A
TREATISE
Concerning the
PRIN CIP LES
O F
HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.
WHEREIN THE
Chief Caufes of Error and Difficulty in the Sciences,
with the Grounds of Scepticifm, Atbeifm, and
Irrfligion, are inquired into.
Firft Printed in the Year 1710.
To which are added
THREE DIALOGUES
BETWEEN
Hylas and Philonous,
In Oppofition to
SCEPTICKS WATHEISTS.
Firft Printed in the Year 1715.
Both written by GEORGE BERKELET, M. A.
Fellow of Trinity-College, Dublin.
LONDON: Printed for Jacob Tonfon, 1734.
INTRODUCTION.
HILOSOPHY being
nothing elfe but the ftudy
of Wifdom and Truth, it
may with reafon be expect-
ed, that thofe who have
fpent moft Time and Pains in it thould
enjoy a greater calm and ferenity of Mind,
a greater clearnefs and evidence of Know-
ledge, and be lefs difturbed with Doubts
and Difficulties than other Men. Yet fo
it is we fee the Illiterate Bulk of Mankind
that walk the High-road of plain, com-
mon Senfe, and are governed by the Dic-
tates of Nature, for the moft part eafy and
undifturbed. To them nothing that's fa-
miliar appears unaccountable or difficult to
comprehend. They complain not of any
want of Evidence in their benfes, and are
out of all danger of becoming Sceptics.
But no fooner do we depart from Senfe
and Inftinct to follow the Light of a Su-
perior Principle, to reafon, meditate, and
reflect on the Nature of Things, but a
thoufand Scruples fpring up in our Minds,
concerning thofe Things which before w*e
feemed fully to comprehend. Prejudices
A 2 and
INTRODUCTION.
and Errors of Scnfe do from all Parts dif-
cover themfelves to our view ; and endea-
vouring to correct tjaefc by Reafon we arc
infenfibly drawn into uncouth Paradoxes,
Difficulties, and Inconfiftences, which mul-
tiply and grow upon us as we advance in
Speculation; till at length, having wander 'd
through many intricate Mazes, we find
our felves juft where we were, or, which
is worfe, fit down in a forlorn Scepticifm.
II. The caufe of this is thought to be
the Obicurity of things, or the natural
Weaknefs and Irrs perfection of our Un-
derftandings. It is faid the Faculties we
have are few, and thole defigned by Na-
ture for the Support and Comfort of
Life, and not to penetrate into the inward
Effence and Constitution of Things. Be-
fides, the Mind of Man being Finite,
when it treats of Things which partake
of Infinity, it is not to be wondered at, if
it run into Abfurdities and Contradictions j
out of which it is impoflible it fhould e-
ver extricate it felf, it being of the na-
ture of Infinite not to be comprehended
by that which is Finite,
III. But perhaps we may be too par-
tial to our felves in placing the Fault ori-
ginally in pur Faculties, and not rather
INTRODUCTION, J
in the wrong ufe we make of them. It
is a hard thing to fuppofe, that right
Deductions from true Principles fhould
ever end in Confcquences which cannot
be maintained or made confident. We
fhould believe that God has dealt more
bountifully with the Sons of Men, than
to give them a ftrong defire for that
Knowledge, which he had placed quite
out of their reach. This were not agreea-
ble to the wonted, indulgent Methods of
Providence, which, whatever Appetites ic
may have implanted in the Creatures,
doth ufually furnim them with fuch
means as, if rightly made ufe of, will
not fail to fatisfy them. Upon the whole,
I am inclined to think that the far great-
er Part, if not all, of thofe Difficulties
wnich have hitherto amus'd Philofophers,
and block'd up the way to Knowledge,
are intirely owing to our felves. That
we have firft rais'd a Duft, and then
complain, we cannot fee.
IV. My Purpofe therefore is, to try
if I can difcover what thole Principles
are, which have introduced all that Doubt-
fulnefs and Uncertainty, thofe Abiurdides
and Contradictions into the feveral Sedts
of Philofophy; infomuch that the Wileft
Men have thought our Ignorance incur a-
A 3 bie,
INTRODUCTION.
*
ble, conceiving it to arife from the natu-
ral dulnefs and limitation of our Faculties.
And furely it is a Work well deferving
our Pains, to make a ftrict inquiry con-
cerning the firft Principles of Humane
Knowledge, to fife and examine them on all
fides : efpecially fince there may be fome
Grounds to fufpect that thofe Lets and
Difficulties, which flay and embarafs the
Mind in its fearch after Truth, do not
fpring from any Darknefs and Intricacy in
the Objects, or natural Defect in the Un-
derftanding, fo much as from falfe Princi-
ples which have been infifted on, and
might have been avoided.
V. How difficult and difcou raging fo-
ever this Attempt may feem, when I con-
fider how many great and extraordinary
Men have gone before me in the fame De-
figns : Yet I am not without fome Hopes,
upon the Confideration that the largeft
Views are not always the Cleareft, and
that he who is Short-fighted will be obliged
to dravv the Object nearer, and may, per-
haps, by a clofe and narrow Survey difcern
that which had efcaped far better Eyes.
VI. In order to prepare the Mind of
the Reader for the eafier conceiving what
follows, it is proper to premife iomewhat-,
by
INTRODUCTION.
by way of Introduction, concerning the
Nature and Abufe of Language. But the un-
raveling this Matter leads me in fome mea-
fure to anticipate my Delign, by taking notice
of what feems to have had a chief part in ren-
dering Speculation intricate and perplexed,
and to have occafioned innumerable Errors
and Difficulties in almoft all parts of Know-
ledge. And that is the opinion that the Mind
hath a power of framing Abftratf Ideas or
Notions of Things. He who is not a perfect
Stranger to the Writings and Dilputes of
Philosophers, muft needs acknowledge that
no fmall part of them are fpent about ab-
Jftracl: Ideas. Thefe are in a more efpecial
manner, thought to be the Object of thofe
Sciences which go by the name of Logic
and Metaphyjics, and of all that which
paffes under the Notion of the moft ab-
ftracted and fublime Learning, in all which
one fhall fcarce find any Queftion handled
in fuch a manner, as docs not fuppofe
their Exigence in the Mind, and that it
is well acquainted with them,
VII. It is agreed on all hands, that the
Qualities or Modes of things do never
really exift each or them apart by it felf,
and (eparated from all others, but are
mix'd, as it were, and blended together,
feyeral in the fame Object. But we are
A 4 told*
« I N T R O D U C T LO N.
told, the Mind being able to confider each
Quality fmgly, or abftra&ed from thofe
other Qualities with which it is united,
does by that means frame to it felf abftradt
Ideas. For example, there is perceived by
Sight an Objedt extended, coloured, and
moved : This mix'd or compound Idea the
mind refolving into its Simple, conftituent
Parts, and viewing each by it felf, exclu-
five of the reft, does frame the abftradt
Ideas of Extenfion, Colour, and Motion.
Not that it is poflible for Colour or Mo-
tion to exift without Extenfion: but only
that the Mind can frame to it felf by Ab-
Jlraftion the Idea of Colour cxclufive of
Extenfion, and of Motion exclufive of
both Colour and Extenfion.
VIII. Again, the Mind having obferved
that in the particular Extensions perceiv'd
by Senfe, there is fomething common and
alike in all, and fome other things pecu-
liar, as this or that Figure or Magnitude,
which diftinguifh them one from another;
it confiders apart or fingles out by it felf
that which is common, making thereof a
moft abftract Idea of Extenfion, which is
neither Line, Surface, nor Solid, nor has
any Figure or Magnitude but is an Idea
Entirely prefcinded from all thefe. bo like-
wife the Mind by leaving out of the par-
ticular
INTRODUCTION.
ticular Colours perceived by Senfe, that
which diftinguifhes them one from ano-
ther, and retaining that only which is
common to all, makes an Idea of Colour
in abftract which is neither Red, nor Blue,
nor White, nor any other determinate Co-
lour. And in like manner by confidering
Motion abftracledly not only from the Body
moved, but likewife from the Figure it
defcribes, and all particular Directions and
Velocities, the abftracl: Idea of Motion is
framed; which equally correfponds to all
particular Motions whatfoever that may
be perceived by Senfe.
IX. And as the Mind frames to it
felf abftract Ideas of Qualites or Modes,
fo does it, by the fame precifion or men-
tal Separation, attain abftract Ideas of the
more compounded Beings, which include
feveral coexiftent Qualities. For exam-
ple, the Mind having obferved that Peter>
Jamesy and John, referable each other,
in certain common Agreements of Shape
and other Qualities, leaves out of the
complex or compounded Idea it has of
Pefer, James, and any other particular
Man, thai which is peculiar to each, re-
taining only what is common to all ; and
fo makes an abitracl: la -. . wherein all the
particulars equally partak., abftracling in-
tirely
tirely from and cutting off all thofe Cir-
cumftances and Differences, which might
determine it to any particular Exiflence.
And after thjs manner it is faid we come
by the abftracl Idea of Man or, if you
pleafe, Humanity or Humane Nature j
wherein it is true there is included Colour,
becaufe there is no Man hut has fome
Colour, but then it can be neither White,
nor Black, nor any particular Colour ;
becaufe the is no one particular Colour
wherein all Men partake. So likewife
there is included Stature, but then it is
neither Tall Stature nor Low Stature, nor
yet Middle Stature, but fomething ab-
ftracted from all thefe. And fo of the
reft. Moreover, there being a great va-
riety of other Creatures that partake in
fome Parts, but not all, of the complex
Idea of Man, the Mind leaving out thofe
Parts which are peculiar to Men, and
retaining thofe only which are common
to all the living Creatures, frameth the
Idea of Animal, which abilracls not only
from all particular Men, but alfo all
Birds, Beafts, Fiihes, and Infecls, The
conftituent Pans of the abftraft Idea of
Animal are Body, Life, benfe, and Spon-
taneous Motion. By Body is meant, Body
without any particular Shape or Figure,
there being no one Shape or Figure com-
BlOfl
INTRODUCTION. it
mon to all An:m:ls, without Covering
either of Hr:r or Feathers, or Scales, &c.
nor yet Naked: Hair, Feathers, Scales,
andNakednefs being the ditiinguifhing Pro-
perties of particular Animals, and for that
reafon left out of the Abjlratf Idea. -Up-
on the fame account the fpontaneous Mo-
tion muft be neither Walking, nor Flying,
nor Creeping, it is neverthelefs a Moti-
on, but what that Motion is, it is not eafy
to conceive.
X. Whether others have this won*
derful Faculty of Abftra&ing tbeir Ideas,
they beft can tell: For my felf I find in-
deed I have a Faculty of imagining, or
reprefenting to myfelf the Ideas of thofe
particular things I have perceived and of
varioufly compounding and dividing them,
I can imagine a Man with Two Heads
or the upper parts of a Man joined to
the Body of a Horfe. I can cotrfider the
Hand, the Eye, the Nofe, each by it
felf abftracted or feparated from the reft
of the Body. But then whatever Hand
or Eye I imagine, it muft have fome
particular Shape and Colour. Likewife
the Idea of Man that I frame to my felf,
muft be either of a White, or a Black,
or a Tawny, a Straight, or a Crooked,
a Tall, or a Low, or a Middle-fized Man.
I
,* INTRODUCTION.
I cannot by any effort of Thought con-
ceive the abftract Idea above deicribed.
And it is equally impoffible for me to
form the abftract Idea of Motion diftinct
from the Body moving, and which is
neither Swift nor Slow, Curvilinear nor
Rectilinear; and the like may be faid of
all other abftract general Ideas whatfo-
ever. To be plain, I own my felf able
to abftract in one Senfe, as when I con-
fider fome particular Parts or Qualities fe-
parated from others, with which though
they are united in fome Object, yet, it
is poflible they may really Exift without
them. But I deny that I can abftract one
from another, or conceive feparatcly, thofe
Qualities which it is impoflible mould
Exift fo feparated; or that I can frame
a General Notion by aftracting from Par-
ticulars in the manner aforefaid. Which
two laft are the proper Acceptations of
Abjlraftion. And there are Grounds to
think moft Men will acknowledge them-
felves to be in my Cafe. The Genera-
lity of Men which are Simple and Illite-
rate never pretend to abftratt Notions.
It is faid they are difficult and not to be
attained without Pains and Study. We
may therefore reafonably conclude that,
if fuch there be, they are confined only
to the Learned.
XI.
INTRODUCTION. 15
XL I proceed to examine what can
be alledfred in defence of the Doctrine of
Abftradlion, and try if I can difcover
what it is that inclines the Men of Spe-
culation to embrace an Opinion, fo re-
mote from common Senfe as that feems
to be. There has been a late defer^edly
Eftejemed Philofopher, who, no doubt, has
given it very much Countenance by feem-
ing to think the having abftradt general
Ideas is what puts the wideft difference
in point of Underftanding betwixt. Man
and Beaft. " The having of general
<{ Ideas (faith he) is that which puts a
" perfed: distinction betwixc Man and
" Brutes, and is an Excellency which the
*c Faculties of Brutes do by no means
" attain unto. For it is evident we ob-
" fervenoFootfteps in them of making ufe
" of general Signs for univerfal Ideas; from
" which we have reafon to imagine that
" they have not the Faculty of abjlrafting
" or making general Ideas, fmce they have
" no ufe of Words or any other general
" Signs. And a little after. Therefore,
<f I think, we may fuppofe that it is in
<c this that the Species of Brutes are dif-
«f criminated from Men, and 'tis that
" proper difference wherein they are
'* wholly feparated, and which at laft
" widens
i4 INTRODUCTION.
" widens to fo wide a Diftance. For if
" they have any Ideas at all, and are
" not bare Machines (as fome would have
" them) we cannot deny them to have
<£ fome Reafon. It feems as evident to
" me that they do fome of them in cer-
" tain Inftances reafon as that they have
" Senfe, but it is only in particular Ideas,
" juft as they receive them from their
" Senfes. They are the heft of them tied
" up within thofe narrow Bounds, and
" have not (as I think) the Faculty to
*' enlarge them by any kind of AbftratfioJi'*
ft/ay on Hum. Vriderjl. B. 2. C. 1 1. Seel. 10
and II. I readily agree with this Learn-
ed Author, that the Faculties of Brutes
can by no means attain to Abftrattion.
But then if this be made the diftinguifli-
ing property of that fort of Animals, I
fear a great many of thofe that pafs for
Men muft be reckoned into their num-
ber. The reafon that is here affigned
why we have no Grounds to think Brutes
have Abftradt general Ideas, is that we
obferve in them no ufe of Words or any
other general Signs ; which is built on this
Suppolition, to wit, that the making ufe
of Words, implies the having general Ideas.
From which it follows, that Men who
ufe Language are able to Abftract or
tl.eir Ideas. That this is the
Senfe
INTRODUCTION.
Senfe and Arguing of the Author will fur-
ther appear by his anfwering the Quefti-
on he in another place puts. " Since all
<£ things that exift are only Particulars,
*' how come we by general Terms ? His
" Anfwer is, Words become general by
<{ being made the Signs of general Ideas."
E/ay on Hum. Underjt. B. 3. C. 3. Setf. 6.
But it feems that a Word becomes gene-
ral by being made the Sign, not of an ab-
ftract general Idea but, of feveral parti-
cular Ideas, any one of which it indif-
ferently fuggefts- to the Mind. For Ex-
ample, When it is faid the change of Mo-
tion is proportional to the imprejjed force,
or that whatever has Exten/ion is divifi-
ble; thefe Proportions are to be under-
ftood of Motion and Extenfion in gene-
ral, and neverthelefs it will not follow
that they fugged to my Thoughts an Idea
of Motion without a Body moved, or
any determinate Direction and Velocity,
or that I rnuft conceive an abftract gene-
ral Idea of Extenfion, which is neither
Line, Surface nor Solid, neither " Great
nor Small, Black, White, nor Red, nor
of any other determinate Colour. It is
only implied that whatever Motion I con-
iider, whether it be Swift or Slow, Per-
pendicular, Horizontal or Oblique, or in
whatever Object, the . Axiom concerning
it
INTRODUCTION.
it holds equally true. As does the other
of every particular E#tenfion, it matters
not whether Line, Surface or Solid, whe-
ther of this or that Magnitude or Fi-
gure.
XII. By obferving how Ideas become
general, we may the better judge how
Words are made fo. And here it is to
be noted that I do not deny abfolutely
there are general Ideas, but only that
there are any abftraft general Ideas : For
in the Paflages above quoted, wherein
there is mention of general Ideas, it is
always fuppofed that they are formed by
Abftrattiorii after the manner fet forth in
Seff. VIII and IX. Now if we will an-
nex a meaning to our Words, and fpeak
only of what we can conceive, I believe
we {hall acknowledge, that an Idea, which
confidered in it felf is particular, her
comes general, by being made to repre-
fent or {land for all other particular Ideas
of the lame fort. To make this plain by
an Example, fuppofe a Geometrician^ is
demonftrating the Method, of cutting a
Line in two equal Parts. He draws,
for Inftance, a Black Line of an Inch in
Length, this which in it felf is a parti-
cular Line is neverthelefs with regard to
its fignificatiqn General, fince as it is
there
INTRODUCTION. 17
there ufed, it reprefents all particular Lines
whatfoever j fo that what is demonftrated of
it, is demonftrated of all Lines, or, in other
Words, of a Line in General. And as that
particular Line becomes General, by being
made a Sign, fo the name Line which
taken abfolutely is particular, by being a
Sign is made General. And as the for-
mer owes its Generality, not to its being
the Sign of an abftract or general Line,
but of all particular right Lines that may
poflibly exift, fo the latter mutt be thought
to derive its Generality from the fame
Caufe, namely, the various particular
Lines which it indifferently denotes.
XIII. To give the Reader a yet clearer
View of the Nature of abftracl Ideas, and
the Ufes they are thought necefTary to, I
mall add one more Paffage out of the Ef-
Jay on Human Under/landing, which is as
follows. " Ahftraft Ideas are not fo ob-
" vious or eafy to Children or the yet
<£ unexercifed Mind as particular ones.
<{ If they feem fo to grown Men, it is
" only becaufe by conftant and familiar
' Uie they are made fo. For when we
" nicely reflect upon them, we mall find
" that general Ideas are Fictions and Con-
" trivances of the Mind, that carry Dif-
" ficuky with them, and do noc fo eafily
B " offer
,g INTRODUCTION.
" offer themfelves, as we are apt to ima-
" gine. For Example, Does it not re-
, " quire fome Pains and Skill to form the
" general Idea of a Triangle (which is
<c yet none of the moft abftracl: compre-
" henfive and difficult) for it muft be nei-
" ther Oblique nor Redtangle, neither E-
" quilateral, Equicrural, nor Scalenon, but
" ail and none of thefe at once. In effect,
<e it is fomething imperfect that cannot ex-
" ift, an Idea wherein fome Parts of fe-
" veral different and inconfijlent Ideas are
" put together. It is true the Mind in this
" imperfed: State has need of fuch Ideas,
" and makes all the hafte to them it can,
" for the conveniency of Communication
<c and Enlargement of Knowledge, to both
" which it is naturally very much inclined.
" But yet one has reafon to fufpedt fuch
" Ideas are Marks of our Imperfection.
" At leaft this is enough to fhew that the
" mofl abftradl: and general Ideas are not
" thofe that the Mind is firft and moft
" eaiily acquainted with, nor fuch as its
" earlieft Knowledge is converfant about.
«' B. 4. C. 7. Sea 9." If any Man has the
Faculty of framing in his Mind fuch an
Idea of a Triangle as is here defcribed, it
is in vain to pretend to difpute him out
of it, nor would I go abouu it. All I de-
fire is, that the Reader would fully and
certainly
certainly inform himfclf whether he has
fuch an Idea or no. And this, methinks,
can be no hard Task for any one to per-
form. What more eafy than for any one
to look a little into his own Thoughts,
and there try whether he has, or can at-
tain to have, an Idea that (hall correfpond
with the defcription that is here given of
the general Idea of a Triangle, which is,
neither Oblique, nor Reflangle, Equilaterd^
Equicrural, nor Scalenon, but all and none
of theje at once ?
XIV. Much is here faid of the Difficul-
ty that abftradt Ideas carry with them, and
the Pains and Skill requifite to the form-
ing them. And it is on all Hands agreed
that there is need of great Toil and La-
bour of the Mind, to emancipate our
Thoughts from particular Objects, and
raife them to thofe fublime Speculations
that are converfant about abflract Ideas.
From all which the natural Confequence
fhould feem to be, that fo difficult a thing
as the forming abftracT" Ideas was not ne-
ceffary for Communication^ which is fo eafy
and familiar to all forts of Men. But we
are told, if they feem obvious and eafy to
grown Men, It is only becauje by conjlant
and familiar uje they are made jo. Now I
would fain know at what time it is, Men
B 2 are
to INTRODUCTION.
are imployed in furmounting that Difficul-
ty, and furniming themfelves with thofc
necefTary helps for Difcourfe. It cannot
be when they are grown up, for then it
feems they are not confcious of any fuch
Pains-taking ; it remains therefore to be
the bulinefs of their Childhood. And
furely, the great and multiplied Labour of
framing abftrad: Notions, will be found a
hard Task for that tender Age. Is it not
a hard thing to imagine, that a couple of
Children cannot prate together, of their
Sugar-plumbs and Rattles and the reft of
their little Trinkets, till they have firft
tacked together numberlefs Inconfiftencies,
and fo framed in their Minds abjlraci ge-
neral Ideas > and annexed them to every
common Name they make ufe of?
XV. Nor do I think them a whit more
needful for the Enlargement of Knowledge
than for Communication. It is I know a
Point much infifted on, that al! Know-
ledge and Demonftration are about univer-
fal Notions, to which I fully agree : But
then it doth not appear to me that thofe
Notions are formed by Abftraftion in the
manner premifed; UwverjfaMty, fo far as
I can comprehend, not confifting in the
abfolute, pofitive Nature or Conception of
any thing, but in the relation it bears to
the
INTRODUCTION.
the Particulars fignified or reprefented by
it : By virtue whereof it is that Things,
Names, or Notions, being in their own
Nature Particular, are rendered Univerfal.
Thus when I demonftrate any Propofition
concerning Triangles, it is to be fuppofed
that I have in view the univerfal Idea of a
Triangle j which ought not to be under-
ftood as if I could frame an Idea of a
Triangle which was neither Equilateral
nor Scalenon nor Equicrural. But only
that the particular Triangle I confider,
whether of this or that fort it matters nor,
doth equally ftand for and reprefent all
Rectilinear Triangles whatfoever, and is in
that fenfe UniverJaL All which feems very
Plain and not to include any Difficulty in it.
XVI But here it will be demanded, how
we can know any Propofition to be true of
all particular Triangles, except we have
firft feen it demonftrated of the abftract
Idea of a Triangle which equally agrees to
all? For becaufe a Property may be de-
monftrated to agree to fome one particular
Triangle, it will not thence follow that it
equally belongs to any other Triangle,
which in all refpedts is not the fame with
it. For Example, Having demonftrated
that the three Angles of an Ifofceles Rec-
tangular Triangle are equal to two right
B 3 Ones,
it INTRODUCTION.
Ones, I cannot therefore conclude this Af-
fection agrees to all other Triangles, which
have neither a right Angle, nor two equal
Sides. It feems therefore that, to be cer-
tain this Proportion is univerfally true, we
muft either make a particular Demonftra-
tion for every particular Triangle, which
is impoffible, or once for all demonftrate
it of the abftraffi Idea of a Triangle, in
which all the Particulars do indifferently
partake, and by which they are all equally
reprefented. To which I anfwer, that
though the Idea I have in view whilft I
make the Demonflration, be, for inftance,
that of an Ifofceles Rectangular Triangle,
whofe Sides are of a determinate Length,
I may neverthelefs be certain it extends to
all other Rectilinear Triangles, of what
Sort or Bignefs foever. And that, becaufc
neither the right Angle, nor the Equality,
nor determinate Length of the Sides, are
at all concerned in the Demonftration. It
is true, the Diagram I have in view in-
cludes all thefe Particulars, but then there
is not the leaft mention made of them in
the Proof of the Propofition. It is not
faid, the three Angles are equal to two right
Ones, becaufe one of them is a right An-
gle, or becaufe the Sides comprehending it
are of the fame Length. Which fufficient-
ly {hews that the right Angle might have
been
INTRODUCTION.
been Oblique, and the Sides unequal, and
for all that the Demonftration have held
good. And for this reafon it is, that I
conclude that to be true of any Obliquan-
gular or Scalenon, which I had demon-
grated of a particular Right-angled, Equi-
crural Triangle 5 and not becaufe I demon-
frrated the Proportion of the abftraft Idea
of a Triangle. And here it muft be ac-
knowledged that a Man may confider a Fi-
gure merely as triangular, without attend-
ing to the particular Qualities of the An-
gles, or relations of the Sides. So far he
may abftrac~l: But this will never prove,
that he can frame an abftracl general in-
confiftent Idea of a Triangle. In like man-
ner we may confider Peter fo far forth as
Man, or fo far forth as Animal, without
framing the forementioned abftracl Idea,
either of Man or of Animal, in as much as
all that is perceived is not confidered.
XVII. It were an endlefs, as well as an
ufelefs Thing, to trace the Schoolmen, thofe
great Matters of Abftraction, through all
the manifold inextricable Labyrinths of Er-
ror and Difpute, which their Doctrine of
abftraft Natures and Notions feems to have
led them into. What Bickerings and Con-
troverfies, and what a learned Duft have
been raifed about thofe Matters, and what
B 4 mighty
INTRODUCTION.
mighty Advantage hath been from thence
derived to Mankind, are things at this Day
too clearly known to need being infifted
on. And it had been well if the ill Effects
of that Doftrine were confined to thofe
only who make the moft avowed Profef-
fion of it. When Men confider the great
Pains, Induftry and Parts, that have for fo
many Ages been laid out on the Cultiva-
tion and Advancement of the Sciences, and
that notwithftanding all this, the far greater
Part of them remain full of Darknefs and
Uncertainty, and Difputes that are like
never to have an end, and even thofe that
are thought to be fupported by the mofl
clear and cogent Demonftrations, contain
in them Paradoxes which are perfectly ir-
reconcilable to the Underftandings of Men,
and that taking all together, a fmall Portion
of then* doth.fupply any real Benefit to
Mankind, otherwiie than by being an in-
nocent Diverfion and Amufement : I fay,
the Confideration of all this is apt to throw
them into a Defpondency, and perfect
Contempt of all Study. But this may per-
haps ceafe, upon a view of the falfe Prin-
ciples that have obtained in the World,
amongft all which there is none, methmks,
hath a more wide Influence over the
Thoughts of Speculative Men, than this
pf abilrad general Ideas.
XVIII. I
INTRODUCTION.
XVIII. I come now to conlider the
Source of this prevailing Notion, and that
feems to me to be Language. And furely
nothing of lefs extent than Reafo'n it felf
could have been the Source of an Opinion
fo univerfally received. The truth of this
appears as from other Reafons, fo alfo from
the plain Confeffion of the ableft Patrons
of abftracl: Ideas, who acknowledge that
they are made in order to naming; from
which it is a clear Confequence, that if
there had been no fuch thing as Speech or
Univerfal Signs, there never had been any
thought of Abftradion. See B. 3. C. 6.
Sect. 39. and elfewbere of the Effay on Hu-
man Under/landing. Let us therefore ex-
amine the manner wherein Words have
contributed to the Origin of that Miflake.
Firft then, 'Tis thought that every Name
hath, or ought to have, one only precifc
and fettled Signification, which inclines
Men to think there are certain abftracl^ df-
termmate Ideas^ which conftitute the true
and only immediate fcignification of each
general Name. And that it is by the me-
diation of thefe abftradt Ideas, that a ge-
neral Name comes to iignify any particular
Thing. Whereas, in truth, there is no
fuch thing as one precife and definite Sig-
nification annexed to any general Name,
they
INTRODUCTION.
they all fignifying indifferently a great
number of particular Ideas. All which
doth evidently follow from what has been
already faid, and will clearly appear to
any one by a little Reflexion. To this it
will be objected, that every Name that has
a Definition, is thereby reftrained to one
certain Signification. For Example, a Tri-
angle is defined to be a plain Surface com-
prehended by three right Lines j by which
that Name is limited to denote one certain
Idea and no other. To which I anfwer,
that in the Definition it is not faid whe-
ther the Surface be Great or Small, Black
or White, nor whether the Sides are Long
or Short, Equal or Unequal, nor with
what Angles they are inclined to each o-
ther j in all which there may be great Va-
riety, and confequently there is no one fet-
tled Idea which limits the Signification of
the word Triangle. 'Tis one thing for to
keep a Name conftantly to the fame Defi-
nition, and another to make it ftand every
where for the fame Idea : the one is necef-
fary, the other ufelefs and impracticable.
XIX. But to give a farther Account
how Words came to produce the Doctrine
of abftracl: Ideas, it muft be obferved that
it is a received Opinion, that Language has
no other End but the communicating our
Ideas,
INTRODUCTION. z7
Ideas, and that every fignificant Name
(lands for an Idea. This being ib, and it
being withal certain, that Names, which
yet are not thought altogether infignificant,
do not always mark out particular con-
ceivable Ideas, it is ftraightway concluded
that they (land for abftrad Notions. That
there are many Names in ufe amongfl Spe-
culative Men, which do not always iug-
gefl to others determinate particular Ideas,
is what no Body will deny. And a little
Attention will difcover, that it is not ne-
ceffary (even in the flricteft Reafonings) iig-
nificant Names which {land for Ideas mould,
every time they are ufed, excite in the Un-
derflanding the Ideas they are made to
(land for : In Reading and Difcourfing,
Names being for the mofl part ufed as Let-
ters are in Algebra, in which though a
particular quantity be marked by each
Letter, yet to proceed right it is not re-
quifite that in every flep each Letter fug-
geft to your Thoughts, that particular
quantity it was appointed to ftand for.
XX. Befides, the communicating of
Ideas marked by Words is not the chief
and only end of Language, as is commonly
fuppoled. There are other Ends, as the
raifing of fome Paflion, the exciting to,
or deterring from an Action, the putting
the
±8 INTRODUCTION.
the Mind in fome particular Difpofition ;
to which the former is in many Cafes bare-
ly fubfervient, and fometimes intirely o-
mitted, when thefe can be obtained with-
out it, as I think doth not infrequently
happen in the familiar ufe of Language. I
intreat the Reader to reflect with himfelf,
and fee if it doth not often happen either in
Hearing or Reading a Difcourfe, that the
Paflions of Fear, Love, Hatred, Admira-
tion, Difdain, and the like, arife imme-
diately in his Mind upon the Perception of
certain Words, without any Ideas coming
between. At firft, indeed, the Words might
have occafioned Ideas that were fit to pro-
duce thofe Emotions ; but, if I miftake
not, it will be found that when Language
is once grown familiar, the hearing of the
Sounds or Sight of the Characters is oft
immediately attended with thofe Paflions,
which at firft were wont to be produced
by the intervention of Ideas, that are now
quite omitted. May we not, for Example,
be affected with the promife of a good
Thing, though we have not an Idea of
what it is ? Or is not the being threatned
with Danger fufficient to excite a Dread,
though we think not of any particular Evil
likely to befal us, nor yet frame to oar
felves an Idea of Danger in Abflraft ? If
any one (hall join ever fo little Reflexion
of
INTRODUCTION.
of his own to what has been faid, I be-
lieve it will evidently appear to him, that
general Names are often ufed in the pro-
priety of Language without the Speaker's
defigning them for Marks of Ideas in his
own, which he would have them raife in
the Mind of the Hearer. Even proper
Names themfelves do not feem always fpo-
ken, with a Defign to bring into our view
the Ideas of thofe Individuals that are fup-
pofed to be marked by them. For Exam-
ple, when a Schoolman tells me Ariftotle
hath faid it, all I conceive he means by it,
is to difpofe me to embrace his Opinion
with the Deference and Submiffion which
Cuftom has annexed to that Name. And
this effeft may be fo inftantly produced in
the Minds of thofe who are accuftomed to
refign their Judgment to the Authority of
that Philofopher, as it is impoffible any
Idea either of his Perfon, Writings, or Re-
putation fhould go before. Innumerable
Examples of this kind may be given, but
why fhould I infift on thofe things, which
every one's Experience will, I doubt not,
plentifully fuggeft unto him ?
XXI. We have, I think, {hewn the Im-
pofiibility tf abftr act Ideas. We have con-
fidered what has been faid for them by
their abkft Patrons; and endeavoured to
fhew
5°
(hew they are of no Ufe for thofe Ends, to
which they are thought necefiary. And
laftly, we have traced them to the Source
from whence they flow, which appears to
be Language. It cannot be denied that
Words are of excellent Ufe, in that by
their means all that Stock of Knowledge
which has been purchaied by the joint La-
bours of inquifitive Men in all Ages and
Nations, may be drawn into the view and
made the poffeffion of one fingle Perfon.
But at the fame time it muft be owned
that moft parts of Knowledge have been
ftrangely perplexed and darkened by the
abufe of Words, and general ways of
bpeech wherein they are delivered. Since
therefore Words are fo apt to impofe on
the Underftanding, whatever Ideas I con-
fider, I {hall endeavour to take them bare
and naked into my View, keeping out of
my Thoughts, fo far as I am able, thofe
Names which long and conftant Ufe hath
fo ftridtly united with them ; from which
1 may exped to derive the following Ad-
vantages.
XXII. Firft, I fhall be fure to get clear
of all Controverfies purely Verbal ; the
fpringing up of which Weeds in almoft atl
the Sciences has been a main Hindrance to
the Growth of true and found Know-
ledge.
INTRODUCTION.
ledge. Secondly, this feems to be a fure
way to extricate my felf out of that fine
and fubtiie Net of abftraff Ideas, which
has fo miferably perplexed and entangled
the Minds of Men, and that with this pe-
culiar Circumftance, that by how much
the finer and more curious was the Wit of
any Man, by fo much the deeper was he
like to be enfnared, and fatter held there-
in. Thirdly, fo long as I confine my
Thoughts to my own Ideas diverted of
Words, I do not fee how I can eafily be
miftaken. The Objects I confider, I clear-
ly and adequately know. I cannot be de-
ceived in thinking I have an Idea which I
have not. It is not poffible for me to
imagine, that any of my own Ideas are a-
like or unlike, that are not truly fo. To
difcern the Agreements or Difagreements
there are between my Ideas, to fee what
Ideas are included in any compound Idea,
and what not, there is nothing more
requifite, than an attentive Perception of
what paries in my own Understanding.
XXIII. But the attainment of all theffe
Advantages doth prefuppofe an intire De-
liverance from the Deception of Words,
which I dare hardly promife my felf; fo
difficult a thing it is to dilTolve an Union
fo early begun, and confirmed by fo long
INTRODUCTION.
a Habit as that betwixt Words and Ideas.
Which Difficulty feems to have been very
much increafed by the Doctrine of Ab-
Jiraftion. For fo long as Men thought ab-
.ftraft Ideas were annexed to their Words,
it doth not feem ftrange that they mould
ufe Words for Ideas : It being found an
impracticable thing to lay afide the Word,
and retain the abftrad: Idea in the Mind,
which in it lelf was perfectly inconceiva-
ble. This feems to me the principal Caufe,
why thofc Men who have fo emphatically
recommended to others, the laying afide
all ufe of Words in their Meditations, and
contemplating their bare Ideas, have yet
failed to perform it themfelves. Of late
many have been very fenfible of the ab-
*furd Opinions and infignificant Difputes,
which grow out of the abufe of Words.
And in order to remedy thefe Evils they
advile well, that we attend to the Ideas
figmfied, and draw off our Attention from
the Words which fignify them. But how
good ioever this Advice may be, they have
given others, it is plain they could not
have a due regard to it themlelves, fo
long as they thought the only immediate
ufe of Words was to fignify Ideas, and
that the immediate Signification of every
general Name was a determinate^ abjiraft
Idea.
XXIV. But
XXIV. But thefc being known to be
Miftakes, a Man may with greater Eafc
prevent his being impofed on by Words.
He that knows he has no other than parti-
cular Ideas, will not puzzle himfelf in vain
to find out and conceive the abftract Idea,
annexed to any Name. And he that knows
Names do not always ftand for Ideas, will
fpare himfelf the labour of looking for
Ideas, where there are none to be had. Ic
were therefore to be wifhed that every
one would ufe his utmoft Endeavours, to
obtain a clear View of the Ideas he would
confider, feparating from them all that
drefs and incumbrance of Words which fo
much contribute to blind the Judgment
and divide the Attention. In vain do we
extend our View into the Heavens, and
pry into the Entrails of the Earth, in vain
do we confult the Writings of learned Men,
and trace the dark Footfteps of Antiquity ;
we need only draw the Curtain of Words,
to behold the faireft Tree of Knowledge,
whofe Fruit is excellent, and within the
reach of our Hand.
XXV. Unlefs we take care to clear the
firft Principles of Knowledge, , from the
embarras and delufion of Words, we may
make infinite Reafonings upon them to no
C purpofe j
purpofe; we may draw Confequcnces from
Confequences, and be never the wifer.
The farther we go, we ihall only lofe our
felves the more irrecoverably, and be the
deeper entangled in Difficulties and Mif-
takes. Whoever therefore defigns to read
the following Sheets, I intreat him to make
my Words the Occafion of his own Think-
ing, and endeavour to attain the fame Train
of Thoughts in Reading, that I had in
writing them. By this means it will be
cafy for him to difcover the Truth or Fal-
fity of what I fay. He will be out of all
danger of being deceived by my Words,
and I do not fee how he can be led into
an ' Error by confidering his own naked,
undifguifed Ideas.
OF
O F T H E
PRINCIPLES
O F
Humane Knowledge.
PART I.
; T is evident to any one who
takes a Survey of the Objects
of Humane Knowledge, that
they are either Ideas aciually
imprinted on the Senfes, or
elfe fuch as are perceived by attending to
the Paffions and Operations of the Mind,
or laftly Ideas formed by help of Memory
and Imagination, cither compounding, di-
viding, or barely reprcfenting thofc origi-
nally perceived in the aforefaid ways. By
C 2 Sight
5 6 Of the Principles Part I.
Sight I have the Ideas of Light and Co-
lours with their feveral Degrees and Varia-
tions. By Touch I perceive, for Example,
Hard and Soft, Heat and Cold, Motion
and Refinance, and of all thefe more and
lefs either as to Quantity or Degree. Smel-
ling furnifhes me with Odors ; the Palate
with Taftcs, and Hearing conveys Sounds
to the Mind in all their variety of Tone
and Compofition. And as feveral of thefe
are obferved to accompany each other,
they come to be marked by one Name, and
fo to be reputed as one Thing. Thus, for
Example, a certain Colour, Tafte, Smell,
Figure and Confiftence having been ob-
ferved to go together, are accounted one
diftinct Thing, fignified by the Name Ap-
ple. Other Collections of Ideas conftitute
a Stone, a Tree, a Book, and the like fen-
fible Things j which, as they are pleafmg
or difagreeable, excite the Paffions of Love,
Hatred, Joy, Grief, and fo forth.
II. But befides all that endlefs variety
of Ideas or Objects of Knowledge, there is
likewife fomething which knows or per-
ceives them, and exercifes divers Operati-
ons, as Willing, Imagining, Remembering
about them. This perceiving, active Be-
ing is what I call Mind^ Spirit, Soul or my
Self. By which Words I do not denote
any one of my Ideas, but a thing intirely
diftincl:
Part I. of Humane Knowledge.
diftinct from them, wherein they exift, or,
which is the fame thing, whereby they
are perceived ; for the Exiftence of an Idea
confifts in being perceived.
III. That neither our Thoughts, nor
Paffions, nor Ideas formed by the Imagi-
nation, exift without the Mind, is what
every Body will allow. And it feems no
lefs evident that the various Senfations or
Ideas imprinted on the Senfe, however
blended or combined together (that is,
whatever Objects they compofe) cannot
exift otherwife than in a Mind perceiving
them. I think an intuitive Knowledge
may be obtained of this, by any one that
fhall attend to what is meant by the Term
Extft; when applied to fenfible Things.
The Table I write on, I fay, exifts, that
is, I fee and feel it ; and if I were out of
my Study I mould fay it exifted, meaning
thereby that if I was in rny Study I might
perceive it, or that fome other Spirit actu-
ally does perceive it. There was an Odor,
that is, it was fmelled ; There was a Sound,
that is to fay, it was heard ; a Colour or
Figure, and it was perceived by Sight or
Touch. This is all that I can underftand
by thefc and the like Expreffions. For as
to what is faid of the abfolute Exift ence
of unthinking Things without any relation
C 3 to
3 8 Of the Principles Part I.
to their being perceived, that feems per-
fectly unintelligible. Their EJJ'e is Percipi,
nor is it pofiible they fhould have any
Exiftence, out of the Minds or thinking
Things which perceive them.
IV. It is indeed an Opinion ftrangely
prevailing amongft Men, that Houfes,
Mountains, Rivers, and in a word all fen-
fible Objects have an Exiftence Natural or
Real, diftinct from their being perceived
by the Underftanding. But with how great
an AfTurance and Aequiefcence foever this
Principle may be entertained in the World ;
yet whoever {hall find in his Heart to call
it in Queftion, may, if I miftake not, per-
ceive it to involve a manifeft Contradicti-
on. For what are the forementioned Ob-
jects but the things we perceive by Senfe,
and what do we perceive beiides our own
Ideas orSenfations; and is it nor plainly re-
pugnant that any one of thefe or any
Combination of them mould exift unper-
ceived ?
V. If we throughly examine this Tenet,
it will, perhaps, be found at Bottom to
depend on the Doctrine of Abjlraft Ideas.
For can there be a nicer Strain of Abftrac-
tion than to diftinguifli the Exiftence of
fenfible Objects from their being perceived,
fQ
Part I. of Humane Knowledge.
fo as to conceive them Exifting unper-
ceived ? Light and Colours, Heat and
Cold, Extenfion and Figures, in a word
the Things we fee and feel, what are they
but fo many Senfations, Notions, Ideas or
Impreffions on the Senfej and is it poffible
to feparate, even in thought, any of thefc
from Perception ? For my part I might as
eafily divide a Thing from it Self. I may
indeed divide in my Thoughts or con-
ceive apart from each other thofe Things
which, perhaps, I never perceived by Senfe
fo divided. Thus I imagiae the Trunk of
a Humane Body without the Li-mbs, or
conceive the Smell of a Rofe without
thinking on the Rofe it felf. So far I will
not deny I can abftract, if that may pro-
perly be called Abjlraftion^ which extends
only to the conceiving feparately fuch Ob-
jects, as it is pofTible may really exift or be
actually perceived afunder. But my con-
ceiving or imagining Power does not ex-
tend beyond the poiiibility of real Exif-
tence or Perception. Hence as it is im-
poffible for me to fee or feel any Thing
without an actual Senfation of that Thing,
fo is it impoflible for me to conceive in
my Thoughts any fenfible Thing or Ob-
ject diftindt from the Senfation or Percep-
tion of it,
C 4 VI. Some
40 Of the Principles Part I.
VI. Some Truths there are fo near and
obvious to the Mind, that a Man need only
open his Eyes to fee them. Such I take
this Important one to be, to wit, that all
the Choir of Heaven and Furniture of the
Earth, in a word all thofe Bodies which
compofe the mighty Frame of the World,
have not any Subfiftence without a Mind,
that their Beirg is to be perceived or
known; that confequently fo long as they
arc not actually perceived by me, or do
not exift ir. my Mind or that of any other
created Spirit, they muft either have no
Exiiieuce at all, or elfe fubfift in the Mind
of feme eternal Spirit : It being perfectly
tHiinreihgible and involving all the Abfur-
d;ty of Abura&ion, to attribute to any fin-
gle part of them an Exiflence independent
of a Spine. To be convinced of which,
tl e Reader need only reflect and try to fe-
parate in his own Thoughts the being of
a fenfible thing from its being perceived.
<•
VII. From what has been faid, it fol-
lows, there is not any other Subftance than
5/>/r/V, or that which perceives. But for
the fuller proof of this Point, let it be
confidered, the fenfible Qualities are Co-
lour, Figure, Motion, Smell, Tafte, and
ifach like, that is, the Ideas perceived by
Senfe,
Parti, of Humane Knowledge. 4*
Senfe. Now for an Idea to exift in an un-
perceiv ing Thing, is a manifeft Contradic-
tion ; for to have an Idea is all one as to
perceive: that therefore wherein Colour,
Figure, and the like Qualities exift, muft
perceive them ; hence it is clear there can
be no unthinking Subftance or Subftratum
of thofe Ideas.
VIII. But fay you, though the Ideas
themfelves do not exift without the Mind,
yet there may be Things like them where-
of they are Copies or Refemblances, which
Things exift without the Mind, in an un-
thinking Subftance. I anfwer, an Idea can
be like nothing but an Idea ; a Colour or
Figure can be like nothing but another
Colour or Figure. If we look but ever fo
little into our Thoughts, we fhall find it
impoflible for us to conceive a Likenefs ex-
cept only between our Ideas. Again, I ask
whether thofe fuppofed Originals or exter-
nal Things, of which our Ideas are the
Pictures or Reprefentations, be themfelves
perceivable or no ? If they are, then they
are Ideas, and we have gained our Point;
but if you fay they are not, I appeal to
any one whether it be Senfe, to aflert a
Colour is like fomething which is invifible;
Hard or Soft, like fomething which is In-
tangible j and fo of the reft.
IX. Some
Of the Principles Part I.
IX. Some there are who make a Di-
ftinction betwixt Primary and Secondary
Qualities : By the former, they mean Ex-
tenfion, Figure, Motion, Reft, Solidity or
Impenetrability and Number : By the latter
they denote all other fenfible Qualities, as
Colours, Sounds, Taftes, and fo forth. The
Ideas we have of thefe they acknowledge
not to be the Refemblances of any thing
exifting without the Mind or unperceived;
but they will have our Ideas of the pri-
mary Qualities to be Patterns or Images of
Things which exift without the Mind, in
an unthinking Subftance which they call
Matter. By Matter therefore we are to
underftand an inert, fenfelefs Subftance, in
which Extenfion, Figure, and Motion, do
actually fubfift. But it is evident from
what we have already (hewn, that Exten-
fion, Figure and Motion are only Ideas
exifting in the Mind, and that an Idea can
be like nothing but another Idea, and that
confequently neither They nor their Ar-
chetypes can exift in an unperceiving Sub-
ftance. Hence it is plain, that the very
Notion of what is called Matter or Cor-
poreal Sub/lance, involves a Contradiction
in it.
X. They
Part I. of Humane Knowledge. 43
X. They who afTert that Figure, Mo-
tion, and the reft of the Primary or Ori-
ginal Qualities do exift without the Mind,
in unthinking Subftances, do at the fame
time acknowledge that Colours, Sounds,
Heat, Cold, and fuch like fecondary Qua-
lities, do not, which they tell us are Sen-
fations exifting in the Mind alone, that
depend on and are occafioned by the diffe-
rent bize, Texture and Motion of the mi-
nute Particles of Matter. This they take
for an undoubted Truth, which they can
demonftrate beyond all Exception. Now
if it be certain, that thofe original Quali-
ties are infeparably united with the other
fenfible Qualities, and not, even in Thought,
capable of being abftracted from them, it
plainly follows that they exift only in the
Mind. But I defire any one to reflect and
try, whether he can by any Abftraction of
Thought, conceive the Extenfion and Mo-
tion of a Body, without all other fenfible
Qualities. For my own part, I fee evi-
dently that it is not in my power to frame
an Idea of a Body extended and moved,
but I muft withal give it fome Colour or
other fenfible Quality which is acknow-
ledged to exift only in the Mind. In fhort,
Extenlion, Figure, and Motion, abftracted
from all other Qualities, are inconceivable.
Where
44 Of the Principles Part I.
Where therefore the other fenfible Quali-
ties are, there muft thefe be alfo, to wit, in
the Mind and no where elfe.
XI. Again, Great and Small, Swift and
Slow, are allowed to exift no where with-
out the Mind, being intirely relative, and
changing as the Frame or Pofition of the
Organs of Senfe varies. The Extenfion
therefore which exifts without the Mind,
is neither great nor fmall, the Motion
neither fwift nor (low, that is, they are
nothing at all. But fay you, they are Ex-
tenfion in general, and Motion in general :
Thus v/e fee how much the Tenet of ex-
tended, movcable Subftances exift ing with-
out the Mird, depends on that ftrange Doc-
trine of abjlraft Ideas. And here I cannot
but remark, how nearly the Vague and in-
determinate Defcription of Matter or cor-
poreal Subftance, which the Modern Phi-
loiophers are run into by their own Prin-
ciples, refcmbles that antiquated and fa
rni'ch ridiculed Notion of Materia prima,
to be met with in Ariflctle and his Fol-
lowers. Without Extenfion Solidity can-
not be conceived ; fmce therefore it has
been fhewn that Extenfion exifts not in an
unthinking Subftance, the fame mult alfo.
be true of Solidity.
XII. That
Part I, of Humane Knowledge.
XII. That Number is intirely the Crea-
ture of the Mind, even though the other
Qualities be allowed to exift without, will
be evident to whoever coniiders, that the
fame thing bears a different Denomination
of Number, as the Mind views it with dif-
ferent refpefts. Thus, the fame Extension
is One or Three or Thirty Six, according
as the Mind coniiders it with reference to
a Yard, a Foot, or an Inch. Number is
fo vifibly relative, and dependent on Mens
Underftanding, that it is ftrange to think
how any one fhould give it an abfolute
Exiftence without the Mind. We fay one
Book, one Page, one Line; all thefe are
equally Unites, though fome contain feve-
ral of the others. And in each Inftance it
is plain, the Unite relates to fome particu-
lar Combination of Ideas arbitrarily put
together by the Mind.
XIII. Unity I know fome will have to
be a fimple or uncompounded Idea, ac-
companying all other Ideas into the Mind.
That I have any fuch Idea anfwering the
Word Unity > I do not find; and if I had,
methinks I could not mifs finding it; on
the contrary it mould be the moft familiar
to my Underftanding, fince it is faid to ac-
company all other Ideas, and to be per-
ceived
Of the Principles Part I.
ceived by all the ways of Senfation and
Reflexion. To fay no more, it is an abftraft
Idea.
XIV. I {hall farther add, that after the
fame manner, as modern Philofophers prove
certain fenfible Qualities to have no Exif-
tence in Matter, or without the Mind, the
fame thing may be likewife proved of all
other fenfible Qualities whatfoever. Thus,
for Inftance, it is faid that Heat and Cold
are Affections only of the Mind, and not
at all Patterns of real Beings, exifting in
the corporeal Subflances which excite
them, for that the fame Body which ap-
pears Cold to one Hand, feems Warm to
another. Now why may we not as well
argue that Figure and Extenfion are not
Patterns or Refemblances of Qualities ex-
ifting in Matter, becaufe to the fame Eye
at different Stations, or Eyes of a diffe-
rent Texture at the fame Station, they ap-
pear various, and cannot therefore be the
Images of any thing fettled and determi-
nate without the Mind ? Again, It is proved
that Sweetnefs is not really in the fapid
Thing, becaufe the thing remaining unal-
tered the Sweetnefs is changed into Bitter,
as in cafe of a Fever or otherwife vitiated
Palate. Is it not as reafonable to fay, that
Motion is not without the Mind, fince if
the
Part I. of Humane Knowledge. 47
the Succeflion of Ideas in the Mind be-
come fwifter, the Motion, it is acknow-
ledged, fhall appear flower without any
Alteration in any external Object.
