peasants pre-
ferred to receive goods for their agricultural products sold on
the black market but later gladly accepted the dinar. This
certainly was an achievement worthy of praise.

The government was successful because it took the most
drastic measures when the old wartime currencies were with-
drawn from circulation. There were, during the war, six dif-
ferent currencies circulating in the territory of Yugoslavia.
The Serbian dinar, the Croat kuna, the German mark, the
Italian lira, the Hungarian pengoe, the Bulgarian lev. The
exchange rate of these wartime currencies for the new Yugo-
slav dinar was very low and nobody was entitled to receive
more than 5,000 dinars (100 dollars) in cash of the new
currency.

This sum hardly covered one month's current expenses,
and people who were not regularly employed had no guarantee
that after having spent these 5,000 dinars they would find a
way to get more. For the rest of the old money, which was
handed over to the treasury, the government returned bonuses
which were progressively so radically devaluated that any
great amount of money delivered to the treasury in this way
was practically confiscated.

The first step taken to avoid the danger of inflation, there-
fore, was to place only a very small amount of the new cur-
rency in circulation. The next step was to keep wages and
salaries very low. Thus, a stable currency was gained by a
general impoverishment of the population.

From the standpoint of the treasury policy, the financial
situation of the country seemed to be stable, because the gov-
ernment had confiscated and later nationalized the mines and
factories without paying indemnity to the original owners. It
also gained by postponing the payment of the prewar and war
obligations.

The government based its calculations on the assumption

234 TITO'S COMMUNISM

that the new dinar had the same value as the prewar currency.
This was a wrong assumption. In 1938, for instance, one
pound of beef of the best quaHty cost 13 dinars; in 1948, on
the regular, controlled market (vezane cene) it cost 28 dinars,
and on the free market 150 dinars. In the summer of 1938,
an egg cost 1 dinar; in 1948, 5 dinars (on the regular market),
or 8 dinars on the free market; in the winter 20 dinars; one
pound of butter, 13 dinars in 1938, and 150 and 300 dinars
respectively in 1948; a chicken, 15 dinars in 1938 and 150 to
200 in 1948; one pound of beans, which is a Yugoslav national
meal used in the poorest families, in 1938 cost 1.5 dinars, in
1948, 10 to 15 dinars; a bottle of wine, 8 dinars in 1938, 80
dinars in 1948; one liter of milk, 2.5 dinars in 1938, and 9
dinars for controlled price and 20 to 25 dinars on the free
market in 1948; one pound of sugar, 7.5 dinars in 1938, and
33 and 150 dinars respectively in 1948. Prices of agricultural
products and raw materials exported abroad have risen much
more.

Before the war the dinar was exchanged on a scale of 1
dollar for about 48 dinars; 1 pound sterling for about 225; 1
Swiss franc for about 1 1 dinars. The present (1951) exchange
is 1 dollar for 50 dinars; 1 pound sterling for 200 dinars; and
1 Swiss franc for about 11.2 dinars. Though the internal buy-
ing power of the dinar is at least four to five times smaller
than it was before the war, the foreign exchange has stayed
almost the same.

The Yugoslav population does not know what the circu-
lation of the currency is. This is a well-kept secret. The
National Bank does not publish any information about its
activities and when the budget is presented to the ParHament,
the minister responsible for the state finances does not feel he
is bound to say how much money actually circulates among
the population. In March, 1946, he made only the general
remark that it was being kept at the prewar level.

This statement, however, did not disclose very much, be-
cause it is general knowledge that the amount of circulating
currency changes according to the intensity of the economic
life. At my disposal I have no information what the prewar
circulation was but I think it did not exceed eight billion dinars.

THE FINANCIAL PATTERN 235

I know, however, from a reliable source that in the spring of
1946, it was fourteen bilHon, and in June, 1947, over twenty
billion. In normal conditions, when the intensity of economic
life is rising, this would not foretell any signs of inflation as
under such conditions the national income increases, the ex-
change of goods is lively and requires a larger circulation of
money.

But in Yugoslavia the exchange of goods is now very lim-
ited, the circulation of currency is rather slow because the
majority of the people receive low salaries and wages, and the
peasants, who always use little cash, depend on state redemption.

The rising tide of currency in 1947, the first year of the
Five Year Plan, can be explained by the rising needs of in-
dustry, which invested large sums in different enterprises.
There are, therefore^ symptoms that the government might
be unable to keep the sound basis of the currency.

From 1947 on, the Yugoslav budgets have been of a different
structure from what they were before. They are determined
by the Communist system of economic life. The government,
or the treasury, is not only the center of income from taxes,
customs, etc., and of expenses for the state administration, but
it also represents the main bartering center of the nation as the
one and only employer and enterpreneur.

Before this new type of budget could be introduced the
government had to take several preliminary measures in the
field of public finances. It established a new law about taxes
and a new organization of banking and the insurance. business.

The system of taxes was simplified. The law of 1946 pro-
vided for only a few taxes: a turnover tax, income tax, in-
heritance and gift tax. A number of taxes which exist in the
western countries were abolished and all levels of income have
been subjected to income tax.

The nationalization of industry led to the first funda-
mental characteristic of the new Yugoslav budget. Eighty
per cent of the income of the treasury is based on the na-
tionalized industry while only 20 per cent is derived from taxes

236 TITO'S COMMUNISM

paid directly by the population, mainly by peasants and em-
ployees. The state-owned industry is, therefore, the main
source of taxes.

The most important tax, the turnover tax, is not like it is
in some European countries where it is paid as a part of the
price of goods whenever they change hands. In Yugoslavia
it is a tax paid by the industrial enterprises which calculate
it in the price of the products, and it moves from 20 to 100
per cent of the production price, according to the nature of
the products.

The spokesmen for the Yugoslav government Hke to em-
phasize that this system has taken the heaviest burden away
from the shoulders of taxpayers. In practice, it means that
instead of individual private industriaHsts, wholesalers, retailers,
and buyers having to pay the turnover tax when acquiring the
goods, now the state industries concentrate the payment in their
hands alone. As this tax often reaches 100 per cent of the
production price, it is not difficult to imagine how much it
affects the final price of goods. And the consumer has to pay
the price, the turnover tax included.

The state authorities estabHsh the price of every product.
They fix what is called the basic production price, i.e., the
amount for which a factory is allowed and supposed to produce
a certain product. To this sum they add the profit which the
factory is allowed to retain and use for various poHtical, social,
and hygienic purposes; the whole amount is increased by a fund
for the treasury, investment program, and, finally, by the turn-
over tax. All these items together form the selling price of
the product. The turnover tax is actually nothing but a clear
profit for the treasury, above the profit of the factory. If a
capitalist would calculate on a 100 per cent profit, he would
be called the greatest exploiter of all times.

The budget for 1947 claimed thirty-eight billion dinars
of income from the turnover tax alone, and the budget for
1948, forty-six bilUon. In theory, the state should have plenty
of money, which should be used for the benefit of the people.

Where are all these bilUons? A Communist would answer
that the budgets themselves indicate that they go for the
construction of factories, roads, railroads, hospitals, cultural

THE FINANCIAL PATTERN 237

and social institutions, for the army, for public administration.
But a glance through the budget would disclose that it is a
very general statement about the government program, that
it is impossible to discover from it what new constructions are
planned, how much they would cost and what is allotted for
the personal expenditures of the army and the administration.
My personal guess is that, first, the state's income stays far
below the preliminary figures because the nationalized industry
does not produce as much as it is expected to and, therefore,
cannot hand over to the treasury the assumed sums. Second,
the state, though a collector of enormous sums, swallows a
good deal of income in its huge bureaucratic apparatus of
public and economic administration; and third, unknown and
never-mentioned sums go to the Communist party of Yugo-
slavia to keep up its extensive party personnel and propaganda
machine.

In November, 1946, a law concerning the organization
and activities of the credit system formally allowed for the
existence of private credit institutions on the condition of a
yearly license issued by the Ministry of Finance. Since 1947
no license has been issued, either for an existing bank or for
a new one. All domestic and foreign banks were obliged to
liquidate their business.

The second law concerning nationalization has also formally
nationahzed all credit institutions. In a Socialist economy it
is only natural, as all private banking loses its raison d'etre.

There are several types of state-owned banks. As in other
European countries, the functions of issuing bank notes, of
studying and regulating the development of currency, of man-
aging the commerce with gold and foreign currencies, and of
the organization of payments connected with foreign trade
are under the exclusive control of the National Bank of Yugo-
slavia. Other banks have various tasks, according to the deci-
sion of the government, and their titles reveal what kind of
business has been entrusted to them. They include the Postal
Savings Bank, State's Investment Bank, Cooperative and Agri-
cultural Bank, Industrial Bank, Craftsmen Bank, and the State
Insurance Institution.

The most important law in the sphere of finances is, of

238 TITO'S COMMUNISM

course, that of the budget. In Communist terminology, as
defined by Minister Kidric, the budget represents "the coordi-
nation of organization and method of the financial system
with a Socialist content and substance" and it is "a plan for
the creation of a concentrated fund of the state finances and
a plan for using these means in harmony with the all-state
econorhic plan for the purpose of the economic reconstruction,
the material and cultural advancement, and social security of
the broad masses, with the aim of strengthening national inde-
pendence and the defensive potential and the maintaining of
the state administration of the country."

The budget of Yugoslavia is formally divided into two
parts, one dealing with the income and expenditures of the
country as a whole, and the other containing income and
expenditures of the individual federal republics. From the
figures published in both parts and from the organization of
industry, one can draw the conclusion that in the highly
centralized Yugoslav economy very little authority and finan-
cial means are left to the republics. It is known that the same
system of thorough centralization of economic power and
financial means is applied in Soviet Russia. However, both
countries, and other Communist states as well, like to em-
phasize that the Communist governments have given full
national autonomy to every nation and federated unit and
that they do not exploit one region for the benefit of another.
From the Yugoslav budget it is clear that, for instance, the
well-balanced economy of Slovenia with its industry, health
resorts, and sea spas has to pay heavily for the central gov-
ernment's daring undertakings in the mountainous and eco-
nomically passive Montenegro and Bosnia.

The budget for 1947 reached the high sum of 85 billion di-
nars. It can be explained by the new system of budgeting in
the Communist economy. Income and expenditure were in
balance but the general presentation of the budget, which does
not give specific figures for individual branches, does not allow
an accurate analysis. Thus, the Ministry of Industry foresaw only
a general expenditure of ten billion, the Ministry of Mining,
six billion; some thirty-two billion were reserved for different
capital investments without any specification. The army asked

THE FINANCIAL PATTERN 239

for an expenditure of ten and one-half billion dinars, which
represents 12,35 per cent of the budget, etc. As to the income
foreseen by the budget, it is stated in general terms only, the
main item being the turnover tax which represented thirty-
eight billion dinars and was expected to cover 44 per cent of
all expenses.

The size of the budget for 1947 gave good reason to believe
that it far surpassed the possibilities of the national wealth.
Prices of all agricultural and industrial products actually did
go up considerably, as the government was in need of an enor-
mous amount of money to finance its investment program and
fixed the turnover tax so high that it necessitated a considerable
rise in prices of finished products.

The budget for 1948 jumped up to the dizzy amount of
124,841,338,000 dinars, i.e., an increase of 45.2 per cent over
the budget of 1947. The members of the government defended
this rise with the argument that the second year of the Five
Year Plan assumed a vigorous growth of the investment pro-
gram, representing sixty-six bilHon dinars, or 72 per cent more
than in 1947. Army expenditures were increased by 35 per cent.

These extravagant figures could be covered only by another
increase in the turnover tax which was supposed to contribute
36.86 per cent of the state income. The consequences were in-
evitably the same as in the previous year: the selling prices of
all products rose again.

Economic dictator Kidric began to be rather worried about
the development, and the government ordered a severe control
of all financial means, a lowering of production expenses, and
announced a national loan amounting to three and one-half
billion dinars. According to official reports the loan subscribed
11.45 per cent more than expected. It was never explained. who
were the main subscribers of the loan. It certainly could not
be individuals or the common people who were not in a position
to subscribe any larger amount of money. It must have been
state-owned industry and banks and shops which were ordered
to buy the bonds. The means were provided by the treasury,
or in other words, the money went from one state pocket into
another. The loan had, on the whole, no other than propaganda
purpose.

240 TITO'S COMMUNISM

Minister Kidric supported the budget before the people
who must have been amazed by its size. The budget was duly
presented to the Parliament, and Kidric did not need to fear that
it would meet with opposition. By 1948, Dragoljub Jovanovic,
the only opponent of the government, was already in prison.
Kidric felt, however, that people would be shocked and so tried
to brush any opposition aside by attacking "reactionaries" who
would see in the budget signs of weakness or failure.

The speech is so characteristic of the Communist financial
policy that it is of importance to quote the most pertinent pas-
sages of it:

.... Many open enemies and hidden sceptics have in-
vented theories that the Yugoslav government was plimg-
ing into an inflation, that it was lowering the standard of
living of the population, that it was preparing itself to at-
tack the peasants, that the Yugoslav leaders have lost
ground and have given themselves up to fantasies which
must inevitably end in a complete breakdown. But im- .
partial figures show that the reality is different from these
theories and slanders.

The coefficient of this year's turnover of the consumers'
goods and money is in comparison with the last year
[1947] at least 15 per cent higher. The enemies who cher-
ish hopes for an inflation will be disappointed deeply.
The value and buying power of the dinar will increase this
year. Equally disappointed will be the ill-willed people who
think that there cannot be a rise in the budget on account
of the standard of living of the working masses. By the end
of this year we shall achieve, assuming an average harvest
and materialization of the basic tasks of the industrial pro-
duction, a standard of living index of 107 in comparison
with the index of 100 in 1939, 54.88 in 1945, 78.72 in
1946, and 86.87 in 1947. . . .

We answer all slander that claims we are preparing an
attack against the peasants by increasing the budget with
a statement that we have already contributed to their
betterment by 16 per cent by introducing fixed prices and
that the income tax of working peasants will be reduced
by 40 per cent in comparison with 1947. We shall attack,
of course, speculators and all capitalistic elements in vil-
lages and it is true that the standard of speculators will fall.
The increase of the present budget has its background

THE FINANCIAL PATTERN 241

in the increase of the national income. The economic plan
foresees for 1948, 191.9 billion dinars in national income,
44.4 per cent higher than that in 1947 when we achieved
132.9 billion dinars. . . .

The rise in the national income is based, first of all, on
an enormous rise of production in our industry, mining,
power stations, forestry, and building industry. . . . People
who have doubts should know the figures not of what is
planned but what has been achieved: In comparison with
1939, we produced in 1946, 104 per cent of electrical en-
ergy and in 1947, 132 per cent; of coal 112 per cent in
1946, and 153 per cent in 1947; of steel hardly 8 5 per
cent in 1946 but 132 per cent in 1947; of cement 88.4
per cent in 1946 and 188 per cent in 1947; of glass 103
per cent in 1946 and 191 per cent in 1947; of sugar 65
per cent in 1946 and 141 per cent in 1947; of building
wood 140 per cent in 1947; all this uses 1939 as 100 per
cent.
Here we have to confront these optimistic figures of Minis-
ter Kidric with the facts. It is difficult to pass judgment about
his estimate of national income because it is not clear what is
considered national income in a Communist country. If, in gen-
eral, the rise of national income should reflect an improvement
in the Hving standard of the population, then his figures cer-
tainly do not correspond with reality. The same applies then
also to the quoted index figures of the standard of living. It is
true that conditions improved slightly in 1947, in comparison
with 1946 and 1945 which were the postwar years and had
particularly weak harvest, but 1948 was again worse because
so much of the national income was drawn into the investment
plan. Altogether there is no comparison with 1939 when peo-
ple lived much better than after the war. It is hardly possible
to understand the whole approach of Minister Kidric to the
point in question when he declares how much has been pro-
duced in every branch of industry, yet people know that there
was an appalling lack of coal, glass, sugar, and wood. Was it
all allotted to the investment program?
Again Minister Kidric said,

The reason for the rise of the national income is to be
found in the change of the political and social conditions
in our country. First, the new Yugoslavia, politically

242 TITO'S COMMUNISM

and economically free and independent, got rid of foreign
imperialists and financial magnates who hampered in the
old semi-colonial Yugoslavia the development and full use
of production forces. Then, also, the working masses have
been socially and nationally liberated, while in the old
Yugoslavia they hated to work for reasons of the class and
national oppression and exploitation. Thus planned eco-
nomy showed great advantages over capitaUstic anarchy
in the field of increasing general production and in that of
using fully all economic possibiUties.

The rise of national income is a result of sociaUsm in
our country. The capitalistic elements enjoyed in the last
year 9 per cent of the national income. . . this year they
will have only 4.5 per cent. . . .

Then follows a long enumeration of figures on the quantity
of every product to be produced in 1948 and a list of articles
which Yugoslavia is already able to produce by herself, while
before she was obliged to import them. Minister Kidric con-
tinued, touching the thorniest problem of Yugoslav industrial-
ization:

A great task of 1948 is the question of labor and new
quahfied groups of workers.

This year, we shall have to mobilize some one hun-
dred thousand new workers, apprentices, and half-quali-
fied workers. This problem cannot be solved on paper,
by planning only, as it aflfects deeply the whole economy
and the whole social life. The capitalists tried to solve it
by impoverishment and proletarization of villages, by a
tremendous oppression of the poorest peasant. "We cannot
mobilize the labor in that way though there were some
tendencies of this kind. On the contrary, with the mobiU-
zation of tens of thousands of new forest, building, and
industrial workers recruited from villages, we have issued
over eight hundred thousand ration cards to the poor peas-
ants. We have made it possible for the passive regions to
buy industrial products for fixed prices \^t'ezane cene],
crediting up to 40 per cent. We have made it possible for
the poor peasants to sell all their goods without exception
for fixed prices.

Another problem of a Communist system in industry is re-
vealed in Minister Kidric's complaint and warning:

THE FINANCIAL PATTERN 243

.... we have to remove the practice of our economic in-
stitutions arid even of the republics which, for reasons of
lack of labor, create unjustified reserves of labor and in-
tentionally overplan the need of labor. This damaging
practice has gone so far that altogether it represented
seven times more than the real need of labor.

Another worry:

We have had great success in the industrial production and
building industry. Those were, however, mainly quanti-
tative achievements. Today, we have to go forward also
in quality. There were branches in which the quaHty suf-
fered greatly, and it has been in contrast to the quantity.
It is a very dangerous feature and should it increase, it
could lead us into a dead-end street out of which it would
be difficult to get later.

Then follows another series of figures about production of
consumers' goods which promises to the population everything
in much bigger quantities than it used to get, and a warning
that the distribution does not work as it should because stores
of goods are left in storage and do not reach the market.

It must have required considerable courage on the part of
Minister Kidric to present to the Parliament such bold figures
of envisaged production for 1948, at the time when the conflict
of his government with Moscow, though still a secret, was in
full swing.

Kidric either did not know about the threatening break,
though he was a high-ranking Communist, or he hoped that
the conflict would be straightened out. Or he did not envisage
the reprisals which the Soviet bloc would take against the dis-
obedient son in Belgrade by enforcing economic isolation. As
a student of Communist theory, he fell into an ecstasy of al-
most poetic surrealism when he quoted all the economic fig-
ures. As a central figure in Yugoslav planning and production,
though, he must have been aware of all the obstacles and dif-
ficulties. But he thought the dictatorial power he held would
make it possible to overcome all troubles. Impressed by his po-
sition, which gives him power over millions of working people
whom he exploits to the last drop of their working strength,
he believes that he can change his extremely high figures into
reality. He himself has become their prisoner.

244 TITO'S COMMUNISM

Even after the break with the Cominform, this megalo-
mania of figures continued. The budget for 1949 was increased
again. It reached the figure of 162 bilUon dinars (3.24 bil-
lion dollars), surpassing the preceding budget by 37 billions,
i.e., by 22.83 per cent. The budget for 1950 jumped to 173.746
billion dinars (3,474,920,000 dollars). It has been maintained
at approximately the same level for 1951 (3,453,240,000 dol-
lars). The inevitable consequence could only be an increase of
prices of all commodities and further impoverishment of the
population.

OflScial figures of Communist finances are unreliable and
disclose only general trends of financial policy. In a liberal
economy the same figures would open a dangerous road to in-
flation and to bankruptcy of the treasury. This is not the case in
a Communist country in which conflicting economic interests
are covered by orders coming from the only existing economic
center, the government. However, the standard of living of
the population remains a pressing problem.

MARKETS, SALARIES, PRICES

Now, WE COME TO THE PRACTICAL SIDE OF ECONOMICS: WHAT

people in Yugoslavia can buy to carry on their daily life.

The Yugoslav state, which owns factories and to which peas-
ants have to sell their products, has the exclusive right of dis-
position of all these products. It can decide how and through
whom goods will reach consumers.

In order to liquidate private business, the state authorities
simply did not sell any goods to private shops; they allotted
them to state-owned business centers only. Thus, private shops
had nothing to sell. But the shopkeeper still had to pay the
rent, and his family and he had to live. He did not get any ra-
tion cards to buy daily commodities at controlled prices because
as shopkeeper he did not belong to any "productive" category
of the population to be entitled to possess ration cards. He had
to supply himself from the black market, or the so-called free

245

246 TITO'S COMMUNISM

market, where the prices were far too high for him. He was
forced to Uquidate his shop and hand it "voluntarily" to the
state. He was fortunate when he could get a minor job in his
former business. And so in 1947, according to ofl&cial reports,
90 per cent of retail and 100 per cent of wholesale businesses
were nationalized.

On one occasion I had a long discussion with a high Czecho-
slovak Communist functionary about my experience with the
Communist economy and gave him a number of examples of
how badly it works in Yugoslavia. This discussion took place
shortly after the Communists seized power in Czechoslovakia.
I warned him against all the excesses which occurred in the dis-
tribution system. He maintained, however, that the com-
munization of the economy must be carried through in all sec-
tions of life. "We shall have to face many difficulties," he said,
"because people have to be educated first to work and live ac-
cording to our doctrine. There is no doubt that many mistakes
are committed, but this is not the case because the system is
wrong but because people act wrongly. If, for instance, vege-
tables come rotten to the markets in Prague, it is because the
organization is bad, which means that people entrusted with
the transport do not fulfill their duty as they should, and it is
not because the transport and the selling of vegetables have
been nationalized."

I said to my Communist opponent, "How would you then
explain that exactly the same things happen in Yugoslavia?
You know that Yugoslavia is a country of very good grapes.
Before the war we used to get them in abundance, cheap, and
of first class quality. Now, it is difficult to buy grapes even on
the free market for excessive prices, and the quality is poor.
Before they reach the market they are half rotten. The peasant
who cultivates grapes does not care what happens to his crop
because he does not know to whom he sells. People who work
in the state-owned transportation companies are interested only
in keeping up the prescribed number of trips from the village
to the town. They do not mind whether grapes are properly
packed and carefully transported, and so before the fruit reaches
the market it is half rotten.

"Or how would you explain that in a period when eggs are

MARKETS, SALARIES, PRICES 247

scarce, wagonloads of them lie rotten for days and days some-
where in a station and cannot be offered for sale at all?

"Another example: Oranges come from Albania. Com-
munist propaganda speaks loudly about the brotherly cooper-
ation of the two people's repubUcs, praising one nation for send-
ing oranges for the undernourished children of the other coun-
try. But before the train is unloaded, all the oranges are rot-
ten.

"This does not apply only to perishable foods. Textiles are
exposed to moths in stores and shops because the employees
don't care what they are going to sell; straw rots in open stores,
exposed to rain. Goods valued at billions are lost because of
bad distribution."

Wages and salaries are decreed by the government for all
categories of employees: public servants, university professors,
hospital doctors, workers, and all sorts of other employees. As
free professions have almost disappeared and industry has been
100 per cent nationalized, the government's decrees embrace
almost the whole non-agricultural population. As for peasants,
the situation is much the same. They have to sell their products
to state authorities for prices fixed by the government, which
is like a salary paid for their labor.

A worker in Yugoslavia earns monthly some sixty dollars,
a university professor some one hundred and twenty dollars.
Workers earn, according to their special qualifications, from
eighteen cents to thirty-two cents per hour. Specially quaHfied
workers and people doing hard manual work in mines and me-
tallurgy can receive special contributions. An ordinary un-
skilled worker, then, earns thirty-four dollars in four weeks,
a skilled worker earns sixty-one dollars. If he has a family, he
earns for each child three and one-half dollars more. These are
the wages prescribed for areas in the first category, i.e., only
for towns where the cost of living is higher, as, for instance,
in Belgrade. At places in the second category wages are 10 per
cent lower. The working time is eight hours a day and forty-
eight hours a week.

For overtime, Sunday and holiday work, normal wages are

248 TITO'S COMMUNISM

paid, plus 50 per cent. But here the Communist economy strikes
very severely. It often happens that workers and officials are
appealed to for "voluntary" overtime work. For this "volun-
tary" work they are not paid. Or they are asked to work for
the benefit of the Communist party, for Greek children, for
a fund for national reconstruction and so on. Then the news-
papers announce that employees of this or that factory have
given a number of hours for a noble cause. The "voluntary"
work is organized by the Communist secretary of the factory
and nobody dares to protest. It may happen that a factory of-
fers high rewards for those who achieve the best production,
and the management announces it will pay these rewards on the
first of May, the national holiday. On that day all workers as-
semble in the yard and the names of the ten best workers are
solemnly announced and their achievement is highly praised.
One of the workers is a well-trained and coached Communist.
When his name is read he proposes to give the reward to the
Communist party. The rest of the rewarded workers have to
follow suit. The general tendency is to stimulate overtime work
but to pay as Uttle as possible for it.

An agricultural worker who is constantly employed on col-
lective farms earns monthly thirty-two to sixty-four dollars.

Public servants have seventy to one hundred and forty dol-
lars a month. The highest salaries are, however, reserved only
for some few heads of departments of ministeries. They can
receive also as special contributions for their work from four
to eighty dollars a month and a special personal contribution
of from six to sixty dollars. Theoretically, therefore, a public
servant performing a special and responsible function and giv-
ing exceptional work could earn much more than other cate-
gories of employees. Here a Communist system creates a new,
privileged class of well-to-do people who, however, have to have
the full confidence of the party, i.e., it is reserved for the mem-
bers of the party only. The purpose of this clause of the gov-
ernment decree is to ensure in the budget a sum of money which
is then deliberately distributed by the minister among high of-
ficials in the Communist party. If a public servant does not
belong to this privileged class, he cannot earn monthly more

MARKETS, SALARIES, PRICES 249

than one hundred and forty dollars even if he has had thirty
years of service and would offer the best possible work. I know
that in practice the non-Communist ofl&cials do not receive
more than one hundred dollars a month.

All these wages and salaries are subjected to different de-
ductions taken from the income by the treasury: the income
tax, insurance against illness and accident, and pensions. In
some oflSces and factories "voluntary" deductions are taken for
the Communist party, regardless of whether an employee is or
is not a member of the party.

In January, 1950, the income tax for state employees, in-
dustrial workers, collective farmers, artisans, and craftsmen
was abolished. According to an official announcement, the in-
come tax used to be 11.5 per cent (presumably of gross earn-
ings). However, to prevent inflation the income was cut by 9.1
per cent so that the net income was increased by only 2.4 per
cent after the abolition of the tax.

Salaries and wages alone do not tell very much about how
people live in Yugoslavia. The standard of living can be judged
only by the comparison of salaries and wages with existing
prices.

In general, I would say this: I lived two and a half years in
Yugoslavia, up to May, 1948. I knew the conditions of living
in my own country, Czechoslovakia, when it was still demo-
cratic. In 1948, I was on the United Nations Commission for
India and Pakistan and I spent a month in London, three months
in Delhi and Karachi, two months in Geneva and one month in
Paris. I stopped for a day or two in Rome and Athens. In the
latter case, my impressions can be only very casual and on the
surface, but as to the other places my conclusions are based on
knowledge and study. There is not a single city which I have
mentioned in which living was as expensive as in Belgrade, the
capital of Socialist Yugoslavia, though some of these countries,
according to Communist propaganda, have suffered and been
"marshallized" by the exploitation of the United States.

To understand what people can buy for their money in
Yugoslavia it is necessary to know that prices of food and other
commodities are regulated for different categories of the popu-
lation.

250 TITO'S COMMUNISM

In February, 1948, the government issued a number of de-
crees introducing a system of threefold distribution, and three-
fold prices: (1) fixed prices (vezane cene) of goods for the non-
agricultural working population; (2) fixed prices of goods for
the peasants; (3) free market prices for every citizen.

The first category concerns working people. Only working
people have a fixed rationing as, according to the well-known
Communist theory, every citizen is obliged to work according
to his abihties, and he who does not work for the benefit of the
national community has no right to receive anything from it.
The fixed rationing embraces laborers and employees who are
divided into several sub-categories according to the kind of
work they do, its importance, their age, etc. They can buy a
fixed, though minimum, quantity of basic goods, such as food,
textiles, and shoes on ration cards and for a low price.

This is the most important category of consumers, and the
state takes care of them because they contribute through their
work to the SociaHst construction of the country. Prices are
low in comparison with what other people have to pay for the
same commodities, but still substantially higher than in 1939.
Another advantage enjoyed by the first category of people in
Yugoslavia is that as workers and employees they buy their
lunches in factory and office cafeterias for much lower prices
than they would have to pay in a restaurant. But all these privi-
leges are considerably lowered in their relative value by the fact
that their wives, children, and aged members of their families
receive an insufficient quantity of rationed food, and the work-
er or official of the first category has to share his rations with
the family. Besides — and this is a point of decisive importance
— ^it often happens that people cannot buy even the commod-
ities the rationing and low prices of which are fixed by law.
They are not always on the market.

The Yugoslav peasantry forms the second category of the
population. Peasants do not receive ration cards for foodstuffs
because they are allowed to keep part of their own products
for the family and themselves. But on selUng their harvest to
the state authorities, they receive partly cash and partly bo-
nuses for which they can buy needed agricultural tools for fixed
prices, which are lower than those on the free market. These

MARKETS, SALARIES, PRICES 251

advantages are of a somehow problematic nature because the
prices for which the peasant has to sell his products are very
low, and, therefore, he can buy only very few of the industrial
commodities.

The third category is formed by all the consumers who do
not contribute directly to the SociaHst upbuilding of the coun-
try by their work in industry or agriculture, so do not get any
ration cards or bonuses. They are the former businessmen, the
artisans, craftsmen, women who do not work and have no child-
ren. They have to buy on the free market.

A free market does not mean either a free business or a
black market. It is a perfectly legal state-owned business, and
prices are regulated by state authorities. Its prices are fantas-
tically high and their purpose is (a) to prevent any black mar-
keteering which loses its justification if people can get legally
commodities for which they would also have to pay high prices
illegally, and (b) to take away from people any free cash they
might still possess.

