The works of George Berkeley D. D. ... including his posthumous works

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The

Works of George Berkeley

Vol. I

HENRY FROWDE, M.A.

PUBLISHER TO THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD

LONDON, EDINBURGH

NEW YORK

The

Works of George Berkeley

D.D. ; Formerty Bishop of Cloyne
Including his Posthumous Works

With Prefaces, Annotations, Appendices, and
An Account of his Life, by

Alexander Campbell Fraser

Hon. D.C.L. Oxford

Hon. LL.D. Glasgow and Edinburgh ; Emeritus Professor
of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh

In Four Volume
Vol. I : Philosophical Wor

Oxford
At the Clarendon Press

mdcccci

OXFORD

PRINTED AT THE CLARENDON" PRESS

BY HORACE HART, M.A.
PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY

PREFACE

MORE than thirty years ago I was honoured by a
request to prepare a complete edition of the Works
of Bishop Berkeley, with Notes, for the Clarendon
Press, Oxford. That edition, which contains many
of his writings previously unpublished, appeared in
1871. It was followed in 1874 by a volume of
annotated Selections from his philosophical works ;
and in 1881 I prepared a small volume on ' Berkeley'
for Blackwood's ' Philosophical Classics.'

The 1871 edition of the Works originated, I be
lieve, in an essay on ' The Real World of Berke
ley/ which I gave to Macmillans Magazine in 1862,
followed by another in 1864, in the North British
Review. These essays suggested advantages to
contemporary thought which might be gained by a
consideration of final questions about man and the
universe, in the form in which they are presented
by a philosopher who has suffered more from
misunderstanding than almost any other modern
thinker. During a part of his lifetime, he was the
foremost metaphysician in Europe in an unmeta-
physical generation. And in this country, after
a revival of philosophy in the later part of the
eighteenth century, idea, matter, substance, cause,
and other terms which play an important part in
his writings, had lost the meaning that he in-

VI PREFACE

tended ; while in Germany the sceptical specula
tions of David Hume gave rise to a reconstructive
criticism, on the part of Kant and his successors,
which seemed at the time to have little concern
with the a posteriori methods and the principles of
Berkeley.

The success of the attempt to recall attention
to Berkeley has far exceeded expectation. Nearly
twenty thousand copies of the three publications
mentioned above have found their way into the hands
of readers in Europe and America; and the critical
estimates of Berkeley, by eminent writers, which have
appeared since 1871, in Britain, France, Germany,
Denmark, Holland, Italy, America, and India, con
firm the opinion that his Works contain a word in
season, even for the twentieth century. Among
others who have delivered appreciative criticisms of
Berkeley within the last thirty years are J. S. Mill,
Mansel, Huxley, T. H. Green, Maguire, Collyns
Simon, the Right Hon. A. J. Balfour, Mr. Leslie
Stephen, Dr. Hutchison Stirling, Professor T. K.
Abbott, Professor Van der Wyck, M. Penjon, Ueber-
weg, Frederichs, Ulrici, Janitsch, Eugen Meyer,
Spicker, Loewy, Professor Hoffding of Copenhagen,
Dr. Lorenz, Noah Porter, and Krauth, besides essays
in the chief British, Continental, and American re
views. The text of those Works of Berkeley which
were published during his lifetime, enriched with a
biographical Introduction by Mr. A. J. Balfour, care
fully edited by Mr. George Sampson, appeared in
1897. In 1900 Dr. R. Richter, of the University of
Leipsic, produced a new translation into German of
the Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, with an

PREFACE Vli

excellent Introduction and notes. These estimates
form a remarkable contrast to the denunciations,
founded on misconception, by Warburton and Beattie
in the eighteenth century.

In 1899 I was unexpectedly again asked by the
Delegates of the Oxford University Press to pre
pare a New Edition of Berkeley's Works, with some
account of his life, as the edition of 1871 was out of
print; a circumstance which I had not expected to
occur in my lifetime. It seemed presumptuous to
undertake what might have been entrusted to some
one probably more in touch with living thought ; and
in one's eighty-second year, time and strength are
wanting for remote research. But the recollection
that I was attracted to philosophy largely by Berkeley,
in the morning of life more than sixty years ago,
combined with the pleasure derived from association
in this way with the great University in which he
found an academic home in his old age, moved me
in the late evening of life to make the attempt. And
now, at the beginning of the twentieth century, I
offer these volumes, which still imperfectly realise my
ideal of a final Oxford edition of the philosopher
who spent his last days in Oxford, and whose mortal
remains rest in its Cathedral.

Since 1871 materials of biographical and philo
sophical interest have been discovered, in addition
to the invaluable collection of MSS. which Arch
deacon Rose then placed at my disposal, and which
were included in the supplementary volume of Life
and Letters. Through the kindness of the late Earl
of Egmont I had access, some years ago, to a large

Vlll PREFACE

number of letters which passed between his ancestor,
Sir John (afterwards Lord) Percival, and Berkeley,
between 1709 and 1730. I have availed myself freely
of this correspondence.

Some interesting letters from and concerning
Berkeley, addressed to his friend Dr. Samuel John
son of Stratford in Connecticut, afterwards Presi
dent of King's College in New York, appeared in
1874, in Dr. Beardsley's Life of Johnson, illustrating
Berkeley's history from 1729 till his death. For
these and for further information I am indebted to
Dr. Beardsley.

In the present edition of Berkeley's Works, the
Introductions and the annotations have been mostly
re-written. A short account of his romantic life is
prefixed, intended to trace its progress in the gradual
development and application of his initial Principle ;
and also the external incidents of his life in their
continuity, with the help of the new material in
the Percival MSS. and the correspondence with
Johnson. It forms a key to the whole. This
biography is not intended to supersede the Life
and Letters of Berkeley that accompanied the 1871
edition, which remains as a magazine of facts for
reference.

The rearrangement of the Works is a feature in
the present edition. Much of the new material that
was included in the 1871 edition reached me when
the book was far advanced in the press, and thus the
chronological arrangement, strictly followed in the
present edition, was not possible. A chronological
Arrangement is suggested by Berkeley himself. ' I

PREFACE IX

could wish that all the things I have published
on these philosophical subjects were read in the
order wherein I published them/ are his words
in one of his letters to Johnson; 'and a second
time with a critical eye, adding your own thought
and observation upon every part as you went
along/

The first three volumes in this edition contain the
Philosophical Works exclusively; arranged in chrono
logical order, under the three periods of Berkeley's
life. The First Volume includes those of his earl}7
life ; the Second those produced in middle life ;
and the Third those of his later years. The Miscel-
laneous Works are presented in like manner in the
Fourth Volume.

The four little treatises in which Berkeley in early
life unfolded his new thought about the universe,
along with his college Commonplace Book published
in 1871, which prepared the way for them, form, along
with the Life, the contents of the First Volume. It
is of them that the author writes thus, in another
of his letters to Johnson: — 'I do not indeed wonder
that on first reading what I have written men are not
thoroughly convinced. On the contrary, I should
very much wonder if prejudices which have been
many years taking root should be extirpated in a few
hours' reading. I had no inclination to trouble the
world with large volumes. WThat I have done was
rather with a view of giving hints to thinking men,
who have leisure and curiosity to go to the bottom of
things, and pursue them in their own minds. Two
or three times reading these small tracts, and making
what is read the occasion of thinking, would, I believe,

X PREFACE

render the whole familiar and eas}^ to the mind, and
take off that shocking appearance which hath often
been observed to attend speculative truths/ Except
Johnson, none of Berkeley's eighteenth-century critics
seem to have observed this rule.

Alciphron, or The Minute Philosopher, with its sup
plement in the Theory of Visual Language Vindicated,
being the philosophical works of his middle life, associ
ated with its American enterprise, form the Second
Volume. In them the conception of the universe
that was unfolded in the early writings is applied, in
vindication of religious morality and Christianity,
against the Atheism attributed to those who called
themselves Free - thinkers ; who were treated by
Berkeley as, at least by implication, atheistic.

The Third Volume contains the Analyst and Sin's,
which belong to his later life, Siris being especially
characteristic of its serene quiet. In both there is
a deepened sense of the mystery of the universe, and
in Siris especially a more comprehensive conception
of the final problem suggested by human life. But
the metaphysics of the one is lost in mathematical
controversy; that of the other in medical controversy,
and in undigested ancient and mediaeval learning.
The metaphysical importance of Siris was long
unrecognised, although in* it Berkeley's thought
culminates, not in a paradox about Matter, but in the
conception of God as the concatenating principle of
the universe ; yet this reached through the conception
of Matter as real only in and through living Mind.

The Miscellaneous Works, after the two juvenile
Latin tracts in mathematics, deal with observations
of nature and man gathered in his travels, questions

PREFACE XI

of social economy, and lessons in religious life.
Several are posthumous, and were first published
in the 1871 edition. Of these, perhaps the most
interesting is the Joiirnal in Italy. The Discourse on
Passive Obedience is the nearest approach to ethical
theory which Berkeley has given to us, and as such it
might have taken its place in the First Volume ; but
on the whole it seemed more appropriately placed
in the Fourth, where it is easily accessible for those
who prefer to read it immediately after the book of
Principles.

I have introduced, in an Appendix to the Third
Volume, some matter of philosophical interest for
which there was no place in the editorial Prefaces
or in the annotations. The historical significance of
Samuel Johnson and Jonathan Edwards, as pioneers
of American philosophy, and also advocates of the
new conception of the material world that is asso
ciated with Berkeley, is recognised in Appendix C.
Illustrations of the misinterpretation of Berkeley by
his early critics are presented in Appendix D. A
lately discovered tractate by Berkeley forms Appen
dix E. In the Fourth Volume, numerous queries
contained in the first edition of the Querist, and omit
ted in the later editions, are given in an Appendix,
which enables the reader to reconstruct that interest
ing tract in the form in which it originally appeared.

The present edition is thus really a new work,
which possesses, I hope, a certain philosophical unity,
as well as pervading biographical interest.

As Berkeley is the immediate successor of Locke,
and as he was educated by collision with the Essay

Xll PREFACE

on Hitman Understanding, perhaps Locke ought to
have had more prominence in the editorial portion
of this book. Limitation of space partly accounts
for the omission ; and I venture instead to refer the
reader to the Prolegomena and notes in my edi
tion of Locke's Essay, which was published by the
Clarendon Press in 1894. I may add that an expan
sion of thoughts which run through the Life and
many of the annotations, in this edition of Berkeley,
may be found in my Philosophy of Theism *.

The reader need not come to Berkeley in the ex
pectation of finding in his Works an all-comprehen
sive speculative system like Spinoza's, or a reasoned
articulation of the universe of reality such as Hegel
is supposed to offer. But no one in the succession
of great English philosophers has, I think, proposed
in a way more apt to invite reflexion, the final alterna
tive between Unreason, on the one hand, and Moral
Reason expressed in Universal Divine Providence,
on the other hand, as the root of the unbeginning
and endless evolution in which we find ourselves
involved ; as well as the further question, Whether
this tremendous practical alternative can be settled
by any means that are within the reach of man ?
His Philosophical Works, taken collectively, may
encourage those who see in a reasonable via media
between Omniscience and Nescience the true path
of progress, under man's inevitable venture of reason
able Faith.

One is therefore not without hope that a fresh

1 Philosophy of Theism: The the University of Edinburgh in
Gilford Lectures delivered before 1894-96. (^Second Edition, 1899.)

PREFACE Xlll

impulse may be given to philosophy and religious
thought by this reappearance of George Berkeley,
under the auspices of the University of Oxford, at
the beginning of the twentieth century. His readers
will at any rate find themselves in the company of
one of the most attractive personalities of English
philosophy, who is also among the foremost of those
thinkers who are masters in English literature-
Francis Bacon and Thomas Hobbes, George Berkeley
and David Hume.

A. CAMPBELL ERASER.

GORTON, HAWTHORNDKN, MIDLOTHIAN,
March, 1901.

CONTENTS
VOL. I

PAGE

LIFE OF GEORGE BERKELEY xxiii

By the Editor.

COMMONPLACE BOOK i

Written in 1705-8.
First published in 1871 .

The Editor's Preface ... . i

THE BOOK ' 7

AN ESSAY TOWARDS A NEW THEORY OF VISION . 93
First published in 1709.

The Editor's Preface . . . . . -95

Dedication to Sir John Percivale 117

Contents 121

THE ESSAY 127

An Appendix to the Essay on Vision . . . 207

A TREATISE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN

KNOWLEDGE. [Part I] . . . /. . .211
Wherein the chief causes of Error and Difficulty in
the Sciences, with the grounds of Scepticism, Atheism,
and Irreligion, are inquired into.
First published in 1710.

The Editor's Preface 213

Dedication to the Earl of Pembroke .... 233

The Author's Preface 235

The Author's Introduction 237

THE TREATISE 257

XVI CONTENTS

PAGE

THREE DIALOGUES BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 349
The Design of which is plainly to demonstrate the
reality and perfection of Human Knowledge, the
Incorporeal nature of the Soul, and the Immediate
Providence of a Deity, in opposition to Sceptics and
Atheists. Also to open a method for rendering the
Sciences more easy, useful, and compendious.
First published in 1713.

The Editor's Preface 351

Dedication to Lord Berkeley of Stratton . . . 373

The Author's Preface 375

THE DIALOGUES 379

r
DE MOTU : sive de Motus principio et natura, et de

Causa communicationis Motuum 487

First published in 1721.

The Editor's Preface 489

THE DISSERTATION 501

VOL. II

ALCIPHRON ; OR, THE MINUTE PHILOSOPHER . . i
In Seven Dialogues. Containing an Apology for the
Christian Religion, against those who are called
Free-thinkers.

First published in 1732.

The Editor's Preface 3

The Author's Advertisement 23

Contents .......... 26

THE DIALOGUES 31

The First Dialogue 31

The Second Dialogue . . • . . . .69

The Third Dialogue 120

The Fourth Dialogue 153

CONTENTS xvii

PAGE

The Fifth Dialogue . - 193

The Sixth Dialogue . . ... . . 242

The Seventh Dialogue 317

THE THEORY OF VISION, OR VISUAL LANGUAGE,
SHEWING THE IMMEDIATE PRESENCE AND PROVI
DENCE OF A DEITY ...... 369

First published in 1733.

The Editor's Preface 371

THE TRACT 379

VOL. Ill

THE ANALYST ; OR, A DISCOURSE ADDRESSED TO AN

INFIDEL MATHEMATICIAN i

Wherein it is examined whether the Object, Prin
ciples, and Inferences of the Modern Analysis are
more distinctly conceived, or more evidently deduced,
than Religious Mysteries.
First published in 1734.

The Editor's Preface 3

Contents 13

THE DISCOURSE 17

A DEFENCE OF FREE-THINKING IN MATHEMATICS . 61
In Answer to a Pamphlet of Philalethes Cantabrigi-
ensis, entitled, ' Geometry no Friend to Infidelity, or a
Defence of Sir Isaac Newton, and the British Mathe
maticians.' Also an Appendix concerning Mr. Walton's
' Vindication of the principles of Fluxions against the
Objections contained in the Analyst.' Wherein it is
attempted to put this controversy in such a light as
that every Reader may be able to judge thereof.

First published in 1735.
THE APPENDIX 97

BERKELEY: ERASER. I. 5

XVlll CONTENTS

PAGE

REASONS FOR NOT REPLYING TO MR. WALTON'S FULL

ANSWER, IN A LETTER TO P.T.P 101

First published in 1735.

SIRIS : A CHAIN OF PHILOSOPHICAL REFLEXIONS AND
INQUIRIES CONCERNING THE VIRTUES OF TAR-
WATER, AND DIVERS OTHER SUBJECTS CONNECTED
TOGETHER AND ARISING ONE FROM ANOTHER . 115

First published in 1744.

The Editor's Preface 117

Contents 137

THE CHAIN OF REFLEXIONS 141

THREE LETTERS TO THOMAS PRIOR, ESQ., AND A
LETTER TO THE REV. DR. HALES, ON THE VIRTUES

OF TAR-WATER 301

First published in 1744-47.

The First Letter to Thomas Prior .... 303
The Second Letter to Thomas Prior .... 314
The Third Letter to Thomas Prior .... 323
The Letter to the Rev. Dr. Hales .... 334

FARTHER THOUGHTS ON TAR-WATER .... 337
First published in 1752.

APPENDICES

A. BERKELEY'S ROUGH DRAFT OF THE INTRODUCTION

TO THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE . 357

B. ARTHUR COLLIER 384

C. SAMUEL JOHNSON AND JONATHAN EDWARDS . . 390

D. SOME OF BERKELEY'S EARLY CRITICS . . . 399

E. AN ESSAY 'Or INFINITES' BY BERKELEY . . 408

Written dr. 1706.

CONTENTS XIX

VOL. IV

ARITHMETICA ABSQUE ALGEBRA AUT EUCLIDE DEMON-
STRATA. Auctore * * * * Art. Bac. Trin. Col. Dub. . 3
Written in 1705.
First published in 1707.

Dedication to the Archbishop of Cashel ... 4

Praefatio 5

THE EXPOSITION 8

Pars Prima 8

Pars Secunda 24

Pars Tertia 31

MISCELLANEA MATHEMATICA : sive Cogitata nonnulla
de Radicibus Surdis, de ^Estu Aeris, de Cono ^Equi-
latero et Cylindro eidem Sphaerse circumscriptis, de
Ludo Algebraico; et Paraenetica quaedam ad studium
Matheseos, praesertim Algebra?. Autore * * * * Art.
Bac. Trin. Col. Dub. ....... 39

Written in 1705.

First published in 1707.

Dedication to Samuel Molyneux 41

THE MISCELLANEA 43

Appendix 63

DESCRIPTION OF THE CAVE OF DUNMORE 73

Written in 1706.
First published in 187 1 .

THE REVELATION OF LIFE AND IMMORTALITY : A Dis
course delivered in the Chapel of Trinity College,
Dublin, on Sunday Evening, January n, 1708 . . 84

First published in 1871.

PASSIVE OBEDIENCE : or, The Christian Doctrine of
not resisting the Supreme Power, proved and vin
dicated, upon the Principles of the Law of Nature, in
a Discourse delivered at the Chapel of Trinity College,

Dublin 95

First published in 1712.

XX CONTENTS

PAGE

The Editor's Preface 97

To the Reader 101

THE DISCOURSE 102

ESSAYS IN THE GUARDIAN 137

First published in 1713.

Two SERMONS PREACHED AT LEGHORN IN 1714 . . 191
First published in 1871.

JOURNAL IN ITALY IN 1717, 1718 219

First published in 1871.

The Editor's Preface 221

THE JOURNAL 225

AN ESSAY TOWARDS PREVENTING THE RUIN OF GREAT

BRITAIN 319

First published in 1721.

A PROPOSAL for the better supplying of Churches in
our Foreign Plantations, and for converting the savage
Americans to Christianity, by a College to be erected
in the Summer Islands, otherwise called the Isles of

Bermuda 341

First published in 1725.

The Editor's Preface 342

THE PROPOSAL 346

VERSES on the Prospect of Planting Arts and Learning

in America 365

NOTES OF SERMONS preached at Newport in Rhode

Island and in the Narragansett country, in 1729-31 . 367
First published in 1871.

The Editor's Preface 369

THE NOTES 371

A SERMON preached before the Incorporated Society
for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts : at
their Anniversary Meeting in the Parish Church of
St. Mary-le-Bow, on Friday, February 18, 1732 . . 393
First published in 1732.

CONTENTS XXI

PAGE

THE QUERIST, containing several Queries, proposed

to the consideration of the Public 415

First published in Three Parts in 1735, 1736, 1737,
and reduced to its present form in 1750.

The Editor's Preface 417

Advertisement by the Author 421

THE QUERIES 422

A DISCOURSE ADDRESSED TO MAGISTRATES AND MEN
IN AUTHORITY. Occasioned by the enormous Licence

and Irreligion of the Times 477

First published in 1736.

The Editor's Preface ... . 479
THE DISCOURSE 483

PRIMARY VISITATION CHARGE DELIVERED TO THE

CLERGY OF THE DIOCESE OF CLOYNE . . . 507

First published in 1871.
ADDRESS ON CONFIRMATION ... . 517

First published in 1871.

A LETTER TO SIR JOHN JAMES, BART., ON THE DIFFER
ENCES BETWEEN THE ROMAN AND ANGLICAN

CHURCHES 519

Written in 1741.
First published in 1850.
Two LETTERS ON THE OCCASION OF THE REBELLION

IN J745 • • 535

First published in the ' Dublin Journal^ in 1745.
A WORD TO THE WISE : or, An Exhortation to the
Roman Catholic Clergy of Ireland. By a Member of

the Established Church 541

First published in 1749.

MAXIMS CONCERNING PATRIOTISM 559

First published in 1750.

APPENDIX : The First Edition of the ' Querist ' . . 567

GEORGE BERKELEY

BY THE EDITOR

I

EARLY LIFE (1685-1721).

TOWARDS the end of the reign of Charles the Second
a certain William Berkeley, according to credible tradition,
occupied a cottage attached to the ancient Castle of Dysert,
in that part of the county of Kilkenny which is watered by
the Nore. Little is known about this William Berkeley
except that he was Irish by birth and English by descent.
It is said that his father went over to Ireland soon after
the Restoration, in the suite of his reputed kinsman,
Lord Berkeley of Stratton, when he was Lord Lieutenant.
William Berkeley's wife seems to have been of Irish
blood, and in some remote way related to the family of
Wolfe, the hero of Quebec. It was in the modest abode
in the valley of the Nore that George, the eldest of their
six sons, was born, on March 12, 1685.

There is nothing in the recorded family history of these
Dysert Berkeleys that helps to explain the singular per
sonality and career of the eldest son. The parents have
left no mark, and make no appearance in any extant
records . of the family. They probably made their way
to the valley of the Nore among families of English con
nexion who, in the quarter of a century preceding the birth
of George Berkeley, were finding settlements in Ireland.
The family, as it appears, was not wealthy, but was
recognised as of gentle blood. Robert, the fifth son,

XXIV GEORGE BERKELEY

became rector of Middleton and vicar-general of Cloyne ;
and another son, William, held a commission in the army.
According to the Register of Trinity College, one of the
sons was born 'near Thurles/ in 1699, and Thomas,
the youngest, was born in Tipperary, in 1703, so that
the family may have removed from Dysert after the birth
of George. In what can be gleaned of the younger sons,
one finds little appearance of sympathy with the religious
and philosophical genius of the eldest.

Regarding this famous eldest son in those early days,
we have this significant autobiographical fragment in his
Commonplace Book : ' I was distrustful at eight years
old, and consequently by nature disposed for the new
doctrines.' In his twelfth year we find the boy in Kil
kenny School. The register records his entrance there in
the summer of 1696, when he was placed at once in the
second class, which seems to imply precocity, for it is
almost a solitary instance. He spent the four following
years in Kilkenny. The School was in high repute for
learned masters and famous pupils ; among former pupils
were the poet Congreve and Swift, nearly twenty years
earlier than George Berkeley; among his school-fellows
was Thomas Prior, his life-long friend and correspondent.
In the days of Berkeley and Prior the head master was
Dr. Hinton, and the School was still suffering from the
consequences of 'the warre in Ireland' which followed
the Revolution.

Berkeley in Kilkenny School is hardly visible, and we
have no means of estimating his mental state when he left
it. Tradition says that in his school-days he was wont
to feed his imagination with airy visions and romance,
a tradition which perhaps originated long after in popular
misconceptions of his idealism. Dimly discernible at
Kilkenny, only a few years later he was a conspicuous
figure in an island that was then beginning to share in
the intellectual movement of the modern world, taking

ENTERS TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN XXV

his place as a classic in English literature, and as the
most subtle and ardent of contemporary English-speaking
thinkers.

In March, 1700, at the age of fifteen, George Berkeley
entered Trinity College, Dublin. This was his home for
more than twenty years. He was at first a mystery to the
ordinary undergraduate. Some, we are told, pronounced
him the greatest dunce, others the greatest genius in the
College. To hasty judges he seemed an idle dreamer;
the thoughtful admired his subtle intelligence and the
beauty of his character. In his undergraduate years,
a mild and ingenuous youth, inexperienced in the ways
of men, vivacious, humorous, satirical, in unexpected ways
inquisitive, often paradoxical, through misunderstandings
he persisted in his own way, full of simplicity and en
thusiasm. In 1704 (the year in which Locke died) he
passed Bachelor of Arts, and became Master in 1707,
when he was admitted to a Fellowship, ' the only reward
of learning which that kingdom had to bestow.'

In Trinity College the youth found himself on the tide
of modern thought, for the 'new philosophy' of Newton
and Locke was then invading the University. Locke's
Essay, published in 1690, was already in vogue. This
early recognition of Locke in Dublin was chiefly due to
William Molyneux, Locke's devoted friend, a lawyer and
member of the Irish Parliament, much given to the
experimental methods. Descartes, too, with his sceptical
criticism of human beliefs, yet disposed to spiritualise
powers commonly attributed to matter, was another ac
cepted authority in Trinity College; and Malebranche was
not unknown. Hobbes was the familiar representative
of a finally materialistic conception of existence, repro
ducing in modern forms the atomism of Democritus and
the ethics of Epicurus. Above all, Newton was acknow
ledged master in physics, whose Principia, issued three

XXVI GEORGE BERKELEY

years sooner than Locke's Essay, was transforming the
conceptions of educated men regarding their surroundings,
like the still more comprehensive law of physical evolution
in the nineteenth century.

John Toland, an Irishman, one of the earliest and
ablest of the new sect of Free-thinkers, made his appear
ance at Dublin in 1696, as the author of Christianity not
Mysterious. The book was condemned by College digni
taries and dignified clergy with even more than Irish
fervour. It was the opening of a controversy that lasted
over half of the eighteenth century in England, in which
Berkeley soon became prominent ; and it was resumed
later on, with greater intellectual force and in finer literary
form, by David Hume and Voltaire. The collision with
Toland about the time of Berkeley's matriculation may have
awakened his interest. Toland was supposed to teach
that matter is eternal, and that motion is its essential
property, into which all changes presented in the outer
and inner experience of man may at last be resolved.
Berkeley's life was a continual protest against these
dogmas. The Provost of Trinity College in 1700 was
Dr. Peter Browne, who had already entered the lists
against Toland ; long after, when Bishop of Cork, he was
in controversy with Berkeley about the nature of man's
knowledge of God. The Archbishop of Dublin in the
early years of the eighteenth century was William King,
still remembered as a philosophical theologian, whose book
on the Origin of Evil, published in 1702, was criticised
by Boyle and Leibniz.

Dublin in those years was thus a place in which a
studious youth, who had been ' distrustful at eight years
old/ might be disposed to entertain grave questions about
the ultimate meaning of his visible environment, and of
the self-conscious life to which he was becoming awake.
Is the universe of existence confined to the visible world,
and is matter the really active power in existence ? Is God

HIS EARLY INSPIRATION XXV11

the root and centre of all that is real, and if so, what is
meant by God ? Can God be good if the world is a mix
ture of good t and evil? Questions like these were ready
to meet the inquisitive Kilkenny youth in his first years
at Dublin.

One of his earliest interests at College was mathematical.
His first appearance in print was as the anonymous author
of two Latin tracts, Ariihmetica and Miscellanea Mathe-
matica, published in 1707. They are interesting as an
index of his intellectual inclination when he was hardly
twenty ; for he says they were prepared three years before
they were given to the world. His disposition to curious
questions in geometry and algebra is further shewn in his
College Commonplace Book.

This lately discovered Commonplace Book throws a flood
of light upon Berkeley's state of mind between his twen
tieth and twenty-fourth year. It is a wonderful revela
tion ; a record under his own hand of his thoughts and
feelings when he first came under the inspiration of a new
conception of the nature and office of the material world.
It was then struggling to find adequate expression,
and in it the sanguine youth seemed to find a spiritual
panacea for the errors and confusions of philosophy. It
was able to make short work, he believed, with atheistic
materialism, and could dispense with arguments against
sceptics in vindication of the reality of experience. The
mind-dependent existence of the material world, and its
true function in the universe of concrete reality, were to
be disclosed under the light of a new transforming self-
evident Principle. ' I wonder not at my sagacity in dis
covering the obvious and amazing truth. I rather wonder
at my stupid inadvertency in not finding it out before—
'tis no witchcraft to see.' The pages of the Common
place Book give vent to rapidly forming thoughts about
the things of sense and the ' ambient space ' of a youth
entering into reflective life, in company with Descartes

XXV111 GEORGE BERKELEY

and Malebranche, Bacon and Hobbes, above all, Locke and
Newton ; who was trying to translate into reasonableness
his faith in the reality of the material world and God.
Under the influence of this new conception, he sees the
world like one awakening from a confused dream. The
revolution which he wanted to inaugurate he foresaw
would be resisted. Men like to think and speak about
things as they have been accustomed to do : they are
offended when they are asked to exchange this for what
appears to them absurdity, or at least when the change
seems useless. But in spite of the ridicule and dislike of
a world long accustomed to put empty words in place
of living thoughts, he resolves to deliver himself of his
burden, with the politic conciliation of a skilful advocate
however ; for he characteristically reminds himself that one
who 'desires to bring another over to his own opinions
must seem to harmonize with him at first, and humour him
in his own way of talking/

In 1709, when he was twenty-four years old, Berkeley
presented himself to the world of empty verbal reasoners
as the author of what he calls modestly An Essay towards
a New Theory of Vision. It was dedicated to Sir John
Percival, his correspondent afterwards for more than
twenty years ; but I have not discovered the origin of their
friendship. The Essay was a pioneer, meant to open the
way for the disclosure of the Secret with which he was
burdened, lest the world might be shocked by an abrupt
disclosure. In this prelude he tries to make the reader
recognise that in ordinary seeing we are always inter
preting visual signs; so that we have daily presented to
our eyes what is virtually an intelligible natural language ;
so that in all our intercourse with the visible world we
are in intercourse with all-pervading active Intelligence.
We are reading absent data of touch and of the other
senses in the language of their visual signs. And the

THE LANGUAGE OF VISION XXIX

visual signs themselves, which are the immediate objects
of sight, are necessarily dependent on sentient and per
cipient mind ; whatever may be the case with the tangible
realities which the visual data signify, a fact evident
by our experience when we make use of a looking-
glass. The material world, so far at least as it presents
itself visibly, is real only in being realised by living
and seeing beings. The mind-dependent visual signs
of which we are conscious are continually speaking to us
of an invisible and distant world of tangible realities;
and through the natural connexion of the visual signs
with their tactual^ meanings, we are able in seeing practi
cally to perceive, not only what is distant in space, but
also to anticipate the future. The Book of Vision is in
literal truth a Book of Prophecy. The chief lesson of the
tentative Essay on Vision is thus summed up : —

' Upon the whole, I think we may fairly conclude that
the proper objects of Vision constitute the Universal
Language of Nature ; whereby we are instructed how to
regulate our actions in order to attain those things that
are necessary to the preservation and well-being of our
bodies, as also to avoid whatever may be hurtful and
destructive of them. And the manner wherein they
signify and mark out unto us the objects which are at a
distance is the same with that of languages and signs of
human appointment; which do not suggest the things
signified by any likeness or identity of nature, but only
by an habitual connexion that experience has made us
to observe between them. Suppose one who had always
continued blind be told by his guide that after he has
advanced so many steps he shall come to the brink of
a precipice, or be stopped by a wall; must not this to
him seem very admirable and surprising? He cannot
conceive how it is possible for mortals to frame such
predictions as these, which to him would seem as strange
and unaccountable as prophecy does to others. Even

XXX GEORGE BERKELEY

they who are blessed with the visive faculty may (though
familiarity make it less observed) find therein sufficient
cause of admiration. The wonderful art and contrivance
wherewith it is adjusted to those ends and purposes for
which it was apparently designed ; the vast extent, number,
and variety of objects that are at once, with so much ease
and quickness and pleasure, suggested by it — all these
afford subject for much and pleasing speculation, and
may, if anything, give us some glimmering analogous
prsenotion of things that are placed beyond the certain
discovery and comprehension of our present state V

Berkeley took orders in the year in which his Essay on
Vision was published. On February i, 1709, he was
ordained as deacon, in the chapel of Trinity College, by
Dr. George Ashe, Bishop of Clogher. Origen and Augus
tine, Anselm and Aquinas, Malebranche, Fenelon, and
Pascal, Cudworth, Butler, Jonathan Edwards, and Schleier-
macher, along with Berkeley, are among those who are
illustrious at once in the history of philosophy and of the
Christian Church. The Church, it has been said, has been
for nearly two thousand years the great Ethical Society
of the world, and if under its restrictions it has been less
conspicuous on the field of philosophical criticism and free
inquiry, these names remind us of the immense service it
has rendered to meditative thought.

The light of the Percival correspondence first falls on
Berkeley's life in 1709. The earliest extant letters from
Berkeley to Sir John Percival are in September, October,
and December of that year, dated at Trinity College. In
one of them he pronounces Socrates ' the best and most
admirable man that the heathen world has produced.'
Another letter, in March, 1710, accompanies a copy of the
second edition of the Essay on Vision. 'I have made
some alterations and additions in the body of the treatise/
he says, 'and in the appendix have endeavoured to meet the

1 Essay on Vision, sect. 147, 148.

SIR JOHN PERCIVAL XXXI

objections of the Archbishop of Dublin ; ' whose sermon
he proceeds to deprecate, for ' denying that goodness and
understanding are more to be affirmed of God than feet
or hands/ although all these may, in a metaphorical sense.
How far, or whether at all, God is knowable by man,
was, as we shall see, matter of discussion and contro
versy with Berkeley in later life ; but this shews that the
subject was already in his thoughts. Returning to the
Essay on Vision, he tells Sir John that ' there remains
one objection, that with regard to the uselessness of that
book of mine ; but in a little time I hope to make what is
there laid down appear subservient to the ends of morality
and religion, in a Treatise I have in the press, the design
of which is to demonstrate the existence and attributes of
God, the immortality of the soul, the reconciliation of
God's foreknowledge and the freedom of man ; and by
shewing the emptiness and falsehood of several parts of
the speculative sciences, to induce men to the study of
religion and things useful. How far my endeavours will
prove successful, and whether I have been all this time in
a dream or no, time will shew. I do not see how it is
possible to demonstrate the being of a God on the principles
of the Archbishop — that strictly goodness and understand
ing can no more be assumed of God than that He has feet
or hands ; there being no argument that I know for God's
existence which does not prove Him at the same time to
be an understanding and benevolent being, in the strict,
literal, and proper meaning of these words.' He adds,
'I have written to Mr. Clarke to give me his thoughts on
the subject of God's existence, but have got no answer.'

The work foreshadowed in this letter appeared in the
summer of 1710, as the ' First part ' of a Treatise concerning
the Principles of Human Knowledge, wherein the chief causes
of error and difficulty in the Sciences, with the grounds of
Scepticism, Atheism, and Ir religion, are inquired into. In
this fragment of a larger work, never finished, Berkeley's

XXX11 GEORGE BERKELEY

spiritual conception of matter and cosmos is unfolded,
defended, and applied. According to the Essay on Vision,
the world, as far as it is visible, is dependent on living
mind. According to this book of Principles the whole
material world, as far as it can have any practical concern
with the knowings and doings of men, is real only by being
realised in like manner in the percipient experience of
some living mind. The concrete world, with which alone
we have to do, could not exist in its concrete reality
if there were no living percipient being in existence to
actualise it. To suppose that it could would be to submit
to the illusion of a metaphysical abstraction. Matter
unrealised in its necessary subordination to some one's
percipient experience is the chief among the illusions
which philosophers have been too ready to encourage, and
which the mass of mankind, who accept words without
reflecting on their legitimate meanings, are ready to accept
blindly. But we have only to reflect in order to see the
absurdity of a material world such as we have experience
of existing without ever being realised or made concrete
in any sentient life. Try to conceive an eternally dead
universe, empty for ever of God and all finite spirits,
and you find you cannot. Reality can be real only in a
living form. Percipient life underlies or constitutes all
that is real. The esse of the concrete material world
is percipi. This was the ' NewT Principle* with which the
young Dublin Fellow was burdened — the Secret of the
universe which he had been longing to discharge upon
mankind for their benefit, yet without sign of desire to
gain fame for himself as the discoverer. It is thus that
he unfolds it :—

' Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind
that a man need only open his eyes to see them. Such
I take this important one to be, viz. that all the choir of
heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word, all those bodies
which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not

SEES MATTER IN MIND XXX111

any subsistence without a Mind ; that their being is to be
perceived or known ; that consequently so long as they are
not actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind,
or that of any other created spirit, they must either have
no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some
Eternal Spirit : it being perfectly unintelligible, and in
volving all the absurdity of abstraction, to attribute to any
single part of them an existence independent of a Spirit1.'

This does not mean denial of the existence of the world
that is daily presented to our senses and which includes
our own bodies. On the contrary, it affirms, as intuitively
true, the existence of the only real matter which our
senses present to us. The only material world of which
we have any experience consists of the appearances (mis-
leadingly called ideas of sense by Berkeley) which are
continually rising as real objects in a passive procession
of interpretable signs, through means of which each finite
person realises his own individual personality ; also the
existence of other finite persons ; and the sense-symbolism
that is more or less interpreted in the natural sciences ;
all significant of God. So the material world of concrete
experience is presented to us as mind-dependent and in
itself powerless : the deepest and truest reality must
always be spiritual. Yet this mind-dependent material
world is the occasion of innumerable pleasures and pains
to human percipients, in so far as they conform to or
contradict its customary laws, commonly called the laws
of nature. So the sense-symbolism in which we live is
found to play an important part in the experience of
percipient beings. But it makes us sceptics and atheists
when, in its name, we put a supposed dead abstract
matter in room of the Divine Active Reason of which all
natural order is the continuous providential expression.

Accordingly, God must exist, because the material
world, in order to be a real world, needs to be continually

1 Principles, sect. 6.

BERKELEY: FRASER. I. C

XXXIV GEORGE BERKELEY

realised and regulated by living Providence ; and we
have all the certainty of sense and sanity that there is a
(mind-dependent) material world, a boundless and end
lessly evolving sense-symbolism.

In the two years after the disclosure of his New Principle
we see Berkeley chiefly through his correspondence with
Percival. He was eager to hear the voice of criticism ;
but the critics were slow to speak, and when they did
speak they misconceived the question, and of course his
answer to it. 'If when you receive my book/ he writes
from Dublin, in July, 1710, to Sir John, who was then in
London, 'you can procure me the opinion of some of your
acquaintances who are thinking men, addicted to the study
of natural philosophy and mathematics, I shall be extremely
obliged to you.' He also asks Percival to present the
book of Principles to Lord Pembroke, to whom he had
ventured to dedicate it, as Locke had done his Essay.
The reply was discouraging.

'I did but name the subject-matter of your book of Prin
ciples to some ingenuous friends of mine/ Percival says, 'and
they immediately treated it with ridicule, at the same time
refusing to read it ; which I have not yet got one to do.
A physician of my acquaintance undertook to describe
your person, and argued you must needs be mad, and
that you ought to take remedies. A bishop pitied you,
that a desire and vanity of starting something new should
put you upon such an undertaking ; and when I justified
you in that part of your character, and added other deserv
ing qualities you have, he could not tell what to think of you.
Another told me an ingenious man ought not to be dis
couraged from exerting his wit, and said Erasmus was
not worse thought of for writing in praise of folly; but
that you are not gone as far as a gentleman in town, who
asserts not only that there is no such thing as Matter, but
that we ourselves have no being at all.'

UNSYMPATHETIC CRITICS XXXV

It is not surprising that a book which was supposed to
deny the existence of all that we see and touch should be
ridiculed, and its author called a madman. What vexed
the author was, ' that men who had never considered my
book should confound me with the sceptics, who doubt the
existence of sensible things, and are not positive of any
one thing, not even of their own being. But whoever
reads my book with attention will see that I question not
the existence of anything we perceive by our senses.
Fine spun metaphysics are what on all occasions I de
claim against, and if any one shall shew anything of that
sort in my Treatise I will willingly correct it.' A material
world that was real enough to yield physical science, to
make known to us the existence of other persons and of
God, and which signified in very practical ways happiness
or misery to sentient beings, seemed to him sufficiently real
for human science and all other purposes. Nevertheless,
in the ardour of youth Berkeley had hardly fathomed the
depths into which his New Principle led, and which he
hoped to escape by avoiding the abstractions of 'fine-spun
metaphysics.'

In December Percival writes from London that he has
'given the book to Lord Pembroke,' who 'thought the
author an ingenious man, and to be encouraged ' ; but for
himself he ' cannot believe in the non-existence *of Matter ' ;
and he had tried in vain to induce Samuel Clarke, the
great English metaphysician, either to refute or to accept
the New Principle. In February Berkeley sends an
explanatory letter for Lord Pembroke to Percival's care.
In a letter in June he turns to social questions, and sug
gests that if ' some Irish gentlemen of good fortune and
generous inclinations would constantly reside in England,
there to watch for the interests of Ireland, they might
bring far greater advantage than they could by spending
their incomes at home.' And so 1711 passes, with re
sponses of ignorant qritics ; vain endeavours to draw

c 2

XXXVI GEORGE BERKELEY

worthy criticism from Samuel Clarke ; the author all the
while doing work as a Tutor in Trinity College on a modest
income; now and then on holidays in Meath or elsewhere
in Ireland. Three discourses on Passive Obedience in the
College Chapel in 1712, misinterpreted, brought on him
the reproach of Jacobitism. Yet they were designed
to shew that society rests on a deeper foundation than
force and calculations of utility, and is at last rooted in
principles of an immutable morality. Locke's favourite
opinion, that morality is a demonstrable, seems to weigh
with him in these Discourses.

But Berkeley was not yet done with the exposition and
vindication of his new thought, for it seemed to him
charged with supreme practical issues for mankind. In
the two years which followed the publication of the Prin
ciples he was preparing to reproduce his spiritual concep
tion of the universe, in the dramatic form of dialogue,
convenient for dealing popularly with plausible objections.
The issue was the Three Dialogues between Hylas and
Philonous, in which Philonous argues for the absurdity of
an abstract matter that is unrealised in the experience of
living beings, as against Hylas, who is put forward to justify
belief in this abstract reality. The design of the Dialogues
is to present in a familiar form 'such principles as, by
an easy solution of the perplexities of philosophers,
together with their own native evidence, may at once
recommend themselves as genuine to the mind, and rescue
philosophy from the endless pursuits it is engaged in ;
which, with a plain demonstration of the Immediate Pro
vidence of an all-seeing God, should seem the readiest
preparation, as well as the strongest motive to the study
and practice of virtue1/

When the Dialogues were completed, at the end of
1712, Berkeley resolved to visit London, as he told
Percival, ' in order to print my new book of Dialogues,

1 Preface to the Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous.

IN LONDON IN 1713 XXXV11

and to make acquaintance with men of merit.' He got
leave of absence from his College 'for the recovery of his
health/ which had suffered from study, and perhaps too
he remembered that Bacon commends travel as 'to the
younger sort a part of education/

Berkeley made his appearance in London in January,
1713. On the 26th of that month he writes to Percival
that he ' had crossed the Channel from Dublin a few days
before/ describes adventures on the road, and enlarges
on the beauty of rural England, which he liked more than
anything he had seen in London. 'Mr. Clarke' had
already introduced him to Lord Pembroke. He had also
called on his countryman Richard Steele, 'who desired to
be acquainted with him. Somebody had given him my
Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge, and that
was the ground of his inclination to my acquaintance.'
He anticipates 'much satisfaction in the conversation of
Steele and his friends/ adding that 'there is lately
published a bold and pernicious book, a Discourse on
Free-thinking1.' In February he 'dines often with Steele
in his house in Bloomsbury Square/ and tells in March
'that you will soon hear of Mr. Steele under the char
acter of the Guardian ; he designs his paper shall come
out every day as the Spectator' The night before ' a very
ingenious new poem upon "Windsor Forest" had been
given to him by the author, Mr. Pope. The gentleman is
a Papist, but a man of excellent wit and learning, one ot
those Mr. Steele mentions in his last paper as having writ
some of the Spectator.' A few days later he has met
' Mr. Addison, who has the same talents as Steele in
a high degree, and is likewise a great philosopher, having
applied himself to the speculative studies more than any
of the wits I know. I breakfasted with him at Dr. Swift's
lodgings. His coming in while I was there, and the good

1 By Anthony Collins.

XXXV111 GEORGE BERKELEY

temper he showed, was construed by me as a sign of the
approaching coalition of parties. A play of Mr. Steele's,
which was expected, he has now put off till next winter.
But Cato, a most noble play of Mr. Addison, is to
be acted in Easter week.' Accordingly, on April 18,
he writes that 'on Tuesday last Cato was acted for the
first time. I was present with Mr. Addison and two or
three more friends in a side box, where we had a talk
and two or three flasks of Burgundy and Champagne,
which the author (who is a very sober man) thought
necessary to support his spirits, and indeed it was a
pleasant refreshment to us all between the Acts. Some
parts of the prologue, written by Mr. Pope, a Tory and
even a Papist, were hissed, being thought to savour of
Whiggism ; but the clap got much the better of the hiss.
Lord Harley, who sat in the next box to us, was observed
to clap as loud as any in the house all the time of the
play.' Swift and Pope have described this famous first
night of Cato ; now for the first time we have Berkeley's
report. He adds, 'This day I dined at Dr. Arbuthnot's
lodging in the Queen's Palace.'

His countryman, Swift, was among the first to welcome
him to London, where Swift had himself been for four
years, 'lodging in Bury Street,' and sending the daily
journal to Stella, which records so many incidents of that
memorable London life. Mrs. Vanhomrigh and her
daughter, the unhappy Vanessa, were living in rooms in
the same street as Swift, and there he 'loitered, hot and
lazy, after his morning's work,' and 'often dined out of
mere listlessness.' Berkeley was a frequent visitor at
Swift's house, and this Vanhomrigh connexion with Swift
had an influence on Berkeley's fortune long afterwards.
On a Sunday in April we find him at Kensington, at
the Court of Queen Anne, in the company of Swift.
'I went to Court to-day,' Swift's journal records, 'on
purpose to present Mr. Berkeley, one of the Fellows of

IN LONDON IN 1713 XXXIX

Trinity College, to Lord Berkeley of Stratton. That
Mr. Berkeley is a very ingenious man, and a great
philosopher, and I have mentioned him to all the ministers,
and have given them some of his writings, and I will
favour him as much as I can/ In this, Swift was as good
as his word. ' Dr. Swift/ he adds, 'is admired both by
Steele and Addison, and I think Addison one of the best
natured and most agreeable men in the world/

One day about this time, at the instance of Addison, it
seems that a meeting was arranged between Berkeley and
Samuel Clarke, the metaphysical rector of St. James's in
Piccadilly, whose opinion he had in vain tried to draw
forth two years before through Sir John Percival. Berke
ley's personal charm was felt wherever he went, and even
'the fastidious and turbulent Atterbury,' after intercourse
with him, is reported to have said : 'So much understanding,
so much knowledge, so much innocence, and such humility,
I did not think had been the portion of any but angels till
I saw this gentleman/ Much was expected from the
meeting with Clarke, but Berkeley had again to complain
that although Clarke had neither refuted his arguments
nor disproved his premisses, he had not the candour to
accept his conclusion.

It was thus that Berkeley became known to 'men of
merit' in that brilliant society. He was also brought
among persons on whom he would hardly have conferred
this title. He tells Percival that he had attended several
free-thinking clubs, in the pretended character of a learner,
and that he there heard Anthony Collins, author of 'the
bold and pernicious book on free-thinking,' boast 'that
he was able to demonstrate that the existence of God is
an impossible supposition/ ,The promised 'demonstration'
seems to have been Collins' Inquiry Concerning Human
Liberty, which appeared two years later, according to
which all that happens in mind and matter is the issue
of natural necessity. Steele invited Berkeley to contribute

xl GEORGE BERKELEY

to the Guardian during its short-lived existence between
March and September, 1713. He took the Discourse of
Collins for the subject of his first essay. Three other
essays are concerned with man's hope of a future life,
and are among the few passages in his writings in which
his philosophy is a meditation upon Death.

In May, Percival writes to him from Dublin that he
hears the ' new book of Dialogues is printed, though not
yet published, and that your opinion has gained ground
among the learned ; that Mr. Addison has come over to
your view ; and that what at first seemed shocking is
become so familiar that others envy you the discovery,
and make it their own/ In his reply in June, Berkeley
mentions that ' a clergyman in Wiltshire has lately pub
lished a treatise wherein he advances something published
three years ago in my Principles of Human Knowledge'
The clergyman was Arthur Collier, author of the Clavis
Universalis, or demonstration of the impossibility of an
external world J.

Berkeley's Three Dialogues were published in June.
In the middle of that same month he was in Oxford,
'a most delightful place/ where he spent two months,
' witnessed the Act and grand performances at the theatre,
and a great concourse from London and the country,
amongst whom were several foreigners/ The Drury Lane
Company had gone down to Oxford, and Cato was on
the stage for several nights. The Percival correspond
ence now first discloses this prolonged visit to Oxford in
the summer of 1713, that ideal home from whence, forty
years after, he departed on a more mysterious journey than
any on this planet. In a letter from thence to Percival, he
had claimed Arbuthnot as one of the converts to the ' new
Principle/ Percival replied that Swift demurred to this,
on which Berkeley rejoins : 'As to what you say of
Dr. Arbuthnot not being of my opinion, it is true there

1 See vol. Ill, Appendix B.

IN FRANCE IN 1713

xli

has been some difference between us concerning some
notions relating to the necessity of the laws of nature;
but this does not touch the main points of the non-existence
of what philosophers call material substance ; against
which he acknowledges he can assert nothing.' One
would gladly have got more than this from Berkeley,
about what touched his favourite conception of the ' arbi
trariness' of law in nature, as distinguished from the
' necessity ' which some modern physicists are ready
vaguely to take for granted.

The scene now changes. On October 15 Berkeley
suddenly writes from London : ' I am on the eve of going
to Sicily, as chaplain to Lord Peterborough, who is Ambas
sador Extraordinary on the coronation of the new king.'
He had been recommended by Swift to the Ambassador,
one of the most extraordinary characters then in Europe,
who a few years before had astonished the world in the
war of the Succession in Spain, and afterwards by his
genius as a diplomatist: in Holland, nearly a quarter
of a century before, he had formed an intimate friendship
with John Locke. Ten months in France and Italy in
the suite of Lord Peterborough brought the young Irish
metaphysician, who had lately been introduced to the wits
of London and the dons of Oxford, into a new world.
It was to him the beginning of a career of wandering
and social activity, which lasted, with little interruption,
for nearly twenty years, during which metaphysics and
authorship were in the background. On November 25
we find him in Paris, writing letters to Percival and
Prior. ' From London to Calais/ he tells Prior, « I came
in company of a Flamand, a Spaniard, a Frenchman, and
three English servants of my Lord. The three gentlemen,
being of three different nations, obliged me to speak the
French language (which is now familiar), and gave me
the opportunity of seeing much of the world in little

xlii GEORGE BERKELEY

compass. . . . On November i (O. S.) I embarked in the
stage-coach, with a company that were all perfect strangers
to me. There were two Scotch, and one English gentle
man. One of the former happened to be the author of the
Voyage to St. Kilda and the Account of the Western Isles1.
We were good company on the road ; and that day se'ennight
came to Paris. I have since been taken up in viewing
churches, convents, palaces, colleges, &c., which are very
numerous and magnificent in this town. The splendour
and riches of these things surpasses belief; but it were
endless to descend to particulars. I was present at a dis
putation in the Sorbonne, which indeed had much of the
French fire in it. I saw the Irish and the English Colleges.
In the latter I saw, enclosed in a coffin, the body of the
late King James. . . . To-morrow I intend to visit Father
Malebranche, and discourse him on certain points.5

The Abbe D'Aubigne, as he informs Percival, was to
introduce him to Malebranche, then the chief philosopher
of France, whose Vision of the world in God had some
affinity with Berkeley's own thought. Unfortunately we
have no record of the intended interview with the French
idealist, who fourteen years before had been visited by
Addison, also on his way to Italy, when Malebranche ex
pressed great regard for the English nation, and admiration
for Newton ; but he shook his head when Hobbes was
mentioned, whom he ventured to disparage as a ' poor
silly creature.* Malebranche died nearly two years after
Berkeley's proposed interview; and according to a story
countenanced by Dugald Stewart, Berkeley was the ' oc
casional cause' of his death. He found the venerable
Father, we are told, in a cell, cooking, in a pipkin, a medi
cine for a disorder with which he was troubled. The con
versation naturally turned on Berkeley's system, of which

1 Murdoch Martin, a native of the Western Islands of Scotland
Skye, author of a Voyage to St. (1703).
Kilda (1698^, and a Description of

IN ITALY IN 1714 xliii

Malebranche had received some knowledge from a trans
lation. The issue of the debate proved tragical to poor
Malebranche. In the heat of disputation he raised his
voice so high, and gave way so freely to the natural im
petuosity of a man of genius and a Frenchman, that he
brought on a violent increase of his disorder, which car
ried him off a few days after1. This romantic tale is, I
suspect, mythical. The Percival correspondence shews
that Berkeley was living in London in October, 1715, the
month in which Malebranche died, and I find no trace
of a short sudden visit to Paris at that time.

After a month spent in Paris, another fortnight carried
Berkeley and two travelling companions to Italy through
Savoy. They crossed Mont Cenis on New Year's Day
in 1714 — 'one of the most difficult and formidable parts
of the Alps which is ever passed over by mortal man/
as he tells Prior in a letter from Turin. 'We were carried
in open chairs by men used to scale these rocks and
precipices, which at this season are more slippery and
dangerous than at other times, and at the best are high,
craggy, and steep enough to cause the heart of the most
valiant man to melt within him.' At the end of other
six weeks we find him at Leghorn, where he spent three
months, 'while my lord was in Sicily.' He 'prefers
England or Ireland to Italy : the only advantage is in
point of air.' From Leghorn he writes in May a com
plimentary letter to Pope, on the occasion of the Rape of
the Lock-. 'Style, painting, judgment, spirit, I had already
admired in your other writings ; but in this I am charmed
with the magic of your invention, with all those images,
allusions, and inexplicable beauties which you raise so
surprisingly, and at the same time so naturally, out of
a trifle. ... I remember to have heard you mention some

1 See Stewart's Works (ed. Quincey, in his quaint essay on
Hamilton), vol. I. p. 161. There Murder considered as one of the
is a version of this story by De Fine Arts.

xliv GEORGE BERKELEY

half-formed design of coming to Italy. What might we
not expect from a muse that sings so well in the bleak
climate of England, if she felt the same warm sun and
breathed the same air with Virgil and Horace/ In July
we find Berkeley in Paris on his way back to England.
He had ' parted from Lord Peterborough at Genoa, where
my lord took post for Turin, and thence designed passing
over the Alps, and so through Savoy, on his way to
England/ In August they are in London, where the
aspect of English politics was changed by the death of
the Queen in that month. He seems to have had a
fever soon after his return. In October, Arbuthnot, in one
of his chatty letters to Swift, writes thus : ' Poor philo
sopher Berkeley has now the idea of health, which was
very hard to produce in him, for he had an idea of a
strange fever upon him, so strange that it was very hard
to destroy it by introducing a contrary one/

Our record of the two following years is a long blank,
first broken by a letter to Percival in July, 1715, dated
at London. Whether he spent any time at Fulham with
Lord Peterborough after their return from Italy does not
appear, nor whether he visited Ireland in those years,
which is not likely. We have no glimpses of brilliant
London society as in the preceding year. Steele was now
in Parliament. Swift had returned to Dublin, and Addison
was the Irish chief secretary. But Pope was still at
Binfield, among the glades of Windsor, and Berkeley
congratulated him after receiving the first volume of his
Homer. Of his own literary pursuits we hear nothing.
Perhaps the Second Part of the Principles, which was
lost afterwards in his travels, engaged him. In the end
of July he wrote to Lord Percival1 from Flaxley2 on
the Severn ; and in August, September, October, and
November he wrote from London, chiefly interested in

1 Sir John became Lord Percival in that year.

2 A place more than once visited by Berkeley.

IN ITALY IN 1716-20 xlv

reports about ' the rebels in Scotland/ and ' the forces
under Lord Mar, which no doubt will languish and dis
perse in a little time. The Bishop of Bristol assured
me the other day that the Court expect that the Duke
of Orleans would, in case of need, supply them with
forces against the Pretender.' Our next glimpse of him
is in May, 1716, when he writes to Lord Percival that he
is ' like soon to go to Ireland, the Prince of Wales having
recommended him to the Lords Justices for the living
of St. Paul's in Dublin.' This opening was soon closed,
and the visit to Ireland was abandoned. A groundless
suspicion of Jacobitism was not overcome by the interest
of Caroline, Princess of Wales. In June, 1716, Charles
Dering wrote from Dublin, that ' the Lords Justices have
made a strong representation against him.' He had to
look elsewhere for the immediate future.

We find him at Turin in November, 1716, with a fresh
leave of absence for two years from his College. It seems
that Ashe, Bishop of Clogher, had engaged him as travel
ling tutor to his son, a means not then uncommon for
enabling young authors of moderate fortune to see new
countries and mix with society. Addison had visited Italy
in this way sixteen years before, and Adam Smith long
afterwards travelled with the young Duke of Buccleuch.
With young Ashe, Berkeley crossed Mont Cenis a second
time. They reached Rome at the beginning of 1717.
His Journal in Italy in that year, and occasional letters
to Percival, Pope, and Arbuthnot, shew ardent interest
in nature and art. With the widest views, 'this very
great though singular sort of man descended into a
minute detail, and begrudged neither pains nor expense
for the means of information. He travelled through a
great part of Sicily on foot ; clambered over the mountains
and crept into the caverns, to investigate its natural history
and discover the causes of its volcanoes ; and I have known
him sit for hours in forges and foundries to inspect their

xlvl GEORGE BERKELEY

successive operations1.' If the Journal had been trans
formed by his own hand into a book, his letter to Pope
from Inarime shews that the book might have rivalled
Addison's Remarks on Parts of Italy in grace of style and
large human interest.

In the summer of 1720 we find the travellers at Florence,
afterwards for some time at Lyons, and in London at the
beginning of the next year. On the way home his meta
physical inspiration was revived. The ' Cause of Motion '
had been proposed by the French Academy as the subject
of a prize dissertation. The subject gave an opportunity
for further unfolding his early thought. In the Principles
and the Dialogues he had argued for the necessary depen
dence of matter, for its concrete substantial reality, upon
living percipient mind. He would now shew its powerless-
ness as it is presented to us in sense. The material world,
chiefly under the category of substance, inspired the Prin
ciples. The material world, under the category of cause
or power, inspired the De Motu. This Latin Essay sums
up the distinctive thought of Berkeley, as it appears in
the authorship of his early life. Moles evolvit et agitat
mentes might be taken as the formula of the materialism
which he sought to dissolve. Mens percipit et agitat mo/em
signiftcantem, cujus esse est percipi expresses what Berkeley
would substitute for the materialistic formula.

The end of the summer of 1721 found Berkeley still in
London. England was in the social agitation and misery
consequent upon the failure of the South Sea Company,
a gigantic commercial speculation connected with British
trade in America. A new inspiration took possession of
him. He thought he saw in this catastrophe signs of a
decline in public morals worse than that which followed
the Restoration. ' Political corruption/ 'decay of religion,'
'growth of atheism,' were descriptive words used by the

1 Bakewell's Memoirs of the Court of Augustus, vol. II. p. 177,

• DE MOTU ' AND ' AN ESSAY ' xlvii

thoughtful. Berkeley's eager imagination was apt to exag
gerate the evil. He became inspired by social idealism,
and found vent for his fervour in An Essay towards pre
venting the Ruin of Great Britain^ which, as well as the
De Motu, made its appearance in 1721. This Essay is a
significant factor in his career. It was the Cassandra wail
of a sorrowful and indignant prophet, prepared to shake
the dust from his feet, and to transfer his eye of hope
to other regions, in which a nearer approach to Utopia
might be realised. The true personality of the individual
is unrealisable in selfish isolation. His favourite non stbi,
sedtoti mundo was henceforward more than ever the ruling
maxim of his life.

II

MIDDLE LIFE (1722-34).

In October, 1721, Berkeley was in Dublin. The register
of the College shews that 'on November 14, 1721, Mr.
Berkeley had the grace of the House for the Degree of
Bachelor and Doctor of Divinity.' There is no ground
for the report that he returned to Ireland at this time as
Chaplain to the Duke of Grafton, the Lord Lieutenant1.
But preferment in the Church seemed within his reach.
' I had no sooner set foot on shore,' he wrote to Percival
in that October, ' than I heard that the Deanery of Dromore
was vacant.' Percival used his influence with the Lord
Lieutenant, and in February, 1722, Berkeley's patent was

1 A letter in Berkeley's Life and Ormond was Lord Lieutenant of

Letters, p. 93, which led me to Ireland. The writer was probably

a different opinion, I have now the Hon. and Rev. George Berke-

reason to believe was not written ley, a Prebendary of Westminster

by him, nor was it written in 1721. in 1687, who died in 1694. The

The research of Dr. Lorenz, con- wife of the ' pious Robert Nelson '

firmed by internal evidence, shews was a daughter of Earl Berkeley,

that it was written in October, 1684. and this 'George' was her younger

before Berkeley the philosopher brother,
was born, and when the Duke of

xlviii GEORGE BERKELEY

'passing the Seals for the Deanery of Dromore.' But the
Bishop of Dromore claimed the patronage, and this led to
a protracted and ineffectual lawsuit, which took Berkeley
to London in the following winter, 'to see friends and
inform himself of points of law/ and he tells that ' on the
way he was nearly drowned in crossing to Holyhead V

Berkeley's interest in church preferment was not per
sonal. He saw in it only means to an end. In March,
1723, he surprised Lord Percival by announcing, in a letter
from London, a project which it seems for some time had
occupied his thoughts. ' It is now about ten months/ he
says, ' since I have determined to spend the residue of my
days in Bermuda, where I trust in Providence I may be
the mean instrument of doing great good to mankind.
Whatever happens, go I am resolved, if I live. Half
a dozen of the most ingenious and agreeable men in our
College are with me in this project, and since I came
hither I have got together about a dozen Englishmen of
quality, who intend to retire to those islands/ He then
explains the project, opening a vision of Christian civilisa
tion radiating from those fair islands of the West, whose
idyllic bliss poets had sung, diffused over the New World,
with its magnificent possibilities in the future history of
mankind.

I find no further record of the origin of this bright
vision. As it had become a practical determination ' ten
months' before March, 1723, one is carried back to the
first months after his return to Dublin and to the Essay
that was called forth by the South Sea catastrophe. One
may conjecture that despair of England and the Old
World — 'such as Europe breeds in her decay' — led him
to look westward for the hopeful future of mankind,
moved, perhaps, by the connexion of the catastrophe with
America. His active imagination pictured a better Re
public than Plato's, and a grander Utopia than More's,

1 Percival MSS.

A NEW INSPIRATION xllX

emanating from a College in the isles of which Waller had
sung.

In the meantime a curious fortune unexpectedly
favoured him. Swift's unhappy Vanessa, associated with
Bury Street in 1713, had settled on her property at
Marley Abbey near Dublin ; and Swift had privately
married Stella, as she confessed to Vanessa, who there
after revoked the bequest of her fortune to Swift, and
left it to be divided between Berkeley and Marshal,
afterwards an Irish judge. Vanessa died in May, 1723.
A few days after Berkeley wrote thus to Lord Percival :
'Here is something that will surprise your lordship as
it doth me. Mrs. Hester Vanhomrigh, a lady to whom
I was a perfect stranger, having never in the whole
course of my life exchanged a word with her, died on
Sunday. Yesterday her Will was opened, by which it
appears that I am constituted executor, the advantage
whereof is computed by those who understand her affairs
to be worth £3000. . . . My Bermuda scheme is now
stronger in my mind than ever; this providential event
having made many things easy which were otherwise
before.' Lord Percival in reply concludes that he would
' persist more than ever in that noble scheme, which may
in some time exalt your name beyond that of St. Xavier
and the most famous missionaries abroad.' But he
warns him that, 'without the protection of Government,'
he would encounter insurmountable difficulties. The
Vanessa legacy, and the obstructions in the way of the
Deanery of Dromore, were the subjects of a tedious corre
spondence with his friend and business factotum, 'Tom
Prior,' in 1724 and the three following years. In the end,
the debts of Vanessa absorbed most of the legacy. And as
to the Deanery of Dromore, he tells Percival, on September
19, 1723: 'I despair of seeing it end to my advantage.
The truth is, my fixed purpose of going to Bermuda sets
me above soliciting anything with earnestness in this part

BERKELEY: FKASER. I.

1 GEORGE BERKELEY

of the world. It can be of no use to me, but as it may
enable me the better to prosecute that design ; and it
must be owned that the present possession of something
in the Church would make my application for an establish
ment in those islands more considered.'

Nevertheless, he got a Deanery at last. In May, 1724,
he informs Lord Percival from Trinity College : ' Yester
day I received my patent for the best Deanery in the
kingdom, that of Derry. It is said to be worth £1500
per annum. But as I do not consider it with an eye
to enriching myself, so I shall be perfectly contented if it
facilitates and recommends my scheme of Bermuda, which
I am in hopes will meet with a better reception if it comes
from one possessed of so great a Deanery.' In September
he is on his way, not to Derry, but to London, ' to raise
funds and obtain a Charter for the Bermuda College from
George the First,' fortified by a remarkable letter from
Swift to Lord Carteret, the new Lord Lieutenant, who
was then in Bath '. As Swift predicted in this letter, Berke
ley's conquests spread far and fast in England, where he
organised his resources during the four following years.
Nothing shews more signally the magic of his personality
than the story of his life in London in those years of
negotiation and endeavour. The proposal met with a
response wonderful in a generation represented by
Walpole. The subscriptions soon reached five thousand
pounds, and Walpole was among the subscribers. The
Scriblerus Club, meeting at Lord Bathurst's, agreed to
rally Berkeley, who was among them, on his Bermuda
scheme. He asked to be heard in defence, and presented
the case with such force of enthusiasm that the company
' were struck dumb, and after a pause simultaneously
rose and asked leave to accompany him.' Bermuda
for a time inspired London.

1 For the letter, see Editor's College in Bermuda, vol. IV. pp.
Preface to the Proposal for a 343-44-

IN LONDON IN 1724-28 li

Berkeley was not satisfied with this. He remembered
what Lord Percival had said about failure without help
from Government. Accordingly he obtained a Charter
from George the First early in 1726, and after canvassing
the House of Commons, secured a grant of £20,000, with
only two dissentient votes, in May of that year. This was
the beginning of his difficulties. Payment was indefin
itely delayed, and he was kept negotiating ; besides, with
the help of Prior, he was unravelling legal perplexities in
which the Vanessa legacy was involved. It was in these
years that he was seen at the receptions of Caroline at
Leicester Fields, when she was Princess of Wales, and after
wards at St. James's or at Kensington, when she became
Queen in 1727; not, he says, because he loved Courts,
but because he loved America. Clarke was still rector
of St. James's, and Butler had not yet migrated to his
parsonage at Stanhope ; so their society was open to him.
The Queen liked to listen to a philosophical discussion.
Ten years before, as Princess of Wales, she had been a
royal go-between in the famous correspondence between
Clarke and Leibniz. And now, Berkeley being in London,
he too wras asked to her weekly reunions, when she loved
to hear Clarke arguing with Berkeley, or Berkeley
arguing with Hoadley. Also in 1726 Voltaire made his
lengthened visit to England, a familiar figure in the
circle of Pope's friends, attracted to the philosophy of
Locke and Newton; and Voltaire mentions that he met
1 the discoverer of the true theory of vision ' during his
stay in London.

From the summer of 1727 until the spring of 1728 there
is no extant correspondence either with Percival or ' Tom
Prior' to throw light on his movements. In February,
1728, he was still in London, but he 'hoped to set out
for Dublin in March, and to America in May.' There is
a mystery about this visit to Dublin. ' I propose to set
out for Dublin about a month hence,' he writes to 'dear

d 2

Hi GEORGE BERKELEY

Tom,5 ' but of this you must not give the least intimation
to anybody. It is of all things my earnest desire (and for
very good reasons) not to have it known that I am in
Dublin. Speak not, therefore, one syllable of it to any
mortal whatsoever. When I formerly desired you to take
a place for me near the town, you gave out that you were
looking for a retired lodging for a friend of yours ; upon
which everybody surmised me to be the person. I must
beg you not to act in the like manner now, but to take for
me an entire house in your own name, and as for yourself;
for, all things considered, I am determined upon a whole
house, with no mortal in it but. a maid of your own putting,
who is to look on herself as your servant. Let there be
two bed-chambers : one for you, another for me ; and,
as you like, you may ever and anon lie there. I would
have the house, with necessary furniture, taken by the
month (or otherwise, as you can), for I propose staying
not beyond that time ; and yet perhaps I may. Take it
as soon as possible. . . . Let me entreat you to say nothing
of this to anybody, but to do the thing directly. ... I would
of all things . . . have a proper place in a retired situation,
where I may have access to fields and sweet air provided
against the moment I arrive. I am inclined to think one
may be better concealed in the outermost skirt of the
suburbs, than in the country or within the town. ... A house
quite detached in the country I should have no objection
to, provided you judge that I shall not be liable to
discovery in it. The place called Bermuda I am utterly
against. Dear Tom, do this matter cleanly and cleverly,
without waiting for further advice. ... To the person from
whom you hire it (whom alone I would have you speak
of it to) it will not seem strange you should at this time
of the year be desirous, for your own convenience or
health, to have a place in a free and open air.' This
mysterious letter was written in April. From April till
September Berkeley again disappears. There is in all

SAILS FOR AMERICA liii

this a curious secretiveness of which one has repeated
examples in his life. Whether he went to Dublin in that
spring, or why he wanted to go, does not appear.

But in September he emerges unexpectedly at Graves-
end, newly married, and ready to sail for Rhode Island,
' in a ship of 250 tons which he had hired/ The marriage,
according to Stock, took place on August i, whether in
Ireland or in England I cannot tell. The lady was Anne,
daughter of John Forster, late Chief Justice, and then
Speaker of the Irish House of Commons. She shared
his fortune when he was about to engage in the most
romantic, and ideally the grandest, Christian mission of
the eighteenth century. According to tradition she was a
devoutly religious mystic : Fenelon and Madame Guyon
were among her favourites. ' I chose her,' he tells Lord
Percival, 'for her qualities of mind and her unaffected
inclination to books. She goes with great thankfulness,
to live a plain farmer's life, and wear stuff of her own
spinning. I have presented her with a spinning-wheel.'
A letter to Prior, dated 'Gravesend September 5, 1728,'
thus describes the little party on the eve of their de
parture : — 'To-morrow, with God's blessing, I set sail for
Rhode Island, with my wife and a friend of hers, my
Lady Handcock's daughter, who bears us company.
I am married since I saw you to Miss Forster, whose
humour and turn of mind pleases me beyond anything
that I know in her whole sex. Mr. James1, Mr. Dalton,
and Mr. Smibert2 go with us on this voyage. We are
now all together at Gravesend, and are engaged in one
view.' We are further told 3 that they carried stores and
goods to a great value, and that the Dean ' embarked 20,000
books, besides what the two gentlemen carried. The}7

1 Afterwards Sir John James. family party then at Gravesend.

a Smibert the artist, who made 3 Historical Register, vol. XIII,

a picture of Berkeley in 1725, p. 289 (1728,.
and afterwards in America of the

v GEORGE BERKELEY

sailed in September for Rhode Island, where the Dean
intends to winter, and to purchase an estate, in order to
settle a correspondence and trade between that island and
Bermudas/ Berkeley was in his forty-fourth year, when,
full of glowing visions of Christian Empire in the West,
'Time's noblest offspring,' he left England, on his way to
Bermuda, with the promise of Sir Robert Walpole that
he should receive the promised grant after he had made
an investment. He bought land in America, but he never
reached Bermuda.

Towards the end of January, in 1729, the little party, in
the 'hired ship of 250 tons/ made their appearance in
Narragansett Bay, on the western side of Rhode Island.
' Blundering about the ocean,' they had touched at Virginia
on the way, whence a correspondent, sceptical of the enter
prise, informs Lord Percival that the Dean ' had dined
with the Governor, and visited our College,' but thinks
that ' when the Dean comes to put his visionary scheme
into practice, he will find it no better than a religious
frenzy,' and that ' he is as much a Don Quixote in zeal
as that renowned knight was in chivalry. I wish the good
Dean may not find out at last that Waller really kidnapt
him over to Bermuda, and that the project he has been
drawn into may not prove in every point of it poetical.'

We have a picture of the landing at Newport, on a
winter day early in 1729. 'Yesterday arrived here Dean
Berkeley of Londonderry, in a pretty large ship. He is
a gentleman of middle stature, of an agreeable, pleasant,
and erect aspect. He was ushered into the town with
a great number of gentlemen, to whom he behaved him
self after a very complaisant manner. 'Tis said he proposes
to tarry here with his family about three months1.' New
port was then a flourishing town, nearly a century old,
an emporium of American commerce, in those days the
rival of Boston and New York. He was 'never more

1 New England Weekly Courier. Feb. 3, 1 729.

A RECLUSE IN RHODE ISLAND lv

agreeably surprised/ he says, than ' at the size of the
town and harbour/ Around him was some of the softest
rural and grandest ocean scenery in the world, which had
fresh charms even for one whose boyhood was spent in
the valley of the Nore, who had lingered in the Bay of
Naples, and wandered in Inarime and among the mountains
of Sicily. He was seventy miles from Boston, and about
as far from Newhaven and Yale College. A range of
hills crosses the centre of the island, whence meadows
slope to the rocky shore. The Gulf Stream tempers the
surrounding sea. 'The people/ he tells Percival, 'are
industrious ; and though less orthodox have not less virtue,
and I am sure they have more regularity, than those I left
in Europe. They are indeed a strange medley of different
persuasions/ The gentry retained the customs of the
squires in England : tradition tells of a cheerful society :
the fox chase, with hounds and horses, was a favourite
recreation. The society, for so remote a region, was
well informed. The family libraries and pictures which
remain argue culture and refinement. Smibert, the artist
of the missionary party, who had moved to Boston, soon
found employment in America, and his pictures still adorn
houses in Rhode Island1.

The Dean and his young wife lived in Newport for
some months after their arrival. Mr. Honeyman, a mis
sionary of the English Society, had been placed there,
in Trinity Church, in 1704. The church is still a con
spicuous object from the harbour. Berkeley preached in
it three days after his arrival, and occasionally afterwards.
Notes of his sermons are included in this edition among
his Miscellaneous Works.

In the summer of 1729 he moved from Newport to
a quiet valley in the interior of the island, where he

1 For valuable information about Higginson, to whom I desire to

Rhode Island, reproduced in make this tardy but grateful ac-

Berkeley's Life and Correspondence knowledgement.
and here, I am indebted to Colonel

Ivi GEORGE BERKELEY

bought a farm, and built a house. In this island-home,
named Whitehall, he lived for more than two years-
years of domestic happiness, and of resumed study, much
interrupted since he left Dublin in 1713. The house
may still be seen, a little aside from the road that runs
eastward from Newport, about three miles from the town.
It is built of wood. The south-west room was probably
the library. The ocean is seen in the distance, while
orchards and groves offer the shade and silence which
soothed the thinker in his recluse life. No invitations
of the three companions of his voyage \ who had migrated
to Boston, could allure him from this retreat, where he
diverted his anxieties about Bermuda by the thoughts
which found expression in the dialogues of Alciphron,
redolent of Rhode Island and the invigorating breezes of
its ocean shore. Tradition tells that much of Alciphron was
the issue of meditation in the open air, at a favourite retreat,
beneath the Hanging Rocks, which commands an extensive
view of the beach and the ocean ; and the chair in which
he sat in this alcove is still preserved with veneration.

While Berkeley loved domestic quiet at Whitehall2 and
the 'still air of delightful studies/ he mixed occasionally
in the society of Newport. He found it not uncongenial,
and soon after he was settled at Whitehall he led the way
in forming a club, which held occasional meetings, the
germ of the Redwood Library, still a useful Newport
institution. His own house was a place of meeting for
the New England missionaries.

Soon after his arrival in Rhode Island, Berkeley was
visited by the Reverend Samuel Johnson, missionary at
Stratford, an acute and independent thinker, one of the two
contemporary representatives of philosophy in America.

1 James, Dalton, and Smibert. Rev. Dr. E. E. Hale, and others.

- Whitehall, having fallen into This good work was completed

decay, has been lately restored in the summer of 1900 ; and the

by the pious efforts of Mrs. Living- house is now as nearly as possible

ston Mason, in concert with the in the state in which Berkeley left it.

SAMUEL JOHNSON Ivii

The other was Jonathan Edwards, at that time Congrega
tional minister at Northampton on the Connecticut river.
They had both adopted a conception of the meaning and
office of the material world in the economy of existence that
was in many respects similar to Berkeley's '. It seems that
Berkeley's book of Principles had before this fallen into
Johnson's hands. He hastened to visit the author when he
heard of his arrival. A succession of visits and a life-long
correspondence followed. The 'non-existence of Matter/
interpreted as a whimsical and even insane paradox,
was found by Johnson to mean the absence of un-
realisable Substance behind the real material world that
is presented to our senses, and of unrealisable Power in
the successive sense-presented appearances of which alone
we are percipient. He came to see the real existence
of the things of sense in the constant order of the data
of sense, through which we gain our knowledge of the
existence of our fellow men, and of the omnipresent
constant Providence of God ; whose Ideas are the true
archetypes of the visible world. He adopted 'and applied
this conception with a lucidity and force which give him
a high place among American thinkers.

All the while a cloud darkened the recluse life at
Whitehall. In June, 1729, Berkeley explains to Percival
the circumstances and secrecy of his departure from
England : —

' Before I left England I was reduced to a difficult
situation. Had I continued there, the report would have
obtained (which I had found beginning to spread) that
1 had dropped the design, after it had cost me and my
friends so much trouble and expense. On the other
hand, if I had taken leave of my friends, even those who
assisted and approved my undertaking would have con
demned my coming abroad before the King's bounty was

1 See vol. Ill, Appendix C.

Ix GEORGE BERKELEY

influences, he will continue to accomplish, some portion at
least of the results which he had aimed at in the founding
of his university. It is the old story over again ; the
tragedy of a Providence wiser than man's foresight ; God
giving the victory to His faithful servant even through
the bitterness of overruling him and defeating him1.'
American Empire, as we now see it with its boundless
beneficent influence, is at least an imperfect realisation
of Berkeley's dream.

Berkeley's head quarters were in London, in Green
Street, for more than two years after the return to England
in the beginning of 1732. Extant correspondence with
Lord Percival ends in Rhode Island, and our picture of
the two years in London is faintly formed by letters to
Prior and Johnson. These speak of ill-health, and breathe
a less sanguine spirit. The brilliant social life of former
visits was less attractive now, even if old friends had
remained. But Swift had quitted England for ever, and
Steele had followed Addison to the grave. Gay, the
common friend of Berkeley and Pope, died soon after the
return from Rhode Island, and Arbuthnot was approaching
his end at Hampstead. Samuel Clarke had passed away
when Berkeley was at Whitehall ; but Seeker now held
the rectory of St. James's, and Butler was in studious
retirement on the Wear; while Pope was at Twicken
ham, publishing his Essay on Man, receiving visits from
Bolingbroke, or visiting Lord Bathurst at Cirencester
Park. Queen Caroline, too, was holding her receptions at
Kensington ; but ' those who imagine (as you write),' he
tells Prior in January, 1734, 'that I have been making my
court here all this time, would never believe (what is most
true) that I have not been at the Court or at the Minister's
but once these seven years. The care of my health and

1 Three Men of Letters, by Moses academical and other institutions
Coit Tyler (New York, 1895). that are directly or indirectly, due
He records some of the American to Berkeley

MINUTE PHILOSOPHY Ixi

the love of retirement have prevailed over whatsoever
ambition might have come to my share.' There is a hint
of a visit to Oxford, at Commemoration in 1733, when his
friend Seeker received the honorary degree.

Soon after he had settled in London, the fruit of his
studies in Rhode Island was given to the world in the
Seven Dialogues of Alciphron, or The Minute Philosopher.
Here the philosophical inspiration of his early years is
directed to sustain faith in Divine Moral Order, and in
the Christian Revelation. Alciphron is the longest, and in
literary form perhaps the most finished of his works, un
surpassed in lively strokes of irony and satire. Yet if it
is to be regarded as a philosophical justification of religion,
as against modern agnosticism, one may incline to the
judgment of Mr. Leslie Stephen, that it is 'the least
admirable of all its author's admirable works.' As we have
seen, the sect of free-thinkers was early the object of Berke
ley's ridicule and sarcasm. They claimed for themselves
wide intellectual vision, yet they were blind to the deep
realities of the universe ; they took exclusive credit for
freedom of thought, although their thinking was confined
within the narrow compass of our data in sense. The
book of Principles, the Dialogues, and the De Motu of
his early years, were designed to bring into clear light the
absolute dependence of the world that is presented to our
senses on Omnipresent Spirit ; and the necessary subjec
tion of all changes in our surroundings to the immediate
agency or providence of God. Boasted ' free-thinking ' was
really a narrow atheism, so he believed, in which mean
ingless Matter usurped the place that belonged in reason
to God, and he employed reason to disclose Omnipotent
Intelligence in and behind the phenomena that are pre
sented to the senses in impotent natural sequence.

The causes of the widespread moral corruption of the
Old World, which had moved Berkeley so profoundly,

Ixii GEORGE BERKELEY

seem to have been pondered anew during his recluse life
in Rhode Island. The decline of morals was explained
by the deification of Matter : consequent life of sensuous
pleasure accounted for decay of religion. That vice is hurt
ful was argued by free-thinkers like Mandeville to be a
vulgar error, and a fallacious demonstration was offered
of its utility. That virtue is intrinsically beautiful was
taught by Shaftesbury ; but Berkeley judged the abstract
beauty, with which l minute philosophers ' were contented,
unfit to move ordinary human beings to self-sacrificing
action ; for this involves devotion to a Perfect Person
by whom goodness is finally distributed. Religion alone
inspires the larger and higher life, in presenting distribu
tive justice personified on the throne of the universe,
instead of abstract virtue.

The turning-point in Alciphron is in man's vision of
• God. This is pressed in the Fourth Dialogue. The
free-thinker asserts that 'the notion of a Deity, or
some invisible power, is of all prejudices the most un
conquerable; the most signal example of belief without
reason for believing.' He demands proof— 'such proof as
every man of sense requires of a matter of fact. . . . Should
a man ask, why I believe there is a king of Great Britain ?
I might answer, Because I had seen him. Or a king of
Spain ? Because I had seen those who saw him. But as
for this King of kings, I neither saw Him myself, nor any one
else that ever did see Him.' To which Euphranor replies,
1 What if it should appear that God really speaks to man ;
would this content you ? What if it shall appear plainly that
God speaks to men by the intervention and use of arbitrary,
outward, sensible signs, having no resemblance or necessary
connexion with the things they stand for and suggest ; if
it shall appear that, by innumerable combinations of these
signs, an endless variety of things is discovered and made
known to us ; and that we are thereby instructed or
informed in their different natures; that we are taught

A VISIBLE GOD Ixiii

and admonished what to shun and what to pursue ; and
are directed how to regulate our motions, and how to act
with respect to things distant from us, as well in time as
place : will this content you ? ' Euphranor accordingly
proceeds to shew that Visible Nature is a Language, in
which the Universal Power that is continually at work is
speaking to us all, in a way similar to that in which
our fellow men speak to us ; so that we have as much
(even more) reason to believe in the existence of the
Universal Person who is the Speaker, as we have to
believe in the existence of persons around us; who become
known to us, when they too employ sense-symbols, in
the words and actions by which we discover that we
are not alone in the universe. For men are really living
spirits : their bodies are only the sign of their spiritual
personality. And it is so with God, who is also revealed
in the visible world as a Spirit. 'In a strict sense,'
says Euphranor, ' I do not see Alciphron, but only such
visible signs and tokens as suggest and infer the being
of that invisible thinking principle or soul. Even so,
in the self-same manner, it seems to me that, though I
cannot with eyes of flesh behold the invisible God,
yet I do, in the strictest sense, behold and perceive,
by all my senses, such signs and tokens ... as suggest,
indicate, and demonstrate an invisible God as cer
tainly, and with the same evidence, at least, as any
other signs, perceived by sense, do suggest to me the
existence of your soul, spirit, or thinking principle ; which
I am convinced of only by a few signs or effects, and the
motions of one small organised body ; whereas I do, at
all times, and in all places, perceive sensible signs which
evince the being of God.' In short, God is the living
Soul of the Universe ; as you and I are the living souls
that keep our bodies and their organs in significant
motion. We can interpret the character of God in the
history of the universe, even as we can interpret the

Ixiv GEORGE BERKELEY

character of our neighbour by observing his words and
outward actions.

This overwhelmed Alciphron. 'You stare to find that
God is not far from any one of us, and that in Him we live
and move and have our being/ rejoins Euphranor. ' You
who, in the beginning of this conference, thought it strange
that God should leave Himself without a witness, do now
think it strange the witness should be so full and clear.'
'I must own I do/ was the reply. ' I never imagined it could
be pretended that we saw God with our fleshly eyes, as
plain as we see any human person whatsoever, and that He
daily speaks to our senses in a manifest and clear dialect/

Although this reasoning satisfied Alciphron, others may
think it inconclusive. How one is able to discover the ex
istence of other persons, and even the meaning of finite
personality, are themselves questions full of speculative
difficulty. But, waiving this, the analogy between the
relation of a human spirit to its body, and that of the
Omnipresent and Omnipotent Spirit to the Universe of
things and persons, fails in several respects. God is
supposed to be continually creating the world by constant
and continuous Providence, and His Omniscience is sup
posed to comprehend all its concrete relations : a man's
body is not absolutely dependent on the man's own power
and providence ; and even his scientific knowledge of it, in
itself and in its relations, is scanty and imperfect, as his
power over it is limited and conditioned. Then the little
that a man gradually learns of what is going on in the sur
rounding universe is dependent on his senses : Omniscience
comprehends Immensity and Eternity (so we suppose) in a
single intuition. Our bodies, moreover, are visible things:
the universe, this organism of God, is crowded with per
sons, to whom there is nothing corresponding within the
organism which reveals one man to another.

But this is not all. After Euphranor has found that the
Universal Power is Universal Spirit, this is still an in-

THE DIVINE SOUL OF THE UNIVERSE Ixv

adequate God ; for what we want to know is what sort of
Spirit God is. Is God omnipotent or of limited power,
regarded ethically, fair or unfair in His treatment of per
sons ; good or evil, according to the highest yet attained
conception of goodness ; a God of love, or a devil omni
potent? I infer the character of my neighbour from his
words and actions, patent to sense in the gradual outward
evolution of his life. I am asked to infer the character
of the Omnipresent Spirit from His words and actions,
manifested in the universe of things and persons. But
we must not attribute to the Cause more than it reveals
of itself in its effects. God and men alike are known by
the effects they produce. The Universal Power is, on this
condition, righteous, fair, and loving to the degree in
which those conceptions are implied in His visible em
bodiment : to affirm more or other than this, on the basis
of analogy alone, is either to indulge in baseless conjec
ture, or to submit blindly to dogma and authority.

Now the universe, as far as it comes within the range
of human experience on this planet, is full of suffering
and moral disorder. The ' religious hypothesis ' of a per
fectly righteous and benevolent God is here offered to
account for the appearances which the universe presents
to us. But do these signify exact distributive justice ?
Is not visible nature apparently cruel and unrelenting?
If we infer cruelty in the character of a man, because his
bodily actions cause undeserved suffering, must we not,
by this analogy, infer in like manner regarding the char
acter of the Supreme Spirit, manifested in the progressive
evolution of the universal organism ?

We find it impossible to determine with absolute cer
tainty the character even of our fellow men, from their im
perfectly interpreted words and actions, so that each man
is more or less a mystery to his fellows. The mystery
deepens when we try to read the character of animals,
—to interpret the motives which determine the overt acts

BERKELEY : FRASEK. I. C

Ixvi GEORGE BERKELEY

of dogs or horses. And if we were able to communicate by
visible signs with the inhabitants of other planets, with
how much greater difficulty should we draw conclusions
from their visible acts regarding their character? But if
this is so when we use the data of sense for reading
the character of finite persons, how infinite must be the
difficulty of reading the character of the Eternal Spirit,
in and through the gradual evolution of the universe of
things and persons, which in this reasoning is supposed
to be His bod}^; and the history of that universe the facts
of His biography, in and by which He is eternally reveal
ing Himself! For we know nothing about the unbegin-
ning and unending. The universe of persons is assumed
to have no end] and I know not why its evolution must
be supposed to have had a beginning, or that there ever was
a time in which God was unmanifested, to finite persons.

Shall we in these circumstances turn with Euphranor,
in the Fifth and Sixth Dialogues, to professed revelation of
the character of the Universal Mind presented in miracu
lous revelation, by inspired prophets and apostles, who are
brought forward as authorities able to speak infallibly to
the character of God ? If the whole course of nature, or
endless evolution of events, is the Divine Spirit revealed
in omnipresent activity, what room is there for any other less
regular revelation ? The universe of common experience,
it is implied by Berkeley, is essentially miraculous, and
therefore absolutely perfect. Is it consistent with fairness,
and benevolence, and love of goodness in all moral agents
for its own sake, that the Christian revelation should
have been so long delayed, and be still so incompletely
made known ? Is not the existence of wicked persons
on this or any other planet, wicked men or devils, a
dark spot in the visible life of God? Does not perfect
goodness in God mean restoration of goodness in men,
for its own sake, apart from their merit ; and must not
Omnipotent Goodness, infinitely opposite to all evil, either

MORAL CHARACTER OF UNIVERSAL MIND Ixvii

convert to goodness all beings in the universe who have
made themselves bad, or else relieve the universe of their
perpetual presence in ever-increasing wickedness ?

Sceptical criticism of this sort has found expression
in the searching minute philosophy of a later day than
Berkeley's and Alciphron's ; as in David Hume and
Voltaire, and in the agnosticism of the nineteenth century.
Was not Euphranor too ready to yield to the demand
for a visible God, whose character had accordingly to be
determined by what appears in nature and man, under
the conditions of our limited and contingent experience? Do
we not need to look below data of sensuous experience, and
among the presuppositions which must consciously or un
consciously be taken for granted in all man's dealings
with the environment in which he finds himself, for the
root of trustworthy experience ? On merely physical
reasoning, like that of Euphranor, the righteous love of
God is an unwarranted inference, and it even seems to be
contradicted by visible facts presented in the history of
the world. But if Omnipotent Goodness must a priori be
attributed to the Universal Mind, as an indispensable
condition for man's having reliable intercourse of any
sort with nature ; if this is the primary postulate necessary
to the existence of truth of any kind — then the ' religious
hypothesis ' that God is Good, according to the highest
conception of goodness, is no groundless fancy, but the
fundamental faith-venture in which man has to live. It
must stand in reason ; unless it can be demonstrated that
the mixture of good and evil which the universe presents,
necessarily contradicts this fundamental presupposition :
and if so, man is lost in pessimistic Pyrrhonism, and can
assert nothing about anything1.

The religious altruism, however inadequate, which

1 The thought implied in this in all human experience. If the

paragraph is pursued in my Philo- Universal Mind is not ethically per-

sophy of Theism, in which the ethical feet, the universe (including our

perfection of the Universal Mind is spiritual constitution; is radically

taken as the fundamental postulate untrustworthy.

e 2

GEORGE BERKELEY

Berkeley offered in Alciphron made some noise at the
time of its appearance, although its theistic argument
was too subtle to be popular. The conception of the
visible world as Divine Visual Language was 'received
with ridicule by those who make ridicule the test of
truth/ although it has made way since. ' I have not seen
Dean Berkeley/ Gay the poet writes to Swift in the
May following the Dean's return, and very soon after
the appearance of Alciphron, 'but I have been reading
his book, and like many parts of it ; but in general think
with you that it is too speculative.' Warburton, with
admiration for Berkeley, cannot comprehend his philo
sophy, and Hoadley shewed a less friendly spirit. A
Letter from a Country Clergyman, attributed to Lord
Hervey, the 'Sporus' of Pope, was one of several ephem
eral attacks which the Minute Philosopher encountered in
the year after its appearance. Three other critics, more
worthy of consideration, are mentioned in one of Berkeley's
letters from London to his American friend Johnson at
Stratford : ' As to the Bishop of Cork's book, and the
other book you allude to, the author of which is one
Baxter, they are both very little considered here ; for which
reason I have taken no public notice of them. To answer
objections already answered, and repeat the same things,
is a needless as well as disagreeable task. Nor should
I have taken notice of that Letter about Vision, had it
not been printed in a newspaper, which gave it course,
and spread it through the kingdom. Besides, the theory
of Vision I found was somewhat obscure to most people ; for
which reason I was not displeased at an opportunity to
explain it1.' The explanation was given in The Theory
of Visual Language Vindicated, in January, 1733, as a
supplement to Alciphron. Its blot is a tone of polemical
bitterness directed against Shaftesbury -.

1 Life and Letters of Berkeley, 2 The third Earl of Shaftesbu^,

p. 222. the pupil of Locke, and author

IS GOD REALLY KNOWABLE ? Ixix

Although Berkeley 'took no public notice' of 'the
Bishop of Cork's book ] ' it touched a great question,
which periodically has awakened controversy, and been
the occasion of mutual misunderstanding among the con
troversialists in past ages. ' Is God knowable by man ;
or must religion be devotion to an object that is unknow
able?' In one of his first letters to Lord Percival, as we
saw, Berkeley animadverted on a sermon by the Arch
bishop of Dublin, which seemed to deny that there was good
ness, or understanding God, any more than feet or hands.
An opinion somewhat similar had been attributed to Bishop
Browne, in his answer to Toland, and afterwards in 1728,
in his Procedure and Limits of Human Understanding.

This touched to the quick Berkeley's ultimate con
ception of the universe, as realisable only in, and there
fore necessarily dependent on, living mind. We are
reminded of the famous analogy of Spinoza '2. If the omni
present and omnipotent M ind, on which Euphranor rested,
can be called ' mind ' only metaphorically, and can be called
'good ' only when the term is used without human meaning,
it may seem to be a matter of indifference whether we have
unknowable Matter or unknowable Mind at the root of
things and persons. Both are empty words. The Power
universally at work is equally unintelligible, equally unfit
to be the object of worship in the final venture of faith,
whether we use the term Matter or the term Mind.

of the Characteristics. In addition by Analogy with Things Natural

to the well-known biography by and Human, by the Author of The

Dr. Fowler, the present eminent Procedure, Extent and Limits of the

Vice-Chancellor of Oxford, Shaftes- Human Understanding. The Divine

bury has been interpreted in two Analogy appeared in 1733, and

other lately published works— a the Procedure in 1728.
Life by Benjamin Rand, Ph.D. 2 Spinoza argues that what is

(1900), and an edition of the called 'understanding' and 'will' in

Characteristics, with an Introduction God, has no more in common with

and Notes, by John M. Robertson human understanding and will than

(1900 . the dog-star in the heavens has

1 The title of this book is— Things with the animal we call a dog. See

Divine and Supernatural conceived Spinoza's Ethica, I. 17, Scholium.

1XX GEORGE BERKELEY

The universe is neither explained nor sustained by a
' mind ' that is mind only metaphorically. To call this ' God '
is to console us with an empty abstraction. The minutest
philosopher is ready to grant with Alciphron that ' there
is a God in this indefinite sense ' ; since nothing can be
inferred from such an account of God about conduct
or religion.

The Bishop of Cork replied to the strictures of
Euphranor in the Minute Philosopher. He qualified and
explained his former utterances in some two hundred
dull pages of his Divine Analogy, which hardly touch
the root of the matter. The question at issue is the
one which underlies modern agnosticism. It was raised
again in Britain in the nineteenth century, with deeper
insight, by Sir William Hamilton; followed by Dean Mansel,
in controversy with F. D. Maurice, at the point of view
of Archbishop King and Bishop Browne, in philosophical
vindication of the mysteries of Christian faith ; by Mr.
Herbert Spencer and by Huxley in a minute philosophy
that has been deepened by Hume's criticism of the rationale
of theism in Berkeley1.

Andrew Baxter's Inquiry into the Nature of the Human
Soul, referred to in Berkeley's letter to Johnson, appeared in
1 733. It has a chapter on ' Dean Berkeley's Scheme against
the existence of Matter and a Material World,' which
is worthy of mention because it is the earliest elaborate
criticism of the New Principle, although it had then been
before the world for more than twenty years. The title
of the chapter shews Baxter's imperfect comprehension
of the proposition which he attempts to refute. It suggests

1 The question of the knowable- of Hamilton's critics in this matter,
ness of God, or Omnipotent Moral The subject is lucidly treated by
Perfection in the concrete, enters Professor Andrew Seth (Pringle-
largely into recent philosophical and Pattison) in his Lectures on Theism
theological discussion in Britain. (1897) and in a supplement to Cal-
Calderwood, in his Philosophy of derwood's Life (1900). So also
the Infinite (1854), was one of the Huxley's David Hume, and Pro-
earliest, and not the least acute, fessor Iverach's Is God Knowable ?

AT CLOYNE Ixxi

that Berkeley argued for the non-existence of the things
we see and touch, instead of for their necessary dependence
on, or subordination to, realising percipient Mind, so far
as they are concrete realities. Baxter, moreover, was
a Scot; and his criticism is interesting as a foretaste
of the protracted discussion of the ' ideal theory ' by Reid
and his friends, and later on by Hamilton. But Baxter's
book was not the first sign of Berkeley's influence in
Scotland. We are told by Dugald Stewart, that ' the
novelty of Berkeley's paradox attracted very powerfully
the attention of a set of young men who were then
prosecuting their studies at Edinburgh, who formed them
selves into a Society for the express purpose of soliciting
from him an explanation of some parts of his theory which
seemed to them obscurely or equivocally expressed. To
this correspondence the amiable and excellent prelate seems
to have given every encouragement ; and I have been
told on the best authority that he was accustomed to say
that his reasoning had been nowhere better understood
than by this club of young Scotsmen V Thus, and after
wards through Hume and Reid, Berkeley is at the root
of philosophy in Scotland.

The two years of indifferent health and authorship in
London sum up what may be called the American period
of Berkeley's life. Early in 1734 letters to Prior open
a new vista in his history. He was nominated to the
bishopric of Cloyne in the south of Ireland, and we have
now to follow him to the remote region which was his
home for eighteen years. The interest of the philosophic
Queen, and perhaps some compensation for the Bermuda
disappointment, may explain the appearance of the meta
physical and social idealist in the place where he shone
as a star of the first magnitude in the Irish Church of the
eighteenth century.

1 Stewart's Works, vol. I. pp. 350-1.

GEORGE BERKELEY

III

LATER YEARS (1734-53).

In May, 1734, Berkeley was consecrated as Bishop of
Cloyne, in St. Paul's Church, Dublin. Except occasional
visits, he had been absent from Ireland for more than
twenty years. He returned to spend eighteen years of
almost unbroken seclusion in his remote diocese. It suited
a growing inclination to a recluse, meditative life, which had
been encouraged by circumstances in Rhode Island. The
eastern and northern part in the county of Cork formed
his diocese, bounded on the west by Cork harbour, and
on the east by the beautiful Blackwater and the mountains
of Waterford ; the sea, which was its southern boundary,
approached within two miles of the episcopal residence in
the village of Cloyne.

As soon as he was settled, he resumed study 'with
unabated attention/ but still with indifferent health.
Travelling had become irksome to him, and at Cloyne
he was almost as much removed as he had been in Rhode
Island from the thinking world. Cork took the place of
Newport ; but Cork was twenty miles from Cloyne, while
Newport was only three miles from Whitehall. His epis
copal neighbour at Cork was Bishop Browne, the critic of
Alciphron. Isaac Gervais, afterwards Dean of Tuam,
often enlivened the 'manse-house' at Cloyne by his wit
and intercourse with the great world. Seeker, the Bishop
of Bristol, and Benson, the Bishop of Gloucester, now
and then exchanged letters with him, and correspondence
was kept up as of old with Prior at Dublin and Johnson
at Stratford. But there is no trace of intercourse with
Swift, who was wearing out an unhappy old age, or with
Pope, almost the only survivor of the brilliant society of
other years. We are told, indeed, that the beauty of Cloyne

INFIDEL MATHEMATICIANS Ixxiii

was so described to the bard of Twickenham, by the pen
which in former days had described Ischia, that Pope
was almost moved to visit it. And a letter from Seeker
in February, I7351, contains this scrap: 'Your friend
Mr. Pope is publishing small poems every now and then,
full of much wit and not a little keenness V ' Our common
friend, Dr. Butler/ he adds, 'hath almost completed a set
of speculations upon the credibility of religion from its
analogy to the constitution and course of nature, which
I believe in due time you will read with pleasure.' Butler's
Analogy appeared in the following year. But I have
found no remains of correspondence between Berkeley
and their 'common friend'; the two most illustrious
religious thinkers of the Anglican communion.

When he left London in 1734 Berkeley was on the eve
of what sounded like a mathematical controversy, although
it was in his intention metaphysical, and was suggested
by the Seventh Dialogue in Alciphron. In one of his letters
to Prior, early in that year, he told him that though he
'could not read, owing to ill health,' yet his thought was
as distinct as ever, and that for amusement 'he passed his
early hours in thinking of certain mathematical matters
which may possibly produce something0'.' This turned, it
seems, upon a form of scepticism among contemporary
mathematicians, occasioned by the presence of mysteries
of religion. The Analyst was the issue. It was followed

1 Berkeley MSS. possessed by Archdeacon Rose.

2 Pope's poetic tribute to Berkeley belongs to this period —

' Even in a bishop I can spy desert ;
Seeker is decent ; Rundle has a heart :
Manners with candour are to Benson given,
To Berkeley — every virtue under heaven.'

Epilogue to the Satires,

Also his satirical tribute to the critics of Berkeley —

' Truth's sacred fort th' exploded laugh shall win ;
And Coxcombs vanquish Berkeley with a grin.'

Essay on Satire, Part II.

3 Berkeley's Life and Letters, p. 210. \

Ixxiv GEORGE BERKELEY

by a controversy in which some of the most eminent
mathematicians took part. Mathematica exeunt in mysteria
might have been the motto of the Analyst. The assump
tions in mathematics, it is argued, are as mysterious as
those of theologians and metaphysicians. Mathematicians
cannot translate into perfectly intelligible thought their
own doctrines in fluxions. If man's knowledge of God
is rooted in mystery, so too is mathematical analysis.
Pure science at last loses itself in propositions which
usefully regulate action, but which cannot be compre
hended. This is the drift of the argument in the Analyst ;
but perhaps Berkeley's inclination to extreme conclusions,
and to what is verbally paradoxical, led him into doubt
ful positions in the controversy to which the Analyst gave
rise. Instead of ultimate imperfect comprehensibility, he
seems to attribute absolute contradiction to the Newtonian
fluxions. Baxter, in his Inquiry, had asserted that things
in Berkeley's book of Principles forced the author 'to
suspect that even mathematics may not be very sound
knowledge at the bottom.' The metaphysical argument
of the Analyst was obscured in a cloud of mathematics.

The social condition of Ireland attracted Berkeley almost
as soon as he was settled in Cloyne. He was surrounded
by a large native Irish population and a small group of
English colonists. The natives, long governed in the in
terest of the stranger, had never learned to exert and govern
themselves. The self-reliance which Berkeley preached
fifteen years before, as a mean for 'preventing the ruin
of Great Britain,' was more wanting in Ireland, where the
simplest maxims of social economy were neglected. It
was a state of things fitted to move one who was too
independent to permit his aspirations to be confined to the
ordinary routine of the Irish episcopate, and who could
not forget the favourite moral maxim of his life.

The social chaos of Ireland was the occasion of what

DAVID HUME Ixxv

to some may be the most interesting of Berkeley's
writings. His thoughts found vent characteristically in
a series of penetrating practical queries. The First Part
of the Querist appeared in 1735, anonymously, edited by
Dr. Madden of Dublin, who along with Prior had lately
founded a Society for promoting industrial arts in Ireland.
The Second and Third Parts were published in the
two following years. A Discourse to Magistrates occa
sioned by the Enormous Licence and Irreligion of the Times,
which appeared in 1736, was another endeavour, with
like philanthropic intention. And the only important
break in his secluded life at Cloyne, in eighteen years of
residence, was when he went for some months to Dublin
in 1737, to render social service to Ireland in the Irish
House of Lords.

His metaphysic, at first encountered by ridicule, was
now beginning to receive more serious treatment. A
Scotsman had already recognised it. In 1739 another
and more famous Scotsman, David Hume, refers thus to
Berkeley in one of the opening sections of his Treatise of
Human Nature : ' A very material question has been
started concerning abstract or general ideas — whether they
be general or particular in the mind's conception of them.
A great philosopher, Dr. Berkeley, has disputed the
received opinion in this particular, and has asserted that
all general ideas are nothing but particular ones, annexed
to a certain term which gives them a more extensive
signification, and makes them recall upon occasion other
individuals which are similar to them. I look upon this
to be one of the greatest and most valuable discoveries
that has been made of late years in the republic of letters.'
It does not appear that Berkeley heard of Hume.

A curious interest began to engage him about this time.
The years following 1739 were years of suffering in the

Ixxvi GEORGE BERKELEY

Irish diocese. It was a time of famine followed by wide
spread disease. His correspondence is full of allusions
to this. It had consequences of lasting importance. Sur
rounded by disease, he pondered remedies. Experience in
Rhode Island and among American Indians suggested
the healing properties of tar. Further experiments in tar,
combined with meditation and much curious reading, deep
ened and expanded his metaphysical philosophy. Tar
seemed to grow under his experiments, and in his thoughts,
into a Panacea for giving health to the organism on which
living mind in man is meanwhile dependent. This natural
dependence of health upon tar introduced thoughts of the
interdependence of all things, and then of the imme
diate dependence of all in nature upon Omnipresent
and Omnipotent Mind. The living Mind that under
lies the phenomena of the universe began to be conceived
under a new light. Since his return to the life of thought
in Rhode Island, he had been immersed in Platonic and
Neoplatonic literature, and in books of mystical Divinity,
encouraged perhaps by the mystical disposition attributed
to his wife. An eccentric ingenuity connected the scientific
experiments and prescriptions with the Idealism of Plato
and Plotinus. The natural law according to which tar-
water was universally restorative set his mind to work
about the immanence of living Mind. He mused about
a medicine thus universally beneficial, and the thought
occurred that it must be naturally charged with ' pure
invisible fire, the most subtle and elastic of bodies, and
the vital element in the universe ' ; and water might be
the natural cause which enables this elementary fire to
be drawn out of tar and transferred to vegetable and
animal organisms. But the vital fire could be only a
natural cause ; which in truth is no efficient cause at all,
but only a sign of divine efficiency transmitted through the
world of sense : the true cause of this and all other natural
effects must be the immanent Mind or Reason in which

CULMINATES IN SIRIS Ixxvii

we all participate ; for in God we live and move and have
our being.

It is thus that Berkeley's thought culminates in Siris,
that Chain of Philosophical Reflexions and Inquiries con
cerning the Virtues of Tar-water, and divers other subjects
connected together and arising one from another, which
appeared in 1744. This little book made more noise at
the time of its appearance than any of his books ; but not
because of its philosophy, which was lost in its medicinal
promise to mankind of immunity from disease. Yet it was
Berkeley's last attempt to express his ultimate conception
of the universe in its human and divine relations. When
Siris is compared with the book of Principles, the immense
difference in tone and manner of thought shews the
change wrought in the intervening years. The sanguine
argumentative gladiatorship of the Principles is exchanged
for pensive speculation, which acknowledges the weakness
of human understanding, when it is face to face with
the Immensities and Eternities. Compare the opening
sections of the Introduction to the Principles with the
closing sections of Siris. The contingent data of our experi
ence are now felt to be insufficient, and there is a more
or less conscious grounding of the Whole in the eternal
and immutable Ideas of Reason. 'Strictly, the sense
knows nothing. We perceive, indeed, sounds by hearing
and characters by sight. But we are not therefore said to
understand them. . . . Sense and experience acquaint us
with the course and analogy of appearances and natural
effects : thought, reason, intellect, introduce us into the
knowledge of their causes. . . . The principles of science
are neither objects of sense nor imagination : intellect and
reason are alone the sure guides to truth.' So the shifting
basis of the earlier thought is found to need support in
the intellectual and moral faith that must be involved in
all reasonable human intercourse with the phenomena
presented in the universe.

Ixxviii GEORGE BERKELEY

The inadequate thought of God, as only a Spirit or
Person supreme among the spirits or persons, in and
through whom the material world is realised, a thought
which pervades Alciphron, makes way in Sin's for the
thought of God as the infinite omnipresent Ground, or
final sustaining Power, immanent in Nature and Man,
to which Berkeley had become accustomed in Neoplatonic
and Alexandrian metaphysics. ' Comprehending God and
the creatures in One general notion, we may say that all
things together (God and the universe of Space and Time)
make One Universe, or TO Hav. But if we should say that
all things make One God, this would be an erroneous
notion of God ; but would not amount to atheism, as
long as Mind or Intellect was admitted to be TO fjyt-
/x-oi/iKoV, or the governing part. ... It will not seem just to
fix the imputation of atheism upon those philosophers who
hold the doctrine of TO f'Ev.' It is thus that he now regards
God. Metaphysics and theology are accordingly one.

No attempt is made in Stris to articulate the universe
in the light of unifying Mind or Reason. And we are still
apt to ask what the truth and goodness at the heart of all
really mean ; seeing that, as conceived in human minds,
they vary in the gradual evolution of intellect and con
science in men. Omnia exeunt in mysteria is the tone of
Stris at the end. The universe of reality is too much
for our articulate intellectual digestion : it must be left
for omniscience; it transcends finite intelligence and
the via media of human understanding. Man must be
satisfied to pass life, in the infinitesimal interval between
birth and death, as a faith-venture, which he may convert
into a growing insight, as the generations roll on, but
which can never be converted into complete knowledge.
' In this state we must be satisfied to make the best of
those glimpses within our reach. It is Plato's remark in
his Thecetetus, that while we sit still we are never the
wiser ; but going into the river, and moving up and down,

ANNIHILATION OR IMMORTALITY Ixxix

is the way to discover its depths and shallows. If we
exercise and bestir ourselves, we may even here discover
something. The eye by long use comes to see even in the
darkest cavern ; and there is no subject so obscure but we
may discern some glimpse of truth by long poring on it.
Truth is the cry of all, but the game of a few. Certainly
where it is the chief passion it doth not give way to vulgar
cares and views ; nor is it contented with a little ardour in
the early time of life : a time perhaps to pursue, but not
so fit to weigh and revise. He that would make a real
progress in knowledge must dedicate his age as well as
his youth, the later growth as well as the first-fruits, at
the altar of Truth.' Such was Berkeley, and such were
his last words in philosophy. They may suggest the
attitude of Bacon when, at a different view-point, he
disclaims exhaustive system : ' I have made a beginning
of the work : the fortune of the human race will give
the issue. For the matter in hand is no mere felicity
of speculation, but the real business and fortunes of the
human race1.'

While Berkeley's central thought throughout his life is
concerned with God as the one omnipresent and omni
potent Providential Agent in the universe, he says little
about the other final question, of more exclusively human
interest, which concerns the destiny of men. That men
are born into a universe which, as the visible expres
sion of Moral Providence, must be scientifically and
ethically trustworthy; certain not to put man to con
fusion intellectually or morally, seeing that it could not
otherwise be trusted for such in our ultimate venture of
faith — this is one thing. That all persons born into it
are certain to continue living self-consciously for ever,
is another thing. This is not obviously implied in the
former presupposition, whether or not it can be deduced

1 Bacon's Novuiti Organuni. Distributio Operis.

Ixxx GEORGE BERKELEY

from it, or else discovered by other means. Although
man's environment is essentially Divine, and wholly in
its smallest details Providential, may not his body, in
its living organisation from physical birth until physical
death, be the measure of the continuance of his self-con
scious personality? Is each man's immortal existence, like
God's, indispensable?

Doubt about the destiny of men after they die is, at
the end of the nineteenth century, probably more prevalent
than doubt about the underlying Providence of God, and
His constant creative activity; more perhaps than it was
in the days of Toland, and Collins, and Tindal. Future life
had been made so familiar to the imagination by the early
and mediaeval Church, and afterwards by the Puritans,
as in Milton, Bunyan, and Jonathan Edwards, that it then
seemed to the religious mind more real than anything
that is seen and touched. The habit wholly formed by
natural science is apt to dissipate this and to make a
human life lived under conditions wholly strange to its
'minute philosophy' appear illusory.

A section in the book of Principles * in which the common
argument for the ' natural immortality ' of the human soul
is reproduced, strengthened by his new conception of
what the reality of body means, is Berkeley's metaphysical
contribution for determining between the awful alternatives
of annihilation or continued self-conscious life after physical
death. The subject is touched, in a less recondite way,
in two of his papers in the Guardian, and in the Dis
course delivered in Trinity College Chapel in 1708, in
which a revelation of the immortality of men is presented
as the special gospel of Jesus Christ. To argue, as
Berkeley does in the Principles, that men cannot be an
nihilated at death, because they are spiritual substances
having powers independent of the sequences of nature,
implies assumptions regarding finite persons which are
1 Section 141.

MEDITATION UPON DEATH Ixxxi

open to criticism. The justification in reason for our
venture of faith that Omnipotent Goodness is at the
heart of the universe is — that without this presupposition
we can have no reasonable intercourse, scientific or other
wise, with the world of things and persons in which
we find ourselves ; for reason and will are then alike
paralysed by universal distrust. But it can hardly be
maintained a priori that men, or other spiritual beings in
the universe, are equally with God indispensable to its
natural order; so that when they have once entered on
conscious existence they must always continue to exist
consciously. Is not the philosophical justification of
man's hope of endless life ethical rather than meta
physical ; founded on that faith in the justice and goodness
of the Universal Mind which has to be taken for granted
in every attempt to interpret experience, with its mixture
of good and evil, in this evanescent embodied life ? Can
a life such as this is be all for men, in a universe that,
because it is essentially Divine, must operate towards the
extinction of the wickedness which now makes it a mystery
of Omnipotent Goodness?

A cheerful optimism appears in Berkeley's habit of
thought about death, as we have it in his essays in
the Guardian : a sanguine apprehension of a present
preponderance of good, and consequent anticipation of
greater good after death ; unlike those whose pessimistic
temperament induces a lurid picture of eternal moral
disorder. But his otherwise active imagination seldom
makes philosophy a meditation upon death. He does not
seem to have exercised himself in the way those do who
find in the prospect of being in the twenty-first century
as they were in the first, what makes them appalled that
they have ever come at all into transitory percipient life ;
or as those others who recoil from an unbodied life after
physical death, as infinitely more appalling than the thought
of being transported in this body into another planet, or

BERKELEY: PHASER. I. f

Ixxxii GEORGE BERKELEY

even to a material world outside our solar system. In
one of his letters to Johnson J he does approach the
unbodied life, and in a characteristic way : —

' I see no difficulty in conceiving a change of state, such
as is vulgarly called death, as well without as with material
substance. It is sufficient for that purpose that we allow
sensible bodies, i.e. such as are immediately perceived
by sight and touch ; the existence of which I am so far
from questioning, as philosophers are used to do, that
I establish it, I think, upon evident principles. Now it
seems very easy to conceive the soul to exist in a separate
state (i.e. divested from those limits and laws of motion
and perception with which she is embarrassed here) and
to exercise herself on new ideas, without the inter
vention of these tangible things we call bodies. It is
even very possible to apprehend how the soul may have
ideas of colour without an eye, or of sounds without
an ear2.'

But while we may thus be supposed to have all our
present sensuous experience in an unbodied state, this
does not enable one to conceive how unbodied persons
can communicate with one another in the absence of
all sense signs ; whether of the sort derived from our
present senses, or from other senses of whose data we
can in this life have no imagination.

Berkeley's tar-water enthusiasm lasted throughout the
rest of his life, and found vent in letters and pamphlets
in support of his Panacea, from 1744 till 1752. Notwith
standing this, he was not forgetful of -other interests—
ecclesiastical, and the social ones which he included in
his large meaning of l ecclesiastical.' The Rising under
Charles Edward in 1745 was the occasion of a Letter to
the Roman Catholics of Cloyne, characteristically humane

1 See ' Editor's Preface to Alciphron.'

2 Compare Essay II in the Guardian with this.

PHILOSOPHERS IN THE ANGLICAN CHURCH Ixxxiii

and liberal. It was followed in 1749 by an Exhortation
to the Roman Catholic Clergy of Ireland in a similar spirit ;
and this unwonted courtesy of an Irish Protestant bishop
was received by those to whom it was addressed in a corre
sponding temper.

It is difficult to determine Berkeley's relation to rival
schools or parties in Church and State. His disposition
was too singular and independent for a partisan. Some
of his early writings, as we have seen, were suspected
of high Tory and Jacobite leanings ; but his arguments
in the suspected Discourse were such as ordinary Tories
and Jacobites failed to understand, and the tenor of his
words and actions was in the best sense liberal. In reli
gious thought Sin's might place him among latitudina-
rians ; perhaps in affinity with the Cambridge Platonists.
His true place is foremost among the religious philo
sophers of the Anglican Church ; the first to prepare the
religious problem for the light in which we are invited
to look at the universe by modern agnostics, and under
the modern conception of natural evolution. He is the
most picturesque figure in that Anglican succession which,
in the seventeenth century, includes Hooker and Cud-
worth ; in the eighteenth, Clarke and Butler ; and in the
nineteenth, may we say Coleridge, in lack of a representative
in orders; although Mansel, Maurice, Mozley, and Jowett
are not to be forgotten, nor Isaac Taylor among laymen ' :
Newman and Arnold, illustrious otherwise, are hardly
representatives of metaphysical philosophy.

A more pensive tone runs through the closing years at
Cloyne. Attempts were made in vain to withdraw him
from the ' remote corner ' to which he had been so long
confined. His friends urged his claims for the Irish
Primacy. ' I am no man's rival or competitor in this matter,'
were his words to Prior. ' I am not in love with feasts,

1 Taylor, in later life, conformed to the Anglican Church.

f2

1XXX1V GEORGE BERKELEY

and crowds, and visits, and late hours, and strange faces,
and a hurry of affairs often insignificant. For my own
private satisfaction, I had rather be master of my time than
wear a diadem/ Letters to his American friends, Johnson
and Clap, shew him still moved by the inspiration which
carried him over the Atlantic, and record his influence in the
development of American colleges1. The home education
of his three sons was another interest. We are told by
his widow that ' he would not trust his sons to mercenary
hands. Though old and sickly, he performed the con
stant tedious task himself/ Of the fruit of this home
education there is little to tell. The death of William,
his favourite boy, in 1751, 'was thought to have struck
too close to his father's heart/ ' I am a man/ so he writes,
'retired from the amusements, politics, visits, and what
the world calls pleasure. I had a little friend, educated
always under mine own eye, whose painting delighted me,
whose music ravished me, and whose lively gay spirit was
a continual feast. It has pleased God to take him hence.'
The eldest son, Henry, born in Rhode Island, did not long
survive his father. George, the third son, was destined
for Oxford, and this destiny was connected with a new
project. The 'life academico-philosophical,' which he
sought in vain to realise in Bermuda, he now hoped to
find for himself in the city of colleges on the Isis. 'The
truth is/ he wrote to Prior as early as September 1746,
' I have a scheme of my own for this long time past, in
which I propose more satisfaction and enjoyment to
myself than I could in that high station 2, which I neither
solicited, nor so much as wished for. A greater income
would not tempt me to remove from Cloyne, and set
aside my Oxford scheme ; which, though delayed by the
illness of my son r>, yet I am as intent upon it and as much
resolved as ever.'

1 See Berkeley's Life and Letters, chap. viii. 2 The Primacy.

3 This seems to have been his eldest son, Henry.

AT OXFORD IxXXV

The last of Berkeley's letters which we have is to Dean
Gervais. It expresses the feeling with which in April,
1752, he was contemplating life, on the eve of his departure
from Cloyne.

' I submit to years and infirmities. My views in this
world are mean and narrow ; it is a thing in which I have
small share, and which ought to give me small concern.
I abhor business, and especially to have to do with great
persons and great affairs. The evening of life I choose
to pass in a quiet retreat. Ambitious projects, intrigues
and quarrels of statesmen, are things I have formerly been
amused with, but they now seem to be a vain, fugitive
dream.'

Four months after this, Berkeley saw Cloyne for the
last time. In August he quitted it for Oxford, which he
had long pictured in imagination as the ideal home of his
old age. When he left Cork in the vessel which carried
his wife, his daughter, and himself to Bristol, he was
prostrated by weakness, and had to be taken from
Bristol to Oxford on a horse-litter. It was late in August
when they arrived there '.

Our picture of Berkeley at Oxford is dim. According
to tradition he occupied a house in Holywell Street, near
the gardens of New College and not far from the cloisters
of Magdalen. It was a changed world to him. While he
was exchanging Ireland for England, death was removing
old English friends. Before he left Cloyne he must have
heard of the death of Butler in June, at Bath, where
Benson, at the request of Seeker, affectionately watched
the last hours of the author of the Analogy. Benson
followed- Butler in August.

1 His son George was already south of France for his health,'

settled at Christ Church. Henry, as one of his brother George's

the eldest son, born in Rhode letters tells us, found among the

Island, was then 'abroad in the Johnson MSS.

Ixxxvi GEORGE BERKELEY

We hear of study resumed in improved health in the
home in Holy well Street. In October a Miscellany, con
taining several Tracts on various Subjects, ' by the Bishop
of Cloyne/ appeared simultaneously in London and
Dublin. The Tracts were reprints, with the exception
of Further Thoughts on Tar-water, which may have been
written before he left Ireland. The third edition of
Alciphron also appeared in this autumn. But Siris
is the latest record of his philosophical thought. A
comparison of the Commonplace Book and the Principles
with the Analyst and Siris gives the measure of his
advancement. After the sanguine beginning perhaps the
comparison leaves a sense of disappointment, when we find
metaphysics mixed up with mathematics in the Analyst,
and metaphysics obscurely mixed up with medicine in
Sin's.

It is curious that, although in 1752 David Hume's
Treatise of Human Nature had been before the world for
thirteen years and his Inquiry concerning Human Under
standing for four years, there is no allusion to Hume by
Berkeley. He was Berkeley's immediate successor in the
eighteenth-century evolution of European thought. The
sceptical criticism of Hume was applied to the dogmatic reli
gious philosophy of Berkeley, to be followed in its turn by
the abstractly rational and the moral reconstructive criticism
of Kant. Alciphron is, however, expressly referred to by
Hume ; indirectly, too, throughout the religious agnosticism
of his Inquiry, also afterwards in the Dialogues on Natural
Religion, in a vindication of minute philosophy by pro-
founder reasonings than those which satisfied Lysicles
and Alciphron. Berkeley, Hume, and Kant are the three
significant philosophical figures of their century, each
holding the supreme place successively in its beginning,
middle, and later years. Perhaps Reid in Scotland did
more than any other in his generation to make Berkeley
known ; not, however, for his true work in constructive

DEATH AND BURIAL AT OXFORD Ixxxvii

religious thought, but for his supposed denial of the
reality of the things we see and touch \

The ideal life in Oxford did not last long. On the
evening of Sunday, January 14, 1753, Berkeley was
suddenly confronted by the mystery of death. ' As he
was sitting with my mother, my sister, and myself,' so his
son wrote to Johnson at Stratford, in October, 'suddenly,
and without the least previous notice or pain, he was re
moved to the enjoyment of eternal rewards ; and although
all possible means were instantly used, no symptom of life
ever appeared after ; nor could the physicians assign any
cause for his death. He arrived at Oxford on August 25,
and had received great benefit from the change of air, and
by God's blessing on tar-water, insomuch that for some
years he had not been in better health than he was the
instant before he left us2.'

Six days later he was buried in Oxford, in the Cathedral
of Christ Church 3, where his tomb bears an appropriate in
scription by Dr. Markham, afterwards Archbishop of York.

1 See Appendix D. Reid, like stretch of credulity to believe that
Berkeley, held that ' matter cannot he knew where his father was
be the cause of anything,' but this buried. It may be added that
not as a consequence of the new Berkeley himself had provided in
conception of the world presented his Will ' that my body be buried
to the senses, through which alone in the churchyard of the parish
Berkeley opens his way to its power- in which I die.' The Will, dated
lessness ; although Reid supposes July 31, 1752, is given in extenso
that in his youth he followed Berke- in my Life and Letters of Berkeley,
ley in this too. See Thomas Reid p. 345. We have also the record of
(1898), in ' Famous Scots Series/ burial in the Register of Christ
where I have enlarged on this. Church Cathedral, which shews

2 Johnson MSS. that 'on January ye 2oth 1753, ye

3 That Berkeley was buried in Right Reverend John (sic} Berkley,
Oxford is mentioned in his son's Ld Bishop of Cloyne, was buryed '
letter to Johnson, in which he there. This disposes of the state-
says : ' His remains are interred in ment on p. 17 of Diprose's Account
the Cathedral of Christ Church, of the Parish of Saint Clement
and next week a monument to Danes (1868), that Berkeley was
his memory will be erected with buried in that church.

an inscription by Dr. Markham, I may add that a beautiful me-

a Student of this College.' As morial of Berkeley has lately been

the son was present at, and super- placed in the Cathedral of Cloyne,

intended the arrangements for his by subscriptions in this country

father's funeral, it can be no and largely in America.

ERRATA

VOL. I

Page 99, line ^for 149-80 read 149-60

99, line 22 for —and to be i suggested/ not signified read —
instead of being only suggested

100, line lofor hearing read seeing

103, note, lines 5, 6 for pp. in, 112 read p. 210
200, note, line 14 for Adam read Robert
364, line 8 from foot for and read which
512, note 6, line 3 for imminent read immanent

VOL. II

Page 194, note, line 3/orTyndal readTindal
207, line i, insert 13. before Ale.
377, line 6, for antethesis read antithesis.

VOL. IV

Page 285, lines 4, 5 for Thisus Alus Cujus, &c. read Ursus. Alus.
Cuius. &c. The inscription, strictly speaking, appears on the Palace of
the Counts Orsini, and is dated MD.

COMMONPLACE BOOK

MATHEMATICAL, ETHICAL, PHYSICAL, AND
METAPHYSICAL

WRITTEN AT TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN, IN 1705-8

First published in 1871

[p. Ixxxix]

EDITOR'S PREFACE

TO THE

COMMONPLACE BOOK

ERKELEY'S juvenile Commonplace Book is a small
quarto volume, in his handwriting, found among the
Berkeley manuscripts in possession of the late Arch
deacon Rose. It was first published in 1871, in my
edition of Berkeley's Works. It consists of occasional
thoughts, mathematical, physical, ethical, and metaphy
sical, set down in miscellaneous fashion, for private use,
as they arose in the course of his studies at Trinity
College, Dublin. They are full of the fervid enthusiasm
that was natural to him, and of sanguine expectations of the
issue of the prospective authorship for which they record
preparations. On the title-page is written, 'G. B. Trin. Dub.
alum./ with the date 1705, when he was twenty years of
age. The entries are the gradual accumulation of the
next three years, in one of which the Arithmetica and the
Miscellanea Mathematical made their appearance. The
New Theory of Vision, given to the world in 1709, was
evidently much in his mind, as well as the sublime concep
tion of the material world in its necessary subordination to
the spiritual world, of which he delivered himself in his
book of Principles, in 1710.

BERKELEY: FRASER. I. B

2 EDITORS PREFACE TO THE

This disclosure of Berkeley's thoughts about things, in
the years preceding the publication of his first essays, is
indeed a precious record of the initial struggles of ardent
philosophical genius. It places the reader in intimate
companionship with him when he was beginning to
awake into intellectual and spiritual life. We hear him
soliloquising. We see him trying to translate into reason
ableness our crude inherited beliefs about the material
world and the natural order of the universe, self-conscious
personality, and the Universal Power or Providence — all
under the sway of a new determining Principle which was
taking profound possession of his soul. He finds that he
has only to look at the concrete things of sense in the light
of this great discovery to see the artificially induced per
plexities of the old philosophers disappear, along with their
imposing abstractions, which turn out empty words. The
thinking is throughout fresh and sincere ; sometimes impe
tuous and one-sided ; the outcome of a mind indisposed to
take things upon trust, resolved to inquire freely, a rebel
against the tyranny of language, morally burdened with
the consciousness of a new world-transforming conception,
which duty to mankind obliged him to reveal, although his
message was sure to offend. Men like to regard things
as they have been wont. This new conception of the
surrounding world — the impotence of Matter, and its sub
ordinate office in the Supreme Economy must, he foresees,
disturb those accustomed to treat outward things as the
only realities, and who do not care to ask what constitutes
reality. Notwithstanding the ridicule and ill-will that his
transformed material world was sure to meet with, amongst
the many who accept empty words instead of genuine
insight, he was resolved to deliver himself of his thoughts
through the press, but with the politic conciliation of a
persuasive Irish pleader.

The Commonplace Book steadily recognises the adverse
influence of one insidious foe. Its world-transforming-

COMMONPLACE BOOK 3

Principle has been obscured by 'the mist and veil of words.'
The abstractions of metaphysicians, which poison human
language, had to be driven out of the author's mind before
he could see the light, and must be driven out of the minds
of others before they could be got to see it along with
him : the concrete world as realisable only in percipient
mind is with difficulty introduced into the vacant place.
'The chief thing I pretend to is only to remove the
mist and veil of words.' He exults in the transformed
mental scene that then spontaneously rises before him. ' My
speculations have had the same effect upon me as visiting
foreign countries, — in the end I return where I was before,
get my heart at ease, and enjoy myself with more satisfac
tion. The philosophers lose their abstract matter; the
materialists lose their abstract extension ; the profane lose
their extended deity. Pray what do the rest of mankind
lose?' This beneficent revolution seemed to be the issue
of a simple recognition of the fact, that the true way of re
garding the world we see and touch is to regard it as
consisting of ideas or phenomena that are presented to
human senses, somehow regularly ordered; and the occa
sions of pleasure or pain to us as we conform to or rebel
against their natural order. This is the surrounding uni
verse—at least in its relations to us, and that is all in it that
we have to do with. ' I know not/ he says, 'what is meant
by things considered in themselves, i. e. in abstraction. This
is nonsense. Thing and idea are words of much about the
same extent and meaning. Existence is not conceivable
without perception and volition. I only declare the mean
ing of the word existence, as far as I can comprehend it.'

In the Commonplace Book we see the youth at Trinity
College forging the weapons which he was soon to direct
against the materialism and scepticism of the generation
into which he was born. Here are rough drafts, crude
hints of intended arguments, probing of unphilosophical
mathematicians— even Newton and Descartes, memoranda

B 2

4 EDITOR'S PREFACE TO THE

of facts, more or less relevant, on their way into the Essay
on Vision and the treatise on Principles— seeds of the philo
sophy that was to be gradually unfolded in his life and
in his books. We watch the intrepid thinker, notwith
standing the inexperience of youth, more disposed to give
battle to mathematicians and metaphysicians than to sub
mit even provisionally to any human authority. It does
not seem that his scholarship or philosophical learning
was extensive. Descartes, Malebranche, and Locke were
his intimates ; Hobbes and Spinoza were not unknown to
him; Newton and some lesser lights among the mathe
maticians are often confronted. Pie is more rarely in
company with the ancients or the mediaevalists. No deep
study of Aristotle appears, and there is even a disposition to
disparage Plato. He seeks for his home in the 'new
philosophy ' of experience ; without anticipations of Kant,
as the critic of what is presupposed in the scientific reli
ability of any experience, against whom his almost blind
zeal against abstractions would have set him at this early
stage. ' Pure intellect I understand not at all/ is one of his
entries. He asks himself, ' What becomes of the aeternae
veritatesf and his reply is, 'They vanish.' When he tells
himself that 'we must with the mob place certainty in the
senses/ the words are apt to suggest that the senses are
our only source of knowledge, but I suppose his mean
ing is that the senses must be trustworthy, as ' the mob '
assume. Yet occasionally he uses language which looks
like an anticipation of David Hume, as when he calls
mind ' a congeries of perceptions. Take away percep
tions/ he adds, 'and you take away mind. Put the per
ceptions and you put the mind. The understanding
seemeth not to differ from its perceptions and ideas/ He
seems unconscious of the total scepticism which such
expressions, when strictly interpreted, are found to in
volve. But after all, the reader must not apply rigorous
rules of interpretation to random entries or provisional

COMMONPLACE BOOK 5

memoranda, meant only for private use, by an enthusiastic
student who was preparing to produce books.