XV. In fhort, let any one confider thofe
Arguments, which are thought manifeftly
to prove that Colours and Taftes exift on-
ly in the Mind, and he fhall find they may
with equal force, be brought to prove the
fame thing of Extenfion, Figure, and Mo-
tion. Though it muft be confefled this
Method of arguing doth not fo much
prove that there is no Extenlion or Co-
lour in an outward Object, as that we do
not know by Senfe which is the true Ex-
tenfion or Colour of the Object. But the
Arguments foregoing plainly (hew it to be
impoflible that any Colour or Extenfion at
all, or other feniible Quality whatfoever,
fhould exift in an unthinking Subject with-
out the Mind, or in truth, that there
fhould be any fuch thing as an outward
Object.
XVI. But let us examine a little the re-
ceived Opinion. It is faid Extenfion is a
Mode or Accident of Matter, and that Mat-
ter is the Subftratum that iupports it. Now
I defire that you would explain what is
meant by Matter's fupporting Extenfion:
Say
48 Of the Principles Part I.
Say you, I have no Idea of Matter, and
therefore cannot explain ir. I anfwer,
though you have no pofitive, yet if you
have any meaning at all, you muft at leaft
have a relative Idea of Matter ; though
you know not what it is, yet you muft be
fuppofed to know what Relation it bears
to Accidents, and what is meant by its fup-
porting them. It is evident Support can-
not here be taken in its ufual or literal
Senfe, as when we fay that Pillars fupport
a Building : In what Senfe therefore muft
it be taken ?
XVII. If we inquire into what the moft
accurate Philofophers declare themfelves to
mean by Material SubJIance j we (hall find
them acknowledge, they have no other
meaning annexed to thofe Sounds, but the
Idea of Being in general, together with
the relative Notion of its fup porting Ac-
cidents. The general Idea of Being ap-
peareth to me the moft abftract and in-
comprehenfible of all other ; and as for its
fupporting Accidents, this, as we have juft
now obferved, cannot be underftood in the
common Senfe of thofc Words j it muft
therefore be taken in fome other Senfe, but
what that is they do not explain. So that
when I confider the two Parts or Branches
which make the fignification of the Words
Material
Part I. of Humane Knowledge.
Material Subjlancey I am convinced there
is no diftincl: meaning annexed to them. But
why mould we trouble our felves any far-
ther, in difcuffing this Material Subftratum
or Support of Figure and Motion, and
other fenfible Qualities ? Does it not fup-
pofe they have an Exiftence without the
Mind ? And is not this a direct Repugnan-
cy, and altogether inconceivable ?
XVIII. But though it were poffible that
folid, figured, moveable Subftances may ex-
ift without the Mind, correfponding to the
Ideas we have of Bodies, yet how is it
poffible for us to know this ? Either we
muft know it by Senfe, or by Reafon. As
for our Senfes, by them we have the
Knowledge only of our Senfations, Ideas,
or thofe things that are immediately per-
ceived by Senie, call them what you will:
But they do not inform us that things ex-
ift without the Mind, or unperccived, like
to thofe which are perceived. This the
Materialifts themfelves acknowledge. It
remains therefore that if we have any
Knowledge at all of external Things, it
muft be by Reafon, inferring their Exif-
tence from what is immediately perceived
by Senfe. But what reafon can induce us
to believe the Exiftence of Bodies without
the Mind, from what we perceive, fince
D the
50 Of the Principles Part I.
the very Patrons of Matter themfelves do
not pretend, there is any neceflary Con-
nexion betwixt them and our Ideas ? I fay
it is granted on all hands ( and what hap-
pens in Dreams, Phrenfies, and the like, puts
it beyond difpute) that it is poffible we
might be affected with all the Ideas we
have now, though no Bodies exifled with-
out, refembling them. Hence it is evident
the Suppofition of external Bodies is not
ncceflary for the producing our Ideas: Since
it is granted they are produced fometimes,
and might porTibly be produced always in
the fame Order we fee them in at prefent,
without their Concurrence.
»
XIX. But though we might poflibly
have all our Senfations without them, yet
perhaps it may be thought eafier to con-
ceive and explain the manner of their Pro-
duction, by fuppofing external Bodies in
their likenefs rather than otherwife ; and
fo it might be at leaft probable there are
fuch things as Bodies that excite their Ideas
in our Minds. But neither can this be faid;
for though we give the Materialifts their
external Bodies, they by their own confef-
lion are never the nearer knowing how our
Ideas are produced: Since they own them-
felves unable to comprehend in what man-
ner Body can act upon Spirit, or how it is
poffible
Parti, of Humane Knowledge. jt
poffible it mould imprint any Idea in the
Mind. Hence it is evident the Production
of Ideas or Senfations in our Minds, can
be no reafon why we {hould fuppofe Mat-
ter or corporeal Subftances, fince that is
acknowledged to remain equally inexpli-
cable with, or without this Suppofition.
If therefore it were poffible for Bodies to
cxift without the Mind, yet to hold they
do fo, muft needs be a very precarious O-
pinion ; fince it is to fuppofe, without any
reafon at all, that God has created innu-
merable Beings that are intirely ufelefs, and
ferve to no manner of purpofe.
XX. In fhort, if thete were external
Bodies, it is impomble We mould ever
come to know it ; and if there were not^
we might have the vefy fame Reafons to
think there were that we have now. Sup-
pofe, what no one can deny poiiible, an
Intelligence, without the help of external
Bodies, to be affected with the fame train
of Senfations or Ideas that you are, im-
printed in the fame order and with like
vividnefs in his Mind. I ask whether that
Intelligence hath not all the Reafon to be-
lieve the Exiftence of corporeal Subftan-
ces, reprefented by his Ideas, and exciting
them in his Mind, that you can pombly
have for believing the fame thing ? Of this
D 2 there
51 Of the Principles Part I.
there can be no Queftion; which one Con-
fideration is enough to make any reafonable
Perfon fufpect the ftrength of whatever
Arguments he may think himfelf to have,
for the Exiflence of Bodies without the
Mind.
XXI. Were it neceflary to add any far-
ther Proof againft the Exigence of Mat-
ter, after what has been faid, I could in-
ftance feveral of thofe Errors and Difficul-
ties ( not to mention Impieties ) which
have fprung from that Tenet. It has oc-
cafioned nurnberlefs Controverfies and Dif-
putes in Philofophy, and not a few of far
greater moment in Religion. But I mail
not enter into the detail of them in this
Place, as well becaufe I think, Arguments
a Pofteriori are unnecefTary for confirming
what has been, if I rmftake not, fufficient-
ly demonftrated a Priori, as becaufe I (hall
hereafter find occafion to fay fomewhat of
them.
XXII. I am afraid I have given caufe to
think me needlefly prolix in handling this
Subject. For to what purpofe is it to di-
late on that which may be demonftrated
with the utmoft Evidence in a Line or
two, to any one that is capable of the leaft
Reflexion ? It is but looking into your own
Thoughts,
Part I. of Humane Knowledge. 5 3
Thoughts, and fo trying whether you can
conceive it poffible for a Sound, or Figure,
or Motion, or Colour, to exifl without the
Mind, or unperceived. This eafy Trial
may make you fee, that what you contend
for, is a downright Contradiction. Info-
much that I am content to put the whole
upon this IfTuej if you can but conceive
it poffible for one extended moveable Sub-
ftance, or in general, for any one Idea or
any thing like an Idea, to exift otherwife
than in a Mind perceiving it, I (hall rea-
dily give up the Caufe : And as for all that
cowpages of external Bodies which you con-
tend for, I mall grant you its Exiftence,
though you cannot either give me any Rea-
fon why you believe it exifts, or affign any
ufe to it when it is fuppofed to exifl. I
fay, the bare poffibility of your Opinion's
being true, mall pafs for an Argument that
it is fo,
XXIII. But fay you, furely there is no-
thing eafier than to imagine Trees, for in-
ftance, in a Park, or Books exifting in a
Clofet, and no Body by to perceive them.
I anfwer, you may fo, there is no difficul-
ty in it: But what is all this, I befeech
you, more than framing in your Mind cer-
tain Ideas which you call Books and Trees,
and at the fame time omitting to frame
D 3 the
54 Of the Principles Part I,
the Idea of any one that may perceive
them ? But do not you your felf perceive
or think of them all the while ? This
therefore is nothing to the purpofe : It on-
ly (hews you have the Power of imagin-
ing or forming Ideas in your Mind; but it
doth not mew that you can conceive it
pofiible, the Objects of your Thought may
exift without ihe Mind : To make out this,
it is neceflary that you conceive them ex-
ifting nnconceived or unthought of, which
is a manifeft Repugnancy. When we do
our utmoft to conceive the Exiftence of
external Bodies, we are all the while only
contemplating our own Ideas. But the
Mind taking no notice of it felf, is de-
luded to think it can and doth conceive
Bodies exifting unthought of or without
the Mind ; though at the fame time they
are apprehended by or exift in it felf. A
little Attention will difcorer to any one
the Truth and Evidence of what is here
faid, and make it unneceflary to infift on
any other Proofs againft the Exiftence of
material Subftance.
XXIV. It is very obvious, upon the leaft
Inquiry into our own Thoughts, to know
vrhether it be poflible for us to underftand
what is meant, by the abfolute Exiftence of
Jenfible Objeffs in tbemfefaes, or without the
Mind.
Part I. of Humane Knowledge. 5 5
Mind. To me it is evident thofe Words
mark out either a direct Contradiction, or
elfe nothing at all. And to convince others
of this, I know no readier or fairer way,
than to intreat they would calmly attend
to their own Thoughts : And if by this
Attention, the Emptinefs or Repugnancy
of thofe Expreffions does appear, furely
nothing more is requifite for their Convic-
tion. , It is on this therefore that I infift,
to wit, that the abfolute Exiftence of un-
thinking Things are Words without a
Meaning, or which include a Contradicti-
on. This is what I repeat and inculcate,
and earneftly recommend to the attentive
Thoughts of the Reader.
XXV. All our Ideas, Senfations, or the
things which we perceive, by whatfoever
Names they may be dhtinguimed, are vifi-
bly inactive, there is nothing of Power or
Agency included in them. So that one
Idea or Object of Thought cannot produce,
or make any Alteration in another. To
be fatisned of the Truth of this, there is
nothing elfe requilite but a bare Obferva-
tion of our Ideas. For fince they and eve-
ry part of them exift only in the Mind, ic
follows that there is nothing in them but
what is perceived. But whoever (hall at-
tend to his Ideas, whether of Senfe or Re-
D 4 flexion
5 6 Of the Principles Part I.
flexion, will not perceive in them any
Power or Activity j there is therefore no
fuch thing contained in them. A little At-
tention will difcover to us that the very
Being of an Idea implies Paflivenefs and
Inertnefs in it, infomuch that it is impof-
fible for an Idea to do any thing, or, ftrict-
ly fpeaking, to be the Caufe of any thing :
Neither can it be the Refemblance or Pat-
tern of any active Being, as is evident
from Sect. 8. Whence it plainly follows
that Extenfion, Figure and Motion, can-
not be the Caufe of our Senfations. To
fay therefore, that thefe are the effects of
Powers refulting from the Configuration,
Number, Motion, and Size of Corpufcles,
mufl certainly be falfe.
XXVI. We perceive a continual Sue-
ceffion of Ideas, fome are anew excited,
others are changed or totally difappear.
There is therefore fome Caufe of thefe
Ideas whereon they depend, and which
produces and changes them. That this
Caufe cannot be any Quality or Idea or
Combination of Ideas, is clear from the
preceding Section. It muft therefore be a
Subftance; but it has been (hewn that there
is no corporeal or material Subftance : It
remains therefore that the Caufe of Ideas
is an incorporeal active Subftance or Spirit.
XXVII, A
Part I. of Humane Knowledge. 5 7
XXVII. A Spirit is one fimple, undi-
vided, active Being : as it perceives Ideas,
it is called the Under/landing, and as it
produces or otherwife operates about them,
it is called the Will. Hence there can be
no Idea formed of a Soul or Spirit : For
all Ideas whatever, being Paffive and Inert,
vide Seel. 25. they cannot reprefent unto
us, by way of Image or Likenefs, that
which acts. A little Attention will make
it plain to any one, that to have an Idea
which mall be like that active Principle of
Motion and Change of Ideas, is abfolutely
impoffible. Such is the Nature of Spirit
or that which acts, that it cannot be of it
felf perceived, but only by the Effects
which it produceth. If any Man {hall
doubt of the Truth of what is here deli-
vered, let him but reflect and^try if he can
frame the Idea of any Power or active Be-
ing j and whether he hath Ideas of two
principal Powers, marked by the Names
Will and Under/landing, diftinct from each
other as well as from a third Idea of Sub-
ftance or Being in general, with a relative
Notion of its fupporting or being the Sub-
ject of the aforelaid Powers, which is lig-
nified by the Name Soul or Spirit. This
is what fome hold ; but fo far as I can fee,
the Words Will, Sou/, Spirit, do not fland
for
j 8 Of the Principles Part I.
for different Ideas, or in truth, for any
Idea at all, but for fomcthing which is ve-
ry different from Ideas, and which being
an Agent cannot be like unto, or repre-
fented by, any Idea whatfoever. Though
it mutt be owned at the fame time, that
we have fome Notion of Soul, Spirit, and
the Operations of the Mind, fuch as Wil-
ling, Loving, Hating, in as much as we know
or underftand the meaning of thofe Words.
XXVIII. I find I can excite Ideas in my
Mind at pleafure, and vary and mift the
Scene as oft as I think fit. It is no more
than Willing, and ftraightway this or that
Idea arifes in my Fancy : And by the fame
Power it is obliterated, and makes way for
another. This making and unmaking of
Ideas doth very properly denominate the
Mind active. Thus much is certain, and
grounded on Experience : But when we
talk of unthinking Agents, or of exciting
Ideas exclufive of Volition, we only amufe
our felves with Words.
XXIX. But whatever Power I may have
over my own Thoughts, I find the Ideas
actually perceived by Senie have not a like
Dependence on my Will. When in broad
Day-light 1 open my Eyes, it is not in my
Power to choofe whether I fhall lee or no,
or
Part I. of Humane Knowledge. 5 p
or to determine what particular Objcdls
{hall prefent themfelves to my View ; and
fo likewife as to the Hearing and other
Senfes, the Ideas imprinted on them are
not Creatures of my Will. There is there-
fore fome other Will or Spirit that pro-
duces them.
XXX. The Ideas of Senfe are more
ftrong, lively, and diftincl: than thofe of
the Imagination ; they have likewife a Sted-
dinefs, Order, and Coherence, and are not
excited at random, as thofe which are the
effects of Humane Wills often are, but in
a regular Train or Scries, the admirable
Connexion whereof fufficiently testifies the
Wifdom and Benevolence of its Author.
Now the fet Rules or eftablifhed Methods,
wherein the Mind we depend on excites in
us the Ideas of Senfe, are called the Laws
of Nature : And thefe we learn by Expe-
rience, which teaches us that fuch and
fuch Ideas are attended with fuch and
fuch other Ideas, in the ordinary courfe of
Things.
XXXI. This gives us a fort of Fore-
fight, which enables us to regulate our
Actions for the benefit of Life. And with-
out this we mould be eternally at a lofs: We
could not know how to act any thing that
might
Of the Principles Part I.
might procure us the leaft Pleafure, or re-
move the leaft Pain of Senfe. That Food
nourimes, Sleep refremes, and Fire warms
usj that to fow in the Seed-time is the
way to reap in the Harveft, and, in gene-
ral, that to obtain fuch or fuch Ends, fuch
or fuch Means are conducive, all this we
know, not by difcovering any neceflary
Connexion between our Ideas, but only by
the Obfervation of the fettled Laws of Na-
ture, without which we mould be all in
Uncertainty and Confufion, and a grown
Man no more know how to manage him-
felf in the Affairs of Life, than an Infant
juft born.
XXXII. And yet this confident uni-
form working, which fo evidently difplays
the Goodnefs and Wifdom of that govern-
ing Spirit whofc Will conftitutes the Laws
of Nature, is fo far from leading our
Thoughts to him, that it rather fends them
a wandering after fecond Caufes. For
when we perceive certain Ideas of Senfe
conftantly followed by other Ideas, and we
know this is not of our own doing, we
forthwith attribute Power and Agency to
the Ideas themfelves, and make one the
Caufe of another, than which nothing can
be more abfurd and unintelligible. Thus,
for Example, having obferved that when
we
Parti, of Humane Knowledge.
we perceive by Sight a certain round lu-
minous Figure, we at the fame time per-
ceive by Touch the Idea or Senfation cal-
led Heat, we do from thence conclude the
Sun to be the caufe of Heat. And in like
manner perceiving the Motion and Colli-
fion of Bodies to be attended with Sound,
we are inclined to think the latter an effect
of the former.
XXXIII. The Ideas imprinted on the
Senfes by the Author of Nature are called
real 'Things: And thofe excited in the Ima-
gination being lefs regular, vivid and con-
ftant, are more properly termed Ideas, or
Images of Things, which they copy and re-
prefent. But then our Senfations, be they
never fo vivid and diftinct, are neverthe-
lefs Ideas, that is, they exift in the Mind,
or are perceived by it, as truly as the Ideas
of its own framing. The Ideas of Senfc
are allowed to have more reality in them,
that is, to be more ftrong, orderly, and
coherent than the Creatures of the Mind ;
but this is no Argument that they exift
without the Mind. They are alfo lefs de-
pendent on the Spirit, or thinking Sub-
ilance which perceives them, in that they
are excited by the Will of another and
more powerful Spirit : yet ftill they are
Ideas, and certainly no Idea, whether faint
or
\
Ct Of the Principles Part I.
or flrong, can exlft otherwife than in a
Mind perceiving it.
XXXIV. Before we proceed any far-
ther, it is necefTary to fpend fome Time in
anfwering Objections which may probably
be made againft the Principles hitherto laid
down. In doing of which, if I feem too
prolix to thofe of quick Apprehenfions, I
hope it may be pardoned, fince all Men do
not equally apprehend things of this Na-
ture ; and I am willing to be underftood
by every one. Firft then, it will be ob^
jc&ed that by the foregoing Principles, all
that is real and fubftantial in Nature is ba-
nifhed out of the World : And inftead
thereof a chimerical Scheme of Ideas takes
place. All things that exift, exift only in
the Mind, that is, they are purely notio-
nal. What therefore becomes of the Sun,
Moon, and Stars ? What muft we think
of Houfes,Rivers, Mountains, Trees, Stones 5
nay, even of our own Bodies ? Are all
thefe but fo many Chimeras and Illufions'
on the Fancy ? To all which, and what-
ever elfe of the fame fort may be objected,
I anfwer, that by the Principles premifed,
we are not deprived of any one thing in
Nature. Whatever we fee, feel, hear, or
any wife conceive or underftand, remains
as fecure as ever, and is as real as ever.
There
Parti, of Humane Knowledge.
There is a rerum natura, and the Diftino
tion between Realities and Chimeras re-
tains its full force. This is evident from
Sect. 29, 30, and 33, where we have
fhewn what is meant by real Things in
oppofition to Chimeras, or Ideas of our
own framing j but then they both equally
exift in the Mind, and in that benfe are a-
like Ideas.
XXXV. I do not argue againft the Ex-
iftence of any one thing that we can ap-
prehend, either by Senfc or Reflexion. That
the things I fee with mine Eyes and touch
with my Hands do exift, really exift, I
make not the leaft Queftion. The only
thing whofe Exiftence we deny, is that
which Philofophers call Matter or corpo-
real Subilance. And in doing of this, there
is no Damage done to the reft of Mankind,
who, I dare fay, will never mifs it. The
Athcift indeed will want the Colour of
an empty Name to fupport his Impiety ;
and the Philofophers may poflibly find,
they have loft a great Handle for Trifling
and Difputation.
XXXVI. If any Man thinks this de-
tracts from the Exiftence or Reality of
Things, he is very far from understanding
what hath been premifed in the plaineft
Terms
Of the Principles Part L
Terms I could think of. Take here an
Abitrad of what has been faid. There are
fpiritual Subftances, Minds, or humane
Souls, which will or excite Ideas in them-
felves at pleafure : but thefe are faint,
weak, and unfteady in refpect of others
they perceive by Senfe, which being im-
prefTed upon them according to certain
Rules or Laws of Nature, fpeak themfelves
the Effects of a Mind more powerful and
wife than humane Spirits. Thefe latter
are faid to have more Reality in them than
the former : By which is meant that they
are more affeding, orderly, and diftind,
and that they are not Fidions of the Mind
perceiving them. And in this Senfe, the
Sun that I fee by Day is the real Sun, and
that which I imagine by Night is the Idea
of the former. In the Senie here given of
Reality, it is evident that every Vegetable,
Star, Mineral, and in general each part of
the Mundane Syftem, is as much a real
Being by our Principles as by any other.
Whether others mean any thing by the
Term Reality different from what 1 do, I
intreat them to look into their own
Thoughts and fee.
XXXVII. It will be urged that thus
much at leaft is true, to wit, that we take
away all corporeal Subftances. To this
my
Part I. of Humane Knowledge.
my Anfwer is, That if the word Subftance
be taken in the vulgar Senfe, for a Combi-
nation of fenfible Qualities, fuchas Exten-
fion, Solidity* Weight, and the like 3 This
we cannot be accufed of taking away. But
if it be taken in a philosophic Senfe, for
the fupport of Accidents or Qualities with-
out the Mind : Thf ; dted I acknow-
ledge that we taks ir uway, if one may be
faid to take away that which never had
any Exiftence, not even in the Imagina-
tion.
XXXVIII. But, fay yon, it founds very
hajrfh to fcv we eat and drink Ideas, and
arc clothed with Ideas. I acknowledge it
does Jo, the word Idea not* being ufed in
common Difcourfe to fignily the feveral
Combinations of lenfible Qualities, which
are called "Things : arid it is certain that
any Expreffion which varies from the fa-
miliar Ufe of Language, will feem harfli
and ridiculous. But this doth not concern,
the Truth of the Proportion, which in
other Words is no more than to fay, we
are fed and clothed with thofe Things
which we perceive immediately byourSen-
fes The Hardnefs or Softnefs, the Co-
lour, Tafte, Warmth, Figure^ and fuch
like Qualities, which combined together
conilituce the feveral forts of Victuals and
E Apparel,
Of the Prtnctpks Part I.
Apparel, have been (hewn to cxift only in
the Mind that perceives them ; and this is
all that is meant by calling them Idtas ;
which Word, if it was as ordinarily ufed
as Thing, would found no harmer nor more
ridiculous than it. I am not for difputing
about the Propriety, but the Truth of the
Expreflion. If therefore you agree with
me that we eat and drink, and are clad
with the immediate Objects of Scnfe which
cannot exift unperceivcd or without the
Mind : I mall readily grant it is more
proper or conformable to Cuftom, that
they mould be called Things rather than
Ideas.
XXXIX. If it be demanded why I make
ufe of the word Idea, and do not rather
in compliance with Cuftom call them
Things. I anfwer, I do it for two Rea-
fons : Firft, becaufe the Term Thing , in
contradiftindtion to Idea, is generally fup-
pofed to denote fomewhat exifting with-
out the Mind : Secondly, becaufe Jibing
hath a more comprehenfive Signification
than Idea, including Spirits or thinking
Things as well as Ideas. Since therefore
the Objects of Senfe exift only in the Mind,
and are withal thoughtlefs and inactive, I
chofe to mark them by the word Idea, which
implies thofe Properties.
XL. But
Parti, of Humane Knowledge. Cj
XL. But fay what we can, fome one
perhaps may be apt to reply, he will ftill
believe his Senfes, ard never fuffer any Ar-
guments, how plaufible foever, to prevail
over the Certainty of them. Be it fo, af-
fert the Evidence of Senfe as high as you
pleafe, we are willing to do the fame. That
what I lee, hear and feel doth exift, that
is to fay, is perceived by me, I no more
doubt than I do of my own Being. But I
do not fee how the Teftimony of Senfe can
be alledged, as a proof for the Exigence
of any thing, which is not perceived by
Senfe. We are not for having any Man
turn Sceptic, and disbelieve his Senles ; on
the contrary we give them all the Strefs
and AlTurance imaginable ; nor are there
any Principles more oppofite to Scepticifm,
than thofe we have laid down, as (hall be
hereafter clearly (hewn.
XLI. Secondly, It will be objected that
there is a great difference betwixt real Fire,
forlnftancc, and the Idea of Fire, betwixt
dreaming or imagining ones felf burnt,
and actually being fo : Tlyp and the like
may be urged in oppofition to our Tenets.
To all which the Anfwer is evident from
what hath been already faid, and I mall
only add in this place, that if real Fire be
E 2 very
6* Of the Principles Part I.
very different from the Idea of Fire, fo al-
fo is the real Pain that it occafions, very
different from the Idea of the fame Pain :
and yet no Body will pretend that real Pain
either is, or can poffibly be, in an unper-
ceiving Thing or without the Mind, any
more than its Idea.
XLII. Thirdly, It will be objected that
we fee Things actually without or at a dif-
tance from us, and which confequently do
not exift in the Mind, it being abfnrd that
thofe Things which are feen at the dif-
tance of feveral Miles, mould be as near
to ut as our own Thoughts. In anfwer to
this, I delire it may be confidered, that in
a Dream we do oft perceive Things as ex-
ifting at a great diftance off, and yet for all
that, thofe Things are acknowledged to have
their Exiftence only in the Mind.
XLIII. But for the fuller clearing of this
Point, it may be worth while to coniider,
how it is that we perceive Diftance and
Things placed at a Diftance by Sight. For
that we mould in truth fee external Space,
and Bodies adfctelly exifting in it, fome
nearer, others farther off, feems to carry
with it fome Oppofition to what hath been
faid, of their exifting no where without
the Mind. The Consideration of this Dif-
ficulty
Part I. of Humane Knowledge.
ficulty it was, that gave birth to my Effay
towards a new Theory of Vtfion^ which was
published not long fmce. Wherein it is
ihewn that Dtjlance or Outnefs is neither
immediately of it felf perceived by Sight,
nor yet apprehended or judged of by Lines
and Angles, or any thing that hath a ne-
cefiary Connexion with it : But that it is
only fuggcfted to our Thoughts, by cer-
tain vifible Ideas and Senfations attending
Vifion, which in their own Nature have
no manner of Similitude or Relation, either
with Diftance, or Things placed at a Dif-
tance. But by a Connexion taught us by
Experience, they come to fignify and fug-
geft them to us, after the fame manner
that Words of any Language fuggeft the
Ideas they are made to ftand for. Info-
much that a Man born blind, and after-
wards made to fee, would not, at firft
Sight, think the Things he faw, to be with-
out his Mind, or at any Diftance from
him. See Sefr. 41. of the forementioneci
Treatife.
XLIV. The Ideas of Sight and Touch
make two Species, intirely diftind and he-
terogeneous. The former are Marks tnd
Prognoftics of the latter. That the proper
Objects of Sight neither exift without ihc
Mind, nor are the Images of external
E 3 Things,
70 Of the Principles Part I.
Things, was (hewn even in that Treatife.
Though throughout the fame, the con-
trary be fuppofed true of tangible Ob-
jects : Not that to fuppofc that vulgar Er-
ror, was neceffary for eftabliftiing the No-
tion therein laid down j but becaufe it wa$
befide my Purpofe to examine and refute
it in a Difcourfe concerning Vifan. So
that in ftrict Truth the Ideas of Sight,
when we apprehend by them Diftance an4
Things placed at a Diftance, do not fug-
geft or mark out to us Things actually ex-
ifting at a Diftance, but only admonifh us
what Ideas of Touch will be imprinted in
our Minds at fuch and fuch diftances of
Time, and in confequence of fuch or fuch
Actions. It is, I fay, evident from what
has been faid in the foregoing Parts of this
Treatife, and in Setf. 147, and elf«where
of the EiTay concerning Vifion, that vifible
Ideas are the Language whereby the go-
verning Spirit, on whom we depend, in-
forms us what tangible Ideas he is about to
imprint upon us, in cafe we excite this or
that Motion in our own Bodies. But for
a fuller Information in this Point, I refer
to the Eflay it felf.
XLV. Fourthly, It will be objected that
from the foregoing Principles it follows,
Things are every moment annihilated and
created
Part I. of Humane Knowledge. 7 i
created anew. The Objects of Senfe exift
only when they are perceived : The Trees
therefore are in the Garden, or the Chairs
in the Parlour, no longer than while there
is fome body by to perceive them. Upon
{hutting my Eyes all the Furniture in the
Room is reduced to nothing, and barely
upon opening them it is again created. In
anfwer to all which, I refer the Reader
to what has been faid in Sett. 3, 4, GV.
and defire he will confider whether he
means any thing by the actual Exiftence of
an Idea, diftinct from its being perceived.
For my part, after the niceft Inquiry I
could make, I am not able to difcover
that any thing elfe is meant by thofe Words.
And I once more intreat the Reader to found
his own Thoughts, and not fuffer himfelf
to be impofed on by Words. If he can con-
ceive it poffible either for his Ideas or their
Archetypes to exift without being per-
ceived, then I give up the Caufe :
But if he cannot, he will acknowledge
it is unreafonable for him to (land up
in defence of he knows not what, and pre-
tend to charge on me as an Abfurdity, the
not alTenting to thofe Proportions which
at Bottom have no meaning in them.
XLVI. It will not be amifs to obferve,
how far the received Principles of Philofo-
E 4 phy
7*1 Of the Principles Part I.
phy are rhemfelvcs chargeable with thofe
pretended Abfurdities. It is thought ftrange-
ly abfurd that upon clofing my Eyelids,
all the vifible Objedls round me mould be
reduced to nothing ; and yet is not this
what Philofophers commonly acknowledge,
when they agree on all hands, that Light
and Colours, which alone are the proper
and immediate Objects of Sight, are mere
Senfations that exifl no longer than they
are perceived ? Again, it may to fome
perhaps feem very incredible, that things
fhould be every moment creating, yet this
very Notion is commonly taught" in the
Schools. For the Schoolmen, though they
acknowledge the Exiftence of Matter, and
that the whole mundane Fabrick is framed
out of it, are neverthelefs of Opinion that
it cannot fubfift without the Divine Con-
fervation, which by them is expounded to
be a continual Creation.
XL VII. Farther, a little Thought will
difcover to us, that though we allow the
Exiftence of Matter or Corporeal Subftance,
yet it will unavoidably follow from the
Principles which are now generally ad-
mitted, that the particular Bodies of what
kind fbever, do none of them exift whilft
they are not perceived. For it is evident
from Serf. XI. and the following Sections,
that
Parti, of Humane Knowledge.
that the Matter Philofophers contend for,
is an incomprehensible Somewhat which
hath none of thofe particular Qualities,
whereby the Bodies falling under our Sen-
fe are diftinguifhed one from another. But
to make this more plain, it muft be re-
marked, that the infinite Divifibility of
Matter is now univerfally allowed, at
leaft by the moft approved and confide-
rable Philofophers, who on the received
Principles demonftrate it beyond all Ex-
ception. Hence it follows, that there is
an infinite Number of Parts in each Par-
ticle of Matter, which are not perceived
by Senfe. The Reafon therefore, that any
particular Body feems to be 'of a finite
Magnitude, or exhibits only a finite Num-
berof Parts to Senfe, is, notbecaufe it con-
tains nomore,fince in itfelf it contains an in-
finite Number of Parts, but becaufe the
Senfe is not acute enough to difcern them. In
proportion therefore as the Senfe is rendered
more acute, it perceives a greater Number of
Parts in the Object, that is, the Object
appears greater, and its Figure varies, thofe
Parts in its Extremities which were before
unperceivable, appearing now to bound it
in very different Lines and Angles from
thofe perceived by an obtufer Senfe. And
at length, after various Changes of Size
and Shape, when the Senfe becomes infi-
nitely
74 Of the Principles Part I.
nitely acute, the Body {hall feem Infinite.
During all which there is no Alteration
in the Body, but only in the Senfe. Each
Body therefore confidered in it felf, is in-
finitely extended, and confequently void
of all Shape or Figure. From which it
follows, that though we mould grant the
Exigence of Matter to be ever fo cer-
tain, yet it is withal as certain, the Ma-
terialifts themfelves are by their own Prin-
ciples forced to acknowledge, that neither
the particular Bodies perceived by SenTe,
nor any thing like them exifts without toe
Mind. Matter, I fay, and each Particle
thereof is according to them infinite and
fhapelefs, and it is the Mind that frames
all that variety of Bodies which compofe
the vifible World, any one whereof does
not exift longer than it is perceived.
XL VIII. If we confider it, the Obje&ion
propofed in Sett. 45. will not be found
reafonably charged on the Principles we
have premifed, fo as in truth to make
any Objection at all againft our Notions.
For though we hold indeed the Objects
of Senfe to be nothing elfe but Ideas which
cannot exift unperceived j yet we may not
hence conclude they have no Exigence
except only while they are perceived by
Vis,, fince there may be fome other Spirit
that
Part I. of Humane Knowledge.
that perceives them, though we do not.
Wherever Bodies are fa id to have no Exif-
tence without the Mind, I would not be
underftood to mean this or that particu-
lar Mind, but ail Minds whatfoever. It
does not therefore follow from the fore-
going Principles, that Bodies are annihi-
lated and created every moment, or exift
not at all during the Intervals between our
Perception of them.
XLIX. Fifthly, It may perhaps be ob-
jedted, that if Extenfion and Figure exifl
only in the Mind, it follows that the Mind
is extended and figured -, fmce Extenfion
is a Mode or Attribute, which (to fpeak
with the Schools) is predicated of the Sub-
ject in which it exiits. I anfwer, Thofe
Qualities are in the Mind only as they are
perceived by it, that is, not by way of
Mode or Attribute, but only by way of
Idea ; and it no more follows, that the Soul
or Mind is extended becaufe Extenfion exiils
in it alone, than it does that it is red or blue,
becaufe thofe Colours are on all hands ac-
knowledged toexift in it, and no where elfe.
As to what Philofophers fay of Subject
and Mode, that feems very groundlefs and
unintelligible. For Jnftance, in this Pro-
pofiupn, a Die is hard, extended and fquare,
jhey will have it that the Word Die de-
notes
7 6 Of the Principles Part I.
notes a Subject or Subftance, diftindt from
the Hardnefs, Extenfion and Figure, which
are predicated of it, and in which they
exift. This I cannot comprehend : To
me a Die feems to be nothing diftinct from
thofe things which are termed its Modes
or Accidents. And to fay a Die is hard,
extended and fquare, is not to attribute
thofe Qualities to a Subject diftinct from
and fupporting them, but only an Expli-
cation of the meaning of the Word Die.
L. Sixthly, You will fay there have
been a great many things explained by
Matter and Motion : Take away thefe,
and you deftroy the whole Corpufcular
Philofophy, and undermine thofe mecha-
nical Principles which have been applied
with fo much Succefs to account for the
Phenomena. In mort, whatever Advan-
ces have been made, either by ancient or
modern Philofophers, in the ftudy of Na-
ture, do all proceed on the Suppofition,
that Corporeal Subftance or Matter doth
really exift. To this I anfwer, that there
is not any one Phenomenon explained on
that Suppofition, which may not as well
be explained without it, as might eafily
be made appear by an Induction of Par-
ticulars. To explain the Phenomena, is
all one as to mew, why upon fuch and
fuch
Part I. of Humane Knowledge. 77'
fuch Occalions .we are affected with fuch
and fuch Ideas. But how Matter mould
operate on a Spirit, or produce any- Idea
in it, is what no Philofopher will pretend
to explain. It is therefore evident, there
can be no ufe of Matter in Natural Philo-
fophy. Betides, they who attempt to ac-
count for Things, do it not by Corpo-
real Subftance, but by Figure, Motion, and
other Qualities, which are in truth no
more than mere Ideas, and therefore can-
not be the Caufe of any thing, as hath been
already {hewn. See Sett. 25.
LI. Seventhly, It will upon this be de-
manded whether it does not feem abfurd
to take away natural Caufes, andafcribe eve-
ry thing to the immediate Operation of
Spirits ? We muft no longer fay upon
thefe Principles that Fire heats, or Water
cools, but that a Spirit heats, and fo forth.
Would not a Man be defervedly laught
at, who mould talk after this manner ?
I anfwer, he would fo ; in fuch things we
ought to think with the Learned, and fpeak
with the Vulgar. They who toDemonitra-
tionare convinced of the truth of the Coper-
nican byftem, do ncvet theleis fay the Sun rif-
es, the Sun fets, or comes to the Meridian:
And if they affected a contrary Stile in
common talk, it would without doubt
appear
Of the Principles Part L
appear very ridiculous. A little Reflexion
on what is here faid will make it mani-
fed that the common ufe of Language would
receive no manner of Alteration orDiftur-
bance from the Admiflion of our Tenets.
LIT. In the ordinary Affairs of Life, any
Phrafes may be retained, fo long as they
excite in us proper Sentiments, or Dif-
poiitions to a<5t in fuch a manner as is
neceffary for our well-being, how falfe Ib-
cver they may be, if taken in a ftricl: and
fpeculative Senfe. Nay this is unavoida-
ble, fince Propriety being regulated by
Cuiiom, Language is fuited to the re-
ce'ved Opinions, which are not always the
truefl:. Hence it is impoffible, even in the
ir.oft rigid philofophic Reafonings, fo far
to? her the Bent and Genius of the Tongue
we fpeak, as never to give a handle for
Cavillers to pretend Difficulties and Incon-
fiftencies. But a fair and ingenuous Reader
.will celled: the Senfe, from the Scope and
Tenor and Connexion of a Difcourfe, mak-
ing allowances for thofe inaccurate Modes
of Speech, which ufe has made inevitable.
LIII. As to the Opinion that there are
no Corporeal Caufes, this has been here-
tofore maintained by fome of the School-
men, as ic is of late by others among the
modern
Part I. of Humane Knowledge.
modern Philofophers, who though they
allow Matter to exift, yet will have GOD
alone to be the immediate efficient Caufe
of all things. Thefe Men faw, that amongft
all the Objects of Senfe, there was none
which had any Power or Activity includ-
ed in it, and that by Confequence this was
likewife true of whatever Bodies they fup*
pofed to exift without the Mind, like un-
to the immediate Objects of Senfe. But
then, that they mould fuppofe an innu-
merable Multitude of created Beings, which
they acknowledge are not capable of produ-
cing any one Effect in Nature, and which
therefore are made to no manner of pur-
pofe, fince God might have done every
thing as well without them ; this I fay,
though we mould allow it poffible, muft
yet be a very unaccountable and extrava-
gant Suppofition.
LIV. In the eighth place, The univer-
fal concurrent Aflent of Mankind may be
thought by fome, an invincible Argument
in behalf of Matter, or the Existence of
external things. Muft we fuppofe the
whole World to be miftaken ? And if fo,
what Caufe can be affigned of fo wide-
fpread and predominant an Error ? I an-
fwcr, Firft, That upon a narrow Inquiry,
k will not perhaps be found, fo many as
is
8o Of the Principles Part I.
is imagined do really believe the Exiftence
of Matter or Things without the Mind.
Strictly Jpeaking, to believe that which
involves a Contradiction, or has no mean-
ing in it, is impoffible : And whether the
foregoing Expreffions are not of that fort,
I refer it to the impartial Examination of
the Reader. In one fenfe indeed, Men
may be faid to believe that Matter exifts,
that is, they aft as if the immediate
Caufe of their Senfations, which affects
them every moment and is fo nearly pre-
fent to them, were fome fenfelefs unthink-
ing Being. But that they mould clearly
apprehend any Meaning marked by thole
Words, and form thereof a fettled fpecu-
lative Opinion, is what I am not able to
conceive. This is not the only Inftance
wherein Men impofe upon themfelves,
by imagining they believe thofe Propoii-
tions they have often heard, though at bot-
tom they have no meaning in them.
LV. But fecondly, Though we mould
grant a Notion to be ever fo univerfally
and ftedfaftly adhered to, yet this is but
a weak Argument of its Truth, to who-
ever confiders what a vaft number of Pre-
judices and falfe Opinions are every where
embraced with the utmoft Tenacioufnefs,
by the unreflecting (which are the far
greater)
Part I. of Humane Knowledge. S i
greater) Part of Mankind. There was a time
when the Antipodes and Motion of the
Earth were looked upon as monftrous
Abfurdities, even by Men of Learning :
And if it be conlidered what a fmall pro-
portion they bear to the reft of Mankind,
we (hall find that at this Day, thofe No-
tions have gained but a very inconliderable
looting in the World.
LVI. But it is demanded, that we affign
a Caufe of this Prejudice, and account
for its obtaining in the World. To this
I anfwer, That Men knowing they per-
ceived feveral Ideas, whereof they them-
felves were not the Authors, as not being
excited from within, nor depending on
the Operation of their Wills, this made
them maintain, thofe Ideas or Objects of
Perception had an Exiftence independent
of, and without the Mind, without ever
dreaming that a Contradiction was invol-
ved in thofe Words. But Philofophers hav-
ing plainly feen, that the immediate Ob-
jects of Perception do not exift without
the Mind, they in fome degree corrected
the miltake of the Vulgar, but at the fame
time run into another which feems no
lefs abfurd, to wit, that there are certain
Objects really exifting without the Mind,
or having a Subfiftence diftinct from being
F per-
8 1 Of the Principles Part I.
perceived, of which our Ideas are only
Imagesor Refemblances, imprinted by thofe
Objects on the Mind. And this Notion
of the Philofophers owes its Origin to
the fame Caufe with the former, namely,
their being confcious that they were not
the Authors of their own Scnfations, which
they evidently knew were imprinted from,
without, and which therefore muft have
fome Caufe, diftinct from the Minds on
which they are imprinted.
LVII. But why they fhould fuppofe the
Ideas of Senfe to be excited in us by things
in their likenefs, and not rather have re-
courfe to Spirit which alone can act, may
be accounted for, Firft, becaufe they were
not aware of the Repugnancy there is,
as well in fuppofing things like unto our
Ideas exifting without, as in attributing
to them Power or Activity. Secondly,
becaufe the fupreme Spirit which excites
thofe Ideas in our Minds, is not marked
out and limited to our view by any par-
ticular finite Collection of fenfible Ideas,
as humane Agents are by their Size, Com-
plexion, Limbs, and Motions. And third-
ly, becaufe his Operations are regular and
uniform. Whenever the Courfe of Na-
ture is interrupted by a Miracle, Men are
ready to own the Prefence of a fuperior
Agent.
Part. t. of Hamane Knowledge. Sj
Agent. But when we fee things go on
in the ordinary Courfe, they do not excite
in us any Reflexion j their Order and Con-
catenation, though it be an Argument of
the greateft Wifdom, Power, and Goodnefs
in their Creator, is yet fo conftant and
familiar to us, that we do not think
them the immediate Effects of a Fret
Spirit : efpecially fince Inconftancy and
Mutability in ailing, though it be an Im-
perfection, is looked on as a mark of
Freedom.
LVIII. Tenthly, It will be objedled,
that the Notions we advance, are incon-
fiftent with feveral found Truths in Phi-
lofophy and Mathematicks. For Example,
The Motion of the Earth is now univerfal-
ly admitted by Aftronomers, as a Truth
grounded on the cleared and moft convin-
cing Reafons ; but on the foregoing Prin*
ciples, there can be no fuch thing. For
Motion being only an Idea, it follows
that if it be not perceived, it exifts not ;
but the Motion of the Earth is not per-
ceived by Senfe. I anfwer, That Tenet,
if rightly underftood, will be found to
agree with the Principles we have premi-
fed : For the Queftion, whether the Earth
moves or no, amounts in reality to no more
than this, to wit, whether we have reafon
F 2 !•
84 Of the Principles PartL
to conclude from what hath been obfer-
ved by Aftronomers, that if we were
placed in fuch and fuch Circumftances,
and fuch or fuch a Pofition and Diftance,
both from the Earth and Sun, we mould
perceive the former to move among the
Choir of the Planets, and appearing in
all refpects like one of them : And this,
by the eftablimed Rules of Nature, which
we have no reafon to miftruft, is reafon-
ably collected from the Phenomena.
LIX. We may, from the Experience we
have had of the Train and Succeffion
of Ideas in our Minds, often make, I will
not fay uncertain Conjectures, but fure
and well-grounded Predictions, concern-
ing the Ideas we (hall be affected with,
purfuant to a great Train of Actions, and
be enabled to pafs a right Judgment of
what would have appeared to us, in cafe we
were placed in Circumftances very dif-
ferent from thofe we are in at prefent. Here-
in confifts the Knowledge of Nature, which
may preferve its Ufe and Certainty very
confidently with what hath been faid.
It will be eafy to apply this to whatr
ever Objections of the like fort may be
drawn from the Magnitude of the Stars,
or any other Difcoveries in Aftronomy or
Nature.
LX. In
Fart I. of Humane Knowledge. 5 j
LX. In the eleventh place, It will be
demanded to what purpofe ferves that cu-
rious Organization of Plants, and the ad-
mirable Mechanifm in the Parts of Ani-
mals ; might not Vegetables grow, and
fhoot forth Leaves and Blonroms> and Ani-
mals perform all their Motions, as well
without as with all that variety of inter-
nal Parts fo elegantly contrived and put
together, which being Ideas have notrrng
powerful or operative in them, nor have
any neceflary Connexion with the Effects
afcribed to them ? If it be a Spirit that
immediately produces every Effect by a
Fiaty or Act of his Will, we mufl think
all that is fine and artificial in the Works,
whether of Man or Nature, to be made
in vain. By this Doctrine, though an
Artift hath made the Spring and Wheels,and
every Movement of a Watch, and adjufted
them in fuch a manner as he knew would
produce the Motions he defigned ; yet he
muft think all this done to no purpofe,
and that it is an Intelligence which directs
the Index, and points to the Hour of the
Day. If fo, why may not the Intelligence
do it, without his being at the pains of
making the Movements, and putting them
together ? Why does not an empty Caie
ferve as well as another ? And how comes
F 3 it
Of the Principks Parti,
it to pafs, that whenever there is any
Fault in the going of a Watch, there is
fome correfponding Diforder to be found
in the Movements, which being mended
by a skilful Hand, all is right again ?
The like may be faid of all the Clock-
work of Nature, great part whereof is fo
wonderfully fine and fubtile, as fcarce to
be difcerned by the beft Microfcope. In
fhort, it will be asked, how upon our
Principles any tolerable Account can be
given, or any final Caufe affigned of an
innumerable multitude of Bodies and Ma^
chines framed with the moft exquifite
Art, which in the common Philofophy
have very appofite ufes affigned them,
and ferve to. explain abundance of Phae-
nomena.
LXI. To all which I anfwer, Firft, That
though there were fome Difficulties re-
lating to the Adminiftration of Providence,
and the ufes by it affigned to the feveral
parts of Nature, which I could not folve
by the foregoing Principles, yet this Ob-
jection could be of fmall weight againfl
the Truth and Certainty of thofe things
which may be proved a priori, with the
utmoft Evidence. Secondly, But neither
are the received Principles free from the
like Difficulties j for it may flill be de-
manded,
Part I. of Humane Knowledge. gj
manded, to what end God mould take
thofe round-about Methods of effecting
things by Inftruments and Machines, which
no one can deny might have been effec-
ted by the mere Command of his Will>
without all that apparatus : Nay, if we
narrowly confider it, we mall find the Ob-
jection may be retorted with greater force
on thofe who hold the Exiftence of thofe
Machines without the Mind j for it has
been made evident, that Solidity, Bulk, Fi-
gure, Morion and the like, have no Afti-
•vity or Efficacy in them, fo as to be ca-
pable of producing any one Effect in Na-
ture. See SecJ. 25. Whoever therefore
fuppofes them to exift (allowing the Sup-
pofition poffible) when they are not per-
ceived, does it manifeftly to no purpofe ;
fince the only ufe that is affigned to them,
as they exift unperceivcd, is that they pro-
duce thofe perceivable Effects, which in
truth cannot be afcribed to any thing but
Spirit.
LXII, But to come nearer the Difficul-
ty, it muft be obferved, that though the
Fabrication of all thofe Parts and Organs
be not abfolutely neceffary to the produ-
cing any Effect, yet it is neceffary to- the
producing of things in a conflant, regu-
Jar way, According to the Laws of Nature.
F 4 There
88 Of the Principles Pnrt I.
There are certain general Laws that run
through the whole Chain of natural Ef-
fects : Thefe are learned by the Obfer-
vation and Study of Nature, and are by
Men applied as well to the framing ar-
tificial things for the Ufe and Ornament
of Life, as to the explaining the various
Phenomena : Which Explication confifts
only in (hewing the Conformity any par-
ticular Phenomenon hath to the general
Laws of Nature, or, which is the fame
thing, in difcovering the Uniformity there
is in the Production of natural Effects ;
as will be evident to whoever (hall at-
tend to the feveral Inftances, wherein Phi-
lofophers pretend to account for Appear-
ances. That there is a great and confpi-
cuous Ufe in thefe regular conftant Me-
thods of working obferved by the Supreme
Agent, hath been fhewn in Se£t. 31.
And it is no lefs vifible, that a particular
Size, Figure, Motion and Difpoiition of
Parts are necefTary, though not abfolu re-
ly to the producing any Effect, yet to the
producing it according to the ftanding
mechanical Laws of Nature. Thus, for
Inftance, it cannot be denied that God, or
the Intelligence which fuftains and rules
the ordinary Courfe of things might, if
He were minded to produce a Miracle,
Ctufe all the Motions on the Dial-plate
of
Part I. of Humane Knowledge. 8 9
of a Watch, though no Body had ever
made the Movements, and put them in
it : But yet if he will aft agreeably to
the Rules of Mechanifm, by him for
wife ends eftablifhed and maintained in
the Creation, it is neceflary that thofe Ac-
tions of the Watchmaker, whereby he
makes the Movements and rightly adjufts
them, precede the Production of the afore-
faid Motions ; as alfo that any Diforder
in them be attended with the Perception
of fome correfponding Diforder in the
Movements, which being once corrected
all is right again.
LXIII. It may indeed on fome Occafi-
ons be neceffary, that the Author of Na-
ture difplay his overruling Power in pro-
ducing fome Appearance out of the ordi-
nary Series of things. Such Exceptions
from the general Rules of Nature are pro-
per to furprife and awe Men into an
Acknowledgment of the Divine Being :
But then they are to be ufed but feldom,
otherwife there is a plain Reafon why they
fhould fail of that E fifed. Befides, God
feems to choofc the convincing our Rea-
fon of his Attributes by the Works of
Nature, which difcover fo much Har-
mony and Contrivance in their Make,
and are fuch plain Indications of Wifdom
and
5?o Of the Principles Parti.
and Beneficence in their- Author, rather
than to aftonim us into a belief of his
Being by anomalous and furprifing E-
vents.
