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©arbarti College iLiiirarg

K-OM TH« BK^UBSX OP

DANIEL TREADWELL

□1 Srieoce to the Useful Arts
1834-1845

TRAINING
INFANTRY

JOHN F. MORRISON

Colonel oi Infantry

U. S. CAVALRY ASSOCIATION

Fort LMiTenTirorth/ Kantaa

1914

V/a\ -'f ." W-, Is. V.

Itf

-ly

FEB 16 1915

BOIINn MAY :> 19(5

KctekwoB Prutting Company
Lcavenwortk

PREFACE

In my commissioned service of over thirty- three
years I have spent over twenty-two years with my
regiment and three years in training a battalion of
college cadets. I have been intimately associated
with the national guard of one state and have had
experience with the guard of four other states. I
have seen something of foreign troops in both peace
and war. In these many years I have observed the
methods of training employed by a number of
officers.

Our infantry training has improved over what I
first knew but there still exists in places a lack of
completeness and system. Of late years a much
greater interest than formerly has been taken in the
tactical instruction and training of our officers and
the progress has been marked. The tactician is,
however, but the skilled mechanic; the tools with
which he works are his troops. New recruits are
like the lump of ore, of no use until converted into
steel and then forged into shape. The making of
this tool from the raw material is our principal
business during peace.

4 PREFACE

At the request of officers with whom I have

often talked and corresponded on the subject of

training infantry, this little book of suggestions has

been prepared. It is based on my own experience

and observation and what others have told me of

their work. It is offered by an older officer to his

younger brothers in the infantry in the hope that

it may be of some service to them.

J. F. M.

CONTENTS

PAGB

Preface 3

Introduction . .... 7

CHAPTER

I The Essential and the Desirable 9

Knowledge and Habit
II General Distribution OF Time 19

Winter and Summer Work

III Fire Superiority ... 32
Fire Distribution, Control and
Discipline, Signals

IV Combat 44

The Company, Battalion, Regiment

V Artillery Fire ... 70

Effectiveness, Formations to Meet
Team Play
VI Patrols, Advance and Rear Guards, 89
Outposts

VII Marching 104

Preparations, Instruction, Practice
VIII The National Guard ... 113
Essential Training for, Armory
Work and Summer Camps

I CONTENTS

IX Inspections .... 130

Yearly, Company and Battalion

Examinations
X Training a New Regiment . 134

Principles, Schedule for
XI Recruiting .... 161

Need for a Change, Plan, Reasons
XII In Conclusion .... 177

Relative Values, Strength of the

Company, Our Responsibility

INTRODUCTION

There is nothing more important to an
army than the correct training of its in- Impor-
fantry. The training of all the arms has t*"i^*j|L
much in common, but training infantry, infantry
owing to the manner of its use in battle, calls
for much that is not required in the other
arms.

The infantry soldier must work more in-
dependently than men in the other branches.
He cannot be led or controlled as can men
in groups or close formations; hence he needs
to be more thoroughly instructed in the part
he is to play. This instruction cannot be
given him on the field of battle. The man
who must steadily advance on an enemy in
position requires not only higher training
but higher discipline than one who does his
fighting in close formation, or at long range
and out of sight of the enemy and protected
from hostile fire by steel shields.

The mere mechanical part of the drill of
all the arms is not difficult as regards its
execution on the peaceful drillground but it
requires much training to carry out these
same things on the battlefield.

8 INTRODUCTION

It is reported as an incident in the recent
Impor- Balkan War that a general of division, whose
infantr ^^^^^^ry had been reinforced by the addition
training ot fifty per cent of recruits who had only re-
ceived about a month's training, prepared for
battle by sending all his new men to the rear,
preferring to fight without them. His divi-
sion was successful but the other divisions,
which retained their new men in ranks during
combat, broke and were routed.

War of today is not a game for amateurs.
Infantry to be of any value has not only
to be trained but to be properly and thor-
oughly trained. On the part of those in
charge of this training there is necessary an
appreciative understanding of the objects
sought, earnest effort, tact, enthusiasm, and
a real knowledge of men.

THE ESSENTIAL AND THE DESIRABLE
KNOWLEDGE AND HABIT

ensure the proper training of our in-
fantry there are needed competent P«'«ctice
officers — officers who know what should be ^,

theory

taught and how to teach it. One some-
times hears: "He is a good practical soldier
but he knows nothing of the theory." Such
an expression is an absurdity. A man may
know the theory yet be unable to apply it or
make practical use of it; we have all seen
such men. But a man cannot practice what
he does not know. The knowledge of theory
required by the junior commander is not
great and the time it takes to learn it is short
compared with the time required to master
its practical application and to instruct prop-
erly a command.

The first requisite for a unit commander
is a knowledge of the fundamental principles Needs of
of the tactics of his arm and its employment * * ""**

^ "^ com-

in combination with the other arms, especi- mander
ally with the artillery. He must have a clear

10 TRAINING INFANTRY

conception of the modern battlefield in order
Needs of to Understand for what he must train his unit.
t e unit jjg must train it for battle conditions, not

com- '

mander peace conditions. A company trained to be
handled exclusively by word of command, as
in a close order drill on the parade ground,
lacks the training that fits for battle.

The more the enlisted men know of the
art of war the better. Time is not available
however, to teach them the whole art of war
even if the men in ranks were capable of
mastering it. The instructor must therefore
clearly understand what are the things the
Essential men must know and what are merely desirable
desirable ^^ additions to their training. Every effort
instruc- should be spent and all available time devoted
tion to first perfecting the men in the things

they must know; afterwards, if more time is
available, it is well to extend in other di-
rections their education and training.

Under the first heading, essentials, the
men must be taught their close order drill.
This is necessary tor two reasons: it renders
possible the orderly movement of troops
and it makes for discipline. So far as the
orderly movement of troops is concerned
very little is necessary but without precision
close order drill is of no value towards dis-

THE ESSENTIAL AND THE DESIRABLE 11

cipline. To have a disciplinary value, drill
movements must be carried out with exacti- Close
tude. Discipline is injured if, when an offi- ^ ..?'
cer gives a command at drill, it is only carried
out approximately; the soldier is acquiring
the habit of slighting his work and of doing
an approximation, not the precise duty
demanded of him.

It takes but little longer to learn to exe-
cute correctly the few movements prescribed
than to learn them incorrectly, but it requires
constant attention on the part of the in-
structor to maintain exactness. The atten-
tion and effort required on the part of the
instructor are, however, amply compensated
by the results.

The men must know perfectly the me-
chanism of the extended order drill. A com- Extended
pany must be able without confusion or mix- j^ij"^
up to form line of skirmishers in the least pos-
sible time from any formation and facing in
any direction. This will necessitate much
practice. It does not take long to learn to
form line of skirmishers quietly, from line or
column of squads, facing to the front; but
that is not sufficient.

The men must know how to estimate dis-
tances, how to shoot, how to use the bayonet;

12 TRAINING INFANTRY

they must understand patrolling and outpost
Other duty, the construction of hasty intrenchments,
essenti s ^j^^ application of first aid, how to cook the

ration and how to care for their arms and

equipment.

Especially important is it that the men
know how to march and how to care for them-
selves in the field. However well instructed
a soldier may be he is of no use if at the time
of battle he is back in the hospital.

Under the second heading, of things that
Desirable n jg desirable the men should know, are
mstruc- s^|3jg^^g ^hich are essential for the oflScers to
know but which are not equally essential for
the men. Nevertheless it is an advantage to
have them know as much as possible, pro-
vided the merely desirable instruction does
' not interfere with the proper training in
essentials. Among these subjects are topog-
raphy and the construction of temporary
bridges; the lis/ might be extended almost
indefinitely.
Things to The instructor must further distinguish
stood and '^^^ween the essential things which the men
things to need merely to know or to understand and
be made those which need to be practiced until they

fixed

only be required to do off the battlefield,

, , become habits. Those things the men will

KNOWLEDGE AND HABIT 13

where they will have time to think and be in Things to
condition to use their heads, need only be ^^J^^^^

known. things to

Psychology teaches us that under great ^® made
stress of danger and excitement a man can be h^^its
depended upon to do only those things which
have become fixed habits, and further, that
under these same trying conditions, a man
who has acquired by practice a habit of doing
something a certain way cannot do that
thing differently. Action contrary to habit
requires thought, and mental activity is
difficult if not impossible under the circum-
stances. Acting according to habit is merely
following the line of least resistance.

It is difficult to conceive of greater stress
of danger and excitement than exists in a
modern battle. Certainly there is no other
case in which the knowledge of this psycho-
logical truth can be used to greater advantage
than in training for battle.

As far as possible, then, all those things
which the men must do under fire should be F«c<l
practiced until they become fixed habits. It ^^^^^^i^
has been said that if in the heat of battle a
man even raises his rifle to his shoulder, before
firing, it shows fair discipline. Not only
must bringing the rifle to the shoulder be made

14 TRAINING INFANTRY

a habit, but correct aiming and trigger pull
Habits of whenever the rifle is brought to the shoulder
^^^f^^ must be made a habit, and one so strongly
Bind firing developed that these acts will always be done

mechanically and without mental effort.

This desired result cannot be accom-
plished by two or three weeks a year of target
practice. The training must be continuous
for an extended period. To accomplish it
altogether with ball cartridges would be too
costly and often impracticable. The desired
results can be obtained by pointing and aim-
ing drills and gallery practice, if these are so
conducted that the men never pull the trigger
without properly bringing the rifle to the
shoulder and looking through the sights at
some target,

A week of continuous work every six
months will not accomplish the results;
frequent short drill periods are necessary.
A man who starts in by smoking three strong
cigars every Christmas and Fourth of July
but not touching tobacco between times will
not be so likely to acquire the smoking habit
as one who starts very moderately and repeats
the act daily. Overdoing any kind of train-
ing at one time, with long intervals between
has a tendency to produce dislike rather than

KNOWLEDGE AND HABIT 15

a habit. A few minutes of honest work at
least twice every week, in pointing and aim-
ing drill and gallery practice, will accom-
plish the result desired and my experience
convinces me that it also produces much
better results on the target range than crowd-
ing even more of this practice into the last
month before going on the range. Certainly
it is worth more than the other as a habit-
former.

The better a man can shoot when the
range is known to him the more important it Estimat-
is that his sight elevation be correct. A poor *"*^ * *

° ^ range

shot will scatter his bullets and may hit some-
thing even with a wrong elevation but the
accurate shot will not hit anything; yet the
correct range is valuable even to the poor
shot.

On the battlefield we can count only on
our estimate of the range; seldom will it be
practicable to determine it otherwise. Thus
estimating distances has to be made a habit
for two reasons: since habits alone count in
battle, only by making it a habit can we
depend on its being done; and second, it re-
quires constant practice to enable men to
estimate distances with fair accuracy.

Devoting two or three consecutive days

16 TRAINING INFANTRY

annually to estimating distances is almost a

Estimat- waste of time; practice should be had every

*^ * • week. I have seen both methods used and I

range

am certain as to their relative values. How
this instruction should be given will be
mentioned later.

The deployments, advancing the attack,
working by signals, taking advantage of
cover, and in fact everything pertaining to
combat from the opening of fire until the end
of the battle must be practiced until it be-
comes a fixed habit on the part of the men.

If we are to have good infantry the officers

The as instructors must be competent, have an

officer appreciation of relative values, be able to dis-

•tructor tinguish between what is essential and what

is merely desirable and make sure of essentials

before spending time on the latter. Each

oflScer must realize fully what has only to be

known and what must be made fixed habit

and govern his work accordingly.

Now a few hints as to the instruction work.
Hints as Never do this work in a perfunctory manner,
to m- Always have in mind what you want to teach

struction / , . t*

^^rk and how you are gomg to do it. Put yoiu*
heart in your work.

I have seen a well drilled company go to
pieces under an officer who gave his com-

KNOWLEDGE AND HABIT 17

mands in an indifferent manner and who
gave too much "place rest." The spirit of Hints as
indifference is contagious as well as the spirit g^^l^^^.
of enthusiasm. If you have no keen interest ^©rk
simulate it and you will find it grow into
the real thing. Remember that you are paid
for good work and if you do not give this kind
of service you are obtaining money fraudu-
lently.

But not only have you yourself to keep in-
terested; if the best results are to be ob-
tained you must keep up the interest of your
men. Nothing kills interest like monotony.
There are so many things to be taught and
there is so great an opportunity for variety
that there is no excuse for not keeping the
men interestedly busy for four hours a day.

Make clear to the men in the instruction
work, particularly in the field training, not
only the object sought but the why and
wherefore. In maneuvers always explain
the problem to them so far as is necessary to
make them understand what the command is
trying to do, where the enemy is supposed to
be, and the rest. They will respond not only
by taking more interest but by doing their
part much better.

I have seen a flank patrol out at a man-
euver the leader of which knew nothing of

18 TRAINING INFANTRY

the supposed situation and had been given no
instructions, except to act as left flank patrol.
What interest could he be expected to take in
the maneuver? How could he be counted
on properly to perform his duty?

I believe in carrying out this principle
Callis- even in the callisthenic drill. Explain to the
^ ®"*^ men the object of each movement, what muscle
is to be developed by it and its advan-
tage. Doing this makes this work much
more profitable to the men as well as more
interesting. It will also prevent our seeing
these movements so executed as to deprive
them of all their intended value.

In other words, treat the men being in-
Appeal structed as the intelligent men they are.
^^ *,j? They will both learn faster and do better
gence of work when they fully understand what is to
the men be done and the reason why. A horse must
be simply made to do certain things in a
given way; it is a tedious process and a horse
never does know much. Men trained as
soldiers on the 3ame plan as the horse give re-
sults out of all . proportion to the time and
effort spent. Why not, therefore, make use
of the man's intelligence and simply help him
train himself?

GENERAL DISTRIBUTION OF TIME

IN this country we cannot follow literally
any of the systems of training adopted by
the great military powers: our whole mili-
tary system is too different. We can, how-
ever, profit by their experience and, if we
translate, not the literal text of their regula-
tions but the spirit, gain much. It is essential
that any scheme of instruction adopted should
be suited to our organization, method of
recruitment and the various conditions
surrounding our service.

The work must be so planned as to utilize
all the available time of the year and in that Requi-
time to cover all the absolute essentials of "*t* ^ \

system of

instruction. In this utilization of the time training
schools for non-commissioned oflScers and
oflScers must be included. There is much
ground to be covered during the year and
unless the time be wisely apportioned it
cannot be done.

There is much of the work that can be
done indoors; other work can only be done

20 TRAINING INFANTRY

outside. Our troops are so widely scattered
and under such varying climatic conditions
that the distribution of time cannot profit-
ably be the same for all.

Each post should make its own schedule.
Winter f^e work in each post must, however, be uni-
*" form. For example, in the northern part of

summer ^ ' ^

work the United States the year's training should
begin November 1st and end October 31st.
All the instruction that can be given during
the winter months, should be given, leaving
the rest for the open season. The schools for
both oflScers and non-commissioned oflScers
are held during the indoor season; the work
done in them should dovetail in with the
general schenie of instruction. Particular
care should be exercised with respect to the

Schools non-commissioned oflScers' schools; in them
the non-commissioned oflScers should be
taught thoroughly how to play their part in
the varied work in the field and be given the
reasons for things.

Simply repeating the words of a book
* should be avoided; teach them to do things.
The company commander who is capable
and in earnest can do much in winter toward
training his company even in garrisons where
weather conditions are the worst.

DISTRIBUTION OF TIME 21

Most of the captains of one regiment
known to me have been doing good work Methods
during the past two years in teaching the ^^^^
principles of the conduct of patrols and tion
covering detachments. Some of them made
use of the Stacey Relief Map; others simply
built a sand table about ten feet by five.
On this the sand was moulded to form hills
and valleys. Blue strings were laid down for
streams, yellow ones for roads. Minature
bridges were constructed and placed where
desired. Small twigs were used to make
forests.

By means of practical examples worked
out on these made or improvised maps the
principles were thoroughly taught and more
easily than is possible out of doors; when
spring came, only a few exercises on the
ground were necessary to make these com-
panies proficient.

Another use made of the sand table was
in the teaching of entrenching. Bull Dur- Entrench-
ham tobacco sacks were converted into sand ^^
bags and the men taught their use in revetting,
loop-holing, etc. Similarly on a minature
scale were taught the preparation of head-
logs, the making of gabions, facines and
hurdle revetment. Brush work thus taught

22 TRAINING INFANTRY

indoors needs only be followed by one out-
door exercise, in which work is done on the
scale actually used in the field, in order to
render the company proficient.

Where the post is so fortunate as to be
Gymna- provided with a gymnasium full advantage
""™ should be taken during the winter season of
the opportunities for physical training which
it affords. The physical development of the
men is most important. Where no gym-
nasium is available a well-planned course in
callisthenics is the best substitute and should
be used. Callisthenics to music or for pure
show should be prohibited,

The indoor season must be fully utilized
First aid iq g^ye the full time of the outdoor season
gna ing j^^ ^j^^^ training which can only be given
then. Instruction in such subjects as first
aid and signalling naturally is given at this
time. A place for gallery practice can
always be rigged up.

The foundation for estimating distances
Estimat- must be laid, and there should be practice in
tan €•*" ^* every week, during the closed season. In
this work the whole company should be em-
ployed together only for the first one or two
exercises when the principles are being ex-
plained; after that a platoon or less at a

DISTRIBUTION OF TIME 23

time. Near each barracks there should be

two stakes one hundred yards apart and so E«timat

placed that the men see them every time the *"^

company forms. This is their unit of measure

and cannot become too familiar to them.

The captain or someone designated by
him selects a couple of distances to be esti-
mated. Each subdivision of the company
then goes out in turn and upon completing
the exercise returns and another goes out.

The men must be taught to estimate dis-
tances both from themselves to a given point
and between two points, both at some dis-
tance from them. The latter is necessary in
their patrol work in estimating lengths of
column and frontages occupied. If the esti-
mating be conducted in this way the weather
will make little difference; the men dress suit-
ably for it and are out only a short time.
The work to be of value must be done under
varying conditions of light.

There should be no week in the year in
which this exercise is not conducted. In
summer it should be done on the days when
the company is away from the garrison on the
weekly practice march; there is ample time
for it during the long halt.

This work can be conducted so as only to

24 TRAINING INFANTRY

take about fifteen minutes of each man's
Estimat- time per week. It is well worth it. I have

tances*' ^^^^ ^^^ above plan carried out intelligently
in two or three companies and the results
were remarkably good; the ability of the
men to estimate distance was better than
that given for musketry school graduates in
foreign services. On the other hand I have
seen it indifferently carried out and, like
most indifferent work, it was a waste of time.

Position and aiming drills and gallery
Position practice must be a weekly occurrence and
*." . holding them twice a week will be better.

aiminsr

drills, If the detachments are made small enough
gallery gallery practice requires but little time for
practice qq^q^ man. It is important in conducting
this practice to see that no man ever fires a
score in a careless or indifferent manner; if
this is permitted the result obtained will be
the opposite of that desired. I found one
very effective means of preventing such care-
less work: a man found guilty of careless
firing was required to repeat his score — but
not at that time when it would delay the
regular course. He had to remain near the
gallery until I, or someone designated by me,
came around to supervise his firing and it was
usually some little time before I got around.

DISTRIBUTION OF TIME 25

Throughout the year careful attention
should be given to bayonet fencing. I do not Bayonet
believe that there is much probability of a ®"^*"^
bayonet contest in war but, for psychological
reasons, this training is necessary. Positions
are carried by the bayonet, but past ex-
perience shows that in such charges the bayo-
nets seldom crossed and when they did it was
a "rough and tumble." Our men may go in
with the best intentions in the world to use
the bayonet according to rule, yet the chances
are that, in the excitement of the melee, habit
will assert itself and the gun become a bat.

Nevertheless, troops are very seldom
"shot out of a position"; the imminent
threat of the bayonet is necessary; but, as
the opposing bayonets get close, one side or
the other weakens.

It would be folly to expect men without
bayonets to charge an enemy with long and ^^^^ ^^
sharp ones, or to expect them without bayo- ,*^^ired
nets to stand a charge by an enemy armed
with such weapons, even though, if they had
bayonets, they would be likely to club their
rifles. The moral effect of a line of bayo-
nets is great.

Infantry should be armed with the best of
bayonets, long and, in war time, razor
sharp. The men must have confidence in

26 TRAINING INFANTRY

their ability to use them with skill and effect;
otherwise they will neither charge nor stand
the enemy's charge. At that stage of the
fight success largely depends on the confi-
dence of the individual man in his power to
win.

Bayonet fencing should be continuous
Amount throughout the year. At least one-half -hour
ba onet ^^^^^^ should be devoted to it and during
practice the indoor season extended and careful in-
struction should be given to groups not
larger than a squad. During the outdoor
season this instruction should be so arranged
as not to interfere with the regular drills.

The company should be divided into
Division sections that can be handled conveniently
****?. for the instruction work. The success of the

sections

for in- indoor work largely depends on keeping the
struction sections small enough.

This is especially necessary in first aid
and sandtable work. If the sections are too
large at estimating distance and gallery
practice it results in too much idle standing
around.

The sections must be changed from one
Changing class of work to another before the work drags
sections ^^ ^^^ ^^^ become tired of it. Give them

variety.

DISTRIBUTION OF TIME 27

The captain must exercise care in select-
ing the instructors for the various subjects. Selecting
The man who will do it the best should be *"**'"^-

tors

the instructor in each. Perfunctory or in-
different work should never be allowed on the
part of an instructor or by the man being
instructed.

The capable, intelligent and honest cap-
tain will utilize the indoor season to the great The
benefit of his company and of his govern- ^*p***"
ment. He will discover the best ways and
means of instructing his own particular men.
The incompetent captain, lacking average in-
telligence, will accomplish nothing under any
circumstances.

