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.VJ4
Gss
THE
WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
^u^/'m&^.„^
rUE WELLINGTON .^MEMORIAL
WELLINGTON
HIS COMRADES
AND CONTEMPORARIES
• c^
BY , <- .
MAJOR ARTHUR GRIFFITHS
AUTHOR or **TUE ENOUSH ARMY," "FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY GENERALS,"
"THE queen's SHILUNG/' "THE ROME EXPRESS,** ETC. ETC.
With Numerous Illustrations
LONDON
GEORGE ALLEN, 156, CHARING CROSS ROAD
1897
[All rights reserved]
Printed by Ballantyne, Hanson 6* Co.
At the Ballantyne Press
\i
r1
T^edicated
{with permission)
to
His Grace
THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON
Preface
It has been said, and with justice, that although
numberless works, historical, biographical, and
anecdotic, have dealt with the great Duke of
Wellington, his true life has yet to be written. I
make no pretence in these pages to fill the gap ;
I offer them only as a small contribution to a fuller
and more just estimate of one of the greatest
captains, the most honest and loyal citizens and
statesmen, that have served this country. It is not
too much to advance, here, that for some years
past the Duke^s reputation has been under partial
eclipse. The least admirable traits in his character
have been unduly emphasised ; we are told he was
harsh, unsympathetic, ungrateful ; without strong
affection, whether as a son or a father; taking all
to his own credit, passing on little praise and
fame to those who chiefly helped him to his great
successes.
Vlt
viii PREFACE
I have now essayed, anxiously if imperfectly, to
combat this narrow and most unfair view ; to give,
as I believe, a more faithful picture of the man,
based upon his achievements. I have set them
forward, so far as I was competent, on broad lines,
and in no more detail than was essential to illus-
trate his brilliant career ; I have endeavoured to
show him as he was, a host in himself, courageous,
self-reliant, sanguine and tenacious in the darkest
hour, undismayed by any odds, however great, rising
superior to and overcoming every difficulty. His
fine generalship, strategic and tactical, his consum-
mate mastery of administrative business, his in-
defatigable labours, his inexhaustible patience, so
sharply contrasted with unerring promptitude when
the time for action came, have been treated briefly,
but, I hope, with due appreciation. We shall see
him bearing his almost crushing burthen alone, with
little or no backing from home, hampered often by
incompetent agents and the questionable support
of feeble allies ; see him building up and gradually
perfecting, by his own unstinting effort, the military
machine that was wanting in so much, both in the
personnel and the matdriel, keeping a firm hand on
the wild spirits who too often showed more courage
-^i
PREFACE ix
than discipline, guiding and forming his officers
by precept and example into skilled and trusty
lieutenants.
It is fitting that the best pupils of his school
should also find place in this memorial to his great
worth ; and I have taken due account of some of his
chief supporters — of such excellent soldiers as Hill,
Beresford, Picton, Cotton, Pakenham, Cole, and
many more ; men who won well-deserved renown
under his orders, and, later, often gained fresh
laurels on various distant fields.
I have devoted principal attention to Wellington
in his military aspect, as the most remarkable, and
most within my own competence to deal with ; but
I have not overlooked his great political services.
I have wished also to present a general view of
his personal character, to exhibit his individual
traits and qualities, and describe them with suffi-
cient minuteness to show up into strong relief his
unfailing sense of duty, his uprightness, his direct-
ness of purpose, his clear and abiding common-
sense. This is an age of revivals, and I venture
to claim for this memorial, that it is a new move
towards strengthening, indeed rehabilitating, Wel-
lington in the esteem of his fellow-countrymen.
X PREFACE
I must here gratefully acknowledge the ample
facilities for the reproduction of pictures in Apsley
House so kindly afforded by his Grace the Duke
of Wellington, and his generous sympathy with
this small tribute to the memory of his illustrious
grandfather.
ARTHUR GRIFFITHS.
Contents
PART I.— WELLINGTON
CHAPTER I
EARLY DAYS
PAGE
Birth - Childhood — School — Enters army — Youthful zeal —
Rapid promotion — First campaign : Flanders — Commands the
rear-guard— Returns home and seeks civil employment . i
CHAPTER II
INDIA
Becomes the trusted counsellor of Governor-General — His
Indian despatches — First proofs of great capacity — Both general
and administrator— Master of detail — " Rice and bullocks mean
men" — Large ideas as a leader — Seringapatam : his first and
only failure — Governs Mysore — Egypt : superseded by Baird —
Mahratta war — Assaye — Returns to England — K.C.B.,but other-
wise unappreciated — Dry-nursed by the Horse Guards 1 1
CHAPTER III
PORTUGAL: 1808
Given and again deprived of command— Disembarks force at
the Mondego— Battles of Roleia and Vimiero— Superseded ; and
pursuit stopped — Convention of Cintra- Wellesley included in
odium — His defence at Chelsea -31
XI
xii CONTENTS
CHAPTER IV
THE DOURO AND TALAVBRA
PACB
Wellesley returns to Portugal — Nearly shipwrecked — The
opposing armies — Passage of the Douro — Spanish allies worth-
less — Talavera — Privations of British troops — Critical position
of Wellesley — His escape — Increasing difficulties of supply 48
CHAPTER V
WELLINGTON LEFT TO HIS OWN
RESOURCES
His steadfast sanguine spirit— He works " like a galley-slave " —
Troublesome officers — Crime in his army — Outrages and ex-
cesses - Punitive measures — His minute supervision ... 62
CHAPTER VI
A WAITING GAME
Wellington plays a waiting game— His enemies at home — The
Government powerless to help him — Overpowering strength of
the French — Massena's invasion — Busaco — Torres Vedras —
Unfriendly critics — Massena retreats — Albuera - • - 77
CHAPTER VII
THE TURNING TIDE
New plans — Fall of Ciudad Rodrigo and of Badajoz — Sala-
manca — Burgos besieged, and retreat therefrom — Results of
campaign of 1812 92
CONTENTS xiii
CHAPTER VIII
THE MAN, WELLINGTON
PAGB
Wellington's burthen— His crosses and difficulties — His breadth
of grasp — His self-confidence, sense of duty, untiring energy
— Exacts implicit obedience from all — Full of resource — Has
two sets of staff- officers — His personal vanity — His physical
strength and powers of endurance 103
CHAPTER IX
MILITARY QUALITIES
Wellington personally controls everything — His military reputa-
tion now established — His demeanour in the field — Busaco,
Badajoz, Salamanca, Vittoria, Burgos — His forbearance to
Craufurd and others 118
CHAPTER X
VITTORIA
Campaign of Vittoria — Masterly strategy — Advantages of his
plan of operations — Turning movements ending in battle of
Vittoria — Complete rout — Vast quantity of booty taken • ' 33
CHAPTER XI
CAMPAIGN OP THE PYRENEES
Soult supersedes King Joseph in south of France — Relative
positions of English and French — Soult's attack — Battles of
Sauroren — Wellington will not invade France prematurely —
The passages of the Bidassoa, Nivelle, Nive, and Adour —
Battle of Toulouse — Peace — Dispersion of Peninsular army 145
xiv CONTENTS
CHAPTER XII
NAPOLEON REAPPEARS
PACE
Escape from Elba — Coalition of Great Powers, and vast pre-
parations — Belgium filled with allied troops— Blucher's and
Wellington's armies — Napoleon's efforts— His army— His plan
of action — Considerations — Wellington's position examined i6o
CHAPTER XIII
LIGNY AND QUATRE BRAS
Opening of Waterloo campaign — Napoleon's advance — Position
of the allies — Forces widely disseminated — Rupture imminent
— Tardy concentration — Ligny an*d Quatre Bras — Retreat on
Waterloo — Napoleon's pursuit — Did Wellington ride to Wavre ?
— The great charger " Copenhagen " — Evidence for and against
the ride . .170
CHAPTER XIV
WA TERLOO
Wellington relies on Blucher — Grouchy's misdirection —
Napoleon's confidence—" Ces Anglais ! Enfin je les tiens "—
Wellington's position— Napoleon's plan of attack — He takes a
fixed post — Wellington moves everywhere — The five phases
of the battle — Reille attacks Hougoumont — Ne/s attack of
centre and left — Ne/s renewed attack on centre — The cavalr>'
attack — Attack by Imperial Guard — Pressure of Prussian
advance severely felt — The last attack repulsed — Defeat all
along the line — Wellington's general good fortune .188
CONTENTS XV
CHAPTER XV
AFTER THE BATTLE
PAGE
Wellington and Napoleon compared — The so-called " surprise "
— Result of Grouchy*s absence from the field — ^Wellington as a
tactical leader — Waterloo " hard pounding " — A battle of giants
— Luck 205
CHAPTER XVI
LATER YEARS
Wellington's great popularity after Waterloo — His continued
service of the State — Master-General — The Chartists — Saves
army from extinction — Wrongly blamed for Crimean disasters —
His political career — Prime Minister — The Reform Bill — His
unpopularity — Last occasion on which he took office . .216
CHAPTER XVII
PERSONAL TRAITS
Alleged hardness of nature — Yet a staunch friend to Fitz Roy
Somerset ; to Alexander Gordon— Severe treatment of Norman
Ramsay and other artillery officers — Colonel Sturgeon — Said to
have neglected old comrades — Proofs of his generosity — No
sordid ideas about money — His charities — Story of the snuff-box ;
of the ball-room at Bath — His indefatigable labours to the last . 226
CHAPTER XVIII
WELLINGTON AT HOME
Apsley House — Private apartments — Art treasures — Wellington
and Sir Bavid Wilkie — China and plate — His craze for and col-
lection of watches — Active habits — Last illness and death . 245
6
xvi CONTENTS
PART II
THE COMRADES OF WELLINGTON
CHAPTER I
LEADING LIEUTENANTS
PAGB
Hil/ — Beresford — Cotton — Graham — Pic ton — Craufurd—
Lowry Cole — Colville^ Leith — Clinton — Fletcher — Le Mar-
chant — Gomm — Kempt — Dickson — Fits Roy Somerset — Colin
Campbell— William Gordon 263
CHAPTER II
COTTON
Of good birth — Rapid promotion — Friend of George III. —
Early service in India — Brighton and the Prince Regent —
Baronetcy 270
CHAPTER III
HILL
Parentage — One of a large family — Early studies— First com-
mission — Promotion — Service abroad — Becomes major-general
— To Copenhagen wi^h Wellesley ; and to Portugal — Engaged in
independent operations — Almaraz — His fine soldierly qualities —
His kindliness and the affection he won — " Father Hill " —
At Waterloo — Later services as commander of the forces —
Wellington's appreciation 282
CONTENTS xvii
CHAPTER IV
BBRBSFORD
PAGB
Birth — First commission and early service — Egypt, Buenos
Ayres, Madeira, Portugal — Given command of Portuguese
army — Its reorganisation and improvement — Aided by excellent
officers — Beresford and Albuera — Wellington's opinion of Beres-
ford — His confidence in him — Later services — Enters political
life 296
CHAPTER V
GRAHAM
Advanced age on entering the service — Early life — A Scotch
laird — Terrible bereavements — Raises 90th Light Infantry —
Serves in Italy ; and with Moore at Corunna — Rank made sub-
stantive — Battle of Barrosa — Ciudad Rodrigo — Gallicia —
Vittoria — San Sebastian — Bergen op Zoom — Long life .312
CHAPTER VI
PICTON
Picton's temper — Unfounded statements of his disagreements —
Duke's high opinion of him — The charge of cruelty in Trinidad
— Torture of Louise Calderon — Verdict of guilty never set
aside, although Picton absolved — His sympathisers — The Duke
of Quecnsberry — Picton's youth and early services — Slow pro-
motion — Peninsula and the fighting 3rd — "Brave old Picton"
— The commissary — Waterloo — Death on the field . -319
xviii CONTENTS
CHAPTER VII
CRA UPURD
PAGB
Birth and early studies abroad — Serves in India — At Monte
Video— Brooding melancholy — The retreat on Corunna — "An
iron man" — The Light Division in the Peninsula — Splendid
march to Talavera — ^The Coa — Outpost duty — Busaco — Leave
to England — Resumes command — Fuentes d'Onoro — Ciudad
Rodrigo^Meets death in the breach 335
CHAPTER VIII
HOPE, COLE, LEITH, PACK, ETC.
Sir John Hope : at the Adour — Cole : an obedient lieutenant :
his hospitality — Kempt : from Cox's to Governor-General —
Leith — Pack — Byng — Colville — Dickson — Gomm — De Lancey . 349
CHAPTER IX
MOORE
Parentage — Early studies — Service in America ; in Corsica —
Conflict with Sir Gilbert Elliot — Promoted brigadier-general
— West Indies — Ireland — Egypt — The nucleus of the Light
Division at Shorncliffe Camp — Sicily — Sweden — Portugal ; and
advance into Spain — Retreat on Corunna ; and death — General
estimate of that campaign 360
List of Illustrations
The Duke of Wellington .... Frontispiece
From an oil painting hy Henry Weigall. Photogravure,
PAGB
The Countess of Mornington, Mother of the
Duke facing 4
From a painting in the possession of the Duke of WELLINGTON.
Photogravure,
Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. Arthur Wellesley . „ 6
From the painting by Sir THOMAS Lawrence, in the posses-
sion of the Duke of Wellington. Photogravure,
The Earl of Mornington, Brother of the Duke „ 20
From the painting by JOHN HOPPNER, belon^ng to the Duke
of Welungton. Photogravure.
Sir John Moore >» 40
From the painting by Sir Thomas Imwrbncb. Photogravure.
The Duke of Wellington ,,62
From the painting by Sir Thomas LAWRENCE. Photogravure.
General Alava n 97
From the painting by GEORGE Da WE, belonging to the Duke
of Wellington.
xix
XX LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
PAGE
The Duke of Wellington .... facing 124
From the fainting by Gambardella. Photogravure.
Marshal Soult „ 144
From the fainting by G. P. A. Hkaly.
Map of Spain, showing the Base of Operations
DURING THE Peninsular War . . . . „ 160
The Duchess of Wellington . . . „ 164
From the fainting by Sir THOMAS Lawrence, new in the
possession of the Duke of Wellington. Photogravure.
The Marquis of Anglesey >i 170
From the fainting by HENRY Edridge, A.R.A., now in the
National Portrait Gallery. By fermission of Messrs.
Walker 6* Boutall.
"Copenhagen" and his Tomb . . . . ^« 183
Sir Thomas Picton facing 196
From the fainting by Sir M. A. Shee, now in the National
Portrait Gallery. By fermission of Messrs. Walker 6*
Boutall. Photogravure.
Lord Seaton ......... 202
From the fainting by H. W. PiCKERSGiLL, belonging to the
Duke of Wellington.
Map of Belgium, showing the Plan of Opera-
tions „ 205
Letter from the Duke of Wellington, June 18,
1838 .......... 226
Facsimile.
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS xxi
PAGB
Lord Raglan, formerly Fitz Roy Somerset facing 228
Strathfieldsaye ^« 237
The Duke's Bedroom, Walmer Castle . ,,241
The Library, Apsley House „ 247
The Duke's Bedroom, Apsley House . . . „ 251
The Duke of Wellington .... facing 254
From the painting by COUNT d'Orsay, ntno in the National
Portrait Gallery. By permission of Messrs, Walker <&•
BoutalL
Letter from Count d'Orsay, July 8, 1837. . „ 256
Facsimile.
The Marquis of Londonderry, formerly Charles
Stewart „ 265
Photogravure,
Viscount Combermere, formerly Stapleton
Cotton ,,276
From the painting by Pearson, now in the National Portrait
Gallery, By permission of Messrs, Walker ^ Boutall,
General Lord Hill ,,292
Photogravure,
Marshal Beresford „ 308
Photogravure,
xxii LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
PACE
Lord Lynedoch. formerly Sir Thomas Graham facing 316
From the painting by Sir George Hayter, in the National
Portrait Gallery. By permission of Messrs. Walker 6*
Boutall.
Major-General Robert Craufurd . . • on 339
Sir Lowry Cole facing 350
From the painting by Sir Thomas Lawrence. Photogravure^
Sir W. Howe De Lancey „ 358
Medallion on the Cover.
From the bust of the great Duke, in the possession of the
Duke of Wellington.
THE
WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
CHAPTER I
EARLY DAYS
Birth — Childhood — School — Enters army — Youthfiil zeal — Rapid pro-
motion — First campaign : Flanders — Commands the rear-guard —
Returns home and seeks civil employment
yyRTHUR WELLESLEY was the fourth son
/-\ of Garret, Earl of Mornington, and Anne
Hill, a daughter of Lord Dungannon. He
came of a good old English stock settled in Ire-
land, and he is said to have been born in Dublin,
or at Dangan Castle, County Meath, about May
1769. Thackeray, in his Ballads, makes the great
Duke refer retrospectively to his parentage —
" His father praps he sees.
Most musicle of Lords,
A playing maddrigles and glees
Upon the Arpsicords.
2 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
Jest phansy this old Ero
Upon his mother's knee !
Did ever lady in this land
Ave greater sons than she ? "
Arthur owed much to both his parents. He
inherited his fathers fine musical taste and his
mother's strength of character. A water-colour
portrait of Lady Mornington still extant shows that
he resembled her in feature — no compliment, per-
haps, to her. He was "her ugly boy Arthur ; " her
other children were remarkable for their good looks,
and the eldest, afterwards Marquis of Wellesley,
was one of the handsomest men of his time.
No very authentic facts are preserved of Wel-
lington's childhood. He was at school in Chelsea,
then at Eton, afterwards in Brussels, and finally for
a year at the academy of a M. Pignerol at Angers.
At Eton he fought his first battle with '* Bobus *'
Smith, Sidney Smith s brother, with what success
we do not know. In Brussels he began the study
of French, and at Angers he was grounded in the
military art ; Pignerol taught everything, and his
was not, as has been said, exclusively a military
school. A schoolfellow has preserved the fact that
Arthur was not very attentive to his studies ; he
preferred to play with his terrier dog '' Vick '* and
accept social civilities from the neighbouring gentry.
WELLINGTON'S CHILDHOOD 3
Undoubtedly Wellington taught himself more than
he ever learnt from his tutors. It is the only ex-
planation of that marvellous breadth of knowledge
he displayed when called, quite early in life, to deal
with great affairs. We have it from his own lips,
moreover, ^ that before he went to India he had
made it his invariable rule to read for several hours
daily, and that he never gave up the practice. His
rare powers, his quick appreciation and strongly
retentive memory, soon stored his mind. Like
other great soldiers, he had laid to heart early
the lessons contained in the works of military
writers, had digested their plans of campaigns, the
movements and operations of famous generals, and
thus acquired clear ideas of conduct, fostering the
faculty of command, the power to control compli-
cated situations and solve difficulties in the field
with promptitude and propriety.
The Duke never looked back with pleasure on
his early days ; he never talked of them, save by
accident or against his will. He was no favourite
with his mother ; on the contrary, it is asserted that
her feeling for him was *'not far removed from
aversion." In after life he exhibited no warmth of
affection for her, and thus repaid her early neglect.
She is said to have called him the "fool of the
^ Colonel Shaw Kennedy.
4 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
family," "fit food for powder" and nothing more;
to have had but a small opinion of him until com-
pelled to be proud of his great deeds. His best
friend was his brother Richard (Marquis Wellesley)/
who helped him to his first commission, secured
him quick promotion, and furnished the necessary
purchase-money.
Arthur Wellesley was gazetted ensign in the
41st Regiment on the 7th March 1787, and joined
in Dublin. We have a glimpse of him there in one
or two apocryphal stories. A lady would not accept
an invitation to a picnic until she had stipulated
that "that mischievous boy Arthur Wellesley
should not be of the party." It is to this period,
no doubt, we may attribute the legend that he was
concerned in a street brawl and came into collision
with the Dublin "Charleys." He was clearly not
a ladies' man — at no pains to please them. Lady
Aldborough was fond of confessing that she thought
him a gawky youth, and but poor company ; for she
took him with her to some entertainment and left
him planted there, to find his way home as best he
could, which he did by accepting a lift from the
musicians. " I never thought," she afterwards told
the great Duke laughingly, " when I left you to
travel with the fiddlers, that you would come to play
first fiddle yourself" He was actually a violinist.
YOUTHFUL ZEAL 5
and a good one, but he gave up the instrument
quite early in life. It says much for the stern bent
of Wellington's mind that he ceased playing be-
cause he felt that it was too engrossing and would
distract him from the more serious business of life.
About the same time he resolved never again to
touch a card. He had been a gambler, and had
once lost so heavily in Dublin that he became
greatly embarrassed. His steadiness and self-re-
spect were strongly marked in those early days.
In an age when hard drinking was deemed an
amiable feeling he was singularly abstemious. He
never smoked but once, when the Prince Regent
gave him a cigar, which he failed to conquer.
The lad was a good soldier from the day he
joined. The gaieties of Dublin, the frolics of the
Viceregal Court when appointed A.D.C. to the
Lord Lieutenant, his parliamentary duties as M.P.
for Trim in the Irish House of Commons— none
of these could turn him from his military work.
He was entirely devoted to his profession. There
is a famous story of him that, as an ensign, he
caused a private soldier to be weighed with and
without his accoutrements, so as to "compare
the weight he carried and the work he had to
do." He was heard to excuse this curious in-
stance of youthful zeal by urging that he could not
6 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
begin too soon to understand something of his
business.
No doubt he had every encouragement to learn
his work, the best incentive of all, that of immediate
reward. His advancement was extraordinarily rapid,
even for a ** sprig of the aristocracy,*' as he some-
times called himself, and in days when commissions
were given to babes in arms of both sexes. He
became a lieutenant in the first month of his service ;
a captain in the 12th Lancers in June 1791, after
four years ; a major in the 33rd foot in April 1793,
and lieutenant-colonel commanding in September
the same year. The last step was by purchase,
with money found by his brother. It is pleasant
to record the close bond of affection that existed
between them, as shown by the eagerness of
Arthur to repay the loan directly Indian prize-
money gave him a substantial bank balance, and
no less by Richard s refusal to accept it. It is
a trait of nobility and straight dealing that does
credit to both characters. But the Wellesleys, and
these two especially, were far above any sordid,
mercenary ideas ; Arthur was liberal to a fault,
his purse-strings ever open, as will be presently
shown, to his friends and to all who established
a claim on his generosity.
Six years from ensign to lieutenant-colonel is
y^rJ/fM.?^iA4,/.///U^,,
RAPID PROMOTION 7
no bad record, even in times when influence, social
and political, counted for so much in every public
career. The system which is supposed to be now
obsolete has been defended on the ground that it
gave us young leaders — men in their prime and
at their very best. The cases of Wellington and
some of his more conspicuous comrades are quoted
in proof of its usefulness. It cannot be denied that,
but for their rapid advancement, the country would
not have been served by such men as Beresford,
Hope, Cole, Colville, Pakenham, Cotton, Slade, and
Gomm. Marshal Beresford was only nine years in
gaining the rank of lieutenant-colonel ; and he was
a major-general at thirty-six. Sir John Hope, who
began late for those times, was also but nine years
in obtaining the command of a regiment, and did
so at the age of twenty-eight. Sir Lowry Cole
was a lieutenant-colonel at twenty-two, after seven
years' service ; Sir Edward Pakenham (Welling-
ton s brother-in-law) was a major at seventeen, and
in one year more a lieutenant-colonel ; Sir Charles
Colville was given his first commission at eleven,
he joined at sixteen, and was a captain at one-
and-twenty ; Sir Stapleton Cotton was a second
lieutenant at seventeen, a captain of cavalry at
twenty, and in command of a newly raised regiment
of Dragoons as lieutenant-colonel in the following
8 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
year. All these were scions of noble families or of
men with large landed estates. The converse has,
however, been rather ignored, and a discreet veil
has been drawn over the failures for which some
of these favourites of fortune became responsible.
Wellington, although he so largely benefited by
the system in vogue, declared it *' certainly desirable
that the only claim to promotion should be military
merit ; but this," he goes on to say, " is a degree
of perfection to which the disposal of military
patronage has never, and cannot be, I believe,
brought in any military establishment." This diffi-
culty, indeed, led him to question whether there
could be any influence in aid of military merit **so
legitimate as that of family connection, fortune, and
influence in the country." He put military merit
first, but where claims were nicely balanced he
would allow interest to weigh down the scale. But
no such arguments can well be applied in favour
of the advancement of '* curled darlings " who have
not been tried. The advantages, as seen in the
rare development of great genius, a mere chance
after all, are more than counterbalanced by the
possible mischief of calling the unknown prema-
turely to high place, and the positive heartburning
it entails.
Wellington has been heard to say that his real
WELLESLEY'S FIRST CAMPAIGN 9
life began in Indiau But the butterfly stage of his
existence, if he ever passed through one, must have
ended when he obtained command of the 33rd.
From that time forward he was wrapped in his
profession, indefatigable in his efforts to become
expert, and a master of all its details. As a regi-
mental commanding officer he soon won golden
opinions. A few years later Lord Harris reported
on the 33rd as a model regiment ; ** for equipment,
for courage, for discipline, for good conduct, it is
above all praise." It no doubt owed this mainly
to its lieutenant-colonel, who was as assiduous in
promoting its efficiency as in perfecting his own
knowledge and tactical skill. Wellesley was un-
doubtedly a " first-rate drill," as the phrase goes ;
that he had thoroughly learnt how to handle not
only an infantry battalion, but larger bodies of all
arms, is shown by the consummate skill he dis-
played on many great occasions. He gained dis-
tinction in this way during his very first campaign,
which he made with the Duke of York in Flanders
in 1794. At the affair of Boxtel, by a prompt
deployment he stayed the victorious advance of
the French, and later this lieutenant-colonel of
twenty-five was entrusted with the command of the
rear-guard, the responsible duty of covering an
army in retreat. Many who noticed his skill in
lo THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
this most arduous manoeuvre predicted his future
success as a leader of men. He must have imbibed
many useful lessons in that disastrous campaign.
He saw the vices of our military system, the evils
of divided command, the incompetence of a royal
general, the blunders caused by the fussy inter-
ference of an Aulic council at home. ** It was a
marvel how any of us escaped," was his commentary
on that series of contemptible military mistakes.
After Flanders Wellington was nearly lost to
the army. Straitened means, debts contracted in
Dublin,^ "circumstances, necessities," as he him-
self described them, induced him to seek civil em-
ployment, '*some post in the Revenue or under the
Treasury, something more lucrative, in short, than
the command of a regiment." ** He did so with re-
luctance. It was departing from a line he preferred,"
but he was driven to it by the seeming hopeless-
ness and narrowness of his military prospects. Yet
within a couple of years the wheel of fortune lifted
him into a position of splendid opportunity. The
33rd went to India, he followed it, to arrive almost
simultaneously with his brother. Lord Mornington.
One Wellesley was but a simple colonel of a regi-
ment, the other was Governor-General.
^ No doubt the losses at play already mentioned.
CHAPTER II
INDIA
Becomes the trusted counsellor of Governor-General — His Indian
despatches — First proofs of great capacity — Both general and ad-
ministrator — Master of detail — '^Rice and bullocks mean men'' —
Large ideas as a leader — Seringapatam : his first and only failure —
Governs Mysore — Egypt : superseded by Baird — Mahratta war —
Assaye — Returns to England — K.C.B., but otherwise unappreciated
— Dry-nursed by the Horse Guards.
INDIA was no doubt the turning-point in Arthur
Wellesley's life, the start and basis of his great
career. It was his first chance of showing what
was in him ; we see now how the habit of quiet,
close observation to which he was constantly ad-
dicted bore fruit, and how, when called upon to use
his reasoning powers, he could rely upon a strong
intellect fortified by study and previous thought.
Almost at once, although but twenty-eight, he was
called upon to consider matters the most varied
and momentous. He became the confidant and
trusted counsellor of men who wielded the highest
authority and were weighted with the heaviest re-
sponsibilities, the most burthensome and anxious
cares. His brother the Governor - General, the
II
12 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
Governor of Madras, the military commander-in-
chief, officials high and low, referred their difficulties
to Wellesley, and gladly took his advice. He had
a rare faculty of going to the very heart of things.
The papers and minutes he drew up on subjects
the most diverse and intricate contained sound,
sagacious opinions, couched in clear language,
based upon wide, deep knowledge, and brimful of
common-sense. His correspondence at that early
period, on the very threshold of his career, is per-
haps the most interesting part of all his voluminous
despatches. Nearly forty years afterwards, when
in the fulness of his fame, he spoke of them with
pardonable pride. ** I have just been reading over
my Indian despatches," he told Lady Salisbury in
1834, **and I am surprised to find them so good.
They are as good as I should write now. They
show the same attention to details — to the pursuit
of all the means, however small, that could promote
success . . . the energy and activity are as great
then as ever afterwards."
There is nothing exaggerated really in this self-
complacent estimate of his early work. Any one
who examines these papers must be struck with
their power ; the grasp, the breadth of knowledge,
the patient attention to minute details, the high
tone, the unerring insight into men and things that
ADMINISTRATOR AND GENERAL 13
fill them. We have here the first evidences of that
high sense of duty that always actuated him ; the
high standard of character he expected from his
officers. This is the same man who wrote, some
ten years later, in Portugal, when oppressed by
many trials : " I come here to perform my duty ; and
I neither do nor can enjoy any satisfaction in any-
thing excepting the performance of my duty to my
own country." First among his thoughts, too, was
to maintain the reputation of an English gentleman.
He will have no dealings with people "who have
no faith, or no principle of honour or of honesty,
or such as usually among us guide the conduct of
gentlemen." Bribery was abhorrent to him, and
he unhesitatingly declared that any offer of it was
an insult to British officers and gentlemen. His
own punctilious nicety is seen in his indignant
disclaimer of all unworthy motives in levying a
contribution upon the city of Burhampore in 1804.
He defends the action, taking his stand on the
practice common in India and in Europe ; he
declares " it would have been much more disgrace-
ful and disastrous to have lost the campaign from
the want of money than to have ensured in this
manner the means of gaining it. ... I believe I
am as anxious as any other man that my character
should not suffer — I do not mean in the mouths of
14 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
common reporters and scandal-bearers, but in the
eyes of a fair-judging people." We find him a
keen judge of character, possessing an almost in-
tuitive penetration ; he reckons men up quickly
at their exact value. One is ** an honest, zealous
servant of the public, . . . but the most unaccom-
modating public officer I have ever met with."
Another, ** although an excellent man, has more of
the oak than the willow in his disposition."
In public affairs, both civil and military, he
exhibits the highest qualities of the administrator
and the general. His views are broad and states-
manlike. His letter, for instance, addressed to Lord
Clive in 1800, then Governor of Bombay, consider-
ing our attitude towards the Mahrattas, is a closely
reasoned state paper of the highest value ; that in
1803 to Colonel Close, the Secretary to Government,
shows an intimate acquaintance with the hidden
springs and secret working of some of the native
states; a third, that to General Stuart in 1804, on
the administration of newly acquired territories and
the maintenance of a proper military establishment,
exhibits profound knowledge and great prescience.
In military matters he is naturally at home, in
all branches and in all respects. He can plan com-
prehensive operations, and yet attend to the most
minute details of preparation ; he is a master of
MASTER OF DETAIL 15
la grande guerre^ yet fully experienced in minor
tactics and regimental interior economy. His
memorandum on the expedition to Egypt, drawn
up for his own guidance when he believed he was
to have the command, but unreservedly placed at
the disposal of the general who had superseded
him, is a clear r&um6 of the pros and cons, the
difficulties that may be expected in crossing the
desert from the Red Sea to the Nile, the reason-
able hopes he entertains that they are not insur-
mountable. Another memorandum, on the proposed
operations against the Mahrattas in 1801, is an ad-
mirable document. Wellesley prepared it believing
that his experience of the theatre of the war, ** the
seasons, nature of the country, its roads, its produce,
and its means of defence, will be of use." With this
preamble he proceeds to compress an immense
quantity of the most valuable information into a
few pages ; he gives the most minute details on
every possible point, from the fighting qualities of
the enemy, the depths of the rivers, the resources
of the country, to directions for taking a fort by a
coup de main and the defences of Mysore. In the
campaign that preceded Assaye he had the clearest
ideas of the object in view. ** I shall attack Ahmed-
nuggur ... by the possession of which place I
shall secure the communications with Poonah and
i6 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
Bombay. . . . When I shall have finished that
operation and crossed the Godavery, I shall then
if possible bring the enemy to action."
It is well known that Wellington put the ques-
tions of commissariat and supply before all. As he
told Rogers, " If I had rice and bullocks I had men,
and if I had men I knew I could beat the enemy."
The Indian despatches abound with proofs of his
early appreciation of this. " Articles of provision
are not to be trifled with or left to chance," he
writes to the Governor of Ceylon, **and there is
nothing more clear than that the subsistence of the
troops must be certain upon the proposed service,
or the service must be relinquished." He has his
fears about Baird's desert march, ** founded upon
the danger that the troops will starve if they do
not return immediately." Read his voluminous
requisitions on the Governor of Bombay for the
supply of his column in the Mahratta war ; the
specification of items one by one, 10,000 gallons
of arrack, 90,000 lbs. of salt meat for the European
troops, 600 garces of rice for the native, with pre-
cise instructions as to packing, in " casks and kegs,
round baskets," and so forth ; the exact calculation
beforehand of quantities, of medical stores (in detail),
military stores, of forage for the horses, of trans-
port animals, draught and carriage bullocks, with
SOUND MILITARY VIEWS 17
the cautious reminder that ** every carriage bullock
must have a saddle." Again, when actually in the
heat of active operations: ** I have written to all
quarters for assistance in cattle, . . . inquired of
Colonel Stevenson whether he can afford to share
with me his supplies of rice." " The cavalry horses
are in goocf order, but our great difficulty is to find
grain for them ; there is plenty in the country, but
it is all hid in holes ; . . . notwithstanding the price
we pay, we get none that we do not dig up." To
the Governor of Bombay : *' The service cannot be
carried on in this manner ; the troops must have
regular supplies of provisions at command, or mis-
fortune and disgrace will be the result." We shall
have much more in this strain when we see Wel-
lington in a larger field.
That Wellington had made an earnest study
of the military art is also plain from these early
despatches. We continually come across interest-
ing reflections, embodying many of the axioms and
principles in war, and applying them to his own
conditions. *' How true it is that in all military
operations time is everything!" ** In all great
actions there is risk." ** If we begin by a long de-
fensive war, and go looking after convoys which are
scattered over the face of the earth, and do not
attack briskly, we shall soon be in distress." . . .
B
i8 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
** I should break that detachment to pieces . . .
should gain a powerful body of allies . . . and
should have the whole game in my hands immedi-
ately." To Colonel Stevenson : '* If you adopt this
plan, and succeed in cutting up or driving to a dis-
tance one good party, the campaign will be our own.
A long defensive war will ruin us, and will answer
no purpose whatever." ** I have served a good deal
in this part of India, against this description of free-
booter, and I think the best mode of operating is to
press him with one or two corps capable of moving
with tolerable celerity, and of such a strength as to
render the result of an action by no means doubtful,
if he should venture to risk one."
His intimate acquaintance with minor tactics,
with the hundred and one details of daily routine
in camp and quarters, his views and methods for
the enforcement of discipline, show the born soldier
with natural faculties developed and improved by
thought, practice, and the exigencies of the service.
His orders for the line of march, his instructions
to the piquets and quarter-guards, his close super-
vision of all outpost duty, his stringent regulations
for the preservation of order, and his management
of courts-martial, bear witness to his strong master-
ful nature, his self-reliance, his powers of wield-
ing authority. All this time his own character was
SECRECY ON PUBLIC AFFAIRS 19
being strengthened. We get much insight into the
young man's mind, the motives that guide him,
the principles that support him, the rules of con-
duct he sets himself to follow. The general who
planned the lines of Torres Vedras, and sprang
them as a complete surprise both upon his own
army and an over-exultant enemy, practised the
same cautious reserve very early in life. '* I wish
to keep in my own breast the period at which hos-
tilities should be commenced," he writes to Colonel
Close in 1803. Again, in 1804, to Colonel Wallace :
** A point ... to which I should wish to draw your
attention ... is the secrecy of your proceedings.
There is nothing more certain, that of a hundred
affairs ninety -nine might be posted up at the
market cross without injury to the public interests;
but the misfortune is, that where the public business
is the subject of general conversation, and is not
kept secret as a matter of course, upon every
occasion, it is very difficult to keep it secret on
that occasion on which it is necessary. ... It
may be depended upon that whenever the public
business ought to be kept secret, it always suffers
when it is exposed to public view. For this reason
secrecy is always best, and those who have been
long trusted with the conduct of public affairs
are in the habit of never making known public
20 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
business. . . . The consequence is that secrecy be-
comes natural to them. . . . Remember that what
I recommend to you is far removed from mystery ;
in fact I recommend silence upon the public busi-
ness on all occasions, in order to avoid the necessity
for mystery upon any."
The young leader in these days of his upward
progress was just as strong in action as in the
closet. He went to India at perhaps the most
critical stage in the growth of our Eastern empire,
when our possessions were limited to strips of
territory upon the sea-coast, when the East India
Company was overshadowed by great native
powers, and when at least one of them, Tippoo
Sahib, was an avowed ally of France. It was
fortunate that our agents and representatives in
India were equal to the strain put upon them in
this crisis. A conflict with Tippoo was inevitable,
and the policy of the Governor-General was now
strengthened, if not inspired, by his young soldier-
brother. Wellesley saw that it was necessary to
split up the Mahratta Confederacy, detach the
Nizam, and disband the French contingent. He
was still desirous to avoid war, yet he prepared for
it strenuously. It was at his urgent recommenda-
tion, and with his assistance, that an effective, well-
equipped force of 30,000 men was assembled in
('>«// t/'.9Krmyittm.. .7/ /:/
HIS FIRST AND ONLY FAILURE 21
the Madras Presidency ready to try conclusions
with Tippoo and move upon Seringapatam. It
was Colonel Wellesley who organised it, for it
happened that he was called by accident to the
temporary command, and he so perfected this
army as to hand it over to General Harris, a few
months later, "one of the best disciplined forces
that had ever taken the field in India."
General Harris put Wellesley, with the rank of
brigadier, in command of the Nizam s contingent,
with which he also associated the 33rd. In the
operations that followed Wellesley commanded the
left, in driving Tippoo from his position at Mala-
velly, and he took part in the first combined attack
on Seringapatam. Here Wellesley met with his
first and only military failure— the memory of which
long lingered with him, and made him tender and
forgiving to non-success. He was heard to say in
after life that he would never have risen had he
been denied a second chance. The causes of that
failure were always well remembered, and avoided
by him in after life ; he never again attacked a
position in the darkness of the night without having
thoroughly reconnoitred his ground. Some writers
have pretended that he owed the chance of rehabili-
tating himself to the kindly offices of Sir David
Baird, whom, a few days later, he superseded in
22 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
accepting the governorship of the captured Seringa-
patam. This is supported by no positive evidence.
As a matter of fact Wellesley succeeded at the same
point, the very morning after his failure, but he took
no part in the final assault beyond commanding the
reserves in the trenches. Sir David Baird led the
stormers ; yet Wellesley was made governor of the
fortress, a preference that caused much heartburn-
ing at the time. It was thought then that undue
favouritism was shown to the Governor-Generals
brother, but the Duke long afterwards ^ maintained
that he was really the most fitted person for the
post. *' I had commanded the Nizam s army during
the campaign and given universal satisfaction. I
was liked by the natives. ..." Baird, on the
other hand, *'had strong prejudices against them,
and he was peculiarly disqualified, from his manner,
habits, and, it was supposed, his temper,* for the
management of them." Notwithstanding this con-
flict of claims Baird and Wellesley were always on
the best of terms, and the Duke said frankly after-
wards, ** I don*t believe there is a man who rejoiced
more sincerely in my ulterior successes."
Sir John Malcolm records how in 1832 he met
^ Duke to Croker, January 24, 1831.
* During Baird's imprisonment by Tippoo Sahib, the news came home that
the English captives were chained t(^ether two and two. " God help the lad
that's tied to our Davie," was his mother's remark on hearing the news.
HIS "SUPERSESSION" BY BAIRD 23
Baird for the first time, after long years, when Sir
David admitted that " Times are changed. No one
knows so well as you how severely I felt the pre-
ference given on several occasions to your friend
Wellesley; but now I see all these things in
a far different point of view. It is the highest
pride of my life that anybody should ever have
dreamed of my being put in the balance with him»
His fame is now to me joy, and, I may almost say,
glory."
Baird had a more immediate revanche, for in
1 80 1 he superseded Wellesley in command of the
expedition sent to Egypt. In the interval Wel-
lesley had administered Seringapatam and Mysore
with great wisdom and spirit, establishing order
and good government, enforcing economy, checking
" rascality," and gaining the approval of his brother,
who wrote : " Your conduct in Mysore has gained
you great credit, and assured your advancement
in after life." While thus peacefully engaged he
could still find employment as a military leader,
and his campaign against the notorious freebooter
Dhoondiah, "the King of the World," was charac-
terised with extraordinary vigour. Soon Wellesley
was sent to Trincomalee to concert measures for
an attack either upon Batavia or Mauritius, and,
while there, had the hardihood to direct the troops
24 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
collected at Ceylon upon Bombay, in order to co-
operate on the latest scheme of all, the expedition
to Eg^pt. He acted thus promptly on his own
authority, and his conduct was not exactly approved,
as likely to cause an *' inconvenient precedent."
Following the force to Bombay, he was there met
with the disappointing news that Baird, not he,
was to command the force going to Egypt. Wel-
lington in his turn resented this ''supersession,"
although Baird was a general officer and he only
a colonel; but he deemed it **a great blow to his
professional prospects." While giving vent to his
irritation in private letters, his public demeanour
was, however, quite proper. He agreed to serve
as second in command. " I am not quite satisfied,"
he wrote, " with the manner in which I have been
treated ; however, I have lost neither my health,
spirits, or temper. ... I have never had much
value for the public spirit of any man who does
not sacrifice his private views and convenience
when it is necessary."
This good feeling prompted him, as I have said,
to place at Sir David Baird*s disposal all the in-
formation he had collected when believing he him-
self was to command, and no doubt he would have
served with loyalty and skill as lieutenant. But
now illness seized him, and he was unable to sail
MAHRATTA WAR 25
with the force. This illness has been called fever,
but the Duke told Earl Stanhope long afterwards
that it was no more than the "Malabar itch,"
which he had caught in a strange bed on ship-
board, and which, although pertinacious, was never
a serious complaint.
Fortune continued to smile on Wellesley. The
expedition to the Red Sea was successful, but
produced no definite results ; while Wellesley, by
remaining in India, fell in for a large share in
the now imminent Mahratta war. His task was to
advance to succour Poonah, the Peishwah's capital,
which he effected with praiseworthy promptitude,
in a forced march made by his cavalry, sixty miles
in thirty hours. He was then nominated to deal
with both the political and military situation, on the
grounds of his ** approved zeal, ability, temper, and
judgment, combined with extensive local know-
ledge." Negotiations followed with Scindia and
Holkar which lasted into August, but were abruptly
terminated on the 8th August, when Wellesley
seized Ahmednuggur and thus gained a strong
place covering Poonah.
24M Aug, He crossed the Godavery and occu-
pied Aurungabad, as a counter movement against
the Mahrattas, who threatened Hyderabad.
12th Sept. Colonel Stevenson, who co-operated
26 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
with the Nizam's army, carried Jalna, and effected
a junction with Wellesley on the 2 ist at Budnapore.
A combined attack upon the enemy's forces
was then arranged — Stevenson to take the left or
western route, Wellesley the eastern.
2 7^rd Sept. Wellesley came upon the whole Mah-
ratta army drawn up behind the Kaitna River,
50,000 men, largely cavalry, with 128 guns — their
right at Bokerdun, the left on Assay e. He had only
8000 men all told, 1 500 of them Europeans ; and his
1 7 guns, drawn by exhausted bullocks, could not be
trusted to do much execution. He was called upon
to make an immediate and most momentous de-
cision. To retire in front of Scindia s numerous
cavalry would be perilous; to wait for Steven-
son, still a day's march distant, meant sacrificing a
great opportunity ; to attack at once was still more
hazardous.
The offensive was a "desperate expedient," yet
he took it, and threw himself upon the enemy's left
by a ford he had discovered. Scindia changed front,
now resting his right upon the Kaitna, his left on
the village of Assaye, while his guns dealt terrible
havoc among the advancing assailants. Wellesley
saw that his only hope was the bayonet, and gave
orders to charge home. The position was carried
and victory seemed near, when the enemy rallied
ASSAYE 27
and were once more charged by Wellesley with the
reserve, the 78th foot, the 19th Dragoons, and the
7th native cavalry, which drove them off the field.
" Never," says Southey, '* was a battle gained
against such tremendous odds. The enemy had
ten times as many combatants in the field as
the English ... his artillery was far superior, his
cannonade frightful. ..." "I have no language
to express the admirable conduct of the troops.
They moved in the best order, and with the greatest
steadiness, under the most murderous fire." *
Assaye was Wellesley 's first independent action,
and is deeply interesting as the first real evidence
of his fine military character. The antecedent
operations had shown him full of dash and energy ;
the battle proved that he closely calculated the
chances and was yet capable of taking the highest
risks in pursuit of great ends. He who could fling
a small force against a disciplined enemy ten times
his strength, strongly posted, with overwhelming
artillery, was no ordinary leader. In after years he
attributed this victory chiefly to the very simple
exercise of common-sense. He knew that he must
attack or be destroyed ; knew, also, that to attack
he must first cross the river. His guides assured
him that it was impassable ; the enemy was too
* General Wellesley*s despatch.
28 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
strong to allow him to examine it unmolested.
Then with his glass he made out two villages built
one on either bank, and he sagely concluded that
** there must be habitual means of communication
between them, either by boat or a ford — most pro-
bably the latter." The guides still persisted there
was no ford, but Wellesley resolved, on the strength
of his own reasoning, to risk the advance to the
river. There he found the passage. He crossed,
and was safe from the enemy's cavalry on the bank
he had left ; he now found himself between two
streams that covered his flanks, while his force just
filled the intervening space. ** And there I fought
and won the battle, the bloodiest for the numbers I
ever saw ; and this was all from the common-sense
guessing that men do not build villages on the
opposite sides of a stream without some means of
communication between them."
When, at the end of the Mahratta war, Wellesley
returned to England, he came ahead of his reputa-
tion. Although greatly honoured, fSted, and appre-
ciated by all classes in India — superiors, comrades,
subordinates, the whole native community — he was
hardly known at home. Had he not been backed by
family influence he would probably have received no
recognition for his brilliant services. As the brother
of Lord Wellesley he could not be quite ignored.
DRY-NURSED BY HORSE GUARDS 29
and he received the Red Riband of the Bath, with
the command of a brigade at Hastings. Then he
entered the House of Commons, and held office as
Chief Secretary for Ireland. But his heart was with
his own work, and he gladly accepted the command
of a division in Lord Cathcart's expedition against
Copenhagen, where he won the action of Kioge, an
attack boldly made upon an entrenched position.
Despite all this, he had not yet gained the con-
fidence of his military superiors. **The Horse
Guards never showed me any favour . . . thought
little of an Indian victory; it was rather a ground
of suspicion than confidence. Because I was an
M.P. they thought I must be a politician and not
a soldier ; they looked on me as a sprig of nobi-
lity come into the army for ornament, and no use.
Could not believe I was a tolerable regimental
officer. ... I have proof that they thought I could
not be entrusted alone with a division. . . . When
the Horse Guards are obliged to employ one of
those fellows like me, they give him what they call
a second in command— one in whom they have
confidence — kind of dry-nurse. When I went to
Zealand they gave me General Stewart. . . . During
the embarkation, the voyage out, and the disem-
barkation Stewart did everything. ... At last, how-
ever, we came up with the enemy. Stewart, as usual,
30 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
was beginning his suggestions and arrangements,
but I stopped him short with 'Come, come, its my
turn now/ I immediately made my own disposi-
tions, assigned him the command of one of the wings,
gave him his orders, attacked the enemy and beat
them. Stewart, like a man of sense, saw in a moment
that I understood my business, and subsided (as far
as I saw) with good humour into his proper place.
*'But this did not cure the Horse Guards. When
I went to Portugal they gave me Sir Brent Spencer
as second in command ; but I came to an explana-
tion with him. I told him I did not know what
second in command meant, any more than third
or fourth or fifth in command. I alone commanded
the army; that the other officers commanded their
divisions ; that if anything happened to me, the
senior survivor would take command ; that, in con-
templation of such a possibility, I would treat him,
but him in particular as next in succession, with the
most entire confidence, and would leave none of my
views or intentions unexplained ; but that I would
have no second in command in the sense of his
having anything like a joint command or super-
intending control ; and that finally, and above all, I
would not only take but insist upon the whole and
undivided responsibility of all that should happen
when the army was under my command."
CHAPTER III
PORTUGAL: 1808
Given and again deprived of command — Disembarks force
at the Mondego.
NOW when Wellesley was on the threshold of
his larger achievements he was all but shut
out from the chance of proving his capacity.
The distrust of his military masters pursued him, and
many arguments were invoked to deprive him of
the command in the Peninsula. The Cabinet gave
him their confidence, but not the Horse Guards.
