Skip to main content

Full text of "Towing Vessel Navigational Safety Act of 1993 : hearing before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, House of Representatives, One Hundred Third Congress, second session, on H.R. 3282, a bill to amend Title 46, United States Code ... March 3, 1994"

See other formats


TOWING VESSEL NAVIGATIONAL SAFEH 
ACT OF 1993 



Y 4. M 53: 103-86 ^ING 

FORE THE 

Touing Vessel Navigational Safety ^ •• • TMTTTpp QM 

COAST GUARD AND NAVIGATION 



COMMITTEE ON 

MERCHANT MAEINE AND FISHERIES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 
ON 

H.R. 3282 

A BILL TO AMEND TITLE 46, UNITED STATES CODE, 
TO IMPROVE TOWING VESSEL NAVIGATIONAL 
SAFFETY 



MARCH 3, 1994 



Serial No. 103-86 



Printed for the use of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries 




U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
WASHINGTON : 1994 



For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office 
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office. Washington, DC 20402 
ISBN 0-16-044264-8 



7 TOWING VESSEL NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY 

ACT OF 1993 

' 4, M 53; 103-86 ^ING 

FORE THE 

ouing Vessel Navigational Safety '^^ • • /rMTTTJ]J] QM 

COAST GUAED AND NAVIGATION 

OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON 

MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 
ON 

H.R. 3282 

A BILL TO AMEND TITLE 46, UNITED STATES CODE, 
TO IMPROVE TOWING VESSEL NAVIGATIONAL 
SAFFETY 



MARCH 3, 1994 



Serial No. 103-86 - ^ "^ t% 



Printed for the use of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries 




U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
78-530CC *^ WASHINGTON : 1994 

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office 
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office. Washington, DC 20402 
ISBN 0-16-044264-8 



COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES 
GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts, Chairman 



WILLIAM J. HUGHES, New Jersey 

EARL HUTTO, Florida 

W.J. (BILLY) TAUZIN, Louisiana 

WILLIAM O. LIPINSKI, Illinois 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

THOMAS J. MANTON, New York 

OWEN B. PICKETT, Virginia 

GEORGE J. HOCHBRUECKNER, New York 

FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey 

GREG LAUGHLIN, Texas 

JOLENE UNSOELD, Washington 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

H. MARTIN LANCASTER, North Carolina 

THOMAS H. ANDREWS, Maine 

ELIZABETH FURSE, Oregon 

LYNN SCHENK, California 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida 

DAN HAMBURG, California 

BLANCHE M. LAMBERT, Arkansas 

ANNA G. ESHOO, California 

THOMAS J. BARLOW, III, Kentucky 

BART STUPAK, Michigan 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

PETER DEUTSCH, Florida 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

Jeffrey R. Pike, Chief of Staff 

Thomas R. Kitsos, Chief Counsel 

Mary J. Fusco Kitsos, Chief Clerk 

Harry F. Burroughs, Minority Staff Director 



JACK FIELDS, Texas 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

HERBERT H. BATEMAN, Virginia 

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

ARTHUR RAVENEL, Jr., South Carolina 

WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland 

RANDY "DUKE" CUNNINGHAM, California 

JACK KINGSTON, Georgia 

TILLIE K. FOWLER, Florida 

MICHAEL N. CASTLE, Delaware 

PETER T. KING, New York 

LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

RICHARD W. POMBO, CaUfomia 

HELEN DELICH BENTLEY, Maryland 

CHARLES H. TAYLOR, North Carolina 

PETER G. TORKILDSEN, Massachusetts 



Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation 



W.J. (BILLY) TAUZIN 
WILLIAM J. HUGHES, New Jersey 
EARL HUTTO, Florida 
H. MARTIN LANCASTER, North Carolina 
THOMAS J. BARLOW III, Kentucky 
BART STUPAK, Michigan 
WILLIAM O. LIPINSKI, Illinois 
OWEN B. PICKETT, Virginia 
GEORGE J. HOCHBRUECKNER, New York 
FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey 
GREG LAUGHLIN, Texas 
LYNN SCHENK, Cahfornia 
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida 
BLANCHE M. LAMBERT, Arkansas 
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 
GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts 
(Ex Officio) 

Elizabeth Megginson, 
James L. Adams, 
Ed Lee, Minority 



Louisiana, Chairman 
HOWARD COBLE, North CaroUna 
HERBERT H. BATEMAN, Virginia 
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland 
TILLIE K. FOWLER, Florida 
MICHAEL N. CASTLE, Delaware 
PETER T. KING, New York 
LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART, Florida 
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 
RICHARD W. POMBO, California 
JACK FIELDS, Texas (Ex Officio) 



Staff Director /Counsel 
Professional Staff 
Professional Staff 



(II) 



CONTENTS 



Page 

Hearing held March 3, 1994 1 

Text of H.R. 3282 36 

Statement of: 

Allegretti, Thomas A., President, American Waterways Operators 24 

Prepared statement 54 

Coble, Hon. Howard, a U.S. Representative from North Carolina, and 
Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Naviga- 
tion 4 

Fields, Hon. Jack, a U.S. Representative from Texas, and Ranking Minor- 
ity Member, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries 5 

Gouveia, John M., Regional Director, Inlandboatmen's Union of the Pa- 
cific, Marine Division, International Longshoremen's and 

Warehousemen's Union (prepared statement) 83 

Henn, R.Adm. Arthur E., Chief, U.S. Coast Guard, Office of Marine 

Safety, Security and Environmental Protection 6 

Kornegay, H. Thomas, Executive Director, The Port of Houston Author- 
ity 28 

Prepared statement '3 

Lambert, Hon. Blanche M., a U.S. Representative from Arkansas 18 

Lipinski, Hon. WiUiam O., a U.S. Representative from lUinois, and Chair- 
man, Subcommittee on Merchant Marine 6 

Peha, Federico, Secretary, Department of Transportation 6 

Prepared statement 39 

Pombo, Hon. Richard W., a U.S. Representative from California 6 

Powers, Ann, Vice President and General Counsel, Chesapeake Bay 

Foundation, presenting statement of William Schrenk 27 

Schenk, Hon. Lynn, a U.S. Representative from. California 4 

Schrenk, WilUam, Senior Consulting Attorney, Natural Resources De- 
fense Council, Incorporated (prepared statement) 66 

Smith, Jeffrey C, Executive Director, Committee for Private Offshore 

Rescue and Towing 30 

Prepared statement 76 

Studds, Hon. Gerry E., a U.S. Representative from Massachusetts, and 

Chairman, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries 1 

Sutton, Capt. John R., President, American Inland Mariners Association . 26 

Prepared statement 60 

Tauzin, Hon. W.J. (Billy), a U.S. Representative from Louisiana, and 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation 3 

Walton, Capt. John, Executive Assistant to the President, International 
Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots, ILA, AFL-CIO (prepared 

statement) 78 

Additional material supplied: 

Application of Sensors in Monitoring Vessel Movement and Position 90 

Associated Press article: "Pilot in Amtrak Disaster Failed Test Seven 

Times" 86 

DOT: 

Cleanup cost in Puerto Rico oil spill 24 

Coast Guard initiating rulemakings 16 

Navigable waters defined 22 

Review of marine safety issues 12 

Warning sign installed 17, 23 

Lancaster, Hon. H. Martin: 

Proposed amendment to Towing Vessel Navigational Safety Act of 
1994 by Jeffrey C. Smith 95 



Page 

Additional material supplied — Continued 
Lancaster, Hon. H. Martin — Continued 

Questions for Coast Guard witness 94 

O'Conner Engineering, Inc.: The Application of Sensors in Monitoring 

Vessel Movement and Position 96 

Communications submitted: 

Kramer, Walter M. (AIMU): Letter of March 7, 1994, to Hon. W.J. (Billy) 

Tauzin A";;" ^'^ 

Pena, Federico (DOT): Letter of December 10, 1993, to Hon. Gerry Studds 
with enclosure 47 



TOWING VESSEL NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY 
ACT OF 1993 



THURSDAY, MARCH 3, 1994 

House of Representatives, 
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation, 
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:10 a.m., in room 
1334, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Gerry E. Studds 
(Chairman, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries) presid- 
ing. 

Present: Representatives Tauzin, Hughes, Barlow, Stupak, 
Hochbrueckner, Schenk, Lambert, Coble, Gilchrest, and King. 

Also Present: Representative Studds, ex officio. 

Staff Present: Jeffrey Pike, Chief of Staff; Mary Kitsos, Chief 
Clerk; Sue Waldron, Press Secretary; Elizabeth Megginson, Staff 
Director; Matt Szigety, Coast Guard Fellow; Catherine Tucker, 
Legislative Clerk; Bill Wright, Professional Staff; Jim Adams, Pro- 
fessional Staff; Douglas Cheramie, Professional Staff; Joan 
Bondareff, Senior Counsel; Lee Crockett, Professional Staff; Harry 
Burroughs, Minority Staff Director; Cyndy Wilkinson, Minority 
Chief Counsel; Ed Lee, Minority Professional Staff; Rebecca Dye, 
Minority Counsel and Margherita Woods, Staff Assistant. 

Mr. Studds. [Presiding] The Subcommittee will come to order. 

STATEMENT OF HON. GERRY E. STUDDS, A U.S. REPRESENTA- 
TIVE FROM MASSACHUSETTS, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE 
ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES 

Mr. Studds. Because our Subcommittee Chair is apparently, 
along with much of the metropolitan area, on the 14th Street 
Bridge at the moment and on his way and more likely to arrive 
soon, and because the Secretary has a limited amount of time, we 
are going to begin the hearing. 

I welcome you, Mr. Secretary. We have been working closely with 
you on maritime reform and a number of other projects and this 
is your first appearance, I guess, before any component of this com- 
mittee. I welcome you and extend a very warm and very permanent 
invitation to return at any time you wish. 

What brings you to us today is your refreshing leadership in the 
efforts to improve the safety of our tug and barge industry and the 
initiative you took immediately after the tragic Amtrak accident 
near Mobile, Alabama, to insure that all agencies of your depart- 
ment are coordinating their activities to enhance safety. 

(1) 



When the Sunset Limited derailed because a barge hit a railroad 
bridge, as you know, 47 people lost their lives. Tragedies of this 
magnitude do not occur every day, but barge accidents apparently 
do happen on a daily basis. 

According to the Coast Guard, more than 12,900 accidents in- 
volving uninspected towing vessels occurred between 1980 and 
1991, which is an average of nearly three per day. 

We are only on the third day of the third month of this year and 
already we have seen several serious accidents. On January 7th 
the barge, Morris J. Berman, adrift after its tow line broke, struck 
a coral reef off the coast of San Juan and spilled 600,000 gallons 
of oil. 

On January 19th, the barge struck a railroad bridge near Amel- 
ia, Louisiana, knocking its railroad tracks six inches out of align- 
ment. Fortunately, the bridge tender notified Amtrak and the Sun- 
set Limited, the very train that had crashed in September the year 
before, was stopped 10 minutes away from that damaged bridge. 

On February 10th, the tug, Edwin Bisso, struck the ferry, St. 
John, on the Mississippi River near New Orleans injuring 12 peo- 
ple, and on February 24th, the tug, John J.D., capsized and sank 
in the Ohio River near Ashland, Kentucky. Fortunately, the tug's 
two-man crew was rescued unharmed. 

Why are there so many accidents involving tugs and barges? Part 
of the problem is that these vessels are what the Coast Guard calls 
uninspected towing vessels. Aside from the obvious lack of inspec- 
tion, this means these vessels have only minimal equipment re- 
quirements. For example, they don't have to carry a radar, compass 
or charts. They have only minimal manning requirements. They 
enjoy licensing requirements that are among the most lenient in 
the maritime industry. 

Mr. Tauzin has introduced a bill, as I am sure he will confess, 
H.R. 3282, which addresses some of these problems. It is a good 
first step and I support it, but the bill does not address two impor- 
tant safety issues, inspection and manning. Every other segment of 
the maritime industry is inspected, passenger vessels, cargo vessels 
and oil tankers. The barges that carry oil or hazardous material as 
cargo are inspected by the Coast Guard, but the towing vessels 
that control the movement of these barges are not, and there are 
over 7,000 of them. 

Manning requirements for towing vessels are much less stringent 
than for any other type of vessels. They do not have to carry mas- 
ters, mates, able seamen or even documented mariners. This is a 
little hard to believe. 

I look forward to working with you, Mr. Secretary, with Chair- 
man Tauzin, Mr. Fields, others in the Minority, including Mr. 
Coble, who share this concern, to develop legislation that will bring 
the manning and inspection requirements into the 20th Century 
some time before the beginning of the 21st, and again, I want to 
thank you, I salute you. You have brought a breath of fresh air to 
your department, and I think you have made a lot of us feel better 
about a lot of undertakings we have had under way here for a 
great many years. 

We have surprised some folks and I think we have some sur- 
prises still to go. It has been a delight working with you. We look 



3 

forward to it. And I am going to hand you into the tender mercies, 
again, of the distinguished Chairman of the Subcommittee, who 
has survived the 14th Street Bridge. Billy, why don't you take over. 

STATEMENT OF HON. W.J. (BILLY) TAUZIN, A U.S. REPRESENT- 
ATIVE FROM LOUISIANA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 
ON COAST GUARD AND NAVIGATION 

Mr. Tauzin. [Presiding] Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will 
want to talk to you, Mr. Secretary, about the new parking lot we 
are building out there on the 14th Street Bridge. I am not going 
to add a lot to what the Chairman has already said. You know how 
important we feel this issue is, particularly in view of the recent 
tragedies and the continued incidents of collisions between barges 
and bridges and the importance to not only overland transpor- 
tation, but inland water transportation, of these hearings in the 
new bill we propose. 

I know you have done some great work in looking at the same 
issue and we are very anxious to hear your perspective on this. I 
am going to yield to the Ranking Minority Member, Mr. Coble, who 
is here to make an opening statement for the Minority. 

Mr. Coble. 

[The statement of Mr. Tauzin follows:] 

Statement of Hon. W.J. (Billy) Tauzin, a U.S. Representative from Louisiana, 
AND Chairman, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation 

The Subconimittee is honored to welcome Secretary Federico Pena. Secretary 
Pena presence this morning is testimony to his commitment to enhance safety and 
promote commerce on our nation's waterways. This hearing was scheduled to re- 
ceive Secretary Peiia recommendations as well as input from the public to improve 
H.R. 3282 "The Towing Vessel Navigational Safety Act of 1993". 

Back in October, this Subcommittee met to investigate the causes of two fatal 
towing vessel accidents. The first occurred last May, when a towboat hit the Judge 
Seeber Bridge in New Orleans, causing the bridge to collapse and resulting in the 
death of a thirty-one year old woman and her unborn child. 

The second accident is sadly familiar to all of us. Last September, a towboat and 
its barges hit the Big Bayou Canot Bridge in Mobile, Alabama, derailing Amtrak's 
Sunset Limited passenger train and killing 47 people. Both tragic accidents were 
caused by operator error. 

Looking back at the accidents, it is clear that existing Federal regulations are not 
enough to minimize the potential for human error aboard towing vessels. H.R. 3282 
was introduced to address specific deficiencies in cvurent towing vessel operating re- 
quirements and to look at new ways to enhance safety on our inland waterways. 

H.R. 3282 will require all towing vessels to carry the basic navigational tools 
which the vast majority of safe, responsible, towboat operators already consider 
standard equipment, including marine charts and a radar. The bill will also ensure 
that towboat operators demonstrate proficiency using the tools necessary for safe 
navigation before being licensed. 

Immediately following the Amtrak investigation, precious response time was lost 
when the operator failed to promptly inform the Coast Guard of the accident. The 
delay may have cost human lives. H.R. 3282 will tighten marine casualties reporting 
requirements. 

H.R. 3282 supports Secretary Peiia's comprehensive review of the adequacy and 
effectiveness of manning and licensing requirements for the operation of towing ves- 
sels. The Secretary's findings were made available to the Committee on December 
10, 1993. I want to thank Secretary Peiia for the priority that this regulatory review 
received and I look forward to discussing the Department's recommendations. 

Finally, H.R. 3282 looks to fundamentally improve safety and commerce on our 
inland waterways. The bill commissions a report on the feasibility of establishing 
a Differential Global Positioning Satellite (DGPS) navigational system on our inland 
waterways. DGPS technology is being applied to coastsu navigation and aeronautical 
navigation. The application of DGPS technology on our inland waterways should re- 
ceive the same consideration. 



STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD COBLE, A U.S. REPRESENTA- 
TIVE FROM NORTH CAROLINA, AND RANKING MINORITY 
MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND NAVIGA- 
TION 

Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for having 
called this hearing. I am pleased to join with you, Chairman 
Studds, Congressman Fields in introducing the Towing Vessel 
Navigational Safety Act. I am an original cosponsor of this impor- 
tant safety legislation and strongly believe it will be an important 
tool in helping to protect those who ride over on our Nation's in- 
land waterways. 

Our subcommittee's hearing last October regarding the deadly 
Amtrak Sunset Limited accident dramatically illustrated the neces- 
sity of increased safety standards on inland towing vessels. Cur- 
rently, I am confident this is correct, a bridge-to-bridge radio tele- 
phone is the only navigational or communication equipment re- 
quired aboard a towing vessel, and this, it appears to me, is unac- 
ceptable. 

I also strongly believe that operators and crew members of in- 
land vessels must be required to know how to use the informa- 
tional equipment on board. The Mauvilla had a radar system, but 
I am advised that some of the crew members misidentified the 
bridge on their radar screen for another barge. That can certainly 
be deadly if you are going to tie up alongside a barge thinking it 
is a barge that turns out to be a bridge. We know what the result 
from that is. 

Equipment, sophisticated as it may be, it would be worthless if 
crew members cannot properly operate it. There is some question, 
Mr. Secretary, admiral, you all may remember about the compass 
aboard that vessel. Well, I have been told by some, well, it makes 
no difference. That would have contributed in no way, whether we 
had a compass or not. I think that may well be subject to interpre- 
tation and I would like to hear more about that as this hearing de- 
velops. 

Not unlike the Chairman, I appreciate Secretary Peiia being with 
us along with Admiral Henn and the other distinguished witnesses, 
who will discuss this in more detail as the hearing develops. 

Mr. Chairman, in closing, I also would like to extend congratula- 
tory remarks to Admiral Henn for his selection as the next Vice ' 
Commandant of the Coast Guard. Admiral. 

Admiral Henn. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Tauzin. Thank you, Mr. Coble, and I, too, would join those 
salutations, Admiral. You have provided remarkable and, indeed, 
tremendous assistance to this committee in the role you have 
served in the Coast Guard, and I know you are going to add a great 
deal as Vice Commandant. 

We would ask now, are there any other opening statements. Ms. 
Schenk is next. 

STATEMENT OF HON. LYNN SCHENK, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE 
FROM CALIFORNIA 

Ms. Schenk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will dispense with the 
formal opening statement in light of the time constraints of our dis- 
tinguished panel, just to say thank you for holding this hearing. 



I had the privilege of holding a hearing on the issue on our En- 
ergy and Commerce Subcommittee on Transportation and Hazard- 
ous Waste where the Railroad Administration provided a lot of in- 
formation, but we needed a lot more. And, Secretary Peiia, I join 
my hand in the salute of our full committee Chairman, to you, and 
not just this issue, but the leadership that you have shown on such 
diverse issues as the earthquake in Los Angeles and high speed 
rail. 

You are my kind of leader, hands on and get the job done and 
it is a pleasure working with you and I welcome you, and. Admiral 
Henn, welcome you as well and look forward to your remarks. 

Mr. Tauzin. Thank you, Ms. Schenk. 

The Chair will now recognize Mr. Coble for a unanimous consent 
request. 

Mr. Coble. Thank you. I would ask unanimous consent to have 
introduced into the record statements by Congressman Fields and 
Congressman Pombo. 

[The statements follow:] 

Statement of Hon. Jack Fields, a U.S. Representative from Texas, and 
Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries 

Mr. Chairman, I strongly support the provisions of the Towing Vessel Safety Act 
to increase the level of navigational safety on our inland waterways. We must act 
now to minimize the risk to innocent individuals travelling on the bridges over in- 
land waters. Nearly 50 lives were lost last year in accidents related to navigation 
safety, not to mention the environmental and economic losses resulting from towing 
vessel personnel errors. 

On May 28, 1993, a 31-year-old woman who was five months pregnant was killed 
and two other motorists were seriously injured when a 145-foot section of the Judge 
Seeber Bridge in New Orleans, Louisiana, collapsed after it was struck by a tug and 
barge. 

On September 22, 1993, Amtrak's Sunset Limited derailed while crossing the Big 
Bayou Canot Bridge north of Mobile, Alabama. The accident was the worst in Am- 
trak's history, and claimed 47 lives. Moments before the derailment, the bridge was 
severely damaged when it was struck by a tug pushing several barges. The tug op- 
erator was operating in heavy fog without basic navigational tools. The National 
Transportation Safety Board is investigating the accident, and is scheduled to com- 
plete the investigation this spring. 

Finally, on January 7, 1994, another towing vessel accident occurred when a 
barge spilled 750,000 gallons of diesel oil off the coast of Puerto Rico. In this case, 
the towing vessel operator used an improperly repaired towing hawser to repair a 
tow. The towing hawser parted, allowing the barge carrying the oil to float free and 
run aground on a reef. The Coast Guard is still involved in the cleanup of the oil 
spill. 

Following the Amtrak accident. Secretary of Transportation Peiia directed the 
Coast Guard to review existing tug and barge safety standards and make rec- 
ommendations regarding the need for additional safety requirements for the tug and 
barge industry. I welcome the Secretary to the hearing today, and hope that he vnW 
provide additional information to us on which additional vessel safety requirements 
will promote inland waterway safety. 

I also extend a warm welcome to Tom Komegay, President of the Gulf Ports Asso- 
ciation. I appreciate his statements in support of my bill, H.R. 3812, the Waterways 
Obstruction Removal Act of 1994, and hope that we can solve the wreck removal 
problem that currently exists in the Houston Ship Channel and in waterways across 
the country. 

The increased safety requirements contained in H.R. 3282 will not only protect 
innocent individuals but will also aid in keeping our nation's ports free of obstruc- 
tions and open to commerce. I look forward to early enactment of H.R. 3282. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 



Statement of Hon. Richard Pombo, a U.S. Representative from California 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding todays hearing on the Towing Vessel Navi- 
gation Safety Act of 1993, H.R. 3282. Over the last year, we have seen random acci- 
dents involving towing vessels. Even though it is human nature that accidents will 
occur, it is only appropriate that Congress take steps to try to prevent the loss of 
life, the destruction of property, and to protect the environment when incidents 
occur on our country's inland waterways. 

As you may be aware, I have the privilege of representing a substantial amount 
of the California Delta. As you travel around my Congressional District you begin 
to realize that the waterways are transverse with numerous automobiles and train 
bridges. Though I have been informed that these bridges in my district have warn- 
ing lights and the Coast Guard is taking the necessary measure to ensure the free 
and safe flow of commerce through the Delta, nevertheless I hope we can take steps 
to make both the waterways in California and our nation's safer. As we move along 
with this important legislation, I hope the Subcommittee will take actions to im- 
prove towing safety wlule taking into consideration the economic consequences our 
actions will have on this industry. 

I especially want to thank Secretary Pena for appearing here today. I look forward 
to your testimony and hearing more about the Department of Transportation's plan 
to enhance the safety on the waterway transportation system which was delivered 
to Congress last year. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I am sure the other distinguished witnesses today will 
provide insight into what steps our committee can and should take to improve the 
safety of towing vessels. 

Thank you. 



Statement of Hon. William O. Lipinski, a U.S. Representative from Illinois, 
and Chairman, Subcommittee on Merchant Marine 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would Uke to take this opportunity to commend both 
you and Secretary Pena for your efforts to improve the safety of our inland water- 
ways. 

Last September, the eyes of the Nation were drawn to Mobile, Alabama, and the 
worst accident in Amtrak's history. This Subcommittee held an oversight hearing 
shortly after the incident and the Department of Transportation began its own in- 
vestigation into the cause of the accident and steps which can be taken to prevent 
such a tragedy from reoccurring. 

We must do all we can to ensure the safe navigation of America's inland water- 
ways. H.R. 3282 is a safety bill. 

I thank today's witnesses for appearing here today and I look forward to their tes- 
timony. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Tauzin. Are there any other requests for opening state- 
ments? 

Then the Chair is pleased to announce, to welcome and to for- 
mally introduce our Secretary of Transportation, Secretary Peiia, 
and Admiral Henn for perspectives of both the Department and the 
Coast Guard on this very important issue. 

Secretary Peiia. 

STATEMENT OF HON. FEDERICO PENA, SECRETARY, DEPART- 
MENT OF TRANSPORTATION ACCOMPANIED BY REAR ADMI- 
RAL ARTHUR E. HENN, CHIEF, UNITED STATES COAST 
GUARD, OFFICE OF MARINE SAFETY, SECURITY AND ENVI- 
RONMENTAL PROTECTION 

Secretary Pena. ThEink you very much, Mr. Chairman, and Mem- 
bers of the Subcommittee. Grood morning to all of you, and, again, 
I would like to commend you, Mr. Chairman, and everyone for hav- 
ing this hearing and we are delighted to be here to share our 
thoughts about how we can improve the safety of these waterways. 



Accompanying me this morning, Mr. Chairman and Members is 
Rear Admiral Henn, Chief of the Coast Guard's Office of Marine 
Safety, Security, and Environmental Protection and as all of you 
have indicated already, you know him well, and I am very de- 
lighted that he is with me today because I have spent a consider- 
able amount of time with him over the last year and can tell you 
that his past performance and outstanding experience and capabil- 
ity will now be brought in a different way to the country in his new 
position. But as respects this particular topic, I could not think of 
a better expert to have with us today, and he will obviously be 
available to handle more specific questions. 

Before I begin, I would like to convey to Chairman Studds and 
to you, Mr. Chairman, and to Congressmen Fields and Coble the 
appreciation of the Department and the administration for the very 
serious and thoughtful approach that you have taken toward as- 
sessing the problem of towing vessel navigational safety in H.R. 
3282. 

Similarly, this subcommittee is to be complimented for its atten- 
tion to this important issue and for scheduling this hearing to ob- 
tain the necessary legislative record. 

Today the subcommittee will hear testimony from a wide range 
of witnesses on the best ways to ensure towing vessel navigational 
safety. Let me say that yesterday I had an opportunity to meet 
with some of the industry leaders and they can speak for them- 
selves when they discuss their positions in the second panel, but 
let me just generally say that we were very pleased with that meet- 
ing because we walked away with an agreement and an under- 
standing that we would work together in trying to address these 
issues, and that kind of cooperative approach from industry is very 
much needed and I appreciate it and I applaud it. 

We all share the frustration of the Coast Guard when it is called 
to rescue the victims of a tragedy that might have been prevented 
if the operator of the vessel had had better navigational equipment 
aboard or better training. Clearly, the collapse of the Judge Seeber 
Bridge in New Orleans and the Amtrak derailment in Bayou Canot 
in Alabama were great tragedies. The loss of life was staggering. 
And I can tell you personally that seeing the victims, comforting 
the survivors and meeting the bereaved brings home the human 
cost of safety lapses. 

While the oil spill in Puerto .Rico fortunately did not claim any 
lives, I was there the day of the spill with Administrator Browner, 
and its environmental and economic effects were widespread. The 
issue before us are very complex. As we take steps to ensure that 
tragedies such as these are prevented in the future, let us recog- 
nize that there is no easy solution or a quick fix to which we can 
turn to eliminate the possibility that human error, the largest 
cause of these problems, equipment malfunction or adverse envi- 
ronmental conditions, will occur. But let me assure you, Mr. Chair- 
man, and others, that this issue, a commitment to improving the 
safety in this particular area, and safety on all of our transpor- 
tation modes throughout the country, is one of our highest prior- 
ities. 