As much latitude as practicable should be
given to subordinate commanders in carry- Initiative
ing out any system of instruction and they 1",^,^^.
should be held strictly responsible for results, tion work
A scheme in which there is laid down just
how each thing is to be taught, and how much
time and what time is to be devoted to it, is
radically wrong. We need to develop our
oflBcers as well as our men. The conditions
are different at different posts. The needs
of different companies at the same posts
are varied. Each captain should know just
how much time he has and what is absolutely

28 TRAINING INFANTRY

required of him in that time. He should
Initiative then be allowed to work out his own solution

instruc- ^^ *^® problem.

tion work When every detail is prescribed the officer
has no initiative, his interest is diminished,
he thinks less, exercises less responsibility,
and his work is not so good. If that policy
be kept up long enough the subordinate officer
will never do anything without positive in-
structions. An officer who exercises no
judgment is of no value in war.

But absolute liberty for the subordinate
The to do as he pleases is impracticable. The

regiment p^gjujejit is a team of which his unit is only

a team

one member. There must be team play and
every member must know and be able to do his
part. The company must be taught certain
things or it will not fit into the battalion
team; the battalion must be fitted for the
regimental team. Each larger unit must
have time for training and has a right to
demand that each lower unit which forms a
part of it shall have accomplished its own
special work on time and be ready to play its
part in the work of the larger unit.

The colonel is responsible for the train-
The ing of his regiment. He should allot the
CO one time, supervise the work and see that every

DISTRIBUTION OF TIME 29

member of the team is ready. He is the best
judge of the requirements of his regiment.
But the colonel should do this so as to leave
all the liberty practicable to subordinate
commanders.

If all our captains were competent and
reliable this work of the colonel would be Orders
very simple. But there are a few captains, *". f.*"
unfortunately, who are far from the best,
whose long suit at drill is ''place rest" and
having a sergeant drill the company in Butts'
Manual. While more restrictions are neces-
sary for such captains these restrictions do
not hamper the others; they merely pro-
hibit things the right kind of captain would
never think of doing or require what he would
never think of omitting.

Of course most of the instruction time be-
longs to the companies ; it is in them that most Time to
of the work must be done. Four well trained ^''f f***"

zations

companies under a competent major can be
made into a well trained battalion in a very
few days, and the time required for each
higher unit is less than that for the one next
below.

To the company belongs all the indoor
season. In dividing the rest of the year for
the northern part of the U. S. I believe that

30 TRAINING INFANTRY

the available time from April 1st to October
1st should be allotted in the proportion of 4
days to the company for each 2 to the bat-
talion and 1 to the regiment. The month of
October should be devoted to maneuvers and
Time to to work in higher units. The time spent on
See the target range is excluded in computing the
available time but no company should be
allowed to devote more than two weeks to
target practice exclusive of field firing; of the
latter we can hardly get too much. It is
appreciated that conditions at various posts
make different schedules necessary.

In the past we have seen the training done
in a back-handed way: work in the higher
units first, finally down to the company and
soldier. This is so unlikely to occur in future
that its evil results are not worth mentioning.

Too much time should not be devoted to

Time to close order drill, especially during the out-

^ ^*® door season. An hour a day for the first five

drill or six drills and thereafter fifteen minutes a

day is ample. There should always be,

however, at least ten minutes a day of snappy,

precise close order work; this together with

the ceremonies will keep the companies up

to the standard. Too much close order drill

becomes monotonous; when that happens the

DISTRIBUTION OF TIME

command fails to improve even if it does not
deteriorate.

The drills during the indoor season should
be two hours long; for the rest of the year V®"5*** ^^
not less than three and generally from f oiu* to
six hours daily.

drills

Fire

effective-
ness in
battle

FIRE SUPERIORITY

WE are told that in battle we must have
fire superiority to win; and fire con-
trol and direction are held as important. I
doubt if these terms are fully understood by
all. A hope to aid some of our younger
officers to a better understanding of these
terms, and of the vital importance of fire
distribution, is the excuse for this chapter.

A line of men firing with the rifle, if not
disturbed or endangered by the fire of an
enemy, can do approximately target practice
work. Now let a heavy fire be opened on
them, one that is fairly accurate and well
placed, and their work falls off very greatly;
the heavier the fire they are subjected to
the less effective becomes their own fire.

Careful study and research by competent

men of foreign armies leads to the conclusion

that if this line, when not under fire, could

make 280 hits in a given time, subjected to a

heavy, well placed fire its effectiveness would

fall to 1/40 or 1/70; that is, from 280 hits

to 7 or 4.

FIRE SUPERIORITY 33

This looks extreme at first thought; but
what captain with a good company but would ^>'"®
know that he could deploy his company at * ®^*»^*-
from 800 to 1000 yards from a line of lying battle
down figures and get a hit for at least every
10 shots. Yet history tells us that it takes
from 1200 to 2000 shots in battle to put a man
out of action. In the light of these facts our
first figures look very moderate.

With our present infantry arm an advance
against a hostile line doing 280 work is im-
possible. Bring the enemy's effectiveness
down to the four and keep it there and you
can advance and win.

Fire superiority does not mean that you
are firing more shots than the enemy, it does
not mean he is firing less than you; it means
that your fire has become so close and effective
that he has lost his nerve and is shooting
wildly.

To obtain this fire superiority certain
things are necessary. We must have proper ^ »J« <*»•-
fire distribution. To explain this let us as-
sume that a hostile line is 200 yards long,
that our force is the stronger. We concen-
trate our fire on the right half of the hostile
line, leaving the other half untouched. The
effectiveness of the fire of half of this line re-

tribiitioii

34 TRAINING INFANTRY

mains at 280, the other half falls to 2, average
141; our advance is impossible. We now
cover the entire target and its fire effec-
tiveness falls to 7; our advance is possible.

Fire superiority is possible, then, only if
we have fire distribution. It is not suflBcient
to fire a certain number of shots at part of the
line, the whole hostile line must be subjected
to a nerve racking fire to reduce the effective-
ness of its fire.

Another thing to be considered is that
the enemy will conceal himself as much as
possible. On a large part of the hostile
line no one will be seen; men will be hidden
by tufts of grass, bushes, etc. But while
this cover conceals the enemy from our view,
he sees our location and his fire is not in-
terrupted. There is a strong tendency to
shoot only at the men that can be seen. This
must be overcome; much of our firing must
be aimed at a locality, although unseen
the enemy is nevertheless there and his fire
effectiveness must be kept down. Our fire
must be distributed to cover every part of
the hostile line whether the enemy is seen or
not.

To secure this fire distribution we must
be able to direct the fire of our men, to place

FIRE SUPERIORITY 36

it where wanted. But direction necessarily
implies control ; you can not direct what you ^»'«
cannot control. Thus a fire control system ^®"*^
which will work on the battlefield is a primary
requisite to success.

Another term used is fire discipline. The
word fire adds nothing to its meaning; but ^|'®
discipline is vital to success. No matter "^*p*"*
what your system of control, if the men do
not respond with prompt obedience it is
worthless. Disciplined men can be counted
on to do what is wanted if they know how,
others cannot. There is no fire discipline
distinct from other military discipline.

To sum up: fire superiority is necessary
to success, to attain fire superiority we must
properly distribute our fire, to do this we
must be able to control and hence direct it,
and this can only be done if our men are
disciplined. An attack with raw troops is
possible only against still poorer ones.

Our fire control and direction needs more
explanation. A method must be had which Method
will work on the battlefield. No one who has ^^ ^®
seen a modern battle will think for a moment
that it is practicable to control and direct a
firing line by verbal orders. A battalion
commander must be far enough to the rear

36 TRAINING INFANTRY

to observe his entire line. In the noise of a
real battle his voice could not be heard ten
yards by men on the firing line. The same
is equally true of company and platoon
commanders. These oflScers cannot be run-
ning up and down the line giving instructions;
if they tried it they would not last long.

Our method must therefore be one that
U»e of can be executed independently of the voice
•igna 8 ^^ J ^^j^ ^^ little exposure of the officers as
practicable. The method by signals given
in our I. D. R. answers the requirements.
The text of it can be learned in a few minutes,
but to train a battalion so that it will fully
respond under danger requires hours of prac-
tice: it is one thing that must become a
habit.

After the mechanism of the drill is learned
officers should conduct their line as in battle
by signals only. Do not teach men to expect
you to be running up and down the line
personally correcting errors and giving direc-
tions, leading them to expect this to be done
in battle. The effect of a decided change in
conduct when danger is present is apt not to
be good. Moreover, the command will not
respond to signals alone on the battlefield
if, in instruction work, they have never been

FIRE SUPERIORITY 37

taught to depend on them exclusively. We
should do everything at battle exercises just U*© ©^
as nearly as possible as it will be done in "^rnaU
battle.

I have seen at battle exercises men stand
up in the open and wave their flags to give
the signals. This is absurd. In battle it
would be needlessly dangerous, would give
the enemy too much information, and it is
unnecessary. The necessary signals in the
battalion can be given by a man lying on the
ground with a handkerchief, or flag without
the staff, and be seen for the short distances
separating the major from his captains or
the captain from his platoon commanders.
Practice alone is required to enable this to be
done efficiently. It must be so done in battle
and must therefore be drilled that way.

It should be remembered that the new
semaphore code recently adopted does not
apply to these signals. The new code re-
quires men to stand; the old must be used
for these battle signals.

Additional signals to those given in the
I. D. R. may be taught and used in companies. Addi-
It is doubtful if they are necessary and if not *|®"*}

Signals

necessary they are wrong. The more signals
you have, the more chance of mistakes.

38 TRAINING INFANTRY

Addi- Signals for forming squad or platoon columns

, are unnecessary. These movements are not
executed close to the enemy nor when your
line is firing, hence verbal commands are prac-
ticable and ^en practicable are desirable,
are surer and easier.

Signals are necessary when your line has
commenced the fire fight but from there on few
commands are necessary; there are so few
things that can be ordered, the time for
maneuver and instruction is past. One or
two of those given might be dispensed with
and one for fixing bayonets should be added ;
possibly there are one or two others that
should be added.

We have discussed how to obtain fire
Observing superiority; how may we know when we have
tii^ncsl^ it, if the volume of the enemy's fire remains
practically the same? Company and pla-
toon commanders must watch for the effect
of the enemy's fire, where his bullets are
striking. If the hostile bullets are going
wild, some striking far short, others way
high, and very few are effective, you have
fire superiority; that is the time to gain
distance to the front. On the other hand,
although you may be suffering no loss, you
see that the enemy's bullets, well massed,

FIRE SUPERIORITY 39

are striking, say 50 yards in your front; you

have no fire superiority; the enemy has simply Observing

underestimated the range and your advance ^. * * *^"

° tiveness

will bring you into the center of his beaten
zone. But this is your opportunity to gain
fire superiority. Your men are suffering
little or no loss, should be less affected and
should do better work. If this opportunity
is well utilized you will gain fire superiority.
When you have fire superiority you must
push the advance, take full advantage of your
opportunity; if you temporarily lose it,
suspend the advance until you regain the
necessary superiority.

Fire properly distributed is one essential
to gaining fire superiority. Proper distri- DUtribu-
bution means it is placed on the target and on ***^"
all of the target, not just one part. Placing
our fire on the target requires that our men be
at least fair shots, have their nerve and know
the range. To cover all the target rather
than concentrate on a part is not easy and to
attain practical efficiency in this requires
skill and practice.

In the deployment for battle the division
is generally given a specific mission, the
division commander assigns to each brigade
its part of the task, and so on down to the

TRAINING INFANTRY

Distribu-
tion of
fire

The

captain's
problems

battalion, company, platoon and even squad.

There is little involved in the larger
units except the tactical skill to know how to
use the larger units to gain the required end ;
dividing the terrain is easy. It is difficult
with the commanders of the smaller units;
the division of the target generally becomes
harder the smaller the subdivision. The
major must divide his target, .say between
two companies, and do it so that there can
be no mistake on the part of the captains
as to just what part each is to cover. The
company commander must then divide his
section among his platoons and the latter
often among the squads.

The battalion commander has only one
difficulty — to find a way to make each captain
clearly understand where is the division of
target and where its extreme limit. The
company commander has a shorter line to
divide and has to divide it into more parts.
Landmarks are not so common as he will then
desire.

The captain has another problem in this
connection: shall he divide his target into
four parts and assign each platoon a separate
part, or into two parts and give two platoons
the same target, i. e., 1st and 3d the right

FIRE SUPERIORITY 41

half, 2d and 4th the left half? The captain
has not only the problem of finding proper The
dividing points in the target, but he must ^^0^*^^*
divide and allot the target so as to get the best
fire effect. It might happen, as I once saw
in a field firing problem, that the right pla-
toon could not see the corresponding part of
the target, hence was given the other extreme
flank and the. rest of the target divided ac-
cordingly. It is not the division alone, but
what is the best division and allotment, that
must be considered.

This will all be more clearly understood if
you will go in the country and assume a regi- Practice
ment is ordered to attack a certain line under *". , "T

tributinj

certain conditions, and then give the col- the
onel's attack order, from that take each target
major's target and divided it between the
companies and then divide each company
target. This should, of course, always be
done at the same distance from the target
that you would have to make the distribution
if a real enemy were there. You should have
two or three men with you to act as the
subordinates in each case and to determine
whether the division is fully and perfectly
understood. It is easy on a map, but often
very difficult on the ground ; distinctive marks
are sometimes very scarce.

TRAINING INFANTRY

tributm^

tance of
artillery

Elach commander should practice this,
devising a method for himself that will work.
Officers alone or together in small groux>s
should practice it as a sort of tactical walk.
But primarily it should be done in each unit:
the colonel should take the majors on such a
tactical walk; the majors their captains; the
captains their platoon commanders. Esti-
mating distance should be worked in the
same exercise.

For the companies this is good work for
the indoor season . There are days when work
can be planned for the company that does
not require the presence of the captain or of
most of his officers and non-commissioned
officers; these can then utilize the drill period
as above described. It may be made a real
tactical walk with special stress laid on the
division and allotment of the target.

It must be borne in mind that in most
cases the artillery will play a large part in the
gaining and maintaining of fire superiority.
But this fact does not alter the work of the
infantry; we must still do most of the killing
and unnerving of the enemy and this is true
whether the enemy consists of infantry alone
or of infantry in conjunction with artillery.

In this chapter the first part is much like

FIRE SUPERIORITY 43

right line strategy" mathematics applied to
a battlefield where little is subject to such
treatment. But that seemed the easiest and
simplest way to make clear to beginners terms
that must be fully understood. It is hoped
that that part of the chapter will be under-
stood as meant, as offering merely a means of
illustration and not as implying that a battle
can be worked out with mathematical pre-
cision.

COMBAT

WAR, according to Clause witz, is the con--
tinuation of diplomacy. Diplomacy-
is not always able to settle international dis-
putes, then the army must do what the
diplomats have failed to accomplish. In our
own history it has been the mass of the people
who have forced our wars, and who, in the
case of a strong public sentiment arising, will
involve us again. On account of the state
of preparedness of most great nations and
because of the enormous cost of modern war,
wars are shorter than formerly.

If this country becomes involved in a war
Object ^th a military power it will be impracticable
^ *" to learn the art of war and train an army

army *^

after the outbreak; the war will not last long
enough. The object of having an army
is for war not for peace, and the battles
alone really decide the issue; the battlea
are not numerous but each tends one
way or the other to end the struggle. Great
armies exist for many years between wars,
and are then trained for these few days of

COMBAT 45

battles which determine the fate of the
nation. The whole aim of an army should
be to be ready for war and the success or fail-
ure in war is determined by a few days of
battle. Untrained troops are of no value on
the modern battlefield.

Part of our close order drill, the cere-
monies and some other things we teach, are Traininj
accessories and, if given their proper place, /*"! .
are of value, but the battlefield is the crucial
test; by our fitness for that must our train-
ing be judged. The work of generals and the
general staff is vitally important but the best
plan will accomplish nothing if there are no
trained companies to carry out their part.

In this chapter is considered the training
necessary for combat. This is the work
executed under the severest strain and under
the greatest difficulties of leadership and
control. This training must be thorough
and the things in combat which have to be
done must become a habit.

THE COMPANY

The first essential is that the men must
know the mechanism of the extended order Extcndec
drill, including all signals used. To keep con- ^^ *|:.

pr&ctico

trol of the skirmish line in battle, that is to

TRAINING INFANTRY

Extended

order

practice

Calmness
in giving
orders

maintain such order therein that it can be
directed and used as desired, is far from easy.
Excitement and confusion, especially in the
last stages of the combat, are apt to occur.
Everything possible must be done to preserve
organization and control.

Much depends upon the start; if there
is confusion at the start and the squads get
mixed, success is more than doubtful. In the
majority of cases the deployment will be
made quietly at long range, but not in all.
The company must be drilled until able
to deploy from all formations, facing in any
direction, in the least time practicable, and
without any confusion or mix-up.

The captain who can give all his orders
and commands at the start of a fight in a
calm, unexcited manner has a great advan-
tage over the one whose voice or manner in-
dicates excitement. This calm manner
should be cultivated during training. As
good a way as I know for such training is to
have a few men to represent hostile forces
conceal themselves at various points in a
moderately close country; march the com-
pany through this terrain and, as the re-
presented enemy appears, form skirmish line
facing the supposed enemy, give the range

COMBAT 47

and the commands for opening fire in the
least possible time. The captain himself
should not know where the represented enemy
will appear. This is training for the captain
and also excellent practice for the company.

Occasionally during an advance points are
reached where a company is sheltered from Re'toring
fire. Advantage should always be taken of ®' *'
such opportunities to reestablish perfect
order, replace fallen leaders and thus get a
new start. Such an opportunity decidedly in-
creases your chance of success in battle; real
control is reestablished. Practice this in
your battle training when the opportunity
offers, but never do it when, in a real combat,
it would be impracticable.

After the mechanism of the extended order
drill is understood all combat exercises should Combat
have a problem or situation. These should •"■'^**^
always be simple; elaborate tactical problems
for this instruction work are unnecessary.
For a simulated attack as part of a line, all
that is necessary is a statement that the
enemy, a regiment of infantry, is holding the

line from to , our regiment is to

attack it at once, our battalion on the right,
we are the right company, our target or ob-
jective the part of the line from to

TRAINING INFANTRY

and
orders

. This of course should be varied but

need be no more complicated. The captain
should give this to his whole company, let all
the men know what they are supposed to be
doing.

The captain should then give his attack
Situation order, always carefully distributing the target.
For a company operating alone the follow-
ing form will answer every purpose: This
company belongs to a division engaged with
a hostile division five miles north of here.
This company was detached to capture that
building (pointing) which is assumed to be
important. The defending force occupies the

line . The order for the attack then

follows. Usually in such a case, a small
support would be held out. Of course the
problems will vary according to what it is de-
sired to teach. Always distribute the target
and let the men understand what you are
trying to do. All combat exercises should be
conducted as nearly as possible as though the
enemy were real. Allow nothing to be done
that would not be attempted were it real war,
otherwise you do not give instruction but
misinformation. After the mechanism is
taught, the captain and platoon commanders
must conduct themselves in combat exercises

Method
of con-
ducting
exercises

COMBAT 49

as they would under hostile fire, keep close
to the ground, use signals only. After the Method
exercise is over have a critique, point out the ^ ^*!""
errors made and tell the command how they exercises
should be corrected.

You must expect that if mistakes are
made at the drill they will be made in battle;
to correct these mistakes you should use only
those means at drill that will be practicable
in battle. The captain needs much practice in
thus handling a skirmish line and those under
him need more practice before the company
can be well handled in this manner.

The effectiveness of the enemy's fire
should be indicated that platoon commanders Means
can practice the control of rushes. The ® '®p'«-

senting

simplest way to do this that I have found is to enemy's
have a man at the hostile position with two fire
little flags. Holding both of these vertically
over his head means the enemy's fire is wild
and nearly harmless. One flag vertical the
other horizontal indicates a moderately
effective fire. Both flags horizontal indicates
the maximum effectiveness — that the enemy
has a decided fire superiority. When both
flags touch the ground it indicates no fire.
The advance of the attacking force is only
practicable by taking advantage of the times

60 TRAINING INFANTRY

when the fire is ineffective or weak to push

Means forward, and, when the hostile fire is too

®' Hn'*" s^^^^^' shooting to gain fire superiority.

enemy's Platoon commanders and men must become

fire accustomed to seizing these opportunities to

advance and suddenly getting down when

there is a burst of effective fire. The flags

on the hostile position may be controlled by

an instructor, stationed behind the company

officers, indicating how the flags are to be

held.

Remember that the hostile fire becomes
more effective in proportion as ours is less
effective. If we have the most men we
should gain fire superiority if our shots are
well placed. If the firing line has not dis-
tributed its fire properly the instructor causes
both flags to be held horizontally; no ad-
vance is then possible until the company
officers find out the cause of the trouble and
correct it. The same is done whenever a
serious error in sight elevation is made.
Majors should frequently conduct such ex-
ercises with their companies. The company
officers must become quick in determining
why the hostile fire is more effective than suits
existing conditions and learn to correct the
error.

COMBAT 51

You may not be able to reduce the effec-
tiveness of the hostile fire so that an advance Judging
under it is practicable and, in some cases, it ^®f*^** *"
may not be your mission to do so; but in every
case where the hostile fire passes a certain
point of effectiveness, depending on relative
numbers, your range, distribution or some-
thing is wrong, or else your men have lost
their nerve. Judging the effect of the hostile
fire is something in which company and pla-
toon commanders must be proficient, but off
the battlefield this can only be taught in
theory.