When the British Government, putting aside a
dozen vain projects, decided at length to succour
Spain and Portugal in their patriotic contest against
Napoleon, the expedition was at first placed under
the orders of Sir Arthur. He had hardly em-
barked before he was superseded — not, as has been
stated, because the force was too large for a major-
generals command (for he was already a lieutenant-
general, although nearly the junior of his rank), but
because the reigning powers at the Horse Guards
could not believe in this upstart young man. They
3«
32 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
thought an officer of greater weight, older, and
with larger experience, was needed. The Duke of
York, then Commander-in-Chief, was all in favour
of seniority ; he declined to accept the principle that
youthful vigour was a strong, although not indis-
pensable qualification in a general, and ignored
such examples as those of Marlborough, Wolfe, and
Napoleon.^ Accordingly four lieutenant-generals, all
senior to Wellesley, were appointed to the expedi-
tion. These were Sir Hew Dalrymple, Sir Harry
Burrard, Sir John Moore, and Sir David Baird.
Dalrymple was fifty-eight, Burrard fifty-three,
Moore forty-seven, and Baird fifty-one years of
age. The two last named had seen much varied
service, and were distinguished in the field ; Dal-
rymple and ' Burrard were what might be styled
barrack-yard soldiers, good useful officers, well
thought of by the authorities, who had served
respectably through all the grades, but had not
seen war on any large scale. Wellesley s Indian
experience and successes, if fairly considered, en-
titled him to be preferred before any of those
whom the Horse Guards now put over him.
The news of his supersession met Wellesley
on his arrival off the coast of Portugal. He faced
the disappointment with his customary good temper
^ It is said that the Duke of York himself looked for the command.
DISEMBARKATION 33
and unfailing public spirit. " I shall be the junior
of the lieutenant-generals," he wrote Lord Castle-
reagh ; " however, I am ready to serve the Govern-
ment wherever and as they please." Again he
writes : " All I can say upon the subject is, that
whether I am to command of the army or not,
or am to quit it, I shall do my best to secure
its success ; and you may depend upon it that I
shall not hurry the operations or commence them
one moment sooner than they ought to be com-
menced in order that I may acquire the credit of
success."
Withal Wellesley was not the man to let slip
golden opportunities. There was work to be done,
by him or others ; he was still in command, and he
acted with his usual judgment and promptitude.
Having decided to disembark at the mouth of the
Mondego River, for sound military reasons, he
began the operation on the ist August and com-
pleted it on the 8th. ** Further delay in disem-
barkation," he reported, "might have discouraged
the country ; " besides, he knew that he would be
better able to arrange for "the movement and
supply of the army when it shall be ashore than
while it shall continue afloat." At this the very
first blush of the business he was brought face to
face with the difficulty that pressed him most sorely
34 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
throughout the whole campaign. " I find the British
commissariat to be ill-composed and incapable," he
reported. Hence, in choosing his line of advance,
he prefers that which will keep him in touch with
the fleet, although communication on this storm-
vexed coast was likely to be precarious. This
further encouraged him to adopt an immediate and
vigorous offensive. The lateness of the season, and
the fact that after August the fleet would be com-
pelled to take the open sea, impressed on him the
importance of undertaking operations without loss
of time. Leaving a letter of explanation to Sir
Harry Burrard, who was hourly expected at the
coast, he pushed on.
Junot, who commanded the French in Portugal,
at once prepared to resist Wellesley's advance,
which was rapid and well-directed ; it cut in be-
tween the French generals Loison and Laborde,
leaving the latter to withstand singly the brunt of
the British attack. The action of Roli9a, the first
fought and won by Wellesley in the Peninsula, dis-
posed of Laborde. The English leader then ad-
vanced towards Lisbon, still clinging to the coast
and the fleet, which had arrived with further rein-
forcements. Meanwhile Junot had concentrated,
and coming up in strength, found Wellesley in posi-
tion at Vimiero, halted there by Burrard s direction
VIMIERO 35
—for the paralysing hand of the new commander was
already extended to check enterprise.
Fortunately the French took the initiative ;
Junot attacked, rashly, and without reconnoitring
the English position. The result was the victory
of Vimiero, in which Junot was so roughly handled
that, with vigorous pursuit, his whole army must have
been destroyed. Again the excessive prudence of
Sir Harry Burrard robbed success of its proper
triumphs. Wellesley wished to follow up the ad-
vantage : " I think if General Hill's brigade and the
advanced guard had moved upon Torres Vedras
. . . the enemy would have been cut off . . . and
we should have been in Lisbon before him ; if,
indeed, any French had remained in Portugal."*
'* If I had not been prevented," he wrote Charles
Stuart, **I should have pursued the enemy, and in all
probability the whole would have been destroyed."
How greatly he wais annoyed by the order to halt,
was shown by his contemptuous remark to his staff
when he received it. ** Then, gentlemen," he said,
''there is nothing left for us to do but to hunt red-
legged partridges."
It is right to add that neither in his letters nor
in his public utterances did he blame Burrard : " I
have always entertained the opinion that Sir Harry
' Wellesley to Duke of York, 22nd August 1808.
36 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
Burrard decided upon fair military grounds, in the
manner which appeared to him to be most con-
ducive to the interests of the country ; and that
he had no motive for his decision which could be
supposed personal to me, or which as an officer
he could not avow." Moreover, Burrard s decision
was backed by his chief staff-officers, Clinton and
Murray, respectively adjutant- and quartermaster-
general ; and Napier, although he qualifies it as
"erroneous," admits that *' error is common in an
art which at best is but a choice of difficulties ; the
circumstances of the moment were imposing enough
to sway most generals. ..." Again, ** The facility
of executing Sir Arthur's plan was not so im-
posing on the field of battle as it was in the
'closet.'"
Burrard's period of control was short-lived. The
day after Vimiero he in his turn was superseded
by Sir Hew Dalrymple, a leader quite as unenter-
prising as Burrard. Both agreed in their veto of
Wellesley s proposal that Moore, who had arrived
with his division off the Mondego, should disem-
bark there and march south-east to intercept the
French communications with Madrid. There was
no sympathy between Dalrymple and his great lieu-
tenant. ** I had reason to believe that I did
not possess his confidence," he told the court of
FRICTION WITH DALRYMPLE zj
inquiry upon the Convention of Cintra ; " nay more,
that he was prejudiced against the opinions which
I should give him." It was Dairy mple he had
in his mind when he said before the- same court :
"It has been my misfortune to have been accused
of temerity and imprudence, as well as of excess
of caution, in the late transactions in Portugal ; ^ but
without appealing to the result of what happened
at the moment I gave over the command of the
army, I may safely assert that whatever might be
the difficulty of the operation, I had taken what
means existed to bring it to a fortunate conclusion ;
and that there was no ground for the apprehension
of my safety which Sir Hew Dairy mple seems to
have entertained."
Wellesley was certainly not happy under the
altered circumstances of the army in Portugal. He
was cheered a little, no doubt, by the knowledge
that he had earned the good-will of his comrades
in arms. The general officers who had been under
him sent him an address expressing their firm belief
in him and their congratulations on his success, to
which he replied with the modest disclaimer that
he owed all to their cordial support and to the
gallantry of the officers and soldiers, ** stimulated
by your example and their discipline, aided and
^ Campaign of Vimiero.
38 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
directed by your experience and ability." These
were his consolations, but his heart was really sore
at his supersession. He did not wish to remain
in Portugal. ** Matters are not prospering here,
and I feel an earnest desire to quit the army. I
have been too successful with this army ever to
serve with it in a subordinate situation with satis-
faction to the person who shall command, and of
course not to myself However, I shall do what-
ever the Government may wish."
Writing again on the same subject, he tells Lord
Castlereagh, ** It is quite impossible for me to con-
tinue any longer with this army." He asks to
be allowed to return to his post as Secretary for
Ireland, if convenient to the Government ; if not,
that he may be appointed to the staff in England,
"or, if that should not be practicable, that I should
remain without employment." "You will hear from
others of the various causes which I must have
for being dissatisfied, not only with the military
and other public measures of the commander-in-
chief, but with his treatment of myself I am
convinced it is better for him, for the army, and
for me that I should go away ; and the sooner I
go the better." This friction, the want of harmony,
the failure on the one hand to appreciate the great
soldier at his proper value, his almost contemptuous
WELLESLEY AND MOORE 39
resentment on the other, the little support given
him at home, lasted till Waterloo.
Wellesley s feelings at this period, when his
budding career might have been so easily blighted
and his deep anxiety that others should escape the
slights which he endured, may be gathered from
the letter he wrote Sir John Moore in September
1808. The condition of the army in Portugal
under its present leaders gave Wellesley great con-
cern. "It appears to me quite impossible that we
can go on as we are now constituted ; the com-
mander-in-chief (Dalrymple) must be changed, and
the country and the army naturally turn their eyes to
you as their commander." Wellesley then touches
delicately upon supposed differences between Moore
and the king s ministers at home, and offers himself
as an intermediary to set them right. " Although
I hold a high office under government,^ I am no
party man, but have long been connected in friend-
ship with many of those persons who are now at
the head of affairs in England ; and I think I have
sufficient influence over them that they may listen
to me upon a point of this description, more parti-
cularly as I am convinced they must be as desirous
as I can be to adopt the arrangement for the com-
mand of this army which all are agreed is the best.
^ He was still Secretary for Ireland.
40 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
In these times, my dear general, a man like you
should not preclude himself from rendering the
services of which he is capable from any idle
point of form." Wellington always expressed the
highest opinion of Sir John Moore. The army in
Portugal at that time, he told Lord Stanhope,^
believed there were only two officers present fit to
command them. Sir John Moore and himself On
one occasion he told Moore this, adding, "You
are the man — and I shall with great willingness
act under you." This is further shown by his
letter to Moore from London in 1808, when he
believed that he was to return to the Peninsula at
once. ** I find I am to be under your command,"
he wrote, ** than which nothing can be more satis-
factory to me."
The Convention of Cintra now came to relieve
Wellesley from his irksome, almost intolerable, situa-
tion. This agreement, by which Junot surrendered
Portugal in exchange for a safe-conduct to France,
was furiously condemned in England, and all the
generals concerned were recalled to stand their
trial. Wellesley was also implicated, although he
repudiated all responsibility for the terms of the
Convention. ** I signed the document by His Ex-
cellency Sir Hew Dalrymple's desire. But as I
* •Conversations," p. 244.
■yy/- L'wi ^///-(V'/r
OF
CONVENTION OF CINTRA 41
had not negotiated the agreement ... I could not
consider myself responsible in any degree for the
terms in which it was framed, nor for any of its
provisions." He writes to a friend, " I have only
to regret that I put my name to an agreement
of which I did not approve and which I did not
negotiate." Yet Sir Arthur to Lord Castlereagh
admits that he thought it expedient that the French
army should be allowed to evacuate Portugal with
their arms and baggage, and that every facility for
this purpose should be afforded them. Viewing the
Convention at this distance of time, we must accept
the impartial verdict of Napier that it was "a great
and solid advantage to the allies, a blunder on
the part of the French." Junot was by no means
at his last gasp. He had a line of retreat still
open through Elvas, and could regain Madrid by
Merida and Almaraz. The forts at Lisbon still
held out, and must have been reduced in due form ;
Elvas and Almeida must also be captured ; the
possession of Lisbon and the mouth of Tagus was
indispensable as a base of supply, for the fleet could
not remain off the coast after the weather broke.
All these operations demanded time, and they
might not be successfully completed before Napo-
leon, already on the move to succour Junot, arrived.
Napoleon himself disapproved of the Convention,
42 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
and said plainly that he would have sent Junot
before a council of war, " when fortunately the
English tried their generals, and so saved me from
the pain of punishing an old friend."
The public outcry against the Convention could
not be satisfied without the usual scapegoat.
"Whom shall we hang.*^" was asked furiously in
the press ; and a court of inquiry sat at Chelsea
Hospital, before which Dalrymple, Burrard, and
Wellesley were arraigned. If further evidence were
needed of the breadth and strength of Wellesley
as a controversialist, dealing with facts within his
own knowledge and in which he was intimately
concerned, it is to be found in his narratives and
addresses prepared for this court. They are most
voluminous, but never wearisome; every point is
touched on with a master-hand. Nothing can be
more dexterous than the way in which Wellesley
fights his own case, without separating himself from
his colleagues and superiors or leaving them alone
to bear the brunt of measures for which, after all,
they and not he were responsible. I am inclined
to think that Wellesley's defence settled once and
for all the question of his military capacity. No
one can read these admirable papers without ad-
mitting that they are the work of no common
man. It is quite clear that they practically quashed
WHOM SHALL WE HANG? 43
these ridiculous proceedings. The court was not
unanimous on the wisdom or otherwise of the
Convention, on which indeed they were hardly
competent to give an opinion, but they agreed
that no further judicial measures were necessary.
The verdict, in short, was acquittal.
The irritation in the public mind was not yet
appeased, however. In deference to it the generals
incriminated were not permitted to return to Spain.
Wellesley being still a member of Parliament, re-
sumed his office as Secretary for Ireland, and was
soon in a position to speak for himself in the House
of Commons. The proposed vote of thanks to him
and the army of Portugal was opposed, and the
young general was bitterly assailed, especially by
the well-known Banastre Tarleton, a general who
had gained some distinction as a cavalry officer in
the war with the American colonies. Tarleton
gravely censured Wellesley 's generalship,* com-
mitting himself to such silly strictures as that
** there was something rash in the action of the
17th August" (Roli^a, where the English outnum-
bered the French as three to one!), *' something
wrong in the action of the 21st" — a great victory,
' His animosity was said to be due to bitter jealousy ; he thought he ought
to have had the command in Portugal. Some notion of his principles may be
gathered from one of his election cries, ** Liberty and the slave trade."
44 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
robbed of its results by an interfering superior.
Wellesley replied with great readiness and vigour,
ably defending both the campaign and the Conven-
tion, His retort ended with a few pregnant words :
** I would far rather follow the gallant general s
example in the field than his advice in the senate,"
although it may be doubted whether he would have
always conquered had he done so. Tarleton had
yet another opportunity of venting his rancour
upon Wellesley. Within a year of the debate
upon the Convention of Cintra the Commons were
called upon to again vote their thanks to Wellesley,
now about to be created a peer. The proposed
honour was fiercely opposed in Parliament, in the
city of London, and by a portion of the press. One
speaker in the Lords said : ** Why reward Sir Arthur
Wellesley.'^ His actions are imprudent, foolish, and
presumptuous. He does not know how to provide
for the subsistence of his soldiers ... he has ex-
posed our army to unexampled calamities, and has
conducted himself throughout so as to merit punish-
ment rather than reward." The Common Council
of London petitioned against the bill brought in
to the Commons proposing a pension of ;^2ooo a
year to Wellington, and ** implored the sovereign to
prevent his ministers from rewarding one who in
the campaign of Talavera had exhibited, with equal
THE DEFENCE OF PORTUGAL 45
rashness and ostentation, nothing but a useless
valour."
The removal of Dalrymple and Burrard from
Portugal left Moore in command of the army, now
numbering some 40,000 men, and early in October
he advanced into Spain. Some account of his
operationis, and of his famous retreat on Corunna
which cost him his life, will be given hereafter when
dealing with Moore — a fine soldier who deserved
better fortune. Moore's failure did not shake the
resolve of the British people to renew the contest
in the Peninsula. Castlereagh sought Wellesley s
advice, arid got it in the form of a memorandum
upon the defence of Portugal, which is another of
the many remarkable papers drawn up by Wel-
lesley in these early days. His views were clear
and precise: '* I have always been of opinion that
Portugal might be defended, whatever might be
the result of the contest in Spain ; and that in the
meantime the measures adopted for the defence of
Portugal would be highly useful to the Spaniards
in their contest with the French." The burthen of
defence he would impose upon Portugal, backed and
reinforced by a British contingent ; the Portuguese
army to be increased and reconstituted under the
command of British officers, its cavalry and artil-
lery completed, the guns re-horsed ; the Portuguese
46 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
exchequer replenished by British gold. ** If Por-
tugal were properly held it could give occupation
to, and probably withstand, 100,000 French troops."
The strength of the strategic frontier of Portugal
no doubt weighed also with so shrewd a mili-
tary observer as Wellesley. Portugal as viewed
from Spain presented a strong natural barrier of
mountains pierced only by two good roads. These
inlets were guarded by two places of arms — Almeida
on the northern, Elvas on the southern approach.
The whole country was one fortress, as it were ; a
secure foothold from which we could not be easily
dislodged, a strong base from which to launch out
in attack.
Wellesley s thorough grasp of the situation more
than justified his reappointment to the command
in the Peninsula. It is claimed for him by some
eulogistic writers that even now, in 1809, he fore-
saw with the prescience of a great mind how the
seemingly inexpugnable fabric of Napoleon's power
might be undermined. He had realised, they say,
and it is possibly true, the insecurity of its founda-
tions ; he saw that the colossal empire created by
Napoleon's genius was of too rapid growth, and
contained within itself the elements of decay. The
tenacious resistance of a stubborn people, backed by
British blood and British treasure, in a far-off corner
WELLESLEY'S FINEST TRAITS 47
in Europe, might sap the strength of the universal
conqueror, and bring about his overthrow in the
end. It may be doubted whether Wellesley made
any such precise and elaborate forecast, although he
may have looked for, Hoped for its accomplishment.
But he was no dreamer ; he had, of course, a great
end in view, to be compassed eventually, but only
by the slow development of such means as he
had at hand. These, as we shall see, were imper-
fect enough, but he made the most of them ; and
his patience, his self-reliance, the painstaking and
minute skill with which he overcame difficulties,
lived down calumny, conquered incompetence and
half-hearted support, are better proofs of his great-
ness than his undoubted genius in war.
CHAPTER IV
THE DOURO AND TA LA VERA
Wellesley returns to Portugal — Nearly shipwrecked— The opposing
armies — Passage of the Douro — Spanish allies worthless— Talavera —
Privations of British troops— Critical position of Wellesley — His
escape — Increasing difficulties of supply.
WELLESLEY, after a tempestuous voyage
in H.M.S. Surveillantey which narrowly
escaped shipwreck off the coast of the
Isle of Wight, landed at Lisbon on 22nd April
1809, amid general rejoicings, and at once applied
himself to the first part of his gigantic task, the
expulsion of the French from Portugal.
It will be well here to review the position and
relative strength of the opponents who were soon
to come into collision.
Early this year Napoleon had laid his plans
for the recovery of Portugal and the invasion of
Andalucia. He had some ioo,cxx) men available
throughout the Peninsula, and three principal
armies, backed by a strong reserve in Madrid, were
set in motion.
1°. Soult, who occupied Gallicia, was to invade
48
THE OPPOSING ARMIES 49
Portugal from the north, seize Oporto, and march
on Lisbon.
2^ Lapisse at Salamanca was to co-operate
with Soult, moving though Ciudad Rodrigo on
Abrantes, thus taking Soult's left flank.
3°. Victor, in the valley of the Tagus about
Talavera, was to reach out to the south to Merida,
whence he could reinforce Soult if required. When
Soult had taken Lisbon, Victor and Lapisse com-
bined were to invade Andalucia.
Much delay was caused by the bickerings of the
French marshals ; want of stores and cash further
checked Soult, and he did not enter Oporto till the
29th March. Victor had refused to move until
Lapisse, diverted from his right direction, had been
ordered to join him at Merida. They were there
united on the 22nd April, 30,000 strong. On that
day Soult with 20,000 men was still in Oporto, his
rear much hampered by Spanish and Portuguese
insurgents.
Passage of the Douro.
22nd April. — Wellesley had under his command :
i*'. 26,000 British and German troops massed
at Leiria, south of the Mondego River.
2°. Beresford with the reorganised Portuguese
regulars, 16,000 men, at Thomar.
D
50 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
3°. Some Portuguese militia who were watching
Soult ; and there were also
4°. Two Spanish armies collecting, one south
of Merida under Cuesta, the other under Venegas
at Carolina, behind the Sierra Morena.
Wellesley, eager to take the initiative, was now
called upon to decide whether he would attack
Soult or Victor. He resolved to adopt the first
course, and detaching a small force towards
Abrantes, to observe or ** contain " Victor, he
marched northward with his main body. He
had good military reasons for choosing the attack
on Soult. Although Victor was a more pressing
danger to Lisbon, Soult was * isolated, and if he
could be driven out of the rich province he occu-
pied, it would greatly revive the spirits of the
Portuguese. Besides, moving with promptitude,
Wellesley could be on the banks of the Douro
before the news reached Victor, who was many
more marches distant from Lisbon. He could
first crush Soult (as he did), then return to deal
with Victor.
^th May, — Wellesley was concentrated at Coim-
bra. That day Beresford with 6000 Portuguese was
directed by Viseu and Lamego to cross high up
the Douro, and strike at Amarante, on Soult s
main line of communication with Spain.
PASSAGE OF THE DOURO 51
nth May. — Wellesley came into touch and
skirmished with Soult's advance. Soult withdrew
entirely behind the Douro, and prepared to retreat
on Amarante.
i2tk May. — Soult s move on Amarante would
have jeopardised Beresford, so Wellesley decided
to force the passage of the Douro at all hazards,
and bring the enemy to action. The only bridge
across this raging river 300 yards wide had been
destroyed, and all the boats had been gathered
in to the French side. Wellesley nevertheless
secured four barges through the intrepidity of
Colonel Waters, and threw over a first detach-
ment into the Seminary, a strong building capable
of defence, which, held by constant reinforcements,
successfully resisted all Soult s attacks. More and
more boats were obtained ; the Guards crossed
below, while Murray's brigade, which had forded
the river at Avintas, came down from above. Soult
was lost He could only fall back hastily, his
retreat soon degenerating into a disordered rout.
This daring operation, one of the most diffi-
cult, that of crossing a deep and rapid river in
the face of an enemy strongly posted, and con-
stituting **a surprise without example in the annals
of war,"^ was accomplished with a loss of only
* Thiers.
52 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
twenty killed. Soult lost scx) men, many guns,
and much ammunition in Oporto. Now in his
headlong flight on Amarante he found that Beres-
ford had forestalled him, and his situation became
most critical. He only escaped by destroying his
baggage and artillery and taking a circuitous route
by mule tracks and goat paths. When he gained
Orense and Lugo on the 19th, his force was deci-
mated and disorganised, being, as Jomini puts it, '* in
a far worse plight than Moore six months before."
Wellesley's passage of the Douro has been
condemned as a rash act, but it was surely justified
by its striking success. The plan of campaign was
strategically sound, and the execution judicious.
The rapidity of Wellesley's movements was extra-
ordinary ; within .twenty-six days of his departure
from England he had cleared Northern Portugal
of the French and dealt Soult a terrible blow.
It was time now to turn southward. Victor
and Lapisse, hoping to relieve the pressure upon
Soult, had threatened Portugal. They were now
in the valley of the Tagus, but they fell back, at
Wellesley s approach, behind the Alberche, covering
Madrid, and near Talavera, a name soon to become
famous in military annals. Wellesley, coming by
Abrantes, marched through Castello Branco, and
was at Plasencia on the 27th June. He was now
WORTHLESS SPANISH ALLIES 53
to make his first experience of the worthlessness
of his Spanish allies ; to find the generals incom-
petent, the troops a mere rabble. He had to
concert operations with Cuesta — an irritable, con-
ceited, crotchety old man, who had already one leg
in the grave, whose favourite conveyance in the
field was a coach and six ; if he mounted a horse
it was with the assistance of grenadiers, who held
him in the saddle ; when he got off he went to sleep
on the cushions brought from his carriage. The
whimsical perverseness of his disposition made him
more and more impracticable every day. ** It is
impossible to do business with him,'* wrote Wel-
lesley, " and very uncertain that any operations will
succeed in which he has any concern." The battle
of Talavera was won in spite of him, after other
fair opportunities had been lost ; the victory was
barren of great results, because Cuesta and all the
Spanish authorities were faithless to their promises
and left the British troops to starve.
Campaign of Talavera.
July 2Ttk. — King Joseph, advancing with all
men available from Madrid, had joined Victor, and
the whole, 50,000 strong, moved rapidly forward
to attack Wellesley, who was now in position at
54 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
Talavera. So rapid was their advance that Sir
Arthur was himself almost caught at the outposts,
and all but made prisoner. The Spaniards behind
entrenchments held the right of the allied line, a
post Cuesta would not take until he "made the
proud Englishman go down on his knees" to im-
plore his co-operation. The rest of the position —
the centre and left — was occupied by the British
and Germans.
2%th July. — After a sharp contest the previous
evening for the key of the position — during which
many of the Spaniards, although safe behind earth-
works, bolted to the rear — the real battle began
about noon. It was fought out with great impetu-
osity and courage, but was won at last by the
British, largely through Wellesley's tactical skill.
He was ubiquitous on the field, always at the right
place at the right moment, and by his masterly dis-
positions ever strongest at the decisive point. A
greater general than Joseph might have made a
final effort to retrieve disaster with his unbroken
reserves, but Napoleon's brother was not Napoleon,
and next day the French drew off again behind
the Alberche.
It was the first great encounter in the war. The
brunt of it was borne by the British, and it fully
proved both their true soldierly qualities and the
TALAVERA 55
generalship of their leader. Yet the troops were
largely recruits and militia; *' with the exception of
the Guards and a few others, there were more knap-
sacks with the names of militia regiments on them
than of numbered regular regiments." And the men
fought starving. A few grains of wheat had been
their sole sustenance for many hours previous. On
the night of the 27th, before the great battle, soldiers
prayed to be allowed to go down and fight, because
*'when engaged they forgot their hunger." *' It is
a positive fact/' VVellesley wrote on the 31st, **that
during the last seven days the British army have not
received one-third of their provisions, and that at
this moment there are nearly 4000 wounded soldiers
dying in hospital for want of common assistance
and necessaries which any other country in the
world would have given even to its enemies. I posi-
tively will not move, nay more, I will disperse
my army, till I am supplied with provisions and
means of transport as I ought to be." This retreat
was forced upon him by other causes, as we shall
see ; but the want of supplies would, in any case,
have made it inevitable. "A starving army is
worse than none," was Wellesley's lamentation at
this time ; *'the soldiers lose their discipline and spirit.
... A fortnight ago they beat double their numbers.
I should now hesitate to meet a French corps of
56 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
half their strength." Again he remarks : ** If we had
had 60,000 men instead of 20,000, in all probability
we should not have got to Talavera to fight, for
want of means and provisions. They could have
got no farther in any case, and the armies must
have separated for want of subsistence, probably
without a battle, certainly afterwards."
Now, however, a sudden and unexpected danger
arose, over and above the needs of the army, and
obliged him peremptorily to retreat. The Spanish
alliance was valueless even in the one respect
of obtaining early and authentic intelligence; and
Cuesta, in his own country, with every facility for
gaining news, remained ignorant to the last of
movements to the northward that now placed
the allies in a position of imminent peril. Three
French army corps had concentrated north of the
Douro, under the orders of the lately discomfited
Soult, following the sagacious conclusion of Napo-
leon, who, although in Austria far removed from the
theatre of war, had written : *• Wellesley will most
likely advance by the Tagus against Madrid. In
that case pass the mountains, fall on his flank and rear,
and crush him." The concentration was long de-
layed by the ever-present jealousies of the marshals,
but on the i8th July, Soult, Ney, and Mortier
combined under the command of the first named ;
WELLESLEY IN JEOPARDY 57
50,coo men were in motion on Salamanca and the
Pass of Banos. This pass and that of Perales
adjoining were the only practicable roads through
the mountains, and Wellesley now thought to bar
both passages, entrusting the duty to Cuesta, who
entirely neglected it.
On the 31st July Soults advance entered Pla-
sencia, and on 3rd August the first news thereof
reached Wellesley at Oropesa. He now learnt to
his dismay, moreover, that Soult had three corps
with him ;. that he had cut him from one line of
retreat across the Tagus, by the bridge of Almaraz ;
and that Cuesta, terrified by Joseph's renewed
advance from Madrid, had abandoned Talavera,
crowded with English wounded.
Wellesley 's position was thus critical in the ex-
treme. The peril was apparent not to him alone,
but to every soldier in the British ranks. His very
existence was jeopardised. Overwhelming numbers
hemmed him ; the French were acting in combi-
nation against his front, his van, and his line of
retreat. It was an occasion that demanded the
highest fortitude, the utmost despatch. Wellesley
rose to it, and at once fell back across the Tagus,
using the bridge at Arzobispo, and adopting the line
of Truxillo-Merida on Badajoz and the Portuguese
frontier. What he felt himself may be gathered
58 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
from his own words : ** We were in a bad scrape,
and I really believe that if I had not determined to
retire at the moment I did, all retreat would have
been cut off for us both " (himself and Cuesta).
Thus ended the campaign of the Douro and
Talavera, a series of brilliant successes neutralised
by causes beyond his control. ** I hope," he writes
home, *'that my public despatch will justify me from
all blame in the eyes of his Majesty's Ministers
except that of having trusted the Spaniards in any-
thing." His painful experience of this had been
already recorded in a despatch written before the
retreat : '* We are worse off here (Talavera) than in
an enemy s country. The Spaniards make all sorts
of promises and accomplish none ; their armies
render us no assistance whatever ; on the contrary,
we are obliged to abandon our stores and to empty
the military chest to employ the waggons in trans-
porting the sick and wounded. They (the Spaniards)
violate all the laws of humanity, and compel us to
leave behind ammunition, provisions, and money.
Everything must be done by the English army."
Again on the same subject, when retreating, he
says : ^ '*This army will be useless in Spain, and will
be entirely lost if this treatment is to continue ; and
I must say that if any efficient measures of relief
' 8th August 1899, to Marquis Wellesley, British Minister at Cadiz.
DIFFICULTIES OF SUPPLY 59
had been adopted by the (Spanish) Government
when they first received accounts of our distresses
from the want of provisions, we ought before now
to have received the benefit of them." He sharply
upbraids the Spanish commanders, who had promised
that the privations should cease, that there should
be plenty of food in future, for their breach of faith,
and declares that he has no confidence in their
assurances. " I give no credit to the accounts of
the existence of resources said to be upon the road
(in what place not known), or of any others in the
magazine at TruxiUo." The latter he found, from
reports received, did **not contain enough to feed
the British army one day only." He holds the
Spanish authorities responsible for the consequences
of this shameful neglect ; those ** who have allowed
a brave army that was rendering gratuitous service
to Spain, that was able and willing to pay for every-
thing it received, to starve in the centre of their
country, and to be reduced by want almost to a
state of inefficiency." Once more he plainly warns
Lord Wellesley : *' Till the evils of which I think
I have reason to complain are remedied ; till I shall
see magazines established for the supply of the
armies, and a regfular system adopted for keeping
them filled ; and an army on whose exertions I can
depend, commanded by officers capable and willing
6o THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
to carry into execution the operations which may
be planned by mutual agreement, I cannot enter
upon any system of co-operation with the Spanish
armies." From henceforth he will fight for the
Spaniards, but never with them. He puts this
plainly before the British Government in a letter
that deserves to be quoted at length in this place : —
** I wish that the eyes of the people of England
were open to the real state of affairs in Spain, as
mine are ; and I only hope, if they should not be
so now, that they will not purchase the experience
by the loss of an army. We have gained a great
and glorious victory over more than double our
numbers, which has proved to the French that they
are not the first military nation in the world. ^ But
the want of common management in the Spaniards,
and of the common assistance which every country
gives to an army and of which this country gives
most plentifully to the French, have deprived us
of all the fruits of it. The Spaniards have neither
numbers, efficiency, discipline, bravery, nor arrange-
ment to carry on the contest." Again he reminds
Marshal Beresford that it is a mistake to think that
the Portuguese and Spanish armies only wanted
^ " This battle (Talavera) recovered the glory of the successors of Marl-
borough, which for a century had declined. It was felt that the English
infantry could contend with the best in Europe."— ^<7OTm/.
THE SPANISH TROOPS 61
"discipline, properly so called. They want the
habits and spirit of soldiers — the habits of command
on one side and of obedience on the other — mutual
confidence between officers and men, and, above
all, the determination in the superiors to obey the
orders they receive, let what will be the conse-
quence, and the spirit to tell the true cause if they
do not."
CHAPTER V
WELLINGTON LEFT TO HIS OWN RESOURCES
His steadfast sanguine spirit — He works "like a galley-slave" —
Troublesome officers — Crime in his army — Outrages and excesses —
Punitive measures — His minute supervision.
THE epoch through which Wellington^ had
now entered, beginning with the retreat
from Talavera and lasting through the
years 1809, 18 10, and 181 1, is surely the most
remarkable in his whole career. Now, when most
sorely tried, he gave convincing proof of his fine
qualities and securely consolidated his reputation.
It will be well to pause and consider his position
at this particular time. Here was a great man
struggling with adversity, one bearing a grievous
burthen alone and almost unaided, with no firm
backing from home. All he could get from the
Government was a confession of their own weak-
ness. ** We are powerless," they wrote him.
^ The petty opposition in Parliament that would have denied his services
their proper recognition had happily been defeated, and in August 1S09 he
was created a peer by the titles of Baron Douro of Wellesley and Viscount
Wellington of Talavera.
62
«»
a
LEFT TO HIS OWN RESOURCES 63
** Be prudent; above all, run no risks.'* His own
opinion of these masters was low enough: **The
Government are terribly afraid I shall get them
into a scrape. But what can be expected from
men who are beaten in the House of Commons
three times a week ? A great deal might be done
now if there existed in England less party and
more public sentiment, or if there was any public
sentiment." ^
He knew full well that he would get no support.
But he was quite undaunted. *' I act with a sword
hanging over me (this was apropos of the attack
made on him by the Corporation of London), which
will fall upon me whatever may be the result of
affairs here ; but they may do what they please : I
shall not give up the game here as long as it can
be played." " I believe there never was any officer,
but certainly never a British officer, placed in so
difficult a situation as I am in." '* If ever there
were an officer at the head of an army interested
(personally, I may say) in keeping down the ex-
penses of the army, it is myself ; for I am left wholly
to my own resources, and am obliged to supply the
wants of the allies, as well as of the British army,
from what I can get ; and if I fail, God will, I hope,
have mercy upon me, for nobody else will."
^ To Admiral Berkeley, i8io.
64 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
He knew, of course, of the attack made upon him
in Parliament, and retorted that it had not ** given
him one moment s concern," so far as he was per-
sonally concerned ; *' indeed I rejoice at it,* as it has
given my friends an opportunity of setting the public
right on some points on which they had not been
informed, and on others on which the misrepresen-
tations had driven the truth from their memories.
But I regret that men like Lord * and others
should carry the spirit of party so far as to attack an
officer in his absence, should take the ground of their
attack from Cobbett and the Moniteur, and should
at once blame him for circumstances and events
over which he could have no control, and for faults
which, if they were committed at all, were not
committed by him."
His steadfastness and self-reliance under these
adverse and irritating conditions compels un-
bounded admiration. ** Being embarked in a course
of military operations of which I hope to see the
successful termination, I shall continue to carry
them on to the end.^ Having been entrusted with
the command and exclusively with the conduct of
the military operations, I will not suffer them (the
^ To Lord Liverpool, the head of the Ministry.
^ Lord Grenville or Lord Moira.
^ To Charles Stuart, relative to Principal Souza's interference with him.
HIS STEADFAST SPIRIT 65
Portuguese Regency) or anybody else to interfere
with them; that I know best where to station my
troops and where to make a stand against the
enemy, and I shall not alter a system framed upon
mature consideration upon any suggestion of theirs.
I am responsible for what I do, and they are not.
False reports and deceptions of every description
are tried. . . . However, nothing of this kind shall
make me take one step either way which is not
dictated by my sense of what is best for the
cause."
He was still sanguine in the teeth of all trials
and rebuffs. **The affairs of the Peninsula," he
remarks most philosophically, ** have invariably
had the same appearance since I have known
them ; they have always appeared to be lost ;
means have always appeared inadequate to ob-
jects ; and the sole dependence of the whole has
apparently been upon us. The contest, however,
still continues, and is in its third year. . . . The
French threaten us at all points, and are most
desirous to get rid of us. But they threaten at
too many points at a time to give me much
uneasiness respecting any one in particular, and
they shall not induce me to disconnect my
army. I am in a situation in which no mischief
can be done to the army or any part of it ; I
E
iU.J.UJi>." » ■"-'^^^P^^-^^—1 . ■^>-"^*<— 1^*^
66 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
am prepared for all events ; and if I am in a
scrape, as appears to be the general belief in
England, although certainly not my own, Til get
out of it."^
All this time there was enough in his daily
work as commander of the forces and general
administrator to unnerve and discourage any but
the strongest, the most self-reliant and resourceful
man. " I work like a galley-slave," he wrote his
brother at Cadiz, "and yet I effect nothing." He
has given us a striking picture of himself, drawn
by his own pen, in those famous despatches of his,
which bear such ample testimony to his general-
ship, his prescience, his masterfulness, and, above
all, his unwearied industry and indomitable pluck.
It will be seen that he did nearly everything him-
self; controlled every department civil and military,
often created them or improved their machinery,
dealt direct with their heads and with the British
representatives at Lisbon and Cadiz. In all army
matters, the business of his own profession, he of
course showed himself thoroughly at home. He
exercised the functions of command with the same
intimate knowledge, the same minute attention to
details, that have already been noticed in his Indian
campaigns.
^ To Colonel Torrens, Military Secretary at the Horse Guards.
TROUBLESOME OFFICERS 67
This may be at once observed by a perusal of
his correspondence, and the general orders issued
from time to time, which were presently codified
and printed for easy reference. Both personnel
and materiel become objects of his minute pains-
taking care. Officers general and regimental, the
rank and file, the interior economy of units, the
marches, baggage, discipline, supplies and so forth :
he touches upon all in turn, always thoroughly, often
at great length.
His generals often gave him much trouble.
There was the case of one subordinate who pro-
tested against being called upon to command a
brigade with which Portuguese troops were in-
corporated ; but Lord Wellington declines to give
any engagement that this officer should be em-
ployed with any particular description of troops.
"As commander-in-chief of the allied army," he
says, '* I consider myself wholly and solely re-
sponsible that his Majesty's troops shall not be
employed in improper situations, and the major-
generals or other superior officers responsible only
that they and those under them do their duty in
the situation in which they may be employed."
The over-punctilious general in question was there-
fore told that he might resign his command and
go home. In those early years of the war he had
1
68 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
been unable to secure the assistance of invariably
the right men ; as yet he had come to trust few of
those about him except Hill, Beresford, Graham,
and Craufurd ; and he evidently doubted Horse
Guards patronage, for we find he earnestly implored
Lord Liverpool to see that no violent party men
were sent out to him : ** We must keep the spirit
of party out of the army, or we shall be in a bad
way indeed."
If he looked askance at some of his generals,
he equally disapproved of many officers in the lower
grades, and visited upon them much of the blame
for the frequent misconduct of his troops. He was
unhesitatingly of opinion that the whole discipline
and regularity of the army depended upon the
regimental officers, particularly of the subalterns,
and that they often failed in their duty in this re-
spect : ** I may order what I please ; but if they
(the officers) do not execute what I order, or if they
execute with negligence, I cannot expect that British
soldiers will be orderly or regular." He was satis-
fied that all soldiers, young or old, could march
long distances, and answer all the calls made upon
them, if once their officers were properly attentive,
if they saw to the men s food, ** if they prevented
them from straggling from their corps on a march,
or from their quarters or camp in search of wine
CRIME IN HIS ARMY 69
and plunder after the march is made." Once again,
in a general order, he says emphatically : ** Officers of
companies must attend to the men in their quarters
as well as on the march, or the army will very soon
be no better than a banditti."
Crime was no doubt terribly prevalent in the
Peninsular army almost from first to last. It is with
a sense of shame that we accept the undoubted and
most humiliating evidence of the despatches and
orders on this particular point — evidence fully corro-
borated by contemporary history. Wellington was
often upbraided in after years for his scathing re-
flections upon the troops to whom he owed his
triumphs. He was prepared to admit that he could
always trust them to get him out of a scrape where
Souk's men would have left him in the lurch. Yet
he was ungenerous enough to call them ** the scum
of the earth," and to declare that all English soldiers
enlisted for drink or to escape the consequences of
evil-doing. Almost in the same breath, however,
he adds that '* they are fine fellows," and, *' consider-
ing their origin, it is wonderful so much is made
out of them after enlistment." The truth is always
unpalatable, but it was still true that the turbulent
element preponderated in the Peninsular army, and
that when it came to the surface, as at the sack of
Badajoz or St. Sebastian, the bravest men proved
70 THE WELLINGfON MEMORIAL
miscreants, and foul scenes were enacted that dis-
graced the British name.
The curse of Wellington s army was drink, as it
has been of most British armies, until these latter
days, when happily the vice of drunkenness among
our soldiers is fast disappearing. Some allowances
must certainly be made for those Peninsular men,
who were exposed to so many privations, and thus
constantly tempted into marauding and excess. It
was true that ** they could not resist wine," ^ a fruitful
source of crime in these campaigns ; but they had to
fight also against hunger, a much more imperious
need. Yet the whole indictment against them is
grave, and their general's repeated, well-substan-
tiated, indignant complaints are not the pleasantest
reading. Now, he says (31st May 1809) : " I have
long been of opinion that a British army could bear
neither success nor failure, and I have had many
proofs of the truth of this opinion in the first of
its branches in the recent conduct of the troops.**
Again, on the same date, to Lord Castlereagh : *'The
army behaves terribly ill. They are a rabble who
cannot bear success any more than Sir John Moore's
^ " No soldier can withstand the temptation of wine. This is constantly
before their eyes in this country, and they are constantly intoxicated when
Ihey are absent from their regiments. There is no crime which they do not
commit to obtain money to purchase it, or if they cannot get money, to obtain
it by force." — Wellington to Colonel Torrens, November 1810.
OUTRAGES AND EXCESSES 71
army could bear failure. I ain endeavouring to
tame them, but if I should not succeed, I must make
an official complaint of them, and send one or
two corps home in disgrace They plunder in all
directions."
A fortnight later he writes : ** I cannot with pro-
priety omit to draw attention again to the state of
discipline of the army, which is a subject of serious
concern to me, and well deserves the considera-
«
tion of his Majesty's Ministers. It is impossible
to describe to you the irregularities and outrages
committed by the troops ; outrages are committed
whenever they are ouj of sight of their officers.
Notwithstanding the pains I take, . . . not a post
or courier comes in, not an officer arrives from the
rear of the army, that does not bring me accounts
of outrages committed by the soldiers. ..." The
general orders contain frequent references to these
excesses : ** The commander of the forces is con-
cerned to hear that last night several soldiers came
into the town of Badajoz and plundered a bakery
and the houses of several individuals of bread."
Notwithstanding repeated orders, the men will
plunder beehives. ** The practice of taking roots
and vegetables without paying for them must
be entirely discontinued." There is still worse.
Capital punishment must be adjudged for a crime
72 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
*'too common in this army" ; several soldiers were
executed for robbing and ill-treating an inhabitant
of this country whom they met on the road — a
crime which " the commander of the forces is
determined in no instance to forgive." He is next
concerned to publish details of murder committed
by the troops ; ** the men were in uniform, and after
the murders they robbed the house of money and
jewellery." In February 1810 three privates were
arraigned before a general court-martial for high-
way robbery, and sentenced to be hanged ; the same
fate meets another for plunder and desertion, and
two more for burglariously entering a dwelling-
house Burglary and highway robbery were com-
mon crimes in Portugal ; so was drunkenness
on duty, desertion, mutiny, and insubordination,
laying embargo on carts and transport animals,
and various high-handed proceedings against the
native population.
There is but an occasional short-lived ray of
light in all this darkness. ** I certainly think the
army are improved. They are a better army than
they were some months ago," he writes to Lord
Liverpool. ** But still these terrible continued
outrages give me reason to apprehend that, not-
withstanding all the precautions I have taken and
shall take, they will slip through my fingers, as
PUNITIVE MEASURES 73
they did through Sir John Moore s, when I shall
be involved in any nice operation with a powerful
enemy in my front" The precautions of which
he speaks were strictly repressive measures, such
as he had learnt to use in India, and now again
applied with even increased severity : " The rolls
shall be called in the different corps of the 4th
Division every hour till further orders, and the
commander of the forces desires that no soldier
may be allowed to quit his lines on any account,
except in charge of an officer. The provost must
punish all found disobeying this order."
The provost-marshal had plenary powers and
several assistants ; it was their business to enforce
obedience to army general orders, and preserve
discipline among soldiers and camp followers by a
summary administration of the "cat." The last
power was, however, strictly limited, and corporal
punishment could only be inflicted upon offenders
caught in the very act. The provost's authority,
as defined by Lord Wellington later, was ** based
only upon necessity and custom, and should be
jealously watched." He might hang out of hand
those caught committing outrage, but this power of
life and death was not extended to his assistants,
who could not execute even the most heinous
offenders. In the case of the plundered beehives,
74 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
Wellington ordered that the regiment owning the
marauders sriould be at once "turned out and
placed under arms " ; ** they are not to quit their
arms till one hour after sunset, when they are to
be sent to their huts and sentries placed round the
camp. . . ." This was to be continued day after
day, and the men were to stand by their arms
from sunrise to sunset until the plunderers were
discovered. Marauding was Wellington's bite noir,
to be checked by every possible means. General
officers were often desired to hold unexpected kit
inspections at the end of the day's march, when
** everything not strictly regimental necessaries
(found in the men's packs), is to be taken from
them and burnt, and those who have these articles
punished, as they must certainly have been ob-
tained by plunder."
While discipline was thus maintained with a
strong hand, Wellington laboured hard to make his
army effective and to improve the military qualities
of his troops. No matter was too s'mall for his
supervision or correction. He could write with
minute knowledge upon bill-hooks and camp-kettles,
discussing seriously whether the latter should be of
iron or tin ; he could enlarge upon the proper
packing of blankets, show how requisitions should
be made out for equipment and necessaries, tents.
HIS MINUTE SUPERVISION 75
great-coats, supplies of all sorts ; he created his
commissariat out of the most unpromising mate-
rials, people " incapable of conducting any business
beyond a counting-house " ; his orders were precise
as to the issue of bread, forage, shoes ; his regula-
tion of transport, of carts and bat mules, by far
the most troublesome service throughout the war,
was exactly adapted to the situation. His eye was
everywhere, on all ranks, on all departments, at all
times. He will not suffer "the cavalry in winter
quarters to lose the habit of marching " ; infantry
are to be regularly exercised in the same way ; the
divisions were to be taken out route marching at
least three leagues, and practised in manoeuvres and
outpost drill. He was for ever urging constant
watchfulness in the presence of the enemy. Just
before Talavera he ordered that *' one-third of each
regiment (is) to remain accoutred in the lines, and
the whole must be on the alert." At such times he
was most particular in his precautions for protecting
his baggagfe and preventing stragglers. The last
were his peculiar aversion ; he would not tolerate
straggling on the line of march. It was *'a most
unmilitary practice, most inconvenient, leading to
loss"; "the enemy has taken 100 British soldiers
straggling in the rear and on the flanks of the army." *
* July 1812.
76 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
Many severe measures were tried to check it, but
not always with success. A report of absentees was
to be made nightly to the brigadier ; an officer was
to be sent back along the rear as far as the rear-
guard to pick up men missing. Again Wellington
threatens three regiments, " notorious offenders in
this respect, having more stragglers than all the
rest of the army," that he will send them into
garrison, and report their conduct especially to his
Majesty.
CHAPTER VI
A WAITING GAME
Wellington plays a waiting game — His enemies at home — The Govern-
ment powerless to help him — Overpowering strength of the French —
Massena's invasion — Busaco — ^Torres Vedras — Unfriendly critics —
Massena retreats — Albuera.
WITH the withdrawal into Portugal in 1809,
Wellington entered into the most trying
period of his life. He was face to
face with the naked truth that he must depend
mainly on his own resources, and fight the French
almost alone. He resolved, therefore, to develop
the Portuguese army and play a waiting game.
But now he was denounced by the Opposition at
home, while his own friends in the Government
gave him but lukewarm support, neglecting his just
demands, refusing his drafts for money and more
men. The bitterest language was used against
him. *' It is truly melancholy and alarming that
Wellington should have the impertinence to think
of defending Portugal with 50,000 men of whom
only 20,000 are English," said one speaker in Par-
liament. "If the French entertain serious designs
77
78 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
on the country (Portugal), before three months
Wellington and his army will be in England."
Another declared that ** the impossibility of defence
is so self-evident, that to reason upon it any further
would be worse than ridiculous. Before six months
are over, if our troops do not escape on board ship,
the only English soldiers left in the Peninsula
will be prisoners." ** The mere proposal to hold
Portugal is the climax of error." Lord Grenville
declared **upon his conscience" that he did not
believe the whole British army could secure that
kingdom, and " any one who said it was unfit to
govern. . . . We could only retain Portugal so
long as Bonaparte permitted." Nothing could save
the situation, thought Lord Holland, but ** a great
plan."
In truth this great plan had already taken shape
in Wellington's brain, as we shall presently see ; but
he religiously guarded the secret. Meanwhile the
timid Government he served could only urge him to
be prudent, to run no risks ; they were ''powerless
to help him." Now, indeed, a storm was gather-
ing in the near horizon, dark enough to daunt
any but the most fearless spirit. Peace in Central
Europe had set free Napoleon's legions, and he
was at liberty to concentrate an enormous force
in Spain for the expulsion of the English and the
FRENCH TAKE OFFENSIVE 79
complete subjugation of the Peninsula. By the
middle of the year 18 10 the French in Spain
numbered 366,000, under the most famous French
generals. Soult was to be launched against the
rich province of Andalucia. Massena, " the spoiled
child of victory," the most capable opponent
Wellington encountered in the Peninsula, was to
invade Portugal. He was to command three army
corps, those of Ney, Regnier, and Junot, 80,000
men all told ; while King Joseph with a reserve of
24,000 stood behind in Madrid.