In April, 1948, for instance, the prices of the free market
were the following: one pound of pork cost one dollar and
twenty cents; one pound of flour, one dollar; butter, three dol-
lars; bacon, two dollars and forty cents; smoked meat, two dol-
lars and sixty cents; sugar, one dollar and five cents; apples,
one dollar and ten cents; one pint of milk, thirty cents; one
egg, sixteen cents in the season and forty cents in the winter.
A lunch in an average restaurant cost two dollars and one pint
of wine of low quaUty, two dollars. A room in a hotel cost
four to six dollars; a shirt, eighteen dollars; one yard of woolen
cloth, thirty-five dollars, of cotton cloth, six dollars; one pair
of shoes, forty to eighty dollars. The quaUty of most of these
articles was poor and western people would not buy them. The
Yugoslav people could not buy them, for they had no money.
I failed to understand for whom actually these free market ar-
ticles were destined; probably for peasants who had to buy a
pair of shoes or a shirt from time to time and who still earned
some money. But for a former businessman, artisan, or crafts-
man to buy a shirt or a pair of shoes was a problem which he
usually solved by selling some of his furniture or china.

In the autumn of 1948 the prices of food rose again, in

252 TITO'S COMMUNISM

spite of a good harvest. The government decided to continue
its policy of privation of the Yugoslav population so as to have
in .store the biggest possible quantities of agricultural prod-
ucts for export. At that time it still believed in uninterrupted
trade with the eastern bloc.

When, however, at the beginning of 1949, Soviet political
and economic pressure had brought the Yugoslav hopes of re-
opening foreign trade with other Communist countries to a
definite end, the government released reserves of agricultural
products and prices went down. This proved to be a temporary
measure, however. In the summer, prices sharply increased,
probably in connection with the opening of trade negotiations
with several western countries which offered new hopes for the
Yugoslav government to place agricultural products on foreign
markets and buy with them machinery for the Five Year Plan.
The price of one pound of lard jumped from six to eight dollars;
butter went to five dollars; potatoes to sixty cents; beans to one
dollar; flour to two dollars; white bread to two dollars; pork to
three dollars; smoked meat to three dollars and sixty cents; one
liter of vegetable oil to eight dollars; wine to three dollars;
whiskey (rakija) to six dollars; one chicken to eight dollars.

In the spring of 1950, there was in Yugoslavia a catastro-
phic lack of food supplies due to the passive resistance of peas-
ants to the regime. The people did not receive basic rations
for weeks, and no meat was on the market for two months.
The high prices of commodities on the free market made these
practically unobtainable. A pair of shoes cost forty to one hun-
dred dollars; a shirt, thirty dollars; a suit, three hundred to
five hundred dollars; a pound of butter, six dollars. There
continued to be a complete lack of needles, buttons, combs, soap,
and shoe polish.

One can imagine what these prices mean for a family of
five persons — and in Yugoslavia, families are often larger — the
head of which does not and cannot earn more than from three
thousand to five thousand dinars (sixty to one hundred dollars)
a month.

FOREIGN TRADE

The foreign trade of the Federal People's Republic of
Yugoslavia is monopolized by the government and no firm is
allowed to export or import goods on its own initiative. Foreign
trade is planned and manned by the Ministry of Foreign Trade
and controlled by the Economic Council, under the supreme
power of Minister Kidric.

The centralization and monopoly of the foreign trade is
not limited to negotiations of trade agreements and the control
of export and import. Officials of the Ministry negotiate even
individual contracts with importers and exporters from abroad,
and the trade itself is entrusted to special state institutions. The
firm then gets the order to export or receive what is planned and
ordered by the Ministry.

The Ministry also fixes the price of exported goods, regard-
less of the price of the same goods on the internal Yugoslav

253

2H TITO'S COMMUNISM

market. The same article is also offered for export to different
countries for different prices according to the general trend of
prices between the two contracting countries and regardless of
the price on the world market.

Raw materials and agricultural products which Yugoslavia
has in abundance should predetermine her foreign trade. For
many years Yugoslavia's traditional export articles were corn,
wheat, pork, fruit, wine, eggs, fish, tobacco, leather, timber,
iron ore, manganese, lead, zinc, and copper. Agricultural prod-
ucts were first in importance, as mines were hardly developed
and were owned mainly by foreign firms (French and British).

In the summer of 1 949 the Yugoslav newspapers announced
large discoveries of new ferrous and non-ferrous mineral re-
sources, deposits of a good quality coal, previously very much
lacking, and deposits of oil. Yugoslavia ranked first in the
production of copper in Europe and eighth in world production;
first in the production of lead in Europe and seventh in world
production; third in the world output of mercury (because of
the acquisition of Istria from Italy, according to the Peace
Treaty of Paris of 1946).

Every industrialized country which needs raw materials
for its industry and agricultural products to feed its population
and which is interested in exporting finished products of its own
industry is, in theory, the best partner for Yugoslavia, which
country needs to import industrial products. With the excep-
tion of Czechoslovakia, the production and needs of which
complement the production and needs of Yugoslavia, all natural
partners of Yugoslavia are west of the Iron Curtain. It would
have been only natural had Yugoslavia had the best trade con-
tacts with Great Britain, United States, France, Belgium, and
Switzerland. But up until the conflict between the Communist
party of Yugoslavia and the Cominform, the practice was the
opposite, as even foreign trade was governed by political and
not economic aspects.

Yugoslavia needs, first of all, products of heavy and Hght
industry. She could not get them from Rumania, Bulgaria, and
Albania, which are also mainly agricultural and economically
primitive countries. The Soviet Union was very busy with its
own Five Year Plan and imported industrial products itself.

FOREIGN TRADE 255

Besides, it followed in its foreign policy strictly authoritarian
methods of ordering from Yugoslavia and the other satellite
countries what best suited its needs, and deHvered in return
only inferior products of its own.

Poland could deUver to Yugoslavia mainly coal. Hungary,
though industrially rather important, was busy deUvering to
Russia most of her production on the account of reparations
based on the Peace Treaty of Paris. The only country of the
Soviet bloc able to satisfy to a considerable extent the Yugo-
slav need of heavy and light industry products was Czechoslo-
vakia. On her deliveries depended the Yugoslav Five Year Plan.

But the government in Prague suffered from the same meg-
alomania of economic figures as did the Communist countries.
Czechoslovak factories were engaged in production for Czecho-
slovakia's Two and Five Year Plans, so that the government
was unable to meet the demands of the export. It could not
meet Yugoslavia's demands either.

In 1947 a new partner became important to Czechoslovak
foreign trade, namely, Russia. Up until then, Czechoslovak-
Russian trade had been negligible. Moscow appHed strong pres-
sure upon Czechoslovakia to increase considerably her export of
heavy machinery to Russia. Czechoslovak industry was ob-
viously unable to satisfy the two conflicting interests, that of
Yugoslavia and that of the Soviet Union, at the same time. The
powerful Soviet Union won out and deliveries to Yugoslavia
and the other satellite countries were delayed.

All this would normally have favored a reorientation of
Yugoslav foreign trade toward western countries. But under
existing conditions, only a complete political breakdown be-
tween Yugoslavia and the rest of the Communist countries
could bring such a result about.

In 1945 and 1946, there was a poor harvest all over eastern
Europe and the Balkans. Even the corn bread rations had to be
reduced. According to official reports the rations of food in
Yugoslavia dropped to under 650 calories a day. Tuberculosis
spread dangerously. Four hundred thousand cases of the dis-
ease were registered and a great number were not registered.

256 TITO'S COMMUNISM

Marshal Tito asked the United States for help. The Ameri-
can authorities studied the urgency of this need. It did not,
however, escape their attention that some seven hundred thou-
sand soldiers were fed with good wheat bread and that two thou-
sand wagonloads of wheat were exported to Rumania and one
thousand wagonloads to Albania for political reasons. They
could also read in a Swiss paper, published in Bern, that the Yu-
goslav government exported five thousand pigs in 1947 to Swit-
zerland, though Marshal Tito stated publicly that it did not
export a single pound of pork and was not going to do so as
long as the country itself did not have enough for its needs.
The American government could not help knowing about the
systematic campaign of hatred which the Yugoslav press and
spokesmen had led for months against "American imperialism,
American reaction and capital, American warmongers. Fascists,
and American dollar-diplomacy."

The awaited help did not come, and Marshal Tito answered
in April, 1947, in the Parliament with a feverish attack against
the government of the United States.

The western press speaks about terrible hunger in
Yugoslavia. It claims that Yugoslavia exported its own
wheat and corn although the nation suffered from hun-
ger. The Yugoslav government asked for 200,000 tons of
wheat from America and from England to prevent, it is
reported, a tragedy which would befall our people. The
same Yugoslavia, it is said, exports pigs and fats abroad.
On one side we are refused help; on the other there is weep-
ing because our country is suffering terribly. . . .

We informed the Allies through the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs that we were not humbly begging on our knees
for charity, but that we were asking for the help to which
we were entitled. If help is given to Germany, Austria, and
other countries which fought against us and against the
Allies during the war, why should we not have the right
to such help? They [the western countries and press]
are, however, making propaganda out of our request, say-
ing we fell on our knees and that the Yugoslav govern-
ment is incapable because it has led the nation to the edge
of an abyss of hunger. They are trying to damage our rep-
utation abroad and to prove that Yugoslavia is not a con-
solidated state. If, however, we allowed them to be our

FOREIGN TRADE 257

guardians, they would give us 200,000 tons of wheat.
But we do not want any guardian. "We have done every-
thing in our power to prevent anyone from dying from
hunger. We ask those who have bread to give to those
who do not have it. If there is a lack of understanding or
there is resistance [to our demand] then the whole of our
honest nation will approve of the most severe measures
against those who oppose us in these diiO&cult moments.

They [the West] say that we gave 20,000 tons of
wheat to Rumania and 10,000 tons of corn to Albania.
Last autumn, when the whole world knew that there were
regions in Rumania where people really were in danger of
dying from hunger, the Secretary of the Rumanian gov-
ernment came to see me and asked if we could help Ru-
mania with a loan. I told him that we could neither sell
nor give. If we had enough for ourselves we would be
only too glad to give. But, I said we would lend to Ruma-
nia, though we were in need ourselves. He agreed and said
this help would be of great importance to Rumania, as it
would prevent hunger. We lent Rumania 20,000 tons of
wheat and corn. Nothing but a humanitarian, friendly,
the most friendly, gesture of our government which is now
being used by the reactionaries against us and our govern-
ment.

As far as Albania is concerned, we shall not forget that
she was our ally in the war and that her sons were killed in
the Sandjak and fought together with us on their and our
territory. We helped the Albanian people as much as we
could and if need be, we shall help again. But it is ordi-
nary slander to say that we export foodstuffs, wheat, corn,
pigs and fats, et cetera. We have not exported a pound of
fat, and we shall not do so as long as we do not have
enough for ourselves. I declare solemnly that we shall
never ask anybody for mercy but only for the help to-
which we are entitled.

In 1947, Yugoslavia had a very good harvest of corn and an
average harvest of wheat. The output of raw materials was
better than in the years immediately following the war. There
was no more need for urgent help from abroad and foreign trade
could have been governed by customary rules of economics. In
spite of this the commercial contacts with the West were lim-
ited to negligible barter trade.

258 TITO'S COMMUNISM

The attitude of the Yugoslav government toward the Mar-
shall Plan made it clear that Yugoslav foreign trade was influ-
enced primarily by political factors. Yugoslavia's participation
in the program of the European economic recovery would have
been in the highest interest of the country, but it was declined
for political reasons.

The government concluded trade agreements with various
countries, some of them short-term, one-year agreements, others
long-term, five-year agreements.

With Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia concluded the so-called
investment treaty, for a period of five years (1947-1951).
Czechoslovakia promised to deliver products of heavy industry,
while Yugoslavia, in return, was expected to export raw mate-
rials and agricultural products. The volume of the exchange
was seven and one-half billion dinars (one hundred and fifty
million dollars) each way.

Similar treaties were signed with Hungary, Poland, Italy,
and Sweden. The arrangements with the satellite countries
(Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary) came to a standstill
after the break with the Cominform because of the Moscow
order to stop deliveries to insurgent Yugoslavia. (The agree-
ment with Italy was,, until the summer of 1949, of a general
character, the fulfillment of which has been hampered by the
unfriendly relations between the two countries because of the
question of Trieste and because of the general unfriendliness
of Yugoslavia toward democratic Italy.)

The same fate met the commercial arrangement with Rus-
sia, about which no information was available. It was generally
believed that in amount it ranked very high. In March, 1950,
Marshal Tito threw some light into the Soviet-Yugoslav econo-
mic relations, when he declared that "Yugoslavia actually gave
more to the USSR than she received, exporting goods valued
at about 84 million dollars — including precious ores — and Im-
porting goods valued at 75,367,000 dollars. Three trade agree-
ments were concluded between the two countries. Under the
first, concluded in 1946, Yugoslavia was given credits amount-
ing to 9 million dollars at 3 per cent interest, payable within
five years .... The second agreement, of 1947, called for a ten-
year credit of 78 million dollars for the purchases of armaments

FOREIGN TRADE 259

and military technical supplies .... Under the third agreement,
also concluded in 1947, the USSR extended a credit of 135 mil-
lion dollars for the purchase of industrial installations. While So-
viet propaganda contends that the USSR gave the entire amount
to Yugoslavia, in fact Yugoslavia received only 800,000 dol-
lars worth of materials . . . ."

Besides these long-term conventions, Yugoslavia had one-
year agreements with many European countries. If all the ob-
ligations of Yugoslavia, arising out of these negotiations, were
summed up they would lead to an enormous figure of export,
exceeding the capacity of Yugoslav production. But Yugoslavia
insisted on voluminous deliveries, being driven by the aims of
the Five Year Plan. She offered the same goods to several coun-
tries, aware of her inability to fulfill her obligations to all of
them, and this practice made commercial negotiations more and
more difficult.

The Communists, maintaining a deep secrecy about com-
mercial arrangements with other countries, look with great
suspicion upon any non-Communist connected with foreign
trade. In Ljubljana, for instance, a Czech official, employed in a
Czech firm, was sentenced for industrial espionage. It was
charged that he gave information to his central office in Prague,
before the factory was nationalized, concerning the number of
employees and production. As the factory manufactured, among
other articles, shirts for the Yugoslav Army, the man was tried
before a military tribunal.

"While guarding severely its own industry and foreign trade
against any danger of espionage, the Yugoslav government en-
gaged in a wide industrial espionage abroad. It sent hundreds
of Yugoslav officials to countries which, according to trade
agreements, had to negotiate a number of technical details con-
cerning deliveries of heavy industry products. These people
had free access to factories, their offices and shopworks. I read
an order signed by Minister Kidric which I could not retain, for
reasons of security, in which he instructed the so-called dele-
gates, going abroad to negotiate individual contracts with firms,

260 TITO'S COMMUNISM

to secure secrets of production, formulas, and technical de-
signs. Bulja, the chief of the delegates in Prague, threatened
some of his subordinates with denunciation if they relaxed in
this particular duty.

Before the Yugoslav party was excommunicated, all other
Communists saw in Tito the greatest hero of communism and
in Yugoslavia the most progressive Communist country. Com-
munist functionaries in high positions in Czechoslovakia were,
therefore, only too glad to open the doors to these Yugoslav
spies. The Yugoslav officers had free access to secret workshops
of the armament factory, Skoda, as the highest military au-
thority in Prague issued an order that there should be no secret
kept from the Yugoslav comrades. Thus, it happened that a
military secret of high importance passed into the hands of
the Yugoslav general staff with the knowledge of the Czecho-
slovak general staff.

Another feature of inter-Communist economic relations
was the penetration of Soviet influence in Yugoslav industry.

The Soviets abused their poHtical predominance in eastern
Europe and established in all satellite countries mixed compa-
nies composed of local representatives and of Soviet representa-
tives. In Rumania, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria,
and Yugoslavia numerous mixed companies have been estab-
lished, divided as a rule evenly between the local nationalized
firms and the Soviets. The local firms brought in, as capital,
installations of the factory and its reserves; the Soviets con-
tributed general management and control. In some cases they
claimed the right to former German factories and turned them
into mixed commercial companies.

This has been one of the most interesting features of post-
war development in Europe. The Soviet Union, a country
which for thirty years had preached the economic liberation
of the backward areas in Central Europe and in the Balkans
from the exploiting capital of the West, now infiltrated itself
into the economy of the satellite countries.

In Yugoslavia were founded mixed Soviet-Yugoslav com-
panies, such as the airline company, Justa, and the Danube navi-
gation company, Juspad. The Yugoslav government brought
to these mixed companies its airplanes, ships, airports, Danube

FOREIGN TRADE 261

ports, and labor. "What has the Soviet Union brought in?
Nobody knows, as no data on the subject were ever published.
Nevertheless, this policy was called a policy of economic democ-
racy and equality of nations. The break with the Comin-
form, however, freed, at least temporarily, Yugoslavia from
this economic burden, as the mixed companies were dissolved
in the summer of 1949.

Another consequence of the break was that Yugoslavia lost
her economic position in Albania. This was a rather curious
and to some extent amusing feature of the postwar relationship
between the two countries. Yugoslavia, exploited by the Soviets,
could not resist the temptation of investing in weak Albania,
in spite of all Marxist teaching to the contrary. In 1947, six
mixed companies were founded in Albania with the partici-
pation of the Yugoslav government: companies for the ex-
ploitation of naphtha, mines, electrification, companies for
import-export, construction of railroads, and a bank for financ-
ing these enterprises.

When the companies were first established the two govern-
ments worked closely together to prepare the economic fusion
of both countries. Hundreds of Albanian officials were trained
in Belgrade and a special airline was maintained to get repre-
sentatives of the two governments quickly over the mountainous
region of Albania, as it formerly took several days to reach
the capital of Albania, Tirana.

In November, 1946, an agreement was signed, which was
assumed to include Albania economically as the seventh federal
republic of Yugoslavia. The economic plans and production
were coordinated and directed from Belgrade; the Albanian
currency was valorized to the level of the Yugoslav dinar to be
ready for amalgamation with the Yugoslav currency at a later
stage; the system of prices in Albania was adapted to that of
Yugoslavia; a customs union was proclaimed; the foreign trade
of Albania was officially performed by the Belgrade authorities;
in 1947 Yugoslavia gave Albania a credit of two billion dinars,
and for 1948 a sum of three bilHon was reserved in the Yugoslav
budget to support the Albanian economy.

It was pathetic to see how exhausted Yugoslavia, herself in
need of help, credit, and investments, was sending wheat and

262 TITO'S COMMUNISM

lending money to Albania and even organizing a financial col-
lection among the impoverished Yugoslav population for
Albanian regions hit by floods.

Then, overnight, when the Yugoslav Communists were
branded as traitors of socialism and Russia, the whole picture
changed, and ungrateful Albania opened a general attack
against the Yugoslav heretics. Yugoslav officials in high posi-
tions in Albanian industry and Yugoslav officers in charge of
training the Albanian Army were insulted and ordered to leave
the country within twenty-four hours. The climax was reached
when the Albanian government accused the government of
Marshal Tito of exploiting Albania as a colony.

A similar close economic cooperation had been planned
between Yugoslavia and the People's Republic of Bulgaria. In
the summer of 1947 the two Prime Ministers, Dimitrov and
Tito, signed several agreements concerning coordination of the
planned economy, collaboration in planning foreign trade,
the exchange of technical and commercial experience, and the
preparation of a customs union.

All these plans were healthy from the economic point of
view. But politics gained the upper hand. The break with the
Cominform brought them to an end. The whole Yugoslav
foreign trade policy suffered a terrible shock. All agreements
signed with other Communist countries proved to be futile.

FOREIGN POLICY

World War I brought freedom to the Yugoslav na-
tions and led to the founding of an independent country.

As is usually the case after a war, the victors of World
War I were interested in maintaining the status quo as it was
determined by the peace treaties. Yugoslavia's interest was
focused on maintaining conditions created by the treaties signed
with her three neighbors: Austria (the Peace Treaty of St.
Germain, signed September 10, 1919), Bulgaria (the Peace
Treaty of Neuilly, signed November 27, 1919), and Hungary
(the Peace Treaty of Trianon, signed June 4, 1920).

Yugoslavia found two other countries deeply interested in
the same poUtical aims of maintaining a state of tranquility
and peaceful development in Central Europe and the Balkans,
namely Czechoslovakia and Rumania. In 1921 and 1922 the

263

264 TITO'S COMMUNISM

representatives of these three countries signed bilateral treaties,^
pledging each other assistance against renewed aggression by
Hungary. The latter had put its signature to the Treaty of
Trianon only under duress, and continued to emphasize that
it would "no, no, never" (nem, nem, soha) be satisfied with
the frontiers drawn by the Peace Treaty. The alHance of the
three countries was called the Little Entente, to indicate its
supplementary character to the Grande Entente (Triple En-
tente), formed before the war by the big powers, France,
Great Britain, and Russia. It found cordial support in the
policy of France which was following a similar course to main-
tain the peace.

The longing of France for securite from a new German
aggression found favorable echo in Yugoslavia, Rumania, and
Czechoslovakia which, too, wished to be secure from an attempt
of the defeated powers to change, by means of violence, the
conditions created by the Peace Treaties. The Little Entente
strengthened its structure in 1933,^ when a permanent organi-
zation was created to seek closer political and economic coopera-
tion among its member states. It followed a policy of solidarity
in Geneva, at the League of Nations, and in close collaboration
with France gave to each country a feeling of relative calm
and security for almost twenty years. Czechoslovakia signed
a treaty of mutual assistance with France against Germany on
October 16, 1925, as one of the international arrangements
of Locarno, while Yugoslavia and Rumania based their policy
on declarations of friendship with France as they did not feel
they were directly threatened by the danger of a renewed
German attack. But feeling threatened by the restless revisionist
policy of Bulgaria, they signed on February 9, 1934, bilateral
pacts between themselves and the other two Balkan countries,
Turkey and Greece, pledging mutual assistance in case of
Bulgarian aggression. Thus, the Balkan Entente, as this group
of nations was called, and the Little Entente assured, together
with France, peace in southeastern and Central Europe.

^The Treaty of Alliance between Rumania and Czechoslovakia of April 23,
1921; between Rumania and Yugoslavia of June 7, 1921; between Czechoslovakia
and Yugoslavia of August 31, 1922.

^The Statute of the Little Entente of February 16, 1933.

FOREIGN POLICY 265

However, under the impact of German policy originating
with the seizure of power by Hitler in January, 1933, the
structure of the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente began
to crumble, and traditional ties of friendship with France were
weakened, partly because of a defeatist foreign policy of the
French government.

After the assassination of King Alexander (October 9, 1934)
and under the new leadership of Prince Paul, Yugoslavia's for-
eign policy began to change fundamentally. The Balkan En-
tente was turned into a scrap of paper when the Yugoslavia of
Prince Paul and Prime Minister Stojadinovic signed a Pact of
Eternal Friendship with Bulgaria on January 24, 1937, thus
giving a free hand to her new partner against the other Balkan
Alhes. The "eternity" of the friendship broke down four years
later when the Bulgarian troops joined the German Army in
invading Yugoslavia.

In the spring of 1937 the Itahan Foreign Minister, Count
Giano, visited Belgrade and an Italo-Yugoslav pact of non-
aggression was signed on March 26. A few months later, von
Neurath, the Foreign Minister of the all-powerful Germany,
paid the first official visit to the Yugoslav government. The
President of Czechoslovakia, Dr. Benes, tried to put a stop
to what he called "the slipping of the Little Entente" by visiting
Belgrade in April, 1937. He did not succeed, however, and
when the Czechoslovak- Yugoslav alliance was put to the
test in the Munich crisis of 193 8, it proved to be another scrap
of paper. Czechoslovakia, threatened by Hungarian aggression,
asked the Yugoslav government whether it would fulfill its
obligations in case of a Hungarian attack, but a very evasive
answer, tantamount to refusal, was received. The alliance broke
down and two years later, on December 11, 1940, Yugoslavia
signed a Treaty of Perpetual Friendship with Hungary.

Official Yugoslav propaganda boasted that Stojadinovic
succeeded in making friends of all former enemies and neigh-
bors— Bulgaria, Austria, Hungary, Italy, and Germany — in
making Yugoslavia's frontiers secure on all sides and in build-
ing up Belgrade as a center of international cooperation. In
the spring of 1941 all these friends launched a simultaneous
attack against Yugoslavia.

266 TITO'S COMMUNISM

The same opportunistic policy was followed toward Soviet
Russia. At the eleventh hour, in 1940, Prince Paul opened
diplomatic relations with Moscow. One of the ablest Yugoslav
politicians and a former diplomat who served in Russia before
World War I, Milan Gavrilovic, was sent to the Kremlin as
the first Yugoslav Ambassador. Russia answered this policy
by opportunistic maneuvers of her own. So far she considered
the war to be a struggle between two imperialist camps. When,
however, its turn toward the Balkans heralded a development
dangerous to Russia, the Soviet government was anxious to give
at least indirect encouragement to the Yugoslavs, and a Pact
of Friendship and Non-Aggression was signed in Moscow on
April 5, 1941 — on the eve of the German invasion of Yugo-
slavia and the mass-bombing of Belgrade.

The Russian-Yugoslav friendship was put to a test. It did
not withstand German pressure, and only a few days later the
Soviets withdrew recognition of the existence of Yugoslavia.
After Russia was attacked by Germany in June, 1941, diplo-
matic relations were reopened and Yugoslavia was again recog-
nized by the Kremlin.

During the war the Yugoslav government and young King
Peter II were in exile in London, later in Cairo, and in 1944 back
again in London. Their foreign policy corresponded with the
aims of the great war coalition.

In agreement with, and under the auspices of, the British
government, the Yugoslav leaders in exile opened discussions
with the Greek government in exile to prepare closer cooperation
between the two countries after the war. In January, 1942,
a declaration was issued envisaging the creation of the Balkan
Union. Similar activities were pursued by the Czechoslovak
and Polish governments in exile to lay foundations for a Central
European Union. Both propositions were dropped under the
pressure of the Soviets who did not wish to see the Balkans
and Central Europe consolidated.

Meanwhile, the position of the Yugoslav government became

ery complicated. Draza Mihajlovic and Marshal Tito, fighting

for Yugoslavia on the soil of Yugoslavia, turned out to be

implacable enemies. Mihajlovic was backed by the Yugoslav

Royal government in London and by the western Allies; Tito,

FOREIGN POLICY 267

by Moscow. In the delicate international situation the United
States and Britain agreed with Russia at the Teheran Confer-
ence in November, 1943, to give military support only to the
troops of Marshal Tito. This sealed the fate of the Yugoslav
government in exile and decided also the foreign policy of
Yugoslavia in the fateful years to come.

The war brought fundamental changes in the geopolitical
and ideological situation which influenced the foreign policy
of Yugoslavia. It was almost reversed. The neighbors on the
east, northeast, and south — Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, and
Albania — became friends of Yugoslavia, bound by common
ties to communism. The only exception was Greece where the
election of the spring of 1946 brought to power the RoyaHst
Populist party and returned the King. The western neighbors,
Italy and Austria, were enemy countries against which Yugo-
slavia had territorial and reparation claims.

The main driving power of the Yugoslav foreign policy
after the war was, however, ideology. The ideological affinity
with the Soviet Union lay in the background of every Yugo-
slav move in the field of international relations, and this con-
tinued to be the case for one year even after her expulsion from
the Cominf orm.

Yugoslavia had the "privilege" of being the first country in
which the Communist party was firmly entrenched in power
immediately after the war. The devotion of its leaders to the
Soviets seemed to be beyond any doubt. The Communist gov-
ernment of Yugoslavia understood better than any other
eastern European country the foreign policy of Soviet Russia
and its aims, and it possessed the best ideological and military
means to contribute to the general policy of Russian imperialism
and Communist expansion.

As a neighbor of Italy, which was the first target of the
expanding communism, Yugoslavia smuggled arms to the Ital-
ian Communists. As neighbor of Greece, she gave considerable
help to the Greek Communist rebels. As neighbor of Austria,
she fomented disorders in the adjacent British zone of occu-
pation. At various international conferences, at the Peace

268 TITO'S COMMUNISM

Conference in Paris, at the General Assemblies of the United
Nations, the representatives of the Yugoslav government gave
full support to the Russians, regardless of their own national
interests. The economic interests of the country were, to a
great extent, subjugated to Moscow.

Hundreds of Yugoslav officers studied at Russian military
academies, and Russian officers served as instructors with every
larger unit of the Yugoslav Army.

In all public places, in schools and in almost every shop
window, hung pictures of Stalin. Theaters presented mainly
Russian plays, concerts played chiefly Russian music, movies
showed principally Russian films, bookshops sold Russian and
Communist literature.

At every public meeting, the Soviet Union, Stalin, and
the Yugoslav-Soviet friendship were objects of endless ova-
tions, and it became an obligatory custom to finish a speech by
glorifying them in ecstatic declarations.

The newspapers were inundated by news from Russia, by
her success in economic reconstruction, in international politics,
in arts and science; and the speeches of the leaders of the Soviet
Union were published in full on the first page. This was an
ideal alliance of spirit and policy.

Soon after the war it became clear that the Kremlin wished
to knit the eastern European countries into a system of alliances.
Three countries, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia, which
were in the allied camp during the war, had signed Pacts of
Friendship, Postwar Collaboration, and Mutual Assistance with
Russia even before the hostilities ended. They were based on
the idea of Slav solidarity and defense against a future danger
of German aggression. Slav solidarity, hitherto unknown to
the international Communists, became a powerful weapon in
the fight against the Germans.

The fear of a new German expansion was justified by his-
tory, and this policy of making treaties was in conformity
with similar treaties signed between Russia and Great Britain
in 1942 and between Russia and France in 1944. Later on,
however, when the Peace Treaties with former enemy satellite
countries had removed the obstacle of differentiating between
victorious and defeated countries, the Soviet Union signed

FOREIGN POLICY 269

similar bilateral treaties of mutual assistance against Germany
with other eastern European countries — Bulgaria, Rumania,
Hungary. The only exception was small Albania, where the
disproportion of the eventual mutual assistance was much too
obvious.

With these alUances the system of knitting eastern European
countries together was not exhausted. Another number of
aUiance pacts soon followed, and Yugoslavia, acting on Soviet
instructions, was only too willing to take the lead.

Here, I propose to go into some detail, as I can offer some
authentic information which throws light on Soviet foreign
poHcy and helps to prove that the Soviets, by creating the
eastern bloc, are solely responsible for the division of the world
into two hostile camps.