In advancing the attack by rushes the size
of the fraction rushing will be dependent upon Advance:
the relative proportion of rifles necessary ^^
to hold your fire superiority. If rushes are
practicable at all it will seldom be necessary
to rush by smaller units than the platoon.
But an advance will sometimes have to be
made by fractions of only a man or two and
sometimes by crawling. All these should be
taught.

When the enemy is active the rushes
should not be long, if of only 25 or 30 yards
the time the men are actually running will
be very short, too short for the average
man to pick up the target, raise the rifle to his

62 TRAINING INFANTRY

shoulder and fire with careful aim. Too
much time is taken by the average man in
getting up and down. The men must be
practiced in springing to their feet and
getting down again in the shortest time
possible. There is a knack in this not diffi-
cult to acquire.

Reinforcing a firing line will generally
Reinforce- bring about intermingling of squads and pla-
menta toons. To avoid this by closing in on the
center by companies, thus creating gaps for
reinforcements, is impracticable on a battle-
field when reinforcing is necessary. In battle
in the great majority of cases reinforcements
ivill go in as they can and fall into the existing
:gaps where found. As this will be the rule in
battle we should so drill it.

When the next rush is made, say by squads,
where do these reinforcements go? In one
regiment at least, they solved it satisfactorily.
The points of division along the firing line
remain where they were; the new man who
joins the firing line always goes with the
man on his right, he belongs to the squad and
to the platoon of the man on his right. This
provision should be added in the I. D. R.

In teaching the mechanism of the ex-
tended order, practice should be had in this

COMBAT 63

by dividing the company into firing line and
support and then feeding in the support and Mixing
continuing the advance by rushes. If you ^.jj**^.
expect this to be done in battle it must become
a habit. To get the best practice in this
mixing, as well as to train officers and ser-
geants to think quickly and to act properly,
there should be many rencontre engagements
so planned as to bring about a mixing of units
on the firing line.

Some practice should be afforded with
companies at war strength. This can be had
by combining two or more companies. By Practice
this means it is sought to accustom officers *5 ^*' .

strength

to the fronts and depths of such a company
and also to the greater length of time re-
quired to change formation.

In combat exercises of the company alone
practice must be had in shifting part of the Redi«tri-
fire to new targets and redistributing the old. ^"**"*

tlie target

In large battles this will seldom if ever be re-
quired by men in the firing line, but it will
occur in detachment work. The companies
should get practice in this and it can be well
coupled with the instruction in hasty deploy-
ments suggested on page 46.

Some work should be done on the de-
fensive. A few men should be detailed to

64 TRAINING INFANTRY

represent the enemy; if the man carries one
Work little flag he represents a squad, if two flags a
^" *^* ^ platoon. These men should be in charge of a
competent man who as nearly as is practicable
directs their advance as such units would
really advance under the assumed con-
ditions. Enveloping movements and sur-
prise attacks can thus be well simulated,
giving the company the opportunity to prac-
tice meeting such movements by the use of
the support, redistribution of targets, etc.

The instruction against an outlined enemy
Company having been practiced until the companies
'J^Z.y ^« ^«" instructed, the enemy should be repre-

company

sented, one company should work agamst
another. This gives an opportunity for re-
connaissance work before and during the
attack and introduces the elements of un-
certainty as to what the enemy will do.

In war, night operations are inevitable
Night op- and we must recognize this fact and prepare
erations ^^^ them. Night marches by large commands,
patrolling by both large and small groups,
and outpost work, including the establishing
of the outpost in the dark, will all occur as
well as an occasional night battle. In all
this work the principal difficulty seems to be
to avoid confusion and mistakes.

COMBAT 66

The men, especially those who are city
bred, are unable to orient themselves in the Orienta-
dark. The darkness when coupled with *®"
possible unseen foes has a demoralizing effect
and this effect will be the greater the more
helpless the man feels himself to be in the dark
and the less confidence he has in the ability
of the company to act as a company. Much
of this diflSculty can be overcome by a little
careful training.

The men ^ould be taken out and taught
to orient themselves by the stars and promi-
nent features that can be distinguished at
night. The effects of different backgrounds
on the visibility of objects should be demon-
strated, and especially the prominence of ob-
jects on a skyline. Estimating distance by
sound should be practiced. The men
grouped into small patrols should be made to
find their way from place to place and then
to operate against other patrols.

The company should be drilled at night.
Forming line from column, front into line, on Night
right or left into line, and even forming line of "
skirmishers, should be practiced and an oc-
casional night march made. A very few
drills each season, held at night instead of in
daylight, will do much toward giving the men

attacks

66 TRAINING INFANTRY

that necessary confidence in the ability of
^■.^J** the company to work together in the dark.
It will sometimes happen that a command
will have to go into camp after dark and es-
tablish an outpost. This should be practiced
at least once each season after the company
has been well instructed in the work by day-
light.

Satisfactory training for night attacks is
Night diflScult. The first principle governing night
attacks is not to shoot but to get in as close
as possible undiscovered and then rush with
the bayonet. It is impracticable to practice
this with a represented enemy; it is too
dangerous. To practice it by allowing the
opposing sides to fire blanks at each other is
all wrong because it is teaching the men to do
what they should not do in war.

One method is to place men to represent
the enemy behind a suitable fence, then to
make the advance and attack, causing the
represented enemy to open fire as soon as the
attack is discovered. An open wire fence
will not prevent the discovery of the attack
but will stop the bayonet rush before anyone is
hurt. This is not very satisfactory work for
the company but is more appropriate for
the battalion and regiment. In these latter

COMBAT 57

it is desirable to practice the necessary for-
mations for such attacks and to give the Night
oflScers experience in such troop Ifiadincr. *"**^"*
For this work to be of benefit the officers
must know their night tactics, the proper
formations to take and the best methods of
troop leading; this knowledge should first
be acquired by study and then put to the
test at night. It is not well to devote too
much time to such work.

In many posts practice can be had in
tactical work in the woods. This oppor- Wood*
tunity should not be neglected. A good °*"**"*
tactician will try to avoid a thick forest as a
battlefield but with long lines of battle parts
of the line will inevitably extend through
forests. Hence the officers must study the
principles governing woods fighting and seek
to train the men so that they can play their
part. Woods combat has many of the diffi-
culties of night work.

There should be considerable work on
fire problems; it is excellent practice, especi- '^>'«
ally for the officers and non-commissioned p*"**^*®"
officers. Field firing is not here meant but
simulated firing. A simple problem is given
and the officer or sergeant with a platoon or
company solves it practically. By using a

58 TRAINING INFANTRY

few men with flags to represent the enemy and
P**"* with a proper critique afterwards for all the

pro ems QQ^j^2iny, great benefit should be derived.

As an example of such a problem: dis-
pose one platoon of the company under cover
near a ridge with a concealed man watching to
the front and stationed about 25 yards from
the platoon, the remainder of the company
400 yards in rear but in sight of the platoon.
The following situation is then given out:
"This company has been detached from
Fi" a larger force back at X. Hostile cavalry

'*'^**t* ^^ ^^ ^^^^ neighborhood and is doing much
cavalry damage. The orders received when this
company was detached stated that other
companies were to go out on other roads and
this company on this one to inflict as much
punishment as practicable on this cavalry
if encountered. We have reached this point
and just halted for a ten minutes rest.''

As soon as the situation is fully under-
stood and the men are in their respective
positions, a troop of cavalry, represented by
a few men with yellow flags, comes in view of
the sentinel and halts. Either verbally, or
by a signal agreed upon, the captain explains
that they have dismounted for rest. The
sentinel and platoon commander now have
their problem.

COMBAT 59

As another example take the same general
situation in such terrain that a glimpse is ^"^
caught of the troop moving along a road but ^'aiiwt*
immediately it passes behind cover; several cavalry
hundred yards beyond, if it continues on the
road, the troop will again come into view and
be exposed for a considerable stretch of road
and within rifle range. What is done now?

After the exercise the captain assembles
the company and criticises the errors made
and points out what should have been done.
In the first situation opening fire by a few men
would result in the hostile troop's mount-
ing and getting away with little damage or
else in their getting their horses back under
cover and being prepared to fight on foot.
After the company once opens fire it will
have a target but for a very short time; hence
great care must be exercised in estimating
the distance, dividing the target and giving
the other necessary orders so as to produce the
greatest effect in the least time. The captain
should carefully study his problem and be
prepared to give an instructive critique.

A little book called "Fu-e Problems" by
T. D. Pilcher of the British Army is recom- Sugges-

T J 1 rr* ^ . t . tions for

mended to our officers; it treats this subject fire
more fully, gives several problems and shows p'®^**"**
how the solutions should be criticized.

TRAINING INFANTRY

Sugges-
tions for
fire
problems

Distribu-
tion of
fire
problem

The problems must be gotten up, as a
matter of course, to fit the ground you have.
A great variety of fire problems is afforded
by any terrain. There should be some prob-
lems in which more than one target is offered.
In getting up problems do not let yourself be
hampered by the critics who will tell you that
a troop of cavalry would not have crossed
your front without having discovered you or
without having been warned by its patrols:
you are teaching fire tactics, not cavalry
tactics, and besides, even cavalry has been
known to do foolish and careless things. Try
to make the problem reasonable and one which
might occur in war but do not discard a good
fire problem which teaches a valuable lesson
because the situation is one which ought
never to arise in battle. Few problems that
are tried out in maneuvers will ever be
duplicated in that exact form in war but the
tactical principles involved will recur often.

There is one field firing problem which, if
practiced once each year, would do a world
of good in securing fire distribution. A line
of prone figures is placed to represent the
enemy on ground so selected that, while the
figures cannot all be seen by the attackers,^
yet a man in the place of each figure could

COMBAT 61

see the ground over which the advance is
made. The defensive line should not be Distribu
straight; it would seldom be so in war, it ^" ^
must conform to the ground. There should problem
be stretches of thirty or forty figures that are
concealed, then groups in plain view; brush,
clumps of heavy grass afford the kind of cover
desired. Have the battalion go through the
form of attacking this line, using ball car-
tridges. Then have the men inspect the tar-
gets, see how plainly they could have been
seen by the enemy while the latter was out of
sight and see the effect of cover on the fire
drawn and the faults in distribution. After
this carefully explain the results of a lack
of distribution; point out that the long
stretches of the hostile line not under fire
would have been doing target practice work
on your advancing line and what the result-
ing losses would have been.

It is an effective way of impressing on
men's minds the necessity of proper distri-
bution and of firing where directed whether
they see anything or not. It also shows the
advantage of cover, if only from view. The
men must be taught to take advantage of
cover, if only from view, whenever offered, if
it can be done without interfering with their
doing their work.

62 TRAINING INFANTRY

For combat against cavalry the men must
Combat be taught in their bayonet work the proper
cavfdr ^^^ ^^ oppose a man on horseback. How to
meet a charge with fire must be largely theo-
rectical but it should be carefully explained
and, if a few mounted men are available to
outline a charging force, some practical work
can be had; it is a fire problem.

There are many problems in minor tactics
Special that should form part of every company's
p^^^*^^ training, such as forcing a defile or a bridge,
passing through a village as a patrol or as
advance party of an advance guard, passing a
woods under the same conditions and, on the
side of the defense, preventing a hostile force
from doing these things. There may be no
gorge or pass through hills in your immediate
vicinity but the practice can still be had:
two large buildings near together will answer
for a defile; the garrison is a village. If there
be no bridge, with a little imagination you
can improvise something to answer. In this
class of problems the captain must know the
tactics of his problem and be able to explain
it thoroughly. Generally in these problems
detachments having important missions have
to be made; give their commanders muc
latitude in carrying them out and in your

COMBAT 63

critique point out the errors and how the work
should have been done. It is well in all such Special
problems to precede them by a simple talk to ^®™P*"y

i • . problem*

the whole company explammg the tactical
principles governing the work. These prob-
lems can be made the most interesting part
of the company's training.

Instruction must be given the company
in meeting artillery fire and in the work of the
various covering detachments but these two
subjects, owing to their importance and
length, are reserved for consideration in
separate chapters.

The company commander must get the full
help and support of his platoon and squad Hints for
leaders, much depends upon them; they are ^®™P*"y
the real leaders of the men; they require much
training and practice, especially in leading the
rushes and in controlling and directing fire.

The discipline must be strict in these ex-
ercises, the men must never be allowed to
slight the work. A certain amount of latitude
must be given but prompt obedience to an
order must be insisted upon. Without such
discipline an attack is hopeless; the drill field
is the place to acquire it.

In all this work keep the interest of the
men. Occasionally take them to a shady

64 TRAINING INFANTRY

place and instruct them orally, explain the
Hints for objects sought and the reasons for doing
con^any j-jj^j^gg j^ anything that is part of their proper

training.

Do not keep at one class of work until the
men are tired of it; vary the work. You can
keep a company interested for four hours
a day if you will only vary the instruc-
tion and put some soul into it. Give very little
place rest; for a rest change the work. Com-
bat exercises must be frequent. They are en-
titled to a large share of the time; the work
of the firing line must be a habit.

THE BATTALION

The period of company training having
Hints for been completed that of the battalion com-
bat a ion jjjgjjces. The same general plan should be

training ° '^

followed as in the case of the company. The
mechanism of extended order should first be
thoroughly learned, then the attack against
an outlined enemy, then battalion against
battalion. The enlisted men have little new
to learn, the work for them is merely practice
in what they have learned in the company
training. For the captains it is instruction
in team work and in^tactics.

The battalion is the attack unit and as a

battalion
training

COMBAT 65

tactical unit is most important. An infantry

attack is largely a combination of battalion Hints for

attacks. Every exercise should be a problem

which teaches some lesson as well as affords

practice. The employment of combat patrols

of some size can be made a part of the exercise

and their proper use and leading taught.

The use of the local support, how it is handled

and how maneuvered, is a very important

part.

In these exercises the major must control
his battalion as in battle. The absurdity of his
riding around and giving verbal instructions to
his firing line must not be permitted. A great
part of the value of these combat exercises
lies in the practice given in handling a bat-
talion with the limited means of control
possible on the field of battle and accustoming
company commanders to carrying out their
part under the same conditions. Majors thus
learn to give their initial orders so as to insure
the carrying out of their plan of action.

The battalion being the attack unit,
whether alone or as part of a long line, its
rushes are independent of those of other bat-
talions although as a whole it keeps the
general line. Each company of course must
govern its advance by that of the others in

66 TRAINING INFANTRY

the same battalion. An advance can only
Hints for start from one flank or the other of the bat-
battahon ^q^q^ qj^^ tjjgjj Continue successively to com-

pletion. Rushes never start from both flanks
or the center; the reason for this is obvious.

The little flags mentioned under company
training can be used in battalion training to
even better advantage. Captains are more
on their own responsibility in a battalion than
are platoon commanders in a company and
must act according to assumed existing con-
ditions. In the battalion the shifting of fire
from one target to another is less frequent
than in the company. New unexpected tar-
gets are cared for, as a rule, by the support.

Battalion commanders have more need of
reconnaissance and must get experience in
ordering it properly and judging the reports
and basing their action thereon.

When a battalion operates against bat-
talion the colonel should prepare the prob-
lems and act as umpire. If he does not do
this the practice should not be omitted, the
majors concerned must get up their own
although this is not so satisfactory.

The battalion commander or colonel
should give a critique after each exercise,
pointing out all errors of tactics and of exe-

COMBAT 67

cution. There should be much more of
tactical instruction and less of mechanical Hints for
training in battalion work than in the com- *****®"

'^ training

pany.

Majors should not be limited to these
drill periods to instruct their officers but be
allowed to have tactical walks at other times.
A major should have a good knowledge of
tactics, be able to give clear and concise orders
and enter into the spirit of his work. Four
good companies, under a competent major
learn with very little practice to work to-
gether as a team and become an efficient
battalion.

THE REGIMENT

In the period alloted to the regiment the
solution of tactical problems and thereby R«8ri-
the gaining of experience in team work and ™*j^*.*
imparting tactical instruction to the officers
are the ends sought. The same rules as to
method of control, giving of orders and
critique apply as in the case of the battalion.

The colonel is responsible for the training
of his regiment. It is not trained until the
three battalions, the band, machine gun pla-
toon and mounted detachment are trained,
each in its special work, and then the whole is
practiced as a team.

68 TRAINING INFANTRY

The training of the twelve companies, as
such and as battalions, has been discussed.

The band forms a large part numerically
Band of the sanitary detachment of the regiment
in battle. It must be trained and made
efficient. This should be done by the officers
of the Medical Corps serving with the regi-
ment. There should be no perfunctory per-
formance of this work; the colonel should
see that it is thoroughly done.

The officer in command of the machine gun
Machine platoon must not only instruct his men in the

*^latoon ^^^® ^^^ working of the guns, but in the proper
care of all his equipment, including the ani-
mals., .^The machine gun is an emergency
..-weapon; tKe commander of the machine gun
company must thoroughly understand the
tactical use of this weapon and be able to act
as circumstances demand even without in-
structions.

Mounted The mounted detachment must be trained

^^^''l^' as scouts.

ment i . t

The principal objects sought in the regi-
mental period are practice and experience by
the colonel in handling his regiment as a
Objects whole, practice by the regiment in team work,
sought ^^j tactical instruction for all. A practical

in regi-
mental knowledge of tactics on the part of the colonel

training is essential if these exercises are to be correctly

COMBAT 69

carried out and his critique of value. Over-
looking tactical errors in these exercises does Objects
much harm, younger officers gain wrong ideas f^"^ ^^
and it is hard to eradicate errors once firmly mental
fixed in the mind. training

If the different units of the regiment are
separately well trained it requires few exer-
cises to make a team of them, good regimental
work is largely a question of the tactical skill
and ability of the colonel. If he is competent
and the units are separately well trained
the regiment is trained. Placing these well
trained units in the hands of an incompetent
regimental commander is but placing a fine
and complicated machine in the hands of an
unskilled operator; there is a fair chance that
he will ruin the machine.

ARTILLERY FIRE

Object T^XCEPT in small engagements in detach-
study ^®^* warfare the infantry will have the

of assistance of friendly artillery and will be op-

artillery posed not only by infantry but by artillery
fire. Some knowledge of artillery, its use, the
effects it can produce and how best to utilize
the aid afforded by our own and to meet the
opposition of the enemy's, is therefore neces-
sary for the infantry officer and also for the
men in ranks. While familiarity with the ar-
tillery will be far from breeding contempt, it
will enable the infantry to escape much un-
necessary loss and, by correcting the false
conception so many have of its power, it will
improve the morale of our men.

This chapter is not intended to teach in-
fantry officers what they should know about
artillery and its use. It is offered merely as
a suggestion as to what our men should be
taught and how to train them to meet certain
phases of this fire. The officer should know
much more about the subject and must go

ARTILLERY FIRE 71

to more extended works by more competent
men for the instruction.

Artillery is effective against infantry both
physically and morally. The moral effect
is the greater, the less instructed and trained
is the man. Most untrained men have very
exaggerated ideas as to the effectiveness of
artillery, they know nothing but guess much.
It is the terror of the unknown.

There are two general classes of artillery
that accompany an army: light and heavy. Classes
The light artillery may be rifles or light howit- ^ ...
zers; the first have a flat trajectory, the others,
of greater caliber, have the advantage of being
able to use high angle fire. Mountain and
horse artillery are merely subdivisions of the
light artillery and, except that the mountain
artillery is less effective at long ranges than
the others, "all look alike" to the infantry
advancing under their fire.

The heavy field artillery in our service
comprises 4.7" and 5" rifles and 6" and 7"
howitzers. Their range is much greater than
that of the pieces of the light field artillery.
In a general way we may say that these heavy
pieces will be used only against hostile bat-
teries, earth works and material objects or
against troops caught in some mass forma-

72 TRAINING INFANTRY

tion. They will generally not be used against
an advancing skirmish line or troops in proper
formation to meet light artillery fire. There
is no training to be given infantry except
discipline to hold them to their duty in an
earth work imder fire by heavy field artillery,
hence in this chapter we may ignore it.

With light field artillery it is very different.
Light The light field artillery is what concerns us
arti ery ^^^^^ ^^ ^^^ training. The extreme range for

which these guns are sighted is 6500 yards,
and at all ranges under 5000 yards they can
produce serious losses on infantry exposed to
their fire. They use two classes (rf projectiles,
shell and shrapnel. The high explosive shel
has a much smaller radius of action than the
shrapnel, but is very effective within this
area. It is generally used to batter material
objects and with high angle fire to get at men
in trenches or behind cover.

The shrapnel of the 3'' rifle contains 252
Shrapnel buUcts and on burst these bullets are
scattered over an area, roughly speaking,
eliptical in form, 200 yards in depth by 25
yards in width. The flatter the trajectory,
the deeper becomes the pattern made; the
width practically does not vary. In other
words the 252 bullets are scattered on burst
over an area of 5000 square yards.

ARTILLERY FIRE 73

If these bullets were uniformly distrib-
uted there would be one for every 20 square Shrapne
yards or an area of 15 x 12 feet. They are,
however, not evenly distributed, being thicker
in a small area near the front end. This
bullet will not penetrate the infantry soldier's
pack at any range, so that when lying on the
ground his pack affords complete protection to
his spine and considerable protection to all
vital parts except his head. The chance then
of a man being wounded by a single shrapnel,
even when inside the cone of dispersion, would
only be about 1 in 80 if in the open and very
much less with partial cover, as a trench, log,
etc. The shrapnel bullet will not pass through
one man and wound a second as will the infantry
bullet.

While artillery can fire very rapidly once
the range data is accurately determined it re- ^^**« ®'
quires considerable time to get into position
and determine this data. Until then it is
harmless.