Massena was to move from Salamanca and
operate by the line of the Douro. At this time
Wellington's army was posted to watch the northern
approaches into Portugal. He held his main
strength along the Mondego, with Craufurd's light
division across the Coa, in near touch with the
French outposts under Ney. Hill was in the valley
of the Tagus, opposite Regnier; and, farther to
the south, Beresford and his Portuguese covered
the fertile district of the Alemtejo. Wellington
had already *' matured his plan " ; it was designed
on lines that would have surprised Lord Holland,
and was far greater than any but a military genius
could have conceived. Its cardinal features were
to give ground slowly before Massena, while the
Portuguese peasantry, as he retreated, laid their
8o THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
lands waste and denied the enemy subsistence.
At a given point Wellington would disappear be-
hind the hills, passing within the impregnable
barrier of Torres Vedras, the great lines of earth-
works created by his own foresight as a secure
citadel and last stronghold to stay the advancing
tide of invasion.
The movements of both armies were slow and
circumspect. Massena advanced in June, and Ney
invested Ciudad Rodrigo ; and Craufurd maintain-
ing himself too long upon the Coa with the rear-
guard, was nearly compromised. Wellington let
Ciudad Rodrigo surrender. He could not risk
failure in the attempt to succour it ; defeat would
have brought on another Corunna, and he fell
back behind the Mondego River, where, skilfully
drawing all his strength towards him, he prepared
to give battle. He has been blamed for fighting
at Busaco. Napier condemns the battle, which
**in a military point of view should not have been
fought. It was extraneous to his (Wellington's)
original plan, and forced upon him by events ; it
was in fine a political battle, and he afterwards
called it a mistake. ... His mixed and inexperi-
enced army was not easily handled. War is full of
mischances, and the loss of a single brigade might
have caused the English Government to abandon
MASSENA INVADES PORTUGAL 8i
the contest altogether." At the time Wellington
did not admit his error. " The croakers about
useless battles will attack me again about that of
Busaco," Wellington wrote a week after the battle,
*' notwithstanding that our loss was really trifling ;
but I should have been inexcusable if, knowing what
I did, I had not endeavoured to stop the enemy
there. ... It has removed an impression which
began to be very general, that we intended to fight
no more, but retire to our ships ; it has given the
Portuguese a taste for an amusement to which
they were not before accustomed, and which they
would not have acquired if I had not put them
in a very strong position."
Massena came on leisurely, feeling sorely the
already scant supplies of food and forage, while
the Portuguese irregulars closed in on his rear,
cutting him from his base, and greatly harassing
his communications. His direction was Coimbra
and the roads leading upon Lisbon. On the 25 th
September Ney with the advanced guard came
up on the Sierra de Busaco, which was the posi-
tion Wellington had selected as best suited for
a defensive action. Hill, hurrying up from the
Tagus, had rejoined him, and he had thus gathered
together all his strength. But when impetuous
Ney dashed up, the long precipitous hill of Busaco
F
82 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
was not yet fully occupied, and if the French had
attacked instantly, the issue might have been
different. Massena would not consent till he was
himself at the front, and the golden opportunity
was lost. On the 26th Wellington carefully lined
the position with his troops, and the battle was
fought on the 27th. Ney (no longer sanguine of
success) commanded the left, Regnier the right ;
Junot was in reserve. Regnier broke in manfully
between the divisions of Picton and Leith, and
was only checked by the prompt intervention of
Wellington, who brought two guns to bear upon
the French flank, and sent on two fresh regiments
to charge. Regnier fought strenuously, but could
not withstand their furious onslaught ; he had no
reserves, and presently fell back, beaten. Ney was
also foiled on the left.
Massena now learnt that he might turn the
position he could not force. Utilising a little-known
mountain path to his own right, he continued
his advance, and Wellington abandoned Busaco.
Massena was very confident of success. Many of
his officers believed that the English were in full
retreat, making in hot haste for their ships; that
re-embarkation was inevitable. There is no more
dramatic surprise in the whole annals of war than
the check which Massena now received. For under
TORRES VEDRAS 83
his very eyes the English columns glided through
the passes of the frowning hills, entering a great
natural fortress rendered impregnable by the highest
engineering skill, and, so to speak, shut the gate be-
hind them. The celebrated lines of Torres Vedras,
says Napier, "were great in conception and execu-
tion, more in keeping with ancient than modern
military labours."
We have no very exact knowledge when the
idea struck Wellington, but it was probably of
gradual growth, arising first in his general dis-
positions for the defence of Portugal, and taking
definite shape as he considered each point in turn.
All this is to be seen in his elaborate and masterly
memorandum to Colonel Fletcher, his chief engineer
officer, dated October 20, 1809. He there considers
the principal aims and objects of the enemy, and
discusses the best measures for encountering them.
The French, seeking to obtain Lisbon, would
naturally advance by the right or left, or both ; by
either the north or south bank of the Tagus, or by
both banks. The river itself would be the best
barrier against the latter, and to meet the former he
thought it possible to organise a system of strong
defensive works in the mountainous country about
Torres Vedras, which (having made a detailed re-
connaissance and visited every part of the ground)
84 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
he saw, with the unerring instinct of a great soldier,
was admirably adapted to the purpose. Having
arrived at this conclusion, he proceeds to describe
minutely how and where the fortifications should be
constructed. The technical knowledge herein dis-
played is remarkable ; the extraordinary eye for
country, the exact application of means for working
parties, the numbers for which the works should be
designed, the armament to cover and command the
approaches — all these are detailed with the pro-
found skill of a practical engineer.
Second only to the sagacity that created them
was the self-control that kept this marvellous plan
a profound secret to the last. That works were
being thrown* up could not of course be concealed ;
there were thousands and thousands of Portuguese
labourers employed upon them under a crowd of sub-
ordinate officers, yet no whisper of their transcendent
importance, no suspicion of the momentous part they
were to play, got abroad. Wellington visited them
often ; ^ he watched over their construction with a
jealous, vigilant eye, yet no one fathomed his inten-
tions. Neither in his own army, among his most
trusted staff-officers, nor in the country at large,
^ February i, 1810, he met Fletcher on the ground to deal with various
difficulties. The day before he had sent home an urgent request for more
engineer officers.
TORRES VEDRAS 85
was there the slightest idea that twelve months
beforehand he was slowly preparing a gigantic
obstacle to the victorious advance of the French.
How extreme was Massena's surprise, how bitter his
disappointment, may be gathered from his indignant
reproof to the Portuguese officers in his camp.
They had assured him that the country lay open
between the Mondego and the capital ; that there
was no naturally strong position ; that if one had
been created artificially, he should have found it
out himself through his spies. ** Yes, yes," retorted
Massena, ** Wellington built the works, but he did
not make the mountains,"
The security afforded by these tremendous lines
was not immediately appreciated by those they
sheltered. The defensive system was in a triple
line ; had the first been stormed there was the
second and still the third ; they were all armed with
heavy guns manned by many troops, reinforced by
marines and bluejackets from the fleet. With his
Spanish and Portuguese allies Wellington's garrison
now reached the respectable total of 130,000 men.
Yet few, if any, believed in Wellington's plan. His
camp was full of traitors who pandered to the
Ignoble hatred of his detractors at home. Through
the long winter, with unshaken fortitude. Welling-
ton stood steadfastly on the defensive, deaf to the
T
I
I
I
86 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
unstinting abuse of those who called him incap-
able, timorous, nothing better than a coward. The
English press at home was filled with the con-
temptuous complaints of his own officers. He
chafed bitterly at the hostile correspondence main-
tained by these ignorant critics, but he was not to
be shaken in his purpose. One of the worst was
a man at his right hand, Charles Stewart, his
adjutant-general, brother to Lord Castlereagh, his
patron and friend. Wellington made short work
of Stewart, and when he had plainly convicted
him of underhand communication, he gave him to
understand that unless he desisted he should be
sent straight home.
The English general at this time had not only
to complain of unfriendly criticism, but he had to
deal with the dangerous and unguarded utterances
of many officers who in their letters home gave
much information to the enemy. ** All this would
not much signify," he declares, **if our staff
and other officers would mind their business, in-
stead of writing news and keeping coffee-houses.
But as soon as an accident happens, every man
who can write, and who has a friend who can read,
sits down to write his account of what he does
not know, and his comments on what he does not
understand ; and these are diligently circulated and
SAFETY OF THE ALLIES 87
exaggerated by the idle and malicious, of whom
there are plenty in all armies." The evil resisted
treatment, the most scathing general^ orders. "It
is a fact, come to the knowledge of the com-
mander of the forces, that the plans of the enemy
have been founded on information extracted from
the English newspapers, which information must
have been obtained through private letters from
officers of the army." Again he gives his general
opinion that '* We are the most indefatigable writers
of letters and of news that exist in the world, and
the fashion and spirit of the times gives encourage-
ment to lies."
However, as the year 18 10 drew to its close,
«
through the succeeding winter, and well into the
spring, the profound wisdom of Wellington's de-
fensive system was brought home convincingly to
the most sceptical. The allied army, safe behind
the entrenchments, lived in comfort, while Massena
starved outside. For once the British commissariat
worked well : supplies were plentiful ; the army was
in close touch with England over sea. While
this long period of leisure was fully occupied in
developing military efficiency, in constant drills,
marches, and manoeuvres, the sports and games so
dear to Englishmen were constantly pursued ; new
arrivals who now landed, fearing to find no army,
88 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
were astonished to be welcomed by friends in good
case, and who, for all their discontented grumblings,
began to seejthat Wellington was right.
Meanwhile Massena held his ground with ex-
traordinary tenacity, undismayed by the horrible
sufferings of his troops, in an enemy's country
wasted and depopulated by famine, fire, and the
sword. By the ist of March he had lost a third
of his numbers ; it was indeed a marvel that his
army still existed. It was said that the French
had subsisted all those months in a country that
would not have fed a British brigade. Years after-
wards, when Massena met Wellington in Paris, he
told him how much he had suffered in this terrible
time. '* Ah! Monsieur le Mardchal," he said, *'que
vous m'avez fait passer des mauvais moments I "
and he assured his great antagonist that he had
not left him one black hair on his whole body.
Massena's retreat before Wellington is generally
counted one of his finest operations, conducted as it
was through an inhospitable country, with an alert
and enterprising foe at his heels — for Wellington
was soon able to prove that he could strike as well
as stand upon his guard. Massena, " the cunning
old fox," as Wellington called him, fell back fight-
ing, and having more than once changed the direc-
tion of his retreat, finally recrossed the frontier
MASSENA'S RETREAT 89
into Spain just three weeks later, having lost from
first to last 30,000 men.
Warfare more or less desultory followed. Two
subsidiary battles were fought in the south, Barrosa
and Albuera.^ Wellington laid siege to Badajoz,
but it was relieved by Soult, to be again be-
sieged without success by Beresford the same year.
Meanwhile Massena made a last essay to restore
his fortunes, and being bent upon relieving Almeida,
fought and lost the battle of Fuentes d'Onoro.
This closed Massena s career; he was recalled to
Paris, and never fought again for the master who
was always intolerant of non-success. Yet the
last battle (Fuentes d'Onoro) was by no means a
defeat. It was so close a thing that Wellington
himself believed' the English would have been
beaten if Napoleon, not Massena, had commanded
the French. *' We had nearly three to one against
us engaged — about four to one of cavalry; and,
moreover, our cavalry had not a gallop in them,
while some of the enemy's were fresh and in excel-
lent order." In telling the story at his own table,
a couple of years later, he admitted that he had
made one great mistake in this battle — he had
over-extended his right ; and said that had the
French taken advantage of it, the consequences
* See under head of Graham and Beresford.
90 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
might have been serious ; ** but they permitted him
to recover himself and to change front before their
face."^
The final expulsion of the French from Portugal
greatly improved Wellington's position at home.
The Government saw now, with his eyes, that the
Peninsula was the true arena of contest, and they
were no more to be led away into vain adventure
on other theatres of war. The lesson of Walcheren
had been a bitter and disastrous experience ; a
capable commander was not to be starved for means
that they should be wasted elsewhere. Wellington
was accordingly promised reinforcements; he was
permitted to accept the supreme command of the
Spanish armies, and otherwise encouraged. Still
his difficulties at the seat of war were not greatly
diminished ; he was kept very short of cash, the
Portuguese at his elbow always gave endless
trouble, and Marmont, who had replaced Massena,
did not mean to remain idle. The main object of
the Frehch was to raise the siege of Badajoz, which
Wellington had resumed. Soult, co-operating from
Andalucia, attacked Beresford before he could be
reinforced, and the magnificent battle of Albuera
was fought, the bloodiest and most desperate ever
won by our unconquerable troops. Marmont and
* Larpent, 65.
CIUDAD RODRIGO 91
Soult now combined, and Wellington, leaving Bada-
joz, faced them undaunted with inferior forces, which
yet imposed sufficiently on a gallant enemy too
frequently worsted of late to enter willingly upon a
fresh encounter.
No active operations of a serious kind marked
the last half of this year. Wellington and Marmont
watched each other closely. The English com-
mander, ever keen to secure one or both of the great
fortresses that must form his base for any offensive
campaign, laid siege to Ciudad Rodrigo. Marmont,
who was numerically stronger at the decisive points,
frustrated every endeavour, succoured the place when
in its direst extremity, fought many serious com-
bats that might easily have expanded into great
battles. In the fall of the year both the opposing
armies went into winter quarters, but Marmont
first renewed the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, and
Wellington continued to observe it.
CHAPTER VII
THE TURNING TIDE
New plans — Fall of Ciudad Rodrigo and of Badajoz — Salamanca —
Burgos besieged, and retreat therefrom — Results of campaign of 1812.
WITH i8t2 the war entered upon a new
stage — the last, as it may be called, of
Wellington s probation. It was a season
of great triumphs, of strongholds captured and
victories won ; if failure closed the year, it was
absolved by a masterly retreat, that most difficult of
all operations, and now at last clamour was silenced
and his reputation securely established.
Yet 181 2 dawned with no great promise.
Wellington's prolonged inactivity was again causing
the keenest dissatisfaction in the public mind at
home. It was essential to perform some feat of
arms, to win some advantage soon, and he quietly
cast about him calculating the comparative cost of
each. Among the various enterprises that offered,
one by its very audacity seemed the most hopeless
and impossible, and that was the capture of Ciudad
Rodrigo by a coup de main. His army seemed
9a
NEW PLANS 93
quite unequal to it. The health of the troops was
indifferent, great numbers were in hospital ; never
before had supplies been so scarce; the men, in
their ragged uniforms, with pay months in arrears,
were continually on half rations, for days without
bread ; all animals, artillery and cavalry horses, the
mules of the transport trains, were half starved.
These undoubted facts were fully known to
Marmont, and lulled him into false security ; he
could not believe the English general, beset with
such innumerable troubles, would dare assume the
offensive. Wellington, on the other hand, correctly
judging Marmont's mind, was the more encouraged
to act. He resolved to fall upon Ciudad Rodrigo,
hoping to carry it by a coup de main before the
enemy, widely disseminated in search of subsistence,
could gather together to raise the siege. He laid
his plans with consummate secrecy and astuteness.
A battering train was collected at Almeida with the
excuse of re-arming that fortress ; large parties ol
infantry were trained in the business of military
engineering. A strong trestle-bridge was pre-
pared for the passage of the river Agueda, upon
which the fortress stands. When all was ready,
at the moment when least expected, in the depth of
winter, the most unlikely and unsuitable season, he
swooped down on the fortress.
94 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
The siege and capture of Ciudad Rodrigo, an
affair completed between the 8th and the 19th of
January, was a magnificent achievement, one of the
most brilliant exploits performed by Wellington's
army. It is "the only well-authenticated example
of a breach, retrenched and well supplied with men,
being carried by an effort of cool but determined
courage against a brave and skilful enemy."* The
assault was delivered prematurely. Time was of
such vital importance, Marmont was so near, that
the place must be taken before bombardment had
opened a sufficient breach. What Wellington ex-
pected even at a terrible sacrifice of life, his soldiers
unhesitatingly accomplished.
Badajoz, the second of the Spanish frontier gates,
was next attempted, and Wellington sat down before
it upon the 9th of March. On the i6th the siege
was begun by Picton with three divisions, 15,000
men, while Hill with 30,000 more covered the
operation against Soult. Philippon, one of the
most chivalrous and dauntless of Frenchmen, held
the place with a garrison of only 5000 ; but their
gallantry, backed by his engineering skill, made up
for paucity of numbers. Here again time was the
essence of the situation. Strict rules of procedure
must be set aside, whatever the cost. The plan
* Jones, " Sieges in Spain."
CIUDAD RODRIGO AND BADAJOZ 95
adopted was never approved by those who formed
and carried it out ; but it was a matter of neces-
sity, ** because no means were at hand to execute
a better."
Eighteen hundred men worked in the trenches
knee deep in mud. On the 25th March the
bombardment opened; two great outworks were
silenced, and so seriously damaged that they were
captured by assault that same night. Next day
new parallels were traced, more batteries prepared ;
but now Marmont was reported as threatening
Ciudad Rodrigo, and Soult was rapidly approach-
ing from Seville. The latter had reached Llerena
on the 5th, and next day Wellington made his
assault. It was neck or nothing ; he could not
afford to wait ; if Badajoz was not taken at once,
he must retire. Four principal columns went up
to the attack ; that at the breaches failed ; prodi-
gies of valour were unavailing against the stubborn
resistance. Had not Picton carried the castle
by escalade, and the 5th Division seized the St.
Vincent bastion, the day must have gone against
us. But these successes pierced Philippon s de-
fence, and ere long he surrendered with his
garrison. Although dearly bought, the posses-
sion of these two fortresses was a splendid prize,
for Ciudad Rodrigo gave Wellington a strategical
96 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
advantage, the benefits of which he was not slow to
gather.
He was now able to choose whether he would
move to the southward against Soult, attack
Marmont, who was based on Salamanca, or operate
against Joseph in Madrid. He decided on the
second, hoping that success against. Marmont would
free the capital. The campaign of Salamanca
which followed is admirably calculated to show
Wellington at his best and worst. His worst,
because he was undoubtedly outmanoeuvred by
Marmont, who, although not a really great com-
mander, showed himself the English generals
tactical superior. His best, because he owed his
ultimate success to unerring promptitude in dealing
with a flagrant tactical error. When his adversary
rashly extended himself, thinking to gain an easy
victory over an army in full retreat, Wellington
delivered the great counter-stroke, with the happy
result of "beating forty thousand men in forty
minutes." Yet even here the batde was long in
doubt, and was gained by the English general
because he had the strongest reserves. It should
have been more decisive, however, and the whole
of the beaten army must have surrendered had not
a careless and disobedient Spanish leader neglected
to hold an important post upon the river Tormes.
CAMPAIGN OF BURGOS 97
Salamanca, according to the historian, may be con-
sidered Wellingtons most skilful battle: **Assaye
was more wonderful, Waterloo more glorious, but
at Salamanca he dominated the field with the
mastery of a practised hand."
This success opened the way to the capital, and,
amid the rejoicings of the inhabitants, Wellington
marched forward. The French were disorganised,
and everywhere in full retreat. Clausel, now com-
manding Marmont's army, had drawn back behind
Burgos ; Joseph had evacuated Madrid, and was
making for the east coast to combine with Suchet ;
Soult's communications were imperilled, and he was
obliged to abandon Andalucia,
Campaign of Burgos.
12th Aug. Wellington entered Madrid, where
he captured a whole arsenal of stores. In this the
heart and centre of Spain, he could plan his next
movements and decide whether to move against
Clausel, Suchet, or Soult. The French had rallied,
and were making fresh head. He himself was in
greater diflficulties, suffering more than ever from the
neglect of the Home Government and the supine-
ness of his Spanish allies. **We are absolutely
bankrupt,*' he writes. '*The troops are now five
98 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
months in arrears, instead of being five months in
advance. The staff have not been paid since
February, the muleteers not since June 1811 ; and
we are in debt in all parts of the country. I
am obliged to take the money sent to me by my
brother for the Spaniards, to give my own troops
a fortnight's pay, who are really suffering for want
of money." He was in sore need of everything,
remounts for cavalry and artillery, and especially
commissariat supplies. It was no doubt with the
wish to establish a new base on the Biscayan
coast,^ and a shorter line of operations, that he now
resolved to attack Burgos. With that strong place
in his possession he could abandon Portugal, and
securing thus a nearer communication with home,
he would also eat like a gangrene into the flank of
the French line of retreat.
igth Sept. The siege of Burgos was begun
with insufficient means — ^a very meagre battering
train, three 18 and five 24 pounders — and the
work in the trenches was entrusted largely to
the Portuguese. A first assault failed, and was
followed with despondency ; a second assault was
only partially successful ; three others failed to give
Wellington possession of the place. The weather
became horribly inclement, and added greatly to the
* Accomplished the following year.
RETREAT INEVITABLE 99
discomfort and hopelessness of the besiegers, whose
numbers diminished daily by sickness. Wellington
was short of all kinds of siege material, he could
bring up no reinforcements, and now he learnt that
Soult had combined with Joseph ; the French had
concentrated from the east and south, while those
in his front were prepared to resume the offensive.
Retreat became inevitable.
2isi Oct, Wellington broke up from his lines
before Burgos, choosing the most direct route,
which led his columns right under the guns of the
castle. He moved with the utmost secrecy, march-
ing in silence, his gun wheels muffled in straw, and
managed so well that only his rear-guard was fired
upon.
2 7^rd Oct. He had retired to the Pisuerga; and
24M Oct. To the Carrion.
29M Oct. He was behind the Douro. The
French crossed lower down, at Tordesillas, and
made Wellington's position untenable ; but he
moved to his left and forbade their passage in
any force.
Meanwhile Hill had stood fast at Madrid, still
showing a bold front against Soult, Joseph, and
Suchet, who were converging upon him ; but
30M Oct. He commenced to withdraw through
the passes of the Guadarrama to rejoin Wellington,
loo THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
the French following on his footsteps, but not in
great strength.
Si A Nov. He reached the Tormes, and was
in touch with Wellington at Salamanca, The
combined British forces now numbered 68,000.
The French also had concentrated, Soult and his
comrade marshals having stretched a hand north-
ward and joining with Wellington's pursuers ; their
united forces were 90,000 strong.
\\th Nov. Soult moved forward, and would
have attacked Wellington had he held his ground,
but the English general prudently withdrew in the
face of superior numbers. His retreat was accom-
plished by an audacious march, under cover of
fog and rain, round the enemy's left, by which he
secured the roads on Ciudad Rodrigo.
i()th Nov. The whole army was behind the
Agueda, and under cover of the Portuguese
frontier.
Thus the brilliant successes of the early part
of the year ended in this masterly but disastrous
retreat. It was an operation to try hard the forti-
tude and self-reliance of the greatest commander,
and never was Wellington's coolness, self-possession,
and adroitness more admirably displayed. The
army was only saved by his firmness from degene-
rating into a rabble rout. The bonds of discipline
RETREAT FROM BURGOS loi
had been sadly relaxed in retreat ; everything con-
tributed to demoralise the troops — short rations,
the insufficiency of transport, persistently inclement
weather. Men broke out into licence and rapine ;
drunkenness, outrage, insubordination were terribly
rife, and could not be checked even by the strong
hand. Wellington in bitter language blamed his
officers ; they retorted, and openly blamed their
superiors. Much hardship and inconvenience were
entailed by the mistakes of the overworked staff:
there was no nice calculation of movements ;
divisions and regiments moved too soon or too
late, were halted for hours exposed to furious
rains ; they struggled on ankle-deep in mud, often
barefoot, always soaked to the skin ; they were left
to bivouac in swampy ground starved with hunger,
or were roused at midnight to receive rations they
could not cook. It was a repetition, intensified, of
the retreat upon Corunna, and the total loss was
little less than 9000 men with much baggage.
Not strangely, this retreat, with all its sufferings
and failures, tried Wellington's blossoming repu-
tation hard. There was a fresh outburst of dis-
content in England ; Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, and
Salamanca were already forgotten. The cry that
Wellington was incompetent was again raised, but
he found friends now with the Opposition, which
I02 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
felt it convenient to attack the Government for
not supplying him with adequate means. Happily
the right triumphed. The blame fell upon those
who merited it. Wellington was further advanced
in rank, and during the winter he received
reinforcements and supplies to enable him to
recommence operations under better auspices in
the spring. He himself spoke modestly of his
achievements in 1812. ** Although we have not
been able to hold the two Castilles," he wrote, " our
campaign has not been a bad one, and we are in a
position to make a good one next year." Napier
goes further, and declares that ** this campaign,
including the sieges of Rodrigo, Badajoz, the
forts of Salamanca, and of Burgos, the assault of
Almaraz and the fight of Salamanca, will probably
be considered his finest illustration of the art of
II
war.
CHAPTER VIII
THE MAN, WELLINGTON
Wellington's burthen — His crosses and difficulties — His breadth of
grasp — His self-confidence, sense of duty, untiring energy — Exacts
implicit obedience from all — Full of resource — Has two sets of staff-
officers— His personal vanity — His physical strength and powers of
endurance.
IT will be well to pause here for a moment to
get some idea of Wellington as a man, of his
personal attributes, to consider the many fine
qualities in his complex character. He was now
nearing the climax of his reputation as a great
commander ; he had conquered the esteem of his
enemies, was respected and feared by the chivalrous
foe in front of him, and was rising superior to scur-
rilous calumny and backbiting at home. He had
earned the most unbounded confidence, and was
assured of the most strenuous support from the men
he had so often led to victory. There is no more
striking picture in our national records than that of
Wellington as he bore with uncomplaining fortitude
the immense burthen laid upon him in the Penin-
sular war. He was then, in truth, that " sight for
the gods," a great man struggling with adversity.
103
I04 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
The difficulties, constant and continually varied, of
his daily life can hardly be exaggerated. Any who,
through forgetfulness or incomplete knowledge,
might be disposed in these latter days to belittle
his achievements, should be reminded of what he
did, and how he did it. He carried everything on
his own shoulders. We have seen something of
his crosses, in regard to the neglect of the Home
Government, the excesses of his troops, the faith-
lessness and uselessness of his allies. Worse than
all was the incompetence of so many of his sub-
ordinates ; he complained bitterly at times of the
ignorance and inefficiency of his lieutenants, and
repeatedly reported the facts home, deploring the
trouble he had in making them understand the
objects he had in view, even in obeying the orders
he gave. ** It is to be hoped," he writes to Lord
Liverpool, **that general and other officers will at
last acquire the experience that will teach them
that success can only be attained by attention to
the most minute details, by tracing every part of
every operation to its conclusion point by point,
and ascertaining that the whole is understood by
those who mean to execute it." How sometimes
his brigadiers disappointed him is told in the story of
the one who, having committed a flagrant mistake,
made the excuse that his eyesight was defective.
HIS SELF-CONFIDENCE 105
The Duke (then Lord Wellington) asked his age.
** Forty -four," was the reply. **Oh," said his chief
contemptuously, who was at that time forty-one,
*• you will be a great soldier when you are as old as
I am." It must be remembered that in those days
no really good and practical school to form the
superior officers had existed, India alone excepted.
No English army had made a really serious war on
large lines upon the Continent of Europe since the
days of Marlborough. But it was out of these un-
promising materials that some of the best modern
English generals, after Wellington, were made.
Such men as Beresford, Hill, Graham, Picton, Cole,
Colville, Clinton, Byng, Beckwith, Colborne, and
many more, came well through the ordeal of tested
efficiency in the field.
A leader often so badly served by many of his
lieutenants was not likely to seek their advice, nor
be greatly guided by their opinion. But it was
peculiarly characteristic of Wellington that he never
appealed to others, never summoned councils of war
to give him their confidence and support. He
elicited the fullest information, and for this pur-
pose regularly gathered together staff and heads
of departments, listening patiently to all. When
he had heard, weighed, assimilated everything,
he made up his own mind, acting according to
io6 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
his lights, on his own judgment alone. Then, he
planned his instructions himself, often most minutely,
issued his own orders, and expected them to be im-
plicitly obeyed. But his decision was final, and he
imposed his will authoritatively on the rest. It was
this that gave him such a commanding influence
on all about him ; he was in truth the master, the
real supreme chief, to whom all looked, on whom
all depended. This concentration of will and
authority in one single individual is no doubt a
necessity to secure success in war ; nevertheless,
when carried to its furthest limits, it undoubtedly
tends to dwarf and discourage, and while checking
independence in thought and action, will frequently
develop mediocrity.
Nothing was too intricate, too small for his
personal attention. It has been said of his de-
spatches that they exhibit in a marked degree his
extraordinary breadth of grasp. ** You might have
fancied the writer of one letter to have been bred
in a merchant's counting-house, of another that
he was a commissaire de guerre, or a profound
diplomatist, or a financier, or a jurist." The day
before the commencement of most important field
operations, with a mass of most intricate military
details on his hands, he wrote two sheets of fools-
cap, in his own hand, to Sir James M*Grigor, on
HIS SENSE OF DUTY 107
a disputed question of medical administration, ex-
plaining at length his reasons for differing with
his principal medical officer. Then Wellington
invariably saw personally to the execution of his
own designs and plans. He kept all the lines
in his own hands ; he liked to look into every-
thing, to superintend the execution of everything
for himself. " I am obliged to be everywhere ; if
absent from any operation, something goes wrong."
This feeling was no doubt partly due to his dis-
trust of so many of his agents ; it Wcis, of course,
encouraged by his own almost unbounded self-
confidence ; still, it had its chief seat in the strong
sense of duty that governed all his public actions.
From first to last he was the ** mimmuck wallah,"
as he called himself — the man who had ** eaten the
king's salt," and who must give his utmost loyal
endeavour to any task entrusted to him.
To say that Wellington never trusted any of
his staff or those about him is not exactly correct.
When he found a good man he was glad enough
to utilise him to the full. Such were, however, the
bright exceptions, and for the most part not those
appointed from home, but those whom he dis-
covered and brought forward himself, generally
from the junior ranks. For, in his own words, he
believed " the young ones will always beat the old
io8 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
ones," not a new or singular opinion; but he usually
qualified the dictum by adding that this was more
particularly the case when the old were ** without
experience." But for his own keen discrimination
in choosing out and advancing the most competent
men he could find, his difficulties would have been
enormously increased.
It was an ever-rankling grievance with him that
the Horse Guards authorities made so many bad
appointments to his staff. ^ Another sore point was
his powerlessness to reward meritorious service.
He could give the capable extended responsibili-
ties, larger command, greater opportunity, but not
promotion. It has been well said, in comparing
the means at the disposal of the two great leaders
of those days, Napoleon and Wellington, that the
English general could not promote a corporal, while
the French emperor could make a duke, and by
a mere stroke of his pen. At a time only imme-
diately antecedent to the Peninsular war, English
commanders in the field had possessed great
patronage ; most of the generals of the day had
been rapidly advanced by such chiefs as Howe,
Clinton, Cornwallis, Burgoyne, Dorchester ; but
this power of giving promotion on active ser-
vice had lately been abolished, and, as a natural
^ See post, p. 163 — Waterloo.
HIS LIMITED POWERS 109
consequence, Wellington was unable to incite offi-
cers to their best efforts. " We who command the
armies of the country, and are expected to make
exertions greater than those made by the French,
. . . have not the power of rewarding or promising
a reward for a single officer of the army." we find
it stated in a letter to Lord Castlereagh. ** It
may be supposed that I wish for this patronage
to gratify my own favourites ; but I declare most
solemnly that if I had it to-morrow, there is not a
soul in the army whom I would wish to promote
excepting for services performed. I would not give
one pin to have the disposal of every commission in
the army." But he insists upon the necessity for
a change in the system : ** It is not known to the
army and to strangers, and I am almost ashamed
of acknowledging, the small degree (I ought to say
nullity) of power of reward which belongs to my
situation ; and it is really extraordinary that I have
got on so well hitherto without it But the day must
come when this system must be altered," It has
not yet arrived, although this prediction is nearly a
century old ; ^ and although a successful commander
^ An instance of this, not a singular one, was that of Ensign Dyas, of the
15th Regiment, who twice volunteered to lead storming parties on the outwork
of San Cristoval at the first si^e of Badajoz in i8ii. His name was men-
tioned in despatches, and Lord Wellington recommended him for promotion ;
yet he never obtained it till after the return of the army from the Peninsula
no THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
in the field can recommend a good officer for pro-
motion, he can do no more.
No doubt Wellington had his own good
reasons for distrusting his staff, but he carried it
to a questionable extreme. He relied so entirely
upon himself, that he would permit no one to make
suggestions, still less to take action, even in the
smallest matters, without his authority. To ques-
tion his orders, to hesitate to obey them, to
traverse or impede them, was with him the great
and unpardonable sin. He never forgave insub-
ordination, or the faintest indication of it. This
explains his implacable resentment against Norman
Ramsay, the most gallant of horse-artillerymen,^
whose guilt in this respect was never clearly
proved, but whom Wellington unsparingly con-
demned. It was this that went near causing a
breach between him and his principal medical
officer. Sir James M'Grigor, with whom, recog-
nising his true worth, he had hitherto been on
the best of terms. The state of the sick and
wounded after Salamanca was so deplorable that
M'Grigor had taken upon himself to order up
in 1 814, and then only by an accidental meeting with an influential person,
the late Sir Frederick Ponsonby, who once more brought his services before
the Horse Guards. Besides neglect or forgetfulness, there existed much
jealousy of recommendations which interfered with home patronage.
^ See post, p. 227.
EXACTS IMPLICIT OBEDIENCE in
commissariat officers and purveyors, and to take
other measures for their relief. Wellington was
furious. *' I should like to know who is to com-
mand the army? I or you.** I establish one route,
one line of communication for the army ; you estab-
lish another, and order the commissariat and sup-
plies by that line. As long as you live, sir, never
do so again ; never do anything without my orders."
M'Grigor pleaded that there was no time to
consult him to save life. Wellington repeated per-
emptorily that nothing must be done without his
orders. Even later on, in the retreat from Madrid,
when the excellence of M*Grigors arrangements
greatly simplified Wellington s task, the autocratic
chief would not yield on the point of duty. Welling-
ton would only admit that it had all turned out very
well ; *' but I recommend you, still, to have my
orders for what you are to do." No wonder this
imperious spirit made him a terror to his staff.
Whether " his lordship " was or was not in a good
temper was anxiously debated at each morning's
levee. There were times indeed when, things
having gone wrong, he gave way to his ill-humour
and snubbed them all unmercifully. At others a
child, so to speak, might play with him. There
were ways of doing business that pleased him,
others that offended him mightily. He could not
112 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
tolerate diffuseness or hesitation in speech ; a man
must go straight to the point with him, short and
sharp, or expect to hear about it. "He could not
bear a roundabout story. Conciseness, alacrity, and
energy were the elements in which he lived. He
liked all that was to be done or said brought to a
point closely and quickly." ^
He judged people very much by their way in
putting things before him, expecting prompt replies
to his questions, off-hand, without notes.* Sir James
M*Grigor tells us that he found Wellington "dis-
liked my coming to him with a written paper ; he
was fidgety and evidently displeased when I re-
ferred to my notes." Another bHe noir was the
making of difficulties : " Never let me hear of them
about anything." He wished to banish such words
as "difficulty," "responsibility," from his vocabu-
lary. He was so full of ingenuity and resource
himself, that he expected others to be the same.
He conquered everything by his ready adapta-
bility of the circumstances as he found them to
the ends he had in view. " No scaling-ladders
for Ciudad Rodrigo? Saw up the waggons of the
transport ; they have done their work." " Want
planking? Use up the platforms of your siege
^ Larpent.
^ Cf, Kinglake and the Duke's approval of Aircy.
GAIETY OF MIND 113
batteries, and make fresh platforms when you
get to the pinewoods of Bayonne." These were
his brief solutions of stiff problems that puzzled
others.
For a long time he was especially dissatisfied
with, possibly a little hard upon, the artillery and
its senior officers. He thought them slow and
inert, and told them so. *' I took care to let him
feel that I thought him very stupid," was his re-
mark upon one artillery commander who had come
under his displeasure. ** And I have no doubt he
said it in very plain terms," was the subsequent
comment of Murray, the quartermaster - general,
who had heard Wellington s remark. This same
artillery officer was again in trouble when having
an audience with the commander of the forces
about some friend's case. Wellington became
exasperated, and told the colonel that his friend
might go to a certain warm place. "Very good,
sir ; then I'll go to the quartermaster-general for
a route," retorted the old chap ; and Wellington,
who really loved a joke, laughed heartily. Few
could tell a good story better, few enjoyed one
more. Rogers, in his ** Recollections," records that
the Duke had great gaiety of mind. *' He laughs
at almost everything if it serves to divert him. . . .
His laugh is easily excited, and it is very loud and
H
114 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
long, like the whoop of a whooping-cough often
repeated." No doubt Wellington had his weak
moments — one in particular, when waiting for
his horse to mount and go out with the hounds.
Astute generals and staff-officers would come to
him then, when he was in high good -humour,
and get through their business, much to their own
satisfaction. Others would range up alongside him
in the run, and get him to decide things in a hasty
way, **in a way I did not always intend," but which
they were prompt to adopt if it suited them. At
last Wellington would have no more of it, and, with
one of the strong expressions he no doubt learnt
in Flanders, he gave it out that he would never talk
on business when in the hunting-field.
Before leaving the subject of his Peninsular
staff, it is well to record in this place a curious fact
regarding it. He had always two distinct sets of
staff-officers — one, so to speak, for use, the other
for show, or, more exactly, for companionship in
private life. With the first he was strictly their
general commanding, with the second he was a
more or less *'off duty" comrade and good friend.
He chose his personal staff mostly from his own
class, following that decided bias towards aristo-
cratic connection to which I have already referred.
His aides-de-camp were generally titled youngsters
SIMPLICITY OF ENTOURAGE 115
whom he called by their Christian names, who sat
round his table and amused him with the gossip of
society at home, and helped him in that hospitable
entertainment for which the Duke was so justly
famous in Spain. No one was more liberal in
that respect, and he was no doubt proud of it.
**You will get a better dinner with me," he said
on one occasion when a guest he had invited
refused, pleading a prior engagement with another
subordinate general.
Yet there was no ** swagger," as we should call
it, no pretension about Wellington, even when
generalissimo of a fine and victorious army. He
did not care for the show and glitter, the pomp
and circumstance of his rank; a single aide-de-
camp only accompanied him in his rides or in the
presence of the enemy — so much so, that he often
ventured almost within their lines unsuspected, for
the French could not suppose that so great a
general would ride about with only one or two
attendants. In quarters there was a marked sim-
plicity in his entourage. Once, in France, a great
local authority who wished to call on him found
that he could enter his room without ceremony, and
that he was seated there alone. ** Marshal Soult,"
said the Frenchman, "would have had, at least,
a general officer in waiting in the ante - chamber.
ii6 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
and a host of aides and orderly officers outside the
door."
With all his simplicity so far as his surround-
ings went, Wellington was not without a certain
amount of personal vanity. Although by no means
a handsome man, he thought a good deal of his
outward appearance, and was always extremely
natty and particular about his dress. Larpent tells
us of the chiefs fondness for well-fitting breeches
and well-made hessians or hunting-boots. There
was a strain of vanity, too, in his using a distinctive
costume with the hounds, which he followed in the
Peninsula on every possible opportunity (the army,
it will be remembered, had a couple of packs —
one Wellington s, one which became in after years
the nucleus of the well-known Calpe Hunt at
Gibraltar). The Duke (or Lord Wellington, or
" the Peer," as he then was generally termed) was
in the dress of the Hampshire Hunt, at that time
pale blue with a black cape ; a very marked con-
trast, no doubt, to the rest of the costumes in the
field. Yet, beyond liking his clothes well made, so
as to show his then youthful figure to best appear-
ance, it cannot be said that he cared for gaudy
uniforms, and he was best known in the field by
the plain blue coat, and, sometimes, a white over-
coat and a cocked hat without feathers.
POWERS OF ENDURANCE 117
Wellington s passion for hunting was the natural
craving of an active man for hard bodily exercise.
No one could take more, whether for pleasure or
business, or wanted it more. His office labours
were incessant, but he threw them off easily, enjoyed
himself thoroughly, and returned without a murmur
to his desk. He could stand the heaviest strain,
mental or physical. Larpent, who was his judge-
advocate-general, describes him as always the most
active of his whole party ; prided himself on it :
**he stayed at business at Frenada until half-past
three, then rode full seventeen miles to Ciudad
Rodrigo for dinner, . . . was in high glee, danced,
stayed supper, at half- past three in the morning
went back by moonlight, arrived at six, and was
ready again for business at twelve." He travelled
from Lisbon to Frenada, nearly two hundred miles,
in five days, with relays of horses — riding the last
day fifty miles between breakfast and dinner.
CHAPTER IX
MILITARY QUALITIES
Wellington personally controls everything — His military reputation
now established — His demeanour in the field — Busaco, Badajoz,
Salamanca, Vittoria, Burgos — His forbearance to Craufurd and
others.
WELLINGTON'S hands were always full.
Till Larpent joined him as judge-advocate,
the general-in-chief had attended to all
the court-martial work — framing charges, reading
evidence, revising the proceedings. Yet in this
department alone there was so much to do that
Larpent was nearly fagged to death. As he writes
in one of his letters : '* I really scarcely know where
to turn, and my fingers are quite fatigued, as well as
my brains, with the arrangements and difficulties as
to witnesses," &c. Lord Wellington remarked on
this : "If your friends knew what was going on
here, they would think you had no sinecure. And
how do you suppose I was plagued when I had to
do it nearly all myself?"
*' Lord Wellington," says Larpent, "reads and
looks into everything. He hunts almost every
ii8
CONTROLS EVERYTHING 119
other day, and then makes up for it by great dili-
gence and instant decision on the intermediate days.
He works until about 4 p.m., and then for an hour
or two parades, with any one he wants to talk to,
up and down the square of Frenada (amidst all the
chattering Portuguese) in his grey coat." He knew
each man's work, and could insist on its being
properly done ; he controlled the medical depart-
ment, now grown to consist of 700 doctors under
Dr. M'Grigor; the quartermaster-general, Murray,^
** one of the best heads in the arrriy," took his orders
direct from Wellington on all the intricacies of
routes and movements, and the provision of equip-
ment ; the adjutant-general, Stewart, was never safe
with a chief whose eye checked every figure and
instantly detected any error in the casting up of
totals. Then there was the more secret and confi-
dential business of obtaining intelligence. A whole
army of agents and spies worked for him and with
him, often direct, from the ubiquitous and inimitable
Colquhoun Grant and the equally useful Colonel
Waters, whose adventures would outdo the most
ingenious romance, to the rank and file, the peasantry
who came and went between the two camps and
took news to both. Wellington had his spies of all
1 ((
' Apparently very clever and clear-headed. In my opinion he comes
next to Wellington, as far as I have seen." — Larpent, 86.
I20 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
ranks in Spain, and a Spanish marquesa con-
stantly sent him valuable information from Madrid,
and yet hated her country's champions as cordially
as she did its French oppressors. This lady, when
asked which she preferred, French or English,
declared that she wished she might see the latter
hanged con las tripas (with the intestines) of the
other. Another was Dr. Curtis, an Irish priest, head
of the seminary at Salamanca, who was a staunch
ally, and who nearly paid the penalty with his life
when the French reoccupied the place. ^
Wellington s reputation as a military leader was
now established beyond dispute. It is pictured
vividly with almost photographic minuteness by
contemporary writers, who do full justice to his
soldierly qualities, his fortitude under adverse cir-
cumstances, his coolness and self-possession, his
unwearied patience when waiting on events, many
of which he had slowly prepared, his prompt unerr-
ing decision when the time for action had arrived.
We may see him in every situation : harassed with
doubts, tormented with difficulties, but ever sanguine,
self-reliant, self-contained. At the passage of the
Douro he away ts, calmly confident, the news of
^ Dr. Curtis was subsequently titular archbishop of Dublin, and when
the Duke was engaged upon the question of Catholic emancipation, was
consulted by Wellington.
DEMEANOUR IN THE FIELD 121
Murray's movement higher up, then issues the brief
order, ** Let the men cross " — a hazardous enterprise,
the very audacity of which assured its success. At
Talavera, with the strongest suspicion of Cuesta's
treachery, the certain knowledge of the cowardice
and incompetence of his Spanish allies, he meets
the French attack quite undismayed. Wellington
undoubtedly influenced the result, and may be said
to have won the battle for himself; he was, as ever,
at the decisive point ; it was by his definite order —
that of a consummate master of tactics, prescient, and
therefore fully prepared to strike in — that Donellan
came up with the 48th and changed the fate of
the day after the rash gallantry of the Guards had
jeopardised it. At Busaco, again, in the crisis of
the battle, when the French with astonishing valour
had climbed the heights and were securely estab-
lished in the heart of our position, it was Wellington
who brought up artillery to tear their flank, while
the fresh infantry he had at hand drove the enemy
headlong down the heights. At Fuentes d'Onoro,
when, yielding to the advice of Sir Brent Spencer,
he tried to hold too much ground and was in
imminent peril of defeat, he saved himself by the
skill and promptitude of his tactical dispositions.
An eye-witness^ has preserved an admirable
* Maxwell, '* Peninsular Sketches," i. 305.
122 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
picture of Wellington at the supreme moment when
all seemed lost at the last assault at Badajoz. The
narrator stood near him as with set face, stern, but
haggard and grey with anxiety, he received the
news, bad news, worse news. " My lord, I have
come from the breaches," says a staff-officer, gallop-
ing up. **The troops, after repeated efforts, have
failed to enter them. Colonel M'Leod, of the 43rd,
is killed. So many officers have fallen, that the
men are without leaders and dispersed in the ditch.
Unless your lordship can send large reinforcements
at once, the attack must fail.*' By the light of a
lantern Wellington read the report ; then, speaking
with the utmost coolness and self-possession, said
shortly, '* Let Major-General Hay's brigade advance."
Another interval of hideous anxiety followed, and
then the scene suddenly changes.
" My lord," says one of his staff, ** I hear that
General Picton has obtained possession of the
castle."
" Who brings the news ? *
The messenger approaches.
'*Are you certain, sir?" asks the anxious
general.
*' I entered the castle with the troops, and have
only just left it. General Picton is inside," is the
reply.
AT BADAJOZ 123
** With how many men ? "
** His whole division."
** Return, sir, to General Picton, and desire him
to retain his position at all hazards. And you" —
to one of his own staff — ** follow and repeat the
same order."
The business had indeed been gallantly done,
and there is no more splendid record of heroism
than that escalade of Badajoz by Picton's division.
Colonel Ridge, of the 5th, was the first to climb the
ladder ; he was one of the *' Come on " class, and
by his noble eagerness he paved the way to success.
Not strangely, Wellington afterwards told Picton
that the 3rd Division, in taking Badajoz, had saved
his honour.
Another striking picture of him is on the field of
Salamanca : a presentment in several scenes. The
first on the forenoon of that great day. He had
spent the early morning in moody preoccupation,
for he was in the presence of a general, his equal,
if not his superior, in tactics. Marmont had both
outmarched and outflanked him, and on the very
morning of his victory Wellington feared that his
retreat into Portugal was inevitable : he had already
missed more than one favourable chance of smiting
his enemy ; now the advantage lay with Marmont.
Wellington's staff had entered a farmyard, where
124 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
a late breakfast was laid out, and Wellington,
whose anxieties were too great for appetite, had
been prevailed upon to munch the drumstick of
a fowl. Then came an aide-de-camp with the
news of Marmont's mistake — the rash overreaching
extension of his left, made in the hope of inter-
cepting Wellington s retreat, with the fatal conse-
quences of exposing his own flank. Wellington
instantly realised the great opportunity that chance
had brought him, and throwing away his uneaten
breakfast, he galloped off to examine Marmont's
dispositions more closely.
The second scene exhibits Wellington on the
hill slope calmly surveying the French columns
rushing to their own destruction. It was then that
he closed his telescope with supreme satisfaction
and said to his Spanish attach^, *' Mon cher Alava,
Marmont est perdu." Then, too, when he had
given his orders for the counter-stroke, for the
gathering up of his divisions to attack Marmont
as they caught him en flagrant (Ulit, that he quietly
lay down to take a short sleep. Much time must
elapse before the orders just issued could be carried
into effect ; the advancing French must cover yet
a couple of miles before they were within striking
distance. Here was a spare hour to be utilised
by this man of iron nerves in restoring his jaded
MX ,/7l',&^,v,
AT SALAMANCA 125
mental and physical faculties. *' I shall have a
little rest," he now said to his faithful Fitz Roy
Somerset. ** Watch the French through your glass.
When they reach yonder copse, near the gap in
the hills, wake me," and, wrapping himself in his
cloak, lay down behind a furze bush, and was soon
sound asleep. At the appointed moment he was
roused, refreshed and alert for the fight. Then it
was that he rode up to the 3rd Division, which
was to head the onslaught, and said to his brother-
in-law, Pakenham, '* Do you see those fellows on
the hill ? Throw your division into column, Ned ;
at them, and drive them to the devil." And it was
done so " handsomely," to use Wellington's favourite
expression, that victory was assured. ** Forty thou-
sand men were beaten in forty minutes."
The third and last is from Napier's glowing
pencil, and must be quoted as it stands — a splendid
tribute to the leader he so devotedly served : ** I
saw him late in the evening of that great day,
when the advancing flashes of cannon and musketry,
stretching far as the eye could command, showed
in the darkness how well the field was won. He
was alone ; the flush of victory was on his brow,
and his eyes were eager and watchful, but his
voice was calm, even gentle. More than the rival
of Marlborough, since he had defeated greater
126 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
warriors than Marlborough ever encountered, with
a prescient pride he seemed only to accept this
glory as an earnest of greater things."