If you have not yet received the Department's seven-point strate- 
gic plan, which we issued some time ago, I will get that for you and 



8 

the Members, but the whole area of safety and security are new 
priorities with a new commitment and focus from this Secretary 
and from this Department. 

On September 30th, 1993, I wrote to the Congress outlining a se- 
ries of safety reviews that we initiated in response to the derail- 
ment of Amtrak's Sunset Limited. On December 10th of 1993, I 
sent to the Congress our final report entitled, "Review of Marine 
Safety Issues Related to Uninspected Towing Vessels," containing 
recommendations for changes to the marine safety and waterways 
management programs. A copy of those recommendations is at- 
tached to my statement. 

That report formed the basis for the four-pronged approach we 
developed to increase safety in the towing vessel industry. First, 
more stringent licensing requirements for operators of uninspected 
towing vessels must be developed, and these licenses should have 
levels of qualification. 

Restrictions for such levels of qualification may be based on the 
route, on gross tonnage or horsepower of the towing vessel and the 
type of towing configuration. The basic three-year apprenticeship 
should qualify an applicant, we believe, only for basic licenses. Op- 
erators must be proficient in the use of navigational and safety 
equipment. 

In order to advance beyond a basic license, an operator should 
be required to attend practical, hands-on training or a Coast 
Guard-approved simulator course and also pass a written, practical 
or simulator examination, or a combination of these. 

As a complement to this, towing vessel owners must employ 
qualified, experienced personnel as operators in charge of these 
vessels. 

Secondly, requirements for radar and upgraded navigational 
equipment on board uninspected towing vessels must be estab- 
lished. Specifically, operators should be required to have on board 
as equipment up-to-date marine charts for the area to be transited, 
current or corrected navigational publications, and a marine radar 
system for surface navigation. In addition, a compass and a depth 
finder may, and I want to emphasize the word "may" here, may be 
necessary tools for safe navigation in certain areas and we can ex- 
plore that in greater detail. 

Thirdly, notification of accidents must be assured and also as- 
sured more promptly. Particularly where barges are concerned and 
an operator might be in some doubt about whether a tow has been 
lost or might have struck something, the rule should be, when in 
doubt, report. To enforce this requirement, the penalty for failure 
to report immediately must be increased significantly, and we rec- 
ommend raising the minimum penalty from $1,000 to $25,000. 

Fourthly, aids to navigation in the vicinity of bridges must be im- 
proved where necessary. I would like to point out that damaging 
an aid to navigation can result in a criminal penalty of up to 
$2,500 and/or imprisonment up to a year and the individual re- 
sponsible must also pay to repair or reposition the aid to naviga- 
tion. Experience has proven this level of fine is too low to justify 
extensive prosecution. That is something that we have learned very 
recently. It is not a high enough priority for prosecution. Therefore, 



we should consider increasing the criminal penalty and instituting 
a civil penalty that can be assessed by the Coast Guard. 

Anyone who damages an aid to navigation must immediately re- 
port it to the Coast Guard. Failure to report, particularly when an 
accident results, can lead to an adjudicative process culminating in 
severe penalties up to revocation of the individual's license. 

Bridges that have been found to pose an unreasonable obstruc- 
tion to navigation under the Truman-Hobbs Act must be repaired 
or replaced. Between 1980 and 1991, 773 tows struck bridges. Nine 
bridges presently have been declared unreasonable obstructions to 
navigation under the Truman-Hobbs Act and are either under de- 
sign or reconstruction today. 

Additionally, there are approximately 52 others that are either 
being or will be investigated to determine whether they are unrea- 
sonable obstructions to navigation according to the Truman-Hobbs 
criteria, and I should note that the President's budget provides for 
funding to repair these highway bridges from the Highway Trust 
Fund. 

Many details of this four-pronged approach will be developed 
during the regulatory process. Where the Department could imple- 
ment some of these proposals without a rulemaking or legislation, 
action is already underway. For example, the curriculum of the 
maritime radar courses is under review to determine if the current 
courses are adequate for specialized operations on some waterways, 
particularly on our western rivers, and the Admiral has indicated 
that that should be completed by the end of this month or early 
next month. 

The review will also determine if the existing courses reflect 
state-of-the-art radar technology and operational procedures. The 
Commander of the Eighth Coast Guard District in New Orleans 
has established a Coast Guard industry team to identify all water- 
ways, including the Bayou Canot where new or additional aids to 
navigation may be needed. Similarly, a review of all bridges cross- 
ing navigable waters is also underway. 

Additionally, Mr. Chairman, there are certain issues that should 
be studied in depth. Specifically, we should examine the adequacy 
and effectiveness of our manning and inspection requirements and 
look at whether the laws for all other commercial vessels on inspec- 
tion and manning should apply to the inland waterway towing in- 
dustry. 

In the past, it was felt, because of differing operating conditions, 
mandatory manning levels were not necessary and the cost of in- 
dustry-wide Coast Guard inspection would be too high for any ex- 
pected benefits. However, it has been some time since this policy 
was reviewed and I think it is now time to do so. Voluntary indus- 
try standards may be an appropriate approach to raising safety 
performance, but we should also examine whether governmental 
requirements are necessary. 

And let me say, Mr. Chairman, I know this is a very difficult, 
complex and controversial issue. We have no prejudgment about 
this analysis, but we think it has to be done in a very comprehen- 
sive, thorough fashion so we can respond to your questions and 
questions raised by others and finally determine whether we have 
updated information about this particular issue of manning. 



10 

Statutory and regulatory provisions currently dictate the man- 
ning level of the navigation watch aboard a towing vessel. Both the 
work-hour limitations and the navigation watch provisions affect 
the manning complement on an uninspected towing vessel. Clearly, 
all inland towing vessels should have someone aboard who is 
knowledgeable in the operation and maintenance of the engineer- 
ing systems and an operator competent to pilot the vessel through 
the waters in which it is traveling. 

The larger question of whether masters, mates, engineers or pi- 
lots should be required is much more difficult to answer. The in- 
dustry is diverse and many towing companies are small. The Coast 
Guard has embarked on a major research project to develop an an- 
alytical, function-based model for rationalizing our approach to de- 
termining the minimum crew complement required for safe oper- 
ation of a vessel. 

The model will include work-hour limits, hours of operation, and 
potential emergency situations as essential factors. Once com- 
pleted, it will give us an accurate picture of how we should ap- 
proach manning levels in the future. 

As I said, Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittee, safe 
transportation is a very high priority for me. I believe we should 
move now to bring the enhanced licensing and equipment require- 
ments into force and take a careful look at whether we need to do 
more in the areas of manning and inspections. The loss of life in 
the Judge Seeber Bridge collapse and the Amtrak derailment was 
devastating, but every day property is damaged and cargo is lost 
in towing accidents. 

My recommendations will not only save lives, but make the ship- 
ment of goods by inland barge more reliable. The inland barge sys- 
tem is an extremely efficient and economical transportation method 
for many shippers. It is our job to make sure that it is as s£ife as 
possible for all. 

Technology has an extremely important role to play in towing 
vessel safety. The Global Satellite Positioning System, which I have 
talked about at length before other groups, developed by the De- 
partment of Defense and the augmentation of Differential Global 
Positioning System, being developed for civil use by the Depart- 
ment of Transportation agencies will provide increased accuracy, 
productivity, safety and efficiency in sea navigation by providing' 
marine navigators with the first precise, worldwide, continuous po- 
sitioning and timing service. 

As a result, commercial shipping will be safer, more efficient, re- 
liable and economical. Augmented with DGPS and combined with 
the developing electronic chart display and information system, it 
will significantly improve waterway and harbor safety. The pro- 
nounced safety benefits of these systems will be a major improve- 
ment in avoiding collisions and groundings and the resulting 
human and environmental losses such events cause. I am very ex- 
cited about the possibilities of this new technology, and therefore 
I support the recommendation for study in H.R. 3282. 

Even if we employ, however, the latest technology for preventing 
accidents and improving survivability if one occurs, we must ac- 
knowledge and recognize that most accidents in all modes of trans- 
portation are caused by human error. Very few accidents are 



11 

caused by equipment or structural failure. Most are the result of 
poor judgment or performance by the operator of the equipment. 

A review of marine casualties for the period 1980 through 1991 
involving towing vessels of fewer than 300 gross tons shows that 
approximately 60 percent of the marine casualties were attrib- 
utable to human error. Since the performance of the operator of the 
vessel is crucial in emergencies, we must ensure that the operator 
is well-trained, proficient in navigation, and alert. 

At the Department of Transportation, we have taken significant 
steps to reduce operator error. Mariners are already subject to the 
Department's drug testing requirements and the Coast Guard's al- 
cohol testing program. Under a proposal I discussed earlier, opera- 
tors would be subject to licensing requirements that would ensure 
proper training and proficiency with navigational and safety equip- 
ment. 

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for this opportunity to share 
my views on how we can increase safety in the vessel towing indus- 
try and rather than offer legislation on behalf of the administra- 
tion, I would like to work with you and the members of the sub- 
committee to forge an overall approach that can be enacted and 
signed into law, we hope, before September 22nd, 1994, the first 
anniversary of the tragic Bayou Canot accident. So Admiral Henn 
and I are prepared to answer your questions and again, thank you 
very much for this opportunity to be here today. 

[The statement of Secretary Peiia may be found at end of hear- 
ing.] 

Mr. Tauzin. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, and Admiral Henn. Let 
me first thank you for setting that target day. I think that is ex- 
tremely important. We cannot allow time to slip without passing 
important legislation. In that regard, you seem to be indicating 
that the work that you are now doing and want to continue to do 
to build the model for manning and inspection might take some 
time. 

Are you suggesting that we should proceed immediately with the 
recommendations that we have found consensus on and then pro- 
ceed separately with the manning and inspection proposal when 
that model is completed? 

Secretary Pena. Mr. Chairman, yes, and to help you and the 
Members of the Subcommittee in this effort, perhaps it would be 
useful for us to produce for you a document that indicates all of the 
administrative, field, legislative and other changes which we be- 
lieve are necessary with target dates of completion. We have, our- 
selves, an internal document that indicates what our own target 
dates are. 

For example, the improvement manuals we hope to complete by 
this month. 

Admiral Henn. Yes, sir. 

Secretary Pena. And we have other target dates. Why don't we 
share that with you and perhaps we could work together in deter- 
mining how much we could get done. 

[The following was submitted:] 



12 



Review of Marine Safety Issues 



Following the Amtrak casualty on September 22, 1993, the Secretary of Transpor- 
tation directed the Coast Guard to conduct a review of related Marine Safety Issues. 
The review recommended changes in the areas of operator training and qualifica- 
tions, vessel equipment, bridge safety, casualty reporting requirements, and aids to 
navigation. 

A Coast Guard team immediately reviewed the aids to navigation in the vicinity 
of Big Bayou Canot and added warning signs in November, 1993. 

The Coast Guard's review of towing vessel safety was made available to the public 
and a public meeting was held on April 4, 1994, to seek pubHc comment. 

The Coast Guard also initiated a review of all bridges for adequacy of fendering 
and lighting, with a completion date of August, 1994. Changes have been incor- 
porated in the Coast Guard's Aids to Navigation Manual and soon may be made as 
a result of the review. 

We are seeking legislation to amend 46 USC 6103 to increase the maximum civil 
penalty from $1,000 to $25,000 for faihng to report a marine casualty. 

The Coast Guard is ciurently reviewing existing radar observer training courses 
for appUcability to towing vessel operators. This review should be completed August, 
1994. 

The Towing Safety Advisory Committee is convening a special working group to 
review and propose changes to the Operator of Uninspected Towing Vessel Ucense. 
This review should be completed by October, 1994. 

Mr. Tauzin. That would be very helpful because, as you know, 
when the legislation begins moving, there is an attempt to continue 
building upon it all the different and alternative solutions and it 
is important, I think, for all our purposes, that we not let that proc- 
ess delay the completion of legislation that we all agree upon, and 
where there is no argument, and knowing the timetable would be 
very helpful for us and we would appreciate that. 

You mentioned today that the administration is now recommend- 
ing in its budget that the Truman-Hobbs funding be transferred to 
the Highway Trust Fund. I understand in the proposal the Coast 
Guard would still make the Truman-Hobbs determinations, but the 
funding would come from the trust fund. Most of the bridges we 
are talking about are railroad bridges. Bayou Canot was a railroad 
bridge. Judge Seeber was both railroad and auto traffic. 

Recently, Bayou Bluff Bridge, which was hit in my district, and 
by the way, in which the bridge operator promptly notified the rail- 
road and stopped a trainload of citizens who might have been in 
trouble on that bridge had they not been notified properly. It 
worked right in that case, but these are all railroad bridges. Can 
you tell us how that determination of eligibility and how the fund- 
ing will work in terms of assisting in the rebuilding for safety pur- 
poses railroad bridges? 

Perhaps Admiral Henn can help us here. 

Secretary Pena. Admiral, feel free. 

Admiral Henn. Certainly. The way we would see this is as we 
are already doing with the two bridges right now, the design work 
would be done and as funding comes along, the actual alterations 
would be made. We have identified, as the Secretary pointed out, 
nine bridges that are — have some progress under way and then an 
additional 52 bridges that we need to investigate and do something 
with them. 

Mr. Tauzin. I mean, for example, the folks in New Orleans who 
watched this tragedy on the Judge Seeber Bridge heard the news 
about the changing administration policy on Truman-Hobbs and 
immediately got worried that there may not be reconstruction of 
that bridge to make it safer. As you know, in that case, we had 



13 

human loss and we continue to have problems with the bridge and 
vessels trying to go under it and through it. 

I guess what I am asking is, how is this system going to work? 
Is it going to be markedly different from the old system of identify- 
ing Truman-Hobbs and funding it or are we going to find it more 
difficult to get these situations addressed? 

Secretary Pena. While the Admiral is getting some information, 
Mr. Chairman, let me say there should not be any significant dif- 
ference in the outcome. That was not our intention. As I under- 
stand it, the two bridges that are under design today— actually 
under design and near construction today, that funding is secured. 
For the seven of the nine identified, we are just in the design 
stages and construction moneys would probably not be needed in 
1995. 

Admiral Henn. That is correct. 

Secretary Pena. That is correct. So that was the reasoning of not 
having the funding in that particular program in 1995, but to at 
least have the Highway Trust Fund also available in the event that 
the funds were necessary. 

Now, I think for 1996 we have to come back and review this and 
determine how we are going to proceed in order not to provide a 
discontinuity of funding once construction begins for the other 
seven that are under design today. 

Mr. Tauzin. As you know, our committee has engaged with the 
Coast Guard in an effort to ensure that that program is a nonpoliti- 
cal program, that it actually serves to identify the most hazardous 
circumstances in the inland waterway system and then begins to 
address them and we want to continue to work with you in that 
regard. 

Admiral. 

Admiral Henn. Mr. Chairman, the way we see this working is 
much like it has in the past. For the railroad bridges we would look 
for the funding to come through the Coast Guard appropriation 
process. 

Mr. Tauzin. So the railroad would still come through the Coast 
Guard appropriations. Highway bridges would come through the 
Highway Trust Fund. 

Admiral Henn. That is right. 

Mr. Tauzin . That may mean difficulty for you. As you know, we 
have a great tension between the appropriators when it comes to 
appropriating to the Coast Guard or appropriating moneys to 
transportation functions and I hope. Secretary Pena, you will be 
aware of that and helpful to us when we try to correct some of 
these very dangerous situations around the country. 

We have all agreed that there ought to be radar on board these 
vessels, that the absence of radar at Bayou Canot, the absence of 
the ability to read a radar, I think, in that case may have been a 
problem. We have been told by members in the industry that it 
may not be sufficient just to require radar, that quality of the 
radar is going to be extremely important, that lesser powered radar 
systems cannot see through fog sufficiently and they might not be 
able to identify structures sufficiently and that confusion can reign, 
as it did in that case in Bayou Canot. 



14 

Recently, there was a collision between a towing vessel and ferry 
in New Orleans in which we had a number of injuries but no 
deaths, thank God, but again that was a heavy fog condition in the 
river. On the same day, another towing vessel hit the Huey P. Long 
Bridge named after the famous character, and it came to our atten- 
tion that merely requiring radar, even requiring operators be suffi- 
ciently instructed to read them may not be enough. 

Have you looked into that and is that going to be part of our re- 
view here? 

Admiral Henn. Mr. Chairman, we certainly support your legisla- 
tive proposal for radars on towing vessels. We would hope that the 
Congress would give the Coast Guard the flexibility to establish the 
standards for the radars to insure that we have the proper type of 
radar on these vessels, and if we have that flexibility, sir, we will 
establish those. 

Mr. Tauzin. We want to look at the language of our legislation 
to make sure that it will do the job. 

And finally, Mr. Secretary, there is enormous interest and con- 
troversy brewing in the river system today in regards to a new 
issue, a new introduction of a new type of vessel called the gaming 
vessel. Louisiana is deliberating with them right now and they are 
coming out of the seams. 

Apparently, because of a political judgment that we should have 
only one land-based casino, the State has made the decision to au- 
thorize gambling ships. They are under construction. They are 
being licensed. The Coast Guard in our district and in other re- 
gions on the river system is having to assist in recommending sites 
for docking and launching and routes for traversing gaming tours, 
and there is a push to make them sail because that legally, I guess, 
satisfies the distinction between a land-based casino and a dock- 
side gambling casino, but the great concern expressed at hearings 
we have conducted in the Baton Rouge recently was that this was 
a very dangerous situation. 

It places citizens of our country who want to participate in gam- 
ing activities, the results of which may indeed endanger the lives 
of many citizens, and while we are looMng at inland waterway sys- 
tems and towing vessel safety, this is an ancillary issue we cannot 
ignore and it is one that, as I said, has attracted a lot of attention! 
And in testimony received in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Coast Guard 
officials indicated to us in testimony for the record that every 17 
days a major foreign flag vessel will lose steerage or power in the 
Mississippi River. The specter of something like that, something 
when a gaming ship filled with thousands of reveling, drinking 
gamblers is rather frightening. 

You know, it seems that while they are gambling for their shirts 
and their pocketbook, they ought not be taking a risk on their lives, 
but nevertheless we see that happening. 

I call it to your attention only because as we examine this tug- 
boat and towing vessel safety issue, we have States enacting laws 
that are going to complicate the safety of our waterway systems 
and I wondered if either of you had any thoughts or suggestions 
for us as we proceed to look at that. We will be in New Orleans 
later this year to follow up on that earlier hearing. 



15 

Secretary Pena. Mr. Chairman, we are concerned about it. We 
have had some discussions about what approach we should take. 
Obviously, this one is also fraught with many difficult issues, not 
to say that the political issues are involved, too. However, we are 
very much focused on the safety issue. Let me have the Admiral 
share some preliminary thoughts on this issue. 

Mr. Tauzin. Thanks. 

Admiral Henn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There are actually 
several things that come into play here. First of all, I think it clear- 
ly shows that with the number of gambling boats out there, par- 
ticularly on the Mississippi, and with the amount of traffic from 
towing vessels, we need to look at increasing not only the capabili- 
ties of the vessel itself, but also the capabilities of those who oper- 
ate those vessels. 

With regard, though, to the gambling vessels themselves, the 
Coast Guard has set additional requirements for these large gam- 
bling vessels on the prevention side as far as structural fire protec- 
tion, as far as a means of escape, but they — the part that still 
needs to be looked at is the inland search and rescue, what do you 
do if there is a collision with the gambling vessel, either a foreign 
tanker coming in or a U.S. towing vessel with a large tow. 

The Commander of the Second Coast Guard District in St. Louis, 
along with our commander of the Atlantic Area have sent letters 
to headquarters with documentation saying this issue needs to be 
looked at and they need headquarters policy on this. 

Within Coast Guard headquarters, our Operations Coordinating 
Council, which myself and Admiral Ecker are both members of, 
have been directed to put together a natural working group. That 
working group has been formed. It is meeting to look at the whole 
picture of what is needed in inland waterways. So we are working 
that issue, sir, and we will be able to report to you on that some 
time later. 

The other point, though, about every 17 days a foreign vessel 
having some sort of a mechanical malfunction — ^basically losing 
power and becoming an obstacle, a threat in the river. Obviously, 
our initiative within Maritime Regulatory Reform, which is a piece 
of the Department, the Secretary's Maritime Policy Reform, is look- 
ing to focus more emphasis on the foreign vessels to even enhance 
our present Port State control efforts. We are going to do that by 
putting more focus on the foreign operators and keeping our focus 
on the U.S. operators at an adequate level, but somewhat reduced 
from what it is now, sir, so we are moving in that area. I think 
we will be successful in that. 

Mr. Tauzin. Thank you very much. I point out, you are abso- 
lutely right, it was pointed out that there is no vessel stationed 
anywhere near Baton Rouge and yet we are going to have gaming 
activities right there in the river, so I thank you and encourage you 
to look at that serious issue because it came up again at our hear- 
ings. 

Secretary Peiia, I am going to pass on to other Members, but I 
don't want to leave without joining the Chairman in expressing to 
you our sincere appreciation to you for your service in this adminis- 
tration already. We have been pleased with the Transportation De- 
partment and delighted that our Coast Guard is properly ref- 



16 

erenced and delighted that you are able to help and see to it that 
they remain a vital part of this Nation's safety efforts in the inland 
waterways. 

I now recognize the Ranking Minority Member, Mr. Coble. 

Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I think 
you came close to answering this, but I want to go through it one 
more time. Is it your opinion that the current manning, inspection 
and licensing requirements for inland towing vessels are sufficient 
for the safe operation of these vessels? And I believe, having read 
your statement very hurriedly, that you would like to direct addi- 
tional study and attention to that. Is that correct? 

Secretary Pena. That is correct. Congressman. We believe that 
it has been some time, many years, since we have done a com- 
prehensive review of this entire area, and without indicating any 
prejudgment about it, we think it would be appropriate to do a 
comprehensive analytical study so we can come back to you and 
say we have now updated our thinking. We have looked at new 
technology which is available now. We have looked at the changing 
nature of the industry, all those differences which did not exist dec- 
ades ago, to come back to you and give you our best thinking on 
whether there should be any changes or not. 

Mr. Coble. And that is not unreasonable by any means. Do you 
have any sort of timeframe when you might get back to us? 

Secretary Pena. Yes, we do. Congressman, and again, we have 
a number of target dates for all of the efforts we have underway, 
both the administrative and others, and again, we will be happy to 
send those to you. Let me see if we can — it is a long list — get you 
a sense of when this effort will be completed. We are looking at the 
June, July of 1994 to look at the marine radar system. That is the 
charts. 

No. You are asking about the manning. 

Mr. Coble. Manning, inspection and all. 

Secretary Pena. Let me get back to you on that. Congressman 
and give you a specific date. I am very focused on meeting our tar- 
gets. That is a longer study and we need to 

Mr. Coble. That is fine. 

[The information follows:] 

Coast Guard Initiating Rulemakings , 

The Coast Guard is considering initiating rulemakings (1) to reqxiire navigation 
eqviipment and the training to operate this equipment on uninspected towing ves- 
sels, (2) to clearly define what a hazardous condition is and require notification of 
hazardous conditions and bridge alUsions, and (3) to fiirther upgrade the qualifica- 
tions and training of the Operator of Uninspected Towing Vessels. 

Mr. Coble. Admiral, I read recently, eight or nine weeks ago 
probably, that the Coast Guard had asked, and that was the word 
in the publication, asked CSX to install warning lights on the 
bridge where the Sunset Limited accident occurred. Now, I realize 
the Coast Guard does not daily or even perhaps frequently extend 
your regulatory powers to extend to regulating over a rail structure 
that crosses a nonnavigable waterway. So having said all that, let 
me ask you a three- or four-part question. 

Number one, is it correct that the Coast Guard did, in fact, re- 
quest that CSX install this warning Ught? Has CSX complied with 
the request? Number three, does the Coast Guard have the author- 



17 

ity to require warning lights over nonnavigable waterways? And, fi- 
nally, does the Coast Guard plan to extend this request that warn- 
ing systems be installed on other nonnavigable waterway bridges? 

Admiral Henn. With regard to the first part of your question, did 
we direct the CSX to install the lights? Yes, we did, on the 30th 
of November. With regard to have they done it, I do not know, sir, 
but we will get that answer and supply that to you. 

[The following was received:] 

Warning Sign Installed 

The Coast Guard has installed a warning sign at the downstream end of the 
Bayou where it meets the Mobile River. The Coast Guard has directed CSX to Ught 
the bridge to indicate there is no commercially navigable channel. This permanent 
lighting, on the downstream side of the bridge, must be installed and fully oper- 
ational not later than April 30, 1994, by direction of the Coast Guard District Com- 
mander. 

Admiral Henn. With regard to that particular location, actually 
that is a navigable water and any time there is a navigable water, 
the Coast Guard has jurisdiction there. 

What do we intend to do in the future, sir? I think we will treat 
each bridge on a case-by-case basis. As the Secretary pointed out, 
we have directed the field by the end of this summer to have 
looked at each of the bridges in their jurisdiction and to make a 
determination if there are additional things, whether it be lighting, 
fendering, buoys located on the approaches, whatever, to identify 
those and then we will go from there, sir. 

Mr. Coble. Thank you. Admiral, let me ask you this. 

Mr. Tauzin. Would the gentleman yield just a second? Let me 
ask all Members, if they have questions for the admiral to hold 
those. We will come back and do those. The Secretary has to leave 
at about 11 o'clock, so if you have questions for the Secretary, I 
want to give everybody a chance at least to ask one question, Mr. 
Coble. 

Mr. Coble. I will hold off until subsequently. 

Mr. Tauzin. Then, if any of you have questions to the Secretary, 
we will ask you to direct those to him at this time. I will go to you 
now to, Mr. Barlow. 

Mr. Barlow. No questions of the Secretary at this time. Thank 
you. 

Mr. Tauzin. Mr. King. 

Mr. King. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary, I want to welcome you. 
I also want to join with the other Members in commending you for 
your testimony today and the cooperation you have given to this 
committee. Mr. Chairman, if I may, however, I would like to take 
advantage of this opportunity. It will just take me several moments 
to ask you a question which is of great significance, not just to my 
district, but to the 10 million residents in downstate New York. 
This involves the FAA. 

The reason I bring it up today is we have not been able to make 
contact with you or with your office on this. As you know, I am re- 
ferring to what has been referred to in our area as the air war be- 
tween the State of New Jersey and the State of New York, which 
was instigated by the senior Senator from New Jersey. And basi- 
cally this refers to a proposal which is before the FAA to reroute 
540 planes from Newark airport over New York. 



18 

On January 25th, 18 other Members of this body, plus Senator 
Moynihan and Senator D'Amato sent you a letter on this and it is 
very important to us to know exactly what the status of this is. I 
put all the cards on the table. We know that the senior Senator 
from New Jersey is Chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee 
on Transportation. I would just add to that, that the Senator from 
New York, Mr. D'Amato lives in a community where these planes 
will be flying over if this is approved. So you can take your pick 
as to who you want to antagonize the most here. 

Also, Senator D'Amato is a constituent of mine so I have an in- 
terest. I think you can identify with my situation here. Again, I 
want to take this opportunity to ask you, Mr. Secretary, we did ask 
for a response by February 15. I realize you have thousands of let- 
ters cross your desk. 