An erratically shifting target is hard for
artillery to keep on. The fuze must be so Moving
set that the burst is at the proper height and **''*^®*
distance to the front of the target to be effec-
tive, both not easy especially in case of a mov-
ing target, and the more erratic the move-

74 TRAINING INFANTRY

ment the harder is the task of the artillery-
man.

On the defense the man's protection is
)n the much better for he will generally have cover
e ensive ^^ gome kind, but he has also a serious dis-
advantage, the line remains fixed, the hostile
artillery soon locates it, gets its exact range
and can place its own fire where it will do the
most good. This is a decided offset to the
defenders' diminished vulnerability. The
use of high explosive shells by their moral as
well as physical effect weakens any advantage
the defense might have as concerns artillery
fire.

To determine the relative vulnerability of
\rtillery different infantry formations let us apply to
targets ^j^gj^ ^j^g target made by a bursting shrapnel.
A line of skirmishers at the normal interval
extending across this beaten zone would have
19 or 20 men inside its extreme limits; if in
squad columns there would be 2 squads at
least and generally 3 squads or 24 men and
the target, being much deeper, would give
the artillery a better chance as it is easier
to get direction correctly than the point of
burst.

In platoon columns there can be but one
platoon in the same burst if fire comes from

ARTILLERY FIRE 75

the front, and platoons are 4 squads strong,
but the whole platoon may be within it. If, ArtiUei]
however, the direction of the artillery fire be ***'*^®**
very oblique, and the platoons are on a line,
more than one platoon may be caught by a
single burst but not all of any one column.

In successive thin lines, if the advance
be made by one man from a squad, and the
fuze and direction be just right, there may be
2 men in the cone of dispersion, which is to
say that, in that formation, the artillery has
about one chance in forty of wounding a man.
If the advance be by one man from each pla-
toon the artillery's chance, provided range
and fuze are correct, is one in two that one
man will be within the cone of dispersion of a
given shrapnel and, if in there, there is one
chance in 80 of his being hit; in other words,
the artillery has one chance in 160 of getting
one man and no possibility of getting two.
Such a target will hardly draw artillery fire.

An infantry battalion in column of squads
well closed up can nearly all be covered by the
burst of a shrapnel. Such a target would
likely draw many shots as would a com-
pany in this formation.

We can only win in the attack if our in-
fantry can advance to the hostile position.

76 TRAINING INFANTRY

We must get there, and as soon as practicable
The and with the least loss of life. We can not
a vance ^q^j.^ j-q j^g^ ^qq many in the advance or we

under ''

artillery shall be too Weak at the end to drive the
fire enemy from his position.

The infantry can not open fire until within
rifle range of the enemy and should try to get
much closer before doing so. In open country,
however, infantry may be subjected to artil-
lery fire while crossing the ground from 5000
yards to, say 1200 yards from the hostile posi-
tion, with no chance to reply. The problem
to be solved by the infantry commander is
how to cross this zone without losing too
many men and too much time.

In skirmish line. The long advance in
^" this formation is tedious work, and the target

* ' " offered is sufiiciently vulnerable to draw artil-
lery fire. If no cover is afforded in the ter-
rain the line is apt to suffer heavy loss and
become more or less disorganized before reach-
ing the point where it will take up the fire
fight. Where the line of advance is crossed
by ridges, sunken roads and other features of
that kind affording cover, where the line can
rest and to a certain extent ref oi m, this for-
mation can be used to advantage, especially if
the terrain permits us to approach under

line

ARTILLERY FIRE 77

cover from artillery fire to within two or three
thousand yards. If this formation be used '"
in a force of some size, as a war strength battal- * '"***
ion or more, the platoons should not keep on a
line but in an irregular echelon formation.

This makes a much more difficult target
for the artillery. The distance from front to
rear between any two adjoining platoons
should not be less than 150 yards. The
advance in skirmish line has the advantage
of being in the formation that it will be neces-
sary to have when you open fire and no changes
are necessary and, if the enemy is enountered
much sooner than expected, you are prepared.

The squad column. This formation was
devised by our soldiers at maneuvers at The
Sparta and in California, where the ground *^iJf^„
in part was covered with thick brush. It was
found an excellent formation to take when the
skirmish line encountered these patches of

TRAINING INFANTRY

The

squad

column

Platoon
columns

thick brush. Since it was placed in the I. D.
R. it has been understood by some as a good
formation for advancing in the open against
artillery fire. This is a mistake. It should
never be so used. In this formation there will
always be two squads, and generally three, in
the burst of a single shrapnel, exposing more
men to danger than if they were in skirmish
line.

Marching in column of files is not as easy
as in line on open ground. Remember good
artillery is pretty accurate in getting direction.
Most shots will be at the head of a column
and if at the head of one, another on each side
is included in the burst. Direction is much
easier to get in artillery fire than exact fuze
setting in the case of a moving target; this is
another reason against the squad column,
the target is deeper and thus slightly im-
proves the chances of the artillery. This
formation not only has no advantage on open
ground, in an advance under artillery fire, but
does have disadvantages.

Platoon columns. In average terrain this
formation will be more used than any other.
The distance between these columns is great
enough so that a shrapnel bursting between
two may entirely miss both; it also permits a

ARTILLERY FIRE 79

more or less erratic or zig zag course to be
followed. Each column is lead presumably Platoon
by a more intelligent and better instructed ^® ""*"»
man than in the case of the squad.

These columns should never be on the
same line but echeloned as explained for the
skirmish line.

In most terrains there are little hills,
clumps of trees, buildings and other cover of
the same general kind. Platoon leaders must
while keeping generally within their own
zones of advance, rush from one cover to an-
other where it is offered and, where cover is
wanting, vary the pace and avoid advancing
in a straight line.

Properly done this formation is one of the
best. No time is lost, the columns are far
enough apart to allow of advantage being
taken of all the cover afforded, and the
target is not, on average terrain, too vulner-
able. It is not so good on fiat open plains
and it should not be used on such ground if
the artillery fire is very oblique to the line of
advance.

This form of advance requires that pla-
toon leaders understand the theory and also
requires much practice on different sites to
give platoon commanders facility in leading

columns

80 TRAINING INFANTRY

and skill in taking advantage of the cover
Platoon offered. This is one of the things in which
captains should give instruction during the
indoor season with the aid of the sand table.
In addition outdoor practice is most necessary.
When this formation is adopted platoon com-
manders should know, if possible, before
starting where line of skirmishers is to be
formed.

•ive thin
lines

Successive thin lines. This is by all
Succes- means the safest formation on open ground in
plain view of the hostile artillery observing
station. The successive lines must be so far
apart that no one shrapnel can reach two; this
distance depends on the range but may be
taken as 200 yards. With one man from
each squad there will be two in the cone of a
single shrapnel that bursts right; if the enemy
is so situated that he can afford to fire at such
a target and you do not want to pay the cost
for such an advance, then send one man from
each platoon in each line. Hostile artillery
cannot afford to fire at such a target and if it
does it will use up ammunition that will be
much needed later and get small results for
the expenditure.

The chief objection to this formation is the
time it takes. In advancing in skirmish line

ARTILLERY FIRE 81

or in platoon columns your firing line is es-
tablished as soon as you get your first line up, Succes-
while, with successive lines formed from J|^^^
squads, it takes the longer time required for a
line to advance 1400 yards, and if formed
from platoons it takes the time required for a
line to advance 6200 yards.

This formation is also safe against oblique
fire.

The training of the men for it is simple.
Before the line starts the point where it is to
be rebuilt must be carefully designated.
That the line may be rebuilt without con-
fusion or mixing, each man must be taught to
keep his eyes on the next preceding man of
his own squad or platoon to ensure his find-
ing his right place in the new line.

After a few of the successive lines have
reached the new position, they form a dense
enough target to draw artillery fire. For this
reason the position of the new line should be
one affording cover from artillery fire if possi-
ble; if not, men must get cover by digging to
protect at least their heads from shrapnel.
Head cover and the pack will give them pro-
tection from being killed if not from being
wounded.

If the advance in this manner must be for

82 TRAINING INFANTRY

three or four thousand yards and the enemy
has advanced posts or is likely to make
an infantry counter attack, the advance over
this whole distance can not be made at once
but must be made by steps, growing shorter
as you approach the enemy's position.

The artillery will often sweep with fire an
Artillery area being crossed by infantry. This is done
sweeping j^y in(»i.easing or decreasing the range after
each shot until the entire area is beaten. If
this process be repeated often enough the
artillery will get anything within this area
not under cover. But this does not change
the average number of shrapnel required to
get a man nor does it render advisable a great
expenditure of ammunition for meager re-
sults.

Infantry encountering this kind of fire
should, as it approaches, lie down and get
what cover is available and, after the storm
has passed, move on.

The artillery may determine the exact
range to some zone which the advancing in-
fantry has to cross and, as the infantry reaches
it, open a heavy and accurate fire. The in-
fantry must cross this zone in a formation
which decreases its vulnerability as much as
practicable, consistent with other condi-
tions, such as the hostile infantry fire.

ARTILLERY FIRE 83

The enemy's guns can get you if they ex-
pend enough ammunition at the task; but Artillery
can they afford the ammunition? Your own g^*****"*
artillery may interfere with such an expendi-
ture even if the enemy were willing to make it.

A division deployed with 2500 men on the
firing line, crossing correctly in thin lines a
fire-swept zone from 4000 to 1200 yards,
might lose 10% of this number from artillery
fire and not have its advance even checked.
With this open formation the loss is so small
that the moral effect of it will be negligible
with trained men. But a loss of 250 men at
an expenditure of 160 shrapnel for each
means 40,000 shrapnel. Even half that
much would be more than could generally
be afforded.

After the skirmish line is formed at the
position for opening the infantry attack, the Forming
further advance from there is conducted as •^*''"*"**
already explained. In skirmish line the hos-
tile infantry is now by far your most dangerous
foe, but the artillery will still be punishing
you: your line must advance under both fires.

Artillery fire will seldom be uniformly
distributed along the entire skirmish line or
continuous in its action. There will be blasts
of intense fire, then a lull. The troops must

84 TRAINING INFANTRY

be trained to take advantage of these lulls

Forming to advance and to lie quiet during the periods

lin™" °^ hottest fire. Of course, if for any cause the

artillery fire is not very effective, the advance

continues as against the infantry.

Our infantry must be taught to keep then-
fire superiority over the hostile infantry and
to this object to devote all their skill and
energy, but to avoid unnecessary heavy loss
from artillery whenever possible. The hos-
tile infantry is their real opponent, their real
danger. As the opposing lines get close the
losses from artillery fire become relatively
slight, compared with the losses from in.
fantry fire.

How are we to get this training in most
How to of our posts where there is no artillery to

Advance ^^^^^ ^^ *^® practice?

under A man with a red flag indicates the posi-

artillery tiou of a hostile battery, or, if the battery is
^''* concealed, a position that can be seen and is

in the general direction of the battery. When
the flag is waved rapidly it indicates a rafale
or violent burst of fire; waved very slowly, it
indicates slow fire by battery. In most ex-
ercises no flag is necessary; the instructor
can give verbally the direction from which
the artillery fire is coming in stating the

ARTILLERY FIRE 85

problem; but in practicing the attack for-
mation, under combined artillery and in-
fantry fire, the flags should be used to prac-
tice platoon leaders in the rushes under such
conditions.

Infantry is sometimes detailed to support
batteries that are somewhat separated from Infantry
the rest of the troops and liable to attack by a ** f "

. , , . , ^^ artillery

rush of infantry or cavalry. Oincers on this support
duty must thoroughly understand their
mission. They must protect the artillery.
Artillery can generally take ample care of it-
self if the attack comes directly from the front.
The infantry commander must never mask
the fire of the guns. Where he will place his
men and what his general dispositions will be
is a problem in tactics and the solution will
vary with each case. These general propo-
sitions may be stated : his position must be
such that from it he can effectively meet the
attack; it should not be where he will get too
much of the fire directed on the batteries; the
command must be well in hand and the re-
connaissance and observation groups so em-
ployed that he will have timely warning of
the hostile approach and be prepared to meet
it. His position will generally be to a flank
and probably somewhat to the rear, never in
front of the guns.

86 TRAINING INFANTRY

An occasional exercise in this work should
Infantry be carried out as a maneuver. Something
arUHe should be placed to represent the guns and a
support battalion or company assigned as their pro-
tection while another force is given the mission
to capture them. This exercise should al-
ways be carefully umpired to see that the
guns get credit for what they could do if fire
is not masked. A problem of this kind is a
small part of the work of infantry in war
and when it comes it is a tactical problem like
any other attack or defense. The reason
for recommending it is that it affords excellent
practice in security and information service
and in combat when one position must be
avoided. Combat exercises should be as
varied as possible, here is another variety.

The importance of fire superiority has
Fire su- already been dwelt upon as well as how much
periority ^j^^ effectiveness of hostile fire falls off as the
effectiveness of our own increases. Infantry
alone does not gain this fire superiority but it
gains it by the help of our powerful ally and
sister arm, the artillery.

Battle fronts are too short for the artillery

Artillery to occupy space in the line, even if this were

infantr' ^ good place for it which it is not; it

must fire over the infantry. All our men must

ARTILLERY FIRE 87

be made to understand the effect of this
artillery fire on the effectiveness of the hos- Artillery
tile infantry, how much more effective this . '^ ®^*"*
latter would be without the fire of our artillery,
and the importance of having this artillery
fire kept up to the last possible moment.
Prove to them how much less we shall lose
by an occasional premature burst than we
should lose by the increased effective-
ness of the hostile infantry if our artillery
ceased to fire. The men must be taught that it
it is the infantry that does most of the killing
and that, especially at the very short ranges,
we want all the help we can get to keep
down this killing by the enemy's infantry.

It has already been shown why the at-
tacker's artillery has an advantage — the
target is fixed. If the men are properly
taught this there will be no trouble in getting
them to want the artillery to fire over their
heads as long as possible.

The connection that must be kept be-
tween the infantry commander and the Tactical
commander of the batteries told off to his ^®""®^"

tion

support is of the greatest importance, but
that will be the function of a higher ranking
man than this book is written for.

How part of this instruction is to be given

88 TRAINING INFANTRY

has already been told. It is believed that

the best way to give the theoretical part is in

small doses between exercises in the field — the

How to little talks referred to before. Care must be

ms ruct ^g^j^gjj jjq|. |.q gjyg ^QQ much at once and

to continue explaining until the men really
grasp it. The theory should go along with
the practical work; some of it can be best
given in the non-commissioned officers' school
and, as before stated, on the sand table.

How and when you do it is of less im-
portance than thdt you do it.

PATROLS, ADVANCE AND REAR GUARDS, OUTPOSTS

PATROLLING. The great importance of
this work calls for the most careful
instruction being given our men in this duty.
It is not easy to teach, there is so little of it
that can be done by thumb rule except in
the simpler forms as visiting patrols. The
first requisite is that the instructor know the
subject thoroughly. As this work is in no
sense a treatise on tactics that phase of the
question will not be entered into here.

In teaching this subject in the company
the following course has been found to give Teaching
good results. In the winter's school thor- p**''®""^
oughly instruct all the non-commissioned offi-
cers and selected privates in the fundamental
principles; for example, the various forma-
tions, the necessity of the leader's determining
his mission and knowing how to interpret what
he sees, how to write a message, and how to
decide many other questions.

With this oral instruction there should be
work on the relief map or sand table. This Sand
latter is one of the most important aids in ^^®
teaching this subject. The instructor with a

90 TRAINING INFANTRY

small group at the table gives a simple situa-
Sand tion and then, turning to one of the men, gives
** * him an order as patrol leader to make a certain

work ^

patrol on the ground represented by the map.
Allow a short time for the section to think it
over then question the leader. First get his
idea of his mission and plan of action, ques-
tion the others as to what they think of it,
then the instructor gives his idea or concurs
in that already given by the men.

Next the leader should be required to tell
what he would do up to the time of moving
out, the inspection he would make, what
men must have and what they must not have,
all the instructions and information he would
give his patrol. The other members are
called on in turn to point out any errors or
omissions, then this part is discussed. The
leader then points out his general route and
gives the formation of his patrol along this
route under the supposition that no enemy is
encountered. The others are questioned as to
their ideas of the correctness of the leader's
decision.

The instructor should then take up the
march in detail, something as follows: When
you reached this point what would you do?
How would you get from here to there?

PATROLS 91

When you reached the bottom of this little
hill what did you do? And so on, bringing out Sand
carefully and thoroughly how woods, bridges, ** *
defiles and villages are traversed, etc.

At the conclusion the instructor should
go back to the start and at various points
along the route have them see various hostile
patrols and bodies of troops, bring out what
should be done in each new situation, what
messages sent, whether by one man or more,
whether written or verbal, requiring in every
case the reasons. The problem should be
worked out once on the assumption that the
patrol is in hostile territory and once as in
friendly territory, the instructor bringing
out clearly the difference in conduct. The
mission should then be changed, as for in-
stance from a patrol seeking information
change the problem, on the same ground so as
to give it a mission of screening.

The various phases of patrolling, in
friendly and hostile territory, with a mission to
gain information and then to prevent the
enemy's gaining it should be worked out
carefully on the same ground with only the
necessary changes in the problem to bring
out the differences in their conduct. It seems
to impress these differences on the men the

92 TRAINING INFANTRY

more lastingly, the more closely the problems
Sand resemble each other in other respects and
^^^^ when they are on the same ground.

After this series is once worked through
with the men, other problems on different
ground are taken. It takes considerable
work of this kind to make the men proficient
in the principles of patrolling. As soon as
they are deemed proficient they should be
taken out for tactical walks in patrol prob-
lems on the ground and there given problems
to solve, the instructor acting as umpire.
This is all work that can be done in most
posts in the winter season by taking advan-
tage of the most favorable weather for the
outdoor part.

The instruction in the principles of patrol
leading can be given to better advantage on
the relief map or sand table than on the ground
but the latter training can not be dispensed
with, some of it must be given. Later on
there should be much opportunity for further
practice in the course of the combat exercises.

The work of the expeditionary patrol

should be taught in the same manner. The

Other work of the visiting and connecting patrols

*"rollin ^^^ ^^ taught during the exercises in advance

guard and outposts. They require very little

PATROLS 98

effort. The company as a whole should be
frequently exercised as a strong patrol. There Other
is one form of patrol, often very strong, that J^",*iJ^j„
is of great importance and yet its proper
training is frequently neglected — the combat
patrol. These patrols are always thrown out
when a command deploys for action and upon
their proper conduct much depends. Their
mission is always to prevent the firing line
from being unexpectedly fired into from the
flank and they fulfill this mission according
to the situation, either by securing the flank
by themselves holding off the enemy, or by
observing and giving timely warning so that
the support or reserves can be disposed to
meet the enemy and thus ward off the at-
tack.

It must be thoroughly impressed on all
what the mission of the combat patrol leader
really means and that any position or for-
mation of such a patrol, that allows the firing
line to be so attacked is all wrong.

The following must be thoroughly taught:

1. That when the patrol is so situated The
that it can see no more than the men on that patrol
flank of the firing line it is serving no valuable
purpose.

2. That in practically all cases where it

94 TRAINING INFANTRY

is not in advance of the firing line it will not
The gain the necesary information in time to be of

3. That the enemy must not get within
effective rifle range of the flank of the line.

The strength of the combat patrol
must depend on whether it is merely to ob-
serve or to offer real resistance and its con-
duct must bfe governed accordingly.

It is believed that the principles govern-
ing this work can be best taught, after a talk
in the school, by a form of tactical walk, where
the instructor can devote himself to the hand-
ling of this patrol; later on it is, of course,
practiced in all battle exercises.

In the conduct of such walks the in-
Combat structor takes his class out as such patrol and
tactk:al ^*^*^^ ^^^ problem, the firing line being repre-
walk sented by a few men or even entirely im-
aginary, its progress being announced from
time to time. The instructor then acts as
leader, explains what is to be done and, as-
suming he has a platoon, takes his first posi-
tion. He conceals his platoon and has ob-
servers out covering him and so placed that
any enemy approaching will be seen in time,
and that he will be in the best position to meet
him. The number of sentinels out and their

PATROLS 96

distance from the main body of the platoon
depend on the terrain. He then carefully Combat
points out his dispositions to the class and ^**'®^ ,
explains why made and assuming in turn that walk
the enemy is approaching from each of the
likely directions, how his dispositions enable
him to meet fully the case. The necessity for
signal communication with the commander
is explained and how he has provided for it.

He then discusses the terrain with refer-
ence to the next advance. As the firing line
advances where he should next go, and how
get there. A small patrol advances to the
next position selected, finds it unoccupied
and so signals back. The platoon then moves
there and sentinels are sent out as before and
possibly small reconnoitering patrols. The
same discussion as before. Also from time
to time hostile patrols are assumed to be seen
and what should be done explained; when
fire would be opened on the main hostile line,
if at all. In fact the whole conduct of this
patrol until the conclusion of the fight should
be discussed, showing how it jumps from place
to place, always covered by sentinels or small
patrols, and how the firing line is always pro-
tected by it from surprise. He should point
out how, in most cases, a mere marching along

96 TRAINING INFANTRY

in a straight line would utterly fail, and im-
Combat press upon the men the fact that the leader

tactical ^^^^ ^^^ ^^^ ^^^^ ^^^ *^® time.

walk Having gone through such an exercies

once or more, the instructor solving the pro-
blem himself, he should then prepare the
problem and, having stated it, call on the
class to solve it step by step in the same
manner. In all cases of errors in disposition
the instructor assumes an enemy from a
certain direction and has the class realize the
error by their inability to meet the situation.
The importance of keeping as many of the
patrol as practicable well in hand must be
emphasized.