Look, again, at Wellington on the eve of the
campaign that culminated at Vittoria. He is once
more in Salamanca, and is attending high mass at
the cathedral, where prayers were being offered up
for the success of the allied arms. He stands,
while the priest chants and the deep-toned organ
plays impressive music, with his face towards the
altar, attentive and absorbed, a simple figure plainly
attired, a marked contrast to the gorgeous uniforms
with which he is surrounded. Wellington "wore a
very light grey pelisse coat, single-breasted, without
a sash, a white neckerchief, with his sword buckled
round his waist underneath the coat, the hilt merely
protruding, with a cocked hat under his arm."
Or on the day of battle, when he chose an
eminence in front of the village of Arifiez, in the
very centre of his line, and made it his head-
quarters during the fight, observing its progress,
''and directing the movements of the divisions as
calmly as if he were inspecting the movements of
a review." ** It is difficult to describe the perfect
coolness, nay, apparent unconcern," says another
eye-witness, **with which Lord Wellington gave
the most important orders, directing the advance
WELLINGTON'S COOLNESS 127
of a division as he perceived it could act with
effect. In the early part of the morning his eyes
were continually directed to that part of the scene
where he expected to see the head of Sir Thomas
Graham s column appear." Graham's enveloping
march on the left,^ aimed at the French line
of retreat by the Bayonne road, was, as will be
seen,* a prime cause of the completeness of the
victory.
Instances might be multiplied of his impertur-
bable coolness and self-possession. They were
never more remarkable than at Fuente Guinaldo in
181 1, when, to save Craufurd and enable him to
make good his retreat, he held his ground with two
weak divisions, isolated and unsupported, within an
arm's length of Marmont's united force numbering
some sixty thousand men. " It seemed the most
desperate game the army had yet been called upon
to play," says Vane, who was present. Yet Welling-
ton was not dismayed. ** You seem quite at your
ease," said Alava to him ; ** why, it is enough to put
any man in a fever." ** I have done according to
the very best of my judgment all that can be done,"
replied Wellington ; "therefore I care not either for
' On another great battlefield (Waterloo) Wellington's eyes were again
constantly directed to his left, the road by which he expected the Prussians.
' Post, p. 142.
128 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
the enemy in front, nor for anything they may say at
home," A friend who paid him a visit in Spain
wondered how, with all his anxieties, he could get
one wink of sleep. " I throw them off with my
clothes, sleep sound, and when I turn in bed I know
it is time to get up."
Larpent, on the strength of Lord Aylmer, at one
time adjutant-general, tells a story of Wellington's
sang froid y^hGXi^ in pursuing the French, he came
upon one of his divisions (Erskines) isolated and
much exposed to the front. The enemy was re-
ported in a village close at hand, but not in any
strength, and it was not until prisoners were brought
in that Wellington found he had to do with the
whole French army. *'Oh! they are all there, are
they.**" was his quiet remark. **Well, we must
take care what we are about, then." Again, on
the same authority : Lord Aylmer reported early
one morning to Wellington, just after Fuentes
d'Onoro, and when a fresh attack was momentarily
expected, that **the French were all off — the last
cavalry mounting to be gone." Wellington was
shaving, and he merely took away his razor for a
moment as he replied, ** Ay, I thought they meant
to be off; very well," and **then another shave just
as before, without another word till he was dressed."^
^ Larpent, 63.
HIS CARE FOR SUBORDINATES 129
Not less marked than his own wisdom and self-
control was his considerateness, nay, his tenderness
to subordinates who fell into error. Save the one
unpardonable offence, the unspeakable sin of direct
disobedience, he could forgive much. The story is
finely told by Napier of his silent rebuke to. the
generals who put their judgment before his in the
retreat from Burgos. Wellington had given orders
to march by a rather circuitous route in order to
avoid inundations he knew were out along the main
road. "This seemed so extraordinary to some
general officers that, after consulting together, they
deemed thefr commander unfit to conduct the army,
and led their troops by what appeared to them the
fittest line of retreat! He (Wellington) had before
daylight placed himself at an important point on his
own road, and waited impatiently for the arrival
of the leading regiment until dawn ; then, suspect-
ing what had happened, he galloped to the other
road, and found the would-be commanders stopped
by water. The insubordination and the danger
to the army were alike glaring, yet the practical
rebuke was so severe and well-timed, the humi-
liation so complete and so deeply felt, that with one
proud, sarcastic observation, indicating contempt
more than anger, he led back the troops and drew
off his forces safely/'
I30 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
The failure at Burgos seems to have drawn
down upon him the distrust of many he commanded.
He has himself admitted his errors in that opera-
tion, but they were not those visited upon him by
his subordinates. ** The fault of which I was guilty
. . . was not that I undertook the expedition to
Burgos with inadequate means, but that I took there
the most inexperienced instead of the best troops."
For the failure in the escalade of the fortress he
blamed the officer entrusted with the command of
it, who "paid no attention to orders given him both
orally and in writing, but followed his own plan,
which was to give no orders. When he fell no one
knew what to do." After that no fresh attack could
be made, because the full scheme wais in the pockets
of the dead man, and fell into the hands of the
French. Wellington throughout this siege was
continually hampered for want of means : he could
not move up a gun from Madrid ; important results
failed for the want of fifty or sixty mules, and of a
few bundles of straw to feed them.
To the last Wellington justified his attack on
Burgos, the siege of which he raised, and retreated
"not because there was any pressure upon me, but
because I did not think Hill secure. I knew that
if he was obliged to retire (from Madrid) I should
b^ lost. ... In short, I played a game which
FORBEARANCE TO CRAUFURD 131
might succeed (the only one which could succeed),
and pushed it to the last ; and the parts having
failed, as I admit was to be expected, ... I
made a handsome retreat to the Agueda with some
labour and inconvenience, but without material
loss."
After this retreat we may understand the noble
modesty of Von Moltke, who would not suffer him-
self to be put in comparison with Napoleon or
Wellington, because, unlike them, he had "never
conducted a retreat."
One other instance may be given of Welling-
ton's magnanimity, and that was in his leniency to
Craufurd after the affair of the Coa. Craufurd
claimed on that occasion that he knew he could
defend his position, but Wellington by no means
agreed with him. ** I am glad to see you safe,
Craufurd," the chief said when he reappeared. To
which Craufurd replied, ** Oh, I was in no danger,
I assure you." " But I was, from your conduct,"
retorted Wellington. Whereupon Craufurd with-
drew, exclaiming, sotto voce^ "He is d d crusty
to-day."^ Wellington bore much from Craufurd,
whose merits he knew well. Only in his private
^ This incident is referred by Craufiird's biographer to the af&ir at
Grimaldo, on the strength of Larpent. It seems to be better placed at a
time just after the Coa.
132 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
correspondence he speaks his mind, and we appre-
ciate the full measure of his kindly forbearance
in a letter addressed about this time to Wellesley
Pole. ** Although I shall be hanged for them,"
he says, "you may be very certain that not only
have I had nothing to do with, but had positively
forbidden the foolish affairs in which Craufurd
involved his outposts. ... In that of the 24th,
I had positively desired him not to engage in
any affair on the other side of the Coa; ... I
had expressed my wish that he should draw on
the other side of the river; and I repeated my
injunction that he should not engage in any
affair on the right of the river, in answer to a
letter in which he told me tkat he thought the
cavalry could not remain there without the in-
fantry. After all this he remained two hours on
his ground after the enemy had appeared in his
front." They did not attack at once, and he could
have retired twice over before they did, and to a
safe situation, behind the river. **You will say
. . . why not accuse Craufurd ? I answer, because
if I am to be hanged for it, I cannot accuse a man
who I believe has meant well, and whose error is
one of judgment and not of intention."
CHAPTER X
VITTORIA
Campaign of Vittoria — Masterly strategy — Advantages of his plan of
operations — Turning movements ending in battle of Vittoria — Com-
plete rout — Vast quantity of booty taken.
1ET US return now to the active operations.
After five years of strenuous and unceasing
effort, of varying fortunes, of great triumphs
neutralised by unavoidable retreat, of flux and re-
flux, the tide was. now at last to set in one direc-
tion, and flow onward with an unbroken wave of
success from Portugal into Southern France. The
balance was to be now fairly adjusted between the
opponents, the weight of advantage inclining rather
to Wellington s side. Napoleon s power had been
sorely tried by his disasters in Russia; he was
driven to withdraw troops from Spain to strengthen
himself at home. Wellington, on the other hand,
had been largely reinforced in all arms. At the
close of the preceding year (1812) he had written
Beresford : "I propose to get into fortune s way ^
^ A favourite phrase with Wellington.
133
134 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
if I should be able to assemble an army sufficiently
strong ; and we may make a lucky hit in the com-
mencement of next campaign." Early in 1813 he
is "very much inclined to apprehend" that ''instead
of having too few troops in a state of discipline,
we shall find we have more troops, clothed, armed,
and disciplined, than the means of the country
can support.* ... It will answer no purpose to
bring to the Douro or the Ebro crowds of starving
soldiers."
His army was, however, in very good case:
" The troops are all well cantoned ; I hope a con-
tinuation of rest for a month or two in the spring
will set us up entirely. I hoped to take the field
with 70,000 British and Portuguese — I think I
shall have 40,000 British, and possibly 25,000 Por-
tuguese, and I shall be better equipped in artil-
lery and much stronger in cavalry than we have
yet been," His cavalry reinforcements had been
substantial, and included the Life Guards and
Horse Guards. With regard to his auxiliaries, a
number of fresh Portuguese battalions had been
raised, and the English general had at last been
put in supreme command of the armies of Spain,
a charge he accepted reluctantly and in ignorance
^ This was ever the crux of campaigning in Spain — too few would not
succeed, too many could not be subsisted.
COMMAND OF SPANISH TROOPS 135
of their real state. Had he known it, he writes,
" I should have hesitated before I should have
charged myself with such a Herculean labour
as its command . . . but I will not relinquish
the task because it is laborious and the success
unpromising." To secure the latter he made
stringent conditions, chief of which was that he
should exercise uncontrolled authority, not over
the Spanish army alone, but the whole resources
of the state. No doubt if the Spanish troops
had been treated as were the Portuguese in the
early days of the war, they would have been
equally efficient. The material was, as it always
has been, magnificent; properly led, the Spaniards
have been brave, patient, and enduring, and they
are excellent marchers.
The months of leisure in winter quarters had been
usefully spent in restoring the spirits, improving the
discipline, and perfecting the organisation of the
force for the field. Under Wellington's intelligent
eye, every detail was considered : camp equipage
and field equipment were seen to ; new tin kettles
replaced the old iron cooking pots ; the troops gave
up their great-coats and carried only a blanket, with
a few necessaries and three pairs of shoes; tents
were issued, three per company, to put an end to
bivouacking and billeting ; new baggage carts had
136 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
been devised, numbers of draught animals secured,
and a pontoon train prepared
Although Wellington's tactical skill, that of the
leader on the narrower limits of the battle-field, has
never been denied, many have doubted his capacity
as a strategist, his power to plan a comprehensive
campaign. Vittoria amply refutes such criticism.
His scheme for the offensive in 1813 was large and
judicious. It was said in the earlier phases of the
Peninsular war, and on his own authority, that he
had no settled plan,^ that he adapted himself to cir-
cumstances; that he was like a man driving with
rope harness — if any part gave way, he tied a fresh
knot and went on again. In 181 3, however, he had
a clear and deliberate purpose, worked out with con-
summate astuteness.
There were risks in his plan of operations, but
he was prepared to take them ; it depended for suc-
cess upon the profound secrecy of the first moves,
and again upon the conquest of physical difficulties
of no ordinary kind, but he had ascertained by care-
ful inquiry that they were not insurmountable.
It was open to various technical objections, as
^ Sir Brent Spencer once pointed out to Wellington that as he (Spencer)
was the next senior, he ought to know something of his leader's plans.
'* I have no plans but to beat the French," was the short answer, inspired
probably by the reticence that was so strong in him, and not, a little by his
distrust of Sir Brent Spencer.
MASTERLY STRATEGY 137
that for a time it split his army into two entirely
separate parts remote from, unable either to com-
municate with or support each other. But its
advantages were commanding. By the direction
of his march alone, his mere appearance on the
Esla in force, he would invalidate the whole de-
fensive line of the French. This was the line of
the Douro, a formidable natural obstacle strength-
ened by fortifications, upon which Joseph chiefly
relied. The French were now confined to the
north-eastern half of Spain, supposing a line to
divide it diagonally from the Asturias to Valencia.
They thus held on, but weakly, to Madrid, while
they covered their main line of communications
with France, the royal road from the capital
through Burgos, and Vittoria to Bayonne. No
other line of operations promised Wellington so
much. To force the Douro by frontal attack would
have • been a serious and costly undertaking ; to
advance along the valley of the Douro by its south
bank, so as to strike at the French left, would
be to betray his intentions and move through an
exhausted territory. Again, the line he chose was
that by which he would be least expected — always
a great point in the assailants favour. No one
knew, his enemy least of all, that he relied upon
being able to traverse the rugged, mountainous
138 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
country of North Portugal and South Gallicia ; that
he had improved the navigation of the Lower Douro
as high as Lamego, where his left lay. Finally,
his daring strategy would secure him, if successful,
a new base, with a short line of communication
to the Bay of Biscay, and thence to England by
sea* This transfer of base from Portugal to some
of the northern ports was indeed the key to his
present and future operations. When he was thus
firmly established the French would be vulnerable
in the most vital point, and a series of well-delivered
blows should open a road into France.
Let us now consider this eventful campaign
more in detail.
Campaign of Vittoria
In May 1813, the allied forces, 75,000 strong,
of whom 44,000 were British troops, occupied a
line drawn from Lamego on the Douro, its left,
through Ciudad Rodrigo, to the pass of Baflos, the
extreme right, under Hill. The Spanish army of
Gallicia was some 40,000 men, but barely half
accompanied Wellington.
At this time the French, 60,000, under King
Joseph, lay all across Old Castille, from Toledo and
Madrid on the left, with their centre behind the
CAMPAIGN OF VITTORIA 139
Douro from Valladolid as far as Zamora, where
the right lined the Esla.
15M May. Wellington directed Graham, with
40,cxx) men, to enter theTras os Montes by the valleys
of the Sabor and Tua (two effluents of the Douro),
march northward, then work eastward through Bra-
ganza to the Esla. The road was rugged and diffi-
cult, so much so that the French never believed it
could be used. But Wellington's surveys satisfied
him it was practicable for wheels and guns. Graham
completed his adventurous march by the 31st May.
Meanwhile Wellington, so soon as he was satis-
fied that Graham was well advanced, made a strong
feint upon Salamanca, so as to occupy and distract
the French. Hill also co-operated, aiming at the
fords across the Upper Tormes. These move-
ments deceived Joseph, who, fully expecting to be
attacked from the south bank, fell back into his
strong position behind the Douro.
Now the sudden arrival of Graham from the
north, and at a point that jeopardised the whole
French army by taking the river Douro in reverse,
struck dismay into the enemy. The French
hurriedly evacuated their works, destroyed the
bridges, and fell back in full retreat towards Burgos,
hoping, however, to make a fresh stand for con-
centration on the Pisuerga.
140 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
^rd June. Wellington was at Toro, holding
both sides of the river, and with his whole army
in hand. Next day he continued his turning move-
ment, passed the Carrion and then the Pisuerga,
once more threatening Joseph's right The French
again retreated, meaning to give battle at Burgos,
backed by that fortress ; but, receiving an unfavour-
able report of its condition, Joseph judged it impera-
tive to retrograde still farther and occupy the line
of the Ebro. This was a naturally strong position ;
the river was defensible, and it could only be
approached from Burgos through narrow defiles,
one the famous gorge of Pancorbo, which could
be held by a handful against an army.
Again Wellington determined to move by the
left flank, and closely reconnoitred the moun-
tainous district on that side, where the Ebro
takes its rise. It was reported, like that in North
Portugal, unfit for wheeled traffic, but he was not
deterred thereby. This march again was of the
most arduous character, the difficulties encountered
stupendous, but they were gallantly overcome.
" Neither the winter gullies, nor the ravines, nor
the precipitate passes among the rocks, retarded
even the march of the artillery. Where horses
could not draw, men hauled ; when the wheels
would not roll, the guns were let down or lifted
JOSEPH FORCED TO FIGHT 141
up with ropes. Six days they toiled unceasingly,
and on the seventh —
20th June. " They burst like raging streams from
every defile, and went foaming into the basin of
Vittoria." Here the hapless king lay at his mercy,
an easy prey. No decided resistance had been
offered to Wellington's columns as they debouched
from the mountains. But Joseph now knew he
must fight, and at a disadvantage. He was out-
numbered — the allies were 80,000 strong, flushed
with unvarying success ; he had but 60,000, and
his position was vicious, for his battle front was
parallel to his line of retreat. This front extended
from Puebla on the left, through Ariiiez in the
centre, to Vittoria on the right, the whole covered
by the Zadora River, a narrow stream with difficult
banks, which flowed in the same direction as the
high-road.
Wellington paused the rest of that day (20th),
to allow his rear columns to close up, but next
morning he attacked the enemy's position in three
lines — Hill on the right, he himself in the centre,
and Graham on the left. Hill's battle was for the
commanding heights of Puebla, and he was long
kept at bay ; when at last he drove out the enemy
and crossed the river, the centre was up in its place
and ready to attack. But Hill's success had made
142 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
Ariftez, the French centre, untenable, and after
some stiff fighting they abandoned this position,
retreating in good order towards Vittoria. Mean-
while Graham, manoeuvring on the far left, struck
at the enemy's right and the high - road to
Bayonne. He too carried all before him; the
enemy, after a stubborn resistance, were driven
out of their positions one after the other, so that
Graham towards sundown was astride of the high-
road, and closed the direct line of retreat into
France.
"Never," says Napier, **was an army more
hardly used by its commander, for the soldiers were
not half-beaten, and yet never was a victory more
complete." Wellington, in his own modest language,
reported that he had driven the enemy from all
their positions, "having taken from them 151 pieces
of cannon (the French saved only one gun and
one howitzer), waggons of ammunition, all their
baggage, provisions, cattle, treasure, &c, and a
considerable number of prisoners." The "loot"
at Vittoria was colossal and heterogeneous.
The French, so one of the French generals
(Gazan) records, lost all their equipages, all their
guns, all their treasure, all their papers, so that no
man could prove even how much pay was due to
him. Generals and subordinate officers alike were
THE ROUT OF VITTORIA 143
reduced to the clothes on their backs, and most of
them were barefooted. Joseph's carriage was inter-
cepted on the road to Pampeluna, and he barely
escaped by mounting a fleet horse. Carriages
innumerable were captured, laden with women ^ and
plunder. Among the first were titled ladies of the
court and many children ; the latter comprised the
spoils of years, gathered up by the unscrupulous
usurpers of Spanish soil — plate, pictures,* jewellery,
wine, furniture, valuables of all kinds. There were
five and a half millions of dollars in the treasure-
chests, although not a fiftieth part was recovered,
so expert were the British marauders.
Vittoria was a crowning triumph, the fit comple-
tion of this remarkable campaign. The able strategy
that had placed his army in a position to gain it, was
only equalled by Wellington's tactical superiority on
the field of battle. The victory had great and far-
reaching results. It practically ended the war in
the Peninsula, and almost entirely cleared it of
' A French prisoner after the battle said to Wellington, " Le fait est,
monseigneur, que voos avez une arm^, mais nous sommes un bordel
ambulant"
' Some of the pictures, which had been cut from their frames for con-
venience of carriage, were famous old masters taken from the Royal Gallery,
and of great value. Wellington restored them to King Ferdinand, their
lawful owner, but he would not accept them, and sent them back to
Wellington. They are the nucleus of the well-known picture gallery in
Apsley House.
144 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
French troops^ True, a force remained in Cata-
lonia under Suchet, but more or less on sufferance ;
one or two fortresses still hoisted the French flag,
but neither San Sebastian (which was at once
besieged) nor Pampeluna (which was blockaded)
could hope to hold out long. Another and though
small gain to the British was the change of base,
its transfer from Portugal to North Spain, which, as
has been pointed out already, was a prominent
feature in Wellington's plans. He had now fully
justified the words he is said to have uttered,
" Good-bye, Portugal ! " when he rode away a short
month previously to join Graham upon the Esla.
CHAPTER XI
CAMPAIGN OF THE PYRENEES
Soult supersedes King Joseph in south of France — Relative positions
of English and French — Soult's attack — Battles of Sauroren — Wel-
lington will not invade France prematurely — The passages of the
Bidassoa, Nivelle, Nive, and Adour — Battle of Toulouse — Peace —
Dispersion of Peninsular army.
THE giant, although sorely beset, was not yet
in the death-throes, and Napoleon was bent
on making one last desperate effort to stay
Wellington's now imminent invasion of France.
An imperial decree superseded Joseph and installed
Soult as the Emperor's lieutenant in the south of
France and Spain. Soult hurried post haste to
the scene of action, which he reached on the
13th July, and by the most tremendous exertions
rapidly reorganised and consolidated the beaten
army. His object was to resume the offensive
without delay, having, with true soldierly insight,
exactly gauged Wellington's now difficult position.
Soult was sanguine that a prompt initiative would
be attended with decided success.
At this date the allied armies held the passes
145 K
146 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
of the Pyrenees — their southern issues, that is to
say — and were disposed so as to cover both the
blockade of Pampeluna and the siege of San
Sebastian. The position was defective ; Wellington
knew it, but could not mend it and still carry on
the business he had in hand. Its chief faults, as he
himself pointed out in a despatch at the end of the
operations now at hand, were that lateral com-
munication between the points held by the British
was "tedious and difficult"; that of the enemy
upon the northern side of the passes was, on the
other hand, "easy and short"; in case of attack, the
most advanced posts in the first line could not
support each other, and could only be reinforced
from the rear.
Soult saw the strategic advantages he enjoyed ;
saw that he might gather swiftly against one flank
and strike at it with overwhelming force before the
other and distant flank or any of the intervening
parts could reinforce it. He had but to choose
between the two ends — whether he could essay
to relieve San Sebastian at one, or Pampeluna at
the other. The latter was the weakest, the most
isolated, that which must soonest fall ; San Sebas-
tian he thought could still hold out, having sea
communication with France, and being stoutly
defended.
IN THE PYRENEES 147
Campaign of the Pyrenees.
He had three principal corps cTarm^e and a
reserve ; the right under Reille, the centre under
D*Erlon, the left under Clausel. Villatte com-
manded the reserve.
2 ^h July. Reille and Clausel, with a part of
D'Erlon's corps, were collected at St. Jean Pied de
Port, and fell upon the British right at Ronces-
valles. D'Erlon at the same time attacked the
centre at Maya. All the British commanders, after
fighting with great tenacity, retreated into positions
far to the rear.
2^th July, Late in the night Wellington, who
was at San Sebastian, heard of Soult's advance,
and he mounted and rode at once to the threatened
right, fifty miles distant, and as he passed along
the line he gathered up all the troops he found
and directed every one to follow him.
27M July. Having ridden hard all day (26th),
he reached Sauroren, where Picton and Cole were
already aux prises with Soult. The English com-
mander was alone — the one staff-officer who had
galloped with him (Lord Fitz Roy Somerset) he
had but lately sent with a pressing pencilled order
for concentration — and as Wellington breasted the
148 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
steep hill-slope he was recognised by some Portu-
guese, who greeted him with tumultuous cheers.
This inspiriting welcome was taken up and tossed
from regiment to regiment along the crests of the
hills. It was a small matter, yet this ebullition of
enthusiastic confidence in a leader who had never
yet been worsted had its effect, as Wellington anti-
cipated, upon the coming engagement. ** Yonder,"
he said aloud, *' is a great commander, but he is cau-
tious, and will delay the attack until he can ascer-
tain the cause of those cheers ; that will give time
for the 6th Division to arrive, and I shall beat him."
In the two battles of Sauroren which followed
and were fiercely disputed — "bludgeon work," as
Wellington called them— the advantage was alto-
gether to the British. Soult received reinforce-
ments, and used them skilfully to withdraw his
forces, having previously sent his guns, cavalry,
and wounded to the rear. He opened up a new
line of retreat, but was in the narrow valley of St.
Esteban with a force (35,000) closely hemmed in,
when the unexpected appearance of three maraud-
ing red-coats betrayed the near neighbourhood of
Wellington's encircling army, and Soult made good
his escape. **Thus the disobedience of three plun-
dering knaves, unworthy of the name of soldiers,
deprived one consummate commander of the most
SOULT DEFEATED 149
splendid success, and saved another from the most
terrible disaster." Wellington had hoped **to do
the enemy more mischief," and yet the French suf-
fered terribly in this boldly conceived but hazardous
operation. Between the 25th July and the 2nd
August they were engaged seriously no less than
ten times, on many occasions in attacking strong
positions, in others defending them only to be
driven out and pursued. Nor did the British
come off without enduring great hardships, for all
at the end of the fighting were footsore, shoeless,
and fatigued.
315/ August. Soult made yet another effort to
relieve San Sebastian, but on the very day that
he had thrown bridges across the Bidassoa and
attacked the Spaniards on the lower banks, the
fortress was stormed and captured. The remnant
of its brave garrison withdrew into the citadel, but
surrendered ten days later with all the honours
of war. Pampeluna still held out, but Soult left
it to its fate, and retired behind the Bidassoa,
condemned now to a defensive attitude for the rest
of the campaign. For a brief space he was allowed
a respite, for, although much urged to it, Wellington
was still firmly resolved to make no premature
invasion of France. The strength of his character
was once again finely displayed in resisting pressure
ISO THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
and declining to commit his army to further adven-
ture before they were refreshed and re-equipped.
*' An army which has made such marches and has
fought such battles as has that under my command
is necessarily much deteriorated. Independent of
the actual loss of numbers by death, wounds, and
sickness, many men and officers are out of the
ranks for various causes. The equipment of the
army, their ammunition, the soldiers' shoes, &c.,
require renewal ; the magazines for the new opera-
tions require to be collected and formed, and many
arrangements to be made, without which the army
could not exist a day." ^ As usual, he had to depend
mainly on himself. He got no assistance from the
navy, although the sea was his chief line of com-
munication. " The supplies of all kinds from Lisbon
and other ports in Portugal are delayed for want
of convoy." ^ Necessaries came quite as slowly from
* To Lord Bathurst, 8th August 1813.
' The shortcomings of the Admiralty at this particular juncture were a
constant subject of complaint with Wellington. They would be inconceiv-
able were not other contemporary records full of the incompetence of that
department. Wellington spoke his mind plainly to the First Lord : "I com-
plain of an actual want of necessary naval assistance and co-operation with the
army. ... I know nothing of the causes. ... I state the fact, which nobody
will deny." The navy had utterly failed to keep up the blockade of San
Sebastian; yet the possession of the place was of the utmost importance
before the bad season set in. All the British could afford was one frigate,
and a few brigs and cutters only fit to carry despatches. The soldiers had
to unload the transports, because no seamen could be furnished ; and harbour
boats of weak construction had to be used to land ofdnance and shot and shelL
INVASION OF FRANCE 151
England. Moreover, the troops were still tainted
with some of the old evils. The bonds of discipline
had slackened under the trials of continuous cam-
paigning and the temptations that follow in the train
of unbroken victory. It was necessary to reform
as well as to reorganise. The army must be "set
to rights " — Wellington's own words — and this
would be far more difficult if it was carried into the
enemy's country. " If we were five times stronger
than we are," he writes, **we could not venture to
enter France if we cannot prevent our soldiers
from plundering."
*'Your lordship (Earl Bathurst) may depend
upon it that I am by no means tired of success,
and shall do everything in my power to draw
attention to this quarter as soon as I shall know
that hostilities are really renewed in Germany" —
and when time was ripe for the next move ahead.
Tth October. At length he deemed it expedient
to cross the Bidassoa in order to establish his left
more securely. This "stupendous operation," as
Napier calls it, was an enterprise "as daring and
dangerous as any undertaken during the whole
war." Soult occupied the rocky heights of the
northern bank with a series of strong entrench-
ments ; down on the lower river artillery raked
the known foi;^s ; and higher up, the mountains
152 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
themselves, the greater and the lesser Rhune and
other almost inaccessible crags, had been worked
into the line of defence.
Wellington having learnt that there were other
fords practicable only at low water, and that the tide
here rises and falls sixteen feet, secretly laid his
plans to throw a strong force across the sands at
the mouth of the river. He left his tents standing,
and so deceived the enemy that his columns were
soon across and firmly established on the northern
shore, from which they at once assailed the French
redoubts. Meanwhile the Spaniards had gone over
by the known fords, and the French, taken at both
flanks, evacuating their works, fell back precipitately.
The risk of this attack had been tremendous ; any
prolonged check would have been fatal, ** because
in two hours the returning tide would have come
in with a swallowing flood upon the rear," Higher
up the river, on Wellington's right, there was a
more obstinate struggle. The French were greatly
favoured by their position among the mountain
fastnesses, but these the intrepid gallantry of British
and Spaniards eventually carried.
Wellington was now in France, but only on its
rocky verge ; his army, half famished and shivering,
high up among the hills, still looked down upon the
smiling plains as to a promised land, and pined to
NIVELLE AND NIVE 153
be led farther forward. Soult had withdrawn be-
hind the Nivelle, where, with inexhaustible pluck
and patience, he constructed a new line of works
second only in strength to those in which Wellington
had defied Massena at Torres Vedras. His right
was nearly impregnable, resting on the sea ; his
left was among mountain ridges that could not be
turned ; only in the centre, at its junction with the
left, was a weak spot, where Wellington broke in
with superior numbers, and separating the parts,
beat each in turn. The right, taken in reverse, was
no longer tenable, and in due course withdrew.
The fighting on the Nivelle extended over three
days, and was of a very desperate character.
Wellington told Sir Henry Bunbury almost im-
mediately afterwards that of all his battles he
was best satisfied with the Nivelle, and that had
he been able to trust the Spaniards for only a
couple of hours, he would have forced Soult's right
wing to lay down its arms. His superior strategy
shown in his adoption of the true line of movement,
and his excellent tactical combinations, were nobly
seconded by the courage of his troops. Soult, who
had thought his position nearly impregnable, now
took up the line of the Nive, still farther to the
rear, with a large part of his force in an entrenched
camp on the Adour below Bayonne. The French
154 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
were well placed in the centre of a circle, around
the circumference of which Wellington s army was
distributed in difficult ground, and but poorly sup-
plied with food and forage.
Accordingly the English commander determined
to throw his army across the Nive and gain com-
mand of the more fertile country beyond. His
whole force was now formed into three corps,
commanded respectively by Hill, Beresford, and
Hope. His army had recently been weakened by
his summary dismissal of his Spanish allies for their
excesses in France, but he knew that the whole
country would rise in arms against marauders, and
that he was better without the Spaniards.
<jth December. Hope was to advance with the
left and occupy Soult, while Beresford in the centre
and Hill on the right crossed the Nive. Soult,
benefiting by his central position, struck first at
Hope, but was foiled after some very severe fight-
ing; then, believing Hill to be alone and unsupported
upon the French side of the Nive, he turned, and
found him in a really critical position between the
rivers. The battle of St. Pierre which followed,
and in which Hill stood the shock alone, and won
just before the arrival of the 6th Division, sent by
Wellington to his support, was one of the most
desperate in the whole war. '* Wellington said he
THE ADOUR 155
had never seen a field so thickly strewn with dead ;
nor can the vigour of the combatants be well denied
when 5000 men were killed and wounded in three
hours upon a space of one mile." After this the
opposing armies went into winter quarters, Soult
extending from Bayonne along the Adour, Wel-
lington across the Nive, but based still upon the
Biscayan ports.
The year 18 14, which was to see the termina-
tion of this protracted struggle, found Wellington
still full of political embarrassments, but superla-
tively strong in numbers, and with an overflowing
military chest. His aim now was to advance
farther into France and rally the Bourbon party
round him, but it was necessary first to reduce or
neutralise Bayonne. For this purpose investment
was indispensable, and yet the north side could
only be reached by bridging the Adour, a great
river with a strong current, held with troops and
gunboats above the town, while below the tide-way
ran seven miles an hour, and there were French
warships to interfere with any attempted passage.
Yet Wellington once more resolved to turn the
seemingly impossible to his purpose, and rightly
judging that Soult would not look for him below
Bayonne, laid his plans to bridge the Adour near
the mouth, six miles from the town, **at a point
156 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
so barred with sands, so beaten with surges, so
difficult of navigation even with landmarks, some
of which the French had removed, that it seemed
impossible for vessels fit for a bridge to enter
from the sea ; and a strong defensive force would
inevitably bar the construction if they could."
22nd February. While Wellington's right and
centre drew Soult from Bayonne by operating
against his left upon the higher Adour, Sir John
Hope was entrusted with the formation of the
great bridge at the mouth of that river. Tempes-
tuous weather delayed this extraordinary operation,
and the flotilla to be employed was still at sea,
when Hope, '* whose firmness no untoward event
could ever shake, resolved to attempt the passage
with the army alone." Small parties were thrown
across till a respectable force was gathered on the
north bank, the French having made no effort to
check them till too late.
2/^k February, The vessels came in under
full sail, and were driven recklessly across the
raging surge to the point where the bridge was
to be laid. Happily, when once within the river
banks, the outermost acted as a breakwater, and
enabled the large two-masted boats {chasse marges)
employed to ride safely and support the nearest
artillery and carriages. Nevertheless, "misfortune.
TOULOUSE 157
the errors of the enemy, the matchless skill and
daring of the British seamen, the discipline and
intrepidity of the British soldiers, all combined by
the genius of Wellington, were necessary to the
success of this stupendous undertaking, which must
always rank among the prodigies of war."
Wellington s forward movement on the right
had been prosecuted with great vigour. Within
sixteen days he traversed eighty miles, passed five
large and several small rivers, forced the enemy
to abandon two fortified bridge-heads and many
minor works, carried one great battle (Orthez) and
two combats . . . forced Soult to abandon Bayonne,
and cut him off from Bordeaux." * Soult had never
a chance from the first. " Having early proved
the power of his adversary, he had never deceived
himself about the ultimate course of the campaign,
and, therefore, struggled without hope, a hard task."
In a campaign of nine months' duration he deli-
vered twenty-four battles and combats. ** Defeated
in all, he fought the last as fiercely as the first,
remaining unconquered in mind, and still intent
upon renewing the struggle, when peace came to
put a stop to his prodigious efforts." He made
his last stand at Toulouse, a strategic centre com-
manding many roads, and the chief arsenal of the
^ Napier.
158 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
south of France, and here he lost the last battle of
the campaign, although he made good his retreat.
About the same time the garrison of Bayonne
made a determined sortie, and the besiegers nar-
rowly escaped a serious disaster.
ii/^ April. In the afternoon of the day after
the battle, news reached Toulouse of the abdica-
tion of Napoleon, and that the war was at an end.
Spaniards and Portuguese recrossed the Pyre-
nees ; part of the British infantry was shipped to
America, part came home ; the cavalry marched
through France, and embarked for England at
Boulogne. Wellington himself passed on to Paris,
but before leaving his army he issued a farewell
order asking them to accept his thanks for their
service. Although circumstances may alter the
relations in which he has stood to them for some
years, so much to his satisfaction, he assures them
he will never cease to feel the warmest interest
in their welfare and honour, and that he "will at
all times be happy to be of any service to those
to whose conduct, discipline, and gallantry their
country is so much indebted." This was the
amende honorable. The hard words so freely cast
upon early misdeeds, the sharp discipline so often
applied to correct disorder, were forgotten now in
the hour of final triumph. It was of this same
ARMY BROKEN UP 159
army, and a little before the conclusion of the war,
that he spoke in such glowing terms to Sir Henry
Bunbury : " I have the finest army that ever man
commanded. I don't believe there ever was such
an army. Not a man or officer behaves ill, except
," mentioning one or two ; " and the Portuguese
are nearly as good as the British troops." After
all, the credit of their transformation was princi-
pally due to himself. The pity of it was that they
were soon dispersed to the four corners of the
earth. Fourteen thousand British veterans were at
once sent to be frittered away in a fratricidal war
beyond the Atlantic, and, as we shall presently see,
Wellington had to fight out the next and last con-
test with much more doubtful material.
CHAPTER XII
NAPOLEON REAPPEARS
Escape from Elba — Coalition of Great Powers, and vast preparations —
Belgium filled with allied troops — Blucher's and Wellington's armies
— Napoleon's efforts — His army — His plan of action — Considerations
— Wellington's position examined.
WELLINGTON was checked in his home-
ward journey by a call for his presence
in Madrid, where Ferdinand VII. had
ascended the throne. Thence he moved northward,
and again passing through Paris, reached London
on the 23rd June. He was the great hero of the
hour. The mob dragged his carriage through the
streets ; he was the chosen, honoured companion of
the allied sovereigns just then the guests of England.
Now he took his seat in the House of Lords,
passing through every grade of the peerage at one
and the same time — saluted in succession ** Baron,"
" Viscount," ** Earl," *' Marquis," and " Duke." He
received the thanks of the Commons clad in the full
dress of a field-marshal, and was presented with the
noble gift of ;^400,ooo; last of all, he carried the sword
of state at the public thanksgiving in St. Pauls.
z6o
T
rgc Allen.
StanSjrds GviarrEsUa!
"NEITHER PEACE NOR TRUCE" i6i
But his labours as the champion and saviour of
Europe were not yet ended. Napoleon, exiled to
Elba after the capitulation of Paris in 1814, returned
to France on the ist March in the following year.
This startling news was everywhere received with
indignation and alarm. The disturbing element was
once more set free to scatter desolation through
Europe. The Great Powers, whose representatives
were just then wrangling in congress at Vienna,
united to make common cause against Napoleon.
It was affirmed as a principle that there could be
no comfort or safety until the disturber of Euro-
pean tranquillity had been crushed and overthrown.
Napoleon should have neither peace nor truce.
England, Russia, Austria, and Prussia bound them-
selves by solemn treaty to furnish each 150,000 men,
and to remain under arms until the great object of
the war had been attained. All eyes were turned
on Wellington, and it is reported that the Czar
Alexander said to him, as he placed his hand
familiarly upon his shoulder : " C est pour vous en-
core sauver le monde."
Vast preparations were at once set on foot.
Austria slowly collected a gigantic host upon the
Rhine frontier. Russia, more remote, had called
out a quarter of a million of men, and was to
act in support of Austria. England and Prussia,
i62 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
concentrating more rapidly, soon filled Belgium, *' the
cockpit of Europe," with troops. By the end of May
Wellington had under his orders a mixed force of
100,000 men, with 194 guns ; Marshal Blucher com-
manded an army of 1 20,000, all Prussians, with 300
guns. Wellington's army was a polyglot, hetero-
geneous body. British, Hanoverians, Dutch, Bel-
gians, and Nassauers served side by side. Of the
first, only a small portion were seasoned veterans,
but few of them his old Peninsular comrades, the
men who (when pleased with them) he had said
could '*go anywhere and do anything." His own
army was largely composed of second battalions,
hastily filled up with militia recruits. Of the total
30,000 British, not above 6000 had seen a shot fired
before.^ For purposes of defensive fight they proved
equal to the best, but Wellington would not have
dared to manoeuvre them under heavy fire over
rough ground. His own opinion, as given to Lord
Stanhope in 1840, of his Waterloo army, was that
on the whole it was certainly **an infamously bad
one, and the enemy knew it. But, however, it beat
them." As for his allies, he had no great reason to
^ '* I never saw such a set of boys, both officers and men," said an old
general (Mackenzie) when inspecting the 3rd battalion 14th at Brussels.
Fourteen officers and three hundred men were under twenty years of age.
" The worst army ever brought together,'* the Duke said before the battle ; yet
after it, it was his opinion that he *' never saw British infantry behave so well."
GENERALS AND STAFF 163
trust the fidelity of the Brunswickers and Nassauer
troops, raised in countries long subject to French
influence. Both the Hanoverian and Dutch Bel-
gian contingents were made up of raw recruits.
But the English cavalry was magnificent, well
mounted and equipped, and thoroughly trained, the
very flower of the army; and the artillery was
splendid, efficient and complete at every point.^ As
regards his officers, the English commander had
but few of his great Peninsular lieutenants to sup-
port him ; Hill and Picton were the chief, with
Clinton, Kempt, Colville, Pack, De Lancy, Shaw
Kennedy, and a few more. His staff, except the
personal, were not his own choice, but made up
mostly of the friends of the Duke of York. Never
had nepotism been more in the ascendant, and the
great general, whose prowess had been so fully
proved, had no voice in the selection of the agents
who were to work out his views. He complains
bitterly to Lord Bathurst, in a letter dated 4th May :
** To tell you the truth, I am not very well pleased
either with the manner in which the Horse Guards
have conducted themselves towards me. It will be
admitted that the army is not a very good one ; and
^ When Blucher accompanied the Duke in his inspection of Mercer's
battery of horse artillery, he was so struck with its splendid appearance that
he declared every horse in it was fit for a field -marshal.
i64 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
being composed as it is, I might have expected that
the generals and staff" formed by me in the late war
would have been allowed to me again ; but, instead,
I am overloaded with people I have never seen
before, and it seems to have been intended to keep
those out of the way whom I wished to have.
However, I will do the best I can with the instru-
ments sent to assist me."
*' I have got an infamous army," he wrote Lord
Stewart, "very weak and ill equipped; and a very
inexperienced staff"." This staff" was clearly re-
sponsible for that neglect to strengthen La Haye
Sainte which led to its capture by the French and
nearly jeopardised the day. Wellington took the
blame of it himself — he never hesitated to accept
responsibility even for the omissions of others — but
proposals to fortify La Haye Sainte had been put
before the headquarter staff", and either rejected or
ignored.
Napoleon, as is well known, strained every nerve
throughout the early part of the famous ** Hundred
Days" to reorganise the troops he had so often
led to victory, and who now received him with
universal acclaim. Although long years of inces-
sant warfare had drained France of men, and
military service was not too popular, Napoleon
made prodigious exertions to raise new levies, and
'Au^,:,,/7/ia,f^,«
FRENCH ARMY • 165
he had at hand the veterans who had been prisoners
of war till the peace, and who now at once fell into
line. He carried out many urgent services ; he
fortified and armed Paris, replenished the frontier
fortresses, found remounts and equipped cavalry
and guns anew, revived the Imperial Guard, in-
creased the number of regimental officers, and
raised two hundred battalions of National Guards.
Many (although not all) of his generals, the men
he had made, had rallied round him ; Soult, Ney,
Grouchy, Reille, D'Erlon, Vandamme, Gerard,
Lobau, Exelmans, Kellermann, Milhaud, had
thrown in their fortunes with his, and were ap-
pointed to various commands.
As the result of thesfe extraordinary exertions
he had by the beginning of June an army of little
less than 200,000 men available for active opera-
tions in the field. After making many inevitable
deductions for the occupation and observation of
other points, there remained some 1 28,000 men
whom he concentrated upon the northern frontier
of France. With this obviously disproportionate
force he resolved to attack the allied armies in
Belgium.
The enterprise might seem hazardous, but it
was well conceived. Many reasons concurred to
induce Napoleon to take the offensive at once.
i66 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
Time with him was everything. Day by day his
enemies gathered strength. Within another month
or so Austrians and Russians would be on the
eastern frontier in overwhelming numbers. He
could not with safety to himself await attack on
any side. Any invasion the least successful had
no doubt alienated French sympathy and hastened
his abdication. He could not risk that chance
again, and yet the allies in Belgium already menaced
Paris ; Wellington, as we now know, was already
considering schemes for advance. A prompt ini-
tiative promised much to Napoleon. Early success
would bring him manifest, even incalculable advan-
tages. If he could beat English and Prussians,
capture Brussels and hold Belgium, he might then
turn to the Rhine and defend it against attack from
the eastward ; he might detach Austria, ever waver-
ing, from the coalition, and by these new triumphs
revive the flagging enthusiasm of his people.
True, he was inferior in numbers to his two
enemies combined. But he knew accurately the
nondescript character of Wellington's army, and
he had often beaten the Prussians before. He
counted not a little upon his own personal pre-
sence, and the impetus it would give to his devoted
troops ; he knew himself to be a past-master in the
art of war, the superior probably to the generals
NAPOLEON'S PLAN 167
opposed to him, whose dispositions, so far as he
could ascertain them, were faulty, and exposed
them to defeat. By the very nature of the duty
imposed upon them, the allied armies were hampered
by strategic difficulties from the first. They were
to combine in defence of Belgium, yet each covered
a divergent line of communications upon bases
widely apart. The English were based upon
Ostend and Antwerp, the Prussians upon Cologne.
If forced back each by his own line, they must
separate as they retreated, while a victorious enemy
was securely planted between them. To aim at.
their nearest point of junction, thrust himself in
and attack each singly before the other could re-
inforce, offered Napoleon a marvellous strategic
opportunity. This was the plan, the almost
obvious plan, he adopted.
Wellington s military reputation has been much
assailed for his failure to realise this. To the last
he looked for the French upon his right ; he firmly
beKeved that Napoleon would advance by the line
of Mons or Tournai on Hal and Brussels, and
held his principal forces therefore on that side.
Most of the English troops were on the right ;
the reserves were in and around Brussels ; the
Dutch and Belgians on the left filled in the line
and communicated with the Prussians. Wellington
i68 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
never changed this opinion. In a memorandum
written in 1842 upon Waterloo he adhered to it, and
even thought that after Quatre Bras Napoleon would
more wisely have operated against his (Welling-
ton's) extreme right at Hal. We have no means of
knowing what induced this pertinacious adherence
to what seems a strategical error. Some writers
have imagined the Duke was in possession of some
secret information that biassed his judgment The
only advantage this line offered Napoleon was that
it threatened the Duke s communications with the
sea — an obvious advantage of course, but which was
more than counterbalanced by the fact that attack
in this direction would have thrown Wellington
back on Blucher and forced that concentration
of the allies it was Napoleon's first business to
impede.
Wellington's fears for his right survived the
definite knowledge that the enemy was advancing
by the centre. It lasted through the whole of the
great day of battle, when victory hung by a thread
and every man was required on the field. Yet
throughout the action Wellington kept almost a
whole division (Colville's), some 4000 men, inactive
at Hal, some six miles distant from Waterloo, too far
to give effective aid. There was no reason for this.
Quite early on the 18th it was known that the
WELLINGTON AND HAL 169
weight of Napoleon s attack would be upon the
centre. Moreover, to make any move against the
British right would have been a long flank march
in the presence of a powerful enemy. Had Colville
been summoned to the battle-field even so late as
8 A.Kf., he could have been on the ground before
the action commenced ; at any time later during
the day, up to two or three o^clock, he could still
have rendered valuable assistance. There is force,
therefore, in the adverse comments so freely made
on this mistake, and there is indeed no defence
for the error to use all available strength in such
a closely contested and momentous affair. Yet it
may be said for Wellington (and I do not re-
member to have heard this point raised) that a
fresh and unbroken division on the right flank
would have availed much if the day had gone
against us ; Colville's men, if skilfully handled,
might have covered the retreat from Hal through
Ninove on Ghent and Ostend. Was not Wel-
lington, in fact, technically right in keeping a re-
serve intact for use in case of disaster?
CHAPTER XIII
LIGNY AND QUATRE BRAS
Opening of Waterloo campaign — Napoleon's advance — Position of
the allies— Forces widely disseminated — Rupture imminent— Tardy
concentration — Ligny and Quatre Bras — Retreat on Waterloo —
Napoleon's pursuit — Did Wellington ride to Wavre? — The great
charger " Copenhagen"— Evidence for and against the ride.
HAVING decided upon his plan of operations,
Napoleon put it into execution with all
possible secrecy and despatch. No one,
under penalty of death, was permitted to cross the
frontier, and behind this (as he hoped) impenetrable
screen he prepared his attack. But news, definite
although imperfect, reached the allied commanders
about the 14th that the French were on the move.
In the early part of. June Napoleons five cot^s
(Carntie had been stationed as follows : —
First and second, under D'Erlon and Reille,
were on the Belgian frontier.
Third, under Vandamme, in the Ardennes.
Fourth, under Gerard, on the Moselle.
Sixth, with the Imperial Guard and the reserve
cavalry, on the road from Paris moving northwards.
170
MARQUESS OF ANGLESEY. K.G.
OPPOSING ARMIES 171
The fifth corps was employed on special service
guarding the approaches to the Rhine.
i^thjuiie. Quickly and with wonderful precision
the whole of these forces were concentrated behind
the Sambre on that night. The left wing was
at Solre-sur-Sambre, the centre about Beaumont,
the right at Philippeville. The direction of all was
towards Charleroi, a town on the high-road to
Brussels, and but thirty-four miles from that capital.
Orders were issued for a general advance at dawn
next day, the 15th June-
Let us now review the positions of the allies
upon this 14th June, the eve of the short but most
memorable Waterloo campaign. Wellington had
formed his forces into two army corps, a reserve
and a cavalry corps.
1°. The first corps was under the command of
the Prince of Orange, and consisted of the ist
Division (Cooke), 3rd (Alten), 2nd Dutch Belgian
(Perpoucher), 3rd Dutch Belgian (Chass6).
2". The second corps was under Lord Hill, and
was made up of the 2nd Division (Clinton), 4th
(Colville), and the ist Dutch Belgian (Stedmann).