I was appointed the Czechoslovak Minister Plenipotentiary
at Belgrade in September, 1945. Before leaving Prague, I was
received by President Benes. He did not give me any special
instructions as regards Czechoslovak policy toward Yugoslavia.
His wish, in general, was to watch the internal development,
as he had no illusion about the democratic character of Tito's
government.

I received the same instructions from the Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Jan Masaryk.

Neither of my superiors mentioned that a pact of alliance
between the two countries was foreseen. After I arrived in
Belgrade the Yugoslavs did not mention the idea of an alliance
treaty with Czechoslovakia either.

Early in 1946, Vladimir Velebit, the Deputy Foreign Min-
ister, informed me "privately" that Marshal Tito would visit
Poland in the near future. "The Polish government," he said,
"has repeatedly asked the Marshal to come to Warsaw. He
has accepted in principle, but the fixing of the date has been
postponed several times. This cannot go on indefinitely, and
it has been decided now that Tito will leave for Warsaw some-
time in the spring."

When I asked what would be the purpose of the visit, Velebit

270 TITO'S COMMUNISM

replied, "Nothing but to manifest the soHdarity of our gov-
ernment with the PoHsh government which faces tremendous
internal diflSculties and which wants Marshal Tito to come to
strengthen, by his visit, the position of the Polish progressive
factors, as he is very popular in Poland.

"In principle, Tito is only too glad to help but, on the
other side, we have to take into consideration also the reaction
of oiir people at home to such a visit. Our people know very
little about Poland. In the past, we have had no special con-
tacts with the Polish nation and before the war we condemned
the Fascist policy of their government. If Marshal Tito went
on his first official trip abroad just to Warsaw, our people would
not understand it and they would ask, 'Why didn't he go to
Czechoslovakia? That's a country with which we have been
in close friendship for hundreds of years. But about Poland,
we know nothing.' It would be interpreted as an inter-party
visit.

"There is another aspect. If Tito went to Poland only, people
would think that the Czechoslovak government had some re-
serves toward Tito's Yugoslavia and this might have a bad
effect on Czechoslovakia's popularity in Yugoslavia. Besides
that, your relations with Poland are at present very bad [be-
cause of Tesin] and if Tito went only to Warsaw, somebody
might think that we are siding with the Poles.

"I wanted, therefore, to put before you, as a personal, purely
private suggestion whether it would not be of common interest
to both countries, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, if Marshal
Tito were invited to pay an official state visit to Prague as well."

I promised to inquire and, a few days later, conveyed
first to Velebit and then to Tito the official invitation of the
Czechoslovak government for Tito's visit. The date was not
fixed and nothing further was heard about it for some time.

At the end of February, 1946, I accompanied Velebit to
Prague where the Foreign Under-Secretary, Vladimir Clementis,
wanted to discuss with him mainly the question of Czechoslovak
claims toward Hungary as regards the transfer of the Hungarian
population from Slovakia to Hungary and, in general, the
question of Czechoslovak policy toward Hungary. The Council
of Four Foreign Ministers was preparing the drafts of the peace

FOREIGN POLICY 271

treaties and the Peace Conference was in sight. Clementis
wanted to harmonize the Yugoslav and Czechoslovak policy
toward Hungary.

While Velebit was in Prague the news came unexpectedly
that Tito would depart for Warsaw in a few days. The fol-
lowing day, the commander of Tito's bodyguard, Colonel
2ezelj, appeared to investigate security requirements. Velebit
left for Belgrade, and I stayed in Prague to take part in the
preparations for the visit.

The visit was to be purely a friendly and social one. The
usual official receptions, a visit to a factory, a parade of the
Czechoslovak Army, and a special performance of the National
Theater were planned and prepared. Not a word about a pact
of alliance.

Meanwhile, Marshal Tito went to Warsaw. There was some
trouble in Slovakia, through which his special train had to pass
on the way to Poland. The Yugoslav escort insisted that the
Yugoslav locomotive must pull Tito's train through the whole
of the journey, but the Czechoslovak railroad authorities were
afraid that the provisional bridges in Slovakia, which were
constructed after the Germans had destroyed the iron con-
structions, would not stand the heavy Yugoslav machine. The
controversy about the matter cost the official party twelve
hours of delay.

The Czechoslovak Ministry for Foreign Affairs received
regular telegrams from its Minister in Warsaw, Mr. Josef
Hejret, during Tito's visit which lasted over a week, but no
information arrived that a pact of alliance would be signed
on that or any other occasion.

It was from the telegraphic agencies' reports that the Czecho-
slovak Foreign Ministry and the Czechoslovak nation were in-
formed that, during Tito's visit in Warsaw, a Treaty of Mutual
Assistance and Friendship was signed.

Masaryk and Clementis immediately felt that Tito would
suggest signing a similar treaty with Czechoslovakia. The Com-
munists were ready to sign if a suggestion came from Tito. But
Dr. Benes and all the democratic ministers in the Cabinet were
strongly against it and severely criticized the fait accompli
before which they were put by the Polish-Yugoslav treaty.

272 TITO'S COMMUNISM

From Warsaw, Tito traveled to Prague. It was in the
second half of March, 1946. He was accompanied by Milovan
Djilas, Minister without Portfolio; Vladimir Ribnikar, Chairman
of the Committee for Culture and Arts; and by Velebit.

Security measures were enormous. The newspapers were
given the information about Tito's coming only on the day
of his arrival. The railroad was closely guarded for some two
hundred miles, from the border to Prague, by the army patrols.
Tito's special train was preceded twenty minutes by a train
loaded with his bodyguards. Behind him, another train fol-
lowed, loaded with Tito's specially equipped automobile and
several jeeps, with food and drinks. A hundred and fifty
members of his bodyguard accompanied Tito. The Czechoslovak
security police arrested everybody suspected of hostile inten-
tions. There was a report from the Czechoslovak-German (Ba-
varian) border that a group of U stale or Cetnici tried to cross
the frontier to attempt to kill Tito, but they were caught and
put in prison.

dementis and I went to greet Tito at the Czechoslovak-
Polish frontier. As the train passed through the coal and steel
area of Moravska Ostrava, Djilas was deeply impressed by the
amount of industrialization in Czechoslovakia. He remarked
that it would take Yugoslavia fifty years to reach such a level of
production. I replied that by that time, we might be some
few steps further.

He spoke highly about the Poles and indicated that he
was influenced by the Polish arguments concerning the Polish-
Czechoslovak dispute over Tesin. Polish-Czechoslovak rela-
tions were running very low at that time, and Djilas told me
that Tito went to Warsaw with the intention of trying to
mediate but discarded the idea when he saw how passionate
the Poles were about Tesin.

After having prepared the ground, Djilas asked me what
the Czechoslovak government thought of the Polish-Yugoslav
pact and whether "we are not going to sign something similar."

I replied that the Czechoslovak government was surprised
by the signing of the pact and reminded him that we were
reproached by the people's democracies for being "a slow
coach." Djilas confessed that they had had no idea of signing

FOREIGN POLICY 273

anything before, they left for Warsaw but that they readily
agreed when the question of the pact was opened in Warsaw.
I could not discover who took the initiative; Djilas only said
that "we were, of course, in constant contact with Lebedev
[the Soviet Ambassador to Poland]."

After our arrival in Prague, Tito was placed in a nearby
castle at Zbraslav. He went speedily through the streets in his
own car, surrounded by the jeeps of his bodyguards who re-
fused to follow the regulations and arrangements of the Czecho-
slovak police and insisted that they would take all the precau-
tions for Tito's safety.

On the evening of Tito's arrival the Communist leaders,
Gottwald and Siroky, accompanied by Clementis, saw Marshal
Tito privately in the castle. The following day they tried,
once again, to convince Dr. Benes and the democratic ministers
of the necessity of signing the pact immediately. There was
a long private meeting with the President about the subject,
but the Communists did not succeed. It was finally agreed
that after Tito's departure the oflScial communique would
mention a pact of alliance that would be signed in the near
future, and the Legations of both countries were raised to
Embassies.

When I saw the President after this conference, he was
angry with Tito and Gottwald, and declared that "a pact of
alliance means something extremely serious for the nation and
the government, and though I am not in principle against a
treaty which would be of a defensive character against a re-
newed German aggression, I could never agree to bind the
country in an alliance for life and death just like this, over-
night, without thorough study. I want the thing to be prepared
through normal diplomatic channels and then the treaty could
be signed in due course."

Other political gains which the Tito government and the
Czechoslovak Communists expected from the visit did not
come through either.

People in Prague were amazed at the extreme precautions
taken by the police wherever Tito went. For the first time
in the history of a free Czechoslovakia, the inhabitants of
Prague were ordered to keep their windows shut in the houses

274 TITO'S COMMUNISM

of the streets through which Tito and his party drove. Armed
soldiers were posted in a dense Hne along the sidewalks, their
faces turned toward the public when Tito passed solemnly
from the Wenceslaw Square to the President's castle, Hradcany.
Trade unions and school children were placed at selected spots
so that the cordial welcome would be well organized. People
were thinking of the spontaneous ovations which Prague gave
General Eisenhower and Montgomery when they visited the
city in 1945. They compared these visits with this first visit
coming from a people's democracy.

The official lunch given by the President was not cordial,
and Tito and the Czechoslovak Communists were irritated
because Dr. Benes pronounced a formal toast without making
a political speech.

The purely official character of the lunch at Hradcany
did not pass unnoticed and people were glad that the visit turned
out to be an inter-Communist manifestation and a rather
unsuccessful one.

When I returned to Belgrade I found that people in Yugo-
slavia thought the same way as Czechoslovaks and were espe-
cially delighted that the Czechoslovak government had escaped
the signing of an alliance treaty. They were deeply disappointed
two and a half months later when a Czechoslovak delegation,
led by Prime Minister Zdenek Fierlinger, came to Belgrade
and on May 9, 1946, signed the Treaty of Friendship, Mutual
Assistance and Postwar Collaboration.

At the time of the signature of the pact and until February,
1948, the Yugoslav government viewed the Czechoslovak in-
ternal and external policy with suspicion. It criticized the
Czechoslovak Communist party for not having succeeded in
eliminating the existence and the policies of the democratic
parties, and it followed with distrust the friendly relations
which the Czechoslovak government had with the western
democratic powers.

The Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, in February, 1948,
brought a change in the appreciation of the Czechoslovak
Communist party by the Yugoslav Communist leaders. They
were delighted to see the last democratic country in the eastern
bloc join the Communist front. They valued highly the

FOREIGN POLICY 275

ideological consequences of transforming this industrialized
and western-oriented country into a Communist pattern. The
enthusiasm did not last long. Four months later the Yugoslav
Communists saw this youngest member of the Communist fam-
ily join others in accusing them of betraying socialism.

In their relations toward Bulgaria the Yugoslav Commun-
ists were seeking a permanent solution before the end of the
war. In the winter of 1944, after Bulgaria had been liberated,
a declaration was ready for signature and publication proclaim-
ing the federation of the two countries. The western powers
intervened as Bulgaria was formally still in the enemy camp;
the war was still going on, and the solemn declaration was,
therefore, postponed.

Discussions about a Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation were re-
sumed in 1945. Only in January, 1949, Rankovic, the Min-
ister of Interior, who is one of the four leading members of
the Yugoslav Politburo, disclosed that the two parties had
held different views about the composition of the federated
state. The Yugoslavs wanted to see Bulgaria incorporated into
a South-Slav federation as the seventh federal republic and
to leave the structure of the Yugoslav federal republic of six
states untouched. The Bulgarians, fearing Yugoslav predomi-
nance in the proportion of 6:1, wanted to base the federation
on two equal units only: Yugoslav and Bulgarian.

Rankovic further revealed that the dispute was brought
before Stalin for final decision, and he was in favor of the
Yugoslav concept of the federation. This, however, was not
put into force, for international reasons. The Yugoslav Com-
munists felt that a unique opportunity had been missed. They
did not abandon the idea and tried to achieve its realization
by way of a subsequent consolidation of the Communist parties'
positions in the Balkans and by closest political and economic
cooperation.

In the summer of 1947 the Bulgarian Prime Minister, ac-
companied by several members of the government, paid the
first official visit to Belgrade. Hundreds of thousands of people
were called out to receive him along the railroad at almost
every station from the Bulgarian-Yugoslav border to Belgrade.
Two old revolutionaries, Dimitrov and Tito, who had met

276 TITO'S COMMUNISM

before only under the protection of their Soviet teachers in
Moscow, met for the first time as leaders of two governments.
The embracing at the station had no end.

In Tito's summer residence at Bled several documents of
importance were signed: protocols about a pact of alliance in
preparation, about a close economic collaboration, about a
common procedure against the so-called Greek monarcho-
Fascists, and last but not least, a protocol according to which
Yugoslavia generously renounced the claim of twenty-five
million dollars in reparations which were assigned to her by
the Peace Treaty of Paris.

In November, 1947, Tito returned the visit and the Pact
of Mutual Assistance was signed, bringing in for the first time
a new formula of defense. Again the Yugoslav government
was privileged to initiate a new concept of eastern European
alliances.

So far, the pacts of alliance signed by Russia with all the
satellites and those of Yugoslavia with Poland and Czecho-
slovakia had been aimed against the danger of a renewed
German aggression. This time, however, the formula of the
Yugoslav-Bulgarian treaty was widened to be against any
aggressor. This change was of historical importance. It dis-
closed the policy of the Soviet-governed countries and of Soviet
Russia, namely, to work toward the formation of an eastern
bloc directed against the western countries.

At the time of his visit to Bulgaria, Tito declared that there
were no frontiers between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, and that
the question of a federation between the two countries was
only a matter of formahty. This idea was carried on by Dimi-
trov in January, 1948, when he enthusiastically expressed him-
self publicly about a forthcoming Balkan and Central European
Federation.

At this moment the Soviets considered it necessary to in-
tervene. They did not like the idea of a closer association be-
tween any powers, even their own satellites, feeling it would
be more difficult to deal with a federated bloc of countries
than with each of them separately. Pravda taught Dimitrov
a severe lesson and rejected his idea of federation in an article
which amazed many people, including Communists. But Dimi-

FOREIGN POLICY 277

trov understood its significance and publicly repented. Though
the attack of Pravda was addressed to the Bulgarian Prime
Minister, political observers interpreted it as being addressed
also to the Yugoslav Prime Minister. Tito, however, kept silent.

In 1947 the capital of Yugoslavia played host to other dis-
tinguished visitors from neighboring countries. Besides Dimi-
trov, Prime Ministers of Rumania, Hungary, and Albania came
to manifest the solidarity of the people's democracies and to
prepare texts of treaties of alliance which were later signed when
Marshal Tito visited their capitals.

As before World War II, Belgrade became once more the
center of international activities; receptions and mass ovations
were arranged. Pacts were signed again. But the set-up was
much different. The Fascist or semi-Fascist host and visitors
of ten years ago were replaced by Communists. The friendship
was, however, again "eternal" — only to end a year later. So
far the pacts of alliance had been signed between Slav nations
and the texts had referred to the idea of Slav solidarity. When
the non-Slav satellites joined the ranks of the Communist
countries and pacts had to be signed, the idea of Slav solidarity
against German imperialism was abandoned and the real nature
of an ideological bloc against the western democracies was fully
revealed.

In the Hungarian, non-Slav capital, Budapest, in December,
1947, Marshal Tito for the first time advanced the idea that
ideological solidarity surpassed that of Slav affinity. He declared
that the idea of Slav solidarity should be, above all, filled with
the spiiit of mutual progress. It did not matter whether one
was a Croat, a Pole, a Serb, a Czech, or an Hungarian; the
first question was whether he was a good democrat (i.e..
Communist ) .

Then the second series of bilateral treaties of alliance fol-
lowed. They were signed among the rest of the satellites, all of
them, with the exception of Czechoslovakia and Poland, "against
any aggressor." By 1949 the number of pacts signed among
the countries of the eastern bloc reached the respectable figure
of twenty- four.

In Yugoslavia, as in other Communist countries, this inun-
dation of treaties was greeted with deep mistrust. Overwhelmed

278 TITO'S COMMUNISM

at every ofl&cial visit by bombastic propaganda and a stream of
official speeches, and exhausted by obHgatory participation in
mass celebrations of the occasion, the Yugoslav people realized
how irresponsible the Yugoslav foreign policy was. The gov-
ernment was signing one international document after another,
binding the nation to march eventually with other nations
to fight the West, should Moscow consider that necessary to
help the spread of an ideology with which they had nothing
in common. They considered all these treaties as declarations
of solidarity among Communist parties.

It is- an historical fact that the government of Yugoslavia,
led by Marshal Tito, took the lead in this aggressive policy
aimed against the West, meeting more than enthusiastically
the desire of the Soviet government to close the ranks of the
eastern powers. Thus, next to Moscow, a grave responsibiKty
is borne by Marshal Tito before mankind and history for having
contributed actively to the division of the world.

The Yugoslav government presented at the Peace Confer-
ence in Paris and at several sittings of the Council of Foreign
Ministers far-reaching territorial and economic claims. It wanted
to incorporate Trieste; it asked considerable adjustments of
the frontier with Italy and Austria; it claimed reparations from
both. According to the Potsdam agreement, for reparations
from Germany, it depended on deliveries from the western zone
of Germany. UNRRA, which Hterally saved the Yugoslav
population from hunger, was mainly subsidized by the United
States. A loan for which Yugoslavia asked could come also
only from Washington. None of these claims or needs could
have been solved by Russia, but only by agreement of the Big
Powers or by the West. Yet the Yugoslav government adhered
faithfully to its ideological hatred of the West.

The Yugoslav Communist party expected their Italian com-
rades to come to power soon, and it offered them help, while it
continuously attacked the legitimate ItaHan government. In
November, 1946, the leader of the Italian Communist party,
Palmiro Togliatti, visited Marshal Tito in Belgrade, and the

FOREIGN POLICY 279

two Communist leaders were reported to have reached an agree-
ment on Trieste, a problem which neither their governments,
the Peace Conference, nor the Security Council had been able
to solve because of the persistent opposition of the Soviet and
Yugoslav governments. But an agreement along a Communist
party Hne was possible as it was meant to help the Italian Com-
munists in their struggle for power.

Similarly, Tito met the desire of the Italian Communists
to release Italian war prisoners, while the government of de
Gasperi repeatedly failed to achieve anything in this thorny
problem. The Austrian Communists had the same success re-
garding the Austrian prisoners. The Communist press of these
countries highly praised these negotiations, making it clear to
public opinion that all questions in dispute between neighbors
could easily be solved if the Communists were in power.

In the Yugoslav press almost daily the United States and
Great Britain were cursed as the worst possible capitalists and
imperialists. American and British diplomats were insulted,
accused of espionage and contacts with subversive elements in
the country.

Every international event served as a good pretext to attack
the wilful West. When a soldier was killed in a border incident
on the Yugoslav-Greek frontier his body was transported
throughout the country. The special train stopped at every
large town; the people were ordered to go to the station, and
speeches were made denouncing "the Greek murderers and
their western accomplices." Such a demonstrative journey was
made with the remains of the Yugoslav consul who was mur-
dered when visiting a camp in which the soldiers of the former
Yugoslav Royal Army were interned.

When the United Nations established the Balkan Conimis-
sion to investigate the situation on the frontiers of Greece,
the bordering countries. Communist Albania, Yugoslavia, and
Bulgaria, refused to cooperate with the Commission. Every
man and woman of Macedonia, through which transports bound
for Greece had to pass, knew that Yugoslavia was actively sup-
plying the Greek Communist partisans with ammunition, food,
clothing, and medical supplies; that she offered the Greek rebels
refuge and re- armed them on Yugoslav soil, and that the secret

280 TITO'S COMMUNISM

radio station, "Free Greece," was actually operating from Yugo-
slavia. The fury of hatred was intensified when the United
States offered help to the Greek government to fight the
Communists.

Soon after the Truman doctrine was proclaimed. Marshal
Tito spoke to the Yugoslav Parliament, in April, 1947. He
formulated the ideological approach to international problems
in the following way:

The western reactionaries usually speak about two
blocs, western and eastern. This is the way people speak
who wish a war. There are, in fact, two fronts in the
world. One front is numerically small, but it is dangerous.
It is the front of the imperialist warmongers. The other
front is tremendous, composed of peoples of all countries,
and this wishes peace. To this second front belong the in-
vincible Soviet Union, new Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslo-
vakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, the democratic forces
of Greece, Hungary, as well as a great majority of the peo-
ple of America, England, France, Italy, and of all other
countries of the world. Constant vigilance, the detecting
of all warmongers, the discovering of the various imperial-
ist maneuvers, etc. — that is the best and most eflScient form
of fighting for the strengthening of peace in the world.
Yugoslavia will consistently adhere to her foreign policy
and will continue fighting for the strengthening of peace
in close collaboration with all countries which accept this
collaboration.

The Marshall Plan was the final test of the good will of
Soviet Russia. It was the last offer to find out whether Russia
was willing to take part in the common economic reconstruction
of Europe or whether she preferred to see and foment misery
which — according to the Communist slogan "the worse, the
better" — was meant to hasten Communist upheavals in western
Europe.

All European countries were invited by Great Britain and
France to take part in the opening conference in Paris, at the
beginning of July, 1947.

When the French and British Ambassadors presented the
invitation to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry, Marshal Tito and
the Deputy Prime Minister, Kardelj, and the Deputy Foreign

FOREIGN POLICY 281

Minister, Bebler, were at their summer residence at Bled,
Slovenia. I was there as well.

One evening I received a message from Prague that the
Czechoslovak government had decided unanimously to attend
the Paris Conference. Late at night I went to see Bebler to
give him the message. He seemed to be very satisfied upon
hearing it and he told me that Tito and Kardelj were just
considering the answer. He indicated that there was a possibility
that Yugoslavia would accept the invitation as well. Two days
later, Yugoslavia refused to attend the Conference.

I met Bebler again. He told me that a positive decision
had been actually taken and even the delegation named, to be
headed by Kardelj, But the night before, Djilas had telephoned
from Belgrade expressing himself strongly against the partici-
pation of Yugoslavia in the Conference. And, as Bebler told
me. Foreign Minister Simic was even more vehemently against
it. The opinion of the latter mattered very Httle. It was clear
that Djilas was only conveying to Tito and Kardelj an order
from Moscow to refuse the invitation, as Czechoslovakia and
Poland finally did.

The Soviet press and those of all satellite countries presented
the Marshall Plan as another move of the "American imperial-
ists" to subjugate Europe. Ignoring his own original decision,
Marshal Tito explained the procedure of the Yugoslav govern-
ment in an interview saying, "In a note addressed to England
and France we expressed our point of view and the reasons
why we could not attend the Conference in Paris. I think
that this stand of ours, which is similar to that of the other
brotherly and neighboring countries, is understandable to every-
body. I cannot say that we would not welcome frankly offered
aid for the reconstruction of our devastated country. But the
experience we have had so far with the western countries, and
first of all with America, or better to say, with the govern-
mental American circles, shows that from these circles we cannot
expect unselfish and frank help for the reconstruction of our
country.

"On the contrary, according to the Marshall Plan, we
would probably have to take over obligations to the detriment
of our country; our Five Year Plan, our industrialization and

282 TITO'S COMMUNISM

electrification would be in danger. These obligations would
also threaten our economic development. This is a certainty,
as much as some gentlemen may be amazed by these assertions
of ours. . . . Let nobody think that we have refused to par-
ticipate in the Paris Conference for any other reason. We did
so only because of what we stated in our note and of what I
have said just now. ..."

After the eastern bloc refused to participate in the Euro-
pean Recovery Program, the international situation rapidly
grew worse. I met Deputy Prime Minister Kardelj on July 22,
and this is what he told me: "Since the Paris Conference the
international situation has deteriorated considerably. Before
long, there will be other complications, social upheavals, and
perhaps even bloody revolutions. Look at the situation in
Greece, China, and Indonesia. Other countries will follow suit.

"The Americans have the atomic bomb, but this weapon
might prove to be very problematic. If there is a war, the
Soviet Army would occupy western Europe in a short time,
and the Americans would not, after all, bomb their own western
allies. In all these countries, people's governments would be
installed and they would mobilize the masses and production.
Besi<les, we have the ideological atomic bomb which would
ruin the whole liberalistic world. The Soviet Union and we
are not so weak as the West thinks. Our soldiers are able to
fight even with limited needs and they do not have to have
chocolate every day. In spite of the seriousness of the situation
I do not believe there will be a war."

In a conversation which I had with Tito on October 10,
1947, he told me, "We frankly want peace. Personally, I do
not believe there will be a war. It will be proved that American
methods lead nowhere and that they do not frighten anybody;
within a year American aggressiveness will start to drop."

On another visit, on January 20, 1948, Tito continued in
the same spirit, "The Americans are sending ships to Greek and
Italian ports and arrpaments to the Near and Middle East. In
western Germany they are building up military and economic
bases. In Greece they follow a policy of various provocations.
I assume that these provocations will increase and that they
will be aimed mainly against Albania. These provocations har-

FOREIGN POLICY 283

bor considerable danger. We are keeping calm and shall keep
calm, however, for we want to do everything to maintain
peace. It would be a mistake though, if this were interpreted
as a weakness. I think that everybody who lives in Yugoslavia
knows that we are not sitting with hands crossed. The Ameri-
cans are pursuing an impossible, brutal policy. Look at the
British, how reasonably and cleverly they proceed. In spite of all
this, I do not beHeve there will be war. In China, the Ameri-
cans suffer one failure after the other, and their public opinion
is against war. I attach considerable importance to the Wallace
movement. It is one thing to make a war, and another to make
provocations. If the Americans really meant to go to war, they
would be getting ready secretly and would not limit them-
selves to noisy provocations."

In September, 1947, the leaders of nine Communist parties
met in Poland and formed the Information Bureau of Commu-
nist Parties, called briefly Cominform. Besides the seven par-
ties of the eastern bloc countries, the Communist parties of
Italy and France took part in secret sessions. The Third In-
ternational, which was formally dissolved in 1943 to create an
impression that the Kremlin had abandoned the policy of using
other Communist parties for Soviet foreign policy, was revived,
in another form. Moscow felt the moment opportune to demon-
strate the strength of the solidarity of the world proletariat and
to frighten the West by a renewed nightmare of international
communism. Widespread strikes in Italy, and particularly in
France, followed to paralyze the effects of the Marshall Plan,
to foment general unrest and fear.

The speech made at the Cominform meeting by Zdanov,
the representative of the Soviet Communist party and one of
the most influential figures in Russia, contained orders to other
Communist leaders on how to proceed in the field of the cold
war. One of the main points of !^danov's appeal was to detect
the western imperialists who wanted to push the world into
war. But the democratic front, i.e., the Communists, zdanov
said, was stronger and bigger and it would break the efforts of
the imperialists. This was the key to the Soviet propaganda strat-
egy. While disrupting the elements of consolidation by Com-
munist activities, Moscow wanted to create at the same time

284 TITO'S COMMUNISM

the impression in the frightened democratic world that Russia
was the only country defending the cause of peace while the
western "capitalist" gavernments were about to drive the world
into another catastrophe.

2;danov's speech became the ten commandments of all Com-
munist parties. The Yugoslav Communists were represented at
the Cominform meeting by two of the most outstanding mem-
bers of the Yugoslav Politburo, Kardelj and Djilas. Soon after
their return from the meeting, the directives of 2danov were
noticed in all public utterances. The Communist speakers and
newspapers paraphrased !^danov's speech, creating the impres-
sion that the Soviet Union would succeed in stopping western
warmongering. However, in private conversations the leaders
of the party did not conceal their conviction that war was in-
evitable. It was necessary to gain time, though, until France
and Italy fell into Communist hands without open fighting,
if possible, and until the Soviet Union was better prepared.
The anti-Western propaganda of hatred reached a culminating
point at that time, in the autumn and winter of 1947, and the
Yugoslavs felt proud to be among the first and most important
allies of Soviet Russia.

At the beginning of 1948, the Yugoslav Communist leaders
were still convinced that their foreign policy of being faithful
to Russia guaranteed Yugoslavia an honorable place in the as-
sociation of eastern countries and gave her the highest possible
security.

In January, at the occasion of the ratification of pacts of
alhance with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania, Kardelj de-
clared:

For many decades, the Balkans were called a barrel of
gunpowder. And so they were, especially because vari-
ous reactionary and anti-national forces in the Balkan and
Danubian countries were in power and sold themselves out
to various masters. The nations were thrown against each
other and against their vital interests so as to fight for for-
eign interests and not their own. . . Tito and the leading
personalities of Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania accom-
plished by the alliance pacts great deeds about which the
best men of these nations have dreamed and fought. The
Balkans have stopped being a barrel of gunpowder because

FOREIGN POLICY 285

the treaties . have put down the foundations of a strong,
lasting peace and of a brotherly collaboration between the
Balkan-Danubian nations.

To prove how Greece was suffering because of being unable
to join the Balkan people's democracies, Kardelj continued,
The heroic Greek nation, which sacrificed so much and
fought bloodily for its independence during the Second
World War, has become a victim of a foreign imperialis-
tic enslavement. This is the reason why it cannot cooper-
ate in the great work of peace and brotherly collaboration
in the Balkans. The fate of the Greek people offers a pic-
ture of what the imperialists would like to impose on the
Balkan-Danubian nations. But not only in the Balkans or
in the Danube area is there, no way, back to old times; in
Greece and in many other countries nobody can prevent
the victory of the people who are fighting for peace and
perpetual peaceful collaboration among nations. Mistaken
are those [people] who think they can create out of
Greece a springboard for a struggle against the freedom-
loving nations of the Balkans and of eastern Europe.

These treaties have also created a very favorable situ-
ation for Yugoslavia which will be even clearer if we think
of the situation before the Second World War when Yugo-
slavia was encircled by hostile countries only, among which
were also the Hungary of Horthy, Rumania of Antonecsu,
Bulgaria of Boris, and the Italian Albania. . . .Pitting
their signatures to these treaties, the responsible states-
men of Bulgaria, Hungary, and Yugoslavia have com-
pleted the firm system of security of the Federal People's
Republic of Yugoslavia, which leans on the great Soviet
Union, and which has made similar treaties with brotherly
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Albania. Never before have
the nations of Yugoslavia reached such a degree of natiorn-
al security as today, thanks to the right policy of comrade
Tito and our national government.

This speech was given on January 8, 1948. It was not more
than six months before this national security disappeared be-
cause of the quarrel between Stalin and Tito. Yugoslavia then
stood alone, estranged from her traditional friends of the West,
and with all the people's democracies turned into ruthless ene-

THE HERESY

In June, 1948, began one of the most exciting develop-
ments of modern history. Two Communist countries, the So-
viet Union and Yugoslavia, began an ideological and political
struggle which may yet develop into a military conflict. Thou-
sands of reports have been sent to world newspapers about this
extraordinary event, hundreds of speeches have been made, po-
sitions have been taken. The issue itself has been clouded by
propaganda, the real background of the conflict has been veiled
in secrecy, and the democratic world has slipped into sentiments
of sympathy, nay friendship, for Marshal Tito, admiring his
courageous stand against the increasing pressure of Moscow and
its satellites.