LXIV. To fet this Matter in a yet clear-
er Light, I (hall obferve that what has
been objected in Setf. 60. amounts in re-
ality to no more than this : Ideas are not
any how and at random produced, there
being a certain Order and Connexion be-
tween them, like to that of Caufe and
EfTecT: : There arc alfo feveral Combina-
tions of them, made in a very regular and
artificial manner, which feem like fo many
Inftruments in the hand of Nature, that
being hid as it were behind the Scenes,
have a fecret Operation in producing thofe
Appearances which are feen on the The-
atre of the World, being themfelves dif-
cernible only to the curious Eye of the
Philofopher. But fince one Idea cannot
be the C.tufe of another, to what purpofe
is that Connexion ? And fince thofe In-
ftruments, being barely inefficacious Percep-
tions in the Mind, are not fubfervient to
the Production of natural Effects ; it is de-
manded why they are made, or, in other
W6rds, what reafon can be affigned why
God mould make us, upori a cloielnfpec-
tion into his Works, behold fo great Va-
riety
Part I. Of Humane Knowledge.
riety of Ideas, fo artfully laid together,
and fo much according to Rule; it not be*
ingcredible,that he would beat theExpence
(if one may fo fpcak) of all that Art and
Regularity to no purpofe ?
LXV. To all which my Anfwer is, Firft,
That the Connexion of Ideas does not
imply the Relation of Cau/e and Effect,
but only of a Mark or S.^n with the thing
fignlfied. The Fire which I fee i± not
the Caufe of the Pain I fufFer upon my
approaching it, but the Mark that fore-
warns me of it. In like manner, the
Noife that I hear is not the Effect of
this or that Motion orCollifion of the am-
bient Bodies, but the Sign thereof. Se-
condly, The Reafon why Ideas are formed
into Machines, that is, artificial and regu-
lar Combinations, is the fame with that
for combining Letters into Words. That
a few Original Ideas may be made to fig-
nify a great number of Effects and Ac-
tions, it is neceflary they be varioufly com-
bined together ; And to the end their
ufe be permanent and univerfal, thefe
Combinations muft be made by Rule, and
with wife Contrivance. By this means
abundance of Information is conveyed ur>-
to us, concerning what we are to expect
from fuch a.nd fuch Actions, and what
Methods
Of the Principles Part I.
Methods are proper to be taken, for the
exciting fuch and fuch Ideas : Which in ef-
fect is all that I conceive to be distinctly
meant, when it is faid that by difcern-
ing the Figure, Texture, and Mechanifm
of the inward Parts of Bodies, whether
natural or artificial, we may attain to know
the feveral Ufes and Properties depending
thereon, or the Nature of the thing.
LXVI. Hence it is evident, that thofc
things which under the Notion of a
Caufe cooperating or concurring to thePro-
ductionof Effects, are altogether inexplica-
ble, and run us into great Abfurdities, may
be very naturally explained, and have a pro-
per and obvious ufe afligned them, when
they are confidered only as Marks or Signs
for our Information. And it is the fearch-
ing after, and endeavouring to underftand
thofe Signs inftituted by the Author of
Nature, that ought to be the Employ-
ment of the Natural Philofopher, and
not the pretending to explain things by
Corporeal Caufesj which Doctrine feems
to have too much cftranged the Minds
of Men from that active Principle, that
fupreme and wile Spirit, in 'whom ive
live, move, and have our being.
LXVII. It
Part I. of Humane Knowledge.
LXVII. In the twelfth place, it may
perhaps be objected, that though it be
clear from what has been faid, that there
can be no fuch thing as an inert, fenfe-
lefs, extended, folid, figured, moveable
Subftance, exifting without the Mind,
fuch as Philofophers defcribe Matter :
Yet if any Man {hall leave out of his
Idea of Matter^ the pofitive Ideas of Ex-
tenfion, Figure, Solidity and Motion, and
fay that he means only by that Word, an
inert fenfelefs Subftance, that exifts with-
out the Mind, or unperceived, which is
the Occafion of our Ideas, or at the pre-
fence whereof God is pleafed to excite Ide-
as in us : It doth not appear, but that
Matter taken in this fenfe may poffibly
cxift. In Anfwer to which I fay, Firft,
that it feems no lefs abfurd to fuppofe a
Subftance without Accidents, than it is to
fuppofe Accidents without a Subftance. But
Secondly, though we {hould grant this un-
known Subftance may poffibly exift, yec
where can it be fuppofed to be ? That ic
exifts not in the Mind is agreed, and that
it exifts not in Place is no lefs certain ;
fince all Extenfion exifts only in the
Mind, as hath been already proved. It
remains therefore that it exifts no where
at all.
LXVIII. Let
$4 Of the Principles PartL
LXVIIT. Let us examine a little the
Defcription that is here given us of Mat-
ter. It neither acts, nor perceives, nor
is perceived : For this is all that is meant
by faying it is an inert, fenfelefs, unknown
fubflance ; which is a Definition intirely
made up of Negatives, excepting only the
relative Notion of its {landing under or
fupporting : But then it muft be obfer-
ved, that it Jupports nothing at all ; and
ho\v nearly this comes to the Defcrip-
tion of a non-entity, I defire may be con-
fidered. But, fay you, it is the unknown
Qccafion, at the prefence of which, Ideas
are excited in us by the Will of God. Now
I would fain know how any thing can
be prefent to us, which is neither per-
ceivable by Senfe nor Reflexion, nor ca-
pable of producing any Idea in our Minds^
nor is at all extended, nor hath any Form,
nor exifts in any Place. The Words to
be prcferzf, when thus applied, muft needs
be taken in fome abftradl and ftrange
Meaning, and which I am not able to
comprehend.
LXIX. Again, let us examine what is
meant by Occafion : So far as f can gather
from the common ufe of Language, that
Word fignifies, either the Agent which
produces
Part I. of Humane Knowledge.
produces any Effect, or elfe fomething
that is obferved to accompany, or go be-
fore it, in the ordinary Courfe of things.
But when it is applied to Matter as above
defcribed, it can be taken in neither of
thofe ienfes. For Matter is faid to be paffive
and inert, and To cannot bean Agent or ef-
ficient Caufe. It is alfo unperceivable,as be-
ing devoid of all fenfible Qualities, and fo
cannot be the Occafion of our Percepti-
ons in the latter Senfe : As when the burn-
ing my Finger is faid to be the Occafioa
of the Pain that attends it. What there-
fore can be meant by calling Matter an
Occafion ? This Term is either ufed in
no ferifc at all, or elfe in fome fenfe
very diftant from its received Significa-
tion.
LXX. You will perhaps fay that Matter,
though it be not perceived by us, is never-
thelefs perceived by GOD, to whom it
is the Occafion of exciting Ideas in our
Minds. For, fay you, fince we obfcrve
our Senfations to be imprinted in an or-
derly and conflant manner, it is but
reafonable to fuppofe there are certain
conflant and regular Occafions of their
being produced. That is to fay, that
there are certain permanent and diftincl:
Parcels of Matter, correfponding to our
Ideas,
Of the Principle* Part I.
Ideas, which, though they do not excite
them in our Minds, or any ways immedi-
ately affect us, as being altogether paffive
and unperceivable to Us, they are never-
thelefs to G o D, by whom they are per-
ceived, as it were fo many Occafions to
remind him when and what Ideas to im-
print on our Minds : that fo things may
go on in a conftant uniform manner.
LXXI. In anfwer to this I obferve,
that as the Notion of Matter is here ftat-
ed, the Queftion is no longer concerning
the Exiftence of a thing diftindt from
Spirit and Idea, from perceiving and b&-
ing perceived : But whether there arc not
certain Ideas, of I know not what fort, in
the Mind of GOD, which are fo many
Marks or Notes that direct him how to pro-
duce Senfations in our Minds, in a conftant
and regular Method : Much after the
fame manner as a Mufician is directed by
the Notes of Mufick to produce that har-
monious Train and Compofition of Sound,
which is called a Tune ; though they who
hear the Mufick do not perceive the Notes,
and may be intirely ignorant of them. But
this Notion of Matter feems too extrava^
gant to deferve a Confutation. Befides,
it is in effect no Objection againft what we
have advanced, to wit, that there isno fenfe-
lefs, unperceived Subftance. LXX1I. If
Part I. of Humane Knowledge.
LXXIL If we follow the Light of Rea-
fon, we (hall, from the conftant uniform
Method of our Senfations, collect theGood-
nefs and Wifdom of the Spirit who excites
them in our Minds. But this is all that I
can fee reafonably concluded from thence.
To me, I fay, it is evident that the Being
of a Spirit infinitely Wife, Good, and Pow-
erful is abundantly fufficient to explain all
the Appearances of Nature. But as for
inert Jenjelefi Matter^ nothing that I per-
ceive has any the leaft Connexion with it,
or leads to the Thoughts of it. And I
would fain fee any one exp4ain any the
meaneft Phenomenon in Nature by it, or
(hew any manner of Reafon, though in
the loweft Rank of Probability, that he
can have for its Existence ; or even make
any tolerable Senfe or Meaning of that Sup-
poiition. For as to its being an Occafion,
we have, I think, evidently (hewn that
with regard to us it is no Occafion : It re-
mains therefore that it muft be, if at all,
the Occafion to GOD of exciting Ideas in
ns ; and what this amounts to, we have juft
now feen.
LXXIII. It is worth while to reflect a
little on the Motives which induced Men
to fuppofe the Exigence of material Sub-
G {lance -,
•9 g Of the Principles Part I.
ftance ; that fo having obferved the gra-
dual ceafing, and Expiration of thofe Mo-
tives or Reafons, we may proportionally
withdraw the AfTent that was grounded on
them. Firft therefore, it was thought
that Colour, Figure, Motion, and the reft
of the fenfible Qualities or Accidents, did
really exift without the Mind; and for this
reafon, it feemed needful to fuppofe fome
unthinking Subftratum or Subftanct where-
in they did exift, fince they could not be
conceived to exift by themfelves. After-
wards, in procefs of time, Men being con-
.vinced that Colours, Sounds, and the reft
of the fenfible fecondary Qualities had no
Exiftence without the Mind, they ftripped
this Subftratum or material bubftance of
thofe Qualities, leaving only the primary
ones, Figure, Motion, and fuch like,
which they ftill conceived to exift with-
out the Mind, and confequently to ftand
jn need of a material bupport. But it
having been fhewn, that none, even of
thefe, can poffibly exift otherwile than in a
Spirit or Mind which perceives them, it
follows that we have no longer any rea-
fon to fuppofe the being of Matter. Nay,
that it is utterly impoflible there fhould be
any fuch thing, fo long as that Word is
taken to denote an unthinking Subftratum
of Qualities or Accidents, wherein they ex-
ift without the Mind. LXXIV.
Part I. of Humane Knowledge.
LXXIV. But though it be allowed by
the Materialijts themfelves, that Matter
was thought of only for the fake of fup-
porting Accidents j and the reaibn intirely
ceafing, one might expect the Mind fliould
naturally, and without any reluctance at
all, quit the belief of what was folely
grounded thereon. Yet the Prejudice is ri-
veted fo deeply in our Thoughts, that we
can fcarce tell how to part with it, and are
therefore inclined, fince the 'Thing it felf
is indefenfible, at leaft to retain the Name-,
which we apply to I know not what ab-
ftracled and indefinite Notions of Being, or
Occajion^ though without any mew of Rea-
fon, at icaft fo far as I can fee. For what
is there on our part, or what do we per-
ceive amongft ail the Ideas, Senfations, No-
tions, which are imprinted OQ our Minds,
either by Senfe or Reflexion, from whence
may be inferred the Exiftence of an inert,
thoughtlefs, unperceived Occafion ? and on
the otner hand, on the part of an all-fuffi-*
dent Spirit, what can there be that fhould
make us believe, or even fufpedt, he is Ji-
refted by an inert Occafion to excite Ideas
in our Minds?
LXXV. Ic is a very extraordinary In-*
of the force of Prejudice, and much
G 2 ro
ioo Of the Principles Parti.
to be lamented, that the Mind of Man re-
tains fo great a Fondnefs againft all the
evidence of Reafon, for a ftupid though t-
lefs Somewhat, by the interposition where-
of it would, as it were, skreen it felf from
the Providence of God, and remove him
farther off from the Affairs of the World.
But though we do the utmoft we can, to
fecure the belief of Matter, though when
Reafon forfakes us, we endeavour to (up-
port our Opinion on the bare poffibility of
the Thing, and though we indulge our
felves in the full Scope of an Imagination
not regulated by Reafon, to make out that
poor Poffibility, yet the upfhot of all is,
that there are certain unknown Ideas in the
Mind of God; for this, if any thing, is
all that I conceive to be meant by Occasion
with regard to God. And this, at the Bot-
tom, is no longer contending for the Tbingy
but for the Name.
LXXVI. Whether therefore there are
fuch Ideas in the Mind of Go D, and whe-
ther they may be called by the name Mat-
ter, I fhall not difpute. But if you flick to
the Notion of an unthinking Subftance, or
Support of Extenfion, Motion, and ether
fenfible Qualities, then tome it is mofr. evi-
dently impoffible there mould be any fuch
thing. Since it is a plain Repugnancy, that
thofe
Part I. of Humane Knowledge. i o i
thofe Qualities mould exift in or be fup-
ported by an unperceiving Subftance.
LXXVII. But fay you, though it be
granted that there is no thouglulefs fup-
port of Extenfion, and the other Qualities
or Accidents which we perceive ; yet there
may, perhaps, be fome inert unperceiving
Subftance, or Subftratum of fome other
Qualities, as incomprehenfible to us as Co-
lours are to a Man born blind, becaufe we
have not a Senfe adapted to them. But if
we had a new Senfe, we mould poffibly
no more doubt of their Exigence, than a
Blind-man made to fee does of the Exif-
tence of Light and Colours. I anfwer,
Firft, if what you mean by the word Mat-
ter be only the unknown Support of un-
known Qualities, it is no matter whether
there is fuch a thing or no, fince it no
way concerns us ; And I do not fee the
Advantage there is in difputing about we
know not wto, and we know not why.
LXXVIII. But fecondly, if we had a
new Senfe, it could only furnifh us with
new Ideas or Senfations : And then we
mould have the fame reafon againfl their
exifting in an unperceiving Subftance, that
has been already offered with relation to Fi-
gure, Motion, Colour, an4 the like. Qua-
G 3 lities,
ioi Of the Principles Part I,
litics, as hath been (hewn, are nothing elfe
but Senfations or Idea?> which exift only in
a Mind perceiving them; and this is true
not only of the Ideas we are acquainted
with at prefent, but like wife of all pofiibje
Ideas whatsoever.
LXXIX. But you will infift, what if I
have no reafon to believe the Exiftence of
Matter, what if I cannot affign any ufe to
it, or explain any thing by it, or even con-
ceive what is meant by that Word ? Yet
ftill it is no Contradiction to fay that Mat-
ter exifts, and that this Matter is in general
a Subftance, or Occajion of Ideas-, though,
indeed, to go about to unfold the meaning,
or adhere to any particular Explication of
thofe Words, may be attended with great
Difficulties. I anfwer, when Words are
ufed without a Meaning, you may put
them together as you pleafe, without danger
of running into a Contradiction. You may
fay, for Example, that twice Two is equal
to Seven, fo long as you declare you do not
take the Words of that Propofhion in their
ufual Acceptation, but for Marks of you
know not what. And by the fame reafon
you may 'fay, there is an inert thoughtlefs
Subftance without Accidents, which is the
occafion of our Ideas. And we {hall under-
ftand juft as much by one Propofition, as
the other. LXXX. In
Part I. of Humane Knowledge.
LXXX. In thelaft place, you will fay,
What if we give up the Caufe of material
Subftance, and aflert, that Matter is an un-
known Somewhat, neither Subftance nor
Accident, Spirit nor Idea, inert, thought-
lefs, indivifible, immoveable, unextended,
exifting in no Place ? For, fay you, What-
ever may be urged againft Subftance or Oc-
cajion^ or any other pofiuve or relative No-
tion of Matter, hath no place at all, fo long
as this negative Definition of Matter is ad-
hered to. I anfwer, you may, if fo it mail
feem good, ufe the word Matter in the
fame Senfe, that other Men ufe nothing^ and
fo make thofe Terms convertible in your
Style. For after all, this is what appears
to me to be the Refult of that Definition,
the Parts whereof when I confider with
Attention, either collectively, or feparate
from each other, I do not find that there
is any kind of EfFedt or Impreflion made
on my Mind, different from what is ex-
cited by the Term Nothing.
LXXXI. You will reply perhaps, that in
the forefaid Definition is included, what
doth fufficiendy diftinguifh it from no-
thing, the pofitive, abftract Idea of Quid-
dity', Entity, or Exiftence. I own indeed,
that thofe who pretend to the Faculty of
G 4 framing
104 Of the Principles Part I.
framing abftraft general Ideas, do talk as
if they had fuch an Idea, which is, fay
they, the moft abftradt and general Notion
of all, that is to me the moft incompre-
henfible of all others. That there are a
great variety of Spirits of different Orders
and Capacities, whofe Faculties, both in
Number and Extent, are far exceeding
thofc the Author of my Being has be-
ftowed on me, I fee no reafon to deny.
And for me to pretend to determine by
my own few, ftinted, narrow Inlets of
Perception, what Ideas the inexhauftible
Power of the SUPREME SPIRIT may
imprint upon them, were certainly the ut-
moft Folly and Prefumption, Since there
may be, for ought that I know, innu-
merable forts of Ideas or Senfations, as dif-
ferent from one another, and from all that
I have perceived, as Colours are from Sounds.
But how ready foever I may be, to acknow-
ledge the Scantinefs of my Comprehenfion,
with regard to the cndlefs variety of Spi-
rits and Ideas, that might poffibly exift,
yet for any one to pretend to a Notion of
Entity or Exiftence, abftrafted from Spirit
and Idea, from perceiving and being per-
ceived, is, I fufpect, a downright repjg-
nancy and trifling with Words. It remains
that we confider the Objections, which may
poilibiy be made on the part of Religion.
LXXXII.
Part I. of Humane Knowledge. 105
LXXXII. Some there are who think,
that though the Arguments for the real
Exiftence of Bodies, which are drawn from
Reafon, be allowed not to amount to De-
monftration, yet the Holy Scriptures are fo
clear in the Point, as will fufficiently con-
vince every good Chriftian, that Bodies do
really exift, and are fomething more than
mere Ideas j there being in Holy Writ in-
numerable Facts related, which evidently
fuppofe the reality of Timber, and Stone,
Mountains, and Rivers, and Cities, and
humane Bodies. To which I anfwer, that
no fort of Writings whatever, facred or
profane, which ufe thofe and the like
Words in the vulgar Acceptation, or fo as
to have a meaning in them, are in danger
of having their Truth called in queftion by
our Doctrine. That all thofe Things do
really exift, that there are Bodies, even
corporeal Subftances, when taken in the
vulgar Senfe, has been (hewn to be agreea-
ble to our Principles : And the difference
betwixt Things and Ideas^ Realities and
Chimeras, has been diftinclly explained *.
And I do not think, that either what Phi-
lofophers call Matter^ or the Exiftence of
Objects without the Mind, is any where
mentioned in Scripture.
LXXXIII.
* Seel. XXIX, XXX, XXXIII, XXXVT, &c,
io6 Of the Principles Part I.
LXXXIII. Again, whether there be, or
be not external Things, it is agreed on all
hands, that the proper Ufe of Words, is
the marking our Conceptions, or Things
only as they are known and perceived by
us ; whence it plainly follows, that in the
Tenets we have laid down, there is nothing
inconfiftent with the right Ufe and Signi-
ficancy "of Language^ and that Diicourfe of
what kind foever, fo far as it is intelligi-
ble, remains undifturbed. But all this
feems lo manifeft, from what hath been
fet forth in the Premifes, that it is needlefs
to infill any farther on it.
LXXXIV. But it will be urged, that Mi-
racles do, at lead, lofe much of their itrefs
and Import by our Principles. What muft
we think of Motes' $ Rod, was it not really
turned into a Serpent, or was there only a
Change of Ideas in rhe Minds of the Spec-
tators ? And can it be fuppofed, that our
Saviour did no more at the Marmge-Feaft
in Caxay than impofe on the Sight, and
Smell, and Tafte of the Gucfts, fo as to
create in them the Appearance or Idea on-
ly of Wine ? The fame may be faid of all
other Miracles : Which, in confequence of
the foregoing Principles, muft be looked
upon only as fo many Cheats, or Illufions
of
Parti, of Humane Knowledge. 107
of Fancy. To this I reply, that the Rod
was changed into a real Serpent, and the
Water into real Wine. That this doth not,
in the leaft, contradict what I have elfe-
where faid, will be evident from Sect, 34,
and 35. But this Bufinefs of Real and
Imaginary hath been already fo plainly and
fully explained, and fo often referred to, and
the Difficulties about it are fo eafily an-
fwered from what hath gone before, that it
were an Affront to the Reader's Under-
ftanding, to refume the Explication of it
in this place. I (hall only obferve, that if
at Table all who were prefent mould fee,
and fmell, and tafte, and drink Wine, and
find the effects of it, with me there could
be no doubt of its Reality. So that, at Bot-
tom, the Scruple concerning real Miracles
hath no place at all on ours, but only on
the received Principles, and confequently
maketh rather fory than againjl what hath
been faid.
LXXXV. Having done with the Objec-?
tions, which I endeavoured to propofc in
the cleared Light, and gave them all the
Force and Weight I could, we proceed ia
the next place to take a view of our Te-
nets in their Confequences. Some of thefe
appear at firft Sight, as that feveral diffi-
cult and obfcure Queftions, on which
abundance
i o S Of the Principles Part I.
abundance of Speculation hath been thrown
away, are intirely banifhed from Philofo-
phy. Whether corporeal Subftance can
think ? Whether Matter be infinitely divi-
fible? And how it operates on Spirit? thefe
and the like Inquiries have given infinite
Amufement to Philofophers in all Ages.
But depending on the Exiftencc of Matter,
they have no longer any place on our Prin-
ciples. Many other Advantages there are,
as well with regard to Religion as the Scien-
ces, which it is eafy for any one to deduce
from what hath been premifed. Bat this
will appear more plainly in the Sequel.
LXXXVI. From the Principles we have
laid down, it follows, humane Knowledge
may naturally be reduced to two Heads,
that of Ideas, and that of Spirits. Of each
of thefe I flvall 'treat in order. And firft
as to Ideas or unthinking Things, our
Knowledge of thefe hath been very much
obfcured and confounded, and we have
been led into very dangerous Errors, by
fuppofing a twofold Exiftence of the Ob-
jeds of Senfe, the one intelligible^ or in
the Mind, the other real and without the
Mind : Whereby unthinking Things are
thought to have a natural Subfiftence of
their own, diftinct from being perceived
by Spirits. This which, if I miftake not,
hath
Parti, of Humane Knowledge,
hath been (hewn to be a moft groundlefs
and abfurd Notion, is the very Root of
Scepfjcijm} for fo long as Men thought
that real Things fubfifted without the Mind,
and that their Knowledge was only fo far
forth real as it was conformable to real
Things^ it follows, they could not be cer-
tain that they had any real Knowledge at
all. For how can it be known, that the
Things which are perceived, are conform-
able to thofe which are not perceived, or
exift without the Mind ?
LXXXVII. Colour, Figure, Motion,
Extenfion and the like, confidered only as
fo many Senfations in the Mind, are per-
fectly known, there being nothing in them
which is not perceived. But if they are
looked on as Notes or Images, referred to
Tbings or Archetypes exifting without the
Mind, then are we involved all in Scepfi-
cifm. We fee only the Appearances, and
not the real Qualities of Things. What
may be the Extenfion, Figure, or Motion
of any thing really and absolutely, or in it
felf, it is impoffible for us to know, but
only the proportion or the relation they
bear to our Senfes. Things remaining the
fame, our Ideas vary, and which of them,
or even whether any of them at all rep're-
fent the true Quality really exifting in the
Thing,
no Of the Principles Part t.
Thing, it is out of our reach to determine.
So that, for ought we know, all we fee,
hear, and feel, may be only Phantom
and vain Chimera, and not at all agree
with the real Things, exifting in Rerum
Natura. All this Scepticifm follows, from
our fuppofing a difference between Things
and Ideas, and that the former have a Sub-
fiftence without the Mind, or unperceived.
It were eafy to dilate on this Subject, and
(hew how the Arguments urged by Sceptics
in all Ages* depend on the Suppofition of
external Objects.
LXXXVIII. So long as we attribute a.
real Exiftence to unthinking Things, di-
ftinct from their being perceived, it is not
only impofiible for us to know with evi-
dence the Nature of any real unthinking
Being, but even that it exifts. Hence it
is, that we fee Philofophers diftruft their
Senfes, and doubt of the Exiflence of Hea-
ven and Earth, of every thing they fee or
feel, even of their own Bodies. And after
all their labour and ftruggle of Thought,
they are forced to own, we cannot attain
to any felf-evident or demonftrative Know-
ledge of the Exiftence of fenfible Things.
But all this Doubtfulnefs, which fo bewil-
ders and confounds the Mind, and makes
Philojbpby ridiculous in the Eyes of the
World,
Part I. of Humane Knowledge. in
World, vanishes, if we annex a meaning to
our Words, and do not amufe our felves with
the Terms Abjblute, External, Exift, and
fuch like, fignifying we know not what.
I can as well doubt of my own Being, as
of the Being of thofe Things which I
actually perceive by Senfe : It being a ma-
nifeft Contradiction, that any fenfible Ob-
ject mould be immediately perceived by
Sight or Touch, and at the fame time
have no Exiftence in Nature, fince the ve-
ry Exiftence of an unthinking Being con-
fifts in being perceived*
LXXXIX. Nothing feems of more Im-
portance, towards erecting a firm Syfteme
of found and real Knowledge, which may
be proof againft the Aflauhs of Scepticifin,
than to lay the beginning in a diftinct Ex-
plication of what is meant by 'L'bing, Rea~
lity, Exiftence : For in vain (hall we dif-
pute concerning the real Exiftence of*
Things, or pretend to any Knowledge
thereof, fo long as we have not fixed the
meaning of thofe Words. Taking or Being
is the mo ft general Name of all, it com-
prehends under it two Kinds intirely di-
ftinct and heterogeneous, and which have
nothing common but the Name, to wit,
Spirits and Ideas. The former are active,
indivifthle Subftances : The latter are inert,
fleeting,
in Of the Principles Part I.
dependent Beings, which fubfift not
by themfclves, but are fupported by, or
exift in Minds or fpiritual Subftances. We
comprehend our own Exiftence by inward
Feeling or Reflexion, and that of other Spi-
rits by Reafon. We may be faid to have
fome Knowledge or Notion of our own
Minds, of Spirits and active Beings, where-
of in a ftrict Senfe we have not Ideas. In
like manner we know and have a Notion
of relations between Things or Ideas, which
relations are diftinct from the Ideas or
Things related, inafmuch as the latter may
be perceived by us without our perceiving
the former. To me it feems that Ideas,
Spirits and Relations are all in their refpec-
tive kinds, the Object of humane Know-
ledge and Subject of Difcourfe : and that
the Term Idea would be improperly ex-
tended to fignify every thing we know or
have any Notion of.
XC. Ideas imprinted on the Senfes arc
real Things, or do really exift ; this we do
not deny, but we deny they can fubfift
without the Minds which perceive them,
or that they are Refemblances of any Ar-
chetypes exifting without the Mind : Since
the very Being of a Senfation or Idea con-
Ms in being perceived, and an Idea can
be like nothing but an Idea. Again, the
Things
Parti., of Humane Knowledge.
Things perceived by Senfe may be termed
external^ with regard to their Origin, in
that they are not generated from within,
by the Mind it felf, but imprinted by a
Spirit diftinct from that which perceives
them. Senfible Objects may likewife be faid
to be without the Mind, in another fenfe,
namely when they exift in fome other
Mind. Thus when I {hut my Eyes, the
Things I faw may ftill exift, but ic muftr
be in another Mind.
XCI. It were a miftake to think, that
what is here faid derogates in the leaft
from the Reality of Things. It is acknow-
ledged on the received Principles, that Ex-
tenlion, Motion, and in a word all fenfi-
ble Qualities, have need of a Support, as
not being able to fubiift by themfelves.
But the Objects perceived by Senfe, are al-
lowed to be nothing but Combinations of
thofe Qualities, and confequently cannot
fublift by themfelves. Thus far it is agreed
on all hands. So that in denying the Things
perceived by Senfe, an Exiftence indepen-
dent of a Subflance, or Support wherein
they may exift, we detract nothing from
the received Opinion of their Reality, and
ire guilty of no Innovation in that refpect.
All the difference is, that according to us
:he unthinking Beings perceived by Senfe,
H hav*
1 1 4 Of the Principles Pare I.
have no Exigence diftinct from Being per-
ceived, and cannot therefore exift in any
other Subftance, than thofe unextended, in-
divifible SubfUnces, or Spirits, which acl,
and think, and perceive them : Whereas
Philofophers vulgarly hold, that the fenfi-
ble Qualities exift in an inert, extended,
unperceiving Subftance, which they call
Matter, to which they attribute a natural
Subfiftence, exterior to all thinking Be-
ings, or diftinct from Being perceived by
a«y" Mind whatfoever, even the eternal
Mind of the GREAT OK, wherein they
fuppofe only Ideas of the corporeal $ub-
jftances created by him : If indeed they
allow them to be at all created.
XCII. For as we have (hewn the Doc-
trine of Matter or corporeal Subftance, to
have been the main Pillar and Support of
Sceptiafm, fo likewife upon the fame Foun-
dation have been raifed all the impious
Schemes of Atbeifm and Irreligion. Nay
Ib great a difficulty hath it been thought,
to conceive Matter produced out of no-
thing, that the moft celebrated among the
ancient Philofophers, even of thefe who
maintained the Being of a GOD, have
thought Matter to be uncreated and coe-
ternal with him. How great a Friend ma-
terial Subftance hath been to Atbeifts in all
Ages,
Part I. of Humane Knowledge. 1 1
Ages, were needlefs to relate. All theif
monftrous Syftems have fo vifible and ne-
cefTary a dependence on it, that when this
Corner-ftone is once removed, the whole
Fabrick cannot choofe but fall to the
Ground ; infomuch that it is no longer
worth while, to bellow a particular Con-
iideration on the Abfurdities of every
wretched Seel: of At.heijls.
XCIII. That impious and profane Per-
fons mould readily fall in with thofe Sy-
ftems which favour their Inclinations, by
deriding immaterial Subftance, and fup-
pofing the Soul to be divifible and ftibject
to Corruption as the Body> which exclude
all Freedom, Intelligence, and Defign from
the Formation of Things, and inilead there-
of make a felf-exiftenr, ftupid, urrthink-
Hig Subftance the Root and Origin of all
Beings. That they mould hearken to thofe
who deny a Providence, or infpedtion of a
fuperior Mind over the Affairs of the
World, attributing the whole Series of E-
vents either to blind Chance or fatal Ne-
ceffity, arifing from the Impulfe of one Bo-
dy on another. All this is very natural.
And on the other hand, when Men of bet-
ter Principles obierve the Enemies of Re-
ligion lay fo great a Strefs on unthinking
Matter^ and all of them ufe fo- much In-
H 2 duftry
ii 6 Of the Principles Fart I.
duftry and Artifice to reduce every thing
to it ; methinks they mould rejoice to fee
them deprived of their grand Support, and
driven from that only Fortrefs, without
which your Epicureans, Hobbifts, and the
Hke, have not even the Shadow of a Pre-
tence, but become the moil cheap and ea-
fy Triumph in the World.
XCIV. The Exigence of Matter, or Bo-
dies unperceived, has not only been the
main Support of Atheijls and Fatalijl^ but
on the fame Principle doth Idolatry 1 ike-
wife in all its various Forms depend. Did
Men but coniider that the Sun, Moon, and
Stars, and every other Object of the Senfes,
are only fo many Senfations in their Minds,
which have no other Exiftence but barely
being perceived, doubtlefs they would ne-
ver fall down, and wormip their own /-
deal ; but rather addrefs their Homage to
that ETERNAL INVISIBLE MIND
which produces and fuftains all Things.
XCV. The fame abfurd Principle, by
mingling it felf with the Articles of our
Faith, hath occafioned no fmall Difficul-
ties to Chriftians. For Example, about the
Re/urreftion, how many Scruples and Ob-
jections have been raifed by Socinians and
others? But do not the moft plaufible of
them
Part I. of Humane Knowledge. 117
them depend on the fuppofhion, that a Bo-
dy is denominated the fame^ with regard
not to the Form or that which is perceived
by Senfe,but the material Subftance which
remains the fame under feveral Forms ?
Take away this material Subftance, about
the Identity whereof all the Difpute is,
and mean by Body what every plain ordi-
nary Perfon means -by that Word, to wit,
that which is immediately feen and felt,
which is only a Combination of fenfible
Qualities, or Ideas: And then their mofl
unanfwerable Objections come to nothing.
XCVI. Matter being once expelled out
of Nature, drags with it fo many fceptical
and impious Notions, fuch an incredible
number of Difputes and puzling Queftions,
which have been Thorns in the bides of
Divines, as well as Philofophers, and made
fo much fruitlefs Work for Mankind •, that
if the Arguments we have produced againft
it, arc not found equal to Demonftration
(as to me they evidently feem) yet I am
fure all Friends to Knowledge, Peace,
and Religion, have reafon to wifh they
were.
XCVII. Befide the external Exigence of
the Objedts of Perception, another great
Source of Errors and Difficulties, with re-
ft 3 gard
1 1 8 Of the Principles Part I.
gard to Ideal Knowledge, is the Doctrine
of abftracl Ideas, fuch as it hath been fet
forth in the Introduction. The plaineft
Things in the World, thofe we are mod
intimately acquainted with, and perfectly
know, when they are confidered in an ab-
ftract way, appear flrangely difficult and
incomprehenfible. Time, Place, and Mo-
tion, taken in particular or concrete, are
•what every Body knows ; but having paf-
fed through the Hands of a Metaphyfician,
they become too abftract and fine, to be
apprehended by Men of ordinary Senfe.
3id vour Servant meet vou at fuch a Time.
•> *
in fuch a Place^ and he mall never ftay to
deliberate on the meaning of thofe Words:
In conceiving that particular Time and
Place, or the Motion by which he is to get
thither, he finds not the leaft Difficulty.
But if Time be taken, exclusive of all thofe
particular Actions and Ideas that diverfify
the Day, merely for the Continuation of
Exiftence, or Duration in Abftract, then it
will perhaps gravel even a Philofopher to
•comprehend it.
XCVJII. Whenever I attempt to frame
• a fimple Idea of *Iimet abftra&ed from the
fucceffion of Ideas in my Mind, which
flows uniformly, and is participated by all
B-ings, I am loft and embrangled in inex-
tricable
Part I. of Humane Knowledge. 1 1
tricable Difficulties. I have no Notion of
it at all, only I hear others fay, it is infi-
nitely divifible, and fpeak of it in fuch a
manner as leads me to entertain odd
Thoughts of my Exiftence : Since that
Duclrine lays one under an abfolute necef-
fity of thinking, either that he palTes away
innumerable Ages without a Thought, or
elfe that he is annihilated every moment
of his Life: Both which feem equally ab-
furd. Time therefore being nothing, ab-
flracled from the Succeflion of Ideas in our
Minds, it follows that the Duration of
any finite Spirit muft be eftimated by the
Number of Ideas or Actions fucceeding
each other in that fame Spirit or Mind.
Hence it is a plain confequence that the
Soul always thinks : And in truth whoever
{hall go about to divide in his Thoughts,
or abftract the Exijicnce of a Spirit from
its Cogitation , will, I believe, find it no eafy
Task.
XCIX. So like wife, when we attempt
to abftracl: Exteniion and Motion from all
other Qualities, and confider them by
themfelves, we prefently lofe fight of them,
and run into great Extravagancies. All
which depend on a two- fold Abftraction :
Firft, it is fuppofed that Extenfion, for Ex-
ample, may be abftracted from all other
H 4
1 10 Of the Principles Part I.
fenfible Qualities ; and Secondly, that the
Entity of Extenfion may be abftracted
from its being perceived. But whoever
(hall reflect, and take care to underftand
what he fays, will, if I miftake not, ac-
knowledge that all fenfible Qualities are a-
like ScnJatloriSi and alike rea/-, that where
the Extenfion is, there is the Colour too,
to wit, in his Mind, and that their Arche-
types can exift only in fome other Mind:
And that the Objects of Senfe are nothing
but thofe Senfations combined, blended, or
( if one may fo fpeak ) concreted together :
None of all which can be fuppofed to ex-
ift unperceived.
C. What it is for a Man to be happy,
or an Object good, every one may think he
knows. But to frame an abftract Idea of
Happinffsy prefcinded from all particular
Pleafure, or of Goodnefs, from every thing
that is good, this is what few can pretend
to. So likewife, a Man may be juft and
virtuous, without having precife Ideas of
yuftice and Virtue. The Opinion that thofe
and the like Words ftand for general No-
tions abftracted from all particular Perfons
and Actions, feems to have rendered Mo-
rality difficult, and the Study thereof of
lefs ufe to Mankind. And in effect, the
Doctrine of Abftraftion has not a Jittle
con-
Part I. of Humane Knowledge.
contributed towards fpoiling the moft ufe.-
ful Parts of Knowledge.
CI. The two great Provinces of fpecu-
lative Science, converfant about Ideas re-
ceived from Senfe and their Relations, are
natural Philofophy and Mathematics ; with
regard to each of thefe I mall make ibme
Obfervations. And-Firft, I (hall fay fome-
what of natural Philofophy. On this Sub-
ject it is, that the Sceptics triumph : All
that (lock of Arguments they produce to
depreciate our Faculties, and make Man-
kind appear ignorant and low, are drawn
principally from this Head, to wit, that
we are under an invincible Blindnefs as to
the true and real Nature of Things. This
they exaggerate, and love to enlarge on.
We are miferably bantered, fay they, by
our Senfes, and amufed only with the out-
fide and mew of Things. The real Ef-
fence, the internal Qualities, and Confti-
tution of every the meaneil Object, is hid
from our view; fomething there is in eve-
ry drop of Water, every grain of Sand,
which it is beyond the Power of humane
Undenlanding to fathom or comprehend.
But it is evident from what has been (hewn,
that all this Complaint is groundlcfs, and
that we are influenced by falfc Principles
to that degree as to miilruft our Senfes,
and
Of the Principles Parti.
and think we know nothing of thofe
Things which we perfectly compre-
hend.
CII. One great Inducement to our pro-
nouncing our felves ignorant of the Nature
of Things, is the current Opinion that
every thing includes* within it felf the
Caufe of its Properties : Or that there is in
each Object an inward EfTence, which is
the Source whence its difcernible Qualities
flow, and whereon they depend. Some
have pretended to account for Appearances
by occult Qualities, but of late they are
moftly refolved into mechanical Caufes, to
wit, the Figure, Motion, Weight, and fuch
like Qualities of infenfible Particles: Where-
as in truth, there is no other Agent or ef-
ficient Caufe than Spirit y it being evident
that Motion, as well as all other Ideas y is
perfectly inert. See SeEt. 25. Hence, to
endeavour to explain the Production of
Colours or Sounds, by Figure, Motion,
Magnitude and the like, muft needs be la-
bour in vain. And accordingly, we fee
the Attempts of that kind are not at all
fatisfadtory. Which may be (aid, in gene-
ral, of thofe Inftances, wherein one Idea
or Quality is affigned for the Caule of an-
other. I need not fay, how many Hypo-
tbefes and Speculations are left out, and
hovy
Part I. of Humane Knowledge. \ 1 3
how much the Study of Nature is abridged
by this Doctrine.
CIII. The great mechanical Principle
now in Vogue is Attraction. That a Stone
falls to the Earth, or the Sea fwells to-
wards the Moon, may to fome appear fuf-
ficiently explained thereby. But how are
we enlightened by being told this is done
by Attraction ? Is it that that Word fig-
nifjes the manner of the Tendency, and
that it is by the mutual drawing of Bodies,
initead of their being impelled or pro-
truded towards each other ? But nothing is
determined of the Manner or Action, and
jt may as truly (for ought we know) be
termed Impulfe or Protrufion as Attraction.
Again, the Parts of Steel we fee cohere
firmly together, and this alfo is accounted
for by Attraction j but in this, as in the
other Inftances, I do not perceive that any
thing is fignified befides the Effect it felf ;
for a$ to the manner of the Action where-
by it is produced, or the Caufe which pro-
duces it, thefe are not fo much as aimed
at.
CIV. Indeed, if we take a view of the
feveral Phenomena, and compare them to-
gether, we may obferve fome likenefs and
conformity between them. For Example,
in
Principles Part I.
in the falling of a Stone to the Ground,
in the rifing of the Sea towards the Moon,
in Cohefion and Cryftallization, there is
fomething alike, namely an Union or rnu-
tual Approach of Bodies. So that any one
of thefe or the like Phenomena t may not
feem ftrange or furprifing to a Man who
hath nicely obferved and compared the Ef-
fects of Nature. For that only is thought
fo which is uncommon, or a thing by it
fclf, and out of the ordinary Courfe of our
Observation. That Bodies mould tend to-
wards the Center of the Earth, is not
thought ftrange, becaufe it is what we per-
ceive every moment of our Lives. But
that they mould have a like Gravitation
towards the Center of the Moon, may feem
odd and unaccountable to moft Men, be-
caufe it is difcerned only in the Tides. But
a Philofopher, whofe Thoughts take in a
larger compafs of Nature, having obferved
a certain fimilitude of Appearances, as well
in the Heavens as the Earth, that argue
innumerable Bodies to have a mutual Ten-
dency towards each other, which he de-
notes by the general Name Attraftion^ what-
ever can be reduced to that, he thinks juft-
ly accounted for. Thus he explains the
Tides by the Attraction of the Terraque-
ous Globe towards the Moon, which to
him doth not appear odd or anomalous, but
only
Part I. of Humane Knowledge. 125
only a particular Example of a general Rule
or Law of Nature.
CV. If therefore we confider the dif-
ference there is betwixt natural Philofo-
phers and other Men, with regard to their
Knowledge of the Phenomena, we (hall
find it confifls, not. in an exacter Know-
ledge of the efficient Gaufe that produces
them, for that can be no other than the
Will of a Spirit, but 't>nly in a greater
Largenefs of Comprehcnfion, whereby A-
nalogies, Harmonies, and Agreements are
difcovered in the Works of Nature, and the
particular Effects explained, that is, re-
duced to general Rules, fee Sift. 62. which
Rules grounded on the Analogy, and Uni-
formnefs obferved in' the Production of na-
tural Effects, are molt agreeable, and fought
after by the Mind j for that they extend
our Profpect beyond what is prefent, and
near to us, and enable us to make very
probable Conjectures, touching Things that
may have happened at very great distances
of Time and Place, as well as to predict
Things to come ; which fort of endeavour
towards Omnifciencc, is much affected by
the Mind.
CVI. But we mould proceed warily in
fuch Things : for we are apt to lay too
great
Of the Principles Part I.
great a Strefs on Analogies, and to the pre-
judice of Truth, humour that Eagernefs of
the Mind, whereby it is carried to extend
its Knowledge into general Theoremes. For
Example, Gravitation, or mutual Attrac-
tion, becaufe it appears in many Inftances,
fome are ftraightway for pronouncing Uni*
wrj'al ; and that to attraft^ and be attracted
by every other Body, is an ejfcntial Duality
inherent in all Bodies ivbatfoe-ver. Whereas
it appears the fixed Stars have no fuch
Tendency towards each other : and fo far
is that Gravitation, from being ejjential to
Bodies, that, in fome Inftances a quite con-
trary Principle feems to {hew it felf : As in
the perpendicular Growth of Plants, and
the Elafticity of the Air. There is no-
thing neceflary or eiTential in the Cafe, DUE
it depends intirely on the Will of the go-
verning Spirit, who caufes certain Bodies
to cleave together, or tend towards each
other, according to various Laws, whilft
he keeps others at a fixed Diftance ; and
to fome he gives a quite contrary Tenden-
cy to fly afunder, juft as he fees conve-
nient.
CVII. After what has been premifed, I
think we may lay down the following Con-
eluiions. Firft, Ic is plain Philoibphers
amufe themfelves in vain, when they in-
quire
Part I. Of Humane Knowledge.
quire for any natural efficient Caufe, di-
ftincl: from a Mind or Spirit. Secondly,
Confidering the whole Creation is the
Workmanfhip of a 'wife and govd Agent^ it
.mould feem to become Philofophers, to
employ their Thoughts (contrary to what
fome hold ) about the final Caufes of
Things : And I muft confefs, I fee no rea-
fon, why pointing out the various Ends, to
which natural Things are adapted, and for
which they were originally with unfpeak-
able Wifdom contrived, mould not be
thought one good way of accounting for
them, and altogether worthy a Philofo-
pher. Thirdly, From what hath been pre-
mifed no reafon can be drawn, why the
Hiftory of Nature fhould not ftill be ftu-
died, and Obfervations and Experiments
made, which, that they are of ufe to Man-
kind, and enable us to draw any general
Conclufions, is not the Refult of any im-
mutable Habitudes, or Relations between
Things themfelveSj but only of G o D'S
Goodnefs and Kindnefs to Men in the Ad-
miniftration of the World. See Setf. 30
and 3 1. Fourthly, By a diligent Obferva-
tion of the Phenomena within our View,
we may difcover the general Laws of Na-
ture, and from them deduce the other
Phcenomena^ I do not fay dcmonjlrate-, for
all Deductions of that kind depend on a
Suppofition
1 18 Of the Principles Part I.
Suppofiddn that the Author of Nature al-
ways operates uniformly, and in a conftant
obfervance of thole Rules we take for
Principles : Which we cannot evidently
know.
CVIII. Thofe Men who frame general
Rules from the Phtznomena^ and afterwards
derive the Phenomena from thofe Rules,
ieem to confider Signs rather than Caufes.
A Man may well underftand natural Signs
without knowing their Analogy, or being
able to fay by what Rule a Thing is fo or
fo. And as it is very poffiblc to write im-
properly, through too ftricl: an Obfervance
of general Grammar- Rules: So in arguing
from general Rules of Nature, it is not im-
poilible we may extend the Analogy coo
iar, and by that means run into Miftakes.
CIX. As in reading other Books, a wife
Man will choofe to fix his Thoughts on
the Senfe and apply it to ufe, rather than
lay them out in Grammatical Remarks on
the Language; fo in perufing the Volume
of Nature, it feems beneath the Dignity
of the Mind to affect an Exactnefs in re-
ducing each particular Pbammenon to ge-
neral Rules, or ihewing how it follows
from them. We mould propoie to our
felves nobler Views, fuch as to recreate and
exalt
Parti, of Humane Knowledge. 12.9
exalt the Mind, with a profpeft of the
Beauty, Order, Extenr, and Variety of na-
tural Things : Hence, by proper Inferea-
ces, to enlarge our Notions of the Gran-
deur, Wifdom, and Beneficence of the
C K E A T o R : And laftly, to make the fe-
veral Parts of the Creation, fo far as in us
lies, fubfervient to the Ends they were de-
figned for, G o D'S Glory, and the Suften-
tation and Comfort of our felves and Fel-
low-Creatures.
CX. The beft Key for the aforefaid A-
nalogy, or natural bcience, will be eafily
acknowledged to be a certain celebrated
Treat ife 01 Mechanics : In the entrance of
which juftly admired Treatife, Time,
Space and Motion, are diftingui(hed into
Abfolute and Relative, True and Apparent,
Mathematical and Vulgar : Which Diftinc-
tion, as it is at large explained by the Au-
thor, doth fuppofe thofe Quantities to have
an Exiftence without the Mind: And thac
they are ordinarily conceived with relation
to fenlible Things, to which neverthelefs
in their own Nature, they bear no relation
at all.
CXI. As for Tifftfj as it is there taken in
an abfolute or abftradted Senie, for the
Duration or Perfeverance of the Exigence
I of
i jo Of the Principles Part I.
of Things, I have nothing more to add
concerning it, after what hath been alrea-
dy faid on that Subject, Seff. 97 and 98.
For the reft, this celebrated Am Lor holds
there is an abfolute Space, which, being un-
perceivable to Senfe, remains in it fr If ft-
milar and immoveable : And relative Space
to be the meafure thereof, which being
moveable, and defined by its Situation in
refpecl of fenfible Bodies, is vulgarly taken
for immoveable Space. Place he defines to
be that part of Space which is occupied by
any Body. And according as the bpace is
abfolute or relative, fo alfo is the Place.
Abfolute Motion is faid to be the Tranflati-
on of a Body from abfolute Place to ab-
folute Place, as relative Motion is from
one relative Place to another. And becaufe
the Parts of abfolute Space, do not fall un-
der our Senfes, inftead of them we are ob-
liged to ufe their fenfible Meafures : And
fo define both Place and Motion with re-
fpecl: to Bodies, which we regard as im-
moveable. But it is faid, in philofophical
Matters we muft abftracl from our Senfes,
fince it may be, that none of thofe Bodies
which feem to be quiefcent, are truly fo :
And the fame thing which is moved rela-
tively, may be really at reft. As likewife
one and the fame Body may be in relative
Reft and Motion, or even moved with con-
trary
Part t. of Humane Knowledge.
trary relative Motions at the fame time,
according as its Place is variously defined.
All which Ambiguity is to be found in the
apparent Motions, but not at all in the
true or abfolute, which fhould therefore
be alone regarded in Philofophy. And the
true, we are told, -are diftinguifhed from
apparent or relative Motions by the follow-
ing Properties. Firft, In true or abfolute
Motion, all Parts which preferve the lame
Pofition with refpect to the whole, par-
take of the Motions of the whole. Second-
ly, The Place being moved, that which is
placed therein is alio moved : So that a Bo-
dy moving in a Place which is in Motion,
doth participate the Motion of its Place.
Thirdly, True Motion is never generated of
changed, other wife than by Force impre£-
fed on the Body it felf. Fourthly, True
Motion is always changed by Force im-
prefled on the Body moved. Fifthly, In
circular Motion barely relative, there is nor
centrifugal Force, which neverthelefs in
that which is true or abfolute, is propor-
tional to the Quantity of Motion.
CXII. But notwithstanding what hath
been faid, it doth not appear to me, that
there can be any Motion other than rela-
tive : So that to conceive Motion, there
muft be at kaft conceived two Bodies,
I 2 whereof
131 Of the Principles Part I.
whereof the Diftance or Polidon in regard
to each other is varied. Hence if there
was one only Body in being, it could not
poffibly be moved. This feems evident, in
that the Idea I have of Motion doth necef-
farily include Relation.
CXIII. But though in every Motion it
be necefTary to conceive more Bodies than
one, yet it may be that one only is moved,
namely that on which the Force caufing
the change of diftance is imprefled, or in
other Words, that to which the Action is
applied. For however fome may define
Relative Motion, fo as to term that Body
moved, which changes its Diftance from
fome other Body, whether the Force or
Action caufing that Change were applied
•to it, or no : Yet as Relative Motion is that
which is perceived by Senfe,and regarded in
the ordinary Affairs of Life, it fhould feem
that every Man of common Scnfe knows
what it is, as well as the beft Philofopher :
Now I ask any one, whether in his Senfe
of Motion as he walks along the Streets,
the Stones he pafles over may be faid to
move, becaufe they change Diftance with
his Feet? To me it feems, that though
Motion includes a Relation of one thing
to another, yet it is not necefTary that
each Term of the Relation be denominated
from
Part I. of Humane Knowledge. \ 3
from it. As a Man may think of fome-
what which doth not think, fo a Body
may be moved to or from another Body,
which is not therefore it felf in Motion.