Any combat patrol that is to offer resist-
ance, from a squad to a company, is handled
in the same way. The work of the smaller
combat patrols whose duty is only to observe
are likewise taught in the same way. The
terrain and conditions bringing about their
use instead of the larger ones make the
problem easier.

The officers of the battalion should be
taken on such walks by the major or some
other officer. The company commander
should conduct them for his lieutenants and
non-commissioned officers.

ADVANCE GUARDS 97

The men should also be practiced in the
same way, as the combat patrol or cover- Combat
ing detachment of a defensive line. This ^^^l? ,

tactical

work IS simpler, the patrol generally does not walk
move from position to position. Its mission
is the same as in the attack and even more
important. In the defense very much de-
pends on the selecting of the best position
for this patrol and the correct dispositions
being taken.

The case must be also considered of a
patrol sent out by the defense for reconnais-
sance or screening which in case of attack
becomes the combat patrol.

In a battle line with intervals, as in the
case of the enveloping attack, connecting
files must be used. Their object is to keep
the commanders of the subdivision informed
as to how the other is progressing. This
can generally be done by forming points
in the line joining the two inner flanks. In
some cases this will not serve. Rules for this
can not be given.

Advance Guard. In most commands too
much of our limited field training period is Advance
devoted to work of advance and rear guards, f "^^ .

° training

It is important and must be taught, but if the
other work which is the real foundation for

TRAINING INFANTRY

training

this is properly done but little more time is
Advance required outside of the maneuver exercises

f"*'^ for training the enlisted men. Patrolling and

combat form most of the work in these exer-
cises so far as the men are concerned.

There are many tactical problems that
come to the oflScers in this class of work and
they must know how to solve them. This is
the work of the school for oflScers and should
be effectively done.

The point is but a patrol with a special
mission. The flanking groups are recon-
noitering and scouting patrols but they in-
volve some new features. When a recontre
engagement occurs on the march one of the
first things the commander wants to know is
the strength of the enemy and his location; if
deployed, where is his line? Where its flank?
If not deployed, what is he doing? As the
advance party deploys and pushes on, these
flanking groups have the best opportunity to
observe and by reconnaissance to gain valu-
able information. They also become, tem-
porarily at least, combat patrols to the firing
line. The men must be taught to carry out
this mission without further orders and to do
it correctly. In case small detachments at-
tempt to delay our march, these patrols by

Advance

guard

rencontre

ADVANCE GUARDS 99

flanking them can greatly hurry their retreat
and prevent the delay of our column.

The general principle of advance and rear
guards should be taught the company. This Maneuver
work can de done in part at the relief map and ^
sand table, but the company should be ex-
ercised on the ground as the advance guard of
a battalion and as the advance party of a
larger advance guard, the other troops being
imaginary. Afterwards two companies should
work against each other, one as rear party of
a rear guard, the other as advance party of an
advance guard; also each as advance party
in a rencontre.

If the foundation has been properly laid
there is no difficulty in teaching the applica-
tion of these principles to covering detach-
ments. If it has not been so laid and the
men do not thoroughly understand patrol-
ling in its different forms, it will be hard to
teach it in these exercises.

In maneuver exercises problems involving
rencontre engagements and engagements in-
volving a marching column encountering an
enemy in position should be had to train the
officers in tactics and to give the men practice
in combat exercises and in the patrolling neces-
sary.

100 TRAINING INFANTRY

Outposts. The general principles of out-
Outpost post duty, the duties of sentinels, the general
rammg fQj.j^ation of an outpost line with its sub-
divisions must be taught the men indoors.
The officers have much to learn in school or
from books on this subject. With proper pre-
paration by all the work outside is simple.

There are a few things that need special
mention :

In the instruction work have a definite
situation. If the company is to be exercised
as a support take an outpost order giving the
situation and general location of the supports.
If any detachment, including the company,
is to march beyond assumed existing cover-
ing detachments, see that it is properly
covered by an advance guard. Judgment
must be used in this, the smaller the detach-
ment the weaker relatively the cover. Bear
in mind where the other detachments are
marching and the amount of cover they
afford to yours.

When starting out instruct the advance
where you are going, then have it go far
enough in advance of that to cover you while
you are making your dispositions after you
have reached your destination.

From the company down make the dis-

OUTPOSTS 101

tribution of troops and assignment of tasks
in an orderly manner, much as the guard is Outpost
divided up for the post guard; do this while *''**"*"«^
the detachment is still formed.

Full information of the situation should
be given the men ; the proper performance of
their duty is impossible otherwise. Each
subdivision commander must attend to this.
The captain should give as much of the neces-
sary information as practicable to the whole
company, this saves time for the picket com-
manders and will probably result in the sit-
uation being better understood.

Where the outpost line should be located
and how it should be disposed varies with Outpost
many conditions. It is a tactical problem ^^^^^e*
that the oflBcers must be able to solve and ground
must learn elsewhere than on the ground in
the few hours devoted to this work in troop
training.

A little practice should be held by the
regiment as a whole in forming outpost; one
with the regiment as the outpost and one with
the regiment as the whole command, one bat-
talion forming the advance guard on the
march. In the latter, a halt order should be
issued and outpost formed from the ad-
vance guard battalion; when completed a

scouts

102 TRAINING INFANTRY

march order should be issued by which the
new advance guard passes through the out-
post line. The outpost should then be
assembled and take its place in column.

We do this very easily in map problems;
try it on the ground, especially in rather
close country.

The mounted scouts. While the mounted
Mounted scouts have been taken from the infantry
regiment there is still with each regiment a
mounted detachment of orderlies. A few
mounted scouts well trained are invaluable
to an infantry regiment when operating alone.
The commander of an infantry regiment,
if wise, will see that these orderlies are trained
as scouts and then when necessary he can
so use them. Their most important and
frequent use will be as the mounted point
and flank patrols for an advance or rear guard
and for patrolling to the front of an outpost
line.

To be of any value they must be well
instructed in these duties as described under
advance guard. Being mounted they are
much more valuable than a dismounted patrol
for gaining information from the flanks and
getting it back to the commander in time to be

OUTPOSTS 108

of some use. These orderlies can be trained
in this work without interfering materially
with their instruction in the care of horses
and equipment and it can be given along
with instruction in horsemanship.

VII

MARCHING

ABILITY to march under war conditions
is of primary importance in the train-
ing of infantry. There is much more march-
ing than fighting in war and, no matter how
well a man may be trained otherwise, if he is
unable to reach the field of battle he is of
' no value as a fighting man.

That the infantry soldier may be able
Requi- to meet the requirements in this respect he
" ** , ?' must possess the necessary health and strength

marching ^ "^ *^

he must be properly shod, know how to care
for himself on the march, especially how to
take care of his feet, and his muscles must be
properly developed. It is also necessary that
the responsible oflEicers know how to conduct
the march and to care for the men.

That the man has been allowed to en-
list presumes the possession of the necessary
health and strength and gives us a man who
can be trained to meet all necessary require-
ments except when temporarily sick or dis-
abled.

The soldier's shoes must be of proper

104

MARCHING 106

construction, well fitted to the man and the

leather kept soft and pliable. The shoe Shoes for

now issued to our army is good and with "**'*^™"«

proper care in fitting leaves little to be desired.

The fitting of the shoes is an important duty

of the company commander and should never

be slighted. The rules prescribed for this

should be carefully followed. Every captain

of infantry should have and carefully study

the little book "The Soldier's Foot," by Lieut.

Colonel Munson, Medical Corps.

No matter how well a shoe may be fitted
if it becomes soaked with water and dries,
without proper care, it will become hard and
stiff and sore feet are apt to result. The men's
shoes in campaign should be kept oiled.
Neatsfoot oil should always be carried in
every company's baggage and officers should
see that it is used as needed. There should
also be a supply of talcum or foot powder.

The socks are of nearly as much im-
portance as the shoes. They, too, must fit. Socks for
If too large they wrinkle, if too small they '"*""^*»»"«
are apt to bend and injure the toes; in both
cases the result is sore feet. Woolen socks
are much better for hard marching than
cotton, they keep the feet dryer and afford
more of a cushion and consequently better

106 TRAINING INFANTRY

protection from injury. If the man finds
that wool next his skin produces too great
irritation he should wear woolen socks over
a pair of cotton or lisle thread.

After a day's march the feet should be

:are of washed and any blisters and abrasions should

rations ^g^giyg proper attention. Adhesive plaster

should be applied to all such, even to spots

that are sore and the skin not yet broken;

properly applied it is a great protection.

Rather than have the men treat their own
feet it is much better that, after the day's
march and camp has been made, a reasonable
time be given the men to wash their feet and
prepare for inspection . Captains should then
carefully inspect the feet of all their men and
send every man with the slightest injury to
the regimental infirmary at once and have
the injuries properly treated.

Men should be taught to do this for them-
selves but as it can be so much more surely
and better done as above described the men
should be permitted to do it themselves only
in emergencies where sanitary troops are not
available.

In marching in very hot weather the men
rotec- must be instructed in the importance of pro-
ead and ^^^ting the back of the neck from the direct
eck rays of the sim. It would be well if our men

MARCHING 107

were issued a small piece of cloth of suitable

color with some means of readily attaching it P'otec-

to the hat to afford this protection. The 5*^",^ ,

'^ head and

Japanese soldiers used such an attachment neck
in Manchuria with good results.

There must be an air space between the
top of the hat and the man's head. The
hat must be ventilated and in very hot weather
a wet sponge or cloth or green leaves should
be carried in the hat. The shirt collar, if not
very loose, should be unbottoned.

Besides bathing the feet the men should
bathe their whole bodies frequently. Any- 'Bathing
one familiar with our "regulars" on the
march and who has seen them break for the
water to bathe as soon as possible after a day's
march knows that it requires no order to get
this done. But sometimes we must camp
where there is no water available for bathing.
Men should at least wash the crotch with a wet
towel, especially if there is a tendency to chafe.
Talcum powder should be used in such cases.

Men should be carefully taught the dis-
abling effects of alcohol if drunk the night be- Dunking
fore or during a hard march, especially if the
march be made in hot weather. The men
must also be instructed to care wisely for
their diet and to avoid the excessive drinking

108 TRAINING INFANTRY

of water on the march. Too little water is as

Drinking bad.

All this instruction should be carefully
given the men by their company officers under
the general supervision of the regimental
surgeon. The surgeon, with the approval of
the colonel, should prepare an outlined
Personal scheme for instruction in first aid and in per-
ygiene g^j^g^j hygiene, having special reference to the
soldier's care of himself in the field. The
surgeon should then instruct such company
officers as have need of the instruction; the
company officers then instruct the men. A
part of the examination of the company at the
end of its indoor period should be on these
subjects.

The muscles must be properly developed.
Muscle n is jjQt ii^Q strongest man who can best stand
tnent^ the march; it does not require great physical
strength. The man's muscles must be flex-
ible, he must be trained to use them and be
able to use them without causing physical
pain.

Marching as fully equipped infantry in
the ranks is a very different proposition from
walking along the road independently, and
for the private in ranks with his load it is
different from what it is for the officer with
his.

MARCHING 109

Many men of great strength are often what
is called "muscle bound." Others have Muscle
certain muscles overdeveloped others under- ®^®/*P"
developed. When muscles usually unused
are brought into play, or when a man is
forced into a constrained position, if it be kept
up continuously for some time, serious pain
and discomfort results and often ends in a
physical break down.

A good course in caUisthenics or in gym-
nasium training is the best thing for the new
man. It loosens him up, brings into play the
different muscles, renders them flexible and
gives the man control of himself. Then prac-
tice in marching, carrying his equipment,
strengthens the necessary muscles and ac-
customs the man to the necessary constraint.

The training of the company for march-
ing consists, then, in getting the men's March
muscles in proper condition by physical drill, '**"*"*
in theoretical instruction as outlined above,
and actual practice. Most of the actual
practice is and should be gained at the regular
daily drills and exercises. In these, if they
are properly conducted, the man gets enough
preparation.

Devoting one day each week to a practice
march is believed a mistake. In many of our Practice
posts a command going out on tb^ rgads can "**'*^ **

110 TRAINING INFANTRY

not leave them, there is no chance for in-
Practice struction except very imperfect instruction in
marc es g^^yg^jj^g ^^^ j.gg^j. g^2ird work and practice in

marching.

The physical part, the mere practice in
marching can be just as well gained in the
regular exercises, and to devote one-fifth of
our field training period to the other instruc-
tion is excessive. It prevents some of the
other necessary training being given and it
ignores relative values.

What are wanted are men physically fit.
Four to six hours a day of correct and rational
training will make them as much fit without
this weekly practice march as with it and
give more time, all of which is needed, for
necessary work.

There should, however, be one march

Yearly every year of from 200 to 300 miles. This is

"**'^ necessary for instruction in camp expedients,

to train the men to care for themselves on

long marches and to give them experience in

field service.

It would be better could it be held late in
the season. The command should march
to come point where they could have ma-
neuver work and training in the larger units
and on the ground more unfamiliar than their

MARCHING 111

home reservation. But the march should
be held, if it be only out and back.

Even with the men well prepared much
of the success of the march depends on the The
officers. They must understand how to con- ® ^®"
duct a march and care for their men and con-
scientiously perform their duty. They must
try to get the man's point of view, think of
the man's comfort and health.

Every officer who may be responsible for
the uniformity and rate of march should care- Marching
fully train himself to take a suitable gait and ****
strictly maintain it. No one thing is more
trying than an unsteady pace and many good
officers are unable properly to lead a column on
on the march for this reason. The halts must Halu
be regulated to suit conditions. In very hot
weather or when climbing steep hills they
must be more frequent than once an hour.

Discipline must be strict, no straggling
allowed. Running to catch up, "backing
and filling" is productive of a big sick report.

Whenever conditions permit the intervals
between units should be increased, especially
when the weather is hot and roads dusty. It
renders a steady, uniform pace easier to
maintain, and thus tires the men less.

The other rules for marches given in our

112 TRAINING INFANTRY

service regulations should be carefully ob-
served.

Much of the success of a long march
The first depends on the first two or three days, until
ew ay« ^j^^ ^^^ ^^^ ^^^^ ^^^ swing. Where practica-
ble the first day's march should be a little less
than average, the second a short one, after
that our trained regulars can keep up the
average march six days a week. On start-
ing out it is the second day's march that is
the most trying to the men. This should be
borne in mind and all practicable allowances
made.

An excessively long march should never
be made just for practice. It does not fit the
man for another but the reverse.

VIII

THE NATIONAL GUARD

IN training the infantry of the national guard
we have a very different problem from
that of the regular regiments.

In these regiments the same proportional
attention should be given to those things that
should be habits as in training the regulars
and the necessity for varied instruction in
order to keep the interest of the men is even
greater.

My observation leads me to believe that
the greatest weakness of many of our na- Scope
tional guard captains lies in the narrow scope ^^^* * *""
of the instruction given and in its monotony.
There is a lack of variety at each meeting.
The men lose interest.

When the recruit first joins the guard he
generally does it for the best of reasons and is
interested in the work. But after going to
the armory for a few times and drilling in a
few movements over and over again he loses
interest, then he cuts drill and possibly ends
by trying to get discharged.

lis

114 TRAINING INFANTRY

There are many things that should be
taught, and you can only hope for success by
varying the work and holding the interest of
your men. Do not put more time than
necessary on non-essentials.

Of course the recruit must first be taught
The the school of the soldier and he must have the
recruit ^g^jeggary instruction in close order drill.
But even early in his course there is a chance
for variety; early in the game give him a rifle
for part of the time and as soon as he has had
a little drill in the manual of arms teach him
sighting and then pointing and aiming drill.
As soon as he is far enough along let him fire
a score at gallery practice each drill. At first
devote the most time to drill without arms
but increase the time with arms until all the
drills are with arms and you get him in the
company for close order drill.

The following should be taught as care-
fully as practicable:

1. Target practice on the range. If the

Essentials gallery practice and pointing and aiming

J drill recommended below be well done, com-

guard

paratively little of this will answer. But it
cannot be omitted, every man should have
some practice. Where possible some of this
practice should be in "field firing." In many

THE NATIONAL GUARD 115

cases there is a tendency to give known dis-
tance firing an exaggerated value to the neglect Essentials
of other training. ^^""Jj*

2. The mechanism of the deployments,
the advance by rushes even after the line is
mixed, control of fire, and all these directed
by signals only; verbal commands should not
be used.

3. Estimating distance must be taught.

4. Pointing and aiming drill and gallery
practice, so that the man will always bring
his piece up properly, look through the sights
and pull the trigger only after careful aim,
must be practiced until the necessary habit
is formed.

5. There must be frequent close order
drill. Knowledge of this is necessary for the
orderly movement of troops and it is our
greatest aid to discipline. But to be an aid to
discipline it must be exact, otherwise it has a
reverse effect. It is just as easy to do it cor-
rectly as to do it approximately if you only
teach it so at the beginning and then give the
subject attention ever afterward and do not
allow the drill to become sloppy.

6. The use of the bayonet must be
taught and practiced.

7. The men must be taught simple in-

116 TRAINING INFANTRY

trenching and the various uses of sand bags.
Essentials g. First aid and personal hygiene.

for the ^ -r* 11. . 11 1 1

guard 9- Patrolhng; especially the combat pa-

trols and those with advance and rear guards
and outposts. As many as possible should
know how to read a map.

10. The company musicians and two or
three privates should know the flag signalling.

But the captain may say: all these are
practicable with the regulars who have all the
time needed and daylight in which to work and
ground to work on; but how are we to do
these in an armory at night?

Every armory should have a place fixed
Required for gallery practice if it is only a backing for
equip- ^j^g target against the wall in one of the

ment iiii -i

corners. And no company should be without
a sand table; a relief map is also very desira-
ble.

With this equipment let us see what we
can do.

The ordinary drills of course are on the
armory floor.

The principles of estimating distance
Estimat- should be taught the company and the men
ing dis- ^„g^ ^Q practice it for themselves. Groups

tances o jt

are formed and go anywhere it is convenient
for this purpose. Occasionally, if found

THE NATIONAL GUARD 117

practicable, the company goes out. Officers
and non-commissioned officers in this same
way should learn to use the range finder.

Patrolling can be well taught on the sand
table or relief map. Pile up your sand, form- Patrolling
ing any desired terrain; with yellow strings
mark the roads and with blue ones the
streams, little bridges, etc., can be made with
a jackknife, houses represented by blocks,
forests with little pieces of evergreen — you
have your outdoors.

A scale must be provided and one end of
the table marked as north.

The instructor takes a squad to the table
and starts out, for instance, by stating:
"Smith, your regiment has reached this point
(just off the table) moving north in hostile
territory. The colonel sends for you and
gives you this order — 'Corporal, I have heard
rumors that there is a force of the enemy in
that village northeast of here. I want to
know whether that is true. Take your squad
and move along in the general direction of
this main road, find out and report. The
regiment will remain here for several hours.
Be back here by 3 P. M., it is now 10 o'clock.' "
The instructor tells Smith to do just as if he
were on the ground. Smith inspects his

118 TRAINING INFANTRY

squad, gives his instructions to his men and
Patrolling then proceeds. He can tell the instructor
his formation, and what he does from time
to time, or each of the men, provided with
a match and a scale, may be required to move
his own match. There are many ways of
doing it. The instructor must give informa-
tion of the enemy, either orally or at certain
points place lead soldiers or something to
represent the enemy.

The thing aimed at is to find out how
Smith and the other men would act under
various conditions, point out their errors and
show them how to correct these, and give
the reasons. An infinite number of such
problems can be devised.

This sand table is especially good for
teaching the work of a combat patrol. Form
your field of battle and along one flank have
a varied terrain with houses, clumps of trees,
little hills, etc. The instructor moves a light
rod along to represent the firing line and the
patrol leader solves his problem. Whenever
any error is made the movement stops until
the mistake is pointed out and explained.

In the same way are treated advance and

Security rear guprds of the strength of a company and

a company as advance or rear party. Out-

THE NATIONAL GUARD 119

posts are established, the sentinels being rep-
resented, and routes of the patrols selected.

Entrenching can be taught by construct-
ing trenches to scale on the sand table terrain. En-
I have seen elaborate field works with bomb *''®"^ ^^
proofs constructed in this way by the men of
one company, but this is not recommended
for any but the officers; it is better to limit
this work to the simpler trenches. With a
round piece of stove wood for a log and with a
good jack knife, or better a hatchet, you can
make your loop holes for the head log. With
a lot of small Bull Durham tobacco sacks,
filled with sand, you have your sand bags, the
varied uses of which should be taught.

The officers should have a war game map
for their patrol problems and for war games.

Bayonet fencing should be practiced if
you have the necessary equipment. If not, Bayonet
and a place is available for it, suspend by ®"^*"^
a rope something to represent a man, a sack
full of straw will do, so that it can be made
to swing through a small angle back and
forth and to right and left. Let the men
practice the thrusts, lunges, cuts, etc., against
this, another man giving the dummy a
motion. This should come after training
in^the bayonet exercise.

120 TRAINING INFANTRY

I would propose a system something like
the following for your company drills :

Recruits by themselves until they can be
put in the company; their work has already
been discussed.

After the company is formed give 15 or 20
Essentials minutes of snappy, precise close order drill
driir '^ ^'^^^ ^ little manual of arms. Then have the
company deploy, two or three times at least,
from different formations. Then go through
an attack formation the best you can, all the
company in the line, no support, an advance
of 40 yards being represented by one of five,
etc. Then try it holding out a support
and putting it in so as to mix squads and
advance as before. Remember, no verbal
commands, all this to be done by signals.

Have little posters on one wall of your
armory at the proper height; have a few
minutes pointing and aiming drill, impressing
on the men the importance of always taking
careful aim.