I was in Geneva working on the United Nations Commission
for India and Pakistan when, on June 29, 1948, newspapers
published on front pages in big headlines the news that Tito

286

THE HERESY 287

and his closest associates, Kardelj, Djilas, and Rankovic, were
accused and condemned by the Cominform for the heaviest
crime that could be committed against the sacred law of Marx-
ism and Leninism. I could not believe it and quickly went to
buy all the newspapers which this international town offered.
The headlines announced the sensation: "Tito sentenced by the
Cominform!" "Tito declared traitor!" "Moscow appeals for
revolt against Tito!" "The Cominform ousts Tito!" I read
them again and again.

In the declaration of the Cominform which met in Rumania,
Tito was accused of pursuing a policy hostile to the Soviet
Union. The leaders of the Yugoslav Communist party were
said to have followed a false internal and foreign policy. They
had abandoned the position of the working class and were be-
coming a party of nationalistic kulaks; they were revising the
Marxist-Leninist doctrine, according to which the Communist
party is the basic and leading power in the country. They had
suppressed the principle of elections in the party and the princi-
ple of autocriticism. They had refused to confess their mistakes
and were obsessed by megalomania and ambitions. They had
oriented themselves wrongly in the international situation
and, being afraid of imperialistic threats, they believed that
they would gain the favor of imperialistic powers by a number
of concessions. They had accepted the well-known bourgeois
theory, according to which capitalist states represent a smaller
danger for the independence of Yugoslavia than the Soviet
Union.

The Yugoslavia of Marshal Tito accused of an anti-Soviet
and anti-Marxist policy! It seemed to me to be nonsense, after
what I had seen in that country for two and a half years of
my assignment there. I assumed that the declaration of the
Cominform was ordered by Moscow, knowing that the other
Cominform parties would not dare do anything on their own
initiative. I was sure that there must have been something
very serious which compelled the grim, conspiratorial figure of
the Kremlin, Josif Visarionovic Stalin, to open a public attack
against the most devoted and so far the most respected pupil
of Communist teaching, Josip Broz Tito.

The conflict was brought to light only a few days after I

288 TITO'S COMMUNISM

left Belgrade, and I must confess that I had not had the sHghtest
idea that anything of historical significance was under way.
There was some kind of tension in the highest governmental
circles but it was felt very vaguely. There were some signifi-
cant incidents but it was impossible to form a clear picture of
them and to reach any conclusion.

I knew, for instance, that all Russian officers had been given
an order from Moscow to leave Yugoslavia within twenty-four
hours. At the time my guess was that the Soviets wanted them
to be back with the Red Army because of the tense international
situation which had developed after the Communist putsch in
Czechoslovakia.

In April, 1948, the Bulgarian Prime Minister, Dimitrov,
passed through Belgrade on his way to pay an official visit to
Prague. I went to the station to greet him and there met Min-
ister Djilas and Minister of Foreign Affairs Simic who had come
for the same purpose. Djilas talked with Dimitrov for half an
hour in the usual cordial and informal manner. Later, I was
confidentially informed that on his way back Dimitrov would
stop twenty-four hours as Tito's guest in Belgrade.

It was about seven o'clock in the morning when I went again
to the station. I was surprised that Djilas was not there this
time, and that Tito's guest was being met by a second-rate
minister and non-Communist, Stanoje Simic. But my surprise
rose even more when I heard that Dimitrov was not going to
interrupt his journey. He did not even care to get up, and Simic
had to wait until the elderly Foreign Minister of Bulgaria, Kola-
rov, came out of his compartment to exchange a few words with
his Yugoslav colleague.

At the time of the Dimitrov incident Simic told one of his
subordinates, Ivan Vejvoda, that Velebit, the Deputy Foreign
Minister, had suddenly fallen gravely ill and had been ordered
by Tito to take two months' leave. This must have caused
everybody who knew Velebit's exceptionally strong physique
to do a lot of thinking. My suspicion was only confirmed when
I paid him a visit before departing and found him flourishing.

In the second half of April, 1948, a delegation of the Yugo-
slav Parliament visited Prague. The journey had been arranged
some two months beforehand. The delegation was led by the

THE HERESY 289

Communist veteran, Pijade. According to the usual ceremony,
the delegation was supposed to be received by the Czechoslovak
Prime Minister, Klement Gottwald. But the audience was can-
celled at the last minute. Mr. Pijade felt bitterly about it and
complained to me later that this was intolerable.

In May, two members of the Politburo, Hebrang and 2ujo-
vic, were relieved of their ministerial functions. This was a
grave step and a very strong sign that something was wrong. A
dismissal of a minister in a totalitarian government is always a
sign of internal trouble. Under normal circumstances only
death can relieve him of his office.

A few days after the official announcement of the dismissal
I heard that Hebrang had been arrested. But I was highly privi-
leged to secure this information. The cook of our Embassy was
a friend of Hebrang's cook who came crying because one day
the secret police had arrested her master, the following day his
wife and then his three children, the eldest of whom v/as no
more than five years old.

Another significant event was the stopping of all Yugoslav
airlines.

When I went to make my last call on the Soviet Ambassa-
dor, Lavrentiev, he mentioned that "the Yugoslav comrades
still have a lot to learn." This was an unheard of remark by a
Soviet diplomat who was always eager to know everything, but
most cautious not to say anything.

All this was convincing, though indirect, evidence that
something was going on, but I think none of the foreign ob-
servers knew the real, grave implication.

Later, after I left Yugoslavia, two other incidents occurred.
On Tito's birthday when hundreds of congratulations poured
into the city, Stalin's greetings, which were always published
on the front page, were noticeably lacking.

When the western powers, the United States, Britain, and
France, agreed upon Belgrade as the place for the Danubian
Conference which was to take place in July, Moscow surprised
them by opposing their proposal.

Then, on June 29, 1948, the bomb exploded. The Comin-
form published its sentence. The world was amazed. Every-
body waited with anxiety for the next happening while the

290 TITO'S COMMUNISM

proclamation of the Cominform appealed to the Yugoslav rank
and file Communists to overthrow Tito's leadership.

This, however, did not take place and it was undoubtedly
the Kremlin which was most surprised that the unity of the
Yugoslav comrades withstood the first wave of pressure.

The seat of the Cominform, which had been so far in Bel-
grade in recognition of the special merits of the Yugoslav Com-
munists, was abruptly transferred to Bucharest.

The Communist party of Yugoslavia did not fail to answer
the accusation immediately. Its declaration revealed that cor-
respondence had been exchanged between Stalin and Tito since
the end of March; it rejected emphatically all the accusations
and attacked the Soviet Communist party and the rest of the
Cominform for serious misbehavior toward Socialist Yugoslavia.
The appeal of the Cominform, addressed to the Yugoslav com-
rades, was counter-attacked by a proclamation from the Yugo-
slav Central Committee, asking all members of the party to
strengthen their ranks.

The same day, June 30, a decision of the Central Committee
of the Yugoslav Communist party was published regarding the
case of Hebrang and 2ujovic. They were accused of factious
tendencies and of sabotage of the Five Year Plan, expelled from
the party, and handed over to justice. A campaign was or-
ganized to prove the solidarity of the members of the party with
the leadership. Thousands of telegrams were sent from different
organizations and from all corners of the country to manifest
the unity among the rank and file standing firmly behind Mar-
shal Tito. Other telegrams were addressed to Premier Stalin as
it was hoped the the excommunication might have been the
work of Comrade 2danov, who directed the activities of the
Cominform. This hope was, however, soon abandoned as Stalin
made it clear that he stood behind !Zdanov's decision.

On July 21, 1948, the Fifth Congress of the Communist
party of Yugoslavia was opened in Belgrade. Not a single guest
representing other Communist parties was present. The Con-
gress had been planned before the conflict broke out, but now

THE HERESY 291

it had to answer the ' Cominf orm accusation and try to have
the Yugoslav party readmitted into the Cominform. It had
to prove that the Yugoslav comrades were worthy followers of
Marxist and Leninist teaching, that they pursued the right
policy in towns and villages, that they were deeply devoted to
the idea of fidelity to Moscow, that they would never abandon
the united front of Socialist states in the struggle against the
western imperialists, and that they represented a party with
democratic status, program, and regular elections.

Marshal Tito described in his speech, which took nine hours,
the history of the Yugoslav Communist party, its difficult be-
ginnings, the period of illegality, its struggle and leading role
in the fight for the liberation of Yugoslavia. He aptly empha-
sized that while teams of Yugoslav Communist leaders were of-
ten changed in the period from 1920 to 1937, following orders
of the Third International which accused them of treachery to
socialism, factious deviationism and bourgeois nationalism, it
was he himself who was given an order by Moscow, in 1937,
to liquidate the Politburo and to create a new leadership. He
was the only leader who had escaped the last purge. Now he
was being accused of the same crimes for which he had been
.^ chosen, eleven years ago, to liquidate his closest associates.

One point of the accusation was answered by Tito with
special stress. This was a provocative statement by StaKn in
which Tito was reminded that the Red Army had saved Tito
and the Partisan movement from annihilation after the Ger-
man parachutists descended on his headquarters in May, 1944,
at Drvar. It was thanks to the successes of the Red Army that
the Communist party of Yugoslavia came to power, Stalin stated.

Tito did not hesitate to answer openly and, to a great ex-
tent, correctly Stalin's humiliating statement. He declared
that the Red Army had reached the Yugoslav border in the
autumn of 1944, when the Yugoslav Army already numbered
several hundreds of thousands soldiers, and that it, the Red
Army, had participated only in the liberation of Belgrade, east-
ern Serbia, and Vojvodina. Concluding his speech, Marshal Tito
expressed the hope that the Russian Communists would give
the Communist party of Yugoslavia an opportunity to prove by
deeds that they were being faithful to Lenin and Stalin.

292 TITO'S COMMUNISM

After Marshal Tito, all the leading members of the Yugo-
slav party took the platform and spoke about the party's or-
ganization, status, program, propaganda, and analyzed, point
by point, the accusations brought against them by the Comin-
form. It was a university of Marxism. The Yugoslav leaders
proved they knew the works of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin by
heart and they refuted the Cominform's attack by quotations
from the books of the founders of Communist teaching.

Kardelj defined the Yugoslav foreign pohcy. He declared
that it was based on the following principles:

( 1 ) An all-out activity in the struggle for peace and
peace-loving collaboration between states on the basis of
equality and within the frame of the United Nations. (2)
Economic collaboration with everybody who wished it, on
the basis of equality and maintenance of mutual obliga-
tions. (3) Political support to forces which are fighting
for peace, democracy, freedom, independence, and social-
ism. (4) Close collaboration with, and all-out support to,
the peace-loving, democratic, anti-imperialist policy of the
Soviet Union and the countries of people's democracy.
( 5 ) Development of an all-out collaboration with the So-
viet Union and the countries of people's democracy in the
sphere of economics and culture for the purpose of
strengthening and coordinating a common economic de-
velopment and mutual cultural understanding among
countries of the Socialist world.
Kardelj made it clear that Yugoslavia would stay faithful
to the Soviets and to the idea of world Communist solidarity
and emphasized that

the action of the Cominform could under no circumstances
change our policy. . . and nothing can affect the basic
fact that our Socialistic country belongs to the Socialistic
camp led by the Soviet Union. On the other side, we are
deeply convinced that neither the Soviet Union, the coun-
tries of people's democracy, nor the whole international
anti-imperialist workers' movement can withdraw support
from a country of socialism which is exposed to attacks
by the enemies of socialism. To do anything else would
mean exposing that country to imperialistic pressure.

The man of economic figures, Kidric, proved in his long
expose that Yugoslavia socialized her industry in two years

THE HERESY 293

while the Soviet Union needed ten years. He analyzed the case
of Hebrang and 2ujovic and characterized their theory as Trot-
sky-Bucharinist.

In conclusion, the Congress of the Communist party passed
a resolution inviting again the Bolshevik party of Russia to come
and study on the spot the accusations of the Cominform to con-
vince itself that they were unjustified.

The Congress voted also the status of the party and accepted
a wide program of action. This was to serve as an answer to the
accusation that the party worked in semi-legality. Its "demo-
cratic" principles were confirmed by elections of the Politburo
in which Tito, Kardelj, Djilas, and Rankovic were solemnly
re-elected. The unity of the party was convincingly manifested.

When the Russian Bolsheviks saw that the original appeal
launched by the Cominform to overthrow Tito's leadership
found no echo in Yugoslav Communist ranks, they turned to
subversive actions. They persuaded a few Yugoslav diplomats
stationed in Moscow and the satellite countries to raise the ban-
ner of counter-revolution. This move, however, made a very
poor showing because these diplomats played no significant role
in Yugoslav political hfe.

At the time of the Communist Congress in Belgrade, Rus-
sian agents secretly distributed leaflets and spread rumors about
the early liquidation of Tito's heresy. In September, 1948,
Pravda published a feverish attack against "Tito's group," and
the article was distributed in Yugoslavia as a separate sheet.
Some letters which Stalin addressed to Marshal Tito preceding
the action of the Cominform were translated into Serbian, in
Moscow, and sent to Belgrade and secretly spread among mem-
bers of the Yugoslav Communist party.

The Yugoslav Politburo retaliated by pubUshing in book-
let form a series of letters which StaHn and Tito had exchanged,
and sent it to its followers as a confidential document.

This correspondence is still not fully known abroad. It is
a most interesting document. It reveals, partly, the truth which
lies behind the conflict and offers a picture of the relations
which exist between the Kremlin and the Communist parties
of other countries. It shows that Moscow speaks to them in an
imperative, dictatorial manner and expects from them a blind

294 TITO'S COMMUNISM

subservience. The tone of Stalin's letters is amazingly arrogant
but, on the other hand, Tito's answers show his pride and firm-
ness.

From what was published one can ascertain that at least
two letters still remain strictly secret. Two of Tito's letters, one
of March 18, and another of May 20, are mentioned but their
text is unknown. It can be assumed that these two documents
contain material which is of special importance.

But the letters which were published give sufficient evidence
that the original reason for the conflict lies elsewhere than in
ideological matters as the Cominform tried to pretend, and
they throw some light on the perplexity of the situation.

The main points of this correspondence deserve to be com-
mented upon.^

The first letter dated March 30 and signed by Tito is ad-
dressed to V. Molotov, then Minister of Foreign Affairs. It
contains information that a Russian general, Barskov, had no-
tified the Yugoslav government about a decision of Moscow to
withdraw at once all Soviet military advisers and instructors
because they were surrounded by unfriendliness; also, that all
civilian Russian experts had been recalled from Yugoslavia be-
cause the Yugoslav economic authorities had refused to give
the Russian commercial mission in Belgrade important infor-
mation.

In his letter Marshal Tito denies the statement about un-
friendliness toward the Russian officers. As to the question of
the Russian commercial mission, he emphasizes that there was
no special agreement according to which Yugoslav authorities
were obliged to give information of a confidential nature to
the Russians. He asks to be told the real reason why the Soviet
government took such important steps.

It is of interest to note that the name of General Barskov
was not on the list of the diplomatic missions in Belgrade, but
he apparently played an important role in the military affairs
of Yugoslavia. He headed the Soviet military teams which were
stationed with the Yugoslav army units and which lived like
masters in an occupied country, enjoyed all sorts of privileges,

^For full text see: Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute. London: Royal Institute of In-
ternational Aflfairs, 1948.

THE HERESY ' 295

and were paid four times better than the Yugoslav officers. At
social gatherings they were given special honors.

The letter from Tito was answered by Moscow on March
17, and signed CKSKP (b), the Central Committee of the Sov-
iet Communist party (of Bolsheviks).

The letter begins with a domineering statement that Tito's
answer is untruthful and completely unsatisfactory. It men-
tions the question of the Russian officers who, according to the
Yugoslavs, are too expensive for the Yugoslav budget and re-
calls a declaration which Minister Djilas allegedly made, in 194S,
that "Soviet officers stand, from the point of view of morale,
below officers of the British Army."

The answer from Moscow gives further reasons why the
Russian Communists are not satisfied with the Yugoslavs.

First: There are among the Yugoslav Communists types
of doubtful Marxists like Djilas, Vukmanovic, Kidric, and
Rankovic, who have made anti-Soviet declarations that "the
Soviet Bolshevik party alienates itself"; that "in the Soviet Union
an all-national chauvinism governs"; that "the Soviet Union
wants to dominate Yugoslavia economically"; that "the Com-
inform is an instrument of the Soviet Bolshevik party to domi-
nate other parties"; that "Socialism in the Soviet Union has
stopped being revolutionary," and that "only Yugoslavia is
a real upholder of a revolutionary Socialism."

Second: The Communist party of Yugoslavia still lives in
a stage of half-legality and lacks democracy within the party
ranks. The secretary of the party's department of personnel is
at the same time Minister of the state's security, which means
that he controls that department. Then follows a sentence which
warns, "According to the Marxist theory, the party must con-
trol all the state organizations of the country, including the
Ministry of the state's security, while in Yugoslavia the opposite
is the case."

In the Yugoslav party, the Russian letter continues, there
is no spirit of class struggle and the capitalist elements in vil-
lages and towns continue to grow rapidly. In Yugoslavia it is
the National Front which is considered the basic leading power
and not the party.

296 TITO'S COMMUNISM

Three: Deputy Foreign Minister Velebit, whom the Yugo-
slav comrades know to be an EngHsh spy, is still in the Yugo-
slav Foreign Service.

These were grave accusations and the Yugoslav party took
some time to answer them. In a letter addressed to J. V. Stalin
and V. M. Molotov, dated April 13, Tito and Kardelj flatly re-
jected all the Moscovite charges, and, wishing to prove that
they had the full confidence of the party, they signed the docu-
ment "as ordered by CKKPJ," the Central Committee of the
Communist party of Yugoslavia.

In the introductory part of the letter, Tito and Kardelj ex-
pressed their surprise at the tone and contents of the Russian
letter, which in their opinion was based on denunciations com-
ing from two former Politburo members, Hebrang and !Zujovic.
They emphasized, for the first time, their patriotism by saying
that "no matter how much a person loves the country of social-
ism, the Soviet Union, still in no case could he diminish his love
for his own country which is also building up socialism."

The letter then deals with each of the Russian points. It
denies the charge against Djilas and deeply resents that people
who have been fighting and suffering for years for communism
and the Soviet Union can be accused of enemy feelings toward
Communist Russia and can be compared to Trotsky. It quotes
figures showing that the Communist party is democratically
governed and represented, it stresses the leading and decisive
role of the party in Yugoslavia and proudly compares its achieve-
ments during and after the war with the activities, organiza-
tional forms, and achievements of other Communist parties.

As regards the case of Velebit, the Yugoslav comrades stress
his merits during the war, offer to investigate his past and make
a concession that he will be transferred to other duties without
delay. (This is the explanation of Velebit's sudden illness.)

Then, they pass over to an attack of their own: The Soviet
organs of espionage try to recruit Yugoslav citizens for their
service and they create a net of espionage in Yugoslavia. They
remind the Soviets that they have in Tito's Yugoslavia a most
faithful ally and that the closest collaboration between the two
countries is of vital interest to both of them, but for this absol-
ute mutual confidence is needed.

THE HERESY 297

At the end of this letter of 4,500 words, Tito and Kardelj
propose to Hquidate what they call a grave misunderstanding
by mutual clarification on the spot, i.e., in Yugoslavia, and they
invite representatives of the Russian Bolshevik party to their
country.

The Central Committee of the Soviet Communist party
answered on May 4 with a letter of 7,600 words.

The Russians again resent the tone of Tito's answer and
qualify it as "exaggeratedly ambitious." They recapitulate, point
by point, the old accusations and add some new. They defend
the privileged position of the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade,
asserting that he had, as a representative of the Soviet Union
and member of the Russian Bolshevik party, the right to know
everything. They indirectly flatter the U. S. Ambassador, Ca-
vendish Cannon, by writing:

It is also impossible to vinderstand why the Minister of the
USA in Belgrade behaves as the master of the house and his
"informants," the number of whom grows, enjoy free-
dom.

The Soviet letter rejects the accusation about the activities
of the Soviet agents in Yugoslavia and stresses that in no other
country have the Soviet civilian or military representatives met
with such difficulties as in Yugoslavia. Stalin asks:

"Why do the Yugoslav comrades refuse to confess their
mistakes as the French and Italian Communists did? . . .
They certainly do not suffer from modesty even though the
merits and successes of other Communist parties are no
smaller than theirs. The leaders of the other parties are
modest and do not make any noise about their successes,
while the Yugoslav leaders have deafened everyone by their
exaggerated boastfulness.

It must also be noted that the French and Italian Com-
munist parties have, as regards revolution, greater not
smaller merits than the Yugoslav Communist party. If
they have been, so far, less successful than the Yugoslav
Commvinist party, it cannot be explained because of some
special qualities of the Yugoslav party, but because the
Soviet Army, after the German parachutists had smashed
the headquarters of the Partisans and when the national
liberation movement in Yugoslavia had passed through a
heavy crisis, hastened to help the Yugoslav nation, broke

298 TITO'S COMMUNISM

down the German occupie 3, liberated Belgrade and thus
created conditions which were necessary for the Commu-
nist party to come to power. Unfortunately, the Soviet
Army did not and could not give such help to the French
and ItaUan parties.
In conclusion, the Soviet Communists did not accept the
Yugoslav suggestion to discuss the problem in Belgrade but they
announced that they would present it to the Cominform.

Another letter from the Yugoslav Central Committee, dated
May 17, followed. It simply said that the Yugoslav Commu-
nists could not agree to present the conflict to the Cominform,
the individual members of which had already expressed their
opinion about the matter. It proposed

to liquidate the thing by proving by deeds that the accu-
sations are unjust. We shall stubbornly build up social-
ism and stay faithful to the Soviet Union, to the teach-
ing of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. The future will
prove, as the past has done, that we shall do what we prom-
ise you.
The last official and published correspondence which StaUn
had with Tito is dated May 22, 1948. The letter imputes to
the Yugoslav Communists that they wanted to escape the criti-
cism of the other Communist parties and thus secure a privi-
leged position. After what had happened, the Russians have
no more confidence in the promise that the Yugoslav comrades
would correct their faults.

Comrades Tito and Kardelj have given promises to the
Central Committee of the Soviet Communist party many
times but have not kept them. . . . The Politburo of the
Communist party of Yugoslavia, and especially Comrade
Tito, should know that they have, through their anti-
Soviet and anti-Russian poHcy. . . done everything to un-
dermine the Soviet party's and the government's confidence
toward them.
By refusing to appear before the Cominform, the Yugoslav
Communists were accused of betraying the cause of the interna-
tional solidarity of the working class and of embracing a na-
tionalism which is hostile to this cause.

To explain its attitude, the Yugoslav Politburo sent a declar-
ation to the Cominform, making it clear that under the circum-
stances it could not take part in the Cominform sittings.

THE HERESY 299

This was an act of unprecedented disobedience by a Com-
munist party to the KremHn. The fundamental principle of
prestige was dangerously involved and the structure of inter-
Communist hierarchy was threatened. The Soviet Communist
party felt that no other solution was possible except to excom-
municate the Yugoslav comrades from the Cominform. At the
same time, it took it for granted that, according to its thirty
years of experience, it would be a simple matter to change the
leadership of the Communist party in Yugoslavia.

The problem was handed over to the Cominform. To cre-
ate an impression for the outside world that the issue was of
an ideological nature Moscow prepared a declaration and had it
adopted by eight Communist parties.

But any accusation of an ideological deviation was un-
founded. The chapter in which I have dealt with the situation
of the Yugoslav peasantry proves that the Yugoslav Commu-
nist policy in agriculture was far from strengthening kulaks y
i.e., individualistic elements in the country. On the contrary,
it had been suppressing them systematically.

Likewise, the argument that bourgeois elements were gain-
ing in influence in towns was completely false. It could be
easily seen how completely the Yugoslav party had liquidated
the middle class and impoverished the whole nation and how
radically industry had been turned over to the state. No other
satellite had gone so far in this field of communization as the
Yugoslavs.

The objection about the predominant position of the Na-
tional Front in Yugoslav politics can be definitely discarded
because of the all-powerful influence of the Communist party,
of which the National Front is nothing but an instrument to
be used by the Communists.

In view of Yugoslavia's open loyalty to Russia, to accuse
the Yugoslavs of pursuing a policy hostile to the Soviet Union
was simply out of place.

The objections concerning the non-democratic and half-
legal status of the Yugoslav Communist party made a very hy-
pocritical argument. To respect democratic principles would
be against the very substance of Communist policy, and to

300 TITO'S COMMUNISM

pursue half conspiratory activity belongs to the basic methods
of Communist activities.

Another point of the Moscow accusation offers more help in
finding the real reason for the break. This was the dissatisfaction
of Moscow with the position of the Soviet ofl&cers and civilian
experts in Yugoslavia. This was the only point which was men-
tioned in the first letter.

There must, also, have been leakage from the conferences
of the Politburo, and the correspondence discloses that it came
from Ministers 2ujovic and Hebrang. Their star had been in
decline for a long time and out of personal hatred for Tito and
especially Djilas, they either informed the Soviet Ambassador,
Lavrentiev, of the most confidential critical remarks of other
members of the Politburo about the Soviets, or, out of sheer
vengeance, just invented them.

Various ideas have been advanced as to the real reasons for
the conflict. The Yugoslav Communist leaders gave as the
reason that they stood for the principle of equality among the
nations of the Soviet bloc and couldn't bear the economic ex-
ploitation of Yugoslavia by Moscow. The western poUtical
writers, have, in general, accepted these assertions. It is, how-
ever, difl&cult for someone who had the opportunity to observe
Tito's policy on the spot to share their opinions.

I reached the conclusion that the real background of the
conflict was mainly psychological and not ideological or eco-
nomic. At the bottom of the conflict lay the Soviet's lust for
power and its imperialistic aims for world domination. The Com-
munist party of Yugoslavia gave full support to this policy of
the Soviet Union. But Moscow failed to understand that Mar-
shal Tito, Prime Minister of the Federal People's RepubHc of
Yugoslavia, the Commander-in-Chief of the Yugoslav Army,
Partisan leader, national hero and dictator, was a different per-
son from Josip Broz, once underground agent of the Third In-
ternational.

In Paris, in November, 1948, I received from Ales Bebler,
Deputy Foreign Minister and a member of the Central Com-
mittee of the Yugoslav Communist party, the following infer-

THE HERESY 301

mation: "There is not a single word of truth in the Soviet accu-
sation that ideologies divided us from the Russian Bolshevik
party. The Soviets know it as well as we do. But they invented
all sorts of objections of an ideological nature to make the break
appear plausible when they found that we were not ready sim-
ply to obey their orders.

"The real reason for the conflict arose out of the different
views which we and the Soviets had about our mutual relations.
Stalin is convinced that war is coming and, therefore, he wants
to tighten up Soviet relations with the people's democracies.
I cannot see any other reason for his ordering Russian oflScers
to penetrate deeper and deeper into the organization of our
army. This is how the trouble started. You know that there
were among us hundreds of Russian officers who acted as in-
structors in our army. They were placed all over the country.
Everybody Hked them as long as they continued their jobs. It
was nonsense when Stalin reproached Tito for having shown
an unfriendly attitude toward the Russian officers stationed
with our troops.

"But, on the other hand, you know our Partisans. When
the Russian officers started behaving as if they were masters
of our army and wanted even to command our units, our of-
ficers did not like it and began to protest. I do not need to tell
you how proud our officers are. They were all Partisans who
fought in the war and they naturally objected to being deprived
of their command. This is how the conflict started. Local quar-
rels were brought to Tito and he agreed with the opinion of
our officers. All the rest which was subsequently added in the
letters which Stalin sent to Tito was meant to serve as a screen
for the Cominform."

This is an authentic testimony and it offers a convincing
explanation of the real background for the slur which the Rus-
sians cast upon the Yugoslavs.

Stahn himself helped to elucidate this policy of military pen-
etration in the satellite countries. In his letter to Tito he stated,

The Soviet Union has military advisers in almost all
the countries of people's democracy. We cannot but em-
phasize that so far we haven't heard any complaints from
our military advisers in these countries. . . . The Soviet

302 TITO'S COMMUNISM

Union has many civilian experts in all the countries of
people's democracy but it does not receive any complaints
from them and has no misunderstanding with the govern-
ments of these countries. The question is: why have diffi-
culties and conflicts arisen only in Yugoslavia?

This is really the important question and an answer to it
offers an explanation of the background of the Soviet-Yugoslav
conflict. As to other Communist countries — Poland, Czechoslo-
vakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania — their Communist gov-
ernments depend entirely upon Moscow, politically, psychologi-
cally, and intellectually. They are real puppets in the Krem-
lin's hands. They came to power thanks to the Red Army or
Soviet pressure only. They disregard their nation's interests in
order to help the Soviet Union, believing that only a strong
Communist Russia can bring communism to all the world.

The same was true with the Yugoslav Communists; let us
not be mistaken about it. They were ideologically better trained
than any other Communists in the satellite countries. They
could not possibly underestimate the leading and decisive role
of Russia in the expansion of communism against the West.
They proved constantly that they knew how to sacrifice their
nation's interest for the Russian policy. There was nothing
patriotic or even nationalistic in their policy and sentiments.
They were more internationalistic than the Russian Commu-
nists, who in fact use international Marxism for chauvinistic
Russian imperialism also.

Yet, when the Yugoslav Communists were ordered to hand
over the command of their army to Soviet officers they objected.
The reason for this stand of Tito has an overwhelmingly psy-
chological background.

Before the war, . the Communist parties of Europe were in
fierce opposition towards the governments of their respective
countries. Some of them, as in Czechoslovakia and in western
Europe, were allowed to have their party organizations and their
own press, and they took part in elections. They had their
representatives in Parliaments. Others were outlawed, either
shortly after World War I, or later, after having displayed a
complete lack of loyalty to their own countries and an unre-
stricted respect for the Soviet Union only.

THE HERESY 303

One thing was common to all Communist parties: they
had their master in Moscow and obeyed his orders without any
hesitation. At that time, communism was established in one
country only, in Russia, which directed the activities of the
other Communist parties through the Third International in
Moscow. These were relations between an all-powerful Bol-
shevik party which was well entrenched in power, on one side,
and the rest of the Communist parties which were either in op-
position or underground, on the other side. They depended up-
on Moscow not only ideologically and intellectually, but mate-
rially as well.

These were easy years for Stalin. Financially poor and often
poKtically powerless, party leaders listened devotedly to the
mighty voice of Moscow. One telegram from the Moscovite
center followed by a check was sufl&cient to bring overnight
a change of the Politburo of any Communist party abroad.