I have followed the manuscript of the Commonplace
Book, omitting a few repetitions of thought in the same
words. Here and there Berkeley's writing is almost
obliterated and difficult to decipher, apparently through
accident by water in the course of his travels, when, as
he mentions long after in one of his letters, several of his
manuscripts were lost and others were injured.

The letters of the alphabet which are interpreted on
the first page, and prefixed on the margin to some of the
entries, may so far help to bring the apparent chaos of en
tries under a few articulate heads.

I have added some annotations here and there as they
happened to occur, and these might have been multiplied
indefinitely had space permitted.

COMMONPLACE BOOK

I. — Introduction. T. = Time.

M. = Matter. S. = Soul — Spirit.

P. — Primary and Secondary G. = God.

qualities. Mo. = Moral Philosophy.

E. = Existence. N. ^ Natural Philosophy.

Qu. If there be not two kinds of visible extension— one
perceiv'd by a confus'd view, the other by a distinct suc
cessive direction of the optique axis to each point ?

I. No general ideas \ The contrary a cause of mistake or
confusion in mathematiques, &c. This to be intimated in
ye Introduction'2.

The Principle may be apply'd to the difficulties of
conservation, co-operation, &C.

N. Trifling for the [natural] philosophers to enquire the
cause of magnetical attractions, &c. They onely search
after co-existing ideas 3.

M. Quaecunque in Scriptura militant adversus Copernicum,
p- militant pro me.

M. All things in the Scripture wcl1 side with the vulgar
P' against the learned, side with me also. I side in all things
with the mob.

1 ' General ideas/ i. e. abstract Introduction, sect. 16.

general ideas, distinguished, in 2 Introduction to the Principles

Berkeley's nominalism, from con- of Human Knowledge,

crete general ideas, or from general 3 ' co-existing ideas/ i. e. phe-

names, which are signs of any one nomena presented in uniform order

of an indefinite number of in- to the senses,
dividual objects. Cf. Principles,

8 COMMONPLACE BOOK

M. I know there is a mighty sect of men will oppose me,
but yet I may expect to be supported by those whose
minds are not so far overgrown wth madness. These are
far the greatest part of mankind — especially Moralists,
Divines, Politicians ; in a word, all but Mathematicians
and Natural Philosophers. I mean only the hypothetical
gentlemen. Experimental philosophers have nothing
whereat to be offended in me.

Newton begs his Principles ; I demonstrate mine \

E. I must be very particular in explaining w* is meant
by things existing— in houses, chambers, fields, caves, &c.
— w11 not perceiv'd as well as wn perceived ; and shew
how the vulgar notion agrees with mine, when we
narrowly inspect into the meaning and definition of the
word existence^ wh is no simple idea, distinct from per
ceiving and being perceived 2.

The Schoolmen have noble subjects, but handle them
ill. The mathematicians have trifling subjects, but reason
admirably about them. Certainly their method and argu
ing are excellent.

God knows how far our knowledge of intellectual beings
may be enlarg'd from the Principles.

M. The reverse of the Principle I take to have been the
chief source of all that scepticism and folly, all those con
tradictions and inextricable puzzling absurdities, that have
in all ages been a reproach to human reason, as well as of
that idolatry, whether of images or of gold, that blinds
the greatest part of the world, and that shamefull immor
ality that turns us into beasts.

E. rvn Vixit & fuit.

ova-ta, the name for substance, used by Aristotle, the
Fathers, &c.

If at the same time we shall make the Mathematiques
much more easie and much more accurate, w* can be ob
jected to us3?

1 Newton postulates a world of 2 He attempts this in many parts

matter and motion, governed me- of the Principles and Dialogues. He

chanically by laws within itself: recognises the difficulty of recon-

Berkeley finds himself charged ciling his New Principles with the

with New Principles, demanded identity and permanence of sensible

by reason, with which Newton's things,

postulate is inconsistent. 3 He contemplated thus early ap-

COMMONPLACE BOOK 9

We need not force our imagination to conceive such very
small lines for infinitesimals. They may every whit as
well be imagin'd big as little, since that the integer must
be infinite.

Evident that wch has an infinite number of parts must be
infinite.

We cannot imagine a line or space infinitely great —
therefore absurd to talk or make propositions about it.

We cannot imagine a line, space, £c., quovis lato majus.
Since y* what we imagine must be datum aliquod ; a thing
can't be greater than itself.

If you call infinite that wch is greater than any assignable
by another, then I say, in that sense there may be an infi
nite square, sphere, or any other figure, w(h is absurd.

Qu. if extension be resoluble into points it does not con
sist of?

No reasoning about things whereof we have no ideas ' ;
therefore no reasoning about infinitesimals.

No word to be used without an idea \

S. If uneasiness be necessary to set the Will at work, Qu.
how shall we will in heaven ?

Bayle's, Malbranch's, &c. arguments do not seem to
prove against Space, but onely against Bodies.
M. I agree in nothing wth the Cartesians as to ye existence
R of Bodies & Qualities-.

Aristotle as good a man as Euclid, but he was allowed
to have been mistaken.

Lines not proper for demonstration.

M. We see the house itself, the church itself; it being an
idea and nothing more. The house itself, the church
itself, is an idea, i. e. an object — immediate object — of
thought3.

plications of his New Principles to mind. While the spiritual theism of

Mathematics, afterwards made in Descartes is acceptable, he rejects

his book of Principles, sect. 118-32. his mechanical conception of the

1 What Berkeley calls ideas are material world.

either perceptible by the senses or 3 But a 'house' or a 'church'

imagined: either way they are con- includes more than visible ideas, so

crete -.abstract ideas are empty words. that we cannot, strictly speaking,

2 i. e. the existence of bodies and be said to see it. We see imme-
their qualities independently of — diately only visible signs of its in-
in abstraction from— all percipient visible qualities.

10 COMMONPLACE BOOK

Instead of injuring, our doctrine much benefits geometry.
E. Existence is percipi, or percipere, [or velle, i.e. agere1].

The horse is in the stable, the books are in the study as

before.
N. In physiques I have a vast view of things soluble hereby,

but have not leisure.
N. Hyps and such like unaccountable things confirm my

doctrine.

Angle not well defined. See Pardies' Geometry, by

Harris, &c. This one ground of trifling.
N. One idea not the cause of another — one power not the

cause of another. The cause of all natural things is onely

God. Hence trifling to enquire after second causes.

This doctrine gives a most suitable idea of the Divinity2.
N. Absurd to study astronomy and other the like doctrines

as speculative sciences.
N. The absurd account of memory by the brain, &c. makes

for me.

How was light created before man ? Even so were Bodies

created before man 3.
E. Impossible anything besides that wch thinks and is

thought on should exist4.

That wch is visible cannot be made up of invisible things.

M. S. is that wherein there are not contain'd distinguish
able sensible parts. Now how can that wch hath not sensi
ble parts be divided into sensible parts ? If you say it may
be divided into insensible parts, I say these are nothings.

Extension abstract from sensible qualities is no sensa
tion, I grant ; but then there is no such idea, as any one
may try5. There is onely a considering the number of
points without the sort of them, & this makes more for me,
since it must be in a considering thing.

1 This is added in the margin. the existence of a table while I am

- The total impotence of Matter, only seeing it.

and the omnipotence of Mind or 4 Existence, in short, can be

Spirit in Nature, is thus early realised only in the form of living

becoming the dominant thought percipient mind,

with Berkeley. 5 Berkeley hardly distinguishes

3 This refers to an objection to uncontingent mathematical rela-
the New Principles that is appar- tions, to which the sensible ideas or
ently reinforced by recent dis- phenomena in which the relations
coveries in geology. But if these are concretely manifested must con-
contradict the Principles, so does form.

COMMONPLACE BOOK II

Mem. Before I have shewn the distinction between visi
ble & tangible extension, I must not mention them as dis
tinct. I must not mention M. T. & M. V., but in general
M. S., &C.1

Ou. whether a M. V. be of any colour? a M. T. of any
tangible quality?

If visible extension be the object of geometry, 'tis that
which is survey'd by the optique axis.

P. I may say the pain is in my finger, £c., according to my
doctrine 2.

Mem. Nicely to discuss wfc is meant when we say a line
consists of a certain number of inches or points, £c. ; a
circle of a certain number of square inches, points, &c.
Certainly we may think of a circle, or have its idea in our
mind, without thinking of points or square inches, &c. ;
whereas it should seem the idea of a circle is not made up
of the ideas of points, square inches, &c.

Qu. Is any more than this meant by the foregoing ex
pressions, viz. that squares or points may be perceived in
or made out of a circle, &c., or that squares, points, &c. are
actually in it, i. e. are perceivable in it ?

A line in abstract, or Distance, is the number of points
between two points. There is also distance between a
slave & an emperor, between a peasant & philosopher,
between a drachm & a pound, a farthing & a crown, &c. ; in
all which Distance signifies the number of intermediate
ideas.

Halley's doctrine about the proportion between infinitely
great quantities vanishes. When men speak of infinite
quantities, either they mean finite quantities, or else talk
of [that whereof they have3] no idea; both which are
absurd.

If the disputations of the Schoolmen are blam'd for in
tricacy, triflingness, & confusion, yet it must be acknow-

1 M. T. = matter tangible ; M. regarding primary qualities seems
V. = matter visible ; M. S. = to contradict.

matter sensible. The distinctions 3 [That need not have been

in question were made prominent blotted out — 'tis good sense, if we

in the Essay on Vision. See sect. do but determine wl we mean by

i, 121-45. thing and ideaJ] — AUTHOR, on

2 Which the common supposition blank page of the MS.

12 COMMONPLACE BOOK

ledg'd that in the main they treated of great & important
subjects. If we admire the method & acuteness of the
Mathematicians]— the length, the subtilty, the exactness
of their demonstrations — we must nevertheless be forced
to grant that they are for the most part about trifling sub
jects, and perhaps mean nothing at all.

Motion on 2d thoughts seems to be a simple idea.

P. Motion distinct from ye thing moved is not conceivable.

N. Mem. To take notice of Newton for defining it [motion] ;
also of Locke's wisdom in leaving it undefin'd l.

Ut ordo partium temporis est immutabilis, sin etiam ordo
partium spatii. Moveantur hse de locis suis, et movebun-
tur (ut ita dicam) de seipsis. Truly number is immensur-
able. That we will allow with Newton.

I3. Ask a Cartesian whether he is wont to imagine his
globules without colour. Pellucidness is a colour. The
colour of ordinary light of the sun is white. Newton in
the right in assigning colours to the rays of light.

A man born blind would not imagine Space as we do.
We give it always some dilute, or duskish, or dark colour
—in short, we imagine it as visible, or intromitted by the
eye, wch he would not do.

N. Proinde vim inferunt sacris literis qui voces hasce (v.
tempus, spatium, motus) de quantitatibus mensuratis ibi
interpretantur. Newton, p. 10.

N. I differ from Newton, in that I think the recession ab
axe motus is not the effect, or index, or measure of motion,
but of the vis impressa. It sheweth not W" is truly moved,
but w* has the force impressed on it, or rather that wch
hath an impressed force.

D and P are not proportional in all circles, d d is to

J dp as d to - ; but d and - are not in the same proportion

in all circles. Hence 'tis nonsense to seek the terms of
one general proportion whereby to rectify all peripheries,
or of another whereby to square all circles.

N.B. If the circle be squar'd arithmetically, 'tis squar'd
geometrically, arithmetic or numbers being nothing but
lines & proportions of lines when apply'd to geometry.

1 See Locke's Essay, Bk. III. ch. 4, § 8, where he criticises attempts to
define motion, as involving a petitio.

COMMONPLACE BOOK 13

Mem. To remark Cheyne * & his doctrine of infinites.

Extension, motion, time, do each of them include the
idea of succession, & so far forth they seem to be of
mathematical consideration. Number consisting in suc
cession & distinct perception, wch also consists in succes
sion ; for things at once perceiv'd are jumbled and mixt
together in the mind. Time and motion cannot be con-
ceiv'd without succession ; and extension, qua mathemat.,
cannot be conceiv'd but as consisting of parts wch may be
distinctly & successively perceiv'd. Extension perceived
at once & /';/ confuso does not belong to math.

The simple idea call'd Power seems obscure, or rather
none at all, but onely the relation 'twixt Cause and Effect.
When I ask whether A can move B, if A be an intelligent
thing, I mean no more than whether the volition of A that
B move be attended with the motion of B ? If A be
senseless, whether the impulse of A against B be followed
by ye motion of B 2 ?

Barrow's arguing against indivisibles, lect. i. p. 16, is
a petitio principii, for the Demonstration of Archimedes
supposeth the circumference to consist of more than 24
points. Moreover it may perhaps be necessary to suppose
the divisibility ad mfinitttm, in order to demonstrate that
the radius is equal to the side of the hexagon.

Shew me an argument against indivisibles that does not
go on some false supposition.

A great number of insensibles — or thus, two invisibles,
say you, put together become visible ; therefore that M. V.
contains or is made up of invisibles. I answer, the M. V.
does not comprise, is not composed of, invisibles. All the
matter amounts to this, viz. whereas I had no idea awhile
agoe, I have an idea now. It remains for you to prove
that I came by the present idea because there were two
invisibles added together. I say the invisibles are nothings,
cannot exist, include a contradiction 3.

1 George Cheyne, the physician ~ This reminds us of Hume, and

(known afterwards as author of the inclines towards the empirical no-

EngKsh Malady} , published in 1705 tion of Causation, as merely con-

awork on Fluxions, which procured stancy in sequence — not even con-

him admission to the Royal Society. tinuous metamorphosis.

He was born in 1670. s This is Berkeley's objection to

14 COMMONPLACE BOOK

I am young, I am an upstart, I am a pretender, I am
vain. Very well. I shall endeavour patiently to bear up
under the most lessening, vilifying appellations the pride
& rage of man can devise. But one thing I know I am not
guilty of. I do not pin my faith on the sleeve of any great
man. I act not out of prejudice or prepossession. I do
not adhere to any opinion because it is an old one,
a reviv'd one, a fashionable one, or one that I have spent
much time in the study and cultivation of.

Sense rather than reason or demonstration ought to be
employed about lines and figures, these being things
sensible; for as for those you call insensible, we have
proved them to be nonsense, nothing l.

If in some things I differ from a philosopher I profess to
admire, 'tis for that very thing on account whereof I admire
him, namely, the love of truth. This &c.

Whenever my reader finds me talk very positively, I
desire he'd not take it ill. I see no reason why certainty
should be confined to the mathematicians.

I say there are no incommensurables, no surds. I say
the side of any square may be assign'd in numbers. Say
you assign unto me the side of the square 10. I ask wfc 10
—10 feet, inches, &c., or 10 points ? If the later, I deny
there is any such square, 'tis impossible 10 points should
compose a square. If the former, resolve yr 10 square
inches, feet, &c. into points, & the number of points must
necessarily be a square number whose side is easily
assignable.

A mean proportional cannot be found betwixt any two
given lines. It can onely be found betwixt those the
numbers of whose points multiply'd together produce
a square number. Thus betwixt a line of 2 inches &
a line of 5 inches a mean geometrical cannot be found,
except the number of points contained in 2 inches multiply'd
by ye number of points contained in 5 inches make a square
number.

If the wit and industry of the Nihilarians were employ'd

abstract, i.e. unperceived, quanti- mathematics, that is to say ; which

ties and infinitesimals — important he rejects as meaningless, in his

in the sequel. horror of unrealisable abstrac-

1 The ' lines and figures' of pure tions.

COMMONPLACE BOOK 15

about the usefull & practical mathematiques, what advan
tage had it brought to mankind !

M. You ask me whether the books are in the study now,
E- when no one is there to see them ? I answer, Yes. You
ask me, Are we not in the wrong for imagining things
to exist when they are not actually perceiv'd by the senses ?
I answer, No. The existence of our ideas consists in be
ing perceiv'd, imagined, thought on. Whenever they are
imagin'd or thought on they do exist. Whenever they
are mentioned or discours'd of they are imagin'd &
thought on. Therefore you can at no time ask me whether
they exist or no, but by reason of yi very question they
must necessarily exist.

E. But, say you, then a chimaera does exist? I answer, it
doth in one sense, i. e. it is imagin'd. But it must be well
noted that existence is vulgarly restrain'd to actuall per
ception, and that I use the word existence in a larger sense
than ordinary '.

N.B. — According to my doctrine all things are cntia
rationis, i. e. solum habent esse in intellectum.
E [2 According to my doctrine all are not entia rationis.
The distinction between ens rationis and ens reale is kept
up by it as well as any other doctrine.]

You ask me whether there can be an infinite idea?
I answer, in one sense there may. Thus the visual sphere,
tho' ever so small, is infinite, i. e. has no end. But if by
infinite you mean an extension consisting of innumerable
points, then I ask yr pardon. Points, tho' never so many,
may be numbered. The multitude of points, or feet,
inches, &c., hinders not their numbrableness (i. e. hinders
not their being numerable) in the least. Many or most
are numerable, as well as few or least. Also, if by
infinite idea you mean an idea too great to be com
prehended or perceiv'd all at once, you must excuse me.
I think such an infinite is no less than a contradiction :>1.

1 Things really exist, that is to both cases be said to exist,

say, in degrees, e.g. in a lesser de- 2 Added on blank page of the MS.

gree, when they are imagined than 3 In Berkeley's limitation of the

when they are actually perceived term idea to what is presented

by our senses ; but, in this wide objectively in sense, or represented

meaning of existence, they may in concretely in imagination. Accord-

l6 COMMONPLACE BOOK

M. The sillyness of the current doctrine makes much for me.
They commonly suppose a material world — figures, mo
tions, bulks of various sizes, &c. — according to their own
confession to no purpose. All our sensations may be, and
sometimes actually are, without them ; nor can men so
much as conceive it possible they should concur in any
wise to the production of them.

M. Ask a man, I mean a philosopher, why he supposes this
vast structure, this compages of bodies ? he shall be at
a stand ; he'll not have one word to say. Wch sufficiently
shews the folly of the hypothesis.

M. Or rather why he supposes all ya Matter? For bodies
and their qualities I do allow to exist independently of our
mind.

S. Qu. How is the soul distinguished from its ideas ?
Certainly if there were no sensible ideas there could be no
soul, no perception, remembrance, love, fear, £c. ; no
faculty could be exerted l.

S. The soul is the Will, properly speaking, and as it is
distinct from ideas.

S. The grand puzzling question, whether I sleep or wake,
easily solv'd.

Qu. Whether minima or meer minima may not be
compared by their sooner or later evanescence, as well as
by more or less points, so that one sensible may be greater
than another, though it exceeds it not by one point ?

Circles on several radius's are not similar figures, they
having neither all nor any an infinite number of sides.
Hence in vain to enquire after 2 terms of one and ye same
proportion that should constantly express the reason of
the d to the p in all circles.

Mem. To remark Wallis's harangue, that the aforesaid
proportion can neither be expressed by rational numbers
nor surds.

ingly 'an infinite idea' would be than those presented in those few

an idea which transcends ideation senses to which man is confined,

— an express contradiction. although self-conscious activity

1 Does the human spirit depend abstracted from a//sorts of presented

on sensible ideas as much as they phenomena seems impossible. But

depend on spirit ? Other orders a self-conscious spirit is not neces-

of spiritual beings may be percipi- sarily dependent on our material

ent of other sorts of phenomena world or our sense experience.

COMMONPLACE BOOK Iy

We can no more have an idea of length without breadth
or visibility, than of a general figure.

One idea may be like another idea, tho' they contain no
common simple idea1. Thus the simple idea red is in
some sense like the simple idea blue ; 'tis liker it than sweet
or shrill. But then those ideas wch are so said to be alike,
agree both in their connexion with another simple idea,
viz. extension, & in their being receiv'd by one & the same
sense. But, after all, nothing can be like an idea but
an idea.

No sharing betwixt God & Nature or second causes
in my doctrine.

Materialists must allow the earth to be actually mov'd by
the attractive power of every stone that falls from the air,
with many other the like absurditys.

Enquire concerning the pendulum clock, &c. ; whether
those inventions of Huygens, c\:c. be attained to by my
doctrine.

The "" & '"" & """ &c. of time are to be cast away and
neglected, as so many noughts or nothings*

Mem. To make experiments concerning minimums and
their colours, whether they have any or no, & whether they
can be of that green wch seems to be compounded of yellow
and blue.

Qu. Whether it were not better not to call the operations
of the mind ideas — confining this term to things sensible2?

Mem. diligently to set forth how that many of the ancient
philosophers run into so great absurditys as even to deny
the existence of motion, and of those other things they
perceiv'd actually by their senses. This sprung from their
not knowing w* Existence was, and wherein it consisted.
This the source of all their folly. 'Tis on the discovering
of the nature and meaning and import of Existence that
I chiefly insist. This puts a wide difference betwixt the

1 [This I do not altogether ap- senses, or represented in sensuous

prove of.] — AUTHOR, on margin. imagination, and applying the for-

- He afterwards guarded the mer to intellectual apprehension of

difference, bycontrastingwoftowand 'operations of the mind,' and of

idea, confining the latter to pheno- ' relations ' among ideas,
mena presented objectively to our

BERKELEY : FRASER. I C

l8 COMMONPLACE BOOK

sceptics &c. & me. This I think wholly new. I am sure
this is new to me \

We have learn'd from Mr. Locke that there may be, and
that there are, several glib, coherent, methodical discourses,
which nevertheless amount to just nothing. This by him
intended with relation to the Scholemen. We may apply
it to the Mathematicians.

QLI. How can all words be said to stand for ideas ? The
word blue stands for a colour without any extension, or
abstract from extension. But we have not an idea of
colour without extension. We cannot imagine colour with
out extension.

Locke seems wrongly to assign a double use of words :
one for communicating&theotherforrecording ourthoughts.
'Tis absurd to use words for recording our thoughts to
ourselves, or in our private meditations2.

No one abstract simple idea like another. Two simple
ideas may be connected with one & the same 3 ] simple idea,
or be intromitted by one <Sc the same sense. But consider'd
in themselves they can have nothing common, and con
sequently no likeness.

Qu. How can there be any abstract ideas of colours?
It seems not so easily as of tastes or sounds. But then all
ideas whatsoever are particular. I can by no means
conceive an abstract general idea. 'Tis one thing to
abstract one concrete idea from another of a different
kind, & another thing to abstract an idea from all particulars
of the same kind3.

Mem. Much to recommend and approve of experimental
philosophy.

What means Cause as distinguish'd from Occasion?
Nothing but a being wch wills, when the effect follows
the volition. Those things that happen from without
we are not the cause of. Therefore there is some other
Cause of them, i. e. there is a Being that wills these
perceptions in us 4.

1 See Principles, sect. 89. 3 Every general notion is ideally

2 Is thought, then, independent realisable in one or other of its
of language ? Can we realise possible concrete or individual ap-
thought worthy of the name without plications.

use of words? This is Berkeley's * This is the germ of Berkeley's

excessive juvenile reaction against notion of the objectivity of the mate-
verbal abstractions. rial world to individual percipients

COMMONPLACE BOOK 19

[S. [l It should be said, nothing but a Will — a Being which
wills being unintelligible.]

One square cannot be double of another. Hence the
Pythagoric theorem is false.

Some writers of catoptrics absurd enough to place the
apparent place of the object in the Barrovian case behind
the eye.

Blew and yellow chequers still diminishing terminate in
green. This may help to prove the composition of green.

There is in green 2 foundations of 2 relations of likeness
to blew & yellow. Therefore green is compounded.

A mixt cause will produce a mixt effect. Therefore
colours are all compounded that we see.

Mem. To consider Newton's two sorts of green.

N. B. My abstract & general doctrines ought not to be
condemn'd by the Royall Society. 'Tis wfc their meeting
did ultimately intend. V. Sprat's History S. R.
Mem. To premise a definition of idea".

I. The 2 great principles of Morality — the being of a God
Mo> cSc the freedom of man. Those to be handled in the be
ginning of the Second Book4.

Subvertitur geometria ut non practica sed speculative.

Archimedes's proposition about squaring the circle has
nothing to do with circumferences containing less than
96 points ; & if the circumference contain 96 points it may
be apply'd, but nothing will follow against indivisibles.
V. Barrow.

Those curve lines that you can rectify geometrically.
Compare them with their equal right lines & by a micro
scope you shall discover an inequality. Hence my squaring
of the circle as good and exact as the best.

M. Qu. whether the substance of body or anything else be

and so of the rise of individual self- by idea has not been attended to by

consciousness. his critics.

1 Added by Berkeley on blank * What < Second Book' is this?

page of the MS. Does he refer to the ' Second Part '

- Cf. p. 420, note 2. Bishop of the Principles, which never ap-

Sprat's History of the Royal Society peared ? God is the culmination of

appeared in 1667. his philosophy, in Sins.

3 Much need; for what he means

C 2

20 COMMONPLACE BOOK

any more than the collection of concrete ideas included in
that thing? Thus the substance of any particular body is
extension, solidity, figure \ Of general abstract body we
can have no idea.

I. Mem. Most carefully to inculcate and set forth that the
endeavouring to express abstract philosophic thoughts by
words unavoidably runs a man into difficulties. This to be
done in the Introduction2.

Mem. To endeavour most accurately to understand what
is meant by this axiom : Quae sibi mutuo congruunt sequalia
sunt.

Qu. what the geometers mean by equality of lines, &
whether, according to their definition of equality, a curve
line can possibly be equal to a right line ?

If wth me you call those lines equal wch contain an equal
number of points, then there will be no difficulty. That
curve is equal to a right line wch contains the same points
as the right one doth.

M, I take not away substances. I ought not to be accused
of discarding substance out of the reasonable world :!,
I onely reject the philosophic sense (wch in effect is no
sense) of the word substance. Ask a man not tainted with
their jargon wl he means by corporeal substance, or the
substance of body. He shall answer, bulk, solidity, and
such like sensible qualitys. These I retain. The philo
sophic nee quid, nee quantum, nee quale, whereof I have
no idea, I discard ; if a man may be said to discard that
which never had any being, was never so much as imagin'd
or conceiv'd.

M. In short, be not angry. You lose nothing, whether real
or chimerical. Wlever you can in any wise conceive or
imagine, be it never so wild, so extravagant, & absurd,
much good may it do you. You may enjoy it for me. I'll
never deprive you of it.

1 This is Berkeley's material and Divine, being essential to their

substance. Individual material realisation for man.

substances are for him, steady ag- 2 Cf. Introduction to the Prin-

gregates of sense-given phenomena, cifiles, especially sect. 18-25.

having the efficient and final cause 3 Stillingfleet charges Locke

of their aggregation in eternally with ' discarding substance out of

active Mind— active mind, human the reasonable part of the world.'

COMMONPLACE BOOK 21

N. B. I am more for reality than any other philosophers \
They make a thousand doubts, & know not certainly but
we may be deceiv'd. I assert the direct contrary.

A line in the sense of mathematicians is not meer
distance. This evident in that there are curve lines.

Curves perfectly incomprehensible, inexplicable, absurd,
except we allow points.

I. If men look for a thing where it 's not to be found, be
they never so sagacious, it is lost labour. If a simple
clumsy man knows where the game lies, he though a fool
shall catch it sooner than the most fleet & dexterous that
seek it elsewhere. Men choose to hunt for truth and know
ledge anywhere rather than in their own understanding,
where 'tis to be found.

M. All knowledge onely about ideas. Locke, B. 4. c. i.

S. It seems improper, & liable to difficulties, to make the
word person stand for an idea, or to make ourselves ideas,
or thinking things ideas.

I. Abstract ideas cause of much trifling and mistake.

Mathematicians seem not to speak clearly and coherently
of equality. They nowhere define w* they mean by that
word when apply'd to lines.

Locke says the modes of simple ideas, besides extension
and number, are counted by degrees. I deny there are
any modes or degrees of simple ideas. What he terms
such are complex ideas, as I have proved.

Wfc do the mathematicians mean by considering curves
as polygons? Either they are polygons or they are not.
If they are, why do they give them the name of curves ?
Why do not they constantly call them polygons, & treat
them as such ? If they are not polygons, I think it absurd
to use polygons in their stead. W1 is this but to pervert
language ? to adapt an idea to a name that belongs not to
it but to a different idea ?

The mathematicians should look to their axiom, Quse

1 The philosophers supposed the the senses, the existence of which

real things toexistbehind our ideas, needs no proof, were themselves

in concealment : Berkeley was now the significant and interpretable

beginningto think that the objective realities of physical science,
ideas or phenomena presented to

22 COMMONPLACE BOOK

congruunt sunt aequalia. I know not what they mean by
bidding me put one triangle on another. The under
triangle is no triangle — nothing at all, it not being per-
ceiv'd. I ask, must sight be judge of this congruentia
or not? If it must, then all lines seen under the same
angle are equal, wch they will not acknowledge. Must
the touch be judge? But we cannot touch or feel lines
and surfaces, such as triangles, &c., according to the
mathematicians themselves. Much less can we touch a
line or triangle that's cover'd by another line or triangle.

Do you mean by saying one triangle is equall to an
other, that they both take up equal spaces ? But then
the question recurs, what mean you by equal spaces ?
If you mean spatia congruentia, answer the above difficulty
truly.

I can mean (for my part) nothing else by equal triangles
than triangles containing equal numbers of points.

I can mean nothing by equal lines but lines wch 'tis
indifferent whether of them I take, lines in wch I observe
by my senses no difference, & wch therefore have the same
name.

Must the imagination be judge in the aforementioned
cases ? but then imagination cannot go beyond the touch
and sight. Say you, pure intellect must be judge. I
reply that lines and triangles are not operations of the
mind.

If I speak positively and with the air of a mathematician
in things of which I am certain, 'tis to avoid disputes, to
make men careful to think before they answer, to discuss
my arguments before they go to refute them. I would by
no means injure truth and certainty by an affected modesty
& submission to better judgments. Wfc I lay before you
are undoubted theorems ; not plausible conjectures of my
own, nor learned opinions of other men. I pretend not
to prove them by figures, analogy, or authority. Let them
stand or fall by their own evidence.

N. When you speak of the corpuscularian essences of
bodys, to reflect on sect. n. & 12. b. 4. c. 3. Locke.
Motion supposes not solidity. A meer colour'd extension
may give us the idea of motion,

COMMONPLACE BOOK 23

P. Any subject can have of each sort of primary qualities
but one particular at once. Lib. 4. c. 3. s. 15. Locke.

M. Well, say you, according to this new doctrine, all is but
meer idea — there is nothing wch is not an ens rationis.
I answer, things are as real, and exist /';/ rerum natura, as
much as ever. The difference between entia rcalia & cntia
rationis may be made as properly now as ever. Do but
think before you speak. Endeavour rightly to comprehend
my meaning, and you'll agree with me in this.

N. Fruitless the distinction 'twixt real and nominal
essences.

We are not acquainted with the meaning of our words.
Real, extension, existence, power, matter, lines, infinite,
point, and many more are frequently in our mouths, when
little, clear, and determin'd answers them in our understand
ings. This must be well inculcated.

M. Vain is the distinction 'twixt intellectual and material
world1. V. Locke, lib. 4. c. 3. s. 27, where he says that is
far more beautiful than this.

S. Foolish in men to despise the senses. If it were not for

Mo- them the mind could have no knowledge, no thought at
all. All * * * of introversion, meditation, contemplation,
and spiritual acts, as if these could be exerted before we
had ideas from without by the senses, are manifestly
absurd. This may be of great use in that it makes
the happyness of the life to come more conceivable and
agreeable to our present nature. The schoolemen &
refiners in philosophy gave the greatest part of mankind
no more tempting idea of heaven or the joys of the blest.

The vast, wide-spread, universal cause of our mistakes
is, that we do not consider our own notions. I mean
consider them in themselves —fix, settle, and determine
them, — we regarding them with relation to each other
only. In short, we are much out in studying] the re
lations of things before we study them absolutely and
in themselves. Thus we study to find out the relations
of figures to one another, the relations also of number,
without endeavouring rightly to understand the nature
of extension and number in themselves. This we think

1 If the material world can be real only in and through a percipient
intelligence, as the realising factor.

24 COMMONPLACE BOOK

is of no concern, of no difficulty ; but if I mistake not
'tis of the last importance.

Mo. I allow not of the distinction there is made 'twixt
profit and pleasure.

Mo. I'd never blame a man for acting upon interest. He's
a fool that acts on any other principles. The not considering
these things has been of ill consequence in morality.

My positive assertions are no less modest than those
that are introduced with ' It seems to me,' ' I suppose,'
&c. ; since I declare, once for all, that all I write or think
is entirely about things as they appear to me. It concerns
no man else any further than his thoughts agree with mine.
This in the Preface.

I. Two things are apt to confound men in their reasonings
one with another, ist. Words signifying the operations
of the mind are taken from sensible ideas. 2ndly. Words
as used by the vulgar are taken in some latitude, their
signification is confused. Hence if a man use words in a
determined, settled signification, he is at a hazard either
of not being understood, or of speaking improperly. All
this remedyed by studying the understanding.

Unity no simple idea. I have no idea meerly answering
the word one. All number consists in relations1.

Entia realia et entia rationis, a foolish distinction of the
Schoolemen.

M. We have an intuitive knowledge of the existence of other

P. things besides ourselves & order, praecedaneous2. To the
knowledge of our own existence — in that we must have
ideas or else we cannot think.

S. We move our legs ourselves. 'Tis we that will their
movement. Herein I differ from Malbranch3.

Mo. Mem. Nicely to discuss Lib. 4. c. 4. Locke4.

M. Mem. Again and again to mention & illustrate the
doctrine of the reality of things, rerum natura, &c.

M. Wfc I say is demonstration — perfect demonstration.
Wherever men have fix'd & determin'd ideas annexed to

1 Cf. Principles, sect. 13, 119-122, agency.

which deny the possibility of an idea 4 In whicli Locke treats ' Of the

or mental picture corresponding Reality of Knowledge/ including

to abstract number. questions apt to lead Berkeley to

• ' Praecedaneous,' i.e. precedent. inquire, Whethcrwe could in reason

:! Who refunds human as well suppose reality in the absence of

as natural causation into Divine all realising mind.

COMMONPLACE BOOK 25

their words they can hardly be mistaken. Stick but to my
definition of likeness, and 'tis a demonstration yt colours
are not simple ideas, all reds being like, £c. So also in
other things. This to be heartily insisted on.

E. The abstract idea of Being or Existence is never thought
of by the vulgar. They never use those words standing
for abstract ideas.

M. I must not say the words thing, substance, &c. have
been the cause of mistakes, but the not reflecting on
their meaning. I will be still for retaining the words.
I only desire that men would think before they speak,
and settle the meaning of their words.

Mo. I approve not of that which Locke says, viz. truth
consists in the joining and separating of signs.

I. Locke cannot explain general truth or knowledge with
out treating of words and propositions. This makes for
me against abstract general ideas. Vide Locke, lib. 4. ch. 6.

I. Men have been very industrious in travelling forward.
They have gone a great way. But none have gone
backward beyond the Principles. On that side there
lies much terra incognita to be travel'd over and dis
covered by me. A vast field for invention.

Twelve inches not the same idea with a foot. Because
a man may perfectly conceive a foot who never thought
of an inch.

A foot is equal to or the same with twelve inches in this
respect, viz. they contain both the same number of points.

[Forasmuch as] to be used.

Mem. To mention somewhat wch may encourage the
study of politiques, and testify of me y* I am well dispos'd
toward them.

I. If men did not use words for ideas they would never
have thought of abstract ideas. Certainly genera and
species are not abstract general ideas. Abstract ideas
include a contradiction in their nature. Vide Locke1, lib. 4.
c. 7. s. 9.

A various or mixt cause must necessarily produce a
various or mixt effect. This demonstrable from the

1 Locke's 'abstract idea' is misconceived and caricatured by Berkeley
in his impetuosity.

26 COMMONPLACE BOOK

definition of a cause ; which way of demonstrating must
be frequently made use of in my Treatise, & to that end
definitions often praemis'd. Hence 'tis evident that, ac
cording to Newton's doctrine, colours cannot be simple
ideas.

M. I am the farthest from scepticism of any man. I know
with an intuitive knowledge the existence of other things
as well as my own soul. This is wfc Locke nor scarce
any other thinking philosopher will pretend to1.

I. Doctrine of abstraction of very evil consequence in all

the sciences. Mem. Barrow's remark. Entirely owing to

language.

Locke greatly out in reckoning the recording our ideas

by words amongst the uses and not the abuses of language.
I. Of great use & ye last importance to contemplate a man

put into the world alone, with admirable abilitys, and see

how after long experience he would know wthout words.

Such a one would never think of genera and species or

abstract general ideas.
I. Wonderful in Locke that he could, wn advanced in years,

see at all thro' a mist ; it had been so long a gathering, &

was consequently thick. This more to be admir'd than yfc

he did not see farther.

Identity of ideas may be taken in a double sense, either

as including or excluding identity of circumstances, such

as time, place, &c.
Mo. I am glad the people I converse with are not all richer,

wiser, &c. than I. This is agreeable to reason ; is no sin.

'Tis certain that if the happyness of my acquaintance

encreases, & mine not proportionably, mine must decrease.

The not understanding this & the doctrine about relative

good, discuss'd with French, Madden2, &c., to be noticed

as 2 causes of mistake in judging of moral matters.

Mem. To observe (w11 you talk of the division of ideas

into simple and complex) that there may be another cause

1 This and other passages refer can never escape from the circle of

to the scepticism, that is founded subjectivity. Berkeley intended to

on the impossibility of our com- refute this scepticism,
paring our ideas of things with 2 Probably Samuel Madden, who

unperceived real things; so that we afterwards edited the Querist.

COMMONPLACE BOOK 27

of the undefinableness of certain ideas besides that which
Locke gives; viz. the want of names.

Mem. To begin the First Book1 not with mention of
sensation and reflection, but instead of sensation to use
perception or thought in general.

I defy any man to imagine or conceive perception with
out an idea, or an idea without perception.

Locke's very supposition that matter & motion should
exist before thought is absurd — includes a manifest con
tradiction.

Locke's harangue about coherent, methodical discourses
amounting to nothing, apply' d to the mathematicians.

They talk of determining all the points of a curve by an
equation. W* mean they by this? Wfc would they signify
by the word points? Do they stick to the definition of
Euclid ?

We think we know not the Soul, because we have no
imaginable or sensible idea annex'd to that sound. This
the effect of prejudice.

Certainly we do not know it. This will be plain if we
examine what we mean by the word knowledge. Neither
doth this argue any defect in our knowledge, no more than
our not knowing a contradiction.

The very existence of ideas constitutes the Soul 2.

Consciousness", perception, existence of ideas, seem to
be all one.

Consult, ransack yr understanding. Wfc find you there
besides several perceptions or thoughts ? Wfc mean you
by the word mind? You must mean something that you
perceive, or y* you do not perceive. A thing not perceived
is a contradiction. To mean (also) a thing you do not
perceive is a contradiction. We are in all this matter
strangely abused by words.

Mind is a congeries of perceptions4. Take away per-

1 This 'First Book' seems to be 2 Does he mean, like Hume after-

' Part I ' of the projected Principles wards, that ideas or phenomena

— the only Part ever published. constitute the ego, so that I am

Here he inclines to ' perception or only the transitory conscious state

thought in general,' in the language of each moment ?

of Descartes; but in the end :! 'Consciousness' — a term rarely

he approximates to Locke's 'sen- used by Berkeley or his contempo-

•sation and reflection.' See Pn'n- raries.

ciples, sect, i, and notes. 4 This too, if strictly interpreted.

28 COMMONPLACE BOOK

ceptions and you take away the mind. Put the perceptions
and you put the mind.

Say you, the mind is not the perception, not that thing
which perceives. I answer, you are abused by the words
' that a thing.' These are vague and empty words with us.
S. The having ideas is not the same thing with perception.
A man may have ideas when he only imagines. But then
this imagination presupposeth perception.

M. That wch extreamly strengthens us in prejudice is y* we
think we see an empty space, which I shall demonstrate
to be false in the Third Book l.

There may be demonstrations used even in Divinity.
I mean in revealed Theology, as contradistinguished from
natural ; for tho* the principles may be founded in faith,
yet this hinders not but that legitimate demonstrations
might be built thereon ; provided still that we define the
words we use, and never go beyond our ideas. Hence
'twere no very hard matter for those who hold episcopacy
or monarchy to be establish edjure Divino to demonstrate
their doctrines if they are true. But to pretend to demon
strate or reason anything about the Trinity is absurd.
Here an implicit faith becomes us.

S. Qu. if there be any real difference betwixt certain ideas
of reflection & others of sensation, e. g. betwixt perception
and white, black, sweet, &c. ? Wherein, I pray you, does
the perception of white differ from white men * * *

I shall demonstrate all my doctrines. The nature of
demonstration to be set forth and insisted on in the In
troduction 2. In that I must needs differ from Locke,
forasmuch as he makes all demonstration to be about
abstract ideas, wcn I say we have not nor can have.

S. The understanding seemeth not to differ from its per
ceptions or ideas. Qu. What must one think of the will
and passions ?

K. A good proof that Existence is nothing without or

looks like an anticipation of flux and movement.' See Hume's

Hume's reduction of the ego into Treatise, Part IV. sect. 6.

successive 'impressions' — 'nothing ] What 'Third Book' is here

but a bundle or collection of projected? Was a ' Third Part ' of

different perceptions, which sue- the Principles then in embryo?

ceed one another with inconceiv- 2 This is scarcely done in the

able rapidity, and are in a perpetual ' Introduction ' to the Principles,

COMMONPLACE BOOK 29

distinct from perception, may be drawn from considering
a man put into the world without company1.

E. There was a smell, i.e. there was a smell perceiv'd.
Thus we see that common speech confirms my doctrine.

T. No broken intervals of death or annihilation. Those
intervals are nothing ; each person's time being measured
to him by his own ideas.

I. We are frequently puzzl'd and at a loss in obtaining
clear and determin'd meanings of words commonly in use,
cSc that because we imagine words stand for abstract
general ideas which are altogether inconceivable.

I. 'A stone is a stone.' This a nonsensical proposition,
and such as the solitary man l would never think on. Nor
do I believe he would ever think on this : ' The whole is
equal to its parts,' &c.

E. Let it not be said that I take away existence. I only
declare the meaning of the word, so far as I can compre
hend it.

I. If you take away abstraction, how do men differ from
beasts? I answer, by shape, by language. Rather by
degrees of more and less.

W* means Locke by inferences in words, consequences
of words, as something different from consequences of
ideas? I conceive no such thing.

I. N. B. Much complaint about the imperfection of lan
guage 2.

M. But perhaps some man may say, an inert thoughtless
Substance may exist, though not extended, moved, &c.,
but with other properties whereof we have no idea. But
even this I shall demonstrate to be impossible, w11 I come
to treat more particularly of Existence.

Will not rightly distinguish'd from Desire by Locke —
it seeming to superadd nothing to the idea of an action,
but the uneasiness for its absence or non-existence.
S. Mem. To enquire diligently into that strange mistery,

1 Berkeley, as we find in the realitiesof existence, which hemust

Commonplace Book, is fond of con- then face directly, without the use

jecturing how a man all alone in the or abuse of verbal symbols.
world, freed from the abstractions " This ' N.B. ' is expanded in the

of language, would apprehend the Introduction to the Principles.

30 COMMONPLACE BOOK

viz. How it is that I can cast about, think of this or that
man, place, action, wn nothing appears to introduce them
into my thoughts, w11 they have no perceivable connexion
with the ideas suggested by my senses at the present ?

I. 5Tis not to be imagin'd w* a marvellous emptiness &
scarcity of ideas that man shall descry who will lay aside
all use of words in his meditations.

M. Incongruous in Locke to fancy we want a sense proper
to see substances with.

I. Locke owns that abstract ideas were made in order to
naming,

M. The common errour of the opticians, that we judge of
distance by angles1, strengthens men in their prejudice
that they see things without and distant from their mind.

E. I am persuaded, would men but examine wfc they mean
by the word existence, they wou'd agree with me.

c. 20. s. 8. b. 4. of Locke makes for me against the
mathematicians.

M. The supposition that things are distinct from ideas takes
away all real truth, & consequently brings in a universal
scepticism ; since all our knowledge and contemplation is
confin'd barely to our own ideas 2.

I. Qu. whether the solitary man would not find it necessary
to make use of words to record his ideas, if not in memory
or meditation, yet at least in writing — without which he
could scarce retain his knowledge.

We read in history there was a time when fears and
jealousies, privileges of parliament, malignant party, and
such like expressions of too unlimited and doubtful a mean
ing, were words of much sway. Also the words Church,
Whig, Tory, &c.; contribute very much to faction and dis
pute.

S. The distinguishing betwixt an idea and perception of the
idea has been one great cause of imagining material sub
stances 3.

S. That God and blessed spirits have Will is a manifest

1 Cf. Essay on Vision, sect. 4. our universe is fundamentally trust-

a What is immediately realised worthy.

in our percipient experience must 3 But he distinguishes, in the

be presumed or trusted in as real, Principles and elsewhere, between

if we have any hold of reality, or an idea of sense and a percipient

the moral right to postulate that ego.

COMMONPLACE BOOK 31

argument against Locke's proofs that the Will cannot be
conceiv'd, put into action, without a previous uneasiness.

The act of the Will, or volition, is not uneasiness, for
that uneasiness may be without volition.

Volition is distinct from the object or idea for the same
reason.

Also from uneasiness and idea together.

The understanding not distinct from particular percep
tions or ideas.

The Will not distinct from particular volitions.

It is not so very evident that an idea, or at least uneasi
ness, may be without all volition or act.

The understanding taken for a faculty is not really dis
tinct from ye will.

This allow'd hereafter.

To ask whether a man can will either side is an absurd
question, for the word can presupposes volition.

Anima mundi, substantial form, omniscient radical heat,
plastic vertue, Hylaschic principle— all these vanish ].

Newton proves that gravity is proportional to gravity.
I think that's all2.

Qu. whether it be the vis inertiae that makes it difficult to
move a stone, or the vis attractivae, or both, or neither ?

Mem. To express the doctrines as fully and copiously
and clearly as may be. Also to be full and particular in
answering objections3.

To say ye Will is a power; [therefore] volition is an
act. This is idem per idem.

W* makes men despise extension, motion, <Scc., & separ
ate them from the essence of the soul, is that they imagine
them to be distinct from thought, and to exist in unthink
ing substance.

1 They reappear in Sin's. and is a mere circle' — as he proceeds

2 In one of Berkeley's letters to to show.

Johnson, a quarter of a century 3 In the Principles, sect. 1-33, he

after the Commonplace Book, when seeks to fulfil the expository part

he was in America, he observes of this intention ; in sect. 33-84,

that ' the mechanical philosophers also in the Dialogues between Hylas

pretend to demonstrate that matter and Philonotts, he is ' particular in

is proportional to gravity. But answering objections.'
their argument concludes nothing,

32 COMMONPLACE BOOK

An extended may have passive modes of thinking good
actions.

There might be idea, there might be uneasiness, there
might be the greatest uneasiness wthout any volition, there
fore the * * *

M. Matter once allow'd, I defy any man to prove that God
is not Matter1.

S. Man is free. There is no difficulty in this proposition,
if we but settle the signification of the word free — if we
had an idea annext to the word free, and would but con
template that idea.

S. We are imposed on by the words will, determine, agent,
free, can, &c.

S. Uneasiness precedes not every volition. This evident
by experience.

S. Trace an infant in the womb. Mark the train & suc
cession of its ideas. Observe how volition comes into the
mind. This may perhaps acquaint you with its nature.

S. Complacency seems rather to determine, or precede, or
coincide wth & constitute the essence of volition, than un
easiness.

S. You tell me, according to my doctrine a man is not free.
I answer, tell me wfc you mean by the word free, and I
shall resolve you -.

N. Qu. W* do men mean when they talk of one body's
touching another ? I say you never saw one body touch,
or (rather) I say, I never saw one body that I could say
touch'd this or that other ; for that if my optiques were
improv'd, I should see intervalls and other bodies behind
those whch now seem to touch.

Mem. Upon all occasions to use the utmost modesty — to
confute the mathematicians wth the utmost civility & respect,
not to style them Nihilarians, &c.

N.B. To rein in ye satyrical nature.

Blame me not if I use my words sometimes in some
latitude. 'Tis w* cannot be helpt. 'Tis the fault of language

1 If Matter is arbitrarily credited a moral and responsible agent, cf»
with omnipotence. Sin's, sect. 257 and note.

- On freedom as implied in

COMMONPLACE BOOK 33

that you cannot always apprehend the clear and determinate
meaning of my words.

Say you, there might be a thinking Substance — something
unknown — wch perceives, and supports, and ties together
the ideas1. Say I, make it appear there is any need of it
and you shall have it for me. I care not to take away
anything I can see the least reason to think should exist.

I affirm 'tis manifestly absurd — no excuse in the world
can be given why a man should use a word without an idea 2.
Certainly we shall find that w* ever word we make use of
in matter of pure reasoning has, or ought to have, a com-
pleat idea 2 annext to it, i.e. its meaning, or the sense we
take it in, must be compleatly known.

'Tis demonstrable a man can never be brought to imag
ine anything should exist whereof he has no idea. Who
ever says he does, banters himself with words.

G. We imagine a great difference & distance in respect of
knowledge, power, &c., betwixt a man & a worm. The
like difference betwixt man and God may be imagin'd ; or
infinitely greater3 difference.

G- We find in our own minds a great number of different
ideas. We may imagine in God a greater number, i. e.
that ours in number, or the number of ours, is inconsider
able in respect thereof. The words difference and number,
old and known, we apply to that wch is unknown. But I
am embrangled 4 in words — 'tis scarce possible it should be
otherwise.

The chief thing I do or pretend to do is onely to remove
the mist or veil of words 5. This has occasion'd ignorance
& confusion. This has ruined the schoolmen and mathe
maticians, lawyers and divines.

S. The grand cause of perplexity & darkness in treating of
the Will, is that we imagine it to be an object of thought :
(to speak with the vulgar), we think we may perceive, con
template, and view it like any of our ideas ; whereas in

1 Is not this one way of express- 3 ' infinitely greater ' — Does in-
ing the Universal Providence and finity admit of imaginable degrees?
constant uniting agency of God * 'embrangled' — perplexed — in-
in the material world? volved in disputes.

2 Here idea seems to be used in its r> See Principles, Introduction,
widersignification,includingwo//ow. sect. 24.

BERKELEY: ERASER, i. D

34 COMMONPLACE BOOK

truth 'tis 'no idea, nor is there any idea of it. Tis toto ccelo
different from the understanding, i. e. from all our ideas.
If you say the Will, or rather volition, is something, I
answer, there is an homonymy ! in the word thing, wn
apply'd to ideas and volition and understanding and will.
All ideas are passive 2.

S. Thing & idea are much what words of the same extent
and meaning. Why, therefore, do I not use the word
thing? Ans. Because thing is of greater latitude than idea.
Thing comprehends also volitions or actions. Now these
are no ideas2.

S. There can be perception wthout volition. Qu. whether
there can be volition without perception ?

E. Existence not conceivable without perception or volition
— not distinguished therefrom.

T. N.B. Several distinct ideas can be perceived by sight
and touch at once. Not so by the other senses. 'Tis this
diversity of sensations in other senses chiefly, but some
times in touch and sight (as also diversity of volitions,
whereof there cannot be more than one at once, or rather,
it seems there cannot, for of that I doubt), gives us the
idea of time — or is time itself.

Wfc would the solitary man think of number?

S. There are innate ideas, i. e. ideas created with us \

S. Locke seems to be mistaken wn he says thought is not
essential to the mind4.

S. Certainly the mind always and constantly thinks : and we
know this too. In sleep and trances the mind exists not
—there is no time, no succession of ideas5.

S. To say the mind exists without thinking is a contra
diction, nonsense, nothing.

S. Folly to inquire w1 determines the Will. Uneasiness, &c.
are ideas, therefore unactive, therefore can do nothing, there
fore cannot determine the Will fi.

1 'homonymy,' i.e. equivoca- 3 Is this consistent with other
tion. entries?

2 Voluntary or responsible acti- 4 Essay, Bk. II. ch. i. sect. 9-19.
vity is not an idea or datum of 5 This is one way of meeting
sense, nor can it be realised in the difficulty of supposed inter-
sensuous imagination. He uses ruptions of conscious or percipient
' thing ' in the wide meaning which activity.

comprehends persons. ° This seems to imply that volun-

COMMONPLACE BOOK 35

S. Again, wfc mean you by determine ?

N. For want of rightly understanding time, motion, exis-

T. tence, &:c., men are forc'd into such absurd contradictions
as this, viz. light moves 16 diameters of earth in a second
of time.

S. ' Twas the opinion that ideas could exist unperceiv'd, or
before perception, that made men think perception } was
somewhat different from the idea perceived, i.e. y* it was an
idea of reflection ; whereas the thing perceiv'd was an idea
of sensation. I say, 'twas this made 'em think the under
standing took it in, receiv'd it from without ; wdl could
never be did not they think it existed without2.

M. Properly speaking, idea is the picture of the imagination's
making. This is ye likeness of, and refer'd to the real idea,
or (if you will) thing3.

S. To ask, have we an idea of Will or volition, is nonsense.
An idea can resemble nothing but an idea.

S. If you ask w* thing it is that wills, I answer, if you mean
idea by the word thing, or anything like any idea, then I
say, 'tis no thing at all that wills 4. This how extravagant
soever it may seem, yet is a certain truth. We are cheated
by these general terms, thing, is, &c.

S. Again, if by is you mean is perceived, or does perceive,
I say nothing wcn is perceived or does perceive wills.

S. The referring ideas to things wch are not ideas, the using
the term 'idea of5,' is one great cause of mistake, as in
other matters, so also in this.

S. Some words there are wch do not stand for ideas, viz.
particles, will, &c. Particles stand for volitions and their
concomitant ideas.

S. There seem to be but two colours wch are simple ideas,
viz. those exhibited by the most and least refrangible rays ;
[the others], being the intermediate ones, may be formed
by composition.

tary action is mysteriously self- as distinguished from what is

originated. perceived in sense.

1 ' perception.' He does not 4 In a strict use of words, only
include the percipient. persons exercise will — not things.

2 'without,' i.e. unrealised by 5 As we must do in imagination,
any percipient. which (unlike sense) is representa-

' This would make idea the tive; for the mental images represent

term only for what is imagined, original data of sense-perception.

D 2

36 COMMONPLACE BOOK

S. I have no idea of a volition or act of the mind, neither
has any other intelligence ; for that were a contradiction.

N. B. Simple ideas, viz. colours, are not devoid of all
sort of composition, tho' it must be granted they are not
made up of distinguishable ideas. Yet there is another
sort of composition. Men are wont to call those things
compounded in which we do not actually discover the
component ingredients. Bodies are said to be compounded
of chymical principles, which, nevertheless, come not into
view till after the dissolution of the bodies — wch were not,
could not, be discerned in the bodies whilst remaining
entire.

I. All our knowledge is about particular ideas, according
to Locke. All our sensations are particular ideas, as is
evident. W* use then do we make of abstract general
ideas, since we neither know nor perceive them ?

S. 'Tis allow'd that particles stand not for ideas, and yet
they are not said to be empty useless sounds. The
truth really is, they stand for operations of the mind, i. e.
volitions.

Mo. Locke says all our knowledge is about particulars. If
so, pray wi is the following ratiocination but a jumble of
words ? ' Omnis homo est animal ; omne animal vivit :
ergo omnis homo vivit/ It amounts (if you annex particular
ideas to the words ' animal' and 'vivit') to no more than
this : ' Omnis homo est homo ; omnis homo est homo :
ergo, omnis homo est homo.' A mere sport and trifling
with sounds.

Mo. We have no ideas of vertues & vices, no ideas of moral
actions1. Wherefore it may be question'd whether we are
capable of arriving at demonstration about them 2, the
morality consisting in the volition chiefly.

E. Strange it is that men should be at a loss to find their
idea of Existence ; since that (if such there be distinct from
perception) it is brought into the mind by all the ways of
sensation and reflection3, methinks it should be most
familiar to us, and we best acquainted with it.

1 Does he not allow that we 2 As Locke says we are.

have meaning, if not ideas, when 3 'Existence and unity are ideas

we use the terms virtue and vice that are suggested to the under-

and moral action ? standing by every object without

COMMONPLACE BOOK 37

E. This I am sure, I have no idea of Existence a, or annext
to the word Existence. And if others have that's nothing
to me ; they can never make me sensible of it ; simple
ideas being incommunicable by language.

S. Say you, the unknown substratum of volitions & ideas is
something whereof I have no idea. I ask, Is there any
other being which has or can have an idea of it ? If there
be, then it must be itself an idea ; which you will think
absurd.

S. There is somewhat active in most perceptions, i. e. such
as ensue upon our volitions, such as we can prevent and
stop : e. g. I turn my eyes toward the sun : I open them.
All this is active.

S. Things are twofold— active or inactive. The existence
of active things is to act ; of inactive to be perceiv'd.

S. Distinct from or without perception there is no volition ;

E. therefore neither is there existence without perception.

G. God may comprehend all ideas, even the ideas wch are
painfull & unpleasant, without being in any degree pained
thereby2. Thus we ourselves can imagine the pain of
a burn, &c. without any misery or uneasiness at all.

N. Truth, three sorts thereof — natural, mathematical, &

Mo- moral.

Mo. Agreement of relation onely where numbers do obtain :
of co-existence, in nature : of signification, by including, in
morality.

I. Gyant who shakes the mountain that's on him must be
acknowledged. Or rather thus : I am no more to be
reckon'd stronger than Locke than a pigmy should be
reckon'd stronger than a gyant, because he could throw off
the molehill wch lay upon him, and the gyant could onely
shake or shove the mountain that oppressed him. This in
the Preface.

I. Promise to extend our knowledge & clear it of those
shamefull contradictions which embarrass it. Something
like this to begin the Introduction in a modest way 3.

and every idea within. When realised neither in percipient life

ideas are in our minds, we consider nor in moral action,

that they exist.' Locke's Essay, 2 This suggests that God knows

Bk. II. ch. 7. sect. 7. sensible things without being sen-

1 i. e. of Existence in the abstract tient of any.

— unperceived and unperceiving — 3 Cf. Piinciples^lnirod., sect. 1-5.

38 COMMONPLACE BOOK

I. Whoever shall pretend to censure any part, I desire he
would read out the whole, else he may perhaps not under
stand me. In the Preface or Introduction '.

S. Doctrine of identity best explained by taking the Will
for volitions, the Understanding for ideas. The diffi
culty of consciousness of w* are never acted surely solv'd
thereby.

I. I must acknowledge myself beholding to the philosophers
who have gone before me. They have given good rules,
though certainly they do not always observe them. Sim
ilitude of adventurers, who, tho' they attained not the
desired port, they by their wrecks have made known the
rocks and sands, whereby the passage of aftercomers is
made more secure & easy. Preface or Introduction.

Mo. The opinion that men had ideas of moral actions 2 has
render'd the demonstrating ethiques very difficult to them.
An idea being itself unactive cannot be the resemblance
or image of an active thing.

Excuse to be made in the Introduction for using the
word idea, viz. because it has obtain'd. But a caution
must be added.

Scripture and possibility are the onely proofs3 with
Malbranch. Add to these what he calls a great propension
to think so : this perhaps may be questioned. Perhaps
men, if they think before they speak, will not be found so
thoroughly persuaded of the existence of Matter3.

M- On second thoughts I am on t'other extream. I am
certain of that wch Malbranch seems to doubt of, viz. the
existence of bodies 4.

l- Mem. To bring the killing blow at the last, e.g. in the
matter of abstraction to bring Locke's general triangle in
the last 5.

They give good rules, tho' perhaps they themselves do
not always observe them. They speak much of clear and
distinct ideas, though at the same time they talk of general
abstract ideas, &c. I'll [instance] in Locke's opinion of
abstraction, he being as clear a writer as I have met with.

1 Cf. Preface to Principles ; also of Matter.

to Dialogues. 4 ' bodies ' — i. e. sensible things

2 i. e. that ethics was a science — not unrealised Matter.

of phenomena or ideas. 5 Cf. Principles, Introduction,

8 i.e. of the independent existence sect. 13.

COMMONPLACE BOOK 39

Such was the candour of this great man that I perswade
myself, were he alive1, he would not be offended that
1 differ from him : seeing that even in so doing I follow
his advice, viz. to use my own judgement, see with my
own eyes, & not with another's. Introduction.

The word thing, as comprising or standing for idea &
volition, usefull ; as standing for idea and archetype without
the mind2, mischievous and useless.

Mo. To demonstrate morality it seems one need only make
a dictionary of words, and see which included which. At
least, this is the greatest part and bulk of the work.

Mo. Locke's instances of demonstration in morality are, ac
cording to his own rule, trifling propositions.

Qu. How comes it that some ideas are confessedly

s* allow'd by all to be onely in the mind3, and others as
generally taken to be without the mind4, if, according to
you, all are equally and only in the mind ? Ans. Because
that in proportion to pleasure or pain ideas are attended
with desire, exertion, and other actions which include voli
tion. Now volition is by all granted to be in spirit.

I. If men would lay aside words in thinking, 'tis impos
sible they should ever mistake, save only in matters of
fact. I mean it seems impossible they should be posi
tive & secure that anything was true wch in truth is not
so. Certainly I cannot err in matter of simple perception.
So far as we can in reasoning go without the help of signs,
there we have certain knowledge. Indeed, in long deduc
tions made by signs there may be slips of memory.

Mo. From my doctrine there follows a cure for pride. We
are only to be praised for those things which are our own,
or of our own doing ; natural abilitys are not consequences
of our volitions.

M. Mem. Candidly to take notice that Locke holds some
dangerous opinions ; such as the infinity and eternity of
Space and the possibility of Matter's thinking5.

1 Locke died in October, 1704. 4 e.g. primary qualities, in which

2 'without the mind,' i.e. ab- pleasure and pain are latent,
stracted from all active percipient 5 See Locke's Essay, Bk. II. ch.
life. 13. § 21, ch. 17. § 4; also Bk. IV.

3 e.g. secondary qualities of sen- ch. 3. § 6; also his controversy
sible things, in which pleasure and with Bishop Stillingfleet regarding
pain are prominent. the possibility of Matter thinking.

40 COMMONPLACE BOOK

I. Once more I desire my reader may be upon his guard
against the fallacy of words. Let him beware that I do
not impose on him by plausible empty talk, that common
dangerous way of cheating men into absurditys. Let
him not regard my words any otherwise than as occasions
of bringing into his mind determin'd significations. So
far as they fail of this they are gibberish, jargon, & de
serve not the name of language. I desire & warn him
not to expect to find truth in my book, or anywhere but
in his own mind. WVver I see myself 'tis impossible
I can paint it out in words.

Mo. N.B. To consider well w"u is meant by that wch Locke
saith concerning algebra — that it supplys intermediate
ideas. Also to think of a method affording the same
use in morals &c. that this doth in mathematiques.

Mo. Homo is not proved to be vivens by means of any
intermediate idea. I don't fully agree wth Locke in wfc he
says concerning sagacity in finding out intermediate ideas
in matter capable of demonstration & the use thereof; as
if that were the onely means of improving and enlarging
demonstrative knowledge.

S. There is a difference betwixt power & volition. There
maybe volition without power. But there can be no power
without volition. Power implyeth volition, & at the same
time a connotation of the effects following the volition '.

M. We have assuredly an idea of substance. 'Twas absurd

s- of Locke2 to think we had a name without a meaning.
This might prove acceptable to the Stillingfleetians.

M. The substance of Body we know3. The substance of

s- Spirit we do not know — it not being knowable, it being a
purus actus.

I. Words have ruin'd and overrun all the sciences — law,
physique, chymistry, astrology, &c.

I. Abstract ideas only to be had amongst the learned.
The vulgar never think they have any such, nor truly do
they find any want of them. Genera & species & abstract
ideas are terms unknown to them.

With Berkeley real space is a finite 2 Essay, Bk. I. ch. iv. § 18. See

creature, dependent for realisation also Locke's Letters to Stillingfleet.

on living percipient Spirit. 3 It is, according to Berkeley,

1 But what of the origination of the steady union or co-existence of

the volition itself? a group of sense-phenomena.

COMMONPLACE BOOK 41

S. Locke's out1 — the case is different. We can have an
idea of body without motion, but not of soul without
thought.

Mo. God ought to be worshiped. This easily demonstrated
when once we ascertain the signification of the words God,
worship, ought.

S. No perception, according to Locke, is active. There
fore no perception (i. e. no idea) can be the image of, or
like unto, that which is altogether active & not at all passive,
i.e. the Will.

S. I can will the calling to mind something that is past,
tho' at the same time that wch I call to mind was not in
my thoughts before that volition of mine, & consequently
I could have had no uneasiness for the want of it.

S. The Will & the Understanding may very well be thought
two distinct beings.

Sed quia voluntas raro agit nisi ducente desiderio.
V. Locke, Epistles, p. 479, ad Limburgum.

You cannot say the m. t. [minimum tangibile] is like or
one with the m. v. [minimum visibilej, because they be
both minima, just perceiv'd, and next door to nothing.
You may as well say the m. t. is the same with or like
unto a sound, so small that it is scarce perceiv'd.

Extension seems to be a mode of some tangible or sen
sible quality according as it is seen or felt.

s- The spirit — the active thing — that wch is soul, & God—

is the Will alone. The ideas are effects— impotent things.

The concrete of the will & understanding I might call

mind ; not person, lest offence be given. Mem. Carefully

to omit defining of person, or making much mention of it.

S. You ask, do these volitions make one Will ? W* you
ask is meerly about a word— unity being no more2.

N. B. To use utmost caution not to give the least handle
of offence to the Church or Churchmen.

1 Essay, Bk. II. ch. i." § 10 — 2 In other words, the material

where he argues for interruptions world is wholly impotent : all acti-

of consciousness. ' Men think not vity in the universe is spiritual,
always/

42 COMMONPLACE BOOK

I. Even to speak somewhat favourably of the Schoolmen,
and shew that they who blame them for jargon are not
free of it themselves. Introd.

Locke's great oversight seems to be that he did not
begin with his third book ; at least that he had not some
thought of it at first. Certainly the 2 l & 4th books don't
agree wth w* he says in ye 3(1 \

M. If Matter2 is once allow'd to exist, clippings of weeds and
parings of nails may think, for ought that Locke can tell ;
tho' he seems positive of the contrary.

Since I say men cannot mistake in short reasoning
about things demonstrable, if they lay aside words, it will
be expected this Treatise will contain nothing but w* is
certain & evident demonstration, & in truth I hope you
will find nothing in it but what is such. Certainly I take
it all for such. Introd.

I. When I say I will reject all propositions wherein I
know not fully and adequately and clearly, so far as know-
able, the thing meant thereby, this is not to be extended
to propositions in the Scripture. I speak of matters of
Reason and Philosophy— not Revelation. In this I think
an humble, implicit faith becomes us (when we cannot
comprehend or understand the proposition), such as a
popish peasant gives to propositions he hears at mass in
Latin. This proud men may call blind, popish, implicit,
irrational. For my part I think it is more irrational to
pretend to dispute at, cavil, and ridicule holy mysteries,
i. e. propositions about things that are altogether above
our knowledge, out of our reach. When I shall come to
plenary knowledge of the meaning of any fact, then I shall
yield an explicit belief. Introd.

Complexation of ideas twofold. Ys refers to colours
being complex ideas.

Considering length without breadth is considering any
length, be the breadth w* it will.

M. I may say earth, plants, &c. were created before man —
there being other intelligences to perceive them, before
man was created ".

1 On the order of its four 2 i. e. independent impercepti-

books and the structure of Locke's ble Matter.

Essay, see the Prolegomena in my 3 What of the earliest geological

edition of the Essay, pp. liv-lviii. periods, asks Ueberweg? But

COMMONPLACE BOOK 43

M. There is a philosopher1 who says we can get an idea
of substance by no way of sensation or reflection, & seems
to imagine that we want a sense proper for it. Truly if
we had a new sense it could only give us a new idea.
Now I suppose he will not say substance, according to
him, is an idea. For my part, I own I have no idea can
stand for substance in his and the Schoolmen's sense of
that word. But take it in the common vulgar sense, &
then we see and feel substance.

E. N.B. That not common usage, but the Schoolmen coined
the word Existence, supposed to stand for an abstract
general idea.

Writers of Optics mistaken in their principles both in
judging of magnitudes and distances.

I. 'Tis evident y* w" the solitary man should be taught to
speak, the words would give him no other new ideas (save
only the sounds, and complex ideas which, tho' unknown
before, may be signified by language) beside w* he had be
fore. If he had not, could not have, an abstract idea
before, he cannot have it after he is taught to speak.

Mo. 'Homo est homo/ &c. comes at last to Petrus est Petrus,
&c. Now, if these identical propositions are sought after in
the mind, they will not be found. There are no identical
mental propositions. 'Tis all about sounds and terms.

Mo. Hence we see the doctrine of certainty by ideas, and
proving by intermediate ideas, comes to nothing 2.

Mo. \fy~e may have certainty & knowledge without ideas, i.e.
without other ideas than the words, and their standing for
one idea, i.e. their being to be used indifferently.

Mo- It seems to me that we have no certainty about ideas,
but only about words. Tis improper to say, I am certain
I see, I feel, &c. There are no mental propositions

is there greater difficulty in such in- in the agreement of 'our ideas with

stances than in explaining the exis- the reality of things.' See Essay,

tenceofatableor a house, while one Bk. IV. ch. 4. § 18. Here the

is merely seeing, withouttouching? sceptical difficulty arises, which

1 Locke explains 'substance' as Berkeley meets under his Prin-
'an uncertain supposition of we ciple. If we have no perception
know not what.' Essay, Bk. I. ch. 4. of reality, we cannot compare our
§ 18. ideas with it, and so cannot have

2 Locke makes certainty consist any criterion of reality.

44 COMMONPLACE BOOK

form'd answering to these words, & in simple perception
'tis allowed by all there is no affirmation or negation, and
consequently no certainty1.

Mo. The reason why we can demonstrate so well about signs
is, that they are perfectly arbitrary & in our power — made
at pleasure.

Mo. The obscure ambiguous term relation, which is said to
be the largest field of knowledge, confounds us, deceives us.

Mo. Let any man shew me a demonstration, not verbal, that
does not depend on some false principle ; or at best
on some principle of nature, which is ye effect of God's
will, and we know not how soon it may be changed.

I. Qu. What becomes of the ceternce veritates? Ans. They
vanish 2.

I. But, say you, I find it difficult to look beneath the words
and uncover my ideas. Say I, Use will make it easy. In
the sequel of my Book the cause of this difficulty shall be
more clearly made out.

I. To view the deformity of error we need onely undress it.

E. ' Cogito ergo sum.' Tautology. No mental proposition
answering thereto.

N. Knowledge, or certainty, or perception of agreement of

Mo- ideas — as to identity and diversity, and real existence,
vanisheth; of relation, becometh merely nominal; of
co-existence, remaineth. Locke thought in this latter
our knowledge was little or nothing. Whereas in this
only real knowledge seemeth to be found 3.

P. We must wth the mob place certainty in the senses 4.

'Tis a man's duty, 'tis the fruit of friendship, to
speak well of his friend. Wonder not therefore that I do
wfc I do.

!• A man of slow parts may overtake truth, £c. Introd.
Even my shortsightedness might perhaps be aiding to me
in this matter — 'twill make me bring the object nearer to
my thoughts. A purblind person, £c. Introd.

1 [This seems wrong. Certainty, into contingent.

real certainty, is of sensible ideas. 3 See Locke's Essay, Bk. IV.
I may be certain without affirma- ch. i, §§ 3-7, and ch. 3. §§ 7-21.
tion or negation. — AUTHOR.] This The stress Berkeley lays on 'co-
needs further explanation, existence' is significant.

~ This entry and the preceding 4 i. e. we must not doubt the real-
tends to resolve all judgments which ity of the immediate data of sense
are not what Kant calls analytical but accept it, as ' the mob ' do.

COMMONPLACE BOOK 45

S. Locke to Limborch, &c. Talk of judicium intellectus
preceding the volition : I think judicium includes volition.
I can by no means distinguish these— judtcium, intellectus,
indifferentia, uneasiness to many things accompanying or
preceding every volition, as e. g. the motion of my hand.

S. Qu. Wfc mean you by my perceptions, my volitions ?
Both all the perceptions I perceive or conceive \ <S:c. are
mine ; all the volitions I am conscious to are mine.

S. Homo est agens liberum. What mean they by homo
and agens in this place ?

E. Will any man say that brutes have ideas of Unity &
Existence ? I believe not. Yet if they are suggested by
all the ways of sensation, 'tis strange they should want
them 2.

I. It is a strange thing and deserves our attention, that the
more time and pains men have consum'd in the study of
philosophy, by so much the more they look upon them
selves to be ignorant & weak creatures. They discover
flaws and imperfections in their faculties wch other men
never spy out. They find themselves under a necessity of
admitting many inconsistent, irreconcilable opinions for
true. There is nothing they touch with their hand, or
behold with their eyes, but has its dark sides much larger
and more numerous than w^ is perceived, & at length turn
scepticks, at least in most things. I imagine all this pro
ceeds from, &c. Exord. Introd. 3

I. These men with a supercilious pride disdain the common
single information of sense. They grasp at knowledge
by sheafs & bundles. ('Tis well if, catching at too much at
once, they hold nothing but emptiness & air.) They in
the depth of their understanding contemplate abstract
ideas.

It seems not improbable that the most comprehensive &
sublime intellects see more m.v.'s at once, i. e. that their
visual systems are the largest.

Words (by them meaning all sorts of signs) are so
necessary that, instead of being (wn duly us'd or in their
own nature) prejudicial to the advancement of knowledge,

1 But is imagination different also Locke's Essay, Bk. II. ch. 7.
from actual perception only in sect. 7.

degree of reality ? 3 Cf. Principles, Introduction,

2 Cf. Principles, sect. 13, 120 ; sect. i.

46 COMMONPLACE BOOK

or an hindrance to knowledge, without them there could
in mathematiques themselves be no demonstration.

Mem. To be eternally banishing Metaphisics, &c., and
recalling men to Common Sense1.

S. We cannot conceive other minds besides our own but
as so many selves. We suppose ourselves affected wth
such & such thoughts &: such and such sensations 2.

S. Qu. whether composition of ideas be not that faculty
which chiefly serves to discriminate us from brutes? I
question whether a brute does or can imagine a blue horse
or chimera.

Naturalists do not distinguish betwixt cause and occa
sion. Useful to enquire after co-existing ideas or occa
sions.

Mo. Morality may be demonstrated as mixt mathematics.

S. Perception is passive, but this not distinct from idea.
Therefore there can be no idea of volition.

Algebraic species or letters are denominations of de
nominations. Therefore Arithmetic to be treated of before
Algebra.

2 crowns are called ten shillings. Hence may appear
the value of numbers.

Complex ideas are the creatures of the mind. Hence
may appear the nature of numbers. This to be deeply
discuss'd.

I am better informed & shall know more by telling me
there are 10,000 men, than by shewing me them all drawn
up. I shall better be able to judge of the bargain you'd
have me make wn you tell me how much (i. e. the name of
yc-) money lies on the table, than by offering and shewing
it without naming. I regard not the idea, the looks,
but the names. Hence may appear the nature of numbers.
Children are unacquainted with numbers till they have
made some progress in language. This could not be if
they were ideas suggested by all the senses.

1 Berkeley's aim evidently is to is intelligible to us is that of which
deliver men from emptyabstractions, another person is percipient, and
by a return to more reasonably in- which is objective to me, in a perci-
terpreted common-sense. pient experience foreign to mine.

2 The sort of external world that

COMMONPLACE BOOK 47

Numbers are nothing but names — never words.

Mem. Imaginary roots— to unravel that mystery.

Ideas of utility are annexed to numbers.

In arithmetical problems men seek not any idea of num
ber. They only seek a denomination. This is all can be
of use to them.

Take away the signs from Arithmetic and Algebra, and
pray wfc remains ?

These are sciences purely verbal, and entirely useless
but for practice in societies of men. No speculative
knowledge, no comparing of ideas in them '.

Qu. whether Geometry may not properly be reckon'd
amongst the mixt mathematics — Arithmetic & Algebra
being the only abstracted pure, i. e. entirely nominal-
Geometry being an application of these to points2?

Mo. Locke of Trifling Propositions, [b. 4. c. 8] Mem.

Well to observe & con over that chapter.
E. Existence, Extension, &c. are abstract, i.e. no ideas.

They are words, unknown and useless to the vulgar.

Mo. Sensual pleasure is the summnm bonuni. This the great
principle of morality. This once rightly understood, all
the doctrines, even the severest of the Gospels, may clearly
be demonstrated.

Mo. Sensual pleasure, qua pleasure, is good & desirable by
a wise man3. But if it be contemptible, 'tis not qua
pleasure but qua pain, or cause of pain, or (which is the
same thing) of loss of greater pleasure.

I. Wn I consider, the more objects we see at once the
more distant they are, and that eye which beholds a great
many things can see none of them near.

I. By idea I mean any sensible or imaginable thing4.

M. To be sure or certain of \v« we do not actually perceive 5

s- (I say perceive, not imagine), we must not be altogether

1 Cf. Berkeley's Arithmetica and as pains or uneasinesses are of

Miscellanea Mathemaiica, published correlative aversions. This is im-

while he was making his entries in plied in the very nature of pleasure

this Commonplace Book. and pain.

- Minima sensibilia? 4 Here we have his explanation

3 Pleasures, qua pleasures, are of idea.

natural causes of correlative desires, 5 Absent things.

48 COMMONPLACE BOOK

passive ; there must be a disposition to act ; there must be
assent, wch is active. Nay, what do I talk ; there must be
actual volition.

What do we demonstrate in Geometry but that lines
are equal or unequal ? i. e. may not be called by the same
name l.

I. I approve of this axiom of the Schoolmen, ' Nihil est in
M- intellectu quod non prius fuit in sensu.' 2 1 wish they

had stuck to it. It had never taught them the doctrine

of abstract ideas.

S. ' Nihil dat quod non habet/ or, the effect is contained in
G- the cause, is an axiom I do not understand or believe

to be true.

E. Whoever shall cast his eyes on the writings of old or
new philosophers, and see the noise is made about formal
and objective Being, Will, &:c.

G. Absurd to argue the existence of God from his idea.
We have no idea of God. 'Tis impossible 3.

M. Cause of much errour & confusion that men knew not

E- what was meant by Reality 4.

I. Des Cartes, in Med. 2, says the notion of this particular
wax is less clear than that of wax in general ; and in the
same Med., a little before, he forbears to consider bodies
in general, because (says he) these general conceptions are
usually confused.

M. Des Cartes, in Med. 3, calls himself a thinking substance,

s- and a stone an extended substance; and adds that they
both agree in this, that they are substances. And in the
next paragraph he calls extension a mode of substance.

S. 'Tis commonly said by the philosophers, that if the soul
of man were self-existent it would have given itself all pos
sible perfection. This I do not understand.

1 Here, as elsewhere, he resolves plied assumptions even in the
geometry, as strictly demonstra- Principles, apart from which they
ble, into a reasoned system of ana- could not cohere ?

lytical or verbal propositions. 3 To have an idea of God — as

2 Compare this with note 3, p. Berkeley uses idea — would imply
34 ; also with the contrast between that God is an immediately percep-
Sense and Reason, in Sin's. Is tible, or at least an imaginable object,
the statement consistent with im- ' Cf. Principles, sect. 89.

COMMONPLACE BOOK 49

Mo. Mem. To excite men to the pleasures of the eye & the
ear, which surfeit not, nor bring those evils after them,
as others.

S. We see no variety or difference betwixt volitions, only
between their effects. 'Tis one Will, one Act — distin
guished by the effects. This Will, this Act, is the Spirit,
i.e. operative principle, soul, &c. No mention of fears and
jealousies, nothing like a party.

M. Locke in his 4th Book \ and Des Cartes in Med. 6, use
the same argument for the existence of objects, viz. that
sometimes we see, feel, &c. against our will.
S. While I exist or have any idea, I am eternally, con
stantly willing ; my acquiescing in the present state is
willing.

E. The existence of any thing imaginable is nothing differ
ent from imagination or perception 2. Volition or Will,
wch is not imaginable, regard must not be had to its exist
ence (?) * * * First Book.

Mo. There are four sorts of propositions : — ' Gold is a metal ;'
'Gold is yellow ; ' ' Gold is fixt ; ' ' Gold is not a stone ' — of
which the first, second, and third are only nominal, and
have no mental propositions answering them.
M. Mem. In vindication of the senses effectually to confute
what Des Cartes saith in the last par. of the last Med.,
viz. that the senses oftener inform him falsely than truely —
that sense of pain tells me not my foot is bruised or broken,
but I, having frequently observed these two ideas, viz. of
that peculiar pain and bruised foot go together, do erron
eously take them to be inseparable by a necessity of Nature
—as if Nature were anything but the ordinance of the free
will of God3.

M. Des Cartes owns we know not a substance immediately
S. by itself, but by this alone, that it is the subject of several

acts. Ans. to 2d objection of Hobbs.

S. Hobbs in some degree falls in with Locke, saying
thought is to the mind or himself as dancing to the dancer.
Object.
S. Hobbs in his Object. 3 ridicules those expressions of

1 Ch. ii. § 5. vourite thought of the divine arbi-

a Why add — ' or perception ' ? trariness of the constitution of Na-

5 Here we have Berkeley's fa- ture, and of its laws of change.

BERKELEY : PHASER. I. E

50 COMMONPLACE BOOK

the scholastiques— ' the will wills/ £c. So does Locke.
I am of another mind \

S. Des Cartes, in answer to Object. 3 of Hobbs, owns he is
distinct from thought as a thing from its modus or manner.

E. Opinion that existence was distinct from perception of
S. horrible consequence. It is the foundation of Hobbs's

doctrine, &c.

M. Malbranch in his illustration 2 differs widely from me.
p- He doubts of the existence of bodies. I doubt not in the
E- least of this.
P. I differ from Cartesians in that I make extension, colour,

£c. to exist really in bodies independent of our mind 3. All

y< carefully and lucidly to be set forth.

M. Not to mention the combinations of powers, but to say the
P. things — the effects themselves — do really exist, even w11 not

actually perceived ; but still with relation to perception 4.

The great use of the Indian figures above the Roman
shews arithmetic to be about signs, not ideas— or at least
not ideas different from the characters themselves 5.

M. Reasoning there may be about things or ideas, or about

N- actions ; but demonstration can be only verbal. I ques
tion, no matter &c.

G. Quoth Des Cartes, The idea of God is not made by me,
for I can neither add to nor subtract from it. No more
can he add to or take from any other idea, even of his own
making.

S. The not distinguishing 'twixt Will and ideas is a grand
mistake with Hobbs. He takes those things for nothing
which are not ideas 6.

M. Say you, At this rate all's nothing but idea — mere phan
tasm. I answer, Everything as real as ever. I hope to
call a thing idea makes it not the less real. Truly I should
perhaps have stuck to the word thing, and not mentioned

1 This suggests the puzzle, that laws are independent of individual
the cause of every volition must will, although the individual partici-
be a preceding volition, and so on pates in perception of the ordered
ad infinitum. changes.

2 Recherche, I. 19. 5 Cf. the Anthmetica.

3 i. e. of his own individual mind. 6 i.e. which are not phenomena.

4 i.e. to a percipient mind, but This recognition of originative Will
not necessarily to mine ; for natural even then distinguished Berkeley.

COMMONPLACE BOOK 51

the word idea, were it not for a reason, and I think a good
one too, which I shall give in the Second Book l.

I. Idea is the object of thought. Y* I think on, whatever

S. it be, I call idea. Thought itself, or thinking, is no
idea. 'Tis an act — i.e. volition, i.e. as contradistinguished
to effects— the Will.

I. Locke, in B. 4. c. 5, assigns not the right cause why

M°- mental propositions are so difficult. It is not because of
complex but because of abstract ideas. Ye idea of a horse
is as complex as that of fortitude. Yet in saying the
' horse is white ' I form a mental proposition with ease.
But when I say ' fortitude is a virtue/ I shall find a mental
proposition hard, or not at all to be come at.

S. Pure intellect I understand not 2.

Locke is in ye right in those things wherein he differs
from ye Cartesians, and they cannot but allow of his
opinions, if they stick to their own principles or causes of
Existence & other abstract ideas.

G. The properties of all things are in God, i. e. there is in

S. the Deity Understanding as well as Will. He is no blind
agent, and in truth a blind agent is a contradiction 3.

G. I am certain there is a God, tho' I do not perceive Him
—have no intuition of Him. This not difficult if we rightly
understand w* is meant by certainty.

S. It seems that the Soul, taken for the Will, is immortal,
incorruptible.

S. Qu. whether perception must of necessity precede voli
tion ?

S. Error is not in the Understanding, but in the Will.

Mo. What I understand or perceive, that I understand. There
can be no errour in this.

Mo. Mem. To take notice of Locke's woman afraid of a

N- wetting, in the Introd., to shew there may be reasoning
about ideas or things.

M. Say Des Cartes & Malbranch, God hath given us strong
inclinations to think our ideas proceed from bodies, or that

1 Is this Part II of the Principles, which he occasionally seems to

which was lost in Italy ? rush in the Commonplace Book,

'2 The thought of articulate rela- in his repulsion from empty ab-

tions to which real existence must stractions.

conform, was not then at least in 3 This is the essence of Berke-

Berkeley's mind. Hence the ley's philosophy — ' a blind agent

empiricism and sensationalism into is a contradiction.'

E 2

52 COMMONPLACE BOOK

bodies do exist. Pray wt mean they by this? Would
they have it that the ideas of imagination are images of,
and proceed from, the ideas of sense ? This is true, but
cannot be their meaning ; for they speak of ideas of sense
as themselves proceeding from, being like unto— I know
not w* ].

M. Cartesius per ideam vult omne id quod habet esse

s- objectivum in intellects V. Tract, de Methodo.

S. Qu. May there not be an Understanding without a Will ?

S. Understanding is in some sort an action.

S. Silly of Hobbs, &c. to speak of the Will as if it were
motion, with which it has no likeness.

M. Ideas of Sense are the real things or archetypes. Ideas
of imagination, dreams, £c. are copies, images, of these.

M. My doctrines rightly understood, all that philosophy of
Epicurus, Hobbs, Spinosa, &c., which has been a declared
enemy of religion, comes to the ground.

G. Hobbs & Spinosa make God extended. Locke also
seems to do the same 2.

Ens, res, aliquid dicuntur termini transcendentales.

E- Spinosa, p. 76, prop. 40, Eth. part 2, gives an odd account
of their original. Also of the original of all universals—
Homo, Canis, &c.

G. Spinosa (vid. Prsef. Opera Posthum.) will have God to
be ' omnium rerum causa immanens/ and to countenance
this produces that of St. Paul, ' in Him we live,' &c. Now
this of St. Paul may be explained by my doctrine as well
as Spinosa's, or Locke's, or Hobbs's, or Raphson's3, &c.

S. The Will is purus actus, or rather pure spirit not imag-

1 This is the basis of Berkeley's also of De Spatio Reati, sett ente In-
reasoning for the necessarily un- fmito: conamen mathetnatico-meta-
rcprcsentativc character of the ideas physicutn (1697), to which Berke-
or phenomena that are presented to ley refers in one of his letters to
our senses. They are the originals. Johnson. See also Green's Prin-

2 Berkeley's horror of abstract cipks of Natural Philosophy (1712).
or unperceived space and atoms The immanence of omnipotent
is partly explained by dogmas goodness in the material world
in natural philosophy that are now was unconsciously Berkeley's pre-
antiquated. supposition. In God we have our

3 Ralph [?] Raphson, author of being.
Demonstratio de Deo (1710), and

COMMONPLACE BOOK 53

inable, not sensible, not intelligible, in no wise the object
of the understanding, no wise perceivable.
S. Substance of a spirit is that it acts, causes, wills,
operates, or if you please (to avoid the quibble y* may be
made of the word 'it') to act, cause, will, operate. Its
substance is not knowable, not being an idea.

G. Why may we not conceive it possible for God to create
things out of nothing ? Certainly we ourselves create in
some wise whenever we imagine.

E. ' Ex nihilo nihil fit.' This (saith Spinoza, Opera Posth.

N- p. 464) and the like are called veritates cetcrnce, because
1 nullam fidem habent extra mentem.' To make this axiom
have a positive signification, one should express it thus :
Every idea has a cause, i. e. is produced by a Will *.

P. The philosophers talk much of a distinction 'twixt
absolute & relative things, or 'twixt things considered in
their own nature & the same things considered with respect
to us. I know not w* they mean by 'things considered in
themselves.' This is nonsense, jargon.

S. It seems there can be no perception — no idea— without
Will, seeing there are no ideas so indifferent but one had
rather have them than annihilation, or annihilation than
them. Or if there be such an equal balance, there must be
an equal mixture of pleasure and pain to cause it ; there
being no ideas perfectly void of all pain & uneasiness, but
wfc are preferable to annihilation.

Recipe in animum tuum, per cogitationem vehementem,
rerum ipsarum, non literarum aut sonorum imagines.
Hobbs against Wallis.

'Tis a perfection we may imagine in superior spirits,
that they can see a great deal at once with the utmost
clearness and distinction ; whereas we can only see a
point2.

Mem. W11 I treat of mathematiques to enquire into the
controversy 'twixt Hobbes and Wallis.

1 Note here Berkeley's version event in the material world

of the causal principle, which is must be the issue of acting Will,
really the central presupposition - So Locke on an ideally perfect

of his whole philosophy — viz. every memory. Essay, Bk. II. ch. x. § 9.

54 COMMONPLACE BOOK

G. Every sensation of mine, which happens in consequence
of the general known laws of nature, & is from without, i. e.
independent of my will, demonstrates the being of a God,
i. e. of an unextended, incorporeal spirit, which is omni
present, omnipotent, &c.

M. I say not with J. S. [John Sergeant] that we see solids.
I reject his 'solid philosophy' — solidity being only per
ceived by touch \

S. It seems to me that will and understanding — volitions and
ideas — cannot be separated, that either cannot be possibly
without the other.

E. Some ideas or other I must have, so long as I exist or

S. will. But no one idea or sort of ideas being essential 2.

M. The distinction between idea and ideatum I cannot
otherwise conceive than by making one the effect or
consequence of dream, reverie, imagination — the other of
sense and the constant laws of nature.

P. Dico quod extensio non concipitur in se et per se, contra
quam dicit Spinoza in Epist. 2a ad Oldenburgium.

G. My definition of the word God I think much clearer than
those of Des Cartes & Spinoza, viz. ' Ens summe perfectum
& absolute infinitum/ or ' Ens constans infinitis attributis,
quorum unumquodque est infinitum V

Tis chiefly the connexion betwixt tangible and visible
ideas that deceives, and not the visible ideas themselves.

S. But the grand mistake is that we know not what we mean
by 'we/ or 'selves/ or 'mind/ &c. 'Tis most sure &
certain that our ideas are distinct from the mind, i. e. the
Will, the Spirit4.

S. I must not mention the understanding as a faculty or

1 John Sergeant was the author of in controversy with Tillotson.

Solid Philosophy asserted against the '2 Spirit and Matter are mutually

Fancies of the Ideists (London, 1697); dependent; but Spirit is the real-

also of The Method to Science (1696}. ising factor and real agent in the

He was a deserter from the Church universe.

of England to the Church of Rome, 3 See Descartes, Meditations, III ;

and wrote several pieces in defence Spinoza, Epist. II, ad Oldenburgium.

of Roman theology— some of them * Cf. Principles, sect. 2.

COMMONPLACE BOOK 55

part of the mind. I must include understanding & will in
the word Spirit — by which I mean all that is active.
I must not say that the understanding differs not from the
particular ideas, or the will from particular volitions.
S. The Spirit, the Mind, is neither a volition nor an idea.
N. I say there are no causes (properly speaking) but spiritual,
S. nothing active but Spirit. Say you, This is only verbal ;
'tis only annexing a new sort of signification to the word
cause, & why may not others as well retain the old one,
and call one idea the cause of another which always
follows it? I answer, If you do so I shall drive you
into many absurditys : you cannot avoid running into
opinions you'll be glad to disown, if you stick firmly to that
signification of the word Cause.

Mo. In valuing good we reckon too much on the present &
our own.

Mo. There be two sorts of pleasure. The one is ordained as
a spur or incitement to somewhat else, & has a visible
relation and subordination thereto ; the other is not.
Thus the pleasure of eating is of the former sort, of
musick of the later sort. These may be used for recreation,
those not but in order to their end.

Mo. Three sorts of useful knowledge— that of Coexistence, to

N- be treated of in our Principles of Natural Philosophy ; that
of Relation, in Mathematiques ; that of Definition, or in
clusion, or words (which perhaps differs not from that of re
lation), in Morality l.

S. Will, understanding, desire, hatred, £c., so far forth as
they are acts or active, differ not. All their difference con
sists in their objects, circumstances, &c.

N. We must carefully distinguish betwixt two sorts of causes

— physical & spiritual.
N. The physical may more properly be called occasions. Yet

(to comply) we may call them causes — but then we must

mean causes y* do nothing.

S. According to Locke, we must be in an eternal uneasiness

1 Is 'inclusion' here virtually a synonym for verbal definition ?

56 COMMONPLACE BOOK

so long as we live, bating the time of sleep or trance, &c. ;
for he will have even the continuance of an action to be in
his sense an action, & so requires a volition, & this an un
easiness.

I. I must not pretend to promise much of demonstration.
I must cancell all passages that look like that sort of pride,
that raising of expectation in my friend.

I. If this be the case, surely a man had better not philoso
phize at all : no more than a deformed person ought to
cavil to behold himself by the reflex light of a mirrour.

j. Or thus, like deformed persons who, having beheld
themselves by the reflex light of a mirrour, are displeased
with their diseases.

M. What can an idea be like but another idea ? We can
compare it with nothing else— a sound like a sound, a col
our like a colour.

M. Is it not nonsense to say a smell is like a thing which
cannot be smelt, a colour is like a thing wb cannot be seen ?

M. Bodies exist without the mind, i. e. are not the mind, but
S. distinct from it. This I allow, the mind being altogether
different therefrom \

p. Certainly we should not see motion if there was no diver
sity of colours.
p. Motion is an abstract idea, i. e. there is no such idea that

can be conceived by itself.
I. Contradictions cannot be both true. Men are obliged to

answer objections drawn from consequences. Introd.
S. The Will and Volition are words not used by the vulgar.

The learned are bantered by their meaning abstract ideas.
Speculative Math, as if a man was all day making hard

knots on purpose to unty them again.

Tho' it might have been otherwise, yet it is convenient

the same thing wch is M.V. should be also M.T., or very

near it.
S. I must not give the soul or mind the scholastique name

'pure act/ but rather pure spirit, or active being.

1 See Principles, sect. 2. The uni- nomena, realised in the percipient
verse of Berkeley consistsof Active experience of persons. All sup-
Spirits that perceive and produce posed powers in Matter are refunded
motion in impotent ideas or phe- into Spirit.

COMMONPLACE BOOK 57

S. I must not say the Will or Understanding are all one,
but that they are both abstract ideas, i. e. none at all — they
not being even ratione different from the Spirit, qua faculties,
or active.

S. Dangerous to make idea cSi thing terms convertible1.
That were the way to prove spirits are nothing.

Mo. Qu. whether vcritas stands not for an abstract idea ?

M. 'Tis plain the moderns must by their own principles own
there are no bodies, i. e. no sort of bodies without the mind,
i. e. unperceived.

S. Qu. whether the Will can be the object of prescience or

G. any knowledge ?

P. If there were only one ball in the world, it could not be
moved. There could be no variety of appearance.

According to the doctrine of infinite divisibility, there
must be some smell of a rose, v. g. at an infinite distance
from it.

M. Extension, tho' it exist only in the mind, yet is no pro
perty of the mind. The mind can exist without it, tho' it
cannot without the mind. But in Book II. I shall at large
shew the difference there is betwixt the Soul and Body or
extended being.

S. 'Tis an absurd question wcn Locke puts, whether man be
free to will ?

Mem. To enquire into the reason of the rule for deter
mining questions in Algebra.

It has already been observed by others that names are
nowhere of more necessary use than in numbering.

M. I will grant you that extension, colour, cKic. may be said

P. to be without the mind in a double respect, i. e. as inde
pendent of our will, and as distinct from the mind.

Mo. Certainly it is not impossible but a man may arrive at

N- the knowledge of all real truth as well without as with
signs, had he a memory and imagination most strong and
capacious. Therefore reasoning & science doth not alto
gether depend upon words or names2.

1 When self-conscious agents are 2 Berkeley insists that we should

included among 'things.' We can individualise our thinking — ' ipsis

have no sensuous image, i. e. idea, of consuescere rebus,' as Bacon says,

spirit, although he maintains we —to escape the dangers of artificial

can use the word intelligently. signs. This is the drift of his

58 COMMONPLACE BOOK

N. I think not that things fall out of necessity. The con
nexion of no two ideas is necessary ; 'tis all the result of
freedom, i. e. 'tis all voluntary \

M. If a man with his eyes shut imagines to himself the sun

S. & firmament, you will not say he or his mind is the sun, or
is extended, tho' neither sun or firmament be without
mind.

S. 'Tis strange to find philosophers doubting & disputing
whether they have ideas of spiritual things or no. Surely
'tis easy to know. Vid. De Vries 2, De Ideis Innatis, p. 64.

S. De Yries will have it that we know the mind agrees with
things not by idea but sense or conscientia. So will Mai-
branch. This a vain distinction.

August 28th, 1708. The Adventure of the [Shirt ?].

It were to be wished that persons of the greatest birth,
honour, & fortune, would take that care of themselves, by
education, industry, literature, & a love of virtue, to surpass
all other men in knowledge & all other qualifications
necessary for great actions, as far as they do in quality
& titles ; that princes out of them might always chose men
fit for all employments and high trusts. Clov. B. 7.

One eternity greater than another of the same kind.

In what sense eternity may be limited.
G.T. Whether succession of ideas in the Divine intellect ?
T. Time is the train of ideas succeeding each other.

Duration not distinguish'd from existence.

Succession explain'd by before, between, after, & num
bering.

Why time in pain longer than time in pleasure ?

Duration infinitely divisible, time not so.

assault on abstract ideas, and his l Nature or the phenomenal
repulsion from what is not concrete. world in short is the revelation of
He would even dispense with perfectly reasonable Will,
words in his meditations in case of 2 Gerard De Vries, the Carte-
being sophisticated by abstractions. sian.

COMMONPLACE BOOK 59

T. The same TO vvv not common to all intelligences.

Time thought infinitelydivisible on account of its measure.

Extension not infinitely divisible in one sense.

Revolutions immediately measure train of ideas, medi
ately duration.
T. Time a sensation ; therefore onely in ye mind.

Eternity is onely a train of innumerable ideas. Hence
the immortality of ye soul easily conceiv'd, or rather the
immortality of the person, that of ye soul not being neces
sary for ought we can see.

Swiftness of ideas compar'd with y« of motions shews
the wisdom of God.

Wfc if succession of ideas were swifter, w1 if slower ?
M. ffall of Adam, use of idolatry, use of Epicurism & Hob-
bism, dispute about divisibility of matter, &c. expounded by
material substances.

Extension a sensation, therefore not without the mind.
M. In the immaterial hypothesis, the wall is white, fire
hot, &c.

Primary ideas prov'd not to exist in matter; after the
same manner y* secondary ones are prov'd not to exist
therein.

Demonstrations of the infinite divisibility of extension
suppose length without breadth, or invisible length, wcn is
absurd.
M. World wthout thought is nee quid, nee quantum, nee qua/e,

&c.

M. 'Tis wondrous to contemplate ye World empty'd of all
intelligences.

Nothing properly but Persons, i. e. conscious things, do
exist. All other things are not so much existences as
manners of ye existence of persons1.

Qu. about the soul, or rather person, whether it be not
compleatly known ?

Infinite divisibility of extension does suppose the external
existence of extension ; but the later is false, ergo ye former
also.

Qu. Blind man made to see, would he know motion at
r* sight ?

Motion, figure, and extension perceivable by sight are

1 Are the things of sense only modes in which percipient persons exist?

60 COMMONPLACE BOOK

different from those ideas perceived by touch wch goe by
the same name.

Diagonal incommensurable wtlx ye side. Quaere how
this can be in my doctrine ?

N. Qu. how to reconcile Newton's 2 sorts of motion with
my doctrine?

Terminations of surfaces & lines not imaginable per se.
Molyneux's blind man would not know the sphere or
cube to be bodies or extended at first sight *.

Extension so far from being incompatible wth, y* 'tis
impossible it should exist without thought.
M. Extension itself or anything extended cannot think —
S. these being meer ideas or sensations, whose essence we
thoroughly know.

No extension but surface perceivable by sight.
M. Wn we imagine 2 bowls v. g. moving in vacuo, 'tis only

conceiving a person affected with these sensations.
M. Extension to exist in a thoughtless thing [or rather in
a thing void of perception — thought seeming to imply
action], is a contradiction.

Qu. if visible motion be proportional to tangible motion ?
T. In some dreams succession of ideas swifter than at other

times.

M- If a piece of matter have extension, that must be deter
mined to a particular bigness & figure, but &c.

Nothing wthout corresponds to our primary ideas but
powers. Hence a direct & brief demonstration of an
active powerfull Being, distinct from us, on whom we
depend.

The name of colours actually given to tangible qualities,
by the relation of ye story of the German Count.

Qu. How came visible & tangible qualities by the same
name in all languages ?

Qu. Whether Being might not be the substance of the
soul, or (otherwise thus) whether Being, added to ye
faculties, compleat the real essence and adequate definition
of the soul ?

N- Qu. Whether, on the supposition of external bodies,
it be possible for us to know that any body is absolutely

1 See Locke's Essay, Bk. II. ch. 9. § 8.

COMMONPLACE BOOK 6l

at rest, since that supposing ideas much slower than at
present, bodies now apparently moving wtl then be ap
parently at rest ?
M. Qu. What can be like a sensation but a sensation ?

Qu. Did ever any man see any other things besides his
own ideas, that he should compare them to these, and make
these like unto them ?

T. The age of a fly, for ought that we know, may be as long
as y* of a man l.

Visible distance heterogeneous from tangible distance
demonstrated 3 several ways : —

i4. If a tangible inch be equal or in any other reason to
a visible inch, thence it will follow yi unequals are equals,
wch is absurd : for at what distance would the visible inch
be placed to make it equal to the tangible inch ?

2d. One made to see that had not yet seen his own
limbs, or any thing he touched, upon sight of a foot length
would know it to be a foot length, if tangible foot & visible
foot were the same idea — sed falsum id, ergo et hoc.

3dl>'. From Molyneux's problem, wch otherwise is falsely
solv'd by Locke and him2.

M. Nothing but ideas perceivable 3.

A man cannot compare 2 things together without per
ceiving them each. Ergo, he cannot say anything wch is
not an idea is like or unlike an idea.

Bodies &c. do exist even wn not perceived — they being
powers in the active being 4.

Succession a simple idea, [succession is an abstract, i.e.
an inconceivable idea,] Locke says5.

Visible extension is [proportional to tangible extension,
also is] encreated & diminished by parts. Hence taken for
the same.

1 Time being relative to the capa- therefore not real,

city of the percipient. 4 So things have a potential objec-

y See Locke's Essay, Bk. II. ch. tive existence in the Divine Will.

9. § 8. 5 With Berkele3', change is time,

" To perceive what is not an idea and time, abstracted from all

(as Berkeley uses idea) is to per- changes, is meaningless,
ceive what is not realised, and

62 COMMONPLACE BOOK

If extension be without the mind in bodies. Qu. whether
tangible or visible, or both ?

Mathematical propositions about extension & motion true
in a double sense.

Extension thought peculiarly inert, because not ac-
company'd wth pleasure & pain : hence thought to exist in
matter; as also for that it was conceiv'd common to 2 senses,
[as also the constant perception of 'em].

Blind at iat sight could not tell how near what he saw
was to him, nor even whether it be wthout him or in his
eye \ Qu. Would he not think the later ?

Blind at Ist sight could not know y* wfc he saw was
extended, until he had seen and touched some one self
same thing — not knowing how minimum tangibile would
look in vision.

M. Mem. That homogeneous particles be brought in to
answer the objection of God's creating sun, plants, &c.
before animals.

In every bodie two infinite series of extension — the one
of tangible, the other of visible.

All things to a blind [man] at first seen in a point.

Ignorance of glasses made men think extension to be in
bodies.

M. Homogeneous portions of matter — useful to contemplate
them.

Extension if in matter changes its relation wth minimum
visibile, wch seems to be fixt.

Qu. whether m.v. be fix'd?
M. Each particle of matter if extended must be infinitely

extended, or have an infinite series of extension.
M. If the world be granted to consist of Matter, 'tis the mind
gives it beauty and proportion.

Wfc I have said onely proves there is no proportion
at all times and in all men between a visible & tangible
inch.

Tangible and visible extension heterogeneous, because
they have no common measure ; also because their simplest
constituent parts or elements are specifically different, viz.
punctum visibile & tangibile. N. B. The former seems to be
no good reason.

1 Could he know, by seeing only, even that he had a body ?

COMMONPLACE BOOK 63

M. By immateriality is solv'd the cohesion of bodies, or

N- rafcher the dispute ceases.

Our idea we call extension neither way capable of infinity,
i. e. neither infinitely small or great.

Greatest possible extension seen under an angle wch will
be less than 180 degrees, the legs of wch angle proceed
from the ends of the extension.

N. Allowing there be extended, solid, &c. substances without
the mind, 'tis impossible the mind should know or perceive
them ; the mind, even according to the materialists, per
ceiving onely the impressions made upon its brain, or
rather the ideas attending these impressions '.

Unity in abstracto not at all divisible, it being as it were
a point, or with Barrow nothing at all ; in concrete not
divisible ad infinitum, there being no one idea demon
strable ad infmitum.

M. Any subject can have of each sort of primary qualities
but one particular at once. Locke, b. 4. c. 3. s. 15.

Qu. whether we have clear ideas of large numbers them
selves, or onely of their relations ?

M. Of solidity see L. b. 2. c. 4. s. i, 5, 6. If any one ask
wfc solidity is, let him put a flint between his hands and he
will know. Extension of body is continuity of solid, &c. ;
extension of space is continuity of unsolid, &c.

Why may not I say visible extension is a continuity
of visible points, tangible extension is a continuity of
tangible points ?

M. Mem. That I take notice that I do not fall in wfch sceptics,
Fardella 2, &c., in that I make bodies to exist certainly, wch
they doubt of.

M. I am more certain of ye existence & reality of bodies
than Mr. Locke ; since he pretends onely to w11 he calls
sensitive knowledge '\ whereas I think I have demonstrative

1 ' the ideas attending these the existence of the material world
impressions,' i.e. the ideas that could not be scientifically proved,
are correlatives of the (by us unper- and could only be maintained by
ceived) organic impressions. faith in authoritative revelation.

2 The Italian physical and meta- See his Universe?, Philosophic? Sys-
physical philosopher Fardella (1650 tema (1690), and especially his
-1718) maintained, by reasonings Logica (1696).

akin to those of Malebranche, that B Locke's Essay, Bk. IV. ch. u.

64 COMMONPLACE BOOK

knowledge of their existence — by them meaning combina
tions of powers in an unknown substratum1.

M. Our ideas we call figure & extension, not images of the
figure and extension of matter ; these (if such there be)
being infinitely divisible, those not so,

'Tis impossible a material cube should exist, because
the edges of a cube will appear broad to an acute sense.

Men die, or are in [a] state of annihilation, oft in a day.
S. Powers. Qu. whether more or one onely ?

Lengths abstract from breadths are the work of the mind.
Such do intersect in a point at all angles. After the same
way colour is abstract from extension.

Every position alters the line.

Qu. whether ideas of extension are made up of other
ideas, v.g. idea of a foot made up of general ideas of an
inch ?

The idea of an inch length not one determin'd idea.
Hence enquire the reason why we are out in judging of
extension by the sight ; for which purpose 'tis meet also to
consider the frequent & sudden changes of extension by
position.

No stated ideas of length without a minimum.
M.' Material substance banter'd by Locke, b. 2. c. 13. s. 19.
M. In my doctrine all absurdities from infinite space <S:c.
cease 2.

Qu. whether if (speaking grossly) the things we see were
all of them at all times too small to be felt, we should have
confounded tangible & visible extension and figure ?

T. Qu. whether if succession of ideas in the -Eternal Mind,
a day does not seem to God a 1000 years, rather than a
1000 years a day?

But one only colour & its degrees.

1 What does he mean by l un- bile, it reaches what is for us the
known substratum ' ? margin of realisable existence : it

2 He gets rid of the infinite in cannot be infinitely little and still
quantity, because it is incapable of a phenomenon : insensible pheno •
concrete manifestation to the senses. mena of sense involve a contradic-
When a phenomenon given in tion. And so too of the infinitely
sense reaches the minimum sensi- large.

COMMONPLACE BOOK 65

Enquiry about a grand mistake in writers of dioptricks
in assigning the cause of microscopes magnifying objects.

Qu. whether a born-blind [man] made to see would at
Ist give the name of distance to any idea intromitted by
sight; since he would take distance yfc that he had per
ceived by touch to be something existing without his mind,
but he would certainly think that nothing seen was without
his mind l ?

S. Space without any bodies existing in rcmm natura would
not be extended, as not having parts — in that parts are
assigned to it wfch respect to body ; from whence also the
notion of distance is taken. Now without either parts or
distance or mind, how can there be Space, or anything
beside one uniform Nothing?

Two demonstrations that blind made to see would not
take all things he saw to be without his mind, or not in a
point — the one from microscopic eyes, the other from not
perceiving distance, i. e. radius of the visual sphere.

M. The trees are in the park, i. e. whether I will or no,
whether I imagine anything about them or no. Let me
but go thither and open my eyes by day, & I shall not
avoid seeing them.

By extension blind [man] would mean either the per
ception caused in his touch by something he calls extended,
or else the power of raising that perception ; wcn power is
without, in the thing termed extended. Now he could not
know either of these to be in things visible till he had
try'd.

Geometry seems to have for its object tangible extension,
figures, cS: motion — and not visible 2.

A man will say a body will seem as big as before, tho'
the visible idea it yields be less than w*- it was ; therefore
the bigness or tangible extension of the body is different
from the visible extension.

Extension or space no simple idea — length, breadth, &
solidity being three several ideas.

1 In short he would idealise the 2 Cf. Essay on Vision, sect. 149-

visible world but not the tangible 59,whereheconcludesthat'neither

world. In the Principles, Berkeley abstract norvisible extension makes

idealises both. the object of geometry.'

BERKELEY: FRASER. I. F

66 COMMONPLACE BOOK

Depth or solidity now perceived by sight *.

Strange impotence of men. Man without God wretch-
eder than a stone or tree ; he having onely the power to
be miserable by his unperformed wills, these having no
power at all 2.

Length perceivable by hearing— length & breadth by
sight — length, breadth, &: depth by touch.
G. Wfc affects us must be a thinking thing, for w* thinks
not cannot subsist.

Number not in bodies, it being the creature of the mind,
depending entirely on its consideration, & being more or
less as the mind pleases :!.

Mem. Quaere whether extension be equally a sensation
with colour ? The mob use not the word extension. 'Tis
an abstract term of the Schools.

P. Round figure a perception or sensation in the mind, but
in the body is a power. L[ocke], b. 2. c. 8. s. 8.

Mem. Mark well the later part of the last cited section.

Solids, or any other tangible things, are no otherwise
seen than colours felt by the German Count.
M. 'Of and ' thing' causes of mistake.

The visible point of he who has microscopical eyes will
not be greater or less than mine.

Qu. Whether the propositions & even axioms of geometry
do not divers of them suppose the existence of lines &c.
without the mind ?

T. Whether motion be the measure of duration ? Locke,
b. 2. c. 14. s. 19 3.

Lines & points conceiv'd as terminations different ideas
from those conceiv'd absolutely.

Every position alters a line.

S. Blind man at i?t would not take colours to be without
his mind ; but colours would seem to be in the same place
with the coloured extension : therefore extension ,wcl not
seem to be without the mind.

1 By the adult, who has learned 3 ' A succession of ideas I take

to interpret its visual signs. to constitute time, and not to be

- Inasmuch as no physical con- only the sensible measure thereof,

sequences/c//ow the volition; which as Mr. Locke and others think.'

however is still self-originated. (Berkeley's letter to Johnson.)

COMMONPLACE BOOK 67

All visible concentric circles whereof the eye is the
centre are absolutely equal.

Infinite number— why absurd — not rightly solv'd by
Locke1.

Qu. how 'tis possible we should see flats or right lines?

Qu. why the moon appears greatest in the horizon 2 ?

Qu. why we see things erect when painted inverted 3 ?

T. Question put by Mr. Deering touching the thief and
paradise.

M. Matter tho' allowed to exist may be no greater than a
pin's head.

Motion is proportionable to space described in given
time.

Velocity not proportionable to space describ'd in given
time.

M. No active power but the Will : therefore Matter, if it
exists, affects us not 4.

Magnitude when barely taken for the ratio partium extra
partes, or rather for co-existence & succession, without
considering the parts co-existing & succeeding, is infinite
ly, or rather indefinitely, or not at all perhaps, divisible,
because it is itself infinite or indefinite. But definite,
determined magnitudes, i.e. lines or surfaces consisting of
points whereby (together wth distance & position) they are
determin'd, are resoluble into those points.

Again. Magnitude taken for co-existence and succession
is not all divisible, but is one simple idea.

Simple ideas include no parts nor relations — hardly sepa
rated and considered in themselves — nor yet rightly singled
by any author. Instance in power, red, extension, &c.
M. Space not imaginable by any idea received from sight-
not imaginable without body moving. Not even then ne
cessarily existing (I speak of infinite space) — for wfc the body
has past may be conceiv'd annihilated.

1 Cf. Essay, Bk. II. ch. 16. 3 Cf. Essay on Vision, sect. 88-
sect. 8. 120.

2 Cf. Essay on Vision, sect. 67- 4 This is of the essence of
77- Berkeley's philosophy.

F 2

68 COMMONPLACE BOOK

M. Qu. What can we see beside colours ? what can we feel
beside hard, soft, cold, warm, pleasure, pain ?

Qu. Why not taste & smell extension ?

Qu. Why not tangible & visible extensions thought
heterogeneous extensions, so well as gustable & olefactible
perceptions thought heterogeneous perceptions? or at
least why not as heterogeneous as blue & red?

Moon w11 horizontal does not appear bigger as to visible
extension than at other times; hence difficulties and dis
putes about things seen under equal angles &c. cease.

All potentice alike indifferent.

A. B. W* does he mean by \\ispotentta ? Is it the will,
desire, person, or all or neither, or sometimes one, some
times t'other ?

No agent can be conceiv'd indifferent as to pain or
pleasure.

We do not, properly speaking, in a strict philosophical
sense, make objects more or less pleasant ; but the laws of
nature do that.

Mo. A finite intelligence might have foreseen 4 thousand
s- years agoe the place and circumstances, even the most
minute & trivial, of my present existence. This true on
supposition that uneasiness determines the will.
S. Doctrines of liberty, prescience, &c. explained by billiard
balls.

Wt judgement would he make of uppermost and lower
most who had always seen through an inverting glass ?

All lines subtending the same optic angle congruent (as
is evident by an easy experiment) ; therefore they are equal.

We have not pure simple ideas of blue, red, or any other
colour (except perhaps black) because all bodies reflect
heterogeneal light.

Qu. Whether this be true as to sounds (& other sensa
tions), there being, perhaps, rays of air wch will onely
exhibit one particular sound, as rays of light one particular
colour.

Colours not definable, not because they are pure unmixt
thoughts, but because we cannot easily distinguish &
separate the thoughts they include, or because we want
names for their component ideas.

COMMONPLACE BOOK 69

S. By Soul is meant onely a complex idea, made up of
existence, willing, & perception in a large sense. There
fore it is known and it may be defined.

We cannot possibly conceive any active power but the
Will.

S. In moral matters men think ('tis true) that they are free;
but this freedom is only the freedom of doing as they
please ; wch freedom is consecutive to the Will, respecting
only the operative faculties a.

Men impute their actions to themselves because they
will'd them, and that not out of ignorance, but whereas
they have the consequences of them, whether good or bad.

This does not prove men to be indifferent in respect of
desiring.

If anything is meant by the potcntia of A. B. it must be
desire ; but I appeal to any man if his desire be indifferent,
or (to speak more to the purpose) whether he himself be
indifferent in respect of w* he desires till after he has
desired it ; for as for desire itself, or the faculty of desiring,
that is indifferent, as all other faculties are.

Actions leading to heaven are in my power if I will
them : therefore I will will them.

Qu. concerning the procession of Wills in infinitum.

Herein mathematiques have the advantage over meta-
physiques and morality. Their definitions, being of words
not yet known to y3 learner, are not disputed ; but words in
metaphysiques & morality, being mostly known to all, the
definitions of them may chance to be contraverted.
M. The short jejune way in mathematiques will not do in
metaphysiques & ethiques : for y* about mathematical
propositions men have no prejudices, no anticipated
opinions to be encounter'd ; they not having yet thought on
such matters. 'Tis not so in the other 2 mentioned
sciences. A man must [there] not onely demonstrate the
truth, he must also vindicate it against scruples and estab
lished opinions which contradict it. In short, the dry,
strigose '2, rigid way will not suffice. He must be more
ample & copious, else his demonstration, tho' never so
exact, will not go down with most.

1 But in moral freedom originates found only in their consequences,
in the agent, instead of being ' con- '-' 'Strigose' strigosus) — meagre,

secutive ' to his voluntary acts or

70 COMMONPLACE BOOK

Extension seems to consist in variety of homogeneal
thoughts co-existing without mixture.

Or rather visible extension seems to be the co-existence
of colour in the mind.

S. Enquiring and judging are actions which depend on the
Mo. operative faculties, wch depend on the Will, wch is de-
termin'd by some uneasiness ; ergo &c. Suppose an agent
wch is finite perfectly indifferent, and as to desiring not
determin'd by any prospect or consideration of good, I say,
this agent cannot do an action morally good. Hence 'tis
evident the suppositions of A. B. are insignificant.

Extension, motion, time, number are no simple ideas,
but include succession to them, which seems to be a simple
idea.

Mem. To enquire into the angle of contact, & into
fluxions, &c.

The sphere of vision is equal whether I look onely in
my hand or on the open firmament, for Ist, in both cases
the retina is full ; 2d, the radius's of both spheres are
equall or rather nothing at all to the sight; 3lll-v, equal
numbers of points in one & t'other.

In the Barrovian case purblind would judge aright.

Why the horizontal moon greater ?

Why objects seen erect ?

N. To what purpose certain figure and texture connected
wth other perceptions ?

Men estimate magnitudes both by angles and distance.
Blind at Ist could not know distance ; or by pure sight,
abstracting from experience of connexion of sight and
tangible ideas, we can't perceive distance. Therefore by
pure sight we cannot perceive or judge of extension.

Qu. Whether it be possible to enlarge our sight or make
us see at once more, or more points, than we do, by dimin
ishing the punctum visibile below 30" ?

I. Speech metaphorical more than we imagine ; insensible
S. things, & their modes, circumstances, &c. being exprest for

the most part by words borrow'd from things sensible.

Hence manyfold mistakes.
S. The grand mistake is that we think we have ideas of the

COMMONPLACE BOOK 71

operations of our minds1. Certainly this metaphorical
dress is an argument we have not.

Qu. How can our idea of God be complex & com
pounded, when his essence is simple & uncompounded ?
V. Locke, b. 2. c. 23. s. 35 2.

G. The impossibility of defining or discoursing clearly of
such things proceeds from the fault & scantiness of
language, as much perhaps -as from obscurity & confusion
of thought. Hence I may clearly and fully understand my
own soul, extension, £c., and not be able to define them ;i.

M. The substance wood a collection of simple ideas. See
Locke, b. 2. c. 26. s. i.

Mem. concerning strait lines seen to look at them
through an orbicular lattice.

Qu. Whether possible that those visible ideas wch are
now connected with greater tangible extensions could
have been connected with lesser tangible extensions,—
there seeming to be no necessary connexion between those
thoughts ?

Speculums seem to diminish or enlarge objects not by
altering the optique angle, but by altering the apparent
distance.

Hence Qu. if blind would think things diminish'd by
convexes, or enlarg'd by concaves ?

P.N. Motion not one idea. It cannot be perceived at once.
M. Mem. To allow existence to colours in the dark, persons
P. not thinking, cScc. — but not an actual existence. 'Tis prudent
to correct men's mistakes without altering their language.
This makes truth glide into their souls insensibly 4.
M. Colours in ye dark do exist really, i. e. were there light ;
P. or as soon as light comes, we shall see them, provided we
open our eyes ; and that whether we will or no.
How the retina is fill'd by a looking-glass?
Convex speculums have the same effect wih concave
glasses.

1 As he afterwards expresses it, means Le Clerc &c. by this? Log.
we have intelligible notions, but I. ch. 8.] — AUTHOR, on margin,
not ideas — sensuous pictures— of ' Si non rogas intelligo.'

the states or acts of our minds. * This way of winning others to

2 [' Omnes reales rerum propri- his own opinions is very character-
etates continentur in Deo.' What isticofEerkeley. Seep.92andnote.

72 COMMONPLACE BOOK

Qu. Whether concave speculums have the same effect
wth convex glasses ?

The reason why convex speculums diminish & concave
magnify not yet fully assign'd by any writer I know.

Qu. Why not objects seen confus'd when that they seem
inverted through a convex lens ?

Qu. How to make a glass or speculum which shall
magnify or diminish by altering the distance without
altering the angle?

No identity (other than perfect likeness) in any indi
viduals besides persons1.

As well make tastes, smells, fear, shame, wit, virtue, vice,
& all thoughts' move wth local motion as immaterial spirit.

On account of my doctrine, the identity of finite sub
stances must consist in something else than continued
existence, or relation to determined time & place of begin
ning to exist — the existence of our thoughts (which being
combined make all substances) being frequently interrupted,
& they having divers beginnings & endings l.

On. WThether identity of person consists not in the
Will ? '

No necessary connexion between great or little optique
angles and great or little extension.

Distance is not perceived : optique angles are not per
ceived. How then is extension perceiv'd by sight?

Apparent magnitude of a line is not simply as the optique
angle, but directly as the optique angle, & reciprocally as
the confusion, &c. (i.e. the other sensations, or want of sen
sation, that attend near vision). Hence great mistakes in
assigning the magnifying power of glasses. Vid. Moly-
[neux], p. 182.

Glasses or speculums may perhaps magnify or lessen
without altering the optique angle, but to no purpose.

Qu. Whether purblind would think objects so much
diminished by a convex speculum as another ?

Qu. Wherein consists identity of person : ? Not in
actual consciousness; for then I'm not the same person
I was this day twelvemonth but while I think of w* I then

1 See Third Dialogue, on same- persons, which it puzzles him to
ness in things and sameness in reconcile with his New Principles.

COMMONPLACE BOOK 73

did. Not in potential ; for then all persons may be the
same, for ought we know.

Mem. Story of Mr. Deering's aunt.

Two sorts of potential consciousness —natural & praeter-
natural. In the last § but one, I mean the latter.

If by magnitude be meant the proportion anything bears
to a determined tangible extension, as inch, foot, &c., this,
'tis plain, cannot be properly & per se perceived by sight ;
& as for determin'd visible inches, feet, &c., there can be
no such thing obtain'd by the meer act of seeing — abstract
ed from experience, &c.

The greatness />£r se perceivable by the sight is onely the
proportion any visible appearance bears to the others seen
at the same time ; or (which is the same thing) the propor
tion of any particular part of the visual orb to the whole.
But mark that we perceive not it is an orb, any more than
a plain, but by reasoning.

This is all the greatness the pictures have per se.

Hereby meere seeing cannot at all judge of the extension
of any object, it not availing to know the object makes such
a part of a sphaerical surface except we also know the
greatness of the sphaerical surface ; for a point may subtend
the same angle wth a mile, & so create as great an image in
the retina, i.e. take up as much of the orb.

Men judge of magnitude by faintness and vigorousness,
by distinctness and confusion, with some other circumstan
ces, by great & little angles.

Hence 'tis plain the ideas of sight which are now connec
ted with greatness might have been connected wth small-
ness, and vice versa : there being no necessary reason why
great angles, faintness, and distinctness without straining,
should stand for great extension, any more than a great
angle, vigorousness, and confusion l.

My end is not to deliver metaphysiques altogether in a
general scholastic way, but in some measure to accommo
date them to the sciences, and shew how they may be
useful in optiques, geometry, &c. 2

Qu. Whether per se proportion of visible magnitudes be
perceivable by sight ? This is put on account of distinct
ness and confusedness, the act of perception seeming to be

1 Cf. Essay on Vision, sect. 52-61. ~ Cf. Principles, sect. 101-134.

74 COMMONPLACE BOOK

as great in viewing any point of the visual orb distinctly,
as in viewing the whole confusedly.

Mem. To correct my language & make it as philoso
phically nice as possible — to avoid giving handle.

If men could without straining alter the convexity of
their crystallines, they might magnify or diminish the
apparent diameters of objects, the same optic angle remain
ing.

The bigness in one sense of the pictures in the fund is
not determin'd ; for the nearer a man views them, the
images of them (as well as other objects) will take up the
greater room in the fund of his eye.

Mem. Introduction to contain the design of the whole,
the nature and manner of demonstrating, &c.

Two sorts of bigness accurately to be distinguished, they
beingperfectlyand toto ccelo different— the one the proportion
that any one appearance has to the sum of appearances per
ceived at the same time wth it, wch is proportional to angles,
or, if a surface, to segments of sphaerical surfaces ; — the
other is tangible bigness.

Qu. wfc would happen if the sphaerse of the retina were
enlarged or diminished ?

We think by the meer act of vision we perceive distance
from us, yet we do not ; also that we perceive solids, yet
we do not ; also the inequality of things seen under the
same angle, yet we do not.

Why may I not add, We think we see extension by meer
vision ? Yet we do not.

Extension seems to be perceived by the eye, as thought
by the ear.

As long as the same angle determines the minimum
visibile to two persons, no different conformation of the eye
can make a different appearance of magnitude in the same
thing. But, it being possible to try the angle, we may cer
tainly know whether the same thing appears differently
big to two persons on account of their eyes.

If a man could see " objects would appear larger to him
than to another; hence there is another sort of purely
visible magnitude beside the proportion any appearance
bears to the visual sphere, viz. its proportion to the M. V.

Were there but one and the same language in the world,
and did children speak it naturally as soon as born, and

COMMONPLACE BOOK 75

were it not in the power of men to conceal their thoughts
or deceive others, but that there were an inseparable
connexion between words & thoughts, so y* posito uno,
ponitur alterum by the laws of nature ; Qu. would not men
think they heard thoughts as much as that they see exten
sion T ?

All our ideas are adaequate : our knowledge of the laws
of nature is not perfect & adaequate 2.

M. Men are in the right in judging their simple ideas to be
P. in the things themselves. Certainly heat & colour is as
much without the mind as figure, motion, time, &c.

We know many things wch we want words to express.
Great things discoverable upon this principle. For want of
considering wch divers men have run into sundry mistakes,
endeavouring to set forth their knowledge by sounds ; wcl1
foundering them, they thought the defect was in their
knowledge, while in truth it was in their language.

Qu. Whether the sensations of sight arising from a
man's head be liker the sensations of touch proceeding
from thence or from his legs ?

Or, Is it onely the constant & long association of ideas
entirely different that makes me judge them the same?

Wfc I see is onely variety of colours & light. Wfc I feel
is hard or soft, hot or cold, rough or smooth, &c. Wfc
resemblance have these thoughts with those ?

A picture painted wth great variety of colours affects the
touch in one uniform manner. I cannot therefore conclude
that because I see 2, I shall feel 2 ; because I see angles or
inequalities, I shall feel angles or inequalities. How there
fore can I — before experience teaches me — know that the
visible leggs are (because 2) connected wth the tangible
ones, or the visible head (because one) connected wth the
tangible head 3 ?

1 ' distance ' — on opposite page phenomena ; indirect or scientific
in the MS. Cf. Essay on Vision, perception is inadequate, leaving
sect. 140. room for faith and trust.

2 Direct perception of pheno- 3 Cf.Essayon Vision^ sect. 107-8.
mena is adequate to the perceived

76 COMMONPLACE BOOK

M. All things by us conceivable are —

ist, thoughts ;

2ndly, powers to receive thoughts ;

Srdly, powers to cause thoughts ;

neither of all wch can possibly exist in an inert, senseless
thing.

An object wthout a glass may be seen under as great an
angle as wth a glass. A glass therefore does not magnify
the appearance by the angle.

S. Absurd that men should know the soul by idea — ideas
being inert, thoughtless. Hence Malbranch confuted1.

I saw gladness in his looks. I saw shame in his face.
So I see figure or distance.

Qu. Why things seen confusedly thro' a convex glass are
not magnify'd ?

Tho' we should judge the horizontal moon to be more

distant, why should we therefore judge her to be greater ?

What connexion betwixt the same angle, further distant,

and greaterness ?

N. My doctrine affects the essences of the Corpuscularians.

Perfect circles, &c. exist not without (for none can so
exist, whether perfect or no), but in the mind.

Lines thought divisible ad infinitum, because they are
suppos'd to exist without. Also because they are thought
the same when view'd by the naked eye, & wn view'd thro'
magnifying glasses.

They who knew not glasses had not so fair a pretence
for the divisibility ad infinitum.

No idea of circle, &c. in abstract.

Metaphysiques as capable of certainty as ethiques, but
not so capable to be demonstrated in a geometrical way ;
because men see clearer & have not so many prejudices in
ethiques.

Visible ideas come into the mind very distinct. So do
tangible ideas. Hence extension seen & felt. Sounds,
tastes, £c. are more blended.

Qu. Why not extension intromitted by the taste in con
junction with the smell— seeing tastes £: smells are very
distinct ideas?

1 The Divine Ideas of Malebrancheand the sensuous ideas of Berkeley
differ.

COMMONPLACE BOOK 77

Blew and yellow particles mixt, while they exhibit an
uniform green, their extension is not perceiv'd ; but as
soon as they exhibit distinct sensations of blew and yellow,
then their extension is perceiv'd.

Distinct perception of visible ideas not so perfect as of
tangible— tangible ideas being many at once equally vivid.
Hence heterogeneous extension.

Object. Why a mist increases not the apparent magni
tude of an object, in proportion to the faintness1?

Mem. To enquire touching the squaring of the circle, &c.

That wcn seems smooth & round to the touch may to
sight seem quite otherwise. Hence no necessary con
nexion betwixt visible ideas and tangible ones.

In geometry it is not prov'd that an inch is divisible ad
infinitum.

Geometry not conversant about our compleat determined
ideas of figures, for these are not divisible ad infmitiun.

Particular circles may be squar'd, for the circumference
being given a diameter may be found betwixt wcn & the
true there is not any perceivable difference. Therefore
there is no difference — extension being a perception ; & a
perception not perceiv d is contradiction, nonsense, nothing.
In vain to alledge the difference may be seen by magnify-
ing-glasses, for in y* case there is ('tis true) a difference
perceiv'd, but not between the same ideas, but others much
greater, entirely different therefrom 2.