The cavalry were under the Earl of Uxbridge
(afterwards Marquis of Anglesea) ; and
3**. The reserve, composed of the 5th and 6th
Divisions, commanded respectively by Picton and
172 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
Cole, he held in his own hands. There was a 7 th
Division, and a Brunswick, Hanoverian, and Nassau
corps. Wellington, to watch his portion of the
frontier, and having always the fear for his right in
mind, held his first corps about Mons, Nivelles, and
Enghien ; his second was farther to the westward,
along the line of the Scheldt, while the reserve was
in and around Brussels.
Blucher s army was in four corps, commanded
by Ziethen, Pirch, Thielmann, and Biilow. The
first corps (Ziethen) was in and about Charleroi ;
the second (Pirch) was at Namur, the third (Thiel-
mann) still farther to the left rear at Ciney, and the
fourth (Billow) away back at Li^ge.
This dispersion of the allied forces over a line
one hundred miles wide and forty miles deep has
been sharply criticised by military, writers. To
emphasise the fault — and such it clearly was — the
allied commanders suffered their forces to remain in
their cantonments until the exact line of the French
was clearly developed. They should rather have
been assembled immediately the report arrived that
the French were in motion ; they should have been
collecting and concentrating upon the 14th at points
where they could oppose the enemy's advance and
at the same time mutually support each other.
Their neglect, oversight, error, call it what we may.
CHARLEROI ATTACKED 173
placed them for a time in imminent peril. They
were in the first instance so widely scattered that
they, and Wellington in particular, could not at first
bring more than fi-actions to face Napoleon's attack.
Had the French Emperor been more intelligently
and promptly seconded, the campaign would have
ended very differently, and history must have told
another tale.
15/^ June, The first point of impact was at
Charleroi, in the morning, where the French came
into collision with Ziethen, who, acting under
Blucher s orders, fell back, fighting, upon Fleurus.
At the same time orders were sent to hurry up the
other Prussian division. Wellington's action was
slower and more circumspect. He appears to have
been informed about midday the 15th that the French
had definitely abandoned the western road by Mons,
and were all gathering towards Charleroi. He
hesitated to accept this news as final, ^nd would
not move his army against what might prove to be
a feint. This surely was an error in judgment, and
his tardy concentration towards his left jeopardised
his own position, while it quite precluded him from
supporting Blucher if attacked, as he soon was,
by Napoleon. Both the allied generals were
agreed upon the paramount importance of main-
taining their lateral communications, yet they were
174 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
outgeneralled, and so completely, that at 3 p.m. on
the 15th, to quote Chesney, **but one Prussian
division was near the ground (of coming contest),
and, saving one division (Perpouchers Dutch Bel-
gians), not a man of Wellington's army within reach
of it, whilst the head of a column of 40,000 French-
men had crossed the Sambre at Marchiennes, and
that of another of nearly 70,000 was entering
Charleroi ! *'
By nightfall on the 15th complete rupture be-
tween the allies was imminent, and Ney, to whom
Napoleon had that day confided sole command of
the left, was at Frasne, upon the Brussels road,
having in front of him only one brigade of Dutch
Belgians, under Prince Bernard of Saxe-Weimar.
That officer, with great promptitude, had however
occupied and was holding Quatre Bras. His judg-
ment in this respect has been questioned, on the
theory that he was exposing a fraction to be over-
powered by a vastly superior force ; but if it was
right at all to offer resistance so far in advance,
then it was imperative to retain Quatre Bras at
all hazards. Wellington was of this opinion. Al-
though he had first ordered concentration upon
Nivelles, he presently realised that he must take
more to his left — to Quatre Bras, in short — if he
would co-operate with Blucher. Opinions differ as
WELLINGTON CONCENTRATES 175
to the precise moment that he came to this
,m
obvious conclusion. In his own despatch written
after Waterloo, he implies that he had issued
the orders .for Quatre Bras upon the night of the
15th. Baron Muffling, the Prussian commissioner
attached to British headquarters, records that Wel-
lington said to him at midnight on the 15th,
"Orders for the concentration of my army at
Nivelles and Quatre Bras are already despatched."
Lord Malmesbury, who was at the Duke of Rich-
mond's ball, writes that he heard the Duke of
Wellington make a similar statement to his host
just before leaving the ball. Yet no such orders
have been preserved, and there is strong pre-
sumptive evidence that Wellington did not order
the Quatre Bras concentration till the morning of
the 1 6th June. The movement was even slower
than he calculated, with the result that Prince
Bernard of Saxe-Weimar and Perpouchen who
reinforced, were for some hours in front of Ney's
superior force, and in grave danger.
16/A /une. Napoleon did not act with his
customary promptitude. Although he had seen
and given Ney verbal instructions to attack the
English, he was to await written orders, and
these were not sent out till 9 a.m. Now Napoleon
had decided to operate by two wings; he entrusted
176 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
»
the left to Ney, the right to Grouchy, and meant to
accompany the latter himself. Ney was to fall upon
whatever force he found in front of him, overwhelm
and continue his march on Brussels. . Grouchy,
under the Emperor s own guidance, was to act against
the Prussians, who were to be sharply attacked, at
Sombreffe if there encountered ; if they had retired
to Gembloux, they were to be followed and still
attacked. After he had disposed of the Prussians,
Napoleon proposed to join Ney with all available
forces and deal next with Wellington.
The battle of Ligny, fought on the afternoon of
the 1 6th, has been considered one of Napoleon's
best ; never had he been more skilful, more cautious,
and yet more bold. It took place too late in the
day, however, and supremely decisive results were
lost through the misadventure with D'Erlons corps.
This corps belonged to Ney s command, but was
diverted in its march to join him by an order to
co-operate with the Emperor. Yet he came on the
ground at Ligny without being looked for, and
doubts whether he were friend or foe delayed
Napoleon's great attack. Then when his aid was
most needed he disappeared from the field, recalled
unwittingly by Ney. It was D'Erlon's sad fate to
have been useless that day to both Napoleon and
Ney ; he only served Wellington, who but for his
LIGNY AND qUATRE BRAS 177
absence at Quatre Bras might easily have been
overpowered. Ligny was a victory to the French,
but although it robbed Blucher of a third of his
strength and forced him to retreat, Napoleon was
disappointed, for he had the battle in his hand
quite early in the day, and thought with Ney s co-
operation to annihilate and wipe out the Prussians.
Blucher was able, too, to retreat in good order, con-
cealing his direction from the French, and he now
made for Wavre, having generously resolved to
surrender his line of communications with his base,
in order to regain ** touch " with his ally.
Wellington had promised to support the Prus-
sians, but only on condition that he was not him-
self attacked. He had ridden over, on his arrival at
Quatre Bras, to confer with Blucher, and he agreed
then to act upon the French flank or as a reserve.
But on his return, Ney, who had been hitherto
motionless, came on with great vigour. By this
time Picton with the 5th Division was near at hand,
and a stubborn resistance met the French. It was
a fierce action, gallantly fought on both sides, but vic-
tory remained with the indomitable British infantry,
recruits mostly, whose squares bravely riesisted the
most determined charges of the French cavalry.
x'jth June. There had been no news of Blucher
the previous evening, nor again this morning until
M
178 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
the day was well advanced. Wellington had his mis-
givings of the result of the action ; for on visiting
the Prussian position at Ligny before the battle, he
expressed his strong disapproval of it. His keen mili-
tary eye soon saw its defects : the Prussian columns
were dotted all along the slope of a hill, so that
no cannon ball could miss its effect upon them, and,
as he told Sir Henry Hardinge, he fully expected
them to be ** damnably mauled." He used the same'
forcible language when conversing upon the day's
events with Captain Bowles, who was with his
company in advance at Quatre Bras. While they
talked, Bowles tells us,^ a staff-officer came up and
whispered something in Wellington s ear, who, with-
out the least change of countenance, gave him some
orders and dismissed him. Then the Duke turned
to. Bowles and said quietly : /' Old Blucher has had
a d d good licking, and gone back to Wavre,
eighteen miles. As he has gone back, we must
go back too. I suppose in England they will say
we have been licked. I can't help it : as they have
gone back, we must go back too." ** He made all
the arrangements for retiring, without moving from
the spot where he was standing, and it certainly did
not occupy him five minutes."
Napoleon was again slow to move after Ligny.
^ In a letter to a friend.
NAPOLEON PURSUES 179
He was no doubt badly served by Ney, who, chaf-
ing at the interference with D'Erlon, one of his
corps commanders, had made no report, as was
clearly his bounden duty, of his check at Quatre
Bras. Napoleon had to call for the information,
and about midday he sent Ney orders to renew
his attack and drive the English out of Quatre
Bras. At the same time he gave Grouchy orders
to pursue the retreating Prussians and find out
exactly what they meant to do. Had this order
been punctually and promptly obeyed, the changed
line of retreat from Namur to Wavre, with its
manifest object, would have been known to Napo-
leon, and of course to Grouchy, in time to alter
events. The mere suspicion of Blucher s rapproche-
ment to Wellington would have roused Grouchy
into a strenuous effort to intercept him.
Ney moved forward at i p.m., but long before
the French columns were in movement Wellington
was far on his way to Waterloo. He had been cau-
tiously withdrawing his force all the morning, and,
covered by Altens division, the British retreated,
in excellent order. When Napoleon came up,
about I P.M., he blamed Ney bitterly for his supine-
ness, and launched Reille s cavalry in pursuit of the
English ; but the utmost activity of horse and guns,
under the eye of the Emperor, could bring no
i8o THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
more than one sharp encounter, at Genappe, before
Wellington reached Waterloo. Here, or more
exactly at Mont St. Jean, he turned, resolved to
give battle in the position he had already selected
and had surveyed for the purpose. Some mili-
tary critics, Napoleon chief among them, condemn
Wellingtons decision. His proper course, they
maintain, was to have continued his retreat through
the forest of Soignies, and so gained time ; time in
which Blucher could certainly have joined him with
his whole army in front of Brussels, in which large
English reinforcements could reach him from the
seaboard ; time which would have made Napoleon's
position more and more precarious, with a forest in-
tervening between and an enemy twice his strength,
and' fresh enemies in almost countless numbers
closing in on his rear. Clausewitz, a writer of the
highest authority, however, defends Wellington's
action on the grounds that Wavre was but ten
miles distant from Waterloo, and that Blucher had
promised to come with all his army to Waterloo.
That Wellington risked much in fighting with
inferior forces, part of whom were probably dis-
affected, cannot be denied. But he was prepared
to face the risks. A battle was necessary ; the
campaign could only thus be brought to a decisive
issue, and there would be none if he fell back from
RIDE TO WAVRE i8i
Waterloo. Besides, it is now absolutely certain
that Wellington stood his ground having the fullest
and clearest assurance of Bluchers support. He
had made this a condition, indeed, of his halt at
Waterloo. The general impression is that the
assurance above mentioned was not given till mid-
night on the 17th, and that the official despatch
embodying it only reached Wellington on the
morning of the battle. Yet he counted upon it,
and for other reasons. No doubt, in the first
instance he took up his ground without it, and
on no one momentous occasion of his eventful
life did he show greater courage and self-reliance
than in thus facing round. Now, an old story has
been revived that Wellington rode over in person
to Wavre on the night of the 17th and got the
promise of Prussian support from Blucher's own
lips. The story has lately been investigated by
a writer of authority,^ and appears to rest upon
plausible evidence. True, Lord Ellesmere, in
1847, denies it, and is supposed to have been in-
spired by the Duke himself On the other hand,
two trustworthy witnesses relate it with great cir-
cumstantiality, on the Duke's authority. One is
Mr. Charles Mayne Young, the other a son of
Mr. Justice Coltman. The first heard it from
' General F. Maurice, R.A., United Service Magazine^ Sept. 1890.
i82 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
Mr. Pierrepoint, who had just returned from a visit
to the Duke at Strathfieldsaye ; the other from his
father, who had also just come from Strathfieldsaye.
The details are identical, although neither had seen
the other's account.
It appears to have arisen out of an inquiry for
the famous charger Copenhagen, which had been
dead some years.^ The Duke then proceeded to
give an instance of the horses quality. ** There
may have been many faster horses, no doubt many
handsomer," said the Duke, **but for bottom and
endurance I never saw his fellow." He had ridden
him since lo a.m. on the 17th, and in the evening
— excellent horse-master as he was — he had seen
him stabled and fed. Later that evening he had
him re-saddled for a secret expedition he had in
mind, and on which he rode with no companion
but his orderly. He had invented some pretext
for getting his secretary (Lord Fitz Roy Somerset)
out of the way, and had eluded all his aides-de-
camp. The Duke gave as his reason for this
secrecy, that had his intention been known to his
staff they would have tried to dissuade him from
his rather hazardous adventure. So he rode the
twelve miles to Wavre in the dark dead night, and
' ** Half the fine ladies ot my acquaintance," said the Duke, ** upon this
occasion have got bracelets or lockets miide from his mane or tail."
i86 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
face to face with our chief difficulty in regard to
the whole of this extraordinary story. It is indeed
impossible to believe that Wellington — the man
upon whom was laid so terrible a responsibility,
who was so fully and rightly conscious that he
alone could direct the coming fight with reasonable
hope of success — would run the risk of this long
and perilous midnight ride. It is no answer to say
that he was a splendid and untiring horseman ; that
he made nothing of such journeys in the Peninsula ;
that this strong, self-reliant, vigorous soldier thought
only of satisfying himself on a most momentous
point on the eve of a desperate struggle. All
that he might have felt, but he could never surely
forget that he was too valuable to the cause, too
precious to wander off even in search of this vital
assurance. H e had a dozen agents, confidential and
completely trustworthy, whom he could despatch to
Blucher. On the whole — even laying Wellington's
denial on one side (for with age his memory became
defective), and after giving due weight to the evi-
dence, which, although striking and plausible, is not
direct, but based only on the hearsay of the witnesses
— the story must be disbelieved. It is unquestion-
able that, if really true, it must have come out much
sooner, and in a much more definite way. There
was no earthly reason for secrecy after the event ;
FOR AND AGAINST THE RIDE 187
certainly not on the part of the Prussians, some of
whom must undoubtedly have heard the fact from
Blucher — yet in none of the German records is there
the slightest reference to it. Ingenious as are the
arguments adduced, those to the contrary, as wdl
as the negative arguments, are to most minds over-
whelming;^ not the least strong among the latter
being the absence of any reference to the ride
in Lord Stanhope's conversations with the Duke.
An incident of the kind would surely have been
approfondi by that most Boswellian of modern
reporters, who pursued Wellington (much to his
discomfiture) everywhere note-book in hand.
^ Lord Wobeley, with whom I have often discussed this question, and at
great length, is unhesitatingly against the story. Yet he gave me two new,
and to some extent interesting, facts regarding it. The first, that he was
offered by a clergyman in Ireland a fac-simile letter written by the aide-
de-camp who accompanied the Duke in his ride ; but the letter was never
really produced, while, as will be seen in the text, it is an int^pral part of
the story that no one went with Wellington except his orderly. This also
seems to dispose of another assertion, that Lord Bathurst rode with Wel-
lington to Wavre. He had dined with the Duke, and it is said they started
together, probably by sundown, some one lending Lord Bathurst a cloak,
which a recent correspondent of a military paper declares is still treasured
by the family as a relic of the great day.
The second fact would be of the utmost importance if quite clearly sub-
stantiated. One of Lord Wolseley*s aides-de-camp in Ireland was Captain the
Hon. Richard Somerset, grandson of Lord Raglan, whose sisters (Captain
Somerset's grand-aunts) were still alive at the time the story of the Wavre
ride was revived. On reference to these ladies they expressed the utmost
astonishment that there should be any doubt on the subject. Their brother.
Lord Fitz Roy Somerset, always firmly believed in the visit to Blucher. It is
very possible, however, that the Ladies Somerset were talking of the visit
paid before Ligny, during the i6th June.
CHAPTER XIV
WATERLOO
Wellington relies on Blucher — Grouchy's misdirection — Napoleon's
confidence — " Ces Anglais ! Enfin je les tiens " — Wellington's position
— Napoleon's plan of attack — He takes a fixed post — Wellington
moves everywhere — The five phases of the battle — Reille attacks
Hougoumont — Ney's attack of centre and left — Ne/s renewed attack
on centre — The cavalry attack — Attack by Imperial Guard — Pressure
of Prussian advance severely felt — ^The last attack repulsed — Defeat
all along the line — Wellington's general good fortune.
WELLINGTON, then, awaited the French
onslaught at Waterloo with calm forti-
tude. He knew that he could count
upon Blucher, that Blucher would keep his promise,
and he hoped to be able to hold out until that
promise was fulfilled. The co-operation of the
Prussians was not a rescue (as some have pre-
tended), a happy chance without which defeat was
inevitable, but a planned and concerted movement
without which Wellington would not have fought
at all. Napoleon, on the other hand, never seems
to have anticipated this combined action of the
allies. Had this been so, he must have drawn
Grouchy to him by earlier and more definite orders,
i88
NAPOLEON'S CONFIDENCE 189
and he would not have delayed his attack at
Waterloo until nearly noon. Of Grouchy s mis-
takes and misconceptions, his neglect whether to
intercept the advancing Prussians or to manoeuvre
towards Napoleon, to work towards the guns, it
is unnecessary to speak here. History now un-
hesitatingly condemns him as a proximate if not
a chief cause of the Emperor s overthrow.
The mere fact that Wellington stood firm might
have warned Napoleon that Blucher was coming.
He cannot have realised it or he would undoubtedly
have begun the battle sooner, say between eight
and nine in the morning, when the rain had ceased.
With these three hours in hand he would have
forestalled Blucher's march ; the crisis of the battle
would have arrived so much earlier, Wellington
might have been beaten before the Prussians made
themselves felt upon the left flank. But Napoleon
was in no hurry. He was too full of confidence,
too sanguine of victory. He was so sure of having
only the Anglo- Dutch army to fight, that he de-
liberately postponed attacking it until he could do
so in the most approved style.* His only fear
was lest his enemy should have decamped, and
dreading this, was up and on the move during the
night ; but the bivouac fires reassured him, and he
^ Rope's *' Campaign of Waterloo,'' p. 294.
iQO THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
found by daylight that the English were still there.
** I never was so pleased," he said afterwards at
St. Helena, ** as when I saw Wellington intended
to fight. ... I had not a doubt of annihilating
his army . . . when I found he gave me battle
singly. I felt confident of his destruction." That
morning at breakfast the Emperor said to several
general officers present: "The enemy's army is
superior in numbers to ours by about a fourth ;
nevertheless we have at least ninety chances in
our favour and not ten against us." Then they
burst in with the news that Wellington was "not
simple enough to wait, that his columns were in full
retreat." "You are mistaken," replied Napoleon,
"he is no longer in time ; he would expose himself
to certain destruction ; the dice have been thrown,
and the chances are in our favour." Now General
Foy, who had seen many hotly contested fields in
the Peninsula, ventured to protest with, "Sire, les
Anglais en duel c'est le diable," and was silenced
angrily. What was uppermost in Napoleon s mind
at that early hour survived to a later ; he was still
confident when Soult urged that it was useless to
try to break the English squares with cavalry,
and he answered rudely, "Vous croyez Welling-
ton grand homme parce qu'il vous a toujours
battu."
FRENCH TAKE UP POSITIONS 191
As the certainty of conflict approaching was
clearly seen, Napoleon desired his troops to break-
fast and clean their pieces, and dictated the orders
which brought the army into line. He had time
in plenty to spare, as he thought, and he decided
that his forces should march into their positions sur-
rounded with all the pomp and circumstance of war.
Column followed column, and squadron squadron,
with drums beating and colours flying — a truly
magnificent spectacle. ** The earth seemed proud,*'
he boasted, "to bear so many brave men." By 10
A.M. his dispositions were completed. His army was
drawn up in battle array upon a series of gentle
slopes trending northward ; his right at Frischer-
mont, his centre at Belle-Alliance, his left upon the
Nivelles- Lou vain road. D'Erlon and Reille were
in the front line, their infantry in two lines sup-
ported by the corps cavalry in three lines on each
flank. Lobau's corps was on the left of Belle-
Alliance, in rear of the centre ; behind Lobau was
the Imperial Guard. Kellermann's and Guyots
cavalry supported Reille ; Milhaud s and Lefebvre-
Desnouettes* supported D'Erlon.
And now Napoleon, amid enthusiastic greetings,
rode slowly along his lines, passing every unit
in review. Full of elation at the triumph he
so confidently expected, he is reported to have
192 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
stretched forth towards his opponents and cried,
*' Ces Anglais ! Enfin je les tiens ! "
Meanwhile ces Anglais^ with their friends and
allies, had been still earlier afoot. Wellington, on
" Copenhagen," was on the move soon after daylight,
riding hither and thither through the length and
breadth of his army. His position was astride of
the great highway to Brussels (which nearly bisected
it), upon a ridge of low hills running east and west,
with a long slope to the southward towards the
French. The summit of the ridge throughout its
length was a narrow plateau traversed from end
to end by the road to Wavre. On the right the
hills bulged rather forward, then curved inwards
slightly to the centre, and again advanced a little
on the left. Three salient outposts or advanced
points added greatly to the strength of the posi-
tion : on the right were the chateau, farm, and
orchards of Hougoumont, in the centre the farm
of La Haye Sainte ; on the left was a clump of
homesteads about Papelotte and La Haye. The
whole formed a compact and advantageous posi-
tion, having, says Hooper, **a slope in front offering
an obstacle to an assailant, a slope in rear conceal-
ing the strength and disposition of an army from
his view, and free and complete means of com-
munication with every part."
ALLIED POSITIONS 193
While the French were moving noisily into their
places, the allies fell into line quietly and with but
little show. The Guards were on the right of the
first line above Hougoumont ; somewhat to their right
rear was Mitchell's brigade, a part of the 2nd corps
which under Lord Hill occupied Braine TAUeud and
protected that right flank for which Wellington was
so solicitous up to the last. Next to the Guards
came Alten's division, the left of which rested on
the Brussels road. On the right of it was Picton s
division, with Bylandt's brigade of Dutch Belgians
deployed in front. The extreme left was filled up
by Vandeleur and Vivian's brigade of light cavalry.
The remaining five brigades of cavalry, includ-
ing the Household Brigade under Lord Edward
Somerset and the Union Brigade under Sir William
Ponsonby, was formed in a second line. Behind
both lines were the reserves, all save Lambert s
brigade and some Dutch cavalry west of the
Nivelles road. They consisted of the 2nd or
Clinton's division, the German legion, Hanoverians,
and Adams' British brigade. Beyond them were
the Brunswickers, beyond these Chassis Dutch
Belgians, reaching a hand towards Colville, who
with his division was kept far off to the right
at Hal and Tubize. Part of the artillery was
posted along the ridge — thirty guns to the right,
N
194 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
twenty-six to the left of the Charleroi road ; the
rest were in reserve. In the most advanced front
Hougoumont was held by a mixed detachment
of Nassauers, Brunswickers, and the light com-
panies of Maitland s brigade of Guards ; a weak
battalion of Germans occupied La Haye Sainte,
and Perpoucher's division was posted in La Haye
and the hamlets around.
Wellington s chief strength, it will be perceived,
lay to his right ; he feared most for this flank from
first to last. His centre and left were weaker, no
doubt, because he expected reinforcements on this
side from Blucher's rapidly advancing columns. It
was to Napoleons advantage that his adversary
looked for attack on his right — a potent reason for
attacking elsewhere. There were others. Suc-
cess upon the English right would have driven
Wellington upon Blucher across the high-road to
Brussels. Success in the centre and left would
have forced the allies more and more widely apart,
and Wellington must have retired towards the sea,
leaving the approaches to the capital open and
exposed. Hence Napoleon decided for the latter
course. He decided to throw the whole weight
of D'Erlon's corps upon the English centre and
left, preluding his advance by a fierce attack on
Hougoumont to divert Wellington's attention to
FIVE PHASES OF ATTACK 195
that side. Having thus matured his plan, Napoleon
took up his position on a knoll named Rossomme,
situated on the main road a mile or so to the rear
of La Belle Alliance. Wellington had no fixed
post during the action. He rode from point to
point wherever and whenever his presence seemed
most required, freely exposing himself, and running
repeated risks.
There were five principal phases or episodes in
the battle of Waterloo, and we shall best follow
the course of events upon this hard-fought day by
briefly describing each as it came on. In all five
the French acted on the offensive. The first was
the attack on Hougoumont ; the second, an attack
on centre and left ; the third, Ney s renewed attack
on the centre ; the fourth, the great cavalry effort ;
the fifth and last, the grand but disastrous advance
of the Imperial Guard.
I. Reille was entrusted with the assault of
Hougoumont. The first gun was fired at twenty
minutes past eleven. "There it goes !" said an old
Peninsular veteran to a comrade, as he took out
his watch and noted the opening of the ball. The
French columns — Jeromes division — came on with
great resolution, but made little impression. Foy s
division followed, and the gallant garrison were
compelled to fall back upon the main buildings
196 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
with their loopholed walls. Then by successive
outflanking movements the French skirmishers
gained the orchards, and almost made good their
entrance to the chateau and farm. . But Welling-
ton, who watched the struggle closely, sent aid
in small but effective detachments just where
required. Gradually the French drew off, having
suffered severely. The diversion had altogether
failed to induce Wellington to draw off troops from
his centre for the reinforcement of the point so
seriously assailed on the right. It was about this
time that the Prussians began to show themselves
upon the heights of St. Lambert, far away to the
east. Napoleon was long in doubt whether these
distant troops were friends or foes. Presently inter-
cepted despatches revealed the startling fact that
this was the advanced guard of Bulow's corps.
Napoleon saw his danger, and called on Grouchy
for immediate help. That general was directed, in
a letter which did not reach him till far too late
in the evening, to intercept the Prussians and
manoeuvre towards Napoleon at once. At the
same time Lobau's corps, hitherto held in reserve
behind La Belle Alliance, was sent out to cover
the right flank of the French position.
2. Meanwhile Ney, ** bravest of the brave,"
Napoleon's most intrepid lieutenant, had been
rj:^rM:r.0^.r^..'^C-'.'I
KEY'S FIRST ATTACK 197
organising the second or main attack, to the east-
ward of the Charleroi road. D'Erlon's corps was
formed in columns of attack behind a grand battery
of guns. Under cover of their fire the French
advanced. Picton held this part of the ridge with
the brigades of Kempt and Pack both deployed in
line, their numbers some three thousand, but all
somewhat withdrawn, and n>ore or less concealed
from view amongst the tall crops hereabouts heavy
in the ear. Donzelet's brigade, attacking La Haye
Sainte and the ridge above, had almost made good
its footing on the plateau when Picton brought
Kempt's men up at a run. A sharp conflict
ensued ; the British bayonet did its work, and the
French were driven, backward down the slope, but
not before they had inflicted serious loss. The
gallant English general, Sir Thomas Picton, was
amongst those who fell, shot right through the
head. Farther to the right of Donzelet the French
brigades of Quiot and Marcognet had also achieved
a temporary success. But they suffered severely
at the hands of a part of Pack s brigade ; and now
the cavalry supports of this part of the line came
into action under Wellington's personal instructions,
with tremendous effect. Sir William Ponsonby,
with the Union Brigade, the Royal Dragoons, the
Inniskillings, and the Scots Greys, came up at a
198 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
gallop, and charging home, carried everything before
him. Another cavalry combat was occurring on
the other side of the road ; for they had brought up
a strong body of Cuirassiers to support Donzelet's
attack, and Lord Uxbridge had launched the
Household Brigade against them. The British
heavy cavalry overbore the French, and the whole
sweeping into the valley, joined with those pursuing
the discomfited French infantry in filling the whole
space with a confused and struggling mass of fight-
ing men. During this period the work was almost
all hand to hand. Innumerable single combats
occurred, and here Shaw, the famous Life Guards-
man, after displaying tremendous prowess, lost his
life. Presently bodies of fresh French cavalry were
brought up to make head against our impetuous
dragoons. These in their turn were driven back,
and under cover of this success the crushed and
shattered columns of D'Erlon's discomfited corps
were withdrawn to re-form. The second attack,
like the first, had signally failed.
3. The third episode was a fresh advance, and
a still more resolute attempt to pierce the British
centre. It was to be carried out in concert with
Pir6, whose light cavalry was to menace the
extreme right on the Nivelles road ; and the attack
upon Hougoumont, seconded now by artillery, was
CAVALRY AND NEY AGAIN 199
to be renewed. Both sides now drew upon their
reserves. The Imperial Guard was brought up to
fill the gap left by Lobau, who was by this time in
battle order on the right rear ; Wellington also
closed in his left, and strengthened it by placing
Lambert's brigade behind Kempt s. The principal
effort of the French was now directed to La Haye
Sainte, which Donzelet and Quiot's brigade once
more attacked with * persistent courage. They
gained their point at last, and this great advantage
to the French was the critical moment of the day.
Had Ney been strong in fresh and untouched
infantry to improve the occasion, the fate of the
day might have been changed. Napoleon himself
was unwilling as yet to use up his corps cPdlite,
the renowned Imperial Guard. He was satisfied,
therefore, to follow up the capture of La Haye
Sainte by a grand attack of cavalry alone.
4. The corps of Milhaud and Lefebvre-Des-
nouettes, supported by the light cavalry of the
Guard, were for the purpose ; a splendid body of
horse, cuirassiers, lancers, and chasseurs, five thou-
sand strong, filling all the space between Hougou-
mont and the Charleroi road. Ney led them to
the front. The British infantry formed square to
receive them — ^small compact bodies so resolute
and firm that the cavalry could make absolutely
200 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
no impression. The withering cross fire of these
"living fortresses" emptied the horsemen's saddles,
shaking the squadrons to pieces, and stoutly defy-
ing attack. Ney's fierce valour rose always with
disaster. Twice foiled, a third time he led the
Frenchmen on, only to fail again. He called up
fresh supports — Guyot s brigade of grenadiers, the
dragoons of the Guard ; Napoleon sent forward
Kellermann's corps, four or five thousand fresh
sabres, to his aid. The whole of the French
cavalry (Pir6 only excepted), the corps of Milhaud
(that is to say, Desnouettes, Kellermann, Guyot,
Jacquinot, Sobervie, Domont) were now hotly en-
gaged. It was a supreme effort, as heroically
executed as it was boldly conceived, **No scene
like it," says Hooper, **is recorded in the annals
of war. . . . They (the French horsemen) behaved
with conspicuous bravery, but although they charged
at the squares, approached, cut at the bayonets
with their sabres, and thrust at the front files with
their lances, it is recorded that they did not in any
case charge home. The squares beat them off,
slew them, killed their horses, and threw them
again into confusion." The struggle lasted for
nearly an hour, and then the French cavalry fell
back discomfited and repulsed at every point.
5. It was now past 5 p.m. Three more hours
NET'S LAST ATTACK 201
of daylight remained, and there was still time to
organise fresh efforts. Both sides were severely
shaken, but full of fighting still Ney, eager to
go again to the front, sent to his chief for more
infantry to renew the attack. " De Tinfanterie,"
angrily replied Napoleon to Ney's messenger, "ou
voulez-vous que j'en prenne ? Voulez-vous que j'en
fasse ? " The fact was that he began to seriously
feel the pressure of the advancing Prussians.
Blucher himself had come up to take command
of Bulow's corps, and was forcing Lobau to retire.
Napoleon was becoming anxious lest his right flank
and rear should be compromised. It was neces-
sary to reinforce Lobau with strong detachments ;
Duchesne, therefore, with the young Guard, joined
him, and three battalions of the old Guard and
several g^ns. These sufficed for the moment to
beat back the Prussians, and Napoleon, who still
thought he had to do only with Bulow's corps and
not with three-fourths of the Prussian army, turned
his attention once more to the front. He was
resolved to use all the means at his disposal in
one grand and final effort to crush his obstinate
foe. He had his last reserve, the Imperial Guard ;
on what could Wellington rely? Wellington had
reserves too, but he counted still more upon the
promised co-operation of the Prussians, who must
202 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
at this time be close at hand. As we have seen,
Bulow had already arrived, and the whole indeed
would have been up much earlier in the day but
for the conflagration in the town of Wavre, which
checked the march of Blucher's columns. Napoleon
in person superintended the arrangements for the
last attack. He harangued the Imperial Guard,
and rode with them a little way out before entrust-
ing the leadership to Ney.
They were formed in two columns of only four
battalions each,' as twelve were facing the Prussians.
The right column moved a little ahead of the left ;
the direction of both was against the British right
centre. Already the battle had been renewed along
the whole line. Divisions and brigades once more
assailed positions they had previously attacked in
vain ; there was a hot artillery fire from g^ns
pushed well to the front, and the cavalry was close
at hand to follow up any advantage gained. On
the English side, Wellington, feeling easy for his
left, which the Prussians assured, had drawn the
best part of his strength towards his right. He
brought up Chass6's division and the Brunswick
battalions, which fell into line between Halkett and
Kielmansegge, while Vivian and Vandeleur with
their cavalry brigades formed up behind in second
line. The same garrison held Hougoumont, backed
"UP, GUARDS!" 203
by detachments of guards and three English regi-
ments. Upon the interior slope Maitland s guards
were held intact and unseen, so was the light
infantry brigade which prolonged the line on their
right. Much sharp fighting ensued before the
great and final attack was delivered. The right
column of the Imperial Guard was still leading, and
bore directly upon the point behind which the
English Guards were concealed. Swept and torn
by artillery fire, losing many of its generals — Ney
dismounted, but still leading on foot — the column
pressed gallantly on. Just as they crowned the
ridge the Duke cried to Maitland's men, ** Up,
Guards, and make ready ! " The effect was elec-
trical. The French Guards were altogether taken
aback. They could not deploy ; every shot from
this wide front of fire told direfuUy upon the dense
column ; and when it wavered, as it soon did,
Wellington gave the order to charge. The French
could not withstand the onslaught, and almost im-
mediately broke and fell away. For a time it fared
better with the second or left column, which, un-
dismayed by the overthrow of the first, continued
to press forward. This had now to deal with
Maitland's brigade, and bravely it kept on its way,
when Colborne with the 52 nd, happily inspired by
a stroke of genius, wheeled his line to the left, and
204 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
poured in such a murderous fire that the French
column was reduced to an "unsteady crowd."
Then the 52nd, supported by the 71st and 95th,
charged nobly, and the second column of the Guard
was also overthrown. From this moment the issue
of the battle was no longer in doubt. The failure
and retreat of the Imperial Guard ruined the
chances of the French attack on every side. They
withdrew from all parts, hotly pressed, especially
by the light troops and the cavalry. Napoleon,
who had been active in these last encounters,
rallied the Guard on the west of Belle-Alliance,
but on the approach of the advancing British they
again retired. There was a struggle between the
English and French cavalry, in which the latter
were worsted and joined in the general rout. The
French about Planchenoit long showed a firm
front, but they were presently outflanked and out-
numbered by the Prussians, and also took flight.
The French army was now en pleine diroute.
Napoleon's single line of retreat was crowded,
''blocked up by the wreck of the baggage, and
a struggling, terrified, shouting mob, the wreck of
that splendid host he had marshalled so arrogantly
in the morning." For the Emperor all was lost.
He was at Charleroi next day at dawn, and three
days later in Paris.
IiondouiGto
tor^e-Allea.
CHAPTER XV
AFTER THE BATTLE
Wellington and Napoleon compared — The so-called "surprise** —
Result of Grouch/s absence from the field — Wellington as a tactical
leader — Waterloo " hard pounding " — A battle of giants — Luck.
THERE can be no doubt," says Shaw
Kennedy, '*that so long as history is read,
the battle of Waterloo will be much and
eagerly discussed ; " that so long as the art of war
is studied, the great features of Waterloo and its
most important details will interest and occupy
military men. The greatest commander has been
well defined as he who makes fewest mistakes.
Napoleon and Wellington both erred in the cam-
paign and battle of Waterloo, but they should
be compared by their merits, not their defects.
Napoleon's strategy was no doubt superior to
Wellington's, his general views were more correct
and sound ; but Wellington was better in execution.
** The blunders and looseness of Napoleon's move-
ments on the 1 6th, 17th, and i8th June were sur-
passingly great and numerous ; while Wellington
ao5
2o6 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
acted with unerring energy, firmness, and pre-
cision."^ Wellington, again, was more active at
the battle ; he personally and more largely con-
trolled its tactics. Wherever he was most wanted,
at any critical moment, on any decisive point, Wel-
lington appeared to judge for himself and deal most
effectively with the situation. Napoleon trusted
to his staff; he remained chiefly on one spot, and
there awaited the reports of others before he gave
his orders to meet the constantly changing aspects
of the fight.
Although Napoleon did not actually surprise the
allies* in the initial movement, the early honours
^ Shaw Kennedy, p. 176.
^ When the Duke of Wellington was sitting for his portrait to Pickersgill,
the painter asked him if it was true that he was surprised at the outset of the
Waterloo campaign. '* I was never surprised till this moment," replied his
Grace.
This story of the *' surprise " seems to have originated with a great per-
sonage, no other than His Royal Highness the Duke of York, whose hostility
to Wellington amounted to malevolence, and is supposed to have grown out
of personal resentment that Wellington was preferred before him in the
command of the army in the Peninsula. The pretension was preposterous,
of course, for the Duke of York's qualification as a general was absolutely
contemptible, yet it was advanced ; and his disappointment explains much
of the pettiness exhibited to the great soldier he would have superseded.
Greville in his Memoirs (June 24, 1821) tells us in so many words that '*the
Duke of York's prejudice against Wellington is exceedingly strong. He does
not deny his military talents, but thinks that he is false and ungrateful, that
he never gave sufficient credit to his officers, and that he was unwilling to put
forward men of talent who might be in a situation to claim some show of
credit, the whole of which he was desirous of engrossing himself. He says
that at Waterloo he got into a scrape, and allowed himself to be surprised,
and he attributes in a great measure the success of that day to Lord Angleseo,
STRATEGY COMPARED 207
of the campaign were undoubtedly his. On the
1 6th June he had already reaped the full benefit
of his strategy, and the game for a time seemed
quite within his hands. His crowning error fol-
lowed quickly on his first success ; and that was
in not falling upon Wellington with his whole
strength directly after Ligny. He was wrong in
detaching Grouchy, even if right in principle, as
he afterwards claimed, on the ground that Blucher
when re-formed could have cut into his communi-
cations ; for with Grouchy he would have greatly
outnumbered the Anglo-Dutch, and if he could
beat them he need have no more fear of Blucher.
He should have led against them "every man and
every horse, even if the risk had been great in the
highest degree, which ... it clearly was not."*
That Grouchy disappointed him, that if his tardy
lieutenant had manoeuvred towards the sound of
guns Waterloo might still have been saved, does
not alter the assertion that the original error was
Napoleon s own.
who, he says, was hardly mentioned, and that in the coldest terms, by the
Duke's despatch."
The suggestion that Lord Uxbridge won the battle is delicious, and
almost parallels the pretension advanced in late years by George IV. that
he was at Waterloo. *' I have often heard your Majesty say so," was the
Duke's evasive reply when appealed to in confirmation of this amusing
assertion.
^ Shaw Kennedy.
2o8 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
Wellington's chief strategical error, that of cling-
ing too tenaciously to his right flank, has been com-
mented upon already. He was wrong also in
agreeing with Blucher to meet Napoleon so far to
the front at Fleurus and Quatre Bras, at points
where their own concentration could only take place
later than that of the enemy who threatened them.
On the tactical field he was most to blame for his
neglect to hold on at all costs to La Haye Sainte,^
the outpost in front of his left centre, the import-
ance of which Napoleon clearly saw, and which
did pass at one time into the hands of the French.
This was the supreme moment of the battle, and
never perhaps did Wellington show to greater
advantage as a tactical leader than in his quiet
self-possessed treatment of this dangerous emer-
gency. The danger was imminent : La Haye
Sainte was lost ; there was a gap in the line ;
it was open between Halketts* Hanoverians
and Kempt's brigade on the left or east side of
the great Nivelles-Brussels road. Shaw Kennedy
took this startling news to the Duke, who received
it with the most perfect coolness, and replied with
great firmness and precision. ** I shall order up the
. ^ See ante, p. 164. That La Haye Sainte was not strengthened and occu-
pied with sufEcient garrison was the fault of the English staff, but Wellington
always accepted the blame.
^ He had been brought from the right an hour before.
"HARD POUNDING" 209
Brunswickers and other troops. Go you," he said
to Shaw Kennedy, **and get all the German troops
you can to the spot, and all the guns you can find."
This was no doubt the hour of greatest peril, when
defeat was within measurable distance ; and with
a less self-reliant leader all would have been lost.
But Wellington came up quickly at the head of
the Brunswick troops ; he was soon backed by Kiel-
mansegge and Vivian's cavalry, while the artillery
with their fire covered the opening. The ground
was held, the day was saved, by the man who
** managed his reserves in a steady yet energetic
and masterly manner, . . . who was eminent on
this great day of trial for coolness, judgment, and
energy in doing everything that the urgencies of
the action required at the proper time."^
In his own simple and modest account of the
action, he lays no claim to having personally con-
trolled it or contributed to the victory. " People
ask me to describe Waterloo," he said to Sir John
Malcolm, in Paris, soon after the battle. ** I tell
them it was hard pounding on both sides, and we
pounded the hardest. There was no manoeuvring.
Bonaparte kept up his attacks, and I was glad to
let it be decided by the troops." There is another
version of this account as given by Wellington to
' Shaw Kennedy, p. 126.
2IO THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
a lady of fashion : " We pummelled them and they
pummelled us, and I suppose we pummelled the
hardest, so we gained the day." ** It was a battle
of giants ! " he said on another occasion. ** Many of
my troops were new ; but the new fight well though
they manoeuvre ill — better perhaps than many have
fought and bled. As to the way in which some
of our ensigns and lieutenants braved danger —
the boys just come from school — it exceeds belief.
They ran as at cricket. *' Again: ** Waterloo was
won in the playing fields of Eton."
I may be permitted here, at the close of Welling-
ton's active service in the field, to lay some stress
upon a point that has hardly been sufficiently
considered when dealing with his military career.
Wellington's good luck has never yet been re-
cognised as an important factor in his success. I
mention it in no disparagement of his great and
enduring reputation. Another great soldier, his
greatest opponent, was proud to acknowledge that
he fought under a fortunate star ; ^ to be lucky
is indeed of the first and last importance in the
greatest of all games of chance. " Est-il heureux ? "
was the first question Napoleon asked in inquiring
' Marmont said at Fuente Guinaldo (see post, p. 214) that bright as was
Napoleon's star, Wellington's outshone it.
NARROW ESCAPES 211
into the qualifications of his generals for command.
Wellington was undoubtedly a lucky man, not only
in that immunity from mishap, that continual escape
from serious wounds, that his unhesitating personal
exposure made constantly possible, but in the larger
fortune that attended him in the general conduct
of operations.
As regards bodily and personal risks, he passed
scatheless through many. The man who was
nearly drowned on his second voyage to Lisbon,
in 1809, when H.M.S. Surveillante was all but
shipwrecked on the coast of the Isle of Wight,
escaped serious wounds on several occasions, and
more than once was nearly taken prisoner. The
day before Talavera he had climbed into an old
ruined house, leaving his horse below, when a
rapid advance of the enemy barely gave him time
to remount and gallop away. In the movements
before Salamanca, a small detachment of French
dragoons charged two of our guns, escorted by
cavalry, with much gallantry, just as Wellington
was passing near. The guns were limbered up and
passing to the rear ; there was a fierce encounter,
in which the French overthrew our dragoons and
drove them back past Wellington, who was en-
veloped in the m616e. The Duke was in the thick
of it, and had a very narrow escape, being obliged
212 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
to draw his sword and fight his way out with the
rest of his staff. At Echalar, in 1813, when pursu-
ing Soult's rear-guard under Clausel, Wellington rode
to the front reconnoitring, escorted by half a com-
pany of the 43rd. The French saw them, and sent
a party to cut them off, which would infallibly have
fallen upon Wellington just as he was examining
his maps, had not a smart and intelligent sergeant,
Blood, who was on the look-out, descried the
enemy's approach. Blood, *'with surprising ac-
tivity, leaping rather than running down the pre-
cipitous rocks," gave Wellington notice ; but the
French arrived in time to send a volley after him
as he galloped away. At Quatre Bras he was
nearly ridden down by Pir6's chasseurs, and only
escaped by calling upon some of the 92nd High-
landers, who were lining a ditch, to lie down while
he jumped his horse over them. At Salamanca
a bullet perforated Wellington's cloak as it lay
folded in front of him on his saddle. At Orthez
a round shot cut the bough of a tree just over
his head, two bullets passed through his clothes ;
another, in the same battle, struck him in the groin
and knocked him from his horse. Alava, who was
with him, thought he was killed. He had been
laughing the moment before at an expression which
had been explained to him, of a Spanish soldier
PERSONAL COURAGE 213
who had said he was '' ofendido'' (slightly hurt),
and now cried, as he jumped again to his feet, that
he was only ^^ ofendido'' At Waterloo he carried
his life in his hand, but was never touched, although
the casualties among those about him were ter-
rible. Colonel De Lancey, quartermaster-general,
was mortally wounded ; so was Colonel Alexander
Gordon. Colonel Canning was killed outright ;
Lord Uxbridge lost his leg by Wellington's side.^
Lord Fitz Roy Somerset was wounded in the
arm, which was afterwards amputated. In the
cavalry attack upon the squares the fire was ex-
ceedingly hot, and he was warned by Sir Colin
Campbell, one of his staff, that it was no place for
him, he had better move ; to which the Duke
replied, " I will when I see those fellows off."
Later, when Colonel Harvey protested that he
was in great danger, Wellington replied, ** Never
mind, let them fire away ; the battle's won, and
my life is of no consequence now." Soon after-
wards he was heading the pursuit, with but a single
member of his staff left by his side.
In larger matters his good fortune was great.
At Assaye, as we have seen, he found the ford he
* Every one probably knows the laconic force with which the sad news
was imparted and received. '* Fve lost my leg, by G — d 1 " said the stricken
man. " Have you, by G — d ? *' replied his imperturbable chief.
214 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
sought ; but yet, if there had been none, his whole
force must have been annihilated. At Busaco,
Massena's jealousy of Ney postponed an imme-
diate attack that promised enormous advantage, for
Wellington was not yet concentrated. At Fuentes
d'Onoro ** there was not during the whole war a
more perilous hour." Wellington's force was divided
by river, and in a plain through which five thousand
French horsemen careered unchecked was a "con-
fused concourse " of small parties, piquets, and non-
combatants, and only the slackness of the enemy
saved this mob from destruction. At Fuente
Guinaldo, Wellington lay with barely fifteen thou-
sand men for thirty-six hours within cannon-shot
of the whole French army. Marmont s mistake at
Salamanca was another stroke of luck for Welling-
ton. Again, in the retreat from Burgos, by an
audacious movement, covered by fog and rain, he
transported his whole army around Soult's left, but
so close to his front that, if discovered, he would
probably have been destroyed. It was immense
good fortune, too, that Napoleon never came to
oppose him in Spain ; that he would have been
worsted even then need not be taken for granted,
but the Emperor in the heyday of his power would
have been a far doughtier antagonist than any
of his marshals. Last of all, luck played up
LUCK AT WATERLOO 215
for Wellington at Waterloo. Soult's want of skill
as chief of staff, Ney's ignorance of the forces
entrusted to him, his dilatoriness, the conflict-
ing orders given to D'Erlon, Napoleon's lack
of promptitude after Ligny, Grouchy 's mistaken
mission and subsequent effacement, were so many
boons and godsends contributing their quota to
the sum total of Wellington s success.
CHAPTER XVI
LATER YEARS
Wellington's great popularity after Waterloo — His continued service
of the State — Master-General — The Chartists — Saves army from
extinction — AVrongly blamed for Crimean disasters — His political
career — Prime Minister — The Reform Bill — His unpopularity — Last
occasion on which he took office.
WELLINGTON may be said to have
reached the zenith, he was at the very
summit and apex of his career imme-
diately after Waterloo. His popularity was un-
bounded. In Paris crowds followed him wherever
he went ; the universal excitement was extraordi-
nary whenever he appeared ; people jostled and
hustled each other in their frantic eagerness to see
this great hero, **a small man, plainly dressed in a
blue frock-coat, white neckcloth, and round hat ; "
they almost kissed the ground at his horse's feet.
He was all powerful in the councils of the nations,
the arbiter of Frances fate. It was his firmness
and moderation, his wise judgment and convincing
logic, that saved her from spoliation and dismem-
berment. It was well for her that England's great
ai6
THE BRIDGE OF JENA 217
representative was predominant, and strong enough
to resist the revengeful desires of her other
triumphant foes. He preserved the bridge of Jena^
and the column of Austerlitz ; he prevented the
cessions of territory which would have made new
wars inevitable; he fixed Louis XVHI. on the
throne, not as the best sovereign possible, but
the only one likely to ensure the future peace of
Europe. To give effect to his views, and guaran-
tee their execution, he devised the joint army of
occupation, which conferred strength and security
upon the new regime, and being terminable on a
fixed date, kept France quiet meanwhile.
In 1818 the Duke returned to England, and
accepted the post of Master- General of the
Ordnance, an ancient and honourable office, that
gave him a seat in the Cabinet as a military
adviser. He fought no more in the field, although
in his green old age he would have gladly accepted
service in Afghanistan ; and in the early days of
the Sikh war he told Sir Charles Napier, "If you
do not go, I must." His last military operation
^ "About blowing up the bridge of Jena, there were two parties in the
Prussian army (Gneisenau and Muffling) against, but Blucher violently for it.