Then divide your company into small

Group groups. One group at the sand table, one re-

^^^ ceiving first aid instruction, another bayonet

work, another gallery practice, etc. The group

at the sand table may be larger than the

others and may stay there for the rest of the

THE NATIONAL GUARD 121

evening, the others should change every 15 or
20 minutes. The sand table group should Group
change each drill and once during the night ^^"*
if practicable, that is, if there is time for one
group to finish its problem and give another
a chance that same evening, it should be
done. Nearly all the company should fire a
score at the gallery every night.

If there are a few men in the company
who are poor at the manual of arms they can
be put in one group and be given one of their
turns in drill in the manual.

One group may have to be taught how
to make the pack. Instruction in guard duty
may be necessary for another. Verbal in-
struction can be given in several subjects with
great advantage where a good instructor is
available; in that case all except the group
at the sand table can be assembled.

The whole course cannot be covered at one
drill. The captain should so arrange his
groups that all in turn get instruction in the
whole course, that all get a variety each night,
that where men have a special deficiency
it receives attention, that the first part, the
essentials for the whole company, be never
slighted, and that as many as practicable
of the company get gallery practice at every
drill — one score will answer fully.

122 TRAINING INFANTRY

Owing to the time it takes to complete a
Group problem or task on the sand table, often but

work •. • rni

one group can use it m an evenmg. The
size of the group working should not, how-
ever, be increased. Only small parties can be
advantageously instructed. For this reason
the sand table must be worked to the limit
and because of this and the number of things
to be taught on it and because some officers
are not very expert in forming suitable terrain
on the sand table, it is an advantage to have
the relief map also. The latter can then be
used for patrolling and work of covering
detachments and the sand table for the field
engineering.

At most stations small twigs can be col-
Brush lected and used to make hurdle revetments,
^^^ fascines and gabions for use on the sand table.
They can be constructed to the reduced scale
and this brush work learned nearly as well as
outside with normally sized faggots.

Have the officer or non-commissioned
officer best qualified give the instruction in
each class. The instructor has much to do
with success; some are specially good at one
thing but poor at another.

With such a course of instruction well
given throughout the year and with a week

THE NATIONAL GUARD 123

or ten days of good camp work annually, and
suitable school work for the officers, there is
no reason why the national guard should not
possess the efficiency required of it to be a
valuable military asset.

Sufficient of the callisthenic or setting up
exercises for the proper development of the No calHs-
soldier should be shown the recruit and the \ .tf*^
latter told of the advantages of practicing
them for a few minutes every morning or even-
ing, or both. Tell him what it will do for his
health and appearance and urge him to get
busy. There is no use drilling these exercises
in the armory. A few minutes once a week
or less often will do no good and wastes drill
time of which the guard has none to spare.

The detailed sergeants should help in all
drill work but especially should be valuable
in teaching camp expedients, care of equip-
ment, etc.

I believe that in nearly every state the
officers pursue a theoretical course each winter
and generally there is a non-commissioned Use of
officers' school as well. In the latter school j^^*^*^*
there should be thoroughly taught, giving n. c. O.
importance and precedence in the order
stated :

Infantry Drill Regulations,

Manual of Guard Duty,

124 TRAINING INFANTRY

Small Arms Firing Regulations, and
Use of parts of Field Engineering.

schools

for Parts of the Field Service Regulations

N. C. O. gjjould be read carefully in connection with
the study of the same subject in Infantry
Drill Regulations. If more time is available
map reading should be taught, and, if time
remains, then applied minor tactics on the
map. Attempt no more than you can thor-
oughly do in the time available and make the
course progressive.

The school for officers should first cover
Schools thoroughly the above course but take more
fficers ^^ Field Service Regulations and include the
Manual of Courts Martial. Map reading
should be thoroughly learned by all and the
remaining time put on tactics. Beginning
with minor tactics study some good problems
with their solutions, then solve others to be
criticised by some competent person. I have
found it satisfactory to use problems in this
way in connection with the drill regulations.
Study a subject, for example an advance
guard, then read a few tactical problems on the
same subject, then try solving one, and so on.

As you progress use larger and larger
forces. But do not attempt the brigade until
you can handle the regiment correctly. Do

THE NATIONAL GUARD 126

not cover too much ground in one season and
acquire only confusion. Each term get Schools
something positively fixed in your mind so ^^^^^^^
that you can use it; there will be more
winters.

Much attention should be given to acquir-
ing facility in giving correct verbal orders.

Studying tactical problems correctly
solved and solving others for yourself is the
best way to learn tactics after you know the
principles laid down in your manuals. Be-
ware of "normal form" solutions, they are
misleading and apt to be wrong. Apply
general principles with common sense. Ad-
vantage should be taken of the officers de-
tailed as inspector-instructors to plan and
conduct this work as well as to help in the
instruction of the men. Only those thor-
oughly competent for this instruction work
should ever be detailed with the national
guard.

There should be a camp of instruction
each year. If properly conducted this is very
valuable.

Nearly all national guard infantry needs
training for individual men and officers and Camps
work in the company, battalion and regi- 3|^*J^"tiQ„
ment. When formed in divisions or larger

126 TRAINING INFANTRY

forces for maneuver campaigns the men in
Camps of ranks and junior officers get but little in-
tion"^"*^" struction. Except a little camp experience, it
is chiefly walking, the object of which they
know nothing, and most of the officers are
not yet ready for this class of work. It is a
camp of instruction, not a campaign, they
need. They must apply on the ground what
they have learned in the armory.

I believe the best results can be obtained
from camps of not more than three regiments
The special needs of each regiment should
be considered in forming the program. The
work should be planned so as to give in-
struction to each in the most important things
in which it is deficient. Special considera-
tion should be given to what can not be learned
in the armory and must be done out of doors.
Most of the program should be made
up of practical drills and exercises in which
all get instruction from private to colonel, and
where their interest can be held and the best
instruction given. Small maneuvers of com-
pany, battalion and regiment are what are
needed.

Tactical walks for officers and non-com-
missioned officers are an excellent means of
instruction — these supplement the other ex-
ercises.

THE NATIONAL GUARD 127

The big maneuvers are very largely for
general officers and very little for regimental Camps of
officers. We need the foundation before we ^^**''"°"

tion

build the superstructure.

As much ground should be covered during
the camp as is consistent with efficient in-
struction. No attempt should be made to
cover the whole art of war in a week as it only
results in confusion of ideas and gives little or
no benefit.

If the law would permit a few national
guardsmen to serve for short periods in the Service
regular army it would help greatly towards ^^^^^ ^
uniformity of training and improve the non- com-
commissioned personnel of the guard. These panies
men should be allowed to so serve for three
months during the company's field training
period or for one month during the indoor
season ; not more than five should be assigned
to any one company. They should receive
the regular's pay and rations and, if joining
for the three months period, one complete
service uniform; the one-month men should
bring their uniforms with them.

This privilege should be granted only to
men who have still one year more to serve in
their enlistment in the guard and who are
recommended by their captains. They

128

TRAINING INFANTRY

Service
with
regular
com-
panies

Value
in wa'

should be excused from post guard and all fa-
tigue duty and in place of that receive addi-
tional instruction work each day. In order to
obtain the most benefit, these men should
be attached to those companies whose train-
ing is the best; in an indifferently trained
company they would get some benefit but it
would be little in comparison with what they
would receive in the other class.

This recommendation is made from having
recently seen the results of having a few men
of the national guard join an excellent regular
company for a short period. These men came
without pay and themselves paid their board
while with the company.

There would probably be no large number
who would so serve, but there are some and
we are in no condition in this country to over-
look even small helps that will contribute to-
wards fitting us for war.

Owing to the small peace strength of most
of these regiments and the large number of
recruits they must take in on the outbreak of
war, their value will depend on the time they
will require to be fit for the field at war
strength. They have the organization in
working shape. Their oflScers will, in the
majority of regiments, be men who have had

THE NATIONAL GUARD 129

considerable training. If they will follow a
logical and systematic course of training in Value
peace, the officers will be familiar with it and ^^ ^*'
will be experienced instructors, and all their
old men will have the instruction to a certain
degree so that they can help drag up the re-
cruits. All this will help to shorten the time
required to fit them for the field and every
day thus cut off adds greatly to their value.
Without such training their value is small,
for no regiment should be accepted except at
war strength and a national guard regiment
so filled up, without experienced instructors
who know the course, will take nearly as long
to become efficient as would a new regiment.

INSPECTIONS

UCH can be done to improve the train-
ing of our infantry by the inspections.
Most officers greatly dislike to have an ad-
verse report made by an inspector on their
commands. Fear of such a report some-
times works to the detriment of sound train-
ing and sometimes to its improvement.

A captain once asked why he put so much
Influence time on cxerciscs of obviously little conse-
o inspec- q^gjj^g Qj^^ gQ jittle time on others more im-

portant, replied: "Blank will inspect this
year. He always pays great attention to
such and such an exercise and never ex-
amines the company in the others. I want
a clean record on this inspection."

We have all been influenced as was this
captain. Even if we do not care personally,
loyalty to our colonel or to the post com-
mander leads us to consider what the in-
spector will require.

The author has no intention of criticizing
adversely the Inspector General's Depart-
ment; its inspections have steadily im-

130

INSPECTIONS 131

proved in recent years and become more
rational and consequently more beneficial, influence
His aim is rather to point out the place of the ^. *"^®p®^"
inspections in the year's training and to
suggest how, in connection with the methods
of training proposed, they may be made both
searching and helpful toward real proficiency.

In the annual inspection it is evident
that in the time available the inspector can- The
not examine an organization in everything f ""^"*^
it should know; he must choose certain tion
things and judge from those of the training
of the company or regiment.

In making this choice the relative im-
portance of the subjects must be kept in
mind. Of course every company must be
tried out in the combat exercises and in all
the things that should be made fixed habits.
It is of equal importance that no stress be
laid on non-essentials. For the rest, he
should select certain important things which
every company should know and inspect it
thoroughly as to its proficiency in those,
examining the various companies at a post in
different subjects so that a captain would feel
that anything in the whole course might fall
to his lot from properly making the pack to
establishing an outpost at night.

132

TRAINING INFANTRY

The
annual
inspec-
tion

Company
examina-
tion

Battalion
examina-
tion

The inspector should make free use of the
war game map, tactical walks and every
other recognized means of instruction to find
out how well the officers and men of the
regiment are instructed and what class of
work each organization is doing.

In order to be fair to the organizations
inspected the annual inspection should be
made late in the season. It should never be
made before the officers have had a fair show
to instruct their commands.

The above inspection by an officer of thJE
Inspector General's Department should noi
however, be the only one. At the close o^
each period of training there should be an ex-
amination of the organizations on the work
they are supposed to have done. The last of
March or first of April the field officers of the
regiment, as a board, should examine the
companies on the results of their winter's
work; a similar examination should be made
at the close of the period of company field
training. When the battalions have finished
their period of field training the colonel and
lieutenant colonel should form the board to
examine them. If the brigade commander
be thoroughly posted on all matters pertaining
to infantry training his presence at the ex-

INSPECTIONS 133

aminations and careful supervision of the
work cannot fail to be very beneficial. His
supervision should not, however, lead to re-
striction of the proper latitude which should
be allowed subordinates; his mission should
be to see that the instruction given is correct
and that the whole course has been satis-
factorily covered.

The same general principles apply to the
inspection of national guard organizations. National
If anything is found wrong with them the .^"*'
inspector should not keep silent at the time uon
and content himself v/ith rendering later an
adverse written report; he should tell the
officer being inspected what is wrong and take
pains to show him how to correct the error.
A helping hand, offered in the right spirit,
will always be appreciated.

TRAINING A NEW REGIMENT

IN this country we are liable to have the
necessity forced upon us of turning out
^"\^ . troops in the shortest possible time. We

training *^ ^

shall have to use troops not fully trained ; we
shall have to employ them as soon as they
can be used at all. Of course this system will
be frightfully costly in blood and money. In
war imperfectly trained troops must pay with
their lives for all mistakes. The better
trained they are, the fewer mistakes, the
more skill they possess the more cheaply can
any desired result be obtained.

It is the duty of all officers who may be
charged with the responsibility of preparing
this mass of untrained men for war service
to give the subject careful thought, to study
the question carefully and to be prepared on
short notice to take charge of such work and
produce the best results possible in the
shortest time.

Success in this hurried training can only
be secured if the man in charge thoroughly

134

A NEW REGIMENT 136

appreciates his task and follows out a well pre-
pared and systematic course.

There are three phases of the problem:
Our regular regiments must be raised from a
strength of about 65 men per company to
nearly 150. The national guard regiments,
less well prepared, will have, as a rule, to
stand a still greater increase of new men, and
there will be hundreds of entirely new regi-
ments to be raised.

In outlining or suggesting a possible course
to be pursued in such cases let us take the new The com-
regiment. The regiment must first be en- "**" *'
listed, organized and equipped. This first
step will not be considered further than to say
that in its organization it is absolutely neces-
sary that its commander be an active, com-
petent officer, one who can train it and
prepare it for its work. In no other way can
the regiment be prepared to do anything
within a reasonable time.

To appoint an incompetent commander
to such a regiment would cost many lives,
would be a crime closely resembling murder
in the second degree.

An effort should be made in every new
regiment to have a reasonable number of
subordinates competent to act as instructors.

'inciples
aining

136 TRAINING INFANTRY

Under modern conditions there is a mini-
eneral mum amount of training that is absolutely
necessary before an organization can be put
in the field. The number of men lost to
an organization from disease depends on how
well the men are trained in caring for them-
selves and how well the officers do their part.

Time is the all important element; we
must have these organizations in such shape
that they can be used as quickly as possible
and be as nearly good as possible. Of course
they will constantly improve in the field and
become excellent, but they will have to be
used before that state is reached. The oc-
casion for organizing such regiments will only
arise in case of great national danger, when
the utmost can be demanded of all. Hours
of work should then be all that can be pro-
fitably employed. Most of the recruits will
be men accustomed to at least eight hours
work a day.

All that has been said previously as to
variety in the work, keeping up the men's
interest, explaining and giving the reasons
for things done, applies even more to a new
volunteer regiment than to our regular
companies. Essentials only must be taught
at first, bearing in mind that discipline is most

A NEW EEGIMENT 137

essential and the use that can be made of

close order drill in obtaining it. Those things General

that should be a habit must be drilled care- p""^*p •

fully and frequently. Other essentials may training
be hurried through for the first time, to give
the men the best general idea possible in the
shortest time, and then repeated and perfected
as time and opportunity offer.

As a rule our men will be intelligent and
quick to learn. Every little taught them, if
they have understood the reason for it, will
help them to do what is required even if their
instruction is not complete. With such
volunteers much instruction should be ^ven
not as a drill but as a sort of lecture or talk.
The average American works better when he
knows the why and the wherefore. Remem-
ber how different are his new life and sur-
roundings from what he is accustomed to
and how very little the average American
knows of an army and how much of that little
is not so.

In submitting a proposed schedule of train-
ing it is fully appreciated that conditions will
vary greatly and any schedule must be suited
to conditions as they exist; it is doubtful if
the one here proposed would ever exactly fit.
It is only offered as a possible help.

oks

138 TRAINING INFANTRY

It is assumed that the colonel is thoroughly
competent and that there are several men in
the command with some military training,
such as ex-regulars and national guardsmen
and those who have had training in a college
battalion. This latter assumption is a safe
one in this country.

It is very probable that every company
mpany ^m have a cook that enlisted as such and
knows something of the art. But handling
the ration and army cooking have features
that are different from what he is used to un-
less he has been trained in the army. The
company kitchen must be correctly run or
training will be difficult. Discontent and
a big sick report are fatal to success.

The first thing, then, is to instruct the
cooks and mess sergeants. Some one must
be found competent to do this and he must
look after the kitchens, correct mistakes and
give instruction until they are all running
properly. The new captains must learn
how to look after this work properly if they do
not already know. If the colonel can find
nobody else to do it he must do it himself. It
must be done. It is a very important part
of the foundation upon which success must
be built.

A NEW REGIMENT 139

The necessary records and papers should
be properly kept and made, both at regi- Pap©**
mental headquarters and in the orderly room. ^^^
This is important but not so much so as the
kitchens. The mistakes in paper work only
cause annoyance and confusion off the battle-
field and possibly will lose somebody some
money; but the other causes loss of life and
prevents efficiency. This work should be
properly taught. Some competent non-
commissioned officers or officer should be
given the task of instructing the clerks and
first sergeants. It is not difficult, at least the
essential parts, and it should be promptly at-
tended to upon organization but so as in no
way to interfere with training. An ex-
regular sergeant major, first sergeant or clerk
would be very valuable here. So far as pos-
sible such a man should be made adjutant
of every new regiment of volunteers. His
value as an instructor in many things would
be great and he would save the colonel much
trouble and annoyance.

From the first day of training the band
should be turned over to the surgeons for B*"^
thorough instruction as auxiliary sanitary
troops. At least two hours a day should
be devoted to this work until they become

140 TRAINING INFANTRY

proficient, after which, an hour or two a week,
to keep them so.

The band must also receive the necessary
Band dnH go that it can be maneuvered as such.
Callisthenic drill, practice in marching, care
of themselves in the field, individual cooking,
and tent pitching must be taught. Three
hours daily should be devoted to this in-
struction until satisfactory results are ob-
tained, after which only occasional drills are
necessary. This may interfere somewhat
with their music, but that can wait.

The regimental surgeon must also care-
Surgeon fully train his detachment. His officers must
not only be doctors but medical officers; his
men must be trained for field service as well
as for hospital attendants.

The training of the machine gun company
Machine and mounted detachment must begin from

*^"" the start and follow generally the lines pro-

company o ^ I-

posed below for the companies. More at-
tention must be paid to their tactical in-
struction than even to that of company com-
manders. They must know their function
Mounted and how to do their part. The instruction of
®**^ " these men as to field service, care of them-

ment '

selves, callisthenics, cooking, etc., must be
the same as in the company. They mxist be

A NEW REGIMENT 141

taught how to care for the animals and in the
case of orderlies how to ride and to scout.

The company musicians will receive the
following instruction with their companies: Mu«i-
callisthenics, first aid and personal hygiene, ^**"^
individual cooking, tent pitching and rifle
firing. They make all practice marches with
their companies. They will be grouped by
battalion and given at least one hour a day
of instruction in signalling, and the musicians
of the regiment assembled under the drum
major for instruction in the necessary march-
ing and maneuvering and practice with their
instruments. They should work about the
same number of hours per day as the other
men.

Those armed with a revolver must be in-
structed in its mechanism and care, and firing
practice frequently held.

In the proposed schedule given below for
the companies an effort is made to provide C«liu-
for the necessary muscular development re- \ fJ?*^
f erred to before. The amount of this drill is
not as great as desirable but as the men pro-
gress bayonet exercise and pointing and
aiming drill answer fairly well to supplement
this work. Some will object to any eallis-
thenic drill, under the assumed conditions,

142 TRAINING INFANTRY

as a waste of time. They are wrong — ^it will
save time in the end, keep down the sick re-
port and give better results.

The colonel should carefully inventory

nstruc- his command for instructors and drill masters.

iriU*" "^^ ^^^ early stages when divided into small

nasters groups many are required; fortunately but

little military training is necessary for this

preliminary work.

Owing to shortage of good drill masters
groups for this preliminary work will have to
be larger than is customary in peace time in
the regular service, not less than eight men
to a group from the start, and these should
be combined into groups of two squads each
then into platoons, as soon as their work per-
mits. The best instructors should be kept as
drill masters after each consolidation.

For the callisthenic drills from the very
start the men can be combined into large
groups and instructors found who are already
competent to drill their squads in the school
of the soldier. The other squad commanders
who are imperfectly prepared must be as-
sembled at this time for drill and instruction
under the best oflSceis and non-commissioned
officers in the regiment. They will be care-
fully taught the next movements to be given

A NEW REGIMENT 143

to the men and how to teach them to their

squads. Instruc-]^

tors and

As these squad leaders are selected as far as ^^111
possible from those having had some mili- masters
tary training and the others from the brightest
and most intelligent men, it is believed possi-
ble for them to keep ahead of their squads. It
becomes easier as the groups grow larger and
fewer instructors are required.

The drill will be given to the officers who
do not know it. The officers being formed
into a squad by themselves.

All trained officers must be on the drill
ground during all these drills by squad, super-
vise the work, correct mistakes and help out
the poorer instructors. The other officers
not acting as instructors should be required to
attend about half to learn from seeing it done,
the other half of this time they should be re-
quired to be drilled themselves and to study
the drill regulations. There should be no
hesitation in having lieutenants drill squads
during this period provided they are better
at it than some of the enlisted men and are
not needed to supervise the work of several
squads.

There should be an officers' school every
evening except Saturdays and Sundays.

144 TRAINING INFANTRY

This should be conducted by the colonel him-
Officers' self. The first subject taken up being the
*^ ^ drill regulations. Lessons should be short as
well as the sessions of the class and the work
thoroughly done. The student officer must
learn the text and the instructor fully explain
it where necessary. Much explanation will be
required in Part II.

The class must keep well ahead of the out-
door work.

Besides the Infantry Drill Regulations, in
this school must be taught early in the course,
parts of the Guard Manual and Small Arms
Firing Manual. The essential parts of the
Field Engineering will be taught, and, those
not proficient therein, how to read military
maps. Lastly take up the Manual of Courts
Martial.

The more important parts of Army Regu-
lations should be included in the above course.
Better results will be obtained if the lesson
each day includes two or three selected para-
graphs from this book than by taking it up as a
whole and by itself. In its use this is largely
a book of reference. In this proposed way
the officers become familiar with it and how
to use it and the relatively few paragraphs
they must positively know are learned.