Any visible circle possibly perceivable of any man may
be squar'd, by the common way, most accurately; or even
perceivable by any other being, see he never so acute, i. e.
never so small an arch of a circle ; this being w* makes
the distinction between acute & dull sight, and not the
m. v., as men are perhaps apt to think.

The same is true of any tangible circle. Therefore
further enquiry of accuracy in squaring or other curves is
perfectly needless, & time thrown away.

Mem. To press wfc last precedes more homely, & so
think on't again.

A meer line or distance is not made up of points, does

1 Cf. Essay on Vision, sect. 71. chapters seem to have been in

2 Cf. Malebranche, Recherche, Berkeley's mind.
Bk. I. c. 6. That and the following

78 COMMONPLACE BOOK

not exist, cannot be imagin'd, or have an idea framed
thereof, — no more than meer colour without extension l.

Mem. A great difference between considering length
wthout breadth, & having an idea of, or imagining, length
without breadth 2.

Malbranch out touching the crystallines diminishing,
L. i.e. 6.

'Tis possible (& perhaps not very improbable, that is, is
sometimes so) we may have the greatest pictures from the
least objects. Therefore no necessary connexion betwixt
visible & tangible ideas. These ideas, viz. great relation
to sphcera visualis, or to the m. v. (wch is all that I would
have meant by having a greater picture) & faintness, might
possibly have stood for or signify'd small tangible exten
sions. Certainly the greater relation to s. v. and m. v.
does frequently, in that men view little objects near the
eye.

Malbranch out in asserting we cannot possibly know
whether there are 2 men in the world that see a thing of
the same bigness. V. L. i. c. 6.

Diagonal of particular square commensurable wth its
side, they both containing a certain number of m. v.

I do not think that surfaces consist of lines, i. e. meer
distances. Hence perhaps may be solid that sophism wcl1
would prove the oblique line equal to the perpendicular
between 2 parallels.

Suppose an inch represent a mile, yoiio °f an mch is
nothing, but TTylair of ye mile represented is something :
therefore j^y of an inch, tho' nothing, is not to be
neglected, because it represents something, i. e. ToVo of
a mile.

Particular determin'd lines are not divisible ad infinitum,
but lines as us'd by geometers are so, they not being deter-
min'd to any particular finite number of points. Yet a
geometer (he knows not why) will very readily say he can
demonstrate an inch line is divisible ad infinitum.

A body moving in the optique axis not perceiv'd to move
by sight merely, and without experience. There is ('tis

1 He here assumes that extension keley's use of ' idea/ and what he
(visible) is implied in the visible intends when he argues against
idea we call colour. l abstract ' ideas.

2 This strikingly illustrates Ber-

COMMONPLACE BOOK 79

true) a successive change of ideas, — it seems less and less.
But, besides this, there is no visible change of place.

Mem. To enquire most diligently concerning the incom
mensurability of diagonale & side — whether it does not go
on the supposition of units being divisible ad infinitum, i. e.
of the extended thing spoken of being divisible ad infinitum
(unit being nothing; also v. Barrow, Lect. Geom.), & so
the infinite indivisibility deduced therefrom is a pctitio
principii?

The diagonal is commensurable with the side.
M. From Malbranch, Locke, & my first arguings it can't be
p- prov'd that extension is not in matter. From Locke's
arguings it can't be proved that colours are not in bodies.

Mem. That I was distrustful at 8 years old ; and conse
quently by nature disposed for these new doctrines '.

Qu. How can a line consisting of an unequal number of
points be divisible [ad infinitum} in two equals ?

Mem. To discuss copiously how & why we do not see
the pictures.

M. Allowing extensions to exist in matter, we cannot know
p- even their proportions — contrary to Malbranch.

M. I wonder how men cannot see a truth so obvious, as
that extension cannot exist without a thinking substance.

M. Species of all sensible things made by the mind. This
prov'd either by turning men's eyes into magnifyers or
diminishers.

Yr m. v. is, suppose, less than mine. Let a 3rd person
have perfect ideas of both our m. vs. His idea of my m. v.
contains his idea of yours, & somewhat more. Therefore
'tis made up of parts : therefore his idea of my m. v. is not
perfect or just, which diverts the hypothesis.

Qu. Whether a m. v. or t. be extended ?

Mem. The strange errours men run into about the pic
tures. We think them small because should a man be
suppos'd to see them their pictures would take up but little
room in the fund of his eye.

1 An interesting autobiographical fact. From childhood he was indis
posed to take things on trust.

8o COMMONPLACE BOOK

It seems all lines can't be bisected in 2 equall parts.
Mem. To examine how the geometers prove the contrary.

'Tis impossible there should be a m. v. less than mine.
If there be, mine may become equal to it (because they are
homogeneous) by detraction of some part or parts. But it
consists not of parts, ergo &c.

Suppose inverting perspectives bound to ye eyes of a
child, & continu'd to the years of manhood — when he looks
up, or turns up his head, he shall behold w* we call under.
Qu. What would he think of up and down 1 ?

M. I wonder not at my sagacity in discovering the obvious
tho' amazing truth. I rather wonder at my stupid inadver
tency in not finding it out before — 'tis no witchcraft to see.

M. Our simple ideas are so many simple thoughts or per
ceptions ; a perception cannot exist without a thing to
perceive it, or any longer than it is perceiv'd ; a thought
cannot be in an unthinking thing ; one uniform simple
thought can be like to nothing but another uniform simple
thought. Complex thoughts or ideas are onely an assem
blage of simple ideas, and can be the image of nothing, or
like unto nothing, but another assemblage of simple ideas, &c.

M. The Cartesian opinion of light & colours &c. is orthodox
enough even in their eyes who think the Scripture ex
pression may favour the common opinion. Why may not
mine also ? But there is nothing in Scripture that can
possibly be wrested to make against me, but, perhaps,
many things for me.

M. Bodies &c. do exist whether we think of 'em or no, they
being taken in a twofold sense —

1. Collections of thoughts.

2. Collections of powers to cause those thoughts.

These later exist ; tho' perhaps a parte rei it may be one
simple perfect power.

Qu. whether the extension of a plain, look'd at straight
and slantingly, survey'd minutely & distinctly, or in the bulk
and confusedly at once, be the same? N.B. The plain is
suppos'd to keep the same distance.

1 Essay on Vision, sect. 88-119.

COMMONPLACE BOOK 8l

The ideas we have by a successive, curious inspection of
ye minute parts of a plain do not seem to make up the ex
tension of that plain view'd & consider'd all together.

Ignorance in some sort requisite in ye person that should
disown the Principle.

Thoughts do most properly signify, or are mostly taken
for the interior operations of the mind, wherein the mind
is active. Those y* obey not the acts of volition, and in
wch the mind is passive, are more properly call'd sensations
or perceptions. But y* is all a case of words.

Extension being the collection or distinct co-existence of
minimums, i.e. of perceptions intromitted by sight or touch,
it cannot be conceiv'd without a perceiving substance.

P. Malbranch does not prove that the figures & extensions
exist not when they are not perceiv'd. Consequently he
does not prove, nor can it be prov'd on his principles, that
the sorts are the work of the mind, and onely in the mind.

M. The great argument to prove that extension cannot be in

P. an unthinking substance is, that it cannot be conceiv'd
distinct from or without all tangible or visible quality.

M. Tho' matter be extended wth an indefinite extension, yet
the mind makes the sorts. They were not before the mind
perceiving them, & even now they are not without the
mind. Houses, trees, &cv tho' indefinitely extended matter
do exist, are not without the mind.

M. The great danger of making extension exist without the
mind is, that if it does it must be acknowledg'd infinite,
immutable, eternal, &c. ; — wch will be to make either God
extended (wch I think dangerous), or an eternal, immutable,
infinite, increate Being beside God.

I. Finiteness of our minds no excuse for the geometers.

M. The Principle easily proved by plenty of arguments ad
absurdum.

The twofold signification of Bodies, viz.

1. Combinations of thoughts ] ;

2. Combinations of powers to raise thoughts1.

'[ 'thoughts/ i.e. ideas of sense?
BERKELEY: FRASER. i. G

82 COMMONPLACE BOOK

These, I say, in conjunction with homogeneous particles,
may solve much better the objections from the creation
than the supposition that Matter does exist. Upon woh
supposition I think they cannot be solv'd.

Bodies taken for powers do exist wn not perceiv'd ; but
this existence is not actual \ W11 I say a power exists, no
more is meant than that if in the light I open my eyes, and
look that way, I shall see it, i.e. the body, &c.

Qu. whether blind before sight may not have an idea of
light and colours & visible extension, after the same man
ner as we perceive them wth eyes shut, or in the dark — not
imagining, but seeing after a sort ?

Visible extension cannot be conceiv'd added to tangible
extension. Visible and tangible points can't make one sum.
Therefore these extensions are heterogeneous.

A probable method propos'd whereby one may judge
whether in near vision there is a greater distance between
the crystalline & fund than usual, or whether the crystalline
be onely render'd more convex. If the former, then the
v. s. is enlarg'd, & the m. v. corresponds to less than 30", or
w'ever it us'd to correspond to.

Stated measures, inches, feet, &c., are tangible not
visible extensions.

M. Locke, More, Raphson, &c. seem to make God extended.
'Tis nevertheless of great use to religion to take extension
out of our idea of God, & put a power in its place. It
seems dangerous to suppose extension, wch is manifestly
inert, in God.

M. But, say you, The thought or perception 1 call extension
is not itself in an unthinking thing or Matter — but it is like
something wch is in Matter. Well, say I, Do you appre
hend or conceive wfc you say extension is like unto, or do
you not? If the later, how know you they are alike?
How can you compare any things besides your own ideas ?
If the former, it must be an idea, i.e. perception, thought,

1 This, in a crude way, is the speaks of the ideas or phenomena

distinction of Swapis and tvtpyfia. that appear in the sense experience

It helps to explain Berkeley's of different persons as if they were

meaning, when he occasionally absolutely independent entities.

COMMONPLACE BOOK 83

or sensation— wch to be in an unperceiving thing is a con
tradiction *.

I. I abstain from all flourish & powers of words & figures;
using a great plainness & simplicity of simile, having oft
found it difficult to understand those that use the lofty &
Platonic, or subtil & scholastique strain 2.

M. Whatsoever has any of our ideas in it must perceive ; it
being that very having, that passive recognition of ideas,
that denominates the mind perceiving — that being the very
essence of perception, or that wherein perception consists.

The faintness wch alters the appearance of the horizontal
moon, rather proceeds from the quantity or grossness of
the intermediate atmosphere, than from any change of
distance, wch is perhaps not considerable enough to be a
total cause, but may be a partial of the phenomenon. N.B.
The visual angle is less in cause the horizon.

We judge of the distance of bodies, as by other things,
so also by the situation of their pictures in the eye, or (wclx
is the same thing) according as they appear higher or lower.
Those wch seem higher are farther off.

Qu. why we see objects greater in ye dark? whether
this can be solv'd by any but my Principles ?

M. The reverse of ye Principle introduced scepticism.
M. N.B. On my Principles there is a reality: there are
things : there is a rerum nattira.

Mem. The surds, doubling the cube, &c.

We think that if just made to see we should judge of the
distance & magnitude of things as we do now ; but this is
false. So also w* we think so positively of the situation of
objects.

Hays's, KeilPs3, £c. method of proving the infinitesimals
of the 3d order absurd, & perfectly contradictions.

1 To be ' in an unperceiving is not in the tone of Sin's.
thing,' i.e. to be real, yet unper- 3 John Keill (1671-1721), an em-
ceived. Whatever is perceived is, inent mathematician, educated at
because realised only through a the University of Edinburgh ; in
percipient act, an idea — in Berke- 1710 Savilian Professor of Astro-
ley's use of the word. nomy at Oxford, and the first to

" This as to the ' Platonic strain ' teach the Newtonian philosophy in

C 2

84 COMMONPLACE BOOK

Angles of contact, & verily all angles comprehended by
a right line & a curve, cannot be measur'd, the arches
intercepted not being similar.

The danger of expounding the H. Trinity by extension.

M. Qu. Why should the magnitude seen at a near distance
P. be deem'd the true one rather than that seen at a farther
distance ? Why should the sun be thought many 1000
miles rather than one foot in diameter — both being equally
apparent diameters? Certainly men judg'd of the sun not
in himself, but wth relation to themselves.

M. 4 Principles whereby to answer objections, viz.

1. Bodies do really exist, tho' not perceiv'd by us.

2. There is a law or course of nature.

3. Language & knowledge are all about ideas ; words

stand for nothing else.

4. Nothing can be a proof against one side of a con

tradiction that bears equally hard upon the other l.

What shall I say? Dare I pronounce the admired
aKpifitia mathematica, that darling of the age, a trifle ?

Most certainly no finite extension divisible ad mfinitum.
M. Difficulties about concentric circles.

N. Mem. To examine & accurately discuss the scholium of
the 8th definition of Mr. Newton's2 Principia.

Ridiculous in the mathematicians to despise Sense.

Qu. Is it not impossible there should be abstract general
ideas ?

All ideas come from without. They are all particular.
The mind, 'tis true, can consider one thing wthout another ;
but then, considered asunder, they make not 2 ideas.
Both together can make but one, as for instance colour &
visible extension 3.

that University. In 1708 he was for Hamilton's law of the con-
engaged in a controversy in sup- ditioned.

port of Newton's claims to the a Newton became Sir Isaac on

discovery of the method of flux- April 16, 1705. Was this written

ions. before that date ?

1 This suggests a negative argu- 3 These may be considered separ-

ment for Kant's antinomies, and ately, but not pictured as such.

COMMONPLACE BOOK 85

The end of a mathematical line is nothing. Locke's
argument that the end of his pen is black or white concludes
nothing here.

Mem. Take care how you pretend to define extension,
for fear of the geometers.

Qu. Why difficult to imagine a minimum ? Ans. Because
we are not used to take notice of 'em singly ; they not
being able singly to pleasure or hurt us, thereby to deserve
our regard.

Mem. To prove against Keill y* the infinite divisibility of
matter makes the half have an equal number of equal parts
with the whole.

Mem. To examine how far the not comprehending
infinites may be admitted as a plea.

Qu. Why may not the mathematicians reject all the
extensions below the M. as well as the dd4, &c., wch are
allowed to be something, & consequently may be magnify'd
by glasses into inches, feet, &c., as well as the quantities
next below the M. ?

Big, little, and number are the works of the mind. How
therefore can ye extension you suppose in Matter be big or
little ? How can it consist of any number of points ?
P. Mem. Strictly to remark Lfocke], b. 2. c. 8. s. 8.

Schoolmen compar'd with the mathematicians.

Extension is blended wth tangible or visible ideas, & by
the mind praescinded therefrom.

Mathematiques made easy — the scale does almost all.
The scale can tell us the subtangent in ye parabola is
double the abscisse.

Wfc need of the utmost accuracy wn the mathematicians
own in rerum natura they cannot find anything corre
sponding wth their nice ideas.

One should endeavour to find a progression by trying
wth the scale.

Newton's fluxions needless. Anything below an M
might serve for Leibnitz's Differential Calculus.

How can they hang together so well, since there are in
them (I mean the mathematiques) so many contradictorice
argutice. V. Barrow, Lect.

A man may read a book of Conies with ease, knowing
how to try if they are right. He may take 'em on the
credit of the author.

86 COMMONPLACE BOOK

Where's the need of certainty in such trifles? The
thing that makes it so much esteem'd in them is that we
are thought not capable of getting it elsewhere. But we
may in ethiques and metaphysiques.

The not leading men into mistakes no argument for
the truth of the infinitesimals. They being nothings may
perhaps do neither good nor harm, except wn they are
taken for something, & then the contradiction begets
a contradiction.

a + 500 nothings = a + 50 nothings — an innocent silly truth.

M. My doctrine excellently corresponds wth the creation.
I suppose no matter, no stars, sun, &c. to have existed
before '.

It seems all circles are not similar figures, there not
being the same proportion betwixt all circumferences &
their diameters.

When a small line upon paper represents a mile, the
mathematicians do not calculate theum^ of the paper line,
they calculate the To<jo(7 °f the mile. 'Tis to this they
have regard, 'tis of this they think ; if they think or have
any idea at all. The inch perhaps might represent to their
imaginations the mile, but ye T<ymro- of the in°h cannot be
made to represent anything, it not being imaginable.

But the louzro of a niile being somewhat, they think the
T -oiop- of tne inch is somewhat : w11 they think of y* they
imagine they think on this.

3 faults occur in the arguments of the mathematicians for
divisibility ad infinitum —

1. They suppose extension to exist without the mind,

or not perceived.

2. They suppose that we have an idea of length

without breadth 2, or that length without breadth
does exist.

3. That unity is divisible ad infinitum.

To suppose a M. S. divisible is to say there are distin
guishable ideas where there are no distinguishable ideas.

1 In as far as they have not 2 [Or rather that invisible lengt

been sensibly realised in finite per- does exist.] — AUTHOR, on margin,
cipient mind.

COMMONPLACE BOOK 87

The M. S. is not near so inconceivable as the signnm in
magnitudine individmun.

Mem. To examine the math, about their point — what it
is— something or nothing; and how it differs from the
M. S.

All might be demonstrated by a new method of indi
visibles, easier perhaps and juster than that of Cavalierius \

p ' Unperceivable perception a contradiction.
G*. Proprietates reales rerum omnium in Deo, tarn corporum
quum spirituum continentur. Clerici, Log. cap. 8.

Let my adversaries answer any one of mine, I'll yield.
If 1 don't answer every one of theirs, I'll yield.

The loss of the excuse 2 may hurt Transubstantiation,
but not the Trinity.

We need not strain our imaginations to conceive such
little things. Bigger may do as well for infinitesimals,
since the integer must be an infinite.

Evident y* wch has an infinite number of parts must be
infinite.

Qu. Whether extension be resoluble into points it does
not consist of?

Nor can it be objected that we reason about numbers,
wch are only words & not ideas 3 ; for these infinitesimals
are words of no use, if not supposed to stand for ideas.

Axiom. No reasoning about things whereof we have no
idea. Therefore no reasoning about infinitesimals.

Much less infinitesimals of infinitesimals, &c.

Axiom. No word to be used without an idea.

M. Our eyes and senses inform us not of the existence of
p- matter or ideas existing without the mind 4. They are not
to be blam'd for the mistake.

' Bonaventura Cavalieri (1598- with meanings not realisable in

1647), the Italian mathematician. imagination, i.e. in the form of

His Geometry of Indivisibles (1635) idea, may discharge a useful office,

prepared the way for the Calculus. See Principles, Introduction, sect.

2 [By ' the excuse ' is meant the 20.

finiteness of our mind— making it 4 We do not perceive unperceived

possible for contradictions to appear matter, but only matter realised in

true to us.] — AUTHOR, on margin. living perception — the percipient

:! He allows elsewhere that words act being the factor of its reality.

88 COMMONPLACE BOOK

I defy any man to assign a right line equal to a paraboloid,
but w11 look'd at thro' a microscope they may appear unequall.

M. Newton's harangue amounts to no more than that gravity
is proportional to gravity.

One can't imagine an extended thing without colour.
V. Barrow, L. G.

P. Men allow colours, sounds, (Sec.1 not to exist without the
mind, tho' they have no demonstration they do not. Why
may they not allow my Principle with a demonstration ?

M. Qu. Whether I had not better allow colours to exist

P. without the mind ; taking the mind for the active thing wch
1 call 'I,' 'myself — yfc seems to be distinct from the under
standing2?

p. The taking extension to be distinct from all other tangible
& visible qualities, & to make an idea by itself, has made
men take it to be without the mind.

I see no wit in any of them but Newton. The rest are
meer triflers, mere Nihilarians.

The folly of the mathematicians in not judging of sensa
tions by their senses. Reason was given us for nobler uses.
M. KeilPs filling the world with a mite 3. This follows from
the divisibility of extension ad infinitum.

Extension, or length without breadth, seems to be
nothing save the number of points that lie betwixt any 2,
points4. It seems to consist in meer proportion — meer
reference of the mind.

To what purpose is it to determine the forms of glasses
geometrically ?

Sir Isaac5 owns his book could have been demonstrated
on the supposition of indivisibles.
M. Innumerable vessels of matter. V. Cheyne.

I'll not admire the mathematicians. 'Tis w* any one of

1 The secondary qualities of Earl of Pembroke.

things. 4 [Extension without breadth —

2 Because, while dependent on i. c. insensible, intangible length —
percipient sense, they are inde- is not conceivable. 'Tis a mistake
pendent of my personal will, being we are led into by the doctrine of
determined to appear under natural abstraction.] — AUTHOR, on margin
law, by Divine agency. of MS.

3 Keill's Introdudio ad verani 5 Here ' Sir Isaac.' Hence
Physicam (Oxon. 1702) — Lectio 5 — written after April, 1705.

a curious work, dedicated to the

COMMONPLACE BOOK 89

common sense might attain to by repeated acts. I prove
it by experience. I am but one of human sense, and I Stc.

Mathematicians have some of them good parts— the more
is the pity. Had they not been mathematicians they had
been good for nothing. They were such fools they knew
not how to employ their parts.

The mathematicians could not so much as tell wherein
truth & certainty consisted, till Locke told 'em '. I see the
best of 'em talk of light and colours as if wthout the mind.

By thing I either mean ideas or that wch has ideas 2.

Nullum pneclarum ingenium unquam fuit magnus mathe-
maticus. Scaliger3.

A great genius cannot stoop to such trifles & minutenesses
as they consider.

1. 4 All significant words stand for ideas5.

2. All knowledge about our ideas.

3. All ideas come from without or from within.

4. If from without it must be by the senses, & they are
call'd sensations6.

5. If from within they are the operations of the mind, &
are called thoughts.

6. No sensation can be in a senseless thing.

7. No thought can be in a thoughtless thing.

8. All our ideas are either sensations or thoughts7, by 3,

4; 5-

9. None of our ideas can be in a thing wch is both
thoughtless & senseless 8, by 6, 7, 8.

10. The bare passive recognition or having of ideas is
called perception.

11. Whatever has in it an idea, tho' it be never so
passive, tho' it exert no manner of act about it, yet it must
perceive. 10.

1 Essay, Bk. IV. ch. iv. sect. 18 ; 5 'Idea' here used in its wider
ch. v. sect. 3, &c. meaning — for ' operations of mind,'

2 He applies thing to self-con- as well as for sense presented pheno-
scious persons as well as to passive mena that are independent of indi-
objects of sense. vidual will. Cf. Principles, sect. r.

3 Scaligerana Seciinda, p. 270. c ' sensations,' i. e. objective

4 [These arguments must be phenomena presented in sense,
proposed shorter and more sepa- 7 Se'e Principles, sect. i.
rate in the Treatise.] — AUTHOR, on 8 See Principles, sect. 2.
margin.

90 COMMONPLACE BOOK

12. All ideas either are simple ideas, or made up of simple
ideas.

13. That thing wch is like unto another thing must agree
wfck it in one or more simple ideas.

14. Whatever is like a simple idea must either be another
simple idea of the same sort, or contain a simple idea of
the same sort. 13.

15. Nothing like an idea can be in an unperceiving thing.
11, 14. Another demonstration of the same thing.

16. Two things cannot be said to be alike or unlike till
they have been compar'd.

17. Comparing is the viewing two ideas together, &
marking wt they agree in and w* they disagree in.

18. The mind can compare nothing but its own ideas. 17.

19. Nothing like an idea can be in an unperceiving thing,
n, 16, 1 8.

N.B. Other arguments innumerable, both a priori &
a posteriori, drawn from all the sciences, from the clearest,
plainest, most obvious truths, whereby to demonstrate the
Principle, i. e. that neither our ideas, nor anything like our
ideas, can possibly be in an unperceiving thing \

N.B. Not one argument of any kind whoever, certain or
probable, a priori or a posteriori, from any art or science,
from either sense or reason, against it.

Mathematicians have no right idea of angles. Hence
angles of contact wrongly apply'd to prove extension
divisible ad infinitum.

We have got the Algebra of pure intelligences.

We can prove Newton's propositions more accurately,
more easily, &: upon truer principles than himself2.

Barrow owns the downfall of geometry. However I'll
endeavour to rescue it— so far as it is useful, or real, or
imaginable, or intelligible. But for the nothings, I'll leave
them to their admirers.

1 An 'unperceiving thing' can- solutions of problems, themselves

not be the factor of material reality. must own to fall infinitely short of

- [To the utmost accuracy, want- perfection.] — AUTHOR, on margin,
ing nothing of perfection. Their

COMMONPLACE BOOK 9!

I'll teach any one the whole course of mathematiques in
ilu part the time that another will.

Much banter got from the prefaces of the mathematicians.
P. Newton says colour is in the subtil matter. Hence
Malbranch proves nothing, or is mistaken, in asserting there
is onely figure & motion.

I can square the circle, &c. ; they cannot. Wch goes on
the best principles ?

The Billys ' use a finite visible line for an — .

m

T. Marsilius Ficinus — his appearing the moment he died

solv'd by my idea of time2.

M. The philosophers lose their abstract or unperceived Mat
ter. The mathematicians lose their insensible sensations.
The profane [lose] their extended Deity. Pray wfc do the
rest of mankind lose ? As for bodies, £c., we have them
still 3.

N.B. The future nat. philosoph. & mathem. get vastly by
the bargain 4.

P. There are men who say there are insensible extensions.
There are others who say the wall is not white, the fire is
not hot, &c. We Irishmen cannot attain to these truths.

The mathematicians think there are insensible lines.
About these they harangue : these cut in a point at all
angles : these are divisible ad infinitwm. We Irishmen
can conceive no such lines.

The mathematicians talk of w* they call a point. This,
they say, is not altogether nothing, nor is it downright
something. Now we Irishmen are apt to think something"
& nothing are next neighbours.

Engagements to P. G on account of ye Treatise that grew
up under his eye ; on account also of his approving my

1 Jean de Billy and Rene de Billy, * So far as we are factors of their
French mathematicians — the former reality, in sense and in science, or
author of Nova Geotnetrice Claris and can be any practical way concerned
other mathematical works. with them.

2 According to Baronius, in the * Cf. Principles, sect. 101-34.
fifth volume of his ' Annals/ Ficinus 5 ' something/ i. e. abstract some-
appeared after death to Michael thing.

Mercatus — agreeably to a promise 6 Lord Pembroke (?)— to whom

he made when he was alive — to the Principles were dedicated, and

assure him of the life of the human to whom Locke dedicated his Essay.
spirit after the death of the body.

92 COMMONPLACE BOOK

harangue. Glorious for P. to be the protector of usefull
tho' newly discover'd truths.

How could I venture thoughts into the world before I
knew they would be of use to the world ? and how could I
know that till I had try'd how they suited other men's ideas ?

I publish not this so much for anything else as to know
whether other men have the same ideas as we Irishmen.
This is my end, & not to be inform'd as to my own parti
cular.

My speculations have the same effect as visiting foreign
countries : in the end I return where I was before, but my
heart at ease, and enjoying life with new satisfaction.

Passing through all the sciences, though false for the
most part, yet it gives us the better insight and greater
knowledge of the truth.

He that would bring another over to his opinion, must
seem to harmonize with him at first, and humour him in
his own way of talking ].

From my childhood I had an unaccountable turn of
thought that way *.

It doth not argue a dwarf to have greater strength than
a giant, because he can throw off the molehill which is
upon him, while the other struggles beneath a mountain.

The whole directed to practise and morality— as ap
pears isfc, from making manifest the nearness and omni
presence of God ; 2d\y, from cutting off the useless labour
of sciences, and so forth.

1 This is an interesting example in the Essay on Vision, and so

of a feature that is conspicuous prepares to unfold and defend them

in Berkeley — the art of ' humour- in the book of Principles and the

ing an opponent in his own way three Dialogues — straininglanguage

of thinking,' which it seems was to reconcile them, with ordinary

an early habit. It is thus that modes of speech,
he insinuates his New Principles

AN ESSAY

TOWARDS

A NEW THEORY OF VISION

First published in 1 709

EDITOR'S PREFACE

TO THE

ESSAY TOWARDS A NEW
THEORY OF VISION

BERKELEY'S Essay towards a New Theory of Vision was
meant to prepare the way for the exposition and defence
of the new theory of the material world, its natural
order, and its relation to Spirit, that is contained in
his book of Principles and in the relative Dialogues,
which speedily followed. The Essay was the firstfruits
of his early philosophical studies at Dublin. It was also
the first attempt to show that our apparently immediate
Vision of Space and of bodies extended in three-dimen
sioned space, is either tacit or conscious inference,
occasioned by constant association of the phenomena of
which alone we are visually percipient with assumed
realities of our tactual and locomotive experience.

The first edition of the Essay appeared early in 1709,
when its author was about twenty-four years of age. A
second edition, with a few verbal changes and an Appendix,
followed before the end of that year. Both were issued
in Dublin, 'printed by Aaron Rhames, at the back of

96 EDITOR'S PREFACE TO THE

Dick's Coffeehouse, for Jeremy Pepyat, bookseller in
Skinner Row/ In March, 1732, a third edition, without
the Appendix, was annexed to Alciphron, on account of
its relation to the Fourth Dialogue in that book. This
was the author's last revision.

In the present edition the text of this last edition is
adopted, after collation with those preceding. The Appen
dix has been restored, and also the Dedication to Sir John
Percival, which appeared only in the first edition.

A due appreciation of Berkeley's theory of seeing, and
his conception of the visible world, involves a study, not
merely of this tentative juvenile Essay, but also of its
fuller development and application in his more matured
works. This has been commonly forgotten by his critics.

Various circumstances contribute to perplex and even
repel the reader of the Essay, making it less fit to be an
easy avenue of approach to Berkeley's Principles.

Its occasion and design, and its connexion with his
spiritual conception of the material world, are suggested
in Sections 43 and 44 of the Principles. Those sections
are a key to the Essay. They inform us that in the
Essay the author intentionally uses language which
seems to attribute a reality independent of all percipient
spirit to the ideas or phenomena presented in Touch ;
it being beside his purpose, he says, to 'examine and
refute' that 'vulgar error' in 'a work on Vision.' This
studied reticence of a verbally paradoxical conception of
Matter, in reasonings about vision which are fully in
telligible only under that conception, is one cause of
a want of philosophical lucidity in the Essay.

Another circumstance adds to the embarrassment of
those who approach the Principles and the three Dialogues
through the Essay on Vision. The Essay offers no
exception to the lax employment of equivocal words
familiar in the early literature of English philosophy,

ESSAY TOWARDS A NEW THEORY OF VISION 97

but which is particularly inconvenient in the subtle
discussions to which we are here introduced. At the
present day we are perhaps accustomed to more precision
and uniformity in the philosophical use of language ;
at any rate we connect other meanings than those
here intended with some of the leading words. It is
enough to refer to such terms as idea, notion, sensation,
perception, touch, externality, distance, and their conjugates.
It is difficult for the modern reader to revive and re
member the meanings which Berkeley intends by idea and
notion — so significant in his vocabulary; and touch with
him connotes muscular and locomotive experience as well
as the pure sense of contact. Interchange of the terms
outward, outness, externality, without the mind, and without
the eye is confusing, if we forget that Berkeley implies
that percipient mind is virtually coextensive with our
bodily organism, so that being ' without ' or ' at a distance
from ' our bodies is being at a distance from the percipient
mind. I have tried in the annotations to relieve some of
these ambiguities, of which Berkeley himself warns us
(cf. sect. 120).

The Essay moreover abounds in repetitions, and inter
polations of antiquated optics and physiology, so that its
logical structure and even its supreme generalisation are
not easily apprehended. I will try to disentangle them.

The reader must remember that this Essay on Vision
is professedly an introspective appeal to human conscious
ness. It is an analysis of what human beings are conscious
of when they see, the results being here and there applied,
partly by way of verification, to solve some famous optical
or physiological puzzle. The aim is to present the facts,
the whole facts, and nothing but the facts of our internal
visual experience, as distinguished from supposed facts
and empty abstractions, which an irregular exercise of
imagination, or abuse of words, had put in their place.

BERKELEY : FRASER. I. H

98 EDITOR'S PREFACE TO THE

The investigation, moreover, is not concerned with Space
in its metaphysical infinity, but with finite sections of Space
and their relations, which concern the sciences, physical
and mathematical, and with real or tangible Distance,
Magnitude, and Place, in their relation to seeing.

From the second section onwards the Essay naturally
falls into six Parts, devoted successively to the proof of
the six following theses regarding the relation of Sight
to finite spaces and to things extended :—

I. (Sect. 2-51.) Distance, or outness from the eye in
the line of vision, is not seen : it is only suggested to the
mind by visible phenomena and by sensations felt in
the eye, all which are somehow its arbitrarily constituted
and non-resembling Signs.

II. (Sect. 52-87.) Magnitude, or the amount of space
that objects of sense occupy, is really invisible : we only
see a greater or less quantity of colour, and colour depends
upon percipient mind : our supposed visual perceptions
of real magnitude are only our own interpretations of the
tactual meaning of the colours we see, and of sensations
felt in the eye, which are its Signs.

III. (Sect. 88-120.) Situation of objects of sense, or
their real relation to one another in ambient space, is
invisible : what we see is variety in the relations of colours
to one another : our supposed vision of real tangible
locality is only our interpretation of its visual non-re
sembling Signs.

IV. (Sect. 121-46.) There is no object that is pre
sented in common to Sight and Touch : space or exten
sion, which has the best claim to be their common object,
is specifically as well as numerically different in Sight
and in Touch.

V. (Sect. 147-48.) The explanation of the tactual sig
nificance of the visible and visual Signs, upon which human
experience proceeds, is offered in the Theory that all
visible phenomena are arbitrary signs in what is virtually

ESSAY TOWARDS A NEW THEORY OF VISION 99

the Language of Nature, addressed by God to the senses
and intelligence of Man.

VI. (Sect. 149-60.) The true object studied in Geometry
is the kind of Extension given in Touch, not that given
in Sight : real Extension in all its phases is tangible,
not visible : colour is the only immediate object of Sight,
and colour being mind-dependent sensation, cannot be
realised without percipient mind. These concluding
sections are supplementary to the main argument.

The fact that distance or outness is invisible is some
times regarded as Berkeley's contribution to the theory
of seeing. It is rather the assumption on which the
Essay proceeds (sect. 2). The Essay does not prove
this invisibility, but seeks to shew how, notwithstanding,
we learn to find outness through seeing. That the rela
tion between the visual signs of outness, on the one hand,
and the real distance which they signify, on the other, is
in all cases arbitrary, and discovered through experience, is
the burden of sect. 2-40. The previously recognised
signs of 'considerably remote' distances, are mentioned
(sect. 3). But near distance was supposed to be inferred
by a visual geometry — and to be 'suggested,' not signified
by arbitrary signs. The determination of the visual signs
which suggest outness, near and remote, is Berkeley's
professed discovery regarding vision.

An induction of the visual signs which 'suggest'
distance, is followed (sect. 43) by an assertion of the
wholly sensuous reality of co/our, which is acknowledged
to be the only immediate object of sight. Hence visible
extension, consisting in colour, must be dependent
for its realisation upon sentient or percipient mind. It
is then argued (sect. 44) that this mind-dependent visible
outness has no resemblance to the tangible reality (sect.
45). This is the first passage in the Essay in which Touch
and its data are formally brought into view. Tactual or

H 2

ioo EDITOR'S PREFACE TO THE

locomotive experience, it is implied, is needed to infuse
true reality into our conceptions of distance or outness.
This cannot be got from seeing any more than from
hearing, or tasting, or smelling. It is as impossible to
see and touch the same object as it is to hear and
touch the same object. Visible objects and ocular sen
sations can only be ideal signs of real things.

The sections in which Touch is thus introduced are
among the most important in the Essay. They represent
the outness given in hearing as wholly sensuous, ideal, or
mind-dependent : they recognise as more truly real that
got by contact and locomotion. But if this is all that
man can see, it follows that his visible world, at any
rate, becomes real only in and through percipient mind.
The problem of an Essay on Vision is thus, to explain
how the visible world of extended colour can inform us of
tangible realities, which it does not in the least resemble,
and with which it has no necessary connexion. That
visible phenomena, or else certain organic sensations
involved in seeing (sect. 3, 16, 21, 27), gradually suggest
the real or tangible outness with which they are con
nected in the divinely constituted system of nature, is the
explanation which now begins to dawn upon us.

Here an ambiguity in the Essay appears. It concludes
that the visible world cannot be real without percipient
realising mind, i.e. not otherwise than ideally: yet the
argument seems to take for granted that we are percipient
of a tangible world that is independent of percipient realising
mind. The reader is apt to say that the tangible world
must be as dependent on percipient mind for its reality
as the visible world is concluded to be, and for the same
reason. This difficulty was soon afterwards encountered
in the book of Principles, where the worlds of sight and
touch are put on the same level; and the possibility of
unperceived reality in both cases is denied ; on the ground
that a material world cannot be realised in the total

ESSAY TOWARDS A NEW THEORY OF VISION IOI

absence of Spirit — human and divine. The term 'ex
ternal ' may still be applied to tactual and locomotive
phenomena alone, if men choose ; but this not because
of the ideal character of what is seen, and the unideal
reality of what is touched, but only because tactual per
ceptions are found to be more firm and steady than
visual. Berkeley preferred in this way to insinuate his
new conception of the material world by degrees, at the
risk of exposing this juvenile and tentative Essay on
Vision to a charge of incoherence.

The way in which visual ideas or phenomena ' suggest '
the outness or distance of things from the organ of sight
having been thus explained, in what I call the First Part
of the Essay, the Second and Third Parts (sect. 52-120)
argue for the invisibility of real extension in two other
relations, viz. magnitude and locality or situation. An
induction of the visual signs of tangible size and situation
is given in those sections. The result is applied to solve
two problems then notable in optics, viz. (i) the reason
for the greater visible size of the horizontal moon than
of the moon in its meridian (sect. 67-87); and (2) the
fact that objects are placed erect in vision only on con
dition that their images on the retina are inverted (sect.
88-120). Here the antithesis between the ideal world
of coloured extension, and the real world of resistant
extension is pressed with vigour. The 'high' and Mow'
of the visible world is not the 'high' and 'low' of the
tangible world (sect. 91-106). There is no resemblance
and no necessary relation, between those two so-called
extensions ; not even when the number of visible objects
happen to coincide with the number of tangible objects
of which they are the visual signs, e.g. the visible and
tangible fingers on the hand : for the born-blind, on first
receiving sight, could not parcel out the visible phenomena
in correspondence with the tangible.

102 EDITOR'S PREFACE TO THE

The next Part of the Essay (sect. 121-45) argues for
a specific as well as a numerical difference between the
original data of sight and the data of touch and locomotion.
Sight and touch perceive nothing in common. Extension
in its various relations differs in sight from extension in
touch. Coloured extension, which alone is visible, is
found to be different in kind from resistant extension,
which alone is tangible. And if actually perceived or
concrete extensions differ thus, the question is deter
mined. For all extension with which man can be con
cerned must be concrete (sect. 23). Extension in the
abstract is meaningless (sect. 124-25). What remains
is to marshal the scattered evidence, and to guard the
foregoing conclusions against objections. This is attempted
in sections 128-46.

The enunciation of the summary generalisation, which
forms the ' New Theory of Vision ' (sect. 147-8), may
be taken as the Fifth and culminating Part of the Essay.

The closing sections (149-60), as I have said, are
supplementary, and profess to determine the sort of ex
tension — visible or tangible — with which Geometry is
concerned. In concluding that it is tangible, he tries
to picture the mental state of Idominians, or unbodied
spirits, endowed with visual perceptions only, and asks
what their conception of outness and solid extension
must be. Here further refinements in the interpretation
of visual perception, and its organic conditions, which have
not escaped the attention of latter psychologists and
biologists, are hinted at.

Whether the data of sight consist of non-resembling
arbitrary Signs of the tactual distances, sizes, and situa
tions of things, is a question which some might prefer
to deal with experimentally — by trial of the experience
of persons in circumstances fitted to supply an answer.

ESSAY TOWARDS A NEW THEORY OF VISION 103

Of this sort would be the experience of the born-blind,
immediately after their sight has been restored ; the
conception of extension and its relations found in persons
who continue from birth unable to see ; the experience
(if it could be got) of persons always destitute of all
tactual and locomotive perceptions, but familiar with
vision; and the facts of seeing observed in infants of
the human species, and in the lower animals.

Berkeley did not try to verify his conclusions in this
way. Here and there (sect. 41, 42, 79, 92-99, 103, 106,
no, 128, 132-37), he conjectures what the first visual
experience of those rescued from born-blindness is likely
to be ; he also speculates, as we have seen, about the
experience of unbodied spirits supposed to be able to
see, but unable to touch or move (sect. 153-59) ; and
in the Appendix he refers, in confirmation of his New
Theory, to a reported case of one born blind who had
obtained sight. But he forms his Theory independently
of those delicate and difficult investigations. His testing
facts were sought irrespectively. Indeed those physio
logists and mental philosophers who have since tried
to determine what vision in its purity is, by cases either
of communicated sight or of continued born-blindness,
have illustrated the truth of Diderot's remark — 'preparer
et interroger un aveugle-ne n'eut point ete une occupation
indigne des talens reunis de Newton, Des Cartes, Locke,
et Leibniz V

Berkeley's New Theory has been quoted as a signal
example of discovery in metaphysics. The subtle analysis
which distinguishes seeing strictly so called, from judg
ments about extended things, suggested by what we see,

1 In Diderot's Lett re sur les 112 ; and Theory of Vision Vindi-

aveugles, a I' usage de cenx qui catcd, sect. 71, with the note, in

voient, where Berkeley, Molyneux, which some recorded experiments

Condillac, and others are men- are alluded to.
tioned. Cf. also Appendix, pp. in,

T04 EDITOR S PREFACE TO THE

appears to have been imperfectly known to the ancient
philosophers. Aristotle, indeed, speaks of colour as the
only proper object of sight ; but, in passages of the
De Aninia l where he names properties peculiar to par
ticular senses, he enumerates others, such as motion, figure,
and magnitude, which belong to all the senses in com
mon. His distinction of Proper and Common Sensibles
appears at first to contradict Berkeley's doctrine of the
heterogeneity of the ideal visible and the real tangible
worlds. Aristotle, however, seems to question the imme
diate perceptibility of Common Sensibles, and to regard
them as realised through the activity of intelligence 2.

Some writers in Optics, in mediaeval times, and in early
modern philosophy, advanced beyond Aristotle, in explain
ing the relation of our matured notion of distance to what
we originally perceive in seeing, and in the fifteenth cen
tury it was discovered by Maurolyco that the rays of light
from the object converge to a focus in the eye ; but I have
not been able to trace even the germ of the New Theory in
these speculations.

Excepting some hints by Descartes, Malebranche was
among the first dimly to anticipate Berkeley, in resolving
our supposed power of seeing outness into an interpretation

1 De Aninia, II. 6, III. i, &c. and the mind each contribute an
Aristotle assigns a pre-eminent element to every knowledge. Aris-
intellectual value to the sense of totle's doctrine of KOIVTJ aiaOr^ois
sight. See, for instance, his would go far, if carried out, to
Metaphysics, I. i. modify his doctrine of the simple

2 Sir A. Grant (Ethics of A n'stot/c, and innate character of the senses,
vol. II. p. 172) remarks, as to the e. g. sight (cf. Eth. II. i, 4), and
doctrine that the Common Sensibles would prevent .its collision with
are apprehended concomitantly by Berkeley's Theory of Vision' — See
the senses, that: 'this is surely the also Sir W. Hamilton, Reid's
true view; we see in the apprehen- Works, pp. 828-830.

sion of number, figure, and the like, Dugald Stewart (Collected Works,

not an operation of sense, but the vol. I. p. 341, note) quotes Aris-

mind putting its own forms andcate- totle's Ethics, II. i, as evidence that

gories, i.e. itself, on the external Berkeley's doctrine, 'with respect

object. It would follow then that to the acquired perceptions of

the senses cannot really be sepa- sight, was quite unknown to the

rated from the mind; the senses best metaphysicians of antiquity.'

ESSAY TOWARDS A NEW THEORY OF VISION 105

of visual signs which we learn by experience to understand.
The most important part of Malebranche's account of
seeing is contained in the Recherche de la Ve'ritc (Liv. I.
ch. 9), in one of those chapters in which he discusses the
frequent fallaciousness of the senses, and in particular of
our visual perceptions of extension. He accounts for
their inevitable uncertainty by assigning them not to sense
but to misinterpretation of what is seen. He also enu
merates various visual signs of distance.

That the Recherche of Malebranche, published more
than thirty years before the Essay, \vas familiar to Berke
ley before the publication of his New Theory, is proved by
internal evidence, and by his juvenile Commonplace Book.
I am not able to discover signs of a similar connexion
between the New Theory and the chapter on the mystery
of sensation in Glanvill's Scepsis Scicntifica (ch. 5), pub
lished some years before the Recherche of Malebranche,
where Glanvill refers to 'a secret deduction/ through
which — from motions, &c., of which we are immediately
percipient— we 'spell out' figures, distances, magnitudes,
and colours, which have no resemblance to them.

An approach to the New Theory is found in a passage
which first appeared in the second edition of Locke's
Essay, published in 1694, to which Berkeley refers in his
own Essay (sect. 132-35), and which, on account of its
relative importance, I shall here transcribe at length : —

1 We are further to consider concerning Perception that
the ideas we receive by sensation are often, in grown peo
ple, altered by the judgment, without our taking notice of
it. When we set before our eyes a round globe of any uni
form colour, e.g. gold, alabaster, or jet, it is certain that the
idea thereby imprinted in our mind is of a flat circle, var
iously shadowed, with several degrees of light and bright
ness coming to our eyes. But, we having by use been
accustomed to perceive what kind of appearance convex
bodies are wont to make in us, what alterations are made

io6 EDITOR'S PREFACE TO THE

in the reflection of light by the difference in the sensible
figures of bodies — the judgment presently, by an habitual
custom, alters the appearances into their causes ; so that,
from that which is truly variety of shadow or colour, col
lecting the figure, it makes it pass for a mark of figure, and
frames to itself the perception of a convex figure and an
uniform colour, when the idea we receive from them is
only a plane variously coloured, as is evident in painting.

' To which purpose I shall here insert a problem of that
very ingenious and studious promoter of real knowledge,
the learned and worthy Mr. Molyneux, which he was
pleased to send me in a letter some months since, and it is
this : — Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and
taught by his touch to distinguish between a cube and a
sphere of the same metal, and nighly of the same bigness,
so as to tell, when he felt the one and the other, which is
the cube and which the sphere. Suppose then the cube
and the sphere placed on a table, and the blind man be
made to see : quere, whether, by his sight, before he
touched them, he could not distinguish and tell, which is
the globe and which the cube ? To which the acute and
judicious proposer answers: "Not." For, though he has
obtained the experience of how a globe, how a cube affects
his touch ; yet he has not obtained the experience that
what affects his touch so and so, must affect his sight so
and so ; so that a protuberant angle in the cube, that
pressed his hand unequally, shall appear to his eye as it
does in the cube. — I agree with this thinking gentleman,
whom I am proud to call my friend, in his answer to this
his problem, and am of opinion that the blind man, at
first sight, would not be able to say with certainty which
was the globe and which the cube, whilst he only saw
them ; though he would unerringly name them by his
touch, and certainly distinguish them by the difference in
their figures felt.

' This I have set down, and leave with my reader, as an

ESSAY TOWARDS A NEW THEORY OF VISION 107

occasion for him to consider how much he may be be
holden to experience, improvement, and acquired notions,
where he thinks he had not the least use of, or help from
them : and the rather because this observing gentleman
further adds that, having, upon the occasion of my book,
proposed this problem to divers very ingenious men, he
hardly ever met with one that at first gave the answer to
it which he thinks true, till by hearing his reasons they
were convinced.

' But this is not I think usual in any of our ideas but
those received by sight : because sight, the most compre
hensive of the senses, conveying to our minds the ideas of
light and colours, which are peculiar only to that sense ;
and also the far different ideas of space, figure, and motion,
the several varieties of which change the appearance of its
proper object, i.e. light and colours; we bring ourselves
by use to judge of the one by the other. This, in many
cases, by a settled habit, in things whereof we have fre
quent experience, is performed so constantly and so quick,
that we take that for the perception of our sensation, which
is an idea formed by our judgment; so that one, i.e. that
of sensation, serves only to excite the other, and is scarce-
taken notice of itself; as a man who reads or hears with
attention and understanding takes little notice of the
character or sounds, but of the ideas that are excited in
him by them.

' Nor need we wonder that this is done with so little
notice, if we consider how very quick the actions of the
mind are performed ; for, as itself is thought to take up no
space, to have no extension, so its actions seem to require
no time, but many of them seem to be crowded into an
instant. I speak this in comparison of the actions of the
body. . . . Secondly, we shall not be much surprised that
this is done with us in so little notice, if we consider how
the facility we get of doing things, by a custom of doing,
makes them often pass in us without notice. Habits,

io8 EDITOR'S PREFACE TO THE

especially such as are begun very early, come at last to
produce actions in us which often escape our observation.
. . . And therefore it is not so strange that our mind
should often change the idea of its sensation into that of
its judgment, and make the one serve only to excite the
other, without our taking notice of it.' (Essay concerning
Human Understanding, Book II. ch. 9. § 8.)

This remarkable passage anticipates by implication the
view of an interpretation of materials originally given in
the visual sense, which, under the name of 'suggestion/ is
the ruling factor in the New Theory of Vision.

The following sentences relative to the invisibility of dis
tances, contained in the Treatise of Dioptrics (published
in 1690) of Locke's friend and correspondent William
Molyneux, whose son was Berkeley's pupil, illustrate
Locke's statements, and may be compared with the opening
sections of the Essay on Vision : —

1 In plain vision the estimate we make of the distance of
objects (especially when so far removed that the interval
between our two eyes bears no sensible proportion thereto,
or when looked upon with one eye only) is rather the act
of our judgment than of sense ; and acquired by exercise,
and a faculty of comparing, rather than natural. For, dis
tance of itself is not to be perceived ; for, 'tis a line (or a
length) presented to our eye with its end toward us, which
must therefore be only a point, and that is invisible. Where
fore distance is chiefly perceived by means of interjacent
bodies, as by the earth, mountains, hills, fields, trees, houses,
&c. Or by the estimate we make of the comparative magni
tude of bodies, or of their faint colours, £c. These I say
are the chief means of apprehending the distance of objects
that are considerably remote. But as to nigh objects— to
whose distance the interval of the eyes bears a sensible
proportion — their distance is perceived by the turn of the
eyes, or by the angle of the optic axes (Grcgorii Opt. Pro-
mot, prop. 28). This was the opinion of the ancients,

ESSAY TOWARDS A NEW THEORY OF VISION 109

Alhazen, Vitellio, &c. And though the ingenious Jesuit
Tacquet (Opt. Lib. I. prop. 2) disapprove thereof, and objects
against it a new notion of Gassendus (of a man's seeing
only with one eye at a time one and the same object), yet
this notion of Gassendus being absolutely false (as I could
demonstrate were it not beside my present purpose), it
makes nothing against this opinion.

'Wherefore, distance being only a line and not of itself
perceivable, if an object were conveyed to the eye by one
single ray only, there were no other means of judging of
its distance but by some of those hinted before. Therefore
when we estimate the distance of nigh objects, either we
take the help of both eyes, or else we consider the pupil of
one eye as having breadth, and receiving a parcel of rays
from each radiating point. And, according to the various
inclinations of the rays from one point on the various parts
of the pupil, we make our estimate of the distance of the
object. And therefore (as is said before), by one single eye
we can only judge of the distance of such objects to whose
distance the breadth of the pupil has a sensible proportion.
. . . For, it is observed before (prop. 29, sec. 2, see also
Gregorii Opt. Promot. prop. 29) that for viewing objects
remote and nigh, there are requisite various conformations
of the eye — the rays from nigh objects that fall on the eye
diverging more than those from more remote objects/
(Treatise of Dioptrics, Part I. prop. 31.)

All this helps to shew the state of science regarding
vision about the time Berkeley's Essay appeared, especially
among those with whose works he was familiar \ I shall
next refer to illustrations of the change which the Essay
produced.

The New Theory has occasioned some interesting criti-

1 A work resembling Berkeley's Essay — the Nova Visionis Theoria
in its title, but in little else, appeared of Dr. Briggs, published in 1685.
more than twenty years before the

110 EDITORS PREFACE TO THE

cism since its appearance in 1709. At first it drew little
attention. For twenty years after its publication the allu
sions to it were few. The account of Cheselden's experi
ment upon one born blind, published in 1728, in the
Philosophical Transactions, which seemed to bring the
Theory to the test of scientific experiment, recalled attention
to Berkeley's reasonings. The state of religious thought
about the same time confirmed the tendency to discuss
a doctrine which represented human vision as interpreta
tion of a natural yet divine language, thus suggesting
Omnipresent Mind.

Occasional discussions of the New Theory may be found
in the Gentleman's Magazine, from 1732 till Berkeley's
death in 1753. Some criticisms may also be found in
Smith's Optics, published in 1738.

Essential parts of^ Berkeley's analysis are explained
by Voltaire, in his Ele'mens de la Philosophic de Newton.
The following from that work is here given on its own
account, and also as a prominent recognition of the new
-doctrine in France, within thirty years from its first
promulgation : —

'II faut absolument conclure de tout ceci, que les distances,
les grandeurs, les situations, ne sont pas, aproprementparler,
des choses visibles, c'est-a-dire, ne sont pas les objets propres
et immediats de la vue. L'objet propre et immediat de la vue
n'est autre chose que lalumiere coloree : tout lereste, nous ne
le sentons qu'ala longue et par experience. Nous apprenons
a voir precisement comme nous apprenons a parler et a
lire. La difference est, que 1'art de voir est plus facile, et
que la nature est egalement a tous notre maitre.

' Les jugements soudains, presque uniformes, que toutes
nos ames, a un certain age, portent des distances, des
grandeurs, des situations, nous font penser qu'il n'y a qu'a
ouvrir les yeux pour voir la maniere dont nous voyons.
On se trompe; il y faut le secours des autres sens. Si
les hommes n'avaient que le sens de la vue, ils n'auraient

ESSAY TOWARDS A NEW THEORY OF VISION III

aucun moyen pour connaitre 1'etendue en longueur, largeur
et profondeur ; et un pur esprit ne la connaitrait pas peut-
etre, a moinsque Dieu ne la lui revelat. II est tres difficile
de separer dans notre entendement 1'extension d'un objet
d'avec les couleurs de cet objet. Nous ne voyons jamais
rien que d'etendu, et de la nous sommes tous portes
a croire que nous voyons en effet 1'etendue. ' (Ele'mens de
la Philos. de Newton, Seconde Partie, ch. 7.)

Condillac, in his Essais sur VOrigine des Connaissanccs
Humaines (Part I. sect. 6), published in 1746, combats
Berkeley's New Theory, and maintains that an extension
exterior to the eye is immediately discernible by sight ; the
eye being naturally capable of judging at once of figures,
magnitudes, situations, and distances. His reasonings in
support of this 'prejudice/ as he afterwards allowed it to
be, may be found in the section entitled ' De quelques
jugemens qu'on a attribues a 1'ame sans fondement, ou
solution d'un probleme de metaphysique.' Here Locke,
Molyneux, Berkeley, and Voltaire are criticised, and
Cheselden's experiment is referred to. Condillac's subse
quent recantation is contained in his Traite des Sensations,
published in 1754, and in his L? Art de Penscr. In the
Traite des Sensations (Troisieme Partie, ch. 3, 4, 5, -6, 7, 8,
&c.) the whole question is discussed at length, and Condillac
vindicates what he allows must appear a marvellous para
dox to the uninitiated— that we only gradually learn to see,
hear, smell, taste, and touch. He argues in particular that
the eye cannot originally perceive an extension that is be
yond itself, and that perception of trinal space is due to
what we experience in touch.

Voltaire and Condillac gave currency to the New Theory
in France, and it soon became a commonplace with
D'Alembert, Diderot, Buffon,and other French philosophers.
In Germany we have allusions to it in the Berlin Memoirs
and elsewhere ; but, although known by name, if not in its
distinctive principle and latent idealism, it has not obtained

Ha EDITOR'S PREFACE TO THE

the consideration which its author's developed theory of
the material as well as the visible world has received. The
Kantian a priori criticism of our cognition of Space, and
of our mathematical notions, subsequently indisposed the
German mind to the a posteriori reasoning of Berkeley's
Essay.

Its influence is apparent in British philosophy. The
following passages in Hartley's Observations on Man, pub
lished in 1749, illustrate the extent to which some of the
distinctive parts of the new doctrine were at that time
received by an eminent English psychologist : —

' Distance is judged of by the quantity of motion, and
figure by the relative quantity of distance. . . . And, as the
sense of sight is much more extensive and expedite than
feeling, we judge of tangible qualities chiefly by sight, which
therefore may be considered, agreeably to Bishop Berkeley's
remark, as a philosophical language for the ideas of feeling ;
being, for the most part, an adequate representative of
them, and a language common to all mankind, and in which
they all agree very nearly, after a moderate degree of
experience.

'However, if the informations from touch and sight dis
agree at any time, we are always to depend upon touch, as
that which, according to the usual ways of speaking upon
these subjects, is the true representation of the essential
properties, i. e. as the earnest and presage of what other
tangible impressions the body under consideration will
make upon our feeling in other circumstances ; also what
changes it will produce in other bodies ; of which again we
are to determine by our feeling, if the visual language
should not happen to correspond to it exactly. And it is
from this difference that we call the touch the reality, light
the representative— also that a person born blind may fore
tell with certainty, from his present tangible impressions,
what others would follow upon varying the circumstances ;
whereas, if we could suppose a person to be born without

ESSAY TOWARDS A NEW THEORY OF VISION 113

feeling, and to arrive at man's estate, he could not, from his
present visible impressions, judge what others would follow
upon varying the circumstances. Thus the picture of a
knife, drawn so well as to deceive his eye, would not, when
applied to another body, produce the same change of visible
impressions as a real knife does, when it separates the
parts of the body through which it passes. But the touch
is not liable to these deceptions. As it is therefore the fun
damental source of information in respect of the essential
properties of matter, it may be considered as our first and
principal key to the knowledge of the external world.'
(Prop. 30.)

In other parts of Hartley's book (c. g. Prop. 58) the
relation of our visual judgments of magnitude, figure,
motion, distance, and position to the laws of associa
tion is explained, and the associating circumstances by
which these judgments are formed are enumerated in
detail.

Dr. Porterfield of Edinburgh, in his Treatise on the Eye,
or the Manner and Phenomena of Vision (Edinburgh, 1759),
is an exception to the consent which the doctrine had
then widely secured. He maintains, in opposition to
Berkeley, that 'the judgments we form of the situation
and distance of visible objects, depend not on custom
and experience, but on original instinct, to which mind
is subject in our embodied state V

Berkeley's Theory of Vision, in so far as it resolves
our visual perceptions of distance into interpretation of
arbitrary signs, received the qualified approbation of Reid,
in his Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of
Common Sense (1764). He criticises it in the Inquiry,
where the doctrine of visual signs, of which Berkeley's
whole philosophy is a development, is accepted, and to
some extent applied. With Reid it is divorced, however,
from the Berkeleian conception of the material world,

1 See Treatise on the Eye, vol. II. pp. 299, &c.

BERKELEY : PHASER. I. I

114 EDITORS PREFACE TO THE

although the Theory of Vision was the seminal principle
of Berkeley's Theory of Matter J.

This Theory of Matter was imperfectly conceived and then
rejected by Reid and his followers, while the New Theory
of Vision obtained the general consent of the Scottish
metaphysicians. Adam Smith refers to it in his Essays
(published in 1795) as 'one of the finest examples of philo
sophical analysis that is to be found either in our own
or in any other language.' Dugald Stewart characterises
it in his Elements as 'one of the most beautiful, and at
the same time one of the most important theories of
modern philosophy/ ' The solid additions/ he afterwards
remarks in his Dissertation, 'made by Berkeley to the
stock of human knowledge, were important and bril
liant. Among these the first place is unquestionably
due to his New Theory of Vision, a work abounding
with ideas so different from those commonly received,
and at the same time so profound and refined, that it
was regarded by all but a few accustomed to deep meta
physical reflection, rather in the light of a philosophical
romance than of a sober inquiry after truth. Such,
however, has since been the progress and diffusion of
this sort of knowledge, that the leading and most ab
stracted doctrines contained in it form now an essential
part of every elementary treatise on optics, and are
adopted by the most superficial smatterers in science
as fundamental articles of their faith.' The New Theory
is accepted by Thomas Brown, who proposes (Lectures,
29) to extend the scope of its reasonings. With regard
to perceptions of sight, Young, in his Lectures on In
tellectual Philosophy (p. 102), says that ' it has been uni
versally admitted, at least since the days of Berkeley,
that many of those which appear to us at present to
be instantaneous and primitive, can yet be shewn to be

1 See Reid's Inquiry, ch. v. §§ on the Intellectual Powers, II. ch.
3> 5> 6, 7 ; ch. vi. § 24, and Essays 10 and 19.

ESSAY TOWARDS A NEW THEORY OF VISION 115

acquired ; that most of the adult perceptions of sight
are founded on the previous information of touch ; that
colour can give us no conception originally of those
qualities of bodies which produce it in us ; and that
primary vision gives us no notion of distance, and , as I
believe, no notion of magnitude/ Sir James Mackintosh,
in his Dissertation, characterises the New Theory of Vision
as ' a great discovery in Mental Philosophy.' ' Nothing
in the compass of inductive reasoning,' remarks Sir
William Hamilton (Reid's Works, p. 182, note), ' appears
more satisfactory than Berkeley's demonstration of the
necessity and manner of our learning, by a slow process
of observation and comparison alone, the connexion
between the perceptions of vision and touch, and, in
general, all that relates to the distance and magnitude
of external things V

The New Theory of Vision has in short been generally
accepted, so far as it was understood, alike by the follow
ers of Hartley and by the associates and successors
of Reid. Among British psychologists, it has recom
mended itself to rationalists and sensationalists, to the
advocates of innate principles, and to those who would
explain by accidental association what their opponents
attribute to reason originally latent in man. But this
wide conscious assent is I think chiefly confined to the
proposition that distance is invisible, and hardly reaches
the deeper implicates of the theory, on its extension to
all the senses, leading to a perception of the final unity

1 While Sir W. Hamilton (Lee- visual instinct of distances ; and

lures on Metaphysics, Ixxviii) ac- elsewhere (Reid's Works, p. 137,

knowledges the scientific validity note) he seems to hesitate about

of Berkeley's conclusions, as to Locke's Solution of Molyneux's

the way we judge of distances, he Problem, at least in its application

complains, in the same lecture, that to Cheselden's case. Cf. Leibniz,

'the whole question is thrown into Nouvcatix Essais, Liv. II. ch. 9, in

doubt by the analogy of the lower connexion with this last,
animals/ i. e. by their probable

I 2

n6 EDITOR'S PREFACE TO THE ESSAY, ETC.

of the natural and the supernatural, and the ultimate
spirituality of the universe1.

1 An almost solitary exception
in Britain to this unusual unifor
mity on a subtle question in
psychology is found in Samuel
Bailey's Review of Berkeley1 s Theory
of Vision, designed to show the un-
soundness of that celebrated Specula
tion, which appeared in 1842. It
was the subject of two interesting
rejoinders— a well-weighed criti
cism, in the Westminster Review,
by J« S. Mill, since republished in
his Discussions ; and an ingenious
Essay by Professor Ferrier, in

Black wood's Magazine, republished
in his Philosophical Remains. The
controversy ended on that occasion
with Bailey's Letter to a Philosopher
in reply to some recent attempts to
vindicate Berkeley's Theory of Vision ,
and in further elucidation of its un-
soundncss, and a reply to it by
each of his critics. It was revived
in 1864 by Mr. Abbott of Trinity
College, Dublin, whose essay on
Sight and 7 ouch is ' an attempt to
disprove the received (or Berke-
leian) Theory of Vision.'

TO THE

RT. HON. SIR JOHN PERCIVALE, BART.1,

ONE OF HER MAJESTY'S MOST HONOURABLE PRIVY COUNCIL
IN THE KINGDOM OF IRELAND.

SIR,

I COULD not, without doing violence to myself, forbear
upon this occasion to give some public testimony of the
great and well-grounded esteem I have conceived for you,
ever since I had the honour and happiness of your ac
quaintance. The outward advantages of fortune, and the
early honours with which you are adorned, together with
the reputation you are known to have amongst the best and
most considerable men, may well imprint veneration and
esteem on the minds of those who behold you from a dis
tance. But these are not the chief motives that inspire me
with the respect I bear you. A nearer approach has given
me the view of something in your person infinitely beyond
the external ornaments of honour and estate. I mean, an
intrinsic stock of virtue and good sense, a true concern for
religion, and disinterested love of your country. Add to
these an uncommon proficiency in the best and most use
ful parts of knowledge ; together with (what in my mind is

1 Afterwards (in 1733^ Earl of ise the province of Georgia in North

Egmont. Born about 1683, he America. His name appears in

succeeded to the baronetcy in the list of subscribers to Berkeley's

1691, and, after sitting for a few Bermuda Scheme in 1726. He

years in the Irish House of Com- died in 1748. He corresponded

mons, was in 1715 created Baron frequently with Berkeley from

Percival, in the Irish peerage. In 1709 onwards.
1732 he obtained a charter to colon-

n8 AUTHOR'S DEDICATION TO THE

a perfection of the first rank) a surpassing goodness of
nature. All which I have collected, not from the uncertain
reports of fame, but from my own experience. Within
these few months that I have the honour to be known unto
you, the many delightful hours I have passed in your
agreeable and improving conversation have afforded me
the opportunity of discovering in you many excellent qual
ities, which at once fill me with admiration and esteem.
That one at those years, and in those circumstances of
wealth and greatness, should continue proof against the
charms of luxury and those criminal pleasures so fashion
able and predominant in the age we live in ; that he should
preserve a sweet and modest behaviour, free from that
insolent and assuming air so familiar to those who are
placed above the ordinary rank of men ; that he should
manage a great fortune with that prudence and inspection,
and at the same time expend it with that generosity and
nobleness of mind, as to shew himself equally remote from
a sordid parsimony and a lavish inconsiderate profusion of
the good things he is intrusted with — this, surely, were ad
mirable and praiseworthy. But, that he should, moreover,
by an impartial exercise of his reason, and constant perusal
of the sacred Scriptures, endeavour to attain a right notion
of the principles of natural and revealed religion ; that he
should with the concern of a true patriot have the interest
of the public at heart, and omit no means of informing
himself what may be prejudicial or advantageous to his
country, in order to prevent the one and promote the
other ; in fine, that, by a constant application to the most
severe and useful studies, by a strict observation of the
rules of honour and virtue, by frequent and serious reflec
tions on the mistaken measures of the world, and the true
end and happiness of mankind, he should in all respects
qualify himself bravely to run the race that is set before
him, to deserve the character of great and good in this life,
and be ever happy hereafter — this were amazing and al
most incredible. Yet all this, and more than this, SIR,
might I justly say of you, did either your modesty permit,
or your character stand in need of it. I know it might
deservedly be thought a vanity in me to imagine that any
thing coming from so obscure a hand as mine could add a
lustre to your reputation. But, I am withal sensible how

ESSAY TOWARDS A NEW THEORY OF VISION IIQ

far I advance the interest of my own, by laying hold on
this opportunity to make it known that I am admitted into
some degree of intimacy with a person of your exquisite
judgment. And, with that view, I have ventured to make
you an address of this nature, which the goodness I have
ever experienced in you inclines me to hope will meet with
a favourable reception at your hands. Though I must own
I have your pardon to ask, for touching on what may pos
sibly be offensive to a virtue you are possessed of in a very
distinguishing degree. Excuse me, SIR, if it was out of
my power to mention the name of SIR JOHN PERCIVALE
without paying some tribute to that extraordinary and sur
prising merit whereof I have so clear and affecting an idea,
and which, I am sure, cannot be exposed in too full a light
for the imitation of others.

Of late I have been agreeably employed in considering
the most noble, pleasant, and comprehensive of all the
senses \ The fruit of that (labour shall I call it or) diver
sion is what I now present you with, in hopes it may give
some entertainment to one who, in the midst of business
and vulgar enjoyments, preserves a relish for the more re
fined pleasures of thought and reflexion. My thoughts
concerning Vision have led me into some notions so far
out of the common road - that it had been improper to
address them to one of a narrow and contracted genius.
But, you, SIR, being master of a large and free understand-
ing, raised above the power of those prejudices that enslave
the far greater part of mankind, may deservedly be thought
a proper patron for an attempt of this kind. Add to this,
that you are no less disposed to forgive than qualified, to
discern whatever faults may occur in it. Nor do I think

1 Similar terms are applied to ' le premier, le plus noble, et le

the sense of seeing by writers with plus etendu de tous les sens.' The

whom Berkeley was familiar. Thus high place assigned to this sense

Locke (Essay, II. ix. 9) refers to by Aristotle has been already

sight as ' the most comprehensive alluded to. Its office, as the chief

of all our senses.' Descartes opens organ through which a concep-

his Dioptrique by designating it as tion of the material universe as

' le plus universal et le plus noble placed in ambient space is given to

de nos sens;' and he alludes to it us, is recognised by a multitude of

elsewhere (Princip. IV. 195) as 'le psychologists and metaphysicians,

plus subtil de tous les sens.' Male- 2 On Berkeley's originality in

branche begins his analysis of sight his Theory of Vision see the Editor's

(Recherche, I. 6) by describing it as Preface.

120 AUTHOR'S DEDICATION TO THE ESSAY, ETC.

you defective in any one point necessary to form an exact
judgment on the most abstract and difficult things, so
much as in a just confidence of your own abilities. And,
in this one instance, give me leave to say, you shew a
manifest weakness of judgment. With relation to the
following Essay, I shall only add that I beg your par
don for laying a trifle of that nature in your way, at a
time when you are engaged in the important affairs of the
nation, and desire you to think that I am, with all sincerity
and respect,

SIR,

Your most faithful and most humble servant,
GEORGE BERKELEY,

CONTENTS

r. Design.

2. Distance of itself invisible.

3. Remote Distance perceived rather by experience than by sense.

4. Near distance thought to be perceiv'd by the angle of the optic axes.

5. Difference between this and the former manner of perceiving distance.

6. Also by diverging rays.

7. This depends not on experience.

8. These the common accounts, but not satisfactory.

9. Some ideas perceived by the mediation of others.

10. No idea which is not itself perceived can be the means of perceiving

another.
IT. Distance perceived by means of some other idea.

12. Those lines and angles mentioned in optics are not themselves per

ceived.

13. Hence the mind does not perceive distance by lines and angles.

14. Also because they have no real existence.

15. And because they are insufficient to explain the phenomena.

16. The ideas that suggest Distance arc— First, the sensation arising from

the turn of the eyes.

17. Betwixt which and distance there is no necessary connexion.

18. Scarce room for mistake in this matter.

19. No regard had to the angle of the optic axes.

20. Judgment of distance made with both eyes, the result of experience.

21. Secondly, confusedness of appearance.

22. This the occasion of those judgments attributed to diverging rays.

23. Objection answered.

24. What deceives the writers of optics in this matter.

25. The cause why one idea may suggest another.

26. This applied to confusion and distance.

27. Thirdly, the straining of the eye.

28. The occasions which suggest distance have in their own nature no

relation to it.

29. A difficult case proposed by Dr. Barrow as repugnant to all the

known theories.

30. This case contradicts a received principle in catoptrics.

31. It is shewn to agree with the principles we have laid down.

32. This phenomenon illustrated.

122 ESSAY TOWARDS A NEW THEORY OF VISION

33. It confirms the truth of the principle whereby it is explained.

34. Vision, when distinct and when confused.

35. The different effects of parallel, diverging, and converging rays.

36. How converging and diverging rays come to suggest the same

distance.

37. A person extremely purblind would judge aright in the foremen-

tioned case.

38. Lines and angles why useful in optics.

39. The not understanding this a cause of mistake.

40. A query, proposed by Mr. Molyneux in his Dioptrics, considered.

41. One born blind would not at first have any idea of distance by sight.
43. This not agreeable to the common principles.

43. The proper objects of sight not without the mind ; nor the images of

anything without the mind.

44. This more fully explained.

45. In what sense we must be understood to see distance and external

things.

46. Distance, and things placed at a distance, not otherwise perceived

by the eye than by the ear.

47. The ideas of sight more apt to be confounded with the ideas of touch

than those of hearing are.

48. How this comes to pass.

49. Strictly speaking, we never see and feel the same thing.

50. Objects of sight twofold — mediate and immediate.

51. These hard to separate in our thoughts.

52. The received accounts of our perceiving Magnitude by sight, false.

53. Magnitude perceived as immediately as distance.

54. Two kinds of sensible extension, neither of which is infinitely

divisible.

55. The tangible magnitude of an object steady, the visible not.

56. By what means tangible magnitude is perceived by sight.

57. This farther enlarged on.

58. No necessary connexion between confusion or faintness of appear

ance and small or great magnitude.

59. The tangible magnitude of an object more heeded than the visible,

and why.

60. An instance of this.

6r. Men do not measure by visible feet or inches.

62. No necessary connexion between visible and tangible extension.

63. Greater visible magnitude might signify lesser tangible magnitude.

64. The judgments we make of magnitude depend altogether on ex

perience.

65. Distance and magnitude seen as shame or anger.

66. But we are prone to think otherwise, and why.

67. The moon seems greater in the horizon than in the meridian.

68. The cause of this phenomenon assigned.

69. The horizontal moon, why greater at one time than another.

70. The account we have given proved to be true.

71. And confirmed by the moon's appearing greater in a mist.

CONTENTS OF THE ESSAY, ETC. 123

72. Objection answered.

73. The way wherein faintness suggests greater magnitude illustrated.

74. Appearance of the horizontal moon, why thought difficult to explain.

75. Attempts towards the solution of it made by several, but in vain.

76. The opinion of Dr. Wallis.

77. It is shewn to be unsatisfactory.

78. How lines and angles may be of use in computing apparent mag

nitudes.

79. One born blind, being made to see, what judgment he would make

of magnitude.

80. The minimum visibile the same to all creatures.

81. Objection answered.

82. The eye at all times perceives the same number of visible points.

83. Two imperfections in the visive faculty.

84. Answering to which, we may conceive two perfections.

85. In neither of these two ways do microscopes improve the sight.

86. The case of microscopical eyes considered.

87. The sight admirably adapted to the ends of seeing.

88. Difficulty concerning Erect Vision.

89. The common way of explaining it.

90. The same shewn to be false.

91. Not distinguishing between ideas of sight and touch cause of mistake

in this matter.

92. The case of one born blind proper to be considered.

93. Such a one might by touch attain to have ideas of upper and lower.

94. Which modes of Situation he would attribute only to things tangible.

95. He would not at first sight think anything he saw, high or low, erect

or inverted.

96. This illustrated by an example.

97. By what means he would come to denominate visible objects, high

or low, &c.

98. Why he should think those objects highest which are painted on the

lowest part of his eye, and vice versa.

99. How he would perceive by sight the situation of external objects.

100. Our propension to think the contrary no argument against what

hath been said,
lor. Objection.

102. Answer.

103. An object could not be known at first sight by the colour.

104. Nor by the magnitude thereof.

105. Nor by the figure.

106. In the first act of vision, no tangible thing would be suggested by

sight.

107. Difficulty proposed concerning number.

108. Number of things visible would not, at first sight, suggest the like

number of things tangible.

109. Number, the creature of the mind.

no. One born blind would not, at first sight, number visible things as

others do.
i ir. The situation of any object determined with respect only to objects

of the same sense.

124 ESSAY TOWARDS A NEW THEORY OF VISION

112. No distance, great or small, between a visible and tangible thing.

113. The not observing this, cause of difficulty in erect vision.

114. Which otherwise includes nothing unaccountable.

115. What is meant by the pictures being inverted.

116. Cause of mistake in this matter.

117. Images in the eye not pictures of external objects.

118. In what sense they are pictures.

119. In this affair we must carefully distinguish between ideas of Sight

and Touch.
T2o. Difficult to explain by words the true theory of vision.

121. The question, whether there is any idea common to sight and touch,

stated.

122. Abstract extension inquired into.

123. It is incomprehensible.

124. Abstract extension not the object of geometry.

125. The general idea of a triangle considered.

126. Vacuum, or pure space, not common to sight and touch.

127. There is no idea, or kind of idea, common to both senses.

128. First argument in proof hereof.

129. Second argument.

130. Visible figure and extension not distinct ideas from colour.

131. Third argument.

132. Confirmation drawn from Mr. Molyneux's problem of a sphere and

a cube, published by Mr. Locke.
T33- Which is falsely solved, if the common supposition be true.

134. More might be said in proof of our tenet, but this suffices.

135. Farther reflection on the foregoing problem.

136. The same thing doth not affect both sight and touch.

137. The same idea of motion not common to sight and touch.

138. The way wherein we apprehend motion by sight easily collected

from what hath been said.

139. Qttes. How visible and tangible ideas came to have the same name,

if not of the same kind ?

140. This accounted for without supposing them of the same kind.

141. Obj. That a tangible square is liker to a visible square than to a

visible circle.

142. Ans. That a visible square is fitter than a visible circle to represent

a tangible square.

143. But it doth not hence follow that a visible square is like a tangible

square.

144. Why we are more apt to confound visible with tangible ideas, than

other signs with the things signified.

145. Several other reasons hereof assigned.

146. Reluctancy in rejecting any opinion no argument of its truth.

147. Proper objects of Vision the Language of Nature.

148. In it there is much admirable and deserving our attention.

149. Question proposed concerning the object of geometry.

150. At first view we are apt to think visible extension the object of

geometry.

CONTENTS OF THE ESSAY, ETC. 125

151. Visible extension shewn not to be the object of geometry.

152. Words may as well be thought the object of geometry as visible

extension.

153. It is proposed to inquire, what progress an intelligence that could

see, but not feel, might make in geometry.

154. He cannot understand those parts which relate to solids, and their

surfaces, and lines generated by their section.

155. Nor even the elements of plane geometry.

156. The proper objects of sight incapable of being managed as geo

metrical figures.

157. The opinion of those who hold plane figures to be the immediate

objects of sight considered.

158. Planes no more the immediate objects of sight than solids.

159. Difficult to enter precisely into the thoughts of the above-mentioned

intelligence.

160. The object of geometry, its not being sufficiently understood, cause

of difficulty and useless labour in that science.

AN ESSAY

TOWARDS

A NEW THEORY OF VISION

1. MY design is to shew the manner wherein we per
ceive by Sight the Distance, Magnitude, and Situation
of objects : also to consider the difference there is betwixt
the ideas of Sight and Touch, and whether there be any
idea common to both senses *.

2. It is, I think, agreed by all that Distance, of itself and
immediately, cannot be seen2. For, distance ;i being a line
directed endwise to the eye, it projects only one point in
the fund of the eye, which point remains invariably the
same, whether the distance be longer or shorter 4.

1 In the first edition alone this Philonous — Alciphron, IV. 8 —
sentence followed : — ' In treating Theory of Vision Vindicated and
of all which, it seems to me, the Explained, sect. 62-69.

writers of Optics have proceeded 3 i. e. outness, ordistanceoutward

on wrong principles.' from thepoint of vision — distance in

2 Sect. 2-51 explain the way in the line of sight — the third dimen-
which we learn in seeing to judge sion of space. Visible distance is
of Distance or Outness, and of visible space or interval between
objects as existing remote from our two points (see sect. H2X. We
organism, viz. by their association can be sensibly percipient of it
with what we see, and with certain only when both points are seen,
muscular and other sensations in 4 This section is adduced by
the eye which accompany vision. some of Berkeley's critics as if it
Sect. 2 assumes, as granted, the were the evidence discovered by
invisibility of distance in the line him for his Theory, instead of being,
of sight. Cf. sect, n and 88 — as it is, a passing reference to the
First Dialogue between Hylas and scientific ground of the already

128 AN ESSAY TOWARDS

3. 1 find it also acknowledged that the estimate we make
of the distance of objects considerably remote is rather an
act of judgment grounded on experience than of sense.
For example, when I perceive a great number of inter
mediate objects, such as houses, fields, rivers, and the like,
which I have experienced to take up a considerable space,
I thence form a judgment or conclusion, that the object
I see beyond them is at a great distance. Again, when
an object appears faint and small which at a near distance
I have experienced to make a vigorous and large appear
ance, I instantly conclude it to be far off1. And this, it is
evident, is the result of experience ; without which, from
the faintness and littleness, I should not have inferred
anything concerning the distance of objects.

4. But, when an object is placed at so near a distance as
that the interval between the eyes bears any sensible pro
portion to it2, the opinion of speculative men is, that the
two optic axes (the fancy that we see only with one eye at
once being exploded), concurring at the object, do there
make an angle, by means of which, according as it is
greater or lesser, the object is perceived to be nearer or
farther off3.

5. Betwixt which and the foregoing manner of estimating
distance there is this remarkable difference :— that, whereas
there was no apparent necessary connexion between small
distance and a large and strong appearance, or between
great distance and a little and faint appearance, there

acknowledged invisibility of out- remote distances. But the question,

ness, or distance in the line of in this and the thirty-six following

sight. See, for example, Bailey's sections, concerns the visibility of

Revieiv of Berkeley's Theory of near distances only — a few yards

Vision, pp. 38-43, also his Theory in front of us. It was 'agreed by

of Reasoning, p. 179 and pp. 200-7 all' that beyond this limit distances

— Mill's Discussions, vol. II. p. 95 — are suggested by our experience of

Abbott's Sight and Touch, p. 10, their signs.

where this sentence is presented 2 Cf. this and the four following

as ' the sole positive argument sections with the quotations in the

advanced by Berkeley/ The in- Editor's Preface, from Molyneux's

visibility of outness is not Berke- Treatise of Dioptrics.

ley's discovery, but the way we 3 In the author's' last edition we

learn to interpret its visual signs, have this annotation : ' See what

and what these are. Des Cartes and others have written

1 i. e. aerial and linear perspec- upon the subject.'
tive are acknowledged signs of

A NEW THEORY OF VISION 129

appears a very necessary connexion between an obtuse
angle and near distance, and an acute angle and farther
distance. It does not in the least depend upon experience,
but may be evidently known by any one before he had
experienced it, that the nearer the concurrence of the optic
axes the greater the angle, and the remoter their concur
rence is, the lesser will be the angle comprehended by
them.

6. There is another way, mentioned by optic writers,
whereby they will have us judge of those distances in
respect of which the breadth of the pupil hath any sensible
bigness. And that is the greater or lesser divergency of
the rays which, issuing from the visible point, do fall on
the pupil — that point being judged nearest which is seen
by most diverging rays, and that remoter which is seen by
less diverging rays, and so on ; the apparent distance still
increasing, as the divergency of the rays decreases, till at
length it becomes infinite, when the rays that fall on the
pupil are to sense parallel. And after this manner it is
said we perceive distance when we look only with one eye.

7. In this case also it is plain we are not beholden to
experience : it being a certain necessary truth that, the
nearer the direct rays falling on the eye approach to a
parallelism, the farther off is the point of their intersection,
or the visible point from whence they flow.

8. * Now, though the accounts here given of perceiving
near distance by sight are received for true, and accord
ingly made use of in determining the apparent places of
objects, they do nevertheless seem to me very unsatisfac
tory, and that for these following reasons :—

9. \ First*,] It is evident that, when the mind perceives
any idea not immediately and of itself, it must be by
the means of some other idea. Thus, for instance, the
passions which are in the mind of another are of them*
selves to me invisible. I may nevertheless perceive them

1 In the first edition this sec- ceived for true by mathematicians^

tion opens thus: ' I have here set andaccordinglymadeuse ofbythem

down the common current accounts in determining the apparent places

that are given of our perceiving of objects, do nevertheless,' &c.

near distances by sight, which, ~ Omitted in the author's last

though they are unquestionably re- edition.

BERKELEY: FRASEK. I. K

130 AN ESSAY TOWARDS

by sight ; though not immediately, yet by means of the
colours they produce in the countenance. We often see
shame or fear in the looks of a man, by perceiving the
changes of his countenance to red or pale.

10. Moreover, it is evident that no idea which is not
itself perceived can be to me the means of perceiving any
other idea. If I do not perceive the redness or paleness
of a man's face themselves, it is impossible I should per
ceive by them the passions which are in his mind.

11. Now, from sect, ii., it is plain that distance is in its
own nature imperceptible, and yet it is perceived by sight '.
It remains, therefore, that it be brought into view by means
of some other idea, that is itself immediately perceived in
the act of vision.

12. But those lines and angles, by means whereof some
men 2 pretend to explain the perception 3 of distance, are
themselves not at all perceived ; nor are they in truth ever
thought of by those unskilful in optics. I appeal to any
one's experience, whether, upon sight of an object, he
computes its distance by the bigness of the angle made by
the meeting of the two optic axes ? or whether he ever
thinks of the greater or lesser divergency of the rays which
arrive from any point to his pupil ? nay, whether it be not
perfectly impossible for him to perceive by sense the
various angles wherewith the rays, according to their greater
or lesser divergence, do fall on the eye? Every one is
himself the best judge of what he perceives, and what not.
In vain shall any man4 'tell me, that I perceive certain
lines and angles, which introduce into my mind the various
ideas of distance, so long as I myself am conscious of no
such thing.

13. Since therefore those angles and lines are not them-

1 i.e. although immediately in- perceived instead of to the per-

visible, it is mediately seen. cipient act ; and sometimes to im-

Mark, here and elsewhere, the agination, and the higher acts of

ambiguity of the term perception, intelligence.

which now signifies the act of 2' Some men' — 'mathematicians,'

being conscious of sensuous phe- in first edition,

iiomena, and again the act of in- 3 i. e. the mediate perception,

ferring phenomena of which we * ' any man ' — ' all the mathema-

are at the time insentient; while ticians in the world/ in first edition,
it is also applied to the object

A NEW THEORY OF VISION 131

selves perceived by sight, it follows, from sect, x., that the
mind does not by them judge of the distance of objects.

14. [Secondly x,] The truth of this assertion will be yet
farther evident to any one that considers those lines and
angles have no real existence in nature, being only an
hypothesis framed by the mathematicians, and by them
introduced into optics, that they might treat of that science
in a geometrical way.

15. The [third and 2] last reason I shall give for reject
ing that doctrine is, that though we should grant the real
existence of those optic angles, &c., and that it was
possible for the mind to perceive them, yet these principles
would not be found sufficient to explain the phenomena of
distance, as shall be shewn hereafter.

16. Now it being already shewn 3 that distance is sug
gested^ to the mind, by the mediation of some other idea
which is itself perceived in the act of seeing, it remains
that we inquire, what ideas or sensations there be that
attend vision, unto which we may suppose the ideas of dis
tance are connected, and by which they are introduced into
the mind.

And, first, it is certain by experience, that when we look
at a near object with both eyes, according as it approaches
or recedes from us, we alter the disposition of our eyes, by
lessening or widening the interval between the pupils.
This disposition or turn of the eyes is attended with a
sensation 5, which seems to me to be that which in this case
brings the idea of greater or lesser distance into the
mind.

1 Omitted in the author's last by Hobbes and Locke. There are
edition. three ways in which the objects

2 Omitted in the author's last we have an immediate perception
edition. of in sight maybe supposed to con-

;! Sect. 3, 9. duct us to what we do not im-

4 Observe the first introduction mediately perceive: (i) Instinct,

by Berkeley of the term suggestion, or what Reid calls ' original sugges-

used by him to express a leading tion' (Inquiry, ch. VI. sect. 20-24);

factor in his account of the visible (2) Custom ; (3) Reasoning from

world, and again in his more accepted premisses. Berkeley's

comprehensive account of our ' suggestion' corresponds to the

knowledge of the material universe second. (Cf. Theory of Vision

in the Principles. It had been em- Vindicated, sect. 42.)

ployed occasionally, among others, 5 In the Theory of Vision Vindi-

K 2

132 AN ESSAY TOWARDS

17. Not that there is any natural or necessary 1 connexion
between the sensation we perceive by the turn of the eyes
and greater or lesser distance. But — because the mind
has, by constant experience, found the different sensations
corresponding to the different dispositions of the eyes to
be attended each with a different degree of distance in the
object — there has grown an habitual or customary con
nexion between those two sorts of ideas : so that the mind
no sooner perceives the sensation arising from the different
turn it gives the eyes, in order to bring the pupils nearer
or farther asunder, but it withal perceives the different
idea of distance which was wont to be connected with that
sensation. Just as, upon hearing a certain sound, the idea
is immediately suggested to the understanding which cus
tom had united with it a.

18. Nor do I see how I can easily be mistaken in this
matter. I know evidently that distance is not perceived of
itself3; that, by consequence, it must be perceived by
means of some other idea, which is immediately perceived,
and varies with the different degrees of distance. I know
also that the sensation arising from the turn of the eyes is
of itself immediately perceived ; and various degrees there
of are connected with different distances, which never fail
to accompany them into my mind, when I view an object
distinctly with both eyes whose distance is so small that
in respect of it the interval between the eyes has any con
siderable magnitude.

19. I know it is a received opinion that, by altering the
disposition of the eyes, the mind perceives whether the
angle of the optic axes, or the lateral angles comprehended
between the interval of the eyes or the optic axes, are made
greater or lesser; and that, accordingly, by a kind of
natural geometry, it judges the point of their intersection
to be nearer or farther off. But that this is not true I am

cated, sect. 66, it is added that this ness and of objects as thus external, is

'sensation' belongs properly to duetomediawhichhaveacontingent

the sense of touch. Cf. also sect. or arbitrary, instead of a necessary,

145 of this Essay. connexion with the distances which

1 Here ' natural ' — ' necessary ' : they enable us to see, or of which

elsewhere = divinely arbitrary con- they are the signs, is a cardinal

nexion. part of his argument.

* That our mediate vision of out- 3 Sect. 2.

A NEW THEORY OF VISION 133

convinced by my own experience; since I am not conscious
that I make any such use of the perception I have by the
turn of my eyes. And for me to make those judgments,
and draw those conclusions from it, without knowing that
I do so, seems altogether incomprehensible1.

20. From all which it follows, that the judgment we
make of the distance of an object viewed with both eyes is
entirely the result of experience. If we had not constantly
found certain sensations, arising from the various disposi
tion of the eyes, attended with certain degrees of distance,
we should never make those sudden judgments from them
concerning the distance of objects ; no more than we would
pretend to judge of a man's thoughts by his pronouncing
words we had never heard before.

2T. Secondly, an object placed at a certain distance from
the eye, to which the breadth of the pupil bears a consider
able proportion, being made to approach, is seen more
confusedly2. And the nearer it is brought the more
confused appearance it makes. And this being found
constantly to be so, there arises in the mind an habitual
connexion between the several degrees of confusion and
distance ; the greater confusion still implying the lesser
distance, and the lesser confusion the greater distance of
the object.

22. This confused appearance of the object doth therefore
seem to be the medium whereby the mind judges of distance,
in those cases wherein the most approved writers of optics
will have it judge by the different divergency with which
the rays flowing from the radiating point fall on the pupil3.
No man, I believe, will pretend to see or feel those imag
inary angles that the rays are supposed to form, according
to their various inclinations on his eye. But he cannot
choose seeing whether the object appear more or less
confused. It is therefore a manifest consequence from
what has been demonstrated that, instead of the greater or
lesser divergency of the rays, the mind makes use of the

1 Here, as generally in Ihe Essay, between confused and faint vision,

the appeal is to our inward experi- Cf. sect. 32-38 with this section.

ence, not to phenomena observed Also Theory of Vision Vindicated,

by our senses in the organism. sect. 68.

- See sect. 35 for the difference 3 See sect. 6.

134 AN ESSAY TOWARDS

greater or lesser confusedness of the appearance, thereby
to determine the apparent place of an object.

23. Nor doth it avail to say there is not any necessary
connexion between confused vision and distance great or
small. For I ask any man what necessary connexion he
sees between the redness of a blush and shame ? And yet
no sooner shall he behold that colour to arise in the face
of another but it brings into his mind the idea of that pas
sion which hath been observed to accompany it.

24. What seems to have misled the writers of optics in
this matter is, that they imagine men judge of distance as
they do of a conclusion in mathematics; betwixt which and
the premises it is indeed absolutely requisite there be an
apparent necessary connexion. But it is far otherwise in
the sudden judgments men make of distance. We are
not to think that brutes and children, or even grown rea
sonable men, whenever they perceive an object to approach
or depart from them, do it by virtue of geometry and
demonstration.

25. That one idea may suggest another to the mind, it
will suffice that they have been observed to go together,
without any demonstration of the necessity of their coexist
ence, or without so much as knowing what it is that makes
them so to coexist. Of this there are innumerable instances,
of which no one can be ignorant1.

26. Thus, greater confusion having been constantly
attended with nearer distance, no sooner is the former
idea perceived but it suggests the latter to our thoughts.
And, if it had been the ordinary course of nature that the
farther off an object were placed the more confused it
should appear, it is certain the very same perception that
now makes us think an object approaches would then have
made us to imagine it went farther off; that perception,
abstracting from custom and experience, being equally
fitted to produce the idea of great distance, or small dis
tance, or no distance at all.

27. Thirdly, an object being placed at the distance above
specified, and brought nearer to the eye, we may never
theless prevent, at least for some time, the appearance's

1 These sections presuppose previous contiguity as an associative
law of mental phenomena.

A NEW THEORY OF VISION 135

growing more confused, by straining the eye1. In which
case that sensation supplies the place of confused vision,
in aiding the mind to judge of the distance of the object ;
it being esteemed so much the nearer by how much the
effort or straining of the eye in order to distinct vision is
greater.

28. I have here2 set down those sensations or ideas"
that seem to be the constant and general occasions of in
troducing into the mind the different ideas of near distance.
It is true, in most cases, that divers other circumstances
contribute to frame our idea of distance, viz. the particular
number, size, kind, &c. of the things seen. Concerning
which, as well as all other the forementioned occasions
which suggest distance, I shall only observe, they have
none of them, in their own nature, any relation or connexion
with it : nor is it possible they should ever signify the
various degrees thereof, otherwise than as by experience
they have been found to be connected with them.

29. I shall proceed upon these principles to account for
a phenomenon which has hitherto strangely puzzled the
writers of optics, and is so far from being accounted for by
any of their theories of vision, that it is, by their own con
fession, plainly repugnant to them; and of consequence, if
nothing else could be objected, were alone sufficient to
bring their credit in question. The whole difficulty I shall
lay before you in the words of the learned Doctor Barrow,
with which he concludes his Optic Lectures* : —

1 Haec sunt, quae circa partem opticse praecipue mathe-
maticam dicenda mihi suggessit meditatio. Circa reliquas
(quae ^t'o-i/coWepat sunt, adeoque saepiuscule pro certis
principiis plausibiles conjecturas venditare necessum
habent) nihil fere quicquam admodum verisimile succurrit,

1 See Reid's Inquiry, ch. vi. near and remote, are either (a)

sect. 22. invisible states of the visual organ,

- Sect. 16 27. — For the signs of or fb] visible appearances,

remote distances, see sect. 3. 4 In Motyneux's Treatise of Diop-

3 These are muscular sensations tries, Ft. I. prop. 31, sect. 9,

felt in the organ, and degrees of Barrow's difficulty is stated. Cf,

confusion in a visible idea. Berke- sect. 40 below,
ley's 'arbitrary' signs of distance.

136

AN ESSAY TOWARDS

a pervulgatis (ab iis; inquam, quae Keplerus, Scheinerus l,
Cartesius, et post illos alii tradiderunt) alienum aut diver-
sum. Atqui tacere malo, quam toties oblatam cramben
reponere. Proinde receptui cano ; nee ita tamen ut pror-
sus discedam, anteaquam improbam quandam difficultatem
(pro sinceritate quam et vobis et veritati debeo minime
dissimulandam) in medium protulero, quae doctrinae nos-
trae, hactenus inculcatae, se objicit adversam, ab ea saltern
nullam admittit solutionem. Ilia, breviter, talis est. Lenti
vel speculo cavo EBF exponatur punc-
tum visibile A, ita distans, ut radii ex
A manantes ex inflectione versus axem
AB cogantur. Sitque radiationis limes
(seu puncti A imago, qualem supra
passim statuimus) punctum Z. Inter
hoc autem et inflectentis verticem B
uspiam positus concipiatur oculus.
Quseri jam potest, ubi loci debeat
punctum A apparere? Retrorsum ad
punctum Z videri non fert natura (cum
omnis impressio sensum afficiens pro-
veniat a partibus A) ac experientia
reclamat. Nostris autem e placitis
consequi videtur, ipsum ad partes anti-
cas apparens, ab intervallo longissime
dissito (quod et maximum sensibile
quodvis intervallum quodammodo ex-
superet), apparere. Cum enim quo
radiis minus divergentibus attingitur
objectum, eo (seclusis utique praeno-
tionibus et praejudiciis) longius abesse
sentiatur ; et quod parallelos ad oculum
radios projicit, remotissime positum aestimetur : exigere
ratio ^ddetur, ut quod convergentibus radiis apprehenditur,
adhuc magis, si fieri posset, quoad apparentiam elongetur.
Quin et circa casum hunc generatim inquiri possit, quidnam
omnino sit, quod apparentem puncti A locum determine!,
faciatque quod constant! ratione nunc propius, nunc re-
motius appareat ? Cui itidem dubio nihil quicquam ex
hactenus dictorum analogia responded posse videtur, nisi

1 Christopher Scheiner, a Ger- the Copernican system, born 1575,
man astronomer, and opponent of died 1650.

A NEW THEORY OF VISION 137

debere punctum A perpetuo longissime semotum videri.
Verum experientia secus attestatur, illud pro diversa oculi
inter puncta B, Z, positione varie distans, nunquam fere (si
unquam) longinquius ipso A libere spectato, subinde vero
multo propinquius adparere ; quinimo, quo oculum appel-
lentes radii magis convergunt, eo speciem objecti propius
accedere. Nempe, si puncto B admoveatur oculus, suo
(ad lentem) fere native in loco conspicitur punctum A (vel
aeque distans, ad speculum); ad O reductus oculus ejusce
speciem appropinquantem cernit ; ad P adhuc vicinius
ipsum existimat ; ac ita sensim, donee alicubi tandem, velut
ad Q, constitute oculo, objectum summe propinquum appa-
rens in meram confusionem incipiat evanescere. Quae
sane cuncta rationibus atque decretis nostris repugnare
videntur, aut cum iis saltern parum amice conspirant.
Neque nostram tantum sententiam pulsat hoc experimen-
tum; at ex aequo caeteras quas norim omnes : veterem
imprimis ac vulgatam, nostrae prae reliquis affinem, ita
convellere videtur, ut ejus vi coactus doctissimus A.
Tacquetus isti principio (cui pene soli totam inaedificaverat
Catoptricam suam) ceu infido ac inconstant! renunciarit,
adeoque suam ipse doctrinam labefactarit ? id tamen, opi-
nor, minime facturus, si rem totam inspexissit penitius,
atque difficultatis fundum attigissit. Apud me vero non ita
pollet haec, nee eousque praepollebit ulla difficultas, ut ab
iis quae manifeste rationi consentanea video, discedam ;
praesertim quum, ut hie accidit, ejusmodi difficultas in
singularis cujuspiam casus disparitate fundetur. Nimirum
in praesente casu peculiare quiddam, naturae subtilitati
involutum, delitescit, aegre fortassis, nisi perfectius explor-
ato videndi modo, detegendum. Circa quod nil, fateor,
hactenus excogitare potui, quod adblandiretur animo meo,
nedum plane satisfaceret. Vobis itaque nodum hunc,
utinam feliciore conatu, resolvendum committo.'

In English as follows :

4 1 have here delivered what my thoughts have suggested
to me concerning that part of optics which is more properly
mathematical. As for the other parts of that science
(which, being rather physical, do consequently abound
with plausible conjectures instead of certain principles),
there has in them scarce anything occurred to my observa-

I38

AN ESSAY TOWARDS

tion different from what has been already said by Kepler,
Scheinerus, Des Cartes, &c. And methinks I had better
say nothing at all than repeat that which has been so often
said by others. I think it therefore high time to take my
leave of this subject. But, before I quit it for good and all,
the fair and ingenuous dealing that I owe both to you and
to truth obliges me to acquaint you with a certain untoward
difficulty, which seems directly opposite to the doctrine
I have been hitherto inculcating, at least admits of no
solution from it. In short it is this. Before the double
convex glass or concave speculum
EBF, let the point A be placed at
such a distance that the rays proceed
ing from A, after refraction or reflec
tion, be brought to unite somewhere
in the axis AB. And suppose the
point of union (/'. e. the image of the
point A, as hath been already set
forth) to be Z; between which and
B, the vertex of the glass or speculum,
conceive the eye to be anywhere placed.
The question now is, where the point
A ought to appear. Experience shews
that it doth not appear behind at the
point Z ; and it were contrary to nature
that it should ; since all the impres
sion which affects the sense comes
from towards^. But, from our tenets
it should seem to follow that it would
appear before the eye at a vast distance
off, so great as should in some sort sur
pass all sensible distance. For since,
if we exclude all anticipations and pre
judices, every object appears by so much the farther off by
how much the rays it sends to the eye are less diverging ;
and that object is thought to be most remote from which
parallel rays proceed unto the eye ; reason would make
one think that object should appear at yet a greater dis
tance which is seen by converging rays. Moreover, it may
in general be asked concerning this case, what it is that
determines the apparent place of the point A, and maketh
it to appear after a constant manner, sometimes nearer, at

A NEW THEORY OF VISION 139

other times farther off? To which doubt I see nothing
that can be answered agreeable to the principles we have
laid down, except only that the point A ought always to
appear extremely remote. But, on the contrary, we are
assured by experience, that the point A appears variously
distant, according to the different situations of the eye
between the points B and Z. And that it doth almost
never (if at all) seem farther off than it would if it were
beheld by the naked eye ; but, on the contrary, it doth
sometimes appear much nearer. Nay, it is even certain
that by how much the rays falling on the eye do more
converge, by so much the nearer does the object seem to
approach. For, the eye being placed close to the point B,
the object A appears nearly in its own natural place, if the
point B is taken in the glass, or at the same distance, if in
the speculum. The eye being brought back to O, the
object seems to draw near ; and, being come to P, it beholds
it still nearer : and so on by little and little, till at length the
eye being- placed somewhere, suppose at O, the object ap
pearing extremely near begins to vanish into mere con
fusion. All which doth seem repugnant to our principles ;
at least, not rightly to agree with them. Nor is our tenet
alone struck at by this experiment, but likewise all others
that ever came to my knowledge are every whit as much
endangered by it. The ancient one especially (which is
most commonly received, and comes nearest to mine) seems
to be so effectually overthrown thereby that the most
learned Tacquet has been forced to reject that principle,
as false and uncertain, on which alone he had built almost
his whole Catoptrics, and consequently, by taking away the
foundation, hath himself pulled down the superstructure
he had raised on it. Which, nevertheless, I do not believe
he would have done, had he but considered the whole
matter more thoroughly, and examined the difficulty to the
bottom. But as for me, neither this nor any other difficulty
shall have so great an influence on me, as to make me
renounce that which I know to be manifestly agreeable to
reason. Especially when, as it here falls out, the difficulty
is founded in the peculiar nature of a certain odd and
particular case. For, in the present case something
peculiar lies hid, which, being involved in the subtilty
of nature, will perhaps hardly be discovered till such time

140 AN ESSAY TOWARDS

as the manner of vision is more perfectly made known.
Concerning which, I must own I have hitherto been able
to find out nothing that has the least show of probability,
not to mention certainty. I shall therefore leave this knot
to be untied by you, wishing you may have better success
in it than I have had.'

30. The ancient and received principle, which Dr. Bar
row here mentions as the main foundation of Tacquet's l
Catoptrics, is, that every 'visible point seen by reflection
from a speculum shall appear placed at the intersection
of the reflected ray and the perpendicular of incidence.'
Which intersection in the present case happening to be
behind the eye, it greatly shakes the authority of that
principle whereon the aforementioned author proceeds
throughout his whole Catoptrics, in determining the
apparent place of objects seen by reflection from any kind
of speculum.

31. Let us now see how this phenomenon agrees with
our tenets2. The eye, the nearer it is placed to the
point B in the above figures, the more distinct is the ap
pearance of the object : but, as it recedes to O, the
appearance grows more confused ; and at P it sees the
object yet more confused; and so on, till the eye, being
brought back to Z, sees the object in the greatest con
fusion of all. Wherefore, by sect. 21, the object should
seem to approach the eye gradually, as it recedes from
the point B ; that is, at O it should (in consequence of
the principle I have laid down in the aforesaid section)
seem nearer than it did at B, and at P nearer than at
O, and at Q nearer than at P, and so on, till it quite
vanishes at Z. Which is the very matter of fact, as
any one that pleases may easily satisfy himself by ex
periment.

32. This case is much the same as if we should sup
pose an Englishman to meet a foreigner who used the
same words with the English, but in a direct contrary

1 Andrea Tacquet, a mathemati- in a collected form, at Antwerp

cian, born at Antwerp in 1611, and in 1669.

referred to by Molyneux as ' the - In what follows Berkeley tries

ingenious Jesuit.' He published a to explain by his visual theory

number of scientific treatises, most seeming contradictions which

of which appeared after his death, puzzled the mathematicians.

A NEW THEORY OF VISION 141

signification. The Englishman would not fail to make
a wrong judgment of the ideas annexed to those sounds,
in the mind of him that used them. Just so in the
present case, the object speaks (if I may so say) with
words that the eye is well acquainted with, that is,
confusions of appearance ; but, whereas heretofore the
greatest confusions were always wont to signify nearer
distances, they have in this case a direct contrary sig
nification, being connected with the greater distances.
Whence it follows that the eye must unavoidably be
mistaken, since it will take the confusions in the sense
it has been used to, which is directly opposed to the true.

33. This phenomenon, as it entirely subverts the opin
ion of those who will have us judge of distance by lines
and angles, on which supposition it is altogether inexplic
able, so it seems to me no small confirmation of the truth
of that principle whereby it is explained '. But, in order
to a more full explication of this point, and to shew how
far the hypothesis of the mind's judging by the various
divergency of rays may be of use in determining the
apparent place of an object, it will be necessary to
premise some few things, which are already well known
to those who have any skill in Dioptrics.

34. First, Any radiating point is then distinctly seen
when the rays proceeding from it are, by the refractive
power of the crystalline, accurately reunited in the retina
or fund of the eye. But if they are reunited either
before they arrive at the retina, or after they have passed
it, then there is confused vision.

35. Secondly, Suppose, in the adjacent figures, NP
represent an eye duly framed, and retaining its natural
figure. In fig. i the rays falling nearly parallel on the
eye, are, by the crystalline AB, refracted, so as their
focus, or point of union F, falls exactly on the retina.
But, if the rays fall sensibly diverging on the eye, as
in fig. 2, then their focus falls beyond the retina ; or, if
the rays are made to converge by the lens QS, before
they come at the eye, as in fig. 3, their focus F will
fall before the retina. In which two last cases it is

1 This is offered as a verification order of nature, by non-resembling
of the theory that near distances visual signs, contingently connected
are suggested, according to the with real distance.

142

AN ESSAY TOWARDS

evident, from the foregoing section, that the appearance
of the point Z is confused. And, by how much the
greater is the convergency or divergency of the rays
falling on the pupil, by so much the farther will the
point of their reunion be from the retina, either before
or behind it, and consequently the point Z will appear
by so much the more confused. And this, by the bye,
may shew us the difference between confused and faint

vision. Confused vision is, when the rays proceeding
from each distinct point of the object are not accurately
re-collected in one corresponding point on the retina,
but take up some space thereon — so that rays from
different points become mixed and confused together.
This is opposed to a distinct vision, and attends near
objects. Faint vision is when, by reason of the dis
tance of the object, or grossness of the interjacent
medium, few rays arrive from the object to the eye.

A NEW THEORY OF VISION 143

This is opposed to vigorous or clear vision, and attends
remote objects. But to return.

36. The eye, or (to speak truly) the mind, perceiving
only the confusion itself, without ever considering the
cause from which it proceeds, doth constantly annex
the same degree of distance to the same degree of
confusion. Whether that confusion be occasioned by
converging or by diverging rays it matters not. Whence
it follows that the eye, viewing the object Z through
the glass QS (which by refraction causeth the rays ZO,
ZS, «Scc. to converge), should judge it to be at such
a nearness, at which, if it were placed, it would radiate
on the eye, with rays diverging to that degree as would
produce the same confusion which is now produced by
converging rays, i.e. would cover a portion of the retina
equal to DC. (Vid. fig. 3, sup.} But then this must
be understood (to use Dr. Barrow's phrase) 'seclusis
praenotionibus et prsejudiciis/ in case we abstract from
all other circumstances of vision, such as the figure, size,
faintness, &c. of the visible objects —all which do ordin
arily concur to form our idea of distance, the mind having,
by frequent experience, observed their several sorts or
degrees to be connected with various distances.

37. It plainly follows from what has been said, that a
person perfectly purblind (i.e. that could not see an
object distinctly but when placed close to his eye) would
not make the same wrong judgment that others do in
the forementioned case. For, to him, greater confusions
constantly suggesting greater distances, he must, as he
recedes from the glass, and the object grows more con
fused, judge it to be at a farther distance ; contrary to
what they do who have had the perception of the
objects growing more confused connected with the idea
of approach.

38. Hence also it doth appear, there may be good use
of computation, by lines and angles, in optics1 ; not that
the mind judges of distance immediately by them, but
because it judges by somewhat which is connected with
them, and to the determination whereof they may be
subservient. Thus, the mind judging of the distance

1 Cf. sect. 78 ; also New Theory of Vision Vindicated, sect. 31.

144 AN ESSAY TOWARDS

of an object by the confusedness of its appearance, and
this confusedness being greater or lesser to the naked
eye, according as the object is seen by rays more or
less diverging, it follows that a man may make use of the
divergency of the rays, in computing the apparent dis
tance, though not for its own sake, yet on account of the
confusion with which it is connected. But so it is, the
confusion itself is entirely neglected by mathematicians,
as having no necessary relation with distance, such as
the greater or lesser angles of divergency are conceived
to have. And these (especially for that they fall under
mathematical computation) are alone regarded, in de
termining the apparent places of objects, as though they
were the sole and immediate cause of the judgments
the mind makes of distance. Whereas, in truth, they
should not at all be regarded in themselves, or any
otherwise than as they are supposed to be the cause of
confused vision.

39. The not considering of this has been a fundamental
and perplexing oversight. For proof whereof, we need
go no farther than the case before us. It having been
observed that the most diverging rays brought into the
mind the idea of nearest distance, and that still as the
divergency decreased the distance increased, and it being
thought the connexion between the various degrees of
divergency and distance was immediate — this naturally
leads one to conclude, from an ill-grounded analogy,
that converging rays shall make an object appear at an
immense distance, and that, as the convergency increases,
the distance (if it were possible) should do so likewise.
That this was the cause of Dr. Barrow's mistake is
evident from his own words which we have quoted.
Whereas had the learned Doctor observed that diverg
ing and converging rays, how opposite soever they
may seem, do nevertheless agree in producing the same
effect, to wit, confusedness of vision, greater degrees
whereof are produced indifferently, either as the diver
gency or convergency of the rays increaseth ; and that
it is by this effect, which is the same in both, that either
the divergency or convergency is perceived by the eye —
I say, had he but considered this, it is certain he would
have made a quite contrary judgment, and rightly concluded

A NEW THEORY OF VISION 145

that those rays which fall on the eye with greater degrees
of convergency should make the object from whence
they proceed appear by so much the nearer. But it is
plain it was impossible for any man to attain to a right
notion of this matter so long as he had regard only to
lines and angles, and did not apprehend the true nature of
vision, and how far it was of mathematical consideration.

40. Before we dismiss this subject, it is fit we take
notice of a query relating thereto, proposed by the inge
nious Mr. Molyneux, in his Treatise of Dioptrics (par. i.
prop. 31. sect. 9), where, speaking of the difficulty we have
been explaining, he has these words : 'And so he (i. e. Dr.
Barrow) leaves this difficulty to the solution of others,
which I (after so great an example) shall do likewise ; but
with the resolution of the same admirable author, of not
quitting the evident doctrine which we have before laid
down, for determining the locus objccti, on account of being-
pressed by one difficulty, which seems inexplicable till
a more intimate knowledge of the visive faculty be obtained
by mortals. In the meantime I propose it to the con
sideration of the ingenious, whether the locus apparcns of
an object placed as in this ninth section be not as much
before the eye as the distinct base is behind the eye ? ' To
which query we may venture to answer in the negative.
For, in the present case, the rule for determining the dis
tance of the distinct base, or respective focus from the
glass is this : As the difference between the distance of the
object and focus is to the focus or focal length, so the distance
of the object from the glass is to the distance of the respective
focus or distinct base from the glass. (Molyneux, Dioptr.,
par. i. prop. 5.) Let us now suppose the object to be
placed at the distance of the focal length, and one-half of
the focal length from the glass, and the eye close to the
glass. Hence it will follow, by the rule, that the distance
of the distinct base behind the eye is double the true
distance of the object before the eye. If, therefore,
Mr. Molyneux's conjecture held good, it would follow
that the eye should see the object twice as far off as it
really is ; and in other cases at three or four times its due
distance, or more. But this manifestly contradicts experi
ence, the object never appearing, at farthest, beyond its
due distance. Whatever, therefore, is built on this suppo-

BERKELEY : FRASER. I. L

146 AN ESSAY TOWARDS

sition (vid. corol. i. prop. 57. ibid.) comes to the ground
along with it.

41. From what hath been premised, it is a manifest
consequence, that a man born blind, being made to see,
would at first have no idea of distance by sight : the sun
and stars, the remotest objects as well as the nearer, would
all seem to be in his eye, or rather in his mind. The
objects intromitted by sight would seem to him (as in truth
they are) no other than a new set of thoughts or sensations,
each whereof is as near to him as the perceptions of pain
or pleasure, or the most inward passions of his soul. For,
our judging objects perceived by sight to be at any dis
tance, or without the mind, is (vid. sect, xxviii.) entirely
the effect of experience ; which one in those circumstances
could not yet have attained to \

42. It is indeed otherwise upon the common supposition
—that men judge of distance by the angle of the optic axes,

just as one in the dark, or a blind man by the angle com
prehended by two sticks, one whereof he held in each
hand 2. For, if this were true, it would follow that one
blind from his birth, being made to see, should stand in
need of no new experience, in order to perceive distance
by sight. But that this is false has, I think, been suffi
ciently demonstrated.

43. And perhaps, upon a strict inquiry, we shall not
find that even those who from their birth have grown up
in a continued habit of seeing are irrecoverably prejudiced
on the other side, to wit, in thinking what they see to be at
a distance from them. For, at this time it seems agreed
on all hands, by those who have had any thoughts of that
matter, that colours, which are the proper and immediate
object of sight, are not without the mind. — But then, it will
be said, by sight we have also the ideas of extension, and
figure, and motion ; all which may well be thought without
and at some distance from the mind, though colour should

1 Berkeley here passes from his Hamilton's Reid, p. 177, on the

proof of visual ' suggestion ' of all distinction between perception of

outward distances— i.e. intervals the external world and perception

between extremes in the line of of distance through the eye.
sight — by means of arbitrary signs, - See Descartes, Dioptrique, VI

and considers the nature of — Malebranche, Recherche, Liv. I.

visible externality. See note in ch. 9, 3— Reid's Inquiry, VI. n.

A NEW THEORY OF VISION 147

not. In answer to this, I appeal to any man's experience,
whether the visible extension of any object do not appear
as near to him as the colour of that object ; nay, whether
they do not both seem to be in the very same place. Is
not the extension we see coloured, and is it possible for us,
so much as in thought, to separate and abstract colour from
extension ? Now, where the extension is, there surely is
the figure, and there the motion too. I speak of those
which are perceived by sight1.

44. But for a fuller explication of this point, and to shew
that the immediate objects of sight are not so much as the
ideas or resemblances of things placed at a distance, it is
requisite that we look nearer into the matter, and carefully
observe what is meant in common discourse when one
says, that which he sees is at a distance from him. Sup
pose, for example, that looking at the moon I should say it
were fifty or sixty semidiameters of the earth distant from
me. Let us see what moon this is spoken of. It is plain
it cannot be the visible moon, or anything like the visible
moon, or that which I see — which is only a round luminous
plain, of about thirty visible points in diameter. For, in
case I am carried from the place where I stand directly
towards the moon, it is manifest the object varies still as
I go on ; and, by the time that I am advanced fifty or sixty
semidiameters of the earth, I shall be so far from being
near a small, round, luminous flat that I shall perceive
nothing like it — this object having long since disappeared,
and, if I would recover it, it must be by going back to the
earth from whence I set out2. Again, suppose I perceive
by sight the faint and obscure idea of something, which
I doubt whether it be a man, or a tree, or a tower, but

1 Berkeley here begins to found, dent on the sensation of colour,
on the experienced connexion be- 3 In connexion with this and the

tween extension and colour, and next illustration, Berkeley seems

between visible and tangible ex- to argue that we are not only unable

tension, a proof that outness is to see distance in the line of sight,

invisible. From Aristotle onwards but also that we do not see a dis-

it has been assumed that colour is tant object in its real visible magni-

the only phenomenon of which we tude. But elsewhere he affirms

are immediately percipient in see- that only tangible magnitude is

ing. Visible extension, visible entitled to be called real. Cf.

figure, and visible motion are sect. 55. 59 6r.
accordingly taken to be depen-

L 2,

148 AN ESSAY TOWARDS

judge it to be at the distance of about a mile. It is plain
I cannot mean that what I see is a mile off, or that it is
the image or likeness of anything which is a mile off;
since that every step I take towards it the appearance
alters, and from being obscure, small, and faint, grows
clear, large, and vigorous. And when I come to the
mile's end, that which I saw first is quite lost, neither
do I find anything in the likeness of it1.

45. In these and the like instances, the truth of the mat
ter, I find, stands thus : — Having of a long time experienced
certain ideas perceivable by touch2 — as distance, tangible
figure, and solidity — to have been connected with certain
ideas of sight, I do, upon perceiving these ideas of sight,
forthwith conclude what tangible ideas are, by the wonted
ordinary course of nature, like to follow. Looking at an
object, I perceive a certain visible figure and colour, with
some degree of faintness and other circumstances, which,
from what I have formerly observed, determine me to think
that if I advance forward so many paces, miles, &c., I shall
be affected with such and such ideas of touch. So that, in
truth and strictness of speech, I neither see distance itself,
nor anything that I take to be at a distance. I say, neither
distance nor things placed at a distance are themselves,
or their ideas, truly perceived by sight. This I am per
suaded of, as to what concerns myself. And I believe
whoever will look narrowly into his own thoughts, and
examine what he means by saying he sees this or that
thing at a distance, will agree with me, that what he sees

1 The sceptical objections to the troduces ' touch ' — a term which

trustworthiness of the senses, pro- with him includes, not merely or-

posed by the Eleatics and others, ganic sense of contact, but also

referred to by Descartes in his muscular and locomotive sense-

Meditations, and by Malebranche experience. After this he begins

in the First Book cf his Recherche, to unfold the antithesis of visual

may have suggested the illustra- and tactual phenomena, whose sub-

tions in this section. Cf. also sequent synthesis it is the aim of

Hume's Essay On the Academical the New Theory to explain. Cf.

or Sceptical Philosophy. The seep- Principles of Human Knowledge,

tical difficulty is founded on the sect. 43 — Theory of Vision Vindi-

assumption that the object seen cated, sect. 22 and 25. Note here

at different distances is the same Berkeley's reticence of his ideal-

visible object: it is really different, ization of Matter — tangible as well

and so the difficulty vanishes. as visible. Cf. Principles, sect. 44.

: Here Berkeley expressly in-

A NEW THEORY OF VISION 149

only suggests to his understanding that, after having passed
a certain distance, to be measured by the motion of his
body, which is perceivable by touch ', he shall come to
perceive such and such tangible ideas, which have been
usually connected with such and such visible ideas. But,
that one might be deceived by these suggestions of sense,
and that there is no necessary connexion between visible
and tangible ideas suggested by them, we need go no
farther than the next looking-glass or picture to be con
vinced. Note that, when I speak of tangible ideas, I take
the word idea for any the immediate object of sense, or
understanding — in which large signification it is commonly
used by the moderns '-'.

46. From what we have shewn, it is a manifest conse
quence that the ideas of space, outness :!, and things placed
at a distance are not, strictly speaking, the object of sight 4 ;
they are not otherwise perceived by the eye than by the ear.
Sitting in my study I hear a coach drive along the street ;
I look through the casement and see it ; I walk out and
enter into it. Thus, common speech would incline one to
think I heard, saw, and touched the same thing, to wit, the
coach. It is nevertheless certain the ideas intromitted by
each sense are widely different, and distinct from each
other ; but, having been observed constantly to go together,
they are spoken of as one and the same thing. By the
variation of the noise, I perceive the different distances of
the coach, and know that it approaches before I look out.
Thus, by the ear I perceive distance just after the same
manner as I do by the eye.

47. I do not nevertheless say I hear distance, in like

1 This connexion of our know- the material universe a riddle to
ledge of distance with our locomo- many, of which afterwards.

tive experience points to a theory 3 The expressive term 'outness,'

which ultimately resolves space favoured by Berkeley, is here first

into experience of unimpeded loco- used,

motion. 4 ' We get the idea of Space/

2 Locke (Essay, Introduction, says Locke, ' both by our sight and
§ 8) takes idea vaguely as 'the touch' (Essay, II. 13. § 2). Locke
term which serves best to stand did not contemplate Berkeley's anti-
for whatsoever is the object of the thesis of visible and tangible exten-
understanding when a man thinks.' sion, and the consequent ambiguity
Oversight of what Berkeley intends of the term extension ; which some-
by the term idea has made his times signifies coloured, and at
whole conception of nature and others resistant experience in sense.

150 AN ESSAY TOWARDS

manner as I say that I see it — the ideas perceived by
hearing not being so apt to be confounded with the ideas
of touch as those of sight are. So likewise a man is easily
convinced that bodies and external things are not properly
the object of hearing, but only sounds, by the mediation
whereof the idea of this or that body, or distance, is sug
gested to his thoughts. But then one is with more difficulty
brought to discern the difference there is betwixt the ideas
of sight and touch 1 . though it be certain, a man no more
sees and feels the same thing, than he hears and feels the
same thing.

48. One reason of which seems to be this. It is thought
a great absurdity to imagine that one and the same thing
should have any more than one extension and one figure.
But, the extension and figure of a body being let into the
mind two ways, and that indifferently, either by sight or
touch, it seems to follow that we see the same extension and
the same figure which we feel.

49. But, if we take a close and accurate view of the
matter, it must be acknowledged that we never see and feel
one and the same object -. That which is seen is one thing,
and that which is felt is another. If the visible figure and
extension be not the same with the tangible figure and
extension, we are not to infer that one and the same thing
has divers extensions. The true consequence is that the
objects of sight and touch are two distinct things 3. It may
perhaps require some thought rightly to conceive this dis
tinction. And the difficulty seems not a little increased,
because the combination of visible ideas hath constantly
the same name as the combination of tangible ideas where
with it is connected — which doth of necessity arise from
the use and end of language 4.

50. In order, therefore, to treat accurately and uncon-
fusedly of vision, we must bear in mind that there are two
sorts of objects apprehended by the eye — the one primarily
and immediately, the other secondarily and by intervention
of the former. Those of the first sort neither are nor
appear to be without the mind, or at any distance off'"'.

1 For an explanation of this dif- 3 This is the issue of the ana-
ficulty, see sect. 144. lytical portion of the Essay.

2 'object' — 'thing,' in the earlier 4 Cf. sect. 139-40.

editions. 5 Here the question of externality,

A NEW THEORY OF VISION 151

They may, indeed, grow greater or smaller, more confused,
or more clear, or more faint. But they do not, cannot
approach, [or even seem to approach l] or recede from us.
Whenever we say an object is at a distance, whenever we
say it draws near, or goes farther off, we must always mean
it of the latter sort, which properly belong to the touch2,
and are not so truly perceived as suggested by the eye, in
like manner as thoughts by the ear.

51. No sooner do we hear the words of a familiar
language pronounced in our ears but the ideas corre
sponding thereto present themselves to our minds : in the
very same instant the sound and the meaning enter the
understanding : so closely are they united that it is not in
our power to keep out the one except we exclude the other
also. We even act in all respects as if we heard the very
thoughts themselves. So likewise the secondary objects,
or those which are only suggested by sight, do often more
strongly affect us, and are more regarded, than the proper
objects of that sense ; along with which they enter into the
mind, and with which they have a far more strict connexion
than ideas have with words3. Hence it is we find it so
difficult to discriminate between the immediate and mediate
objects of sight, and are so prone to attribute to the former
what belongs only to the latter. They are, as it were,
most closely twisted, blended, and incorporated together.
And the prejudice is confirmed and riveted in our
thoughts by a long tract of time, by the use of language, and
want of reflection. However, I doubt not but anyone that
shall attentively consider what we have already said, and
shall say upon this subject before we have done (especially
if he pursue it in his own thoughts), may be able to deliver
himself from that prejudice. Sure I am, it is worth some

signifying independence of all per- is the problem of the Principles

cipient life, is again mixed up with of Human Knowledge.

that of the invisibility of distance :> In this section the conception

outwards in the line of sight. of a natural Visual Language,

1 Omitted in author's last edition. makes its appearance, with its

2 i. e. including muscular and implication that Nature is (for us)
locomotive experience as well as virtually Spirit. Cf. sect. 140, 147
sense of contact. But what are — Principles, sect. 44 — Dialogues of
the tangibilia themselves? Are Hylas and Philonous — Alciphron,
they also significant, like visibilia, IV. 8, n— and Theory of Vision
of a still ulterior reality? This Vindicated, passim.

152 AN ESSAY TOWARDS

attention to whoever would understand the true nature of
vision.

52. I have now done with Distance, and proceed to shew
how it is that we perceive by sight the Magnitude of objects '.
It is the opinion of some that we do it by angles, or by
angles in conjunction with distance. But, neither angles
nor distance being perceivable by sight '2, and the things
we see being in truth at no distance from us 3, it follows
that, as we have shewn lines and angles not to be the
medium the mind makes use of in apprehending the
apparent place, so neither are they the medium whereby it
apprehends the apparent magnitude of objects.

53. It is well known that the same extension at a near
distance shall subtend a greater angle, and at a farther dis
tance a lesser angle. And by this principle (we are told)
the mind estimates the magnitude of an object4, comparing
the angle under which it is seen with its distance, and
thence inferring the magnitude thereof. What inclines
men to this mistake (beside the humour of making one sec
by geometry) is, that the same perceptions or ideas which
suggest distance do also suggest magnitude. But, if we
examine it, we shall find they suggest the latter as im
mediately as the former. I say, they do not first suggest
distance and then leave it to the judgment to use that as a
medium whereby to collect the magnitude ; but they have
as close and immediate a connexion with the magnitude as
with the distance ; and suggest magnitude as indepen
dently of distance, as they do distance independently of
magnitude. All which will be evident to whoever considers
what has been already said and what follows.

54. It has been shewn there are two sorts of objects
apprehended by sight, each whereof has its distinct magni
tude, or extension — the one, properly tangible, i.e. to be
perceived and measured by touch, and not immediately
falling under the sense of seeing ; the other, properly and
immediately visible, by mediation of which the former is
brought in view. Each of these magnitudes are greater or

1 Sect. 52-87 treat of the invisi- '2 Sect. 8-15.

bility of real, i.e. tactual, Magni- 3 Sect. 41, &c.

tude. Cf. Theory of Vision Vindi- 4 See Molyneux's Treatise on

catcd, sect. 54-61. Dioptrics, B. I. prop. 28.

A NEW THEORY OF VISION 153

lesser, according as they contain in them more or fewer
points, they being made up of points or minimums. For,
whatever may be said of extension in abstract1, it is
certain sensible extension is not infinitely divisible 2.
There is a minimum tangibilc, and a minimum visibilc,
beyond which sense cannot perceive. This every one's
experience will inform him.

55. The magnitude of the object which exists without
the mind, and is at a distance, continues always invariably
the same : but, the visible object still changing as you
approach to or recede from the tangible object, it hath no
fixed and determinate greatness. Whenever therefore we
speak of the magnitude of any thing, for instance a tree or
a house, we must mean the tangible magnitude ; otherwise
there can be nothing steady and free from ambiguity spoken
of it3. Now, though the tangible and visible magnitude
do in truth belong to two distinct objects4, I shall never
theless (especially since those objects are called bv the
same name, and are observed to coexist5), to avoid tedious-
ness and singularity of speech, sometimes speak of them as
belonging to one and the same thing.

56. Now, in order to discover by what means the mag
nitude of tangible objects is perceived by sight, I need only
reflect on what passes in my own mind, and observe what
those things be which introduce the ideas of greater or
lesser into my thoughts when I look on any object. And
these I find to be, first, the magnitude or extension of the
visible object, which, being immediately perceived by sight,
is connected with that other which is tangible and placed
at a distance : secondly, the confusion or distinctness : and
thirdly, the vigorousness or faintness of the aforesaid

1 See sect. 122-126. in the case of visible extension, and

2 In short there is a point at which, as an idea touched, in the case
with our limited sense, we cease of tangible extension, — is yet no
to be percipient of colour, in seeing ; property of mind. Mind can exist
and of resistance, in locomotion. without being percipient of exten-
Though Berkeley regards all visible sion, although extension cannot be
extensions as sensible, and there- realised without mind.

fore dependent for their reality on 3 But this is true, though less

being realised by sentient mind, obviously, of tangible as well as of

he does not mean that mind or visible objects.

consciousness is extended. With 4 Sect. 49.

him, extension, though it exists 5 Cf. sect. 139, 140, &c.

only in mind, — i.e. as an idea seen,

J54 AN ESSAY TOWARDS

visible appearance. Cceteris paribus, by how much the
greater or lesser the visible object is, by so much the
greater or lesser do I conclude the tangible object to be.
But, be the idea immediately perceived by sight never so
large, yet, if it be withal confused, I judge the magnitude
of the thing to be but small. If it be distinct and clear, I
judge it greater. And, if it be faint, I apprehend it to be
yet greater. What is here meant by confusion and faint-
ness has been explained in sect. 35.

57. Moreover, the judgments we make of greatness do,
in like manner as those of distance, depend on the dispo
sition of the eye ; also on the figure, number, and situation *
of intermediate objects, and other circumstances that have
been observed to attend great or small tangible magnitudes.
Thus, for instance, the very same quantity of visible exten
sion which in the figure of a tower doth suggest the idea
of great magnitude shall in the figure of a man suggest
the idea of much smaller magnitude. That this is owing
to the experience we have had of the usual bigness of
a tower and a man, no one, I suppose, need be told.

58. It is also evident that confusion or faintness have no
more a necessary connexion with little or great magnitude
than they have with little or great distance. As they sug
gest the latter, so the}- suggest the former to our minds.
And, by consequence, if it were not for experience, we
should no more judge a faint or confused appearance to be
connected with great or little magnitude than we should
that it was connected with great or little distance.

59. Nor will it be found that great or small visible mag
nitude hath any necessary relation to great or small
tangible magnitude — so that the one may certainly and
infallibly be inferred from the other. But, before we
come to the proof of this, it is fit we consider the difference
there is betwixt the extension and figure which is the pro
per object of touch, and that other which is termed visible ;
and how the former is principally, though not immediately,
taken notice of when we look at any object. This has been
before mentioned2, but we shall here inquire into the cause
thereof. We regard the objects that environ us in propor
tion as they are adapted to benefit or injure our own

1 'situation '—not in the earlier editions.