In spite of all I could do, he did make the attempt, even while, I believe, my
sentinel was standing at one end of the bridge. But the Prussians had no
experience in blowing up bridges. ..." '* They made a hole in one of the
pillars, but their powder blew out instead of up, and, I believe, hurt some of
their own people." — Wellington to Stanhope, p. 119.
2i8 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
was to concert measures for the defence of London
against the Chartists in 1848, and his masterly
arrangements for garrisoning the city saved it
without the firing of a shot. He placed troops
unseen in all commanding points, and was ready
to act with decisive effect if the malcontents had
risked a collision. From 1842 till his death he
was commander-in-chief of the army, which .he
governed in its best interests, although he intro-
duced no new system, was quite opposed indeed
to reforms. For the latter he has been blamed,
and it is so far true that he was to the last degree
conservative, satisfied with existing methods, con-
tent to subordinate always the military to the civil
power in the State. But while thus seeming to
neglect it, he was defending the very existence
of the army, threatened as it was by unspsu-ing
economists who would have made a clean sweep of
it, and who continually attacked the Estimates. The
Duke s best protection was to hide it out of sight,
in the colonies, or distributed in small detachments
at home. ** He treated the army as a machine, to
be taken to pieces and packed away in small pieces
till it should be needed."^ No doubt it followed
that the higher tactical instruction was entirely
neglected ; there could be no practice in handling
^ Hamley, " Wellington's Career," p. 107.
CRIMEAN COLLAPSE 219
the three arms ; the manoeuvres of any but the
smallest bodies was impossible.
The responsibility for the collapse of the army
administi:ative departments in the Crimea has also
been fixed upon the Duke of Wellington. There
had been the same fatal defects in the Peninsular
army at the outset, but he had conquered them
by his own masterly power. If, however, "the
perfected organisations by which Wellington had
worked out his purpose were soon after destroyed
— destroyed so completely that not even so much
as the framework of his land transport system'
was left to show how in future our armies might
be moved and supplied"^ — was Wellingtons the
blame? His splendid talents had created means
never before existent, services that were never
part and parcel of our army system ; *'they formed
no part of the mechanism by which England
managed war business at any other times," and it
was beyond his power to give them permanent
life. At the same time, it is more than probable
that he would have been more urgent for their
continuance had not the drift towards economy
and reduction been almost irresistible.
Although Wellington sheathed his sword, he
did not cease to render loyal and most ungrudging
' Kinglake.
220 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
service to his country. He entered the arena of
politics, and the impression prevails that, though
a great administrator and a great statesman, he
was not a great politician.^ He was never, and
could never have been, a party leader ; he could not
conduct party warfare ; he was no party man. He
was ever "guided by large principles of duty, dis-
interestedness, and perfect honesty," and he could
never subordinate these to political exigencies ; he
was first and before everything a loyal and de-
voted servant of the Crown and the State. ** He
was pre-eminently a great national servant, always
intent on promoting what, according to his cool
judgment, was best for the common weal."
The earlier phases of his political career were
certainly cast in troublous times. There was the
quarrel between the king, George IV., and his
queen, Caroline, in which the Duke spoke his mind
to the king with noble directness.* There was
constant effervescence on the Continent, wars and
rumours of wars — the Greek revolt against Turkey,
^ Hamley.
^ There was a story current at the time of the Queen Caroline agitation
which shows the Duke's grim humour. The mob were obliging every one
who passed along a certain street to halt and rep>eat the words, " God bless
Queen Caroline." The Duke*s turn came, and he at once very sensibly
acquiesced in the demand, but as he rode away he fired a parting shot.
*'God bless Queen Caroline," he said, quietly adding, **and may all your
wives be like her."
THE DUKE'S DUEL 221
the Holy Alliance, and the desire to interfere in
the internal affairs of Spain. At home Welling-
ton was called to high office, and became Prime
Minister in 1828, although he did not seek it, and
had said the year before that he should be '* worse
than mad to think of such a thing." He had to
deal with some of the most momentous issues
that have been raised in our political history. On
the question of Catholic Emancipation he yielded
at length, preferring to accept a measure against
which he had really no prejudice rather than face
a terrible civil war in Ireland. It was his con-
cession on this point that led to his duel with Lord
Winchelsea, who had accused him in a political
pamphlet of being a papist in disguise. They met
and exchanged shots on Battersea fields, but the
Duke fired wide, and Winchelsea in the air. The
Duke claimed satisfaction on public grounds ; it
was his duty to fight, he said, for the duel was
a part of the Catholic question. When to these
calumnies were added the constant conflicts with
the king and his brothers, the struggle with Russian
intrigues at the British Court, the dealing with
people he disliked or despised, we may easily
understand his passionate outburst of regret that
he had ever accepted office. "If I had known in
January 1828," he wrote in November 1829, ''one
222 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
tithe of what I do now, and of what I discovered
one month after I was in office, I should never
have been the kings Minister, and should have
avoided loads of misery. I believe there never
was a man who suffered so much and for so little
purpose."
A still greater trial was at hand. The vital
question of Parliamentary Reform was forced into
strong relief by the French Revolution of 1830,
but Wellington could not see why the country
should be dissatisfied with the state of representa-
tion. He was fully convinced, he told the Lords,
that the country actually possessed a legislature
which answered all good purposes of legislation,
and in which it had full and entire confidence. Yet
he would have transferred seats from the corrupt
boroughs to the great towns. His objection to
thorough-going reform was based on his belief that
one of the foundation-stones of the constitution
was land ; for he could not see that " the pivot of
power had at last begun to shift from land to trade,
commerce, and industry, and that the claim of these
to share in power could not be denied."^ His op-
position to the Reform Bill was therefore unflinch-
ing, and it gained him unmerited but widespread
obloquy. The hero who a few years before had
^ Hooper, 243.
THE REFORM BILL 223
been the idol of the nation was now hooted and
hunted by the mob ; his Apsley House, which he
had acquired in the heyday of his glory, was attacked,
and its windows broken ; the Duke, riding home
from the city, was chased, and only escaped under
the escort of two courageous barristers. He never
forgot these outrages, and when he once more re-
gained his popularity he would not acknowledge the
cheers of the fickle crowd, but pointed grimly to
the iron shutters he had put up for the protection
of his house.
At the worst hour, however, although he wore
outwardly a perfectly placid and unruffled de-
meanour, he was terribly harassed and depressed
by his political anxieties and the demeanour of the
House of Commons ; so much so, indeed, that he
told Lord Stanley, "It is fortunate that I don't
find a brace of loaded pistols by my side when
I wake in the morning."
In the teeth of his strenuous opposition the
Reform Bill was passed, and effected, as he thought,
" the greatest revolution that ever occurred without
bloodshed in any country." He had fought it, had
helped to defeat it, had tried to form a Ministry
to modify it, and finally determined to absent him-
self from the House when he saw that its passing
could alone save the country from grave dissensions.
224 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
A promise had been exacted by Lord Grey from
the king, that should the Lords again defeat the
Bill he would create a number of new peers suffi-
cient to outvote the Opposition. Wellington would
not allow the king s prerogative to be attacked by
a resolution condemning this creation, nor did he
wish to see the House swamped and discredited.
He preferred to abandon the fight with his fol-
lowers, and thus, as the lesser of two great evils, sur-
rendered his personal convictions for the common
good. ** No generous mind can study the story of
the Reform Bill without recognising the honour-
able and manly conduct of a statesman whose
first and last thought was for country and not
for himself."^
Only once again did the Duke take political
office. It was on the sudden dissolution of the
Melbourne Ministry in 1834, when Wellington
advised the king to send for Sir Robert Peel, who
was then travelling in Italy. Until Peel could arrive
the Duke agreed to discharge the whole duties
of administration. He became First Lord of the
Treasury and Home Secretary, the latter office,
that of the Secretary of State, enabling him to
act in all the others. For three weeks the Duke
of Wellington was sole and absolute dictator, **an
* Hooper.
UNIVERSAL COUNSELLOR 225
expedient of doubtful and anomalous character/'
says Sir Erskine May, but he adds that the Duke
exercised the extraordinary powers entrusted to him
with honour and good faith. He took all the
responsibility and none of the patronage ; proving
himself once again the devoted public servant, ready
to grapple with a great emergency, ** who, suddenly
finding the king without a government, at once
supplied one in his own person."
When Peel returned the Duke went to the
Foreign Office, and he was again a member of
the Cabinet of 1841. But he gradually passed up
above the cares of party warfare, and, except when
he joined Peel in repealing the Corn Laws, took no
active part in politics save as leader of the House
of Lords. He held no civil office, but he was the
universal counsellor, moderating opposition, helping
Ministers, guiding his peers, and influencing public
opinion for the good of the crown, the constitution,
and the country.
CHAPTER XVII
PERSONAL TRAITS
Alleged hardness of nature — Yet a staunch friend to Fitz Roy Somer-
set ; to Alexander Gordon — Severe treatment of Norman Ramsay and
other artillery officers — Colonel Sturgeon — Said to have neglected old
comrades — Proofs of his generosity — No sordid ideas about money —
His charities — Story of the snuff-box ; of the ball-room at Bath — His
indefatigable labours to the last.
I HAVE dealt in an earlier page with the various
features of Wellington's personal character,
more especially as they were exhibited in the
field, in the days of his military successes. It
remains to complete the portraiture with some
account of the man himself, supported by fuller
and later evidence, and as he appeared and was
known to his best friends. There is a tendency
at this present time to rather dwarf his repu-
tation. That he had weaknesses, defects ; that he
was of a hard nature, with no deep or extensive
sympathies, ** impervious to softer influences," un-
feeling to the extent of ignoring natural family
affections, unbending and implacable to those who
offended him ; that he forgot the services of his
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WAS HE A HARD MAN? 227
officers, maligned the men who won his victories
— such disagreeable traits as these have been so
much put forward in recent years, and repeated
with so many exaggerations, that it is to be feared
the present estimate of Wellington by his country-
men is below his unquestioned merits and rights.
It will be well to close this imperfect tribute to
his conspicuous worth with some examination of
these charges, and of the rebutting evidence that
may be offered after a better acquaintance with
his finer characteristics.
Greville is one of those who wrote Wellington
down as a hard man, mainly because the son
showed no ardent affection in after life for the
mother who had neglected him in his youth. Lady
Mornington could hardly look for great devotion
from her son Arthur, from the ugly duckling whom
she had despised, and who had blossomed so un-
expectedly into fame. Nor can the Duke be
greatly blamed for withholding his filial tender-
ness. But it is surely incorrect to say that he
was without heart, although Gleig may go too far
in claiming that **no more tender heart beat in a
human bosom." Wellington was undemonstrative,
cold and impassive outwardly, but within he was
very different. ** He has a short manner of speak-
ing and a stern look that people mistake for want
228 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
of heart ; but I have witnessed his kindness to
others, and felt it in so many instances, and so
strongly, that I cannot bear to hear him accused
of wanting what I know he possesses," says one
who was much thrown with him.^ His extreme
fondness for children bears out this view. He
played and romped with them, and fought again
his battles, suffering them to bombard him with
cushions. Two children who were staying at
Walmer complained that others got letters every
morning, but that the bag brought them none.
Whereupon the Duke with his own hand wrote one
to each daily, which were delivered with the rest.
Undoubtedly, to his own comrades he was a
good and staunch friend, kindly, considerate, some-
thing more than **not inhuman," as Hamley dis-
paragingly puts it. He rode twenty miles after a
hard day s fighting to visit the bedside of a wounded
aide-de-camp, the son of his dearest friends, and
stood there affected to tears when the case seemed
hopeless. The commander, so fully occupied with
momentous and immense transactions, could yet
find time to write to parents and relatives breaking
the sad news of the death or wounds of their be-
longings. When Lord Fitz Roy Somerset lost his
right arm at Waterloo, his chief, with great delicacy
» "George Napier's Life," p. i68.
LORD RAGLAN.
GRIEF AT LOSSES OF FRIENDS 229
and nice feeling, replaced him temporarily with a
one-armed man, Colonel Felton Harvey, so as to
assure his old military secretary that he might re-
turn when convalescent to his old post* We have
frequent outbursts of poignant grief in Wellington s
correspondence at the heavy penalties paid for
success. We owe to him the pregnant apothegm,
** Nothing is more tragical than a victory, except a
defeat." He was deeply affected by the loss of
Alexander Gordon at Waterloo, and wrote to Lord
Aberdeen : " The glory resulting from such actions,
so dearly bought, is no consolation to me."
Dr. Hume, in whose arms Gordon expired at
3 A.M. the morning after Waterloo, woke the Duke
to tell him the sad news. He sat up in bed, *his
face covered with the dust and sweat of the previous
day, and extended his hand to me, which I took
and held in mine, whilst I told him of Gordon's
death, and of such of the casualties as had come
to my knowledge. He was much affected ; I felt
the tears dropping fast upon my hand, and looking
towards him, saw them chasing one another in
furrows over his dusty cheeks. He brushed them
away suddenly with his left hand, and said to me,
^ Lord FiU Roy was so determined to return to his chief, and in the same
capacity, that he devoted himself to writing with his left hand, and could
soon do so with ease and clearness.
230 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
in a voice trembling with emotion, 'Well, thank
God, I don't know what it is to lose a battle, but
certainly nothing can be more painful than to gain
one with the loss of so many of one's friends/"
Again, to the Duke of Beaufort : ** The losses I have
sustained have quite broken me down, and I have
no feeling for the advantages we have acquired."
It is true that against this we have one or two
well-authenticated cases of his harshness to officers
who erred, and who came under his serious dis-
pleasure. His treatment of the gallant Norman
Ramsay after Vittoria is quoted as a proof of
Wellington's implacable nature. Ramsay, as second
captain, had commanded Bulls famous battery of
horse artillery at that battle, and at its close had
carried his guns across hedges and ditches to bring
them to bear upon the retreating enemy. Later
in the day Wellington met him at a village far in
advance, where he desired him to remain with his
battery till he, Wellington himself, sent him his
next orders. None reached Ramsay that night,
and he believed that the obligation to stand fast
was ended. Moreover, the quartermaster-general
now desired him to rejoin the rest of the cavalry.
So Ramsay moved off with his battery, and, when
the Duke returned, was not to be found ; he had
become involved, too, in a difficult defile, and
NORMAN RAMSAY AND MERCER 231
being unable to extricate himself, was shut out from
usefulness the whoje of next day. Wellington was
deeply incensed at what he deemed direct dis-
obedience of the orders he had given personally,
and he placed Norman Ramsay in arrest. Much
sympathy was felt for the young artilleryman
throughout the army, and strong intercession was
made for him, especially by Sir Thomas Graham, but
it only increased Wellington s irritation. Ramsay
was kept in arrest a month, and then permitted to
return to his battery. It is said that he never re-
covered the indignity, and gladly met his death
at Waterloo at the head of his guns, behind
Hougoumont.
Wellington is thought to have never been
partial to artillery, or to have sufficiently acknow-
ledged the support it gave him. It was a great
grievance with the horse artillery that its services
were not mentioned in the Waterloo despatch.
Cavali6 Mercer, in his journal, complains that
his magnificent battery had hardly a word of com-
mendation from the Duke, although it was all but
destroyed during the action. We have also the
story of the rockets with Whinyates' battery. The
Duke did not believe in rockets much, and ordered
that the tubes should be left behind at the base.
When Sir George Wood pleaded hard, saying it
232 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
would break Whinyates heart to lose his rockets,
the Duke is reported to haye replied angrily,
** D n his heart; let my orders be obeyed."
This objection to rockets has been called ** irrational
prejudice against innovation," It was rather a dis-
like to experiment ; the Duke preferred to depend
upon what he had tried and knew to be trust-
worthy, and for this reason he was opposed to the
arming of horse artillery with heavier guns ; their
work having been well done in Spain with six-
pounders, he saw no necessity for nine. But it
may be admitted that the Duke chafed much at
artillery traditions, and thought little of the senior
officers of artillery on his staff in Spain. This
was shown by his advancement of a junior, whose
value he had discovered, over the heads of all.
Alexander Dickson, who had shown what he was
worth with the artillery of the Portuguese army, and
in the artillery business at all the great sieges, was
put by Wellington in 1813 at the head of all his
artillery. Dickson was then only a captain in the
regiment, although a colonel by brevet, and he was
practically holding a lieutenant-general's command
— some 8000 men and 3500 horses.
One other instance must be given of Welling-
ton's severity, but with the saving clause that it
was surely well deserved. Colonel Sturgeon was
COLONEL STURGEON 233
clearly entitled to sharp rebuke for neglect of duty
after Orthez, although not perhaps in such un-
measured terms. Sturgeon was an officer of the
staff corps, "a clear-headed officer," in whom
Wellington had the highest confidence. He be-
longed to the quartermaster-general's department,
and in the latter part of the Peninsular war was
head of the post office, and in command of the
corps of guides. Wellington after Orthez was
most anxious to communicate the news to Hope,
who was in charge of independent operations at
Bayonne. When the officer who was to carry the
despatches asked for guides, there were none forth-
coming. Sturgeon had suffered them to wander
abroad much as they pleased, and the urgent letter
to Hope was delayed for several days. Wellington
was furious, and vented it upon Sturgeon in so
violent a manner, using such harsh expressions,
that the poor man never lifted his head again.
He was heart-broken, and only a few days later he
sought death by riding alone in among the enemy's
skirmishers, who soon shot him through the head.
George Napier, who relates this incident, adds that
Wellington felt this tragic ending very deeply, but
he made no show of it or of his regrets. '* He has
always kept/* writes George Napier, ** to that system
of never acknowledging he was wrong or mistaken."
234 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
Again, it is thrown in Wellington s teeth that
he neglected his old companions in arms ; that he
was callous and indifferent to their hardships and
grievances. Even Gleig, a nearly invariable pane-
gyrist, remarks, that although he had a warm regard
for them, he entered very little into the amenities
of social life with them. ** We have reason to believe
that neither Lord Hill, nor Lord Raglan, nor Sir
George Murray ever visited the Duke at Strath-
fieldsaye ; nor could they or others of similar stand-
ing, such as Lord Anglesea, Sir Edward Paget, and
Sir James Kempt, be reckoned among the habitues
of his hospitable gatherings at Apsley House. The
circle in which he chiefly moved was that of fashion-
able ladies and gentlemen." We have here, no
doubt, the survival of the spirit that impelled him
to have two sets of staff-officers in the Peninsula —
the men who amused him and the men who did the
work. He was never, perhaps, very intimate with
his senior officers, as officers ; they were never —
and I may be forgiven the only word that will de-
scribe it — his *' pals ; " he never associated with them
either in Spain or afterwards, probably because it
consorted better with his ideas of command to fix
a gulf between them and him, and in the after years
it was never bridged over.
It is no doubt true that Wellington was slow to
OPEN purse-strings 235
admit the claims of those who had served with him to
honours and rewards. He was averse to any general
recognition of the kind ; the Peninsular medal was
not issued to the Peninsular army till some thirty
years after the war ; the grant had been steadfastly
refused by the Duke, who himself wore almost every
European decoration.^ Yet he willingly stirred him-
self to secure the promotion of deserving officers,
and not only his interest but his purse was always
open to them. One or two little-remembered in-
stances of the latter deserve to be recorded. The
first is to be found in the Life of Lord Hill, when
that gallant officer was suddenly summoned from
Paris, in 18 15, to attend to some pecuniary losses in
England. When he applied for leave, stating his
reasons, Wellington, in granting it, said he was
** much concerned for the unfortunate circumstances
that had occasioned the necessity for his return to
England." Then he goes on : ''In the existing
state of public and private credit in England, I am
apprehensive that you will find it difficult to procure
the money which you will require. I have a large
sum of money which is entirely at my command,'
and I assure you that I could not apply it in a
' There is a room wholly lined with glass cases in Apsley House, all
filled with ribands, and orders, and swords of honour.
' No doubt part of the Waterloo grant.
236 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
manner more satisfactory to me than in accom-
modating you, my dear Hill, to whom I am under
so many obligations, and your father, for whom
I entertain the highest respect, although I am not
acquainted with him." The Duke asked only to
be told if Hill found any difficulty in raising the
money, when he would immediately put his man
of business in communication with Lord Hills.
The second instance was with Alava, the Spanish
officer who was attached to his staff in Spain, and
for whom he cherished a sincere regard. When, in
the whirligig of Spanish political changes, Alava
was exiled and came to England as a refugee,
Wellington offered him a house rent free upon the
Strathfieldsaye estate, with other pecuniary advan-
tages. He went further, and introduced him to his
bankers as his friend, emphasising the often empty
expression, and stating that Alava was to be allowed
to draw for what money he required. It is pleasant
to know that Alava was loath to trespass too far
on the Dukes generosity, and on one occasion,
when staying at Brighton, he gladly accepted the
use of another friend s carriage to go out to dinner,
on the honourable plea that he was anxious to save
the Duke's pocket. Wellington was far above all
pettiness, all sordid ideas about money ; he was
free and liberal with it. and strictly honourable in
ACTIVE BENEVOLENCE 239
all pecuniary transactions, a most hospitable host,
who kept an excellent table, and did things really
well — so much so, that in Spain his expenditure
exceeded his income, and he was compelled to
demand better allowances, which were grudgingly
granted. His brother, the Governor-General, pur-
chased his lieutenant-colonelcy for him, and Arthur
Wellesley's first desire on receiving some Indian
prize-money was to repay the loan, a proposal
which his brother, greatly to his honour, distinctly
repudiated.
Full justice has never been done to Welling-
ton s active benevolence. His hand was continually
in his pockets ; he never turned a deaf ear to any
appeal, and was often shamelessly victimised. When
rebuked on one occasion for being so easily taken
in, he answered naively, ** What could I do?. One
could not let the man starve." He kept a bag of
sovereigns handy, as well as a sheaf of bank notes,
in his desk, to be applied to any pressing neces-
sitous case that arose. Mr. Gleig reports that the
Duke s charities amounted in one year to ;^4000.
There is a story on this head which should be
inserted here. It is of one of the Waterloo ban-
quets that took place annually at Apsley House.
The Duke produced a valuable snuff-box at one
period in the banquet ; it went the round of the
240 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
table and — disappeared. The incident was so un-
pleasant that the guests present proposed that all
should agree to be searched. All did agree but
one old officer, who altogether refused, and was
very coldly looked upon in consequence, being
strongly suspected of the theft. Next year the
Duke of Wellington wore for the first time the
same uniform for the same banquet, and almost
immediately found the snuff-box in some pocket.
He had not forgotten the old officers suspicious
conduct, which in this new light became the more
strange. So the Duke searched him out, and asked
what it meant. *'Your Grace, I refused to be
searched because at that moment my pockets were
filled with broken victuals I had filched from your
table. While I feasted, my family were starving
in a poor lodging, and I was taking them food."
The story runs that the Duke was affected to
tears, and at once took care that the impoverished
officer should be put in a better position and
above want.^
One other story was recounted to me in my
youth by an old Peninsular veteran, who vouched
for its accuracy. Once, in a ball-room at Bath,
the Duke came across a half-pay officer whom he
^ '* Ramsay's Reminiscences." The same story is told of Marshal Wadc,
and will be found in Horace Walpole's letters.
WELLINGTON'S UNiqUE POSITION 243
knew well, and accosted with much kindliness.
** Can I do anything for you ? " asked Wellington.
**Yes, your Grace, you can do me a very great
service. Give me your arm across the room." The
Duke assented laughingly, and at the other end of
the room asked what it all meant. *' I am paying
my addresses to a wealthy widow who is here, and
who will, I think, accept me now that she sees me
so honoured by your Grace." The result was as he
hoped, and with part of the fortune thus acquired
he purchased back on to full pay, and resuming
an active career, gained in due course the highest
distinction.
As time passed, and during the later years of
his life, Wellington occupied a unique position.
He was on a high pinnacle, the first man in
England, the best known man in the country ;
**not only the adviser of the Crown and the
arbiter of parties," but to the public a universal
referee and correspondent. People consulted him
on every conceivable subject ; all sorts of tricks
were adopted to get one of his famous replies,
couched in the well-known style, ** Field-Marshal
the Duke of Wellington presents his compliments
to," &c. &c. It is now said that the application
made by Lord Douro's washerwoman to the Duke
for an unpaid account was only a hoax in order to
244 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
extract an autograph letter. Almost to the day
of his death the Duke was a real painstaking
operative, a man of habit and hard work of the
most varied kind. No one in England gave away
more brides or had more god-children. He rose
early from his simple couch at Walmer, an old
campaigning friend in Apsley House, a truckle-
bed, and went straight to his desk, where he dealt
with his day s correspondence, taking every point in
turn, and giving each that concentrated attention
that was one of his greatest faculties. ** Rest !
Every other animal, even a donkey, a coster-
monger's donkey, is allowed some rest, but the
Duke of Wellington never. There is no help for
it. As long as I am able to go on, they will put
the saddle on my back and make me go." In the
short interval when the whole Ministry was com-
bined in his single person, and he found arrears
in some of the offices, he left none. The training
of the Peninsula was still bearing good fruit.
CHAPTER XVIII
WELLINGTON AT HOME
Apsley House— Private apartments — Art treasures— Wellington and
Sir David Wilkie — China and plate — His craze for and collection of
watches — Active habits — Last illness and death.
SOMETHING of the skill of the modern inter-
viewer is needed to bring Wellington as
he was and lived — his tastes, habits, ways,
predilections, even his eccentricities — before a
later generation. He had three separate homes —
Walmer, Strathfieldsaye, and Apsley House, giving
his preference perhaps to the first, but residing at
all in turn. Walmer has been in many hands since
his, but the recollection of him is still religiously
preserved there, and he is remembered as one of
the most conscientious wardens the Cinque Ports
have ever had.^ Strathfieldsaye is also full of
memories of the first Duke, but Apsley House is
actually the same to-day as when he last left it to
end his great life at Walmer.
m
' It says much for the Duke's far-seeing judgment that he was in favour of
the harbour or port extension of Dover, on almost the very lines that it is now
being carried out, some fifty years later. I am told that Lord Salisbury shows
the same business head in conducting the aflfairs of the Cinque Ports.
»45
246 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
The visitor who enters Apsley House in the
proper spirit cannot but be affected by the sentiment
of the place. We seem to see the great man pacing
its marble halls, issuing from its portals to walk or
ride through the streets, working laboriously in the
modest library attached to his still more modest
private apartments ; the three rooms which were
peculiarly his own, at the back of the house, upon
the ground floor ; the small bedroom with its
seven doors, bare of furniture, and leading into the
study, where he worked in the forenoon with his
secretaries. The standing desk is still preserved
there, a plain rosewood desk, and near it the
famous **mule box," of campaigning days, a plain
deal box, never painted, with a special but by no
means safe key, in which he kept his confidential
papers and the bank notes for his secret charities.
These rooms are still beautifully plain and simple,
and no pains have been spared to keep them as
they were occupied by the first owner and head
of the house.
Apsley House is so named after Lord Chan-
cellor Apsley, who built it at the latter end of the
eighteenth century, on the site of the old lodge to
Hyde Park, where once stood the suburban inn
called **The Pillars of Hercules," where Squire
Western stayed when he came seeking his fugitive
ART TREASURES 249
daughter. In 18 10 Apsley House came into the
possession of Marquis Wellesley, who lived there
while Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The
Duke bought it from his brother in 1820, and spent
a large sum of money (some /^ 1 30,000) in alterations
and improvements inside and out. The present
bath-stone front was placed over the old brick, and
a new wing, that adjoining the Park, was added.
He was not pleased with the bill, which, he said,
** would have broken any ones back but mine;"
and he never seems to have had much affection
for the house, the name of which — Apsley House
— he seldom used, either in speaking of it or dating
from it.
It is not exactly an art treasure house, yet there
are many valuable pictures on its walls, many inte-
resting curiosities and relics. In the chief hall are
several busts and statues : notably of Castlereagh,
by Chantrey ; of the Duke himself, in bronze, by
Count D'Orsay ; a reduced copy of Rauch's statue
of Blucher; Canovas great statue of Bonaparte,
executed in 18 10, but never unveiled, and purchased
by our Government for ;^3000 from that of Louis
XVIII., after Waterloo, for presentation to the
Duke. The principal reception rooms are reached
by a steep circular staircase, and in the first
drawing-room is an indifferent portrait, attributed
250 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
to Wootton, of Marlborough, for whom Wellington
had the highest respect. ** I can conceive nothing
greater than Marlborough at the head of an English
army," he told Stanhope; and again: * 'Marlborough
was remarkable for his clear, cool, steady under-
standing." Opposite Marlborough is Landseer's
** Van Amberg in the lions* den," a picture painted
under the personal supervision of the Duke, who
stood over Landseer, Bible in hand, and pointed
to the passage in Genesis where Adam is given
dominion over the earth and its animals. Landseer
was not unnaturally restive under the Duke s inter-
ference, who on looking at sketches, sometimes con-
demned them with, '* Very fine, I dare say, but not
what I want." The ** Chelsea Pensioners" and the
** Greenwich Veterans" are also here. The first
was painted, slowly and painfully, by Sir David
Wilkie, who went much to nature and painted
many of the figures from life. This is the picture
for which Wellington paid ;^i26o, or 1200 guineas,
which sum the Duke paid over on the nail, in cash.
When Wilkie mildly suggested that he would prefer
a cheque, the Duke replied laughingly, *' Do you
think I want Messrs. Coutts's clerks to know how
foolishly I spend my money ? " This picture was
lent to Graves for three years to be engraved, on
the clear understanding that it was to be returned
THE SPANISH PICTURES 253
exactly at the date of the expiration of this term.
It was sent back to time, the Duke receiving it,
watch in hand, with the remark, ''Now, Mr. Graves,
you shall have any other picture of mine to engrave
whenever you like." Sir David Wilkie is said to
have received a second ;^i200 for the rights of
engraving. The other picture of the Greenwich
veterans was painted by Mr. Burnet, Wilkie having
declined the commission. The Duke paid ;^500
for it, and made it an heirloom.
The principal pictures made heirlooms by the
Duke are the Spanish pictures, as they are called in
the inventory — those recovered from King Joseph
after Vittoria, and restored to King Ferdinand of
Spain by Wellington ; although that monarch, with
much good feeling, insisted that the Duke should
keep them. Among these are several famous works
by Velasquez : the '' Aguador," or water-carrier ;
portraits of Quevedo and **The Young Man,"
long supposed to have been Velasquez himself,
also the great portrait of the Pope, Innocent X.,
whose shrewd rubicund visage shines out from
the canvas instinct with life and truth. There is
a fine Correggio, and the Murillo of which Soult
said to Gurwood when he saw it in Apsley House,
** I value that picture, for it saved the life of
two estimable men." The rapacious marshal had
254 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
threatened to shoot them both unless they gave
up the picture.
Space forbids anything like a complete cata-
logue of the works of art in Apsley House, The
pictures include many of the Dutch school, for which
the Duke had a great liking — Jan Steens, Ostades,
Teniers, and the rest ; many portraits, those parti-
cularly of many of his comrades and lieutenants, the
best of which are given in this work ; a full-length
by Lefebvre of Napoleon ; Wilkie s portrait of the
beautiful Lady Lyndhurst ; an exceedingly fine like-
ness of Francis I. of Austria, so lifelike that the
Duke on unpacking it exclaimed, ** Poor man, very
good— poor man, very like;" portraits also of
** those two corporals," as Wellington styled the
Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia ; last
of all, a most monstrous and grotesque portrait of
George IV., **in the garb of Old Gaul," a gigantic
Highlander in a kilt.
Among the, curiosities are the malachite vases
presented to the Duke by the Czar, and a whole
room full of china, crammed with the offerings of
grateful kings and peoples. Here is the great gilt
shield designed by Stothard, R.A., the gift of that
very corporation of London that in 1809 clamoured
for the recall of Wellington from Spain, valued at
;^ 1 00,000; innumerable dinner services in all kinds
PORTRAITS OF WELLINGTON 255
of faience ; and in cases through the room are
ribbons and decorations of every order in the civi-
lised world.
It has been said that Wellington was no great
art lover, but he took a very lively interest in
pictures, especially those he chose and purchased
for himself. No doubt he was an unwilling sitter,
and yet no man had more portraits painted of him
He once said of himself that he had been taken in
every attitude except that of standing on his head
Another story is to the effect that he once gave
rendezvous to several portrait painters at one and
the same time. When they arrived, all together,
they were aghast to find that he had caused a
studio "throne" to be placed in the centre of a
large room, which he ascended, saying, " Now,
gentlemen, I can give you two hours. Seat your-
selves around and fire away." Of all likenesses he
preferred Count D'Orsays, **who always made him
look like a gentleman." To be an English gentle-
man was, in Wellington's mind, the highest title of
honour. It was his religion almost, and he acted
most scrupulously to the rules of conduct that
guided the class in his days. There is no better
proof of this than his readiness to give satisfac-
tion to Gronow when the latter thought his char-
acter had been unfairly aspersed by the great Duke.
256 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
One man was fresh from the field of Waterloo, the
cynosure of every eye ; the other a simple captain in
the Guards. But the Duke, having first apologised,
wrote Gronow with his own hand to say he was
ready to meet him if he was not ** satisfied."
Wellington had one foible as a collector. His
taste lay in watches ; his fondness for them rivalled
that of the Emperor Charles V., who amused him-
self in the cloister with watchmaking. The Duke
loved to chat with M. Breguet, the watchmaker,
who was always a welcome caller at Apsley House.
He was very particular about time-keeping, yet his
watches often disappointed him, probably because
he insisted upon winding — or forgetting to wind —
them up himself. The only clock he could really
depend upon in Apsley House was that which
still stands in the hall, and. was as trustworthy as
that at the Horse Guards. The Duke had six
or seven watches always going in his room, and
when he travelled had as many in the portmanteau
which fitted into the front of his carriage.
Two of his watches possessed historical interest.
One, his favourite, and constant- companion, was
of old-fashioned English make, and once belonged
to Tippoo Sahib, having passed into the Dukes
possession after the taking of Seringapatam. It
was left once on the ground at a bivouac during
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WATCHES 257
a retreat in the Peninsula, and Wellington valued
it so highly that he went back three miles through
the crowd, and was fortunate enough to recover
it. The other watch was one made by Breguet for
Napoleon, as a gift to his brother Joseph, which had
a map of Spain enamelled on the back. Napoleon,
after Joseph's misfortunes and expulsion from Spain,
would not pay for it. It remained on Breguet's hands,
and after the peace Sir Edward Paget bought it to
present to the Duke. A third watch of Welling-
ton s had belonged to Junot, and recorded lunar
and weekly movements as well as the hours.
In late life the Duke always carried montres
de louche, watches contrived by Breguet with knobs
or bosses on the dial-plate, so that the time could
be felt with the watch in the pocket, thus avoiding
the rudeness ot openly pulling it out. The Duke
all his life thought highly of the value of time.
He absolutely worshipped punctuality, and prided
himself on never being late for a train. Once,
however, he ran it very close, and got to the station
after the proper time of departure of the express
for Dover. The express had actually started, but,
as many other passengers had also been left behind,
a second special was being despatched just as the
Duke arrived. ** Ha ! " cried the Duke, delighted.
** Thought I was late. Never late in my life before.
R
1
258 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
My watch must be wrong ; let it be taken to be
regulated."
To the last the Duke retained his fondness for
field sports and life in the open air. The general
who rode to hounds as his chief relaxation in
Spain, hunted regularly in England whenever and
wherever he could. He is a prominent figure in
Sir Francis Grants picture of the Melton Hunt,
and in Calvert's of the Vine. He was very fond
of shooting, and a good shot. He walked a good
deal, even when infirm and at a very advanced
age. There is no better story, especially in the
sequel, which, I believe, is hardly known, than that
of his adventure at the crossing in front of Apsley
House. The Duke narrowly escaped an accident,
from which he was rescued by some stranger, who
profited by the occasion to express his deep thank-
fulness at being of some assistance to "the great
Englishman, the great hero, the " " Don t
be a d d fool," snapped the Duke, who hated
hyperbole, and walked off. The best part of the
story is to come. The Duke later the same day
was describing the affair in a lady's^ drawing-
room, and wound up the story with the astonish-
ing statement, ** I do believe if it hadn't been for
me the fellow would have been run over."
^ Lady Lyttleton.
ACTIVE HABITS 259
There can be no doubt that the Duke owed
immunity from serious illness, and his longevity, to
these active habits. He benefited largely by his
systematic, resolute employment of the simplest
and best means of keeping up his condition. He
was exceedingly temperate and abstemious, a very
small eater — too small, his friends sometimes said,
for health. When he paid the great debt at last,
he had reached the long age of eighty-three. His
end was peaceful ; he passed away quietly and
painlessly, mourned by the whole nation.
*^ Mourn for the man of long-enduring blood,
The statesman- warrior, moderate, resolute,
Whole in himself, a common good.
Mourn for the man of amplest influence
Vet clearest of ambition's crime.
Our greatest yet with least pretence,
Great in council and great in war.
Foremost captain of his time.
Rich in saving common-sense,
And as the greatest only are,
In his simplicity sublime.
O good grey head which all men knew,
O voice from which their omens all men drew,
O iron nerve to true occasion true —
O fall'n at length that tower of strength
Which stood four-square to all the winds that blew !
Such was he whom we deplore.
The long self-sacrifice of life is o'er,
The great world-victor*s victor will be seen no more."
—Tennyson : Ode on the Death of the
Duke of Wellington,
(By kind permission of Messrs. Macmillan & Co.)
PART II
THE COMRADES OF WELLINGTON
CHAPTER I
LEADING LIEUTENANTS
Hill — Beresford — Cotton — Graham — Picton — Craufurd — Lowry
Cole — Colville — Leith — Clinton — Fletcher — Le Marchant—Gomm —
Kempt— Dickson— Fitz Roy Somerset — Colin Campbell — William
Gordon.
MANY fine soldiers surrounded Wellington,
and served him loyally through his long
and chequered campaigns, but, like lesser
stars in a system, their effulgence was dimmed in
the strong brilliant light of the central sun. The
chief was unquestionably a head and shoulders
above his lieutenants ; none could approach him
or compare with him ; he was immeasurably their
superior in every respect Yet they were good men
and true, each according to his means and capa-
bilities. Each had his strong points ; this was
foremost in the fight, that strenuous and unyielding
in defence, another was skilled in administration or
an adept in manoeuvre, of a sanguine spirit to sway
and strengthen troops. There was Hill, " Farmer
Hill," ** Daddy Hill," as he was affectionately known
through the army, beloved by all who knew him,
963
264 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
the most modest, retiring, mild-mannered of men,
the very ideal of an English country gentleman, yet
brave as a lion, sturdy, safe, unflinching in battle,
a good and faithful soldier who made no mistakes
and "always did what he was told,"^ a model of
discipline " who never exceeded his orders, but never
failed to execute them in consummate and complete
style"*; Beresford, the big boisterous Irishman, long-
headed, large-minded, one on whom his chief greatly
relied for counsel and support, who had great gifts
for organisation and a firm temper in forming and
perfecting the drill and discipline of newly raised
levies ; Cotton, the beau sadreur^ the splendid horse-
man, young, intrepid, handsome, the Murat of
English cavalry ; Graham, the grand and gallant
old soldier, who took late in life to the business
of war out of pure love of it, and showed that he
was a born leader of men, strongest in the hour of
supreme danger, keen, daring, ** of ready temper for
battle " ; Picton, ever an eager, forward combatant,
a slogger and hard hitter, *'a rough, foul-mouthed
devil as ever lived," Wellington called him, yet be-
lieved in him thoroughly, declaring that **no man
could do better in the different services assigned to
him " ; Craufurd, dark, stern, and unbending, perhaps
the strictest disciplinarian the army has ever known.
^ Wellington. ' Napier.
^
^yfZz^
HIS LIEUTENANTS 265
an unrivalled leader of light troops, whose incom-
parable " Orders " still survive as a military classic ;
Lowry Cole, trustworthy and obedient, of courtly
manners and fine presence ; Colville, an excellent
tactician ; Leith and Clinton the same, and good
safe divisional leaders ; Murray, the practised staff-
officer, of long experience as a quartermaster-
general, "the best brains in the army after
Wellington " * ; Charles Stewart, afterwards Lord
Londonderry ; Wellington's brother-in-law, good-
tempered Edward Pakenham, the most straight-
forward officer, most skilful and intelligent in
action ; Fletcher, the skilful engineer who built
the lines of Torres Vedras, and who was killed all
too soon at the first and unsuccessful assault at
San Sebastian ; his colleagues and subordinates,
Burgoyne and Harry Jones, both of whom rose in
after years to great place and fame ; Le Marchant,*
the first to give an impetus to military education in
England, and who invented Sandhurst by starting
the colleges of Great Marlow and High Wycombe ;
Kempt, at one time a clerk in Cox & Greenwood s,
the army agents;' Gomm, most accomplished
^ Larpent.
^ Le Marchant will be remembered as having devised the regulations for
cavalry sword exercise ; he was a splendid sadrgur^ and at Salamanca, before
his death, cut down six of the enemy with his own hand.
' His Royal Highness the Duke of York was, it is said, deep in the books
266 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
of staff-officers ; Hardinge, the same who rose
to be a peer of the realm and commander-in-
chief of the army ; Colborne, Lord Seaton, one of
the best regimental colonels the army has ever
seen, "a man of singular talent for war" (Napier),
who on several occasions, by his ready tactical
genius, changed the fate of a battle at the most
critical time ; Beckwith, another fine regimental
officer and leader of light troops, and, with Col-
borne, trusted subordinates of their renowned chief.
Craufurd ; Dickson, already mentioned, a great artil-
leryman, of impetuous character, fighting doggedly
against ill-health, a most methodical and industrious
soldier, minute and painstaking, a master of detail ;
Pack, a fighting Irishman, renowned for his for-
wardness on many various fields ; De Lancey, one
of the most expert in the quartermaster-general's
branch ; the Napiers, three intrepid brothers who
poured out their life's blood unhesitatingly upon
numberless hard-fought fields ; Waters, unrivalled as
an intelligence officer, ubiquitous, keenly observant,
who could assume any costume, play any part, speak
fluent Castilian or the lowest patois, talk French if
necessary with the German accent of the pure
of this well-known bank. There is a story of a dinner at which the Duke
proposed their health, saying, " I am their banker ; that is to say, I have
more of their money than they of mine."
HIS PERSONAL STAFF 267
Alsatian; Colquhoun Grant, another of the same
kidney, upon whose explorations and reconnaissances
Wellington relied, and was assisted in some of his
greatest coups ; Cameron of the fighting 9th, better
known as " Devil " Cameron, a man of astonishing
enterprise in attack ; Colin Campbell, afterwards
Lord Clyde, who learnt his trade in the Peninsula,
and was inured to danger by his sturdy captain,
who marched him to and fro under the hottest fire
the first time he went into action, and lived to
command armies on his own account in very critical
times.
Wellington's own personal staff, who shared his
labours and dangers, could work as well as play ;
they must be men of like endurance with their
indefatigable chief. Lord Fitz Roy Somerset
stands first among them as the most devoted
assistant and friend. "You are aware how useful
he always has been to me . . . and what a regard
and affection I feel for him," Wellington wrote of
him after Waterloo. Lord Fitz Roy was not only
untiring in his special secretarial work, but he was
in intimate relations with regimental commanding
officers, who could always come to him in matters
appertaining to their battalions, and through him
to Wellington, thus giving the general-in-chief
more exact knowledge of the state of regiments.
268 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
the merits of individual officers, than could have
been obtained by the regular official reports.^ This
was done, as Napier tells us, with such discretion
and judgment that the military hierarchy was in
no manner weakened. Another staff-officer who
was at Wellington s side through all his campaign-
ing was Sir Colin Campbell ; * their acquaintance
began in India, at the assault of Ahmednuggur,
where Campbell was thrown off a high wall into
space. Wellesley saw the affair, and feared Camp-
bell was killed, but, on sending to inquire, found
that he was only severely wounded. Campbell
afterwards became Wellesley's brigade major ; in
the Peninsula he joined his personal staff, and was
by his side to the last at Waterloo and in Paris.
William Gordon, again, who was a dear friend ;
Lord March, for whom he had a fatherly affection ;
Lord William Lennox ; the faithful Gurwood, who
first won his chiefs esteem at the assault of Ciudad
Rodrigo, where he received the Governor s sword —
these were all good soldiers, active, full of spirits,
all alive, ready to chaff and laugh, dance, hunt,
play, but ready, too, to spend hours in the saddle
by their chiefs side, in covering long distances or
in the thick of the fight.
1 " Napier's History," iv. 80.
* Not the Colin Campbell who afterwards became Lord Clyde.
A GALLANT BAND 269
It is impossible, however, to do full justice to
the merits of all Wellington's worthies ; the names
even of all the gallant and deserving band cannot
be enumerated. But I propose now to deal more
at length with some of the most prominent and
distinguished.
CHAPTER II
COTTON
Of good birth — Rapid promotion — Friend of Geoi^e III. — Early
service in India — Brighton and the Prince Regent — Baronetcy.
COTTON comes first of those who bore the
whole heat and burthen of the day, who
fought from first to last from Portugal
through Spain into France — first by right of seni-
ority, for after the second landing in Portugal he
presently became the highest on the list, although
the youngest of the major-generals. Stapleton
Cotton owed it to his family connections that he
gained promotion more rapidly than most, even in
those days when influence was so powerful a lever.
The son of a baronet, with large landed estates and
many political friends, he found himself lieutenant-
colonel commanding a regiment of horse, " Gwynn s
Hussars," the 25th Light Dragoons, at the early
age of one-and-twenty. Yet he was already a soldier
of promise who had done good service in the field.
** Little Cotton " passed in a couple of years from
ensign of infantry to a captain of carabineers— the
970
EARLY SERVICES 271
6th Dragoon Guards, a wild regiment, in those days
much given to hard drinking and ready fighting;
but the boy, whose exuberant spirits soon earned
him the epithet of ** Rapid Cotton,'* was the life
of the mess without yielding to debauchery. He
fought at Fremont in Flanders, returning to com-
mand his troop in action, although actually on his
homeward journey with his new rank of lieutenant-
colonel. He became the friend of George HI.,
who loved the light-hearted young man, at that
time the beau-ideal of a cavalry officer, slight but
strongly built, with a neat figure, active in wind
and limb. Society welcomed the handsome youth
with open arms, and he was in the thick of gaieties,
which he never preferred to his own adventurous
calling, and he hailed with delight the order to
embark with his regiment for India in 1796. En
route he was detained at the Cape for the opera-
tions that ended with the defeat of the Dutch. In
India he was stationed in the Madras Presidency,
and was brought into frequent contact with Colonel
Wellesley, his great future leader. There was,
however, no intimacy between them ; Cotton found
Wellesley *' cheerful, good-natured, but reserved,
never even at that age indulging in the confi-
dential intercourse of youth." Cotton was at the
taking of Seringapatam, and the day previous, at
272 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
six-and-twenty, commanded a small cavalry brigade,
which he handled so well that he was mentioned in
despatches, and proved himself thus early a cool
and skilful cavalry leader.
The death of his elder brother made him next
heir to the title, and cut short his Indian career.
He was exchanged by his father into the i6th
Dragoons, and returned to the frivolous life of the
Court. At Brighton he became intimate with the
Prince of Wales, but fell into disgrace over some
incautious gossip about Mrs. Fitz- Herbert, an
offence the Prince never pardoned, and the full
penalty of which Cotton felt years later in losing the
command of the cavalry at Waterloo. Marriage,
service in Ireland, parliamentary duties (for Cotton,
after the manner of many prominent soldiers ot his
time, had a seat in the House of Commons) filled
up his time till war loomed near at home. He was
now a major-general (1805), and he had lost his
young wife in 1807, and in 1808 he gladly accepted
the command of a small brigade to serve in Portu-
gal. He was too late to join Sir John Moore, but
he was with Wellesley in the advance of the Douro,
and again at Talavera, where with his brigade, and
his firm front at the critical moment, he helped with
the 48th foot to save the battle.
At the end of the year 1809 Cotton succeeded
AS A CAVALRY LEADER 273
to the baronetcy, and went home to settle his
affairs. Other than family honours awaited him,
for on taking his place he received the thanks of
the House of Commons. He might now have
fairly rested upon his laurels, and remained in
England to enjoy life, a spoiled darling of fortune,
possessed of a fine estate, made much of in society,
indulging to the full in gaiety and sport. But
Cotton was before all a soldier, devoted to the
trade in which he was so great a proficient, and he
was eager to return at once to Spain. Welling-
ton received him cordially, and gave 4iim the
command of the whole of his cavalry. It has
been said by Cottons friends that Wellington
never liked him, and there are stories extant that
go to prove, if trustworthy, that he laughed a
little at the dandified cavalry general in after years.*
Yet it is certain that in the Peninsula Wellington
thought highly of him ; he was heard to say
that he knew, when he gave Sir Stapleton Cotton
an order, it would be obeyed with zeal and dis-
cretion. As a leader Wellington was very thrifty
of his horsemen, and used them as little as he
could help. There were times, too, when he
rebuked his cavalry officers sharply. In 181 2 he
writes to Hill condemning '*the trick our officers
' See post, p. 280.
274 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
of cavalry have acquired of galloping at every-
thing, and then galloping back as fast as they
gallop on the enemy. They never consider their
situation, never think of manoeuvring before an
enemy — so little, that one would think they cannot
manoeuvre except on Wimbledon Common ; and
when they use their arm as it ought to be used,
viz. offensively, they never keep nor provide for
a reserve."
It does not appear that Wellington included
Sir Stapleton in these severe strictures. Nor was
he chary of praise to his cavalry leader. At Sala-
manca he spoke out with ungrudging enthusiasm.