CXIV. As the Place happens to be va-
rioufly defined, the Motion which is re-
lated to it varies. 'A Man in a Ship may
be faid to be quiefcent, with relation to
the fides of the VelTel, and yet move with
relation to the Land. Or he may move
Eaftward in refpedt of the one, and Weft-
ward in refpect of the other. In the com-
mon Affairs of Life, Men never go beyond
the Earth to define the Place of any Body :
And what is quiefcent in refpect of that, is
accounted abfolutely to be fo. But Philo-
fophers who have a greater Extent of
Thought, and jufter Notions of the Syftem
of Things, difcover even the Earth it felf
to be moved. In order therefore to fix
their Notions, they feem to conceive the
Corporeal World as finite, and the utmoft
unmoved Walls or Shell thereof to be the
Place, whereby they eftimate true Moti-
ons. If we found our own Conceptions,
I believe we may find all the abfolute Mo-
tion we can frame an Idea of, to be at
bottom no other than relative Motion thus
defined. For as hath been already obferved,
abfolute Motion exclufive of all external
I 3 Relation
4 Of the Principles Part I.
Relation is incomprehenfible : And to this
kind of Relative Motion, all the above-
mentioned Properties, Caufes, and Effects
afcribed to abfolute Motion, will, if I mif-
take not, be found to agree, As to what
is faid of the centrifugal Force, that it doth
not at all belong to circular Relative Mo-
tion : I do not fee how this follows from
the Experiment which is brought to prove
it. See °Pbilojbf.bi(Z Naturalis Principia Ma-
thematica^ in Schol. Lief. VIII. For the Wa-
ter in the Veffel, at that time wherein it is
faid to have the greateft relative circular
Motion, hath, I think, no Motion at all:
As is plain from the foregoing Section.
CXV. For to denominate a Body moved,
it is requifite, fir ft, that it change its Di-
ftance or Situation with regard to fome
other Body : And fecondly, that the Force
or Action occasioning that Change be ap-
plied to it. If either of thefe be wanting,
I do not think that agreeably to the Senfc
of Mankind, or the Propriety of language,
a Body can be faid to be in Motion. I
grant indeed, that it is poffible for us to
think a Body, which we fee change its
Diftance from fome other, to be moved,
though it have no force applied to it, ( in
which Senfe there may be apparent Mo-
EJpn,) but then it is, becaufe the Force
cauling
Part I. of Humane Knowledge. 135
caufin£ the Change of Diftance, is ima-
gined by us to be applied or imprefled on
thar Body thought to move. Which in-
deed {hews we are capable of miftaking a
thing to be in Motion which is not, and
that is all.
CXVL From what hath been faid, it
follows that the Philofophic Confideration
of Motion doth not imply the being of an
abfolute Space, diftinct from that which is
perceived by Senfe, and related to Bodies :
Which that it cannot exift without the
Mind, is clear upon the fame Principles,
that demonftrate the like of all other Ob-
jeds of Senfe. And perhaps, if we in-
quire narrowly, we (hall find we cannot
even frame an Idea of pure Space, exclu-
five of all Body. This I muft confefs feems
impoffible, as being a moft abftracl Idea.
When I excite a Motion in fome part of
my Body, if it be free or without Refif-
tance, I fay there is Space : But if I find
a Refiftunce, then I fay there is Body : and
in proportion as the Refiftance to Motion
is lerTer or greater, I fay the Space is more
or Impure. So that when I fpeak of pure
or empty Space, it is not to be fuppofed,
that the Word Space ftands for an' Idea di-
ftindt from, or conceivable without Body
and Motion. Though indeed we are apt
14 t(>
3 6 Of the Principles Part I.
to think every Noun Subftantive flands
for a diftinct Idea, that may be feparated
from all others : Which hath occafioned
infinite Miftakes. When therefore fuppo-
fing all the World to be annihilated befides
my own Body, I fay there ftill remains
pure Space : Thereby nothing elfe is meant,
but only that I conceive it poffible, for the
Limbs of my Body to be moved on all
fides without the leaft Refiftance : But if
that too were annihilated, then there could
be no Motion, and confequently no Space.
Some perhaps may think the Senfe of
Seeing doth furnifti them with the Idea of
pure Space ; but it is plain from what we
have elie where (hewn, that the Ideas of
Space and Pittance are not obtained by
that Senfe. See the EJf'ay concerning Vi-
fion.
CXVII. What is here laid down, feems
to put an end to all thofe Difputes and
Difficulties, which have fprung up amongft
the Learned concerning the nature of pure
Space. But the chief Advantage arifing
from it, is, that we are freed from that
dangerous Dilemma, to which feveral who
have employed their Thoughts on this Sub-
ject, imagine themfelves reduced, to wit,
of thinking either that Real Space is GOD,
or elfe that there is fomething befide GOD
which
Part I. of Humane Knowledge.
which is Eternal, Uncreated, Infinite, In-
divifible, Immutable. Both which may
juftly be thought pernicious and abfurd
Notions. It is certain that not a few Di-
vines, as well as Philofophers of great
note, have, from the Difficulty they found
in conceiving either Limits or Annihila-
tion of Space, concluded it muft be Di-
vine. And fome of late have fet themfelves
particularly to (hew, that the incommu-
nicable Attributes of GOD agree to ir.
Which Doctrine, how unworthy foever it
may feem of the Divine Nature, yet I do
not fee how we can get clear of it, fo long
as we adhere to the received Opinions.
CXVIII. Hitherto of Natural Philofo-
phy : We come now to make fome Inqui-
ry concerning that other great Branch of
fpeculative Knowledge, to wit, Mathema-
tics. Thefe, how celebrated foever they
may be, for their Clearnefs and Certainty
of Demonftration, which is hardly any
where elfe to be found, cannot neverthe-
lefs be fuppofed altogether free from Mif-
takes ; if in their Principles there lurks
fome fecret Error, which is common to
the ProfeiTors of thofe Sciences with the
reft of Mankind. Mathematicians, though
they deduce their Theoremes from a great
height of Evidence, yet their firft Princi-
ples
1 3 8 Of the Principles Part L
pics arc limited by the confideration of
Quantity : And they do not afcend into
any Inquiry concerning thofe tranfcenden-
tal Maxims, which influence all the parti-
cular Sciences, each Part whereof, Mathe-
matics not excepted, doth confequendy
participate of the Errors involved in them.
That the Principles laid down by Mathe-
maticians are true, and their way of De-
duction from thofe Principles clear and in-
conteftable, we do not deny. But we hold,
there may be certain erroneous Maxims of
greater Extent than the Object of Mathe-
matics, and for that reafon not cx-
prefly mentioned, though tacitly fuppofed
throughout the whole progrefs of that
Science ; and that the ill Effects of thofe
fecret unexamined Errors are diffufed
through all the Branches thereof. To be
plain, we fufpect the Mathematicians arc,
as well as other Men, concerned in the Er-
rors arifing from the Doctrine of abftract
general Ideas, and the Exiftence of Ob-
jects without the Mind.
CXIX. Arithmetic hath been thought to
have for its Object abftract Ideas of Num-
ber. Of which to understand the Proper-
ties and mutual Habitudes is fuppofed no
mean part of fpeculative Knowledge. The
Opinion of the pure and intellectual Na-
ture
Part I. of Humane Knowledge.
ture of Numbers in Abftract, hath made
them in efteem with thcfe Philofophers,
who feem to have affected an uncommon
Finenefs and Elevation of Thought. It
hath fet a Price on the moft trifling nu~
merical Speculations which in Practice are
of no ufe, but ferve only for Amufement:
And hath therefore fo far infected the
Minds of fome, that they have dreamt of
mighty Myfteries involved in Numbers, and
attempted the Explication of natural Things
by them. But if we inquire into our own
Thoughts, and confider what hath been
premifed, we may perhaps entertain a low
Opinion of thole high Flights and Ab-
ftractions, and look on all Inquiries about
Numbers, only as fo many difficilss mtgce,
fo far as they are not fubfervient to prac-
tice, and promote the benefit of Life.
CXX. Unity in Abftract we have before
considered in Se€l. 13, from which and
what hath been faid in the Introduction, it
plainly follows there is not any fuch Idea.
But Number being defined a Collection of
Unites, we may conclude that, if there be
no fuch thing as Unity or Unite in Ab-
{tract, there are no Ideas of Number in
Abftract denoted by the numeral Names
and Figures, The Theories therefore in
Arithmetic, if they are abftracted from the
Names
Of the Principles Part I.
Names and Figures, as likewife from all
Ufe and Practice, as well as from the
particular things numbered, can be fup-
pofed to have nothing at all for their
Object. Hence we may fee, how intire-
ly the Science of Numbers is fubordinate
to Practice, and how jejune and trifling
it becomes, when considered as a matter
of mere Speculation.
CXXI. However fince there may be
fome, who, deluded by the fpecious
Shew of discovering abftracted Verities,
wafte their time in Arithmetical Theo-
remes and Problemes, which have not a-
ny Ufe : It will not be amifs, if we more
fully confider, and expofe the Vanity of
that Pretence; And this will plainly ap-
pear, by taking a view of Arithmetic in
its Infancy, and obferving what it was
that originally put Men on the Study of
that Science, and to what Scope they di-
rected it. It is natural to think that at firft,
Men, for cafe of Memory and help of
Computation, made ufc of Counters, or
in writing of fingle Strokes, Points or
the like, each whereof was made to fignify
an Unite, that is, fome one thing of what-
ever Kind they had occafion to reckon.
Afterwards they found out the more
compendious ways, of making one Cha-
rader ftand in place of feveral Strokes,
or
Parti, of Humane Knowledge. 141
or Points. And laftly, the Notation of
the Arabians or Indians came into ufe,
wherein by the repetition of a few Cha-
racters or Figures, and varying the Sig-
ni6cation of each Figure according to the
place it obtains, all Numbers may be
moft aptly exprefled : Which feems to
have been done in Imitation of Lan-
guage, fo that an exact Analogy is ob-
ferved betwixt the Notation by Figures
and Names, the nine fimple Figures
anfvvering the nine firfl numeral Names
and Places in the former, correfponding
to Denominations in the latter. And
agreeably to thofe Conditions of the
fimple and local Value of Figures,
were contrived Methods of finding from
the given Figures or Marks of the Parts,
what Figures and how placed, arc pro-
per to denote the whole or vice vtr/a.
And having found the fought Figures,
the fame Rule or Analogy being obferved
throughout, it is eafy to read them into
Words; and fo the Number becomes per-
fectly known. For then the Number of
any particular Things is faid to be known,
when we know the Name or Figures (with
their due arangement) that according to the
Handing Analogy belong to them. For thefe
Signs being known, we can by the Ope-
rations of Arithmetic, know the Signs of
any
Of the Principles Part I.
any Part of the particular Sums fighified
by them; and thus computing in Signs,
(becauie of the Connexion efbbtilhed be-
twixt them and the diftinct multi-
tudes of Things, whereof dne is taken
for an Unite,) we may be able rightly
to fum up, divide, and proportion the
things themfelves that we intend to num-
ber.
CXXII. In Arithmetic therefore we
regard not the Things but the Signs,
which neverthelefs are not regarded for
their own fake, but bccaufe they direct
us how to act with relation to Things,
and difpofe rightly of tnem. Now a-
greeably to what we have before obferved,
of Words in general (Setf. 19. Introd.)
it happens here likewile, that ab-
ftract Ideas are thought to be fignified
by Numeral Names or Characters, while
they do not fuggeft Ideas of particular
Things to our Minds. I malt not at
preftnt enter into a more particular Dif-
lertaaon on this Subject; but only obferve
that it is evident from what hath been faid^
thofe Things which pafs for abftract
Truths and Theoremes concerning Num-
bers, are, in reality, converfant about
no Object diflinct from particular nume-
rable Things, except only Names and
Cha-
Part I. of Humane Knowledge. 1
Characters; which originally came to be
confidered, on no other account but their
being Signs, or capable to reprefent aptly,
whatever particular Things Men had need
to compute. Whence it follows, that to
ftudy them for their own fake would be
juft as wife, and to • as good purpofe, as
if a Man, neglecting the true Ufe or ori-
ginal Intention and Subferviency of Lan-
guage, mould fpend his time in imper-
tinent Criticifms upon Words, or Reafo-
nings and Comroverfies purely Ver-
bal.
CXXIII. From Numbers we proceed
to fpeak of Extenjion, which confidered
as relative, is the Object of Geometry.
The Infinite Divifibility of Finite Exten-
fion, though it is not exprefly laid down,
cither as an Axiome or Theoreme in the
Elements of that Science, yet is through-
out the fame every where fuppofed, and
thought to have fo infeparable and efTen-
tial a Connexion with the Principles and
Demonflrations in Geometry, that Ma-
thematicians never admit it into Doubt,
or make the leaft Queftion of it. And
as this Notion is the Source from whence
do fpring all thole amufmg Geometrical
Paradoxes, which have fuch a direct Re-
pugnancy to the plain common Senfe of
Mankind,
144 Of the Principles Part I.
Mankind, and are admitted with fo much
Reluctance into a Mind not yet debauch-
ed by Learning: So is it the principal
occaiion of all that nice and extreme Sub-
tiity, which renders the Study of Mathe-
matics fo difficult and tedious. Hence if
we can make it appear, that no Finite
Extenfion contains innumerable Parts, or
is infinitely Diviiible, it follows that we
fhall at once clear the Science of Geo-
metry from a great Number of Difficul-
ties and Contradictions, which have ever
been efteemed a Reproach to Humane
Reafon, and withal make the Atcainment
thereof a Bufinefs of much lefs Time and
Pains, than it hitherto hath been.
CXXIV. Every particular Finite Ex-
tenfion, which may poffibly be the Ob-
ject of our Thought, is an Idea exifting
only in the Mind, and confequently each
Part thereof mufl be perceived. If there-
fore I cannot perceive innumerable Parts
in any Finite Extenfion that I conlider,
it is certain they are not contained in it:
But it is evident, that I cannot diftin-
guifh innumerable Parts in any particu-
lar Line, Surface, or Solid, which I ei-
ther perceive by Senfe, or Figure to my
felf in my Mind: Wherefore I conclude
they are not contained in it. Nothing
can
Parti, of Humane Knowledge. 145
can be plainer to me, than that the Ex-
ten (ions I have in View are no other
than my own Ideas, and it is no lefs
plain, that I cannot refolve any one of
my Ideas into an innnire Number ©f
other Ideas, that is, that they are not in-
finitely Divilible. If by Finite Extenfiov
be meant fomcthing diftincl: from a Fi-
nite Idea, I declare I do not know what
that is, and fo cannot affirm or deny a-
ny thing of it. But if the terms Exteji~
dony Parts, and the like, are taken in any
Senfe conceivable, that is, for Ideas j then
:o fay a Finite Quantity or Extenfion
:onfifts of Parts infinite in Number, is
b manifeft a Contradiction, that everv
' j
me at firft fight acknowledges it to be
o. And it is impomble it mould ever
;ain the Ailent of any reafonable Crea-
ure, who is not brought to it by gentle
.nd flow Degrees, as a converted Gentile
o the belief of Tranfubjlantiation. An-
:ient and rooted Prejudices do often pafs
nto Principles: And thofe Propofitions
vhich once obtain the force and credit
if a Principle^ are not only themfelves,
ut likewile whatever is deducible from
hem, thought privileged from all Exa-
lination. And there is no Abfurdity fo
rofs, which by this means the Mind of
dan may not be prepared to fwallow.
K CXXV.
Of the Principles ParcL
CXXV. He whofe Undemanding is
prcpoffeft with the Doctrine of abftract
general Ideas, may be perfuaded, that
(whatever be thought of the Ideas of
Senfe,) Extenfion in abjlraffi is infinitely
divifible. And one who thinks the Ob-
jects of Senfe exift without the Mind,
will perhaps in virtue thereof be brought
to admit, that a Line but an Inch long
may contain innumerable Parts really
exifling, though too fmall to be difcer-
ned. Thefe Errors are grafted as well
in the Minds of Geometricians, as of other
Men, and have a like influence on their
Reafoningsj and it were no difficult thing,
to fhew how the Arguments from Geo-
metry made ufe of to fupport the infi-
nite ^ Divifibility of Extenfion, are bot-
tomed on them. At prefent we (hall on-
ly obferve in general, whence it is that
the Mathematicians are all fo fond and
tenacious of this Doctrine.
CXXVI. It hath been obferved in ano-
ther place, that the Thcoremes and De-
monflrations in Geometry are converfant
about Univerfal Ideas. Scff. 15. Introd.
Where it is explained in what Senfe this
ought to be underflood, to wit, that the
particular Lines and Figures included in
the
Part I. of Humane Knowledge. 147
the Diagram, are fuppofed to ftand for in-
numerable others of different Sizes : or in
other words, the Geometer confiders them
abftradting from their Magnitude : which
doth not imply that he forms an abftract
Idea, but only that he cares not what the
particular Magnitude is, whether great or
Imall, but looks on that as a thing indiffe-
rent to the Demonftration : Hence it fol-
lows, that a Line in the Scheme, but an
Inch long, muft be fpoken of, as though ic
contained ten thoufand Parts, fince it is re-
garded not in it felf, but as it is univerfal ;
and it is univerfal only in its Signification,
whereby it reprefents innumerable Lines
greater than it felf, in which may be dif-
tinguimed ten thoufand Parts or more,
though there may not be above an Inch in
it. After this manner the Properties of the
Lines fignified are (by a very ufual Figure)
transferred to the bign, and thence through
Miftake thought to appertain to it conii-
dered in its own Nature.
CXXVII. Becaufe there is no Number
of Parts fo great, but it is poffible there
may be a Line containing more, the Inch-
line is faid to contain Parts more than any
afiignable Number ; which is true, not of
the Inch taken abfolutely, but only for the
Things fignified by it. But Men not re-
K 2 taining
148 Of the Principles Port I.
taining that Diftindion in their Thoughts,
flide into a belief that the fmall particular
Line defcribed on Paper contains in it felf
Parts innumerable. There is no fuch thing
as the ten-thoufandth Part of an Inch -,
but there is of a Mile or Diameter of the
Earth, which may be fignified by that Inch.
When therefore I delineate a Triangle on
Paper, and take one fide not above an Inch,
for Example, in length to be the Radius :
This I confider as divided into ten thou-
fand or an hundred thoufand Parts, or
more. For though the ten-thoufandth Part
of that Line confidered in it felf, is no-
thing at all, and confequcntly may be neg-
lected without any Error or Inconvenien-
cy ; yet thefe defcribed Lines being only
Marks ftanding for greater Quantities,
whereof it may be the ten-thoufandth Part
is very confiderable, it follows, that to pre-
vent notable Errors in Practice, the Radius
muft be taken of ten thoufand Parts, or
more.
CXXVIII. From what hath been faid
the reafon is plain why, to the end any The-
oreme may become univerfal in its Ufe, it
is neceffary we fpeak of the Lines defcribed
on Paper, as though they contained Parts
which really they do not. In doing of
which, if we examine the matter through-
.fart I. of Humane Knowledge.
ly, we (hall perhaps difcover that we can-
not conceive an Inch it felf as confiding
of, or being divifible into a thoufand Parts,
but only fome other Line which is far
greater than an Inch, and reprefented by
it. And that when we fay a Line is infi-
nitely divifible y we mufl mean a Line
which is infinitely great. What we have
here obferved feems to be the chief Caufe,
why to fuppofe the infinite Divifibility of
finite Extenfion hath been thought necef-
fary in Geometry.
CXXIX. The feveral Abfurdities and
Contradictions which flowed from this falfe
Principle might, one would think, have
been efteemed fo many Demonftrations a-
gainft it. But by I know not what Logict
it is held that Proofs a pofteriori are not to
be admitted againft Propofitions relating to
Infinity. As though it were not impofli-
ble even for an infinite Mind to reconcile
Contradictions. Or as if any thing abfurd
and repugnant could have a necefTary Con-
nexion with Truth, or flow from it. But
whoever confiders the Weaknefs of this
Pretence, will think it was contrived on
purpofe to humour the Lazinefs of the
Mind, which had rather acquiefce in an
indolent Scepticifm, than be at the Pains
to go through with a fevere Examination
K 3 of
j o Of the Principles Part I.
of thofe Principles it hath ever embraced
for true.
CXXX. Of late the Speculations about
Infinites have run fo high, and grown to
fuch ftrange Notions, as have occafioned no
fmall Scruples and Difputes among the
Geometers of the prefcnt Age. Some there
are of great Note, who not content with
holding that finite Lines may be divided
into an infinite Number of Parts, do yet
farther maintain, that each of thofe Infi-
nitefimals is it felf fubdivifible into an In-
finity of other Parts, or Infinitefimals of a
fecond Order, and fo on ad infinitum.
Thefe, I fay, afTert there are Infinitefimals
of Infinitefimals of Infinitefimals, without
ever coming to an end. So that according
to them an Inch doth not barely contain
an infinite Number of Parts, but an Infi-
nity of an Infinity of an Infinity ad infini-
tum of Parts. Others there be who hold
all Orders of Infinitefimals below the firft
to be nothing at all, thinking it with good
reifon abfurd, to imagine there is any po-
fuive Quantity or Part of Extenfion,
which though multiplied infinitely, can
ever equal the fmalleft given Extenfion.
And yet on the other hand it feems no lefs
«•
abfurd, to think the Sqtiare, Cube, or other
Power of a pofitive real Root, fhould it
felf
Part I. of Humane Knowledge. i 5 i
felf be nothing at all ; which they who
hold Infinitefimals of the firft Order, de-
nying all of the fubfequent Orders, are ob-
liged to maintain.
CXXXI. Have we not therefore reafon
to conclude, that they are both in the
wrong, and that there is in effect no fuch
thing as Parts infinitely final!, or an infi-
nite number of Parts contained in any fi-
nite Quantity ? But you will fay, that if
this Doctrine obtains, it will follow the ve-
ry Foundations of Geometry are deftroyed :
And thofe great Men who have raifed that
Science to fo aftoniming an height, have
been all the while building a Caflle in the
Air. To this it may be replied, that what-
ever is ufeful in Geometry and promotes
the benefit of humane Life, doth ftill re-
main firm and unfhaken on our Principles.
That Science confidered as practical, will
rather receive Advantage than any Preju-
dice from what hath been faid. But to fet
this in a due Light, may be the Subject of
a diftinct Inquiry. For the reft, though
it mould follow thatforne of the more in-
tricate and fubtile Parts of Speculative Ma-
thematics may be pared off without any
prejudice to Truth 3 yet I do not fee what
jDamage will be thence derived to Man-
kind, On the contrary, it were highly to
K 4 be
Of the Principles Part I.
be wifhed, that Men of great Abilities and
obftinate Application would draw off their
Thoughts from thofe Amufements, and
employ them in the Study of fuch Things
as lie nearer the Concerns of Life, or have
a more direct Influence on the Manners.
CXXXII. If it be faid that feveral The-
oremes undoubtedly true, are difcovered
by Methods in which Innnitefimals arc
made ufe of, which could never have been,
if their Exiftence included a Contradiction
in it. I anfvver, that upon a thorough
Examination it will not be found, that in
any Inftance it is necetfary to make ufe of
or conceive infinitefimal Parts of finite
Lines, or even Quantities lefs than the Mi-
nimum Senjibile : Nay, it will be evident
this is never done, it being impoilible.
CXXXIII. By what we have premifed,
it is plain that very numerous and impor-
tant Errors have taken their rife from thofe
falfe Principles, which were impugned in
the foregoing Parts of this Treatife. And
the Oppoiitcs of thofe erroneous Tenets at
the fame time appear to be moft fruitful
Principles, from whence do flow innume-
rable Confequences highly advantageous to
true Philosophy as well as to Religion.
Particularly, Matter or the alfilute Exif-
tenc?
Part I. of Humane Knowledge.
fence of Corporeal Objects, hath been (hewn
to be that wherein the moft avowed and
pernicious Enemies of all Knowledge, whe-
ther humane or divine, have ever placed
their chief Strength and Confidence. And
furely, if by diftinguifhing the real Exif-
tence of unthinking Things from their be-
ing perceived, and allowing them a Subfif-
tence of their own out of the Minds of
Spirits, no one thing is explained in Na-
ture j but on the contrary a great many
inexplicable Difficulties arife : If the Sup-
pofition of Matter is barely precarious, as
not being grounded on fo much as one fin-
gle Reafon : If its Confequences cannot en-
dure the Light of Examination and free
Inquiry, but skreen themfelves under the
dark and general pretence of Infinites being
incomprcbenfible : If withal the Removal of
this Matter be not attended with the leaft
evil Confequence, if it be not even miffed
in the World, but every thing as well, nay
much eaiier conceived without it : If laft-
ly, both Sceptics and Atheifts are for ever
filenced upon fuppofing only Spirits and
Ideas, and this Scheme of Things is per-
fectly agreeable both to Reafon and Reli-
gion : Methinks we may expect it {hould
be admitted and firmly embraced, though
it were propofed only as an Hypothefis, and
the Exigence of Matter had been allowed
poffible,
154 Of tke Principles Part I.
pofiible, which yet I think we have evi-
dently demonflratcd that it is not.
CXXXIV. True it is, that in confe-
quence of the foregoing Principles, feve-
ral Difputes and Speculations, which are
efteemed no mean Parts of Learning, are
rejected as ufelefs. But how great a Pre-
judice foevcr againft our Notions, this
may give to thofe who have already
been deeply engaged, and made large Ad-
vances in Studies of that Nature : Yet
by others, we hope it will not be
thought any juft ground of Diflike to
the Principles and Tenets herein laid
down, that they abridge the labour of
Study, and make Humane Sciences more
clear, compendious, and attainable, than,
they were before.
CXXXV. Having difpatched what we
intended to fay concerning the knowledge
of Ideas, the Method we propofed leads
us, in the next place, to treat of Spirits:
With regard to which, perhaps Humane
Knowledge is not fo deficient as is vuU
* garly imagined. The great Reafon that
is affigned for our being thought igno-
rant of the nature of Spirits, is, our not
having an Idea of it. But furely it ought
not to be looked on as a defedt in a Hu-
mane
Part I. of Humane Knowledge. 155
mane Underftanding, thatch does not per-
ceive the Idea of Spirit, if it is mani-
feftly impoffible there mould be any fuch
Idea. And this, if I miftake not, has been
demonftrated in Sett. 27 : To which I
(hall here add that a Spirit has been (hewn
to be the only Subftance or Support,
wherein the unthinking Beings or Ideas can
exift : But that this Subftance which fup-
ports or perceives Ideas mould it felf be an
Idea or like an Idea, is evidently abfurd.
CXXXVI. It will perhaps be faid,
that we want a Senfe (as fome have ima- .
gined) proper to know Subftances with-
al, which if we had, we might know"
our own Soul, as we do a Triangle.
To this I anfwer, that in cafe we had a
new Senfe beftowed upon us, we could
only receive thereby fome new Senfations
or Ideas of Senfe. But I believe no Bo-
dy will fay, that what he means by the
terms Soul and Sttbjtance, is only fome
particular fort of Idea or Senfation. We
may therefore infer, that all things du-
ly confidered, it is not more reasonable
to think our Faculties defective, in that
they do not furnim us with an Idea of
Spirit or active thinking Subftance, than it
would be if we mould blame them for not
being able to comprehend a round Square.
CXXXVIL
1 5 6 Of the Principles Part I.
CXXXVII. From the opinion that Spi-
rits are to be known after the manner of
an Idea or Senfation, have rifen many
abfurd and heterodox Tenets, and much
Sccpticifm about the Nature of the Soul.
It is even probable, that this Opinion
may have produced a Doubt in fome,
whether they had any Soul at all diftinct
from their Body, iince upon inquiry they
could not find they had an Idea of it.
That an Idea which is inactive, and the
Exiftence whereof confifts in being per-
ceived, mould be the Image or Likenefs
of an Agent fublifting by it felf, feems
to need no other Refutation, than barely
attending to what is meant by thole
Words. But perhaps you will fay, that
tho* an Idea cannot refemble a Spirit,
in its Thinking, Acting, or Subfifting by
it felf, yet it may in fome other refpedls:
And it is not neceflary that an Idea or
Image be in all refpe&s like the Original.
CXXXVIII. I anfwer, If it does not in
thofe mentioned, it is impoffible it mould
reprefent it in any other thing. Do but
leave out the Power of Willing, Think-
ing, and Perceiving Ideas, and there re-
mains nothing elfe wherein the Idea can
be like a Spirit. For by the Word Spi-
rit
Part I. of Humane Knowledge. 1 5 7
rit we mean only that which thinks,
wills, and perceives; this, and this alone,
conftitutes the Signification of that Term.
If therefore it is impoflible that any de-
gree of thofe Powers mould be represented
in an Idea, it is evident there can be no Idea
of a Spirit.
CXXXIX. But it will be objected, tliac
if there is no Idea fignified by the Terms
Soul, Spirit^ and Sub/lance, they are whol-
ly infignificant, or have no meaning in
them. I anfvver, thofe Words do mean or
fignify a real Thing, which is neither an
Idea nor like an Idea, but that which per-
ceives Ideas, and Wills, and Reafons about
them. What I am my felf, that which I
denote by the Term I, is the fame with
what is meant by Soul or Spiritual Sub-
Jlance. If it be faid that this is only quar-
relling at a Word, and that fmce the im-
mediate Significations of other Names arc
by common confent called Ideas, no rcaibn
can be alTigned, why that which is figni-
fied by the Name Spirit or Soul may not
partake in the fame Appellation. I anfwer,
All the unthinking Objects of the Mind a-
gree, in that they are intirely pafTive, and
their Exiftence confifts only in being per-
ceived : Whereas a Soul or Spirit is an ac-
live Being;, whofe Exiilence conlifts not in
' u •
be ins
1 5 8 Of the Principles Part I.
being perceived, but in perceiving Ideas
and Thinking. It is therefore necefiary, in
order to prevent Equivocation and con-
founding Natures perfectly difagreeing and
unlike, that we diftinguifli between Spirit
and Idea. See Se&. 27.
CXL. In a large Senfe indeed, we may
be faid to have an Idea, or rather a Notion
of Spirit, that is, we underftand the mean-
ing of the Word, otherwife we could not
affirm or deny any thing of ic. Moreover,
as we conceive the Ideas that are in the
Minds of other Spirits by means of our
own, which we fuppofe to be Refemblan-
ccs of them : So we know other Spirits
by means of our own Soul, which in that
fcenfe is the Image or Idea of them, it
having a like relpect to other Spirits, that
Bluenefs or Heat by me perceived hath to
thofe Ideas perceived by another.
CXLI. It muft not be fuppofed, that
they who aflert the natural Immortality of
the Soul are of opinion, that it is abfolute-
]y incapable of Annihilation even by the
infinite Power of the CREATOR who
firfl gave it Being : But only that it is not
liable to be broken or difiblved by the or-
dinary Laws of Nature or Motion. They
indeed, who hold the Soul of Man to be
only
Part I. Of Humane Knowledge. i j
only a thin vital Flame, or Syflem of ani-
mal Spirits, make it periming and corrup-
tible as the Body, fince there is nothing
more eafily diffipated than fuch a Being,
which it is naturally impoffible mould fur-
vive the Ruin of the Tabernacle, wherein
it is inclofed. And this Notion hath been
greedily embraced and cherimed by the
worft part of Mankind, as the moft effectual
Antidote againft all Impreffions of Virtue
and Religion. But it hath been made evi-
dent, that Bodies -of what Frame or Tex-
ture foever, are barely paflive Ideas in the
Mind, which is more diftant and hetero-
geneous from them, than Light is from
Darknefs. We have fhewn that the Soul
is Indivifible, Incorporeal, Unextended, and
it is confequently Incorruptible. Nothing
can be plainer, than that the Motions,
Changes, Decays, and Diffolutions which
we hourly fee befal natural Bodies (and
which is what we mean by the Courfe of
Nature) cannot poffibly affect an active,
fimple, uncompounded Subftance : Such a
Being therefore is indiflbluble by the force
of Nature, that is to fay, the Soul of Man
is naturally immortal.
CXLII. After what hath been faid, it is
I fuppofe plain, that our Souls are not to
be known in the fame manner as fenfelefs
• • inactive
160 Of the Principles Part I.
inactive Objects, or by way of Idea. Spi-
rits and Ideas are Things fo wholly diffe-
rent, that when we fay, they exijl^ they are
knoiun> or the like, thefe Words muft not
be thought to fignify any thing common to
both Natures. There is nothing alike or
common in them : And to expert that by
any Multiplication or Enlargement of our
Faculties, we may be enabled to know a
Spirit as we do a Triangle, feems as ab-
furd as if we mould hope to fee a Sound.
This is inculcated becaufe I imagine it may
be of Moment towards clearing feveral
important Queflions, and preventing fome
very dangerous Errors concerning the Na-
ture of the Soul. We may not I think
flridly be faid to have an Idea of an ac-
tive Being, or of an Action, although we
may be faid to have a Notion of them. I
have fome Knowledge or Notion of my
Mind, and its Acts about Ideas, inafmuch
as I know or underfland what is meant by
thofe Words. What I know, that I have
fome Notion of. I will not fay, that the
Terms Idea and Notion may not be ufed
convertibly, if the World will have it fo.
But yet it conduceth to Clearnefs and Pro-
priety, that we diftinguith Things very dif-
ferent by different Names. It is alfo to be
remarked, that all Relations including an
Act of the Mind, we cannot fo properly
be
Part I. of Humane Knowledge.
be faid to have an Idea, but rather a No-
tion of the Relations or Habitudes between
Things. But if in the modern way the
Word Idea is extended to Spirits, and Re-
lations and Ads; this is after all an Affair
of verbal Concern.
CXLIII. It will not be amifs to add,
that the Dodrine of Abftratt Ideas hath
had no fmall {hare in rendering thofe Scien-
ces intricate and obfcure, which are parti-
cularly converfant about fpiritual Things.
Men have imagined they could frame ab-
ilrad Notions of the Powers and Ads of
the Mind, and confider them prefcinded,
as well from the Mind or Spirit it felf, as
frorn their refpedive Objeds and Effeds.
Hence a great number of dark and ambi-
guous Terms presumed to (land for ab-
ilrad Notions, have been introduced into
Metaphyfics and Morality, and from thefe
have grown infinite Diftradions and Dif-
putes amqngft the Learned.
CXLIV. But nothing feems more to
have contributed towards engaging Men in
Controverfies and Miftakes, with regard to
the Nature and Operations of the Mind,
than the being ufed to fpeak of thofe
Things, in Terms borrowed from fenfible
Ideas. For Example, the Will is termed
L the
Of the Principles Part I.
the Motion of the Soul : This infufes a
Belief, that the Mind of Man is as a Ball
in Motion, impelled and determined by
the Obje<fls of Senfe, as neceflarily as that
is by the Stroke of a Racket. Hence arife
endlefs Scruples and Errors of dangerous
confequence in Morality. All which I
doubt not may be cleared, and Truth ap-
pear plain, uniform, and confident, could
but Philofophers be prevailed on to retire
into themfelves, and attentively confider
their own meaning.
CXLV. From what hath been faid, it is
plain that we cannot know the Exiftence
of other Spirits, otherwife than by their
Operations, or the Ideas by them excited
in us. I perceive feveral Motions, Changes,
and Combinations of Ideas, that inform
me there are certain particular Agents like
my felf, which accompany them, and con-
cur in their Production. Hence the Know-
ledge I have of other Spirits is not imme-
diate, as is the Knowledge of my Ideas 5
but depending on the Intervention of Ideas,
by me referred to Agents or Spirits diftinct
from my felf, as Effects or concomitant
Signs.
CXLVI. But though there be fomo
Things which convince us, humane Agents
are
Part I. of Humane Knowledge.
are concerned in producing them ; yet it' is
evident to every one, that thofe Things
•which are called the Works of Nature, that
is, the far greater part of the Ideas or Sen-
fations perceived by us, are not produced
by, or dependent on the Wills of Men.
There is therefore fome other Spirit thas
caufes them, fince it is repugnant that they
ihould fubfift by themfelves. See Sect. 29.
But if we attentively confider the conftant
Regularity, Order, and Concatenation of
natural Things, the furprifing Magnifi-
cence, Beauty, and Perfection of the larger,
and the exquifite Contrivance of the fmal-
ler Parts of the Creation, together with the
exact Harmony and Correfpondence of the
whole, but above all, the never enough
admired Laws of Pain and Pleafure, and
the Inftindls or natural Inclinations, Appe-*
tites, and Paflions of Animals ; I fay if we
confider all thefe Things, and at the fame
time attend to the meaning and import of
the Attributes, One, Eternal, infinitely Wife,
Good, and Perfect, we mail clearly per-
ceive that they belong to the aforefaid Spi-
rit, 'who works all in all, and by whom all
things conjift.
CXLVII. Hence it is evident, that GOD
is known as certainly and immediately as
any other Mind or Spirit whatfoever, di-
L a Aindt
Of the Principles Part I.
ftinft from our felves. We may even af-
fert, that the Exiftence of G o D is far more
evidently perceived than the Exiftence of
Men j becaufe the Effects of Nature are
infinitely more numerous and confiderable,
than thofe afcribed to humane Agents.
There is not any one Mark that denotes a
Man, or Effect produced by him, which
doth not more ftrongly evince the Being
of that Spirit who is the Author of Na-
ture. For it is evident that in affecting
other Perfons, the Will of Man hath no
other Object, than barely the Motion of the
Limbs of his Body j but that fuch a Mo-
tion mould be attended by, or excite any
Idea in the Mind of another, depends
wholly on the Will of the CREATOR.
He alone it is who upholding all things by
the Word of his Power, maintains that In-
tercourfe between Spirits, whereby they are
able to perceive the Exiftence of each
other. And yet this pure and clear Light
which enlightens every one, is it felf invi-
fible.
CXLVIII. It feerris to be a general Pre-
tence of the unthinking Herd, that they
cannot fee GOD. Could we but fee him,
fay they, as we fee a Man, we mould be-
lieve that he is, and believing obey his
Commands. But alas we need only open
our
Part I. of Humane Knowledge.
our Eyes to fee the fovereign Lord of all
Things with a more full and clear View,
than we do any one of our Fellow-Crea-
tures. Not that I imagine we fee GOD
( as fome will have it ) by a direct and im-
mediate View, or fee Corporeal Things, not
by themfelves, but by feeing that which
reprefents them in the EfTence of G o D,
which Doctrine is I muft confefs to me
incomprehenfible. But I {hall explain my
Meaning. A humane Spiric or Perfon is
not perceived by Senfe, as not being an.
Idea j when therefore we fee the Colour,
Size, Figure, and Motions of a Man, we
perceive only certain Senfations of Ideas ex-
cited in our own Minds : And thefe being
exhibited to our View in fundry diftinct Col-
jections, ferve to mark out unto us the Ex-
iftence of finite and created Spirits like our
felves. Hence it is plain, we do not fee a
Man, if by Man is meant that which lives,
moves, perceives, and thinks as we do;
But only fuch a certain Collection of Ideas,
as directs us to think there is a diftinct
Principle of Thought and Motion like to
our felves, accompanying and reprefented
by it. And after the fame manner we fee
G o D j all the difference is, that whereas,
fome one finite and narrow Affemblage of
Ideas denotes a particular humane Mind,
whither foe ver we direct our View, we do
L at
166 Of the Principle* Part I,
at all Times and in all Places perceive ma^-
nifeft Tokens of the Divinity : Every thing
we fee, hear, feel, or any wife perceive by
Senfe, being a Sign or Effect of the Power
of G o D j as is our Perception of thofe ver
ry Motions, which are produced by Men.
CXLIX. It is therefore plain, that no-
thing can be more evident to any one that
is capable of the leaft Reflexion, than the
Exiftence of G o D, or a Spirit who is in-
timately prefent to our Minds, producing
in them all that variety of Ideas or Senfa-
tions, which continually affedlus, on whom
we have an abfolmc and intire Depen^
dence, in fhort, in whom ive live, and move,
and have our Being. That the Difcovery
of this great Truth which lies fo near and
obvious to the Mind, ihould be attained to
by the Reafon of fo very few, is a fad in-
flance of the Stupidity and Inattention of
Men, wh.o, though they are furrounded
with fuch clear Manifeflations of the Dei-
ty, are yet fo little affefted by them, that
they feem as it were blinded with excefs
of Light.
CL. But you will fay, Hath Nature no
jfhare in the Production of natural Things,
and muft they be all afcribed to the im-
inediate and fole Operation of G o D? I an,-
fwer,
Part I. of Humane Knowledge.
fwer, If by Nature is meant only the vifi-
ble Series of Effects, or Senfations imprint-
ed on our Minds according to certain fixed
and general Laws : Then it is plain, that
Nature taken in this Senfe cannot produce
any thing at all. But if by Nature is
meant fome Being diftinct from GOD, as
well as from the Laws of Nature, and
Things perceived by Senfe, I muft confefs
that Word is to me an empty Sound, with-
out any intelligible Meaning annexed to it."
Nature in this Acceptation is a vain Chi-
mera introduced by thofe Heathens, who
had not juft Notions of the Omniprefence
and infinite Perfection of GOD. But it is
more unaccountable, that it mould be re-
ceived among Gbrtftiam profeffing Belief
in the Holy Scriptures, which conftantly
afcribc thofe Effects to the immediate
Hand of GOD, that Heathen Philofophers
are wont to impute- to Nature. The
L 0 R D, be caufetb the Vapours to afcend ;
he maketh Lightnings with Rain ; he bringetb
forth the Wind out of his Treafures, Jerem.
Chap. 10. ver. 13. He turneth the fiadow of
Death into the Morning, and maketh the Day
dark with Night, Amos Chap. 5. ver. 8. He
•vifiteth the Earth, and maketh it foft with
Showers : He bleffeth the fpringing thereof,
and crowneth the Tear with his Goodnejs j Jo
that the Paftures are clothed with Flocks, and
L 4 tU
Of the Principles Part I.
the Valleys are covered over 'with Corn. See
Pfalm 65. But notwithftanding that this is
the conftant Language of Scripture } yet
\ve have I know not what Averfion from
believing, that GOD concerns himfelf fo
nearly in our Affairs. Fain would we fup-
pofe him at a great diftance off, and fub-
flitute fome blind unthinking Deputy in
his ftead, though ( if we may believe Saint
Paul ) be be not far from every one of us.
CLI. It will I doubt not be objected,
that the flow and gradual Methods obferved
in the Production of natural Things, do
not feem to have for their Caufe the im-
mediate Hand of an almighty Agent. Be-
fides, Monftcrs, untimely Births, Fruits
blafted in the Bloffom, Rains falling in de-
fert Places, Miferies incident to humane
Life, are fo many Arguments that the whole
Frame of Nature is not immediately ac-
tuated and fuperin tended by a Spirit of in-
finite Wifdom and Goodnefs. But the An-
fwer to this Objection is in a good meafure
plain from Setf. 62, it being vifible, that
the aforefaid Methods of Nature are abfo-
lutely neceffary, in order to working by
the mod fimple and general Rules, and af-
ter a fteady and confident Manner; which
argues both the Wifdom and Goodnefs of
GOD. Such is the artificial Contrivance
of
Part I. of Humane Knowledge.
of this mighty Machine of Nature, that
whilft its Motions and various Phenomena
ftrike on our Senfes, the Hand which ac-
tuates the whole is it felf unperceivable to
Men of Flefh and Blood. Verily (faith the
Prophet ) thou art a GOD that hi deft thy
fe/f., Ifaiah Chap. 45. ver. 15. But though
GOD conceal himfelf from the Eyes of the
Senfual and Lazy, who will not be at the
leaft Expence of Thought j yet to an un-
biafled and attentive Mind, nothing can be
more plainly legible, than the intimate
Prefence of an All-wife Spirit, who fafhions,
regulates, and fuftains the whole Syfteme
of Being. It is clear from what we have
elfewhere obferved, that the operating ac-
cording to general and ftated Laws, is fo
neceflary for our Guidance in the Affairs
of Life, and letting us into the Secret of
Nature, that without it, all Reach and
Compafs of Thought, all humane Sagacity
and Defign could ferve to no manner of
purpofe : It were even impoffiblc there
fhould be any fuch Faculties or Powers in
the Mind. See Serf. 3 1. Which one Con-
fideration abundantly out-balances what-
ever particular Inconveniences may thence
arife.
CLII. We mould further confider, that
the very Blemifties and Defects of Nature
are
1 70 Of the Principles Part I.
are not without their Ufe, i-n that they
make an agreeable fort of Variety, and
augment the Beauty of the reft of the
Creation, as Shades in a Picture ferve to fet
off the brighter and more enlightened
Parts. We would likewife do well to ex-
amine, whether our taxing the Wafte of
Seeds and Embryos, and accidental De-
ftruction of Plants and Animals, before
they come to full Maturity, as an Impru-
dence in the Author of Nature, be not the
effect of Prejudice contracted by our Fa-
miliarity with impotent and faving Mor-
tals. In Man indeed a thrifty Manage-
ment of thofe Things, which he cannot
procure without much Pains and Induftry,
may be efteemed WiJ'dom. But we muft
not imagine, that the inexplicably fine Ma-
chine of an Animal or Vegetable, cofts the
great CREATOR any more Pains or Trou-
ble in its Production than a Pebble doth :
nothing being more evident, than that an
omnipotent Spirit can indifferently pro-
duce every thing by a mere Fiat or Act of
his Will. Hence it is plain, that the fplen-
did Profufion of natural Things mould
not be interpreted, Weaknefs or Prodigali-
ty in the Agent who produces them, but
rather be looked on as an Argument of the
Riches of his Power.
CUII. As
Part L of Humane Knowledge. 171
CLIII. As for the mixture of Pain or
Uneafmefs which is in the World, purfuant
to the general Laws of Nature, and the
Actions of finite imperfect Spirits : This,
in the State we are in at prefent, is indif-
penfibly neceflary to our well-being. But
our Profpecls are too narrow : We take, for
Inftance, the Idea of fome one particular
Pain into our Thoughts, and account it
Evil j whereas if we enlarge our View, fo
as to comprehend the various Ends, Con-
nexions, and Dependencies of Things, on
what Occafions and in what Proportions
we are affected with Pain and Pleafure, the
Nature of humane Freedom, and the De-
fign with which we are put into the World;
we mall be forced to acknowledge that
thofe particular Things, which confidered
in themfelves appear to be Evil, have the
Nature of Good, when confidered as linked
with the whole Syfteme of Beings.
CLIV. From what hath been faid it
will be manifeft to any confidering Perfon,
that it is merely for want of Attention and
Comprehend venefs of Mind, that there are
any Favourers of Athelfm or the Manlchean
Herejy to be found. Little and unreflect-
ing bouls may indeed burlefque the Works
of Providence, the Beauty and Order where-?
1 71 Of the Principles Part L
of they have not Capacity, or will not be
at the Pains to comprehend. But thofe
who are Matters of any Juftnefs and Ex-
tent of Thought, and are withal ufed to
reflect, can never fufficiently admire the
divine Traces of Wifdom and Goodnefs
that fliine throughout the Oeconomy of
Nature. But what Truth is there which
fhineth fo flrongly on the Mind, that by
an Averfion of Thought, a wilful mutting
of the Eyes, we may not efcape feeing it ?
Is it therefore to be wondered at, if the
generality of Men, who are ever intent on
Buiinefs or Pleafure, and little ufed to fix
or open the Eye of their Mind, mould not
have all that Conviction and Evidence of
the Being of GOD, which might be ex-
pected in reafonable Creatures ?
CLV. We fhould rather wonder, that
Men can be found fo ftupid as to neglect,
than that neglecting they mould be uncon-
vinced of fuch an evident and momentous
Truth. And yet it is to be feared that too
many of Parts and Leifure, who live in
Chriftian Countries, are merely through a
fupine and dreadful Negligence funk into
a fort of Athcijm. Since it is downright
impoffible, that a Soul pierced and enligh-
tened with a thorough Senfe of the Omni-
prefence, Holinefs, and Juflice of that Al-
mighty
Part I. of Humane Knowledge. 1 75
mighty Spirit, mould perfift in a remorfe-
lefs Violation of his Laws. We ought
therefore earnefUy to meditate and dwell
on thofe important Points ; that fo we
may attain Conviction without all Scruple,
that the Eyes of the LORD are in every
place bt? holding the Evil and the Good-, that
he is with us and keepeth us in all places
•whither we go, and giveth us Bread to eat,
and Raiment to put on j that he is prefent
and confciousto our innermoft Thoughts ;
and that we have a moft abfolute and im-
mediate dependence on him. A clear View
of which great Truths cannot choofe but
fill our Hearts with an awful Circumfpec-
tion and holy Fear, which is the ftrongeft
Incentive to Virtue, and the beft Guard a-
gainft Vice.
CLVI. For after all, what deferves the
firft place in our Studies, is the Confidera-
tion of GOD, and our 'Duty j which to
promote, as it was the main drift and de-
iign of my Labours, fo {hall I efleem them
altogether ufelefs and ineffectual, if by
what I have faid I cannot infpire my Rea-
ders with a pious Senfe of the Prefence of
GOD: And having (hewn the Falfenefs or
Vanity of thofe barren Speculations, which
make the chief Employment of learned
Men,
*74 Of *bff Principles* &c* Part f.
Men, the better difpofe them to reverence
and embrace the falutary Truths of the
GOSPEL, which to know and to practife
is the higheft Perfection of humane
ture.
THREE
DIALOGUES
BETWEEN
r
Hylas and Thilonous.
,Jn OPPOSITION to
SCEPTICS and ATHEISTS.
By GEORGE BERKELET, M. A.
Fellow of Trinity College, Dublin.
Firft Printed in the Year 1713
THE FIRST
DIALOGUE.
rHILONOUS.
OOD Morrow, Hylas s I did
not expect to find you abroad fo
early.
Hylas. It is indeed fortieth ing
unufual ; but my Thoughts were fo taken
up with a Subject I was difcourfing of laft
Night, that finding I could not deep, I re-
folved to rife and take a turn in the Gar-
den.
Phil. It happened well, to let you fee
what innocent and agreeable Pleafures you
lofe every Morning. Can there be a plea^.
fanter time of the Day, or a more delight-
ful Seafon of the Year ? That purple Sky,
thefe wild but fweet Notes of Birds, the
fragrant Bloom upon the Trees and Flow-
M ers,
I7S The FIRST
ers, the gentle Influence of the rifing Sun,
thefe and a thoufand namelefs Beauties of
Nature infpire the Soul with lecret Tranf-
ports ; its Faculties too being a" this time
fre(h and lively, are fit for thofe Meditati-
ons, which the Solitude of a Garden and
Tranquillity of the Morning naturally dif-
pofe us to. But I am afraid I interrupt
your Thoughts : for you feemed very in-
tent on fomething.
Hyl. It is true, I was, and (hall be ob-
liged to you if you will permit me to go
on in the fame Vein j not that I would by
any means deprive my felf of your Com-
pany, for my Thoughts always flow more
eafily in Converfation with a Friend, than
when I am alone: But my Requeft is, that
you would fufrer me to impart my Reflexi-
ons to you.
Phil. With all my heart, it is what I
Should have requeued my felf, if you had
not prevented me.
Hyl. I was confidering the odd Fate of
thofe Men who have in all Ages, through
an Affectation of being diftingui(hed from
the Vulgar, or forne unaccountable Turn
of Thought, pretended either to believe no-
thing at all, or to believe the rnoft extra-
vagant Things in the World. This how-
ever might be born, if their Paradoxes and
Scepticifm did not draw after them fome
Con-
DIALOGUE.