A NEW REGIMENT 145

If, beside the colonel, the regiment has
three or more thoroughly competent officers, N. c. o.
the colonel will not require the others to *^ ^^ *
attend officers' school but will order schools
for non-commissioned officers with these
others as instructors. The classes should not
be larger than one composed of all the non-
commissioned officers of a battalion and, if
instructors are available, those of only two or
three companies should form a class.

The work of this class will be largely con-
fined to Infantry Drill Regulations. First the
drill then combat and covering detachments
must be fully explained and the principles of
patrolling taught. If time is available these
schools will also take up other subjects taught
in our regular indoor course. Care must be
taken not to give the men more in one lesson
than they can learn.

If there be one, and less than three, com-
petent instructors for these non-commissioned
officers, a class will be formed in each battalion
and only two sessions held weekly for each,
the instructor taking them in turn. Lessons
in this case may be longer but the work can-
not be so well done.

If there be no one available except the
colonel, each captain will be required to have

146 TRAINING INFANTRY

a school in his company at the most con-
N. C. O. venient hour and try to transmit to the men
^^ * what he has learned in the oflScers' school.

The following instruction should be given
by demonstration or by talks given to the
men assembled and sitting.

Part of it will be given by battalion, part

Talks and by company, 2 and 4 should be given by squad

demon- ^^ platoon, the leaders having first been in-

structed. In the schedule this instruction is

designated by the word " verbal' \ Its value

will depend on the instructor.

List of subjects for instruction by talks
and demonstrations:

1. General duties of a soldier. His
relation to his officers. System of discipline.
Military courtesy. Customs of service as they
relate to him. An outline of organization.
Encourage the class to ask questions on the
subject in hand and kindred subjects and then
answer them.

2. The rifle, its mechanism and care and
how to clean it.

3 . Care of the other equipment, especially
that of leather.

4. How to make the pack and adjust it.

A NEW REGIMENT 147

5. Duties of a sentinel on the interior

guard. Sentinels' orders. Talks and

detnon-

6. The most essential parts of the course strations
in personal hygiene and first aid.

7. Importance and necessity of fire con-
trol and distribution.

8. Instruction as to artillery with a view
to diminish unreasonable fear of its fire.

9. Principles of patrolling.

10. Objects of advance and rear guards
and outposts.

11. Duties of a sentinel on outpost and
conduct of visiting patrols.

12. If time is available give more in-
struction under 6.

Most of this is only preliminary to ex-
planations and instruction the men will get in
their drills. It is a start, and at the beginning
of his training will help to arouse interest and
gives some variety at the time when, in the
regular drills, but little variety is possible
and the drills are least interesting. A good
instructor will make this pay.

It is assumed in this schedule that the
season is between May and October. Work
beginning on a Monday.

148 TRAINING INFANTRY

Reveille at 6 A. M. Breakfast immediately
after. Necessary police between that and 7
A. M. No drill Saturday afternoon except
one hour for instructors; none on Sunday.

PROPOSED SCHEDULE

1st, 2d and 3d Days.
A. M.

1st week 6-30 to 7-45

Drill for instructors and

officers only.

to 7-30

Callisthenics.

to 8-45

School of the soldier with-
out arms.

to 9-45

Same.

to 10-30

Callisthenics.

to 10-45

Drill for officers and instruc-
tors.

to 11-45

p. M.

Verbal.

to 1-45

School of the soldier with-
out arms.

to 2-45

Same.

to 3-45

Same.

to 4-30

Callisthenics.

to 5-00

Drill for officers and in-
structors.

School'to last from J^ to ^
of an hour at first, later the
time to be extended.

A NEW REGIMENT 149

4th and 5th Days and Morning of the 6th
Day. !•* ^•^^

The same as above except that the drill
from 9 to 9-45 A. M. and 2 to 2-45 P. M. will be
in the manual of arms.

Some camp guards will probably be neces-
sary. This should be done by platoon and
this time on guard used to the utmost to teach
this duty.

2d Week. — During this week drills will be
in the school of the soldier without and with ^d week
arms, the proportion with arms steadily in-
creasing.

Commencing Thursday one-half hour each
half-day will be pointing and aiming drill.

A. M.

6-30 to 7-45 Drill for officers and in-
structors.

7-00 to 7-30 Callisthenics.

8-00 to 9-15 Drill— school of the soldier.

9-30 to 10-15 Verbal.

10-30 to 11-45 Drill.

p. M.
1-00 to 2-00 Drill for officers and in-
structors.
1-30 to 2-00 Callisthenics.
2-15 to 3-45 Drill.
4-00 to 4-30 Callisthenics.

150 TRAINING INFANTRY

4-00 to 5-00 Drill for officers and in-
structors.
7-00 School.

3d Week. — Squads combined in pairs.
Jd week Drill wiU be with arms. Part of each drill
will be pointing and aiming drill and extended
order, close order work being continued.
Beginning Thursday an aggregate of half an
hour daily will be given to bayonet exercise.
The drill must be varied, change made every
15 or 20 minutes.

A. M.

7-00 to 7-30 Callisthenics.

6-30 to 7-45 Drill for officers.

8-00 to 10-45 Drill.

11-00 to 11-45 Verbal.

p. M.

1-00 to 3-45 Drill.

4-00 to 5-00 Monday and Wednesday —

estimating distance.
Tuesday and Thursday —
intrenching, using the small
tools.

Friday — Instruction in
guard duty by company.

7-00 School.

4th Week. — Squads are combined into full
4th week platoons. Five or six men are selected from

A NEW REGIMENT

151

each company to form the signal detachment
of the company. These men are required to ^^^ ^®«^
do at least one hour's work a day at this from
now on until thoroughly proficient, and ex-
cused from a corresponding amount of other
work, preferably police and close order in the
afternoon.

A. M.

7 to 11

DRILL

11 to 12

P. M.

lto4

DRILL

Each drill to be divided approxi-
mately as to time as follows :
30 minutes pointing and aiming
drill.

20 minutes bayonet exercise.
1 hour close order drill.
Remainder of time extended order
drill.

All non-commissioned officers
have gallery practice and instruc-
tion in use of range finder.

The best officers of the company
for the work take one-half
the non-commissioned officers
of the company for work in pa-
trolling. The two sections alter-
nate as to days. Remainder of
company will be divided into
groups. All must have gallery
practice at least 5 shots per man

152 TRAINING INFANTRY.

P. M. dsdly. Only one group at target

1 to 4 at a time.

DRILL Each group to have estimating
distance twice during week. Each
group to have individual cooking
twice.

Each group to have one hour's in-
struction during week in first aid
and care of feet on a march.

All to be taught to form for and
pitch shelter tent camp.
If the necessary masks and plas-
trons are available practice in bay-
onet fencing at least three times
during week for each group. If no
fencing rifles are available, poles
the length of the rifle and bayonet,
with a good pad fastened on the
end, answer the purpose. If
masks are not available bayonet
exercise and close order drill will
fill up the rest of the time.
In arranging this work the best
man for it should be put in charge
of each class of work.

4 to — Company formed with full kit,
except rations and ammunition,
and marched first day about

A NEW REGIMENT 163

twenty minutes, lengthening the

time each day by 10 minutes.

7 P. M.

School.

5th Week.

A. M.

7 to 11

Drill same as last week.

1 to 12

Same as last week.

Gallery practice same as last week.

Patrolling same as last week.

First aid, same as last week.

Estimating distance, once during

week.

Bayonet fencing or exercise for at

least one hour during the week,
p. M.

1 to 4 Each platoon to be posted as a
picket of an imaginary outpost
line and men instructed twice
during week.

Each squad as above once as a
sentry squad.

A wall prepared and men given in-
struction in scaling it.
Any time left over to be used as
thought best.

4 to 5 March with pack as before, giv-
ing instruction in advance and
rear guard.

7 School.

5th week

h week

A* M.

impany

7 to 11

DRILL

11 to 12

P. M.

Ito 4

154 TRAINING INFANTRY

6th Week — Company.

One hour close order, remainder
extended order drill.
Much practice in attack as ex-
plained in Chapter IV.
Same as last week.

Gallery practice as last week,
except on Friday.
Friday whole company as support
of an outpost, sentinels and pa-
trols carefully instructed.
Each non-commissioned officer,
twice during week, to conduct a
patrol, instructing privates.
Bayonet fencing. and wall scaling
as last week.

Estimating distance as last week.
Remainder of time teaching men
brush work, hurdle revetment,
fascines, etc.

4 to 5 Same as last week.

7 School.

Saturday, formal inspection by
company.

7th Week — The Company.
h week a. M. As last week except that time
>mpany rj ^^ -^-^ given to close order may be re-

DRILL duced to 15 minutes daily.

A NEW REGIMENT 155

7 to 11 At least two days must be given
DRILL to maneuver of company against ^th week

^^.^»v«^,, company

company.

All the men must fire 20 shots dur-
ing the week at gallery practice at
such times as found practicable
without interfering with the pre-
scribed program.

p. M. Monday. Outpost, company as a
1 to 5 support.

Friday. Practice march with in-
struction in patrolling, advance
and rear guard, and attack and
defense, either one company to
work against another or enemy
to be outlined.

Estimating distance drill while
out. Men must not march more
than 10 miles nor less than 6.
Packs will be carried.
Tuesday, Wednesday and Thurs-
day.

1 to 3-30 Patrolling at least once during
week by each non-commissioned
oflScer as leader.

Remainder of time to brush work,
filling and piling sand bags, mak-
ing loopholes and intrenching.

166 TRAINING INFANTRY

P. M. Drill in dark as training for night
9 to 10 work.

School as last week.

Saturday, formal inspection by

company.

8th Week — Battalion.

*^ A. M. Drill by Battalion. Not more

7 to 11 than one hour of this time per day
should be devoted to close order.
Gallery practice, same as last
week,
p. M. Tuesday and Thursday.
1 to 5 March and instruction by bat-
talion similar to that by company
last week. Distance marched
about 10 miles.
Monday.

1 to 5 Tent pitching and making camp,
including the large tents.
Wednesday and Friday.

1 to 3-30 Field engineering.

Work same as last week.

9 to 10 Night drill.

6 Monday, Wednesday, Friday,

battalion dress parade. Each bat-
talion once during week. School
as usual.

Saturday morning, battalion re-
view and inspection.

A NEW REGIMENT 167

9th Week. Target practice on the range

with ball cartridges. ^** ^^^^

_- , . _ , ,, , target

If the pits are not large enough so that practice
each company can have three targets, only
part of the companies should go at a time
so as to give that number of targets. It
should be completed by end of 9th week and
may have had to come earlier for some
companies.

If the range is right at the instruction
camp it would be much better to have the
companies shoot only a couple of hours a day
beginning with 7th week and reduce the
other instruction by that much, but so that
at the end of the 9th week the work accom-
plished is the same.

10th Week.

A. M.

7 to 11 Battalion drill all but 16 minutes

daily, extended order work. Bat- *®*** ^••>'
talion against battalion at least
twice.

p. M. Monday, battalion outpost in-
1 to 6 struction.

Wednesday, march by battalion
with packs. Instruction as be-
fore.

168 TRAINING INFANTRY

Tuesday and Thursday from 1 to
'^ 5 and Friday from 1 to 3 instruc-

tion by company. Gallery prac-
tice, pointing and aiming and
estimating distance, each once.

Bayonet work for one hour. Wall
scaling once. Two patrol prob-
lems for each non-commissioned
officer. Balance of time field en-
gineering work as before.

Friday 9 to 10 P. M. Night drill
by battalion.

Battalions in turn have battalion
dress parade on Monday, Tues-
day and Thursday.

Saturday morning battalion re-
view and inspection.
School, 7 P. M.

11th Week.

'^ Regimental work. Colonel uses it to best
advantage.

One afternoon practice march. Regi-
mental dress parade 4 evenings. School,
7 P. M. as before.

Saturday, regimental review and in-
spection.

A NEW REGIMENT 159

12th Week.

A seven days' practice march under war ^2th week
conditions with as much instruction as pos- p'*®*"^*
sible in field service, care of men, especially
the feet, and of course in loading wagons,
making and breaking camp.

Marches, especially the first two or three,
must not be long.

13th Week.

Work each forenoon from 7 to 11-30 in i^*** ^••^
what, by careful observation, the colonel
finds is most needed.

No work in the afternoon except as fol-
lows:

Each man to have gallery practice once,
ten shots. Each man to estimate distance
once. Companies to have bayonet work for
at least two half -hour periods each week and
pointing and aiming drill once for some length
of time.

Dress parade by regiment three times
during week.

Regimental review and inspection Satur-
day.

School as usual.

160 TRAINING INFANTRY

This regiment can be used at the end of
esults of this three months. It will not be completely
•aining ^^^ even well trained but it is believed to be
the best that can be done in that time.

Can we have even this much time without
great sacrifice and loss? It is very doubtful,
and yet it is not believed practicable to use
volunteers with less training except in forti-
fications.

The work has been very strenuous for all;
the weaklings will have been, eliminated.
Any one fit for a soldier in war could have
stood the strain, and the others had better be
eliminated before taking the field.

If at the end of our 13th week we find we
have more time, the work for the week follow-
ing should be reduced to three hours per
day and the schools, after that we may
resume the long days of work.

RECRXnTING

THE method of recruiting has a decided
influence on effective training. It is
much harder to train a company whose re-
cruits dribble in a few at a time than one, all
of whose recruits for the year come in at once.

The best results can be obtained if these
recruits can all be had in the fall. As stated When

recruits

should

join

before, the course of instruction should run
from November 1st to October 31st. In the
indoor season all thiat part of the instruction
course that can be given, should be. It should
be preparatory to the outdoor work. The
foundation of sound training should be laid
during this season ; the recruit can then be
given his elementary instruction and be ready
to begin the outdoor work with the company.
The outdoor season is none too long in which
to go through properly the whole course of
work that should be taught outside.

If recruits are received late in the spring
or summer they are not prepared to do the
work with the company, they get only part

161

162 TRAINING INFANTRY

of it and that in a way that does not give good

When results. It is like trying to teach Algebra

'h^'Td* fi^st, then Arithmetic. Another drawback to

join this method is that it results in the captain's

not having all his company for this outdoor

work. Our present peace strength is so low

that correct training in parts is difficult and

when much below this the training is very

imperfect.

Most, if not all, good captains very much
Recruit prefer to have their recruits directly on
depots gniistjnent to having them go to a depot for
several weeks. The training they receive
in these depots, in value, is out of all pro-
portion to the time spent. In their com-
panies, from the very start, while learning the
recruit drill they are learning much else of
value. The recruit is better off and more
contented. In his company there is a personal
feeling for him and interest in him not found
at the depot.

The instruction and ways of doing things
first learned are those of his company, not
always the case at the depot. The few move-
ments taught at the recruit depots must be
taught exactly right if precise close order
drill is to be had, it is harder to change a
recruit's ways of doing anything than to teach

RECRUITING 163

him the right way from the start. It has been
suggested that if the depots are kept up, all Recruit
drill thereat except callisthenics be prohibited. ®p*^**

Recruits dribbling in, waste effort. It is
as much bother to a company to train and get
one recruit into the company as a squad of
eight. The large number of men held at these
recruit depots would give a very desirable in-
crease in strength to our companies if we
could have them. The vaccinations that
are attended to at the depots could just as well
be done at the posts.

The following is offered as a plan of re-
cruiting that it is believed, would improve P**" ^^

...

that branch of the service and greatly im- '■®^''"* *"
prove the training of our infantry:

All recruiting stations and recruit depots
in time of peace to be abolished.

Each regiment in the U. S. to be assigned
a permanent district within which its recruits
are to be found. The regiment may never be
stationed inside this district but its recruits
are all to come from there.

Early in November of each year, each regi-
mental commander to select a few recruiting
parties composed of an officer and three or
four men from his regiment to beat up this
district for recruits. They should visit the

IW TRAININGIINFANTRY

small towns as well as have stations in the
^^ larger ones. Before enlistment the recruits to
iitmgr j^^ physically examined by a doctor, either of

the Medical Corps or one hired in the district.

These recruits are to be sent directly to
their regiments in detachments as enlisted and
their training commenced.

As there are many young men who will
not enlist for service in the U. S., but do want
to go on foreign service, each home regiment
will, in addition to getting its own recruits, be
given the task of getting a certain number for
the Philippines, Hawaii and Panama, the num-
ber being allotted by the War Department.
Men reenlisting should be sent, as far as prac-
ticable, to foreign service. These latter will
be sent to designated posts and held long
enough to be properly equipped, vaccinated,
etc., and then be sent to their regiments.

Large cities like New York and Chicago
should not be assigned to a single regiment
but three or four regiments to have stations
there and part oi the outlying districts to be
theirs to beat up.

These recruitijig parties to remain out
until they have completed their quotas then to
return to their stations, but never later than
February 1st.

RECRUITING 165

This plan offers several advantages and
some disadvantages, but is believed to be an Advan-
improvement. *t*^^ ^

^ plan

Its advantages are:

All the recruits of the company come in at
one season and that the best one.

They come directly to the company on
enlistment.

Companies can be larger without in-
creasing strength of army.

The officer enlisting them belongs to the

regiment as does his recruiting"party[and will
exercise more care to get only suitable men.

The recruiting will be more widely distrib-
uted and as the men go back to their homes
knowledge of the service, and trained men in
case of war, will be generally distributed.

Fewer men from the slums of the big
cities and more from small towns and rural
districts.

The men of a regiment coming from one
locality, year after year, a friendly feeling
for the regiment should be built up and future
recruiting assisted and, in case of a great war,
every section will have its nucleus of trained
men.

Discipline will be improved and desertion

166 TRAINING INFANTRY

diminished. The men will realize that their
Advan- comrades are from their home section and
tages o pgQpjg g^|. home will know of their misdeeds.

plan r- r-

Besides it is pleasanter for the men to serve
with those they have known before.

It cannot be asserted without a trial that
this method will be cheaper than the present
one but the author believes it will be.

To send out these recruiting parties will be
a considerable expense but to offset this there
is the cost of the present recruiting stations
for rent, the difference in the cost of com-
mutation paid and actual cost at posts, the
travelling expenses incurred sending recruits
to depots, often in an opposite direction from
that to their future posts, the costs of keep-
ing up these depots, a large amount, the
loss of the service of all the recruiting person-
nel for any other valuable purpose during the
year as well as the cost for the time lost in
training of all the recruits.

The recruiting parties sent out by the
regiments are taken from trained men at the
season when they can be best spared and
probably they would be absent but for a
relatively short time.

If this plan be adopted the method will
work better each year. The men who have

RECRUITING 167

gone back, and even those in the ranks,

can and will help in the recruiting, and as the Advan-

number of these increase recruiting will be *^^^' ^

° plan

more easily and quickly done. Each village
will know that the party will visit it at a
certain season and many will be ready at once.

It will be more expensive the first year or
two than afterwards. The saving on deserters
should be large after the first two or three
years.

There are two apparent objections. That
there will be no large number of recruits in Discus-
hand to be sent to particular regiments in an ' °" ^
emergency. This is of small consequence, tions
Where the regiment is wanted for a sudden
emergency, the adding of a large number of
raw recruits is of no immediate advantage.

Suspending recruiting February 1st may
result at first in some regiments not being
filled up but this is doubtful. Most of our
original enlistments at present are made in
winter, and this would be offset, if it does
occur, by the other advantages enumerated.

Convenience of administration and keep-
ing records should have no weight as against
efficient training for action, the only reason
for our army's existence.

168 TRAINING INFANTRY

If the infantry cannot have the above
ossible system the following modification would
;^fj^- improve matters.

Each company to receive recruits but
once during the year, each in its turn and
regiments as nearly at one time as practi-
cable. The recruits to be sent out within one
week of their receipt at the depots except
those for foreign service. If the peace
strength of the companies be kept at 65, when
the company is assigned recruits it should be
filled to a strength of 80 it will then average
about 65 for the year possibly a few more.
It is not believed the total enlisted strength
of the army would be increased at all. It
would amount to having the men with com-
panies instead of in recruit depots.

The above will enable the captains to do
much better training and greater efficiency
will result.

Of course those who receive their recruits
in October or November would have a great
advantage over the others but all could do
better work.

Recruits enlisted in summer could be held
much longer than others and then, about
September 1st, sent to the regiments stationed
in the tropics. It is more comfortable for the

RECRUITING 169

recruits if they can reach those stations
in the fall and get their first hard drills and
become acclimated while weather conditions
are most favorable. This would give the*
regiments at home their recruits at a favorable
season if not the best for all of them.

Either of the above changes can be made
by a change in regulations and orders. Need for

With our great population and military l^""^^^^^
needs and very small army it is folly not to use
what army we have so as to be as well pre-
pared for war as conditions permit.

In the preceding chapter it has been shown
how important it is that we have some trained
men for every new regiment. We must have
trained men to fill the regular army which
must bear the brunt of the first attack.

The present law does not provide this.
The enlistment law should be radically
changed to get the best results for training,
general efficiency and preparedness for war.

All men should enlist for 5 years. At
the end of one year's honest and faithful Enlist-
service, except when serving beyond the *"*"* **^
limits of the U. S., the man should, on his
application, be granted a furlough for the
remaining four years; if war breaks out, or be-
comes so imminent as to call for mobilization,

170 TRAINING INFANTRY

these furloughs to cease and the men to rejoin.
Enlist- The men to have the privilege of remaining on
ment aw j^^ ^j^^ service if they so desire and of taking
their furloughs at the end of any completed
year of service. Discharges not to be given
the men until the end of their full five years.
Hence these men can not reenlist in another
organization while on furlough, and there can
be no doubt of their status and liability for
punishment as deserters if they fail to re-
join when called.

