Woodrow Wilson And The Progressive Era 1910-1917

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WOODROW WILSON

and the Progressive Era

The
New American Nation Series

EDITED BY

HENRY STEELE GOMMAGER

AND

RICHARD B. MORRIS

WOODROW
WILSON

AND THE
PROGRESSIVE ERA

191 O * 1917

BY ARTHUR S. LINK

ILLUSTRATED

NKW Y O H K
HARP K R & B R T II K US PUBLISH K R S

WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

Copyright, 1954, by Harper & Brothers
Printed in the United States of America

All rights in this book are reserved.
No part of the book may be vsed or reproduced
in any manner whatsoever without written per-
mission except in the case of brief quotations
embodied in critical articles and ieineivs. I^or
information addjess Harper & Brothers,
49 East 33?d Street, New York, 16, N. Y.

M

Library of Ctrngrt-tx cnlulo" ctnd riumhrr: ;1,V

For My Mother and Father

Contents

EDITORS' INTRODUCTION xi

PREFACE xv

1. THE NEW NATIONALISM VERSUS THE NEW FREEDOM i

2. THE NEW FREEDOM 25

3. THE NEW FREEDOM AND THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT,

54

4. MISSIONARY DIPLOMACY 81

5. MEXICO: INTERFERENCE AND DEFEAT, 1913-17 107

6. AMERICAN NEUTRALITY, 1914-15 145

7. THE PREPAREDNESS CONTROVERSY, 1914-16 174

8. DEVIOUS DIPLOMACY, 1915-16 197

9. PROGRESSIVISM AND PEACE: THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 223
io. FROM PEACE WITHOUT VICTORY TO WAR 252

ESSAY ON SOURCES 283

INDEX 315

vii

Illustrations and

These photographs, grouped in a separate section,
will be found following page 140

1. WOODROW WILSON

2. WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT

3. THEODORE ROOSEVELT

4. GlFFORD PlNClIOT

5. SENATOR JONATHAN P. DOLLIVER

6. SENATOR WILLIAM E. BORAH

7. Wilson Being Inaugurated by Chief Justice Edward D. While,

March 4, 1913.

8. Wilson and His Cabinet, 1913

9. Lours D. BRANDEIS

10. OSCAR W. UNDER WOOD

11. CHAMP CLARK

12. CARTER GLASS

13. WILLIAM J. BRYAN

14. ROBERT LANSING

15. EDWARD M. HOUSE

16. FRANCISCO VILLA

1 7. VlCTORlANO HUERTA

18. GKNKRAL VENUSTIANO CARRANZA with His Stuff

19. BRIGADIER GKNKRAL JOHN J. PRKSIUNO

20. "Horse Marines'* in Vera Grass

21. Pershintf and UK; Staff of the Punitive Expedition

ix

X ILLUSTRATIONS AND MAPS

22. SIR EDWARD GREY, British Foreign Secretary

23. THEOBALD VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG, Imperial German Chan-

cellor

24. The Great Preparedness Parade, May 13, 1916

25. CHARLES EVANS HUGHES in 1916

26. GOVERNOR HIRAM JOHNSON

27. Wilson on Campaign Tour, 1916

28. Wilson Reads His War Message to Congress, April 2, 1917

MAPS

The United States and the Caribbean, 1913-1917 95

The United States and Mexico, 1913-1916 no

The Submarine Enters Modern War 258

Editors' Introduction

A HALF century ago the House of Harper launched the American
Nation scries under the editorship of the distinguished historian,,
Albert Bushnell Hart. There had been earlier co-operative works of this
kind Justin Winsor's Narrative and Critical History of America comes
to mind but none on the scale of the American Nation series, none as
comprehensive, none as effectively designed for scholar and layman.
The principle behind the original American Nation series,, which is
now out of print, was simple enough: that the history of America was
too large and complex for any one scholar to master and present, and
that its adequate presentation must be, therefore, of necessity, a co-
operative enterprise.

The American Nation series, ultimately completed in twenty-seven
volumes, established itself at once as an authoritative synthesis of the
historical scholarship of that day. Affectionately known to two genera-
tions of American students and scholars, it exercised a pervasive in-
fluence on the study and teaching of American history. Some volumes^
by virtue of scholarly originality, philosophical insight, or literary
charm, quickly became classics; others pioneered along now paths of
historical discovery, stimulated new investigations, inspired new points
of view.

It is no criticism of the American Nation series to observe that it
represented the scholarship and the point of view of the turn of the
century rather than of the mid-twentieth century. The discovery and
exploitation of new and rich mines of source rnatermL thr deepening
and broadening of historical investigations, the importunate advance of

xi

Xii INTRODUCTION

new points of view, all these have operated to make most of the volumes
of the older series inadequate to the needs of our generation. It is for
this reason that the House of Harper is once again launching a compre-
hensive co-operative survey of the history of the area now known as the
United States from the days of discovery to the mid-twentieth century.
It is hoped that this new series will perform for our generation the
service that the original American Nation scries performed for two
earlier generations.

When, back in the days of Jackson, George Bancroft inaugurated his
massive History of the United States, he could look forward with some
confidence to mastering the events and the problems ho planned to
describe and explain. Yet even in his own lifetime, and before he; had
completed his Author's Last Revision, readers found his range of
interest too narrow, his interpretation too partisan, his philosophi'/intf
too simple, for the illumination of the past. Already before the turn of
the century the age of specialization had set in, and with it th frag-
mentation of the past, chronologically and topically. In recent years, us
we have come to see not only how complex are the threads that make
up the tapestry of the past, but how dependent each is on the others
in making a recognizable pattern, there has developed a determined
effort to overcome the evils of excessive specialization and fragmenta-
tion. Our own generation has not only broadened the scope of imtoty
to embrace such interests as science, technology, public administra-
tion, religion, economics, and similar subjects, but has developed
a new inter-disciplinary approach to the problems of historical inter-
pretation and presentation. The time has now come for A judicious
appraisal of the findings of the new history, a cautious application of
the new techniques of investigation and presentation, and a large-scale
effort to achieve a synthesis of the new findings with the traditional
facts, and to present the whole in attractive literary form.

To this task the New American Nation Series h dedicated* Each
volume is part of a carefully planned whole, and co-ordinated with
other volumes in the series; at the same time each volume i denigned
to be complete in itself. Some overlapping is doubtless inevitable!, but
it has seemed to the editors that overlapping is lest regrettable than
omissions, and from time to time the same series of evuntu and iht
same actors will be seen from different points of view. While for the
xnost part the series follows a chronological organization, separata

INTRODUCTION Xlll

volumes or groups of volumes will be devoted to cultural history,
constitutional history, and foreign affairs.

It is in many ways appropriate that this first volume to appear in
the new series should address itself to a period which was in part the
subject of the final volume of the original American Nation series:
Frederick Austin Ogg's National Progress, igoy-igi?. The difference
in scope and even in title suggests something of the change in perspec-
tive and in approach that the new scries reflects. Professor Link de-
votes half again as much space to roughly half the period of years
covered by Professor Ogg's book, and he is by no means as confident as
was his predecessor that these years spell progress. An immense body of
new evidence, and perhaps a more critical attitude toward that evi-
dence, has enabled Professor Link to tell a more complete and better
balanced story than it was possible to tell a generation ago. Into this
volume Professor Link has distilled the results of years of research in
the career of Woodrow Wilson and the prodigious events which make
that career so significant. Based upon an impressive body of docu-
mentation, this volume considers the dilemma which confronted pro-
gressives in the first Wilson administration, and appraises the President's
plans and achievements on both the domestic and the international
scene. Professor Link's volume will be preceded in the scries by a study
of Rooscveltian progressivism and the challenge which it evoked, and
followed by a volume on the First World War and the collapse of Wil~
sonian idealism and internationalism in the twenties, while other
volumes will tell the story of cultural and constitutional developments
during these crucial years when the United States was emerging into
world power,

HENRY STBELE GQMMAGER
RICHARD BRANDON MORRIS

Preface

rTlHIS book represents an attempt to comprehend and re-create
JL the political and diplomatic history of the United States from
the beginning of the disruption of the Republican party in 1910 to the
entrance of the United States into the First World War in 1917.
Every scholar thinks the period he is studying is the most important
interval in history, and I perhaps have an exaggerated notion of the
significance of the events I relate. Even so, none can doubt that these
were momentous and terrible years, not only for the American people,
but for all mankind. In this country the great progressive movement
found its first culmination in the formation of the Progressive party,
the election of Woodrow Wilson to the presidency, and, above all, the
enactment by Congress from 1913 to 1917 of a comprehensive reform
program. How this came about and how progressives found an answer
to the great dilemma that had divided their ranks and confounded
some of their leaders this constitutes my first theme. At the same
time Europeans attempted to solve the dilemmas created by rival im-
perialisms and nationalisms by appealing to the God of battles. How
the American people and government were eventually drawn into the
vortex of this awful struggle is my second theme.

In this volume I have attempted to synthesize the results of five
years of research that I made for the next three volumes of my biog-
raphy of Woodrow Wilson, which will cover Wilson's first administra-
tion. The present book is, therefore, in the nature of an outline of my
larger, more detailed, and more copiously documented study. As this
volume is based almost exclusively upon research in the sources, I have

xv

XVI PREFACE

included secondary works in my footnotes only when I was specifically
indebted to them. The literature on this period, none the less, is already
varied and rewarding; and in the bibliographical essay I have tried to
present and describe it in a way that will prove useful to students and
scholars.

It is now my pleasant duty to acknowledge my deep obligation to
the institutions whose financial assistance made it possible for me to do
the research for this volume. The Princeton University Research Com-
mittee extended several grants during the period 19-16-49, From 19f>0
to 1951 the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation, the Col-
lege of Liberal Arts of Northwestern University, and the Northwestern
University Research Committee all co-operated to enable me to leave
Evanston for fifteen months of sustained research. I can never fully
express my gratitude to Mr. Henry Allen Moe of the Guggenheim
Foundation, to Dean Simeon E. Leland of the College of Liberal Arts,
and to Professor Gray C. Boycc, chairman of my Department, for their
indispensable help and encouragement.

In writing this book, moreover, I have leaned so heavily upon the
counsel of my friends that I like to think it is a eo-operntive undertak-
ing. From the beginning of my research Professor Kdxvard Mend Rarta
of the Institute for Advanced Study has sustained my determination.
Moreover, he read the manuscript and made many sun4*'stion$, I am
indebted to the editors of this series, Professors Henry Strele (!omm:i*,;t % r
and Richard B, Morris, for their help and Kmarrstiom. Every jtatjjr* of
this book bears testimony to their contribution. Pwfmsor Morris also
assumed the onerous tasks of cutting my overly copious footnotes and
seeing the manuscript through the last stages before publication. My
colleagues, Professors Richard W. Leopold and Ray A. Hillim*tr*n,
both read the manuscript and saved me from many errors, as did
Professor Charles Seymour* President Emeritus of Yah? University,
Professor George E, Mowry of th University of California* LOH
Angeles, Professor Edward li Buchrig of Indian* University, anrl Mr.
John W. Davidson of the Manuscript* Division, Library of
In addition, my former colteagms and now ht*ad of thft
Atnerican Division of the Library of Gongix***, Dr. Howard K, Claw,
read Chapters 4 and 5 with cart* and discrimination. He he!j>e<l we
find my way through the mase of Mexican polities and revolution*.

I gratefully acknowledge the pcnniftuon granted by the Yitle Uni-
^, f ^A MV nh<*rl<m Suvmour to use Quotations from the

PREFACE

diary and letters of Edward M. House and Frank L. Polk; by Mr.
Allen W. Dulles to use quotations from the diary and letters of Robert
Lansing and by the Yale University Library and Professor Sherman
Kent to use quotations from the papers of William Kent.

I must also thank Mr. Konrad G. Mueller, formerly of Harvard
University, for his help in translating German documents and news-
papers; three of my graduate students at North western, Messrs. Edward
Lurie, David W. Hirst, and Gerald N. Grob for their assistance in
checking proof, footnotes, and bibliography; as well as Dr, Marion
McKenna of Hunter College and Mr. Cass Canfield and Mrs. Beulah
W. Hagen of Harper & Brothers for their aid in preparing the manu-
script for publication.

Finally, to my wife, Margaret Douglas Link, I owe a debt I can
never describe or repay. She has not only inspired my work at every
stage but has also been my best collaborator.

A, S. L.

Evanston, Illinois
February 2

WOODROW WILSON

and the Progressive Era

1910-1917

CHAPTER 1

The New Nationalism
Versus the New Freedom

THE ELECTION of 1912 marked the culmination of more than
twenty years of popular revolt against a state of affairs that seemed
to guarantee perpetual political and economic control to the privileged
few in city, state, and nation. The uprising that came so spectacularly
to a head in the first years of the twentieth century the progressive
movement was the natural consummation of historical processes long
in the making.

To begin with, the philosophy of laissez-faire individualism, upon
which the exploitative and competitive system depended for ideological
justification, had suffered steady erosion! by the writings of neodem-
ocrats like Henry George, Lester F. Ward, and Henry Demarest Lloyd.
By 1900 the ideal of an individualistic society had given way, at least in
the minds of many intellectuals and political leaders, to the concept of
a, society organized for collective action in the public interest. More-
over, under the spur of economic adversity of the eighties and nineties,
a large segment of the farmers had abandoned their traditional indi-
vidualism and had organized politically to implement a comprehensive
program for the control of the railroads, the large corporations, and
the money supply. Finally, jfthere were numerous evidences during
these years that the old impulse to doing good, which had been the
wellspring of American humanitariamsm, was not entirely dead. This
spirit manifested itself in an organized way mainly in the cities in
efforts to make the churches more responsive to social and economic

2 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

needs, in campaigns to clean up the slums and protect the weak and
helpless, and in spasmodic drives to wrest control of city governments
from grafters often allied with vested economic interests.

Thus the progressive movement of the first part of the twentieth
century was an outgrowth and a fulfillment, rather than a beginning.
All during the years from 1900 to 1917 the reform crusade was in mo-
tion on various levels and was moving in different directions. But there
was some unity and a general chronological development in it. The
first reform wave came in the cities, with a great drive to overturn the
politicians allied with corporations, railroads, and utilities. Consider-
able success in this endeavor led next to campaigns to capture the state
governments, as the city crusaders invariably found that the city ma-
chines were either adjuncts of or else the main cogs in the state ma-
chines.

Inevitably, the reform^joapulse also affected the two great national
parties and their leaders/By 1908 William Jennings Bryan of Nebraska
and his progressive followers again dominated the Democratic party.
The Democrats, however, were still a minority and were so badly rent
by internal dissensions that they offered little immediate hope of ef-
fective leadership for the liberal element of the countryXMuch more
important a development before 1912 was the steady infiltration of
progressive ideas among the Republican leadership and rank and file,
especially in the Middle West. The leader of that party from 1901 to
1909, Theodore Roosevelt, never managed and rarely attempted to
dislodge the remarkable combination of conservatives who dominated
it and determined its policies. Even so, Roosevelt held office during a
time of transition, and there is no doubt that the service he rendered
the reform movement was substantial He was a shrewd opportunist
with an eye on the main political chance, it 5s true, and the sum of his
legislative accomplishments was* small. Yet his constant sermonising
about the malpractices of big business and high finance, and his
successful and important struggle for the conservation of natural re-
sources, stirred millions of citizens into a high state of righteous indig-
nation, In brief, his chief contribution to the reform cause was the
publicity he gave to it. 1

Roosevelt, therefore, appreciated the meaning and significance of
the progressive movement and dealt carefully with the rising RepubH-

1 As George E. Mowry hat pointed out in Theodore Roouvelt and th* Pro-
Movement (Madiion, Wit,, 194$), pp.

THE NEW NATIONALISM VERSUS THE NEW FREEDOM 3

can insurgents. The fact that he succeeded in keeping them in good
humor while he worked closely with the Old Guard in Congress is
testimony to his superb astuteness. His one great mistake, and it was
an error of personal judgment, was in choosing William Howard Taft
to succeed him^If Roosevelt had selected Charles Evans Hughes, the
brilliant, crusading, and independent Governor of New York, the
future history of the United States might have been considerably dif-
ferent.

But it was Taft whom Roosevelt put into the White House in 1909;
and for all his superficial joviality and apparent progressivism, his in-
telligence and integrity, Taft was ill equipped to play the role the polit-
ical exigencies demanded. The job ahead would have taxed the
resources of a Roosevelt, but Taft possessed neither Roosevelt's astute-
ness nor his energy. In order to prevent the disruption of the Republi-
can party, Taft had to facilitate the shift in party control from the Old
Guard to the insurgents. Instead of boldly doing this, he vacillated at
first, finally aligned himself with the reactionaries, and so completely
alienated the progressives that a rupture was inevitable.

A few examples will suffice to illustrate Taft's bungling leadership
and to set the stage for the opening event in the election of 1912, the
Democratic landslide in the Congressional and gubernatorial elections
of November, 1910.

When, at the beginning of the Taft administration in 1909, the in-
surgents in the House of Representatives maneuvered to unhorse the
reactionary Speaker, Joseph G. Cannon, Taft was forced to choose be-
tween the rival factions. He supported Cannon, and the insurgents
came out of the fight wondering how deep the President's progressivism
went. Soon afterward occurred the revolt of the insurgent Republicans
in the Senate against the Aldrich amendments to the Payne tariff bill,
which the House had just adopted. Taft at first encouraged, then de-
sertod the insurgents, and made one move after another that quickened
their disaffection. First he made a thirteen-thousand-mile speaking tour
of the Middle West in September, 1909, which, instead of assuaging
the insurgent temper, further inflamed it* Then during the following
autumn and winter he supported his Secretary of the Interior, Richard
A. Ballinger, in a long and bitter controversy with Gifford Pinchot and
other conservationists, Ballmger was officially exonerated by the Re-
publican majority of a Congressional committee; but in the eyes of

4 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

the country he stood convicted as a foe of conservation, and Taft was
discredited. 2

Finally 3 in the spring of 1910 the President took the last step in his
devolution from progressivism to conservatism. He joined the Old

Herbert Johnaon in tho I*hUmh<lphiu tfnrth American

The tariff iwuu: Taft pleads with Aldrich> who wjoins: "Aw, hang
the consumer!* 3 T. R?$ big stick gathers cobwebs.

Guard in a well-planned and generously financed campaign to root in-
surgency out of the party, by defeating progressive Republicans for

id* t pp 7$-87. Alpheut T. Mason, Bureaucracy Cnmet$ Itstlf (Prince-
ton, 194} ), b a definitive atudy of th Ballinger afT&ir. For a drfn <*f Taft
and Ballingcr sec Henry F. Pringle, The Life and Tim** of William Ifaward
Taft (2 vols., New York, 1939),

THE NEW NATIONALISM VERSUS THE NEW FREEDOM 5

renomination in the coming primaries in the Middle West. The insur-
gents, in turn, were goaded by the administration's attacks into virtually
declaring their independence from the party dominated by Aldrich,
Cannon, and Taft The flames of Midwestern progressivism had now
indeed become the raging prairie fire of insurgency, and the battle for
the control of the G.O.P. that transpired during the spring of 1910
promised to decide the fate of Republicanism in the nation as well as
in the great Mississippi Valley.

In spite of the ruthless use of the federal patronage, the sending of
the best stand-pat orators into the Midwest, and the widespread use of
money, Taft's campaign against the insurgents failed completely. In
state after state Indiana, Wisconsin, Minnesota, the Dakotas, Kansas
the progressives triumphed* Nothing was more suggestive of the ad-
ministration's impending doom than the refusal of the Midwestern
rank and file to turn against their local leaders. Already by the summer
of 1910 there was considerable talk of organizing a third party in 1912
should Taft be renominated. Already progressives were turning to
Roosevelt as their messiah.

The estrangement between Roosevelt and Taft was one of the most
important by-products of these two years of bitter party strife. Soon
after Taft's inauguration, Roosevelt had obligingly gone off to Africa
to hunt big game. By the time he returned to New York in June, 1910,
he was definitely alienated from his one-time friend. What had hap-
pened meantime to bring this about?

The coolness that Roosevelt now felt toward Taft was born of a
series of incidents, many of them petty and personal The event which,
more than any other, convinced Roosevelt that Taft had betrayed his
policies was the Ballinger affair. A few months before his return to the
United States, Roosevelt had a long conference in Europe with Gifford
Pinchot, leader of the anti-Ballinger group. We do not know what the
two men said to each other, but we do know that Roosevelt never felt
the same about Taft after that meeting* Pinchot, moreover, had taken
with him a sheaf of letters to Roosevelt from Senator Jonathan P.
DoIIiver of Iowa, Senator Albert J. Beveridge of Indiana, William
Allen White of Kansas, and other Midwestern progressive Republican
leaden?, all presenting full bills of particulars against the President.
From that day on, Roosevelt was convinced Taft had permitted the

6 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

Old Guard to maneuver him into a position that made the revolt of
the insurgents inevitable. 8

Meanwhile, after Roosevelt's return to America the war within the
Republican party increased in bitterness and intensity. In one Mid-
western state convention after another, the Republicans greeted Taft's
name with boos and catcalls and refused to endorse his administration*
Important, also, was the fact that the revolt was spreading to all sec-
tions of the country except the rotten boroughs of the South. In June,
for example, Hiram W. Johnson and the progressives in California
smashed the old ring that had long been dominated by the Southern
Pacific Railroad and captured the Republican party lock, stock, and
barrel. In New Hampshire., in Washington, and in numerous other
states the insurgents were also triumphant.

Although by this time Roosevelt had committed himself to the
progressive cause, he tried hard to maintain an air of impartiality, and
he labored sincerely during the fall of 1910 to bring the warring
factions together. He knew the outcome of the disruption of his party
would be to present the presidency and control of Congress to the
Democrats in 1913, and he was still enough of a conventional Re-
publican to believe this was about the worst thing that could happen to
the country. But when he tried to take a hand in organizing tlu> state
convention in New York, as a means of strengthening the national ad-
ministration, Roosevelt found that Taft had come out against him and
had aligned himself with the reactionary bosses in the state. Rebuffed
and resentful, Roosevelt set out upon a great tour of the West where,
amid wildly cheering crowds, he enunciated the advanced political and
economic philosophy that he called the New Nationalism,

The Democratic party, like its ancient rival, wax at a critical junc-
ture in its career in 1910* It had been fourteen years since Bryan had
captured leadership of the party, fourteen years without patronage? or
national office, without real unity or effective purpose, Bryan had
never been unfaithful to the progressive cause, had broadened his
program since 1896, and still commanded the devotion of many of the
rural Democrat* of the South and West* Yet even Bryant own spokes-
men knew the party must have a new leader if it was ever to win a
national election again, This was the conviction particularly of Ifie

Mowry, Roostvttt, pp. 125-126*

THE NEW NATIONALISM VERSUS THE NEW FREEDOM ^

leaders of urban, middle-class progressive Democrats and was shared
by The Commoner himself. 4

Democratic hopes of profiting from the division in the Republican
party were realized beyond the wildest expectations in the Congres-
sional and gubernatorial elections in November, 1910. It was a virtual
Democratic landslide throughout all sections except the Pacific Coast.
The House of Representatives went Democratic for the first time since
1892, by a large margin, 5 while enough new Democratic senators were
elected to enable them and the insurgent Republicans to control the
upper house. In addition, Democratic governors were elected in many
traditionally Republican states: Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
York, New Jersey, Ohio, Indiana, Nebraska, and Colorado, among
others. So sweeping was the victory that the party was at once recon-
stituted as a potent threat to Republican supremacy. It was not yet a
united force, and the issues upon which it had been swept into office
were hardly new, but it was evident that Bryan's day had passed.

Bryan would remain the titular head of the party until 191 2, to be
sure, but the great Democratic sweep was not a Bryan victory, except
as it was a vindication of the principles for which he had long fought.
Actually, Bryan had bolted the party ticket in Nebraska 6 and had
played a minor role in the campaign* New leaders, among them
Woodrow Wilson of New Jersey, Governor Judson Harmon of Ohio,
and Champ Clark of Missouri, had risen. Practically every Democratic
newspaper in the country believed a reorganization of the party was
in the offing and would culminate in the nomination of a new presi-
dential candidate in 1912. "For the first time since Jackson's adminis-
tration the Democratic party is emancipated and master of its own
destiny,*' the leading eastern Democratic newspaper asserted. "All the
shackles have been struck off. There is no load of sectional issues or
dead issues or economic fallacies for [the party] to struggle under. As
secession followed slavery to the grave . . , so the Bryan socialism has
followed silver, and the Democratic slate is wiped clean. The party is

4 B.g*, sec Josephus Daniels, The Wilson Era, Years of Peace 1910-1917
(Chapel Hill, N,C., 1944), p. 16, and Mary B. Bryan (ed.), The Memoirs
of William Jennings Bryan (Philadelphia, 1925), p, 158.

*The Sixty-Second Congress, elected in November, 1910, was composed of
the following: 227 Democrats, 162 Republicans, and 1 Socialist in the House
of Representatives; 42 Democrats and 49 Republicans in the Senate.

The New York Tim**, Sept 21, 1910.

8 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

back to first principles again, under leadership that is fit to lead.*' 7
Moreover, when Bryan announced he was not in the running for a
fourth nomination, all observers agreed that events during the next
eighteen months would determine not only the question of leadership
but also the fate of the Democracy.

Thus the Democratic preconvention campaign of 1911 and 1912
was no ordinary pre-election contest. As it became an all-out struggle
for control of the Democratic party, it would be well to know the
leading contenders, the issues, and the progress of that contest.

Woodrow Wilson, who had made an extraordinarily brilliant cam-
paign for the governorship of New Jersey, quickly emerged as the most
distinguished Democratic claimant. No man in the history of Ameri-
can politics had such a spectacular and rapid rise to political promi-
nence. Born in Staunton, Virginia, on December 28, 1856, he grew up
in the South during the Civil War and Reconstruction, After a brief
attendance at Davidson College in North Carolina, he went to Prince-
ton University in 1875 and was graduated in 1879. Next he studied
law at the University of Virginia and during 1882-83 attempted a
brief and impoverishing practice in Atlanta. Unhappy over his failure
as a lawyer, Wilson went to the new Johns Hopkins University in
Baltimore to study history and political science under the renownrd
Herbert Baxter Adams. His PhJX thesis, Congressional Gowtnmrnt,
published in 1885, was a brilliant analysis of the federal legislative*
system, strongly influenced by Walter Bagohol. From I88f> to 1888 he:
taught at Bryn Mawr College and from 1888 to 1890 at Wesleyan
University. In the latter year IHJ returned to Princeton as pmfessor of
jurisprudence and political economy and for the next twelve years won
fame as a teacher and writer on political and historical subjects.

Elected president of Princeton in 1902, Wilson inaugurated n series
of bold innovations that revitalized the University and marked him as
one of the outstanding educational statesmen of his thm*. H** tvviatrd
the curriculum; he established the preceptorial system of guidt*d *tudy;
and he brought to Princeton a large group of promising youtw trarhers
and scholars. At the same times he became increasingly prominent
throughout the country an a spokesman of Democratic comervativin
as a foe of Bryanisrn, of governmental regulation, and of tlw* rtstrir-

New York World, Nov. 1$, 1910; al*o Th* N*w York Timts, Mar, 9, I9U.

THE NEW NATIONALISM VERSUS THE NEW FREEDOM 9

tive practices of labor unions. 8 George Harvey, editor of the conser-
vative Harper's Weekly, had begun a movement in 1906 and 1907 to
make Wilson the Democratic presidential nominee in 1908 or 1912,
but few persons took Harvey seriously until two events of profound
importance in Wilson's own career occurred.

The first was the defeat of Wilson's program at Princeton after the

first years of brilliant success. In 1906 and 1907 he attempted almost
singlehanded to abolish the undergraduate eating clubs and to sub-
stitute in their stead quadrangles, or colleges, where undergraduates
would live and eat together. He attacked the clubs on sound academic
and intellectual grounds, not because they were allegedly centers of
campus snobbery and exclusiveness; but the alumni and part of the
faculty protested so violently that the trustees had to abandon Wilson
in the fight. This was a humiliating defeat, and he contemplated re-
signing. But the really crushing blow came during the bitter fight in
1909 and 1910 over the establishment and control of a graduate col-
lege. Wilson's chief antagonist, Andrew F. West, Dean of the Graduate
School, insisted that the graduate college be set apart under his con-
trol Wilson, on the other hand, demanded that the graduate college
be made the center of the University's intellectual life and subject to
his control. As the bitterness of the controversy mounted, Wilson in-
jected the personal issue and claimed he was fighting for democracy
at Princeton. West, however, obtained the money to build the kind of
college he wanted and won in the end. 9

These tragic and bitter controversies left a deep scar on the Univer-
sity that did not heal for many years. They also highlighted grave de-
fects in Wilson's character and quality of leadership for example,
his unfailing habit of converting differences over issues into bitter
personal quarrels, his proud and unyielding stubbornness, and his
inability to work with the opposition. But more important for the
future of American politics, Wilson's defeat at Princeton made him
willing to launch forth on the uncertain sea of politics,

The second decisive event that shaped Wilson's action at this im-
portant juncture in his career was his nomination for governor of New
Jersey on the Democratic ticket in September, 1910, This maneuver

* Arthur S. Link, Wilson; The Road to the White House (Princeton, 1947),
pp. 106-122, 126-127.

* For an account of the quadrangle and graduate college controversies, set?
ibid., pp. 45-9 L

IO WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

/vas executed chiefly by Wilson's old booster, George Harvey, who
:onvinced the leading Democratic boss, James Smith, Jr., that Wilson
zould be used to head off a growing progressive revolt within the party
In the state. At the time of his nomination, Wilson was a political con-
servative, almost totally ignorant of the issues agitating the people. His
political convictions, however, were never as fixed as his ambition ; and
as for the issues, he was a rapid learner. Gutting himself loose from the
machine that nominated him, Wilson went over completely to the
reform program that progressives of both parties had been pressing for
a decade. His brilliant campaign swept him into the governorship by a
fifty thousand majority and the Democrats into control of the lower
house of the legislature.

It is no exaggeration to say that Wilson's meteoric rise electrified the
nation, 10 while events of the next six months convinced many thought-
ful observers that he was the bright hope of the Democracy, A few
weeks after the election, Wilson broke openly with the bosses when he
refused to support Smith's ambition to return to the United States
Senate. By assiduous work among the politicians and by another appeal
to the people, Wilson not only prevented Smith's election but also
firmly established his personal control over the Democratic party in the
state. Then, during the winter and spring of 1911, he subdued the
bosses once again and pushed through a reluctant legislature prac-
tically the entire reform program a direct primary system, corrupt
practices legislation, workmen's compensation, and strict state control
of railroads and public utilities* It was no wonder that Democratic
progressives throughout the country were bttgirmiru; to look upon
Wilson, us one Texas editor later declared, as the "most hopeful figure
in American politics*" u

There is little doubt, also, that Wilson wanted the leadership of the
Democratic party in the nation. A small tfroup of hopeful president*
makra gathered around him and began an organised campaign for
his nomination in the spring of 1911, u For his part, Wikwi cam-
paigned strenuously in every section of the country before* the end of

York World, Nov. 8, 1010; Outlook, XCVI (Nov. 5, 1910), 521;
Baltimore Sun, Nov. 4, 1910; Philadelphia North American, Ort, 27, 1910.
11 Galvfston Daily News, Jan, 11, 1912.

18 It i* interesting that moit of them wrre, Hk<? Wilson, Southrrnm living in

the North. The kadexi of the group were William F. McConibi , a voting lawyer

from Arkansaa, who established Wilson headquarters at 42 Broadway, NVw

York City, and who was general manager of the campaign ; William G,

- - * * >- .,... ... T..IU... m

THE NEW NATIONALISM VERSUS THE NEW FREEDOM II

the prenomination campaign. Up and down the country he went,
pleading for support and setting forth his philosophy and program.
JBy and large he talked in generalities, about returning the government
to the people, the need for trust control and tariff and banking reforms,
and the iniquity of special privilege legislation. Although few old-line
politicians had committed themselves by the end of 1911, it seemed
certain that Wilson would win the nomination without difficulty. No
other serious contender seemed yet to be in sight.

The superficial success of Wilson's early campaign, therefore, made
the rise of Champ Clark, Speaker of the House of Representatives, as
the leading contestant for the Democratic nomination all the more
startling. Clark was an old-time war horse from Pike County, Missouri,
who had served in the House since the 1890's. A politician of the
Bryan type, he had accumulated a consistent progressive record over
the years. He had never originated any legislation or taken leadership
in any important movement, however; and he was narrow and pro-
vincial in outlook, undistinguished by intellectual prowess, and tem-
peramentally and for lack of experience in leadership unfitted for the
presidency of a great nation. 18 There is, therefore, little reason to doubt
that the New York World was justified when it warned that Clark's
nomination would spell disaster for the Democratic party and, if he
were elected, for the United States. 14

As Speaker of the House after March, 1911, Clark made hardly any
popular campaign for the nomination, except occasionally to recite his
stock lecture, "The Signs of the Times/' In contrast, Wilson traveled
tens of thousands of miles and made hundreds of speeches. Yet when
the Democratic presidential primaries were held and the state con-
ventions met in the spring of 1912, one after another of the states went
for the Speaker. Clark had inherited most of Bryan's following in the
Middle and Far West. He had the fervid support of William Randolph
Hearst, 1 * and the influence of the Hearst newspapers in his behalf in
states like Illinois, California, and Massachusetts was decisive* Finally,

**For an excellent contemporary summary see Frank Parker Stockbridge,
"Champ Clark, of Pike County," World's Work, XXIV (May, 1912), 27-36.

"New York World, Apr. 25, 1912; Herbert A. Hilary to Richard Olney,
Apr. 17, 1912, the Papers of Richard Olney, in the Library of Congress; Olney
to Hilary, Apr. 18, 1912, ibid.; World's Work, XXIV (June, 1912), 130;
Collier's W**kly> XLVIII (Mar. 9, 1912), 9; m, XLIX (June 22, 1912),
10.

*See Hcart*$ *tatementi in Chicago Examiner, Sept 26, 1911, and New

112 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

Clark had the support of most of the time-serving Democratic poli-
ticians and the state organizations, and their support was the critical
factor in the success of his campaign.

While Clark gathered some 436 delegates pledged to support his
nomination at the national convention in Baltimore in June, Wilson
could count at the most only 248. The best the Wilson managers could
hope for was that the support of the uninstructed Wilson delegates
would give him control of at least one-third of the total convention
vote of 1088. Wilson had made an especially hard fight to win his
native South, but had to divide the Southern delegations with Clark
and Oscar W. Underwood of Alabama, chairman of the House Ways
and Means Committee. 10 For Wilson and his friends the days pre-
ceding the Baltimore convention were disheartening indeed. Wilson
himself was ready to quit. Colonel Edward M. House, a quiet Texas
politician who had joined the Wilson movement late in 1911, became
discouraged and advised his friends to find another candidate to sup-
port if it seemed Wilson could not be nominated. 17

It was easily the most critical time in the history of the Democratic
party since 1896 when the national convention opened at Baltimore on
June 25, 1912, for nothing less than control of the parly and also of the
federal government was at stake. From the very first day th< conven-
tion was riotous and bitter. A member of the Nebraska delegation,
Bryan led a revolt against the selection of the; conservative Jwi<*e Alton
B. Parker of New York as keynote speaker. The Wilson ddt^atos sup-
ported Bryan in the fight, but the Clark men voted for Parker and h
made his address. Next Bryan introduced a resolution pledging thr
party not to nominate any candidate subservient to "J. P, Morgan,
Thomas Fortune Ryan, August Bclmont, or any other member of the
privilege-hunting and favor-seeking class** and demanding the with-
drawal of delegates representing Wall Street interests, A Ryan and
Belrmmt were both delegates, the resolution hud considerable sting and
evoked great controversy. It was adopted without the latter provision
and Ryan and Belmont stayed on.

Bryan's courageous fight to <jxpoe and neutralise the reactionary

** Arthur S. Link, 4< Th Underwood Presidential Movement of 191 2, M /cur-
nal of South* History, XI (May, 1945), 230-245,

17 E. M, House to C. A. Cuibcrioa, Apr. 23, 1912, thcs Papcn of Edward M.
House, in the Library of Yak* Univcnity; Houae to Mary B. Bryan, June 22,
1912, ibid. Further ntfaienciit in thii chapter to the writing! of Colonel House
have been drawn from this collection o! paper**

THE NEW NATIONALISM VERSUS THE NEW FREEDOM 13

element aroused the convention and the country, but it had little effect
on the voting for a presidential candidate. In the early balloting Clark
forged far in the lead. On the tenth ballot the boss of Tammany Hall,
Charles F. Murphy, electrified the convention by delivering New
York's ninety votes to Clark. It was the signal for a landslide, for the
Speaker now had 556 votes, well over a majority. Under then existing
rules he needed two-thirds for the nomination, to be sure, but not since
1844 had a Democrat obtained a majority in a national convention
and then failed to win the necessary two-thirds.

The expected landslide did not materialize, however, because the
Wilson delegates stood absolutely firm and because the Wilson and
Underwood managers agreed to stand solidly together. Then began a
long and grueling battle in which Wilson's managers undermined
Clark's strength. On the fourteenth ballot Bryan came out against
Clark and voted for Wilson, but his action was no great help to the
Wilson leaders. They concentrated their efforts, not on the Bryan men,
most of whom were fanatically loyal to Clark, but upon the boss-
controlled delegations and upon the Underwood bloc. This strategy
finally succeeded when Roger Sullivan, Illinois Democratic boss., de-
livered his delegates to Wilson on the forty-second ballot, and the
Underwood men came to Wilson on the forty-sixth, thus nominating
him. What had seemed impossible only a few days before was now a
reality: one of the miracles of modern American politics. 18

Thus control of the Democratic party was given over to its progres-
sive element, and without any open rupture or more than the usual
dissension* The Republican party, however, did not resolve its dilemma
so happily. It will be recalled that the elections of 1910 had amounted
to a mass repudiation of Taft's leadership and that the insurgents had
made it plain sodn afterward that they would not tolerate Taft's re-
nomination. The Republican progressives now constituted a majority
of the party in the Middle and Far Western states. They had a fairly
coherent program of tariff and trust reform. All they lacked, therefore,
was a dynamic leader of national standing to unite their ranks and
lead their campaign. In 1910 and early 1911 many signs seemed to
point to Senator RoterTM; ta Fdtette of Wisconsin as this leaden No
Republican, not even Roosevelt, had carried the banner of progres-
sxvism so courageously and so faithfully as La Toilette. He was, more-

18 For th Baltimore convention, see Link, Wilson, pp. 431-465.

14 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

over, far and away the ablest of the Midwestern insurgents. He had led
the fight against the Aldrich tariff betrayal and Ballingerism in 1909
and 1910; meanwhile, he had come forward with a comprehensive and
rational program for financial and business control. 1 *

It was Roosevelt and not La Follette, however, who dominated the
progressive Republican situation, and until nearly the end of 1911
Roosevelt was undecided. He made friendly gestures in La Follette's
direction, but his friends told him, and he agreed, that the Wisconsin
senator could never defeat Taft. Many leading progressives turned to
Roosevelt himself and pleaded with him to come out boldly and give
them the only leadership that could win. He did not stop thorn when
they began a high-pressure campaign for his nomination. Finally, in
response to a prearranged appeal from seven Republican governors,
dated February 10, 1912, Roosevelt on February 24 announced his
candidacy and began a tremendous campaign to win delegates to the
Chicago convention. 20

The Republican preconvention campaign that followed, from March
through May, was probably the bitterest 5n the history of the* party,
The Taft spokesmen searched Roosevelt's record and laid down a
heavy barrage of personal abuse. Roosevelt replied in kind, giving
more than he took. So enormous was the intraparty bittonim that
some of the Republican state conventions were riotous brawls,, with
fistfights common. During April, May, and early June Roosevelt made*
a personal campaign that for strenuosity equaled Bryan'n of 1896, and
there seemed to be no doubt that his appeal was succeeding. Hr swept
most of the states that held presidential primaries and even won T aft's
native Ohio after a campaign into which both aides had jxwred all
their resources. In thirteen states where the Republican votm had un
opportunity to express a preference, La Foltattc won 36 delegate*, Taft
46, and Roosevelt 278,*'

But it was not enough. Taft had used the patronage steam roller to
obtain control of the Southern delegations. Ho had the support of moat
of the delegates from boss-controlled states, like New York, Above all,
he controlled the National Committee, which would organise th<* na-

Alpheus T, Mason, &rand*u> A Frt Man's Lift (Ni*w York, 1H6), np,
366-574,

Tht Works of Thtodor* Rot>$ev*tt {20 vok, Nttw York. 1926), XVIL
14&-150.

Mowry, Roostvtlt, pp. 220-236, ii the bt account of the Republican pro*
convention campaign,

THE NEW NATIONALISM VERSUS THE NEW FREEDOM 15

tional convention and pass on the credentials of the delegates. Thus
while the results of the preconvention campaign seemed confused,
because one-fourth of the seats in the national convention were con-
tested, actually the outcome was foregone before the convention met
in Chicago on June 18. By the ruthless use of the same steam-roller

K. K Knecht in the Evansvllle Courier
Roosevelt and Taft 1908 and 2912

tactics that Roosevelt had perfected in 1908, the Taft forces organized
the convention and gave themselves 235 of the 254 contested scats.
Roosevelt, who was then in Chicago directing his followers, gave the
word and most of them walked out, whereupon the administration
men proceeded to renominate Taft.
Convinced he had been cheated out of the nomination by corrupt

1 6 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

and reactionary politicians, Roosevelt was now angry as only he could
be and more than ever determined to run for President, even if that
meant destroying the Republican party. His motives were obviously
complicated^ but prominent among them was his refusal to accept
humiliation at the hands of the man he had put in the White House.
Thus, in spite of the unwillingness of most of the insurgent leaders to
follow him, Roosevelt went ahead relentlessly with his plans to or-
ganize a third party.

The outgrowth of his anger, the Progressive party, came into ex-
istence in Chicago on August 6 in one of the most remarkable political
conventions the country had ever witnessed. Distinguished social and
economic reformers like Jane Addams of Hull House in Chicago and
George L. Record, resourceful progressive of New Jersey, disappointed
politicians like the notorious William' Flinn of Pittsburgh all these
and more made up the crowd that sang "Onward, Christian Soldiers,"
adopted the most significant platform since the Populist platform of
1892, 22 and nominated Roosevelt and Governor Hiram W. Johnson of
California to head their ticket. Feeling, he said, like a bull moose,
Roosevelt came to accept the nomination and delivered his "Confes-
sion of Faith," a statement of social and economic principles that was a
classic synthesis of the most advanced thought of the time:/-* 3

The country witnessed during the summer and fall of 1912 the first
serious three-cornered presidential contest since 1860. The, Socialists,
under the leadership of Eugene V. Debs, adopted an advanced plat-
form and were making their strongest bid for power; hut they were still

22 The Progressive platform provided the basis for the futwrv tWelopntrnt of
the progressive movement in the United States after 1912, just an thi? Populist
platform of 1892 had earlier provided a foundation for the first phase of Amrri-
can progrcssivism.

The Progressive platform was most significant for the fart that the soda!
justice group and other advanced progressives found approval for their objec-
tives by a major, if ephemeral, party. Thus measures like the minimum wat?r
for women, prohibition of child labor, workmen's compensation, and social in-
surance were embodied in the platform. On the political fowl the. l'rot$rr*aive

economic field the major demands were for a federal trade commission to
exercise sweeping regulatory authority over business and industrial activity and
a tariff commission that would set tariff rates on a seientifie basis ami g
that benefits of protection accrued to workers as well its to employers,
** Works, XVII, 254-299,

THE NEW NATIONALISM VERSUS THE NEW FREEDOM Ij

a small minority of the voters. By the middle of August it was obvious
that Taft simply was not in the running. He was in the race only to
defeat Roosevelt anyway, and he could do this without strenuous
effort. "I think I might as well give up so far as being a candidate is

Denver Post
T. R. vaults the anti-third-term hurdle in 1912

concerned," he wrote as early as July 22. "There are so many people in
the country who don't like me." 24 Except for his speech of acceptance,
which he could not avoid making, the President refused to join in the
specchmaking at all

"Taft to Hdcn Taft, July 22, 1912, cited in Prinrfe, Taft, II, 817.

l8 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

Wilson and Roosevelt carried the burden of the campaign, there-
fore, and deserve most of our attention. Ideologically speaking, the
progressive movemenjp culminated and diverged in the philosophies
and programs they #fet forth. Certain commentators, notably William
Allen White, have -referred to Roosevelt and Wilson as Tweedledum
and Tweedledee,, each in his own way setting forth an identical
philosophy and program in 1912. 25 To say this is to miss a large part
of the significance of the campaign, for Roosevelt's New Nationalism
and what Wilson called the New Freedom mirrored a divergence in
the progressive movement itself, a divergence far-reaching in its im-
plications for the future development of governmental policies in the
United States. As the campaign of 1912 became a full-dress debate
over t\vo conflicting progressive theories of government, it would be
well to know what these theories were.

The New Nationalism was no mere campaign platform hastily con-
trived for the purpose of catching votes. It was, rather, the consum-
mation of a steady progression in the political thought of Roosevelt
and a significant minority of progressive thinkers. During the last few
years of his presidency Roosevelt had set forth his developing concept
of the federal government as a dynamic force in the social and eco-
nomic affairs of men. His Annual Message of 1908, for example, was a
clarion call to progressives to re-examine the assumptions upon which
their program rested. This, of course, was in the best Republican,
nationalistic tradition. Although Roosevelt by 1909 had adopted a
program demanding broad federal economic and .social regulation, he
had not yet formulated a coherent political philosophy to justify such
a program. This task fell to a then obscure New York journalist,
Herbert Croly, who published in 1909 hi&JPromiw o^jMdfftnLifc. It
was easily the best political treatise to cor3?Wffona^>rop'TOive fer-
ment 2 *

Croly's thesis not only summarized the most advanced progrmive

2 * W, A White, Woodrow Wilson (Boston, 1924), p, 264.

26 Born in New York City in 1869, Croly was educated at Harvard and was
editor of the Architectural Record from 1900 to 1906, HP gained st pro-
eminent position among intellectual progressive* with the publication of Th*
Promise of American Life. With the backing of Willard Straight of th Morgan
firm, Croly in 1914 founded the New Republic and gathered around him fomtt
of the leading young thinkers In the country, including Walter Lippmann,
Charles A. Beard, John Dcwev, Walter Wcyl, and Thomai N. Cnrwr, His
Progressive Democracy, published in 1914, was a second significant commentary
on the American progressive movement

THE NEW NATIONALISM VERSUS THE NEW FREEDOM IQ

thought of the time but also became the rationale of the New National-
ism and even of Wilsonian progressivism after 1915. It might, there-
fore, be characterized as the philosophical underpinning of the modern
progressive movement. In American thought, Groly said, there had
been two divergent views of the role the federal government should
play. The first was the Hamiltonian belief that government should
intervene directly to alter existing economic relationships or to estab-
lish new ones. The second was the Jeff ersonian view that government
should pursue a policy of strict laissez faire with regard to economic
activity. The important historical fact about these two conflicting
philosophies, Croly continued, was that the Hamiltonian concept of
government had become identified in the popular mind with aristocracy
and special privilege, while the Jeffersonian dogma of weak govern-
ment had all along been identified with democracy and with a pro-
gram of equal rights and opportunities. Croly admitted that the Hamil-
tonian philosophy had been used historically by the financial and in-
dustrial groups to justify special interest legislation, but he called
boldly for an entirely new orientation in progressive thinking. What he
demanded was nothing less than that the progressives abandon their
JefFersonian prejudices against strong government and adopt Hamil-
tonian means to achieve Jeffersonian, or democratic, ends.

It is impossible to measure the influence of The Promise of American
Life on Roosevelt's developing progressivism. Roosevelt read the book
with enthusiastic approval and it at least helped him systematize his
own ideas. In any event, he at once began to translate Crol/s abstruse
and heavy language into living political principles that the rank and
file could comprehend. 37 In a famous speech at Osawatomie, Kansas*
on August 31, 1910, Roosevelt sounded the keynote of his two years*
campaign* The old nationalism, he said, had been used "by the sinis-
ter ... special interests.** What he proposed was a new nationalism,
a dynamfo ^emncrafly^ that would recojgnize the inevitability of con-
centration in industry and bring the great corporations under complete
federal control, that would protect and encourage the laboring man,
that, in brief, would do many of the things usually associated with the
modern concept of the welfare state. "We are face to face with new
conceptions of the relations of property to human welfare/* he de-
clared. ". . Property [is] subject to the general right of the com-

8T Henry F. Prfngle, Thtodor* Roosevtlt, A Biography (New York, 1931),
pp, 540-54L

2O WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

munity to regulate its use to whatever degree the public welfare may
require it." 28

This, in general, was also the program and theme Roosevelt set forth
during the campaign of 1912. Needless to say, it attracted a large fol-
lowing, particularly among the social justice group and the social
workers. As the campaign progressed, however, Roosevelt became
increasingly radical and explicit. He began to place more emphasis
upon the social justice objectives of his program a minimum wage for
women workers, a federal child labor law, a federal workmen's com-
pensation act, federal intervention in labor disputes, an expanded
federal health and conservation program, use of tariff protection to
insure fair wages to workers in industry, and the like. In turn, he
scoffed at Wilson as representing "rural Toryism," the mossback, worn-
out Jeflfersonian philosophy of laissez fairs*

In contrast to his chief opponent, Wilson had no such well-
defined program or philosophy when the campaign began. He was at
another important crossroads in his career, but it was foregone in
which direction he would travel. For, along with his general commit-
ment to the ideal of social justice, he was still a progressive of the Jef-
fersonian persuasion, undisturbed by Croly's challenge. Fundamentally
a state rights Democrat, he believed the federal power should be used
only to sweep away special privileges and artificial barriers to the de-
velopment of individual energies, and to preserve and restore competi-
tion in business. The idea of the federal government's moving directly
into the economic field, by giving special protection to workers or
farmers, was as abhorrent to Wilson in 1912 as the idea of class legis-
lation in the interest of manufacturers or shipowners.

At first it seemed Wilson would make his campaign mainly on the
tariff, but it did not take him long to discover that this was a worn-out
issue and would evoke no popular response. He seemed to be searching
for an issue more appealing when he met Louis D. Brandeis for the
first time on August 28 at Sea Girt, New Jersey, One of the? leading
progressive lawyers in the country, Brandeis was also probably the
chief spokesman of the philosophy of regulated competition, un-
hampered enterprise, and economic freedom for the small business-
man. And it was Brandeis who clarified Wilson's thought and led him
to believe the most vital question confronting the American people was
preservation of economic freedom in the United States. 3 *

28 Works, XVII, 5-22.

New York Timts, Aug. 29, 1912* Brandeis outlined his program for

THE NEW NATIONALISM VERSUS THE NEW FREEDOM 21

Brandeis taught, and Wilson agreed and reiterated in his speeches,
that the main task ahead was to provide the means by which business
could be set free from the shackles of monopoly and special privilege.
Roosevelt claimed that the great corporations were often the most
efficient units of industrial organization, and that all that was necessary
was to bring them under strict public control, by close regulation of
their activities by a powerful trade commission. Wilson replied: "As to
the monopolies, which Mr. Roosevelt proposes to legalize and to wel-
come, I know that they are so many cars of juggernaut, and I do not
look forward with pleasure to the time when the juggernauts are
licensed and driven by commissioners of the United States." Monopoly,
he added, developed amid conditions of unregulated competition. "We
can prevent these processes through remedial legislation, and so restrict
the wrong use of competition that the right use of competition will
destroy monopoly."

The divergence in Wilson's and Roosevelt's views on the role gov-
ernment should play in human affairs was more vividly revealed, how-
ever, by Wilson's savage attacks on Roosevelt's proposals for social
welfare legislation. He objected to Roosevelt's labor program because
it was paternalistic, because it would inevitably mean that workingmen
would become wards of the federal government. Perhaps Roosevelt's
"new and all-conquering combination between money and govern-
ment" would be benevolent to the people, he said; perhaps it would
carry out "the noble programme of social betterment" which so many
credulously expected; but he did not believe paternalism was the
answer for free rnen. so

And as the campaign progressed Wilson became more and more
convinced that the struggle between the New Freedom and the New
Nationalism was a struggle between two concepts of government so
radically different that he prophesied slavery and enchainment for the
people if Roosevelt were elected* "This is a second struggle for emanci-
pation," he declared in a supreme outburst at Denver on October 7.
** . * If America is not to have free enterprise, then she can have
freedom of no sort whatever." 31 It was Wilson's discovery that he was

trust control in a memorandum entitled "Suggestions for letter of Governor
Wilson on Trusts," which he sent to Wilson on September 30, 1912. The memo-
randum is in the Woodrow Wilson Papers, in the Library of Congress*

*> Speech at Buffalo, N.Y., Sept 2, 1912, Th* N*w York Times, Sept. 3,
1912.

11 Denver Rocky Mountain News, Oct. 8, 1912.

22 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

battling for the old American way of life and his conviction that
economic democracy was absolutely essential to political democracy
that gave ultimate meaning to his slogan "The New Freedom."

One of the most interesting developments of the campaign was the
manner in which progressives reacted to Roosevelt's and Wilson's
appeals. In the early weeks, before Wilson found himself and his great
vital issue, progressives wondered whether he was a progressive after
all. In contrast to Roosevelt's warm appeals for social justice, Wilson's
early speeches seemed cold indeed. But as he gathered momentum, as
he began to talk in glowing, if general, phrases of social righteousness
and economic justice, many progressives claimed him as their new
leader and hastened to his support. The significant development of the
campaign was Roosevelt's failure to unite progressive Republicans and
progressive Democrats. The Roosevelt that progressives knew had
many sides, and a considerable portion of the progressives refused to
believe he was now sincere. "I wish I could believe he intended to do
a single honest thing," wrote Anna Howard Shaw, for example, "or
that he would carry out a single plank in the platform if he were
elected. ... I cannot." * 2

By the middle of October there was not much doubt about the out-
come of the contest. To be sure, Roosevelt had made a magnificent
campaign and had won the support of most of the Republican progres-
sives, especially in the Middle West. But he had failed to draw pro-
gressive Democrats away from Wilson, and that fact alone signified his
inevitable defeat. More important for the future of American Clitics
was the fact that he had signally failed to establish the Progressive
party on a firm and lasting basis. As the election statistics revealed, there
was little more to the new party than Roosevelt himself.

The results of the election, however, clearly demonstrated that the
country was now overwhelmingly progressive in temper. Individuals
might disagree over a definition for progressivism, but a largo majority
of them were discontented with Old Guard policies and in a rebellious
mood. Wilson polled 6,293,019 popular votes, Roosevelt 4,1 19,307, and
the Socialist candidate, Eugene V, Debs, 901,873. Even Tuft, who
received only 3,484,956 votes, would have denied he was a conserva-
tive. Because of the multiple division of the votes, Wilson's victory in
the electoral college was of landslide proportions. Tuft earnVcl only

32 A, II. Shaw to Jane Addanw, Aug. 16, 1912, Jane Addarns Paper*, in the
Swarthmorrj College Library.

24 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

Vermont and Utah and received eight electoral votes; Roosevelt won
eleven of California's votes and all of Michigan, Minnesota, Pennsyl-
vania, South Dakota, and Washington, for a total of eighty-eight votes.
Wilson received all the rest, 435 electoral votes. The disruption of the
G.O.P., however, gave control not only of the presidency but of Con-
gress as well to the Democrats. At least for two years Wilson would be
assured of a preponderant majority of seventy- three in the House of
Representatives and a small but workable majority of six in the Senate.

Sweeping though the victory was, the Democrats could dciivc small
comfort from a cold analysis of the returns, Wilson had not polled as
many popular votes as Bryan had received in 1908. With a little more
than 42 per cent of the popular vote, moreover, Wilson had clearly
failed to establish his party as the majority party of the country, for the
national Democratic ticket received clear majorities only in the eleven
former Confederate states.

On the other hand, it is perhaps significant that neither Roosevelt
nor Taft was responsible for the decrease in the Democratic vote in
1912. The combined popular vote given Wilson's two chief opponents
in 1912 was also slightly less than Taft's total vote in 1908. In short, all
major parties suffered a relative and absolute decline in 1912, because
about half a million disgruntled progressives voted for I )ebs.

What was the meaning of Wilson's election, what did it signify for
the future of the country? Certainly it was as much a political revolu-
tion as Jefferson's election had been. As in 1800, the flection of 1912
effected an important shift in the geographical control of the federal
government. For one thing, Southern influence had barn decisive in
nominating Wilson and directing his campaign, and Southerners would
soon be given the same share in formulating national policies; that their
grandfathers once enjoyed. But the most significant result of all the
preceding three or four years of political ferment was the emergence
of Woodrow Wilson as a national leader. It was an open question
whether the Now .Freedom program would satisfy progressive demands,
but there could be no doubt that the; Democratic party and the cmmtry
now had a leader of resolution, ability, and boldness. Best of all, Wilson
had made no binding commitments to any important economic inter-
ests. He would be; embarrassed by no important political bargains. Few
presidents have entered office so completely free to serve tht; general
interest.

CHAPTER 2

The New Freedom

FEW months between the election and the inaugural afforded
JL scant time to accomplish the gigantic task that lay ahead of
Wilson and his advisers. They had to map the plans for a legislative
program and to organize a government almost from the ground up.
The prospect of a general housccleaning might warm the hearts of
office-hungry worthies in Texas and Illinois^ but it was intolerably
annoying to the President-elect. Even before the election returns were
complete, William F. McCombs, the erratic and morose Democratic
national chairman, handed Wilson one list of names for the Cabinet
and another of the faithful who expected appropriate rewards. 1 Within
a few days some fifteen thousand supplicating letters poured in on
Wilson at his home in Princeton, and it seemed that almost as many
politicians descended upon him.

In tho face of mounting demands for office, Wilson announced he
would make no appointments until after his inauguration. Then, on
November 1 6, ho escaped with his family to his old refuge in Bermuda,
in order, as he wrote, to get his head cleared for what was to follow.
In this "lotus hind" for a month, he was "free to do . . . quiet think-
ing and reflecting,'* to work out the program he had set his heart
upon. 2 Meanwhile, he had commissioned his friend, Colonel Edward
M. HOUKC, to find material for the Cabinet.

Now York Wnrld* Nov. 7, 1912.

-Wilson to W. J, Bryan, c. Nov. 15, 1912, Sworn Notebooks, Ray Stunnarcl
Baker Collection, m the Library of Congress; Wilson to J. P. Tumulty, Nov.
27, 1912,-ftoU

26 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

The friendship between Wilson and House was already an intimate
one, although the two men had known each other hardly a year and
even though House had played a minor role in the campaign. "Almost
from the first our association was intimate; almost from the first, our
minds vibrated in unison," House later recalled. "When we had ex-
changed thoughts with one another he translated our conclusions into
action without delay. Nine times out of ten we reached the same con-
clusions." 3

It was one of the most important friendships in history, but not "one
of the strangest." 4 Like all great public men, Wilson needed a friend
to whom he could unburden his secret thoughts and turn for advice
and spiritual support. A man of intellect and moral strength. House
was perfectly equipped to meet Wilson's peculiar needs. Wilson de-
manded the total loyalty of his friend, and House knew when to speak
or be silent, when to agree or to demur. Yet in thus subordinating his
will to Wilson's, House did not compromise his own integrity, judg-
ment, or critical capacities. Because he understood the Wilsonian tem-
perament and handled the President in a shrewdly calculated manner,
House was able to retain Wilson's confidence and affection until new
circumstances arose and a break came abruptly in 1919. From 1912
until 1917, however, House's influence grew steadily; and that in-
fluence by and large was salutary, for in times of crisis House proved a
wise counselor and a stabilizing force.

The Cabinet that Wilson finally appointed was mainly of House's
choosing and, with one or two exceptions, was perhaps as good as
could be constructed from the material available. Because of his com-
manding influence in the party,, Bryan received the appointment as
Secretary of State. The Nebraskan was no great authority on foreign
affairs. So much a believer in party government that he stiemd almost
a spoilsman, he made a number of appointments that did great damage
to the foreign service.* In spite of his tenderness for "deserving Demo-

a E. M. House, "Memoirs of Colonel House/* copy in the Papers of George
Sylvester Vicrcck, in the Library of Yale University,

*As George Sylvester Viereck called it in Tkt Strangest FrwnelMp in Uh-
tcry (New York, 1932),

* For example, W, W. Russdl, an old csirwr officer, wag mnnvrd a* Minister
to Santo Domingo and replaced by Jame-s M. Sullivan, one of the -wont officer*
in the history of the American diplomatic service. Or, sigain, I^wts Einstein, a
brilliant young career diplomat, wa removed as Minister to Coata Rica and
replaced by Edward J. Hale, editor of Fayetteville, North Carolina, who had
supported Wilson in the predomination content* For further < i lnlx>ration sea

THE NEW FREEDOM 27

crats/' however, Bryan did surprisingly well; and if the world had
remained at peace he would probably have served out his term, happy
at his post. The conservative press ridiculed him for refusing to serve
wine at state dinners and accused him of neglecting his duties to lec-
ture for profit. 6 The truth was that Bryan was an indefatigable worker
who gave assiduous attention to the detailed work of the Department
and had a large part in the development of foreign policy. Moreover,
he completely sublimated his personal ambitions to work loyally and
well for the success of the President, at home and abroad, until dif-
ferences over a matter of principle drove them apart in June, 1915.

Bryan was succeeded in the chief Cabinet post by Robert Lansing,
who had served under him as Counselor for a little more than a year.
In contrast to Bryan, Lansing was a professional at the practice of in-
ternational law. A person of enormous reserve, he gave the superficial
impression of a dignified law clerk; but the fire of strong conviction
burned hot within him, even though his official statements rarely be-
trayed his secret thoughts. He often disagreed with the President's
foreign policies but loyally strove to implement them, or to change
them, if he could, by indirection.

The new Secretary of the Treasury, William G. McAdoo, was a
Georgian transplanted to New York, who had played a prominent
part in the preconvention campaign. In many respects McAdoo was
the ablest and in some the most interesting member of the Cabinet.
His restless, probing mind was unencumbered by economic or political
theories, and during his tenure the Treasury Department launched
new and interesting experiments for the benefit of businessmen and
farmers. McAdoo was also the most ambitious, aggressive, and domi-

The New York Times, July 9, 1913, and George Harvey, "The Diplomats of
Democracy/* North American Review, CXCIX (Feb., 1914), 161-174.

If Bryan had been given a free rein, he would have also turned all Re-
publicans out of thft consular service, which President Theodore Roosevelt and
Secretary of State EHhu Root had organized on a competitive and career basis.
Sec the Diary of Edward M. House, in the Papers of Edward M. House, in the
Library of Yale University, Apr. 18, 1913.

* Bryan frankly admitted that he found it necessary to lecture for profit in
order to supplansnt his salary, which, he said, was inadequate to meet his
obligation* to church, charity, and education. See W. J. Bryan, "Making a
Living,** The Commoner, Aug., 1913. See also "The Bryan Scandal," The
Nation, XCVH (Sept. 18, 1913), 256-257, and George Harvey, "Mr. Bryan
Rides Again," North American Review, CXCIX (Mar., 1914), 321-334.

28 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

neering member of the Wilson circle. House thought, and probably
correctly, that McAdoo was consumed by ambition to be President. 7

For Attorney General, Wilson first thought of Louis D. Brandeis,
the chief architect of the New Freedom. For a number of reasons
House was opposed, and he finally persuaded Wilson that Brandeis
was "not fit for that place." 8 Instead, Wilson allowed the Colonel to
choose James G. McReynolds, a Kentuckian practicing law in New
York, who had participated in the government's prosecution of the
Tobacco Trust case and who was then thought to be a radical foe of
monopoly. Although he was not yet as cynical, irascible, and reaction-
ary as he later became on the Supreme Court, McReynolds did not
get on well with his colleagues. There was general relief in the
Cabinet in 1914 when Wilson elevated him to the Supreme Court
and appointed to his post Thomas W. Gregory, a Texan of high prin-
ciples and even temper.

For Secretary of War, Wilson turned at the last moment to Lindlcy
M. Garrison, a judge of the chancery court of New Jersey. Garrison
vied with McAdoo for the reputation of the ablest Cabinet member,
Utterly forthright, a superb administrator who quickly won the* ostcern
of the military leaders, and loyal to the President, his was, however,
inept in dealing with politicians, and Congressional leaders resented
what they thought his overbearing manner. .During the great battle
over preparedness he resigned rather than compromise and was sup-
planted, early in 1916, by Newton 1). Baker, Mayor of Cleveland,

Wilson rewarded his chief North Carolina supporter, Joseplnis
Daniels, with the Secretaryship of the Navy. As editor of the Raleigh
News and Observer, Daniels had been in the forefront of the progres-
sive movement in his state, although he never allowed devotion to
reform causes to stand in the way of his own advancement. The chief
target of Republican ridicule, Daniels had nevertheless far more ability
than his enemies admitted or his own benign countenance su^rstrd.
As Secretary of the Navy, he improved th<; conditions and opportu-
nities of the enlisted men, fought the armor-pinto monopoly to a stand-
still, and helped get through Congress In If) 1 6 th<* ^n-atest naval
building program in the nation's history to that time. His studied but

''House Diary, July 7, Oct 20, 27, Nov. 4, 1914, Aug. 27, 1916,
Ibid., Dec, 18, 1912, Jan, 30, 17, 23, 24, 1913,

Sne, e.g., "J, C. M'Rcynokls, the Ntsw Preceptor for the Trust*/* The N*w
York Times Magazine, Mar. 9, 1913.

THE NEW FREEDOM 29

sincere adulation of Wilson won for him the President's affection and
enabled him to ride out many a hard storm of popular criticism.

Wilson and House went deliberately to Congress for a Postmaster
General Albert S. Burleson, another Texas veteran of many Con-
gressional battles. Though he called himself a progressive, he never
allowed principle alone to determine his course of action. He was a
superb professional politician, utterly loyal to Wilson, who used the
patronage ruthlessly to compel adoption of administration measures.
Wilson's friends expected him to employ the appointing power to build
up progressive factions in the states. It was Burleson, however, who
persuaded the President that friendly support in Congress, even from
old-line reactionaries, was more to be desired than control of the party
by men who called themselves progressives. Thus the administration's
great power was used to strengthen the factions already in control of
the state organizations. In states like Virginia, North Carolina, Ala-
bama, or Kentucky, where conservative Democrats were dominant,
Burleson's policy operated to discourage and weaken the progressive
faction. 10

Franklin K. Lane, a California Democrat, was elevated from the
Interstate Commerce Commission to the post of Secretary of the In-
terior. A brilliant conversationalist, letter writer, and wit, Lane was
also the chief gossip of the Cabinet. Because Lane could not resist the
temptation to divulge secrets to the newspapermen, Wilson had to
stop saying anything important in the Cabinet meetings. 11 As Secre-

10 Materials substantiating this generalization abound in the Wilson Papers.
In Kentucky, for example, control of the patronage was turned over to Senator
Ollie M. James and the congressmen, all identified with the liquor interests and
all bitterly at odds with the antiltquor, Wilson-progressive faction. At the end
of Wilson's first year as President, only one Wilson man had been named to
federal oflire in the entire state. Sec Lexington Herald, Mar. 7, 1914, and
Deshu Breekenridge to W. F. McCombs, Mar. 7 5 1914, the Woodrow Wilson
Papers, in the Library of C3ongress,

The same situation existed in Virginia. In that state a large and active group
of yount* progressive Democrats had revolted against the conservative organiza-
tion and tried to carry their state for Wilson before the Baltimore convention.
Yet this group of ardent Wilson supporters were denied any federal patronage
once Wilson catered the White House; in fact, the federal patronage after IS 1 3
was used to build the strength of the old machine. See J. G. Pollard ct al. to
Wilson, Jan. 5, 1914. ibid.

For details of a similar situation in Alabama, see Horace Hood to W. J.
Bryan, Oct. 11, 1913, the Papers of Willian Jennings Bryan, in the National
Archives.

R, S. Baker, interviews with N. D. Baker, Apr. 6, 1928; with T, W.

30 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

tary of the Interior, Lane followed a middle course, although in the
California oil lands controversy he supported the claims of private
interests and became suspect among stanch conservationists. 12

Lane's colleague in the Agriculture Department was David F.
Houston, originally a North Carolinian but now a distinguished
economist and president of Washington University in St. Louis. A close
friend of House, Houston had met Wilson in December, 1911, and
written a memorandum on the protective tariff for him. A classical
economist and therefore a conservative, Houston presided over the
Department during a time when the demands of farm groups for a
larger measure of federal aid were growing irresistibly powerful. When
the cotton market collapsed immediately after the beginning of the
First World War, he successfully resisted the demands of the planters
for far-reaching relief. He left his stamp upon the Federal Warehouse
Act of 1914 and the Good Roads Act of 1916 in the large degree of
federal control that these measures provided. Moreover, he opposed
the rural credits bill, because it provided for governmental subvention
to farmers, -and blocked passage of the measure until 1916. A conserva-
tive in the field of federal economic policies, he none the loss was an
extraordinarily able administrator and brought his Department to a
new peak of efficiency.

Wilson had given in to the pressure against making Brnndds At-
torney General, but during February and early March, 1911), he seemed
determined to bring the distinguished "people's lawyer' 1 into his
official family, as Secretary of Commerce. Indeed, the question of
Brandeis* appointment came to be regarded by many progressives as a
test of Wilson's sincerity. 13 On the other hand, when news of Brandeis*

Gregory, Mar. 14-15, 1927; with W. B. Wilson, Jan. 12-13, 1928, and with
D. F. Houston, Dec. 1, 1928, Baker Collection.

12 This was the longest and bitterest controversy that rent the administration
before 1917. Presidents Roosevelt and Tuft had withdrawn certain California
oil lands from the public domain and constituted them a naval oil reserve.
Meanwhile, a number of private parties had entered claim* and protested th
withdrawals. The Supremo Court in 1909 and 1915 denied the claims and up*
held the withdrawals. In 1914 Lane drafted a General Leasing bill that would
have provided relief by permitting private leasing of government oil lands, but
not of such lands set aside for military or naval purposes. On the other hand,
Daniels, Gregory, and conservation leaders like Giflford Pinchot and William
Kent accused Lane of surrendering to private interests and bitterly opposed
his leasing bill. In fact, this opposition was so vociferous that no leasing legis-
lation was passed during the first administration.

ls See, e.g., Norman Hapgood to House, Nov. 23, 1912, House Papers; alto

THE NEW FREEDOM 3!

probable appointment was published. Colonel House, the Irish poli-
ticians of Boston, and spokesmen of the great financial interests all
combined to warn Wilson against making such a disastrous mistake. 14
Wilson wavered and then surrendered again. "The interests every-
where . . . and the country will think Wfilson] showed the white
feather," lamented Norman Hapgood when the Cabinet list was pub-
lished. 15

Instead of Brandeis, Wilson finally chose William C. Redfield, a
second-rate congressman from Brooklyn. Never much aware of issues
or political principles, Redfield worked only to make his department
the servant and protector of the American businessman. He will be
remembered chiefly because he was the last important public man to
wear side whiskers.

As for Secretary of Labor, there never seemed to be much doubt
that the post should go to William B. Wilson^ Democratic congressman
from Pennsylvania and chairman of the House Labor Committee. A
man of heroic stature, Wilson had begun his career as a miner at the
age of nine. His qualities of leadership soon won him recognition
among his fellows, and he helped organize the United Mine Workers
of America, of which he was secretary-treasurer from 1900 to 1908.
Hounded by employers because of his union activities, Wilson was once
imprisoned for defying an injunction. As the first Secretary of Labor
his was the task of organizing a new department. His first assistant,
Louis F, Post, was a distinguished single taxer and friend of organized
labor.

No account of the Wilson circle would be complete without some
notice of Joseph P, Tumulty, Wilson's secretary from 1911 through
1921. Tumulty had joined the rising Democratic leader early in 1911
and had boon his chief aide and adviser during the gubernatorial
battles. Fiery, eloquent in an Irish way, and impulsive, Tumulty was
passionate in his devotion to his chief. Wilson gave him a large share

W. I Bryan to Wilson, Dec. 25, 1912; N. Hapgood to Wilson, Jan. 30, 1913;
Felix Frankfurter to N. Hapgood, Fob, 12, 1913; Hamilton Holt to Wilson,
Feb. 28, 1913, all in Wilson Papers. There arc also many interesting items re-
lating to this matter in the Papers of Louis D. Brandeis, in the Law School
Library of the; University of Louisville.

1-1 On the grounds that Brandeis was not a Democrat, was too controversial
a figure as House thoughtor else was so antagonistic to the business and
financial interests that he could not be fair to them. House Diary, Jan. 23, 26,
Feb. 13, 1913.

* B Hapgood to L. D. Brandeis, Mar. 4, 1913, Brandeis Papers.

J}2 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

in determining patronage policies in the Northeast and Tumulty gave
in return frequent advice, some of it foolish, on public opinion, legis-
lative matters, and foreign policies. Tumulty was never popular among
the official circle. After the election of 1916, House and Mrs. Wilson
persuaded the President to ease Tumulty out of his job. Tumulty
appealed pathetically to Wilson's better nature, and Wilson let him
remain; but their relations were on a different basis after that.

Dominating the administration group. was of course Wilson himself.
In so far as he gave full rein to his subordinates and stood loyally by
them, he was an excellent administrator. This was usually the case,
especially in matters involving the prestige of the administration, or
matters in which Wilson himself was not particularly interested. More-
over, he frequently took advice, and not a few of the administration's
important policies were originated by Bryan, Lansing, McAdoo, and
the others to a lesser degree.

There was, however, a less happy side to the Wilsonian character.
Except for Colonel House, the group did not always enjoy satisfactory
personal relations with their chief. Several of them bitterly resented
Wilson's aloofness, his social sang-froid.^ Worse still, practically all of
them knew that when really vital questions were involved, Wilson did
not want their advice unless it complemented his own thought or
prejudices. Bryan, for example, realized this and resented Wilson's re-
fusal to confide in him. Finally, Wilson's temperament put a heavy
strain on his administrative talents. Because he valued loyalty and
flattery over hardheaded frankness arid cold and sometimes unpleasant
logic, he was an 'extraordinarily poor judge of men. 17 Because he re-
sented criticisra r his advisers either told him what they thought he
wanted to hear or else remained silent. 18

16 The Diary of Walter H. Page, in Houghton Library, Harvard University,
n.d., but fall of 1916.

17 John Sharp Williams, senator from Mississippi and a friend of Wilson,
declared: "He was the best judge of measures and the poorest of men I ever
knew." R. S. Baker, interview with John Sharp Williams, Mar. 11, 1927, Baker
Collection. See also House Diary, Nov. 22, 1915, Sept. 6, Nov. 4, 1913, Nov. 14,
1914, Apr. 2, May 17, June 10, Aug. 27, 1916.

ia The following description of Wilson's mental processes is the most illuminat-
ing this writer has read:

"When one comes to consider Mr, Wilson's mental processes, there is the
feeling that intuition rather than reason played the chief part in the way in
which he reached conclusions and judgments. In fact arguments, however
soundly reasoned, did not appeal to him if they were opposed to his feeling of
what was the right thing to do. Even established facts were ignored if they did

THE NEW FREEDOM 33

Personally, Wilson had changed little over the past ten years, except
that advancing age had sharpened his traits of personality. He was still
as much as ever intrigued by ideas and bored by details. A scholar
rather than an intellectual, fascinated by ideas that had practical uses
but not given to speculative thinking, intensive but restricted in his
reading, Wilson's absorption with public affairs after 1910 demanded
all his time and meager physical resources. His one great function,
however, was to assimilate and synthesize ideas and .proposals and then
to use his incomparable power of leadership to translate them into
statutory realities. Given favorable circumstances and a majority be-
hind him, whether at Princeton, Trenton, or Washington, he usually
succeeded.

Meanwhile, long before his inauguration, while he was in Bermuda
and during the two and a half months after his return, Wilson worked
intensively to lay the groundwork of his reform program. In Princeton
and Trenton he conferred with Democratic leaders in Congress over
the details of tariff and financial reform. He also made bold speeches
in New York, Staunton, Virginia, Trenton, and Chicago, forecasting
the realization of the New Freedom and warning; the masters of capital
not to use their great power to obstruct the fulfillment, of that program.
He did not believe, he said, that the businessman would use his power
to start a panic in order to prevent the enactment of reform legislation.
"If he does," Wilson warned, "I promise him, not for myself but -for
my countrymen, a .gibbet as high as Haman." 19 There can be no doubt
that he was imbued with high motives and a deep passion to set things
aright.

Inaugural day dawned bright and clear a good augury, some men
thought, for the future of the first Democratic administration since
1897. In lofty and poetic phrases Wilson voiced his hopes of a new era

not fit in with this intuitive sense, this semi-divine power to select the right.
Such an attitude of mind is essentially feminine. In the case of Mr. Wilson, it
explains many things in his public career, which are otherwise very perplexing.

"In the first place it gave a superior place to his own judgment. With him it
was a matter of conviction formed without weighing evidence and without
going through the process of rational deduction. His judgments were always
right in his own mind, because he knew that they were right. How did he know
that they were right? Why he knew it and that was the best reason in the
world. No other was necessary." "The Mentality of Woodrow Wilson/' the
Diary of Robert Lansing, in the Library of Congress, Nov. 20, 1921.

1& This warning was given in his speech in New York Dec. 17, 1912 3 New
York World, Dec. 18, 1912.

34 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

of social righteousness and iterated the partial program that had taken
shape in his mind. The tariff would be lowered; the banking system
would be overhauled and made the servant, rather than the master, of
business. Strangely, he said nothing about strengthening the antitrust
laws. Then, in a passage movingly beautiful, he ended: 'This is not a
day of triumph; it is a day of dedication. Here muster, not the forces
of party, but the forces of humanity. Men's hearts wait upon us; men's
lives hang in the balance; men's hopes call upon us to say what we will
do. Who shall live up to the great trust? Who dares fail to try? I
summon all honest men, all patriotic, all forward-looking men, to my
side. God helping me, I will not fail them, if they will but counsel and
sustain me!" *

No one who had read Wilson's writings could have doubted that he
would inaugurate a new system of presidential leadership. From his
youth he had been impressed by the almost fatal lack of responsibility
in the presidential-Congressional system. 21 Until the early years of the
twentieth century he believed the only way to obtain responsible gov-
ernment in the United States was adoption of the British Cabinet
system. Roosevelt's success in arousing public opinion and bludgeoning
Congress into action, however, apparently convinced Wilson that the
President had all power sufficient for effective leadership, if only he
called forth and used the power inherent in his office. The President,
Wilson observed in 1907, "is ... the political leader of the nation, or
has it in his choice to be. The nation as a whole has chosen him, and is
conscious that it has no other political spokesman. His is the only
national voice in affairs. Let him once win the admiration and con-
fidence of the country, and no other single force can withstand him, no
combination of forces will easily overpower him." 22

Wilson's strengthening and extension of the presidential powers
constituted perhaps his most lasting contribution to American political
practice. A strong believer in party government, he decided to work
through and with his party in Congress, rather than to govern by a

*> Ray S. Baker and William E. Dodd (eds.), The Public Papers of Woodrow
Wilson (6 vols., New York, 1925-27), The New Democracy, I, 1-6.

21 See, for example, his "Cabinet Government in the United States," Inter-
national Review, VII (Aug., 1879), 146-163, or Congressional Government
(Boston, 1885), the most famous of his earlier works.

^ 2 Constitutional Government in the United States (New York, 1908), p. 68.
Wilson's views of the presidential office are best expressed in his letter to A,
Mitchell Palmer, dated Feb. 5, 1913, printed in The Public Papers, New De-
mocracy, I, 21-26.

THE NEW FREEDOM 35

coalition of progressives, as he might have done. Moreover, he con-
ceived of himself as the responsible leader of his party, as the only
leader who could speak for it and the country. Therefore, he felt him-
self personally charged with the introduction and sponsorship of im-
portant legislation; and for the first time in many years the Executive
formulated a complete legislative program and worked closely with
committee chairmen in giving body to it.

Wilson's methods and practice of leadership were spectacularly suc-
cessful, to be sure; but they succeeded in large measure because of the
peculiar circumstances that prevailed during his first administration.
To begin with, because of the Republican rupture, the Democrats had
a majority of seventy-three in the House during the critical first two
years of the administration. Moreover, many of the Democratic mem-
bers were new and inexperienced 114 of the 290 had been elected for
the first time in 1912 and Wilson easily dominated them. In addition,
the old-line Democratic leaders like Oscar W. Underwood, William G.
Adamson, or Henry D. Clayton realized that the fate of their party de-
pended upon their performance, and they willingly co-operated with
the President to prove that they were not, as Republicans often
charged, "the organized incapacity of the country." Finally, most of
the Democrats in the Senate were able, responsible, and progressive, as
eager as Wilson himself to give the administration success. The young,
progressive group constituted a virtual galaxy: Joseph T. Robinson of
Arkansas, Henry F. Ashurst of Arizona, Thomas J. Walsh of Montana,
William Hughes of New Jersey, Henry F. Hollis of New Hampshire,
Robert L. Owen of Oklahoma, and Atlee Pomerene of Ohio. Even the
older, more conservative leaders in the Senate, like Furnifold M.
Simmons of North Carolina, Thomas S. Martin of Virginia, John H.
Bankhead of Alabama, or William J, Stone of Missouri, signified then:
readiness to follow the President. In these circumstances, Wilson's task
was one mainly of uniting his forces and encouraging the strong
Democratic determination to make good.

The first item on Wilson's legislative agenda was the smashing of
the system of privileged tariff protection that the Republican party
had carefully erected since 1861. On the day of his inauguration,
Wilson called a special session of Congress, and on April 8 he went
dramatically in person and delivered a short message before the two
houses. Not since John Adams had a President appeared personally
before the legislative branch. He wanted the congressmen and senators

3 6 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

to see for themselves, he said, that he was a real person, "not a mere
department of the Government hailing Congress from some isolated
island of jealous power." He wanted them to think of him as a col-
league in the great work of tariff rejEorin.they were now about to under-
take. The following day he went to the Capitol and held the first of
many conferences with Democratic leaders. 28 Thus Wilson not only
asserted his personal leadership but also focused the attention of the
country on Congress.

So largely has the tariff been eliminated from the politics of the
present day that it would be easy to minimize the difficulties that
Wilson and his supporters faced, or the critical character of this first
struggle. Ever since the Civil War the high protective tariff had been
to progressives one of the symbols of privilege. Cleveland had tried
hard to lower the rates and had almost wrecked his party in the effort.
Taft had promised tariff revision, and his failure had hastened the
disruption of his party.

The bill that Chairman Oscar W. Underwood 24 of the Ways and
Means Committee presented to the House on April 22 had been writ-
ten for the most part two years before, when Congress had passed
three Democratic tariff bills and Taft had vetoed them. Before Con-
gress convened in special session in 1913 there had been months of
new hearings and investigations. Wilson conferred frequently with
Underwood while the measure was being written, and in the writing of
the critical wool and sugar schedules he intervened in a decisive
manner. Two years earlier Underwood had insisted upon moderate
protection for wool and sugar; Wilson had supported him then, in the
face of Bryan's demand for free wool. As in 1911, so again in 1913 the
controversy over these two important products of Democratic states
threatened to destroy party harmony. In the Ways and Means Com-
mittee the moderate protectionists had their way and voted a 15 per
cent duty on raw wool. Then, for reasons that are not apparent, the

23 The New York Times, Apr. 10, 1913.

24 Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee and Majority Leader from
1911 to 1915, Underwood was probably the foremost authority in the country
on tariff matters and one of the leading advocates of tariff reduction. Elected
to the Senate in 1915, he served in that body until 1927. See Burton J. Hen-
drick, "Oscar W. Underwood, a New Leader from the New South," McClure**
Magazine, XXXVIII (1912), 405-420, and Arthur S. Link, "The Underwood
Presidential Movement of 1912," Journal of Southern History, XI (May.
1945), 230-245.

PLAYING TO THE GALLERIES

Nelson Harding in the Brooklyn Daily Eagle satirizes protectionist
arguments during the 1912 campaign.

38 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

President called Underwood to the White House and sent him back to
his Committee with instructions to obtain the adoption of free wool.
As for sugar, the most Wilson would agree to was retention of a duty
of one cent a pound for three years, after which it, too, must go on the
free list. After a minor skirmish in the Commitee Wilson easily won his
.demand.

When Chairman Underwood presented his bill to the House of
Representatives, competent observers agreed it was the most honest
tariff measure that had been proposed since 186 1. 25 By no means a free
trade tariff, it aimed only at striking down the special advantages that
the protectionist policy had conferred upon American manufacturers.
T*he average ad : \3fi5?frGa rate of the Payne- Aldrich tariff of 1909 was a
little over 40 per cent; the Underwood bill brought rates down to
about an average of 29 per cent and placed a whole host of important
products on the free list. In brief, the aim of the Underwood bill was
moderate protection by placing domestic industries in a genuinely com-
petitive position with regard to European manufacturers JThe duties
were all ad valorem, with no devices to cover up exorbitant rates. In
all cases where it could be shown that American products occupied a
dominant position in the world market, rates were either abolished or
drastically reduced. Agricultural machinery and most consumers'
goods, such as food, clothing, and shoes, were put on the free list or
given only incidental protection. All products manufactured by 'the so-
called trusts, such as iron and steel and steel products, were also given
free entry, thus satisfying the demands of the Midwestern insurgents.

Anticipating a decrease in customs receipts of about $100,000,000
because of the lower rates, the Ways and Means Committee added a
provision for a graduated income tax that was drafted by Representa-
tive Cordell Hull of Tennessee, a leader in the struggle for tax reform.
It was the, first income J:ax under the Sixteenth Amendment, which
had just been ratified on February 25, but exemptions were high and
the graduated surtax was low. 28 Although the framers of the provision

26 New York World, Apr. 8, 1913; Harper's Weekly, LVII (Apr. 19, 1913),
4; Nation (London), XIII (Apr. 12, 1913), 43-44; Economist (London),
LXXVI (Apr. 12, 1913), 867-868; World's Work, XXVI (June, 1913), 137-
138. 4

26 A flat 1 per cent tax was applied on all incomes, individual and corporate,
over $4,000. In addition, a surtax of 1 per cent on incomes from $20,000 to
$50,000, 2 per cent on incomes from $50,000 to $100,000, and 3 per cent on
incomes over $100,000 was added.

THE NEW FREEDOM 39

welcomed the opportunity to shift some of the tax burden from the
poor to the wealthy, they had no intention of using the income tax to
redistribute wealth or income.

This cautious beginning of a democratic tax policy apparently satis-
fied progressives in the House and was in time also approved by the
Democratic members of the Senate Finance Committee. When the in-
come tax provision of the Underwood bill came up for debate on the
Senate floor on August 28, however, the Republican insurgents and
radical Democrats, led by La Follette, George W. Norris of Nebraska,
James K. Vardaman of Mississippi, and James A. Reed of Missouri,
launched a stirring attack against it. La Follette demanded a maxi-
mum rate of 10 per cent, while Norris, in addition, proposed an in-
heritance tax ranging from 1 to 75 per cent. The Democratic radicals
claimed a majority of the Senate caucus and threatened to rewrite the
income tax provision if the Finance Committee did not surrender to
their demands. So serious was the threat that Chairman Furnifold M.
Simmons at once proposed a compromise, increasing the surtax to a
maximum of 6 per cent on incomes over $500,000. 27 When the radicals
still objected, Simmons hurriedly appealed to Wilson and Bryan for
aid. In order to prevent party dissension, Bryan concurred in the com-
promise proposal, while the President agreed that it was wiser "to
begin upon somewhat moderate lines." 2S In the face of this pressure,
the Senate Democratic caucus approved the compromise on September
5 and it was adopted as one of the provisions of the final Underwood
Act. Thus was the cautious first effort of the Ways and Means Com-
mittee transformed into the first serious attempt in the twentieth cen- "
tury to democratize the American tax structure. 29 The author of the
original provision, Representative Hull, viewed the changes forced by
the Senate progressives with delight. "I myself felt," he later recalled,
"that if I should live two lifetimes I probably would not be able to

27 Under the compromise proposal the surtax was 1 per cent on incomes from
$20,000 to $50,000, 2 per cent from $50,000 to $75,000, 3 per cent from
$75,000 to $100,000, 4 per cent from $100,000 to $250,000, 5 per cent from
$250,000 to $500,000, and 6 per cent on incomes over $500,000.

28 J. P. Tumulty to Wilson, Sept. 2, 1913; Wilson to Simmons, Sept. 4, 1913,
both in Wilson Papers.

39 For a more detailed account see Sidney Ratner, American Taxation (New
York, 1942), pp. 324-333.

4O WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

render public service equal to my part in the long fight for enactment
of our income-tax system." 30

The Underwood bill passed the House on May 8 by the resounding
majority of 281 to 139. This, however, was as everyone thought it
would be. Public attention now focused on the Senate. Would it betray
party pledges as it had done during the passage of the Wilson-Gorman
and Payne-Aldrich bills, by surrendering to the lobbyists and rewriting
the measure in the interests of the manufacturers? It was a dangerous
crisis, indeed, for Wilson's insistence on free wool and free sugar had
embittered the very men whose votes were absolutely essential to the
bill's success in the upper house. 31 In a canvass of the Senate on April
6, five Democrats from Louisiana, Arizona, Nevada, and Montana an-
nounced they would not support free sugar or free wool and a change
of three votes could turn a Democratic majority into a minority.
Indeed, there was a grave danger that the Underwood bill would go
the way of the Wilson and Payne bills, that Wilson's leadership would
be repudiated in this first important test.

Confronted, therefore, with a perilous situation, Wilson at once took
bold steps. First, he applied in full measure his great power of per-
suasion, by conciliatory but firm letters to and private conferences with
the doubtful senators. "No party can ever for any length of time con-
trol the Government or serve the people which can not command the
allegiance of its own minority," he wrote, for example, reminding a
Louisiana senator of his duty to the party. 32 By the first of May it was
evident that Wilson was winning his fight. On that day he conferred
with six senators from the Western and Rocky Mountain states, and
all of them agreed to support the Underwood bill when it came up in
the Senate.'jDnejof them, Thomas J. Walsh of Montana, had declared
only a week before that it was his duty to oppose free sugar and free
wool; two weeks after his conference with Wilson he agreed that free
sugar and wool would not bring disaster to his state. So confident was
the President by the middle of May that he announced flatly that he

would consider no compromise whatever on sugar and wool. When the

/

* Gordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cor dell Hull (2 vols., New York, 1948), I,
71. /

31 The Democrats /could not be sure of receiving a single progressive Republi-
can vote, because b| making the bill a strict party measure the President had
alienated the Midwestern senators who had co-operated with the Democrats in
passing the tariff bills of 1911.

32 Wilson to J. R. Thornton, July 15, 1913, Wilson Papers.

THE NEW FREEDOM 4!

Senate, in an important test vote on May 16, refused to instruct the
Finance Committee to hold hearings on the Underwood bill, the ad-
ministration forces had passed the first hurdle.

In spite of his victories in these preliminary skirmishes, Wilson knew
the situation was still dangerous and uncertain. This was made all the
more obvious when Senator Walsh, who had voted with the Democrats
in refusing to force the Finance Committee to hold hearings, reversed
his earlier position and announced publicly on May 19 that he would
oppose free sugar and free wool. Besides, swarms of lobbyists had
descended upon Washington and were hard at work on the senators
from the West. The wool and sugar lobbyists, now joined by spokes-
men of the cotton manufacturers, citrus fruit growers, and others, were
in a state of high indignation and were bombarding senators with
resolutions, petitions, and appeals. 33 Washington was so full of the
representatives of special interests, Wilson said, that "a brick couldn't
be thrown without hitting one of them." In a dramatic maneuver that
gave fire and daring to his leadership, the President struck back. On
May 26 he issued a public statement denouncing the "industrious and
insidious" lobby. "It is of serious interest to the country," he declared,
"that the people at large should have no lobby and be voiceless in
these matters, while great bodies of astute men seek to create an arti-
ficial opinion and to overcome the interests of the public for their
private profit." 3 *

Reaction to Wilson's sensational statement was at first unfavorable,
especially in the Senate, where Democratic leaders feared the Presi-
dent had overplayed his hand. In a move calculated to embarrass the
administration, Senator Albert B. Cummins of Iowa proposed the ap-
pointment of a special committee to investigate the charge. The
Democrats, of course, could not object; and when Senator La Follette
suggested that all senators disclose their own property holdings that
might In any way be affected by tariff reductions, no senator dared
publicly to protest. What had begun as a political maneuver, therefore,
soon turned into a sweeping investigation into the activities of private
interests in behalf of legislation. 85

33 For accounts of the activities of the lobbyists, see New York World, Apr.
10, 22, 23, May 5, 18, 1913.

**The New York Times, May 27, 1913; printed in The Public Papers, New
Democracy, I, 36.

35 Senate Judiciary Committee, Maintenance of Lobby to Influence Legisla-
tion, Hearings . . ., 63d Cong., 1st sess. (4 vols., Washington, 1913).

42 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

The results were more favorable than Wilson or the progressives
could have expected. The investigation proved that there was indeed
an industrious lobby in behalf of sugar, whether insidious or not ; and
that an enormous amount of other lobbying was being carried on. But
more important was the fact that each senator came before the com-
mittee and dutifully told how many shares of coal or steel stock, or
how many acres of sugar or grazing land he owned. 36 For the first time
in American history the economic interests of the members of the
Senate were laid bare for the whole country to see. Under this glaring
spotlight., the opposition of the Democratic senators, except for the
two immovable Lousianians, wilted.

The first sign that the hardest phase of the struggle was over came
when the Democratic caucus voted on June 25 to endorse free sugar
and free wool. Although the Western senators dissented and grumbled,
they made it plain they had no intention of carrying their fight to the
Senate floor. On July 19 Chairman Simmons of the Finance Com-
mittee opened debate in the upper house; and if the Republicans had
not sought to delay banking legislation by debating the tariff bill
schedule by schedule, it might have been passed almost at once. As it
was, the Republicans talked tariff all during the summer months. They
made a final and unsuccessful effort on September 8 to break the now
solid Democratic ranks by offering an amendment for a gradual
reduction of the wool duty. The following day the opposition collapsed
and the Senate, forty-four to thirty-seven, passed the revised tariff bill.
Among the Democrats, only the two Louisiana senators, Joseph E.
Ransdell and John R. Thornton, voted against it.

When the-Serjfate had finisfosd its work, many observers could hardly
believe, >yhat they saw. Instead of wrecking tariff reform, the Senate
had actually effected a general reduction of 4 per cent in the Under-
wood rates, mainly by putting food and other farm products on the
free list, thus bringing the general level of rates down to 24-26 per
cent. Moreover, the Senate had increased the maximum surtax on

86 For example, Senator Albert B. Fall of New Mexico revealed that he was a
large owner of cattle, horses, sheep, and coal lands. Senator Asle J. Gronna of
North Dakota said he owned a farm of nine thousand acres and had opposed
the Canadian reciprocity treaty of 1911, Senator Henry F. Lippitt of Rhode
Island admitted that he had extensive holdings in textile mills and that he had
always favored a tariff on textile products. Senator Lee S. Overman of North
Carolina said he and his wife owned shares in cotton mills, but that he stood
with the President for tariff reductions.