After Le Marchant's charge, when the heavy
dragoons, " big men on big horses," crashed into
the French columns and almost destroyed them,
Wellington rode up to him, and cried with his
usual objurgation, ** By G — d. Cotton, I never saw
anything more splendid in my life ! The day is
yours'' ^ Afterwards he strongly urged that some
special mark of favour should be conferred upon
^ General Le Marchant, who lost his life in this charge, had had ** words"
with his chief just before he started on his perilous adventure. Le Marchant,
a little confused by the many changes of position that had taken place that
morning, asked his chief which way he should front. ** To the enemy, sir 1 "
cried Cotton furiously. Le Marchant retorted as angrily, for the answer
conveyed an imputation on his courage, of course neither meant nor deserved.
The matter would probably have ended in a duel but for poor Le Marchant's
death.
A NOBLE PRESENCE 275
him, and Cotton got the red ribbon of the Bath.
"No cavalry could act better than ours," he wrote
Lord Bathurst; "and I must say for Sir Stapleton,
that I don't know where we could find an officer
that could command our cavalry in this country
as well as he does."
Sir Stapleton Cotton was no doubt entitled to
high commendation. By natural gifts, inclinations,
habits, and acquired proficiency he was admirably
fitted for the post he held. He knew his business
to the letter ; no adjutant in the smartest regiment
could beat him in details of the cavalry service. At
an inspection his eye was quick and unerring ; in
manoeuvres he was an adept, no ill-informed officer
dared go wrong in drill when he was by ; his
leadership was excellent ; a good eye for the country,
much promptitude and decision, with a full know-
ledge of pace ; always cool and collected, under
the heaviest fire as calm as in a room, above all,
full of the cheery hopefulness that looked always
at the bright side, refusing to be cast down or
depressed, he won the readiest support of those he
commanded. In person he was the perfection of
a cavalry officer. A fine figure and a fine seat,
a noble presence on horseback, and a full belief
in the decorative part of his business, helped him
greatly, and enhanced his reputation as a beau
276 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
sabreur. Like Wellington he paid the strictest
attention to dress, but, more like Murat, he loved
gay uniforms and gorgeous trappings, and he ap-
peared always in the hardest encounters and most
trying occasions as though going to a levee or
a ball. His splendid appearance in Spain gained
him the title of the *'Lion d'Or." When fully
dressed and accoutred, generally in the uniform
of a general of Hussars, it was computed that
Cotton as he rode, man and horse, was worth
about ;^500. Withal he was kindly, sociable,
warm-hearted, courteous to all ranks, hospitable,
and loving to entertain his friends. Although hot-
tempered, sharp speaking, he was greatly liked,
for he personified some of the qualities men mostly
admire — youth, good looks, and daring courage.
At the close of the day at Salamanca, Cotton
was severely wounded in the arm, and but for his
own strenuous objection must have suffered ampu-
tation. But he rejoined Wellington in time to
cover the retreat from Burgos. At the crossing of
the Pisuerga he fought an action of the three arms
with great skill and judgment, for which he was com-
mended by Wellington. It is in this period that
we must place the story, told by Sir Harry Jones,^
of his sitting by the bivouac fire when a group of
* To Colonel W. W. Knolljrs, Lord Combermere's biographer.
DISCOUNT COMBERMEHE, O.C.B.
NOT AT WATERLOO 277
staff-officers galloped up, and one of them, appa-
rently a young aide-de-camp, gave some orders in
an authoritative voice. "Who is that chap who
speaks so impetuously?" asked Jones. *' Don't
you know?" replied Sir Richard Fletcher, his
chief '* It is Sir Stapleton Cotton, who com-
mands the cavalry."
Cotton returned a second time to England, and
was again thanked by the House of Commons.
He looked now for a peerage, and his friends were
justified in urging his claims. But there were
reasons* other than the continued disfavour in
which he stood with the Prince Regent, and 'he
wept back to the Peninsula still Sir Stapleton
Cotton, just too late for Vittoria, but in time to
take part in the closing scenes of the war. Now,
however, six of Wellington's most distinguished
generals were advanced to the peerage. Cotton
among them, with the title of Lord Combermere.
Then followed the bitter disappointment of his
omission from the staff for the Waterloo campaign.
While he fully expected, and might fairly claim,
the command of the cavalry, it was denied, as is
said, by the unrelenting spitefulness of the Prince
Regent. A letter from the military secretary to
the Duke sought to ignore the real reason of the
See post, under Beresford.
278 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
refusal. "There appears to be a very general
wish on his own part and that of others," writes
Torrens, " that Lord Uxbridge should be appointed
to your cavalry. Will you have the goodness to
let me know your confidential wishes and opinion
on the subject?" The Duke wished for Lord
Combermere, and strongly urged his appointment,
assuring him that he was most anxious "to have
the assistance of all those to whom upon former
occasions I have been so much indebted." But
the great leader's wishes were as nothing against
court intrigue, and Combermere was passed over.
It was another of the many rebuffs and crossings
Wellington had to endure when preparing for the
great final struggle with Napoleon, and to which
I have referred elsewhere.^ Lord Uxbridge, it
must be admitted, nobly discharged the duty en-
trusted to him,* and after his wound on the field,
the cavalry command during the occupation of
France was given to Combermere.
* See ante, p. 163.
' Lord Uxbridge, as Lord Paget, commanded the cavalry in the retreat
on Corunna, and was highly commended by Sir John Moore. His force was
in sore straits too — many of the horses without shoes, the men greatly worn
and harassed. But Moore said his cavalry behaved admirably, and always
showed superior to the French, thanks to the fine example showed them by
their leaders. Lord Paget and Stewart. Uxbridge had risen at one bound
through the regimental grades ; he was lieutenant in the 7th Fusiliers in
March I795« and a lieutenant-colonel of the i6th Dragoons in June the same
year. In 1796 he became colonel of the 7th Light Dragoons, and, despite
his brief military experience, is said to have made it one of the smartest
BHURTPORE 279
The remainder of a useful and distinguished life,
prolonged far beyond the usual limits, was spent
by Stapleton Cotton in the service of his country.
He governed Barbadoes ; he commanded the troops
in Ireland ; he was especially selected by his old
chief for that difficult enterprise the reduction of
Bhurtpore, and he was afterwards commander-in-
chief in India, and acted for a time as Governor-
General. He was never credited with conspicuous
genius, and it was said that Wellington valued him
more for his bull-dog determination to carry any
business through than his capacity and mental
gifts. Hence the famous story of his reply to the
East India Company's directors when they waited
upon him to ask for a general to take Bhurtpore.
*'You can't do better than have Combermere," the
Duke had said. " But," protested the directors,
** we believed your Grace did not think very highly
of Lord Combermere, or consider him a man of
great genius." ** I don't care a d — n about his
genius," was the reply, in the Duke's down-
right language ; ** I tell you he is the man to take
Bhurtpore." And he took it with splendid gallantry,
cavalry regiments in the army. Except at Walcheren he saw no service
between Corunna and Waterloo. But in the final campaign Wellington
greatly relied upon him, gave him a free hand, and we have it from Lord
Uxbridge himself that "from first to last he never bothered the Duke with a
single question as to necessary movements."
28o THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
having been with difficulty dissuaded from leading
the stormers ; but he went in person through the
thick of the fire to summon the citadel to surrender.
It was as brilliant an achievement as any in our
Indian annals, and had a potent influence upon the
consolidation of our rule ; for smaller folk had con-
stantly pointed to the supposed impregnable fortress
and cried tauntingly, "You may bully us, but go
and take Bhurtpore."
There was little question of the fine soldierly
qualities of the old sabreur^ although in later years his
services were rather overlooked, and the stern stuff
of which he was made forgotten under the guise
he assumed of a superannuated dandy and gay man
about town. It was always said that Thackeray's
Sir George Tufto, that inimitable type of a dashing
dragoon general, was drawn from Lord Comber-
mere. Nor is the story quite apocryphal of the
Duke of Wellington's apostrophe when his former
lieutenant paid him a visit at the Horse Guards.
Lord Fitz Roy Somerset is said to have announced
him; whereupon the Duke cried testily, "What does
the d d old painted jackass want with me } " H is
military secretary, aghast, whispered, "He will hear
you, sir." Then the old Duke used the words so
often quoted, " Do you think I care a twopenay
tinker's d — n whether he hears me or not ! " And
DIES FULL OF HONOURS 281
not strangely, when Lord Fitz Roy went out into
the ante-room, Lord Combermere had disappeared.
Stapleton Cotton outlived all his contempo-
raries, and died full of honours, a field-marshal,
gold stick colonel of the ist' Life Guards, and
constable of the Tower, at the advanced age of
ninety-two.
CHAPTER III
HILL
Parentage — One of a large family — Early studies — First commission
— Promotion — Service abroad — Becomes major-general — To Copen-
hagen with Wellesley ; and to Portugal — Engaged in independent
operations — Almaraz — His fine soldierly qualities— His kindliness and
the affection he won — "Father Hill" — ^At Waterloo — Later services
as commander of the forces — Wellington's appreciation.
ROWLAND HILL came of a good old Shrop-
shire stock, the Hills of Hawkstone; he
belonged to the younger branch, but the
baronetcy is now merged in the higher honours won
by the distinguished general. There were sixteen
of them, ten sons and six daughters, all children of
the fine old man whom George IV. greeted in after
years as the father of so many brave sons. Four
of them served under Wellington — Rowland, Lord
Hill ; Sir Robert, an officer in the Blues ; Thomas
Noel, who commanded a Portuguese regiment ; and
Clement, his brothers aide-de-camp. Rowland is
remembered as a gentle, sensitive child, always
good-tempered, but of delicate health, unable to join
in the athletic sports of his more robust companions,
282
SWEET DISPOSITION 283
devoted to gardening and pet animals. It is told
of him that he fainted at the sight of a cut finger ;
yet he lived to show coolness and self-possession
amidst the carnage of a stricken field. When in
his teens, and a commissioned* officer, he could not
bear to look at a prize fight under his windows. As
his biographer says, "No common observer would
have imagined for an instant that the army would
have been his choice." Yet he made it himself, and
his first commission dates from 1 790, when he was
in his nineteenth year, so that he entered later than
was usual in those days, and he spent some time at
the military school of Strasburg ^ before he joined
for duty with the 53rd on i8th January 1791. His
superiors at once recognised his merits, and he
is described by his major (Mathews) as an officer
whose ** talents, disposition, and assiduity are of the
most promising nature." The same observer strikes
at once the keynote of the young man's character
by adding that "his amiable manners, sweetness of
temper, and uncommon propriety of conduct have
not only endeared him to the regiment, but produced
him the most flattering attentions from an extensive
circle of the first fashion in this country."
Hill became a captain in 1793 by raising an
independent company, and while still unattached
' Beresford also studied there.
284 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
he served as aide-de-camp in succession to Lord
Mulgrave, Sir David Dundas, and General O'Hara.
The latter, with far-seeing judgment, predicted that
** the young man would rise to be one of the first
soldiers of the age." While serving with Lord
Mulgrave at the defence of Toulon, he made the
acquaintance of a Mr. Graham, a volunteer aide-
de-camp, the future Sir Thomas Graham, Lord
Lynedoch, who had just then turned to military
adventure as an anodyne in a terrible bereavement.
Graham in the following year definitely decided
to make the army his profession, and raised a
regiment, the famous 90th, in which he offered Hill
a majority if he would bring the necessary quota of
recruits. When a second battalion was added. Hill
became its lieutenant-colonel, holding the command
from the year 1795 to 1803, when he was appointed
a brigadier-general on the staff in Ireland. In those
eight years he served with his regiment abroad
and at home, in Ireland, at Isle Dieu, at Gibraltar,
and with Sir Ralph Abercromby in Egypt. He was
wounded in the battle of Aboukir, and until he re-
covered was on board the Foudroyant^ Lord Keith s
flagship, occupying the same cabin with his general,
Sir Ralph, when the latter was brought there to
die of his wounds. Hill next led his regiment to
Cairo, as part of General Cradock's force ; and we
A GENERAL OFFICER 285
may gather how good a regiment it was, how ex-
cellent a chief it had, from the encomiums of the
inspecting general, Hope, a future companion in
arms on a larger stage. ** Considering the service
your regiment has gone through," Hope remarked
to its lieutenant-colonel, '*it is impossible that it
can be more complete than at present. I have
minutely inspected every part of it, and it is with
pleasure I tell you that the whole corps does you
and the officers the greatest credit." Graham also
wrote from London to congratulate him on the
good conduct of the regiment.
Hill's promotion and removal from the 90th
filled the regiment with the deepest regret ; he was
endeared to all ranks by the firm yet mild discipline
he had enforced, and ** his general attention to their
interests." In his new sphere of duty, as a gene-
ral charged with the defence of an Irish district
now threatened with invasion, he was as active yet
as tactful and considerate as ever. Now, how-
ever, he was appointed to General Lord Cathcart's
Copenhagen expedition, and thus was thrown for
the first time with Sir Arthur Wellesley, and estab-
lished those friendly relations that subsisted between
them till death. One of Sir Arthur's earliest letters
on his receiving the command in Portugal was to
** my dear Hill," and it went on to say : ** I rejoice
286 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
extremely at the prospect I have before me of
serving again with you. I hope we shall have
more to do than we had on the last occasion on
which we were together." He writes, again, that
he is full of work, ** but I shall not fail to attend to
whatever you may write to me." An ever-anxious
desire to show his confidence in Hill, and to treat
him with kindliness and consideration, is to be seen
everywhere in Wellington's correspondence.
Hill was the first to arrive off Portugal in 1808,
and it was he who, " in the absence of Lieutenant-
General Sir Arthur Wellesley," reported to Lord
Castlereagh that "none of the transports are
missing, and the troops perfectly healthy." Hill
commanded a brigade at Roleia and Vimiero ; after
the Convention of Cintra he joined Sir John Moore,
and was engaged in the retreat on Corunna. Hill
was with Hope in the centre during the battle ; he
covered the embarkation, and his brigade was the
last on board ship. A very short time elapsed,
barely enough to visit Shropshire, before he was
again in Portugal. In March 1809 he was with
Cradock, and was sent forward with a force towards
Pombal to watch the French, who were threatening
the north of Portugal, but with strict injunctions to
avoid a collision. Sir John Cradock was a timid
general, and there would have been no crossing of
INDEPENDENT COMMAND 287
the Douro, no Talavera, no Peninsular triumphs, if
he had continued in command. But a better man
was close at hand, and Wellesley, in his prompt
advance against Soult, was glad to give Hill a fore-
most place. Hill was the first to come in touch
with the French ; he crossed the Douro with the
earliest boatloads of men, and the stout defence of
the Seminary, which paved the way to success, was
made under his personal control. At Talavera again
Hill held the hill on the left, that was long the
chief point of danger, and was wounded in the head.
After this Hill was advanced by Wellington to
the position he long held, that practically of second
in command. Wellington, in laying his plans for
the defence of Portugal, divided his whole force into
two separate corps, one of which he kept under
his own command, the other he offered to Hill.
" I will not make any arrangements," he wrote,
** either as to the troops that are to comprise it or
as to the officer who is to command it, without
offering the command to you. At the same time,
I will not separate you from the army and from my
own immediate command without consulting your
wishes." Hill frankly and readily accepted the pro-
posal made him (as he put it) **in the handsomest
manner." *' I am aware," he goes on, *'of the im-
portance of the situation I am placed in, and trust
288 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
I shall' be attended with the same good fortune
I have hitherto experienced." Henceforth he was
continually employed in more or less independent
operations. After the withdrawal into Portugal, he
held the right flank, at first at Abrantes, on the
Tagus, and then more in advance across the river
about Portalegre, where he watched Elvas and
Badajoz. When Massena invaded Portugal, Hill
faced Regnier until it was certain that no move
would be made along the valley of the Tagus;
then, anticipating his orders, he crossed the river,
and by forced marches joined Wellington. During
the long defence of Torres Vedras, Hill was
again the guardian of the right flank, and held
the Tagus, when by his ceaseless vigilance he pre-
vented Massena from bridging the river.
Again, in 1811, on his return from sick leave to
England, he won on his own account the action of
Arroyo de los Molinos, where he surprised Gerard
after a night march, and almost destroyed him —
**a triumph for our general (Hill), a triumph all
his own. He gained great credit for this well-
conducted enterprise, and he gained what to one
of his mild, kind, humane character was still more
valuable, a bloodless victory."^ The surprise of
Almaraz was another operation entirely his own.
* Moyle Sherer, " Recollections."
ALMARAZ 289
He had been detached as usual to make head
against Soult, while Wellington was engaged in
the reduction of the fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo
and Badajoz. After their capture, when Wellington
was resolved to advance against Marmont on the
Tormes, it became essential that the one remaining
passage by which Soult, coming from the south,
could cross the Tagus and join Marmont, should
be closed. This was by the bridge of boats at
Almaraz, which was defended by strong works.
Hill, after clever feints to deceive Soult, fell
upon Almaraz by forced marches from Badajoz,
and seized it. The value of this achievement was
fully seen when the bridge of Alcantara, lower
down the Tagus, was repaired, and the corps of
Hill became by fourteen days' march nearer Wel-
lington than Soult, in Andalucia, was to Marmont.
While Wellington carried on the operations that
included the battle of Salamanca and were fol-
lowed by the entry into Madrid, Hill maintained
his useful r61e of holding the south, and was
across the Guadiana at Zafra. After the victory
he was, if Soult showed no signs of retreating, to
come to terms with him ; but the general move-
ment of the French was one of concentration to the
eastward, where King Joseph, Soult, and Suchet
were presently combined. Wellington now called
290 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
Hill to him, and gave him charge of Madrid, while
he moved northward to undertake the siege of
Burgos, as already described.^ In the famous retreat
Hill evacuated Madrid promptly, having first de-
stroyed the bridge of Aranjuez, and crossing the
Guadarrama mountains by the royal road, reached
Arevalo, where he was again in touch with Welling-
ton, and co-operated with him in the final with-
drawal behind Giudad Rodrigo. Then Hill once
more assumed his post upon the right flank, and
spent the winter about Coria, where he watched the
Pass of Perales, and was within easy reach of the
Tagus.
In all these important movements Hill displayed
admirable qualities. Too high praise cannot be
accorded to his promptitude, his daring, the sure
and skilful handling of his troops. He was espe-
cially remarkable, too, for his loyal support of his
great chief ; he seemed to know Wellington's plans
almost by intuition, at least he most readily under-
stood them, and how he could best further and
support them by subordinating his own personal
and subsidiary operations. As I have said on a
previous page, Wellington entirely trusted Hill,
and it is to be seen in all his correspondence ; the
chief took the lieutenant often into his confidence,
* See ante, p. 99.
VITTORIA AND ST. PIERRE 291
not exactly seeking his advice, but keeping him
informed of his most secret plans. Wellington was
ever ready to acknowledge the assistance he got
from Hill. ** Nothing could be more satisfactory to
me than all you did," he writes in 181 1 ; and after
the affair at Arroyo de los Molinos strongly recom-
mended him to the Prince Regent for some ** mark
of favour," which was followed in due course with
the knighthood of the Bath ; and the affair was
mentioned, when Parliament met, in the speech
from the throne. He was Sir Rowland Hill at the
time of the surprise of Almaraz.
In the final advance from Portugal, Hill was for
a time still alone ; but he came under Wellington's
command when the army was united before the river
Ebro, and in the turning movements that ended
with Vittoria. In that famous action Hill worked
out his own attack, but under Wellingfton s eye ;
it was generally the same in the Pyrenees, although
the army had been now formed into three principal
corps, commanded respectively by Hill, Beresford, and
Graham (who was presently succeeded by Hope).
HilFs chief exploit was the victory of St. Pierre, a
battle which he fought single-handed against Soult,
and won in spite of the defection of two of his own
colonels at the critical moment. He played the
soldier as well as the general, rallying the broken
292 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
regiments, and using his reserves with decision.
"He knew indeed that the 6th Division (sent by
Wellington to his aid) was close at hand, and the
battle might be fought over again ; but, like a
thorough soldier, he was resolved to win his own
fight with his own troops if he could ; and he did
so, after a manner that in less eventful times would
have rendered him the hero of a nation."
Hill richly merited the affections and devoted
support of his troops. '* The great foundation of his
popularity," wrote one who knew him well, "was his
sterling personal worth and his heroic spirit ; but
his popularity was increased and strengthened as
soon as he was seen. He was the very picture of
an English country gentleman. To those soldiers
who came from the rural districts of England he re-
presented home ; his fresh complexion, placid face,
kind eyes, kind voice, and the total absence of
all parade or noise in his habits, delighted them
. . . his kind attention to all the wants and com-
forts of his men, his visits to the sick in hospital,
his vigilant protection of the poor country people,
his just severity to marauders, his generous and
humane treatment of such prisoners and wounded
as fell into his hands, made him a place in the
hearts of his soldiery." He was always thinking
of his men, and no better trait is preserved than
;,/,^;^
AT WATERLOO 293
his shortening the day's drill when his corps was
being paraded, saying, "It is too hot ; we must not
fatigue the men." The story goes that a whisper
ran through the ranks, ** Bless him ! There he is !
Father Hill again."
Hill was created a peer when he returned from
Spain, and might have gone at once into another
campaign. He was offered the command of the
expedition about to be despatched to America, but
refused it. When Napoleon broke loose froip Elba,
Hill was one of the first officers in the field. He
was summoned to the Cabinet, and asked if he
could start without delay that very night for
Belgium.
News had arrived that Louis XVHL, having
fled from France, was at Ostend, and that some
premature collision might take place upon the
frontier. It was Hill's mission to **keep all right"
until the arrival of Wellington from Vienna ; to
take no position that was too advanced, to avoid
any serious engagement. The part Hill played in
the short and decisive campaign need not be de-
tailed at any length. In the great battle his corps
was posted on the right and right centre. His
horse was killed under him, pierced in five places,
and rolled over him, bruising him severely. He
remained in France during the occupation by the
294 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
allied troops, and commanded the whole of the
British infantry, 25,000 men.
Lord Hill retired for a time into private life,
but in his seclusion he was repeatedly asked to
return to active work. He was offered the post
of Master-General of the Ordnance, then that of
commander-in-chief in India, but he declined both
offices. He did not care for purely sedentary
employment, and his health was too delicate for
India. At length the Duke of Wellington became
Prime Minister, and was forced to surrender the
chief command of the army. The post was
at once offered to Hill in the most flattering
terms, and accepted with gratitude and diffi-
dence. One of his first and most pleasing tasks
was to give a command to his old friend and
comrade, Lord Lynedoch, the colonel who had
made him a major ; he retained Lord Fitz Roy
Somerset as his military secretary, and his dis-
posal of patronage was at all times fair and im-
partial. The close attention he gave to his work
gradually impaired his health, and in 1842 he felt
constrained to resign his office, and he died the
same year. The Duke of Wellington's letter of
condolence is worth inserting here, as it bears upon
the unjust charges made against him for want of
due appreciation of those who served under him.
AN HONOURABLE LIFE 295
*' You may conceive," writes the Duke to the
new Lord Hill/ "better than I can express how
much I have felt his loss. More than thirty-five
years have elapsed since I had the satisfaction of
being first connected with and assisted by him in
the public service ; and I must say that from that
moment up to the latest period of his valuable and
honourable life, nothing ever occurred to interrupt
for one moment the friendly and intimate relations
which subsisted between us."
' A nephew. Rowland Hill never married, and the peerage was specially
continued to his brother's children.
CHAPTER IV
BERESFORD
Birth — First commission and early service — Egypt, Buenos Ayres,
Madeira, Portugal — Given command of Portuguese army — Its re-
organisation and improvement — Aided by excellent officers — Beresford
and Albuera — Wellington's opinion of Beresford — His confidence in
him — Later services — Enters political life.
BERESFORD, a natural son of the first
Marquis of Waterford, was born in 1768;
educated at home, and at the military
school of Strasburg. When seventeen he was ap-
pointed ensign in the 6th Regiment, and served
with it almost immediately in Halifax, Nova Scotia.
He got his company unattached in 1791, after six
years, and was appointed to the 69th. He was
at the defence of Toulon, and at the taking of
Corsica. Returning to England in 1794, he was
given the command of a regiment raised upon
his fathers estates, which was soon broken up,
and he became lieutenant-colonel of the famous
88th, or Connaught Rangers. ** Christian's storm"
dispersed the transports on which the 88th were
embarked for the West Indies, and when it was
996
EARLY SERVICES 297
got together again, Beresford did garrison duty
with it in Jersey until ordered to India in 1799.
He missed Seringapatam, but joined Baird's ex-
pedition to the Red Sea, and on the desert
march from Cosseir to the Nile commanded a
brigade. On his return to England in 1803, he
became a ** full " colonel, and served at home until
chosen to command one brigade of the expedition
sent under Baird to recapture the Cape of Good
Hope. Thence Beresford accompanied Admiral
Popham to South America, where they seized
Buenos Ayres, only to lose it again by surrender.
Beresford defended the place for three days, then
capitulated. This misfortune was followed by the
disgraceful disaster at Monte Video, for which,
however, Beresford was in nowise blamed. But
he was held six months as a prisoner of war.
In 1807 Beresford returned to England, and
was sent to seize Madeira in the name of the king
of Portugal. He held the command of that island
for six months, utilising his time so well that he
acquired the Portuguese language, a cause largely
contributing to his future success. A peace com-
mand was not much in his line, and he gladly
left Madeira to take a brigade under Wellesley in
Portugal, where, after the battle of Vimiero, he
was commandant of Lisbon. In April 1808, after
298 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
twenty-three years' service, he became a major-
general — no bad record — and was appointed to
command a division under Sir John Moore, He
took part in the memorable retreat on Corunna,
and acted with the reserve in rendering valuable
service in the constant contests with the pursuers.
He fought at Corunna, and was one of the last to
embark after the action.
Now came Beresford s opportunity ; he reaped
the reward of his diligence at Madeira. When a
British commander was wanted for the disorganised
Portuguese forces, the choice fell upon Beresford,
largely on account of his knowledge of the lan-
guage, and of his now large local experience in
the country. No better selection could have been
made. He exercised his powers wisely, tactfully,
but with a strong, firm hand. When he assumed
command, the Portuguese army was at the lowest
point of "degradation, meanness, and bigotry."
Neither honour, honesty, nor bravery was to be
found among any serving in its ranks. Some of
the officers were absent in civil situations, others
were servants in great families ; every regiment
had its patron saint, who was borne on the
strength as a captain or major, and his pay was
drawn by the monks of some convent raised in
his honour.
PORTUGUESE ARMY 299
Beresford in his first proclamation to the Por-
tuguese gave them the credit of possessing the
military spirit, but latent and undeveloped, and
appealed to their patriotism to submit to disci-
pline in order to meet their enemy on equal terms.
Then fixing his headquarters at Thomar, he col-
lected the regiments together, and recast them on
British models, using "stern but wholesome rigour,"
enforcing obedience and orderly conduct, and in-
fusing the true soldierly spirit. The lines of re-
organisation had, however, been sketched out by
Wellington himself. A first elementary principle
was that the army should have English officers at
its head. The staff, the commissariat in particular,
must be British ; their proportion to the rest of
the army must be large, in view of the number of
detached posts that would have to be occupied,
and the difficulty of providing and distributing
supplies. The Portuguese officers who were re-
tained, mostly in the junior ranks, were to be
placed on a better footing. Their pay was to be
increased ; *' without that it is vain to hope for
much exertion from them." Wellington pointed
out that for many years they had done little or
no duty ; they had occupied always the same gar-
rison town, and had lived with their own families
at home. If old abuses were to be removed, they
4
300 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
must have enough pay, and be enabled to main-
tain themselves decently. Wellington, in advising
Beresford how to proceed, indicated exactly what
was most needed in the Portuguese army. It was
not discipline properly so called; "what they want
are the habits and spirit of soldiers, the habits of
command on the one side and of obedience on the
other, mutual confidence between officers and men,
and, above all, a determination in the superiors to
obey the spirit of the orders they receive, let what
will be the consequence, and the spirit to tell the
true cause if they do not."
An independent witness — not a military officer,
it is true — speaks in high terms of the Portuguese
troops as they appeared to him in 1812. "They
are in the highest order ; the men really look at
least equal to ours, better than some ; the officers
are well dressed and gay, and have the advantage
of language, the infantry and the Ca9adores in par-
ticular." Their marching is very "fresh"; "they
come in even to the last mile singing along the
road. The cavalry are not nearly so good, and are
not, I suppose, so much to be trusted . . . they
are called the Vamuses, from what passed last year
when they ran off with a general cry of * Vamus.'
The infantry are termed Valerosas, from their
having hugged and cheered each other early in the
THE "VALEROSAS'' 301
war, when they had for the first time behaved well,^
and beat off the French, each patting the other on
the head, and saying, ' Mucha Valerosa!' I hope
the latter will support their name, and, indeed, they
are disposed to do so, for we have put so much
beef into both men and officers, that they are quite
different animals, and will not submit at all to what
they used to do, even from the English." *
Yet at an earlier date, when the newly raised
levies were first incorporated with the British bri-
gades, they were not thought of highly. Costello,
the rifleman who served through the Peninsula with
the 95th, describes the ist and 2nd Ca9adores in
very uncomplimentary terms when they first joined
the Light Division. "These fellows I never had any
opinion of from the very first moment I saw them.
They^were the dirtiest and noisiest brutes I ever
came across. Historians of the day have given
them great credit, but during the whole of the
Peninsular war, or at least the time they were with
us, I never knew them to perform one gallant act.
On the line of march they often reminded me
of a band of strollers. They were very fond of
gambling, and every halt we made was sure to
find them squatted, and with cards in their hands."
Costello was perhaps a little prejudiced, as the rank
^ At Busaco. See ante, p. 8i« ' Larpent, 14a
302 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
and file sometimes are, especially against foreigners.
But superior officers had also their doubts of the
Portuguese, for we find Wellington writing to
Craufurd in 1810, ** I hope you will find the Ca^a-
dores better than you expected;" and the com-
mander of the Light Division was not, as a fact,
disappointed in them.
The creation and development of the Portu-
guese army, whether or not it became a perfect
fighting machine, yet gave many British officers
commands and opportunities they might not have
otherwise enjoyed. Many good men won their
spurs under Beresford. He was always ready to
accept volunteers of the right sort ; thus George
Napier would have gone to him for the chance of
a regimental command, had not Craufurd refused
to part with him, Dickson, as we have seep, first
showed his talents with the Portuguese artillery.
D'Urban and Hardinge rose high, thanks mainly
to their early employment on Beresford's staff.
The first D'Urban was quartermaster-general of
the Portuguese army ; a trained and experienced
officer, who had served with Abercromby, and had
been superintendent of the junior military college
at High Marlow. When Sir Robert Wilson
organised the Lusitanian Legion, D' Urban joined
him ; then his knowledge of Portuguese, and general
D'URBAN AND HARDINGE 303
staff experience, recommended him to Beresford
when the new army was being formed. He served
as quartermaster-general through the whole of the
war, never once leaving the Peninsula, and being
engaged in almost every affair. He remained in
Portugal after the British army left, and so missed
Waterloo ; but in after life he held many important
posts, especially as Governor of Barbadoes, and
afterwards of the Cape of Good Hope, where he
annexed Natal after ejecting the rebellious boors,
and gave his name to the chief town of the
colony.
Henry Hardinge had a still more distinguished
career in after life, but it may be doubted whether
he would have gone so far to the front but for the
Portuguese army. He also had learnt staff duties
at High Wycombe under General Jarry, and he was
deputy assistant quartermaster-general to Sir Brent
Spencer's force, and was with it in the campaign
of Vimiero, where he was wounded. But he joined
Moore for the retreat, and his activity at the em-
barkation of the troops at Corunna first gained him
the goodwill of Beresford, who secured him at
once for the Portuguese army, in which he held
the post of deputy under D' Urban. Hardinge was
present in every engagement, and ever won golden
opinions. His conduct at Albuera will be referred
304 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
to directly/ and Wellington thought so well of him
that he wrote Beresford once : " Send me Hardinge
or some staff-officer who has intelligence, to whom
I can talk about the concerns of the Portuguese
army." Hardinge, in the campaign of Waterloo,
was British Commissioner at the Prussian head-
quarters, and lost his arm at Ligny, a misfortune
that gained him the kindly sobriquet of "the one-
handed miscreant" from Daniel O'Connell in after
years. Sir Henry Hardinge in 1820 entered poli-
tical life as member for Durham ; he twice held
office as Irish Secretary, and gained reputation as
a ''plain, straightforward, just, and excellent man
of business." Wellington thought highly of him
to the last,* and at his urgent recommendation
Hardinge was made Governor-General of India,
where he is remembered as one of the best Vice-
roys that reigned. At the Duke's death Lord Har-
dinge became commander-in-chief of the army.
To return to Beresford. The Marshal, although
specially in command of the Portuguese, held by
virtue of that rank, and that of local lieutenant-
general in the British army, a place next to Wel-
lington, very much to the discontent of officers
who were actually his senior. More than one
* See post, p. 306.
* Sir Henry Hardinge was Wellington's second in the duel with Lord
Winchelsea.
ALBUERA 305
general resigned his command in consequence, and
all affected resented the supersession. Wellington
was so much hampered and annoyed that in one
of his despatches he says : ** I wish Beresford would
resign his local rank ; the embarrassments and ill
blood it causes are inconceivable." Yet in the first
phases of the war Beresford took no very active
part. He was busy with his organisation, and it
prospered so well that in 18 10 Wellington was able
to bring some of the best Portuguese regiments
into line with the British troops, and they rendered
excellent service at Busaco. In the following year
( 1 8 1 1 ) Beresford was afforded his first opportunity
of distinction as an independent general fighting on
his own field. During Hill's absence in England
he was called to the command of the corps, com-
posed of the 2nd and 3rd Divisions, with Lay's
cavalry and four Portuguese brigades, which was
to invest Badajoz and check the movements of
Soult for its relief. Beresford seems to have in-
spired little confidence; he was in character and
bearing a strong contrast to his predecessor ; those
who loved their "Daddy" Hill would not yield the
same allegiance to the brusque, boisterous Irishman.
In the cavalry action of Campo Mayor he suffered
the 14th Light Dragoons to be drawn too far away,
and to be almost cut to pieces. Then Soult came up
u
3o6 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
and forced on the battle of Albuera, when Beresford
yielded to the urgent appeals of his officers to stand
his ground. The position at Albuera was behind
the river of that name, and Soult s main attack was
on Beresford s right, where the Spaniards turned
tail, and the few English were outnumbered and all
but overpowered. Happily Colonel Hardinge had
ordered up, on his own authority. Cole's fresh and
unbroken division to the wavering right flank, and
snatched victory, when it seemed assured, from
Soult s grasp. Napier s account of the close of the
action deserves to be written in letters of gold. It
is one of the finest bursts of impassioned prose in
the English language.
Albuera has been called one of the most des-
perate and sanguinary of battles. Soult, although
beaten back, showed himself greatly superior to
Beresford as a tactical leader. Napier s strictures
upon the English general are very severe, exces-
sively so perhaps. " Beresford had studied his
own field of battle . • . and yet occupied it so as
to render defeat almost certain ; his infantry were
not in hand, his inferiority in guns and cavalry was
not compensated by entrenchments. He had supe-
rior numbers of infantry, on a position which was
contracted to three miles ; yet ten thousand never
fired a shot, and three times the day was lost
BERESFORD AND NAPIER 307
and won, the allies being always fewest in number
at the decisive point. . . . The person of the
general-in-chief was seen everywhere, a gallant
soldier ! — the mind of the great commander no-
where."
Beresford protested fiercely against this estimate
of his generalship, and a bitter controversy ensued,
in which the practised writer got the advantage.
Napier struck the last blow in reminding Beresford
that he claimed to be greater than Alexander or
Caesar, in that he declared he had never made a
mistake. Wellington (who, as we shall see, had
the very highest opinion of Beresford) excused him
on the ground that he had not the habit and experi-
ence of command on the field — precisely Napier s
criticism. Wellington gave Beresford carte blanche;
he was to fight or not, as he thought best at
the time ; but adds, "Had I been there " (he was
delayed by an accident at Almeida), "we should
have made a great thing of it." Beresford had
gladly welcomed his chiefs expected advent. "He
wrote me," says Wellington, "to the effect that
he was delighted I was coming ; that he could not
stand the slaughter about him nor the vast respon-
sibility. His letter was quite in a desponding
tone. It was brought to me next day, I think, by
General Arbuthnot when I was at dinner at Elvas,
3o8 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
and I said directly, * This won't do ; write me down
a victory.* The despatch (about Albuera) was
altered accordingly."
It is somewhat curious that, in spite of Albuera,
Wellington had the very highest opinion of Beres-
ford. After Salamanca, where the Marshal was
severely wounded, Wellington paid him a great
compliment by urging that Sir Stapleton Cotton
should not be given a peerage, lest it might pique
Beresford into throwing up his Portuguese com-
mand. "All I can tell you is," he writes Lord
Bathurst, **that the ablest man I have yet seen
with the army, and that one having the largest
views, is Beresford. They tell me that when I
am not present he wants decision . . . but I am
quite certain he is the only person capable of con-
ducting a large concern." Lord Albemarle tells the
story that when Wellington was asked at a dinner-
table in the Peninsula upon whom the command
should devolve in case of accidents, he named — but
not without hesitation — ** Beresford." Some sur-
prise was expressed, and he went on : ** I see what
you mean by your looks. If it was a question of
handling troops, some of you fellows might do as
well, nay, better than he ; but what we want now
is some one to feed our troops, and I know no one
fitter for the purpose than Beresford."
THE DUKE AND BERESFORD 309
There are passages in the Wellington despatches
that fully bear out this opinion. ** I can have no ob-
jection," he writes, **to give Beresford any power;
on the contrary, the greater power he has, the better
it will be for the public service." Again : *' It is im-
possible for two persons to understand each other
better than Beresford and I. He is two miles from
this, and I see him every day, and I believe we
take pretty nearly the same view of every trans-
action." The Duke, whenever it was possible,
consulted Beresford with regard to projected opera-
tions, and he was heard to say that there was **no
one like the Marshal for seeing the weak point in
a plan." One of the glimpses Larpent gives us
of the two generals, Wellington and Beresford,
walking up and down in close conference in the
narrow street of a dirty little Spanish town, shows
how deep was the connection between them. On
another occasion Wellington writes : " I may ven-
ture, however, to assure you that, with the excep-
tion of Marshal Beresford, who, I believe, concurs
entirely in all my opinions respecting the state of
the contest and the measures to be adopted here,
there is no man in the army who has taken half
the pains upon the subject (the conduct of the war)
than I have." Beresford, whenever it was possible,
accompanied Wellington on his reconnaissances.
3IO THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
which, as we know, were often of the most daring
character and pushed very far to the front. The
Duke said afterwards that he relied greatly on
the Marshals quick eye for country, and generally
on his sagacity. "If there be a weak point in
any plan, Beresford is the man to see it," sums up
his opinion.
After Toulouse, where he restored the battle
when it had been endangered by Pictons rash
advance, Beresford (now a peer of the realm) re-
turned to Portugal, and thus missed Waterloo.
There had been some talk of bringing over a
portion of the Portuguese army to Belgium, but
nothing came of it, no doubt to Lord Beresford s
great chagrin. His position in Portugal after the
war was by no means enviable ; petty squabbles
and ill-usage both of officers and men were very
rife, and Beresford paid two visits to Rio Janeiro,
where the royal family still resided, seeking redress
for grievances, and when there in 1817 he was
able by his vigorous measures to quell a serious
rebellion. He left Portugal in 1820, and entered
upon a short political career. Although elected
M.P. for Waterford in 1811, and again in 181 2,
he had never taken his seat. But now he entered
the House of Peers, and, with the loyalty of a
soldier who had served with Caesar, strenuously
HIS MARRIAGE 311
supported his old chief in all his political action.
He was advanced to the rank of Viscount, and
was at one time Master-General of the Ordnance,
but retired into private life, and married in 1832
the wealthy widow of " Anastasius" Hope.
CHAPTER V
GRAHAM
Advanced age on entering the service — Early life — A Scotch laird —
Terrible bereavements — Raises 90th Light Infantry — Serves in Italy ;
and with Moore at Corunna — Rank made substantive — Battle of
Barrosa — Ciudad Rodrigo — Gallicia — Vittoria — San Sebastian —
Bergen op Zoom — Long life.
THE case of Thomas Graham, Lord Lynedoch,
is a curious contradiction of some modem
theories in regard to military command.
It is held nowadays, somewhat obstinately, and
with a narrowness that ignores clear proof to the
contrary, that youthful vigour is essential to good
generalship, that little can be expected from the
leader advanced in years. Yet we can point to
Charles Napier, who won his first battle at sixty-
one ; Radetzky, who made the successful campaign
of Novara at eighty-four. Sir Thomas Graham
was over sixty when he commanded a brigade
at Walcheren, and sixty-four when he took San
Sebastian. Some time after that, it is true, his
health broke down, but the hardships of campaign-
ing in the Pyrenees were exceptionally severe.
3x2
RAISES THE 90™ 313
Again, Graham controverts the commonly received
opinion that it is essential to serve through all
the grades to become proficient in the leading of
troops. He jumped straight into the rank of
lieutenant-colonel at forty-eight, and sixteen years
later was a major-general commanding a brigade in
the field. He was, in fact, a born soldier, whose
genius for war came out by accident late in life,
but was then incontestably proved.
A Scotch laird, born in 1748, of old family,
with broad estates, he lived the life of a country
gentleman, devoted to field sports, wrapped up
entirely in his love for the beautiful wife whose
well-known portrait is one of the finest of Gains-
borough's triumphs.^ When she was lost to him
prematurely, and to his intense grief, he essayed
to forget by seeking military adventure. Graham
served as volunteer aide-de-camp to Lord Mul-
grave at Toulon in 1792, being then forty-four.
He showed so much military capacity that he was
advised to raise a regiment, and did so in 1794,
the Perthshire Volunteers, afterwards the famous
90th Light Infantry, a regiment which has given
many distinguished officers to the British army,
and two commanders-in-chief.^ Later he added a
^ This picture, when Mrs. Graham died, he bricked up in a wall, and it
was only brought to light again long years after his bereavement.
2 Lord Hill and Lord Wolseley.
314 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
second battalion, of which Hill became lieutenant-
colonel,^ and now claimed with some show of
reason that his own rank should be made sub-
stantive. But the king (George III.) had set
his face against giving high permanent status to
officers who had not passed through all the junior
grades. Graham's politics, which were of a Liberal
bias, helped to gain him this refusal ; but, although
he felt it bitterly, he accepted the post of military
attach^ with the Austrian army in Italy, and shared
its defeats at the vigorous hands of the young
Napoleon. Nelson entrusted Graham with the
duty of blockading the fortress of Valetta, which
he performed until the French surrendered the
island to Sir Ralph Abercromby. Graham served
then in Egypt, and was present at the battle of
Alexandria. He was still colonel of his regiment,
the 90th, and would not vacate it, resolved to
lose no chance of active employment. With this
idea he accompanied Moore to Sweden, and was
again his aide-de-camp at Corunna. It was his
gallant chiefs dying wish that Graham should be
confirmed in his rank in the army, and on the
4th March 1809 Graham heard from the Duke of
York, then commander-in-chief, that he had not
failed to submit to the king "the communication
^ See ante, p. 284.
SUBSTANTIVE RANK 315
made .to me by General Hope, at the dying request
of the late Sir John Moore, regarding the eminent
and important services performed by you in Spain,
. . . and his Majesty has been pleased to direct
that the established custom of the army may be
departed from by your being promoted to the rank
of major-general."
Graham accepted this tardy acknowledgment of
his services as ample compensation for the many
years of bitter disappointment. It was, as he said,
a high reward to have merited the good word of
such a man as Moore. Now, the seniority given
him was that he would have had if his first appoint-
ment of lieutenant -colonel had been substantive,
and not merely temporary rank. It put him in a
fine position, and, with his other claims, entitled
him to further employment. So we find him in
the wretched Walcheren business in command of
a brigade, and afterwards, with the local rank of
lieutenant-general, in command of the British
garrison at Cadiz in 18 10- 11.
Graham was now to have an opportunity of
independent command in the field. The French
had long besieged Cadiz, but Soult had been drawn
away to invest Badajoz, and had left Victor alone
to enforce the blockade of Cadiz. Graham pro-
posed to fall upon Victor, taking him in reverse,
3i6 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
and sending a force of 5000 men round by sea.
He landed at Tarifa, and joining with La Pefia,
the Spanish general, attacked the French at Bar-
rosa. Deserted by his allies at the most critical
moment, Graham found himself in a position of
imminent danger, out of which he saw no escape
but by a prompt offensive. The ready, reckless
gallantry of his troops, who closed in to fight
almost as they were, without any regular formation,
gave him the victory, but only after a sanguinary
conflict. He had but 4000 men against 9000,
and La Penas Spaniards, although largely rein-
forced, looked on inactive throughout. Graham was
warmly congratulated by Wellington, who said that
the victory would certainly have raised the siege
of Cadiz had the Spaniards played their part ; '* I
am equally certain . . . that if you had not decided
with the utmost promptitude to attack the enemy,
and if your own attack had not been a most
vigorous one, the whole allied army would have
been lost."
Graham after Barrosa joined Wellington, and
was given command of the ist Division. He
contributed to the successful capture of Ciudad
Rodrigo by surprising the convent of Santa Cruz
six days before the final assault He covered the
siege of Badajoz, but health compelled him to pay
LORD LVNEDOCH. G.C.B
SAN SEBASTIAN 317
a visit to England, thus losing him a share in the
battle of Salamanca. But Graham returned to his
post in January 181 3, and was warmly welcomed
by Wellington. ** I was happy to learn . . . you
were able to return to us, and hope we may make
a good campaign of it. ... I propose to take the
field as early as I can, and at least to put myself
in fortune's way." Graham played a leading part
in the great advance from Portugal in 181 3, for
he led the turning movement through the rugged
mountain districts of the Tras os Montes, in com-
mand of the British left. He was entrusted again,
still on the left, with the outflanking attack at
Vittoria, which aimed at the French line of retreat
and cut them from it. Wellington gave him the im-
mediate control of the siege of San Sebastian, and
it may be that the sturdy old man was forced into
errors against his judgment — errors that led to the
failure of the first assault. But it was his tenacious
spirit that achieved the final capture, by concen-
trating the whole fire of his heavy guns, which
destroyed the curtain and gave an opening for
the stormers. Soon after this he again left the
Peninsula, being unequal to the excessive fatigues
of the campaign. But he had not yet finally
sheathed his sword ; for when the Dutch rose
against the French, a British expedition was sent
3i8 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
to their assistance, and it was placed under the
command of Sir Thomas Graham. While he
was investing Antwerp, he conceived it possible
to carry the neighbouring fortress of Bergen op
Zoom by a coup de main. The attack, however,
failed.
Sir Thomas Graham was created a peer at the
peace, and became Lord Lynedoch ; but he fought
no more. Retiring full of honours, and with a
mind cured by great exploits from grief and melan-
choly, he lived on to a green old age, mostly at
his own Perthshire home, Balgowan, where he
shot and fished, and entertained his comrades and
friends, until 1847, when he died, at the advanced
age of ninety-six.
CHAPTER VI
PICTON
Picton's temper — Unfounded statements of his disagreements — Duke's
high opinion of him — The charge of cruelty in Trinidad — Torture of
Louise Calderon — Verdict of guilty never set aside, although Picton
absolved — His sympathisers — The Duke of Queensberry — Picton's
youth and early services — Slow promotion— Peninsula and the fight-
ing 3rd — "Brave old Picton" — The commissary — Waterloo— Death
on the field.
WELLINGTON called Picton -a rough,
foul-mouthed devil as ever lived," and
Napier has given colour to the picture
when contrasting him with Craufurd, after the Coa :
*' The stern countenance, robust frame, saturnine
complexion, caustic speech, and austere demeanour
of the first (Picton), promised little sympathy with
the short thick figure, dark flashing eyes, quick
movements, and fiery temper of the second ; nor
did they often meet without a quarrel." The last
statement is not borne out by other evidence. An
officer high upon Picton's staff declares that the
one general *• never expressed himself in any but
the most friendly terms of Craufurd." ** I certainly
upon one occasion heard him observe, * That d d
319
320 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
fighting fellow Craufurd will some day get us into
a scrape,' but this was not uttered at all in an un-
friendly tone." Napier also implies that Picton was
on bad terms with Wellingfton. ** It was common
opinion," he says, "that the Duke and Picton did
not get on smoothly together when they happened
to have personal intercourse, which was seldom."
Wellington himself entirely repudiated this later
in life, and assured Picton's biographer, " not only
that I was not on bad terms with Sir Thomas
Picton, but that in the whole course of the period
during which I was in relation with him, I do not
recollect even a difference of opinion, much less
anything of the nature of a quarrel." The Duke
goes on to say that he had asked for Picton to be
sent out to him in the Peninsula, encouraged to do
so by the report he had had of his fitness from
General Miranda, who had known him in the West
Indies; and that "he had never reason to regret"
— on the contrary, numberless reasons to rejoice —
that he had solicited his appointment. " It was
made at the moment when an unmerited prejudice
existed against Sir Thomas Picton, the recollection
of which was effaced by his services."
Picton's temper might well have been soured, his
demeanour affected, by the painful affair to which
his great leader refers. He was nearly sacrificed to
CHARGE OF CRUELTY 321
the emotional philanthropy that accepts an over-
coloured story as gospel, and is ready to con-
demn a public servant too hastily, on imperfect
grounds. Picton was arraigned by public opinion
for an offence the mere suspicion of which will
always rouse indignation in England. He was
charged with cruelty — the harsh, inhuman abuse of
his powers as a proconsul ; and the story as it was
put forward might well inflame the public mind.