Confequences of general Difadvantage to
Mankind. But the Mifchief lieth here ;
that when Men of lefs Leifure fee them
who are fuppofed to have fpent their whole
time in the Purfuits of Knowledge, profef-
iing an intire Ignorance of all Things, or
advancing fuch Notions as are repugnant
to plain and commonly received Principles,
they will be tempted to entertain Suipici-
ons concerning the moft important Truths,
which they had hitherto held facred and
unqueftionable.
Phil. I intirely agree with you, as to the
ill Tendency of the affected Doubts of
fome Philofophers> and fantaftical Conceits
of others. I am even fo far gone of late
in this way of Thinking, that I have quit-
ted feveral of the fublime Motions I had
got in their Schools for vulgar Opinions.
And I give it you on my Word, fince this
Revolt from Metaphyfical Notions to the
plain Dictates of Nature and common
Senfe, I find my Under (landing ftrangely
enlightened, fo that I can now eafily com-
prehend a great many Things which before
were all Myftery and Riddle.
Hyl. I am glad to find there was nothing
in the Accounts I heard of you.
Phil. Pray, what were thofe ?
Hyl. You were reprefented in lad Night's
Converfation, as one who maintained the
M 2 mo(t
iSo Tfe F I R 5 T
moft extravagant Opinion that ever entered
into the Mind of Man, to wit, That there
is no fuch Thing as material Subjiance in
the World.
Phil. That there is no fuch Thing as
what Philofophers call Material Subftance,
1 am ferioufly perfuaded : But if I were
made to fee any thing abfurd or fceptical
in this, I mould then have the fame Rea-
fon to renounce this, that I imagine I have
now to reject the contrary Opinion.
HyL What ! can any Thing be more fan-
taftical, more repugnant to common Senfe,
or a more manifeft Piece of Scepticifm,
than to believe there is no fuch Thing as
Matter ?
Phil. Softly, good Hyfa. What if it
fhould prove, that you, who hold there is,
are by virtue of that Opinion a greater
Sceptic, and maintain more Paradoxes and
Repugnancies to common Senfe, than I
who believe no fuch Thing ?
HyL You may as foon perfuade me, The
Part is greater than the Whole, as that, in
order to avoid Abfurdity and Scepticifm, I
fhould ever be obliged to give up my Opi-
nion in this Point.
Phil. Well then, are you content to ad-
mit that Opinion for true, which upon Exa-
mination fhall appear moft agreeable to
common Senfe, and remote from Scepti-
cifm ? Hyl.
DIALOGUE. iSr
HyL With all my Heart. Since you are
for railing Difputes about the plaineft
Things in Nature, I am content for once
to hear what you have to fay.
Phil. Pray, Hylas, what do you mean
by a Sceptic ?
Hyl. I mean what all Men mean, one
that doubts of every Thing.
Phil. He then who entertains no Doubt
concerning fome particular Point, with re- .
gard to that Point cannot be thought a
Sceptic.
HyL I agree with you.
Phil. Whether doth Doubting confift in
embracing the Affirmative or Negative Side
of a Queftion ?
HyL In neither ; for whoever underftanda
EngHjfj, cannot but know that Doubting
fignifies a Sufpenfe between both.
Phil. He then that denieth any Point,
can no more be faid to doubt of it, than he
who affirmeth it with the fame Degree of
AfTu ranee.
HyL True.
PhiL And confequently, for fuch his De-
nial is no more to be efteemed a Sceptic
than the other.
Hyl. I acknowledge it.
PhiL How cometh it to pafs then, Hylas,
that you pronounce me a Sceptic, becaufe
I deny wnat you affirm, to wit, the Exif-
M 3 tencc
The FIR 5 T
tencc of Matter? Since, for ought you can
tell, I am as peremptory in my Denial, as
you in your Affirmation.
Hyl. Hold, Philonous, I have been a lit-
tle out in my Definition-, but every falfc
Step a Man makes in Difcourfe is not to be
infifted on. I laid indeed, that a Sceptic
was one who doubted of every Thing; but
I fliould have added, or who denies the
Reality and Truth of Things.
Phil. What Things ? Do you mean the
Principles and Theoremes of Sciences? But
thefe you know are univerfal intellectual
Notions, and confequently independent of
Matter ; the Denial therefore of this doth
not imply the denying them.
Hyl. I grant it. But are there no other
Things? What think you of diftrufting the
Senfes, of denying the real Exiftence of
fenfible Things, or pretending to know no-
thing of them. Is not this fufficient to de-
nominate a Man a Sceptic ?
Phil. Shall we therefore examine which
of us it is that denies the Reality of Sen-
fible Things, or proferTes the greateft Igno-
rance of them ; fince, if I take you right-
ly, he is to be efleemed the greateft
Sceptic ?
Hyl. That is what I defire.
Phil. What mean you by Senfible Things?
Hyl.
DIALOGUE. 183
H)'l. Thofe Things which are perceived
by the Senfes. Can you imagine that I
mean any thing elfe ?
Phil. Pardon me, Hylas, if I am defi-
rous clearly to apprehend your Notions,
fmce this may much fhorten our Inquiry.
Suffer me then to ask you this farther Que-
ftion. Are thole Things only perceived by
the Senfes which are perceived immediate-
ly ? Or may thofe Things properly be faid
to be Senjible, which are perceived mediate-
ly, or not without the Intervention of o-
thers ?
Hyl. I do not fufficiently under/land you.
jP/6//. In reading a Book, what I imme-
diately perceive are the Letters, but me-
diately, or by means of thefe, are fug-
ge£ed to my Mind the Notions of God,
Virtue, Truth, &c. Now, that the Let-
ters are truly Senfible Things, or perceived
by Senfe, there is no doubt : But I would
know whether you take the Things fug-
gefled by them to be fo too.
Hyl. No certainly, it were abfurd to
think God or Virtue Senfible Things, though
they may be fignined and fuggefted to the
Mind by Senfible Marks, with which they
have an arbitrary Connexion.
Phil. It feems then, that by Senfible
'Things you mean thofe only which can be
perceived immediately by Senfe.
M 4 Hyl.
184 The F I R S T
Hyl. Right.
Phil. Doth it not follow from this, that
though I fee one part of the Sky Red, and
another Blue, and that my Reafon doth
thence evidently conclude there muft be
fomc Caufe of that Diverfity of Colours,
yet that Caufe cannot be faid to be a Sen-
fible Thing, or perceived by the Senfe of
Seeing ?
Hyl. It doth.
Phil. In like manner, though I hear Va-
riety of Sounds, yet I cannot be faid to
hear the Caufes of thofe Sounds.
Hyl. You cannot.
Phil. And when by my Touch I per-
ceive a Thing to be hot and heavy, I can-
not fay with any Truth or Propriety, that
I feel the Caufe of its Heat or Weight. ,
HyL To prevent any more Questions of
this kind, I tell you once for all, that by
Senfible Things I mean thofe only which
are perceived by Senfe, and that in truth
the benfes perceive nothing which they do
not perceive immediately : for they make
no Inferences. The deducing therefore of
Caufes or Occafions from Effects and Ap-
pearances, which alone are perceived by
Senfe, intirely relates to Reafon.
Phil. This Point then is agreed between
us, That Senfible Things are thoj'e only which
pre immediately perceived by Sen/e. You
will
DIALOGUE.
will farther inform me, whether we im-
mediately perceive by Sight any thing be-
fide Light, and Colours, and Figures : or
by Hearing, any thing but Sounds: by the
Palate, any thing befide Taftes : by the
Smell, befide Odors~: or by the Touch,
more than tangible Qualities.
Hyl. We do not.
Phil. It feems therefore, that if you take
away all fenfible Qualities, there remains
nothing fenfible.
Hyl. I grant it.
Phil. Senfible Things therefore are no-
thing elfe but fo many fenfible Qualities, or
Combinations of fenfible Qualities.
Hyl, Nothing elfe.
Phil. Heat then is a fenfible Thing.
Hyl. Certainly.
Phil. Doth the Reality of fenfible Things
confift in being perceived ? or, is it fome-
thing diftinft from their being perceived,
and that bears no relation to the Mind?
Hyl. To exift is one thing, and to be
perceived is another.
Phil. I fpeak with regard to fenfible
Things only: And of thefe I ask, Whether
by their real Exiftence you mean a bub-
fiftence exterior to the Mind, and diftinct
from their being perceived?
H)L I mean a real abfolute Being, di-
ftinct from, and without any relation to
their being perceived. 'Phil.
Tie F I R S T
Phil. Heat therefore, if it be allowed
a real Being, muft exifl without the Mind.
HyL It muft.
Phil Tell me, Hylas, is this real Exif-
tence equally compatible to all Degrees of
Heat, which we perceive : or is there a-
ny Reafon why we mould attribute it to
fome, and deny it others ? And if there be,
pray let me know that Reafon.
HyL Whatever Degree of Heat we per-
ceive by Senfe, we may be fure the fame
exifls in the Objf ct that occafions it.
Phil. What, the greateft as well as the
leaft ?
HyL I tell you, the Reafon is plainly the
fame in refpect of both : They are both
perceived by Senfe; nay, the greater De-
gree of Heat is more fenfibly perceived ;
and consequently, if there is any Diffe-
rence, we are more certain of its real Ex-
iftence than we can be of the Reality of a
lefTer Degree.
Phil. But is not the mod vehement and
intenfe Degree of Heat a very great Pain ?
HyL No one can deny it.
Phil. And is any unperceiving Thing
capable of Pain or Pleafure ?
HyL No certainly.
Phil. Is your material Subftance a fenfe-
lefs Being, or a Being endowed with Senfe
and Perception?
Hyl.
DIALOGUE. 187
JJyl. It is fenfelefs, without doubt.
Phil It cannot therefore be the Subjedt
of Pain.
Hyl. By no means.
Phil. Nor confequently of the greateft
Heat perceived by Senfe, fince you ac-
knowledge this to be no imall Pain.
Hyl. I grant it.
Phil. What fhall we fay then of your
external Object j is it a material Subftance,
or no?
Hyl. It is a material Subftance with the
fenfible Qualities inhering in it.
Pbil. How then can a great Heat exift
in it, fince you own it cannot in a mate-
rial Subftance ? I defire you would clear
this Point.
Hyl. Hold, Philonow, I fear I was out
in yielding intenfe Heat to be a Pain. It
mould feem rather, that Pain is fomething
diftinct from Heat, and the Confequence or
Effect of it.
Phil. Upon putting your Hand near the
Fire, do you perceive one fimple uniform
Senfation, or two diftindl Senfations ?
Hyl. But one fimple Senfation.
Phil. Is not the Heat immediately per-
ceived ?
Hyl. It is.
Phil. And the Pain ?
Hyl. True.
Thil.
1 88 The F I R S T
Phil. Seeing therefore they are both im-
mediately perceived at the fame time, and
the Fire affects you only with one fimple,
or uncompounded Idea, it follows that this
fame fimple Idea is both the intenfe Heat
immediately perceived, and the Pain ; and
confequently, that the intenfe Heat imme-
diately perceived, is nothing diftinct from
a particular fort of Pain.
HyL It feems fo.
Phil Again, try in your Thoughts, Hy-
las, if you can conceive a vehement Senfa-
tion to be without Pain, or Pleafure.
Hyl. I cannot.
Phil. Or can you frame to yourfelf an
Idea of fenfible Pain or Pleafure in general,
abftracted from every particular Idea of
Heat, Cold, Taftes, Smells? &c.
Hyl. I do not find that I can.
Phil. Doth it not therefore follow, that
fenfible Pain is nothing diftinct from thofe
Senfations or Ideas, in an intenfe De-
gree?
Hyl. It is undeniable ; and to fpeak the
Truth, I begin to fufpect a very great
Heat cannot exift but in a Mind perceiv-
ing it.
Phil. What ! are you then in that Scep-
tical State of Sufpenfe, between Affirming
and Denying ?
Hyl.
DIALOGUE.
Hyl. I think I may be pofitive in the
Point. A very violent and painful Heat
cannot exift without the Mind.
Phil. It hath not therefore, according
to you, any real Being.
Hyl. I own it.
Phil. Is it therefore certain, that there
is no body in Nature really hot ?
Hyl. I have not denied there is any real
Heat in Bodies. I only fay, there is no
fuch thing as an intenfe real Heat.
Phil. But did you not fay before, that
all Degrees of Heat were equally real : or
if there was any difference, that the Greater
were more undoubtedly real than the Lef-
fer?
Hyl. True: But it was, becaufe I did
not then confider the Ground there is for
diftinguiming between them, which I now
plainly fee. And it is this : Becaufe in-
tenfe Heat is nothing elfe but a particular
kind of painful Senfation ; and Pain can-
not exift but in a perceiving Being ; it fol-
lows that no intenfe Heat can really exift
in an unperceiving corporeal Subftance.
But this is no. Reafon why we mould de-
ny Heat in an inferior Degree to exift in
fuch a Subftance.
Phil. But how mall we be able to dif-
cern thofe Degrees of Heat which exift on-
ly in the Mind, from thofe which exift
without it ? Hyl.
Tt>e F I R S T
Hyl. That is no difficult matter. You
know, the leaft Pain cannot exift unper-
ceived; whatever therefore Degree of Heat
is a Pain, exifts only in the Mind. But
as for all other Degrees of Heat, nothing
obliges us to think the fame of them.
Phil. I think you granted before, that
no unperceiving Being was capable of Plea-
fure, any more than of Pain.
Hyl. i did.
Phil. And is not Warmth, or a more
gentle Degree of Heat than what caufes
Uneafinefs, aPleafure?
Hyl. What then ?
Phil. Confequently it cannot exift with-
out the Mind in any unperceiving Sub-
ftance, or Body.
Hyl. So it feems.
Phil. Since therefore, as well thofe De-
grees of Heat that are not painful, as thofe
that are, can exift only in a Thinking Sub-
ftance ; may we not conclude that external
Bodies are abfolutely incapable of any De-
gret of Heat whatfoever ?
Hyl On fecond Thoughts, I do not think
it fo evident that Warmth is a Pleafure, as
that a great Degree ot Heat is a Pain.
Phil. I do not pretend that Warmth is
as great a Pleat r-re as Heat is a Pain. But
if you grant it to be even a (mail Pleafure,
it icrvcs to make good my Concluiion.
Hyl
DIALOGUE.
77)7. I could rather call it an Indolence.
It fcems to be nothing more than a Priva-
tion of both Pain and Pleafure. And that
fuch a Quality or State as this may agree to
an unthinking Subftance, I hope you will
not deny.
Phil. If you are refolved to maintain that
Warmth, or a gentle Degree of Heat, is no
Pleafure, I know not how to convince you
otherwife, than by appealing to your own
Senfe. But what think you of Cold?
HyL The fame that I do of Heat. An
intenfe Degree of Cold is a Pain ; for to
feel a very great Cold, is to perceive a great
Uheafinefs : It cannot therefore exift with-
out the Mind ; but a lefier Degree of Cold
may, as well as a lefler Degree of
Heat.
Phil. Thofe Bodies therefore, upon
whofe Application to our own, we per-
ceive a moderate Degree of Heat, muft be
concluded to have a moderate Degree of
Heat or Warmth in them : And thofe, up-
on whofe Application we feel a like De-
gree of Cold, muft be thought to have Cold
in them.
HyL They muft.
Phil. Can any Doftrine be true that ne-
ceiTarily leads a Man into an Abfurdity ?
HyL Without doubt it cannot.
<PhiL
Phil. Is it not an Abfurdity to think that
the fame thing mould be at the fame time
both cold and warm ?
Hyl. It is.
Phil. Suppofe now one of your Hands
hot, and the other cold, and that they are
both at once put into the fame Veflel of
Water, in an intermediate State ; will not
the Water feem cold to one Hand, and
warm to the other ?
Hyl. It will.
Phil. Ought we not therefore by your
Principles to conclude, it is really both cold
and warm at the fame time, that is, ac-
cording to your own Conceffion, to believe
an Abfurdity.
Hyl. I confefs it feems fo.
Phil. Confequently, the Principles them-
felves are falfe, fince you have granted that
no true Principle leads to an Abfurdity.
Hyl. But after all, can any thing be more
abfurd than to fay, there is no Heat in the
Fire ?
Phil. To make the Point ftill clearer ;
tell me, whether in two Cafes exactly a-
like, we ought not to make the fame Judg-
ment ?
Hyl. We ought.
Phil. When a Pin pricks your Finger,
doth it not rend and divide the Fibres of
your Flefh?
Hyl.
DIALOGUE.
Hyl. It doth.
Phil. And when a Coal burns your Fin-
ger, doth it any more ?
Hyl. It doth not.
Phil. Since therefore you neither judge
the Senfation itfelf occafioned by the Pin,
nor any thing like it to be in the Pin j you
mould not, conformably to what you have
now granted, judge the Senfation occa-
fioned by the Fire, or any thing like it, to
be in the Fire.
Hyl. Well, fince it muft be fo, I am
eontent to yield this Point, and acknow-
ledge, that Heat and Cold are only Senfa-
tions exifting in cur Minds: But there flill
remain Qualities enough to fecure the Rea-
lity of external Things.
Phil. But what will you fay, Hylasy\i
it mall appear that the Cafe is the fame
with regard to all other fenfible Qualities,
and that they can no more be fuppofed to
exift without the Mind, than Heat and
Cold?
Hyl. Then indeed you will have done
fomething to the purpofe ; but that is what
I defpair of feeing proved.
Phil. Let us examine them in order.
What think you of Taftes, do they exifl
without the Mind, or no?
Hyl. Can any Man in his Senfes doubt
whether Sugar is fweet, or Wormwood bit-
ter? N Tbil.
i«?4 e FIRST
PblL Inform me, Hylas. Is a fweet
Tartc a particular kind of Pleafure or plea-
fant Seniation, or is it not?
H;7. It is.
P,.il. And is not Bittcrnefs fbme kind of
Uneafmefs or Pain?
Hyl. I grant it.
Phil. If therefore Sugar and Wormwood
are unthinking corporeal Subftances exift-
irig without the Mind, how can Sweetnefs
and Bitternefs, that is, Pleafure and Pain,
agree to them ?
Hyl. Hold, Pbihnous, I now fee what it
was deluded me all this time. You asked
whether Heat and Cold, Sweetnefs and Bit-
ternefs, were not particular Sorts of Plea-
fure and Pain ; to which I anfwered fim-
ply, that they were. Whereas I {hould
have thus diftinguimed : Thofe Qualities,
as perceived by us, are Pleafures or Pains,
but not as exifting in the external Objects.
We muft not therefore conclude abfolute-
ly, that there is no Heat in the Fire, or
Sweetnefs in the Sugar, but only that Heat
or Sweetnefs, as perceived by us, are not
in the Fire or Sugar. What fay you to
this ?
PhiL I fay it is nothing to the Purpofe.
Our Difcourfe proceeded altogether con-
cerning Senfible Things, which you defined
to be the Things we immediately perceive by
our
DIALOGUE.
bur Senfes. Whatever other Qualities there-
fore you ffdak of, as diflindt from thefe,
I know nothing of them, neither do they
at all belong to the Point in Difpute. Yotf
may indeed pretend to have difcovered cer-
tain Qualities which you do not perceive,
and affert thofe infenfible Qualities exift in
Fire and Sugar. But what Ufe can be
made of this to your prefent Purpofe, I
am at a lofs to conceive. Tell me then
6nce more, do you acknowledge that Heat
and Cold, Sweetnefs and Bitternefs, (mean-
ing thofe Qualities which are perceived by
the Senfes) do not exift without the Mind ?
Hyl. I fee it is to no purpofe to hold out,
fo I give up the Caufe as to thofe men-
tioned Qualities. Though I profefs it
founds odly, to fay that Sugar is not fweet.
Phil. But for your farther Satisfaction,
fake this along with you : That which at
other times feems fweet, (hall to a diftem-
pered Palate appear bitter. And nothing
Can be plainer, than that divers Perfons
perceive different Taftes in the fame Food,
nnce that which one Man delights in, ano-
ther abhors. And how could this be, if the
Tafte was fomething really" inherent in th3
Food?
Hyl. I acknowledge I know not how.
Phil. In the next place, Odours are to
be confidered. And with regard to thefe,
N 2
The F I R S T
I would fain know, whether what hath
been faid of Taftes doth not exactly agree
to them ? Are they not fo many pleafing
or difpleafing Senfations ?
Hyl. They are.
Phil. Can you then conceive It poffible
that they mould exifl in an unpcrceiving
Thing ?
Hyl. I cannot.
Phil. Or caji you imagine, that Filth and
Ordure affect thofe brute Animals that feed
on them out of Choice, with the fame
Smells which we perceive in them ?
Hyl. By no means.
Phil. May we not therefore conclude of
Smells, as of the other forementioned Qua-
lities, that they cannot exift in any but a
perceiving Subftance or Mind ?
Hyl. I think fo. .
Phil. Then as to Sounds, what muil we
think of them : Are they Accidents really
inherent in external Bodies, or not ?
Hyl. That they inhere not in the fono-
rous Bodies, is plain from hence ; becaufe
a Bell {truck in the exhaufted Receiver of
an Air-Pump, fends forth no Sound. The
Air therefore muft be thought the Subject
of Sound.
Phil. What Reafon is there for that, Hy-
las?
Hyf.
DIALOGUE. 197
Hyl. Becaufe when any Motion is raifed
in the Air, we perceive a Sound greater or
lefler, in Proportion to the Air's Motion ;
but without fome Motion in the Air, we
never hear any Sound at all.
Phil. And granting that we never hear a
Sound but when fome Motion is produced
in the Air, yet I do not fee how you can
infer from thence, that the Sound itfelf is
in the Air.
Hyl. It is this very Motion in the exter-
nal Air, that produces in the Mind the
Senfation of Sound. For, finking on the
Drum of the Ear, it caufeth a Vibration,
which by the Auditory Nerves being com-
municated to the Brain, the Soul is there-
upon affected with the Senfation called
Sound. '
Phil. What ! is Sound then a Senfation ?
Hyl. I tell you, as perceived by us, it is
a particular Senfation in the Mind.
Phil. And can any Senfation exift with-
out the Mind ?
Hyl. No certainly.
Phil. How then can Sound, being a Sen-
fation exift in the Air, if by the Air you
mean a fenfelefs Subftance exifting without
the Mind?
Hyl. You muft diftinguim, Philonous, be-
tween Sound as it is perceived by us, and
as it is in itfelf j or ( which is the fame
N 3
i«>8 Me F I R 5 F
thing ) between the Sound we immediate-
ly perceive, and that which exifts without
us. The former indeed is a particular
kind of Scnfation, but the latter is merely
a Vibrative or Undulatory Motion in the
Air.
FbiL I thought I had already obviated
that Diftinclion by the Anfwpr I gave
when you were applying it in a like Cafe
before. But to fay no more of that j Are
you fure then that Sound is really nothing
but Motion?
Hyl. I am.
PbiL Whatever therefore agrees to real
Sound, may with Truth be attributed to
Motion.
Hyl. It may.
Phil. It is then good Senfe to fpeak of
Motion, as of a thing that is loud, fweet,
acute, or grave.
Hyl. I fee you are refolved not to under-
Hand me. Is it not evident, thofe Acci-
dents or Modes belong only to fenfible
Sound, or Sound in the common Accepta-
tion of the Word, but not to Sound in the
Real and Philofophic Senfe, which, as I
juft now told you, is nothing but a certain
Motion of the Air ?
PbiL It feems then there are two Sons
of Sound, the one Vulgar, or that which is
heard, the other Philoibphical and Real.
Hyh
DIALOGUE.
Uyl. Even fo.
Phil. And the Utter eonfifts in Motion.
Jfyl. I told you To before.
Phil. Tell me, Hylas, to which of the
Senfes think you, the Idea of Motion be-
longs : To the Hearing ?
Hyl. No certainly, but to the Sight and
Touch.
Phil, It mould follow then, that accord-
ing to you, real Sounds may podibjy bcjeert
or felt, but never heard.
Hyl. Look you, Philonous, you may if
you pleafe make a Jeft of my Opinion, buc
that will not alter the Truth of Things. I
pwn indeed, the Inferences you draw me
into, found fomething odly j but common
Language, you know, is framed by, and for
the Uie of the Vulgar: wemufi not there-
fore wonder, if Expreffions adapted toex-^
a<ft Phiiofophic Notions, feem uncouth and
out of the way.
.Phil. Is it come to that? I aflure you, I
imagine myfelf to have gained no fmall
Point, fince you make fo light of depart-
ing from common Phrafes and Opinions 5
it being a main Part of our Inquiry, to
examine whole Notions are wideft of the
common Road, and moil repugnant to the
general Senfe of the World. Bui can you
chink it no more than a Philolophical Pa-
radox, to fay that real Sounds are never
N 4 beard>
200 The FIRST
beard, and that the Idea of them is ob-
tained by fome other Senfe. And is there
nothing in this contrary to Nature and the
Truth of Things?
Hyl. To deal ingefiuoufly, I do not like
it. And after the ConceiTions already made,
I had as well grant that Sounds too' have no
real Being without the Mind.
Phil. And I hope you will make no Dif-
ficulty to acknowledge the fame of Co-
lours.
HyL Pardon me: the Cafe of Colours is
very different. Can any thing be plainer,
than that we fee them on the Objects ?
Phil. The Objects you fpcak of are, I
fuppofe, corporeal subftances exifting with-
out the Mind.
HyL They are. :
Phil. And have true and real Colours in-
hering in them ?
Hyl. Each vifible Object hath that Co-
lour which we fee in it.
Phil. How ! Is there any thing vifible
but what we perceive by Sight.
HyL There is not.
Phil. And do we perceive any thing by
Senfe, which we do not perceive imme-
diately ?
HyL How often muft I be obliged to re-
peat the fame thing ? I tell you, we do not.
Tbil.
DIALOGUE. io£
Phil Have Patience, good Hy/as; and
tell me once more, whether there is any
thing immediately perceived by the Senfes,
except fenfible Qualities. I know you
aflerted there was not : But I would now be
informed, whether you Hill perfift in the
jfame Opinion.
Hyl. I do.
Phil. Pray, is your corporeal Subftance
either a fenfible Quality, or made up of
fenfible Qualities ?
Hyl. What a Queftion that is I who ever
thought it was ?
Phil. My Reafon for asking was, becaufe
in faying, each wfible Objift hath that Co-
lour which we jee in if, you make vifible
Objects to be corporeal Subftances ; which
implies either that corporeal Subllances are
fenfible Qualities, or elie that there is fome-
thing befide fenfible Qualities perceived by
Sight : But as this Point was formerly a-
greed between us, and is frill maintained
by you, it is a clear Confequence, that your
corporeal Subftance is nothing diflinct from
fenfible Qualities.
Hyl. You may draw as many abfurd
Confequences as you pleafe, and endeavour
to perplex the plainest Things ; but you
(hall never perfuade me out of my Senfes.
I clearly underftand my own Meaning.
Thil.
The F I R $ T
Phil. I wim you would make me tin-
derftand it too. But iince you are unwil-
ling to have your Notion of corporeal Subr
ftance examined, I (hall urge that Point
no farther. Only be pleated to let me know,
whether the fame Colours which we fee,
ex i ft in external Bodies, or forne other.
Hyl. The very fame.
Phil. What ! are then the beautiful Red
and Purple we fee on yonder Clouds, realr
ly in them ? Or do you imagine they have
in themfelves any other Form, than that of
a dark Mift or Vapour ?
Hyl. I muft own, PhilonQust thofe Co-
Jours are not really in the Clouds as they
feem to be at this Diftance. They are on-
ly apparent Colours.
Phil. Apparent call you them ? how mail
we diftinguifh thefe apparent Colours from
ftal?
Hyl. Very eafily. Thofe are to be
thought apparent, which appearing only
at a diftance, vanim upon a nearer Ap-
proach.
Phil. And thofe I fuppofe are to be
thought real, which are difcovered by ^he
moft near and exact Survey.
Hyl. Right.
Phil. Is the neareft and exadleft Survey
made by the help of a Microfcope, or by
the naked Eye?
V 1 A L 0 G U n.
ffyl. By a Microfcope, doubtlefs.
Phil. But a Microfcope ofcen difcovcrs
Colours in an Object different from thofe
perceived by the unafTifted Sight. And in
cafe we had Microfcopes magnifying to a-
ny a ffigned Degree; it is certain, that no
Object whatfoever viewed through them,
would appear in the fame Colour which it
exhibits to the naked Eye.
HyL And what will you conclude from
all this ? You cannot argue that there are
really and naturally no Colours on Ob-
jects : becaufe by artificial Managements
they may be altered, or made to vanifh.
Phil. I think it may evidently be con-
cluded from your own Conceflions, that
all the Colours we fee with our naked Eyes,
are only apparent as thofe on the Clouds,
lince they vanim upon a more clofe an4
accurate Infpection, which is afforded us
by a Microfcope. Then as to what you
fay by way of Prevention : I ask you, whe-
ther the real and natural State of an Object
is better difcovered by a very (harp and
piercing Sight, or by one which is lefs
jfharp ?
Hyl. By the former without doubt.
Phil. Is it not plain from ^Dioptrics^ that
Microfcopes make the Sight more pene-
trating, and reprefent Objects as they
Would appear to the Eye, in cafe it were
naturally
±04 W<? F I R S T
naturally endowed with a moft exquifite
Sharpnefs ?
Hyl. It is.
Phil. Confequently the Microfcopical
Reprefentation is to be thought that which
heft fets forth the real Namre of the Thing,
or what it is in itfelf. The Colours there-
fore by it perceived, are more genuine and
real, than thofe perceived ocherwife.
Hyl. I confefs there is fomething in
what you fay.
Phil. Befides, it is not only poffible but
manifeft, that there actually are Animals,
whofe Eyes are by Nature framed to per-
ceive thofe Things, which by reafon of
their Minutenefs efcape our Sight. What
think you of thofe inconceivably fmall A-
nimals perceived by Glafles ? Muft we fup-
pofe they are all ftark blind ? Or, in cafe
they fee, can it be imagined their Sight
hath not the fame Ufe in preferving their
Bodies from Injuries, which appears in
That of all other Animals? And if it hath,
is it not evident, they muft fee Particles
lefs than their own Bodies, which will pre-
fent them with a far different View in each
Objed, from that which iirikes our Senfes?
Even our own Eyes do not always repre-
fent Objects to us after the fame manner.
In the Jaundice, every one knows that all
Things feem yellow. Is it not therefore
highly
DIALOGUE. 105
highly probable, thofe Animals in whofe
Eyes we difcern a very different Texture •
from that of ours, and whofe Bodies a-
bound with different Humours, do not fee
the fame Colours in every Object that we
do? From all which, mould it not feem
to follow, that all Colours are equally ap-
parent, and that none of thofe which we
perceive are really inherent in any outward
Object ?
Hyl. It mould.
Phil. The Point will be paft all doubt,
if you confider, that in cafe Colours were
real Properties or Affections inherent in ex-
ternal Bodies, they could admit of no Al-
teration, without fome Change wrought in
the very Bodies themfelves: But is it not
evident from what hath been faid, that up-
on the Ufe of Microfcopes, upon a Change
happening in the Humours of the Eye, or
a Variation of Diflance, without any man-
ner of real Alteration in the Thing itfelf,
the Colours of any Object are either changed,
or totally difappear ? Nay all other Cir-
cumftances remaining the fame, change but
the Situation of fome Objects, and they
fhall prefent different Colours to the Eye.
The fame thing happens upon viewing an
Object in various Degrees of Light. And
what is more known, than that the fame
Bodies appear differently coloured by Can-
dle-light,
3L06T W F f R S
die-light, from what they do in the" opeit
Day ? Add to thefe the Experiment of a.
Prifm, which feparating the heterogeneous
Rays of Light, alters the Colour of any
Object ; and will caufe the Whiteft to ap-
pear of a deep Blue of Red to the naked
Eye. And now tell me, whether you afd
ftill of Opinion, that every Body hath its
true real Colour inhering in it j and if you
think it hath, I would fain know farther
from you, what certain Diftance and Poii-
tion of the Object, what peculiar Texture
and Formation of the Eye, what Degree or
Kind of Light is neceflary for afcertaining
that true Colour, and diftinguiming it from
apparent ones.
HyL I own myfelf intirely fatisfied, that
they are all equally apparent -, and that
there is no fuch thing as Colour really in-
hering in external Bodies, but that it is al-
together in the Light. And what confirms
me in this Opinion is, that in proportion
to the Light, Colours are ftill more or lefs
vivid -, and if there be no Light, then ard
there no Colours perceived. Befides, allow-
ing there are Colours on external Objects,
yet how is it poffible for us to perceive
them ? For no external Body affects the
Mind, unlefs it act firft on our Organs of
Senle. But the only Action of Bodies is
Motion 3 and Motion cannot be communi-
cated
DIALOGUE. ±07
cared otherwife than by Impulfe. A diftant
Object therefore cannot act on the Eye,
nor confequently make itfelf or its Proper-
ties perceivable to the Soul. Whence it
plainly follows, that it is immediately fome
contiguous Subftance, which operating on
the Eye occafions a Perception of Colours:
And fuch is Light.
Phil. How ! is Light then a Subftance ?
Hyl. I tell you, Philonous, external Light
is nothing but a thin fluid Subftance, whofe
minute Particles being agitated with a brisk
Motion, and in various Manners reflected
from the different Surfaces of outward Ob-
jects to the Eyes, communicate different
Motions to the Optick Nerves j which be-
ing propagated to the Brain, caufe therein
various Impreffions : And thefe are attend-
ed with the Senfations of Red, Blue, Yel-
low, &c.
Phil. It feems then, the Light doth no
more than (hake the Optick Nerves.
Hyl. Nothing elfe.
Phil. And confequent to each particular
Motion of the Nerves the Mind is affected
with a Senfation, which is fome particular
Colour.
Hyl Right.
Phil. And thefe Senfations have no Ex-'
iftence without the Mind.
HyL They have not.
The F I R S T
Phil. How then do you affirm that Co-
lours are in the Light, fince by Light you
underftand a corporeal Subfhance external
to the Mind ?
H\l. Light and Colours, as immediately
perceived by us, I grant cannot exift with-
out the Mind. But in themfelves they are
only the Motions and Configurations of cer-
tain infenfible Particles of Matter.
Thll. Colours then in the vulgar Senfe,
or taken for the immediate Objects of Sight,
cannot agree to any but a perceiving Sub-,
ftance.
Hyl. That is what I fay.
Phil. Well then, fince you give up the
Point as to thole lenrible Qualities, which
are alone thought Colours by all Mankind
befide, you may hold what you pleafe with
regard to thole invilible ones of the Philo-
Ibphers. It is not my Bufmefs to difputc a-
bout them j only 1 would advife you to
bethink your felf, whether confidering the
Inquiry we are upon, it be prudent for you
to affirm, rfhe Red and Blue which we fee
are not real Colours^ but certain unknown
Motions and Figures which no Man ever did
or canjee^ are truly fo. Are not thefe fhock-
ing Notions, and are not they fubject to as
many ridiculous Inferences, as thofe you
were obliged to renounce before in the Cafe>
of Sounds ?
Hyl.
DIALOGUE.
Kyi. I frankly ovvn, Pbilonom, that it is
in vain to ftand out any longer. Colours,
Sounds, Taftes, in a word, all thofe termed
Secondary Qualities, have certainly no Ex-
iftence without the Mind. But by this Ac-
knowledgment I muft not be fuppofed to
derogate any thing from the Reality of
Matter or external Objects, feeing it is no
more than feveral Philofophers maintain,
who neverthelefs are the fartheft imagina-
ble from denying Matter. For the clearer
Underftanding of this, you muft know fen-
fible Qualities are by Philofophers divided
into Primary and Secondary. The former
are Extenfion, Figure, Solidity, Gravity,
Motion, and Reft. And thefe they hold
exift really in Bodies. The latter are thofe
above enumerated ; or briefly, all fenfiblc
Qualities befide the Primary, which they
aflert are only fo many Senfations or Ideas
exifting no where but in the Mind. But
all this, I doubt not, you are already ap-
prifed of. For my part, I have been a long
time fenfible there was fuch an Opinion
current among Philofophers, but was ne-
ver thoroughly convinced of its Truth till
now.
Phil. You are ftill then of Opinion, that
Extenfion and Figures are inherent in ex-
ternal unthinking Subftances.
HyL I arn.
O Phil.
o The F I R S T
Phil. But what if the fame Arguments
which are brought againft Secondary Qua-
lities, will hold good againft thefe alfo ?
Hyt. Why then I fhall be obliged td
think, they too exift only in the Mind.
Phil. Is it your Opinion, the very Figure
and Extenfion which you perceive bySenfe,
exift in the outward Object or material Sub-
ftance ?
Hyl. It is.
Phil. Have all other Animals as good
Grounds to think the fame of the Figure
and Extenfion which they fee and feel ?
Hyl. Without doubt, if they have any
Thought at all.
PhTi Anfwer me, Hylas. Think you the
Senfes were beftowed upon all Animals for
their Prefervation and Well-being in Life ?
or were they given to Men alone for this
End?
Hyl. I make no queftion but they have
the fame Ufe in all other Animals.
Phil. If fo, is it not heceffary they (hould
be enabled by them to perceive their own
Limbs, and thofe Bodies which are capable
of harming them ?
Hyl. Certainly.
Phil A Mite therefore muft be fuppofed
to' fee his own Foot, and Things equal or
even lefs than' it, as Bodies of fome confi-
derable Dimenfion \ though at the fame
time
DIALOGUE.
time they appear to you fcarce discernible,
or at beft as fo many vifibie Points.
HyL I cannot deny it.
Phil. And to Creatures lefs than the
Mite they will feem yet larger.
HyL They will.
Phil. Infomuch that what you can hard-
ly difcern, will to another extremely mi-
nute Animal appear as fome huge Moun-
tain.
HyL All this I grant.
Phil. Can one and the fame thing be at
the fame time in itfcif of different Dimen-
fions ?
HyL That were abfurd to imagine.
Phil, But from what you have laid down
k follows, that both the Extenfion by you
perceived, and that perceived by the Mite
itfelf, as likewifc all thofe perceived by tef-
fer Animals, are each of them the true
Bxtenfion of the Mite's Foot, that is to
fay, by your own Principles you are led
into an Abfurdity.
HyL There feems to be fome Difficulty
in the Point.
Phil. Again, have you not acknowledged
that no real inherent Property of any Ob*-
ject can be changed, without fome Change
in the thing itfelf?
HyL I have,
O z <Phil.
F I R S T
• PLil. But as we approach to or recede
frcm an Object, the vilible Extenfion va-
ries, being at one Diftance ten or an hun-
dred times greater than at another. Doth
it not therefore follow from hence like-
vife, that it is not really inherent in the
Qbjta ?
Hyl. I own I am at a lofs what to
think.
Phil. Your Judgment will foon be de-
termined, if you will venture to think as
freely concerning this Quality, as you have
done concerning the reft. Was it not ad-
mitted as a good Argument, that neither
Heat nor Cold was in the Water, becaufe
it feemed warm to one Hand, and cold to
the other ?
Hyl. It was.
Phil. Is it not the very fame Rcafoning
to conclude, there is no Extenfion or Fi-
gure in an Objedt, becaufe to one Eye it
{hall feem little, fmooth, and round, when
at the fame time it appears to the other,
great, uneven, and angular ?
Hyl. The very fame. But doth this lat-
ter Fact ever happen ?
Phil. You may at any time make the
Experiment, by looking with one Eye bare,
and with the other through a Micro-
fcope.
Hyl.
DIALOGUE. ii
Uyl. I know not how to maintain if,
and yet I am loth to give up Ext en/ton > I
fee fo many odd Confequenccs following
upon fuch a Conceffion.
Phil. Odd, fay you ? After the Concef-
fions already made, I hope you will flick
at nothing for its Oddnefs. But on the o-
thcr hand mould it not feem very odd, if
the general reafoning which includes all
other fenfible Qualities did not alfo include
Extenfion ? If it be allowed that no Idea
nor any thing like an Idea can exift in an
unperceiving Subrtance, then furely it fol-
lows, that no Figure or Mode of Exten-
fion, which we can either perceive or ima-
gine, or have any Idea of, can be really in-
herent in Matter j not to mention the pe-
culiar Difficulty there muft be, in conceiv-
ing a material Subftance, prior to and di-
ftincl from Extension, ro be the Subflratum
of Extenfion. Be the fenfible Quality what
it will, Figure, or Sound, or Colour ; it
feems alike impoffible it mould fubfift in
that which doth not perceive it.
HyL I give up the Point for the pre-
fenr, referving ft. 11 a Right to retract my
Opinion, in cafe I mall hereafter difcover
any falie Mep in my Prcgrefs to it.
Phil. That is a Right you cannot be de-
nied. Figures and Extenfion being dif-
O 3 patched,
2,14 T** FIRST
patched, we proceed next to Motion. Can
a real Motion in any external Body be at
the fame time both very fwift and very
flow?
Hyl. It cannot.
Phil. Is not the Motion of a Body fwift
in a reciprocal Proportion to the time it
takes up in defcribing any given Space?
Thus a Body that defcribes a Mile in an
Hour, moves three times fafter than it
would in cafe it defcribed only a Mile in
three Hours.
Hy-l. I agree with you.
PhiL And is not Time meafured by the
Succeffion of Ideas in our Minds?
Hyl. It is.
Phil. And is it not poflible Ideas fhould
fuceecd one another twice as faft in your
Mind, as they do in mine, or in that of
fome Spirit of another kind.
HyL I own if.
Phil. Confequently the fame Body may
to another feem to perform its Motion over
any Space in half the time that it doth to
you. And the fame Reafoning will hold
as to any other Proportion : That is to fay,
according to your Principles (fmce the Mo-
tions perceived are both really in the Ob-
ject ) it is poffible one and the fame Body
ihall be really moved the fame way at once,
both
DIALOGUE.
both very fwift and very flow. How is
this confiftent either with common Senfe,
or with what you juft now granted ?
//y/. I have nothing to fay to it.
Phil. Then as for Solidity ; either you
do not mean any fenfible Quality by that
Word, and fo it is befide our Inquiry : Or
if you do, it muft be either Hardnefs or
Refiftance. But both the one and the other
are plainly relative to our Senfes : It being
evident, that what feems hard to one Ani-
mal, may appear foft to another, who hath
greater Force and Firmnefs of Limbs. Nor
is it lefs plain, that the Refiftance I feel is
not in the Body.
HyL I own the very Senfation of Refif-
tance, which is all you immediately per-
ceive, is not in the Body, but the Caufe of
that Senfation is.
Pbil. But the Caufes of our Senfations
are not Things immediately perceived, and
therefore not fenfible. This Point I thought
had been already determined.
Hyl. I own it was; but you will pardon
me if I feem a little embarafled : I know
not how to quit my old Notions.
Phil. To help you out, do but confider,
that if Exteniion be once acknowledged to
have no Exiftence without the Mind, the
fame muft neceffarily be granted of MotU
on, Solidity, and Gravity, fmce they all
O 4 evidently
The FIRST
evidently fuppofe Extenfion. It is there-
fore fuperfluous to inquire particularly con-
cerning each of them. In denying Exten-
lion, you have denied them all to have any
real Exiftence.
Hy/. I wonder, Philonous, if what you
fay be true, why thofe Philofophers who
deny the Secondary Qualities any real Ex-
iftence, mould yet attribute it to the Pri-
mary. If there is no Difference between
them, how can this be accounted for ?
Phil. It is not my bufinefs to account
for every Opinion of the Philofophers. But
among other Reafons which may be af-
figncd for this, it feems probable, thatPlea-
fure and Pain being rather annexed to the
former than the latter, may be one. Heat
and Cold, Taftcs and Smells, have fome-
thing more vividly plealing or difagreeable
than the Ideas of Extenfion, Figure, and
Motion, affect us with. And it being too
vifibly abfurd to hold, that Pain orPleafure
can be in an unperceiving Subftance, Men
are more eafily weaned from believing the
external Exiftence of the Secondary, than
the Primary Qualities. You will be fatis-
fied there is fomething in this, if you re-
coiled!: the Difference you made between
an intenfe and more moderate Degree of
Heat, allowing the one a real Exiftence,
\vhile you denied it to the other. But af-
ter
DIALOGUE. 117
ter all, there is no rational Ground for that
DiftindYion ; for furcly an indifferent Sen-
fation is as truly a Senjation, as one more
pleating or painful ; and confequently
Ihould not any more than they be fuppofed
to exift in an unthinking Subject.
Hyl. It is juft come into my Head, Phi-
hnous, that I have fomewhere heard of a
Diftinction between abfolute and fenfible
Extenfion. Now though it be acknow-
ledged that great and fmall^ confiding
merely in the Relation which other ex-
tended Beings have to the Parts of our
own Bodies, do not really inhere in the
Subftances themfeives ; yet nothing obliges
us to hold the fame with regard to ab joint e
Extenfion, which is fomething abltracled
from great and Jma//y from this or that
particular Magnitude or Figure. So like-
wife as to Motion, jivift and Jlow are al-
together relative to the Succeflion of Ideas
in our own Minds. But it doth not fol-
low, becaufe thofe Modifications of Mo-
tion exift not without the Mind, that there-
fore abfolute Motion abftraded from them
doth not.
Phil. Pray what is it that diftinguifhes
one Motion, or one Part of Extenfion from
another ? Is it not fomething fentible, as
fome Degree of Swiftnefs or Slownefs, fome
certain Magnitude or Figure peculiar to
each? Hyl.
Th F I R S T
HyL I think fo.
Phil. Thcfe Qualities therefore ft ripped
of all fenfible Properties, are without all
fpecific and numerical Differences, as the
Schools call them.
HyL They arc.
Phil. That is to fay, they are Exteniion
in general, and Motion in general.
HyL Let it be fo.
Phil. But it is an univerfally received
Maxim, That Every thing •which exifts, is
particular. How then can Motion in ge-
neral, or Extenfion in general exift in any
corporeal Subftance ?
HyL I will take time to folve your Dif-
ficulty.
Phil. But I think the Point may be fpee-
dily decided. Without doubt you can tell,
whether you are able to frame this or that
Idea. Now I am* content to put our Dif- ,
pute on this Ifltie. If you can frame in
your Thoughts a diftincl: abftraft Idea of
Motion or Exteniion, diverted of all thofe
fenfible Modes, as fwift and flow, great
and fmall, round and fqnare, and the like,
which are acknowledged to exift only in
the Mind, I will then yield the Point you
contend for. But if you cannot, it will be
tmreafonable on your Side to infift any lon-
ger upon what you have no Notion of.
HyL To confefs ingenuoufly, I cannot.
ThiL
DIALOGUE.
PbiL Can you even feparatc the Ideas of
Extenfion and Motion, from the Ideas of
all thofe Qualities which they who make
the Diftinction, term Secondary.
HyL What ! is it not an eafy Matter, to
confider Extenfion and Motion by them-
fclvcs, abftracled from all other fenfible
Qualities ? Pray how do the Mathemati-
cians treat of them ?
PbiL I acknowledge, Hytas, it is not
difficult to form general Proportions and
Reafonings about thofe Qualities, without
mentioning any other ; and in this Senfe to
confider or treat of them abftractedly. But
how doth it follow that becaufe I can pro-
nounce the Word Motion by itfelf, I can
form the Idea of it in my Mind exclufivc
of Body ? Or becaufe Theoremes may be
made of Extenfion and Figures, without
any mention of great or fmally or any o-
thcr fenfible Mode or Quality; that there-
fore it is poffible fuch an abftracl: Idea of
Extenfion, without any particular Size or
Figure, or fenfible Quality, mould be di-
ftinctly formed, and apprehended by the
Mind ? Mathematicians treat of Quantity,
without regarding what other fenfible Qua-
lities it is attended with, as being altoge-
ther indifferent to their Demonftrations.
But when laying afide the Words, they
contemplate the bare Ideas, I believe you
will
no The FIRST
will find, they are not the pure abftracted
Ideas of Extenfion.
Hyl. But what fay you to pure Intellect ?
May not abftracted Ideas be framed by that
Faculty?
Phil. Since I cannot frame abftract Ideas
at all, it is plain, I cannot frame them by
the help of pure Intellect > whatfoevcr Fa-
culty you underftand by thofe Words. Be-
fides, not to inquire into the Nature of
pure Intellect and its fpiritual Objects, as
Virtue^ Reajbn, God, or the like; thus
much feems manifefl, that fenfible Things
are only to be perceived by Senfe, or re-
prefented by the Imagination. Figures
therefore and Extenfion being originally
perceived by Senfe, do not belong to pure
Intellect. But for your farther Satisfaction,
try if you can frame the Idea of any Fi-
gure, abflracted from all Particularities of
Size, or even from other fenfible Quali-
ties.
Hyl. Let me think a little 1 do
not find that I can.
Phil. And can you think it poflible, that
fhould really exift in Nature, which implies
a Repugnancy in its Conception ?
Hyl. By no means.
Phil. Since therefore it is impoflible e-
ven for the Mind to difunite the Ideas of
Extenfion and Motion from all other fen-
fible
DIALOGUE.
fible Qualities, doth it not follow, that
where the one exift, there neceflarily the
other exift likewifc ?
Hyl. It mould feem fo.
Phil. Confequcntlv the very fame Argu-
ments which you admitted, as conclufive
againft the Secondary Qualities, are with-
out any farther Application of Force againft
the Primary too. Eefides, if you will truft
your Senfcs, is it not plain all fenfible
Qualities cocxift, or to them, appear as
being in the fame Place ? Do they ever re-
prefent a Motion, or Figure, as being di-
verted of all other vifible and tangible Qua-
lities ?
Hyl. You need fay no more on this
Head. I am free to own, if there be no fe-
cret Error or Overfight in our Proceedings
hitherto, that all fenfible Qualities are a-
like to be denied Exiftence without the
Mind. But my Fear is, that I have been
too liberal in my former Conceflions, or
overlooked fome Fallacy or other. In fhort,
I did not take time to think.
Phil. For that matter, Hylas, you may
take what time you pleafc in reviewing the
Progrefs of our Inquiry. You are at liber-
ty to recover any Slips you might have
made, or offer whatever you have omitted,
which makes for your firft Opinion,
Hyl
HyL One great Overfight I take to be
this : That I did hot Efficiently diflinguifti
the Objeft from the Senfatiott. Now
though this latter may not exift without
the Mind, yet it will not thence follow
that the former cannot.
Phil. What Object do you mean ? the
Object of the Senfes ?
Hyl. The fame.
Phil. It is then immediately perceived.
ffyl. Right.
Phil Make me to underftand the Dif-
ference between what is immediately per*
ceived, and a Senfation.
HyL The Senfation T take to be an Act
of the Mind perceiving ; befidc which,
there is form-thing perceived ; and this I
Call the Objeft. For Example, there is Red
and Yellow on that Tulip. But then the
Act of perceiving thofe Colours is in rnc
only, and not in the Tulip.
Phil. What Tulip do you fpeak of? is
it that which you fee ?
Hyl. The lame.
Phil. And what do you fee befide Co-
lour, Figure, and Extenfion ?
HyL Nothing.
Phil. What you would fay then is, that
the Red and Yellow are coexiftent with the
Extenfion ; is it not ?
Hyl
DIALOGUE.
jfy/. That is not all ; I would fay, They
have a real Exiftence without the Mind, in
fome unthinking Subftance.