A NEW THEORY OF VISION 155

bodies, and thereby produce in our minds the sensations
of pleasure or pain. Now, bodies operating on our organs
by an immediate application, and the hurt and advantage
arising therefrom depending altogether on the tangible,
and not at all on the visible, qualities of any object-- this
is a plain reason why those should be regarded by us much
more than these. And for this end [chiefly1] the visive
sense seems to have been bestowed on animals, to wit,
that, by the perception of visible ideas (which in themselves
are not capable of affecting or anywise altering the frame
of their bodies), they may be able to foresee'2 (from the
experience they have had what tangible ideas are connect
ed with such and such visible ideas) the damage or benefit
which is like to ensue upon the application of their own
bodies to this or that body which is at a distance. Which
foresight, how necessary it is to the preservation of an
animal, every one's experience can inform him. Hence it
is that, when we look at an object, the tangible figure and
extension thereof are principally attended to ; whilst there
is small heed taken of the visible figure and magnitude,
which, though more immediately perceived, do less sensibly
affect us, and are not fitted to produce any alteration in our
bodies.

60. That the matter of fact is true will be evident to any
one who considers that a man placed at ten foot distance is
thought as great as if he were placed at the distance only
of five foot ; which is true, not with relation to the visible,
but tangible greatness of the object: the visible magnitude
being far greater at one station than it is at the other.

61. Inches, feet, <S:c. are settled, stated lengths, whereby
we measure objects and estimate their magnitude. We
say, for example, an object appears to be six inches, or six
foot long. Now, that this cannot be meant of visible
inches, &c. is evident, because a visible inch is itself no
constant determinate magnitude", and cannot therefore
serve to mark out and determine the magnitude of any

1 Omitted in the author's last needs of embodied life, not

edition. to immediately convey scientific

3 Ordinary sight is virtually knowledge, Recherche, Liv. I. ch. 5,

foresight. Cf. sect. 85. — See also 6, 9, &c.

Malebranche on the external senses, 3 Sect. 44. — See also sect. 55,

as given primarily for the urgent and note.

156 AN ESSAY TOWARDS

other thing. Take an inch marked upon a ruler ; view it
successively, at the distance of half a foot, a foot,
a foot and a half, &c. from the eye : at each of
which, and at all the intermediate distances, the inch shall
have a different visible extension, i.e. there shall be more
or fewer points discerned in it. Now, I ask which of all
these various extensions is that stated determinate one that
is agreed on for a common measure of other magnitudes ?
No reason can be assigned why we should pitch on one
more than another. And, except there be some invariable
determinate extension fixed on to be marked by the word
inch, it is plain it can be used to little purpose; and to say
a thing contains this or that number of inches shall imply
no more than that it is extended, without bringing any
particular idea of that extension into the mind. Farther,
an inch and a foot, from different distances, shall both
exhibit the same visible magnitude, and yet at the same
time you shall say that one seems several times greater
than the other. From all which it is manifest, that the
judgments we make of the magnitude of objects by sight
are altogether in reference to their tangible extension.
Whenever we say an object is great or small, of this
or that determinate measure, I say, it must be meant
of the tangible and not the visible extension J, which,
though immediately perceived, is nevertheless little taken
notice of.

62. Now, that there is no necessary connexion between
these two distinct extensions is evident from hence — because
our eyes might have been framed in such a manner as to
be able to see nothing but what were less than the minimum
tangibilc. In which case it is not impossible we might have
perceived all the immediate objects of sight the very same
that we do now; but unto those visible appearances there
would not be connected those different tangible magnitudes
that are now. Which shews the judgments we make of
the magnitude of things placed at a distance, from the
various greatness of the immediate objects of sight, do not

1 This supposes ' settled ' tangi- felt as larger or smaller according

bt'h'a, but not 'settled' visibilia. to the state of the organism, and the

Yet the sensible extension given other conditions of our embodied

in touch and locomotive experience perception,
is also relative — an object being

A NEW THEORY OF VISION 157

arise from any essential or necessary, but only a customary,
tie which has been observed betwixt them.

63. Moreover, it is not only certain that any idea of sight
might not have been connected with this or that idea of
touch we now observe to accompany it, but also that the great
er visible magnitudes might have been connected with and
introduced into our minds lesser tangible magnitudes, and
the lesser visible magnitudes greater tangible magnitudes.
Nay, that it actually is so, we have daily experience — that
object which makes a strong and large appearance not
seeming near so great as another the visible magnitude
whereof is much less, but more faint, l and the appearance
upper, or which is the same thing, painted lower on the
retina, which faintness and situation suggest both greater
magnitude and greater distance.

64. From which, and from sect. 57 and 58, it is manifest
that, as we do not perceive the magnitude of objects im
mediately by sight, so neither do we perceive them by the
mediation of anything which has a necessary connexion
with them. Those ideas that now suggest unto us the
various magnitudes of external objects before we touch
them might possibly have suggested no such thing ; or
they might have signified them in a direct contrary manner,
so that the very same ideas on the perception whereof we
judge an object to be small might as well have served to
make us conclude it great ; — those ideas being in their own
nature equally fitted to bring into our minds the idea of
small or great, or no size at all, of outward objects2, just
as the words of any language are in their own nature
indifferent to signify this or that thing, or nothing at all.

65. As we see distance so we see magnitude. And we
see both in the same way that we see shame or anger in the
looks of a man. Those passions are themselves invisible ;
they are nevertheless let in by the eye along with colours
and alterations of countenance which are the immediate
object of vision, and which signify them for no other
reason than barely because they have been observed to
accompany them. Without which experience we should

1 What follows, to end of sect. 63, tactual experience, taken in this
added in the author's last edition. Essay provisionally as the real ex-

2 ' outward objects,' i. e. objects ternal objects. See Principles,
of which we are percipient in sect. 44.

158 AN ESSAY TOWARDS

no more have taken blushing for a sign of shame than
of gladness.

66. We are nevertheless exceedingly prone to imagine
those things which are perceived only by the mediation
of others to be themselves the immediate objects of sight,
or at least to have in their own nature a fitness to be
suggested by them before ever they had been experienced
to coexist with them. From which prejudice every one
perhaps will not find it easy to emancipate himself, by
any the clearest convictions of reason. And there are
some grounds to think that, if there was one only invari
able and universal language in the world, and that men
were born with the faculty of speaking it, it would be the
opinion of some, that the ideas in other men's minds were
properly perceived by the ear, or had at least a necessary
and inseparable tie with the sounds that were affixed to
them. All which seems to arise from want of a due appli
cation of our discerning faculty, thereby to discriminate
between the ideas that are in our understandings, and con
sider them apart from each other ; which would preserve
us from confounding those that are different, and make us
see what ideas do, and what do not, include or imply this
or that other idea !.

67. There is a celebrated phenomenon 2 the solution
whereof I shall attempt to give, by the principles that have
been laid down, in reference to the manner wherein we
apprehend by sight the magnitude of objects. — The appa
rent magnitude of the moon, when placed in the horizon, is
much greater than when it is in the meridian, though the
angle under which the diameter of the moon is seen be not
observed greater in the former case than in the latter ; and

1 Cf sect. 144. Note, in this between words and their accepted

and the three preceding sections, meanings.

the stress laid on the arbitrariness '2 In sect. 67-78, Berkeley at-

of the connexion between the signs tempts to verify the foregoing

which suggest magnitudes, or other account of the natural signs of

modesof extension, and theirsignifi- Size, by applying it to solve a

cates. This is the foundation of the phenomenon, the cause of which

New Theory ; which thus resolves had been long debated among men

physical causality into a relation of science — the visible magnitude

of signs to what they signify and of heavenly bodies when seen in

predict — analogous to the relation the horizon.

A NEW THEORY OF VISION 159

the horizontal moon doth not constantly appear of the same
bigness, but at some times seemeth far greater than at
others.

68. Now, in order to explain the reason of the moon's
appearing greater than ordinary in the horizon, it must be
observed that the particles which compose our atmosphere
do intercept the rays of light proceeding from any object to
the eye ; and, by how much the greater is the portion of
atmosphere interjacent between the object and the eye, by
so much the more are the rays intercepted, and, by conse
quence, the appearance of the object rendered more faint—
every object appearing more vigorous or more faint in pro
portion as it sendeth more or fewer rays into the eye.
Now, between the eye and the moon when situated in the
horizon there lies a far greater quantity of atmosphere than
there does when the moon is in the meridian. Whence it
comes to pass, that the appearance of the horizontal moon
is fainter, and therefore, by sect. 56, it should be thought
bigger in that situation than in the meridian, or in any
other elevation above the horizon.

69. Farther, the air being variously impregnated, some
times more and sometimes less, with vapours and exhala
tions fitted to retund and intercept the rays of light, it
follows that the appearance of the horizontal moon hath
not always an equal faintness, and, by consequence, that
luminary, though in the very same situation, is at one
time judged greater than at another.

70. That we have here given the true account of the
phenomena of the horizontal moon, will, I suppose, be
farther evident to any one from the following considera
tions : — First, it is plain, that which in this case suggests
the idea of greater magnitude, must be something which is
itself perceived ; for, that which is unperceived cannot sug
gest to our perception any other thing1. Secondly, it must
be something that does not constantly remain the same,
but is subject to some change or variation ; since the ap
pearance of the horizontal moon varies, being at one time
greater than at another. {Thirdly, it must not lie in the
circumjacent or intermediate objects, such as mountains,
houses, fields, &c. ; because that when all those objects are

1 Cf. sect. 10.

160 AN ESSAY TOWARDS

excluded from sight the appearance is as great as ever1. ]
And yet, thirdly 2, it cannot be the visible figure or magni
tude ; since that remains the same, or is rather lesser, by
how much the moon is nearer to the horizon. It remains
therefore, that the true cause is that affection or alteration
of the visible appearance, which proceeds from the greater
paucity of rays arriving at the eye, and which I term faint-
ness : since this answers all the forementioned conditions,
and I am not conscious of any other perception that does.

71. Add to this that in misty weather it is a common
observation, that the appearance of the horizontal moon is
far larger than usual, which greatly conspires with and
strengthens our opinion. Neither would it prove in the
least irreconcilable with what we have said, if the horizon
tal moon should chance sometimes to seem enlarged beyond
its usual extent, even in more serene weather. For, we
must not only have regard to the mist which happens to be
in the place where we stand ; we ought also to take into
our thoughts the whole sum of vapours and exhalations
which lie betwixt the eye and the moon : all which co-oper
ating to render the appearance of the moon more faint, and
thereby increase its magnitude, it may chance to appear
greater than it usually does even in the horizontal position,
at a time when, though there be no extraordinary fog or
haziness just in the place where we stand, yet the air be
tween the eye and the moon, taken altogether, may be
loaded with a greater quantity of interspersed vapours and
exhalations than at other times :!.

72. It may be objected that, in consequence of our prin
ciples, the interposition of a body in some degree opaque,
which may intercept a great part of the rays of light, should
render the appearance of the moon in the meridian as
large as when it is viewed in the horizon. To which
I answer, it is not faintness anyhow applied that suggests

1 Omitted in the author's last sect. 74. WhyMesser'?
edition. Cf. sect. 76, 77. — The 3 When Berkeley, some years
explanation in question is attributed afterwards, visited Italy, he re-
to Alhazen, and by Bacon to Pto- marked that distant objects ap-
lemy, while it is sanctioned by peared to him much nearer than
eminent scientific names before they really were— a phenomenon
and since Berkeley. which he attributed to the com-

2 'Fourthly' in the second parative purity of the southern
edition. Cf. what follows with air.

A NEW THEORY OF VISION l6j

greater magnitude ; there being no necessary, but only an ex
perimental, connexion between those two things. It follows
that the faintness which enlarges the appearance must
be applied in such sort, and with such circumstances, as
have been observed to attend the vision of great magnitudes.
When from a distance we behold great objects, the particles
of the intermediate air and vapours, which are themselves
unperceivable, do interrupt the rays of light, and thereby
render the appearance less strong and vivid. Now, faint-
ness of appearance, caused in this sort, hath been experi
enced to co-exist with great magnitude. But when it is
caused by the interposition of an opaque sensible body,
this circumstance alters the case ; so that a faint appearance
this way caused does not suggest greater magnitude, be
cause it hath not been experienced to co-exist with it.

73. Faintness, as well as all other ideas or perceptions
which suggest magnitude or distance, does it in the same
way that words suggest the notions to which they are
annexed. Now, it is known a word pronounced with
certain circumstances, or in a certain context with other
words, hath not always the same import and signification
that it hath when pronounced in some other circumstances,
or different context of words. The very same visible ap
pearance, as to faintness and all other respects, if placed
on high, shall not suggest the same magnitude that it
would if it were seen at an equal distance on a level with
the eye. The reason whereof is, that we are rarely accus
tomed to view objects at a great height ; our concerns lie
among things situated rather before than above us ; and
accordingly our eyes are not placed on the top of our
heads, but in such a position as is most convenient for
us to see distant objects standing in our way. And, this
situation of them being a circumstance which usually at
tends the vision of distant objects, we may from hence
account for (what is commonly observed) an object's ap
pearing of different magnitude, even with respect to its
horizontal extension, on the top of a steeple, e.g. a hun
dred feet high, to one standing below, from what it would
if placed at a hundred feet distance, on a level with his eye.
For, it hath been shewn that the judgment we make on
the magnitude of a thing depends not on the visible ap
pearance only, but also on divers other circumstances, any

BERKELEY: FRASER. i. M

1 62 AN ESSAY TOWARDS

one of which being omitted or varied may suffice to make
some alteration in our judgment. Hence, the circum
stance of viewing a distant object in such a situation as
is usual and suits with the ordinary posture of the head
and eyes, being omitted, and instead thereof a different
situation of the object, which requires a different posture
of the head, taking place — it is not to be wondered at if
the magnitude be judged different. But it will be de
manded, why a high object should constantly appear less
than an equidistant low object of the same dimensions ; for
so it is observed to be. It may indeed be granted that the
variation of some circumstances may vary the judgment
made on the magnitude of high objects, which we are less
used to look at ; but it does not hence appear why they
should be judged less rather than greater? I answer, that
in case the magnitude of distant objects was suggested by
the extent of their visible appearance alone, and thought
proportional thereto, it is certain they would then be judged
much less than now they seem to be. (Vid. sect. 79.)
But, several circumstances concurring to form the judg
ment we make on the magnitude of distant objects, by
means of which they appear far larger than others whose
visible appearance hath an equal or even greater exten
sion, it follows that upon the change or omission of any
of those circumstances which are wont to attend the vision
of distant objects, and so come to influence the judgments
made on their magnitude, they shall proportionally appear
less than otherwise they would. For, any of those things
that caused an object to be thought greater than in
proportion to its visible extension being either omitted,
or applied without the usual circumstances, the judgment
depends more entirely on the visible extension ; and con
sequently the object must be judged less. Thus, in the
present case the situation of the thing seen being different
from what it usually is in those objects we have occasion
to view, and whose magnitude we observe, it follows that
the very same object being a hundred feet high, should
seem less than if it was a hundred feet off, on (or nearly
on) a level with the eye. What has been here set forth
seems to me to have no small share in contributing to
magnify the appearance of the horizontal moon, and de
serves not to be passed over in the explication of it.

A NEW THEORY OF VISION 163

74. If we attentively consider the phenomenon before
us, we shall find the not discerning between the mediate
and immediate objects of sight to be the chief cause of
the difficulty that occurs in the explication of it. The
magnitude of the visible moon, or that which is the pro
per and immediate object of vision1, is no greater when
the moon is in the horizon than when it is in the meridian.
How comes it, therefore, to seem greater in one situation
than the other ? What is it can put this cheat on the
understanding ? It has no other perception of the moon
than what it gets by sight. And that which is seen is
of the same extent — I say, the visible appearance hath
the very same, or rather a less, magnitude, when the
moon is viewed in the horizontal than when in the
meridional position. And yet it is esteemed greater in
the former than in the latter. Herein consists the diffi
culty ; which doth vanish and admit of the most easy
solution, if we consider that as the visible moon is not
greater in the horizon than in the meridian, so neither
is it thought to be so. It hath been already shewn
that, in any act of vision, the visible object absolutely,
or in itself, is little taken notice of— the mind still car
rying its view from that to some tangible ideas, which
have been observed to be connected with it, and by that
means come to be suggested by it. So that when a thing
is said to appear great or small, or whatever estimate
be made of the magnitude of any thing, this is meant
not of the visible but of the tangible object. This duly
considered, it will be no hard matter to reconcile the
seeming contradiction there is, that the moon should
appear of a different bigness, the visible magnitude thereof
remaining still the same. For, by sect. 56, the very
same visible extension, with a different faintness, shall
suggest a different tangible extension. When therefore
the horizontal moon is said to appear greater than the
meridional moon, this must be understood, not of a greater
visible extension, but of a greater tangible extension,
which, by reason of the more than ordinary faintness
of the visible appearance, is suggested to the mind along
with it.

1 i. e. the original perception, of suggestion and inferential
apart from any synthetic operation thought, founded on visual signs.

M 2

164 AN ESSAY TOWARDS

75. Many attempts have been made by learned men
to account for this appearance \ Gassendus -, Des Cartes :;,
Hobbes4, and several others have employed their thoughts
on that subject ; but how fruitless and unsatisfactory their
endeavours have been is sufficiently shewn in the Philo
sophical Transactions* (Numb. 187, p. 314), where you
may see their several opinions at large set forth and
confuted, not without some surprise at the gross blunders
that ingenious men have been forced into by endeavouring
to reconcile this appearance with the ordinary principles
of optics"'. Since the writing of which there hath been
published in the Transactions (Numb. 187, p. 323) another
paper relating to the same affair, by the celebrated Dr.
Wallis, wherein he attempts to account for that phe
nomenon ; which, though it seems not to contain anything
new, or different from what had been said before by
others, I shall nevertheless consider in this place.

76. His opinion, in short, is this :— We judge not of
the magnitude of an object by the optic angle alone,
but by the optic angle in conjunction with the distance.
Hence, though the angle remain the same, or even become
less, yet, if withal the distance seem to have been increased,
the object shall appear greater. Now, one way whereby
we estimate the distance of anything is by the number
and extent of the intermediate objects. When there
fore the moon is seen in the horizon, the variety of

1 In Riccioli's Almagest, II. and Remarks, pp. 48, &c. At p. 55

lib. X. sect. 6. quest. 14, we have Berkeley's New Theory is referred

an account of many hypotheses to, and pronounced to be at variance

then current, in explanation of the with experience. Smith concludes

apparent magnitude of the hori- by saying, that in 'the second

zontal moon. edition of Berkeley's Essay, and

>J Gassendi's ' Epistolae quatuor also in a Vindication and Explana-

de apparente magnitudine solis tion of it (called the Visual Lan-

humilis et sublimis.' — Opera, torn. g*tage), very lately published, the

III. pp. 420-477. Cf. Appendix to author has made some additions to

this Essay, p. no. hissolutionof the said phenomenon;

3 See Dioptrique, VI. but seeing it still involves and de-

4 Opera Latina, vol. I. p. 376, pends on the principle of faintness,
vol. II. pp. 26-62; English Works, I may leave the rest of it to the
vol. I. p. 462. (Molesworth's reader's consideration.' This, which
Edition.) appeared in 1738, is one of the very

5 The paper in the Transactions few early references to Berkeley's
is by Molyneux. Neiv Theory of Vision Vindicated.

0 See Smith's Optics, pp. 64-67,

A NEW THEORY OF VISION 165

fields, houses, &c. together with the large prospect of
the wide extended land or sea that lies between the eye
and the utmost limb of the horizon, suggest unto the
mind the idea of greater distance, and consequently
magnify the appearance. And this, according to Dr.
Wallis, is the true account of the extraordinary large
ness attributed by the mind to the horizontal moon, at
a time when the angle subtended by its diameter is not
one jot greater than it used to be.

77. With reference to this opinion, not to repeat what
has been already said concerning distance ', I shall only
observe, first, that if the prospect of interjacent objects
be that which suggests the idea of farther distance, and this
idea of farther distance be the cause that brings into the mind
the idea of greater magnitude, it should hence follow that
if one looked at the horizontal moon from behind a wall,
it would appear no bigger than ordinary. For, in that case,
the wall interposing cuts off all that prospect of sea and
land, &c. which might otherwise increase the apparent dis
tance, and thereby the apparent magnitude of the moon.
Nor will it suffice to say, the memory doth even then
suggest all that extent of land, <S:c. which lies within
the horizon, which suggestion occasions a sudden judg
ment of sense, that the moon is farther off and larger
than usual. For, ask any man who from such a station
beholding the horizontal moon shall think her greater
than usual, whether he hath at that time in his mind
any idea of the intermediate objects, or long tract of
land that lies between his eye and the extreme edge
of the horizon ? and whether it be that idea which is
the cause of his making the aforementioned judgment ?
He will, without doubt, reply in the negative, and declare
the horizontal moon shall appear greater than the meri-
dional, though he never thinks of all or any of those
things that lie between him and it. [And as for the
absurdity of any idea's introducing into the mind an
other, whilst itself is not perceived, this has already
fallen under our observation, and is too evident to need
any farther enlargement on it2.] Secondly, it seems im
possible, by this hypothesis, to account for the moon's

1 Sect. 2-51. - This sentence is omitted in the author's last edition.

166 AN ESSAY TOWARDS

appearing, in the very same situation, at one time greater
than at another ; which, nevertheless, has been shewn
to be very agreeable to the principles we have laid
down, and receives a most easy and natural explication
from them. I1 For the further clearing up of this point,
it is to be observed, that what we immediately and
properly see are only lights and colours in sundry situ
ations and shades, and degrees of faintness and clearness,
confusion and distinctness. All which visible objects are
only in the mind; nor do they suggest aught external'2,
whether distance or magnitude, otherwise than by ha
bitual connexion, as words do things. We are also to
remark, that beside the straining of the eyes, and beside
the vivid and faint, the distinct and confused appearances
(which, bearing some proportion to lines and angles,
have been substituted instead of them in the foregoing
part of this Treatise), there are other means which
suggest both distance and magnitude — particularly the
situation of visible points or objects, as upper or lower ;
the former suggesting a farther distance and greater
magnitude, the latter a nearer distance and lesser magni
tude—all which is an effect only of custom and experience,
there being really nothing intermediate in the line of
distance between the uppermost and the lowermost, which
are both equidistant, or rather at no distance from the
eye ; as there is also nothing in upper or lower which
by necessary connexion should suggest greater or lesser
magnitude. Now, as these customary experimental means
of suggesting distance do likewise suggest magnitude,
so they suggest the one as immediately as the other.
I say, they do not (vide sect. 53) first suggest distance,
and then leave the mind from thence to infer or compute
magnitude, but suggest magnitude as immediately and
directly as they suggest distance.]

78. This phenomenon of the horizontal moon is a clear
instance of the insufficiency of lines and angles for explain
ing the way wherein the mind perceives and estimates the
magnitude of outward objects. There is, nevertheless, a
use of computation by them 3 — in order to determine the

1 What follows to the end of this 2 i. e. tangible.

section is not contained in the first 3 Cf. sect. 38 ; and Theory of

edition. Vision Vindicated, sect. 31.

A NEW THEORY OF VISION 167

apparent magnitude of things, so far as they have a con
nexion with and are proportional to those other ideas or
perceptions which are the true and immediate occasions
that suggest to the mind the apparent magnitude of things.
But this in general may, I think, be observed concerning
mathematical computation in optics — that it can never1 be
very precise and exact2, since the judgments we make of
the magnitude of external things do often depend on several
circumstances which are not proportional to or capable of
being defined by lines and angles.

79. From what has been said, we may safely deduce this
consequence, to wit, that a man born blind, and made to
see, would, at first opening of his eyes, make a very dif
ferent judgment of the magnitude of objects intromitted
by them from what others do. He would not consider the
ideas of sight with reference to, or as having any connexion
with, the ideas of touch. His view of them being entirely
terminated within themselves, he can no otherwise judge
them great or small than as they contain a greater or lesser
number of visible points. Now, it being certain that any
visible point can cover or exclude from view only one
other visible point, it follows that whatever object intercepts
the view of another hath an equal number of visible points
with it; and, consequently, they shall both be thought by
him to have the same magnitude. Hence, it is evident one
in those circumstances would judge his thumb, with which
he might hide a tower, or hinder its being seen, equal to
that tower ; or his hand, the interposition whereof might
conceal the firmament from his view, equal to the firma
ment : how great an inequality soever there may, in our
apprehensions, seem to be betwixt those two things, be
cause of the customary and close connexion that has grown
up in our minds between the objects of sight and touch,
whereby the very different and distinct ideas of those two
senses are so blended and confounded together as to be
mistaken for one and the same thing— out of which pre
judice we cannot easily extricate ourselves.

1 'Never' — 'hardly,' in first it to be considered, whether the

edition. said phenomenon is not as clear

- Cf. Appendix, p. 208. — See an instance of the insufficiency of

Smith's Optics, B. I. ch. v, and faintness' as of mathematical com-

Remarks, p. 56, in which he ' leaves putation.

1 68 AN ESSAY TOWARDS

80. For the better explaining the nature of vision, and
setting the manner wherein we perceive magnitudes in a
due light, I shall proceed to make some observations con
cerning matters relating thereto, whereof the want of
reflection, and duly separating between tangible and visible
ideas, is apt to create in us mistaken and confused notions.
And, first, I shall observe, that the minimum visibilc is
exactly equal in all beings whatsoever that are endowed
with the visive faculty1. No exquisite formation of the
eye, no peculiar sharpness of sight, can make it less in one
creature than in another ; for, it not being distinguishable
into parts, nor in anywise consisting of them, it must
necessarily be the same to all. For, suppose it otherwise,
arid that the minimum visibilc of a mite, for instance, be
less than the minimum visibilc of a man ; the latter there
fore may, by detraction of some part, be made equal to
the former. It doth therefore consist of parts, which is
inconsistent with the notion of a minimum visibilc or point.

81. It will, perhaps, be objected, that the minimum visi
bilc of a man doth really and in itself contain parts whereby
it surpasses that of a mite, though they are not perceivable
by the man. To which I answer, the minimum visibile
having (in like manner as all other the proper and imme
diate objects of sight) been shewn not to have any existence
without the mind of him who sees it, it follows there cannot
be any part of it that is not actually perceived and therefore
visible. Now, for any object to contain several distinct

1 A favourite doctrine with help of a microscope; consequently

Berkeley, according to whose there are animals whose whole

theory of visibles there can be no bodies are far less than the minimum

absolute visible magnitude, the visibile of a man. Doubtless these

minimum being the least that is "animals have eyes, and, if their

perceivable by each seeing subject, minimum visibile were equal to that

and thus relative to his visual of a man, it would follow that they

capacity. This section is thus cannot perceive anything but what

criticised, in January, 1752, in a is much larger than their whole

letter signed ' Anti-Berkeley/ in body ; and therefore their own

the Gent. Mag, (vol. XXII. p. 12) : bodies must be invisible to them,

' Upon what his lordship asserts because we know they are so to

with respect to the minimum visi- men, whose minimum visibile is

bile, I would observe that it is asserted by his lordship to be equal

certain that there are infinite num- to theirs.' There is some miscon-

bers of animals which are imper- ception in this. Cf. Appendix to

ceptible to the naked eye, and Essay, p. 209
cannot be perceived but by the

A NEW THEORY OF VISION 169

visible parts, and at the same time to be a minimum visibilc,
is a manifest contradiction.

82. Of these visible points we see at all times an equal
number. It is every whit as great when our view is
contracted and bounded by near objects as when it is
extended to larger and remoter ones. For, it being im
possible that one minimum visibile should obscure or keep
out of sight more than one other, it is a plain consequence
that, when my view is on all sides bounded by the walls
of my study, I see just as many visible points as I could in
case that, by the removal of the study-walls and all other
obstructions, I had a full prospect of the circumjacent
fields, mountains, sea, and open firmament. For, so long
as I am shut up within the walls, by their interposition
every point of the external objects is covered from my
view. But, each point that is seen being able to cover or
exclude from sight one only other corresponding point, it
follows that, whilst my sight is confined to those narrow
walls, I see as many points, or minima visibilia, as I should
were those walls away, by looking on all the external
objects whose prospect is intercepted by them. Whenever,
therefore, we are said to have a greater prospect at one
time than another, this must be understood with relation,
not to the proper and immediate, but the secondary and
mediate objects of vision— which, as hath been shewn, do
properly belong to the touch.

83. The visive faculty, considered with reference to its
immediate objects, may be found to labour of two defects.
First, in respect of the extent or number of visible points
that are at once perceivable by it, which is narrow and
limited to a certain degree. It can take in at one view but
a certain determinate number of minima visibilia, beyond
which it cannot extend its prospect. Secondly, our sight
is defective in that its view is not only narrow, but also for
the most part confused. Of those things that we take in
at one prospect, we can see but a few at once clearly and
unconfusedly ; and the more we fix our sight on any one
object, by so much the darker and more indistinct shall
the rest appear.

84. Corresponding to these two defects of sight, we may
imagine as many perfections, to wit, ist. That of compre
hending in one view a greater number of visible points;

170 AN ESSAY TOWARDS

2dly. of being able to view them all equally and at once,
with the utmost clearness and distinction. That those
perfections are not actually in some intelligences of a
different order and capacity from ours, it is impossible for
us to know '.

85. In neither of those two ways do microscopes con
tribute to the improvement of sight. For, when we look
through a microscope, we neither see more visible points,
nor are the collateral points more distinct, than when we
look with the naked eye at objects placed at a due distance.
A microscope brings us, as it were, into a new world. It
presents us with a new scene of visible objects, quite
different from what we behold with the naked eye. But
herein consists the most remarkable difference, to wit, that
whereas the objects perceived by the eye alone have a
certain connexion with tangible objects, whereby we are
taught to foresee what will ensue upon the approach or
application of distant objects to the parts of our own body
—which much conduceth to its preservation 2— there is not
the like connexion between things tangible and those visible
objects that are perceived by help of a fine microscope.

86. Hence, it is evident that, were our eyes turned into
the nature of microscopes, we should not be much bene-
fitted by the change. We should be deprived of the fore-
mentioned advantage we at present receive by the visive
faculty, and have left us only the empty amusement of
seeing, without any other benefit arising from it. But, in
that case, it will perhaps be said, our sight would be endued
with a far greater sharpness and penetration than it now
hath. But I would fain know wherein consists that sharp
ness which is esteemed so great an excellency of sight. It
is certain, from what we have already shewn 3, that the
minimum visibile is never greater or lesser, but in all cases
constantly the same. And in the case of microscopical
eyes, I see only this difference, to wit, that upon the ceasing
of a certain observable connexion betwixt the divers per
ceptions of sight and touch, which before enabled us to

1 Those two defects belong to needful— to assist finite intuition,

human consciousness. See Locke's Reasoning is the sign at once of

Essay, II. 10, on the defects of our dignity and our weakness,

human memory. It is this imper- <J Sect. 59.

fection which makes reasoning y Sect. 80-82.

A NEW THEORY OF VISION 171

regulate our actions by the eye, it would now be rendered
utterly unserviceable to that purpose.

87. Upon the whole, it seems that if we consider the use
and end of sight, together with the present state and
circumstances of our being, we shall not find any great
cause to complain of any defect or imperfection in it, or
easily conceive how it could be mended. With such ad
mirable wisdom is that faculty contrived, both for the
pleasure and convenience of life.

88. Having finished what I intended to say concerning
the Distance and Magnitude of objects, I come now to treat
of the manner wherein the mind perceives by sight their
Situation '. Among the discoveries of the last age, it is
reputed none of the least, that the manner of vision has been
more clearly explained than ever it had been before.
There is, at this day, no one ignorant that the pictures of
external objects are painted on the retina or fund of the
eye ; that we can see nothing which is not so painted ; and
that, according as the picture is more distinct or confused,
so also is the perception we have of the object2. But then,
in this explication of vision, there occurs one mighty diffi
culty, viz. the objects are painted in an inverted order on the
bottom of the eye : the upper part of any object being
painted on the lower part of the eye, and the lower part of the
object on the upper part of the eye; and so also as to right
and left. Since therefore the pictures are thus inverted, it
is demanded, how it comes to pass that we see the objects
erect and in their natural posture ?

89. In answer to this difficulty, we are told that the mind,
perceiving an impulse of a ray of light on the upper part of
the eye, considers this ray as coming in a direct line from
the lower part of the object ; and, in like manner, tracing
the ray that strikes on the lower part of the eye, it is
directed to the upper part of the object. Thus, in the adjacent
figure, C, the lower point of the object ABC, is projected on
c the upper part of the eye. So likewise, the highest point A
is projected on a the lowest part of the eye ; which makes the
representation cba inverted. But the mind— considering

1 Sect.SS-iiQrelatetothenature, of tangible things. Cf. Theory of
invisibility, and arbitrary visual Vision Vindicated, sect. 44-53.
ngns of Situation, orof the localities - Cf. sect. 2, 114, 116, 118.

172

AN ESSAY TOWARDS

the stroke that is made on c as coming in the straight line
Cc from the lower end of the object; and the stroke or
impulse on a, as coming in the line Aa from the upper end
of the object — is directed to make a right judgment of the
situation of the object ABC, notwithstanding the picture
of it be inverted. Moreover, this is illustrated by con
ceiving a blind man, who, holding in his hands two sticks
that cross each other, doth with them touch the extremities
of an object, placed in a perpendicular situation l. It is cer
tain this man will judge that to be the upper part of the
object which he touches with the stick held in the under
most hand, and that to be the lower part of the object

which he touches with the stick in his uppermost hand.
This is the common explication of the erect appearance of
objects, which is generally received and acquiesced in,
being (as Mr. Molyneux tells us, Diopt. part ii. ch. vii. p. 289)
' allowed by all men as satisfactory.'

90. But this account to me does not seem in any degree
true. Did I perceive those impulses, decussations, and
directions of the rays of light, in like manner as hath been
set forth, then, indeed, it would not at first view be alto
gether void of probability. And there might be some pre
tence for the comparison of the blind man and his cross
sticks. But the case is far otherwise. I know very well
that I perceive no such thing. And, of consequence, I
cannot thereby make an estimate of the situation of objects.
Moreover, I appeal to any one's experience, whether he be
conscious to himself that he thinks on the intersection made
by the radius pencils, or pursues the impulses they give in
right lines, whenever he perceives by sight the position of

1 This illustration is taken from Descartes. See Appendix.

A NEW THEORY OF VISION 173

any object ? To me it seems evident that crossing and
tracing of the rays, &c. is never thought on by children,
idiots, or, in truth, by any other, save only those who have
applied themselves to the study of optics. And for the
mind to judge of the situation of objects by those things
without perceiving them, or to perceive them without
knowing it ', take which you please, it is perfectly beyond
my comprehension. Add to this, that the explaining the
manner of vision by the example of cross sticks, and
hunting for the object along the axes of the radius pencils,
doth suppose the proper objects of sight to be perceived at
a distance from us, contrary to what hath been demonstrated2.
[We may therefore venture to pronounce this opinion, con
cerning the way wherein the mind perceives the erect
appearance of objects, to be of a piece with those other
tenets of writers in optics, which in the foregoing parts of
this treatise we have had occasion to examine and refute3.]

91. It remains, therefore, that we look for some other
explication of this difficulty. And I believe it not im
possible to find one, provided we examine it to the bottom,
and carefully distinguish between the ideas of sight and
touch ; which cannot be too oft inculcated in treating of
vision4. But, more especially throughout the consideration
of this affair, we ought to carry that distinction in our
thoughts ; for that from want of a right understanding
thereof, the difficulty of explaining erect vision seems
chiefly to arise.

92. In order to disentangle our minds from whatever
prejudices we may entertain with relation to the subject in
hand, nothing seems more apposite than the taking into our
thoughts the case of one born blind, and afterwards, when
grown up, made to see. And— though perhaps it may not
be a task altogether easy and familiar to us, to divest our
selves entirely of the experiences received from sight, so
as to be able to put our thoughts exactly in the posture of
such a one's— we must, nevertheless, as far as possible, en
deavour to frame true conceptions of what might reason
ably be supposed to pass in his mind r>.

1 Sect. 10 and 19. solvent of the psychological difficul-

- Sect. 2-51. ties involved in visual-perception.

3 Omitted in author's last edition. •' Cf. sect. 103, 106, no, 128, &c.

4 This is Berkeley's universal

174 AN ESSAY TOWARDS

93. It is certain that a man actually blind, and who had
continued so from his birth, would, by the sense of feeling,
attain to have ideas of upper and lower. By the motion
of his hand, he might discern the situation of any tangible
object placed within his reach. That part on which he
felt himself supported, or towards which he perceived his
body to gravitate, he would term lower, and the contrary
to this upper] and accordingly denominate whatsoever
objects he touched.

94. But then, whatever judgments he makes concerning
the situation of objects are confined to those only that are
perceivable by touch. All those things that are intangible,
and of a spiritual nature— his thoughts and desires, his
passions, and in general all the modifications of his soul—
to these he would never apply the terms upper and lower,
except only in a metaphorical sense. He may perhaps, by
way of allusion, speak of high or low thoughts : but those
terms, in their proper signification, would never be applied
to anything that was not conceived to exist without the
mind. For, a man born blind, and remaining in the same
state, could mean nothing else by the words higher and
lower than a greater or lesser distance from the earth ;
which distance he would measure by the motion or appli
cation of his hand, or some other part of his body. It is,
therefore, evident that all those things which, in respect
of each other, would by him be thought higher or lower,
must be such as were conceived to exist without his mind,
in the ambient space1.

95. Whence it plainly follows, that such a one, if we
suppose him made to see, would not at first sight think
that anything he saw was high or low, erect or inverted.
For, it hath been already demonstrated, in sect, 41, that he
would not think the things he perceived by sight to be at
any distance from him, or without his mind. The objects
to which he had hitherto been used to apply the terms up
and down, high and low, were such only as affected, or
were some way perceived by his touch. But the proper

Berkeley treats this case hypotheti- ever the Appendix, and Theory

cally in the Essay, in defect of of Vision Vindicated, sect. 71.

actual experiments upon the born- 1 i. e. tangible things. Cf. Prin-

blind, since accumulated from c/ples, sect. 44.
Cheselden downwards. See how-

A NEW THEORY OF VISION 175

objects of vision make a new set of ideas, perfectly distinct
and different from the former, and which can in no sort
make themselves perceived by touch. There is, therefore,
nothing at all that could induce him to think those terms
applicable to them. Nor would he ever think it, till such
time as he had observed their connexion with tangible
objects, and the same prejudice1 began to insinuate itself
into his understanding, which, from their infancy, had
grown up in the understandings of other men.

96. To set this matter in a clearer light, I shall make
use of an example. Suppose the above-mentioned blind
person, by his touch, perceives a man to stand erect. Let
us inquire into the manner of this. By the application of
his hand to the several parts of a human body, he had
perceived different tangible ideas ; which being collected
into sundry complex ones'- have distinct names annexed to
them. Thus, one combination of a certain tangible figure,
bulk, and consistency of parts is called the head ; another
the hand ; a third the foot, and so of the rest — all which
complex ideas could, in his understanding, be made up
only of ideas perceivable by touch. He had also, by his
touch, obtained an idea of earth or ground, towards which
he perceives the parts of his body to have a natural
tendency. Now — by erect nothing more being meant
than that perpendicular position of a man wherein his feet
are nearest to the earth — if the blind person, by moving
his hand over the parts of the man who stands before him,
do perceive the tangible ideas that compose the head to be
farthest from, and those that compose the feet to be near
est to, that other combination of tangible ideas which he
calls earth, he will denominate that man erect. But, if we
suppose him on a sudden to receive his sight, and that he
behold a man standing before him, it is evident, in that
case, he would neither judge the man he sees to be erect
nor inverted ; for he, never having known those terms
applied to any other save tangible things, or which existed
in the space without him, and what he sees neither being
tangible, nor perceived as existing without, he could not

1 The ' prejudice,' to wit, which 2 Thus forming individual con-
Berkeley would dissolve by his crete things out of what is per-
introspective analysis of vision. Cf. ceived separately through different
Theory of Vision Vindicated, sect. 35. senses.

176 AN ESSAY TOWARDS

know that, in propriety of language, they were applicable
to it.

97. Afterwards, when, upon turning his head or eyes up
and down to the right and left, he shall observe the visible
objects to change, and shall also attain to know that they
are called by the same names, and connected with the
objects perceived by touch ; then, indeed, he will come to
speak of them and their situation in the same terms that
he has been used to apply to tangible things : and those
that he perceives by turning up his eyes he will call upper,
and those that by turning down his eyes he will call lower.

98. And this seems to me the true reason why he should
think those objects uppermost that are painted on the
lower part of his eye. For, by turning the eye up they
shall be distinctly seen ; as likewise they that are painted
on the highest part of the eye shall be distinctly seen by
turning the eye down, and are for that reason esteemed
lowest. For we have shewn that to the immediate objects
of sight, considered in themselves, he would not attribute
the terms high and low. It must therefore be on account
of some circumstances which are observed to attend them.
And these, it is plain, are the actions of turning the eye up
and down, which suggest a very obvious reason why the
mind should denominate the objects of sight accordingly
high or low. And, without this motion of the eye— this
turning it up and down in order to discern different
objects — doubtless erect, inverse, and other the like terms
relating to the position of tangible objects, would never
have been transferred, or in any degree apprehended
to belong to the ideas of sight, the mere act of seeing
including nothing in it to that purpose; whereas the dif
ferent situations of the eye naturally direct the mind to
make a suitable judgment of the situation of objects intro-
mitted by it ].

99. Farther, when he has by experience learned the
connexion there is between the several ideas of sight and
touch, he will be able, by the perception he has of the
situation of visible things in respect of one another, to
make a sudden and true estimate of the situation of out
ward, tangible things corresponding to them. And thus

1 This briefly is Berkeley's solu- images,' which long puzzled men
tion of ' the knot about inverted of science.

A NEW THEORY OF VISION 177

it is he shall perceive ! by sight the situation of external 2
objects, which do not properly fall under that sense.

100. I know we are very prone to think that, if just made
to see, we should judge of the situation of visible things as
we do now. But, we are also as prone to think that, at
first sight, we should in the same way apprehend the
distance and magnitude of objects, as we do now; which
hath been shewn to be a false and groundless persuasion.
And, for the like reasons, the same censure may be passed
on the positive assurance that most men, before they have
thought sufficiently of the matter, might have of their being
able to determine by the eye, at first view, whether objects
were erect or inverse.

101. It will perhaps be objected to our opinion, that a
man, for instance, being thought erect when his feet are
next the earth, and inverted when his head is next the
earth, it doth hence follow that, by the mere act of vision,
without any experience or altering the situation of the eye,
we should have determined whether he were erect or in
verted. For both the earth itself, and the limbs of the
man who stands thereon, being equally perceived by sight,
one cannot choose seeing what pare of the man is nearest
the earth, and what part farthest from it, i.e. whether he
be erect or inverted.

102. To which I answer, the ideas which constitute the
tangible earth and man are entirely different from those
which constitute the visible earth and man. Nor was it
possible, by virtue of the visive faculty alone, without
superadding any experience of touch, or altering the
position of the eye, ever to have known, or so much as
suspected, there had been any relation or connexion be
tween them. Hence, a man at first view would not
denominate anything he saw, eartli, or licad, or foot]
and consequently, he could not tell, by the mere act of
vision, whether the head or feet were nearest the earth.
Nor, indeed, would we have thereby any thought of earth
or man, erect or inverse, at all— which will be made yet

1 i. c. perceive mediately— visible Mow,' 'great' and 'inverted,' in

objects, per se, having no tactual the real or tactual meaning of those

situation. Purevision,hewouldsay, terms,
has nothing to do with ' high' and 2 i. c. tangible.

BERKELEY : FKASER. I. N

178 AN ESSAY TOWARDS

more evident, if we nicely observe, and make a particular
comparison between, the ideas of both senses.

103. That which I see is only variety of light and
colours. That which I feel is hard or soft, hot or cold,
rough or smooth. What similitude, what connexion, have
those ideas with these? Or, how is it possible that any
one should see reason to give one and the same name ' to
combinations of ideas so very different, before he had
experienced their co-existence ? We do not find there is
any necessary connexion betwixt this or that tangible
quality, and any colour whatsoever. And we may some
times perceive colours, where there is nothing to be felt.
All which doth make it manifest that no man, at first
receiving of his sight 2, would know there was any agree
ment between this or that particular object of his sight and
any object of touch he had been already acquainted with.
The colours therefore of the head would to him no more
suggest the idea of head 3 than they would the idea of feet.

104. Farther, we have at large shewn (vid. sect. 63 and
64) there is no discoverable necessary connexion between
any given visible magnitude and any one particular tangible
magnitude ; but that it is entirely the result of custom and
experience, and depends on foreign and accidental circum
stances, that we can, by the perception of visible extension,
inform ourselves what may be the extension of any tangible
object connected with it. Hence, it is certain, that neither
the visible magnitude of head or foot would bring along
with them into the mind, at first opening of the eyes, the
respective tangible magnitudes of those parts.

105. By the foregoing section, it is plain the visible figure
of any part of the body hath no necessary connexion with
the tangible figure thereof, so as at first sight to suggest it
to the mind. For, figure is the termination of magnitude.
Whence it follows that no visible magnitude having in its
own nature an aptness to suggest any one particular tangible
magnitude, so neither can any visible figure be inseparably
connected with its corresponding tangible figure, so as of
itself, and in a way prior to experience, it might suggest it

1 e. g. ' extension,' which, ac- tciMgibilia. Cf. sect. 139, 140.

cording to Berkeley, is an equi- - Cf. sect. 93, 106, no, 128.

vocal term, common (in its dif- 3 i. e. real or tangible head,
ferent meanings) to visibilia and

A NEW THEORY OF VISION 179

to the understanding. This will be farther evident, if we
consider that what seems smooth and round to the touch
may to sight, if viewed through a microscope, seem quite
otherwise.

106. From all which, laid together and duly considered,
we may clearly deduce this inference : — In the first act
of vision, no idea entering by the eye would have a perceiv
able connexion with the ideas to which the names earth,
man, head, foot, &c. were annexed in the understanding of
a person blind from his birth ; so as in any sort to intro
duce them into his mind, or make themselves be called by
the same names, and reputed the same things with them,
as afterwards they come to be.

107. There doth, nevertheless, remain one difficulty,
which to some may seem to press hard on our opinion, and
deserve not to be passed over. For, though it be granted
that neither the colour, size, nor figure of the visible feet
have any necessary connexion with the ideas that compose
the tangible feet, so as to bring them at first sight into
my mind, or make me in danger of confounding them, be
fore I had been used to and for some time experienced
their connexion ; yet thus much seems undeniable, namely,
that the number of the visible feet being the same with that
of the tangible feet, I may from hence, without any
experience of sight, reasonably conclude that they repre
sent or are connected with the feet rather than the head.
I say, it seems the idea of two visible feet will sooner suggest
to the mind the idea of two tangible feet than of one head
—so that the blind man, upon first reception of the visive
faculty, might know which were the feet or two, and which
the head or one.

108. In order to get clear of this seeming difficulty, we
need only observe that diversity of visible objects does not
necessarily infer diversity of tangible objects corresponding
to them. A picture painted with great variety of colours
affects the touch in one uniform manner ; it is therefore
evident that I do not, by any necessary consecution, inde
pendent of experience, judge of the number of things tan
gible from the number of things visible. I should not there
fore at first opening my eyes conclude that because I see
two I shall feel two. How, therefore, can I, before ex
perience teaches me, know that the visible legs, because

N 2

180 AN ESSAY TOWARDS

two, are connected with the tangible legs ; or the visible head,
because one, is connected with the tangible head ? The
truth is, the things I see are so very different and heteroge
neous from the things I feel that the perception of the one
would never have suggested the other to my thoughts, or
enabled me to pass the least judgment thereon, until I had
experienced their connexion \

109. But, for a fuller illustration of this matter, it ought
to be considered, that number (however some may reckon
it amongst the primary qualities 2) is nothing fixed and
settled, really existing in things themselves. It is entirely
the creature of the mind, considering either a simple idea
by itself, or any combination of simple ideas to which it
gives one name, and so makes it pass for a unit. Accord
ing as the mind variously combines its ideas, the unit
varies ; and as the unit, so the number, which is only a
collection of units, doth also vary. We call a window one,
a chimney one; and yet a house, in which there are many
windows and many chimneys, has an equal right to be
called one ; and many houses go to the making of one city.
In these and the like instances, it is evident the unit con
stantly relates to the particular draughts the mind makes
of its ideas, to which it affixes names, and wherein it

1 Cf. sect. 140, 143. In the Gent. affected his sight differently from

Mag. (vol. XXII. p. 12), 'Anti- the rest of the fingers; upon moving

Berkeley ' thus argues the case of his fingers he would see the joints,

one born blind. 'This man,' he Though therefore, by means of this

adds, ' would, by being accustomed lately acquired sense of seeing, the

to feel one hand with the other, object affected his mind in a new

have perceived that the extremity and different manner from what it

of the hand was divided into fingers did before, yet, as by touch he had

— that the extremities of these acquired the knowledge of these

fingers were distinguished by cer- several divisions, marks, and dis-

tain hard, smooth surfaces, of a tinctions of the hand, and, as the

different texture from the rest of new object of sight appeared to be

the fingers— and that each finger divided, marked, and distinguished

had certain joints or flexures. Now, in a similar manner, I think he

if this man was restored to sight, would certainly conclude, before he

and immediately viewed his hand touched his hand, that the thing

before he touched it again, it is which he now saw was the same

manifest that the divisions of the which he had felt before and called

extremity of the hand into fingers his hand.'

would be visibly perceived. He 2 Locke, Essay, II. 8, 16. Aris-

would note too the small spaces at totle regards number as a Common

the extremity of each finger, which Sensible. — De Anima, II. 6, III. i.

A NEW THEORY OF VISION l8l

includes more or less, as best suits its own ends and pur
poses. Whatever therefore the mind considers as one,
that is an unit. Every combination of ideas is considered as
one thing by the mind, and in token thereof is marked by
one name. Now, this naming and combining together of
ideas is perfectly arbitrary, and done by the mind in such
sort as experience shews it to be most convenient — without
which our ideas had never been collected into such sundry
distinct combinations as they now are.

no. Hence, it follows that a man born blind, and after
wards, when grown up, made to see, would not, in the first act
of vision, parcel out the ideas of sight into the same distinct
collections that others do who have experienced which do
regularly co-exist and are proper to be bundled up together
under one name. He would not, for example, make into
one complex idea, and thereby esteem and unite all those
particular ideas which constitute the visible head or foot.
For, there can be no reason assigned why he should do so,
barely upon his seeing a man stand upright before him.
There crowd into his mind the ideas which compose the
visible man, in company with all the other ideas of sight
perceived at the same time. But, all these ideas offered
at once to his view he would not distribute into sundry
distinct combinations, till such time as, by observing the
motion of the parts of the man and other experiences, he
comes to know which are to be separated and which to be col
lected together '.

in. From what hath been premised, it is plain the
objects of sight and touch make, if I may so say, two sets
of ideas, which are widely different from each other. To
objects of either kind we indifferently attribute the terms
high and low, right and left, and such like, denoting the
position or situation of things ; but then we must well
observe that the position of any object is determined with
respect only to objects of the same sense. We say any
object of touch is high or low, according as it is more or
less distant from the tangible earth : and in like manner we

1 ' If the visible appearance of and readily have signified the unity

two shillings had been found con- of the (tangible) object as it now

nected from the beginning with signifies its duplicity.' Reid, />/-

the tangible idea of one shilling, quiry,Vl. n.
that appearance would as naturally

182 AN ESSAY TOWARDS

denominate any object of sight high or low, in proportion
as it is more or less distant from the visible earth. But,
to define the situation of visible things with relation to the
distance they bear from any tangible thing, or vice versa,
this were absurd and perfectly unintelligible. For all
visible things are equally in the mind, and take up no part
of the external space ; and consequently are equidistant
from any tangible thing which exists without the mind l.

112. Or rather, to speak truly, the proper objects of sight
are at no distance, neither near nor far from any tangible
thing. For, if we inquire narrowly into the matter, we
shall find that those things only are compared together in
respect of distance which exist after the same manner, or
appertain unto the same sense. For, by the distance be
tween any two points, nothing more is meant than the
number of intermediate points. If the given points are
visible, the distance between them is marked out by the
number of the interjacent visible points ; if they are tangible,
the distance between them is a line consisting of tangible
points; but, if they are one tangible and the other visible,
the distance between them doth neither consist of points
perceivable by sight nor by touch, i.e. it is utterly inconceiv
able 2. This, perhaps, will not find an easy admission into
all men's understanding. However, I should gladly be
informed whether it be not true, by any one who will be
at the pains to reflect a little, and apply it home to his
thoughts.

113. The not observing what has been delivered in the
two last sections, seems to have occasioned no small part
of the difficulty that occurs in the business of direct ap
pearances. The head, which is painted nearest the earth,
seems to be farthest from it ; and on the other hand, the
feet, which are painted farthest from the earth, are thought
nearest to it. Herein lies the difficulty, which vanishes if
we express the thing more clearly and free from ambiguity,
thus : — How comes it that, to the eye, the visible head,
which is nearest the tangible earth, seems farthest from the

1 Here again note Berkeley's be real 'without mind.' Cf. Prin-

inconvenient reticence of his full ciples, sect. 43, 44. 'Without the

theory of matter, as dependent on mind ' — in contrast to sensuous

percipient life for its reality. Tan- phenomenon only,

gible things are meantime granted to 2 Cf. sect. 131.

A NEW THEORY OF VISION 183

earth ; and the visible feet, which are farthest from the
tangible earth, seem nearest the earth? The question
being thus proposed, who sees not the difficulty is founded
on a supposition that the eye or visive faculty, or rather
the soul by means thereof, should judge of the situation of
visible objects with reference to their distance from the
tangible earth ? Whereas, it is evident the tangible earth
is not perceived by sight. And it hath been shewn, in the
two last preceding sections, that the location of visible
objects is determined only by the distance they bear from
one another, and that it is nonsense to talk of distance, far
or near, between a visible and tangible thing.

114. If we confine our thoughts to the proper objects of
sight, the whole is plain and easy. The head is painted
farthest from, and the feet nearest to, the visible earth ;
and so they appear to be. What is there strange or un
accountable in this ? Let us suppose the pictures in the
fund of the eye to be the immediate objects of sight \ The
consequence is that things should appear in the same
posture they are painted in ; and is it not so ? The head
which is seen seems farthest from the earth which is seen ;
and the feet which are seen seem nearest to the earth
which is seen. And just so they are painted.

115. But, say you, the picture of the man is inverted,
and yet the appearance is erect. I ask, what mean you by
the picture of the man, or, which is the same thing, the
visible man's being inverted ? You tell me it is inverted,
because the heels are uppermost and the head undermost ?
Explain me this. You say that by the head's being under
most, you mean that it is nearest to the earth ; and, by the
heels being uppermost, that they are farthest from the
earth. I ask again, what earth you mean ? You cannot
mean the earth that is painted on the eye or the visible
earth— for the picture of the head is farthest from the
picture of the earth, and the picture of the feet nearest to
the picture of the earth ; and accordingly the visible head
is farthest from the visible earth, and the visible feet
nearest to it. It remains, therefore, that you mean the
tangible earth ; and so determine the situation of visible
things with respect to tangible things — contrary to what
hath been demonstrated in sect, in and 112. The two

1 Sect. 2,88, 116, 118.

184 AN ESSAY TOWARDS

distinct provinces of sight and touch should be considered
apart, and as though their objects had no intercourse, no
manner of relation to one another, in point of distance or
position \

116. Farther, what greatly contributes to make us
mistake in this matter is that, when we think of the pictures
in the fund of the eye, we imagine ourselves looking on the
fund of another's eye, or another looking on the fund of
our own eye, and beholding the pictures painted thereon.
Suppose two eyes, A and B. A from some distance
looking on the pictures in B sees them inverted, and for
that reason concludes they are inverted in B. But this is
wrong. There are projected in little on the bottom of A
the images of the pictures of, suppose, man, earth, &c.,
which are painted on B. And, besides these, the eye B
itself, and the objects which environ it, together with
another earth, are projected in a larger size on A. Now,
by the eye A these larger images are deemed the true
objects, and the lesser only pictures in miniature. And it
is with respect to those greater images that it determines
the situation of the smaller images ; so that, comparing the
little man with the great earth, A judges him inverted, or
that the feet are farthest from and the head nearest to the
great earth. Whereas, if A compare the little man with
the little earth, then he will appear erect, /'. e. his head
shall seem farthest from and his feet nearest to the little
earth. But we must consider that B does not see two
earths as A does. It sees only what is represented by
.the little pictures in A, and consequently shall judge the
man erect. For, in truth, the man in B is not inverted,
for there the feet are next the earth ; but it is the repre
sentation of it in A which is inverted, for there the head of
the representation of the picture of the man in B is next
the earth, and the feet farthest from the earth— meaning
the earth which is without the representation of the pictures
in B. For, if you take the little images of the pictures in
B, and consider them by themselves, and with respect
only to one another, they are all erect and in their natural
posture.

1 In short, we see only quantities down, right and left, &c., being
of colour— the real or tactual dis- gradually associated with the various
tance; size, shape, locality, up and visible modifications of colour.

A NEW THEORY OF VISION 185

117. Farther, there lies a mistake in our imagining that
the pictures of external l objects are painted on the bottom
of the eye. It has been shewn there is no resemblance
between the ideas of sight and things tangible. It hath
likewise been demonstrated 2, that the proper objects of sight
do not exist without the mind. Whence it clearly follows
that the pictures painted on the bottom of the eye are not
the pictures of external1 objects. Let any one consult his
own thoughts, and then tell me, what affinity, what likeness,
there is between that certain variety and disposition of
colours which constitute the visible man, or picture of
a man, and that other combination of far different ideas,
sensible by touch, which compose the tangible man. But,
if this be the case, how come they to be accounted pictures
or images, since that supposes them to copy or represent
some originals or other?

118. To which I answer — In the forementioned instance,
the eye A takes the little images, included within the
representation of the other eye B, to be pictures or copies,
whereof the archetypes are not things existing without",
but the larger pictures4 projected on its own fund; and
which by A are not thought pictures, but the originals or
true things themselves. Though if we suppose a third eye
C, from a due distance, to behold the fund of A, then
indeed the things projected thereon shall, to C, seem
pictures or images, in the same sense that those projected
on B do to A.

119. Rightly to conceive the business in hand, we must
carefully distinguish between the ideas of sight and touch,
between the visible and tangible eye ; for certainly on the
tangible eye nothing either is or seems to be painted.
Again, the visible eye, as well as all other visible objects,
hath been shewn to exist only in the mind •' ; which,
perceiving its own ideas, and comparing them together,
does call some pictures in respect to others. What hath
been said, being rightly comprehended and laid together,
does, I think, afford a full and genuine explication of the
erect appearance of objects — which phenomenon, I must

1 i.e. tangible. r' Cf. sect. 41-44. The 'eyes'

2 Sect. 41-44. — visible and tangible— are them-

3 i.e. tangible things. selves objects of sense.

4 i.e. visible.

l86 AN ESSAY TOWARDS

confess, I do not see how it can be explained by any
theories of vision hitherto made public.

120. In treating of these things, the use of language is
apt to occasion some obscurity and confusion, and create
in us wrong ideas. For, language being accommodated to
the common notions and prejudices of men, it is scarce
possible to deliver the naked and precise truth, without
great circumlocution, impropriety, and (to an unwary
reader) seeming contradictions. I do, therefore, once for
all, desire whoever shall think it worth his while to under
stand what I have written concerning vision, that he would
not stick in this or that phrase or manner of expression,
but candidly collect my meaning from the whole sum and
tenor of my discourse, and, laying aside the words l as
much as possible, consider the bare notions themselves,
and then judge whether they are agreeable to truth and his
own experience or no.

121. We have shewn the way wherein the mind, by
mediation of visible ideas2, doth perceive or apprehend the
distance, magnitude, and situation of tangible objects3.
I come now to inquire more particularly concerning the
difference between the ideas of sight and touch which are
called by the same names, and see whether there be any
idea common to both senses 4. From what we have at large
set forth and demonstrated in the foregoing parts of this
treatise, it is plain there is no one self-same numerical
extension, perceived both by sight and touch ; but that the
particular figures and extensions perceived by sight, how
ever they may be called by the same names, and reputed
the same things with those perceived by touch, are never
theless different, and have an existence very distinct and

1 Cf. Principles, Introduction, sibles ; and, in particular, whether

sect. 21-25. an extension of the same kind at

" 'Visible ideas' — including sen- least, if not numerically the same,

sations muscular and locomotive, is presented in each. The Kantian

felt in the organ of vision. Sect. theory of an a priori intuition of

16, 27, 57. space, the common condition of

:! i.e. objects which, in this tenta- tactual and visual experience, be-

tive Essay, are granted, for argu- cause implied in sense-experience

ment's sake, to be external, or inde- as such, is not conceived by Berke-

pendent of percipient mind. ley. Cf. Theory of Vision Vindi-

4 i.e. to inquire whether there cated, sect. 15.
are, in this instance, Common Sen-

A NEW THEORY OF VISION 187

separate from them. So that the question is not now
concerning the same numerical ideas, but whether there be
any one and the same sort or species of ideas equally
perceivable to both senses? or, in other words, whether
extension, figure, and motion perceived by sight, are not
specifically distinct from extension, figure, and motion
perceived by touch ?

122. But, before I come more particularly to discuss
this matter, I find it proper to take into my thoughts exten
sion in abstract1. For of this there is much talk; and
I am apt to think that when men speak of extension as
being an idea common to two senses, it is with a secret
supposition that we can single out extension from all other
tangible and visible qualities, and form thereof an abstract
idea, which idea they will have common both to sight and
touch. We are therefore to understand by extension in
abstract, an idea2 of extension — for instance, a line or
surface entirely stripped of all other sensible qualities and
circumstances that might determine it to any particular
existence; it is neither black, nor white, nor red, nor
hath it any colour at all, or any tangible quality whatso
ever, and consequently it is of no finite determinate mag
nitude1'5; for that which bounds or distinguishes one ex
tension from another is some quality or circumstance
wherein they disagree.

123. Now, I do not find that I can perceive, imagine,
or anywise frame in my mind such an abstract idea as is
here spoken of. A line or surface which is neither black,
nor white, nor blue, nor yellow, &c. ; nor long, nor short,
nor rough, nor smooth, nor square, nor round, &c. is
perfectly incomprehensible. This I am sure of as to
myself; how far the faculties of other men may reach
they best can tell.

124. It is commonly said that the object of geometry is

' In the following reasoning phron, VII. 5-8. — Defence of Free

against abstract, as distinguished Thinkingin M atlic mafics, sect. 45-48.

from concrete or sense presented 2 Berkeley's ideas are concrete or

(visible or tangible) extension, Ber- particular — immediate data of sense

keley urges some of his favourite or imagination,

objections to ' abstract ideas/ fully '"' i. e. it cannot be individualized,

unfolded in his Principles, Intro- either as a perceived oran imagined

duction, sect. 6-20. — See also A lei- object.

188 AN ESSAY TOWARDS

abstract extension. But geometry contemplates figures :
now, figure is the termination of magnitude l ; but we
have shewn that extension in abstract hath no finite
determinate magnitude ; whence it clearly follows that
it can have no figure, and consequently is not the object
of geometry. It is indeed a tenet, as well of the modern
as the ancient philosophers, that all general truths are
concerning universal abstract ideas; without which, we
are told, there could be no science, no demonstration of
any general proposition in geometry. But it were no
hard matter, did I think it necessary to my present pur
pose, to shew that propositions and demonstrations in
geometry might be universal, though they who make
them never think of abstract general ideas of triangles
or circles.

125. After reiterated efforts and pangs of thought 2 to
apprehend the general idea of a triangle3, I have found
it altogether incomprehensible. And surely, if any one
were able to let that idea into my mind, it must be
the author4 of the Essay concerning Human Un
derstanding: he, who has so far distinguished himself
from the generality of writers, by the clearness and sig-
nificancy of what he says. Let us therefore see how
this celebrated author"1 describes the general or [which
is the same thing, the6] abstract idea of a triangle. 'It
must be,' says he, 'neither oblique nor rectangle, neither
equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenum ; but all and none of
these at once. In effect it is somewhat imperfect that can
not exist ; an idea, wherein some parts of several different
and inconsistent ideas are put together.' (Essay on Human
Understanding, B. iv. ch. 7. s. 9.) This is the idea which
he thinks needful for the enlargement of knowledge, which
is the subject of mathematical demonstration, and without
which we could never come to know any general proposi-

1 Sect. 105. •"' ' this celebrated author,' — 'that

- 'Endeavours' in first edition. great man' in second edition. In

3 i. e. a mental image of an ab- assailing Locke's ' abstract idea,' he
straction, an impossible image, discharges the meaning which
in which the extension and com- Locke intended by the term, and
prehension of the notion must be then demolishes his own fig-
adequately pictured. ment.

4 ' deservedly admired author,' in 6 Omitted in the author's last
the first edition. edition.

A NEW THEORY OF VISION 189

tion concerning triangles. [Sure I am, if this be the case,
it is impossible for me to attain to know even the first
elements of geometry : since I have not the faculty to
frame in my mind such an idea as is here described1.)
That author acknowledges it doth 'require some pains
and skill to form this general idea of a triangle.' (Ibid.}
But, had he called to mind what he says in another place, to
wit, 'that ideas of mixed modes wherein any inconsistent
ideas are put together, cannot so much as exist in the
mind, i.e. be conceived/ (vid. B. iii. ch. 10. s. 33, ibid.} —
I say, had this occurred to his thoughts, it is not im
probable he would have owned it above all the pains and
skill he was master of, to form the above-mentioned idea
of a triangle, which is made up of manifest staring contra
dictions. That a man [of such a clear understanding 2J,
who thought so much and so well, and laid so great
a stress on clear and determinate ideas, should neverthe
less talk at this rate, seems very surprising. But the
wonder will lessen, if it be considered that the source
whence this opinion [of abstract figures and extension3]
flows is the prolific womb which has brought forth in
numerable errors and difficulties, in all parts of philosophy,
and in all the sciences. But this matter, taken in its full
extent, were a subject too vast and comprehensive to be
insisted on in this place 4. [I shall only observe that
your metaphysicians and men of speculation seem to
have faculties distinct from those of ordinary men, when
they talk of general or abstracted triangles and circles, &c.,
and so peremptorily declare them to be the subject of
all the eternal, immutable, universal truths in geometry5.]
And so much for extension in abstract.

126. Some, perhaps, may think pure space, vacuum, or
trine dimension, to be equally the object of sight and
touch6. But, though we have a very great propension
to think the ideas of outness and space to be the im
mediate object of sight, yet, if I mistake not, in the
foregoing parts of this Essay, that hath been clearly de-

1 Omitted in last edition. ' Omitted in author's last edition.

• Omitted in last edition. " He probably has Locke in his

3 Omitted in last edition. eye.

4 See Principles, passim.

190 AN ESSAY TOWARDS

monstrated to be a mere delusion, arising from the quick
and sudden suggestion of fancy, which so closely connects
the idea of distance with those of sight, that we are apt
to think it is itself a proper and immediate object of that
sense, till reason corrects the mistake \

127. It having been shewn that there are no abstract
ideas of figure, and that it is impossible for us, by any
precision of thought, to frame an idea of extension separate
from all other visible and tangible qualities, which shall be
common both to sight and touch— the question now re
maining is2, whether the particular extensions, figures,
and motions perceived by sight, be of the same kind with
the particular extensions, figures, and motions perceived
by touch? In answer to which I shall venture to lay
down the following proposition :— The extension, figures,
and motions perceived by sight are specifically distinct from
the ideas of touch, called by me same names ; nor is there any
such thing as one idea, or kind of idea, common 3 to both
senses. This proposition may, without much difficulty,
be collected from what hath been said in several places
of this Essay. But, because it seems so remote from,
and contrary to the received notions and settled opinion
of mankind, I shall attempt to demonstrate it more par
ticularly and at large by the following arguments :—

128. [First*,] When, upon perception of an idea, I range
it under this or that sort, it is because it is perceived after
the same manner, or because it has a likeness or confor
mity with, or affects me in the same way as the ideas
of the sort I rank it under. In short, it must not be
entirely new, but have something in it old and already
perceived by me. It must, I say, have so much, at least,

1 On Berkeley's theory, space concrete space.

without relation to bodies (i.e. 2 Sect. 121. Cf. Neiv Theory of
insensible or abstract space) would Vision Vindicated, sect. 15.
not be extended, as not having 3 i.e. there are no Common Sen-
parts ; inasmuch as parts can be sibles : from which it follows that
assigned to it only with relation to we can reason from the one sense
bodies. Berkeley does not distin- to the other only by founding on
guish space from sensible extension. the constant connexion of their
Cf. Reid's Works, p. 126, note — in respective phenomena, under a natu-
which Sir W. Hamilton suggests ral yet (for us) contingent law. Cf.
that one may have an a priori con- New Theory of Vision Vindicated,
ception of pure space, and also an sect. 27, 28.
a posteriori perception of finite, 4 Omitted in last edition.

A NEW THEORY OF VISION 191

in common with the ideas I have before known and
named, as to make me give it the same name with them.
But, it has been, if I mistake not, clearly made out1 that
a man born blind would not, at first reception of his sight,
think the things he saw were of the same nature with
the objects of touch, or had anything in common with
them ; but that they were a new set of ideas, perceived
in a new manner, and entirely different from all he had
ever perceived before. So that he would not call them
by the same name, nor repute them to be of the same sort,
with anything he had hitherto known. [And surely the
judgment of such an unprejudiced person is more to
be relied on in this case than the sentiments of the gene
rality of men ; who, in this as in almost everything else,
suffer themselves to be guided by custom, and the erro
neous suggestions of prejudice, rather than reason and
sedate reflection 2.~]

129. Secondly, Light and colours are allowed by all to
constitute a sort or species entirely different from the ideas
of touch ; nor will any man, I presume, say they can make
themselves perceived by that sense. But there is no other
immediate object of sight besides light and colours". It is
therefore a direct consequence, that there is no idea com
mon to both senses.

130. It is a prevailing opinion, even amongst those who
have thought and writ most accurately concerning our
ideas, and the ways whereby they enter into the under
standing, that something more is perceived by sight than
barely light and colours with their variations. [The excel
lent4] Mr. Locke termeth sight 'the most comprehensive
of all our senses, conveying to our minds the ideas of light
and colours, which are peculiar only to that sense ; and
also the far different ideas of space, figure, and motion.'
(Essay on Human Understanding, B. iii. ch. 9. s. 9.)
Space or distance'"', we have shewn, is no otherwise the

1 Cf. sect. 93, 103, 1 06, no. tual extension. Whether we can

" Omitted in last edition. perceive visible extension without

3 Cf. sect. 43, 103, &c. A plural- experienceofmuscularmovement.at

ity of co-existent minima of colour- least in the eye, he does not here say.

ed points constitutes Berkeley's * Omitted in last edition.

visible extension ; while a plurality 5 Real distancebelongsoriginally,

of successively experienced minima according to the Essay, to our

of resistant points constitutes his tac- tactual experience only— in the

192 AN ESSAY TOWARDS

object of sight than of hearing. (Vid. sect. 46.) And, as
for figure and extension, I leave it to any one that shall
calmly attend to his own clear and distinct ideas to decide
whether he has any idea intromitted immediately and pro
perly by sight save only light and colours : or, whether it
be possible for him to frame in his mind a distinct abstract
idea of visible extension, or figure, exclusive of all colour ;
and, on the other hand, whether he can conceive colour
without visible extension? For my own part, I must
confess, I am not able to attain so great a nicety of abstrac
tion. I know very well that, in a strict sense, I see nothing
but light and colours, with their several shades and varia
tions. He who beside these doth also perceive by sight
ideas far different and distinct from them, hath that faculty
in a degree more perfect and comprehensive than I can
pretend to. It must be owned, indeed, that, by the media
tion of light and colours, other far different ideas are sug
gested to my mind. But so they are by hearing1. But
then, upon this score, I see no reason why the sight should
be thought more comprehensive than the hearing, which,
beside sounds which are peculiar to that sense, doth, by
their mediation, suggest not only space, figure, and motion, but
alsoall other ideas whatsoever that can be signified bywords.
131. Thirdly, It is, I think, an axiom universally received,
that ' quantities of the same kind may be added together
and make one entire sum.' Mathematicians add lines
together ; but they do not add a line to a solid, or con
ceive it as making one sum with a surface. These three
kinds of quantity being thought incapable of any such mu
tual addition, and consequently of being compared together
in the several ways of proportion, are by them for that
reason esteemed entirely disparate and heterogeneous.
Now let any one try in his thoughts to add a visible line or
surface to a tangible line or surface, so as to conceive them
making one continued sum or whole. He that can do this
may think them homogeneous ; but he that cannot must,
by the foregoing axiom, think them heterogeneous. [I
acknowledge myself to be of the latter sort2.] A blue and
a red line I can conceive added together into one sum and

wide meaning of touch, which perception of contact,
includes muscular and locomotive ' Added in second edition,

perceptions, as well as the simple 2 Omitted in last edition.

A NEW THEORY OF VISION 193

making one continued line ; but, to make, in my thoughts,
one continued line of a visible and tangible line added
together, is, I find, a task far more difficult, and even
insurmountable — and I leave it to the reflection and expe
rience of every particular person to determine for himself.

132. A farther confirmation of our tenet may be drawn
from the solution of Mr. Molyneux's problem, published
by Mr. Locke in his Essay jl : which I shall set down as it
there lies, together with Mr. Locke's opinion of it : — 'Sup
pose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his
touch to distinguish between a cube and a sphere of the
same metal, and nighly of the same bigness, so as to tell
when he felt one and the other, which is the cube, and
which the sphere. Suppose then the cube and sphere
placed on a table, and the blind man made to see : Quaere,
Whether by his sight, before he touched them, he could
now distinguish, and tell, which is the globe, which the
cube. To which the acute and judicious proposer an
swers : Not. For, though he has obtained the experience
of how a globe, how a cube affects his touch ; yet he has
not yet attained the experience, that what affects his touch
so or so must affect his sight so or so : or that a protuber
ant angle in the cube, that pressed his hand unequally,
shall appear to his eye as it doth in the cube. I agree
with this thinking gentleman, whom I am proud to call
my friend, in his answer to this his problem ; and am of
opinion that the blind man, at first sight, would not
be able with certainty to say, which was the globe, which
the cube, whilst he only saw them.' (Essay on Human
Understanding, B. ii. ch. 9. s. 8.)

133. Now, if a square surface perceived by touch be of
the same sort with a square surface perceived by sight, it
is certain the blind man here mentioned might know a
square surface as soon as he saw it. It is no more but
introducing into his mind, by a new inlet, an idea he has
been already well acquainted with. Since therefore he is
supposed to have known by his touch that a cube is a body

1 See also Locke's ' Correspon- putes the heterogeneity. — Smith's

dence'with Molyneux, in Locke's Optics. — Remarks, §§ 161-170. —

Works, vol. IX. p. 34. — Leibniz, Hamilton's Reid, p. 137, note, and

Nouveanx Essais, Liv. II. ch. 9, Lect. Metaph, II. p. 176.
who, so far granting the fact, dis-

BEKKELEY: FRASER. I. O

194 AN ESSAY TOWARDS

terminated by square surfaces ; and that a sphere is not
terminated by square surfaces — upon the supposition that
a visible and tangible square differ only in numero, it
follows that he might know, by the unerring mark of the
square surfaces, which was the cube, and which not, while
he only saw them. We must therefore allow, either that
visible extension and figures are specifically distinct from
tangible extension and figures, or else, that the solution of
this problem, given by those two [very1] thoughtful and
ingenious men, is wrong.

134. Much more might be laid together in proof of the
proposition I have advanced. But, what has been said is,
if I mistake not, sufficient to convince any one that shall
yield a reasonable attention. And, as for those that will
not be at the pains of a little thought, no multiplication of
words will ever suffice to make them understand the truth,
or rightly conceive my meaning2.

135. I cannot let go the above-mentioned problem with
out some reflection on it. It hath been made evident that
a man blind from his birth would not, at first sight, denom
inate anything he saw, by the names he had been used to
appropriate to ideas of touch. (Vid. sect. 106.) Cube,
sphere, table are words he has known applied to things
perceivable by touch, but to things perfectly intangible he
never knew them applied. Those words, in their wonted
application, always marked out to his mind bodies or solid
things which were perceived by the resistance they gave.
But there is no solidity, no resistance or protrusion,
perceived by sight. In short, the ideas of sight are all
new perceptions, to which there be no names annexed in
his mind ; he cannot therefore understand what is said to
him concerning them. And, to ask of the two bodies he
saw placed on the table, which was the sphere, which the
cube, were to him a question downright bantering and
unintelligible ; nothing he sees being able to suggest to his
thoughts the idea of body, distance, or, in general, of
anything he had already known.

136. It is a mistake to think the same3 thing affects both
sight and touch. If the same angle or square which is the

1 Omitted in last edition. 3 Cf. sect. 49, 146, &c. Here

- Cf. Theory of Vision Vindicated, i same ' includes ' similar.'
sect. 70.

A NEW THEORY OF VISION 195

object of touch be also the object of vision, what should
hinder the blind man; at first sight, from knowing it ?
For, though the manner wherein it affects the sight be
different from that wherein it affected his touch, yet, there
being, beside this manner or circumstance, which is new
and unknown, the angle or figure, which is old and known,
he cannot choose but discern it.

137. Visible figure and extension having been demon
strated to be of a nature entirely different and heterogene
ous from tangible figure and extension, it remains that we
inquire concerning motion. Now, that visible motion is
not of the same sort with tangible motion seems to need no
farther proof; it being an evident corollary from what we
have shewn concerning the difference there is betwixt
visible and tangible extension. But, for a more full and
express proof hereof, we need only observe that one who
had not yet experienced vision would not at first sight
know motion '. Whence it clearly follows that motion per
ceivable by sight is of a sort distinct from motion perceiv
able by touch. The antecedent I prove thus — By touch he
could not perceive any motion but what was up or down, to
the right or left, nearer or farther from him ; besides these,
and their several varieties or complications, it is impossible
he should have any idea of motion. He would not
therefore think anything to be motion, or give the name
motion to any idea, which he could not range under some
or other of those particular kinds thereof. But, from sect.
95, it is plain that, by the mere act of vision, he could not
know motion upwards or downwards, to the right or left,
or in any other possible direction. From which I conclude,
he would not know motion at all at first sight. As for the
idea of motion in abstract, I shall not waste paper about it,
but leave it to my reader to make the best he can of it.
To me it is perfectly unintelligible 2.

138. The consideration of motion may furnish a new
field for inquiry :!. But, since the manner wherein the

1 i.e. visible and tangible motions 2 Cf. sect. 122-125.

beingabsolutely heterogeneous, and 3 Cf. Principles, sect. 111-116;

the former, at man's point of view, also Analyst, query 12. On Berke-

only contingent signs of the latter, ley's system space in its three di-

we should not, at first sight, be mensions is unrealisable without

able to interpret the visual signs of experience of motion,
tactual phenomena.

O 2

196 AN ESSAY TOWARDS

mind apprehends by sight the motion of tangible objects,
with the various degrees thereof, may be easily collected
from what has been said concerning the manner wherein
that sense doth suggest their various distances, magni
tudes, and situations, I shall not enlarge any farther on
this subject, but proceed to inquire what may be alleged,
with greatest appearance of reason, against the propo
sition we have demonstrated to be true ; for, where there
is so much prejudice to be encountered, a bare and naked
demonstration of the truth will scarce suffice. We must
also satisfy the scruples that men may start in favour of
their preconceived notions, shew whence the mistake
arises, how it came to spread, and carefully disclose
and root out those false persuasions that an early preju
dice might have implanted in the mind.

139. First, therefore, it will be demanded how visible
extension and figures come to be called by the same name
with tangible extension and figures, if they are not of the
same kind with them ? It must be something more than
humour or accident that could occasion a custom so con
stant and universal as this, which has obtained in all ages
and nations of the world, and amongst all ranks of men,
the learned as well as the illiterate.

140. To which I answer, we can no more argue a visible
and tangible square to be of the same species, from their
being called by the same name, than we can that a tangible
square, and the monosyllable consisting of six letters
whereby it is marked, are of the same species, because
they are both called by the same name. It is customary
to call written words, and the things they signify, by the
same name : for, words not being regarded in their own
nature, or otherwise than as they are marks of things, it
had been superfluous, and beside the design of language,
to have given them names distinct from those of the things
marked by them. The same reason holds here also.
Visible figures are the marks of tangible figures ; and, from
sect. 59, it is plain that in themselves they are little re
garded, or upon any other score than for their connexion
with tangible figures, which by nature they are ordained
to signify. And, because this language of nature : does

1 Here the term ' language of applicable to the ideas or visual
nature ' makes its appearance, as signs of tactual realities.

A NEW THEORY OF VISION 197

not vary in different ages or nations, hence it is that in
all times and places visible figures are called by the same
names as the respective tangible figures suggested by
them ; and riot because they are alike, or of the same
sort with them.

141. But, say you, surely a tangible square is liker to
a visible square than to a visible circle : it has four angles,
and as many sides ; so also has the visible square — but the
visible circle has no such thing, being bounded by one
uniform curve, without right lines or angles, which makes
it unfit to represent the tangible square, but very fit to re
present the tangible circle. Whence it clearly follows,
that visible figures are patterns of, or of the same species
with, the respective tangible figures represented by them ;
that they are like unto them, and of their own nature fitted
to represent them, as being of the same sort ; and that
they are in no respect arbitrary signs, as words.

142. I answer, it must be acknowledged the visible
square is fitter than the visible circle to represent the
tangible square, but then it is not because it is liker, or
more of a species with it ; but, because the visible square
contains in it several distinct parts, whereby to mark the
several distinct corresponding parts of a tangible square,
whereas the visible circle doth not. The square per
ceived by touch hath four distinct equal sides, so also
hath it four distinct equal angles. It is therefore neces
sary that the visible figure which shall be most proper
to mark it contain four distinct equal parts, correspond
ing to the four sides of the tangible square ; as likewise
four other distinct and equal parts, whereby to denote the
four equal angles of the tangible square. And accordingly
we see the visible figures contain in them distinct visible
parts, answering to the distinct tangible parts of the figures
signified or suggested by them.

143. But, it will not hence follow that any visible figure
is like unto or of the same species with its corresponding
tangible figure— unless it be also shewn that not only the
number, but also the kind of the parts be the same in both.
To illustrate this, I observe that visible figures represent
tangible figures much after the same manner that written
words do sounds. Now, in this respect, words are not
arbitrary ; it not being indifferent what written word stands

198 AN ESSAY TOWARDS

for any sound. But, it is requisite that each word contain
in it as many distinct characters as there are variations in
the sound it stands for. Thus, the single letter a is proper
to mark one simple uniform sound ; and the word adultery
is accommodated to represent the sound annexed to it — in
the formation whereof there being eight different collisions
or modifications of the air by the organs of speech, each of
which produces a difference of sound, it was fit the word
representing it should consist of as many distinct charac
ters, thereby to mark each particular difference or part of
the whole sound. And yet nobody, I presume, will say the
single letter a, or the word adultery, are alike unto or of
the same species with the respective sounds by them re
presented. It is indeed arbitrary that, in general, letters
of any language represent sounds at all ; but, when that is
once agreed, it is not arbitrary what combination of letters
shall represent this or that particular sound. I leave this
with the reader to pursue, and apply it in his own thoughts.

144. It must be confessed that we are not so apt to con
found other signs with the things signified, or to think
them of the same species, as we are visible and tangible
ideas. But, a little consideration will shew us how this
may well be, without our supposing them of a like nature.
These signs are constant and universal ; their connexion
with tangible ideas has been learnt at our first entrance
into the wrorld ; and ever since, almost every moment of
our lives, it has been occurring to our thoughts, and fasten
ing and striking deeper on our minds. When we observe
that signs are variable, and of human institution ; when we
remember there was a time they were not connected in our
minds with those things they now so readily suggest, but
that their signification was learned by the slow steps of
experience : this preserves us from confounding them.
But, when we find the same signs suggest the same things
all over the wrorld ; when we know they are not of human
institution, and cannot remember that we ever learned
their signification, but think that at first sight they would
have suggested to us the same things they do now : all this
persuades us they are of the same species as the things
respectively represented by them, and that it is by a
natural resemblance they suggest them to our minds.

145. Add to this that whenever we make a nice survey

A NEW THEORY OF VISION 199

of any object, successively directing the optic axis to each
point thereof, there are certain lines and figures, described
by the motion of the head or eye, which, being in truth per
ceived by feeling1, do nevertheless so mix themselves, as
it were, with the ideas of sight that we can scarce think
but they appertain to that sense. Again, the ideas of sight
enter into the mind several at once, more distinct and un-
mingled than is usual in the other senses beside the touch.
Sounds, for example, perceived at the same instant, are
apt to coalesce, if I may so say, into one sound : but we
can perceive, at the same time, great variety of visible
objects, very separate and distinct from each other. Now,
tangible2 extension being made up of several distinct co
existent parts, we may hence gather another reason that
may dispose us to imagine a likeness or analogy between
the immediate objects of sight and touch. But nothing,
certainly, does more contribute to blend and confound them
together, than the strict and close connexion 3 they have
with each other. We cannot open our eyes but the ideas
of distance, bodies, and tangible figures are suggested by
them. So swift, and sudden, and unperceived is the tran
sit from visible to tangible ideas that we can scarce forbear
thinking them equally the immediate object of vision.

146. The prejudice 4 which is grounded on these, and
whatever other causes may be assigned thereof, sticks so
fast on our understandings, that it is impossible, without
obstinate striving and labour of the mind, to get entirely
clear of it. But then the reluctancy we find in rejecting
any opinion can be no argument of its truth, to whoever
considers what has been already shewn with regard to the
prejudices we entertain concerning the distance, magni
tude, and situation of objects ; prejudices so familiar to
our minds, so confirmed and inveterate, as they will hardly
give way to the clearest demonstration.

147. Upon the whole, I think we may fairly conclude 5

1 Cf. sect. 16, 27, 97. 4 Cf. Neiv Theory of Vision Vindi-

- Is ' tangible ' here used in its cated, sect. 35.

narrow meaning— excluding mus- 5 Berkeley, in this section, enun-

cular and locomotive experience ? ciates the principal conclusion in

3 i.e. as natural signs, divinely the -Essay, which conclusion indeed

associated with their thus implied forms his new theory of Vision,
meanings.

200 AN ESSAY TOWARDS

that the proper objects of Vision constitute the Universal
Language of Nature ; whereby we are instructed how
to regulate our actions, in order to attain those things
that are necessary to the preservation and well-being
of our bodies, as also to avoid whatever may be hurtful
and destructive of them. It is by their information that
we are principally guided in all the transactions and
concerns of life, And the manner wherein they signify
and mark out unto us the objects which are at a distance
is the same with that of languages and signs of human
appointment ; which do not suggest the things signified
by any likeness or identity of nature, but only by an
habitual connexion that experience has made us to observe
between them l.

148. Suppose one who had always continued blind be
told by his guide that after he has advanced so many
steps he shall come to the brink of a precipice, or be
stopped by a wall ; must not this to him seem very ad
mirable and surprising ? He cannot conceive how it
is possible for mortals to frame such predictions as these,
which to him would seem as strange and unaccountable
as prophecy does to others. Even they who are blessed
with the visive faculty may (though familiarity make it
less observed) find therein sufficient cause of admiration.
The wonderful art and contrivance wherewith it is adjusted
to those ends and purposes for which it was apparently

1 A suggestion thus due to na- sociated with them. So that if, on

tural laws of association. The this account, we are to suppose,

explanation of the fact that we with a late ingenious writer, that

apprehend, by those ideas or phe- the ideas of sight constitute a Visual

nomena which are objects of Language, because they readily

sight, certain other ideas, which suggest the corresponding ideas of

neither resemble them, nor efficient- touch — as the terms of a language

ly cause them, nor are so caused by excite the ideas answering to them

them, nor have any necessary con- — I see not but we may, for the same

nexion with them, comprehends, reason, allow of a tangible, audible,

according to Berkeley, the whole gustatory, and olefactory language;

Theory of Vision. 'The imagina- though doubtless the Visual Lan-

tion of every thinking person/ re- guage will be abundantly more

•marksAdamSmith/will supply him copious than the rest.' Smith's

with instances toprove that the ideas Optics. — Remarks, p. 29. — And into

received by any one of the senses this conception of a universal sense

do readily excite such other ideas, symbolism, Berkeley's theory of

either of the same sense or of any Vision ultimately rises,
other, as have habitually been as-

A NEW THEORY OF VISION 2OI

designed ; the vast extent, number, and variety of objects
that are at once, with so much ease, and quickness, and
pleasure, suggested by it — all these afford subject for much
and pleasing speculation,, and may, if anything, give us
some glimmering analogous prsenotion of things, that are
placed beyond the certain discovery and comprehension
of our present state l.

149. I do not design to trouble myself much with
drawing corollaries from the doctrine I have hitherto
laid down. If it bears the test, others may, so far as they
shall think convenient, employ their thoughts in extending
it farther, and applying it to whatever purposes it may
be subservient to. Only, I cannot forbear making some
inquiry concerning the object of geometry, which the
subject we have been upon does naturally lead one to.
We have shewn there is no such idea as that of exten
sion in abstract2; and that there are two kinds of sensible
extension and figures, which are entirely distinct and
heterogeneous from each other :!. Now, it is natural to
inquire which of these is the object of geometry4.

150. Some things there are which, at first sight, incline
one to think geometry conversant about visible extension.
The constant use of the eyes, both in the practical and
speculative parts of that science, doth very much induce
us thereto. It would, without doubt, seem odd to a
mathematician to go about to convince him the diagrams
he saw upon paper were not the figures, or even the
likeness of the figures, which make the subject of the
demonstration — the contrary being held an unquestion
able truth, not only by mathematicians, but also by those
who apply themselves more particularly to the study of
logic; I mean who consider the nature of science, certainty,
and demonstration ; it being by them assigned as one

1 Cf. Akiphron, Dialogue IV. sion ; and others that space is a
sect. 11-15. necessary implicate of sense-experi-

2 Sect. 122-125. ence, rather than, per se, an object

3 Sect. 127-138. of any single sense. Cf. Kant's

4 Some modern metaphysicians explanation of the origin of our
would say, that neither tangible mathematical knowledge, Kritik
nor visible extension is the object der reinen Vernunft. Elementar-
of geometry, but abstract exten- lehre, I.

202 AN ESSAY TOWARDS

reason of the extraordinary clearness and evidence of
geometry, that in that science the reasonings are free
from those inconveniences which attend the use of arbi
trary signs, the very ideas themselves being copied out,
and exposed to view upon paper. But, by the bye, how
well this agrees with what they likewise assert of abstract
ideas being the object of geometrical demonstration I
leave to be considered.

151. To come to a resolution in this point, we need
only observe what has been said in sect. 59, 60, 61, where
it is shewn that visible extensions in themselves are little
regarded, and have no settled determinate greatness,
and that men measure altogether by the application of
tangible extension to tangible extension. All which makes
it evident that visible extension and figures are not the
object of geometry.

152. It is therefore plain that visible figures are of
the same use in geometry that words are. And the one
may as well be accounted the object of that science as
the other; neither of them being any otherwise concerned
therein than as they represent or suggest to the mind
the particular tangible figures connected with them.
There is, indeed, this difference betwixt the signification
of tangible figures by visible figures, and of ideas by words
--that whereas the latter is variable and uncertain, depend
ing altogether on the arbitrary appointment of men, the
former is fixed, and immutably the same in all times
and places. A visible square, for instance, suggests to
the mind the same tangible figure in Europe that it doth
in America. Hence it is, that the voice of nature, which
speaks to our eyes, is not liable to that misinterpretation
and ambiguity that languages of human contrivance are
unavoidably subject to l. From which may, in some
measure, be derived that peculiar evidence and clearness
of geometrical demonstrations.

153. Though what has been said may suffice to shew
what ought to be determined with relation to the object
of geometry, I shall, nevertheless, for the fuller illustration
thereof, take into my thoughts the case of an intelligence
or unbodied spirit, which is supposed to see perfectly

1 Cf. sect. 51-66, 144.

A NEW THEORY OF VISION 203

well, t. e. to have a clear perception of the proper and
immediate objects of sight, but to have no sense of touch '.
Whether there be any such being in nature or no, is be
side my purpose to inquire ; it suffices, that the supposition
contains no contradiction in it. Let us now examine
what proficiency such a one may be able to make in
geometry. Which speculation will lead us more clearly
to see whether the ideas of sight can possibly be the
object of that science.

154. First, then, it is certain the aforesaid intelligence
could have no idea of a solid or quantity of three dimen
sions, which follows from its not having any idea of
distance. We, indeed, are prone to think that we have
by sight the ideas of space and solids ; which arises from
our imagining that we do, strictly speaking, see distance,
and some parts of an object at a greater distance than
others ; which has been demonstrated to be the effect of
the experience we have had what ideas of touch are con
nected with such and such ideas attending vision. But
the intelligence here spoken of is supposed to have no
experience of touch. He would not, therefore, judge as
we do, nor have any idea of distance, outness, or pro
fundity, nor consequently of space or body, either imme
diately or by suggestion. W7hence it is plain he can have
no notion of those parts of geometry which relate to the
mensuration of solids, and their convex or concave surfaces,
and contemplate the properties of lines generated by the
section of a solid. The conceiving of any part whereof
is beyond the reach of his faculties.

155. Farther, he cannot comprehend the manner where
in geometers describe a right line or circle ; the rule and
compass, with their use, being things of which it is impos
sible he should have any notion. Nor is it an easier
matter for him to conceive the placing of one plane or
angle on another, in order to prove their equality; since
that supposes some idea of distance, or external space.

1 This is a conjecture, not as to ' Geometry of Visibles,' and the

the probable ideasof one born blind, mental experience of Idomenians,

but as to the ideas of an 'unbodied' or imaginary beings supposed to

intelligence, whose only sense have no ideas of the material world

was that of seeing. See Reid's except those got by seeing,
speculation (Inquiry, VI. 9) on the

204 AN ESSAY TOWARDS

All which makes it evident our pure intelligence could
never attain to know so much as the first elements of plain
geometry. And perhaps, upon a nice inquiry, it will be
found he cannot even have an idea of plain figures any
more than he can of solids ; since some idea of distance
is necessary to form the idea of a geometrical plane, as will
appear to whoever shall reflect a little on it.

156. All that is properly perceived by the visive faculty
amounts to no more than colours with their variations, and
different proportions of light and shade— but the perpetual
mutability and fleetingness of those immediate objects of
sight render them incapable of being managed after the man
ner of geometrical figures ; nor is it in any degree useful that
they should. It is true there be divers of them perceived
at once ; and more of some, and less of others : but accur
ately to compute their magnitude, and assign precise deter
minate proportions between things so variable and incon
stant, if we suppose it possible to be done, must yet be a
very trifling and insignificant labour.

157. I must confess, it seems to be the opinion of some
very ingenious men that flat or plane figures are immediate
objects of sight, though they acknowledge solids are not.
And this opinion of theirs is grounded on what is observed
in painting, wherein (say they) the ideas immediately im
printed in the mind are only of planes variously coloured,
which, by a sudden act of the judgment, are changed into
solids : but, with a little attention, we shall find the planes
here mentioned as the immediate objects of sight are not
visible but tangible planes. For, when we say that pictures
are planes, we mean thereby that they appear to the touch
smooth and uniform. But then this smoothness and uni
formity, or, in other words, this planeness of the picture is
not perceived immediately by vision ; for it appeareth to
the eye various and multiform.

158. From all which we may conclude that planes are no
more the immediate object of sight than solids. What we
strictly see are not solids, nor yet planes variously coloured
— they are only diversity of colours. And some of these
suggest to the mind solids, and others plane figures; just
as they have been experienced to be connected with the
one or the other : so that we see plains in the same way
that we see solids — both being equally suggested by the

A NEW THEORY OF VISION 205

immediate objects of sight, which accordingly are themselves
denominated planes and solids. But, though they are
called by the same names with the things marked by them,
they are, nevertheless, of a nature entirely different, as hath
been demonstrated1.

159. What has been said is, if I mistake not, sufficient to
decide the question we proposed to examine, concerning
the ability of a pure spirit, such as we have described, to
know geometry. It is, indeed, no easy matter for us to
enter precisely into the thoughts of such an intelligence ;
because we cannot, without great pains, cleverly separate
and disentangle in our thoughts the proper objects of sight
from those of touch which are connected with them. This,
indeed, in a complete degree seems scarce possible to be
performed; which will not seem strange to us, if we con
sider how hard it is for any one to hear the words of his
native language, which is familiar to him, pronounced in
his ears without understanding them. Though he endea
vour to disunite the meaning from the sound, it will never
theless intrude into his thoughts, and he shall find it
extreme difficult, if not impossible, to put himself exactly
in the posture of a foreigner that never learnt the language,
so as to be affected barely with the sounds themselves, and
not perceive the signification annexed to them.

160. By this time, I suppose, it is clear that neither
abstract nor visible extension makes the object of geometry ;
the not discerning of which may, perhaps, have created
some difficulty and useless labour in mathematics. [2Sure
I am that somewhat relating thereto has occurred to my
thoughts; which, though after the most anxious and repeated
examination I am forced to think it true, doth, nevertheless,
seem so far out of the common road of geometry, that I
know not whether it may not be thought presumption if

1 Cf. sect. 130, and New Theory caped more recent British psycho-

of Vision Vindicated, sect. 57. Does legists, including Stewart, Brown,

Berkeley, in this and the two pre- Mill, and Bain, who seem to hold

ceding sections, mean to hint that that unextended colour is perceiv-

the only proper object of sight is able and imaginable.
unextended colour ; and that, apart 2 The bracketed sentence is not

from muscular movement in the eye retained in the author's last edition,

or other locomotion, visibilia re- in which the first sentence of sect,

solve into unextended mathematical 160 is the concluding one of sect,

points? This question has not es- 159, and of the Essay.

205 ESSAY TOWARDS A NEW THEORY OF VISION

I should make it public, in an age wherein that science hath
received such mighty improvements by new methods ;
great part whereof, as well as of the ancient discoveries,
may perhaps lose their reputation, and much of that ardour
with which men study the abstruse and fine geometry be
abated, if what to me, and those few to whom I have
imparted it, seems evidently true, should really prove to
be so. I

AN APPENDIX

TO THE ESSAY ON VISION

[This Appendix is contained only in the second edition .]

THE censures which, I am informed, have been made
on the foregoing Essay inclined me to think I had not been
clear and express enough in some points ; and, to prevent
being misunderstood for the future, I was willing to make
any necessary alterations or additions in what I had written.
But that was impracticable, the present edition having been
almost finished before I received this information. Where
fore, I think it proper to consider in this place the principal
objections that are come to my notice.

In \\\e first place, it is objected, that in the beginning of
the Essay I argue either against all use of lines and angles
in optics, and then what I say is false ; or against those
writers only who will have it that we can perceive by sense
the optic axes, angles, &c., and then it is insignificant, this
being an absurdity which no one ever held. To which
I answer that I argue only against those who are of opinion
that we perceive the distance of objects by lines and angles,
or, as they term it, by a kind of innate geometry. And, to
shew that this is not fighting with my own shadow, I shall
here set down a passage from the celebrated Des Cartes ' : —

' Distantiam praeterea discimus, per mutuam quandam
conspirationem oculorum. Ut enim caecus noster duo ba-
cilla tenens, A E et C E, de quorum longitudine incertus,
solumque intervallum manuum A et Ct cum magnitudine

1 This passage is contained in the Dioptrices of Descartes, VI. 13 ; see
also VI. it.

208

APPENDIX TO AN ESSAY TOWARDS

angulorum A C E, et C A E exploratum habens, inde, ut
ex Geometria quadam omnibus innata, scire potest ubi
sit punctum E. Sic quum nostri
oculi RST et rst ambo, vertuntur
ad X, magnitude lineae Ss, et an
gulorum X S s et X s S, certos nos
reddunt ubi sit punctum X. Et
idem opera alterutrius possumus
indagare, loco ilium movendo, ut si
versus X ilium semper dirigentes,
primo sistamus in puncto S, et statim
post in puncto 5, hoc sufficiet ut mag
nitude lineae S s, et duorum angu
lorum X S s et X s S nostrae imagi
nation! simul occurrant, et distantiam puncti ^Tnos edoceant:
idque per actionem mentis, quae licet simplex judicium esse

videatur, ratiocinationem
tamen quandam involu-
tam habet, similem illi, qua
Geometrae per duas sta-
tiones diversas, loca inac-
cessa dimetiuntur.'

I might amass together
citations from several au-
thors to the same purpose,
but, this being so clear in
the point, and from an
author of so great note,
I shall not trouble the
reader with any more. What I have said on this head
was not for the sake of finding fault with other men ; but,
because I judged it necessary to demonstrate in the first
place that we neither see distance immediately, nor yet
perceive it by the mediation of anything that hath (as lines
and angles) a necessary connexion with it. For on the
demonstration of this point the whole theory depends \

Secondly, it is objected, that the explication I give of
the appearance of the horizontal moon (which may also be

1 The arbitrariness or contin
gency — as far as our knowledge
carries us — of |,the connexion
between the visual phenomena; as

signs, on the one hand, and actual
distance, as perceived through this
means, on the other.

A NEW THEORY OF VISION 209

applied to the sun) is the same that Gassendus had given
before. I answer, there is indeed mention made of the
grossness of the atmosphere in both ; but then the methods
wherein it is applied to solve the phenomenon are widely
different, as will be evident to whoever shall compare what
I have said on this subject with the following words of
Gassendus :—

' Heine dici posse videtur : solem humilem oculo specta-
tum ideo apparere majorem, quam dum altius egreditur,
quia dum vicinus est horizonti prolixa est series vaporum,
atque adeo corpusculorum quae solis radios ita retundunt,
ut oculus minus conniveat, et pupilla quasi umbrefacta
longe magis amplificetur, quam dum sole multum elato
rari vapores intercipiuntur, solque ipse ita splendescit, ut
pupilla in ipsum spectans contractissima efficiatur. Nempe
ex hoc esse videtur, cur visibilis species ex sole procedens,
et per pupillam amplificatam intromissa in retinam, am-
pliorem in ilia sedem occupet, majoremque proinde creet
solis apparentiam, quam dum per contractam pupillam
eodem intromissa contendit.' Vid. Epist. i. DC Apparente
Magnitudine Solis Humilis et Sublimis, p. 6. This solu
tion of Gassendus proceeds on a false principle, to wit, that
the pupil's being enlarged augments the species or image
on the fund of the eye.

Thirdly, against what is said in Sect. 80, it is objected,
that the same thing which is so small as scarce to be dis
cerned by a man, may appear like a mountain to some
small insect ; from which it follows that the minimum visibile
is not equal in respect of all creatures '. I answer, if this
objection be sounded to the bottom, it will be found to
mean no more than that the same particle of matter which
is marked to a man by one minimum visibile, exhibits to an
insect a great number of minima visibilia. But this does
not prove that one minimum visibile of the insect is not
equal to one minimum visibile of the man. The not distin
guishing between the mediate and immediate objects of
sight is, I suspect, a cause of misapprehension in this
matter.

Some other misinterpretations and difficulties have been

1 Cf. sect. 80-83.

BERKELEY : FRASEK. I. P

210 APPENDIX TO ESSAY ON VISION

made, but, in the points they refer to, I have endeavoured
to be so very plain that I know not how to express my
self more clearly. All I shall add is, that if they who
are pleased to criticise on my Essay would but read the
whole over with some attention, they might be the better
able to comprehend my meaning, and consequently to
judge of my mistakes.

*

*

I am informed that, soon after the first edition of
this treatise, a man somewhere near London was made
to see, who had been born blind, and continued so for
about twenty years \ Such a one may be supposed a
proper judge to decide how far some tenets laid down in
several places of the foregoing Essay are agreeable to
truth ; and if any curious person hath the opportunity
of making proper interrogatories to him thereon, I should
gladly see my notions either amended or confirmed by
experience 2.

1 The reference here seems to be account of a miraculous cure of a

to the case described in the Tatler Young Man in Neivington, who was

(No. 55) of August 16, 1709, in born blind, and was in five minutes

which William Jones, born blind, brought to perfect sight, by Mr. Roger

had received sight after a surgical Grant, oculist. London, 1709.

operation, at the age of twenty, '2 Cf. New Theory of Vision Vindi-

on the agth of June preceding. cafed, sect. 71, with the relative

A medical narrative of this case note,
appeared, entitled A full and true

A TREATISE

CONCERNING THE

PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

pPART I]

WHEREIN THE CHIEF CAUSES OF ERROR AND DIFFICULTY
IN THE SCIENCES, WITH THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM,
ATHEISM, AND IRREL1GION, ARE INQUIRED INTO

First Published in 1710

1 Omitted on the title-page in the second edition, but retained in the body
of the work.

P 2

EDITOR'S PREFACE

TO THE

TREATISE CONCERNING THE
PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

THIS book of Principles contains the most systematic and
reasoned exposition of Berkeley's philosophy, in its early
stage, which we possess. Like the Essay on Vision,
its tentative pioneer, it was prepared at Trinity College,
Dublin. Its author had hardly completed his twenty-fifth
year when it was published. The first edition of this
' First Part' of the projected Treatise, 'printed by Aaron
Rhames, for Jeremy Pepyat, bookseller in Skinner Row,
Dublin,' appeared early in 1710. A second edition, with
minor changes, and in which ' Part I ' was withdrawn from
the title-page, was published in London in 1734, 'printed
for Jacob Tonson ' — on the eve of Berkeley's settlement at
Cloyne. It was the last in the author's lifetime. The
projected 'Second Part' of the Principles was never given
to the world, and we can hardly conjecture its design.
In a letter in 1729 to his American friend, Samuel
Johnson, Berkeley mentions that he had 'made consider
able progress on the Second Part/ but 'the manuscript/
he adds, 'was lost about fourteen years ago, during my
travels in Italy ; and I never had leisure since to do so

214 EDITORS PREFACE TO THE

disagreeable a thing as writing twice on the same sub
ject1.'

An edition of the Principles appeared in London in 1776,
twenty-three years after Berkeley's death, with a running
commentary of Remarks by the anonymous editor, on the
pages opposite the text, in which, according to the editor,
Berkeley's doctrines are ' carefully examined, and shewn to
be repugnant to fact, and his principles to be incompatible
with the constitution of human nature and the reason and
fitness of things.' In this volume the Dialogues between
Hylas and Philonous are appended to the Principles, and a
' Philosophical Discourse concerning the nature of Human
Being' is prefixed to the whole, 'being a defence of Mr.
Locke's principles, and some remarks on Dr. Beattie's
Essay on Truth* by the author of the Remarks on
Berkeley's Principles. The acuteness of the Remarks is
not in proportion to their bulk and diffuseness : many
popular misconceptions of Berkeley are served up, without
appreciation of the impotence of matter, and of natural
causation as only passive sense-symbolism, which is at
the root of the theory of the material world against which
the Remarks are directed.

The Kantian and post-Kantian Idealism that is charac
teristic of the nineteenth century has recalled attention
to Berkeley, who had produced his spiritual philosophy
under the prevailing conditions of English thought in the
preceding age, when Idealism in any form was uncongenial.
In 1869 the book of Principles was translated into German,
with annotations, by Ueberweg, professor of philosophy at
Konigsberg, the university of Kant. The Clarendon Press
edition of the Collected Works of Berkeley followed in
1871. In 1874 an edition of the Principles, \>y Dr. Kranth,
Professor of Philosophy in the university of Pennsylvania,
appeared in America, with annotations drawn largely from

1 Beardsley's Life and Correspon- First President of King's College,
dence of Samuel Johnson, D.D., New York, p, 72 (1874).

PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 215

the Clarendon Press edition and Ueberweg. In 1878 Dr.
Collyns Simon republished the Principles, with discussions
based upon the text, followed by an appendix of remarks
on Kant and Hume in their relation to Berkeley.

The book of Principles, as we have it, must be taken as
a systematic fragment of an incompletely developed philo
sophy. Many years after its appearance, the author thus
describes the conditions : — ' It was published when I was
very young, and without doubt hath many defects. For
though the notions should be true (as I verily think they
are), yet it is difficult to express them clearly and con
sistently, language being framed for common use and
received prejudices. I do not therefore pretend that my
books can teach truth. All I hope for is that they may
be an occasion to inquisitive men of discovering truth V
Again: — 'I had no inclination to trouble the world with
large volumes. What I have done was rather with the
view of giving hints to thinking men, who have leisure and
curiosity to go to the bottom of things, and pursue them
in their own minds. Two or three times reading these
small tracts (Essay on Vision, Principles, Dialogues, De
Motif], and making what is read the occasion of thinking,
would, I believe, render the whole familiar and easy to the
mind, and take off that shocking appearance which hath
often been observed to attend speculative truths'-'.' The
incitements to further and deeper thought thus proposed
have met with a more sympathetic response in this genera
tion than in the lifetime of Berkeley.

There is internal evidence in the book of Principles
that its author had been a diligent and critical student of
Locke's Essay. Like the Essay, it is dedicated to the
Earl of Pembroke. The word idea is not less character-

1 Beardsley's Life of Johnson, ~ Chandler's Life of Johnson,

pp. 71, 72. Appendix, p. 161.

216 EDITOR'S PREFACE TO THE

istic of the Principles than of the Essay, although Berkeley
generally uses it with a narrower application than Locke,
confining it to phenomena presented objectively to our
senses, and their subjective reproductions in imagination.
With both Berkeley and Locke objective phenomena
(under the name of ideas) are the materials supplied to
man for conversion into natural science. Locke's reduc
tion of ideas into simple and complex, as well as some
of his subdivisions, reappear with modifications in the
Principles. Berkeley's account of Substance and Power,
Space and Time, while different from Locke's, still bears
marks of the Essay. Concrete Substance, which in its
ultimate meaning much perplexes Locke, is identified with
the personal pronouns 'I' and 'you' by Berkeley, and
is thus spiritualised. Cause proper, or Power, he finds
only in the voluntary activity of persons. Space is pre
sented to us in our sensuous experience of resistance
to organic movements ; while it is symbolised in terms of
phenomena presented to sight, as already explained in
the Essay on Vision. Time is revealed in our actual
experience of change in the ideas or phenomena of
which we are percipient in sense; length of time being
calculated by the changes in the adopted measure of
duration. Infinite space and infinite time, being neces
sarily incapable of finite ideation, are dismissed as
abstractions that for man must always be empty of
realisable meaning. Indeed, the Commonplace Book
shews that Locke influenced Berkeley as much by an
tagonism as otherwise. ' Such was the candour of that
great man that I persuade myself, were he alive, he would
not be offended that I differed from him, seeing that in so
doing I follow his advice to use my own judgment, see with
my own eyes and not with another's.' So he argues against
Locke's opinions about the infinity and eternity of space,
and the possibility of matter endowed with power to think,
and urges his inconsistency in treating some qualities

PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 217

of matter as wholly material, while he insists that others,
under the name of 'secondary/ are necessarily dependent
on sentient intelligence. Above all he assails Locke's
'abstract ideas' as germs of scepticism— interpreting
Locke's meaning paradoxically.

Next to Locke, Descartes and Malebranche are prominent
in the Principles. Recognition of the ultimate supremacy
of Spirit, or the spiritual character of active power and
the constant agency of God in nature, suggested by
Descartes, was congenial to Berkeley, but he was op
posed to the mechanical conception of the universe found
in the Cartesian physical treatises. That thought is synony
mous with existence is a formula with which the French
philosopher might make him familiar, as well as with
the assumption that ideas only are immediate objects of
human perception; an assumption in which Descartes
was followed by Locke, and philosophical thinkers in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but under differing
interpretations of the term idea.

Malebranche appears less in the Principles than Locke
and Descartes. In early life, at any rate, Berkeley
would be less at home in the 'divine vision' of Male
branche than among the 'ideas' of Locke-. The mysti
cism of the Recherche de la Ve'rite is unlike the transparent
lucidity of Berkeley's juvenile thought. But the subor
dinate place and office of the material world in Male-
branche's system, and his conception of power as wholly
spiritual, approached the New Principles of Berkeley.

Plato and Aristotle hardly appear, either by name or as
characteristic influence, in the book of Principles, which
in this respect contrasts with the abundant references to
ancient and mediaeval thinkers in Sin's, and to a less
extent in the De Motn and Alciphron.

The Introduction to the Principles is a proclamation of
war against ' abstract ideas,' which is renewed in the body

218 EDITOR'S PREFACE TO THE

of the work, and again more than once in the writings of
Berkeley's early and middle life, but is significantly with
drawn in his old age. In the ardour of youth, his prime
remedy for anarchy in philosophy, and for the sceptical dis
position which philosophy had been apt to generate, was sup
pression of abstract ideas as impossible ideas — empty names
heedlessly accepted as ideas — an evil to be counteracted by
steady adherence to the concrete experience found in our
senses and inner consciousness. Never to lose our hold
of positive facts, and always to individualise general con
ceptions, are regulative maxims by which Berkeley would
make us govern our investigation of ultimate problems.
He takes up his position in the actual universe of ap
plied reason ; not in the empty void of abstract reason,
remote from particulars and succession of change, in
which no real existence is found. All realisable ideas
must be either concrete data of sense, or concrete data
of inward consciousness. It is relations embodied in
particular facts, not pretended abstract ideas, that give
fruitful meaning to common terms. Abstract matter,
abstract substance, abstract power, abstract space, abstract
time — unindividualisable in sense or in imagination —
must all be void of meaning ; the issue of unlawful
analysis, which pretends to find what is real without
the concrete ideas that make the real, because per
cipient spirit is the indispensable factor of all reality.
The only lawful abstraction is nominal — the applica
tion, that is to say, of a name in common to an
indefinite number of things which resemble one another.
This is Berkeley's ' Nominalism.'

Berkeley takes Locke as the representative advocate
of the ' abstract ideas ' against which he wages war in
the Introduction to the Principles. Under cover of an
ambiguity in the term idea, he is unconsciously fighting
against a man of straw. He supposes that Locke means
by idea only a concrete datum of sense, or of imagina-

PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 219

tion ; and he argues that we cannot without contradic
tion abstract from all such data, and yet retain idea.
But Locke includes among his ideas intellectual rela
tions—what Berkeley himself afterwards distinguished
as notions, in contrast with ideas. This polemic against
Locke is therefore one of verbal confusion. In later
life he probably saw this, as he saw deeper into the whole
question involved. This is suggested by the omission
of the argument against abstract ideas, given in earlier
editions of Alciphron, from the edition published a year
before he died. In his juvenile attack on abstractions,
his characteristic impetuosity seems to carry him to the
extreme of rejecting rational relations that are involved
in the objectivity of sensible things and natural order, thus
resting experience at last only on phenomena — particular
and contingent.

A preparatory draft of the Introduction to the Principles,
which I found in the manuscript department of the library
of Trinity College, Dublin, is printed in the appendix to
this edition of Berkeley's Philosophical Works. The
variations are of some interest, biographical and philo
sophical. It seems to have been written in the autumn
of 1708, and it may with advantage be compared
with the text of the finished Introduction, as well as
with numerous relative entries in the Commonplace
Book.

After this Introduction, the New Principles themselves
are evolved, in a corresponding spirit of hostility to empty
abstractions. The sections may be thus divided : —

i. Rationale of the Principles (sect. 1-33).

ii. Supposed Objections to the Principles answered
(sect. 34-84).

iii. Consequences and Applications of the Principles
(sect. 85-156).

220 EDITORS PREFACE TO THE

i. RATIONALE OF THE PRINCIPLES.

The reader may remember that one of the entries
in the Commonplace Book runs as follows : — l To begin
the First Book, not with mention of sensation and
reflexion, but, instead of sensation, to use perception, or
thought in general.' Berkeley seems there to be oscillat
ing between Locke and Descartes. He now adopts
Locke's account of the materials of which our concrete
experience consists (sect. i). The data of human know
ledge of existence are accordingly found in the ideas,
phenomena, or appearances (a) of which we are percipient in
the senses, and (b) of which we are conscious when we
attend to our inward passions and operations — all which
make up the original contents of human experience,
to be reproduced in new forms and arrangements, (c) in
memory and (d) imagination and (e) expectation. Those
materials are called ideas because living mind or spirit
is the indispensable realising factor : they all pre
suppose living mind, spirit, self, or ego to realise and
elaborate them (sect. 2). This is implied in our use of
personal pronouns, which signify, not ideas of any of
the preceding kinds, but that which is 'entirely distinct
from them, wherein they exist, or, which is the same
thing, by which they are perceived.' In this fundamental
presupposition Descartes is more apparent than Locke, and
there is even an unconscious forecast of Kant and Hegel.

Berkeley next faces a New Question which his New
Principles are intended to answer. How is the concrete
world that is presented to our senses related to Mind or
Spirit? Is all or any of its reality independent of percipient
experience? Is it true that the phenomena of which
we are percipient in sense are ultimately independent of
all percipient and conscious life, and are even the ultimate
basis of all that is real? Must we recognise in the phe
nomena of Matter the substance of what we call Mind?

PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 221

For do we not find, when we examine Body and
Spirit mutually related in our personality, that the latter
is more dependent on the former, and on the physical
cosmos of which the former is a part, than our body
and its bodily surroundings are dependent on Spirit ? In
short, is not the universe of existence, in its final form,
only lifeless Matter?

The claim of Matter to be supreme is what Berkeley
produces his Principles in order to reduce. Concrete
reality is self-evidently unreal, he argues, in the total
absence of percipient Spirit, for Spirit is the one realis
ing factor. Try to imagine the material world unper-
ceived and you are trying to picture empty abstraction.
Wholly material matter is self-evidently an inconceiv
able absurdity ; a universe emptied of all percipient
life is an impossible universe. The material world
becomes real in being perceived : it depends for its reality
upon the spiritual realisation. As colours in a dark room
become real with the introduction of light, so the material
world becomes real in the life and agency of Spirit. It
must exist in terms of sentient life and percipient
intelligence, in order to rise into any degree of reality
that human beings at least can be at all concerned
with, either speculatively or practically. Matter totally
abstracted from percipient spirit must go the way of
all abstract ideas. It is an illusion, concealed by confused
thought and abuse of words; yet from obvious causes
strong enough to stifle faith in this latent but self-evident
Principle — that the universe of sense-presented pheno
mena can have concrete existence only in and by
sentient intelligence. It is the reverse of this Prin
ciple that Berkeley takes to have been ' the chief source
of all that scepticism and folly, all those contradictions
and inexplicable puzzling absurdities, that have in all
ages been a reproach to human reason1.' And indeed,

1 Commonplace Book.

222 EDITOR'S PREFACE TO THE

when it is fully understood, it is seen in its own
light to be the chief of ' those truths which are so near
and obvious to the mind, that a man need only open
his eyes to see them. For such I take this important one
to be — that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the
Earth, in a word, all those bodies which compose the mighty
frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a
Mind' (sect. 6). Living Mind or Spirit is the indispen
sable factor of all realities that are presented to our senses,
including, of course, our own bodies.

Yet this Principle, notwithstanding its intuitive cer
tainty, needs to be evoked by reflection from the latency
in which it lies concealed, in the confused thought of
the unreflecting. It is only gradually, and with the help of
reasoning, that the world presented to the senses is dis
tinctly recognised in this its deepest and truest reality.
And even when we see that the phenomena immediately
presented to our senses need to be realised in percipient
experience, in order to be concretely real, we are ready to
ask whether there may not be substances like the things so
presented, which can exist ' without mind/ or in a wholly
material way (sect. 8). Nay, are there not some of the
phenomena immediately presented to our senses which do
not need living mind to make them real ? It is allowed by
Locke and others that all those qualities of matter which are
called secondary cannot be wholly material, and that
living mind is indispensable for their realisation in nature ;
but Locke and the rest argue, that this is not so with the
qualities which they call primary, and which they regard as
of the essence of matter. Colours, sounds, tastes, smells are
all allowed to be not wholly material ; but are not the size,
shape, situation, solidity, and motion of bodies qualities
that are real without need for the realising agency of any
Mind or Spirit in the universe, and which would continue
to be what they are now if all Spirit, divine or human,
ceased to exist?

PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 223

The supposition that some of the phenomena of what
is called Matter can be real, and yet wholly material, is
discussed in sections 9-15, in which it is argued that the
things of sense cannot exist really, in any of their
manifestations, unless they are brought into reality in
some percipient life and experience. It is held impossible
that any quality of matter can have the reality which
we all attribute to it, unless it is spiritually realised
(sect. 15).

But may Matter not be real apart from all its so-called
qualities, these being allowed to be not wholly material,
because real only within percipient spirit ? May not
this wholly material Matter be Something that, as it were,
exists behind the ideas, phenomena, or qualities that
make their appearance to human beings ? This question,
Berkeley would say, is a meaningless and wholly unpractical
one. Material substance that makes and can make no real
appearance — unphenomenal or unideal— stripped of all its
qualities — is only 'anothername for abstract Being,' and ' the
abstract idea of Being appeareth to me the most incom
prehensible of all other. When I consider the two parts
or branches which make up the words material substance,
I am convinced there is no distinct meaning annexed to
them' (sect. 17). Neither Sense nor Reason inform us of
the existence of real material substances that exist abstractly,
or out of all relation to the secondary and primary
qualities of which we are percipient when we exercise our
senses. By our senses we cannot perceive more than ideas
or phenomena, aggregated as individual things that are pre
sented to us : we cannot perceive substances that make
no appearance in sense. Then as for reason, unrealised
substances, abstracted from living Spirit, human or divine,
being altogether meaningless, can in no way explain
the concrete realisations of human experience. In
short, if there are wholly unphenomenal material sub
stances, it is impossible that we should ever discover

224 EDITOR'S PREFACE TO THE

them, or have any concern with them, speculative
or practical ; and if there are not, we should have the
same reason to assert that there are which we have
now (sect. 20). It is impossible to put any meaning
into wholly abstract reality. ( To me the words
mean either a direct contradiction, or nothing at all '
(sect. 24).

The Principle that the esse of matter necessarily involves
percipi, and its correlative Principle that there is not any
other substance than Spirit, which is thus the indispen
sable factor of all reality, both lead on to the more
obviously practical Principle — that the material world,
per se, is wholly powerless, and that all changes in Nature
are the immediate issue of the agency of Spirit (sect. 25-
27). Concrete power, like concrete substance, is essentially
spiritual. To be satisfied that the whole natural world is
only the passive instrument and expression of Spiritual
Power we are asked to analyse the sensuous data of
experience. We can find no reason for attributing inherent
power to any of the phenomena and phenomenal things
that are presented to our senses, or for supposing that
they can be active causes, either of the changes that
are continuously in progress among themselves, or of the
feelings, perceptions, and volitions of which spiritual beings
are conscious. We find the ideas or phenomena that pass
in procession before our senses related to one another as
signs to their meanings, in a cosmical order that virtu
ally makes the material world a language and a prophecy :
but this cosmical procession is not found to originate in the
ideas or phenomena themselves, and there is reason for
supposing it to be maintained by ever-living Spirit, which
thus not only substantiates the things of sense, but explains
their laws of motion and their movements.

Yet the universe of reality is not exclusively One
Spirit. Experience contradicts the supposition. I find

PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 225

on trial that my personal power to produce changes in the
ideas or phenomena which my senses present to me
is a limited power (sect. 28-33). I can niake and un
make my own fancies, but I cannot with like freedom
make and unmake presentations of sense. When in day
light I open my eyes, it is not in my power to determine
whether I shall see or not ; nor is it in my power to determine
what objects I shall see. The cosmical order of sense-
phenomena is independent of my will. When I employ
my senses, I find myself always confronted by sensible
signs of perfect Reason and omnipresent Will. But I
also awake in the faith that I am an individual person.
And the sense-symbolism of which the material world con
sists, while it keeps me in constant and immediate relation
to the Universal Spirit, whose language it is, keeps me
likewise in intercourse with other persons, akin to myself,
who are signified to me by their overt actions and articulate
words, which enter into my sensuous experience. Sense-
given phenomena thus, among their other instrumental
offices, are the medium of communication between human
beings, who by this means can find companions, and make
signs to them. So while, at our highest point of view,
Nature is Spirit, experience shews that there is room in
the universe for a plurality of persons, individual, and in
a measure free or morally responsible. If Berkeley does
not say all this, his New Principles tend thus.

At any rate, in his reasoned exposition of his Principles
he is anxious to distinguish those phenomena that are
presented to the senses of all mankind from the private
ideas or fancies of individual men (sect. 28-33). The
former constitute the world which sentient beings realise
in common. He calls them ideas because they are un-
realisable without percipient mind; but still on the under
standing that they are not to be confounded with the
chimeras of imagination. They are more deeply and truly
real than chimeras. The groups in which they are found

BERKELEY : PHASER. I. Q

226 EDITOR'S PREFACE TO THE

to coexist are the individual things of sense, whose fixed
order of succession exemplifies what we call natural law, or
natural causation : the correlation of their changes to our
pleasures and pains, desires and aversions, makes scientific
knowledge of their laws practically important to the life of
man, in his embodied state.

Moreover, the real ideas presented to our senses, unlike
those of imagination, Berkeley would imply, cannot be
either representative or misrepresentative. Our imagina
tion may mislead us : the original data of sense cannot :
although we may, and often do, misinterpret their relations
to one another, and to our pleasures and pains and higher
faculties. The divine meaning with which they are charged,
of which science is a partial expression, they may perhaps
be said to represent. Otherwise representative sense-
perception is absurdity : the ideas of sense cannot be
representative in the way those of imagination are ; for
fancies are faint representations of data of sense. The
appearances that sentient intelligence realises are the things
of sense, and we cannot go deeper. If we prefer accordingly
to call the material world a dream or a chimera, we must
understand that it is the reasonable dream in which all
sentient intelligence participates, and by which the em
bodied life of man must be regulated.

Has Berkeley, in his juvenile ardour, and with the
impetuosity natural to him, while seeking to demonstrate
the impotence of matter, and the omnipresent supremacy of
Spirit, so spiritualised the material world as to make it unfit
for the symbolical office in the universe of reality which he
supposes it to discharge? Is its potential existence in God,
and its percipient realisation by me, and presumably by
innumerable other sentient beings, an adequate account
of the real material world existing in place and time ? Can
this universal orderly dream experienced in sense involve
the objectivity implied in its being the reliable medium of

PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 227

social intercourse? Does such a material world provide
me with a means of escape from absolute solitude ? Nay,
if Matter cannot rise into reality without percipient spirit
as realising factor, can my individual percipient spirit realise
myself without independent Matter? Without intelligent
life Matter is pronounced unreal. But is it not also true
that without Matter, and the special material organism we
call our body, percipient spirit is unreal ? Does not Nature
seem as indispensable to Spirit as Spirit is to Nature ? Must
we not assume at least their unbeginning and unending
coexistence, even if we recognise in Spirit the deeper and
truer reality? Do the New Principles explain the final
ground of trust and certainty about the universe of change
into which I entered as a stranger when I was born ?
If they make all that I have believed in as outward to be in
its reality inward, do they not disturb the balance that is
necessary to all human certainties, and leave me without
any realities at all ?

That Berkeley at the age of twenty-five, and educated
chiefly by Locke, had fathomed or even entertained all
these questions was hardly to be looked for. How far he
had gone may be gathered by a study of the sequel of his
book of Principles.

ii. OBJECTIONS TO THE NEW PRINCIPLES ANSWERED
(sect. 34-84).

The supposed Objections, with Berkeley's answers, may
be thus interpreted :—

First objection. (Sect. 34-40.) The preceding Principles
banish all substantial realities, and substitute a universe
of chimeras.

Answer. This objection is a play upon the popular
meaning of the word 'idea/ That name is appropriate
to the phenomena presented in sense, because they be
come concrete realities only in the experience of living

Q2

228 EDITOR'S PREFACE TO THE

Spirit ; and so it is not confined to the chimeras of in
dividual fancy, which may misrepresent the real ideas of
sense that are presented in the natural system indepen
dently of our will.

Second objection. (Sect. 41.) The preceding Principles
abolish the distinction between Perception and Imagina
tion — between imagining one's self burnt and actually
being burnt.

Answer. Real fire differs from fancied fire : as real pain
does from fancied pain ; yet no one supposes that real pain
any more than imaginary pain can exist unfelt by a sen
tient intelligence.

Third objection. (Sect. 42-44.) We actually see sensible
things existing at a distance from our bodies. Now,
whatever is seen existing at a distance must be seen as
existing external to us in our bodies, which contradicts
the foregoing Principles.

Answer. Distance, or outness, is not visible. It is
a conception which is suggested gradually, by our experi
ence of the connexion between visible colours and certain
visual sensations that accompany seeing, on the one hand,
and our tactual experience, on the other- -as was proved
in the Essay on Vision, in which the ideality of the visible
world is demonstrated1.

Fourth objection. (Sect. 45-48.) It follows from the New
Principles, that the material world must be undergoing
continuous annihilation and recreation in the innumer
able sentient experiences in which it becomes real.

Answer. According to the New Principles a thing
may be realised in the sense-experience of other minds,
during intervals of its perception by my mind ; for the
Principles do not affirm dependence only on this or that

1 Moreover, even if the outness unperceived. On the contrary,

or distance of things were visible, it Berkeley implies that they are

would not follow that either they perceived visually.
or their distances could be real if

PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 229

mind, but on a living Mind. If this implies a con
stant creation of the material world, the conception of
the universe as in a state of constant creation is not new,
and it signally displays Divine Providence.

Fifth objection. (Sect. 49.) If extension and extended
Matter can exist only in mind, it follows that extension is
an attribute of mind — that mind is extended.

Answer. Extension and other sensible qualities exist in
mind, not as modes of mind, which is unintelligible, but as
ideas of which Mind is percipient; and this is absolutely
inconsistent with the supposition that Mind is itself ex
tended '.

Sixth objection. (Sect. 50.) Natural philosophy proceeds
on the assumption that Matter is independent of percipient
mind, and it thus contradicts the New Principles.

Answer. On the contrary, Matter — if it means what
exists abstractly, or in independence of all percipient
Mind — is useless in natural philosophy, which is con
versant exclusively with the ideas or phenomena that
compose concrete things, not with empty abstractions.

Seventh objection. (Sect. 51.) To refer all change to
spiritual agents alone, and to regard the things of sense
as wholly impotent, thus discharging natural causes as
the New Principles do, is at variance with human language
and with good sense.

Answer. While we may speak as the multitude do, we
should learn to think with the few who reflect. We may
still speak of ' natural causes/ even when, as philosophers,
we recognise that all true efficiency must be spiritual, and
that the material world is only a system of sensible symbols,

1 It is also to be remembered are mine, because their existence

that sensible things exist ' in depends on my consciousness of

mind,' without being exclusively them ; and even sensible things

mine, as creatures of my will. In are so far mine, because, though

one sense, that only is mine in present in many minds in common,

which my will exerts itself. But, they are, for me, dependent on

in another view, my involuntary my percipient mind,
states of feeling and imagination

230 EDITOR'S PREFACE TO THE

regulated by Divine Will and revealing Omnipresent
Mind.

Eighth objection. (Sect. 54, 55.) The natural belief of men
seems inconsistent with the world being mind-dependent.

Answer. Not so when we consider that men seldom
comprehend the deep meaning of their practical assump
tions ; and when we recollect the prejudices, once dignified
as good sense, which have successively surrendered to
philosophy.

Ninth objection. (Sect. 56, 57.) Any Principle that is
inconsistent with our common faith in the existence of
the material world must be rejected.

Answer. The fact that we are conscious of not being
ourselves the cause of changes perpetually going on in
our sense-ideas, some of which we gradually learn by
experience to foresee, sufficiently accounts for the common
belief in the independence of those ideas, and is what men
truly mean by this.

Tenth objection. (Sect. 58, 59.) The foregoing Principles
concerning Matter and Spirit are inconsistent with the
laws of motion, and with other truths in mathematics and
natural philosophy.

Answer. The laws of motion, and those other truths,
may be all conceived and expressed in consistency with
the absence of independent substance and causation in
Matter.

Eleventh objection. (Sect. 60-66.) If, according to the
foregoing Principles, the material world is merely phe
nomena presented by a Power not-ourselves to our senses,
the elaborate contrivances which we find in Nature are
useless ; for we might have had all experiences that are
needful without them, by the direct agency of God.