The blame rests with those who by malevolence
.and mis-statement sought to sully Picton's good
name — chiefly with Colonel FuUarton, a co-com-
missioner in the government of Trinidad, who
greedily seized upon a small matter, and exag-
gerated an excusable error into a shameful and
atrocious offence. Picton was accused of having
tortured a poor girl who would not give evidence
in a case of theft ; to have ** applied the question,"
or ordered it to be applied, and in the form of
** picketing," by which the victim is compelled to
stand upon a pointed peg with one foot, the body
being raised by the arms from the ground. The
act was not denied, but it could be in a measure
justified, and it was in accordance with the existing
law in Trinidad.
The case arose out of the robbery of one Ruiz,
a tobacconist, to the amount of ;^400, and suspicion
(
322 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
fell upon a man who was known to be in familiar
intercourse with the female servant and housekeeper
of Ruiz, a young girl named Louise Calderon.
She was arrested and examined, but would not
speak. Whereupon, following the usual procedure
on the island, the judge applied to Picton, the
supreme authority, for leave to apply the question.
Picton consented, and thus laid himself open to a
criminal indictment, which took its course later in
England, where he was arrested and tried in the
Court of Kings Bench in 1806. The prosecution
was of the most rancorous kind ; the facts were
grossly distorted, and by no means justified the
impassioned language of counsel. It was asserted
that Louise Calderon was under fourteen years of
age, whereas it is certain that she was a good deal
older; it was alleged that the torture (the picket-
ing) was applied with much severity, that the girl
fell down, in appearance dead, and there was no
physician or surgeon to assist. Yet the truth was,
that but little pain was inflicted, that confession was
almost immediate, that the girl was so little affected
that she walked, with a cigar in her mouth, from
the gaol, more than half a mile, to the scene of the
robbery, where she pointed out the manner in which
it had been effected. There had been a surgeon
present at the picketing ; there was no necessity for
VERDICT OF GUILTY 323
one then or afterwards, as the feet were not swollen
or injured. The rebutting evidence was so strong
that no verdict would have been given had not
the prosecution brought forward a witness, Vargas,
from Trinidad, to swear that the Spanish law — the
law under which the question was applied — was not
really in force in the island. On this a general
verdict of guilty was returned against General
Picton.
An appeal was made against this mistaken find-
ing, and a new trial was permitted. It was clearly
shown that Vargas was perjured ; the old Spanish
law was actually in force in Trinidad, and Picton
had been distinctly instructed to administer it as he
found it. Fresh evidence, altogether in his favour,
was adduced from Trinidad ; for there the strongest
sympathy was felt for him, and the inhabitants sub-
scribed to defray the legal expenses of the trial, and
presented him with a sword. The second trial
ended with a special verdict, accepting it as fact
that torture was legal at the time in Trinidad, and
absolving the defendant of malice against Louise
Calderon ** independent of the illegality of the act,"
a rider that shows a British jury would not tole-
rate the infliction of torture. Picton was never
fully acquitted ; as the result of this verdict his
recognisances were respited until "the court should
324 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
further order," which it never did, and the general
opinion in legal circles was that, had judgment
been delivered, it would have been against Picton ;
" but that, on consideration of the merits, it would
have been followed by a punishment so slight, and
so little commensurate with the magnitude of the
questions embraced by the case, as to have reflected
but little credit upon the prosecution."
Picton had many sympathisers. The testimonials
sent in his favour from Trinidad were of the most
cordial nature, and took the substantial form, as we
have seen, of subscriptions in cash and a sword.
The first he would not accept, when, shortly after
the trial, a terrible calamity befell the principal town,
which was destroyed by fire. Picton at once sent
back the whole amount, to be applied in the work of
charitable relief He found another staunch friend
in the eccentric Duke of Queensberry, who con-
veyed a very kindly message to the persecuted
general, assuring him "ol his entire conviction ot
his innocence, and of his high sense of Picton s
character." That this was no empty compliment
was further proved by his generous offer of ;^ 10,000,
a sum placed entirely at his disposal for the defence
of the action. Picton's rugged but manly nature
was greatly touched by this noble offer, and he
wrote at once to the Duke of Queensberry to say
PICTON AND qUEENSBERRY 325
that ''had it not been for the kindness and gener-
osity of a near relation (his uncle) who has lent
me his fortune to defend my character, I should
most readily have availed myself of your disin-
terested liberality." They met subsequently, but
only once. When Picton was on the eve of start-
ing for Spain, and waiting one day at his favourite
house of call, the Grosvenor coffee-house,^ the
Dukes card was brought in to him, with a request
that Picton would go out and speak to his Grace,
who apologised, saying : ** I am too infirm, General
Picton, to leave my carriage ; you must forgive me,
but I was anxious to shake hands with you and
bid you farewell. And I have one favour to ask —
that you will sometimes write to me. We get such
vague and contradictory accounts in the newspapers
that I should like, when you have leisure to write,
to know the real truth." Picton readily promised,
and wrote as long as the Duke lived, which was
only to the end of the year. He left Picton a
legacy of jCsooo.
I have been led by this Trinidad story to omit
some details of Picton's early career. He was the
son of a country gentleman in Pembrokeshire, and
obtained a commission in 1771, at the early age
of thirteen. He did not join his regiment of the
* There were no military clubs in those days.
326 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
1 2th Foot for a couple of years, and remained at
the military academy of a Frenchman, M. Lachee.
Then he went to Gibraltar, where, in the leisure of
garrison duty, he studied the Spanish language, and
rambled through the neighbouring mountains and
cork woods, as British subalterns do to this day. It
was this knowledge of Spanish that helped him to
the unlucky governorship of Trinidad. He left the
Rock, on promotion, just before the great siege, and
thus lost that interesting and exciting experience.
Five years afterwards, too, he came in for the army
reduction, and spent twelve long years, from 1 783
to 1794, on half-pay. In 1794, however, renewed
hostilities gave him a hope of re-employment, and
he went, quite on his own account, to the West
Indies. He had a slight acquaintance with Sir
J ohn Vaughan, the commander-in-chief, who at once
named him to a captaincy in the 17th Foot, and
appointed him aide-de-camp. From this he soon
passed to major in the 68th, and the post of deputy
quartermaster-general, in which he was presently
superseded. Then Sir Ralph Abercromby came
out in command, and in the active operations that
followed Major Picton found abundant opportuni-
ties of distinction. He took part, as one of Aber-
cromby 's staff, in the capture of St. Lucia and St.
Vincent, and was thrown into close connection with
SERVICES IN WEST INDIES 327
soldiers like Hope and Moore. Sir Ralph Aber-
cromby had a very high opinion of him, and he
appointed him to the governorship of Trinidad,
because he thought him quite the most qualified
man he could find for the situation. The island
was then a hotbed of crime, the refuge of malefac-
tors, of pirates and privateers, who spread depreda-
tions and dismay through the neighbouring isles.
The population was made up of fugitive desf)era-
does who had been concerned in the rebellions
and massacres at places near. In the island,
** murders and robberies were committed with im-
punity, widows and orphans despoiled, inheritances
plundered." So infamous was the character of the
people of Trinidad, that no person coming from it
was permitted to remain in a neighbouring island
without giving bond in ;^icxx> for good behaviour.
The proof of "usual or frequent residences" in
Trinidad was ipso facto enough to commit a person
to gaol. That Picton with a very inadequate force —
300 men of the 57th, and 200 foreigners and blacks
— was able to maintain order, crush a dangerous
conspiracy, and resist Spanish aggression, showed
him to be a vigorous administrator. But for the un-
fortunate affair of the " picketed " Louise Calderon.
his governorship would have been considered an
unmixed success.
328 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
From the various causes stated, Picton's ad-
vancement had been slow. He was nearly fifty
before he became a colonel, and he only reached
the rank of major-general in 1810, when he was
fifty-two, and therefore much senior in point of
years to his colleagues in the Peninsula. In person
at that time he is described as a tall, large man,
six feet one in height, with a stem face, but his
smile "dispelled at once a repulsive expression
which sometimes hung upon his brow " ; keen eyes,
a sharp quick voice which commanded attention ;
**the earnestness of his delivery and the power of
his language impressed the hearer with convic-
tion." ^ In the field his voice altered and became
full, deep, and impressive, and had an almost
magnetic effect upon the men he led. One who
heard him rebuke his division after the pillage of
a wine store was greatly prejudiced against him
as he looked at **the dark, gloomy, forbidding
face, which deepened when he opened his mouth
and began to pour forth a torrent of abuse on
us for our conduct." Yet, although no man could
blame with more severity when occasion required,
he was no niggard of his praise when it was de-
served. Nothing could surpass his calm intrepidity
and bravery in danger; and his presence in battle had
^ See ante, p. 319, Wellington's remarks.
n
THE "FIGHTING THIRD" 329
the effect of a talisman, so much had his skill and
valour gained upon the men under his command.
Wellington, as has been said, asked that Picton
might be sent out to him. When the general
joined, he was given the command of the 3rd
Division, which he retained till the end of the war.
He was so far concerned in Craufurd's rash action
on the Coa that he is said to have been in support,
and yet refused to come up — a statement that tends
to show Picton's good sense, for it was certainly
Wellington s wish to avoid a general engagement
then, and that the arrival of the 3rd Division would
probably have precipitated. Picton's division was
last but one on the left at Busaco, and had to meet
the attack of the second corps (Regnier's). It was
hardly pressed, and might have given way but for
the prompt support of Wellington ; then Picton's
reserves drove all before them. An amusing
incident occurred in the early morning. When the
piquets were attacked and repulsed, Picton charged
at the head, waving a red nightcap in which he
had slept at the bivouac.
Picton, with his ** fighting 3rd," was always to
the front in the pursuit of Massena from Torres
Vedras. It was indeed conspicuous then, and after-
wards through the Peninsula, for **its daring enter-
prise and indefatigable activity," often in strong
330 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
contrast with discreditable marauding. As when
the 88th made a splendid charge at Fuentes
d'Onoro, and Picton commended them with, " Well
done, 88th ! " " Are we the greatest blackguards
in the army now?" retorted voices, reminding him
of some former reproaches. "No, no," answered
Picton readily ; ** you are brave and gallant soldiers.
This day has redeemed your character." It was to
these splendid soldiers that he said, "We'll waste
no powder, Rangers, to-day ; the business must
be done with cold iron." They were his ** brave
ragged rascals." " I don't care how they dress," he
once said, "so long as they mind their fighting."
At El Boden he saved his division, which he held,
as always, entirely under command ; the battalions,
preserving their beautiful order, were ready to form
square at any moment, and quite imposed upon the
French cavalry. Picton's people were among the
first in at Ciudad Rodrigo, and one of his briga-
diers (Mackinnon) was killed by the first explo-
sion ; the general himself, with a voice of "twenty
trumpet power," controlling the fight. Picton's
division took the castle at Badajoz, headed by
their general, who was soon struck down. Welling-
ton s gratitude for the last feat was great, and he
wrote Lord Liverpool that "General Picton has
inspired a confidence in the army, and exhibited
"BRAVE OLD PICTON" 331
an example of science and bravery which has been
surpassed by no^ other officTer. His exertions in
the attack cannot fail to excite the most lively
feelings of admiration."
Picton missed Salamanca through a dangerous
illness, but Pakenham led them nobly in the great
counter-stroke. When their own chief returned to
duty from England, he was received with vociferous
shouts by his men ; they gathered round him as
he rode into camp, with cries of '* Here comes
our brave old father," and "Three cheers for
old Picton." He was in time for Vittoria, and we
have an authentic account of his impatience that
day waiting for orders to advance. An aide-de-
camp came past him, looking for the 7th Division,
which had not yet come up. "What are you to
tell him ? " Picton insisted upon knowing. " To
attack that bridge, the 4th and 6th Divisions to
support." "Tell Lord Wellington I mean to take
that bridge in less than ten minutes, and the 4th
and 6th Divisions may support or not as they
please." Then, turning to his troops, he shouted,
"Come on, ye rascals! Come on, ye fighting
villains!" and he kept his word. His conduct
and that of his division was the admiration of the
whole army.
Picton held the ground against Soult in the
332 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
critical fighting at Sauroren, and shortly after re-
turned for a brief space to England, again to recruit
his health, and receive the thanks of the House of
Commons, having not long before been elected
M.P. for Carmarthen. But he was soon back at
the seat of war, and was engaged in the closing
episodes, being as usual ever in the forefront. He
was always at the head of his division, stick in
hand — for he almost always carried one, and used
it to tap with on his horse's mane when full of im-
patience, or to wave over his head as he pointed
with it to the enemy's lines. Sometimes, however,
he exchanged it for an umbrella, and it was so in
the advance on Vittoria, when he beat Welling-
ton's butler about the head with it for impeding the
march of his division. The man was escorting
headquarters baggage, and objected to make way,
when Picton, who was no respecter of persons,
thrashed him and threatened him with the provost-
marshal A story of this kind substantiates the
other of Picton's threat to hang the commissary
if he failed to bring up the rations for his division.
The story is now credited, but on no convincing
evidence, to General Craufurd.^
^ Wellington's reply to the injured commissary when he complained is
historical. " Did he (whoever it was, Picton or Craufurd) say that ? Then
you may depend if^n it he will keep his word."
DEATH AT WATERLOO 333
Sir Thomas Picton was in private life, living at
his seat in Wales, when the Waterloo storm burst.
He was at once offered a command, but accepted
only on the condition that he was to serve under
Wellington. Then, with that assurance gained, he
made ready for the field in such hot haste that
he reached Belgium ahead of his uniforms. Many
strange presentiments are reported as concurring
to predict it would be his last campaign. He must
have suffered from some severe mental strain, for
Wellington told Stanhope^ that Picton came to
him shortly before Waterloo and said, ** My lord, I
must give up. I am grown so nervous that, when
there is service to be done, it works upon my mind,
so that it is impossible for me to sleep at nights.
I cannot possibly stand it, and I shall be forced to
retire." Poor fellow! he was killed a few days
afterwards.
He preserved his indomitable pluck to the last.
He said to his aide-de-camp, Tyler, at the end of
the hard fighting at Quatre Bras, ** I shall begin to
think that I cannot be killed after this." Yet at
that moment he was badly wounded. A musket-
ball had broken his ribs and produced other internal
injuries ; but he concealed his hurts, lest he should
be prevented from taking part in the great battle
' Stanhope says **in France." It must, of course, have been in Belgium.
334 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
that was imminent. He was killed in the second
phase of Waterloo,^ when Ney assailed the left
centre, and was met by Kempt's and Pack's bri-
gades of Picton's corps. Picton headed the charge
of the latter, and it advanced with such determi-
nation that it appalled the enemy. It was a most
critical moment ; the success gained was triumphant
in the end, but the price paid was heavy, for Picton
was killed.
The brave soldier, whom a rancorous spirit had
cruelly maligned in early life, was greatly honoured
lifter death. A splendid public funeral, a noble
monument, the sorrow of a nation, were the tributes
paid to his heroic services. His conduct in war
may be held up as an example to the coming
generations of British soldiers.
^ See ante, p. 197.
J
CHAPTER VII
CRA UFURD
Birth and early studies abroad — Serves in India — At Monte Video —
Brooding melancholy — The retreat on Corunna — "An iron man" —
The Light Division in the Peninsula — Splendid march to Talavera
— The Coa — Outpost duty — Busaco — Leave to England — Resumes
command— Fuentes d'Onoro — Ciudad Rodrigo — Meets death in the
breach.
CRAUFURD'S preparation for his profession
was more practical and thorough than was
at all customary in those days. He travelled
abroad at nineteen, soon after he had gained the
rank of captain, and studied the military art in
Germany, visited many battle-fields, and became
personally known to Frederick the Great. At the
same time he gained fluency in German, and his
knowledge of the language stood him in good stead
years afterwards, when the Hussars of the German
Legion were under his command in the Peninsula.
His elder brother, Charles Craufurd, also a dis-
tinguished officer, had been equerry to the Duke
of York, and commissioner to Austrian head-
quarters. This added to Robert's experience, for
335
336 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
the brothers were much together upon the Con-
tinent, and, later, Robert Craufurd was employed on
special missions with Austrian armies in the field.
Before this, however, he rose through the regi-
mental grades by no means rapidly, having regard
to his family interest ; for his brother Charles married
the widow of the Duke of Newcastle, and wielded
much political influence. Robert, although a captain
in the 75th at nineteen, waited three-and-twenty
years for the rank of colonel, and in the interval
served in India, where he took part in the early
wars against Tippoo Sahib. His real opportunity
came when he entered Parliament as M.P. for East
Retford, and established a close friendship with
Mr. Windham, then Secretary of State for Colonies
and War. Mr. Windham nominated him to the
command of a special expedition, a selection that
evoked loud murmurs, for Craufurd was of junior
rank, and the command that of a lieutenant-general.
Windham stood firm to his appointment ; but when
Craufurd's force was sent on without landing from
the Cape of Good Hope to South America, the
chief command was vested in the ill-fated and in-
competent General Whitelocke. Craufurd's part in
the disastrous affair of Monte Video was, however,
creditable to himself, and when his pusillanimous chief
surrendered, he offered to place himself at the head
BROODING SPIRIT 337
of the troops and cut his way through. ** But this
unfortunate affair," says his biographer, " embittered
his mind to the very end of his career, and much
increased his constitutional tendency to brooding."
Fits of deep depression often alternated with the
fiercest energy in Craufurd — the reaction so often
seen in men of his fiery nature. Again, the brilliant
audacity he often showed at the outposts was pro-
bably his protests against the vacillation and timid
counsels that had involved him in the disgrace of
Monte Video. It is certain that his contempt for
his wretched chief was unbounded, and some said
that he strove hard to have Whitelocke shot. The
feeling of indignation was universal ; even among
the rank and file it was the rule to give the toast,
when drinking, " Success to grey hairs, bad luck to
white locks!"
Robert Craufurd was the friend and comrade of
Sir John Moore, and under him he commanded the
Light Brigade in the retreat upon Corunna. He
was long in charge of the rear-guard, and conducted
it with conspicuous ability. At Orense his brigade
was united with that of Charles Alten, and sepa-
rating from Moore, took a different line of retreat
through the mountains upon Vigo, an independent
operation successfully accomplished by Craufurd
under adverse circumstances, that brought out his
338 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
indomitable character. "He was an iron man ;
nothing daunted him ; nothing turned him from his
purpose," It was his fixed resolve to bring off his
men in safety, and this he felt could only be effected
by an iron discipline, enforced with a severity that
was ruthless, cruel even, yet salutary, and indeed
indispensable. Nothing could have done it but
the firm hand of the commander, hard, heavy, and
unrelaxing, the magnetic control of his stern eye,
his unremitting vigilance, watching ever for the
slightest symptom of insubordination or faltering
weakness, his prompt unhesitating infliction of
punishment where he felt that an example must
be made. ** He would have no straggling, no
marauding ; no murmurs at the length of the way,
the difficulties, the almost intolerable hardships of
the retreat. Men quite barefoot, pallid, wayworn,
half-starved, reeling as though they were drunk, but
only from fatigue, drenched to the skin, in ragged
uniforms and shattered accoutrements ; yet still,"
says one of their number, ** still we held on reso-
lutely. Craufurd was not to be daunted by long
miles, fatigue, or foul weather. Many a man caught
courage from his stern eye and gallant bearing."
He was inexorable when an example must be
made. If men left the ranks, he would halt
the whole brigade, order a drumhead court-martial,
J
y
I '
MAJON-CENEHAL R
IRON DISCIPLINE 341
and flog the culprits on the spot, although the
French were close at his heels. In one case the
colonel of the regiment pleaded for three men
as good soldiers who had borne their part stoutly
in the fight. ** I order you, sir, to do your duty.
These men shall be punished." One man took his
flogging as he stood, there were no halberds ready,
and afterwards resumed his place in the ranks ; only
his devoted wife, who was in the retreat, carried the
knapsack that he could not strap upon his bleeding
back. When the punishment was ended, Craufurd
gave notice that he would repeat it whenever he
caught any man disobeying his orders. It may well
seem to modern ideas that this severity was carried
too far, but those whom he thus held together in that
harassing retreat admitted its necessity. Harris,
who was a private in the ranks of the 95th (now
the Rifle Brigade), bears witness that ** no man but
one formed of stuff like General Craufurd could
have saved the brigade from perishing altogether,
and if he flogged two he saved hundreds from death
by his management." It is said of this stern, in-
flexible leader, that although he was greatly disliked
by officers, he was never unpopular with his men.
He was always on the side of the latter, and never
was he seen more angered than when he caught an
officer being carried across a river pick-a-back upon
342 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
a soldier s shoulders. *' Put him down instantly,"
roared the general to the man ; and to the officer he
cried, **Go back, sir, and come through the water
like the others." His ascendency over the troops
was immense. If he (Craufurd) stopped his horse,
and halted to deliver one of his stern reprimands,
you would see half-a-dozen men, unshaven, shoeless,
and savage riflemen, standing for the moment lean-
ing upon their weapons, and scowling up in his face
as he scolded ; and when he dashed his spurs into
his reeking horse, they would place their rifles upon
their shoulders and hobble after him again. He
was sometimes to be seen in the front, then in the
rear, and then he would fall in with them again in
the midst, dismounted and marching on foot, that
the men might see he took an equal share in the
toils they were enduring.
Craufurd brought off" his brigade in safety, but
they landed in England a deplorably ragged and
squalid band. There the three regiments, the 43rd,
52nd, and 95th, were quickly re-formed, their ranks
re-filled, and they returned to Portugal under their
old commander, to form the nucleus of the gallant
Light Division. When Craufurd landed, Welling-
ton's army was committed to the campaign of
Talavera, and it was Craufurd's desire to join him
without delay. Then followed that famous march
MARCH OF THE LIGHT DIVISION 343
which IS still recorded as one of the most splendid
achievements of infantry. Craufurd was moving
steadily forward, his men suffering greatly from the
July sun ; heat apoplexy claimed its victims, and
two men of the 52 nd committed suicide to escape
the torments of the road. Then, on the 28th July,
having been already three weeks on the march,
Craufurd met news that the army had been engaged
and was in full retreat. Spanish fugitives were
already streaming .to the rear ; to reinforce the
front was all Craufurds care. The weakest, a
small handful of fifty, were weeded out of his
ranks, and he began his memorable march under
the strict regulations he had instituted, and which
became the standing orders of his division. No
man might fall out by the way without a pass from
his officer ; when he rejoined his company he was
paraded before the regimental surgeons, and if his
case was seen to be one of skulking, he was at once
tried by drumhead court-martial. "Thus frequently,
when almost dying with thirst,* we were obliged to
pass springs of the finest water by the • roadside
untasted. But all this apparent severity, as we
afterwards learnt, was considered as absolutely
essential to the great purpose General Craufurd
had in view— despatch." As the brigade advanced
* Costello, p. 31.
344 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
more and more runaways were encountered, spread-
ing the wildest rumours of disaster and defeat.
Craufurd's men "hastened rather than slackened
their impetuous pace, and leaving only seventeen
stragglers behind, in twenty-six hours crossed the
field of battle (Talavera) in a close and compact
body, having in that time crossed over sixty-two
English miles in the hottest season of the year, each
man carrying from fifty to sixty pounds weight
upon his shoulders."^
Craufurd s one independent action, that on the
Coa, has been much criticised, and it was con-
demned by Wellington, as has been said on a
previous page.^ He stayed too long beyond the
river, no doubt, but it was of advantage, although
so hazardous, and the whole of the antecedent
operations were of the most brilliant and daring
character. With one weak division — barely 2500
men, and 400 cavalry (the ist German Hussars) —
he held his ground to the last moment, although
opposed to two entire French army corps and
some 6000 cavalry. No finer commander of the
outposts has ever been known than Craufurd. He
made himself intimately acquainted with his ground
* Sir George Napier, who made the march, calls it fifty miles in twenty-
two hours.
* See ante, p. 132.
-n^
FINE MILITARY QUALITIES 345
directly he occupied, posted his men himself, and
was in close personal communication with the
piquet officers, even with single sentinels. He
was greatly aided by the full knowledge of outpost
work possessed both by the famous regiments
trained by Sir John Moore, and those excellent
troops the German Hussars, with whom Craufurd
could converse fluently in their own tongue. The
vigilance and alertness of Craufurd's men were
always remarkable.^ The people of the country
were also on our side, and kept him fully informed
of all movements, otherwise his position would
have been perilous and untenable.
** For three months Craufurd kept a weak divi-
sion within two hours' march of 60,000 men, . . .
but this did not satisfy his feverish thirst for distinc-
tion, and, forgetting his stay beyond the Coa was
a matter of sufferance and not of real strength, he
with headstrong ambition resolved, in defiance of
reason and the reiterated orders of his general, to
fight on the right bank/' Thus Napier the his-
torian ; his brother George says (and both were
present) that Craufurd let his vanity get the better
of his judgment, and delayed so long " that at last
' Their colonel met another English colonel and asked how he was.
''Tolerably well/' replied the latter, "considering that I am obliged to
sleep with one eye open/' **6y Gott," replied the German, "I never sleeps
at all."
346 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
the enemy made a sudden attack." Wellington
put it less strongly, and merely said that "unfor-
tunately Craufurd did not begin to retire till the
last moment." The result was that the whole force
was nearly lost, many valuable lives were sacrificed.
It was necessary to withdraw across the Coa by one
narrow bridge in the face of almost overwhelm-
ing numbers. Only the splendid courage of his
splendid division saved it from destruction ; officers
and men emulated each other in deeds of brilliant
self-sacrificing heroism.
At Busaco, Craufurd, "in a happy mood for
command, made masterly dispositions." He faced
Ney, and waited till the attack was fully developed,
and the enemy was within a very few yards of him, to
head a charge that hurled them back beaten, " driven
like sheep from the mountain side." Soon after this
he went on short leave to England, and missed the
minor operations in which the Light Division was
engaged. Wellington had some difficulty in saving
Craufurd from supersession, there were so many
generals senior to him ; but on his return, in
April 1811, Wellington wrote : "You will find your
division in its old quarters, and the sooner you can
come up to them the better." He rejoined them in
time to take part in the battle of Fuentes d'Onoro.
At Fuente Guinaldo, Craufurd was late in his
WELLINGTON AND CRAUFURD 347
march of concentration, and was sharply repri-
manded by Wellington, who, however, valued him
too highly to be long annoyed. ** He knew his
merits, and humoured him. It was surprising what
he bore from him at times " ^ — absence from an
inspection parade, neglect of orders or the substi-
tution of his own, and other headstrong acts, which
in any one else Wellington would have visited with
more than mere displeasure.
Craufurd's last appearance on the stirring scene
was now approaching, and he was to make his
exit in the most gallant fashion. He was mortally
wounded in the desperate assault of Ciudad Rod-
rigo. The 3rd and Light Divisions were charged
with the assault of the breaches, Craufurd*s men
having that known as ** the Lesser." He harangued
them before they started, reminding them that the
eyes of their country were upon them. " Be
steady ; be cool ; be firm in the assault. The
town must be yours to-night." Then, when the
signal rocket was fired, he cried, '* Now, lads, for
the breach!" and taking up a commanding posi-
tion, encouraged them by voice and gesture until
he was struck down. A musket-ball pierced his
lungs and entered his spine.
He died of his wounds, and was sincerely
^ Larpent, p. 85.
348 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
mourned by all who knew him. In his own
division his name was pronounced with "expres-
sions of the most profound reverence and poignant
sorrow." Every man turned out to attend his
funeral ; all the generals were present — Welling-
ton, Beresford, Castanos, and the rest ; all the staff.
Six veterans carried the coffin, not a dry eye among
them, and "the symptoms of grief were such as men
show when they lose parent or child." Wellington
wrote his requiem in a few choice words, express-
ing his sorrow and regret that his Majesty should
have been "deprived of the services, and I of the
assistance, of an officer of tried talents and expe-
rience, who was an ornament to his profession, and
was calculated to render the most important ser-
vices to the country."
i
CHAPTER VIII
HOPE, COLE, LEITH, PACK, ETC.
Sir John Hope : at the Adour — Cole : an obedient lieutenant : his
hospitality — Kempt : from Cox's to Governor- General — Leith — Pack
— Byng — Colville — Dickson — Gomm — De Lancey.
ANY good soldiers remain to be noticed a
little more in detail than in the opening of
this Part.
Hope.
The Hon. Sir John Hope, an elder officer,
did not join in the Peninsula until after Vittoria,
when the question of seniority was settled by
Wellington's advancement to the rank of field-
marshal. Hope had already seen service in Spain,
in the retreat to Corunna, where he succeeded to
the command on Moore's death. Previous to that
he had been actively engaged in the West Indies
and in Egypt ; he had gone to Hanover with
Cathcart, and to Sweden with Moore. At Wal-
cheren he commanded a division, but, like the rest,
gained no laurels, and in 1813 he took Graham's
349
350 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
place in command of an army corps, being then
next in seniority, but not second in command, to
Wellington.
Hope was heartily welcomed by his great chief,
who said afterwards that he thought him the ablest
man in the Peninsular army. Hope was of
soldierly mien and polished beauty, gifted with
strong common-sense, and having a high ideal of
duty. It was his fortune to exercise quasi-inde-
pendent command for a time, and his passage of
the Adour was a noble achievement ; only a great
general could have given practical effect to the
daring plans of his still greater chief. Wellington s
only anxiety was lest he might lose Hope. " Like
every one else, I have the highest opinion of him ; "
** every day convinces me of his worth,** but **we
shall lose him if he continues to expose himself
as he has done during the last three days." He
would never take shelter ; stood erect among the
sharp-shooters, and on one occasion his hat and
coat were both shot through, and he was wounded
in the leg.
Sir Thomas Hope eventually succeeded to the
family honours, and became fourth Lord Hope-
toun.
.■y„-j,'«.n,/u
I^(-
^
AN OBEDIENT LIEUTENANT 351
Cole.
The Hon. Lowry Cole was a son of the Earl
of Enniskillen, who made soldiering his profession,
and climbed the tree rapidly. He was a major
at twenty-one, having then six years service, and
a lieutenant - colonel the following year in the
Coldstream Guards. He served on the staff, he
sat in Parliament, and he seized every chance of
seeing active service. At Maida he was brigadier,
and second in command ; but he had differences
with Stuart, and left Sicily, to get soon afterwards
(1809) the command of the 4th Division in the
Peninsula. It was said of him that he had not
the same genius for war as Picton or Craufurd, but
that he was more obedient. Cole always claimed
to have himself commanded that decisive advance
of his division at Albuera which saved the day,
and which is commonly believed to have been an
inspiration of Hardinge's, then a young officer on
the staff. In the Peninsula, Cole was known for
his hospitality; he kept a liberal table, and gave
the best dinners. Wellington placed him first
among the campaigning Amphitryons. Cole was
at Waterloo, and did good service, but he obtained
no reward in rank, and was bitterly disappointed
that he was not made a peer or a baronet.
352 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
Kempt.
Sir James Kempt, who lived to a great age, and
filled the highest offices, was of small stature and
unassuming manners, popular with every one, and
a really clever man. He did not rise very rapidly,
and was handicapped by nine years' half-pay, during
which time he became a clerk at Cox & Green-
wood s, and personally known to the Duke of York.
When he had helped to raise the 1 1 3th, and became
a major, he went on the staff, and served as aide-
de-camp to both Sir Ralph Abercromby and Sir
David Dundas (of the "manoeuvres," and after-
wards adjutant - general). He was in Sicily, at
Maida ; in America, as assistant quartermaster-
general, till 181 1 ; and at last in Spain, with the
local rank of major-general, and the command of
a brigade under Picton. It fell to Kempt to replace
Picton at the storming of Badajoz, and after his
chiefs death at Waterloo. In later years, on the
express recommendation of the Duke of Welling-
ton, he was sent to Canada as Governor-General
and he was at one time Master- General of the
Ordnance, with a seat in the Cabinet.
LEITH AND PACK 353
Leith.
Leith was a Scotch general officer, who com-
manded a division throughout the Peninsula with
great skill and judgment. Having studied in the
military school at Lille, he served a good deal on the
stafif, as aide-de-camp to Boyd, Lieutenant-Gover-
nor of Gibraltar, to Generals O'Hara and David
Dundas ; he was in command of a brigade under
Moore, and afterwards was under Hill, with the
general charge of the division, so as to release Hill
for higher duties. Then he got the 5th Division
to himself, and led it at Badajoz and Salamanca,
where he was badly wounded. He returned from
England in time to command at the final assault
upon San Sebastian, and served through the rest
of the war. He missed Waterloo by being sent
to recover Barbadoes for Louis XVHL, and was
for some time Governor of the Leeward Islands.
Pack.
The record of Sir Denis Pack is one of un-
broken fighting from 1791 to 18 15. The son of
the Dean of Kilkenny, he became a cornet in
1 79 1, and a captain in the 5th Dragoon Guards in
1795. In those four years he served in Flanders,
354 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
at Quiberon, and in Ireland against the French
invasion under Humbert, whom he escorted as a
prisoner from the south to Dublin. He was colonel
of the 71st at the Cape of Good Hope, and
in Monte Video with Whitelocke ; he fought at
Vimiero and Corunna, went to Walcheren, and
at last settled down as a brigadier in the Portu-
guese army in 18 10, with which he was engaged
at Busaco, Almeida, Ciudad Rodrigo, Salamanca,
and the retreat from Burgos. During the opera-
tions in the Pyrenees at Sauroren, and afterwards
in the south of France, he commanded the 6th
Division of Wellington's army. At Waterloo he
had the second brigade under Picton.
Byng.
The Hon. Sir John Byng, another fighting briga-
dier, who when under forty was a major-general,
and being strongly recommended to Wellington by
the Duke of York, was given a command under
Hill. Byng was hotly engaged at Vittoria, and in
the fighting in the Pyrenees showed a very firm
front at Roncesvalles, and afterwards at Sauroren.
He commanded the second brigade of Guards at
Waterloo.
COLVILLE AND DICKSON 355
COLVILLE.
The Hon. Sir Charles Colville was an ensign
at eleven, and joined as a lieutenant at sixteen.
At twenty he was a captain in the 13th Foot,
and served with it for nineteen years in the West
Indies, Bermuda, Egypt, and was a brigadier at
the capture of Martinique. He was major-general
commanding one of Picton's brigades from 18 10,
and was greatly trusted by that enterprising leader.
At the storming of Badajoz he commanded the
4th Division ; while, finally, at Waterloo he was
condemned to inaction on the far right flank, as
we have seen.
Dickson.
Sir Alexander Dickson, who became Welling-
tons right hand as commander of the artillery,
left Woolwich in 1 793, at twenty-one, and served at
the capture of Minorca, and at Buenos Ayres. He
was brigade major of artillery at the passage of the
Douro, after which he joined Beresford, and com-
manded the newly organised Portuguese artillery.
His sterling qualities were soon exhibited in this
post, and recognised by Wellington, who gradu-
ally advanced him to more and more responsible
356 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
functions. He was a master of details, even the
most minute and trifling, most methodical and pains-
taking, with great powers of work, and rendered
excellent service at the great sieges in Spain. In
due course he rose to the command of Wellington's
artillery, although a comparatively junior officer.
He was chief at Vittoria, and in all the great
battles in the Pyrenees, the passage of the Bidas-
soa, the Nive, Nivelle, Orthez, and Toulouse. At
Waterloo he reverted to the command of a battery
of horse artillery, but during the battle and at
Quatre Bras he was in personal attendance on Sir
George Wood, who led the whole artillery.
GOMM.
Sir William Gomm, who lived to be commander-
in-chief in India and a field-marshal, was an ensig^n
at ten years of age, having been given the com-
mission in reward for his father s services, who was
killed at the storming of Guadaloupe. He was not
a little helped by an aunt, who brought him up, and
who was governess in the royal family. Gomm
at fifteen made the campaign of Flanders, but after
that he spent three years at the military school
recently established at High Wycombe, where he
studied staff" duties under Colonel Howard Douglas.
A TYPICAL STAFF-OFFICER 357
Gomm first and last was a staff-officer, and a culti-
vated one, holding many appointments, always in
the quartermaster -general's department: assistant
quartermaster - general in Copenhagen, again in
Portugal, and with Moore at Corunna; assistant
quartermaster-general at Walcheren, and then again
in the Peninsula, where he was employed to the
end of the war. He was in most of the fighting :
at Fuentes d'Onoro, Ciudad Rodrigo, Salamanca,
Burgos, in the retreat from which he led Leith's
division ; again, he led the advance of Graham's
corps in 1813 through the wild mountain tracks of
the Tras os Montes, most of which he had pre-
viously reconnoitred and surveyed. At Quatre
Bras and Waterloo he was on the staff of Picton's
division. Gomm, who was made a K.C.B. and
transferred from the 9th Regiment to the Cold-
stream Guards, was a typical staff-officer of the
class that worked ^ — quiet, industrious, and of high
usefulness, as Wellington was fully aware.
De Lancey.
The career of Sir William De Lancey was cut
short by his death at Waterloo, but he was of the
same type as Gomm, and would no doubt have
^ See ante, p. 1 14.
358 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
risen to the highest honours if he had been spared.
He came of a loyal New York family of Huguenot
descent, and his family having left the States, he
became a cornet in 1792, served in India and the
West Indies, first in cavalry and then in infantry,
till 1 802, when he joined the quartermaster-general's
department, and remained on the staff till his death.
He was repeatedly mentioned in despatches for his
gallantry and good service, at the Douro, Ciudad
Rodrigo, Vittoria (where he was deputy quarter-
master-general to Sir Thomas Graham). He filled
the same post with marked usefulness in the
Waterloo campaign, and was greatly esteemed by
the Duke. He was at Wellington's side when
struck in the back by a ricochet shot, and was
thought to be killed. Next day the Duke saw him
still alive, and cheerily told him he would be like
the man in '* Castle Rackrent " who heard what his
friends said of him after he was dead. Wellington
told this to Rogers, adding, " Poor fellow ! we knew
each other ever since we were boys. But I had
no time to be sorry. I went on with the army,
and never saw him again."
Lady De Lancey, a sister of Captain Basil Hall,
R.N., and a bride of just three riionths' standing,
accompanied her husband to Belgium, but was sent
back to Antwerp during the fighting. She rejoined
n: H. tVaril it (p.
SIR WM. HOWE DE LANCEY.
A TOUCHING TRIBUTE 359
her poor husband, however, and nursed him tenderly
till his death. I have been privileged to read a
manuscript journal of Lady De Lancey's kept dur-
ing this terrible time, and remember it as the most
beautiful and touching, yet unconscious, tribute to
her own fine nature and true womanhood that has
ever been penned.
CHAPTER IX
MOORE
Parentage — E^irly studies— Service in America t in Corsica — Con-
flict with Sir Gilbert Elliot — Promoted brigadier -general — West
Indies — Ireland — Egypt — The nucleus of the Light Division at
Shomcliffe Camp — Sicily — Sweden — Portugal ; and advance into
Spain — Retreat on Corunna ; and death — General estimate of that
campaign.
ONE distinguished soldier must not be
omitted from the list of Wellington s con-
temporaries, a general whom Wellington
was willing to serve under, who under a happier
fate might have achieved the same renown — a
man of the highest talents, fearless, honourable, a
chivalrous soldier sans peur et sans reproche.
John Moore was the second son of Dr. Moore
of Glasgow, the author of "Zeluco," and was
given a commission in the 51st Regiment at the
age of sixteen. He was then, according to his
proud father, "a pretty youth ; his face is of a manly
beauty, his person is strong, and his figure elegant.
He dances, fences, and rides with uncommon
address. His mind begins to expand, and he
360
AMERICA AND CORSICA 361
shows a great deal of vivacity, tempered with good
sense and benevolence. He is of a daring and
intrepid temper, and of an obliging disposition . . .
everybody is fond of him." He was at this time
making the grand tour with his father and the
young Duke of Hamilton, and chiefly interested
in things military — finding weak spots in foreign
fortifications, attending reviews under Frederick
the Great, and being drilled in spare moments by
a Prussian sergeant.
He learnt his work really at Port Mahon in
Minorca, and then served under Clinton in the
American war, distinguishing himself greatly in
an attack up the river Penobscot. At the peace
(1783) Moore was placed on half-pay, but devoted
himself to the study of his profession, and entered
Parliament through the influence of his friend the
Duke of Hamilton, being about three-and-twenty.
At last, in 1787, he returned to the active list, and
became major, then lieutenant-colonel of his old
regiment the 51st, which he brought into high
order. He now first showed that faculty of in-
teresting his officers in their work, and he checked
the excessive indulgence in wine which was the
great blot on every regimental mess of those days.
The regiment was soon actively employed under
Moore ; he was just too late for Toulon, but formed
362 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
part of the descent on Corsica to reinstate Paoli.
In these operations, during which Corsica was won
and lost again, Moore became adjutant-general to
the military leader, Sir Charles Stuart. When
that general resigned his command sooner than
support the overbearing conduct of Sir Gilbert
Elliot, who had been appointed Viceroy of Corsica,
Moore remained, but was soon at cross purposes
with Elliot. Moore was popular in Corsica, the
Viceroy very much the reverse ; the latter insisted
that the former should break off all relations with
the people, or expect to be sent home, as he was,
presently, in the most peremptory way. He went
to England, as it seemed, in disgrace, but it was
admitted, even by Sir Gilbert Elliot s friends, that
Moore had been harshly treated, and he was given
the rank of brigadier-general, with a command in
the West Indies under Sir Ralph Abercromby.
He was in all the sharp fighting that ended in
the capture of St. Lucia, and was then appointed
governor of that island.
Moore was soon busy in the work of restoring
tranquillity, but he was much hampered by "the
shameful ignorance and want of zeal in the principal
officers under my command," and his great aim was
to carry them with him and improve them. He
wanted ** proper officers," and **such, I am sure," he
WEST INDIES 363
writes Abercromby, ** still exist in the British army,
though they are not to be found among those who
have most money or most political interest." ** In
order to inspire some activity and zeal, it was
necessary to show a great deal." At that time he
wrote his father : *' I rise at daylight, go to bed at
nine, and am during the day in eternal action. I
have not time to be ill." He felt confident that
the troops might be kept healthy if more atten-
tion was paid to them ; the greatest cleanliness
enforced, regular diet, " an addition to the eating
part of the rations instead of rum ; sea or river
bathing, constant activity and movement." The
mere parade of a regiment twice a day pleased the
officers, but '* leaves the soldier to lounge the whole
day in a barrack, which cannot be good, and where
from indolence his body becomes enervated and
liable to disorder."
Moore did not escape the fatal scourge of the
locality, and would have died of yellow fever but
for his constitution and the reserve power stored
in him by a wise way of living. After this he
was invalided home, to serve soon in the south of
Ireland when the French invasion was expected,
and to be actively employed against the Irish
insurgents in 1798. He saved Wexford from the
most horrid outrages, and ** entered it so opportunely
364 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
as to prevent it from being laid in ashes " * and its
inhabitants massacred. When Abercromby was
sent to Holland in 1799, Lord Cornwallis spared
Moore, who had been constantly at his side in
Dublin, writing: **You shall have all the troops
you ask and General Moore, who is a greater loss
to me than the troops. But he will be of infinite
service to Abercromby; and I likewise think it
an object to the State that an officer of his talents
and character should have every opportunity of
acquiring knowledge and experience in his pro-
fession." Abercromby was superseded by the
Duke of York, with the deplorable results well
known to history. Moore was wounded in the
campaign.
His next serious service was in Egypt with
Abercromby in 1 800-1, whose right hand he was,
and of whom he spoke as follows : " Sir Ralph was
a truly upright, honourable, and judicious man ; his
great sagacity, which had been pointed all his life
to military matters, made him an excellent officer.
The disadvantage he laboured under was being ex-
tremely short-sighted. He therefore stood in need
of good executive generals under him." Moore
was one of the best, and was peculiarly useful in
' London Gautte^ June 26, 1798.
SHORNCLIFFE CAMP 365
reconnaissance. Hutchinson and Craddock were
both senior to Moore, and he had no very leading
part in the rest of the operations. Shortly afterwards
he returned to England on the death of his father,
and was appointed to that command at Shorncliffe
which was the cradle of Craufurd s Light Divi-
sion. The time was approaching when Napoleon
in the camp at Boulogne threatened invasion, and
people were playing at soldiers everywhere, espe-
cially on our southern coasts. The Prince Regent
commanded his regiment (the loth Hussars) at
Brighton. Mr. Pitt, as warden of the Cinque Ports,
commanded their militia, and was directly under
Moore's orders.^
Sir William Napier, speaking of those Shorn-
cliffe days, says : ** To awaken the faculties of those
under him was one of Sir John Moore's quali-
fications for command. At Shorncliffe camp he
devised such improvements in drill, discipline,
dress, arms, formations, and movements as would
have placed him for military reforms beside the
Athenian Iphicrates. ... His materials were the
43rd, 52nd, and Rifle regiments, and he so fashioned
^ Mr. Pitt, who constantly rode over from Walmer to Shomclifle to
confer with Moore, asked once what post would be assigned to him and his
regiment in case of invasion. " I shall put you on that hill in the rear, where
you will make a most formidable show, while I with the soldiers are fighting
on the beach."
366 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
them that afterwards, as the Light Division under
Wellington, they were found to be soldiers unsur-
passable, perhaps never equalled. The separate
successful careers of the officers strikingly attest
the merits of the school ; so long a list of notable
men could not be presented by three regiments
of any service in the world. In it will be found
above ninety who attained the grade of field-
officer or higher grades, and amongst them four
who commanded armies (three being celebrated
as conquerors), two adjutants-general of the British
army, three military secretaries, sixteen governors
of colonies, and two organisers of the Metropolitan
and Irish constabularies. Many generals who have
commanded districts, one who commanded a foreign
army, several persons noted in science and litera-
ture or by peculiar missions and organisations, also
belong to the roll ; and nearly all were of some
fame in battle, although unequal in merit and repu-
tation."
After Trafalgar, when Napoleon broke up his
camp at Boulogne to win Austerlitz, Moore went as
second in command to General Fox, who was to
have superseded Stuart in command of the expedi-
tion to Sicily ; but he was not present at the battle
of Maida. Next he went on that extraordinary
mission to Sweden, in aid of its king, Gustavus,
PORTUGAL 367
who would not suffer the British troops to land
unless they were placed under his own command.
After a series of the most exasperating yet petty
disputes, the mad king of Sweden suddenly made
Moore a prisoner, and declared that the British
general should not leave Stockholm without his
permission. Moore, however, by a stratagem,
escaped to Gothenburg, where he found the fleet
and the transports, and the wind being favourable,
he sailed at once for England, where he was but
coldly received by the Government. He indig-
nantly protested to Lord Castlereagh, *' Had I been
an ensign I could hardly have been treated with
less ceremony." He was to go to Portugal, but
in a subordinate command, yet he only knew it by
inference. He had a right to be treated with more
consideration, although he never questioned the
right of Ministers to employ whom they pleased.
** Had they on this occasion given the command
to the youngest general in the army, I should
neither have felt nor expressed that the least injury
had been done to me."
His soreness was natural, but it did not pre-
vent him .from yielding honest admiration for Sir
Arthur Wellesley, nor from urging that **the suc-
cessful young general should continue what he
had begun so well." After Vimiero he told Sir
368 THE WELLINGTON MEMORIAL
Hew Dalrymple : ** I waive all pretensions as
senior, for I consider this as his (Wellesley's)
expedition. He ought to have the command of
whatever is detached. For my part, I wish I
could withdraw altogether ; but I shall aid as
far as I can for the good of the service without
interfering with Sir Arthur, and take any part
that is allotted to me." Wellesley heartily re-
ciprocated, as we have seen,^ and most hand-
somely offered, when recalled to England, to
make Moore's peace with the Ministers. Wellesley
always acknowledged Moore's fitness for supreme
command, which now indeed, after the Convention
of Cintra, fell upon him by express orders from
England. He was told that Baird had Ifeft England
with a reinforcement of 10,000, that he was to com-
bine with them, and advancing into Spain, to aid
the Spaniards as circumstances might suggest.
What followed cannot be told more clearly, or
in finer words, than it has been by Napier : —
•'It is well known how the truly great and ill-
used Moore was sent into the heart of Spain by
incapable Ministers, to find, not armies, nor enthu-
siasm, nor energetic government, nor military aid,
all of which he had been promised ; but, in their
stead, the greatest military genius of the world
* See ante, p. 39.
CORUNNA 369
(Napoleon) before him, with troops so numerpus
that their cavalry alone doubled his whole force.
It is known also with what a mastery of war he
extricated himself from that raging storm ; with
what firmness he conducted his retreat ; and how,
turning at Corunna, he ended his glorious life amid
the fires of victory."
It is not enough with, us to deserve success ;
Moore failed to command it, although he actually
brought off his army all but intact. His military
reputation suffered. British public opinion visited
upon him the faults of the Government, which had
ordered the advance into Spain, and was really
responsible for the retreat. There were many
carping critics in his army, too, who ignorantly
condemned his conduct, unable to appreciate his
difficulties or realise the risks he ran. These
would have had him stand at bay at some point
like Astorga, still far from the sea, and try con-
clusions with his pursuers to escape the sufferings
still in store. The advantages victory offered were
of course immense, but unless decisive it would
not end the pursuit ; anything less, indeed, meant
annihilation or surrender. Napoleon himself de-
clared that Moore chose the wiser part ; for at
Astorga the great captain was within striking
distance, and had not yet turned his command
2 A