Secretary Pena. This is an important one, Mr. Congressman. I 
am very much aware of the letter and the great interest here. And 
as you know, I have spent a considerable amount of time on this 
issue, and we will be responding to your letter very shortly. Mr. 
Henson is near fmalization of the draft. 

Let me just say, although it is not related to today's hearing, in 
my former position, when I was mayor of Denver, I had to deal 
with a lot of noise issues. I am very much aware of the noise con- 
cerns and how they affect different communities, and then the bal- 
ancing act that airport operators and communities and local gov- 
ernments have to play in trying to deal with people's concerns. 

And that is why this issue is so complicated, you know, and we 
will, bottom line, respond to you very quickly. 

Mr. King. Thank you. It is important. We currently have a thou- 
sand flights overhead. There are going to be another 540, which 
would likely contribute to our tremendous air pollution problems. 
I appreciate your tolerance. This is very important to me and my 
district and also to the Junior Senator. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Tauzin. Good job. 

Ms. Lambert. 

STATEMENT OF HON. BLANCHE M. LAMBERT, A U.S. 
REPRESENTATIVE FROM ARKANSAS 

Ms. Lambert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, join Chairman 
Tauzin and Chairman Studds in welcoming both of you and thank- 
ing you for the tremendous job you have done. It has been wonder- 
ful to work with the Department of Transportation. You all have 
been very responsive in the many needs that my office has brought 
to you and I appreciate the fine job that you are doing. And I also 
welcome Admiral Henn. 

I have one quick question. I noted in your testimony and your 
response when you talk about the five emphasis areas that you 
would like to work on this is very important for me and my district. 
I know last week we had a barge that hit in Memphis, so we do 
see these instances not nearly as major obviously as Congressman 
Tauzin's, but frequently. 

I do cover the whole eastern half of Arkansas, which comes along 
the Mississippi and we are pleased with the response that we get 
from the Coast Guard and others. When you talk about developing 
more stringent licensing requirements for operators and the 



19 

uninspected towing vessels, is there perhaps the need for ground 
schooling. I know that they are required to have three year's quali- 
fied experience and other things in the licensing process. 

Does that entail any ground schooling or any prep courses or 
anything like that? And would that be something that we might 
want to look into? 

Secretary Pena. The whole area we want to explore. As respects 
the current requirement, let me ask the Admiral to talk about it. 

Admiral Henn. There is no ground schooling as far as the use 
of simulators, showing your abilities to handle a vessel or what- 
ever. The only ground schooling that is required is basic things like 
CPR, firefighting, first aid. What we see for the future is that there 
is a need for things like ground school, a need to use simulators. 
We believe simulators are coming into their own. Indeed, we have 
a study that is almost completed with the Marine Board showing 
the viability of using simulators for training and also for testing, 
which is, I think, just as important. 

So, those are areas, as the Secretary said, that we are going to 
move into. They are areas where the timing is right. Ten years ago, 
we couldn't do it. Today, we are ready to do it. 

Ms. Lambert. Are there any such schools currently that provide 
any type of — excuse the pun — crash courses? 

Admiral Henn. Yes, there are. All the way from ground schools 
to teach you how to pass a Coast Guard licensing examination to 
schools to teach you how to get your radar certificate, either to pass 
a Coast Guard radar examination or to get a certificate that the 
Coast Guard will accept because they are accredited to do that type 
of work. 

Ms. Lambert. Are they Coast Guard schools? 

Admiral Henn. No, these are not Coast Guard schools. These are 
private sector schools, but they are accredited by the Coast Guard 
to do that type of work. There is a regime out there in place. We 
intend to build on that. 

Ms. Lambert. We had in previous years the National River Boat 
Academy in my hometown, which produced a number of excellent 
river boat navigators. I traveled on boats with many of them. And 
it was a school that I think produced some good navigators for the 
river and the inland waterways. The problems that it had were ad- 
ministrative and I think some of the community colleges have been 
working with Secretary Reich to help provide for administrative 
umbrellas for some such schools to be able to provide in that area. 
Thank you very much. 

Mr. Tauzin. Thank you, Ms. Lambert. 

Mr. Gilchrest. 

Mr. Gilchrest. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for com- 
ing. Secretary Pena and Admiral Henn. One question and one com- 
ment. The Chesapeake Bay relies heavily on the Coast Guard for 
safety, for protection, for a lot of things. And basically the Coast 
Guard does an excellent job. They also rely upon the Corps of Engi- 
neers to do a lot of dredging to keep the coastal waterways for the 
commercial watermen and marinas productive and active. I am just 
curious, in your opinion, Mr. Secretary, how well in your mind does 
the Coast Guard and the Corps of Engineers coordinate as far as 



20 

compiling information concerning oil spills or spills of other types 
of chemicals? 

As we begin to gather information about the, luckily, small oil 
spills that have occurred in the Chesapeake Bay, and they are nu- 
merous, and the fact that dredging needs to occur in a variety of 
places, there may be — and we haven't really delved into this too 
much, and I am hoping there is a great deal of understanding and 
communication as to how much oil is transported by barge, by 
tanker. 

How much is there of it, and where are the spills and is there 
regular communication between the Coast Guard and the Corps of 
Engineers? 

Secretary Pena. Congressman, there is now. And let me explain 
why. We have started an interdepartmental effort on the question 
of dredging. It hasn't been done in years. And we think that given 
the number of concerns and questions raised about it, we believe 
that it is now time to refocus on that. So we have all of the key 
departments which have been working on it for some time to look 
at the entire dredging question as a government-wide effort so that 
you don't have the Corps of Engineers saying one thing, EPA say- 
ing something else, DOT here. 

Mr. GiLCHREST. Fish and Wildlife. 

Secretary Pena. Exactly. That work is proceeding very well. And 
they are now, if they hadn't been in the past, they are now in the 
same room sharing the same information such as the information 
that you have talked about, but we will make sure that is a note 
that is to be passed on. 

Mr. GiLCHREST. And the number of ships that come from foreign 
ports that come into the bay, who monitors that? And who mon- 
itors the domestic barges that come into the bay and the various 
tributaries of the C&D canal? I am not sure that is done right now. 

Secretary Pena. All the particular factors that you are concerned 
about, please send those to us and I will make sure that they are 
placed before that interdepartmental group and make sure that 
they are shared among those departments. 

Mr. GiLCHREST. My last comment is, I suppose if there is any 
single act that can improve the safety of the Chesapeake Bay, in 
my opinion, it is to allow Maryland State licensed pilots — and I 
agree with the provisions that are in the bay and this requiii-es 
maps and charts and pathfinders and things like that, but a Mary- 
land State licensed pilot can now board a foreign flag vessel and 
guide that person up the bay, but it can't board a domestic vessel, 
either tanker or a barge or things like that. 

And I know this is going to tighten up the barge system and the 
tugs and the tow vessels and whatever, but just a thought that I 
would think that a Maryland State licensed pilot, given the shal- 
lowness of the bay, given the horrendous problem, if you not only 
spill the oil, but if you spill the liquid sugar in tributaries that are 
not real rivers but tidal basins and have very little flow capacity 
to cleanse themselves, especially in this estuary area, I would like 
the regulation that exempts State law in this area to be looked into 
and reviewed again. 

Secretary Pena. Let me have the Admiral respond to that. Con- 
gressman. 



21 

Admiral Henn. Yes, sir, we have a study. It is almost completed 
and we expect it to be delivered to us in June from the Marine 
Board. It is a pilotage study. We are not totally pleased with pilot- 
age as it exists around the United States today. We think there is 
room for improvement. And this particular aspect is included in it, 
what is needed with regard to the towing industry. That is one 
facet of the study, so we are looking forward to getting that. 

You are absolutely right that a U.S. vessel that is documented 
for foreign trade and a foreign vessel coming into our ports, those 
are vessels that are required by law to take a State pilot when they 
come into State waters. A coastwise U.S. vessel can operate with 
a U.S. pilot and normally that is an endorsement on the master's 
license, the U.S. master. 

With regard to inland towing, they are not required to have pi- 
lots except for on coastwise seagoing tank barges. But this is an 
area that needs to be looked at, and indeed, this study, which has 
taken over two years to complete, and we think will be a major 
milestone, we will look and see what is proposed there. 

Mr. GiLCHREST. One last quick 15 seconds. We don't have green 
lights here; it is really pleasant to come here. I don't want to over- 
use the tragedy of the Valdez, but if there had been an Alaska 
State pilot on board that vessel, I don't think that would have hap- 
pened. Thank you. 

Mr. Tauzin. Mr. Stupak. 

Mr. Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, and, admiral, for being 
here. You have mentioned the comprehensive review that is being 
undertaken in this area. The part that bothers me and maybe I am 
not clear about the definition and I would ask that you review, is 
that the Amtrak accident happened in what we call nonnavigable 
waters, and yet you have commercial vessels moving goods in non- 
navigable waters. 

Whose jurisdiction does it fall under and what kind of enforce- 
ment rights do you have under the definition of nonnavigable? Do 
we have to change some definitions? Do we have to expand navi- 
gable versus nonnavigable waters? I know it is a complex thing and 
may be opening a Pandora's box. But it is confusing because every- 
body knew there was commercial traffic in this area. 

I think the tugboat operator said that he thought there was an- 
other vessel that he was going to tie up next to. Who has jurisdic- 
tion? Who has the enforcement power? Who has the legal right to 
be there? Really, I hope you address that in your review. 

Secretary Pena. Congressman, that is an excellent question, and 
as we know, this was a bridge which at one time was operational 
and then secured permanently, and then legally classified by Con- 
gress here, admiral, as nonnavigable in a sense that there was not 
supposed to be usage of the river, but in effect it was still prac- 
tically and physically able to be navigated. And therein gets the 
confusion that you have raised about legal definitions and practical 
application. 

And that has caused us not only to review this, but the whole 
issue of the lighting system, the fencing system, et cetera, because 
certain decisions were made years ago about fencing that particular 
bridge. And I asked the question when I arrived on scene, it is now 
time to review this question because even though it is technically 



22 

unnavigable, you can still traverse it so we have to analyze those 
issues also. 

You raise a good question. 

Mr. Stupak. Thank you. 

Mr. Tauzin. Thank you, Mr. Stupak. Again, let me thank you, 
Secretary Pena, and you. Admiral. I know that we have run a little 
late and I apologize. I am particularly concerned that we get this 
business done as quickly as we can and we don't complicate it with 
the controversial issues that are still outstanding until we have re- 
solved them. 

In that regard I am asking staff to set the markup date as expe- 
ditiously as possible. It may be as early as the end of this month. 
And I woulci urge, if you could assign someone from your office, 
and, Admiral Henn, someone from your staff to work with our com- 
mittee and the industry, we are going to obviously have to redraft 
the bill in certain key aspects. 

The recommendations for new penalties on failure to report is a 
good one and maybe others. We want to move it rapidly so I think 
we are can meet what is your excellent idea for setting the target 
date for putting it on the President's desk in September. And I 
would urge you to assign someone to help us in the new redraft. 

When we do it, if it is in March or early April, we would appre- 
ciate very specific recommendations, if you have any, for changes 
in the language itself by that time. Mr. Secretary, and Admiral 
Henn, thank you very much. We know that you have to leave, Mr. 
Secretary, and we deeply appreciate your personal attention to this 
issue. 

Secretary Pena. Thank you. I want to congratulate you and 
Members of the subcommittee for your leadership on this subject. 
We will get you those timetables so that you will know what our 
schedule is on this and anything that we can do to speed it along, 
we will do so. jo mi- 

Mr. Tauzin. Admiral, you may want to stay just a second? The 
Chair recognizes Mr. Coble for additional questions. 

Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, Mr. Stupak 
picked up on my question. Let me go back to that to plow that field 
one more time as to what constitutes navigable and nonnavigable. 
I guess the law books are filled with that, subject to legal interpre- 
tation. Let me put the question to you again, admiral, that I ini- 
tially asked regarding the Coast Guard's authority to extend its 
regulatory arm to a rail structure or a nonnavigable or a navigable 
waterway. 

I presume on the latter that the Coast Guard would have that 
authority over a navigable waterway; correct? 

Admiral Henn. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Coble. How about a nonnavigable waterway? 
Admiral Henn. I don't know, sir. I think in this instance in Mo- 
bile was a navigable waterway. A waterway that you can float a 
canoe in is navigable. 
[The following was received:] 

Navigable Waters Defined 

33 CFR §2.05-25 defines navigable waters as: (1) Territorial seas of the United 
States; (2) Internal waters of the United States that are subject to tidal influence 
that; (i) are or have been susceptible for use, by themselves or in connection with 



23 

other waters, as highways for substantial interstate or foreign commerce, notwith- 
standing natural or man-made obstructions that require portage, or (ii) a govern- 
mental or non-governmental body, having expertise in waterway improvement, de- 
termines to be capable of improvement at a reasonable cost (a favorable balance be- 
tween cost and need) to provide, by themselves or in connection with other waters, 
highways for substantial interstate or foreign commerce. 

33 CFR §2.10-10 states that inquiries regarding the status of Coast Guard juris- 
diction over specific waters should be directed to the Coast Guard District Com- 
mander within whose purview the waters he. 

Mr. Coble. What about the CSX comphance? Has, in fact, a 
warning being installed? 

Admiral Henn. We have directed as of 30 November that they 
install lights. I don't know if they have been installed, and we will 
get back to you on that. 

[The following was received:] 

Warning Sign Installed 

The Coast Guard has installed a warning sign at the downstream end of the 
Bayou where it meets the Mobile River. The Coast Guard has directed CSX to Ught 
the bridge to indicate there is no commercially navigable channel. This permanent 
lighting, on the downstream side of the bridge, must be installed and fully oper- 
ational not later than April 30, 1994, by direction of the Coast Guard District Com- 
mander. 

Mr. Coble. I would like to know that. Mr. Chairman, if I may, 
two more quick questions. Admiral. Our bill 3282, provides for in- 
land towing vessels to have aboard certain types of navigational 
equipment and publications. I am sure you are familiar with that. 
If you had your druthers, would you like to add to or delete from 
that list? 

Admiral Henn. I would not want to add or delete from the list, 
sir. And let me tell you why. I think the equipment shown there 
is a basic set of equipment that the general operator needs to navi- 
gate his vessel safely. I think with regard to the fathomer, we in 
the Coast Guard would prefer some flexibility as to defining the 
areas where a fathomer is absolutely needed. 

I think there are some areas where it is probably not needed. 
With regard to as you move up the line to a magnetic compass, 
that is good anywhere, regardless of whether it is a river system 
or not. I know that people say that we are not navigating by mag- 
netic compasses, we are looking at ranges. That is true, but when 
you are in low lying areas where you do not have good radar recep- 
tion, particularly in fog or at night, and you don't have a good 
image of the outline of the river, certainly the magnetic compass 
gives you some idea of whether you are steering north or whether 
you are steering northeast. And, obviously, that is a very important 
thing to know, and in many cases when you have tributaries com- 
ing in it will prevent you from doing something like steering up the 
wrong tributary and into a railroad bridge. 

Mr. Coble. It would certainly serve as no detriment. Admiral, 
someone mentioned about the oil spill in Puerto Rico. In passing, 
can you give us the approximate cost of the cleanup and would 
there be anything that we could add in H.R. 3282 which would 
have helped prevent such a spill, again applying 20/20 hindsight? 

Admiral Henn. The last figure I had, sir, was that the company 
had reached the $10 million limit of their insurance. That money 
was spent. The Coast Guard, in cleanup, had expended somewhere 



24 

in the order of around $30 million. And then there were going to 
be third-party claims coming in which might run it up to the mag- 
nitude of $50 million. 

We could get you the precise numbers, but that is the general 
ball park. We will come back to you with those. 

[The following was submitted:] 

Cleanup Cost In Puerto Rico Oil Spill 

As of March 11, 1994, total estimated cost to complete removal is $75 million. 
Total estimated claims are $25 million. 

Mr. Tauzin. Thank you much, Admiral. We are going to have to 
recess. There is a Floor vote. We will take a 15-minute recess and 
then reconvene the second panel. Thank you, Admiral. The Nation 
is the winner here. Thank you, sir. We will be in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. Tauzin. The hearing will please come to order. 

We have some more time constraints. We are being asked to va- 
cate this room by 12:30. So we are going to put the lights on and 
try to abide by the five-minute rule. The written testimony of all 
our witnesses, by unanimous consent, is already made a part of the 
record. And the record is automatically kept open for two weeks for 
additional statements or submissions. So you need not read your 
testimony. 

We would be more interested in the summation or the summary. 
And we want to reserve time to discuss with you some of the points 
you made. We are pleased to welcome the first witness on our sec- 
ond panel, Mr. Thomas Allegretti, the President of American Wa- 
terway Operators, Mr. Allegretti. 

STATEMENT OF THOMAS A. ALLEGRETTI, PRESIDENT, 
AMERICAN WATERWAYS OPERATORS 

Mr. Allegretti. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Mr. 
Chairman and Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the 
opportunity to be here with you today. We appreciate being able to 
share with you our views on how to enhance navigation safety in 
the inland towing business. 

We have provided you with detailed testimony which addresses 
the specific provisions of H.R. 3282. We recommend some modifica- 
tions to that bill. We also call for its strengthening in certain re- 
spects. In the interest of time, I will highlight the most important 
parts of our testimony. 

The first point that I want to make to you is that I think there 
has been considerable progress made since this subcommittee met 
in October; a series of positive things have happened in terms of 
industry-government partnership, new areas of inquiry and new 
ways of looking at safety. Those are detailed in my testimony. 

l^ow, we think the time has come to act. We believe that joint 
government and industry action is needed in order to effect the 
changes that are necessary to move us closer to the goal of en- 
hanced navigation safety. We have two things in mind. 

First, we strongly urge the subcommittee, the full committee and 
the House to quickly enact H.R. 3282. 

Most vessels in the towing industry have long utilized and have 
long recognized the value of the equipment that that bill seeks to 



25 

require. Our testimony expands on this point. We make the point 
to you that the towing industry is hardly a monoHth and that given 
the diversity of its operations, it is important to provide some flexi- 
bility to the Coast Guard about where certain types of navigation 
equipment are required. 

Navigation equipment that may have great utility on one vessel, 
may have limited utility on another. And we think that the Coast 
Guard has the expertise to make some of those detailed decisions. 

The second area that we recommend to you with respect to action 
is that the Department of Transportation, through the Coast 
Guard, working in consultation and with the support of industry 
through the Towing Safety Advisory Committee, should move for- 
ward to implement the 19 recommendations contained in the Sec- 
retary's December 10 report to the Congress. 

We believe that they constitute a sound framework for change on 
the most important szifety issues that are attendant to the oper- 
ation of towing vessels. I mentioned in my testimony that AWO has 
established a review group of its own where we looked at the same 
kinds of issues that the Department looked at in its evaluation. 
There is close alignment between — in the direction and in the con- 
tent of — the recommendations that emerged from the internal 
AWO analysis with that which emerged from the Secretary's analy- 
sis conducted at the Coast Guard. 

I think that tells us two things right off the bat. The first is that 
we have focused on the right solutions since both of these bodies 
independently came to the same conclusion drawing on the exper- 
tise of navigators. The second thing is that filling in the details of 
these solutions and establishing standards which implement these 
improvements should move forward without delay and without sig- 
nificant controversy. 

There is no reason that we should not be able to see the fruits 
of that labor in very short order. I think that the development of 
these recommendations will be substantially facilitated by the in- 
volvement of the Towing Safety Advisory Committee. 

As you know, Mr. Chairman, that Advisory Committee to the 
Secretary is congressionally-authorized and was indeed originally 
established through legislation that began in this subcommittee 
more than a decade ago. It draws heavily on not only the naviga- 
tion expertise of the towing industry but provides balance by bring- 
ing in labor, shippers, terminal operators and public representa- 
tives to ensure a complete point of view. 

I noted with interest the Secretary's remarks about moving for- 
ward on these things. We could not agree with him more — that the 
right thing to do is enact 3282, move forward to implement all of 
the provisions in his recommendations to you that can be imple- 
mented administratively, and to do that quickly and without hesi- 
tation. 

And one last point, I am speculating a bit with you about where 
that process may lead. If the partnership between industry and 
government comes about as I think it should, we are going to see 
substantial improvements in the most important area of safety. 
And that is with respect to the competency and proficiency of tow- 
ing vessel operators. I think that we are going to plow some new 



26 

ground that will eventually find its way into the competency and 
proficiency issues of all mariners, not just towing vessel operators. 

I will be happy to answer any questions that you may have. 

[The statement of Mr. Allegretti may be found at end of hearing.] 

Mr. Tauzin. Thank you very much. 

I want to join with the Secretary and other members who have 
expressed a great deal of appreciation to the industry for being 
willing to be partners in the solution. And we have seen nothing 
but cooperation from day one in our efforts, and I want to thank 
you for that. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN SUTTON, PRESffiENT, AMERICAN 
INLAND MARINERS 

Mr. Tauzin. We are now pleased to have here, Mr. John Sutton, 
President of the American Inland Mariners. 

Mr. Sutton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would ask that you excuse my public speaking skills. 

I am a licensed mariner. American Inland Mariners Association 
would like to take this opportunity to thank the subcommittee for 
recognizing our association and the mariners we represent. 

We would also like to thank the sponsors of H.R. 3283 for re- 
sponding to the void in the regulations regarding minimal naviga- 
tional safety equipment on uninspected towing vessels. While we 
generally support H.R. 3282, we have made several recommenda- 
tions to the subcommittee with regard to this bill. 

We feel that our recommendations may more accurately reflect 
the needs of the uninspected towing vessel and the mariner who 
works on these vessels. The seven specific recommendations that I 
have made in my official statement, to improve the overall safety 
of our Nation's waterways from a mariner's point of view, I would 
like to place great emphasis on the United States Coast Guard 
identifying those bridges on our Nation's waterways that pose navi- 
gational hazard. And also to improve aids to navigation on and 
near these bridges. 

I personally believe that each of these goals are attainable with- 
out placing excessive strain on the United States Coast Guard's 
budget. As the United States Coast Guard and licensed master and 
pilot of one of the last uninspected towing vessels on the Mis- 
sissippi River, I feel that I will be able to answer any technical 
questions that this subcommittee may possibly have. 

Mr. Chairman, also in the conclusion of my official statement, I 
have placed a list of five towing companies that have extended the 
offer to any of the committee Members or staff members to ride 
their vessels in an observation capacity to observe the inner-work- 
ings of an inland towboat vessel and, hopefully, enlighten this 
panel with regard to the daily working routine of these mariners. 

Again, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you and your per- 
sonal staff for assisting me through these proceedings. And I would 
be happy to answer any questions that the panel might have. 

Mr. Tauzin. John, thanks. It is always good to have some home 
folks here. And I also want to thank you for the suggestions. And 
I hope when we get into the issues of licensing and manning and 
inspections that we do actually examine the industry up close and 
personal, rather than relying strictly upon what we may hear from 



27 

representative groups here in Washington. And we are going to 
take that to heart very much. 

[The statement of Mr. Sutton may be found at end of hearing.] 

STATEMENT OF ANN POWERS, CHESAPEAKE BAY FOUNDA- 
TION, REPRESENTING WILLIAM SCHRENK, SENIOR CON- 
SULTING ATTORNEY, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE 
COUNCIL, INCORPORATED 

Mr. Tauzin. Mr. WilHam Schrenk, Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., was delayed by weather in New York. No surprise. 
Ann Powers of the Chesapeake Bay Foundation is here to give his 
testimony. 

Ann, we welcome you and would welcome your summation. 

Ms. Powers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and committee Members. 
I do extend apologies from Mr. Schrenk, it was pretty much un- 
avoidable. 

As you know, the Natural Resource Defense Council has been ac- 
tive for a long time in oil transportation safety issues. They have 
published two major reports, "No Safe Harbor" in 1990, and "Safety 
at Bay" in 1992. Likewise, the Chesapeake Bay Foundation has 
long taken an interest in oil transportation safety issues. 

Back in 1976, we put out a report called, "The Bay on Borrowed 
Time." Ironically, only a few months after that a major oil spill, 
just as was predicted in our report, occurred. In 1990, we published 
another report called, "Preventing Catastrophe," and we are now 
working on a third report which will be issued very shortly. One 
of the reasons that we are here this morning is because much of 
the traffic that is on the Chesapeake Bay and on our inland water- 
ways is tug and barge traffic. 

Most of the millions and millions of gallons of oil that are trans- 
ported on the Chesapeake Bay are transported by tug vessels tow- 
ing barges. 

Many of these barges contain up to a million gallons of oil. We 
have been quite fortunate on the Chesapeake that we have not yet 
experienced an incident like the Valdez, although we have had two 
major spills in the last 10 years or so. Both of those involved 
barges that were being towed by tug vessels. 

In 1976, the first of these major spills, the captain of the tugboat 
towed the barge across a shoal in bad weather. He had insufficient 
navigational equipment. They were not even aware that they had 
grounded the tug for quite some time. 

It spilled a quarter of a million gallons into the marshes of the 
Chesapeake Bay. In 1988, a similar accident in a similar location 
occurred. In that instance, the barge was being towed in relatively 
mild weather. 

We did have some wind and seas, but they are not uncommon 
on the Chesapeake. But the barge that had been inspected just a 
few months previously by the Coast Guard, basically split in half. 
The operator of the tugboat was not aware of that for, it appears, 
several hours until notified by a passing vessel. And these are the 
types of incidents that we basically dread on the Chesapeake Bay. 

The bay is also not immune from accidents involving barges and 
obstacles such as bridges. We are told by the Coast Guard that in 
the last 10 years, there have been 26 bridge allisions on the bay. 



28 

At least 11 of them were due to some type of operator error. And 
indeed, there is one investigation currently underway involving a 
barge which hit the Route 313 bridge on the Nanticoke River, in 
Mr. Gilchrest's district, I might add. 

Fortunately, it doesn't appear that there was serious damage. 
But these are the kinds of incidents that can threaten an estuary 
like the Chesapeake, which is exceedingly sensitive. It is a shallow 
estuary, very rich in marine life. We know that the damage there 
from any kind of major spill could be extensive. 

Likewise, around the country we have seen similar problems. 
Both the Natural Resources Defense Council and the Chesapeake 
Bay Foundation support the bill being presented H.R. 3282. We 
think it makes great strides in addressing the problems that are 
of concern to us. 

In our testimony, we have pointed out several areas, however, 
where we think that it could be strengthened. Those include in- 
spections. We believe that the tug vessel should be subject to great- 
er inspection requirements. We are told that at the present time 
all but two vessels would be exempt from inspection. 

A second point would be to treat the towboat and their tank ves- 
sels as tankers, in all respects, subject to inspections, equipment 
and manning standards. We support more stringent licensing and 
training requirements. 

I would echo what Mr. Gilchrest had to say about the need for 
training and perhaps even for State pilots. We have a very good pi- 
loting system on the Chesapeake Bay. 

And finally, I would like to address the issue of the Towing Safe- 
ty Advisory Committee. We think that the committee needs to be 
reconstituted to better reflect the various views of the stakeholders 
around the country or, if not reconstituted, it should be abolished. 

I speak, I think on behalf of not only the people around the 
Chesapeake Bay but others who live around water bodies that they 
consider as precious as we do the Chesapeake. We ask you to do 
everything within your power to make sure that when oil and other 
products are transported on our bays and water bodies it is done 
so with a high level of safety. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. Tauzin. Thank you very much. 

[The statement of Mr. Schrenk may be found at end of hearing.] 

STATEMENT OF H. THOMAS KORNEGAY, EXECUTIVE 
DIRECTOR, PORT OF HOUSTON AUTHORITY 

Mr. Tauzin. We will next hear from Mr. Tom Kornegay, Execu- 
tive Director of the Port of Houston Authority. 