Answer. Elaborate contrivances in Nature are relatively
necessary as signs : they express to its the occasional pre
sence and some of the experience of other men, also the
constant presence and power of the Universal Spirit, while

PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 231

the scientific interpretation of elaborately constituted Nature
is a beneficial moral and intellectual exercise.

Twelfth objection. (Sect. 67-79.) Although the impossi
bility of active Matter may be demonstrable, this does not
prove the impossibility of inactive Matter, neither solid
nor extended, which may be the occasion of our having
sense-ideas.

Answer. This supposition in unintelligible : the words
in which it is expressed convey no meaning.

Thirteenth objection. (Sect. 80, 81.) Matter may be an
unknowable Somewhat ', neither substance nor accident, cause
nor effect, spirit nor idea : all the reasonings against
Matter, conceived as something positive, fail, when this
wholly negative notion is maintained.

Answer. This is to use the word 'Matter' as people
use the word 'nothing': Unknowable Somewhat cannot be
distinguished from nothing.

Fourteenth objection. (Sect. 82-84.) Although we cannot,
in opposition to the New Principles, infer scientifically the
existence of Matter, in abstraction from all realising perci
pient life, or form any conception, positive or negative, of
what Matter is ; yet Holy Scripture demands the faith of
every Christian in the independent reality of the material
world.

Answer. The independent reality of the material world
is nowhere affirmed in Scripture.

iii. CONSEQUENCES AND APPLICATIONS OF THE NEW
PRINCIPLES (sect. 85-156).

In this portion of the Treatise, the New Principles, already
guarded against objections, are applied to enlighten and
invigorate final faith, often suffering from the paralysis of
the scepticism produced by materialism ; also to improve
the sciences, including those which relate to Mind, in
man and in God. They are applied ; —

232 EDITORS PREFACE TO THE PRINCIPLES, ETC.

1. To the refutation of Scepticism as to the reality

of the world (sect. 85-91) and God (sect. 92-96) ;

2. To the liberation of thought from the bondage of

unmeaning abstractions (sect. 97-100) ;

3. To the purification of Natural Philosophy, by

making it an interpretation of ideas of sense,
simply in their relations of coexistence and se
quence, according to which they constitute the
Divine Language of Nature (sect. 101-116);

4. To simplify Mathematics, by eliminating infinites

and other empty abstractions (sect. 117-134);

5. To explain and sustain faith in the Immortality

of men (sect. 135-144) ;

6. To explain the belief which each man has in the

existence of other men ; as signified to him in and
through sense-symbolism (sect. 145) ;

7. To vindicate faith in God, who is signified in and

through the sense-symbolism of universal nature
(sect. 146-156).

It was only by degrees that Berkeley's New Principles
attracted attention. A new mode of conceiving the world
we live in, by a young and unknown author, published at a
distance from the centre of English intellectual life, was apt
to be overlooked. In connexion with the Essay on Vision,
however, it drew enough of regard to make Berkeley an
object of interest to the literary world on his first visit to
London, three years after its publication.

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

THOMAS, EARL OF PEMBROKE1, &c.

KNIC.HT OF THE MOST NOBLE ORDER OF THE GARTER, AND
THE LORDS OF HER MAJESTY
HONOURABLE PRIVY COUNCIL

MY LORD,

You will perhaps wonder that an obscure person, who
has not the honour to be known to your lordship, should
presume to address you in this manner. But that a man
who has written something with a design to promote
Useful Knowledge and Religion in the world should
make choice of your lordship for his patron, will not be
thought strange by any one that is not altogether unac
quainted with the present state of the church and learning,
and consequently ignorant how great an ornament and
support you are to both. Yet, nothing could have induced
me to make you this present of my poor endeavours, were

1 Thomas Herbert, eighth Earl Oxford, in 1672 ; succeeded to his

of Pembroke and fifth Earl of Mont- titles in 1683; was sworn of the

gomery, was the correspondent Privy Council in 1689 ; and made

and friend of Locke— who dedicated a Knight of the Garter in 1700.

his famous Essay to him, as a work He filled some of the highest

' having some little correspondence offices in the state, in the reigns

with some parts of that nobler of William and Mary, and of Anne,

and vast system of the sciences He was Lord Lieutenant of Ireland

your lordship has made so new, in 1707, having previously been

exact, and instructive a draft of.' one of the Commissioners by whom

He represents a family renowned the union between England and

in English political and literary Scotland was negotiated. He died

history. He was born in 1656; in January 1733.
was a nobleman of Christ Church,

234 AUTHOR S DEDICATION TO THE PRINCIPLES, ETC.

I not encouraged by that candour and native goodness
which is so bright a part in your lordship's character.
I might add, my lord, that the extraordinary favour and
bounty you have been pleased to shew towards our
Society l gave me hopes you would not be unwilling to
countenance the studies of one of its members. These
considerations determined me to lay this treatise at your
lordship's feet, and the rather because I was ambitious to
have it known that I am with the truest and most profound
respect, on account of that learning and virtue which the
world so justly admires in your lordship,

My Lord,

Your lordship's most humble

and most devoted servant,

GEORGE BERKELEY.

1 Trinity College, Dublin.

THE PREFACE

WHAT I here make public has, after a long and scrupu
lous inquiry1, seemed to me evidently true and not un-
useful to be known ; particularly to those who are tainted
with Scepticism, or want a demonstration of the existence
and immateriality of God, or the natural immortality of
the Soul. Whether it be so or no I am content the reader
should impartially examine ; since I do not think myself
any farther concerned for the success of what I have written
than as it is agreeable to truth. But, to the end this may
not suffer, I make it my request that the reader suspend
his judgment till he has once at least read the whole
through, with that degree of attention and thought which
the subject-matter shall seem to deserve. For, as there
are some passages that, taken by themselves, are very
liable (nor could it be remedied) to gross misinterpretation,
and to be charged with most absurd consequences, which,
nevertheless, upon an entire perusal will appear not to
follow from them ; so likewise, though the whole should
be read over, yet, if this be done transiently, it is very
probable my sense may be mistaken : but to a thinking
reader, I flatter myself it will be throughout clear and
obvious.

As for the characters of novelty and singularity 2 which

1 In his Commonplace Book 2 Cf. Locke, in the ' Epistle

Berkeley seems to refer his specu- Dedicatory' of his Essay. Not-

lations to his boyhood. The con- withstanding the 'novelty' of the

ception of the material world pro- New Principles, viz. negation of

pounded in the following Treatise abstract or unperceived Matter,

was in his view before the publica- Space, Time,Substance, and Power;

tion of the New Tlicory of Vision, and affirmation of Mind, as the

which was intended to prepare the Synthesis, Substance, and Cause

way for it. of all — much in best preceding

236 AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE PRINCIPLES, ETC.

some of the following notions may seem to bear, it is, I
hope, needless to make any apology on that account. He
must surely be either very weak, or very little acquainted
with the sciences, who shall reject a truth that is capable of
demonstration l, for no other reason but because it is newly
known, and contrary to the prejudices of mankind.

Thus much I thought fit to premise, in order to prevent,
if possible, the hasty censures of a sort of men who are
too apt to condemn an opinion before they rightly compre
hend it 2.

philosophy, ancient and modern, to understand his meaning, and

was a dim anticipation of it. especially to avoid confounding the

1 Cf. sect. 6, 22, 24, &c., in illus- ordered ideas or phenomena, ob-
tration of the demonstrative claim jectively presented to our senses,
of Berkeley's initial doctrine. with capricious chimeras of ima-

2 Berkeley entreats his reader, gination.
here and throughout, to take pains

INTRODUCTION

i. PHILOSOPHY being nothingelse but the study of Wisdom
and Truth \ it may with reason be expected that those who
have spent most time and pains in it should enjoy a greater
calm and serenity of mind, a greater clearness and
evidence of knowledge, and be less disturbed with doubts
and difficulties than other men. Yet, so it is, we see the
illiterate bulk of mankind, that walk the high-road of plain
common sense, and are governed by the dictates of nature,
for the most part easy and undisturbed. To them nothing
that is familiar appears unaccountable or difficult to com
prehend. They complain not of any want of evidence
in their senses, and are out of all danger of becoming
Sceptics. But no sooner do we depart from sense and
instinct to follow the light of a superior principle— to reason,
meditate, and reflect on the nature of things, but a thousand
scruples spring up in our minds, concerning those things
which before we seemed fully to comprehend. Prejudices
and errors of sense do from all parts discover themselves
to our view ; and, endeavouring to correct these by reason,
we are insensibly drawn into uncouth paradoxes, difficulties,
and inconsistencies, which multiply and grow upon us as
we advance in speculation ; till at length, having wandered
through many intricate mazes, we find ourselves just
where we were, or, which is worse, sit down in a forlorn
Scepticism 2.

1 ' Philosophy is nothing but the to make latent common sense, or
true knowledge of things.' Locke. common reason, reveal itself in its

2 The purpose of those early genuine integrity. Cf. the closing
essays of Berkeley was to re- sentences in the Third Dialogue bc-
concile philosophy with common tiveen Hylas and Philonous.
sense, by employing reflection

238 AUTHOR'S INTRODUCTION TO THE

2. The cause of this is thought to be the obscurity of
things, or the natural weakness and imperfection of our
understandings. It is said the faculties we have are few,
and those designed by nature for the support and pleasure
of life, and not to penetrate into the inward essence and
constitution of things : besides, the mind of man being
finite, when it treats of things which partake of Infinity, it
is not to be wondered at if it run into absurdities and contra
dictions, out of which it is impossible it should ever extricate
itself; it being of the nature of Infinite not to be compre
hended by that which is finite \

3. But, perhaps, we may be too partial to ourselves in
placing the fault originally in our faculties, and not rather
in the wrong use we make of them. It is a hard thing to
suppose that right deductions from true principles should
ever end in consequences which cannot be maintained or
made consistent. We should believe that God has dealt
more bountifully with the sons of men than to give them a
strong desire for that knowledge which he had placed quite
out of their reach. This were not agreeable to the wonted
indulgent methods of Providence, which, whatever appe
tites it may have implanted in the creatures, doth usually
furnish them with such means as, if rightly made use of,
will not fail to satisfy them. Upon the whole, I am inclined
to think that the far greater part, if not all, of those
difficulties which have hitherto amused philosophers, and
blocked up the way to knowledge, are entirely owing to
ourselves. We have first raised a dust, and then complain
we cannot see.

4. My purpose therefore is, to try if I can discover what
those Principles are which have introduced all that doubt
fulness and uncertainty, those absurdities and contradictions,
into the several sects of philosophy ; insomuch that the
wisest men have thought our ignorance incurable, con
ceiving it to arise from the natural dulness and limitation
of our faculties. And surely it is a work well deserving
our pains to make a strict inquiry concerning the First

1 Cf. Locke's Essay, Introduction, row faculties, which are meant to

sect. 4-7 ; Bk. II. ch. 23, § 12, &c. regulate our lives, not to remove

Locke (who is probably here in all mysteries. See also Descartes,

Berkeley's eye) attributes the per- Principia, I. 26, 27, &c. ; Male-

plexities of philosophy to our nar- branche, Recheir/ie, III. 2.

PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 239

Principles of Human Knowledge ; to sift and examine
them on all sides : especially since there may be some
grounds to suspect that those lets and difficulties, which
stay and embarrass the mind in its search after truth, do
not spring from any darkness and intricacy in the objects,
or natural defect in the understanding, so much as from
false Principles which have been insisted on, and might
have been avoided.

5. How difficult and discouraging soever this attempt
may seem, when I consider what a number of very great
and extraordinary men have gone before me in the like
designs ', yet I am not without some hopes ; upon the
consideration that the largest views are not always the
clearest, and that he who is short-sighted will be obliged
to draw the object nearer, and may, perhaps, by a close
and narrow survey, discern that which had escaped far
better eyes.

6. In order to prepare the mind of the reader for the
easier conceiving what follows, it is proper to premise
somewhat, by way of Introduction, concerning the nature
and abuse of Language. But the unravelling this matter
leads me in some measure to anticipate my design, by
taking notice of what seems to have had a chief part in
rendering speculation intricate and perplexed, and to
have occasioned innumerable errors and difficulties in
almost all parts of knowledge. And that is the opinion
that the mind hath a power of framing abstract ideas or
notions of things2. He who is not a perfect stranger to
the writings and disputes of philosophers must needs

1 His most significant forerun- niatics, sect. 45-48. Also Sin's,
ners were Descartes in his Prin- sect. 323, 335, &c., where he
cipia, and Locke in his Essay. distinguishes Idea in a higher

2 Here 'idea' and 'notion' meaning from his sensuous ideas,
seem to be used convertibly. See As mentioned in my Preface,
sect. 142. Cf. with the argument the third edition of Alciphron,
against abstract ideas, unfolded in published in 1752, the year before
the remainder of the Introduction, Berkeley died, omits the three
Principles, sect. 97-100, 118-132, sections of the Seventh Dialogue
143 ; New Theory of Vision, sect. which repeat the following argu-
122-125; Alciphi-on, Dial. vii. 5-7; ment against abstract ideas.
Defence of Free Thinking in Mathe-

240 AUTHOR S INTRODUCTION TO THE

acknowledge that no small part of them are spent about ab
stract ideas. These are in a more especial manner thought
to be the object of those sciences which go by the name
of logic and metaphysics, and of all that which passes
under the notion of the most abstracted and sublime
learning ; in all which one shall scarce find any question
handled in such a manner as does not suppose their exist
ence in the mind, and that it is well acquainted with them.

7. It is agreed on all hands that the qualities or modes
of things do never really exist each of them apart by
itself, and separated from all others, but are mixed, as
it were, and blended together, several in the same object.
But, we are told, the mind, being able to consider each
quality singly, or abstracted from those other qualities with
which it is united, does by that means frame to itself
abstract ideas. For example, there is conceived by sight an
object extended, coloured, and moved : this mixed or com
pound idea the mind resolving into its simple, constituent
parts, and viewing each by itself, exclusive of the rest, does
frame the abstract ideas of extension, colour, and motion.
Not that it is possible for colour or motion to exist without
extension ; but only that the mind can frame to itself by
abstraction the idea of colour exclusive of extension, and
of motion exclusive of both colour and extension.

8. Again, the mind having observed that in the particular
extensions perceived by sense there is something common
and alike in all, and some other things peculiar, as this or
that figure or magnitude, which distinguish them one from
another, it considers apart, or singles out by itself, that
which is common ; making thereof a most abstract idea of
extension ; which is neither line, surface, nor solid, nor has
any figure or magnitude, but is an idea entirely prescinded
from all these. So likewise the mind, by leaving out of the
particular colours perceived by sense that which distin
guishes them one from another, and retaining that only
which is common to all, makes an idea of colour in abstract ;
which is neither red, nor blue, nor white, nor any other
determinate colour. And, in like manner, by considering
motion abstractedly, not only from the body moved, but
likewise from the figure it describes, and all particular
directions and velocities, the abstract idea of motion is

PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 241

framed ; which equally corresponds to all particular motions
whatsoever that may be perceived by sense.

9. And as the mind frames to itself abstract ideas of
qualities or modes, so does it, by the same precision, or
mental separation, attain abstract ideas of the more com
pounded beings which include several coexistent qualities.
For example, the mind having observed that Peter, James,
and John resemble each other in certain common agree
ments of shape and other qualities, leaves out of the
complex or compound idea it has of Peter, James, and any
other particular man, that which is peculiar to each,
retaining only what is common to all, and so makes an
abstract idea, wherein all the particulars equally partake ;
abstracting entirely from and cutting off all those circum
stances and differences which might determine it to any
particular existence. And after this manner it is said we
come by the abstract idea of man, or, if you please, human
ity, or human nature ; wherein it is true there is included
colour, because there is no man but has some colour, but
then it can be neither white, nor black, nor any particular
colour, because there is no one particular colour wherein
all men partake. So likewise there is included stature,
but then it is neither tall stature, nor low stature, nor yet
middle stature, but something abstracted from all these.
And so of the rest. Moreover, there being a great variety
of other creatures that partake in some parts, but not all, of
the complex idea of man, the mind, leaving out those parts
which are peculiar to men, and retaining those only which
are common to all the living creatures, frames the idea of
animal '; which abstracts not only from all particular men,
but also all birds, beasts, fishes, and insects. The consti
tuent parts of the abstract idea of animal are body, life,
sense, and spontaneous motion. By body is meant body
without any particular shape or figure, there being no one
shape or figure common to all animals ; without covering,
either of hair, or feathers, or scales, &c., nor yet naked :
hair, feathers, scales, and nakedness being the distinguish
ing properties of particular animals, and for that reason
left out of the abstract idea. Upon the same account, the
spontaneous motion must be neither walking, nor flying,
nor creeping ; it is nevertheless a motion/ but what that
motion is it is not easy to conceive.

BERKELEY : FRASER. I. R

242 AUTHOR'S INTRODUCTION TO THE

10. Whether others have this wonderful faculty of
abstracting their ideas, they best can tell \ For myself, [2 1
dare be confident I have it not.] I find indeed I have
a faculty of imagining, or representing to myself, the ideas
of those particular things I have perceived, and of variously
compounding and dividing them. I can imagine a man
with two heads ; or the upper parts of a man joined to the
body of a horse. I can consider the hand, the eye, the
nose, each by itself abstracted or separated from the rest of
the body. But then whatever hand or eye I imagine3, it
must have some particular shape and colour1. Likewise
the idea of man that I frame to myself must be either of
a white, or a black, or a tawny, a straight, or a crooked,
a tall, or a low, or a middle-sized man. I cannot by any
effort of thought conceive the abstract idea above described.
And it is equally impossible for me to form the abstract
idea of motion distinct from the body moving, and which
is neither swift nor slow, curvilinear nor rectilinear; and
the like may be said of all other abstract general ideas
whatsoever. To be plain, I own myself able to abstract in
one sense, as when I consider some particular parts or
qualities separated from others, with which, though they
are united in some object, yet it is possible they may really
exist without them. But I deny that I can abstract from
one another, or conceive separately, those qualities which
it is impossible should exist so separated ; or that I can
frame a general notion, by abstracting from particulars in the
manner aforesaid — which last are the two proper accepta
tions of abstraction. And there is ground to think most
men will acknowledge themselves to be in my case. The
generality of men which are simple and illiterate never
pretend to abstract notions4. It is said they are difficult,
and not to be attained without pains and study. We may

1 As in Derodon's Logica, Pt. II. ous imagination ; and his argu-

c.6, 7 ; Philosophia Contracta, I. i. §§ ment is that none of these can be

7-11 ; and Gassendi, Leg. Instit., an abstraction. We can neither

I. 8 ; also Cudworth, Eternal and perceive nor imagine what is not

Immutable Morality, Bk. IV. concrete and part of a succession.

'2 Omitted in second edition. 4 'abstract notions' — here used

3 We must remember that what convertibly with 'abstract ideas.'

Berkeley intends by an idea is either Cf. Principles, sect. 89 and 142. on

a percept of sense, or a sensu- the special meaning of notion.

PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 243

therefore reasonably conclude that, if such there be, they
are confined only to the learned.

ii. I proceed to examine what can be alleged in defence
of the doctrine of abstraction *, and try if I can discover
what it is that inclines the men of speculation to embrace
an opinion so remote from common sense as that seems to
be. There has been a late [2 excellent and] deservedly
esteemed philosopher3 who, no doubt, has given it very
much countenance, by seeming to think the having abstract
general ideas is what puts the widest difference in point of
understanding betwixt man and beast. ' The having of
general ideas/ saith he, ' is that which puts a perfect dis
tinction betwixt man and brutes, and is an excellency which
the faculties of brutes do by no means attain unto. For
it is evident we observe no foot-steps in them of making
use of general signs for universal ideas ; from which we
have reason to imagine that they have not the faculty of
abstracting, or making general ideas, since they have no
use of words, or any other general signs.' And a little
after : — ' Therefore, I think, we may suppose, that it is in
this that the species of brutes are discriminated from man :
and it is that proper difference wherein they are wholly
separated, and which at last widens to so wide a distance.
For if they have any ideas at all, and are not bare machines
(as some would have them 4), we cannot deny them to have
some reason. It seems as evident to me that they do,
some of them, in certain instances, reason, as that they
have sense ; but it is only in particular ideas, just as they
receive them from their senses. They are the best of them
tied up within those narrow bounds, and have not (as I
think) the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of abstraction.'
— Essay on Human Understanding, B. II. ch. n. § 10 and
ii. I readily agree with this learned author, that the facul
ties of brutes can by no means attain to abstraction. But
then if this be made the distinguishing property of that sort

1 Supposed by Berkeley to mean, the phenomena in which it is

that we can imagine, in abstraction realised in sense,

from all phenomena presented in '2 Omitted in second edition,

concrete experience, e. g. imagine :i Locke.

existence, in abstraction from all 4 Descartes, who regarded brutes

phenomena in which it manifests it- as (sentient?) machines,
self to us ; or matter, stripped of all

R 2

244

of animals, I fear a great many of those that pass for men
must be reckoned into their number. The reason that is
here assigned, why we have no grounds to think brutes
have abstract general ideas, is, that we observe in them no
use of words, or any other general signs ; which is built on
this supposition, to wit, that the making use of words implies
having general ideas. From which it follows that men who
use language are able to abstract or generalize their ideas.
That this is the sense and arguing of the author will
further appear by his answering the question he in another
place puts : 'Since all things that exist are only particulars,
how come we by general terms ? ' His answer is : 'Words
become general by being made the signs of general ideas.'
— Essay on Human Understanding, B. III. ch. 3. § 6. But
it seems that a word ' becomes general by being made the
sign, not of an abstract general idea, but of several particu
lar ideas, any one of which it indifferently suggests to the
mind. For example, when it is said 'the change of motion
is proportional to the impressed force/ or that 'whatever
has extension is divisible/ these propositions are to be
understood of motion and extension in general ; and
nevertheless it will not follow that they suggest to my
thoughts an idea'2 of motion without a body moved, or any
determinate direction and velocity ; or that I must conceive
an abstract general idea of extension, which is neither line,
surface, nor solid, neither great nor small, black, white,
nor red, nor of any other determinate colour. It is only
implied that whatever particular motion I consider, whether
it be swift or slow, perpendicular, horizontal, or oblique,
or in whatever object, the axiom concerning it holds
equally true. As does the other of every particular exten
sion ; it matters not whether line, surface, or solid, whether
of this or that magnitude or figure 3.

1 ' To this I cannot assent, being which that particular idea exernpli-

of opinion that a word/ &c. — in fies, and which, as he shews,

first edition. may be signified by a correspond-

~ 'an idea/ i.e. a concrete men- ing word. All ideas (in Berkeley's

tal picture. confined meaning of 'idea') are

3 So that ' generality ' in an idea particular. We rise above particu-

is, our 'consideration ' of a particu- lar ideas by an intellectual appre-

lar idea (e. g. a ' particular motion ' hension of their relations ; not b}'

or a ' particular extension ') not per forming abstract pictures, which are

se, but under general relations, contradictory absurdities.

PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 245

12. By observing how ideas become general, we may
the better judge how words are made so. And here it is
to be noted that I do not deny absolutely there are general
ideas, but only that there are any abstract general ideas. For,
in the passages we have quoted wherein there is mention
of general ideas, it is always supposed that they are formed
by abstraction, after the manner set forth in sections 8 and
9 '. Now, if we will annex a meaning to our words, and
speak only of what we can conceive, I believe we shall
acknowledge that an idea, which considered in itself is
particular, becomes general, by being made to represent or
stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort 2. To
make this plain by an example. Suppose a geometrician
is demonstrating the method of cutting a line in two equal
parts. He draws, for instance, a black line of an inch in
length : this, which in itself is a particular line, is never
theless with regard to its signification general ; since, as it
is there used, it represents all particular lines whatsoever ;
so that what is demonstrated of it is demonstrated of all
lines, or, in other words, of a line in general3. And, as
that particular line becomes general by being made a sign,
so the name line, which taken absolutely is particular, by
being a sign, is made general. And as the former owes its
generality, not to its being the sign of an abstract or
general line, but of all particular right lines that may
possibly exist, so the latter must be thought to derive its
generality from the same cause, namely, the various par
ticular lines which it indifferently denotes.

13. To give the reader a yet clearer view of the nature
of abstract ideas, and the uses they are thought necessary
to, I shall add one more passage out of the Essay on
Human Understanding, which is as follows : — ' Abstract
ideas are not so obvious or easy to children, or the yet
unexercised mind, as particular ones. If they seem so to
grown men, it is only because by constant and familiar use

1 Locke is surely misconceived. this, although he expresses his
He does not say, as Berkeley seems meaning in ambiguous words ?
to suppose that in forming 'ab- 3 It is a particular idea, but con-
stract ideaL, we are forming ab- sidercd relatively — a significant
stract mental images — pictures in particular idea, in other words,
the mind that are not individual We realise our notions in ex-
pictures, amples, and these must be con-

- Does Locke intend more than crete.

246 AUTHOR'S INTRODUCTION TO THE

they are made so. For, when we nicely reflect upon
them, we shall find that general ideas are fictions and
contrivances of the mind, that carry difficulty with them,
and do not so easily offer themselves as we are apt to
imagine. For example, does it not require some pains and
skill to form the general idea of a triangle (which is yet
none of the most abstract, comprehensive, and difficult);
for it must be neither oblique nor rectangle, neither
equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon ; but all and none of
these at once? In effect, it is something imperfect, that
cannot exist ; an idea ' wherein some parts of several
different and inconsistent ideas are put together. It is
true the mind, in this imperfect state, has need of such
ideas, and makes all the haste to them it can, for the
conveniency of communication and enlargement of know
ledge ; to both which it is naturally very much inclined.
But yet one has reason to suspect such ideas l are marks of
our imperfection. At least this is enough to shew that
the most abstract and general ideas are not those that the
mind is first and most easily acquainted with, nor such
as its earliest knowledge is conversant about.' — B. iv. ch. 7.
§ 9. If any man has the faculty of framing in his mind such
an idea of a triangle as is here described, it is in vain to
pretend to dispute him out of it, nor would I go about it.
All I desire is that the reader would fully and certainly
inform himself wrhether he has such an idea or no. And
this, methinks, can be no hard task for any one to perform.
What more easy than for any one to look a little into his
own thoughts, and there try whether he has, or can attain
to have, an idea that shall correspond with the description
that is here given of the general idea of a triangle — which
is neither oblique nor rectangle, equilateral, equicrural nor
scalenon, but all and none of these at once ?

14. Much is here said of the difficulty that abstract ideas
carry with them, and the pains and skill requisite to the
forming them. And it is on all hands agreed that there is

1 i.e. ' ideas ' in Locke's mean- intellectually, when Locke calls
ing of idea, under which he com- them abstract, general, or uni-
prehends, not only the particular versal. Omniscience in its all-
ideas of sense and imagination — comprehensive intuition may not
Berkeley's ' ideas ' — but these con- require, or even admit, such general
sidered relatively, and so seen ideas.

PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 247

need of great toil and labour of the mind, to emancipate
our thoughts from particular objects, and raise them to
those sublime speculations that are conversant about
abstract ideas. From all which the natural consequence
should seem to be, that so difficult a thing as the forming
abstract ideas was not necessary for communication, which
is so easy and familiar to all sorts of men. But, we are
told, if they seem obvious and easy to grown men, it is
only because by constant and familiar use they are made
so. Now, I would fain know at what time it is men are
employed in surmounting that difficulty, and furnishing
themselves with those necessary helps for discourse. It
cannot be when they are grown up ; for then it seems they
are not conscious of any such painstaking. It remains
therefore to be the business of their childhood. And
surely the great and multiplied labour of framing abstract
notions1 will be found a hard task for that tender age. Is
it not a hard thing to imagine that a couple of children
cannot prate together of their sugar-plums and rattles and
the rest of their little trinkets, till they have first tacked
together numberless inconsistencies, and so framed in their
minds abstract general ideas, and annexed them to every
common name they make use of?

15. Nor do I think them a whit more needful for the
enlargement of knowledge than for communication. It is, I
know, a point much insisted on, that all knowledge and
demonstration are about universal notions, to which I fully
agree. But then it does not appear to me that those notions
are formed by abstraction in the manner premised — uni
versality, so far as I can comprehend, not consisting in the
absolute, positive nature or conception of anything, but in
the relation it bears to the particulars signified or repre
sented by it ; by virtue whereof it is that things, names, or
notions 2, being in their own nature particular, are rendered
universal. Thus, when I demonstrate any proposition
concerning triangles, it is supposed that I have in view the

1 Here and in what follows, attached to the term, when he con-

' abstract notion' 'universal notion,' trasted it with idea,

instead of abstract idea. Notion 2 ' notions,' again synonymous

seems to be here a synonym for with ideas, which are all particular

idea, and not taken in the special or concrete, in his meaning of idea,

meaning which he afterwards when he uses it strictly.

AUTHOR'S INTRODUCTION TO THE

universal idea of a triangle : which ought not to be
understood as if I could frame an idea l of a triangle which
was neither equilateral, nor scalenon, nor equicrural ; but
only that the particular triangle I consider, whether of this
or that sort it matters not, doth equally stand for and re
present all rectilinear triangles whatsoever, and is in that
sense universal. All which seems very plain and not to
include any difficulty in it2.

16. But here it will be demanded, how we can know any
proposition to be true of all particular triangles, except we
have first seen it demonstrated of the abstract idea of
a triangle which equally agrees to all ? For, because
a property may be demonstrated to agree to some one
particular triangle, it will not thence follow that it equally
belongs to any other triangle which in all respects is not
the same with it. For example, having demonstrated that
the three angles of an isosceles rectangular triangle are
equal to two right ones, I cannot therefore conclude this
affection agrees to all other triangles which have neither a
right angle nor two equal sides. It seems therefore that,
to be certain this proposition is universally true, we must
either make a particular demonstration for every particular
triangle, which is impossible ; or once for all demonstrate
it of the abstract idea of a triangle, in which all the
particulars do indifferently partake, and by which they are
all equally represented. To which I answer, that, though the
idea I have in view" whilst I make the demonstration be,
for instance, that of an isosceles rectangular triangle whose
sides are of a determinate length, I may nevertheless be
certain it extends to all other rectilinear triangles, of what
sort or bigness soever. And that because neither the right
angle, nor the equality, nor determinate length of the sides
are at all concerned in the demonstration. It is true the
diagram I have in view:! includes all these particulars; but
then there is not the least mention made of them in the
proof of the proposition. It is not said the three angles are
equal to two right ones, because one of them is a right

1 idea, i.e. individual mental pic- ledge, and without which experi-

ture. ence could not cohere.

In all this he takes no account 3 'have in view,' i.e. actually

of the intellectual relations neces- realise in imagination,
sarily embodied in concrete know-

PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 249

angle, or because the sides comprehending it are of the
same length. Which sufficiently shews that the right angle
might have been oblique, and the sides unequal, and for all
that the demonstration have held good. And for this
reason it is that I conclude that to be true of any obliquan-
gular or scalenon which I had demonstrated of a parti
cular right-angled equicrural triangle, and not because
I demonstrated the proposition of the abstract idea of a
triangle. fl And here it must be acknowledged that a man
may consider a figure merely as triangular ; without
attending to the particular qualities of the angles, or rela
tions of the sides. So far lie may abstract. But this will
never prove that he can frame an abstract, general,
inconsistent idea of a triangle. In like manner we may
consider Peter so far forth as man, or so far forth as
animal, without framing the forementioned abstract idea,
either of man or of animal ; inasmuch as all that is
perceived is not considered.)

17. It were an endless as well as an useless thing to
trace the Schoolmen, those great masters of abstraction,
through all the manifold inextricable labyrinths of error
and dispute which their doctrine of abstract natures and
notions seems to have led them into. What bickerings
and controversies, and what a learned dust have been
raised about those matters, and what mighty advantage has
been from thence derived to mankind, are things at this
day too clearly known to need being insisted on. And it
had been well if the ill effects of that doctrine were confined
to those only who make the most avowed profession of it.
When men consider the great pains, industry, and parts
that have for so many ages been laid out on the cultivation
and advancement of the sciences, and that notwithstanding
all this the far greater part of them remain full of darkness
and uncertainty, and disputes that are like never to have
an end ; and even those that are thought to be supported
by the most clear and cogent demonstrations contain in
them paradoxes which are perfectly irreconcilable to the
understandings of men; and that, taking all together,
a very small portion of them does supply any real benefit
to mankind, otherwise than by being an innocent diversion

' What follows, to the end of this section, was added in the second or
1734 edition.

250 AUTHOR'S INTRODUCTION TO THE

and amusement1— I say, the consideration of all this is apt
to throw them into a despondency and perfect contempt of
all study. But this may perhaps cease upon a view of the
false Principles that have obtained in the world ; amongst
all which there is none, methinks, hath a more wide
influence2 over the thoughts of speculative men than this
of abstract general ideas.

18. I come now to consider the source of this prevailing
notion, and that seems to me to be language. And surely
nothing of less extent than reason itself could have been
the source of an opinion so universally received. The
truth of this appears as from other reasons so also from
the plain confession of the ablest patrons of abstract
ideas, who acknowledge that they are made in order to
naming ; from which it is clear consequence that if there
had been no such thing as speech or universal signs,
there never had been any thought of abstraction. See
B. iii. ch. 6. § 39, and elsewhere of the Essay on Human
Understanding.

Let us examine the manner wherein Words have con
tributed to the origin of that mistake. — First then, it is
thought that every name has, or ought to have, one only
precise and settled signification ; which inclines men to think
there are certain abstract determinate ideas that constitute
the true and only immediate signification of each general
name; and that it is by the mediation of these abstract ideas
that a general name comes to signify any particular thing.
Whereas, in truth, there is no such thing as one precise
and definite signification annexed to any general name,
they all signifying indifferently a great number of particular
ideas. All which does evidently follow from what has
been already said, and will clearly appear to any one by a
little reflexion. To this it will be objected that every name
that has a definition is thereby restrained to one certain
signification. For example, a triangle is defined to be ' a
plain surface comprehended by three right lines ' ; by which
that name is limited to denote one certain idea and no
other. To which I answer, that in the definition it is not

1 So Bacon in many passages of - 'wide influence,' — 'wide and

his De Augnicntis Scicntianii-n and extended sway' — in first edition.
Novtttn Oi'ganiim.

PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 251

said whether the surface be great or small, black or white,
nor whether the sides are long or short, equal or unequal,
nor with what angles they are inclined to each other ; in
all which there may be great variety, and consequently
there is no one settled idea which limits the signification
of the word triangle. It is one thing for to keep a name
constantly to the same definition, and another to make it
stand everywhere for the same idea ' : the one is necessary,
the other useless and impracticable.

19. But, to give a farther account how words came to
produce the doctrine of abstract ideas, it must be observed
that it is a received opinion that language has no other end
but the communicating ideas, and that every significant
name stands for an idea. This being so, and it being withal
certain that names which yet are not thought altogether
insignificant do not always mark out particular conceivable
ideas, it is straightway concluded that they stand for abstract
notions. That there are many names in use amongst specu
lative men which do not always suggest to others deter
minate, particular ideas, or in truth anything at all, is what
nobody will deny. And a little attention will discover that
it is not necessary (even in the strictest reasonings) that
significant names which stand for ideas should, every time
they are used, excite in the understanding the ideas they
are made to stand for : in reading and discoursing, names
being for the most part used as letters are in Algebra, in
which, though a particular quantity be marked by each
letter, yet to proceed right it is not requisite that in every
step each letter suggest to your thoughts that particular
quantity it was appointed to stand for2.

20. Besides, the communicating of ideas marked by words
is not the chief and only end of language, as is commonly
supposed. There are other ends, as the raising of some
passion, the exciting to or deterring from an action, the
putting the mind in some particular disposition ; to which
the former is in many cases barely subservient, and some
times entirely omitted, when these can be obtained with-

1 'idea,' i.e. individual datum in his Elements, vol. I. ch. 4, § i,

of sense or of imagination. on our habit of using language

" See Leibniz on Symbolical without realising, in individual

Knowledge (Opera Philosophica, examples or ideas, the meanings of

pp. 79, 80, Erdmann). and Stewart the common terms used.

252 AUTHOR'S INTRODUCTION TO THE

out it, as I think doth ! not unfrequently happen in the
familiar use of language. I entreat the reader to reflect
with himself, and see if it doth not often happen, either in
hearing or reading a discourse, that the passions of fear,
love, hatred, admiration, and disdain, and the like, arise
immediately in his mind upon the perception of certain
words, without any ideas - coming between. At first,
indeed, the words might have occasioned ideas2 that were
fitting to produce those emotions ; but, if I mistake not, it
will be found that, when language is once grown familiar,
the hearing of the sounds or sight of the characters is oft
immediately attended with those passions which at first
were wont to be produced by the intervention of ideas2
that are now quite omitted. May we not, for example, be
affected with the promise of a good thing, though we have
not an idea of what it is? Or is not the being threatened
with danger sufficient to excite a dread, though we think
not of any particular evil likely to befal us, nor yet frame
to ourselves an idea of danger in abstract ? If any one
shall join ever so little reflection of his own to what has
been said, I believe that it will evidently appear to him that
general names are often used in the propriety of language
without the speakers designing them for marks of ideas2 in
his own, which he would have them raise in the mind of
the hearer. Even proper names themselves do not seem
always spoken with a design to bring into our view the
ideas '2 of those individuals that are supposed to be marked
by them. For example, when a schoolman tells me
' Aristotle hath said it,' all I conceive he means by it is to
dispose me to embrace his opinion with the deference and
submission which custom has annexed to that name. And
this effect may be so instantly produced in the minds of
those who are accustomed to resign their judgment to
authority of that philosopher, as it is impossible any idea
either of his person, writings, or reputation should go before.
[3 So close and immediate a connexion may custom establish

1 'doth' — 'does,' here and else- sight of a verbal sign may do duty
where in first edition. for the concrete idea in which

2 ' ideas,' i. e. representations in the notion signified by the word
imagination of any of the indi- might be exemplified.

vidual objects to which the names 3 This sentence is omitted in the

arc applicable. The sound or second edition.

PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 253

betwixt the very word Aristotle 1 and the motions of assent
and reverence in the minds of some men.] Innumerable
examples of this kind maybe given, but why should I insist
on those things which every one's experience will, I doubt
not, plentifully suggest unto him ?

21. We have, I think, shewn the impossibility of Abstract
Ideas. We have considered what has been said for them
by their ablest patrons ; and endeavoured to shew they are
of no use for those ends to which they are thought neces
sary. And lastly, we have traced them to the source
from whence they flow, which appears evidently to be
Language.

It cannot be denied that words are of excellent use,
in that by their means all that stock of knowledge which
has been purchased by the joint labours of inquisitive
men in all ages and nations may be drawn into the view
and made the possession of one single person. But [2 at the
same time it must be owned that] most parts of knowledge
have been [3 so] strangely perplexed and darkened by the
abuse of words, and general ways of speech wherein they
are delivered, :! that it may almost be made a question
whether language has contributed more to the hindrance
or advancement of the sciences]. Since therefore words
are so apt to impose on the understanding, [3 I am resolved
in my inquiries to make as little use of them as possibly I
can : j whatever ideas I consider, I shall endeavour to take
them bare and naked into my view ; keeping out of my
thoughts, so far as I am able, those names which long
and constant use hath so strictly united with them. From
which I may expect to derive the following advantages : —

22. First, I shall be sure to get clear of all controversies
purely verbal, the springing up of which weeds in almost all
the sciences has been a main hindrance to the growth of
true and sound knowledge. Secondly, this seems to be a
sure way to extricate myself out of that fine and subtle net

1 Elsewhere he mentions Aris- notions of the utmost universality ;

totle as ' certainly a great admirer for they are the most remote from

and promoter of the doctrine of sense. Metaph., Bk. I. ch. 2.

abstraction,' and quotes his state- - Added in second edition,

ment that there is hardly anything :' Omitted in second edition,
so incomprehensible to men as

254 AUTHOR'S INTRODUCTION TO THE

of abstract ideas, which has so miserably perplexed and
entangled the minds of men ; and that with this peculiar
circumstance, that by how much the finer and more curious
was the wit of any man, by so much the deeper was he
likely to be ensnared and faster held therein. Thirdly, so
long as I confine my thoughts to my own ideas T, divested
of words, I do not see how I can easily be mistaken. The
objects I consider, I clearly and adequately know. I can
not be deceived in thinking I have an idea which I have
not. It is not possible for me to imagine that any of my own
ideas are alike or unlike that are not truly so. To discern the
agreements or disagreements there are between my ideas,
to see what ideas are included in any compound idea and
what not, there is nothing more requisite than an atten
tive perception of what passes in my own understanding.

23. But the attainment of all these advantages does pre
suppose an entire deliverance from the deception of words ;
which I dare hardly promise myself, so difficult a thing it is
to dissolve an union so early begun, and confirmed by so
long a habit as that betwixt words and ideas. Which diffi
culty seems to have been very much increased by the
doctrine of abstraction. For, so long as men thought
abstract ideas were annexed to their words, it does not
seem strange that they should use words for ideas ; it being
found an impracticable thing to lay aside the word, and retain
the abstract idea in the mind ; which in itself was perfectly
inconceivable. This seems to me the principal cause why
those who have so emphatically recommended to others the
laying aside all use of words in their meditations, and con
templating their bare ideas, have yet failed to perform it
themselves. Of late many have been very sensible of the
absurd opinions and insignificant disputes which grow out
of the abuse of words. And, in order to remedy these evils,
they advise well 2, that we attend to the ideas signified, and
draw off our attention from the words which signify them 3.

1 ' my own ideas/ i. e. the con- hinder the due tracing of our ideas,
crete phenomena which I can and finding out their relations, and
realise as perceptions of sense, agreements or disagreements one
or in imagination. with another, has been, I suppose,

2 He probably refers to Locke. the ill use of words. It is im-

3 According to Locke, ' that possible that men should ever
which has most contributed to truly seek, or certainly discover,

PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 255

But, how good soever this advice may be they have given
others, it is plain they could not have a due regard to it
themselves, so long as they thought the only immediate use
of words was to signify ideas, and that the immediate sig
nification of every general name was a determinate abstract
idea.

24. But these being known to be mistakes, a man mav
with greater ease prevent his being imposed on by words.
He that knows he has no other than particular ideas, will
not puzzle himself in vain to find out and conceive the
abstract idea annexed to any name. And he that knows
names do not always stand for ideas * will spare himself the
labour of looking for ideas where there are none to be had.
It were, therefore, to be wished that every one would use
his utmost endeavours to obtain a clear view of the ideas he
would consider ; separating from them all that dress and
incumbrance of words which so much contribute to blind
the judgment and divide the attention. In vain do we
extend our view into the heavens and pry into the entrails
of the earth, in vain do we consult the writings of learned
men and trace the dark footsteps of antiquity. We need
only draw the curtain of words, to behold the fairest tree
of knowledge, whose fruit is excellent, and within the reach
of our hand.

25. Unless we take care to clear the First Principles of
Knowledge from the embarras and delusion of Words, we
may make infinite reasonings upon them to no purpose ;
we may draw consequences from consequences, and be
never the wiser. The farther we go, we shall only lose
ourselves the more irrecoverably, and be the deeper en
tangled in difficulties and mistakes. Whoever therefore
designs to read the following sheets, I entreat him that he

the agreement or disagreement of avoided thereby a great part of

ideas themselves, whilst their that perplexity, puddering, and

thoughts flutter about, or stick confusion which has so much

only in sounds of doubtful and hindered men's progress in other

uncertain significations. Mathema- parts of knowledge.' Essay, Bk. IV7.

ticians, abstracting their thoughts ch. 3, § 30. See also Bk. III. ch.

from names, and accustoming 10, IT.

themselves to set before their ' General names involve in their

minds the ideas themselves that signification intellectual relations

they would consider, and not among ideas or phenomena; but the

sounds instead of them, have relations, per te, are unimaginable.

256 AUTHOR'S INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES, ETC.

would make my words the occasion of his own thinking, and
endeavour to attain the same train of thoughts in reading
that I had in writing them. By this means it will be easy
for him to discover the truth or falsity of what I say. He
will be out of all danger of being deceived by my words.
And I do not see how he can be led into an error by con
sidering his own naked, undisguised ideas1.

1 The rough draft of the Intro
duction, prepared two years before
the publication of the Principles
(see Appendix, vol. Ill), should
be compared with the published
version. He there tells that i there
was a time when, being bantered
and abused by words/ he ' did
not in the least doubt ' that he
was 'able to abstract his ideas';
adding that ' after a strict survey
of my abilities, I not only dis
covered my own deficiency on
this point, but also cannot con
ceive it possible that such a power
should be even in the most perfect
and exalted understanding.' What
he thus pronounces ' impossible.' is
a sensuous perception or imagina

tion of an intellectual relation, as to
which most thinkers would agree
with him. But in so arguing, he
seems apt to discard the intellectual
relations themselves that are neces
sarily embodied in experience.

David Hume refers thus to Berke
ley's doctrine about ' abstract
ideas' :— ' A great philosopher has
asserted that all general ideas are
nothing but particularones annexed
to a certain term, which gives them
a more extensive signification. I
look upon this to be one of the
greatest and most valuable dis
coveries that has been made of
late years in the republic of letters.'
; Treatise of H. N. Pt. I, sect. 7.)

OF THE

PRINCIPLES

OF

H U M A N KNOWLEDGE

PART FIRST

i. IT is evident to any one who takes a survey of the
objects of human knowledge, that they are either ideas
actually imprinted on the senses ; or else such as are
perceived by attending to the passions and operations of
the mind ; or lastly, ideas formed by help of memory and
imagination — either compounding, dividing, or barely re
presenting those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways.
By sight I have the ideas of light and colours, with their
several degrees and variations. By touch I perceive hard
and soft, heat and cold, motion and resistance ; and of all
these more and less either as to quantity or degree.
Smelling furnishes me with odours ; the palate with tastes ;
and hearing conveys sounds to the mind in all their variety
of tone and composition \

1 This resembles Locke's account in this external and internal ex-

of the ideas with which human pcrience are, with the help of

knowledge is concerned. They memory and imagination, elabor-

are all originally presented to the ated by the human understanding

senses, or got by reflexion upon in ways innumerable, true and false,

the passions and acts of the mind ; See Locke's Essay, Bk. II, ch. i,

and the materials contributed §§ 1-5; ch. 10, n, 12.

BERKELEY : PHASER. I S

OF THE PRINCIPLES [PART I

And as several of these are observed to accompany each
other, they come to be marked by one name, and so to be
reputed as one thing. Thus, for example, a certain colour,
taste, smell, figure and consistence having been observed
to go together, are accounted one distinct thing, signified
by the name apple ; other collections of ideas constitute a
stone, a tree, a book, and the like sensible things ; which
as they are pleasing or disagreeable excite the passions of
love, hatred, joy, grief, and so forth \

2. But, besides all that endless variety of ideas or
objects of knowledge, there is likewise Something which
knows or perceives them ; and exercises divers operations,
as willing, imagining, remembering, about them. This
perceiving, active being is what I call mind, spirit, soul,
or myself. By which words I do not denote any one of my
ideas, but a thing entirely distinct from them, wherein
they exist, or, which is the same thing, whereby they are
perceived ; for the existence of an idea consists in being
perceived 2.

3. That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas
formed by the imagination, exist without the mind is
what everybody will allow. And to me it seems no less
evident that the various sensations or ideas imprinted on
the Sense, however blended or combined together (that is,
whatever objects they compose), cannot exist otherwise
than in a mind perceiving them3. I think an intuitive
knowledge may be obtained of this, by any one that shall
attend to what is meant by the term exist when applied to

1 The ideas or phenomena of from ideas or perceptions, in which

which we are percipient in our they exist and are perceived, and

five senses make their appear- on which they ultimately depend,

ance, not isolated, but in individual Spirit, intelligent and active, pre-

masses, constituting the things, that supposed with its implicates in

occupy their respective places in ideas, thus becomes the basis of

perceived ambient space. It is as Berkeley's philosophy. Is this

qualities of things that the ideas subjective idealism only ? Locke

or phenomena of sense arise in appears in sect, i, Descartes, if not

human experience. Kant by anticipation, in sect. 2.

- This is an advance upon the 3 This sentence expresses Berke-

language of the Commonplace Book, ley's New Principle, which filled

in which 'mind' is spoken of as only his thoughts in the Commonplace

a ' congeries of perceptions.' Here Book. Note 'in a mind,' not

it is something 'entirely distinct' necessarily in my mind.

PART l] OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 259

sensible things *. The table I write on I say exists ; that
is, I see and feel it : and if I were out of my study I should
say it existed ; meaning thereby that if I was in my study
I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does
perceive it. There was an odour, that is, it was smelt ;
there was a sound, that is, it was heard ; a colour or figure,
and it was perceived by sight or touch. This is all that I
can understand by these and the like expressions -. For
as to what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking
things, without any relation to their being perceived, that is
to me perfectly unintelligible. Their cssc is pcrcipi; nor is
it possible they should have any existence out of the minds
or thinking things which perceive them !.

4. It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst
men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all
sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real 4,
distinct from their being perceived by the understanding.
But, with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever
this Principle may be entertained in the world, yet who
ever shall find in his heart to call it in question may, if I
mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction.
For, what are the forementioned objects but the things we
perceive by sense ? and what do we perceive besides our
own •"' ideas or sensations ? and is it not plainly repugnant
that any one of these, or any combination of them, should
exist unperceived ?

5. If we throughly examine this tenet6 it will, perhaps,

1 That is to say, one has only to or self-evident.

put concrete meaning into the terms 4 Mark that it is the 'natural or

existence and reality, in order to have real existence 'of the material world,

' an intuitive knowledge ' that mat- in the absertce of alJ realising Spirit,

ter depends for its real existence that Berkeley insists is impossible

on percipient spirit. — meaningless.

- In other words, the things of "' 'our own' — yet not exclusively

sense become real, only in the con- mine. They depend for their reality

crete experience of living mind, upon a percipient, not on my per-

which gives them the only reality ception.

we can conceive or have any sort 6 ' this tenet,' i. c. that the con-

of concern with. Extinguish Spirit crete material world could still be a

and the material world necessarily reality after the annihilation of all

ceases to be real. realising spiritual life in the universe

" That esse is percipi is Berkeley's — divine or other,
initial Principle, called 'intuitive'

S 2

260 OF THE PRINCIPLES [PART I

be found at bottom to depend on the doctrine of abstract
ideas. For can there be a nicer strain of abstraction than
to distinguish the existence of sensible objects from their
being perceived, so as to conceive them existing unper-
ceived l ? Light and colours, heat and cold, extension and
figures— in a word the things we see and feel — what are
they but so many sensations, notions2, ideas, or impres
sions on the sense ? and is it possible to separate, even in
thought, any of these from perception ? For my part, I
might as easily divide a thing from itself. I may, indeed,
divide in my thoughts, or conceive apart from each other,
those things which perhaps I never perceived by sense
so divided. Thus, I imagine the trunk of a human body
without the limbs, or conceive the smell of a rose without
thinking on the rose itself. So far, I will not deny, I can
abstract ; if that may properly be called abstraction which
extends only to the conceiving separately such objects as
it is possible may really exist or be actually perceived
asunder. But my conceiving or imagining power does not
extend beyond the possibility of real existence or percep
tion. Hence, as it is impossible for me to see or feel
anything without an actual sensation of that thing, so is
it impossible for me to conceive in my thoughts any
sensible thing or object distinct from the sensation or percep
tion of it. [a In truth, the object and the sensation are the
same thing, and cannot therefore be abstracted from each
other.]

6. Some truths there are so near and obvious to the
mind that a man need only open his eyes to see them.
Such I take this important one to be, viz. that all the choir
of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word all those
bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world,
have not any subsistence without a mind ; that their being is
to be perceived or known ; that consequently so long as they
are not actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my
mind, or that of any other created spirit, they must either

1 ' existing unperceived,' i. e. ex- (see sect. 27, 89, 142) restricted,
isting without being realised in any is here applied to the immediate
living percipient experience — ex- data of the senses — the ideas of
isting in a totally abstract existence, sense.

whatever that can mean. 3 This sentence is omitted in the

2 'notions' — a term elsewhere second edition.

PART l] OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE ' 261

have no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of
some Eternal Spirit : it being perfectly unintelligible, and
involving all the absurdity of abstraction, to attribute to
any single part of them an existence independent of a spirit.
[l To be convinced of which, the reader need only reflect,
and try to separate in his own thoughts the being of
a sensible thing from its being perceived.]

7. From what has been said it is evident there is not
any other Substance than Spirit, or that which perceives2.
But, for the fuller proof3 of this point, let it be considered
the sensible qualities are colour, figure, motion, smell, taste,
and such like, that is, the ideas perceived by sense. Now,
for an idea to exist in an unperceiving thing is a manifest
contradiction ; for to have an idea is all one as to perceive:
that therefore wherein colour, figure, and the like qualities
exist must perceive them. Hence it is clear there can be
no unthinking substance or substratum of those ideas.

8. But, say you, though the ideas themselves4 do not
exist without the mind, yet there may be things like them,
wherof they are copies or resemblances; which things exist
without the mind, in an unthinking substance5. I answer,
an idea can be like nothing but an idea; a colour or figure
can be like nothing but another colour or figure. If we
look but never so little into our thoughts, we shall find it
impossible for us to conceive a likeness except only
between our ideas. Again, I ask whether those supposed
originals, or external things, of which our ideas are the
pictures or representations, be themselves perceivable or

1 In the first edition, instead of intelligible trustworthy experience,
this sentence, we have the follow- 3 ' proof — ' demonstration ' in
ing: 'To make this appear with firsteditionjyethecallsit'intuitive.'
all the light and evidence of an * 'the ideas themselves,' i. e. the
Axiom, it seems sufficient if I can phenomena immediately presented
but awaken the reflexion of the in sense, and that are thus realised
reader, that he may take an im- in and through the percipient ex-
partial view of his own meaning, perience of living mind, as their
and turn his thoughts upon the factor.

subject itself ; free and disengaged 5 As those say who assume that
from all embarras of words and perception is ultimately only re-
prepossession in favour of received presentative of the material reality,
mistakes.' the very things themselves not

2 In other words, active per- making their appearance to us
cipient Spirit is at the root of all at all.

262 OF THE PRINCIPLES [PART I

no? If they are, then they are ideas, and we have gained
our point : but if you say they are not, I appeal to any one
whether it be sense to assert a colour is like something
which is invisible ; hard or soft, like something which is
intangible; and so of the rest.

9. Some there are who make a distinction betwixt
primary and secondary qualities '. By the former they
mean extension, figure, motion, rest, solidity or impenetra
bility, and number; by the latter they denote all other
sensible qualities, as colours, sounds, tastes, and so forth.
The ideas we have of these last they acknowledge not to
be the resemblances of anything existing without the mind,
or unperceived ; but they will have our ideas of the
primary qualities to be patterns or images of things which
exist without the mind, in an unthinking substance
which they call Matter. By Matter, therefore, we are to
understand an inert2, senseless substance, in which exten
sion, figure, and motion do actually subsist. But it is
evident, from what we have already shewn, that extension,
figure, and motion are only ideas existing in the mind3,
and that an idea can be like nothing but another idea; and
that consequently neither they nor their archetypes can
exist in an unperceiving substance. Hence, it is plain that
the very notion of what is called Matter or corporeal
substance, involves a contradiction in it. [4 Insomuch that
I should not think it necessary to spend more time in
exposing its absurdity. But, because the tenet of the ex
istence of Matter 5 seems to have taken so deep a root in
the minds of philosophers, and draws after it so many ill
consequences, I choose rather to be thought prolix and
tedious than omit anything that might conduce to the full
discovery and extirpation of that prejudice.]

10. They who assert that figure, motion, and the rest of

1 He refers especially to Locke, * What follows to the end of the

whose account of Matter is accord- section is omitted in the second

ingly charged with being incoherent. edition .

'' 'inert.' See the De Motu. ° ' the existence of Matter,' i. e.

3 ' ideas existing in the mind/ i. e. the existence of the material world,

phenomena of which some mind is regarded as a something that does

percipient ; which are realised in not need to be perceived in order

the sentient experience of a living to be real,
spirit, human or other.

PART l] OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 263

the primary or original qualities1 do exist without the
mind, in unthinking substances, do at the same time
acknowledge that colours, sounds, heat, cold, and suchlike
secondary qualities, do not ; which they tell us are sensa
tions, existing in the mind alone, that depend on and are
occasioned by the different size, texture, and motion of the
minute particles of matter2. This they take for an un
doubted truth, which they can demonstrate beyond all
exception. Now, if it be certain that those original
qualities are inseparably united with the other sensible
qualities, and not, even in thought, capable of being abstract
ed from them, it plainly follows that they exist only in the
mind. But I desire an}' one to reflect, and try whether he
can, by any abstraction of thought, conceive the extension
and motion of a body without all other sensible qualities.
For my own part, I see evidently that it is not in my power
to frame an idea of a body extended and moving, but
I must withal give it some colour or other sensible quality,
which is acknowledged to exist only in the mind. In short,
extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other
qualities, are inconceivable. Where therefore the other
sensible qualities are,there must these be also, to wit, in the
mind and nowhere else 3.

ii. Again, great and small, swift and slow, are allowed
to exist nowhere without the mind 4 ; being entirely relative,
and changing as the frame or position of the organs of
sense varies. The extension therefore which exists with
out the mind is neither great nor small, the motion neither
swift nor slow ; that is, they are nothing at all. But, say
you, they are extension in general, and motion in general.
Thus we see how much the tenet of extended moveable
substances existing without the mind 4 depends on that
strange doctrine of abstract ideas. And here I cannot but
remark how nearly the vague and indeterminate descrip-

1 Sometimes called objective quali- and the primary qualities of matter
ties, because they are supposed only hypothetically.

to be realised in an abstract ob- 3 ' in the mind, and nowhere

jectivity, which Berkeley insists is else,' i. e. perceived or conceived,

meaningless. but in no other manner can they

2 See Locke's Essay, Ek. II, ch.8, be real or concrete.

§§ *3> J8; ch. 23, § ii ; Bk. IV, 4 'without the mind/ i. e. inde-

ch. 3, § 24-26. Locke suggests pendently of all percipient experi-
this relation between the secondary ence.

264 OF THE PRINCIPLES [PART I

tion of Matter, or corporeal substance, which the modern
philosophers are run into by their own principles, resem
bles that antiquated and so much ridiculed notion of materia
prima, to be met with in Aristotle and his followers.
Without extension solidity cannot be conceived : since
therefore it has been shewn that extension exists not in an
unthinking substance, the same must also be true of
solidity1.

12. That number is entirely the creature of the mind 2,
even though the other qualities be allowed to exist without,
will be evident to whoever considers that the same thing
bears a different denomination of number as the mind
views it with different respects. Thus, the same extension
is one, or three, or thirty-six, according as the mind
considers it with reference to a yard, a foot, or an inch.
Number is so visibly relative, and dependent on men's
understanding, that it is strange to think how any one
should give it an absolute existence without the mind.
We say one book, one page, one line, &c. ; all these are
equally units, though some contain several of the others.
And in each instance, it is plain, the unit relates to some
particular combination of ideas arbitrarily put together by
the mind n.

13. Unity I know some4 will have to be a simple or
uncompounded idea, accompanying all other ideas into the
mind. That I have any such idea answering the word
unity I do not find ; and if I had, methinks I could not
miss finding it ; on the contrary, it should be the most
familiar to my understanding, since it is said to accompany
all other ideas, and to be perceived by all the ways of

1 Extension is thus the dis- trated by their dependence on the

tinguishing characteristic of the organisation of the percipient. In

material world. Geometrical and this, the preceding, and the follow-

physical solidity, as well as motion, ing sections, Berkeley argues the

imply extension. inconsistency of the abstract reality

a 'number is the creature of the attributed to the primary qualities

mind,' i. e. is dependent on being with their acknowledged depen-

realised in percipient experience. dence on the necessary conditions

This dependence is here illustrated of sense perception,

by the relation of concrete number •' Cf. New Theory of Vision, sect,

to the point of view of each 109.

mind; as the dependence of the * e.g. Locke, Essay, Bk. II, ch. 7,

other primary qualities was illus- § 7 ; ch. 16, § i.

PART l] OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 265

sensation and reflexion. To say no more, it is an abstract
idea.

14. I shall farther add, that, after the same manner as
modern philosophers prove certain sensible qualities to
have no existence in Matter, or without the mind, the same
thing may be likewise proved of all other sensible qualities
whatsoever. Thus, for instance, it is said that heat and
cold are affections only of the mind, and not at all patterns
of real beings, existing in the corporeal substances which
excite them ; for that the same body which appears cold to
one hand seems warm to another. Now, why may we not
as well argue that figure and extension are not patterns
or resemblances of qualities existing in Matter ; because
to the same eye at different stations, or eyes of a dif
ferent texture at the same station, they appear various, and
cannot therefore be the images of anything settled and
determinate without the mind ? Again, it is proved that
sweetness is not really in the sapid thing ; because the
thing remaining unaltered the sweetness is changed into
bitter, as in case of a fever or otherwise vitiated palate. Is
it not as reasonable to say that motion is not without the
mind; since if the succession of ideas in the mind become
swifter, the motion, it is acknowledged, shall appear slower,
without any alteration in any external object ' ?

15. In short, let any one consider those arguments
which are thought manifestly to prove that colours and
tastes exist only in the mind, and he shall find they may
with equal force be brought to prove the same thing of
extension, figure, and motion. Though it must be con
fessed this method of arguing does not so much prove that
there is no extension or colour in an outward object, as
that we do not know by sense which is the true extension
or colour of the object. But the arguments foregoing2
plainly shew it to be impossible that any colour or extension
at all, or other sensible quality whatsoever, should exist
in an unthinking subject without the mind, or in truth that
there should be any such thing as an outward object !.

1 'without any alteration in any the qualities of matter, are expanded
external object ' — ' without any ex- in the First Dialogue between Hylas
ternal alteration' — in first edition. and Pliilonous.

2 These arguments, founded on 3 'an outward object, 'i.e. an object
the mind-dependent nature of all wholly abstract from living Mind.

266 OF THE PRINCIPLES [PART I

16. But let us examine a little the received opinion. It
is said extension is a mode or accident of Matter, and that
Matter is the substratum that supports it. Now I desire
that you would explain to me what is meant by Matter's
supporting extension. Say you, I have no idea of Matter;
and therefore cannot explain it. I answer, though you have
no positive, yet, if you have any meaning at all, you must
at least have a relative idea of Matter; though you
know not what it is, yet you must be supposed to know
what relation it bears to accidents, and what is meant by
its supporting them. It is evident support cannot here be
taken in its usual or literal sense, as when we say that
pillars support a building. In what sense therefore must
it be taken ? [J For my part, I am not able to discover any
sense at all that can be applicable to it.J

17. If we inquire into what the most accurate philoso
phers declare themselves to mean by material substance,
we shall find them acknowledge they have no other mean
ing annexed to those sounds but the idea of Being in
general, together with the relative notion of its supporting
accidents. The general idea of Being appeareth to me the
most abstract and incomprehensible of all other ; and as
for its supporting accidents, this, as we have just now
observed, cannot be understood in the common sense of
those words : it must therefore be taken in some other
sense, but what that is they do not explain. So that when
I consider the two parts or branches which make the
signification of the words material substance, I am con
vinced there is no distinct meaning annexed to them.
But why should we trouble ourselves any farther, in
discussing this material substratum or support of figure and
motion and other sensible qualities? Does it not suppose
they have an existence without the mind ? And is not this
a direct repugnancy, and altogether inconceivable ?

18. But, though it were possible that solid, figured,
moveable substances may exist without the mind, corre
sponding to the ideas we have of bodies, yet how is it
possible for us to know this ? Either we must know it by
Sense or by Reason 2. As for our senses, by them we

1 This sentence is omitted in the argued, in this and the next section,

second edition. that a reality unrealised in perci-

- * reason/ i. e. reasoning. It is pient experience cannot be proved,

PART l] OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 267

have the knowledge only of our sensations, ideas, or
those things that are immediately perceived by sense, call
them what you will : but they do not inform us that things
exist without the mind, or unperceived, like to those which
are perceived. This the materialists themselves acknow
ledge. — It remains therefore that if we have any knowledge
at all of external things, it must be by reason inferring
their existence from what is immediately perceived by
sense. But (l I do not see) what reason can induce us to
believe the existence of bodies without the mind, from what
we perceive, since the very patrons of Matter themselves
do not pretend there is any necessary connexion betwixt
them and our ideas ? I say it is granted on all hands (and
what happens in dreams, frensies, and the like, puts it
beyond dispute) that it is possible we might be affected
with all the ideas we have now, though no bodies existed
without resembling them 2. Hence it is evident the sup
position of external bodies" is not necessary for the pro
ducing our ideas ; since it is granted they are produced
sometimes, and might possibly be produced always, in
the same order we see them in at present, without their
concurrence.

19. But, though we might possibly have all our sensa
tions without them, yet perhaps it may be thought easier
to conceive and explain the manner of their production,
by supposing external bodies in their likeness rather than
otherwise ; and so it might be at least probable there are
such things as bodies that excite their ideas in our minds.
But neither can this be said. For, though we give the
materialists their external bodies, they by their own con
fession are never the nearer knowing how our ideas are
produced ; since they own themselves unable to compre
hend in what manner body can act upon spirit, or how it is
possible it should imprint any idea in the mind 4. Hence

either by our senses or by reason- characteristics from the external

ing. ideas of which we are percipient

1 Omitted in the second edition, in sense. Cf. sect. 29 33.
and the sentence converted into :! i external bodies,' i.e. bodies

a question. supposed to be real independently

a But the ideas of which we are of all percipients in the universe,
cognizant in waking dreams, and 4 i. e. they cannot shew how

dreams of sleep, differ in important their unintelligible hypothesis of

268 OF THE PRINCIPLES [PART I

it is evident the production of ideas or sensations in our
minds1, can be no reason why we should suppose Matter
or corporeal substances 2 ; since that is acknowledged to
remain equally inexplicable with or without this sup
position. If therefore it were possible for bodies to exist
without the mind, yet to hold they do so must needs be
a very precarious opinion ; since it is to suppose, without
any reason at all, that God has created innumerable beings
that are entirely useless, and serve to no manner of
purpose.

20. In short, if there were external bodies3, it is im
possible we should ever come to know it ; and if there
were not, we might have the very same reasons to think there
were that we have now. Suppose— what no one can deny
possible — an intelligence, without the help of external
bodies 3, to be affected with the same train of sensations or
ideas that you are, imprinted in the same order and with
like vividness in his mind. I ask whether that intelli
gence hath not all the reason to believe the existence of
Corporeal Substances, represented by his ideas, and ex
citing them in his mind, that you can possibly have for
believing the same thing ? Of this there can be no ques
tion. Which one consideration were enough to make any
reasonable person suspect the strength of whatever argu
ments he may think himself to have, for the existence of
bodies without the mind.

21. Were it necessary to add any farther proof against
the existence of Matter 4, after what has been said, I could
instance several of those errors and difficulties (not to
mention impieties) which have sprung from that tenet. It
has occasioned numberless controversies and disputes in
philosophy, and not a few of far greater moment in religion.
But I shall not enter into the detail of them in this place,
as well because I think arguments a posteriori are unneces
sary for confirming what has been, if I mistake not,

Matter accounts for the experience - Mind-dependent Matter he not

we have, or expect to have ; or only allows to exist, but maintains

which we believe other persons its reality to be intuitively evident,

have, or to be about to have. 3 i. e. bodies existing in abstrac-

1 ' the production/ &c., i. e. the tion from living percipient spirit,

fact that we and others have per- 4 ' Matter,' i. e. abstract Matter,

cipient experience. unrealised in sentient intelligence.

PART l] OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 269

sufficiently demonstrated a priori, as because I shall here
after find occasion to speak somewhat of them.

22. I am afraid I have given cause to think I am need
lessly prolix in handling this subject. For, to what
purpose is it to dilate on that which may be demonstrated
with the utmost evidence in a line or two, to any one that
is capable of the least reflexion? It is but looking into
your own thoughts, and so trying whether you can conceive
it possible for a sound, or figure, or motion, or colour to
exist without the mind or unperceived. This easy trial1 may
perhaps make you see that what you contend for is a
downright contradiction. Insomuch that I am content to
put the whole upon this issue : — If you can but conceive it
possible for one extended moveable substance, or in general
for any one idea, or anything like an idea, to exist other
wise than in a mind perceiving it '', I shall readily give up
the cause. And, as for all that compages of external
bodies you contend for, I shall grant you its existence,
though you cannot either give me any reason why you
believe it exists, or assign any use to it when it is supposed
to exist. I say, the bare possibility of your opinions being
true shall pass for an argument that it is so.

23. But, say you, surely there is nothing easier than for
me to imagine trees, for instance, in a park, or books exist
ing in a closet, and nobody by to perceive them. I answer,
you may so, there is no difficulty in it. But what is all this,
I beseech you, more than framing in your mind certain
ideas which you call books and trees, and at the same time
omitting to frame the idea of any one that may perceive
them ? But do not you yourself perceive or think of them
all the while ? This therefore is nothing to the purpose :
it only shews you have the power of imagining, or forming
ideas in your mind ; but it does not shew that you can
conceive it possible the objects of your thought may exist
without the mind ;!. To make out this, it is necessary that

1 The appeal here and elsewhere 3 This implies that the material

is to consciousness — directly in world may be realised in imagina-

each person's experience, and in- tion as well as in sensuous per-

directly in that of others, ception, but in a less degree of

'- i. e. otherwise than in the form reality ; for reality, he assumes.

of an idea or actual appearance admits of degrees,
presented to our senses.

270 OF THE PRINCIPLES [PART I

you conceive them existing unconceived or unthought of;
which is a manifest repugnancy. When we do our utmost
to conceive the existence of external bodies \ we are all the
while only contemplating our own ideas. But the mind,
taking no .notice of itself, is deluded to think it can and
does conceive bodies existing unthought of, or without the
mind, though at the same time they are apprehended by, or
exist in, itself. A little attention will discover to any one
the truth and evidence of what is here said, and make it
unnecessary to insist on any other proofs against the exist
ence of material substance.

24. ['- Could men but forbear to amuse themselves with
words, we should, I believe, soon come to an agreement in
this point. It is very obvious, upon the least inquiry into
our own thoughts, to know whether it be possible for us to
understand what is meant by the absolute existence of sensi
ble objects in themselves, or without the mind*. To me it is
evident those words mark out either a direct contradiction,
or else nothing at all. And to convince others of this, I
know no readier or fairer way than to entreat they would
calmly attend to their own thoughts ; and if by this atten
tion the emptiness or repugnancy of those expressions
does appear, surely nothing more is requisite for their con
viction. It is on this therefore that I insist, to wit, that
the absolute existence of unthinking things are words with
out a meaning, or which include a contradiction. This
is \vhat I repeat and inculcate, and earnestly recommend
to the attentive thoughts of the reader.

25. All our ideas, sensations, notions 4, or the things which
we perceive, by whatsoever names they may be distinguish
ed, are visibly inactive : there is nothing of power or agency

' ' to conceive the existence of spiritual life and perception, is what

external bodies/ i. e. to conceive Berkeley argues against, as tnean-

bodies that are not conceived — ingless, if not contradictory ; not the

that are not ideas at all, but which existence of a material world,

exist in abstraction. To suppose when this means the realised order

what we conceive to be uncon- of nature, regulated independently

ceived, is to suppose a contra- of individual will, and to which our

diction. actions must conform if we are to

2 This sentence is omitted in the avoid physical pain,

second edition. 4 Here again notion is undis-

:5 ; The existence of things with- tinguished from idea.
out mind,' or in the absence of all

PART l] OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 271

included in them. So that one idea or object of thought
cannot produce or make any alteration in another \ To be
satisfied of the truth of this, there is nothing else requisite
but a bare observation of our ideas. For, since they and
every part of them exist only in the mind, it follows that
there is nothing in them but what is perceived : but whoever
shall attend to his ideas, whether of sense or reflexion, will not
perceive in them any power or activity; there is, therefore,
no such thing contained in them. A little attention will
discover to us that the very being of an idea implies pas-
siveness and inertness in it ; insomuch that it is impossible
for an idea to do anything, or, strictly speaking, to be the
cause of anything : neither can it be the resemblance or
pattern of any active being, as is evident from sect. 8.
Whence it plainly follows that extension, figure, and motion
cannot be the cause of our sensations. To say, therefore,
that these are the effects of powers resulting from the con
figuration, number, motion, and size of corpuscles 2, must
certainly be false.

26. We perceive a continual succession of ideas ; some
are anew excited, others are changed or totally disappear.
There is therefore some cause of these ideas, whereon they
depend, and which produces and changes them 3. That this
cause cannot be any quality or idea or combination of ideas,
is clear from the preceding section. It must therefore be
a substance ; but it has been shewn that there is no corporeal
or material substance : it remains therefore that the cause
of ideas is an incorporeal active substance or Spirit 4.

1 This and the three following of Causality, or the ultimate need

sections argue for the essential for an efficient cause of every

impotence of matter, and that, as far change. To determine the sort of

as we are concerned, so-called Causation that constitutes and per-

; natural causes' are only signs vades the universe is the aim of

which foretell the appearance of his philosophy,

their so-called effects. The material 4 In other words, the material

world is presented to our senses as world is not only real in and

a procession of orderly, and there- through percipient spirit, but the

fore interpretable, yet in themselves changing forms which its pheno-

powerless, ideas or phenomena : mena assume, in the natural evolu-

motion is always an effect, never tion, are the issue of the perpetual

an originating active cause. activity of in-dwelling Spirit. The

• As Locke suggests. argument in this section requires

:' This tacitly presupposes the a deeper criticism of its premisses,
necessity in reason of the Principle

272 OF THE PRINCIPLES [PART I

27. A Spirit is one simple, undivided, active being — as it
perceives ideas it is called the understanding, and as it pro
duces or otherwise operates about them it is called the will.
Hence there can be no idea formed of a soul or spirit ; for
all ideas whatever, being passive and inert (vid. sect. 25),
they cannot represent unto us, by way of image or likeness,
that which acts. A little attention will make it plain to any
one, that to have an idea which shall be like that active Princi
ple of motion and change of ideas is absolutely impossible.
Such is the nature of Spirit, or that which acts, that it
cannot be of itself perceived, but only by the effects which
it produceth ]. If any man shall doubt of the truth of what
is here delivered, let him but reflect and try if he can frame
the idea of any power or active being ; and whether he has
ideas of two principal powers, marked by the names will
and understanding, distinct from each other, as well as from a
third idea of Substance or Being in general, with a relative
notion of its supporting or being the subject of the aforesaid
powers — which is signified by the name soul or spirit.
This is what some hold ; but, so far as I can see, the words
will, ['• understanding, mind,'] soul, spirit, do not stand for
different ideas, or, in truth, for any idea at all, but for some
thing which is very different from ideas, and which, being
an agent, cannot be like unto, or represented by, any idea
whatsoever. [3 Though it must be owned at the same time
that we have some notion of soul, spirit, and the operations
of the mind, such as willing, loving, hating — inasmuch
as we know or understand the meaning of these words.]

28. I find I can excite ideas4 in my mind at pleasure,
and vary and shift the scene as oft as I think fit. It is no
more than willing, and straightway this or that idea arises
in my fancy ; and by the same power it is obliterated and

1 In other words, an agent can- as in the words soul, active power,
not, as such, be perceived or ima- &c. Here he says that i the opera-
gined, though its effects can. The tions of the mind' belong to
spiritual term agent is not mean- notions, while, insect, i, he speaks
ingless ; yet we have no sensuous of ' ideas perceived by attending to
idea of its meaning. the ' ' operations " of the mind.'

2 Omitted in second edition. 4 'ideas,' i. e. fancies of imagi-

3 This sentence is not contained nation ; as distinguished from the
in the first edition. It is remark- more real ideas or phenomena that
able for first introducing the term present themselves objectively to
notion, to signify idealess meaning, our senses.

PART l] OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 273

makes way for another. This making and unmaking of
ideas doth very properly denominate the mind active.
Thus much is certain and grounded on experience : but
when we talk of unthinking agents, or of exciting ideas
exclusive of volition, we only amuse ourselves with
words'.

29. But, whatever power I may have over my own
thoughts, I find the ideas actually perceived by Sense have
not a like dependence on my will. When in broad day
light I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose
whether I shall see or no, or to determine what particular
objects shall present themselves to my view : and so like
wise as to the hearing and other senses ; the ideas imprinted
on them are not creatures of my will '-. There is therefore
some other Will or Spirit that produces them.

30. The ideas of Sense are more strong, lively, and dis
tinct than those of the Imagination 3 ; they have likewise a
steadiness, order, and coherence, and are not excited at
random, as those which are the effects of human wills often
are, but in a regular train or series — the admirable con
nexion whereof sufficiently testifies the wisdom and bene
volence of its Author. Now the set rules, or established
methods, wherein the Mind we depend on excites in us
the ideas of Sense, are called the laws of nature] and
these we learn by experience, which teaches us that such
and such ideas are attended with such and such other ideas,
in the ordinary course of things.

31. This gives us a sort of foresight, which enables us to
regulate our actions for the benefit of life. And without
this we should be eternally at a loss : we could not know

1 With Berkeley the world of senses may be distinguished from

external ideas is distinguished all other ideas, in consequence of

from Spirit by its essential passi- which they may be termed ' ex-

vity. Active power is with him ternal,' while those of feeling and

the essence of Mind, distinguishing imagination are wholly subjective

me from the changing ideas of or individual.

which I am percipient. We must 3 This mark — the superior

not attribute free agency to phe- strength and liveliness of the

nomena presented to our senses. ideas or phenomena that are pre-

• In this and the four following sented to the senses — was after-
sections, Berkeley mentions marks wards noted by Hume. See
by which the ideas or phenomena Inquiry concerning Human Under-
that present themselves to the standing, sect. II.

BERKELEY : FRASER.

274 OF THE PRINCIPLES [PART i

how to act anything that might procure us the least pleasure,
or remove the least pain of sense. That food nourishes,
sleep refreshes, and fire warms us ; that to sow in the seed
time is the way to reap in the harvest ; and in general
that to obtain such or such ends, such or such means
are conducive — all this we know, not by discovering any
necessary connexion between our ideas, but only by the
observation of the settled laws of nature ; without which
we should be all in uncertainty and confusion, and a
grown man no more know how to manage himself in the
affairs of life than an infant just born1.

32. And yet this consistent uniform working, which so
evidently displays the Goodness and Wisdom of that Gov
erning Spirit whose Will constitutes the laws of nature,
is so far from leading our thoughts to Him, that it rather
sends them wandering after second causes 2. For, when we
perceive certain ideas of Sense constantly followed by other
ideas, and we know this is not of our own doing, we forthwith
attribute power and agency to the ideas themselves, and
make one the cause of another, than which nothing can be
more absurd and unintelligible. Thus, for example, having
observed that when we perceive by sight a certain round
luminous figure, we at the same time perceive by touch the
idea or sensation called heat, we do from thence con
clude the sun to be the cause of heat. And in like manner
perceiving the motion and collision of bodies to be attended
with sound, we are inclined to think the latter the effect of
the former :!.

33. The ideas imprinted on the Senses by the Author of
nature are called real things: and those excited in the
imagination, being less regular, vivid, and constant, are
more properly termed ideas or images of things, which

1 Berkeley here and always in- universe, 'second causes' are
sists on the arbitrary character of divinely established signs of im-
the 'settled laws ' of change in the pending changes, and are only
world, as contrasted with 'neces- metaphorically called 'causes.'
sary connexions' discovered in 3 So Schiller, in Don Carlos,
mathematics. The material world Act III, where he represents scep-
is thus virtually an interpretable tics as failing to see the God who
natural language, constituted in veils Himself in everlasting laws,
what, at our point of view, is But in truth God is eternal law
arbitrariness or contingency. or order vitalised and moralised.

2 Under this conception of the

PART I] OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 275

they copy and represent. But then our sensations, be
they never so vivid and distinct, are nevertheless ideas ' :
that is, they exist in the mind, or are perceived by it, as
truly as the ideas of its own framing. The ideas of Sense
are allowed to have more reality- in them, that is, to be
more strong, orderly, and coherent than the creatures
of the mind ; but this is no argument that they exist
without the mind. They are also less dependent on the
spirit or thinking substance which perceives them, in that
they are excited by the will of another and more powerful
Spirit: yet still they are ideas: and certainly no idea,
whether faint or strong, can exist otherwise than in a mind
perceiving it 3.

34. Before we proceed any farther it is necessary we
spend some time in answering Objections 4 which may
probably be made against the Principles we have hitherto
laid down. In doing of which, if I seem too prolix to those
of quick apprehensions, I desire I may be excused, since
all men do not equally apprehend things of this nature ;
and I am willing to be understood by every one.

First, then, it will be objected that by the foregoing
principles all that is real and substantial in nature is
banished out of the world, and instead thereof a chimerical
scheme of ideas takes place. All things that exist exist
only in the mind ; that is, they are purely notional. What
therefore becomes of the sun, moon, and stars ? What
must we think of houses, rivers, mountains, trees, stones ;
nay, even of our own bodies? Are all these but so many

1 ' sensations} with Berkeley, are Berkeley's two leading Principles,
not mere feelings, but in a sense The first conducts to and vindicates
external appearances. the second— inadequately, how-

2 ' more reality.' This implies ever, apart from explication of their
that reality admits of degrees, and root in moral reason. The former
that the difference between the gives a relation sui generis. The
phenomena presented to the senses latter gives our only example of
and those which are only imagined active causality — the natural order
is a difference in degree of reality. of phenomena being the outcome of

3 In the preceding sections, two the causal energy of intending Will,
relations should be carefully dis
tinguished — that of the material * Sect. 34-84 contain Berkeley's
world to percipient mind, in answers to supposed objections to
which it becomes real; and that the foregoing Principles concern-
between changes in the world ing Matter and Spirit in their
and spiritual agency. These are mutual relations.

T 2

276 OF THE PRINCIPLES [PART I

chimeras and illusions on the fancy?— To all which, and
whatever else of the same sort may be objected, I answer,
that by the Principles premised we are not deprived of any
one thing in nature. Whatever we see, feel, hear, or any
wise conceive or understand, remains as secure as ever, and
is as real as ever. There is a rerum natura, and the dis
tinction between realities and chimeras retains its full force.
This is evident from sect. 29, 30, and 33, where we have
shewn what is meant by real things, in opposition to chim
eras or ideas of our own framing ; but then they both equally
exist in the mind, and in that sense ' are alike ideas.

35. I do not argue against the existence of any one thing
that we can apprehend, either by sense or reflection. That
the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do
exist, really exist, I make not the least question. The only
thing whose existence we deny is that which philosophers
call Matter or corporeal substance. And in doing of this
there is no damage done to the rest of mankind, who, I
dare say, will never miss it. The Atheist indeed will want
the colour of an empty name to support his impiety; and
the Philosophers may possibly find they have lost a great
handle for trifling and disputation. \~ But that is all the
harm that I can see done.]

36. If any man thinks this detracts from the existence
or reality of things, he is very far from understanding
what hath been premised in the plainest terms I could
think of. Take here an abstract of what has been said :—
There are spiritual substances, minds, or human souls,
which will or excite ideas3 in themselves at pleasure; but
these are faint, weak, and unsteady in respect of others
they perceive by sense : which, being impressed upon them
according to certain rules or laws of nature, speak them
selves the effects of a Mind more powerful and wise than
human spirits 4. These latter are said to have more reality 5

1 To be an ' idea ' is, with Berke- mena, naturally presented to sense,

ley, to be the imaginable object of yet ottt of all relation to living

a percipient spirit. But he does mind.

not define precisely the relation '2 Omitted in second edition,

of ideas to mind. ' Existence :1 i. e. of imagination. Cf. sect,

in mind ' is existence in this 28-30.

relation. His question (which he * Cf. sect. 29.

determines in the negative) is, "' ' more reality.' This again im-

the possibility of concrete pheno- plies that reality admits of degrees.

PART l] OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 277

in them than the former ; — by which is meant that they are
more affecting, orderly, and distinct, and that they are not
fictions of the mind perceiving them \ And in this sense the
sun that I see by day is the real sun, and that which I
imagine by night is the idea of the former. In the sense
here given of reality, it is evident that every vegetable, star,
mineral, and in general each part of the mundane system,
is as much a real being by our principles as by any other.
Whether others mean anything by the term reality different
from what I do, I entreat them to look into their own
thoughts and see.

37. It will be urged that thus much at least is true, to wit,
that we take away all corporeal substances. To this my an
swer is, that if the word substance be taken in the vulgar sense,
for a combination of sensible qualities, such as extension,
solidity, weight, and the like— this we cannot be accused of
taking away: but if it be taken in a philosophic sense, for
the support of accidents or qualities without the mind —
then indeed I acknowledge that we take it away, if one may
be said to take away that which never had any existence,
not even in the imagination ~.

38. But after all, say you, it sounds very harsh to say we
eat and drink ideas, and are clothed with ideas. I acknow
ledge it does so — the word idea not being used in common
discourse to signify the several combinations of sensible
qualities which are called things ; and it is certain that any
expression which varies from the familiar use of language
will seem harsh and ridiculous. But this doth not concern
the truth of the proposition, which in other words is no more;
than to say, we are fed and clothed with those things which we
perceive immediately by our senses 3. The hardness or soft
ness, the colour, taste, warmth, figure, and suchlike qualities,
which combined together4 constitute the several sorts of

What is perceived in sense is substance proper, or (6) an aggre-
more real than what is imagined, gate of sense-phenomena, called a
and eternal realities are more 'sensible thing' — substance con-
deeply real than the transitory ventionally and superficially,
things of sense. 3 And which, because realised

1 Cf. sect. 33. ' Not fictions/ in living perception, are called

i. e. they are presentative, and ideas — to remind us that reality is

therefore cannot misrepresent. attained in and through percipient

" With Berkeley substance is mind,

cither (a active reason, i.e. spirit— 4 'combined together,' i.e. in the

278 OF THE PRINCIPLES [PART I

victualsand apparel, have been shewn to exist only in the mind
that perceives them : and this is all that is meant by calling
them ideas ; which word, if it was as ordinarily used as
thing, would sound no harsher nor more ridiculous than it.
I am not for disputing about the propriety, but the truth of
the expression. If therefore you agree With me that we
eat and drink and are clad with the immediate objects of
sense, which cannot exist unperceived or without the mind,
I shall readily grant it is more proper or conformable
to custom that they should be called things rather than
ideas.

39. If it be demanded why I make use of the word idea,
and do not rather in compliance with custom call them
things ; I answer, I do it for two reasons : — First, because
the term thing, in contradistinction to idea, is generally
supposed to denote somewhat existing without the mind :
Secondly, because thing hath a more comprehensive signi
fication than idea, including spirits, or thinking things ], as
well as ideas. Since therefore the objects of sense exist
only in the mind, and are withal thoughtless and inactive,
I chose to mark them by the word idea ; which implies
those properties 2.

40. But, say what we can, some one perhaps may be apt
to reply, he will still believe his senses, and never suffer
any arguments, how plausible soever, to prevail over the
certainty of them. Be it so ; assert the evidence of sense
as high as you please, we are willing to do the same.
That what I see, hear, and feel doth exist, that is to say, is
perceived by me, I no more doubt than I do of my own
being. But I do not see how the testimony of sense can be
alleged as a proof for the existence of anything which is not
perceived by sense. We are not for having any man turn
sceptic and disbelieve his senses ; on the contrary, we give
them all the stress and assurance imaginable ; nor are there

form of ( sensible things/ according sense-percipient mind; but he

to natural laws. Cf. sect. 33. does not, as popularly supposed,

1 'thinking things' — more ap- regard ' sensible things ' as created
propriately called persons. and regulated by the activity of his

2 Berkeley uses the word idea own individual mind. They are
to mark the fact, that sensible perceived, but are neither created
things are real only as they nor regulated, by the individual
manifest themselves in the form percipient, and are thus practi-
of passive objects, presented to cally external to each person.

PART I] OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 279

any principles more opposite to Scepticism than those we
have laid down, as shall be hereafter clearly shewn \

41. Secondly, it will be objected that there is a great dif
ference betwixt real fire for instance, and the idea of fire,
betwixt dreaming or imagining oneself burnt, and actu
ally being so. [a If you suspect it to be only the idea of
fire which you see, do but put your hand into it and you
will be convinced with a witness.] This and the like
may be urged in opposition to our tenets. — To all which
the answer is evident from what hath been already said 3 ;
and I shall only add in this place, that if real fire be very
different from the idea of fire, so also is the real pain that
it occasions very different from the idea of the same pain,
and yet nobody will pretend that real pain either is, or can
possibly be, in an unperceiving thing, or without the mind,
any more than its idea 4.

42. Thirdly, it will be objected that we see things actually
without or at a distance from us, and which consequently
do not exist in the mind ; it being absurd that those things
which are seen at the distance of several miles should be
as near to us as our own thoughts5. — In answer to this, I
desire it may be considered that in a dream we do oft per
ceive things as existing at a great distance off, and yet for
all that, those things are acknowledged to have their exist
ence only in the mind.

43. But, for the fuller clearing of this point, it may be
worth while to consider how it is that we perceive distance,
and things placed at a distance, by sight. For, that we
should in truth see external space, and bodies actually ex
isting in it, some nearer, others farther off, seems to carry

1 Cf. sect. 87-91, against the pain are spoken of, without qualifi-

scepticism which originates in al- cation, as in like relation to living

leged fallacy of sense. mind as sensible things or ideas are.

- Omitted in second edition. 5 That the ideas of sense should

3 It is always to be remembered be seen ' at a distance of several

that with Berkeley ideas or phe- miles ' seems not inconsistent with

nomena presented to sense are their being dependent on a perci-

themselves the real things, whilst pient, if ambient space is itself (as

ideas of imagination are representa- Berkeley asserts) dependent on

tive (or misrepresentative). percipient experience. Cf. sect. 67.

1 Here feelings of pleasure or

280 OF THE PRINCIPLES [PART I

with it some opposition to what hath been said of their
existing nowhere without the mind. The consideration of
this difficulty it was that gave birth to my Essay towards a
New Theory of Vision, which was published not long since1.
Wherein it is shewn that distance or outness is neither
immediately of itself perceived by sight2, nor yet apprehen
ded or judged of by lines and angles, or anything that hath
a necessary connexion with it 3 ; but that it is only suggested
to our thoughts by certain visible ideas, and sensations
attending vision, which in their own nature have no manner
of similitude or relation either with distance or things
placed at a distance 4 ; but, by a connexion taught us by
experience, they come to signify and suggest them to us,
after the same manner that words of any language suggest
the ideas they are made to stand for5. Insomuch that
a man born blind, and afterwards made to see, would not,
at first sight, think the things he saw to be without his
mind, or at any distance from him. See sect. 41 of the
forementioned treatise.

44. The ideas of sight and touch make two species en
tirely distinct and heterogeneous r>. The former are marks
and prognostics of the latter. That the proper objects of
sight neither exist without the mind, nor are the images
of external things, was shewn even in that treatise 7.
Though throughout the same the contrary be supposed
true Q{ tangible objects]— not that to suppose that vulgar error
was necessary for establishing the notion therein laid down,
but because it was beside my purpose to examine and refute
it, in a discourse concerning Vision. So that in strict truth
the ideas of sight s, when we apprehend by them distance,
and things placed at a distance, do not suggest or mark
out to us things actually existing at a distance, but only
admonish us what ideas of touch 1J will be imprinted in our
minds at such and such distances of time, and in conse
quence of such or such actions. It is, I say, evident, from

1 In the preceding year. percipient of in seeing.

- Essay, sect. 2. 9 Touch is here and elsewhere

3 Ibid. sect. 11-15. taken in its wide meaning, and in-

4 Ibid. sect. 16-28. eludes our muscular and locomotive

5 Ibid. sect. 51. experience, all which Berkeley in-
0 Ibid. sect. 47-49, 121-141. eluded in the 'tactual' meaning of
7 Ibid. sect. 43. distance.

>s i. e. what we are immediately

PART l] OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 281

what has been said in the foregoing parts of this Treatise,
and in sect. 147 and elsewhere of the Essay concerning
Vision, that visible ideas are the Language whereby the
Governing Spirit on whom we depend informs us what
tangible ideas he is about to imprint upon us, in case
we excite this or that motion in our own bodies. But for
a fuller information in this point I refer to the Essay itself.

45. Fourthly, it will be objected that from the foregoing
principles it follows things are every moment annihilated
and created anew. The objects of sense exist only when
they are perceived : the trees therefore are in the garden,
or the chairs in the parlour, no longer than while there
is somebody by to perceive them. Upon shutting my
eyes all the furniture in the room is reduced to nothing,
and barely upon opening them it is again created '. — In
answer to all which, I refer the reader to what has been
said in sect. 3, 4, &c. ; and desire he will consider whether
he means anything by the actual existence of an idea
distinct from its being perceived. For my part, after
the nicest inquiry I could make, I am not able to dis
cover that anything else is meant by those words ; and
I once more entreat the reader to sound his own thoughts,
and not suffer himself to be imposed on by words. If
he can conceive it possible either for his ideas or their
archetypes to exist without being perceived, then I give
up the cause. But if he cannot, he will acknowledge it
is unreasonable for him to stand up in defence of he
knows not what, and pretend to charge on me as an ab
surdity, the not assenting to those propositions which at
bottom have no meaning in them '-'.

1 To explain the condition of or the other individual percipient,

sensible things during the intervals Moreover they always exist really

of our perception of them, consistently in the Divine Idea, and potentially,

with the belief of all sane persons in relation to finite minds, in the

regarding the material world, is Divine Will.

a challenge which has been often '2 Berkeley allows to bodies un-

addressed to the advocates of ideal perceived by me potential, but (for

Realism. According to Berkeley, me) not real existence. When I say

there are no intervals in the exist- a body exists thus conditionally,

ence of sensible things. They are I mean that if, in the light, I open

permanently perceivable, under my eyes, I shall see it, and that

the laws of nature, though not if I move my hand, I must feel it.
always perceived by this, that

282 OF THE PRINCIPLES [PART I

4.6. It will not be amiss to observe how far the received
principles of philosophy are themselves chargeable with
those pretended absurdities. It is thought strangely absurd
that upon closing my eyelids all the visible objects
around me should be reduced to nothing ; and yet is
not this what philosophers commonly acknowledge, when
they agree on all hands that light and colours, which
alone are the proper and immediate objects of sight, are
mere sensations that exist no longer than they are per
ceived ? Again, it may to some perhaps seem very incred
ible that things should be every moment creating ; yet
this very notion is commonly taught in the schools. For
the Schoolmen, though they acknowledge the existence
of Matter l, and that the whole mundane fabric is framed
out of it, are nevertheless of opinion that it cannot sub
sist without the divine conservation ; which by them is
expounded to be a continual creation 2.

47. Farther, a little thought will discover to us that,
though we allow the existence of Matter or corporeal
substance, yet it will unavoidably follow, from the princi
ples which are now generally admitted, that the particular
bodies, of what kind soever, do none of them exist whilst
they are not perceived. For, it is evident, from sect, n
and the following sections, that the Matter philosophers
contend for is an incomprehensible Somewhat, which hath

1 i.e. unperceived material sub- was therein particular, and had few

stance. followers. The very poets teach

a Berkeley remarks, in a letter to a doctrine not unlike the Schools —

the American Samuel Johnson, that mens agitat moleni (Virgil, ^Eneid,

' those who have contended for a VI). The Stoics and Platonists

material world have yet acknow- are everywhere full of the same

ledged that natura naturans (to notion. I am not therefore singular

use the language of the Schoolmen) in this point itself, so much as in

is God ; and that the Divine con- my way of proving it.' Cf. Aid-

servation of things is equipollent phron, Dial. IV. sect. 14 ; Vindi-

to, and in fact the same thing with, cation of New Theory of Vision,

a continued repeated creation;— sect. 8, 17, &c. ; Sin's, passim,

in a word, that conservation and but especially in the latter part,

creation differ only as the terminus See also Correspondence between

a quo. These are the common Clarke and Leibniz (1717^. Is it

opinions of Schoolmen ; and Du- not possible that the universe of

randus, who held the world to be things and persons is in continuous

a machine, like a clock made up natural creation, unbeginning and

and put in motion by God, but unending?
afterwards continued to go of itself,

PART l] OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 283

none of those particular qualities whereby the bodies
falling under our senses are distinguished one from an
other. But, to make this more plain, it must be remarked
that the infinite divisibility of Matter is now universally
allowed, at least by the most approved and considerable
philosophers, who on the received principles demonstrate
it beyond all exception. Hence, it follows there is an
infinite number of parts in each particle of Matter which
are not perceived by sense \ The reason therefore that
any particular body seems to be of a finite magnitude,
or exhibits only a finite number of parts to sense, is, not
because it contains no more, since in itself it contains an
infinite number of parts, but because the sense is not acute
enough to discern them. In proportion therefore as the
sense is rendered more acute, it perceives a greater
number of parts in the object, that is, the object appears
greater ; and its figure varies, those parts in its extremities
which were before unperceivable appearing now to bound
it in very different lines and angles from those perceived
by an obtuser sense. And at length, after various changes
of size and shape, when the sense becomes infinitely
acute, the body shall seem infinite. During all which
there is no alteration in the body, but only in the sense.
Each body therefore, considered in itself, is infinitely
extended, and consequently void of all shape and figure.
From which it follows that, though we should grant the
existence of Matter to be never so certain, yet it is withal
as certain, the materialists themselves are by their own
principles forced to acknowledge, that neither the particu
lar bodies perceived by sense, nor anything like them,
exists without the mind. Matter, I say, and each particle
thereof, is according to them infinite and shapeless; and
it is the mind that frames all that variety of bodies which
compose the visible world, any one whereof does not exist
longer than it is perceived.

48. But, after all, if we consider it, the objection pro
posed in sect. 45 will not be found reasonably charged on
the Principles we have premised, so as in truth to make
any objection at all against our notions. For, though we
hold indeed the objects of sense to be nothing else but

1 Cf. sect. 123-132.

284 OF THE PRINCIPLES [PART I

ideas which cannot exist unperceived, yet we may not
hence conclude they have no existence except only while
they are perceived by its', since there may be some other
spirit that perceives them though we do not. Wherever
bodies are said to have no existence without the mind,
I would not be understood to mean this or that particular
mind, but all minds whatsoever. It does not therefore
follow from the foregoing Principles that bodies are annihil
ated and created every moment, or exist not at all during
the intervals between our perception of them.

49. Fiftiily, it may perhaps be objected that if extension
and figure exist only in the mind, it follows that the mind
is extended and figured ; since extension is a mode or
attribute which (to speak with the Schools) is predicated of
the subject in which it exists. — I answer, those qualities
are in the mind only as they are perceived by it ; — that is, not
by way of mode or attribute t but only by way of idea\
And it no more follows the soul or mind is extended,
because extension exists in it alone, than it does that it is
red or blue, because those colours are on all hands acknow
ledged to exist in it, and nowhere else. As to what
philosophers say of subject and mode, that seems very
groundless and unintelligible. For instance, in this
proposition ' a die is hard, extended, and square,' they
will have it that the word die denotes a subject or sub
stance, distinct from the hardness, extension, and figure
which are predicated of it, and in which they exist. This
I cannot comprehend : to me a die seems to be nothing
distinct from those things which are termed its modes
or accidents. And, to say a die is hard, extended, and

1 He distinguishes 'idea' from of which philosophers speak;
' mode or attribute.' With Berke- nor (b] as one idea or phenome-
ley, the 'substance' of matter (if the non is related to another idea or
term is still to be applied to sensible phenomenon, in the natural aggre-
things) is the naturally constituted gation of sense-phenomena which
aggregate of phenomena of which constitute, with him, the substance
each particular thing consists. of a material thing. Mind and its
Now extension, and the other •' ideas ' are, on the contrary, related
qualities of sensible things, are as percipient to perceived — in what
not, Berkeley argues, l in mind ' ever ' otherness ' that altogether
either (a) according to the abstract sui generis relation implies,
relation of substance and attribute

PART I] OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 285

square is not to attribute those qualities to a subject
distinct from and supporting them, but only an explication
of the meaning of the word die.

50. Sixthly, you will say there have been a great many
things explained by matter and motion ; take away these
and you destroy the whole corpuscular philosophy, and
undermine those mechanical principles which have been
applied with so much success to account for the phe
nomena. In short, whatever advances have been made,
either by ancient or modern philosophers, in the study of
nature do all proceed on the supposition that corporeal
substance or Matter doth really exist. — To this I answer
that there is not any one phenomenon explained on that
supposition which may not as well be explained without it,
as might easily be made appear by an induction of par
ticulars. To explain the phenomena, is all one as to shew
why, upon such and such occasions, we are affected with
such and such ideas. But how Matter J should operate on
a Spirit, or produce any idea in it, is what no philoso
pher will pretend to explain ; it is therefore evident there
can be no use of Matter1 in natural philosophy. Besides,
they who attempt to account for ihings do it, not by
corporeal substance, but by figure, motion, and other
qualities ; which are in truth no more than mere ideas,
and therefore cannot be the cause of anything, as hath
been already shewn. See sect. 25.

51. Seventhly, it will upon this be demanded whether it
does not seem absurd to take away natural causes'2, and
ascribe everything to the immediate operation of spirits?
We must no longer say upon these principles that fire
heats, or water cools, but that a spirit heats, and so forth.
Would not a man be deservedly laughed at, who should
talk after this manner? — I answer, he would so: in such
things we ought to think with the learned, and speak with the
vulgar. They who to demonstration are convinced of the

1 ' Matter/ i. e. abstract material empty the material world of all

Substance, as distinguished from originative power, and refer the

the concrete things that are realised supposed powers of bodies to the

in living perceptions. constant and omnipresent agency

' 'take away natural causes,' i.e. of God.

286 OF THE PRINCIPLES [PART I

truth of the Copernican system do nevertheless say 'the
sun rises/ 'the sun sets/ or 'comes to the meridian';
and if they affected a contrary style in common talk it
would without doubt appear very ridiculous. A little
reflection on what is here said will make it manifest that
the common use of language would receive no manner
of alteration or disturbance from the admission of our
tenets '.

52. In the ordinary affairs of life, any phrases may be
retained, so long as they excite in us proper sentiments, or
dispositions to act in such a manner as is necessary for
our well-being, how false soever they may be if taken
in a strict and speculative sense. Nay, this is unavoid
able, since, propriety being regulated by custom, language
is suited to the received opinions, which are not always
the truest. Hence it is impossible — even in the most
rigid, philosophic reasonings — so far to alter the bent
and genius of the tongue we speak as never to give
a handle for cavillers to pretend difficulties and inconsis
tencies. But, a fair and ingenuous reader will collect
the sense from the scope and tenor and connexion of
a discourse, making allowances for those inaccurate modes
of speech which use has made inevitable.

53. As to the opinion that there are no corporeal
causes, this has been heretofore maintained by some
of the Schoolmen, as it is of late by others among the
modern philosophers; who though they allow Matter to
exist, yet will have God alone to be the immediate
efficient cause of all things 2. These men saw that
amongst all the objects of sense there was none which
had any power or activity included in it; and that by
consequence this was likewise true of whatever bodies

1 Some philosophers have treated sni generis.

the relation of Matter to Mind in '2 He refers to Descartes, and

perception as one of cause and effect. perhaps Geulinx and Malebranche,

This, according to Berkeley, is an who, while they argued for material

illegitimate analysis, which creates substance, denied the causal effi-

a fictitious duality. On his New ciency of sensible things. Berke-

Principles, philosophy is based on ley's new Principles are pre-

a recognition of the fact, that per- sented as the foundation in reason

ception is neither the cause nor for this denial, and for the essen-

the effect of its object, but in tial spirituality of all active power

a relation to it that is altogether in the universe.

PART I] OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 287

they supposed to exist without the mind, like unto the
immediate objects of sense. But then, that they should
suppose an innumerable multitude of created beings,
which they acknowledge are not capable of producing
any one effect in nature, and which therefore are made
to no manner of purpose, since God might have done
everything as well without them — this I say, though we
should allow it possible, must yet be a very unaccountable
and extravagant supposition J.

54. In the eighth place, the universal concurrent assent
of mankind may be thought by some an invincible
argument in behalf of Matter, or the existence of external
things2. Must we suppose the whole world to be mis
taken ? And if so, what cause can be assigned of so
widespread and predominant an error? — I answer, first,
that, upon a narrow inquiry, it will not perhaps be found
so many as is imagined do really believe the existence
of Matter or things without the mind :i. Strictly speaking,
to believe that which involves a contradiction, or has no
meaning in it \ is impossible ; and whether the foregoing
expressions are not of that sort, I refer it to the impartial
examination of the reader. In one sense, indeed, men
may be said to believe that Matter exists; that is, they
act as if the immediate cause of their sensations, which
affects them every moment, and is so nearly present to
them, were some senseless unthinking being. But, that
they should clearly apprehend any meaning marked by
those words, and form thereof a settled speculative opinion,
is what I am not able to conceive. This is not the only
instance wherein men impose upon themselves, by imagin
ing they believe those propositions which they have
often heard, though at bottom they have no meaning in
them.

1 On the principle, ' Entia non matter is not wonderful. It is

sunt multiplicanda praeter necessi- the office of philosophy to improve

tatem.' their conception, making it deeper

'2 ' external things/ i. e. things and truer, and this was Berkeley's

in the abstract. preliminary task ; as a mean for

3 That the unreflecting part of shewing the impotenceof the things

mankind should have a confused of sense, and conclusive evidence

conception of what should be of omnipresent spiritual activity,

meant by the external reality of 4 Cf. sect. 4, 9, 15, 17, 22, 24.

288 OF THE PRINCIPLES [PART I

55. But secondly, though we should grant a notion to be
never so universally and stedfastly adhered to, yet this
is but a weak argument of its truth to whoever considers
what a vast number of prejudices and false opinions are
everywhere embraced with the utmost tenaciousness, by
the unreflecting (which are the far greater) part of man
kind. There was a time when the antipodes and motion
of the earth were looked upon as monstrous absurdities
even by men of learning : and if it be considered what
a small proportion they bear to the rest of mankind,
we shall find that at this day those notions have gained
but a very inconsiderable footing in the world.

56. But it is demanded that we assign a cause of this
prejudice, and account for its obtaining in the world. To
this I answer, that men knowing they perceived several
ideas, whereof they themselves were not the authors ],
as not being excited from within, nor depending on the
operation of their wills, this made them maintain those
ideas or objects of perception, had an existence indepen
dent of and without the mind, without ever dreaming that
a contradiction was involved in those words. But, philo
sophers having plainly seen that the immediate objects
of perception do not exist without the mind, they in some
degree corrected the mistake of the vulgar2; but at the
same time run into another, which seems no less absurd,
to wit, that there are certain objects really existing with
out the mind, or having a subsistence distinct from being
perceived, of which our ideas are only images or resem
blances, imprinted by those objects on the mind 3. And
this notion of the philosophers owes its origin to the same
cause with the former, namely, their being conscious that
they were not the authors of their own sensations ; which

1 i. e. their sense-ideas. — Though or that it is immediately known
sense-ideas, i. e. the appearances by us only as sensuous appearance,
presented to the senses, are inde- 3 i.e. 'imprinted' by unper-
pendentof the will of the individual ceived Matter, which, on this
percipient, it does not follow that dogma of a representative sense-
they are independent of all percep- perception, was assumed to exist
tioHj so that they can be real in the behind the perceived ideas, and to
absence of realising percipient ex- be the cause of their appearance,
perience. Cf. sect. 29-33. Cf. Third Dialogue between Hylas

2 By shewing that what we are and Philonous.
percipient of in sense must be idea,

PART I] OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 289

they evidently knew were imprinted from without, and
which therefore must have some cause, distinct from the
minds on which they are imprinted.

57. But why they should suppose the ideas of sense
to be excited in us by things in their likeness, and not
rather have recourse to Spirit, which alone can act, may
be accounted for. First, because they were not aware
of the repugnancy there is, as well in supposing things
like unto our ideas existing without, as in attributing to
them power or activity. Secondly, because the Supreme
Spirit which excites those ideas in our minds, is not
marked out and limited to our view by any particular
finite collection of sensible ideas, as human agents are
by their size, complexion, limbs, and motions. And
thirdly, because His operations are regular and uniform.
Whenever the course of nature is interrupted by a miracle,
men are ready to own the presence of a Superior Agent.
But, when we see things go on in the ordinary course,
they do not excite in us any reflexion ; their order and
concatenation, though it be an argument of the greatest
wisdom, power, and goodness in their Creator, is yet so
constant and familiar to us, that we do not think them
the immediate effects of a Free Spirit; especially since
inconsistency and mutability in acting, though it be an
imperfection, is looked on as a mark of freedom \

58. Tcnthly, it will be objected that the notions we
advance are inconsistent with several sound truths in
philosophy and mathematics. For example, the motion
of the earth is now universally admitted by astronomers
as a truth grounded on the clearest and most convincing
reasons. But, on the foregoing Principles, there can be
no such thing. For, motion being only an idea, it
follows that if it be not perceived it exists not : but the
motion of the earth is not perceived by sense. — I answer,
That tenet, if rightly understood, will be found to agree
with the Principles we have premised : for, the question

1 Hence the difficulty men have express Divine Will in nature,

in recognising that Divine Reason instead of narrowing, extends our

and Will, and Law in Nature, are knowledge of God. And divine or

coincident. Buttheadvanceof scien- absolutely reasonable l arbitrariness '

tific discovery of the laws which is not caprice.

BERKELEY : FRASER. I. U

290 OF THE PRINCIPLES [PART I

whether the earth moves or no amounts in reality to no
more than this, to wit, whether we have reason to con
clude, from what has been observed by astronomers,
that if we were placed in such and such circumstances,
and such or such a position and distance both from the
earth and sun, we should perceive the former to move
among the choir of the planets, and appearing in all respects
like one of them : and this, by the established rules of
nature, which we have no reason to mistrust, is reasonably
collected from the phenomena.

59. We may, from the experience we have had of the
train and succession of ideas 1 in our minds, often make,
I will not say uncertain conjectures, but sure and well-
grounded predictions concerning the ideas1 we shall be
affected with pursuant to a great train of actions ; and
be enabled to pass a right judgment of what would
have appeared to us, in case we were placed in circum
stances very different from those we are in at present.
Herein consists the knowledge of nature, which may
preserve its use and certainty very consistently with what
hath been said. It will be easy to apply this to whatever
objections of the like sort may be drawn from the mag
nitude of the stars, or any other discoveries in astronomy
or nature.

60. In the eleventh place, it will be demanded to what
purpose serves that curious organization of plants, and
the animal mechanism in the parts of animals. Might
not vegetables grow, and shoot forth leaves and blossoms,
and animals perform all their motions, as well without
as with all that variety of internal parts so elegantly
contrived and put together ; — which, being ideas, have
nothing powerful or operative in them, nor have any
necessary connexion with the effects ascribed to them ?
If it be a Spirit that immediately produces every effect
by a fiat, or act of his will2, we must think all that is fine
and artificial in the works, whether of man or nature,

1 ' ideas,' i. e. ideas of sense. This sages in Berkeley's writings in
'experience' implies an association which he insists upon the arbitra-
of sensuous ideas, according to the riness — divine or reasonable — of
divine or reasonable order of nature. the natural laws, and sense-sym-

2 Cf. sect. 25-33, and other pas- bolism.

PART l] OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 291

to be made in vain. By this doctrine, though an artist
hath made the spring and wheels, and every movement
of a watch, and adjusted them in such a manner as he
knew would produce the motions he designed ; yet he
must think all this done to no purpose, and that it is an
Intelligence which directs the index, and points to the
hour of the day. If so, why may not the Intelligence do
it, without his being at the pains of making the movements
and putting them together? Why does not an empty
case serve as well as another? And how comes it to pass,
that whenever there is any fault in the going of a watch,
there is some corresponding disorder to be found in the
movements, which being mended by a skilful hand all is
right again ? The like may be said of all the Clockwork
of Nature, great part whereof is so wonderfully fine and
subtle as scarce to be discerned by the best microscope.
In short, it will be asked, how, upon our Principles, any
tolerable account can be given, or any final cause assigned
of an innumerable multitude of bodies and machines,
framed with the most exquisite art, which in the com
mon philosophy have very apposite uses assigned them,
and serve to explain abundance of phenomena?

61. To all which I answer, first, that though there
were some difficulties relating to the administration of
Providence, and the uses by it assigned to the several
parts of nature, which I could not solve by the forego
ing Principles, yet this objection could be of small weight
against the truth and certainty of those things which
may be proved a priori, with the utmost evidence and
rigour of demonstration '. Secondly, but neither are the
received principles free from the like difficulties ; for,
it may still be demanded to what end God should take
those roundabout methods of effecting things by instru
ments and machines, which no one can deny might have
been effected by the mere command of His will, without
all that apparatus. Nay, if we narrowly consider it, we
shall find the objection may be retorted with greater force
on those who hold the existence of those machines without
the mind ; for it has been made evident that solidity, bulk,

1 Cf. sect. 3, 4, 6, 22-24, 2^j in Principles, concerning Reality and
which he proceeds upon the in- Causation.
tuitive certainty of his two leading

U 2

292 OF THE PRINCIPLES [PART I

figure, motion, and the like have no activity or efficacy
in them, so as to be capable of producing any one effect
in nature. See sect. 25. Whoever therefore supposes
them to exist (allowing the supposition possible) when
they are not perceived does it manifestly to no purpose ;
since the only use that is assigned to them, as they
exist unperceived, is that they produce those perceivable
effects which in truth cannot be ascribed to anything but
Spirit.

62. But, to come nigher the difficulty, it must be ob
served that though the fabrication of all those parts and
organs be not absolutely necessary to the producing any
effect, yet it is necessary to the producing of things in a
constant regular way, according to the laws of nature.
There are certain general laws that run through the
whole chain of natural effects : these are learned by the
observation and study of nature, and are by men applied,
as well to the framing artificial things for the use and
ornament of life as to the explaining the various phe
nomena. Which explication consists only in shewing the
conformity any particular phenomenon hath to the general
laws of nature, or, which is the same thing, in discovering
the uniformity there is in the production of natural
effects ; as will be evident to whoever shall attend to
the several instances wherein philosophers pretend to
account for appearances. That there is a great and
conspicuous use in these regular constant methods of
working observed by the Supreme Agent hath been shewn
in sect. 31. And it is no less visible that a particular
size, figure, motion, and disposition of parts are neces
sary, though not absolutely to the producing any effect,
yet to the producing it according to the standing-
mechanical laws of nature. Thus, for instance, it cannot
be denied that God, or the Intelligence that sustains
and rules the ordinary course of things, might if He
were minded to produce a miracle, cause all the motions
on the dial-plate of a watch, though nobody had ever made
the movements and put them in it. But yet, if He will act
agreeably to the rules of mechanism, by Him for wise ends
established and maintained in the creation, it is necessary
that those actions of the watchmaker, whereby he makes
the movements and rightly adjusts them, precede the

PART l] OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 293

production of the aforesaid motions ; as also that any
disorder in them be attended with the perception of some
corresponding disorder in the movements, which being
once corrected all is right again l.

63. It may indeed on some occasions be necessary
that the Author of nature display His overruling power
in producing some appearance out of the ordinary series
of things. Such exceptions from the general rules of
nature are proper to surprise and awe men into an
acknowledgment of the Divine Being ; but then they are
to be used but seldom, otherwise there is a plain reason
why they should fail of that effect. Besides, God seems
to choose the convincing our reason of His attributes
by the works of nature, which discover so much har
mony and contrivance in their make, and are such plain
indications of wisdom and beneficence in their Author,
rather than to astonish us into a belief of His Being by
anomalous and surprising events 2.

64. To set this matter in a yet clearer light, I shall
observe that what has been objected in sect. 60 amounts
in reality to no more than this: — ideas3 are not anyhow
and at random produced, there being a certain order
and connexion between them, like to that of cause and
effect : there are also several combinations of them, made
in a very regular and artificial manner, which seem like
so many instruments in the hand of nature that, being
hid as it were behind the scenes, have a secret operation
in producing those appearances which are seen on the
theatre of the world, being themselves discernible only to
the curious eye of the philosopher. But, since one idea
cannot be the cause of another, to what purpose is that
connexion ? And since those instruments, being barely
inefficacious perceptions in the mind, are not subservient

1 In short, what is virtually the tion to the divine, or perfectly
language of universal natural order reasonable, order of the universe,
is the divine way of revealing Relatively to a finite knowledge
omnipresent Intelligence ; nor can of nature, they seem anomalous —
we conceive how this revelation exceptions from general rules,
could be made through a capricious which nevertheless express, im-
or chaotic succession of changes. mediately and constantly, perfect

2 He here touches on moral active Reason.

purpose in miraculous phenomena, :! ' ideas,' i. e. the phenomena

but without discussing their rela- presented to the senses.

294 OF THE PRINCIPLES [PART i

to the production of natural effects, it is demanded why
they are made ; or, in other words, what reason can be
assigned why God should make us, upon a close inspec
tion into His works, behold so great variety of ideas,
so artfully laid together, and so much according to rule ;
it not being f1 credible] that He would be at the expense
(if one may so speak) of all that art and regularity to no
purpose ?

65. To all which my answer is, first, that the connexion
of ideas2 does not imply the relation of cause and effect,
but only of a mark or sign with the thing ^ signified. The
fire which I see is not the cause of the pain I suffer upon
my approaching it, but the mark that forewarns me of
it. In like manner the noise that I hear is not the effect
of this or that motion or collision of the ambient bodies,
but the sign thereof11. Secondly, the reason why ideas
are formed into machines, that is, artificial and regular
combinations, is the same with that for combining letters
into words. That a few original ideas may be made
to signify a great number of effects and actions, it is
necessary they be variously combined together. And to
the end their use be permanent and universal, these
combinations must be made by rule, and with wise con
trivance. By this means abundance of information is
conveyed unto us, concerning what we are to expect
from such and such actions, and what methods are proper
to be taken for the exciting such and such ideas 4. Which
in effect is all that I conceive to be distinctly meant when
it is said r> that, by discerning the figure, texture, and
mechanism of the inward parts of bodies, whether natural
or artificial, we may attain to know the several uses

1 ' imaginable ' — in first edition. forms of their existence, as it were.

2 'the connexion of ideas,' i. e. 4 Berkele}', in meeting this ob-
the presence of law or reasonable jection, thus implies Universal
uniformity in the coexistence and Natural Symbolism as the essential
succession of the phenomena of character of the sensible world, in
sense; which makes them interpre- its relation to man.

table signs. •"' See Locke's £ssay,Bk. IV, ch.3,

2 According to Berkeley, it is' § 25-28, &c., in which he suggests

by an abuse of language that the that the secondary qualities of

term ' power ' is applied to those bodies may be the natural issue

ideas which are invariable ante- of the different relations and modi-

cedents of other ideas — the prior fications of their primary qualities.

PART l] OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 295

and properties depending thereon, or the nature of the
thing.

66. Hence, it is evident that those things which, under
the notion of a cause co-operating or concurring to the
production of effects, are altogether inexplicable and run
us into great absurdities, may be very naturally explained,
and have a proper and obvious use assigned to them,
when they are considered only as marks or signs for
our information. And it is the searching after and en
deavouring to understand this Language (if I may so
call it) of the Author of Nature, that ought to be the
employment of the natural philosopher ; and not the
pretending to explain things by corporeal causes, which
doctrine seems to have too much estranged the minds
of men from that Active Principle, that supreme and
wise Spirit 'in whom we live, move, and have our being.'

67. In the twelfth place, it may perhaps be objected
that — though it be clear from what has been said that
there can be no such thing as an inert, senseless, extended,
solid, figured, moveable Substance, existing without the
mind, such as philosophers describe Matter; yet, if any
man shall leave out of his idea of Matter the positive ideas
of extension, figure, solidity and motion, and say that he
means only by that word an inert, senseless substance,
that exists without the mind, or unperceived, which is the
occasion of our ideas, or at the presence whereof God is
pleased to excite ideas in us— it doth not appear but that
Matter taken in this sense may possibly exist. — In answer
to which I say, first, that it seems no less absurd to
suppose a substance without accidents, than it is to sup
pose accidents without a substance ]. But secondly,
though we should grant this unknown substance may
possibly exist, yet where can it be supposed to be ? That
it exists not in the mind 2 is agreed ; and that it exists not
in place is no less certain, since all place or extension

1 With Berkeley, material sub- Active Reason, is the constantly

stance is merely the natural com- sustaining cause of this combina-

bination of sense-presented pheno- tion or substantiation,
mena, which, under a diinne or a i. e. that it is not realised in

reasonable1 arbitrariness,' constitute a living percipient experience,
u concrete thing. Divine Will, or

296 OF THE PRINCIPLES [PART I

exists only in the mind \ as hath been already proved. It
remains therefore that it exists nowhere at all.

68. Let us examine a little the description that is here
given us of Matter. It neither acts, nor perceives, nor is
perceived : for this is all that is meant by saying it is an
inert, senseless, unknown substance ; which is a definition
entirely made up of negatives, excepting only the relative
notion of its standing under or supporting. But then it
must be observed that it supports nothing at all, and how
nearly this comes to the description of a nonentity I desire
may be considered. But, say you, it is the unknown
occasion-, at the presence of which ideas are excited in us
by the will of God. Now, I would fain know how any
thing can be present to us, which is neither perceivable by
sense nor reflexion, nor capable of producing any idea in
our minds, nor is at all extended, nor hath any form, nor
exists in any place. The words 'to be present,' when
thus applied, must needs be taken in some abstract and
strange meaning, and which I am not able to comprehend.

69. Again, let us examine what is meant by occasion.
So far as I can gather from the common use of language,
that word signifies either the agent which produces any
effect, or else something that is observed to accompany or
go before it, in the ordinary course of things. But, when
it is applied to Matter, as above described, it can be taken
in neither of those senses ; for Matter is said to be passive
and inert, and so cannot be an agent or efficient cause. It
is also unperceivable, as being devoid of all sensible
qualities, and so cannot be the occasion of our perceptions
in the latter sense ; as when the burning my finger is said
to be the occasion of the pain that attends it. What
therefore can be meant by calling matter an occasion!
This term is either used in no sense at all, or else in some
very distant from its received signification.

70. You will perhaps say that Matter, though it be not
perceived by us, is nevertheless perceived by God, to
whom it is the occasion of exciting ideas in our minds :!.

1 For ' place ' is realised only as crete locality.

perceived — percipient experience - So in the Cartesian theory of

being its concreteexistence. Living occasional causes,

perception is, with Berkeley, the 3 So Geulinx and Malebranche.
condition of the possibility of con-

PART l] OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 297

For, say you, since we observe our sensations to be
imprinted in an orderly and constant manner, it is but
reasonable to suppose there are certain constant and
regular occasions of their being produced. That is to say,
that there are certain permanent and distinct parcels of
Matter, corresponding to our ideas, which, though they do
not excite them in our minds, or anywise immediately
affect us, as being altogether passive, and unperceivable to
us, they are nevertheless to God, by whom they are
perceived ], as it were so many occasions to remind Him
when and what ideas to imprint on our minds : that so
things may go on in a constant uniform manner.

71. In answer to this, I observe that, as the notion of
Matter is here stated, the question is no longer concerning
the existence of a thing distinct from Spirit and idea, from
perceiving and being perceived ; but whether there are not
certain Ideas (of I know not what sort) in the mind of God,
which are so many marks or notes that direct Him how to
produce sensations in our minds in a constant and regular
method : much after the same manner as a musician is
directed by the notes of music to produce that harmonious
train and composition of sound which is called a tune ;
though they who hear the music do not perceive the notes,
and may be entirely ignorant of them. But this notion of
Matter (which after all is the only intelligible one that I
can pick from what is said of unknown occasions) seems
too extravagant to deserve a confutation. Besides, it is in
effect no objection against what we have advanced, viz.
that there is no senseless unperceived substance.

72. If we follow the light of reason, we shall, from the
constant uniform method of our sensations, collect the
goodness and wisdom of the Spirit who excites them in
our minds ; but this is all that I can see reasonably
concluded from thence. To me, I say, it is evident that
the being of a Spirit — infinitely wise, good, and powerful—
is abundantly sufficient to explain all the appearances of
nature2. But, as for inert, senseless Matter, nothing that

1 As known in Divine in- Ideas of God are symbolised to our

telligence, they are accordingly senses, and then interpreted (or

Divine Ideas. And, if this means misinterpreted) by human minds,

that the sensible system is the this allies itself with Platonic

expression of Divine Ideas, which Idealism,

are its ultimate archetype — that the - ' It seems to me/ Hume says,

298 OF THE PRINCIPLES [PART I

I perceive has any the least connexion with it, or leads
to the thoughts of it. And I would fain see any one
explain any the meanest phenomenon in nature by it, or
shew any manner of reason, though in the lowest rank of
probability, that he can have for its existence ; or even
make any tolerable sense or meaning of that supposition.
For, as to its being an occasion, we have, I think,
evidently shewn that with regard to us it is no occasion.
It remains therefore that it must be, if at all, the occasion
to God of exciting ideas in us ; and what this amounts to
we have just now seen.

73. It is worth while to reflect a little on the motives
which induced men to suppose the existence of material
substance. ; that so having observed the gradual ceasing
and expiration of those motives or reasons, we may
proportionably withdraw the assent that was grounded
on them. First, therefore, it was thought that colour,
figure, motion, and the rest of the sensible qualities or
accidents, did really exist without the mind ; and for this
reason it seemed needful to suppose some unthinking
substratum or substance wherein they did exist, since
they could not be conceived to exist by themselves1.
Afterwards, in process of time, men 2 being convinced that
colours, sounds, and the rest of the sensible, secondary
qualities had no existence without the mind, they stripped
this substratum or material substance of those qualities,
leaving only the primary ones, figure, motion, and such
like ; which they still conceived to exist without the mind,
and consequently to stand in need of a material support.
But, it having been shewn that none even of these can
possibly exist otherwise than in a Spirit or Mind which
perceives them, it follows that we have no longer any
reason to suppose the being of Matter 3, nay, that it is

' that this theory of the univer- perience of the universe ?

sal energy and operation of the ' Accordingly we are led to ask,

Supreme Being is too bold ever what the deepest support of their

to carry conviction with it to a mind reality must be. Is it found in

sufficiently apprised of the weak- living Spirit, i e. Active Reason, or

ness of human reason, and the in blind Matter?

narrow limits to which it is con- a e. g. Descartes, Malebranche,

fined in all its operations.' But is it Locke, &c.

not virtually presupposed in the 3 In short, if we mean by Matter,

assumed trustworthiness of our ex- something unrealised in percipient

PART l] OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 299

utterly impossible there should be any such thing; — so
long as that word is taken to denote an unthinking sub
stratum of qualities or accidents, wherein they exist with
out the mind1.

74. But — though it be allowed by the materialists
themselves that Matter was thought of only for the sake
of supporting accidents, and, the reason entirely ceasing,
one might expect the mind should naturally, and without
any reluctance at all, quit the belief of what was solely
grounded thereon : yet the prejudice is riveted so deeply
in our thoughts that we can scarce tell how to part with it,
and are therefore inclined, since the tiling itself is indefen
sible, at least to retain the name ; which we apply to I
know not what abstracted and indefinite notions of being,
or occasion, though without any shew of reason, at least
so far as I can see. For, what is there on our part, or
what do we perceive, amongst all the ideas, sensations,
notions which are imprinted on our minds, either by sense
or reflexion, from whence may be inferred the existence
of an inert, thoughtless, unperceived occasion ? and, on
the other hand, on the part of an All-sufficient Spirit, what
can there be that should make us believe or even suspect
He is directed by an inert occasion to excite ideas in our
minds ?

75. It is a very extraordinary instance of the force of
prejudice, and much to be lamented, that the mind of man
retains so great a fondness, against all the evidence of
reason, for a stupid thoughtless Somewhat, by the inter
position whereof it would as it were screen itself from
the Providence of God, and remove it farther off from the
affairs of the world. But, though we do the utmost we
can to secure the belief of Matter; though, when reason
forsakes us, we endeavour to support our opinion on the
bare possibility of the thing, and though we indulge
ourselves in the full scope of an imagination not regulated
by reason to make out that poor possibility ; yet the upshot
of all is — that there are certain unknown Ideas in the mind
of God ; for this, if anything, is all that I conceive to be
meant by occasion with regard to God. And this at the

experience of sense, what is called sufficiently externalised, when re-
its reality is something unintelligible. garded as regulated by Divine
1 And if sensible phenomena are Reason.

300 OF THE PRINCIPLES [PART I

bottom is no longer contending for the thing, but for the
name1.

76. Whether therefore there are such Ideas in the mind
of God, and whether they may be called by the name
Matter, I shall not dispute2. But, if you stick to the
notion of an unthinking substance or support of extension,
motion, and other sensible qualities, then to me it is most
evidently impossible there should be any such thing ; since
it is a plain repugnancy that those qualities should exist in,
or be supported by, an unperceiving substance :'.

77. But, say you, though it be granted that there is no
thoughtless support of extension, and the other qualities or
accidents which we perceive, yet there may perhaps be
some inert, unperceiving substance or substratum of some
other qualities, as incomprehensible to us as colours are to
a man born blind, because we have not a sense adapted to
them. But, if we had a new sense, we should possibly no
more doubt of their existence than a blind man made to see
does of the existence of light and colours. — I answer, first,
if what you mean by the word Matter be only the unknown
support of unknown qualities, it is no matter whether
there is such a thing or no, since it no way concerns us.
And I do not see the advantage there is in disputing about
what we know not wliat, and we know not why.

78. But, secondly, if we had a new sense, it could only
furnish us with new ideas or sensations ; and then we
should have the same reason against their existing in an
unperceiving substance that has been already offered with

1 Twenty years after the pubii- 2 Berkeley's philosophy is not

cation of the Principles, in a letter inconsistent with Divine Ideas

to his American friend Johnson, which receive expression in the

Berkeley says : — ' 1 have no objec- laws of nature, and of which

tion against calling the Ideas in the human science is the imperfect

mind of God archetypes of ours. interpretation. In this view,

But I object against those arche- assertion of the existence of

types by philosophers supposed to Matter is simply an expression

be real things, and so to have of faith that the phenomenal

an absolute rational existence dis- universe into which we are born

tinct from their being perceived by is a reasonable and interpretable

any mind whatsoever ; it being the universe ; and that it would be

opinion of all materialists that an fully interpreted, if our notions

ideal existence in the Divine Mind could be fully harmonised with the

is one thing, and the real existence Divine Ideas which it expresses,
of material things another,' 3 Cf, sect. 3-24.

PART I] OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 301

relation to figure, motion, colour, and the like. Qualities,
as hath been shewn, are nothing else but sensations or
ideas, which exist only in a mind perceiving them ; and
this is true not only of the ideas we are acquainted with
at present, but likewise of all possible ideas whatsoever \

79. But you will insist, What if I have no reason to
believe the existence of Matter? what if I cannot assign
any use to it, or explain anything by it, or even conceive
what is meant by that word ? yet still it is no contradiction
to say that Matter exists, and that this Matter is in general
a substance, or occasion of ideas ; though indeed to go
about to unfold the meaning, or adhere to any particular
explication of those words may be attended with great
difficulties. — I answer, when words are used without a
meaning, you may put them together as you please, without
danger of running into a contradiction. You may say, for
example, that twice two is equal to seven ; so long as you
declare you do not take the words of that proposition in
their usual acceptation, but for marks of you know not
what. And, by the same reason, you may say there is an
inert thoughtless substance without accidents, which is the
occasion of our ideas. And we shall understand just as
much by one proposition as the other.

80. In the last place, you will say, What if we give up
the cause of material Substance, and stand to it that
Matter is an unknown Somewhat — neither substance nor
accident, spirit nor idea — inert, thoughtless, indivisible,
immoveable, unextended, existing in no place ? For, say
you, whatever may be urged against substance or occasion,
or any other positive or relative notion of Matter, hath no
place at all, so long as this negative definition of Matter is
adhered to. — I answer, You may, if so it shall seem good,
use the word matter in the same sense as other men use
nothing, and so make those terms convertible in your
style. For, after all, this is what appears to me to be
the result of that definition ; the parts whereof, when I

1 So that superhuman persons, Matter than man is, with his few
endowed with a million senses, senses,
would be no nearer this abstract

302 OF THE PRINCIPLES [PART I

consider with attention, either collectively or separate from
each other, I do not find that there is any kind of effect or
impression made on my mind, different from what is
excited by the term nothing.