Phil. That the Colours are really in the
Tulip which I fee, is manifeft. Neither
can it be denied, that this Tulip may exifl
independent of your Mind or mine ; but
that any immediate Object of the Senies,
that is, any Idea, or Combination of Ideas,
mould exifl in an unthinking Subftance, or
exterior to all Minds, is in itfelf an evi-
dent Contradiction. Nor can I imagine
how this follows from what you faid juft
now, to wit that the Red and Yellow were
on the Tulip you faw, fince you do not
pretend to fee that unthinking bubftance.
HyL You have an artful way, 'Philo-
nous, of diverting our Inquiry from the
Subject.
Phil. I fee you have no mind to be pref-
fed that way. To return then to your Di-
ftinction between Senfation and Object; if
I take you right, you diftinguim in every
Perception two Things, the one an Action
of the Mind, the other not.
Hyl. True.
Phil. And this Action cannot exift in, or
belong to any unthinking thing ; but
whatever befide is implied in a Perception,
may.
HyL That is my Meaning.
Thil
12.4 Tt* FIRST
Phil. So that if there was a Perception
without any Act of the Mind, it were pof-
fible fuch a Perception mould exift in an
unthinking Subftancc.
Hyl. I grant it. But it is impoflible there
mould be fuch a Perception.
Phil. When is the Mind faid to be ac-
tive ?
HyL When it produces, puts an end to,
or changes any thing.
Phil. Can the Mind produce, difcon-
tinue, or change any thing but by an Act
of the Will ? '
Hyl It cannot.
Phil. The Mind therefore is to be ac-
counted active in its Perceptions, fo far forth
as Volition is included in them.
Hyl. It is.
Phil. In plucking this Flower, I am ac-
tive, becaufe I do it by the Motion of my
Hand, which was confequent upon my Vo-
lition; fo likewife in applying it to my
Nofe. But is either of thefe Smelling r
HyL No.
Phil. I act too in drawing the Air
through my Nofe ; becaufe my Breathing
fo rather than otherwife, is the Effect of
my Volition. But neither can this be cal-
led Smelling : For if it were, I mould
fmell every time I breathed in that man-
ner.
HyL
DIALOGUE. 215
Hyl. True.
Phil. Smelling then is fomewhat confe-
quent to all this.
Hyl. It is.
Phil. But I do not find my Will con-
cerned any farther. Whatever more there
is, as that I perceive fuch a particular
Smell or any Smell at all, this is indepen-
dent of my Will, and therein I am alto-
gether paffive. Do you find it otherwife
with you, Hylas ?
HyL No, the very fame.
Phil. Then as to Seeing, is it not in your
Power to open your Eyes, or keep them
{hut; to turn them this or that way ?
HyL Without doubt.
Phil. But doth it in like manner depend
on your Will, that in looking on this
Flower, you perceive White rather than a-
ny other Colour ? Or directing your open
Eyes toward yonder Pan of the Heaven,
can you avoid feeing the Sun ? Or is Light
or Darknefs the Effect of your Volition ?
Hyl. No certainly.
PhiL You are then in thefe Refpedts al-
together pafiive.
HyL I am.
Phil. Tell me now, whether Seeing con-
fifts in perceiving Light and Colours, or in
opening ai.d turning tue Eyes?
HyL Without doubt, in the former.
P Thil.
the F 1 R S T
Pbil. Since therefore vou are in the ve-
j
ry Perception of Light and Colours altoge-
ther paffive, what is become of that Acti-
on you were fpeaking of, as an Ingredient
in every Senfation ? And doth it not fol-
low from your own Conceffions, that the
Perception of Light and Colours, includ-
ing no Action in it, may exift in an unper-
ceiving Subftance ? And is not this a plain
Contradiction ?
Hyl. I know not what to think of it.
Phil. Befides, fince you diftinguifh the
dftive and PaJ/ive in every Perception, you
muft do it in that of Pain. But how is it
poffible that Pain, be it as little active a$
you pleafe, fhould exift in an unperceiving
Subftance ? In fhort, do but confider the
Point, and then confefs ingenuoufly, whe-
ther Light and Colours, Taftes, Sounds, Gfc.
are not all equally Paffions or Senfo>
dons in the Soul. You may indeed call
them external Objtfts, and give them in
Words what Subfiftence you pleafe. But
examine your own Thoughts, and then tell
me whether it be not as I fay ?
Hyl. I acknowledge, Philonous, that up-
on a fair Obfervation of what pafles in my
Mind, I can difcover nothing clfe, but that
I am a thinking Being, affected with Va-
riety of Senfations j neither is it poffible to
conceive how a Senfation (hould exift in
an
DIALOGUE.
an tinperceiving Subftance. But then on
the other hand, when I look on fenfible
Things in a different View, confidering
them as fo many Modes and Qualities, I
find it neceffary to fuppofe a material Sub-
ftratum^ without which they cannot be
conceived to exift.
Phil. Material Subftratum call you it ?
Pray, by which of your Senles came you
acquainted with that Being?
Hyl. It is not itfelf fenfible ; its Modes
and Qualities only being perceived by the
Senfes.
Phil. I prefume then, it was by Reflexi-
on and Reafoo you obtained the Idea of it.
Hyl. I do not pretend to any proper po-
fitive Idea of it. However I conclude ic
exifts, becaufe Qualities cannot be con-
ceived to exifl without a Support.
Phil. It feems then you have only a re-
lative Notion of it, or that you conceive
it not othcrwife than by conceiving the Re-
lation it bears to fenfible Qualities.
Hyl. Right.
Phil. Be pleafed therefore to let me know
wherein that Relation confifts.
Hyl. Is it not furficiently exprefled in the
Term Subftratum, or Subftance ?
Phil. If fo, the Word Subftratum rtiould
import, that it is fpread under the fenfible
Qualities or Accidents.
P 2 Hyl.
The F I R S T
Hyl. True.
Phil. And confequently under Exten-
fion.
Hyl. I own it.
Phil. It is therefore fomewhat in its
own Nature intirely diftinct from Exten-
fion.
Hyl. I tell you, Extenfion is only a
Mode, and Matter is fomething that fup-
ports Modes. And is it not evident the
Thing fupported is different from the Thing
fupporting?
Phil. So that fomething diftin<5t from,
and exclulive of Extenfion, is fuppofed to
be the Suhftratum of Extenfion.
Hyl. Juft fo.
Phil. Anfwer me, Hylas. Can a Thing
be fpread withc-iit Extenfion ? or is not the
Idea of Extenfion neceiTarily included in
Spreading ?
5 Hyl. It is.
Phil. Whatfoever therefore you fuppofe
fpread under any thing, muft have in it-
felf an Extenfion diftinft from the Exten-
fion of that Thing under which it is
fpread.
Hyl. It muft.
Phil. Confequently every corporeal Sub-
fiance being the Subftratum of Extenfion,
muft have in itielf another Extenfion by
which it is qualified to be a Subftratum ;
And
DIALOGUE.
And fo on to Infinity. And I ask whether
this be not abfurd in itfelf, and repugnant
to what you granted juft now, to wit, that
the Subftratum was fomething diftindt from,
and exclulive of Extension.
Hyl. Ay but, Philonous, you take me
wrong. I do not mean that Matter is
Jpread in a grofs literal Senfe under Exten-
fion. The Word Subftratum is ufed only
to exprefs in general the fame thing with
Subftance.
Phil. Well then, let us examine the Re-
lation implied in the Term Subftance. Is
it not that it ftands under Accidents?
Hyl. The very fame.
Phil. But that one thing may ftand un-
der or fupport another, muft it not be ex-
tended ?
Hyl. It muft.
Phil. Is not therefore this Supposition
liable to the fame Ablurdity with the foiv
mer ?
Hyl. You ftill take Things in a ftrict li-
teral Senfe : That is not fair, Philonous.
Phil. I am not for impofing any Senfe on
your Words : You are at Liberty to ex-
plain them as you pleafe. Only 1 befeech
you, make me underftand fomething by
them. You tell me, Matter iuppons or
flands under Accidents. How ! is it a,s
your Legs fupport your Body ?
P 3
The FIRST
Hyl. No ; that is the literal Senfe.
Phil. Pray let me know any Senfe, lite-
ral or not literal that you underftand it
in. How long mufl I wait for an An-
fwer, Hy/as?
Hyl. I declare I know not what to fay.
I once thought I underftood well enough
what was meant by Matter's fupporting
Accidents. But now the more I think on
it, the lefs can I comprehend it; in fhort,
I find that I know nothing of itr
Phil. It .kerns then you have no Idea at
all, neither relative nor pofitive of Matter;
you know neither what it is in itfelf, nor
what Relation it bears to Accidents.
'Hyl. I acknowledge it.
Phil. And yet you aliened, that you
could not conceive how Qualities or Acci-
dents mould really exift, without conceiv-
ing at the fame time a material Support of
them.
Hyl. I did.
Phil. That is to fay, when you conceive
the real Exiftence of Qualities, you do
withal conceive fomething which you can-
not conceive.
Hyl. It was wrong I own. But ffcill I
fear there is fome Fallacy or other. Pray
what think you of this ? It is juft come in-
to my Head, that the Ground of all our
Miftakc lies in your treating of each Qua-
lity
DIALOGUE.
lity by itfelf. Now, I grant that each Qua-
lity cannot fingly fubfift without the Mind
Colour cannot without Extcnfion, neither
can Figure without fome other fenfiblc
Quality. But as the feveral Qualities uni-
ted or blended together form intire fenfible
Things, nothing hinders why fuch Things
may not be fuppofed to exifl without the
Mind.
Phil. Either, Hylas, you are jefting, or
have a very bad Memory. Though in»
deed we went through all the Qualities by
Name one after another ; yet my Argu-
ments, or rather your ConceiTions no where
tended to prove, that the Secondary Quali-
ties did not fubfift each alone by itfelf; but
that they were not at all without the Mind.
Indeed in treating of Figure and Motion,
we concluded they could not exift without
the Mind, becaufe it was impoffible even
in Thought to feparatc them from all Se-
condary Qualities, fo as to conceive them
exiiling by themfelves. But then this was
not the only Argument made ufe of upon
that Occafion. But ( to pafs by all that
hath been hitherto faid, and reckon it for
nothing, if you will have it fo ) I am con-
tent to put the whole upon this IfTue. If
you can conceive it poffible for any Mix-
ture or Combination of Qualities, or any
feniible Object whatever, to cxift without
P 4 the
The F I R S T
the Mind, then I will grant it actually to
be fo.
HyL If it comes to that, the Point will
foon be decided. What more eafy than to
conceive a Tree or Houfe exifting by itfelf,
independent of, and un perceived by any
Mind whatfoever ? I do at this prefent
time conceive them exifting after that man-
ner.
Phil. How fay you, Hylasy can you fee
a thing which is at the fame time unfeen ?
HyL No, that were a Contradiction.
. Phil. Is it not as great a Contradiction
to talk of conceiving a thing which is un-
conceived?
HyL It is.
Phil. The Tree or Houfe therefore which
you think of, is conceived by you.
HyL How mould it be otherwife ?
Phil. And what is conceived, is furely in
the Mind.
HyL Without queftion, that which is
conceived is in the Mind.
PHI. How then came you to fay, you
conceived a Houfe or Tree exifting inde-
pendent and out of all Minds whatsoever ?
HyL That was I own an Overfight; but
flay, let me confider wnat led me into it. —
It is :i pleafant Miftake enough. As I was
thinking of a Tree in a folitary Place,
where no one was prefent to lee it, me-
thought
DIALOGUE.
thought that was to conceive a Tree as ex-
ifting unperceivtd or unthought of, not
coniidering that I myfelf conceived it all
the while. But now I plainly fee, that all
I can do is to frame Ideas in my own Mind.
I may indeed conceive in my own Thoughts
the Idea of a Tree, or a Houfe, or a Moun-
tain, but that is all. And this is far from
proving, that I can conceive them exijling
out of the Minds of all Spirits.
'Phil. You acknowledge then that you
cannot poffibly conceive, how any one cor-
poreal fenfible Thing mould exift otherwifc
than in a Mind.
Hyl. I do.
Phil'. And yet you will earneftly con-
tend for the Truth of that which you can-
not fo much as conceive.
Hyl. I profcfs I know not what to think,
but (till there are fome bcruples remain
with me. Is it not certain I fee Things
at a Diftance ? Do we not perceive the Stars
and Moon, for Example, to be a great way
off? Is not this, I fay, manifefl to the Sen-
f£s?
Phil. Do you not in a Dream too per-
ceive thofe or the like Objects ?
Hyl I do.
Phil And have they not then the fame
Appearance of being diftant ?
Hyl.
FIRST
Hyl. They have.
Phil. But you do not thence conclude
the Apparitions in a Dream to be without
the Mind?
Hyl. By no means.
Phil. You ought not therefore to con*
elude that fenfible Objects are without the
Mind, from their Appearance op Manner
wherein they are perceived.
Hyl. I acknowledge it. But doth not
my Senfe deceive me in thofe Cafes ?
Phil. By no means. The Idea or Thing
which you immediately perceive, neither
Senfe nor Reafon inform you that it actu-
ally exifts without the Mind. By Senfe
you only know that you are affected with
fuch certain Senfations of Light and Co-
lours, &c. And thefe you will not fay arc
without the Mind.
Hyl. True : But befide all that, do you
not think the Sight fuggefts fomething of
Outnefs or Diftance ?
Phil. Upon approaching a diftant Ob-
ject, do the vifible Size and Figure change
perpetually, or do they appear the fame at
all Diftanccs ?
Hyl. They are in a continual Change.
Phil. Sight therefore doth not fuggeft
or any way inform you, that the vifible
Object you immediately perceive, exifts at
DIALOGUE. 155
A Diftance *, or will be perceived when
you advance farther onward, there being
a continued Series of vifible Objects fuc-
ceeding each other, during the whole time
of your Approach.
Hyl. It doth not ; but ftill I know, up-
on feeing an Object, what Object I (hall
perceive after having pafled over a certain
Diftance : No matter whether it be exactly
the fame or no : There is flill ibmething
of Diftance fuggefted in the Cafe.
*Phil. Good Hylas, do but reflect a little
on the Point, and then tell me whether
there be any more in it than this. From
the Ideas you actually perceive by Sight,
you have by Experience learned to collect
what other Ideas you will (according to
the {landing Order of Nature ) be affected
with, after fuch a certain SuccefTion of
Time and Motion.
Hyl. Upon the whole, I take it to be no-
thing clfc.
Phil. Now is it not plain, that if we
fuppofe a Man born blind was on a fudden
made to fee, he could at firft have DO Ex-
perience of what may be fuggefted by Sight.
Hyl. It is.
* See the Eflay towards a new Theory of Vifion ; And its
Vindicatipn.
TbiL
The FIRST
Phil. He would not then according to
you have any Notion of Diftance annexed
to the Things he faw j but would take
them for a new Set of Senfations exifting
only in his Mind.
Hyl. It is undeniable.
Phil. But to make it ftill more plain : Is
not ^D'iftancc a Line turned end wife to the
Eye?
Hyl It is.
Phil And can a Line fo fituated be per-
ceived by Sight?
Hyl. It cannot.
Phil. Doth it not therefore follow that
Diftance is not properly and immediately
perceived by Sight ?
Hyl. It mould feem fo.
Phil. Again, is it your Opinion that Co-*
lours are at a Diftance?
Hyl. It muft be acknowledged, they are
only in the Mind.
Phil. But do not Colours appear to the
Eye as coexifting in the fame place with
Extenfion and Figures ?
Hyl. They do.
Phil. How can you then conclude from
Sight, that Figures exift without, when you
acknowledge Colours do not j the fenfible
Appearance being the very fame with re-
gard to both ?
Hyl. I know not what to anfwer.
Thil.
DIALOGUE. 137
Phil. But allowing that Diftance was
truly and immediately perceived by the
Mind, yet it would not thence follow it
exifted out of the Mind. For whatever is
immediately perceived is an Idea : And can
any Idea exift out of the Mind ?
Hyl. To fuppofe that, wereabfurd: But
inform me, Pbilonous, can we perceive or
know nothing beiide our Ideas ?
Phil. As for the rational deducing of
Caufes from Effects, that is befide our In-
quiry. And by the Senfes you can bed tell,
whether you perceive any thing which is
not immediately perceived. And I ask you,
whether the Things immediately perceived,
are other than your own Senfations or
Ideas ? You have indeed more than once,
in the Courfe of this Converfation, declared
yourfelf on thofe Points ; but you feem by
this lalt Queftion to have departed from
what you then thought.
Hyl. To fpeak the Truth, Pbilonous, I
think there are two Kinds of Objects, the
one perceived immediately, which are 1 ike-
wife called Ideas.-, the other are real Things
or external Obiedb- perceived by the Me-
diation of Ideas, which are their Images
and Reprefentations. Now I own, Ideas
do not exiil without the Mind j but the
latter fort of Objects do. I am forry I
did not think of this Diilinction fooner ;
it
3 8 The F I R S T
it would probably have cut fliort your Dif-
courfe.
Phil. Are thofe external Objects per-
ceived by Senfe, or by fome other Faculty ?
HyL They are perceived by Senfe.
Phil. How! is there any thing perceived
by Senfe, which is not immediately per-
ceived ?
HyL Yes, Phihnous, in fome fort there
is. For Example, when I look on a Pic-
ture or Statue of Julius Cajar, I may be
faid after a manner to perceive him (though
not immediately) by my Senfes.
Phil. It feems then, you will have our
Ideas, which alone are immediately per-
ceived, to be Pictures of external Things :
And that thefe alfo are perceived by Senfe,
inafmuch as they have a Conformity or Re-
femblance to our Ideas.
HyL That is my Meaning.
Phil. And in the fame way that Julius
Cczfary in himfelf invifible, is neverthelefs
perceived by Sight; real Things in them-
Selves imperceptible, are perceived by Senfe.
HyL In the very fame.
Phil. Tell me, Hylas, when you behold
the Picture of Julius C<ejary do you fee
with your Eyes any more than fome Co-
lours and Figures with a certain Symmetry
and Compofition of the whole ?
HyL Nothing elfe.
ThiL
DIALOGUE,
'Phil. And would not a Man, who had
never known any thing of Julius Cafary
fee as much ?
Hyl. He would.
Phil. Confequendy he hath his Sight,
and the Ufe of it, in as perfect a Degree as
you.
Hyl. I agree with you.
Phil. Whence comes it then that your
Thoughts are directed to the Roman Em-
peror, and his are not? This cannot pro-
ceed from the Senfations or Ideas of Senfc
by you then perceived j fmce you acknow-
ledge you have no Advantage over him in
that refpect. It fhould feem therefore to
proceed from Reafon and Memory : fliould
it not ?
Hyl. It fliould.
Phil. Confequendy it will not follow
from that Inftance, that any thing is per-
ceived by Senfe which is not immediately
perceived. Though I grant we may in
one Acceptation be faid to perceive fenfible
Things mediately by Senfe: That is, when
from a frequently perceived Connexion, the
immediate Perception of Ideas By one
Senle fuggefts to the Mind others perhaps
belonging to another Senfe, which are wont
to be connected with them. For inftance,
when I hear a Coach drive along the
Streets, immediately I perceive only the
Sound -,
±40 The FIRST
Sound ; but from the Experience I have
had that fuch a Sound is connected with a
Coach, 1 am faid to hear the Coach. It
is ncverthclefs evident, that in truth and
ftridtnefs, nothing can be heard but Sound:
And the Coach is not then properly per-
ceived by Senfe, but fuggefted from Expe-
rience. So likewife when we are laid to
fee a red-hot Bar of Iron j the Solidity and
Heat of the Iron are not the Objects of
Sight, but fuggefted to the Imagination by
the Colour and Figure, which are proper-
ly perceived by that Senfe. In fliort, thofe
Things alone are actually and ftridly per-
ceived by any Senfe, which would have
been perceived, in cafe that fame Senfe
had then been firft conferred on us. As
for other Things, it is plain they are only
fuggefted to the Mind by Experience
grounded on former Perceptions. But to
return to your Companion of Ccefars Pic-
ture, it is plain, if you keep to that, you
muft hold the real Things or Archetypes
of our Ideas are not perceived by Senfe,
but by fome internal Faculty of the Soul,
as Reafon or Memory. I would therefore
fain know, what Arguments you can draw
from Reafon for the Exiftence of what
you call real Things or material Objeffs.
Or whether you remember to have feen
them formerly as they are in themfelves ?
or
DIALOGUE. 241
or if you have heard or read of any one
that did.
Hyl. I fee, Philonous, you are difpofed
to Rallery; but that will never convince
me.
Phil. My Aim is only to learn from
you, the way to come at the Knowledge
of material Beings. Whatever we per-
ceive, is perceived either immediately or
mediately : By Senfe, or by Reafon and
Reflexion. But as you have excluded
Senfe, pray (hew me what Reafon you
have to believe their Exiftence ; or what
medium you can poffibly make ufe of, to
prove it either to mine or your own Un-
derftanding.
Hyl. To deal ingenuoufly, 'Pbllonouf,
now I confider the Point, I do not find I
can give you any good Reafon for it. But
thus much feems pretty plain, that it is at
leaft poffible fuch Things may really exift.
And as long as there is no Abfurdity in
fuppofing them, I am refolved to believe as
I did, till you bring good Reafons to the
contrary.
Phil. What ! is it come to this, that
you only believe the Exiftence of material
Objects, and that your Belief is founded
barely on the Poffibility of its being true ?
Tlttn you will have me bring Reafons a>
gaiaft it : Though another would think it
reafonable,
The FIRST
rcafonable, the Proof mould lie on him
who holds the Affirmative. And after all,
this very Point which you are now re-
folved to maintain without any Reafon, is
in effect what you have more than once
during this Difcourfe feen good Reafon to
give up. But to pafs over all this ; if I
underftand you rightly, you fay our Ideas
do not exift without the Mind ; but that
they are Copies, Images, or Reprefentati-
ons of certain Originals that do.
HyL You take me right.
Phil. They are then like external Things.
HyL They are.
Phil. Have thofe Things a ftable and
permanent Nature independent of our Sen-
fes j or are they in a perpetual Change,
upon our producing any Motions in our
Bodies, fufpending, exerting, or altering our
Faculties or Organs of Senfe.
HyL Real Things, it is plain, have a
fixed and real Nature, which remains the
fame, notwithftanding any Change in our
Senfes, or in the Pofture and Motion of
our Bodies ; which indeed may affect the
Ideas in our Minds, but it were abfurd to
think they had the fame Effect on Things
cxifting without the Mind.
Phil. How then is it poffible, that
Things perpetually fleeting and variable as
•ur Ideas, fhould be Copies or Images of
any
DIALOGUE.
any thing fixed and conftant ? Or in other
Words, fince all fenfible Qualities, as Size,
Figure, Colour, &c. that is, our Ideas are
continually changing upon every Altera-
tion in the Diftance, Medium, or Inftru-
ments of Senfation ; how can any deter-
minate material Objects be properly re-
prefented or painted forth by feveral di-
ftincl: Things, each of which is fo diffe-
rent from and unlike the reft ? Or if
you fay it refembles fome one only of
our Ideas, how mall we be able to di-
ftinguifh the true Copy from all the falfe
ones ?
Hyl. I profefs, Philonous, I am at a lofs.
I know not what to fay to this.
Phil. But neither is this all. Which are
material Objects in themfelves, perceptible
or imperceptible ?
Hyl. Properly and immediately nothing
can be perceived but Ideas. All material
Things therefore are in themfelves infen-
fible, and to be perceived only by their
Ideas.
^Phil. Ideas then are fcnfible, and their
Archetypes or Originals infenfible.
Hyl. Right.
Phil. But how can that which is fenfi-
ble be like that which is infenfible ? Can a
real thing in itfelf invifible be like a Co-
lour j or a real thing which is not au-drble^
be
144 Me FIRST
be like a Sound? In a word, can any thing
be like a Senfation or Idea, but another
Senfation or Idea ?
Kyi. I muft own, I think not.
Phil. Is it poffible there fhould be any
doubt in the Point ? Do you not perfectly
know your own Ideas?
Hyl. I know them perfe&ly ; fince what
I do not perceive or know, can be no part
of my Idea.
Phil. Confider therefore, and examine
them, and then tell me if there be any
thing in them which can exift with-
out the Mind : or if you can conceive
any thing like them exifting without the
Mind.
Hyl. Upon Inquiry, I find it is impoffi-
ble for me to conceive or underftand how
any thing but an Idea can be like an Idea.
And it is moft evident, that no Idea can
exift without the Mind.
y/j/7. You are therefore by your Prin-
ciples forced to deny the Reality of fenli-
ble Things, (ince you made it to confift
in an abiblute Exiftence exterior to the
Mind. That is to fay, you are a down-
right Sceptic. So I have gained my Point,
which was to mew your Principles led to
Scepticifm.
Hyl. For the prefent I am, if not intire-
ly convinced, at lead filenced,
Thil.
DIALOGUE. 145
Pbil. I would fain know what more
you would require in order to a perfect
Convidion. Have you not had the Liber-
ty of explaining yourfelf all manner of
ways ? Were any little Slips in Difcourfe
laid hold and iniifted on ? Or were you
not allowed to retract or reinforce any
thing you had offered, as bed ferved your
Purpofe ? Hath not every thing you could
fay been heard and examined with all the
Fairnefs imaginable ? In a word, have you
not in every Point been convinced out of
your own Mouth ? And if you can at prc-
fent difcover any Flaw in any of your for-
mer Conceflions, or think of any remain-
ing Subterfuge, any new Diitinction, Co-
lour, or Comment whatsoever, why do you
not produce it ?
Hyl. A little Patience, Philonous. I am
at prefent fo amazed to fee myfelf en fnared,
and as it were imprifoned in the Labyrinths
you have drawn me into, that on the fud-
den it cannot be expected I mould find
my way out. You muft give me time to
look about me, and recoiled: myfelf.
Phil. Hark j is not this the College-
Bell ?
Hyl. It rings for Prayers.
Phil. We will go in then if you pleafe,
and meet here again to Morrow Morning.
In the mean time you may employ your
Thoughts
The FIRST tec.
Thoughts on this Morning's Difcourfe,
and try if you can find any Fallacy in it,
or invent any new means to extricate your-
fclf.
Hyl. Agreed.
THE
THE SECOND
DIALOGUE.
H Y L A S.
BEG your Pardon, 'Philonous,
for not meeting you fooner. All
this Morning my Head was fo
filled with our late Converfation,
that I had not leifure to think of
the Time of the Day, or indeed of any
thing elfe.
Philonous. I am glad you were fo intent
upon it, in Hopes if there were any Mif-
takes in your Conceflions, or Fallacies in
my Reafonings from them, you will now
difcover them to me.
Hyl. I aflure you, I have done nothing
ever fince I faw you, but fearch after Mif-
takes and Fallacies, and with that View
have
Tte SECOND
have minutely examined the whole Series
of Yefterday's Difcourfe : but all in vain,
for the Notions it led me into, upon Re-
view appear flill more clear and evident ;
and the more I confider them, the more
irrefiftibly do they force my Aflent.
Phil. And is not this, think you, a Sign
that they are genuine, that they proceed
from Nature, and arc conformable to right
Reafon ? Truth and Beauty are in this a-
like, that the ftri&eft Survey fets them both
off to Advantage. While the falfe Luftre
of Error and Difguife cannot endure being
reviewed, or too nearly infpedted.
Hyl. I own there is a great deal in what
you fay. Nor can any one be more in-
tirely fatisfied of the Truth of thofe odd
Confequences, fo long as I have in View
the Reafonings that lead to them. But
when thefe are out of my Thoughts, there
feems on the other hand fomething fo fa-
tisfadtory, fo natural and intelligible in the
modern way of explaining Things, that I
profefs I know not how to rejedl it.
Phil. I know not what way you mean.
Hyl. I mean the way of accounting for
pur Senfations or Ideas.
Phil. How is that ?
Hyl. It is fuppofed the Soul makes her
Refidence in fome part of the Brain, from
which the Nerves take their rife, and are
thence
DIALOGUE. 149
thenc? extended to all Parts of the Body:
And that outward Objects by the different
Impreffions they make on the Organs of
Senfe, communicate certain vibrative Mo-
tions to the Nerves -, and thefe being filled
with Spirits, propagate them to the Brain
or Seat of the Soul, which according to
the various Impreffions or Traces thereby
made in the Brain, is varioufly affected with
Ideas.
Phil. .And call you this an Explication
of the manner whereby we are affected with
Ideas ?
Hyl. Why not, Philonous, have you any
thing to object againft it ?
Phil. I would firft know whether I right-
ly underftand your Hypothecs. You make
certain Traces in the Brain to be the Catifes
or Occafions of our Ideas. Pray tell me,
whether by the Brain you mean any fenli-
ble Thing?
Hyl. What elfe think you I could mean?
Phil. Senfible Things are all immediate-
ly perceivable ; and thofe Things which
are immediately perceivable, are Ideas; and
thefe exifl only in the Mind. Thus much
you have, if I miftake not, long fince a-
greed to.
Hyl. I do not deny it.
Phil. The Brain therefore you fpeak of,
being a fenfible Thing, exifts only in the
Mindl
i5o The S E C 0 N D
Mind. Now, I would fain know whether
you think it reafonable to fuppofe, that one
Idea or Thing exifting in the Mind, occa-
fions all other Ideas. And if" you think fo,
pray how do you account for the Origin
of that Primary Idea or Brain itfelf?
Hyl. I do not explain the Origin of our
Ideas by that Brain which is perceivable to
Senfe, this being itfelf only a Combination
of fenfible Ideas, but by another which I
imagine.
Phil. But are not Things imagined as
truly in the Mind as Things perceived ?
Hyl. I muffc confefs they are.
Phil. It comes therefore to the fame
thing ; and you have been all this while
accounting for Ideas, by certain Motions or
Impreffions in the Brain, that is, by fome
Alterations in an Idea, whether fenfible or
imaginable,- it matters not.
Hyl. I begin to fufpecl: my Hypothefis.
Phil. Befide Spirits, all that we know
or conceive are our own Ideas. When
therefore you fay, all Ideas are occafioned
by Impreffions in the Brain, do you con-
ceive this Brain or no ? If you do, then
you talk of Ideas imprinted in an Idea,
caufing that fame Idea, which is abfurd. If
you do not conceive it, you talk unintelli-
gibly, inflead of forming a reafonable Hy-
pothefis*
DIALOGUE.
Hyl. I now clearly fee it was a mere
Dream. There is nothing in it.
Phil. You need not be much concerned
at it : for after all, this way of explaining
Things, as you called it, could never have
fatisfied any reafonable Man. What Con-
nexion is there between a Motion in the
Nerves, and the Senfations of Sound or Co-
lour in the Mind ? or how is it poiTiblc
thefe mould be the Effect of that ?
Hyl. But I could never think it had fo
little in it, as now it feems to have.
Phil. Well then, are you at length fa-
tisfied that no fenfible Things have a real
Exiftencc j and that you are in truth an ar-
rant Sceptic ?
Hyl. It is too plain to be denied.
Phil. Look ! are not the Fields covered
with a delightful Verdure ? Is there not
fomething in the Woods and Groves, in
the Rivers and clear Springs that fooths,
that delights, that tranfports the Soul ? At
the Profpecl of the wide and deep Ocean,
or fome huge Mountain whofe Top is loft
in the Clouds, or of an old gloomy Foreft,
are not our Minds filled with a pleafing
Horror? Even in Rocks and Deferts, is
there not an agreeable Wildnefs ? How
fmcere a Pleafure is it to behold the na-
tural Beauties of the Earth ! To preferve
and renew our Relifh for them, is not the
Veil
The S E C 0 N D
Veil of Night alternately drawn over her
Face, and doth (he not change her Drefs
with the Seafons? How aptly are the Ele-
ments difpofed ? What Variety and Ufe in
the meaneft Productions of Nature ? What
Delicacy, what Beauty, what Contrivance
in animal and vegetable Bodies ? How ex-
quifitely are all Things fuited, as well to
their particular Ends, as to conflitute ap-
pofite Parts of the Whole ! And while they
mutually aid and fupport, do they not alfo
fet off and illuftrate each other ? Raife now
your Thoughts from this Ball of Earth, to
all thofe glorious Luminaries that adorn
the high Arch of Heaven. The Motion
and Situation of the Planets, are they not
admirable for Ufe and Order ? Were thofe
(mifcalled Rrratlque) Globes ever known to
ftray, in their repeated Journeys through
the pathlefs Void ? Do they not meafure
Areas round the Sun ever proportioned to
the Times ? So fixed, fo immutable are the
Laws by which the unfeen Author of Na-
ture actuates the Univerfe. How vivid and
radiant is the Luftre of the fixed Stars!
How magnificent and rich that negligent
Profufion, with which they appear to be
fcattered throughout the whole Azure
Vault! Yet if you take the Telefcope, it
brings into your Sight a new Hoft of Stars
that efcape the naked Eye. Here they
feem
DIALOGUE. 153
feem contiguous and minute, but to a
nearer View immenfe Orbs of Light at va-
rious Diftances, far funk in the Abyfs of
Space. Now you muft call Imagination
to your Aid. The feeble narrow Senfe
cannot defcry innumerable Worlds revolv-
ing round the central Fires ; and in thofe
Worlds the Energy of an all-perfect Mind
difplayed in endlefs Forms. But neither
Senfe nor Imagination are big enough to
comprehend the boundlefs Extent with all
its glittering Furniture. Though the la-
bouring Mind exert and drain each Power
to its utmoft reach, there ftill ftands out
ungrafped a Surplufage immeafurable. Yet
all the vaft Bodies that compofe this migh-
ty Frame, how diftant and remote foever,
are by fome fecret Mechanifm, fome divine
Art and Force linked in a mutual Depen-
dence and Intercourfe with each other,
even with this Earth, which was almoft
flipt from my Thoughts, and loft in the
Crc .i of Worlds. Is not the whole Syilem
imrnenfe, beautiful, glorious beyond Ex-
preiTion and beyond Thought ! What treat-
ment then do thole Philofophers deferve,
who would deprive thefe noble and de-
lightful Scenes of all Reality? How mould
thole Principles be entertained, that lead us
to think all the vifible Beauty of the Crea-
tion a falfe imaginary Glare? To be plain,
can
i54 Tie S E C 0 tt D
can you expect this Scepticifm of youfg
will not be thought extravagantly abfurd
by all Men of Senfe ?
Hyl. Other Men may think as they
pleafe : But for your part you have no-^
thing to reproach me with. My Comfort
is, you are as much a Sceptic as I am.
Phil. There, Hylas, I muff beg leave to
differ from you.
Hyl. What! have you all along agreed
to the Premifes, and do you now deny the
Conclufion, and leave me to maintain thofe
Paradoxes by myfelf which you led me in-
to? This furely is not fair.
Phil. I deny that I agreed with you in
thofe Notions that led to Scepticifm. You
indeed laid, the Reality of fenfible Things
confifted in an abfolute Exiftence out of the
Minds of Spirits, or diftinct from their be-
ing perceived. And purfuant to this No-
tion of Reality, you are obliged to deny
fenfible Things any real Exiftence : That
is, according to your own Definition, you
profefs yourfelf a Sceptic. But I neither
faid nor thought the Reality of fenfible
Things was to be defined after that man-
ner. To me it is evident, for the Reafon*
you allow of, that fenfible Things cannot
cxift otherwife than in a Mind or Spirit.
Whence I conclude, not that they have no
real Exiftence, but that feeing they depend
not
DIALOGUE.
not on my Thought, and have an Exiftcncc
diftincl from being perceived by me, there
mufl be fome other Mind 'wherein they exift.
As fure therefore as the fenfible World
really exifts, fo fure is there an infinite
omniprelent Spirit who contains and fup-
ports it.
Hyl. What ! this is no more than I and
all Chriftians hold ; nay, and all others too
who believe there is a God, and that he
knows and comprehends all Things.
Phil. Ay, but here lies the Difference.
Men commonly believe that all Things are
known or perceived by God, becaufe they
believe the Being of a God, whereas I on
the other fide, immediately and neceffarily
conclude the Being of a God, becaufe all
fenfible Things mufl be perceived by him.
Hyl. But fo long as we all believe the
fame thing, what matter is it how we come
by that Belief ?
Phil. But neither do we agree in the
fame Opinion. For Philofophers, though
they acknowledge all corporeal Beings to
be perceived by God, yet they attribute to
them an abfolute Subfiftence diftincl: from
their being perceived by any Mind what*
ever, which I do not. Befides, is there no
Difference between faying, There is a God,
therefore he perceives all Things : and fay-
ing, Senjible Things do really exiji : and if
they
25 S The S E C 0 N D
they really exift, they are neceffarily perceived
by an infinite Mind : therefore there is an
infinite Mir.d^ or God. This furnifhes you
with a direct and immediate Demonftrati-
on, from a moft evident Principle, of the
Being of a God. Divines and Philofophers
had proved beyond all Controverfy, from
the Beauty and Ufefulnefs of the feveral
Parts of the Creation, that it was the
Workmanmip of God. But that letting
afide all Help of Aftronomy and natural
Philofophy, all Contemplation of the Con-
trivance, Order, and Adjustment of Things,
an infinite Mind mould be neceffarily in-
ferred from the bare Exiftence of the fen-
fible World, is an Advantage peculiar to
them only who have made this eafy Re-
flexion : That the fenfible World is that
which we perceive by our feveral Senfes;
and rhat nothing is perceived by the SAnfes
beiide. Ideas ; and that no Idea or Arche-
type of an Idea can exift otherwife than in
a Mind. You may now, without any la-
borious fearch into the Sciences^ without
any Subtilty of Reafon, or tedious Length
of Difcourfe, oppofe and baffle the moft
flrenuous Advocate for Atheilm. Thofe
miierable Refuges, whether in an eternal
Succeflion of unthinking Caufes and Ef-
fects, or in a fortuitous Concourfe of
Atoms j thofe wild Imaginations
DIALOGUE.
, Hobbes, and Spinofa •> in a word the whole
Syftem of Atheifm, is it not intircly over-
thrown by this /ingle Reflexion on the Re-
pugnancy included in fuppofing the
Whole, or any Part, even the molt rude
and fhapelefs of the vifible World, to exift
without a Mind? Let any one of thofe A-
bettors of Impiety but look into his own
Thoughts, and there try if he can con-
ceive how fo much as a Rock, a Defert, a
Chaos, or confufed Jumble of Atoms -t how
any thing at all, either feniible or imagina-
ble, can ex.ift independent of a Mind, and
he need go no farther to be convinced of
his Folly. Can any thing be fairer than to
put a Difpute on fuch an Iffue, and leave
it to a Man himfelf to fee if he can con-
ceive, even in Thought, what he holds to
be true in Fact, and from a notional to
allow it a real Exiflence ?
HyL It cannot be denied, there is fome-
thing highly ferviceable to Religion in
what you advance. But do you not think
it looks very like a Notion entertained by
fome eminent Moderns, of feeing all
things in God ?
Phil. I would gladly know that Opini-
on ; pray explain it to me.
Hyl They conceive that the Soul being
immaterial, is incapable of being united
material Things, fo as to perceire
R theru
them in themfelves, but that (he perceives
them by her Union with the Subftance of
God, which being fpiritual is therefore
purely intelligible, or capable of being the
immediate Object of a Spirit's Thought.
Befides, the Divine EfTence contains in it
Perfections correfpondent to each created
Being > and which are for that lleafon
proper to exhibit or reprefent them to the
Mind.
Phil. I do not underftand how our Ideas,
which are Things altogether paffive and
inert, can be the EfTence, or any Part ( or
like any Part ) of the EfTence or Subftance
of God, who is an impaffive, indivifible,
purely active Being. Many more Difficul-
ties and Objections there are, which occur
at firft View againft this Hypothecs; but I
{hall only add that it is liable to all the
Abfurdities of the common Hypothefes, in
making a created World exift otherwife
than in the Mind of a Spirit. Befide all
which it hath this peculiar to itfelf j that
it makes that material World ferve to no
Purpofe. And if it pafs for a good Ar-
gument againft other Hypothefes in the
Sciences, that they fuppofe Nature or the
Divine Wifdom to make fomething in
vain, or do that by tedious round-about
Methods, which might have been per-
formed in a much more eafy and compen-
dious
DIALOGUE. z55>
dious way, what (hall we think of that
Hypothefis which fuppofes the whole
World made in vain ?
HyL But what fay you, are not you too
of Opinion that we fee all Things in God ?
If I miftake not, what you advance comes
near it.
Phil. Few Men think, yet all will have
Opinions. Hence Mens Opinions are fu-
perficial and confufed. It is nothing ftrange
that Tenets, which in themfelves are ever
fo different, mould ncverthelefs be con-
founded with each other by thofe who do
not confidcr them attentively. I flaall not
therefore be furprifed, if fome Men ima-
gine that I run into the Enthufiafm of Mai-
branche, though in truth I am very remote
from it. He builds on the moft abftradt
general Ideas, which I intirely difclaim.
He afferts an abfolute external World,
which I deny. He maintains that we are
deceived by our Senfes, and know not the
real Natures or the true Forms and Figures
of extended Beings; of all which I hold
the dired contrary. So that upon the whole
there are no Principles more fundamen-
tally oppofite than his and mine. It muft
be owned I intirely agree with what the
holy Scripture faith, That in God we Izvet
and move, and have our Being. But that
we fee Things in his EfTence after the
R^ 2 manner
The SECOND.
manner above fet forth, I am far from be-
lieving. Take here in brief my Meaning. It
is evident that the Things I perceive are my
own Ideas, and that no Idea can exift un-
lefs it be in a Mind. Nor is it lefs plain
that thefe Ideas or Things by me percei-
ved, either themfelves or their Archetypes,
exift independently of my Mind, fmcc I
know myielf not to be their Author, it be-
ing out of my power to determine at plea-
fure, what particular Ideas I mall be af-
fected with upon opening my Eyes or
Ears. They muft therefore exift in fome
other Mind, whofe Will it is they mould
be exhibited to me. The Things, I fay,
immediately perceived, are Ideas or Scnfa-
tions, call them which you will. But how
can any Idea or Senfation exift in, or be
produced by, any thing but a Mind or Spi-
rit? This indeed is inconceivable j and to
affert that which is inconceivable, is to
talk Nonfenfe: Is it not ?
Hyl. Without doubt.
Phil. But on the other hand, it is very
conceivable that they mould exift in, and
be produced by, a Spirit; fince this is no
more than I daily experience in myfelf, in-
asmuch as I perceive numberlefs Ideas j
and by an Act of my Will can form a great
Variety of them, and raife them up in my
Imagination : Though it muft be confeiTed,
thefe
DIALOGUE.
thefe Creatures of the Fancy are not alto-
gether fo diftinc~r., fo ftrong, vivid, and per-
manent, as thofe perceived by my Senfes,
which latter are called Real things. From
all which I conclude, there is a Mind which
affcffs me every Moment with all the fenfibie
Imprejfiom I perceive. And from the Va-
riety, Order, and Manner of thefe, I con-
clude the Author of them to be ivifi,
powerful^ and good, beyond* comprehenjkn.
Mark it well; I do not fay, I fee Things
by perceiving that which reprefents them
in the intelligible Subftance of God. This
I do not underftand; but I fay, The Things
by me perceived are known by the Under-
ftanding, and produced by the Will, of an
infinite Spirit. And is not all this moft
plain and evident ? Is there any more in it,
than what a little Obfervation of our own
Minds, and that which paries in them net
only enableth us to conceive, but alfo obli-
geth us to acknowledge ?
Hyl. I think I underftand you very
clearly ; and own the Proof you give of a
Deity feems no lefs evident, than it is fur-
prifing. But allowing that God is the
.Supreme andUniverfalCaufe of all Things,
yet may not there be ft ill a Third Nature be-
fides Spirits and Ideas? May we not admit
a fubordinate and limhed Caufe of our
R 3 Ideas?
Tfo SECOND
Ideas? In a word, may there not for all
that be Matter?
Phil. How often muft I inculcate the
fame thing ? You allow the Things imme-
diately perceived by Senfe to exift no where
without the Mind: But there is nothing
perceived by Senfe, which is not perceived
immediately : therefore there is nothing
fenfible that exifts without the Mind. The
Matter therefore which you ftill infift on,
is fomething intelligible, I fuppofe; fome-
thing that may be difcovered by Reafon,
and not by Senfe.
Hyl. You are in the right.
Phil. Pray let me know what Reafon-
ing your Belief of Matter is grounded on ;
and what this Matter is in your prefent
Senfe of it.
Hyl. I find myfelf affected with various
Ideas, whereof I know I am not the Cauie;
neither are they the Caufe of themfelves, or
of one another, or capable of fubfifting by
themfelves, as being altogether inactive,
fleeting, dependent Beings. They have
therefore fome Caufe diftincl; from me and
them : Of which I pretend to know no
more, than that it is the Caufe of my Ideas.
And this thing, whatever it be, I call Matter,
Phil. Tell me, Hylas, hath every one a
Liberty to change the current proper Sig-
nification
DIALOGUE.
nification annexed to a common Name in
any Language ? For Example, fuppofe a
Traveller mould tell you, that in a cer-
tain Country Men might pafs unhurc
through the Fire} and, upon explaining
himfelf, you found he meant by the Word
Fire that which others call Water : Or if
he fhould aflcrt there are. Trees which
walk upon two Legs, meaning Men by the
Term Frees. Would you think this rea-
fonable ?
HyL No; I fhould think it very abfurd.
Common Cuftom is the Standard of Pro-
priety in Language. And for any Man to
affect fpeaking improperly, is to pervert
the Ufe of Speech, and can never ferve to a
better purpofe, than to protract and multi-
ply Difputes where there is no Difference
in Opinion.
Phil. And doth not Matter, in the com-
mon current Acceptation of the Word, fig-
nify an extended, folid, moveable, unthink-
ing, inactive Subftance ?
HyL It doth.
Phil. And hath it not been made evident,
that no fuch Subflance can poffibly exiil ?
And though it fhould be allowed to exilt,
yet how can that which is inatfi've be a
Caufe-y or that which is unthinking be a
Caufe of^houghtl You may indeed, if you
pleafe, annex to the Word Matter a con-
R 4 trary
Ue S E C 0 N D.
trary Meaning to what is vulgarly receiv-
ed; and tell me you underftand by it an
unextended, thinking, active Being, which
is the Caufe of our Ideas. But what elfe
is this, than to play with Words, and run
into that, very Fault you jufl now con-
demned with fo much Reafon? I do by
no means find fault with your Reafoning,
in that you colled; a Caufe from the Phe-
nomena : But 1 deny that the Caufe de-
duciblc by Reafon can properly be termed
Matter.
Hyl. There is indeed fomething in
what you fay. But I am afraid you do not
thoroughly comprehend my Meaning. I
would by no means be thought to deny
that God or an Infinite Spirit is the Su-
preme Caufe of all things. All I contend
for, is, that fubordinate to the Supreme A-
gent there is a Caufe of a limited and in-
ferior Nature, which concurs in the Pro-
duction of our Ideas, not by any Act of
Will or Spiritual Efficiency, but by that
Kind of Action which belongs to Matter,
viz. Motion.
*PhiL I find, you are at every Turn re-
lapfing into your old exploded Conceit, of
a moveable and confequently an extend-
ed Subftance exifting without the Mind.
What! Have you already forgot you were
convinced, or are you willing I fliould re-
peat
DIALOGUE.
peat what has been faid on that Head ? In
truth this is not fair Dealing in you, ftill
to fuppofe the Being of that which you
have io often acknowledged to have no Be-
ing. But not to infill: farther on what has
been fo largely handled, I ask whether all
your Ideas are not perfectly paffive and inert,
including nothing of Action in them?
HyL They are.
Phil. And are fenfible Qualities any
thing elfe but Ideas?
HyL How often have I acknowledged
that they are not?
Phil. But is not Motion a fenfible Qua-
lity ?
HyL It is.
Phil. Confequently it is no Action.
HyL I agree with you. And indeed it
is very plain, that when I flir my Finger,
it remains paflivcj but my Will which
produced the Motion, is active.
Phil. Now I defire to know in the firft
place, whether Motion being allowed to be
no Action, you can conceive any Action
befides Volition: And in the fecond place,
whether to fay fomething and conceive
nothing be not to talk Nonfcnfe: And
laftly, whether having confidered the Pre-.
mifes, you do not perceive that to fup-
pofe any efficient or active Caufe' of our
Ideas, other than Spirit, is highly abfurd
and unreafonable ? HyL
The SECOND
Hyl. I give up the Poinc intirely. But
though Matter may not be a Caufe, yet what
hinders its being an Inftrument fubfervient
to the Supreme Agent in the Produ&ioa
of our Ideas?
Phil. An Inftrument, fay you ; pray
what may be the Figure, Springs, Wheels,
and Motions of that Inftrument ?
Hyl. Thofe I pretend to determine no-
thing of, both the Subftance and its Qua-
lities being intirely unknown to me.
Phil. What ? You are then of Opinion,
it is made up of unknown Parts, that it
hath unknown Motions, and an unknown
Shape.
Hyl. I do not believe it hath any Figure
or Motion at all, being already convinced,
that no fenlible Qualities can exift in an
unperceiving Subftance.
*Phil. But what Notion is it poffible to
frame of an Inftrument void of all fcnfible
Qualities, even Extenfion itfclf ?
Hyl. I do not pretend to have any Noti-
on of it.
Phil. And what reafon have you to
think, this unknown, this inconceivable
Somewhat doth exift? Is it that you ima-
gine God cannot ad: as well without it,
or that you find by Experience the Ufe
of fome fuch thing, when you form Ideas
in your own Mind?
Hyl.
DIALOGUE.
HyL You arc always teizing me for Rea-
fons of my Belief Pray what Reafons
have you not to believe it ?
Phil. It is to me a fufficient Reafon not
to believe the Exiftence of any thing, if I
fee no Reafon for believing it. But not
to infift on Reafons for believing, you will
not fo much as let me know what it is
you would have me believe, ilnce you
fay you have no manner of Notion of
it. After all, let me intreat you to confi-
der whether it be like a Philofopher, or
even like a Man of common Senfe, to pre-
tend to believe you, know not what, and
you know not why.
HyL Hold, Tbilonous. When I tell you
Matter is an Inftrument, I do not mean al-
together Nothing. It is true, I know not
the particular Kind of Instrument ; but
.however I have fome Notion of Inftru-
ment in general^ which I apply to it).
Phil, But what if it mould prove that
there is fomething, even in the moft ge-
neral Notion of Inftrument, as taken in a
diflinct Senfe from Caufet which makes
the Ufe of it inconfiftent with the Divine
Attributes?
HyL Make that appear, and I mall give
up the Point.
Phil. What mean you by the general
J^ature or Notion of Injlrument \
HyL
Hyl. That which is common to all par-
ticular Instruments, compofeth the general
Notion.
Phil. Is it not common to all Inftru-
ments, that they are applied to the doing
thofe things only, which cannot be per-
formed by the mere Act of our Wills?
Thus for inftance, I never ufe an Inftru-
ment to move my Finger, becaufe it is
done by a Volition. But I mould ufe
one, if I were to remove part of a Rock,
or tear up a Tree by the Roots. Are you
of the fame Mind ? Or can you (hew any
Example where an Instrument is made
ufe of in producing an Effect immedi-
ately depending on the Will of the
Agent ?
Hyl. I own, I cannot.