The teams of Communist leaders came and went. Favorites
of yesterday were proclaimed traitors of socialism today. Only
the ablest opportunists survived repeated purges.

The Communist party of Yugoslavia was one of the most
pitiful before the war. As described in a previous chapter, it
was dissolved in 1921 and went underground. In an agricul-
tural country, with deep religious feelings and a working class
of undeveloped class-consciousness, there was no fertile soil for
Communist activities in Yugoslavia. Many leaders were liqui-
dated, others put in prisons, and there were periods of complete
passivity and practically non-existence of the party.

The war changed many things and many people. Some
Communist leaders in Europe were put into concentration camps
in Germany, some escaped before the German Army occupied
their countries and found refuge in Moscow. The latter spent
four years in comparative comfort and had a good opportunity
to receive another period of training in Marxism and subser-
vience to the Bolshevik party of Russia. Once more they were
under the complete control of the Soviet Politburo.

The only contribution they made personally to the war
effort was to broadcast to the people in the occupied territories
and incite them to take up arms against the Germans. They saw
the successes of the Red Army and applauded its victorious

304 TITO'S COMMUNISM

march toward their subjugated countries. It was thanks to
this army that they could seize the governments against the
wish of a good majority of the nations.

The story of the Communist party of Yugoslavia under the
leadership of Marshal Tito was very different. He spoke about
it in the following terms: "From that time [1938] till now
[1948], the Central Committee of the Communist party of
Yugoslavia stayed uninterruptedly in the country, working il-
legally underground, not just until 1941 when Yugoslavia be-
came an occupied territory." The impUcation of these words,
which were pronounced after the conflict with the Cominform
broke out, is clear. They were addressed to the other Commu-
nist leaders who fought from Moscow for the victory of their
common ideology, instead of staying with their rank and file
as was the case of Tito and his lieutenants.

The Yugoslav Communist party was probably the only
Communist organization which took part in the fighting as an
organized entity. As already described, its members fought va-
liantly. Tito and his Partisans went through many dangers and
did not shrink from risking their lives. Tito himself was once
wounded. They fought simultaneously against the German and
Itahan armies, Serbian Cetnici and Croat Ustase. One idea only
obsessed the fanatical minds of these men: Victory for commu-
nism all over Yugoslavia.

Once the aim was achieved, the leaders of the Yugoslav
Communists realized the material change which followed in
their personal positions and in the situation of the party itself.
The underground conspirator and prisoner who had been afraid
of the mere appearance of a policeman and had had to dis-
guise his identity under different names now became the leader
and manager of the state machinery. He bore the distinguished
title and wore the decorative uniform of Marshal of Yugoslavia.
He lived in a huge palace formerly inhabited by kings and
princes. He had a large bodyguard. He started to receive dip-
lomats and graciously greeted respectable guests at official parties.

His associates — ministers, generals, party secretaries — under-
went parallel changes. Only yesterday they were persecuted,
outlawed agitators and hard-fighting Partisans. Now, they have
ministerial chairs and live in comfortable villas. Illegal crossings

THE HERESY 305

of the frontier were exchanged for official journeys in special
trains and luxurious American automobiles. Hot and tasty
meals and good wines were substituted for dry bread and water.
All this was a change which would influence the mind and men-
tality of almost anyone.

The Communist party of Yugoslavia, once prohibited and
persecuted, powerless and without any financial means, became
a party identified with the state itself, and actually above the
state, all-powerful and all-rich.

It is true that other Communist leaders in eastern Europe
also reached these high levels of state functionaries and com-
fortable living. But Tito and his party people were the only
men who somehow deserved it; they personally fought for their
positions. They were well aware of this fact. They were seized
by an immense pride in their war achievements.

It is not unusual that people like to speak about moments
of their lives when dangers had to be faced and risks taken. This
tendency of narration has, however, grown geometrically with
the Yugoslav Partisans. With time the reality of arduous fight-
ing changed into a legend, and pride has grown into conceit
mixed with an unconcealed scorn for the achievements of others.

Tito and the Yugoslav PoHtburo had great contempt for the
other Communist leaders with the exception of Stalin and the
Russian Politburo. It grew into a superiority complex. The
Yugoslav comrades liked to teach ideological lessons to the rest
of the members of the Communist family. They felt they had
carried the Communist revolution through better and quicker
than others, and that communism was best and first consoli-
dated in Yugoslavia. This was fully recognized in Moscow. Up
until the beginning of the dispute with Moscow in the spring
of 1948, the Soviet government did not conceal its preference
for the Yugoslav Communists.

The Communist leaders of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the
rest were heavily afflicted by this attitude. They suffered from
another complex: that of inferiority, feeling rightly how small
their contribution toward the common cause of communism was
and to what extent they owed their power to the Russians.

Gottwald, the chairman of the Communist party of Czecho-
slovakia, and now President of the Republic, always blushed

306 TITO'S COMMUNISM

with anger when I told him, with maKcious satisfaction, that the
Yugoslav Communists criticized the Czechoslovak party for
not having eliminated the democrats from Czech political hfe.
Only one month before the Communists made the putsch in
Prague, Gottwald shouted at me at a lunch in his private villa:
"I'll show them how we shall win. And it will not be by the
comical ballot as they do in Belgrade." This significant, and
for a Communist, unusual frankness can be explained by the
jealousy and hatred which he felt toward Tito and which were,
at the moment, stimulated by several drinks of brandy.

These feelings of Gottwald toward Marshal Tito were fully
shared by Bierut, the President of Poland; by Dimitrov, the
Prime Minister of Bulgaria; by Rakosi, the Deputy Prime Min-
ister of Hungary; and by Anna Pauker, the Foreign Minister
of Rumania. They have all been top leaders of their respective
parties and their prestige within their own parties has been high.
They felt uneasy, however, when they met with Tito on vari-
ous occasions and had to bend their obedient spirit to the fight-
ing will of the Yugoslavs. When Tito conversed with these
leaders, either in Yugoslavia or when paying them official visits
in their own countries, he never missed an opportunity to speak
with enthusiasm about "the famous five oflfensives" which the
Partisan Army went through. His guests or hosts listened cour-
teously, trying hard to conceal how annoyed they were that
they could not offer any soldierly story about their own contri-
bution to the common cause.

This atmosphere contributed largely to the last phase of
the conflict between the Yugoslav party and the Cominform,
the leaders of which were more than satisfied that at last Tito
had been taught a lesson by Moscow. Their inferiority complex
found its compensation in the dethronization of Tito.

Tito was accused of bourgeois nationalism. The adjective
can be easily discarded. This is shown by observing how far
he had driven the country into communism, whether in the
political, cultural, or economic field. I do not share, however,
the thesis which has been generally accepted that he had mani-
fested a kind of nationalism which caused the friction. Tito

THE HERESY 307

was an internationalist. His speeches started to sound a national-
istic tone only after he had been definitely isolated by the Corn-
inform. It was his Partisan background and Partisan mentality,
not nationalism, which led him into the conflict with the Corn-
inform. It could be called Partisan chauvinism, if a formula for
his heresy is needed.

There was, however, nothing nationaHstic in the behavior
or policy of the Yugoslav Communists. They had their Par-
tisan pride, it's true, and they wanted to serve the idea of
communism, world revolution, inter-Communist solidarity and
Moscow-uncontested command with their necks straight and
not bent humbly in the manner of the other satellite servants.

This is what I call the specific situation of the Communist
party of Yugoslavia. Stalin missed it completely, thinking that
he could give orders to Tito and his associates in the same brutal
manner he had used for many years when they were only mis-
erable agitators.

Dictators are weak in psychological matters. They often
commit grave mistakes when they have to face a problem which
requires a distinct psychological approach. They become vic-
tims of their own lies which, in the end, nobody believes but
themselves. They overlook the real situation in their own coun-
tries and are wrongly informed about what is happening abroad.
The system is built on fear, and judgment is based on informa-
tion received from diplomatic representatives who are afraid to
report impartially on disagreeable matters.

This was the case of Yugoslavia. Stalin's ambassador at Bel-
grade, A. V. Lavrentiev, is a mathematician by profession. It
might have been a good qualification for checking up how much
precious copper, zinc, and lead Yugoslavia delivered to Russia,
but no algebraic formula could interpret the minds of the
Yugoslav Communists.

When we met in Paris, in the fall of 1948, Ales Bebler told
me further, in effect, "We consider Lavrentiev as the person
most responsible for the conflict. He did not inform Moscow
properly. He failed to understand that we in Yugoslavia could
not be given orders just like this. Had he studied our Partisan
movernent and had he realized how high was the authority of
Tito in the party and with the nation, he would have come to

308 TITO'S COMMUNISM

the conclusion that we could not be handled in that way. But
he either did not understand the situation or did not report truly
to Moscow. He is mainly guilty for the turn things took. Now,
however, his position is almost untenable. You know how he
was received everywhere before. Now, nobody speaks to him."

Actually, he was absent from his post for several months
and in the summer of 1949 was recalled from Belgrade to be
promoted to the high function of one of the Deputy Foreign
Ministers of the Soviet Union.

It can be safely assumed that Stalin, when opening the ques-
tion of Soviet officers and technical experts assigned to Yugo-
slavia, did not reahze that it could develop into a conflict. It
was a problem of prestige. Later, when the conflict grew and
other accusations were added and answered in the same bold
manner, Stalin was still convinced that it would be easy to settle
it by a simple reshuffle of the Yugoslav Communist leadership.
He was sure that Tito, Djilas, Kardelj, and Rankovic would be
liquidated overnight. This kind of change had been arranged
often before; why shouldn't it work this time?

But Stalin was fundamentally wrong. There can be no
stronger bonds of friendship between men than those which
have been forged in trenches. The Yugoslav Partisans lived for
four years in forests during the war, and were bound together
by inseparable links of common danger and suffering, success
and setback, and also by a feeling of immense responsibility for
the death of many countrymen. This experience of Partisan
friendship enriched the prescribed party discipline by a factor
which is unknown to the Marxist theory and technique, namely,
feelings of faithfulness and solidarity among themselves and es-
pecially toward their war-time leader. Marshal Tito.

This situation was neglected by Moscow. The conflict grew,
and so far Stalin has not succeeded in liquidating the present
leadership of the Yugoslav party. He has lost, at least tempo-
rarily, his best ally.

THE CRUCIAL STRUGGLE

After the war, the Soviet armies helped to liberate
Europe from the evils of nazism, but the Soviet government
did not keep the promise given at Yalta, in February, 1945,
and on different other occasions, that Russia would leave the
internal development of the Hberated countries to the nations
themselves. Thinking of her further aggressive move toward
the West, she estabHshed full control over all eastern Europe
and on the Stettin-Trieste line built up springboards for further
conquest.

Yugoslavia was considered the most important bastion in
this system of ideological aggression. She was to play a role
which no other Communist country could possibly undertake.
Not only was the Yugoslavia of Marshal Tito considered to be
the best consolidated state under Communist rule but, also,
her geographical position opened possibilities which no other

309

310 TITO'S COMMUNISM

satellite could offer to the Russian policy aiming to conquer
first Italy and then France.

Poland and Czechoslovakia are separated from Italy and
France by several hundreds of miles. Western Germany and
Austria lie in between. They are occupied by the American,
British, and French armies. Though these armies are kept small
and could not possibly be a match for the huge armies which
Russia keeps on her western border, the Soviet government is
aware that a military move through these countries would rep-
resent an act of aggression and more than a risk of an open con-
flict with the United States and other western countries. As the
Soviets seem to be, for the moment, anxious to avoid a war,
the way through Germany or Austria would not be appropriate
to force the issue in France and Italy. Czechoslovakia and
Poland do not offer, therefore, strategical advantages to Russia,
in this case.

Moreover, their armies are not yet up to the standard.
Both countries, during the war, had units both in the Soviet
Union and in western Europe. When these units returned to
their motherland, they brought with them their experience from
fighting side by side with the Americans and British on the
West, and with the Russians on the East. They were also
given a very enlightening opportunity to see how people live
under Russian socialism and in British democracy. This ex-
perience was not without influence upon their minds. The
westerners, or Londoners, as they are called, were impressed by
the British way of living, the easterners were deeply disappointed
and even many Communist soldiers were shocked. Though the
new Communist regimes have purged the ranks of officers in
the Polish and Czechoslovak armies, it will take a long period
before they can be sure about the moral and political reliability
of these armies.

Two other countries within the Soviet bloc — Rumania and
Bulgaria — with shores on the Black Sea are certainly important
for the Russian system of defense. But in the ideological pene-
tration of Russia toward the West, they are too far away, and
because of their negligible political influence cannot play any
decisive role in spreading communism outside their own bor-

THE CRUCIAL STRUGGLE 311

ders, though Bulgaria is of some importance because of lying
adjacent to Greece.

The same applies to Hungary which, as a completely inland
country surrounded by other Communist states, is not impor-
tant to the ideological strategy of the Soviets.

Albania of Enver Hoxha borders only on Greece and Yugo-
slavia, being cut off from any direct contact with the Russians.

There was, however, one country of the Russian bloc
which was supposed to take active and decisive part in the in-
filtration of Communist and Russian elements into Italy and
France. This country was the Yugoslavia of Marshal Tito.
Her geographical position and miUtary disposition offered unique
advantages.

Yugoslavia has a common frontier with Italy and Austria,
and Italy is adjacent to France and Switzerland. Yugoslavia
has a long coast on the Adriatic and through this an outlet
to the Mediterranean and Africa. The valley of the River
Vardar often in history brought the Serbian armies down to
Greece. Albania is militarily in Yugoslav haijds. The Yugoslav
Army numbers 700,000 soldiers and this figure can be doubled,
from a population of almost sixteen millions. A good number
of Yugoslavia's soldiers are seasoned fighters who have gone
through many tests of fire in the Partisan war. The army is
exceedingly well disciplined and trained, though not equipped
sufficiently for modern warfare. The officer corps is composed
almost exclusively of organized Communists and former
Partisans.

The Communist party of Yugoslavia is far the most homo-
geneous of all the satelhtes. Even the terrific pressure brought
upon it by Moscow and the Cominform did not split it as would
certainly have been the case in any other country. It is, above
all, a combative party, steeled in active fighting and devoted
to the idea of world revolution.

Also, Yugoslavia is rich in iron ore, copper, chrome, zinc,
lead, and other raw materials which are indispensable to war
production.

Nobody was better acquainted with the irretrievable value
which Yugoslavia represented for the Kremlin policy than
Stalin himself. There was, however, one man who valued the

312 TITO'S COMMUNISM

role of Yugoslavia in the Communist strategy just as much
and considered it just as high as Stalin did — ^Marshal Josip
Broz Tito.

Tito did not forget the real reason for the conflict. He
knew that the Russians wanted to take over the command
of the Yugoslav Army because of their expansionist plans. He
felt he could afford to be firm and cherished the hope that
Moscow would have to forgive him one day, when she needed
what his country could bring to the common pool for a
Communist onslaught.

The possibility of reconciliation hung for several months
in the minds of foreign observers. Many people in western
countries even suspected that the whole conflict was faked
to deceive the western world.

It is well to remember that there is no opportunism which
would be too low and which the Soviet government would
refuse to use if it felt it served its policy. It has been a pro-
nounced feature of Soviet policy to change its concept of
settling international problems according to the need of the
immediate situation. The pupils of Lenin have been taught
that no means must be neglected, however miserable, if the
idea of world revolution can gain from it. They follow
fanatically their final aim, and it is just this fanaticism which
allows, nay dictates, that they proceed in short-term matter?
without any scruples.

It would not be entirely strange to the minds of the Soviet
Bolshevik leaders to consider the idea of reconciliation with
Tito. He could always be liquidated later.

Yet, a reconciliation is out of the question now. The
Russian Bolsheviks can seemingly forgive a western democrat
whom they need in a momentous situation. The case of Win-
ston Churchill is typical: For twenty years, Moscow considered
him as the worst example of British and western dark reaction,
capitalism, and imperialism. During the war he was in high
esteem and Stalin addressed him at Yalta as "the bravest gov-
ernmental figure in the world . . . ," as one of the "few examples
in history where the courage of one man had been so important
to the future history of the world . . . ," as his "fighting

THE CRUCIAL STRUGGLE 313

friend."^ Only one year later Stalin started to call Churchill
chief warmonger and enemy.

But it would seem impossible to pardon a Communist
leader whose violation of inter-party discipHne had exposed
the structure of the Communist movement itself to grave
dangers. Party discipline belongs to one of the first com-
mandments of the Communist methodology of work, and a
lack of respect for this principle represents a very serious crime.
I know of no case in the history of the Communist movement
in which Moscow readmitted any member who was publicly
declared a traitor to sociaUsm.

The Yugoslav PoHtburo counted on the possibiHty of re-
conciHation up until the winter of 1948. As Bebler told me, "We
hope that the conflict will be somehow settled, some day, when
the Soviets find out that they were wrong in trying to give
us orders.

"You can see the big successes of the Chinese National
Army. This may help us in our situation. The Soviets may
find out that it is not so easy to give orders to a people's gov-
ernment which came to power through the fighting of its own
nation. This applies to China as well as to us. This will com-
pel the Soviets to reconsider the methods of collaboration be-
tween them and the people's democracies.

"We hope for the best. But the Cominform countries
have offended us so deeply that we could not simply return
to the Cominform. Now, we put conditions for reconciUation:
(1) Injustice done to us must be undone. (2) Our Partisan
liberation movement and struggle must be recognized as a
revolution of independent value. (3) The party must retain
the right to choose its leadership as it pleases. You can see
that our Partisan spirit has not abandoned us."

These hopes faded out with the increasing pressure of the
Cominform, and by January, 1949, the Yugoslav Communists
abandoned them definitely.

^Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York: Harper and Brothers,
1948), p. 868.

314 TITO'S COMMUNISM

The Soviets apparently did not contemplate at all pardon-
ing the Yugoslav heretics. The moment Tito was excommuni-
cated they began a concentric action to bring about the over-
throw of his leadership. They unleashed a campaign against
him, using simultaneously all sorts of diplomatic, political, and
economic pressure combined with subversive, underground
activities on the soil of Yugoslavia. No means, short of an
open war, has been neglected to liquidate this unbearable schism.

Using its methods of work and previous experience the
Russian Bolshevik party first thought it would be possible and
easy to find some traitors within the ranks of the Yugoslav
party to split the party itself and get rid of Tito and his closest
followers in the usual way.

There was one person in whom the Russians put many of
their hopes. He was Lieutenant General Arsa Jovanovic. He
was a young, nice-looking man, one of the few former active
oflEcers of the prewar Royal Army who had joined the Partisan
movement and had become, for a period, the Chief of StaflF. He
was considered the most talented officer of Tito's army and
after the war was sent to Moscow to receive the highest possible
education in military affairs. This included also an education in
Communist ideology. General Jovanovic received proper and
thorough teaching in this field as well, and when the conflict
with the Cominform broke out, the Soviet secret service ar-
ranged for Jovanovic to escape from Yugoslavia to organize
a movement against Tito from abroad. The Yugoslav secret
service was, however, vigilant and Jovanovic met his death from
a bullet when he tried to cross the Yugoslav-Rumanian border
clandestinely.

Then the Russians tried to find some subversive elements
in the Yugoslav Army and among local politicians of the indi-
vidual federal republics. They succeeded in some cases but
these were quickly dealt with by the Yugoslav poHce. It is
certainly remarkable that as far as the leadership is concerned,
not a single Yugoslav Communist has succumbed to Moscow
pressure. The members of the Politburo have stood firmly and
unitedly behind Tito.

As to the reaction of the rank and file Communists, Beb-
ler told me, "We had some difficulties in the local organizations

THE CRUCIAL STRUGGLE 31 J

of the party. When the conflict broke out and local cells dis-
cussed our stand, there were some places where local func-
tionaries expressed the opinion that we should not have driven
the conflict into the open by refusing to attend the Comin-
form conference. They thought it would have been preferable
to take part in the session of the Cominform and to defend
our policy there. But these people changed their minds when
they were told that this would not have changed the trend of
things and that Tito would have been pressed to give up the
leadership of the party. They were especially angry when we
showed them the correspondence between Stalin and Tito con-
cerning the history of Drvar.

"We certainly do not deny the Russians credit for taking
part in the liberation of Yugoslavia, but you know that our
people will never agree to being deprived of their own merits.
The allegation of Stalin [that the Russian Army rescued the
Yugoslav Partisans from complete annihilation] deeply offended
our people who are proud of their war achievements.

"There were also some difficulties among the politicians and
officers from Montenegro. The tradition of friendship toward
Russia has been deeply rooted in Montenegro. Some people
thought that whatever were the reasons of the conflict and
whatever the issue, we simply shouldn't under any circumstances
oppose Russia. The Montenegrins like to think along the line
of the old proverb: *We Montenegrins are, together with the
Russians, two hundred million people.' But this dissension was
quickly dealt with, and some people were arrested. Among
them was the Deputy Prime Minister of Montenegro, Ljumovic,
who was against Tito for purely personal motives because he
had not been appointed at least Prime Minister after he re-
turned home from Poland [where he had been Yugoslav Am-
bassador]. The party is now absolutely firm and Tito enjoys
full confidence and authority."

Things continued to develop but Tito was always in control.
One of the oldest Macedonian Communists, Bane Andrejev,
was deprived of his function as Minister of Mines, allegedly for
opposing Tito's policy; almost all local governments were re-
shuffled and many high functionaries and officers were im-
prisoned. According to some reports, which, however, cannot

316 TITO'S COMMUNISM

be confirmed, some 30 per cent of the party members are in
secret opposition to the PoUtburo, and the number is increasing.
Rehable reports confirm that large scale arrests are constantly
taking place. Anybody, regardless of his former standing,
who directly or indirectly expresses a reserve as to Tito's
policy, is persecuted without mercy. Prisons are overcrowded.
This can be easily explained: The Yugoslav Communists have
been fanatically devoted to Marshal Tito. But, at the same time,
they professed the same fanaticism toward the idea of inter-
national communism led by Russia. Now they face a sort of
a conflict of Communist conscience. They still believe in Tito
but they have come to realize what a heavy blow international
communism has suffered from his heresy.

As for attempts to liquidate Tito, a period of almost three
years has proved how difficult the task is. Tito's personal
bodyguard has been constantly increased. The Minister of In-
terior, Rankovic, made it known in May, 1949, in a speech
addressed to the security police corps, that any Yugoslav who
might try to take part in an attempt to overthrow Tito's regime
would be exterminated. The national militia has been increased
by tens of thousands. There were reports that several attempts
on Tito's life were made in the summer of 1948, but these
could not be confirmed. It is not technically easy to liquidate
a dictator. Tito knows the methods of liquidation, as he was
taught them in the best school in Moscow, and he personally
took a prominent part in liquidating his opponents. He can,
therefore, take careful precautions and arrange his own defense.

Besides, Tito is not alone. There are nine members of the
Politburo and they all seem to stick together as one man, well
aware of the necessity to stand or fall together. Among them
are Rankovic, the Minister of Interior; the omnipotent Djilas;
and the severe Marxist and Foreign Minister, Kardelj. Together,
they have good control of the army, police, and secret service,
and through their devoted agents, they follow cautiously every
breath and move of their own comrades and subordinates. It
would not, therefore, solve Stalin's problem if Tito alone were
removed, though admittedly it would be a grave blow to the
party's resistance.

THE CRUCIAL STRUGGLE 317

The Communist press and radio everywhere launched a
series of attacks against the Yugoslav party. The Communist
leaders in Warsaw, Prague, Sofia, Bucharest, Budapest, and
Tirana began to curse Tito, the man who only a few weeks
earher had been praised as the example of a Communist fighter.

Comradess Anna Pauker of Rumania was the first to open
fire against Tito. After the outbreak of the conflict, she imme-
diately ordered all pictures of Tito removed, started to perse-
cute the Yugoslav minority in Rumania, and appealed to the
Yugoslav nation to overthrow Tito's dictatorship. It was Mrs.
Pauker who tried to organize the escape of General Jovanovic.

Small Communist Albania did not lag behind. Within forty-
eight hours, hundreds of Yugoslav teachers, officers, and tech-
nicians lent to the Albanian administration were brutally ex-
pelled from Albania. Agreements concerning common Yugo-
slav-Albanian commercial enterprises, vaHd for thirty years,
were nullified. Forgotten was the gift of Yugoslavia to the Al-
banian economy, amounting yearly, according to Yugoslav
sources, to a sum of four billion dinars, almost half of it going
to the benefit of the Albanian Army (excluding miHtary equip-
ment). The name of Tito was no longer permitted to be men-
tioned in schools, and songs about "the hero Tito" disappeared.
The import of Yugoslav newspapers and books was forbidden.

The Communist party of Hungary, which did absolutely
nothing during the war to contribute to the common victory
over nazism, was the first to begin press and radio attacks
threatening reprisals against the Yugoslav Communists. This
although Yugoslavia had been the first after the war to offer
a fraternal hand to the defeated Hungarian nation and to give
support to the Hungarian Communist leaders.

The Czechoslovak Communists were pleased finally to have
an occasion to pay Tito back for the contempt he had shown
for them. Two years before, when he paid a visit to the Prague
government, a large factory was named for him. A dormi-
tory for Yugoslav students, called after King Alexander, was
solemnly renamed Marshal Tito Dormitory and the same act
changed the name of a street in Prague. Now Tito's name was
effaced.

Two years before this, the Czechoslovak government had

318 TITO'S COMMUNISM

received, at its own expense, three thousand Yugoslav appren-
tices to train in Czechoslovak factories. Now they were ex-
pelled. A Yugoslav motion picture showing Partisan heroism
was excluded from participation in an international competi-
tion of films arranged by Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovak tour-
ists, who for decades had gone to the Adriatic shores to spend
their holidays, were forbidden to travel any more to Yugoslavia.

In the international field, Yugoslavia was isolated. At an ex-
hibition of the Slav nations arranged in the Soviet zone of Ber-
^lin, the Russians ordered the removal of the picture of Tito.
At the General Assembly of the United Nations in Paris, in
1948, no delegation of the Soviet bloc contacted the Yugoslav
delegates and nobody applauded Kardelj, though he still kept
to the common line of the eastern bloc and attacked "western
imperialists."

The Yugoslavs living in Russia and the satellite countries,
partly spontaneously, partly under pressure, joined the Comin-
form in attacks against Tito. They formed associations pledg-
ing fidelity to Russia and with the financial help of the Com-
munist governments started publications in Serbian of periodi-
cals and leaflets which were smuggled into Yugoslavia. In
Prague appeared Nova Borba. In Sofia was founded a "Na-
tional Front of Yugoslavs in Bulgaria," and, oddly enough,
one of the points of its program was declared to be a federation
of South Slavs. Yugoslav minorities in the satellite countries
were forced to declare their loyalty to the respective govern-
ments (as, on the other side, their nationals in Yugoslavia were
forced to pledge loyalty to Tito), and individuals were sent
clandestinely to Yugoslavia to spy and foment disorders.

How did the Yugoslav Politburo react to all these attacks?
In the first months after the break, the Yugoslav press did not
answer the satellite propaganda. It published a series of articles,
the authorship of which was ascribed to Djilas, trying to prove
by quotations from Marx, Lenin, and Stalin that the Yugoslav
Communist party acted according to Communist teaching.
Stalin's pictures were still displayed in public places and all
meetings ended with the customary slogans, "Long live Soviet
Russia. Long live the great leader and teacher of all nations,

THE CRUCIAL STRUGGLE 319

Stalin!" The press continued to maintain the regular column
about the Soviet Union.

In August, 1948, when speaking to the soldier-members of
the party, Tito deviated for the first time from the obligatory-
formula. There was no more "glory to the heroic Red Army
and to Stalin."

The second deviationist statement followed in November,
1948. The old veteran of the Yugoslav Communist movement,
Mosa Pijade, declared in a solemn speech pronounced on the
anniversary of the foundation of the Yugoslav Republic and
in the presence of diplomats, that Britain and the United States
had given help to Tito before the Soviets during the war. This
was a very radical change. Up until then, only the merits of
the Soviet Army were stressed, and the contribution of the
West was mentioned with contempt.

The year 1949 brought more flame into the struggle, from
both sides. The fiercest battle developed in the economic
field. Yugoslavia was to be strangled by a gradual economic
blockade. She was to be made to break down and capitulate
before Russian pressure through increasing misery, hunger, and
economic chaos. She was to pay for her own shortsightedness
in her foreign trade which had been subordinated to political
and ideological interests and was, therefore, now closely linked
with the economy of the eastern bloc. The Soviets assumed that
Tito would be forced to revise or abandon the Five Year Plan
if the Communist countries stopped exporting to Yugoslavia,
and that economic frustration combined with other methods
of pressure would finally induce potential opponents of Tito
to liquidate him.

At the end of 1948, Moscow announced a curtailment of
foreign trade with Yugoslavia by seven-eighths because of the
"unfriendly policy of the Yugoslav government toward the
Soviet Union." Yugoslavia was not invited to join "the Marshall
Plan of the East," the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance.

Other Communist countries slowed down their exports to
Yugoslavia, under various pretexts, and by the spring of 1949,
the commerce between all the satellite countries and Yugoslavia
was brought practically to a standstill. The Hungarian gov-
ernment stopped paying reparations (70 million dollars) in

320 TITO'S COMMUNISM

spite of the provisions of the Peace Treaty of Paris. The Yugo-
slav mission in Hungary, deaUng with the problem of repar-
ations and restitution of the Yugoslav property looted by the
Hungarian Army during the war, was expelled. DeUveries of
military equipment from all Communist countries had been
stopped even before the Cominform break with Yugoslavia
was made public. To counteract the Yugoslav move of opening
commercial contacts with the West, the Russians, following
a policy of dumping, offered some goods below the price of
Yugoslav products.

The Yugoslav government was not slow to detect the grave
dangers threatening their economy by the Soviet strangulation.
In December, 1948, Marshal Tito informed the Parliament
about the economic break between Yugoslavia and the other
countries of the eastern bloc. He warned the latter that he was
compelled to switch the export of raw materials from the East
to the West. By quoting the figures of the Yugoslav export
to the Communist countries, he made it clear that by the dis-
continuation of this export, they would suffer from the break
at least as much as Yugoslavia herself.

This statement opened a new period of trade relations be-
tween Yugoslavia and the western countries. After three years
of the trying experience of artificial foreign trade with the
East, the economic structure of which was not complementary
to Yugoslav needs, the Yugoslav government finally was forced
to find its natural partners in trade among the western coun-
tries.