81. You will reply, perhaps, that in the foresaid
definition is included what doth sufficiently distinguish
it from nothing — the positive abstract idea of quiddity,
entity, or existence. I own, indeed, that those who pretend
to the faculty of framing abstract general ideas do talk as
if they had such an idea, which is, say they, the most
abstract and general notion of all : that is to me the most
incomprehensible of all others. That there are a great
variety of spirits of different orders and capacities, whose
faculties, both in number and extent, are far exceeding
those the Author of my being has bestowed on me, I see
no reason to deny. And for me to pretend to determine,
by my own few, stinted, narrow inlets of perception, what
ideas the inexhaustible power of the Supreme Spirit may
imprint upon them, were certainly the utmost folly and
presumption. Since there may be, for aught that I know,
innumerable sorts of ideas or sensations, as different
from one another, and from all that I have perceived,
as colours are from sounds1. But, how ready soever
I may be to acknowledge the scantiness of my compre
hension, with regard to the endless variety of spirits and
ideas that may possibly exist, yet for any one to pretend to
a notion of Entity or Existence, abstracted from spirit and
idea, from perceived and being perceived, is, I suspect,
a downright repugnancy and trifling with words.

It remains that we consider the objections which may
possibly be made on the part of Religion.

82. Some there are who think that, though the argu
ments for the real existence of bodies which are drawn
from Reason be allowed not to amount to demonstration,
yet the Holy Scriptures are so clear in the point, as will

1 Matter and physical science is course inconceivable by man. Or,

relative, so far that we may sup- we may suppose an intelligence

pose in other percipients than men, destitute of all our senses, and so in

an indefinite number of additional a material world wholly different

senses, affording corresponding in its appearances from ours.
varieties of qualities in things, of

PART l] OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 303

sufficiently convince every good Christian, that bodies
do really exist, and are something more than mere ideas ;
there being in Holy Writ innumerable facts related which
evidently suppose the reality of timber and stone, moun
tains and rivers, and cities, and human bodies l — To
which I answer that no sort of writings whatever, sacred or
profane, which use those and the like words in the vulgar
acceptation, or so as to have a meaning in them, are in dan
ger of having their truth called in question by our doctrine.
That all those things do really exist ; that there are bodies,
even corporeal substances, when taken in the vulgar
sense, has been shewn to be agreeable to our principles :
and the difference betwixt things and ideas, realities and
chimeras, has been distinctly explained. See sect. 29, 30,
33, 36, cvic. And I do not think that either what philosophers
call Matter, or the existence of objects without the mind*,
is anywhere mentioned in Scripture.

83. Again, whether there be or be not external things ",
it is agreed on all hands that the proper use of words
is the marking our conceptions, or things only as they
are known and perceived by us : whence it plainly follows,
that in the tenets we have laid down there is nothing
inconsistent with the right use and significancy of language,
and that discourse, of what kind soever, so far as it is
intelligible, remains undisturbed. But all this seems so
very manifest, from what has been largely set forth in the
premises, that it is needless to insist any farther on it.

84. But, it will be urged that miracles do, at least, lose
much of their stress and import by our principles.
What must we think of Moses' rod? was it not really
turned into a serpent ? or was there only a change of ideas
in the minds of the spectators ? And, can it be supposed
that our Saviour did no more at the marriage-feast in
Cana than impose on the sight, and smell, and taste of

1 The authority of Holy Scrip- should mean when we affirm its
ture, added to our natural tendency reality, and the basis of its explica
te believe in external reality, are bility in science,
grounds on which Malebranchc a i. e. existing unrealised in any
and Norris infer a material world. intelligence — human or Divine.
Berkeley's material world claims a ; external things,' i. e. things
no logical proof of its reality. His existing really, yet out of all rela-
aim is not to prove the reality of tion to active living spirit.
the world, but to shew what we

304 OF THE PRINCIPLES [PART I

the guests, so as to create in them the appearance or idea
only of wine? The same may be said of all other
miracles : which, in consequence of the foregoing principles,
must be looked upon only as so many cheats, or illusions of
fancy. — To this I reply, that the rod was changed into
a real serpent, and the water into real wine. That this does
not in the least contradict what I have elsewhere said will
be evident from sect. 34 and 35. But this business of
real and imaginary has been already so plainly and fully
explained, and so often referred to, and the difficulties
about it are so easily answered from what has gone before,
that it were an affront to the reader's understanding to
resume the explication of it in this place. I shall only
observe that if at table all who were present should see,
and smell, and taste, and drink wine, and find the effects
of it, with me there could be no doubt of its reality ]. So
that at bottom the scruple concerning real miracles has
no place at all on ours, but only on the received principles,
and consequently makes rather for than against what has
been said.

85. Having done with the Objections, which I endeav
oured to propose in the clearest light, and gave them
all the force and weight I could, we proceed in the
next place to take a view of our tenets in their Conse
quences2. Some of these appear at first sight — as that
several difficult and obscure questions, on which abun
dance of speculation has been thrown away, are entirely
banished from philosophy. Whether corporeal substance
can think ? Whether Matter be infinitely divisible ? And
how it operates on spirit? — these and the like inquiries
have given infinite amusement to philosophers in all ages.

1 Simultaneous perception of order, otherwise than as all natural

the 'same' (similar?) s£«s£-ideas, evolution is divinely providen-

l>y different persons, as distin- tial.
guished from purely individual con
sciousness of feelings and fancies, 2 Some of the Consequences of

is here taken as a test of the virtu- adoption of the New Principles, in

ally external reality of the former. their application to the physical

Berkeley does not ask whether sciences and mathematics, and then

the change of the rod into a ser- to psychology and theology, are

pent, or of the water into wine, is unfolded in the remaining sections

the issue of divine agency and of the Principles.

PART l] OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 305

But, depending on the existence of Matter, they have
no longer any place on our Principles. Many other
advantages there are, as well with regard to religion as
the sciences, which it is easy for any one to deduce from
what has been premised. But this will appear more
plainly in the sequel.

86. From the Principles we have laid down it follows
human knowledge may naturally be reduced to two heads
—that of ideas and that of Spirits. Of each of these
I shall treat in order.

And First as to ideas, or unthinking things. Our know
ledge of these has been very much obscured and con
founded, and we have been led into very dangerous errors,
by supposing a two-fold existence of sense— the one
intelligible or in the mind, the other real and without
the mind '. Whereby unthinking things are thought to
have a natural subsistence of their own, distinct from
being perceived by spirits. This, which, if I mistake not,
hath been shewn to be a most groundless and absurd
notion, is the very root of Scepticism ; for, so long as
men thought that real things subsisted without the mind,
and that their knowledge was only so far forth real as it
was conformable to real things, it follows they could not
be certain that they had any real knowledge at all. For
how can it be known that the things which are perceived
are conformable to those which are not perceived, or
exist without the mind 2 ?

87. Colour, figure, motion, extension, and the like,
considered only as so many sensations in the mind, are
perfectly known ; there being nothing in them which
is not perceived. But, if they are looked on as notes or
images, referred to things or archetypes existing without the
mind, then are we involved all in scepticism. We see
only the appearances, and not the real qualities of things.

1 Berkeley disclaims the sup- tative sense-perception, with its

posed representative character of the double object, the germ of total

ideas given in sensuous perception, scepticism. Berkeley claims that,

and recognises as the real object under his interpretation of what

only what is ideally presented in the reality of the material world

consciousness. means, immediate knowledge of

- So Hume, Reid, and Hamilton, mind-dependent matter is given in

who all see in a wholly represen- sense.

BERKELEY : FRASER. I. X

306 OF THE PRINCIPLES [PART I

What may be the extension, figure, or motion of anything
really and absolutely, or in itself, it is impossible for us
to know, but only the proportion or relation they bear to our
senses. Things remaining the same, our ideas vary ; and
which of them, or even whether any of them at all,
represent the true quality really existing in the thing,
it is out of our reach to determine. So that, for aught
we know, all we see, hear, and feel, may be only phantom
and vain chimera, and not at all agree with the real things
existing in reruni natura, All this scepticism1 follows
from our supposing a difference between things and ideas,
and that the former have a subsistence without the mind, or
unperceived. It were easy to dilate on this subject, and
shew how the arguments urged by sceptics in all ages
depend on the supposition of external objects. |_2 But this
is too obvious to need being insisted on.]

88. So long as we attribute a real existence to unthink
ing things, distinct from their being perceived, it is not
only impossible for us to know with evidence the nature of
any real unthinking being, but even that it exists. Hence
it is that we see philosophers distrust their senses, and
doubt of the existence of heaven and earth, of everything
they see or feel, even of their own bodies. And after all
their labouring and struggle of thought, they are forced to
own we cannot attain to any self-evident or demonstrative
knowledge of the existence of sensible things n. But, all
this doubtfulness, which so bewilders and confounds the
mind and makes philosophy ridiculous in the eyes of the
world, vanishes if we annex a meaning to our words,
and do not amuse ourselves with the terms absolute,
external, exist, and such like, signifying we know not what.
I can as well doubt of my own being as of the being of
those things which I actually perceive by sense : it being
a manifest contradiction that any sensible object should
be immediately perceived by sight or touch, and at the
same time have no existence in nature ; since the very

1 ' scepticism ' — ' sceptical cant ' so far resembles that afterwards
in the first edition. employed by Reid and Hamilton.

2 This sentence is omitted in the They differ as regards the depen-
second edition. dence of the sensible object upon

:! Berkeley's argument against percipient spirit lor its reality,
a finally representative perception

PART l] OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 307

existence of an unthinking being consists in being per
ceived.

89. Nothing seems of more importance towards erecting
a firm system of sound and real knowledge, which may be
proof against the assaults of Scepticism, than to lay the
beginning in a distinct explication of what is meant by
thing, reality, existence ; for in vain shall we dispute con
cerning the real existence of things, or pretend to any
knowledge thereof, so long as we have not fixed the
meaning of those words. Thing or being is the most
general name of all : it comprehends under it two kinds,
entirely distinct and heterogeneous, and which have
nothing common but the name, viz. spirits and ideas. The
former are active, indivisible, f1 incorruptible] substances :
the latter are inert, fleeting, [^perishable passions,] or
dependent beings; which subsist not by themselves'2, but
are supported by, or exist in, minds or spiritual substances.

[3 We comprehend our own existence by inward feeling
or reflection, and that of other spirits by reason4. We
may be said to have some knowledge or notion* of our
own minds, of spirits and active beings ; whereof in a strict
sense we have not ideas. In like manner, we know and
have a notion of relations between things or ideas ;
which relations are distinct from the ideas or things
related, inasmuch as the latter may be perceived by us
without our perceiving the former. To me it seems that
ideas, spirits, and relations are all in their respective kinds
the object of human knowledge and subject of discourse ;
and that the term idea would be improperly extended to
signify everything we know or have any notion of0.]

90. Ideas imprinted on the senses are real things, or do
really exist 7 : this we do not deny ; but we deny they can

1 Omitted in second edition. to apprehension of the Ego, and

2 But whilst unthinking things intelligence of relations. The term
depend on being perceived, do not ' notion/ in this contrast with
our spirits depend on ideas of his 'idea/ becomes important in
some sort for their percipient life ? his vocabulary, although he some-

3 The important passage within times uses it vaguely.

brackets was added in the second 6 Locke uses idea in this wider

edition. signification.

4 ' reason,' i. e. reasoning. 7 Inasmuch as they are real
•"' ' Notion,' in its stricter mean- in and through living percipient

ing, is thus confined by Berkeley mind.

X 2

308 OF THE PRINCIPLES [PART I

subsist without the minds which perceive them, or that they
are resemblances of any archetypes existing without the
mind l ; since the very being of a sensation or idea con
sists in being perceived, and an idea can be like nothing
but an idea. Again, the things perceived by sense may be
termed external, with regard to their origin ; in that they
are not generated from within by the mind itself, but
imprinted by a Spirit distinct from that which perceives
them. Sensible objects may likewise be said to be 'with
out the mind' in another sense, namely when they exist
in some other mind. Thus, when I shut my eyes, the
things I saw may still exist ; but it must be in another
mind2.

91. It were a mistake to think that what is here said
derogates in the least from the reality of things. It is
acknowledged, on the received principles, that extension,
motion, and in a word all sensible qualities, have need
of a support, as not being able to subsist by themselves.
But the objects perceived by sense are allowed to be
nothing but combinations of those qualities, and conse
quently cannot subsist by themselves 3. Thus far it is
agreed on all hands. So that in denying the things
perceived by sense an existence independent of a sub
stance or support wherein they may exist, we detract
nothing from the received opinion of their reality, and
are guilty of no innovation in that respect. All the
difference is that, according to us, the unthinking beings
perceived by sense have no existence distinct from
being perceived, and cannot therefore exist in any other
substance than those unextended indivisible substances,
or spirits, which act, and think and perceive them.
Whereas philosophers vulgarly hold that the sensible
qualities do exist in an inert, extended, unperceiving
Substance, which they call Matter, to which they attribute
a natural subsistence, exterior to all thinking beings, or
distinct from being perceived by any mind whatsoever,

1 i. e. unthinking archetypes. nal.' It is the business of the

2 In this section Berkeley explains philosopher to explicate its true
what he means by externality. Men meaning.

cannot act, cannot live, without 3 i. e. they are not substances in

assuming an external world — in the truest or deepest meaning of
some meaning of the term c exter- the word.

PART l] OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 309

even the Eternal Mind of the Creator; wherein they
suppose only Ideas of the corporeal substances l created
by Him : if indeed they allow them to be at all created'21.

92. For, as we have shewn the doctrine of Matter
or Corporeal Substance to have been the main pillar
and support of Scepticism, so likewise upon the same
foundation have been raised all the impious schemes
of Atheism and Irreligion. Nay, so great a difficulty
has it been thought to conceive Matter produced out of
nothing, that the most celebrated among the ancient
philosophers, even of those who maintained the being
of a God, have thought Matter to be uncreated and co-
eternal with Him3. How great a friend material substance
has been to Atheists in all ages were needless to relate.
All their monstrous systems have so visible and neces
sary a dependence on it, that when this corner-stone
is once removed, the whole fabric cannot choose but
fall to the ground ; insomuch that it is no longer worth
while to bestow a particular consideration on the absurd
ities of every wretched sect of Atheists 4.

93. That impious and profane persons should readily
fall in with those systems which favour their inclinations,
by deriding immaterial substance, and supposing the soul
to be divisible, and subject to corruption as the body ;
which exclude all freedom, intelligence, and design from
the formation of things, and instead thereof make a self-
existent, stupid, unthinking substance the root and origin
of all beings; that they should hearken to those who
deny a Providence, or inspection of a Superior Mind

1 ' Ideas of the corporeal sub- Matter must be distinguished
stances.' Berkeley might perhaps from an unbeginning and end-
say — Divine Ideas which are them- less creation of sensible ideas or
selves our world of sensible things phenomena, in percipient spirits,
in its ultimate form. according to divine natural law

- On thescheme of ideal Realism, and order, with implied imma-

' creation' of matter is presenting nence of God.

to finite minds sense-ideas or * Because the question at

phenomena, which are, as it were, issue with Atheism is, whether

letters of the alphabet, in that the universe of things and per-

language of natural order which sons is finally substantiated and

God employs for the expression evolved in unthinking Matter or in

of His Ideas to us. the perfect Reason of God.

J The independent eternity of

3TO OF THE PRINCIPLES [PART I

over the affairs of the world, attributing the whole series
of events either to blind chance or fatal necessity, aris
ing from the impulse of one body on another — all
this is very natural. And, on the other hand, when
men of better principles observe the enemies of religion
lay so great a stress on unthinking Matter, and all of
them use so much industry and artifice to reduce every
thing to it ; methinks they should rejoice to see them
deprived of their grand support, and driven from that
only fortress, without which your Epicureans, Hobbists,
and the like, have not even the shadow of a pretence, but
become the most cheap and easy triumph in the world.

94. The existence of Matter, or bodies unperceived,
has not only been the main support of Atheists and Fatal
ists, but on the same principle doth Idolatry likewise
in all its various forms depend. Did men but consider
that the sun, moon, and stars, and every other object
of the senses, are only so many sensations in their minds,
which have no other existence but barely being perceived,
doubtless they would never fall down and worship their
own ideas ; but rather address their homage to that Eter
nal Invisible Mind which produces and sustains all things.

95. The same absurd principle, by mingling itself with
the articles of our faith, hath occasioned no small diffi
culties to Christians. For example, about the Resur
rection, how many scruples and objections have been
raised by Socinians and others ? But do not the most
plausible of them depend on the supposition that a body
is denominated the same, with regard not to the form,
or that which is perceived by sense J, but the material
substance, which remains the same under several forms ?
Take away this material substance — about the identity
whereof all the dispute is — and mean by body what
every plain ordinary person means by that word, to wit,
that which is immediately seen and felt, which is only
a combination of sensible qualities or ideas : and then
their most unanswerable objections come to nothing.

96. Matter2 being once expelled out of nature drags

1 Of which Berkeley does not 2 'matter,' i. e. matter abstracted

predicate a numerical identity. Cf. from all percipient lifeand voluntary

Third Dialogue bctiveen Hylas and activit}T.
PMlonous.

PART l] OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 311

with it so many sceptical and impious notions, such an
incredible number of disputes and puzzling questions,
which have been thorns in the sides of divines as well
as philosophers, and made so much fruitless work for
mankind, that if the arguments we have produced against
it are not found equal to demonstration (as to me they
evidently seem), yet I am sure all friends to knowledge,
peace, and religion have reason to wish they were.

97. Beside the external1 existence of the objects of
perception, another great source of errors and difficulties
with regard to ideal knowledge is the doctrine of abstract
ideas, such as it hath been set forth in the Introduction.
The plainest things in the world, those we are most
intimately acquainted with and perfectly know, when
they are considered in an abstract way, appear strangely
difficult and incomprehensible. Time, place, and motion,
taken in particular or concrete, are what everybody knows ;
but, having passed through the hands of a metaphysi
cian, they become too abstract and fine to be apprehended
by men of ordinary sense. Bid your servant meet you
at such a time, in such a place, and he shall never stay
to deliberate on the meaning of those words. In con
ceiving that particular time and place, or the motion by
which he is to get thither, he finds not the least difficulty.
But \itinic be taken exclusive of all those particular actions
and ideas that diversify the day, merely for the continua
tion of existence or duration in abstract, then it will
perhaps gravel even a philosopher to comprehend it.

98. For my own part, whenever I attempt to frame
a simple idea of time, abstracted from the succession
of ideas in my mind, which flows uniformly, and is par
ticipated by all beings, I am lost and embrangled in
inextricable difficulties. I have no notion of it at all :
only I hear others say it is infinitely divisible, and speak
of it in such a manner as leads me to harbour odd
thoughts of my existence : since that doctrine lays one
under an absolute necessity of thinking, either that he
passes away innumerable ages without a thought, or else
that he is annihilated every moment of his life : both

1 'external' — not in Berkeley's meaning of externality. Cf. sect. 90.
note 2.

312 OF THE PRINCIPLES [PART I

which seem equally absurd !. Time therefore being no
thing, abstracted from the succession of ideas in our minds,
it follows that the duration of any finite spirit must be
estimated by the number of ideas or actions succeeding
each other in that same spirit or mind. Hence, it is
a plain consequence that the soul always thinks. And
in truth whoever shall go about to divide in his thoughts
or abstract the existence of a spirit from its cogitation,
will, I believe, find it no easy task2.

99. So likewise when we attempt to abstract exten
sion and motion from all other qualities, and consider
them by themselves, we presently lose sight of them,
and run into great extravagances. [3 Hence spring those
odd paradoxes, that the fire is not hot, nor the wall
white ; or that heat and colour are in the objects no
thing but figure and motion.] All which depend on a
twofold abstraction : first, it is supposed that extension,
for example, may be abstracted from all other sensible
qualities ; and, secondly, that the entity of extension
may be abstracted from its being perceived. But, who
ever shall reflect, and take care to understand what
he says, will, if I mistake not, acknowledge that all sen
sible qualities are alike sensations, and alike real] that
where the extension is, there is the colour too, to wit, in
his mind 4, and that their archetypes can exist only in

1 Si non rogas, intelligo. Berke- is to be measured by succession of
le}^ writes long after this to John- ideas in another mind : not con-
son thus: — 'A succession of ideas sidering the true use of words,
(phenomena) I take to constitute which as often terminate in
time, and not to be only the sen- the will as in the understanding,
sible measure thereof, as Mr. Locke being employed to excite and
and • others think. But in these direct action rather than to pro-
matters every man is to think for duce clear and distinct ideas.'
himself, and speak as he finds. Cf. Introduction, sect. 20.
One of my earliest inquiries was - As the esse of unthinking things
about time\ which led me into is percipi, according to Berkeley, so
several paradoxes that I did not the^ss^of persons is percipere. The
think it fit or necessary to publish, real existence of individual Mind
particularly into the notion that thus depends on having ideas of
the resurrection follows the next some sort : the real existence of
moment after death. We are matter depends on a percipient,
confounded and perplexed about 3 This sentence is omitted in the
time — supposing a succession in second edition.
God; that we have an abstract 4
idea of time ; that time in one mind

PART l] OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 313

some other mind: and that the objects of sense1 are
nothing but those sensations, combined, blended, or
(if one may so speak) concreted together ; none of all
which can be supposed to exist unperceived. [2 And
that consequently the wall is as truly white as it is ex
tended, and in the same sense.]

100. What it is for a man to be happy, or an object
good, every one may think he knows. But to frame
an abstract idea of happiness, prescinded from all par
ticular pleasure, or of goodness from everything that
is good, this is what few can pretend to. So likewise
a man may be just and virtuous without having precise
ideas of justice and virtue. The opinion that those
and the like words stand for general notions, abstracted
from all particular persons and actions, seems to have
rendered morality difficult, and the study thereof of less
use to mankind. [2And in effect one may make a great
progress in school ethics without ever being the wiser
or better man for it, or knowing how to behave him
self in the affairs of life more to the advantage of himself
or his neighbours than he did before.] And in effect
the doctrine of abstraction has not a little contributed
towards spoiling the most useful parts of knowledge.

101. The two great provinces of speculative science
conversant about ideas received from sense and their
relations, are Natural Philosophy and Mathematics. With
regard to each of these I shall make some observations.

And first I shall say somewhat of Natural Philosophy.
On this subject it is that the sceptics triumph. All that
stock of arguments they produce to depreciate our facul
ties and make mankind appear ignorant and low, are drawn
principally from this head, namely, that we are under an in
vincible blindness as to the true and real nature of things.
This they exaggerate, and love to enlarge on. We are
miserably bantered, say they, by our senses, and amused
only with the outside and shew of things. The real

1 'objects of sense,' i. e. sensible tinguishable ideas or phenomena

things, practically external to each that are naturally aggregated in the

person. Cf. sect, i, on the meaning form of concrete things,

of tiling, as distinct from the dis- - Omitted in second edition.

314 OF THE PRINCIPLES [PART I

essence, the internal qualities and constitution of every
the meanest object, is hid from our view : something
there is in every drop of water, every grain of sand,
which it is beyond the power of human understanding
to fathom or comprehend \ But, it is evident from
what has been shewn that all this complaint is groundless,
and that we are influenced by false principles to that
degree as to mistrust our senses, and think we know
nothing of those things which we perfectly comprehend.

102. One great inducement to our pronouncing ourselves
ignorant of the nature of things is, the current opinion
that every thing includes within itself the cause of its
properties : or that there is in each object an inward
essence, which is the source whence its discernible quali
ties flow, and whereon they depend. Some have pre
tended to account for appearances by occult qualities ;
but of late they are mostly resolved into mechanical
causes, to wit, the figure, motion, weight, and suchlike
qualities, of insensible particles '2 : whereas, in truth, there
is no other agent or efficient cause than spirit, it being
evident that motion, as well as all other ideas, is perfectly
inert. See sect. 25. Hence, to endeavour to explain
the production of colours or sounds, by figure, motion,
magnitude, and .the like, must needs be labour in vain.
And accordingly we see the attempts of that kind are not
at all satisfactory. Which may be said in general of
those instances wherein one idea or quality is assigned
for the cause of another. I need not say how many hypo
theses and speculations are left out, and how much
the study of nature is abridged by this doctrine8.

103. The great mechanical principle now in vogue
is attraction. That a stone falls to the earth, or the sea
swells towards the moon, may to some appear sufficiently
explained thereby. But how are we enlightened by being
told this is done by attraction ? Is it that that word
signifies the manner of the tendency, and that it is by the

1 Cf. Introduction, sect. 1-3. With ism, which eliminates effective
Berkeley, the real essence of sensi- causation from the material world,
ble things is given in perception — concentrates it in Mind, and in
so far as our perceptions carry us. physical research seeks among data

2 e. g. Locke's Essay, Bk.IV.ch.3. of sense for their divinely main-

3 Berkeley advocates a Real- tained natural laws.

PART l] OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 315

mutual drawing of bodies instead of their being impelled
or protruded towards each other? But nothing is de
termined of the manner or action, and it may as truly
(for aught we know) be termed impulse, or protrusion,
as attraction. Again, the parts of steel we see cohere
firmly together, and this also is accounted for by attrac
tion ; but, in this, as in the other instances, I do not perceive
that anything is signified besides the effect itself; for as
to the manner of the action whereby it is produced, or the
cause which produces it, these are not so much as aimed at.

104. Indeed, if we take a view of the several phe
nomena, and compare them together, we may observe
some likeness and conformity between them. For ex
ample, in the falling of a stone to the ground, in the rising
of the sea towards the moon, in cohesion and crystallization,
there is something alike ; namely, an union or mutual
approach of bodies. So that any one of these or the like
phenomena may not seem strange or surprising to a man
who has nicely observed and compared the effects of
nature. For that only is thought so which is uncommon,
or a thing by itself, and out of the ordinary course of our
observation. That bodies should tend towards the centre
of the earth is not thought strange, because it is what we
perceive every moment of our lives. But that they should
have a like gravitation towards the centre of the moon
may seem odd and unaccountable to most men, because it
is discerned only in the tides. But a philosopher, whose
thoughts take in a larger compass of nature, having
observed a certain similitude of appearances, as well in
the heavens as the earth, that argue innumerable bodies
to have a mutual tendency towards each other, which he
denotes by the general name attraction, whatever can be
reduced to that, he thinks justly accounted for. Thus he
explains the tides by the attraction of the terraqueous
globe towards the moon ; which to him doth not appear
odd or anomalous, but only a particular example of a
general rule or law of nature.

105. If therefore we consider the difference there is
betwixt natural philosophers and other men, with regard
to their knowledge of the phenomena, we shall find it
consists, not in an exacter knowledge of the efficient cause
that produces them— for that can be no other than the will

316 OF THE PRINCIPLES [PART I

of a spirit— but only in a greater largeness of comprehen
sion, whereby analogies, harmonies, and agreements are
discovered in the works of nature, and the particular
effects explained, that is, reduced to general rules, see
sect. 62 : which rules, grounded on the analogy and
uniformness observed in the production of natural effects,
are most agreeable and sought after by the mind ; for that
they extend our prospect beyond what is present and near
to us, and enable us to make very probable conjectures
touching things that may have happened at very great
distances of time and place, as well as to predict things to
come : which sort of endeavour towards Omniscience is
much affected by the mind.

106. But we should proceed warily in such things : for
we are apt to lay too great a stress on analogies, and, to
the prejudice of truth, humour that eagerness of the mind,
whereby it is carried to extend its knowledge into general
theorems. For example, gravitation or mutual attraction,
because it appears in many instances, some are straight
way for pronouncing universal ; and that to attract and be
attracted by every other body is an essential quality
inherent in all bodies whatsoever. Whereas it is evident
the fixed stars have no such tendency towards each other ;
and, so far is that gravitation from being essential to bodies
that in some instances a quite contrary principle seems to
shew itself; as in the perpendicular growth of plants, and
the elasticity of the air. There is nothing necessary or
essential in the case l ; but it depends entirely on the will
of the Governing Spirit2, who causes certain bodies to
cleave together or tend towards each other according to
various laws, whilst He keeps others at a fixed distance ;
and to some He gives a quite contrary tendency to fly
asunder, just as He sees convenient.

107. After what has been premised, I think we may lay
down the following conclusions. First, it is plain philoso-

1 In interpreting the data of parisons of experience,
sense, we are obliged to assume ~ The preceding forms of new

that every new phenomenon must phenomena, being finally deter-

have previously existed in some mined by Will, are, in that sense,

equivalent form — but not neces- arbitrary ; but not capricious, for

sarily in this or that particular the Will is perfect Reason. God

form, for a knowledge of which is the immanent cause of the

we are indebted to inductive com- natural order.

PART l] OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 317

phers amuse themselves in vain, when they enquire for
any natural efficient cause, distinct from a mind or spirit.
Secondly, considering the whole creation is the workman
ship of a wise and good Agent, it should seem to become
philosophers to employ their thoughts (contrary to what
some hold l) about the final causes of things. [~2 For, besides
that this would prove a very pleasing entertainment to the
mind, it might be of great advantage, in that it not only
discovers to us the attributes of the Creator, but may also
direct us in several instances to the proper uses and
applications of things.] And I must confess I see no
reason why pointing out the various ends to which natural
things are adapted, and for which they were originally
with unspeakable wisdom contrived, should not be thought
one good way of accounting for them, and altogether
worthy a philosopher. Thirdly, from what has been pre
mised, no reason can be drawn why the history of nature
should not still be studied, and observations and experi
ments made ; which, that they are of use to mankind, and
enable us to draw any general conclusions, is not the
result of any immutable habitudes or relations between
things themselves, but only of God's goodness and kind
ness to men in the administration of the world. See sects.
30 and 31. Fourthly, by a diligent observation of the

Ehenomena within our view, we may discover the general
iws of nature, and from them deduce other phenomena.
I do not say demonstrate ; for all deductions of that kind
depend on a supposition that the Author of Nature
always operates uniformly, and in a constant observance
of those rules we take for principles, which we cannot
evidently know 3.

108. [2 It appears from sect. 66, &c. that the steady consis
tent methods of nature may not unfitly be styled the
Language of its Author, whereby He discovers His
attributes to our view and directs us how to act for the
convenience and felicity of life. Those men who frame 4
general rules from the phenomena, and afterwards derive 5

1 He probably refers to Bacon. only. Nature in its deepest mean-

2 Omitted in second edition. ing explains itself in the Divine
a What we are able to discover Omniscience.

in the all-comprehensive order 4 i. e. inductively.

may be subordinate and provisional 5 i. e. deductively.

318 OF THE PRINCIPLES [PART I

the phenomena from those rules, seem to consider signs l
rather than causes. 2 A man may well understand natural
signs without knowing their analogy, or being able to say
by what rule a thing is so or so. And, as it is very
possible to write improperly, through too strict an obser
vance of general grammar-rules ; so, in arguing from
general laws of nature, it is not impossible we may ex
tend3 the analogy too far, and by that means run into
mistakes.

109. [4 To carry on the resemblance.] As in reading
other books a wise man will choose to fix his thoughts on
the sense and apply it to use, rather than lay them out in
grammatical remarks on the language ; so, in perusing the
volume of nature, methinks it is beneath the dignity of the
mind to affect an exactness in reducing each particular
phenomenon to general rules, or shewing how it follows
from them. We should propose to ourselves nobler
views, such as to recreate and exalt the mind with a
prospect of the beauty, order, extent, and variety of natural
things : hence, by proper inferences, to enlarge our notions
of the grandeur, wisdom, and beneficence of the Creator :
and lastly, to make the several parts of the creation, so far
as in us lies, subservient to the ends they were designed
for — God's glory, and the sustentation and comfort of
ourselves and fellow-creatures.

no. [r> The best key for the aforesaid analogy, or natural
Science, will be easily acknowledged to be a certain
celebrated Treatise of Mechanics^] In the entrance of

1 'seem to consider signs/ i.e. ed and applied to Nature, by a philo-
to be grammarians rather than sopher of a neighbouring nation,
philosophers: physical sciences whom all the world admire. I shall
deal with the grammar of the divine not take upon me to make re-
language of nature. marks on the performance of that

2 ' A man may be well read in the extraordinary person : only some
language of nature without under- things he has advanced so directly
standing the grammar of it, or being opposite to the doctrine we have
able to say/ &c. — in first edition. hitherto laid down, that we should

3 ' extend ' — ' stretch ' — in first be wanting in the regard due to
edition. the authority of so great a man did

4 Omitted in second edition. we not take some notice of them.'

5 In the first edition, the section He refers, of course, to Newton,
commences thus: 4 The best gram- The first edition of Berkeley's/Vm-
mar of the kind we are speaking of ciples was published in Ireland —
will be easily acknowledged to be hence 'neighbouringnation.' New-
a treatise of Mechanics, demonstrat- ton's Principia appeared in 1687.

PART l] OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 319

which justly admired treatise, Time, Space, and Motion
are distinguished into absolute and relative, true and appar
ent, mathematical and vulgar: which distinction, as it is at
large explained by the author, does suppose those quanti
ties to have an existence without the mind : and that they
are ordinarily conceived with relation to sensible things, to
which nevertheless in their own nature they bear no
relation at all.

in. As for Time, as it is there taken in an absolute or
abstracted sense, for the duration or perseverance of the
existence of things, I have nothing more to add concern
ing it after what has been already said on that subject.
Sects. 97 and 98. For the rest, this celebrated author
holds there is an absolute Space, which, being unperceiv-
able to sense, remains in itself similar and immoveable ;
and relative space to be the measure thereof, which, being
moveable and defined by its situation in respect of
sensible bodies, is vulgarly taken for immoveable space.
Place he defines to be that part of space which is occupied
by any body : and according as the space is absolute or
relative so also is the place. Absolute Motion is said to be
the translation of a body from absolute place to absolute
place, as relative motion is from one relative place to
another. And because the parts of absolute space do not
fall under our senses, instead of them we are obliged to
use their sensible measures ; and so define both place and
motion with respect to bodies which we regard as immove
able. But it is said, in philosophical matters we must
abstract from our senses; since it may be that none of
those bodies which seem to be quiescent are truly so ;
and the same thing which is moved relatively may be
really at rest. As likewise one and the same body may be
in relative rest and motion, or even moved with contrary
relative motions at the same time, according as its place is
variously defined. All which ambiguity is to be found in
the apparent motions ; but not at all in the true or absolute,
which should therefore be alone regarded in philosophy.
And the true we are told are distinguished from apparent
or relative motions by the following properties. First, in
true or absolute motion, all parts which preserve the same
position with respect of the whole, partake of the motions
of the whole. Secondly, the place being moved, that

320 OF THE PRINCIPLES [PART I

which is placed therein is also moved : so that a body
moving in a place which is in motion doth participate
the motion of its place. Thirdly, true motion is never
generated or changed otherwise than by force impressed
on the body itself. Fourthly, true motion is always
changed by force impressed on the body moved. Fifthly,
in circular motion, barely relative, there is no centrifugal
force, which nevertheless, in that which is true or absolute,
is proportional to the quantity of motion.

112. But, notwithstanding what hath been said, I must
confess it does not appear to me that there can be any
motion other than relative1: so that to conceive motion
there must be conceived at least two bodies; where
of the distance or position in regard to each other is
varied. Hence, if there was one only body in being it
could not possibly be moved. This seems evident, in
that the idea I have of motion doth necessarily include
relation. — f2 Whether others can conceive it otherwise, a
little attention may satisfy them.]

113. But, though in every motion it be necessary to
conceive more bodies than one, yet it may be that one only
is moved, namely, that on which the force causing the
change in the distance or situation of the bodies is im
pressed. For, however some may define relative motion,
so as to term that body moved which changes its distance
from some other body, whether the force [3or action]
causing that change were impressed on it or no, yet, as
relative motion is that which is perceived by sense, and
regarded in the ordinary affairs of life, it follows that every
man of common sense knows what it is as well as the best
philosopher. Now, I ask any one whether, in his sense of
motion as he walks along the streets, the stones he passes
over may be said to move, because they change distance
with his feet? To me it appears that though motion
includes a relation of one thing to another, yet it is not
necessary that each term of the relation be denominated
from it. As a man may think of somewhat which does

1 ' Motion,' in various aspects, impeded locomotion. Cf. sect,

is treated specially in the De Motu. 116.

An imagination of trinal space - Omitted in second edition,

presupposes locomotive experience " Added in second edition.
— unimpeded, in contrast with

PART l] OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 321

not think, so a body may be moved to or from another
body which is not therefore itself in motion, [' I mean
relative motion, for other I am not able to conceive.]

114. As the place happens to be variously defined, the
motion which is related to it varies2. A man in a ship
may be said to be quiescent with relation to the sides of
the vessel, and yet move with relation to the land. Or he
may move eastward in respect of the one, and westward in
respect of the other. In the common affairs of life, men
never go beyond the Earth to define the place of any
body; and what is quiescent in respect of that is accounted
absolutely to be so. But philosophers, who have a greater
extent of thought, and juster notions of the system of
things, discover even the Earth itself to be moved. In
order therefore to fix their notions, they seem to conceive
the Corporeal World as finite, and the utmost unmoved
walls or shell thereof to be the place whereby they esti
mate true motions. If we sound our own conceptions, I
believe we may find all the absolute motion we can frame
an idea of to be at bottom no other than relative motion
thus defined. For, as has been already observed, absolute
motion, exclusive of all external relation, is incomprehensi
ble : and to this kind of relative motion all the above-
mentioned properties, causes, and effects ascribed to
absolute motion will, if I mistake not, be found to agree.
As to what is said of the centrifugal force, that it does not
at all belong to circular relative motion, I do not see how
this follows from the experiment which is brought to prove
it. See Newton's PhilosopJiiac Naturalis Principia Mathe-
matica, in ScJioL Dcf. VIII. For the water in the vessel,
at that time wherein it is said to have the greatest relative
circular motion, hath, I think, no motion at all : as is plain
from the foregoing section.

115. For, to denominate a body moved, it is requisite,
first, that it change its distance or situation with regard
to some other body : and secondly, that the force occa
sioning that change be applied to3 it. If either of these
be wanting, I do not think that, agreeably to the
sense of mankind, or the propriety of language, a body

1 Omitted in second edition. " 'applied to' — ' impressed on'

2 See Locke's Essay, Bk. II. ch. — in first edition.
I3> §§ 1~10-

BERKELEY : FRASER. I. Y

322 OF THE PRINCIPLES [PART I

can be said to be in motion. I grant indeed that it
is possible for us to think a body, which we see change
its distance from some other, to be moved, though it have
no force applied to l it (in which sense there may be
apparent motion) ; but then it is because the force causing
the change2 of distance is imagined by us to be [3 applied
or] impressed on that body thought to move. Which
indeed shews we are capable of mistaking a thing to be
in motion which is not, and that is all. [4 But it does not
prove that, in the common acceptation of motion, a body
is moved merely because it changes distance from an
other; since as soon as we are undeceived, and find that
the moving force was not communicated to it, we no
longer hold it to be moved. So, on the other hand, when
one only body (the parts whereof preserve a given position
between themselves) is imagined to exist, some there
are who think that it can be moved all manner of ways,
though without any change of distance or situation to any
other bodies ; which we should not deny, if they meant
only that it might have an impressed force, which, upon
the bare creation of other bodies, would produce a motion
of some certain quantity and determination. But that
an actual motion (distinct from the impressed force, or
power, productive of change of place in case there were
bodies present whereby to define it) can exist in such a
single body, I must confess I am not able to comprehend.]
116. From what has been said, it follows that the
philosophic consideration of motion doth not imply the
being of an absolute Space, distinct from that which is
perceived by sense, and related to bodies : which that
it cannot exist without the mind is clear upon the same
principles that demonstrate the like of all other objects
of sense. And perhaps, if we inquire narrowly, we shall
find we cannot even frame an idea of pure Space exclusive
of all body. This I must confess seems impossible 5, as

1 'applied to' — 'impressed on' their consequent events, not effi-

— in first edition. cient causes of change.

a 'the force causing the change' 3 Added in second edition.

— which 'force/ according to Berke- 4 What follows to the end of this

ley, can only be attributed meta- section is omitted in the second

phorically to the so-called impelling edition.

body; inasmuch as bodies, or the 5 ' seems impossible' — 'is above

data of sense, can only be signs of my capacity' — in first edition.

PART l] OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 323

being a most abstract idea. When I excite a motion in
some part of my body, if it be free or without resistance,
I say there is Space. But if I find a resistance, then I say
there is Body: and in proportion as the resistance to
motion is lesser or greater, I say the space is more or less
pure. So that when I speak of pure or empty space,
it is not to be supposed that the word space stands for
an idea distinct from, or conceivable without, body and
motion. Though indeed we are apt to think every noun
substantive stands for a distinct idea that may be separ
ated from all others; which hath occasioned infinite
mistakes. When, therefore, supposing all the world to be
annihilated besides my own body, I say there still remains
pure Space; thereby nothing else is meant but only that
I conceive it possible for the limbs of my body to be
moved on all sides without the least resistance : but if that
too were annihilated then there could be no motion, and
consequently no Space *. Some, perhaps, may think the
sense of seeing doth furnish them with the idea of pure
space ; but it is plain from what we have elsewhere
shewn, that the ideas of space and distance are not obtained
by that sense. See the Essay concerning Vision.

ii 7. What is here laid down seems to put an end to
all those disputes and difficulties that have sprung up
amongst the learned concerning the nature of pure Space.
But the chief advantage arising from it is that we are
freed from that dangerous dilemma, to which several
who have employed their thoughts on that subject ima
gine themselves reduced, viz. of thinking either that Real
Space is God, or else that there is something beside God
which is eternal, uncreated, infinite, indivisible, immutable.
Both which may justly be thought pernicious and absurd
notions. It is certain that not a few divines, as well as
philosophers of great note, have, from the difficulty they
found in conceiving either limits or annihilation of space,
concluded it must be divine. And some of late have set
themselves particularly to shew that the incommunicable
attributes of God agree to it. Which doctrine, how un
worthy soever it may seem of the Divine Nature, yet

1 In short, empty Space is the of Vision. He minimises Space,
sensuous idea of unresisted motion. treating it as a datum of sense.
This is implied in the New Theory

Y 2

324 OF THE PRINCIPLES [PART I

I must confess I do not see how we can get clear of it, so
long as we adhere to the received opinions \

118. Hitherto of Natural Philosophy. We come now
to make some inquiry concerning that other great branch
of speculative knowledge, to wit, Mathematics -. These,
how celebrated soever they may be for their clearness
and certainty of demonstration, which is hardly any
where else to be found, cannot nevertheless be supposed
altogether free from mistakes, if in their principles
there lurks some secret error which is common to the
professors of those sciences with the rest of mankind.
Mathematicians, though they deduce their theorems from
a great height of evidence, yet their first principles are
limited by the consideration of Quantity. And they do
not ascend into any inquiry concerning those transcenden
tal maxims which influence all the particular sciences;
each part whereof, Mathematics not excepted, doth con
sequently participate of the errors involved in them. That
the principles laid down by mathematicians are true, and
their way of deduction from those principles clear and
incontestible, we do not deny. But we hold there may
be certain erroneous maxims of greater extent than the
object of Mathematics, and for that reason not expressly
mentioned, though tacitly supposed, throughout the whole
progress of that science ; and that the ill effects of those
secret unexamined errors are diffused through all the
branches thereof. To be plain, we suspect the mathe
maticians are no less deeply concerned than other men
in the errors arising from the doctrine of abstract general
ideas, and the existence of objects without the mind.

119. Arithmetic hath been thought to have for its object
abstract ideas of number. Of which to understand the
properties and mutual habitudes, is supposed no mean
part of speculative knowledge. The opinion of the pure and
intellectual nature of numbers in abstract has made them

1 He probably refers to Samuel concerned with the New Principles
Clarke's Demonstration of the Being in their application to Mathematics.
and Attributes of God, \vhich appear- The foundation of the mathema-
ed in 1706, and a treatise De Spatio tical sciences engaged much of
Reali, published in the same year. Berkeley's thought in early life and

2 Sect. 118-132 are accordingly in his later years. See \i\$Analyst.

PART l] OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 325

in esteem with those philosophers who seem to have
affected an uncommon fineness and elevation of thought.
It hath set a price on the most trifling numerical specu
lations, which in practice are of no use, but serve only
for amusement ; and hath heretofore so far infected the
minds of some, that they have dreamed of mighty mysteries
involved in numbers, and attempted the explication of
natural things by them. But, if we narrowly inquire into
our own thoughts, and consider what has been premised,
we may perhaps entertain a low opinion of those high
flights and abstractions, and look on all inquiries about
numbers only as so many difficiles nugac, so far as they are
not subservient to practice, and promote the benefit of life.

120. Unity in abstract we have before considered in
sect. 13; from which, and what has been said in the Intro
duction, it plainly follows there is not any such idea.
But, number being defined a collection of units, we may
conclude that, if there be no such thing as unity, or unit
in abstract, there are no ideas of number in abstract,
denoted by the numeral names and figures. The theories
therefore in Arithmetic, if they are abstracted from the
names and figures, as likewise from all use and practice, as
well as from the particular things numbered, can be
supposed to have nothing at all for their object. Hence
we may see how entirely the science of numbers is subor
dinate to practice, and how jejune and trilling it becomes
when considered as a matter of mere speculation 1.

121. However, since there may be some who, deluded
by the specious show of discovering abstracted verities,
waste their time in arithmetical theorems and problems
which have not any use, it will not be amiss if we more
fully consider and expose the vanity of that pretence.
And this will plainly appear by taking a view of Arith
metic in its infancy, and observing what it was that origin
ally put men on the study of that science, and to what
scope they directed it. It is natural to think that at first,
men, for ease of memory and help of computation, made
use of counters, or in writing of single strokes, points,
or the like, each whereof was made to signify an unit, i. e.
some one thing of whatever kind they had occasion to

1 Numerical relations are realised only in concrete experience.

326 OF THE PRINCIPLES [PART I

reckon. Afterwards they found out the more compendious
ways of making one character stand in place of several
strokes or points. And, lastly, the notation of the
Arabians or Indians came into use ; wherein, by the re
petition of a few characters or figures, and varying the
signification of each figure according to the place it obtains,
all numbers may be most aptly expressed. Which seems
to have been done in imitation of language, so that an
exact analogy is observed betwixt the notation by figures
and names, the nine simple figures answering the nine
first numeral names and places in the former, corre
sponding to denominations in the latter. And agreeably
to those conditions of the simple and local value of figures,
were contrived methods of finding, from the given figures
or marks of the parts, what figures and how placed are
proper to denote the whole, or vice versa. And having
found the sought figures, the same rule or analogy being
observed throughout, it is easy to read them into words ;
and so the number becomes perfectly known. For then
the number of any particular things is said to be known,
when we know the name or figures (with their due
arrangement) that according to the standing analogy
belong to them. For, these signs being known, we can by
the operations of arithmetic know the signs of any part of
the particular sums signified by them; and thus computing
in signs, (because of the connexion established betwixt
them and the distinct multitudes of things, whereof one
is taken for an unit), we may be able rightly to sum up,
divide, and proportion the things themselves that we
intend to number.

122. In Arithmetic, therefore, we regard not the things
but the signs ; which nevertheless are not regarded for
their own sake, but because they direct us how to act
with relation to things, and dispose rightly of them. Now,
agreeably to what we have before observed of Words
in general (sect. 19, Introd.), it happens here likewise,
that abstract ideas are thought to be signified by numeral
names or characters, while they do not suggest ideas of
particular things to our minds. I shall not at present
enter into a more particular dissertation on this subject;
but only observe that it is evident from what has been
said, those things which pass for abstract truths and

PART l] OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 327

theorems concerning numbers, are in reality conversant
about no object distinct from particular numerable things ;
except only names and characters, which originally came
to be considered on no other account but their being
signs, or capable to represent aptly whatever particular
things men had need to compute. Whence it follows
that to study them for their own sake would be just as
wise, and to as good purpose, as if a man, neglecting
the true use or original intention and subserviency of lan
guage, should spend his time in impertinent criticisms upon
words, or reasonings and controversies purely verbal \

123. From numbers we proceed to speak of extension '2,
which, considered as relative, is the object of Geometry.
The infinite divisibility of finite extension, though it is not
expressly laid down either as an axiom or theorem in
the elements of that science, yet is throughout the same
everywhere supposed, and thought to have so inseparable
and essential a connexion with the principles and demon
strations in Geometry that mathematicians never admit
it into doubt, or make the least question of it. And as
this notion is the source from whence do spring all those
amusing geometrical paradoxes which have such a direct
repugnancy to the plain common sense of mankind, and
are admitted with so much reluctance into a mind not yet
debauched by learning ; so is it the principal occasion
of all that nice and extreme subtilty, which renders the
study of Mathematics so very difficult and tedious.
Hence, if we can make it appear that no finite extension
contains innumerable parts, or is infinitely divisible, it
follows that we shall at once clear the science of Geometry
from a great number of difficulties and contradictions
which have ever been esteemed a reproach to human
reason, and withal make the attainment thereof a business
of much less time and pains than it hitherto hath been.

124. Every particular finite extension which may possi
bly be the object of our thought is an idea existing only
in the mind ; and consequently each part thereof must be
perceived. If, therefore, I cannot perceive innumerable
parts in any finite extension that I consider, it is certain
they are not contained in it. But it is evident that

1 Cf. New Theory of Vision, sect. 107, &c.
a Ibid. sect. 122-125, 149-160.

328 OF THE PRINCIPLES [PART I

I cannot distinguish innumerable parts in any particular
line, surface, or solid, which I either perceive by sense,
or figure to myself in my mind. Wherefore I conclude
they are not contained in it. Nothing can be plainer
to me than that the extensions I have in view are no
other than my own ideas ; and it is no less plain that
I cannot resolve any one of my ideas into an infinite
number of other ideas ; that is, that they are not infinitely
divisible \ If by finite extension be meant something
distinct from a finite idea, I declare I do not know what
that is, and so cannot affirm or deny anything of it.
But if the terms extension, parts, and the like, are taken
in any sense conceivable — that is, for ideas, — then to say
a finite quantity or extension consists of parts infinite
in number is so manifest and glaring a contradiction,
that every one at first sight acknowledges it to be so.
And it is impossible it should ever gain the assent of any
reasonable creature who is not brought to it by gentle
and slow degrees, as a converted Gentile2 to the belief
of transubstantiation. Ancient and rooted prejudices
do often pass into principles. And those propositions
which once obtain the force and credit of a principle, are
not only themselves, but likewise whatever is deducible
from them, thought privileged from all examination.
And there is no absurdity so gross, which, by this means,
the mind of man may not be prepared to swallow3.

125. He whose understanding is prepossessed with
the doctrine of abstract general ideas may be persuaded
that (whatever be thought of the ideas of sense) extension
in abstract is infinitely divisible. And one who thinks
the objects of sense exist without the mind will perhaps,
in virtue thereof, be brought to admit4 that a line but an
inch long may contain innumerable parts really existing,
though too small to be discerned. These errors are

1 An infinitely divided extension, ceasing to be perceived or real,
being unperceived, must be un- 2 'converted Gentile' — 'pagan

real — if its existence is made real convert' — in first edition,
only in and through actual per- 3 Cf. Locke's Essay, Bk. I, ch.

ception, or at least imagination. 3, § 25.

The only possible extension is, 4 'will perhaps in virtue thereof

accordingly, sensible extension, be brought to admit/ &c. — ' will

which could not be infinitely not stick to affirm/ &c. — in first

divided without the supposed parts edition.

PART I] OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 329

grafted as well in the minds of geometricians as of other
men, and have a like influence on their reasonings ; and
it were no difficult thing to shew how the arguments
from Geometry made use of to support the infinite divisi
bility of extension are bottomed on them. [ 1 But this, if
it be thought necessary, we may hereafter find a proper
place to treat of in a particular manner.] At present
we shall only observe in general whence it is the mathe
maticians are all so fond and tenacious of that doc
trine.

126. It has been observed in another place that the
theorems and demonstrations in Geometry are conver
sant about universal ideas (sect. 15, Introd.) : where it is
explained in what sense this ought to be understood,
to wit, the particular lines and figures included in the
diagram are supposed to stand for innumerable others of
different sizes ; or, in other words, the geometer con
siders them abstracting from their magnitude : which doth
not imply that he forms an abstract idea, but only that
he cares not what the particular magnitude is, whether
great or small, but looks on that as a thing indifferent
to the demonstration. Hence it follows that a line in
the scheme but an inch long must be spoken of as though
it contained ten thousand parts, since it is regarded not
in itself, but as it is universal ; and it is universal only
in its signification, whereby it represents innumerable
lines greater than itself, in which may be distinguished
ten thousand parts or more, though there may not be
above an inch in it. After this manner, the properties
of the lines signified are (by a very usual figure) trans
ferred to the sign ; and thence, through mistake, thought
to appertain to it considered in its own nature.

127. Because there is no number of parts so great
but it is possible there may be a line containing more,
the inch-line is said to contain parts more than any
assignable number ; which is true, not of the inch taken
absolutely, but only for the things signified by it. But
men, not retaining that distinction in their thoughts,
slide into a belief that the small particular line described
on paper contains in itself parts innumerable. There

1 Omitted in second edition. See the Analyst.

33° OF THE PRINCIPLES [PART I

is no such thing as the ten thousandth part of an inch ; but
there is of a mile or diameter of the earth, which may
be signified by that inch. When therefore I delineate
a triangle on paper, and take one side, not above an
inch for example in length, to be the radius, this I
consider as divided into 10,000 or 100,000 parts, or
more. For, though the ten thousandth part of that line
considered in itself, is nothing at all, and consequently
may be neglected without any error or inconveniency,
yet these described lines, being only marks standing
for greater quantities, whereof it may be the ten thou
sandth part is very considerable, it follows that, to prevent
notable errors in practice, the radius must be taken of
10,000 parts, or more.

128. From what has been said the reason is plain why,
to the end any theorem may become universal in its use,
it is necessary we speak of the lines described on paper
as though they contained parts which really they do not.
In doing of which, if we examine the matter throughly,
we shall perhaps discover that we cannot conceive an
inch itself as consisting of, or being divisible into, a
thousand parts, but only some other line which is far
greater than an inch, and represented by it ; and that
when we say a line is infinitely divisible, we must mean *
a line which is infinitely great. What we have here ob
served seems to be the chief cause, why to suppose
the infinite divisibility of finite extension has been thought
necessary in geometry.

129. The several absurdities and contradictions which
flowed from this false principle might, one would think,
have been esteemed so many demonstrations against
it. But, by I know not what logic, it is held that proofs
a posteriori are not to be admitted against propositions
relating to Infinity. As though it were not impossible
even for an Infinite Mind to reconcile contradictions ;
or as if anything absurd and repugnant could have a
necessary connexion with truth, or flow from it. But
whoever considers the weakness of this pretence, will
think it was contrived on purpose to humour the lazi
ness of the mind, which had rather acquiesce in an

1 ' we must mean ' — ' we mean (if we mean anything) ' — in first
edition.

PART l] OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 331

indolent scepticism than be at the pains to go through
with a severe examination of those principles it has ever
embraced for true.

130. Of late the speculations about Infinites have run
so high, and grown to such strange notions, as have
occasioned no small scruples and disputes among the
geometers of the present age. Some there are of great
note who, not content with holding that finite lines may
be divided into an infinite number of parts, do yet
farther maintain, that each of those Infinitesimals is itself
subdivisible into an infinity of other parts, or Infinitesi
mals of a second order, and so on ad infinituin. These,
I say, assert there are Infinitesimals of Infinitesimals of
Infinitesimals, without ever coming to an end. So that
according to them an inch does not barely contain an infinite
number of parts, but an infinity of an infinity of an in
finity ad infinitum of parts. Others there be who hold all
orders of Infinitesimals below the first to be nothing at
all ; thinking it with good reason absurd to imagine there
is any positive quantity or part of extension which, though
multiplied infinitely, can ever equal the smallest given
extension. And yet on the other hand it seems no less
absurd to think the square, cube, or other power of a
positive real root, should itself be nothing at all ; which
they who hold Infinitesimals of the first order, denying
all of the subsequent orders, are obliged to maintain.

131. Have we not therefore reason to conclude they
are both in the wrong, and that there is in effect no
such thing as parts infinitely small, or an infinite number of
parts contained in any finite quantity ? But you will say
that if this doctrine obtains it will follow the very founda
tions of Geometry are destroyed, and those great men
who have raised that science to so astonishing a height,
have been all the while building a castle in the air. To
this it may be replied, that whatever is useful in geome
try, and promotes the benefit of human life, does still
remain firm and unshaken on our Principles ; that science
considered as practical will rather receive advantage than
any prejudice from what has been said. But to set this
in a due light, [' and shew how lines and figures may be

1 Omitted in the second edition.

332 OF THE PRINCIPLES [PART I

measured, and their properties investigated, without sup
posing finite extension to be infinitely divisible,] may
be the proper business of another place \ For the rest,
though it should follow that some of the more intricate
and subtle parts of Speculative Mathematics may be
pared off without any prejudice to truth, yet I do not
see what damage will be thence derived to mankind.
On the contrary, I think it were highly to be wished
that men of great abilities and obstinate application "
would draw off their thoughts from those amusements,
and employ them in the study of such things as lie
nearer the concerns of life, or have a more direct influ
ence on the manners.

132. If it be said that several theorems, undoubtedly
true, are discovered by methods in which Infinitesimals
are made use of, which could never have been if their
existence included a contradiction in it: — I answer, that
upon a thorough examination it will not be found that
in any instance it is necessary to make use of or con
ceive infinitesimal parts of finite lines, or even quantities
less than the minimum sensibile : nay, it will be evident
this is never done, it being impossible. [3 And whatever
mathematicians may think of Fluxions, or the Differential
Calculus, and the like, a little reflexion will shew them
that, in working by those methods, they do not conceive
or imagine lines or surfaces less than what are perceiv
able to sense. They may indeed call those little and
almost insensible quantities Infinitesimals, or Infinitesi
mals of Infinitesimals, if they please. But at bottom this
is all, they being in truth finite ; nor does the solution of
problems require the supposing any other. But this
will be more clearly made out hereafter '.]

I33- By what we have hitherto said, it is plain that
very numerous and important errors have taken their
rise from those false Principles which were impugned
in the foregoing parts of this Treatise ; and the opposites

1 Does this refer to the intended obstinate application/ &c. — in first
* Part II ' of the Principles ? edition.

2 f men of great abilities and ob- 3 What follows to the end of
stinate application/ &c. — ; men of this section is omitted in the second
the greatest abilities and most edition.

PART l] OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 333

of those erroneous tenets at the same time appear to be
most fruitful Principles, from whence do flow innumerable
consequences, highly advantageous to true philosophy
as well as to religion. Particularly Matter, or the absolute l
existence of corporeal objects, hath been shewn to be that
wherein the most avowed and pernicious enemies of
all knowledge, whether human or divine, have ever
placed their chief strength and confidence. And surely
if by distinguishing the real existence of unthinking
things from their being perceived, and allowing them
a subsistence of their own, out of the minds of spirits,
no one thing is explained in nature, but on the contrary
a great many inexplicable difficulties arise ; if the sup
position of Matter- is barely precarious, as not being
grounded on so much as one single reason ; if its con
sequences cannot endure the light of examination and
free inquiry, but screen themselves under the dark and
general pretence of infinites being incomprehensible', if
withal the removal of this Matter 2 be not attended with
the least evil consequence ; if it be not even missed in
the world, but everything as well, nay much easier con
ceived without it ; if, lastly, both Sceptics and Atheists
are for ever silenced upon supposing only spirits and
ideas, and this scheme of things is perfectly agreeable
both to Reason and Religion : methinks we may expect
it should be admitted and firmly embraced, though it
were proposed only as an hypothesis, and the existence
of Matter2 had been allowed possible; which yet I
think we have evidently demonstrated that it is not.

134. True it is that, in consequence of the foregoing
Principles, several disputes and speculations which are
esteemed no mean parts of learning are rejected as use
less [3 and in effect conversant about nothing at all].
But how great a prejudice soever against our notions
this may give to those who have already been deeply
engaged, and made large advances in studies of that
nature, yet by others we hope it will not be thought

1 ' absolute,' i. e. abstract, in- 2 Matter unrealised in percep-

dependent, irrelative existence — tion — not the material world that

as something of which there can is realised in percipient experi-

be no sensuous perception or con- ence of sense,

ception. 3 Omitted jn second edition.

334 OF THE PRINCIPLES [PARTI

any just ground of dislike to the principles and tenets
herein laid down, that they abridge the labour of study,
and make human sciences more clear, compendious, and
attainable than they were before.

135. Having despatched what we intended to say con
cerning the knowledge of ideas, the method we proposed
leads us in the next place to treat of spirits l : with regard
to which, perhaps, human knowledge is not so deficient
as is vulgarly imagined. The great reason that is assigned
for our being thought ignorant of the nature of Spirits
is our not having an idea of it. But, surely it ought not
to be looked on as a defect in a human understanding
that it does not perceive the idea of Spirit, if it is mani
festly impossible there should be any such idea. And
this if I mistake not has been demonstrated in section
27. To which I shall here add that a Spirit has been
shewn to be the only substance or support wherein un
thinking beings or ideas can exist : but that this substance
which supports or perceives ideas should itself be an
idea, or like an idea, is evidently absurd.

136. It will perhaps be said that we want a sense
(as some have imagined 2) proper to know substances
withal ; which, if we had, we might know our own soul
as we do a triangle. To this I answer, that in case
we had a new sense bestowed upon us, we could only
receive thereby some new sensations or ideas of sense.
But I believe nobody will say that what he means by
the terms soul and substance is only some particular sort
of idea or sensation. We may therefore infer that, all
things duly considered, it is not more reasonable to
think our faculties defective, in that they do not furnish
us with an idea of Spirit, or active thinking substance,
than it would be if we should blame them for not being
able to comprehend a round square 3.

1 Sect. 135-156 treat of con- mind, with Berkeley, needs data
sequences of the New Prin- of sense in order to its realisation
ciples, in their application to in consciousness ; while it is de-
sciences concerned with our no- pendent on God, in a relation
tions of Spirit or Mind ; as distin- which he does not define distinctly,
guished from sciences of ideas 2 e. g. Locke suggests this,
in external Nature, and their 3 Is this analogy applicable ?
mathematical relations. Individual

PART l] OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 335

137. From the opinion that Spirits are to be known
after the manner of an idea or sensation have risen many
absurd and heterodox tenets, and much scepticism about
the nature of the soul. It is even probable that this
opinion may have produced a doubt in some whether
they had any soul at all distinct from their body ; since
upon inquiry they could not find they had an idea of it.
That an idea, which is inactive, and the existence whereof
consists in being perceived, should be the image or
likeness of an agent subsisting by itself, seems to need
no other refutation than barely attending to what is
meant by those words. But perhaps you will say that
though an idea cannot resemble a Spirit in its thinking,
acting, or subsisting by itself, yet it may in some other
respects ; and it is not necessary that an idea or image be
in all respects like the original.

138. I answer, If it does not in those mentioned, it is
impossible it should represent it in any other thing.
Do but leave out the power of willing, thinking, and
perceiving ideas, and there remains nothing else wherein
the idea can be like a spirit. For, by the word spirit
we mean only that which thinks, wills, and perceives ;
this, and this alone, constitutes the signification of that
term. If therefore it is impossible that any degree of
those powers should be represented in an idea [l or
notion |, it is evident there can be no idea [* or notion] of
a Spirit.

139. But it will be objected that, if there is no idea
signified by the terms sou/, spirit, and substance, they
are wholly insignificant, or have no meaning in them.
I answer, those words do mean or signify a real thing ;
which is neither an idea nor like an idea, but that which
perceives ideas, and wills, and reasons about them.
What I am myself, that which I denote by the term /, is
the same with what is meant by soul, or spiritual substance.
[2 But if I should say that / was nothing, or that / was
an idea or notion, nothing could be more evidently absurd
than either of these propositions.] If it be said that

1 Omitted in second edition, as 2 Ibid. In the omitted passage

he had previously learned to dis- it will be seen that he makes idea

tinguish notion from idea. Cf. sect. and notion synonymous.
89, 142.

336 OF THE PRINCIPLES [PART 1

this is only quarrelling at a word, and that, since the
immediate significations of other names are by common
consent called ideas, no reason can be assigned why
that which is signified by the name spirit or soul may not
partake in the same appellation. I answer, all the un
thinking objects of the mind agree in that they are
entirely passive, and their existence consists only in
being perceived : whereas a soul or spirit is an active
being, whose existence consists, not in being perceived,
but in perceiving ideas and thinking '. It is therefore
necessary, in order to prevent equivocation and confound
ing natures perfectly disagreeing and unlike, that we
distinguish between spirit and idea. See sect. 27.

140. In a large sense indeed, we may be said to have
an idea [2or rather a notion] of spirit. That is, we
understand the meaning of the word, otherwise we
could not affirm or deny anything of it. Moreover, as
we conceive the ideas that are in the minds of other spirits
by means of our own, which we suppose to be resem
blances of them, so we know other spirits by means of
our own soul : which in that sense is the image or idea
of them ; it having a like respect to other spirits that
blueness or heat by me perceived has to those ideas
perceived by another ".

141. [4 The natural immortality of the soul is a neces
sary consequence of the foregoing doctrine. But before
we attempt to prove this, it is fit that we explain the
meaning of that tenet.] It must not be supposed that
they who assert the natural immortality of the soul r> are
of opinion that it is absolutely incapable of annihilation
even by the infinite power of the Creator who first gave
it being, but only that it is not liable to be broken or

1 Is the reality of mind as de- is a mediate knowledge that we
pendent on having ideas (of some have of other persons. The ques-
sort) as ideas are on mind ; although tion about the individuality of finite
mind is more deeply and truly egos, as distinguished from God,
real than its ideas are ? Berkeley has not touched.

2 Introduced in second edition. * These sentences are omitted

3 We know other finite persons in the second edition.

through sense-presented pheno- 5 ' the soul,' i. e. the individual

mena, but not as themselves Ego.
phenomena. Cf. sect. 145. It

PART l] OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 337

dissolved by the ordinary laws of nature or motion.
They indeed who hold the soul of man to be only a thin
vital flame, or system of animal spirits, make it perishing
and corruptible as the body ; since there is nothing
more easily dissipated than such a being, which it is
naturally impossible should survive the ruin of the taber
nacle wherein it is inclosed. And this notion hath been
greedily embraced and cherished by the worst part of
mankind, as the most effectual antidote against all im
pressions of virtue and religion. But it hath been made
evident that bodies, of what frame or texture soever,
are barely passive ideas in the mind, which is more
distant and heterogeneous from them than light is from
darkness1. We have shewn that the soul is indivisible,
incorporeal, unextended ; and it is consequently incorrup
tible. Nothing can be plainer than that the motions,
changes, decays, and dissolutions which we hourly see
befal natural bodies (and which is what we mean by the
course of nature) cannot possibly affeet an active, simple,
uncompounded substance : such a being therefore is indis
soluble by the force of nature ; that is to say, the soul oj
man is naturally immortal1.

142. After what has been said, it is, I suppose, plain
that our souls are not to be known in the same manner
as senseless, inactive objects, or by way of idea. Spirits
and ideas are things so wholly different, that when we
say 'they exist/ 'they are known/ or the like, these words

1 Cf. sect. 2 ; 25-27. ourselves, than any other matter

2 This is Berkeley's application around us.' This train of thought
of his new conception of the reality is foreign to us at the present
of matter, to the final human ques- day, when men of science remind
tion of the self-conscious exis- us that self-conscious life is found
tence of the individual human only in correlation with corpo-
Ego, after physical death. Phi- real organisation, whatever may
losophers and theologians were be the abstract possibility. Hope
accustomed in his generation to of continued life after physical
ground their argument for a future death seems to depend on ethical
life on the metaphysical assumption considerations more than on meta-
of the physical indivisibility of our physical arguments, and on what
self-conscious spirit, and on our con- is suggested by faith in the final
tingent connexion with the body. outcome of personal life, in a divinely
' Our bodies/ says Bishop Butler, constituted universe.

' are no more ourselves i or part of

BERKELEY: FRASER. I. £

338 OF THE PRINCIPLES [PART I

must not be thought to signify anything common to both
natures '. There is nothing alike or common in them ; and
to expect that by any multiplication or enlargement of our
faculties, we may be enabled to know a spirit as we do a
triangle, seems as absurd as if we should hope to see
a sound. This is inculcated because I imagine it may be
of moment towards clearing several important questions,
and preventing some very dangerous errors concerning
the nature of the soul.

[2 We may not, I think, strictly be said to have an idea
of an active being, or of an action ; although we may be
said to have a notion of them. I have some knowledge
or notion of my mind, and its acts about ideas ; inasmuch
as I know or understand what is meant by these words.
What I know, that I have some notion of. I will not
say that the terms idea and notion may not be used
convertibly, if the world will have it so. But yet it con-
duceth to clearness and propriety, that we distinguish
things very different by different names. It is also to
be remarked that, all relations including an act of the mind ::,
we cannot so properly be said to have an idea, but
rather a notion, of the relations and habitudes between
things. But if, in the modern way4, the word idea is
extended to spirits, and relations, and acts, this is, after all,
an affair of verbal concern.]

143. It will not be amiss to add, that the doctrine of
abstract ideas has had no small share in rendering those
sciences intricate and obscure which are particularly
conversant about spiritual things. Men have imagined
they could frame abstract notions of the powers and acts
of the mind, and consider them prescinded as well from
the mind or spirit itself, as from their respective objects
and effects. Hence a great number of dark and am-

1 Mind and the ideas presented But Berkeley has not analysed
to the senses are at opposite poles that activity of mind which consti-
of existence. But he does not say tutes relation, nor systematically
that, thus opposed, they are each unfolded the relations involved in
independent of the other. the rational constitution of ex-

2 What follows was introduced perience. There is more disposition
in the second edition, in which to this in Sin's.

notion is contrasted with idea. 4 As with Locke, for example.

3 Here is a germ of Kantism.

PART I] OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 339

biguous terms, presumed to stand for abstract notions,
have been introduced into metaphysics and morality ;
and from these have grown infinite distractions and
disputes amongst the learned \

144. But, nothing seems more to have contributed
towards engaging men in controversies and mistakes
with regard to the nature and operations of the mind,
than the being used to speak of those things in terms
borrowed from sensible ideas. For example, the will
is termed the motion of the soul : this infuses a belief
that the mind of man is as a ball in motion, impelled
and determined by the objects of sense, as necessarily
as that is by the stroke of a racket. Hence arise end
less scruples and errors of dangerous consequence in
morality. All which, I doubt not, may be cleared, and truth
appear plain, uniform, and consistent, could but philoso
phers be prevailed on to [2 depart from some received
prejudices and modes of speech, and] retire into them
selves, and attentively consider their own meaning. [- But
the difficulties arising on this head demand a more particular
disquisition than suits with the design of this treatise.]

145. From what hath been said, it is plain that we
cannot know the existence of other spirits otherwise than
by their operations, or the ideas by them, excited in us.
I perceive several motions, changes, and combinations
of ideas, that inform me there are certain particular
agents, like myself, which accompany them, and concur
in their production. Hence, the knowledge I have of
other spirits is not immediate, as is the knowledge of
my ideas ; but depending on the intervention of ideas, by
me referred to agents or spirits distinct from myself, as
effects or concomitant signs3.

' Note this condemnation of the ley's rejection of Panegoism or

tendency to substantiate ; powers Solipsism. Is this consistent with

of mind.' his conception of the reality of

- Omitted in second edition. the material world ? It is objected

Berkeley was after all reluctant (e. g. by Reid) that ideal realism

to i depart from received modes dissolves our faith in the existence

of speech,' notwithstanding their of other persons. The difficulty

often misleading associations. is to shew how appearances pre«

;! This is one of the notable sented to my senses, which are

sections in the Principles, as it sensuous and subjective, can be

suggests the rationale of Berke- media of communication between

Z 2

34° OF THE PRINCIPLES [PART I

146. But, though there be some things which convince
us human agents are concerned in producing them,
yet it is evident to every one that those things which
are called the Works of Nature, that is, the far greater
part of the ideas or sensations perceived by us, are not
produced by, or dependent on, the wills of men. There
is therefore some other Spirit that causes them ; since
it is repugnant l that they should subsist by themselves.
See sect. 29. But, if we attentively consider the constant
regularity, order, and concatenation of natural things,
the surprising magnificence, beauty and perfection of the
larger, and the exquisite contrivance of the smaller parts
of the creation, together with the exact harmony and
correspondence of the whole, but above all the never-
enough-admired laws of pain and pleasure, and the
instincts or natural inclinations, appetites, and passions of
animals ; — I say if we consider all these things, and at the
same time attend to the meaning and import of the attri
butes One, Eternal, Infinitely Wise, Good, and Perfect, we
shall clearly perceive that they belong to the aforesaid Spirit,
1 who works all in all ' and ' by whom all things consist.'

147. Hence, it is evident that God is known as certainly
and immediately as any other mind or spirit whatsoever,
distinct from ourselves. We may even assert that the
existence of God is far more evidently perceived than
the existence of men ; because the effects of Nature are
infinitely more numerous and considerable than those
ascribed to human agents. There is not any one mark
that denotes a man, or effect produced by him, which
does not more strongly evince the being of that Spirit
who is the Author of Nature2. For it is evident that, in
affecting other persons, the will of man hath no other
object than barely the motion of the limbs of his body ;
but that such a motion should be attended by, or excite

persons. The question carries us of Vision Vindicated, and Siris.
back to the theistic presupposition ' ' repugnant ' — for it would in-
involved in the trustworthiness volve thought in incoherence,
of experience — which is adapted by paralysis of its indispensable
to deceive if I am the only person causal presupposition,
existing. With Berkeley a chief 2 Is not God the indispensable
function of ideas of sense is to sig- presupposition of trustworthy ex-
nify other persons to each person. perience, rather than an empirical
See Alciphron, Dial, IV ; New Theory inference ?

PART l] OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 341

any idea in the mind of another, depends wholly on the
will of the Creator. He alone it is who, ' upholding all
things by the word of His power/ maintains that inter
course between spirits whereby they are able to perceive
the existence of each other1. And yet this pure and
clear Light which enlightens everyone is itself invisible [2to
the greatest part of mankind].

148. It seems to be a general pretence of the unthinking
herd that they cannot see God. Could we but see Him,
say they, as we see a man, we should believe that He is,
and believing obey His commands. But alas, we need
only open our eyes to see the Sovereign Lord of all
things, with a more full and clear view than we do any one
of our fellow-creatures. Not that I imagine we see God
(as some will have it) by a direct and immediate view ; or
see corporeal things, not by themselves, but by seeing that
which represents them in the essence of God ; which
doctrine is, I must confess, to me incomprehensible".
But I shall explain my meaning. A human spirit or
person is not perceived by sense, as not being an idea.
When therefore we see the colour, size, figure, and motions
of a man, we perceive only certain sensations or ideas
excited in our own minds ; and these being exhibited to
our view in sundry distinct collections, serve to mark out
unto us the existence of finite and created spirits like
ourselves. Hence it is plain we do not see a man, if by
man is meant, that which lives, moves, perceives, and
thinks as we do : but only such a certain collection of
ideas, as directs us to think there is a distinct principle of
thought and motion, like to ourselves, accompanying and
represented by it. And after the same manner we see

1 This suggests an explanation the Power universally at work is

of the objective reality and sig- morally trustworthy. Unless our

nificance of ideas of sense ; through God-given experience is deceiv-

which they become media of social ing, Solipsism is not a necessary

intercourse in the fundamentally result of the fact that no one but

divine universe. God so regulates myself can be percipient of m}"

the sense-given ideas of which sensuous experience,

human beings are individually per- 2 Omitted in second edition,

cipient, as that, while numerically 3 Malebranche, as understood by

different, as in each mind, those Berkeley. See Recherche, Liv. III.

ideas are nevertheless a sufficient p. ii. ch. 6, &c.
medium for social intercourse, if

342 OF THE PRINCIPLES [PART I

God : all the difference is that, whereas some one finite
and narrow assemblage of ideas denotes a particular
human mind, whithersoever we direct our view we do at
all times and in all places perceive manifest tokens of the
Divinity : everything we see, hear, feel, or anywise per
ceive by sense, being a sign or effect of the power of God ;
as is our perception of those very motions which are
produced by men1.

149. It is therefore plain that nothing can be more
evident to any one that is capable of the least reflexion
than the existence of God, or a Spirit who is intimately
present to our minds, producing in them all that variety of
ideas or sensations which continually affect us, on whom
we have an absolute and entire dependence, in short 'in
whom we live, and move, and have our being.' That the
discovery of this great truth, which lies so near and
obvious to the mind, should be attained to by the reason
of so very few, is a sad instance of the stupidity and
inattention of men, who, though they are surrounded with
such clear manifestations of the Deity, are yet so little
affected by them that they seem, as it were, blinded with
excess of light ~.

150. But you will say — Hath Nature no share in the
production of natural things, and must they be all ascribed
to the immediate and sole operation of God ? I answer,
If by Nature is meant only the visible series of effects or
sensations imprinted on our minds according to certain
fixed and general laws, then it is plain that Nature, taken
in this sense, cannot produce anything at all 3. But if by
Nature is meant some being distinct from God, as well as
from the laws of nature and things perceived by sense, I
must confess that word is to me an empty sound, without
any intelligible meaning annexed to it. Nature, in this
acceptation, is a vain chimera, introduced by those
heathens who had not just notions of the omnipresence

1 For all finite persons somehow experience is rooted remaining
live, and move, and have their latent, or being unintelligent,
being 'in God.' The existence of y Cf. sect. 25-28, 51-53, 60-66.
eternal living Mind, and the present His conception of Divine causation
existence of other men, are both in Nature, as the constant omni-
infcrences, resting on the same present agency in all natural law,
foundation, according to Berkeley. is the deepestpartof his philosophy.

2 The theistic trust in which our It is pursued in the De Motu.

PART l] OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 343

and infinite perfection of God. But it is more unaccount
able that it should be received among Christians, professing
belief in the Holy Scriptures, which constantly ascribe
those effects to the immediate hand of God that heathen
philosophers are wont to impute to Nature. 'The Lord,
He causeth the vapours to ascend ; He maketh lightnings
with rain ; He bringeth forth the wind out of His trea
sures.' Jerem. x. 13. ' He turneth the shadow of death
into the morning, and maketh the day dark with night/
Amos v. 8. 'He visiteth the earth, and maketh it soft
with showers : He blesseth the springing thereof, and
crowneth the year with His goodness ; so that the pastures
are clothed with flocks, and the valleys are covered over
with corn.' See Psal. Ixv. But, notwithstanding that this
is the constant language of Scripture, yet we have I know
not what aversion from believing that God concerns
Himself so nearly in our affairs. Fain would we suppose
Him at a great distance off, and substitute some blind
unthinking deputy in His stead; though (if we may believe
Saint Paul) ' He be not far from every one of us.'

151. It will, I doubt not, be objected that the slow,
gradual, and roundabout methods observed in the pro
duction of natural things do not seem to have for their
cause the immediate hand of an Almighty Agent : besides,
monsters, untimely births, fruits blasted in the blossom,
rains falling in desert places, miseries incident to human
life, and the like, are so many arguments that the whole
frame of nature is not immediately actuated and superin
tended by a Spirit of infinite wisdom and goodness. But
the answer to this objection is in a good measure plain
from sect. 62 ; it being visible that the aforesaid methods
of nature are absolutely necessary in order to working by
the most simple and general rules, and after a steady and
consistent manner ; which argues both the wisdom and
goodness of God1. [2 For, it doth hence follow that the
finger of God is not so conspicuous to the resolved and
careless sinner ; which gives him an opportunity to harden
in his impiety and grow ripe for vengeance. (Vid. sect.
57.)] Such is the artificial contrivance of this mighty

1 Is not the unbeginning and or Active Reason at the heart of
unending natural evolution, an arti- the whole ?
culate revelation of Eternal Spirit 2 Omitted in second edition.

344 OF THE PRINCIPLES [PART i

machine of Nature that, whilst its motions and various
phenomena strike on our senses, the Hand which actuates
the whole is itself unperceivable to men of flesh and blood.
' Verily ' (saith the prophet) ' thou art a God that hidest
thyself.' Isaiah xlv. 15. But, though the Lord conceal
Himself from the eyes of the sensual and lazy, who will
not be at the least expense of thought \ yet to an un
biassed and attentive mind, nothing can be more plainly
legible than the intimate presence of an All-wise Spirit,
who fashions, regulates, and sustains the whole system
of Being. It is clear, from what we have elsewhere ob
served, that the operating according to general and stated
laws is so necessary for our guidance in the affairs of life,
and letting us into the secret of nature, that without it all
reach and compass of thought, all human sagacity and de
sign, could serve to no manner of purpose. It were even
impossible there should be any such faculties or powers in
the mind. See sect. 31. Which one consideration abund
antly outbalances whatever particular inconveniences may
thence arise 2.

152. We should further consider, that the very blem
ishes and defects of nature are not without their use,
in that they make an agreeable sort of variety, and aug
ment the beauty of the rest of the creation, as shades
in a picture serve to set off the brighter and more
enlightened parts. We would likewise do well to exa
mine, whether our taxing the waste of seeds and embryos,
and accidental destruction of plants and animals before
they come to full maturity, as an imprudence in the
Author of nature, be not the effect of prejudice con
tracted by our familiarity with impotent and saving mortals.
In man indeed a thrifty management of those things
which he cannot procure without much pains and indus
try may be esteemed wisdom. But we must not imagine
that the inexplicably fine machine of an animal or vege
table costs the great Creator any more pains or trouble
in its production than a pebble does ; nothing being
more evident than that an Omnipotent Spirit can indif-

1 So Pascal in the Pensees. otherwise the changing universe

'- Divine reason ever active in in which we live would be unfit

Nature is the necessary correlate to be reasoned about or a.cted in.

to reason in man ; inasmuch as

PART l] OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 345

ferently produce everything by a mere fiat or act of his
will. Hence it is plain that the splendid profusion of
natural things should not be interpreted weakness or
prodigality in the Agent who produces them, but rather
be looked on as an argument of the riches of His power.

153. As for the mixture of pain or uneasiness which
is in the world, pursuant to the general laws of Nature,
and the actions of finite, imperfect Spirits, this, in the
state we are in at present, is indispensably necessary
to our well-being. But our prospects are too narrow.
We take, for instance, the idea of some one particular
pain into our thoughts, and account it evil. Whereas,
if we enlarge our view, so as to comprehend the various
ends, connexions, and dependencies of things, on what
occasions and in what proportions we are affected with
pain and pleasure, the nature of human freedom, and
the design with which we are put into the world ; we
shall be forced to acknowledge that those particular
things which, considered in themselves, appear to be
evil, have the nature of good, when considered as linked
with the whole system of beings \

154. From what hath been said, it will be manifest to
any considering person, that it is merely for want of
attention and comprehensiveness of mind that there are
any favourers of Atheism or the Manichean Heresy to be
found. Little and unreflecting souls may indeed bur
lesque the works of Providence ; the beauty and order
whereof they have not capacity, or will not be at the
pains, to comprehend -. But those who are masters of
any justness and extent of thought, and are withal used
to reflect, can never sufficiently admire the divine traces

1 The existence of moral evil, goodness is thus not an inference,

or what ought not to exist, is the but the implied basis of all real in-

difficulty which besets faith in the ferences. I have expanded this

fundamental divinity or goodness thought in my Philosophy of Theism.

of the universe. Yet that faith is We cannot prove God, for we must

presupposed in interpretation of assume God, as the basis of all proof,

nature, which proceeds on the Faith even in the uniformity of

postulate of universal order ; and nature is virtually faith in omni-

this implies the moral trustworthi- potent goodness immanent in the

ness of the world which we begin universe.

to realise when we begin to be 2 So Leibniz in his Theodicee, which

conscious. That we are living and was published in the same year as

having our being in omnipotent Berkeley's Principles.

346 OF THE PRINCIPLES [PART I

of Wisdom and Goodness that shine throughout the
economy of Nature. But what truth is there which
glares so strongly on the mind that, by an aversion of
thought, a wilful shutting of the eyes, we may not escape
seeing it ? Is it therefore to be wondered at, if the gene
rality of men, who are ever intent on business or
pleasure, and little used to fix or open the eye of their
mind, should not have all that conviction and evidence
of the Being of God which might be expected in reason
able creatures J ?

155. We should rather wonder that men can be found
so stupid as to neglect, than that neglecting they should
be unconvinced of such an evident and momentous truth 2.
And yet it is to be feared that too many of parts and
leisure, who live in Christian countries, are, 'merely
through a supine and dreadful negligence, sunk into
a sort of Atheism. [3They cannot say there is not a
God, but neither are they convinced that there is. For
what else can it be but some lurking infidelity, some
secret misgivings of mind with regard to the existence
and attributes of God, which permits sinners to grow
and harden in impiety ?] Since it is downright impossi
ble that a soul pierced and enlightened with a thorough
sense of the omnipresence, holiness, and justice of that
Almighty Spirit should persist in a remorseless viola
tion of His laws. We ought, therefore, earnestly to
meditate and dwell on those important points ; that so
we may attain conviction without all scruple 'that the
eyes of the Lord are in every place, beholding the evil
and the good ; that He is with us and keepeth us in
all places whither we go, and giveth us bread to eat
and raiment to put on ; ' that He is present and con-

1 The divine presupposition, la- 2 Our necessarily incomplete

tent in all human reasoning and knowledge of the Universe in

experience, is hid from the unre- which we find ourselves is apt

fleeting, in whom the higher life to disturb the fundamental faith,

is dormant, and the ideal in the uni- that the phenomena presented to

verse is accordingly undiscerned. us are significant of God. Yet

Unless the universe is assumed to we tacitly assume that they are

be physically and morally trust- thus significant when we interpret

worthy, i.e. unless God is presup- real experience, physical or moral,

posed, even natural science has no a Omitted in second edition,
adequate foundation.

PART l] OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 347

scious to our innermost thoughts ; and, that we have
a most absolute and immediate dependence on Him. A
clear view of which great truths cannot choose but fill
our hearts with an awful circumspection and holy fear, which
is the strongest incentive to Virtue, and the best guard
against Vice.

156. For, after all, what deserves the first place in
our studies is, the consideration of GOD and our DUTY ;
which to promote, as it was the main drift and design
of my labours, so shall I esteem them altogether useless
and ineffectual if, by what I have said, I cannot inspire
my readers with a pious sense of the Presence of God ;
and, having shewn the falseness or vanity of those barren
speculations which make the chief employment of learned
men, the better dispose them to reverence and embrace
the salutary truths of the Gospel ; which to know and to
practise is the highest perfection of human nature.

THREE DIALOGUES

BETWEEN

HYLAS AND PHILONOUS

THE DESIGN OF WHICH IS PLAINLY TO DEMONSTRATE
THE REALITY AND PERFECTION OF

HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

THE INCORPOREAL NATURE OF THE

SOUL
AND THE IMMEDIATE PROVIDENCE OF A

DEITY

IN OPPOSITION TO

SCEPTICS AND ATHEISTS

ALSO TO OPEN A METHOD FOR RENDERING THE SCIENCES MORE
EASY, USEFUL, AND COMPENDIOUS

First published in 1713

EDITOR'S PREFACE

TO THE

THREE DIALOGUES BETWEEN HYLAS
AND PHILONOUS

THIS work is the gem of British metaphysical literature.
Berkeley's claim to be the great modern master of Socratic
dialogue rests, perhaps, upon Alciphron, which surpasses
the conversations between Hylas and Philonous in expres
sion of individual character, and in dramatic effect. Here
conversation is adopted as a convenient way of treating
objections to the conception of the reality of Matter which
had been unfolded systematically in the book of Principles.
But the lucid thought, the colouring of fancy, the glow of
human sympathy, and the earnestness that pervade the
subtle reasonings pursued through these dialogues, are
unique in English metaphysical literature. Except perhaps
Hume and Ferrier, none approach Berkeley in the art
of uniting metaphysical thought with easy, graceful,
and transparent style. Our surprise and admiration are
increased when we recollect that this charming production
of reason and imagination came from Ireland, at a time
when that country was scarcely known in the world of
letters and philosophy.

The immediate impression produced by the publication

352 EDITOR'S PREFACE TO THE

of the Principles, is shewn in Berkeley's correspondence
with Sir John Percival. Berkeley was eager to hear what
people had to say for or against what looked like a paradox
apt to shock the reader; but in those days he was not
immediately informed by professional critics. ' If when
you receive my book' — he wrote from Dublin in July,
1710, to Sir John Percival1, then in London, — 'you can
procure me the opinion of some of your acquaintances
who are thinking men, addicted to the study of natural
philosophy and mathematics, I shall be extremely obliged
to you.' In the following month he was informed by
Sir John that it was 'incredible what prejudice can work in
the best geniuses, even in the lovers of novelty. For I did
but name the subject matter of your book of Principles
to some ingenious friends of mine and they immediately
treated it with ridicule, at the same time refusing to read
it, which I have not yet got one to do. A physician of my
acquaintance undertook to discover your person, and
argued you must needs be mad, and that you ought to
take remedies. A bishop pitied you, that a desire of
starting something new should put you upon such an
undertaking. Another told me that you are not gone so
far as a gentleman in town, who asserts not only that there
is no such thing as Matter, but that we ourselves have no
being at all.'

Berkeley's reply is interesting. ' I am not surprised,'
he says, ' that I should be ridiculed by those who won't take
the pains to understand me. If the raillery and scorn of
those who criticise what they will not be at the pains to
understand had been sufficient to deter men from making
any attempts towards curing the ignorance and errors of
mankind, we should not have been troubled with some
very fair improvements in knowledge. The common

1 For the following extracts from Percival, I am indebted to the kind-
previously unpublished correspon- nessof hisdescendant, the late Lord
dence of Berkeley and Sir John Egmont.

DIALOGUES BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 353

cry's being against any opinion seems to me, so far from
proving false, that it may with as good reason pass for an
argument of its truth. However, I imagine that whatever
doctrine contradicts vulgar and settled opinion had need
be introduced with great caution into the world. For this
reason it was that I omitted all mention of the non-
existence of Matter in the title-page, dedication, preface and
introduction to the Treatise on the Principles of Human
Knowledge ; that so the notion might steal unawares upon
the reader, who probably might never have meddled with
the book if he had known that it contained such
paradoxes.'

With characteristic fervour he disclaims 'variety and
love of paradox' as motives of the book of Principles,
and professes faith in the unreality of abstract unperceived
Matter, a faith which he has held for some years, 'the
conceit being at first warm in my imagination, but since
carefully examined, both by my own judgment and that
of ingenious friends.' What he especially complained
of was ' that men who have never considered my book
should confound me with the sceptics, who doubt the
existence of sensible things, and are not positive as to
any one truth, no, not so much as their own being — which
I find by your letter is the case of some wild visionist
now in London. But whoever reads my book with
attention will see that there is a direct opposition
between the principles that are contained in it and
those of the sceptics, and that I question not the existence
of anything we perceive by our senses. I do not deny
the existence of the sensible things which Moses says
were created by God. They existed from all eternity, in
the Divine Intellect ; and they became perceptible (i. e. were
created) in the same manner and order as is described
in Genesis. For I take creation to belong to things only
as they respect finite spirits ; there being nothing new to
God. Hence it follows that the act of creation consists in

BERKELEY: FRASER. I. A a

354 EDITORS PREFACE TO THE

God's willing that those things should become perceptible
to other spirits which before were known only to Himself.
Now both reason and scripture assure us that there are
other spirits besides men, who, 'tis possible, might have
perceived this visible world as it was successively exhib
ited to their view before man's creation. Besides, for to
agree with the Mosaic account of the creation, it's sufficient
if we suppose that a man, in case he was existing at the
time of the chaos of sensible things, might have perceived
all things formed out of it, in the very order set down in
scripture; all which is in no way repugnant to my
principles.'

Sir John in his next letter, written from London in
October, 1716, reports that the book of Principles had
fallen into the hands of the highest living English authority
in metaphysical theology, Samuel Clarke, who had pro
duced his Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God
four years before. The book had also been read by
Whiston, Newton's successor at Cambridge. ' I can only
report at second-hand,' he says, 'that they think you a
fair arguer, and a clear writer; but they say your first
principles you lay down are false. They look upon you
as an extraordinary genius, ranking you with Father
Malebranche, Norris, and another whose name I forget,
all of whom they think extraordinary men, but of a parti
cular turn of mind, and their labours of little use to
mankind, on account of their abstruseness. This may
arise from these gentlemen not caring to think after
a new manner, which would oblige them to begin
their studies anew; or else it may be the strength of
prejudice.'

Berkeley was vexed by this treatment on the part of
Clarke and Whiston. He sent under Sir John's care a
letter to each of them, hoping through him to discover
'their reasons against his notions, as truth is his sole aim.'
'As to what is said of ranking me with Father Male-

DIALOGUES BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 355

branche and Mr. Norris, whose writings are thought to be
too fine-spun to be of any great use to mankind, I have
this answer, that I think the notions I embrace are not in
the least agreeing with theirs, but indeed plainly incon
sistent with them in the main points, inasmuch as I know
few writers I take myself at bottom to differ more from
than from them. Fine-spun metaphysics are what on all
occasions I declare against, and if any one shall shew
anything of that sort in my Treatise I will willingly
correct it/ Sir John delivered the letters to two friends of
Clarke and Whiston, and reported that ' Dr. Clarke told
his friend in reply, that he did not care to write you his
thoughts, because he was afraid it might draw him into a
dispute upon a matter which was already clear to him.
He thought your first principles you go on are false; but
he was a modest man, his friend said, and uninclined to
shock any one whose opinions on things of this nature
differed from his own/ This was a disappointment to the
ardent Berkeley. ' Dr. Clarke's conduct seems a little
surprising,' he replies. 'That an ingenious and candid
person (as I take him to be) should refuse to shew me
where my error lies is something unaccountable. I never
expected that a gentleman otherwise so well employed as
Dr. Clarke should think it worth his while to enter into
a dispute with me concerning any notions of mine. But,
seeing it was clear to him I went upon false principles,
I hoped he would vouchsafe, in a line or two, to point
them out to me, that so I may more closely review and
examine them. If he but once did me this favour, he
need not apprehend I should give him any further trouble.
I should be glad if you have opportunity that you
would let his friend know this. There is nothing that
I more desire than to know thoroughly all that can
be said against what I take for truth/ Clarke, however,
was not to be drawn. The incident is thus referred to by
Whiston, in his Memoirs of Clarke. ' Mr. Berkeley,' he

A a 2

356 EDITOR'S PREFACE TO THE

says, 'published in 1710, at Dublin, the metaphysical
notion, that matter was not a real thing ' ; nay, that the
common opinion of its reality was groundless, if not
ridiculous. He was pleased to send Mr. Clarke and
myself each of us a book. After we had perused it,
I went to Mr. Clarke to discourse with him about it,
to this effect, that I, being not a metaphysician, was not
able to answer Mr. Berkeley's subtle premises, though
I did not believe his absurd conclusions. I therefore
desired that he, who was deep in such subtleties, but did
not appear to believe Mr. Berkeley's conclusion, would
answer him. Which task he declined.'

What Clarke's criticism of Berkeley might have been is
suggested by the following sentences in his Remarks on
Human Liberty, published seven years after this corre
spondence : ' The case as to the proof of our free agency
is exactly the same as in that notable question, whether
the [material] world exists or no? There is no demon
stration of it from experience. There always remains a bare
possibility that the Supreme Being may have so framed
my mind, that I shall always be necessarily deceived a in
every one of my perceptions as in a dream — though
possibly there be no material world, nor any other
creature existing besides myself. And yet no man in
his senses argues from thence, that experience is no proof
to us of the existence of things. The bare physical
possibility too of our being so framed by the Author of
Nature as to be unavoidably deceived in this matter by
every experience of every action we perform, is no more
any ground to doubt the truth of our liberty, than the
bare natural possibility of our being all our lifetime in a
dream, deceived in our [natural] belief of the existence of

1 What Berkeley seeks to shew or explicable expression of ever

is, not that the world of the senses active Intelligence, more or less

is unreal, but in what its reality interpreted in natural science ?
consists. Is it inexplicable chaos,

DIALOGUES BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 357

the material world, is any just ground to doubt the reality
of its existence/ Berkeley would hardly have accepted
this analogy. Does the conception of a material world
being dependent on percipient mind for its reality imply
deception on the part of the ' Supreme Being ' ? ' Dreams/
in ordinary language, may signify illusory fancies during
sleep, and so understood the term is misapplied to a uni
versally mind-dependent universe with its steady natural
order. Berkeley disclaims emphatically any doubt of
the reality of the sensible world, and professes only to
shew in what its reality consists, or its dependence upon
percipient life as the indispensable realising factor. To
suppose that we can be ' necessarily deceived in every one
of our perceptions ' is to interpret the universe atheistically,
and virtually obliges us in final nescience to acknowledge
that it is wholly uninterpretable ; so that experience is
impossible, because throughout unintelligible. The moral
trustworthiness or perfect goodness of the Universal Power
is I suppose the fundamental postulate of science and
human life. If all our temporal experience can be called
a dream it must at any rate be a dream of the sort sup
posed by Leibniz. ' Nullo argument© absolute demon-
strari potest, dari corpora ; nee quidquam prohibet somm'a
qucedain bate ordinata menti nostrae objecta esse, quae
a nobis vera judicentur, et ob consensum inter se quoad
usum veris equivalent V

The three Dialogues discuss what Berkeley regarded
as the most plausible Objections, popular and philoso
phical, to his account of living Mind or Spirit, as the
indispensable factor and final cause of the reality of the
material world.

The principal aim of the First Dialogue is to illustrate

1 Leibniz : DC modo disiinguendi Phenomena Rcalia ab Imaginariis
(1707).

358 EDITOR'S PREFACE TO THE

the contradictory or unmeaning character and sceptical
tendency of the common philosophical opinion — that we
perceive in sense a material world which is real only
in as far as it can exist in absolute independence of per
ceiving mind. The impossibility of any of the qualities
in which Matter is manifested to man — the primary
qualities not less than the secondary — having real ex
istence in a mindless or unspiritual universe is argued
and illustrated in detail. Abstract Matter, unrealised
in terms of percipient life, is meaningless, and the ma
terial world becomes real only in and through living
perception. And Matter, as an abstract substance with
out qualities, cannot, without a contradiction, it is also
argued, be presented or represented, in sense. What
is called matter is thus melted in a spiritual solution,
from which it issues the flexible and intelligible medium
of intercourse for spiritual beings such as men are ;
whose faculties moreover are educated in interpreting
the cosmical order of the phenomena presented to their
senses.

The Second Dialogue is in the first place directed against
modifications of the scholastic account of Matter, which
attributes our knowledge of it to inference, founded on
sense-ideas assumed to be representative, or not pre-
sentative of the reality. The advocates of Matter in
dependent and supreme, are here assailed in their various
conjectures — that this Matter may be the active Cause,
or the Instrument, or the Occasion of our sense-ex
perience ; or that it is an Unknowable Something some
how connected with that experience. It is argued in
this and in the preceding Dialogue, by Philonous (who
personates Berkeley), that unrealised Matter — intending
by that term either a qualified substance, or a Something
of which we cannot affirm anything — is not merely un
proved, but a proved impossibility : it must mean nothing,

DIALOGUES BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 359

or it must mean a contradiction, which comes to the
same thing. It is not perceived ; nor can it be suggested
by what we perceive ; nor demonstrated by reasoning ;
nor believed in as an article in the fundamental faith of
intuitive reason. The only consistent theory of the uni
verse accordingly implies that concrete realities must all
be either (a) phenomena presented to the senses, or
else (b) active spirits percipient of presented pheno
mena. And neither of these two sorts of concrete
realities is strictly speaking independent of the other ;
although the latter, identical amid the variations of
the sensuous phenomena, are deeper and more real than
the mere data of the senses. The Second Dialogue
ends by substituting, as concrete and intelligible Realism,
the universal and constant dependence of the material
world upon active living Spirit, in place of the ab
stract hypothetical and unintelligible Realism, which
defends Matter unrealised in percipient life, as the type
of reality.

In the Third Dialogue plausible objections to this con
ception of what the reality of the material world means
are discussed.

Is it said that the new conception is sceptical, .and
Berkeley another Protagoras, on account of it? His
answer is, that the reality of sensible things, as far as
man can in any way be concerned with them, does
not consist in what cannot be perceived, suggested,
demonstrated, or even conceived, but in phenomena
actually seen and touched, and in the working faith
that future sense-experience may be anticipated by the
analogies of present sense-experience.

But is not this negation of the Matter that is assumed
to be real and independent of Spirit, an unproved con
jecture ? It is answered, that the affirmation of this
abstract matter is itself a mere conjecture, and one self-

360 EDITOR'S PREFACE TO THE

convicted by its implied contradictions, while its negation
is only a simple falling back on the facts of experience,
without any attempt to explain them.

Again, is it objected that the reality of sensible things
involves their continued reality during intervals of our
perception of them? It is answered, that sensible
things are indeed permanently dependent on Mind,
but not on this, that, or the other finite embodied
spirit.

Is it further alleged that the reality of Spirit or
Mind is open to all the objections against independent
Matter; and that, if we deny this Matter, we must in
consistency allow that Spirit can be only a succession
of isolated feelings? The answer is, that there is no
parity between self-conscious Spirit, and Matter out of
all relation to any Spirit. We find, in memory, our own
personality and identity; that we are not our ideas, 'but
somewhat else ' — a thinking, active principle, that per
ceives, knows, wills, and operates about ideas, and that
is revealed as continuously real. Each person is con
scious of himself; and may reasonably infer the existence
of other self-conscious persons, more or less like what
he is conscious of in himself. A universe of self-con
scious persons, with their common sensuous experiences
all under cosmical order, is not open to the contradictions
involved in a pretended universe of Matter, independent
of percipient realising Spirit.

Is it still said that sane people cannot help dis
tinguishing between the real existence of a thing and
its being perceived! It is answered, that all they are
entitled to mean is, to distinguish between being
perceived exclusively by me, and being independent
of the perception of all sentient or conscious beings.

Does an objector complain that this ideal realism dis
solves the distinction between facts and fancies? He
is reminded of the meaning of the word idea. That term

DIALOGUES BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 361

is not limited by Berkeley to chimeras of fancy: it is
applied also to the objective phenomena of our sense-
experience.

Is the supposition that Spirit is the only real Cause
of all changes in nature declaimed against as baseless ?
It is answered, that the supposition of unthinking Power
at the heart of the cosmos of sensible phenomena is
absurd.

Is the negation of Abstract Matter repugnant to the
common belief of mankind ? It is argued in reply, that
this unrealised Matter is foreign to common belief, which
is incapable of even entertaining the conception ; and
which only requires to reflect upon what it does enter
tain to be satisfied with a relative or ideal reality for
sensible things.

But, if sensible things are the real things, the real
moon, for instance, it is alleged, can be only a foot
in diameter. It is maintained, in opposition to this, that
the term real moon is applied only to what is an in
ference from the moon, one foot in diameter, which
we immediately perceive ; and that the former is a
part of our previsive or mediate inference, due to what
is perceived.

The dispute, after all, is merely verbal, it is next
objected ; and, since all parties refer the data of the
senses and the things which they compose to a Power
external to each finite percipient, why not call that
Power, whatever it may be, Matter, and not Spirit ? The
reply is, that this would be an absurd misapplication
of language.

But may we not, it is next suggested, assume the possi
bility of a third nature — neither idea nor Spirit? Not,
replies Philonous, if we are to keep to the rule of having
meaning in the words we use. We know what is meant
by a spirit, for each of us has immediate experience of
one ; and we know what is meant by sense-ideas and

362 EDITOR'S PREFACE TO THE

sensible things, for we have immediate and mediate
experience of them. But we have no immediate, and
therefore can have no mediate, experience of what is
neither perceived by our senses, nor realised in inward
consciousness : moreover, ' entia non sunt multiplicanda
praeter necessitatem/

Again, this conception of the realities implies, it is said,
imperfection, because sentient experience, in God. This
objection, it is answered, implies a confusion between
being actually sentient and merely conceiving sensations,
and employing them, as God does, as signs for expressing
His conceptions to our minds.

Further, the negation of independent powerful Matter
seems to annihilate the explanations of physical phenomena
given by natural philosophers. But, to be assured that
it does not, we have only to recollect what physical ex
planation means— that it is the reference of an apparently
irregular phenomenon to some acknowledged general rule
of co-existence or succession among sense-ideas. It is
interpretation of sense-signs.

Is the proposed ideal Realism summarily condemned
as a novelty? It can be answered, that all discoveries
are novelties at first ; and moreover that this one is
not so much a novelty as a deeper interpretation of the
common faith.

Yet it seems, at any rate, it is said, to change real
things into mere ideas. Here consider on the contrary
what we mean when we speak of sensible things as
real. The changing appearances of which we are per
cipient in sense, united objectively in their cosmical
order, are what is truly meant by the realities of sense.

But this reality is inconsistent with the continued identity
of material things, it is complained, and also with the
fact that different persons can be percipient of the same
thing. Not so, Berkeley explains, when we attend to
the true meaning of the word same, and dismiss from

DIALOGUES BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 363

our thoughts a supposed abstract idea of identity which
is nonsensical.

But some may exclaim against the supposition that
the material world exists in mind, regarding this as an
implied assertion that mind is extended, and therefore
material. This proceeds, it is replied, on forgetfulness
of what 'existence in mind* means. It is intended
to express the fact that matter is real in being an
objective appearance of which a living mind is sensible.

Lastly, is not the Mosaic account of the creation of
Matter inconsistent with the perpetual dependence of
Matter for its reality upon percipient Spirit? It is
answered that the conception of creation being depen
dent on the existence of finite minds is in perfect
harmony with the Mosaic account : it is what is
seen and felt, not what is unseen and unfelt, that is
created.

The Third Dialogue closes with a representation of
the new principle regarding Matter being the harmony of
two apparently discordant propositions— the one-sided
proposition of ordinary common sense ; and the one
sided proposition of the philosophers. It agrees with
the mass of mankind in holding that the material world
is actually presented to our senses, and with the
philosophers in holding that this same material world is
realised only in and through the percipient experience of
living Spirit.

Most of the objections to Berkeley's conception of
Matter which have been urged in the last century and
a half, by its British, French, and German critics, are
discussed by anticipation in these Dialogues. The history
of objections is very much a history of misconceptions.
Conceived or misconceived, it has tacitly simplified and

364 EDITOR'S PREFACE TO THE

purified the methods of physical science, especially in
Britain and France.

The first elaborate criticism of Berkeley by a British
author is found in Andrew Baxter's Inquiry into the
Nature of the Human Soul, published in 1735, in the
section entitled ' Dean Berkeley's Scheme against the
existence of Matter examined, and shewn to be incon
clusive.' Baxter alleges that the new doctrine tends to
encourage scepticism. To deny Matter, for the reasons
given, involves, according to this critic, denial of mind,
and so a universal doubt. Accordingly, a few years
later, Hume sought, in his Treatise of Human Nature, to
work out Berkeley's negation of abstract Matter into scep
tical phenomenalism — against which Berkeley sought to
guard by anticipation, in a remarkable passage introduced
in his last edition of these Dialogues.

In Scotland the writings of Reid, Beattie, Oswald,
Dugald Stewart, Thomas Brown, and Sir W. Hamilton
form a magazine of objections. Reid — who curiously
seeks to refute Berkeley by refuting, not more clearly
than Berkeley had done before him, the hypothesis of a
wholly representative sense-perception — urges the sponta
neous belief or common sense of mankind, which obliges
us all to recognise a direct presentation of the exter
nal material world to our senses. He overlooks what
with Berkeley is the only question in debate, namely,
the meaning of the term external] for, Reid and Berke
ley are agreed in holding to the reality of a world regu
lated independently of the will of finite percipients, and
is sufficiently objective to be a medium of social inter
course. With Berkeley, as with Reid, this is practically
self-evident. The same objection, more scientifically de
fined—that we have a natural belief in the existence of
Matter, and in our own immediate perception of its
qualities — is Sir W. Hamilton's assumption against Ber
keley ; but Hamilton does not explain the reality thus

DIALOGUES BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 365

claimed for it. 'Men naturally believe/ he says, 'that
they themselves exist — because they are conscious of
a Self or Ego ; they believe that something different
from themselves exists — because they believe that they
are conscious of this Not-self or Non-ego.' (Dis
cussions, p. 193.) Now, the existence of a Power
that is independent of each finite Ego is at the root
of Berkeley's principles. According to Berkeley and
Hamilton alike, we are immediately percipient of solid
and extended phenomena ; but with Berkeley the pheno
mena are dependent on, at the same time that they are
'entirely distinct' from, the percipient. The Divine
and finite spirits, signified by the phenomena that
are presented to our senses in cosmical order, form
Berkeley's external world.

That Berkeley sows the seeds of Universal Scepti
cism ; that his conception of Matter involves the Pan-
egoism or Solipsism which leaves me in absolute soli
tude ; that his is virtually a system of Pantheism,
inconsistent with personal individuality and moral respon
sibility — these are probably the three most comprehensive
objections that have been alleged against it. They are
in a measure due to Berkeley's imperfect criticism of
first principles, in his dread of a departure from the
concrete data of experience in quest of empty ab
stractions.

In England and France, Berkeley's criticism of Matter,
taken however only on its negative side, received a
countenance denied to it in Germany. Hartley and
Priestley shew signs of affinity with Berkeley. Also
an anonymous Essay on the Nature and Existence of
the Material World, dedicated to Dr. Priestley and Dr.
Price, which appeared in 1781, is an argument, on em
pirical grounds, which virtually makes the data of the
senses at last a chaos of isolated sensations. The
author of the Essay is said to have been a certain

366 EDITOR'S PREFACE TO THE

- Russell, who died in the West Indies in the end of
the eighteenth century. A tendency towards Berkeley's
negations, but apart from his synthetic principles, appears
in James Mill and J. S. Mill. So too with Voltaire and
the Encyclopedists.

The Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous were pub
lished in London in 1713, 'printed by G. James, for
Henry Clements, at the Half-Moon, in St. Paul's church
yard/ unlike the Essay on Vision and the Principles, which
first appeared in Dublin. The second edition, which is
simply a reprint, issued in 1725, 'printed for William
and John Innys, at the West End of St. Paul's.' A
third, the last in the author's lifetime, 'printed by Jacob
Tonson,' which contains some important additions,
was published in 1734, conjointly with a new edition of
the Principles. The Dialogues were reprinted in 1776, in
the same volume with the edition of the Principles, with
Remarks.

The Dialogues have been translated into French and
German. The French version appeared at Amsterdam
in 1750. The translator's name is not given, but it is
attributed to the Abbe Jean Paul de Gua de Malves \
by Barbier, in his Dictionnaire des Ouvragcs anonymes
ct pscudonymes, torn. i. p. 283. It contains a Prefatory
Note by the translator, with three curious vignettes
(given in the note below) meant to symbolise the
leading thought in each Dialogue2. A German trans-

1 For some information relative qualites secondaires et premieres,
to Gua de Malves, see Querard's la nature et 1'existence des corps ;
La France Litteraire, torn. iii. p. 494. et il pretend prouver en meme terns

2 The following is the translator's 1'insuffisance de 1'un et de 1'autre.
Prefatory Note, on the objects of La Vignette qu'on voit a la tete du
the Dialogues, and in explanation Dialogue, fait allusion a cet objet.
of the three illustrative vignettes : — Elle represente un Philosophe dans

' L'Auteur expose dans le premier son cabinet, lequel est distrait de
Dialogue le sentiment du Vulgaire son travail par un enfant qu'il ap-
et celui des Philosophes, sur les percoit se voyant lui-meme dans

DIALOGUES BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 367

lation, by John Christopher Eschenbach, Professor of
Philosophy in Rostock, was published at Rostock in
1756. It forms the larger part of a volume entitled
Sammlung der vornehmsten Schriftsteller die die Wirklichkeit
ihres eignen Korpers und der ganzen Korperwelt Idugnen.
This professed Collection of the most eminent authors

un miroir, en tendant les mains
pour embrasser sa propre image.
Le Philosophe rit de 1'erreur ou il

Quid rides
Fabula narralur.

croit que tombe 1'enfant ; tandis
qu'on lui applique a lui-meme ces
mots tires d'Horace :

' . . , . de tc

' Le second Dialogue est employe
a exposer le sentiment de 1'Auteur
sur le meme sujet, Sfavoir, que
les choses corporelles ont une
existence reelle dans les esprits
qui les apperfoivent ; maisqu'elles
ne Sfauroient exister hors de tous
les esprits a la fois, meme de 1'-
esprit infini de Dieu ; et que par
consequent la Matiere, prise suivant
1'acception ordinaire du mot, non
seulement n'existe point, mais seroit
meme absolument impossible. On
a tache de representer aux yeux
ce sentiment dans la Vignette du
Dialogue. Le mot grec loot's qui
signifie ame, designe Tame : les
rayons qui en partent marquent

1'attention que 1'ame donne a des
idees ou objets ; les tableaux qu'on
a places aux seuls endroits oil les
rayons aboutissent, et dont les
sujetssont tires de la description des
beautes de la nature, qui se trouve
dans le livre, representent les idees
ou objets que 1'ame considere, pas
le secours des facultes qu'elle a
refues de Dieu ; et 1'action de
1'Etre supreme sur 1'ame est figuree
par un trait, qui, partant d'un tri
angle, symbole de la Divinite, et
pedant les nuages dont le triangle
est environne. s'etend jusqu'a 1'ame
pour la vivifier ; enfin, on a fait
en sorte de rendre le meme senti
ment par ces mots :

Quce noscere ciitnqtte Deus det,
Esse pnta.

368

EDITOR S PREFACE TO THE

who are supposed to deny the reality of their own bodies
and of the whole material world, consists of Berkeley's
Dialogues, and Arthur Collier's Clavis Universalis, or
Demonstration of the Non-existence or Impossibility of an

1 L'objet du troisieme Dialogue
est de repondre aux difficultes aux-
quelles le sentiment qu'on a etabli
dans les Dialogues precedens, peut
etre sujet, de 1'eclaircir en cette
sorte de plus, d'en developper toutes
les heureuses consequences, enfin
de fairevoir. qu'etantbien entendu,
il revieut aux notions les plus com
munes. EtcommerAuteurexprime
a la fin dulivre cette derniere pensee,
en comparant ce qu'il vient de dire,
a 1'eau que les deux Interloctiteurs
sont supposes voir jaillir d'un jet,

Urget aquas vis sursunt^

et qu'il remarque que la meme force
de la gravite fait clever jusqu'a une
certainehauteur et retomberensuite
dans le bassin d'ou elle etoit d'abord
partie ; on a pris cet embleme pour
le sujet de la Vignette de ce Dia
logue ; on a represente en conse
quence danscette derniere Vignette
les deux Interlocuteurs, se promen-
ant dans le lieu oil TAuteur les
suppose, et s'entretenantla-dessus,
et pourdonner au Lecteur Texplica-
tion de rembleme, on a mis au bas
le vers suivant :

eadem Jlectitqnc deorsum.'

DIALOGUES BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 369

External World. The volume contains some annotations,
and an Appendix in which a counter-demonstration of the
existence of Matter is attempted. Eschenbach's principal
argument is indirect, and of the nature of a rcductio ad
absurdum. He argues (as others have done) that the
reasons produced against the independent reality of Mat
ter are equally conclusive against the independent reality
of Spirit.

An interesting circumstance connected with the Dialogues
between Hylas and Philonous was the appearance, also in
1713, of the Clavis Universalis, or demonstration of the
impossibility of Matter, of Arthur Collier, in which the
merely ideal existence of the sensible world is maintained.
The production, simultaneously, without concert, of con
ceptions of the material world which verbally at least have
much in common, is a curious coincidence. It shews
that the intellectual atmosphere of the Lockian epoch in
England contained elements favourable to a reconsideration
of the ultimate meaning of Matter. They are both the
genuine produce of the age of Locke and Malebranche.
Neither Berkeley nor Collier were, when they published
their books, familiar with ancient Greek speculations ;
those of modern Germany had only begun to loom in
the distance. Absolute Idealism, the Panphenomenalism
of Auguste Comte, and the modern evolutionary conception
of nature, have changed the conditions under which the
universal problem is studied, and are making intelligible
to this generation a manner of conceiving the Universe
which, for nearly a century and a half, the British and
French critics of Berkeley were unable to entertain.

Berkeley's Principles appeared three years before the
Clavis Universalis. Yet Collier tells us that it was ' after
a ten years' pause and deliberation,' that, 'rather than
the world should finish its course without once offering
to inquire in what manner it exists/ he had ' resolved

BERKELEY: FRASER. I. B b

370 EDITOR'S PREFACE TO THE

to put himself upon the trial of the common reader, without
pretending to any better art of gaining him than dry
reason and metaphysical demonstration.' Mr. Benson,
his biographer, says that it was in 1703, at the age of
twenty-three, that Collier came to the conclusion that
'there is no such thing as an external world'; and he
attributes the premises from which Collier drew this
conclusion to his neighbour, John Norris. Among Collier's
MSS., there remains the outline of an essay, in three
chapters, dated January, 1708, on the non-externality of
the visible world.

There are several coincidences between Berkeley and
Collier. Berkeley virtually presented his new theory of
Vision as the first instalment of his explanation of the Reality
of Matter. The first of the two Parts into which Collier's
Clavis is divided consists of proofs that the Visible World
is not, and cannot be, external. Berkeley, in the Principles
and the Dialogues, explains the reality of Matter. In like
manner the Second Part of the Clavis consists of reason
ings in proof of the impossibility of an external world
independent of Spirit. Finally, in his full-blown theory,
as well as in its visual germ, Berkeley takes for granted,
as intuitively known, the existence of sensible Matter ;
meaning by this, its relative existence, or dependence
on living Mind. The third proposition of Collier's
system asserts the real existence of visible matter in
particular, and of sensible matter in general.

The invisibility of distances, as well as of real magni
tudes and situations, and their suggestion by interpretation
of visual symbols, propositions which occupy so large
a space in Berkeley's Theory of Vision, have no counter
part in Collier. His proof of the non-externality of
the visible world consists of an induction of instances
of visible objects that are allowed by all not to be external,
although they seem to be as much so as any that are
called external. His Demonstration consists of nine proofs,

DIALOGUES BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 371

which may be compared with the reasonings and analyses
of Berkeley. Collier's Demonstration concludes with
answers to objections, and an application of his account of
the material world to the refutation of the Roman doctrine
of the substantial existence of Christ's body in the
Eucharist.

The universal sense-symbolism of Berkeley, and his
pervading recognition of the distinction between physical
or symbolical, and efficient or originative causation, are
wanting in the narrow reasonings of Collier. Berke
ley's more comprehensive philosophy, with its human
sympathies and beauty of style, is now recognised as
a striking expression and partial solution of fundamental
problems, while Collier is condemned to the obscurity of
the Schools \

1 Collier never came fairly in sight
of the philosophical public of last
century. He is referred to in Ger
many by Bilfinger, in his Dihicida-
tiones Philosophical (1746), and also
in the Ada Ernditorutn, Suppl. VI.
244, &c., and in England by Corry
in his Reflections on Liberty and
Necessity (1761), as well as in the
Remarks on the Reflections, and
Answers to the Remarks, pp. 7, 8
(1763), where he is described as
' a weak reasoner, and a very dull
writer also.' Collier was dragged
from his obscurity by Dr. Reid, in

his Essays on the Intellectual Powers,
Essay II. ch. 10. He was a sub
ject of correspondence between Sir
James Mackintosh, then at Bombay,
and Dr. Parr, and an object of curi
osity to Dugald Stewart. A beau
tiful reprint of the Clavis i^of the
original edition of which only seven
copies were then known to exist)
appeared in Edinburgh in 1836 ;
and in the following year it was
included in a collection of Meta-
pJiysical Tracts by English Philo
sophers of the Eighteenth Century,
prepared for the press by Dr. Parr.

B b 2

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
THE

LORD BERKELEY OF STRATTON1,

MASTER OF THE ROLLS IN THE KINGDOM OF IRELAND,

CHANCELLOR OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER, AND

ONE OF THE LORDS OF HER MAJESTY'S MOST

HONOURABLE PRIVY COUNCIL.

MY LORD,

The virtue, learning, and good sense which are acknow
ledged to distinguish your character, would tempt me
to indulge myself the pleasure men naturally take in
giving applause to those whom they esteem and honour :
and it should seem of importance to the subjects of Great
Britain that they knew the eminent share you enjoy
in the favour of your sovereign, and the honours she
has conferred upon you, have not been owing to any
application from your lordship, but entirely to her majesty's
own thought, arising from a sense of your personal merit,

1 William, fourth Lord Berkeley Ireland, an office which he held

of Stratton, born about 1663, sue- till 1672, when he was succeeded

ceeded his brother in 1697, and died by the Earl of Essex (see Burke's

in 1741 at Bruton in Somerset- Extinct Peerages). It is said that

shire. The Berkeleys of Stratton Bishop Berkeley's father was rela-

were descended from a younger ted to him. The Bishop himself

son of Maurice, Lord Berkeley was introduced by Dean Swift, in

of Berkeley Castle, who died in 1713, to the Lord Berkeley of Strat-

1326. His descendant, Sir John ton,towhomthe.D/Vi70,°7^sarededi-

Berkeley of Bruton, a zealous cated, as 'a cousin of his Lordship.'

Royalist, was created first Lord The title of Berkeley of Stratton

Berkeley of Stratton in 1658, and became extinct on the death of the

in 1669 became Lord Lieutenant of fifth Lord in 1773.

374 AUTHOR S DEDICATION TO THE DIALOGUES, ETC.

and an inclination to reward it. But, as your name is
prefixed to this treatise with an intention to do honour
to myself alone, I shall only say that I am encouraged
by the favour you have treated me with to address these
papers,to your lordship. And I was the more ambitious
of doing this, because a Philosophical Treatise could
not so properly be addressed to any one as to a person
of your lordship's character, who, to your other valuable
distinctions, have added the knowledge and relish of
Philosophy.

I am, with the greatest respect,

My Lord,

Your lordship's most obedient and
most humble servant,

GEORGE BERKELEY.

THE PREFACE1

THOUGH it seems the general opinion of the world, no
less than the design of nature and providence, that the
end of speculation be Practice, or the improvement and
regulation of our lives and actions ; yet those who are
most addicted to speculative studies, seem as generally
of another mind. And indeed if we consider the pains
that have been taken to perplex the plainest things, that
distrust of the senses, those doubts and scruples, those
abstractions and refinements that occur in the very
entrance of the sciences ; it will not seem strange that
men of leisure and curiosity should lay themselves out
in fruitless disquisitions, without descending to the prac
tical parts of life, or informing themselves in the more
necessary and important parts of knowledge.

Upon the common principles of philosophers, we are
not assured of the existence of things from their being
perceived. And we are taught to distinguish their real
nature from that which falls under our senses. Hence
arise scepticism and paradoxes. It is not enough that
we see and feel, that we taste and smell a thing : its true
nature, its absolute external entity, is still concealed. For,
though it be the fiction of our own brain, we have made
it inaccessible to all our faculties. Sense is fallacious,
reason defective. We spend our lives in doubting of those
things which other men evidently know, and believing
those things which they laugh at and despise.

In order, therefore, to divert the busy mind of man
from vain researches, it seemed necessary to inquire
into the source of its perplexities ; and, if possible, to

1 This interesting Preface is omit'.ed in his last edition of the Dialogues.

376 AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE

lay down such Principles as, by an easy solution of them,
together with their own native evidence, may at once
recommend themselves for genuine to the mind, and
rescue it from those endless pursuits it is engaged in.
Which, with a plain demonstration of the Immediate
Providence of an all-seeing God, and the natural Immor
tality of the soul, should seem the readiest preparation,
as well as the strongest motive, to the study and practice
of virtue.

This design I proposed in the First Part of a treatise
concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, published
in the year 1710. But, before I proceed to publish the
Second Part !, I thought it requisite to treat more clearly
and fully of certain Principles laid down in the First, and
to place them in a new light. Which is the business
of the following Dialogues.

In this Treatise, which does not presuppose in the
reader any knowledge of what was contained in the
former, it has been my aim to introduce the notions I
advance into the mind in the most easy and familiar
manner ; especially because they carry with them a great
opposition to the prejudices of philosophers, which have
so far prevailed against the common sense and natural
notions of mankind.

If the Principles which I here endeavour to propagate
are admitted for true, the consequences which, I think,
evidently flow from thence are, that Atheism and Scepticism
will be utterly destroyed, mairy; intricate points made
plain, great difficulties solved, several useless parts of
science retrenched, speculation referred to practice, and
men reduced from paradoxes to common sense.

And although it may, perhaps, seem an uneasy reflexion
to some, that when they have taken a circuit through
so many refined and unvulgar notions, they should at
last come to think like other men ; yet, methinks, this
return to the simple dictates of nature, after having wan
dered through the wild mazes of philosophy, is not un
pleasant. It is like coming home from a long voyage :
a man reflects with pleasure on the many difficulties

1 The Second Part of the Princi- in part written. See Editor's
pies was never published, and only Preface to the Principles,

DIALOGUES BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 377

and perplexities he has passed through, sets his heart
at ease, and enjoys himself with more satisfaction for
the future.

As it was my intention to convince Sceptics and Infidels
by reason, so it has been my endeavour strictly to observe
the most rigid laws of reasoning. And, to an impartial
reader, I hope it will be manifest that the sublime notion
of a God, and the comfortable expectation of Immortality,
do naturally arise from a close and methodical application
of thought : whatever may be the result of that loose,
rambling way, not altogether improperly termed Free-
thinking by certain libertines in thought, who can no
more endure the restraints of logic than those of religion
or government.

It will perhaps be objected to my design that, so
far as it tends to ease the mind of difficult and useless
inquiries, it can affect only a few speculative persons.
But if, by their speculations rightly placed, the study of
morality and the law of nature were brought more into
fashion among men of parts and genius, the discourage
ments that draw to Scepticism removed, the measures of
right and wrong accurately defined, and the principles of
Natural Religion reduced into regular systems, as art
fully, disposed and clearly connected as those of some
other sciences ; there are grounds to think these effects
would not only have a gradual influence in repairing the
too much defaced sense of virtue in the world, but also,
by shewing that such parts of revelation as lie within
the reach of human inquiry are most agreeable to right
reason, would dispose all prudent, unprejudiced persons
to a modest and wary treatment of those sacred mysteries
which are above the comprehension of our faculties.

It remains that I desire the reader to withhold his
censure of these Dialogues till he has read them through.
Otherwise, he may lay them aside in a mistake of their
design, or on account of difficulties or objections which
he would find answered in the sequel. A Treatise of
this nature would require to be once read over coherently,
in order to comprehend its design, the proofs, solution
of difficulties, and the connexion and disposition of its
parts. If it be thought to deserve a second reading,
this, I imagine, will make the entire scheme very plain.

378 AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE DIALOGUES, ETC.

Especially if recourse be had to an Essay I wrote some
years since upon Vision, and the Treatise concerning
the Principles of Human Knowledge] wherein divers notions
advanced in these Dialogues are farther pursued, or placed
in different lights, and other points handled which natur
ally tend to confirm and illustrate them.

THREE DIALOGUES

BETWEEN

HYLAS AND PHILONOUS, IN OPPOSITION
TO SCEPTICS AND ATHEISTS

THE FIRST DIALOGUE

Philonoiis. Good morrow, Hylas : I did not expect to
find you abroad so early.

Hylas. It is indeed something unusual ; but my thoughts
were so taken up with a subject I was discoursing of last
night, that finding I could not sleep, I resolved to rise
and take a turn in the garden.

Phil. It happened well, to let you see what innocent
and agreeable pleasures you lose every morning. Can
there be a pleasanter time of the day, or a more
delightful season of the year? That purple sky, those
wild but sweet notes of birds, the fragrant bloom upon
the trees and flowers, the gentle influence of the rising
sun, these and a thousand nameless beauties of nature
inspire the soul with secret transports ; its faculties too
being at this time fresh and lively, are fit for those medi
tations, which the solitude of a garden and tranquillity
of the morning naturally dispose us to. But I am afraid
I interrupt your thoughts : for you seemed very intent
on something.

//>'/. It is true, I was, and shall be obliged to you if
you will permit me to go on in the same vein ; not that
I would by any means deprive myself of your company,
for my thoughts always flow more easily in conversation

380 THE FIRST DIALOGUE

with a friend, than when I am alone : but my request is,
that you would suffer me to impart my reflexions to you.

Phil. With all my heart, it is what I should have request
ed myself if you had not prevented me.

HyL I was considering the odd fate of those men who
have in all ages, through an affectation of beingdistinguished
from the vulgar, or some unaccountable turn of thought,
pretended either to believe nothing at all, or to believe
the most extravagant things in the world. This however
might be borne, if their paradoxes and scepticism did not
draw after them some consequences of general disadvan
tage to mankind. But the mischief lieth here; that when
men of less leisure see them who are supposed to have
spent their whole time in the pursuits of knowledge
professing an entire ignorance of all things, or advancing
such notions as are repugnant to plain and commonly
received principles, they will be tempted to entertain
suspicions concerning the most important truths, which
they had hitherto held sacred and unquestionable1.

Phil. I entirely agree with you, as to the ill tendency
of the affected doubts of some philosophers, and fantastical
conceits of others. I am even so far gone of late in this
way of thinking, that I have quitted several of the sublime
notions I had got in their schools for vulgar opinions.
And I give it you on my word ; since this revolt from
metaphysical notions to the plain dictates of nature and
common sense2, I find my understanding strangely en
lightened, so that I can now easily comprehend a great
many things which before were all mystery and riddle.

HyL I am glad to find there was nothing in the accounts
I heard of you.

Phil. Pray, what were those ?

Hyl. You were represented, in last night's conversation,
as one who maintained the most extravagant opinion that
ever entered into the mind of man, to wit, that there is
no such thing as material substance in the world.

1 Principles, Introduction, sect. i. Philonous personates the revolt,

- Berkeley's philosophy is pro- and represents Berkeley. Hylas

fessedly a ' revolt ' from abstract vindicates the uncritical concep-

ideas to an enlightened sense of con- tion of independent Matter,
crete realities. In these Dialogues

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 381

Phil. That there is no such thing as what philosophers
call material substance, I am seriously persuaded : but,
if I were made to see anything absurd or sceptical in this,
I should then have the same reason to renounce this that
I imagine I have now to reject the contrary opinion.

Hyl. What ! can anything be more fantastical, more
repugnant to Common Sense, or a more manifest piece of
Scepticism, than to believe there is no such thing as matter'*

Phil. Softly, good Hylas. What if it should prove
that you, who hold there is, are, by virtue of that opinion,
a greater sceptic, and maintain more paradoxes and repug
nances to Common Sense, than I who believe no such
thing?

Hyl. You may as soon persuade me, the part is greater
than the whole, as that, in order to avoid absurdity and
Scepticism, I should ever be obliged to give up my
opinion in this point.

Phil. Well then, are you content to admit that opinion
for true, which upon examination shall appear most
agreeable to Common Sense, and remote from Scepticism ?

Hyl. With all my heart. Since you are for raising
disputes about the plainest things in nature, I am content
for once to hear what you have to say.

Phil. Pray, Hylas, what do you mean by a sceptic ?

Hyl. I mean what all men mean — one that doubts of
everything.

Phil. He then who entertains no doubt concerning
some particular point, with regard to that point cannot
be thought a sceptic.

Hyl. I agree with you.

Phil. Whether doth doubting consist in embracing the
affirmative or negative side of a question ?

Hyl. In neither ; for whoever understands English can
not but know that doubting signifies a suspense between
both.

Phil. He then that denies any point, can no more be
said to doubt of it, than he who affirmeth it with the same
degree of assurance.

Hyl. True.

Phil. And, consequently, for such his denial is no more
to be esteemed a sceptic than the other.