Tom, I know that Mr. Fields wanted to be here to welcome you 
personally, but on his behalf and on behalf of the subcommittee, 
welcome, sir. 

Mr. Kornegay. Thank you. 

Chairman Tauzin and Members of the subcommittee, I am Tom 
Kornegay, the Executive Director of the Port of Houston Authority, 
and I serve as President of the Gulf Ports Association. 

Thank you for inviting us to testify regarding a subject of consid- 
erable importance to our membership, the critical need to increase 
safety on our channels. 



29 

We would also like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Houston's 
Congressman Fields, for introducing H.R. 3283, we view this legis- 
lation as an important step toward ensuring the safety of our Na- 
tion's waterways. The membership of the Gulf Ports Association 
consists of the 26 government entities which own and operate deep- 
water port facilities on the U.S. Gulf Coast from Tampa to Browns- 
ville, Texas. 

The common purpose shared by the GPA ports is expressed in 
our mission statement: 

"To promote the progress in waterbome commerce through U.S. 
Gulf Ports to provide a forum through which member ports can ad- 
dress mutual concerns; to educate the public and elected officials 
as to the economic impact of United States Gulf Ports and to pro- 
vide users of the ports in the Gulf with innovatively managed and 
environmentally sensitive facilities." 

I can say with pride that the commerce and activity of our gulf 
ports contribute mightily to the Nation's economy and security. We 
contribute over $40 million — $40 billion annually to the Nation's 
economy. Likewise, the activity of the gulf ports is almost half a 
million jobs directly and indirectly. 

Gulf ports have proven to be vital to defense, providing facilities 
for mobilization, deployment and supply of the U.S. forces in the 
time of war, in Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 25 per- 
cent of all the U.S. military cargo was handled by three gulf ports. 

Naturally, setting and maintaining standards for safe navigation 
on our channels is critical to the important functions served by the 
gulf ports and ports all across the Nation. Any time safe passage 
is impaired, both the flow of commerce and personal safety is 
threaten. 

Ports are keenly aware of that and we are doing our part to en- 
sure safety. For instance, as the result of the passage of the Oil 
Pollution Act of 1990, gulf ports have worked diligently with State 
and Federal agencies to develop plans for quick response to spills 
and accident prevention through safety awareness. 

We do our part, but unfortunately we have no control over the 
vessels that navigate our channels. In the case of tows and barges, 
we must look to this Congress, and more specifically, to this sub- 
committee, to do what is necessary to make sure that these vessels 
operate safely and that pilots who captain them are well trained. 

As with other port regions, the gulf ports have experienced seri- 
ous and life-threatening accidents as a result of ill-equipped vessels 
and untrained operators navigating our channels. The most dev- 
astating example is, of course, the Amtrak accident near Mobile, 
Alabama. You are well aware of the details of that event. 

I would like to draw your attention to other examples of deficient 
safety measures resulting in loss of life, cargo and commerce in the 
gulf ports. The Port of Houston is a uniquely narrow channel. The 
need for properly equipped vessels and adequately skilled and ade- 
quately trained piloting is even greater in channels such as the 
Houston Ship Channel. On December 21, 1992, there were — ^there 
was a three-vessel collision caused by a vessel which had not been 
inspected and didn't have a functioning compass. The Freemont 
was pushing the barge Duvall II, when it ran off course and struck 



30 

the Juraj Dalmatinac. The Freemont sustained $16,000 in damage, 
the Duvall II, $750,000 damage and loss of cargo of $122,000. 

The Juraj Dalmatinac suffered $67,500 in damage. The Houston 
Ship Channel was closed for three full days. Fifteen outbound ves- 
sels were stuck in port; 50 inbound vessels were anchored in the 
Gulf of Mexico. 

The channel was restricted to one-way traffic from December 25 
to the February 17. The cost in loss of wharfage fees was estimated 
at over $6 million for the three-day period the channel was closed. 

Our neighbors in Freeport experienced a problem in their chan- 
nel in 1986 when a towboat barge collided with a Monsanto barge 
dock. This incident occurred in foggy conditions and with a vessel 
which was lacking proper safety equipment. Brazos pilots and the 
Port of Freeport have similarly supported a need for legislation re- 
quiring each tow to be equipped with a compass, radar, VHF and 
current charts of areas traversed. 

More recently in the summer of 1993, there was the collision in 
Louisiana by a barge and tow hitting a bridge resulting in the loss 
of two lives, the mother and her unborn childf. 

These are only a few examples of the serious nature of the acci- 
dents which we believe might be minimized or even avoided with 
the proper equipment and certification required for barge and tow 
operators. It is for this reason that the gulf ports support the re- 
quirement of navigational safety equipment on all vessels which 
traverse our channels, and further, we believe that proper training 
of these individuals piloting vessels is critical. 

This Nation's ports are a vital source of support for the economy. 
Accidents can arid should be minimized. Interruptions in normal 
activity which impedes the flow of commerce through U.S. ports is 
costly in terms of dollars, in terms of the danger to the environ- 
ment and most importantly in terms of the dangers posed to 
human life. 

We believe that H.R. 3282 is a positive step to enhance safety 
and thus minimize the chance of accidents. The gulf ports urge the 
swift passage of H.R. 3282. 

Mr. Tauzin. Thank you very much, Mr. Komegay, and we also 
note your interest in H.R. 3812, which by the way, I am only just 
becoming familiar with. And we are going to get a copy of it. I 
think it is the kind of thing that we always would want to support. 

[The statement of Mr. Komegay may be found at end of hearing.] 

STATEMENT OF JEFFREY C. SMITH, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 
COMMITTEE FOR PRIVATE OFFSHORE RESCUE AND TOWING 
(C-PORT) 

Mr. Tauzin. We are pleased to have Mr. Jeffrey Smith, Executive 
Director of C-Port Committee for Private Offshore Rescue and Tow- 
ing. 

Mr. Smith. I am here today to discuss H.R. 3282's impact on 
firms which provide nonemergency towing to disabled vessels. 
Being familiar, as I am, with your record, Mr. Chairman, I know 
that you are aware that government actions sometimes have unin- 
tended consequences. And in this case, I would submit the legisla- 
tion has an impact which I think is no part of the intention of the 
committee. 



31 

This situation occurs because of the way the law is written. 
Under 46 U.S. Code, the section to which this bill would amend, 
Section 4102, is written in such as way as it makes no distinction 
between large commercial towing operations and small assistance 
towing operations. Whereby the difference is a major difference. 
Analogies can never fully explain the situation but it is much like 
the analogy between let's say, a Lear Jet and a large commercial 
jet. Both are certainly airplanes, but they are regulated very dif- 
ferently by the FAA. 

A large commercial vessel as represented well by my colleague 
here Mr. Allegretti from the American Waterways Operators, tows 
or pushes a cargo weighing hundreds or thousands of tons. A small 
assistance towing vessel rescues boaters whose boats weigh less 
than approximately 8 tons. Unfortunately, this bill would treat 
both vessels the same. 

In uninspected towing vessel of the type that our members at the 
association represent are basically 17 to 30-foot long vessels that 
are operated by one or two persons who are licensed under legisla- 
tion this committee passed approximately 10 years ago. 

Basically, we urge the subcommittee to look favorably upon an 
amendment which would, in effect, exempt some of our small ves- 
sels from the provisions of the bill. And the most important provi- 
sion of the bill is the radar requirement, for example. You would 
have a good a 22-foot vessel required to carry a radar and have all 
its crew trained in a radar observer course which costs about 
$1,000 a person. 

Now, the Coast Guard's own rescue boats, 22-feet long, are not 
equipped with radar. Generally, few are. The Coast Guard's 41-foot 
boats are all equipped with radar. So that would be a costly and 
I believe unnecessary requirement on our industry. 

And I should also point out that is the iinplementation of these 
equipment requirements not recommended by the DOT's study. 
None of the 19 recommendations made by DOT included this. Nor 
was it recommended by any other report. 

So in summary, our industry, which was actually created by this 
committee 11 years ago, was not, I believe, intended to be included 
in this legislation, so we would urge the committee to look favor- 
ably upon an amendment in the upcoming markup that would give 
consideration to the bill's real intent. 

Thank you. 

[The statement of Mr. Smith may be found at end of hearing.] 

Mr. Tauzin. Thank you, very much, Mr. Smith. 

Mr. Smith, if I can quickly go to you, there is current exemptions 
in the law that we are amending that provides for exemption for 
any vessel where the Secretary finds good cause exists for the ex- 
emption where the safety of the vessel or persons on board would 
not be adversely effected. Are those not adequate for your pur- 



Mr. Smith. Well, I think that would be very problematic because 
what you would deal with is the local Coast Guard officer in charge 
making those exemptions on a case-by-case basis. That would put 
him in the line of fire if in the unlikely circumstance there was an 
accident, and if I were that officer in charge, I think you would find 



32 

that people would be very reluctant to exempt any vessel from the 
law. 

Mr. Tauzin. And your point is that these rescue vessels don't 
push barges and that you serve a very special purpose and, there- 
fore, that these requirements may not apply to you; is that it? 

Mr. Smith.. Precisely. 

Mr. Tauzin. Let me turn to Ms. Powers. Ms. Powers, you were 
here, I think, when the Secretary spoke and it is a very important 
point that I asked him to be specific on because like you, he wants 
to see us and many of us want to see us move in the direction of 
reforming the inspection and licensing provisions of the law, spe- 
cifically to do it in a way that fits the real world out there in re- 
gards to the very different kinds of towing vessels and different 
tows that are on the waterways. 

Recognizing, I think Mr. Allegretti will probably want to join in 
here, there is some controversy as to how those ought to be applied, 
where they ought to be applied and how deeply the inspections go 
and how far licensing requirements may go. 

The concern I have, and the Secretary seemed to echo is, is that 
we ought not delay the things we currently have agreement upon 
while we are watching and working with the Secretary to develop 
a model for improvements in inspection and licensing. 

Do you have any comments on that particular point of view? 

Ms. Powers. Well, Mr. Chairman, we certainly would not want 
to delay any of the salutary provisions of this bill. However, we 
think that it would be wise to include all the provisions at this 
time in this bill to make sure that these issues are covered. 

Mr. Tauzin. Let me turn to Mr. Allegretti. Again, the same sub- 
ject. I know that your industry and Mr. Sutton, you might want to 
join in, will be deeply involved in these discussions and, hopefully, 
as you pointed out, involved actually in a government, business 
partnership to find the right formula for inspections and licensing, 
what have you. 

Do you feel that that topic is so controversial that it could delay 
implementation of the improvements we all agree upon and every- 
one apparently is ready to move on right now? 

Mr. Allegretti. We believe it absolutely would, Mr. Chairman. 
Our industry has very deep, very grave concerns with the idea of 
Coast Guard inspection and Coast Guard-prescribed mannirig 
scales. These are very complex, very controversial issues. There is 
not consensus among the parties on them and the decision as to 
whether or not you move forward on something like that requires 
very careful analysis. 

When we are talking about things like the provisions of H.R. 
3282 that deal with equipment or deal with licensing standards, I 
think that there is consensus that these are very positive directions 
in which to go and that they get at the root cause of accidents in 
our industry; and therefore, there is broad support for them in our 
industry. That same consensus does not exist with respect to man- 
ning or inspection. 

Mr. Tauzin. Mr. Coble tried to get some idea from the Secretary 
as to when he thought he would be prepared to make recommenda- 
tions in this area and he, of course, was not prepared yet to give 
us a time date on it. What is your idea? Is it possible that prior 



33 

to our goal, which I think the Secretary expressed today, is Sep- 
tember for enactment and signing of this bill, is it possible for that 
consensus to be reached in time for us to add provisions to this bill 
somewhere in the process or do you think it will take longer than 
that to reach that consensus? 

Mr. Allegretti. I don't believe that you can reach the consensus 
by the target date that the Secretary suggested of September 22nd, 
and I believe that principally because you cannot complete the 
analysis that is necessary to get all the data on the table that will 
lead to a sound public policy decision. 

Mr. Tauzin. Mr. Sutton, would you like to join in this? You obvi- 
ously have some interest here. 

Mr. Sutton. Certainly. I would like to concur with Mr. Allegretti 
on the fact that I don't think this can be done in a hurried manner. 
The vessels that plow the inland waters are a diverse group of ves- 
sels. They come in all shapes and forms and I would think the in- 
spection of these vessels would — ^you know, each vessel has its own 
characteristics and I would think quite a bit of thought would have 
to go into something like this. 

As far as the licensing requirements, absolutely our association 
believes that at some level, licensing requirements need to have 
some observation and as a licensed mariner that is actively in- 
volved in the industry and — I see things on a daily basis that I feel 
need to be looked at and I don't think it can be done by the target 
date. 

I think it is going to be something that quite a bit of thought 
needs to go in. I have had no formal conversation with Mr. 
Allegretti and the American Waterways Operators or the Coast 
Guard on participating in a joint effort, but my association would 
look forward to participating. We do represent the licensed and 
documented mariners of the inland waterways and it is something 
that we would like to participate in. 

Mr. Tauzin. I can only urge you that it may well be that some 
on this committee and on the full committee and on the Floor or 
the Senate may want to add additional requirements to this bill. 
Before that consensus is reached, insofar as any elements of con- 
sensus can be attained in time for consideration of this measure, 
we would urge you to expedite consideration. 

Obviously, in drafting the bill we recognized going in that this 
was a critical area that needs improvement, just as Secretary Pefia 
pointed out that old tradition in this area has to yield to common 
sense and to change. Our committee concurs in that view and as 
soon as possible we need to get this effort and consensus going and 
as rapidly as possible terminated. 

One point before my time is up, too, and I want to quickly get 
it in, Mr. Allegretti, you pointed out that compasses may not be im- 
portant in inland waterways, in fact that other instruments may do 
a better job, but in regards to some of the information we just re- 
ceived from Mr. Komegay, obviously compasses would be terribly 
important when it comes to operations in some of the ports of the 
Nation. Is that not correct? 

Mr. Allegretti. That is correct, and I think to the extent that 
I am familiar with the details of the Fremont accident, that was 



34 

the kind of situation where a compass would have helped that op- 
erator make sure that he was aligned with the buoy. 

Mr. Tauzin. Here is the problem. Can we in the legislation define 
a requirement on a vessel that may be operating in a port one day, 
may be operating in an inland waterway the next day? If we don't 
require the compass, because in the inland waterways they are not 
very effective, and that same vessel has a tow operating in one of 
the ports where a compass is extraordinarily effective, we may 
have missed a vital part of the safety concerns of that vessel. Don't 
you agree? 

Mr. Allegretti. I do agree and I think that therefore the poten- 
tial solution to that is to draft the language of the bill in such a 
way as to require the vessel to have some type of direction assist- 
ance mechanism on it, whether that is a swing meter or rate of 
turn indicator or a compass, and then leave the detail to the Coast 
Guard as to where the line of demarcation is. 

Mr. Tauzin. But you understand the problem. So the vessel 
chooses a swing meter and all of a sudden it is operating in a port 
environment where a swing meter is not nearly as effective as a 
compass. We have missed something there. Would you disagree 
with that, Mr. Komegay? 

Mr. KORNEGAY. No, sir, I would not disagree. 

Mr. Tauzin. You understand our problem then? We want to con- 
tinue our conversation on this, but I want you to know that is a 
deep concern of ours. If we leave it too flexible and the wrong 
choice is made as to equipment and the vessel ends up operating 
in another area where that particular equipment is not very useful 
and some other equipment is vital, we have missed — literally, we 
have missed the boat on it and I don't want to see that occur. 

Let me yield to Mr. Barlow for questions. 

Mr. Barlow. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for holding 
these hearings. I want to pay my deepest respects to you for the 
manner in which you convened hearings so quickly after the trage- 
dies in the Gulf and got us focused on the problems of inland wa- 
terways. 

Coming out of those hearings, we had dialog with the witnesses 
on possible engineering solutions using low cost, low frequency sen- 
sors on bridges and on the towboats and ships in inland waterway^ 
and the possibility of installing these sensors. Since that time, I 
have had my staff look into this area and there is an engineering 
company we found that is working with Exxon for the docking of 
tankers and large bulk carriers where they have sensors on the 
piers. 

These very large carriers are, of course, very lengthy and you 
come in fog and a lot of damage can be done to piers and damage 
done to the hull of the ship itself if they aren't docking properly. 
I am wondering if we could ask — ^we as a committee could ask the 
Coast Guard to look into this particular technology that is being 
worked out with Exxon and see if there is application in some of 
the other areas. If I may, I would like to put into the record a de- 
scription of the sensor process. Also, I ask that the committee ask 
the Coast Guard to give us a report on the applicability of this 
process. I would appreciate a response from this. 



^5 

Mr. Tauzin. If the gentleman would yield, first of all, the gen- 
tleman makes an unsinimous consent request for introduction into 
the record today of information on the technology. And without ob- 
jection, that is so ordered. 

[The information may be found at end of hearing.] 

Mr. Tauzin. Secondly, it is my understanding that Secretary 
Pefia has had numerous discussions on that very topic within the 
administration and that other committees of this Congress, includ- 
ing the Transportation HAZMAT Committee, Energy and Com- 
merce, has examined that issue additionally, and there may be rec- 
ommendations in the Secretary's package that we have not yet 
seen regarding that issue, but we will highlight it and we will 
make sure that we get some responses for you on it. 

Mr. Barlow. Thank you very much, sir. 

Mr. Tauzin. Well, I guess that is it then. I don't see any other 
questions. Let me thank you all. As I asked Admiral Henn and as 
I asked the Secretary to continue to dialog with us on changes in 
language that we can make to the bill, I would appreciate you 
doing the same thing. 

All of your testimony is very instructive to us on suggestions for 
improvement, possible exemptions, possible refinements, possible 
targeting and flexibilities. All of those are very important to us. 

If you have specific language changes that you think would be 
helpful in redrafting as we prepare for markup either this month 
or the next month, we would deeply appreciate that. 

Where consensus can be found on some of these other issues, you 
know, we are going to stand ready to support amendments to the 
bill if, in fact, those consensuses can be achieved in time for us to 
hit our target date. But I want to stress again the goal of Secretary 
Peiia and of the subcommittee, and that is that we report to the 
Congress and eventually put on the President's desk hopefully well 
before the anniversary date of that horrible tragedy in Mobile legis- 
lation that clearly moves very forcefully safety concerns in the in- 
land waterways and the towing industry forward. 

And I think we have a good start here. I am only asking you to 
make sure that it is as perfect as we can make it by the time we 
put it on the President's desk. In that regard, we all have the same 
interests in common, Ms. Powers and all of us from the govern- 
mental industry and from the public interest community stand- 
point. We all want the same thing here and I think it is incumbent 
upon us to have continuing dialoguing to see we get it as quickly 
as we can. 

Bottom line is I don't want to hold it up any time if there is still 
outstanding controversy. I want to move what we can move as rap- 
idly as possible. Thank you very much for your participation today, 
for coming long distances and for sharing with the Congress, again, 
some very important perspectives on this safety issue. We appre- 
ciate it. The hearing of this subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned; 
and the following was submitted for the record.] 



103d congress 
1st Session 



H. R. 3282 



To amend title 46, United States Code, to improve towing vessel navigational 
safety. 



IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

October 14, 1993 
Mr. Tauzik (for himself, Mr. Studds, Mr. Fields of Texas, and Mr. Coble) 
introduced the foUoAving bill; which was referred to the Committee on 
Merchant Marine and Fisheries 



A BILL 

To amend title 46, United States Code, to improve towing 
vessel navigational safety. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa- 

2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembUd, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the "Towing Vessel Naviga- 

5 tional Safety Act of 1993". 

6 SEC. 2. MINIMUM NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY EQUIPMENT FOR 

7 TOWING VESSELS. 

8 (a) In General.— Section 4102 of title 46, United 

9 States Code, is amended by adding at the end the 
10 following: 



37 



2 

1 "(f) Each towing vessel to which this chapter appUes 

2 shall be equipped with navigational publications and 

3 equipment as prescribed by the Secretary, including — 

4 "(1) marine charts of the area being transited; 

5 "(2) navigational publications for the area 

6 being transited; 

7 "(3) compasses; 

8 "(4) radar; and 

9 "(5) a fathometer.". 

10 (b) Regulations. — The Secretary of Transportation 

11 shall issue regulations by not later than 6 months after 

12 the date of the enactment of this Act, prescribing naviga- 

13 tional publication and equipment requirements under sub- 

14 section (f) of section 4102 of title 46, United States Code, 

15 as added by subsection (a) of this section. 

16 SEC. 3. DEMONSTRATION OF PROFICIENCY IN USE OF 

17 NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY EQUIPMENT RE- 

18 QUIRED. 

19 Section 7101 of title 46, United States Code, is 

20 amended by adding at the end the following: 

21 "(j) The Secretary shall require an individual who ap- 

22 plies for issuance or renewal of a towing vessel operators 

23 license to demonstrate proficiency in the use of naviga- 

24 tional safety equipment.". 



3 

1 SEC. 4. REPORTING MARINE CASUALTIES. 

2 (a) Expedited Reporting Required. — Section 

3 6101(b) of title 46, United States Code, is amended by 

4 striking "within 5 days" and inserting "by as soon as 

5 practicable, but in no case later than within 5 days,". 

6 (b) Regulations. — Not later than 90 days after the 

7 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall pre- 

8 scribe regulations implementing the amendment made by 

9 subsection (a). 

10 SEC. 5. REPORT ON ADEQUACY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF 

11 MANNING AND UCENSING REQUIREMENTS 

1 2 FOR OPERATION OF TOWING VESSELS. 

13 Not later than 6 months after the date of the enact- 

14 ment of this Act, the Secretary of Transportation shall 

15 submit a report to the Congress on the adequacy and ef- 

16 fectiveness of manning and licensing requirements for op- 

17 eration of towing vessels. 

18 SEC. 6. REPORT ON FEASIBILITY OF ESTABUSHING A DIF- 

19 FERENTIAL GLOBAL POSITIONING SAT- 

20 ELLTTE NAVIGATION SYSTEM FOR INLAND 

21 WATERWAYS. 

22 Not later than 6 months after the date of the enact- 

23 ment of this Act, the Secretary of Transportation shall 

24 submit a report to the Congress on the feasibility of estab- 

25 lishing a differential global positioning satellite navigation 

26 system for the inland waterways of the United States. 

o 



FINAL 



Statement of 

The Secretary of the 

United States Department of Transportation 

Federico Pefia 



Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries 

Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation 

House of Representatives 

March 3, 1994 

TQWING VESSEL NAVTnATTO NAL SAFFTY 



40 



Final 

Statement of the Secretary of the 

United States Department of Transportation 

Federico Pena 

before the 

Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries 

Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation 

House of Representatives 

March 3, 1994 

TOWTNG VESSEL NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY 

Good morning Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee. 

I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before you today to 
discuss the serious problem of towing vessel navigational safety. 
Accompanying me is Rear Admiral A. E. Henn, Chief of the Coast Guard's 
Office of Marine Safety, Security, and Environmental Protection, who will 
be available to respond to any specific operational questions that the 
Subcommittee may wish to ask. 

Before I begin, I would like to convey to Chairmen Studds and 
Tauzin, and Congressmen Fields and Coble the appreciation of the 
Department of Transportation and the Administration for the very serious 
and thoughtful approach they have taken toward assessing the problem of 
towing vessel navigational safety in H.R. 3282, the "Towing Vessel Safety 
Navigational Act of 1993." Similarly, this Subcommittee is to be 
complimented for its attention to this important issue and for scheduling this 
hearing to obtain the necessary legislative record. 



41 



Today the Subcommittee will hear testimony from a wide range of 
wimesses on the best way to ensure towing vessel navigational safety. We 
all share the frustration of the Coast Guard when it is called in to rescue the 
victims of an accident that might have been prevented if the operator of the 
vessel had had better navigational equipihent aboard or better training. 

Clearly, the collapse of the Judge Seeber Bridge in New Orleans and 
the Amtrak derailment at Bayou Canot, Alabama were great tragedies. The 
loss of life was staggering. And, I can tell you personally, that seeing the 
victims, comforting the survivors and meeting the bereaved brings home the 
human costs of safety lapses. While the oil spill in Puerto Rico, fortunately, 
did not claim any lives, its environmental and economic effects were wide- 
spread. The issues before us are complex. As we take steps to ensure that 
tragedies such as these are prevented in the future, let us recognize that there 
are no easy solutions or quick fixes to which we can turn to eliminate the 
possibility that human error, the largest cause of these problems, equipment 
malfunction, or adverse environmental conditions, will occur. Let me assure 
you diat my commitment to safety is of the highest level. 

On September 30, 1993, 1 wrote to Congress outlining a series of 
safety reviews that I initiated in response to the derailment of Amtrak's 
Sunset Limited. On December 10, 1993, 1 sent to Congress our final report, 
entitled "Review of Marine Safety Issues Related to Uninspected Towing 
Vessels," containing recommendations for changes to the Marine Safety and 
Waterways Management Programs. A copy of the recommendations is 
attached to this statement. 

That report formed the basis for the four-pronged approach I 
developed to increase safety in the towing vessel industry. First, more 
stringent licensing requirements for operators of uninspected towing vessels 



42 



must be developed, and these licenses should have levels of qualification. 
Restrictions for such levels of qualification may be based on route, gross 
tonnage ot horsepower of the towing vessel, and type of towing 
configuration. The basic three-year apprenticeship should quahfy an 
applicant for a basic hcense only. Operators must be proficient in the use of 
navigational and safety equipment. In order to advance beyond a basic 
license, an operator should be required to attend practical, hands on training 
or a Coast Guard approved simulator course and pass a written, practical or 
simulator examination, or some combination thereof. As a complement to 
this, towing vessel owners must employ qualified, experienced personnel as 
operators in charge of their vessels. 

Second, requirements for radar and upgraded navigational equipment 
on board uninspected towing vessels must be estabUshed. Specifically, 
operators should be required to have on board as equipment up-to-date 
marine charts for the area to be transited, current or corrected navigational 
publications, and a marine radar system for surface navigation. In addition, 
a compass and depth finder may be necessary tools for safe navigation in 
certain areas. 

Third, notification of accidents must be assured and also assured more 
promptly. Particularly where barges are concemed and an operator might be 
in some doubt about whether a tow has been lost or might have stmck 
somethings the rule must be-when in doubt, report. To enforce this 
requirement, the penalty for failure to report immediately must be increased 
significantly, and I recommend raising the maximum penalty from $1,000 to 
$25,000. 

Fourth, aids-to-navigation in the vicinity of bridges must be improved 
where necessary. I would like to point out that damaging an aid-to- 



43 



navigation can result in a criminal penalty of up to $2,500 and/or 
imprisonment up to a year, and the individual responsible must also pay to 
repair or reposition the aid-to navigation. Experience has proven this level of 
fine to be too low to justify extensive prosecution. Therefore, we should 
consider increasing the criminal penalty and instituting a civil penalty that 
can be assessed by the Coast Guard. Anyone who damages an aid-to- 
navigation must report it to the Coast Guard. Failure to report, particularly 
when an accident results, can lead to an adjudicative process culminating in 
severe penalties, up to revocation of the individual's license. 

Bridges that have been found to pose an unreasonable obstruction to 
navigation under the Truman-Hobbs Act must be repaired or replaced. 
Between 1980 and 1991, 773 tows struck bridges. Nine bridges presently 
have been declared unreasonable obstructions to navigation under the 
Truman-Hobbs Act and are either under design or reconstruction. 
Additionally, there are approximately 52 others that either are being or will 
be investigated to determine whether they are unreasonable obstructions to 
navigation according to the Tnunan-Hobbs criteria. I should note that the 
President's budget provides for funding to repair the highway bridges from 
the Highway Trust Fund. 