The United States authorities were cautious in their esti-
mates of the idea of expanding the trade with Yugoslavia. It
was felt that such an expansion would have to be supported
by a loan, as Yugoslavia had no reserves of dollars, and politi-
cally, the Yugoslav Communist policy was not being forgot-
ten. "... it will not be the policy of the United States to greet
the leader of totalitarian Yugoslavia as if he suddenly had be-
come a 'Jeffersonian democrat.' "^

^New York Times, December 29, 1948.

THE CRUCIAL STRUGGLE 321

A few days later, it was reported^ that the Yugoslav gov-
ernment was negotiating to ship to the United States copper
and lead worth fifteen million dollars.

Meanwhile, trade negotiations with other western countries
were hastened. In December, 1948, a voluminous one-year trade
agreement with Britain, amounting to one hundred and twenty
million dollars, was signed and conversations concerning a long-
term agreement, pursued for one and a half years, intensified.
They were brought to a successful end in December, 1949, and
an agreement was signed amounting to a respectable figure of
one-hundred million pounds sterling and making provision for
a British loan to Yugoslavia of eight million pounds.

In May, 1949, a one-year trade agreement was signed with
France. Though of small volume (six billion francs), its signi-
ficance lay in a protocol attached to the agreement, providing
for negotiations for a five-year agreement which would ensure
exchange of goods to the amount of twenty billion francs.

In August, 1949, an important trade agreement was signed
with Italy. It provided for an exchange of goods to the value
of ninety-four million dollars a year. The act of signature was
accompanied by friendly words of good neighborly relations
between the two countries which before had been tense and
unsettled. (Other countries which opened closer trade contacts
with Yugoslavia soon after the war ended were Sweden and
Switzerland. ) ^

To avert at least partly dangers caused by economic iso-
lation, Yugoslavia turned her eyes to the United States, which
was the only country in a position to give immediate help. The
Yugoslav government approached the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development and the Import-Export Bank,
asking for loans.

The State Department, foreseeing the far-reaching impact
that the saving of Tito's shattered economy would have upon
his ability to withstand the Soviet pressure, decided to feed the
conflict with Moscow and revised its policy of granting ex-
port licenses for goods to Yugoslavia. In the spring of 1949,

^Ibid, January 14, 1949.

■*The year of 1950 saw an important opening o£ trade relations with Western
Germany, and also with Latin America.

322 TITO'S COMMUNISM

several American companies negotiated contracts with the Yugo-
slav government concerning the export of mine installations
and heavy machinery. In August permission was given by the
State Department to sell a steel-finishing mill worth three mil-
lion dollars to Yugoslavia.

Meanwhile, the shipment of raw materials — lead, copper,
and zinc — from Yugoslavia to the United States increased, and
it was expected that the year of 1949 would double the total
figure of Yugoslav- American trade of 1948.

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment sent a delegation to Yugoslavia to study on the spot the
conditions for a loan. The Import-Export Bank extended, in
September, 1949, to the Yugoslav government a loan of twenty
million dollars and the International Monetary Fund gave a
credit of three million dollars.

The fury of the Soviet government against Yugoslavia in-
creased when they saw that Tito was seeking salvation from
the West. They accused him of selling his country's indepen-
dence to western capitalism. Their anger was natural. First,
the purpose of the economic strangulation had been frustrated,
and second, they found that the blockade worked both ways
economically. The Soviet-Czechoslovak armament industry was
deprived of precious and indispensable raw materials which
it had received from Yugoslavia. There have been indications
that Czechoslovakia tried to overcome this problem by buying
the Yugoslav copper and lead through a third, neutral country
(Switzerland).

In order to justify to the members of the Yugoslav Commu-
nist party its turning toward the West, the Yugoslav govern-
ment accused the Soviets of exploitation of the Yugoslav econ-
omy. This was not unknown to the world abroad, but figures
were kept in strict secrecy. Up until the break with the Comin-
form, the Yugoslav government was only full of praise for
Soviet generosity, stressing that there would not have been any
reconstruction of devastated Yugoslav territories and no Five
Year Plan if the Russians had not helped the Yugoslav economy.
Even the correspondence between Stalin and Tito did not give
any indication of Yugoslav complaints about Russian exploi-
tation.

THE CRUCIAL STRUGGLE 323

With the increasing hostilities of the Soviet bloc against
Yugoslavia, Tito's government, however, started to lift the veil
of secrecy covering inter-Communist relations, and the world
was shown how Russia understands trade among Communist
countries. In March, 1949, the Communist paper Borba dis-
closed that the Soviet Union had put pressure on the Yugoslav
government to sell Russia raw materials according to world
prices, which were many times below the production price.
Yugoslavia suffered enormous losses. In April the same news-
paper revealed that the Yugoslav government had to pay Rus-
sian technicians working on the construction of a bridge up to
1,000 dollars a month, while the highest salary of a highly quali-
fied Yugoslav technician was known not to surpass 100 dollars.
Figures were quoted on raw materials which Yugoslavia had to
export to the eastern bloc in exchange for tractors, automobile
spare parts, steel tubes, tires, to show the disproportion of ex-
changed goods to the disadvantage of Yugoslavia.

The most convincing proof of the Russian "capitalistic" pen-
etration into the Yugoslav economy and of its ruthless ex-
ploitation was offered when two Yugoslav-Soviet mixed com-
panies— one for the Danube navigation, Juspad, the other for
the civil aviation, Justa — were dissolved in September, 1949,
and the Yugoslav government published figures on the partner-
ship. It was announced that at the time of the foundation of
the companies, in February, 1947, the Yugoslav government
brought in 80 per cent of the capital and investment. The Sov-
iet government invested only 3,400,000 dinars (68,000 dollars),
in the Juspad company, and the Yugoslavs had to purchase
abroad equipment to keep the port installations in working
order. There were three-fold freight rates operating on the
Danube, according to which Yugoslavia had to pay for shipping
on her vessels a rate of 52 per cent higher than the Soviet ves-
sels and 30 per cent more than other countries (Czechoslovakia,
Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria). As to Justa, the Yugo-
slavs had to bear the expenses of the airfield constructions.

In both companies, it was a Russian who was appointed as
general manager, and the shares were equally divided between
the two governments.

These "friendly and Socialist-based" relations between two

324 TITO'S COMMUNISM

Communist countries were revealed by the Yugoslav delegate,
Joza Vilfan, at a meeting of the General Assembly of the United
Nations. The Soviet bloc delegates angrily denied his statement,
branding it as a lie and giving their own figures on commercial
contracts with Yugoslavia. There is no reason to beHeve fully
either of the opposing sides. But the Yugoslavs are undoubtedly
right in the main that they were exploited by Russia.

The same cannot be said about another argument advanced
by the Yugoslav government to explain its change of foreign
trade policy. In December, 1948, Marshal Tito declared the
main cause of the trouble between Yugoslavia and other Com-
munist countries to have been "that we want to bring socialism
to our people, industrialize our country as rapidly as possible
and that we are not remaining a backward rural country which
only sends out raw materials."

This statement does not correspond with the facts, as I know
them from personal experience. There were some democratic
politicians and non-political economic experts in Czechoslovakia,
for instance, who expressed doubts about the scope of Yugo-
slav industrialization when the long-term trade agreement was
negotiated in 1947. But they were overruled by the Commu-
nists who insisted fiercely on meeting the Yugoslavs' unreason-
able requests. They did everything in their power to contri-
bute to a quick reconstruction and industrialization of Tito's
Yugoslavia.

The Yugoslavs brutally attacked every Czechoslovak who
dared oppose Yugoslav claims, accusing him of a reactionary
and hostile attitude. They used to denounce these people to the
Czechoslovak Communist leaders who were only too willing
to make concessions to the detriment of the basic interests of
the Czechoslovak economy.

A study of Czechoslovak-Yugoslav trade agreements would
show that as a result of Yugoslav insistence and of the eagerness
of Czechoslovak Communists to help Yugoslavia, Czechoslo-
vakia delivered a disproportionate quantity of heavy machinery,
trucks, railroad cars, coke, and steel tubes in exchange for Yugo-
slav prunes, apples, wines, and tobacco. Only in June, 1949,
when political aspects pushed the Czechoslovak delegates to the
limit and they finally broke commercial contacts with Yugo-

THE CRUCIAL STRUGGLE 325

slavia, the Czechoslovak government started to insist on putting
the relations "on a purely commercial basis" and revised the
whole qualitative structure of exchanged goods.

The same was the case and experience with Poland. Bul-
garia and Rumania could not contribute to Yugoslav indus-
trialization. Russia's relations toward Yugoslavia were accom-
panied by factors of exploitation, but it is certainly untrue
that the Soviet bloc hampered the industrialization of Yugo-
slavia.

Simultaneously with the economic blockade, the political
pressure pursued by Moscow had been systematically intensi-
fied. Rumors had been cultivated to the extent that it was ex-
pected that the Russians might take over the rule any day.

The Moscow and satellite broadcasting stations have poured
out attacks against Tito and the Yugoslav Communists. Ac-
cording to Tito's statement, in March, 1949, alone, the eastern
bloc propaganda delivered 240 onslaughts against Yugoslavia.
Border incidents (219 cases were listed during July and Aug-
ust, 1949,) have taken place almost daily and many Yugoslav
soldiers have been killed. Disorders have been fomented among
the minorities in Yugoslavia. Macedonia has become once again
a hot spot of the Balkans. This federal republic, which was to
serve as a nucleus of unification of all parts of Macedonia (the
Yugoslav- Vardar, the Bulgarian-Pirin, and the Greek- Aegean)
within the Yugoslav federation, has been turned into a cockpit
for anti-Yugoslav separatist activities.

In summer, 1949, the pressure received a new impetus. A
number of diplomatic notes, packed with mutual accusations
and formulated in abusive language unheard of in diplomatic
practices, were exchanged between Russia and the other Comin-
form countries and Yugoslavia. The Russians and their satel-
lites called their former Yugoslav comrades bandits, satans,
criminals, assassins, malicious deserters, agents of imperialism,
wild Fascists, Fascist lunatics; the Yugoslavs called their Com-
munist enemies slanderers, liars, imperialists, hirelings, pseudo-
Marxists, dictators, double-crossers. Never in history have re-
lations between countries, which at the time still had diplomatic
relations, sunk to such shocking vulgarity.

These were only words, but they were accompanied by a

326 TITO'S COMMUNISM

fury of political actions and counter- actions. The Russians ac-
cused the Yugoslav government of having arrested thirty-one
Soviet citizens, and when the Yugoslavs answered that they
were spying under the leadership of a counsellor of the Soviet
Embassy in Belgrade, Moscow threatened repressive measures.

In the international field, Molotov and Vishinsky for two
years blocked the negotiations of the Council of Four Foreign
Ministers on the peace treaty for Austria. One of the main ob-
stacles was their insistence on territorial concessions by Austria
to Yugoslavia. To hit the Yugoslav government hard and fur-
ther undermine its authority in Communist ranks, the Soviet
government dropped its backing of Yugoslav claims from Aus-
tria. Once the Yugoslav government proved to be hostile to
Russia all previous arguments about territorial changes fell to
pieces. The Yugoslavs reacted sharply to this Soviet move and
several diplomatic notes full of mean accusations were exchanged
on the subject.

With increasing Soviet pressure the resistance of the Yugo-
slav government stiffened gradually. In April, 1949, Mosa
Pijade, a member of the Politburo and the chief organizer of
the Yugoslav counter-campaign, made it clear that "no resolu-
tion [of the Cominform] can have any effect against a people's
state. . . which can be affected only through the use of guns
or through being conquered." In July he accused the Soviet
government of having "transformed the right of self-determina-
tion of peoples into a thing of barter and Shylockian commerce
with the imperialists," and he hit the Soviet leaders on a spot
where they are most sensitive, saying that "They have brought
their diplomacy, foreign policy, and methods to the line that
existed in Russia before the October Revolution." In Septem-
ber he went as far as to compare Stalin to Hitler in his policy
toward small nations.

One article of Pijade deserves special attention. "Writing
about the trial of Laszlo Rajk, former Hungarian Foreign Min-
ister accused and sentenced to death in September, 1949, for
plotting the overthrow of the Hungarian government in co-
operation with Yugoslav Communist leaders and American es-
pionage service, Mosa Pijade wrote that the trial reminded the

THE CRUCIAL STRUGGLE 327

world of the Moscow purge in 1936 and was "a penetration in-
to Europe of the dark methods of the Soviet intelHgence serv-
ice." He also recalled the ugly Soviet move when the Soviet
government signed a pact with Hitlerite Germany in August,
1939.

When several people were accused by a Bulgarian tribunal
of spying for Tito, the Yugoslav newspapers ridiculed the pro-
cedure of the court as an illustration of a complete lack of
justice and as an illustration of methods of terror.

At the General Assembly of the United Nations in October,
1949, the Yugoslav delegates led their political counter-offen-
sive so far as to propose a resolution to the effect that

. . . .Every state has the duty to refrain from foment-
ing, organizing, encouraging, or assisting civil wars and
disturbances, or acts of terrorism, within the territory of
another state, and to prevent the organization within its
territory of activities calculated to foment, organize, en-
courage, or assist civil wars and disturbances or acts of
terrorism in other states.

A superficial observer might be caught in how justified all
these accusations are. But one is bound to ask, "Who is the ac-
cuser?" It is the same Yugoslav government whose members
applauded Moscow trials, v/ho considered the pact between Hit-
ler and Stalin as an act of high statesmanship, who used and
are using the dark methods of intelligence service, who gave
help to Italian Communists, who sent money to the French
Communists, who had spies in Czechoslovakia, who have no
respect for basic rules of justice before their own tribunals,
who assisted considerably the civil war and acts of terrorism in
Greece. For years the democratic politicians and the western
democratic press have criticized the Communist countries for
the pohcy and methods they use, and the Yugoslav Communist
leaders and press branded them as capitalists, liars, imperialists,
and warmongers. Now when the Yugoslav government has
become victim of these ruthless methods of Communist poHcy,
it joins the western democracies, even surpassing their accusa-
tions. This is moral insanity.

328 TITO'S COMMUNISM

In August, 1949, the situation seemed to be packed with
dynamite which might explode any minute. The Soviets con-
centrated troops on the borders of Yugoslavia; high military
oflScials of the Cominform countries met ostentatiously in Sofia;
appeals were repeated to the Yugoslav nation to revolt; Yugo-
slavia was officially denounced as an enemy of the USSR, which
it was said "will be forced to more effective measures necessary
to defend the rights and interests of Soviet citizens in Yugo-
slavia and call to order the violators." A Russian monitor passed
provocatively through the Yugoslav part of the Danube ignor-
ing rules of navigation.

Tito made it clear that no pressure would compel him to
retreat. Speaking in the Macedonian capital, Skoplje, he ap-
pealed indirectly to the Bulgarian and Albanian nations to rise
against the Communist governments, expressing the opinion
that "eventually the time will come when the Bulgarian people,
overcoming these low and impudent slanderers, will be able to
extend their brotherly hand to us, and we will help them remove
everything which individuals today have placed as obstacles to
the creation and preservation of fraternal relations. The situ-
ation today is the same with Albania."

Speaking to officers of the Yugoslav Army guarding the
Bulgarian- Yugoslav border, Tito warned the Russians that no
pressure can frighten the Yugoslav Communists as "we are not
men to be frightened by such things. We can only be afraid
of such things as elemental upheavals, droughts, hail, etc."

In October he answered the impending threats of war by a
statement that "it is better to die honestly in battle, fighting for
justice and truth, than to allow yourselves to be trampled upon,
than to bend your necks like slaves. ..."

Another wave of pressure came at the end of September,
1949, when the Russians and all the satellites abrogated their
treaties of alliance with Yugoslavia, signed in the period of
1944 and 1947 for twenty years. This was only a formal con-
firmation of conditions which had existed ever since the Comin-
form declaration, namely, that the pacts were nothing but a
scrap of paper.

At this point, one cannot abstain from quoting from a
speech which Marshal Tito made in March, 1947:

THE CRUCIAL STRUGGLE 329

Western reaction slanders with incredible persistence
the Soviet Union as if it influenced [the policy of] small
nations in eastern Europe and among them also Yugoslavia.
It slanders Yugoslavia as an ordinary satellite. Yugoslavia,
however, and some other eastern countries march together
with the Soviet Union just because they know that it
does not threaten their independence. Yugoslavia has gone
along with the Soviet Union since the war also just be-
cause she is deeply convinced that it is only the Soviet
Union which understands her suffering and sacrifices
brought on by the great struggle for hberation. We and
other small countries of eastern Europe march together
with the Soviet Union just because we are convinced that
out of all the big and small allies, only the Soviet Union
sincerely and persistently fights for the strengthening of
peace in the world.

Under the grave dangers to which the Yugoslav government
was exposed, its delegation at the General Assembly of the United
Nations in the autumn of 1949 voted for the first time against
some of the Soviet proposals and was elected, backed by the
United States but not by Great Britain, to the Security Coun-
cil against the Soviet candidate, Czechoslovakia. Thus the
events which started as an inter-Communist quarrel have been
brought to a point where they are an international problem of
great magnitude and unforeseeable dangers. This is exactly what
Tito wanted, once the conflict couldn't be settled within the
family of Communist countries.

The year of 1950 brought new developments in the inter-
national position of Yugoslavia: the Soviet bloc intensified its
attacks against the government of Marshal Tito; the latter re-
formulated its foreign policy, but reaffirmed its adherence to
communism; the United States increased its support to Yugo-
slavia.

The economic blockade was intensified by depriving Yugo-
slavia of international use of the Danube river, which follow-
ing the Danube Convention of August, 1948, fell under the
domination of the Communist countries.

Political attacks, subversive activities, and military threats
continued. As Foreign Minister Kardelj stated before the United
Nations General Assembly in September, 1950, the Yugoslav

330 TITO'S COMMUNISM

diplomatic representatives in eastern European countries have
been persecuted; Yugoslav minorities are being displaced; Ru-
mania has severed all rail and postal traffic with Yugoslavia;
trenches are being dug along the borders; troop movements are
taking place; measures of mobiUzation are being taken. The
Communist governments have broken forty-seven treaties con-
cluded with Yugoslavia. In the course of two years 896 fron-
tier incidents have taken place; 6,732 anti-Yugoslav broadcasts
have been beamed from the eastern European countries to Yugo-
slavia in the first six months of 1950.

The concept of the Yugoslav foreign policy underwent a
material change. The Yugoslav Communist leaders made a vir-
tue out of necessity and embarked upon a policy of defending
the cause of peace and the rights of small nations. They couched
in friendly words their relations with Greece, Italy, and Aus-
tria, and were inevitably led to a rapprochement with the western
powers, particularly with the United States. They announced
the resumption of full diplomatic relations with Athens and
promised to return the Greek children to their homes.

On the other side, the Yugoslav Ambassadors in the Com-
munist countries were withdrawn and the Legation in Albania
closed. In the United Nations the Soviet policy was increas-
ingly attacked. But otherwise Tito avoided having to compro-
mise his Communist beliefs.

The Yugoslav government recognized the Communist re-
gime in China and exchanged letters of recognition with the
Indo-Chinese Communist leader, Ho Chi Minh. It continued
to fight for the unseating of the Chinese Nationalists in the Se-
curity Council. It voted in the Security Council against the
draft resolution submitted by the United States and appealing
to all nations to render assistance to the victim of the Commu-
nist aggression in Korea, though Marshal Tito later condemned
the Communist action in Korea.

On September 2 5, 1950, Kardelj reaffirmed the new Yugo-
slav foreign policy before the United Nations General Assembly:

Responsible Yugoslav representatives have stated time and
again, and I am stating it once more on behalf of the gov-
ernment I represent, that Yugoslavia belongs to no blocs,
that she has not concluded any public or secret military

THE CRUCIAL STRUGGLE 331

alliances with any country, that no foreign power pos-
sesses, either directly or indirectly, military bases on Yugo-
slav territory, and that no foreign power participates in
any form in determining Yugoslav defense poUcy.

Further, neither the peoples of Yugoslavia nor their
government nurture any aggressive intentions with regard
to any neighboring country and do not in any way men-
ace the latters' peace and independence.

I am besides authorized to state here on behalf of the
Yugoslav government the following:

The peoples of Yugoslavia have defended in the past,
and will defend in the future, the independence and integ-
rity of their country against all aggressions and against
all attempts to endanger their right to be masters in their
own house. The peoples of Yugoslavia, however, do not
want to take part in any aggressive war and wish to live
in lasting peace and peaceful cooperation with all nations
and especially with their neighbors. In accordance with
this consistent peace-loving attitude the government of the
Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia declares that it
is ready to conclude an agreement on lasting peace and
- non-aggression with each neighboring country.

This declaration of policy certainly represents a great ad-
vance since the days when the same Yugoslav government of
Marshal Tito directly supported the Greek Communist guef-
rillas and assisted the Italian Communists in their revolutionary
activities against the legitimate government in Rome.

The United States government followed a policy of giving
economic help to Yugoslavia to make Tito's opposition against
the Soviet pressure possible. According to the declaration of
the United States Ambassador to Yugoslavia, George V. Allen,
the United States policy toward Yugoslavia was

based on strict non-interference in the internal affairs of
Yugoslavia. No political conditions were attached to the
credits already extended to Yugoslavia and no such condi-
tions are attached to the credits now under consideration.^

By fall, 1950, the Export-Import Bank extended to Yugo-
slavia three loans, totalling the sum of fifty-five million dollars.
The negotiations concerning a loan from, the World Bank have
not as yet led to positive conclusions.

^New York Times, February 20, 1950.

332 TITO'S COMMUNISM

Weakened by unprecedented drought Yugoslavia asked
the United States in the fall of 1950 for aid in food to the
amount of 105 million dollars. The American government in
November, aware of international dangers which would ensue
from denying assistance, extended to Tito through various
channels aid in the amount of 33.5 millions, and in December
the Congress voted the Yugoslav Emergency Relief Assistance
Act under which Yugoslavia received a grant of food valued at
38 million dollars. According to an agreement signed on Jan-
uary 6, 1951, the Yugoslav government pledged to give full
publicity to the American aid and to permit supervision by
American authorities of the food distribution which was going
to be equitable. Toward the end of January the Cooperative
for American Remittances to Europe (CARE) announced its
decision to distribute in the most drought-stricken regions of
Yugoslavia food worth 35 million dollars.

In political and military matters the Yugoslav government
has been able to enlist limited support from the United States.
In November, 1949, the State Department announced partial
lifting of the ban on shipment of some materials to Yugoslavia,
clearing export of gasoline and lubricants for aircrafts.^ In
January, 1950, a decision of the National Security Council was
reported, concerning limited military help to be given to Yugo-
slavia in case of invasion.^

Ambassador George V. Allen formulated, before his de-
parture to Yugoslavia, the American policy toward the govern-
ment of Marshal Tito in generally encouraging terms, "I shall
tell Marshal Tito that the United States opposes aggression
wherever it takes place. It appears that the spearhead of Soviet
aggression is directed at Yugoslavia as to anywhere else."^

As a result of this policy, Tito has been able so far to with-
stand Soviet pressure. He also spoke in more friendly terms
about his non-Communist neighbors. He opened the Yugoslav
airfields to American aircraft, according to an agreement signed
in December, 1949. In the spring of 1950 he agreed to solve
the painful problem of "dual nationality," which embittered

^IbiJ, November 4, 1949.
"^Ibid, January 14, 1950.
^Ibid, December 29, 1949.

THE CRUCIAL STRUGGLE 33 3

American-Yugoslav relations when he had refused to give exit
visas to American citizens of Yugoslav origin.

In November, 1950, Tito publicly praised the United
States pohcy toward Yugoslavia, stressing the fact that no
strings have been attached to the American assistance. He also
promised to follow the United Nations stand against any
aggressor.

This reorientation of the Yugoslav foreign policy and the
concrete concessions Marshal Tito has made are not without
considerable importance, but in the basic aspects and concepts
of the Communist dictatorship, Tito has firmly remained
faithful to his Communist creed and practice.

Marshal Tito has not relieved the democratic world from
anxiety and suspicion, which it must have toward dictatorship
of any kind. These feelings were expressed in a leading article,
published in the New York Times on December 26, 1949, on
the occasion of signing of the pact concerning the landing of
American aircraft in Yugoslavia. "It would be, of course, a
mistake to construe this pact as an act of endorsement of Tito's
dictatorship. . . . But Marshal Tito will have to understand,
if he wishes ever to be included among such friends, that
friendship is a two-way proposition. We will deal with him
if he makes and keeps mutually advantageous promises. But
on the basis of experience we will be wary of him so long as he
calls himself a Communist and behaves like a dictator."

And Communist he is and dictator he remains.

For months the Yugoslav Communists declared that no-
body had the right to eject them from the family of people's
democracies. In December, 1948, Kardelj declared in the Yugo-
slav Parhament that "the United Front of the SociaHst and peo-
ple's democratic countries headed by the Soviet Union remains
unshaken in the struggle against the enemies of peace, against
imperialist expansion and against the attacks of the enemies of
Socialism."

The Yugoslav Communists continued to assert that they
were faithful Marxists. They joined the Soviet bloc in attacking

334 TITO'S COMMUNISM

the North Atlantic Pact and continued to brand the Marshall
Plan as a threat to the independence of European countries.

In March, 1949, the Paris newspaper, Le Monde, published
an interview with a high Yugoslav official, according to which
"Yugoslavia is and remains an integral part of the Socialist
bloc and could under no circumstances become a link between
the two camps. "^ In April, Marshal Tito reaffirmed that "no
intimidation from the West or East can divert us from our
principles as determined followers of Marxism-Leninism or
from our road to Socialism." On May Day, 1949, the official
proclamation attacked "imperialists . . . threatening a new
war against the Soviet Union." In June, a statement of the
Yugoslav Communist party reassured "that Yugoslavia would
remain faithful to the Soviet Union despite all that had taken
place, because the Soviet Union represented the main strength
of the international workers' democratic movements." Then
on October 3, 1949, Tito declared that "it is better to die
honestly in battle . . . than to see the great principles of
Marxism and Leninism being destroyed without resistance."

Returning to the United States from Yugoslavia, the
American Ambassador, Cavendish Cannon, declared the con-
flict between Stalin and Tito to be "just as genuine as it could
be," but characterized Tito's regime as "just as communistic
as before. Tito has not turned toward the West in a doctrinal
sense. . . . Make no mistake about that."

In spite of the increasing dependence upon the United
States, and regardless of increasing threats by Communist Rus-
sia, the government of Marshal Tito made no ideological con-
cessions to democracy, but continued its Communist policy.

In November, 1949, Minister Djilas declared to the French
Press Agency, AFP, "Yugoslavia is a Socialist country and
considers herself under obligation to lend moral support to
every workers' democratic and peace-loving movement stand-
ing for the principles of the equality of states and peoples, the
equahty of workers' and democratic movements."

The Yugoslav Ambassador to the United States, Vladimir
Popovic, was tactless enough to publish in the official periodical

^Ibid, March 23, 1949.

THE CRUCIAL STRUGGLE 335

of the Yugoslav Communist party, Kamunisi, an article in
which he accused the United States of imperialism.

In the parhamentary election in March, 1950, the main
emphasis was put on the Communist program of the govern-
ment, and Marshal Tito made it clear that no opposition would
be tolerated. "Two programs cannot exist in our country. . . .
Revolution is a brutal thing ... if something should hamper
us on this road [of revolution] it must be vanquished and eli-
minated," declared Tito in February, 1950.

Milovan Djilas went further in an election speech in
March, 1950, "Our Sociahst regime is so contrary to the western
capitaHst world that its very nature does not permit us to
agree to anything, nor expect anything, other than the trade
relations which are common to capitaHsm. Therefore it is
clear that we cannot make any poKtical or economic concessions
to the western capitalist world because of trade relations or
because of this or that temporary need, because that would
mean returning to capitalism, and we have passed a just
sentence on capitalism."

Tito does stand for communism and he continues to prac-
tice it in Yugoslavia. He can not do otherwise. The only force
which supports Tito's regime is the Yugoslav Communist party.
Tito is not only its leader, but its prisoner as well. He receives
its backing in his Hfe-and-death struggle, as long as he sticks
to communism. He would probably lose it the moment he
would compromise his Communist belief and policy.

There is a general tendency to applaud and even to admire
Tito's audacious stand, and many people are inclined to over-
look things for which they judged him severely only recently.
They forget that Tito is a Communist with the Communist
ways of thinking, with the Communist methods in politics.

However, the international and possibly also the ideological
implications of Tito's heresy have proved to be of such far-
reaching significance that it appears to be, as it is officially
called, a well-calculated risk to feed the break which is bound
to weaken the position of Soviet Russia.

In the international field, Soviet Russia has lost its most

336 TITO'S COMMUNISM

faithful ally; in the military field, its most important strategic
outpost in the whole area of eastern Europe; in the economic
field very precious metals.

Ideological consequences of the conflict may prove to be,
in the long run, of an even graver nature. The conflict has
opened a new problem for the Communist movement. Before
the war the Communist movement was limited to inter-
Communist relations between an all-powerful Bolshevik center
in Moscow and the rather powerless Communist parties in
other countries. Since the war, this has changed into relations
between the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union and the
would-be statesmen of other Communist countries.

Minister Djilas foresaw this problem. Wlien I met him
in March, 1948, after the Communist putsch in Czechoslovakia,
he spoke with enthusiasm about this event, "Victory of social-
ism in Czechoslovakia is of special importance for the West.
Liberal theoreticians and politicians like to say that socialism
is not good for the West which is economically more advanced
than we are. It is a fact that Russia did not pass through
the period of liberalism but jumped from feudalism straight
to socialism. Her peasant population is far more backward
than ours. We, in Yugoslavia, have a very intelligent peasant
class but our industry is still undeveloped. The Poles have
considerable industry but their peasants are reactionaries. As
to Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, the West has always re-
garded these countries as a negligible quantity which cannot
have any influence on European developments.

"But Czechoslovakia is a country which has always at-
tracted the attention of the West. You have a long tradition
of freedom, you have had old contacts with the West and
you have a highly developed industry. Socialism is now being
introduced in Czechoslovakia and all these arguments about
'socialism in primitive countries' cannot hold. The change of
government in your country is of historical significance. The
West will see that sociahsm can best flourish in a country with
a high industrial potential. Success in the economic field in
Czechoslovakia will exert great influence in all western countries
and it will help the working classes of Italy and France in
their struggle." (Now, much later, Czechoslovak economic

THE CRUCIAL STRUGGLE 337

life, continuing to disintegrate under Communist rule, has
proved how wrong Djilas was.)

Then, Djilas advanced another interesting idea, "The top
leaders of the Communist parties are now studying the princi-
ples which should govern the mutual relations of people's democ-
racies. Personally, I am of the opinion that a period is forth-
coming, and it may last several decades, when the individual
Socialist states will develop independently but closely hnked
together. They will form a bouquet of SociaHst flowers bound
by common ideals but of diflFerent scents because of their
different tradition, culture, economic standards, and ways and
means of solving their poHtical and economic problems. Lenin's
theory dealt with the question of how to materialize socialism
by different approaches, but as in his time there was no other
Communist state besides the Soviet Union, he did not envisage
the problem of what the relations should be among countries
which have estabHshed conununism already. This is a new idea
which I am studying now."