THE NEW FREEDOM 43

incomes from 3 to 6 per cent. It was almost unbelievable. "I did not
much think we should live to see these things/* was Houston's sur-
prised comment. 37 The House conferees accepted most of the Senate
amendments and the revised bill was approved by the House on Sep-
tember 30 and by the Senate on October 2. A day later the President
signed it in a pleasant ceremony at the White House. "It is hard to
speak of these things without seeming to go off into campaign elo-
quence/' he told an assembled throng of Democratic leaders, "but
that is not my feeling. It is one very profound, a feeling of profound
gratitude." M

What Wilson's victory in the tariff fight signified no one could
doubt. Whether the operation of the Underwood law would in fact
reduce the cost of living, as Democrats prophesied, was unimportant
as compared with the fact that the party had proved itself free from
shackling alliances with special privilege and capable of pulling to-
gether. As one editor put it : "This is no tariff by log-rolling, by manip-
ulation, by intrigue, by bribery. It was bought by no campaign
contributions. It was dictated by no conspiracy between corrupt
business and corrupt politics." w

Significant, also, was the fact that by virtue of this victory Wilson's
dominance in the Democratic party was firmly established. A weaker
man would have failed where he succeeded and, as a London editor
observed, the tariff victory raised Wilson "at a single stage from the
man of promise to the man of achievement." 40 It was fortunate for
the President that events turned out as they did, for another and more
important struggle was already well in progress: the administration's
campaign to free the nation's banks and businessmen from monopo-
listic control. It was a battle in which Wilson needed all the support
he could find.

No objective stood higher on the Democratic reform schedule than
banking and currency reform. In fact, there was by the beginning of
1913 complete agreement among informed circles that the most press-
ing economic need of the time was a fundamental reorganization of
the nation's banking and money system. 41 Bankers and businessmen,

87 David F, Houston to W. H. Page, c. Sept. 9, 1913, the Papers of Walter
H. Page, in Houghton Library, Harvard University.

88 The New York Times, Oct. 4, 1913.
w New York World, Oct. 4, 1913.

London Nation, XIV (Oct. 11, 1913), 90.

41 There are literally thousands of letters, written during December, 1912,

44 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

economists and leaders of both parties agreed that the national bank-
ing system, which had been established during the Civil War, was
about as badly adapted to the financial needs of a great nation as any
system could be. The national banking structure was disjointed and
without any effective central control. The provisions for mobilizing
the banking reserves of the country were entirely inadequate in periods
of crisis; the money supply bore no necessary relation to the needs of
business and industry.

The sharp bankers 9 panic of 1907 had reminded the country of the
grave danger of attempting to get along with immobile reserves and an
inelastic money supply. It had also evoked widespread discussion as to
a remedy and the appointment of the National Monetary Commission,
headed by Senator Nelson W. Aldrich. After studying intensively the
banking systems of the world, the Commission offered its report and
recommendations to Congress in 1911 and 1912. 42 Opinion was
unanimous that financial reform was urgent, but the publication of
the Aldrich report revealed a profound divergence over the kind of
banking system the country should adopt.

The Aldrich plan was drawn up by Paul M. Warburg, of Kuhn,
Loeb & Company, 43 and was cordially endorsed by the American
Bankers' Association; in brief, it represented the ideal of almost the en-
tire banking community. It provided for one great central bank, the
National Reserve Association, with a capital of at least $100 million
and with fifteen branches in various sections..* The branches were to be
controlled by the member banks on a basis of their capitalization. The
National Reserve Association would issue currency, based on gold and
commercial paper, that would be the liability of the bank and not of
the government. It would also carry a portion of member banks' re-
serves, determine discount reserves, buy and sell on the open market,

and January and February, 1913, in the Papers of Carter Glass, in the Library
of the University of Virginia, from businessmen, manufacturers, merchants,
editors, or bankers, all strongly condemning the national banking and currency
system and begging Glass and his House committee to lead the way in reforming
the system. There would seem to be no doubt of the widespread nature of
business discontent and of the conviction that banking and monetary reform was
the most important need of the country.

42 National Monetary Commission, Sen. Doc. 243, 62d Cong., 2d sess. (Wash-
ington, 1912). The Commission also published twenty-four monographs on all
phases of banking problems and practices. These were published as Senate
Documents from 1910 to 1912.

* 3 At least, so Warburg told Colonel House. House Diary, Mar. 31, 1913*

THE NEW FREEDOM 45

and hold the deposits of the federal government. The branches and
businessmen of each of the fifteen districts would elect thirty out of
the thirty-nine members of the board of directors of the National
Reserve Association. 44

To progressive Democrats, the adoption of the Aldrich plan could
mean only the perpetuation of existing Wall Street control nothing
less, in fact, than a resurrection of the second Bank of the United
States, which Jackson had destroyed. After talking so much about the
necessity for banking reform, Wilson and his party were now obliged
to propose an alternative to the Aldrich plan, one that would avoid
the danger of monopolistic control and at the same time satisfy bank-
ing and other conservative opinion that it was not a populistic, cheap-
money scheme. Devising such an alternative and getting it adopted in
the face of the united opposition of the banking community proved to
be a task of infinite difficulty.

Soon after the election of 1912 a subcommittee of the House Bank-
ing Committee, headed by Carter Glass of Virginia, began to make
plans for an exchange of views and hearings on currency legislation.
There was, however, no agreement or even understanding among the
Democratic leaders as to what kind of banking and currency system
should be established. An ardent foe of the central bank plan, Glass
was determined to establish such a loose and disconnected system of
reserve banks that no one bank could ever become dominant. On the
vital issue of control, however, he was thoroughly conservative. On the
other hand, Bryan insisted that the government control the system and
issue the currency a proposition that caused conservative editors, and
Democrats like Colonel House, to shudder. It was fortunate for the
country that Wilson knew practically nothing about the details of the
matter, had made no commitments on the basic issues, and stood free
to serve as mediator among the rival Democratic factions.

Ten days after his return from Bermuda, Wilson called Glass and
the subcommittee's expert, H. Parker Willis, 45 to Princeton for the
first conference on the banking bill. Glass outlined his plan for a de-
centralized, privately controlled reserve system with possibly twenty

44 For a brief analysis of the Aldrich plan sec H. Parker Willis, The Federal
Reserve System (New York, 1923), pp. 79-83.

45 Formerly a professor of political economy at Washington and Lee and
George Washington universities, in 1912 Willis was associate editor of the New
York Journal of Commerce. He subsequently became secretary of the Federal
Reserve Board and one of the leading authorities on the Federal Reserve System-

46 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

independent reserve banks. Wilson tentatively approved, but he asked
Glass and Willis to draw plans for a general supervisory board; what
he called the "capstone" of the system. 46 To Glass, Wilson's proposal
smacked of "dangerous centralization"; he was not at all convinced
any such "capstone" was necessary; but he and Willis proceeded
faithfully to follow the President-elect's instructions. By January 15,
1913, they had completed a tentative draft of the bill. Then, from
January 7 to February 17, the House subcommittee listened patiently
while bankers and businessmen voiced their eagerness for a strong and
highly centralized reserve system, privately controlled. When the
hearings were ended, Willis went carefully through the draft bill, re-
vising and strengthening its technical provisions in light of the bankers'
suggestions.

Thus, even before Wilson's inaugural, the administration had seem-
ingly come to an agreement on the form and detail of the new banking
and currency bill. Working in close harmony with the bankers, Glass
and Willis had constructed a measure that, in Glass' words, would
"commend itself for soundness to the bankers of the country and , . .
secure the support of the business community." 47 In this objective they
had apparently succeeded, for leading bankers in New York, Chicago,
and St. Louis had promised cordial support. There had been no real
test of opinion among the Democrats, however, for the details of the
Glass plan had been kept a carefully guarded secret among Wilson,
Glass, Willis, and McAdoo. It did not seem to occur to Glass that his
plan might evoke hostility from the progressive element of the party.

The secret leaked when House sent a memorandum on the Glass
bill, which he had obtained from Wilson, to his friend, Paul M.
Warburg, one of the really competent authorities on banking practice
in the country. 48 From Warburg news of the plan spread through the
financial community and was blazoned in the press. Within a short

46 Garter Glass, An Adventure in Constructive Finance (Garden City, N.Y.,
1927), pp. 81-84.

47 Glass to Festus J. Wade, Jan. 24, 1913, Glass Papers.

48 Formerly a partner in the banking house of M. M. Warburg & Company
of Hamburg, Germany, Warburg was at this time a partner in the New York
firm of Kuhn, Loeb & Company. He strongly favored a powerful central bank
with three or four branches, modeled after the German Reichsbank. Moreover,
he stood firmly against public control of the new system or governmental issue
of the currency. See his The Owen-Glass Bill, Some Criticisms and Suggestions,
written at Silas-Maria, Switzerland, July 15, 1913 (New York [?], 1913), and
Warburg to House, July 22, 1913, House Papers.

THE NEW FREEDOM 47

time a controversy of serious proportions was developing in the inner
circle of the administration and in Congress so serious that for a
time it threatened to disrupt the party and destroy all hopes for
financial reform.

The issue at stake was nothing less than the fundamental character
of the proposed banking system. Glass and Wilson had agreed upon
what was substantially a decentralized version of the Aldrich plan;
there was not the slightest chance the progressive wing of the party
would accept it. They demanded, instead, outright governmental con-
trol over the reserve system, and governmental issue of the currency.
McAdoo, for example, came forward with an entirely new proposal to
establish the system as an adjunct of the Treasury Department. Robert
L. Owen, chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, and Samuel
Untermyer, counsel for the Pujo "Money Trust" Committee, sup-
ported the McAdoo plan. Realizing that adoption of the Glass bill
would signify repudiation of the Democratic platforms of 1896, 1900,
1908, and 1912, as well as his own convictions on the banking and
money question, Bryan regretfully warned the President that he would
have to oppose the measure. 49

The administration was shaken during May and early June by these
dissensions, but not, as Glass thought at the time and afterward,
because a group of Greenbackers sought to wreck his constructive
efforts. The trouble arose simply because the progressive element re-
fused to stand by and see control of the banking system given over to
private hands, especially if this were done by a "reform" administra-
tion. As the controversy developed, Glass appealed to his banker
friends for support against McAdoo's "utter perversion of the true
function of government." Bryan in effect replied that insistence upon
the Glass bill would make any banking legislation impossible and wreck
the Democratic party. 50

Wilson was strangely surprised and of course profoundly disturbed
by the dimensions of the struggle. By the middle of June it was plain
the controversy would continue for months unless he could find a
workable compromise and reconcile the opposing factions. If he had
any genuine convictions on the basic issues, we do not know them.

House Diary, May 11, 15, 19, 1913; House to Wilson, May 15, 1913,
House Papers; Mary B. Bryan (ed.), The Memoirs of William Jennings Bryan
(Philadelphia, 1925), p. 370.

*>Ibid.,p. 371.

4.8 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

Probably he was undecided, even unconcerned, over what he thought
was a question of detail. In any event, he had to either intervene
quickly and decisively or else abandon his role as leader.

He could not decide, however, without consulting the man whose
opinions on economic questions he respected above all others Louis
D. Brandeis. Brandeis came to the White House on June 11 and told
the President frankly that Bryan and the progressives were right. The
government alone should issue the currency, Brandeis insisted; and the
government alone must control the banking system. "The conflict
between the policies of the Administration and the desires of the finan-
ciers and of big business, is an irreconcilable one," he warned. 51
Brandeis' admonition must have persuaded Wilson that concessions to
the progressive element had to be made. In several show-down con-
ferences with Glass, Owen, and McAdoo June 17-19, the President
announced that he would insist upon exclusive governmental control
of the Federal Reserve Board and upon making Federal Reserve notes
obligations of the United States. It was the absolute minimum that
would satisfy the Bryan element, who wanted governmental operation
of the entire system, and the most that Glass would concede, but it
sufficed.

On June 23, therefore, Wilson went again to Congress and explained
the administration's program for banking reform, "The control of the
system of banking and of issue," he declared, "which our new laws are
to set up must be public, not private, must be vested in the Govern-
ment itself, so that the banks may be the instruments, not the masters,
of business and of individual enterprise and initiative." 52 He must
have reckoned on the opposition of the banking interests, but he was
confident at least of the united support of his party in Congress.
Actually, another revolt in the party was gathering, one that again
threatened to split the party ranks in Congress and destroy all hopes
of legislative action.

The revolt was brewing among the Southern agrarian spokesmen,
the inheritors of the Jacksonian-Populist tradition, who demanded
really thoroughgoing and radical reform. 53 Because the Glass bill did

51 Brandeis to Wilson, June 14, 1913, Wilson Papers, embodying the sub-
stance of the views Brandeis had expressed at the conference of June 11, 1913.

52 The Public Papers, The New Democracy, I, 39-40.

53 For a further discussion of this group see Arthur S. Link, "The South and
the New Freedom: An Interpretation," The American Scholar, XX (Summer,
1951), 314^-324.

THE NEW FREEDOM 49

not provide for the destruction of interlocking arrangements among
and the prohibition of restrictive practices by the great banks, they
charged the administration with betrayal of the Democratic platform;
because the bill authorized private control of the regional banks and
the issuance of currency based in part upon commercial paper, they
accused the Democratic leaders of surrendering control of the banking
system and the money supply to private interests. Finally, because the
Glass bill made no provision for short-term agricultural credit, these
agrarian representatives accused the administration of selling out the
fanners to the moneylenders. The leader of the rebels, Robert L. Henry
of Texas, chairman of the powerful Rules Committee of the House,
opened the battle on June 14 with a blast in the press. 54

The administration went serenely on, however, unaware of the
meaning or seriousness of the new revolt. Glass and Owen introduced
identical bills on June 26; but when Glass asked for approval by his
committee, the radical majority took charge. Over Glass* angry protest,
they adopted an amendment prohibiting interlocking directorates.
Rumors that they had even prepared an entirely new banking bill
seemed to be borne out when the committee, on July 25, refused to
report the Glass measure to the House Democratic caucus.

At this juncture Wilson entered the fight, pleading, cajoling, and
promising that the interlocking directorate amendment would be in-
corporated in the antitrust bill. The rebels accepted the President's
promise and then moved to their most important demand: provision
for the discounting by reserve banks of short-term agricultural paper.
It was when Representative J. Willard Ragsdale of South Carolina
introduced a series of amendments on July 24 to encompass this objec-
tive that the really critical struggle began. The Eastern press scoffed at
this proposal for "cotton currency" and "corn tassel currency" and
predicted the administration would never surrender. 65 And when
Wilson persuaded the Banking Committee to report the Glass bill to
the Democratic caucus, observers were confident the President had
stood firm.

**The New York Times, June 15, 1913. Other leaders of the agrarian fac-
tion were Representative Otis T. Wingo of Arkansas, James Willard Ragsdale
of South Carolina, Joe Henry Eagle of Texas, Robert J. Bulkley of Ohio, and
George A. Neeley of Kansas.

* s The New York Times, July 26, 1913; Springfield Republican, Aug. 19,
1913; Financial Age, XXVIII (Aug. 23, 1913), 297; Bankers' Magazine,
LXXXVII (Sept., 1913), 234r-235.

5O WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

The radicals, however, had meantime won Bryan to their side. After
the first great compromise was effected, Bryan had heartily supported
the Glass bill; but the radical leaders now convinced him their demand
for short-term agricultural credit was reasonable, and he pleaded with
Wilson at least not to oppose the demand when it was made in the
caucus. 56

For the President there now seemed no course open but to yield.
When the Democratic caucus met from the eleventh through the
twenty-eighth of August, the Southern and Western representatives
combined to force an amendment for the discounting of short-term
agricultural paper. 57 Even this concession, however, did not appease
the more radical agrarians, who continued to attack the bill because it
authorized so-called asset currency and private control of the reserve
banks. At this critical stage in the caucus deliberation, Bryan issued
a fervent appeal to the radicals to support the measure, assuring them
that Wilson would fulfill his promise to destroy interlocking directo-
rates. 58 Bryan's masterful plea ended the struggle. On August 28 the
caucus, by 116 to 9, voted to approve the Glass bill with the agri-
cultural credit and less important amendments. Not all the radicals
were pacified; a few of them, like Representative Joe H. Eagle of
Texas, continued to oppose the bill. But the great majority of them,
including their leader, Representative Robert L. Henry, were satisfied
and voted for the bill when it passed the House on September 18 by a
vote of 285 to 85. 59

During that epochal summer of 1913 Wilson and his advisers moved
from crisis to crisis. No sooner had the administration done the things
necessary to consolidate Democratic support behind the Glass bill than
there arose a virtual storm of protest and abuse from bankers, business
leaders, and their spokesmen in Congress, all of them up in arms de-
nouncing the bill as socialistic, theoretical, vicious, as the "preposterous
offspring of ignorance and unreason." Meeting in Boston in early
October, the American Bankers' Association severely criticized the bill,

ss Bryan to Wilson, Aug. 6, 1913, Wilson Papers.

^The New York Times, Aug. 15, 26, 1913; "Journal of the Democratic
Caucus on Banking and Currency, August 11-28, 1913," in Glass Papers.

Commoner >

w Twenty-three Republicans and ten Progressives, most of them from the
Middle West, supported the measure. Only three Democrats voted against it.
The New York Times, Sept. 19, 1913.

THE NEW FREEDOM 5!

and appointed a committee to wait upon the President. Even the
so-called liberal bankers^ George M. Reynolds^ Sol Wexler, A. Barton
Hepburn, and Festus J. Wade, who had helped frame the original
measure, turned against it because of the provision for public control.

In the face of this torrent of abuse and criticism, Wilson stood im-
movable. For one thing, it was evident that the bankers were rapidly
maneuvering themselves into an indefensible position as advocates of
the private against the public interest. For another, the amended Glass
bill had the warm support of all the independent and progressive news-
papers and journals of the country, which kept hammering at the
opposition all during the summer and fall. 60 Even more valuable and
more surprising, however, was the support that some leaders of the
business world gave the measure. 61

These were all encouraging signs that the great mass of non-banking
opinion in the country was behind the administration, and prospects
for prompt action by the Senate seemed bright until three Democratic
members of the Banking Committee James A. O'Gorman of New
York, James A. Reed of Missouri, and Gilbert M. Hitchcock of
Nebraska bolted their party and upset the legislative timetable. The
Republican-Democratic coalition now dominating the Committee in-
sisted, first, on holding a long series of new hearings, which proceeded
at a leisurely pace from the first of September until October 25. Mean-
while 3 Wilson was at work almost constantly with Democratic leaders
in the Senate, urging and pleading, even threatening to go to the
people if the obstructionists persisted in blocking legislation. The party
leaders were as indignant as the President, but they were helpless.

The situation changed suddenly around the middle of November,
however, when O'Gorman and Reed, one intimidated and the other
satisfied, surrendered and permitted the Democratic members of the
Committee to make a report. 62 On November 22 the Committee re-

<*> E.g., Springfield Republican, June 20, 21, 23, 24, July 3, Aug. 7, Sept. 19,
Oct. 7, 1913; Harper's Weekly, LVII (June 28, 1913), 3; ibid., LVIII (Aug.
16, 1913), 4; Outlook, CIV (July 5, 1913), 490-491; Saturday Evening Post,
CLXXXVI (Sept. 27, 1913), 26; St. Louis Republic, Sept. 29, 30, 1913; St.
Louis Star, Sept. 3, 1913.

01 The Merchants' Association of New York, for example, endorsed the
Federal Reserve bill on October 9, while the constituent membership of the
United States Chamber of Commerce approved it by a vote of 306 to 1 7. The
New York Times, Oct. 10, 1913; New York Journal of Commerce, Oct. 15,
1913.

62 Hitchcock's opposition stemmed in part from the fact that he was himself

2 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

ported three separate drafts of the Glass bill to the Senate, and debate
was begun at once. The Senate leaders were determined to pass the bill
before Christmas, and progress from this time on was uninterrupted.
The Senate passed the Federal Reserve bill, fifty-four to thirty-four,
on December 19; 63 three days later the conference committee agreed,
and on December 23 the two houses ratified and the President signed
the measure.

Thus it was that the greatest single piece of constructive legislation
of the Wilson era was enacted, and almost exactly one year after that
bleak afternoon when Wilson had held his first meeting with Glass and
Willis in Princeton. Clearly the administration's whole concept and
plan of banking and currency legislation had undergone profound
alteration since that day. What had begun as a bill designed to serve
only the business community and to reinforce private control over
banking and the currency had metamorphosed, under progressive pres-
sure, into a measure that offered substantial benefits to farmers as well
as businessmen and allowed at least a modicum of public regulation.

The tide of progressive banking concepts had receded, however,
once the bill left the House of Representatives. During the long struggle
in the Senate, the Democratic leaders had felt themselves compelled to
make concessions that gravely impaired the power of the Federal
Reserve Board and enlarged the private influence. The Board, for
example, was deprived of authority directly to set the discount rates of
the several reserve banks and was empowered only to veto changes in
existing rates; the gold reserve behind the Federal Reserve notes was

a banker and a spokesman of banking interests and in part from resentment at
the administration's patronage policies in Nebraska.

Reed had apparently bolted because the President would not appoint his
candidate as postmaster of Kansas City. Wilson finally named Reed's man,

O' Gorman, on the other hand, was determined to teach the President that
he should not attempt to coerce the Senate. The New York senator, moreover,
was working hand in glove with Tammany, and the administration's warfare on
that organization had embittered him. When the administration-supported
mayoralty candidate, John P. Mitchel, soundly thrashed the Tammany nominee
in the New York election in November, however, O'Gorman began to view the
President in a more favorable light. For an extended discussion see Charles W.
Thompson's comments in The New York Times Magazine, Nov. 16, 1913.

63 All Democrats present, including Hitchcock, voted for the amended bill.
They 'were joined by six Republicans John W. Weeks of Massachusetts,
Thomas Sterling of South Dakota, John D. Works and George C. Perkins of
California, Wesley L. Jones of Washington, and George W. Norris of
Nebraska and by the lone Progressive senator, Miles Poindexter of Washing-
ton.

THE NEW FREEDOM 53

increased from thirty-three to forty per cent, as a result of a single
speech by Senator Elihu Root of New York; finally, the bankers won
the addition of an Advisory Commission, composed of bankers, to the
Board. Yet the Glass plan survived in its fundamental structure and
purposes, in spite of the abuse hurled against it and in spite of the
severity of the conservative attack in the Senate. The basic structure
twelve Federal Reserve banks, privately controlled, regulated and
supervised in the public interest by the capstone of the Federal
Reserve Board still remained.

The creation of the Federal Reserve System was the crowning
achievement of the first Wilson administration. The system was not
created to prevent industrial depressions or banish poverty. The framers
of the act hoped merely that it would provide the country with an
absolutely sound yet elastic currency, establish machinery for mobiliz-
ing the entire banking reserves of the country in times of financial
stringency, prevent the concentration of reserves and credit in New
York City, and, finally, preserve private enterprise in banking on the
local level while at the same time imposing a degree of public regula-
tion. On the whole, they succeeded remarkably well.

CHAPTER 3

The Mew Freedom and the
Progressive Movement, 1913-16

UNSUCCESSFUL struggle of the progressives to achieve a
reserve banking and currency system owned and operated ex-
clusively by the government underscored the dilemma in which the
American progressive movement found itself during the years imme-
diately preceding the First World War. The great impulses of the
several movements for social and economic justice were now pulsating
more strongly than before; diverse groups were in the field, campaign-
ing for stringent regulation of industry, woman suffrage, federal child
labor legislation, and advanced governmental aid to labor, farmers,
tenant farmers, and the unemployed. It was inevitable that - these
progressives x should sooner or later coalesce to put their i; program
across. The important question was whether the New Freedom phi-
losophy was sufficiently dynamic to accommodate the advanced pro-

1 Diverse though they were, the several parts of advanced progressivism were
clearly distinguishable by 1913. The more radical progressives included, first,
the several important organized groups dedicated to the cause of social justice
the American Association for Labor Legislation, the Consumers' League, the
organized social workers, the National Child Labor Committee, and the Na-
tional Association for the Advancement of Colored People. The leaders of
organized labor should also be included, even though they generally refused to
associate themselves with the professional students of labor problems. Finally,
there were the farm organizations, like the National Farmers' Union, and
shortly afterward the Non-Partisan League, that were now demanding a
dynamic program of governmental intervention in their behalf, especially the
establishment of a governmental system of long-term rural credits.

54

THE NEW FREEDOM AND THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT, 1913-16 55

gressive concepts; whether Wilson himself could abandon his liberal,
laissez-faire rationale and become a progressive statesman; whether,
in brief, there was room in the Democratic party for progressivism of
this type.

Evaluating the New Freedom at the end of the first ten months of
Wilson's incumbency, advanced progressives wolild have disagreed in
their answer to that vital question. Most of them conceded that the
Underwood tariff was a step in the right direction, even though it was
in part based on laissez-faire assumptions. They viewed the Federal
Reserve Act, however, with mixed reactions. Uncompromising progres-
sives, like La Follette, and the irreconcilable agrarians denounced it
because of the large measure of private control that it allowed, 2 while
middle-of-the-road progressives approved it as beginning a new experi-
ment in public regulation. Even so, they must have suspected that
Wilson's concessions to the progressive concept had been made under
duress and were not the result of any genuine convictions on his part.

That this suspicion was well founded was demonstrated time and
again from 1913 to 1916, by the manner in which the President either
obstructed or refused to encourage the fulfillment of a large part of the
progressive platform. There was, for example, the way in which he
maneuvered on the important question of the application of the anti-
trust law to labor unions. Since 1906 the American Federation of
Labor had waged a relentless campaign to obtain immunity from the
application of the Sherman Law to its methods of industrial warfare,
particularly the secondary boycott. 8 The Democratic platforms of 1908
and 1912 had endorsed labor's demands, and Democratic leaders in
Congress from 1911 to March, 1913, had tried conscientiously, if un-
successfully, to redeem their party's pledges.

Failing to get their contempt and injunction bills past the Republi-
can opposition, the Democratic leaders had attached a rider to the
Sundry Civil bill of 1913, prohibiting the Justice Department from
using any funds therein appropriated in the prosecution of labor unions
or farm organizations. President Taft promptly vetoed the bill, de-

2 E.g., R. M. La Follette, "Legalizing the 'Money Power/ " La Follette's
Weekly, V (Dec. 27, 1913), 1; Daniel T. Gushing, The Betrayal of the People
in the. Aldrich-Wilson Federal Reserve Act and the Rural Credits Act (Wash-
ington, 1916).

3 For a brief account of this campaign see "The Twenty-Year Struggle for
Adequate Eight-Hour Legislation," American Federationist, XX (Aug., 1913),
590-616.

56 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

nouncing the rider as "class legislation of the most vicious sort." When
the same measure came up again in the special session in April, Wilson
intimated to Congressional leaders that he would not oppose the ex-
emption. News of Wilson's apparent approval and passage of the bill
with the rider attached evoked a flood of petitions and appeals to the
President from practically every spokesman of organized capital in the
country, and from many of his personal friends as well. "The most
vicious bill ever enacted by a Congress of the United States now awaits
your approval or your dissent," exclaimed George Harvey, perhaps the
most authoritative conservative spokesman in the country. 4

Under such pressure Wilson weakened and then reversed his position.
He signed the bill on June 23 but at the same time issued a state-
ment explaining that the rider was merely an expression of Congres-
sional opinion and that he would find money in the general funds of
the Justice Department for the prosecution of any groups that broke
the antitrust law. The explanation was not convincing, either to con-
servatives or to labor leaders. "He attempts to retain the support of
those who insist upon this special privilege ... by signing the bill,"
Taft commented., "and at the same time to mitigate the indignation of
those who have regarded this as a test of his political character by con-
demning the rider in a memorandum and excusing his signature." 5
On the other hand, Samuel Gompers, president of the A.F. of L., had
tried to make it plain that labor demanded nothing less than class
legislation in its behalf; he later added that his union would not be
satisfied until the principles embodied in the rider had been written
into substantive law.

In this first critical test, however, Wilson had signified that he would
adhere to the New Freedom doctrine of "special privileges to none,"
that he would no more approve special legislation on labor's behalf
than such legislation in the interest of any other class. Using the New
Freedom doctrine to thwart the demands of the farm groups was some-
what more difficult, however, as the agrarian spokesmen constituted
perhaps a majority of the Democratic membership in Congress. Under
heavy pressure, Wilson had consented to the addition of the short-term

4 "An Appeal to the President," Harper's Weekly, LVII (May 17, 1913),
3-4; also "Six Months of Wilson," North American Review, CXCVIH (Nov..
1913), 576-587.

fi W. H. Taft to Gus J. Karger, June 25, 1913, the Papers of William Howard
Taft, in the Library of Congress.

THE NEW FREEDOM AND THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT, 1913-16 57

agricultural credit amendment to the Glass bill; but this had not in-
volved federal subvention to farmers, nor did it satisfy farm groups
throughout the country. Their chief objective was the establishment,
underwriting, and operation by the federal government of a system of
long-term credits. The question had been under discussion for many
years; all three major parties promised some form of federal aid in
their platforms of 1912. By 1913 the movement was so powerful that
no one expected the new administration to resist it.

Indeed, at the beginning of the serious discussions of the rural
credits question it appeared that no occasion for controversy would
arise. In the spring of 1913 Congress authorized the appointment by
the President of a Rural Credits Commission to study the problem and
bring in a recommendation. The Commission studied rural credits
systems in Europe during the summer; then its chairman, Senator
Duncan U. Fletcher of Florida, framed a bill that would establish a
system of privately controlled land banks, operating under federal
charter. 6 Secretary of Agriculture Houston endorsed the bill and
Wilson added his warm approval. In fact, he conferred with the joint
subcommittee of the House and Senate banking committees that had
charge of the legislation and urged prompt passage of the Fletcher bill.

Encouraged by the President's friendly attitude, the joint sub-
committee at once set to work and came up, around May 1, 1914, with
a bill that adopted more or less the framework of the system proposed
in the Fletcher plan but added a provision requiring the government
to furnish the capital of the land banks, to purchase their bonds if
private investors did not, and to operate the system. It was practically
the same rural credit bill that was finally passed in 1916. The reporting
of this, the so-called Hollis-Bulkley bill, set off a significant controversy
in the administration, significant because it pointed up Wilson's limited
view of the proper function of government. The root of the difficulty
was that the farm spokesmen were convinced a rural credits system
without governmental support and sponsorship would never succeed
in making farmers independent of private moneylenders, while Wilson
and Houston were just as strongly convinced this was no kind of busi-
ness for the federal government to engage in.

Houston cogently expressed this sentiment in a speech before the
National Grange at Manchester, New Hampshire, in November, 1913.
"I am not impressed," he said, "with the wisdom and the justice of

6 Introduced on August 9, 1913.

58 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

proposals that would take the money of all the people, through bonds
or other devices, and lend it to the farmers or to any other class at a
rate of interest lower than the economic conditions would normally
require and lower than that at which other classes are securing their
capital. This would be special legislation of a particularly odious type,
and no new excursions in this direction would be palatable when we
are engaged in the gigantic task of restoring the simple rule of equity." 7

The controversy came to a head when Representative Robert J.
Bulkley insisted on introducing the joint subcommittee's bill, in spite
of the indignant protests of Carter Glass and other administration
leaders. To head off the revolt, Majority Leader Underwood called a
caucus of the House Democrats. To the assembled throng Glass read a
fervent appeal from the President declaring he would gladly approve
the Hollis-Bulkley bill without the governmental aid feature. But,
Wilson added, "I have a very deep conviction that it is unwise and
unjustifiable to extend the credit of the Government to a single class
of the community." This, he continued, was a clear and permanent
conviction, one that had come to him, as it were, "out of fire." 8
Obviously threatening a veto of the Hollis-Bulkley bill, Wilson's letter
angered the agrarian spokesman, who avowed there would be no rural
credits legislation at all until the President changed his mind. Nor was
there any such legislation, until new political circumstances prevailed in
1916 and Wilson abruptly reversed his position,

Wilson's momentary defeat of the rural credits measure pleased the
private investors, but it generated a good deal of bitterness among the
rural leaders of the country. Efforts of Democrats like Glass and Bryan
to justify the President's stand in terms of "sound Democratic doc-
trine" * made little sense to editors of farm papers -and presidents of
granges and farmers' unions. When Congress reconvened in December,
1914, Senator Henry F. Hollis warned the President that he and
Bulkley planned to renew their campaign, even though Wilson's
Annual Message had relegated rural credits legislation to the scrap
heap. 1 ' Pressure from the rural sections mounted during the following

7 Quoted in Commercial West, XXIV (Nov. 22, 1913), 7-8.

18 Wilson to Glass, May 12, 1914, the Woodrow Wilson Papers, in the
Library of Congress.

* Glass to D. G. Pryer, July 9, 1914, the Papers of Carter Glass, in the
Library of the University of Virginia; Glass to Herbert Myrick, May 18, 1914,
ibid.; "Rural Credits Legislation," The Commoner, June, 1914.

10 Hollis to Wilson, Dec. 11, 1914, Wilson Papers. In his Annual Message of

THE NEW FREEDOM AND THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT, 1913-16 59

months. Without warning to administration leaders, the Senate on
February 25, 1915, adopted an amendment to the agricultural ap-
propriation bill providing for the establishment of a rural credits system
in the Treasury Department. A few days later, on March 2, the House
approved the Hollis-Bulkley bill, but the session expired before the
conference committee could agree, and the President was spared the
embarrassment of vetoing a bill that had overwhelming support in
Congress and among the farmers of the country.

Thus Wilson successfully stood off the movements designed to swing
the influence and financial support of the federal government to labor
unions and farmers in their struggle for advancement. His strong con-
viction that there were definite limits beyond which the federal
authority should not be extended was demonstrated, again, in the
manner in which he thwarted the campaign of the social justice groups
to commit the administration to a positive program of social legis-
lation.

One of the chief objectives of the reformers, for example, was a
federal child labor law. A model bill, drafted by the National Child
Labor Committee, was introduced in the House by Representative A.
Mitchell Palmer on January 26, 1914. It would be incorrect to say
Wilson opposed it; he simply refused to support it because he thought
it was unconstitutional. 11 And so long as he withheld his aggressive
support the bill would never get past the Senate.

Another social justice objective was woman suffrage. Here, again,
Wilson did not openly fight the cause but rather refused to aid it. And
Southern opposition in Congress was so strong that without Wilson's
most determined effort applied in its behalf a suffrage amendment
could never obtain the necessary two-thirds vote. Wilson probably did

December 8, 1914, Wilson had declared: "The great subject of rural credits
still remains to be dealt with, and it is a matter of deep regret that the diffi-
culties of the subject have seemed to render it impossible to complete a bill for
passage at this session. But it can not be perfected yet, and therefore there are
no other constructive measures the necessity for which I will at this time call
your attention to." Ray S. Baker and William E. Dodd (eds.), The Public
Papers of Woodrow Wilson (6 vols., New York, 1925-27), The New De-
mocracy, I, 220.

11 In early January, 1914, a delegation of leaders in the child labor reform
movement requested an interview with the President. "Glad to see these gentle-
men," Wilson replied, in a note to Tumulty, "but they ought to know, in all
frankness, that no child labor law yet proposed has seemed to me constitu-
tional." Wilson to Tumulty, inscribed at the bottom of Tumulty to Wilson, Jan.
24, 1914, Wilson Papers.

6<> WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

not believe it was proper for a lady to vote> but the excuse he always
gave the delegations of suffragettes who visited him was that he was
bound hand and foot in the matter because the Democratic platform
had not approved a suffrage amendment. 12 Some of the interviews
were not pleasant affairs, as the ladies could be brutally frank. For
example, Mrs. Glendower Evans of Boston, who had escorted a large
delegation of working women to the White House on February 2, 1915,
reminded the President that in 1912 he had led her to believe he
would support woman suffrage. Wilson replied that he had then
spoken as an individual, but that he was now speaking as a representa-
tive of his party. "Of course," Mrs. Evans shot back, "you were gun-
ning for votes then." Wilson's face turned red, but he managed a weak
smile. On the occasion of the sixth visitation by petitioning females,
however, he finally confessed that he was "tied to a conviction" that
the states alone should control the suffrage.

A third item of the program supported by many leaders of the
social justice movement was the imposition of some restriction on the
enormous numbers of immigrants then coining to American shores.
Restriction or, if possible, putting an end altogether to immigration
had long been a prime objective of the A.F. of L. and other labor
groups, whose spokesmen claimed unrestricted immigration operated
to depress wages in the United States. Appalled by the dire effects of
unrestrained immigration on American institutions, a number of lead-
ing sociologists and social workers supported the movement. 13 More-
over, the restrictionists were also strongly supported by anti-Catholic
and anti- Jewish elements.

The device favored by the restrictionists and exclusionists of that
day, the literacy test, was embodied in the Burnett general immigration
bill, which the House approved on February 4, 1914, and the Senate
on January 2, 1915. From the beginning of the debates in the House,
Wilson had intimated he would veto the immigration bill if it included
the literacy test. After the House passed the bill, he frankly warned
Senate leaders that he would veto the measure if they did not strike

New York Times, Dec. 9, 1914; Elizabeth Glendower Evans, "An
Audience at the White House," La Follette's Weekly, VI (Feb. 14, 1914), 5, 15.
18 Among them were Henry P. Fairchild of Yale, Edward A. Ross of Wis-
consin, Jeremiah W. Jenks of New York University, Thomas N. Carver of
Harvard, Dean Leon G. Marshall of the University of Chicago, and Robert A.
Woods of South End House, Boston. See H. P. Fairchild to Wilson, Mar. 17,
1914, Wilson Papers.

THE NEW FREEDOM AND THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT, 1913-16 6 1

out the disputed provision. 14 Whether he thus acted out of conviction
or for reasons of expediency, it is impossible to say/ 5 but when the
Senate approved the Burnett bill in toto he replied with a ringing
veto. "Those who come seeking opportunity are not to be admitted
unless they have already had one of the chief of the opportunities
they seek, the opportunity of education," he asserted. "The object of
such provisions is restriction, not selection." 16 Two years later, in
January, 1917, Congress re-enacted the Burnett bill. Wilson replied
again with a stirring veto, but this time the forces of restriction were
not to be denied victory, and the House on February 1 and the Senate
on February 5 overrode the veto.

One great measure of social justice, the Seamen's bill, had the
President's approval in the beginning, as its purpose was only to free
American sailors from the bondage of their contracts and to strengthen
maritime safety requirements. Any recital of how this measure was
passed should begin by taking account of the devotion and twenty
years' unrequited labor of the president of the Seamen's Union,
Andrew Furuseth "one of the heroes of the world, who . . . for-
feited money, position, comfort and everything else to fight the battle
"of the common sailor." ir Furuseth finally found sponsors for his bill

14 Wilson to Senator E. D. Smith, Mar. 5, 1914, ibid.

15 Senator John Sharp Williams urged Wilson not to veto the Burnett bill.
Wilson's reply indicated that political considerations were uppermost in his
mind. He wrote : "I find myself in a very embarrassing situation about that bill.
Nothing is more distasteful to me than to set my judgment against so many of
my friends and associates in public life, but frankly stated the situation is this:
I myself personally made the most explicit statements at the time of the presi-
dential election about this subject to groups of our fellow-citizens of foreign
extraction whom I wished to treat with perfect frankness and for whom I had
entire respect. In view of what I said to them, I do not see how it will be pos-
sible for me to give my assent to the bill. I know that you will appreciate the
scruple upon which I act." Wilson to Williams, Jan. 7, 1915, ibid.

" The Public Papers, New Democracy, I, 254.

It should be pointed out here that during this long controversy a number of
the social justice leaders strongly opposed any form of restriction. See, e.g., Jane
Addams to Wilson, Jan. 29, 1915, Wilson Papers; Stephen S. Wise to Wilson,
Jan. 29, 1915, ibid.; The Public, XVIII (Feb. 5, 1915), 121.

The large employers of labor and their spokesmen, the spokesmen of the
Italian-, Polish-, Hungarian-, and Russian-American societies, and the repre-
sentatives of the Jewish community in the United States, however, were the
real leaders in the fight against any form of restriction. The author could find
no evidence that the Catholic Church entered the controversy on the political
level.

17 William Kent to Norman Hapgood, June 16, 1914, the Papers of William
Kent, in the Library of Yale University.

62 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

in the Sixty-Second Congress, Representative William B. Wilson and
Senator La Follette. It passed the House in 1912 and the Senate in
1913, only to receive a pocket veto from President Taft in the closing
days of his administration.

Had the Seamen's bill been merely a matter of domestic concern
it would probably have been promptly re-enacted by the Sixty-Third
Congress and signed by the President. Before the international rami-
fications of the measure were brought home to him, for example,
Wilson was cordially disposed and promised to support the bill.
Trouble arose, however., because the measure in effect abrogated the
contractual obligations of alien seamen on foreign ships in American
ports, thus violating treaties with all the maritime powers. 18 More-
over, the United States had consented to send delegates to an inter-
national conference on safety at sea in London in November, 1913; it
seemed hardly courteous for the nation that had taken the initiative
in calling the conference to act unilaterally before it could meet.

The envoys of several of the great powers expressed these objections
emphatically to the Secretary of State, but Wilson was not disturbed
until John Bassett Moore, Counselor of the State Department, called
his attention to them on October 16, 1913. By this time it was too late
to stop action by the Senate, which on October 23 adopted the
Furuseth bill sponsored by La Follette. The administration blocked
action by the House, however, and the American delegates, Furuseth
among them, went to the London conference unembarrassed by any
prior action by their government. Furuseth resigned and came home
when the conference adopted safety requirements that did not meet
the standards of his own bill. The rest of the American delegates
stayed on, however, and helped draft a Convention that imposed uni-
form and generally rigid safety standards on the vessels of all maritime
powers.

The administration was now in another dilemma. Should the
United States ratify the Convention on Safety at Sea unconditionally,
which would mean abandoning the Furuseth bill, or should it ratify
with a reservation that would leave room for the passage of that
measure? Wilson let the State and Commerce departments, which in-

18 The United States had entered into treaties with the maritime powers
providing for the arrest of foreign seamen who deserted while their ships were
in American ports. The Seamen's bill would have unilaterally abrogated these
treaties.

THE NEW FREEDOM AND THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT, 1913-16 63

sisted on unconditional ratification, make the decision ; and he reversed
his own support of the Furuseth bill and applied administration
pressure toward speedy ratification of the Convention. Thus a bitter
controversy ensued between the administration and some of the
progressive leaders in Congress. In the end the progressives won. The
House passed a modified version of the Furuseth bill on August 27,
1914; the Senate in December ratified the Convention with a sweeping
reservation; and three months later both houses ratified the conference
report.

Events now moved swiftly to a conclusion. Bryan urged the Presi-
dent to give the bill a pocket veto, 19 and the newspapers on March 1,
1915, predicted that this would be the measure's fate. Furuseth
appealed in a moving letter, begging Wilson to approve the legislation
for which he had fought so long, and Wilson replied in words indicat-
ing he had no alternative but to follow the advice of the State De-
partment. The same day, March 2, La Follette, Furuseth, and Senator
Owen called on Bryan. Bryan had never heard of Furuseth, but he
was so shaken by the old sailor's plea that he at once reversed his
position. 20 La Follette added his personal promise that Congress would
give the State Department ample time in which to abrogate old
treaties and negotiate new ones. Wilson signed the Furuseth bill on
March 4, but apparently not without considerable soul searching. "I
debated the matter of signing the bill very earnestly indeed . . .," he
explained, "and finally determined to sign it because it seemed the
only chance to get something like justice done to a class of workmen
who have been too much neglected by our laws." 21

The dearth in administration circles of any impelling passion for
social justice was nowhere better illustrated than in the government's
policy toward Negroes during Wilson's magistracy. During the cam-
paign of 1912 Wilson had appealed for Negro support, and spokesmen
for the cause of racial democracy, among them being Oswald Garrison
Villard, William E. B. Du Bois, and William Monroe Trotter, had

19 On the grounds that passage of the bill would require the United States to
denounce unilaterally some twenty-two treaties with maritime nations. Bryan to
Wilson, Feb. 27, 1915, the Papers of William Jennings Bryan, in the National
Archives. See also Bryan to Wilson, Mar. 1, 1915, Wilson Papers, and Robert
Lansing to Bryan, Mar. 1, 1915, ibid.

20 Bryan also urged the President " to suggest that the Seamen's bill be
amended so as to give the State Department time in which to abrogate the
treaties. Bryan to Wilson, Mar. 2, 1915, ibid.

21 Wilson to Newton D. Baker, Mar. 5, 1915, ibid.

64 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

accepted his promises and worked for his election. Soon after Wilson's
inauguration, Oswald Garrison Villard, one of the founders of the Na-
tional Association for the Advancement of Colored People and pub-
lisher of the New York Evening Post and the Nation, called at the
White House and presented a plan for the appointment of a National
Race Commission to study the whole problem of race relations in the
United States. Wilson seemed "wholly sympathetic" to the suggestion,
and Villard left for a visit to Europe, confident Wilson would soon be
ready to appoint the Commission. 22 He returned in July and tried
several times to see the President, but Wilson refused to grant him an
interview. Finally, when Villard appealed in personal terms, Wilson
had to tell him that the political situation was too delicate for any
such action, that the appointment of the Commission would incite the
resentment of Southerners in Congress, whose votes he needed for the
success of his legislative program. 23

Villard's disappointment over Wilson's abandonment of the Race
Commission was nothing, however, as compared with his consternation
at the way in which Southern race concepts had gained ascendancy
in Congress and in the administration. Southerners were riding high in
Washington for the first time since the Civil War, demanding segrega-
tion in the government departments and public services and the dis-
missal or down-grading of Negro civil servants.

Throughout his incumbency, Wilson stood firm against the cruder
demands of the white supremacists, but he and probably all of his
Cabinet believed in segregation, social and official. The issue first arose
on April 11, 1913, when Burleson suggested segregating all Negroes in
the federal services. If there were any defenders of the Negro or any
foes of segregation in the Cabinet they did not then or afterward raise
their voice. 24 Shortly afterward the Bureau of the Census, the Post
Office Department, and the Bureau of Printing and Engraving quietly
began to segregate workers in offices, shops, rest rooms, and res-

22 O. G. Villard to R. H. Leavell, May 15, 1913, the Papers of Oswald
Garrison Villard, in Houghton Library, Harvard University. Villard's plan was
explained in A Proposal for a National Race Commission to be appointed by
the President of the United States, Suggested by the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People (n.p., n.d.).

as Villard to Wilson, Aug. 18, 1913, Villard Papers; Wilson to Villard, Aug.
21, 1913, ibid. Wilson made this point even clearer in a conversation with John
Palmer Gavit on October 1, 1913, for an account of which see Gavit to Villard,
Oct. 1, 1913, ibid.

24 The Diary of Josephus Daniels, in the Library of Congress, Apr. 11, 1913.

THE NEW FREEDOM AND THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT, 1913-16 65

taurants. Employees who objected were discharged. 25 Moreover, fed-
eral Post Office and Treasury officials in the South were given free
rein to discharge and down-grade Negro employees. The postmaster of
Atlanta, for example, discharged thirty-five Negroes. "There are no
Government positions for Negroes in the South," the Collector of
Internal Revenue in Georgia announced. "A Negro's place is in the
cornfield." 26

There had been segregation in the government departments before,
to be sure, but it had been informal and unofficial. Now it seemed that
for the first time since the Civil War the federal government had
placed its approval on the Southern caste system. Needless to say,
Negroes throughout the country were shocked and confused by this
action of an administration that promised a new freedom for all the
people. "I have recently spent several days in Washington, and I have
never seen the colored people so discouraged and bitter as they are at
the present time," the great leader of the Negroes wrote. 27 "We had
looked forward in the hope that under your guidance all this would be
changed," another Negro leader wrote the President, "but the cold
facts presented to us show that these cherished hopes are to be dashed
to the ground and that for a while longer we must continue to drink
from this bitter cup." 28

The anger of the Negro leaders at the new segregation policies was
the natural reaction of a group who had hopefully supported the man
they were sure would deal with them compassionately. More surprising,
however, was the manner in which a large part of the progressive
leadership of the North and Middle West rose in fervent protest.
Villard and his Nation and New York Evening Post and the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People first sounded the
alarm, and the storm of protests from editors, clergymen, and civic
leaders that followed gave ample proof that the old spirit of equali-
tarianism was not dead,

Wilson was visibly surprised and greatly disturbed by the furor his

26 May Ghilds Nerney to Oswald G. Villard, Sept. 30, 1913, Wilson Papers,
is the report by an investigator for the National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People. For other analyses see J. P. Gavit in New York
Evening Post, Oct. 21, 1913, and William Monroe Trotter, "Federal Segrega-
tion Under Pres. Wilson," Boston Guardian, Oct. 25, 1913.

26 Atlanta Georgian and News, Oct. 7, 1913.

27 Booker T. Washington to O. G. Villard, Aug. 10, 1913, Wilson Papers.

28 W. F. Powell to Wilson, Aug. 25, 1913, ibid.

66 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

subordinates had provoked. From the beginning of the controversy,
however, he contended that segregation was being instituted in the
interest of the Negroes, and throughout he stoutly maintained this
position. "I would say that I do approve of the segregation that is
being attempted in several of the departments," he wrote, for example,
to the editor of the influential Congregationalist. 29 Moreover, when the
militant Boston Negro spokesman, William Monroe Trotter, headed a
delegation to carry a protest to the White House and spoke rashly, the
President virtually ordered him out.

In every respect the whole affair was tragic and unfortunate one
of the worst blots on the administration's record. It was more than
even Wilson's staunchest editorial supporter, Frank Gobb, could
stomach. "It is a small, mean, petty discrimination/' he cried in pro-
test, "and Mr. Wilson ought to have set his heel upon this presumptu-
ous Jim-Grow government the moment it was established. He ought to
set his heel upon it now. It is a reproach to his Administration and to
the great political principles which he represents." 30

Although the President never set his heel upon Jim Crow, the forth-
right protests of the liberal North had some effect. -The Treasury De-
partment reversed its policy and began quietly to eliminate segrega-
tion. But more important was the fact that the segregation movement
in other departments was entirely checked. Jim Crowism was not
rooted out of the federal government, to be sure, but at least the white
supremacists were less bold and far less successful after 1913.

The segregation affair caused many progressives to wonder what
kind of progressive Wilson was. Their confusion was compounded,
moreover, by the perplexing reversals that Wilson executed when he
proceeded to complete his legislative program by fulfilling his pledges
to strengthen the antitrust laws.

Wilson had fabricated the New Freedom program in 1912 largely
out of promises to destroy monopoly and restore free competition. He
had, moreover, evolved a fairly definite remedy, which was to rewrite
the rules of business practice so clearly that there could be no doubt as
to their meaning, and to enforce these rules by the normal processes of
prosecution and adjudication. Not until the middle of November,
1913, however, when the Underwood bill was passed and the Federal
Reserve bill was safely on its way to passage in the Senate, did Wilson

2 Wilson to Rev. H. A. Bridgman, Sept. 8, 1913, ibid.
3 New York World, Nov. 13, 1914.

THE NEW FREEDOM AND THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT, 1913-16 67

give any thought to details. On November 20 he began a long series of
conferences with Democratic leaders in Congress, seeking their views
and requesting them to submit their recommendations. The news that
the President was determined to carry through with antitrust legisla-
tion also provoked the introduction of a bewildering variety of bills
when Congress convened in December.

By the middle of December most of the recommendations were in,
and it was evident that progressive opinion was divided over the
remedy. The main body of Democrats desired merely an interpretative
amendment of the Sherman Act, to define precisely the prohibitions
against restraint of trade, to outlaw interlocking directorates of all
kinds, and to narrow and clarify the "rule of reason," promulgated by
the Supreme Court in 19 II. 31 A minority of Democrats and practically
all progressive Republicans, on the other hand, agreed with Theodore
Roosevelt that this was a na'ive solution, that it would be impossible to
define by statute every conceivable restraint of trade. They wanted
instead a powerful, independent trade commission armed with broad
authority and capable of suppressing unfair competition whenever it
arose and under whatever guise. 32

Wilson had to choose, therefore, between what he called the "two
ways open to us" in brief, to choose between the solution he had
offered in 1912 and the program that Roosevelt and his friends cham-
pioned. He pondered this question during his vacation at Pass Chris-
tian, Mississippi, over the Christmas holidays, and if there was any
doubt in his mind it was quickly resolved. He would press ahead for
legislation along New Freedom lines, in spite of the great pressure that
was being brought to bear upon him by personal friends and spokes-
men of the great business interests to abandon his efforts, in spite of
the seeming surrender of the House of Morgan, when it announced on

81 The rule of reason, first promulgated by the Supreme Court in the
Standard Oil case in May, 1911 (221 U.S. I) and shortly afterward reaffirmed
in the American Tobacco case (221 U.S. 106), represented a triumph for Chief
Justice Edward D. White, who, since 1897, had contended that the framers of
the Sherman Act had intended to outlaw only unreasonable, or direct, restraints
of trade, not reasonable restraints that were normally ancillary to most contracts.

Some Democrats, notably John Sharp Williams and Bryan, wanted to abolish
the rule of reason altogether and outlaw every restraint of trade, whether direct
or ancillary. See J. S. Williams to Wilson, Jan. 13, 1914, Wilson Papers.

82 For an analysis of such proposals see J. E. Davies to Wilson, Dec. 27, 1913,
and "Memorandum of Recommendations as to Trust Legislation by Joseph E.
Davies, Commissioner of Corporations," both in ibid.

68 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

January 2, 1914, its withdrawal from thirty directorships in banks,
railroads, and industrial firms. 83

Soon after his return to Washington, Wilson had full-dress con-
ferences with Congressional leaders, who agreed to support the pro-
gram the administration had formulated. Then, appearing for the
fifth time before a joint session, the President explained in unusual
detail the kind of legislation he had in mind. He brandished no flam-
ing sword against business, however, but offered an olive branch of
peace and the hope of permanent accommodation. "The antagonism
between business and Government is over," he said several times, as if
to emphasize that he was speaking for the best business thought of the
country. 84

Wilson's program was embodied in three bills, originally drawn by
Chairman Henry D. Clayton of the House Judiciary Committee, which
were soon combined into one measure, known as the Clayton bill. It
enumerated and prohibited a series of unfair trade practices, outlawed
in unqualified terms interlocking directorates and stockholdings, and
gave private parties benefit of decisions in suits that the government
had originated. A fourth bill, prepared by Representatives Clayton,
James H. Covington, and William C. Adamson and Senator Francis
G. Newlands, created an interstate trade commission to supplant the
Bureau of Corporations. The new commission would be no independ-
ent arbiter of business practices, however, but would serve merely as
the right arm of the Justice Department in antitrust matters. Actually,
it was the Bureau of Corporations, under a new name and with a little
more power as Wilson said, no "dangerous experiment," but a "safe
and sensible" agency that all Democrats could approve. A final feature
of the program was the bill prepared by Representative Sam Rayburn
of Texas and Louis D. Brandeis, to give the Interstate Commerce
Commission control over the issuance of new securities by the rail-
roads. 35

This, therefore, was the substance of the original Wilson program for

33 The New York Times, Jan. 3, 1914.

3 * The Public Papers, New Democracy, I, 81-88.

35 This measure passed the House on June 5, 1914, but later died in the
Senate, in part a casualty of the panic that the war evoked. During the early
months of the war the American security markets were in a chaotic condition;
the New York Stock Exchange was closed; and the railroads were in a state
approaching insolvency. Administration leaders decided, therefore, to drop the
Rayburn bill entirely.

THE NEW FREEDOM AND THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT, 1913-16 69

trust reform. No sooner was it proposed, however, than there arose a
storm of confusing dissent and criticism. The "Money Trust" expert,
Samuel Untermyer, rushed to Washington and pointed to many weak-
nesses in the Clayton bill. Brandeis, who was now spending most of his
time in Washington, was evolving an entirely new solution, the corner-
stone of which was the strengthening of small business by fair-trade
price laws. Progressives and the representatives of small business were
up in arms in protest against the plan for a weak interstate trade com-
mission. And to compound the difficulty. Democratic leaders in Con-
gress began to quarrel among themselves over jurisdiction and details.
It seemed no one knew what to do or how to do it

The most serious controversy of all, however, was that which oc-
curred when the labor leaders and spokesmen in Congress read the
Clayton bill and found nothing in it to give labor unions exemption
from the application of the antitrust laws. Gompers and his colleagues
in the A.F. of L. had supported Wilson in 1912 and had confidently
expected the administration to stand by the Democratic platform
pledges to exempt labor and farm organizations from the penalties of
the Sherman law. They were now up in arms, threatening the Demo-
crats with loss of labor's vote if these demands were not conceded.
"Without further delay," Gompers declared, "the citizens of the United
States must decide whether they wish to outlaw organized labor." 86

In this bitter controversy Wilson and his Congressional leaders stood
absolutely firm. The most they would concede was a compromise
amendment providing for jury trials in cases of criminal contempt,
circumscribing the issuance of injunctions in labor disputes, and de-
claring that neither farm nor labor unions should be considered as
illegal combinations in restraint of trade when they lawfully sought
to obtain legitimate objectives. 37 This did not go far enough to suit the

S6 New York World, Mar. 1, 1914.

37 Wilson was emphatic in declaring that the provision did not authorize labor
unions to use methods of industrial warfare that had previously been con-
demned by the courts. The New York Times, June 2, 1914; New York World,
June 2, 1914.

Representative E. Y. Webb of North Carolina, who framed the compromise
provision, further explained :

"The framers of the Sherman law never intended to place labor organizations
and farmers' organizations under the ban of that law. The existence of a labor
of farmers' union never has been unlawful, and is not unlawful today, but it
was decided to place in the statutory law of the country a recognition of the
rights of those organizations to exist and carry out their lawful purposes.

7O WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

labor leaders, whose spokesmen in Congress 3S went to the White
House on April 30 and threatened to join the Republicans in defeating
the administration's antitrust program if labor's demand for complete
immunity were not granted. Wilson would not budge, however, and
the labor congressmen and union officials had to accept the compro-
mise, which was better than nothing.

With the compromise labor provision included, the House passed the
Clayton bill, along with the interstate trade commission and railroad
securities bills, by overwhelming majorities on June 5, 1914. The
House's action brought to an end the New Freedom phase of antitrust
legislation, that is, of legislation based upon the assumption that all
that was required was merely to make more specific the prohibitions
against restraint of trade. From this point forward, progress away from
this concept was uninterrupted, until in the end Wilson accepted
almost entirely the New Nationalism's solution for the regulation of
business by a powerful trade commission. The metamorphosis in ad-
ministration policy was gradual, and the story of how it evolved is
complicated; but the major reasons for the change are clear.

To begin with, there is much evidence that Wilson was growing un-
certain as to the manner in which the broad objectives of his program
should be accomplished. His attitude toward the industrial problem
was conditioned by his belief that the vast majority of businessmen
were honest and desired only the public good. Thus his objective was
chiefly to strengthen the altruistic tendencies in the business com-
munity; and he began to wonder whether this could be done by rigid,
inflexible laws that might only further alienate and confuse the honest
businessman.

On the other hand, a large minority of the Democrats the Southern
agrarians and the Bryan followers proposed legislation to destroy the
oligarchical economic structure: stringent federal regulation of stock
exchanges; " a graduated corporation tax that would bear so heavily

"After the original Section 7 of the Anti-trust bill was drawn, certain repre-
sentatives of labor contended that the section did not give labor all it was
entitled to and demanded that we should make the section provide that the
anti-trust laws should not apply to labor organizations. The acceptance of this
amendment would have placed labor organizations beyond the pale of the
anti-trust law entirely, which neither the president nor the members of the
[Judiciary] committee would agree to." The New York Times, June 14, 1914.

38 Representatives David J. Lewis of Maryland, Edward Keating of Colorado,
Isaac R. Sherwood of Ohio, and John J. Casey of Pennsylvania.

39 This was one of the recommendations of the Pujo Committee and was
strongly supported by Samuel Unterrnyer and Senator Robert L. Owen of

THE NEW FREEDOM AND THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT, 1913-16 ?I

on the great combinations as to put them out of business; limiting a
corporation or holding company usually to about one-third the total
product of any given industry; * abolition of the "rule of reason"; and
the complete destruction of the complicated network of interlocking
relationships among banks^ railroads, corporations, and insurance com-
panies. 41 This program went far beyond anything Wilson envisaged at
any time. For example, he did not object to bigness per se; he only
wanted to prevent the great interests from using their power to stifle
new growth and competition. And he was beginning to doubt that the
Clayton bill and the weak interstate trade commission bill offered an
effective remedy.

In the second place, the spokesmen of the business community, par-
ticularly the United States Chamber of Commerce, had embraced the
ideal of the "self-regulation" of business. What they desired most was
legislation prohibiting unfair trade practices, with a trade commission
to pass upon the legality of practices and to serve as a friendly adviser
to businessmen. The suggestion found strong support in the Senate and
among progressives generally, as it seemed to offer a simple solution to
a perplexing difficulty.

Just at the moment when Wilson seemed most confused and uncer-
tain, Louis D. Brandeis took up the strong trade commission idea and
persuaded the President to adopt it also. Since October, 1913, Brandeis
had been hard at work, in Boston and Washington, on the antitrust
question. His close friend and associate, George L. Rublee of New
York, had joined the "people's lawyer," and together the two men
drafted a Federal Trade Commission bill that was introduced by
Representative Raymond B. Stevens, Democrat of New Hampshire.
The Stevens bill in general terms outlawed unfair trade practices and
established a trade commission endowed with plenary authority to
oversee business activity and by the issuance of cease and desist orders
to prevent the illegal suppression of competition.

Oklahoma. Early in the Congressional discussions of antitrust legislation the
President let it be known he did not favor the stock exchange bill. The New
York Times, Jan. 23, 1914.

40 The report of the House committee, headed by A. O. Stanley of Kentucky,
which investigated United States Steel in 1911-12, proposed that there should
be a presumption of restraint of trade when a single corporation or holding
company controlled at least 30 per cent of the output of a single industry.
House Report, No. 1127, 62d Gong., 2d sess. (Washington, 1912), p. 214.

41 This was the desire and determination, often voiced, of practically all the
so-called radical Democrats in the House of Representatives.

72 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

Wilson and Congressional leaders first learned the details of the
Brandeis-Rublee plan in the latter part of April, 1914. The chairman
of the House Commerce Committee, William C. Adamson of Georgia,
was aghast at the proposal, declaring it proposed giving an administra-
tive agency power to make law. Wilson said nothing at first, but after
the antitrust bills were safely through the House he called Brandeis,
Rublee, and Stevens to the White House on June 10 and told them he
had decided to make the Stevens bill the cornerstone of his antitrust
program. How the President was won over to the idea of a strong trade
commission is nowhere evident. In any event, three days after the
White House conference the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee
reported the Federal Trade Commission bill with the Stevens bill as an
amendment. There then followed several weeks of debate in the
Senate, during which time Wilson, Brandeis, and Rublee worked
feverishly to overcome old-line Democratic and conservative opposition
to Section 5, empowering the Commission to issue cease and desist
orders. After adopting amendments guaranteeing broad court review
of the Commission's orders, the Senate passed the bill on August 5 by
a bipartisan vote of fifty-three to sixteen. The House agreed a month
later, and the measure became law on September 10. "If the bill is
wrong I shall be much to blame," Rublee wrote. "I drafted the con-
ference report which was agreed to. Section 5 is exactly as I wanted it
to be." 42

Meanwhile, after he espoused the Brandeis-Rublee plan, Wilson
seemed to lose all interest in the Clayton bill. It was cut adrift in the
Senate, with the result that one after another of its strong provisions
was so weakened as to make it in many particulars almost innocuous.
For example, instead of forbidding exclusive selling contracts, inter-
locking directorates, or interlocking stockholdings outright, the words
"where the effect may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce," or words of similar pur-
port, wfcre inserted after all the prohibitions. 43

"When the Clayton bill was first written," Senator James A. Reed of
Missouri exclaimed, "it was a raging lion with a mouth full of teeth.
It has degenerated to a tabby cat with soft gums, a plaintive mew, and

42 Rublee to Brandeis, Oct. 6, 1914, the Papers of Louis D. Brandeis, in the
Law School Library of the University of Louisville.

43 For a good analysis of the weakening of the Clayton bill see Henry R.
Seager and Charles A. Gulick, Jr., Trust and Corporation Problems (New York,
1929), pp. 420-422.

THE NEW FREEDOM AND THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT, 1913-16 73

an anaemic appearance. It is a sort of legislative apology to the trusts,
delivered hat in hand, and accompanied by assurances that no dis-
courtesy is intended." * 4 Wilson, too, complained that Senator Culber-
son, chairman of the Judiciary Committee, had made the bill "so weak
that you cannot tell it from water." 45 Of course this was largely true,
but it was true because the administration had put all faith in the
trade commission plan and had given up its effort to prohibit restraints
of trade by statutory action.

Farm and labor leaders, meanwhile, had been striving mightily with
the Senate to win the concessions the President and House of Repre-
sentatives had denied them. On July 30, Gompers, Frank Morrison,
secretary-treasurer of the A.F. of L., the legislative representatives of
the railroad brotherhoods, the general counsel of the Fanners' Union,
and the secretary of the Farmers' National Congress addressed an im-
portant appeal to the Senate Judiciary Committee. The letter reviewed
the labor provisions of the Clayton bill, as it had passed the House, and
pointed out specifically the changes that were necessary to satisfy labor
and farm demands. The effect of the suggested changes would have
been to give to labor and farm organizations the immunity from the
penalties of the Sherman law they were seeking.

A comparison of the labor-farm demands with the labor provisions
of the Clayton bill as it passed the Senate and conference committee
reveals that the Senate, like the President and the House of Repre-
sentatives, stood absolutely firm in resisting these demands. The Senate
made one change that became famous but was not important. At the
suggestion of Senator Albert B. Cummins, it amended the provision to
read, "The labor of human beings is not a commodity or article of
commerce," which phrase was nothing more than a pious expression
of senatorial opinion and did not change labor's standing before the
law.* 6

In any event, the labor provisions of the act apparently pleased
everyone. Gompers hailed them as labor's "Magna Carta" 47 and after-

, New York Times, Sept. 29, 1914.

*5 The Diary of Edward M. House, in the Papers of Edward M. House, in
the Library of Yale University, Oct. 2, 1914.

46 That the labor provisions of the Clayton Act did not confer immunity from
prosecution on farm and labor unions was the opinion of practically every re-
sponsible contemporary observer. See, e.g., the cogent essay, " 'Labor Is Not a
Commodity,' " New Republic, IX (Dec. 2, 1916), 112-114, or W. H. Taft to
G. W. Wickersham, Oct. 31, Nov. 8, 1914, Taft Papers.

47 "Labor's Magna Carta Demand It," American Federationist, XXI (July,
1914), 553-557; ibid. (Oct., 1914), 866-867.

74 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

ward tried desperately to convince himself and the country that labor
was freed from the restraints of the antitrust laws. On the other ex-
treme, the general counsel of the American Anti-Boycott Association
was also entirely satisfied with the legislation. "The bill makes few
changes in existing laws relating to labor unions, injunctions and con-
tempts of court/' he observed, "and those are of slight practical im-
portance." * 8

With the appointment of the Federal Trade Commission on Febru-
ary 22, 1915, the administration launched its experiment in the regula-
tion of business enterprise. It is well, however, to understand the spirit
in which the experiment was conceived and the purposes that Wilson
and his colleagues hoped to accomplish. They were chiefly purposes
friendly to business. As Redfield later put it, Wilson hoped to "create
in the Federal Trade Commission a counsellor and friend to the busi-
ness world. ... It was no large part of his purpose that the Federal
Trade Commission should be primarily a policeman to wield a club
over the head of the business community. Rather the reverse was true
and the restraining powers of the Commission were thought a neces-
sary adjunct which he hoped and expected to be of minor rather than
of major use." 4%9

Progressives like Brandeis and Rublee, who hoped the Commission
would become a dynamic factor in American economic life, were
bitterly disappointed when it failed to do anything constructive during
the first years of its life. Brandeis later correctly observed that Wilson
had ruined the Commission by his choice of commissioners. "It was a
stupid administration," he recalled. 50 The chairman, Joseph E. Davies
of Wisconsin, lacked force and judgment. In fact, the only really com-
petent appointee, Rublee, was prevented from serving because the
Senate refused to confirm his nomination. 51 Davies proved so incom-
petent that in June, 1916, the majority of the Commission deposed him
and made Edward N. Hurley, a Chicago industrialist, chairman. Hurley

48 Daniel Davenport, in Springfield Republican, Oct. 11, 1914.

49 W. G. Redfield, "Woodrow Wilson: An Appreciation,' 1 in the Ray Stan-
nard Baker Collection, in the Library of Congress; see also A. W. Shaw, MS of
interview on Jan. 4, 1915, with Wilson, in Wilson Papers.

50 R. S. Baker, interview with L. D. Brandeis, Mar. 23, 1929, Baker Collec-
tion.

51 Jacob H. Gallinger of New Hampshire, minority leader in the Senate,
objected to the appointment on personal grounds and the Senate refused to
confirm Rublee, in spite of the President's strenuous efforts to obtain confirma-
tion.

THE NEW FREEDOM AND THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT, 1913-16 75

was certainly abler than Davies; but he devoted his talents to making
the Commission useful to businessmen and to preaching the doctrine of
co-operation between government and business. And under his leader-
ship, the Commission practically abandoned its role as watchdog of
business practices. It was little wonder, therefore, that, on reviewing
the situation on the eve of America's entry into the war, Rublee con-
cluded that the Commission was on the rocks. 52

The weakening of the administration's antitrust program was only
the first sign of a general reaction that began to set in around the be-
ginning of 1914 and increasingly affected the administration and the
President. The chief cause of the ebbing of the reform impulse was
the insidious depression that began during the fall of 1913 and
mounted in severity during the late winter and spring of 1914. It was
a world-wide phenomenon, the result of the tightening of credit in
Europe because of the Balkan Wars and the fear of a general war. 53
But in the United States the Republicans blamed the Underwood tariff
and Wilson's antitrust measures. Business failures increased, production
sagged, and unemployment was widespread and especially acute in the
large cities. 54 Wilson and administration leaders like McAdoo tried to
persuade themselves and the public that no real depression existed.
Actually, however, they were seriously alarmed, and their concern in-
evitably evidenced itself in administration policies.

To begin with, in the spring of 1914 the President embarked upon
a campaign calculated to win the friendship of businessmen and
bankers and to ease the tension that had existed between the adminis-
tration and the business community. The accommodation of the anti-
trust program to the desires of the business world was the first step,
along with Wilson's repeated expressions of confidence in and friend-
ship for businessmen. Next the President began to welcome bankers

52 George Rublee to E. M. House, Jan. 26, 1917, Wilson Papers.

53 See the excellent analysis by S. S. Fontaine, in New York World, Jan. 3,
1915.

64 Incomplete surveys revealed that in New York 23.7 per cent of 115,960
families investigated in January-February, 1915, had members unemployed. The
Bureau of Statistics of Massachusetts reported that returns received from labor
organizations in the state, representing 66 per cent of the total trade-union
members, showed 18.3 per cent unemployed on December 31, 1914. See Mayor's
Committee on Unemployement, New York City, Report of the Mayor's Com-
mittee on Unemployment (New York, 1916), and Bureau of Statistics, Labor
Division, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Thirtieth Quarterly Report on Un-
employment in Massachusetts, Quarter Ending June 30, 1915 (Boston, 1915).

76 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

and business leaders to the White House. In the palmy days of 1913
he had not wanted their advice; now he welcomed J. P. Morgan^ dele-
gations of businessmen and bankers from Illinois, and Henry Ford.
Thirdly, Wilson let it be known in the financial circles of New York
and Boston that he had never really been an enemy of big business, but
only of business that grew "big by methods which unrighteously crushed
those who were smaller." 55

It was about this time, also, that Attorney General McReynolds, with
Wilson's approval, began to use a new method in dealing with alleged
combinations in restraint of trade. He announced that any large cor-
poration that felt doubtful of the legality of its corporate structure
might seek the friendly advice and help of the Justice Department in
rearranging its affairs. Several great combinations, notably the Ameri-
can Telephone & Telegraph Company and the New Haven Railroad,
came to terms with the administration and received its blessing. 56
Whether such policy was wise or foolish depended upon one's point of
view; in any event, there was no trust-busting ardor in the Wilson
administration.

Wilson climaxed his little campaign to win the friendship of the
business classes by turning over control of the Federal Reserve Board,
in effect, to their representatives, as if he were trying to prove the sin-
cerity of his recent professions. For several months McAdoo and House
had engaged in a tug of war over the selection of the Board, McAdoo
arguing that the appointees should be men in sympathy with the ad-

55 Wilson to A. S. Burleson, July 27, 1914, Wilson Papers. See also Wilson to
H. L. Higginson, Oct. 23, 1914, ibid.; E. M. House to J. C. McReynolds, Jan.
7, 1914, House Papers.

56 For details and consequences of the A. T. & T. settlement, see The New
York Times, Dec. 20, 21, 1913.

The New Haven settlement was reached only after long and bitter negotia-
tions. There was first a thorough investigation into the affairs of the railroad by
Joseph W. Folk, special prosecutor for the Interstate Commerce Commission.
This was followed by an agreement for the dissolution of the vast New Haven
empire, the terms of which were agreed to by railroad and Justice Department
officials on January 10, 1914. Ibid., Jan. 11, 1914. The New Haven officers
objected, however, to the government's demand that they dispose of the Boston
& Maine Railroad at once. Ibid., July 21, 22, 23, 1914. The government replied
by instituting a suit to compel dissolution, whereupon the railroad officials sur-
rendered and accepted the Justice Department's terms. Ibid., Aug. 12, 1914.

It should be added that when officials of the United States Steel Corporation,
notably Henry C. Frick, endeavored to reach agreement with McReynolds, the
Attorney General refused to approve the proposed settlement on the ground
that it would not restore genuine competition in the industry. House Diary,
Mar. 22, 24, 26, Sept 30, 1913.

THE NEW FREEDOM AND THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT, 1913-16 77

ministration's broad policies, House advising that the President choose
leading bankers and businessmen. Actually, there never was much
doubt in Wilson's mind as to the wise course to follow; and when the
membership of the Board was announced it evoked almost unanimous
approval from bankers and business leaders. Progressives, on the other
hand, were shocked and astonished. "Why, it looks as if Mr. Vanderlip
[president of the National City Bank of New York] has selected them,"
one progressive Republican senator exclaimed. 57

The degree to which Wilson had outraged progressive sentiment,
however, did not become apparent until the President sent the nomi-
nations to the Senate on June 15. Insurgent anger in the upper house
centered on two of the nominees Thomas D. Jones of Chicago and
Paul M. Warburg. A former trustee of Princeton University and a
close friend of Wilson, Jones was one of the owners of the so-called
Zinc Trust and a director of the International Harvester Company,
then under state and federal indictment for being an illegal combina-
nation. Warburg was a partner in Kuhn, Loeb & Company, one of the
great Wall Street banking houses.

In reply to attacks on his friend Jones, Wilson addressed a public
letter to the Senate Banking Committee, defending him and explaining
that he had become a director of the Harvester Trust to help bring
that corporation into conformity with the law. Jones came before the
Committee, however, and affirmed that he had not gone on the board
of the corporation to reform it and approved everything the Trust had
done since he became a director. The upshot was that the Banking
Committee refused to approve Jones' nomination and Wilson had to
ask him to withdraw from the contest. The Warburg affair, on the
other hand, developed differently, and with certain comic aspects.
Much insulted by the senatorial opposition, Warburg at first refused to
appear before the Committee. Finally the President persuaded him to
swallow his pride and the Senate confirmed his appointment.

The startling aspect of the Jones-Warburg affair, however, was
Wilson's own reaction to it and the manner in which he came forward
as the champion and defender of big business. "It would be partic-
ularly unfair to the Democratic Party and the Senate itself to regard
it as the enemy of business, big or little," he declared, while the fight
was in progress. 68 When it became obvious that the Senate would re-

7 Boston Advertiser, May 6, 1914.
8 The New York Times, July 9, 1914.

78 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

fuse to confirm Jones, Wilson's anger became intense. In a commisera-
ting letter to Jones, he lashed out at the Senate insurgents, and at pro-
gressives in general. "I believe that the judgment and desire of the
whole country cry out for a new temper in affairs/' he wrote. ". . . We
have breathed already too long the air of suspicion and distrust." In
short, there was no room in this year of New Freedom grace for "class
antagonism/' for the very dynamic quality that had given impetus and
force to the American progressive movement. 59

Wilson's temper soon cooled, and a week later the attention of the
country was diverted to other matters by the outbreak of the war in
Europe. Then followed a period of political confusion, during which
partisan passions subsided. As it turned out, these developments at
home and abroad were a godsend to the Democrats during the ensuing
Congressional campaign. The Republicans did not wage a vigorous
fight, and there seemed to be a general disposition to stand by the
President during a time of peril. The most important Democratic asset,
however, was the continued disruption of the Republican party, with
Roosevelt and the Progressives making one last and futile effort to
establish themselves as a major party. 60

In spite of all these advantages, the Democrats made such a poor
showing in the state and Congressional elections on November 3 that
their defeat in 1916 seemed almost certain. The Democratic majority
in the House was reduced from seventy- three to twenty-five; there was
no change of voting strength in the Senate; but the Republicans swept
back into or stayed in power in states like New York, Illinois, Pennsyl-
vania, Ohio, Kansas, New Jersey, Connecticut, Wisconsin, and South
Dakota. It seemed as if the progressive tide was beginning to recede,
and everywhere progressive leaders were disheartened. "The cataclysm
was just about what I expected," Roosevelt lamented. 61 "We are sad-
dened by many defeats," Brandeis added. 62 Wilson, too, was heartsick
and wondered whether all the effort of the preceding two years had
been worth while. "People are not so stupid not to know," he declared,
"that to vote against a Democratic ticket is to vote indirectly against

* Wilson to T. D. Jones, July 23, 1914, printed in ibid., July 24, 1914.
* George E. Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement
(Madison, Wis., 1946), pp. 300-303.

61 Roosevelt to Archie B. Roosevelt, Nov. 7, 1914, the Papers of Theodore
Roosevelt, in the Library of Congress.

62 L. D. Brandeis to Gifford Pinchot, Nov. 4, 1914, Brandeis Papers.

THE NEW FREEDOM AND THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT, 1913-16 79

me." 6S He changed his mind soon, however, and boasted that the
Democrats had won a great victory.

In the autumn of 1914 Wilson, moreover, thought his program to
effect a fundamental reorganization of American economic life was
complete and that the progressive movement had fulfilled its mission.
"We have only to look back ten years or so to realize the deep per-
plexities and dangerous ill-humors out of which we have at last issued,
as if from a bewildering fog, a noxious miasma," he wrote in a public
letter to McAdoo in November, 1914, announcing the consummation of
the New Freedom program. "Ten or twelve years ago the country was
torn and excited by an agitation which shook the very foundations of
her political life, brought her business ideals into question, condemned
her social standards, denied the honesty of her men of affairs, the in-
tegrity of her economic processes, the morality and good faith of many
of the things which her law sustained." And so things stood until the
Democrats came to power and the New Freedom legislation righted
fundamental wrongs. The nightmare of the past years was over now,
and the future would be a time of co-operation, of new understanding,
of common purpose, "a time of healing because a time of just
dealing." 6 *

Advanced progressives were puzzled by Wilson's remarkable letter.
Did the President mean what he had said? Was the progressive move-
ment over? If so, then where could the social justice element go?
Herbert Croly, chief editor of the New Republic, which had just be-
gun its distinguished career, voiced the apprehensions that many pro-
gressives felt when he wrote:

How can a man of ... [Wilson's] shrewd and masculine intelligence
possibly delude himself into believing the extravagant claims which he makes
on behalf of the Democratic legislative achievement? . . . How many sincere
progressives follow him in believing that this legislation has made the future
clear and bright with the promise of best things? . . .

President Wilson could not have written his letter unless he had utterly
misconceived the meaning and the task of American progressivism. After every
allowance has been made for his justifiable pride . . . , there remains an
ominous residue of sheer misunderstanding. Any man of President Wilson's
intellectual equipment who seriously asserts that the fundamental wrongs of

* House Diary, Nov. 4, 1934.

* "Wilson to W. G. McAdoo, Nov. 17, 1914, printed in The New York Times,
Nov. 18, 1914. See also Wilson to Powell Evans, Oct. 20, 1914, Wilson Papers.

80 WOODROW \VILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

a modern society can be easily and quickly righted as a consequence of a few
laws . . . casts suspicion either upon his own sincerity or upon his grasp of
the realities of modern social and industrial life. Mr. Wilson's sincerity is
above suspicion, but he is a dangerous and unsound thinker upon con-
temporary political and social problems. He has not only ... "a single-track
mind," but a mind which is fully convinced of the everlasting righteousness
of its own performances and which surrounds this conviction with a halo of
shimmering rhetoric. He deceives himself with these phrases, but he should
not be allowed to deceive progressive popular opinion. 65

Groly's analysis of the superficial character of Wilson's progressivism
was essentially correct. There is little evidence that Wilson had any
deep comprehension of the far-reaching social and economic tensions
of the time. As Groly said, Wilson was intelligent and sincere. But that
did not make him a prophet or a pioneer, or even a progressive of the
advanced persuasion. He had not taken office to carry out a program
of federal social reform. He had promised to lower the tariff, reor-
ganize the currency and banking system, and strengthen the antitrust
laws, in order to free the nation's energies and unleash the competitive
urges of the people. He had done these things, and with a minimum
of concession to advanced progressive concepts. He had, moreover,
turned over control of the public agencies established by the new legis-
lation the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Trade Commis-
sion to cautious men. To try to portray such a man as an -ardent
social reformer is to defy the plain record.

This, however 3 is only one chapter in the history of the journey of
the Democratic party on the road leading to the New Deal and the
Fair Deal. Events and circumstances sometimes cause men to change
their minds or to adopt policies they have previously opposed. The
process of reform was but temporarily halted in 1914, only to be
reactivated by 1916. But before we tell this story we must first give
some account of other events more portentous for the immediate future
of the American people.

66 "Presidential Complacency," New Republic, I (Nov. 21, 1914), 7.

CHAPTER 4

Missionary Diplomacy

uTT WOULD be the irony of fate if my administration had to deal
JL chiefly with foreign affairs/ 3 Wilson remarked to a Princeton friend
just before he went to Washington. 1 As it turned out, fate was not only
ironical, but in a sense also cruel, for the new administration had to
cope with foreign problems of such magnitude as had not confronted
the nation since the early years of the nineteenth century. With the
outbreak of the war in Europe, the difficulty became almost more than
the administration could handle; but even from the first months of his
presidency, Wilson was perplexed by one crisis after another in foreign
relations.

Wilson and Bryan shared with most of their predecessors ignorance
of and indifference to foreign affairs. To a remarkable degree, however,
they also shared certain assumptions and ideals, which provided the
dynamic for their foreign policy. They were both moralists, who
thought of foreign policy in terms of the eternal venues, ratheT diaii
in terms of the expedienfTTKey were both dedicated to the democratic
ideal, at least theoretically,"and obsessed with the concept of America's
mission in the world. Finally, they were both fundamentally mission-
aries, evangelists, confident that they comprehended the peace and
well-being of other countries better than the leaders of those countries
themselves. This urge to do good, to render disinterested service, was
so compelling that it motivated interference in the internal affairs of

1 To E. G. Conklin, cited in Ray Stannard Baker, W oodrow Wilson: Life and
Letters (8 vols., Garden City, N.Y., 1927-39), IV, 55.

8z

82 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

other nations on such a scale as the United States had not heretofore
attempted.

The missionary impulse helps explain much that is baffling about
Wilson's foreign policy, but it is not a full and sufficient explanation.
To a varying degree, many other factors were involved naivete, the
desire to protect American economic interests, imperialistic ambi-
tions but these operated subconsciously in Wilson's and Bryan's
minds. Paramount in their motivation was the ambition to do justly, to
advance the cause of international peace, and to give to other peoples
the blessings of democracy and Christianity.

The most typical manifestation of missionary diplomacy 2 was
Bryan's great campaign during 1913 and 1914 to negotiate treaties of
conciliation with the nations of the world. 3 It had long been an ob-
session with the Nebraskan to promote the cause of peace, 4 and one of
the conditions upon which he accepted the Secretaryship of State was
that Wilson should give him a free hand in negotiating the peace
treaties. The first was signed with Salvador on August 7, 1913, and
during the following year twenty-nine others were negotiated, includ-
ing treaties with Great Britain, France, and Italy. Significantly, the
German government refused to sign a treaty. Hardheaded realists like
Theodore Roosevelt might condemn the plan as futile and dangerous,
but Bryan was sure he had struck a blow for peace, and to the end of
his life he was prouder of this achievement than of anything else he
did during his long career.

Another early evidence of the power of the missionary urge was the
abrupt manner in which the administration withdrew support from
the Six-Power Consortium, which had been formed in 1911 to make a

2 The author wishes to explain that he does not use this term in its technical
meaning that is, diplomacy aimed at protecting missionaries and church mis-
sions abroad. He means, simply, diplomacy motivated by a desire to help other
nations.

3 These "cooling off" treaties, as they were called, provided for the submis-
sion of all disputes, even those involving questions of national honor, to perma-
nent commissions for investigation. Neither party would declare war during the
"cooling off" period, which was usually one year. After the investigation was
completed, the parties could accept or reject the commission's findings. Bryan
explained the details of his plan in a speech in New York City on May 9, 1913,
for which see The New York Times, May 10, 1913.

* Bryan first suggested his peace plan in February, 1905, and from that time
forward he pressed it vigorously. He tells the history of the idea in his letter to
Harry Walker, Jan. 20, 1915, the Papers of William Jennings Bryan, in the
Library of Congress.

MISSIONARY DIPLOMACY 83

loan of $125 million to the Chinese government for the construction of
the Hukuang Railway. 5 The visit to the State Department on March
10, 1913, by representatives of the American banking interests involved
precipitated the first discussion of the project in administration circles.
There is strong evidence that the American bankers were anxious to be
rid of their commitment and that the European bankers, too, were
lukewarm because Russian and Japanese banking interests had been
admitted to the Consortium. 6 Secretary of State Philander C. Knox
had insisted upon American admission to the Consortium and partici-
pation by the American banking group in order that the State Depart-
ment might be in a position to protect American interests and the
Open Door in China. There seems, however, to have been no serious
consideration by the new administration of these larger economic and
strategic interests, only the moral judgment that, as the President told
the Cabinet, "we ought to help China in some better way." 7 In any
event, on March 18 Wilson issued a public statement explaining the
American withdrawal. The United States could not approve the loan
agreement, he declared, because the conditions attached to it touched
"very nearly the administrative independence of China itself" and
would lead to intolerable interference in Chinese affairs by foreign
agents. The United States, he added, earnestly desired to help the
struggling Chinese people in every way consistent with their own
principles, but not by thwarting the Chinese efforts at independence
and self-government.

Experienced and cynical diplomatists thought they saw some
Machiavellian purpose in Wilson's action. The German Under-Secre-
tary for Foreign Affairs, for example, suspected that the American
bankers wanted to withdraw from the Consortium, and that Wilson
used their withdrawal as a means of winning good will in China. The
suspicion credited Wilson with a sophistication in foreign affairs that
he did not yet possess. The way in which the withdrawal evoked the

5 The Consortium was first composed of British, French, and German bankers.
Upon the demand of President Taft and the State Department in 1909, an
American banking group was admitted in 1911, and Russian and Japanese
interests were included soon afterward.

6 Chief of the Banking House, M. M. Warburg & Company, in Hamburg,
Max Warburg, to the Undersecretary in the Foreign Office, Zimmermann, Mar.
20, 1913, in Die Grosse Politik der Europdischen Kabinette, 1871-1914 (40
vols. in 54, Berlin, 1926), XXXII, 380-382.

7 The Diary of Josephus Daniels, in the Library of Congress, Mar. 12, 1913,
relating Cabinet discussions of the same date.

84 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

overwhelming approval of missionaries and the American religious
press was good evidence that Wilson and Bryan had simply voiced the
revulsion all moralists felt against what seemed to be a conspiracy to
control the government of China. As the President expressed it at a
Cabinet meeting, "If we had entered into the loan with other powers
we would have got nothing but mere influence in China and lost the
proud position which America secured when Secretary Hay stood for
the open door." s

The administration's ambition to deal justly with China could be
satisfied, therefore, only if the United States played a lone hand in the
Far East, free from allegedly sinister European influences. A few weeks
later, moreover, the President insisted upon recognizing the new Re-
public of China unilaterally and without prior agreement among the
powers.

Friendly feeling and good intentions did not always suffice to settle
delicate diplomatic questions, as was evidenced when a serious contro-
versy with Japan arose at the time the administration was considering
other aspects of the Far Eastern question. The dispute had its origin
in the efforts of Progressive and Democratic politicians in California
to curry favor with the farm and labor vote in that state by enacting
legislation prohibiting Japanese ownership of land. 9 The controversy
soon deepened into a major international crisis, because the California
leaders proceeded ruthlessly and deliberately to humiliate the Japanese
people.

In this development, unfortunately, Wilson and Bryan were not
blameless. To begin with, they did not at first take the affair seriously
or realize its international ramifications. In the second place, they
acted throughout the episode as if California were a sovereign nation,
at liberty to defy the treaty obligations of the United States. 10 Even
more important, however, was the fact that they actually encouraged
the Californians in their designs. When Democratic leaders in the state

8 Daniels Diary, Mar. 28, 1913.

9 The Democrats made an even more strenuous anti- Japanese campaign in
1912 than the other two major parties. See J. O. Davis, chairman of the Demo-
cratic state central committee, to J. P. Tumulty, Jan. 4, 1913, Papers of the
Department of State, in the National Archives.

10 "I do not feel by any means as confident as you do," Wilson wrote a young
professor of jurisprudence at Princeton, "as to the power of the Federal Gov-
ernment in the matter of overriding the constitutional powers of the states
through the instrumentality of treaties." Wilson to Edward S. Corwin, Apr. 19,
1913, the Woodrow Wilson Papers, in The Library of Congress.

MISSIONARY DIPLOMACY 85

expounded upon the Japanese peril, the President replied that he
understood. "I have only hoped," he added, "that the doing of the
thing might be so modulated and managed as to offend the sus-
ceptibilities of a friendly nation as little as possible" X1 He then pro-
ceeded to volunteer a means by which the Japanese in California
might be excluded from landownership without violating the Japanese-
American Treaty of 19 II. 12

The affair seemed to be progressing smoothly when the California
Assembly on April 16 passed an alien land bill that prohibited Japa-
nese landownership in the indirect manner that Wilson had sug-
gested. 13 Underneath the surface, however, an international crisis of
the first order was in the making. The Japanese representatives in
Washington and the American Charge in Tokyo had repeatedly
warned the State Department of the inevitable Japanese reaction; but
it was not until public opinion in Japan erupted in full fury around the
middle of April that the Washington government awoke to a realiza-
tion that the two countries might be moving toward a break in re-
lations.

The crisis was made all the more acute, moreover, when the leaders
in the California Senate announced on April 21 that they intended to
ignore the cautiously worded Assembly bill and to substitute a measure
aimed specifically at the Japanese, by prohibiting landownership by all
persons "ineligible to citizenship." This, and a rising war fever in

11 Wilson to James D. Phelan, Apr. 9, 1913, ibid.; italics mine.

12 William Kent, who acted as intermediary between the President and
Governor Hiram Johnson, tells the story: "I was in Washington and had an
interview with President Wilson. He suggested the extremely irritated state of
affairs with Japan, admitted and endorsed the state's right to handle its own
land questions, but deferentially submitted the fact that it might be framed in
less offensive form. The result of our conference was, that it should be suggested
that a bill might be drawn excluding from land ownership those who had not
made application for American citizenship, thereby leaving the way open for
bona fide prospective citizens to participate in the privilege of owning California
land, but excluding those who had no such intent, necessarily including the
Japanese whose first papers would not be accepted." William Kent, "Some,
Reminiscences of Hiram Johnson," in the Papers of William Kent, in the
Library of Yale University. See also Kent to Johnson, Apr. 7, 1913, and Wilson
to Kent, Apr. 10, 1913, both in Wilson Papers.

13 This was the so-called Thompson-Birdsall bill, which was modeled after
the Alien Ownership Act of the District of Columbia of March 3, 1887, and
which prohibited aliens from owning land for more than one year unless they
declared their intentions of becoming United States citizens. The New York
Times, Apr. 17, 1S13: Boston Transcript, Apr. 16, 1913.

86 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

Japan, impelled the President at last to take a hand. Firstly, on April
22 he addressed a public appeal to the Californians, urging them to
exclude Japanese from landownership only by polite and indirect
means, and not to embarrass the federal government by making the
bill openly discriminatory, 1 * Secondly, Wilson decided to send Bryan
to California to plead the cause of national honor personally before
the California lawmakers. 15

Bryan left for Sacramento on April 24 with only the power of an
ambassador, to plead but not to coerce. In the capital he addressed the
legislature and conferred with the Governor and legislators, begging
that they defer legislation until the State Department had had an
opportunity to negotiate the question and, if that were impossible, that
they adopt a law that would not openly discriminate against the Japa-
nese. The Californians, however, knew what they wanted and were
determined to get it. They conceded the right of Japanese subjects to
lease agricultural property for short periods; but they insisted on
denying the privilege of landownership to persons "ineligible to citizen-
ship" words that could only excite and insult the people of Japan.
In one last, desperate stroke, Bryan appealed to Johnson to veto the
bill, but the Governor, in a telling reply, refused.

Meanwhile, relations with the Japanese government were rapidly
approaching the point of tension. On May 9, the day the California
legislature passed the alien land bill, the Japanese Ambassador, Vis-
count Chinda, lodged his government's protest with the State Depart-
ment. It was politely worded, but it left no doubt that the Imperial
Government felt sorely aggrieved. 16 The American naval chiefs, fearful
of a surprise attack on the Philippines, on May 13 urged the imme-
diate distpatch of three American warships in the Yangtze River to
those islands. The following day, the Joint Board of the Army and
Navy reiterated the recommendation and Admiral Bradley A. Fiske
warned that war with Japan was "not only possible, but even prob-
able." 17 These recommendations precipitated a spirited discussion in

14 Wilson to Hiram Johnson et al., Apr. 22. 1913, printed in The New York
Times f Apr. 23, 1913.

15 The decision was made at a Cabinet meeting on April 22. See the Daniels
Diary, Apr. 22, 1913, for an account of these Cabinet discussions.

16 Chinda to Bryan, May 9, 1913, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations
of the United States, 1913 (Washington, 1920), pp. 629-631.

17 Daniels Diary, May 15, 1913; B. A. Fiske to Josephus Daniels, May 14,
1913, the Papers of Josephus Daniels, in the Library of Congress.

MISSIONARY DIPLOMACY 87

the Cabinet on May 16. Garrison favored strong action and approved
the Joint Board's recommendation, while Daniels argued that moving
the warships would only irritate the Japanese without making it pos-
sible to defend the Philippines if war occurred. Wilson,, of course, made
the final decision. He not only decreed that no ships should be sent to
the Philippines but also directed the Joint Board to hold no further
meetings until he so ordered.