Many details of this four-pronged approach will de developed during 
the regulatory process. Where the Department could implement some of 
these proposals without a rulemaking or legislation, action is already 
underway. The curriculum of the maritime radar courses is under review to 
determine if the current courses are adequate for specialized operations on 
some waterways, particularly westem rivers. The review will also determine 
if the existing courses reflect state-of-the-art radar technology and 
operational procedures. The Conunander of the Eighth Coast Guard District 



44 



in New Orleans has established a Coast Guard- industry team to identify all 
waterways, including Bayou Canot, where new or additional aids-to- 
navigation may be needed. Similarly, a review of all bridges crossing 
navigable waters is underway. 

Additionally, there are certain issues that should be studied. 
Specifically, we should examine the adequacy and effectiveness of our 
manning and inspection requirements and look at whether the laws for all 
other commercial vessels on inspection and manning should apply to the 
inland-waterway towing industry. Traditionally, it was felt that, because of 
differing operating conditions, mandatory manning levels were not 
necessary and the cost of industry-wide Coast Guard inspection would be 
too high for any expected benefits. However, I am not satisfied with 
traditional approaches. Voluntary industry standards may be an appropriate 
approach to raising safety performance, but we should also examine whether 
governmental requirements are necessary. 

Statutory and regulatory provisions currently dictate the manning 
level of the navigation watch aboard a towing vessel. Both the work-hour 
limitations and the navigation watch provisions affect the manning 
complement on an uninspected towing vessel Qearly, all inland towing 
vessels should have someone aboard who is knowledgeable in the operation 
and maintenance of the engineering systems and an operator competent to 
pilot the vessel through the waters in which it is traveling. The larger 
question of whether masters, mates, engineers or pilots should be required is 
more difficult to answer. The industry is diverse and many towing 
companies are smaU. The Coast Guard has embarked on a major research 
project to develop an analytical, function-based model for rationalizing our 
approach to determining the minimum crew complement required for safe 



45 



operation of a vessel. The model will include workhour limits, hours of 
operation, and potential emergency situations as essential factors. Once 
completecWit will give us an accurate picture of how we should approach 
manning levels in the future. 

Safe transportation is my priority. I believe we should move now to 
bring the enhanced licensing and equipment requirements into force, and 
take a careful look at whether we need to do more in the areas of manning 
and inspections. The loss of life in the Judge Seeber Bridge collapse and the 
Amtrak derailment was devastating, but every day property is damaged and 
cargo lost in minor towing accidents. My recommendations will not only 
save lives, but make the shipment of goods by inland barge more reliable. 
The inland barge system is an extremely efficient and economical 
transportation method for many shippers. It is our job to make sure it is as 
safe as possible, for all. 

Technology has an extremely important role to play in towing vessel 
safety. The Global Satellite Positioning System, developed by the 
Department of Defense, and the augmentation of Differential Global 
Positioning System (DGPS), being developed for civil use by DOT agencies, 
will provide increased accuracy, productivity, safety and efficiency in sea 
navigation by providing marine navigators with the first precise, worldwide, 
continuous positioning and timing service. As a result, commercial shipping 
will be safer; more client, reliable and economical. Augmented with 
DGPS, an* combined with the developing Electronic Chart Display and 
Information System, it will significantly improve waterway and harbor 
safety. The pronounced safety benefits of these systems will be a major 
improvement in avoiding collisions and groundings, and the resulting human 
and environmental losses such events cause. I am very excited about the 



46 



possibilities of this new technology and therefore I support the 
recommended study in H.R. 3282. 

Even if we employ the latest technology for preventing accidents and 
improving survivability if one occurs, we must acknowledge that most 
accidents in all modes of transportation are caused by human error. Very 
few accidents are caused by equipment or structural failure; most are the 
result of poor judgment or performance by the operator of the equipment. A 
review of marine casualties for the period 1980 through 1991, involving 
towing vessels of fewer than 300 gross tons, shows that approximately 60% 
of the marine casualties were attributable to human error. Since the 
performance of the operator of the vessel is crucial in emergencies, we must 
ensure that the operator is well-trained, proficient in navigation, and alert. 
At the Department of Transportation, we have taken significant steps to 
reduce operator error. Mariners are already subject to the Department's 
rigid drug testing requirements and the Coast Guard's effective alcohol 
testing program. Under a proposal I discussed earlier, operators would be 
subject to licensing requirements, that would ensure proper training and 
proficiency with navigational and safety equipment 

I thank you for this opportunity to share my views on how we can 
increase safety in the vessel towing industry. Rather than offer legislation 
on behalf of the Administration, I would like to work with you and this 
Subcommittee to forge an overall approach that can be enacted and signed 
into law before September 22, 1994, the fu^t anniversary of the tragic Bayou 
Canot accident. 

Admiral Henn and I would now be happy to answer your questions. 



47 



\1^^^; WASHINGTON. D.C. 



#^P M*! THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION 



*'An%ft*' December 10, 1993 



The Honorable Geny Studds 
Chainnan, Committee on Merchant 

Marine and Fisheries 
U.S. House of Representatives 
Washington. D.C. 20515 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

On September 30. 1 wrote to the Congress outlining a series of safety reviews that I was 
initiating in the Department of Transportation, in response to the derailment of Amtrak's 
Sunset Limited near Mobile. Alabama. I now want to forward to you the resulting action 
plan that the Department is initiating in response to the tragic accident at Big Bayou 
CanoL 

As you know, the National Transportation Safety Board is continuing its investigation 
into the probable cause of the September 22 accident That investigation is expected to 
be completed early next year. 1 commend the Board for its work and, upon completion of 
the on-going investigation, look forward to receiving and promptly evaluating the Safety 
Board's recommendations. 

In the interim, however, there arc a number of critical safety initiatives identified in the 
Depanmcni's review of the Mobile accident and the subsequent emergency response that 
we believe should be undertaken immediately. These marine and rail safety initiatives 
arc outlined in detail in the enclosed repon. A separate set of actions designed to respond 
to recent highway-rail grade crossing accidents also is included in our action plan. In 
total. I believe these initiatives will enhance significantly the safety of our inland 
waterways and national system of railroads. 

I am committed to ensuring that safety remains the Department of Transportation's 
highest pnonty. 1 firmly believe that the initiatives oudined in this package will help 
improve transportation safety, a process that will continue as the Department prepares its 
Coast Guard and rail safety authonzauon bills for submission to the Congress early next 
year. I look forward to working with you and others in the Congress in the months to 
come to enhance the safety of the traveling public. 



Sincerely. 
Fedenco Peha 



Enclosure 



48 



Actions Initiat.e<l by the Departaient of Transportation 
to Enhance Safety on the Nation's Transportation System 

I. Response to the Derailment of Amtrak's Sunset Limited 

As a result of the fatal barge/railroad bridge accident near 
Mobile, Alabama on September 22, 1993, the Secretary of 
Transportation directed the U.S. Coast Guard and the Federal 
Railroad Administration (FRA) to review the circumstances 
surrounding the accident, and undertake initiatives to minimize 
the risk of any similar tragedy in the future. 

The preliminary work has now been completed and the Department has 
developed an action plan involving five emphasis areas: 

a. Developing more stringent licensing requirements for 
operators of uninspected towing vessels , 

b. Upgrading the requirements for radar and navigational 
equipment on board such ships, 

c. Improving the procedures whereby information concerning 
mishaps and collisions is reported, 

d. Seeking new means by which the structural integrity of 
bridges can be checked, and actions taken if damage occurs, 

e. Strengthening emergency preparedness, and enhancing the 
prospects for victims' survival if a crash occurs. 

Some of these actions will require rulemaking or legislation, and 
others will involve building closer %«>rking relationships with 
Amtrak and the other railroads, as well as State and local 
governments . 

A. Developing more stringent licensing requirements for operators 
of uninspected towing vessels . Licenses for operators of 
uninspected towing vessels (inland tugs, and seagoing tugs below 
300 gross tons, do not require Coast Guard inspection) will be 
expanded to recognize different levels of qualification. The 
Coast Guard will initiate a series of rulemakings that will 
propose the following: 

Licensees who have only minimum basic qualifications shoul<^ 
be restricted to those towing configurations, sizes and 
routes they are qualified to operate. 

Those who wish to increase the scope of their license should 
have to pass simulator courses and written examinations. 

All operators of radar-equipped towing vessels should be 
required 'to attend an approved radar observer training 
course. 



49 



- 2 



Applicants desiring to operate on mldwestern and certain Gulf 
state river routes must acquire operating experience on that 
route and pass an appropriate examination. 

The equivalency between licensed masters and mates of ships, 
and those who cpej-ate uninspected towing vessels will be 
reassessed. 

The Coast Guard will also emphasize the responsibility of towing 
vessel owners to employ qualified experienced personnel as 
operators in charge (or masters) of their vessels. 

B. UDoradinQ the requirements for radar and navigational equipment 
on board uninspected towing vessels . The accident might have been 
avoided if the tug operator had known where he was in the fog, and 
his relation to the bridge. The presence of marine radar and 
other navigational equipment, and an operator proficient in their 
use, may have prevented the barge from striking the bridge. 

The Coast Guard will initiate rulemaking to determine whether 
all uninspected towing vessels should carry a marine radar 
system for surface navigation, as well as marine charts for 
the area to be transited and current or updated publications. 
In addition, the rulemaking should seek to identify areas of 
operation where a compass, depth finder and other 
instrumentation are necessary tools for safe navigation. 

The Coast Guard will amend the Aids to Navigation Manual to 
address specifically the need to consider approaches to 
bridges in the design for aids to navigation systems. 

The Coast Guard, together with the Maritime Administration 
(MARAD) will review the existing standards of- the approved 
inland radar observer courses, to determine if the existing 
curriculum meets the operational and safety needs of the 
inland mariner. In addition, the review will also develop 
the standards necessary to reflect current technology. 

Each Coast Guard district will conduct a survey of all 
bridges under its jurisdiction and make case-.by-case 
determinations regarding the adequacy of existing systems, 
the need for additional tendering systems, and possibly 
additional bridge lighting. 

The Coast Guard will hold discussions with Congressional 
staff to include in H.R. 3282 provisions to link the 
requirement for compasses and fathometers to the area of 
operation of a towing vessel. 



50 



3 - 



C. improvino tihe procedures wh ereby information concerning mj-sha, _ 
and collisions is reported . A matter of significant concern is 
how quickly and effectively notification is given to authorities, 
work crews and response forces regarding such an episode. 

Tht Coast Guard will initiate a rulemaking proposing that the 
definition of marine casualties be expanded to include all 
collisions to bridges and other structures, and requiring 
that they be reported iiamediately (after all urgent safety 
concerns have been addressed ) . A related rulemaking covering 
mandatory notices of hazardous conditions will clarify that 
these conditions also include damage resulting from such 
collisions. 

To the extent needed after vessel strikes, FRA will assist 
the Coast Guard (at the field office level) in identifying 
railroads that control operations over active railroad 
bridges and providing emergency telephone ntimbers. 

The Coast Guard will initiate discussions on amending H.R. 
3282, or develop a separate legislative proposal, to increase 
the maximum civil penalty from $1,000 to $25,000 for failing 
to report a marine casualty as defined under 46 CFR 4.05-1. 

FRA has evaluated the need to strengthen procedures for 
verbal notification of railroad dispatching centers when 
bridges are struck and accidentally damaged by other 
transportation vessels or vehicles. It has determined that 
it is wise to vest coordination of bridge damage notification 
at a local level, rather than to attempt to pass information 
through centralized clearinghouses staffed by persons not 
familiar with the specific geography involved. Reliance on 
local resources is especially appropriate where, as in the 
case of the Mobile/Saraland accident, those most likely to 
make the report are not aware of their own precise location. 

D. Seeking new means bv which the structural integrity of bridges 
can be checked, and action taken if damag e occurs. Following the 
accident, FRA conducted a 10-year analysis of previous train 
accidents involving bridge failures induced by damage from vessels 
and vehicles — three involved bridges struck by highway vehicles 
and none by marine vessels. In 1992-3, FRA also reviewed railroad 
programs designed to ensure bridge structural safety, which 
indicated that most railroads, including all major railroads, have 
in place credible programs to inspect railroad bridges 
periodically and verify their structural integrity for loads 
allowed. The review also indicated the need to monitor the 
efforts of smaller railroads with respect to bridge safety. 

FRA is conducting a review of in-use or available automatic 
detection systems capable of identifying misalignment or 
other structural damage to railroad bridges and communicating 



51 



warning through the signal system or by other means. This 
review is expected to be completed by the end of January 
1994. 

FRA, in coordination with the Federal Highway Administration 
and the Coast Guard, is performing a technology review to 
ascertain v^ether new or emerging technologies offer the 
promise of more effective detection of bridge damage at 
lesser cost than traditional methods. This is also scheduled 
for completion by the end of January 1994. 

FRA will pursue the demonstration of any new technology that 
offers promise for more cost-effective application. 

FRA will include the issue of bridge damage in its analysis 
of incursions onto the railroad right-of-way under a 
forthcoming rulemaking on high speed rail. Lessons learned 
in this context may be transferable to conventional rail 
operations . 

FRA will adopt a policy for continuing effort in support of 
bridge structural safety by the end of 1993. 

E. Strenothenino emeroencv preparedness, and enhancing the 
prospects for victims' survival if a crash occurs . FRA has 
initiated, in coordination with Amtrak, a review of selected 
elements of emergency preparedness and response for passenger 
train accidents. They will 

Review Amtrak 's standard onboard emergency equipment, 
including emergency lighting; availability and ease of 
operation of emergency exits through doors , windows , roof , 
etc.; fire extinguisher; first aid kit; crowbar; and sledge 
hammer. A comparison of Amtrak with commuter and selected 
foreign operations should be complete by early 1994. 

Review Amtrak ' s program to train local emergency responders 
and determine adequacy of Amtrak 's current training material, 
which is prepared in videotape format. Amtrak has agreed to 
take a proactive approach in placing its training aids in the 
hands of emergency responders . 

Review procedures for providing additional emergency egress 
and other safety information to all passengers, such as using 
seat cards, video presentations, and public address 
announcements. Solutions will be evaluated for commuter rail 
and will be incorporated into revised passenger car safety 
standards when issued. 

Review and determine readiness of major railroad dispatching 
centers to respond to an emergency by promptly contacting 
local emergency responders in the affected jurisdiction. 



52 



5 - 



FRA instituted d review of Amtrak crash survivability issues, 
including the performance of the locomotives involved in the 
Alabama accident regarding crash survivability. Although the 
locomotives remained intact, the accident was not survivable due 
to the forces involved and the location where the lead locomotive 
came to rest (under water). Fuel tanks on all three locomotives 
failed, but this accident was not a valid test of the new 
compartmentalized design which was expected to limit fuel loss 
under much less catastrophic circumstances. 



II. ReinviQoratino the Departme nt's Safety Efforts Relating to 
Hiahwav-Ra il Grade Crossings. 

Recent serious transportation accidents, and particularly highway- 
rail collisions, highlight the concern we each share for safety in 
the national transportation system. While great progress has been 
made over the years in reducing fatalities at highway-rail 
crossings, a vehicle and a train collide nearly every ninety 
minutes somewhere in the U.S. 

In 1992, 579 individuals lost their lives in highway-rail crashes 
and nearly 2,000 others were injured. Collisions at highway-rail 
crossings are the 'leading cause of fatalities in the entire rail 
industry, far surpassing fatalities among rail passengers or 
employees. This is particularly disturbing because these 
accidents are preventable. 

The Department is now preparing an action plan, to be completed 
within 60 days, to reinvigorate our safety efforts relating to 
highway-rail grade crossings. It will be based on the following 
initiatives: , 

Develop integrated plans to safeguard the public through 
crossing closures, improved warning systems, better passive 
signage, grade separations, and other engineering 
improvements. Identify and promote specific system 
improvements at those crossings with active warning devices 
where, despite flashing lights or gates, 50 percent of 
fatalities occur. 

Review passive signage effectiveness and options. 

Review emergency notification procedures where crossing 
devices fail to work or vehicles are disabled at crossings. 

Ensure inclusion of crossing safety impacts in analysis of 
plans for Federally funded transportation projects. 

Increase public awareness by working with diverse groups such 
as Operation Lifesaver, Inc., the American Automobile 
Association, the National Association of Governors' Highway 



- fi - 



Safety Representatives, and others to strengthen public 
outreach during 1994 and beyond. 

Complete promptly FRA rulemakings dealing with grade crossing 
warning signals (maintenance, inspection, and testing), and 
locomotive alerting lights. 

Evaluate the results of ongoing research and development for 
actions that can yield additional safety benefits (e.g., 
locomotive horn effectiveness, ref lectorization of rolling 
stock, etc.) and review the R&D plan for crossing safety to 
ensure all affordable opportunities are exploited. 

Review the need for legislation or regulatory action to 
impose strict responsibilities on holders of private crossing 
rights commensurate with the crossing's risk to public users 
and rail operations. 



54 



Hearings on 

H.R. 3282 

The Towing Vessel Navigational Safety Act of 1993 



Statement of 

Thomas A. Allegretti 

President 

American Waterways Operators 



Before the 

Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation 

Conunittee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries 

U. S. House of Representatives 



March 3, 1994 



55 



Good morning, Chairman Tauzin and members of the Subcommittee. My name is Tom 
Allegretti and I am President of the American Waterways Operators (AWO)! AWO is 
the national trade association representing the inland and coastal barge and towing 
industry and the shipyards which build and service our industry's vessels. 

I appreciate the opportunity to again appear before the Subcommittee to provide AWO's 
assistance in your ongoing efforts to craft legislation which will ensure that inland river 
navigational safety is improved and enhanced. As you recall, Mr. Chairman, when I 
testified at the October 12 safety hearing, I pledged to you that AWO would work as a 
constructive partner to address this issue with you, the Congress, and the Department of 
Transportation, and I am most pleased to inform you that real progress has indeed been 
made toward reaching this most important goal. 

Immediately following the October hearing, AWO mobiUzed to bring before our Board 
of Directors the legislation you. Chairman Studds, and Ranking Members Fields and 
Coble introduced -- H.R. 3282, the Towii^ Vessel Navigational Scrfety Act of 1993 - which 
would require that towing vessels be equipped with certain navigational equipment not 
presently prescribed by law or regulation. As you know, Mr. Chairman, on October 26, 
we were able to advise you that AWO's Board voted overwhelmingly in favor of 
supporting the bill. We also promptly held extensive discussions with AWO's Executive 
Committee and developed specific comments and recommendations concerning the 
particular requirements set forth in your legislation, which we submitted to you by letter 
dated November 9. Additionally, during the time since we last met, AWO initiated the 
development of nine recommendations to improve navigation safety, which were 
approved by the AWO Board and submitted to the National Transportation Safety Board 
at its hearings in December. 

We will begin this morning by restating AWO's support for H.R. 3282. We note that 
most in the towing industry have long utilized and recognized this equipment as valuable 
in enhancing navigation safety. Given the diversity of towing industry operations, 
however, we also note that a particular navigation aid may add value in some locations, 
but have Umited or no utihty in others. Establishing navigation equipment requirements 
which apply to all towing vessels, in all circimistances, can consequently be problematic. 
We, therefore, believe it is essential that equipment requirements be based on the 
contribution which they will make to the saJFety of a vessel and its tow. 

Compasses , for example, are effective as a direction-identifying device on large, open 
bodies of water. However, on the twisting, far narrower river systems, direction 
references, and compasses in particular, are of very Umited utihty. Instead, the inland 
towing industry uses swing meters (rate-of-tum indicators) to identify changes in the 
location of the tow between river banks. Swing meters, along with jackstaffs, generate 
information about motion relative not only to other vessels, but also to fixed objects such 
as bridges, shorelines, or fixed navigational aids. Much attention has been given to the 
lack of compasses on towboats, implying an inadequacy in safety or an effort by the 
industry to save money. This is not the case. A compass simply is not a useful tool for 
operators on the inland system They are not as reactive or sensitive as rate-of-tum 
indicators. Moreover, a compass can generally be purchased for roughly $200, one-tenth 
the cost of the widely used rate-of-tum indicators. 

Similarly, fathometers have specific utihty in areas where water depth fluctuates or where 
deep-draft vessels are used, such as on the Lower Mississippi River. However, 
fathometers are of limited use to many vessel operations on the inland system (the Ohio, 
Tennessee, Cumberland, and other tributary rivers) where depth is not a problem. In 
addition, shift boats and other small vessels which operate in Umited geographic areas do 
not encounter problems with depth. 

Radar is another tool commonly used aboard inland towboats for detecting the presence 
or movement of objects in or near the waterway. However, for very small vessels which 
operate in limited geographic areas which do not present positioning, depth, and other 
navigational problems, radar may not fulfiU a practical, valuable function. We, therefore, 
recommend that the legislation be amended to grant the Coast Guard regulatory 
flexibility to (1) determine areas of operation where the specific equipment mandated in 
the bill needs to be used, and (2) determine whether small vessels operating in limited 
geographic areas need be required to add this equipment. 



56 



-2 



Finally, AWO's inquiriy into safety improvements has not been limited to the content of 
H.R. 3282. Instead, we have gone beyond the requirements of the legislation to consider 
other navigation equipment which will contribute to safe operations. We recommend 
that consideration be given to additionally requiring a searchlight, whistle light, and 
general alarm on towing vessels. This equipment, like the other included in H.R. 3282, is 
widely used in the inland towing industry and has proven useful as an aid to safe 
navigation and vessel operation. 

Marine charts and publications may also serve as important navigational aids. 
Nonetheless, we believe the Subcommittee should note that inland charts differ 
substantially from charts produced for coastal waters, and are, by themselves, of limited 
value to a vessel operator. Indeed, inland charts, which are more akin to waterway maps 
than traditional ocean charts, typically caution that they should not be used for 
navigational positioning purposes. To enhance the value of an inland chart, a towing 
vessel captain develops what is known as a "bar book" or "bar chart." A bar book begins 
as a standard marine chart but is annotated and personalized over time by a vessel 
operator to reflect the particular landmarks, changes in channel conditions, and the like, 
which the operator uses to navigate a given stretch of waterway. This personalized chart 
is among the most important of the navigational tools available to an inland towing 
vessel operator. Other useful publications include the Light List, a Coast Guard-issued 
publication which provides information on fixed aids to navigation and waterside 
structures, and the Local Notice to Mariners, also issued by the Coast Guard, which 
updates vessel operators on changing river conditions, lock closures, and special events 
which may impede navigation. 

AWO believes the Subcommittee should note that as drafted, H.R. 3282 applies only to 
towing vessels. In fact, all other commercial vessels under 1600 gross tons -- not just 
towing vessels -- are currently not covered by existing Coast Guard regulations regarding 
the enhanced equipment requirements envisioned in H.R. 3282. 

A very important issue raised by the bill's requiring new pieces of equipment concerns 
the legal impact such mandates will have on statutory " seaworthiness " requirements 
should the equipment fail or malfunction. For example, with radar required by statute, if 
a vessel's equipment malfunctions, it could be deemed "unseaworthy" should it continue 
to operate. Thus, a malfunction would cause the vessel to have to immediately anchor or 
moor - regardless of weather conditions, time of day, location, etc. -- until repairs are 
made. Such a costly mandate is clearly not warranted under all circumstances. 

This issue has been successfully dealt with before by 33 USC 1205, concerning the 
requirement that certain vessels carry radiotelephone equipment in order to communicate 
with other vessels. In that section, language was included which requires the vessel 
master to exercise due diligence to restore the communications equipment to effective 
operating condition "at the earliest practicable time." Section 1205 also provides that 
failure of a vessel's radiotelephone equipment "shall not, in itself, constitute a violation... 
nor shall it obligate the master of any vessel to moor or anchor his vessel." However, 
that statute does stipulate that the loss of radiotelephone capability shall be given 
consideration in the navigation of the vessel. We believe this language offers useful 
guidance for the development of H.R. 3282, and recommend that similar language 
addressing seaworthiness be added to the bill at mark-up. 

Section 5 of H.R. 3282 requires a report on the adequacy and effectiveness of licensing 
and manning requirements for operators of towing vessels. While we generally support 
study provisions reviewing our industry operations, we believe that events may have 
already overtaken the bill's mandates in this regard. Specifically, the review initiated by 
Secretary of Transportation Federico Pefta following the Amtrak derailment, and 
forwarded to Chairman Studds on December 10, included extensive recommendations 
concerning Coast Guard licensing initiatives. We note with interest the Secretary's public 
statements that the Department already has the requisite authority and expertise to take 
action in upgrading licensing requirements. We concur, and we applaud and support 
these activities. Thus, with this DOT report completed and licensing regulatory efforts 
already underway, it appears to us that the study envisioned in Section 5 has been 
eclipsed. We, therefore, recommend that the section be redrafted to instead ask the 
Secretary to report to the Congress on progress made to improve licensing requirements. 



57 



During this interim period, AWO pledges to continue to work with the Coast Guard, and 
will particularly focus our efforts on the following licensing issues which we believe will 
lead us in the direction of a better, safer waterway system for the future. 

• Existing Coast Guard requirements for licensing towing vessel operators, masters, 
and mates focus heavily on knowledge and experience requirements and do not 
include a demonstration or test of an applicant's navigational proficiency. Many 
companies have instituted their own systems for performing such checks before they 
will entrust to a prospective captain responsibility for a company tow. We believe it 
is appropriate to consider including in the licensing process a requirement that an 
operator's proficiency be checked by a qualified person within the company. 

• Similarly, we believe it makes sense to consider including such an attestation of 
proficiency in the license renewal process to ensure that a vessel operator maintains 
his or her navigational and boat handling skills. 

• Companies should also be required to ensure that an operator is competent to 
handle his or her tow, given the variety of factors which may prevail in a particular 
situation (tow size, horsepower, geography, river and weather conditions, etc.). 
Given the number and complexity of the factors to which consideration must be 
given, however, great care must be taken in developing licensing requirements that 
are tied to one or more particular factors. 

• While not likely to play a role in reducing vessel casualties (collisions, allisions, 
groundings), we believe entry-level training has value in preventing personal injuries 
suffered by towing vessel crews. As such, it is a worthwhile component of a 
company's overall safety program. To this end, we support the ongoing work of the 
Towing Safety Advisory Committee to develop voluntary guideUnes (via a Coast 
Guard Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular) for the training of entry-level 
personnel. 

• Greater standardization of initial notification procedures for reporting marine 
casualties would be of benefit to both industry and the Coast Guard in eliminating 
inconsistency and confusion. Pilot industry /Coast Guard projects to institute 
standardized notification procedures are currently underway in the Second and 
Eighth Coast Gu£u-d Districts. We beUeve such efforts have merit and deserve 
consideration on a broader scale. 

AWO's focus on these areas is significantly similar to those conclusions and 
recommendations reached by Secretary Pena's smdy, demonstrating remarkable 
agreement between industry and the Department of Transportation. This bodes well in 
two respects. The first is that we have really identified the most productive avenues to 
pursue. The second is that given these common views, the regulatory process should be 
facilitated, without undue delay because of fundamental chasms between industry and 
government. Indeed, AWO has actively assisted the Coast Guard in conducting its study 
and will continue to work with them to facilitate and ensure that the process of 
instituting these safety recommendations progresses. For these reasons, Mr. Chairman, 
AWO believes that you may take comfort in the fact that this process will work, and that 
it will produce beneficial results. 