Hyl. I acknowledge it.

382 THE FIRST DIALOGUE

Phil. How cometh it to pass then, Hylas, that you
pronounce me a sceptic, because I deny what you affirm, to
wit, the existence of Matter? Since, for aught you can
tell, I am as peremptory in my denial, as you in your
affirmation.

Hyl. Hold, Philonous, I have been a little out in my
definition ; but every false step a man makes in discourse
is not to be insisted on. I said indeed that a sceptic was
one who doubted of everything ; but I should have added,
or who denies the reality and truth of things.

Phil. What things ? Do you mean the principles and
theorems of sciences ? But these you know are universal
intellectual notions, and consequently independent of
Matter. The denial therefore of this doth not imply the
denying them J.

Hyl. I grant it. But are there no other things ? What
think you of distrusting the senses, of denying the real
existence of sensible things, or pretending to know nothing
of them. Is not this sufficient to denominate a man a
sceptic ?

Phil. Shall we therefore examine which of us it is that
denies the reality of sensible things, or professes the
greatest ignorance of them ; since, if I take you rightly, he
is to be esteemed the greatest sceptic ?

Hyl. That is what I desire.

Phil. What mean you by Sensible Things ?

Hyl. Those things which are perceived by the senses.
Can you imagine that I mean anything else ?

Phil. Pardon me, Hylas, if I am desirous clearly to
apprehend your notions, since this may much shorten our
inquiry. Suffer me then to ask you this farther question.
Are those things only perceived by the senses which are
perceived immediately? Or, may those things properly be
said to be sensible which are perceived mediately, or not
without the intervention of others ?

Hyl. I do not sufficiently understand you.

Phil. In reading a book, what I immediately perceive

1 Berkeley's zeal against Matter ' universal intellectual notions ' —

in the abstract, and all abstract ' the principles and theorems of

ideas of concrete things, is therefore sciences.'
not necessarily directed against

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 383

are the letters ; but mediately, or by means of these,
are suggested to my mind the notions of God, virtue, truth,
&c. Now, that the letters are truly sensible things, or
perceived by sense, there is no doubt : but I would know
whether you take the things suggested by them to be so too.

Hyl. No, certainly : it were absurd to think God or virtue
sensible things ; though they may be signified and sug
gested to the mind by sensible marks, with which they
have an arbitrary connexion.

Phil. It seems then, that by sensible things you mean
those only which can be perceived immediately by sense?

Hyl. Right.

Phil. Doth it not follow from this, that though I see one
part of the sky red, and another blue, and that my reason
doth thence evidently conclude there must be some cause of
that diversity of colours, yet that cause cannot be said to be
a sensible thing, or perceived by the sense of seeing ?

Hyl. It doth.

Phil. In like manner, though I hear variety of sounds,
yet I cannot be said to hear the causes of those sounds ?

Hyl. You cannot.

Phil. And when by. my touch I perceive a thing to be
hot and heavy, I cannot say, with any truth or propriety,
that I feel the cause of its heat or weight ?

Hyl. To prevent any more questions of this kind, I tell
you once for all, that by sensible tilings I mean those only
i which are perceived by sense ; and that in truth the senses
\perceive nothing which they do not perceive immediately :
utbr they make no inferences. The deducing therefore of
Causes or occasions from effects and appearances, which
alone are perceived by sense, entirely relates to reason \

Phil. This point then is agreed between us — That sensible
things are those only which are immediately perceived by sense.
You will farther inform me, whether we immediately per
ceive by sight anything beside light, and colours, and
figures a; or by hearing, anything but sounds ; by the palate,
anything beside tastes ; by the smell, beside odours ; or
by the touch, more than tangible qualities.

1 Here' reason 'means reasoning and 'inference.'

or inference. Cf. Theory of Vision 2 'figure' as well as colour, is

Vindicated, sect. 42, including the here included among the original

distinction between 'suggestion ' data of sight.

384 THE FIRST DIALOGUE

Hyl We do not.

Phil. It seems, therefore, that if you take away all sensi
ble qualities, there remains nothing sensible ?

Hyl. I grant it.

Phil. Sensible things therefore are nothing else but
so many sensible qualities, or combinations of sensible
qualities ?

Hyl. Nothing else.

Phil. Heat then is a sensible thing ?

Hyl. Certainly.

Phil. Doth the reality of sensible things consist in being
perceived? or, is it something distinct from their being
perceived, and that bears no relation to the mind ?

Hyl. To exist is one thing, and to be perceived is an
other.

Phil. I speak with regard to sensible things only. And
of these I ask, whether by their real existence you mean a
subsistence exterior to the mind, and distinct from their
being perceived ?

Hyl. I mean a real absolute being, distinct from, and
without any relation to, their being perceived.

Phil. Heat therefore, if it be allowed a real being, must
exist without the mind * ?

Hyl. It must.

Phil. Tell me, Hylas, is this real existence equally com
patible to all degrees of heat, which we perceive ; or is
there any reason why we should attribute it to some, and
deny it to others ? And if there be, pray let me know that
reason.

Hyl. Whatever degree of heat we perceive by sense, we
may be sure the same exists in the object that occasions it.

Phil. What ! the greatest as well as the least ?

Hyl. I tell you, the reason is plainly the same in respect
of both. They are both perceived by sense; nay, the
greater degree of heat is more sensibly perceived; and con
sequently, if there is any difference, we are more certain of
its real existence than we can be of the reality of a lesser
degree.

Phil. But is not the most vehement and intense degree
of heat a very great pain ?

1 ' without the mind/ i. e. unrealised by any percipient mind.

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUb 385

Hyl. No one can deny it.

Phil. And is any unperceiving thing capable of pain or
pleasure ?

Hyl. No, certainly.

Phil. Is your material substance a senseless being, or a
being endowed with sense and perception ?

HyL It is senseless without doubt,

Phil. It cannot therefore be the subject of pain ?

Hyl. By no means.

Phil. Nor consequently of the greatest heat perceived
by sense, since you acknowledge this to be no small pain ?

Hyl. I grant it.

Phil. What shall we say then of your external object ; is
it a material Substance, or no ?

Hyl. It is a material substance with the sensible quali
ties inhering in it.

Phil. Mow then can a great heat exist in it, since you
own it cannot in a material substance ? I desire you
would clear this point.

Hyl. Hold, Philonous, I fear I was out in yielding
intense heat to be a pain. It should seem rather, that
pain is something distinct from heat, and the consequence
or effect of it.

Phil. Upon putting your hand near the lire, do you
perceive one simple uniform sensation, or two distinct
sensations ?

HyL But one simple sensation.

Phil. Is not the heat immediately perceived ?

HyL It is.

Phil. And the pain ?

HyL True.

Phil. Seeing therefore they are both immediately per
ceived at the same time, and the fire affects you only with
one simple or uncompoundcd idea, it follows that this
same simple idea is both the intense heat immediately per
ceived, and the pain ; and, consequently, that the intense-
heat immediately perceived is nothing distinct from a par
ticular sort of pain.

HyL It seems so.

Phil. Again, try in your thoughts, Hylas, if you can
conceive a vehement sensation to be without pain or
pleasure.

BERKELEY : FKASEK. J. ^ C

386 THE FIRST DIALOGUE

Hyl. I cannot.

Phil. Or can you frame to yourself an idea of sensible
pain or pleasure in general, abstracted from every particu
lar idea of heat, cold, tastes, smells ? &c.

Hyl. — I do not find that I can.

Phil. Doth it not therefore follow, that sensible pain is
nothing distinct from those sensations or ideas, in an
intense degree?

Hyl. It is undeniable ; and, to speak the truth, I begin
to suspect a very great heat cannot exist but in a mind
perceiving it.

Phil. What ! are you then in that sceptical state of
suspense, between affirming and denying?

Hyl. I think I may be positive in the point. A very
violent and painful heat cannot exist without the mind.

Phil. It hath not therefore, according to you, any real
being?

Hyl. I own it.

Phil. Is it therefore certain, that there is no body in
nature really hot ?

Hyl. I have not denied there is any real heat in bodies.
I only say, there is no such thing as an intense real heat.

Phil. But, did you not say before that all degrees of
heat were equally real ; or, if there was any difference, that
the greater were more undoubtedly real than the lesser?

Hyl. True : but it was because I did not then consider
the ground there is for distinguishing between them,
which I now plainly see. And it is this : because intense
heat is nothing else but a particular kind of painful
sensation ; and pain cannot exist but in a perceiving
being; it follows that no intense heat can really exist in
an unperceiving corporeal substance. But this is no
reason why we should deny heat in an inferior degree to
exist in such a substance.

Phil. But how shall we be able to discern those degrees
of heat which exist only in the mind from those which
exist without it?

Hyl. That is no difficult matter. You know the least
pain cannot exist unperceived ; whatever, therefore, degree
of heat is a pain exists only in the mind. But, as for all
other degrees of heat, nothing obliges us to think the same
of them.

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 387

Phil. I think you granted before that no unperceiving
being was capable of pleasure, any more than of pain.

Hyl I did.

Phil. And is not warmth, or a more gentle degree of
heat than what causes uneasiness, a pleasure?

Hyl What then?

Phil Consequently, it cannot exist without the mind in
an unperceiving substance, or body.

Hyl. So it seems.

Phil Since, therefore, as well those degrees of heat that
are not painful, as those that are, can exist only in
a thinking substance ; may we not conclude that external
bodies are absolutely incapable of any degree of heat
whatsoever ?

Hyl. On second thoughts, I do not think it so evident
that warmth is a pleasure as that a great degree of heat is
a pain.

Phil. I do not pretend that warmth is as great a pleasure
as heat is a pain. But, if you grant it to be even a small
pleasure, it serves to make good my conclusion.

Hyl. I could rather call it an indolence. It seems to be
nothing more than a privation of both pain and pleasure.
And that such a quality or state as this may agree to an
unthinking substance, I hope you will not deny.

Phil If you are resolved to maintain that warmth, or
a gentle degree of heat, is no pleasure, I know not how to
convince you otherwise than by appealing to your own
sense. But what think you of cold ?

Hyl. The same that I do of heat. An intense degree of
cold is a pain ; for to feel a very great cold, is to perceive
a great uneasiness : it cannot therefore exist without the
mind ; but a lesser degree of cold may, as well as a lesser
degree of heat.

Phil. Those bodies, therefore, upon whose application
to our own, we perceive a moderate degree of heat, must
be concluded to have a moderate degree of heat or warmth
in them ; and those, upon whose application we feel a like
degree of cold, must be thought to have cold in them.

Hyl. They must.

Phil. Can any doctrine be true that necessarily leads
a man into an absurdity ?

Hyl. Without doubt it cannot.

c c 2

388 THE FIRST DIALOGUE

Phil. Is it not an absurdity to think that the same thing
should be at the same time both cold and warm ?

Hyl. It is.

Phil. Suppose now one of your hands hot, and the other
cold, and that they are both at once put into the same
vessel of water, in an intermediate state ; will not the
water seem qold to one hand, and warm to the other ! ?

Hyl It will.

Phil. Ought we not therefore, by your principles, to
conclude it is really both cold and warm at the same time,
that is, according to your own concession, to believe an
absurdity?

Hyl. I confess it seems so.

Phil. Consequently, the principles themselves are false,
since you have granted that no true principle leads to an
absurdity.

Hyl. But, after all, can anything be more absurd than to
say, there is no heat in the fire t

Phil. To make the point still clearer ; tell me whether,
in two cases exactly alike, we ought not to make the same
judgment ?

Hyl. We ought.

Phil. When a pin pricks your linger, doth it not rend
and divide the fibres of your flesh ?

Hyl. It doth.

Phil. And when a coal burns your linger, doth it any
more ?

Hyl. It doth not.

Phil. Since, therefore, you neither judge the sensation
itself occasioned by the pin, nor anything like it to be in
the pin ; you should not, conformably to what you have
now granted, judge the sensation occasioned by the fire, or
anything like it, to be in the fire.

Hyl. Well, since it must be so, 1 am content to yield
this point, and acknowledge that heat and cold arc
only sensations existing in our minds. But there still
remain qualities enough to secure the reality of external
things.

Phil. But what will you say, Hylas, if it shall appear
that the case is the same with regard to all other sensible

1 Cf. Principles, sect. 14.

BETWEEN IIYI.AS AND PHILONOrs 389

qualities l, and that they can no more be supposed to exist
without the mind, than heat and cold ?

HyL Then indeed you will have done something to the
purpose ; but that is what I despair of seeing proved.

Phil. Let us examine them in order. What think you
of tastes — do they exist without the mind, or no?

HyL Can any man in his senses doubt whether sugar is
sweet, or wormwood bitter ?

Phil. Inform me, Hylas. Is a sweet taste a particular
kind of pleasure or pleasant sensation, or is it not?

HyL It is.

Phil. And is not bitterness some kind of uneasiness or
pain ?

HyL I grant it.

Phil. If therefore sugar and wormwood are unthinking
corporeal substances existing without the mind, how can
sweetness and bitterness, that is, pleasure and pain, agree
to them ?

HyL Hold, Philonous, I now see what it was deluded me
all this time. You asked whether heat and cold, sweet
ness and bitterness, were not particular sorts of pleasure
and pain ; to which I answered simply, that they were.
Whereas I should have thus distinguished : — those qualities,
as perceived by us, are pleasures or pains ; but not as
existing in the external objects. We must not therefore
conclude absolutely, that there is no heat in the fire, or
sweetness in the sugar, but only that heat or sweetness, as
perceived by us, are not in the fire or sugar. What say
you to this ?

Phil. I say it is nothing to the purpose. Our discourse
proceeded altogether concerning sensible things, which you
defined to be, the things we immediately perceive by our
senses. Whatever other qualities, therefore, you speak of,
as distinct from these, I know nothing of them, neither do
they at all belong to the point in dispute. You may,
indeed, pretend to have discovered certain qualities which
you do not perceive, and assert those insensible qualities
exist in fire and sugar. But what use can be made of this
to your present purpose, I am at a loss to conceive. Tell
me then once more, do you acknowledge that heat and

1 Cf. Principles, sect. 14, 15.

390 THE FIRST DIALOGUE

cold, sweetness and bitterness (meaning those qualities
which are perceived by the senses), do not exist without
the mind ?

Hyl. I see it is to no purpose to hold out, so I give up
the cause as to those mentioned qualities. Though
I profess it sounds oddly, to say that sugar is not sweet.

Phil. But, for your farther satisfaction, take this along
with you : that which at other times seems sweet, shall, to
a distempered palate, appear bitter. And, nothing can be
plainer than that divers persons perceive different tastes
in the same food ; since that which one man delights in,
another abhors. And how could this be, if the taste was
something really inherent in the food ?

HyL I acknowledge I know not how.

Phil. In the next place, odours are to be considered.
And, with regard to these, I would fain know whether what
hath been said of tastes doth not exactly agree to them ?
Are they not so many pleasing or displeasing sensations ?

HyL They are.

Phil. Can you then conceive it possible that they should
exist in an unperceiving thing?

Hyl. I cannot.

Phil. Or, can you imagine that filth and ordure affect
those brute animals that feed on them out of choice, with
the same smells which we perceive in them ?

Hyl. By no means.

Phil. May we not therefore conclude of smells, as of the
other forementioned qualities, that they cannot exist in
any but a perceiving substance or mind ?

Hyl. I think so.

Phil. Then as to sounds, what must we think of them :
are they accidents really inherent in external bodies, or not?

HyL That they inhere not in the sonorous bodies is plain
from hence : because a bell struck in the exhausted
receiver of an air-pump sends forth no sound. The air,
therefore, must be thought the subject of sound.

Phil. What reason is there for that, Hylas ?

HyL Because, when any motion is raised in the air, we
perceive a sound greater or lesser, according to the air's
motion ; but without some motion in the air, we never hear
any sound at all.

Phil. And granting that we never hear a sound but when

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 391

some motion is produced in the air, yet I do not see how
you can infer from thence, that the sound itself is in the air.

HyL It is this very motion in the external air that pro
duces in the mind the sensation of sound. For, striking
on the drum of the ear, it causeth a vibration, which by
the auditory nerves being communicated to the brain, the
soul is thereupon affected with the sensation called sound.

Phil. What ! is sound then a sensation ?

HyL I tell you, as perceived by us, it is a particular
sensation in the mind.

Phil. And can any sensation exist without the mind ?

HyL No, certainly.

Phil. How then can sound, being a sensation, exist in
the air, if by the air you mean a senseless substance exist
ing without the mind ?

HyL You must distinguish, Philonous, between sound as
it is perceived by us, and as it is in itself; or (which is the
same thing) between the sound we immediately perceive,
and that which exists without us. The former, indeed, is
a particular kind of sensation, but the latter is merely a
vibrative or undulatory motion in the air.

PhiL I thought I had already obviated that distinction,
by the answer I gave when you were applying it in a like
case before. But, to say no more of that, are you sure
then that sound is really nothing but motion ?

HyL I am.

PhiL Whatever therefore agrees to real sound, may with
truth be attributed to motion ?

HyL It may.

PhiL It is then good sense to speak of motion as of
a thing that is loud, sweet, acute, or grave.

HyL I see you are resolved not to understand me. Is
it not evident those accidents or modes belong only to
sensible sound, or sound in the common acceptation of the
word, but not to sound in the real and philosophic sense ;
which, as I just now told you, is nothing but a certain
motion of the air ?

PhiL It seems then there are two sorts of sound — the
one vulgar, or that which is heard, the other philosophical
and real ?

HyL Even so.

PhiL And the latter consists in motion ?

392 THE FIRST DIALOGUE

Hyl. I told you so before.

Phil Tell me, Hylas, to which of the senses, think you,
the idea of motion belongs? to the hearing?

Hyl. No, certainly; but to the sight and touch.

Phil. It should follow then, that, according to you, real
sounds may possibly be seen orfe/f, but never Jieard.

Hyl. Look you, Philonous, you may, if you please, make
a jest of my opinion, but that will not alter the truth of
things. I own, indeed, the inferences you draw me into
sound something oddly; but common language, you know,
is framed by; and for the use of the vulgar : we must not
therefore wonder if expressions adapted to exact philo
sophic notions seem uncouth and out of the way.

Phil. Is it come to that ? I assure you, I imagine myself
to have gained no small point, since you make so light of
departing from common phrases and opinions; it being
a main part of our inquiry, to examine whose notions are
widest of the common road, and most repugnant to the
general sense of the world. But, can you think it no more
than a philosophical paradox, to say that real sounds are
never heard, and that the idea of them is obtained by some
other sense ? And is there nothing in this contrary to
nature and the truth of things ?

Hyl. To deal ingenuously, I do not like it. And, after
the concessions already made, I had as well grant that
sounds too have no real being without the mind.

Phil. And I hope you will make no difficulty to acknow
ledge the same of colours.

Hyl. Pardon me : the case of colours is very different.
Can anything be plainer than that we see them on the
objects ?

Phil. The objects you speak of are, I suppose, corporeal
Substances existing without the mind ?

Hyl. They are.

Phil. And have true and real colours inhering in them ?

Hyl. Each visible object hath that colour which we see
in it.

Phil. How ! is there anything visible but what we
perceive by sight ?

Hyl. There is not.

Phil. And, do we perceive anything by sense which we
do not perceive immediately ?

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 393

Hyl. How often must I be obliged to repeat the same
thing ? I tell you, we do not.

Phil. Have patience, good Hylas ; and tell me once
more, whether there is anything immediately perceived by
the senses, except sensible qualities. I know you asserted
there was not ; but I would now be informed, whether you
still persist in the same opinion.

PlyL I do.

Phil. Pray, is your corporeal substance either a sensible
quality, or made up of sensible qualities ?

Hyl. What a question that is ! who ever thought it was ?

Phil. My reason for asking was, because in saying, each
visible object hath that colour which we see in it, you make
visible objects to be corporeal substances ; which implies
either that corporeal substances are sensible qualities, or
else that there is something beside sensible qualities per
ceived by sight : but, as this point was formerly agreed
between us, and is still maintained by you, it is a clear
consequence, that your corporeal substance is nothing
distinct from sensible qualities1.

Hyl. You may draw as many absurd consequences as
you please, and endeavour to perplex the plainest things ;
but you shall never persuade me out of my senses. I clearly
understand my own meaning.

Phil. I wish you would make me understand it too.
But, since you are unwilling to have your notion of
corporeal substance examined, I shall urge that point no
farther. Only be pleased to let me know, whether the
same colours which we see exist in external bodies, or
some other.

Hyl. The very same.

Phil. What ! are then the beautiful red and purple we
see on yonder clouds really in them ? Or do you imagine
they have in themselves any other form than that of a dark
mist or vapour ?

Hyl. I must own, Philonous, those colours are not really
in the clouds as they seem to be at this distance. They
are only apparent colours.

Phil. Apparent call you them ? how shall we distinguish
these apparent colours from real?

1 'Sensible qualities,' i.e. the significant appearances presented in

394 THE FIRST DIALOGUE

Hyl. Very easily. Those are to be thought apparent
which, appearing only at a distance, vanish upon a nearer-
approach.

Phil. And those, I suppose, are to be thought real which
are discovered by the most near and exact survey.

Hyl. Right.

Phil. Is the nearest and exactest survey made by the
help of a microscope, or by the naked eye ?

Hyl. By a microscope, doubtless.

Phil. But a microscope often discovers colours in an
object different from those perceived by the unassisted
sight. And, in case we had microscopes magnifying to
any assigned degree, it is certain that no object whatsoever,
viewed through them, would appear in the same colour
which it exhibits to the naked eye.

Hyl. And what will you conclude from all this ? You
cannot argue that there are really and naturally no colours
on objects : because by artificial managements they maybe
altered, or made to vanish.

Phil. I think it may evidently be concluded from your
own concessions, that all the colours we see with our
naked eyes are only apparent as those on the clouds, since
they vanish upon a more close and accurate inspection
which is afforded us by a microscope. Then, as to what
you say by way of prevention : I ask you whether the
real and natural state of an object is better discovered by
a very sharp and piercing sight, or by one which is less
sharp ?

Hyl. By the former without doubt.

Phil. Is it not plain from Dioptrics that microscopes
make the sight more penetrating, and represent objects as
they would appear to the eye in case it were naturally
endowed with a most exquisite sharpness ?

Hyl. It is.

Phil. Consequently the microscopical representation is
to be thought that which best sets forth the real nature of
the thing, or what it is in itself. The colours, therefore,
by it perceived are more genuine and real than those
perceived otherwise.

Hyl. I confess there is something in what you say.

Phil. Besides, it is not only possible but manifest, that
there actually are animals whose eyes are by nature framed

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 395

to perceive those things which by reason of their minuteness
escape our sight. What think you of those inconceivably
small animals perceived by glasses ? must we suppose
they are all stark blind ? Or, in case they see, can it be
imagined their sight hath not the same use in preserving
their bodies from injuries, which appears in that of all
other animals ? And if it hath, is it not evident they must
see particles less than their own bodies; which will present
them with a far different view in each object from that
which strikes our senses l ? Even our own eyes do not
always represent objects to us after the same manner. In
the jaundice every one knows that all things seem yellow.
Is it not therefore highly probable those animals in whose
eyes we discern a very different texture from that of ours,
and whose bodies abound with different humours, do not
see the same colours in every object that we do ? From
all which, should it not seem to follow that all colours are
equally apparent, and that none of those which we perceive
are really inherent in any outward object ?

Hyl It should.

Phil. The point will be past all doubt, if you consider
that, in case colours were real properties or affections
inherent in external bodies, they could admit of no altera
tion without some change wrought in the very bodies
themselves : but, is it not evident from what hath been
said that, upon the use of microscopes, upon a change
happening in the humours of the eye, or a variation of
distance, without any manner of real alteration in the thing
itself, the colours of any object are either changed, or
totally disappear ? Nay, all other circumstances remaining
the same, change but the situation of some objects, and
they shall present different colours to the eye. The same
thing happens upon viewing an object in various degrees
of light. And what is more known than that the same
bodies appear differently coloured by candle-light from
what they do in the open day? Add to these the ex
periment of a prism which, separating the heterogeneous
rays of light, alters the colour of any object, and will cause
the whitest to appear of a deep blue or red to the naked
eye. And now tell me whether you are still of opinion

1 Cf. New Theory of Vision, sect. 80-86.

396 THE FIRST DIALOGUE

that every body hath its true real colour inhering in it ;
and, if you think it hath; I would fain know farther from
you, what certain distance and position of the object, what
peculiar texture and formation of the eye, what degree or
kind of light is necessary for ascertaining that true colour,
and distinguishing it from apparent ones.

Hyl. I own myself entirely satisfied, that they are all
equally apparent, and that there is no such thing as colour
really inhering in external bodies, but that it is altogether
in the light. And what confirms me in this opinion is, that
in proportion to the light colours are still more or less
vivid ; and if there be no light, then are there no colours
perceived. Besides, allowing there are colours on external
objects, yet, how is it possible for us to perceive them?
For no external body affects the mind, unless it acts first
on our organs of sense. But the only action of bodies is
motion ; and motion cannot be communicated otherwise
than by impulse. A distant object therefore cannot act
on the eye ; nor consequently make itself or its properties
perceivable to the soul. Whence it plainly follows that it
is immediately some contiguous substance, which, operating
on the eye, occasions a perception of colours : and such is
light.

Phil. How! is light then a substance ?

Hyl. I tell you, Philonous, external light is nothing but
a thin fluid substance, whose minute particles being agitated
with a brisk motion, and in various manners reflected from
the different surfaces of outward objects to the eyes, com
municate different motions to the optic nerves ; which,
being propagated to the brain, cause therein various
impressions ; and these are attended with the sensations
of red, blue, yellow, cS:c.

Phil. It seems then the light doth no more than shake
the optic nerves.

Hyl. Nothing else.

Phil. And consequent to each particular motion of the
nerves, the mind is affected with a sensation, which is some
particular colour.

Hyl. Right.

Phil. And these sensations have no existence without
the mind.

Hyl. They have not,

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 397

Phil. How then do you affirm that colours are in the
light ; since by light you understand a corporeal substance
external to the mind ?

Hyl. Light and colours, as immediately perceived by us,
I grant cannot exist without the mind. But in themselves
they are only the motions and configurations of certain
insensible particles of matter.

Phil. Colours then, in the vulgar sense, or taken for the
immediate objects of sight, cannot agree to any but a per
ceiving substance.

Hyl. That is what I say.

Phil. Well then, since you give up the point as to those
sensible qualities which are alone thought colours by all
mankind beside, you may hold what you please with regard
to those invisible ones of the philosophers. It is not my
business to dispute about them ; only I would advise you
to bethink yourself, whether, considering the inquiry we
are upon, it be prudent for you to affirm — the red and blue
which ivc see are not real colours, but certain unknown motions
and figures ivhicli no man ever did or can see are truly so.
Are not these shocking notions, and are not they subject
to as many ridiculous inferences, as those you were obliged
to renounce before in the case of sounds?

Hyl. I frankly own, Philonous, that it is in vain to stand
out any longer. Colours, sounds, tastes, in a word all
those termed secondary qualities, have certainly no existence
without the mind. But by this acknowledgment I must
not be supposed to derogate anything from the reality of
Matter, or external objects ; seeing it is no more than
several philosophers maintain ', who nevertheless are the
farthest imaginable from denying Matter. For the clearer
understanding of this, you must know sensible qualities
are by philosophers divided into Primary and Secondary".
The former are Extension, Figure, Solidity, Gravity,
Motion, and Rest ; and these they hold exist really in
bodies. The latter are those above enumerated ; or,

1 Descartes and Locke for ex- See also Descartes, Meditations, I II,
ample. Principia, I. sect. 69 ; Malebranche,

2 On Primary and Secondary Recherche, Liv. VI. Pt. II. sect. 2;
Qualities of Matter, and their mutual Locke's Essay, Bk. II. ch. 8.
relations, cf. Principles, sect. 9-13.

398 THE FIRST DIALOGUE

briefly, all sensible qualities beside the Primary ; which they
assert are only so many sensations or ideas existing
nowhere but in the mind. But all this, I doubt not, you
are apprised of. For my part, I have been a long time
sensible there was such an opinion current among philo
sophers, but was never thoroughly convinced of its truth
until now.

Phil. You are still then of opinion that extension and
figures are inherent in external unthinking substances ?

Hyl I am.

Phil. But what if the same arguments which are brought
against Secondary Qualities will hold good against these
also?

Hyl. Why then I shall be obliged to think, they too
exist only in the mind.

Phil. Is it your opinion the very figure and extension
which you perceive by sense exist in the outward object
or material substance ?

Hyl It is.

Phil. Have all other animals as good grounds to think
the same of the figure and extension which they see and
feel?

Hyl. Without doubt, if they have any thought at all.

Phil Answer me, Hylas. Think you the senses were
bestowed upon all animals for their preservation and
well-being in life? or were they given to men alone for
this end ?

Hyl I make no question but they have the same use in
all other animals.

Phil If so, is it not necessary they should be enabled
by them to perceive their own limbs, and those bodies
which are capable of harming them ?

Hyl Certainly.

Phil A mite therefore must be supposed to see his own
foot, and things equal or even less than it, as bodies of
some considerable dimension ; though at the same time
they appear to you scarce discernible, or at best as so
many visible points J ?

Hyl I cannot deny it.

1 Cf. New Theory of Vision, sect. 80.

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 399

Phil And to creatures less than the mite they will seem
yet larger ?

Hyl. They will.

Phil. Insomuch that what you can hardly discern will
to another extremely minute animal appear as some huge
mountain ?

Hyl. All this I grant.

Phil. Can one and the same thing be at the same time
in itself of different dimensions?

Hyl. That were absurd to imagine.

Phil. But, from what you have laid down it follows that
both the extension by you perceived, and that perceived
by the mite itself, as likewise all those perceived by lesser
animals, are each of them the true extension of the mite's
foot ; that is to say, by your own principles you are led
into an absurdity.

Hyl. There seems to be some difficulty in the point.

Phil. Again, have you not acknowledged that no real
inherent property of any object can be changed without
some change in the thing itself?

Hyl. I have.

Phil. But, as we approach to or recede from an object,
the visible extension varies, being at one distance ten or
a hundred times greater than at another. Doth it not
therefore follow from hence likewise that it is not really
inherent in the object?

Hyl. I own I am at a loss what to think.

Phil. Your judgment will soon be determined, if you
will venture to think as freely concerning this quality as
you have done concerning the rest. Was it not admitted
as a good argument, that neither heat nor cold was in the
water, because it seemed warm to one hand and cold to
the other ?

Hyl. It was.

Phil. Is it not the very same reasoning to conclude,
there is no extension or figure in an object, because to
one eye it shall seem little, smooth, and round, when at
the same time it appears to the other, great, uneven, and
angular ?

Hyl. The very same. But does this latter fact ever
happen ?

Phil. You may at any time make the experiment, by

400 THE FIRST DIALOGUE

looking with one eye bare, and with the other through
a microscope.

Hyl I know not how to maintain it ; and yet I am loath
to give up extension, I see so many odd consequences
following upon such a concession.

Phil. Odd, say you ? After the concessions already
made, I hope you will stick at nothing for its oddness.
pBut, on the other hand, should it not seem very odd,
if the general reasoning which includes all other sensible
qualities did not also include extension ? If it be allowed
that no idea, nor anything like an idea, can exist in an
unperceiving substance, then surely it follows that no
figure, or mode of extension, which we can either per
ceive, or imagine, or have any idea of, can be really
inherent in Matter; not to mention the peculiar difficulty
there must be in conceiving a material substance, prior
to and distinct from extension, to be the substratum of
extension. Be the sensible quality what it will — figure,
or sound, or colour, it seems alike impossible it should
subsist in that which doth not perceive it. |

HyL I give up the point for the present, reserving still
a right to retract my opinion, in case I shall hereafter
discover any false step in my progress to it.

Phil. That is a right you cannot be denied. Figures
and extension being despatched, we proceed next to
•motion. Can a real motion in any external body be at
the same time both very swift and very slow?

Hyl. It cannot.

Phil. Is not the motion of a body swift in a reciprocal
proportion to the time it takes up in describing any given
space? Thus a body that describes a mile in an hour
moves three times faster than it would in case it described
only a mile in three hours.

Hyl. I agree with you.

Phil. And is not time measured by the succession of
ideas in our minds ?

Hyl It is.

Phil And is it not possible ideas should succeed one
another twice as fast in your mind as they do in mine, or
in that of some spirit of another kind ?

1 What follows, within brackets, is not contained in the first and
second editions.

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 401

Hyl. I own it.

Phil. Consequently the same body may to another seem
to perform its motion over any space in half the time that
it doth to you. And the same reasoning will hold as to
any other proportion : that is to say, according to your
principles (since the motions perceived are both really in
the object) it is possible one and the same body shall be
really moved the same way at once, both very swift and
very slow. How is this consistent either with common
sense, or with what you just now granted ?

Hyl. I have nothing to say to it.

Phil. Then as for solidity ; either you do not mean any
sensible quality by that word, and so it is beside our
inquiry : or if you do, it must be either hardness or
resistance. But both the one and the other are plainly
relative to our senses : it being evident that what seems
hard to one animal may appear soft to another, who hath
greater force and firmness of limbs. Nor is it less plain
that the resistance I feel is not in the body.

Hyl. I own the very sensation of resistance, which is all
you immediately perceive, is not in the body ; but the cause
of that sensation is.

Phil. But the causes of our sensations are not things
immediately perceived, and therefore are not sensible.
This point I thought had been already determined.

Hyl. I own it was ; but you will pardon me if I seem
a little embarrassed : I know not how to quit my old notions.

Phil. To help you out, do but consider that if extension
be once acknowledged to have no existence without the
mind, the same must necessarily be granted of motion,
solidity, and gravity; since they all evidently suppose
extension. It is therefore superfluous to inquire particu
larly concerning each of them. In denying extension, you
have denied them all to have any real existence *.

Hyl. I wonder, Philonous, if what you say be true, why
those philosophers who deny the Secondary Qualities any
real existence should yet attribute it to the Primary. If
there is no difference between them, how can this be
accounted for?

1 Percipient mind is, in short, the indispensable realising factor of all
the qualities of sensible things.

BERKELEY : ERASER. I.

402 THE FIRST DIALOGUE

Phil. It is not my business to account for every opinion
of the philosophers. But, among other reasons which
may be assigned for this, it seems probable that pleasure
and pain being rather annexed to the former than the
latter may be one. Heat and cold; tastes and smells, have
something more vividly pleasing or disagreeable than the
ideas of extension, figure, and motion affect us with. And,
it being too visibly absurd to hold that pain or pleasure
can be in an unperceiving Substance, men are more easily
weaned from believing the external existence of the
Secondary than the Primary Qualities. You will be
satisfied there is something in this, if you recollect the
difference you made between an intense and more
moderate degree of heat ; allowing the one a real exist
ence, while you denied it to the other. But, after all,
there is no rational ground for that distinction ; for,
surely an indifferent sensation is as truly a sensation as
one more pleasing or painful ; and consequently should
not any more than they be supposed to exist in an unthink
ing subject.

Hyl. It is just come into my head, Philonous, that I have
somewhere heard of a distinction between absolute and
sensible extension \ Now, though it be acknowledged
that great and small, consisting merely in the relation
which other extended beings have to the parts of our
own bodies, do not really inhere in the substances them
selves ; yet nothing obliges us to hold the same with
regard to absolute extension, which is something abstracted
from great and small, from this or that particular magni
tude or figure. So likewise as to motion ; swift and slow
are altogether relative to the succession of ideas in our
own minds. But, it doth not follow, because those
modifications of motion exist not without the mind,
that therefore absolute motion abstracted from them
doth not.

Phil. Pray what is it that distinguishes one motion, or
one part of extension, from another ? Is it not something
sensible, as some degree of swiftness or slowness, some
certain magnitude or figure peculiar to each ?

1 Cf. Neiv Theory of Vision, sect. 122-126 ; Principles, sect. 123, &c. ;
Sins, sect. 270, &c.

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 403

Hyl I think so.

Phil. These qualities, therefore, stripped of all sensible
properties, are without all specific and numerical differences,
as the schools call them.

Hyl. They are.

Phil. That is to say, they are extension in general, and
motion in general.

Hyl. Let it be so.

Phil. But it is a universally received maxim that Everv-
thing which exists is particular1. How then can motion
in general, or extension in general, exist in any corporeal
substance ?

Hyl. I will take time to solve your difficulty.

PhiL But I think the point may be speedily decided.
Without doubt you can tell whether you are able to frame
this or that idea. Now I am content to put our dispute on
this issue. If you can frame in your thoughts a distinct
abstract idea of motion or extension, divested of all those
sensible modes, as swift and slow, great and small, round
and square, and the like, which are acknowledged to
exist only in the mind, I will then yield the point you
contend for. But if you cannot, it will be unreasonable
on your side to insist any longer upon what you have no
notion 2 of.

Hyl. To confess ingenuously, I cannot.

Phil. Can you even separate the ideas of extension and
motion from the ideas of all those qualities which they
who make the distinction term secondary ?

Hyl. What ! is it not an easy matter to consider exten
sion and motion by themselves, abstracted from all other
sensible qualities ? Pray how do the mathematicians treat
of them?

PhiL I acknowledge, Hylas, it is not difficult to form
general propositions and reasonings about those qualities,
without mentioning any other ; and, in this sense, to
consider or treat of them abstractedly 3. But, how doth
it follow that, because I can pronounce the word motion
by itself, I can form the idea of it in my mind exclusive

1 Cf. Principles, Introduction, idea?

sect. 15. 3 Cf. Principles, Introduction,

- Is ' notion ' here a synonym for sect. \ 6.

D d 2

404 THE FIRST DIALOGUE

of body ? or, because theorems may be made of extension
and figures, without any mention of great or small, or any
other sensible mode or quality, that therefore it is possible
such an abstract idea of extension, without any particular
size or figure, or sensible quality1, should be distinctly
formed, and apprehended by the mind ? Mathematicians
treat of quantity, without regarding what other sensible
qualities it is attended with, as being altogether indifferent
to their demonstrations. But, when laying aside the
words, they contemplate the bare ideas, I believe you
will find, they are not the pure abstracted ideas of
extension.

Hyl. But what say you to pure intellect^. May not
abstracted ideas be framed by that faculty?

Phil. Since I cannot frame abstract ideas at all, it is
plain I cannot frame them by the help of pure intellect ;
whatsoever faculty you understand by those words2.
Besides, not to inquire into the nature of pure intellect
and its spiritual objects, as virtue, reason, God, or the like,
thus much seems manifest — that sensible things are only
to be perceived by sense, or represented by the imagina
tion. Figures, therefore, and extension, being originally
perceived by sense, do not belong to pure intellect : but,
for your farther satisfaction, try if you can frame the idea
of any figure, abstracted from all particularities of size, or
even from other sensible qualities.

Hyl. Let me think a little 1 do not find that

I can.

Phil. And can you think it possiblefthat should really
exist in nature which implies a repugnancy in its con
ception ?

Hyl. By no means.

Phil. Since therefore it is impossible even for the mind
to disunite the ideas of extension and motion from all other
sensible qualities, doth it not follow, that where the one
exist there necessarily the other exist likewise ?

Hyl. It should seem so.

1 ' Size or figure, or sensible implicates of pure intellect are
quality' — 'size, colour, &c./ in the called notions, in contrast to his
first and second editions. ideas, which are concrete or indi-

2 In Berkeley's later and more vidual sensuous presentations,
exact terminology, the data or

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 405

Phil. Consequently, the very same arguments which you
admitted as conclusive against the Secondary Qualities
are, without any farther application of force, against the
Primary too. Besides, if you will trust your senses, is it
not plain all sensible qualities coexist, or to them appear
as being in the same place ? Do they ever represent a
motion, or figure, as being divested of all other visible and
tangible qualities ?

Hyl. You need say no more on this head. I am free to
own, if there be no secret error or oversight in our pro
ceedings hitherto, that all sensible qualities are alike to be
denied existence without the mind '. But, my fear is that
I have been too liberal in my former concessions, or over
looked some fallacy or other. In short, I did not take time
to think.

Phil. For that matter, Hylas, you may take what time
you please in reviewing the progress of our inquiry. You
are at liberty to recover any slips you might have made, or
offer whatever you have omitted which makes for your first
opinion.

Hyl. One great oversight I take to be this— that I did not
sufficiently distinguish the object from the sensation 2. Now,
though this latter may not exist without the mind, yet it
will not thence follow that the former cannot.

Phil. What object do you mean ? the object of the
senses ?

Hyl. The same.

Phil. It is then immediately perceived ?

Hyl. Right.

Phil. Make me to understand the difference between
what is immediately perceived and a sensation.

Hyl. The sensation I take to be an act of the mind per
ceiving ; besides which, there is something perceived ; and
this I call the object. For example, there is red and yellow
on that tulip. But then the act of perceiving those colours
is in me only, and not in the tulip.

Phil. What tulip do you speak of? Is it that which you
see?

Hyl. The same.

1 They need living percipient 8, 9; Essays on the Intellectual
mind to make them real. Powers, II. ch. 16. Cf. Neiv Theory

3 So Reid's Inquiry, ch. ii. sect. of Vision Vindicated, sect. 8, &c.

406 THE FIRST DIALOGUE

Phil. And what do you see beside colour, figure, and
extension x ?

Hyl. Nothing.

Phil. What you would say then is that the red and yellow
are coexistent with the extension ; is it not ?

Hyl. That is not all ; I would say they have a real exist
ence without the mind, in some unthinking substance.

Phil. That the colours are really in the tulip which I sec
is manifest. Neither can it be denied that this tulip may
exist independent of your mind or mine ; but, that any im
mediate object of the senses— that is, any idea, or combin
ation of ideas — should exist in an unthinking substance, or
exterior to all minds, is in itself an evident contradiction.
Nor can I imagine how this follows from what you said
just now, to wit, that the red and yellow were on the tulip
yon saw, since you do not pretend to see that unthinking
substance.

Hyl. You have an artful way, Philonous, of diverting our
inquiry from the subject.

Phil. I see you have no mind to be pressed that way.
To return then to your distinction between sensation and
object', if I take you right, you distinguish in every percep
tion two things, the one an action of the mind, the other not.

Hyl. True.

Phil. And this action cannot exist in, or belong to, any
unthinking thing - ; but, whatever beside is implied in a
perception may?

Hyl. That is my meaning.

Phil. So that if there was a perception without any act
of the mind, it were possible such a perception should
exist in an unthinking substance ?

Hyl. 1 grant it. But it is impossible there should be
such a perception.

Phil. When is the mind said to be active ?

Hyl. When it produces, puts an end to, or changes, any
thing.

Phil. Can the mind produce, discontinue, or change any
thing, but by an act of the will ?

Hvl. It cannot.

1 i. c. figured or extended visible sect. 43, &c.
colour. Cf. New Theory of Vision, 2 Cf. Prindplcs. sect. 25, 26.

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 407

Phil. The mind therefore is to be accounted active in its
perceptions so far forth as volition is included in them ?

Hyl. It is.

Phil. In plucking this flower I am active ; because I do
it by the motion of my hand, which was consequent upon
my volition ; so likewise in applying it to my nose. But
is either of these smelling?

Hyl No.

Phil. I act too in drawing the air through my nose ; be
cause my breathing so rather than otherwise is the effect of
my volition. But neither can this be called smelling: for, if
it were, I should smell every time I breathed in that manner?

Hyl. True.

Phil Smelling then is somewhat consequent to all this ?

Hyl It is.

Phil But I do not find my will concerned any farther.
Whatever more there is— as that I perceive such aparticular
smell, or any smell at all — this is independent of my will,
and therein I am altogether passive. Do you find it other
wise with you, Hylas ?

Hyl No, the very same.

Phil Then, as to seeing, is it not in your power to open
your eyes, or keep them shut ; to turn them this or that way?

Hyl Without doubt.

Phil But, doth it in like manner depend on your will
that in looking on this flower you perceive white rather
than any other colour? Or, directing your open eyes
towards yonder part of the heaven, can you avoid seeing
the sun ? Or is light or darkness the effect of your volition ?

Hyl No, certainly.

Phil You are then in these respects altogether passive ?

Hyl I am.

Phil Tell me now, whether seeing consists in perceiving
light and colours, or in opening and turning the eyes ?

Hyl Without doubt, in the former.

Phil. Since therefore you are in the very perception of
light and colours altogether passive, what is become of
that action you were speaking of as an ingredient in every
sensation? And, doth it not follow from your own con
cessions, that the perception of light and colours, including
no action in it, may exist in an unperceiving substance ?
And is not this a plain contradiction ?

408 THE FIRST DIALOGUE

HyL I know not what to think of it.

Phil. Besides, since you distinguish the active and passive
in every perception, you must do it in that of pain. But
how is it possible that pain, be it as little active as you
please, should exist in an unperceiving substance? In
short, do but consider the point, and then confess ingenu
ously, whether light and colours, tastes, sounds, &c. are
not all equally passions or sensations in the soul. You
may indeed call them external objects, and give them in
words what subsistence you please. But, examine your
own thoughts, and then tell me whether it be not as I say ?

HyL I acknowledge, Philonous, that, upon a fair obser
vation of what passes in my mind, I can discover nothing
else but that I am a thinking being, affected with variety
of sensations ; neither is it possible to conceive how a sen
sation should exist in an unperceiving substance. — But
then, on the other hand, when I look on sensible things
in a different view, considering them as so many modes
and qualities, I find it necessary to suppose a material
substratum, without which they cannot be conceived to
exist \

Phil. Material substratum call you it ? Pray, by which
of your senses came you acquainted with that being ?

HyL It is not itself sensible ; its modes and qualities
only being perceived by the senses.

Phil. I presume then it was by reflexion and reason you
obtained the idea of it ?

HyL I do not pretend to any proper positive idea of it.
. However, I conclude it exists, because qualities cannot be
* conceived to exist without a support.

Phil. It seems then you have only a relative notion of it,
or that you conceive it not otherwise than by conceiving
the relation it bears to sensible qualities ?

HyL Right.

Phil. Be pleased therefore to let me know wherein that
relation consists.

1 After maintaining, in the pre- to dispose of the supposition that

ceding part of this Dialogue, the Matter may still be an unmani-

inevitable dependence of all the fested or unqualified substratum,

qualities of Matter upon percipient independent of living percipient

Spirit, the argument now proceeds Spirit.

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 409

Hyl Is it not sufficiently expressed in the term sub
stratum, or substance?

Phil. If so, the word substratum should import that it is
spread under the sensible qualities or accidents ?

Hyl True.

Phil And consequently under extension ?

Hyl I own it.

Phil It is therefore somewhat in its own nature entirely
distinct from extension ?

Hyl. I tell you, extension is only a mode, and Matter is
something that supports modes. And is it not evident the
thing supported is different from the thing supporting ?

Phil. So that something distinct from, and exclusive of,
extension is supposed to be the substratum of extension ?

Hyl. Just so.

Phil. Answer me, Hylas. Can a thing be spread without
extension ? or is not the idea of extension necessarily in
cluded in spreading ?

Hyl It is.

Phil Whatsoever therefore you suppose spread under
anything must have in itself an extension distinct from the
extension of that thing under which it is spread ?

Hyl It must.

Phil Consequently, every corporeal substance, being
the substratum of extension, must have in itself another
extension, by which it is qualified to be a substratum : and
so on to infinity ? And I ask whether this be not absurd
in itself, and repugnant to what you granted just now, to
wit, that the substratum was something distinct from and
exclusive of extension ?

Hyl Aye but, Philonous, you take me wrong. I do not
mean that Matter is spread in a gross literal sense under
extension. The word substratum is used only to express
in general the same thing with substance.

Phil. Well then, let us examine the relation implied in
the term substance. Is it not that it stands under accidents ?

Hyl The very same.

Phil. But, that one thing may stand under or support
another, must it not be extended ?

Hyl. It must.

Phil Is not therefore this supposition liable to the
same absurdity with the former?

410 THE FIRST DIALOGUE

Hyl. You still take things in a strict literal sense. That
is not fair, Philonous.

Phil. I am not for imposing any sense on your words :
you are at liberty to explain them as you please. Only,
I beseech you, make me understand something by them.
You tell me Matter supports or stands under accidents.
How ! is it as your legs support your body ?

Hyl. No ; that is the literal sense.

Phil. Pray let me know any sense, literal or not literal,
that you understand it in. — How long must I wait for an
answer, Hylas ?

Hyl. I declare I know not what to say. I once thought
I understood well enough what was meant by Matter's
supporting accidents. But now, the more I think on it
the less can I comprehend it : in short I find that I know
nothing of it.

Phil. It seems then you have no idea at all, neither
relative nor positive, of Matter; you know neither what it
is in itself, nor what relation it bears to accidents ?

Hyl. I acknowledge it.

Phil. And yet you asserted that you could not conceive
how qualities or accidents should really exist, without con
ceiving at the same time a material support of them ?

Hyl. I did.

Phil. That is to say, when you conceive the real existence
of qualities, you do withal conceive Something which you
cannot conceive ?

Hyl. It was wrong, I own. But still I fear there is some
fallacy or other. Pray what think you of this ? It is just
come into my head that the ground of all our mistake lies
in your treating of each quality by itself. Now, I grant
that each quality cannot singly subsist without the mind.
Colour cannot without extension, neither can figure with
out some other sensible quality. But, as the several
qualities united or blended together form entire sensible
things, nothing hinders why such things may not be sup
posed to exist without the mind.

Phil. Either, Hylas, you are jesting, or have a very bad
memory. Though indeed we went through all the
qualities bv name one after another, yet my arguments,
or rather your concessions, nowhere tended to prove that
the Secondary Qualities did not subsist each alone by

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 411

itself; but, that they were not at all without the mind.
Indeed, in treating of figure and motion we concluded
they could not exist without the mind, because it was
impossible even in thought to separate them from all
secondary qualities, so as to conceive them existing by
themselves. But then this was not the only argument
made use of upon that occasion. But (to pass by all
that hath been hitherto said, and reckon it for nothing,
if you will have it so) I am content to put the whole
upon this issue. If you can conceive it possible for any
mixture or combination of qualities, or any sensible object
whatever, to exist without the mind, then I will grant it
actually to be so.

Hyl. If it comes to that the point will soon be decided.
What more easy than to conceive a tree or house existing
by itself, independent of, and unperceived by, any mind
whatsoever? I do at this present time conceive them
existing after that manner.

Phil. How say you, Hylas, can you see a thing which is
at the same time unseen ?

Hyl. No, that were a contradiction.

Phil. Is it not as great a contradiction to talk of conceiv
ing a thing which is unconceived!

Hyl. It is.

Phil. The tree or house therefore which you think of is
conceived by you ?

Hyl. How should it be otherwise?

Phil. And what is conceived is surely in the mind ?

Hyl. Without question, that which is conceived is in the
mind.

Phil. How then came you to say, you conceived a house
ur tree existing independent and out of all minds what
soever ?

Hyl. That was I own an oversight ; but stay, let me
consider what led me into it. — It is a pleasant mistake
enough. As I was thinking of a tree in a solitary place,
where no one was present to see it, methought that was
to conceive a tree as existing unperceived or unthought
of; not considering that I myself conceived it all the
while. But now I plainly see that all I can do is to frame
ideas in my own mind. I may indeed conceive in my own
thoughts the idea of a tree, or a house, or a mountain, but

412 THE FIRST DIALOGUE

that is all. And this is far from proving that I can con
ceive them existing out of the minds of all Spirits.

Phil. You acknowledge then that you cannot possibly
conceive how any one corporeal sensible thing should
exist otherwise than in a mind ?

Hyl. I do.

Phil. And yet you will earnestly contend for the truth
of that which you cannot so much as conceive ?

Hyl. I profess I know not what to think ; but still there
are some scruples remain with me. Is it not certain I see
things at a distance ? Do we not perceive the stars and
moon, for example, to be a great way off? Is not this,
I say, manifest to the senses ?

Phil. Do you not in a dream too perceive those or the
like objects ?

Hyl. I do.

Phil. And have they not then the same appearance of
being distant ?

Hyl. They have.

Phil. But you do not thence conclude the apparitions in
a dream to be without the mind ?

Hyl. By no means.

Phil. You ought not therefore to conclude that sensible
objects are without the mind, from their appearance, or
manner wherein they are perceived.

Hyl. I acknowledge it. But doth not my sense deceive
me in those cases ?

Phil. By no means. The idea or thing which you
immediately perceive, neither sense nor reason informs
you that it actually exists without the mind. By sense
you only know that you are affected with such certain
sensations of light and colours, &c. And these you will
not say are without the mind.

Hyl. True : but, beside all that, do you not think the
sight suggests something of outness or distance ?

Phil. Upon approaching a distant object, do the visible
size and figure change perpetually, or do they appear the
same at all distances ?

Hyl. They are in a continual change.

Phil. Sight therefore doth not suggest, or any way
inform you, that the visible object you immediately per-

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 413

ceive exists at a distance *, or will be perceived when you
advance farther onward ; there being a continued series
of visible objects succeeding each other during the whole
time of your approach.

Hyl. It doth not ; but still I know, upon seeing an
object, what object I shall perceive after having passed
over a certain distance : no matter whether it be exactly
the same or no : there is still something of distance
suggested in the case.

Phil. Good Hylas, do but reflect a little on the point,
and then tell me whether there be any more in it than
this : From the ideas you actually perceive by sight,
you have by experience learned to collect what other
ideas you will (according to the standing order of nature)
be affected with, after such a certain succession of time
and motion.

Hyl. Upon the whole, I take it to be nothing else.

Phil. Now, is it not plain that if we suppose a man born
blind was on a sudden made to see, he could at first have
no experience of what may be suggested by sight ?

Hyl. It is.

Phil. He would not then, according to you, have any
notion of distance annexed to the things he saw; but
would take them for a new set of sensations, existing only
in his mind?

Hyl. It is undeniable.

Phil. But, to make it still more plain : is not distance
a line turned endwise to the eye 2 ?

Hyl. It is.

Phil. And can a line so situated be perceived by sight ?

Hyl. It cannot.

Phil. Doth it not therefore follow that distance is not
properly and immediately perceived by sight ?

Hyl. It should seem so.

Phil. Again, is it your opinion that colours are at
a distance 3 ?

Hyl. It must be acknowledged they are only in the mind.

Phil. But do not colours appear to the eye as coexisting
in the same place with extension and figures ?

1 [See the Essay towards a New the 1734 edition.
Theory of Vision, and its Vindi- " Cf. Essay on Vision, sect. a.

cation.'] Note by the Author in 3 Cf. Ibid., sect. 43.

414 THE FIRST DIALOGUE

Hyl. They do.

Phil. How can you then conclude from sight that figures
exist without, when you acknowledge colours do not ; the
sensible appearance being the very same with regard to
both?

Hyl. I know not what to answer.

Phil. But, allowing that distance was truly and im
mediately perceived by the mind, yet it would not thence
follow it existed out of the mind. For, whatever is
immediately perceived is an idea1: and can any idea
exist out of the mind ?

Hyl. To suppose that were absurd : but, inform me,
Philonous, can we perceive or know nothing beside our
ideas2?

Phil. As for the rational deducing of causes from effects,
that is beside our inquiry. And, by the senses you can
best tell whether you perceive anything which is not
immediately perceived. And I ask you, whether the
things immediately perceived are other than your own
sensations or ideas? You have indeed more than once,
in the course of this conversation, declared yourself on
those points ; but you seem, by this last question, to have
departed from what you then thought.

Hyl. To speak the truth, Philonous, I think there are
two kinds of objects : — the one perceived immediately,
which are likewise called ideas ; the other are real things
or external objects, perceived by the mediation of ideas,
which are their images and representations. Now, I own
ideas do not exist without the mind ; but the latter
sort of objects do. I am sorry I did not think of this
distinction sooner ; it would probably have cut short your
discourse.

Phil. Are those external objects perceived by sense, or
by some other faculty ?

Hyl. They are perceived by sense.

Phil. How ! Is there anything perceived by sense
which is not immediately perceived ?

Hyl. Yes, Philonous, in some sort there is. For example,
when I look on a picture or statue of Julius Caesar, I may

1 'an idea,' i.e. a phenomenon - This was Reid's fundamental

present to our senses. question in his criticism of Berkeley.

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 415

be said after a manner to perceive him (though not im
mediately) by my senses.

Phil. It seems then you will have our ideas, which
alone are immediately perceived, to be pictures of ex
ternal things : and that these also are perceived by sense,
inasmuch as they have a conformity or resemblance to our
ideas?

HyL That is my meaning.

Phil. And, in the same way that Julius Caesar, in him
self invisible, is nevertheless perceived by sight ; real
things, in themselves imperceptible, are perceived by
sense.

HyL In the very same.

Phil. Tell me, Hylas, when you behold the picture of
Julius Caesar, do you see with your eyes any more than
some colours and figures, with a certain symmetry and
composition of the whole?

HyL Nothing else.

Phil. And would not a man who had never known any
thing of Julius Caesar see as much ?

HyL He would.

Phil. Consequently he hath his sight, and the use of it,
in as perfect a degree as you ?

HyL I agree with you.

Phil. Whence comes it then that your thoughts are
directed to the Roman emperor, and his are not ? This
cannot proceed from the sensations or ideas of sense by
you then perceived ; since you acknowledge you have
no advantage over him in that respect. It should seem
therefore to proceed from reason and memory : should
it not?

HyL It should.

Phil. Consequently, it will not follow from that instance
that anything is perceived by sense which is not immediately
perceived. Though I grant we may, in one acceptation,
be said to perceive sensible things mediately by sense :
that is, when, from a frequently perceived connexion, the
immediate perception of ideas by one sense suggests to the
mind others, perhaps belonging to another sense, which
are wont to be connected with them. For instance, when
I hear a coach drive along the streets, immediately I per
ceive only the sound ; but, from the experience I have had

416 THE FIRST DIALOGUE

that such a sound is connected with a coach, I am said to
hear the coach. It is nevertheless evident that, in truth
and strictness, nothing can be heard but sound] and the
coach is not then properly perceived by sense, but
suggested from experience. So likewise when we are
said to see a red-hot bar of iron ; the solidity and heat
of the iron are not the objects of sight, but suggested
to the imagination by the colour and figure which are
properly perceived by that sense. In short, those things
alone are actually and strictly perceived by any sense,
which would have been perceived in case that same sense
had then been first conferred on us. As for other things,
it is plain they are only suggested to the mind by ex
perience, grounded on former perceptions. But, to return
to your comparison of Caesar's picture, it is plain, if you
keep to that, you must hold the real things, or archetypes
of our ideas, are not perceived by sense, but by some
internal faculty of the soul, as reason or memory. I would
therefore fain know what arguments you can draw from
reason for the existence of what you call real things or
material objects. Or, whether you remember to have seen
them formerly as they are in themselves ; or, if you have
heard or read of any one that did.

Hyl. I see, Philonous, you are disposed to raillery ; but
that will never convince me.

Phil. My aim is only to learn from you the way to come
at the knowledge of material beings. Whatever we per
ceive is perceived immediately or mediately : by sense, or
by reason and reflexion. But, as you have excluded
sense, pray shew me what reason you have to believe
their existence ; or what medium you can possibly make
use of to prove it, either to mine or your own under
standing.

Hyl. To deal ingenuously, Philonous, now I consider
the point, I do not find I can give you any good reason
for it. But, thus much seems pretty plain, that it is at
least possible such things may really exist. And, as
long as there is no absurdity in supposing them, I am
resolved to believe as I did, till you bring good reasons
to the contrary.

Phil. What ! Is it come to this, that you only believe
the existence of material objects, and that your belief is

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 417

founded barely on the possibility of its being true ? Then
you will have me bring reasons against it : though another
would think it reasonable the proof should lie on him who
holds the affirmative. And, after all, this very point which
you are now resolved to maintain, without any reason, is
in effect what you have more than once during this dis
course seen good reason to give up. But, to pass over all
this ; if I understand you rightly, you say our ideas do not
exist without the mind, but that they are copies, images,
or representations, of certain originals that do ?

HyL You take me right.

Phil. They are then like external things x ?

HyL They are.

Phil. Have those things a stable and permanent nature,
independent of our senses ; or are they in a perpetual
change, upon our producing any motions in our bodies —
suspending, exerting, or altering, our faculties or organs
of sense ?

HyL Real things, it is plain, have a fixed and real nature,
which remains the same notwithstanding any change in our
senses, or in the posture and motion of our bodies ; which
indeed may affect the ideas in our minds, but it were absurd
to think they had the same effect on things existing without
the mind.

Phil. How then is it possible that things perpetually
fleeting and variable as our ideas should be copies or
images of anything fixed and constant ? Or, in other words,
since all sensible qualities, as size, figure, colour, &c., that
is, our ideas, are continually changing, upon every altera
tion in the distance, medium, or instruments of sensation ;
how can any determinate material objects be properly
represented or painted forth by several distinct things,
each of which is so different from and unlike the rest?
Or, if you say it resembles some one only of our ideas,
how shall we be able to distinguish the true copy from all
the false ones ?

HyL I profess, Philonous, I am at a loss. I know not
what to say to this.

Phil. But neither is this all. Which are material objects
in themselves — perceptible or imperceptible ?

1 Cf. Principles, sect. 8.

BERKELEY: FRASEk. I. ^ e

418 THE FIRST DIALOGUE

Hyl. Properly and immediately nothing can be perceived
but ideas. All material things, therefore, are in themselves
insensible, and to be perceived only by our ideas.

Phil. Ideas then are sensible, and their archetypes or
originals insensible ?

Hyl. Right.

Phil. But how can that which is sensible be like that
which is insensible ? Can a real thing, in itself invisible,
be like a colour; or a real thing, which is not audible, be
like a sound? In a word, can anything be like a sensation
or idea, but another sensation or idea?

Hyl. I must own, I think not.

Phil. Is it possible there should be any doubt on the
point ? Do you not perfectly know your own ideas?

Hyl. I know them perfectly ; since what I do not per
ceive or know can be no part of my idea1.

Phil. Consider, therefore, and examine them, and then
tell me if there be anything in them which can exist without
the mind : or if you can conceive anything like them exist
ing without the mind.

Hyl. Upon inquiry, I find it is impossible for me to
conceive or understand how anything but an idea can be
like an idea. And it is most evident that no idea can exist
without tJic mind '2.

Phil. You are therefore, by your principles, forced to
deny the reality of sensible things ; since you made it
to consist in an absolute existence exterior to the mind.
That is to say, you are a downright sceptic. So I have
gained my point, which was to shew your principles led
to Scepticism.

Hyl. For the present I am, if not entirely convinced, at
least silenced.

Phil. I would fain know what more you would require
in order to a perfect conviction. Have you not had the
liberty of explaining yourself all manner of ways ? Were
any little slips in discourse laid hold and insisted on ? Or
were you not allowed to retract or reinforce anything you
had offered, as best served your purpose? Hath not
everything you could say been heard and examined with

1 Cf. Principles, sect. 25, 26. necessary condition of the real eX-

2 In other words, the percipient istence of all ideas or phenomena
activity of a living spirit is the immediately present to our senses.

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 419

all the fairness imaginable? In a word, have you not in
every point been convinced out of your own mouth ? And, if
you can at present discover any flaw in any of your former
concessions, or think of any remaining subterfuge, any new
distinction, colour, or comment whatsoever, why do you
not produce it ?

Hyl. A little patience, Philonous. I am at present so
amazed to see myself ensnared, and as it were imprisoned
in the labyrinths you have drawn me into, that on the
sudden it cannot be expected I should find my way out.
You must give me time to look about me and recollect
myself.

Phil. Hark ; is not this the college bell ?

Hyl. It rings for prayers.

Phil. We will go in then, if you please, and meet here
again to-morrow morning. In the meantime, you may
employ your thoughts on this morning's discourse, and try
if you can find any fallacy in it, or invent any new means
to extricate yourself.

Hyl. Agreed.

tea

THE SECOND DIALOGUE

Hylas. I beg your pardon, Philonous, for not meeting
you sooner. All this morning my head was so filled with
our late conversation that I had not leisure to think of
the time of the day, or indeed of anything else.

Philonoiis. I am glad you were so intent upon it, in
hopes if there were any mistakes in your concessions, or
fallacies in my reasonings from them, you will now dis
cover them to me.

Hyl. I assure you I have done nothing ever since I saw
you but search after mistakes and fallacies, and, with that
view, have minutely examined the whole series of yester
day's discourse : but all in vain, for the notions it led me
into, upon review, appear still more clear and evident ;
and, the more I consider them, the more irresistibly do
they force my assent.

Phil. And is not this, think you, a sign that they are
genuine, that they proceed from nature, and are conform
able to right reason ? Truth and beauty are in this alike,
that the strictest survey sets them both off to advantage ;
while the false lustre of error and disguise cannot endure
being reviewed, or too nearly inspected.

Hyl. I own there is a great deal in what you say. Nor
can any one be more entirely satisfied of the truth of those
odd consequences, so long as I have in view the reasonings
that lead to them. But, when these are out of my thoughts,
there seems, on the other hand, something so satisfactory,
so natural and intelligible, in the modern way of explaining
things that, I profess, I know not how to reject it.

Phil. I know not what way you mean.

SECOND DIALOGUE BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 421

Hyl. I mean the way of accounting for our sensations or
ideas.

Phil. How is that ?

Hyl. It is supposed the soul makes her residence in
some part of the brain, from which the nerves take their
rise, and are thence extended to all parts of the body ; and
that outward objects, by the different impressions they
make on the organs of sense, communicate certain vibrative
motions to the nerves ; and these being filled with spirits
propagate them to the brain or seat of the soul, which,
according to the various impressions or traces thereby
made in the brain, is variously affected with ideas '.

Phil. And call you this an explication of the manner
whereby we are affected with ideas ?

Hyl. Why not, Philonous ? Have you anything to
object against it ?

Phil I would first know whether I rightly understand
your hypothesis. You make certain traces in the brain to
be the causes or occasions of our ideas. Pray tell me
whether by the brain you mean any sensible thing.

Hyl. What else think you I could mean ?

Phil. Sensible things are all immediately perceivable ;
and those things which are immediately perceivable are
ideas ; and these exist only in the mind. Thus much you
have, if I mistake not, long since agreed to.

Hyl. I do not deny it.

Phil. The brain therefore you speak of, being a sensible
thing, exists only in the mind ~. Now, I would fain know
whether you think it reasonable to suppose that one idea
or thing existing in the mind occasions all other ideas.
And, if you think so, pray how do you account for the
origin of that primary idea or brain itself?

Hyl. 1 do not explain the origin of our ideas by that
brain which is perceivable to sense— this being itself only
a combination of sensible ideas— but by another which
I imagine.

1 An ' explanation ' afterwards in which it is included constitutes

elaborately developed by Hartley, a part of the material world, and

in his Observations on Man (1749). must equally with the rest of the

Berkeley has probably Hobbes in material world depend for its reali-

view. sation upon percipient Spirit as the

- The brain with the human body realising factor.

422 THE SECOND DIALOGUE

Phil. But are not things imagined as truly in the mind
as things perceived J ?

Hyl. I must confess they are.

Phil. It comes, therefore, to the same thing ; and you
have been all this while accounting for ideas by certain
motions or impressions of the brain ; that is, by some
alterations in an idea, whether sensible or imaginable it
matters not.

Hyl. I begin to suspect my hypothesis.

Phil. Besides spirits, all that we know or conceive are
our own ideas. When, therefore, you say all ideas are
occasioned by impressions in the brain, do you conceive
this brain or no ? If you do, then you talk of ideas im
printed in an idea causing that same idea, which is absurd.
If you do not conceive it, you talk unintelligibly, instead of
forming a reasonable hypothesis.

Hyl. I now clearly see it was a mere dream. There is
nothing in it.

Phil. You need not be much concerned at it ; for after
all, this way of explaining things, as you called it, could
never have satisfied any reasonable man. What con
nexion is there between a motion in the nerves, and the
sensations of sound or colour in the mind ? Or how is
it possible these should be the effect of that ?

Hyl. But I could never think it had so little in it as now
it seems to have.

Phil. Well then, are you at length satisfied that no sen
sible things have a real existence ; and that you are in
truth an arrant sceptic ?

Hyl. It is too plain to be denied.

Phil. Look ! are not the fields covered with a delightful
verdure ? Is there not something in the woods and groves,
in the rivers and clear springs, that soothes, that delights,
that transports the soul ? At the prospect of the wide and
deep ocean, or some huge mountain whose top is lost in the
clouds, or of an old gloomy forest, are not our minds filled
with a pleasing horror ? Even in rocks and deserts is
there not an agreeable wildness ? How sincere a pleasure
is it to behold the natural beauties of the earth ! To pre
serve and renew our relish for them, is not the veil of night

1 Cf. Principles, sect. 23.

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 423

alternately drawn over her face, and doth she not change
her dress with the seasons ? How aptly are the elements
disposed ! What variety and use [l in the meanest pro
ductions of nature !] What delicacy, what beauty, what
contrivance, in animal and vegetable bodies ! How ex
quisitely are all things suited, as well to their particular
ends, as to constitute opposite parts of the whole ! And,
while they mutually aid and support, do they not also set
off and illustrate each other? Raise now your thoughts
from this ball of earth to all those glorious luminaries that
adorn the high arch of heaven. The motion and situation
of the planets, are they not admirable for use and order ?
Were those (miscalled erratic] globes once known to stray,
in their repeated journeys through the pathless void ? Do
they not measure areas round the sun ever proportioned
to the times ? So fixed, so immutable are the laws by
which the unseen Author of nature actuates the universe.
How vivid and radiant is the lustre of the fixed stars !
How magnificent and rich that negligent profusion with
which they appear to be scattered throughout the whole
azure vault ! Yet, if you take the telescope, it brings into
your sight a new host of stars that escape the naked eye.
Here they seem contiguous and minute, but to a nearer
view immense orbs of light at various distances, far sunk
in the abyss of space. Now you must call imagination to
your aid. The feeble narrow sense cannot descry innu
merable worlds revolving round the central fires ; and in
those worlds the energy of an all-perfect Mind displayed
in endless forms. But, neither sense nor imagination are
big enough to comprehend the boundless extent, with all
its glittering furniture. Though the labouring mind exert
and strain each power to its utmost reach, there still stands
out ungrasped a surplusage immeasurable. Yet all the
vast bodies that compose this mighty frame, how distant
and remote soever, are by some secret mechanism, some
Divine art and force, linked in a mutual dependence and
intercourse with each other ; even with this earth, which
was almost slipt from my thoughts and lost in the crowd
of worlds. Is not the whole system immense, beautiful,
glorious beyond expression and beyond thought ! What
treatment, then, do those philosophers deserve, who would

1 ' in stones and minerals' — in first and second editions.

424 THE SECOND DIALOGUE

deprive these noble and delightful scenes of all reality 1
How should those Principles be entertained that lead us to
think all the visible beauty of the creation a false imaginary
glare ? To be plain, can you expect this Scepticism of
yours will not be thought extravagantly absurd by all men
of sense ?

HyL Other men may think as they please ; but for your
part you have nothing to reproach me with. My comfort
is, you are as much a sceptic as I am.

Phil. There, Hylas, I must beg leave to differ from you.

HyL What ! Have you all along agreed to the premises,
and do you now deny the conclusion, and leave me to
maintain those paradoxes by myself which you led me
into ? This surely is not fair.

Phil. I deny that I agreed with you in those notions
that led to Scepticism. You indeed said the reality of
sensible things consisted in an absolute existence out of the
minds of spirits, or distinct from their being perceived.
And pursuant to this notion of reality, you are obliged to
deny sensible things any real existence : that is, according
to your own definition, you profess yourself a sceptic.
But I neither said nor thought the reality of sensible
things was to be defined after that manner. To me it is
evident, for the reasons you allow of, that sensible things
cannot exist otherwise than in a mind or spirit. Whence
I conclude, not that they have no real existence, but that,
seeing they depend not on my thought, and have an
existence distinct from being perceived by me \ there must
be some other Mind wherein they exist. As sure, therefore,
as the sensible world really exists, so sure is there an
infinite omnipresent Spirit who contains and supports it.

HyL What ! This is no more than 1 and all Christians
hold ; nay, and all others too who believe there is a God,
and that He knows and comprehends all things.

Phil. Aye, but here lies the difference. Men commonly
believe that all things are known or perceived by God,
because they believe the being of a God ; whereas I, on
the other side, immediately and necessarily conclude the

1 Cf. Principles, sect. 29-33; also unimagined by human beings, is
sect. 90. — The permanence of a here assumed, as a natural con-
sensible thing, during intervals in viction.
which it may be unperceived and

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 425

being of a God, because all sensible things must be per
ceived by Him J.

Hyl. But, so long as we all believe the same thing, what
matter is it how we come by that belief?

Phil. But neither do we agree in the same opinion. For
philosophers, though they acknowledge all corporeal beings
to be perceived by God, yet they attribute to them an
absolute subsistence distinct from their being perceived by
any mind whatever ; which I do not. Besides, is there no
difference between saying, There is a God, therefore He
perceives all things ; and saying, Sensible tilings do really
exist; and, if they really exist, they are neccssaruv perceived
by an infinite Mind : therefore there is an infinite Mind, or
God2? This furnishes you with a direct and immediate
demonstration, from a most evident principle, of the being
of a God. Divines and philosophers had proved beyond
all controversy, from the beauty and usefulness of the
several parts of the creation, that it was the workmanship
of God. But that — setting aside all help of astronomy
and natural philosophy, all contemplation of the con
trivance, order, and adjustment of things— an infinite Mind
should be necessarily inferred from 3 the bare existence of
the sensible world, is an advantage to them only who have

i made this easy reflexion : That the sensible world is that
which we perceive by our several senses ; and that nothing

j is perceived by the senses beside ideas ; and that no idea

j or archetype of an idea can exist otherwise than in a mind.

/ You may now, without any laborious search into the
sciences, without any subtlety of reason, or tedious length
of discourse, oppose and baffle the most strenuous advocate
for Atheism. Those miserable refuges, whether in an
eternal succession of unthinking causes and effects, or in
a fortuitous concourse of atoms ; those wild imaginations
of Vanini, Hobbes, and Spinoza : in a word, the whole
system of Atheism, is it not entirely overthrown, by this

1 In other words, men are apt 2 Cf. Principles, sect. 90. A per-

to treat the omniscience of God manent material world is grounded

as an inference from the dogmatic on Divine Mind, because it cannot

assumption that God exists, instead but depend on Mind, while its

of seeing that our cosmic ex- reality is only partially and at

perience necessarily presupposes intervals sustained by finite minds,

omnipotent and omniscient Intel- ;! 'necessarily inferred from' —

ligence at its root. rather necessarily presupposed in.

426 THE SFXOND DIALOGUE

| single reflexion on the repugnancy included in supposing
the whole, or any part, even the most rude and shapeless,
of the visible world, to exist without a Mind ? Let any
one of those abettors of impiety but look into his own
thoughts, and there try if he can conceive how so much as
a rock, adesert, a chaos, or confused jumble of atoms; how
anything at all, either sensible or imaginable, can exist
independent of a Mind, and he need go no farther to be
convinced of his folly. Can anything be fairer than to put
a dispute on such an issue, and leave it to a man himself
to see if he can conceive, even in thought, what he holds
to be true in fact, and from a notional to allow it a real
existence ' ?

Hyl. It cannot be denied there is something highly
serviceable to religion in what you advance. But do you
not think it looks very like a notion entertained by some
eminent moderns2, of seeing all things in God?

Phil. I would gladly know that opinion : pray explain
it to me.

Hyl. They conceive that the soul, being immaterial, is
incapable of being united with material things, so as to
perceive them in themselves ; but that she perceives
them by her union with the substance of God, which,
being spiritual, is therefore purely intelligible, or capable
of being the immediate object of a spirit's thought.
Besides, the Divine essence contains in it perfections
correspondent to each created being ; and which are, for
that reason, proper to exhibit or represent them to the
mind.

Phil. I do not understand how our ideas, which are
things altogether passive and inert 3, can be the essence, or
any part (or like any part) of the essence or substance of
God, who is an impassive, indivisible, pure, active being.
Many more difficulties and objections there are which
occur at first view against this hypothesis; but I shall only

1 The present reality of Some- 2 He refers of course to Male-
thing implies the eternal existence branche and his Divine Vision,
of living Mind, if Something must :; But Malebranche uses idea in
exist eternally, and if real or con- a higher meaning than Berkeley
crete existence involves living does — akin to the Platonic, and in
Mind. Berkeley's conception of contrast to the sensuous phenomena
material nature presupposes a the- which Berkeley calls ideas,
istic basis.

BETWEEN IIYLAS AND PHILONOUS 427

add, that it is liable to all the absurdities of the common
hypothesis, in making a created world exist otherwise than
in the mind of a Spirit. Beside all which it hath this
peculiar to itself; that it makes that material world serve
to no purpose. And, if it pass for a good argument against
other hypotheses in the sciences, that they suppose Nature,
or the Divine wisdom, to make something in vain, or do
that by tedious roundabout methods which might have
been performed in a much more easy and compendious
way, what shall we think of that hypothesis which supposes
the whole world made in vain ?

Hyl. But what say you ? Are not you too of opinion
that we see all things in God ? If I mistake not, what you
advance comes near it.

Phil. [! Few men think ; yet all have opinions. Hence
men's opinions are superficial and confused. It is nothing
strange that tenets which in themselves are ever so
different, should nevertheless be confounded with each
other, by those who do not consider them attentively.
I shall not therefore be surprised if some men imagine
that I run into the enthusiasm of Malebranche; though in
truth I am very remote from it. He builds on the most
abstract general ideas, which I entirely disclaim. He
asserts an absolute external world, which I deny. He
maintains that we are deceived by our senses, and know
not the real natures or the true forms and figures of
extended beings ; of all which I hold the direct contrary.
So that upon the whole there are no Principles more
fundamentally opposite than his and mine. It must be
owned that] I entirely agree with what the holy Scripture
saith, 'That in God we live and move and have our being.'
But that we see things in His essence, after the manner
above set forth, I am far from believing. Take here in
brief my meaning : — It is evident that the things I perceive
are my own ideas, and that no idea can exist unless it be
in a mind : nor is it less plain that these ideas or things by
me perceived, either themselves or their archetypes, exist
independently of my mind, since I know myself not to be
their author, it being out of my power to determine at
pleasure what particular ideas I shall be affected with

1 The passage within brackets first appeared in the third edition.

428 THE SECOND DIALOGUE

upon opening my eyes or ears l : they must therefore exist
in some other Mind, whose Will it is they should be
exhibited to me. The things, I say, immediately perceived
are ideas or sensations, call them which you will. But
how can any idea or sensation exist in, or be produced by,
"anything but a mind or spirit? This indeed is incon
ceivable 2. And to assert that which is inconceivable is
to talk nonsense : is it not ?

Hyl. Without doubt.

Phil But, on the other hand, it is very conceivable that
they should exist in and be produced by a Spirit ; since
this is no more than I daily experience in myself3, inasmuch
as I perceive numberless ideas ; and, by an act of my will,
can form a great variety of them, and raise them up in my
imagination : though, it must be confessed, these creatures
of the fancy are not altogether so distinct, so strong, vivid,
and permanent, as those perceived by my senses — which
latter are called real things. From all which I conclude,
there is a Mind which affects me every moment with all tJie
sensible impressions I perceive. And, from the variety,
order, and manner of these, I conclude the Author of them
to be wise, powerful, and good, beyond comprehension. Mark
it well ; I do not say, I see things by perceiving that which
represents them in the intelligible Substance of God. This
I do not understand ; but I say, the things by me perceived
are known by the understanding, and produced by the will
of an infinite Spirit. And is not all this most plain and
evident ? Is there any more in it than what a little
observation in our own minds, and that which passeth in
them, not only enables us to conceive, but also obliges us
to acknowledge ?

Hyl. I think 1 understand you very clearly ; and own
the proof you give of a Deity seems no less evident than
it is surprising. But, allowing that God is the supreme
and universal Cause of all things, yet, may there not be
still a Third Nature besides Spirits and Ideas? May we

1 Cf. Principles, 8601.25-33. sciouslife. I cannot represent to my -

2 Cf. Ibid., sect. 3-24. self sensible things existing totally

3 I can represent to myself unperceived and unimagined ; be-
another mind perceiving and con- cause I cannot, without a contradic-
ceiving things; because I have an tion, have an example of this in my
example of this in my own cop- own experience.

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 429

not admit a subordinate and limited cause of our ideas ?
In a word, may there not for all that be Matter •?

Phil. How often must I inculcate the same thing ? You
\ allow the things immediately perceived by sense to exist
nowhere without the mind ; but there is nothing perceived
by sense which is not perceived immediately: therefore
there is nothing sensible that exists without the mind.
The Matter, therefore, which you still insist on is some
thing intelligible, I suppose ; something that may be dis
covered by reason \ and not by sense.

Hyl. You are in the right.

Phil. Pray let me know what reasoning your belief of
Matter is grounded on ; and what this Matter is, in your
present sense of it.

Hyl. I find myself affected with various ideas, whereof
I know I am not the cause ; neither are they the cause of
themselves, or of one another, or capable of subsisting by
themselves, as being altogether inactive, fleeting, dependent
beings. They have therefore some cause distinct from me
and them : of which I pretend to know no more than that
it is the cause of my ideas. And this thing, whatever it
be, I call Matter.

Phil. Tell me, Hylas, hath every one a liberty to change
the current proper signification attached to a common
name in any language ? For example, suppose a traveller
should tell you that in a certain country men pass unhurt
through the fire ; and, upon explaining himself, you found
he meant by the word fire that which others call water.
Or, if he should assert that there are trees that walk upon
two legs, meaning men by the term trees. Would you
think this reasonable?

Hyl. No ; I should think it very absurd. Common
custom is the standard of propriety in language. And
for any man to affect speaking improperly is to pervert
the use of speech, and can never serve to a better purpose
than to protract and multiply disputes where there is no
difference in opinion.

Phil. And doth not Matter, in the common current
acceptation of the word, signify an extended, solid, move-
able, unthinking, inactive Substance ?

HyL It doth.

1 l reason,' i. e. by reasoning.

43° THE SECOND DIALOGUE

Phil. And, hath it not been made evident that no such
substance can possibly exist ' ? And, though it should be
allowed to exist, yet how can that which is inactive be
a cause\ or that which is unthinking be a cause of thought!
You may, indeed, if you please, annex to the word Matter
a contrary meaning to what is vulgarly received ; and tell
me you understand by it, an unextended, thinking, active
being, which is the cause of our ideas. But what else
is this than to play with words, and run into that very
fault you just now condemned with so much reason ?
I do by no means find fault with your reasoning, in that
you collect a cause from the phenomena : but I deny that
the cause deducible by reason can properly be termed
Matter -.

HyL There is indeed something in what you say. But
1 am afraid you do not thoroughly comprehend my mean
ing. I would by no means be thought to deny that God,
or an infinite Spirit, is the Supreme Cause of all things.
All I contend for is, that, subordinate to the Supreme
Agent, there is a cause of a limited and inferior nature,
which concurs in the production of our ideas, not by any
act of will, or spiritual efficiency, but by that kind of action
which belongs to Matter, viz. motion.

Phil. I find you are at every turn relapsing into your
old exploded conceit, of a moveable, and consequently an
extended, substance, existing without the mind. What !
Have you already forgotten you were convinced ; or are
you willing I should repeat what has been said on that
head? In truth this is not fair dealing in you, still to
suppose the being of that which you have so often acknow
ledged to have no being. But, not to insist farther on
what has been so largely handled, I ask whether all your
ideas are not perfectly passive and inert, including nothing
of action in them ;!.

HyL They are.

Phil. And are sensible qualities anything else but
ideas ?

1 Berkeley's material substance Berkeley, it must be a living Spirit,
is a natural or divinely ordered and it would be an abuse of Ian-
aggregate of sensible qualities or guage to call this Matter,
phenomena. '3 Cf. Principles, sect. 25, 26.

• Inasmuch as, according to

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PIIILONOUS 431

Hyl. How often have I acknowledged that they are not.

Phil. But is not motion a sensible quality ?

Hyl It is.

Phil. Consequently it is no action ?

Hyl. I agree with you. And indeed it is very plain that
when I stir my finger, it remains passive ; but my will
which produced the motion is active.

Phil. Now, I desire to know, in the first place, whether,
motion being allowed to be no action, you can conceive
any action besides volition : and, in the second place,
whether to say something and conceive nothing be not
to talk nonsense x : and, lastly, whether, having considered
the premises, you do not perceive that to suppose any
efficient or active Cause of our ideas, other than Spirit,
is highly absurd and unreasonable ?

Hyl. I give up the point entirely. But, though Matter
may not be a cause, yet what hinders its being an instru
ment, subservient to the supreme Agent in the production
of our ideas ?

Phil. An instrument say you ; pray what may be the
figure, springs, wheels, and motions, of that instrument ?

Hyl. Those I pretend to determine nothing of, both the
substance and its qualities being entirely unknown to me.

Phil. What ? You are then of opinion it is made up
of unknown parts, that it hath unknown motions, and an
unknown shape ?

Hyl. I do not believe that it hath any figure or motion
at all, being already convinced, that no sensible qualities
can exist in an unperceiving substance.

Phil. But what notion is it possible to frame of an
instrument void of all sensible qualities, even extension
itself?

Hyl. I do not pretend to have any notion of it.

Phil. And what reason have you to think this unknown,
this inconceivable Somewhat doth exist ? Is it that you
imagine God cannot act as well without it; or that you
find by experience the use of some such thing, when
you form ideas in your own mind?

1 It is here argued that y& volition into the term Cause, to apply that

is the only originative cause implied term to what is not volition is to

in our experience, and which con- make it meaningless, or at least to

sequently alone puts true meaning misapply it.

432 THE SECOND DIALOGUE

Hyl. You are always teasing me for reasons of my
belief. Pray what reasons have you not to believe it ?

Phil. It is to me a sufficient reason not to believe the
existence of anything, if I see no reason for believing it.
But, not to insist on reasons for believing, you will not
so much as let me know what it is you would have me
believe ; since you say you have no manner of notion
of it. After all, let me entreat you to consider whether
it be like a philosopher, or even like a man of common
sense, to pretend to believe you know not what, and you
know not why.

Hyl. Hold, Philonous. When I tell you Matter is an
instrument, I do not mean altogether nothing. It is true
I know not the particular kind of instrument ; but, how
ever, I have some notion of instrument in general, which
I apply to it.

Phil. But what if it should prove that there is some
thing, even in the most general notion of instrument, as
taken in a distinct sense from cause, which makes the use
of it inconsistent with the Divine attributes ?

Hyl. Make that appear and I shall give up the point.

Phil. What mean you by the general nature or notion
of instrument ?

Hyl. That which is common to all particular instruments
composeth the general notion.

Phil. Is it not common to all instruments, that they are
applied to the doing those things only which cannot be
performed by the mere act of our wills? Thus, for
instance, I never use an instrument to move my finger,
because it is done by a volition. But I should use one
if I were to remove part of a rock, or tear up a tree by
the roots. Are you of the same mind ? Or, can you
shew any example where an instrument is made use of
in producing an effect immediately depending on the will
of the agent ?

Hyl. I own I cannot.

Phil. How therefore can you suppose that an All-perfect
Spirit, on whose Will all things have an absolute and
immediate dependence, should need an instrument in his
operations, or, not needing it, make use of it? Thus it
seems to me that you are obliged to own the use of a life
less inactive instrument to be incompatible with the infinite

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 433

perfection of God ; that is, by your own confession, to
give up the point.

Hyl. It doth not readily occur what I can answer you.

Phil. But, methinks you should be ready to own the
truth, when it has been fairly proved to you. We indeed,
who are beings of finite powers, are forced to make use
of instruments. And the use of an instrument sheweth
the agent to be limited by rules of another's prescription,
and that he cannot obtain his end but in such a way, and
by such conditions. Whence it seems a clear consequence,
that the supreme unlimited Agent useth no tool or instru
ment at all. The will of an Omnipotent Spirit is no
sooner exerted than executed, without the application of
means ; which, if they are employed by inferior agents, it
is not upon account of any real efficacy that is in them,
or necessary aptitude to produce any effect, but merely in
compliance with the laws of nature, or those conditions
prescribed to them by the First Cause, who is Himself
above all limitation or prescription whatsoever1.

Hyl. I will no longer maintain that Matter is an instru
ment. However, I would not be understood to give up its
existence neither ; since, notwithstanding what hath been
said, it may still be an occasion 2.

Phil. How many shapes is your Matter to take ? Or,
how often must it be proved not to exist, before you are
content to part with it ? But, to say no more of this
(though by all the laws of disputation I may justly blame
you for so frequently changing the signification of the
principal term) — I would fain know what you mean by
affirming that matter is an occasion, having already denied
it to be a cause. And, when you have shewn in what
sense you understand occasion, pray, in the next place,
be pleased to shew me what reason induceth you to believe
there is such an occasion of our ideas ?

Hyl. As to the first point : by occasion I mean an inactive

1 While thus arguing against the if it is available for this purpose,

need for independent matter, as an Unless the visible and audible

instrument needed by God, Berke- ideas or phenomena presented to

ley fails to explain how dependent me are actually seen and heard

matter can be a medium of in- by other men, how can they be

tercourse between persons. It instrumental in intercommunica-

must be more than a subjective tion ?

dream, however well ordered, 2 Cf. Principles, sect. 68-79.

BERKELEY : FRASER. I, F *

434 THE SECOND DIALOGUE

unthinking being, at the presence whereof God excites
ideas in our minds.

Phil. And what may be the nature of that inactive un
thinking being ?

Hyl. I know nothing of its nature.

Phil. Proceed then to the second point, and assign some
reason why we should allow an existence to this inactive,
unthinking, unknown thing.

Hyl. When we see ideas produced in our minds, after
an orderly and constant manner, it is natural to think they
have some fixed and regular occasions, at the presence of
which they are excited.

Phil. You acknowledge then God alone to be the cause
of our ideas, and that He causes them at the presence
of those occasions.

Hyl. That is my opinion.

Phil. Those things which you say are present to God,
without doubt He perceives.

Hyl. Certainly; otherwise they could not be to Him an
occasion of acting.

Phil. Not to insist now on your making sense of this
hypothesis, or answering all the puzzling questions and
difficulties it is liable to : I only ask whether the order
and regularity observable in the series of our ideas, or
the course of nature, be not sufficiently accounted for by
the wisdom and power of God ; and whether it doth not
derogate from those attributes, to suppose He is in
fluenced, directed, or put in mind, when and what He
is to act, by an unthinking substance? And, lastly,
whether, in case I granted all you contend for, it would
make anything to your purpose ; it not being easy to
conceive how the external or absolute existence of an
unthinking substance, distinct from its being perceived,
can be inferred from my allowing that there are certain
things perceived by the mind of God, which are to Him
the occasion of producing ideas in us?

Hyl. I am perfectly at a loss what to think, this notion of
occasion seeming now altogether as groundless as the rest.

Phil. Do you not at length perceive that in all these
different acceptations of Matter, you have been only
supposing you know not what, for no manner of reason,
and to no kind of use ?

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 435

Hyl. I freely own myself less fond of my notions since
they have been so accurately examined. But still, me-
thinks, I have some confused perception that there is such
a thing as Matter.

Phil. Either you perceive the being of Matter immediately
or mediately. If immediately, pray inform me by which
of the senses you perceive it. If mediately, let me know
by what reasoning it is inferred from those things which
you perceive immediately. So much for the perception.
Then for the Matter itself, I ask whether it is object,
substratum, cause, instrument, or occasion ? You have
already pleaded for each of these, shifting your notions,
and making Matter to appear sometimes in one shape,
then in another. And what you have offered hath been
disapproved and rejected by yourself. If you have any
thing new to advance I would gladly hear it.

Hyl. I think I have already offered all I had to say on
those heads. I am at a loss what more to urge.

PhiL And yet you are loath to part with your old pre
judice. But, to make you quit it more easily, I desire
that, beside what has been hitherto suggested, you will
farther consider whether, upon supposition that Mattel-
exists, you can possibly conceive how you should be
affected by it. Or, supposing it did not exist, whether
it be not evident you might for all that be affected with
the same ideas you now are, and consequently have the
very same reasons to believe its existence that you now
can have1.

Hyl. I acknowledge it is possible we might perceive all
things just as we do now, though there was no Matter in the
world ; neither can I conceive, if there be Matter, how it
should produce any idea in our minds. And, I do farther
grant you have entirely satisfied me that it is impossible
there should be such a thing as Matter in any of the fore
going acceptations. But still I cannot help supposing that
there is Matter in some sense or other. What that is I do
not indeed pretend to determine.

Phil. I do not expect you should define exactly the
nature of that unknown being. Only be pleased to tell me
whether it is a Substance ; and if so, whether you can

1 Cf. Principles, sect. 20.

Ff2

43^ THE SECOND DIALOGUE

suppose a Substance without accidents ; or, in case you
suppose it to have accidents or qualities, I desire you will
let me know what those qualities are, at least what is meant
by Matter's supporting them?

Hyl. We have already argued on those points. I have
no more to say to them. But, to prevent any farther
questions, let me tell you I at present understand by Matter
neither substance nor accident, thinking nor extended
being, neither cause, instrument, nor occasion, but Some
thing entirely unknown, distinct from all these '.

Phil. It seems then you include in your present notion
of Matter nothing but the general abstract idea of entity.

Hyl. Nothing else ; save only that I superadd to this
general idea the negation of all those particular things,
qualities, or ideas, that I perceive, imagine, or in anywise
apprehend.

Phil. Pray where do you suppose this unknown Matter
to exist ?

Hyl. Oh Philonous ! now you think you have entangled
me ; for, if I say it exists in place, then you will infer
that it exists in the mind, since it is agreed that place
or extension exists only in the mind. But I am not
ashamed to own my ignorance. I know not where it
exists ; only I am sure it exists not in place. There is
a negative answer for you. And you must expect no other
to all the questions you put for the future about Matter.

Phil. Since you will not tell me where it exists, be pleased
to inform me after what manner you suppose it to exist, or
what you mean by its existence!

Hyl. It neither thinks nor acts, neither perceives nor is
perceived.

Phil. But what is there positive in your abstracted notion
of its existence ?

Hyl. Upon a nice observation, I do not find I have any
positive notion or meaning at all. I tell you again, I am
not ashamed to own my ignorance. I know not what is
meant by its existence, or how it exists.

Phil. Continue, good Hylas, to act the same ingenuous
part, and tell me sincerely whether you can frame a distinct
idea of Entity in general, prescinded from and exclusive of

1 Cf. Principles, sect. 80, 8 1.

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 437

all thinking and corporeal beings \ all particular things
whatsoever.

Hyl. Hold, let me think a little 1 profess, Philonous,

I do not find that I can. At first glance, methought I had
some dilute and airy notion of Pure Entity in abstract ;
but, upon closer attention, it hath quite vanished out of
sight. The more I think on it, the more am I confirmed
in my prudent resolution of giving none but negative
answers, and not pretending to the least degree of any
positive knowledge or conception of Matter, its where, its
how, its entity, or anything belonging to it.

Phil. When, therefore, you speak of the existence of
Matter, you have not any notion in your mind ?

HyL None at all.

Phil. Pray tell me if the case stands not thus :— At first,
from a belief of material substance, you would have it that
the immediate objects existed without the mind ; then that
they are archetypes; then causes; next instruments; then
occasions : lastly, something^ in general, which being inter
preted proves nothing. So Matter comes to nothing. What
think you, Hylas, is not this a fair summary of your whole
proceeding?

Hyl. Be that as it will, yet I still insist upon it, that our
not being able to conceive a thing is no argument against
its existence.

Phil. That from a cause, effect, operation, sign, or other
circumstance, there may reasonably be inferred the exist
ence of a thing not immediately perceived ; and that it
were absurd for any man to argue against the existence of
that thing, from his having no direct and positive notion of
it, I freely own. But, where there is nothing of all this ;
where neither reason nor revelation induces us to believe
the existence of a thing ; where we have not even a rela
tive notion of it ; where an abstraction is made from per
ceiving and being perceived, from Spirit and idea : lastly,
where there is not so much as the most inadequate or faint
idea pretended to — I will not indeed thence conclude
against the reality of any notion, or existence of anything ;
but my inference shall be, that you mean nothing at all ;
that you employ words to no manner of purpose, without

1 i. e. all Spirits and their dependent ideas or phenomena.

438 THE SECOND DIALOGUE

any design or signification whatsoever. And I leave it to
you to consider how mere jargon should be treated.

Hyl. To deal frankly with you, Philonous, your argu
ments seem in themselves unanswerable ; but they have
not so great an effect on me as to produce that entire con
viction, that hearty acquiescence, which attends demonstra
tion x. I find myself still relapsing into an obscure surmise
of I know not what, matter.

Phil. But, are you not sensible, Hylas, that two things
must concur to take away all scruple, and work a plenary
assent in the mind ? Let a visible object be set in never
so clear a light, yet, if there is any imperfection in the
sight, or if the eye is not directed towards it, it will not be
distinctly seen. And though a demonstration be never so
well grounded and fairly proposed, yet, if there is withal
a stain of prejudice, or a wrong bias on the understanding,
can it be expected on a sudden to perceive clearly, and
adhere firmly to the truth ? No ; there is need of time
and pains : the attention must be awakened and detained
by a frequent repetition of the same thing placed oft in the
same, oft in different lights. I have said it already, and
find I must still repeat and inculcate, that it is an un
accountable licence you take, in pretending to maintain
you know not what, for you know not what reason, to you
know not what purpose. Can this be paralleled in any art
or science, any sect or profession of men ? Or is there
anything so barefacedly groundless and unreasonable to
be met with even in the lowest of common conversation ?
But, perhaps you will still say, Matter may exist ; though
at the same time you neither know what is meant by Matter,
or by its existence. This indeed is surprising, and the more
so because it is altogether voluntary [- and of your own

1 This, according to Hume v'who ments, though otherwise intended,

takes for granted that Berkeley's are, in reality, merely sceptical,

reasonings can produce no con- appear from this — that they admit

viction), is the natural effect of of no answer, and produce no

Berkeley's philosophy. — 'Most of conviction. Their only effect is to

the writings of that very ingenious cause that momentary amazement

author (Berkeley) form the best and irresolution and confusion,

lessons of scepticism which are to which is the result of scepticism.'

be found either among the ancient (Hume's Essays, vol. II. Note N,

or modern philosophers, Bayle not p. 554.)

excepted. . . . That all his argu- - Omitted in last edition.

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 439

head], you not being led to it by any one reason ; for I
challenge you to shew me that thing in nature which needs
Matter to explain or account for it.

HyL The reality of things cannot be maintained without
supposing the existence of Matter. And is not this, think
you, a good reason why I should be earnest in its defence ?

Phil. The reality of things ! What things ? sensible or
intelligible ?

HyL Sensible things.

Phil. My glove for example ?

HyL That, or any other thing perceived by the senses.

Phil. But to fix on some particular thing. Is it not
a sufficient evidence to me of the existence of this glove,
that I see it, and feel it; and wear it ? Or, if this will not
do, how is it possible I should be assured of the reality of
this thing, which I actually see in this place, by supposing
that some unknown thing, which I never did or can see,
exists after an unknown manner, in an unknown place, or
in no place at all ? How can the supposed reality of that
which is intangible be a proof that anything tangible really
exists? Or, of that which is invisible, that any visible
thing, or, in general of anything which is imperceptible,
that a perceptible exists ? Do but explain this and I shall
think nothing too hard for you.

HyL Upon the whole, I am content to own the existence
of Matter is highly improbable ; but the direct and absolute
impossibility of it does not appear to me.

Phil. But granting Matter to be possible, yet, upon that
account merely, it can have no more claim to existence
than a golden mountain, or a centaur.

HyL I acknowledge it ; but still you do not deny it is
possible ; and that which is possible, for aught you know,
may actually exist.

Phil. I deny it to be possible ; and have, if I mistake
not, evidently proved, from your own concessions, that it
is not. In the common sense of the word Matter, is there
any more implied than an extended, solid, figured, move-
able substance, existing without the mind ? And have not
you acknowledged, over and over, that you have seen
evident reason for denying the possibility of such a sub
stance?

HyL True, but that is only one sense of the term Matter.

440 THE SECOND DIALOGUE

Phil. But is it not the only proper genuine received
sense ? And, if Matter, in such a sense, be proved impos
sible, may it not be thought with good grounds absolutely
impossible ? Else how could anything be proved impos
sible ? Or, indeed, how could there be any proof at all
one way or other, to a man who takes the liberty to un
settle and change the common signification of words?

Hyl. I thought philosophers might be allowed to speak
more accurately than the vulgar, and were not always con
fined to the common acceptation of a term.

Phil. But this now mentioned is the common received
sense among philosophers themselves. But, not to insist
on that, have you not been allowed to take Matter in what
sense you pleased ? And have you not used this privilege
in the utmost extent ; sometimes entirely changing, at
others leaving out, or putting into the definition of it what
ever, for the present, best served your design, contrary to
all the known rules of reason and logic ? And hath not
this shifting, unfair method of yours spun out our dispute
to an unnecessary length ; Matter having been particularly
examined, and by your own confession refuted in each of
those senses? And can any more be required to prove
the absolute impossibility of a thing, than the proving it
impossible in every particular sense that either you or any
one else understands it in ?

Hyl. But I am not so thoroughly satisfied that you have
proved the impossibility of Matter, in the last most obscure
abstracted and indefinite sense.

Phil. When is a thing shewn to be impossible ?

Hyl. When a repugnancy is demonstrated between the
ideas comprehended in its definition.

Phil. But where there are no ideas, there no repugnancy
can be demonstrated between ideas ?

Hyl. I agree with you.

Phil. Now, in that which you call the obscure indefinite
sense of the word Matter, it is plain, by your own con
fession, there was included no idea at all, no sense except
an unknown sense ; which is the same thing as none. You
are not, therefore, to expect I should prove a repugnancy
between ideas, where there are no ideas ; or the impossi
bility of Matter taken in an unknown sense, that is, no
sense at all. My business was only to shew you meant

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 441

nothing', and this you were brought to own. So that, in
all your various senses, you have been shewed either to
mean nothing at all, or, if anything, an absurdity. And if
this be not sufficient to prove the impossibility of a thing,
I desire you will let me know what is.

Hyl. I acknowledge you have proved that Matter is im
possible ; nor do I see what more can be said in defence of
it. But, at the same time that I give up this, I suspect all
my other notions. For surely none could be more seem
ingly evident than this once was : and yet it now seems as
false and absurd as ever it did true before. But I think
we have discussed the point sufficiently for the present.
The remaining part of the day I would willingly spend in
running over in my thoughts the several heads of this
morning's conversation, and to-morrow shall be glad to
meet you here again about the same time.

Phil. I will not fail to attend you.

THE THIRD DIALOGUE

Philonous. ! Tell me, Hylas, what are the fruits of yes
terday's meditation ? Has it confirmed you in the same
mind you were in at parting? or have you since seen
cause to change your opinion ?

Hylas. Truly my opinion is that all our opinions are
alike vain and uncertain. What we approve to-day, we
condemn to-morrow. We keep a stir about knowledge,
and spend our lives in the pursuit of it, when, alas ! we
know nothing all the while : nor do I think it possible for
us ever to know anything in this life. Our faculties are
too narrow and too few. Nature certainly never intended
us for speculation.

Phil. What ! Say you we can know nothing, Hylas ?

HyL There is not that single thing in the world whereof
we can know the real nature, or what it is in itself.

Phil. Will you tell me I do not really know what fire or
water is ?

HyL You may indeed know that fire appears hot, and
water fluid ; but this is no more than knowing what sensa
tions are produced in your own mind, upon the application
of fire and water to your organs of sense. Their internal
constitution, their true and real nature, you are utterly
in the dark as to that.

Phil. Do I not know this to be a real stone that I stand
on, and that which I see before my eyes to be a real tree ?

HyL Know? No, it is impossible you or any man alive
should know it. All you know is, that you have such a
certain idea or appearance in your own mind. But what
is this to the real tree or stone ? I tell you that colour,

1 'Tell me, Hylas,' — ' So Hylas' — in first and second editions.

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 443

figure, and hardness, which you perceive, are not the real
natures of those things, or in the least like them. The
same may be said of all other real things, or corporeal
substances, which compose the world. They have none
of them anything of themselves, like those sensible qualities
by us perceived. We should not therefore pretend to
affirm or know anything of them, as they are in their own
nature.

Phil. But surely, Hylas, I can distinguish gold, for
example, from iron : and how could this be, if I knew not
what either truly was ?

HyL Believe me, Philonous, you can only distinguish
between your own ideas. That yellowness, that weight,
and other sensible qualities, think you they are really in
the gold? They are only relative to the senses, and have
no absolute existence in nature. And in pretending to
distinguish the species of real things, by the appearances
in your mind, you may perhaps act as wisely as he that
should conclude two men were of a different species,
because their clothes were not of the same colour.

Phil. It seems, then, we are altogether put off with the
appearances of things, and those false ones too. The
very meat I eat, and the cloth I wear, have nothing in
them like what I see and feel.

HyL Even so.

Phil. But is it not strange the whole world should be
thus imposed on, and so foolish as to believe their senses ?
And yet I know not how it is, but men eat, and drink, and
sleep, and perform all the offices of life, as comfortably
and conveniently as if they really knew the things they
are conversant about.

HyL They do so : but you know ordinary practice does
not require a nicety of speculative knowledge. Hence the
vulgar retain their mistakes, and for all that make a shift
to bustle through the affairs of life. But philosophers
know better things.

Phil. You mean, they know that they know nothing.

HyL That is the very top and perfection of human
knowledge.

Phil. But are you all this while in earnest, Hylas ; and
are you seriously persuaded that you know nothing real in
the world ? Suppose you are going to write, would you

444 THE THIRD DIALOGUE

not call for pen, ink, and paper, like another man ; and
do you not know what it is you call for?

HyL How often must I tell you, that I know not the
real nature of any one thing in the universe ? I may
indeed upon occasion make use of pen, ink, and paper.
But what any one of them is in its own true nature, I
declare positively I know not. And the same is true with
regard to eve^ other corporeal thing. And, what is more,
we are not only ignorant of the true and real nature of
things, but even of their existence. It cannot be denied
that we perceive such certain appearances or ideas ; but
it cannot be concluded from thence that bodies really exist.
Nay, now I think on it, I must, agreeably to my former
concessions, farther declare that it is impossible any real
corporeal thing should exist in nature.

Phil. You amaze me. Was ever anything more wild
and extravagant than the notions you now maintain : and
is it not evident you are led into all these extravagances
by the belief of material substance^ This makes you
dream of those unknown natures 1 in everything. It is
this occasions your distinguishing between the reality and
sensible appearances of things. It is to this you are
indebted for being ignorant of what everybody else knows
perfectly well. Nor is this all : you are not only ignorant
of the true nature of everything, but you know not whether
anything really exists, or whether there are any true
natures at all ; forasmuch as you attribute to your material
beings an absolute or external existence, wherein you
suppose their reality consists. And, as you are forced in
the end to acknowledge such an existence means either a
direct repugnancy, or nothing at all, it follows that you
are obliged to pull down your own hypothesis of material
Substance, and positively to deny the real existence of
any part of the universe. And so you are plunged into
the deepest and most deplorable scepticism that ever man
was 2. Tell me, Hylas, is it not as I say ?

1 Variously called noimiena, tions concerning them. Questions

' things -in -themselves,' absolute about existence are thus confined

substances, &c. — which Berke- within the concrete or realising

ley's philosoplry banishes, on the experiences of living spirits,

ground of their unintelligibility, 2 Berkeley claims that his doctrine

andthusannihilatesall furtherques- supersedes scepticism, and excludes

BETWEEN IIYLAS AND PHILONOUS 445

HyL I agree with you. Material substance was no more
than an hypothesis ; and a false and groundless one too.
I will no longer spend my breath in defence of it. But
whatever hypothesis you advance, or whatsoever scheme
of things you introduce in its stead, I doubt not it will
appear every whit as false : let me but be allowed to ques
tion you upon it. That is, suffer me to serve you in your
own kind, and I warrant it shall conduct you through as
many perplexities and contradictions, to the very same
state of scepticism that I myself am in at present.

Phil. I assure you, Hylas, I do not pretend to frame any
hypothesis at all1. I am of a vulgar cast, simple enough
to believe my senses, and leave things as I find them.
To be plain, it is my opinion that the real things are those
very things I see, and feel, and perceive 2 by my senses.
These I know ; and, finding they answer all the necessities
and purposes of life, have no reason to be solicitous about
any other unknown beings. A piece of sensible bread,
for instance, would stay my stomach better than ten
thousand times as much of that insensible, unintelligible,
real bread you speak of. It is likewise my opinion that
colours and other sensible qualities are on the objects.
I cannot for my life help thinking that snow is white, and
fire hot. You indeed, who by snow and fire mean certain
external, unperceived, unperceiving substances, are in the
right to deny whiteness or heat to be affections inherent
in them. But I, who understand by those words the
things I see and feel, am obliged to think like other folks.
And, as I am no sceptic with regard to the nature of
things, so neither am I as to their existence. That a
thing should be really perceived by my senses3, and at

the possibility of fallacy in sense, ] He accepts the common belief
in excluding an ultimately repre- on which interpretation of sense
sentative perception of Matter. He symbols proceeds — that sensible
also assumes the reasonableness of phenomena are evolved in rational
faith in the reality and constancy order, under laws that are inde-
of natural law. When we see an pendent of, and in that respect ex-
orange, the visual sense guarantees ternal to, the individual percipient,
only colour. The other phenomena, 2 Mediately as well as immedi-
which we associate with this colour ately.

— the other ' qualities ' of the 3 We can hardly be said to have

orange — are, when we only sec the an immediate sense-perception of

orange, matter of faith. We believe an individual 'thing ' — meaning by

them to be realisable. 'thing' a congeries of sense-ideas

446 THE THIRD DIALOGUE

the same time not really exist, is to me a plain contra
diction ; since I cannot prescind or abstract, even in
thought, the existence of a sensible thing from its being
perceived. Wood, stones, fire, water, flesh, iron, and the
like things, which I name and discourse of, are things
that I know. And I should not have known them but
that I perceived them by my senses ; and things perceived
by the senses are immediately perceived ; and things im
mediately perceived are ideas ; and ideas cannot exist
without the mind ; their existence therefore consists in
being perceived ; when, therefore, they are actually per
ceived there can be no doubt of their existence. Away
then with all that scepticism, all those ridiculous philo
sophical doubts. What a jest is it for a philosopher to
question the existence of sensible things, till he hath it
proved to him from the veracity of God J ; or to pretend
our knowledge in this point falls short of intuition or
demonstration - ! I might as well doubt of my own being,
as of the being of those things I actually see and feel.

Hyl. Not so fast, Philonous : you say you cannot con
ceive how sensible things should exist without the mind.
Do you not ?

Phil. I do.

Hyl. Supposing you were annihilated, cannot you con
ceive it possible that things perceivable by sense may still
exist 3 ?

Phil. I can ; but then it must be in another mind. When
I deny sensible things an existence out of the mind, I do
not mean my mind in particular, but all minds. Now, it is
plain they have an existence exterior to my mind ; since
I find them by experience to be independent of it4. There

or phenomena, presented to differ- in the trustworthiness of the Uni-

ent senses. We immediately per- versal Power at the heart of the

ceive some of them, and believe in universe, the fundamental presup-

the others, which those suggest. position of all human experience,

See the last three notes. and God thus the basis and end of

1 He probably refers to Des- philosophy and of experience ?

cartes, who argues for the trust- 2 As Locke does. See Essay,

worthiness of our faculties from the Bk. IV. ch. n.

veracity of God; thus apparently :! Cf. Principles of Human Know-

arguing in a circle, seeing that the ledge, sect. 45-48.

existence of God is manifested to * And to be thus external to

us only through our suspected individual minds,
faculties. But is not confidence

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 447

is therefore some other Mind wherein they exist, during
the intervals between the times of my perceiving them : as
likewise they did before my birth, and would do after my
supposed annihilation. And, as the same is true with
regard to all other finite created spirits, it necessarily
follows there is an omnipresent eternal Mind, which knows
and comprehends all things, and exhibits them to our view-
in such a manner, and according to such rules, as He
Himself hath ordained, and are by us termed the laws
of nature1.

Hyl. Answer me, Philonous. Are all our ideas perfectly
inert beings ? Or have they any agency included in them ?

Phil. They are altogether passive and inert 2.

Hyl. And is not God an agent, a being purely active ?

Phil. I acknowledge it.

Hyl. No idea therefore can be like unto, or represent
the nature of God ?

Phil. It cannot.

Hyl. Since therefore you have no iaea of the mind of
God, how can you conceive it possible that things should
exist in His mind ? Or, if you can conceive the mind of
God, without having an idea of it, why may not I be allowed
to conceive the existence of Matter, notwithstanding 1 have
no idea of it ?

Phil. As to your first question : I own I have properly f
no idea, either of God or any other spirit; for these being
active, cannot be represented by things perfectly inert, as
our ideas are. I do nevertheless know that I, who am f
a spirit or thinking substance, exist as certainly as I know
my ideas exist 3. Farther, I know what I mean by the
terms / and myself } and I know this immediately or in-

1 It is here that Berkeley differs, Power, Mill expresses by the term

for example, from Hume and Comte ' permanent possibility of sensation.'

and J. S. Mill; who accept sense- (See his Examination of Hamilton,

given phenomena, and assume ch. n.) Our belief in the con-

the constancy of their orderly tinued existence of a sensible thing

reappearances, as a matter of fad, in our absence merely means, with

while they confess total ignorance him, our conviction, derived from

of the cause of natural order. custom, that we should perceive it

(Thus ignorant, why do they as- under inexplicable conditions which

sume reason or order in nature ?) determine its appearance.

The ground of sensible things, '•* Cf. Principles, sect. 25, 26.

which Berkeley refers to Divine 3 Cf. Ibid., sect. 2, 27, 135-142^

448 THE THIRD DIALOGUE

tuitively, though I do not perceive it as I perceive a
triangle, a colour, or a sound. The Mind, Spirit, or Soul
is that indivisible unextended thing which thinks, acts, and
perceives. I say indivisible, because unextended ; and un-
extended, because extended, figured, moveable things are
ideas ; and that which perceives ideas, which thinks and
wills, is plainly itself no idea, nor like an idea. Ideas are
things inactive, and perceived. And Spirits a sort of beings
altogether different from them. I do not therefore say my
soul is an idea, or like an idea. However, taking the word
idea in a large sense, my soul may be said to furnish me
with an idea, that is, an image or likeness of God — though
indeed extremely inadequate. For, all the notion I have
of God is obtained by reflecting on my own soul, heighten
ing its powers, and removing its imperfections. I have,
therefore, though not an inactive idea, yet in myself some
sort of an active thinking image of the Deity. And, though
I perceive Him not by sense, yet I have a notion of Him,
or know Him by reflexion and reasoning. My own mind
and my own ideas I have an immediate knowledge of;
and, by the help of these, do mediately apprehend the
possibility of the existence of other spirits and ideas *.
Farther, from my own being, and from the dependency
I find in myself and my ideas, I do, by an act of reason '2,
necessarily infer the existence of a God, and of all created
things in the mind of God. So much for your first ques
tion. For the second : I suppose by this time you can
answer it yourself. For you neither perceive Matter3
objectively, as you do an inactive being or idea ; nor
know it, as you do yourself, by a reflex act 4 ; neither do

1 Inasmuch as I am conscious of minds, external to our own, is, with

myself, I can gather, through the Berkeley, an application of this faith,

sense symbolism, the real existence a ' Matter,' i. e. Matter as abstract

of other minds, external to my own. substance. Cf. Principles, sect. 135-

For I cannot, of course, enter into 138.

the very consciousness of another * Does this imply that with

person. Berkeley, self, as distinguished

- * reason,' i. e. reasoning or from the phenomena of which the

necessary inference — founded here material world consists, is not a

on our sense of personal depen- necessary presupposition of experi-

dence ; not merely on our faith in ence? He says in many places —

sense symbolism and the interpre- I am conscious of ' my own being,'

tability of the sensible world. Our and that my mind is myself. Cf.

belief in the existence of finite Principles, sect. 2.

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 449

you mediately apprehend it by similitude of the one or the
other l ; nor yet collect it by reasoning from that which
you know immediately2. All which makes the case of
Matter widely different from that of the Deity.

You sa}' your own soul supplies you with some
sort of an idea or image of God. But, at the same time,
you acknowledge you have, properly speaking, no idea of
your own soul. You even affirm that spirits are a sort of
beings altogether different from ideas. Consequently that
no idea can be like a spirit. We have therefore no idea
of any spirit. You admit nevertheless that there is spiritual
Substance, although you have no idea of it; while you
deny there can be such a thing as material Substance,
because you have no notion or idea of it. Is this fair
dealing? To act consistently, you must either admit
Matter or reject Spirit. What say you to this ?

Phil. I say, in the first place, that I do not deny the
existence of material substance, merely because I have no
notion of it, but because the notion of it is inconsistent ; or,
in other words, because it is repugnant that there should
be a notion of it. Many things, for aught I know, may
exist, whereof neither I nor any other man hath or can
have any idea or notion whatsoever. But then those
things must be possible, that is, nothing inconsistent must
be included in their definition. I say, secondly, that,
although we believe things to exist which we do not per
ceive, yet we may not believe that any particular thing
exists, without some reason for such belief: but I have no
reason for believing the existence of Matter. I have no
immediate intuition thereof: neither can I immediately
from my sensations, ideas, notions, actions, or passions,
infer an unthinking, unperceiving, inactive Substance —
either by probable deduction, or necessary consequence.
Whereas the being of my Self, that is, my own soul, mind,
or thinking principle, I evidently know by reflexion 4.

1 Cf. Principles, sect. 8. reality of abstract or unperceived

2 Cf. Ibid., sect. 20. Matter, to the reality of the Ego

3 This important passage, printed or Self, of which we are aware
within brackets, is not found in through memory, as identical
the first and second editions of the amid the changes of its successive
Dialogues. It is, by anticipation, states.

Berkeley's answer to Hume's ap- * See note * on preceding page.

plication of the objections to the

BERKELEY : PHASER. I. G g

45° THE THIRD DIALOGUE

You will forgive me if I repeat the same things in answer
to the same objections. In the very notion or definition
of material Substance, there is included a manifest repug
nance and inconsistency. But this cannot be said of the
notion of Spirit. That ideas should exist in what doth not
perceive, or be produced by what doth not act, is repug
nant. But, it is no repugnancy to say that a perceiving
thing should be the subject of ideas, or an active thing the
cause of them. It is granted we have neither an immediate
evidence nor a demonstrative knowledge of the existence
of other finite spirits ; but it will not thence follow that
such spirits are on a foot with material substances : if to
suppose the one be inconsistent, and it be not inconsistent
to suppose the other ; if the one can be inferred by no
argument, and there is a probability for the other ; if we
see signs and effects indicating distinct finite agents like
ourselves, and see no sign or symptom whatever that leads
to a rational belief of Matter. I say, lastly, that I have
a notion of Spirit, though I have not, strictly speaking, an
idea of it *. I do not perceive it as an idea, or by means
of an idea, but know it by reflexion.

Hyl. Notwithstanding all you have said, to me it seems
that, according to your own way of thinking, and in con
sequence of your own principles, it should follow that you
are only a system of floating ideas, without any substance
to support them. Words are not to be used without a
meaning. And, as there is no more meaning in spiritual
Substance than in material Substance, the one is to be ex
ploded as well as the other.

Phil. How often must I repeat, that I know or am con
scious of my own being ; and that / myself am not my
ideas, but somewhat else ", a thinking, active principle
that perceives, knows, wills, and operates about ideas.
I know that I, one and the same self, perceive both colours
and sounds : that a colour cannot perceive a sound, nor
a sound a colour : that I am therefore one individual
principle, distinct from colour and sound ; and, for the
same reason, from all other sensible things and inert ideas.

1 Cf. Principles, sect. 142. not conscious of ideas — sensible

2 Cf. Ibid., sect. 2. Does he or other ? Or, does he deny
assume that he exists when he is that he is ever unconscious ?

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 451

But, I am not in like manner conscious either of the exis
tence or essence of Matter l. On the contrary, I know
that nothing inconsistent can exist, and that the existence
of Matter implies an inconsistency. Farther, I know what
1 mean when I affirm that there is a spiritual substance or
support of ideas, that is, that a spirit knows and perceives
ideas. But, I do not know what is meant when it is said
that an unperceiving substance hath inherent in it and
supports either ideas or the archetypes of ideas. There is
therefore upon the whole no parity of case between Spirit
and Matter.]

Hyl. I own myself satisfied in this point. But, do you
in earnest think the real existence of sensible things con
sists in their being actually perceived ? If so ; how comes
it that all mankind distinguish between them ? Ask the
first man you meet, and he shall tell you, to be perceived is
one thing, and to exist is another.

Phil. I am content, Hylas, to appeal to the common
sense of the world for the truth of my notion. Ask the
gardener why he thinks yonder cherry-tree exists in the
garden, and he shall tell you, because he sees and feels it ;
in a word, because he perceives it by his senses. Ask
him why he thinks an orange-tree not to be there, and he
shall tell you, because he does not perceive it. What he
perceives by sense, that he terms a real being, and saith it
•is or exists-, but, that which is not perceivable, the same,
he saith, hath no being.

Hyl. Yes, Philonous, I grant the existence of a sensible
thing consists in being perceivable, but not in being actually
perceived.

Phil. And what is perceivable but an idea? And can
an idea exist without being actually perceived ? These
are points long since agreed between us.

HyL But, be your opinion never so true, yet surely you
will not deny it is shocking, and contrary to the common
sense of men 2. Ask the fellow whether yonder tree hath
an existence out of his mind : what answer think you he
would make ?

1 That is of matter supposed to sciousness of belief in abstract
exist independently of any mind. material Substance?
Berkeley speaks here of a conscious- * Cf. Principles, sect. 54^57.

ness of matter. Does he mean con-

G g 2

452 THE THIRD DIALOGUE

Phil. The same that I should myself, to wit, that it doth
exist out of his mind. But then to a Christian it cannot
surely be shocking to say, the real tree, existing without
his mind, is truly known and comprehended by (that is
exists in) the infinite mind of God. Probably he may not
at first glance be aware of the direct and immediate proof
there is of this ; inasmuch as the very being of a tree, or
any other sensible thing, implies a mind wherein it is.
But the point itself he cannot deny. The question between
the Materialists and me is not, whether things have a real
existence out of the mind of this or that person \ but,
whether they have an absolute existence, distinct from
being perceived by God, and exterior to all minds 2. This
indeed some heathens and philosophers have affirmed,
but whoever entertains notions of the Deity suitable to
the Holy Scriptures will be of another opinion.

HyL But, according to your notions, what difference is
there between real things, and chimeras formed by the
imagination, or the visions of a dream — since they are all
equally in the mind :; ?

Phil. The ideas formed by the imagination are faint and
indistinct ; they have, besides, an entire dependence on
the will. But the ideas perceived by sense, that is, real
things, are more vivid and clear ; and, being imprinted on
the mind by a spirit distinct from us, have not the like
dependence on our will. There is therefore no danger of
confounding these with the foregoing: and there is as
little of confounding them with the visions of a dream,
which are dim, irregular, and confused. And, though they
should happen to be never so lively and natural, yet, by
their not being connected, and of a piece with the preceding
and subsequent transactions of our lives, they might easily
be distinguished from realities. In short, by whatever
method you distinguish things from chimeras on your
scheme, the same, it is evident, will hold also upon mine.
For, it must be, I presume, by some perceived difference ;
and I am not for depriving you of any one thing that you
perceive.

HyL But still, Philonous, you hold, there is nothing in

1 Which he does not doubt. and his antagonists.

'-' This sentence expresses the J Cf. Principles, sect. 29-41.

whole question between Berkeley

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 453

the world but spirits and ideas. And this, you must needs
acknowledge, sounds very oddly.

Phil. I own the word idea, not being commonly used for
thing, sounds something out of the way. My reason for
using it was, because a necessary relation to the mind is
understood to be implied by that term ; and it is now
commonly used by philosophers to denote the immediate
objects of the understanding. But, however oddly the
proposition may sound in words, yet it includes nothing
so very strange or shocking in its sense ; which in effect
amounts to no more than this, to wit, that there are only
things perceiving, and things perceived ; or that every
unthinking being is necessarily, and from the very nature
of its existence, perceived by some mind ; if not by
a finite created mind, yet certainly by the infinite mind
of God, in whom ' we live, and move, and have our being.'
Is this as strange as to say, the sensible qualities are not
on the objects : or that we cannot be sure of the existence
of things, or know anything of their real natures — though
we both see and feel them, and perceive them by all our
senses ?

Hyl. And, in consequence of this, must we not think
there are no such things as physical or corporeal causes ;
but that a Spirit is the immediate cause of all the phe
nomena in nature ? Can there be anything more extrava
gant than this?

Phil. Yes, it is infinitely more extravagant to say —
a thing which is inert operates on the mind, and which
is unperceiving is the cause of our perceptions, [J without
any regard either to consistency, or the old known axiom,
Nothing can give to another that which it hath not itself \.
Besides, that which to you, 1 know not for what reason,
seems so extravagant is no more than the Holy Scriptures
assert in a hundred places. In them God is represented
as the sole and immediate Author of all those effects which
some heathens and philosophers are wont to ascribe to
Nature, Matter, Fate, or the like unthinking principle.
This is so much the constant language of Scripture that
it were needless to confirm it by citations.

Hyl. You are not aware, Philonous, that, in making God

1 The words within brackets are omitted in the third edition,

454 THE THIRD DIALOGUE

the immediate Author of all the motions in nature, you
make Him the Author of murder, sacrilege, adultery, and
the like heinous sins.

Phil. In answer to that, I observe, first, that the imputa
tion of guilt is the same, whether a person commits an
action with or without an instrument. In case therefore
you suppose God to act by the mediation of an instrument,
or occasion, called Matter, you as truly make Him the
author of sin as I, who think Him the immediate agent
in all those operations vulgarly ascribed to Nature.
I farther observe that sin or moral turpitude doth not
consist in the outward physical action or motion, but in
the internal deviation of the will from the laws of reason
and religion. This is plain, in that the killing an enemy
in a battle, or putting a criminal legally to death, is not
thought sinful ; though the outward act be the very same
with that in the case of murder. Since, therefore, sin
doth not consist in the physical action, the making God
an immediate cause of all such actions is not making Him
the Author of sin. Lastly, I have nowhere said that God
is the only agent who produces all the motions in bodies.
It is true I have denied there are any other agents besides
spirits ; but this is very consistent with allowing to think
ing rational beings, in the production of motions, the use
of limited powers, ultimately indeed derived from God,
but immediately under the direction of their own wills,
which is sufficient to entitle them to all the guilt of their
actions1.

HyL But the denying Matter, Philonous, or corporeal
Substance ; there is the point. You can never persuade
me that this is not repugnant to the universal sense of
mankind. Were our dispute to be determined by most
voices, I am confident you would give up the point, with
out gathering the votes.

Phil I wish both our opinions were fairly stated and
submitted to the judgment of men who had plain common
sense, without the prejudices of a learned education. Let
me be represented as one who trusts his senses, who
thinks he knows the things he sees and feels, and enter-

1 The index pointing to the orig- upon the free voluntary agency of
inative causes in the universe is thus persons, as absolutely responsible
the ethical judgment, which fastens causes, not merely caused causes.

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 455

tains no doubts of their existence ; and you fairly set forth
with all your doubts, your paradoxes, and your scepticism
about you, and I shall willingly acquiesce in the determina
tion of any indifferent person. That there is no substance
wherein ideas can exist beside spirit is to me evident.
And that the objects immediately perceived are ideas, is
on all hands agreed1. And that sensible qualities are
objects immediately perceived no one can deny. It is
therefore evident there can be no substratum of those
qualities but spirit ; in which they exist, not by way of
mode or property, but as a thing perceived in that which
perceives it 2. I deny therefore that there is any unthink
ing substratum of the objects of sense, and in that accepta
tion that there is any material substance. But if by
material substance is meant only sensible body — that which
is seen and felt (and the unphilosophical part of the world,
I dare say, mean no more) — then I am more certain of
matter's existence than you or any other philosopher
pretend to be. If there be anything which makes the
generality of mankind averse from the notions I espouse :
it is a misapprehension that I deny the reality of sensible
things. But, as it is you who are guilty of that, and not
I, it follows that in truth their aversion is against your
notions and not mine. I do therefore assert that I am as
certain as of my own being, that there are bodies or
corporeal substances (meaning the things I perceive by
my senses) ; and that, granting this, the bulk of mankind
will take no thought about, nor think themselves at all
concerned in the fate of those unknown natures, and
philosophical quiddities, which some men are so fond of.

HyL What say you to this ? Since, according to you,
men judge of the reality of things by their senses, how
can a man be mistaken in thinking the moon a plain lucid
surface, about a foot in diameter ; or a square tower, seen
at a distance, round ; or an oar, with one end in the
water, crooked?

Phil. He is not mistaken with regard to the ideas he
actually perceives, but in the inferences he makes from

1 That only ideas or phenomena sensuous experience implies more

are presented to our senses may than the sensuous or empirical

be assented to by those who never- data,

theless maintain that intelligent - Cf. Principles, sect. 49.

456 THE THIRD DIALOGUE

his present perceptions. Thus, in the case of the oar,
what he immediately perceives by sight is certainly
crooked ; and so far he is in the right. But if he thence
conclude that upon taking the oar out of the water he shall
perceive the same crookedness ; or that it would affect his
touch as crooked things are wont to do : in that he is mis
taken. In like manner, if he shall conclude from what he
perceives in one station, that, in case he advances towards
the moon or tower, he should still be affected with the like
ideas, he is mistaken. But his mistake lies not in what he
perceives immediately, and at present, (it being a manifest
contradiction to suppose he should err in respect of that)
but in the wrong judgment he makes concerning the ideas
he apprehends to be connected with those immediately
perceived : or, concerning the ideas that, from what he
perceives at present, he imagines would be perceived in
other circumstances. The case is the same with regard to
the Copernican system. We do not here perceive any
motion of the earth : but it were erroneous thence to con
clude, that, in case we were placed at as great a distance
from that as we are now from the other planets, we should
not then perceive its motion \

Hyl. I understand you ; and must needs own you say
things plausible enough. But, give me leave to put you
in mind of one thing. Pray, Philonous, were you not
formerly as positive that Matter existed, as you are now
that it does not?

Phil. I was. But here lies the difference. Before, my
positiveness was founded, without examination, upon pre
judice ; but now, after inquiry, upon evidence.

Hyl. After all, it seems our dispute is rather about words
than things. We agree in the thing, but differ in the
name. That we are affected with ideas from without is
evident ; and it is no less evident that there must be
(I will not say archetypes, but) Powers without the mind 2,
corresponding to those ideas. And, as these Powers can
not subsist by themselves, there is some subject of them
necessarily to be admitted ; which I call Matter, and you
call Spirit. This is all the difference.

1 Cf. Principles, sect. 58. out the mind of each percipient

2 'without the mind/ i. e, with- person.

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 457

Phil. Pray, Hylas, is that powerful Being, or subject of
powers, extended ?

Hyl. It hath not extension ; but it hath the power to
raise in you the idea of extension.

Phil. It is therefore itself unextended ?

Hyl. I grant it.

Phil. Is it not also active ?

Hyl. Without doubt. Otherwise, how could we attribute
powers to it ?

Phil. Now let me ask you two questions : First, Whether
it be agreeable to the usage either of philosophers or
others to give the name Matter to an unextended active
being? And, Secondly, Whether it be not ridiculously
absurd to misapply names contrary to the common use
of language ?

Hyl. Well then, let it not be called Matter, since you
will have it so, but some Third Nature distinct from
Matter and Spirit. For what reason is there why you
should call it Spirit ? Does not the notion of spirit imply
that it is thinking, as well as active and unextended ?