From this time on, the state of high tension gradually diminished,
and by the end of May the jingoists in both countries seem to have
given up hope. But it would be a grave error to assume that friendly
relations were restored by the administration's attempts to conciliate
the Japanese. Many notes passed between the two foreign offices dur-
ing the remainder of 1913 and the first half of 1914. In August, 1913,
the Japanese proposed a treaty guaranteeing the mutual right of land-
ownership by the citizens of both countries, and the Imperial Foreign
Office repeatedly urged the extreme necessity of satisfying Japanese
public opinion on this point. In turn, Wilson and Bryan promised to
negotiate such a treaty as soon as it were politically possible to do so.
But the time never seemed to come. The Yamamoto ministry fell on
April 16, 1914, when the Diet rejected its naval budget, and Foreign
Minister Makino was succeeded by Baron Kato in the new Okuma
ministry. Shortly afterward, Kato abruptly brought the negotiations
with the United States to an end. Japanese resentment had in no wise
abated; the Imperial government had simply concluded that further
parleys were useless and humiliating.

The spreading of the First World War to the Far East, a develop-
ment that Bryan tried unsuccessfully to prevent, brought a new tension
in the troubled relations between Japan and America. The Japanese
expelled the Germans from the Shantung Province and gave evidence
of their intention to remain there permanently. What the American
leaders suspected that Japan would seize this opportunity to extend
her control over China proper was borne out when, in the early weeks
of 1915, the Japanese government presented a series of demands,
twenty-one in number, to the Republic of China. 18 This move so

18 Reinsch to Secretary of State, Jan. 23, 24, 26, 27, Feb. 1, 1915, Papers
Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915 (Washington,
1924), pp. 79-82.

The first fourteen demands, embodied in Article I~IV of a treaty proposed
by the Japanese government, transferred German interests in the Shantung
Province to Japan, extended Japan's control in South Manchuria, and pro-

88 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

alarmed some State Department officials that discussions in the ad-
ministration were begun at once. In the beginning of the crisis, how-
ever, the President signified he would move cautiously and not in a
manner antagonistic to Japan. The charge that Japan had made
demands that would have seriously compromised Chinese independence
had only been alleged, not proved; and the allegation seemed false
when Baron Kato informed the American Ambassador in Tokyo that
the Imperial government had made no secret demands on China., had
no desire to impair Chinese independence or to abrogate the rights of
other nations in China, and desired only to strengthen its paramount
interests in Manchuria and the Shantung Province. Wilson and the
State Department officials knew they would have to make a frank
avowal of their attitude, but they apparently had no intention of enter-
ing the negotiations as special defenders of China. In fact, they were
ready to admit Japan's paramount interests in Manchuria and the
Shantung Province and discussed using such recognition as a bargain-
ing weapon in reaching a settlement of the California question. 19

As a preliminary move, Bryan addressed a long note to the Japanese
Ambassador on March 13, 1915, unequivocally reminding the Imperial
government that the United States had large commercial and religious
interests in China, which it had no intention of abandoning. 20 Not yet
alarmed, Wilson and Bryan were confident a friendly agreement with
Japan was possible.

But at the very moment when it appeared that American influence
in the Japanese Foreign Office was having a moderating effect, the

hibited China from leasing any ports or harbors to foreign countries. The re-
maining seven demands, embodied in Article V, would have made China virtually
a protectorate of Japan if the Chinese government had accepted them. In these
provisions Japan demanded, among other things, that China employ Japanese
administrative, military, and financial advisers; that China and Japan jointly
police the important areas of China; that China purchase half her arms and
munitions from Japanese firms, and that Japan be given important economic
privileges. The proposed treaty is printed in ibid., pp. 93-95.

19 Wilson to Bryan, Feb. 25, 1915, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations
of the United States, The Lansing Papers, 1914-1920 (2 vols., Washington,
1939-40), II, 407. See also E. T. Williams to Bryan, Feb. 26, 1915, the Papers
of William Jennings Bryan, in the National Archives, and Lansing to Bryan,
Mar. 1, 1915, ibid.

20 Bryan to Chinda, Mar. 13, 1915, State Dept. Papers. The Japanese 'reply
was "Unofficial Memorandum left by Ambassador Chinda Mch 22 1915 at my
[Bryan's] request after he had delivered its contents as an oral communication,"
in Bryan Papers, National Archives. For Wilson's comment thereon, see Wilson
to Bryan, Mar. 24, 1915, ibid.

MISSIONARY DIPLOMACY 89

situation suddenly worsened. On March 31 the Chinese and Japanese
negotiators in Peking reached a deadlock and -observers predicted that
Japan would soon present an ultimatum. Then, on April 5, the Ameri-
can Charge at Peking made a full report to Wilson on the negotiations
then in progress in the Chinese capital. Contrary to Baron Kato's as-
surances, he wrote, the Japanese had presented secret and sweeping
demands to the Chinese government; the Chinese had resisted this
attack on their independence and had expected diplomatic support
from the United States. Nine days later came a report from Reinsch,
the American Minister in Peking, that destroyed any chance that the
United States 'would come to a friendly understanding with Japan.
The Japanese Minister, Reinsch reported, had told the Chinese ne-
gotiators that it was futile for them to expect support from the United
States. Moreover, the authoritative Tientsin Times had quoted a
prominent Japanese to the effect that "the Secretary of State is so
much under the influence of Baron Chinda that he is not saying a
word against the wishes of Japan." 21

Wilson's comment on Reinsch's dispatch indicated that he had lost
confidence in the good faith of the Japanese government and was now
determined to take a strong stand in behalf of the Chinese cause. On
April 27, therefore, Bryan informed Ambassador Chinda that the State
Department could no longer refuse to take a public position, since its
silence had been interpreted as acquiescence in the Japanese de-
mands. 22 Moreover, the State Department issued a statement for the
American press, declaring that the United States had never contem-
plated surrendering its treaty rights in China. 28 When the Japanese
Cabinet, on May 4, voted to send an ultimatum to China and the
Chinese began to make preparations to defend their capital, Bryan
addressed a long memorandum to the Japanese government, setting
forth the American objections to the demands, especially the secret
demands included in Article V of the treaty Japan was attempting to
force on China. The following day, he addressed a personal message to
Count Okuma, the Prime Minister, urging patience and a peaceful
policy. 24

21 Reinsch to Secretary of State, Apr. 14, 1915, State Dept. Papers.
22 Bryan to Chinda, Apr. 27, 1915, Bryan Papers, National Archives. For
Wilson's comment, see Wilson to Bryan, Apr. 27, 1915, Lansing Papers^ II,
417-418.

28 Foreign Relations* 1915, p. 143.

24 Bryan to Chinda, May 5, 1915, Bryan Papers, National Archives; Bryan to
Charg6 Wheeler, May 6, 1915, Lansing Papers, II, 422-423.

9O WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

The upshot of the State Department's strong stand was that the
Japanese gave in under the American pressure and abandoned for the
time being the demands included in Article V., while the Chinese con-
sented to the remainder. It was a signal triumph for missionary di-
plomacy. Bryan, moreover, had the last word in the controversy. He
addressed an identic note to China and Japan, solemnly declaring that
the United States could not "recognize any agreement or undertaking
which has been entered into or which may be entered into between the
Governments of Japan and China, impairing the treaty rights of the
United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial in-
tegrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy relative to
China commonly known as the open door policy." 25 Whether unwit-
tingly or not, the Secretary of State was expounding a policy to which
his government would adhere in future years and which eventually
would prove to be one of the causes of war with the Japanese Empire.

The significant point of Wilson's and Bryan's position during this
crisis was that they were considerably more sympathetic to the Japa-
nese at the outset of the affair than has heretofore been thought; that
they were in no wise endeavoring to thwart Japanese attempts to
strengthen their position in South Manchuria or even to legitimize their
seizure of the Shantung Province; and that they finally took a firm
public stand in defense of Chinese so-called sovereignty only after they
were convinced the Japanese were using American friendship for Japan
to intimidate the Chinese and compel them to surrender the vestiges of
their independence. Had the Japanese Foreign Office been less devious
in its diplomacy or more moderate in its aspirations, the story might
well have had a different ending. 26

Another international difficulty, for example, was promptly and
effectively settled because there was good faith and mutual trust on
both sides the Anglo-American dispute over the free use of the
Panama Canal by American ships engaged in the coastwise trade. Con-
gress had exempted coastwise ships from the payment of tolls in
August, 1912, and the Democratic and Progressive platforms had both
strongly approved the exemption. On October 14, 1912, the British
Foreign Office lodged a strong protest against the exemption, asserting
that its effect would be to violate the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901,

25 Bryan to Outline, May II, 1915, Foreign Relations, 1915, p. 146.

26 For extended discussions of this episode, see Essay on Sources, "The
United States and the Far East, 1910-17."

MISSIONARY DIPLOMACY 9 1

which promised equal rates for all nations/ 7 and proposing that the
matter be arbitrated.

The issue did not involve the vital interests of either country, to be
sure, but to many Americans and practically all Britons it involved the
good faith and honor of the United States. As the American Ambassa-
dor, Walter Page, wrote from London, "Everywhere in circles the
most friendly to us and the best-informed, I received commiseration
because of the dishonourable attitude of our Government about the
Canal Tolls." 2S Although he had approved the exemption during the
campaign of 1912, Wilson was soon persuaded that national honor
required repeal of the disputed provision. 29 In the first weeks of the
administration, the British Ambassador, James Bryce, pressed Bryan
hard for prompt action; but Bryan had to tell him the President could
not then risk disrupting his party. In the following November, Sir
William Tyrrell, secretary to the British Foreign Minister, came to
America to discuss the Mexican situation and to reiterate the British
point of view in the tolls controversy. He left with personal assurances
from the President that the United States would, in good time, live up
to its treaty obligations. 30

It was not until the Federal Reserve Act had been passed and the
antitrust discussions had been launched, however, that Wilson was
ready to carry out his plan. On January 26, 1914, he met the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee in a three-hour conference and frankly
reviewed the critical state of foreign affairs. He pointed to the tensions
with Japan and the support the Japanese government was extending
to the Huerta regime in Mexico; to the tolls dispute with Britain; and
to the generally perilous world situation. One way to clean at least part
of the American slate, he said, was to repeal the exemption clause and

27 "The canal shall be free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war,"
the treaty read, "of all nations observing these rules, on terms of entire
equality, so that there shall be no discrimination against any such nation, or its
citizens or subjects, in respect of the conditions or charges of traffic, or other-
wise."

28 Page to Wilson, Sept 10, 1913, the Papers of Walter H. Page, in Hough-
ton Library, Harvard University.

29 He had come to this decision at least by January, 1913. See the Diary of
Edward M. House, in the Papers of Edward M. House, in the Library of Yale
University, Jan. 24, 1913, and Henry White, The Roster of the Round Table
Dining Club (New York, 1926), pp. 21-25.

30 For details of this conference see House to W. H. Page, Nov. 14, 1913,
House Papers.

92 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

to come to a friendly understanding with the British government on
other matters. A week and a half later he came out publicly for repeal
of the exemption provision, which, he said, was "in clear violation of
the terms of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty."

For a time it seemed the President might encounter grave difficulty
in obtaining repeal by the House, for Speaker Clark and Majority
Leader Underwood both refused to follow his lead, asserting that they
would not be parties to the violation of the solemn pledge given in the
platform of 1912. Warned that repeal would fail unless he took per-
sonal leadership of the fight, Wilson on March 5 laid his case clearly
and ably before a joint session, ending with a cryptic reference to the
Mexican difficulty: "I ask this of you in support of the foreign policy
of the administration. I shall not know how to deal with other matters
of even greater delicacy and nearer consequence if you do not grant it
to me in ungrudging measure." 31

The subsequent battle in the House came dangerously close to dis-
rupting the Democratic ranks, and the bolt of Clark and Underwood
caused observers to wonder if the President had lost his once firm con-
trol over the lower house. The bad feeling was aggravated, moreover,
when Republican Anglophobes charged that Wilson had promised
repeal of tolls exemption in return for the withdrawal of British sup-
port from Huerta. 32 Republican hopes of a Democratic rupture, how-
ever, soon vanished. On March 31 the House passed the Sims bill to
repeal the exemption provision, 247 to 162, with only Clark, Under-
wood, the Tammany representatives, and Irish-American spokesmen
from Boston and Chicago, among the Democrats, dissenting. 33 In the
Senate the fight was more prolonged and bitter than in the House.
Led by Senator James A. O'Gorman of New York a the Irish- Americans

31 Ray S. Baker and William E. Dodd (eds.), The Public Papers of Woodrow
Wilson (6 vols., New York, 1925-27), The New Democracy, I, 92-93. For
significant British comment see Pall Mall Gazette (London), Mar. 6, 1914;
Daily Post (Birmingham), Mar. 6, 1914; Westminster Gazette (London), Mar.

6, 1914; The Times (London), Mar. 6, 1914; Morning Post (London), Mar.

7, 1914; Observer (London), Mar. 8, 1914.

32 Wilson and Sir Edward Grey both indignantly denied the accusation. New
York World, Mar. 20, 1914; The New York Times, Mar. 31, June 30, 1914.

33 New York World, Apr. 1, 1914; The New York Times, Apr. 1, 1914. It
was perhaps a victory for principle, but one should not assume that devotion to
principle alone motivated the Democrats. The dispenser of the patronage, Post-
master General Burleson, also had something to do with the victory in the
House. See R. S. Baker, interview with A. S. Burleson, Mar. 17-19, 1927, Ray
Stannard Baker Collection, in the Library of Congress.

MISSIONARY DIPLOMACY 93

and other enemies of England enjoyed a field day and gave free rein
to their opinions. After two months of bitter skirmishing and debate,
the administration forces and Republican advocates of repeal won
easily enough when they were able to obtain a vote. 34

The significance of the President's personal victory in the tolls fight
was not lost upon the country or the rest of the world: it was a clear
vindication of the principle of honor and decent dealing among
nations, and it came about in spite of all that purveyors of prejudice
and local patriots could do. Administration policies in the Caribbean
area, on the other hand, pose a more difficult problem of interpreta-
tion. Here was another important testing ground of Wilsonian ideal-
ism; here the difficulties of squaring generous professions with the
necessities of power politics first became apparent.

Latin America indeed, the entire civilized world confidently ex-
pected that the coming to power of the Democrats in 1913 would
signify the beginning by the United States of a policy of noninterven-
tion in Latin American affairs. 35 Since 1898 the Democratic party, and
particularly its chief spokesman before 1912, Bryan, had consistently
opposed the extension of American control over the Caribbean region,
whether by outright military force or by so-called dollar diplomacy.
After 1912, moreover, Wilson, Bryan, and, later, Lansing gave eloquent
voice to the doctrines of nonintervention and the absolute equality of
the states of the Western Hemisphere. The President went even further
in his promise of a new Latin American policy when, at Mobile on
October 27, 1913, he prophesied the freeing of the southern republics
from the strangle hold of foreign concessionaires. 36

So much for the promise, which was bright. What does the record
say about the performance? To state a complex matter briefly, the
administration, with the best intentions, found itself so entangled by
previous commitments and especially by its own inconsistencies that it
violated all its generous professions in its relations with Mexico, Central
America, and the island countries. The years from 1913 to 1921 wit-
nessed intervention by the State Department and the navy on a scale
that had never before been contemplated, even by such alleged im-
perialists as Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft

34 On June 11, 1914, by a vote of fifty to thirty-five.

35 For an example of such expectations see La Follette's Weekly, V (Mar. 29,
1913), 9.

36 The Public Papers, New Democracy, I, 64-69. For a further discussion of
the circumstances and significance of this address, see below, pp. 116-118.

94 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

The most important reason for this wide disparity between profes-
sion and practice was the fact that the administration inherited a
Caribbean policy, the object of which was the protection of the future
Panamanian life line, which could not be reversed without a radical
change in foreign policy. The Roosevelt and Taft administrations had
used private bankers to consolidate American control in the Carib-
bean. Bryan earnestly sought to persuade the President to inaugurate a
new policy to use the financial resources of the United States to free
Latin America from private banker control. If Wilson had meant to
undertake a new policy and hasten the day when the New World
would be free of European financial exploitation, he would have con-
sidered Bryan's proposal. However, it was too bold, too unprecedented,
too "radical," and Wilson rejected it. Thus Bryan thought he had no
alternative but to continue to use the old instrumentalities. Certainly it
was not at that time possible for him to think in terms of complete
nonintervention. American naval power was not sufficient to allow
such a luxury.

In the second place, Wilson and Bryan were confident that the well-
being of the Caribbean archipelago was absolutely dependent upon
American supremacy in the area. Moreover, as evangels of democracy,
they thought they could teach the Mexican, Central American, and
Caribbean peoples how to elect good leaders and establish stable insti-
tutions. Intervention, therefore, was always rationalized in terms of the
good neighbor rescuing his helpless friends from foreign dangers and
internal disorders. Because he thought in these terms, it did not occur
to Bryan that he might be pursuing a conventionally imperialistic
course, even when, for example, he began a diplomatic campaign to
establish a string of new American naval bases in the Caribbean.

Thirdly, Bryan was often extraordinarily naive in his estimate of
character and motivation. If a man came from a respectable middle-
class family or were a good friend and loyal Democrat, then Bryan
thought he was as guileless as Bryan himself. Sometimes this was not
true, and Bryan often took advice that was hardly disinterested.

The formulation of Bryan's Nicaraguan program provides an illus-
tration of how these several factors combined to determine policy. In
1909 Secretary Knox had established a Conservative government,
headed first by Juan J. Estrada and then by Adolfo Diaz, in Managua
and had persuaded American bankers to underwrite the regime. 37 In

87 During a revolution against the Nicaraguan dictator, Jos6 Santos Zelaya,

96 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

addition, Knox had negotiated a treaty with Nicaragua by which that
country agreed to sell an option on its canal route to the United States
for three million dollars, which sum was to be used to put Nicaragua's
finances in order. The Democrats defeated ratification of the treaty in
the Senate^ but no sooner had Wilson come into office than the Diaz
government opened a campaign for the renegotiation of the treaty.
The turning point in the negotiations came on June 9 and 11, 1913,
when Charles A. Douglas, close friend of Bryan and counsel for the
Nicaraguan government, presented a draft treaty to the State Depart-
ment. It provided for American purchase of the canal option for three
million dollars and American supervision of the disbursement of the
purchase money; but, more important, it empowered the United States
to intervene in Nicaragua to maintain orderly government, to protect
property, and to preserve Nicaraguan independence. It is clear from
this and other correspondence that the idea of making Nicaragua a
protectorate of the United States was conceived by the American
bankers, Douglas, and the Diaz regime, chiefly as a means of keeping
an unpopular government in power.

How was Bryan persuaded to approve a treaty embodying a policy
that he had strenuously opposed most of his adult life? He approved
the treaty because it seemed the only possible way to preserve Ameri-
can influence and to prevent civil war and possible anarchy in Nica-
ragua. 58 He approved it, also, because he trusted his friend Douglas. It
was no accident that the Diaz government chose Douglas to plead
their cause before the Secretary of State.

The details of the subsequent negotiations are too involved to be
told here. Suffice it to say that the inclusion in the treaty of the pro-
vision for American control of the internal and external affairs of

in 1909, the State Department gave the revolutionists material aid. Zelaya was
driven, from the country and a Conservative and minority government, with
intimate business connections in the United States, was established. This was
followed by the inauguration of an American receivership of the customs and
the refinancing of Nicaragua's foreign debt by the American bankers, Brown
Brothers and J & W Seligman. In 1912 a revolt against the Conservative gov-
ernment was suppressed with the help of some 2,700 American marines, who
stayed on in the capital until 1925. For monographic treatments of this subject
see Essay on Sources, "The United States, the Caribbean, and Latin America,
1910-17."

38 Bryan explained and defended the treaty in Bryan to Wilson, June 16,
19,13, Jan. 15, June 12, July 8, Sept. 30, 1914, Wilson Papers; Bryan to Wilson,
Jan. 23, 1914, Jan. 22, 1915, Bryan papers, National Archives; Bryan to W. J.
Stone, July 2, 1914, State Dept. Papers.

MISSIONARY DIPLOMACY 97

Nicaragua aroused the hostility of the rest of Central America and also
of the Democratic members of the Foreign Relations Committee.
They, in fact, refused to ratify the treaty until that provision was
eliminated. 39 Actually, the removal of the objectionable clause made
no difference at all in the State Department's policy, which continued
to be one of active intervention in Nicaraguan affairs.

The effect of Bryan's Nicaraguan policy 40 was, in brief, to fasten
upon the people of Nicaragua a regime they did not like and the life
of which depended upon the military and financial support of the
United States. Even so 3 as it developed, the policy was also aimed at
freeing Nicaragua from banker control and at establishing conditions
in which orderly government might be maintained.
^ Bryan's policy toward the Dominican Republic had much the same
objectives, but it was wrecked by the machinations of the gentleman
he sent as Minister to that country, in one of the most disgraceful
chapters in the history of the American foreign service. Because of
his tenderness for "deserving Democrats," especially for veterans of
the campaign of 1896, Bryan made many unfortunate appointments
on the ministerial level. Most of them, however, were mere incom-
petents, not scoundrels. The worst mistake of all was the appointment
of James M. Sullivan of New York City and Connecticut to Santo
Domingo. A former prize-fight promoter and a lawyer of poor reputa-
tion, Sullivan by any criteria hardly measured up to the standards of
the foreign service. Bryan did not know it then, but the fact came out
later through the revelations of the New York World and a presiden-
tial commission of inquiry, 41 that the man who engineered Sullivan's
appointment was William C. Beer, New York agent of Samuel M.
Jarvis and his Banco Nacional of Santo Domingo. Jarvis coveted the

39 The Senate ratified the treaty on February 18, 1916. For accounts of the
struggle for ratification see Bryan to Wilson, July 31, 1913, Wilson Papers; The
New York Times, Aug. 3, 1913; New York World, Aug. 3, 1913; B. W. Long,
memorandum of conversation with W. J. Stone, dated Dec. 16, 1915, State
Dept. Papers.

40 The writer uses this term deliberately, as the Nicaraguan policy was the
work of Bryan and the State Department and Wilson had nothing to do with
formulating it. In fact, the President gave Bryan and the Department a free
hand in the formulation of all policies relating to the Caribbean republics. He
had some reservations about the Nicaraguan treaty, and he seemed to sense that
there was some inconsistency about the Department's policies and his own high-
sounding phrases about nonintervention and equality of states. He did not, how-
ever, allow these doubts to disturb him unduly.

New York World, Dec. 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 1914.

98 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

deposits of the American Receiver-General of the Dominican customs.
He supported Sullivan's candidacy in return for Sullivan's help in get-
ting the deposits transferred from the agent of the National City Bank
of New York in Santo Domingo to his own Banco Nacional.

The funds of the Receiver-General were, accordingly, transferred
soon after Sullivan reached Santo Domingo. If this had been the
Minister's only manipulation, however, his record would not have been
exceptionally bad. The funds, in any event, were soon transferred
back to the bank from which they had been taken. 42 But Sullivan also
entered into some kind of alliance with the then President, Jose" Bordas
Valdes. The extent to which the Minister personally profited from the
arrangement is not known; however, his cousin, Timothy Sullivan,
who accompanied him to Santo Domingo, received a large share of
the government's construction contracts, and it is possible the Minister
received a favor or two.

The Sullivan affair might have had a comic aspect, in view of the
Minister's foibles and his long-winded reports to the Department, if a
revolution had not broken out against Bordas in September, 1913.
As it was, Sullivan kept his friend in power for almost a year, in the
face of overwhelming popular hostility. He threatened the rebels with
punishment by the United States; he constantly misrepresented the
Dominican situation in his reports to the Department. In spite of the
open support that the United States extended to the Bordas govern-
ment, the rebels triumphed everywhere outside the capital, until in
desperation Bordas had to call for American military aid. By mid-
summer, 1914, the situation in the republic was rapidly approaching
a state of anarchy and State Department officials concluded that only
complete military occupation by American forces would suffice to
restore order.

Wilson finally intervened to end the civil war. Firstly, Sullivan was
dismissed and replaced by the career officer, William W. Russell, who
had preceded him. Secondly, the President sent a commission to Santo
Domingo under instructions to confer with all the Dominican leaders,
to request these chieftains to agree upon a provisional president, and
to warn the Dominicans that if they did not settle their quarrels peace-

42 It soon became evident the Banco Nacional was utterly unreliable and
unsafe, and the funds were transferred back to the National City Bank's agent,
S. Michelena. See W. W. Vick to Frank Mclntyre, Feb. 19, 1914, State Dept.
Papers; Sullivan to Secretary of State, May 25, 1914, ibid.; L. M. Garrison to
Bryan, June 4, 1914, ibid.; Frank Mclntyre to Bryan, June 10, 1914, ibid.

MISSIONARY DIPLOMACY 99

fully he would occupy their country with American military forces. 43
The commission found a provisional president apparently acceptable
to all factions, and elections were held the following November under
American supervision, at which one of the revolutionary leaders, Juan
Y. Jimenez, was elected President. Unfortunately, however, Jimenez
was too old and feeble to cope with the still explosive and complicated
situation. On May 2, 1916, the opposition elements in the Dominican
Congress voted to impeach the President, and when sharp fighting
broke out three days later he resigned. After repeated warnings by
Minister Russell, American marines were landed at the capital on May
15 and took possession of the city. As it turned out, this was merely
the beginning of what became by the end of 1916 the full-fledged
occupation of the country and the establishment of a military govern-
ment under the command of the senior naval officer, Captain Harry S.
Knapp.

American relations with Santo Domingo's neighbor, Haiti, during
the Wilson period began differently but ended in the same way, except
that the Haitians, with their long and proud tradition of independence,
fiercely resisted the American occupation. Soon after Wilson's in-
auguration, a new President, Michel Oreste, was elected by the usual
methods and inaugurated in Port-au-Prince. For a few months affairs
went smoothly, and then the inevitable 44 revolution broke out in
Le Plaine du Cul de Sac and spread to Cap Haitien. Oreste ab-
dicated on January 27, 1914, and American sailors were landed tem-
porarily at Port-au-Prince. Oreste was succeeded by two revolutionary
chiefs, the brothers Zamor, Charles and Oreste, the latter being elected
President on February 8, 1914.

The downfall of the Oreste regime the fourth to be overthrown in
two and a half years provoked discussions in the State Department of

43 Bryan to John Franklin Fort, Aug. 10, 1914, Wilson Papers. The "Plan of
President Wilson" is printed in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1914 (Washington, 1922), pp. 247-248.

** Inevitable because revolution was the instrument usually employed to ac-
complish political change in Haiti. Control of the customs houses was the chief
objective of all Haitian politicians. A military chieftain would seize control of
the government and appropriate the customs revenues. Then another chieftain
would organize a "revolution" to oust the "tyrant," and when this "revolution"
had succeeded the new dictator would proceed to loot the Treasury. Under
such an arrangement the democratic procedures established in the Haitian con-
stitution were obviously inoperative. See Boaz W. Long to Secretary of State,
Jan. 23, 1914, and B. W. Long, "Revolution in Haiti," memorandum dated
Feb. 9, 1914, both in Wilson Papers.

IOO WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

the need for American control of Haitian affairs. Prominent in these
discussions was the agent of the National City Bank of New York in
Haiti, Roger L. Farnham, and Boaz W. Long, Chief of the Latin
American Affairs Division, who also had intimate connections with
Wall Street. Farnham and Long suggested this would be the proper
time to seize control of the Haitian customs houses, to press for a naval
base at Mole St. Nicholas, 45 and in general to bring Haiti under as
complete American control as was feasible. These plans were momen-
tarily abandoned, however, when the Department learned that the
Germans in Haiti were intriguing against the new Zamor government.
Instead of attempting immediately to establish a protectorate, the
Department recognized the Zamor regime on March 1, 1914, and gave
it open support.

Once the Zamor government was apparently securely in power,
however, Bryan and the Latin American Affairs Division began to
mature the so-called Farnham plan for American control of the
Haitian custom houses and financial affairs. 46 A convention along the
lines of the Dominican- American Convention of 1907 was drafted,
and Farnham went to Haiti to promote its acceptance by the native
leaders. 47 In a conference with Farnham and the American Consul at
Cap Haitien, Charles Zamor, brother of the President, accepted the
plan on behalf of the government. Moreover, he agreed that on the
occasion of the next revolutionary disturbance, the United States
should land occupation forces. An outbreak did occur in Port-au-
Prince on July 19 and State Department officials urged that the time
for full-scale intervention had come. The Zamor brothers, however,
had found elsewhere the money they needed to stay in power, and they

45 Acquisition of this naval base was one of Bryan's first projects. He not
only recognized the strategic value of the base but was also anxious to prevent
any European nation, particularly Germany, from obtaining a foothold in
Haiti. In June, 1913, Bryan sent former Governor John E. Osborne of Wyo-
ming to Haiti to negotiate the cession of a strip of land twenty miles wide run-
ning ten miles beyond the eastern line of the harbor. Bryan to Wilson, June 14,

1913, Wilson Papers; Bryan to Wilson, June 20, 1913, Bryan Papers, National
Archives.

46 The French and German governments, incidentally, asked for a share in
the control of the Haitian customs and were told decisively that the United
States would not consent to such an arrangement. Bryan to Wilson, Mar. 24 3

1914, and Wilson to Bryan, Mar. 26, 1914, both in Wilson Papers.

47 Bryan to Livingston, American Consul, Gap Haitien, July 10, 1914, State
Dept. Papers. A copy of the proposed treaty was sent to Minister Blanchard on
July 2, 1914, and is printed in Foreign Relations, 1914, pp. 349-350.

MISSIONARY DIPLOMACY IOI

now repudiated their acceptance of the proposed convention. The
State Department, therefore, held off and did not intervene.

The situation in Haiti grew utterly hopeless, however, in September
and October, 1914. When it was apparent their government was
doomed, the Zamor brothers appealed to the American Minister for
help. They were now ready to accept the proposed treaty if the United
States would maintain them in power. It was too late. President Zamor
fled the capital on a Dutch boat on October 29, while his brother,
Charles, and his so-called Cabinet sought refuge in the French lega-
tion. A few days later the successful revolutionary chief, Davilmar
Theodore, entered Port-au-Prince and took possession of the govern-
ment.

Immediately the State Department applied pressure upon the new
Theodore government for the negotiation of the treaty. When Acting
Foreign Minister Bobo refused and offered instead to grant large com-
mercial and mining concessions to the United States in return for
American financial assistance, Bryan was so offended by the proffered
bribe that he replied that the United States had no desire to force its
influence on Haiti. The Theodore government soon proved incompe-
tent and corrupt, and when another revolution broke out in Cap
Haitien in early January, 1915, Bryan and the President agreed that
American intervention could not long be postponed. They sent former
Governor John Franklin Fort of New Jersey and Charles C. Smith to
Haiti to negotiate the convention; but before the commission arrived
in Port-au-Prince, Theodore had fled and General Vilbrun G. Sam had
been elected President. Sam and his Foreign Minister, Duvivier, talked
informally with the commissioners but refused officially to negotiate,
on the ground that the Americans were not properly accredited to a
sovereign government.

During the following months, Wilson and Bryan pondered a course
of action. Although he still supported the proposed treaty, the Secre-
tary was reluctant to force it on the Haitians and tried to find an
alternative to military action; the President, on the other hand, was
completely out of patience and anxious to bring the matter to a head.
The excuse for such action arose when the Haitian situation exploded
again in June and July, 1915, after Bryan had resigned. When a
revolution under Dr. Rosalvo Bobo threatened the capital, President
Sam executed 160 political prisoners, including former President
Zamor, who had returned to Haiti. The people of Port-au-Prince rose

102 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA.

in righteous anger, dragged Sam and his executioners from their refuge
in the French legation, and hacked their bodies to pieces.

This final display of anarchy spelled the doom of Haitian independ-
ence. Marines and bluejackets landed at Port-au-Prince on July 28
and encountered slight resistance in occupying the city, A week later
American sailors were landed at Cap Haitien, the nest of revo-
lutionary disorders. From this point on, the task was mainly one of sub-
duing the cacos, the professional soldiers, who resisted the American
forces and took refuge in the mountainous parts of the country. The
process of pacification, which had begun so easily, soon became almost
a war of extermination, as the Haitians fought back fanatically, and
the job was not completed until some two thousand of them had been
shot.

Meanwhile, on August 9, 1915, Admiral W. B. Gaperton took con-
trol of the Haitian government. Three days later the Admiral allowed
the National Assembly to elect a pro-American, Sudre Dartiguenave,
President of Haiti. The State Department now moved firmly to press a
treaty upon the government, an arrangement providing not only for
American financial supervision but also for the disarming of the so-
called ^army and the establishment of a native constabulary under
American control. When Dartiguenave balked at signing the treaty,
Secretary of State Robert Lansing threatened to establish complete
military government or else to put another puppet in power. 48 After
much parleying, in which the Haitians got nowhere, Dartiguenave
signed the treaty making his country a protectorate of the United
States on September 16, 1915. 49

To such extremes of intervention, invasion, and military occupation
did missionary diplomacy carry the United States. By 1917 the close
bonds between Nicaragua and Santo Domingo and the United States
had been immeasurably strengthened, while a new protectorate 50 in
Haiti had been added to the State Department's realm. Nor would the
process have stopped here, if Bryan had had his way; for he originally

48 Lansing to Davis, Aug. 24, 1915, Foreign Relations, 1915, pp. 437-438.

49 Printed in ibid., pp. 449-451. The treaty was ratified by the Haitian
Senate on November 12, 1915, and by the United States Senate on February
28, 1916.

50 The writer uses the word "protectorate" in its popular sense. Technically
and legally, Nicaragua, Santo Domingo, and Haiti were not protectorates of the
United States. In reality, however, they were.

MISSIONARY DIPLOMACY 103

dreamed of making quasi protectorates of all the Central American
republics.

Whether in the long run the achievements of missionary diplomacy
justified the unfortunate consequences is a matter of opinion. Certainly
in the more important case of Mexico, which will be examined in the
next chapter, the constructive accomplishments were few and the un-
fortunate results were many.

The one saving feature of the policy, the feature that in the end
prevented it from becoming pure imperialism, was its peculiar motiva-
tion. Important in this motivation was the administration's desire to
preserve the stability of the Caribbean area in order to preclude the
excuse for European intervention, it is true. But just as important was
Bryan's and Wilson's conviction that the great American democracy
could not in Christian conscience refuse to offer a friendly hand to
peoples ravaged by endemic civil war, disease, and starvation. Actually,
this was the most important immediate motive for intervention in
Santo Domingo and Haiti, for in 1915-16 there was no danger of any
early European intervention. Moreover, had the people of these two
republics demonstrated even a slight capacity to govern themselves and
to discharge their international responsibilities, intervention in their
affairs by the United States would not have occurred.

It can be said, also, that missionary diplomacy was not motivated by
any ambition to promote the exclusive material interests of the United
States. On the contrary, Bryan was often more regardful of the rights
and interests of the Caribbean peoples than were their so-called gov-
ernments. For example, on one occasion Bryan advised the Cuban
government not to agree to the terms of a loan it was negotiating with
Wall Street firms, because the conditions of the loan restricted Cuba's
ability to borrow in the future. "It is the policy of this Government,"
he added, "to treat all Americans alike and to give all an equal oppor-
tunity . . . ; but in advising the Latin American states it is our desire
to look at the question from their standpoint and to give them every
assistance." 61 On several occasions, moreover, Bryan intervened to
prevent the Diaz government of Nicaragua from granting exclusive
concessions and undue privileges to American bankers. When the
Nicaraguan government negotiated a loan in September, 1913, Bryan
wrote: "We have put in everything [in the loan agreement] that we

61 Bryan to Minister W. E. Gonzales, Nov. 21, 1913, Bryan Papers, Library
of Congress.

IO4 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

can think of that will protect Nicaragua. . . . The Nicaraguan repre-
sentatives in Washington would have willingly made a contract less
favorable to Nicaragua. In fact, they complained a little at the restric-
tions that I imposed, but I told them that I would not recommend
anything to you that could, in my judgment, be criticized." 52 Soon
afterward Bryan prevented Nicaragua from granting a ninety-nine-
year contract to Brown Brothers, banking firm of Baltimore, for the
construction and operation of a railroad. He objected because the con-
cession was exclusive and too long lived. 53 Finally, when the Haitian
government of Davilmar Theodore tried to bribe the State Department
by an offer of exclusive concessions for Americans, Bryan replied in a
ringing affirmation of the principle that undergirded his diplomacy:
"Our obligation to the American people requires that we shall give all
legitimate assistance to American investors in Haiti, but we are under
obligations just as binding to protect Haiti, as far as our influence goes,
from injustice or exploitation at the hands of Americans." 54 A poor
principle, indeed, upon which to build an American imperialism!

In fact, it was Wilson's and Bryan's great hope that their policies
would lead to peace and unity throughout the Western Hemisphere.
In their relations with the stable governments of South America they
gave full evidence that they regarded them as equals, deserving of the
respect and treatment of sovereign neighbors. This conviction was
given dramatic expression in 1914, when the President accepted
Argentina's, Brazil's, and Chile's offer of mediation soon after the
occupation of Vera Cruz, when it appeared war between the United
States and Mexico was inevitable. A year later Wilson went even
further and sought the advice and support of the leading Latin Ameri-
can governments in his handling of the Mexican problem. ^

But the act which, more than any other, helped restore the moral
prestige of the United States in the eyes of South America was the
negotiation of a treaty with Colombia in 1913-14 to repair the damage
done by Theodore Roosevelt's aggression in practically seizing the
Canal Zone in 1903. 55 It was an act of honest and humble statesman-

52 Bryan to Wilson, Sept. 3, 1913, Wilson Papers.

53 I am not disposed to favor anything down there, Bryan added, "that I
would not favor here and an exclusive franchise is abhorrent, especially when
running ninety-nine years." Bryan to Wilson, Oct. 4, 1913, ibid.

54 Bryan to Blanchard, Dec. 19, 1914, Foreign Relations, 1914, p. 371.

55 In Article I of the treaty the United States expressed "sincere regret that
anything should have occurred to interrupt or to mar the relations of cordial

MISSIONARY DIPLOMACY 105

ship, sincerely meant. The idea of the great and powerful government
of the United States in effect apologizing to the helpless government
of Colombia for a past wrong stirred a wave of warm and friendly feel-
ing in South America. The publication of the treaty of course nearly
gave Roosevelt apoplexy, 56 and his friends in the Senate prevented its
ratification. 57 The good intentions of the administration had been
made clear, none the less.

Wilson climaxed his hemispheric diplomacy by taking leadership in
a movement to unite the American republics in a great Pan-American
alliance, binding them to a "mutual guarantee of territorial integrity
and of political independence under republican forms of government,"
to settle all disputes by peaceful means, and mutually to refrain from
aiding the enemies of any signatory government. 58 Such a pact had
been suggested by Representative James L. Slayden of Texas in 1910-
1 1 and formally proposed a year later by the Colombian government.
The Taft administration had scoffed at the Colombian proposal; but
as soon as Wilson came into office, Slayden and the Colombian Minis-
ter renewed their campaigns for a nonaggression pact. Wilson took up
the idea enthusiastically; the State Department drafted a treaty and
circulated it among the Latin American governments. Practically all
the small republics hastened to approve the pact; the Brazilian govern-
ment strongly supported it. Argentina, however, was lukewarm^ while
Chile, because of her long-standing boundary dispute with Peru, was

friendship that had so long subsisted between the two nations" an obvious
apology for the Panama affair. Moreover, the United States offered the
Colombian government free use of the Canal and an indemnity of $25 million.
The treaty is printed in ibid., pp. 163-164.

56 Roosevelt demanded a speedy hearing by the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee. "I ask for this hearing," he wrote, "because I regard the proposed
Treaty as a crime against the United States, an attack upon the honor of the
United States, which, if true, would convict the United States of infamy, and
a serious menace to the future well-being of our people." Theodore Roosevelt
to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, July 11, 1914,
the Papers of Theodore Roosevelt, in the Library of Congress.

57 Led by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, the Republicans defeated ratification
of the treaty in 1914 and again in 1917, although on the latter occasion Lan-
sing warned the Foreign Relations Committee that ratification was vital to the
security of the United States. A treaty awarding Colombia $25 million, but
without the so-called apology, was negotiated and approved by the United
States Senate in April, 1921.

58 These were the provisions of the proposed treaty. A copy is printed in
Charles Seymour (ed.), The Intimate Papers of Colonel House (4 vols., Boston,
1926-28), I, 233-234.

IO6 WOODROW WILSON AND- THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

positively opposed. The State Department was never able to crack the
hard shell of Chilean resistance, and so the pact failed.

Although the Pan-American Pact clearly forecast the League of
Nations Covenant and the Good Neighbor Policy of a later President,
the historian must be allowed a few doubts as to the administration's
sincerity in proposing it. There is no evidence that Wilson, Bryan, or
Lansing was prepared to do more than pay lip service to the Pan-
American ideal, especially where the Caribbean and Central American
countries were concerned. Nor were they ready to renounce the so-
called right of intervention, in spite of the solemn pledges contained in
the Pan-American Treaty. The truth was they were trying to reap the
benefits of the Good Neighbor Policy without being willing to abide by
that policy's fundamental principles. One of the chief tasks of subse-
quent administrations was to liquidate the remaining vestiges of mis-
sionary interventionism, in order that genuine Pan-American unity
might become a living reality.

CHAPTER 5

Mexico: Interference and Defeat, 1913-17

MISSIONARY diplomacy found its apogee in Wilson's efforts to
shape the Mexican Revolution into a constitutional and moral-
istic pattern of his own making. In spite of the President's frequent
denials that he ever had intervened or ever would intervene, this effort
involved interference by the United States in Mexican affairs on an
unprecedented scale. Wilson's broad objective the establishment of a
constitutional government in Mexico, responsive to the economic
and social needs of the people and amenable to his direction was
always paramount in his thought and policy. And Wilson had a sincere
passion to help the struggling Mexican masses win land and liberty.
The root of his difficulty and the chief cause of his failure was that in
working toward a commendable objective he used the wrong tactics,
with the result that by the end of his administration the United States
had hardly a friend left^in Mexico.

Wilson, of course, inherited and did not create the Mexican prob-
lem. The old regime under Porfirio Diaz had been overthrown in 1911
by a reformer, Francisco I. Madero. Mystic, idealist, and dreamer
though he was, Madero none the less tried to destroy the backbone of
the old system the landed aristocracy, the professional politicians
allied with the business interests, the Church, and the army. And
because he was attempting to reconstruct the bases of Mexican society
the inevitable counterrevolutions occurred, and, in the end, Madero
was betrayed, deposed, and murdered by his chief general, Victoriano
Huerta.

Events of the "Tragic Ten Days" in Mexico City, February 9-18,

107

IO8 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

1913, during which Huerta executed his coup, shook the Western
world and set off a chain of events that culminated in one of the sig-
nificant revolutions of the twentieth century. That fact was not, how-
ever, apparent at the time. The only reason President Taft did not
heed the advice of his Ambassador, Henry Lane Wilson, to extend
immediate recognition to the Huerta government was that the State
Department planned to use recognition as a bargaining weapon in
obtaining favorable settlement of certain outstanding disputes with
Mexico. 1 Following traditional practice, England, France, Germany,
Japan, and the other powers extended recognition, as Huerta seemed
the only person capable of preserving order and protecting foreign
interests.

This, therefore, was the state of affairs when Wilson and Bryan took
control of the foreign policy of the United States in March, 1913. Am-
bassador Wilson began to bombard them with urgent pleas for recog-
nition. Learned specialists in the State Department argued correctly
that Huerta had observed constitutional requirements in assuming
power, that the United States had always extended de facto recogni-
tion to revolutionary governments, and that the Huerta regime was in
fact the only government in Mexico. Moreover, practically the entire
American colony in Mexico City and powerful financial interests in
the United States brought strong pressure to bear upon the administra-
tion to force recognition. 2 Wilson, however, would not be hurried or
persuaded by these advices and pleas. To him, as to Bryan, 3 the issue

1 The Diary of Chandler P. Anderson, in the Library of Congress, Mar. 15,
1915. Former Secretary of State Knox told Anderson that if he and Taft had
realized that Wilson would not recognize Huerta, they would have done so
themselves. See also W. H. Taft to W. V. Backus, July 10, 1916, the Papers of
William Howard Taft, in the Library of Congress.

2 Especially active in this regard were E. N. Brown, president of the National
Railways of Mexico, and James Speyer, of Speyer & Company, New York
bankers with large interests in Mexican bonds. See the Diary of Edward M.
House, in the Papers of Edward M. House, in the Library of Yale University,
Mar. 27, Apr. 1, 1913; W. A. Tucker to E. M. House, Apr. 17, 1913, House
Papers; James Speyer to J. B. Moore, May 1, 31, 1913, Papers of the Depart-
ment of State, in the National Archives; Speyer to W. G. McAdoo, May 5,
1913, ibid. y

3 From the beginning of their administration, Wilson and Bryan were in
complete accord in dealing with the Mexican problem. The State Department
records reveal that although Wilson took the initiative in determining policy
and made all important decisions, Bryan heartily concurred and faithfully exe-
cuted his^ chief's policies. The present writer does not know of a single im-
portant disagreement between the two men over Mexican policies.

MEXICO: INTERFERENCE AND DEFEAT, 1913-17 IOQ

was clear: a constitutional, popular government had been overthrown
by a military usurper^ and the rightful rulers of Mexico had been mur-
dered. To recognize such a coup d'etat in a country as important as
Mexico would be to sanction and encourage government by assassina-
tion throughout the Western Hemisphere. "I will not recognize a gov-
ernment of butchers," Wilson said privately. * Through the press he let
it be known he would not appoint a successor to Ambassador Henry
Lane Wilson, as such an act would imply tacit recognition of the
Huerta government. 5

It is plain Wilson's decision was dictated chiefly by the moral re-
vulsion he felt against the bloody means Huerta had used to rise to
power. There was, however, another reason why the administration
hesitated to accord a hasty recognition to the provisional government
in Mexico. On the day after Huerta's coup, the standards of a new
revolution were unfurled in the northern states of Coahuila and Chi-
huahua. The leader was the Maderista Governor of Coahuila, Venus-
tiano Carranza, a bespectacled, scholarly-looking man with a great
white beard, whose childlike face failed to reveal his inflexible charac-
ter. Calling themselves Constitutionalists and the rightful heirs of
Madero, the anti-Huertistas met at Guadalupe and pledged themselves
to carry on the struggle, under the leadership of the First Chief, Car-
ranza, until Huerta was overthrown and constitutional government
was re-established. Although it was impossible to measure the propor-
tions or predict the future of the Constitutionalist movement during
March-May, 1913, it was evident Huerta's claim that he had pacified
Mexico was false.

4 Charles Willis Thompson to "Rube" Bull, May 22, 1913, the Papers of
Charles Willis Thompson, in the Library of Princeton University.

5 New York World, Mar. 13, 1913; The New York Times, May 17, 1913.
On March 11 Wilson issued a public statement declaring that the United
States could not approve Latin American governments established by fraud and
violence and in defiance of the -wishes of the majority. "We can have no sym-
pathy with those who seek to seize the power of government to advance their
own personal interests or ambition," he warned. Ibid., Mar. 12, 1913. This
statement, however, was not meant to apply to the situation in Mexico. It was
issued because the administration had received advice from American diplomatic
officials in Nicaragua that revolutionary leaders in that country were con-
templating an uprising against the Diaz government. Miguel Alvarez S. to Dr.
Salvador Castrillo, Nicaraguan Minister to the United States, Feb. 1, 1913,
State Dept. Papers; Minister George F. Weitzel, from Managua, to Secretary of
State, Feb. 18, Apr. 4, 1913, ibid. The Diary of Josephus Daniels, in the Library
of Congress, Mar. 11, 1913, gives details of the Cabinet discussions of the same
date.

MEXICO: INTERFERENCE AND DEFEAT, 1913-17 III

In the face of this uncertain situation, Wilson and Bryan wisely
decided to wait and see whether Huerta could extend his control over
all of Mexico and whether he would hold constitutional elections, as he
had said he would do. Meanwhile, the United States would not for-
mally recognize the provisional government, although it would deal
with it, through Ambassador Wilson, "on the basis of the fact of its
existence." 6

At this point in the administration's deliberations, that is, in early
May, the spokesmen of several corporations with large material interests
in Mexico the Southern Pacific Railroad, Phelps, Dodge & Company,
the Greene Cananea Copper Company, and Edward L. Doheny's
Mexican Petroleum Company came forward with a plan that seemed
to offer a practical solution. They proposed that the State Department
agree to recognize Huerta, provided Huerta hold an election before
October 26, 1913, the date the leaders of the provisional government
had already agreed upon. The Constitutionalists, moreover, should
suspend hostilities, join in the election, and agree to support the Presi-
dent thus chosen. Wilson was so impressed by the proposal that he at
once drafted a plan for a settlement that provided for recognition of
Huerta by the United States, on the condition that Huerta hold an
early and fair election; the plan also envisaged suspension of hostilities,
participation in the election, and submission to the new government
on the part of the Constitutionalists. 7 Wilson also drafted a note
to Ambassador Wilson, setting forth the terms of his settlement, but
for reasons that are not evident he did not send the note or formally
offer his plan to the provisional government. 8

Meanwhile, before he settled upon any policy, Wilson endeavored to
obtain a true estimate of the Mexican situation. As early as March 7
there had been disturbing reports reflecting on the integrity of Ambas-
sador Wilson, reports to the effect that he had actually aided and
abetted the Huerta coup d'etat. 9 These and subsequent revelations

6 This policy was announced in the press on May 17, 1913, although Am-
bassador Wilson was apparently not informed of it until July 10. The New
York Times, May 17, 1913; Bryan to H. L. Wilson, July 10, 1913, Papers Re-
lating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1913 (Washington, 1920),
p. 809.

7 "Mexico. Settlement," MS drafted by Wilson, c. May 8-10, 1913, the
Woodrow Wilson Papers, in the Library of Congress. Wilson planned to ne-
gotiate with the Constitutionalists through a special envoy.

8 The text of this draft is printed in R. S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson: Life and
Letters (8 vols., Garden City, N.Y., 1927-39), IV, 248-249.

9 New York World, Mar. 7, 8, 12, 1913. The extent to which Ambassador

112 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

convinced the President that Henry Lane Wilson was thoroughly un-
trustworthy, and it is doubtful that thereafter he even read the Ambas-
sador's dispatches. Instead, the President by-passed the Ambassador
by sending a trusted friend, William Bayard Hale, 10 on a secret mis-
sion to Mexico City to investigate and report. Hale's vivid and dra-
matic dispatches from the Mexican capital during the summer of 1913
reiterated a single theme, that the Huerta government could not pos-
sibly survive and that only the election of a constitutional government
could avert full-scale American intervention. 11

Shortly before Hale's dispatches began to come to the President,
the Southern Pacific-Phelps, Dodge & Company group brought for-
ward on May 26 a revised plan for a settlement of the civil war in
Mexico. These spokesmen did not now advise recognition of Huerta;
they merely proposed that the State Department use its good offices
to mediate between the provisional government and the Constitution-
alists, who were daily gaining strength, to effect a fair and nation-wide
election. Soon afterward Hale's reports began to come in, and on June
14 the administration made its first formal and outright declaration of
policy. Huerta was told that if he gave satisfactory assurances that an
early and free election would be held and observed his promise not to

Wilson encouraged the Huerta-Diaz cabal has never been determined. It is
evident from Wilson's own dispatches, however, that he was strongly opposed to
Madero, knew well in advance about the plot to overthrow the legal govern-
ment and did not inform the constitutional authorities, and actually brought
Huerta and Felix Dia2 together in the American Embassy and persuaded them
to sign the "Pacto de la Ciudadela" on February 18, 1913, by which an agree-
ment on the composition of the provisional government was reached. See
especially H. L. Wilson to Secretary of State, Mar. 12, 1913, Foreign Relations,
1913, pp. 768-776.

10 A former Episcopal clergyman, William Bayard Hale was in 1910-13 one
of the leading journalists in the United States. As a reporter for Walter Page's
World's Work, Hale had come to know Wilson intimately in 191 L In 1912
Hale edited Wilson's major campaign addresses in a volume entitled The New
Freedom, which was published in 1913. Hale's brilliant style and quick intelli-
gence made a deep impression on Wilson. In so far as the present writer can
ascertain, Hale's reports from Mexico City were generally credible.

11 Hale to Ben G. Davis (for the Secretary of State), June 3, 22, 25, July 2,
8, 9, 12, 15, 16, 17, 24, 29, Aug. 5, 1913, State Dept. Papers.

It should be added that Bryan also sent a secret envoy to Mexico Reginaldo
F. Del Valle of California. Del Valle first conferred with Constitutionalist
leaders, including Carranza, in northern Mexico; he then went to Mexico City,
where he acted so indiscreetly that Bryan was forced to recall him. See Del
Valle to Ben G. Davis, June 8, 9, 12, 17, 23, 1913, ibid.; Davis to Del
Valle, July 8, 15, 1913, ibid.; El Diario (Mexico City), July 7, 1913.

MEXICO: INTERFERENCE AND DEFEAT, 1913-17 113

be a candidate, 12 the United States would attempt to bring the war-
ring factions in Mexico together in a common program and govern-
ment.

This first message to the Huerta government was merely suggestive
of a larger program of interference in the affairs of Mexico, along the
lines of the second Southern Pacific- Phelps, Dodge & Company pro-
posal, that the President was preparing to undertake. That the pro-
gram involved interference that neither side in Mexico had asked for
or wanted did not seem to disturb the President, who apparently
thought a strong policy would bring prompt submission. Firstly, he
called Henry Lane Wilson home and then dismissed him. Secondly, he
sent John Lind, former Governor of Minnesota and a close friend of
Bryan, to the Mexican capital to press his proposal for the election of
a constitutional government the United States could recognize. 13
Thirdly, the President addressed a circular note to the powers, request-
ing them to urge upon Huerta the necessity of accepting American
mediation. 14 When news of Lind's mission reached Mexico City,
Huerta blustered and informed the American Charge, Nelson
O'Shaughnessy, that Lind would not be welcomed unless he came
properly accredited. "I will resist with arms any attempt by the United
States to interfere in the affairs of Mexico," he threatened. 15

Huerta's outburst was, of course, not seriously meant. But his anger
and the astonishment that most Mexicans, including the Constitution-
alists, felt were not without good cause. Wilson's missionary diplomacy
succeeded, to be sure, when all the President had to do was to order
the occupation of some small republic and establish a puppet govern-
ment. Mexico, however, was not Nicaragua or Santo Domingo.
Mexico was a nation, whose citizens cherished their independence and

12 The statement, "that Huerta will observe his original promise and not be
a candidate at that election," reveals a puzzling misconception on Wilson's part
regarding Huerta's position. Huerta had never promised that he would not be a
candidate, yet during the future negotiations Wilson acted as if he had.

13 Wilson's instructions to Lind, embodying the plan, are printed in Foreign
Relations, 1913, pp. 821-822. Specifically, Wilson proposed (1) that there
should be an immediate armistice in Mexico, (2) that there should be an early
and free election, in which all parties would participate, ( 3 ) that Huerta should
bind himself not to be a candidate for the presidency, and (4) that all factions
should agree to abide by the results of the election and co-operate in supporting
the new administration.

14 Circular note to governments with representatives in Mexico, Aug. 8, 1913,
Wilson Papers.

The New York Times, Aug. 9, 1913.

114 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA.

sovereignty more than their lives. To these proud people Wilson's
assumption of the right to tell them who should or should not be their
President was, in any event, intolerable. The method Wilson used,
moreover that of sending an unofficial agent to a government the
United States would not recognize only increased Mexican resent-
ment and added to the general irony of the situation.

Arriving in Mexico City on August 11, the following day Lind dis-
creetly presented the President's proposal to the Foreign Minister of
the de facto government, Federico Gamboa. Gamboa pleaded mov-
ingly for recognition, or at least abstention from interference in Mexi-
can affairs by the United States. He declared, moreover, that Mexico
regarded the President's proposal as an unwarranted meddling in the
domestic affairs of a sovereign neighbor. Lind replied firmly. The
United States, he said, would never recognize the provisional govern-
ment. Moreover, he continued, in a thinly veiled threat, if Huerta re-
jected the President's mediation, Wilson might be compelled to lay
the whole matter before Congress and might also allow the Constitu-
tionalists to buy arms in the United States. Day after day the parleys
proceeded stubbornly, amid alarming rumors in both countries of an
impending break or outright American military intervention. On
August 22 Lind went his limit and held out the promise that, if Huerta
accepted Wilson's proposal, the State Department would help the
Mexican government obtain a loan in the United States. Gamboa
replied that he dared not transmit this offer, or bribe, to his chief. 16

Then, after Lind had broken off the negotiations and left for Vera
Cruz, the Foreign Minister delivered his final reply. Indignantly re-
pudiating the right of an American President to determine Mexican
affairs, Gamboa added: "If even once we were to permit the counsels
and advice (let us call them thus) of the United States of America not
only would we as I say above, forego our sovereignty but we would as
well compromise for an indefinite future our destinies as a sovereign
entity and all the future elections for president would be submitted to
the veto of any President of the United States of America. And such
an enormity, Mr. Confidential Agent, no government will ever attempt
to perpetrate and this I am sure of unless some monstrous and almost
impossible cataclysm should occur in the conscience of the Mexican

16 Lind to Secretary of State, Aug. 12, 1913, State Dept. Papers; Lind to
Secretary of State, n.d., but received Aug. 15, 1913, ibid.; Lind to Secretary of
State, Aug. 18, 22, 1913, Wilson Papers. Of course Gamboa did transmit the
offer to Huerta.

MEXICO: INTERFERENCE AND DEFEAT, 1913-17 115

people." However, Gamboa continued, the fact was that under the
Mexican Constitution Huerta could not be a candidate to succeed
himself. Huerta had done nothing to raise the suspicion that he would
be a candidate. "On what then is the gratuitous suspicion of the Presi-
dent of the United States of America based and his demand which is
absolutely inadmissible?" Finally, Gamboa rejected Lind's offer of an
American loan with the following barb: "When the dignity of the
nation is at stake I believe that there are not loans enough to induce
those charged by the law to maintain it to permit it to be lessened." 17

Expressed though it was in proud words, Gamboa's note in effect
conceded Wilson's most important demand, that Huerta eliminate
himself from the Mexican presidency at an early date. Before the note
arrived in Washington, however, Wilson went before a joint session, in
the afternoon of August 27, for the first time to explain his Mexican
policy to Congress and the country. He outlined the proposal that Lind
had presented to Huerta and declared that Huerta had flatly rejected
it. The United States, therefore, would now pursue a policy of "watch-
ful waiting," would urge American citizens to withdraw from Mexico,
and would "follow the best practice of nations in- the matter of
neutrality by forbidding the exportation of arms or munitions of war
of any kind" to either side in the civil war that was mounting in in-
tensity. 18

The arrival during the evening of August 27 of Gamboa's note, to-
gether with assurances from Lind that the United States had won a
substantial victory, greatly eased the tension in Washington and set
Wilson and Bryan to making further plans to bring peace and stability
to Mexico. The next four or five weeks were a virtual honeymoon
period in Mexican-American relations. When Huerta expressed a desire
to send a confidential agent to Washington, Bryan replied encourag-

17 Gamboa to Lind, Aug. 26, 1913, transmitted in O'Shaughnessy to Secre-
tary of State, Aug. 27, 1913, original in ibid.

18 The address is printed in Ray S. Baker and William E. Dodd (eds.), The
Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson (6 vols., New York, 1925-27), The New
Democracy, I, 4551.

Up to this time the provisional government had been able to purchase arms
in the United States, while the Constitutionalists, whose belligerent status the
United States had not recognized, could not. Wilson's careless assertion that
"the best practice of nations in the matter of neutrality" was the application of
an arms embargo was grossly false. Two years later friends of Germany, who
were urging an arms embargo, quoted it over and over, and with telling effect.

Jl6 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

ingly. 1 * Then, on September 16 Huerta announced to the Mexican
Congress his ardent desire to turn the government over to a constitu-
tional successor, and Lind and Bryan were greatly relieved. But the
most encouraging development of all was the nomination of Gamboa
for the presidency by the Catholic party on September 24. "I feel that
we have nearly reached the end of our trouble/' wrote Bryan in strong
approval of the Foreign Minister, 20 while the State Department an-
nounced it would approve Gamboa's election, even if the northern
states in revolt against Huerta did not participate. 21

Just at the moment, however, when it appeared that Huerta would
yield power to Gamboa and that the United States would throw its
moral and financial support behind the new government, a catastrophic
chain of events was set in motion upon the arrival in Mexico City of a
new British Minister, Sir Lionel Garden. Garden was the mouthpiece
of S. Weetman Pearson, Lord Gowdray, who had enormous oil
interests in Mexico, and there is some ground for believing that the
British Foreign Office for a time allowed Gowdray to dictate its
Mexican policy. 22 Nor was there much doubt that Cowdray, through
his agents in Mexico, exercised great influence over the Huerta govern-
ment. In any event, Garden's arrival coincided with Huerta's most
appalling act since the murder of Madero. 23 On October 10 the

19 O'Shaughnessy to Secretary of State, Sept. 1, 1913; Bryan to Lind, Sept.
8, 1913, both in State Dept. Papers.

20 Bryan to Wilson, Sept. 25, 1913, Wilson Papers; also Bryan to Lind, Sept.
26, 1913, State Dept. Papers.

21 New York World, Sept 26, 1913. It should be added, however, that the
State Department was doing its best at this time to bring about an armistice
in the fighting and to obtain the participation of the Constitutionalists in the
coming presidential election, scheduled to be held October 26, 1913.

22 This was Wilson's and Bryan's firm conviction. See, e.g., Daniels Diary,
Apr. 18, 1913, for Cabinet discussions of this point; also House Diary, Oct. 30,
1913. Sir Edward Grey emphatically denied the charge in Twenty-Five Years,
1892-1916 (2 vols., New York, 1925), II, 98-100.

In any event, the major factor in British policy was Mexican oil, as the
British navy had recently converted from coal burners to oil burners. With its
production of twenty-five million barrels in 1912, Mexico was practically the
sole source of oil for the British navy. British policy, therefore, was naturally
directed at preserving a steady flow of petroleum. The provisional government
in Mexico City could and did give guarantees that this vital British interest
would be protected.

28 Lind was convinced that Garden knew beforehand of Huerta's coup of
October 10 and that the British Minister timed the presentation of his creden-
tials with reference to it. Lind to Secretary of State, Oct. 23, 27, 1913, State
Dept. Papers.

MEXICO: INTERFERENCE AND DEFEAT, 1913-17 1 17

usurper fell upon the Chamber of Deputies, composed mainly of
Maderistas, arrested and imprisoned 110 members, and inaugurated a
full-fledged military dictatorship. The following day, October 11,
Garden went ostentatiously to the Presidential Palace and presented
his credentials to Huerta.

Huerta's act of violence and Garden's open approval shocked and
angered Wilson and impelled him to adopt a new course of action.
Firstly, the President accused Huerta of personal bad faith and told
him the United States would not approve any election he might hold.
Secondly, the President addressed a circular note to the governments
with representatives in Mexico, asking them to withhold recognition
from the new regime. Thirdly, two weeks later, on November 7, he
warned these governments that it was "his immediate duty to require
Huerta's retirement from the Mexican government" and that the
United States would "now proceed to employ such means as may be
necessary to secure this result." 24

A significant exchange among Wilson, Bryan, and Counselor John
Bassett Moore preceded the sending of the circular note of November
7. Following Garden's recognition of Huerta's coup d'etat of October
10, Wilson wrote on his own typewriter an outline of a circular note
he wished the State Department to prepare. In his outline, the Presi-
dent accused the European powers of keeping Huerta in power, "with-
out regard to the wishes or purposes of the United States." Would they
co-operate with the United States, Wilson continued, "or is their policy
and intention to antagonize and thwart us and make our task one of
domination and force?" To England, Wilson wanted it said that "The
bottom was about to drop out when Sir Lionel Garden appeared upon
the scene and took charge of its rehabilitation." Finally, Wilson wrote,
he wanted the note to be "as strong and direct as the courtesies and
proprieties of pacific diplomacy permit" 25

Bryan thereupon proceeded to write a draft of the note Wilson had
requested, and the President went over Bryan's draft, making certain
textual changes in his own handwriting. In this note the United States

24 Bryan to American Embassy, Oct. 13, 1913, ibid.; Bryan to certain diplo-
matic officers, Oct. Jz4, Nov. 7, 1913, Foreign Relations, 1913, pp. 849, 856.

25 Undated memorandum in State Dept. Papers. Wilson's anger stemmed
chiefly from his belief that the British government was supporting Huerta in
order to protect Gowdray's oil concessions. He told Colonel House he was de-
termined to expose this alliance between the provisional government and
Cowdray. "He said it was his purpose to build a fire back of the British Ministry
through the English public." House Diary, Oct. 30, 1913.

Il8 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

accused the powers of allowing their citizens to assist and encourage
Huerta, in return for commercial concessions. The United States,
therefore, "in the name of the people of the western hemisphere, whose
lands have been dedicated to free and constitutional government, ask
them [the powers] to withdraw that recognition which has exerted so
baneful an influence." 26

The note, if sent as drafted, might well have provoked a severe crisis
with the British government and certainly would have earned for its
authors a reputation for blustering diplomacy. Fortunately, however,
Bryan handed the note to Moore for its polishing, with the suggestion
that the Counselor add a paragraph invoking the Monroe Doctrine.
Moore now proceeded to do a courageous, but dangerous, thing: he
forthwith gave Wilson probably the severest tongue-lashing the Presi-
dent ever received. The states of this hemisphere are independent,
Moore pointed out, and "it has therefore never been considered neces-
sary for foreign Powers to ask our consent to their recognition of an
American government." Before accusing the powers of improper
motives in recognizing Huerta, Moore added, the President should
remember that actually the United States had been conducting dip-
lomatic relations with the provisional government for many months.
Seventeen governments had recognized Huerta. They thought they
were doing the proper thing. As for Great Britain, he concluded, it
would be unwise to impugn British motives in view of the grievances
the British government had against the United States. Sending the pro-
posed note, therefore, would only stir up resentment abroad and
would in the end defeat the President's purpose. 27

The significant point of this episode is that the gist of Wilson's emo-
tional memorandum and projected note was incorporated in the
famous speech he delivered at Mobile on October 27, in which he
heralded the day when Latin America would be emancipated from the
control of foreign concessionaires. If one reads "Mexico" for "Latin
America" and "Great Britain" for "foreign interests," the subtle mean-
ing of Wilson's words becomes evident. Moreover, Wilson was in-
directly assuring the Mexicans that in the campaign he was about to
undertake against Huerta he would avoid intervoption that carried
with it acquisition of territory and would seek only to make possible
the development of constitutional government in Mexico.

26 Draft of note, in State Dept. Papers.

27 John Bassett Moore to Wilson, Oct. 28, 1913, ibid.

MEXICO: INTERFERENCE AND DEFEAT, 1913-17 IIQ

During the six months from November, 1913, until nearly the end
of April, 1914, Wilson bent all his energies and employed all the diplo-
matic resources of the United States to force Huerta from power, by
all means short of war. His campaign was two-pronged: to isolate
Huerta diplomatically, and then to encourage the Constitutionalists in
their war against Huerta. 28

As the German government quickly signified its willingness to follow
the President's lead, Wilson brought his greatest pressure to bear upon
the British Foreign Office. In cold truth, the British were forced to
choose between the friendship of the United States and that of Huerta.
The Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, was frankly fearful of what
would happen to British property in Mexico if the Constitutionalists
succeeded. If Huerta were eliminated and the Constitutionalists ob-
tained control, would the United States assume responsibility for the
protection of British property in Mexico? These questions were dis-
cussed and answered when Grey sent his secretary, Sir William Tyrrell,
to Washington for talks with the President and Colonel House. Tyrrell
promised that the Foreign Office would withdraw its recognition and
support from Huerta. For his part, Wilson assured Tyrrell that he
would "teach the South American republics to elect good men" and
that the United States would work to establish a government in Mexico
"under which all contracts and business and concessions will be safer
than they have been," as well as to protect all foreign property in
Mexico during the civil war. 29

However doubtful Grey might have been about the President's ability
to carry out these promises, 30 in the then perilous state of European

28 It should be pointed out, however, that before undertaking this campaign,
Wilson made another strenuous effort to persuade Huerta to retire in favor of
a provisional government of elder statesmen, which should hold new elections.
"This Government cannot too earnestly urge him [Huerta] to make the inevi-
table choice wisely and in full view of the terrible consequences of hesitation or
refusal," Wilson warned. Bryan to American Embassy, Nov. 1, 1913, ibid.

When Huerta signified his readiness to agree (O'Shaughnessy to Secretary of
State, Nov. 13, 1913, ibid.), Wilson proceeded to draw up a contract providing
for Huerta's retirement, for the formation of a provisional government accept-
able to the United States, and for American recognition of the new provisional
government. Bryan to O'Shaughnessy, Nov. 14, 1913, ibid. At this point, how-
ever, Huerta balked 'and announced to the world his determination to fight on.

29 Burton J. Hendrick, The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page (3 vols.,
Garden City, N.Y., 1924-26), I, 204; Wilson to Tyrrell, Nov. 22, 1913, Wilson
Papers.

30 Wilson's promise was, of course, a vitally important one. But the President
made it on the assumption that he could create and control a Mexican govern-

I2O WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

affairs he had no alternative but to co-operate. In the event of a
general European war, which seemed in the offing, American friend-
ship would be worth more than Mexican oil. Accordingly, Garden was
soon bridled by the Foreign Office, the British withdrew recognition of
Huerta, and British policy in Mexico, generally, was thereafter sub-
ordinated to the personal wishes of the President of the United States.
Meanwhile, the steady progress of the Constitutionalist armies
toward Mexico City encouraged Wilson to believe they might be the
instrument he could use to encompass Huerta's downfall, without the
military intervention of the United States. The Constitutionalist chief-
tain, Venustiano Carranza, established a provisional government at
Hermosillo, in Sonora, on October 17, and already claimed control of
most of the large northern states. There was no doubt in the minds of
many observers that the Constitutionalists were carrying the torch of
the Madero Revolution and were fighting to achieve the aspirations of
the Mexican masses. The chief question in Wilson's mind, however,
was whether they had the capacity to govern Mexico and whether he
could control them. To find the answer, in mid-November Wilson sent
his trusted confidential agent, William Bayard Hale, to Nogales,
Mexico, with a message of supreme importance for Carranza. It pro-
posed nothing less than the joint co-operation of the United States and
the Constitutionalists in the war against Huerta. 31

ment, and the assumption was unwarranted by the circumstances. As will be
shown, Wilson tried hard enough to bring the Constitutionalists under his con-
trol but failed.

31 The author was not able to find a copy of Wilson's message to Carranza.
Fortunately, however, the President outlined his plan to Colonel House, as
follows :

"The President has in mind to declare war against Mexico even though actual
armed entrance into Mexico is not made. His purpose in this is to keep the
powers from interfering and entirely out of the situation. He will first blockade
the ports, thereby cutting off all revenue from the Mexican Government which
will have a tendency to break down Huerta's resistance.

"He has in mind also throwing a line across the southern part of Mexico, and
perhaps another line just south of the Northern States. He plans to send troops
to the Northern States, if they [the Constitutionalists] consent, in order to
protect the lives and property of foreign citizens. These troops would be
stationed at strategic points, but would not be intended to contend against
either the Constitutionalists or Federals [the Huerta forces] unless some overt
act was made by one or the other.

"It is his purpose to send six battleships at once. . . . The President seems
alert and unafraid. He realizes that his course may possibly bring about a coali-
tion of the European Powers against this Government, but he seems ready to
throw our gauntlet into the arena and declare all hands must be kept off
excepting our own." House Diary, Oct. 30, 1913.

MEXICO! INTERFERENCE AND DEFEAT, 1913-17 I5U

The Nogales conference was significant, not only because of Wilson's
offer of support to the Constitutionalists, but also because in the course .
of the negotiations he clearly revealed the pattern of his future rela-
tions with the Constitutionalist movement. In brief, in return for
American support, he insisted on guiding the Revolution into orderly
and democratic channels by obtaining Carranza's promise that the
rebels would participate in new elections, provided a provisional gov-
ernment of elder statesmen were established. Carranza, on the other
hand, made it abundantly plain that the Constitutionalists did not want
the advice and support of the United States and would oppose the
entry of American troops into Mexico by force, if that were necessary.
They wanted from the American government only one thing recogni-
tion of their belligerent status, with the accompanying privilege of buy-
ing arms and ammunition. Moreover, they were determined to effect a
thoroughgoing revolution; they would not compromise with the old
regime by co-operating with a facsimile of it in holding national elec-
tions; and they would use constitutional processes only after they had
occupied all of Mexico. Once Wilson's plan was made clear to Car-
ranza, he broke up the conference by demanding diplomatic recogni-
tion and by refusing further to see Hale. Hale, in turn, accused the
First Chief of a lack of candor and left in a huff for Washington. "You
know the world is full of all kinds of people," he told reporters at
Nogales, Arizona. "Some of them are not only impossible, but highly
improbable. Please understand that I am not speaking of the gentle-
men across the border who are with such admirable skill preventing
their friends from helping them." 32

For two months after the Nogales conference Wilson withheld any
form of support from the Constitutionalists. By the beginning of 1914,
however, it was evident the President would have to either allow them
to obtain arms and supplies or else carry out his threats to depose
Huerta by the military force of the United States. As Wilson was not
yet ready to intervene in an active way, he had no alternative but to
lift the arms embargo. In late January, therefore, the State Depart-
ment undertook official negotiations with Luis Cabrera, Carranza's
agent in Washington, and obtained from him the promise that the
provisional Constitutionalist government would respect property rights
and "just and equitable" concessions. Following this exchange, the

82 The New York Times, Nov. 20, 1913. Kale's reports are Hale to Secretary
of State, Nov. 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 1913, State Dept. Papers.

122 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

President on February 3 took the fateful step of revoking the embargo;
thus, in the eyes of the world, he identified the United States with the
cause of the Mexican Revolution.

Wilson, his advisers, and the Constitutionalists all confidently pre-
dicted the speedy triumph of the revolutionary forces as the result of
the President's action. Events did not turn out that way, however, for
by lifting the arms embargo Wilson spurred Huerta and his govern-
ment to new endeavors and caused the landed aristocracy, the business
and banking elements, and the Church for the first time to throw their
full support to Huerta. By the end of March, therefore, Huerta's end
seemed no nearer than it had been two months before. From Wilson's
point of view, this was a catastrophic development, for, as Lind wrote
almost daily from Vera Cruz, it was now up to the President to fulfill
his pledges to Mexico and the world.

But how could this be done? How could Huerta be deposed, if not
by the direct military intervention of the United States, which was
what the Constitutionalists had threatened to oppose by force of arms?
There seemed no other way, yet Wilson shrank from the extreme
alternative, as if his former threats had been mere bluff. Then an op-
portunity to intervene, and with some show of excuse, presented itself
when an otherwise minor incident occurred on April 10 at Tampico,
held by the Huertistas but then under siege by a Constitutionalist army.
The paymaster and crew of the U.S.S. Dolphin were arrested by a
Mexican colonel when they landed their whaleboat without permission
behind the federal lines. As soon as the Huertista commander, General
Morelos Zaragoza, learned of the incident, he immediately released the
Americans and sent a personal apology to Admiral Henry T. Mayo,
commander of the American squadron off Vera Cruz. 33

The affair would have ended with Zaragoza's apology had not the
Washington administration been looking for an excuse to provoke a
fight. On his own volition, Admiral Mayo demanded a twenty-one-gun
salute to the American flag, and Wilson backed up the demand. There
followed a serious of ridiculous exchanges between Mexico City and
Washington, in which the latter converted the arrest of the paymaster
and his crew from the petty incident it was into a deliberate affront

33 Morelos Zaragoza, "Truth of the 'Dolphin* Incident at Tampico," El
Excelsior (Mexico City), Dec. 6, 1931, gives the Mexican side; Clarence A.
Miller, Consul at Tampico, to Secretary of State, May 21, 1914, State Dept.
Papers, is a splendid report of the incident and its aftermath. Miller's account
generally agrees with Zaragoza's.

MEXICO: INTERFERENCE AND DEFEAT, 1913-17 If23

to the honor of the United States and on April 18 issued an ultimatum
to Huerta to salute the American flag at once or take the consequences.

The logic behind Wilson's demand was difficult for the Mexicans to
perceive. The United States had refused to recognize the Huerta gov-
ernment yet was dealing with it as if it were enough of a government
to discharge an official international obligation. The humor of the
situation was not lost upon Huerta, who replied that he would salute
the American flag, but only if an American warship returned the salute,
volley for volley. As this would have been tantamount to recognizing
the provisional government, Wilson refused. Then in Hot Springs,
Virginia, he announced on April 19 he would go before Congress the
following day. In Washington naval and military leaders laid plans for
a general blockade and possible war operations, the first step of which
would be the occupation of Vera Cruz. Arriving in Washington early in
the morning of April 20, the President at once held hurried con-
ferences with the Cabinet, Congressional leaders, and his military and
naval advisers. At three that afternoon he went before a joint session,
related the details of the Tampico affair and the subsequent negotia-
tions, accused the Huerta government of deliberately insulting the
United States, and asked for Congressional authority to use the armed
forces to obtain redress. 34

While both houses were debating resolutions conferring the authority
Wilson had requested, news reached the State Department in the early
morning of April 21 of the impending arrival at Vera Cruz of a
German steamer, the Ypiranga, with an enormous load of ammunition
for the Huerta government. In order to be able legally to prevent the
entry of these supplies, which might soon be used against American
forces, and without waiting for Congressional sanction, Wilson at day-
break ordered the navy to occupy Vera Cruz. 35 A landing was easily
effected and by the following day, April 22, all of the city was in
American hands, although Mexican naval cadets and civilians offered
spirited resistance and suffered 126 killed and 195 wounded. 36 Ameri-
can casualties were nineteen dead and seventy-one wounded.

It is clear Wilson contemplated only this limited punitive action

3 *The Public Papers, New Democracy, I, 99-103.

35 The New York Times, Apr. 22, 1914. The Ypiranga, incidentally, slipped
out of Vera Cruz harbor, moved down the coast to Puerto Mexico, and dis-
charged her cargo there.

36 This was the official American count. Fletcher to Secretary of the Navy,
Apr. 24, 1914, Wilson Papers.

124 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

against the de facto government, 87 in order to hasten its downfall.
Because he had not been frank with Congress and the people, because
he insisted he was punishing an individual, Huerta, for a personal
insult, 38 no one outside high administration circles understood the
reason for the Vera Cruz action. Indeed, in the eyes of the civilized
world the President appeared ridiculous, as a person willing to make
war over an obscure point of honor. As one London editor put it, "If
war is to be made on points of punctilio raised by admirals and gen-
erals, and if the Government of the United States is to set the example
for this return to mediaeval conditions it will be a bad day for civiliza-
tion." S9 No wonder the public at home was also dazed, when Wilson
told them over and again that he had a passion for peace and justice
and an abhorrence of war. 40 Nor was the confusion abated when Car-

37 As was evidenced by his instructions to General Frederick Funston, when
the army relieved the navy of the duty of occupying Vera Cruz. See Chief of
Staff, Memorandum for the Adjutant General, Apr. 26, 1914, ibid.

38 On April 20, just before he addressed the joint session, Wilson told re-
porters: "What, then, is the purpose of our naval operation in Mexico? It is
not, as you gentlemen seem to think not this act, that is the elimination of
Huerta. Its purpose is to compel the recognition of the dignity of the United
States." "President Wilson on His Foreign Policy," World's Work, XXVIII
(Oct., 1914), 489-490.

In his message to the joint session, Wilson added: "I therefore come to ask
your approval that I should use the armed forces of the United States in such
ways and to such an extent as may be necessary to obtain from General Huerta
and his adherents the fullest recognition of the rights and dignity of the United
States." The Public Papers, New Democracy, I, 102.

The present writer finds it difficult to believe that Wilson was speaking
frankly, that he was actually willing to go to war to compel an unqualified
salute.

** Economist (London), LXXVIII (Apr. 18, 1914), 906-907.

The action at Vera Cruz provoked a series of anti-American demonstrations
throughout Latin America in Montevideo, Santiago, Chile, Costa Rica,
Guatemala, and elsewhere, while the authorities in Buenos Aires prevented a
public demonstration* Except for the Brazilian newspapers, the Latin American
press generally condemned the occupation of Vera Cruz as another manifesta-
tion of American imperialism. As for European opinion, the British Foreign
Office welcomed the occupation of Vera Cruz as heralding full-scale occupation
of Mexico by American forces, while Conservative journals and newspapers, in-
cluding The Times (London), also approved. The German government and
press were generally favorable to the United States, but Russian editorial com-
ment was mordant. See, e.g., Novoe Vremya (St. Petersburg), 9/22, 15/28 Apr.
1914; Retch (St. Petersburg), 9/22 Apr. 1914; Russkoe Slovo (Moscow),
11/24 Apr. 1914.

40 The New York Times, Apr. 21, 1914. Perhaps a word about American
reaction to the Vera Cruz action is in order. A small Republican interven-
tionist group in the Senate, led by Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts and

MEXICO: INTERFERENCE AND DEFEAT, 1913-17 125

ranza and his lieutenants, with one notable exception, condemned the
seizure of Vera Cruz as wanton aggression against the Mexican people.
Indeed, only by the most strenuous effort were hostilities with the Con-
stitutionalists avoided.* 1

Albert B. Fall of New Mexico, tried unsuccessfully to obtain adoption of a
resolution empowering the President to send the armed forces anywhere into
Mexico to compel respect for American lives and property. It is doubtful, how-
ever, if Lodge and Fall spoke for a majority even of their own party. Certainly
they did not bespeak the sentiments of the American people. As it was mani-
fested in newspapers, mass meetings, and resolutions and letters, the pre-
ponderant American sentiment was decidedly pacific. It is even doubtful that
most articulate leaders and spokesmen approved the Vera Cruz action; they
certainly regarded the prospect of a general war with utter repugnance. From
the crisis over the flag salute through the occupation of Vera Cruz, peace
groups, labor unions. Socialist organizations, and diverse groups of plain citizens
held mass meetings and flooded congressmen and the President with appeals for
peace. For a few samples of such appeals see Resolutions adopted by the Com-
mission on Peace and Arbitration of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ
in America, Apr. 21, 1914, in the Papers of Elihu Root, in the Library of Con-
gress; Massachusetts Federation of Churches to Wilson, Apr. 22, 1914, Wilson
Papers; Executive Committee of the Socialist Party to Wilson, Apr. 22, 24,
1914, ibid.; Andrew Carnegie to Wilson, Apr. 21, 1914, ibid.; O. G. Villard to
Wilson, Apr. 23, 1914, ibid.; John W. Foster to Elihu Root, Apr. 24, 1914,
Root Papers; Moorfield Storey, president of the Anti-Imperialist League, to
Wilson, Apr. 25, 1914, Wilson Papers; Charles W. Eliot to Wilson, Apr. 29,
1914, ibid. There is, moreover, no evidence that men with large material inter-
ests in Mexico, or their spokesmen, except for William R. Hearst, were in any
way agitating for a war. The Financial World, XXII (Apr. 18, 1914), 2, and
Financial Age, XXIX (Apr. 25, 1914), 673, condemned Wilson's policy and
declared the financial community did not want war. Former President Taft
declared that Wilson was attempting to provoke war for political purposes. Taft
to Mabel T. Boardman, Apr. 19, 1914, Taft Papers. Senator Elihu Root wrote
that he was heartsick at the thought of war with Mexico. Root to A. T. Mahan,
Apr. 27, 1914, Root Papers. There seems no reason to continue to pile evidence
on evidence to prove this point.

41 On April 23 Carranza addressed a letter to the President and the Secretary
of State, in which he declared: "The invasion of our territory and the perma-
nency of your forces in the Port of Vera Cruz are a violation of the rights that
constitute our existence as a free and independent sovereignty, and will drag us
into an unequal war which until today we desired to avoid." Carranza, more-
over, demanded that the United States evacuate Vera Cruz at once. Carranza
to Carothers, for Wilson and Bryan, Apr. 22, 1914, printed in The New York
Times, Apr. 23, 1914. In reply, Wilson and Bryan assured the First Chief that
their intentions were friendly and called upon him to affirm that the Constitu-
tionalists would not resist the efforts of the United States to obtain redress from
Huerta. Bryan to Letcher, Consul at Chihuahua, Apr. 24, 1914, State Dept.
Papers. In addition, supporters of the Constitutionalist movement in the United
States brought immediate pressure to bear upon Carranza to show a more
friendly attitude and assured him that the American government had no inten-
tion of subverting Mexican sovereignty. C. A. Douglas to Pesqueira, Apr. 23,

126 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

It came as a great relief to the American people, therefore, when the
Brazilian, Argentine, and Chilean envoys in Washington on April 25
offered to mediate the dispute and Bryan and Huerta accepted. The
offer did not come any too soon, for Wilson's decision on April 23 to
send an occupation army into Vera Cruz brought the military leaders
prominently into the administration's deliberations and was further
provocation to the Huerta government. At a Cabinet meeting on April
24, for example, Secretary of War Garrison urged the President to
order the army to move toward Mexico City as rapidly as possible. At
a White House conference that evening the President, Bryan, Garrison,
and Daniels discussed plans for a general war, while Garrison and
Daniels at once set their staffs at work on campaign plans. It should
be noted, however, that throughout these discussions Bryan argued
consistently against further preparations or provocations.

On the face of it, it was somewhat absurd for the United States to
negotiate on the high level of international mediation with a govern-
ment it had refused to recognize. But Wilson was not disturbed by a
seeming inconsistency, for he never had any intention of submitting to
a genuine mediation. On the contrary, he expected to use the media-
tion as a means of eliminating Huerta and establishing a provisional
government that would turn Mexico over to the Constitutionalists. 42

1914, copy in ibid.; S. G. Hopkins to Carranza, Apr. 24, 1913, copy in the
Papers of Hugh L. Scott, in the Library of Congress.

Meanwhile, Carranza's chief general in the north, Francisco Villa, -who was
already laying plans to seize control of the Constitutionalist movement, publicly
declared he would not join Carranza in wax against the United States. New
York World, Apr. 24, 1914. Privately, Villa assured Wilson that Carranza had
spoken only for himself and that he, Villa, entirely approved the seizure of
Vera Cruz. Carothers to Bryan, Apr. 25, 1914, transmitting Villa to Wilson,
Apr. 25, 1914, State Dept. Papers.

Villa's defection from the otherwise solid Constitutionalist ranks precluded
any action by Carranza. On April 28 the two men met at Chihuahua City and
agreed that the Constitutionalists should not oppose American forces unless they
invaded Constitutionalist territory. The New York Times, Apr. 29, 1914; New
York World, Apr. 29, 1914.

42 In a confidential memorandum for the ABC mediators, written probably
on April 25, 1914, Wilson warned that no settlement of the Mexican problem
would be acceptable to American public opinion or the American government
that did not provide for "the entire elimination of General Huerta'* and the
establishment of a provisional government in Mexico City representative of all
factions. Undated memorandum in the Wilson Papers. Moreover, the American
commissioners at the peace conference that met soon afterward at Niagara
Falls, Canada, constantly pressed Wilson's plan for the creation of a provisional
government controlled by the Constitutionalists. Obviously, the American ob-

MEXICO: INTERFERENCE AND DEFEAT, 1913-17 127

The American and Mexican delegates met at Niagara Falls,
Canada, under the ABC sponsorship, from May 20 until July 2, 1914.
As the talks droned on, the Constitutionalists drove nearer and nearer
Mexico City. Huerta notified the commissioners that he was about at
the end of his rope and would soon have to abdicate. The only sig-
nificant aspect of the conference, therefore, was Wilson's attempt to
compel the Constitutionalists to cease fighting and submit to American
guidance in establishing a provisional government. After much par-
leying, Carranza reluctantly sent a delegation to Niagara Falls, which
met secretly with the American commissioners on June 16. Carranza's
envoys frankly declared that the First Chief did not want American
help, would oppose any form of mediation of the civil war itself, and
would not accept Mexico City if it were offered to him by outsiders.

Carranza's absolute refusal to allow Wilson to use the ABC media-
tion to settle the civil war and to impose a program for the economic
and social reconstruction of Mexico 43 was final and complete proof
that the Revolution was out of American control. And it was out of
control at the very moment when the cumulative effect of American
policies was making possible the triumph of the revolutionary forces.
In short, Wilson had made possible the success of a movement for
which he had assumed responsibility before the British government,

jective was either to persuade Huerta to abdicate peacefully and to turn over
the government to his enemies or else, as General Hugh L. Scott, American
Chief of Staff, put it, "to kill time until Villa takes the City of Mexico." Scott
to Mary L. Scott, May 19, 1914, Scott Papers.

43 At least since the early winter of 1913-14, Wilson and his chief advisers
had given much study to the economic and social aspects of the Mexican prob-
lem. This shift from a moralistic to a sociological approach brought with it an
increasing awareness on the administration's part that the basic causes of dis-
order in Mexico were the illiteracy, abject poverty, landlessness, and exploita-
tion of 80 per cent of the Mexican people. In a long conversation with Samuel
G. Blythe on April 27, for example, Wilson revealed an acute comprehension
of the underlying causes of the Revolution and of the aspirations of the Mexi-
can masses. S. G. Blythe, "Mexico: The Record of a Conversation with Presi-
dent Wilson," Saturday Evening Post, CLXXXVI (May 23, 1914), 2-4. In a
memorandum that he prepared on May 4, 1914, for the guidance of the Presi-
dent and the Secretary of State, Counselor Robert Lansing also revealed a
thorough understanding of the important causes of Mexico's difficulties. Robert
Lansing, "The Mexican Situation," May 4, 1914, State Dept. Papers.

Consequently, the American commissioners at the ABC conference pressed
hard for a comprehensive program for the reconstruction of Mexico, a program
that emphasized land reform. The insuperable obstacle was, of course, Car-
ranza's refusal to admit that the Washington government knew more about the
Mexican problem than the Constitutionalists did.

128 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

yet over which he could exercise no real direction. There was nothing
he could do, therefore, except to acquiesce and to make it plain that
the United States would not tolerate wholesale executions or confisca-
tions when the Constitutionalists captured their capital. On July 15
Huerta abdicated; a provisional government was speedily formed to
arrange the surrender, and on August 20 the First Chief, his lieuten-
ants, and his armies triumphantly entered the City of Mexico.

"With the retirement of Huerta . . , prospects are bright for the
triumph of President Wilson's moral-suasion peace policy," wrote one
optimistic editor,* 4 and many commentators throughout the world
agreed. Yet the new era of peace and reconstruction, the end of
Mexico's suffering and of Wilson's perplexities, was not yet; for almost
immediately after Huerta's downfall there occurred a tragic split in
the ranks of the Constitutionalists that was to plunge Mexico into civil
war for another three years. The disruption of the revolutionary move-
ment was, of course, long in the making and the product of many
forces. The root of the trouble, however, was the personal rivalry
between the First Chief and his most spectacular general, Francisco, or
"Pancho," Villa. 45 Born a peon, Villa, who had spent most of his early
life an outlaw and a bandit, joined the Madero forces in 1911 and two
years later threw in his lot with Carranza. Where Carranza was stolid,
Villa was volatile and violent, the personal embodiment, as it were, of
the hatred the peons bore toward the great landowners and profes-
sional politicians. Ignorant and illiterate though he was, Villa soon
demonstrated astonishing military skill and a dashing leadership; and,
as general of the Division of the North, he became the dynamic force
behind the Constitutionalist movement in the northern states.

Unfortunately for his distracted country, Villa was also consumed
with an ambition to become ruler of Mexico, and during the early
months of 1914 he schemed to wrest control of the revolutionary
armies from Carranza. There was almost a complete rupture between
the two leaders in April, 1914, but American diplomatic officers in the
field, especially George C. Carothers, who was attached to Villa's head-
quarters, temporarily patched up the break. Then, during the first two
months after the Constitutionalists assumed power, Villa carefully
garnered supplies and built up his forces.

From its consular agents in Chihuahua and Juarez, the Washington

** Dallas Baptist Standard, XXVI (July 23, 1914), 4.
45 Villa's real name was Doroteo Arango.

MEXICO: INTERFERENCE AND DEFEAT, 1913-17 129

government knew about the impending rupture long before it oc-
curred. From Wilson's and Bryan's point of view. Villa's revolt was
not altogether unfortunate, because it afforded an opportunity to dis-
place Carranza as leader of the Revolution with Villa, who had
studiously manifested his willingness to follow Wilson's advice. The
deposing of Carranza and the enthroning of Villa now became the
chief objective of the American government. 46 In August, 1914, the
administration embarked upon its new policy, one ill conceived and
unfortunate in its consequences.

As the first step, John Lind was dismissed as adviser to the State De-
partment, because he was too friendly to Carranza and too hostile to
the Roman Catholic Church. He was replaced by Paul Fuller, a mem-
ber of the New York law firm of Coudert Brothers, a leading Roman
Catholic layman, and an authority on Latin American affairs. As the
second and more important step, Fuller was sent with secret instruc-
tions from Wilson on confidential missions to Villa's headquarters and
to Mexico City to propose the calling of a convention representing the
revolutionary armies and the subsequent creation of a new provisional
government. At Santa Rosalia on August 16, Fuller conferred with
Villa and obtained from him oral and written promises of his willing-
ness to co-operate and his purpose to help establish speedily a constitu-
tional government and then to retire from political life. The American
agent added also a flattering description of Villa's personal qualities
his quiet demeanor, gentleness, and self-effacement. 47 That Villa's

46 How did it happen that Wilson and Bryan turned against Carranza and
threw their support to Villa, whose violent character and consuming ambition
for personal power had already been made plain to them in numerous ways?
Their dislike of Carranza is not hard to understand, as the First Chief time and
again had demonstrated his stubborn refusal to take their advice or even to
reciprocate their early friendship. Wilson's and Bryan's support of Villa
stemmed chiefly from the fact that Villa had been careful to give them the
impression that he would establish a government they could control. The two
Americans did not forget, moreover, that Villa's firm stand had prevented
Carranza from making trouble at the time of the Vera Cruz affair. Further-
more, there was a strong pro- Villa clique in the administration, headed by
George C. Carothers, Consul accredited to Villa's headquarters, and General
Hugh L. Scott, Chief of Staff, who pleaded Villa's cause and played upon the
President's prejudices against Carranza. Finally, Villa had enjoyed a friendly
press in the United States and had been depicted as a natural leader of the
downtrodden Mexican masses. It was assumed Villa would effect land reform
more quickly than Carranza.