Returning to the bill's Section 5 maiming study, as in the case of licensing, we suggest 
work to address this issue is already underway. As you know, Mr. Chairman, the Coast 
Guard has circulated for discussion an early draft of legislation which proposes a variety 
of changes in current manning requirements. Both labor and industry are fully engaged 
in the process, and detailed comments including proposed modifications have been 
submitted to the Coast Guard to move this initiative forward. Thus, we suggest that 
Congress allow the process to continue on its cooperative course and not reverse the 
effort ab-eady underway by mandating the proposed study. Committee oversight will 
certainly be exercised in this area when the Coast Guard submits to you its proposed 
legislative package. 

In addition to workiog with you and the Subcommittee on H.R. 3282, AWO also 
provided extensive testimony on December 14 to the National Transportation Safety 
Board in its investigation of the Amtrak Sunset Limited accident. Much of the attention 
of both government and industry in the wake of the Amtrak accident has focused on the 
crucial role of a vessel and its personnel in ensuring navigation safety. While this is a 



58 



natural and necessary line of inquiry, we believe it is also important to look beyond the 
vessel and its crew to the safety of the waterway system in which they operate. If we are 
serious about improving navigation safety for all waterway users, we must also look to 
the safety of the waterways themselves and to the adequacy of the aids to navigation, 
marking systems, and protective structures established to help vessel operators navigate 
around bridges and other obstructions on the rivers. We believe the most meaningful 
safety solutions will be those which address each Unk in the navigation safety chain. 

As you know, the casualty under investigation before the Safety Board specifically 
focused considerable attention on the issue of barge and towing vessel allisions with 
bridges and on the frequency with which barges and towing vessels are involved in 
accidents. This issue was also raised by the Chairman and others during the 
Subcommittee hearing last year. 

While this is a pertinent area of investigation for both the NTSB and Congress, statistics 
cited in the wake of the casualty have unfortunately been alarming, contradictory, and 
frequently misleading. One newspaper, for example, reported that barges and towing 
vessels are involved in as many as four accidents a day! Such statistics are not only 
unsupported by Coast Guard casualty data, but also fail to take into account the nature 
of the towing vessel "casualties" reported. In fact, some 58% of dynamic casualties 
involving barges and towing vessels are groundings, the majority of which result in no 
damage to life, property, or the environment. Indeed, because federal regulations 
require reporting of all accidental groundings, even an incident in which a vessel touches 
bottom in mid-channel and proceeds without hindrance -- a common occurrence on 
alluvial river systems such as the Mississippi -- is logged in government files as a "marine 
casualty." 

In an effort to learn more about towing vessel alUsions with bridges, and to determine 
the severity of this problem vis-a-vis public safety, AWO undertook an examination of 
Coast Guard data on bridge allisions for the years 1980 through 1991. Our review of this 
data revealed several interesting patterns which we believe will be of particular interest 
to the Subcommittee. 

First, Coast Guard data indicates that bridge allisions are not a frequent occurrence on 
the inland river system. During the 12-year period 1980 through 1991, barges and towing 
vessels were involved in some 772 allisions with 292 bridges, or 1.6% of the 
approximately 18,000 bridges which span the nation's inland waterways. This record must 
also be considered in the context of total vessel transits. For example, one of the most 
notoriously difficult bridges to transit on the Upper Mississippi River (Crescent Rock) 
was hit 16 times between 1980 and 1991. During this period, however, some 38,000 tows 
passed through the bridge. Thus, the actual rate at which allisions with this bridge 
occurred was one in almost 2,375 transits. 

Second, the data indicates that bridge hits have not been widely dispersed throughout the 
river system, but have instead tended to involve a small group of "problem" bridges. The 
vast majority of the 292 bridges struck by barges or towing vessels between 1980 and 
1991 were hit only once or twice. By contrast, a group of only 16 bridges accounted for 
some 37% of the allisions which occurred during that period. This concentration 
suggests that certain bridges have consistently posed problems for commercial inland 
navigators and may, in fact, be unreasonable obstructions to commercial navigation. 

Interestingly, a comparison of those bridges which have most frequently been hit and 
those bridges identified by the Coast Guard as actual or potential obstructions to 
navigation under the Truman-Hobbs Act reveals remarkable consistency. (The Truman- 
Hobbs Act mandates that "No bridge shall at any time unreasonably obstruct the free 
navigation of any navigable waters of the United States." If a bridge is deemed such, 
either on account of insufficient height, width of span, or otherwise, or if there is 
difficulty in passing the draw opening or the drawspan of such bridge, the Secretary of 
Transportation is to require that alterations be made to render navigation through or 
under the bridge "reasonably free, easy, and unobstructed.") Significantly, each of the six 
bridges on the Upper Mississippi River which sustained 10 or more hits over the 12-year 
period ~ as well as many of the other more-frequently-hit bridges on the inland system - 
- is currently under alteration, awaiting alteration design, or on the high priority list as 
qualifying for alterations under the Truman-Hobbs Act. 



-5- 

These collision-prone bridges were generally built with little regard for commercial 
navigation, making transit through the bridge difficult for river traffic. They may have 
been constructed with draws too narrow to safely accommodate vessel passage or leave 
room for error, or placed in locations prone to fog or above river stretches with tight 
bends and tricky cross-currents. Many of these bridges were also constructed with poorly 
protected fenders and deflection devices. 

The Coast Guard statistics strongly suggest that bridge allisions are not an across-the- 
board industry operations problem, but rather one closely linked to the design, 
construction, and location of particular bridges. This suggests that attempts to reduce the 
incidence of bridge hits should begin with a determination of the level of danger posed 
by each bridge in terms of its potential to obstruct commercial navigation. AWO and the 
towing industry have been actively involved in making such determinations, and we are 
working regionally with the Coast Guard to identify and prioritize changes which should 
be made to bridges within specific river segments. Indeed, we have already submitted, in 
concert with the Gulf Intracoastal Canal Association and the Warrior-Tombigbee 
Development Association, a list of 17 bridges identified by waterway users as posing 
long-term navigation problems to the Commander of the Eighth Coast Guard District. 

Given the critical role bridge location has in navigational safety, we are particularly 
concerned that the Administration's FY 95 budget proposes that highway bridges 
determined to be an obstruction to navigation wUl be funded through the federal-aid 
highway program instead of via the existing separately-funded Coast Guard program. We 
are concerned the navigation-related bridge designations will be lost if the program is 
separated from direct Coast Guard responsibility and, therefore, recommend the 
Subcommittee oppose this program alteration. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I unfortunately feel compelled to again voice our strong objection 
to requiring Merchant Mariners Documents (MMDs) for deckhands and cooks serving in 
the inland fleet. Although the Coast Guard clearly shsires our view that MMDs ~ which 
require no training or showing of marine competence as a prerequisite to issuance ~ are 
in no way related to improving safety on the waterways, we understand efforts are 
nevertheless underway to add this requirement to H.R. 3282. In our view, this does an 
extreme disservice to the valuable, safety-enhancing provisions of your proposal by adding 
an unnecessary, special interest requirement which serves no pubhc policy purpose. It 
clearly detracts from this most important and worthwhile effort. If the votes are there to 
pass the MMD proposal, we only ask that the issue be considered separately - on its 
own merits - and not gain a fi-ee ride on an important piece of legislation. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to address the Subcommittee today on 
safety issues which are of utmost concern to oiu' industry. I would be happy to answer 
any questions members of the Subcommittee may have. 



COAST GUARD AND NAVIGATION SUBCOMMITTEE 

PUBLIC HEARING OF H.R. 3282 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

STATEMENT OF 

CAPTAIN JOHN R. SUTTON 

PRESIDENT 

AMERICAN INLAND MARINERS ASSOCIATION 

MARCH 3, 1994 



61 



I. INTRODDCTION 

Good morning, Chairman Tauzin and members of the subcommittee, 
my name is Captain John R. Sutton. I hold the following United 
States Coast Guard licenses: Master, First Class Pilot, and 
Operator of Uninspected Towing Vessel. I also hold an Unlimited 
Radar Observers certificate approved by the Coast Guard. 

I have come to Washington, D.C. , today to speak to the 
subcommittee both individually as a professional mariner, and also 
in my capacity as the President of American Inland Mariners 
Association. American Inland Mariners Association is a newly 
formed association of United States Coast Guard licensed and 
documented "inland mariners". Inland mariners are those employed on 
the inland waterways of the United States. We generally work aboard 
towboats that push barges on the nation's rivers. This is to be 
contrasted with "blue water mariners", employed on deep sea or 
ocean going vessels. 

While the duties and safety concerns of the inland as opposed 
to the blue water mariner are vastly different, this difference, 
unfortunately, is often not taken into consideration by regulatory 
agencies when promulgating safety regulations. We have therefore 
organized for the purpose of developing our own voice within the 
maritime community. 

One of the goals of American Inland Mariners Association is to 
assist mariners with the increasingly complex United States Coast 
Guard licensing and renewal process. The association also seeks to 
improve the safety of our nations inland waterways, through 
increased communication with the regulating agencies of our 
industry and improved communication with our industry leaders. That 
is our purpose for participating in these hearings. 

We have come here today to express our opinion on H.R. 3282, 
also known as the "Towing Vessel Navigation Safety Act of 1993". 
We also wish to make some recommendations of our own for improved 
waterways safety. These are based on our experience as professional 
mariners and towboat operators. Finally, we wish to discuss some of 
the recommendations that have been made by the United States Coast 
Guard in the "Review of Marine Safety Issues Regarding Uninspected 
Towing Vessels". This report was prepared by the Office of 
Navigation Safety and Waterway Services and the Office of Marine 
Safety, Security and Environmental Protection. 

II. Comments on H.R. 3282 

We would like to commend the sponsors of H.R. 3282 for 
responding to the void in the regulation of uninspected towing 
vessels. American Inland Mariners Association recognizes the 
necessity for minimal navigational safety equipment required on 
today's commercial towing vessels. However, while American Inland 
Mariners Association supports H^R. 3282 in theory, we do not 
support this specific piece of legislation as it is presently 
written. We feel that while it may satisfactorily address safety 
concerns relative to blue water vessels, it is too broad and in 
many respects is simply not tailored to the safety needs of the 
inland maritime industry and its mariners. 

Our position on each section of the proposed legislation is as 
follows: 

Sec. 2 Navigational Publications and Equipment 

We at American Inland Mariners Association generally approve 
the five pieces of navigational equipment prescribed by this 
section. However, all five pieces of equipment are not necessary 
for all vessels. For example, a compass is essential for vessels 
that transit bays, sounds, and other areas of open water. However, 
a compass is useless for vessels that only transit rivers. 



62 



Fathometers (depthf inders) are useful navigational aids for 
vessels that regularly transit where water depth fluctuates. 
However, fathometers are not essential for vessels that transit in 
areas in which water depth fluctuation is not a problem. Examples 
of these are fleet shift boats and vessels that transit waters 
maintained by the United States Corps of Engineers to specific 
project depths. 

This section is an example of indiscriminate legislation that 
does not differentiate between the problems of inland and blue 
water navigation. Navigational equipment should only be required 
where it is needed. Requiring equipment that is unnecessary for the 
specific situation, such as discussed above, will result in an 
unnecessary financial burden for vessel owners without an increase 
in maritime safety. 

In lieu of a compass for vessels that regularly transit rivers 
we would like to suggest to the committee that a "rate of turn 
meter", also known as a "swing meter", be substituted as prescribed 
equipment on towing vessels that regularly transit the "Western 
Rivers". This has been a recognized and important piece of 
navigational equipment on large river towboats for many years. It 
provides the mariner with a tool that will tell him/her if the 
vessel is turning to the port (left) or starboard (right) . 

Sec. 3 Proficiency in Use of Navigational Safety Equipment". 

We at American Inland Mariners Association interpret this to 
mean that the mariner will be required to obtain and maintain Radar 
Observers Certificates for the issuance and renewal of a license to 
operate uninspected towing vessels. Most professional mariners 
would not object to such radar certificates of proficiency. Nearly 
all inland mariners, however, object to the certificate as it is 
administered today. 

The current Maritime Administration and Coast Guard approved 
course is adapted to the needs of deep sea mariners. The course 
teaches the mariner a mathematical triangulation for determining 
the closest point of approach (C.P.A.). Determining a vessel's 
C.P.A. allows the mariner to make a determination as to whether 
her/she should alter the course and speed of the vessel to prevent 
a collision at sea. While necessary for deep sea mariners, however, 
this is not a useful navigational aid for inland mariners 
transiting a twisting, turning river. 

As a pilot of one of the largest river towboats on the 
Mississippi River that regularly moves forty loaded barges down the 
river, weighing in excess of 65,000 gross tons, I can tell you from 
experience that I would not be able to safely navigate my vessel, 
act as lookout, and make an accurate C.P.A. plot to determine if a 
risk of collision existed. 

The "Radar Observers" course as taught today simply does not 
reflect accurate working conditions for inland mariners and should 
be adapted to do so. 

Sec. 4 Reporting Marine Casualties 

As professional mariners we have no objection to the reporting 
of marine casualties as soon as practicable. In fact, timely 
reporting often prevents the public and other mariners from 
experiencing casualties. 

As we in the maritime community know, however, some allisions 
involve only slight contact between a vessel and a structure, such 
as a bridge fendering system, with no damage incurred to the 
structure. While such allisions are most common on the Upper 
Mississippi and Illinois rivers, they are not limited solely to 
these areas. 



The restricted navigational spans of some highway and railroad 
bridges is the cause of the majority of the incidents involving 
such slight contact. It is not uncommon for towboats, with tows 
1000 ft. by 105 ft., to transit bridges having as little as eight 
feet of horizontal clearance.^ Incidental contact with the 
tendering systems of such bridges is unavoidable. Such incidental 
contact, however, does not compromise the structural integrity of 
these bridges, or cause structural damage to the vessels involved. 

As stated above, American Inland Mariners Association feels 
that the prompt reporting of all maritime casualties is important. 
However, we do want the subcommittee to know that sometimes 
incidental contact between a vessel and a structure such as a 
bridge is unavoidable, due to circumstances beyond the control of 
the mariner.^ 

Sees. 5 & 6 Report on Adequacy and Effectiveness of Manning 
and Licensing Requirements for Operation of Towing Vessels; Report 
on Feasibility of Differential Global Positioning System for Inland 
Waterways. 

While American Inland Mariners Association has an opinion on 
each of these areas, we will defer comment on these subjects until 
the Secretary of Transportation has submitted his reports to 
Congress. 

III. suggested Safety Improvements 

We feel that if Congress and the Department of Transportation 
truly want to improve the safety of our nation's waterways, 
legislation must be enacted to cover many areas other than just 
minimal navigation equipment and the proficiency testing of the 
mariners that use such equipment. 

With the improvement of today's river towboat and the 
improvement of our nation's waterways by the Army Corp. of 
Engineers Dike Program, commercial towing vessels move 40% to 50%. 
more cargo today than thirty years ago. One of the major problems 
that we mariners see on a daily basis, however, is that we are 
currently navigating railway and highway bridges that were not 
designed and built to accommodate the size of the tows and traffic 
flow that currently transit through them today. 

Some Congressional action that we feel will improve the safety 
of our inland waterways with regard to bridges and aids to 
navigation are as follows: 

(1) Increased funding to the United States Coast Guard Bridge 
Program to provide adequate resources for the inspection of all 
bridges that cross navigable waters to determine the adequacy of 
existing bridge tendering and lighting systems. 

(2) Mandate an in depth study of United States Coast Guard 
"Marine Casualties Data" to determine the bridges most frequently 
struck by commercial traffic. A study of this nature would provide 
the United States Coast Guard and Congress with the needed 
information to determine those bridges that do in fact pose a 
navigational hazard to commercial towing vessels. Once those 
bridges are so identified, funding can be provided through the 



An example of such a bridge is the Elgin, Joliett, and 
Eastern (the E.J.& E.) Railroad Bridge, Mile 270.6, Illinois River. 
This bridge has a horizontal clearance of only 113.6 ft. 

^ In addition to the problem of restricted bridge spans, 
other unavoidable causes of incidental contact include currents, 
mechanical failure, weather, and visibility. 



64 



"Truman-Hobbs Act of 1940", 33 U.S.C.§ 523, to rectify the problem. 

(3) Amend bridge statutes and regulations to contain 
authority to retroactively require the fendering of bridges that 
significantly restrict navigational clearances. It is my 
understanding that this may be achieved by amending the "Ports and 
Waterways Safety Act", 33 U.S.C. § 121 et seq. . and 33 C.F.R. 
§ 118.40. 

(4) Amend bridge statutes to impose a substantial penalty on 
bridges owners who continue to neglect bridge lighting. 

(5) Increase funding to the United States Coast Guard for the 
study of improving aids to navigation on and near all bridges that 
cross navigable waterways. 

(6) Impose a substantial penalty on owners of structures such 
as docks, electrical highline towers, and barge fleeting areas, who 
continue to neglect the required lighting of such structures in 
navigable waters. 

(7) Require the issuance of endorsements requiring basic 
navigational knowledge and skills to operators of small 
recreational watercraft that share the navigable waterways with 
commercial traffic. There are millions of recreational watercraft 
that share the inland waterways with commercial vessels. Thousands 
of these watercraft operators are not familiar with the "Rules of 
the Road". The operators of such watercraft pose a hazard to 
navigation not only to fellow boaters, but also to commercial 
towing vessels and the professional mariners that operate them. 

Mr. Chairman, these are just a few recommendations that we 
feel would improve the overall safety of our nations waterways. 
The commercial towing industry and our nations waterways are a 
diverse and complicated system. We feel that no one piece of 
legislation will be able to truly improve waterway safety and 
improve the safety of the traveling public without first 
researching all parameters of the maritime industry. 

IV. Proposed simulator Training for Operators of 
Dninspected Towing Vessels 

In the United States Coast Guard's "Review of Marine Safety 
Issues Regarding Uninspected Towing Vessels"^, the Coast Guard has 
made nineteen specific recommendations regarding the standards for 
obtaining and renewing the Operator of Uninspected Vessels (OUTV) 
license. Of these nineteen recommendations, three recommendations 
specifically require mariners to pass Coast Guard approved 
simulator training examinations for acquiring, increasing the scope 
of, and renewal of the OUTV license. 

To my personal knowledge there are only two such simulator 
training facilities in the United States that have courses adapted 
to the needs of the inland waterways. Of these two courses, neither 
is currently capable of determining the proficiency of a mariner 
working on a large towboat that handles tows or flotillas of barges 
weighing in excess of 25,000 gross tons. 

If the Coast Guard does adopt such required simulator 
training, the expense would be born by the mariner and not his/her 
employer. Course fees currently cost in excess of $2,000.00 and 
would be required every five years when a mariner renews his/her 
license. 

There is no doubt that in the future simulators may play an 



' Memorandum from the Chief, Office of Marine Safety, 
Security and Environmental Protection, to the Commandant, United 
States Coast Guard, dated December 1, 1993. 



65 



important role in testing the proficiency of mariners. However, the 
cost of such simulation for an individual that makes $25,000 to 
$45,000 per year would be unduly burdensome given the benefit that 
can be currently derived from such testing. 

V. Conclusion 

The members of American Inland Mariners Association and I 
respectfully request that the Coast Guard and Navigation 
subcommittee hold several other hearings pertaining to the 
regulation of the OUTV license now issued by the United States 
Coast Guard. We would suggest that meetings be held in the East 
Coast, Mid-West, Gulf -South and West-Coast regions to allow a wide 
and diverse attendance of inland mariners. This would allow the 
subcommittee to obtain opinions from several hundred professional 
mariners, rather than just from the maritime industry lobby and the 
labor unions that represent only a small percentage of today's 
inland mariners. 

Enclosed is a list of inland towing companies that have 
offered to allow the subcommittee members to board and ride their 
towboats. This would give the members the opportunity to observe 
the day to day operations of an inland river vessel, and the 
various conditions that confront the inland mariner in his/her 
occupation. American Inland Mariners Association and I would 
like to thank the subcommittee for allowing our opinions -to be 
entered into the record. We would also like to thank Representative 
Tauzin and his office for arranging to place us on the official 
witness list for this hearing. 



66 



Natural Resources 
Defense Council 

40 West 20th Stral 
New York. New York 10011 
111 727-Z700 
fax Z12 727-1773 



TESTIMONY OF 



NATtJRAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL 
CHESAPEAKE BAY FOUNDATION 



HR 3282 

TOWING VESSEL NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY ACT 

of 1993 



Before the 



SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND NAVIGATION 

COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 



March 3, 1994 PREPARED BY: 

W.J. Schrenk 
Attorney, NRDC 

Ann Powers 

Vice President and 

General Counsel, CBF 



1350 New York Ave. . N. W. 71 Stevenson Street 6310 San Vicente Bhd . Suite 250 212 Merchant St. . Suite 203 

Washington. DC 20005 San Francisco. CA 94105 Los Angeles. CA 9004S Honolulu. Hawai i 96813 

202 783-7800 415 777-0220 213 934-6900 803 533-1075 

Fax 202 783-5917 Fax 415 495-5996 Fax 213 934-UlO Fax 808 521-6841 



67 



The Natviral Resources Defense Covmcll and the 
Chesapeake Bay Foundation welcome the opportunity to make 
this statement to support the measures called for by HR 3282 
and the recommendations contained in the recent Coast Guard 
Review of Marine Safety Issues Related to Uninspected Towing 
Vessels. We also wish to comment on the urgent need for 
additional measures to improve safety in barge and towing 
vessel operations. With more than 170,000 members 
throughout the country, NRDC has participated in the 
development of federal and state legislation and regulations 
on issues relating to marine oil spill prevention and has 
published reports on barge and tanker safety in U.S. ports 
and waterways - No Safe. Harbor in 1990 and Safety at Bay in 
1992. CBF focuses on environmental issues relating to 
Chesapeake Bay, the largest estuary and one of the most 
environmentally sensitive coastal areas in the U.S., and is 
about to publish a new report on oil transport safety on the 
Bay. CBF has approximately 86,000 members, mainly in the 
Bay area. 

The safety of tank barge operation is a matter of 
vital importance and growing concern for the protection of 
life, property and the marine and coastal environments. In 
U.S. waters, there are about 5,800 tugs and towboats and 
31,000 barges, including 4,000 tank barges that carry oil 
and other liquid cargoes. Barges carry about 30% of all oil 
transported in the U.S. and a much larger percentage of that 
transported on U.S. inland and coastal waters. 

Barge groundings and collisions account for a very 
large part of the oil spilled in U.S. waters— nearly 
2 million gallons during a recent two-year period and more 
in some years thah tanker accidents. According to the 
American Waterways Operators, there were 36 barge groundings 
and collisions on the Hudson River alone during the years 
1981-1989, resulting from human factors. The two largest 
oil spills in Chesapeake Bay resulted from accidents 
involving barges and towboats, spilling more than half a 
million gallons. 

Barges generally operate in nearshore waters with 
greater environmental sensitivity and hazards to navigation, 
often amid heavy traffic of tankers and other ocean-going 
vessels. Traffic on many bays, ports and waterways is 
dominated by barges and their towing vessels. 

Barges are restricted in their movements, and 
handling them in ports and channels can be more difficult 



than handling self-propelled vessels. The Coast Guard 
points out that towing operations present unique 
shiphandling and seamanship considerations. 

Recent accidents have heightened concern eUsout the 
safety of tug/barge operations and the adequacy of present 
federal legislation and regulations. In September 1993 a 
tragic accident occurred on the Big Bayou Canot in Alabama, 
when the uninspected towboat Mauvilla with six barges 
apparently became lost in fog without the benefit of a chart 
of the area and strayed into an impassable bayou, striking a 
railroad bridge. An Amtrak train was derailed while 
crossing the bridge, resulting in the death of 47 passengers 
and crew. 

Less than four months later the single-hull barge, 
Morris J. Bermac . towed by an uninspected towboat, grounded 
on a coral reef off the resort beaches near San Juan, Puerto 
Rico, when a reportedly defective towline broke - for the 
second time on its brief coastwise voyage. More than 
600,000 gallons of heavy fuel oil were spilled in the 
groiinding — plus 100,000 more when the barge was scuttled — 
fouling beaches and causing other natural resource damage. 
Early reports said cleanup expenses to date exceeded 
$30 million. 

The circumstances of these two accidents, as 
reported, strongly indicate that they were attributable 
primarily to personnel and equipment deficiencies and 
reflected inadequate regulatory standards. 

Dealing with the failures and deficiencies that 
led to these particular accidents is not enough. The next 
accidents will be caused by other deficiencies, unless they 
are dealt with now. 

Coast Guard Review and HR 3282 . Concern about 
towing safety following the Mauvilla accident prompted the 
Secretary of Transportation to request a Coast Guard study, 
leading to its December 1993 "Review of Marine Safety issues 
Related to Uninspected Towing Vessels" (the Review) . The 
Review is an important document, containing valuable 
discussion of towing vessel operations. It states that 
uninspected towing vessels were involved in 7,664 casualties 
directly attributable to personnel errors during the years 
1980-1991; and nearly two-thirds of these casualties 
involved uninspected towing vessels under 300 gross tons. 



The Review contains important conclusions and 
reconunendations . One of its most important conclusions is 
that a towing vessel and the barge or barges that it tows 
should be considered a single system — that the towboat is 
not a stand-alone unit. The Review also concludes that the 
training/ Knowledge and experience required under present 
rules are inadequate for many levels and types of service — 
and that navigation equipment and information needed for the 
operation of the tug/barge unit should be prescribed by 
regulation. It makes recommendations to meet these 
deficiencies, with emphasis on higher licensing standards, 
simulator training and testing, and navigation equipment, 
charts and publications. 

HR 3282 covers some of the same issues as the 
Review and calls for studies of manning and licensing 
requirements and use of the global positioning system for 
inland waterway traffic. 

we wholeheartedly support the provisions contained 
in HR 3282 and those recommended by the Coast Guard Review. 
But we believe they stop far short of the improvements in 
tug/barge regulation that are called for. 

The following are key additional subjects that we 
believe should be addressed promptly by legislation or 
regulation. 

(1) Inspection. Inspection procedures are 
designed to ensure adequacy of structure, manning, equipment 
and operating condition. Under present law as applied, 
towing vessels are not subject to inspection unless they are 
seagoing coastwise vessels and are 300 gross tons or more in 
size. This exempts from inspection most coastwise and all 
inland towboats - including those involved in the Alabama 
and Puerto Rico accidents. 

A tug of less than 300 tons can tow barges many 
times its size - barges that are themselves subject to 
inspection if they are tank barges. 

We strongly support action to make towing vessels 
subject to inspection under Title 46 of the U.S. Code. 

(2) Treatment as Tank vessels. A towboat exists 
to propel barges. As the Coast Guard concluded in its 
Review, a towboat and barge should be regarded as a single 
unit. 



70 



We believe therefore that towboats used to tow 
tank barges should be treated as tank vessels for all 
relevant purposes, such as manning and navigation. They 
should be subject to Chapter 37 of Title 46, which provides 
for the regulation and inspection of vessels engaged in 
"carriage of liquid bulk dangerous cargoes", and to other 
laws and regulations that apply to tank vessels. If this 
purpose cannot be achieved by regulation under present law, 
we urge that the necessary legislation be included in the 
pending bill. 

(3) Training and Licensing. The primary causes 
of accidents in the tug/barge industry are related to 
personnel error. Present standards for licensing operators 
of towing vessels are among the lowest set by the Coast 
Guard for any professional qualification. Proficiency is 
not tested or evaluated. Service requirements are limited. 
In testimony before this subcommittee at a hearing held in 
June 1991, James H. Sanborn, Executive Vice President of 
Maritrans GP Inc., one of the largest independent U.S. tank 
barge companies, stated that present coast Guard standards 
are unaccepteible ; that sharply increased standards of 
training and demonstrated proficiency are necessary; and 
that training and licensing standards and methods of 
determining competency for towing vessel officers under 
present rules are inadequate. 