PbiL How therefore can you fuppofe,
that an All-perfect Spirit, on whofe Will
all things have an abfolute and immediate
Dependence, mould need an Inftrument in
his Operations, or not needing it make
ufe of it ? Thus it feems to me that you
are obliged to own the Ufe of a lifelefs
inactive Inftrument, to be incompatible
with the Infinite Perfection of God ; that
is, by your own Confeffion, to give up
the Point.
Hyl. It doth not readily occur what I
can anfwer you.
Phil.
DIALOGUE. 169
Phil. But methinks you mould be ready
to own the Truth, when it hath been fair-
ly proved to you. We indeed, who are
Beings of Finite Powers, arc forced to
make ufe of Inftruments. And the Ufe of
an Inftrument fheweth the Agent to be
limited by Rules of another's Prefcription,
and that he cannot obtain, his End, but
in fuch a Way and by fuch Conditions.
Whence it feems a clear Confequence, that
the fupreme unlimited Agent ufeth no
Tool or Inftrument at all. The Will of
an Omnipotent Spirit is no fooner exerted
than executed, without the Application
of Means, which, if they are employed
by inferior Agents, it is not upon account
of any real Efficacy that is in them, or
neceflary Aptitude to produce any Effect,
but merely in compliance with the Laws
of Nature, or thofe Conditions prefcribed
to them by the firft Caufe, who is Him-
felf above all Limitation or Prefcription
whatfoever.
Hyl. 1 will no longer maintain that Mat-
ter is an Inftrument. However, I would
not be underftood to give up its Exif-
tence neither; fince, notwithstanding what
hath been faid, ic may ftiil be an Oc-
cajion.
Phil. How many Shapes is your Mat-
ter to take ? Or how often muft it be
proved
SECOND
proved not to exift, before you are con-'
tent to part with it ? But to fay no more
of this (though by all the Laws of Dik
putation I may juftly blame you for fo
frequently changing the Signification of
the principal Term) I would fain know
what you mean by affirming that Matter
is an Occafion, having already denied it
to be a Caufe. And when you have
(hewn in what Senfe you underftand Oc-
cafiony pray in the next place be pleafed
to (hew me what Reafon induceth you to
believe there is fuch an Occafion of our
Ideas.
HyL As to jhe firft Point: By Occafon
I mean an inactive unthinking Being,
at the Prefence whereof God excites Ideas
in our Minds.
Phil And what may be the Nature of
that inactive unthinking Being?
HyL I know nothing of its Nature.
Phil. Proceed then to the fecond Point,
and affign fome Reafon why we mould
allow an Exiftence to this inactive, un-
thinking, unknown thing.
HyL When we fee Ideas produced in
our Minds after an orderly and conftanc
manner, it is natural to think they have
fome fixed and regular Occafions, at the
Prefence of which they are excited.
Phil.
DIALOGUE. 271
il. You acknowledge then God alone
to be the Caufe of our Ideas, and that
he caufes them at the Prefence of thofe
Occafions.
Hyl. That is my Opinion.
Phil. Thofe Things which you fay are
prefent to God, whithout doubt He per-
ceives.
Hyl. Certainly j otherwife they could
not be to Him an Occafion of acting.
Phil. Not to infift now on your mak-
ing Senfe of this Hypothecs, or anfwer-
ing all the puzzling Queftions and Diffi-
culties it is liable to: I only ask whether
the Order and Regularity obfervable in
the Series of our Ideas, or the Courfe of
Nature, be not fufficiently accounted for
by the Wifdom and Power of God; and
whether it doth not derogate from thoic
Attributes, to fuppofe He is influenced,
directed, or put in mind, when and what
He is to acl, by any unthinking Sub-
ftance. And laftly whether, in cafe I
granted all you contend for, it would
make any thing to your purpofe, it not
being eafy to conceive how the exter-
nal or abfolute Exigence of an unthink-
ing Subftance, diftincl: from its being per-
ceived, can be inferred from my allow-
ing that there are certain things per-
ceived by the Mind of God, which are
to
SECOND
to Him the Occafion of producing Ideas
in us.
Hyl. I am perfectly at a lofs what
to think, this Notion of Occafion feem-
ing now altogether as groundlefs as the
reft.
Phil Do you not at length perceive,
that in. all thefe different Acceptations of
Matter, you have been only fuppofing
you know not what, for no manner of
Reafon, and to no kind of Ufe ?
Hyl. I freely own my felf lefs fond of
my Notions, fince they have been fo ac-
curately examined. But flill, methinks
I have fome confufed Perception that
there is fuch a thing as Matter.
Phil. Either you perceive the Being of
Matter immediately, or mediately. If im-
mediately, pray inform me by which of
the Senfes you perceive it. If mediately,
let me know by what Reafoning it is in-
ferred from thofe Things which you per-
ceive immediately. So much for the Per-
ception. Then for the Matter it felf, I
ask whether it is Object, Subftratum, Caufe,
Instrument, or Occafion ? You have alrea-
dy pleaded for each of thefe, (hifting your
Notion?, and making Matter to appear
fometimes in one Shape, then in another.
And what you have offered hath been dif-
approved and rejected by your felf. If
you
DIALOGUE.
you have anything new to advance, I would
gladly hear it.
Hyl. I think I have already offered all
I had to fay on thofe Heads. I am at
a lofs what more to urge.
Phil And yet you are loth to part with
your old Prejudice. But to make you quit
it more eafily, I defire that, befhie what has
been hitherto fuggefted, you will farther
confider whether, upon fuppofiuon that
Matter exifts, you can polfibly conceive
how you mould be affected by it ? Or
fuppofing it did not exift, whether it be
not evident you might for all that be
affected with the fame Ideas you now are,
and confequently have the very fame rea-
fons to believe its Exiftence that you now
can have ?
Hyl. I acknowledge it is poffible we
might perceive all things jiift as we do
now, though there was no Matter in the
World ; neither can I conceive, if there be
Matter, how it mould produce any Idea
in our Minds. And I do farther grant,
you have intirely fatisfied me, that it is
impoffible there mould be fuch a thing as
Matter in any of the foregoing Accepta-
tions. But ftill I cannot help fuppofing
that there is Matter in fome fenfe or other.
What that is I do not indeed pretend to
determine.
S Phil
174 Tht SECOND
Phil. I do not expecl you (hould define
exactly the Nature of that unknown Being.
Only be pleafed to tell me, whether it is
a Subftance : And if fo, whether you can
fuppofe a Subftance without Accidents ; or
in cafe you fuppofe it to have Accidents
or Qualities, I defire you will let me know
what thofe Qualities are, at leaft what
is meant by Matter's fupporting them.
Hyl. We have already argued on thofe
Points. I have no more to fay to them.
But to prevent any farther Queftions, let
me tell you, I at prefent underftand by
Matter neither Subftance nor Accident,
thinking nor extended Being, neither Caufe,
Inftrument, nor Occafion, but fomething
intircly unknown, diftinct from all thefe.
Phil. It feems then you include in your
prefent Notion of Matter, nothing but the
general abftracl Idea of Entity.
Hyl. Nothing elfe, fave only that I fuper-
add to this general Idea the Negation
of all thofe particular Things, Qualities,
or Ideas that I perceive, imagine, or in
any wife apprehend.
PbiL Pray where do you fuppofe this
unknown Matter to exift ?
Hyl. Oh PjbilonouiJ now you think you
have entangled me ; for if I fay it exifts in
Place, then you will infer that it exifts in
the Mind, fince it is agreed, that Place or
Extenfion
DIALOGUE,
Extenfion exifts only in the Mind: But I
am not amamed to own my Ignorance. I
know not where it exiftsj only I am fure
it cxifts not in Place. There is a negative
Anfwer for you : And you muft expect no
other to all the Queftions you put for the
future about Matter.
'Phil. Since you will not tell me where
it exifts, be pleafed to inform me after
what Manner you fuppofe it to exift, or
what you mean by its Exiftence.
Hyl. It neither thinks nor ads, neither
perceives, nor is perceived.
Phil. But what is there pofitive in your
abftracted Notion of its Exiftence ?
HyL Upon a nice Obfervation, I do not
find I have any politive Notion or Mean-
ing at all. I tell you again I am not afhamed
to own my Ignorance. I know not what
is meant by its Exiftence, or how it exifts.
Phil. Continue, good Hylas, to act the
fame ingenuous Part, and tell me fmcerely
whether you can frame a diftinct Idea of
Entity in general, prefcinded from and
exclufive of all thinking and corporeal Be-
ings, all particular things whatfoever.
Hyl. Hold, let me think a little I
profefs, PhilGnoiiS) I do not find that I can.
At firft Glance methought I had fome di-
lute and airy Notion of pure Entity in
Abilract j but upon clofer Attention it hath
S 2 quite
i76 The S E C 0 N D
quite vanimed out of Sight. The more
I think on it, the more am I confirmed in
my prudent Refolution of giving none but
negative Anfwers, and not pretending to
the lead Degree of any pofitive Knowledge
or Conception of Matter, its Where, its
How, its Entity, or any thing belonging to
it.
Phil When therefore you fpeak of the
Exigence of Matter, you have not any No-
tion in your Mind.
Hyl. None at all.
Phil. Pray tell me if the Cafe ftands not
thus: At firft, from a Belief of Material
Subftance you would have it that the im-
mediate oObje6ls exifted without the Mind;
then that their Archetypes; then Caufes;
next Inftruments; then Occafions: Laftly,
fomething in general, which being interpre-
ted proves nothing. So Matter comes to
nothing. What think you, Hylas, is not
this a fair Summary of your whole Pro-
ceeding?
HyL Be that as it will, yet I flill infift
upon it, that our not being able to conceive
a Thing, is no Argument againft its Ex-
iftence.
Phil. That from a Caufe, Effect, Ope-
ration, Sign, or other Circumftance, there
may reafonably be inferred the Exiftence
of a Thing not immediately perceived, and
that
D I A L 0 G U E. 177
that it were abfurd for any Man to argue
again ft the Exiftence of that Thing, from
his having no direct and pofitive Notion of
it, I freely own. But where there is no-
thing of all this; where neither Rcafon
nor Revelation induce us to believe the
Exiftence of a Thing ; where we have not
even a relative Notion of it ; where an
Abftraction is made from perceiving and
being perceived, from Spirit and Idea:
Laftly, where there is not fo much as the
moft inadequate or faint Idea pretended to :
I will not indeed thence conclude againft
the Reality of any Notion or Exiftence of
any thing: But my Inference mall be, that
you mean nothing at all: That you irn-
ploy words to no manner of Purpofe, with-
out any Defign or Signification whatfoe-
ver. And I leave it to you to confider how
mere Jargon fhould be treated.
HyL To deal frankly with you, Philonous,
your Arguments feem in themfelves unan-
fwerable, but they have not fo great an Ef-
fect on me as to produce that intire Con-
viclion, that hearty Acquiefcence which at-
tends Demonftrauon. I find myfelf ftill
relapfing into an obfcure Surmife of I
know not what, Matter.
Phil. But are you not fenfible, Hylas,
that two Things mtift concur to take away
all Scruple, and work a plenary Aflent in
S 3 the
The SECOND
the Mind ? Let a vifible Objeft be fet in ne-
ver fo clear a Light, yet if there is any Im-
perfe&ion in the Sight, or if the Eye is not
directed towards it, it will not be diftindl-
ly feen. And though a Demonftration be
never To well grounded and fairly propofed,
yet if there is withal a Stain of Prejudice,
or a wrong Bias on the Underftanding, can
it be expected on a fudden to perceive clear-
ly and adhere firmly to the Truth ? No,
there is need of Time and Pains: The
Attention muft be awakened and detained
by a frequent Repetition of the fame Thing
placed oft in the fame, oft in different
Lights. I have faid it already, and find
Imuftftill repeat and inculcate, that it is an
unaccountable Licence you take in pretend-
ing to maintain you know not what, for
you know not what Reafon, to you know
not what Purpofe ? Can this be paralleled
in any Art or Science, any Seft or Profefli-
on of Men ? Or is there any thing fo bare-
facedly groundlefs and unreafonable to be
met with even in the loweft of common
Converfation ? But perhaps you will ftill
fay, Matter may exift, though at the fame
'time you neither know what is meant by
Matter, or by its Extftence. This indeed
is furprizing, and the more fo bccaufe it is
altogether voluntary, you not being led to
it by any one Reafon ; for I challenge you
to
DIALOGUE. i75>
to fhew me that Thing in Nature which
n ' Matter to explain or account for it.
/. The Reality of Things cannot be
maintained without fuppoiing the Exiftence
of Matter. And is not this, think you, a
good Ren Ion why I mould be earneft in its
Defence ?
Phil The Reality of Things! What
Things, fenfible or intelligible ?
Hyl. Seniible Things.
Phil My Glove, for Example?
Hyl. That or any other thing perceived
by the Senfes.
Phil. But to fix on fome particular thing j
is it not a fufficient Evidence to me of the
Exiftence of this Gtove, that I fee it, and
feel it, and wear it? Or if this will not
do, how is it poflible I mould be affured
of the Reality of this Thing, which I
actually fee in this Place, by fuppofing
that fome unknown Thing which I ne-
ver did or can fee, exifts after an unknown
manner, in an unknown place, or in no
place at all ? How can the fuppofed Reali-
ty of that which is intangible, be a Proof
that any thing tangible really exifts? or
of that which is inviiible, that any vifible
thing, or in general of any thing which is
imperceptible, that a Perceptible exifts ?
Do but explain this, and I (hall think no-
thing joo hard for you,
S 4
The S E C O N D
Hyl. Upon the whole, I am content to
own the Exiftence of Matter is highly im-
probable; but the direct and abfolute Im-
poffibility of it does not appear to me.
Phil. But granting Matter to be poffible,
yet upon that account merely it can have
no more Claim to Exigence, than a Gol-
den Mountain or a Centaur.
Hyl. I acknowledge it; but ftill you do
not deny it is poffible; and that which is
poffible, for ought you know, may actual-
ly exift.
Phil. I deny it to be poffible ; And have,
if I miftake not, evidently proved from
your own Conceffions that it is not. In
the common Senfe of the Word Matter^
is there any more implied, than an ex-
tended, folid, figured, moveable Sub/lance
exifting without the Mind? And have not
you acknowledged over and over, that you
have feen evident Reafon for denying the
Poffibility of fuch a Subftance?
Hyl. True, but that is only one Senfe of
the Term Matter.
Pkil. But is it not the only proper ge-
nuine received Senfe? And if Matter in
iuch a Senfe be proved impoffible, may it
not be thought with good Grounds abib-
lutely impoiiible ? Elfe how could any thing
be proved impoffible? Or indeed how could
there be any Proof at all one way or o-
ther,
DIALOGUE.
then, to a Man who takes the Liberty to
unfettle and change the common Signifi-
cation of Words?
Hyl. I thought Philofophers might he
allowed to fpeak more accurately than the
Vulgar, and were not always confined to
the common Acceptation of a Term.
¥KL But this now mentioned is the
common received Senfe among Philofo-
phers themfelves. But not to infill: on that,
have you not been allowed to take Matter
in what Senfe you pleafed ? And have you
not ufed this Privilege in the utmoft Ex-
tent, fometimes intirely changing, at others
leaving out or putting into the Definition
of it whatever for the prefent bed ferved
your Defign, contrary to all the known
Rules of Reafon and Logick ? And haih
not this fhifting unfair Method of yours
fpun out our Difpute to an unneceiTary
Length; Matter having been particularly
examined, and by your own Confeffion re-
futed in each of thofe Senfes? And cana-
ny more be required to prove the abfo-
lutelmpofiibility of a Thing, than the prov-
ing it impoffible in every particular Senfe,
that either you or any one elle understands
it in?
Hyl. But I am not fo thoroughly fatisfied
that you have proved the Impoffibiliiv of
Matter
i8i The S E C 0 N D
Matter in the laft moft obfcure abftrad.-
ed and indefinite Senfe.
Phil. When is a thing {hewn to be im-
poflible?
Hyl. When a Repugnancy is dcmonttra-
ted between the Ideas comprehended in its
Definition.
Phil. But where there are no Ideas, there
no Repugnancy can be demonflrated be-
tween Ideas.
Hyl. I agree with you.
Phil. Now in that which you call the
obfcure indefinite Senfe of the Word Mat-
ter', it is plain, by your own Confeffion,
there was included no Idea at all, no Senfe
except an unknown Senfe, which is the
fame thing as none. You are not therefore
to expedt 1 mould prove a Repugnancy be-
tween Ideas where there are no Ideas ; or
the Impoflibility of Matter taken in an un-
known Senfe, that is no Senfe at all. My
bufinefs was only to (hew, you meant no-
thing ; and this you were brought to own.
So that in all your various Senfes, you have
been fhewed either to mean nothing at all,
or if any thing, an Abiurdity. And if this
be not fufficient to prove the Impoffibility
of a Thing, I defire you will let me know
what is.
Hyl. I acknowledge you have proved
that Matter is impoffible; nor do I fee what
more
more can be faid in defence of it. But at
the fame time that I give up this, I fuf-
pect all my other Notions. For furely
none could be more feemingly evident than
this once was : And yet it now feems as falfe
and abfurd as ever it did true before. But
I think we have difcuifed the Point fuffici-
ently for the prefcnt. The remaining Part
of the Day I would willingly fpend, in run-
ning over in my Thoughts the fevcral
Heads of this Morning's Converfation, and
to Morrow (hall be glad to meet you here
again about the fame time.
Phil. I will not fail to attend you.
THE THIRD
DIALOGUE.
PHILONOUS.
J/f&Si
gp*==J||| tion ? Hath it confirmed you in
tSyi&*Sly c^e ^ame Mind you were in at
parting ? or have you flnce feen
Caufe to change your Opinion ?
HyL Truly my Opinion is, that all our
Opinions are alike vain and uncertain. What
we appove to day, we condemn to morrow.
We keep a Stirabout Knowledge, and fpend
our Lives in the Purfuit of it, when, alas!
we know nothing all the while: nor do 1
think it poffible for us ever to know any
thing in this Life. Our Faculties are too
narrow
DIALOGUE. 185
narrow and too few. Nature certainly
never intended us for Speculation.
Phil. What ! fay you we can know no-
thing, Hylas?
Hyl. There is not that fingle thing in the
World, whereof we can know the real Na-
ture, or what it is in itfelf.
Phil. Will you tell me I do not really
know what Fire or Water is?
Hyl. You may indeed know that Fire
appears hot, and Water fluid: But this is
no more than knowing what Senfations
are produced in your own Mind, upon the
Application of Fire and Water to your Or-
gans of Senfe. Their internal Conftitution,
their true and real Nature, you are utterly
in the dark as to that.
Phil. Do I not know this to be a real
Stone that I (land on, and that which I fee
before my Eyes to be a real Tree ?
Hyl. Know? No, it is impomble you or
any iVIan alive mould know it. All you
know, is, that you have fuch a certaift Idea
or Appearance in your own Mind. But
what is this to the real Tree or Stone ? I
tell you, that Colour, Figure, and Hard-
nefs, which you perceive, are not the real
Natures of thofe Things, or in the leafl
like them. The fame may be faid of all
other real Things or corporeal Subftances
which compofe the World. They have
none
286 The THIRD
none of them any thing in themfclves, like
thofe fenfible Qualities by us perceived.
We mould not therefore pretend to affirm
or know any thing of them, as they are
in their own Nature.
Thil. But furely, Hylas, I can diftinguifh
Gold, for Example, from Iron : And how
could, this be if I knew not what either
truly was ?
HyL Believe me, fPbiIonous, you can only
diftinguilh between your own Ideas. That
Yellownefs, that Weight, and other fenfible
Qualities, think you they are really in the
Gold ? They are only relative to the Senfes,
and have no abfolute Existence in Nature.
And in pretending to diftinguifh the Species
of real Things, by the Appearances in your
Mind, you may perhaps act as wifely as
he that mould conclude two Men were of
a different Species, becaufe their Clothes
were not of the fame Colour.
Phil. It feems then we are altogether
put off with the Appearances of Things,
and thofe falfe ones too. The very Meat I
eat, and the Cloth I wear, have nothing in
them like what I fee and feel.
HyL Even fo.
*Pbtl. But is it not ftrange the whole
World mould be thus impoled on, and fo
foohfli as to believe their Senfes ? And yet I
know not how it is, but Men eat, and
drink,
DIALOGUE. 187
drink, and deep, and perform all the Of-
fices of Life as comfortably and conveni-
ently, as if they really knew the Things
they are converfant about.
Hyl. They do fo: But you know ordi-
nary Practice does not require a Nicety of
fpeculative Knowledge. Hence the Vulgar
retain their Miftakes, and for all that,
make a Shift to buftle through the Affairs
of Life. But Philofophers know better
things.
Phil. You mean, they know that they
know nothing.
Hyl. That is the very Top and Perfecti-
on of Humane Knowledge.
Phil. But are you all this while in car-
neft, Hylas-, and are you ferioufly perfua-
ded that you know nothing real in the
World? Suppofe you are going to write,
would you not call for Pen, Ink, and Paper,
like another Man ; and do you not know
what it is you call for ?
Hyl. How often muft I tell you,_that I
know not the real Nature of any one thing
in the Univerfe? I may indeed upon Oc-
cafion make ufe of Pen, Ink, and Paper.
But what any one of them is in its own
true Nature, I declare pofitively I know nor.
And the fame is true with regard to every
other corporeal thing. And, what is more,
we are not only ignorant of the true and
real
188 The THIRD
real Nature of Things, but even of their
Exiftence. It cannot be denied that we
perceive fuch certain Appearances or Ideas ;
but it cannot be concluded from thence
that Bodies really exift. Nay, now I think
on It, I muft agreeably to my former Con-
ceffions farther declare, that it is impoffible
any real corporeal Thing mould exift in
Nature.
Phil. You amaze me. Was ever any
thing more wild and extravagant than the
Notions you now maintain : And is it not
evident you are led into all thefe Extrava-
gancies by the Belief of material Subftance ?
This makes you dream of thofe unknown
Natures in every thing. It is this occafions
your diftinguiming between the Reality and
fenfible Appearances of Things. It is to
this you are indebted for being ignorant of
what every Body elfe knows perfectly well.
Nor is this all : You are not only ignorant
of the true Nature of every Thing, but
you know not whether any thing really
exifts, or whether there are any true Na-
tures at all ; forafmuch as you attribute to
your material Beings an abfolute or exter-
nal Exiftence, wherein you fuppofe their
Reality confifts. And as you are forced in
the end to acknowledge fuch an Exiftence
means either a direct Repugnancy, or no-
thing at all, it follows that you are obliged
to
DIALOGUE.
to pull down your own Hypothecs of
, material Subftance, and pofltively to deny
the real Exiftence of any Part of the
Univerfe. And fo you are plunged into
the deepeft and mofl deplorable Seep-,
ticlfm that ever Man was, Tell me, Hy-
las, is it not as I fay ?
Hyi. I agree with you. Material Sub-
flanee was no more than an tfypothefis,
and a falfe and groundlefs one too. I will
no longer fpend my Breath in defence of
it. But whatever Hypothefis you advance,
or whatsoever Scheme of Things you in-
troduce in its ftead, I doubt not it will
appear every whit as falfe : Let me but
be allowed to queftion you upon it. That
is, fuffer me to ferve you in your own
kind, and I warrant it {hall conduct you
through as many Perplexities and Contra-
dictions, to the very fame State of Seep-.
ticifm that I my felf am in at prefent.
Phil. I aflure you, Hy/as, I do not pre-
tend to frame any Hypothefis at all. I
am of a vulgar Caft, limple enough to
believe my Senfes, and leave Things as
I find them. To be plain, it is my
Opinion, that the real Things are thole
very Things I fee and feel, and perceive
by my Senfes. Thefe I know, and rind-
ing they anfwer all the NecerTities and
Purpofes of Life, have no reafon to be
T felicitous
i5>o The THIRD.
felicitous about any other unknown Be-
ings. A Piece of fenfible Bread, for In-
ftance, would ftay my Stomach better than
ten thoufand times as much of that infenfi -
ble, unintelligible, real Bread you fpeak of.
It is likewife my Opinion, that Colours
and other fenfible Qualities are on the
Objects. I cannot for my Life help think-
ing that Snow is white, and Fire hot. You
indeed, who by Snow and Fire mean cer-
tain external, unperceived, unperceiving
Subftances, are in the right to deny White-
nefs or Heat to be Affections inherent in
them. But I, who underftand by thofe
Words the Things I fee and feel, am
obliged to think like other Folks. And
as I am no Sceptic with regard to the
Nature of Things, fo neither am I as to
their Exiftence. That a thing mould be.
really perceived by my Senfes, and at the
fame time not really exift, is to me a
plain Contradiction ; fince I cannot pre-
fcind or abftracl:, even in Thought, the
Exiflence of a fenfible Thing from its
being perceived. Wood, Stones, Fire,
Water, Flefh, Iron, and the like Things,
which I name and difcourfe of, are Things
that I know. And I mould not have known
them, but that I perceived them by my
Senfes; and Things perceived by the Sen-
fes are immediately perceived ; and Things
immediately
DIALOGUE. 2<>i
immediately perceived are Ideas ; and I-
deas cannot exift without the Mind; their
Exiftence therefore confifts in being per-
ceived j when therefore they are actually
perceived, there can be no doubt of their
Exiftence. Away then with all that Scep-
ticifm, all thofe ridiculous philofophical
Doubts. What a Jeft is it for a Philo-
fopher to queftion the Exiftence of fenfi-
ble Things, till he hath it proved to him
from the Veracity of God : Or to pre-
tend our Knowledge in this Point falls
fhort of Intuition or Demonftration ? I
might as well doubt of my own Being,
as of the Being of thofe Things I actu-
ally fee and feel.
Hyl. Not fo faft, Pbilonoiis: you fay
you cannot conceive how fenfible Things
Ihould exift without the Mind. Do you
not ?
Phil. I do.
Hyl. Suppofmg you were annihilated,
cannot you conceive it poffibie, that
Things perceivable by Senfe may ft ill
exift?
Phil. I can j but then it muft be in
another mind. When I denv iendble
Things an Exiftence out of the Mind, I
do not mean my Mind in particular, but
all Minds. Now it is plain they have an
Exiftence exterior to my Mind, fince I
T 2 find
the THIRD.
find them by Experience to be indepen-
dent of it. There is therefore fome other
Mind wherein they exift, during the In-
tervals between the Times of my perceiv-
ing them : As likewife they did before my
Birth, and would do after my fuppofed
Annihilation. And as the fame is true,
with regard to all other finite created
Spirits; it necefTarily follows, there is an
Omniprejent Eternal Mind, which knows
and comprehends all things, and exhibits
them to our View in fuch a manner, and
according to fuch Rules as He Himfelf
hath ordained, and are by us termed the
Laws of Nature.
Hyl. Anfwer me, Philonous. Are all
our Ideas perfectly inert Beings ? Or have
they any Agency included in them ?
Phil. They are altogether paffive and
inert.
Hyl. And is not God an Agent, a Be-
ing purely adtive?
Phil. I acknowledge it.
HyL No Idea therefore can be like un-
to, or rcprefent the Nature of God.
Phil. It cannot.
HyL Since therefore you have no Idea
of the Mind of God, how can you con-
ceive it pofiible, that things fhould exift
in his Mind? Or, if you can conceive the
Mind of God without having an Idea of
DIALOGUE.
it, why may not I be allowed to conceive
the Exigence of Matter, notwithftanding
that I have no Idea of it?
Phil As to your firft Qneftion ; I own
I have properly no Idea, either of God
or any other Spirit; for thefe being aftive,
cannot be reprefented by things perfectly
inert, as our Ideas are. I do neverche-
lefs know, that I who am a Spirit or
thinking Subftance, exift as certainly, as
I know^my Ideas exift. Farther, I know
what I mean by the Terms / and My-
Jiff-, and I know this immediately, or
intuitively, though I do not perceive it
as I perceive a Triangle, a Colour, or a
Sound. The Mind, Spirit or Soul, is
that indivifible unexiended Thing, which
thin,ks, adts, and perceives. I fay indi-
ixjiblc, becaufe unextended; and unexfen-
ded, becaufe extended, figured, moveable
Things, are Ideas; and that which per-
ceives Ideas, which thinks and wills, is
plainly it felf no Idea, nor like an Idea.
Ideas are Things inactive, and perceived:
And Spirits a fort of Beings .altogether
different from them. I do not therefore
jay my Soul is an Idea, or like an Idea.
However, taking the Word Idea in a large
Senfe, my Soul may be faid to furnim me
with an Idea, that is, an Image, or Like-
nefs of God, though indeed extremely in-
T 3 adequate.
THIRD
adequate. For all the Notion I have of
God, is obtained by reflecting on my own
Soul heightning its Powers, and removing
its Imperfections. I have therefore, though
not an inactive Idea, yet in my felf fome
fort of an active thinking Image of the
Deity. And though I perceive Him not
by Senfe, yet I have a Notion of Him,
or know Him by Reflexion and Reafon-
ing. My own Mind and my own Ideas
I have an immediate Knowledge of;
and by the help of thefe, do mediate-
ly apprehend the Poffibility of the Exif-
tence of other Spirits and Ideas. Farther,
from my own Being, and from the De-
pendency I find in my felf and my Ideas,
I do by an Act of Reafon, necefTarily in-
fer the Exiftence of a God, and of all
created Things in the Mind of God. So
much for your firfl Queftion. For the
fecond : I fuppofe by this time you can
anfwer it your felf. For you neither per-
ceive Matter objectively, as you do an inac-
tive Being or Idea, nor know it, as you
do your felf by a reflex Act: Neither do
you mediately apprehend it by Similitude
of the one or the other : Nor yet collect
it by Reafon ing from that which you
know immediately. All which makes the
Cafe of A$atter widely different from that
, of the Dtity.
Hyl.
DIALOGUE. 25>5
HyL You fay your own Soul fupplies
you with fome fort of an Idea or Image
of God. But at the fame time you ac-
knowledge you have, properly fpeaking,
no Idea of your own Soul. You even af-
firm that Spirits are a fort of Beings al-
together different from Ideas. Confequent-
ly that no Idea can be like a Spirit. We
have therefore no Idea of any Spirit. You
admit neverthelefs that there is fpirhual
Subftance, although you have no Idea of
it ; while you deny there can be fuch a
thing as material Subftance, becaufe you have
no Notion or Idea of it. Is this fair Dealing?
To adt confiftently, you muft either admit
Matter or reject Spirit. What fay you, to this?
Pbik I fay in the firft place, that I do
not deny the Exiftence of material Sub-
ftance, merely becaufe I have no Notion
of it, but becaufe the Notion of it is in-
continent, or in other words, becaufe it is
repugnant that there fhould be a Notion,
of it. Many things, for ought I know,
may exift, whereof neither I nor any other
Man hath or can have any Idea or Noti-
on whatfoever. But then thofe things
muft be poffiblc, that is, nothing incon-
fiftenr. muft be included in their Definiti-
on. I fay fecondly, that although we be-
lieve things to exift which we do not per-
ceive ; yet we may not believe that any
T 4 particular
?bt THIRD.
particular thing exifts, without fome rea-
fon for fiich Belief: But I have no rea-
fon for believing the Exiftence of Matter.
J have no immediate Intuition thereof:
neither can I mediately from my Senfati-
ons, Ideas, Notions, Actions or Paffions,
infer an unthinking, unperceiving, inactive
Subftancc, either by probable Deduction,
or neceflary Confequence. Whereas the
Being of my felf, that is, my own Soul,
Mind or thinking Principle, I evidently
know "by Reflexion. You will forgive me
if I repeat the fame things in anfwer to
the fame Objections. In the very Notion
or Definition of material Subftance, there
is included a manifeft Repugnance and
InconiTftency. But this cannot be faid of
the Notion of Spirit. That Ideas fhould
exift in what doth not perceive, or be
produced by what doth not act, is repug-
nant. But it is no Repugnancy to fay,
that a perceiving Thing mould be the
Subject of Ideas, or an active Thing the
Caufe of them. It is granted we have nei-
ther an immediate Evidence nor a demon-
flrative Knowledge of the Exiftence of o-
ther finite Spirits j but it will not thence
follow that fuch Spirits are on a foot with
material Subftances : if to fuppofe the one
be inconfiftent, and it be not inconfiftent
;o fuppofe the other -, if the one can be in-
ferred
DIALOGUE.
ferred by no Argument, and there is a
Probability for the other; if we fee Signs
and Effects indicating diftincl: finite Agents
like our felves, and fee no Sign or Symp-
tom whatever that leads to a rational Be-
lief of Matter. I fay laftly, that I have
a Notion of Spirit, though 1 have not,
ftrictly fpeaking, an Idea of it. I do not
perceive it as an Idea or by Means of
an Idea, but know it by Reflexion.
Hyl. Notwithftanding all you have fai<3,
to me it feems, that according to your
own way of thinking, and in confequence
of your own Principles, it mould follow
that you are only a Syftem of floating
Ideas, without any Subftance to fupport
them. Words are not to be ufed with-
out a meaning. And as there is no more
Meaning in fpiritual Subftance than in
material Subftance, the one is to be ex-
ploded as well as the other.
Phil. How often muft I repeat, 'that I
know or am confcious of my own Be-
ing; and that I my felf am not my I-
deas, but fomewhat -elfe, a thinking active
Principle chat perceives, knows, wills, and
operates about 'Ideas. I know that J, one
and the fame felf, .perceive both Colours
and Sounds : that a Colour cannot per-
ceive a Sound, nor a Sound a Colour :
Thac I am therefore one individual Prin-
ciple,
The T H I R D
ciple, diftincl: from Colour and Sound ;
and, for the fame reafon, from all other
fenfible things and inert Ideas. But I am
not in like manner confcious either of the
Exiftence or Effence of Matter. On the
contrary I know that nothing inconfiftent
can cxift, and that the Exiftence of Mat-
ter implies an Inconfiftency. Farther, I
know what I mean, when I affirm that
there is a fpiritual Subftance or Support of
Ideas, that is, That a Spirit knows and
perceives Ideas. But I do not know what
is meant, when it is faid, that an unper-
ceiving Subftance hath inherent in it and
fupports either Ideas or the Archetypes of
Ideas. There is therefore upon the whole
no parity of cafe between Spirit and Mat-
ter.
Hyl. I own my felf fatisfied in this point.
But do you in earneft think, the real Exif-
tence of fenfible things confifts in their
being actually perceived ? If fo ; How
comes it that all Mankind diftinguifh be-
tween them ? Ask the firft Man you meet,
and he mall tell you, to be perceived is
one thing, and to exijl is another.
Phil. I am content, Hylas, to appeal to
the common Senfe of the World for the
Truth of my Notion. Ask the Gardiner,
why he thinks yonder Cherry-Tree exifts
in the Garden, and he lhall tell you, be-
caufe
DIALOGUE.
caufe he fees and feels it 3 in a word, be-
caufe he perceives it by h's Senfes. Ask
him, why he thinks an Orange-Tree not
to be there, and he lhall tell you, becaufe
he does not perceive it. What he per-
ceives by Senfe, that he terms a- real Be-
ing, and faith it is, or exifts ; but that which
is not perceivable, the fame, he faith, hath
no Being.
Hyl. Yes, Pbilonous^ I grant the Exif-
tence of a fenfible thing confifts in be-
ing perceivable, but not in being actually
perceived.
Phil. And what is perceivable but an
Idea ? And can an Idea exift without
being actually perceived ? Thefe are Points
long iince agreed between us.
Hyl. But be your opinion never fo true,
yet furely you will not deny it is Shocking,
and contrary to the common Senfe of Men.
Ask the Fellow, whether yonder Tree hath
an Exigence out of his Mind : What An-
fwer think you he would make ?
Phil The fame that I (hould my felf,
to wit, That it doth exift out of his Mind.
But then to a Chriflian it cannot furely
be ihocking to fay, The real Tree exift-
ing without his Mind is truly known and
comprehended by (that is, exifts in) the in-
finite Mind of God. Probably he may
not at nrft glance be aware of the direct
and
The T H I R D
and immediate Proof there is of this, in-
afmuch as the very Being of a Tree, or
any other fenfibie Thing, implies a Mind
wherein it is. But the Point it ielf he can-
not deny. The Queftion between the Ma-
terialifts and me is not, whether Things
h.ave a real Exigence out of the Mind of
this or that Peribn, but whecher chey have
an abfolute Existence, diftinct from being
perceived by God, and exterior to all
Minds. This indeed fome Heathens and
Philofophers have affirmed, -but whoever
entertains Notions of the Deity fuicahle
to the Holy Scriptures, will be of another
Opinion.
Hyl. Bat according to your Notions,
what Difference is there between real
Things, and Chimeras formed by the Ima-
gination, or the Viiions.of a Dream, fince
they are all equally in the Mind ?
Phil. The Ideas formed by the Imagi-
nation are faint and indiftin<ft j they have
betides an intire Dependence on the Will.
But the Ideas perceived by Senfe, that is, real
Things, are more vivid and clear, and be-
ing imprinted on the Mind by a Spirit dif-
tinct from us, have not a like Dependence
on our Will. There is therefore no Dan-
ger of confounding thefe with the forego-
ing : and there is as little of confounding
them with the Vifions of a Dream, which
arq
DIALOGUE. 301
are dim, irregular, and confufed. And
though they mould happen to be never fo
lively and natural, yet by their not being
connected, and of a piece with the pre-
ceding and fubfeqdent Tranfactions of
our Lives, they might eafily be diftin-
guifhed from Realities. In fhort, by what-
ever Method you diftinguim Things from
Chimeras on your own Scheme, the fame,
it is evident, will hold alfo upon mine.
For it muft be, I prefume, by fome per-
ceived Difference, and I am not for de-
priving you of any one thing that you
perceive.
HyL But flill, PhiJonoit^ you hold, there
is nothing in the World but Spirits and Ide-
as. And this, you muft needs acknowledge,
founds very odly.
Phil. I own the Word Idea, not being
commonly ufed for Thing, founds fome-
thing out of the way. My Reafon for
ufing it was, becaufe a neceffary Relation
to the Mind is underftood to be implied
by that Term ; and it is now common-
ly uled by Philofophers, to denote the
immediate Objects of the Understanding.
But however odly the Propofition may
found in Words, yet it includes nothing
fo very ftrange or {hocking in its Senfe,
which in effect amounts to no more than
this, to wit, that there are only Things
per-
302, The THIRD
perceiving, and Things perceived ; or that
every unthinking Being is necefTarily, and
from the very Nature of its Exiftrnce, per-
ceived by fome Mind ; if not by any fi-
nit created Mind, yet certainly by the
infinite Mind of God, in whom we live,
and move, and have our Being. Is this as
ftrange as to fay, The fenfible Qualities
are not on the Objects : Or, That we
cannot be fure of the Exiftence of: Things,
or know any >thing of their real Natures,
though we both fee and feel them, and
perceive them by all our Senfes ?
Hyl. And in Confequence of this, muft
we not think there are no fuch Things
as Phyfical or Corporeal Caufes ; but
that a Spirit is the immediate Caufe of
all the Phenomena in Nature ? Can there
be any thing more extravagant than this ?
Phil. Yes, it is infinitely more extrava-
gant to fay, A thing which is inert, ope-
rates on the Mind, and which is unper-
ceiving, is the Caufe of our Perceptions.
Befides, that which* to you, I know not for
what Reafon, feems fo extravagant, is no
more than the Holy Scriptures aiTert in
a hundred Places. In them God is repre-
fented as the fole and immediate Author
of all thofe Effects, which fome Heathens
and Philofophers are wont to afcribe to
Nature, Matter, Fate, or the like unthink-
ing
DIALOGUE. 503
ing Principle. This is fo much the con-
ftant Language of Scripture, that it were
needlefs to confirm it by Citations.
Hyl. You are not aware, Pbilonous, that
in making God the immediate Author of
all the Motions in Nature, you make him
the Author of Murder, Sacrilege, Adultery,
and the like heinous Sins.
Phil. In Anfwer to that, I ohferve firft,
that the Imputation of Guilt is the fame,
whether a Perfon commits an Action with
or without an Inftrument. In cafe there-
fore you fuppofe God to act by the Medi-
ation of an Inftrument, or Occafion, called
Matter, you as truly make Him the Au-
thor of Sin as I, who think Him the im-
mediate Agent in all thofe Operations
vulgarly afcribed to Nature. I farther ob-
ferve, that Sin or moral Turpitude doth
not confift in the outward Phyfical Action
or Motion, but in the internal Deviation
of the Will from the Laws of Reafon and
Religion. This is plain, in that the killing an
Enemy in a Battle, or ptitting a Criminal
legally to Death, is not thought finful,
though the outward Act be the very fame
with that in the Cafe of Murder. Since
therefore Sin doth not confift in the Phy-
fical Action, the making God an imme-
diate Caufe of all fuch Actions, is not
making him the Author of Sin. Laftly,
I
304 * THIRD
I have no where faid that God is the only
Agent who produces all the Motions in Bo-
dies. It is true, I have denied there are
any other Agents befide Spirits: But this is
very confiftent with allowing to Thinking
Rational Beings, in the Production of Mo-
tions, the Ufe of limited Powers, ulti-
mately indeed derived from God, but im-
mediately under the Direction of their
own Wills, which is fufficient to intitle
them to all the Guilt of their Actions.
Hyi But the denying Matter, Pbihnoiis,
or corporeal Subftance; there is the Point.
You can never perfuade me that this is not
repugnant to the univerfal Senfe of Man-
kind. Were our Difpute to be determined
by moft Voices, I am confident you would
give up the Point, without gathering the
Votes
fbil. I wifli both our Opinions were
fairly ftated and fubmitted to the Judg-
ment of Men who had plain common
.Senfe, without the Prejudices of a learned
Education. Let me be reprefented as one
who trufts his Senfes, who thinks he knows
the Things he fees and feels, and entertains
no Doubts, of their Exiftencej and you fair-
Jy fet forth with all your Doubts, your Pa-
radoxes, and your Scepticifm about you,
and I (hall willingly acquiefce in the De-
termination of any indifferent Perfon. That
there
DIALOGUE. 305
there is no Subftance wherein Ideas can
exift befide Spirit, is to me evident. And
that the Objects immediately perceived are
Ideas, is on all Hands agreed. And that
fenfible Qualities are Objects immediately
perceived, no one can deny. It is there-
fore evident there can be no Subftratum
of thofe Qualities but Spirit, in which they
exift, not by way of Mode or Property, but
as a thing perceived in that which perceives
it. I deny therefore that there is any un-
thinking Subjlratum of the Objedlsof Senfe,
and in that Acceptation that there is any
material Subflance. But if by material Sub-
fiance is meant only fenfible Body, that
which is feen and felt, (and the unphilofo-
phical Part of the World, I dare fay, mean
no more) then I am more certain of Mat-
ter's Exiftence than you, or any other Phi-
lofopher, pretend to be. If there be any
thing which makes the Generality of Man-
kind averfe from the Notions I efpoufe, it
is a Mifapprehenfion that I deny the Reali-
ty of fenfible Things : But as it is you who
are guilty of that and not I, it follows that
in truth their Averfion is againft your No-
tions, and not mine. I do therefore aflert
that I am as certain as of my own Being,
that there are Bodies or corporeal Sub-
ftances, (meaning the Things I perceive by
my Senfes) and that granting this, the
U Bulk
The THIRD
Bulk of Mankind will take no Though)
about, nor think themfelves at all concern-
ed in the Fate of thofe unknown Natures
and Philofophical Quiddities, which fom(
Men are fo fond of.
HyL What fay you to this? Since, ac-
cording to you, Men judge of the Realit)
of Things by their Senfes, how can a Mar
be miftakcn in thinking the Moon a plair
lucid Surface, about a Foot in Diameter
or a fquare Tower, feen at a diftance
round j or an Oar, with one End in the
Water, crooked?
Phil. He is not miftaken with regard t<
the Ideas he actually perceives; but in the
Inferences he makes from his prefent Per-
ceptions. Thus in the Cafe of the Oar
what he immediately perceives by Sight i<
certainly crooked; and fo far he is in the
right. But if he thence conclude, that up-
on taking the Oar out of the Water h(
{hall perceive the fame Crookednefs; 01
that it would affect his Touch, as crook-
ed things are wont to do : In that he ii
miftaken. In like mannner, if he mall
conclude from what he perceives in on<
Station, that in cafe he advances towarc
the Moon or Tower, he mould ftill b<
affected with the like Ideas, he is miftaken
But his Miftake lies not in what he per-
ceives immediately and at prefent, (it being
DIALOGUE. 307
a manifcft Contradiction to fuppofe he
mould err in refpeft of that) but in the
wrong Judgment he makes concerning the
Ideas he apprehends to be connected with
thofe immediately perceived: Or concern-
ing the Ideas that, from what he perceives at
prefent, he imagines would be perceived in
other Circumftances. The Cafe is the
fame with regard to the Coperniean Syftem*
We do not here perceive any Motion of
the Earth: But it were erroneous thence
to conclude, that in cafe we were placed
at as great a Diftance from that, as we
are now from the other Planets, we mould
not then perceive its Motion.
HyL I underftand youj and muft needs
own you fay things plaufible enough: But
give me leave to put you in mind of one
thing. Pray, Philonous, were you not for-
merly as pofitive that Matter exiiled, as
you are now that it does not ?
Phil. I was. But here lies the Diffe-
rence. Before, my Pofitivenefs was found-
ed without Examination, upon Prejudice;
but now, after Inquiry, upon Evidence.
HyL After all, it feems our Difputc is
rather about Words than Things. We a-
gree in the Thing, but differ in the Name.
That we are affedted with Ideas from with-
out is evident; and it is no leis evident,
that there muft be (I will not fay Arche-
U 2 types,
3o8 The T H I R D
types, but) Powers without the Mind, cor-
refponding to thofe Ideas. And as thefe
Powers cannot fubfift by themfelves, there
is fome Subject of them neceffarily to
be admitted, which I call Matter, and
you call Spirit. This is all the Diffe-
rence.
Phil Pray, Hy/as, is that powerful Be-
ing, or Subject of Powers, extended?
Hyl. It hath not Extenfion; but it hath
the Power to raife in you the Idea of Ex-
tenfion.
Phil. It is therefore itfelf unextended.
Hyl. I grant it.
Phil. Is it not alfo active ?
Hyl. Without doubt: Otherwife, how
could we attribute Powers to it?
fhil. Now let me ask you Two Que-
ftions: Firft> Whether it be agreeable to
the Ufage either of Philofophers or others,
to give the Name Matter to an unextend-
ed active Being? And Secondly, Whether it
be not ridiculoufly abfurd to mifapply
Names contrary to the common Ufe of
Language ?
Hyl. Well then, let it not be called Mat-
ter, fince you will have it fo, but fome
Third Nature diftinct from Matter and
Spirit. For, what reafon is there why you
fliould call it Spirit ? does not the Notion
DIALOGUE. 3 op
of Spirit imply, that it is thinking as well
as active and unextended?
Phil. My Rcafon is this : becaufe I have
a mind to have fome Notion or Meaning
in what I fay ; but I have no Notion of
any Action diftinct from Volition, neither
can I conceive Volition to be any where
but in a Spirit: therefore when I fpeak of
an active Being, I am obliged to mean a
Spirit. Betide, what can be plainer than
that a thing which hath no Ideas in it-
felf, cannot impart them to me; and if it
hath Ideas, furely it mufl be a Spirit.
To make you comprehend the Point ftill
more clearly if it be poffible: I affert as
well as you, that fince we are affected from
without, we muft allow Powers to be with-
out in a Being diftinct from ourfelves. So
far we are agreed. But then we differ as
to the Kind of this powerful Being. I
will have it to be Spirit, you Matter, or I
know not what (I may add too, you know
not what) Third Nature. Thus I prove it
to be Spirit. From the Effects I fee pro-
duced, I conclude there are Actions; and
becaufe Actions, Volitions; and becaufe
there are Volitions, there mult be a Will.
Again, the Things I perceive mufl have
an Exiftence, they or their Archetypes,
out of my Mind: But being Ideas, nei-
ther they nor their Archetypes can exift
U 3 other wife
3io The T H I R D
otherwife than in an Underftanding: There
is therefore an Underftanding. But Will
and Underftanding conftitute in the ftrict-
cft Sei.fe a Mind or Sp:rit. The power-
ful Cau't therLf.?re of my Ideas, is in ftrict
Propriety of Speech a Spirit.
HyL And now I warrant you think you
have made the Point very clear, little fuf-
pecting that what you advance leads di-
rectly to a Contradiction. Is it not an Ab-
furdity to imagine any Imperfection in
God?
Phil. Without douht.
HyL To fuffcr Pain is an Imperfection.
Phil- his.
Hyl. Are we not fometimes affected
with Pain and Uneafinefs by fome other
Being ?
Phil. We are.
HyL And huve you not faid that Being
is a Spirit, and is not that Spirit God ?
Phil I grant it.
HyL But you have afferted, that what-
ever Ideas we perceive from without, are
in the Mind which affects us. The Ideas
threfore of Pain and Uneafinefs are in God j
or in other words, God fuffers Pain : That
is to fay, there is an Imperfection in the
Divine Nature, which you acknowledged
was ablurd. So you are caught in a plain
Contradiction.
Phil.
DIALOGUE. 3
PbiL That God knows or underftands
all things, and that He knows among
other things what Pain is, even every fort
of painful Senfation, and what it is for
His Creatures to fufFerPain, I make no que-
ftion. But that God, though He knows
and fome;<mes caufes painful Senfations in
us, can Himfelf fuffer Pain, I pofidvely
deny. We who are limited and dependent
Spirits, are liable to Impreflions of Senfe,
the Effects of an external Agent, which
being produced againft our Wills, arefome-
times painful and uneafy. But God, whom
no external Being can affect, who perceives
nothing by Senfe as we do, whofe Will is ab-
folute and independent, caufing all things,
and liable to be thwarted or refitted by no-
thing j it is evident, fuch a Being as this can
fuffer nothing, nor be affected with any pain-
ful Senfation, or indeed any Senfation at all.
We are chained to a Body, that is to fay,
our Perceptions are connected with corpo-
real Motions. By the Law of our Nature
we are affected upon every Alteration in the
nervous Parts of our fenfible Body: Which
fenfible Body rightly confidered, is nothing
but a Complexion of fuch Qualities or
Ideas, as have no Exiftence diftinct from
being perceived by a Mind: So that this
Connexion of Senfations with corporeal Mo-
tions, means no more thanaCorrefpondence
U 4 in
The T H I R 0
in the Order of Nature between two Sets of
Ideas, or Things immediately perceivable.
But God is a pure Spirit, difengaged from all
fuch Sympathy or natural Ties. No corpo*
real Motions are attended with the Senfati-
ons of Pain or Pleafure in his Mind. To
know every thing knowable is certainly a
Perfection ; but to endure, or fuffer, or feel
any thing by Senfe, is an Imperfection. The
former, I fay, agrees to God, but not the latter.
God knows or hath Ideas j but His Ideas are
not convey 'd to Him by Senfe, as ours are.
Your not Diftinguiming where there is fo
manifeft a Difference, makes you fancy
you fee an Abfurdity where there is none.
Hyl, But all this while you have not con-
fidered, that the Quantity of Matter hath
been demonftrated to be proportional to the
Gravity of Bodies. And what can with-
ftand Demonftration?
Phil. Let me fee how you demonflratc
that Point.