47 Paul Fuller, "Memorandum for the President," dated Aug. 20, 1914, State
Dept. Papers. Villa's written affirmation was "Statement by General Villa of

I3O WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA.

promise to retire from public life was given or received sincerely might
be doubted, as Fuller later declared that the object of his mission was
"conciliation and mediation between the hostile elements, directed
chiefly to bringing about a convention which would place Villa in con-
trol." 48

Fuller went next to Mexico City, by way of Vera Cruz. Arriving in
the capital on September 4, he proceeded to lecture the Foreign Secre-
tary in the provisional government on correct democratic procedures.
In conference with Carranza on September 5 3 Fuller found the First
Chief accommodating, friendly, and willing to co-operate in President
Wilson's plan and to retire from the leadership of the Constitutionalist
movement after the new government was established. Obviously Car-
ranza was in a perilous situation and dared not risk the consequences
of open defiance, as his chief lieutenant, Alvaro Obregon, had come
out in support of the President's plan. On September 8 Fuller had his
last conference with Carranza, and agreement was made for the calling
of the convention and the speedy establishment soon afterward of a
civil government, representing all factions. Thus it seemed the way was
finally open for the retirement of Carranza and the seating of a new
coalition, headed by Villa.

That Villa was all along jockeying for supremacy was evidenced
when he issued a declaration of war against Carranza on September 23,
three weeks before the convention was to assemble. The convention,
none the less, met at Aguascalientes from October 12 through Novem-
ber 12. Middle-of-the-road leaders like Obregon and Pablo Gonzales,
who sincerely desired the retirement of Carranza and Villa and a
genuine reconciliation of all factions, tried vainly to heal the breach.
At the insistence of the Villistas, delegates from the Zapatista revolu-
tionary movement ** were admitted, whereupon the Villistas joined

the purposes and intentions of his Division of the North with reference to the
new government in Mexico, August 18, 1914," enclosed in Villa to Wilson,
Aug. 18, 1914, ibid. One is tempted to believe that Fuller helped Villa write
this statement.

48 Anderson Diary, Feb. 20, 1915.

49 In 1910 Emiliano Zapata began a revolutionary movement in the state of
Morelos, southeast of Mexico City, against the Diaz regime, which he continued
against the Madero government. The Zapatistas' first objective was destruction
of the great estates and the distribution of land among the peons, which
objective was set forth in the Plan of Ayala, adopted November 28, 1911. See
E. Zapata to Wilson, Aug. 23, 1914, Wilson Papers, and "Plan for the libera-
tion of the natives of the State of Morelos belonging to the Insurgent
Army . . .," dated Nov. 28, 1911, and "Act of Ratification of the Plan of
Ayala," dated July 19, 1914, copies in ibid.

MEXICO: INTERFERENCE AND DEFEAT, 1913-17 13!

with them to dominate the convention, depose Carranza, establish a
new government, and elect General Eulalio Guiterrez, a Villa f ollower,
President.

Along with other lesser chieftains, Carranza's two stalwarts, Obregon
and Gonzales, co-operated with the Villista-Zapatista majority and
even tried to persuade Garranza to withdraw. But it was evident to the
First Chief that the new convention government was merely a front
for Villa, and he defied the convention and declared war on the
usurpers of Aguascalientes. At this point, when it was clear they
would have to choose personally between Villa and their chief, a ma-
jority of the able generals, including Obregon and Gonzales, unhesi-
tatingly repudiated the convention and rushed to Garranza's , side.
Garranza then moved his capital from Mexico City to Vera Cruz, re-
cently evacuated by the American forces ; Villa and Zapata met in the
City of Mexico and established the convention government there, and
the civil war was begun all over again.

If the State Department had remained absolutely neutral in the
ensuing conflict, its duration would have been considerably shortened.
Instead of remaining aloof, the Washington government threw its
moral and diplomatic support behind the convention, or Villa, gov-
ernment. As it turned out, Wilson and Bryan could have made no
more unrealistic decision or worse diplomatic blunder. They bet on the
wrong man, in spite of the fact that their agents at Aguascalientes
told them Carranza still commanded the loyalty of a large majority
of the revolutionary forces and that Villa was surrounding himself
with the worst elements in Mexico.

Events soon demonstrated the error of the administration's policy.
While Villa sat in Mexico City and waited for the Garranzistas to dis-
integrate, the First Chief set to the task of rebuilding his armies and
broadening his program. The "Additions to the Plan of Guadalupe"
of December, 1914, the decree of January 6, 1915, restoring land to
the villages, and various labor decrees mobilized broad public support
behind the Constitutionalists and set in motion a social revolution
that is still in progress. Then, in January, 1915, under Obregon's mas-
terful generalship, Carranza began a campaign that inflicted a series
of crushing blows on the Villistas, culminating in a great defeat of
Villa's army at Gelaya, April 14-16, 1915. From this time on, Villa
fought a desperate retreat northward, until he found refuge in his
native stronghold of Chihuahua.

132 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

The period of the rapid destruction of Villa's power, from January
to September, 1915, was a time of divided counsels and confusion in
the Washington government. The administration quickly shifted from
support of the Villa convention government to a policy of strict neu-
trality, and Wilson forthrightly and courageously insisted that the
Mexicans be allowed to settle their own problems in their own way. 50
The war in Europe made this policy of abstention easier, as there was
now no possibility of immediate European interference. On the other
hand, demands at home for intervention mounted so rapidly during
the first nine months of 1915 that the administration was subjected to
pressures almost irresistible. Some business elements may have desired
the military occupation of Mexico, but if they did their spokesmen
were remarkably silent. Since 1913 the Hearst newspapers had been
trying frantically to generate a war fever; they now redoubled this ef-
fort. But more important were the powerful new voices in the inter-
ventionist camp. On December 6, 1914, Theodore Roosevelt opened
his campaign for intervention with a strong blast in The New York
Times Magazine?* His assertion that Wilson was responsible for most
of the trouble in Mexico^ because he had made the civil war possible
by his support of the Constitutionalist movement., was soon echoed by
influential spokesmen, some of whom had previously been friendly to
the administration. 52 Even more important a factor in the new cam-
paign for intervention, however, were the hierarchy and laymen of the
Roman Catholic Church. 53

Confronted with a rapidly changing situation in Mexico that he did
not understand, Wilson in February, 1915, sent another agent, Duval
West of San Antonio, to Mexico; but West returned to report that no

50 Especially in his Jackson Day address at Indianapolis, January 8, 1915,
The Public Papers, New Democracy, I, 236-251.

51 Theodore Roosevelt, "Our Responsibility in Mexico," The New York
Times Magazine, Dec. 6, 1914.

52 E.g., Chicago Daily Tribune, Dec. 7, 1914; \V. H. Taft to M. T. Herrick,
Dec. 14, 1914, Taft Papers; Outlook, CIX (Jan. 20, 1915), 127, GX (May 5,
1915), 10-12; Independent, LXXXI (Jan. 25, Mar. 22, 1915), 112-113, 407;
Louisville Courier- Journal, Apr. 17 S 1915; New Republic, HI (June 12, 1915),
loo.

53 E.g., sermon by Joseph Schrembs, Bishop of Toledo, in the Baltimore
Cathedral, Sept. 27, 1914, New York World, Sept 28, 1914; American Federa-
tion of Catholic Societies to Wilson, Sept. 29, 1914, Wilson Papers; Cardinal
O'Connell of Boston, in New York World, Nov. 16, 1914; John Ireland, Arch-
bishop of St. Paul, to Theodore Roosevelt, Dec. 7, 1914, the Papers of Theodore
Roosevelt, in the Library of Congress.

MEXICO: INTERFERENCE AND DEFEAT, 1913-17 133

faction was strong enough to dominate the country and establish or-
der. West also brought back a tragic report of a Mexico ruined and
devastated, her industries and railroads destroyed, her people near
starvation. The worst aspect of the tragedy was that there seemed to
be no hope. The administration pondered the alternatives and con-
cluded that the only effective solution was the establishment and main-
tenance by the United States of a government capable of restoring
order and suppressing the civil war. This, clearly, was what the Presi-
dent had in mind when, on June 2, he issued a warning to the
Mexican leaders to stop fighting or else to face American interven-
tion. Villa replied by offering to make peace with Garranza, while the
First Chief emphatically repudiated the President's right to interfere. 54

At this point, when it seemed the administration would at last suc-
cumb to interventionist pressures and temptations, the situation took a
new turn. In the first place, it became increasingly evident during the
summer and early fall that Duval West's estimate had been incorrect.
The unpleasant truth was that Carranza was growing stronger daily
and that intervention by the United States^would entail a war with
Mexico that no one in administration circles wanted. Secondly, at the
same time the United States became embroiled in a diplomatic crisis
of the greatest magnitude with Germany over the use of the submarine
against merchant shipping. As war with Germany became a possibility,
administration leaders recognized the necessity of avoiding a second
possible war with Mexico. Thirdly, and most important, the German
government undertook to provoke a war between the United States
and Mexico, in order to weaken American pressure against free use of
the submarine. 55

In early June, 1915, moreover, a new Secretary of State, Robert
Lansing, took the helm at the Department of State. In decisions
affecting Mexico, Bryan had always followed Wilson's lead, without
attempting to take the initiative. Lansing, however, pursued a more
vigorous policy. Earlier, in March, he had suggested that the ABC
powers be brought into the administration's consultations, and in
August he began a series of conferences with the ABC Ambassadors,
the Ministers from Bolivia, Uruguay, and Guatemala^ and Paul Fuller

54 "I think I have never known of a man more impossible to deal with on
human principles than this man Carranza," Wilson wrote soon afterward.
Wilson to Lansing, July 2, 1915, the Ray Stannard Baker Collection, in the
Library of Congress.

55 These intrigues are discussed more fully below, pp. 200-201.

134 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

that lasted into October. At the outset of these deliberations, Lansing
and his colleagues agreed Carranza should be eliminated and a new
provisional government, representing all factions, should be estab-
lished. 56 On August 11 the conferees addressed an appeal to the
various Mexican leaders, urging them to compose their differences
under the auspices of the Pan-American council. 67 Villa agreed at once
to a mediation that would save a remnant of his shattered power,
but the Carranzistas replied with one voice that their only leader was
the First Chief, who would transmit their refusal to submit to any
form of mediation. 58 Finally, Carranza sent his refusal to Washington
on September 10, at the very time his armies were capturing Torreon,
the Villista stronghold in the North.

Impressed by the unity in the Constitutionalist ranks and by Car-
ranza's capture of Torreon, Lansing decided the First Chief should be
recognized. Moreover, the German intrigues in Mexico had convinced
him there was no alternative. 59 First, however, he had to persuade the
Latin American envoys, who represented reactionary governments and
were extremely hostile to the Mexican Revolution, to concur. "It was a
situation which required delicate handling because a false move would
defeat the object for which the Conference was called/' Lansing wrote
soon afterward. "The plan of carrying on the negotiation which I de-
termined to follow ... to bring the desired result, the recognition of

56 Lansing to Wilson, Aug. 6, 1915, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations
of the United States, The Lansing Papers, 1914-1920 (2 vols., Washington,
1939-40), II, 544. On the other hand, Wilson did not agree that the Pan-
American conferees should insist upon Carranza's elimination. He was so im-
pressed by the First Chiefs growing power that he was willing to consider the
possibility of recognizing him. Wilson to Lansing, Aug. 11, 1915, ibid., p. 549.

57 Printed in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States,
1915 (Washington, 1924), pp. 735-736.

58 The New York Times, Aug. 22, 1915.

59 Lansing wrote (the Diary of Robert Lansing, in the Library of Congress)
on October 10, 1915:

"Looking at the general situation I have come to the following conclusions:

"Germany desires to keep up the turmoil in Mexico until the United States
is forced to intervene; therefore, we must not intervene.

"Germany does not wish to have any one faction dominant in Mexico ; there-
fore, we must recognize one faction as dominant in Mexico.

"When we recognize a faction as the government, Germany will undoubtedly
seek to cause a quarrel between that government and ours; therefore, we must
avoid a quarrel regardless of criticism and complaint in Congress and the
press.

"It comes down to this: Our possible relations with Germany must be our
first consideration; and all our intercourse with Mexico must be regulated ac-
cordingly."

MEXICO: INTERFERENCE AND DEFEAT, 1913-17 135

Carranza, was to lay a foundation in philosophy^ which would appeal
strongly to the Latin mind." Lansing's strategy was to convince his
colleagues that Mexican sovereignty now resided in the revolutionary
armies, and that the Carranza faction was de facto sovereign because
it controlled most of the country. 60

Lansing's strategy succeeded on October 9, and ten days later the
United States and its six Latin American associates formally recog-
nized the government of Venustiano Carranza as the de facto govern-
ment of Mexico. The Villa clique in Washington, headed by the Chief
of Staff, General Hugh L. Scott, were of course angered, but the
Roman Catholic hierarchy and journalistic spokesmen were even more
outraged and replied with a savage attack on the administration that
continued through the election of 19 16. 61 The Catholic leaders felt
insulted, not only because the Carranzistas were avowedly anticlerical
and had committed outrages against priests, nuns, and church property,
but also because these same Catholic leaders had earlier attempted to
persuade Wilson and Bryan to bring pressure to bear upon the Con-
stitutionalists to repeal the Reform Laws of the Juarez era, and Wilson
and Bryan had refused. 62 Whether the Catholic hierarchy would have
preferred Villa to Carranza, it is impossible to say. 63 In any event, the
powerful hostility of the Catholic Church to the administration's policy,
already manifested, was intensified. Wilson, in turn, resented the
Catholic criticism and contemplated striking the hierarchy a public
blow, but apparently thought better of it. 64

e Ibid. \

i E.g., America, XIII (Oct. 2, 1915), 614; ibid., XIV (Oct. 16, 1915), 14;
ibid. (Oct. 23, 1915), p. 38; Brooklyn Tablet. Oct. 16, 1915; New Orleans
Morning Star, Oct. 16, 1915.

62 The Rev. Francis G. Kelley, of the Catholic Church Extension Society of
Chicago, was the hierarchy's intermediary with the administration. See D. F.
Malone to Wilson, Apr. 22, 1915, Wilson Papers. Kelley wrote a long letter,
setting forth the official Catholic position and objectives on February 23, 1915.
The author was unable to find this letter, but Bryan described it in a letter to
Wilson, Apr. 19, 1915, the Papers of William Jennings Bryan, in the National
Archives. "Father Kelley's letter is on the whole quite moderate I think," Bryan
commented, "but there is one proposition in it which would seem to be un-
tenable, namely, that the revolutionists should be asked to repeal the laws which
they have there on the separation of church and state/ 9

68 Villa's chief agent in the United States, Felix A. Sommerfeld, obtained
from Villa a promise not to molest the Church and negotiated with the Rev.
Francis C. Kelley, the chief Catholic spokesman in the United States on Mexi-
can matters. F. A. Sommerfeld to H. L. Scott, Feb. 18, 1915, Scott Papers.

64 "The President was very firm in his determination to strike the Catholics a

136 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

Relations between the United States and the Carranza government
were friendly, if not cordial, during the first three months after recog-
nition. Then 3 in early January, 1916, occurred the first in a series of
events that was to culminate in the two nations' drawing to the verge
of war. The entire cause of the trouble was Villa, who, after Carranza's
recognition, turned violently on his erstwhile friends and began a cam-
paign to exterminate Americans in the Northern states. On January
11, 1916, Villistas stopped a Mexico Northwestern train at Santa
Ysabel, fifty miles west of Chihuahua City, removed seventeen Ameri-
cans, and shot sixteen of them on the spot Coinciding as it did with
the opening of the campaign of 1916, the massacre evoked a strong
demand in Congress for intervention, and even Wilson's stalwart
spokesman in the Senate, William J. Stone, wavered. It required the
full force of administration influence to block passage of a resolution
authorizing the President to use the military forces in Mexico. 65

Villa, however, was now deliberately attempting to provoke such
intervention as a means of discrediting Carranza and regaining his lost
power. When the Santa Ysabel massacre failed to bring results, the
bandit chieftain made a desperate raid on American territory, at
Columbus, New Mexico, on March 9, burning the town and killing
nineteen Americans. Some observers thought he had been seized with
what Mexicans called Delirio de Grandeza and had gone mad with an
obsession to kill Americans. Whatever his motivation, Villa this time
achieved his objective, for the demand in the United States for mili-
tary action against the Villistas was now so strong that the administra-
tion could hardly resist it. Instructions were sent immediately to
military commanders in Texas to assemble an expedition for the pursuit
of Villa. The President, however, would not allow this so-called Puni-
tive Expedition to cross the border until he had been assured the
Mexican authorities approved such action. 68 At the same time, in re-
public blow, provided they carried their arrogance too far." House Diary, Dec
16, 1914 [1915].

65 Tta New York Times, Jan. 14, 15, 1916. The interventionists did, how-
ever, obtain passage of a resolution by the Senate calling on the Secretary of
State to submit a report on the number of Americans killed in Mexico since
the beginning of the Revolution. The resolution and the State Department's
reply are printed in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1916 (Washington, 1925), pp. 463-464, 469-478.

6ft This approval was given orally by the Mexican Secretaries for Foreign
Relations, War, and Marine on March 15. Silliman to Secretary of State Mar
15, 1916, ibid., p. 491.

MEXICO! INTERFERENCE AND DEFEAT, 1913-17 137,

sponse to a suggestion from Carranza, Lansing negotiated on March 13
a protocol with Eliseo Arredondo, Mexican Ambassador-designate in
Washington, empowering either nation in the future to pursue bandits
across the international boundary. 'Finally, the Punitive Expedition,
under the command of Brigadier General John J. Pershing, was sent
across the border on March 15, 1916, but with the most explicit in-
structions to commit no acts of aggression against the Carranza forces,

At the same time that Lansing initialed the protocol, the administra-
tion announced that the agreement was "in full force" and that it
authorized the entry of the Punitive Expedition into Mexican territory.
The Washington government was acting in good faith, but its asser-
tions were incorrect. In the first place, the protocol had not been rati-
fied by the Mexican government when the Expedition crossed the
border; in the second, it authorized only temporary crossings in the
future. Actually, the protocol was not officially ratified by the de facto
government until March 24, and by this time Pershing's force was far
into Mexico.

When he proposed authorizing the mutual right of hot pursuit across
the border, Carranza was thinking in terms of small forces, whose stay
in the neighboring territory would be limited to a few days. The entry
of Pershing's large force 67 greatly alarmed him, and he at once began
a diplomatic campaign to compel the Expedition's retirement. During
the first few weeks of the chase, however, the Carranzistas restrained
their irritation and even made a show of co-operating with Pershing.
There would have been no difficulty if Villa had been less elusive;
several times Pershing came within an ace of capturing him and de-
stroying his band, but Villa always somehow contrived to escape south-
ward, drawing Pershing behind him. By April 8 the Punitive Expedi-
tion, now 6,675 strong, had penetrated more than three hundred miles

Before this word had come from the Mexican capital, then at Queretaro,
Wilson told Tumulty that if the Mexicans showed an intention to resist the
Punitive Expedition he would not allow Pershing to cross the border. Tumulty
to Wilson, Mar. 15, 1916, Wilson Papers; House Diary, Mar. 17, 1916. This
was a time of renewed crisis with Germany, and, as House expressed it, the
President was determined to avoid war with Mexico because Germany ardently
desired such a war. Ibid., Mar. 29, 1916.

167 In the beginning the Expedition contained a little over 5,000 officers and
men. By April 5 there were 251 officers and 6,424 men in the force. On April
18 an additional 2,300 troops were sent to Pershing. By June 19, at the height
of the Mexican- American tension, Pershing's force numbered 11,635 385
officers and 11,250 men.

138 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

deep into the heart of Mexico. To sensitive Mexicans this was alarm-
ing enough; worse still, the Expedition gave no signs of halting, was
being constantly reinforced, and was rapidly assuming the appearance
of an army of occupation in the northern states. Carranza had never
agreed to the Expedition's entry; he now decided he could remain
acquiescent no longer, and on April 13 Arredondo presented his chief's
protest, a virtual demand for the withdrawal of the Expedition from
Mexican soil.

By mid-April, therefore, it was evident the two governments had
unintentionally blundered into an exceedingly dangerous situation. By
now Mexican public opinion was so hostile to the Expedition that
Carranza could not long remain in power if he did not take drastic
steps to compel its withdrawal. On the other hand, the Washington
government were now convinced Carranza either could not or else did
not wish to control the bandit gangs in northern Mexico. The longer
the Expedition stayed in Mexico, the less willing the Carranzistas were
to pursue the Villistas, which fact only deepened American suspicion
that the Carranza commanders were contemplating an attack on the
Expedition, Moreover, the Republicans were now launching a bitter
campaign against the administration's Mexican policy. Carranza's
demand for the withdrawal of the Expedition evoked indignant pro-
tests from leaders of the President's own party, who realized with-
drawal at this time might have disastrous political consequences.

Neither Carranza nor Wilson wanted war, yet a situation was
rapidly developing in which conflict between the American and de
facto forces was inevitable. This unhappy truth was demonstrated by
an incident that occurred on April 12 and that prompted Carranza to
demand the withdrawal of the expeditionary force. A detachment of
American troops entered the town of Parral to purchase supplies.
Mexican soldiers opened fire upon the Americans as they were leaving,
and in the ensuing exchange forty Mexicans and two Americans were
killed. The issue, therefore, was now clearly drawn. In the face of an
inflamed Mexican public opinion, Carranza could not acquiesce in the
shedding of Mexican blood on Mexican soil. On the other hand,
Wilson could not give the appearance of allowing a Mexican mob to
drive the United States Army out of Mexico. Carranza's demand,
therefore, was refused.

Immediately after the Parral incident the two governments made one
desperate effort at agreement, in order to avert the likelihood of hos-

MEXICO! INTERFERENCE AND DEFEAT, 1913-17

139

tilities, when Generals Hugh L. Scott and Frederick Funston conferred
with General Alvaro Obregon, Mexican War Minister, in Juarez and
El Paso. It was evident from the War Department's instructions to
Scott that the administration sought only the protection of the border

HUMANITY

NEUTRAL RU6HTS
INTERNATIONAL LAW

Kirby in the New York World
The class in reading and writing

and the suppression of the Villa marauders. But the President insisted
that these objectives could be obtained only through the effective co-
operation of the Mexican and American forces, operating on Mexican
soil. Obregon, on the other hand, demanded the complete and imme-
diate withdrawal of the Expedition. Scott and Funston finally drew
Obregon into a secret conference and persuaded him to sign an agree-

140 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

merit providing for the gradual withdrawal of the Punitive Expedition
and an effective campaign against the Villistas by the de facto govern-
ment. Wilson immediately approved the protocol; Carranza, however,
rejected it because it did not stipulate a definite date for the complete
evacuation of the Expedition, and he countered with the suggestion
that the two governments co-operate in policing the border. In the
end, the most Scott and Funston could get from Obregon was a
promise that the Mexicans would in good faith try to clean out the
Villistas.

As it turned out, Villa had other plans. Almost at the very moment
Obregon was giving his pledge, the bandit leader executed a daring
raid fifteen miles across the Rio Grande, on the little settlement of
Glen Springs, Texas, killing three soldiers and a boy and capturing one
soldier. There were new demands in Congress for full-fledged interven-
tion, and the Governor of Texas called for the occupation of all
northern Mexico. And when the President sent a new detachment into
Mexico to pursue the Glen Springs raiders, Carranza concluded the
time for a showdown had come by diplomacy if possible, by war if
that were necessary. On May 22 he addressed a long and bitter note to
the Secretary of State, accusing the American government of bad faith,
requesting the United States frankly to avow its intentions, and declar-
ing that Washington could prove it did not want war only by imme-
diately withdrawing the Punitive Expedition.

Carranza's note was delivered at the State Department on May 31.
From this time forward it seemed events were out of control, that the
two nations were plunging headlong toward a war that neither of them
wanted, and that the most tragic chapter in twentieth-century Ameri-
can history was about to open. Firstly, the American military leaders
began to draw plans for a Mexican campaign. "I would like plans,
prepared by the War College for the invasion of Mexico on the lines of
the various railways from the north," Scott ordered. 68 Secondly, Car-
ranza instructed his commanders to prevent new American expeditions
from entering Mexico and to resist the Punitive Expedition if it moved
in any direction but northward, toward the border. Thirdly, the Presi-
dent on June 18 called out practically the entire National Guard, some
100,000 men, to protect the border, 6 * and sent additional warships to

68 H. L. Scott, "Memorandum for Chief, War College Division/* June 16,
1916, Scott Papers.

69 'The New York Times, June 19, 1916. Scott later wrote (to Robert

i. WOODROW WILSON

Painting by Sir William Orpen, courtesy of Bernard Baruch, Jr., photo-
graphed by Fernand Bourges.

Brown Brothe

2. WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, President of the United States, 1909-1913,
and Sympathetic Critic of Wilson's Policies, 1913-1917.

Underwood Sf Underwood

3. THEODORE ROOSEVELT, Leader of Republican Progressives and Wil-
son's Chief Critic on Foreign Policy.

Brown Brothers

4. GlFFORD PlNCHOT

Brown Brothen

5. SEN. JONATHAN P. DOLLIVER

LEADERS

OF THE

REPUBLICAN

INSURGENTS

Brown Brothers

6. SENATOR WILLIAM E. BORAH

:-*

Iffff

~~ji v-

Underwood & Underwood

7. Wilson Being Inaugurated by Chief Justice Edward D. White,
March 4, 1913.

Underwood & Underwood

8. Wilson and His Cabinet, 1913. Reading from left to right: President
Wilson, William G. McAdoo, James C. McReynolds, Josephus Daniels,
David F. Houston, William B. Wilson, William C. Redfield, Franklin K.
Lane, Albert S. Burleson, Lindley M. Garrison, William J. Bryan.

Underwood & Underwood
9. Louis D. BRANDEIS, one of the Chief Architects of the New Freedom.
Appointed to the Supreme Court in 1916.

Brown Brothers

10. OSCAR W. UNDERWOOD

Brown Brother

11. CHAMP CLARK

MAKERS

OF

AMERICAN
DOMESTIC

POLICY

Brown Brothers

12. CARTER GLASS

Underwood & Underwood Brown Brothers

13. WILLLIAM J. BRYAN 14. ROBERT LANSING, Counsellor of the j

Secretary of State, 1913-1915 State Department, 1914-1915, and Secre- |

tary of State, 1915-1920. [

MAKERS

OF

AMERICAN
FOREIGN
POLICY,

Underwood 6* Underwood

15. EDWARD M. HOUSE, Adviser to the
President, 1913-1919

LEADING

CONTENDERS

IN MEXICO,

Underwood Sf Underwood

18. GENERAL VENUSTIANO
CARRANZA with His Staff

Underwood & Underwood

19. BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN J.
PERSHING, Commander of the
Punitive Expedition.

Underwood r Undcn

20. "Horse Marines" in Vera Cruz, April 24,
1914.

i. Pershing and the Staff of the Punitive Expedition. Reading from
left to right: Col. L. G. Berry, Col. De R. C. Cabell, Lt. M. C. Schellen-
berger, Gen. Pershing, Lt. George E. Patton, Maj. J. L. Hines, Maj. J. B.
Clayton, Capt. W. B. Burt.

I

2

2

I *

25- CHARLES EVANS HUGHES Appeals
for Votes in 1916

GOVERNOR HIRAM JOHNSON Is
bj Not Amused

Brown Brothers

27. Wilson on Campaign Tour, 1916

Brom Brothers

28, Wilson Reads His War Message to Congress, April 2,

MEXICO: INTERFERENCE AND DEFEAT, 1913-17 14!

both coasts of Mexico. Fourthly, on June 19 occurred a clash between
Mexican soldiers and American sailors at the port of Mazatlan, on the
west coast. 70 Finally, on June 20, the Secretary of State addressed the
reply of the United States to Aguilar's note of May 22. Lansing re-
counted the destruction of American life and property in Mexico, by
Mexican citizens; he accused Carranza of being unable or unwilling to
punish the perpetrators of these outrages; he reviewed the diplomatic
exchanges since the sending of the Punitive Expedition; he told the
Mexican government that the Expedition would not be withdrawn,
and he ended with the warning that any attacks by the de facto forces
on American troops would "lead to the gravest consequences." 71

The incident that seemed inevitably to lead to "the gravest conse-
quences" occurred on June 21, only a few hours after Lansing's sting-
ing rebuke was delivered in Mexico City. On June 15, Pershing, then
encamped at Dublan, received a report that a large force of de facto
troops were concentrating against him. The General sent two troops of
cavalry under one Captain Boyd and Captain Lewis S. Morey to in-
vestigate, with Boyd in command. The American party came upon a
detachment of 250 Mexicans near CarrizaL Wishing to push on be-
yond, to Ahumada, Boyd negotiated briefly with the Mexican com-
mander, General Felix G. Gomez. Gomez informed Boyd he could not
allow him to pass through the town but offered to request such per-
mission from his superiors. Convinced the Mexicans would not resist,
Boyd ordered his men to charge the Mexican troops, who meanwhile
had taken a strong position. Instead of running, as Boyd expected, the
Mexicans replied gallantly, surrounded the American force, killing
twelve, including Boyd, and capturing twenty-three soldiers and an
interpreter. General Gomez and twenty-nine Mexicans were killed. 73

Leonard, Dec. 11, 1916, Scott Papers) : "The Mexicans had an idea that \ve
were afraid of them; some 20,000 of them were congregating around Pershing
within striking distance; some 14,000 were below Douglas, Arizona, and our
line was thin everywhere. . . . Obregon was boasting that he would be in San
Antonio within two weeks."

70 For details see The New York Times, June 20, 1916; Flagship San Diego
to Secretary of the Navy, June 21, 1916, Wilson Papers; Josephus Daniels to
Wilson, July 21, 1916, the Papers of Josephus Daniels, in the Library of Con-
gress, and Daniels to Secretary of State, July 19, 1916, ibid., endorsing report
by Commander A. G. Kavanagh of the U.S.S. Annapolis.

71 Lansing to Secretary of Foreign Relations, June 20, 1916, Foreign Rela-
tions, 1916 9 pp. 581-592.

72 The foregoing is based upon the following accounts, all of which agree
remarkably: (1) report by Captain Morey, written immediately after the

142 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

Was this the first incident in the war that all responsible officials in
Washington now expected? So it seemed, for the first accounts of the
clash told of a treacherous ambush of the American troops. Charging
the Mexican government with "deliberately hostile" purposes, Wilson
demanded the immediate release of the prisoners. A few hours later,
he called Congressional leaders to the White House and told them
American troops had been deliberately attacked at Carrizal and that
he would soon appear before a joint session. Next, he prepared the
message he would deliver, in which he reviewed the recent history of
the troubles with Mexico, disavowed any intention of seeking to inter-
vene in Mexican internal affairs, declared the United States had no
alternative but to clear the northern states of the bandit gangs, and
asked Congress to empower him to use the armed forces for such a
purpose. 73

Such action, even the publication of Wilson's message, would have
meant a war that would end only in the occupation of practically every
square mile of Mexico by American soldiers. And yet, because of the
force of public opinion in the United States, because Wilson never lost
control of the military services, and because neither Carranza nor
Wilson wanted war, war was averted. Captain Morey's report, which
proved that the Americans had been the aggressors at Carrizal, was
published in the newspapers on June 26. It was taken up by the
American Union Against Militarism, a pacifist organization, which
printed it and a fervent plea against war in full-page advertisements
in all the metropolitan newspapers. As a result, Wilson was immediately
overwhelmed with a flood of telegrams, letters, and petitions; and
from the replies he made to the appeals for peace it is evident that he
was shaken and deeply moved. Not slowly, but almost at once, good
sense returned to official circles in Washington. And when Carranza,
on June 28, ordered the release of the American soldiers, tension eased
perceptibly. Two days later, in a speech before the New York Press

battle, printed in Foreign Relations, 1916, p. 596; (2) report written by the
interpreter, Lemuel Spillsbury, printed in The New York Times, June 25, 1916;

(3) official Mexican report, Lt. Col. Genovevo Rivas to General Gonzales at
Juarez, c. June 21, 1916, printed in El Pueblo (Mexico City), July 1, 1916;

(4) official United States Army report, E. A. Garlington, Inspector General,
"Fourth Endorsement on the Report of investigation of the encounter between
American and Mexican forces at Carrizal, Chihuahua, June 21, 1916," dated
Oct. 2, 1916, Wilson Papers.

78 The manuscript copy of Wilson's address, "To the Congress. June, 1916,"
is in ibid.

MEXICO: INTERFERENCE AND DEFEAT, 1913-17 143

Club, Wilson reciprocated with a forthright, passionate plea for peace.
"Do you think the glory of America would be enhanced by a war of
conquest in Mexico?" he asked. 74 An answer was given in Mexico City
on July 4, when Carranza suggested direct and friendly negotiations to
end the causes of the Mexican- American tension.

The upshot was the signing soon afterward of an agreement for the
appointment of a Joint High Commission to investigate and recom-
mend. Wilson welcomed the negotiations, as they afforded some relief
from the Republican attacks during the presidential campaign then in
progress. Carranza welcomed the conference because it afforded him
an opportunity to hold elections, the first step in the establishment of a
constitutional government. From September 6, 1916, through January
15, 1917, the commissioners Secretary of the Interior Franklin K.
Lane, the Reverend Doctor John R. Mott, former Judge George Gray,
Luis Cabrera, Ignacio Bonillas, and Alberto J. Pani met in New
London, Atlantic City, and Philadelphia. All phases of the Mexican
problem were thoroughly discussed. The Mexicans pressed for an
agreement promising the immediate withdrawal of the Punitive Expe-
dition. The Americans, on the other hand, insisted on discussing
internal conditions in Northern Mexico., taxes on American mining
properties in Mexico, and the protection of British and American oil
properties. The Mexican commissioners finally surrendered to the
extraordinarily heavy pressure being put upon them and, on November
24, signed a protocol for the withdrawal of the Expedition within forty
days, only provided conditions in the Northern states warranted such
action.

A new crisis was created, however, when Garranzaj on December 27,
rejected the protocol and announced he would approve no agreement
that did not first provide for the immediate evacuation of Mexican
territory by the forces of the United States. As accord on that issue was
impossible, the Joint High Commission broke up January 15, 1917. It
had preserved the peace, and that fact alone justified its existence; and
it had helped Wilson win the election by neutralizing the Mexican
issue during the campaign. But with the breakup of the Commission
the Washington government was back at the point from which nego-
tiations had begun. In brief, the United States now had either to with-
draw the expedition or else to break relations and attempt to occupy

74 New York World, July 1, 1916.

144 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

the Northern Mexican states. With the possibility of soon becoming in-
volved in the European war staring him in the face, there was never
much doubt in Wilson's mind what the national interest compelled him
to do. The decision was made by January 18, when Secretary of War
Baker informed the military commanders that the President would
soon order the return of Pershing's command to Texas. By January 27
the withdrawal had begun and a near-tragic chapter in Mexican-
American relations was finished.

The de facto government, meanwhile, had proceeded serenely and
quite independently to establish a constitutional government. On
October 22, 1916, the Mexican people elected a constituent assembly
that met in Queretaro in December and January and adopted a new
and advanced Constitution. Next, on March 11, a new Congress and a
constitutional President, Carranza, were elected; finally, the United
States extended de jure recognition by sending Henry P. Fletcher as
Ambassador to Carranza on March 13, 1917.

The recognition of Carranza's de jure government and the with-
drawal of the Punitive Expedition were the outward and visible signs
of the First Chiefs victory, not only at home, but also over an equally
stubborn man in the White House. Since the first days of the Consti-
tutionalist movement, Carranza had never once wavered in his de-
termination to preserve the integrity and independence of the Revolu-
tion. Neither Wilson's blandishments nor threats had moved him. The
result was that Mexico was now free to undertake its great experiment
and its long and difficult progress toward democratic institutions.

The tragedy was that Wilson had in large measure made this oppor-
tunity possible, yet had interfered in the wrong way so often that he
embittered Mexican-American relations for many years to come. Even
so, future generations may forget his mistakes and the Mexican people
may some day remember that he, almost alone, stood off Europe dur-
ing the days of the Huertista tyranny, withstood the powerful forces
in the United States that sought the undoing of the Revolution, and
refused to go to war at a time when it might have insured his re-
election.

CHAPTER 6

American Neutrality ^ 1914-15

TO SAY that the outbreak of the First World War in August, 1914,
came as a shock to the American people would be to make an
understatement of heroic proportions. In the summer of that momen-
tous year most Americans were still living in the confident international
community of the nineteenth century and were totally unprepared for
the impending catastrophe. Americans read with horrified interest
about the assassination on June 28 of the Austrian Archduke and his
wife, but they were unaware that this spark would set off a general
conflagration. When war came and the international structure fell
crashing in ruins, thoughtful men in the United States, indeed, in all
the world, were stunned and perplexed. As one sensitive North Caro-
linian expressed it, "This dreadful conflict of the nations came to most
of us as lightning out of a clear sky. The horror of it all kept me awake
for weeks, nor has the awfulness of it all deserted me." *

Yet events compelled Americans to examine closely the basic causes
and issues of the war. During the first months, indeed, during the long
period from August, 1914, to April, 1917, the American people were
deluged -with a flood of appeals, both at home and abroad, in behalf of
the opposing alliances. So much that is superficial has been written on
the subject of propaganda and the formation of American attitudes
that perhaps a few corrective generalizations are in order. Firstly, it is
doubtful that Americans of this period were as naive about the origins
of the war as a later generation believed. On the contrary, many

* Robert N. Page to Walter H. Page, Nov. 12, 1914, the Papers of Walter H.
Page, in Houghton Library, Harvard University.

145

146 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

molders of opinion had a sophisticated understanding of the intricate
causes of the war, 2 To be sure, some influential newspapers and spokes-
men in the United States immediately branded Germany as the ag-
gressor; 3 but other distinguished leaders in church and secular affairs
argued persuasively that Germany was least guilty. 4 Secondly, the
Germans had a full and free opportunity to present their case before
the American public and did present it in a variety of ways, especially
through the regular channels of opinion. 5 Far from being inept >and

2 Colonel House's comment, which is too long to be printed here, is particu-
larly significant, as it revealed 'an acute understanding of European politics and
the background of the war. The Diary of Edward M. House, in the Papers of
Edward M. House, in the Library of Yale University, Apr. 15, 1915. See also,
for example, Benjamin Ide Wheeler to F. K. Lane, Sept. 5, 1914, copy in the
Woodrow Wilson Papers, in the Library of Congress; C. W. Eliot to Wilson,
Aug. 20, 1914, ibid.; Saturday Evening Post, CLXXXVII (Aug. 29, 1914), 20;
ibid., June 19, 1915, p. 22; George Harvey, "Europe at Armageddon," North
American Review, CC (Sept., 1914), 321-332; The Presbyterian, LXXXIV
(Sept. 30, 1914), 3; ibid., Dec. 2, 1914, p. 3; Pastoral Letter of the Methodist
Episcopal Bishops, May 12, 1915, in New York Christian Advocate, XC (May
20, 1915), 677.

3 E.g., New York World, Aug. 4, 5, 1914; Outlook, CVII (Aug. 15, 1914),
891-893; ibid., CVIII (Sept. 30, 1914), 245-249; W. H. Taft to Mrs. W. A.
Edwards, Sept. 2, 1914, the Papers of William Howard Taft, in the Library of
Congress; O. G. Villard to E. W. Hilgard, Sept. 18, 1914, the Papers of Oswald
Garrison Villard, in Houghton Library, Harvard University; Henry A. Wallace
to W. H. Page, Aug. 2, 1915, Page Papers; Henry Watterson, in Louisville
Courier- Jour rial, July 4, 1915. Elihu Root's views are given fully in the memo-
randum of an interview of c. Aug. 4, 1914, that Hamilton Holt sent to Root on
Aug. 7 3 1914, the Papers of Elihu Root, in the Library of Congress.

* Lutheran Church Work, III (Sept. 3, 1914), 8-9; ibid., Oct. 1, 1914, pp.
89. Rear Admiral French E. Chadwick carried on a long campaign to convince
the public that Britain was chiefly responsible for the war. For samples of his
propaganda see Chadwick to Wilson, Aug. 23, Sept. 12, Dec. 16, 1914, Feb. 19,
1915, Wilson Papers; Chadwick to O. G. Villard, Jan. 4, 1915, Villard Papers.
Professor John W. Burgess of Columbia University was another ardent de-
fender of Germany. See, among others, his articles in the Boston Evening
Transcript, Aug. 19, 1914; Newport (R.I.) Daily News, Sept. 12, 1914; New
York Evening Mail, Aug. 14, 1915; letter to editor of the Springfield Republi-
can, reprinted in The Open Court, XXVIII (Oct., 1914), 587-595. Perhaps
the most influential German apologist in the United States, however, was the
Rev. Dr. Walter Rauschenbusch, leader of the social gospel movement. His "Be
Fair to Germany,'* reprinted from the Congregationalist by the Lutheran
Church Work, III (Nov. 19, 1914), 8-10, is typical of his appeals.

5 The British cut the cable between Germany and the United States imme-
diately after the declaration of war; but the lack of direct cable connection
between Berlin and New York was no deterrent to the sending of news from
Germany. A great amount of literature came through the mails during the first
year of the war; American correspondents sent their dispatches through either

AMERICAN NEUTRALITY, 1914-15 147

unsuited to the American mentality, much of the German propaganda
was skillfully executed and made a deep impression on the American
mind, especially when it appealed to the deep-rooted American hatred
of Russian despotism and anti-Semitism and the American fear of
future Russian aggression. 6

The fact is, the Germans and their champions in the United States
went to greater expense and effort to influence American opinion, at
least before the German propaganda machine was exposed in August,
1915, than did their enemies. That they failed to persuade a majority
of Americans that their cause was just does not necessarily signify that
they blundered. They failed because a majority of thoughtful Ameri-
cans had made up their minds on the causes and issues of the war
before the German or British propaganda agencies set effectively to
work. American attitudes were of course conditioned by the back-
ground of German-American rivalries, by the fear that Germany had
naval ambitions in the Caribbean, and by a deep-rooted distrust of the
Kaiser and the military clique that controlled Imperial Germany. But
most important, Germany's actions immediately before and after the
outbreak of the war confirmed the deepest American suspicions. Ger-
many's and Austria's refusal to submit the Serbian question to arbitra-
tion, i f . was thought, had made a general war inevitable, while Ger-
many's ruthless breach of treaty pledges in violating Belgian neutrality
was regarded as a defiance of the moral conscience of the world. Thus
the preponderant American opinion was determined during the first
months of the war, not by atrocity stories, 7 British propaganda, and

Rotterdam, Copenhagen, or London, but in the latter case the British censors
often did not interfere. Finally, American correspondents could always use
the wireless for important dispatches, and a large quantity of news came by this
route.

6 For samples of German propaganda in the United States, see the Essay on
Sources, "Propaganda and American Opinion on the War German Propa-
ganda."

7 Before the publication of the Bryce Report on May 13, 1915, no person of
consequence in the United States took the atrocity stories seriously, mainly
because American correspondents with the German armies in Belgium and
France denied them emphatically. See Roger Lewis et al. 9 in New York World 9
Sept. 7, 1914; John T. McGutcheon, in ibid., Sept. 19, 1914; -Joseph Medill
Patterson, in ibid., Sept. 25, 1914; Arno Dosch, "Louvain the Lost," World's
Work, XXVIII (Oct., 1914), A-H; Arthur Sweetser, "A Diary from the Front,"
ibid. 9 XXIX (Jan., 1915), 350-356; Irvin S. Gobb, "Being a Guest of the
German Kaiser," Saturday Evening Post, GLXXXVII (Oct. 24, 1914), 14;
A. Sweetser, "With the Germany Army in Its Dash Toward Paris," Outlook,
CIX (Jan. 27, 1915), 186-190.

146 WOODROW WILSON AXD THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

molders of opinion had a sophisticated understanding of the intricate
causes of the Avar. 2 To be sure, some influential newspapers and spokes-
men in the United States immediately branded Germany as the ag-
gressor; 3 but other distinguished leaders in church and secular affairs
argued persuasively that Germany was least guilty: 1 Secondly, the
Germans had a full and free opportunity to present their case before
the American public and did present it in a variety of ways, especially
through the regular channels of opinion. 5 Far from being inept and

2 Colonel House's comment, which is too long to be printed here, is particu-
larly significant, as it revealed 'an acute understanding of European politics and
the background of the war. The Diary of Edward M. House, in the Papers of
Edward M. House, in the Library of Yale University, Apr. 15, 1915. See also,
for example, Benjamin Ide Wheeler to F. K. Lane, Sept. 5, 1914, copy in the
Woodrow Wilson Papers, in the Library of Congress; C. W. Eliot to Wilson,
Aug. 20, 1914, ibid.; Saturday Evening Post, CLXXXVII (Aug. 29, 1914), 20;
ibid., June 19, 1915, p. 22; George Harvey, "Europe at Armageddon," North
American Review, CC (Sept., 1914), 321-332; The Presbyterian, LXXXIV
(Sept. 30, 1914), 3; ibid., Dec. 2, 1914, p. 3; Pastoral Letter of the Methodist
Episcopal Bishops, May 12, 1915, in New York Christian Advocate, XC (May
20, 19;5\ 677.

3 E.g., New York World, Aug. 4, 5, 1914; Outlook, CVII (Aug. 15, 1914),
891-893: ibid., CVIII (Sept. 30, 1914), 245-249; W. H. Taft to Mrs. W. A.
Edwards, Sept. 2, 1914, the Papers of William Howard Taft, in the Library of
Congress; O. G. Villard to E. W. Hilgard, Sept. 18, 1914, the Papers of Oswald
Garrison Yiilard, in Houghton Library, Harvard University; Henry A. Wallace
to W. H. Page, Aug. 2, 1915, Page Papers; Henry Watterson, in Louisville
Courier- Journal, July 4, 1915. Elihu Root's views are given fully in the memo-
randum of an interview of c. Aug. 4, 1914, that Hamilton Holt sent to Root on
Aug. 7, 1914, the Papers of Elihu Root, in the Library of Congress.

* Lutheran Church Work, III (Sept. 3, 1914), 8-9; ibid., Oct. 1, 1914, pp.
8-9. Rear Admiral French E. Chadwick carried on a long campaign to convince
the public that Britain was chiefly responsible for the war. For samples of his
propaganda see Chadwick to Wilson, Aug. 23, Sept. 12, Dec. 16, 1914, Feb. 19,
1915, Wilson Papers; Chadwick to O. G. Villard, Jan. 4, 1915, Villard Papers.
Professor John W. Burgess of Columbia University was another ardent de-
fender of Germany. See, among others, his articles in the Boston Evening
Transcript, Aug. 19, 1914; Newport (R.I.) Daily News, Sept. 12, 1914; New
York Evening Mail, Aug. 14, 1915; letter to editor of the Springfield Republi-
can, reprinted in The Open Court, XXVIII (Oct., 1914), 587-595. Perhaps
the most influential German apologist in the United States, however, was the
Rev. Dr. W r alter Rauschenbusch, leader of the social gospel movement. His "Be
Fair to Germany," reprinted from the Congregationalist by the Lutheran
Church Work, III (Nov. 19, 1914), 8-10, is typical of his appeals. ,

5 The British cut the cable between Germany and the United States imme-
diately after the declaration of war; but the lack of direct cable connection
between Berlin and New York was no deterrent to the sending of news from
Germany. A great amount of literature came through the mails during the first
year of the war; American correspondents sent their dispatches through either

AMERICAN NEUTRALITY, 1914-15 147

unsuited to the American mentality, much of the German propaganda
was skillfully executed and made a deep impression on the American
mind, especially when it appealed to the deep-rooted American hatred
of Russian despotism and anti-Semitism and the American fear of
future Russian aggression. 6

The fact is, the Germans and their champions in the United States
went to greater expense and effort to influence American opinion, at
least before the German propaganda machine was exposed in August,
1915, than did their enemies. That they failed to persuade a majority
of Americans that their cause was just does not necessarily signify that
they blundered. They failed because a majority of thoughtful Ameri-
cans had made up their minds on the causes and issues of the war
before the German or British propaganda agencies set effectively to
work. American attitudes were of course conditioned by the back-
ground of German-American rivalries, by the fear that Germany had
naval ambitions in the Caribbean, and by a deep-rooted distrust of the
Kaiser and the military clique that controlled Imperial Germany. But
most important, Germany's actions immediately before and after the
outbreak of the war confirmed the deepest American suspicions. Ger-
many's and Austria's refusal to submit the Serbian question to arbitra-
tion, i<: was thought, had made a general war inevitable, while Ger-
many's ruthless breach of treaty pledges in violating Belgian neutrality
was regarded as a defiance of the moral conscience of the world. Thus
the preponderant American opinion was determined during the first
months of the war, not by atrocity stories, 7 British propaganda, and

Rotterdam, Copenhagen, or London, but in the latter case the British censors
often did not interfere. Finally, American correspondents could always use
the wireless for important dispatches, and a large quantity of news came by this
route.

6 For samples of German propaganda in the United States, see the Essay on
Sources, "Propaganda and American Opinion on the War German Propa-
ganda."

7 Before the publication of the Bryce Report on May 13, 1915, no person of
consequence in the United States took the atrocity stories seriously, mainly
because American correspondents with the German armies in Belgium and
France denied them emphatically. See Roger Lewis et aL 9 in New York World,
Sept. 7, 1914; John T. McGutcheon, in ibid., Sept. 19, 1914; Joseph Medill
Patterson, in ibid., Sept. 25, 1914; Arno Dosch, "Louvain the Lost," World's
Work, XXVIII (Oct., 1914), A-H; Arthur Sweetser, "A Diary from the Front,"
ibid., XXIX (Jan., 1915), 350-356; Irvin S. Gobb, "Being a Guest of the
German Kaiser," Saturday Evening Post, CLXXXVII (Oct. 24, 1914), 14;
A. Sweetser, "With the Germany Army in Its Dash Toward Paris," Outlook,
CIX (Jan. 27, 1915), 186-190.

148 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

hysterical fear, but upon a fairly keen analysis of the international
situation and sure knowledge of German actions. And this opinion was
confirmed and strengthened by subsequent events, especially the ruth-
less submarine campaign. 8

The fact that probably a majority of Americans were mildly pro-
Allied by the autumn of 1914 did not mean, however, that they wanted
to intervene in any fashion. At this time, at any rate, opinion was
almost unanimous that the United States had no vital stake in the war
and that wisdom dictated a policy of complete neutrality. Therefore,
when the President issued an official proclamation of neutrality and
backed it up on August 18 with a personal appeal to his fellow country-
men for impartiality of thought as well as of action, even ardent be-
lievers in the British cause like Charles W. Eliot applauded. 9

The publication by the Bryce Commission of its Report, however, created an
entirely new situation. James Bryce, Sir Frederick Pollock, and the other mem-
bers of the Commission were venerated in the United States, and their names
gave authority to a superficially convincing document, the main thesis of
which was that the German army had used cruelty as a deliberate policy in
Belgium. Coining as it did after the second greatest atrocity of the war the
sinking of the Lusitania the Report caused many Americans to wonder or to
believe that there was a firm basis of truth in many of the atrocity charges. For
American comment see New York World, May 13, 1915; The Nation, C (May
20, 1915), 554-555; Independent, LXXXII (May 24, 1915), 309-310; Out-
look, CX (May 26, 1915), 150-151; World's Work, XXX (June, 1915), 134;
Collier's, LV (June 5, 1915), 15.

It would be easy, however, to overestimate the importance of the Bryce
Report. We know, for example, that Wilson steadfastly refused to listen to,
much less believe, the atrocity charges. Southerners with long memories pointed
out that General Sherman had used a deliberate policy of cruelty to civilians
to shorten the Civil War. And most Americans had made up their minds by
the time the Bryce Report was issued.

8 Oswald Garrison Villard, certainly not an interventionist, best expressed
the preponderant American opinion in reply to the German naval attache", who
had asserted that the American people were being misled by British lies. "I am
frant to admit," Villard replied, "that it is no longer possible for the bulk of
the papers to deal with judicial minds with the situation; for the bulk of them
it has been impossible since Belgium, but I insist that the responsibility rests
with Germany alone and that their acts in Belgium, in Louvain and the sinking
of the Lusitania readily account for this partisanship of our press. Germany has
affronted the moral, neutral sentiment of the world, and that cannot be ex-
plained away by dismissing our sources of information as English lies, etc."
Villard to Karl Boy-Ed, Oct. 28 3 1915, Villard Papers.

9 Wilson also forbade army and navy officers publicly to discuss the issues of
the war. Later he went so far as to make an appeal to motion-picture audiences
to refrain from demonstrating in any way in favor of either side, Wilson to
Bryan, Sept. 11, 1914, Wilson Papers. On another occasion, he refused to
accept a cutting from a rosebush from the battlefield of Verdun because to do
so might be "unneutral." Wilson to B. R. Newton, June 9, 1916, ibid.

AMERICAN NEUTRALITY, 1914-15 149

Shattering though the war was to American dreams of the progres-
sive betterment of mankind, it had also a profound impact on the
domestic economy and created problems that demanded prompt atten-
tion. Rumors of war, for example, sent prices on the New York Stock
Exchange on July 30 tumbling an average of nearly five points, and
the pressure of European liquidation was so enormous that the Ex-
change closed the following day. A panic was averted by Secretary
McAdoo's decisive action in making available an almost unlimited
quantity of so-called "emergency currency," authorized by the Aldrich-
Vreeland Act, until the Federal Reserve System could go into opera-
tion. 10 Moreover, closing prices on the Stock Exchange were used to
determine the value of securities offered as collateral for loans from
national banks, thus freezing, as it were, stock and bond prices at an
almost normal level.

Effective co-operation between bankers and the Treasury saved the
national financial structure until the day, in the spring of 1915, when
Allied war orders began to pour in upon American manufacturers and
stimulated a boom of great proportions. But when a similar crisis de-
moralized the cotton market and caused prices to drop from ten-eleven
to four-five cents a pound, the government at first failed to do any-
thing. Facing economic ruin, the cotton planters and their spokesmen
were up in arms all over the South and in Washington, imploring the
administration to use governmental resources to stabilize cotton prices,
by "valorizing" the price of cotton. 11 There was even a short-lived
filibuster in Congress in October, but the strongest pressure Southern-
ers could muster brought no substantial relief. The most the ad-
ministration would do was to allow the issuance of emergency currency
against cotton in licensed warehouses, but "on thelbasis of 75 per cent
of the current price, ,to approve a federally licensed warehouse system,
and to promote the establishment by private bankers of a national pool
oj jj>150 million to stabilize cotton at six cents a pound. So onerous
were the tern^uno!ef" which planters could borrow from the national

10 To September 10, 1914, some $256,170,000 of the emergency currency was
issued.

11 Representatives of- the cotton growers met with Secretary McAdoo at a
conference in the Pan-American Building in Washington on August 24^-25,
1914. The cotton spokesmen proposed that the federal government peg the
price of cotton at its normal level of ten cents a pound and allow state banks to
issue emergency currency, in the form of loans to planters, based upon ten-cent
cotton. The New York Times, Aug. 25, 26, 1914; New York Journal of Com-
merce, Aug. 25, 1914.

150 WOODROW \V1LSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

pool, however, that only seven loans, totaling $28,000, were made; and
it is a safe assumption the South lost about half the value of the cotton
crop of 1914 without benefit of any decisive action by the administra-
tion.

Southerners, therefore, complained bitterly that the administration
was mindful of business and banking interests and callous to the des-
perate needs of the farmers. These complaints were not without sub-
stance* In numerous ways besides the issuing of emergency currency
and the pegging of security prices the administration evidenced its
readiness to soften the impact of the war on the business and commer-
cial classes, if not actually to take advantage of the war situation to
give a peculiar advantage to those interests.

Thus, on July 31 the President called Congressional leaders to the
White House, warned them that the outbreak of war would demoralize
the sea lanes until the British navy had cleared them of German
raiders, and urged the passage of emergency legislation to increase the
American merchant marine. 12 In response to this appeal, the Senate
on August 3 passed a bill authorizing the use of naval vessels as cargo
carriers. It was never approved by the House; but the administration
obtained drastic alterations in the ship registry law, making it easy for
foreign ships to hoist the American flag. 13 The administration, more-
over, obtained Congressional approval for the establishment in the
Treasury Department of a War Risk Insurance Bureau to provide

12 He was obviously thinking of blockade and contraband in traditional terms,
as he pointed out that American ships alone would be available to carry food,
cotton, and other raw materials to the Central Powers. W. C. Adamson, un-
dated memorandum in the Baker Collection; also New York World, Aug. 1,
1914.

13 As the bill approved on August 18, 1914, did not even require American
ownership of a majority of stock in corporations applying for American regis-
try, it was a clear violation of international custom and law and later evoked
strong protests from the British government. See Joint Neutrality Board, "Note
to the French Ambassador Concerning Purchase of German Merchant Ships,"
dated Sept. 16, 1914, copy in the Papers of Chandler P. Anderson, in the
Library of Congress.

Fortunately for the United States, the German owners of vessels in American
harbors dared not risk losing their property and did not openly take advantage
of the new provision. Thus most of the vessels 'that changed their registry were
American-owned ships previously under British, Belgian, and German registry,
and the United States was spared the necessity of defending the right of Ger-
man shipowners to operate under the American flag. The right of American
citizens to buy German vessels and operate them in the European trade was a-
different matter and will be discussed later.

AMERICAN NEUTRALITY., 1914-15 15!

marine insurance at standard rates for American shipowners and
shippers.

The administration's early position on the question of loans by
American bankers to belligerent governments should also be understood
as part and parcel of a great effort to protect the much damaged
domestic financial structure. In early August the French government
asked J. P. Morgan & Company to float a $100 million loan in the
United States. There were good economic reasons why the loan should
not be made: the security markets were disorganized and there was
widespread fear that foreign creditors would demand large quantities
of gold in return for American securities and payment of outstanding
obligations. In refusing to approve the French loan, the administration
was protecting the American gold reserve. Unfortunately, however, the
President allowed the Secretary of State to inject an irrational and
unneutral meaning into the State Department's refusal to approve the
transaction, and to trumpet it abroad as the official position of the
American government. "There is no reason why loans should not be
made to Governments of neutral nations," Bryan was allowed to say in
an official statement, "but in the judgment of this Government loans by
American bankers to any foreign nation which is at war is [sic] incon-
sistent with the true spirit of neutrality." 14 Moreover, in a signed
article in his monthly, The Commoner, for September, 1914, Bryan
went further and declared, "Money is the worst of contrabands it
commands all other things." 15

While the State Department's ban did not violate international law,,
it was a deviation from traditional practice and, further, was un-
neutral, in that it operated to the disadvantage of Great Britain, a sea
power, and to the great advantage of Germany, a land power. More-
over, it was an economically unrealistic policy, because if it had been
faithfully adhered to it would have ended by destroying the only
foreign trade in which the United States could then engage on a large
scale trade with its natural customers, Britain and France.

As these facts became evident after the panic in Wall Street bad

14 Bryan's statement of August 15, 1914, printed in The New York Times,
Aug. 16, 1914.

15 Bryan expressed these sentiments also in Bryan to Wilson, Aug. 10, 1914,
Wilson Papers. One is tempted to believe that had this issue not arisen at the
time of Mrs. Wilson's death, when he was almost beside himself with grief, the
President would not have allowed Bryan to lead him into approving this mis-
taken policy.

152 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

passed, the economic impossibility and strategic unwisdom of maintain-
ing Bryan's ban on loans also became apparent, and the State
Department began a retreat that ended in complete revocation of the
prohibition. In mid-October the Department shifted its position and ,
made it plain it would not attempt to obstruct future loans to the
belligerents. A short time later, on October 23, the President told
Lansing, then Counselor, that he would not oppose an extension of
commercial credits, information that was at once relayed to the Na-
tional City Bank and the Morgan firm. The bankers, however, seemed
still uncertain of the administration's attitude, especially regarding the
floating of outright loans, and they moved with extreme care to avoid
offending public opinion. Before the spring of 1915 only a few small
short-term commercial credits had been advanced by the New York
banks. As exports began greatly to exceed imports, however, larger
credits had to be advanced, and the bankers demanded explicit assur-
ances of approval from the State Department before they undertook to
finance the growing war trade. The issue came to a head in March,
1915, when the Morgan firm sought official approval for a $50 million
commercial credit to the French government. Every responsible person
knew there was no difference between a credit of this kind and a
"loan," but Bryan saved face by announcing on March 31 that the
Department would not object to such credit arrangements, although it
had in the past disapproved "loans."

The administration's most important effort to meet the economic
needs created by the war situation was its vigorous, almost frantic
campaign to obtain passage of a bill to provide $30 million for the
purchase of a governmentally owned and operated shipping line. The
author of the ship purchase bill introduced in August, 1914, was Mc-
Adoo, who brought the President to his side and led the fight for its
adoption. As the bill provided for the purchase, not for the construc-
tion, of ships, the question of what ships would be purchased immedi-
ately arose. Obviously, the only vessels available in quantity were the
German ships, totaling half a million tons, lying in American harbors.
Wilson was reluctant to take the step, but McAdoo convinced him there
was no other way to get the ships quickly. Moreover, as McAdoo
pointed out, the government "would not ... be confined to the pur-
chase of German ships only." 16

Wilson's insistence on' pushing the measure provoked a bitter fight in

McAdoo to Wilson, Nov. 21, 1914, ibid.

AMERICAN NEUTRALITY, 1914-15 153

Congress. The Republicans, led by Henry Cabot Lodge and Elihu
Root, opposed the bill because it would project the government into
the business field. They opposed it, also, because they suspected the
administration planned to buy the German ships and operate them in
the Atlantic trade; 17 and this, they asserted, would inevitably involve
the United States in a serious and entirely needless dispute with the
British government. 18 Administration spokesmen were not frank with
Congress and refused to affirm or deny the charge that they contem-
plated purchasing the German ships. Like most other leaders, Bryan
saw the issue clearly and begged the President to come out frankly and
tell the American people and the Allies that he had no intention of
buying the disputed vessels. But Wilson would not surrender. On the
contrary, he grew sullen and bitter and privately charged Lodge and
Root with lack of conscience and with using "insincere and contempti-
ble methods of fighting." After the defeat of the bill in early March,
1915, moreover, he wrote a long and bitter indictment of the Repub-
lican senators and the seven Democrats who had joined them in de-
feating the measure. 19 Someone must have persuaded him to withhold
the statement, for it was never published.

The administration, meanwhile, had been maneuvering to take a
definite diplomatic position in relation to the belligerents. As the Ger-
man government early announced its intention to adhere to the
Declaration of London 20 in its maritime warfare and adhered to this

17 Lodge, moreover, believed McAdoo was involved in some understanding,
probably corrupt, with Kuhn, Loeb & Company, which firm, he thought, would
handle the sale of the ships. See Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, Jan. 15, 20, 26,
Feb. 5, 8, 19, Mar. 1, 1915, the Papers of Theodore Roosevelt, in the Library
of Congress; Lodge to Henry L. Higginson, Jan. 8, 25, 1915, the Papers of
Henry L. Higginson, in Hough ton Library, Harvard University; Lodge to John
T. Morse, Jr., Jan. 28, 1915, the Papers of John T. Morse, Jr., in the Massa-
chusetts Historical Society.

18 Lodge's and Root's fear was well grounded, as was evidenced by the bitter
protest of the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, against the ship
purchase bill (Grey to Spring Rice, Jan. 22, 1915, House Papers). It is certain
the British would not have acknowledged the legality of the American govern-
ment's purchase of the German vessels. Moreover, the British would probably
have seized the ships if the government shipping corporation had tried to use
them in the Atlantic trade. This action, in turn, would have compelled the
United States either to abandon its shipping venture or else to resort to strong
diplomacy or force to maintain its illegal position.

19 "Statement about the shipping bill," c. Mar. 4, 1915, in Wilson Papers.

20 Drawn up by the representatives of the maritime powers at the London
Conference of 1909, the Declaration represented the culmination of liberal

154 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

promise until February, 1915, the administration's early troubles were
all with Great Britain over the contraband list, the status of Ameri-
can-owned ships formerly under German registry, and the searching
and detention of American ships by British naval craft. Determined to
use their naval supremacy to the fullest advantage, the British Cabinet,
by Order in Council on August 20, 1914, began the process of tighten-
ing the noose around the Central Powers. Slowly, gradually, this eco-
nomic warfare was intensified, until soon Germany was denied access,
even through neutral ports, to neutral sources of copper, oil, food,
cotton, and other vital raw materials. But the Cabinet always operated
with a keen eye on American reactions. The British policy, in brief, was
to exercise the maximum restraint of neutral trade compatible with
retaining the friendship of the United States. By the beginning of 1915
the structure of the British system of maritime controls was fairly com-
plete, although it was strengthened considerably as new opportunities
arose.

The important question was whether the American government
would acquiesce in the British system or attempt to enervate it by
insisting, to the point of war, upon freedom of trade with Germany in
so-called noncontraband commodities. At first Wilson endeavored to
persuade the Foreign Office to accept in full the Declaration of Lon-
don, with one modification, as the code governing British sea opera-
tions. Wilson's proposal would have given the British only slight
control over the transit of goods into Germany through neutral ports
and would have denied to the British their most effective weapon
their control over the contraband list. 21 Grey pointed out this elemental,
but important, fact to Page when he rejected the President's suggestion.
In their subsequent negotiations with the British Foreign Office, there-

nineteenth-century thought on the subject of maritime warfare. Its provisions
regarding contraband were most explicit and generous to land powers, as it
forbade placing food and raw materials on the list of absolute, or prohibited,
contraband. The Declaration was never ratified by the British Parliament and
was, therefore, never an integral part of international law.

21 Specifically, Wilson proposed that the British government accept the
Declaration of London, with the reservation that when the territory of a
neutral country was used as a base for the transit of supplies to Germany, "such
port or territory has acquired enemy character in so far as trade in contraband
is concerned and that vessels trading shall be thereafter subject to the rules of
the declaration governing trade to enemy's territory." (Italics mine.) Acting
Secretary of State to Page, Oct. 16, 1914, Papers Relating to the Foreign Rela-
tions of the United States, 1914, Supplement (Washington, 1928), pp. 249-
250.

AMERICAN NEUTRALITY,, 1914-15 155

fore, the Washington government had to appeal to traditional inter-
national law, much controverted though it was.

In actual fact, however, the President was unwilling at this time to
make a serious issue with the British over the important aspects of
their economic warfare. On December 26, 1914, for example, the State
Department sent a firm note to the Foreign Office protesting ship
seizures and detentions, but it was cordial in tone. For obvious reasons,
however, Grey was anxious to come to an informal understanding with
Wilson and to accomplish this end sent a message of great importance
to the President by Chandler P. Anderson, then in the State Depart-
ment. Firstly, Grey wanted Wilson to have a clear understanding of the
Allied war aims, which he specified in detail. 22 Secondly, he wanted
the President to know that the British government was doing its best to
meet American objections to the manner in which the Order in Council
of August 20, 1914, was being enforced. When Anderson relayed Grey's
message to Wilson, the President replied that there were "no very im-
portant questions of principle" involved in the Anglo-American dis-
putes, and that they could all be settled by arbitration or adjudication
after the war was over. 28

Just at the moment, therefore, when it seemed Wilson and Grey had
found a basis of mutual adjustment, a new issue of serious proportions
arose and revived smoldering grievances. It was the much debated
question of the purchase of the German ships in American ports by
American citizens or by German-controlled dummy corporations, which
was raised when the Hamburg-American Line sold a freighter, the
Dacia, to Edward N. Breitung, mine operator and banker. As Breitung
was acting for the German government and planned to buy all the
German vessels in the United States if the Dacia purchase went un-
challenged, the British Cabinet became enormously agitated and

22 At this time they included restitution of and reparation for Belgium, the
return of Alsace-Lorraine and an indemnity for France, and the transfer of
Constantinople and the Dardanelles to Russia.

23 The Diary of Chandler P. Anderson, in the Library of Congress, Jan. 9,
1915. Anderson himself had argued to this effect earlier in his "Memorandum
of reasons why the United States should acquiesce without protest but reserving
all rights in regard to Great Britain's interference with shipments from the
United States to neutral countries of supplies available for war purposes, the
ultimate destination of which is Germany," dated Oct. 21, 1914, Anderson
Papers. Anderson gave Wilson a copy of this memorandum, but if Wilson read
it he was not impressed. He told Anderson on January 9, 1915, that he did not
remember it.

156 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

warned they would seize the vessel and bring it before the Prize
Court. 24 Even more excited were the British editors, some of whom
hinted that the United States would force a break in relations if the
State Department attempted to protect the Dacia. 25 Although the
Department was moderate and conciliatory throughout the controversy,
the Dacia affair stirred British resentment as no other incident before
1916 did; and the fact that their government sidestepped the issue by
allowing the French to seize the ship did not appease the anger of the
British people. 26

The dispute over the transfer of German ships to American registry
was soon obscured, however, by a new and startling development the
German submarine challenge to the British maritime system and to
traditional concepts of international law, which compelled a re-exami-
nation of Wilson's whole plan of neutrality. Hereafter it would be
impossible for the United States to acquiesce in the British system
without seriously impairing the continuance of friendly relations with
Germany. In other words, as the two giants fought desperately for
survival impartiality was no longer possible for the United States. Any
American action against one belligerent was bound to benefit the other;
American acquiescence in the maritime measures of one belligerent
would injure the other.

It is, of course, clear that Britain and Germany were determined to
exert the maximum economic pressure compatible with achieving their
supreme goals, 27 and that the policies of the one were not necessarily

24 See e.g., Page to Secretary of State, Jan. 15, 18, 1915, Papers Relating to
the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915, Supplement (Washington,
1928), pp. 679-680, 682-683,

25 See especially the vitriolic editorial in the Spectator (London), Jan. 23,
1915; also, Morning Post (London), Jan. 14, 1915; Standard (London), Jan.
16, 1915; Westminster Gazette (London), Jan. 16, 1915.

26 The Dacia affair led Grey to send an extraordinary message to the British
Ambassador, Sir Cecil Spring Rice, to be shown only to Wilson and House. In
this dispatch, Grey made a sweeping indictment of the allegedly unneutral con-
duct of the Wilson administration, for blocking private loans to the Allies, re-
fusing to allow the export of submarine parts, trying to obtain passage of the
ship purchase bill, promoting the sale of German ships, and for not discouraging
the movement to apply an embargo on the export of munitions. Grey to Spring
Rice, Jan. 22, 1915, House Papers. Page also summarized the British grievances
in a frank personal letter to the President, Jan. 26, 1915, Wilson Papers.

As for the Dacia, she was confiscated by the French government, was renamed
the Yser, and was sunk by a submarine in the Mediterranean on November 9,
1915.

27 Thus, for Great Britain, this meant using the maximum pressure against

AMERICAN NEUTRALITY, 1914-15 157

dependent upon the policies of the other. 28 In diplomatic practice, how-
ever, the doctrine of retaliation and reprisal is often invoked to justify
policies unpleasant to third parties. Thus after January, 1915, the
Germans used the illegal British measures as an excuse for instituting
illegal measures of their own, which action in turn furnished further
excuse to the British for intensifying their maritime controls.

The question of how far each of the contenders should go in their
maritime warfare was raised in such a way, however, as to confuse the
American government and public. In January, 1915, the W. L. Greene
Commission Company of St. Louis shipped a large cargo of food to
Germany on the Wilhelmina, owned by the Southern Products Trading
Company. Actually, German interests were behind the entire trans-
action. Four days after the Wilhelmina sailed, the Bundesrat, or Fed-
eral Council, impounded all foodstuffs within the German Empire, and
this action gave the British Cabinet an excuse to prohibit all shipments
of food from the United States to Germany. The Bundesrat thereupon
rescinded its order, in so far as it applied to food imported from
neutrals; but the British stood by their decree and seized the Wilhel-
mina off Falmouth on February 11.

In reply and allegedly in retaliation against the British food blockade,
the German Admiralty on February 4, 1915, announced a submarine
blockade of the British Isles. All enemy vessels within the war zone
would be destroyed, the German proclamation warned, while neutral
vessels in the zone would be in grave danger because of the British
misuse of neutral flags. 29 During the ensuing weeks German spokesmen
explained and appealed to the American people for understanding. The
German government, they said, had adopted extreme measures only to
force the British to abandon their blockade aimed at starving German

Germany compatible with retaining American friendship, which was absolutely
essential to an Allied victory. For Germany, it meant adjusting its sea warfare
to the demands of the United States until it was considered more advantageous
to have the United States in the war than to forgo longer the unrestricted use
of the submarine.

28 In other words, the British would have instituted a total blockade of Ger-
many and neutral European port* whether or not the Germans resorted to the
submarine weapon, while the Germans would have used the submarine regard-
less of British measures.

29 Gerard to Secretary of State, Feb. 4, 1915, Foreign Relations, 79/5,
Supplement, p. 94. In a concurrent memorandum, the Imperial Chancellor
explained that the submarine blockade was being undertaken as reprisal against
British violations of the laws of sea warfare. "Memorandum of the German
Government . . .," dated Feb. 4, 1915, ibid., pp. 96-97.

WOCDROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

THE SUBMARINE ENTERS
MODERN WAR

Military Area established by
Britain, November 3, 1914

women and children. Germany would, therefore, it was officially an-
nounced, abandon the submarine blockade if Britain would abandon
her food blockade. 30

30 Official statement of Admiral Behncke of the Marine Department, pre-
sented to the United States naval attach6 on February 16, 1915, and printed
in The New York Times, Feb. 17, 1915; Gerard to Secretary of State, Feb. 12,
1915, Foreign Relations, 1915, Supplement, p. 102; Bernstorff to Secretary of
State, Feb. 15, 1915, ibid., pp. 104-105.

AMERICAN NEUTRALITY, 1914-15 159

As was later revealed, this German offer was not seriously intended.
The Germans were simply using a bluff, a paper blockade, to try to
compel the British to relax their controls, not only on food, about which
they were not seriously worried, but also on other so-called noncontra-
band raw materials. If the Germans had been able to institute an
effective blockade of the British Isles at this or any other time, they
would have done so and would thereby have brought the war to a
speedy conclusion.

This fact, however, was not apparent to most American leaders, some
of whom, like Bryan, took seriously the German cry of "starvation."
As correspondents and diplomatic officers pointed out time and again,
there was an ample supply of food in the Empire before 1917, and the
British food blockade was a failure. The head of the German War
Food Office, Dr. Batocki, summarized the situation when he declared
on January 27, 1917:

There is absolutely no question of our ability to pull through. Despite the
blockade and the practically complete stoppage of our imports, despite the
partial failures of some of our own crops last year, we have enough food. We
do not pretend that it is all we should like to have. There are numerous
things which we enjoy, but they are not necessary. We eat them with pleasure
when we have them. But we do not starve without them, nor do we lose
health and vigor for the lack of them. ... I tell you there is absolutely no
question of starvation for the German people. In point of fact, there is less
starvation in Germany today than there is in the United States with your
congested cities and your great centres of poverty and distress. 31

The German "war zone" decree and accompanying "offer" raised a
challenge and presented an opportunity to the State Department that
it did not fail to grasp. To answer the challenge to American interests
implicit in the warning to neutral vessels, Lansing and Wilson at once
prepared a reply, advising the German authorities that the United
States would not tolerate unrestrained attacks on American vessels,
would hold the Imperial government to "a strict accountability" for
illegal destruction of American ships and lives, and would take meas-
ures necessary to defend American rights on the seas. 82 Although

31 The New York Times, Jan. 28, 1917.

32 Secretary of State to Gerard, Feb. 10, 1915, Foreign Relations, 1915,
Supplement, pp. 98-100. Lansing's original draft of this note, dated February
6, 1915, with Wilson's penciled emendations, is in the Wilson Papers.

l6o WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

Lansing wondered whether any protest should be made 33 and the note
was weak, in that it was confined entirely to German attacks against
American vessels and said nothing about attacks upon belligerent mer-
chant ships upon which Americans might be traveling or working,
American commentators hailed the note as a forthright and courageous
reply. 3 * Actually, in the subsequent negotiations and after several
American ships had been destroyed, the Imperial government backed
down in its threat against American vessels, so that the later and great
controversies centered around an entirely new issue the alleged rights
of Americans traveling and working on Allied merchantmen.

On the other hand, the Washington administration also seized the
opportunity presented by the German offer to abandon the submarine
blockade, provided the British gave up their "hunger blockade," to
attempt to persuade the British Cabinet to relax their controls. From
the point of view of American neutral interests, such a move became
highly desirable when the British Cabinet on March 1 1 issued a new
Order in Council interdicting all neutral commerce to Germany,
through German or neutral ports. So hostile was the reaction in Ameri-
can circles that the administration could not well ignore this extension
of Britain's sea dominion. Even before the new British Order was
issued, the President had instructed Page and House, then in London,
emphatically to urge the Cabinet to accept the German offer. Under
increasing American pressure, Grey finally agreed in May to accept,
with reservations, the proposed arrangement, and Wilson and House
were delighted. It later turned out, however, that both Wilson and the
German Foreign Office insisted that the British allow free entry into
Germany, not only of foodstuffs, but also of all noncontraband prod-
ucts, and this the British adamantly refused to do.

Meanwhile, Wilson and his advisers had been moving in another
direction to solve their dilemma in the direction of ending the war by
mediation. At the outset of hostilities the President had offered his good
offices as mediator, and although this offer was rejected peace rumors
and discussions persisted. Most of them came to nothing, but out of the
talks begun by the New York banker, James Speyer, in September,
1914, grew the idea that England and Germany might come to an
understanding under the aegis of Wilson and House. 35 As time passed,

33 Lansing to Wilson, Feb. 7, 1915, ibid.

3*E.g., New York World, Feb. 12, 1915; The Nation, G (Feb. 18, 1915),
loo.

35 Speyer dined with Ambassador von Bernstorff on September 5, 1914, on

AMERICAN NEUTRALITY, 1914-15 l6l

the pressure on the President to take some positive steps to end the war
mounted^ while his own thoughts turned irresistibly in the same direc-
tion. 36 Thus, in mid-December, 1914, Wilson asked Colonel House to
begin serious discussions with the British and German Ambassadors and
then to go to Europe to carry the conversations to the point of definite
agreement. Bernstorff was positive his government would agree to
evacuate and indemnify Belgium, while Grey sent word to Spring Rice
that the Allies could not refuse a reasonable German offer. 37 It was
with high hopes, therefore, that House sailed from New York on Jan-
uary 30, 1915.

House was received cordially in London, but his early progress was
interrupted by the controversy over the submarine blockade, the British
retaliatory measures, and considerable opposition within the British
Cabinet to the idea of any peace discussions. 38 From London House
went to Paris and thence to Berlin for long talks with all the leading
civilian officials. To the British he had suggested general disarmament
and an international organization as a basis for the peace settlement;
to the Germans he held out the bait of freedom of the seas and an end
to British navalism. Friendly and hopeful though the German officials
were, they frankly admitted they could not dare publicly to agree to
evacuate and indemnify Belgium. House left Berlin, however, with the
understanding that he would endeavor to persuade the British govern-
ment to "consent to freedom of the seas as one of the peace conditions,"
while the German leaders should begin to prepare their people to

which occasion Bernstorff told him he believed the Kaiser would be willing to
discuss measures of peace through mediation. Speyer went at once to Washing-
ton and relayed the conversation to Bryan, who began serious intergovernmental
discussions.

36 For example, he told House on September 28, 1914, that Grey should be
warned of the grave danger of postponing peace discussions, because if Ger-
many and Austria were crushed it might become impossible to restrain Russia.
House Diary, Sept. 28, 1914.

37 Ibid., Dec. 17, 20, 1914. Grey revealed his great enthusiasm for the peace
project in a conversation with Sir Horace Plunkett on February 6, 1915. See
the Diary of Horace Plunkett, microfilm copy in possession of Herbert Brayer,
Evanston, 111., Feb. 6, 1915.

38 House to Wilson, Feb. 8, 9, 15, 18, 23, Mar. 1, 5, 9, 1915, Wilson Papers;.
House Diary, Feb. 10, 11, 13, 14, 17, 18, 20, 24, 25, Mar. 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 1915,

"E. M. House went to Paris this morning, having no peace message from this
Kingdom whatever. This kind of talk here now was spoken of by the Prime
Minister [Asquith] the other day as 'the twittering of a sparrow in a tumult that
shakes the world. 9 " The Diary of Walter H. Page, in Houghton Library,
Harvard University, Mar. 11, 1915.

1 62 WOODKOW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

accept the idea of giving up Belgium. After House left Berlin and had
gone to Paris, the Foreign Secretary, Gottlieb von Jagow, revealed to
him the terms Germany would be willing to accept. They included
German retention of Namur, Liege, and the Valley of the Meuse, an
indemnity from France, and acquisition of part of the Belgian Congo.
House repeated the terms to Delcasse, the French Foreign Minister,
who remarked that if the Germans wanted their indemnity they would
have to come to Paris to get it.

Back in London in late April, the Colonel set to work at once to
persuade the British Cabinet that freedom of the seas was as essential
to British as to German security. Grey, personally, was not opposed,
provided Germany consented to general disarmament and gave definite
guarantees for the future. What progress House made, however, was
shattered by the ruthless sinking of the British liner Lusitania by a
German submarine on May 7, 1915. If that were the German idea of
"freedom of the seas," then the British wanted none of it. Moreover, as
the German-American negotiations over the Lusitania proceeded,
House became momentarily convinced his country would soon be
drawn into the war. 39 He left England on June 5, therefore, more an
emissary of war than of peace, his mission a failure because neither
coalition was yet willing to admit that it could not achieve by war what
it had failed to achieve by diplomacy.

At the very time House was in Berlin, the German admirals were
setting in motion the underseas campaign that would inevitably bring
their government into collision with the United States. The first im-
portant issue arose when a submarine sank the British steamer Falaba
on March 28, 1915, without giving the passengers and crew time to
escape. One American, Leon C. Thrasher, was drowned.

The Thrasher case assumed an extraordinary significance when it
became evident during the ensuing discussions that the administration
was constructing a future policy regarding submarine warfare. The
debate in the State Department revealed at once a profound diver-
gence in the administration. The distinguished international lawyer,
Chandler P. Anderson, then acting in an advisory capacity, argued
that the case did not involve an affront to the United States^ as
Thrasher's death was incidental to the destruction of the Falaba.

39 At times lie thought the United States should enter the war. For revealing
statements by House, see the Plunkett Diary, June 1, 4, 1915; also House to
Wilson, June 16, 1915, Wilson Papers.

AMERICAN NEUTRALITY, 1914-15 163

Under international law, Anderson asserted, the United States was
warranted in asking only for pecuniary damages. Bryan reinforced
Anderson's argument by a series of letters and memoranda, in which
he raised many extraneous issues, 40 but the chief purport of which was
that the United States should grant the same freedom to violate inter-
national law to Germany that it had given to Britain. In opposition,
Lansing, Counselor of the Department, argued that the attack on the
Falaba was such a flagrant violation of international law that the
United States could not avoid asking the German government to dis-
avow the act, punish the submarine commander, and pay damages. He
frankly admitted that such demand might lead to war. Lansing, more-
over, was supported by an unequivocal declaration by the Joint Neu-
trality Board that American interests were vitally involved in the case
and that "the action of the commanding officer of the German sub-
marine appears to the Board not only illegal but revoltingly in-
human." 41

The final decision, of course, rested with the President. From the
outset of the discussions he seemed to agree with Lansing; even so, he
was reluctant to raise a serious issue with the German government,
especially since he thought there was some chance that House's mission
would succeed. The collapse of the peace negotiations and the growing
truculence, not to say insolence, of the German government, 42 how-
ever, must have made a deep impression on him. On April 22 he finally
gave his decision : he would avoid discussing the issue on merely tech-

40 Chief among which was the question whether the British were arming their
merchant ships and whether this did not provide justification for unrestricted
submarine warfare.

41 Memorandum of the Joint Neutrality Board, Apr. 8, 1915, Wilson Papers.

42 Bernstorff, for example, on April 6 gave out a statement from his govern-
ment disavowing any responsibility for the safety of neutrals on board bellig-
erent ships. The New York Times, Apr, 7, 1915. On April 4, moreover, the
Ambassador presented to the State Department a long memorandum accusing
the United States of virtual unneutrality because it acquiesced in British viola-
tions of international law and allowed the export of munitions to Germany's
enemies. Foreign Relations, 1915, Supplement, pp. 157-158. Without consulting
the State Department, BernstorfF gave the memorandum to the newspapers on
April 11. This move, which, incidentally, he made on the direct order of the
Foreign Office, was clearly an appeal to the American people over the heads of
their leaders and a direct encouragement to the movement then getting under
way in the United States with the help of German money to force Congress to
apply an embargo on munitions exports. The Department's reply, probably
drafted by Wilson, was a masterful refutation of the German accusations. Secre-
tary of State to Bernstorff, Apr. 21, 1915, ibid., pp. 160-162.

164 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

nical grounds and would "put the whole note on very high grounds,
not on the loss of this single man's life, but on the interests of mankind
which are involved and which Germany has always stood for; on the
manifest impropriety of a single nation's essaying to alter the under-
standings of nations; and as all arising out of her mistake in employing
an instrument against her enemy's commerce which it is impossible to
employ in that use in accordance with any rules that the world is likely
to be willing to accept." 43 After having come to this decision, how-
ever, Wilson six days later admitted he was not sure what the adminis-
tration should do. "Perhaps it is not necessary to make formal
representations in the matter at all," he wrote to Bryan. 44

To follow Bryan's advice and say nothing about Thrasher's death
would have been the easy way out, and Wilson might have followed
such a course had not events taken a sudden, spectacular turn. That a
profoundly serious crisis was impending was evidenced when, on May
1, the German Embassy published a formal warning to Americans
against traveling on belligerent merchantmen. Before the administra-
tion could come to a decision on a Falaba note or comment on the
remarkable German warning, there occurred the dramatic and catas-
trophic event the sinking of the Lusitania on May 7 that forced the
President to make some kind of reply to the German challenge. 45

Americans were shocked and horrified at \vhat they considered the
deliberate murder of almost twelve hundred noncombatants, including
128 Americans, on the high seas, by direct order of the German gov-
ernment. But except for a small group of ardent nationalists headed by
Theodore Roosevelt, few Americans wanted to go to war to avenge the

43 Wilson to Bryan, Apr. 22, 1915, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations
of the United States, The Lansing Papers, 1914-1920 (2 vols., Washington,
1939-40) I, 378.

Wilson to Bryan, Apr. 28, 1915, ibid., p. 380.

45 I do not have space to go into the many facets of the controversy that has
since grown up over the sinking of the Lusitania. Whether the great North
Atlantic liners were legitimate prey of the submarines since they were prime
carriers of contraband became obscured by the methods the Germans used to
destroy them. There are, however, a few points that might be cleared up.
Firstly, the Lusitania was not armed. Secondly, she was not actually an
auxiliary cruiser. Thirdly, she carried some 4,200 cases of small arms, which
was a small part of her cargo of contraband. Fourthly, the submarine com-
mander, Schwieger, knew well that he was aiming at a great passenger
ship. He apparently fired only one torpedo and was astonished when the
ship sank rapidly. See "Admiralstab d. Marine. Kriegstagebuch. U. 20. Kptltn.
Schwieger. vom 18.3.15. bis 31.8.15 Bd. 3," from the Kriegsarchiv der Marine,
Berlin, photostat in the Wilson Papers.

AMERICAN NEUTRALITY, 1914-15

165

CUNARD

EUROPE VIA LIVERPOOL

LUSITANIA

Fastest and Largest Steamer

now in Atlantic "Service Sails

SATURDAY, MAY 1, 10 A. M.
Transylvania, Fri. f May 7, 5P.M.
Orduna, Tues.,May 18, 10A.M.
Ttiscania, - - Fri., May 21, 5P.M.
LUSITANIA, Sat., May 29, 1O A.M.
Transylvania, Frl. June 4, 5 P.M.

Gibra Itar-Genoa-Naple-Piraeus
S.S. Carpathia, Thur. t May 13, Noon

Two notices concerning the same sailing

wrong. The great majority applauded when Wilson acted deliberately
during the crisis, even when he declared in a speech at Philadelphia on
May 10 that "There is such a thing as a man being too proud to
fight." 4S From governors, senators, congressmen, and other spokesmen

NOTICE!

-TRAVKLLKKS intending to
embark on (h$ Atlantic voyage,
are reminded that a state of 4
war exists betweTm. Germany ;
and her "allies and Great Britain '
and^her allies; that the'zone of
war includes the waters adja-
cent to the British Isles; that,
in accordance witfi formal no-
tice given by the Imperial Ger-
man Government, vessels flying
the flag of Great Britain, or of
any of her allios. ars liable to
destruction in those ivaters and
that travellers sailing in the
**ar zone on ships of Great'
Britain or her allies do so at!

their own risk.

i

IMPERIAL GERMAN EMBASSY

D. C.. Al'RIL 22. 1913.

New York Times, May 11, 1915. Although the foregoing generaliza-
tion is correct, it should also be pointed out that the sinking of the Lusitania
convinced a small but significant segment of thoughtful American opinion that
Imperial Germany was a menace to the peace of the world and that the
philosophy of ruthlessness had so captured the German mind that the United
States could not survive in a world dominated by the Prussian military class.
Lansing, for example, who had heretofore taken a realistic view of the German
violations of American rights (Diary of Robert Lansing, in the Library of Con-
gress, May 3, 1915), was now firmly convinced that German success "would
mean the overthrow of democracy in the world, the suppression of individual
liberty, the setting up of evil ambitions, the subordination of the principles of
right and justice to physical might directed by arbitrary will, and the turning
back of the hands of human progress two centuries." Jbid.j July 11, 1915. Elihu
Root, also, found evidence in the Lusitania disaster that the war was a struggle
between democracy and military despotism. Anderson Diary, May 15, 1915.

l66 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

came fervid appeals for peace. From Senator Thomas S. Martin and
Representative Hal D. Flood, two powerful Democratic leaders, came
an explicit warning that the country did not want war and that the
President might find it impossible to obtain a war resolution from
Congress.

It should not, however, be assumed that in the subsequent negotia-
tions with the German government Wilson's strong arm was paralyzed
by popular and Congressional opposition to a belligerent policy. The
President was confident there would be no real diplomatic crisis and, in
any event, contemplated no stronger step than severing relations with
Germany.

During the discussions over the writing of the first Lusitania note,
Lansing took a consistently strong stand, while Bryan sought to find
some way to mitigate the severity of the language. In his note to the
German government of May 13, 1915, the President now took the high
ground he had earlier decided to take in composing a Falaba note and
had then abandoned. He reviewed the submarine actions culminating
in the sinking of the Lusitania and virtually demanded that the
Imperial government abandon submarine warfare altogether against
unarmed merchantmen. 47 Under pressure from Bryan, Wilson agreed
to issue a statement suggesting arbitration of the dispute; but under
stronger pressure from Lansing, Garrison, Burleson, and Tumulty,
Wilson recalled the statement, which had already been cabled to
Berlin. 48 The note, therefore, was delivered at the Foreign Office in all
its naked severity. When Von Jagow replied evasively, 49 Bryan pleaded
for compromise even more strongly than before. Wilson stood firm,
however, and Bryan resigned rather than sign the second note, in which
the President appealed to the Imperial government to renew its alle-
giance to "the rights of humanity, which every Government honors itself
in respecting." 50 Von Jagow's reply, again, was evasive and unsatis-
factory, and for a third time Wilson addressed the German govern-

47 Bryan to Gerard, May 13, 1915, Foreign Relations, 1915. Supplement, pp.
393-396.

48 This was the famous "postscript" episode, about which there was much
controversy later. For details see L. M. Garrison to R. S. Baker, Nov. 12, 3CL
1928, Ray Stannard Baker Collection, in the Library of Congress; House Diary^
Nov. 3, 1916; Bryan to Wilson, May 13, 1915, the Papers of William Jennings
Bryan, in the National Archives; Bryan to Gerard, May 13, 1915, ibid.

** Gerard to Bryan, May 29, 1915, Foreign Relations, 1915, Supplement, pp.
419-421.

50 Lansing to Gerard, June 9, 1915, ibid., pp. 436-438.

AMERICAN NEUTRALITY, 1914-15 1 67

ment. He was both conciliatory and peremptory. He admitted that it
might be possible for submarine warfare to be conducted within the
rules of visit and search, and he invited the German government to
join him in achieving freedom of the seas. But he ended with the
warning that a repetition of ruthless sinkings would be regarded by the
United States as "deliberately unfriendly/' in other words, would lead
to diplomatic rupture and possibly to war. 51

The summer of crisis was a time of alarm, confusion, and divided
counsels among the American people. After his resignation, Bryan set
out upon a peace campaign, which added new impetus to the already
widespread antiwar sentiment. There were increased demands that the
administration adopt a stern attitude also toward the British. The
movement for an arms embargo, liberally financed by the German
Embassy, was gaining new converts, while German- and Irish- American
spokesmen grew frantic in their rage against the President's policy. On
the other hand, anti-German sentiment undoubtedly increased by leaps
and bounds as a result of the failure of the Lusitania negotiations.
Moreover, the secrets of the German propaganda machine, headed by
Privy Councillor Heinrich Albert in New York City, were revealed
when United States secret-service agents picked up a brief case that
Albert left on an elevated train and the contents were published in
the New York World and the Chicago Tribune. Nor was the excitement
allayed when the Austrian Ambassador, Dr. Constantin Dumba, was
sent home for trying to persuade Austro-Hungarian subjects to quit
working in American munitions plants. Even more irritating to in-
flamed American sentiment were the rumors and reports of German
intrigues and machinations against the neutrality and peace of the
United States. Many thoughtful men looked with shame and disgust at
a nation "too proud to fight," so weak that it could not protect its
rights on the seas or preserve its neutrality at home, so divided from
within that its government could not speak with authority abroad.

In Germany, too, the popular temper was inflamed 52 and demanded

si Lansing to Gerard, July 21, 1915, ibid., pp. 480-482.

52 On two counts, mainly: (1) the export of munitions to the Allies, which
infuriated the German people, and (2) the widespread impression that the
United States was trying to force Germany to give up her most effective naval
weapon without at the same time compelling Great Britain to adhere to inter-
national law. For able analyses of German opinion and samples of German edi-
torial opinion, see J. G. O'Laughlin to Wilson, Feb. 1, 1915, Wilson Papers;
O'Laughlin to Tumulty, Apr. 16, 1915, ibid.; New York World, Apr. 17, 1915;
The New York Times, June 30, 1915; Von Reventlow in New York World,

1 68 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

that the Imperial government resist inflexibly the American demands.
Official spokesmen had so aroused the people against the alleged
"hunger blockade" and predicted so confidently the success of the
submarine campaign that the government feared disastrous conse-
quences if it should yield. However, as it became apparent that conces-
sions might be necessary to maintain peaceful relations with the
United States, the moderate editorial spokesmen in Germany defied
public opinion and boldly championed conciliation and compromise.
In the meantime, the Washington government waited to see what
events would bring. On June 30, 1915, a British passenger liner, the
Armenian, was sunk off the coast of Cornwall; but when it developed
that the ship had attempted to escape after warning was given, no
issue arose. On July 17 another British liner, the Orduna, was at-
tacked, though the torpedo missed its mark and the German Admiralty
denied official knowledge of the incident. Then on August 19 came
the event that ended the President's time of waiting the torpedoing
without warning of the White Star liner Arabic off Fastnet, with the
loss, among others, of two American lives. 53 Wilson evidently resolved
to obtain full satisfaction or else to break relations, although he was
not yet thinking in terms of war. 54 The tension was relieved on August

July 4, 1915; Karl Boy-Ed to O. G. Villard, Nov. 6, 1915, Villard Papers;
Kolnische Zeitung, 1st morning ed., Feb. 3, 1915; Frankfurter Zeitung, 2d
morning ed., Feb. 14, 1915; Deutsche Tageszeitung (Berlin), morning ed., Feb.
14, 1915; Vossische Zeitung (Berlin), Apr. 22, 1915; Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger,
morning ed., Apr. 22, 1915; Kolnische %eitung, noon ed., May 18, 1915;
Kreuzzeitung (Berlin), June 4, 1915.