This same company requires at least 5 to 7 years 
of supervised and evaluated training and experience for 
officers of their coastal or port barge units — more for 
large units. As a result, it says its accident rate has 
been reduced to one-third the level of a decade ago. 
According to information furnished by The American Waterways 
Operators, some other major towing companies also apply 
standards of supervised and evaluated training and 
experience far greater than those required by Coast Guard 
regulations. 

Leading towing companies thus protect their own 
vessels, cargoes and crews, through the standards they apply 
for their own personnel. The public is entitled to 
comparable protection, for their safety and for protection 
of the marine and coastal environment, through coast Guard 
rules applicable to all operators - including small or 
marginal ones that may not voluntarily apply suitable 
standards. According to Coast Guard data, the majority of 
companies in the coastwise towing industry operate only one 



71 



of two barges, and many of these companies are 
undercapitalized. 

We urge the Coast Guard to strengthen 
substantially the licensing standards for towboat operators 
and to include not only the measures recommended in its 
Review but also high standards of supervised and evaluated 
training and experience and testing of proficiency for all 
levels of qualification. 

(4) Pilotage. We believe that when in pilotage 
waters all barges over a minimum tonnage (for example, 1,000 
tons) that are subject to federal jurisdiction, including 
the towing vessels that propel them, should be under the 
direction and control of a pilot holding a federal license 
or pilotage endorsement for the waters being traversed. 1/ 

Under present federal law and regulations, 
towboats and barges in inland trade are not siibject to 
pilotage requirements. Seagoing coastwise tugs over 
300 gross tons and barges are in principle subject to 
pilotage under present law but have the benefit of exemption 
under a Coast Guard rule issued in 1985. 2/ This rule 
exempts self-propelled vessels (including tugs) of 1,600 
gross tons or less and tank barges of 10,000 gross tons or 
less (including those carrying oil or other dangerous 
cargoes) from employing personnel who hold federally issued 
pilots' licenses. Instead these barges and tugs may be 
"piloted" by the operator of the tug if he meets certain 
minimal requirements, without hands-on experience, 
supervised training or an examination of skill and 
knowledge; under the rule, the operator is said to "serve 
as" pilot. These requirements are substantially less than 
those for federal pilots' licenses. 3/ Moreover, the Coast 
Guard does not oversee or attempt to verify or ensure 
compliance with even these minimal requirements, for the 



i/ State pilotage requirements apply only to the very 
few tug/barge units that are engaged in foreign trade. 

Z/ Prior to 1985, federally licensed pilots were 
required for barges over 1,000 tons. 

1/ And even the federal license requirements are 
generally regarded as only the threshold or entry-level 
standard for a genuine program of pilot training and 
qualification. 



72 



operator is allowed to "self -certify" his compliance (, 
it is left to his conscience) . These personnel thus do not 
carry a license or other document indicating that the Coast 
Guard confirm their qualifications. 

Barges of 10,000 tons can carry up to 7 million 
gallons of oil. Very few tank barges exceed this tonnage; 
when the 1985 rule was adopted it exempted all but 22 barges 
nationwide. And most barge traffic (more than 80% of 
coastwise traffic, for example) involves the carriage of oil 
and other hazardous liquids. 

We believe that action is needed to eliminate this 
exemption and to ensure that the pilots of tug/barge units 
xrnder federal jurisdiction will meet licensing standards 
that include strong and effective provisions for experience, 
training, examination and oversight. 

(5) Towing Safetv Adv isorv Committee (33 USC Sec. 
I23la^ . TSAC has played a major role - perhaps a dominant 
one - in the development of regulations for the tug/barge 
industry. Except for two members from the "general piiblic" 
its 16 members are required to be drawn from the towing 
industry and related fields. It has broad powers to advise 
and make recommendations. The Coast Guard must consult it 
on issues affecting the towing industry. 

We believe that TSAC should be abolished, unless 
it is reformed to include equal representation for the 
pxiblic, independent experts, and specialists in marine 
environmental and safety issues. Without such 
representation, those who are outside the industry and who 
suffer the consequences of marine accidents resulting from 
faulty tug/barge operations will not be assured that the 
Coast Guard's deliberations give proper weight to their 
interests . 

Thank you for the opportunity to present these i 
comments. 



73 



TESTIMONY BEFORE THE 

COAST GUARD AND NAVIGATION SUBCOMMITTEE 

OF THE 

HOUSE MERCHANT MARINE AND 

FISHERIES COMMITTEE 

ON 

H.R. 3282 

THE TOWING VESSEL NAVIGATION SAFETY ACT OF 1993 

MARCH 3, 1994 



BY 

H. THOMAS KORNEGAY 

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 
THE PORT OF HOUSTON AUTHORITY 



AND 

PRESIDENT 
GULF PORTS ASSOCIATION 



74 



Chairman Tauzin and members of the subcommittee, I am Tom Kornegay, the 
Executive Director of the Port of Houston Authority and I am also privileged to serve as 
the current president of the Gulf Ports Association (GPA). I would like to express the 
appreciation of the Association for inviting us to testify regarding a subject of 
considerable importance to our membership -- the critical need to increase safety on our 
channels. We would also like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Houston's own 
Congressman Jack Fields for introducing H.R. 3282, the Towing Vessel Navigation 
Safety Act of 1993. We view this legislation as an important step toward ensuring the 
safety of our nation's waterways. 

The membership of the Gulf Ports Association consists of the 26 government 
entities which own and operate public deepwater port facilities on the U.S. Gulf Coast 
from Tampa, Florida to Brownsville, Texas. The common purpose shared by GPA 
member ports is expressed in our mission statement: 

"To promote progress in waterborne commerce through 
United States Gulf Ports; to provide a forum through which 
member ports can address mutual concerns; to educate the 
public and elected officials as to the economic impact of 
United States Gulf Ports; and, to provide users of ports in 
the Gulf with innovatively managed and environmentally 
sensitive facilities." 

I can say with pride that the commerce and activity of our Gulf Ports contribute 
significantly to the nation's economy and security. We contribute over $40 billion 
annually to the nation's economy. Likewise, the activity of the Gulf Ports supports 
almost half of a million jobs, directly and indirectly. 

The Gulf Ports have also proven to be vital to defense, providing facilities for the 
mobilization, deployment and supply of U.S. forces in time of war. In fact, during 
Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 25% of all U.S. military cargo was handled by 
three Gulf Ports. 

Naturally, setting and maintaining standards for safe navigation on our channels is 
critical to the important functions served by the Gulf Ports and ports all across the 
nation. Anytime safe passage is impaired both the flow of commerce and personal safety 
is threatened. 

Ports are keenly aware of this and the Gulf Ports are doing their part to ensure 
safety. For instance, as a result of the passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Gulf 
Ports have worked diligently with state and federal agencies to develop plans for quick 
response to spills, and more importantly, for accident prevention through safety 
awareness. 

We do our part, but unfortunately, we have no control over the vessels that 
navigate our channels. In the case of tows and barges, we must look to Congress, and 
more specifically to this subcommittee to do what is necessary to ensure that these 
vessels operate safely and that the pilots who captain them are adequately trained. 

As with other port regions, the Gulf PorU have experienced serious, sometimes 
even life threatening, accidents as a result of ill-equipped vessels and untrained 
operators navigating our channels. The most devastating example is, of course, the 
Amtrak accident near Mobile, Alabama. You are well aware of the details of that event. 

I would like to draw your attention to other examples of deficient safety measures 
which have resulted in loss of life, cargo and commerce in the Gulf Ports. 

The Port of Houston is a unique channel of only 400 feet in width. The need for 
properly equipped vessels and adequately skilled piloting is even greater in channels such 
as the Houston Ship Channel. On December 21, 1992, there was a three vessel collision 
caused by a vessel which had not been inspected and did not have navigation instruments 



75 



on board. The tug, FREEMONT. was pushing the barge, DUVALL II. when it ran off 
course and struck an ocean going vessel, the JURAJ DALMATTNAC . The 
FREEMONT sustained $16,000 in damage; the DUVALL II. $750,000 damage and loss 
of cargo of $122,000; and, the JURAJ DALMATINAC. $67,500 in damage. The 
Houston Ship Channel was closed for three full days. Fifteen outbound vessels were 
forced to remain in port; 50 inbound vessels were anchored in the Gulf of Mexico 
waiting for the channel to clear. The channel was restricted to one way traffic from 
December 25 to February 17 due to the sunken wreck of the DUVAL II . The cost in 
loss of wharfage fees and commerce was estimated at over $6 million for the three-day 
period the channel was closed. 

Our neighbors in Freeport experienced a problem in their channel in February 
1986, when a towboat barge collided with the Monsanto/Quintana Barge Dock. This 
incident occurred in foggy conditions with a vessel which was lacking proper safety 
equipment Brazos pilots and the Port of Freeport have similarly supported a need for 
legislation requiring each tow to be equipped with a compass, radar, VHF and current 
charts of areas traversed. 

More recently, in the summer of 1993 in Louisiana, an accident caused by a barge 
and tug hitting a bridge resulted in the loss of two lives - a mother and her unborn 
child. A barge and the tug attached to it, idling near the bridge and waiting to move 
through the Industrial Canal locks, drifted into the girder. The impact sent the four lane 
144 foot section of the bridge and two cars plummeting. One of the cars was driven by a 
31 year old pregnant woman. The woman and her unborn child were killed. The cause 
of the accident was clearly pilot error due to inadequate requirements and lack of 
certification of proficiency. The portion of the waterway utilizing this bridge is a busy 
route linking the Mississippi River, the Intercoastal Waterway and Lake Pontchartrain. 
Thirty-nine vessels had backed up behind the bridge before the canal was re-opened. 
This Industrial Canal is a major waterway for bulk cargoes. Its closure would force ships 
to make a 130-mile, 30 hour detour to get from the Gulf of Mexico to the Intercoastal 
Waterway. 

These are only a few examples of the serious nature of accidents which we believe 
might be minimized or even avoided with proper equipment and certification required 
for barge and tow operators. It is for this reason, the Gulf Ports support the 
requirement of navigational safety equipment on all vessels which traverse our channels 
and further, we believe that proper training of those individuals piloting vessels is 
critical. This nation's ports are a vital source of support for the economy. Accidents can 
and should be minimized. Interruptions in normal activity which impedes the flow of 
commerce through U.S. ports is costly - in terms of dollars; in terms of danger to the 
environment; and most importantly, in terms of the danger posed to human lives. We 
believe that H.R. 3282 is a positive step to enhance safety and, thus, minimize the 
chance of accidents. The Gulf Ports urge the swift passage of H.R. 3282. 

Mr. Chairman, I would also like to mention another bill pending before the 
House which we believe is also important to safe port access. That is H.R. 3812, the 
Waterways Obstruction Removal Act of 1994, introduced by Congressmen Fields and 
Laughlin and pending before the Public Works Committee. H.R. 3812 provides for 
immediate action to remove sunken or grounded vessels that obstruct navigable 
waterways. It seems to us that H.R. 3812 is complementary to your own tow and barge 
bill - H.R. 3282 would work to enhance safety and minimize accidents and H.R. 3812 
would work to promptly clear a channel of obstruction in the event an accident does 
occur. We hope that every member of the subcommittee will join as cosponsors to 
H.R. 3812. We applaud the ranking member, Jack Fields and Congressman Laughlin for 
their efforts and we will work to move both bills through to enactment this year. 



76 



Testimony of 

Jeffrey C. Smith 
Executive Director 

Committee for Private Offshore Rescue and Towing 
(C-PORT) 

Before the House Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation 

on HR 3282 

March 3, 1994 



Mr. Chairman and meinbers of the Subcommittee. 

I am here today to discuss HR 3282 's impact on firms which 
provide non-emergency towing of disabled vessels, also called 
assistance towing. The group I represent, C-PORT, is the national 
trade association for the marine assistance and rescue industry, 
representing over 140 companies across the nation. 

As you know, HR 3282 would affect all uninspected vessels 
engaged in "towing." The problem is that that term "towing" can 
indicate two very different types of operations. It can mean a 
commercial tow such as a tug pushing a barge, or it can mean an 
assistance tow such as a 22 foot rescue vessel towing a disabled 
recreational boat which has run out of fuel. 

The differences between vessels engaged in commercial towing 
and those engaged in assistance towing are substantial. An 
uninspected commercial towing vessel is a 50-200 foot long vessel 
weighing 10 to 100 tons which tows or pushes barges of cargo 
weighing hundreds of tons. An uninspected assistance towing vessel 
is generally a 17-30 foot long vessel which tows recreational 
vessels weighing less than 8 tons. 

However, to prove once again the existence of the law of 
unintended consequences, HR 3282 would treat a 22 foot rescue boat 
and a 70 ton commercial tug the same. Besides being impractical, 
placing a radar and fathometer on small rescue/utility boats is 
not recommended by the Department of Transportation study or any 
other report. In fact, most Coast Guard vessels less than 2 6 feet 
do not contain radar, while all of the Coast Guard's vessels 41 
feet and larger do carry radar as standard equipment. 

I submit that the intention of HR 3282 is to target large 
towing vessels engaged in commercial towing, of the type involved 
in the tragedy in Mobile, Alabama last September 22, and as 
recommended in the DOT report following the accident . 

The marine assistance industry was created only 11 years ago 
by this very Subcommittee when it restricted the Coast Guard from 
engaging in non-emergency towing of vessels. In this tradition, at 
the upcoming markup on HR 3282, I urge the subcommittee to 
continue to exercise astute policymaking by giving favorable 
consideration to an amendment which would exempt firms engaged in 
assistance towing of disabled boats from the provisions of the 
bill. 

Thank you for this opportunity. 



(■pictures of typical industry vessels attached) 



77 



Examples of typical marine assistance towing vessels 




Immel's Marine 

Jerry Immel 

St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands 




655 1 5th Street, NW 
Suite 310 

Washington, DC 20005 
(202) 546-6993 
FAX (202) 546-2121 



78 



STATEMENT OF 



CAPTAIN JOHN WALTON 



EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT 



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF MASTERS, MATES & PILOTS, ILA, AFL-CIO 



SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND NAVIGATION 



ON 



HR 3282 



MARCH 3, 1994 



79 



My name is Captain John Walton. I am executive assistant to 
Captain Timothy A. Brown, International President of the 
International Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots, ILA, AFL-CIO 
(lOMM&P). I have personal onboard work experience in both the 
towing segment and deep-sea segment of the maritime industry. I 
appreciate this opportunity to comment on HR 3282, a bill Introduced 
by Chairman Billy Tauzin, to amend Title 46, USC, to improve towing 
vessel navigational safety. You may recall, Mr, Chairman, that I 
testified before your committee on March 17, 1992, on HR 3942, a 
bill Introduced by Congressman Nell Abercrombie, which would have 
established requirements for manning and watches on uninspected 
towing vessels. I can only remark that the tragic events of the 
last year have only served to emphasize the necessity for 
comprehensive changes in the laws regulating the towboat industry. 

While we appreciate the recognition that there is a problem as 
evidenced by the introduction of HR 3282, we feel that this 
legislation is only the beginning of a solution. HR 3282 calls for 
minimum navigational safety equipment for towing vessels and for the 
demonstration of proficiency in the use of navigational safety 
equipment thus required. Most of the vessels manned by the MM&P 
already have this mandated equipment and our union has always prided 
itself on the highest levels of competence of our members. While we 
agree that If there are towing vessels out there without this 
equipment, it should certainly be required, I would emphasize that 
when manning is reduced to dangerous levels neither all the 
equipment in the world nor the highest level of professionalism may 
be enough to prevent an accident. 

The MM&P is extremely concerned about the health, safety and 
environmental threats posed by the operation of uninspected towing 
vessels due to the lack of proper Federal manning and watchstanding 
regulations. 

When a tow boat operates with one person on watch on the bridge 
and no one on duty in the engine room, the potential for an accident 



80 



is great. The person on watch not only has to navigate, but must 
transmit radio messages as well. On some of these vessels, the 
chart room and radio room are away from the bridge, forcing the 
person on watch to leave his position. The automation of the engine 
room and installation of an alarm to alert the man on watch does not 
adequately ensure the safe operation of these vessels. In the first 
place, automated systems can and do malfunction. Further, if the 
man on watch is alerted to a potential problem by an alarm, he is 
put in the position of reacting to a problem, rather than being able 
to anticipate and correct a situation before it gets out of 
control. By being forced to react rather than prevent, our members' 
lives, the vessel, the cargo, and the marine environment are put at 
risk. 

Historically, towing vessels in the ocean and coastwise trades 
carried three deck officers divided into three watches, and an 
engineer. The industry had an enviable safety record. Then, in the 
1980' s, due in part to cutbacks in the oil industry, a surplus of 
equipment was realized. Much of this equipment wound up in the 
hands of "shoestring" opetators. In order to gain economic 
advantage, these operators crew their vessels at unsafe levels, and 
the more established operators are forced to react by reducing 
manning in order to compete. Unfortunately, the courts have 
concluded that the present inadequate and unsafe manning levels do 
not violate existing law. It is, therefore, up to Congress to 
rectify this situation. 

The MM&P believes the three watch system should be restored with 
a minimum of three crew members on watch at all times. This could 
be accomplished by requiring that vessels of more than 50 gross tons 
on a voyage of a duration of more than 24 hours from departure to 
final destination be operated by a licensed master and carry two 
additional mates. We believe that this is essential to ensure the 
safe operation of tow-vessels. 



81 



-3- 



Presently, our members stand watches of six hours on and six 
hours off on these vessels as well as performing overtime work 
during off -watch, for an average work day of 16 hours. It is not 
unusual for the off-watch deck officers to be interrupted to monitor 
a host of situations such as stormy seas, equipment failure, 
personnel illness or any other crisis which may occur when you are 
hundreds of miles from shore. Our members are among the best 
trained and highly motivated and dedicated mariners in the world, 
but they are not immune from the fatigue that sets in from working 
an average 16 hours a day for months on end. When crew members are 
forced to work to the point of exhaustion, bad judgment calls are a 
strong possibility. Even if no lives are lost or serious injuries 
caused, our members put their licenses at risk due to these 
inadequate manning policies forced on the industry by uninspected 
towing vessel companies. 

We also believe it is important to note that the reduced manning 
levels on these towboats have a long-term negative effect on the 
industry through the elimination of an essential training ground for 
future experienced Second Mates. Previously, this individual 
received practical, on-the-job training and experience under the 
direction of the Master and Chief Mate. Now that the Second Mate's 
position has been cut on these uninspected vessels, there is no one 
learning the skills necessary to move up to Chief Mate. Meanwhile, 
the Chief Mate has no time to spend with the Master and learn from 
him. There really is no alternative to take the place of the years 
of experience that working on board the vessel offers. 

Manning on all commercial towing vessels should be set by law to 
ensure that Deck Officers and seamen on look-out should stand 
watches of no more than eight hours a day (four on and eight off) as 
it used to be. The Engineer shpuld not have to be working on the 
deck performing able-seamen duties and, thereby, neglecting a very 
important part of vessel operation, namely preventative maintenance 
and upkeep of engines. 



82 



The lOMM&P believes that comprehensive reform of the towboat 
industry should put safety first: safety of life, safety of vessel 
and cargo, and safety of the marine environment- We strongly urge 
that such legislation be enacted now -- to prevent additional 
tragedies from occurring, rather than in response to yet another 
disaster. 

Please let me know if the lOMM&P can be of assistance to this 
Committee in any way in order to ensure enactment of such much 
needed and long overdue comprehensive towboat industry reform 
legislation. 



83 



STATEMENT OF JOHN N. 60UVEXA 

REGIONAL DIRECTOR 

INLANDBOATMEN'8 UNION OF THE PACIFIC, 

MARINE DIVISION OF THE 

INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S AND WAREHOOSEMEN ' S UNION 

BEFORE THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

COMMITTEE OF MERCHANT MARINE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND NAVIGATION 

HEARING ON H.R. 3282 

MARCH 3, 1994 

Mr. Chairman and honorable members of this committee, my name is 
John M. Gouveia and I am a Regional Director for the 
Inlandboatmen's Union of the Pacific (IBU) , Marine Division of the 
International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union. I 
appreciate this opportunity to provide written testimony for the 
record on H.R. 3282, a bill related to Towing Vessel and Barge 
Safety. We appreciate your introducing the legislation but we 
respectfully suggest that it does not address the most critical 
issue — crew fatigue — which is endangering the lives of crew and 
threatening our environment. 

The IBU is a labor organization which represents seafaring 
employees most of whom are employed on towing vessels. I was 
originally a seaman who worked on towing vessels for many years 
prior to becoming a Regional Director of the IBU. Therefore, I am 
familiar with the safety conditions on towing vessels. 

At the present time the existing statutes concerning the 
requirements for manning and watches (work shifts) on towing 
vessels need to be amended to protect the safety of the public, our 
environment, as well as the safety of our crews on board these 
vessels. The potential danger created by the minimum manning and 
watch requirements under the current laws are enormous. The 
current laws put in jeopardy the crew of towing vessels, as well as 
the licensed personnel who are on the bridge (command center) of 
the towing vessel, not to mention our environment. 

The current laws require only one man to be assigned to observe 
where the vessel is headed and to control the whole towing vessel. 
Should that one man on the bridge leave for any reason, or fall 
asleep, or succumb to a heart attack or seizure and become 
unconscious, the effects would be devastating; a collision or 
grounding would very likely cause an oil spill of great magnitude. 
The licensed person on "watch" in the wheel house or Bridge has a 
number of responsibilities including steering the vessel to avoid 
obstacles, plotting the vessel's course in the chartroom, and 
transmitting radio messages. On some of the towing vessels the 



84 



chartroom and radio room are away from the bridge. In other cases 
the chartroom or desk and radio are behind the person on watch, 
leaving him with his back to the front of the towing vessel, 
consequently having no one at the steering wheel (helm) and no 
look-out. This situation is akin to having no one watching where 
a moving car is going, and no one steering the car as it moves. 

It is my understanding that the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska 
occurred partly because the Captain left the bridge to go below to 
the radio room, to send a message to the corporate headquarters, 
thereby, leaving an inexperienced person at the helm. Under the 
current laws regulating manning on towing vessels, the Exxon Valdez 
scenario stated above, would be more likely because when the 
Captain leaves the bridge to go to the radio room for example, no 
one would be at the helm. 

Currently, there are times when the person on watch will leave his 
post to use the bathroom, or to get a cup of coffee, or maybe a 
snack. In the worst possible scenario, the consequences of the 
bridge being unmanned, when the barges are loaded with fuel, is 
that the towing vessel will run aground or collide with another 
vessel. Today most towing vessels are equipped with an automatic 
pilot, but even these devices have been known to malfunction. 

Therefore, if the person manning the helm leaves the helm because 
he is relying on the automatic pilot and the automatic pilot fails, 
the tow will be out of control with no one watching where the 
vessel is going. 

Today, automated alarm systems are installed within the engine 
rooms. Should a break down occur, the alarms are not activated 
until after the fact, whereas, if manned properly, some one would 
be able to see, hear, or possibly smell a problem and correct it 
before it happens. 

Under the current statute, the minimum manning for uninspected 
vessels on runs less than 600 miles can be as little as two men. 
All that is needed is two deck officers on a six on and a six off 
12 hour watch system. This results in only one man at a time 
running the whole towing vessel. 

The minimum manning level is unsafe and must be changed, in order 
to avoid the foregoing hazards to the environment and the crew. 
The towing vessel Companies will even go so far as to say that what 
we are asking, will be costly, and there may not be enough bunk 
space on most of these vessels. This assertion is absolutely 
untrue. Most of these vessels have sufficient space to sleep up to 
ten crew men now, and should these spaces be unavailable, they can 
be readily made available with the least amount of alterations at 
a relatively low cost. 

Today, the practice of no Able Seaman or Ordinary Seaman on deck, 
is at the very least inadequate. Some Companies are running these 
towing vessels with no AB's, and this violates Federal Law. 



85 



There are some Companies that are sailing with Oilers or Wipers, 
and engine room personnel. They proceed to give the Coast Guard a 
letter stating that said Oiler or Wiper has enough sea time, the 
Coast Guard tests this person for a Mate, he passes the test, then 
becomes a Mate on watch by himself, with no competent bridge 
experience. We recently had a similar situation here in Hawaii, 
but this so called Mate ran into an Island. Another incident 
recently occurred with an engineer, who lost his finger tips, while 
trying to free a line on deck. 

In a December 6, 1993 report entitled "Review of Marine Safety 
Issues Related to Uninspected Towing Vessels", the Coast Guard 
stated that, of the 12,971 marine casualties involved uninspected 
towing vessels between 1980 and 1991, 7,664 were directly related 
to personnel errors (59%) . Section 3 of the "Towing Safety Act" 
attempts to address these personnel deficiency problems by; (1) 
increasing the number of licensed personnel on towing vessels; (2) 
augmenting the qualifications for obtaining a towing vessel 
license; (3) increasing the number of experienced deck hands; and 
(4) establishing a mechanism for removing negligent or incompetent 
individuals from the industry. 
Also see attached copy of Associated Press — Birmingham, Alabama 

There have been too many near disasters and oil spills nationwide. 
The Tow Boat Industry has expanded a great deal in the last 3 
years or more, and it is about time we have the laws of this great 
nation amended to rectify the current hazards that have been 
created due to this expansion in the industry. These Rules and 
Laws have to be enforced and amended. It's like having more than 
one person in the cockpit of a plane, and who wants to fly without 
a co-pilot? Let's listen to the real Merchant Seaman who make 
their livelihoods on the water and who have seen too many men and 
women hurt and even killed. The employers may want to cut costs 
for more profits, but is that worth the lives of the crew and 
potential environmental disaster? 

Legislation should be enacted to address crew fatigue and 
inadequate manning on towing vessels for the entire United States 
of America, what is already applicable to the Great Lakes. We have 
got to go back to how it used to be, when you sail in the 
department that you sign on for i.e., Deck Engine, or Steward 
Department and not work alternately. We need to maintain a two men 
watch on the Bridge while the vessel is under way and maintain a 
manned engine room. 

Thank you for allowing me to submit testimony on behalf of the 
working men and women of the Inlandboatmen's Union of the Pacific, 
Marine Division of the International Longshoremen's and 
Warehousemen's Union. I would be pleased to respond in writing to 
any questions or comments from the members of this Committee. 



Pilot in Amtrak Disaster 
Failed Test Seven Times 



BIRMINQBAHI, iUi. ^ Tht 

tighth UfDi Um pilot oFtbt (ovboat 
iDvolYid io Amtrik*! dudltut 
wrtek took thi Cout Onird lletnN 
turn b« piNfd H. 

W1UI« C. Odom, pilot of thi MV 
MittvUli th« Bl|ht of Not n, had 
been promoted tnd dtmottd hvviI 
tlroei bifort iho dliitter thtt 
clilmtd 47 Uvti near Mobile. He 
had three minor lecldenti within i 
tbree^mootk period while pUotlai 
other boeu, the BlnnlB|b«Ri Newi 
reported Tburtdep. 

The inferroetlon wae lo ewom 
tutemenu tlven in deMelUoni iw 
oineiali of Warrior * OilFNavlia* 
Hob Co.. which operated the blaovll* 
le, In connection with lltlietlon 
itemming from the dUeiter, the 
Detvipiper leld. 