For the present, men should not be re-
Men on quired to take the furlough and reenlistment
ur oug should not be prohibited, but remaining in
service with the colors over two years in time
of peace should not be encouraged; later,
if found practicable to get sufficient recruits,
reenlistment for all, except non-commissioned
officers and certain mechanics who first enlist
after that date, should be prohibited. Men
who have enlisted with the understanding that
they can remain in service until retired, pro-
vided they behave themselves properly and
are physically fit, should be honestly treated ;
they have an implied contract at the least.
Time on furlough not to count for retire-
ment or increase of pay, and men on such
furlough not to be counted in strength of
company.

RECRUITING 171

Recruits on foreign service should have
the privilege of the furlough only after two M®" o"
years service, and men with regiments in the "'^ °"^
U. S. who wish to remain in the service, after
one year's service should be encouraged or
required to transfer to foreign service for the
next two years.

Men whose service in their first year has
not been satisfactory and who are not fairly
trained should be required to serve two years
before being granted a furlough. The law
should also provide that men, whose
conduct is found unsatisfactory by a board of
officers and the finding is approved by the
colonel, may be f urloughed at any time after
two years service whether the man desires
it or not.

It is believed the plan would work if no
pay were given men on furlough, but if each
be paid ten dollars each six months on report-
ing his address by mail to the adjutant of the
post it would help in finding him when wanted
and might be an inducement to some to en-
list.

An effort should be made to get young men
as recruits. Boys of eighteen or over if physi-
cally strong should be encouraged to enlist.

172 TRAINING INFANTRY

Young men are easier to train and for a longer
Men on time afterwards are available for service.

furlough

We need a reserve but no men should be
enlisted directly for it. The reserve for the
regular service should be our men on furlough.
Men too long out of service and advanced in
years are not what is needed for the regular
service which must be ready at short notice
to face serious war.

The reasons for the foregoing recommen-
Reasons dations as they appear to the author are :

^ent !• F^y^ years is as long as the average

plan man is willing to pledge his future for military

service unless he means to make it a life oc-
cupation. The latter class is not the best for
the government. Young men are the best for
the ranks in time of war. Men who serve only
long enough to be trained for the work are to
be desired. It results in a much greater num-
ber of trained men being available in time
of war and is much cheaper, for it reduces
current pay and the retired list.

2. The great importance of having as
many trained men as possible and having them
dispersed through the country to help in the
formation of the new regiments at the out-
break of war is apparent to any one who
thinks^ on this subject.

RECRUITING 173

3. If recruits be received during the
winter months only, the organizations can Reason*
follow a prescribed course of instruction and ^^ ®" "*"
complete it annually. If recruits dribble in pian
throughout the year a proper course of in-
struction cannot be satisfactorily given in

that time.

4. At the outbreak of war, it is of vital
importance that we have as strong a force
as possible of men fully ready trained and
equipped. The losses at first in this force will
be heavy. If green recruits, enough to fill
the regular organizations to war strength
and to make good the early losses, be poured
in on them they will cease to be trained or-
ganizations. A reserve is a necessity. This
will provide it at small cost.

5. Many excellent and patriotic young
men are willing to serve a short time in the
army for the experience and training. Foxir
years, however, is longer than they are willing
to postpone settling down to their real life's
work. These are the men it is most desirable
to get into the army, not as professional
soldiers, but as a trained reserve for war.
For the first years they are a reserve for the
regular companies, then they become avail-
able for officers QV ^op-cpmpiisiQned officers

174 TRAINING INFANTRY

of volunteers. This class of young men will
Reasons enlist much more freely when they can do so

nen" " " ^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^ ^^^^ from civil pursuits.

*^*" 6. Enlisting men as young as they are

physically fit interferes less with their civil
careers, hence will get us more desirable re-
cruits. The physical and mental discipline a
boy thus gets will help him in his future work
and the younger he gets it, so long as it does
not interfere with his schooling, the more it
will be worth to him. Taking the recrjiit
young, the five years while his military ser-
vice is with the regulars are the five best
for that purpose. Later when older, more
developed mentalljrand matured in judgment
he is best in higher rank than private with the
volunteers. If he enters at 18 he is available
at 23 for the volunteers or national guard and
has at least seven years left in which he can be
considered at his best.

7. The provision for letting men out at
the end of one year, provided their conduct has
been good and they are fairly instructed, will
be a great aid to discipline and a preventative
of desertion. A good many young men enter
the service thoughtlessly and find after a few
weeks that the life is different from what they
expected. They look ahead to over three

RECRUITING 175

years more of it and the weak ones desert.
They are not vicious nor criminal as a rule but Reasons
this step injures them seriously; they become ^'* *""•*"
prisoners or fugitives, and either will decrease plan
the man's moral stamina and self respect.
This provision will greatly reduce this.
The man will see that he has only to behave
himself for the rest of the year to return to civil
life with a clean record. The great expense
resulting from desertion will be largely
eliminated. The men will be more contented,
they will feel they can leave in a short time if
they wish, which will tend to decrease the
desire to quit. This does not prevent those
stajring in the service who wish to do so. A
few old soldiers are desirable.

Less than one year's training is notsuflS-
cient in which to cover properly the course the
infantry soldier should have. Two years is
necessary to make a good job of it. But we
need more men who can be used in war.
With some thoroughly trained men in the
ranks it is believed better to have 100 others
of one year's training than fifty of two or
more.

The national guard should have the same
period of five years for enlistment with a pro-
vision for inactive service, except in war,

176 TRAINING INFANTRY

after two years of service, unless the man has
Enlist- had service in some other organization, as
menu for ^ college battalion. Less than two years is
tional iiot enough training to be of value where so
suard little time per year is devoted to it.

While it has nothing to do with training,
there is another provision that should be in the
enlistment law; that is, that every man who
enlists for five years, and is in service when war
breaks out, shall be liable for service for at
least one year thereafter no matter when
his term expires. At the outbreak of a
great war is no time to discharge trained men.

XII

IN CONCLUSION

TIME is wasted at most posts on some
things that are of little value compared Relative
with the time spent on them. ^* "®*

"Butt's Manual" is fine callisthenic drill
and at proper times should be practiced.
It would be just as valuable and even more so
if, instead of having the men learn to go
through it all without command, an in-
structor gave the movements and the men
executed them purely for physical drill. The
cadence amounts to little, but executing them
so as to exercise properly the desired muscles
is important.

Many captains spend a great deal of time
practicing this so that their companies can
go through the whole series without com-
mand and to music. It is pretty, and for
the chorus in a musical comedy act might
be a success, but for soldiers it is a waste
of valuable drill time that could and should
be put to better use.

Our inspectors have had something to do
with this, and county fairs and similar shows,

177

178 TRAINING INFANTRY

more. The narrow scope of instruction fol-
lowed in some companies, and the seeking
for the easiest way to kill the drill hour by a
few, has helped to give this its prominence in
our training.

Our target practice is open to criticism in

Target some respects. Its importance can not be

practice Qyerestimated and it must not be slighted,

but rational methods should be followed. It

is necessary to appreciate fully what is

requu-ed and wanted.

The individual man must be a fairly good
marksman for two reasons: so that he can
place his shots in a designated locality, and
to give him confidence in himself. The
better the men can shoot, other things being
equal, the more confidence they have in them-
selves and in each other. For practical re-
sults on the battlefield an expert rifleman is of
little if any more value than a marksman.
Good, fair shooting by every man in the
company is what is desired.

On the battlefield much depends on the
confirmed habit, this habit-forming can not
be done on the target range, but throughout
the year's work. Not to exceed two weeks
a year should be allowed to any company for
known distance practice on the range. If

IN CONCLUSION 179

its work during the rest of the year has
been properly done, this is sufficient. The Targ.
rest of the time is needed for other work. ^^^^^
But the time put on field firing, where done in
the solution of correct tactical problems, can-
not well be excessive. The more of this the
better.

The law granting extra pay to expert
shots, sharpshooters and marksmen is not E»^"
believed good in its effect; it gives undue ^^^
importance to range firing. An expert rifle-
man without other training and discipline
is of but little value on the battlefield, while
even a second class shot, well trained and
disciplined, is infinitely his superior as a sol-
dier. This law should be amended so as to
divide the men into two classes : the best men in
each company to be rated as 1st class. To be
so rated the man must be thoroughly well
trained in all his duties, of excellent character
and 1st classman or better in target shooting.
The extra pay for 1st classmen to be so
alloted as to cost the government no more
than is now paid for higher classifications.
Men have drawn this extra pay for qualifica-
tion as shots who were of but little account
as soldiers.

Rifle firing among young men in civil life

180 TRAINING INFANTRY

should be encouraged. It is a necessary part

Rifle of a soldier's training and is that much ac-

*"^ complished toward making efficient soldiers

compe*

titions of them if the occasion arises.

Our rifle competitions take too much time
and are allowed to interfere too much with
regular training. Officers should not be
allowed to compete. Their work during
this season is with their companies; they
should be learning the duties of an officer not
that of the private in the ranks. It is un-
- doubted that a man can not make much of a
success teaching what he does not know.
The officer must know how to shoot well
enough to be an instructor, he must know
the theory and have the knack of instructing.
He does not need to neglect his regular work
for weeks at a time several summers to acquire
this at competitions.

The best company instructor in rifle
firing the author ever saw on a target range
was a first sergeant who himself never made
better than marksman. The company was
very short on sharpshooters and experts but
was still shorter on 3d class men. The poorest
instructor he ever saw was an officer whose
breast on state occasions was covered with
big medals for shooting. He had to spare his

IN CONCLUSION 181

own eyes so as to make phenomenal scores;
the instruction of the new men in the company
was of little importance compared with the
former.

The proper garrisoning of the army, to
avoid so much necessary labor and afford Proper
better opportunities for training, has been ^*"[*"
given great attention by the War Depart-
ment. May it soon meet with success. But
much can be done even under present con-
ditions to help in this matter. This beautiful
parking perfectly kept is pretty, but it takes
ground needed for other purposes and re-
quires an immense amount of "fatigue"
labor. This labor could be reduced: the
parks would not be so pretty but military
efficiency would be greater. For which does
the government spend its money?

Our companies should be increased in size
to 100 men in peace, in war to 150. Our Strength
companies are now too small for good train- ""^ **"•

'^ ° company

ing; it requires too many new men to raise
them to war strength, and the present strength
is wasteful of money and effort.

With the companies at a fixed peace
strength of 65 it means much of the time still
less. There are not enough men to drill in the
regular platoon formations. In our extended

182 TRAINING INFANTRY

order work the captain is reduced to the
Strength capacity of a platoon commander and pla-
toon commanders are out of a job. These

company '*

men do not get practice in the handling of
their proper units and it can not fail to di-
minish their interest and enthusiasm and result
in poorer work*asVell as in incomplete work.

In the case of war we shall need our regular
organizations very promptly and as efficient
as possible. At the same time these organi-
zations are certain to lose many officers taken
for other duties. The addition of much more
than one man to each two then in ranks, even
if they have been previously trained, is a
serious blow to efficiency. The new men must
either be untrained or meti from a reserve.
If from a reserve they are rusty on many
points and are apt to be strange to the officers
who change in a company so frequently.
Adding 50 reservists to a company of 100 men
will do no harm ; adding 85 to a company of 65
will be very different and, if the men added
in the second case be untrained recruits, we
shall not have a trained unit but a school of
instruction.

A great objection to our present strength
is the fact that it is so wasteful'of money and
effort.

IN CONCLUSION 183

The object of the army is to have a trained
force ready for action and to help train the Stren
great mass of men that will be called out in
case of war. We want as many trained men
as possible, both for the ranks and to help
prepare others. Since we cannot have a
large army we should do all we are able with
what we have.

We have in the regular army an expensive
plant; the interest on cost and overhead
charges form a large part of the annual cost,
the cost for privates is relatively small. There
is a demand and need for the output, trained
soldiers; yet we produce less than half of what
we could for the same cost, except pay of pri-
vates. With no increase in interest on plant
and pay of officers and senior non-commis-
sioned officers and administration, we could
more than double our output of trained men
and more than double our efficiency for war,
and the training would be much better.

A private corporation doing business this
way would probably go into bankruptcy.

One thing should be made a fixed policy
and made positive law now so that in case of a New o
real war it will be carried out. All organiza- ^|*^***
tions received into the service for the war must in wai
be at full strength.

184 TRAINING INFANTRY

We shall require in such a war a very large
New or- army which means the utilizing of all the
tkm"" oJ'g^^izations we now have and forming
in war many new ones. By filling all existing or-
ganizations to war strength we reduce the
number of new ones to be formed and utilize
their training capacity to the best advantage;
they can not be taken at their existing strength
and state of training and have much value
in battle. We shall need so many men that
must be trained that we must use what
means of training we have to its utmost.

By reducing the number of new organiza-
tions, more and better officers can be used for
their training; there will be more chance of get-
ting the necessary instructors for them. A
few of the right kind of men can fit for service
a full strength regiment as well as one of half
strength and better officers and non-com-
missioned officers can be found for it, for
there will be fewer required and the average
can be higher.

Besides the difference in cost, administra-
tion, road space on the march, and the
tactical handling when massed in great
numbers, are of great importance and are
much better done with fewer organizations.

Upon the army today rests a great re-

IN CONCLUSION 185

sposibility. With our small numbers and
many faults in organization and stations we The
must be as nearly ready for a great war as pos- **'"*^ *
sible; not only personally ready but do what sibiiity
we can to make the organization of a great
and eflScient army, if it ever becomes neces-
sary, a possibility.

This means we must study and know our
profession thoroughly, give a helping hand
to the national guard when and where we
can and to any other organization that does
something toward the military training of
men who may make up this great army if it
has to be raised. We must remember that
there are many things to be taught a man
before he is an eflScient soldier; all he learns
before he joins a volunteer regiment is that
much of a help.

But our chief duty, after personal quali-
fication, is to make the best soldiers possible
out of the men under us. This is what we
are paid for and this is worth much more to
our country than anything else we can do in
peace. We should make the best we can of
the conditions as they exist at our post,
they may not be favorable for getting the best
results but that is no reason for our not get-
ting the best possible.

178 TRAINING INFANTRY

more. The narrow scope of instruction fol-
lowed in some companies, and the seeking
for the easiest way to kill the drill hour by a
few, has helped to give this its prominence in
our training.

Our target practice is open to criticism in

Target some respects. Its importance can not be

practice overestimated and it must not be slighted,

but rational methods should be followed. It

is necessary to appreciate fully what is

required and wanted.

IN CONCLUSION 179

its work during the rest of the year has
been properly done, this is sufficient. The Target
rest of the time is needed for other work, p*"*^***^®
But the time put on field firing, where done in
the solution of correct tactical problems, can-
not well be excessive. The more of this the
better.

The law granting extra pay to expert
shots, sharpshooters and marksmen is not Extra
believed good in its effect; it gives undue ^*^
importance to range firing. An expert rifle-
man without other training and discipline
is of but little value on the battlefield, while
even a second class shot, well trained and
disciplined, is infinitely his superior as a sol-
dier. This law should be amended so as to
divide the men into two classes : the best men in
each company to be rated as 1st class. To be
so rated the man must be thoroughly well
trained in all his duties, of excellent character
and 1st classman or better in target shooting.
The extra pay for 1st classmen to be so
alloted as to cost the government no more
than is now paid for higher classifications.
Men have drawn this extra pay for qualifica-
tion as shots who were of but little account
as soldiers.

Rifle firing among young men in civil life

180 TRAINING INFANTRY

should be encouraged. It is a necessary part
^\^« of a soldier's training and is that much ac-
*"^ complished toward making efficient soldiers
titions of them if the occasion arises.

IN CONCLUSION 181

own eyes so as to make phenomenal scores;
the instruction of the new men in the company
was of little importance compared with the
former.

The proper garrisoning of the army, to
avoid so much necessary labor and afford Proper
better opportunities for training, has been **^*"
given great attention by the War Depart-
ment. May it soon meet with success. But
much can be done even under present con-
ditions to help in this matter. This beautiful
parking perfectly kept is pretty, but it takes
ground needed for other purposes and re-
quires an immense amount of "fatigue''
labor. This labor could be reduced: the
parks would not be so pretty but military
eflSciency would be greater. For which does
the government spend its money?

Our companies should be increased in size
to 100 men in peace, in war to 150. Our Strength
companies are now too small for good train- ® * •

compAny

ing; it requires too many new men to raise
them to war strength, and the present strength
is wasteful of money and effort.

With the companies at a fixed peace
strength of 65 it means much of the time still
less. There are not enough men to drill in the
regular platoon formations. In our extended

182 TRAINING INFANTRY

order work the captain is reduced to the
Strength capacity of a platoon commander and pla-
** «• * too^ commanders are out of a job. These

company *'

men do not get practice in the handling of
their proper units and it can not fail to di-
minish their interest and enthusiasm and result
in poorer work*asVell as in incomplete work.

In the case of war we shall need our regular
organizations very promptly and as eflScient
as possible. At the same time these organi-
zations are certain to lose many oflScers taken
for other duties. The addition of much more
than one man to each two then in ranks, even
if they have been previously trained, is a
serious blow to eflSciency. The new men must
either be untrained or meh from a reserve.
If from a reserve they are rusty on many
points and are apt to be strange to the oflScers
who change in a company so frequently.
Adding 50 reservists to a company of 100 men
will do no harm ; adding 85 to a company of 65
will be very different and, if the men added
in the second case be untrained recruits, we
shall not have a trained unit but a school of
instruction.

A great objection to our present strength
is the fact that it is so wastefurof money and
effort.

IN CONCLUSION 183

The object of the army is to have a trained
force ready for action and to help train the Strength
great mass of men that will be called out in ** * *

^ company

case of war. We want as many trained men
as possible, both for the ranks and to help
prepare others. Since we cannot have a
large army we should do all we are able with
what we have.

We have in the regular army an expensive
plant; the interest on cost and overhead
charges form a large part of the annual cost,
the cost for privates is relatively small . There
is a demand and need for the output, trained
soldiers; yet we produce less than half of what
we could for the same cost, except pay of pri-
vates. With no increase in interest on plant
and pay of officers and senior non-commis-
sioned oflScers and administration, we could
more than double our output of trained men
and more than double our efficiency for war,
and the training would be much better.

A private corporation doing business this
way would probably go into bankruptcy.

One thing should be made a fixed policy
and made positive law now so that in case of a New or-
real war it will be carried out. All organiza- fj*^^*"
tions received into the service for the war must in war
be at full strength.

184 TRAINING INFANTRY

We shall require in such a war a very large
New or- army which means the utilizing of all the
u^n™" organizations we now have and forming
in war many new ones. By filling all existing or-
ganizations to war strength we reduce the
number of new ones to be formed and utilize
their training capacity to the best advantage;
they can not be taken at their existing strength
and state of training and have much value
in battle. We shall need so many men that
must be trained that we must use what
means of training we have to its utmost.

By reducing the number of new organiza-
tions, more and better officers can be used for
their training ; there will be more chance of get-
ting the necessary instructors for them. A
few of the right kind of men can fit for service
a full strength regiment as well as one of half
strength and better officers and non-com-
missioned officers can be found for it, for
there will be fewer required and the average
can be higher.

Upon the army today rests a great re-

IN CONCLUSION 185

sposibility. With our small numbers and
many faults in organization and stations we Th«
must be as nearly ready for a great war as pos- *'"*^ *_
sible; not only personally ready but do what sibiiity
we can to make the organization of a great
and efficient army, if it ever becomes neces-
sary, a possibility.

This means we must study and know our
profession thoroughly, give a helping hand
to the national guard when and where we
can and to any other organization that does
something toward the military training of
men who may make up this great army if it
has to be raised. We must remember that
there are many things to be taught a man
before he is an efficient soldier; all he learns
before he joins a volunteer regiment is that
much of a help.

186 TRAINING INFANTRY

The quitter, the man who does as little as
Th« possible, who always wants to be away from
*™*^ * troops because things are not as he thinks

rcspon*

sibility they should be, or who does nothing because
he cannot do it exactly as laid down, is a
curse to the army; he should leave the
service and sell ribbons.

Rational, systematic training besides
producing the greatest military efficiency
will keep the men interested in their work and
will occupy more of their time; the men will
be more contented. Interested and contented
men will furnish a smaller sick report and
fewer deserters. There will be less dissipation
hence less punishment.

Discontent, ennui, a constant grouch,
injure digestion and bring on other physical
ills. This is another responsibility resting
on officers — that for the men under them.
With young men we have a great influence
on their characters and future careers. We
make men better fit for life's work or turn
them back worse than we found them.

To the credit of the army it can be said
that in most cases an enlistment served there-
in is a benefit to the majority who so serve.
The men are physically and mentally better
for a short service and I believe morally.

IN CONCLUSION 187

There is certainly less excessive drinking
among our soldiers in nearly all regiments The
than in a corresponding number of civilians ^^"^^ *

* respon*

in the same vicinity, and the same is true as sibility
to other vices. In personal cleanliness, de-
cency and politeness they are far ahead of the
average man of the same social standing as
that from which they come. Many em-
ployers have recognized this, and are giving
preference to discharged soldiers in em-
ployment. The uniform makes the man
conspicuous and one drunken soldier in a
thousand will call for more attention than
ten drunken civilians out of five hundred.

The duty of trying to improve the men
morally is a military as well as a moral duty. *
It is in line with what has been said before:
the better the man, the more valuable the
soldier, the more he can be taught, the more
he can help to train others, and the more
likely is he to remain in physical condition
to be fit for service in the field.

"We have a profession not a trade." Let
us take it seriously, appreciate our responsi-
bility, make the best of conditions as we
find them, improving them where we can,
and train ourselves and those imder us to be
The Best Infantry.

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