The incident that had probably the most unfortunate effect on German-
American relations was the publication by the Cleveland Automatic Machine
Company in the American Machinist, XLII (May 6, 1915), 26-27, of an
advertisement depicting a machine that manufactured high-explosive shells.
The advertisement went on to describe in a gory way the deadliness of the
shrapnel thrown out as the shell exploded. A facsimile was printed in the
German press (e.g., Frankfurter eitung, 3d morning ed., June 26, 1915) and
evoked a wave of resentful criticism of the United States. See Deutsche
Zeitung (Berlin), evening ed., June 25, 1915; Berliner Tageblatt, evening ed.,
June 25, 1915; Tdgliche Rundschau (Berlin), morning ed., June 26, 1915;
Kolnische Zeitung, evening ed., June 25, 1915. Copies of the advertisement
were also laid on the desks of every member of the Reichstag.

58 The Arabic was another important carrier of contraband. For a descrip-
tion of her cargoes on her last three voyages from New York to Liverpool, see
the New York World, Aug. 20, 1915. She was westbound when she was sunk.

54 There appeared in the Baltimore Sun, August 24, 1915, an article pur-
porting to describe the plans for a war with Germany that the Army War
College had drawn up. Wilson read the report, became much agitated, and

AMERICAN NEUTRALITY, 1914-15 1 69

25, when the German Chancellor declared that the submarine com-
mander must have exceeded his instructions, and that if investigation
proved a German submarine had sunk the Arabic the Imperial gov-
ernment would not hesitate to give complete satisfaction to the United
States. Rumors that Germany had begun a diplomatic retreat were
confirmed when it became known that the Imperial government, on
June 6, had ordered its submarines to spare large passenger liners.
More important for the United States was the outcome of an Imperial
conference at Pless Castle on August 26, at which the Emperor took
Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg's side and ordered the abandon-
ment of unrestricted warfare against all passenger ships. The decision
was telegraphed at once to BernstorfT, who, under strong pressure from
Lansing, on September 1 gave a written promise that "Liners will not
be sunk by our submarines without warning and without safety of the
lives of noncombatants, provided that the liners do not try to escape or
offer resistance." 55

The giving of the so-called Arabic pledge, the later explicit dis-
avowal of the sinking of the ship, and the generous pledges given con-
cerning American ships in the war zone 56 added up to a remarkable
diplomatic achievement for the President and sufficed at least to pre-
serve peace between the two governments. This, however, was no
lasting and complete settlement of the submarine troubles, for the
reluctant Arabic pledge applied only to passenger vessels and left
uncertain the status of merchantmen and armed merchant and pas-
senger ships. Moreover, the Lusitania issue still hung fire, and German
refusal to give satisfaction prevented cordial relations. Most important,
Wilson's confidence in the good faith and integrity of the German
government had been severely shaken, if not destroyed.

Meanwhile, the administration had not relaxed its pressure on the
British government, although the dire crisis with Germany precluded
strong and effective measures to compel the British to abandon their
illegal blockade. The gravest threat to Anglo-American relations was

ordered the Assistant Secretary of War to investigate. "No such plans have ever
been prepared, nor even contemplated by the General Staff," the Chief of the
War College replied. W. W. Macomb, Chief, War College Division, Memoran-
dum for the Chief of Staff, Aug. 24, 1915, Wilson Papers.

55 The New York Times, Sept. 2, 1915. '

56 Given in the so-called Frye note of September 19, 1915. Gerard to Secre-
tary of State, Sept. 20, 1915, Foreign Relations, 1915, Supplement, pp. 551-
552.

I7O WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

the possibility that the Southern contingent in Congress might join
with the German- and Irish-American elements to force the applica-
tion of an arms embargo in retaliation against British suppression of
the cotton trade with Central Europe. The British Foreign Office
made arrangements to provide for that part of the crop of 1914 that
had been sold to German buyers; 57 but as the crop of 1915 blossomed
in the fields and picking time drew near, a wave of hysteria swept over
the South, out of fear that the British would suppress exports to
Europe altogether and the South would have to endure another year
of depression. That the situation was full of danger was evidenced by
a widespread campaign throughout the South for retaliation against
the British government 58 The pro-British senator from Mississippi,
John Sharp Williams, spoke truthfully when he declared that every
politician in the South had to be anti-British. 59

Rumors that the British would put cotton on the list of absolute
contraband and refuse to support the price of the staple leaked to the
Washington administration in July. Greatly excited, Wilson declared
such action would have a "fatal effect" on American opinion and
would probably lead to "action by Congress cutting off munitions."
The warning was at once relayed to the British Cabinet. So great was
the popular demand in Britain for making cotton absolute contra-
band that is, for suppressing completely the cotton trade with Ger-
many that the government could no longer resist it. The Foreign

57 After the promulgation of the Order in Council of March 11, 1915, de-
claring a virtual blockade of Germany, the British Cabinet's policy regarding
the shipment of cotton to the Continent was designed to prevent such shipments
without unnecessarily offending American cotton growers. All cotton sold to
German buyers before March 2 was given free transit; but the British reserved
the right to buy the cotton at the contract price. This arrangement would not,
however, apply in the future. Official statement of the British Foreign Office,
The New York Times, May 21, 1915.

58 On June 28, for example, the Georgia legislature petitioned the President
to use every means, "diplomatic if possible, retaliatory if necessary," to open
American trade in cotton with neutral European ports. Ibid. 3 June 29, 1915.
See also "Preamble and Resolution adopted by the Board of Directors of the
New Orleans Cotton Exchange," dated June 30, 1915, in the Papers of Albert
S. Burleson, in the Library of Congress; resolution adopted by the State Coun-
cil of the North Carolina Farmers' Union, c. July 3, 1915, Wilson Papers;
resolutions adopted by the Savannah Cotton Exchange, July 8, 1915, ibid.;
officers of the National Farmers' Union to Wilson, Aug. 13, 1915, ibid.; resolu-
tion adopted by the Texas Farmers' Union, Aug. 6, 1915, ibid.; A. F. Lever,
E. J. Watson, and Wade Stackhouse to Wilson, July 12, 1915, ibid. New York
World, July 22, 1915, gives a long and able analysis of Southern sentiment.

89 Williams to Wilson, June 29, 1915, Wilson Papers.

AMERICAN NEUTRALITY, 1914-15 IJl

Office, therefore, sought and obtained an understanding with the
American government that solved the dilemma. A secret agreement,
officially unknown to Wilson and Lansing, was negotiated by Am-
bassador Cecil Spring Rice and Sir Richard Crawford of the British

McCutcheon in the Chicago Tribune

Embassy with W. P. G. Harding of the Federal Reserve Board and
Theodore Price, a financial reporter of New York City. It provided in
effect that the British government would buy enough cotton to stabilize
the price at ten cents a pound. 60 The agreement was never published,

60 For details of the cotton agreement see Anderson Diary, July 22, 30, 1915;
Page to Secretary of State, Aug. 13, 1915, Wilson Papers; New York Tribune,
Nov. 20, 1915.

172 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

and for a time after the British put cotton on the absolute contraband
list the pressure from Southerners for retaliation was enormous. But in
almost no time cotton prices began to rise as a result of British buying,
and the cotton crisis was soon passed.

It was fortunate for the British that they were able thus easily to
eradicate the most rankling cause of American resentment before the
summer of 1915 had ended. For the fact was, as the Germans
lamented time and again, that the United States had by now become
virtually an arsenal of the Allies. This was a natural consequence of
the British control of the seas and was in no respect the outcome of
American sentiments. The important fact was, however, that Allied
buying in the United States had become so heavy by August, 1915,
that the British were near the end of the resources from which they
could obtain dollars. 61 Allied purchases would have to be drastically
curtailed if Britain and France did not obtain a large loan in the
United States to finance the war trade. But the New York bankers
who stood ready to float such a loan refused to commit themselves to
the undertaking unless the State Department explicitly approved. The
trouble was, as McAdoo pointed out in a long letter to Wilson, that
Bryan had committed the administration and even the President per-
sonally to a policy of discouraging outright loans. Had a strictly neutral
course been adopted in the beginning, the administration would not
have discouraged loans to the belligerents and would not now find
itself caught in a trap from which escape was difficult.

In the end, the State Department specifically reversed the Bryan
doctrine which Bryan himself had in effect reversed on March 31,
when he approved large commercial credits and declared that it had
no objection to the loan. Certain New York bankers may have had
strong pro-Allied sentiments, although that fact did not prevent them
from demanding and obtaining a commission of 2 per cent, in addition
to an interest rate of nearly 5^2 per cent. It is clear, however, that the
administration made its decision to approve the loan on two grounds
only: firstly that negotiation of, the loan was essential to the main-
tenance of the war trade, and therefore to the prosperity of the United

the loan would be an unneutral

61 By the end of May the British economic situation was becoming almost
desperate. By this date Britain was purchasing $50 million to $75 million
monthly in excess of her ability to pay in gold, goods, and services.

AMERICAN NEUTRALITY, 191415 173

act, so discriminatory as to deprive Britain of her legitimate advantage
as mistress of the seas.

On September 10, 1915, a distinguished Anglo-French commission
arrived in New York City and subsequently negotiated with a group of
bankers, headed by J. P. Morgan, for a loan of $500 million. Popular
opposition, generated by the Hearst press and the German- and Irish-
American groups, was so great that the campaign to sell the bonds to
the public did not come off well. 62 During the next year and a half the
British government borrowed a billion dollars, the French government
three hundred millions, and the Canadians over four hundred millions
more. All the later loans, however, were secured 100 per cent by high-
grade American and South American securities, and none was sold by
public campaign.

The summer of 1915 was a time not only of uncertainty and alarm
but also of decision. Anglo-American relations were considerably Im-
proved by the cotton agreement and by the State Department's rever-
sion to a neutral position on loans to the belligerents. The first great
submarine crisis had been weathered by a mixture of firmness and
pacific diplomacy, but German-American relations were still in a
precarious state. The great crisis through which the American people
had passed had stimulated new fears and suggested remedies so con-
flicting that it was evident the nation was on the verge of one of the
bitterest and most portentous debates in its history. In fact, the great
debate over foreign policy and preparedness had already begun, and
the administration could not long ignore it.

62 The syndicate managing the loan was unable to sell $187 million of the
bonds, which had to be taken by the participating banks.

CHAPTER 7

The Preparedness Controversy., 1914-16

DURING the first months of the war, before the submarine issue
was raised, American sentiment was overwhelmingly neutral and
pacific. Even those persons who believed in a vague way that the
United States had some interest in the European settlement were re-
assured by the knowledge that the Allies were bound to win. This
conviction of the certainty of an Allied victory^ held by civilian and
military leaders alike, conditioned all American attitudes on questions
of foreign policy and preparedness. No catastrophe such as the fall of
France in 1940 occurred before April, 19 17, to shock Americans out of
their complacency; nothing compelled them to calculate seriously the
consequences of German domination of Europe. 1

A few observers like Ambassador Walter H. Page and Charles W.
Eliot sensed that the issues involved in the conflict were freighted with
momentous consequences for the United States. Page and a few other
like-minded citizens frankly declared at the outset of the war that
American and British interests were so closely intertwined that the de-
struction of British naval power and the triumph of a dynamic, mili-
taristic Imperial Germany would constitute a grave threat to the
future security of the United States. 2 Such voices, however 3 were ob-

a significant commentary on this point, see Edward H. Buehrig,
"Wilson's Neutrality Re-Examined," World Politics, III (Oct., 1950), 1-19.

2 See, e.g., H. L. Higginson to E. M. House, Sept. 1, 1914, the Papers of
Edward M. House, in the Library of Yale University,- Walter H. Page to House,
Sept. 22, 1914, ibid.; Henry Van Dyke to Wilson, Sept. 10, 1914, the Woodrow
Wilson Papers, in the Library of Congress; Collier's, LIII (Sept. 12, 1914),
16; Stuart H. Perry, "After the War," North American Review, GG (Nov.,
1914), 732-741; Outlook, CVHI (Nov. 4, 1914), 521-524.

174

THE PREPAREDNESS CONTROVERSY, 1914-16 175

scured by the more vociferous and more representative spokesmen,
who affirmed the total separation of American and European interests.
This, after all, was the ideological base upon which American neu-
trality rested.

Even so> after the war's first shock wore off, impartiality in thought
became impossible for many sensitive Americans, who refused to close
their minds to the issues of the greatest catastrophe that had visited
the world in a century. It was inevitable that as German methods and
ambitions unfolded, these observers should begin to calculate the value
of neutrality. The first important manifestation of this sentiment came
during the debate provoked by Theodore Roosevelt's charge^ 3 later
reiterated by Senators Root and Lodge and other Republican leaders,
that the administration had virtually acquiesced in Germany's invasion
of Belgium by not protesting that violation of the Hague Convention. 4

The great submarine crisis of 1915 and the concurrent revelations
of German intrigues against American peace and neutrality, however,
caused an even more significant turn in this segment of American
opinion. The conviction that the United States could probably not
avoid intervention, especially if the Allies weakened, now spread irre-
sistibly among leaders like Root, Lansing, Roosevelt, George Harvey,
editor of the North American Review, Lawrence Abbott, an editor
of the Outlook, and Paul Fuller, prominent New York attorney. The
rationale of these interventionists and near-interventionists of course
varied. Some were sheer idealists, who believed the American
democracy could not refuse to aid the European democracies in their
death grapple with imperialistic autocracy; some, like Roosevelt, were
realists, who thought a firm defense of American rights on the seas
would lead inevitably to war. 5

3 'Tear God and Take Your Own Part," The New York Times Magazine,
Nov. 8, 1914.

4 The controversy rather fizzled, however, when Norman Hapgood pointed to
Roosevelt's earlier articles in the Outlook, August 22 and September 23, 1914,
in which Roosevelt had declared that the United States should adhere to a
strict neutrality and bore no responsibility for Belgium's fate. Norman Hapgood,
"The Real Hughes Idea/' Harper's Weekly, LXII (Mar. 18, 1916), 271. As
the New Republic, VI (Mar. 25, 1916), 204, pointed out, the truth was that
everyone Wilson, Roosevelt, and Root included thought in August, 1914,
that noninterference was the proper course to follow.

5 For expressions of the interventionist attitude, see Lawrence Abbott to T.
Roosevelt, Dec. 23, 1914, the Papers of Theodore Roosevelt, in the Library of
Congress; Paul Fuller, for the American Rights Committee, "A Memorial to the
President of the United States," dated Nov. 29, 1915, Wilson Papers, and the

176 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

In December, 1915, a little group of New York interventionists
formed the American Rights Committee, 6 which, with the New York
Tribune, then edited by Ogden Reid, and similar groups in Boston and
Cambridge, \vaged a valiant but generally futile campaign to fire the
American war spirit. 7 Calling upon the President to break relations
with the German government, these idealists devoted their talents to
the hopeless task of persuading the American people that a complete
Allied victory was essential to the preservation of democracy and
civilization. As the President turned a deaf ear to their pleas and suc-
ceeded, in spite of extraordinary provocations, in preserving neutrality,
the interventionists turned on him in disgust and contempt. 8 Their
sentiments were nowhere more accurately expressed than in the follow-
ing tribute by the novelist, Owen Wister:

To WOODROW WILSON. FEB. 22, 1916.
History has lashes that have flayed the names

Of public cowards, hypocrites, poltroons,
You go immune, cased in your self-esteem;

The next world cannot scathe you, nor can this;
No fact can stab through your complacent dream;

Nor present laughter, nor the future's hiss.
But if its fathers did this land control

Dead Washington would wake and blast your soul. 9

titles cited in the Essay on Sources, "German-American Relations, 1914-17
American Comment on Germany General" and "American Public Opinion on
the War, 1914-17 Representative American Comment on the War."

6 Prominent in this organization were George Haven Putnam, Henry L.
Stimson, Everett V. Abbott, Lawrence F. Abbott, Frederick R. Goudert, Profes-
sor Franklin H. Giddings, Lawrence Godkin, Charles P. Howland, and, before
his death, Paul Fuller.

7 For representative editorials in the New York Tribune, see the issues of
Dec. 29, 1915, Jan. 1, 4, 26, 1916.

8 Theodore Roosevelt, for example, from the early days of the submarine
crisis, accused the President of cowardice and of being a "Byzantine logothete"
because he wrote notes instead of taking strong action to defend American
rights. The following comment (Roosevelt to Archibald B. Roosevelt, May 19,
1915, Roosevelt Papers) is typical: "There is a chance of our going to war;
but I don't think it is very much of a chance. ... As a nation, we have
thought very little about foreign affairs ; we don't realize that the murder of the
thousand men, women and children on the Lusitania is due, solely, to Wilson's
abject cowardice and weakness. . . He and Bryan are morally responsible for
the loss of the lives of those American women and children. . . . They are
both of them abject creatures and they won't go to war unless they are kicked
into it."

' Printed in the Springfield Republican, Feb. 24, 1916.

THE PREPAREDNESS CONTROVERSY., 1914-16 177

For all the depth of their conviction and the ardor of their pleading,
however, the interventionists remained only a fractional minority
before March, 1917, devoid of influence on the masses of people.
Their organization, the American Rights Committee, never gained a
foothold outside the Northeast and was in no sense comparable in
power and influence to the Committee to Defend America by Aiding
the Allies of the period 1939-41. The crisis in German-American rela-
tions in 1915 was chiefly significant, therefore, not because it stimu-
lated the interventionists to greater efforts, but because it provoked
among many Americans an awareness of the military impotence of
their country. In fact, an important public debate over the question
of increased armaments had been maturing for months before the
submarine controversy erupted. For example, Theodore Roosevelt and
his editorial organ, the Outlook, assumed leadership of the prepared-
ness movement in November and December, 1914, 10 while in the latter
month Senator Lodge's son-in-law, Representative Augustus P. Gard-
ner, tried vainly to force a Congressional investigation of the military
and naval establishments. Moreover, on December 1, 150 public
leaders gathered in New York City and organized the National Security
League, frankly dedicated to the task of preparing the United States
for a possible war with Germany. Meanwhile, the two stalwart cham-
pions of the services, the Navy League and the Army League, had
redoubled their propaganda.

This early preparedness agitation, however, fell on deaf ears in the
administration and country and aroused the bitter antagonism of the
progressive and peace groups. In October, 1914, the President laugh-
ingly called the preparedness talk "good mental exercise," and in his
Annual Message of December 8 he reaffirmed the traditional position.
"We shall not alter our attitude . . .," he declared, "because some
amongst us are nervous and excited." " Secretary Daniels announced
happily that the navy was in "fine shape," even though the General
Board had advised differently. 12 Every effort by the preparedness

1 Outlook, CVIII (Nov. 25, Dec. 9, 16, 30, 1914), 663-666, 813-814,
865-866, 986-988.

11 Ray S. Baker and William E. Dodd (eds.), The Public Papers of Woodrow
Wilson (6 vols., New York, 1925-27), The New Democracy, I, 223-227.

12 The navy had suffered a severe decline in efficiency as a result of the con-
centration of the Atlantic fleet in Mexican waters since February 10, 1913.
Target practice had been so neglected that a large proportion of the men of the
fleet had never heard a ship's guns fired. The crews of the Texas and the New
York, the largest and most powerful of the battleships, had never fired a gun.

iy8 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

advocates met not only with strong administration opposition in Con-
gress but also with intimations by Wilson that he suspected some lobby
was stirring up an artificial alarm. Thus, when the President and his
defense secretaries conferred with Democratic leaders in January,
1915, over the army and navy appropriations for 1915, opinion was
unanimous that, in view of the decrease in federal revenues, the mili-
tary budgets would have to be cut instead of increased.

In reply, the preparedness spokesmen increased the tempo and
broadened the scope of their activities and propaganda during the
early months of 1915. A stream of articles and books, depicting the
nation's military weakness and forecasting the invasion of American
territory by hostile forces, began to pour forth. Then, after the
Lusitania disaster, this stream became a mighty flood. Motion-picture
producers, too, entered the struggle, with The Battle Cry of Peace and
The Fall of a Nation, both of which portrayed invasions of the United
States by soldiers with a goose step and German-style mustaches. Not
in many years had the American people been subjected to such pres-
sure by an organized minority. 13

As the conviction grew after the Lusitania incident that the United
States had a vital interest in the conduct of the belligerents and the
outcome of the war, preparedness became a virtual crusade. Defense
societies were swamped with applications for membership. When the
Navy League asked for $25,000 for a campaign to compel Congress to
appropriate half a billion dollars for "an adequate navy/* the sum
.was oversubscribed in twenty-five minutes. 14 In a stirring manifesto
issued two days after the sinking of the Lusitania, the National Se-
curity League appealed to the American people to examine their
defenses and compel Congress to strengthen them, while the Navy
League on May 11 demanded that Congress be called into special
session and vote $500 million for naval expansion. In mid- June the
National Security League convoked a great preparedness assemblage

Moreover, because of their prolonged stay in the tropics and their long absence
from home, the men were in bad spirits. A. F. Nicholson, senior member of the
General Board, to Secretary of the Navy, Sept. 9, 1914, Wilson Papers.

13 Needless to say, none of this literature was Allied propaganda. It was,
instead, thoroughly indigenous. For the literature of preparedness, see the Essay
on Sources, "The Preparedness and Peace Movements, 1914-17 The Litera-
ture of Preparedness."

14 At a meeting of 100 of New York City's wealthiest men. on Tune 10. 1915.
New York World, June 11, 1915.

THE PREPAREDNESS CONTROVERSY, 1914-16 179

in New York City, which was attended by public leaders from twenty-
five states. By September, twenty-two governors had joined the or-
ganization.

It was evident, therefore, that a powerful movement had been set
on foot that could not long be ignored by the political leaders. Although
the various defense societies had made an honest effort to be non-
partisan, practically all their chief spokesmen were Republicans as-
sociated with the great financial and industrial interests. As many
observers pointed out, the danger seemed grave indeed that the Re-
publicans would capture the preparedness movement and succeed in
identifying the Democratic party with national weakness.

As he was ever mindful of the desirability of keeping the Democratic
party in power, the significance of the preparedness agitation could
not have been lost upon the President. It would, however, probably
be more accurate to say that the submarine crisis and the exasperat-
ingly futile Lusitania negotiations were the chief reasons why Wilson
decided to reverse his position on the armaments question. In any
event, he became a convert to preparedness reluctantly and only after
much soul searching. On July 21, 1915, he asked Secretaries Garrison
and Daniels to investigate and recommend programs adequate to
satisfy the needs of security. Shortly afterward, he advised Congres-
sional leaders that the administration would soon reverse its position.

As they had long been at work on comprehensive plans, the General
Board of the Navy and the Army War College speedily answered the
President's request of July 21. Garrison and Daniels evidently exercised
little restraint, but rather gave their subordinates a free hand in con-
structing what they thought were ideal programs. The General Board
submitted a long-range program, aimed at achieving naval equality
with the British by 1925. Approved by the President on October 15,
this plan envisaged the construction, during the first five years, of ten
battleships, six battle cruisers, ten cruisers, fifty destroyers, one hun-
dred submarines, and lesser craft, at a cost of $500 million. Even the
Navy League had not asked for more. Although the army plan was a
compromise between what the War College wanted and what Garrison
thought it could get, in certain respects it was even more astonishing
than the General Board's recommendations. The army plan proposed
not only substantial increases in the Regular Army, which everyone
expected, but also virtually to scrap the National Guard as the first

l8o WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

line of defense and to substitute instead a national reserve force, the
Continental Army, of 400,000 men. 15

Although the administration's defense program had been described
piecemeal by the newspapers during October, it was not until Novem-
ber 4, 1915, that the President presented it formally to the country.
The occasion was an address before the Manhattan Club in New York
City, in which he explained the program and urged its adoption. 16
The Navy League and other defense organizations rallied at once to
the President's side; but it was as yet impossible to ascertain Congres-
sional or popular opinion. From the violent protests and criticisms of
the antipreparedness forces, however, it was evident that one of the
hardest battles of the decade impended.

To understand the intensity and significance of the struggle that
followed, it is necessary first to appreciate the character of the progres-
sive-pacifistic movement of these years. The humanitarian spirit that
had given momentum to the progressive movement stemmed from
definite beliefs about America and her place in the family of nations.
To begin with, progressivism concentrated largely on economic and
social justice at home. This emphasis grew into such an obsession that
progressivism became tantamount to provincialism. To be sure, a
small Eastern minority, led by Roosevelt, were internationally minded;
but to the large majority of progressives, particularly in the South and
Middle West, America's unique mission was to purify and offer herself
to decadent Europe, an example of democracy triumphant over social
and economic injustice. This self-purification involved also an end to
America's experiment in imperialism and a weakening of American
naval power. The second major progressive assumption concerned the
place of war in modern society. Wars were mainly economic in causa-
tion and necessarily evil because bankers with money to lend, munition-
makers with sordid profits to earn, and industrialists with markets to
win were the chief promoters and beneficiaries of war.

It followed from these two assumptions that the path of progressive
righteousness led straight to disarmament, an international system
based upon compulsory arbitration, and an unequivocal repudiation of
war. To these progressives, therefore, the call of duty was unmistak-
ably clear in the summer and fall of 1915. The forces against which
they had been battling at home since 1898 the big navy imperialists,

15 There is a comprehensive analysis of the administration's defense program
in The New York Times, Nov. 6, 1915.

15 The Public Papers, New Democracy, I, 384-392.

THE PREPAREDNESS CONTROVERSY, 191416

181

the armor-plate monopoly, the big industrialists^ and the bankers
were arrayed solidly in support of a great military effort. This fact
alone would have sufficed to arouse the hostility of progressives^ but
more important was their repudiation of the principle of using power

Robert Carter in the New York Evening Sun
Preparedness: Wilson reverses himself in midstream

as an instrument of diplomacy. To them preparedness signified turning
America into an armed camp, the glorification of force, and, worst of
all, an end to the reform movement at home. Little wonder it was
that in the ensuing battle almost every leader of the American progres-
sive movement was found in the antipreparedness ranks.

The antipreparedness forces had not been entirely inactive before

l82 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

the summer of 1915. At the same time the National Security League
was organized, a group of Eastern peace leaders, including Oswald
Garrison Villard, George Foster Peabody, Jane Addams, Lillian D.
Wald, and Rev. Charles E. Jefferson of New York City, formed the
League to Limit Armament to offset the agitation for preparation. 17
A few weeks later the Woman's Peace party was organized by Jane
Addams and Carrie Chapman Catt to mobilize feminine sentiment.
These and other peace groups kept up a steady reply to the prepared-
ness propaganda. 18

So long as the administration withstood the demand for increased
armaments the peace forces felt reasonably secure. The President's
desertion of the peace cause in the summer of 1915, however, caused
the first real crisis in the progressive movement since 1912. Whether to
follow Wilson and attempt to moderate his program, or to oppose him
in what promised to be a doubtful battle these were the difficult
alternatives. For most progressives, however, there was only one
answer: fight the President. For, as one pacifist warned, he was "sow-
ing the seeds of militarism, raising up a military and naval caste." w
Thus Wilson's preparedness appeal of November 4 was met by a
thundering opposition. Bryan, who had already begun his peace cam-
paign, now undertook a nation-wide appeal to persuade the people
that Wilson was being duped by his enemies, the great business inter-
ests. Senator La Follette, too, entered the fight, charging that profiteers
were the real promoters of preparedness. 20 And from every obscure
corner of the country came angry demands, protests, pleas, and appeals.
And even more meaningful to the politicians was the almost unani-
mous opposition of labor and farm organizations to the preparedness
program. 21

17 "Organization Meeting of the American League to Limit Armament
December 18, 1914"; "Report of the Secretary . . . April 7, 1915," in* the
Papers of Oswald Garrison Villard, in Houghton Library, Harvard University.

18 For the literature of the peace and antipreparedness movements see Essay
on Sources, "The Preparedness and Peace Movements, 1914-17 General
Studies; The Peace and Antipreparedness Crusades,"

19 O. G. Villard to Wilson, Oct. 30, 1915, Wilson Papers.

20 R. M. La Follette, "Patriots," La toilette's Magazine, VII (Nov., 1915),
I,*

21 For example, see H. Q. Alexander, president of the National Farmers'
Union, to Claude Kitchin, Nov. 3, 24, 1915, the Papers of Claude Kitchin, in
the Library of the University of North Carolina; resolutions adopted by the
North Carolina Farmers' Union, Nov. 18, 1915, The New York Times .'Nov. 19,
1915; American Socialist, Dec. 4, 1915; Ohio Valley Trades and Labor As-

THE PREPAREDNESS CONTROVERSY, 1914-16 183

Antipreparedness sentiment at once focused upon the members of
Congress, for the outcome of the controversy depended upon the suc-
cess or failure of Bryan and his friends in wresting control of the
legislative branch from the President. Appalled by Wilson's new de-
parture, a group of from thirty to fifty Democratic radicals, most of
them Southerners and Westerners, took counsel with one another dur-
ing the summer and fall of 1915. The leaders of the group were Claude
Kitchin, the new House majority leader 22 and farmer-lawyer from
Scotland County, North Carolina, and Warren Worth Bailey, single
taxer and publisher of the Johnstown, Pennsylvania, Democrat. With
the tacit co-operation of the chairman of the House Military Affairs
Committee, James Hay of Virginia, the antipreparedness leaders were
able to pack and control that key body. 23

When Congress assembled in December, 1915, Wilson made patriot-
ism, preparedness, and a new shipping bill the keynotes of his Annual
Message. 24 Having failed to budge Majority Leader Kitchin from his
stubborn opposition, the President called the House and Senate
minority leaders, James R. Mann of Illinois and Jacob H. Gallinger
of New Hampshire, to the White House and asked for the opposition's
aid. After beginning this energetic campaign, however, Wilson was
drawn away from the developing controversy for several weeks by his
marriage on December 18, 1915, to Mrs. Edith Boiling Gait of Wash-
ington. The consequence of his failure to press his measures at this
time was that he soon lost control of the House of Representatives.
Democratic members were apathetic, if not openly opposed, to the
defense program.

Preparedness advocates were most alarmed, however, by the situa-
tion in the Military Affairs Committee. The leaders of this body had
never got on well with Secretary Garrison, whom they thought dic-
tatorial and responsive only to the military point of view. Now the

sembly to Wilson, Dec. 3, 1915, Wilson Papers; action of the United Mine
Workers of America, Jan. 18, 1916, The New York Times, Jan. 19, 1916; Isaac
R. Sherwood to W. W. Bailey, Nov. 5, 12, 1915, the Papers of Warren Worth
Bailey, in the Library of Princeton University.

22 Oscar W. Underwood, House majority leader from 1911 to 1915, was
elected to the Senate in the latter year.

. 23 The membership and activities of the antipreparedness radicals are fully
revealed in the voluminous correspondence in the Kitchin and Bailey Papers
and the Papers of William Jennings Bryan, in the Library of Congress, August
through November, 1915.

24 The Public Papers, The New Democracy, I, 406-428.

184 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

Committee were at positive loggerheads with Garrison over the most
important feature of the administration's army plan, the Continental
Army. The Army War College had emphatically asserted that because
of constitutional limitations on federal control of the state forces, the
National Guard could never be legally subjected to the control of the
President and War Department. 25 Garrison reiterated this argument
before the Committee, adding that any army plan that made the Na-
tional Guard the core of the reserve force was not only futile but also
dangerous, because it could provide no effective reserve force at all.
The Committee members, however, were adamantly opposed to the
idea of a national reserve force. The powerful National Guard lobby
in Washington was active during the fight, to be sure, but its opposition
to the Continental Army proposal was not the only reason for the
Committee's opposition. A large, effective reserve army, under the
absolute control of the War Department, seemed to the rural Demo-
crats on the Committee the very symbol of uncontrolled militarism.
Southerners, moreover, feared that a President hostile to their racial
system might enlist Negroes in the volunteer reserve force. Chairman
James Hay came forward, instead, with a plan to "federalize" the
militia, that is, to give the War Department control over the enlist-
ment, equipment, and training of the National Guard. The state
forces, moreover, would be paid by the federal government. In spite
of everything administration leaders could do 5 the Committee members
insisted upon having their way.

This, therefore, was the stalemate that existed during the month fol-
lowing the President's second marriage. To the country at large he
seemed helpless in face of the deadlock and, for the first time in his
political career, ineffective. As friendly critics pointed out, he had
abandoned his leadership of Congress at a critical juncture and had

25 E.g., H. L. Scott to Charles M. de Bremond, Dec. 27, 1915, the Papers of
Hugh L. Scott, in the Library of Congress; L. M. Garrison to Wilson, Jan. 12,
1916, Wilson Papers.

The Army War College and Garrison based their arguments in behalf of the
Continental Army plan entirely on this assertion. The Committee members, on
the other hand, declared that of course Congress had ample power to bring the
state forces under federal control. In spite of the obvious necessity of clearing
up this legal point, it was not until after the Continental Army plan had been
abandoned and Secretary Garrison had resigned that Wilson sought to find an
answer to this question. On February 25, 1916, Attorney General Thomas W.
Gregory submitted a long memorandum, dated February 24, 1916, to the
President. Gregory supported the Committee's assertion that the authority of
Congress over the militia was practically unlimited.

THE PREPAREDNESS CONTROVERSY, 1914-16 185

left the business of creating opinion to a public bewildered by a multi-
tude of discordant elements. "I cannot impress upon you too forcibly the
importance of an appeal to the country at this time on the question of
preparedness/' Tumulty advised. ". . . Our all is staked upon a
successful issue in this matter." 26 Stung by his critics and by Tumulty's
warning, after returning from his honeymoon Wilson decided to carry
the fight to the people. Opposition to preparedness was strongest in the
rural areas of the South and Middle West; since Southern congress-
men might support the administration out of party loyalty, Wilson
decided to address his appeal to the East and Middle West.

Opening his tour in New York City on January 27, 1916, the Presi-
dent campaigned westward through Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Chicago,
Milwaukee, Des Moines, Kansas City, Topeka, and St. Louis. He
explained and defended the Continental Army plan, and in a famous
slip at St. Louis on February 3 he declared the United States should
have "incomparably the greatest navy in the world." 27 He affirmed
the necessity of defending the Western Hemisphere against hostile
attack; he declared he could not defend the national honor without
military power; he depicted the explosive and unpredictable European
situation. Preparedness, he declared, was not a partisan cause, but a
national necessity. 28

Everywhere Wilson went he was welcomed by friendly editors and
cheering throngs, a fact that deluded him into thinking he had changed
the Midwestern mind. And he came back to Washington on February
4 and waited for the ground swell he thought would soon overwhelm
Congressional opposition. It soon became evident, however, that the
masses of farmers and workers in the Midwest were unconverted. 29

26 Tumulty to Wilson, Jan. 17, 1916, Wilson Papers.

27 In the official printed version Wilson changed this phrase to read "in-
comparably the most adequate navy in the world." For criticisms of the St. Louis
address, see New York Journal of Commerce, Feb. 4, 1916; Springfield Re-
publican, Feb. 5, 1916; The Nation, CII (Feb. 10, 1916), 153.

28 Wilson's addresses are printed in The Public Papers* New Democracy, II,
1-121.

29 This, at least, was the opinion of competent observers. See Governor
Arthur Capper, of Kansas, to O. G. Villard, Feb. 3, 1916, Villard Papers;
H. E. Farnham to W. W. Bailey, Feb. 5, 1916, Bailey Papers; S. H. Smith to
Bailey, Feb. 8, 1916, ibid.

As preparedness enthusiasm throughout the country was largely concen-
trated in the cities and towns, there was actually a large body of favorable
opinion in the Middle West before Wilson began his tour. There can be no
doubt that his speeches, which were delivered in the large cities of the region,

1 86 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

More important, it was obvious the President had failed to convince
many leaders of opinion that the United States confronted any grave
danger from abroad.

"I see no real change in the attitude of the Members since the
President's Western tour," Claude Kitchin observed five days after
Wilson returned to the capital. 30 Events soon proved the accuracy of
Kitchin's surmise. By now the deadlock between Garrison and the
House Military Affairs Committee was apparently hopeless, for Garri-
son had taken such advanced ground he could never compromise,
while the Democratic congressmen were more than ever determined
to scrap the Continental Army plan and to strengthen the National
Guard. Convinced that the Committee's alternative was vicious,
because it would prevent enactment of effective legislation, Garrison
intimated he would resign if the President surrendered.

Even before he left on his Western tour, Wilson had given signs of
weakening. On February 5, the day after his return, Chairman Hay
advised him that the Democrats would never accept the Continental
Army scheme; three days later he added that Garrison and the military
spokesmen had thoroughly antagonized the Committee. In order to
get any army bill at all, the President had to give in, abandon the
Continental Army, and accept "federalization" of the National Guard.
As he had no other choice, he surrendered to the Committee and
allowed Garrison to resign on February 10. Immediately the tension
between the Committee and the executive department vanished.
Garrison left hurriedly for home, deeply aggrieved but still too loyal
to his chief to vent his feelings. 31

The appointment of Garrison's successor was another move calcu-
lated to heal the breach between the President and the Military Affairs
Committee. He was Newton D. Baker, Mayor of Cleveland, who, until

mid ? le " and u PP er -dass support for preparedness. But it seems likely
that Wilson failed to change rural antipreparedness sentiment. For one thing
the opposition of the rural members in Congress to the defense program did
not diminish. For another, rural opposition, as revealed in farm journals and
letters to congressmen, did not noticeably subside after Wilson's tour

3 ^ tChin t0 Bryan ' Febl 9 > 1916 > Ktebin Papers; also W. W. Bailey to
W. E. Ewer, Feb. 11, 1916, Bailey Papers.

31 Only once in later years did Garrison say what he thought of Wilson. "I
once heard a description which as nearly fits the case of President Wilson as
any other I know," he wrote in 1929. "In describing someone it was said, 'He
was a man of high ideals but no principles/ " Garrison to W. E. Brooks *Feb
24, 1929, the Papers of William E. Brooks, in the Library of Congress. '

THE PREPAREDNESS CONTROVERSY, 1914-16 187

within a month of his appointment on March 7, was outspokenly
opposed to preparedness. Wilson had followed Baker's rise to a position
of leadership among young, progressive Democrats with admiration
and in 1913 had twice offered him the Secretaryship of the Interior.
Baker came as Secretary of War because Wilson convinced him it was
his duty to come, and the President thereafter had no more loyal or
congenial friend in the Cabinet.

After the administration's acceptance of the Hay plan and Garri-
son's withdrawal, the Democratic leaders made steady progress in
Congress. On March 23, 1916, the House, 402 to 2, adopted the Com-
mittee bill, which increased substantially the Regular Army and
brought the National Guard under the control of the War Depart-
ment. It was true, however, as Kitchin claimed, that the victory be-
longed to the antipreparedness group. They had waged what seemed
in the beginning a hopeless battle against the combined force of the
administration, the metropolitan press, and a part of the Republican
minority. They had forced the President to abandon the heart of his
military program, the Continental Army, and to sacrifice a Secretary
of War who had won the affection of the military leaders and a
reputation for courage and loyalty to principle. As Kitchin further
pointed out, however, there still remained the danger that the Garrison
plan would triumph in the Senate, where the Military Affairs Com-
mittee was dominated by large-army men.

The month following the adoption by the House of the Hay army
bill was a time of severe crisis in German-American relations. Follow-
ing the torpedoing of the French packet, Sussex, in the English Chan-
nel on March 24, the President announced that if the Germans did not
thereafter adhere to the rules of cruiser warfare in their submarine
operations the United States would sever diplomatic relations with the
Imperial government. The preparedness leaders in the Senate, whose
spokesman was George E. Chamberlain, chairman of the Military
Affairs Committee, used the Sussex crisis to advance their cause. On
April 18, the same day Wilson threatened to break relations with the
German government, the Senate adopted a bill that embodied vir-
tually the War College-Garrison program. The House bill had in-
creased the Regular Army from 100,000 to 140,000 officers and men.
In contrast, the Senate measure increased the regulars to 250,000,
"federalized" the National Guard, provided $15 million for the con-
struction of nitrate plants, and, most important, established a national

1 88 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

volunteer reserve force the Continental Army of 261,000 men.

Thus the issue between the moderates and the preparedness advo-
cates was frankly raised in the ensuing struggle between the two
houses for control of the major aspects of the military bill. In this
struggle Wilson displayed all his powers of leadership and mediation.
He quickly spotted weaknesses in the Hay bill to "federalize" the Na-
tional Guard and obtained their correction. He threw his support
behind Secretary Baker's suggestion for the creation of a Council of
National Defense. And in the struggle between the House and Senate
he offered a compromise, in which the House's demand for a smaller
standing army and the Senate's plan for a larger number of regiments
would be reconciled. When the conferees adjourned without agree-
ment on May 5, Wilson entered the controversy again, pleading with
the House members to meet the Senate halfway.

Under steady presidential pressure the legislative deadlock was
finally broken, and on May 13 the conferees agreed on a bill embody-
ing mutual concessions. The measure 32 more than doubled the Regu-
lar Army, increasing it from an authorized peacetime strength of
5,029 officers and 100,000 men to 11,327 officers and 208,338 men.
The Garrison plan for a large national reserve force was abandoned,
but the National Guard was thoroughly integrated into the federal
defense structure and increased to an authorized strength of 17,000
officers and 440,000 men within five years. In addition, the War De-
partment was allowed to establish a number of volunteer summer
training camps, patterned after the highly successful experimental
camp at Plattsburg, New York. Finally, the War Department was
authorized to construct and operate a nitrate plant, to cost not more
than $20 million. Later legislation provided for a Council of National
Defense.

Because the army bill constructed the first line of the nation's reserve
upon the cornerstone of the National Guard, the extreme preparedness
advocates denounced it as "a menace to public safety in that it pur-
ports to provide a military force of value" and does not. 88 With cus-
tomary exaggeration, Roosevelt called it "one of the most iniquitous
bits of legislation ever placed on the statute books," and the National

32 Approved by the Senate on May 17 and by the House on May 20, 1916.

33 Leonard Wood, "Memorandum with respect to legislation affecting the
Militia," sent to E. M. House, Apr. 17, 1916, Wilson Papers.

THE PREPAREDNESS CONTROVERSY, 1914-16 189

Security League urged the President to veto the measure. 34 On the
other hand, the progressive, antipreparedness leaders congratulated
themselves that the country had been saved from the worst conse-
quences of the preparedness hysteria and that the traditional American
defensive structure had been preserved. As Warren Worth Bailey's
newspaper claimed, they had forced the administration to accept
"reasonable" preparedness. 55

Meanwhile^ the House and Senate Naval Affairs committees had
been biding their time until the army issue was settled. Actually, there
had been little controversy over naval expansion. The die-hard paci-
fists in the House in principle opposed increased naval appropriations;
but they concentrated their energies on the army bill, which seemed to
them more important. On May 18 the House Committee presented a
bill that ignored the administration's request for approval of the five-
year building program but provided more tonnage than Secretary
Daniels had requested for the first year: five battle cruisers, four
cruisers, ten destroyers, twenty submarines, and smaller vessels. The
scrapping of the five-year program, the provision for battle cruisers
instead of dreadnoughts, and the addition of an amendment authoriz-
ing the President to convene a naval disarmament conference at the
end of the war all represented substantial achievements by the anti-
preparedness group. During the final debate in the House, on June 2,
a Republican "big navy" amendment was narrowly defeated, 189 to
183, although the Democrats agreed to increase the number of sub-
marines to fifty and almost to double the appropriations for the naval
air force, from $2 million to $3j4 million. The House on May 31 had
approved a Senate bill to establish a government armor-plate fac-
tory. 36

34 Roosevelt to A. C. Wiprud, Dec. 21, 1916, Roosevelt Papers; Robert
Bacon, president, National Security League, to Wilson, May 26, 1916, Wilson
Papers. The military leaders, of course, regarded the bill as "a gold brick." For
a detailed criticism by a member of the Army War College, see W. H. Johnston
to H. L. Scott, May 26, 1916, Scott Papers.

35 Johnstown Democrat, May 25, 1916.

36 The passage of this bill was a personal triumph for old Senator "Pitch-
fork" Ben Tillman of South Carolina, who had been at war with the armor-
plate manufacturers since the Spanish-American War. When Tillman brought
his bill out in December, 1915, the manufacturers offered to reduce their prices
substantially if the South Carolinian would abandon his measure. Tillman
replied that they were "robbers." Then the manufacturers threatened to
increase prices $200 a ton if the measure passed. This threat, however, back-
fired by arousing the entire country and expediting passage of the bill. See

I go WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

The House navy bill, however, was wrecked by the complete
triumph of the "big navy" forces in the Senate and by the battle of
Jutland, which naval experts said demonstrated the superiority of the
dreadnought over the faster and more lightly armored battle cruiser.
Thus the Senate measure, passed on July 21, provided for the com-
pletion of the administration's program within three years, not five,
and for the construction during the first year of four battleships, four
battle cruisers, four cruisers, twenty destroyers, thirty submarines, and
a number of lesser craft.

Up to this point the President had not interfered directly in the
course of the legislation; now, however, he turned the full force of his
personal and political pressure on the House leaders, to obtain accept-
ance of the astonishing Senate bill. The reasons for his sudden and
decisive intervention are not hard to find. There was a first of all, the
possibility of a war between Germany and the United States should
the former triumph in Europe. In the second place, fear that Japan
would emerge from the war expansionist and aggressive was another
major cause for the Senate's action and the President's vigorous support
of it. 37 But a more immediate cause was the fact that relations between
Britain and the United States were becoming exceedingly strained at
this time. Although the naval building program could have no imme-
diate effect on foreign policy, Wilson was anxious to hasten the day
when the American navy was larger than Britain's. "Let us build a
navy bigger than hers and do what we please," he told Colonel House.

After considerable wrangling, the conferees voted on August 7 to
disagree and refer the bills to their respective houses. The first break
in the House ranks came the following day, when Chairman Lemuel
P. Padgett of the House Committee conferred with Wilson and agreed
to support the Senate bill. Then, on August 15, the House capitulated
and accepted the important provisions of the Senate measure without
altering a sentence. The antipreparedness leaders were heartsick. "The
United States today becomes the most militaristic naval nation on
earth," Kitchin shouted. "The forces on the other side are too great,"
Bailey lamented. 88

Francis B. Simkins, Pitchfork Ben Tillman (Baton Rouge, La., 1944), pp.
512-513.

37 The New York Times, July 18, 19, 1916. Outten J. Clinard, Japan's In-
fluence on American Naval Power, 1897-1917 (Berkeley, Calif., 1947), pp.
145-172, offers convincing evidence to support this statement.

s* The New York Times, Aug. 16, 1916; W. W. Bailey to G. F. Dole, Aug. 8,
1916, Bailey Papers.

THE PREPAREDNESS CONTROVERSY, 1914^16 19!

In the meantime, the administration also obtained the adoption of
a much revised shipping bill as part of the general preparedness legis-
lation. As early as May 24, 1915, the President had revived the defunct
ship purchase bill, and all during the following summer McAdoo
urged the proposal in administration circles and before the country. In
his speeches after the Lusitania and Arabic crises, however, McAdoo
placed increasing emphasis upon the need for a strong merchant
marine as an indispensable adjunct to the navy. He began, moreover,
to think in terms of comprehensive federal regulation of maritime rates
and services, rather than merely of the purchase and operation of
ships. 39

By late October, 1915, McAdoo had drafted a new shipping bill,
which furnished the basis for administration discussions during the
following weeks. Then, on January 31, 1916, Chairman Alexander of
the Merchant Marine Committee introduced the administration's
measure in the House. Carefully phrased to meet the objections of the
Democratic senators who had helped defeat the ship purchase bill a
year before, the Alexander bill authorized the appointment of a United
States Shipping Board, which might spend up to $50 million in the
construction or purchase of merchant ships suitable for use as naval
auxiliaries. The Board was empowered to operate shipping lines but
might also lease or charter its vessels to private corporations. Finally,
the agency was endowed with full power to regulate the rates and
services of all vessels engaged in the interstate, coastwise, and foreign
trade of the United States.

The Merchant Marine Association inveighed against this "socialistic
scheme"; the shipping companies sent experts to testify against it
before the House Committee; yet administration leaders made rapid
headway in pushing the bill. Early in May, 1916, the Committee
approved the Alexander bill, slightly revised, 40 and the House adopted
it on May 20. There was no longer any real opposition to the proposal
among Senate Democrats, only a general apathy and still a lingering

39 See e.g., McAdoo's speech before the businessmen and commercial or-
ganizations of Indianapolis, Oct. 13, 1915, mimeographed copy in Wilson
Papers; also speeches at St. Louis, Oct. 14, and Kansas City, Oct. 15, The New
York Times, Oct. 15, 16, 1915.

40 The Committee's major change stipulated that the shipping lines owned
and operated by the Shipping Board should go out of business five years after
the end of the European war and that all the Board's property, except vessels
designed primarily as naval auxiliaries, should be sold.

1 92 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

fear that purchase of German vessels would involve the country in a
serious dispute with the British government. When, in mid- July, the
Senate Democrats iinally consented to consider the measure, they
amended it to prevent the Shipping Board from purchasing any ships
under belligerent registry. As the presidential campaign was by now
getting into full swing, debate in the Senate was desultory, with the
Republican stalwarts, Warren G. Harding of Ohio and Jacob H.
Gallinger of New Hampshire, leading the opposition. By a strict party
vote the bill was adopted on August 18, 1916.

Although McAdoo complained that the shipping bill was "tre-
mendously emasculated," the truth was the act Wilson signed on
September 7 had been immensely strengthened by Congress. In the
place of regulation of ocean rates and services by the overburdened
Interstate Commerce Commission, which McAdoo's draft had con-
templated, the House Committee had substituted thoroughgoing
regulation by a powerful independent commission. Instead of Mc-
Adoo's ill-advised plan to purchase the German vessels, the Senate had
insisted on a frank statutory avowal that the United States would be
guilty of no such unneutral conduct. Thus what had begun in 1914 as
a hastily conceived emergency measure had metamorphosed into one
of the most important pieces of legislation of the Wilson era, for his-
torians date the birth of the modern American merchant marine from
the passage of this Shipping Act of 1916.

The great defense appropriations of 1916 entailed for that day
enormous outlays and compelled Congress in an election year either
to impose new taxes or to approve a bond issue. In short, the Demo-
crats had to find large new revenues; and in their search for them they
provoked a new discussion and gave a powerful impetus to the move-
ment then being agitated for a progressive tax policy. In light of
federal fiscal policy since 1916, one is tempted to believe the Revenue
Act of that year marked another milestone in the progress toward a
more democratic America: a dividing point between the old tax policy
and the new.

The federal tax structure in 1914 was so constructed as to throw the
major share of the tax burden on the lower and middle classes. Almost
$300 million of the government's total revenues of $734,673,167, ex-
clusive of postal receipts, came from customs receipts, which were
paid by the mass of consumers. Another $300 million were paid by the
rank and file in the form of taxes on tobacco, liquor, wine, and beer.

THE PREPAREDNESS CONTROVERSY, 1914-16 1 93

Individuals and corporations paid $71 million in income taxes, while
the balance was derived from surplus postal receipts, the sale of public
lands, and miscellaneous sources. The wealthy, obviously, enjoyed rela-
tive immunity from taxation.

If conservatives had had their way, the entire cost of the new arma-
ments would have been met by a bond issue and by increased con-
sumption taxes. Rejecting the suggestion of a bond issue, McAdoo
presented in November, 1915, a comprehensive tax plan that threw
the burden of paying for preparedness as much on the lower and
middle classes as on the rich. 41 When Congress on December 17 ex-
tended the emergency war tax act of 1914 for another year, it seemed
the administration still had firm control of fiscal policy.

McAdoo' s proposal to place the heaviest burden of increased taxa-
tion on the lower and middle classes, however, aroused bitter comment
and opposition from radicals and progressives, as well as from Demo-
cratic politicians with uneasy eyes on the coming campaign. 42 The
Central Labor Union of Seattle, for example, suggested that since the
capitalists sought to provoke a war to increase their own profits, Con-
gress should instruct the War Department to seize all bank deposits
and all security holdings worth more than $5,000. 4S More significant
was the organization by a group of Eastern progressives, including
John Dewey, Frederick C. Howe, and George L. Record, of the As-
sociation for an Equitable Federal Income Tax. Their executive secre-
tary, Benjamin Marsh, undertook a speaking campaign in the Middle

41 Specifically, McAdoo proposed ( 1 ) to retain the emergency war taxes
voted in the autumn of 1914, which were mainly stamp and excise taxes; (2)
to retain the duty on sugar, instead of allowing it to enter free in 1916, as the
Underwood Act provided; (3) to reduce the income tax exemption from $4,000
to $3,000 for married persons and from $3,000 to $2,000 for single persons; (4)
to begin application of the surtax on incomes at $10,000 or $15,000,, instead of
at $20,000; (5) to double the normal income tax of 1 per cent, but not to
increase the surtax; and (6) to levy new taxes on gasoline, crude and refined oil,
and automobile horsepower. McAdoo to Wilson, Nov. 23, 1915, Wilson Papers;
The New York Times, Nov. 26, 1915.

42 See, e.g., W. J. Bryan, "The President's Message Analyzed," The Com-
moner, Dec., 1915; "Who Will Pay?" Harper's Weekly, LXI (Dec. 18, 1915),
577; Edwin O. Wood, member of the Democratic National Committee for
Michigan, to Tumulty, Dec. 1, 1915, Wilson Papers; R. B. Glenn to G. Kitchin,
Dec. 30, 1915, Kitchin Papers.

43 Resolution adopted c. Jan. 21, 1916, Wilson Papers. Local 5, Amalgamated
Sheet Metal Workers' Alliance, Youngstown, Ohio, and Local 24, International
Association of Machinists, Topeka, Kansas, adopted identical resolutions on
January 13 and February 27, 1916.

IQ4 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

West in January, 1916, and reported strong popular sentiment for
increasing the maximum surtax to 20 or 30 per cent. Finally, on Feb-
ruary 1 Representative Warren Worth Bailey came forward with a
plan to meet the entire cost of preparedness by raising the maximum
surtax to 50 per cent. "If the forces of big business are to plunge this
country into a saturnalia of extravagance for war purposes in a time
of peace," he declared on introducing his bill, "it is my notion that the
forces of big business should put up the money." **

This ground swell had immediate impact on the Southern and West-
ern radicals who controlled the House Ways and Means Committee
and who agreed among themselves to force through a tax bill accept-
able to the labor and farm spokesmen. In late January and early Feb-
ruary of 1916, Chairman Kitchin was suddenly deluged with letters
from Democratic congressmen, most of them representing rural or
labor constituencies, warning they would not support the administra-
tion's tax program, even if a Democratic caucus thus ordered. More-
over, all demanded that the money for preparedness be raised by
greatly increasing taxes on large incomes and by imposing new taxes
on inheritances and the profits of munitions manufacturers. "The
people of the United States are now paying annually $250,000,000 for
the national defense," a Nebraskan wrote. "I think this is sufficient but
if it is not let the surplus wealth that is claiming additional protection
pay for it." 45 Kitchin of course replied that he agreed completely. To
Bryan he confided that he was "persuaded to think that when the
New York people are thoroughly convinced that the income tax will
have to pay for the increase in the army and navy, . . . preparedness
will not be so popular with them as it now is." * 6

It was not publicly apparent until July, 1916, but control of the
Ways and Means Committee had been wrested from the administra-
tion for the first time since March 4, 1913. The radicals made one

** Johnstown Democrat, Feb. 2, 1916; also ibid., Feb. 15, 1916, and The
Public, XIX (Mar. 3, 1916), 194-195, for significant comment.

* 5 Dan V. Stephens to Kitchin, Jan. 29, 1916, Kitchin Papers. See also the
following letters to Kitchin, all in ibid.: R. L. Doughton, Jan. 25, 1916; Oscar
Callaway, Jan. 26, 1916; Carl G. Van Dyke, Clyde H. Tavenner, Isaac R.
Sherwood, W. L. Hensley, William Gordon, W. W. Bailey, Jan. 27, 1916; T. J.
Steele, Jan. 28, 1916; W. W. Hastings, Jim McClintic, James H. Mays, James
S. Davenport, William A. Ayres, Jan. 29, 1916; Carl Hayden, Jouett Shouse,
William H. Murray, Jan. 31, 1916; Scott Ferris, D. S. Church, J. R. Connelly.
Feb. 1,1916.

* Kitchin to Bryan, Jan. 31, 1916, ibid.

THE PREPAREDNESS CONTROVERSY, 191416 1 95

concession, by voting to retain the one-cent duty on sugar. But the bill
that the Committee presented to the House on July 1, 1916, was a far
cry from McAdoo's and Wilson's proposals. It doubled the normal
income tax, from 1 to 2 per cent, without lowering exemptions; raised
the surtax on incomes over $40,000 to a maximum of 10 per cent,
instead of the maximum of 6 per cent under the law of 1913; imposed
a federal estate tax ranging from 1 to 5 per cent on estates over
$50,000; levied a tax of from 1 to 8 per cent on the gross receipts of
munitions manufacturers making a net profit of 10 per cent and over,
and repealed the hated stamp tax sections of the war emergency tax
law of 1914. 47 In all, Kitchin asserted, the bill would produce some
$250 million in new revenues, enough to pay for the military and naval
increases that Congress contemplated. Amid angry charges in the
House that the South and West had combined in a gigantic raid on
Northern wealth, 48 the House adopted the revenue bill on July 10.

Under the spur of progressives like George W. Norris and Robert
M. La Follette, the Senate Finance Committee went even further than
the House had gone in "soaking the rich," and the Senate bill finally
adopted on September 6 and agreed to by the House represented a
frank assessment against privileged wealth. In addition to the House
provision which doubled the normal income tax, the Senate bill in-
creased the surtax on incomes over $20,000 to a maximum of 13 per
cent, which, with the normal tax of 2 per cent, set the maximum
income tax at 15 per cent; levied a new tax on corporation capital,
surplus, and undivided profits; increased the estate tax to a maximum
of 10 per cent, and increased to 12J4 per cent the tax on gross receipts
of munitions industries.

What the passage of the revenue bill of 1916 signified was clear to
both the friends and the enemies of preparedness, to both the progres-
sives and the spokesmen for great property. Heretofore, the advocates
of a progressive tax policy the single taxers, the Socialists, and the
labor and agrarian progressives had been a minority, scourged and
ridiculed by conservatives as purveyors of class prejudice and despoilers
of the rich. Now for the first time in the saddle, these progressives used

47 For this and the following analysis of the Senate amendments I am in-
debted to Sidney Ratner, American Taxation (New York, 1942), pp. 345-361.

48 Martin Madden, Illinois Republican, for example, pointed out that four
states New York, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Illinois had paid $85
million in individual and corporation income taxes in 1915, while twelve
Southern states combined had paid only $5,389,670.

196 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

the necessity for vastly increased revenues as the occasion for putting
their advanced tax theories into effect. The new income and inheritance
taxes constituted,, for that day, a powerful equalitarian attack on great
property, unrivaled even by Lloyd George's "Tax on Wealth" of 1909.

Nor did the progressives fail to derive satisfaction from the way in
which they had seemingly turned the tables on the preparedness-big
business element. "What has become of the dollar patriots?" Bailey
taunted. "Where are the members of the Preparedness league and the
Navy league? In the counting room hollering loud and long because
they find that incomes must bear a portion of the burden they had
hoped to unload upon the farmer and the steel worker." 49 This was
the progressives* economic interpretation of the movement to make
America strong enough to defend herself.

By the autumn of 1916 the administration's preparedness program
was fairly well accomplished. Looking back over the enormous
obstacles that the President had faced, both from pacifists and from
ardent preparationists, it was clear his accomplishment was consider-
able indeed. It was a program designed, not to meet the immediate
needs of diplomacy, but rather to afford some measure of security to
the United States in a troubled postwar era. It did not satisfy the Na-
tional Security League any more than it pleased the extreme pacifists.
But opinion in the country as a whole agreed that the administration's
program provided "reasonable" preparedness for the uncertain years
ahead. Still doggedly noninterventionist, the rank and file were think-
ing in terms, not of preparedness for war 5 but of preparedness for
peace.

^Johnstown Democrat, July 15, 1916.

CHAPTER 8

Devious Diplomacy, 1915-16

r I 1 HE FAVORABLE settlement of the nation's most urgent contro-
JL versies with Germany and Britain in the autumn of 1915 brought
relief to a people distraught at the thought of active intervention. Yet
the calm that settled upon the country with the exacting of the Arabic
pledge was not shared by the few men who controlled the foreign
policy of the United States. Obviously, the great majority of Americans
wanted peace, yet the maintenance of peace depended upon German
observance of the Arabic promise, which was beyond Wilson's power
to control. Nor was a break with Britain an impossibility, although it
seemed unlikely at the time.

With his usual perspicacity, Colonel House saw that the surest way
to end the dilemma and create a situation subject to American direc-
tion was to inaugurate a movement for peace under President Wilson's
leadership. His earlier efforts to persuade the Germans to agree to the
status quo ante as a basis for peace talks having been rebuffed, 1 House
was by the late summer of 1915 convinced that the triumph of un-
bridled German militarism in Europe would gravely imperil future
American security. He concluded, moreover, that the only chance for
peace lay in coming to firm agreement with the Allies and in co-
operating with them in a drive for peace, based on the status quo ante,
so powerful the Germans could not resist it. 2

Although mediation had been much in House's thought since the

1 See above, pp. 160-162.

2 House to Edward Grey, Sept. 3, 1915, the Papers of Edward M. House, in
the Library of Yale University. House later explained the objectives of his
peace plan in a letter to George S. Viereck, Feb. 13, 1932, ibid., written in
connection with Viereck's Strangest Friendship in History.

197

198 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

failure of his first peace mission, it was probably Sir Edward Grey's
suggestion that the United States intervene to bring the war to an end
that prompted House's action soon afterward. During a brief con-
ference in New York City on October 8 he first presented to Wilson
a daring plan that had been taking shape in his mind: either to com-
pel a peace settlement or else to bring the United States into the war
on the Allied side. The President was startled but seemingly acquiesced
by silence. 3 A few days later House received letters from Grey intimat-
ing that the Allies might be willing to consider a negotiated and
reasonable peace if the United States were prepared to join a postwar
League of Nations to prevent aggressive war in the future. 4

House went at once to Washington where, with Grey's letters in
hand; he and Wilson collaborated on a reply. The time might soon
come. House advised Grey, when the United States should demand a
peace conference upon the basis of the elimination of militarism and
navalism. "What I want you to know is that whenever you consider
the time propitious for this intervention I will propose it to the Presi-
dent." After conferring with the British government., House added, he
would go to Berlin and tell the German leaders that the President in-
tended to stop the war. He would not, however, tell the Germans of
his prior understanding with the Allies. "If the Central Powers were
still obdurate, it would probably 5 be necessary for us to join the Allies
and force the issue." 6

3 Specifically, House proposed that he ask the Allies whether they would
accept the President's mediation. He thought they would accept. If the Central
Powers accepted also, all would be well. If the Central Powers refused, how-
ever, "we could then push our insistence to a point where diplomatic relations
would first be broken off, and later the whole force of our Government . . .
might be brought against them." The Diary of Edward M. House, in House
Papers, Oct. 8, 1915.

4 Grey to House, Sept. 22, 1915, two letters, House Papers; also Spring Rice
to House, Oct. 15, 1915, ibid. "I cannot say which Governments would be
prepared to accept such a proposal, but I am sure that the Government of the
United States is the only Government that could make it with effect," Grey
wrote. Perhaps the most significant part of Grey's communication, however, was
his intimation that, although the Allies would like to see Alsace-Lorraine re-
turned to France and the Dardanelles given to Russia, the British government
might be willing to negotiate on a basis of the restoration of Belgium and the
evacuation of France.

9 The word probably" was inserted by Wilson. "I do not want to make it
inevitable quite, that we should take part to force terms on Germany, because
the exact circumstances of such a crisis are impossible to determine," he wrote.
Wilson to House, Oct. 18, 1915, the Ray Stannard Baker Collection, in the
Library of Congress.

6 House to Grey, Oct. 17, 1915, House Papers.

DEVIOUS DIPLOMACY, 1915-16 1 99

Because the ship that carried House's letter to England was delayed,
it was not until November 9 that Grey replied, asking what House
meant by "elimination of militarism and navalism" and whether
House agreed that the peace of the world could be secured only by
the United States' joining a League of Nations and guaranteeing the
peace settlement. In relaying Grey's message to the President, House
begged him to come out forthrightly behind Grey's proposal. "This is
the part I think you are destined to play in this world tragedy," he
urged, "and it is the noblest part that has ever come to a son of man.
This country will follow you along such a path, no matter what the
cost may be." 7 Wilson agreed, and House at once replied affirmatively
to the Foreign Secretary.

In a long conference in New York City with Wilson on November
28, House again pressed his proposal for an Anglo-American entente.
There was an irrepressible conflict between German autocracy and
American democracy, he declared, and the United States could not
permit a military autocracy to dominate the world. The President,
moreover, should make these convictions known to the Allied leaders.
Wilson agreed and suggested that House go to London to begin secret
talks. 8 Two weeks later the momentous decision was made. House
would go to London and Berlin to sound out the possibilities of peace
on the basis of military and naval disarmament and a League of
Nations to prevent aggression and maintain the "absolute" freedom of
the seas. "If either party to the present war will let us say to the other
that they are willing to discuss peace on such terms," the President's
confidential instructions read, "it will clearly be our duty to use our
utmost moral force to oblige the other to parley, and I do not see how
they could stand in the opinion of the world if they refused." 9

7 House to Wilson, Nov. 10, 1915, the Woodrow Wilson Papers, in the
Library of Congress.

8 House Diary, Nov. 28, 1915. By now Wilson was convinced that Walter
Page was thoroughly unreliable and totally ineffective, because of his partiality
to the British cause. The President, moreover, had no confidence in the British
Ambassador in Washington, Sir Cecil Spring Rice, that "highly excitable
invalid," Wilson called him. Like his successor, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Wilson
seemed obsessed with a desire to circumvent diplomatic channels and to estab-
lish direct, personal communication with the British leaders.

9 Wilson to House, Dec. 24, 1915, Baker Collection; italics mine. Wilson's
use of the term "moral force" did not necessarily imply a qualification of his
statement. He meant, actually, diplomatic force, which in the then existing cir-
cumstances could have been a powerful weapon of coercion. Diplomatic force
used strongly against Germany, for example, might have led to a rupture in
relations and war.

2OO WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

In order to understand the reasons for the profoundly significant
change in policy implied in Wilson's determination to intervene de-
cisively for peace, it is necessary to review briefly the troubled state of
German-American relations from October through December, 1915,
during the time when Wilson and House agreed to embark upon the
new course. Too often it has been assumed that the President simply
decided upon a policy of intervention, diplomatic if possible, military
if necessary^ on general moral grounds. The fact was, however, that
Wilson's and House's willingness to think boldly was conditioned by
the knowledge that German-American relations, already extremely
tense, might worsen at any moment to the point of an open rupture.

The giving of the Arabic pledge by the Germans had prevented a
break in relations without effecting a comprehensive settlement of out-
standing grievances and without convincing the Washington govern-
ment that a friendly understanding was possible. To begin with, this,
the fall of 1915, was the time when German agents in the United States
and Mexico were most active and stimulated genuine alarm among the
administration. As early as August 4 Wilson was convinced the country
was "honeycombed with German intrigue and infested with German
spies." As evidence of German espionage began to unfold on all sides, 10

10 The most important case that developed during the summer of 1915 in-
volved the head of the powerful German secret-service organization in the
United States, Franz Rintelen von Kleist, who came to America in April, 1915.
News of Rintelen's activities came to Lansing in July. Investigation by American
agents revealed that Rintelen was head of the German intriguers, had engaged
in a number of schemes to stop the export of munitions to the Allies, and had
intrigued with Villa and Huerta to provoke a war between the United States
and Mexico. The Diary of Chandler P. Anderson, in the Library of Congress,
July 22, 1915, summarizing report by Charles Warren, Assistant Attorney
General.

Later and more comprehensive reports by United States secret-service agents
established that Rintelen and the German military and naval attache's, Franz
von Papen and Karl Boy-Ed, ha*d spent at least $27 million before December,
1915, as follows: (1) $12 million to promote a Huerta- Villa counterrevolution
against Carranza in Mexico; (2) $5 million for the Bridgeport Projectile Com-
pany, which the Germans bought in order to tie up Allied war orders; (3)
$3 million for secret-service and detective work; (4) $3 million for lecturers,
press bureaus, and foreign language publications; (5) $2*/i million to supply
German warships; and (6) $lVi million for miscellaneous expenses.

The reports of the United States agents were given to the press and were
summarized in The New York Times, Dec. 5, 8, 1915, and the New York
World, Dec. 8, 1915. See also Lansing to Wilson, Sept. 27, 1915, enclosing Page
to Lansing, Sept. 25, 1915, Wilson Papers, for another interesting case. Attor-
ney General Gregory reviewed the work of the German Embassy among Ameri-

DEVIOUS DIPLOMACY, 1915-16 201

Wilson grew indignant and threatened to send Bernstorff home. 11 The
Department of Justice, heretofore almost criminally negligent, turned
in full force on the German intriguers, while the Attorney General
issued an unprecedented appeal for assistance to state authorities. The
climax of the government's campaign came early in December, when
Lansing demanded the recall of Von Papen and Boy-Ed, German
military and naval attaches, for their proved complicity in plots against
American neutrality. Soon afterward Bernstorff disavowed Rintelen,*
but he could not so easily repudiate his two attaches.

It was at this time, also, that Lansing began his diplomatic campaign
to wrest from the Imperial government an apology and disavowal for
the destruction of American lives on board the Lusitania. This was
still the most rankling wound of all, and until it was healed cordial
relations between the two governments were impossible. From the
voluminous correspondence on the matter that passed among Wilson,
Lansing, Bernstorff, and the German Foreign Office, it is clear the
Washington administration were resolved to obtain full satisfaction or
else to break diplomatic relations, and that the Foreign Office would
surrender only if that were necessary to avoid a rupture. 12 During the
first weeks of the negotiation, however, the Foreign Office stubbornly
refused to concede the illegality of the destruction of the Lusitania.
The result was that, at the very time Wilson and House were making

can organizations in a letter to Vance McCormick, Sept. 30, 1916, copy in
House Papers.

George S. Viereck, who was a key figure in the German propaganda agency
in New York City, gives the best description of how that organization func-
tioned in Spreading Germs of Hate (New York, 1930), pp. 43-118. H. C.
Peterson, Propaganda for War (Norman, Okla., 1939), pp. 134-158, is a brief
account of German sabotage and propaganda activities.

11 House Diary, Oct. 8, 1915. Bernstorff protested piously that he had abso-
lutely no connection with the various intrigues. The fact was, however, that he
knew everything about and was a key figure in them. See, for example, Foreign
Office to Bernstorff, Jan. 13, 1916, "Bernstorff Wireless Messages 1916," in
the Papers of Walter H. Page, in Houghton Library, Harvard University;
Bernstorff to Foreign Office, Mar. 21, 1916, ibid.; Wolf von Igel to War Office,
May 10, 1916, ibid.; Bernstorff to Foreign Office, Aug. 26, 1916, ibid.

Lansing, however, was never fooled by BernstorfFs protestations of innocence.
See the Diary of Robert Lansing, in the Library of Congress, "Count von
Bernstorff," entry in Notes, dated May, 1916.

12 The documents covering the first phase of the negotiation are printed in
Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Lansing
Papers, 1914-1920 (2 vols., Washington, 1939-40), I, 488-497.

2O2 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

plans for the second peace mission, a break in relations with Germany
seemed likely almost any day.

Finally a break between the United States and Austria impended
over the sinking of the Italian liner Ancona in the Mediterranean on
November 7, with the loss of twenty-seven lives, by a German sub-
marine flying the Hapsburg ensign. Only a few days before Wilson and
House made plans for their peace move, the State Department had
dispatched a virtual ultimatum to Vienna. Although the Austrian gov-
ernment later yielded completely to the American demands for dis-
avowal and reparation, it was not certain at the height of the crisis
that the outcome would be a happy one.

Obviously, then, House's peace plan was not conceived in a vacuum^
or even as a means of needlessly hastening American intervention.
Wilson and House knew a break with Germany might become neces-
sary if the Lusitania negotiations failed, and they realized it would be
difficult to arouse popular approval for war over this somewhat stale
issue. It is clear, therefore, that they hoped to avert such a break by
compelling a reasonable peace settlement that would benefit all man-
kind. But if this effort failed because of German unreasonableness,
then the President could appeal in the name of humanity for the
support of the American people in a drive to end the war.

These thoughts were much in House's mind when he arrived in
London on January 6, 1916. It seemed a propitious time to begin
serious peace talks. Russia was wounded beyond hope of recovery,
while the prospect of the Allies' breaking through the German lines in
the West was at best remote. In fact, it seemed the situation would get
worse, not better, for the Allies in the coming months of 19 16. 13 Dur-
ing his two-weeks stay in London, before leaving for the Continent,
House talked with every official of consequence in the government.
Although he, Grey, and Balfour, head of the Admiralty, discussed only
the major aspects of the President's plan and the British leaders did
not make any commitments, House was so encouraged by the prospects
for successful mediation that he begged Wilson not to break relations
with Germany over the Lusitania issue, as that would wreck the entire
project.

From London House went to Berlin where, from January 26 to 29,
he conferred with the chief civilian leaders. As he had already led

13 As Sir Edward Grey later pointed out in Twenty-Five Years. 1892-1916
(2 vols., New York, 1925), II, 128-129.

DEVIOUS DIPLOMACY, 1915-16 203

Bernstorff to believe he was as friendly to Germany as to the Allies,
House received a cordial welcome. To the Colonial Secretary he de-
clared that the moderate elements in Britain and Germany could and
should come to agreement. With the Imperial Chancellor and the
Foreign Secretary, House pleaded movingly the cause of understanding
and peace, pointing to the impending danger of a collapse of Western
civilization and the futility of the war. Disclaiming any responsibility
for the tragedy, Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg agreed; but he made
it clear Germany would entertain no peace offer that did not include
indemnities from Britain and France and German control of Belgium
and Poland.

By the end of his stay in Berlin, therefore, House was convinced
neither side was yet ready to begin serious peace discussions. "Hell will
break loose in Europe this spring and summer as never before," he
advised the President; but he was certain Wilson could intervene after
the summer campaigns were over. 14 This conviction was strengthened
in Paris where, from February 2 to 8, House had a series of confiden-
tial talks with the French Premier and Foreign Minister, Aristide
Briand and Jules Cambon. Grey had been reluctant to broach the sub-
ject of peace with the French government. Convinced of the urgency
of a complete understanding with the French, House revealed the
President's plan and on February 7 made an important agreement with
Briand and Cambon. "In the event the Allies are successful during the
next -few months" House related, (e l promised that the President
would not intervene. In the event they were losing ground, I promised
the President would intervene." He declared, moreover, that the lower
the fortunes of the Allies ebbed, the closer the United States would
stand by them. Briand and Cambon, in turn, "agreed not to let the
fortunes of the Allies recede beyond a point where our intervention
could save them." 15

In reporting this conference to the President, House for the only
time in the writer's knowledge failed to convey a faithful account of
what he did and said. Omitting any reference to his sweeping promise
of American support for the Allies in his letter to Wilson, House
merely reported: "It was finally understood that in the event the Allies
had some notable victories during the spring and summer, you would

i* House to Wilson, Feb. 3, 1916, Wilson Papers,
is House Diary, Feb. 7, 1916.

204 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA.

[not] 16 intervene; and in the event that the tide of war went against
them or remained stationary, you would intervene." 1T The important
point, of course, was House's sweeping assurances of American inter-
vention under certain conditions and support under almost all condi-
tions. These assurances led the French Cabinet to believe they could
expect the military support of the United States if their prospects
darkened. Yet House was probably thinking, as Wilson assuredly was,
only in terms of diplomatic intervention. House later claimed Briand
and Gambon misinterpreted and exaggerated his promises to them. 1
There is no evidence in his Diary or letters to Wilson, however, that he
sought to make clear to the French leaders the important distinction in
his mind between military intervention and diplomatic intervention.

In London again on February 9, House moved swiftly to bring Grey
to some agreement. At a conference the following morning, the Foreign
Secretary made it clear he preferred American military intervention to
mediation, but he finally agreed that the President might demand that
the war be ended and a peace conference be held. 19 Next came the
more difficult task of winning the approval of the other Cabinet mem-
bers. The decisive conference was held on February 14, with House,
Grey, Balfour, Asquith, Lloyd George, and Lord Reading, the Chief
Justice, present. House promised that Wilson would preside at the
peace conference, and he wanted to know specifically when the Presi-
dent should issue his peace demand. The British conferees agreed that
early fall would be the best time. Lloyd George insisted that the Allies
and the United States come to agreement on terms before the con-
ference was called, but House refused to make any such promise. What
would Wilson do if the Allies insisted on terms he considered unjust?

16 Professor Seymour, in The Intimate Papers of Colonel House (4 vols.,
Boston, 1926-28), II, 164, made this sentence read as follows: "It was finally
understood that in the event the Allies had some notable victories during the
spring and summer, you would not intervene. . . ." It seems reasonable to
assume that House's omission of this important "not" in his letter to Wilson was
an inadvertence.

w House to Wikon, Feb. 9, 1916, Wilson Papers.

18 "The Memoirs of Colonel House," in the Papers of George Sylvester
Viereck, in the Library of Yale University.

19 "I argued the matter earnestly and convinced him," House wrote in his
Diary Feb. 10, 1916, "that for the good of all it would be best for us to smooth
over the Lusitania incident, and intervene by demanding a conference of the
belligerents for the purpose of discussing peace terms. We finally agreed it was
best for the President not to set any conditions whatever, but merely to demand
that war cease, and a conference be held."

DEVIOUS DIPLOMACY, 1915-16 205

Asquith asked. "I replied that he would probably withdraw from the
conference and leave them to their own devices." But what would
Wilson do if the Germans insisted on unreasonable terms? "In these
circumstances, I thought the President would throw the weight of the
United States on the side of the Allies. In other words, he would
throw the weight of the United States on the side of those wanting a
just settlement a settlement which would make another such war
impossible." 20

Three days after this epochal meeting, on February 17, Grey and
House drafted a memorandum embodying the Anglo-French-American
understanding. 21 Grey was now anxious that the President intervene
quickly. "History will lay a grave charge against those of us who refuse
to accept your proffered services at this time," he declared with
obvious feeling. 22 House sailed from Falmouth on February 25, there-
fore, confident the day was not far distant when the President might
perform the greatest service ever given man to render: to end the most
destructive war in history and to lay the foundations of a secure, just,
and lasting peace.

In the meantime, however, while House was in Europe, Wilson
and Lansing had embarked upon an independent diplomatic cam-
paign that nearly wrecked House's negotiations, threatened to draw
the United States and Germany together against the Allies, and back-
fired in a most spectacular way in Congress. It was the controversy
over armed ships, provoked by the administration's drive to disarm

20 House Diary, Feb. 14, 1916. The writer believes that on this supremely
important occasion House faithfully reflected the President's position. House
also revealed the true purpose behind Wilson's plan of mediation, which was a
purpose chiefly to bring peace to Europe, not to involve the United States in
the war. To be sure, the risk of war with Germany was inherent in the plan,
but that risk would be even more serious if the mediation effort failed. And
Wilson undoubtedly believed that, once an armistice had been effectuated and
a peace conference actually held, there was little chance the people of Europe
would allow their governments to resume hostilities.

21 Initialed by Grey on February 22, 1916, the memorandum began:
"Colonel House told me that President Wilson was ready, on hearing from

France and England that the moment was opportune, to propose that a Con-
ference should be summoned to put an end to the war. Should the Allies accept
this proposal, and should Germany refuse it, the United States would probably
enter the war against Germany." The full text is printed in Intimate Papers, II,
201-202.

22 House Diary, Feb. 17, 1916. Grey confessed, however, that the Cabinet
would have to be guided by military judgment in deciding upon the best time
for the President's mediation. Ibid., Feb. 21, 1916.

2O6 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

Allied merchantmen. One of the most maladroit blunders in American
diplomatic history, it revealed the immaturity and inherent confusion
of the President's policies.

The immediate background of the episode was the nearly successful
conclusion of the Lusitania negotiations and the generous guarantees
the German government gave regarding submarine operations in the
Mediterranean. All during January the Lusitania negotiations pro-
ceeded, the Imperial government refusing to admit the illegality of
the sinking and insisting on arbitration, the United States just as
stubbornly demanding an explicit admission of wrongdoing. Finally,
on January 25 the President threatened to break diplomatic relations
unless Germany gave in.

Then, moved by House's pleading to avoid a break, Wilson backed
down and indicated he would accept a "handsome apology" without
explicit disavowal. For their part, the Germans were ready to go to
any length except to admit the illegality of the destruction of the
Lusitania. The final German proposal, handed to Lansing on February
4, expressed regret at the loss of American lives, for which the Imperial
government assumed liability and offered to pay indemnity. It was the
maximum Germany could concede, Bethmann-Hollweg declared in
an unprecedented direct appeal to the American people. "I cannot
concede a humiliation of Germany and the German people, or the
wrenching of the submarine weapon from our hands." 23

And it was enough. As Lansing pointed out, the German concessions
came so close to meeting the American demand that the Imperial
government had surrendered in spirit if not in explicit language. More-
over, it was evident Congressional sentiment would never sanction a
rupture of relations over a semantic disagreement. On February 11,
therefore, Lansing, Vice-President Thomas R. Marshall, the chairman
of the House and Senate Foreign Relations committees, and Senator
Hoke Smith of Georgia answered Bethmann-Hollweg by assuring the
German people the United States sought only honorable friendship.

In this manner was a severe crisis settled, or would have been settled
had not the armed ship controversy arisen to revive old animosities
and create new tensions. During the first months of the war, long
before the submarine issue was raised, the State Department had issued
regulations classifying defensively armed merchant ships as peaceful
vessels. For almost a year the question of the status of armed ships was

23 New York World, Feb. 9, 1916.

DEVIOUS DIPLOMACY, 1915-16

207

quiescent, mainly because the British Admiralty did not begin arming
ships in the American trade until the late summer of 1915. The issue
was first raised in September, 1915, when an armed British steamer
entered the port of Norfolk and Lansing, for reasons that are not clear,
suggested changing the regulations. 24 This case was settled when the

Harper's Weekly, October 2, 1915

So sorry!

ship's guns were removed. In the following months, however, the issue
assumed larger proportions as the British and Italians began to arm
even passenger liners.

24 Lansing to Wilson, Sept. 12, 1915, Lansing Papers, I, 330-331. Lansing's
position was revealed to the British Cabinet, whose members became much
agitated lest the United States attempt to change international law during the
progress of the war. A. J. Balfour to House, Sept. 12, 1915, House Papers;
Horace Plunkett to House, Sept. 17, 1915, ibid. After reading the letters from
Balfour and Plunkett, Wilson commented: "The matter of armed merchant-
men is not so simple as Balfour would make it. It is hardly fair to ask Sub-
marine commanders to give warning by summons if, when they approach as
near as they must for that purpose they are to be fired upon. It is a question of
many sides and is giving Lansing and me some perplexed moments." Wilson to
House, Oct. 4, 1915, Baker Collection.

208 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

The matter came to a head when the Persia, an armed British liner,
was torpedoed in the Mediterranean on December 30, 1915, and when
armed Italian liners began to enter the port of New York. Lansing,
whose sense of fairness sometimes outran his strategic thinking, laid
the matter before the President on January 2, 1916. Since so-called
defensively armed merchant ships could destroy submarines, and since
many of them were under orders to attack submarines on sight, how
could the United States expect submarines to surface and give warning
before they attacked? Lansing asked. Moreover, should not armed
merchant ships entering American ports be dealt with as warships? On
the other hand, Lansing suggested a few days later, would it not be
possible to settle the whole submarine question if the Allies agreed to
disarm their merchant ships and the Germans, in turn, agreed to
observe the rules of cruiser warfare in all submarine operations against
merchant vessels?

Agreeing that Lansing's proposal was "reasonable, and thoroughly
worth trying," Wilson authorized the Secretary of State to undertake a
diplomatic campaign to obtain a revision of the rules. On January 18,
1916, therefore, Lansing issued to the Allied governments his proposal
for a new modus vivendi to govern maritime warfare. Repeating the
German argument that under modern conditions any armed merchant
ship was offensively armed, Lansing warned the Allies that the United
States was seriously considering treating armed merchantmen as
auxiliary cruisers and suggested that all merchant ships be disarmed,

In London Lansing's modus vivendi caused dismay and confusion.
Grey must have been sorely puzzled for, as he cabled Spring Rice on
January 25, the American government had proposed nothing less than
that "sinking of merchant vessels shall be the rule and not the excep-
tion." In short, the modus vivendi envisaged a change in international
law, during the course of the war, that would profoundly benefit Ger-
many. "It confronts us with a most serious situation," Grey added,
"which must of course be considered in consultation with our Allies." 26
On the same day, Grey called Ambassador Page to the Foreign Office.
"I have only once before seen Sir Edward so grave and disappointed,"
Page reported, "and that was when he informed me that the British
had sent the German Government an ultimatum." 26 House, too, at

25 Grey to Spring Rice, Jan. 25, 1916, handed to Lansing by Spring Rice,
Jan, 27, 1916, enclosed in Lansing to Wilson, Jan. 27, 1916, Wilson Papers;
also Grey to Spring Rice, Feb. 3, 1916, ibid.

26 Page added : "Then he asked me for House's address because, as I gath-

DEVIOUS DIPLOMACY, 1915-16 2OQ

once realized the disastrous consequences the modus vivendi was bound
to have and on February 14 cabled Lansing that it was extremely
urgent the proposal be held in abeyance. 27

Grey's and House's alarm at the modus vivendi was well founded.
Had the State Department insisted upon the proposed arrangement,
the British would have faced the fatal choice of either allowing their
vast merchant fleet to be sunk or defying the American government
and running the risk of an Anglo-American rupture. Moreover, House's
efforts looking toward the President's mediation would assuredly have
been blasted. No one realized these facts better than the Germans, who
must have been gleeful over this turn of events. On January 26 Lansing
saw the Austrian Charge, Baron Erich Zwiedinek, and told him confi-
dentially about the proposal of January 18. Zwiedinek replied that the
German and Austrian governments were contemplating issuing a
declaration of unrestricted warfare against armed ships; he wondered
if it would be wise to do this. Lansing replied that he thought the
sooner it were done the better the situation would be. 28

This, then, was the involved background of the armed ship contro-
versy that exploded soon afterward. Taking Lansing at his word, the
German government on February 10, 1916, announced that its sub-
marines would soon receive orders, to go into effect February 29, to
attack armed merchant ships without warning. 29 For several days

ered, he had talked with him at my table so frankly and freely about the rela-
tions of our two Governments that he thought he ought to inform House that
he [did not] then know that this proposal would come. He spoke as one speaks
of a great calamity. He said that he would not mention the subject in his
speech in the House of Commons to-morrow because the announcement that
such a proposal had been made by the United States would cause a storm that
would drive every other subject out of the mind of the House and of the
country." Paper Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1916,
Supplement (Washington, 1929), p. 151.

27 House to Lansing, Feb. 14, 1916, Lansing Papers, I, 342. Sir Horace
Plunkett presented the British view forcibly in talks with House on February
12, 13, and 14, 1916. The Diary of Kforace Plunkett, microfilm copy in pos-
session of Herbert Brayer, Evanston, 111., Feb. 12-14, 1916.

28 The Desk Diary of Robert Lansing, in the Library of Congress, Jan. 26,
1916; "Memorandum by the Secretary of State . . . February 9, 1916," Lan-
sing Papers, I, 341. Zwiedinek of course at once cabled this information to
Vienna and Berlin, except that he reported Lansing had said he would
"welcome" the Austro-German declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare
against armed merchant ships.

29 Gerard to Secretary of State, Feb. 10, 1916, Foreign Relations, 1916,
Supplement, p. 163; memorandum of the German government dated Feb. 8,

2IO WOODROW "WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

American newspapers predicted the State Department would approve
the new decree and warn Americans against traveling on armed ships.
Then, on February 15, Lansing startled the country by telling reporters
that although the Department believed the interests of humanity would
best be served by the disarming of merchant ships, none the less,
should the Allies reject the modus vivendi the United States would not
insist upon a change in the conventional rules. Nor would the United
States warn its citizens against traveling on ships armed defensively.
Moreover, on February 17 Lansing called Bernstorff to the Depart-
ment and informed him that, in view of the new submarine policy, the
American government could not accept the Lusitania note of February
16.

By this startling reversal the administration set off a new dispute
with Germany and an explosion in Congress. Although Wilson and
Lansing nowhere set in writing the explicit reasons for their abrupt
change of policy, those reasons can easily be inferred from other
evidence and from the circumstances. In the first place, Wilson and
Lansing had blundered in proposing the modus Vivendi because they
were desperately trying to avoid another showdown with Germany
over the submarine issue. 80 Wilson later admitted he had made a
serious mistake. Secondly, insistence upon the disarming of merchant
ships would have driven a deep wedge between the United States and
Great Britain and would have wrecked Wilson's mediation plan.
Wilson obviously did not consider these consequences when he allowed
Lansing to launch his bolt on January 18; but Grey and House made
them ominously apparent. Thirdly, the President executed his sudden
change of policy in order to restore his standing among the Allies as
neutral mediator. It was no mere coincidence the British leaders con-
sented to the possibility of Wilson's mediation on the same day the
President abandoned the ill-fated modus vivendL

Although the reasons for the reversal were sound, the administra-
tion's action had tragic consequences in Congress and the country at

1916, ibid., pp. 163-166. The Austrian government followed suit on February
10, 1916. , y

30 House_ recorded in his Diary, Mar. 7, 1916: "Spring-Rice told me what
Lansing said to the Italian Ambassador, an indiscretion of which I am sorry
Lansing was guilty. He told him that his purpose in proposing the disarming of
Allied merchantmen was to please Germany and get a favorable settlement of
the Lusitania controversy. This is exactly what Lansing and the President have
been charged with."

DEVIOUS DIPLOMACY, 1915-16 211

large. Completely ignorant of the President's peace move and of the
necessity for abandoning the modus vivendi, Congressional leaders
began for the first time to suspect Wilson was maneuvering to involve
the country in the war. Troubled and perplexed, Senate Majority
Leader John W. Kern, Chairman William J. Stone of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, and Chairman Hal D. Flood of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee went to the White House on Feb-
ruary 21, 1916. The Congressional leaders wanted to know what would
happen if a submarine without warning sank an armed ship upon
which Americans were traveling. Wilson replied that he would hold
Germany to strict account and that he would not compel the Allies to
disarm their merchantmen. At this Senator Stone, heretofore Wilson's
most loyal and admiring friend in the upper house, lost his temper.
Banging his fist on the table, he shouted: "Mr. President, would you
draw a shutter over my eyes and my intellect? You have no right to
ask me to follow such a course. It may mean war for my country." 31
News of the President's position was at once taken back to Congress.
"Flood told me today," a Texan wrote, "that Stone & Kern (& he
also) were afraid of an immediate break, & the two former thought
the President was almost determined on war." 32 At almost the same
time the Imperial Foreign Secretary announced publicly that Germany
would not recede from her new position. The result of the simul-
taneous declarations was to provoke an unprecedented panic in Con-
gress on February 23. Veteran congressmen said that not for many
years had they seen a situation so dramatic and sensational. The
Democratic members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee met
and agreed unanimously to demand prompt action on a resolution
already offered by Representative Jeff: McLemore of Texas, warning
Americans against traveling on armed belligerent ships. Although they

81 W. J. Stone to Wilson, Feb. 24, 1916, Wilson Papers, repeats the gist of
the conversation. The quotation is from The New York Times, Feb. 24, 1916.
Senator Thomas P. Gore told the Senate on March 2 that he "had it on good
authority" that Wilson had said war -with Germany might not necessarily be
undesirable, as American intervention might operate to bring the war to a
speedy conclusion. Charles G. Tansill, America Goes to War (Boston, 1938),
pp. 465466, uses Gore's statement (saying Gore got his information from
Stone) to reinforce the dubious thesis that Wilson was at this point seeking to
promote full-scale American intervention. Yet Wilson, Stone, and Flood all
denied emphatically that the President had in any way intimated he desired
American intervention. The New York Times, Mar. 3, 1916.

32 J. L. Slayden to O. G. Villard, Feb. 23, 1916, the Papers of Oswald
Garrison Villard, in Houghton Library, Harvard University.

2112 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

strongly favored the resolution, Speaker Clark and Majority Leader
Kitchin pleaded with their colleagues to take no action until they had
consulted with the President. Senator Stone, also, worked diligently to
prevent the impending revolt in the House.

Confronted with an uprising that threatened to wrest control of
foreign policy from his hands, the President struck back at his critics
in Congress. In an open letter to Stone, Wilson declared that of course
he would do his utmost to keep the country out of war. Even so, he
could not consent to the abridgment of the rights of American citizens,
and to bow to the German threat against armed ships would be a
"deliberate abdication of our hitherto proud position as spokesmen,
even amidst the turmoil of war, for the law and the right." Once
accept a single abatement of the right and "the whole fine fabric of
international law might crumble under our hands piece by piece." 33

The hysteria rapidly subsided after the publication of Wilson's
letter. At nine in the morning of February 25 the Democratic leaders
in the House, Clark, Kitchin, and Flood, visited the President to
inform him of sentiment in Congress. The McLemore resolution would
carry two to one, the Speaker announced, if members were -allowed to
vote on it. He intended to stand by his announced policy, Wilson
replied, in spite of Congressional resolutions. But what if an armed
ship were torpedoed with the loss of American lives? the congressmen
asked. He would break relations with the Central Powers, the Presi-
dent declared. What then? He had been told this might lead to war,
Wilson replied. What would be the effect of American intervention?
one of the congressmen asked. American participation might have the
effect of bringing the war to an end sooner than would otherwise be
the case, Wilson countered. But why should any man think he wanted
war? he added. His policies were the policies of peace, not of war. "In

33 Wilson to Stone, Feb. 24, 1916, printed in Ray S. Baker and William E.
Dodd (eds.), The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson (6 vols., New York, 1925-
27), The New Democracy, II, 122-124.

During the early evening of February 24 Tumulty wrote to Wilson suggesting
he write an identic letter to Chairmen Flood and Stone. This was necessary,
Tumulty added, because he had talked with Speaker Clark, Senator Key Pitt-
man, and Representative T. W. Sims, who had all warned that action on the
McLemore resolution could not be delayed much longer. Tumulty went on to
suggest what the President should say in the letter, and the phrases "the whole
fabric of international law" and "What we are contending for in this matter is
of the very essence of the things that have made America a sovereign nation* *
were Tumulty's. Tumulty to Wilson, Feb. 24, 1916, Wilson Papers.