Hyl. I lay it down for a Principle, that
the Moments or Quantities of Motion in
Bodies, are in a direct compounded Reafon
of the Velocities and Quantities of Matter
contained in them. Hence, where the Ve-
locities are equal, it follows, the Moments
are directly as the Quantity of Matter in
each. But it is found by Experience, that
all Bodies (bating the fmall Inequalities,
ariiing
DIALOGUE. 513
arifing from the Refinance of the Air) de-
fcend with an equal Velocity ; the Moti-
on therefore of defcending Bodies, and
confequently their Gravity, which is the
Caufe or Principle of that Motion, is pro-
portional to the Quantity of Matter:
which was to be demonftrated.
Phil. You lay it down as a felf-evi-
dent Principle, that the Quantity of Mo-
tion in any Body, is proportional to the
Velocity and Matter taken together : And
this is made ufe of to prove a Propofiti-
qn, from whence the Exiftence of Matter
is inferred. Pray is not this arguing in
a Circle ?
Hyl. In the Premife I only mean, that
the Motion is proportional to the Veloci-
ty} jointly with the Extenfion and Solidi-
ty-
'Phi/. But allowing this to be true, yet
it will not thence follow, that Gravity is
proportional toMaffer, in your Philofophic
Senfe of the Word ; except you take it
for granted, that unknown Subftratumy or
whatever elfe you call it, is proportional
to thofe fenfiblc Qualities ; which to
fuppofe, is plainly begging the Queftion.
That there is Magnitude and Solidity,
or Refinance, perceived by Senfe, I readi-
ly grant j as likewife that Gravity may
be proportional to thofe Qualities, I will
noc
3i4 Tk THIRD
not difpute. But that either thefc Qua-
lities as perceived by us, or the Powers
producing them do exift in a material
Subftratum\ this is what I deny, and you
indeed affirm, but notwithstanding your
Demonftration, have not yet proved.
Hyl. I mall infift no longeron that Point.
Do you think however, you (hall per-
fuade me the natural Philofophers have
been dreaming all this while ; pray wnat
becomes of all their Hypothefes and Ex-
plications of the Phenomena, which fup-
pofe the Exiftence of Matter ?
Phil. What mean you, Hylas, by the
Phenomena ?
Hyl. I mean the Appearances which I
perceive by my Senfes.
Thil. And the Appearances perceived
by Senfe, are they not Ideas ?
Hyl. I have told you fo a hundred times.
Phil. Therefore, to explain the Thrtno-
mena, is to {hew how we come to be af-
fected with Ideas, in that Manner and Or-
der wherein they are imprinted on our
Senfes. Is it not?
Hyl. It is.
Phil. Now if you can prove, that any
Philofopher hath explained the Production
of any one Idea in our Minds by the
Help of Matter, I (hill for ever acquiefcc,
and look on all that hath been faid againft
it
DIALOGUE. 315
it as nothing: But if you cannot, it is in,
vain to urge the Explication of Pheno-
mena. That a Being endowed with Know-
ledge and Will, mould produce or exhi-
bit Ideas, is eafily underftood. But that
a Being which is utterly deftitute of thefe
Faculties (hould be able to produce Ideas,
or in any fort to affect an Intelligence,
this I can never underftand. This I fay,
though we had fome pofitive Conception
of Matter, though we knew its Qualities,
and could comprehend its Exiftence, would
yet be fo far from explaining things, that
it is it felf the moft inexplicable thing
in the World. And yet for all this, it
will not follow, that Philofophers have
been doing nothing j for by oblerving and
reafoning upon the Connexion of Ideas,
they difcover the Laws and Methods of
Nature, which is a part of Knowledge
both ufeful and entertaining.
Hyl After all, can it be fuppofed God
would deceive all Mankind ? Do you
imagine, He would have induced the whole
World to believe the Being of Matter, if
there was no fuch thing?
Phil. That every epidemical Opimcn
arifing from Prejudice, or Paflion, or
Thoughtiefnefs, may be imputed to God,
as the Author of it, I believe you will not
affirm. Whatlbever Opinion we father on
Him,
3i(J The T H I R D
Him, it muft be either becaufe He has
difcovered it to us by fupernatural Reve-
lation, or becaufe it is fo evident to our
natural Faculties, which were framed and
given us by God, that it is impoffible
we mould withhold our AfTent from it.
But where is the Revelation ? or where
is the Evidence that extorts the Belief of
Matter? Nay, how does it appear, that
Matter taken for fomething diftinct from
what we perceive by our Senfes, is thought
to exift by all Mankind, or indeed by
any except a few Philofophers, who do
not know what they would be at? Your
Queftion fuppofes thefe Points are clear;
and when you have cleared them, I mall
think my felf obliged to give you another
Anfwer. In the mean time let it fuffice
that I tell you, I do not fuppofe God has
deceived Mankind at all.
Hyl. But the Novelty, Phiknous^ the
Novelty ! There lies the Danger. New
Notions mould always be difcountenanced ;
they unfettle Mens Minds, and no body
knows where they will end.
Phil. Why the rejecting a Notion that
hath no Foundation either in Senfe or in
Reafon, or in Divine Authority, mould
be thought to unfettle the Belief of fuch
Opinions as are grounded on all or any of
thefe, I cannot imagine. That Innova-
tions
DIALOGUE. 317
lions in Government and Religion, are
dangerous, and ought to be difcountenan-
ced, I freely own. But is there the like
Reafon why they mould be difcouraged in
Philofophy ? The making any thing known
which was unknown before, is an Inno-
vation in Knowledge : And if all fuch In-
novations had been forbidden, Men would
have made a notable Progrefs in the Arts
and Sciences. But it is none of my bu-
linefs to plead for Novelties and Paradoxes.
That the Qualities we perceive, are not
on the Objects : That we muft not be-
lieve our Senfes: That we know nothing
of the real Nature of Things, and can
never be afTu red even of their Exiftence:
That real Colours and Sounds are nothing
but certain unknown Figures and Motions:
That Motions are in themfelves neither
fwift nor flow: That there are in Bodies
abfolute Extenfions, without any particu-
lar Magnitude or Figure: That a Thing
ftupid, thoughtlefs and inactive, operates
on a Spirit : That the leafl Particle of a
Body, contains innumerable extended Parts.
Thefe are the Novelties, thefe are the
ilrange Notions which {hock the genuine
uncorrupted Judgment of all Mankind;
and being once admitted, embarrafs the
Mind with endlefs Doubts and Difficul-
ties. And it is againft thefe and the like
Innova-
The T H I R D
Innovations, I endeavour to vindicate com-
mon Senfe. It is true, in doing this, I
may perhaps be obliged to ufe fome Am-
bages, and ways of Speech not common.
But if my Notions are once thorowly
underftood, that which is moft fingular
in them, will in effect be found to amount
to no more than this: That it is abfolute-
ly impoffible, and a plain Contradiction
to fuppofe, any unthinking Being fhould
exift without being perceived by a Mind.
And if this Notion be fingular, it is a
fhame it mould be fo at this time of
day, and in a Chriftian Country.
Hyl. As for the Difficulties other Opi-
nions may be liable to, thofe are out of
the Queftion. It is your Bufinefs to de-
fend your own Opinion. Can any thing
be plainer, than that you are for chang-
ing all things into Ideas ? You, I fay, who
are not afhamed to charge me with Scep-
tic ijm. This is fo plain, there is no de-
nying it.
Phil. You miflake me. I am not for
changing Things into Ideas, but rather
Ideas into Things ; fince thofe immediate
Objects of Perception, which according
to you, are only Appearances of Things,
1 take to be the real Things themfelves.
Hyl. Things ! you may pretend what
you pleafej but it is certain, you leave
us
DIALOGUE. 3 1
us nothing but the empty Forms of Things,
the Outfide only which ftrikes the Sen-*-
fes.
Phil. What you call the empty Forms
and Outfide of Things, feems to me the very
Things the'mfelves. Nor are they empty
or incomplete otherwife, than upon your
Suppofition, that Matter is an elTential
Part of all corporeal Things. We both
therefore agree in this, that we perceive
only fcnfible Forms: But herein we dif-
fer, you will have them to be empty Ap-
pearances, I real Beings. In fhort you do
not truil your Senfes, I do.
Hyl. You fay vou believe your Senfes ;
and feem to applaud your felf that in.
this you agree with the Vulgar. Accord-
ing to you therefore, the true Nature of
a Thing is difcovered by the Senfes. If
fo, whence comes that Difagreement ?
Why is not the fame Figure, and other
fenlible Qualities, perceived all manner of
Ways ? and why mould we ufe a Micro-
fcope, the better to difcover the true Na-
ture of a Body, if it were difcoverable to
the naked Eye ?
Phil btri&ly fpeaking, Hylas, we do
not fee the fame Object that we feel;
neither is the fame Object perceived by
the Micro fcope, which was by the na-
ked Eye. But in cafe every Variation
was
10 The T H I R D
was thought fufficient to conftitute a
new Kind or Individual, the endlefs
Number or Confufion of Names would
render Language impracticable. Therefore
to avoid this as well as other Inconvenien-
cies which are obvious upon a little Thought,
Men combine together feveral Ideas, appre-
hended by divers Senfes, or by the fame
Senfe at different times, or in different Cir-
cumftanccs, but obferved -however to have
fome Connexion in Nature, either with
refpect to Coexiftence or Succeffion ; all
which they refer to one Name, and con-
fider as one Thing. Hence it follows that
when I examine by my other Senfes a
Thing I have feen, it is not in order to
underftand better the fame Object which
I had perceived by Sight, the Object of
one Senfe not being perceived by the other
Senfes. And when I look through a Mi-
crofcope, it is not that I may perceive
more clearly what I perceived already
with my bare Eyes, the Object perceived
by the Glafs being quite different from
the farmer. But in both cafes my Aim
is only to know what Ideas are connec-
ted together j and the more a Man knows
of the Connexion of Ideas, the more he
is faid to know of the Nature of Things.
What therefore if our Ideas are variable j
what if our Senfes are not in all Circum-
ftances
DIALOGUE. 511
: fiances affected with the fame Appearan-
ces ? It will not thence follow, they are
not to be trufted, or that they are in-
confiftent either with themfelves or any
thing elfe, except it be with your precon-
ceived Notion of (I know not whar) one
fmgle, unchanged, unperceivable, real Na-
ture, marked by each Name : Which Pre-
judice feems to have taken its Rife from
not rightly underftanding the common
Language of Men fpeaking of feveral dif-
tinct Ideas, as united into one thing by
the Mind. And indeed there is Caufe
to fufpect feveral erroneous Conceits of
the Philofophers are owing to the fame
Original : While they began to build their
Schemes, not fo much on Notions as
Words, which were framed by the Vulgar,
merely for Conveniency and Difpatch in
the common Actions of Life, without any
regard to Speculation.
HyL Methinks I apprehend your Mean-
ing.
fPhiL It is your Opinion, the Ideas we
perceive by our Senfes are not real Things,
but Images, or Copies of them. Our Know-
ledge therefore is no farther real, than
as our Ideas are the true Reprefentations
of thofe Originals. But as thefe fuppo-
fed Originals are in themfelves unknown,
it is impoflible to know how far our Ide-
X as
3li The THIRD.
as refemble them ; or whether they re-
femble them at all. We cannot therefore
be fure we have any real Knowledge.
Farther, as our Ideas are perpetually va-
ried, without any Change in the fuppofed
real Things, it neceflarily follows they can-
not all be true Copies of them : Or if
fome are, and others are not, it is impof-
fible to diflinguim the former from the
latter. And this plunges us yet deeper
in Uncertainty. Again, when we confider
the Point, we cannot conceive how any
Idea, or any thing like an Idea, mould
have an abfolute Exigence out of a Mind :
Nor confequently, according to you, how
there mould be any real thing in Nature.
The Refult of all which is, that we arc
thrown into the moft hopelefs and aban-
doned Scepticifm. Now give me leave to
ask you, Firft, Whether your referring
Ideas to certain abfolutely exifting unper-
ceived Subftances, as their Originals, be
not the Source of all this Scepticifm ? Se-
condly, Whether you are informed, either
by Senfe or Reafon, of the Exigence of
thofe unknown Originals ? And in cafe
you are not, Whether it be not abfurd to
fuppofe them ? Thirdly, Whether, upon
Inquiry, you find there is any thing dif-
tinftly conceived or meant by the abfolute
or external Exiftence of unperceiving Sub-
fiances ?
DIALOGUE. $23
Jtances ? Laftly, Whether the Premifes
, confidered, it be not the wifeft way to
follow Nature, truft your Senfes, and lay-
ing afide all anxious Thought about un-
known Natures or Subftances, admit with
the Vulgar thofe for real Things-, which
are perceived by the Senfes ?
Hyl. For the prefent, I have no Incli-
nation to the anfwering Part. I would
much rather fee how you can get over
what follows. Pray are not the Objects
perceived by the Senfes of one, likewife
perceivable to others prefent ? If there
were an hundred more here, they would
all fee the Garden, the Trees, and Flow-
ers as I fee them. But they are not in
the fame manner affected with the Ideas I
frame in my Imagination. Does not
this make a Difference between the for-
mer fort of Objects and the latter ?
Phil. I grant it does. Nor have I ever
denied a Difference between the Objects of
Senfe and thofe of Imagination. But what
would you infer from thence ? You can-
not fay that fenfible Objects exift unper-
ceived, becaufe they are perceived by ma-
ny.
Hyl. I own, I can make nothing of that
Objection : But it hath led me into another.
Is it not your Opinion that by owr Senfes
X 2 we
3 14 The T H I R V
we perceive only the Ideas exifting in our
Minds?
Tbil. It is.
Hyl. But the fame Idea which is in my
Mind, cannot be in yours, or in any ether
Mind. Doth it not therefore follow from
your Principles, that no Two can fee the
fame thing ? And is not this highly ab-
furd?
Phil. If the Term fame be taken in the
vulgar Acceptation, it is certain, (and not
at all repugnant to the Principles I main-
tain) that different Perfons may perceive
the fame Thing \ or the fame Thing or
Idea exifl in different Minds. Words are
of arbitrary Impofuion ; and iince Men are
ufed to apply the Word fame where no
Diftinftion or Variety is perceived, and
I do not pretend to alter their Percepti-
ons , it follows, that as Men have faid be-
fore, federal Jaw the fame thing^ fo they,
may upon like Occafions ftill continue
to ufe the fame Phrafe, without any De-
viation either from Propriety of Language,
or the Truth of Things. But if the
Term fame be ufed in the Acceptation
of Philofophers, who pretend to an ab-
ftracted Notion of Identity, then, according
to their fundry Definitions of this Notion,
(for it is not yet agreed wherein that Philo-
fophic Identity confifts) it may or may
not
DIALOGUE. 515
not be poflible for divers Perfons to per-
ceive the fame thing. But whether Phi-
lofophers (hall think fit to call a thing the
fame or no, is, I conceive, of fmall Im-
portance. Let us fuppofe feveral Men to-
gether, all endued with the fame Facul-
ties, and confequently affected in like fort
by their Senfes, and who had yet never
known the Ufe of Language; they would
without queftion agree in their Percepti-
ons. Though perhaps, when they came
to the Ufe of Speech, fome regarding the
Uniformnefs of what was perceived, might
call it thejame thing : Others efpecially
regarding the Diverfity of Perfons who
perceived, might choofe the Denominati-
on of different things. But who fees not
that all the Difpute is about a Word ?
to wit, Whether what is perceived by
different Perfons, may yet have the Term
fame applied to it ? Or fuppofe a Houfe,
whofe Walls or outward Shell remaining
unaltered, the Chambers are all pulled
down, and new ones built in their place ;
and that you mould call this tkejame, and
I mould fay it was not the fame Houfe :
Would we not for all this perfectly agree
in our Thoughts of the Houfe, considered
in it felf ? and would not all the Difference
confift in a Sound ? If you mould fay,
We differed in our Notions ; for that you
X 3 fuper-
16 The T H 1 R V.
fuperadded to your Idea of the Houfe thfc
fimple abftracT:ed Idea of Identity, where-
as I did not ; I would tell you I know
not what you mean by that dbftrafted Idea
of Identify ; and mould defire you to look
into your own Thoughts, and be fureyou
underftood your felf. Why fo filent,
Hylas ? Are you not yet fatisfied, Men
rnay difpute about Identity and Diverfity,
without any real Difference in their
Thoughts and Opinions, abftraded from
Names ? Take this farther Reflexion with
you : That whether Matter be allowed
to exift or no, the Cafe is exactly the
fame as to the Point in hand. For the Matc-
rialifts themfelves acknowledge what we
immediately perceive byourSenfes, tobeour
own Ideas. Your Difficulty therefore, that
no two fee the fame thing, makes equally
againft the Materialifts and me.
Hyl. But they fuppofe an external Ar-
chetype, to which referring their feveral
Ideas, they may truly be faid to perceive
the fame thing.
Phil. And (not to mention your having
difcarded thofe Archetypes) fo may you
fuppofe an external Archetype on my Prin-
ciples; external, I mean, to your own Mind 5
though indeed it muft be fuppofed to exift
in that Mind which comprehends all things;
t)Ut then this ferves all che Ends of Iden-
DIALOGUE. 317
tity, as well as if it exifted out of a
Mind. And I am fure you yourillf will
not fay, It is lefs intelligible.
Hyl. You have indeed clearly fatisfied me,
either that there is no Difficulty at bot-
tom in this Point ; or if there be, that
it makes equally againft both Opinions.
Phil. But that which makes equally
againft two contradictory Opinions, can
be a Proof againft neither.
Hyl. I acknowledge it. But after all,
PbiionouSy when I confidcr the Subftance
of what you advance againft Scepticifm, it
amounts to no more than this. We are
fure that we really fee, hear, feel ; in a
word, that we are affected with fenfible
Impremons.
Phil. And how are we concerned any
farther ? I fee this Cherry, I feel it, I tafte
it : And I am fure nothing cannot be
feen, or felt, or tafted : It is therefore
real. Take away the Senfations of Soft-
nefs, Moifture, Rednefs, Tartnefs, and you
take away the Cherry. Since it is not a
Being diilinft from Senfations j a Cherry,
I fay, .is nothing but a Congeries of fen-
fible Impremons, or Ideas perceived by
various Senfes : Which Ideas are united
into one thing (or have one Name given
them) by the Mind j becaufe they are ob-
ferved to attend each other. Thus when
X 4 the
5i8 UK T H I R D
the Palate is affected with fuch a particu-
lar Tafte, the Sight is affected with a red
Colour, the Touch with Roundnefs, Soft'
nefs, &c. Hence, when I fee, and feel,
and tafte, in fundry certain manners, I
am fure the Cherry exifts, or is real ; its
Reality being in my Opinion nothing ab-
ftradted from thofe Senfations. But if by
the Word Cherry you mean an unknown
Nature diftincT: from all thofe fenfible
Qualities, and by its Exiftence fomething
diftincT: from its being perceived ; then in-
deed I own, neither you nor I, nor any
one elfe can be fure it exifts.
HyL But what would you fay, Pbilo-
nous, if I mould bring the very fame Rea-
fons againft the Exiftence of fenfible
Things in a Mind, which you have of-
fered againft their exifting in a material
Subjlratum ?
Phil. When I fee your Reafons, you fliall
hear what I have to fay to them.
HyL Is the Mind extended or unexten-
ded?
Phi!. Unextended, without doubt.
Hyl. Do you fay the Things you per-
ceive are in your Mind ?
Phil. They are.
Hyl. Again, have I not heard you fpeak
of fenfible Impreflions ?
Phil. I believe you may.
• Tr /
HyL
DIALOGUE.
Hyl. Explain to me now, O Pbilonous !
how it is poflible there (hould be room
for all thofe Trees and Houfes to exift in
your Mind. Can extended Things be
contained in that which is unextended ?
Or are we to imagine Impreffions made
on a Thing void of all Solidity ? You can-
not fay Objects are in your Mind, as Books
in your Study: Or that Things are im-*
printed on it, as the Figure of a Seal upon
Wax. In what Senfe therefore are we
to understand thofe Exprefiions? Explain
me this if you can : And I mall then be
able to anfwer all thofe Queries you
formerly put to me about my Subjtra-
turn.
Phil. Look you, Hylas, when I fpcak
of Objects as exifting in the Mind or im-
printed on the Seniesj I would not be
underftood in the grofs literal Senfe, as
when Bodies are faid to exift in a place,
or a Seal to make an Impreffion upon
Wax. My Meaning is only that the Mind
comprehends or perceives them ; and that
it is affected from without, or by fomc
Being diftinct from itfelf. This is my
Explication of your Difficulty ; and how
it can ferve to make your Tenet of an
unperceiving material Subftratum intelligi-
ble, I would fain know.
Hyl
$ The T H I R D
Hyl Nay, if that be all, I confefs I do
not fee what Ufe can be made of it. But
are you not guilty of fome Abufe of Lan-
guage in this?
Phil. None at all: It is no more than
common Cuftom, which you know is the
Rule of Language, hath authorized: No-
thing being more ufual, than for Philofo-
phers to fpeak of the immediate Objedts
of the Underftanding as Things exifting
in the Mind. Nor is there any thing in
this, but what is conformable to the ge-
neral Analogy of Language ; mofl part of
the mental Operations being fignified by
Words borrowed from fenfible Things j as
is plain in the Terms Comprehend, Refletf,
Difcourfe, &c. which being applied to the
Mind, muft not be taken in their grois
original Senfe.
Hyl. You have, I own, fatisned me in
this Point: But there ftill remains one
great Difficulty, which I know not how
you wHl get over. And indeed it is of
fuch Importance, that if you could folve
all others, without being" able to find a
Solution for this, you muft never expeft
to make me a Profelyte to your Princi-
ples.
Phil Let me know this mighty Diffi-
culty.
Hyl
DIALOGUE. 33*
Hyl The Scripture Account of the
Creation, is what appears to me utterly
irreconcileable with your Notions. Mofes
tells us of a Creation: A Creation of what?
of Ideas ? No certainly, but of Things, of
real Things, folid corporeal Subftarices.
Bring your Principles to agree with this,
and I (hall perhaps agree with you.
Phil. Mofes Mentions the Sun, Moon,
and Stars, Earth and Sea, Plants and Ani-
mals: That all thefe do really exift, ^ id
were in the Beginning created by God,
I make no queftion. If by Ideas, you
mean Fictions and Fancies of the Min<1,
then thefe are no Jdeas. , If by Ideas, you
mean immediate Objects of the Under-
flanding, or fenfible Things which cannot
exift unperceived, or out of a Mind, then
thefe Things are Ideas. But whether you
do, or do not call them f dears, it matters
little. The Difference is 'only about a
Name. And whether that Name be re-
tained or rejected, the Senfe, the Truth and
Reality of Things continues the fame.
In common Talk, the Objects of our
Senfes are not termed Ideas but things.
Call them fo ftill : Provided you do not
attribute to them any abfolute external
Exiftence, and I mall never quarrel with
you for a Word. The Creation therefofe-
J allow to have been a Creation of Things,
of
The T H I R D
of Real Things. Neither is this in the
lead inconfiftcnt with my Principles, as
is evident from what I have now faid;
and would have been evident to you with-
out this, if you had not forgotten what
had been fo often faid before. But as for
folid corporeal Subftances, I defire you to
{hew where Mofes makes any mention of
them ; and if they mould be mentioned by
him, or any other infpired Writer, it would
ftill be incumbent on you to mew thofe
Words were not taken in the vulgar Ac-
ceptation, for things falling under our
Senfes, but in the Philofophic Acceptati-
on, for Matter, or an unknown Quiddity,
with an abfolute Exiftence. When you
have proved thefe Points, then (and not
till then) may you bring the Authority of
Mofes into our Difpute.
Hyl. It is in vain to difpute about a
Point fo clear. I am content to refer
it to your own Confcience. Are you not
fatisfied there is fome peculiar Repugnan-
cy between the Mofaic Account of the
Creation, and your Notions ?
Phil. If all poffible Senfe, which can be
put on the firft Chapter of Genefis, may
be conceived as confidently with my Prin-
ciples as any other, then it has no pecu-
liar Repugnancy with them. But there is
no Senfe you may not as well conceive,
believing
DIALOGUE. 333
believing as I do. Since, befide Spirits,
all you conceive are Ideas j and the Ex-
iftence of thefe I do not deny. Neither
do you pretend they exift without the
Mind.
Hyl. Pray let me fee any Senfe you can
underftand it in.
Phil. Why, I imagine that if I had been
prefent at the Creation, I (hould have feen
Things produced into Being; that is, be-
come perceptible, in the Order defcribed
by the Sacred Hiftorian. I ever before
believed the Mofaic Account of the Crea-
tion, and now find no Alteration in my
Manner of believing it. When Things
are faid to begin or end their Exiftence, we
do not mean this with regard to God, but
His Creatures. All Objects arc eternally
known by God, or which is the fame thing,
have an Eternal Exiftence in his Mind:
But when Things before imperceptible
to Creatures, are by a Decree of God,
made perceptible to them; jhen are they
faid to begin a relative Exiftence, with re-
fpect to created Minds. Upon reading
therefore the Mojaic Account of the Crea-
tion, I underftand that the feveral Parts
of the World became gradually perceivea-
blc to finite Spirits, endowed with proper
Faculties ; fo that whoever fuch were pre-
fent, they were in truth perceived by them.
This
334 The T H I R D
This is the literal obvious Senic fuggeft-
ed to me, by the Words of the Holy
Scripture : In which is included no Men-
tion or no Thought, either of Subftratum,
Inftrument, Occafion, or abfolute Exif-
tence. And upon Inquiry, I doubt not, it
will be found, that moil plain honeft Men,
who believe the Creation, never think of
thofe things any more than I. What me-
taphyfical Senfe you may underftand it
in, you only can tell.
HyL But, Philonous, you do not feem
to be aware, that you allow created Things
in the Beginning, only a relative, and
confequently hypothetical Being : That is
to fay, upon Suppofition there were Men
to perceive them, without which they have
no Actuality of abfolute Exiftence, where-
in Creation might terminate. Is it not
therefore according to you plainly impof-
fible, the Creation of any inanimate Crea-
tures mould precede that of Man? And
is not this directly contrary to the Mo*
falc Account?
Phil. In Anfwer to that I fay, Firft,
Created Beings might begin to exift in
the Mind of other created Intelligences, be-
fide Men. You will not therefore be a-
ble to prove any Contradiction between
Mofes and my Notions, unlefs you firft
(hew, there was no .other Order of finite
created
DIALOGUE. 3 3 5
created Spirits in Being before Man. I
fay farther, in cafe we conceive the Crea-
tion, as we fhould at this time a Parcel
of Plants or Vegetables of all forts, pro-
duced by an invin'ble Power, in a Defcrt
where no body was prefent: That this
Way of explaining or conceiving it, is con-
fident with my Principles, lince they de-
prive you of nothing, either fenfible or
imaginable : That it exactly fuits with the
common, natural, undebauched Notions
of Mankind: That it manifests the De-
pendence of all Things on God; and con-
fequently hath all the good Effect or In-
fluence, which it is poffible that impor-
tant Article of our Faith mould have in
making Men humble, thankful, and refign-
ed to their Creator. I fay moreover, thac
in this naked Conception of Things, di-
verted of Words, there will not be found
any Notion of what you call the Aftuali-
ty of abjblute Extflence. You may indeed
raife a Duft with thofe Terms, and fo
lengthen our Difpute to no purpofe. But
I intreat you calmly to look into your
own Thoughts, and then tell me if they
are not an ufelefs and unintelligible
Jargon.
Hyl. I own, I have no very clear No-
tion annexed to them. But what fay you
to this ? Do you not make the Exiftence
of
The T H I R D
of fenfible Things confift in their being
in a Mind ? And were not all Things eter-
nally in the Mind of God ? Did they not
therefore exift from all Eternity, accord-
ing to you ? And how could that which
was Eternal, be created in Time ? Can
any thing be clearer or better connected
than this?
Phil. And are not you too of Opinion,
that God knew all Things from Eter-
nity ?
Hyl. I am.
Phil. Confequently they always had *
Being iathe Divine Intellect.
Hyl. This I acknowledge.
Phil. By your own Confeffion therefore,
nothing is New, or begins to be, in refpedt
of the Mind of God. So we are agreed
in that Point.
Hyl. What {hall we make then of the
Creation ?
Phil. May we not underftand it to have
been intirely in refpect of finite Spirits ; fo
that Things, with regard to us, may pro-
perly be faid to begin their Exiftence, or
be created, when God decreed they mould
become perceptible to intelligent Creatures,
in that Order and Manner which He then
eftablimed, and we now call the Laws of
Nature ? You may call this a relative, or
hypothetical Exijience if you pleafe. But
fo
DIALOGUE: 3 5 7
fo long as it fupplies us with the moft
natural, obvious, and literal Senfe of the
Mofaic Hiftory of the Creation ; fo long
as it anfwers all the religious Ends of that
great Article; in. a word, fo long as you
can aflign no other Senfe or Meaning in
its (lead ; why mould we reject this ? Is it
to comply with a ridiculous Sceptical Hu-
mour of making every thing Nonfenfe and
Unintelligible? I am fure you cannot fay,
it is for the Glory of God. For allowing
it to be a thing poffible and conceivable,
that the corporeal World mould have an
abfolute Subfiftence extrinfical to the Mind
of God, as well as to the Minds of all
created Spirits: Yet how could this fet
forth either the Immenlity or Omnifcience
of the Deity, or the neceffary and imme-
diate Dependence of all things on Him?
Nay, would it not rather feem to derogate
from thofe Attributes?
Hyl. Well, but as to this Decree of
God's, for making Things perceptible;
What fay you, Thilonous^ is it not plain,
God did either execute that Decree from
all Eternity, or at feme certain time be-
gan to will what He had not actually
willed before, but only defigned to will.
If the former, then there could be no Crea-
tion or Beginning of Exiftence in finite
Things. If the latter, then we muft ac^
Y knowledge
Tie T H I R D
knowledge fomething new to befal the
Deicy; which implies a fort of Change:
and all Change argues Imperfection.
Phil. Pray confider what you are do-
ing. Is it not evident, this Objection con-
cludes equally againft a Creation in any
Senfe; nay, againft every other Act of
the Deity, difcoverable by the Light of
Nature ? None of which can we conceive,
otherwife than as performed in Time,
and having a Beginning. God is a Being
of tranfcendent and unlimited Perfections:
His Nature therefore is incomprehenfible
to finite Spirits. It is not therefore to be
expected, that any Man, whether Mate-
rial ft or Immaterialijl^ mould have exact-
ly juft Notions of the Deity, His Attri-
butes, and ways of Operation. If then you
wouid infer any thing againft me, your
Difficulty muft not be drawn from the Ina-
dequatenefs of our Conceptions of the Di-
vine Nature, which is unavoidable on any
Scheme; but from the Denial of Matter,
of which there is not one Word, directly or
indirectly, in what you have now objected.
Hyl. I muft acknowledge, the Difficul-
ties you are concerned to clear, are fuch
only as arife from the Non-exiftence of
Matter, and are peculiar to that Notion.
So far .you are in the right. But I can-
HOt by any means bring my felf to think
there
D 1 A L 0 G U E.
there is no fuch peculiar Repugnancy be-
tween the Creation and your Opinion ;
though indeed where to fix it, I do not
diflindly know.
Phil. What would you have ! do I not
acknowledge a twofold State of Things,
the one Eclypal or Natural, the other
Archetypal and Eternal? The former
was created in Time; the latter exifted
from Everlafting in the Mind of God. 1$
not this agreeable to the common Notions
of Divines ? or is any more than this ne-
ceffary in order to conceive the Creation?
But you fufpe<ft fome peculiar Repugnan-
cy, though you know not where it lies*
To take away all PofTibility of Scruple in
the cafe, do but confider this one Point.
Either you are not able to conceive the
Creation on any Hypothecs whatfoever;
and if fo, there is no ground for Diflike or
Complaint againft my particular Opinion
on that Score : Or you are able to con-
ceive it ; and if fo, why not on my Prin-
ciples, fince thereby nothing conceivable is
taken away ? You have all along been al-
lowed the full Scope of Senfe, Imaginati-
on, and Reafon. Whatever therefore you
could before apprehend, either immedi-
ately or mediately by your Senfes, or by
Ratiocination from your Senfes ; whatever
you could perceive, imagine or underftand^
Y 2 remains
}4o The THIRD
remains ftill with you. If therefore the
Notion you have of the Creation by other
Principles be intelligible, you have it ftill
upon mine ; if it be not intelligible, I con-
ceive it to be no Notion at all; and fo
there is no Lofs of it. And indeed it feems
to me very plain, that the Suppofition of
Matter, that is, a thing perfectly unknown
and inconceivable, cannot ferve to make
us conceive any thing. And I hope, it
need not be proved to you, that if the
Existence of Matter doth not make the
Creation conceivable, the Creation's being
without it inconceivable, can be no Ob-
jection againft its Non-Exiftence.
HyL I confefs, Philonous^you have almoft
fatisfied me in this Point of the Creation.
PhiL I would fain know why you are
not quite fatisfied. You tell me indeed of
a Repugnancy between the Mojaic tLftory
and Immaterialifm : But you know not
where it lies. Is this reafonable, Hy/as ?
Can you expect I mould lolve a Difficul-
ty without knowing what it is? But to
pafs by all that, would not a Man think
you were aflured there is no Repugnancy
between the received Notions of Materia-
lifts and the infpired Writings?
HyL And fo I am.
Phil Ought the Hiftorical Part of
Scripture to be underflood in a plain ob-
vious
DIALOGUE. 341
vious Senfe, or in a Senfe which is meta-
phyfical, and out of the way ?
Hyl. In the plain Senfe, doubtlefs.
Phil. When Mojes fpeaks of Herbs,
Earth, Water, &c. as having been created
by God ; think you not the fenfible Things,
commonly fignified by thofe Words, are
fuggefted to every unphilofophical Reader?
Hyl. I cannot help thinking fo.
Phil. And are not all Ideas, or Things
perceived by Senfe, to be denied a real
Exiftence by the Doctrine of the Materia-
lifts?
Hyl. This I have already acknowledged.
Phil. The Creation therefore, according
to them, was not the Creation of Things
fenfible, which have only a relative Being,
but of certain unknown Natures, which
have an abfolutc Being, wherein Creation,
might terminate.
Hyl. True.
Phil. Is it not therefore evident, the
Aflerters of Matter deftroy the plain ob-
vious Senfe of Mojes, with which their
Notions are utterly inconfiftent j and inftcad
of it obtrude on us I know not what,
fomething equally unintelligible to them-
felves and me?
Hyl. I cannot contradict you.
Phil. Mofes tells us of a Creation. A
Creation of what ? of unknown Quiddities,
V3 of
The THIRD
of Occafions, or Subftratums ? No certain-
ly; but of Things obvious to the Senfes.
You muft firft reconcile this with your
Notions, if you expect I fhould be re-
conciled to them.
Hyl. I fee you can afTault me with my
own Weapons.
Phil. Then as to abfolute Exiftcnce\
was there ever known a more jejune Notion
than that ? Something it is, fo abflracted
and unintelligible, that you have frankly
owned you could not conceive it, much
lefs explain any thing by it. But allowing
Matter to exifl, and the Notion of abfo-
lute Exiftence to be as clear as Light; yet
was this ever known to make the Creation
more credible ? Nay hath it not furnifhed
the Atheijh and Infidch of all Ages, with
the moft plaufible Argument againft a Crea-
tion ? That a corporeal Subftance, which
hath an abfolute Exiftence without the
Minds of Spiriis, mould be produced out
of nothing by the mere Will of a Spirit,
hath been locked upon as a thingfo contra-
ry to all Reafon, fo impofTible and abfurd,
that not only the moll: celebrated among
the Ancients, but even divers Modern and
Chriflian Philosophers have thought Mat-
ter coeternal with the Deity. Lay thefe
things together, and then judge you whe-
ther Materialifmdifpofes Men to believe the
Creation of Things.
DIALOGUE. 343
JFfv/. I own, Pbilonotts, I think it does
not. This of the Creation is the laft Ob-
jection I can think of; and I mufi needs
©wn it hath been fufficiently anfwered as
well as the reft. Nothing now remains
to be overcome, but a fort of unaccounta-
ble Backwardnefs that I find in my felf
toward your Notions.
Phil. When a Man is fwayed, he knows
not why, to one Side of a Queftion ; Cnn.
this, think you, be any thing elfe but tr 6
Effect of Prejudice, which never fails to
attend old and rooted Notions? And in-
deed in this refpecl I cannot deny the
Belief of Matter to have very much the
Advantage over the contrary Opinion, with
Men of a learned Education.
UyL I confefs it feems to be as you fay.
Phil. As a Balance therefore to this
Weight of Prejudice, let us throw into
the i)cale the great Advantages that arife
from the Belief of Immatenalifrn, both in
regard to Religion and Humane Learning.
The Being of a God, and Incorruptibility
of the Soul, thofe great Articles of Reli-
gion, are they not proved with the clearelt
and mofl immediate Evidence? When I
fay the Being of a God, I do not mean an
obfcure general Caufe of Things, \v here-
of we have no Conception, but God, in
the Arid and proper Senfe of the Word.'
¥4 A
3 44 The T H I R D
A Being whofe Spirituality, Omniprefence,
Providence, Omnifcience, Infinite Power
and Goodnefs, are as confpicuous as the
Exiftence of fenfible Things, of which
(notwithftanding the fallacious Pretences
and affected Scruples of Sccpticks) there is
no more reafon to doubt, than of our own
Being. Then with relation to Humane
Sciences; in Natural Philofophy, what In-
tricacies, what Obfcurities, what Contra-
dictions, hath the Belief of Matter led Men
into! To fay nothing of the numberlefs
Difputes about its Extent, Continuity, Ho-
mogeneity, Gravity, Diviiibility, &c. do
they not pretend to explain all things by
Bodies operating on Bodies, according to
the Laws of Motion r and yet, are they able
to comprehend how any one Body mould
move another? Nay, admitting there was
no Difficulty in reconciling the Notion of
an inert Being with a Caufe; or in con-
ceiving how an Accident might pafs from
one Body to another; yet by all their
ftrained Thoughts and extravagant Suppo-
fitions, have they been able to reach the
mechanical Production of any one Animal
or Vegetable Body? Can they account by
the Laws of Motion, for Sounds, Taftes,
Smells, or Colours, or for the regular
Courfe of Things? Have they accounted
by Phyfical Principles for the Aptitude
and
DIALOGUE. 345
and Contrivance, even of the moft incon-
fiderable Parts of the Univerfe? But laying
afide Matter and corporeal Caufes, and
admitting only the Efficiency of an All-
perfect Mind, are not all the Effects of
Nature eafy and intelligible? If the Phce-
iwmena are nothing elfe but Ideas ; God is
a Spirit, but Matter an unintelligent, un-
perceiving Being. If they demonftrate an
unlimited Power in their Caufcj God is
Active and Omnipotent, but Matter an
inert Mafs. If the Order, Regularity, and
Ufefulnefs of them, can never be fuffici-
ently admired j God is infinitely Wife and
Provident, but Matter deftitute of all Con-
trivance and Defign. Thefe furely are
great Advantages in Phyfas. Not to men-
tion that the Apprehenfion of a diftant
Deity, naturally difpofes Men to a Negli-
gence in their moral Actions, which they
would be more cautious of, in cafe they
thought Him immediately prefent, and
a&ing on their Minds without the Inter-
poficion of Matter, or unthinking Second
Caufes. Then in Metaphyjics\ what Dif-
ficulties concerning Entity in Abftract,Sub-
ftantial Forms, Hylarchic Principles, Pla-
ftic Natures, Subftance and Accident Prin-
ciple of Individuation, Poffibility of Mat-
ter's thinking, Origin of Ideas, the Man-
ner how two independent Subftances, fo
widely
34* We T H I R D
widely different as Spirit and Matter, mould
mutually operate on each other? What
Difficulties, I fay, and endlefsDifquifitions
concerning thefe and innumerable other
the like Poinrs, do we efcape by fuppofu g
only Spirits and Ideas? Even the Matbe-
tnaticks thernfelves, if we take awjy the
abiblute Exiftence of extended Things, be-
come much more clear and eafy ; the moft
fhocking Paradoxes and intricate Specula-
tions in thofe Sciences, depending on the
infinite Diviiibility of finite Extenfion,
which depends on that Suppofuion. But
what need is there to infill on the parti-
cular Sciences ? Is not that Oppofition to
all Science whatfoever, that Phrenfy of ti;e
ancient and modern Fcepticks, built on the
fame Foundation? Or can yo'i produce
fo much as one Argument againft the
Reality of corporeal Thing?, or in behalf
of that avowed utter Ignorance of their
Natures, which doth not fuppofe their
Reality to confift in an external abfolute
Exiftence? Upon this Suppofuion indeed,
the Objections from the Change of Co-
lours in a Pigeon's Neck, or the Appea-
rances of a broken Oar in the Water, muft
be allowed to have Weight. But thofe
and the like Objections vanifh, if we do
not maintain the Being of abfolute ex-
ternal Original?, but place the Reality of
Things
DIALOGUE. 347
Things in Ideas, fleeting indeed, and
changeable; however not changed at ran-
dom, but according to the fixed Order of
Nature. For herein confifts that Conftan-
cy and Truth of Things, which fecures
all the Concerns of Life, and diftinguimes
that which is real from, the irregular Vi-
fions of the Fancy.
j
HyL I agree to all you have now faid,
and muft own that nothing can incline me
to embrace your Opinion, more than the
Advantages I fee it is attended with. I
am by Nature lazyj and this would be a
mighty Abridgment in Knowledge. What
Doubts, what Hypothefes, what Laby-
rinths of Amufement, what Fields of Dif-
putation, what an Ocean of falfe Learning,
may be avoided by that fingle Notion of
Immaterialifm ?
Phil. After all, is there any thing far-
ther remaining to be done ? You may re-
member you promifed to embrace that O-
pinion, which upon Examination mould
appear moil agreeable to common Senfe,
and remote from ScepticiJ'm. This by your
own Confeffion is that which denies Mat-
ter, or the abfolute Exiftence of corpo-
real Things. Nor is this all ; The fame
Notion has been proved feveral Ways,
viewed in different Lights, purfued in its
Confequences, and all Objections againft
it
54* Th THIRD
it cleared. Can there be a greater Evidence
of its Truth ? or is it poflible ic fhould
have all the Marks of a true Opinion, and
yet he falfe ?
Hyl. I own my felf intirely fatisfied for
the prefent in all refpects. But what Se-
curity can I have that I (hall ftill conti-
nue the fame full Aflent to your Opinion,
and that no unthought-of Objection or Dif-
ficulty will occur hereafter?
Phil. Pray, Hylas> do you in other Cafes,
when a Point is once evidently proved,
withhold your Aflent on account of Ob-
jections or Difficulties it may be liable to ?
Are the Difficulties that attend the Doctrine
of incommeniurable Quantities, of the An-
gle of Contact, of the Afymptotes to
Curves or the like, fufficient to make you
hold out againft Mathematical Demonftra-
tion ? Or will you disbelieve the Provi-
dence of God, becaufe there may be fome
particular things which you know not how
to reconcile with it ? If there arc Diffi-
culties attending Immaterialifm, there are at
the fame time direct and evident Proofs
for it. But for the Exiftence of Matter,
there is not one Proof, and far more nu-
merous and infurmountable Objections lie
againft it. But where are thole mighty
Difficulties you infift on? Alas! you know
- not where or what they are; fomething
which may poflibly occur hereafter. If this
be
DIALOGUE.
be a fufficient Pretence for withholding your
full AfTent, you mould never yield it to any
Propofition, how free foever from Excep-
tions, how clearly and folidly foever de-
monftrated.
Hyl. You have fatisfied me, Philonous.
Phil. But to arm you againft all future
Objections, do but confider, That which
bears equally hard on two contradictory
Opinions, can be a Proof againft neither.
Whenever therefore any Difficulty occurs,
try if you can find a Solution for it on the
Hypothefis of the Materialifts. Be not de-
ceived by Words ; but found your own
Thoughts. And in cafe you cannot con-
ceive it eafier by the help of Materialifmy it
is plain it can be no Objection againft Im-
materiallfm. Had you proceeded all along
by this Rule, you would probably have
fpared yourfelf abundance of trouble in ob-
jecting ; fince of all your Difficulties I chal-
lenge you to (hew one that is explained by
Matter ; nay, which is not more unintel-
ligible with, than without that Suppofition,
and confequently makes rather againft than
for it. You fhould confider in each Parti-
cular, whether the Difficulty arifes from
the Ncn-exijience of Matter. If it doth not,
you might as well argue from the infinite
Divifibility of Exteniion againft the Divine
PrefcUnce, as from fuch a Difficulty againft
3 jo The T H I R D
ImmateriaUfm. And yet upon Recollection
\ believe you will find this to have been of-
ten, if not always the Cafe. You fhould
Hkewife take heed not to argue on a petitio
Principii. One is apt to fay, The unknown
Subftances ought to beefteemed real Things,
rather than the Ideas in our Minds : And
who can tell but the unthinking external
Subftance may concur as a Caufe or Inftru-
ment w the Production of our Ideas ? But
;s net this proceeding on a Suppofition
that there are fuch external Subftances ?
And to fuppofe this, is it not begging the
Queftion ? But above all things you mould
beware of impofing on your felf by that
vulgar Sophifm, which is called Ignoratio
Elenchi. You talked often as. if you thought
I naaintained the Non-exiftence of fenfible
Things : Whereas in truth no one can be
more thorowly allured of their Exiftence
than I am : And it is you who doubt ; I
flaould have faid, pofitively deny it. Every
thing that is feen, felt, heard, or any way
perceived by the Senfes, is on the Principles
I embrace, a real Being, but not on yours.
Remember, the Matter you contend for is
an unknown fomewhat, (if indeed it may
be termed fomewhat) which is quite ftrip-
ped of all feniible Qualities, and can neither
be perceived by Senle, nor apprehended by
the Mind. Remember, I fay, that it is not
any
DIALOGUE. '
any Object which is hard or fofr, hot or
cold, blue or white, round or fqnare, Gfr.
For all thefe things 1 affirm do exift.
Though indeed I deny they have an Exif-
tence diftindt from being perceived ; or that
they exift out of all Minds whatfoever.
Think on thefe Points ; let them be attentive-
ly confidered and ftill kept in view. Other-
wife you will not comprehend the State
of the Queftion j without which your Ob-
jections will always be wide of the Mark,
and inftead of mine, may poffibly be direc-
ted (as more than once they have been)
againft your own Notions.
Hyl. I muft needs own, Philonous, QO-
thing feems to have kept me from agree-
ing with you more than this fame mif-
taking the Queftion. In denying Matter, at
firft glimple I am tempted to imagine you
deny the things we fee and feel -, but upon
Reflexion find there is no Ground for it.
What think you therefore of retaining the
Name Matter, and applying it to fenfible
Things ? This may be done without any
Change in your Sentiments : And believe
me it would be a Means of reconciling them,
to fome Perfons, who may be more {hock-
ed at an Innovation in Words than ia
Opinion.
Phil. With all my heart : Retain the
Word Matter, and apply it to the Objc&R
of
35 * The THIRD
of Senfe, if you plcafe, provided you do not
attribute to them any Subfiftence diftincl:
from their being perceived. I {hall never
quarrel with you for an Expreffion. Mat-
ter, or material Subftance, are Terms intro-
duced by Philofophers ; and as ufed by
them, imply a fort of Independency, or a
Subfiftence diftinct from being perceived
by a Mind : But are never ufed by com-
mon People ; or if ever, it is to fignifythc
immediate Objects of Senfe. One would
think therefore, folong as the Names of all
particular Things, with the Termsfenjib/e,
Subftance, Body, Stuff, and the like, are re-
tained, the Word Matter mould be never
miffed in common Talk. And in Philofo-
phical Difcourfes it feems the beft way to
leave it quite out ; fmce. there is not per-
haps any one thing that hath more favou-
red and ftrcngthned the depraved Bent of
the Mind toward Atheifm, than the Ufe of
that general confufed Term.
Hyl. Well but, Philonous, fmce I am
content to give up the Notion of an un-
thinking Subftance exterior to the Mind,
I think you ought not to deny me the Pri-
vilege of ufing the Word Matter as I pleafe,
and annexing it to a Collection of fenfible
Qualities fubiifting only in the Mind. I
freely own there is no other Subftance in
a ftrid Senfe, than Spirit. But I have
been
DIALOGUE. 353
been fo long accuftomed to the Term Mat-
ter, that I know not how to part with it.
To fay, There is no Matter in the World,
is Hill {hocking to me. Whereas to fay,
There is no Matter, if by that Term be
meant an unthinking Subftance exifting
without the Mind: But if by Matter is
meant fome fenfible Thing, whofe Exift-
ence confifts in being perceived, then there
is Matter: This Diftinction gives it quite
another Turn : And Men will come into
your Notions with fmall Difficulty, when
they are propofed in that manner. For
after all, the Controverfy about Matter in
the Ariel: Acceptation of it, lies altogether
between you and the Philofophers ; whofe
Principles, I acknowledge, are not near fo
natural, or fo agreeable to the common
Senfe of Mankind, and Holy Scripture, as
yours. There is nothing we either defire
or fhun, but as it makes, or is apprehend-
ed to make fome Part of our Happinefs or
Mifery. But what hath Happinefs or Mi-
fery, Joy or Grief, Pleafure or Pain, to do
with abfolute Exiftence, or with unknown
Entities, abftra&ed from all Relation to us ?
It is evident, Things regard us only as
they are pleating or difpleafmg : And
they can plcafe or difpleafe, only fo far
forth as they are perceived. Farther there-
fore we are not concerned j and thus far
Z you
354 The T H I R D
you leave things as you found them. Yet
ftill there is fomething new in this Doc-
trine. It is p4ain, I do not now think
with the Philofophers, nor yet altogether
with the Vulgar. I would know how the
Cafe f|ands in that refpecl:: Precifely, what
you have added to, or altered in my for-
mer Notions.
Phil. I do not pretend to be a Setter-
up of New Notions. My Endeavours tend
only to unite and place in a clearer Light
that Truth, which was before (hared be-
tween the Vulgar and the Philofophers:
The former being of Opinion, that thoj'e
Things they immediately perceive are the real
ff kings; and the latter, that the Things
immediately perceived,, are Ideas 'which ex-
ijl only in the Mind. Which Two Noti-
ons put together, do in effect conftitute
the Subftance of what I advance.
Hyl. I have been a long time diftruft-
ing my Senfesj methought I faw things
by a dim Light, and through falfe piaffes.
Now the Glaffes are removed, and a new
JLight breaks in upon my Understanding. I
am clearly, convinced that I fee things in
their native Forms j and am no longer in
Pain about their unknown Natures or
abfolute Exigence. This is the State I
find my felf in at prefent: Though in-
deed the Courfe that brought me to it, I
do
do not yet thorowly comprehend. You
fet out upon the fame Principles that Aca-
demicks, Cartefiansy and the like Seels,
ufually do; and for a longtime it looked
as if you were advancing their Philofophi-
cal Scepticifm-, but in the End your Con-
clufions are directly oppofite to theirs.
Phil. You fee, Hylas, the Water of yon-
der Fountain, how it is forced upwards, in
a round Column, to a certain Height; at
which it breaks and falls back into the
Bafon from whence it rofe: Its Afccnt as
well as Defcent, proceeding from the fame
uniform Law or Principle of Gravitation.
Juft fo, the fame Principles which at firfl
View lead to Scepticifm, purfued to a cer-
tain Point, bring Men back to common
Senfe.
FINIS,
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