The depoiitioni art not pert of 
the public record la MM, &Mrlet 
Cottrt In Mobile, where the Utlgitloa 
li pendlfii. An attorney for lome of 
the (emiilei of Yletimi, Btepheo 
Heolnier of BlnnlBihim, confirmed 
the aocountt reported by the newi* 
paper Thwedat. Mr. OJom'i atto^ 
otV. Donald Brlikman of Mobile, 
uld he would have no comment on e 



!n the depoeltione. Warrior ft 
Gulf eftideli ul4 the Coait Quard 
»aB ilteo IncorrMt InformailoB 
about Mr. Odom la ^ Ueeme appU- 



WilUeC.Odom,pUotor 
theMVMauviUAthe 
night of Sept. 22, had 
bMn promoted and 
demoted several times 
before the disaster that 
claimed 47 lives near 
Mobile. 

ton, the Manvilla got toet la ioi and 
lie tew of bargee nt looee, raaunlng 
B railroad brtdie that ipanned Bay* 
ou Canot A faert time latr, Am* 
trek'i SttBiet Limited paiienger 
train plunied from the damajed 
bridge, with 44 uaiengen and three 
criwmemben ojrlng, meet of them 
drowning la a lubmerged train ear. 
Fieton Involved in the dliaiter 
according to federal Inveitigaton, 
Include llr. Odom mlitaUBf the 
bridge for e berge on hli radar, a 
leek of llghU en the bridge or warn* 
Ing ilgne at bayou weten. .. ... 

AaSraw Stibler, tfce^ MaavUla 
eepuln who had turned the boat 
over to Mr. Odom before the dliai- 
ur. wM. aiked darlngJiU fipMtloo 
whet grade he wetdTglve Mr. Odom 
for hli handllni of the barge on the 
nlgbl of the wreck- 
Mr. BUbler deelloed, uylng It 
wai "a talry-tale queftlen; but el 



cetlon, where be wae deeerlbed ai the eueitlon wu' repeebid leveral 

being e ellot trainee, rether than a timet Mr. BUbler lald he would give 

deck^ana. for a loor-paar oerlod. Mr.Uem en t 

But Worrier « Oulfi geoeni] man- „ A trie) 



iger. Andy H Harrle, lald It wai net 
ImproMr for the comBany to eeek to 
heve Mr. Odom take Um Ucobm ei- 
em eight tlmn In order to put It. 
According to federal laveetlga- 



, if icheduled for June 1 on 

Werrior It Qulfi petition to Uinlt lu 
llabUlty to the ceee to MU.a00. The 
company recently aiked the wurt to 
dlimlii the oeUtlen, but the court 
hli not niled! 



87 



AIMU 



The Honorable W.J. (Billy) Tauzin 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation 

Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Washington, D. C. 20515 



Dear Mr. Chairman: 

As the national association representing this country's marine 
insurers, the American Institute of Marine Underwriters (AIMU) 
would like to commend you and the co-sponsors of H.R. 3282 for 
acting to mandate the carriage of basic navigational aids aboard 
inland towing vessels. We share your hope that legislation can be 
enacted by the anniversary date of the Amtrak derailment at Bayou 
Canal, Alabama. 

AIMU' s member companies have an obvious vested interest in 
measures aimed at reducing maritime accidents. A combination of 
improved technology and better trained personnel can be expected to 
yield results which will be reflected in vessel operators' claims 
experience. While AIMU refrains from endorsing new technologies 
which have not proved themselves, the navigational equipment listed 
in Section 2 of H.R. 3282 is generally accepted as worthwhile. In 
your work to refine this bill, however, we urge an amendment to 



American Institute of Marine Underwriters 

14 Wall Street * New York. New York 10005 . (©2 12.233.0550 . Fax: 212.227.5102 



88 



provide the Secretary with the flexibility to alter or adapt 
specific requirements in order to take into account varying 
conditions in particular areas and types of operations. 

We also support the change in licensing regulations proposed 
in Section 3 of the bill to require operators to demonstrate 
proficiency in the use of prescribed equipment. This is a sensible 
corollary to requiring carriage of the equipment. 

The expedited reporting of casualties contained in Section 4 
is a potential life-saver and aid to mitigation of damages caused 
by accidents. We strongly support this provision. 

Safety regulation of the maritime industry is a primary and 
continually evolving mission of the Coast Guard. We are aware that 
some have suggested expansion of H.R. 3282 to mandate new manning 
and inspection requirements for vessels operating on our inland 
waters, the subject of the study proposed in Section 5 of the bill. 
Under its existing authority and as a result of a study ordered in 
September by the Secretary of Transportation, the Coast Guard is 
already working on these related concerns. AIMU respectfully 
suggests that final Congressional action on H.R. 3282 should not be 
jeopardized by trying to expand the' bill to cover additional 
requirements unless consensus can be reached with those to be 
impacted. Instead, this effort should be recognized as an 
important step in a continuing process of improving maritime 
safety. 



89 



We thank you for considering our views on this important 
matter and ask that this letter be included in the record of your 
hearings on H.R. 3282. 

Very truly yours, 



lu^l/^^ 



Walter M. Kramer 
President 



AtkUA^ 



90 



•nw ADPIJOBtion of Smnaon in Monitoring V— «<l Movament and PosMon 

When ttia potentfal for ios» of life or damage is considerable, the trend within all 
transportation indufftfies has been to provide the pDot of a vehicle vvidi as muoh pertinent 
information as possible to assist in the pitotino operation. Sensors and other devices that 
provide precise measurements or advance warning of impencf ng problems or dangers are 
used to augment the pilot's natural sensing abilities wherever possible. Commercial aircraft 
navigation and collision warning systems are an excellent example of how tBChnology has 
been successfully applied in the interest of improved operating safety. 

The marine industry has followed suit with the advent of global positioning systems (GPS) 
and improvements in marine radars, LORAN, and other navigational systems. Onboard 
electronic positioning systems continue to be of limited value, however, during some pQoting 
operations. They are incapable of providing velocity and position information with sufficient 
accuracy to assist a vessel during a docking operation, or when transiting a bridge structure 
or lock. In tight situations such as these, distances in tenths of feet and velocities in 
hundredths of knots become important. Left with few devices, ttie pilot continues to 
depend on his 'feel' for how the ship is progressing and his ability to 'sense' how 
environmental forces are affecting the vessel to successfully complete these operations. 

A system is now being developed, however, that can assist pilots in these situations. A 
vessel docking system is being constructed at a marine terminal on the West Coast that will 
provide precise position information directly to the vessel as it approaches the terminal. The 
system will incorporate the latest available sensor technology, while its modular in design 
will provide the flexibilitv needed to apply this same technology to other tight maneuvering 
situations, such as bridge structure or lock transitt. 

Ve^el Docking System - The Vessel Doddng System (VDS) wffl assist large vessels as they 
berth at marine terminals. A series of low power radar and laser sensors will be strategically 
placed along the dock to determine the vessel's distance, angle of approach, and approach 
velocity relative to the dock. This and other pertinent information will be processed and 
transmitted directly to the vessel on a real-time basis using portable receivers. Once the 
vessel is moored, its position alongside the dock will be monitored continuously to provide 
advance wanning of drift-off. 



91 



The system will display the following: 

• Approach velooitY relative to the dock 

• Distance off the dock 

• Vessel angle of approach 

• Vessel drift-off 



In addition, the system wJB accept signals from other sensors and display Information such 



Weather information 

Tide and current information 

Mooring line tension 

Cargo flow rates, manifold pressures, etc. 



Transiting brklge structures and locka are tight maneuvering 
situations that demand a level of pikning expertise simBar to that required when docking a 
vessel at a marine tenminal. VDS technology can be used to assist the pOot in these 
situatkms. Ranging and velocity sensor statkms placed at strategic positions can monitor a 
vessel's progress as it approaches and completes its transit through a bridge structure or 
lock. As with the VDS, velocity and distance informaHon is provided directly to the vessel 
on a real-time basis in an annotated pictorial forniat. 



The system would display the following: 



Structure identificatkMi, including vertical and horizontal clearances 

Position of the vessel relative to the center line of the channel 

Position of the vessel relative to key structures 

Velocity of the vessel relative to the structures 

Graduated ckne proximity alarms 

Status of other traffic in the immediate area 

information via other sensors, such as wind velocity, wind direction, 

current speed, and water depth 



Local Traffic InfOrroalion Svstaq i < The location and status of traffic in the immediate area is 
of primary importance to any vessel transiting a navigable waterway. In a meeting or 
overtaking situation, the pflots of both vessels must decide in advance where and how they 
will meet to ensure it is done safely. A vessel approaching a bend in the channel must 
know what traffic will be encountered before negotiating the turn. On-board marine radar 
systems are of limited value on Inland waterways because they are incapable of looking 



92 



around bends. In these situations the vessel must depend solely on VHF radio 
eommunications to determine the presence and status of traffic in the immediate area. 

The directional sensor technology being tested under the VOS project is well suited for 
Inland waterways where bluffs and river bends create a significant number of blind spots. 
Sensors placed at strateaic locations along the channel can identifv the location and speed 
of traffio moving up or down the channel. As with the vessel docldng and structure 
collision avoidance systems, this information can be transmitted to vessels using portable 
receivers, giving each vessel in the immediate area advance notice of the other's presence. 

Regional Vessel Traffic System - Vessel Traffic Systems (VTS) operating within several ports 
around the United States anempt to reduce the risk of ooinsion or grounding by monftoring 
and controDing the flow of vossei traffic . These systems reJy on centrally located 360 
degree sweep radars and vessel position reporting by VHF radio to monitor location and 
flow of traffic. As designed, these systems are effective where activity is concentrated in 
one area but impractical in situations wtwre activity is spread over a wide area, such as with 
a river system. 

Using directional sensors to monitor traffic flow, and taidng advantage of communications 
technology already available, a Regional Vessel Traffic System (RVTS) can be established for 
an extensive area such as a river system. GPS information, transmitted by each vessel via 
wireless data link directly to a RVTS Center, can be incorporated with information received 
from strategically placed directional sensors to provide an extensive vessel tracking system. 
Traffic can then be monitored and controlled as necessary to reduce congestion and the 
potential for casualties. Vessels would receive pertinent information on all areas of the river 
system, including v«^ather updates and lock transit scheduiino information. 

As presented, the RVTS can provide an additional benefit to vessel operators in the area of 
logistical planning. Having access to up-to-<iate information on vessel location can help 
operations personnel better plan their operations and thereby reduce operating costs. 



Major Points 



A Vessol Ooddng Systwn is betng installed at a West Coast marins terminal that will 
assist vessel pilots during the doddng operation. 



It 1$ a land-based system using low-cost, high performance sensors to determine vessel 
position and movement. 



The system uses lov\f-cost receivers to provide the vessel pilot with the following 
information: 

- Approach velocity 

- Distance off the dock 

- Angle of approach 

• Vessel drfft-off once moored 



The system will augment VHF radio communications and can, as an option, provide the 
following: 

- Weather information 

- Tide and current Information 
• mooring line tension 

- cargo flow rates, manifold pressures, etc. 



The vessel dodong system can be configured as a StnictiuB Collision Avoidance System 
to assist vessels through bridge structures and locks. 



The directional sensor technology being used for the above systems is well suited for 
monitoring vessel traffk: on inland waterways. 



Directional sensors providing local traffic information are designed to be integrated imo a 
network system. By Incorporatina information from these sensors with vessel GPS 
information, an extenshre Reipoiisl Traffic Management Systam can be established. 



94 



(EnngrcBB 

af the 

VinlUb BtattB 

lAomt of SeprcBcntatlutH 

H. MARTIN LANCASTER 

NORTH CAROLINA 
THIRD DISTRICT 



m 



March 3, 1993 
Hon. Martin Lancaster 



Question for Coast Guard Witness 

1. Do you agree that as currently drafted the bill applies to all uninspected towing 
vessels, including those commonly referred to as "assistance towing vessels" subject to 
the Ucensing requirement of secUon 8904(b) of Title 46? 

2. In the Coast Guard's view, can the problems we axe seeking to cure be satisfactorily 
addressed without Imposing new requirements on "assistance towing vessels?" How 
would the Coast Guard react If the bill excluded "assistance towing vessels" from its 
coverage? 



QuesUon for Jeff Smith, C-PORT (Committee for Private Offshore Rescue and 
Towing; Harry Schlffman is a member): 

1. What distinguishes your members from larger commercial towing vessels? 

2. Don't some of your members' vessels routinely carry some of the equipment 
mandated by the bill, such as compasses, fathometers, radars, and charts? What sort 
of vessel would not carry such equipment? 

3. Have you consulted with the Coast Guard about cm exemption for "assistance towing 
vessels?" How has the Coast Guard responded to your inquiries? 



m House Offc* Bui 
WMhinglon. DC 2(BIS 
I2D2I Z2b-3>\i 
Fw I2(CI 22S^)6» 



Oalrkrl OlfK,. 

Roooi 10S Ftdnal BuMing 

134 N John SltMl 

. N.C 27S30 



95 



Proposed Amendment to Towing Vessel 
Navigational Safety Act of 1994 



Backgroxind 

H.R 3282 will amend Section 4102 of Title 46 USC to require 
all "towing" vessels to .carry a radar, a fathometer, and compass, 
as well as charts and publications. It will also require that 
towboat operators attend an approved radar observer course. 

Its provisions are aimed to implement the Department of 
Transportation's suggested actions in the wake of the September 
22, 1993 fatal Amtrak/barge accident in Mobile, Alabama. 

However, the bill would also affect firms engaged in non- 
emergency towing of disabled boats, which bear no resemblance to 
the type of commercial towing vessels the bill seeks to address. 
These firms, which were created by a 1983 change in Coast Guard 
policy, are often referred to as assistance tovjing firms, towing & 
salvage companies, and quick response marine firms. Operators of 
all assistance towing vessels are licensed in 46 USC § 8904(b). 

Piixpose of amendment 

There is no indication that the provisions of HR 3292 are 
intended in any way to affect firms engaged in assistance towing 
of disabled vessels. Therefore, the assistance towing industry 
seeks an exemption from H.R. 3282. 

Suggested text of amendment 

The bill should be eunemded to insert: "except vessels engaged 
in towing a disabled vessel for consideration, as defined in 46 
USC § 8904(b)" following every occurance of the term "towing 
vessel' which appears on: page 2 line 6; page 3, line 2; and page 
3, line 21. 

Suggested report language 

The report language should further define assistance towing 
as "taking into tow a vessel which is disabled or in danger." 



Respectfully Submitted, 

Jeffrey C. Smith 

Executive Director 

Committee for Private Offshore Rescue and Towing (C-PORT) 

655 15th Street, Nw. Suite 310 

Washington, DC 2 0005 

Tel: (202) 546-6993, Fax (202) 546-2121 



96 



a 

e 
■c 

i 

I 
S 

c 
o 
o 
b 



O 
0) 

o 
> 

G) 



c 


o 


o 


^ 


S 


"tn 


c 


o 


1? 


T3 


o 

0) 




(0 

14- 


C 
0) 

E 


o 


S? 




> 


c 


o 


o 


S 


+J 




m 




o 




12^ 




Q. 




Q. 




< 




0) 





p « 

I 

o S 

9 C 

< £ 

a 

Si 

"S 



97 



Q. 

■o 
c 

(0 

c 

0) 

E 

> 
o 

"3 
w 
tn 

O) 

c 



Q. 
Q. 
< 







O 






« 






3 






'I-' 






CO 




s 


g 




8 


K 




CO 


a> 




o 


c 




c 


"C 




ca 


IB 




u. 


S 




c 


o 




(0 






CO 


o 




■g 


5 




o* 












a. 


" 




c 






S 


"5 






S 




>« 


H (0 




V) 


t o 




? 


c o 




J^ 


4> <= 


1 


1 


II 


^ 


s 


■^ 5 




M 




> 


s 


Q. (0 


o 


> 


< s 



^ C«l CO ^ 



98 



in "O m in 

in <D *i in 

c ID > a " 

•B 2 ° o 2 

I i I ° ? 



-o t 

fll 

E •« 2 
.-I £ 

1 c ° 

^ ! §^ 
.9 ® P io 

?5 - -2 £ 



<o E 



& ? 



> c 



— •= *J = 

© ^ '— R) 

S 2 o «- 

> <2 3 2 

o ® _ 3 

1 III 

o 5 S - 

^ 0) — = 

» ~ 2 5 

■^ 2- c .2 

R> O g > 

to *" E "O 

O) en S n> 

5 > C 
> £ O 



♦- w *t P >. 



S S .2 2 



■y E 

E w 

"5 " 

a " 

•0 £ 

o .9 

2. w 

O) g> 



6 2 

T5 



i '^ ^ 2 8 r « 



£ .E £ g » 
= I S.- 



o 
^ 5. 



o 

~ <D 



s If ? 

sill 

> £ 8 § 



Si 

§ e 

u m 

at > 

- 3 

^ (D 

O C 

= (0 

t^ E 



«, 8 2 

= 0)0) 

<o 5. c 

C "D O 
O) (0 "^ 

i|i 

a) > "" 

ig 2 S 
> ti) — 

_ 10 O) 

•^ «i 

2 5 S 

C ^ (D 
2 » ~ 

E > 

(D O u 
O — (0 

c 2 a 
<o o ^ 

111 



. C 5 S ^ 

0) ® (0 © 

^ o g (0 o 

•O i O O) Q. 

c w 2 ^ o 

.2 :^ 5 ^ S 

(D 5 >- *' (0 

o) <D *= "o E 

i .9 8 S - 

"-1 in 






<D J- W ,-C 

> o E " 

<D C 2 ^ 



> 5 



•S o (0 >. o 

= v- c to 13 

«. <dI- ™ S 



o £ 



• .:^ tD 
c > £ 
0(0*' 



•^ :5 -S S „ 

•S > 2« 2 

*5 2 <» Q. £ 

S ^%^ i 

S 2 o) .0 5 

«* w .£ (0 o 

^ c Q. " .i 

£ t;; • 2 o 

<D 3 -C -c to 

:£ -o ♦- nj 2 

$ .£ .£ E £ 



to 
o E 
to ® 
c t5 

♦= w 
2 o) 

IB .£ 
Q. ^ 

o o 

?^ 

2 .£ 

2 w 



S o *. 

^ to to 

OT C O 

O ID U 

O W i_ 

2-i 

tb 2 o 

o c , 

£ 2 (B 

2 E u 

£ a> £ 

t o I" 

^ s § 



3 ® O) 

J3 OC ~ 

^ « I 

o ^ a 

g S2 



2 .2 



+- 5 § o 

C .!= O O 

5 Q- £ 

to a) 

to o £ "^ 

£*■ -B E 



® 9 "t 
u. ;: o 

3 ID ij 

o «J E i 
g"5 o a 

"SIS 

!-£§ 

— — ID o 

a> o o ^ 
o o o c 

2 2-S-g 
.2 .«2 ^ ^ 

S 8 1 1 

< < Q. Q. 



- J^ c c 



o '3 

5 s 

■& o 



^ § o 



99 



<5 o > -5 

<0 m v- V 

ro *- BJ -s 

JO - -5 g 

— <D >- w 

CO </) ^ 

c « ^ ni 

!s c 5 o 

2 S o - 

> o 

(o S _ <« 



(o !s <" 

"5 ♦- S « 

> £ Q- -S 

a> * Q. ♦* 

■D m « o 

2 «■? ^ 

>■- "^ 
£ O) jc ® 
2 = 0- 

I =5 2 -o 

° . ss 

O <D H_ t 

^ o "• 

<D C C 



5 >■ 



"J _ 



£ <>> 



o «5 5 £ 

o . o 
•" m c > *= 

2 ?t; o Z 

O ~ -o ♦= » 

S I .« i s 

§^ S o > 
" c S E 5 

2 "> c • 

- s I M 

JS "• « '^ ° 
£ S = S • 

c c = -o S 

"^ SL E .iS 2 
• ™2h H 

C O) M 
c c >■ . 

o 2 "> j^ 



5 S 



9- o 

.£ Q. 

•° E 

■o o 

o u 

■^ >. 

(0 u> 



.$■ 



o 

10 



o 5 o t 

O » (0 T3 

«o o 

o c 0) o 

J- (0 M 0) 

< Q > > 



;>• :§ c 2 



Q. 5 5 >5 

« > -S is =5 -Q 

o o « w « ,p 

i_ (0 o 5 c " 

S 8 • !5 I 1 8 

<D (0 A -^ O U U 



C ^ > :^ ? 



<if(i:5 



♦= C 

(0 (0 

E E 



i S2^ 



w ■£ <o ~ o 
a> (o (D o o> 

*! § I- 5 U 



O T3 fc T3 



o .E 



100 



E 

0) 

t 

C/) 

c 

!S 
o 
o 
O 

<n 

(0 




101 




102 






■? -D 2 

S £ «» 
2 2 « 



u m c 

» r ^ 

lO M 



o>€ 



» o 

€ -o 

c 

:- I 

8 1 

i 1 

; I 

^ I 

1: 5 

" I 

1 I 



I s 






1 1 

— o 

i S 
* 8 

CO "■ 

ll 

> ** 



I I 

O O 

a S 



® o -Q 

° > 

If 

e o 

— c 

•D » 

C ♦* 

2 (/) 

i Q 

■S > 



.t: a> c 
c a 

2 ^ c 
"> o .= 



<o ® V 

"« - S 
S^ " 
5i ^ 

« w o 

♦' a> 

._ "> 

o^ iS 

.t; o > 

o — « 
c a> o 

i|2 

(0 o 

o a> -o 

0.-0 



25 



.£ £ £ 



o - 



2 c 

o M E 

a s o 

a ♦- .£ 
c - " 

•2 !8 « . 

4-> 0) t-* tJ 

•o ti •'> to 
^l-B E 

5 i^-2 



W (0 

S .£ B> 

<i5 



.t; o 

« ® > -o 

I S E S 

2 S o 

-o a (0 c 

c a > c 

<0 (O <0 (D 



(D c 
9> ffi 

c o 






•5 



w £ > 

3 3 (0 -O 

o o £ .£ 
2 2 "5 
SIS 2 jg 

■S5 ^ g o 
o o E E 3 

« ® J2 — CO 
> > <o o g 
« « ^ 5 « 

£ £ E e § 
S 1 1 £ I 

lllll 

o o "5 ° o 

lllll 



2- {2 < 

I ^ > B 

a » » 2 

° - " g, 

.2 5 a> a> 

-, .9 c c 

2 ♦^ o .» 

£ ") -D £ 

<D 2 „ o 



o J^ 

C (0 



:i 2^ 



5 w S 

(0 ID ^ 
O " >. 

3-1 

sl| 
•2 al 

i= ? " 



c m 
1 .£ 

O (0 JO 



o 5 g 



E "fe 



^ S 



103 



o « >^ o 

^ i5 g S 

g. 2 5 ""^ 

(0 (0 Q 0) 

•o "g *" E 

Rj E ® c 

Em 

- _ 3 » 

•p a> 2 <« 

w •£ -^ 5 

o *- o > 

O c W m 



t 5 2 c 

C _ 0) w 

a) o -D o c 

- -o o £ c 

C Q> Q. Q> <0 

« ^ !2 "S E 



> ■D 
O *" 




r f I 



ST c 



o (A i: Q- 

i S „ " ^ 

io fc o 2 c 
x: „ o ♦= a) 

ill if 



c c « ° » 

o -2 ^ o 5 

" I S " ° 

S i £ 51 

o o a „ Bj 

<o c .t s "O 

8 :^ I ? § 

- x: *' o o 

O I- t T3 Q- 



2 ? P ^ - 

t;; s i i I 

« « S o ■» 

■D E « <D o 

1 °^^ fe 



^1 

s 8 



•M c 

'So S 

= o > 
w E -o 
® >" £ 



CO 



c 2 



S o s 

5. c -2 



a- i_ .. ™ 

2 °-5^ a 

^ ^ « i2 *t 

sills 

3 u o) ^ a> 
o 1 I .2 « 



■£ 2 o 

o «2 5 
« E o 

■is:;: 



S e5S 

• S M o 

O CO ^ E 



(I) c O) c 

> o c o 

tj <g I -o 

£ o ro to 

■fe ro Q- « 

S 1 S « 
I §5 I 

ST 5 ■eg' 

c E 2 ^ 

O O o CO 

to .E 2 -c 
E <» 2 "> 

1-1°' 
~£SS 

.2 « == 

BJ « > s 
t= 6 o a, 

« 2 T3 ■" 
O 3 (B -D 
O O -O 3 

10 0) Q. ^ 

8 i^^ 

O T3 O m 



.9 -S O (D 

« <S o £ 



-, = o 

to o 

C ^ E 

W O Q 



i= E -o £ 



CO wj CO •; 

■c .y " o 

<D ^ < = 

<"% o 

" H E o 

o> ,_ « £ 

.£ 5 to I- .. 

I '^ " " I 

B ? ? s I 

c .2 •- a 5 

^ o> a> 3 *' 



CO *: o o) 

CO _ = c 

® £ "£ o 

> .2 2 o 

O CO ^ o 

« i "'S 

O c ♦: ._ 
c _ o o 
-o i"= c 

CD ~ CD O 

3"*= 

C "O C (0 

CO 0) <P O) 
>£>"«= 

T3 o "D ~ 

< W < 2 



££ RS 



104 



E 
■I— • 

CO — 

o .9 



CO 
T3 

O 

> 


Q. 
CL 
< 


<c 


(0 


c 


CO 


o 


J^ 


.^ 


V 


;^ 


o 


o 


^ 


2 


0) 


ID 


> 


t3 


cc 


13 





CO 




105 



stem 
tion 


^i 


>. (0 


in 


CO o 


l| 


CD Q. 


?- 


O Q. 


I§ 


k< 


11 


^■^ 


ii 


O r- 


* 2 


onAv 
re Trai 


f' 


(0 3 


fl 


— ■*-> 


= O 


O D 

O 4= 


CD CO 


gl 


^ CD 


1 i! 

11 


O "D 




^ CD 



CO 





SI 



s 


•i 


.9 




* 


io 


j= 






c 






— 


ra 


(J 












o 


(D 


<D 




(0 




3 




o 




i-i 




a, 


E 


^ 




<D 


u> 


is 




5 


Z 


w 












I 




OT 




% 
£ 


i 


1 




O 


2 


1 
1 


■6 


2 


(D 


2 


8 


o 


re 


§ 


2 


1 




1 


S 




■0 


u 


o> 


£ 


(0 




c 





1 


E 


•5 


^ 







£ 


re 


t 


.£ 


> 


o 


CD 


M 


.h 


^ 


C 

m 


E 
2 


1 




© 


in 


UJ 




c 


> 


re 


;^ 





«) 


(D 


<o 


f 


u 

c 


;§ 


b 





^ 


5 


♦J 


% 






E 2 



Q. U) 

o E 



c o 
re Q. 



S E 



<D W O " 

J3 >• > = 

o) *" I i 

I - ® C 

re ^ £ E 

re o *- re 



S E 



at 
o re 



BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY 



10« 3 9999 05982 660 



b .E 



>- .2 

3 
(J 






107 



■^ -c 



5 fe 
I I 



" C m Z 

"^ ■; s s 



E > 



I I = 



' E 
? 2 



.^ .£ 



E 1? o 



§ « 
I i 

I I 
I 



if 



li 



' E 

^ i 
'8 ST 



~ E 



I ? 



^ -^ f 

.2 a> > 
£ £ - 

° r £ 

w « 2 
o 5 Q 

of? 

^ ^ 1 

= 0) 10 

If I 

c o E 
3 « ^ 

0, » £ 

S il 
III 



5 = s 



1 I « 

5 = » 

« 3 c 

S <D O 

o o- jE 

^ . 

Ill I 

1 c 2 S, 

3 5 .£ g 






E S ^ 



2 = T3 

S 5 « 



" E a> 
» S — 









o 



ISBN 0-16-044264-8 



780160"442643' 



90000