DEVIOUS DIPLOMACY, 1915-16 213

God's name/ 9 he exclaimed, "could any one have done more than I
to show a desire for peace? 9 ' S4

Meanwhile, the McLemore resolution, warning Americans against
traveling on armed belligerent ships, was hanging like a sword over
Wilson's head, while Senator Thomas P. Gore of Oklahoma intro-
duced a similar resolution of warning in the upper house on February
25. It was an intolerable situation, for so long as these resolutions hung
fire no one knew who controlled the foreign policy of the United
States. With Burleson in command and brandishing the patronage
stick, administration leaders worked desperately to bring the Demo-
cratic members into line. On February 29, when he was certain of a
favorable vote, the President demanded that the Rules Committee
allow the House to vote on the McLemore resolution. Newspapers and
journals of opinion rushed to the President's defense, one of them de-

34 This was the celebrated "Sunrise Conference." The above is based upon
full accounts of the conference printed in The New York Times, Feb. 26 and
Mar. 3, 1916.

Five years after this meeting, Kitchin wrote an account for the journalist,
Gilson Gardner, that placed the date of the conference in early April, 1916.
Kitchin also recalled that Wilson had declared the time had come to put the
United States in the war and that Wilson desired Congressional co-operation in
achieving this objective. Gilson Gardner, "Why We Delayed Entering the War,"
McNaughfs Monthly, III (June, 1925), 171-173.

Alex M. Arnett, Claude Kitchin and the Wilson War Policies (Boston, 1937),
pp. 183-192, accepts Kitchin's version of the affair. C. C. Tansill, America
Goes to War, pp. 467, 485-486, disagrees with Kitchin and Arnett as to the
date of the conference; but Tansill quotes with seeming approval Kitchin's
statement that Wilson requested support for American intervention.

The time has come to clear away the misunderstanding about this important
event created by Professors Arnett and Tansill. As Ray S. Baker, Woodrow
Wilson: Life and Letters (8 vols., Garden City, N.Y., 1927-39), VI, 169, points
out, the date of the conference was February 25, 1916, not February 22, as
Tansill asserts. The meeting was no secret and was reported in some detail by
the newspapers on the following day, February 26. Moreover, there is not a
shred of reliable evidence that the President in any way intimated he desired
American participation in the war. Kitchin's memorandum is, therefore, entirely
untrustworthy. Tansill points out that at the time he wrote his memorandum
Kitchin was suffering from a severe stroke. Tansill asserts that Kitchin was
mistaken as to the date of the conference and admits that Kitchin's memory
might have been affected by the stroke. Yet Professor Tansill proceeds to quote
Kitchin's memorandum, in order to prove his own impossible thesis that Wilson
was actually maneuvering to get the country into the war.

It is remarkable that in his correspondence at the time, Kitchin never once
mentioned the President's alleged request. One thing, at least, is certain: if
Wilson had been moving to get a war resolution from Congress he would not
have divulged his plans to his bitter critics, Clark and Kitchin.

214 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

claring, "Whoever defends these resolutions defends German lawless-
ness against American rights and American honor." 85 The New York
World, moreover, published a series of documents, which were widely
reprinted, revealing that the German-American Alliance had been
conducting a powerful lobby to apply pressure on congressmen in
behalf of a foreign policy partial to the "Fatherland." 36

So overwhelming, in fact, was the apparent popular and editorial
support for the President that the wonder was his opposition did not
collapse entirely. The Senate, where Wilson had strong support among
Eastern Republicans like Lodge, voted first, on March 3, to table the
Gore resolution. 37 After more than a week's delay, during which time
Bryan rushed to the capital to bolster his discouraged followers, the
House came to the showdown. On March 7 ninety-three Republicans
joined with most of the Democrats in an emphatic vote, 276 to 142,
to stand by the President. 38 Wilson's support came chiefly from the
Atlantic states and the South. In contrast, the Middle West recorded
a majority against Wilson, with the delegations from Iowa, Nebraska,
Minnesota, and Wisconsin solidly arrayed.

In the meantime, the German government refused to rescind its
warfare against armed merchantmen, claiming it had in no manner
violated the Arabic pledge, as was true. The Foreign Office, moreover,
assured the State Department on February 28 that no armed liner
would be sunk "unless such armament is proved. 55 None the less, Lan-
sing pressed for a break and urged Wilson to accuse the Imperial gov-
ernment of violating its pledges. The President, however, apparently
refused to force a break over a dubious point and after the tabling of
the Gore and McLemore resolutions simply waited to see what events
would bring.

35 New York World, Mar. 3, 1916; also The New York Times, Mar. 7, 1916,
and Outlook, GXII (Mar. 8, 1916), 545-546.

36 New York World. Mar. 7, 1916.

37 By a last-minute maneuver Gore reversed his resolution, which originally
warned Americans against traveling on armed belligerent ships, to read that
the destruction of American lives on such ships would constitute a cause for
war. In this form the resolution was tabled sixty-eight to fourteen, although the
parliamentary situation was so confused many senators did not know what they
were voting for. The New York Times, Mar. 4, 1916.

38 The vote for and against tabling the resolution was as follows: in favor
of tabling, 182 Democrats, 93 Republicans, 1 Progressive; against tabling, 33
Democrats, 102 Republicans, 5 Progressives, 1 Independent, and 1 Socialist.
Ibid., Mar. 8, 1916.

DEVIOUS DIPLOMACY, 1915-16 215

The opportunity to force a final showdown with Germany over all
aspects of the submarine question soon came, with the torpedoing
without warning of the unarmed French Channel steamer Sussex on
March 24, with eighty casualties. Lansing was ready to break relations
at once, but Wilson moved with customary deliberateness. After first
denying a submarine had attacked the Sussex, on April 10 Von Jagow
admitted that a U-boat commander had sunk what he thought was
a warship in the English Channel on March 24, at the same spot
where the Sussex had been hit.

For days the President fought an agonizing struggle for the right
course to follow. Pressed by his wife, Lansing, and House either to
break relations immediately or else to issue an ultimatum, 39 he held
firm against warlike moves and drafted a note that left wide room for
future negotiation. In the end, however, Wilson gave in and followed
the counsel of his close advisers. The note that he drafted on April 16
and sent to Berlin two days later was an unequivocal denunciation of
the ruthless German campaign against all shipping, whether belligerent
or neutral, armed or unarmed. The United States had waited with
extraordinary patience; it was now painfully evident that the use of
submarines against merchant ships was "utterly incompatible with the
principles of humanity, the long-established and incontrovertible rights
of neutrals, and the sacred immunities of non-combatants." Unless the
Imperial government abandoned its relentless warfare against mer-
chant and passenger ships, therefore, the United States had no alterna-
tive but to sever relations with the German Empire. The following
day, April 19, 1916, Wilson went before a joint session and reiterated
his ultimatum.*

Published in the German press on April 22-23, Wilson's note caused
a wave of hot anger to sweep over the German people, most of whom
now believed the President was seeking to wrest from their govern-
ment's hands the one weapon that could bring the war to a speedy and
victorious conclusion. "We can no longer retreat," declared a Berlin

39 Lansing drafted a note denouncing Germany's "brutal," "inhuman," and
"lawless" submarine warfare, which Wilson rejected on the ground that it was
tantamount to a declaration of war. See Lansing's "Draft Instructions . . ."
and "Suggested Insertion . . .," Lansing Papers, I, 540-543; House Diary,
Apr. 11, 1916, gives an account of House's and Mrs. Wilson's talks with the
President.

40 Lansing to Gerard, Apr. 18, 1916, Foreign Relations, 1916, Supplement,
pp. 232-234; The New York Times, Apr. 20, 1916.

2l6 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

newspaper, "but rather must use the freedom which the enemy has
given us to conduct unlimited submarine warfare, with consideration
for no one." 41 The moderate editors were angry, too, but they con-
tinued to urge calmness and to deprecate the idea of war with the
United States.

Wilson's ultimatum also sharpened the struggle over submarine
policy then going on between the military and naval leaders and the
civilian heads of government in Germany. Since the beginning of the
year, the heads of the War and Navy departments had been pressing
hard for unrestricted submarine warfare, even at the cost of war with
the United States. 42 Arguing that such policy would inevitably bring
America into the war, Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg had stead-
fastly resisted this strong pressure and had brought the Emperor to his
side. 43 One concession, however, had been made to the navy, that
hereafter all belligerent merchant ships in the war zone, whether
armed or unarmed, should be sunk without warning. 44 Thinking the
Sussex was either a troopship or a merchantman, and acting under the
new orders, the commander of the U-29 had torpedoed the Sussex.

Wilson's demands, therefore, compelled the German rulers to calcu-
late whether American friendship was worth an abandonment, not
only of the campaign against armed ships, but also of the unrestricted
campaign against belligerent merchantmen in the war zone. Beth-
mann-Hollweg and the Foreign Office were still desperately anxious to
avert war. In spite of the mounting pressure applied by his military
and naval chieftains, on May 1 the Emperor announced his submis-
sion to the President's demands, even if that meant abandoning sub-
marine activity altogether in the war zone. 45

^Tdglische Rundschau, morning ed., Apr. 23, 1916; also Morgenpost
(Berlin), Apr. 23, 1916; Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger, morning ed., Apr. 23, 1916;
Germania (Berlin), Apr. 23, 1916; Vossische Zeitung (Berlin), morning ed.,
Apr. 23, 1916; Frankfurter &itung, 2d morning ed, Apr. 23, 1916; Kolnische
Zeitung, 2d morning ed., Apr. 23, 1916,

42 "Report ... of Imperial Chancellor v. Bethmann-Hollweg," Jan. 4,
1916; Chief of Admiralty Staff, Von Holtzendorff, to Bethmann-Hollweg, Jan.
7, 1916; Von Tirpitz to Bethmann-Hollweg, Feb. 13, 1916; Chief of General
Staff, Von Falkenhayn, to Bethmann-Hollweg, Feb. 13, 1916, all printed in
Official German Documents Relating to the World War (2 vols., New York,
1923), II, 1116-1130.

43 Bethmann-Hollweg to Von Jagow, Mar, 5, 1916, ibid., pp. 1139-1142.

44 Admiralty Order of Mar, 13, 1916, cited in Tansill, America Goes to War,
p. 491.

45 Arno Spindler, La Guerre Sous-Marine (Ren6 Jouan, trans., 3 vols., Paris,

DEVIOUS DIPLOMACY, 1915-16 217

Dated May 4, the German reply admitted that U-boat commanders
had recently been waging unrestricted warfare against belligerent mer-
chant ships in the war zone. But it conceded Wilson's minimum
demand by announcing that hereafter submarines would observe the
rules of visit and search before sinking merchant vessels, both within
and outside the war zone. The note, however, was truculent, almost
insolent, in tone and ended with the threat that if the United States
did not compel the British to observe international law, "the German
Government would then be facing a new situation in which it must
reserve itself complete liberty of decision." German editors agreed
their government had gone the extreme limit, and that it was now in-
cumbent upon the United States to bring Britain to book. 46

In America reaction to the German reply was sharply divided. A
few bellicose editors suggested rejecting it altogether, 47 while many
moderate journals resented its accusatory tone. However, the rank and
file, especially in the Middle West and South and among the German-
Americans, hailed the German note with unalloyed relief as a victory
for the United States that precluded even the possibility of a war they
desperately wanted to avoid. As the President shared this desire for
peace, he, too, regarded the German reply as a welcome surrender to
his long-standing demand. When Lansing tried to warn him that the
note had all the appearances of a " 'gold brick' swindle, with a de-
cidedly insolent tone," he at first ignored the admonition and drafted
a reply expressing gratification and accepting the German promises.
Wilson finally eliminated the paragraph expressing gratification, how-
ever. His note, sent to Berlin May 8, simply accepted the German con-
cessions, warned that friendly relations would depend upon a scrupu-
lous observance of them, and declared the United States could not

1933-35), III, 191-197, is the best account of the German deliberations during
the Sussex crisis. The Emperor still believed the navy was not strong enough
to institute an effective blockade. Only two months before he had declared that
the U-boat forces "were insufficient to overcome England; that as a matter of
fact England could not be overcome." Bethmann-Hollweg to Von Jagow, Mar.
5, 1916, Official German Documents, II, 1142.

46 E.g., Kolnische geitung, evening ed., May 5, 1916; Frankfurter eitung f
evening ed., May 5, 1916; Vossische geitung (Berlin), evening ed., May 5,
1916.

47 The New York Tribune, quoted in New York World, May 6, 1916, for
example, declared the President had no choice left but to sever relations imme-
diately. See also Providence Evening Journal, Louisville Courier- Journal, Louis-
ville Times, Atlanta Journal, Philadelphia Record, Philadelphia Evening Bulle-
tin, all cited in New York World, May 6, 1916.

2l8 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

accept the conditions upon which the German concessions had been
made.* 8

The passing of this great crisis marked a major turning point in
American attitudes and policies toward the war. As the months passed
and no incident occurred to mar German-American relations, Ameri-
can opinion toward Germany softened perceptibly. This changing
attitude was reflected on all sides in the press and in the comments of
public leaders. It was reflected even more significantly, however, in
the consequent hardening of American attitudes toward the British
and the nearly disastrous worsening of official Anglo-American rela-
tions that occurred during the spring and summer of 1916.

A hardening of popular attitudes toward Great Britain was inevi-
table after the Sussex settlement focused attention on alleged British
wrongdoing. Thus, no sooner had the Sussex notes been exchanged
than there arose demands for stern action, now against the British.
This was, however, only the beginning, for events following hard upon
the Sussex settlement provoked hostility against the British govern-
ment and widened the gulf between the two countries. First came the
Irish Rebellion of April 24, 1916, which the British authorities sup-
pressed so ruthlessly that even Anglophiles in America were shocked. 49
Next occurred the trial and execution of the leaders of the Rebellion,
including the Irish nationalist, Sir Roger Casement, who had come
from Germany to lead the revolt. The Senate of the United States
formally petitioned the British government to spare the Irish prisoners,
but the appeal merely exacerbated mutual bitterness. As the best
American journal of opinion put it, "The Dublin executions have done
more to drive America back to isolation than any other event since the
war began." 50 Finally, as the British intensified further their economic
warfare^ the movement in the United States for outright retaliation
grew stronger than at any time since the beginning of the war.

The worsening of official Anglo-American relations was, if anything,
even more evident than the change in popular attitudes. Certainly it
had more serious consequences, for the President's heart so hardened
against the British that before the year had ended he regarded the

48 Secretary of State to Gerard, May 8, 1916, Foreign Relations, 1916, Supple-
ment, p. 263.

^ For a moving protest by a shocked Anglophile, see William Dean Howells
to the Editor, May 6, 1916, New York Evening Post, May 8, 1916.

*> New Republic, VII (July 29, 1916), 321-322.

DEVIOUS DIPLOMACY, 1915-16

Allies with suspicion, almost contempt, and was contemplating the
possibility of a sympathetic alliance with Germany. 51

This momentous change in Wilson's attitude had many causes, but
the most important was probably Sir Edward Grey's refusal to allow
the President to set the machinery of mediation in motion. The House-
Grey memorandum of February 22, 1916, to be sure, had made it plain
that the final decision rested with the British Cabinet. But Grey had
given House rather definite verbal assurances that Wilson's mediation
would be welcomed in the late summer or early autumn. During April
and months following, House pleaded with Grey to consent to media-
tion on the basis of the memorandum of February 22. House warned
explicitly that dire consequences would follow an Allied rejection, but
each time Grey evaded the request. Emboldened by the failure of the
German attack on the French fortress of Verdun and the apparent
success of the great British offensive beginning July 1, 1916, the Allies
grew more and more confident of their ability to defeat Germany on
the battlefield. 52 Moreover, it was evident that Grey sincerely doubted
the President's ability to bring the United States into the war if the
proposed peace conference should fail. In late August, therefore, Sir
Edward had to come out flatly and tell House a peace conference could
not yet be held, 53

As it became evident that the British and French leaders would
allow the President's mediation only if their hopes of victory were
shattered beyond recall, the attitude of Wilson and House became in-
creasingly recriminatory, even hostile. Wilson made it plain that

51 See below, pp. 252-253, 255-257.

52 As Grey pointed out in a memorandum for the Cabinet in the autumn of
1916, "Nothing but the defeat of Germany can make a satisfactory end to this
war and secure future peace." However, he added, if an absolute victory could
not be won, then Wilson's mediation would be desirable. Grey, Twenty-Five
Years, II, 131-133. The British military leaders were confident they could
deliver a decisive blow against the German lines in 1916. Wilson's mediation,
therefore, would not be considered until the success or failure of this impending
British offensive was demonstrated.

53 For the important correspondence between House and Grey see House to
Grey, Apr. 7, May 10, 11, 19, 23, 27, June 8, July 15, 1916; Grey to House,
Apr. 7, 8, May 12, 29, June 28, Aug. 28, 1916, all in House Papers.

Looking back over these events. Grey concluded that the Germans had made
a fatal mistake in not joining with the President in a drive for a reasonable
peace. He also acknowledged that the Allies, by rejecting Wilson's leadership,
had missed a great opportunity to save the Western community from the dire
consequences of a prolongation of the war. Grey, Twenty-Five Years, II, 135-
137.

22O WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

Britain would have to either consent to mediation or else expect stern
efforts by the United States to protect its maritime rights. Later he
resolved to cut loose from the Allies altogether and to issue his own
peace demand at the right time. For his part. House began to criticize
Allied "selfishness" and "ingratitude"; to tell himself, and probably the
President also, that the trouble was the Allies did not want a reason-
able settlement; and even to advise Wilson that he might have to ap-
peal directly to the British and French peoples, over the heads of
their governments.

The really dangerous tension in official Anglo-American relations
came, however, when the British tightened their economic warfare
and moved directly and indirectly to bring all neutral trade and ship-
ping under their control. When the British and French seized and
examined parcels in the American mails, for example, Lansing ob-
jected in language that betrayed the administration's growing anger.
"The Government of the United States . . . can no longer tolerate
the wrongs which citizens of the United States have suffered and con-
tinue to suffer through these methods," the note concluded. "To sub-
mit to a lawless practice of this character would open the door to
repeated violations of international law by the belligerent powers." 54
The mails dispute was never settled and continued to rankle. But the
event that had spectacular consequences was the British government's
attempt to extend its economic warfare directly to the United States
and Latin America by the publication on July 19, 1916, of a "black-
list" of 87 American and some 350 Latin American firms, with whom
British subjects were forbidden to deal in any way. 55

To Wilson, the publication of the "blacklist" came as the culmina-
tion of a series of British indignities. "I am seriously considering asking
Congress to authorize me to prohibit loans and restrict exportations to
the Allies," he advised House. ". . . Polk [Counselor of the State De-
partment] and I are compounding a very sharp note. I may feel
obliged to make it as sharp and final as the one to Germany on the

54 Lansing to Spring Rice and Jusserand, May 24, 1916, Foreign Relations,
1916, Supplement, pp. 604-608.

55 British spokesmen correctly claimed that the "blacklist" was a lawful
attempt to forbid British subjects to give aid to the enemy. On the other hand,'
American officials asserted that the practical effect of the measure was to put
the proscribed firms entirely out of business, because British shipping would be
denied them and because the balance of American and other neutral firms
would refuse to do business with them, for fear of being put on the "blacklist"
themselves. See The New York Times, July 19, 20, 22, 24, 1916; New York
World, July 21, 23, 1916.

DEVIOUS DIPLOMACY, 1915-16 221

submarines." Publicly the President declared that the "blacklist" had
"got on his nerves"; privately he called the British leaders "poor
boobs." 56 Although the note of protest that Wilson and Frank L. Polk,
Counselor of the State Department, sent to London on July 26 was not
the ultimatum Wilson had threatened, it was ominous in tone and
harsh in language, forecasting grave consequences if the British gov-
ernment persisted in their attacks on American commerce. 57

That the President's wrath was mounting was evidenced in a way
that threatened to bring the United States and Britain to a parting of
the ways. At the beginning of the "blacklist" dispute, Acting Secretary
of State Polk had warned the British Ambassador that Wilson was
considering retaliatory measures. And when the British refused to
withdraw the "blacklist" and the Foreign Office failed to reply
promptly to the American note of July 26 3 58 Wilson moved swiftly to
obtain from Congress a means of redress. 59 An amendment to the
Shipping Act of September 7 empowered the President to refuse clear-
ance to any vessel refusing to carry the freight of a blacklisted Ameri-
can citizen. More important, however, were amendments to the
Revenue Act adopted the following day, which authorized the Presi-
dent to deny clearance and port facilities to ships of any nation that
discriminated unfairly against American commerce, and to use the
armed forces to enforce these provisions.

There was, of course, a vast difference between enacting such legis-
lation and using it, but the significant fact was that the administration
had taken leadership in providing retaliatory recourses which, if used,
might deal the Allied cause a death blow. Indeed, friends of the Allies
were shocked by the hardening of Wilson's attitude and by the con-
comitant severity with which the British were being dealt. Lansing
sensed the danger that the President's resentment would lead him to
retaliation and shuddered at the prospect of his government's aligning
itself on the German side. 60

56 Wilson to House, July 23, 1916, Baker Collection; The New York Times*
July 25, 1916; Wilson to House, July 27, 1916, Baker Collection.

57 Polk to Page, July 26, 1916, Foreign Relations, 1916, Supplement, pp.
421-422.

58 The British reply was not sent until October 12, 1916. Ibid., pp. 461-465.
89 The fact that Wilson took the initiative in obtaining retaliatory legislation

is evidenced in the Diary of Frank L. Polk in the Library of Yale University,
July 26, 1916; Lansing to Wilson, Aug. 26, 1916, the Papers of Albert S.
Burleson, in the Library of Congress; Lansing Desk Diary, Aug. 29, 30, 31,
Sept. 6, 7, 8, 1916.

60 "The President's Attitude Toward Great Britain and Its Dangers," Lansing
Diary, Sept., 1916.

222 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

Wilson's change of attitude was a crushing blow, however, to Walter
Page, who carne to Washington in August, 1916, to have full-dress
conferences, he thought, on the British situation. Nothing better illus-
trated the changed atmosphere in Washington than the reception
accorded this distinguished champion of Anglo-American friendship.
From August 17 to September 25 Page had five conferences with Lan-
sing; but Lansing was mindful of Wilson's hostility to Page and would
talk of nothing but complaints against the British government. "I have
tried in vain to inform the Secretary of the larger view of the subject,"
Page recorded in his Diary; "he changes the topic of conversation and
discusses some technicality or some 'case.' " 61 Wilson invited the Am-
bassador to lunch the day after he arrived and on August 29, but on
both occasions other guests were present and Wilson refused to talk
about the war. On September 22, five weeks after he had arrived in
the United States, Page finally obtained a private interview with the
President. What Wilson told him only deepened Page's despair. "The
President] said to me that when the war began he and all the men he
met were in hearty sympathy with the Allies; but that now the senti-
ment toward England had greatly changed. He saw no one who was
not vexed and irritated at the arbitrary English course." 62

To such a state had Anglo-American relations come, therefore, by
the autumn of 1916. The favorable settlement of the submarine con-
troversy had practically eliminated the German-American tension and
focused American resentment on the British maritime system. This
resentment had hardened into bitterness and near hostility as a result
of the rejection of Wilson's offer of mediation, the ruthless suppression
of the Irish Rebellion, and the intensification of Britain's economic
warfare. The fact that the nation was in the throes of a presidential
campaign prevented Wilson either from using his new retaliatory
powers or from launching an independent peace campaign. But he
stood ready, if sustained by the people, to embark upon a bold policy,
portentous for the United States and the world a policy of genuinely
neutral mediation.

61 The Diary of Walter H. Page, in Houghton Library, Harvard University,
n.d.

* 2 Ibid., n.d. For an extended discussion see Burton J. Hendrick, The Life
and Letters of Walter H. Page (3 vols., Garden City, N.Y., 1924-26), II, 148-
188.

CHAPTER 9

Progressivism and Peace:
The Campaign of 1916

NOT SINCE 1910 had the American political scene seemed so
confused as at the beginning of 1916, when both major parties
began to lay plans for the coming presidential election. The Republi-
cans were slowly recovering from the great rupture of four years before.
Theodore Roosevelt was now back in the G.O.P. in all but name, but
no one could predict whether the great body of Progressives would
follow their erstwhile leader. Nor could any man forecast the policies
the Republican party might unite upon, for Republicans were, if any-
thing, more divided than their opponents on the great issues of the
day.

The Democrats^ too, were rent by factionalism and conflict over
policies. The President's preparedness program had antagonized a
large body of progressives and rural voters, and there were rumors of
an impending revolt of the pacifist element, under Champ Clark's
leadership. 1 More important, Bryan was in a rebellious mood, angered
by Wilson's stand on preparedness and the armed ship issue, and
threatening to disrupt the party if the President made further warlike
moves.. "I have been amazed at the slush he [Wilson] has been pouring
out upon the West," Bryan wrote at the time of Wilson's preparedness
tour. ". . . It is disturbing to see our party's chances of success de-

i-The New York Times, Jan. 26, 1916; especially Chicago Herald, Feb. 28,
1916. Clark, however, hotly denied these charges. See Clark to Wilson, Mar.
10, 1916, the Woodrow Wilson Papers, in the Library of Congress.

223

224 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

stroyed and the country's peace menaced by one in whom we had such
great hope. If I find that his purpose is to drag this nation into this
war I may feel it my duty to oppose his nomination." 2

As it turned out, however, these were momentary alarms that quickly
vanished once the Sussex crisis and the controversies over the defense
bills were settled. All Democrats knew they could win only under
Wilson's leadership and that revolt would merely insure a Republican
victory. Looking at the election returns of 1912, moreover, Wilson and
his party leaders realized they could convert the Democratic minority
of 1912 into a majority in 1916 only if they won over a large number
of former Progressives.

But how could these Progressives be lured into the Democratic
camp? The answer was so obvious most commentators took it for
granted. The administration would have to convince Progressives that
the Democratic party was an acceptable vehicle of reform of the kind
they wanted; that it had, once and for all, cast off the doctrines of
laissez-faire and state rights that had heretofore shackled it. Thus far
Wilson had either thwarted or failed to support the advanced progres-
sive objectives, like rural credits and child labor legislation, woman
suffrage, and other economic and social legislation. Could he now
reverse himself and sponsor such dynamic measures of domestic
reform?

Those observers who predicted the President would adhere stub-
bornly to New Freedom concepts did not well understand Woodrow
Wilson. He had broad political principles, to be sure; but he was no
inflexible dogmatist on methods or details. As he thought the Demo-
cratic party offered the only hope of constructive, progressive change,
he believed his party's most important task was to stay in power.
Nowhere did he come out and say that his desire to maintain the
Democrats in power was responsible for the commitment he made to
advanced progressivism in 1916. Yet he became almost a new political
creature, and under his leadership a Democratic Congress enacted the

2 Bryan to Josephus Daniels, Feb. 4, 1916, the Papers of Josephus Daniels, in
the Library of Congress. See also Bryan to Claude Kitchin, c. Feb. 5, 1916,
the Papers of Claude Kitchin, in the Library of the University of North Car-
olina; Bryan to Burleson, Mar. 8, 1916, the Papers of Albert S. Burleson, in the
Library of Congress; David Lawrence, in New York Evening Post, Feb. 15,
1916 ; the Diary of Edward M. House, in the Papers of Edward M. House, in the
Library of Yale University, Mar. 7, 1916, in which House recorded Wilson's
fear that Bryan would bolt.

PROGRESSIVISM AND PEACE: THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 225

most sweeping and significant progressive legislation in the history of
the country up to that time.

The first public sign of the new departure was Wilson's nomination,
on January 28, of Louis D. Brandeis to the Supreme Court. 3 It was an
open defiance of and a personal affront to the masters of capital as
well as to conservative Republicans like Taft. Nor was the significance
of the appointment lost upon rejoicing progressives and labor leaders.
"The appointment . . . tends to restore faith in President Wilson,"
the single-tax oracle declared, 4 while Senator La Follette gladly
acknowledged the people's debt to the President for a courageous act. 5
As the forces of privilege mustered all their resources to prevent
Brandeis' confirmation, and as the President took up the gage, publicly
defending the champion of social justice and throwing the whole force
of the administration behind the nominee, the battle became a test of
strength between conservatives and progressives. After a grueling
struggle the administration won on June I. 6 "The confirmation of Mr.
Brandeis is an important mile-stone in the progress of the republic,"
one progressive asserted. "For the first time within my knowledge the
vested interests have gone out to defeat an important nomination, and
after using every possible source have been soundly beaten." 7

A second major test of the President's attitude involved the much
controverted rural credits bill, which he had blocked in 1914 and 1915
and which seemed certain to become an important issue in the im-
pending campaign. 8 The sponsors of the Hollis-Bulkley bill, Senator
Henry F. Hollis and Representative A. F. Lever, decided to make one
last appeal to Wilson to support the provision for federal underwriting

8 Attorney General Thomas W. Gregory strongly urged Brandeis* nomination,
as did certain independent progressive leaders.

*The Public, XIX (Feb. 4, 1916), 97.

5 R. M. La Follette, "Brandeis," La Follette* 's Magazine, VIII (Feb., 1916),
1-2; also Amos Pinchot to Norman Hapgood, c. Jan. 29, 1916, Wilson Papers;
several hundred letters of approval from civic and labor leaders in Box 522,
File VI, ibid.; "A Secret!" Harper's Weekly, LXII (Feb. 12, 1916), 145;
Collier's, LVI (Feb. 26, 1916), 14; Springfield Republican, Apr. 4, 1916.

6 There is a splendid account of this battle in Alpheus T. Mason, Brandeis:
A Free Man's Life (New York, 1946), pp. 465-508.

7 H. F. Hollis to E. F. McClennen, June 7, 1916, the Papers of Louis D.
Brandeis, in the Law School Library of the University of Louisville.

18 As the secretary of the American Rural Credits Association, Frank G.
Odell, warned on January 9, 1916: "The support of the farmers, which would
be engaged by rural credit legislation, is necessary to the Democratic Party in
the Middle West." The New York Times, Jan. 10, 1916.

226 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

of the proposed system. They were willing. Lever told Wilson and
Secretary Houston at a White House conference in late January, 1916,
to reduce the amount of federal farm bonds the government might
have to buy to $250,000 for each of the proposed twelve federal farm
loan banks. "I have only one criticism of Lever's proposition," the
President replied, "and that is that he is too modest in the amount."
Then and there it was agreed the government should establish and
operate the farm loan banks and provide an initial capital of $500,000
for each of them.

From that day on, the rural credits bill had the full support of the
administration. Denounced by radicals because it did not go far
enough, castigated by conservatives as a dangerous socialistic measure
and as "class legislation, using the public resources to do for some what
is not done for others," it none the less passed the Senate on May 4
and the House on May 15 almost unanimously and became law on
July 17.* Thus the Democratic campaigners had ample opportunity to
appear as friends of the farmer in the presidential campaign of this
year.

The great social justice movement also came to its first legislative
culmination, on the national level, in this year of the new progressive
dispensation, but not before the President virtually bludgeoned his
party leaders into allowing the necessary measures to pass. 10 Then sud-
denly the log jam was broken. Under administration pressure, the
Kern-McGillicuddy bill, a model workmen's compensation measure for
federal employees drafted by the American Association for Labor
Legislation, was resurrected and passed by Congress on August 19 and
quickly signed. Even more astonishing was the manner in which
Wilson forced the passage of the Keating-Owen child labor bill. This
measure, the special project of the National Child Labor Committee,
passed the House on February 2, with only a few dissenting votes from
Southern textile states. Then the bill languished in the Senate, where

9 Only a handful of urban votes were cast against the bill. The vote in the
Senate was 58 to 5, in the House, 295 to 10.

10 Stymied time and again by the administration's refusal to support their
measures, the leaders of this important segment of independent opinion were
growing restive by the spring of 1916. John B. Andrews to L. D. Brandeis, May
17, June 1, 1916, Brandeis Papers; A. O. Lovejoy to C. Kitchin, June 3, 1916,
Kitchin Papers. Their suspicion that the administration was not sincere in its
professions of support seemed borne out when Wilson and Congressional leaders
agreed, on March 24, 1916, on a legislative schedule that made no provision
for the social justice bills. The New York Times, Mar. 25, 1916.

PROGRESSIVISM AND PEACE: THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 22J

it would have died had not political exigencies demanded decisive
presidential action. Before July 17 Wilson had said not a word in sup-
port of the bill. On July 17 the Democratic liaison with the social
workers warned the President that the independent progressives con-
sidered the Keating-Owen bill a test of the administration's pro-
gressivism and that the Democrats might stand or fall on this issue.
The following day, July 18, Wilson went to the Capitol, pleaded with
the Democratic Senate leaders to allow the measure to come to a vote,
and warned that the fortunes of their party depended upon prompt
and favorable action. After much grumbling, the obstructive Southern-
ers gave in and the measure was adopted on August 8 and signed by
the President on September 1, "with real emotion," he said.

Nor was this all, though it represented perhaps the high peak of
Wilsonian progressivism. 11 The movement to give the Filipinos a
larger measure of autonomy, perhaps independence, the product of
years of anti-imperialistic, progressive agitation, also came to fruition
in 1916. Wilson had early endorsed the bill sponsored by Representa-
tive William A. Jones of Virginia to give self-government at once and
full independence within a short time to the Philippines. Then, under
pressure from Republicans, Catholics, and the War Department, the
President had reversed himself on the question of independence and
had helped to shape a new Jones bill drafted by the Bureau of Insular
Affairs, which gave legislative autonomy and a larger measure of ad-
ministrative control to the Filipinos, but reserved final sovereignty to
the United States and made no definite promises about independence.

11 The child labor law forbade the shipment in interstate commerce of goods
manufactured in whole or in part by children under fourteen, of products of
mines and quarries involving the labor of children under sixteen, and of any
products manufactured by children under sixteen employed more than eight
hours a day. Many Southerners opposed the measure out of the conviction, until
recently shared by Wilson, that the bill represented an unconstitutional invasion
of the police power of the states. The National Association of Manufacturers
also opposed the bill, not because they favored child labor, but because they
realized the bill was merely the beginning of a new federal regulation under
the commerce cause, as the spokesman in Washington of the N.A.M. wrote, "of
any commodity produced in whole or part by the labor of men or women who
work more than eight hours, receive less than a minimum wage, or have not
certain educational qualifications." James A. Emery to W. H. Taft, Apr. 4,
1916, the Papers of William Howard Taft, in the Library of Congress.

In 1918 the Supreme Court, in Hammer v. Dagcnhart, 274 U.S., 251, de-
clared this child labor law unconstitutional. The Court declared that the pur-
pose of the law was not to regulate commerce, but to regulate the labor of
children, which fell solely within the competence of the states.

228 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

This revised Jones bill passed the House on October 14, 1914, but
Republicans easily blocked it in the Senate during the hectic short ses-
sion of 1914-15. The measure could not be delayed for long, however.
In complete control of the Senate, the anti-imperialists on February 4,
1916, adopted the Jones bill with the so-called Clarke amendment,
promising independence to the Filipinos by March 4, 1921. The coun-
try expected an automatic approval by the House. But the Catholic
hierarchy in the United States, fearful that an independent Philippines
might confiscate church property, 12 brought enormous pressure to bear
upon the Catholic membership of the House against the Clarke
amendment. 13 On May 1, therefore, thirty Catholic Democrats joined
with the Republicans and defeated the amendment, and the bill as
passed and signed by Wilson lacked any definite promise of independ-
ence, although it did greatly enlarge the liberties of the Philippine
peoples.

Finally, as if to make his new program complete and his bid for
support all inclusive, Wilson capitulated also to the mounting demands
of business organizations for a tariff commission, 14 antidumping legis-
lation, 15 and legislation allowing Americans engaged in the export

12 The Catholic position was ably and candidly set forth by the representatives
of the Philippine hierarchy in Washington, in W. N. Kinkaid to Wilson, Feb.
11, 1916, Wilson Papers.

13 William H. Taft, who had been on intimate terms with American Catholic
leaders since the time when he was Governor General of the Philippines, was a
key figure in marshaling Catholic opposition to the Clarke amendment. For his
negotiations with Cardinals Gibbons and O'Connell, see Taft to J. Cardinal
Gibbons, Jan. 11, 16, 1916, and Gibbons to Taft, Jan. 12, 1916, all in Taft
Papers; also The New York Times, Apr. 27, 28, 1916; New York World, Apr.
29, 1916.

14 As late as August 27, 1915, Wilson had steadfastly opposed the establish-
ment of a tariff commission, which Roosevelt and the Progressives had ad-
vocated in 1912. But the demands of the business groups were so overwhelming
that Wilson finally gave in and on January 24, 1916, came out in favor of a
strong, independent, and nonpartisan commission, which would allegedly work
to remove the tariff issue from politics. Wilson to C. Kitchin, Jan. 24, 26, 1916,
printed in The New York Times, Jan. 27, 1916. Because it represented such a
radical departure from traditional Democratic policies, Kitchin refused to
sponsor the tariff commission bill in the House. Leadership in putting the bill
through fell, therefore, to Representative Henry T. Rainey of Illinois. The
measure was incorporated as a part of the Revenue Act of 1916.

15 Especially alarmed were American chemical and dye manufacturers, who
feared the German chemical trust would resume its destructive competition once
the war had ended. On January 4, 1916, Secretary Redfield presented an anti-
dumping measure (Redfield to Wilson, Jan. 4, 1916, Wilson Papers) that
McAdoo roundly condemned as a Republican device (W. G. McAdoo, "Confi-

PROGRESSIVISM AND PEACE: THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 229

trade to combine. 16 In making these concessions to the business com-
munity, Wilson in effect reversed the historic Democratic policy 17
and put the government at the service of American businessmen. 18
There was no reason why he should not have done this, to be sure., but
the point was he had espoused the very program of co-operation be-
tween business and government that Theodore Roosevelt had proposed
in 1912 and that he, Wilson, had then strongly condemned. A few
Democratic leaders, who prized the old Democratic tariff principles,
rebelled and uttered futile protests, but most Democrats followed the
President.

The significance of the astonishing metamorphosis in Democratic
policies that occurred during the summer of 1916 was apparent to all
observers. Regardless of the motivation behind Wilson's commitment
to advanced doctrines, the fact was the Democratic Congressional
majority had, by the fall of 1916, enacted almost every important
plank in the Progressive platform of 1912. Wilson, therefore, could
affirm that Democrats were also Progressives, and Democratic cam-

dential Memorandum for the President," Jan. 14, 1916, ibid.). Soon afterward
a representative of the dye manufacturers conferred with the President and
urged the importance of sizable tariff protection for the infant dye industry
(Andrew C. Imbrie, "Memorandum of talk with President Wilson, March 8th,
1916," the Ray Stannard Baker Collection, in the Library of Congress), and
this was the instrumentality finally agreed upon and included in the Revenue
Act of September, 1916.

18 Wilson and the administration strongly supported the Webb bill to amend
the antitrust laws so as to allow manufacturers engaged in the export trade to
combine for purposes of selling abroad. The bill was not passed, however, until
1918.

17 That the President had gone over to the protectionist principle was pub-
licly evidenced when he wrote the president of the Illinois Manufacturers' As-
sociation: "It ought to be possible by such [nonpartisan] means to make the
question of duties merely a question of progress and development, a question of
adapting means to ends, of facilitating and helping business and employing to
the utmost the resources of the country in a vast development of our business
and enterprise." Wilson to S. M. Hastings, July 28, 1916, Wilson Papers.

18 Wilson proposed, among other things, to use the resources of the govern-
ment to gather information and statistics, to help businessmen find new markets
abroad, and to assist trade associations in standardizing products and eliminating
cut-throat competition. He outlined this program in an address before the
United States Chamber of Commerce, February 10, 1916, The New York
Times, Feb. 11, 1916; see also L. Ames Brown, "Preparedness for Peace, an
Authorized Statement of President Wilson's Plans," Collier's, LVIII (Sept. 16,
1916), 12-13, and Wilson to Edward N. Hurley, May 12, 1916, printed in Ray
S. Baker and William E. Dodd (eds.), The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson
(6 vols., New York, 1925-27), The New Democracy, II, 167-168.

230 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

paigners could espouse the cause of social justice with mounting fervor.
Whether this acceptance of the New Nationalism signified a funda-
mental change in Democratic philosophy, or whether it was executed
solely for expediency's sake, no man could tell. In any event, on the
surface, at least, progressivism had come momentarily to fruition and
had found acceptance by one of the major parties. And the future of
American politics would be profoundly altered by this fact. 19

While the Democrats were writing into legislation the nationalistic,
progressive program of 1916, their opponents were floundering in a sea
of confusion and conflicting counsels. For months Theodore Roosevelt
had waged a strenuous campaign for strong action against Mexico and
Germany; and when Elihu Root and Henry Cabot Lodge took up the
theme in important political speeches in February and March, it
seemed almost certain the Republicans would make Wilson's Mexican
policy, his failure to protest the violation of Belgium, and his weak
and futile defense of American rights on the seas their chief points of
attack during the presidential campaign. 20

Or so it seemed at the beginning of the preconvention campaign.
But Republican leaders like Taft protested that the G.O.P. was head-
ing straight for disaster if it nominated Roosevelt on a war platform.
A series of startling developments soon demonstrated, moreover, that
the Eastern interventionists did not speak for the Republican rank and
file, even of their own section. The action of a majority of the Re-
publican representatives and of an almost solid Midwestern contingent
in voting to warn American citizens off armed merchant ships was the
first sign that the Republican masses, especially in the Midwest, valued
peace more highly than a heroic assertion of technical rights. The
defeat of Robert Bacon, an avowed interventionist, for the Republican
senatorial nomination in New York by William M. Galder, who had
the support of the German-Americans and the peace element, signified
that interventionism could not command a majority among Repub-
licans even in Root's and Roosevelt's own state. More important, how-
ever, was the success of Henry Ford, a pacifist leader of dubious wis-

19 For incisive comments on the triumph of the New Nationalism in the
Democratic party, see New Republic, VII (June 24, 1916), 185-187; VIII
(Sept. 2, 9, 1916), 103-104, 128-129; also Collier's, LVIII (Sept. 16, 1916),
14.

20 Root spoke before the New York Republican state convention in New York
City on February 15, 1916, Lodge before the Republican Club of Lynn, Massa-
chusetts, on March 16, 1916. Their speeches are printed in The New York
Times, Feb. 16, 1916, and the Boston Evening Transcript, Mar. 17, 1916.

PROGRESSIVISM AND PEACE! THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 23!

dom, in the Republican presidential primaries in Michigan and Ne-
braska, despite the fact that he was not a candidate and had tried to
take his name off the ballots in these states. Obviously, Midwestern
Republican leaders were using the Ford candidacy as a warning to the
national leaders. Finally., German- American spokesmen gave early
notice they would enter the presidential campaign and bitterly oppose
any interventionist candidate. As they were for the most part Re-
publicans, the significance of their admonition was not lost upon the
men who controlled the G.O.P.

After minor booms for Root and former Governor Myron T. Her-
rick of Ohio had fizzled, the Republican preconvention contest settled
into a test of strength between Roosevelt and Charles Evans Hughes,
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. The party managers liked
Hughes little better than Roosevelt, but he was their best hope of
heading off the alleged destroyer of the party. Outwardly, at least,
Hughes bore many resemblances to Wilson. Like the President, he had
integrity, independence, great power of leadership, and, above all, in-
tellectual depth. Hughes had come first into public notice in 1905,
when he conducted investigations of the New York utilities ring and
the great insurance companies. His methods were so relentless and
his disclosures were so startling that at once he was catapulted into
leadership of the progressive wing of the Republican party in New
York. Elected Governor in 1906 and 1908, Hughes, like Wilson a few
years later, electrified the country by his defiance of the bosses and his
magnificent battles for reform legislation. He might have been elected
President in 1908, but he spurned Theodore Roosevelt's overtures.
Appointed to the Supreme Court in 1910 by President Taft, Hughes
by 1916 had won a place of leadership among the liberal minority of
that tribunal. In 1912 he flatly refused to accept the Republican presi-
dential nomination, but four years later the draft was so strong that
he could not refuse duty's command. 21

For his part, Theodore Roosevelt worked strenuously for the nomi-
nation and apparently thought his chances were good, 22 but the bosses
knew better. They went to the national convention at Chicago on June
8 to prevent Roosevelt's triumph, even if that meant nominating the

21 This paragraph is a brief summary of Merlo J. Pusey, Charles Evans
Hughes (2 vols., New York, 1951), I, 132-324.

22 So did the professional odds makers. Roosevelt was the favorite in the
betting in St. Louis on June 1, when his supporters offered two to one odds in
his favor. The New York Times, June 2, 1916.

232 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

independent and progressive Hughes. The leaders of the nearly de-
funct Progressive party also gathered in Chicago at the same time.
Die-hard Progressives insisted that their rump convention nominate
Roosevelt and make a hopeless campaign, rather than surrender
abjectly to the enemy, the Old Guard. Most Progressives did not know
it, but Roosevelt was using them to bludgeon the Republicans into
nominating him. The strategy, of course, failed, and Hughes was
nominated easily on June 10. Having failed to win a single important
concession from the Republican managers, the rebellious Progressives
proceeded in sheer anger and desperation to nominate Roosevelt any-
way. Roosevelt declined the dubious honor at once and suggested that
the Progressives and Republicans unite behind Henry Cabot Lodge
one of the "staunchest fighters for different measures of economic
reform in the direction of justice," Roosevelt said. Two weeks later the
Progressive National Committee followed their leader's instructions
and disbanded the party that had been launched with such hope and
enthusiasm in 1912. 23

The nomination of Hughes on a platform that carefully avoided
any denunciation of hyphenism and the extreme German-American
element and that called for "a straight and honest" neutrality was,
therefore, an implicit repudiation of the Rooseveltian intervention-
ists. 24 As Roosevelt wrote soon after the convention, "the country
wasn't in a heroic mood." The selection of Hughes was also a signal
victory for the German-American element of the party, for, whether
he liked it or not, Hughes had become the German-American candi-
date.

Meanwhile, Wilson, House, and other Democratic leaders had been

23 George E. Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement
(Madison, Wis., 1946), pp. 345360. A minority of the Progressives, led by
John M. Parker, Matthew Hale, and Bainbridge Colby, held a new Progressive
convention in Indianapolis in early August, repudiated Roosevelt, and came out
for Wilson. As will be shown, they were an important factor in accomplishing
Wilson's re-election in November.

24 The Republican platform, among other things, demanded protection of
American rights, "by land and sea," but also called for an "honest neutrality."
It condemned the administration's interference in Mexico and blamed it for
much of the alleged chaos prevailing in that country. On the preparedness issue,
the Republicans equivocated by simply demanding "adequate" land and naval
forces. Finally, they reaffirmed their allegiance to the principle of tariff protec-
tion, condemned the Democrats for attempting to abandon the Philippines, and
pledged themselves to support effective rural credits and federal child labor
legislation. Republican Campaign Text-Book (New York, 1916), pp. 48-52.

PROGRESSIVISM AND PEACE! THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 233

laying their own plans for the coming campaign. The party machinery
was reorganized and the erratic and ineffective national chairman,
William F. McCombs, was eased out and replaced by the young and
progressive Vance G. McCormick of Pennsylvania. After the happy
settlement of the armed ship and Sussex crises the President was once
again in undisputed control of party policies. In consultation with
party leaders, 25 he wrote the Democratic platform, which contained an
open bid for Progressive support in the form of a plank approving an
advanced program of social legislation, promised a neutral foreign
policy, endorsed reasonable preparedness, commended the cause of
woman suffrage to the states, and denounced groups that placed the
interests of foreign countries above the interests of the United States.
Finally, the platform committed the party to support entrance by the
United States into a postwar League of Nations pledged to enforce
peace by collective security measures against aggressors. 26

When delegates began to assemble for the national convention in
St. Louis on June 11, the Democratic situation seemed so firmly under
presidential control that the vanguard of party leaders on the scene
expected a dull affair. Irritated by the Republicans' claim to a
monopoly on patriotism, the President sent instructions that "Ameri-
canism" should be the keynote of the convention and that frequent
demonstrations should attest to Democratic loyalty to the flag. When
former Governor Martin H. Glynn of New York gave the keynote
address at the opening session on June 14, however, he failed to evoke
more than dutiful enthusiasm for the President, preparedness, and 100
per cent Americanism. Glynn then moved on to the war and American

25 Senators W. J. Stone, Henry F. Hollis, F. M. Simmons, O. W. Underwood,
and T. J. Walsh all submitted suggestions for the platform. These suggestions
were sent to Wilson by Burleson on June 7, 1916, and are in the Wilson Papers.

26 In fact, Wilson had already personally committed the country to this
project in a significant address at Washington on May 27 before the League to
Enforce Peace, a nonpartisan organization formed in 1915 to propagate the
League plan. It is interesting that in preparing this address, which alleged
America's willingness to depart from its historic policy of isolation, Wilson con-
sulted only Colonel House and Secretary Lansing. In spite of his failure to
confer with Democratic Congressional leaders on the matter, the Democrats
willingly accepted a plank embodying the far-reaching proposal. It was a
significant commentary on Wilson's mastery over the party leaders. The League
to Enforce Peace speech is printed in The Public Papers, New Democracy, II,
184-188. The Democratic platform of 1916 is printed in The Democratic Text
Book, 1916 (New York, 1916), pp. 3-26, and in many other contemporary
sources.

234 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

neutrality, invoking historical parallels to prove that Wilson's diplo-
macy of note writing had good precedent in the American past. But this
would be a dull recital, he averred; and he was about to pass over that
portion of his address when the immense crowd were on their feet,
shouting, "No I No! Go on!" This was an unexpected development,
but Glynn sensed the electrical quality of the situation and at once
launched into his historical exposition. As he cited one case after
another in which the United States had refused under provocation to
go to war, the mighty throng would chant, "What did we do? What
did we do?" And Glynn would roar back, "We didn't go to war, we
didn't go to war!" On and on he went, while the convention indulged
in one frenzied demonstration after another. It was as if the delegates
had just discovered that pacifism, jeered at and derided, was the
cornerstone upon which American foreign policy had been built.

Events of the following day gave even more spectacular evidence
of the passion for peace that consumed the delegates and deafened
their ears to any other appeals. The permanent chairman, Senator
Ollie M. James of Kentucky, was a veteran of many campaigns with
a sharp understanding of crowd psychology. He appealed stirringly to
the delegates' desire for peace, and with the famous peroration, "With-
out orphaning a single American child, without widowing a single
American mother, without firing a single gun or shedding a drop of
blood, he .[Wilson] wrung from the most militant spirit that ever
brooded over a battlefield the concession of American demands and
American rights," James provoked a nearly riotous demonstration that
lasted twenty-one minutes.

At the night session of June 15 the cries for Bryan grew so loud that
The Commoner had to speak. Cast out of party councils and castigated
by the Democratic press, Bryan had even been refused election as a
delegate from Nebraska and had come to the convention as a re-
porter. 27 He it was who became the hero of the convention, when he
urged the delegates to renominate Wilson and thanked God the coun-
try had a President who did not want war. A few hours later Wilson
was named by one mighty acclamation, and the convention adjourned
the following day after adopting the platform. 28

The meaning of the peace demonstration at St. Louis was unmistak-

w Bryan's letters to the newspapers from the convention are printed in The
Commoner, June, 1916.

2 * The New York Times, June 16, 17, 1916.

PROGRESSIVISM AND PEACE: THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 235

ably clear to Wilson and his campaign managers. Irresistibly they were
drawn into the ground swell for peace, and, as will be shown, the
Democratic campaign that followed became in many respects a pro-
longed demonstration for peace. But while the managers in both
camps were busy constructing their organizations and raising their
funds, another development occurred that had a profound impact on
the course of the contest. It was the near occurrence of a general rail-
road strike and the President's method of averting it.

Storm clouds had gathered on the horizon in early spring, when the
presidents of the four railroad brotherhoods presented demands for an
eight-hour day, with no reduction in wages, and time and a half for
overtime work. On June 15 the railroad managers rejected these
demands, although they offered to submit them to arbitration, and a
weary conference broke up. When the United States Board of Media-
tion failed to bring agreement and 94 per cent of the nation's 400,000
engineers, firemen, conductors, and trainmen approved a general strike
call, Wilson decided the time for decisive action had come. On August
13 he invited the brotherhood chiefs and the railroad managers to the
White House and reminded them of the catastrophic consequences of
a general strike suffering, even starvation, in the great cities, disrup-
tion of the nation's economic life, and a setting back of the prepared-
ness effort. The following morning the contending parties presented
their cases, and Wilson appealed solemnly for compromise in the na-
tional interest. When both sides refused to budge he then and there
resolved to impose his own settlement. The workers' demand for the
eight-hour day was right, he declared; but they must abandon their
demand for punitive overtime pay, and a federal commission should
be appointed to study the entire railroad labor problem. 29

The brotherhood chiefs accepted the President's proposal on August
18, but the managers had rejected it the day before. At once Wilson
summoned the presidents of the great railroad systems to the White
House and set Congressional leaders at work on legislation to be
rushed through if his last-ditch efforts failed. Thirty-one railroad presi-
dents appeared at the White House on August 18, but they were un-
moved by the President's pleading. 80 Then Wilson issued a public

* Q Ibid., Aug. 14, 15, 16, 17, 1916. Wilson's solution was embodied in "Pro-
posal. R. R. Conference," memorandum prepared by Wilson c. Aug. 16-17,
1916, Wilson Papers.

80 The New York Times, Aug. 19, 1916. There were indications that some of
the railroad presidents welcomed the prospect of a general strike, which they

236 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

appeal for support and summoned twelve more railroad presidents to
Washington. To the railroad executives assembled and sweating in 100
degrees of heat in the East Room on August 21, Wilson appealed in
the name of humanity that they accept his compromise. When they
refused he exclaimed bitterly, "I pray God to forgive you, I never
can," and left the room. 31

Further futile negotiations between executives and union leaders
only highlighted the hopelessness of the deadlock. On August 27 the
brotherhood local chairman left Washington with orders to call a
nation-wide strike on September 4. The railroad presidents' committee
gave Wilson their final refusal to accept his plan. Wilson went to the
Capitol, where he was closeted with Senate Democratic leaders during
the afternoon of August 28, and before a joint session the following
day he outlined legislation to prevent a strike and guarantee that the
country would never again be threatened by such a catastrophe. 32
More important for the long future, however, was his sweeping en-
dorsement of the eight-hour day, as a cause so vital to the health and
happiness of the people that its fate could not be arbitrated.

The next few days were extraordinarily hectic. For a while it seemed
Congress might refuse to act and, thinking he had failed, the President
called fifteen thousand national guardsmen from the Mexican border
to preserve order. Meanwhile, however, Chairman William C. Adam-
son of the House Interstate Commerce Committee and Majority
Leader Kitchin drafted a bill imposing the eight-hour day, beginning

were sure they could break and which they thought would destroy the brother-
hoods. "President Ripley of the Santa Fe road believes that if a violent strike
should occur, it can be broken in thirty days," wrote the publisher of the reac-
tionary Los Angeles Times. "In that case the organized railroad men would be
the losers by a tremendous majority, and the outcome would be the ultimate
non-unionizing of the railway service." Harrison Gray Otis to H. L. Scott, Aug.
24, 1916, the Papers of Hugh L. Scott, in the Library of Congress; also The
New York Times, Aug. 29, 1916.

31 Ibid., Aug. 22, 1916; C. W. Eliot to J. P. Tumulty, Sept. 11, 1916; Wilson
to Tumulty, c. Sept. 21, 1916, Wilson Papers.

32 Wilson proposed ( 1 ) the eight-hour day for railroad workers engaged in
interstate commerce, which, in the absence of punitive overtime, meant ten
hours' pay for eight hours' work; (2) compulsory suspension of railroad strikes
pending investigation by a federal commission; (3) that the Interstate Com-
merce Commission be enlarged and directed to study the cost of the eight-hour
day, with a view to allowing the railroads to increase rates; and (4) that the
President be authorized to compel railroad officials and workers to operate
trains for military purposes. His address is printed in The Public Papers, New
Democracy, II, 267-274.

PROGRESSIVTSM AND PEACE I THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 237

January 1, 1917, and providing for a commission to study the railroad
problem. As it was the only measure that could be passed quickly, it
was approved August 31 by Wilson, Burleson, and the Congressional
leaders. The House approved the following day, 239 to 56; and after
a day of acrimonious debate the Senate accepted the bill on September
2 and the President signed it in his private car in the Union Station
the next morning, just before he left for Hodgenville, Kentucky., for an
address at Lincoln's birthplace. 83

Passage of the Adamson Act prevented the railroad strike, to be
sure, but it also injected a new issue, which Hughes gladly seized upon
to bolster his sagging campaign. For it was now plain that he was not
doing well. He had entered the contest with the respect and admira-
tion of most independent and many Democratic journals. The four
leading independent organs of opinion, the New Republic, the Nation,
The New York Times, and the New York Evening Post, stood predis-
posed to support him. But his acceptance speech at Carnegie Hall on
July 31 had been a bitter disappointment, reflecting mainly the advice
of Henry Lane Wilson on the Mexican question. 34 Soon afterward
Hughes had set out on a long tour of the Middle West and Far West,
and everywhere he spoke he made votes for Wilson by his petty
criticisms and failure to offer any constructive alternatives. 35 The great

33 The New York Times, Sept. 2, 3, 4, 1916. There is a denouement to this
story that should not be overlooked. The railroad managers refused to accept
the Adamson settlement and immediately instituted proceedings to test the act's
constitutionality. When the railroads refused to abide by the law after January
1, 1917, the brotherhoods, on March 15, issued a general strike order. As the
nation was on the verge of war with Germany, Wilson and the Council of
National Defense appealed to both sides to remember that the country was
already in dire peril. On March 17 the brotherhoods postponed the strike
forty-eight hours; and the following day, after German submarines sank three
American ships, the railroad managers gave in and conceded the eight-hour
day. Then, on March 19, the Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, upheld
the constitutionality of the Adamson Act. This important decision, rendered in
Wilson v. New, 243 U.S., 332, affirmed that Congress 1 control over transporta-
tion facilities operating in interstate commerce was absolute.

34 It was a significant commentary on Hughes' campaign that he should have
chosen the discredited former Ambassador as his chief adviser on Mexico. See
H. L. Wilson to Taft, June 23, 1916, Taft Papers; H. L. Wilson, "Memoran-
dum on Mexico," undated, sent to Hughes, copy in ibid.; The New York Times,
July 23, 28, 1916. For comment on Hughes' acceptance speech see Denver Post,
Aug. 1, 1916; The New York Times, Aug. 1, 1916; Springfield Republican,
Aug. 1, 1916; New York Evening Post, Aug. 1, 1916; New York World, Aug.
1, 1916; New Republic, VIII (Aug. 5, 1916), 4-5.

35 See, for example, his speeches at Detroit, Aug. 7, in New York Evening

238 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

Eastern journals, which had hailed Hughes' candidacy with real
enthusiasm, were baffled and searched about for an explanation, for, as
one editor put it, "No other candidate for President within the memory
of living man ever ran downhill so rapidly." 36

The triumph of the brotherhoods in the epochal struggle for the
eight-hour day, however, breathed life into the corpse of the Hughes
campaign. For one thing, it aroused the business community to frantic
anger and overwhelming support of the Republican ticket and sent a
cold chill down the spines of the Democratic managers. For another,
Hughes finally had an issue and launched a vigorous attack on Wilson
for betraying the cause of arbitration and knuckling under to the rail-
road workers "the most shameful proceeding," he said, "that has
come to my attention since I have observed public life." 37

For his part, Wilson stayed at his post until the threat of a railroad
strike was past. He made a few short speeches in the capital, important
only as portents of the course he would later follow; and he wrote a
long letter to Representative Lever, reviewing the agricultural legisla-
tion of his administration. 38 His first important pronouncement, how-
ever, he saved for his acceptance speech at Shadow Lawn, New Jersey,
his temporary summer home, on September 2. It was more a scholarly
summary of recent Democratic achievements than a rousing campaign
address. 39 Then, on September 23, the President began a series of hard-
hitting speeches that got his campaign into high gear and left his
opponents dazed. Instead of apologizing for the Adamson Act, he

Post, Aug. 8, 1916; at Chicago, Aug. 8, in The New York Times, Aug. 9, 1916;
at St. Paul, Aug. 9, ibid., Aug. 10, 1916; at Fargo, N.D., Aug. 10, ibid., Aug.
11, 1916; at Butte, Mont., Aug. 12, ibid., Aug. 13, 1916.

36 New York World, Aug. 17, 1916; for similar comments see The New York
Times, Aug. 17, Sept. 8, 1916; Independent, LXXXVII (Aug. 28, 1916), 289-
290; The Nation, CIII (Sept. 14, 1916), 251; Oswald G. Villard to William
L. Phelps, July 21, 1916, the Papers of Oswald Garrison Villard, in Houghton
Library, Harvard University.

Although Merlo J. Pusey, Hughes* biographer, makes out the best possible
case for his subject, he nowhere answers the baffling question of why Hughes
failed to wage a positive, constructive type of campaign. Nor, it might be added,
is Mr, Pusey fair to Wilson, whom he accuses of using the peace issue at a time
when the President knew war with Germany was likely. Pusey, Hughes, II,
356357. The evidence Mr. Pusey uses to substantiate this charge is totally
unreliable.

M G. E. Hughes to Taft, Sept. 16, 1916, Taft Papers.

**The New York Times, July 5, 14, 1916; the letter to Lever is printed in
The Public Papers, New Democracy, II, 260-263.

39 Printed in ibid. f pp. 275-291.

PROGRESSIVISM AND PEACE: THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 239

boldly defended it and the principle of the eight-hour day. In October
he campaigned into the Middle West, defending his Mexican policy,
reiterating the blessings his administration had brought the farmers,
and in general magnifying his and the Democratic party's devotion to
the great cause of progressive reform.*

Wilson's bold championship of labor's supreme objective and of the
cause of social justice stood out in vivid contrast to the equivocation of
the Republican platform and Hughes' evasive declarations. The result,
therefore, was such a division on domestic issues as the country had
not seen since 1896. The left wing of the progressive movement, in-
cluding many Socialists and most single taxers, did not like Wilson's
advocacy of preparedness and of measures calculated to appease the
business community, but they never once seemed to doubt they had no
alternative but to support the President. 4 * Even more astonishing, how-
ever, was the way in which independent 1 progressives the social work-
ers, sociologists, and articulate intellectuals moved en masse into the
Wilson camp. To name them is to name practically the entire leader-
ship of the advanced wing of the progressive movement in the United
States. 42 If this did not suffice to prove that the Democratic party was
being transformed and re-created, then the wholesale movement of the
former leaders of the Progressive party into the Democracy must have
convinced the most cynical observer. One by one, the men and women
who had gone into the Roosevelt party in 1912 to fight for principles
and social regeneration, rather than to follow a hero, came out for
Wilson Jane Addams of Illinois, Francis J. Heney of California, John
M. Parker of Louisiana, Edgar C. Snyder, chairman of the state com-
mittee in Washington, Bainbridge Colby of New York, Victor Mur-

40 Addresses at Chicago, Oct. 4, 1916, The New York Times, Oct. 5, 1916;
at Omaha, Oct. 5, 1916, printed in The Public Papers, New Democracy, II,
344-355; at Indianapolis, Oct. 12, 1916, ibid., pp. 356-363; at Cincinnati, Oct.
26, 1916, ibid., pp. 376-382; at Buffalo, Nov. 1, 1916, New York World, Nov.
2, 1916.

41 On this point, see the significant articles: Victor S. Yarros, "Hughes,
Wilson and the Radicals," The Public, XIX (June 16, 1916), 559-560, and
Louis F. Post, "A Campaign Talk to Old Friends," ibid., XIX (Oct. 20-27,
1916), 992-995, 1016-1019.

42 A partial list would include William Kent, Norman Hapgood, Francis J.
Heney, Frederic C. Howe, E. W. Scripps, A. J. McKelway; a host of journalists,
including John Reed, Ray S. Baker, Lincoln Steffens, Ida M. Tarbcll, Irvin S.
Cobb, Walter Lippmann, Herbert Croly, and George Creel; Ben B. Lindsey,
Jane Addams, Lillian D. Wald, David Lubin, Amos Pinchot, John Dewey, Max
Eastman, Washington Gladden, and Bishop Francis J. McConnell of the
Methodist Episcopal Church.

24<> WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

dock of Kansas, Edward P. Costigan of Colorado, Matthew Hale of
Massachusetts, acting chairman of the national committee, and many
others. Finally, a week before the election, eleven out of the nineteen
members of the Progressive platform committee at the Chicago con-
vention joined in a public appeal for Wilson, on the ground that the
Democrats had redeemed the Progressive promises of 1912.

Obviously, Wilson's strategy of building a new coalition and draw-
ing large accessions to his party had succeeded brilliantly. But there
were other and as important additions to Democratic strength. The
railway brotherhoods, the American Federation of Labor, and other
organized labor groups were profoundly grateful to the administration
and abandoned all pretense of neutrality during the campaign. 43 So
vigorous was their support of the Democratic ticket, in fact, that at
least two Old Guard bosses demanded that Hughes drop the eight-
hour issue at once. 44 There were also many signs that Wilson's appeal
for farm support was paying large dividends. The distinguished farm
editor, Herbert Quick, traveled with the Federal Farm Loan Board
through the Middle West in September and noted that everywhere the
Board went Republican farmers were going in droves into the Wilson
ranks. The Non-Partisan League, which was spreading like wildfire in
the region, came out officially for Wilson because of the adoption of
the rural credits act. Everywhere, in practically every state of the
Middle West, farm groups endorsed Wilson.

Finally, the accession to the Democratic ranks of practically all
independent newspapers and periodicals completed the great progres-
sive coalition and added powerful support to Wilson's candidacy. "I
shall vote not for the Wilson who has uttered a few too many noble
sentiments," one independent declared, "but for the Wilson who is
evolving under experience and is remaking his philosophy in the light
of it, for the Wilson who is temporarily at least creating, out of the
reactionary, parochial fragments of the Democracy, the only party
which at this moment is national in scope, liberal in purpose, and

43 Statements of Samuel Gompers, Andrew Furuseth, et al. t in Wilson and
Labor (Democratic National Committee, 1916); Samuel Gompers et al, "To
the Officers of All Organized Labor," Oct. 14, 1916, copy in Wilson Papers;
appeal of the presidents of the four brotherhoods, The New York Times, Oct.
27, 1916; Locomotive Firemen's and Engineers' Magazine, Nov., 1916; Samuel
Gompers, "On Which Side Are You?" American Federationist, XXIII (Nov.,
1916), 1067-1068.

44 W. Murray Crane to Taft, Sept. 5, 1916, Taft Papers; David Baird to
Taft, Oct. 7, 1916, ibid.

PROGRESSrVTSM AND PEACE! THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 24!

effective in action." 45 Herbert Groly confessed that he would vote
for Wilson because the President had reconstructed the Democratic
party into a responsible instrument of progressive nationalism, but that
a few years before he would not have believed such a miracle was
possible. 46 Thus the New Republic, The New York Times, the New
York Evening Post, the Nation, Pearson's Magazine, the Scripps news-
papers, and other leaders of independent opinion came out, some of
them reluctantly, for Wilson as the hope of the country.

It is clear, therefore, that the campaign witnessed an almost perfect
alignment of progressives and conservatives into two opposing camps
and that the issue of further advancement toward a dynamic social
welfare democracy drew large numbers to Wilson's side. But to inter-
pret the campaign solely within this framework would be to miss the
most important phenomenon of the contest: the fusion of the peace
cause with the ideal of progressive democracy that the President and
his campaigners effected.

As he was profoundly impressed by the mounting manifestations of
the deep peace longings of the people, and particularly by the develop-
ments at St. Louis, Wilson must have deliberately decided to make a
direct appeal to what was obviously an overwhelming popular senti-
ment. Nor was he motivated by considerations of expediency alone.
By September his efforts to co-operate with the Allies in ending the
war had failed, and he was growing suspicious of British motives and
was persuaded neither side should win. Thus his metamorphosis from
the firm defender of American rights on the seas to a leading champion
of nonintervention was facilitated by developments both at home and
abroad.

In an address at Shadow Lawn on September 30, the President first
sounded the new keynote of his campaign. He brought his audience
to their feet by charging that the Republicans were a war party and
that Hughes* election must mean intervention in Mexico and the
European war. 47 It was as if he had finally found the one great issue,
and time and again he expounded this theme, in the Midwest and in
the East, until it became the staccato note of his addresses. Moreover,
by implication he promised to keep the United States out of war if the

45 Walter Lippmann, "The Case for Wilson/' New Republic, VIII (Oct. 14,
1916), 263-264.

* 6 Herbert Groly, "The Two Parties in 1916," ibid., Oct. 21, 1916, pp. 286-
291.

* 7 New York World, Oct. 1, 1916.

242 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

people sustained him. "I am not expecting this country to get into
war," he declared at Shadow Lawn on October 21, for example. "I
know that the way in which we have preserved peace is objected to,
and that certain gentlemen say that they would have taken some
other way that would inevitably have resulted in war, but I am not
expecting this country to get into war, partly because I am not expect-
ing those gentlemen to have a chance to make a mess of it." tt Or
again, ten days later he wrote for publication in Western newspapers
the following letter: "Thank you warmly for your letter of October
twenty-third. The reason you give for supporting me touches me very
deeply, that you should feel when you see 'the boys and mother' to-
gether in your home circle that I have preserved the peace and happi-
ness of the home. Such a feeling on the part of my fellow-citizens is a
sufficient reward for everything that I have done." 4fl

Wilson, moreover, shared with the people his great vision of a post-
war community of nations co-operating to maintain the peace. There
were times when he warned that the day might come when America
must fight for the right. But he made it clear he was talking about the
future, after the war, when the United States would use its strength
in concert with other nations to prevent aggression. That was what
he meant in his Cincinnati address of October 26, when he declared,
"the business of neutrality is over." 50

As the Republican interventionists, led by Theodore Roosevelt, took
up Wilson's peace challenge and increased the ferocity of their attacks
on his alleged failure to defend American rights on the seas, the Presi-
dent indignantly denounced them for dragging questions of foreign
policy into the campaign in a partisan way. The Democratic cam-
paign committee and orators, however, were elated by Roosevelt's
blasts and used the peace issue for all it was worth. They knew the
slogan, "He kept us out of war," 51 had vast potentialities, and when

48 The Public Papers, New Democracy, II, 371-372.

** Wilson to J. W. Wasson, Velva, N.D., Oct. 31, 1916, Wilson Papers.

50 In this same address Wilson also denounced those persons who said the
United States should now be at war. "Have you ever heard what started the
present war?" he asked. "If you have, I wish you would publish it, because
nobody else has, so far as I can gather. Nothing in particular started it, but
everything in general." The Public Papers, New Democracy p , II, 381.

51 Robert W. Woolley, publicity director for the Democratic National Com-
mittee in 1916, claims that he and Richard L. Metcalfe, his assistant, invented
the phrase, "With honor, he has kept us out of war," and that it was used in
all official literature. Woolley admitted, however, that the shorter "He kept us
out of war" was used thousands of times by Democratic campaigners. Woolley

PROGRESSIVTSM AND PEACE I THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 243

Wilson sounded the peace note on September 30 they were delighted
and urged him on. So overwhelming was the popular response in
the Midwest to Wilson's speech that Senator Thomas J. Walsh, in
charge of Midwestern headquarters in Chicago, at once sent instruc-
tions to an army of orators in the region to adopt the peace issue as
their main theme. Thus it was that "He kept us out of war" became
the battle cry of peace that was thundered over the plains.

To lead the Democratic peace campaigners in the Middle and Far
West the great apostle himself, Bryan, was chosen. No longer a pariah,
up and down the West he went, carrying the good news of peace and
progressivism to countless throngs. "Bryan's speeches at Pueblo last
night and Colorado Springs tonight were masterpieces in argument
and power/* the former Governor of Colorado wrote. 52 Democratic
leaders in Wisconsin reported that The Commoner had never been so
well received in their state. 58

It was in the millions of pamphlets and thousands of newspaper
advertisements they published, however, that the campaign committee
attained the maximum effectiveness. No matter what the subject of
the written appeal happened to be, the peace issue was highlighted.
Thus, a pamphlet entitled Woodrow Wilson and Social Justice con-
cluded: "More than all, our country is at peace in a world at war,"
while an essay devoted to the child labor law reminded mothers that
Wilson had saved their children from mines, mills, and sweatshops, as
he had "saved their sons and their husbands from unrighteous battle-
fields!" 54 The climax of this propaganda came just before the elec-
tion, when the Wilson Business Men's League on November 4 pub-
lished the following advertisement in leading newspapers:

to R. S. Baker, Nov. 21, 1928, Baker Collection. Vance C. McCormick, Demo-
cratic national chairman in 1916, could not later remember who invented the
slogan, although he well recalled how effectively it was used. R. S. Baker,
interview with Vance G. McCormick, July 15, 1928, ibid. In so far as the
present writer knows, Wilson never used the phrase.

52 Alva Adams to T. J. Walsh, Oct. 13, 1916, the Papers of Thomas J.
Walsh, in the Library of Congress.

63 Joseph Martin to T. J. Walsh, Oct. 27, 1916, the Papers of William Jen-
nings Bryan, in the Library of Congress.

^Children's Emancipation Day (Democratic National Committee, 1916);
also "Yes" or "No!" Mr. Hughes?, Ten Reasons for Voting for Wilson, by Dr.
Irving Fisher, "Complete Accord with Roosevelt" Wilson and Labor, War
Menace Masked by Republican Policy, The Wilson Volunteers, Wilson Workers 3
Manual, all issued by the Democratic National Committee, 1916.

244 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

You Are Working Not Fighting!

Alive and Happy; Not Cannon Fodder!

Wilson and Peace with Honor?

or
Hughes with Roosevelt and War?

Roosevelt says we should hang our heads in shame because we are
not at war with Germany in behalf of Belgium! Roosevelt says that
following the sinking of the Lusitania he would have foregone
diplomacy and seized every ship in our ports flying the German
Flag. That would have meant war!

Hughes Says He and Roosevelt are in Complete Accord!

The Lesson is Plain:
If You Want WAR, vote for HUGHES!

If You Want Peace with Honor
VOTE FOR WILSON!

While the Democrats were pressing a united and powerful cam-
paign, Hughes and his managers fumbled from one issue to another,
confused and continually embarrassed by feuds within their ranks. The
Democrats kept pounding away, demanding that Hughes tell what he
would have done. At Louisville on October 12 the former Justice
finally shot back that he would have broken relations with Germany
after the sinking of the Lusitania, although he said the tragedy would
never have occurred if the Germans had believed Wilson meant what
he had said about "strict accountability." Even more embarrassing to
the Republicans than the Democratic gadflies, however, was'Theodore
Roosevelt, who barnstormed the country, denouncing the President for
cowardly weakness abroad. Indeed, Roosevelt was a virtual millstone
around Hughes' neck, for the hapless candidate was drawn into ap-
proving Roosevelt's declarations, which enabled the Democrats to
charge that Hughes also harbored warlike designs. 55 Bernstorff was not
far wrong when he wrote the Foreign Office, "If Hughes is defeated he
has Roosevelt to thank for it." 56

55 When Roosevelt made one of his usual addresses at Lewiston, Maine,
Hughes telegraphed him from Kansas: "I heartily congratulate you on your
speech at Lewiston, and warmly appreciate your effective support." Outlook,
GXIV (Sept. 13, 1916), 63. For the way in which the Democrats used this
incident, see "Complete Accord with Roosevelt/*

6 Oct. 19, 1916, "Bernstorff Wireless Messages--! 9 16," in the Papers of
Walter H. Page, in Houghton Library, Harvard University.

PROGRESSIVISM AND PEACE: THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 245

Hughes' difficulties with the peace issue,, his failure to attract wide
independent and Progressive support, and Roosevelt's bellicose speeches
were serious encumbrances to the Republican cause, to be sure, but in
the showdown it was the bitter factionalism within the party that
caused its undoing. For one thing, the Old Guard resented Hughes'
approval of Roosevelt and the appointment of former Progressives to
positions of leadership in the campaign organization. For another, in
certain Western states the old-line bosses were more interested in pre-
venting the Progressives from capturing the party than they were in
electing Hughes. This was the situation, for example, in California,
through which Hughes campaigned in August. The former Progres-
sives were preparing to move back into the Republican party and to
nominate Governor Hiram Johnson for the Senate on the G.O.P.
ticket. From the day he entered the seething California campaign,
Hughes went from one blunder to another. He allowed himself to be
surrounded and his itinerary to be determined by the Old Guard
leaders, who had declared open war on the Progressives. He followed
the Republican state chairman across a picket line in San Francisco.
Finally, he unwittingly failed to confer with Governor Johnson, when
the two men were in a Long Beach hotel at the same time.

As if to compound Republican difficulties, Hughes was also em-
barrassed by the open support of organized German-American groups
and practically the entire German-language press. It was a difficult
situation, and Hughes tried to play both ends against the middle. On
the one hand, he talked boldly of "straight Americanism" and ap-
plauded Roosevelt; on the other he conferred with the most extreme
pro-German spokesmen in the country the leaders of the German-
financed American Independence Conference 57 and satisfied them
he would pursue a policy of true neutrality. 58 Apparently to prove his
sincerity, at Philadelphia on October 9 Hughes affirmed that he would
take strong action against the British if he were elected. Unhappily for
the luckless Hughes, the Democratic National Committee bought or
stole the records of the American Independence Conference and pub-
lished the details of the German- and Irish-American plot to defeat

57 They were Jeremiah A. O'Leary, Carl E. Schmidt, Will R. McDonald,
Frank Seiberlich, Jaspar T. Darling, St. John Gaffney, Joseph Frey, Victor
Bidder, and Daniel F. Cohalan.

58 The meeting took place around the middle of September, probably in New
York City.

246 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

Berlin's candidate

Kirby in the New York World

Wilson and of Hughes' negotiations with the leaders of that move-
ment. 5 *

The Democratic managers tried just as shamelessly to curry favor
with the so-called hyphen vote, 60 but Wilson personally refused to

59 The documents were printed in The New York Times, Oct. 23, 24, 25,
1916; New York World, Oct. 24, 25, 1916.

60 For details of these negotiations see Kent E. Keller to N: Hapgood, Sept.
16, 1916, Wilson Papers; William J. Stone to J. P. Tumulty, Sept. 25, 1916,

PROGRESSIVISM AND PEACE! THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 247

engage in any such negotiations. Indeed, when the blatant president
of the American Truth Society, Jeremiah A. O'Leary, tried to compel
the President to state his views, Wilson shot back: "I would feel deeply
mortified to have you or anybody like you vote for me. Since you have
access to many disloyal Americans and I have not, I will ask you to
convey this message to them." 61 It was a telling blow that many voters
remembered when the details of Hughes' conference with O'Leary and
his brethren were later published.

In their effort to turn out what many of them sincerely thought was
a disgraceful administration, the Republicans thundered and volleyed
on Mexico, made a vain bid for women's votes in the Western states,
accused Wilson and Bryan of adding a postcript to the first Lusitania
note, telling the German government they did not mean what they
had just said, and charged that Southerners in control of Congress
were plundering the wealth of the North and Middle West to pay for
preparedness. Finally, the Republicans organized vast whispering cam-
paigns against the President, accusing him of all kinds of irregularities,
but especially of numerous infidelities to his first wife.

In spite of all the din and confusion, however, two issues peace and
progressivism stood out above all the rest, and nothing the Republi-
cans could do diverted attention from them. Even so, it seemed at first
that the new Democratic-Progressive coalition had failed to convert
the normal Democratic minority into a majority. Outside the South,
the majority of farmers, businessmen, and professional people normally
voted Republican. The great mass of laborers and minority groups
were in that day politically illiterate and leaderless. In 1912 Taft and
Roosevelt combined had received 1,311,484 more votes than Wilson;
perhaps it was unreasonable to think Wilson could overcome such a
preponderance against his party.

Early returns on Tuesday evening, November 7, revealed that
Hughes had made almost a clean sweep of the East, except for Ohio
and possibly New Hampshire, and the Democratic spokesman, the

ibid.; The New York Times, Oct. 11, 12, 13, 14, 1916; also "Complete Accord
with Roosevelt" the most extraordinary document issued by the Democratic
National Committee during the campaign. It accused Hughes of sympathizing
with England and of desiring a war with the beloved Fatherland. "Such a
bloody war," it declared, "would help crush a nation, millions of whose sons
and daughters dwell in our land and love our flag; and help destroy a people
who lead in art, poetry, music, philosophy, and science" and "drain our veins
in order that Germany might bleed the more."

ei Wilson to O'Leary, Sept. 29, 1916, The New York Times, Sept. 30, 1916.

248 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

New York World, conceded defeat. Wilson went to bed at ten that
evening and slept soundly in the knowledge that he could soon turn his
thoughts to matters less pressing than affairs of state. But the Demo-
cratic managers kept their eyes on the West and refused to concede,
and as one Western state after another recorded its vote for Wilson

(Courtesy, Knickerbocker News).

The suspense which followed the November, 1916, election depicted
by a cartoonist for the Albany, N. Y v Knickerbocker Press.

the margin between the two candidates narrowed. In Delaware, New
Hampshire, Minnesota, New Mexico, North Dakota, and California
the contest was so close a handful of votes either way would have
turned the tide. Wilson won all these doubtful states except Delaware

PROGRESSIVISM AND PEACE: THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 249

and Minnesota, which went to Hughes by pluralities of 1,258 and 392,
respectively. With a total of 277 electoral votes, Wilson had a majority
of twenty-three in the Electoral College. 62 He received in all 9,129,606
votes, as against 8,538,221 for Hughes a gain for the President of
nearly three million votes over 1912. It was the best possible evidence
that the progressive-peace issue had succeeded in drawing together a
new coalition. The congressional and senatorial contests had been so
close, however, that the Democratic majority in the Senate was reduced
to eight, while control of the House of Representatives would rest with
a handful of Progressives and Independents. 63

After the ballots in the hotly contested states had been recounted,
analysts tried to discover the factors that had enabled Wilson to win.
A close examination of the returns yielded many surprises and portents.
To begin with, the vaunted German- American bloc had been so riddled
by the Democratic peace appeal and Roosevelt's campaign blasts that
the so-called hyphen vote almost vanished. 64 The labor vote, while not
yet solidly organized, went largely to Wilson and was a factor in his
success in New Hampshire, Ohio, Washington, and California. In the
Middle and Far Western states the women's vote went disproportion-
ately to Wilson. 65 Moreover, Socialists deserted their party by the

62 Wilson carried all the Southern states, including Maryland, Kentucky,
Missouri, and Oklahoma, plus New Hampshire, Ohio, Kansas, Nebraska, North
Dakota, Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Nevada,
Idaho, Washington, and California.

63 The Sixty-Fifth Congress would contain, in the House, 213 Democrats, 217
Republicans, 2 Progressives, 1 Prohibitionist, 1 Socialist, and 1 Independent; in
the Senate, 54 Democrats and 42 Republicans.

64: The German-American vote went largely to Hughes in Oregon, Minnesota,
and Illinois, and was apparently important in the Republican success in the
first two states. On the other hand, in Maryland the German-Americans voted
largely for Wilson and probably swung the state to him. Hamilton County, Ohio
(Cincinnati), an important German-American center, returned a twelve
thousand plurality for Hughes. On the other hand, Taft carried the county by
18,374 in 1908 and the combined Taft-Roosevelt vote exceeded Wilson's vote
by 16,036 in 1912. With its large German-American population, Ohio gave
Wilson a plurality of 89,503 in 1916, although Taft carried the state by 69,591
in 1908 and Taft and Roosevelt together in 1912 polled a vote that exceeded
Wilson's by 83,341. In the six "German" wards of St. Louis, Hughes gained
only two-tenths of one per cent over the combined Republican-Progressive per-
centage of the total vote four years before. Hughes gained 12,480 votes in
twelve "German" counties in Wisconsin, but Wilson carried the most important
of them, Milwaukee County, by seven thousand, although not another Democrat
received a majority in the county. This note is based upon the excellent analy-
sis in The New York Times, Nov. 12, 1916.

65 Democratic and Republican leaders in Kansas estimated, for example, that

25 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

hundreds of thousands the Socialist vote declined from 901,873 in
1912 to 585,113 in 1916 and it is a safe assumption that all the
seceders went to Wilson. They, too, could claim a large share in de-
termining the result. 66

So much for the voting behavior of the several important groups. As
for the issues, all observers agreed the key factor in Democratic success
was Wilson's and his party's promise of continued peace, prosperity,
and progressive democracy. 67 These were the issues that won a ma-
jority of the women, a large minority of the Socialists^ and a large
enough number of former Progressives to put Wilson across. 68

What the election portended for the long future of American politics
would in large measure depend upon the administration's success in
holding the new coalition together, and this in turn might depend
upon a redemption of the Democratic promises to keep the country out
of war. The election's immediate significance, however, was apparent
to all observers and especially to the President. "It is the South and
West united," a distinguished historian wrote; "the farmers, small
business men and perhaps a large sprinkle of Union labor against the
larger industrial, transportation and commercial interests." 69 It was,
indeed, the South and West united again in an emphatic mandate for
progressivism and peace. 70 In short, Wilson had consummated the

70,000 women Republicans in the state, out of a total of 625,000 voters, voted
for Wilson on the peace issue; it was estimated, moreover, that 90,000 out of
155,000 registered women voted for Wilson in Washington, where his plurality
was only 16,594; and that women also helped carry California, Idaho, Utah,
and Arizona for the President. These estimates were made by local politicians
and newspaper correspondents. See The New York Times, Nov. 12, 1916.

66 The Socialist losses were heaviest in the key states. Expressed in per-
centages, the losses were as follows: Ohio, 58 per cent; Pennsylvania, 50 per
cent; Illinois, 50 per cent; California, 62 per cent; New York, 27 per cent;
Washington, 47 per cent. In California the Socialist presidential vote in 1916
declined fifty thousand from the high point of 1912.

67 William Allen White was the only contemporary observer who thought the
peace issue was not important. He believed Midwestern and Western Progres-
sives supported Wilson solely on the ground that the administration was com-
mitted to further progressive reforms. William A. White, "Who Killed Cock
Robin?" Collier's, LVIII (Dec. 16, 1916), 5-6, 26-27.

68 It was estimated that 20 per cent of the former Progressives voted for
Wilson in 1916, but this was a national average and the percentage was much
higher in the West.

69 William E. Dodd to E. M, House, Nov. 10, 1916, House Papers.

70 There were special reasons, which did not generally operate in the West,
to account for Hughes' victory in the East and in the central Midwestern states
of Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Iowa.

PROGRESSIVISM AND PEACE: THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 25!

union of most of the agricultural states, which Bryan had narrowly
failed to do in 1896, and had added to the Democratic column two
Eastern states and a large portion of the social justice element, who
had heretofore followed Roosevelt.

No war clouds darkened the horizon. No convulsion threatened
domestic tranquillity. To Democrats and progressives it was a time full
of joy and hope for another four years of peace and an intensification
of the drive for social justice. 71 The poet Witter Bynner expressed this
feeling:

The morning-sun arose, the evening star:

America renewed her light all day

And stood serene at evening, and from far

Freedom was visible with lifted ray . . .

Wilson! humanity once more is true

The light that shone on Lincoln shines on you. 72

Hughes carried Minnesota and Wisconsin, normally heavily Republican
states, by greatly reduced Republican majorities, which fact was testimony to
the power of the progressive-peace appeal. In Illinois and Iowa the reunion of
the Republican party had resulted in a shift of control to former Progressives or
progressive Republicans. Reunion had been accomplished in Indiana under
Old Guard auspices, but without recrimination or bitterness. Thus Republican
losses, by defection of former Progressives to Wilson, were small in these two
states.

In Illinois, Indiana, and the Eastern states, moreover, other factors con-
tributed to Hughes' success. Firstly, the Democratic city machines, especially in
Boston, Chicago, and New York City, either knifed the national ticket or else
made only halfhearted campaigns. Secondly, the Negro vote went almost solidly
to Hughes. Thirdly, a part of the Catholic hierarchy and many priests and
Catholic journals entered the campaign against Wilson. Catholics were par-
ticularly aroused against the President's Mexican policy. The opposition of the
Catholic Church had its most profound impact upon the Irish-Americans, who
were already angry because Wilson had refused to intervene in behalf of the
Irish during the Rebellion of the preceding April and May. They left the
Democratic party in droves, and Wilson did not carry a single state in which
they were an important factor.

71 For significant comments on the meaning of the election, see the New York
World, Nov. 9, 1916; R. M. La Follette, "Jingoism Rebuked," La Follette's
Magazine, VIII (Nov., 1916), 1; W. J. Bryan, "The Election of 1916," The
Commoner, Nov., 1916; The New York Times, Nov. 10, 1916; New Republic,
IX (Nov. 11, 1916), 31-32; The Public, XIX (Nov. 17, 1916), 1092-1093.

72 "Wilson," printed in The Public, XIX. (Nov. 24, 1916), 1121.

CHAPTER 1

From Peace Without Victory to War

WHILE Wilson, the Democratic campaigners, and a large seg-
ment of the American people displayed their deep desire for
peace during the autumn of 1916, events in Europe were conspiring to
make continued American neutrality difficult, if not impossible. After
the failure of the German Verdun offensive in the spring and of the
Allied Somme offensive in the summer and fall, both sides resolved
to use their most desperate weapons to break the deadlock and end
the awful slaughter.

For Great Britain, this decision involved an intensification of eco-
nomic warfare, which would inevitably exacerbate Anglo-American
tension. Thus, instead of yielding to American pressure on the "black-
list," the British extended their warfare against suspected American
firms. "We have the rawest kind of cases all over the world," the
Counselor of the State Department complained, "where British officials
have threatened and browbeaten American merchants." x The British,
moreover, devised a new scheme to obtain control of all neutral ship-
ping: the so-called bunkering agreement, by which the neutral ship-
owner submitted to the regulations of the British Admiralty in return
for the privilege of buying British coal in various ports of the world. 2

iR L. Polk to Irwin Laughlin, Dec. 8, 1916, the Papers of Frank L. Polk,
in the Library of Yale University.

2 When a neutral shipowner entered into this agreement, he promised to keep
the British Admiralty informed of the names of all his vessels, not to charter
ships to any person or country not approved by British authorities, not to trade
with any country at war with Great Britain, to co-operate closely with British
authorities in operations with Holland and Scandinavia, and to carry no goods

252

FROM PEACE WITHOUT VICTORY TO WAR 253

When the British trade representative in the United States, Sir Richard
Crawford, frankly admitted the purpose of the bunkering agreement,
the issue became to the American government even more serious than
the "blacklist" dispute.

It is no exaggeration to say that official Anglo-American relations
reached the point of highest tension during the critical period from
November, 1916, through the following January. This was true, not
only because of the tightening of British economic controls, but also
because of the British refusal to co-operate in the German and Ameri-
can peace drives. It is perhaps conjectural to say the two countries
were heading toward a break in relations, yet such a catastrophe was
not impossible. On November 24, for example, Wilson asked Colonel
House to tell Sir Edward Grey that Americans "were growing more
and more impatient with the intolerable conditions of neutrality, their
feeling as hot against Great Britain as it was at first against Germany
and likely to grow hotter still against an indefinite continuation of the
war." 3 "I hate to feel that the two great democratic countries are
drifting apart," Polk wrote, "but ... I cannot persuade myself that
the fault is entirely ours, or even half ours." 4 Nor was all the ex-
asperation on the American side. British nerves were on edge and
British resentment at American efforts to enforce the rules of neutrality
was noticeably increasing. 5

consigned "to order." There is a copy of the bunkering agreement in Papers
Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1916, Supplement
(Washington, 1929), pp. 458-459.

3 Wilson to House, Nov. 24, 1916, the Ray Stannard Baker Collection, in the
Library of Congress.

*F. L. Polk to W. H. Page, Nov. 23, 1916, Polk Papers. "Confidentially,"
Polk wrote a short time later, "what I am afraid of is that Congress will get on
to this [blacklist] abuse, call for a Congressional investigation of the way the
blacklist is being administered, and then the lid will be off . ... I have become
a most violent believer in a large army and navy, because li see that we are
fast arriving at a station, if we have not already reached it, where everyone
hates us and we have got to be in a position to protect ourselves and ask no
favors." Polk to Irwin Laughlin, Dec. 8, 1916, ibid. See also Polk to W. H.
Page, Sept. 29, 1916, and to F. R. Coudert, Oct. 6, 1916, ibid.

5 Lansing relates the story of an extraordinary interview on January 18, 1917,
with the British Ambassador, Sir Cecil Spring Rice, which illustrated the pos-
sibility of difficulties on other issues. The British Admiralty had placed a gun
crew on a certain merchant vessel, which caused the State Department to
protest and warn that such vessels would be regarded as warships. Spring Rice
inquired if the protest were authentic, Lansing replied that it was. Spring
Rice's u face twitched, his eyes blazed, and his hands clenched until the knuckles
showed white." The two men stood facing each other about three feet apart.

254 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

At the same time, events on the seas and developments in the Ger-
man government pointed to the grave danger that Germany would
burst the bonds of the Sussex pledge and use her submarines in such a
way as to imperil good relations with the United States. For one thing,
a series of borderline U-boat sinkings during October and November
raised the question whether the German government had not in fact
already violated its pledges. There were a number of questionable
sinkings, but the two important cases involved the British merchant
ship Marina, sunk without warning October 28, and the British liner
Arabia, torpedoed without warning November 6, 1916. 6 Wilson was
not willing to raise a serious issue over doubtful cases at this time
because he planned to begin a peace campaign immediately after the
election. Even within the limits of the Sussex pledge, however, the
submarine campaign was being tremendously stepped up. German sub-
marines, raiders, and mines sank on an average about 350,000 tons a
month from October, 1916, through January, 1917, as compared with
185,800 tons sunk in August, 1915, 191,600 tons in April, 1916, and
230,400 in September of the same year. During the eight months that
the Germans honored the Sussex pledge, from June, 1916, to Feb-
ruary, 1917, their submarines and raiders accounted for an over-all
total of 2,099,523 tons. 7

The intensified submarine operations during the fall and early
winter of 1916-17 had a profound impact upon the British, making
them all the more determined to intensify their own economic war-
fare. 8 But so long as the Germans remained reasonably within the
bounds of the Sussex pledge, the Washington government would offer

The Ambassador leaned forward and "fairly hissed," "If you follow this course,
sir, of doing nothing while helpless people are murdered or put in open boats
three hundred miles from land, and at the same time of stopping our vessels
from defending themselves, you will be held personally responsible, yes, you and
the President will be personally responsible." "Memorandum of an Interview
with the British Ambassador, Thursday, January 18, 1917," the Diary of Robert
Lansing, in the Library of Congress.

6 Robert Lansing, "Memorandum. Vessels Sunk by German and Austrian
Submarines, November 13, 1916," the Woodrow Wilson Papers, in the Library
of Congress, and two memoranda by Lansing, entitled "Marina Case" and
"Arabia Case," sent to the President Dec, 8, 1916, and in ibid.

7 These figures are taken from the tables in R. H. Gibson and Maurice
Prendergast, The German Submarine War, 1914-1918 (New York 1931) TD
380-381. ' H '

8 For a discussion of the impact of this warfare on the British economy before
February, 1917, see Official German Documents Relating to the World War (2
vols., Now York, 1923), II, 702-705.