Three months after Djilas had spoken about the bouquet
of Socialist flowers, the Yugoslav blossom was thrown away as
a treacherous weed.

The problem of relations among Communist countries was
brought into the open. The uniformity of thinking which has
been so essential for the totahtarian Communist policy is in
danger and may be slowly but systematically affected by the
bad example of Tito's schism. The politburo of Moscow is
faced with a very compUcated problem, the solution of which
might bring a deep rift in the PoHtburo itself. The loss of
prestige which would be involved in any concession is almost
fatal to a dictatorial regime. But a new structure of Commu-
nist hierarchy cannot be reached without concessions from Mos-
cow.

One is tempted to make an historical parallelv In the four-
teenth century John WycHffe of England and Jan Hus of Bo-
hemia led a reform movement against the Pope. It was later fol-
lowed by Martin Luther of Germany. The consequences are
known: an ecclesiastic schism and the foundation of the Protes-
tant church.

One cannot carry the analogy far. The dispute between

338 TITO'S COMMUNISM

Rome and the Reformation preachers was of a spiritual char-
acter and about high moral values. The Stalin-Tito dispute
is nothing but a ruthless struggle between two dictators about
a materialistic issue. But technically, the present dispute is
analogous to the Reformation in the sense that here, as well,
a local leader, though respecting the same ideals based on the
same books of teaching and claiming the same aims, has been
driven to elaborate his own interpretation of the ideology. He
is in opposition to the highest and officially infalhble central
authority, thus taking away the universality of their common
creed.

I consider the conflict between Moscow and Belgrade as
one of the gravest mistakes the Kremlin has committed since
the end of the war. Whatever solution the Kremlin finds to
solve the Yugoslav Communist problem, the rift itself must
inevitably weaken the structure on which the strength of the
Communist movement was built.

There has been a lot of speculation about the development
of Titoism, as Tito's heresy is called, in other Communist coun-
tries. In November, 1948, two of the closest associates of the
Albanian Prime Minister, Enver Hoxha, were arrested and
later executed: General Koci Xoxe and Pandi Chrlsto. Both
were accused of being agents of Yugoslavia. In Poland, Wlady-
slav Gomulka, General Secretary of the Polish Communist
party, and once the most powerful and talented figure among
the Polish Communists, was deprived of his functions for sid-
ing with Tito. He repented publicly, but was never returned
to his former position.

In February, 1949, the Greek guerrilla Communist leader.
General Markos Vafiades, was deprived of command, officially
for reasons of bad health, but allegedly for sympathies for
Tito. His fate is unknown. In Bulgaria, the Deputy Prime
Minister, Traicho Rostov, one of the most influential figures
of the Politburo, was arrested in April, 1949, condemned, and
later hanged. The reason: national deviation and adherence to
a policy hostile to Russia. But in this case, Tito denounced Ros-
tov as an agent of capitalism.

THE CRUCIAL STRUGGLE 339

In September, 1949, Laszlo Rajk, the former Hungarian
Foreign Minister and a member of the PoHtburo, was sentenced
to death for association with the Yugoslav Communist leaders.
Tito emphatically denied the charge. In the Soviet section of
Berhn a "Free Communist party" under Karl Heinz Scholz
was founded in August, 1949.

There have been other reports about Titoism appearing
here and there, and the arrests that followed. It is of interest
that no prominent cases of leanings toward Tito have been
so far oflScially announced from the Communist parties in
western countries. The local revolt of the two Italian Depu-
ties, Valdo Magnani and Aldo Cucchi, which developed in Feb-
ruary, 1951, has not affected as yet the leadership of the ItaHan
Communist party, and its significance cannot be evaluated at
the moment of writing.

Tito himself counts on further progress in this direction
and already can see himself as a founder of a new national,
but internationally spread movement of Communist parties,
based on the principles of equality. Should this occur, it might
prove to be even m6re dangerous to democracy than Stalin's
communism.

It might be more attractive to uninformed masses than
the international communism which,, especially in the western
countries, has been considerably compromised by a fifth-
columnist subservience to Moscow and Russian imperialism. It
would be a no less brutal dictatorship, with the same com-
munization of industry and land, abolition of private property,
and eradication of basic moral and human values of mankind.
In the long run, experience may show that the applause which
Tito enjoys today will be turned into deep sorrow.
, y It seems to me, though, that the possibilities or hopes of
Titoism in the satellite countries are remote. Too much im-
portance is being attached to symptoms of Titoism as mani-
fested by the liquidation of some prominent Communists behind
the Iron Curtain. Their indictments may have been based on
false accusations. Before the war, one was used to seeing old
leaders of Communist parties liquidated, for Trotskyism, fac-
tionary tendencies, deviation, etc., and new leaders appeared
only to be liquidated later also. The world did not, however.

340 TITO'S COMMUNISM

attach any special importance to these violent changes. The
Communist parties were in opposition in their countries and
changes of leadership passed almost unnoticed. It is bound to
create more attention if and when a Prime Minister or Foreign
Minister of a Communist country is liquidated.

It is evident, however, that Moscow is aware of this danger,
for Stalin follows a systematic poHcy of securing all key posi-
tions in the satellite countries for leaders who were thoroughly
trained in Moscow and have never shown any signs of inde-
pendent thinking. One can assume that the Soviet PoUtburo
was taught an important lesson by Tito's heresy.

There is another reason why I am not inclined to expect
Titoism to occur in a measure which would threaten the ruling
circles of the Communist parties. In the satelHte countries
conditions do not seem to exist for a move such as was possible
in Yugoslavia. As described before, Tito's Communists and
Tito himself were and are fighters; other Communist leaders
in eastern Europe are hotbed functionaries who were artificially
cultivated in Moscow during the war, and then, with the
bayonets of the Red Army, transplanted into their respective
countries. They do not have either the background or the
courage of Tito.

I As to Yugoslavia, there is no way back on either side.
Tito cannot return to Moscow and Moscow cannot withdraw
the pressure. Tito will continue in his stand against the Comin-
form and fight for it if attacked. Internationally the signifi-
cance of this position, as it appeared to be at the beginning
of 1951, was well expressed by a complete reversal of language
used by Tito: he now calls Americans friends and the Soviets
imperialists. He is undoubtedly sincere as to the latter part
of this terminology. MiHtarily, his army of three-quarters of
a million soldiers has taken its place in the calculations of the
defensive potential of the western powers. In the words of
President Truman contained in his message to Congress asking
for emergency aid to Yugoslavia, on November 29, 1950, "The
continued existence of Yugoslavia is of great importance to the
security of the United States and its partners in the North At-
lantic organization, and to all nations associated with them in
their common defense against the threat of Soviet aggression."

THE CRUCIAL STRUGGLE 341

For the first time since the break, a member of the Yugoslav
government and Pohtburo, Milovan Djilas, paid an oflScial visit
to a western country. He spent ten days in London, in Feb-
ruary, 1951. And the United States Assistant Secretary of
State, George W. Perkins, went on an official trip to Belgrade,
in February, following reported consultations in Washington
concerning coordination of the defense of the Balkan countries,
Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey, against possible Communist
attack.

According to Tito's estimate presented to the Yugoslav
Parhament on December 28, 1950, the Yugoslav Army was
facing a combined force of 660,000 soldiers from Hungary,
Rumania, and Bulgaria equipped, trained, and complemented
by the Soviet Army. Their threat to Yugoslavia has been in-
creasingly alarming.

Should Yugoslavia be attacked directly there is no doubt
that her army would put up a vaHant resistance, after initial
withdrawal from the undefendable borderland plains. Should
an all-out European and world war follow this attack, the
Communist Tito would become an ally of the West, contrib-
uting to the defense of western heritage and culture.

But the unforeseen may happen: Should the Soviets attack
western Europe they may choose to bypass and isolate Yugo-
slavia to spare their forces, for the time being, the necessity
of fighting thirty to forty divisions. In such a case they would
make it more diflScult for Tito to make up his mind to asso-
ciate himself with the "western reactionaries against the pro-
gressive forces of communism." He would undoubtedly ob-
tain support from the party and his Communist officers in case
of an invasion of Yugoslavia. But it might not be so easy for
him to get backing for an attack against the Russian armies if
they were not an immediate threat to his country. So far Tito
has promised to abide by the decisions of the United Nations
against any aggression. Experience has shown, however, that
the word aggression can be subjected to various interpretations.

The crucial question now is whether, with the mounting
pressure from the East which increases Tito's need of help

342 TITO'S COMMUNISM

from the West, he can be induced, in the long run, to ease the
pUght — pohtical and economic — of the Yugoslav nation.

The Communists in Yugoslavia say that Marshal Tito and
his government are more popular among the Yugoslav people

L than ever before. I wonder if this is true. Undoubtedly, many
party men are delighted to see the proud stand of Tito against
the Soviet giant; others are impressed. There are certainly
people who in their souls were ashamed to serve Tito's regime
but, once compromised, there was no possibility of withdrawing
their support to his government and they had to declare them-
selves publicly as his adherents. They are numerous, and they
are not party members. Their conscience may be relieved by
the self-deception that Tito has proved to be a good Yugoslav.
But what of the broad masses of the Yugoslav nation?

" This Tito-Stalin conflict has not brought any improvement
in their daily lives. They are watched as before, with this dif-
ference, that now also Communist comrades are subjected to
control. They do not enjoy more freedom or have more food
than before the conflict. They have to continue in their "vol-
untary" work. They are well aware that their hfe won't be
better until Communist rule, of whatever shape, is entirely
eradicated.

The Yugoslav people will have to continue their suffering
and struggle. This heroic, and unfortunate, nation has been
fighting for its independence for centuries. But the high reward
of real liberty has always escaped them. It seems to be the fate
of this part of the world that because of the short-sightedness
and selfishness of democratic leaders, and because of the lack
of understanding from abroad, the privileges of democracy,
freedom, and progress cannot come to Yugoslavia for some
time to come.

"Do not worry," people used to tell me, "we have so far
always succeeded in dealing with tyrants. We have survived
many bad governments. Tito will go, one day, as well."

But patriots who had thought deeply about their country's
history and its experience in modern times used to add: "Tito
will go, but who will come instead? It is difficult for us, as
good democrats, to imagine a government in Yugoslavia against
which we would not be in opposition."

THE CRUCIAL STRUGGLE 343

This sounds like a sad joke. But people who understand the
problems of Yugoslav politics and have the fate of its people
sincerely at heart will sense its tragic appeal. They will also be
aware that peace in the Balkans and in Europe depends, to a
considerable extent, upon a strong, united, and democratic
Yugoslavia.

POSTSCRIPT

"While adding the last touches to my manuscript I felt
that it would be of use and importance to compare some of the
judgments and conclusions contained herein with those of a per-
son who read the first draft of this manuscript and who has had
a very good knowledge of present conditions in Yugoslavia.
He has been a student of international affairs of long and high
standing. He has spent many years in the Soviet Union, the
Balkans, and Central Europe.

I asked him whether, after his recent research in Yugo-
slavia, he thought my own opinions still valid, and I asked him
several questions covering Yugoslav politics and economics. He
answered, "You do not need to make any substantial change
in the manuscript," and then continued:

"There is practically no change in the police and political
methods of Tito's government. Hence, there is no change in

344

POSTSCRIPT 34 J

the political life of Yugoslav citizens. One aspect, however, is
of importance: I have noticed that there is a little more 'free-
dom' in the air. You can't define it but you feel it. I have
put the word freedom in quotes because the beautiful word
is too big to be applied to that weak and very precarious wind
which has been refreshing slightly the atmosphere in Belgrade
during the last few months.

"But it is a fact that people are less afraid to speak with a
foreigner. When I was in Belgrade, some of my old acquaint-
ances greeted me on the streets and even had the courage to
come and see me in my office. During my previous visits, they
had done everything to avoid meeting me.

"In general I would say this: People are now allowed and
even ordered to curse Russia just as loudly as they curse Ameri-
ca; Russia, of course, can be criticized only in the sense that
she betrayed communism — communism which only in Yugo-
slavia is good and authentic. Within these Hmits criticism is
allowed; but already that means much for our good old friends
in Belgrade who just love discussions, and now, after all, they
are allowed to speak loudly on politics. Communists themselves
are most active and ambitious in this respect. They have to de-
fend themselves against the 'slander' of the Cominform, and
that means they have to convince the people and bring up ar-
guments, or in other words — to discuss. Discussions are going
on all the time everywhere. The theory of Marxism, Lenin-
ism a la Tito — these are the themes being elaborated and dis-
cussed. All this is somehow better than the previous terrify-
ing silence. But you understand that this is still far away from
our freedom.

"Another point is the disappearance of pictures of Stalin.
The Soviet idolatry is being mocked. But the consequence is
that, to some extent, the portraits of Tito have to be taken
away also.

"You asked me whether there is any opposition within the
Communist party, and what I had heard concerning the demo-
cratic opposition. If there are any anti-Titoists left after a
long and hard anti-Cominf orm purge, they are thoroughly hid-
den and silent. According to some sources of information, they
follow orders from Moscow to stay for the time being in deep

346 TITO'S COMMUNISM

illegality [Communist terminology for inactively underground] .
As to the other part of your question, I must state that I have
not heard a single word about activity among the democratic
opposition. I didn't hear anything of remarkable interest about
the Orthodox church. I would say, in general, that it does not
help the regime, but neither does it seem to cause trouble.

"The economic situation is worse than ever before. The
contacts with the West are developing well and offer a small
hope for improvement at a later period. The Yugoslav peas-
ants apparently follow a policy of passive resistance. This is
how I explain, for instance, the almost unexplainable fact that
the Belgrade people have not had meat for months. They have
to pay enormous prices for commodities on the free market.
Perhaps people have better clothes and shoes than a year ago,
but they eat less and worse. . . . To put it briefly, politically and
economically it is still the same communism and in many as-
pects worse and even more inhumane than the Soviet one.

"I don't think, therefore, that Tito is more popular than be-
fore the break with Stalin. There may be people who have
been impressed by Tito's opposition to Moscow, but in general
they have no illusions about the continued hardness of the re-
gime. I hope I don't need to tell you in detail about the last
election which was nothing else than another totalitarian elec-
tion.

"People are, of course, following with greatest interest the
American policy toward Tito. If they [non-Communists] agree
with it, then it is only because they hope that the Americans
will, in the long run, compel Tito to give up something of his
communism. I did not notice, at least not to the extent that I
did elsewhere [behind the Iron Curtain], that the Yugoslavs
see in a new war the only hope to change the regime.

"You asked me also about the future. In case of an attack
upon Yugoslavia [by Russia], Tito's government will definitely
defend itself. The abyss between Tito and Moscow has become
too deep to take their ideological affinity into consideration.
Tito has gone so far in his struggle against Stalinist 'revision-
ism' [of Marxist-Leninist theory] that Kardelj, for instance,
now speaks explicitly about Soviet imperialism, a thing which
he, until recently, has been anxiously avoiding in view of the

POSTSCRIPT 347

orthodox Marxist definition of imperialism. Up till now they
[the Yugoslav Communists] have been admitting that the
U.S.S.R. is all the same a SociaHst country. But recently they
have begun to criticize even the Soviet Constitution as non-
Socialist — though their own is nothing but a copy — and the So-
viet social system as state-capitaUstic. I consider this very
significant. By this the last ties are being severed, and there
remains no reason for acting towards the Soviet Union other
than as towards an enemy. I therefore consider it as certain that
the Yugoslavs would defend themselves against a Soviet or
satellite invasion.

"It would be quite another thing to determine what Tito's
government would do should the Soviets attack Germany or
Austria. I think it will try, as long as possible, to remain neu-
tral or at least not to intervene miHtarily. But as such an attack
against Germany or Austria would lead to a European and
world war, Yugoslavia would be inevitably dragged in — on
the side of the "West, I think."

APPENDIX 1

Text of the agreement (and of two annexes) between lAar-
shal Tito and I. ^ubasic. Prime Minister of the Royal Yugoslav
government in exile, signed on December 7, 1944.
A. THE agreement:

In compliance with the principle of the continuity of the
Yugoslav state from the point of view of international law, and
the clearly expressed will of all Yugoslav nations, demonstrated
by their four years' struggle for a new, independent, and fed-
erative state, built up on the principles of democracy, we desire
and make every effort for the people's will to be respected at
every step and by everybody, both with regard to the internal
organization of the state and to the form of government, and
therefore intend to comply with the fundamental and general
principles of constitutional government proper to all truly
democratic states.

348

APPENDIX 1 349

Yugoslavia being acknowledged among the United Na-
tions in its established form, and functioning as such, we shall
continue to represent our country abroad, and in all acts per-
taining to foreign policy in the same way, up to the time when
our state, the democratic federative Yugoslavia of the future,
assumes by a free decision of the people, the definitive form of
its government.

In order to avoid any possible tension of relations in the
country, we have agreed that King Peter II shall not return to
the country until the people have pronounced their decision in
this respect, and that in his absence the royal power shall be
wielded by a Regency Council.

The Regency Council will be appointed by a constitutional
act of the King, on the proposal of the Royal government, and
in agreement with the President of the National Committee of
Liberation of Yugoslavia, Marshal J. Broz Tito, and the Prime
Minister of the Royal Yugoslav government, Ivan Subasi^.
The Regency Council take their oath to the King, while the
government take their oath to the people.

The President of the National Committee of Liberation of
Yugoslavia, Marshal Josip Broz Tito, and the Prime Minister
of the Royal Yugoslav government, I. Subasic, with the full
concurrence of the Anti-Fascist Council of National Libera-
tion of Yugoslavia, agree that the government be formed as
follows: —

President (Prime Minister) ; Vice-President; Ministers of
Foreign Affairs, Interior, National Defense, Justice, Education,
Finance, Trade and Industry, Communications, Posts, Tele-
graphs and Telephones, Forests, Mines, Agriculture, Social Wel-
fare, National Health, Public Works, Reconstruction, Food,
and Information; Minister for Settlement of Populations; Min-
ister for the Constituent Assembly; and Ministers of State for
Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia
and Herzegovina.

This form of government in Yugoslavia shall remain in
force up to the decision of the Constituent Assembly, i.e., until
the final constitutional organizations of the state will be estab-
Hshed. The new government will publish a declaration pro-
claiming the fundamental principles of the democratic liberties

3jb TITO'S COMMUNISM

and guaranteeing their application. Personal freedom, freedom
from fear, freedom of worship, liberty of conscience, freedom
of speech, liberty of the press, freedom of assembly and associ-
ation, will be specially emphasized and guaranteed; and, in the
same way, the right of property and private initiative. The sov-
ereignty of the national individualities within the state and
their equal rights will be respected and safeguarded, as decided
at the second session of the Anti-Fascist Council of National
Liberation of Yugoslavia. Any predominance of one nation over
another will be excluded.

B. ANNEX 1:

1. Elections for the Constituent Assembly will be decided
upon within three months of the liberation of the whole coun-
try. The elections will be held in accordance with the law oh
elections for the Constituent Assembly, which will be enacted
in good time. This law will guarantee complete freedom of elec-
tions, freedom of assembly and speech, liberty of the press,
franchise for all and a secret ballot, as well as the right of inde-
pendent or united political parties, corporations, groups, and
individuals — who have not collaborated with the enemy — to
present Hsts of candidates for the election. All those whose col-
laboration with the enemy will have been proved will be de-
prived of both the right to elect and to be elected.

2. The Anti-Fascist Council of the National Liberation of
Yugoslavia will wield the legislative power until the convoca-
tion of the Constituent Assembly.

3. The government will be responsible for the organization
of the executive power.

4. One of the first and foremost tasks of the new govern-
ment will be to organize the judiciary power in the country in
a democratic spirit. The courts of justice will be independent
in their proceedings and the judges will decide according to the
law and their conscience.

C, ANNEX 2:

1. His Majesty King Peter II can dispose of his estates and
property in the country during his absence. The superinten-
dence of the Royal Estates will for that period be under the
supervision of the Regency Council.

APPENDIX 2 351

2. Regular intercourse between his Majesty the King and
the Regency Council will be estabHshed and guaranteed.

3. In case of disability, ill-health, death or resignation of
one of the Regents, his Majesty the King will, on the proposal
of the government, appoint another Regent in his place.

NOTE: This translation of the agreement appeared in the London Times, Janu-
ary 24, 194J.

APPENDIX 2

The Letter of Milan Grol to Marshal Tito
(Translation from Serbian)
To the Office of the Prime Minister, Marshal Josip Broz Tito:
Mr. Prime Minister:

When exchanging opinions with you and with your closest
associates in the government and in the presidium of AVNOJ,
I brought to your attention several times the fact that the. gov-
ernment followed an exclusive [Communist] party program
which was not in harmony with the assurances given me in our
first exchange of ideas on the occasion of my entrance into the
government and reaffirmed later. During all these discussions,
regardless of the interests and ideas of the [Democratic] party
which I represent, I stressed my view that these exclusive ten-
dencies were out of place for they made more difficult the so-
lution of our internal, political, and economic problems and

3J2 TITO'S COMMUNISM

the consolidation of the hard-hit [by the war] country — a
question, grave within itself, which for me today still remains
the decisive one.

The question, which has appeared to be one of dispute and
which has remained so, concerns the national authorities who,
in the first place, were not elected by the nation in a normal
[democratic] way, who were then deUberately changed, who
did not proceed according to the law, and who were not compe-
tent, yet whose pohtical position remained exclusive. The same
applies to the question of justice. The serious diflSculties experi-
enced in the general administrative and economic order and in
other public affairs have confirmed as justified the complaints
against this state of affairs. To pacify aroused feelings and to
calm the country, a just and effective amnesty would have
served.

After the end of the military operations these questions and
questions of political freedom would have been first in order.
I discussed them with you when we exchanged ideas, Mr. Prime
Minister, a month ago and then I repeated them in writing,
formulating my opinion as to the only possible way to organize
and to give a definite basis to the new situation [as created by
the war].

There are three tasks emanating from the situation in which
the country finds itself today, from the Tito-Subasic agree-
ments, from the Crimean Conference, and from the Declara-
tion of the [Yugoslav] government of March:

1. The establishment of a provisional Parliament by en-
larging AVNOJ with former members of the Parliament and
political groups for the purpose of widening the political basis
of public life.

2. The promulgation by this provisional Parliament of po-
litical laws which secure the freedom of the press or associa-
tion, and the right to hold public meetings and to organize
political parties — in general a free exchange of thought in the
period preceding the election, and a free electoral law.

3. In the spirit of these laws concerning political freedoms,
it is absolutely necessary to create a situation which would
guarantee a just application of these laws, an atmosphere of
freedom, patience, calm, mutual trust, and order without the

APPENDIX 2 353

exceptional Draconian measures applied in the preceding war
period, without the exclusive [Communist] party power de-
rived from revolutionary times. To create such a situation in
the period preceding the election presupposes the establishment
of national authorities which would be freely elected by the
nation; the establishment of a qualified and impartial justice
which has, Hke the national committees, an important role to
play in the preparation of the election; the establishment of a
regular civil police, and the realization of far-reaching amnesty.
One cannot imagine an election in the situation which exists
today.

These three points, the enlargement of AVNOJ, the poli-
tical laws, and the establishment of freedom, are closely inter-
related and cannot be solved one without the other. An agree-
ment about the enlargement of AVNOJ presupposes an agree-
ment as to what AVNOJ should declare as law. It would have
been necessary to reach an agreement upon the content of these
laws and upon the general conditions under which these laws
would be applied in the pre-election and election periods. In
order to reach this agreement it would have been necessary to
agree upon the ways and the aims to follow. I repeated all along
and also repeat today that an agreement between the progressive
political parties was and is still possible if the leading Commu-
nist party desires such an agreement. This would be proved if
it [the Communist party] decided to put limits to its program
and to share its power with the other political parties which
today only have a share in the responsibility [of the govern-
ment]. Without such broad agreement on the program there
is no real solution. The difficulties which are growing into dan-
gerous dimensions prove this today only too clearly.

All the statements of my position have remained unanswered.
During the past one and a half months there has been no con-
clusive personal exchange of opinion between you and me, nor
has there been any meeting of the government before which
I would have been able to raise these questions.

At one time I was given some hope of reaching an agree-
ment when the Deputy Prime Minister Kardelj declared him-
self to be of the opinion that before AVNOJ could make a de-
cision it would be necessary to reach an agreement upon a pro-

354 TITO'S COMMUNISM

gram, and, when he pledged several weeks ago that there would
be a meeting of the government "in a couple of days."

Instead of this, after a pause of three months, the meeting
of the government was arranged for the last week preceding
the convening of AVNOJ and a few days before this, mem-
bers of the government received a great number of proposed
bills: the electoral law, the law of electoral Usts, the law con-
cerning the punishment of crimes against the state, the law
about the Constitutional Assembly, about citizenship, about
the press, public gatherings, and freedom of association.

All these important drafts, which are of decisive importance
for solving present-day problems, have been worked out with-
out a wider agreement of principle, and suddenly, at the last
minute, presented to the Council of Ministers on the eve of the
session of AVNOJ, the transformation of which into a provi-
sional Parliament has not been agreed upon.

In this kind of work one can see a very expedient appraisal
of the basic political questions and a very technical execution
of the policy as if this policy had proved to be good and one
of integrity which excludes any difference of opinion. In one
way or another these laws limit or destroy the rights of the
citizens; they are a denial of the agreement establishing a def-
inite form of government and are a negation of the basic
principles upon which they are supposedly based. For instance
the expression "the sources of struggle for liberation" or the
expression "national authorities" carries a connotation of a de-
liberately exclusive one-party program. The role of the Con-
stituent Assembly, a supposedly sovereign body, is limited to
an institution which merely takes note of actions already com-
pleted and interpreted as the sources of the struggle for libera-
tion. This opinion has been repeated by leading [Communist]
persons, defended even before the Committee of Ministers
when the law about the Constituent Assembly was being dis-
cussed. The exclusive opinion that the second session of AVNOJ
at Jajce was an expression of national sovereignty proves to be
fatal although no progressive group has been against accepting
its decisions as the basis for discussion.

The law about the electoral lists, although revised and made
milder in the Committee of Ministers, can deny political rights

APPENDIX 2 3J5

to many thousands of people who were pardoned from the mis-
takes committed during the four years of occupation, those
turbulent and chaotic times. The sword hanging over the head
of those accused for poHtical reasons or those whose position
is in doubt is in the hands of the electoral commissions and na-
tional committees which, not having been regularly elected
and with the state of affairs as it is today, do not give a guar-
antee of impartial work.

This exclusive [one-party] opinion has inspired all drafts
and it reveals a tendency to achieve through such technical
means that which couldn't be secured by agreement. The ex-
clusive rule of "national authorities" who were not elected
by the nation has to receive tacitly the sanction of political
laws which are being applied by the same national authorities,
political laws which should have been enacted in the same spirit
and way in which a [truly] national government is achieved.
However, the newspaper of the Communist party incites the
members of the [National] Front to take the lead in making
out the electoral lists.

There is a general tendency to accuse people, to threaten
them and to put their position in doubt, to question their basic
citizen's rights, and this tendency was illustrated by the draft
concerning the punishment of crimes against the state, and it
also appeared in the law regarding citizenship. The first law
[of those mentioned] is nothing but a re-written project about
"punishments for crimes against the national authorities" which,
after protests from the legislative Committee, was withdrawn
six weeks ago. Purged from the drastic formulations of the
first project but still written by the same author, it has retained
the same ideas. Upon entering a new political era, which should
be an era of consolidation and calm, this law makes provisions
for continued persecution as a weapon for securing order and
it undermines the hope that this order can be secured by the
agreement and endeavors of progressive groups and thoughts.

It is being stressed at public meetings of the [National]
Front and in the press that the essential task of today is "to
purge" and "to complete the work of destroying fascism." A
deliberate accusation of fascism of everyone who, in the last

356 TITO'S COMMUNISM

chaotic and disorderly years, did not find himself on the Ub-
eration front [of the Partisans] in the country itself, or in the
concentration camps, or in exile, threatens thousands of people
among whom are not only those who are actually responsible
for bloodshed, but also masses of innocent people. Continuing
with an uninterrupted incrimination of [people's] behavior
during the period of occupation, that law sets up a basis not
only for the perpetual trials of delinquents, but also for con-
tinuous error, prejudice, and the eruption of national sentiments
in a terrible period.

This law had been distributed to the members of the Leg-
islative Committee already by the end of July before the
drafts, which were distributed last, concerning the press, free-
dom of association, of assembly, and of organization of political
parties. The law about the press proclaims formally in its first
article the freedom to be given to the press. Meanwhile, however,
there can't be any guarantee of that freedom if the technical
conditions and judgment about what can and what cannot be
discussed continue to depend only upon a one-party policy.
As far as the drafts regarding free association, political parties,
and assembly are concerned these are being presented on the
eve of the very announcement of the date of the election, and
include all the conditions regarding the thousands of [necessary]
signatures and affidavits without giving means of information
to the other parties (in spite of their many years of existence).
Without giving citizens the right to move freely from one place
to another such a law obviously follows the aim to make par-
ties impossible, or to limit them to the narrowest local organi-
zation without the opportunity to influence the development
of thinking in the entire country.

Political laws which do not guarantee a free exchange of
thoughts do not lead to a free election for the Constituent As-
sembly, nor do they build up, through the work of the Consti-
tuent Assembly, a sound foundation for the new order. They
only give impulse to reactionary and underground movements.
And, in this series of arguments I have not mentioned the most
difficult and decisive fact which causes the hostile sentiments of
the people — the economic crisis.

Not a single one of these arguments has been impartially

APPENDIX 2 357

considered [by the government], and the brutal and uncon-
ceding manner followed in the discussions in the Legislative
Committee and in the Presidium of the Provisional Parliament
has confirmed the uncompromising tendency of the leading
[Communist] group which excludes the idea of cooperation.

My position as a member of the government has been diffi-
cult from the beginning as I had not taken part in the prepar-
ation of these drafts except in criticizing them. With the pro-
posal of these political laws my position has become impossible.