FROM PEACE WITHOUT VICTORY TO WAR 255

no objections. Of serious consequence to the United States, however,
were the increasing evidences that the Germans contemplated inaugu-
rating unrestricted submarine warfare at an early date. The question
entered an acute stage of discussion at a conference of all civilian and
military chieftains at Pless Castle on August 31, 1916. The naval
leaders pressed for immediate resumption of all-out, ruthless warfare,
but Hindenburg and LudendorfT, the new masters of the army, agreed
with Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg that the military situation was too
unpromising to invite the certain intervention of the United States,
Rumors of an impending all-out submarine campaign were alternately
affirmed and denied by American representatives in Berlin, but the
possibility hung like a sword over the President's head.

This, therefore, was the uncertain and dangerous situation confront-
ing Wilson during the last weeks of the presidential campaign and
immediately afterward. The two giants in Europe were obviously pre-
paring for a desperate bid for victory, which would inevitably abridge
further American neutral rights. To preserve neutrality in the face of
such assaults would be nearly impossible at best. Yet that was obviously
what the American people wanted the President to do. Even more,
they apparently preferred to abandon their rights on the seas rather
than go to war to defend them, and Wilson was so impressed by the
peace manifestations that his will to maintain his submarine policy was
profoundly shaken. "I do not believe the American people would wish
to go to war no matter how many Americans were lost at sea," he told
House and Vance McCormick. He was sorry this was true, but it was
his firm opinion. 9

The only course of peace and safety for the United States, was,
therefore so the President thought to bring the war to an end. Yet
the House-Grey understanding was dead, and British spokesmen,
aware of the possibilities of an American mediation attempt, publicly
announced that anyone who talked of peace was a friend of Ger-
many. 10 As the wisest British journalist warned, the mere suggestion of
peace would make the British people "wild with fury." If Wilson

9 The Diary of Edward M. House, in the Papers of Edward M. House, in the
Library of Yale University, Nov. 2, 1916.

10 Lloyd George, for example, on September 28 warned that Britain would
"tolerate" no mediation by the United States and was determined to fight until
"Prussian military despotism is broken beyond repair." The New York Times,
Sept. 29, 1916. For the background of Lloyd George's statement see the Diary
of Chandler P. Anderson, in the Library of Congress, Sept. 15, 1916.

256 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

could expect nothing but hostility to peace in British circles, then
where could he turn? Obviously, there was no alternative left but to
seek peace through diplomatic co-operation with the German govern-
ment.

Since the happy settlement of the Sussex crisis, Colonel House had
dangled the lure of Wilson's mediation before BernstorfFs eyes, and in
turn the Ambassador had excited the hopes of his government. At first
disdainful of the President's help, by autumn Bethmann-Hollweg and
the Foreign Office had concluded that Wilson's mediation on terms
favorable to Germany was the only hope of forestalling a resumption
of unrestricted submarine operations. The Imperial Chancellor, there-
fore, began urgently to request that Wilson take an early initiative for
peace. 11 And Bernstorff and Gerard made it abundantly plain what
the consequences of the failure of the peace campaign would be.

In a pacific mood, the President welcomed the German overtures
as the first ray of hope since the collapse of the House-Grey talks,
Bernstorff talked with him around October 14 and made the following
revealing report: "Wilson gave his remarks a particular weight
through referring to the fact that the leaders of the opposition, Roose-
velt, Lodge, et aL, wanted war with Germany, a desire which he
could not understand. He stated that he had but the one wish, to
remain neutral and to help bring the war to an end, since in his
opinion a decision could not be reached by force of arms." 12 As soon
as his re-election was beyond doubt, the President summoned House
to Washington and on November 14 told him that, in order to avert
the necessity of American intervention, he planned to demand that the
war be ended. House protested that such a move would be highly
prejudicial to the Allies. The following morning Wilson announced
he had made up his mind to move for peace. But what if Germany
agreed to a reasonable settlement and the Allies refused? House asked,
In that case would not the United States drift into a sympathetic
alliance with Germany? Might not France and Britain declare war on

11 Bethmann-Hollweg to Bernstorff, Sept. 25, Oct. 9, 1916, Official German
Documents, II, 984^986, 986-987. At the same time, Gerard left Berlin
for Washington with Jagow's and Bethmann's request that he ask the President
to move quickly for peace, in order to prevent resumption of ruthless submarine
warfare. James W. Gerard, My First Eighty-Three Years in America (Garden
City, N.Y., 1951), pp. 241-243.

12 Bernstorff to Foreign Office, received Oct. 14, 1916, Official German
Documents, II, 988.

FROM PEACE WITHOUT VICTORY TO WAR 257

the United States? If the Allies wanted war 3 Wilson replied^ he would
not shrink from it. 13

The event that caused Wilson to pause was not House's opposition
or the threat of a break with Great Britain, which he did not take
seriously. It was the deportation by the German government of some
300 3 000 Belgians for forced labor in the Reich. This act, which the
Germans justified on the ground of desperate necessity, provoked a
wave of indignation in the United States that exceeded initial Ameri-
can anger at the violation of Belgian neutrality. At first Wilson thought
he had no right to protest, but the rising popular wrath soon caused
him to change his mind.

Even so, pressure from Germany and at home for daring presidential
leadership in the peace movement was also heavy, and Wilson set to
work on his note soon after his conference with House of November
14-15. By November 25 he had completed the first draft and read it
to House on November 26. As the President for the first time since
1914 unburdened his most secret thoughts on the war and America's
relation to it, the note was a document of extraordinary importance. 14
He described the futility of the war and its baneful effects on civiliza-
tion. Declaring that the causes of the war were obscure, he went on to
point out that the position of neutrals was becoming intolerable, not
only because of the conduct of the belligerents, but also because
neutrals still did not know what the war was about. 15 Future American

18 "He [Wilson] thought they would not dare resort to this and if they did,
they could do this country no serious hurt. I disagreed with him again. I
thought Great Britain might conceivably destroy our fleet and land troops from
Japan in sufficient numbers to hold certain parts of the United States. He
replied they might get a good distance but would have to stop somewhere, to
which I agreed." House Diary, Nov. 15, 1916.

14 The original is in the Wilson Papers. R. S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson: Life
and Letters (8 vols., Garden City, N.Y., 1927-39), VI, 381-386, reprints it in
fun.

15 "And yet the reasons for this upheaval of the world remain obscure f and
the objects which would, if attained, satisfy the one group of belligerents or
the other have never been definitely avowed. As it is not known what motives
led to the war's sudden outbreak so it is not known, the The world can still
only conjecture what definitive results, what actual exchange of guarantees,
what political readjustments or changes, what stage or degree of military suc-
cess even, would bring it to an end. If any other nation now neutral should be
drawn in, it would know only that it was forced drawn in by some force it
could not resist, because it had been hurt and saw no remedy but to risk still
greater, it might be even irreparable, injury, in order to make the weight in
the one scale or the other decisive; and even as a participant it would not know

258 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

policy would depend upon the objectives for which the respective
alliances were fighting, yet leaders on both sides had avowed the same
objectives. He was clearly within his rights, therefore, in urging the
belligerents to define their objectives, and to do this at an early con-
ference.

Because the proposed note reflected a cool, neutral detachment,
House did not like it and prophesied it would have dire consequences
for Anglo-American relations. He urged delay, but Wilson was appar-
ently unmoved. Lansing, too, was gravely troubled. "Suppose . . .
Germany listens to the President and the Allies decline to do so, what
will be our situation?" he asked. "How can we turn then to the Allies?
This is causing me the gravest concern." 16 Wilson agreed to delay
action, but not for long; and when House tried to divert him by reviv-
ing the House-Grey understanding, Wilson answered flatly: "We can-
not go back to those old plans. We must shape new ones." 17

One of the new plans involved calling a halt to the partial financing
of the Allied war effort by American bankers. The British were near
the point of exhausting the securities they could use as collateral for
. loans, while their dependence upon American food, raw materials, and
munitions was increasing daily. J. P. Morgan & Company proposed to
solve the difficulty by taking the unsecured and renewable short-term
bills of the British and French treasuries. A majority of the Federal
Reserve Board, however, decided the time to call a halt had come, lest
the American economy become too dependent upon the war trade.
Their spokesman, W. P. G. Harding, conferred with Lansing on No-
how far the scales must tip before the end would come or what was being
weighed in the balance!'* The words italicized were crossed out by Wilson in
his original draft.

16 The Diary of Robert Lansing, in the Library of Congress, Dec. 3, 1916.
Lansing further outlined the danger in a letter to Wilson on December 10,
1916 (Wilson Papers):

"I think, among other questions, we should consider these: Unless the
answers of both parties are made in the right spirit, will there be any other
course than to declare in favor of the one most acceptable and abandon a
neutrality which is becoming more and more difficult? But suppose that the un-
acceptable answer comes from the belligerents whom we could least afford to
see defeated on account of our own national interest and on account of the
future domination of the principles of liberty and democracy in the world
then what? Would we not be forced into an even worse state than that in which
we are now? . . . Can we avoid the logic of our declarations? And if we act
in accordance with that logic, would it not be a calamity for the nation and for
all mankind?"

"Wilson to House, Dec. 8, 1916, Baker Collection.

FROM PEACE WITHOUT VICTORY TO WAR 259

vember 20 and with Wilson on November 25 and proposed that the
Board caution American bankers against accepting the short-term
Treasury notes. Wilson, however., wanted a strong warning and was
pleased when the Board, on November 27, advised bankers that it did
not "regard it in the interest of the country at this time that they
invest in foreign Treasury bills of this character." Although Wall Street
grumbled and threatened to buy the Treasury notes anyway, the
British discreetly decided not to issue them.

While Wilson was debating with Lansing and House the wisdom of
launching his peace bolt, the civilian and military leaders of Germany
agreed that events had finally created a situation favorable to a peace
move. Poor harvests in the United States and Britain and the ravages
of the submarines would make the British susceptible, while the
spectacular success of the German campaign in Rumania had stabi-
lized the military situation. Bethmann-Hollweg and Hindenburg
reached accord on peace terms by November 7, and when Wilson did
not act during November the Germans grew restive. Bucharest fell on
December 6; two days later Hindenburg and the Emperor allowed
Bethmann-Hollweg to launch an independent peace campaign. If it
failed, unrestricted submarine warfare should be inaugurated in Jan-
uary, 1917.

On December 12, therefore, the Chancellor announced to an excited
Reichstag that the Imperial government was ready to join with its
enemies to end the war. 18 He said nothing about the German terms,
which, if they had been disclosed, would have shocked the world. They
included, in the East/ establishment of the Kingdom of Poland and
German annexation of the Baltic provinces of Courland and Lith-
uania; in the West, "guarantees in Belgium" or the annexation of
Liege and "corresponding areas," annexation of Luxemburg and the
French territories of Briey and Longwy, which contained great iron
deposits, strategic boundary adjustments in Alsace-Lorraine, and in-
demnities; overseas, the return of German colonies, except Kiaochow,
the Carolines, and the Marianas, and acquisition of all or part of the
Belgian Congo. 19

18 For his speech, see The New York Times, Dec. 13, 1916. The German
peace note is printed in Foreign Relations, 1916, Supplement, p. 90.

19 These were the terms agreed upon by the Emperor, Hindenburg, and
Bethmann-Hollweg. See Official German Documents, II, 1059-1062, 1064.
For an excellent discussion see Hans W. Gatzke, Germany's Drive to the West
(Baltimore, 1950), pp. 139-144.

260 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

On December 5 the American Charge in Berlin, Joseph G. Grew,
had told Bethmann-Hollweg, "What the President now most earnestly
desires is practical cooperation on part of German authorities in bring-
ing about a favorable opportunity for early and affirmative action." ^
On the day he announced Germany's willingness to negotiate, the
Chancellor dispatched an earnest appeal to Wilson: "It is my sincere
hope that this formal and solemn offer to enter immediately into peace
negotiations . . . will coincide with the wishes of the President of the
United States." 21 At first Wilson was depressed because he thought
the Germans had acted hastily. Within a week, however, he was writ-
ing and without any knowledge of the German terms "We are just
now . . . holding our breath for fear the overtures of the Central
Powers with regard to peace will meet with a rebuff instead of an ac-
ceptance." 22 Even Lansing admitted the Germans might sincerely
desire peace and that, in any event, they had put the Allies in a
difficult position. 23

On the day the German offer was announced, December 12, Wilson,
House, and Lansing were debating the President's proposed peace
message. Wilson at once revised his draft, which he submitted to
Lansing on December 17. Lansing thought the revision "far superior,
. , . much more forceful and convincing" than the original draft had
been. Actually, the note as sent to all belligerents on December 18 had
been vastly weakened by the force of House's and Lansing's advice and
of recent circumstances. The warning that the future policies of the
United States would depend upon a frank avowal by the belligerents of
their war objectives was absent. Also eliminated was the President's
virtual demand for a conference to discuss peace terms. In brief, the

20 Quoted in Bernstorff to House, Dec. 12, 1916, House Papers.

21 Grew to Secretary of State, Dec. 12, 1916, Foreign Relations, 1916,
Supplement, p. 87.

22 Wilson to P. A. Stovall, Dec. 19, 1916, Wilson Papers.

23 Robert Lansing, "The German Proposal to Enter on Peace Negotiations,'*
Dec. 14, 1916, ibid.

The Allies wasted no time in replying to the German offer. On December 15
the Russian Czar and Duma unanimously rejected the offer to negotiate, and
four days later Lloyd George, the new British Prime Minister, gave answer for
Britain and France. The Allies, Lloyd George declared, would be putting their
heads into a noose, with Germany holding the end of the rope, if they agreed to
enter a peace conference without knowing the German terms. The Prime
Minister, however, left large loopholes for future negotiations. The New York
Times, Dec. 16, 20, 1916, The official Allied reply was sent to the German
government on December 30, 1916. Ibid., Dec. 31, 1916.

FROM PEACE WITHOUT VICTORY TO WAR 26l

note of December 18 simply called upon the belligerents to define the
objectives for which they were fighting. 24

American reaction to Wilson's appeal^ which was published on
December 20, accurately reflected the commentator's attitude toward
the war. The defenders of Germany, the peace element, and the great
mass of noninterventionists hailed it as the beginning of the end of the
war. 25 In contrast, American champions of the Allied cause denounced
Wilson for playing Germany's game and approving Germany's attempt
to impose a dictated peace settlement. 26 Many German editors naturally
interpreted Wilson's move as co-operation with their own government,
while a large segment of the English and French press were in a state
of virtual frenzy.

Unperturbed by the violence of his critics at home and abroad, the
President now proceeded to carry his peace campaign beyond the level
of suggestion to direct negotiation with the German government. His
negotiations were based upon the hope that the Germans, at least,
would agree to the kind of reasonable peace he contemplated. The
unhappy truth was, however, that the German leaders now had no
intention of allowing Wilson to participate in the peace discussions.
They would be glad to use him to force the Allies to negotiate directly
with the German government, but their plans left small scope for the
play of Wilsonian idealism, and they still suspected that Wilson was
pro-British.

In order to head off any "meddling" by Wilson in the peace negotia-
tions, the German Foreign Office answered the President's request for
a definition of objectives by evading his query and suggesting the

24 The note is printed in Foreign Relations, 1916, Supplement, pp. 97-99.

25 There could be no doubt that an overwhelming majority of American
newspapers, periodicals, and public spokesmen approved the move. For samples
of this dominant opinion see the statements of Congressional leaders in The
New York Times, Dec. 21, 1916; New York World, Dec. 21, 22, 1916; Herbert
Croly to E. M. House, Dec. 26, 1916, House Papers; New Republic, IX (Dec.
30, 1916), 228-231; W. J. Bryan in The Commoner, Jan., 1917; New Yorker
Staats-Zeitung, Dec. 21, 1916; New Yorker Herold, Dec. 21, 1916.

26 E.g., H. C. Lodge to T. Roosevelt, Dec. 21, 1916, the Papers of Theodore
Roosevelt, in the Library of Congress; T. Roosevelt to G. W. Perkins, Jan. 11,
1917, ibid.; T. Roosevelt, statement in The New York Times, Jan. 4, 1917;
George Burton Adams to the Editor, Dec. 24, 1916, ibid., Dec. 26, 1916; Rev.
Dr. William T. Manning, cited in ibid.; Frank J. Mather, Jr., to the Editor,
Dec. 24, 1916, The Nation, GUI (Dec. 28, 1916), 607; Rev. Newell Dwight
Hillis et al, "To the Christians of America," The New York Times, Jan. 1,
1917.

262 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

speedy assembling of a conference of the belligerents only. After the
peace conference had accomplished its task, then the German govern-
ment stood ready to co-operate with the United States in preventing
future wars. Gravely disappointed by the Imperial government's refusal
frankly to state its terms. House and Bernstorff at once began personal
negotiations that they hoped would draw the Chancellor and the
President into sympathetic co-operation.

On December 29 Bernstorff informed his government that House
had invited him to take part in "absolutely confidential" negotiations.
The President was not concerned with territorial adjustments, the
Ambassador continued, but was anxious to obtain guarantees for the
future. In reply, Secretary Zimmermann sent specific and important
instructions. Germany positively did not desire American participation
in the actual peace negotiations. However, Bernstorff might say Ger-
many stood ready to sign an arbitration treaty with the United States
and to join with it in establishing a League of Nations and setting
general disarmament under way after the war. Moreover, Germany's
terms were moderate and did not include the annexation of Belgium.
On the other hand, Zimmermann concluded, only quick and decisive
action by the President could forestall a resumption of unrestricted
U-boat warfare.

On January 15 Bernstorff transmitted to House Zimmermann's
assurances for the future and his offer to sign a treaty of arbitration.
BernstorfFs message, House declared in astonishment, was the most
important pronouncement he had received from any belligerent gov-
ernment since the war began. "In my opinion," he advised Wilson,
"the best interests of the Allies and ourselves would be met by taking
Germany at her word and concluding peace as speedily as possible."
And if Bernstorff had expressed his government's views correctly, he
added, Wilson would be justified in forcing the Allies to consider peace
negotiations. 27

House's enthusiasm was soon dampened, however, when Bernstorff
finally admitted that his government did not want the President's
presence at the peace conference and that the German assurances ap-
plied only to the future, after the peace treaty had been signed. In
short, while the Imperial government would be delighted to use Wilson
to force the Allies to go to the peace table, at a time when the military
situation greatly favored Germany, there would be no room at that

27 House to Wilson, Jan. 18, 1917, Wilson Papers.

FROM PEACE WITHOUT VICTORY TO WAR 263

table for the President of the United States! The disclosure of this
important fact caused Wilson to lay his cards on the table. Germany
could have peace, he declared, if she were ready to state her terms
frankly., propose a reasonable settlement, and confide in him. "It oc-
curs to me that it would be well for you to see Bernstorff," Wilson
wrote House, ". . . and tell him this is the time to accomplish some-
thing, if they really and truly want peace. . . . Feelings, exasperations
are neither here nor there. Do they want me to help? I am entitled to
know because I genuinely want to help and have now put myself in a
position to help without favour to either side." 28

In other words, Wilson was not deceived by the evasive German
promise to join a League of Nations and co-operate in a general dis-
armament after the peace treaty had been signed. The first task was
to build a righteous peace, and the Germans had to give him frank
assurances that this was the kind of peace they desired. If they could
give such assurances, however, then he would gladly join hands with
them in compelling the Allies 29 to accept a settlement including, by
and large, the status quo ante, disarmament, and the establishment of
a new concert of power. Such a settlement did not offer victory to
Germany. It offered only the promise of the friendship of the United
States and a secure, peaceful, and prosperous future. Unfortunately for
mankind, time had already run out on the House-Bernstorff negotia-
tions. The men who governed Germany preferred victory, with an-
nexations and indemnities, because they were confident they could win
such a victory. The military and naval leaders, who had taken control
out of the Chancellor's hands, had decided on January 8 to launch the
all-out submarine campaign on February 1.

House did not know the secret, and Bernstorff kept it from him
until the last moment. 80 Meanwhile, was there any chance the Allies
would abandon their hope of victory and join with the United States

28 Wilson to House, Jan. 24, 1917, Baker Collection.

29 As will soon be shown, if Wilson had obtained such assurances from the
German government at this time, the Allies would probably have consented to a
negotiated settlement under Wilson's direction. But if the Allies had refused
to mediate on this basis, Wilson would almost certainly have used strong
diplomatic pressure to force them to the peace table.

30 Bethmann-Hollweg informed Bernstorff of the decision on January 16,
1917. Official German Documents, II, 1017-1019. It should be added that
Bernstorff urged his government to delay taking the fateful step until Wilson
had had a chance to complete his peace plans. Bernstorff to Foreign Office,
Jan. 19, 1917, ibid., p. 1021.

264 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

and Germany in peace negotiations? To find an answer to this ques-
tion 3 House had also been conducting secret talks with the Allied
representatives, particularly with Sir William Wiseman, chief of British
Intelligence in the United States. A few hours after Bernstorff made his
remarkable pronouncement on January 15 about Germany's willing-
ness to co-operate in peace plans, House told Wiseman Germany was
willing to negotiate on liberal terms. Five days later House advised
Wiseman that his government should agree immediately to enter a
peace conference, as this alone would prevent Germany from inaugu-
rating a submarine campaign that might soon bring Great Britain to
her knees. On January 26, therefore, Wiseman gave to House his gov-
ernment's reply. After telling House what he already suspected, that
he was in direct communication with the British Cabinet, Wiseman
declared that Great Britain was ready to begin peace discussions, pro-
vided the Germans were willing to negotiate on a reasonable basis. 31

In the meantime, however, the peace talks on the public level had
collapsed. On December 30 the Allied governments with one voice
indignantly rejected the German proposal of a peace conference. The
German government replied in a note to the neutral powers on Jan-
uary 10, accusing the Allies of prolonging the war for conquest and
answering the Allied aspersions. Two days later the Allied powers
made formal answer to Wilson's request of December 18. Without
specifying their objectives, they made it plain they intended to exact
huge reparations from the Central Powers and to destroy German
power in Europe.

In order to clarify the American position in the light of these de-
velopments, to strengthen House's hand, and to appeal directly to the
peoples of the countries at war, 32 Wilson decided to lay frankly before
the world his concept of a peace settlement the United States would
be willing to support in a League of Nations. Preliminary discussions
with House on January 3 and 11 and a reading of the provocative
suggestions outlined in the New Republic sa helped to crystallize his

31 House to Wilson, Jan. 20, 26, 1917, Wilson Papers. The British already
knew of the German decision to launch unrestricted submarine warfare, and it
is possible this was an important factor in their willingness to talk of peace.

82 "The real people I was speaking to was neither the Senate nor foreign
governments, as you will realize, but the people of the countries now at war "
Wilson to J. P. Gavit, Jan. 29, 1917, ibid.

83 In "Peace Without Victory," IX (Dec. 23, 1916), 201-202, "The Note
as Americanism;* IX (Dec. 30, 1916), 228-231, and "Beneath the Outcry"
IX (Dec. 30, 1916), 231-232, the editors of the New Republic called for a

FROM PEACE WITHOUT VICTORY TO WAR 265

thought. By January 16 he had completed the address and discussed it
with Lansing and Senator Stone; and on January 22, after the message
had been secretly telegraphed to the American embassies, he delivered
it before the Senate.

Wilson began by asserting the right of the United States to claim a
share in laying the broad foundations of a lasting peace. While his
government would have no voice in determining the specific details of
settlement, he continued, the world should know what kind of arrange-
ment the American people would help to guarantee. It must be a
"peace without victory," without humiliation, for only a "peace among
equals" could last. It must be a peace based upon the principle of the
equality of all nations, upon the right of peoples now under alien
domination to govern themselves, and upon the freedom of the seas
and an end to huge armies. These were "American principles, Ameri-
can policies," approved by forward-looking men everywhere. "I would
fain believe, 55 the President concluded, "that I am speaking for the
silent mass of mankind everywhere who have as yet had no place or
opportunity to speak their real hearts out concerning the death and
ruin they see to have come already upon the persons and the homes
they hold most dear." S4s

It was a clarion call to the Old World to shake off war's stupor
before European civilization was destroyed, and many men of good
will in all the Western nations were intoxicated by the President's
vision of a postwar order founded upon the principle of Christian love,
rather than upon the precepts of Realpolitik. But was it possible that
the millennium could be conceived during such a war and given birth
during a conference of mortal men? No one could answer this question,
but the reaction of liberal groups among the Allied nations and in the
British press seemed to offer hope that mankind was indeed ready to
meet the President's challenge. 36 In any event, Wilson had high hopes

negotiated peace, based upon the status quo ante, and warned that the Ameri-
can people would not support a dictated settlement of the old imperialistic
kind, involving annexations, indemnities, and attempts to construct a new im-
perialistic balance of power.

34 Ray S. Baker and William E. Dodd (eds.), The Public Papers of Woodrow
Wilson (6 vols., New York, 1925-27), The New Democracy, II, 407-414.

35 On January 26 the 89 Socialist members of the French Chamber of Depu-
ties hailed Wilson's speech as "the charter of the civilized universe," while on
the same day the British trades unions endorsed the League of Nations pro-
posal. The New York Times, Jan. 27, 1917. Even the Russian Foreign Office
affirmed its approval of the President's "broad humanitarian principles." Ibid.

266 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

and noble expectations. "I have said what everybody has been longing
for but has thought impossible," he declared. "Now it appears to be
possible." 36

Noble expressions, however, emphasize the tragic and abiding fact
of history: that a wide gulf separates the ideal from the attainable.
No one could sneer at Wilson's vision without abandoning his hope for
the eventual redemption of human society. But to believe that his
address embodied a practical solution would make cynics out of dream-
ers. Thus Wilson's effort had a tragic and ironic, as well as a noble,
quality. He affirmed the necessity of a negotiated peace, a "peace
without victory," and declared that no other kind of peace could last.
In the next breath he depicted a settlement that could be imposed only
when Germany's military power was broken and the Allies could dictate
the terms. 37 And if this came to pass, the possibility of a reasonable and
just peace, of a "peace without victory," was slight indeed.

On January 31 the German government finally gave its answer to
Wilson's request for the terms upon which it would have been willing
to negotiate. The German terms included territorial adjustments in the
East, "which would protect Germany and Poland against Russia,
strategically and economically"; additional colonies; the return of
French territory occupied by Germany, but "under reservations con-
cerning the establishment of strategic and economic boundaries, as well
as financial compensation"; the restoration of Belgium, but "under
certain guarantees assuring Germany's safety, which would have to be
reached by negotiations with the Belgian Government"; indemnifica-
tion of German corporations and individuals injured by the war; and
freedom of the seas. 88

Bernstorff delivered this message at the same time he gave Ger-
many's answer to the President's demand for a peace of justice and
understanding. After February 1, the Imperial government announced,

3 6 Ibid., Jan. 23, 1917.

37 For example, Wilson declared that governments derive their just powers
from the consent of the governed and that peoples under alien domination
should be given "inviolable security of life, of worship, and of industrial and
social development" in other words, complete autonomy, if not independence.
This was also what the Allies had promised to give the subject peoples of
Germany and Austria-Hungary. Certainly Germany and Austria would not have
negotiated for the dissolution of their empires. Nor would the British, for that
matter. It should be pointed out again, moreover, that the kind of peace the
German leaders thought they could obtain was a far cry from a "peace without
victory" among equals.

88 Official German Documents, II, 1048-1050.

FROM PEACE WITHOUT VICTORY TO WAR 267

submarines would sink without warning all ships, belligerent and neu-
tral, found in a zone around Great Britain, France, and Italy, and
in the eastern Mediterranean. The German Admiralty, however, would
allow one American passenger ship to sail between New York and
Falmouth weekly, provided the ship were painted with red and white
stripes and carried no contraband. The decision had been made de-
liberately, "in the certain consciousness that the commencement of an
unrestricted U-boat warfare would inevitably be followed by war with
America." 39

Thus it happened that the President found himself in the dilemma
he had tried so desperately to avoid. Had the Germans declared un-
restricted submarine warfare only against armed merchantmen, or even
against all belligerent shipping, he might well have acquiesced and
allowed the two giants to fight it out. But the Germans had quite
deliberately promised to sink on sight all American ships found in the
broad war zones, because destruction of neutral shipping was as much
essential to their plan as was destruction of Allied shipping. Moreover,
the strategists in the German Admiralty were confident they could
bring England to her knees before American manpower and resources
could be brought effectively to bear upon the conflict. "By entering
into the war," the chief of the Admiralty predicted, "the United States
Government will give up by a single move the sources of that com-
mercial prosperity which has given it the towering political prominence
which it now occupies. It stands face to face with the Japanese peril;
it can neither inflict material damage upon us, nor can it be of
material benefit to our enemies. ... I guarantee that for its part the
U-boat war will lead to victory." 40

Gould Wilson view this wholesale assault upon American commerce
with his customary philosophic detachment? He was indignant and
bitterly disappointed, but not belligerent. Indeed, he was so persuaded
that mankind's salvation depended upon a negotiated peace that he
hesitated even to break diplomatic relations with Germany, as that
might be the prelude to full-scale American participation. He revealed
his mental agony during a two-hour conference with Lansing on the
evening of January 31. Obsessed with the fear that American interven-

the "Report of the Second Subcommittee of the Committee of
Inquiry," June 18, 1920, Md. 9 I, 150.

* Chief of the Admiralty Staff Admiral von Holtzendorff to Chief of the
General Staff General Field Marshal von Hindenburg, Dec. 22, 1916, ibid., II,
1269-1270.

268 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

tion would hasten the disintegration of "white" civilization, he won-
dered whether America could perform her duty only by bearing the
German insult. None the less, he asked Lansing to prepare the note
announcing severance of relations with the German Empire. The fol-
lowing morning Colonel House arrived at the White House. He be-
lieved an immediate break was necessary, and Wilson and Lansing
agreed. Thus the decision was already made when the President pre-
sented Lansing's draft to the Cabinet on February 2 and discussed it
with Democratic senators soon afterward. 41

Even so, Wilson had not changed his opinion that the war should
end without victory, and he continued to hope that somehow he would
not have to drink the bitter cup. This hope he expressed movingly in
his address to a joint session of Congress on February 3 announcing
the break in relations he had just effected. The message was no such
condemnation of German "barbarism" as Lansing had advised him to
deliver, nor was it a stirring appeal to the American people to prepare
for inevitable war. "We do not desire any hostile conflict with the
Imperial German Government,'* Wilson declared. "We are the sincere
friends of the German people and earnestly desire to remain at peace
with the Government which speaks for them. We shall not believe that
they are hostile to us unless and until we are obliged to believe it." 42

During the remainder of February the President and probably a
large majority of people continued to hope for peace, while circum-
stances were developing that would soon force the nation to make a
decision. Army leaders who suggested rapid preparation for war were
abruptly told to mind their own business, but slowly and quietly the
government laid its plans. The naval appropriations bill, then under
discussion in the House, was immediately amended to provide in-
creased construction and to empower the President to seize shipyards
and munitions factories in the event of war or national emergency.
The War College was set to work on a conscription bill. Even so, the
administration acted as if war would not occur and precautions would
suffice. 43

41 "Memorandum on the Severance of Diplomatic Relations with Germany,"
Lansing Diary, Feb. 4, 1917; Josephus Daniels to Wilson, Feb. 2, 1917, Wilson
Papers, summarizing Wilson's views; The New York Times, Feb. 3, 1917.

42 The Public Papers, The New Democracy, II, 422-426. The note announcing
severance of relations was Lansing to Bernstorff, Feb. 3, 1917, Papers Relating
to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917, Supplement 1 (Washington.
1931), pp. 106-108.

48 Especially in so far as army preparations were concerned. The army bill

FROM PEACE WITHOUT VICTORY TO WAR 269

Thus it turned out that the three weeks following the break in
relations were a time of waiting, wasted in the false hope that no
overt act by the German government would compel abandonment of
neutrality. As the days of waiting ripened into weeks, the deep peace
longing of the people revived and the pacifist leaders had full oppor-
tunity to get a nation-wide campaign under way. New committees to
keep the country out of war were hastily organized, while all the old
ones, like the American Union Against Militarism, leaped into action.* 4
As in 1915 and at the height of the Sussex crisis^ monster rallies in the
great cities demanded that Americans stay out of the war zone. Bryan
made a fervent^ last-ditch campaign. In their desperate search for any
alternative to war, the peace groups demanded embargoes, a war
referendum, or a general strike if war occurred. At the other extreme,
the interventionists redoubled their propaganda, calling for a bold and
heroic defense of American rights. 45 But before March 1, at least, they
still represented only a small Eastern minority, and their appeals roused
no response among the rank and file of the people.

Still, the German campaign of sea terror was obviously succeeding
in one of its main objectives, the frightening of neutral shipping from
the seas. When the administration on February 7 refused to use battle-
ships to convoy ships through the war zone, the International Mer-
cantile Marine Company of New York canceled the sailing of its pas-
senger ships, the Saint Louis and Saint Paul. As more and more ships
stayed at their berths and goods began to pile up on wharves and in
warehouses, the demand for the arming and protection of American

passed by the House on February 22, 1917, for example, appropriated only a
normal $250 million for the coming fiscal year. As the Chief of Staff wrote,
"The President does not want us to do anything which will give Germany an
idea that we are getting ready for war, so we are not allowed to ask for any
money or to get ready in a serious way, until the soft pedal is taken off." H. L.
Scott to D. Hunter Scott, Feb. 15, 1917, the Papers of Hugh L. Scott, in the
Library of Congress.

44 For a comprehensive description of all the peace organizations and their
activities, see the New York World, Mar. 4, 1917.

45 American Rights Committee, appeal to the American people for a declara-
tion of war, The New York Times, Feb. 12, 1917; American Rights Committee,
"A CALL TO AMERICANS to assure the President that he will receive The
United Support of the American People in taking effective action to UPHOLD
AMERICAN RIGHTS and DEFEND THE NATIONAL HONOR," ibid.,
Feb. 26, 1917. For the activities of the Committee see George H. Putnam to
John G. Hibben, Feb. 2, 1917, the Papers of John Grier Hibben, in the Library
of Princeton University; R. G. Monroe to J. G. Hibben, Feb. 21, 1917, ibid.;
Paul D. Cravath to J. G. Hibben, Feb. 21, 1917, ibid.

270

WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

ships grew on all sides. Discussion of the subject within the administra-
tion began on February 6 and continued through February 23. At
Cabinet meetings on February 6 and 13 the President declared that,
while ships might arm for defense, he would not ask Congress for

Kirby in the New York World

Nailing It There

authority to arm them. Continuing their demand that the government
protect its sea-borne commerce, Houston, Lane, and McAdoo provoked
a crisis in the Cabinet on February 23. Wilson bitterly reproached the
champions of belligerency for appealing to the code duello and asserted
that the country was not willing to run the risk of war.

FROM PEACE WITHOUT VICTORY TO WAR 27 1

Two events coming immediately on the heels of the Cabinet session
of February 23 caused Wilson to change his mind. First, the Repub-
lican leaders in the Senate agreed on that day to filibuster the impor-
tant appropriations bills, in order to force Wilson to call the next
Congress into special session. 46 Secondly, on February 25 the President
received a message from London so shocking as to end all doubts of
German intentions. It was a dispatch from Page, transmitting a mes-
sage from the German Foreign Secretary, Zimmermann, to the Ger-
man Minister in Mexico City. In the event Germany and the United
States went to war, the message read, the Minister should propose to
the Mexican government an alliance by which Mexico would enter
the war against the United States and receive in return "the lost terri-
tory in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona." Moreover, President Car-
ranza should be asked to invite Japan to join the coalition. 47

The day after the receipt in Washington of the Zimmermann note
Wilson went before a joint session to ask Congress for authority, first,
to arm American merchant ships, and second, to "employ any other
instrumentalities or methods that may be necessary and adequate to
protect our ships and our people in their legitimate and peaceful pur-
suits on the seas." It was not, however, a warlike speech. Wilson did
not mention the Zimmermann note; he admitted that the "overt act"
had not been committed, and he voiced a fervent desire for continued
peace.* 8 Except for a few interventionist newspapers, which protested
that Wilson would not defend American commerce in any event, 49 the
press of the country overwhelmingly endorsed the President's request. 50

**The New York Times, Feb. 24, 1917; New York World, Feb. 24, 1917.
"I have also come to the conclusion that we must force an extra session," Lodge
wrote to Theodore Roosevelt, February 27, 1917 (Roosevelt Papers). "Although
I have not much faith in Congress we should be safer with Congress here than
we would be with Wilson alone for nine months."

* 7 Page to Secretary of State, Feb. 24, 1917, Foreign Relations, 1917, Sup-
plement 1, pp. 147148. The Zimmermann note had been sent to Bernstorff on
January 19, with instructions that he relay it to Minister von Eckhardt in
Mexico City. The British had intercepted the message and were able to decipher
it because they had BernstorfFs code. For an exciting account of this episode
see Burton J. Hendrick, The Life and Letters of Walter H, Page (3 vols., Gar-
den City, N. Y., 1924-26), III, 331-348.

48 The Public Papers, New Democracy, II, 428-432.

4 New York Sun, Feb. 27, 1917; Boston Herald, Feb. 27, 1917; Boston
Advertiser, Feb. 27, 1917.

50 There is a comprehensive survey of press opinion in The New York Times,
Feb. 27, 1917. Even the spokesmen of the peace element approved the idea of
armed neutrality, as they saw in it a possible alternative to full-fledged war.

S2?2 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

Indeed, there was little opposition in either house of Congress to
giving the President authority simply to arm merchantmen. Extreme
noninterventionists like La Follette would vote against such a bill, to
be sure, but they were not prepared to block it by desperate obstruc-
tion. The entire controversy that developed revolved, therefore, around
Wilson's additional request for broad authority to use "any other in-
strumentalities or methods' 5 to protect American lives and commerce.
Senate Republican leaders like Lodge did not object to giving the
President authority to wage limited war, but they were determined
that Congress should be in session. The extreme anti-interventionists in
the Senate, however, so strongly opposed giving Wilson virtual blanket
authority that they would fight an armed ship bill with such a provi-
sion to the point of a filibuster. When this fact became apparent, the
Republican leaders quickly abandoned their own plans for a filibuster
to force a special session and let the noninterventionists carry the
burden of opposition and receive the opprobrium.

That the President would encounter bitter opposition was evident
from the beginning. In spite of heavy administration pressure, the
House Foreign Affairs Committee refused to empower the President to
use "other instrumentalities or methods" and would only approve a
bill authorizing the arming of merchant ships. 51 Just at the moment,
therefore, when it appeared neither house would grant the virtual war-
making authority he desired, the President gave the Zimmermann note
to the Associated Press, which published it on March 1. The bolt
struck so suddenly that Congress and the country were stunned and
confused. Could this fantastic news be true, or was the note, as George
Sylvester Viereck, the leading Germanophile, claimed, "unquestionably
a brazen forgery planted by British agents" ? 52 Most doubts were dis-

Professor Carlton J. H. Hayes of Columbia University first made the proposal,
which was soon taken up by peace groups all over the country, for armed
neutrality instead of war. See C. J. H. Hayes, "Memorandum on Constructive
Action if Confronted by Alternative of War," sent by House to Wilson, Feb. 8,
1917, Wilson Papers; C. J. H. Hayes, "Which? War Without a Purpose? Or
Armed Neutrality with a Purpose?" The Survey, XXXVII (Feb. 10, 1917),
535-538; New York Evening Post, Feb. 10, 1917; The Nation, CIV (Feb. 15,
1917), 178-179; Paul U. Kellogg, "The Fighting Issues," The Survey, XXXVII
(Feb. 17, 1917), 572-577.

51 The House bill also prohibited the insuring by the War Risk Bureau of
ships carrying munitions. A. S. Burleson, penciled note to Wilson, c. Feb. 27,
1917, the Papers of Albert S. Burleson, in the Library of Congress; Wilson to
Burleson, c. Feb. 27, 1917, ibid.; The New York Times, Feb. 28, Mar. 1, 1917.

52 G. S. Viereck to A. S. Burleson, Mar, 1, 1917, Burleson Papers.

FROM PEACE WITHOUT VICTORY TO WAR 273

pelled at once 5S when Wilson, in reply to a pointed inquiry by the
Foreign Relations Committee,, affirmed the note's authenticity. 54

American incredulity now burst into anger that swept the country.
Not since August, 1914, had the people been so aroused or so con-
vinced of the hostile intentions of the German government. The House
of Representatives quickly passed the armed ship bill on March I,
403 to 13, but without giving the President broad authority. 55 In the
Senate, however, administration leaders pressed a bill empowering the
President to wage an undeclared naval war; and the Republican lead-
ers were willing to agree, since the important appropriation bills could
not be passed before March 5 and Wilson would have to call a special
session in any event. But a group of eleven or twelve die-hard non-
interventionists, including Senators La Follette and George W. Norris,
refused to abdicate the warmaking power to the Chief Executive and
insisted on talking the bill to death. 56 The newspapers fiercely de-
nounced the "dastardly moral treason" of these alleged "descendants
of Benedict Arnold," but it remained for Wilson to coin the phrase to

53 Not all, however. The defenders of Germany continued to charge that the
note was a piece of British humbuggery, until Zimmermann himself admitted
on March 3, 1917, that he had sent the note, pointing out that Eckhardt had
been instructed to suggest an alliance to the Mexican government only in the
event the United States declared war on Germany. Official statement, Mar. 3,
1917, The New York Times, Mar. 4, 1917. Zimmermann further defended him-
self in a speech before the Reichstag on March 29, 1917, ibid., Mar. 31, 1917.

**Ibid., Mar. 2, 1917; H. G. Lodge to T. Roosevelt, Mar. 2, 1917, Roosevelt
Papers.

55 The House also prohibited the War Risk Bureau from insuring ships carry-
ing munitions. The New York Times, Mar. 2, 1917. The anti-interventionists in
the House had also tried to add an amendment forbidding any armed merchant
ship from carrying munitions. This, the so-called Cooper amendment, received
125 votes. For significant comment see New Republic, X (Mar. 24, 1917),
218-219.

60 The senators who prevented passage of the armed ship bill objected to
giving extraordinary authority to the President and protection to ships carrying
munitions. They charged that Wilson had brought the bill forward near the
end of the session and then had sprung the Zimmermann note solely to stam-
pede the country and coerce Congress into giving him dictatorial power. And,
they argued, if the armed ship bill were vital to the country's safety, then
Wilson could easily call Congress into special session and obtain passage of the
measure in a short time.

Most of the so-called filibusterers later issued statements defending their
action and claiming there had been no real filibuster. See R. M. La Follette,
"The Armed Ship Bill Meant War," La Follette's Magazine, IX (Mar., 1917),
1_4 ; w. J. Stone to the Editor, March 4, 1917, New York World, Mar. 5,
1917; statements by Senators Vardaman, O'Gorman, Kenyon, Cummins, and
Lane, March 6, 1917, in The New York Times, Mar. 7, 1917.

274 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

fit the crime. Immediately after the Senate adjourned he indignantly
declared: "A little group of willful men, representing no opinion but
their own, have rendered the great Government of the United States
helpless and contemptible." 5T

Thus the Sixty-Fourth Congress passed out of existence amid a
display of bad temper on all sides and the country entered upon a
month of increasing tension. After obtaining opinions from Lansing
and Attorney General Gregory that arming merchant ships would not
contravene the piracy statute of 1819, and after discussing the implica-
tions of such action with his naval advisers, 58 the President on March
9 announced he would forthwith put guns and naval crews on mer-
chant ships and called Congress into special session for April 16.
Soon afterward the work of arming the ships was begun and the crews
were ordered to fire on any submarine that approached within striking
range or acted suspiciously.

By this time, also, public opinion had reached a point of near alarm,
and for the first time since the outbreak of the war the interventionists
found a sympathetic audience. On March 18 submarines sank without
warning and with heavy loss of life three American merchant vessels,
the City of Memphis, Illinois, and Vigilancia. It was the "overt act"
for which the President had been waiting, and Theodore Roosevelt
issued a call for war, the echoes of which reverberated over the coun-
try, from New York to the plains of Kansas. 59 At this moment of

57 I&wf.,Mar. 5, 1917.

58 There is a group of documents in the Papers of Josephus Daniels, in the
Library of Congress, relating to the armed ship question. The most important
are Daniels to Wilson, Mar. 9, 1917, two letters; memorandum by Commander
F. H. Schofield for the Secretary of the Navy, dated Mar. 9, 1917; an undated
memorandum entitled "Rules for the Conduct of American Merchant Vessels";
draft of a proclamation announcing the arming of American merchant ships;
and a memorandum in Daniels' handwriting of a conversation with P. A. S.
Franklin, president of the International Mercantile Company.

59 Roosevelt's statement is printed in The New York Times, Mar. 20, 1917.
The Union League of New York demanded adoption of a war declaration on
March 20. The following day the New York World seconded the demand. On
March 22 a mass meeting of twelve thousand persons at Madison Square
Garden cheered for Roosevelt and war. On March 23 a group of prominent
Socialists, including William English Walling, Charles Edward Russell, Upton
Sinclair, and William J. Ghent, condemned the antiwar resolution adopted by
the Socialist National Executive Committee. On March 24 Governor Arthur
Capper of Kansas, heretofore an antipreparedness and antiwar leader, declared
the United States had to resist the "murderous assaults" of the German gov-
ernment. The New York Times, Mar. 21, 23, 24, 25, 1917; New York World,
Mar. 21, 1917.

FROM PEACE WITHOUT VICTORY TO WAR 275

mounting tension occurred the first Russian Revolution^ with the
overthrow of the autocratic Gzarist government and the establishment
of a constitutional monarchy. To Americans who had tried to convince
themselves the Allies were fighting for democracy, the news from
Petrograd ended all doubt as to the issues of the war. The fear of
Russian despotism and future aggression, which all along had been the
greatest single handicap to Allied spokesmen in the United States, was
at once swept away.

It was also the hour of supreme crisis for the peace forces. If any-
thing, their appeals during the last critical days were more fervent than
before. 60 On the extreme left wing, the Socialist leader, Eugene V.
Debs, demanded a general strike if Rockefeller, Morgan, and the rest
of the Wall Street crowd succeeded in their insidious war campaign.
The more moderate peace spokesmen continued to petition the Presi-
dent and to hope for a miracle. As for the great mass of citizenry, not
during the height of the Lusitania and Sussex crises had there been
such an outpouring of peace sentiment. The public opinion of a great
nation during a period of crisis and stimulated hysteria cannot be
measured with any precision, for the great mass of people have no
means of expressing their sentiments, while spokesmen for organized
groups are necessarily minorities. From such evidence as is available,
however, one might hazard the guess that even as late as April 1, 1917,
the majority of people were still firmly for peace. 61

The week from about March 12 to 20 was also the time of Wilson's
Gethsemane, when events on the seas compelled him to a reluctant
decision for war. During the early part of this week of spiritual agony

60 Committee for Democratic Control (Amos Pinchot, R. S. Bourne, Max
Eastman, Winthrop D. Lane), "Do the People Want War?" New Republic, X
(Mar. 3, 1917), 145; Emergency Peace Federation, "Mothers, Daughters and
Wives of Men," The New York Times, Mar. 29, 1917; American Union
Against Militarism, "To the People of New York," ibid.; W. J. Bryan, "To the
Members of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives," Mar. 28, 1917,
the Papers of Thomas J. Walsh, in the Library of Congress.

61 Evidence supporting this generalization abounds in the papers of Claude
Kitchin, W. J. Bryan, Library of Congress, Warren Worth Bailey, George W.
Norris, Thomas J. Walsh, Robert M. La Follette, Oswald G. Villard, and other
such public leaders. The present writer knows how deceptive such evidence can
be. Yet one cannot read through the thousands of letters, telegrams, and peti-
tions from people in all walks of life and all sections of the country without
being profoundly impressed by the depth of the popular desire for peace and
the positive hostility to a war resolution in response to the German submarine
challenge.

276 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

he remained secluded in the White House. From all sides he was
bombarded with advice and pleadings for peace and for war. From
Page came an appeal to bolster the credit of the British government,
lest the whole system of international exchange collapse. 62 For the first
time came reports that the Allies were in a desperate military situation,
that Allied morale was cracking, and that only American intervention
could turn the tide. Finally, it was obvious the German campaign
against sea-borne commerce was succeeding even beyond the expecta-
tions of the most ardent champions of the submarine. Nearly 600,000
tons of Allied and neutral shipping were sunk during March, 1917, and
the toll reached nearly 900,000 tons the following month.

In spite of these appeals and warnings, the President still hesitated.
On March 19, the day after the sinking of the three American ships,
he conferred with Lansing and told him he opposed immediate action.
The following afternoon Wilson called the Cabinet to consider the
crisis and advise him on the course he should follow. McAdoo, Hous-
ton, Redfield, and Baker urged an immediate declaration of war.
Lansing agreed, pointing out the ideological issues and the importance
of speedy American aid to the Allies. Wilson replied that he did not
see how he could speak of a war for democracy in addressing Congress.
Secretary Wilson and Attorney General Gregory concurred with Lan-
sing; his eyes filled with tears, Daniels admitted there was no other
course. And so all of them declared. "The solemnity of the occasion as
one after another spoke was increasingly impressive and showed in
every man's face as he rose from the council table and prepared to
leave the room." 6S

The President gave his advisers no sign of his decision, but the next
day he called Congress into special session for April 2, "to receive a
communication concerning grave matters of national policy." More-
over, his action during the ten days that followed left no doubt that he
had resolved to ask for a war resolution. On March 24, for example,
he ordered the withdrawal of American diplomatic and relief officials

2 In an urgent telegram to Lansing on March 5, 1917, Page warned that the
British government had absolutely reached the end of the resources it could use
to obtain credit in the United States. If the United States government did not
supply the credit or guarantee a large Allied loan, Page added, the great war
trade would come to an end. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1917, Supplement 2 (2 vols., Washington, 1932), I, 516-518.

63 "Memorandum of the Cabinet Meeting, 2 : 30-5 P.M. Tuesday, March 20,
1917," Lansing Diary.

FROM PEACE WITHOUT VICTORY TO WAR 277

from Belgium. On the same day he authorized Daniels to begin con-
versations with the British Admiralty for the co-ordination of the naval
operations of the two countries. On March 25 and 26 he called the
National Guard of the Eastern, Midwestern, and Far Western states
into the federal service, and on March 25 he increased the enlisted
strength of the navy to the statutory limit of 87,000.

Meanwhile, Wilson had begun writing his war message. Gethsemane
was over; the decision was made. But the road ahead pointed straight
to Golgotha, and in his turmoil he could find no sleep at night. Colonel
House came to Washington on March 27 and tried to calm his spirit,
but the anguish would not leave him and on April 1 he sent for Frank
Cobb, editor of the New York World, and unburdened his soul.

He said he couldn't see any alternative, that he had tried every way he knew
to avoid war [Gobb later recalled]. ... He said war would overturn the
world we had known; that so long as we remained out there was a preponder-
ance of neutrality, but that if we joined with the Allies the world would be
off the peace basis and onto a war basis. ... He had the whole panorama
in his mind. He went on to say that so far as he knew he had considered
every loophole of escape and as fast as they were discovered Germany de-
liberately blocked them with some new outrage.

Then he began to talk about the consequences to the United States. He
had no illusions about the fashion in which we were likely to fight the
war. . . .

"Once lead this people into war,*' he said, "and they'll forget there ever
was such a thing as tolerance. To fight you must be brutal and ruthless, and
the spirit of ruthless brutality will enter into the very fibre of our national
life, infecting Congress, the courts, the policeman on the beat, the man in the
street." . . .

He thought the Constitution would not survive it; that free speech and the
right of assembly would go. He said a nation couldn't put its strength into
a war and keep its head level; it had never been done.

"If there is any alternative, for God's sake, let's take it," he exclaimed. 64

At no time during this critical period did the President recognize the
necessity for American intervention on idealistic grounds or because
such intervention was necessary to protect the security of the United
States. Indeed, had he been a free agent he would probably have
adhered to the course of armed neutrality he had embarked upon on

64 Quoted in Baker, Wilson, VI, 490, 506-507.

278 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

March 9. 65 Much of his despair stemmed from the fact that events
beyond his control were impelling the nation blindly into a war it did
not want. In brief, the country had now arrived at the situation Wilson
had described so vividly in the first draft of his peace note of Decem-
ber 18, 1916: "If any other nation now neutral should be drawn in, it
would know only that it was drawn in by some force it could not re-
sist, because it had been hurt and saw no remedy but to risk still
greater, it might be even irreparable, injury, in order to make the
weight in the one scale or the other decisive; and even as a participant
it would not know how far the scales must tip before the end would
come or what was being weighed in the balance!" 66

What forces and events impelled a divided nation and a distraught
President and Congress to do the thing they had fought so desperately
to avoid?

The progressives, pacifists, and Socialists gave an answer in 1917
that was reiterated by the Nye Committee in 1934 and 1935. To these
observers, the causes for American intervention were mainly economic
and psychological. That was what Senator George W. Norris meant by
his assertion, made during his speech against the war resolution, that
the Senate would stamp the dollar mark on the American flag if it
approved a declaration of belligerency. Before the United States en-
tered the war American bankers had lent $2,145 million to the Allied
governments for war purposes. The economic masters of the United
States had invested the savings of the American people in an Allied
victory a cause they could not now afford to abandon. Moreover so
the progressive-pacifist argument ran by April, 1917, American pros-

65 During the last days of March, Wilson received four letters of great sig-
nificance, from J. P. Gavit, Senator Joseph I. France of Maryland, Matthew
Hale, and Senator Gilbert M. Hitchcock of Nebraska, all of them urging him
to adhere to armed neutrality and a course of limited participation as the only
sensible method of defending American rights on the seas and avoiding en-
tanglement in the peace plans of the Allies. Gavit to Wilson, Mar. 25, 1917;
France to Wilson, Mar. 28, 1917; Hale to Wilson, Mar. 28, 1917; Hitchcock
to Wilson, Mar. 29, 1917, all in Wilson Papers. In his reply to Hale, Mar. 31,
1917, ibid., Wilson declared he would be inclined to adhere to armed neutral-
ity, but that such a course was no longer feasible. "To defend our rights upon
the seas, we must fight submarines," he explained. ". . . Germany has inti-
mated that she would regard the only sort of warfare that is possible against
her submarines as an act of war and would treat any persons who fell into her
hands from the ships that attacked her submarines as beyond the pale of law.
Apparently, to make even the measures of defense legitimate we must obtain
the status of belligerents."

Baker, Wilson, VI, 382.

FROM PEACE WITHOUT VICTORY TO WAR 279

perity had become so dependent upon a continuation of the war trade
that the country went to war also to protect it. 67 Munitions-makers,
who sought a new market for their products, added their voices to the
rising clamor for war. Finally, propagandists, voluntary and hired, had
misled Americans into believing that the Allies were fighting for
democracy and that Germany's triumph would spell the doom of
Western civilization. These and other forces more subtle had caused
the administration to pursue an unneutral course from the beginning
to enforce the rules against Germany, but not against Britain and had
compelled Germany to adopt desperate measures in 1917.

At the other extreme, Walter Lippmann, in a series of articles in the
New Republic published in 1916-17 and later in U.S. Foreign Policy:
Shield of the Republic developed the thesis that the United States
had followed a deliberate policy of unneutrality, had accepted British
transgressions of international law and stood firm against German
transgressions, because the American people condemned the objectives
for which Germany was fighting. When German success seemed immi-
nent, Lippmann continued, the United States had gone to war to
preserve the supremacy of the Atlantic Community in Europe and to
protect its vital stake in a peaceful and orderly world.

What is the truth? Does it lie somewhere in between these extremes?
The events, forces, and developments from 1914 to 1917 were too
complex to permit any simple generalizations on the causes of Ameri-
can intervention. There is no evidence that bankers or munitions-
makers influenced the decision for war. On the contrary, because it
furnished deadly ammunition to the progressives and pacifists, the sup-
port that bankers and munitions-makers gave the preparedness and
intervention movements was a great obstacle to the success of those
movements. The power of the propagandists has been vastly overrated,
and it is doubtful if they played a major role. 69 Although Lansing and
occasionally House shared Lippmann's views, they had only an inci-
dental influence on Wilson.

67 The foreign trade of the United States with the Allied countries increased
from $824,860,237 in 1914, to $1,991,747,493 in 1915, to $3,214,480,547 in
1916.

68 The passage in U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic (Boston,
1943) is pp. 33-39; see also Walter Lippmann to Wilson, Mar. 11, 1917,
Wilson Papers, enclosing "Memorandum" on the reasons for the American de-
termination to resist the German bid for domination of Europe.

69 See above, pp. 145-148.

280 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

In the final analysis, American policy was determined by the Presi-
dent and public opinion, which had a great, if unconscious, influence
upon him. It was Wilson who decided to accept the British maritime
system in the first instance, who set the American government against
unrestricted use of the submarine, and who made the final decision for
war instead of a continuance of armed neutrality.

Before the summer of 1916 the President's policies, on the whole,
constituted a differential neutrality, favorable to the Allies. This was
true because Wilson accepted the British sea measures and resisted the
German, a course that seemed necessary in the light of a number of
factors: German unfriendliness, as manifested by the network of in-
trigue and conspiracies against American neutrality, the invasion of
Belgium and the deliberate killing of civilians on the high seas, and the
fact that there seemed to be a hope for a reasonable settlement by
working with Britain and France.

The policy of differential neutrality was, therefore, grounded upon
Wilson's personal assessment of the situation, which in turn was de-
termined by his moralistic judgment of events. When he became con-
vinced the Allied governments did not want a reasonable peace, he
began to change differential neutrality into impartiality. Moreover, he
began to shift his personal moral condemnation from Germany to
Great Britain. And in the process he came to the firm conviction that
neither side was fighting for worthy objectives and that the hope of
the world lay in a negotiated settlement and a future concert of all
the powers.

These were the concepts paramount in Wilson's mind toward the
end of 1916 and in early 1917. So long as the German government paid
lip service, at least, to the Sussex pledge he would have pursued his
neutral course relentlessly. Or, if the German leaders had at any time
desired a genuinely reasonable settlement and evidenced a willingness
to help build a peaceful and orderly postwar world, they would have
found a friend in the White House eager to join with them in accom-
plishing these high goals.

Given the circumstances existing at the beginning of 1917, therefore,
the Germans had three alternatives, which were carefully considered
by them. Firstly, they could have accepted Wilson's leadership in the
peace campaign, which would also have involved abandoning their
hopes for winning on the fields of battle the ambitious program they
had set for themselves. Secondly, they could have rejected Wilson's

FROM PEACE WITHOUT VICTORY TO WAR 28 1

mediation and continued their "legal/ 9 although devastating, sub-
marine campaign in the hope of obtaining a draw. Or, thirdly, they
could run the risks involved in American intervention by launching an
overwhelming submarine campaign against all commerce. They took
the third alternative because their strategists told them it would bring
complete victory and a chance to establish German domination in
Europe, if not in the world. 70

The German decision to gamble on all-out victory or complete ruin,
therefore, alone compelled Wilson to break diplomatic relations, to
adopt a policy of armed neutrality, and finally to ask for a declaration
of war because American ships were being sunk and American citi-
zens were being killed on the high seas, and because armed neutrality
seemed no longer possible. Considerations of America's alleged eco-
nomic stake in an Allied victory did not influence Wilson's thought
during the critical weeks from February 1 to April 2, 1917. Nor did
considerations of the national interest, or of the great ideological issues
at stake in the conflict.

In response to the President's call Congress assembled on the ap-
pointed day, April 2, and with the help of the independents the Demo-
crats organized the House and elected Champ Clark Speaker again.
At eight-thirty in the evening Wilson went before the joint session and
read his message before the expectant throng. He reviewed the recent
German warfare against commerce, which he termed "warfare against
mankind." He declared that armed neutrality was no longer feasible
and that there was no choice but to admit that the recent course of
the Imperial German government was war against the United States.
After enumerating the steps necessary to put the country on a war
footing, Wilson abruptly turned to a discussion of the issues and
objectives for which the nation would fight. The American people now
knew the Imperial government, like all autocracies, was a natural foe
of liberty. Therefore, "The world must be made safe for democracy.
Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political
liberty." And then, with one great peroration, which has gone ringing
down the years, the long ordeal of neutrality was over:

It is a distressing and oppressive duty, Gentlemen of the Congress, which I
have performed in thus addressing you. There are, it may be, many months

70 The sanest and most convincing opinion on German motivation yet written
was offered by the majority of the Reichstag's committee of inquiry in its
report dated June 18, 1920, Official German Documents, I, 128-150.

282 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

of fiery trial and sacrifice ahead of us. It is a fearful thing to lead this great
peaceful people into war, into the most terrible and disastrous of all wars,
civilization itself seeming to be in the balance. But the right is more precious
than peace, and we shall fight for the things which we have always carried
nearest our hearts, for democracy, for the right of those who submit to
authority to have a voice in their own Governments, for the rights and
liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert
of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the
world itself at last free. To such a task we can dedicate our lives and our
fortunes, everything that we are and everything that we have, with the pride
of those who know that the day has come when America is privileged to
spend her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth and
happiness and the peace which she has treasured. God helping her, she can
do no other. 71

From the halls of Congress the deafening thunder of applause
reverberated round the world. Men in the trenches took hope, and the
Allied peoples thanked God their cause was not lost. Even Wilson's
bitterest critics, Lodge, Root, and Roosevelt, admitted the President
had epitomized their own thoughts. But for Wilson it was not a day of
triumph but of sadness and, one is tempted to believe, of doubt and
soul searching. Tumulty recalled a scene in the White House after
Wilson returned from the Capitol, when the President broke down and
sobbed like a child. 72 The story is probably fictional, but it conveys
poetic truth.

In spite of the opposition in both houses of men like Claude Kitchin,
George W. Norris, and Robert M. La Follette, the war resolution was
quickly passed. On April 4 the Senate adopted the resolution, 82 to 6;
at 3:12 A.M. on April 6 the House concurred, 373 to 50; and at 1: 18
the following afternoon Wilson signed the resolution. Minutes later the
news was sent by telegraph and wireless around the world. A new
epoch in the history of the United States had begun.

71 The Public Papers, War and Peace, I, 6-16.

72 J. P. Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson As 1 Know Him (Garden Gity a N.Y.,
1921), p. 259.

Essay on Sources

PREFACE

The following essay does not include all works and sources on American
history for the period 1910-1917. Even if it were susceptible of compilation,
such a list would more than fill the present volume and would be a source
of confusion rather than of help to students. The writer, however, has en-
deavored to include all significant and relevant works and sources and to
arrange them in an orderly and purposeful manner.

Thus, the first seven sections include the general sources manuscripts,
newspapers, periodicals, published writings and memoirs, and the like that
relate in a broad way to the politics, personalities, and diplomacy of the
period. In contrast, the last sections are arranged roughly to follow the
chapters of the book and include monographs, articles, and other works that
bear specifically upon the subjects under which they are listed.

Finally, the author has attempted to avoid repeating in this bibliography
the references that he lists in the footnotes. It has not been possible to avoid
such repetition entirely; generally, however, the footnotes cite letters, diaries,
and newspaper and periodical articles and editorials, while the bibliographical
essay attempts to survey works and sources in a more general and compre-
hensive manner.

MANUSCRIPTS

The Wilson Administration

Of greatest importance for the period from 1912 to 1917 are the Papers of
Woodrow Wilson in the Library of Congress, which are excellently arranged
and, in spite of their huge volume, easily used. They are open to advanced
students by permission of Mrs. Woodrow Wilson. An important supplement
to the Wilson Papers is the Ray Stannard Baker Collection, Library of Con-
gress, which Baker gathered while writing the President's authorized biogra-
phy. The Baker Collection contains correspondence not available in the

383

284 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

Wilson Papers, transcripts of interviews with and memoranda by many of the
leaders of the period, and a large collection of articles on Wilson. For certain
fields, particularly the diplomacy of the neutrality period, the Papers and
massive Diary of Edward M. House, Yale University Library, rival the Wilson
Papers in significance.

The papers of most of the chief figures of the Wilson administration are
available and together constitute a fairly complete documentation of the
period. They include the Papers of William Jennings Bryan in the Library
of Congress and the National Archives; the Papers, Diary, and Desk Diary
of Robert Lansing, Library of Congress; the Papers, Diary, and Desk Diary
of Josephus Daniels, Library of Congress, a collection as large as the Wilson
Papers; and the Papers of Albert S. Burleson, Library of Congress. The Papers
of David F. Houston, Houghton Library, Harvard University, are fragmen-
tary and should be supplemented by the Department of Agriculture Papers
in the National Archives, which contain Houston's letter-books. The Papers
of William B. Wilson are in the Pennsylvania Historical Society, Philadelphia,
and should be used with the Department of Labor's file in the National Ar-
chives. The Papers of Lindley M. Garrison, Princeton University Library,
are extremely disappointing; for Garrison's correspondence one has to go to
the Wilson Papers and the War Department Papers in the National Archives.
The Papers of Newton D. Baker, Wilson's other Secretary of War, have just
come to the Library of Congress. The Papers of William G. McAdoo, in the
Library of Congress, will not be opened until around 1960. The Papers of
Joseph P. Tumulty, in the possession of the family in Washington, are val-
uable for the light they shed on patronage policies. Most of Tumulty's im-
portant letters are in the Wilson Papers.

Among administration officials of the second rank, the papers of the fol-
lowing are most important: Frank L. Polk, Diary and Papers, Yale Univer-
sity Library; Chandler P. Anderson, Diary and Papers, Library of Congress;
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park; Louis F, Post, Library
of Congress; Francis Burton Harrison, Library of Congress; Charles S. Ham-
lin, Diary and Scrapbooks, Library of Congress; Robert W. Woolley, Library
of Congress; and John Purroy Mitchel, Library of Congress.

The Papers of Walter H. Page, Houghton Library, Harvard University, in-
clude not only Page's voluminous letters and intimate Diary but also the
London Embassy files for the period 1913-18, The Diary of Joseph C. Grew,
Houghton Library, sheds much light on German developments, 1913-17. The
Papers of John Lind, Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul, bear chiefly on
Mexico during the period 1913-17.

Of the papers of military leaders during the prewar period, the Papers of
Hugh L. Scott, Tasker H. Bliss, Leonard Wood, and John J. Pershing, all in
the Library of Congress, are the most important. The Wood Papers are tightly

ESSAY ON SOURCES 285

sealed, but the Scott Papers are indispensable for a study of Mexican-Ameri-
can relations during this period.

The Senate

Of great value for a study of Democratic policies in the Senate and of
public opinion in various sections are the Papers of John Sharp Williams,
Library of Congress; Thomas J. Walsh, Library of Congress; Furnifold M.
Simmons, Duke University Library; Francis J. Newlands, Yale University
Library; John H. Bankhead, Alabama Department of Archives, Montgomery;
Benjamin R. Tillman, University of South Carolina Library; Gilbert M.
Hitchcock, Library of Congress; Thomas R. Marshall, Indiana Historical
Society, Indianapolis; Lee S. Overman, University of North Carolina Library;
and Paul O. Rusting, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison.

Republican insurgency, the revolt of 1910-12, progressive Republican re-
action to Wilsonian reform, and Midwestern public opinion are revealed in
enormous detail in the papers of the leading insurgent senators: Miles Poin-
dexter, Alderman Library, University of Virginia; Jonathan P. Dolliver, State
Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa City; Albert J. Beveridge, Library of Con-
gress; Moses Clapp and Knute Nelson, Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul;
Albert B. Cummins, Historical Memorial and Art Department of Iowa, Des
Moines; Joseph H. Bristow, Kansas Historical Society, Topeka; John D.
Works, Stanford University Library and University of California Library;
George W. Norris, Library of Congress; William E. Borah, Library of Con-
gress; and Robert M. La Follette, in the possession of Miss Fola La Follette,
Washington.

Conservative Republican policies in the Senate are amply revealed in the
Papers of Henry Cabot Lodge, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston; of
Elihu Root, Library of Congress; and of Philander C. Knox, Library of
Congress. The Lodge Papers are temporarily closed. The Root Papers are
somewhat disappointing, but the Diary of Chandler P. Anderson, Library of
Congress, records many intimate conversations with the distinguished New
Yorker.

The House of Representatives

The papers of most of the House Democratic leaders during the Wilson
period are now available. The Papers of Oscar W. Underwood, Alabama
Department of Archives, Montgomery, and of Hal D. Flood, Library of
Congress, are disappointing; but the Papers of Carter Glass, Alderman
Library, University of Virginia, and of Claude Kitchin, University of North
Carolina Library, are immensely rich.

The papers of two independent congressmen, William Kent, Yale University
Library, and Warren Worth Bailey, Princeton University Library, contain

286 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

important materials on progressive politics, conservation, the Japanese ques-
tion, and the preparedness and peace movements. For reaction in the upper
Middle West to Wilson's policies and the war see the Papers of Charles A.
Lindbergh, Minnesota Historical Society, and of Nils P. Haugen, State His-
torical Society of Wisconsin. The Papers of Richmond P. Hobson, Library of
Congress, are loaded with materials on the prohibition crusade,

Republican Leaders

Most important in this group are the Papers of Theodore Roosevelt and
of William Howard Taft, both in the Library of Congress. Both collections
are enormous and contain voluminous materials on all phases of public
affairs.

Significant for a study of progressive Republican opinion and politics are
the Papers of William Allen White, Library of Congress; Herbert S. Hadley,
University of Missouri Library; Gifford Pinchot, Library of Congress; Chester
H. Rowell, University of California Library; Frank O. Lowden, University
of Chicago Library; and Charles J. Bonaparte, Library of Congress.

For conservative and middle-of-the-road Republican politics see the
Papers of Henry L. Stimson, Yale University Library; Charles Evans Hughes,
Library of Congress; Nicholas Murray Butler, Columbia Uaiversity Library;
Charles G. Dawes, Northwestern University Library; and Joseph B. Foraker,
Library of Congress and Historical and Philosophical Society of Ohio, Cin-
cinnati.

Editors and Newspapermen

One of the most important manuscript collections in the field of recent
American history is the Papers of Oswald Garrison Villard, Houghton
Dbrary, Harvard University. The Papers of Lincoln Steffens, now in the
University of California Library, shed much light on radical thought and on
Mexican relations. The Papers of Henry Watterson, Library of Congress, are
thin for the period of 1910-17, but the Papers of Albert Shaw, New York
Public Library, are rewarding, as are the Papers of Ray Stannard Baker and
of Charles E. Russell, both in the Library of Congress.

Miscellaneous

For the social justice, labor, Negro rights, and peace movements, see the
Papers of Andrew Carnegie, of Alexander J. McKelway, of Ben B. Lindsey,
of George Foster Peabody, of Booker T. Washington, and of Amos Pinchot,
all in the Library of Congress; of Samuel Gompers, American Federation of
Labor Archives, Washington; of Jane Addams, Swarthmore College Library;
and of Edward P. Costigan, University of Colorado Library.

One of the great collections in recent American history is the Papers of

ESSAY ON SOURCES 287

Louis D. Brandeis, Law School Library, University of Louisville, which is
especially important for a study of the origins of the Federal Reserve Act,
the Clayton Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act, and of progressive
politics during the Wilson era.

The Papers of Charles W. Eliot, Harvard College Archives, are valuable
for a study of pro-Allied opinion in the United States. The Papers of John
Grier Hibben, Princeton University Library, shed some light on the inter-
vention movement, 1915-17, and on the presidential campaign of 1916.

Business opinion may be consulted in the Papers of Henry Lee Higginson,
Houghton Library, Harvard University, and of Daniel A. Tompkins, Uni-
versity of North Carolina Library and the Library of Congress. Finally, the
Papers of Richard Olney, Library of Congress, are valuable for conservative
Democratic opinion; the Papers of Henry White, Library of Congress, con-
tain correspondence by leading Republicans; and the Papers of Moreton
Frewen, Library of Congress, include important letters from Frewen's friends
in the United States and Great Britain.

PUBLISHED LETTERS AND WRITINGS

Most useful to the student of this period are the published writings of
Wilson, Theodore Roosevelt, and Edward M. House. Ray S. Baker and
WiUiam E. Dodd (eds.), The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson (6 vols.,
New York, 1925-27), is carefully edited and fairly complete for the period
after 1912. There is no edition of Wilson's letters. Charles Seymour (ed.),
The Intimate Papers of Colonel House (4 vols., Boston 1926-28), is master-
fully edited. Elting E. Morison and John M. Blum (eds.), The Letters of
Theodore Roosevelt (8 vols., Cambridge, Mass., 1951-54), is one of the great
sources for the period 1901-19. The Works of Theodore Roosevelt (20 vols.,
National Ed., New York, 1926) reprints Roosevelt's important speeches dur-
ing the period 1910-17. Henry Cabot Lodge (ed.), Selections from the
Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884-191B
(2 vols., New York, 1925), is not always reliable. For the period after 1900
the student can consult the Lodge file in the Roosevelt Papers.

Burton J. Hendrick, The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page (3 vols.,
Garden City, N.Y., 1924-26), prints some of Page's best letters. The first
two volumes are filled with errors, with large portions of the original text
often omitted. The third volume, which includes Page's letters to Wilson, is
on the whole carefully edited.

The following are also useful: Anne W. Lane and Louise H. Wall (eds.),
The Letters of Franklin K. Lane, Personal and Political (Boston, 1922);
Stephen Gwynn (ed.), The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice

288 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

(2 vols., Boston, 1929); Allan Nevins (ed.), The Letters and Journal of
Brand Whitlock (2 vols., New York, 1936); Worthington C. Ford (ed.),
Letters of' Henry Adams, 1892-1918 (.Boston, 1938); Arthur B. Darling
(ed.), The Public Papers of Francis G. Newlands (2 vols., Boston, 1932);
Ella Winter and Granville Hicks (eds.), The Letters of Lincoln Steffens (2
vols., New York, 1938); Constance Gardner (ed.), Some Letters of Augustus
Peabody Gardner (Boston, 1920); and Walter Johnson (ed.), Selected
Letters of William Allen White, 1899-1943 (New York, 1947).

NEWSPAPERS

The New York Times and the New York World were easily the two best
newspapers in the United States from 1910 to 1917. The Times' reporting
of news was better than the World's, but the World excelled in editorials,
cartoons, special features, and the reporting of political news.

Along with the World, which was the editorial spokesman of the Wilson
administration, a number of other progressive newspapers carried the
Democratic-progressive banner from 1910 to 1917. They included the Spring-
field Republican, which Wilson read avidly, the Raleigh News and Observer,
the Baltimore Sun, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, the Milwaukee Journal, and
the San Francisco Bulletin.

The pre-eminent spokesmen of Wall Street and Old Guard Republicanism
were the New York Sun and Evening Sun. Harrison Gray Otis' Los Angeles
Times, however, rivaled the New York Sun as the leading champion of re-
actionary policies.

In a special class were the Hearst newspapers. Although nominally a
Democrat, William R. Hearst was lukewarm in his support of Wilson's
domestic program, and during the neutrality period he was so violently anti-
British as to be almost pro-German. The leading Hearst newspapers during
the prewar years were the New York American and Chicago American.

Other newspapers noteworthy for their editorials and features were the
Chicago Daily Tribune, Des Moines Register, Topeka Capital, Louisville
Courier- Journal, Boston Advertiser, Minneapolis Tribune, Kansas City Star,
New York Herald,. New York Tribune, Charlotte Daily Observer, and Dallas
Morning News.

The chief editorial spokesmen of militant Negro opinion were The Crisis
(New York, 1910- ), edited by William E. B. DuBois, the Boston Guardian,
edited by William Monroe Trotter, the New York Age, and the Pittsburgh
Courier. For radical American opinion the New York Call, the Appeal to
Reason (Girard, Kan., 1895- ), Pearson's Magazine (New York, 1899-
1925), International Socialist Review (Chicago, 1900-18), and The Masses
(New York, 1911-17) are most useful.

ESSAY ON SOURCES 289

PERIODICALS

General

The magazines in this group often published articles and editorials of
contemporary significance, although they were not primarily journals of
opinion. Among the more important were the Review of Reviews (New
York, 1890-1937), Collier's (New York, 1888- ), Cosmopolitan (New
York, 1886-1925), Everybody's Magazine (New York, 1899-1929), Ameri-
can Magazine (New York, 1876- ), Metropolitan (New York, 1911-24),
Munsey's Magazine (New York, 1889-1929), The Independent (New York,
1848-1928), Saturday Evening Post (Philadelphia, 1821- ), World's Work
(New York, 1900-32), McClure's Magazine (New York, 1893-1929), and
Literary Digest (New York, 1890-1937), useful for its summaries of press
opinion.

Political Journals

Easily the most significant periodical in this group was the New Republic
(New York, 1914- ), which was the pre-eminent spokesman of advanced
progressive and internationalist thought. The Nation (New York, 1865- )
generally expressed nineteenth-century liberal opinions. Under the editorship
of Norman Hapgood, Harper's Weekly (New York, 1857-1916) was a
spokesman of the Wilson administration. The Outlook (New York, 1870-
1935) was Roosevelt's chief editorial mouthpiece and a leader in the pre-
paredness movement. La Follette's Magazine (Madison, Wis., 1909-29) was
the Wisconsin senator's personal outlet, while The Commoner (Lincoln,
Neb., 1901-23) was Bryan's. George Harvey's North American Review
(Boston and New York, 1815-1940) was the leading conservative periodical.
Capper's Weekly (Topeka, Kan., 1875- ) is useful for Midwestern farm
opinion.

The Religious Press

As the religious periodicals often expressed social and economic opinions
and printed articles of significance, the student of this period cannot well
ignore them. Most advanced socially were the Congregational, Baptist,
Methodist, and Episcopal organs. For the Gongregationalists see the Con-
gregationalist and Christian World (Boston, 1816-1934); for the Baptists, the
Watchman-Examiner (New York, 1819- ) and The Standard (Chicago,
1853-1920); for the Methodists, the Christian Advocate (Nashville, 1832-
1940) and Christian Advocate (New York, 1826- ); for the Episcopalians,
The Churchman (New York, 1845- ) and The Living Church (Milwaukee,
1878- ). The Presbyterian journals generally followed a conservative edi-
torial policy. See The Presbyterian (Philadelphia, 1831- ) and Christian

29O WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

Observer (Louisville, 1813- ). Although the Lutheran periodicals usually
ignored political and social issues, during the period of neutrality they were
militantly pro-German. For two leading Lutheran papers see The Lutheran
(Lebanon, Penna., 1896-1919) and Lutheran Church Work and Observer
(Philadelphia, 1908-19).

The Catholic press is especially important for a study of the Mexican and
Philippine questions. All Catholic newspapers were opposed to administra-
tion policies in these fields, but most outspoken were The Extension Maga-
zine (Chicago, 1906- ) and the Jesuit organ, America (New York, 1909- ).

The Agricultural Press

The rural press is an indispensable source for opinion on all administration
policies, but particularly on rural credits, the Underwood tariff, and pre-
paredness. The following are most important: Progressive Farmer (Raleigh
and Birmingham, 1886- ), Wisconsin Farmer (Madison, Wis., 1881-1929),
Wallace's Farmer (Des Moines, 1874- ), Nebraska Farm Journal (Omaha,
1897-1924), Capper's Farmer (Topeka, 1893- ), and Dakota Farmer
(Aberdeen, S.D., 1881- ). For radical Midwestern farm opinion see the
organs of the Farmer's Non-Partisan League, The Farmer's Open Forum,
later United Farmers 9 Forum (Washington, 1915-21) and the Non-Partisan
Leader, later National Leader (Minneapolis and Fargo, 1915-23).

Banking Journals

Banking journals are useful for their views on the Federal Reserve bill,
antitrust legislation, the appointment of the Federal Reserve Board, and
financial policies toward the belligerents. The following provide a cross-
section of banking opinion: Bankers 9 Magazine (New York, 1846- ), Com-
mercial and Financial Chronicle (New York, 1865- ), Financial Age (New
York, 1900- ), Magazine of Wall Street (New York, 1907- ), Wall Street
Journal (New York, 1889- ), Southern Banker (Atlanta, 1904- ), Texas
Bankers' Record (Austin, 1911- ), Bankers 3 Monthly (Chicago, 1883- ),
Northwestern Banker (Des Moines, 1895- ), and Kansas Banker (Topeka,
1910- ).

Commercial and Industrial Journals

The commercial and industrial magazines also provide one of the best
sources of specific class and interest points of view. Thus the Manufacturers 3
Record (Baltimore, 1882- ) spoke for the Southern textile interests, Ameri-
can Industries (New York, 1902-31) for the National Association of Manu-
facturers, Iron Age (New York, 1859- ) for the American Iron and
Steel Institute, Commercial Bulletin (Boston, 1859- ) and News Bureau

ESSAY ON SOURCES 29 1

(Boston, 1887- ) for the Boston commercial interests, Commercial America
(Philadelphia, 1904 ), for the commercial interests of the Middle states,
Annalist (New York, 1913-40) and Journal of Commerce and Commercial
(New York, 1827- ) for the New York commercial interests, and Com-
mercial West (Minneapolis, 1901- ) for the commercial and banking
interests of the Midwest.

The Labor Press

Easily the commanding voices in this field were the American Federationist
(Washington, 1894- ) and the American Federation of Labor Weekly News
Letter (Washington, 1911- ). Both are indispensable sources. The Coast
Seamen's Journal (San Francisco, 1887-1937) should be used in connection
with the passage of the Seamen's Act of 1915. The United Mine Workers 3
Journal (Indianapolis, 1891- ) is especially important for a study of the
Colorado Coal Strike of 1913-14.

British Journals of Opinion

The following British periodicals are included in this section because of
their significant observations on domestic politics in the United States,
Mexican- American relations, and the United States and the European war:
The Nation (London, 1907-31), The Outlook (London, 1898-1928), The
Spectator (London, 1828- ), The Economist (London, 1843- ), The
Fortnightly Review (London, 1865- ), The Statist (London, 1878- ),
The Saturday Review (London, 1855-1938), and The Nineteenth Century
(London, 1877- ).

GENERAL MEMOIRS

The autobiographical material for the period 1910-17 is immensely rich.
Among the leaders of the administration, Bryan, Houston, Lansing, Daniels,
McAdoo, Tumulty, House, Marshall, Clark, and Redfield have written
memoirs. Mary B. Bryan (ed.) 5 The Memoirs of William Jennings Bryan
(Philadelphia, 1925), is honest for Bryan's motivation. David F. Houston,
Eight Years with Wilson's Cabinet, 1913-1920 (2 vols., Garden City, N.Y.,
1926), is generally reliable. Robert Lansing, The War Memoirs of Robert
Lansing (Indianapolis, 1935), must be supplemented by the Lansing Diary
in the Library of Congress. Josephus Daniels, The Wilson Era (2 vols.,
Chapel Hill, N.C., 1944-46) , must be used with great caution. William G.
McAdoo, Crowded Years (Boston, 1931), goes to 1917 and reveals, among
other things, McAdoo's high regard for himself. Joseph P. Tumulty,
Woodrow Wilson As I Know Him (Garden City, N.Y., 1921), is not reliable.

WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

Tumulty's versions of Wilson's conversations are often semifictional, George
S. Viereck, Transcripts of conversations with Edward M. House, unpublished
MS entitled "The Memoirs of Colonel House," in the George Sylvester
Viereck Papers, Yale University Library, is revealing but demands critical
scrutiny. William C. Redfield, With Congress and Cabinet (Garden City,
N.Y., 1924), is undistinguished. A reading of Champ Clark, My Quarter
Century of American Politics (2 vols., New York, 1920), and Thomas R.
Marshall, Recollections of Thomas R. Marshall (Indianapolis, 1925), makes
one grateful neither was indulged his wish to become President. William F.
McCombs, Making Woodrow Wilson President (New York, 1921, is the
bitter memoir of a man who fell from Wilson's grace. For the personal poli-
tics of the administration see also Daniel C. Roper, Fifty Years of Public Life
(Durham, N.C., 1941); Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (2 vols.,
New York, 1948); Frederic C. Howe, Confessions of a Reformer (New York ?
1925); and Henry Morgenthau, Sr., All in a Life-Time (Garden City, N.Y.,
1922).

Excellent for the insurgent revolt, progressive Republican politics, and the
coming of the First World War are George W. Norris, Fighting Liberal (New
York, 1945); William Allen White, The Autobiography of William Allen
White (New York, 1946); Harold L. Ickes, Autobiography of a Curmudgeon
(New York, 1943); Giiford Pinchot, Breaking New Ground (New York,
1947); Owen Wister, Roosevelt: The Story of a Friendship (New York,
1930); and Donald Richberg, Tents of the Mighty (New York, 1930). Henry
L. Stimson, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York, 1948);
Nicholas Murray Butler, Across the Busy Years (2 vols., New York, 1939-
40); and James E. Watson, As I Knew Them (Indianapolis, 1936), are
valuable sources for the Republican politics of the era.

Intimate and revealing accounts of the politics and personalities of the
Wilson period are presented in the following autobiographies of editors and
reporters: Lincoln Steffens, Autobiography of Lincoln Steffens (New York,
1931); Oswald Garrison Villard, Fighting Years, Memoirs of a Liberal Editor
(New York, 1939); Ray S. Baker, American Chronicle (New York, 1945);
George Creel, Rebel at Large (New York, 1947); Oscar K. Davis, Released
for Publication (Boston, 1925); Arthur W. Dunn, From Harrison to Harding
(2 vols., New York, 1922); J. Frederick Essary, Covering Washington (Bos-
ton, 1927); H. H. Kohlsaat, From McKinley to Harding (New York, 1923);
Henry L. Stoddard, As I Knew Them (New York, 1927); and Henry Watter-
son, "Marse Henry 3 * (2 vols., New York, 1919).

Also important are Samuel Gompers, Seventy Years of Life and Labor (2
vols., New York, 1925); Hugh L. Scott, Some Memories of a Soldier (New
York, 1928); and Thomas W. Lament, Across World Frontiers (New York,
1951).

ESSAY ON SOURCES 293

BIOGRAPHIES

Theodore Roosevelt, the Insurgent Revolt, and Republican Politics,
1910-17

Although Henry F. Pringle does not take Roosevelt seriously enough, his
Theodore Roosevelt, A Biography (New York, 1931), is still the best study
of the man. Much better for the period 1909-19, however, is George E.
Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement (Madison, "Wis.,
1946). Russell Buchanan, "Theodore Roosevelt and American Neutrality,
1914^-1917," American Historical Review, XLIII (July, 1938), 775-790, is
also useful.

The two best biographies relating to the insurgent revolt and progressive
Republican politics are Walter Johnson, William Allen White's America
(New York, 1946), and Claude Bowers, Beveridge and the Progressive Era
(Boston, 1932). The literature on the regular Republican leaders is unusually
rich. Merlo J. Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes (2 vols., New York, 1951), is
marred only by lack of critical judgment. Philip G. Jessup, Elihu Root (2
vols., New York, 1938) , is the authorized biography, but Richard W. Leopold's
forthcoming study of Root is not only briefer but also more critical. Henry
F. Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft (2 vols., New York,
1939), is practically definitive, but lacks a critical quality, while Nathaniel
W. Stephenson, Nelson W. Aldrich (New York, 1930), is helpful for the
background and writing of the Federal Reserve bill.

Woodrow Wilson, the Administration, and the Democratic Party,
1910-17

The most nearly complete biography of Wilson is Ray S. Baker's author-
ized Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters (8 vols., Garden City, N.Y., 1927-
39). The first four volumes, which carry the biography to August, 1914, are
uncritical and often ignore the important historical processes. Volumes V and
VI, which cover the neutrality period, were written during the disillusion-
ment over American participation in the war and reflect the temper of the
time in which they were written. The best one-volume biography of Wilson is
Herbert G. F. Bell, Woodrow Wilson and the People (Garden City, N.Y.,
1945), although David Lawrence, The True Story of Woodrow Wilson (New
York, 1924); James Kerney, The Political Education of Woodrow Wilson
(New York, 1926); Robert E. Annin, Woodrow Wilson: A Character Study
(New York, 1924); and William B. Hale, Woodrow Wilson: The Story of
His Life (Garden City, N.Y., 1912), have a special value because they were
written by contemporaries.

Scholarly and historical works on Wilson are few. Laura S. Turnbull,
Woodrow Wilson, A Selected Bibliography (Princeton, N.J., 1948), is a use-

294 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

ful guide. Arthur S. Link, Wilson: The Road to the White House (Princeton,
N.J., 1947), is the first volume of a new multi-volume biography. Harley
Notter, The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson (Baltimore,
1937), is thorough but based on published sources. William Diamond, The
Economic Thought of Woodrow Wilson (Baltimore, 1943), is good for the
period before 1913 but weak on the presidential years.

Scholarly biographies of leaders in the Wilson administration and the
Democratic party are also scarce. For House the best work is still Seymour,
The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, previously cited, which of course is
not strictly a biography. Arthur D. H. Smith, Mr. House of Texas (New
York, 1940), and George Sylvester Viereck, The Strangest Friendship in
History (New York, 1932), were written with House's collaboration and
exaggerate his influence. There is no biography of Lansing. Paxton Hibben
and G. H. Grattan, The Peerless Leader (New York, 1929); M. R. Werner,
Bryan (New York, 1929); Wayne G. Williams, William Jennings Bryan
(New York, 1936); and J. G. Long, Bryan, the Great Commoner (New
York, 1928), are either overly critical or else worshipful.

One of the best biographies for the period is Alpheus T. Mason, Brandeis,
A Free Man's Life (New York, 1946). John M. Blum, Joe Tumulty and the
Wilson Era (Boston, 1951), is also excellent. For other administration and
party leaders see Mary Synon, McAdoo (Indianapolis, 1924); Rixey Smith
and Norman Beasley, Carter Glass, A Biography (New York, 1939); George
G. Osborn, John Sharp Williams (Baton Rouge, La., 1943); Francis B.
Simkins, Pitchfork Ben Tillman (Baton Rouge, La., 1944); John L. Heaton,
Cobb of the World (New York, 1924); Frederick Palmer, Newton D. Baker:
America at War (2 vols., New York, 1931); and F. Palmer, Bliss, Peace-
maker (New York, 1934).

Miscellaneous

Disparate but excellent biographies relevant to the period are Allan
Nevins, Henry White, Thirty Years of American Diplomacy (New York,
1930) ; Hermann Hagedorn, Leonard Wood, A Biography (2 vols., New York,
1931); Willis F. Johnson, George Harvey, "A Passionate Patriot" (Boston,
1929); Ferdinand Lundberg, Imperial Hearst, a Social Biography (New
York, 1936); Ray Ginger, The Bending Cross: A Biography of Eugene Victor
Debs (New Brunswick, N.J., 1949); and G. Vann Woodward, Tom Watson:
Agrarian Rebel (New York, 1938).

GENERAL WORKS

The only general works that treat this period specifically are Frederick L.
Paxson, The Pre-War Years, 1913-1917 (Boston, 1936), and Mark Sullivan,
Our Times, The United States, 1900-1925 (6 vols., New York, 1926-35),
V. Of great value for its analysis of economic institutions and social and

ESSAY ON SOURCES 295

economic legislation is Harold U. Faulkner, The Decline of Laissez-Faire,
1897-1917 (New York, 1951). The best general account of the progressive
movement is still Harold U. Faulkner, The Quest for Social Justice, 1898
1914 (New York, 1931), but no student of this period should overlook
Russell B. Nye, Midwestern Progressive Politics (East Lansing, Mich., 1951),
or Eric F. Goldman, Rendezvous with Destiny (New York, 1952), a history
of the American reform movement since 1865. Sidney Ratner, American
Taxation (New York, 1942) , is another invaluable study.

FROM THE NEW FREEDOM TO THE NEW NATIONALISM,
1910-17

The Years of Revolt, 1910-12

The culmination of the progressive movement evoked the writing of many
commentaries on the changing political order. The following are selected
samples of this literature: Herbert Croly, The Promise of American Life
(New York, 1909) and Progressive Democracy (New York, 1914); Thomas
N. Carver, Essays in Social Justice (Cambridge, Mass., 1915); Allan L.
Benson, Our Dishonest Constitution (New York, 1914); Nicholas M. Butler,
Why Should We Change Our Form of Government? (New York, 1912); and
Elihu Root, Experiments in Government and the Essentials of the Constitu-
tion (Princeton, N.J., 1913).

The best secondary sources on the insurgent revolt and the campaign of
1912 are Mo wry and Link, cited above, and Kenneth W. Hechler, In-
surgency: Personalities and Politics of the Taft Era (New York, 1940). See
also the biographies and memoirs of the leaders involved, cited above, to
which should be added chapters from Robert M. La Follette, La Follette's
Autobiography (Madison, Wis., 1913).

The best sources for the conventions and platforms of 1912 are the news-
papers and the official party publications. W. J. Bryan, A Tale of Two Con-
ventions (New York, 1912), is a day-by-day account of the Republican and
Democratic conventions* A. S. Link (ed.), "A Letter from One of Wilson's
Managers," American Historical Review, L (July, 1945), 768-775, presents
an inside view of the Democratic convention.

Wilson's and Roosevelt's important speeches during the campaign of 1912
may be found in Woodrow Wilson, The New Freedom (Garden City, N.Y.,
1913), The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, and the Works of Theodore
Roosevelt.

The Underwood Tariff

The best source for contemporary opinion on the tariff question is House
Ways and Means Committee, Tariff Schedules, Hearings . . . , 62d Cong.,
3d sess. (7 vols., Washington, 1913). An excellent contemporary comment

296 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

is Frank W. Taussig, Some Aspects of the Tariff Question (Cambridge,
Mass., 1915).

The activities of the various tariff lobbies in 1913 were fully revealed and
analyzed in Senate Judiciary Committee, Maintenance of Lobby to Influence
Legislation, Hearings . . . , 63d Cong., 1st sess. (4 vols., Washington, 1913).

The great source for Congressional debates on the tariff and all other legis-
lation for the period 1911 to 1917 is Congressional Record, 62d Cong., 1st
sess.-64th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, 1911-17).

The Federal Reserve Act

The Federal Reserve Act had a long background of public discussion and
agitation over the shape that banking reform should assume. Discussions of
the movement for a new banking and currency system and significant ac-
counts of the writing of the Federal Reserve Act may be found in the fol-
lowing general works by some leaders of the era: H. Parker Willis, The
Federal Reserve System (New York, 1923); J. Laurence Laughlin, The
Federal Reserve Act, Its Origins and Problems (New York, 1933); Paul M.
Warburg, Essays on Banking Reform in the United States (New York, 1914);
and The Federal Reserve System, Its Origin and Growth (2 vols., New York,
1930).

The revelations of the Pujo Committee during the early months of 1913
dramatized the extent of the concentration of banking credits in the United
States and set off a widespread demand for legislation to destroy the "Money
Trust," For the report of the Pujo Committee see Report of Committee Ap-
pointed Pursuant to H.R. 429 and 504 . . , , 62d Cong., 3d sess. (Washing-
ton, 1913). Louis D. Brandeis summarized the testimony taken by the Pujo
Committee in Other People's Money and How the Bankers Use It (New
York, 1914).