Resigning from the government, I consider it rny duty to
express to you personally, Mr. Prime Minister, an acknowl-
edgment that if I have found any understanding and any
broader consideration of the problems it was with you, and I
consider it necessary, Mr. Prime Minister, to assure you that
my withdrawal from the government does not imply any lack
of readiness on the part of the Democratic party, which I have
represented in the government, for cooperation under condi-
tions which would make such cooperation possible and justi-
fiable. As always the cooperation of the progressive groups
remains conditio sine qua non for pulling the country out of
the situation in which it finds itself today.
Belgrade, 19 August, 1945

(signed) Milan Grol

INDEX

AFP (French Press Agency),
334

Agitation and Propaganda Bu-
reau (AGITPROP), 80, 97,
98, 127, 128

Agriculture: s^^ Five Year Plan,
Land Reform, Markets, Peas-
ants

Albania: campaign against
Yugoslavia, 317; exploitation
by Yugoslavia, 261 ; importance
to Russia, 311; reprisals after
schism, 262; %ee also Foreign
trade. International relations

Alexander, King, 38, 52, 63, 93,
157, 163,265

Allen, George V., 75, 331, 332

Andrejev, Bane, 315

Andric, Ivo, 21

Anti-Fascist Council of National
Liberation of Yugoslavia (AV-
NOJ), 13, 39-40, 348-358
passini

Anti-Fascist Front of Women
(AF!Z) : Second Congress, 110;
see also Women

Army (Yugoslav), 4, 12; ca-
pitulation of, 8; and elections,
34; and Five Year Plan, 215;
Communists in, 67', Royal offi-
cers in, 67 \ quality of, 311;
Russian officers in, 268

Aucouturier, Gustave, 3

Augustin^ic, 144

Austria, 263, 267, 310, 326, 330

Bakaric, Vladimir, 89; on coop-
eratives, 204

Balkan Entente, 264, 265

Barskov, General, 294

Bartulovic, Niko, 21

Bebler, Ales, 89, 281; on Lav-
rentiev, 307-308; on reconciH-

ation, 313; on schism, 300-301,
314-315

Belgrade, 2, 25, 41, 58, 146;
bombing of, 7; as Cominform
seat, 290; cost of living in,
249; illiteracy in, 138; life in,
69-70, 107-108; musical tradi-
tion, 140; reconstruction of,
108; University, 4

BeUc, Alexander, 9 3

Benes, Edvard, 3, 5, 18, 80, 265,
269; on Polish- Yugoslav alli-
ance, 271, 273; visit to Yugo-
slavia (1937), 4

Bierut, Boleslav, 130, 306

Bihac, 39

Bled, 276, 281

Borba, 60, 80, 96, 127-128, 130,
193, 224-225, 323

Bosnia-Herzegovina, 12, 39, 53,
5 5, 187; ethnical composition
of, 55; illiteracy in, 138

Brcko-Banovici (railroad), 104

British Broadcasting Corpora-
tion (BBC), 31, 132

Broz, Josip: see Tito

Broz, 2arko, 72-73

Budget, 232; and education,
13 5; evaluation of, 241, 244;
for 1947, 238; for 1948, 239;
for 1949, 1950, 1951, 244; in-
ternal loan, 239; prevention of
inflation, 233; structure of,

235, 237, 238, 240; taxes, 235,

236, 249
Budisavljevic, Srdjan, 22
Bulgaria, 29, 263, 269; depend-
ence upon Russia, 302; federa-
tion with Yugoslavia, 275, 276-
277, 318; importance to Rus-
sia, 310; see also Foreign trade,
International relations

358

INDEX

359

Cannon, Cavendish, 297, 334

Central Commission of Control,
224

Central Commission of Plan-
ning, 226, 228; see also Five
Year Plan

Cetnici, 12, 56, 58, 82, 272, 304

Christo, Pandi, 338

Churchill, Winston, 6, 13, 312

dementis, Vladimir, 270, 271,
272

Cominform, 204, 283; accused
by Tito of sabotage, 228-229;
anti-Tito campaign, 314, 316-

318, 319, 322, 325-326, 328,
329-330; see also Cominform
schism, Cominform - Yugoslav
correspondence, Communist
party of Yugoslavia, Tito

Cominform schism, 286ff; bor-
der incidents, 325, 330; cul-
tural consequences, 144; dis-
puted issues, 193, 204-205,
224; economic consequences,

319, 329; effect on Yugoslav
people, 342; evaluation of ac-
cusation, 299-300; and Five
Year Plan, 227; and foreign
trade, 258, 262; ideological
consequences, 33 6^ 337-338,
345; impossibility of reconcil-
iation, 312-313; Pravda article,
293; real reasons for, 300, 307;
resulting political trials, 168-
169; tension prior to, 288; see
also Cominform, Communist
party of Yugoslavia, Interna-
tional relations, Tito

Cominform - Yugoslav corres-
pondence, 293-298, 301-302;
see also Cominform schism,
Stalin, Tito

Committee for Arts and Cul-
ture, 19

Committee of National Libera-
tion, 13, 40, 41, 349

Communist party of Yugoslavia,
16, 3 5, 46; answers Comin-
form accusations, 290 - 291,
292-293; see also Cominform-
Yugoslav correspondence; atti-
tude toward justice, 176; atti-
tude toward other Communist
parties, 305; attitude toward
religion, 147; and Austrian
Communists, 279; comparison
with other parties, 67 ; coopera-
tives, 198-199; criticism and
auto-criticsm, 123-124; discip-
line in, 65-66; dissolution of,
63; expelled by Cominform,
287-299; see also Cominform,
Cominform schism; finances
of, 89-90, 237; Fifth Con-
gress, 63, 67, 290-295; func-
tionaries of, 88-89, 91; history
of, 62-68, 291, 303-304; ideol-
ogy after schism, 333-33 5; im-
portance to Moscow, 309, 311-
312; income of members, 248;
and Italian Communists, 278;
leadership changed, 63; leaflet
(text), 98; life of leaders, 68-
70; mass manifestations, 100-
102,103; membership of, 64,
66-67; meetings, 96-97, 100;
methods of work, 89, 90-91;
and National Front, 15, 16;
nationalistic tendencies of, 302,
306-307; opposition within,
316, 345; press, 126; see also
Borha, Press; public attorneys,
178-179; radio, 126; reaction
to Cominform campaign, 318-
319, 326-327; relations with

360

INDEX

Moscow, 303; school of, 97-98;
Second Congress, 63; and Ser-
bian uprising, 64; social divis-
ion 67 \ street secretaries, 96-97
passim; struggle for power, 12;
students' attitude toward, 137;
view of democracy, 124-125;
voluntary work, 248; women
in, 110; in World War II, 5,
9, 64, 304; youth organization,
67

Constituent Assembly, 13, 42,
350; election of, 2 5, 31-33;
electoral laws, 31-32, 47n

Constitution, 25, 46-48; on cul-
ture, 134; on economics, 189;
on education, 13 5; on free-
doms, 172; on public attorneys,
176; on nationalities, 49; on
religion, 146

Cooperatives: law of, 195; gov-
ernment policy toward, 200,
204; number of, 204-205;
types of, 198-199

Cost of Hving, 249, 251-252; in
Belgrade, 249; differentiation,
250; comparison with other
countries, 249; prices, 234;
rationing, 245, 250, 251, 252

Council of Economic Mutual
Assistance, 319

Council of Nationalities, 42, 45,
47 ; see also Parliament

Croat Peasant party, 3, 14; atti-
tude toward Serbo-Croat feud,
52

Croat Peasant Republican party,
16

Croatia, 30, 39, 53; Independent
State of, 8, 52

Croats, 3, 10; feud with Serbs,
8, 51-59; and German aggres-
sion, 52; and Karadjordjevic

dynasty, 38; national charac-
ter, 50, 51; nationahsm, 3;
religion, 153; and Yugoslav
unity, 58

Cucchi, Aldo, 339

Culture, 139-145; attitude of
artists, 143; bookshops, 139;
censorship, 139; consequences
of schism, 147; contacts with
the West, 142, 145; films, 143,
144, 318; and Five Year Plan,
139, 219; foreign reading
rooms, 139; music, 139-143;
theater, 80, 143

Currency, 233; circulation, 234-
23 5; valup, 234

Cvetkovic, Dragisa, 5,52

Czechoslovakia: alHance with
France, 264; army, 310; atti-
tude toward Tito, 305; cam-
paign against Yugoslavia, 317-
318; Communist party of, 67-
68; cultural relations, 139; de-
pendence upon Moscow, 302;
importance to Russia, 310; in-
vestments in Yugoslavia, 180
ff, 188; putsch in, 336; rela-
tions with Hungary, 23; rela-
tions with Yugoslavia, 24; see
also International relations; and
Serbian Orthodox church, 150;
strike in, 114; trade with
Yugoslavia, 73, 228, 324-325;
see also Foreign trade; transfer
of Hungarian minority, 270

Dedijer, Vladimir, 89, 132

Democratic party, 3, 14, 16

Dcmokrati]a, 17

Dimitrov, Georgi, 130, 169, 288,
306; on federation with Yugo-
slavia, 276; visits Yugoslavia,
275-276

INDEX

361

Djilas, Milovan, 98, 132, 284,
295, 316, 318; attacked by
Stalin, 287; background, 78-
79, 8 1 ; conversation with Dim-
itrov, 288; and education, 135;
on faithfulness to communism,
334, 33 5; and AGITPROP,
127; impression upon Benes,
80; on inter-Communist rela-
tions, 337; on Dragoljub Jova-
novic, 166; and Marshall Plan,
281; position in the party, 77,
78, 80, 82; potential successor,
73; in Prague, 272; and press,
131; on putsch in Prague, 336;
re-elected to Politburo, 293;
visits London, 341

Drvar, 291, 315

Economic structure, 187-188;
according to Constitution, 189;
Five Year Plan, 212, 219; na-
tionalization laws, 189-193;
see also Five Year Plan, Indus-
triaHzation

Education, 134-137; attitude of
teachers, 136; illiteracy, 138;
planning of, 137; and religion,
146, 158; school construction,
210; universities, 137; state
control of, 13 5; textbooks,
135, 144

Elections, 26-37, 34n; U. S. at-
titude toward, 36

Export: see Foreign trade

Federal Council, 47; see also
Parliament

Five Year Plan, 71, 102; affected
by foreign trade, 226; agricul-
ture, 194-195; army, 215; bu-
reaucracy, 220-221; Central
Commission of Planning, 208,
213, 221, 223; contents of,
209-212; criticism of, 86, 124

passim; currency, 23 5; decla-
ration of, 209; evaluation of,
212-215; execution of, 219ff;
financial aspect, see Budget;
and foreign property, 184; and
foreign trade, 213,255; fulfill-
ment of, 226-227,228; planned
education, 137; preparation of,
207ff; prolonged, 229; revi-
sion of, 228, 229; skilled for-
eign labor, 222-224; statistics,
229-230; see also Industrializa-
tion, Foreign trade

Foreign investments, 180ff;
Tito on, 216

Foreign trade, 252; with Al-
bania, 254, 261-262; with
Belgium, 254; with Bulgaria,
254, 262, 276; cut by Comin-
form, 319; with Czechoslo-
vakia, 226, 254, 255, 258, 260
passim; exports, 254; and Five
Year Plan, 226; with France,
254, 321; with Great Britain,

254, 321; with liungary, 226,

255, 258; imports, 254; with
Italy, 258, 321; with Latin
America, 32 In; organization
of, 253, 254; orientation of,
254; with Poland, 226, 2 5 5,
258; politics in, 254 passim,
258; reorientation, 228, 229;
with Rumania, 254; with
Russia, 226, 254, 258-259;
secrecy of, 259-260; and Soviet
exploitation, 260-261; support
by Cominform, 260; with
Switzerland, 254, 321; with
Sweden, 258,321; with United
States, 254, 320, 321-322; with
the West, 346; with Western
Germany, 3 2 In

France, 310; alliance with Rus-

362

INDEX

sia, 268; cultural relations,
139; property in Yugoslavia,
188, 216; trade with Yugo-
slavia, 321; see also Foreign
trade, International relations

Furlan, Professor, 166

Gavrilo, Patriarch, 148; attitude
toward Tito, 149; on religious
freedom in Yugoslavia, 150,
151-152

Gavrilovic, Milan, 3, 163, 266

George, Prince, 44

Germany: property in Yugo-
slavia, 188

Gomulka, Wladyslav, 338

Gorazd, Bishop, 150

Gorkic, 64

Gosnjak, General Ivan, 83, 98

Gottwald, Klement, 131, 273;
attitude toward Tito, 305-306

Great Britain, 166; alleged espi-
onage, 168; alliance with Rus-
sia, 268; attacked in press, 279;
cultural relations, 139; loan to
Yugoslavia, 321; property in
Yugoslavia, 184, 188, 191;
trade with Yugoslavia, 321; see
also Foreign trade; and Yalta
Declaration, 13; see also Inter-
national relations

Greece, 311; see also Interna-
tional relations

Grol, Milan, 3, 14, 16, 27; letter
of resignation, 14, 352-358
(text)

Handler, M. S., 122n, 186n

Hebrang, Andrija, 84, 124,
129, 226, 300; accused by
Politburo, 86; arrested, 86,
289, 290; background, 85; on
Five Year Plan, 208

Hoxha, Enver, 130, 311, 338

Ho Chi Minh, 330

Hungary, 7, 23, 169, 228, 263,
269; campaign against Yugo-
slavia, 317; dependence upon
Moscow, 302; importance to
Russia, 311; relations with
Yugoslavia, 23; see also Inter-
national relations; trade with
Yugoslavia, 319; see also For-
eign trade

Hurley, Bishop Joseph Patrick,
157

Illiteracy, 138; and Five Year
Plan, 222

Import: see Foreign trade

Import-Export Bank, 321, 322,
331

Independent Democratic Serbian
party, 3, 14, 16, 22

Industrialization, 188; control
of work, 224-225; evaluation
of failures, 231; prices of pro-
ducts, 236; quality of pro-
ducts, 243; unemployment,
227; visits to factories, 220;
see also Five Year Plan, Volun-
tary work

International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development,
321, 322, 331

International relations: with Al-
bania, 227; attitude toward
UN Balkan Commission, 279;
with Austria, 330; with Bul-
garia, 264, 265, 275 - 277;
change of policy, 327, 329,
330-331; concept of foreign
policy, 267; among Commu-
nist countries, 337; with
Czechoslovakia, 2 63, 2 64n,
268, 269, 274, 329; govern-
ment in exile, 266; with Great
Britain, 329; with Greece, 264,
330, 341; help to Greek Com-

INDEX

365

munists, 279-280; with Hun-
gary, 264, 265, 277; with Italy,
267, 330; Kardelj on, 292;
peace treaties, 25 5, 263, 320;
with Poland, 268, 271; putsch
in Czechoslovakia, 274-275;
renunciation of Bulgarian rep-
arations, 276; with Rumania,
263, 264n, 277; with Russia,
266, 267-268, 329, 345; sys-
tem of alHances, 268, 269;
treaties abrogated, 328; with
Turkey, 264, 341; with United
States, 329, 330, 333, 345;
with the West, 276, 277, 278flF,
329; and Yugoslav people,
277-278
Italy, 7, 10, 267, 310; see also
Foreign trade. International re-
lations

Jajce, 39, 40, 42

Josip, Metropolitan, 148, 151

Jovanovic, General Arsa, 313,
317

Jovanovic, Dragoljub, 3, 45, 46,
240; arrested, 162; attitude
toward Russia, 163, 164; atti-
tude toward Tito, 164; back-
ground, 163-164; criticism of
government, 164-165; de-
nounced by followers, 165-
166; on public attorneys, 176-
179

Justice: collaborators con-
demned, 1 7 9 ff ; Communist
notion of, 176; court proce-
dure, 184; Criminal Law, 186;
denunciation encouraged, 173,
183; foreign property, 180 ff;
political trials, 159-160, 161,
162, 166-169; private prop-
erty, 179-185; public attor-

neys, 48, 176-179; war profit
tax, 183

Karadjordjevic, Dynasty of, 35,
38-39, 42, 51; abrogation of
reign, 44; and Congress at
Jajce, 40

Kardelj, Edvard, 98, 144, 284,
316, 318; accused by Comin-
form, 287; on Cominform
campaign, 329-330; on deteri-
orating situation, 282; on for-
eign policy, 292, 330; on D.
Jovanovic's arrest, 163; and
Marshall Plan, 281; position in
the party, 77, 82; re-elected to
Politburo, 293; on schism, 333;
on solidarity of East, 284-28 5;
at United Nations, 77

Kidric, Boris, 98, 253; back-
ground, 83-85; on the budget,
240-242; and Five Year Plan,
220, 229; and foreign prop-
erty, 185; and foreign trade,
259; method of work, 84-85,
122-123 passim; in Moscow,
207; on nationalization, 191

Klance, 72

Kolarov, Vasilj, 288

Komunist, 33 5

Konjevic, Peter, 141

Korosec, Anton, 4

Kosanovic, Sava, 14, 152

Kosovo-Metohija, 53-54, .57

Rostov, Traicho, 338

Kramer, Albert, 4

Krek, Miha, 154

Land reform: acquistion of land,
196, 199; churches, 149, 155;
internal colonization, 196-197,
200; land distribution, 199-
200; law of, 195; maximum
acreage, 200; in Slovenia, 199

364

INDEX

Lavrentiev, Anatolij, 289, 300;

and schism, 300, 307
Lawyers, 120-122
Lebedev, Ambassador, 273
Leskovsek, Franje, 66, 83
Little Entente, 264, 264n, 265
Ljotic, Dimitrij, 8
Ljubljana, 167, 259

Macedonia, 29, 39, 53, 168; il-
literacy in, 138; separatist
movement, 54, 325; Serbian
Orthodox church in, 151; Uni-
versity in, 54

Macedonians: nationalism of,
54; rehgion of, 148

Macek, Vlatko, 3, 16, 52

Magnani, Valdo, 339

Mandic, Ante, 22

Maniu, Juliu, 1 5

Markets, 245, 246-247; free
market, 251; liquidation of
business, 245-246; see also Cost
of living

Marshall Plan, 258, 3 34; Yugo-
slav attitude toward, 280-282

Marusic, Drago, 14

Masaryk, Jan, 269, 271

Mestrovic, Ivan, 143

Mihajlovic, Draia, 8, 21, 53, 57,
82, 148, 266; and civil war,
10; clash with Tito, 9; con-
demned, 159

Mikolajczyk, Stanislav, 1 5

Minorities, 59-61, 203; Bulgar-
ian, 60; Cominform abuse of,
61; Communist policy toward,
59; Constitution on, 47;
Czechoslovak, 28, 60; in
Czechoslovakia, 270; German,
59, 63, 199; Greek, 60; Hun-
garian, 28-29, 60, 63; Italian,
60; poUtical attitude of, 60;
in Russia, 59; situation after

schism, 318, 330; Turkish, 60;
in World War II, 181
Mitrovic, Mitra, 78, 79
Mitrovic, General Stefan, 89
Molotov, V. M., 129, 130, 294,

326
Montenegrins: colonists, 197;
national conscience, 53; rehg-
ion, 148; in Yugoslav Army,
55
Montenegro, 39, 53; ilHteracy
in, 138; as part of Italy, 8;
reaction to schism, 315; Ser-
bian Orthodox church in, 151

Nagy, Ferencz, 1 5
Narodni Glas, 17
National Front, 15-16, 35, 46,

67; and elections, 27, 33, 34
National Peasant party, 16, 163
Nazor, Vladimir, 93
Nedic, Milan, 8
Neskovic, Blagoje, 83
Novi Sad, 169, 230
Nova Borba, 3 1 8

OflSce of State Security (UDB),
81, 173, 174-175

Organization of Communist
Youth of Yugoslavia (SKOJ),
67

Organization for Protection of
the Nation (OZNA), 81, 173,
175

Parhament, 13, 31, 46, 48; first
session, 42-45; and nationahza-
tion laws, 190-191; number of
Communists in, 67; organiza-
tion of, 47-48; proclamation of
Republic, 39, 44; provisional,
41, 353, 355, 358; see also
Constituent Assembly

Patterson, Richard C, Jr., 45

Pauker, Anna, 3 17

INDEX

365

Paul, Prince, 4, 22; change of
policy, 265

Pavelic, Ante, 8, 52, 93

Peace Conference of Paris: terri-
torial claims, 278; Tito's policy
at, 268

Peace Treaty: of Neuilly, 263;
of Paris, 25 5, 320; of St. Ger-
main, 263; of Trianon, 263

Peasants, 113, 346; attitude
toward communism, 94-96,
206; characteristics of, 195;
cost of living, 250-251; forced
to comply with planned agri-
cultural production, 201-203;
income, 247; persecution of,
203; property rights, 200

Peake, Sir Charles, 145

People's Assembly: see Parlia-
ment

Perkins, George W., 341

Perovic, Ivo, 5

Peter the Liberator, King, 44

Peter the Second, King, 5, 38,
39, 93, 266, 349, 350; attitude
toward Tito - Subasic Agree-
ment, 14; and elections, 27;
marriage, 39; privation of
rights, 44; return of, 40

Petkov, Nikola, 1 5

Physicians, 117-120, 247; perse-
cution of, 185-186

Pijade, Mosa: attacks Russia,
326-327; position in the party,
83; on Soviet help, 319; on
visit in Prague, 289

Poland: army of, 310; attitude
toward Tito, 305; cultural re-
lations, 139; dependence upon
Moscow, 302; importance to
Russia, 310; see also Foreign
trade. International relations

Volitika, 19, 128

Political parties: see Communist
party of Yugoslavia, Croat
Peasant, Croat Peasant Repub-
lican, Democratic, National
Peasant, Republican, Serbian
Peasant, Serbian Radical, Slo-
venian Liberal, Socialist
Popovic, General Koca, 86-88,

98
Popovic, Vladimir, 334
Potsdam Agreement, 278
Pravda: attacks Tito, 293; on
Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation,

276, 277
Press, 80; and agricultural pro-
duction, 202; answers Comin-
form campaign, 318; attacks
Great Britain, 279; attitude
toward Czechoslovakia, 131-
132; attitude toward Russia,

129, 268; attitude toward
United States, 130, 279; cen-
sorship of, 17, 130; controlled
by D jilas, 131; on nationaliza-
tion, 191; regulation of, 129;
and Roman Catholic church,
15 5; supports Five Year Plan,

130, 219; voice of National
Front, 128

Pristina, 162

Prodanovic, Jasa, 42

Provisional government, 14

Radic, Stephan, 39

Radio, 126, 132

Rajk, Laszlo, 326, 339

Rakosi, Maty as, 306

Rankovic, Alexander, 67, 316;
accused by Cominform, 287;
background, 81, 82; position
in the party, 77, 81, 82; re-
elected to Politburo, 293; on
Yugoslav - Bulgarian f e d e r a -
tion, 275

366

INDEX

Regents, Royal, 14, 22, 349,
350-351

Religion: see Gavrilo, Roman
Catholic church, Serbian Or-
thodox church, Stepinac

Republican party, 16, 42

Ribar, Ivan, 42, 92

Ribar, Lola, 4

Ribnikar, Vladimir, 19, 23, 13 5,
272

Rittig, Monseigneur, 157

Roman Catholic church, 4, 147,
153-157; attitude toward Tito,
154; pastoral letter, 154-155;
on persecution of priests, 15 5;
Tito's answer to, 156; visit of
American ministers, 152; see
also Croats, Slovenes, Stepinac

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 13

Rude Prdvo, 147

Rumania, 269; campaign against
Yugoslavia, 317, 330; depend-
ence upon Moscow, 302; im-
portance to Russia, 310; see
also Foreign trade. Interna-
tional relations

Sadcikov, Ivan, 30-31

Salaj, 1 1 5

Salaries, of public servants, 248;
see also "Wages

Sarajevo-Samac (railroad), 104

Scholz, Karl Heinz, 339

Schools: see Education

Serbia, 12, 53

Serbian Orthodox church, 50,
57, 147-148, 345; in World
"War II, 148; attitude toward
Mihajlovic, 148; attitude
toward Tito, 148; dissidents of,
150; and land reform, 149; in
Macedonia, 57, 15 In; in Mon-
tenegro, 57, 151; relations with

Czechoslovakia, 150; visit of
American ministers, 151

Serbian Peasant party, 3, 16

Serbian Radical party, 3

Serbs, 3, 28; feud with Croats,
8, 51-59; and Karadjordjevic
dynasty, 38; national charac-
ter, 50, 51; religion, 148; and
Yugoslav unity, 57

Sernec, Dusan, 22

Shantz, Harold, 160

Skoplje, 167

Simic, Stanoje, 92, 281, 288

Simic, Vladimir, 92

Simovic, General Dusan, 5 , 64

Siroki Breg, 1 5 5

Siroky, Viliam, 273

Slav soUdarity, 268, 277

Slavonia, 58, 187

Slovenes: in administration, 55;
and Karadjordjevic dynasty,
39; national character, 50,
51; religion, 153; and Serbo-
Croat feud, 52; and Yugoslav
unity, 58

Slovenia, 7, 53

Slovenian Liberal party, 4, 14

Socialist party, 16

Soviet Russia: accused of espion-
age in Yugoslavia, 296; at-
titude toward Titoism, 340;
cultural relations, 139; exploi-
tation of Yugoslavia, 323-324;
plan of infiltration, 309-312;
relations with Communist par-
ties, 302-303; trade with
Yugoslavia, 228, 319, 322; see
also Foreign trade; trial of
Soviet citizens in Yugoslavia,
169; Yalta Declaration, 13;
and Yugoslav elections, 31; see
also International relations

Srem, 20, 187

INDEX

367

Stalin, Joseph V., 13, 287, 311;
attitude toward Cominform
accusation, 129; on Churchill,
312; correspondence with Tito,
see Cominform-Yugoslav cor-
respondence; picture displayed,
41, 129, 268, 345; and Yugo-
slav-Bulgarian federation, 275

Stankovic, Radenko, 5

Stepinac, Archbishop Alois, 3,
156, 159; accused of collabora-
tion, 157

Stevenson, Sir Ralph, 45

Stojadinovic, Milan, 2, 128, 265

^ubasic, Ivan, 13, 14, 29ff, 40,
41; agreement with Tito, 12-
13,27,40,348-351 (text)

Sutej, Juraj, 14

Sweden, 321 ; property in Yugo-
slavia, 184, 188, 191; see also
Foreign trade

Switzerland, 311, 321; property
in Yugoslavia, 184; see also
Foreign trade

Teheran Conference, 267

Telegraphic Agency of Yugo-
slavia (TANJUG), 127-128,
130

Tesin, 270, 272

Third Communist International,
283, 300, 303

Tito, Marshal Josip Broz, 9, 19,
21, 22, 35, 40, 41, 43, 45, 53,
100, 136, 304, 311; accused by
Cominform, 287; agreement
with Subasic, 12-13, 27, 40,
348-351 (text); agreement
with Togliatti, 278-279; on
American Embassy, 162; au-
thor's audience with, 23; clash
with Mihajlovic, 9; on Comin-
form accusation, 291 ; on Com-
inform campaign, 319, 328;

on cooperatives, 204; corre-
spondence with Stalin, see
Cominform - Yugoslav corre-
spondence; and Dimitrov, 275;
on elections, 29, 35; on faith-
fulness to communism, 334,
33 5; on Five Year Plan, 215-
219, 227, 229; on foreign
trade, 320; and Gottwald, 273;
on history of party, 291; on
international situation, 282-
283; on D. Jovanovic, 164;
knowledge of languages, 72;
on Marshall Plan, 281-282; on
National Front, 46; national-
istic tendencies, 306-307; on
need of American aid, 256-
257; organization of Partisans,
74; picture displayed, 41, 345;
popularity, 342, 346; position
in the party, 70, 76-77, 82;
private life, 71-73 passim;
pseudonyms, 73-74; public ap-
pearances, 74-75; on reasons
for schism, 324; re-elected to
Politburo, 293; responsibility
for West-East division, 278;
and Roman Catholic church,
154, 156; security precautions,
71, 74-75, 76\ and Serbian
Orthodox church, 148-149; on
Slav solidarity, 277; and Span-
ish Civil War, 74; victorious
entrance into Belgrade, 10;
visit to Bulgaria, 276; visit to
Czechoslovakia, 270, 272-274;
visits with diplomats, 75-76;
visit to Poland, 269, 271; on
Wallace movement, 283; on
West, 329; on women's work,
110; on world's division, 280

Titograd, 71

Titoism, 338-340

368

Togliatti, Palmiro, 278, 279

Trade unions, 17, 113-115;
and party manifestations, 101;
membership, 115-116 passim

Trieste, 258, 278,309

Trifunovic, Misa, 3, 161; con-
demnation of, 160

Truman, Harry S., 130, 340;
Doctrine, 280

United Nations, 318; Balkan
Commission, 279; Yugoslav
policy in, 268, 327, 329, 330

United Nations Relief and Re-
habilitation Administration
(UNRRA),278

United States, 47; aid to
Yugoslavia, 331, 332; alleged
espionage, 179; attacked in
press, 279; attitude toward
Yugoslav elections, 36; cul-
tural relations, 139; Embassy
in Belgrade, 160, 161, 163;
property in Yugoslavia, 188,
191; relations with Yugoslavia
after schism, 320, 331-333,
346; trade with Yugoslavia,
320-321, 322; see also Foreign
trade; Yalta Declaration, 13;
see also International relations

Ustase, 8, 21, 30, 153, 272, 304

Vafiades, General Markos, 33 8

Vejvoda, Ivan, 288

Velebit, Vladimir, 132, 269,
288; alleged spy, 296; in
Prague, 270, 272

Vikentije, Patriarch, 15 In

Vilder, Vje^eslav, 3

Vilfan, Joza, 324

Vlahov, Colonel, 89

Voice of America, 31, 132

Vojvodina, 28, 57, 187

Voluntary work, 21, 102-109,

INDEX

137; in Belgrade, 107; at
Brcko-Banovici, 104; by chil-
dren, 102-103 passim; foreign
youth brigades, 105; govern-
ment profit from, 103 passim,
106 passim; health conditions,
106; number of participants,
104, 107; and political educa-
tion, 105, 108-109; pubHcized
in the press, 102; rewards for,
248; at Sarajevo-Samac, 104-
106, 107; Shock Brigades, 103;
Shock Troopers, 103; by wo-
men, 102-103 passifn, 111

Vreme, 128

Vuco, Alexander, 144

Vukmanovic - Tempo, General
Svetozar, 89, 98

Vishinsky, Andre], 129, 130,
326

Wages, 247-249

Wallace, Henry A., 283

Western Germany, 310

Women, 109-113; family hfe,
110 passim, 112-113; and Na-
tional Front, 110; in Partisan
movement, 109

Xoxe, General Koci, 338

Yalta Conference, 30, 41, 309;
Declaration, 13, 31

Youth, 109; working brigades,
see Voluntary work; see also
Communist party of Yugo-
slavia, Organization of Com-
munist Youth of Yugoslavia

Zagreb, 3, 140

:^danov, Andre], 283, 290

leielj, Colonel, 72, 271

2ujovic, Sreten, 8 5, 124, 296,
300; accused by Politburo, 86;
arrested, 86, 290; released from
prison, 86

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