A violent tempest in a teapot raged in 1926 and 1927 over the authorship
of the Federal Reserve Act. Professor Seymour's assertion, made in the
Intimate Papers of Colonel House, I, 160, that House was the "unseen
guardian" of the Federal Reserve bill so infuriated Carter Glass that he
wrote An Adventure in Constructive Finance (Garden City, N.Y., 1927) to
prove that House and Samuel Untermyer, counsel for the Pujo Committee,
had nothing to do with the measure. Untermyer shot back at Glass in Who
Is Entitled to the Credit for the Federal Reserve Act? An Answer to Senator
Carter Glass (New York, 1927). Glass' rejoinder, "Vapor vs. the Record/ 9 a
manuscript in the Carter Glass Papers, was apparently never published.

The best sources on the writing and passage of the Federal Reserve bill
are Willis, The Federal Reserve System; Glass, An Adventure in Constructive
Finance, and Robert L. Owen, The Federal Reserve Act (New York, 1919).

For opinions on the bill see House Banking and Currency Committee,

ESSAY ON SOURCES 2Q7

Banking and Currency Reform. Hearings before Subcommittee . . . , 62d
Cong., 3d sess. (13 parts, Washington, 1913), and Senate Banking and Cur-
rency Committee, Hearings on H.R. 7837 (S. 2639) . . . , 63d Cong., 1st
sess. (3 vols., Washington, 1913). Academy of Political Science, Banking and
Currency in the United States (New York, 1913), includes criticisms and
defenses of the Federal Reserve bill by leading bankers and administration
spokesmen.

The best works on the development of Federal Reserve policies are Willis,
cited above, and Seymour E. Harris, Twenty Years of Federal Reserve
Policy (2 vols., Cambridge, Mass., 1933).

Antitrust Legislation

For a general discussion of the background and adoption of the antitrust
legislation of the Wilson administration, the following are useful: John D.
Clark, The Federal Trust Policy (Baltimore, 1931); Henry R. Seager and

C. A. Gulick, Jr., Trust and Corporation Problems (New York, 1929); and
Oswald W. Knauth, The Policy of the United States Towards Industrial
Monopoly (New York, 1914).

Progressive opinion on a policy toward big business diverged sharply from
1910 through 1914. The main body of Democrats, who advocated destruction
of the great combinations, found an eloquent spokesman in Louis D.
Brandeis, whose articles on the trust question were reprinted in Business A
Profession (Boston, 1914). Wilson's views in 1912 are set forth in The New
Freedom, previously cited. The Progressive program for acceptance and
federal regulation of the great corporations was most explicitly set forth in
Charles R. Van Hise, Concentration and Control: A Solution of the Trust
Problem in the United States (New York, 1912).

All shades of opinion -on the question, however, were most completely set
forth in American Academy of Political and Social Science, Industrial Com-
petition and Combination (Philadelphia, 1912); House Judiciary Committee,
Trust Legislation, Hearings, 63d Cong., 2d sess. (4 vols., Washington, 1914);
and Senate Interstate Commerce Committee, Hearings on Bills Relating to
Trust Legislation, 63d Cong., 2d sess, (2 vols., Washington, 1914).

The Rural Credits Act

The background of the Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916 is briefly discussed
in Theodore Saloutos and John D. Hicks, Agricultural Discontent in the
Middle West, 1900-1939 (Madison, Wis., 1951). More detailed are James
B. Morman, The Principles of Rural Credits (New York, 1915), and Edna

D. Bullock, Agricultural Credit (New York, 1915).

The conservative argument that a federal rural credits system would
constitute special privilege for a favored class may be found in Myron T.

298 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

Herrick and R. Ingalls, Rural Credits (New York, 1914). All phases of
current opinion may be conveniently found in House Banking and Currency
Committee, Rural Credits, Hearings Before Subcommittee . . . , 63d Cong.,
2d sess. (Washington, 1914), and Senate Banking and Currency Committee,
Rural Credits, Joint Hearings Before Subcommittees on Banking and Cur-
rency of Senate and House of Representatives, 63d Cong., 2d sess. (2 vols.,
Washington, 1914).

The Seamen's Bill

The campaign for the passage of the Furuseth seamen's bill can be fol-
lowed in the Coast Seamen's Journal, La Follette's Magazine, The Survey
(New York, 1897-1932), and the American Labor Legislation Review (New
York, 1911- ). A wide range of opinion for and against the bill may be
found in House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, Seamen's Bill,
Hearings on S. 136 . . . , 63d Cong., 2d sess. (2 parts, Washington, 1914),
and Senate Commerce Committee, Seamen's Bill, Hearings on S. 136 . . . 9
63d Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, 1914).

The ChUd Labor Act

The passage of the Child Labor Act in 1916 marked the first culmination
of a movement already a decade old. For background and related discussions
see Elizabeth Brandeis, "Labor Legislation," in J. R. Commons et aL, History
of Labor in the United States (4 vols., New York, 1918-35), III; Elizabeth
H. Davidson, Child Labor Legislation in the Southern Textile States (Chapel
Hill, N.C., 1939); Miriam E. Loughran, The Historical Development of
Child-Labor Legislation in the United States (Washington, 1921); and C. G.
Bowers, Beveridge and the Progressive Era, cited above.

The best sources for contemporary opinion on the measure are House
Labor Committee, Child-Labor Bill, Hearings on H.R. 12292 . . . , 63d
Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, 1914); House Labor Committee, Child-Labor
Bill, Hearings on H.R. 8234 . . . , 64th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, 1916);
and Senate Interstate Commerce Committee, Interstate Commerce in
Products of Child Labor, Hearings on H.R. 8234 . . . , 64th Cong., 1st sess.
(2 parts, Washington, 1916).

The Burnett Immigration Bills of 1915 and 1917

Samuel Gompers, "Immigration Legislation Effected," American Federa-
tionist, XXIV (Mar., 1917), 189-195, reviews the long struggle for restric-
tion. House Immigration and Naturalization Committee, Restriction of
Immigration, Hearings . . . , 63d Cong., 2d sess. (3 parts, Washington,
1913-14), and House Immigration and Naturalization Committee, Hear-

ESSAY ON SOURCES 299

ings ... 9 64th Gong., 1st sess. (Washington, 1916), are the best sources
for contemporary opinion.

The Negro, 1910-17

Negro reaction to administration policies, especially segregation, can best
be followed in The Crisis and other Negro newspapers. William E. B.
DuBois, Dusk of Dawn (New York, 1940), and Alexander Walters, My Life
and Work (New York, 1917), are two memoirs by Negro leaders during the
Wilson period. The following contemporary accounts of the segregation of
Negroes in the federal departments are excellent: Belle Case La Follette,
"Color Line to Date," La Follette 3 s Weekly, VI (Jan. 24, 1914), 6-7; O. G.
Villard, "The President and the Segregation at Washington," North Ameri-
can Review, CXCVIII (Dec., 1913), 800-807; McGregor (A. J. Mc-
Kelway), "Segregation in the Departments," Harper's Weekly, LIX (Dec.
26, 19 14), 620-621.

THE UNITED STATES, THE CARIBBEAN, AND LATIN
AMERICA, 1910-17

General

The best summaries are Samuel F. Bemis, The Latin American Policy of
the United States (New York, 1943), and Wilfred H. Callcott, The Carib-
bean Policy of the United States, 1890-1920 (Baltimore, 1942). Less detailed
treatments are Dexter Perkins, The United States and the Caribbean (Cam-
bridge, Mass., 1947), and Julius W. Pratt, America's Colonial Experiment
(New York, 1950)* Selig Adler, "Bryan and Wilsonian Carribean Penetra-
tion," Hispanic American Historical Review, XX (May, 1940), 198-226, is
the only detailed study of this subject.

As for contemporary materials, the richest published sources for a study of
Taft's and Wilson's Latin American and Caribbean policies are the Papers .
Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1910-1917 (8 vols.,
Washington, 1915, 1918-20, 1922, 1924-26). These volumes are so incom-
plete, however, that the student must go to the State Department Papers in
the National Archives for the full record.

Special Studies

Isaac J. Cox, Nicaragua and the United States, 1909-1927 (Boston, 1927),
is fairly complete, although not based upon archival materials. The standard
history of Santo Domingo, Sumner Welles, Naboth's Vineyard, the Domini-
can Republic, 1844-1924 (New York, 1928), has a critical account of the
American occupation. A wealth of information on the occupations of Santo
Domingo and Haiti may be found in Senate Select Committee, Inquiry into

30O WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

Occupation and Administration of Haiti and Santo Domingo, 67th Cong., 1st
and 2d sess. (2 vols., Washington, 1922). Detailed accounts of the American
occupation of Haiti may be found also in Raymond L. Buell, The American
Occupation of Haiti (New York, 1929); Arthur G. Millspaugh, Haiti Under
American Control, 1915-1930 (Boston, 1931); and Emily G. Balch (ed.),
Occupied Haiti (New York, 1927). The only general work on Colombian-
American relations is J. Fred Rippy> The Capitalists and Colombia (New
York, 1931). For Cuban- American relations during the Wilson period see
Russell H. Fitzgibbon, Cuba and the United States, 1900-1935 (Menasha,
Wis., 1935), and Leland H. Jenks, Our Cuban Colony: A Study in Sugar
(New York, 1928). Charles C. Tansill, The Purchase of the Danish West
Indies (Baltimore, 1932), is definitive.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE FAR EAST, 1910-17

General Works

Several general works offer excellent guides in studying this area of Ameri-
can foreign relations: A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the
United States (New York, 1938); Edwin O. Reischauer, The United States
and Japan (Cambridge, Mass., 1950); and John K. Fairbank, The United
States and China (Cambridge, Mass., 1948). Roy H. Akagi, Japanese
Foreign Relations, 1542-1936 (Tokyo, 1936), is the only survey in English
by a Japanese scholar.

The California Controversy of 1913

General treatments are Carey McWilliams, Prejudice: Japanese-Americans
(Boston, 1944); Yamato Ichihashi, Japanese in the United States (Stanford,
Calif., 1932); Toyokichi lyenaga and Kenoske Sato, Japan and the Cali-
fornia Problem (New York, 1921); and Sidney L. Gulick, The American
Japanese Problem: A Study of the Racial Relations of East and West (New
York, 1914) . A contemporary report of unusual significance is H. A. Millis,
The Japanese Problem in the United States, an Investigation for the Com-
mission on Relations with Japan Appointed by the Federal Council of the
Churches of Christ in America (New York, 1915).

The Crisis over the Twenty-One Demands

Stanley K. Hornbeck, Contemporary Politics in the Far East (New York,
1916), is an excellent contemporary discussion. Paul S. Reinsch, An American
Diplomat in China (New York, 1922), is the memoir of the American Min-
ister at Peking during the crisis. Tien-yi Li, Woodrow Wilson's China Policy,
1913-1917 (New York, 1952), is an excellent discussion. For the documents
in the Japanese-Chinese negotiations of 1915 see Carnegie Endowment for

ESSAY ON SOURCES 30 1

International Peace, The Sino-Japanese Negotiations of 1915 (Washington,
1921).

The United States and the Philippines

The Wilson administration sponsored legislation and pursued policies that
greatly enlarged the self-government of the Filipino peoples. Wilson's Gov-
ernor General, Francis B. Harrison, tells the story in The Corner-Stone of
Philippine Independence: A Narrative of Seven Years (New York, 1922), as
does Manuel L. Quezon, The Good Fight (New York, 1946). Highly critical
of Wilson's policies was W. Cameron Forbes in The Philippine Islands (2
vols., Boston, 1928).

THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO, 1910-17

Official and Manuscript Sources

The most important published official sources are the volumes in the
Foreign Relations series, cited on p. 299. The sections on Mexico in these
volumes, however, are so incomplete that the student must work through the
Mexican files in the State Department Papers to understand the formation of
policies. There are, moreover, many important documents, not elsewhere
available, in the Wilson and Frank L. Polk Papers.

The relation between American oil and railroad promoters and the Madero
Revolution was revealed in Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Revolutions
in Mexico . . . , 62d Cong., 3d sess. (Washington, 1913). Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, Investigation of Mexican Affairs . . . , 66th Cong., 2d
sess. (2 vols., Washington, 1920), was an effort to discredit Wilson's Mexican
policy but contains much useful data.

General Works on the Mexican Revolution

There is no authoritative history of the Mexican Revolution in any lan-
guage. Charles C. Cumberland, The Mexican Revolution, Genesis Under
Madero (Austin, Tex., 1952), is excellent for the first phase of the Revolu-
tion. Ernest H. Gruening, Mexico and Its Heritage (New York, 1928), and
Frank Tannenbaum, The Mexican Agrarian Revolution (New York, 1929),
are two general works by American scholars. Miguel Alessio Robles, Historica
Politica de la Revolucion (Mexico City, 1946), is the only good Mexican
work on the subject.

Contemporary Accounts, Critiques, and Documents of the Revolu-
tion, 1913-17

Edith L. O'Shaughnessy, Diplomatic Days (New York, 1917) and A Diplo-
mat's Wife in Mexico (New York, 1916), are editions of the letters of the

302 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

wife of the American Charge in Mexico City from 1912 to 1914. Important
defenses of Huerta are Rafael de Zayas Enriquez, The Case of Mexico and
the Policy of President Wilson (New York, 1914), and Manuel Calero, Un
Decinio de Politico, Mexicana (New York, 1920). For an eloquent defense of
the Revolution, however, see Luis Cabrera, The Mexican Situation from a
Mexican Point of View (Washington, 1913 [?]).

John Reed, Insurgent Mexico (New York, 1914), and Gasper Whitney,
What's the Matter with Mexico? (New York, 1916), are reports by journalists
friendly to the Revolution. The following are samples of anti-Revolutionary
propaganda: Edward I. Bell, The Political Shame of Mexico (New York,
1914); Randolph W. Smith, Benighted Mexico (New York, 1916); and
Thomas E. Gibson, Mexico Under Carranza (Garden City, N. Y., 1919).

American Catholics and Mexico

Catholic comment on the Revolution and Wilson's policies may be followed
in the newspapers and magazines cited above. Francis C. Kelley, The Book
of Red and Yellow, Being a Story of Blood and a Yellow Streak (Chicago,
1915), was a severe condemnation of Wilson's allegedly cowardly policies.
Blood-Drenched Altars (Milwaukee, 1935) is Father Kelley's autobiographical
account. Dr. A. Paganel [Carlo de Fornaro], What the Catholic Church Has
Done to Mexico (Mexico City, 1916), was a Constitutionalist reply to Catholic
charges.

The United States and Mexico, 1913-17

J. Fred Rippy, The United States and Mexico (New York, 1931), is now
superseded by Howard F. Cline, The United States and Mexico (Cambridge,
Mass., 1953). There is a wealth of information on Wilson's policy toward
Huerta in George M. Stephenson, John Lind of Minnesota (Minneapolis,
1935). Stuart A. MacCorkle, American Policy of Recognition Towards Mex-
ico (Baltimore, 1933), is helpful for the period 1913-17.

Contemporary observations on Wilson's Mexican policy are usually critical.
Henry Lane Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes in Mexico, Belgium and Chile
(Garden City, N.Y., 1927), is hardly objective. Francisco Bulnes, The Whole
Truth About Mexico, President Wilson's Responsibility (New York, 1916),
and Manuel Calero, The Mexican Policy of President Wilson As It Appears
to a Mexican (New York, 1916), are condemnations of Wilsonian interven-
tion. Henry Morris, Our Mexican Muddle (Chicago, 1916), is a thoroughgo-
ing denunciation by an American observer.

The British and Mexico

Edward Grey, Twenty-Five Years, 1892-1916 (2 vols., New York, 1925),
and B. J. Hendrick, The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page, help to explain

ESSAY ON SOURCES 303

Britain's Mexican policy. John A. Spender, Weetman Pearson, First Viscount
Cowdray, 1856-1927 (London, 1930) , is also useful. The best sources of British
opinion, however, are the British journals of comment, cited on p. 291, which,
until the war in Europe began, made the most penetrating and permanently
valuable observations on Wilson's policy that we have.

AMERICAN NEUTRALITY, 1914-17, GENERAL

Official American Sources and Manuscripts

Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Supplements,
1914-1917 (6 vols., Washington, 1928-29, 1931-32), the great storehouses of
materials relating to American neutrality, are magnificently edited and com-
plete for all important issues. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the
United States, The Lansing Papers (2 vols., Washington, 1939-^0), and
Carlton Savage (ed.)> Policy of the United States Toward Maritime Com-
merce in War, 1776-1918 (2 vols., Washington, 1934-36), are also absolutely
indispensable. Special Senate Committee, Hearings Before the Special Com-
mittee Investigating the Munitions Industry, 74th Gong., 2d sess. (40 parts,
Washington, 1937), reprints much of the important correspondence of bankers
and administration leaders bearing on the question of loans to the belligerents.

The Wilson, House, Page, Bryan, Lansing, Daniels, Polk, and McAdoo
Papers all contain documents relating to the manifold aspects of the problems
of neutrality that cannot be found elsewhere.

General Works

It has now been more than thirty-five years since the United States entered
the First World War; most of the important documents bearing upon that
event have been available to scholars at least since 1941. Even so, we still do
not have a general study that can be recommended to students as compre-
hensive and dispassionate.

Ray S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters, V-VI; Harley Hotter,
The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, and Newton D. Baker,
Why We Went to War (New York, 1936), are useful. Among the general
studies, however, Charles Seymour's American Diplomacy during the World
War (Baltimore, 1934) and American Neutrality, 1914-1917 (New Haven,
Conn., 1935), remain the most balanced discussions of the subject. One of
the most perceptive commentaries has not yet been published Edward H.
Buehrig, "Our First European Intervention: 1917" (MS in possession of the
author). C. Harley Grattan, Why We Fought (New York, 1929), and Walter
Millis, Road to War: America, 1914-1917 (Boston, 1935), are vividly written
journalistic studies that often ignore the important issues. Alex M. Arnett,

304 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

Claude Kitchin and the Wilson War Policies (Boston, 1937), is reliable only
for Congressional opinions on preparedness and the question of intervention.
Alice M. Morrissey, The American Defense of Neutral Rights, 1914-1917
(Cambridge, Mass., 1939), is legalistic and unrealistic.

Because of their impact upon subsequent historical writing, Edwin M.
Borchard and W. P. Lage, Neutrality for the United States (New Haven,
Conn., 1937), and Charles C. Tansill, America Goes to War (Boston, 1938),
deserve special notice. Professor Borchard was imbued with a sense of mission
to expose Wilson's duplicity and to prove that a truly neutral conduct would
have kept the United States out of the war. Professor TansilPs volume is based
upon enormous research but is marred by a deep anti-British tension and by
TansilTs willingness to use doubtful evidence to bolster a weak case.

Bibliographical Aids

Bernadotte E. Schmitt, "American Neutrality, 1914-1917," Journal of
Modern History, VIII (June, 1936), 200-211, and D. F. Fleming, "Our Entry
into the World War in 1917: the Revised Version," Journal of Politics, II
(Feb., 1940), 75-86, are older commentaries. Richard W. Leopold, "The
Problem of American Intervention, 1917: An Historical Retrospect," World
Politics, II (Apr., 1950), 405-425, is a comprehensive survey of the literature.

ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1914^17

General

In addition to the general works cited above, the following are useful sup-
plementary monographs by American scholars: Malbone W. Graham, The
Controversy between the United States and the Allied Governments, Respect-
ing Neutral Rights and Commerce during the Period of American Neutrality,
1914-1917 (Austin, Tex., 1923); Richard W. Van Alstyne, "The Policy of
the United States Regarding the Declaration of London, at the Outbreak of
the Great War," Journal of Modern History, VII (Pec., 1935), 434-447;
Thomas A. Bailey, "The United States and the Blacklist during the Great
War," Journal of Modern History, VI (Mar., 1934), 14-35; Joseph V. Fuller,
"The Genesis of the Munitions Traffic," Journal of Modern History, VI
(Sept., 1934), 280-293; R. W. Van Alstyne, "Private American Loans to the
Allies, 1914-1916," Pacific Historical Review, II (June, 1933), 180-193; T,
A. Bailey, "World War Analogues of the Trent Affair," American Historical
Review, XXXVIII (Jan., 1933), 286-290; J. C. Crighton, "The Wilhelmina:
An Adventure in the Assertion and Exercise of American Trading Rights
during the World War," American Journal of International Law, XXXIV
(Jan., 1940), -74-88.

ESSAY ON SOURCES 305

Contemporary American Comment

One of the most influential contemporary comments on the British mari-
time system was Edwin J. Clapp, Economic Aspects of the War (New Haven,
Conn., 1915), which was highly critical of British measures. Some Americans,
however, well recognized that British victory and the preservation of British
sea power in the North Atlantic were essential to the security of the United
States. For samples of such views see Roland G. Usher, The Challenge of the
Future (Boston, 1916), and George Louis Beer, "America's Part Among
Nations," New Republic, V (Nov. 20, 1915), 62-64. The most perspicacious
articles in this vein, however, were a series by Walter Lippmann in the New
Republic, published from February, 1916, to April, 1917.

British Newspapers and Periodicals

Armin Rappaport, The British Press and Wilsonian Neutrality (Stanford,
Calif., 1951), is an excellent summary. British newspapers and journals of
opinion commented freely and often caustically on Wilson's neutral policies.
Among the daily press, the London Chronicle, London Observer, London
Daily Telegraph, Manchester Guardian, London Times, Westminster Gazette,
and London Pall Mall Gazette were generally friendly to the United States,
while, the London Clarion, London Daily Express, London Daily Mail, Lon-
don Daily News and Leader, London Morning Post, and Glasgow Herald
were usually highly critical of American policies. For a list of the significant
British journals of comment see p. 291.

Letters, Memoirs, and Biographies of British Leaders

Stephen Gwynn (ed.), The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring
Rice (2 vols., Boston, 1929), is important, but more useful for British opinion
are Herbert H. Asquith, Memories and Reflections, 1852-1927 (2 vols.,
Boston, 1928); Arthur J. Balfour, Retrospect: An Unfinished Biography
(Boston, 1930); Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis (4 vols. in 5, New
York, 1923-29); Edward Grey, Twenty-Five Years, 1892-1916, cited above;
David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George (6 vols., Boston,
1933-37); and Henry W. Steed, Through Thirty Years, 1892-1922 (Garden
City,N,Y., 1924).

Also helpful in understanding British policies are Blanche E. C. Dugdale,
Arthur James Balfour (2 vols., London, 1936); Herbert A. L. Fisher, fames
Bryce (2 vols., New York, 1927); and George M. Trevelyan, Grey of
Fallodon (Boston, 1937).

FRANCO-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1914-17

Most of the general works cited under "American Neutrality, 1914^17,
General" advert to the relations between the United States and France.

306 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

T. Bentley Mott, Myron T. Herrick, Friend of France (Garden City, N.Y.,
1929), and William G. Sharp, War Memoirs of William Graves Sharp
(London, 1931), are the biography and memoir of the two American Am-
bassadors in Paris from 1914 to 1917. Georges E. B. Clemenceau, In the
Evening of My Thought (Charles M. Thompson and John Heard, Jr., trans.,
2 vols., Boston, 1929), is the only autobiography of an important French
statesman. Andre* P. G. A. Tardieu, France and America (Boston, 1927), is
also useful.

GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1914-17

General

The general sources and works cited under "American Neutrality, 1914-17,
General" are of course especially pertinent here. In this connection, see also
James W. Gerard, My Four Years in Germany (New York, 1917), Face to
Face with Kaiserism (New York, 1918), and My First Eighty-Three Years in
America (Garden City, N.Y., 1951); Hugh Gibson, A Journal from Our
Legation in Belgium (Garden City, N.Y., 1917), and Joseph G. Grew,
Turbulent Era, A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945 (Walter
Johnson, ed., 2 vols., Boston, 1952).

Johann H. von Bernstorff, My Three Years in America (New York, 1920)
and Memoirs (New York, 1936), and Gonstantin Dumba, Memoirs of a
Diplomat (Ian F, D. Morrow, trans., Boston, 1932), should be used with
care.

William H. Skaggs, German Conspiracies in America (London, 1915), is
somewhat exaggerated, but Franz Rintelen von Kleist, The Dark Invader
(London, 1933), is the story of German intrigues in the United States by
the chief German agent.

American Comment on Germany General

For sympathize analyses of and comment on the German war effort and
objectives by Americans see E. F. Henderson, Germany's Fighting Machine
(Indianapolis, 1914); John W. Burgess, The European War of 1914 (Chicago,
1915); George S. Fullerton, Germany of Today (Indianapolis, 1915); Max
Eastman, Understanding Germany (New York, 1916); and Albert J.
Beveridge, What Is Back of the War? (Indianapolis, 1915).

In contrast to these Americans who viewed the German cause sympa-
thetically, other American observers asserted that Germany had begun the
war in order to achieve hegemony in the world and condemned the Prussian
military class as a dire menace to liberty everywhere. In this vein see James
M. Beck, The Evidence in the Case (New York, 1914); J. M. Beck, The
War and Humanity (New York, 1916); Frederick W. Whitridge, One

ESSAY ON SOURCES 307

American's Opinion of the European War (New York, 1914); John Jay
Chapman, Deutschland 'liber Alles, or Germany Speaks (New York, 1914);
Oswald G. Villard, Germany Embattled (New York, 1915); William Roscoe
Thayer, Germany vs. Civilization (Boston, 1916); and A. D. McLaren,
Germanism from Within (New York, 1916).

German Atrocities

The report of the Bryce Commission, Report of the Committee on Alleged
German Outrages, was published in full in The New York Times and other
American newspapers on May 13, 1915. For other such contemporary indict-
ments against the German government see, e.g., Joseph Bedier, Les Crimes
Allemands d'apres Temoignages Allemands (Paris, 1916); J. H. Morgan,
German Atrocities (New York, 1916); and James M. Beck, The Case of
Edith Cavell (New York, 1916).

There is considerable doubt, however, that these atrocity charges signifi-
cantly affected American public opinion. This was true primarily because
American reporters with the German armies in Belgium and northern France
unanimously repudiated the accusations. See, e.g., Roger Lewis et al., in
New York World and other newspapers, Sept. 7, 1914; John T. McCutcheon,
in New York World, Sept. 19, 1914; Arno Dosch, "Louvain the Lost,"
World's Work, XXVIII (Oct., 1914), A-H; Irvin S. Cobb, "Being a Guest
of the German Kaiser," Saturday Evening Post, CLXXXVII (Oct. 24,
1914), 14-15, 48-50; Arthur Sweetser, "With the German Army In Its Dash
toward Paris," Outlook, CIX (Jan. 27, 1915), 186-190.

The Submarine Controversy, 1915-17

The most authoritative work on German submarine operations before
February, 1917, is Arno Spindler, La Guerre Sous-Marine (Rene Jouan,
trans., 3 vols., Paris, 1933-35), but the following are also useful: Albert
Gayer, "Summary of German Submarine Operations in the Various Theaters
of War from 1914 to 1918," Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute,
LI (1926),. 621-659; and Maurice Prendergast and R. H. Gibson, The
German Submarine War, 1914-1918 (New York, 1931).

All available data on the sinking of the Lusitania are brought together in
Thomas A. Bailey, "The Sinking of the Lusitania" American Historical Re-
view, XLI (Oct., 1935), 54-73, and "German Documents Relating to the
'Lusitania,' " Journal of Modern History, VIII (,Sept., 1936), 320-337.

German Sources

The Archives of the German Foreign Office for the period 1914r-18 are
now available on microfilm in the National Archives. Except for data on
German intrigues in the United States and Mexico, however, the record of

308 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

German diplomacy toward the United States is fully revealed in Official
German Documents Relating to the World War (2 vols., New York, 1923).
Die Grosse Politik der Europdischen Kabinette, 1871-1914 (40 vols. in 54,
Berlin, 1922-27) goes only through the outbreak of the war.

An excellent source for a study of German policies is the memoirs of the
leaders of the government and the armed forces: Theobald von Bethmann-
Hollweg, William II, Matthias Erzberger, Erich Georg von Falkenhayn, Karl
Helfferich, Paul von Hindenburg, Erich LudendorfT, and Alfred von Tirpitz.
The best source for German opinion on the developing tension between
Germany and the United States, however, is the German press, which was
enlightened and subjected only to slight censorship. Among the Liberal news-
papers the Berliner Tageblatt, which often spoke for the Foreign Office,
the Kolnische Zeitung, and the Frankfurter Zeitung, were the leaders.
Vorwdrts of Berlin spoke for the Social Democrats and consistently cham-
pioned peace with America. The Lokal-Anzeiger (Berlin) was an organ of
the government, while the Vossische Zeitung (Berlin) was another moderate
spokesman. Deutsche Tageszeitung and Tdglische Rundschau, both of Berlin,
were organs of the Conservative party and mouthpieces of the military and
naval leaders. The spokesman of Rhenish Catholic opinion was the
Kolnische Volkszeitung.

AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION ON THE WAR, 1914-17

There is no comprehensive study of this important subject, but Robert E.
Osgood, Ideals and Self -Interest in America's Foreign Relations (Chicago,
1953), analyzes the thought of an important segment of American leadership,
while Ralph O. Nafziger, "The American Press and Public Opinion During
the World War 1914 to April 1917," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of
Wisconsin Library, is also helpful.

' The following specialized studies contribute toward understanding the great
diversity of American attitudes: Edwin Costrell, How Maine Viewed the
War, 1914-1917 (Orono, Me., 1940); Cedric C. Cummins, Indiana Public
Opinion and the World War, 1914-1917 (Indianapolis, 1945); John C.
Crighton, Missouri and the World War, 1914-1917 (Columbia, Mo., 1947);
Joseph Rappaport, "Jewish Immigrants and World War I: A Study of
American Yiddish Press Reactions," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Columbia
University Library; Ray A. Billington, "The Origins of Middle Western
Isolationism," Political Science Quarterly, LX (Mar., 1945), 44-64; and
Harold C. Syrett, "The Business Press and American Neutrality, 1914-1917,"
Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXXII (Sept., 1945), 215-230.

Although they are fragmentary and inconclusive, several contemporary
surveys by Americans offer insight: Samuel H. Church, The American Verdict

ESSAY ON SOURCES 309

on the War (Baltimore, 1915); J. M. Baldwin, American Neutrality (New
York, 1916); and Joseph H. Ghoate et aL, Sixty American Opinions on the
War (London, 1915). The keenest analyses of American opinion, however,
were made by British observers, most of whom never deluded themselves into
believing the American people wanted to enter the war. Three documents of
extraordinary importance are Gilbert Parker, Memorandum on the Attitude
of the American Press (London, 1914); G. Parker, Report of the Opinion of
the Universities and Colleges in America upon the War (London, n.d.); and
Horace Plunkett, Memorandum on the Anglo-American Situation, Printed for
the use of the Cabinet (London, 1916).

Representative American Comment on the War

American comment on all phases of the difficulties with Germany is cited
on pp. 306-307. American comment on the British conduct of the war is
listed on pp. 304-305. For general German- American comment, see p. 310.

In addition, George Harvey, "Europe at Armageddon," North American
Review, CC (Sept., 1914), 321-332, and the Pastoral Letter of the Bishops of
the Methodist Episcopal Church, May 12, 1915, printed in New York
Christian Advocate, XG (May 20, 1915), 677, were balanced commentaries
on the causes of the war.

For representative interventionist or quasi-interventionist sentiment see
William Dean Howells, "Why?" North American Review, CGI (May, 1915),
676-682; George Harvey, "The German Attitude," North American Review,
CCII (Oct., 1915), 481-488; American Rights Committee, A Memorial to
the President of the United States (New York, 1915); Josiah Royce, The
Duties of Americans in the Present War (Boston, 1916); and William T.
Manning, The Present Crisis in Our National Life (New York, 1916).

GERMAN- AND IRISH-AMERICANS AND THE WAR

General

Carl Wittke, German- Americans and the World War (Columbus, Ohio,
1936), and Clifton J. Child, The German- Americans in Politics, 1914-1917
(Madison, Wis., 1939), provide a fairly complete picture. Alden Jamison,
"The Irish Question and American Diplomacy, 1895-1921," unpublished
Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University Library, is excellent.

German-American Periodicals and Newspapers

The Fatherland (New York, 1914-33), The Vital Issue, later Issues and
Events (New York, 1914-18), and The Open Court (Chicago, 1887-1936)
were the leading German-American periodicals. Among the many German-
language newspapers, the following were most influential: New York

3IO WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

Deutsches M or gen-Journal, New York Staats-Zeitung, Chicago Abendpost,
Chicago Illinois Staats-Zeitung, St. Louis Westliche Post, Milwaukee Ger-
mania, and Cincinnati Freie Presse.

German-American Comment and Propaganda

Gustavus Ohlinger, Their True Faith and Allegiance (New York, 1916), is
a compilation of utterances by German-American leaders. The following are
samples of German- American appeals for sympathy for the Fatherland:
Edmund von Mach, What Germany Wants (Boston, 1914); Kuno Francke,
A German-American's Confession of Faith (New York, 1915); Roland
Hugins, Germany Misjudged (Chicago, 1916); S. I. Stefan, Neutrality?
(Chicago, 1916); Charles F. Aked and Walter Rauschenbusch, "Private
Profit and the Nation's Honor," Chicago Standard, LXII (July 31, 1915),
1486-1487.

Irish-Americans and the War

The best source for Irish-American efforts to obtain an arms embargo and
acquiescence in the German submarine campaign is the Hearst press and the
several Irish-American periodicals, New York Irish World, New York Gaelic
American, and Los Angeles Irish Review. Typical of Irish-American tracts
are J. K. McGuire's The King, the Kaiser, and Irish Freedom (New York,
1915) and What Could Germany Do for Ireland? (New York, 1916).

For samples of the propaganda of the most vociferous Irish-American
organization, the American Truth Society, see J. A. O'Leary, Why Woodrow
Wilson Should be Defeated and a Republican Congress Elected (New York,
1916), and A Statement Issued by the American Truth Society in defense of
its President against an unjust attack made upon him by the President of the
United States (New York, 1916).

PROPAGANDA AND AMERICAN OPINION ON THE WAR

General Surveys

All of the studies of propaganda exaggerate its role in shaping American
opinions on the war. H. C. Peterson, Propaganda for War (Norman, Okla.,
1939), is the best of the general works. J. D. Squires, British Propaganda at
Home and in the United States from 1914-1917 (Cambridge, Mass., 1935),
analyzes the content of British propaganda. Arthur Willert, Road to Safety:
A Study in Anglo-American Relations (London, 1952), is a revealing study
by the former Washington correspondent for the Northcliffe Press. George
Sylvester Viereck, Spreading Germs of Hate (New York, 1931), is especially
good for the operations of the German propaganda machine in the United
States.

ESSAY ON SOURCES 31 1

How the belligerents utilized propaganda as a weapon of war is well
presented in J. M. Read, Atrocity Propaganda, 1914-1919 (New Haven,
Conn., 1941); Georges Demartial, La Guerre de 1914: Comment OnMobilisa
les Consciences (Paris, 1922); Harold D. Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in
the World War (New York, 1927); and Arthur Ponsonby, Falsehood in War-
Time (New York, 1928).

British Propaganda

From 1914 to 1917 the American periodical press printed hundreds of
statements and appeals by British leaders. Good examples of books in this
category are Ramsay Muir, Britain's Case Against Germany (New York,
1914), and Douglas Sladen, The Real "Truth About Germany 93 (New York,
1914).

For the student who wishes to go thoroughly into this subject, there is a
practically complete listing of British propaganda books and articles in Her-
mann Wanderscheck, Bibliographie zur englischen Propaganda im Weltkrieg
(Stuttgart, 1935).

German Propaganda

American magazines and newspapers printed hundreds of articles, state-
ments, and appeals by various German leaders during the period 1914-17.
For representative books and pamphlets see Adolph von Baeyer et al. t To the
Civilized World (n.p., n.d.); How the Franco-German Conflict Could Have
Been Avoided (Berlin, 1914); Notable Germans, The Truth About Germany
(New York [?], 1914); Hugo Miinsterberg, The War and America (New
York, 1914); Bernhard Dernburg, The Case of Belgium in the Light of
Official Reports Found in the Secret Archives of the Belgian Government
. . . (New York, 1915 [?]); H. Miinsterberg, The Peace and America (New
York, 1915); and Alexander Fuehr, The Neutrality of Belgium (New York,
1915).

THE PREPAREDNESS AND PEACE MOVEMENTS, 1914-17

General Studies

The best general surveys of the preparedness and peace movements are
William H. Harbaugh, "Wilson, Roosevelt, and American Interventionism,
1914-1917," unpublished Ph.D. thesis in Northwestern University Library,
and R. E. Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations,
cited above. William W. Tinsley, "The American Preparedness Movement,
1913-1916," unpublished Ph.D. thesis in the Stanford University Library, is
useful for the literature of preparedness.

Hermann Hagedorn's The Bugle That Woke America (New York, 1940)

312 WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

and Leonard Wood, A Biography, cited above, and Elting E. Morison, Ad-
miral Sims and the Modern American Navy (Boston, 1942), are excellent on
the most aggressive preparedness elements.

The only general studies of the peace movement are Merle Curti, The
American Peace Crusade (Durham, N.C., 1929); M. Curti, Bryan and World
Peace (Northampton, Mass., 1931), and Jane Addams, Peace and Bread in
Time of War (New York, 1922).

In a special category is Ruhl J. Bartlett, The League to Enforce Peace
(Chapel Hill, N.G., 1944), an excellent study of the most important inter-
nationalist organization in the United States during the neutrality period.

Preparedness Periodicals

Leaders in the preparedness movement were the periodicals published by
the military and naval societies and by the armed services. The Seven Seas
Magazine (New York, 1915-16) and Sea Power (Washington, 1916-21,
1935- ) were organs of the Navy League. Spokesmen for the military
branch included the Army and Navy Magazine (Washington, 1893- ) , Army
and Navy Journal (New York, 1863- ), and Infantry Journal (Washington,
1904 ). In addition, a number of general periodicals, including Outlook,
Everybody's Magazine, and New Republic, were active in the preparedness
agitation.

The Literature of Preparedness

The following books illustrate the propaganda of the preparedness move-
ment and often reflect the conviction that a conflict between the United States
and Germany was almost inevitable: Hudson Maxim, Defenseless America
(New York, 1915); Frederick L. Huidekoper, The Military Unpreparedness of
the United States (New York, 1915); Howard D. Wheeler, Are We Ready?
(Boston, 1915); Theodore Roosevelt, Fear God and Take Your Own Part
(New York, 1916); John B. Walker, America Fallen! (New York, 1916);
Owen Wister, The Pentecost of Calamity (New York, 1915); Julius W.
Muller, The Invasion of America (New York, 1916); Cleveland Moffett,
The Conquest of America (New York, 1916); Porter E. Browne, Scars and
Stripes (New York, 1917).

The Peace and Antipreparedness Crusades

The best contemporary sources for these movements are The Survey, The
Nation, the New York Evening Post, the Johnstown (Penna,) Democrat,
Bryan's Commoner, the Chicago Public, and La Follette's Magazine. For
accounts of the peace movement and its objectives, see Jane Addams et aL,
Women at The Hague (New York, 1915), and Randolph S. Bourne (ed.),

ESSAY ON SOURCES 313

Towards an Enduring Peace (New York, 1916), an elaboration of various
current peace proposals.

The campaign against preparedness was an outgrowth of the peace move-
ment and closely related to it. Among the contemporary arguments against
preparedness, the following are representative: Allen L. Benson, Inviting
America to War (New York, 1916); William I. Hull, Preparedness: The
American versus Military Programme (New York, 1916); Oswald G. Villard,
Preparedness (Washington, 1915); Charles E. Jefferson, Christianity and In-
ternational Peace (New York, 1915) and What the War Is Teaching (New
York, 1916); Washington Gladden, The Forks of the Road (New York,
1916); John Haynes Holmes, New Wars for Old (New York, 1916); and
Frederick G. Howe, Why War? (New York, 1916).

The Army Bills of 1916-17

The whole range of public and professional opinion on the army bills of
1916 and 1917 may be consulted in House Military Affairs Committee, Army
Appropriation Bill, 1917, Hearings . . . , 64th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington,
1916) ; Senate Military Affairs Committee, Preparedness for National Defense
. . . , 64th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, 1916); House Military Affairs Com-
mittee, Army Appropriation Bill, 1918, Hearings . . . , 64th Cong., 2d sess.
(Washington, 1917), and Senate Military Affairs Committee, Universal Mili-
tary Training, Hearings . . . , 64th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, 1917).

The Naval and Shipping Bills of 1916

Important background of this legislation is discussed in Outten J. Clinard,
Japan's Influence on American Naval Power, 1897-1917 (Berkeley, Calif.,
1947). Storehouses of information and opinion on these measures are House
Naval Affairs Committee, Hearings on Estimates Submitted by Secretary of
Navy t 1916, 64th Cong., 1st sess. (3 vols., Washington, 1916), and Senate
Commerce Committee, Creating Shipping Board, Naval Auxiliary, and Mer-
chant Marine, Hearings . . . , 64th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, 1916).

Index

Abbott, Lawrence F., 175-176

ABC mediation, 104, 126-127

Adams, Herbert Baxter, 8

Adamson, William C., a Democratic
leader in the House, 35; helps pre-
pare antitrust legislation, 68; op-
poses Federal Trade Commission
idea, 72; and writing and adoption
of Adamson Act, 236-237

Adamson Act, 235-237, 238-239

Addams, Jane, 16, 182, 239

Aguascalientes Convention, 130-131

Albert, Heinrich, 167

Aldrich, Nelson W., 3, 5, 44

Aldrich Plan, 44-45, 47

Alexander, Joshua W., 191

American Anti-Boycott Association,
74

American Association for Labor
Legislation, 54, 226

American Bankers* Association, 50-51

American Federation of Labor, see
Labor

American League to Limit Arma-
ment, 182

American Rights Committee, 176,
269

American Telephone & Telegraph
Company antitrust settlement, 76

American Union Against Militarism,
pleads against war with Mexico,
142; agitates against war with Ger-
many, 269

Ancona affair, 202

Anderson, Chandler P., 155, 162-163

Antipreparedness movement, origins
and motivation, 180-181; organi-
2ation of, 181-182; champions in
House of Representatives, 183; vic-
tory in controversy over Army
Reorganization Act, 189

Antitrust legislation, discussion and
formulation of original Wilsonian
program, 6669; controversy over,
69-70; adoption of Clayton Act,
70, 7273; writing and adoption
of Federal Trade Commission Act,
71-72

Arabia case, 254

Arabic case, 168-169

Armed neutrality, 271-272, 277-278

Armed ship controversy of 1916, 205-
214

Armed ship controversy of 1917, 269-
274

Armenian, 168

Arms embargo, 167

Army League of the United States,
177

Army Reorganization Act of 1916,
Army War College proposal, 179-
180; controversy over, 180186;
adoption of House bill, 187; Senate
bill, 187-188; adoption and terms
of final measure, 188; opinions of,
188-189

315

316 INDEX

Army War College, prepares army
reorganization bill, 179-180; pre-
pares conscription bill, 268

Arredondo, Eliseo, 137, 138

Ashurst, Henry F., 35

Asquith, Herbert H,, 204^205

Association for an Equitable Income
Tax, 193

Bacon, Robert, 230
Bagehot, Walter, 8
Bailey, Warren. Worth, a leader of
antipreparedness group, 183; com-
ments on Army Act, 189; laments
passage of naval bill, 190; proposes
huge increases in income tax, 194;
praises Revenue Act of 1916, 196
Baker, Newton D., appointed Secre-
tary of War, 28, 187; orders with-
drawal of Punitive Expedition,
144; proposes establishment of
Council of National Defense, 188;
urges war resolution, 276
Baker, Ray S., 239
Balfour, Arthur J., and House's peace
plan, 202, 204; and armed ship
question, 207
Ballinger, Richard A. and the Ball-

inger Affair, 34, 5
Banco Nacional of Santo Domingo,

97-98

Bankhead, John H., 35
Beer, William C., 97
Belmont, August, 12
BerastorrT, Johann von, and House's
first peace mission, 160-161; pre-
sents protest against sale of muni-
tions, 163; disavows Rintelen, 201;
connection with intriguers, 201;
comments on Roosevelt and cam-
paign of 1916, 244; excites Ger-
man hopes of peace, 256; reports
Wilson's comments on Roosevelt
and Lodge, 256; secret negotiations
with House, 262-263; urges post-
ponement of unrestricted sub-
marine warfare, 263
Bethmann-Hollweg, Theobald von,
and the Arabic crisis, 168-169;
discusses peace with House, 203;
on Lusitania negotiations, 206; re-
sists pressure for unrestricted sub-
marine warfare, 216, 255; desires

Wilson's mediation, 256; issues
peace offer to enemies, 259; ap-
peals for Wilson's support, 260;
loses control of foreign policy, 263

Beveridge, Albert J., 5

"Blacklist" dispute, 220-221, 252

Bobo, Rosalvo, 101

Bonillas, Ignacio, 143

Bordas, Valdes Jos6, 98

Boyd, Captain, 141

Boy-Ed, Karl, 200-201

Brandeis, Louis D., Wilson's chief ad-
viser in 1912, 20-21 ; not appointed
to Cabinet in 1913, 28, 30-31; and
framing of Federal Reserve bill,
48; helps prepare railroad securi-
ties bill, 68; evolving new antitrust
solution, 69; and writing of Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act, 71-
72; disappointed over failure of
Federal Trade Commission, 74;
comments on results of election of
1914, 78; nomination to Supreme
Court, 225

Breitung, Edward N., 155

Briand, Aristide, 203, 204

Brown, E. N., 108

Bryan, William Jennings, dominant
in Democratic party, 1908-1910,
2; and need for new leadership,
2-7; and elections of 1910, 7;
and Baltimore convention, 12-13;
sketch of as Secretary of State, 26-
27; and income tax of 1913, 39;
and writing of Federal Reserve
bill, 4550; and adoption of sea-
men's bill of 1915, 63; urges aboli-
tion of "rule of reason," 67;
dynamics of foreign policy, 81-82;
negotiates conciliation treaties, 82;
and dispute with Japan, 84-87;
and crisis over Twenty-One De-
mands, 8790; and Panama Canal
tolls dispute, 91; origins and moti-
vation of Latin American and
Caribbean policies, 93-94, 103-
104; Nicaraguan policy, 94-97;
Dominican policy, 97-99; Haitian
policy, 99-102; negotiates- treaty
of reparation with Colombia, 104-
105; and relations with Huerta
government of Mexico, 1913-1914,
107-128; and ABC mediation,

INDEX

3*7

126; and Villa's revolt, 129; sup-
ports Villa government, 131; re-
fuses to sanction Catholic demands
for repeal of Reform Laws, 135;
bans war loans as unneutral, 151;
implicitly revokes ban, 152; on
ship purchase bill, 153; and the
British food blockade, 159; and
peace talks in 1914, 160-161;
pleads against strong stand in
Thrasher case, 163; seeks to find
peaceful solution in Lusitania nego-
tiations, 166; resigns, 166; sets out
on peace campaign, 167; leader in
antipreparedness, 182; threatens to
bolt party, 223-224; hero of St.
Louis convention, 234; and cam-
paign of 1916, 243; makes last-
ditch campaign for peace, 269

Bryce, James, 91, 147-148

Bryce Report, 147-148

Bulkley, Robert J., 57-59

Bunkering agreement, 252-253

Burleson, Albert S., patronage poli-
cies as Postmaster General, 29;
segregates Negro workers, 64-65;
uses patronage in tolls dispute, 92;
protests Lusitania postscript, 166;
uses patronage to defeat McLemore
Resolution, 213

Burnett immigration bills of 1915 and
1917, see Immigration legislation

Bynner, Witter, 251

Cabrera, Luis, 121, 143

Calder, William M., 230

California alien land act of 1913,
84^-87

Cambon, Jules, 203-204

Cannon, Joseph G., 3

Caperton, W. B., 102

Capper, Arthur, 274

Garden, Sir Lionel, 116-117, 120

Caribbean policy of the United
States, 1910-1917, see Latin
American Policy of the United
States, 1910-1917

Carothers, George G., 128, 129

Carranza, Venustiano, begins revolt
against Huerta, 109; establishes
provisional government, 120; re-
fuses to allow Wilson to control
Constitutionalist movement, 120-

121; condemns American occupa-
tion of Vera Cruz, 125-126;
occupies Mexico City, 128; and
Villa's revolt, 128-129; concurs
in plan for new government for
Mexico, 129-130; declares war on
Villa's government, 131; broadens
program and crushes Villa, 131;
repudiates Wilson's right to inter-
vene in Mexico, 133-134; wins
recognition by United States and
Latin America, 135; alarmed by
entry of Punitive Expedition, 137;
demands withdrawal of Punitive
Expedition, 138-139; rejects Scott-
Obreg6n agreement, 140; threatens
war against United States, 140;
suggests direct negotiations, 143;
and Joint High Commission, 143;
establishes constitutional govern-
ment and is recognized de jure by
United States, 144; and the Zim-
mermann "note," 271

Carrizal incident, 141-142

Casement, Sir Roger, 218

Casey, John J., 70

Catt, Carrie Chapman, 182

Chadwick, French E., 146

Chamberlain, George E., 187

Child Labor Act of 1916, origins, 59;
passage of, 226-227; significance,
227

China and the United States, Ameri-
can withdrawal from Six-Power
Consortium, 82-84; American rec-
ognition of Republic of China, 84;
and crisis over Twenty-One De^
mands, 87-90

Chinda, Viscount, 86, 89

City of Memphis, 274

Clark, Champ, a new Democratic
leader, 7; biographical sketch, 11;
and the Democratic pre-convention
campaign of 191O-1912, 11-12;
and Baltimore convention, 12-13;
opposes Wilson in tolls dispute, 92;
and armed ship controversy of
1916, 212; threatened revolt of,
223; elected Speaker in 1917, 281

Clarke amendment, 228

Clayton, Henry D., 35, 68

Clayton Act of 1914, writing of, 67-
68; controversy over, 69; passage

INDEX

by House, 70; weakening of in
Senate, 72-73. For adoption of
labor provisions see Labor

Cleveland Automatic Machine Com-
pany, 168

Cobb, Frank, comments on segrega-
tion, 66; talk with Wilson, 277

Cobb, Irvin S., 239

Colby, Bainbridge, 232, 239

Colombia and the United States,
104-105

Columbus Raid, 136

Committee to Defend America by
Aiding the Allies, 177

Conciliation treaties, 82

Constitutionalist movement in Mex-
ico, see Mexican Revolution

Consumers' League, 54

Continental Army, Army War Col-
lege proposal, 179-180; opposed
by House Military Affairs Commit-
tee, 184, 186; defeat of, 188

Convention on Safety at Sea, 62-63

"Cooling-off" treaties, 82

Cooper amendment, 273

Costigan, Edward P., 240

Cotton, the cotton crisis of 1914,
149-150; cotton crisis of 1915,
1 69-1 70 ; Anglo-American agree-
ment on, 171-172

Coudert, Frederic R., 176

Council of National Defense, 188

Covington, James H., 68

Cowdray, Lord (S. Weetman Pear-
son), 116-117

Crawford, Sir Richard, 171-172, 253

Creel, George, 239

Croly, Herbert, contribution to de-
velopment of progressive thought,
1819; comments on Wilson's con-
cept of progressivism, 78-79; sup-
ports Wilson in 1916, 239, 240

Cuba and the United States, 103

Culberson, Charles A., 73

Cummins, Albert B., 41, 73

Dacia affair, 155-156

Daniels, Josephus, sketch of as Secre-
tary of the Navy, 28-29; and con-
troversy over general leasing bill,
30; on conditions in navy, 177;
and formulation of naval prepared-
ness program, 179; urges war reso-

lution, 276; begins talks with
British Admiralty, 277

Dartiguenave, Sudre, 102

Davies, Joseph ., 74-75

Debs, Eugene V., and campaign of
1912, 16-17; popular vote in 1912,
22; demands general strike in
event of war, 275

Declaration of London, 153-154

Del Valle, Reginaldp F., 112

Democratic party, victory in elections
of 1910, 6-7; preconvention cam-
paign of 1910-1912, 8-13; Balti-
more convention, 1213; election
of 1912, 22-24; patronage policies
of Wilson administration, 29;
leadership in Congress in 1913, 35;
approves A.F. of L.'s legislative de-
mands, 55; suffers reversal in
elections of 1914, 78; situation in
early 1916, 223-224; platform of
1916, 233; St. Louis convention,
233-235; campaign of 1916, 237-
247; election of 1916, 247-251

Depression of 1913-1915, 75

Dewey, John, 193, 239

Diaz, Adolfo, 94, 96

Diaz, F<51ix, 112

Diaz, Porfirio, 107

Dolliver, Jonathan P., 5

Dominican Republic and the United
States, 1913-1917, 97-99

Douglas, Charles A., 96

Du Bois, William E. B., 63

Dumba, Constantin, 167

Eagle, Joe H., 50

Eastman, Max, 239

Einstein, Lewis, 26

Elections of 1910, 1912, 1914, and

1916, see Democratic party and

Republican party
Eliot, Charles W., 148, 174
Estrada, Juan J., 94
Evans, Mrs. Glendower, 60
Evening Post, New York, 237, 241

Falaba case, 162-164
Fall, Albert B., 42, 124-125
Farnham, Roger L., 100
Farnham Plan, 100
Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916, ef-
forts of agrarian leaders to establish

INDEX

319

rural credits system blocked by
Wilson administration, 5659 ',
passage of Act, 225-226

Federal Reserve Act of 1913, 43-53

Federal Reserve Board, controversy
over appointment, 76-78; calls halt
to extension of short-term credits
to Allies, 258-259

Federal Trade Commission, purpose
of, 74; failure to realize ambitions
of its sponsors, 74-75

Federal Trade Commission Act of
1914, Roosevelt proposes and Wil-
son condemns during campaign of
1912, 16, 21; "weak" trade com-
mission bill, 68; writing of "strong"
trade commission bill and approval
by Wilson, 71-72; passage of meas-
ure, 72

Fiske, Bradley A., 86 .

Fletcher, Duncan .," 57

Fletcher, Henry P., 144

Flinn, William, 16

Flood, Hal D., and Lusitania crisis,
166; assures Germany of American
friendship, 206; and armed ship
controversy of 1916, 211-212

Ford, Henry, 76, 230-231

Fort, John Franklin, 101

France, Joseph I., 278

Frick, Henry C., 76

Frye note, 169

Fuller, Paul, goes on secret mission to
Mexico, 129-130; views on war,
175-176

Furuseth, Andrew, early campaign
for seamen's bill, 6162; denoun-
ces London Convention on Safety
at Sea, 62; and passage of Sea-
men's Act, 62-63

Gallinger, Jacob H., 183, 192

Gait, Edith Boiling, 183

Gamboa, Federico, repudiates Wil-
son's right to intervene in Mexico,
114-115; candidate for Mexican
presidency, 116

Gardner, Augustus P., 177

Gardner, Gilson, 213

Garrison, Lindley M., sketch of as
Secretary of War, 28; favors strong
action against Japan, 87; protests
Lusitania postscript, 166; and

formulation of army preparedness
program, 179-180; at loggerheads
with House committee over army
bill, 183-184, 186; resigns, 186;
opinion of Wilson, 186

Gavit, J. P., 278

George, Henry, 1

Gerard, James W., 256

German- American Alliance, 214

German-Americans, and senatorial
contest in New York, 230; and
Republican preconvention cam-
paign of 1916, 231; win victory in
nomination of Hughes, 232; and
campaign of 1916, 245-247; vote
in election of 1916, 249

Germany, food situation in, 159; war
objectives in 1915, 162; German
anger over export of munitions to
Allies, 167-168; German reaction
to Sussex ultimatum, 215-216; in-
ternal struggle over submarine
policy, 216; intensifies submarine
campaign, 254; discussions of un-
restricted submarine warfare, 255;
deportation of Belgian laborers,
257; leaders decide upon peace
campaign and, that failing, un-
restricted submarine warfare, 259;
war objectives in December 1916,
259; peace offer, 259-260, 264;
decision for unrestricted submarine
warfare, 263; reveals peace terms
to Wilson, 266; announces unre-
stricted submarine warfare, 266-
267; success of submarine cam-
paign, 276. See also Germany and
the United States

Germany and the United States,
Bryan anxious to prevent German
control of Haiti, 100; Germany
supports United States in Mexico,
119; Germany foments trouble be-
tween United States and Mexico,
133-134; Wilson anxious to avoid
war with Mexico because of trouble
with Germany, 137; German prop-
aganda during First World War
and American opinion, 145-148;
Germany challenges British block-
ade with submarines, 156-159; re-
jects Wilson's mediation, 160-162;
the Thrasher case, 162-164; Ger-

32O INDEX

man protests over American sale
of munitions to Allies, 163; sink-
ing of Lusitania and subsequent
crisis, 164-167; revelation of Ger-
man propaganda in United States,
167; sinking of Arabic leads to first
German submarine pledge, 168-
169; growth of anti-German senti-
ment in United States, 174-177;
German intrigues in Mexico and
United States, 200-201; negotia-
tions to settle Lusitania affair, 201,
206, 210; discussions over armed
ships, 205-209; Germany issues
proclamation against armed ships,
209-210; controversy over armed
ships, 210-214; Sussex crisis and
settlement, 215-218; intensified
submarine campaign raises new
cases, 254; and possibilities of
Wilson's mediation, 255-257; Ger-
many rejects Wilson's offer of
mediation and friendship, 261-
266; unrestricted submarine war-
fare causes break in relations, 266
268; the Zimmermann "note,"
271; causes for war between, 278-
281

Ghent, William J., 274

Giddings, Franklin H., 176

Gladden, Washington, 239

Glass, Carter, and writing of Federal
Reserve bill, 45-50; and rural
credits legislation, 58

Glynn, Martin H., 233-234

Godkin, Lawrence, 176

Gomez, F<lix G., 141

Gompers, Samuel, president of A.F.
of L., demands exemption of labor
unions from prosecution under
antitrust laws, 56, 69, 73; calls
Clayton Act "Magna Carta" of
labor, 7374; supports Wilson in
1916, 240

Gonzales, Pablo, 130-131

Gore, Thomas P,, 211-214

Gore Resolution, 213-214

Gray, George, 143

Great Britain, British war objectives
in 1915, 155, 198; interdicts all
commerce with Germany, 160; in-
ability to pay for war purchases in
United States, 172; intensifies eco-

nomic warfare, 252-253; and Ger-
man peace offer, 260, 264. See also
Great Britain and the United
States

Great Britain and the United States,
dispute over Panama Canal tolls,
90-93; British- government sup-
ports Huerta, 116; Wilson contem-
plates strong protest to British
government, 1 1 7-1 18; Wilson
forces British government to aban-
don Huerta, 119-120; British
propaganda during First World
War and American opinion, 145-
148; Anglo-American difficulties
and negotiations over neutral trad-
ing rights, 154-155; Dacia contro-
versy, 155-156; British food
blockade, 157; cotton crisis of
1915, 169-172; negotiation of
Anglo-French loan of 1915, 172-
173; worsening of Anglo-American
relations, 218-220; mails dispute,
220; "blacklist" dispute, 220-221;
new antagonisms drive two nations
further apart, 252-253; potential
controversy over mediation, 255-
257; restriction of American credit
to Britain, 258-259; Anglo-Ameri-
can negotiations looking toward
mediation, 263-264

Gregory, Thomas W., appointed At-
torney General, 28; and contro-
versy over general leasing bill, 30;
submits memorandum on army bill
of 1916, 184; reviews work of Ger-
man Embassy, 200-201; issues ap-
peal for help against German intri-
guers, 201; urges appointment of
Brandeis to Supreme Court, 225;
on legality of arming merchant
ships, 274; urges war resolution,
276

Grew, Joseph C., 260

Grey, Sir Edward, denies "deal" with
Wilson over Panama Canal tolls
and Mexico, 92; denies that Cow-
dray controls Mexican policy of
British government 116; agrees to
abandon support of Huerta, 119
120; protests ship purchase bill and
American unneutrality, 153, 156;
anxious to come to understanding

INDEX

321

with Wilson, 155; welcomes peace
talks, 161; and House's peace mis-
sion of 1915, 162; suggests Ameri-
can mediation, 198-199; confers
with House, 202-203, 204-205;
understanding with House, 205;
shocked by Lansing's modus vi-
vendi, 208; refuses to allow Wil-
son's mediation, 219

Gronna, Asle J., 42

Guiterrez, Eulalio, 131

Haiti and the United States, 1913-

1916, 99-102, 104
Hale, Edward J., 26
Hale, Matthew, 232, 240, 278
Hale, William Bayard, 112, 120-121
Hapgood, Norman, 31, 175, 239
Harding, Warren G., 192
Harding, W. P. G., 171, 258
Harmon, Judson, 7
Harvey, George, 9, 10, 56, 175
Hay, James, 183, 186
Hayes, Garlton J. H., 271-272
"He kept us out of war," 242-243
Hearst, William Randolph, supports
Clark, 11; agitates for war with
Mexico, 125
Hearst newspapers, 132
Heney, Francis J., 239
Henry, Robert L., 49-50
Hepburn, A. Barton, 51
Herrick, Myron T., 231
Hindenburg, Paul von, 255, 259
Hitchcock, Gilbert M., opposes Fed-
eral Reserve bill, 51-52; urges
armed neutrality instead of war,
278

Hollis, Henry F., Democratic leader
in Senate, 35; and controversy over
rural credits bill, 5759; and pas-
sage of rural credits bill, 225-226;
and Democratic platform of 1916,
233

House, Edward M., and Democratic
preconvention campaign of 1912,
12; personal relations with Wilson,
26; helps Wilson select Cabinet,
25, 26, 30-31; and appointment of
Federal Reserve Board, 76-77;
opinion on causes of First World
War, 146; first mediation effort,
1914-1915, 160-162; formulates

plan to end war, 197-201; second
peace mission, 202205; under-
standing with Grey, 205; urges
Lansing to hold modus vivendi in
abeyance, 208-209; urges strong
stand in Sussex crisis, 215; urges
Grey to allow mediation, 219; sus-
picious of British motives, 219-
220; Wilson consults on League
speech, 233; excites BernstorfFs
hopes of mediation, 256; warns
Wilson of dangers of mediation,
256-258; and Wilson's peace note,
260; secret negotiations with Bern-
storff and Wiseman, 262-264;
urges severance of relations with
Germany, 268; tries to calm Wil-
son, 277

House-Grey understanding (the
"Gentlemen's Agreement"), 205

Houston, David F., sketch of as Secre-
tary of Agriculture, 30; comments
on Underwood tariff, 43; opposes
rural credits bill, 5758; and pas-
sage of rural credits bill, 226; urges
arming of merchant ships, 270;
urges war resolution, 276

Howe, Frederick C., 193, 239

Howland, Charles P., 176

Huerta, Victoriano, deposes Madero
and seizes power in Mexico, 107-
108; Wilson offers mediation to,
112-113; repudiates Wilson's right
to intervene, 113-115; establishes
military dictatorship, 116-117;
again refuses to retire, 119; grows
in strength, 122; refuses to salute
American flag during Tampico
affair, 122-123; and ABC media-
tion, 126-127; abdicates, 128; and
German intrigues, 200

Hughes, Charles Evans, and presi-
dential nomination in 1908, 3;
biographical sketch, 231; nomina-
tion for President, 232; failure of
campaign appeals, 237-238; de-
nounces Adamson Act, 238; embar-
rassments in campaign, 244-245;
confers with German-Americans,
245-246; and election of 1916,
247-251

Hughes, William, 35

Hull, Cordell, 38, 39-40

322

Hurley, Edward N., 74, 75

INDEX

Illinois, 274

Immigration legislation, movement

for immigration restriction, 60;

Wilson vetoes Burnett bill of 1915,

60-61; passage of Burnett bill in

1917 over Wilson's veto, 61
Income tax of 1913, 38-40; income

tax of 1916, 192-196
International Harvester Company, 77
International Mercantile Company,

269
Irish-Americans and campaign and

election of 1916, 245-247, 251
Irish Rebellion, 218

Jagow, Gottlieb von, 162, 166, 211,
215

James, Ollie M., 29, 234

Japan and the United States, crisis
over California alien land act of
1913, 84^-87; crisis over Twenty-
One Demands, 87-90; difficulties
over Mexico, 91

Jarvis, Samuel M., 97

Jefferson, Charles E., 182

Jimenez, Juan Y., 99

Johnson, Hiram W., elected Governor
of California, 6; Progressive vice-
presidential candidate, 16; and
crisis over California alien land act,
85-86; and campaign of 1916 in
California, 245

Joint Board of Army and Navy, 86
87

Joint Neutrality Board, opinion on
purchase of belligerent merchant
ships, 150; opinion in Thrasher
case, 163

Jones Act of 1916, 227-228

Jones, Thomas D., 77

Jones, Wesley L., 52

Jones, William A., 227

Kato, Baron, 87-89

Keating, Edward, 70

Keating-Owen child labor bill, 226-

227

Kelley, Rev. Francis C., 135
Kent, William, 30, 85, 239
Kern, John W., 211
Kern-McGillicuddy bill, 226

Kitchin, Claude, leader of antipre-
paredness group, 183; comments
on results of Wilson's tour, 186;
claims victory for anti-preparedness
group in army bill controversy,
187; denounces naval bill, 190;
and writing of Revenue Act of
1916, 194^-195; and armed ship
controversy of 1916, 212-213; and
"Sunrise Conference," 213; refuses
to support tariff commission, 228;
helps draft Adamson bill, 236;
opposes war resolution, 282

Kleist, Franz Rintelen von, 200

Knapp, Harry S., 99

Knox, Philander C., and Six-Power
Consortium, 83; and Nicaragua,
94, 96; on non-recognition of
Huerta, 108

Labor, W. B. Wilson and develop-
ment of Labor Department, 31;
A.F. of L. 9 s unsuccessful campaign
to win immunity for labor unions
from application of antitrust laws,
55-56, 69-70, 73-74; attitude of
organized labor toward immigra-
tion restriction, 60; passage of
Seamen's Act, 61-63; labor legisla-
tion of 1916, 226-227; passage of
Adamson Act, 235-237; A.F. of L.
and campaign of 1916, 240; and
election of 1916, 249

La Foilette, Robert M., insurgent Re-
publican leader, 13-14; and in-
come tax of 1913, 39; and tariff
lobby investigation, 41; denounces
Federal Reserve Act, 55; sponsors
seamen's bill, 61-63; denounces
preparedness advocates, 182; and
Revenue Act of 1916, 195; on
Brandeis' nomination to Supreme
Court, 225; opposes armed ship
bill, 272-273; opposes war resolu-
tion, 282

Lane, Franklin K., sketch of as Secre-
tary of Interior, 2930; serves on
Joint High Commission, 143; urges
arming of merchant ships, 270

Lansing, Robert, sketch of as Secre-
tary of State, 27; comments on
Wilson's mental processes, 32-33;
forces Haitians to sign treaty, 102;

INDEX

323

on causes of Mexican Revolution,
127; convinced Germany desires
war between United States and
Mexico, 133-135; negotiates pro-
tocol for entry of Punitive Expedi-
tion into Mexico, 136137; warns
Garranza of danger of war, 141;
and "strict accountability" note,
159-160; argues for strong protest
in Thrasher case, 163; impact of
Lusitania sinking on, 165; protests
Lusitania postscript, 166; views on
war, 175; investigates German in-
trigues, 200201 ; begins Lusitania
negotiations, 201; negotiations for
disarming of merchant ships, 205-
209; assures Germany of American
friendship, 206; reverses position
on armed ships, 210; his indiscre-
tion, 210; and Sussex crisis and
settlement, 215-218; protests Brit-
ish seizure of mails, 220; fears
Wilson will retaliate against Brit-
ain, 221; refuses to discuss Anglo-
American relations with Page, 222;
Wilson, consults on League speech,
233; unpleasant interview with
Spring Rice, 253; warns Wilson of
dangers of mediation, 258; on Ger-
man peace offer, 260; and Wilson's
peace note, 260; discusses "Peace
without Victory" speech, 265; and
decision to break relations with
Germany, 267-268; affirms legality
of arming ships, 274; urges war
resolution, 276

Latin American policy of the United
States, 1910-1917, origins and gen-
eral aspects, 93-94, 103-104, 109;
Nicaragua and United States, 94*-
97 ; Dominican Republic and
United States, 97-99; Haiti and
United States, 99-102; United
States and major Latin American
powers, 104; Colombian treaty,
104-105; Pan-American Pact, 105-
106; limitations of, 106; relations
between United States and Mexico,
1913-1914, 107-128; background
and significance of Wilson's Mobile
address, 117-118; United States
and Mexican civil war, 128-133;
United States recognizes Carranza

government, 133-135; sending of
Punitive Expedition nearly pro-
vokes war between United States
and Mexico, 136-142; Mexican-
American Joint High Commission,
143; withdrawal of Punitive Ex-
pedition and de jure recognition of
Carranza government by United
States, 143-144

League of Nations, 233

League to Enforce Peace, 233

Lever, A. F., 225-226, 238

Lewis, David J., 70

Lind, John, goes to Mexico City as
confidential agent, 113; presents
Wilson's proposals to H u e r t a
government, 114; is convinced Brit-
ish government supports Huerta,
116; urges Wilson to depose
Huerta by force, 122; dismissed as
adviser on Mexico, 129

Lindsey, Ben B., 239

Lippitt, Henry F., 42

Lippmann, Walter, 239, 240, 279

Lloyd George, David, tax bill of 1909,
196; peace talks with House, 204;
warns against mediation effort,
255; answers German peace offer,
260

Lloyd, Henry Demarest, 1

Loans, war, Bryan's ban, 1.51,; revoca-
tion of ban, 1J5&; negotiation of
Anglo-French loan of 1915, 172-
j_73 L-Subscquent loans, J73; restric-
tion of American credits, 258-259 ;
and American intervention, 278
279

Lodge, Henry Cabot, leads fight
against ratification of Colombian
treaty, 105; urges strong action
against Mexico, 124-125; opposes
ship purchase bill, 153; supports
Wilson in armed ship controversy,
214; attacks Wilson's foreign policy,
230; on necessity for special ses-
sion, 271, 272; commends Wilson's
war message, 282

Long, Boaz W., 99, 100

Lubin, David, 239

Ludendorff, Erich F. W., 255

Lusitania case and negotiations, 164-
167, 201, 206, 210

Lusitania postscript episode, 166, 247

324 INDEX

McAdoo, William G., leader in Wil-
son's preconvention campaign, 10 ;
sketch of as Secretary of Treasury,
27; and framing of Federal Re-
serve bill, 46-48; and appointment
of Federal Reserve Board, 76-77;
acts in war crisis, 149; and cotton
crisis of 1914, 149; and ships pur-
chase bill, 152-153; urges Wilson
to approve Anglo-French loan, 172;
pushes revised shipping bill, 191-
192; presents tax bill to pay for
preparedness, 193; opposes anti-
dumping measure, 228-229; urges
arming of merchant ships, 270;
urges war resolution, 276

McGombs, William F., 10, 25, 233

McConnell, Francis J., 239

McGormick, Vance G., 233, 243, 255

McKelway, A. J., 239

McLemore Resolution, 211-214

McReynolds, James G., sketch of as
Attorney General, 28; new solution
for trust problem, 76

Madden, Martin, 195

Madero, Francisco I., 107

Mails dispute, 220

Mann, James R., 183

Marina case, 254

Marsh, Benjamin, 193

Marshall, Thomas R., 206

Martin, Thomas S., 35, 166

Mayo, Henry T., and Tampico affair,
122

Mazatlan incident, 141

Mexican-American Joint High Com-
mission, 143

Mexican Revolution, beginnings un-
der Madero and counterrevolution
by Huerta, 107-108; beginnings
and early progress of Constitu-
tionalist movement, 109, 120;
triumph of Constitutionalists, 127-
128; great schism in Revolution,
1914-1915, 128-131; triumph of
Carranza, 131135; adoption of
Constitution of 1917 and establish-
ment of de jure government, 144

Mexico and the United States, 1910-
1917, United States and Huerta
regime, 107-128; Tampico affair
and occupation of Vera Cruz, 122-
125; ABC mediation, 126-127;

triumph of the Revolution, 127-
128; United States supports Villa
in civil war, 129-131; Pan-Ameri-
can conferences on Mexico, 133-
135; Santa Ysabel massacre, 136;
Columbus raid, 136; formation and
sending of Punitive Expedition,
136-138; development of war
situation, 138; Scott-Obregon con-
ferences, 138-139; Glen Springs,
Texas, raid, 140; Carrizal incident
leads to verge of war, 141142;
Mexican-American Joint High
Commission, 143; withdrawal of
Punitive Expedition and de jure
recognition of Carranza govern-
ment by United States, 143-144;
German agents try to stir trouble
between, 200 ; Mexican-American
relations as an issue in campaign
of 1916, 230, 232, 237, 239, 246,
251

Mitchel, John Purroy, 52

Mobile Address, Wilson's, 117-118

Moore, John Bassett, on seamen's
bill, 62; prevents Wilson from
sending insulting note to London,
117-118

Morey, Lewis S., 141-142

Morgan, House of, withdraws from
thirty directorships, 67-68; and
French loan of 1914, 151; and
French commercial credit, 152;
negotiates Anglo-French loan of

1915, 173; attempts to extend
short-term credit to British, 258-
259

Morgan, J. Pierpont, Jr., 76
Morgan, J. Pierpont, Sr., 12
Morrison, Frank, 73
Mott, John R., 143
Munitions-makers and American in-
tervention, 279
Murdock, Victor, 239-240
Murphy, Charles F., 13

Nation, disappointed by Hughes cam-
paign, 237; supports Wilson in

1916, 241

National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People, 54, 65

National Association of Manufac-
turers, 227

INDEX

325

National Child Labor Committee,
and advanced progressivism, 54;
sponsors child labor bill in 1914,
59; sponsors child labor bill in
1916, 226-227

National City Bank of New York,
and Dominican finances, 98; and
Haiti, 100; and war loans, 152

National Farmers' Union, 54

National Guard, Wilson calls to
Mexican border, 140; Army War
College proposes to scrap, 179-180;
controversy over, 184, 186; provi-
sion for control in House army bill,
187; provisions for expansion and
federal control of in Army Act of
1916, 188; called by President in
railroad strike crisis, 236; called
into federal service, 277

National Monetary Commission, 44

National Security League, formation,
177; issues manifesto, 178; urges
Wilson to veto Army Act, 188-189

Naval Appropriations Act of 1916,
General Board proposes program of
expansion, 179; House bill, 189;
Senate bill, 190; Wilson wins adop-
tion of Senate bill as final measure,
190

Navy League of the United States,
177-178, 179, 180

Negroes, Wilson's promises to in
1912, 63-64; segregation in federal
departments under Wilson, 64-66;
Negroes protest segregation, 65

New Freedom, see Wilson, Woodrow

New Haven Railroad antitrust case,
76

New Nationalism, see Roosevelt,
Theodore

New Republic, disappointed by
Hughes' campaign, 237; supports
Wilson in 1916, 241; influences
Wilson's views on peace settlement,
264-265

New York Times, The, disappointed
by Hughes' campaign, 237; sup-
ports Wilson in 1916, 241

New York World, exposes intrigue
behind appointment of J. M. Sul-
livan as Minister to Santo Do-
mingo, 97; publishes revelations of
German propaganda, 167; pub-

lishes documents on German-Ameri-
can Alliance, 214; comments on
Hughes' campaign, 238; concedes
Republican victory in 1916, 247-
248; demands war resolution, 274

Newlands, Francis G., 68

Nicaragua and the United States,
1909-1917, 94, 96-97, 103-104,
109

Non-Partisan League, 54, 240

Norris, George W., and income tax of
1913, 39; vote on Federal Reserve
bill, 52; and Revenue Act of 1916,
195; opposes armed ship bill, 273;
speech against war resolution, 278;
votes against war resolution, 282

Obreg6n, Alvaro, 130-131, 139-140

O' Gorman, James A,, 51-52, 92-93

Okuma, Count, 87, 89

O'Leary, Jeremiah A., 247

Orduna, 168

Oreste, Michel, 99

O'Shaughnessy, Nelson, 113

Outlook, 177

Overman, Lee S., 42

Owen, Robert L., Democratic leader
in Senate, 35; and writing of Fed-
eral Reserve bill, 47-49; supports
measure for control of stock ex-
changes, 7071

Padgett, Lemuel, 190

Page, Walter H., leader in Wilson's
preconvention campaign, 10; Pan-
ama Canal tolls dispute, 91 ; com-
ments on House's mediation efforts,
161; on issues of the war, 174;
Wilson's opinion of, 199; on Grey's
dismay over Lansing's modus vi~
vendi, 208-209; dismayed by anti-
British sentiment in administration,
222 ; transmits Zimmermann
"note," 271; appeals for credit for
British government, 276

Panama Canal tolls dispute, 90-93

Pan-American Pact, 105-106

Pani, Alberto J., 143

Papen, Franz von, 200-201

Parker, Alton B., 12

Parker, John M., 232, 239

Parral incident, 138

326 INDEX

Payne-Aldrich tariff of 1909, 3, 38,
40

Peabody, George Foster, 182

Peace issue in campaign of 1916,
241-244, 249-250

"Peace without Victory" speech, 264-
266

Pearson's Magazine, 241

Perkins, George C., 52

Pershing, John J., 137, 141

Persia case, 208

Philippine Islands, 227-228

Pinchot, Amos, 239

Pinchot, Gifford, and the Ballinger
affair, 3; and Roosevelt-Taft
estrangement, 5; and controversy
over general leasing bill, 30

Pittman, Key, 212

Plunkett, Sir Horace, 161, 209

Poindexter, Miles, 52

Polk, Frank L., and "blacklist" dis-
pute, 220-221, 252; comments on
Anglo-American tension, 253

Pollock, Sir Frederick, 148

Pomerene, Atlee, 35

Preparedness movement, beginnings,
177; literature of, 178; becomes
crusade, 178-179; General Board's
program, 179; War College's pro-
gram, 179-180; opposition devel-
ops, 180-182; antipreparedness
group controls House, 183; contro-
versy in House over army bill, 183-
184, 186; sectional alignment, 185-
186; Wilson's preparedness tour,
185; adoption and provisions of
Army Reorganization Act, 187-
188; writing and adoption of
Naval Appropriations Act, 189-
190; adoption of Shipping Act,
191-192; paying for preparedness,
192-196

Progressive movement, origins, 1-2;
and Republican party, 1901-1909,
2; divergence in ideology and
movement, 1909-1912, 18-22; ad-
vanced segment of, 1913-1915, 54-
55; Wilson's refusal to yield to
advanced program, 54-66; Wilson
accepts advanced program for reg-
ulation of business, 66-72; Wilson
announces consummation of pro-
gram, 79-80; and foreign policy

and preparedness, 180-181; and
culmination of democratic tax pro-
gram, 192-196; Wilson adopts ad-
vanced progressive program, 224-
230; progressives support Wilson in
1916, 239-241

Progressive party, organized, 16; plat-
form in 1912, 16; election of 1912,
22-24; last effort during election
of 1914, 78; Roosevelt disbands in
1916, 232; many leaders of party
support Wilson in 1916, 239-240;
significance of vote in election of
1916, 250

Propaganda and the First World War,
145-148, 279

Punitive Expedition, formation, 136;
sent into Mexico, 137; strength of,
137; threatened by Carranza, 140;
withdrawn, 144

Pusey, Merlo J., 238

Putnam, George Haven, 176

Quick, Herbert, 240

Ragsdale, J. Willard, 49

Railroad brotherhoods, and strike
crisis of 1916, 235-237; and strike
crisis of 1917, 237; and campaign
of 1916, 240

Railroad securities bill, 68, 70

Rainey, Henry T., 228

Rauschenbusch, Walter, 146

Rayburn, Sam, 68

Reading, Lord, 204

Record, George L., 16, 193

Redfield, William C., sketch of as
Secretary of Commerce, 3 1 ; states
purpose of Federal Trade Commis-
sion, 74; suggests anti-dumping
measure, 228; urges war resolution,
276

Reed, James A., and income tax of
1913, 39; opposes Federal Reserve
bill, 51-52; comments on weaken-
ing of Clayton bill, 72

Reed, John, 239

Reid, Ogden, 176

Reinsch, Paul S., 89

Republican party, background of dis-
ruption of, 3-6; disruption of,
1911-1912, 13-16; election of
1912, 22-24; resurgence during

INDEX

327

election of 1914, 78; situation in
early 1916, 223; preconvention
campaign of 1916, 230-231; Chi-
cago convention of 1916, 231-232;
platform of 1916, 232; campaign
of 1916, 237-247; election of
1916, 247-251

Revenue Act of 1916, 192-196

Reynolds, George M., 51

Robinson, Joseph T., 35

Roman Catholic Church, campaign
for intervention in Mexico, 132;
resents recognition of Carranza,
135; desires repeal of Reform Laws,
135; opposes independence for
Philippines, 227-228; Catholics
and election of 1916, 251

Roosevelt, Theodore, contribution to
progressive movement, 1901-1909,
2-3; estrangement from Taft, 5-6;
enunciates New Nationalism during
campaign of 1910, 6; unsuccessful
bid for Republican presidential
nomination in 1912, 1415; organ-
izes Progressive party, 16; develop-
ment of New Nationalism, 18-20;
and campaign and election of
1912, 20-24; on results of election
of 1914, 78; condemns conciliation
treaties, 82; and Colombian treaty,
104105; opens campaign for inter-
vention in Mexico, 132; for war
during Lusitania crisis, 164; views
on war, 175; denounces Wilson's
failure to protest violation of Bel-
gian neutrality, 175; characterizes
Wilson's diplomacy, 176; assumes
leadership of preparedness agita-
tion, 177; denounces Army Re-
organization Act, 188; campaigns
for Republican nomination in 1916,
231-232; embarrasses Hughes,
244-245; issues call for war, 274;
commends Wilson's war message,
282

Root, Elihu, contribution to Federal
Reserve bill, 52-53; heartsick at
thought of war with Mexico, 125;
views on First World War, 146,
175; opposes ship purchase bill,
153; opinion on Lusitania sinking,
165; attacks Wilson's foreign pol-
icy, 230; boom for President in

1916, 231; commends Wilson's war
message, 282

Rublee, George L., and writing of
Federal Trade Commission bill,
7172; disappointed over failure of
Federal Trade Commission, 74-
75; Senate refuses to confirm
nomination as trade commissioner,
74

"Rule of Reason," 67, 71

Rural credits, see Federal Farm Loan
Act of 1916

Russell, Charles Edward, 274

Russell, William W., 26, 98-99

Russian kevolution, 275

Ryan, Thomas Fortune, 12

Sam, Vilbrun G., 101-102

Scott, Hugh L., 129, 135, 139, 140,
140-141, 269

Scripps, E. W., 239, 241

Seamen's Act of 1915, 61-63

Segregation, see Negroes

Seymour, Charles, 204

Shaw, Anna Howard, 22

Sherwood, Isaac R., 70

Ship purchase bill of 1914-1915,
152-153

Shipping Act of 1916, 191-192

Simmons, Furnifold M., Democratic
leader in Senate, 35; and politics
of Underwood tariff bill in Senate,
39-42

Sims, T. W., 212

Sinclair, Upton, 274

Six-Power Consortium, origins, 82-
83; American withdrawal from,
83-84

Slayden, James L,, 105

Smith, Charles C., 101

Smith, Hoke, 206

Smith, James, Jr., 10

Snyder, Edgar C., 239

Socialist party, and campaign of
1912, 16-17; election of 1912, 22;
and campaign of 1916, 239, 249-
250; and war resolution, 274, 275

Southern agrarians, revolt against
Federal Reserve bill, 48-50; plans
for destruction of oligarchical eco-
nomic structure, 70-71

Speyer, James, 108, 160-161

Spring Rice, Sir Cecil, British

328 INDEX

Ambassador to United States, 161;
negotiates cotton agreement, 171;
Wilson's opinion of, 199; and Lan-
sing's indiscretion, 210; unpleasant
interview with Lansing, 253

Steffens, Lincoln, 239

Sterling, Thomas, 52

Stevens, Raymond B., 71-72

Stimson, Henry L., 176

Stone, William J., Democratic leader
in Senate, 35; wavers in support
of Wilson's Mexican policy, 136;
assures Germany of American
friendship, 206; and armed ship
controversy of 1916, 211-212; and
Democratic platform of 1916, 233;
discusses "Peace without Victory"
speech, 265

Submarine controversy, see Germany
and the United States and Germany

Sullivan, James M., 97-98

Sullivan, Roger, 13

Sullivan, Timothy, 98

"Sunrise Conference," 212-213

Sussex crisis and settlement, 215-218

Taft, William Howard, and begin-
ning of disruption of Republican
party, 3-4; attacks insurgents, 45;
becomes estranged from Roosevelt,
5-6; defeats Roosevelt for presi-
dential nomination in 1912, 14^15;
and campaign of 1912, 17; vote in
election of 1912, 22-24; vetoes bill
to exempt labor from prosecution
under antitrust law, 55-56; com-
ments on Wilson's signing of Sun-
dry Civil Act, 56; vetoes seamen's
bill in 1913, 62; refuses to recog-
nize Huerta, 108; condemns Wil-
son's Mexican policy, 125; helps
defeat Clarke amendment, 228;
and the preconvention campaign of
1916, 230

Tampico affair, 122-123

Tansill, Charles C., 211, 213

Tarbell, Ida M., 239

Tariff Commission of 1916, 228

Thrasher case, 162-164

Th6odore, Davilmar, 101

Tilhnan, Ben, 189

Tolls dispute, 90-93

Trotter, William Monroe, 63, 66

Tumulty, Joseph P., sketch of as
Secretary to President, 31-32; pro-
tests Lusitania postscript, 166;
urges Wilson to appeal to country
on preparedness, 185; and the
armed ship controversy of 1916,
212

Twenty-One Demands, Japanese-
American crisis over, 8790

Tyrrell, Sir William, 91, 119

Underwood, Oscar W., campaign for
Democratic presidential nomination
in 1912, 12; and Baltimore conven-
tion, 13; leader in House, 35; and
writing of Underwood tariff bill,
36-40; opposes Wilson in tolls dis-
pute, 92; elected to Senate, 183;
and Democratic platform of 1916,
233
Underwood Tariff Act of 1913, 35-

43

Union League of New York, 274
United States Chamber of Commerce,

71

United States Shipping Board, 191
United States Steel Corporation, 76
Untermyer, Samuel, and writing of
Federal Reserve bill, 47; criticizes
Clayton bill, 69; supports measure
for control of stock exchanges, 70
71

Vardaman, James K., 39

Vera Cruz affair, occupation by
United States, 123; Wilson's moti-
vation, 123124; Latin American
and European reactions, 124;
American reaction, 124^125

Viereck, George Sylvester, 272

Vigilancia, 274

Villa, Francisco, opposes Carranza
during Vera Cruz crisis, 126;
schemes to control Mexico and
begins war against Carranza, 128-
129; concurs in American plan for
new government for Mexico, 129-
130; joins forces with Zapata and
seizes control at Aguascalientes
convention, 130-131; defeated by
Obreg6n, 131; offers to make peace
with Carranza, 133-134; massacres
Americans at Santa Ysabel, 136;

INDEX

329

executes raid on Columbus, New
Mexico, 136; escapes capture by
Punitive Expedition, 137; raids
Glen Springs, Texas, 140; and
German intrigues, 200
Villard, Oswald Garrison, advises
Wilson on race problem, 64; pro-
tests segregation, 65; denounces
Germany, 148; active in peace and
antipreparedness movements, 182

Wade, Festus J., 51

Wald, Lillian D., 182, 239

Walling, William English, 274

Walsh, Thomas J., Democratic leader
in Senate, 35; and politics of
Underwood tariff bill, 40-41; and
Democratic platform of 1916, 233;
and peace issue in 1916, 243

War Risk Insurance Bureau, 150-
151, 272, 273

Warburg, Paul M., and framing of
Aldrich Plan, 44; and framing of
Federal Reserve bill, 46; contro-
versy over appointment to Federal
Reserve Board, 77

Ward, Lester F., 1

Washington, Booker T., 65

Webb, E. Y., 69-70

Weeks, John W., 52

West, Andrew F., 9

West, Duval, 132-133

Wexler, Sol, 51

White, Edward D., 67

White, William Allen, 5, 18, 250

Wilhelmina case, 157

William II, Emperor, orders abandon-
ment of unrestricted submarine
warfare, 169; and Sussex crisis,
216217; agrees to peace campaign
and, that failing, to approve un-
restricted submarine warfare, 259

Williams, John Sharp, comments on
Wilson, 32; urges abolition of "rule
of reason," 67; on anti-British
sentiment in South, 170

Willis, H. Parker, 45-46, 52

Wilson, Henry Lane, advises recogni-
tion of Huerta, 108; role in Huerta
coup, 111-112; dismissed as Ambas-
sador to Mexico, 113; Hughes*
chief adviser on Mexico, 237

Wilson, William B., as Secretary of

Labor, 31; sponsors seamen's bill
in 1912, 61-62; urges war resolu-
tion, 267

Wilson, Woodrow, new Democratic
leader, 7; biographical sketch, 8;
as president of Princeton University,
8-9; nominated and elected Gover-
nor of New Jersey, 9-10; and re-
form movement in New Jersey, 10;
campaigns for presidential nomina-
tion, 10-11; near failure of cam-
paign, 12; nomination for presi-
dency, 13; enunciates New Free-
dom, 20-22; election, 22-24; maps
legislative program and appoints
Cabinet, 25-33; sketch of in early
1913, 32-33; inaugural, 33-34; his
system of presidential leadership,
34-35; and writing and adoption
of Underwood tariff bill, 35-43;
and writing and adoption of Fed-
eral Reserve bill, 45-52; relations
with advanced wing of progressive
movement, 54-55; opposes exempt-
ing labor from prosecution under
antitrust law, 56, 69-70, 73; op-
poses plan to establish federal rural
credits system, 5659; refuses to
support child labor bill, 59; op-
poses women's suffrage, 59-60;
vetoes Burnett immigration bills of
1915 and 1917, 60-61; and passage
of Seamen's Act, 61-63; and Negro
question, 63-64; and segregation
controversy, 64-66; formulates New
Freedom program for business, 66
69; abandons New Freedom pro-
gram for business control and
adopts Rooseveltian solution, 70
72; loses interest in Clayton bill,
72; purpose of antitrust program,
74; campaign to win friendship of
business community, 7576; ap-
pointment of Federal Reserve
Board raises controversy, 76-78;
disheartened by congressional elec-
tion of 1914, 78-79; announces
consummation of progressive pro-
gram, 79; character of Wilson's
progressivism, 79-80; dynamics of
Wilson's foreign policy, 81-82; and
dispute with Japan over California
alien land act of 1913, 84r-87; and

330 INDEX

crisis over Twenty-One Demands,
87-90; and Panama Canal tolls
dispute, 90-93; origins, formula-
tion, and motivation of his Latin
American and Caribbean policies,
93-94, 103-104; Nicaraguan pol-
icy, 94-97; Dominican policy, 97-
99; Haitian policy, 99-102; rela-
tions with. Huerta government of
Mexico, 1913-1914, 107-128; early
attempts to control Constitutionalist
movement are rebuffed, 120-121;
revokes arms embargo against
Mexico, 121-122; and Tampico
Affair, 122-123; orders occupation
of Vera Cruz, 123-124; and ABC
mediation, 126-128; turns against
Carranza and supports Villa, 129-
131; plans intervention in Mexico,
132-133; resents Catholic inter-
ference, 135-136; prepares for war
with Mexico, 137-142; refuses to
go to war with Mexico, 142-143;
orders withdrawal of Punitive Ex-
pedition, 144; issues proclamation
of neutrality, 148; urges adoption
of measures to meet war crisis,
150-151; and question of war
loans, 151-152; futile struggle for
ship purchase bill, 152-153; replies
to German submarine challenge,
159-160; attempts to obtain Brit-
ish-German agreement on block-
ade and submarines, 160; first
efforts at mediation, 160-162; at-
tempts to formulate policy toward
submarines in Thrasher case, 162-
164; during Lusitania crisis, 165-
166; negotiations with German
government, 166-167; obtains satis-
faction in Arabic case, 168169;
and cotton crisis of 1915, 170-171;
deprecates preparedness talk, 177-
178; takes up preparedness, 179;
presents preparedness program to
country, 180; loses control of
House, 183; campaigns for pre-
paredness through East and Mid-
west, 185; accepts House army
plan, 186; contributions to Army
Reorganization Act, 188; supports
Senate naval bill, 190; concurs in
House's plan to end war through

mediation, 198-199; opinion of
Page and Spring Rice, 199;
alarmed by German intrigues in
Mexico and United States, 200-
201 ; purpose of his proposed media-
tion, 205; and discussion over
armed ships, 205-209; reverses
position on armed ships, 210; and
controversy over armed ships, 210-
214; and Sussex crisis and settle-
ment, 215-218; hardening of atti-
tude toward British, 218-220;
obtains retaliatory power from
Congress, 220-221; confers with
Page, 222; adopts advanced pro-
gressivism, 224-225; names Bran-
deis to Supreme Court, 225;
supports rural credits bill, 225-226;
supports workmen's compensation
bill, 226; forces passage of child
labor bill, 226-227; supports meas-
ures to aid business, 228-229;
plans for campaign of 1916, 232-
233; renominated by St. Louis con-
vention, 234; and railroad strike
crisis, 235237; assumes leadership
of progressives during campaign of
1916, 235-241; takes leadership of
peace forces, 241-242; and election
of 1916, 247-251; angered by Brit-
ish maritime practices, 253; un-
willing to raise submarine issue
during campaign, 254; determines
to end war to avoid American inter-
vention, 255-257; reads draft of
peace note, 257-258; spurns Anglo-
American co-operation for peace,
258; urges tightening credit to
Allies, 259; impressed by German
peace offer, 260; issues peace ap-
peal, 260-261; negotiates directly
with German and British govern-
ments, 261-264; voices American
peace objectives in "Peace without
Victory" speech, 264-266; breaks
relations with Germany, 266-268;
continues to hope for peace, 268;
refuses to sanction arming of mer-
chant ships, 269-270; receives
Zimmermann message, asks Con-
gress for authority to arm merchant
ships, 271; publishes Zimmermann

"note," 272; denounces opponents
of armed ship bill, 273-274; arms
merchant ships, 274; makes reluc-
tant decision for war, 275-276;
calls Congress into special session
and begins war preparations, 276
277; talk with Frank Gobb, 277;
his despair, 277278; an analysis
of his policies toward belligerents,
280; delivers war message and
signs war resolution, 281282

Wiseman, Sir William, 264

Wister, Owen, 176

Women's Peace party, 182

Woolley, Robert W., 241-242

Works, John D., 52

World War, First, American reaction
to, 145, 174-177; German and
British propaganda in United

INDEX 331

States, 145-148; early economic
impact on American economy,
149-150; administration measures
to meet war crisis, 150151; mili-
tary situation in January 1916,
202; causes for American entry
into, 278-281

Zamor, Charles and Oreste, 99101

Zapata, Emiliano, 130-131

Zaragoza, Morelos, 122

Zelaya, Jose" Santos, 94, 96

Zimmermann, Alfred, sends instruc-
tions during peace negotiations,
262; message to Minister in Mexico,
271 ; admits authenticity of mes-
sage, 273

Zimmermann "note," 271273

Zwiedinek, Erich, 209

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