Phil. My reason is this : because I have a mind to have
some notion of meaning in what I say : but I have no
notion of any action distinct from volition, neither can
I conceive volition to be anywhere but in a spirit : there
fore, when I speak of an active being, I am obliged to
mean a Spirit. Beside, what can be plainer than that
a thing which hath no ideas in itself cannot impart them
to me ; and, if it hath ideas, surely it must be a Spirit.
To make you comprehend the point still more clearly if
it be possible. I assert as well as you that, since we are
affected from without, we must allow Powers to be with
out, in a Being distinct from ourselves. So far we are
agreed. But then we differ as to the kind of this powerful
Being ]. I will have it to be Spirit, you Matter, or I know
not what (I may add too, you know not what) Third
Nature. Thus, I prove it to be Spirit. From the effects
I see produced, I conclude there are actions ; and, because

1 This is the gist of the whole according to Hume and Agnostics,

question. According to the their origin is unknowable, }'et

Materialists, sense-presented phe- (incoherently) they claim that we

nomena are due to unpresented, can interpret them — in physical

unperceived, abstract Matter ; ac- science,
gordingto Berkeley, tolivingSpirit;

458 THE THIRD DIALOGUE

actions, volitions ; and, because there are volitions, there
must be a will. Again, the things I perceive must have an
existence, they or their archetypes, out of my mind : but,
being ideas, neither they nor their archetypes can exist
otherwise than in an understanding ; there is therefore
an understanding. But will and understanding constitute
in the strictest sense a mind or spirit. The powerful
cause, therefore, of my ideas is in strict propriety of speech
a Spirit.

Hyl. And now I warrant you think you have made the
point very clear, little suspecting that what you advance
leads directly to a contradiction. Is it not an absurdity
to imagine any imperfection in God ?

Phil. Without a doubt.

Hyl. To suffer pain is an imperfection ?

Phil. It is.

Hyl. Are we not sometimes affected with pain and un
easiness by some other Being ?

Phil. We are.

Hyl. And have you not said that Being is a Spirit, and
is not that Spirit God ?

Phil. I grant it.

Hyl. But you have asserted that whatever ideas we
perceive from without are in the mind which affects us.
The ideas, therefore, of pain and uneasiness are in God ;
or, in other words, God suffers pain : that is to say, there
is an imperfection in the Divine nature : which, you
acknowledged, was absurd. So you are caught in a plain
contradiction \

Phil. That God knows or understands all things, and
that He knows, among other things, what pain is, even
every sort of painful sensation, and what it is for His
creatures to suffer pain, I make no question. But, that
God, though He knows and sometimes causes painful
sensations in us, can Himself suffer pain, I positively
deny. We, who are limited and dependent spirits, are
liable to impressions of sense, the effects of an external
Agent, which, being produced against our wills, are some
times painful and uneasy. But God, whom no external

1 A similar objection is urged Berkeley in the Grnndriss der Ge-
by Erdmann, in his criticism of schichte der PhilosopJiie.

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 459

being can affect, who perceives nothing by sense as we
do ; whose will is absolute and independent, causing all
things, and liable to be thwarted or resisted by nothing :
it is evident, such a Being as this can suffer nothing, nor
be affected with any painful sensation, or indeed any
sensation at all. We are chained to a body : that is to
say, our perceptions are connected with corporeal motions.
By the law of our nature, we are affected upon every
alteration in the nervous parts of our sensible body;
which sensible body, rightly considered, is nothing but
a complexion of such qualities or ideas as have no exis
tence distinct from being perceived by a mind. So that
this connexion of sensations with corporeal motions
means no more than a correspondence in the order of
nature, between two sets of ideas, or things immediately
perceivable. But God is a Pure Spirit, disengaged from
all such sympathy, or natural ties. No corporeal motions
are attended with the sensations of pain or pleasure in
His mind. To know everything knowable, is certainly
a perfection ; but to endure, or suffer, or feel anything
by sense, is an imperfection. The former, I say, agrees
to God, but not the latter. God knows, or hath ideas ;
but His ideas are not conveyed to Him by sense, as ours
are. Your not distinguishing, where there is so manifest
a difference, makes you fancy you see an absurdity where
there is none.

Hyl. But, all this while you have not considered that
the quantity of Matter has been demonstrated to be pro
portioned to the gravity of bodies \ And what can with
stand demonstration ?

Phil. Let me see how you demonstrate that point.
Hyl. I lay it down for a principle, that the moments or
quantities of motion in bodies are in a direct compounded
reason of the velocities and quantities of Matter contained
in them. Hence, where the velocities are equal, it follows
the moments are directly as the quantity of Matter in each.
But it is found by experience that all bodies (bating the
small inequalities, arising from the resistance of the air)
descend with an equal velocity; the motion therefore of
descending bodies, and consequently their gravity, which

1 Cf. Principles, sect. 50 ; Sin's, sect. 319.

460 THE THIRD DIALOGUE

is the cause or principle of that motion, is proportional
to the quantity of Matter ; which was to be demonstrated.

Phil. You lay it down as a self-evident principle that
the quantity of motion in any body is proportional to the
velocity and Matter taken together ; and this is made use
of to prove a proposition from whence the existence of
Matter is inferred. Pray is not this arguing in a circle?

Hyl. In the premise I only mean that the motion is pro
portional to the velocity, jointly with the extension and
solidity.

Phil. But, allowing this to be true, yet it will not thence
follow that gravity is proportional to Matter, in your
philosophic sense of the word ; except you take it for
granted that unknown substratum, or whatever else you
call it, is proportional to those sensible qualities ; which
to suppose is plainly begging the question. That there is
magnitude and solidity, or resistance, perceived by sense,
I readily grant ; as likewise, that gravity may be pro
portional to those qualities I will not dispute. But that
either these qualities as perceived by us, or the powers pro
ducing them, do exist in a material substratum', this is what
I deny, and you indeed affirm, but, notwithstanding your
demonstration, have not yet proved.

Hyl. I shall insist no longer on that point. Do you
think, however, you shall persuade me the natural philoso
phers have been dreaming all this while ? Pray what
becomes of all their hypotheses and explications of the
phenomena, which suppose the existence of Matter1?

Phil. What mean you, Hylas, by the phenomena ?

Hyl. I mean the appearances which I perceive by my
senses.

Phil. And the appearances perceived by sense, are they
not ideas ?

Hyl. I have told you so a hundred times.

Phil. Therefore, to explain the phenomena is, to shew
how we come to be affected with ideas, in that manner
and 2 order wherein they are imprinted on our senses. Is
it not?

Hyl It is.

1 Cf. Principles, sect. 58.

- 'order' — i series/ in first and second editions.

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 461

Phil Now, if you can prove that any philosopher has
explained the production of any one idea in our minds by
the help of Matter\ I shall for ever acquiesce, and look on
all that hath been said against it as nothing; but, if you
cannot, it is vain to urge the explication of phenomena.
That a Being endowed with knowledge and will should
produce or exhibit ideas is easily understood. But that
a Being which is utterly destitute of these faculties should
be able to produce ideas, or in any sort to affect an intelli
gence, this I can never understand. This I say, though
we had some positive conception of Matter, though we
knew its qualities, and could comprehend its existence,
would yet be so far from explaining things, that it is itself
the most inexplicable thing in the world. And yet, for all
this, it will not follow that philosophers have been doing
nothing ; for, by observing and reasoning upon the con
nexion of ideas'", they discover the laws and methods of
nature, which is a part of knowledge both useful and enter
taining.

Hyl. After all, can it be supposed God would deceive
all mankind? Do you imagine He would have induced
the whole world to believe the being of Matter, if there
was no such thing?

Phil. That every epidemical opinion, arising from pre
judice, or passion, or thoughtlessness, may be imputed to
God, as the Author of it, I believe you will not affirm.
Whatsoever opinion we father on Him, it must be either
because He has discovered it to us by supernatural revel
ation ; or because it is so evident to our natural faculties,
which were framed and given us by God, that it is impos
sible we should withhold our assent from it. But where is
the revelation ? or where is the evidence that extorts the
belief of Matter? Nay, how does it appear, that Matter,
taken for something distinct from what we perceive by our
senses, is thought to exist by all mankind ; or, indeed, by
any except a few philosophers, who do not know what

1 ' Matter/ i. c. when the reality the physical coexistences and se-

of 'matter 'is supposed to signify quences, maintained in constant

what Berkeley argues cannot be ; order by Power external to the

because really meaningless. individual, and which are disclosed

8 'the connexion of ideas,' i.e. in the natural sciences.

462 THE THIRD DIALOGUE

they would be at ? Your question supposes these points
are clear ; and, when you have cleared them, I shall think
myself obliged to give you another answer. In the mean
time, let it suffice that I tell you, I do not suppose God
has deceived mankind at all.

Hyl. But the novelty, Philonous, the novelty ! There
lies the danger. New notions should always be discoun
tenanced ; they unsettle men's minds, and nobody knows
where they will end.

Phil. Why the rejecting a notion that has no foundation,
either in sense, or in reason, or in Divine authority, should
be thought to unsettle the belief of such opinions as are
grounded on all or any of these, I cannot imagine. That
innovations in government and religion are dangerous,
and ought to be discountenanced, I freely own. But is
there the like reason why they should be discouraged in
philosophy ? The making anything known which was un
known before is an innovation in knowledge : and, if all
such innovations had been forbidden, men would have
made a notable progress in the arts and sciences. But
it is none of my business to plead for novelties and para
doxes. That the qualities we perceive are not on the
objects : that we must not believe our senses : that we
know nothing of the real nature of things, and can never
be assured even of their existence : that real colours and
sounds are nothing but certain unknown figures and
motions : that motions are in themselves neither swift nor
slow : that there are in bodies absolute extensions, without
any particular magnitude or figure : that a thing stupid,
thoughtless, and inactive, operates on a spirit : that the
least particle of a body contains innumerable extended
parts: — these are the novelties, these are the strange
notions which shock the genuine uncorrupted judgment
of all mankind ; and being once admitted, embarrass the
mind with endless doubts and difficulties. And it is against
these and the like innovations I endeavour to vindicate
Common Sense. It is true, in doing this, I may perhaps
be obliged to use some ambages, and ways of speech not
common. But, if my notions are once thoroughly under
stood, that which is most singular in them will, in effect,
be found to amount to no more than this : — that it is
absolutely impossible, and a plain contradiction, to suppose

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 463

any unthinking Being should exist without being perceived
by a Mind. And, if this notion be singular, it is a shame it
should be so, at this time of day, and in a Christian country.

Hyl. As for the difficulties other opinions may be liable
to, those are out of the question. It is your business to
defend your own opinion. Can anything be plainer than
that you are for changing all things into ideas ? You,
I say, who are not ashamed to charge me with scepticism.
This is so plain, there is no denying it.

Phil. You mistake me. I am not for changing things
into ideas, but rather ideas into things J ; since those im
mediate objects of perception, which, according to you,
are only appearances of things, I take to be the real things
themselves 2.

Hyl. Things ! You may pretend what you please ; but
it is certain you leave us nothing but the empty forms of
things, the outside only which strikes the senses.

Phil. What you call the empty forms and outside of
things seem to me the very things themselves. Nor are
they empty or incomplete, otherwise than upon your sup
position—that Matter ;! is an essential part of all corporeal
things. We both, therefore, agree in this, that we perceive
only sensible forms : but herein we differ — you will have
them to be empty appearances, I real beings. In short,
you do not trust your senses, I do.

Hyl. You say you believe your senses ; and seem to
applaud yourself that in this you agree with the vulgar.
According to you, therefore, the true nature of a thing is
discovered by the senses. If so, whence cornes that dis
agreement ? Why is not the same figure, and other
sensible qualities, perceived all manner of ways ? and why
should we use a microscope the better to discover the true
nature of a body, if it were discoverable to the naked eye ?

Phil. Strictly speaking, Hylas, we do not see the same
object that we feel4; neither is the same object perceived

1 Cf. Principles, sect. 38. Berke- appearance, as far as our limited
ley is not for making things subjec- senses allow them to be realised
five, but for recognising ideas or for us.

phenomena presented to the senses 3 i. e. abstract Matter.

as objective. * Cf. Neiv Theory of Vision, sect.

2 They are not mere illusory 49 ; and New Theory of Vision
appearances but are the very Vindicated, sect. 9, 10, 15, &c.
things themselves making their

464 THE THIRD DIALOGUE

by the microscope which was by the naked eye 1. But, in
case every variation was thought sufficient to constitute
a new kind or individual, the endless number or confusion
of names would render language impracticable. There
fore, to avoid this, as well as other inconveniences which
are obvious upon a little thought, men combine together
several ideas, apprehended by divers senses, or by the
same sense at different times, or in different circumstances,
but observed, however, to have some connexion in nature,
either with respect to co-existence or succession ; all which
they refer to one name, and consider as one thing. Hence
it follows that when I examine, by my other senses, a
thing I have seen, it is not in order to understand better
the same object which I had perceived by sight, the object
of one sense not being perceived by the other senses.
And, when I look through a microscope, it is not that
I may perceive more clearly what I perceived already with
my bare eyes ; the object perceived by the glass being quite
different from the former. But. in both cases, my aim is
only to know what ideas are connected together ; and the
more a man knows of the connexion of ideas 2, the more he
is said to know of the nature of things. What, therefore,
if our ideas are variable ; what if our senses are not in all
circumstances affected with the same appearances ? It
will not thence follow they are not to be trusted ; or that
they are inconsistent either with themselves or anything
else : except it be with your preconceived notion of (I know
not what) one single, unchanged, unperceivable, real
Nature, marked by each name. Which prejudice seems
to have taken its rise from not rightly understanding the
common language of men, speaking of several distinct
ideas as united into one thing by the mind. And, indeed,
there is cause to suspect several erroneous conceits of the
philosophers are owing to the same original : while they
began to build their schemes not so much on notions as on
words, which were framed by the vulgar, merely for con-
veniency and dispatch in the common actions of life, with
out any regard to speculation ;;.

1 Cf. New Theory of Vision, sect. in nature.
84-86. 'A Cf. Principles, Introduction,

3 ' the connexion of ideas,' i. c. sect. 23-25.
the order providentially maintained

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 465

Hyl. Methinks I apprehend your meaning.

Phil. It is your opinion the ideas we perceive by our
senses are not real things, but images or copies of them.
Our knowledge, therefore, is no farther real than as our
ideas are the true representations of those originals. But,
as these supposed originals are in themselves unknown, it
is impossible to know how far our ideas resemble them ;
or whether they resemble them at all *. We cannot, there
fore, be sure we have any real knowledge 2. Farther, as
our ideas are perpetually varied, without any change in
the supposed real things, it necessarily follows they can
not all be true copies of them : or, if some are and others
are not, it is impossible to distinguish the former from the
latter. And this plunges us yet deeper in uncertainty n.
Again, when we consider the point, we cannot conceive
how any idea, or anything like an idea, should have an
absolute existence out of a mind : nor consequently, accord
ing to you, how there should be any real thing in nature 4.
The result of all which is that we are thrown into the most
hopeless and abandoned scepticism. Now, give me leave
to ask you, First, Whether your referring ideas to certain
absolutely existing unperceived substances, as their origin
als, be not the source of all this scepticism5? Secondly,
whether you are informed, either by sense or reason 6, of
the existence of those unknown originals? And, in case

1 Cf. Principles, sect. 8-10, 86, 87. a father, or a brother, or a friend,

2 This difficulty is thus pressed is only a parcel of ideas in my
by Reid : — ' The ideas in my mind own mind ; they cannot possibly
cannot be the same with the ideas have that relation to another mind
in any other mind ; therefore, if which they have to mine, any
the objects I perceive be only more than the pain felt by me
ideas, it is impossible that two or can be the individual pain felt by
more such minds can perceive the another. I am thus left alone as
same thing. Thus there is one un- the only creature of God in the
confutable consequence of Berke- universe' (Hamilton's 7?£z#, pp. 284-
ley's system, which he seems not 285). Implied Solipsism or Panego-
to have attended to, and from ism is thus charged against Berke-
which it will be found difficult, if ley, unless his conception of the
at all possible, to guard it. The material world is further guarded,
consequence I mean is this — that, 3 Reid and Hamilton argue in
although it leaves us sufficient like manneragainst a fundamentally
evidence of a Supreme Mind, it representative sense-perception,
seems to take away all the evi- 4 Cf. Principles, sect. 6.

dence we have of other intelligent r> Cf. Ibid., sect. 87-90.

beings like ourselves. What I call 6 Cf. Ibid., sect. 18.

BERKELEY: FRASER. I. H h

466 THE THIRD DIALOGUE

you are not, whether it be not absurd to suppose them ?
Thirdly, Whether, upon inquiry, you find there is anything
distinctly conceived or meant by the absolute or external
existence of unperceiving substances * ? Lastly, Whether,
the premises considered, it be not the wisest way to follow
nature, trust your senses, and, laying aside all anxious
thought about unknown natures or substances2, admit
with the vulgar those for real things which are perceived
by the senses ?

Hyl. For the present, I have no inclination to the
answering part. I would much rather see how you can
get over what follows. Pray are not the objects perceived
by the senses of one, likewise perceivable to others
present? If there were a hundred more here, they
would all see the garden, the trees, and flowers, as
I see them. But they are not in the same manner affected
with the ideas I frame in my imagination. Does not this
make a difference between the former sort of objects and
the latter ?

Phil. I grant it does. Nor have I ever denied a differ
ence between the objects of sense and those of imagina
tion 3. But what would you infer from thence ? You
cannot say that sensible objects exist unperceived, because
they are perceived by many.

Hyl. I own I can make nothing of that objection : but it
hath led me into another. Is it not your opinion that by
our senses we perceive only the ideas existing in our
minds ?

Phil. It is.

Hyl. But the same idea which is in my mind cannot be
in yours, or in any other mind. Doth it not therefore
follow, from your principles, that no two can see the same
thing4 ? And is not this highly absurd ?

Phil. If the term same be taken in the vulgar accepta
tion, it is certain (and not at all repugnant to the principles

1 Cf. Principles, sect. 24. of music may indeed in some

2 ' unknown/ i. e. unrealised in measure be said to hear the same
percipient life. notes ; yet the sound which the

3 Cf. Principles, sect. 28-33. one nears is n°t the very sanie with
* See also Collier's Clavis Uni- the sound which another hears,

versatis, p. 6: 'Two or more per- because the souls or persons are sup-
sons who are present at a concert posed to be different.

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 467

I maintain) that different persons may perceive the same
thing ; or the same thing or idea exist in different minds.
Words are of arbitrary imposition ; and, since men are
used to apply the word same where no distinction or
variety is perceived, and I do not pretend to alter their
perceptions, it follows that, as men have said before,
several saw the same thing, so they may, upon like
occasions, still continue to use the same phrase, without
any deviation either from propriety of language, or the
truth of things. But, if the term same be used in the
acceptation of philosophers, who pretend to an abstracted
notion of identity, then, according to their sundry defini
tions of this notion (for it is not yet agreed wherein that
philosophic identity consists), it may or may not be
possible for divers persons to perceive the same thing1.
But whether philosophers shall think fit to call a thing
the same or no, is, I conceive, of small importance. Let
us suppose several men together, all endued with the
same faculties, and consequently affected in like sort by
their senses, and who had yet never known the use of
language ; they would, without question, agree in their
perceptions. Though perhaps, when they came to the
use of speech, some regarding the uniformness of what
was perceived, might call it the same thing : others,
especially regarding the diversity of persons who per
ceived, might choose the denomination of different things.
But who sees not that all the dispute is about a word ?
to wit, whether what is perceived by different persons may
yet have the term same applied to it 2 ? Or, suppose
a house, whose walls or outward shell remaining un
altered, the chambers are all pulled down, and new ones
built in their place ; and that you should call this the

1 Berkeley seems to hold that ' other persons ' exist, or that any

in tilings there is no identity finite person except myself is

other than perfect similarity — only cognizant of the ideal cosmos — if

in persons. And even as to per- the sort of sameness that Berkeley

sonal identity he is obscure. Cf. advocates is all that can be predi-

St'ris, sect. 347, &c. cated of concrete ideas; which are

- But the question is, whether thus only similar, or generically

the very ideas or phenomena that the same. Unless the ideas are

are perceived by me can be also numerically the same, can different

perceived by other persons ; and persons make signs to one another

if not, how I can discover that through them ?

H h 2

468 THE THIRD DIALOGUE

same, and I should say it was not the same house : — would
we not, for all this, perfectly agree in our thoughts of the
house, considered in itself? And would not all the differ
ence consist in a sound ? If you should say, We differed
in our notions ; for that you superadded to your idea of
the house the simple abstracted idea of identity, whereas
I did not ; I would tell you, I know not what you mean
by the abstracted idea of identity ; and should desire you to
look into your own thoughts, and be sure you understood

yourself. Why so silent, Hylas ? Are you not yet

satisfied men may dispute about identity and diversity,
without any real difference in their thoughts and opinions,
abstracted from names ? Take this farther reflexion with
you — that whether Matter be allowed to exist or no, the
case is exactly the same as to the point in hand. For the
Materialists themselves acknowledge what we immediately
perceive by our senses to be our own ideas. Your
difficulty, therefore, that no two see the same thing, makes
equally against the Materialists and me.

HyL [*Ay, Philonous,] But they suppose an external
archetype, to which referring their several ideas they may
truly be said to perceive the same thing.

Phil. And (not to mention your having discarded those
archetypes) so may you suppose an external archetype
on my principles ; — external, I mean, to your own mind:
though indeed it must be supposed to exist in that Mind
which comprehends all things ; but then, this serves all
the ends of identity, as well as if it existed out of a mind 2.
And I am sure you yourself will not say it is less intelligible.

HyL You have indeed clearly satisfied me — either that
there is no difficulty at bottom in this point ; or, if there
be, that it makes equally against both opinions.

1 Omitted in author's last edition. so that they are practically* the same.'

2 This seems to imply that inter- If we are living in a fundamentally
course between finite persons is divine, and therefore absolutely
maintained through ideas or phe- trustworthy, universe, the phe
nomena presented to the senses, nomena presented to my senses,
under a tacit faith in divinely which I attribute to the agency of
guaranteed correspondence be- another person, are so attributed
tween the phenomena of which I rightly. For if not, the so-called
am conscious, and the phenomena cosmos is adapted to mislead me.
of which my neighbour is conscious ;

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 469

Phil. But that which makes equally against two contra
dictory opinions can be a proof against neither.

Hyl. I acknowledge it.

But, after all, Philonous, when I consider the substance
of what you advance against Scepticism, it amounts to no
more than this : — We are sure that we really see, hear,
feel ; in a word, that we are affected with sensible impres
sions.

Phil. And how are we concerned any farther? I see
this cherry, I feel it, I taste it : and I am sure nothing
cannot be seen, or felt, or tasted : it is therefore real.
Take away the sensations of softness, moisture, redness,
tartness, and you take away the cherry, since it is not
a being distinct from sensations. A cherry, I say, is
nothing but a congeries of sensible impressions, or ideas
perceived by various senses : which ideas are united into
one thing (or have one name given them) by the mind,
because they are observed to attend each other. Thus,
when the palate is affected with such a particular taste,
the sight is affected with a red colour, the touch with
roundness, softness, &c. Hence, when I see, and feel,
and taste, in such sundry certain manners, I am sure
the cherry exists, or is real ; its reality being in my
opinion nothing abstracted from those sensations. But
if by the word cherry you mean an unknown nature,
distinct from all those sensible qualities, and by its
existence something distinct from its being perceived ;
then, indeed, I own, neither you nor I, nor any one else,
can be sure it exists.

Hyl. But, what would you say, Philonous, if I should
bring the very same reasons against the existence of
sensible things in a mind, which you have offered against
their existing in a material substratum ?

Phil. When I see your reasons, you shall hear what
I have to say to them.

Hyl. Is the mind extended or unextended?

Phil. Unextended, without doubt.

Hyl. Do you say the things you perceive are in your
mind?

PJiil. They are.

Hyl. Again, have I not heard you speak of sensible
impressions ?

470 THE THIRD DIALOGUE

Phil. I believe you may.

Hyl. Explain to me now, O Philonous! how it is possible
there should be room for all those trees and houses to exist
in your mind. Can extended things be contained in that
which is unextended ? Or, are we to imagine impressions
made on a thing void of all solidity ? You cannot say
objects are in your mind, as books in your study : or that
things are imprinted on it, as the figure of a seal upon
wax. In what sense, therefore, are we to understand
those expressions ? Explain me this if you can : and
I shall then be able to answer all those queries you
formerly put to me about my substratum.

Phil. Look you, Hylas, when I speak of objects as
existing in the mind, or imprinted on the senses, I would
not be understood in the gross literal sense ; as when
bodies are said to exist in a place, or a seal to make an
impression upon wax. My meaning is only that the mind
comprehends or perceives them ; and that it is affected
from without, or by some being distinct from itself1. This
is my explication of your difficulty ; and how it can serve
to make your tenet of an unperceiving material substratum
intelligible, I would fain know.

Hyl. Nay, if that be all, I confess I do not see what use
can be made of it. But are you not guilty of some abuse
of language in this ?

Phil None at all. It is no more than common custom,
which you know is the rule of language, hath authorised :
nothing being more usual, than for philosophers to speak
of the immediate objects of the understanding as things
existing in the mind. Nor is there anything in this but
what is conformable to the general analogy of language ;
most part of the mental operations being signified by
words borrowed from sensible things; as is plain in
the terms comprehend, reflect, discourse, &c., which, being
applied to the mind, must not be taken in their gross,
original sense.

Hyl. You have, I own, satisfied me in this point. But
there still remains one great difficulty, which I know not
how you will get over. And, indeed, it is of such impor-

1 This explanation is often overlooked by Berkeley's critics.

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 471

tance that if you could solve all others, without being able
to find a solution for this, you must never expect to make
me a proselyte to your principles.

PJiil. Let me know this mighty difficulty.

Hyl. The Scripture account of the creation is what
appears to me utterly irreconcilable with your notions1.
Moses tells us of a creation: a creation of what? of
ideas ? No, certainly, but of things, of real things, solid
corporeal substances. Bring your principles to agree with
this, and I shall perhaps agree with you.

Phil. Moses mentions the sun, moon, and stars, earth
and sea, plants and animals. That all these do really
exist, and were in the beginning created by God, I make
no question. If by ideas you mean fictions and fancies
of the mind2, then these are no ideas. If by ideas you
mean immediate objects of the understanding, or sensible
things, which cannot exist unperceived, or out of a mind :!,
then these things are ideas. But whether you do or do
not call them ideas, it matters little. The difference is
only about a name. And, whether that name be retained
or rejected, the sense, the truth, and reality of things
continues the same. In common talk, the objects of our
senses are not termed ideas, but things. Call them so
still : provided you do not attribute to them any absolute
external existence, and I shall never quarrel with you for
a word. The creation, therefore, I allow to have been a
creation of things, of real things. Neither is this in the
least inconsistent with my principles, as is evident from
what I have now said ; and would have been evident to
you without this, if you had not forgotten what had been
so often said before. But as for solid corporeal sub
stances, I desire you to shew where Moses makes any
mention of them ; and, if they should be mentioned by
him, or any other inspired writer, it would still be incum
bent on you to shew those words were not taken in the
vulgar acceptation, for things falling under our senses, but
in the philosophic 4 acceptation, for Matter, or an unknown

1 Cf. Principles, sect. 82-84. 3 i. e. if you take the term idea

~ i. c. if you take the term idea in its objective meaning,
in its wholly subjective and popular * ' philosophic,' i. e.pseudo-philo-

meaning. sophic, against which he argues.

472 THE THIRD DIALOGUE

quiddity, ivitli an absolute existence. When you have proved
these points, then (and not till then) may you bring the
authority of Moses into our dispute.

Hyl. It is in vain to dispute about a point so clear.
I am content to refer it to your own conscience. Are
you not satisfied there is some peculiar repugnancy
between the Mosaic account of the creation and your
notions ?

Phil. If all possible sense which can be put on the first
chapter of Genesis may be conceived as consistently with
my principles as any other, then it has no peculiar repug
nancy with them. But there is no sense you may not
as well conceive, believing as I do. Since, besides spirits,
all you conceive are ideas ; and the existence of these I do
not deny. Neither do you pretend they exist without the
mind.

Hyl. Pray let me see any sense you can understand
it in.

Phil Why, I imagine that if I had been present at the
creation, I should have seen things produced into being —
that is become perceptible— in the order prescribed by
the sacred historian. I ever before believed the Mosaic
account of the creation, and now find no alteration in
my manner of believing it. When things are said to
begin or end their existence, we do not mean this with
regard to God, but His creatures. All objects are
eternally known by God, or, which is the same thing,
have an eternal existence in His mind : but when things,
before imperceptible to creatures, are, by a decree of God,
perceptible to them, then are they said to begin a relative
existence, with respect to created minds. Upon reading
therefore the Mosaic account of the creation, I understand
that the several parts of the world became gradually per
ceivable to finite spirits, endowed with proper faculties;
so that, whoever such were present, they were in truth
perceived by them J. This is the literal obvious sense

1 Had this their relative exist- the senses of percipient beings in

ence — this realisation of the cosmical order, if not on this planet

"material world through finite per- yet elsewhere, perhaps under other

cipient and volitional life — any be- conditions ? Has there been any

ginning? May not God have been beginning in the succession of

eternally presenting phenomena to finite persons?

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 473

suggested to me by the words of the Holy Scripture : in
which is included no mention, or no thought, either of
substratum, instrument, occasion, or absolute existence.
And, upon inquiry, I doubt not it will be found that most
plain honest men, who believe the creation, never think of
those things any more than I. What metaphysical sense
you may understand it in, you only can tell.

HyL But, Philonous, you do not seem to be aware that
you allow created things, in the beginning, only a relative,
and consequently hypothetical being : that is to say, upon
supposition there were men to perceive them ; without
which they have no actuality of absolute existence, wherein
creation might terminate. Is it not, therefore, according
to you, plainly impossible the creation of any inanimate
creatures should precede that of man ? And is not this
directly contrary to the Mosaic account?

Phil. In answer to that, I say, first, created beings might
begin to exist in the mind of other created intelligences,
beside men. You will not therefore be able to prove any
contradiction between Moses and my notions, unless you
first shew there was no other order of finite created spirits
in being, before man. I say farther, in case we conceive
the creation, as we should at this time, a parcel of plants
or vegetables of all sorts produced, by an invisible Power,
in a desert where nobody was present — that this way of
explaining or conceiving it is consistent with my principles,
since they deprive you of nothing, either sensible or im
aginable ; that it exactly suits with the common, natural,
and undebauched notions of mankind ; that it manifests
the dependence of all things on God ; and consequently
hath all the good effect or influence, which it is possible
that important article of our faith should have in making
men humble, thankful, and resigned to their ['greatj
Creator. I say, moreover, that, in this naked conception
of things, divested of words, there will not be found any
notion of what you call the actuality of absolute existence.
You may indeed raise a dust with those terms, and so
lengthen our dispute to no purpose. But I entreat you
calmly to look into your own thoughts, and then tell me if
they are not a useless and unintelligible jargon.

1 In the first and second editions only.

474 THE THIRD DIALOGUE

Hyl. I own I have no very clear notion annexed to
them. But what say you to this ? Do you not make the
existence of sensible things consist in their being in a
mind ? And were not all things eternally in the mind of
God? Did they not therefore exist from all eternity,
according to you ? And how could that which was eternal
be created in time ? Can anything be clearer or better
connected than this ?

Phil. And are not you too of opinion, that God knew all
things from eternity?

Hyl. I am.

Phil. Consequently they always had a being in the
Divine intellect.

Hyl. This I acknowledge.

Phil. By your own confession, therefore, nothing is new,
or begins to be, in respect of the mind of God. So we are
agreed in that point.

Hyl. What shall we make then of the creation ?

Phil. May we not understand it to have been entirely
in respect of finite spirits ; so that things, with regard to
us, may properly be said to begin their existence, or be
created, when God decreed they should become perceptible
to intelligent creatures, in that order and manner which
He then established, and we now call the laws of nature ?
You may call this a relative, or hypothetical existence if you
please. But, so long as it supplies us with the most
natural, obvious, and literal sense of the Mosaic history of
the creation ; so long as it answers all the religious ends
of that great article ; in a word, so long as you can assign
no other sense or meaning in its stead ; why should we
reject this ? Is it to comply with a ridiculous sceptical
humour of making everything nonsense and unintelligible ?
I am sure you cannot say it is for the glory of God. For,
allowing it to be a thing possible and conceivable that the
corporeal world should have an absolute existence ex
trinsical to the mind of God, as well as to the minds of all
created spirits; yet how could this set forth either the
immensity or omniscience of the Deity, or the necessary
and immediate dependence of all things on Him ? Nay,
would it not rather seem to derogate from those attributes ?

Hyl. Well, but as to this decree of God's, for making
things perceptible, what say you, Philonous? Is it not

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 475

plain, God did either execute that decree from all eternity,
or at some certain time began to will what He had not
actually willed before, but only designed to will ? If the
former, then there could be no creation, or beginning of
existence, in finite things1. If the latter, then we must
acknowledge something new to befall the Deity; which
implies a sort of change : and all change argues imperfec
tion.

Phil. Pray consider what you are doing. Is it not evi
dent this objection concludes equally against a creation in
any sense ; nay, against every other act of the Deity, dis
coverable by the light of nature ? None of which can we
conceive, otherwise than as performed in time, and having
a beginning. God is a Being of transcendent and unlimited
perfections: His nature, therefore, is incomprehensible to
finite spirits. It is not, therefore, to be expected, that any
man, whether Materialist or Immaterialist, should have
exactly just notions of the Deity, His attributes, and ways
of operation. If then you would infer anything against
me, your difficulty must not be drawn from the inadequate-
ness of our conceptions of the Divine nature, which is un
avoidable on any scheme ; but from the denial of Matter,
of which there is not one word, directly or indirectly, in
what you have now objected.

Hyl. I must acknowledge the difficulties you are con
cerned to clear are such only as arise from the non-existence
of Matter, and are peculiar to that notion. So far you arc
in the right. But I cannot by any means bring myself to
think there is no such peculiar repugnancy between the
creation and your opinion ; though indeed where to fix it,
I do not distinctly know.

Phil. What would you have ? Do I not acknowledge
a twofold state of things — the one ectypal or natural, the
other archetypal and eternal ? The former was created in
time ; the latter existed from everlasting in the mind of
God '2. Is not this agreeable to the common notions of
divines ? or, is any more than this necessary in order to
conceive the creation ? But you suspect some peculiar

1 Is ' creation ' by us distinguish- is there a distinction between

able from continuous evolution, creation or evolution of things and

unbeginning and unending, in creation or evolution of persons'1.
divinely constituted order ; and 2 Cf. Sin's, sect. 347-349-

476 THE THIRD DIALOGUE

repugnancy/ though you know not where it lies. To take
away all possibility of scruple in the case, do but consider
this one point. Either you are not able to conceive the
creation on any hypothesis whatsoever ; and, if so, there is
no ground for dislike or complaint against any particular
opinion on that score : or you are able to conceive it ; and,
if so, why not on my Principles, since thereby nothing con
ceivable is taken away ? You have all along been allowed
the full scope of sense, imagination, and reason. What
ever, therefore, you could before apprehend, either im
mediately or mediately by your senses, or by ratiocination
from your senses ; whatever you could perceive, imagine,
or understand, remains still with you. If, therefore, the
notion you have of the creation by other Principles be
intelligible, you have it still upon mine ; if it be not in
telligible, I conceive it to be no notion at all ; and so there
is no loss of it. And indeed it seems to me very plain that
the supposition of Matter, that is a thing perfectly unknown
and inconceivable, cannot serve to make us conceive
anything. And, I hope it need not be proved to you that
if the existence of Matter1 doth not make the creation
conceivable, the creation's being without it inconceivable
can be no objection against its non-existence.

Hyl. I confess, Philonous, you have almost satisfied me
in this point of the creation.

Phil. I would fain know why you are not quite satisfied.
You tell me indeed of a repugnancy between the Mosaic
history and Immaterialism : but you know not where it
lies. Is this reasonable, Hylas? Can you expect I should
solve a difficulty without knowing what it is ? But, to
pass by all that, would not a man think you were assured
there is no repugnancy between the received notions of
Materialists and the inspired writings ?

Hyl. And so I am.

Phil. Ought the historical part of Scripture to be under
stood in a plain obvious sense, or in a sense which is
metaphysical and out of the way ?

Hyl. In the plain sense, doubtless.

Phil. When Moses speaks of herbs, earth, water, &c.
as having been created by God ; think* you not the sensible

1 'Matter,' i.e. Matter in this pseudo-philosophical meaning of the
word.

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 477

things commonly signified by those words are suggested to
every unphilosophical reader ?

Hyl. I cannot help thinking so.

Phil. And are not all ideas, or things perceived by sense,
to be denied a real existence by the doctrine of the
Materialist?

Hyl. This I have already acknowledged.

Phil. The creation, therefore, according to them, was not
the creation of things sensible, which have only a relative
being, but of certain unknown natures, which have an
absolute being, wherein creation might terminate?

Hyl True.

Phil Is it not therefore evident the assertors of Matter
destroy the plain obvious sense of Moses, with which their
notions are utterly inconsistent ; and instead of it obtrude
on us I know not what ; something equally unintelligible to
themselves and me ?

Hyl. I cannot contradict you.

Phil Moses tells us of a creation. A creation of what ?
of unknown quiddities, of occasions, or substratum ? No,
certainly; but of things obvious to the senses. You must
first reconcile this with your notions, if you expect I should
be reconciled to them.

Hyl I see you can assault me with my own weapons.

Phil Then as to absolute existence ; was there ever
known a more jejune notion than that ? Something it is
so abstracted and unintelligible that you have frankly
owned you could not conceive it, much less explain any
thing by it. But allowing Matter to exist, and the notion
of absolute existence to be as clear as light ; yet, was this
ever known to make the creation more credible? Nay,
hath it not furnished the atheists and infidels of all ages
with the most plausible arguments against a creation ?
That a corporeal substance, which hath an absolute exis
tence without the minds of spirits, should be produced out
of nothing, by the mere will of a Spirit, hath been looked
upon as a thing so contrary to all reason, so impossible
and absurd, that not only the most celebrated among the
ancients, but even divers modern and Christian philoso
phers have thought Matter co-eternal with the Deity3.

1 Thus Origen in the early with God would mean that God
Church. That 'Matter' is co-eternal is eternally making things real

478 THE THIRD DIALOGUE

Lay these things together, and then judge you whether
Materialism disposes men to believe the creation of things.

Hyl. I own, Philonous, I think it does not. This of the
creation is the last objection I can think of; and I must
needs own it hath been sufficiently answered as well as the
rest. Nothing now remains to be overcome but a sort of
unaccountable backwardness that I find in myself towards
your notions.

Phil. When a man is swayed, he knows not why, to one
side of the question, can this, think you, be anything else
but the effect of prejudice, which never fails to attend old
and rooted notions ? And indeed in this respect I cannot
deny the belief of Matter to have very much the advantage
over the contrary opinion, with men of a learned education.

Hyl. I confess it seems to be as you say.

Phil. As a balance, therefore, to this weight of prejudice,
let us throw into the scale the great advantages 1 that arise
from the belief of Immaterialism, both in regard to religion
and human learning. The being of a God, and incorrupti
bility of the soul, those great articles of religion, are they
not proved with the clearest and most immediate evidence ?
When I say the being of a God, I do not mean an obscure
general Cause of things, whereof we have no conception,
but God, in the strict and proper sense of the word. A
Being whose spirituality, omnipresence, providence, omni
science, infinite power and goodness, are as conspicuous
as the existence of sensible things, of which (notwithstand
ing the fallacious pretences and affected scruples of Scep
tics) there is no more reason to doubt than of our own
being. — Then, with relation to human sciences. In Natural
Philosophy, what intricacies, what obscurities, what con
tradictions hath the belief of Matter led men into ! To say
nothing of the numberless disputes about its extent, con
tinuity, homogeneity, gravity, divisibility, &c.— do they not
pretend to explain all things by bodies operating on bodies,
according to the laws of motion ? and yet, are they able to
comprehend how one body should move another ? Nay,

in the percipient experience of advantages of the new conception

persons. of matter and the material cosmos

1 Cf. Principles, sect. 85-156, in are illustrated, when it is rightly

which the religious and scientific understood and applied.

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 479

admitting there was no difficulty in reconciling the notion
of an inert being with a cause, or in conceiving how an
accident might pass from one body to another ; yet, by all
their strained thoughts and extravagant suppositions, have
they been able to reach the mechanical production of any
one animal or vegetable body ? Can they account, by the
laws of motion, for sounds, tastes, smells, or colours ; or
for the regular course of things ? Have they accounted,
by physical principles, for the aptitude and contrivance
even of the most inconsiderable parts of the universe ?
But, laying aside Matter and corporeal causes, and admitting
only the efficiency of an All-perfect Mind, are not all the
effects of nature easy and intelligible ? If the phenomena
are nothing else but ideas', God is a spirit, but Matter an
unintelligent, unperceiving being. If they demonstrate
an unlimited power in their cause ; God is active and omni
potent, but Matter an inert mass. If the order, regularity,
and usefulness of them can never be sufficiently admired ;
God is infinitely wise and provident, but Matter destitute
of all contrivance and design. These surely are great
advantages in Physics. Not to mention that the appre
hension of a distant Deity naturally disposes men to
a negligence in their moral actions ; which they would be
more cautious of, in case they thought Him immediately
present, and acting on their minds, without the interposition
of Matter, or unthinking second causes. — Then in Meta
physics : what difficulties concerning entity in abstract,
substantial forms, hylarchic principles, plastic natures,
1 substance and accident, principle of individuation, possi
bility of Matter's thinking, origin of ideas, the manner how
two independent substances so widely different as Spirit
and Matter, should mutually operate on each other ? what
difficulties, I say, and endless disquisitions, concerning
these and innumerable other the like points, do we escape,
by supposing only Spirits and ideas? — Even the Mathe
matics themselves, if we take away the absolute existence
of extended things, become much more clear and easy ;
the most shocking paradoxes and intricate speculations in
those sciences depending on the infinite divisibility of finite

1 'substance and accident' — 'subjects and adjuncts/— in the first
and the second edition.

480 THE THIRD DIALOGUE

extension ; which depends on that supposition. — But what
need is there to insist on the particular sciences ? Is not
that opposition to all science whatsoever, that frenzy of the
ancient and modern Sceptics, built on the same foundation ?
Or can you produce so much as one argument against the
reality of corporeal things, or in behalf of that avowed utter
ignorance of their natures, which doth not suppose their
reality to consist in an external absolute existence ? Upon
this supposition, indeed, the objections from the change of
colours in a pigeon's neck, or the appearance of the broken
oar in the water, must be allowed to have weight. But
these and the like objections vanish, if we do not maintain
the being of absolute external originals, but place the reality
of things in ideas, fleeting indeed, and changeable ; — how
ever, not changed at random, but according to the fixed
order of nature. For, herein consists that constancy and
truth of things which secures all the concerns of life, and
distinguishes that which is real from the irregular visions
of the fancy \

Hyl. I agree to all you have now said, and must own
that nothing can incline me to embrace your opinion more
than the advantages I see it is attended with. I am by
nature lazy; and this would be a mighty abridgment in
knowledge. What doubts, what hypotheses, what labyrinths
of amusement, what fields of disputation, what an ocean of
false learning, may be avoided by that single notion of
Immaierialisni \

Phil. After all, is there anything farther remaining to be
done ? You may remember you promised to embrace
that opinion which upon examination should appear most
agreeable to Common Sense and remote from Scepticism.
This, by your own confession, is that which denies Matter,
or the absolute existence of corporeal things. Nor is this
all ; the same notion has been proved several ways, viewed
in different lights, pursued in its consequences, and all
objections against it cleared. Can there be a greater
evidence of its truth ? or is it possible it should have all
the marks of a true opinion and yet be false ?

1 Cf. Principles, sect. 28-42. In thought more allied to Platonism,
Sin's, sect. 294-297, 300-318, 335, if not to Hegelianism.
359-365. we have glimpses of

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 481

Hyl. I own myself entirely satisfied for the present in
all respects. But, what security can I have that I shall
still continue the same full assent to your opinion, and
that no unthought-of objection or difficulty will occur
hereafter ?

Phil. Pray, Hylas, do you in other cases, when a point
is once evidently proved, withhold your consent on account
of objections or difficulties it may be liable to ? Are the
difficulties that attend the doctrine of incommensurable
quantities, of the angle of contact, of the asymptotes to
curves, or the like, sufficient to make you hold out against
mathematical demonstration ? Or will you disbelieve the
Providence of God, because there may be some particular
things which you know not how to reconcile with it? If
there are difficulties attending Immaterialism, there are at
the same time direct and evident proofs of it. But for the
existence of Matter1 there is not one proof, and far more
numerous and insurmountable objections lie against it.
But where are those mighty difficulties you insist on ?
Alas ! you know not where or what they are ; something
which may possibly occur hereafter. If this be a sufficient
pretence for withholding your full assent, you should never
yield it to any proposition, how free soever from exceptions,
how clearly and solidly soever demonstrated.

Hyl. You have satisfied me, Philonous.

Phil. But, to arm you against all future objections, do
but consider : That which bears equally hard on two
contradictory opinions can be proof against neither.
Whenever, therefore, any difficulty occurs, try if you
can find a solution for it on the hypothesis of the
Materialists. Be not deceived by words ; but sound your
own thoughts. And in case you cannot conceive it easier
by the help of Materialism, it is plain it can be no objec
tion against Immaterialism. Had you proceeded all along
by this rule, you would probably have spared yourself
abundance of trouble in objecting; since of all your
difficulties I challenge you to shew one that is explained
by Matter : nay, which is not more unintelligible with
than without that supposition ; and consequently makes
rather against than for it. You should consider, in each

1 < Matter/ i.e. matter unrealised in any mind, finite or Divine.

BERKELEY : FKASER. I. »

4.82 THE THIRD DIALOGUE

particular, whether the difficulty arises from the non-
existence of Matter. If it doth not, you might as well
argue from the infinite divisibility of extension against
the Divine prescience, as from such a difficulty against
Immaterialism. And yet, upon recollection, I believe you
will find this to have been often, if not always, the case.
You should likewise take heed not to argue on a petitio
principii. One is apt to say — The unknown substances
ought to be esteemed real things, rather than the ideas
in our minds : and who can tell but the unthinking
external substance may concur, as a cause or instru
ment, in the productions of our ideas ? But is not this
proceeding on a supposition that there are such external
substances ? And to suppose this, is it not begging the
question ? But, above all things, you should beware of
imposing on yourself by that vulgar sophism which is
called ignoratio elenchi. You talked often as if you
thought I maintained the non-existence of Sensible
Things. Whereas in truth no one can be more thoroughly
assured of their existence than I am. And it is you who
doubt ; I should have said, positively deny it. Every
thing that is seen, felt, heard, or any way perceived by
the senses, is, on the principles I embrace, a real being;
but not on yours. Remember, the Matter you contend
for is an Unknown Somewhat (if indeed it may be termed
somewhat], which is quite stripped of all sensible qualities,
and can neither be perceived by sense, nor apprehended
by the mind. Remember, I say, that it is not any object
which is hard or soft, hot or cold, blue or white, round or
square, <S:c. For all these things I affirm do exist.
Though indeed I deny they have an existence distinct
from being perceived ; or that they exist out of all minds
whatsoever. Think on these points; let them be attentively
considered and still kept in view. Otherwise you will not
comprehend the state of the question ; without which your
objections will always be wide of the mark, and, instead of
mine, may possibly be directed (as more than once they
have been) against your own notions.

Hyl. I must needs own, Philonous, nothing seems to
have kept me from agreeing with you more than this
same mistaking the question. In denying Matter, at first
glimpse I am tempted to imagine you deny the things

BETWEEN HVLAS AND PHILONOUS 483

we sec and feel : but, upon reflexion, find there is no
ground for it. What think you, therefore, of retaining
the name Matter, and applying it to sensible tilings ? This
may be done without any change in your sentiments : and,
believe me, it would be a means of reconciling them to
some persons who may be more shocked at an innovation
in words than in opinion.

Phil. With all my heart : retain the word Matter, and
apply it to the objects of sense, if you please ; provided
you do not attribute to them any subsistence distinct from
I their being perceived. I shall never quarrel with you for
an expression. Matter, or material substance, arc terms
introduced by philosophers ; and, as used by them, imply
a sort of independency, or a subsistence distinct from
being perceived by a mind : but are never used by
common people ; or, if ever, it is to signify the immediate
objects of sense. One would think, therefore, so long as
the names of all particular things, with the terms sensible,
substance, body, stuff, and the like, are retained, the word
Matter should be never missed in common talk. And in
philosophical discourses it seems the best way to leave it
quite out : since there is not, perhaps, any one thing that
hath more favoured and strengthened the depraved bent
of the mind towards Atheism than the use of that general
confused term.

Hyl Well but, Philonous, since I am content to give up
the notion of an unthinking substance exterior to the mind,
I think you ought not to deny me the privilege of using
the word Matter as I please, and annexing it to a collection
of sensible qualities subsisting only in the mind. I freely
own there is no other substance, in a strict sense, than
Spirit. But I have been so long accustomed to the term
Matter that I know not how to part with it : to say, there
is no Matter in the world, is still shocking to me. Where
as to say — There is no Matter, if by that term be meant an
unthinking substance existing without the mind ; but if by
Matter is meant some sensible thing, whose existence
consists in being perceived, then there is Matter-. — this
distinction gives it quite another turn ; and men will come
into your notions with small difficulty, when they are
proposed in that manner. For, after all, the controversy
about Matter in the strict acceptation of it, lies altogether

i i 2

484 THE THIRD DIALOGUE

between you and the philosophers : whose principles,
I acknowledge, are not near so natural, or so agreeable
to the common sense of mankind, and Holy Scripture,
as yours. There is nothing we either desire or shun but
as it makes, or is apprehended to make, some part of our
happiness or misery. But what hath happiness or misery,
joy or grief, pleasure or pain, to do with Absolute Exis
tence ; or with unknown entities, abstracted from all
relation to us? It is evident, things regard us only as
they are pleasing or displeasing : and they can please
or displease only so far forth as they are perceived.
Farther, therefore, we are not concerned ; and thus far
you leave things as you found them. Yet still there is
something new in this doctrine. It is plain, I do not now
think with the philosophers ; nor yet altogether with the
vulgar. I would know how the case stands in that
respect ; precisely, what you have added to, or altered
in my former notions.

Phil. I do not pretend to be a setter-up of new notions.
My endeavours tend only to unite, and place in a clearer
light, that truth which was before shared between the
vulgar and the philosophers :— the former being of opinion,
that those things they immediately perceive are the real things]
and the latter, that the things immediately perceived are ideas,
w/iich exist only in the mind1. Which two notions put to-

? ether, do, in effect, constitute the substance of what
advance.

Hyl. I have been a long time distrusting my senses :
methought I saw things by a dim light and through false
glasses. Now the glasses are removed and a new light
breaks in upon my understanding. I am clearly con
vinced that I see things in their native forms, and am
no longer in pain about their unknown natures or absolute
existence. This is the state I find myself in at present ;
though, indeed, the course that brought me to it I do not

1 These two propositions are personality. Berkeley's ' material
a summary of Berkeley's concep- world' of enlightened Common
tion of the material world. With Sense, resulting from two factors,
him, the immediate objects of sense, Divine and human, is independent
realised in perception, are indepen- of each finite mind ; but not in
dent of the will of the percipient, dependent of all living Mind,
and are thus external to his proper

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 485

yet thoroughly comprehend. You set out upon the same
principles that Academics, Cartesians, and the like sects
usually do ; and for a long time it looked as if you were
advancing their philosophical Scepticism : but, in the end,
your conclusions are directly opposite to theirs.

Phil. You see, Hylas, the water of yonder fountain, how
it is forced upwards, in a round column, to a certain
height ; at which it breaks, and falls back into the basin
from whence it rose : its ascent, as well as descent, pro
ceeding from the same uniform law or principle of gravita
tion. Just so, the same Principles which, at first view,
lead to Scepticism, pursued to a certain point, bring men
back to Common Sense.

DE MOTU :

SIVE

DE MOTUS PRINCIPIO ET NATURA,
ET DE CAUSA COMMUNICATIONS MOTUUM

First published in 1721

EDITOR'S PREFACE

TO

DE MOTU

THIS Latin dissertation on Motion, or change of place
in the component atoms of the material world, was written
in 1720, when Berkeley was returning to Ireland, after
he had spent some years in Italy, on leave of absence
from Trinity College. A prize for an essay on the ' Cause
of Motion/ had, it seems, been offered in that year by the
Paris Academy of Sciences. The subject suggested an
advance on the line of thought pursued in Berkeley's
Principles and Dialogues. The mind-dependent reality of
the material world, prominent in those works, was in them
insisted on, not as a speculative paradox, but mainly in
order to shew the spiritual character of the Power that
is continually at work throughout the universe. This
essay on what was thus a congenial subject was finished
at Lyons, and published early in 1721, soon after Berkeley
arrived in London. It was reprinted in his Miscellany
in 1752. I have not found evidence that it was ever sub
mitted to the French Academy. At any rate the prize
was awarded to Crousaz, the well-known logician and pro
fessor of philosophy at Lausanne,

49° EDITOR S PREFACE TO THE

The DC Mofu is interesting biographically as well as
philosophically, as a revelation of Berkeley's way of
thinking about the causal relations of Matter and Spirit
seven years after the publication of the Dialogues. In
1713 his experience of life was confined to Ireland. Now,
after months in London, in the society of Swift, and Pope,
and Addison, he had observed nature and men in France
and Italy. His eager temperament and extraordinary
social charm opened the way in those years of travel to
frequent intercourse with famous men. This, for the time,
superseded controversy with materialism and scepticism,
and diverted his enthusiasm to nature and high art. One
likes to see how he handles the old questions as they now
arise in the philosophical treatment of motion in space,
which was regarded by many as the key to all other
phenomena presented in the material world.

For one thing, the unreality of the data of sense after
total abstraction of living mind, the chief Principle in
the earlier works, lies more in the background in the
De Mot?/. Yet it is tacitly assumed, as the basis of an
argument for the powerlessness of all sensible things,
and for refunding all active power in the universe into
conscious agency. Mens agitat molcm might be taken as
a motto for the De Motu. Then there is more frequent
reference to scientific and philosophical authorities than
in his more juvenile treatises. Plato and Aristotle are
oftener in view. Italy seems to have introduced him to
the physical science of Borelli and Torricelli. Leibniz,
who died in 1716, when Berkeley was in Italy, is named
by him for the first time in the De Motu. Perhaps he
had learned something when he was abroad about the
most illustrious philosopher of the time. And it is in
teresting by the way to find in one of those years what
is, I think, the only allusion to Berkeley by Leibniz. It
is contained in one of the German philosopher's letters
to Des Bosses, in 1715. ' Qui in Hybernia corporum

DE MOTU

491

realitatem impugnat/ Leibniz writes, 'videtur nee rati-
ones afferre idoneas, nee mentem suam satis explicare.
Suspicor esse ex eo hominum genere qui per Paradoxa
cognosci volunt.' This sentence is interesting on account
of the writer, although it suggests vague, and perhaps
second-hand knowledge of the Irishman and his principles.
The name of Hobbes does not appear in the DC Motu.
Yet one might have expected it, in consideration of the
supreme place which motion takes in his system, which
rests upon the principle that all changes in the universe
may be resolved into change of place.

In the De Motu the favourite language of ideal realism
is abandoned for the most part. ' Bodies/ not ' ideas
of sense,' are contrasted with mind or spirit, although
body still means significant appearance presented to the
senses. Indeed the term idea occurs less often in this and
the subsequent writings of Berkeley.

I will now give some account of salient features in the
DC Motu.

Like the Principles the tract opens with a protest against
the empty abstractions, and consequent frivolous discus
sions, which even mechanical science had countenanced
although dealing with matters so obvious to sense as the
phenomena of motion. Force, effort, solicitation of gravity,
m'sus, are examples of abstract terms connected with motion,
to which nothing in what is presented to the senses is
found to correspond. Yet corporeal power is spoken of
as if it were something perceptible by sense, and so found
within the bodies we see and touch (sect. 1-3).

But it turns out differently when philosophers and
naturalists try to imagine the physical force that is sup
posed to inhabit todies, and to explain their motions.
The conception of motion has been the parent of innumer
able paradoxes and seeming contradictions among ancient
Greek thinkers ; for it presents, in a striking form, the

492 EDITOR S PREFACE TO THE

metaphysical difficulties in the way of a reconciliation of
the One and the Many — difficulties which Berkeley had
already attributed to perverse abstractions, with which
philosophers amused themselves and blocked up the
way to concrete knowledge ; first wantonly raising a dust,
and then complaining that they could not see. Nor has
modern mechanical science in this respect fared better
than the old philosophies. Even its leaders, Torricelli,
for instance, and Leibniz, offer us scholastic shadows-
empty metaphysical abstractions — when they speak about
an active power that is supposed to be lodged within the
things of sense. Torricelli tells us that the forces within
the things around us, and within our own bodies, are
'subtle quintessences, enclosed in a corporeal substance
as in the enchanted vase of Circe ' ; and Leibniz speaks
of their active powers as their ' substantial form/ whatever
that can be conceived to mean. Others call the power to
which change of place is due, the hylarchic principle, an
appetite in bodies, a spontaneity inherent in them ; or they
assume that, besides their extension, solidity, and other
qualities which appear in sense, there is also something
named force, latent in them if not patent— in all which
we have a flood of words, empty of concrete thought. At
best the language is metaphorical (sect. 2-9).

For showing the active cause at work in the production
of motion in bodies, it is of no avail to name, as if it were
a datum of sense, what is not presentable to our senses.
Let us, instead, turn to the only other sort of data in
realised experience. For we find only two sorts of
realities in experience, the one sort revealed by our
senses, the other by inward consciousness. We can
affirm nothing about the contents of bodies except what
our senses present, namely, concrete things, extended,
figured, solid, having also innumerable other qualities,
which seem all to depend upon change of place in the
things, or in their constituent particles. The contents

DE MOTU 493

of mind or spirit, on the other hand, are disclosed to
inner consciousness, which reveals a sentient Ego that is
actively percipient and exertive. And it must be in the
second of these two concrete revelations of reality, that
active causation, on which motion and all other change
depends, is to be found —not in empty abstractions,
covered by words like power, cause, force, or nisus,
which correspond to nothing perceived by the senses
(sect. 21).

So that which we call body presents within itself nothing
in which change of place or state can originate causally.
Extension, figure, solidity, and all the other perceptible
constituents of bodies are appearances only — passive
phenomena, which succeed one another in an orderly
cosmical procession, on which doubtless our pains and
pleasures largely depend. But there is no sensibly per
ceptible power found among those sensuous appearances.
They can only be caused causes, adapted, as we pre
suppose, to signify to us what we may expect to follow
that appearance. The reason of their significance, i. e. of
the constancy of their sequences and coexistences, must
be sought for outside of themselves. Experimental research
may discover new terms among the correlated cosmical
sequences or coexistences, but the newly discovered terms
must still be only passive phenomena previously unper-
ceived. Body means only what is presentable to the
senses. Those who attribute to it something not per
ceptible by sense, which they call the force or power in
which its motions originate, say in other words that the
origin of motion is unknowable by sense (sect. 22-24).

Turn now from things of sense, the data of perception,
to Mind or Spirit, as revealed in inner consciousness.
Here we have a deeper and more real revelation of what
underlies, or is presupposed in, the passive cosmical pro
cession that is presented to the senses. Our inward
consciousness plainly shews the thinking being actually

494 EDITORS PREFACE TO THE

exercising power to move its animated body. We find
that we can, by a causal exertion of which we are distinctly
conscious, either excite or arrest movements in bodies.
In voluntary exertion we have thus a concrete example
of force or power, producing and not merely followed
by motion. In the case of human volition this is no
doubt conditioned power ; nevertheless it exemplifies
Power on a greater scale than human, even Divine power,
universally and continuously operative, in all natural
motions, and in the cosmical laws according to which
they proceed (sect. 25-30).

Thus those who pretend to find force or active causa
tion within bodies, pretend to find what their sensuous
experience does not support, and they have to sustain
their pretence by unintelligible language. On the other
hand, those who explain motion by referring it to conscious
exertion of personal agents, say what is supported by their
own consciousness, and confirmed by high authorities,
including Anaxagoras, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, and
Newton, demonstrating that in Spirit only do we find power
to change its own state, as well as the states and mutual
relations of bodies. Motion in nature is God continuously
acting (sect. 31-34). But physical science is conveniently
confined to the order of the passive procession of sensuous
appearances, including experiments in quest of the rules
naturally exemplified in the motions of bodies : reasoning
on mathematical and mechanical principles, it leaves the
contemplation of active causation to a more exalted science
(sect. 35-42).

In all this it can hardly be said that Berkeley has in
this adequately sounded the depths of Causation. He
proclaims inability to find through his senses more than
sequence of significant sensuous appearances, which are
each and all empty of active power ; while he apparently
insists that he has found active power in the mere feeling

DE MOTU 495

of exertion; which after all, as such, is only one sort of
antecedent sign of the motion that is found to follow it.
This is still only sequence of phenomena ; not active power.
But is not causation a relation that cannot be truly pre
sented empirically, either in outer or inner conscious
ness? And is not the Divine order that is presupposed
by us in all change, a presupposition that is inevitable in
trustworthy intercourse with a changing universe ; unless
we are to confess atheistically} that our whole sensuous
experience may in the end put us to utter confusion ? The
passive, uneasy feeling of strain, more or less involved
in the effort to move our bodies and their surroundings,
is no doubt apt to be confused with active causation ;
for as David Hume remarks, 'the animal nisus which
we experience, though it can afford no accurate precise
idea of power, enters very much into the vulgar, inac
curate idea which is formed of it/ So when Berkeley
supposes that he has found a concrete example of originat
ing power in the nisus of which we are conscious when
we move our bodies, he is surely too easily satisfied. The
nisus followed by motion is, per se, only a natural sequence,
a caused cause, which calls for an originating cause that
is absolutely responsible for the movement. Is not the
index to this absolutely responsible agency an ethical one,
which points to a free moral agent as alone necessarily
connected with, or responsible for, the changes which he
can control? Persons are causally responsible for their
own actions ; and are accordingly pronounced good or
evil on account of acts of will that are not mere caused
causes — passively dependent terms in the endless succes
sion of cosmical change. They must originate in self, be
absolutely self-referable, in a word supernatural issues of
the personality. Moral reason implies that they are not
determined ab extra, and so points to moral agents as our
only concrete examples of independent power; but this
only so far as those issues go for which they are morally

496 EDITOR S PREFACE TO THE

responsible. Is not faith in the Universal Power neces
sarily faith-venture in the absolutely perfect and trustworthy
moral agency of God ?

While the principle of Causation, in its application to
change of place on the part of bodies and their constituent
atoms, is the leading thought in the De Motu, this essay
also investigates articulately the nature of the phenomenon
which we call motion (sect. 43-66). It assumes that
motion is only an effect, seeing that no one who reflects
can doubt that what is presented to our senses in the
case of motion is altogether passive : there is nothing in
the successive appearance of the same body in different
places that involves action on the part of either of the moving
or the moved body, or that can be more than inert
effect (sect. 49). And all concrete motion, it is assumed,
must be something that can be perceived by our senses.
Accordingly it must be a perceptible relation between
bodies, as far as it is bodily : it could make no appear
ance at all if space contained only one solitary body :
a plurality of bodies is indispensable to its appearance.
Absolute motion of a solitary body, in otherwise absolutely
empty space, is an unmeaning abstraction, a collocation
of empty words. This leads into an inquiry about relative
space as well as relative place, and the intelligibility of
absolute space, place, and motion (sect. 52-64).

Local motion is unintelligible unless we understand
the meaning of space. Now some philosophers distinguish
between absolute space, which with them is ultimately
the only real space, and that which is conditioned by
the senses, or relative. The former is said to be
boundless, pervading and embracing the material world,
but not itself presentable to our senses ; the other is the
space marked out or differentiated by bodies contained in
it, and it is in this way exposed to our senses (sect. 52).
What must remain after the annihilation of all bodies in the

DE MOTU

497

universe is relativeless, undifferentiated, absolute space,
of which all attributes are denied, even its so-called
extension being neither divisible nor measurable ; ne
cessarily imperceptible by sense, unimaginable, and unin
telligible, in every way unrealisable in experience ; so that
the words employed about it denote nothing (sect. 53).

It follows that we must not speak of the real space
which a body occupies as part of a space that is necessarily
abstracted from all sentient experience ; nor of real motion
as change within absolute space, without any relation be
tween bodies, either perceived or conceived. All change
of place in one body must be relative to other bodies,
among which the moving body is supposed to change its
place — our own bodies which we animate being of course
recognised among the number. Motion, it is argued, is
unintelligible, as well as imperceptible and unimaginable,
without some relation between the moving body and at
least one other body : the truth of this is tested when we
try to suppose the annihilation of all other bodies, our
own included, and retain only a solitary globe : absolute
motion is found unthinkable. So that, on the whole, to
see what motion means we must rise above the mathe
matical postulates that are found convenient in mechanical
science ; we must beware of empty abstractions; we must
treat motion as something that is real only so far as it
is presented to our senses, and remain modestly satisfied
with the perceived relations under which it then appears
(sect. 65-66).

Finally, is motion, thus explained, something that can
be spoken of as an entity communicable from one body
to another body ? May we think of it as a datum of
sense existing in the striking body, and then passing
from it into the struck body, the one losing exactly as
much as the other receives ? (sect. 67). Deeper thought
finds in those questions only a revival of the previously

KERKELEY : ERASER. I. K k

498 EDITOR'S PREFACE TO THE

exploded postulate of ' force ' as something sensible, yet
distinct from all the significant appearances sense presents.
The language used may perhaps be permitted in mathe
matical hypotheses, or postulates of mechanical science,
in which we do not intend to go to the root of things.
But the obvious fact is, that the moving body shews less
perceptible motion, and the moved body more. To dispute
whether the perceptible motion acquired is numerically
the same with that lost leads into frivolous verbal con
troversy about Identity and Difference, the One and the
Many, which it was Berkeley's aim to expel from science,
and so to simplify its procedure and result. Whether we
say that motion passes from the striking body into the
struck, or that it is generated anew within the struck
body and annihilated in the striking, we make virtually the
same statement. In each way of expression the facts remain,
that the one body presents perceptible increase of its
motion and the other diminution. Mind or Spirit is the
active cause of all that we then see. Yet in mechanical
science — which explains things only physically, by shewing
the significant connexion of events with their mechanical
rules — terms which seem to imply the conveyance of
motion out of one body into another may be pardoned,
in consideration of the limits within which physical science
is confined, and its narrower point of view. In physics
we confine ourselves to the sensuous signs which arise
in experience, and their natural interpretation, in all
which mathematical hypotheses are found convenient ; so
that gravitation, for example, and other natural rules of
procedure, are spoken of as causes of the events which
conform to them, no account being taken of the Active
Power that is ultimately responsible for the rules. For
the Active Power in which we live, move, and have our
being, is not a datum of sense ; meditation brings it into
light. But to pursue this thought would carry us beyond
the physical laws of Motion (sect. 69-72).

DE MOTU 499

The De Motu may be compared with what we found
in the Principles, sect. 25-28 and 101-117. The total
powerlessness of the significant appearances presented
to the senses, and the omnipotence of Mind in the
economy of external nature, is its chief philosophical
lesson.

K k 2

DE MOTU

1. AD veritatem inveniendam praecipuum est cavisse ne
voces male intellectae * nobis officiant : quod omnes fere
monent philosophi, pauci observant. Quanquam id quidem
hand adeo difficile videtur, in rebus praesertim physicis
tractandis, ubi locum habent sensus, experientia, et ratioci-
nium geometricum. Seposito igitur, quantum licet, omni
praejudicio, tarn a loquendi consuetudine quam a philoso-
phorum auctoritate nato, ipsa rerum natura diligenter
inspicienda. Neque enim cujusquam auctoritatem usque
adeo valere oportet, ut verba ejus et voces in pretio sint,
dummodo nihil clari et certi iis subesse comperiatur.

2. Motus contemplatio mire torsit veterum philoso-
phorum2 mentes, unde natse sunt variae opiniones supra
modum difficiles, ne dicam absurdae ; quae, quum jam fere
in desuetudinem abierint, baud merentur ut iis discutiendis
nimio studio immoremur. Apud recentiores autem et
saniores hujus aevi philosophos :!, ubi de Motu agitur,
vocabula baud pauca abstractae nimium et obscurae signi-
ficationis occurrunt, cujusmodi sunt solicitatio gravitatis,
conatus, vires mortua*, &.C., quae scriptis, alioqui doctissimis,
tenebras offundunt, sententiisque non minus a vero, quam
a sensu hominum communi abhorrentibus, ortum prsebent.

1 ' voces male intellectse.' Cf. physics. It involves Space, Time,

Principles of Human Knowledge, and the material world, with the

'Introduction,' sect. 6, 23-25, on ultimate causal relation of Nature

the abuse of language, especially to Spirit,
by abstraction. 3 ' hujus aevi philosophos.' As in

'- l veterum philosophorum.' The Bacon on motion, and in the ques-

history of ancient speculations tions raised by Newton, Borelli,

about motion, from the paradoxes Leibniz, and others, discussed in

of Zeno downwards, is, in some the following sections,
sort, a history of ancient meta-

502 DE MOTU

Haec vero necesse est ut, veritatis gratia, non alios refellendi
studio, accurate discutiantur.

3. Solicitatio et nisus, sive conatus, rebus solummodo
animatis revera competunt \ Cum aliis rebus tribuuntur,
sensu metaphorico accipiantur necesse est. A metaphoris
autem abstinendum philosopho. Porro, seclusa omni tam
animae affectione quam corporis motione, nihil clari ac
distinct! iis vocibus significari, cuilibet constabit qui modo
rem serio perpenderit.

4. Quamdiu corpora gravia a nobis sustinentur, sentimus
in nobismet ipsis nisum, fatigationem, et molestiam. Per-
cipimus etiam in gravibus cadentibus motum acceleratum
versus centrum telluris ; ope sensuum praeterea nihil.
Ratione tamen colligitur causam esse aliquam vel prin-
cipium horum phaenomenon ; illud autem gravitas vulgo
nuncupatur. Quoniam vero causa descensus gravium caeca
sit et incognita, gravitas ea acceptione proprie dici nequit
qualitas sensibilis ; est igitur qualitas occulta. Sed vix,
et ne vix quidem, concipere licet quid sit qualitas occulta,
aut qua ratione qualitas ulla agere aut operari quidquam
possit. Melius itaque foret, si, missa qualitate occulta,
homines attenderent solummodo ad effectus sensibiles ;
vocibusque abstractis (quantumvis illae ad disserendum
utiles sint) in meditatione omissis, mens in particularibus
et concretis, hoc est in ipsis rebus, defigeretur.

5. Vis 2 similiter corporibus tribuitur : usurpatur autem
vocabulum illud, tanquam significaret qualitatem cognitam,
distinctamque tam a motu, figura, omnique alia re sensibili,
quam ab omni animalis affectione : id vero nihil aliud esse
quam qualitatem occultaiu, rem acrius rimanti constabit.
Nisus animalis et motus corporeus vulgo spectantur tan
quam symptomata et mensurae hujus qualitatis occultae.

6. Patet igitur gravitatem aut vim frustra poni pro
principio 3 motus : nunquid enim principium illud clarius

1 Sect. 3-42 are concerned with active power is an immediate da-
the principle of Causality, exempli- turn of sense is the example here
fied in the motion, or change of offered of the abuse of abstract
place and state, that is continually words. He proceeds to dissolve
going on in the material world, the assumption by shewing that it
and which was supposed by some is meaningless.

to explain all the phenomena of 3 'principio' — the ultimate ex-

the universe. planation or originating cause. Cf.

2 ' vis/ The assumption that sect. 36. Metaphors, or indeed

DE MOTU 503

cognosci potest ex eo quod dicatur qualitas occulta ? Quod
ipsum occultum est, nihil explicat : ut omittamus causam
agentem incognitam rectius dici posse substantiam quam
qualitatem. Porro vis, gravitas, et istiusmodi voces, saepius,
nee inepte, in concrete usurpantur ; ita ut connotent corpus
motum, difficultatem resistendi, £c. Ubi vero a philoso-
phis adhibentur ad significandas naturas quasdam, ab
hisce omnibus praecisas et abstractas, quae nee sensibus
subjiciuntur, nee ulla mentis vi intelligi nee imaginatione
effingi 1 possunt, turn demum errores et confusionem
pariunt.

7. Multos autem in errorem ducit, quod voces generales
et abstractas in disserendo utiles esse videant, nee tamen
earum vim satis capiant. Partim vero a consuetudine
vulgari inventae sunt illse ad sermonem abbreviandum,
partim a philosophis ad docendum excogitatae ; non quod
ad naturas rerum accommodatae sint, quae quidem singu-
lares et concretae existunt ; sed quod idoneae ad tradendas
disciplinas, propterea quod faciant notiones, vel saltern
propositiones, universales 2.

8. Vim corporcarn esse aliquid conceptu facile plerumque
existimamus. li tamen qui rem accuratius inspexerunt
in diversa surit opinione ; uti apparet ex mira verborum
obscuritate qua laborant, ubi illam explicare conantur.
Torricellius ait vim et impetum esse res quasdam abstractas
subtilesque et quintessentias, quae includuntur in substantia
corporea, tanquam in vase magico Circes3. Leibnitius
item in naturae vi explicanda haec habet — Vis activa, primi-
tiva, quw est 6WfAe'x«a TT/JCOT^ animw vel fornicc substantiali

empty words, are accepted for a\$oA!dphron, Dial. VII. sect. 8, 17.

explanations, it is argued, when 3 [La Materia altro non e che

bodily power or force, in any form, un vaso di Circe incantato, il quale

e.g. gravitation, is taken as the real serve per ricettacolo della forza

cause of motion. To call these et de' momenti dell' impeto. La

' occult causes ' is to say nothing forzae 1'impeti sono astratti tanto

that is intelligible. The perceived sottili, sono quintessenze tanto

sensible effects and their customary spiritose, che in altre ampolle non

sequences are all we know. si possono racchiudere, fuor che

Physicists are still deluded by nelF intima corpulenza de' solid!

words and metaphors. naturali,Vide LezioniAccademiche.~]

1 Cf. sect. 53, where sense, imagi- — AUTHOR. Torricelli (1608-47),

nation, and intelligence are dis- the eminent Italian physicist, and

tinguished. professor of mathematics at Flor-

- Cf.PrincipleSflntrod. 16,20, 21; ence, who invented the barometer.

504 DE MOTU

respondct. Vide Ada Erudit. Lips. Usque adeo necesse
est lit vel summi viri, quamdiu abstractionibus indulgent,
voces nulla certa significatione praeditas, et meras scholasti-
corum umbras sectentur. Alia ex neotericorum scriptis,
nee pauca quidem ea, producere liceret ; quibus abunde
constaret, metaphysicas abstractiones non usquequaque
cessisse mechanicae et experimentis, sed negotium inane
philosophis etiamnum facessere.

9. Ex illo fonte derivantur varia absurda, cujus generis
est illud, vim pcrcussionis, utcunque exiguce, csse infinite
magnam. Quod sane supponit, gravitatem esse qualitatem
quandam realem ab aliis omnibus diversam ; et gravi-
tationem esse quasi actum hujus qualitatis, a motu realiter
distinctum : minima autem percussio producit effectum
majorem quam maxima gravitatio sine motu ; ilia scilicet
motum aliquem edit, haec nullum. Unde sequitur, vim
percussionis ratione infinita excedere vim gravitationis, hoc
est, esse infinite magnam *. Videantur experimenta
Galilaei, et quae de definita vi percussionis scripserunt
Torricellius, Borellus, et alii.

10. Veruntamen fatendum est vim nullam per se imme
diate sentiri ; neque aliter quam per effectum 2 cognosci
et mensurari. Sed vis mortuae, seu gravitationis simplicis,
in corpore quiescente subjecto, nulla facta mutatione,
effectus nullus est ; percussionis autem, effectus aliquis.
Quoniam, ergo, vires sunt effectibus proportionales, con-
cludere licet vim mortuam3 esse nullam. Neque tamen
propterea vim percussionis esse infmitam: non enim oportet
quantitatem ullam positivam habere pro infinita, propterea
quod ratione infinita superet quantitatem nullam sive nihil.

1 Borelli (1608-79), Italian pro- petually active in the universe,
fessor of mathematics at Pisa, and imperceptible through the senses,
then of medicine at Florence ; see and revealed to t/iem only in its
his De Vi Percussionis, cap. XXI V. sensible effects. 'Power,' e.g.
prop. 88, and cap. XXVII. 'gravitation,' in things, per se, is dis-

2 'per effectum,' i.e. by its tinguished from perceived 'motion'
sensible effects — real power or only through illusion due to mis-
active force not being a datum leading abstraction. There is no
of the senses, but found in the spiri- physical power, intermediate be-
tual efficacy, of which we have an tween spiritual agency, on the
example in our personal agency. one hand, and the sensible changes

3 ' vim mortuam/ The only we see, on the other. Cf.
power we can find is the living sect. n.

power of Mind. Reason is per-

DE MOTU 505

11. Vis gravitationis a momenta secerni nequit ; momen
tum autem sine celeritate nullum est, quum sit moles in
celeritatem ducta : porro celeritas sine motu intelligi non
potest ; ergo nee vis gravitationis. Deinde vis nulla nisi
per actionem innotescit, et per eandem mensuratur ; actio-
nem autem corporis a motu praescindere non possumus ;
ergo quamdiu corpus grave plumbi subject! vel chordae
figuram mutat; tamdiu movetur ; ubi vero quiescit, nihil
agit, vel, quod idem est, agere prohibetur. Breviter, voces
istae vis mortua et gravitatio, etsi per abstractionem meta-
physicam aliquid significare supponuntur diversum a
movente, moto, motu et quiete, revera tamen id totum
nihil est.

12. Siquis diceret pondus appensum vel impositum agere
in chordam, quoniam impedit quominus se restituat vi
elastica : dico, pari ratione corpus quodvis inferum agere
in superius incumbens, quoniam illud descendere prohibet:
dici vero non potest actio corporis, quod prohibeat aliud
corpus existere in eo loco quern occupat.

13. Pressionem corporis gravitantis quandoque sentimus.
Verum sensio ista molesta oritur ex motu corporis istius
gravis fibris nervisque nostri corporis communicato, et
eorundem situm immutante; adeoque percussioni accepta
referri debet. In hisce rebus multis et gravibus praejudiciis
laboramus, sed ilia acri atque iterata meditatione subigenda
sunt \ vel potius penitus averruncanda.

14. Quo probetur quantitatem ullam esse infinitam,
ostendi oportet partem aliquam finitam homogeneam in
ea infinities contineri. Sed vis mortua se habet ad
vim percussionis, non ut pars ad totum, sed ut punctum
ad lineam, juxta ipsos vis infinitae percussionis auctores.
Multa in hanc rem adjicere liceret, sed vereor ne pro-
lixus sim.

15. Ex principiis praemissis lites insignes solvi possunt,
quae viros doctos multum exercuerunt. Hujus rei exem-
plum sit controversia ilia de proportione virium. Una
pars dum concedit, momenta, motus, impetus, data mole,
esse simpliciter ut velocitates, affirmat vires esse ut quad-
rata velocitatum. Hanc autem sententiam supporiere vim

1 ' meditatione subigenda sunt.' Cf. Theory of Vision Vindicated,
sect. 35, 70.

506 DE MOTU

corporis distingui ' a momento, motu, et impetu ; eaque
suppositione sublata corruere, nemo non videt.

16. Quo clarius adhuc appareat, confusionem quandam
miram per abstractiones metaphysicas in doctrinam de
motu introductam esse, videamus quantum intersit inter
notiones virorum celebrium de vi et impetu. Leibnitius
impetum cum motu confundit. Juxta Newtonum 2 impetus
revera idem est cum vi inertise. Borellus3 asserit impetum
non aliud esse quam gradum velocitatis. Alii impetum et
conatum inter se differre, alii non differre volunt. Pleri-
que vim motricem motui proportionalem intelligunt. Non-
nulli aliam aliquam vim praeter motricem, et diversimode
mensurandam, utpote per quadrata velocitatum in moles,
intelligere prse se ferunt. vSed infinitum esset hsec prosequi.

17. Vis, gravitas, attractio, et hujusmodi voces, utiles 4
sunt ad ratiocinia et computationes de motu et corporibus
motis ; sed non ad intelligendam simplicem ipsius motus
naturam, vel ad qualitates totidem distinctas designandas.
Attractionem certe quod attinet, patet illam ab Newtono
adhiberi, non tanquam qualitatem veram et physicam, sed
solummodo ut hypothesin mathematicam 5. Quinetiam
Leibnitius, nisum elementarem seu solicitationem ab impetu
distinguens, fatetur ilia entia non re ipsa inveniri in rerum
natura, sed abstractione facienda esse.

18. Similis ratio est compositions et resolutionis virium
quarumcunque directarum in quascunque obliquas, per
diagonalem et latera parallelogrammi. Hsec mechanics
et computationi inserviunt : sed aliud est computationi
et demonstrationibus mathematicis inservire, aliud rerum
naturam exhibere.

19. Ex recentioribus multi sunt in ea opinione, ut putent

1 ' distingui.' It is here argued Tested. Cf. Sin's, sect. 236, 247,

that so-called power within the 249.

things of sense is not distinguish- 2 Principia Math. Def. III.

able from the sensibly perceived 3 De Vi Pcrcussionis, cap. I.

sequences. To the meaningless 4 'utiles.' Such words as 'force,'

supposition that it is, he attri- . 'power/ < gravity/ 'attraction,' are

butes the frivolous verbal contro- held to be convenient in physical

versies among the learned men- reasonings about the phenomena of

tioned in the following section. motion, but worthless as philoso-

The province of natural philosophy, phical expressions of the cause of

according to Berkeley, is to inquire motion, which transcends sense

what the rules are under which and mechanical science. Cf. Siris,

sensible effects are uniformly mani- sect. 234, 235. ° Cf. sect. 67.

DE MOTU 507

motum neque destrui nee de novo gigni, seel eandem l
semper motus quantitatem permanere. Aristoteles etiam
dubium illud olim proposuit — utrum motus factus sit et
corruptus, an vero ab aeterno ? Phys. lib. viii. Quod vero
motus sensibilis pereat; patet sensibus : illi autem eundem
impetum, nisum, aut summam virium eandem manere velle
videntur. Unde affirmat Borellus, vim in percussione non
imminui, sed expandi ; impetus etiam contraries suscipi et
retineri in eodem corpore. Item Leibnitius nisum ubique
et semper esse in materia, et ubi non patet sensibus,
ratione intelligi contendit. — Haec autem nimis abstracta
esse et obscura, ejusdemque fere generis cum formis
substantialibus et entelechiis, fatendum.

20. Quotquot ad explicandam motus causam atque
originem, vel principio hylarchico, vel naturae indigentia,
vel appetitu, aut denique instinctu naturali utuntur, dixisse
aliquid potius quam cogitasse censendi sunt. Neque ab
hisce multum absunt qui supposuerint z paries terra; esse se
woventcs, aut etiam spiritus Us implantatos ad instar format ,
ut assignent causam accelerations gravium cadentium :
aut qui dixerit3, in corpore prccter solidam extcnsionem
dcbere etiam poni aliquid unde virium consideratio oriatur.
Siquidem hi omnes vel nihil particulare et determinatum
enuntiant ; vel, si quid sit, tarn difficile erit illud explicare,
quam id ipsum cujus explicandi causa adducitur4.

21. Frustra ad naturam illustrandam adhibentur ea quae
nee sensibus patent, nee ratione intelligi possunt. Vi-
dendum ergo quid sensus, quid experientia, quid demum
ratio iis innixa, suadeat. Duo sunt summa rerum genera—
corpus et anima. Rem extensam, solidam, mobilem,
figuratam, aliisque qualitatibus quae sensibus occurrunt
praeditam, ope sensuum ; rem vero sentientem, perci-
pientem, intelligentem, conscientia quadam interna cogno-

1 'eandem.' So in recent dis- presentable to the senses are a cover

cussions on the conservation of for meaninglessness. Only through

force. self-conscious experience of per-

- [Borellus.]- AUTHOR. See De sonal activity does real meaning

Vi Pcraisstonts, cap. XXIII. enter into the portion of language

3 [Leibnitius.] — AUTHOR. which deals with active causation.

4 On Berkeley's reasoning all This is argued in detail in sect,
terms which involve the assumption 21-35.

that real causality is something

508 DE MOTU

vimus. Porro, res istas plane inter se diversas esse,
longeque heterogeneas, cernimus. Loquor autem de
rebus cognitis : de incognitis enim disserere nil juvat '.

22. Totum id quod novimus, cui nomen corpus indidimus,
nihil in se continet quod motus principium seu causa
efficiens esse possit. Etenim impenetrabilitas, extensio,
figura nullam includunt vel connotant potentiam producendi
motum ; quinimo e contrario non modo illas, verum etiam
alias, quotquot sint, corporis qualitates sigillatim per-
currentes, videbimus omnes esse revera passivas, nihilque
iis activum inesse, quod ullo modo intelligi possit tanquam
fons et principium motus -. Gravitatem quod attinet, voce
ilia nihil cognitum et ab ipso effectu sensibili, cujus causa
quseritur, diversum significari jam ante ostendimus. Et
sane quando corpus grave dicimus, nihil aliud intelligimus,
nisi quod feratur deorsum ; de causa hujus effectus sensi-
bilis nihil omnino cogitantes.

23. De corpore itaque audacter pronunciare licet, utpote
de re comperta, quod non sit principium motus. Quod si
quisquam, praeter solidam extensionem ej usque modifica-
tiones, vocem corpus qualitatem etiam occultam, virtutem,
formam, essentiam complecti sua significatione contendat ;
licet quidem illi inutili negotio sine ideis disputare, et
nominibus nihil distincte exprimentibus abuti. Cseterum
sanior philosophandi ratio videtur ab notionibus abstractis
et generalibus (si modo notiones dici debent quse intelligi
nequeunt) quantum fieri potest abstinuisse.

24. Quicquid continetur in idea corporis novimus ; quod

1 Our concrete experience is as- the material world is tacitly implied,

sumed to be confined to (a) bodies,!, e. but not obtruded,
the data of the senses, and (b] mind 2 ' nihilque,' &c. Cf. Principles

or spirit — sentient, intelligent, of Human Knowledge, e.g. sect. 26,

active — revealed by internal con- 65, 66. where the essential passivity

sciousness. Cf. Principles, sect, i, of the ideas presented to the senses,

2, in which experience is resolved i.e. the material world, is maintained

into ideas and the active intelli- as a cardinal principle — on the

gence which they presuppose. positive ground of our percipient

Here the word idea disappears, but, experience of sensible things. To

in accordance with its signification, speak of the cause of motion as

' bodies' is still regarded as aggre- something sensible, he argues (sect.

gates of external phenomena, the 24), is merely to shew that we

passive subjects of changes of know nothing about it. Cf. sect,

place and state : the idealisation of 28, 29, infra.

DE MOTU

509

vero novimus in corpore, id non esse principium motus
constat1. Qui praeterea aliquid incognitum in corpore,
cujus ideam nullam habent, comminiscuntur, quod motus
principium dicant, ii revera nihil aliud quam principium
motus esse incognitum dicunt. Sed hujusmodi subtilitatibus
diutius immorari piget.

25. Prseter res corporeas alterum est genus rerum cogi-
tantium^. In iis autem potentiam inesse corpora movendi,
propria experientia didicimus11; quandoquidem anima
nostra pro lubitu possit ciere et sistere membrorum motus,
quacunque tandem ratione id fiat. Hoc certe constat,
corpora moveri ad nutum animae ; eamque proinde baud
inepte dici posse principium motus : particulare quidem
et subordinatum, quodque ipsum dependeat a primo et
universali Principio 4.

26. Corpora gravia feruntur deorsum, etsi nullo impulsu
apparente agitata ; non tamen existimandum propterea in
iis contineri principium motus : cujus rei hanc rationem
assignat Aristoteles5: — Gravia etlevia (inquit) non moventur
a seipsis ; id enim vitale esset, et se sistere possent. Gravia
omnia una eademque certa et constanti lege centrum
telluris petunt, neque in ipsis animadvertitur principium
vel facultas ulla motum istum sistendi, minuendi, vel, nisi
pro rata proportione, augendi, aut denique ullo modo
immutandi : habent adeo se passive. Porro idem, stricte
et accurate loquendo, dicendum de corporibus percussivis.
Corpora ista quamdiu moventur, ut et in ipso percussionis
momento, si gerunt passive, perinde scilicet atque cum
quiescunt. Corpus iners tarn agit quam corpus motum, si

1 The phenomena that can be the merely empirical data even of
presented to the senses are taken internal consciousness reveal this
as the measure of what can be causal connexion between volition
attributed to the material world ; and bodily motions, without the
and as the senses present only venture of theistic faith ?
conditioned change of place in 4 ' a primo et universali Principio'
bodies, we must look for the active i. e. God, or the Universal Spirit, in
cause in the invisible world which whom the universe of bodies and
internal consciousness presents to spirits finds explanation ; in a way
us. which Berkeley does not attempt to

2 l genus rerum cogitantiuwi.' Cf. unfold articulately and exhaustively
Principles, sect. 2. in philosophical system.

;: ' experientia didicimus.' Can 5 1'hys. 0. 4. 2553 5-7.

510 DE MOTU

res ad verum exigatur: id quod agnoscit Newtonus, ubi
ait, vim inertiae esse eandem cum impetu l. Corpus autem
iners et quietum nihil agit, ergo nee motum.

27. Revera corpus aeque perseverat in utrovis statu, vel
motus vel quietis. Ista vero perseverantia non magis
dicenda est actio corporis, quam existentia ejusdem actio
diceretur. Perseverantia nihil aliud est quam continuatio
in eodem modo existendi, quae proprie dici actio non potest.
Casterum resistentiam, quam experimur in sistendo corpore
moto, ejus actionem esse fingimus vana specie delusi.
Revera enim ista resistentia quam sentimus2, passio est
in nobis, neque arguit corpus agere, sed nos pati : constat
utique nos idem passuros fuisse, sive corpus illud a se
moveatur, sive ab alio principio impellatur.

28. Actio et reactio dicuntur esse in corporibus : nee
incommode ad demonstrationes mechanicas 3. Sed caven-
dum, ne propterea supponamus virtutem aliquam realem,
quae motus causa sive principium sit, esse in iis. Etenim
voces illae eodem modo intelligendae sunt ac vox attractio ;
et quemadmodum haec est hypothesis solummodo mathe-
matica4, non autem qualitas physica : idem etiam de illis
intelligi debet, et ob eandem rationem. Nam sicut veritas
et usus theorematum de mutua corporum attractione in
philosophia mechanica stabiles manent, utpote unice fun-
dati in motu corporum, sive motus iste causari supponatur
per actionem corporum se mutuo attrahentium, sive per
actionem agentis alicujus a corporibus diversi impellentis
et moderantis corpora ; pari ratione, quaecunque tradita
sunt de regulis et legibus motuum, simul ac theoremata
inde deducta, manent inconcussa, dum modo concedantur
effectus sensibiles, et ratiocinia iis innixa ; sive supponamus
actionem ipsam, aut vim horum effectuum causatricem,
esse in corpore, sive in agente incorporeo.

29. Auferantur ex idea corporis extensio, soliditas, figura,
remanebit nihil 5. Sed qualitates istae sunt ad motum

1 Princip. Math. Def. III. Preface.

2 'resistentia.' Our muscular 3 ' nee incommode/ Cf. sect.
sensation of resistance is apt to be 17, and note.

accepted empirically as itself active 4 'hypothesis mathematical Cf.

power in the concrete, entering very sect. 17, 35, 36-41, 66. 67; also

much, as has been said, into the Siris, sect. 250-251.

often inaccurate idea of power r> 'nihil.' This section sums up

which is formed. See Editor's Berkeley's objections to crediting

DE MOTU 511

indifferentes, nee in se quidquam habent quod motus
principium dici possit. Hoc ex ipsis ideis nostris per-
spicuum est. Si igitur voce corpus significatur id quod
concipimus, plane constat inde non peti posse principium
motus : pars scilicet nulla aut attributum illius causa
efficiens vera est, quae motum producat. Vocem autem
proferre, et nihil concipere, id demum indignum esset
philosopho.

30. Datur res cogitans, activa, quam principium motus
esse in hobis experimur1. Hanc animam, mcntem, spiritum
dicimus. Datur etiam res extensa, iners, impenetrabilis,
mobilis, quse a priori toto ccelo differt, novumque genus2
constituit. Quantum intersit inter res cogitantes et ex-
tensas, primus omnium deprehendens Anaxagoras, vir
longe sapientissimus, asserebat mentem nihil habere cum
corporibus commune, id quod constat ex primo libro Aristo-
telis DC Anima*. Ex neotericis idem optime animadvertit
Cartesius 4. Ab eo alii 3 rem satis claram vocibus obscuris
impeditam ac difficilem reddiderunt.

31. Ex dictis manifestum est eos qui vim activam,
actionem, motus principium, in corporibus revera inesse
affirmant, sententiam nulla experientia fundatam amplecti,
eamque terminis obscuris et generalibus adstruere, nee

matter vtitin. real power ; the senses mental states for which we can be
being taken as the test of what is morally approved or blamed,
contained in matter. It may be 2 'novumque genus.' Cf. sect,
compared with David Hume, 21. We have here Berkeley's anti-
Thomas Brown, and J. S. Mill on thesis of mind and matter— spirits
Causation. Berkeley differs from and external phenomena presented
them in recognising active power to the senses— persons in contrast
in spirit, while with them he re- to passive ideas,
solves causation among bodies into :I De Anima, I. ii. 13, 22, 24.
invariable sequence. ' ' Cartesius.' The antithesis of
1 Can the data presented to extended things and thinking things
us reveal more than sequence, pervades Descartes ; but not, as
in the relation between our voli- with Berkeley, on the foundation
tions and the corresponding move- of the new conception of what is
ments of our bodies? Is not the truly meant by matter or sensible
difference found in the moral pre- things. See e.g. Principle*, P. I.
supposition, which supernaturalises §§ 63, 64.

man in his voluntary or morally 3 ' alii.' Does he refer to Locke,

responsible activity? This obliges who suggests the possibility ot

us to see ourselves as absolutely matter thinking ?
original causes of all bodily and

512 DE MOTU

quid sibi velint satis intelligere. E contrario, qui mentem
esse principium motus volunt, sententiam propria ex-
perientia munitam proferunt, hominumque omni aevo
doctissimorum suffragiis comprobatam.

32. Primus Anaxagoras l TOV vovv introduxit, qui motum
inerti materise imprimeret. Quam quidem sententiam
probat etiam Aristoteles 2, pluribusque confirmat, aperte
pronuncians primum movens esse immobile, indivisibile, et
nullam habens magnitudinem. Dicere autem, omne moti-
vum esse mobile, recte animadvertit idem esse ac siquis
diceret, omne sedificativum esse aedificabile, Physic, lib. viii.
Plato insuper in Timaeo 3 tradit machinam hanc corpoream,
sen mundum visibilem, agitari et animari a mente, quae
sensum omnem fugiat. Quinetiam hodie philosophi Carte-
siani4 principium motuum naturalium Deum agnoscunt.
Et Newtonus5 passim nee obscure innuit, non solummodo
motum ab initio a numine profectum esse, verum adhuc
systema mundanum ab eodem actu moveri. Hoc sacris
literis consonum est : hoc scholasticorum calculo compro-
batur. Nam etsi Peripatetici naturam tradant esse prin
cipium motus et quietis, interpretantur tamen naturam
naturantem esse Deum6. Intelligunt nimirum corpora
omnia systematis hujusce mundani a mente prsepotenti
juxta certam et constantem rationem 7 moveri.

33. Caeterum qui principium vitale corporibus tribuunt,
obscurum aliquid et rebus parum conveniens fingunt.
Quid enim aliud est vitali principio praeditum esse quam

1 See Aristotle, De Anima, I. ii. 5 Prindpia Mathematica — Scho-

5, 13; Diogenes Laertius, Lib. VI. i. Hum Generale.

6. G ' naturam naturantem esse

2 Nat. Ausc. VIII. 15; also De Deum' — as we might say, God
Anitna, III. x. 7. considered as imminent cause in

3 Hardly any passage in the the universe. See St. Thomas
Timaus exactly corresponds to this. Aquinas, Opera, vol. XXII. Quest.
The following is, perhaps, the most 6, p. 27.

pertinent : — Kivrjaiv yap airevfi^v 7 ' juxta certam et constantem

avroJ rrjv rov awyuaros ol/fdav, TWV rationem.' While all changes

fTTTo. TT)V Trepl vovv Kal (f>p6vr]o~iv in Nature are determined by Will,

{jLaXiara ovoav (p. 34 a). Aristotle it is not capricious but rational

quotes the Timceus in the same Will. The so-called arbitrariness

connexion, De Anima, I. iii. n. of the Language of Nature is

4 'philosophi Cartesiani.' Se- relative to us, and from our point
cundum Cartesium causa generalis of view. In itself, the universe of
omnium motuum et quietum est reality expresses Perfect Reason.
Deus. — Derodon, Phystca, I. ix. 30.

DE MOTU 513

vivere ? aut vivere quam se movere, sistere, et statum suum
mutare ? Philosophi autem hujus saeculi doctissimi pro
principio indubitato ponunt, omne corpus perseverare in
statu suo; vel quietis vel motus uniformis in directum, nisi
quatenus aliunde cogitur statum ilium mutare : e contrario,
in anima sentimus esse facultatem tam statum suum quam
aliarum rerum mutandi ; id quod proprie dicitur vitale,
animamque a corporibus longe discriminat.

34. Motum et quietem in corporibus recentiores consi-
derant velut duos status existendi, in quorum utrovis corpus
omne sua natura iners permaneret1, nulla vi externa
urgente. Unde colligere licet, eandem esse causam motus
et quietis, quae est existentiae corporum. Neque enim
quserenda videtur alia causa existentiae corporis successivae
in diversis partibus spatii, quam ilia unde derivatur ex-
istentia ejusdem corporis successiva in diversis partibus
temporis. De Deo autem Optimo Maximo rerum omnium
Conditore et Conservatore tractare, et qua ratione res
cunctae a summo et vero Ente pendeant demonstrare,
quamvis pars sit scientiae humanae praecellentissima, spectat
tamen potius ad philosophiam primam 2, seu rnetaphysicam
et theologiam, quam ad philosophiam naturalem, quae
hodie fere omnis continetur in experimentis et mechanica.
Itaque cognitionem de Deo vel supponit philosophia natu-
ralis, vel mutuatur ab aliqua scientia superiori. Quanquam
verissimum sit, naturae investigationem scientiis altioribus
argumenta egregia ad sapientiam, bonitatem, et potentiam
Dei illustrandam et probandam undequaque subministrare.

35. Quod haec minus intelligantur, in causa est, cur non-
nulli immerito repudient physicae principia mathematica,
eo scilicet nomine quod ilia causas rerum efficientes non
assignant : quum tamen revera ad physicam aut mechani-
cam spectet regulas3 solummodo, non causas efficientes,
impulsionum attraction umve, et ut verbo dicam, motuum
leges tradere; ex iis vero positis phaenomenon particu-
larium solutionem, non autem causam efficientem assignare.

1 ' permaneret.' Cf. sect. 51. from the Power with which meta-

2 'spectat potius ad philosophiam physics and theology are con-
primam.' The drift of the De Motu cerned, and which we approach
is to distinguish the physical se- through consciousness,
quencesof molecular motion, which 3 ' regulas.' Cf. .Sm's, sect. 231-
the physical sciences articulate, 235.

BERKELEY: ERASER. I. L 1

514 DE MOTU

36. Multum intererit considerasse quid proprie sit
principium, et quo sensu intelligenda sit vox ilia apud
philosophos1. Causa quidem vera efficiens et conservatrix
rerum omnium jure optimo appellatur fons et principium
earundem. Principia vero philosophiae experimentalis
proprie dicenda sunt fundamenta quibus ilia innititur, seu
fontes unde derivatur, (non dico existentia, sed) cognitio
rerum corporearum, sensus utique ex experientia. Simi-
liter, in philosophia mechanica, principia dicenda sunt, in
quibus fundatur et continetur universa disciplina, leges
illae motuum primariae, quae experimentis comprobatae,
ratiocinio etiam excultae sunt et redditae universales 2.
Has motuum leges commode dicuntur principia, quoniam
ab iis tarn theoremata mechanica generalia quam particu-
lares T£>V ^aivo^v^v explicationes derivantur.

37. Turn nimirum dici potest quidpiam explicari me-
chanice, cum reducitur ad ista principia simplicissima
et universalissima, et per accuratum ratiocinium, cum iis
consentaneum et connexum esse ostenditur. Nam inventis
semel naturae legibus, deinceps monstrandum est philoso-
pho, ex constanti harum legum observatione, hoc est, ex
iis principiis phaenomenon quodvis necessario consequi :
id quod est phaenomena explicare et solvere, causamque,
id est rationem cur fiant, assign are.

38. Mens humana gaudet scientiam suam extendere et
dilatare. Ad hoc autem notiones et propositiones generates
efformandae sunt, in quibus quodam modo continentur
propositiones et cognitiones particulars, quae turn demum
intelligi creduntur cum ex primis illis continue nexu dedu-
cuntur. Hoc geometris notissimum est. In mechanica
etiam praemittuntur notiones, hoc est definitiones, et
enunciationes de motu primae et generates, ex quibus

1 Having, in the preceding sec- derstands universally efficient su-

tions contrasted perceived motions persensible Power. In natural

and their immanent originating philosophy the term is applied to

Power— matter and mind— physics the orderly sequences manifested

and metaphysics — he proceeds in to our senses, not to the active

this and the seven following sec- cause of the order,

tions to explain more fully what 2 ' ratiocinio . . . redditae univer-

he means by pnnciptum and also sales.' Relations of the data of sense

the two meanings (metaphysical to universalising reason are here

and mechanical) of solutio. By recognised.
principium^ in philosophy, he un-

DE MOTU 515

postmodum methodo mathematica conclusiones magis
remotae et minus generales colliguntur. Et sicut per
applicationem theorematum geometricorum, corporum parti-
cularium magnitudines mensurantur; ita etiam per appli
cationem theorematum mechanices universalium, systematis
mundani partium quarumvis motus, et phenomena inde
pendentia, innotescunt et determinantur: ad quern scopum
unice collineandum physico.

39. Et quemadmodum geometrae, disciplinae causa, multa
comminiscuntur, quae nee ipsi describere possunt, nee in
rerum natura invenire ; simili prorsus ratione mechanicus
voces quasdam abstractas et generales adhibet, fingitque
in corporibus vim, actionem, attractionem, solicitationem, &c.
quae ad theorias et enunciationes, ut et computationes de
motu apprime utiles sunt, etiamsi in ipsa rerum veritate
et corporibus actu existentibus frustra quaererentur, non
minus quam quae a geometris per abstractionem mathemati-
cam finguntur.

40. Revera ope sensuum nil nisi effectus seu qualitates
sensibiles, et res corporeas omnino passivas, sive in motu
sint sive in quiete, percipimus : ratioque et experientia
activum nihil praeter mentem aut animam esse suadet.
Quidquid ultra fingitur, id ejusdem generis esse cum aliis
hypothesibus et abstractionibus mathematicis existiman-
dum : quod penitus animo infigere oportet. Hoc ni fiat, facile
in obscuram scholasticorum subtilitatem, quae per tot
saecula, tanquam dira quaedam pestis, philosophiam cor-
rupit, relabi possumus.

41. Principia mechanica legesque motuum aut naturae
universales, saeculo ultimo feliciter inventae, et subsidio
geometriae tractatae et applicatae, miram lucem in philoso
phiam intulerunt. Principia vero metaphysica causaeque
reales efficientes motus et existentiae corporum attribu-
torumve corporeorum nullo modo ad mechanicam aut
experimenta pertinent ; neque eis lucem dare possunt, nisi
quatenus, velut praecognita, inserviant ad limites physicae
praefiniendos, eaque ratione ad tollendas difficultates
quaestionesque peregrinas.

42. Qui a spiritibus motus principium petunt, ii vel rem
corpoream vel incorpoream voce spiritus intelligent. Si
rem corpoream, quantumvis tenuem, tamen redit difficultas:
si incorpoream, quantumvis id verum sit, attamen ad

L 1 2

516 DE MOTU

physicam non proprie pertinet. Quod si quis philosophiam
naturalem ultra limites experimentorum et mechanicae
extenderit, ita ut rerum etiam incorporearum, et inexten-
sarum cognitionem complectatur, latior quidem ilia vocis
acceptio tractationem de anima, mente, seu principio vitali
admittit. Caeterum commodius erit, juxta usum jam fere
receptum, ita distinguere inter scientias, ut singulae propriis
circumscribantur cancellis, et philosophus naturalis totus
sit in experimentis, legibusque motuum, et principiis
mechanicis, indeque depromptis ratiociniis ; quidquid autem
de aliis rebus protulerit, id superiori alicui scientiaeacceptum
referat. Etenim ex cognitis naturae legibus pulcherrimae
theoriae, praxes etiam mechanicae ad vitam utiles con-
sequuntur. Ex cognitione autem ipsius naturae Auctoris
considerationes longe praestantissimae quidem illae, sed
metaphysicae, theologicae, morales oriuntur.

43. De principiis hactenus : nunc dicendum de natura
motus \ Atque is quidem, cum sensibus clare percipiatur,
non tarn natura sua, quam doctis philosophorum commentis
obscuratus est. Motus nunquam in sensus nostros incurrit
sine mole corporea, spatio, et tempore. Sunt tamen qui
motum, tanquam ideam quandam simplicem et abstractam,
atque ab omnibus aliis rebus sejunctam, contemplari
student. Verum idea ilia tenuissima et subtilissima2
intellectus aciem eludit : id quod quilibet secum meditando
experiri potest. Hinc nascuntur magnae difficultates de
natura motus, et definitiones, ipsa re quam illustrare
debent longe obscuriores. Hujusmodi sunt definitiones
illae Aristotelis et Scholasticorum :\ qui motum dicunt esse

1 'natura motus/ Sect. 43-66 ciples, sect. 111-116.
treat of the nature of the effect — i.e. 2 'idea ilia tenuissima et sub-
perceptible motion, as distinguished tilissima.' The difficulty as to
from its true causal origin {princi- definition of motion is attributed
pium} in mind or spirit. The to abstractions, and the inclina-
origin of motion belongs to meta- tion of the scholastic mind to
physics ; its nature, as dependent prefer these to concrete experi-
on percipient experience, belongs ence.

to physics. Is motion indepen- 3 Motion is thus defined by Ari-

dent of a plurality of bodies ; or stotle : — Ato rj Kivrjais Ij/TeAe'xeta rov

does it involve bodies in relation KIVTJTOV, rj KIV^JOV. Nat. A use. III.

to other bodies, so that absolute ii; see also i. and iii. Cf. Derodon,

motion is meaningless ? Cf. Pn'n- Pkystca, I. ix.

DE MOTU 517

actiun mobilis quatenus est mobile, vel actmn entis in poteniia
quatenus in potentia. Hujusmodi etiam est illud viri * inter
recentiores Celebris, qui asserit nihil in motu esse reale
prceter momentaneum illud quod in vi ad mutationem nitente
constitui debet. Porro constat, horum et similium defini-
tionum auctores in animo habuisse abstractam motus
naturam, seclusa omni temporis et spatii consideratione,
explicare : sed qua ratione abstracta ilia motus quintes-
sentia (ut ita dicam) intelligi possit, non video.

44. Neque hoc contenti, ulterius pergunt, partesque
ipsius motus a se invicem dividunt et secernunt, quarum
ideas distinctas, tanquam entium revera distinctorum,
efformare conantur. Etenim sunt qui motionem a motu
distinguant, illam velut instantaneum motus elementum
spectantes. Velocitatem insuper, conatum, vim, impetum
totidem res essentia diversas esse volunt, quarum quaeque
per propriam atque ab aliis omnibus segregatam et ab
stractam ideam intellectui objiciatur. Sed in hisce rebus
discutiendis, stantibus iis quae supra disseruimus 2, non est
cur diutius immoremur.

45. Multi etiam per transitum :; motum definiunt, obliti,
scilicet, transitum ipsum sine motu intelligi non posse,
et per motum definiri oportere. Verissimum adeo est
definitiones, sicut nonnullis rebus lucem, ita vicissim aliis
tenebras afferre. Et profecto, quascumque res sensu
percipimus, eas clariores aut notiores definiendo efficere
vix quisquam potuerit. Cujus rei vana spe allecti res
faciles difficillimas4 reddiderunt philosophi, mentesque
suas difficultatibus, quas ut plurimum ipsi peperissent,
implicavere. Ex hocce definiendi, simul ac abstrahendi
studio, multae tarn de motu quam de aliis rebus natae sub-
tilissimas quaestiones, eaedemque nullius utilitatis, hominum
ingenia frustra torserunt; adeo ut Aristoteles ultro et
saepius fateatur motum esse actum quendam cognitu diffi-
cileni 5, et nonnulli ex veteribus usque eo nugis exercitati
deveniebant, ut motum omnino esse negarent 6.

1 Newton. 2 Cf. sect. 3-42. 5 Kat 8td TOVTO 8rj xa^f7ro

3 Descartes, Principia, P. II. AajSeu/ ri iariv. Nat. Ausc. III. ii.
§ 25; also Borellus, De Vi Percus- 6 e.g. Zeno, in his noted argu-
sionis, p. i. ment against the possibility of

4 < res' faciles difficillimas.' Cf. motion, referred to as a signal ex-
Principlcs, ' Introduction/ sect. i. ample of fallacy.

518 DE MOTU

46. Sed hujusmodi minutiis distineri piget. Satis sit
fontes solutionum indicasse : ad quos etiam illud adjungere
libet : quod ea quae de infinita divisione temporis et
spatii in mathesi traduntur, ob congenitam rerum naturam
paradoxa et theorias spinosas (quales sunt illae omnes
in quibus agitur de infinite J) in speculationes de motu
intulerunt. Quidquid autem hujus generis sit, id omne
motus commune habet cum spatio et tempore, vel potius
ad ea refert acceptum.

47. Et quemadmodum ex una parte nimia abstractio
seu divisio rerum vere inseparabilium, ita ab altera parte
compositio seu potius confusio rerum diversissimarum
motus naturam perplexam reddidit. Usitatum enim est
motum cum causa motus efficiente confundere2. Unde
accidit ut motus sit quasi biformis, unam faciem sensibus
obviam, alteram caliginosa nocte obvolutam habens. Inde
obscuritas et confusio, et varia de motu paradoxa originem
trahunt, dum effectui perperam tribuitur id quod revera
causae solummodo competit.

48. Hinc oritur opinio ilia, eandem semper motus
quantitatem conservari3. Quod, nisi intelligatur de vi et
potentia causae, sive causa ilia dicatur natura, sive vovs,
vel quodcunque tandem agens sit, falsum esse cuivis facile
constabit. Aristoteles4 quidem 1. viii. Physicorum, ubi
quaerit utrum motus factus sit et corruptus, an vero ab
seterno tanquam vita immortalis insit rebus omnibus, vitale
principium potius, quam effectum externum, sive mutationem
loci 5, intellexisse videtur.

49. Hinc etiam est, quod multi suspicantur motum non
esse meram passionem in corporibus. Quod si intelligamus
id quod in motu corporis sensibus objicitur, quin omnino
passivum sit nemo dubitare potest. Ecquid enim in se
habet successiva corporis existentia in diversis locis, quod
actionem referat, aut aliud sit quam nuduset iners effectus?

1 * de infinite, &c.' Cf. Prin- * Aristotle states the question in
cifiles, sect. 130-132, and the Nat. Ausc. VIII. cap. i, and solves
Analyst passim, for Berkeley's it in cap. iv.

treatment of infinitesimals. 5 ' mutatio loci' is the effect, i.e.

2 'confundere.' Cf. sect. 3-42 motion perceived by sense ; 'vitale
for illustrations of this confusion. principium ' the real cause, i.e. vital

3 The modern conception of the rational agency.
' conservation of force.'

DE MOTU

50. Peripatetici, qui dicunt motum esse actum unum
utriusque, moventis et moti l, non satis discriminant causam
ab effectu. Similiter, qui nisum aut conatum in motu
fingunt, aut idem corpus simul in contrarias partes ferri
putant, eadem idearum confusione, eadem vocum am-
biguitate ludificari videntur.

51. Juvat multum, sicut in aliis omnibus, ita in scientia
de motu accuratam diligentiam adhibere, tarn ad aliorum
conceptus intelligendos quam ad suos enunciandos : in
qua re nisi peccatum esset, vix credo in disputationem
trahi potuisse, utrum corpus indifferens sit ad motum et
ad quietem, necne. Quoniam enim experientia constat,
esse legem naturae primariam, ut corpus perinde perseveret
in statu motus ac quietis, quamdiu aliunde nihil accidat ad
statum istum mutandum ; et propterea vim inertiae sub
diverse respectu esse vel resistentiam, vel impetum,
colligitur : hoc sensu profecto corpus dici potest sua
natura indifferens ad motum vel quietem. Nimirum tarn
difficile est quietem in corpus motum, quam motum in
quiescens inducere : cum vero corpus pariter conservet
statum utrumvis, quidni dicatur ad utrumvis se habere
indifferenter ?

52. Peripatetici pro varietate mutationum, quas res aliqua
subire potest, varia motus genera distinguebant. Hodie
de motu agentes intelligunt solummodo motum localem2.
Motus autem localis intelligi nequit nisi simul intelligatur
quid sit locus : is vero a neotericis 3 definitur pars spatii
quam corpus occupat : unde dividitur in relativum et absolu-
tum pro ratione spatii. Distinguunt enim inter spatium
absolutum sive verum, ac relativum sive apparens. Volunt
scilicet dari spatium undequaque immensum, immobile,
insensibile, corpora universa permeans et continens, quod

1 'moventis et moti,' i.e. as con- Locke's Essay, Bk. II. ch. 13, 15,
causes. 17 ; also Papers which passed be-

2 ' motum localem/ Sect. 52-65 tween Mr. Leibnitz and Dr. Clarke
discuss the reality of absolute or- in 1715-16, pp. 55-59 ; 73~8i ; 97-
empty space, in contrast with con- 103, &c. Leibniz calls absolute
crete space realised in perception space 'an ideal of some modern
of the local relations of bodies. Englishman/

The meaninglessness of absolute 3 Newton's Principia, Def. Sch.

space and motion is argued. Cf. III. See also Derodon, Physica,
Principles, sect. 116, 117. See P. I. cap. vi. § i.

520 DE MOTU

vocant spatium absolutum. Spatium autem a corporibus
comprehensum vel definitum, sensibusque adeo subjectum,
dicitur spatium relativum, apparens, vulgare.

53. Fingamus itaque corpora cuncta destrui, et in nihilum
redigi. Quod reliquum est vocant spatium absolutum, omni
relatione quae a situ et distantiis corporum oriebatur, simul
cum ipsis corporibus, sublata. Porro spatium illud est
infmitum, immobile, indivisibile, insensibile, sine relatione
et sine distinctione. Hoc est, omnia ejus attributa sunt
privativa vel negativa : videtur igitur esse merum nihil 3.
Parit solummmodo difficultatem aliquam quod extensum
sit. Extensio autem est qualitas positiva. Verum qualis
tandem extensio est ilia quae nee dividi potest, nee men-
surari, cujus nullam partem, nee sensu percipere, nee
imaginatione depingere possumus ? Etenim nihil in
imaginationem cadit, quod, ex natura rei, non possibile
est ut sensu percipiatur ; siquidem imaginatio - nihil aliud
est quam facultas representatrix rerum sensibilium, vel
actu existentium, vel saltern possibilium. Fugit insuper
intellectum purum1*, quum facultas ilia versetur tantum
circa res spirituales et inextensas, cujusmodi sunt mentes
nostrae, earumque habitus, passiones, virtutes, et similia.
Ex spatio igitur absolute auferamus modo vocabula, et
nihil remanebit in sensu, imaginatione, aut intellectu : nihil
aliud ergo iis designator, quam pura privatio aut negatio,
hoc est, merum nihil.

54. Confitendum omnino est nos circa hanc rem gravis-
simis praejudiciis teneri, a quibus ut liberemur, omnis animi
vis exercenda. Etenim multi, tantum abest quod spatium
absolutum pro nihilo ducant, ut rem esse ex omnibus (Deo
excepto) unicam existiment, quae annihilari non possit :
statuantque illud suapte natura necessario existere, aeter-
numque esse et increatum, atque adeo attributorum divi-
norum particeps3. Verum enimvero quum certissimum
sit, res omnes, quas nominibus designamus, per qualitates

1 Cf. Locke on a vacuum, and may be compared •with

the ' possibility of space existing (pavraaia, and vovs in Aristotelian

without matter,' Essay, Bk. II. psychology.

ch. 13. 3 ' attributorum divinorum parti-

2 Note the account here given ceps.' See Samuel Clarke, in his
of imagination and intellect, as Demonstration, and in the Papers
distinguished from sense, which between Clarke and Leibnitz.

DE MOTU 521

aut relationes, vel aliqua saltern ex parte cognosci (ineptum
enim foret vocabulis uti quibus cogniti nihil, nihil notionis,
ideas vel conceptus subjiceretur), inquiramus diligenter,
utrum formare liceat ideam ullam spatii illius puri, realis,
absoluti, quod post omnium corporum annihilationem per-
severet existere. Ideam porro talem paulo acrius intuens,
reperio ideam esse nihili purissimam, si modo idea appel-
landa sit. Hoc ipse summa adhibita diligentia expertus
sum : hoc alios pari adhibita diligentia experturos reor.

55. Decipere nos nonnunquam solet, quod aliis omnibus
corporibus imaginatione sublatis, nostrum 1 tamen manere
supponimus. Quo supposito, motum membrorum ab omni
parte liberrimum imaginamur. Motus autem sine spatio
concipi non potest. Nihilominus si rem attento animo
recolamus, constabit primo concipi spatium relativum
partibus nostri corporis defmitum : 2°. movendi membra
potestatem liberrimam nullo obstaculo retusam : et praeter
haec duo nihil. Falso tamen credimus tertium aliquod,
spatium videlicet immensum, realiter existere, quod liberam
potestatem nobis faciat movendi corpus nostrum : ad hoc
enim requiritur absentia solummodo aliorum corporum.
Quam absentiam, sive privationem corporum, nihil esse
positivum fateamur necesse est2.

56. Caeterum hasce res nisi quis libero et acri examine
perspexerit, verba et voces parum valent. Meditanti vero,
et rationes secum reputanti, ni fallor, manifestum erit,
quaecunque de spatio puro et absolute praedicantur, ea
omnia de nihilo praedicari posse. Qua ratione mens
humana facillime liberatur a magnis difficultatibus simulque
ab ea absurditate tribuendi existentiam necessarian! ?> ulli
rei praeterquam soli Deo optimo maximo.

57. In proclivi esset sententiam nostram argumentis
a posteriori (ut loquuntur) ductis confirmare, quaestiones
de spatio absolute proponendo ; exempli gratia, utrum sit
substantia vel accidens ? utrum creatum vel increatum ?

1 ' nostrum/ sc. corpus. When Principiis Cognitionis Humance,
we imagine space emptied of idiomate anglicano decem abhmc
bodies, we are apt to forget that our annis edito.]— AUTHOR. He refers
own bodies are part of the material to sect. 116 of the Principles.
world. :i He treats absolute space as

2 [Vide quse contra spatium ab- nothing, and relative space as de-
solutum disseruntur in libro DC pendent on Perception and Will.

522 DE MOTU

et absurditates ex utravis parte consequentes demonstrando.
Sed brevitati consulendum. Illud tamen omitti non debet,
quod sententiam hancce Democritus olim calculo suo com-
probavit, uti auctor est Aristoteles 1. i. Phys.1 ubi haec
habet : Democritus solidum et inane ponit principia, quorum
aliud quidem ut quod est, aliud ut quod non est esse dicit.
Scrupulum si forte injiciat, quod distinctio ilia inter spatium
absolutum et relativum a magni nominis philosophis usur-
petur, eique quasi fundamento inaedificentur multa praeclara
theoremata, scrupulum istum vanum esse, ex iis quae
secutura sunt, apparebit.

58. Ex praemissis patet, non convenire ut definiamus
locum verum corporis esse partem spatii absoluti quam
occupat corpus, motumque verum seu absolutum esse
mutationem loci veri et absoluti. Siquidem omnis locus
est relativus, ut et omnis motus. Veruntamen ut hoc
clarius appareat, animadvertendum est, motum nullum
intelligi posse sine determinatione aliqua seu directione,
quae quidem intelligi nequit, nisi praeter corpus motum,
nostrum etiam corpus, aut aliud aliquod, simul intelligatur
existere. Nam sursum, deorsum, sinistrorsum, dextrorsum,
omnesque plagae et regiones in relatione aliqua fundantur,
et necessario corpus a moto diversum connotant et sup-
ponunt. Adeo ut, si reliquis corporibus in nihilum redactis,
globus, exempli gratia, unicus existere supponatur ; in illo
motus nullus concipi possit : usque adeo necesse est, ut
detur aliud corpus, cujus situ motus determinari intelligatur.
Hujus sententiae veritas clarissime elucebit, modo corporum
omnium tarn nostri quam aliorum, praeter globum istum
unicum, annihilationem recte supposuerimus.

59. Concipiantur porro duo globi, et praeterea nil cor-
poreum, existere. Concipiantur deinde vires quomodo-
cunque applicari : quicquid tandem per applicationem
virium intelligamus, motus circularis duorum globorum
circa commune centrum nequit per imaginationem concipi.
Supponamus deinde ccelum fixarum creari : subito ex con-
cepto appulsu globorum ad diversas cceli istius partes motus
concipietur. Scilicet cum motus natura sua sit relativus,
concipi non potuit priusquam darentur corpora correlata.
Quemadmodum nee ulla relatio alia sine correlatis concipi
potest.

1 Phys. a. 5. i88a. 22, 23.

DE MOTU

523

60. Ad motum circularem quod attinet, putant multi,
crescente motu vero circular!, corpus necessario magis
semper magisque ab axe niti. Hoc autem ex eo provenit,
quod, cum motus circularis spectari possit tanquam in
omni momento a duabus directionibus ortum trahens,
una secundum radium, altera secundum tangentem ; si in
hac ultima tantum directione impetus augeatur, turn a centro
recedet corpus motum, orbita vero desinet esse circularis.
Quod si aequaliter augeantur vires in utraque directione,
manebit motus circularis, sed acceleratus conatu, qui non
magis arguet vires recedendi ab axe, quam accedendi
ad eundem, auctas esse. Dicendum igitur, aquam in situla
circumactam ascendere ad latera vasis, propterea quod,
applicatis novis viribus in directione tangentis ad quamvis
particulam aquae, eodem instanti non applicentur novae
vires aequales centripetae. Ex quo experimento nullo
modo sequitur, motum absolutum circularem per vires
recedendi ab axe motus necessario dignosci. Porro qua
ratione intelligendae sunt voces istae, vires corporum et
conatus, ex praemissis satis superque innotescit.

61. Quo modo curva considerari potest tanquam constans
ex rectis infinitis, etiamsi revera ex illis non constet, sed
quod ea hypothesis ad geometriam utilis sit, eodem modo
motus circularis spectari potest tanquam a directionibus
rectilineis infinitis ortum ducens, quae suppositio utilis est
in philosophia mechanica. Non tamen ideo affirmandum,
impossibile esse, ut centrum gravitatis corporis cujusvis
successive existat in singulis punctis peripheriae circularis,
nulla ratione habita directionis ullius rectilineae, sive in
tangente sive in radio.

62. Haud omittendum est, motum lapidis in funda, aut
aquae in situla circumacta, dici non posse motum vere
circularem, juxta mentem eorum qui per partes spatii ab-
soluti definiunt loca vera corporum ; cum sit mire compositus
ex motibus non solum situlae vel fundae, sed etiam telluris
diurno circa proprium axem, menstruo circa commune
centrum gravitatis terrae et lunae, et annuo circa solem : et
piopterea particula quaevis lapidis vel aquae describat
lineam a circulari longe abhorrentem. Neque revera est,
qui creditur, conatus axifugus, quoniam non respicit unum
aliquem axem ratione spatii absoluti, supposito quod detur
tale spatium : proinde non video quomodo appellari possit

524 DE MOTU

conatus unicus, cui motus vere circularis tanquam proprio
et adaequato effectui respondet.

63. Motus nullus dignosci potest, aut mensurari, nisi per
res sensibiles. Cum ergo spatium absolutum nullo modo
in sensus incurrat, necesse est ut inutile prorsus sit ad
distinctionem motuum. Praeterea determinatio sive directio
motui essentialis est, ilia vero in relatione consistit. Ergo
impossibile est ut motus absolutus concipiatur.

64. Porro quoniam pro diversitate loci relativi varius sit
motus ejusdem corporis, quinimo uno respectu moveri,
altero quiescere dici quidpiam possit l ; ad determinandum
motum verum et quietem veram, quo scilicet tollatur
ambiguitas, et consulatur mechanicae philosophorum, qui
systema rerum latius contemplantur, satis fuerit spatium
relativum fixarum ccelo, tanquam quiescente spectato,
conclusum adhibere, loco spatii absoluti. Motus autem
et quies tali spatio relative definiti, commode adhiberi
possunt loco absolutorum, qui ab illis nullo symptomate
discerni possunt. Etenim imprimantur utcunque vires,
sint quicunque conatus, concedamus motum distingui per
actiones in corpora exercitas ; nunquam tamen inde
sequetur, dari spatium illud et locum absolutum, ejusque
mutationem esse locum verum.

65. Leges motuum, effectusque, et theoremata eorundem
proportiones et calculos continentia, pro diversis viarum
figuris, accelerationibus itidem et directionibus diversis,
mediisque plus minusve resistentibus, haec omnia constant
sine calculatione motus absoluti. Uti vel ex eo patet quod,
quum secundum illorum principia qui motum absolutum
inducunt, nullo symptomate scire liceat, utrum Integra
rerum compages quiescat, an moveatur uniformiter in
directum, perspicuum sit motum absolutum nullius corporis
cognosci posse.

66. Ex dictis patet ad veram motus naturam perspici-
endam summopere juvaturum, i°. Distinguere inter hypo
theses mathematicas et naturas rerum : 2°. Cavere ab
abstractionibus : 3°. Considerare motum tanquam aliquid
sensibile, vel saltern imaginabile ; mensurisque relativis
esse contentos. Quae si fecerimus, simul clarissima quaeque

1 See Locke, Essay, Bk. II. ch. 13, §§ 7-10.

DE MOTU

525

philosophise mechanics theoremata, quibus reserantur
naturae recessus, mundique systema calculis humanis
subjicitur, manebunt intemerata, et motus contemplatio
a mille minutiis, subtilitatibus, ideisque abstractis libera
evadet. Atque haec de natura motus dicta sufficiant.

67. Restat, ut disseramus de causa communicationis
motuum \ Esse autem vim impressam in corpus mobile
causam motus in eo, plerique existimant. Veruntamen
illos non assignare causam motus cognitam, et a corpore
motuque distinctam, ex praemissis constat. Patet insuper
vim non esse rem certam et determinatam, ex eo quod viri
summi de ilia multum diversa, immo contraria, proferant,
salva tamen in consequentiis veritate. Siquidem Newtonus2
ait vim impressam consistere in actione sola, esseque
actionem exercitam in corpus ad statum ejus mutandum,
nee post actionem manere. Torricellius:! cumulum quendam
sive aggregatum virium impressarum per percussionem in
corpus mobile recipi, ibidemque manere atque impetum
constituere contendit. Idem fere Borellus 4 aliique praedi-
cant. At vero, tametsi inter se pugnare videantur
Newtonus et Torricellius, nihilominus, dum singuli sibi
consentanea proferunt, res satis commode ab utrisque
explicatur. Quippe vires omnes corporibus attributae
tarn sunt hypotheses mathematicae quam vires attractivae
in planetis et sole. Caeterum entia mathematica in rerum
natura stabilem essentiam non habent : pendent autem
a notione definientis; unde eadem res diversimode ex-
pi icari potest.

68. Statuamus motum novum in corpore percusso con-
servari, sive per vim insitam, qua corpus quodlibet per-
severat in statu suo vel motus vel quietis uniformis in
directum ; sive per vim impressam, durante percussione
in corpus percussum receptam ibidemque permanentem;
idem erit quoad rem, differentia existente in nominibus
tantum. Similiter, ubi mobile percutiens perdit, et

1 Sect. 67-72 treat of the sup- or equivalent to, that given forth

posed ejection of motion from the by the former?
striking body into the body struck. 2 Printipia, Def. IV.

Is this only metaphorical? Is 3 Lezioni Accademiche.

the motion received by the latter * De Vi Percussionis, cap. IX.

to be supposed identical with,

526 DE MOTU

percussum acquirit motum, parum refert disputare, utrum
motus acquisitus sit idem numero cum motu perdito, ducit
enim in minutias metaphysicas et prorsus nominales de
identitate. Itaque sive dicamus motum transire a per-
cutiente in percussum, sive in percusso motum de novo
generari, destrui autem in percutiente, res eodem recidit.
Utrobique intelligitur unum corpus motum perdere, alterum
acquirere, et praeterea nihil.

69. Mentem, quae agitat et continet universam hancce
molem corpoream, estque causa vera efficiens motus, eandem
esse, proprie et stricte loquendo, causam communicationis
ejusdem baud negaverim. In philosophia tamen physica,
causas et solutiones phcenomenon a principiis mechanicis
petere oportet. Physice igitur res explicatur non assignando
ejus causam vere agentem et incorpoream, sed demon-
strando ejus connexionem cum principiis mechanicis:
cujusmodi est illud, actionem et reactionem esse semper
contrarias et cequales\ a quo, tanquam fonte et principio
primario, eruuntur regulae de motuum communicatione,
quae a neotericis, magno scientiarum bono, jam ante
repertae sunt et demonstratae.

70. Nobis satis fuerit, si innuamus principium illud alio
modo declarari potuisse. Nam si vera rerum natura potius
quam abstracta mathesis spectetur, videbitur rectius dici,
in attractione vel percussione passionem corporum, quam
actionem, esse utrobique aequalem. Exempli gratia, lapis
fune equo alligatus tantum trahitur versus equum, quantum
equus versus lapidem : corpus etiam motum in aliud
quiescens impactum, patitur eandem mutationem cum cor-
pore quiescente. Et quoad effectum realem, percutiens
est item percussum, percussumque percutiens. Mutatio
autem ilia est utrobique, tarn in corpore equi quam in
lapide, tarn in moto quam in quiescente, passio mera. Esse
autem vim, virtutem, aut actionem corpoream talium
effectuum vere et proprie causatricem non constat. Corpus
motum in quiescens impingitur; loquimur tamen active,
dicentes illud hoc impellere : nee absurde in mechanicis,
ubi ideae mathematicae potius quam verae rerum naturae
spectantur.

71. In physica, sensus et experientia, quae ad effectus

1 Newton's third law of motion.

DE MOTU

527

apparentes solummodo pertingunt, locum habent; in
mechanica, notiones abstracts mathematicorum admit-
tuntur. In philosophia prima, seu metaphysica, agitur
de rebus incorporeis, de causis, veritate, et existentia
rerum. Physicus series sive successiones rerum sensi-
bilium contemplatur, quibus legibus connectuntur, et quo
ordine, quid praecedit tanquam causa, quid sequitur tanquam
effectus, animadvertens l. Atque hac ratione dicimus corpus
motum esse causam motus in altero, vel ei motum im-
primere, trahere etiam, aut impellere. Quo sensu causae
secundae corporeae intelligi debent, nulla ratione habita
verae sedis virium, vel potentiarum actricum, aut causae
realis cui insunt. Porro dici possunt causae vel principia
mechanica, ultra corpus, figuram, motum, etiam axiomata
scientiae mechanicae primaria, tanquam causae conse-
quentium spectata.

72. Causae vere activae meditatione tantum et ratiocinio
e tenebris erui quibus involvuntur possunt, et aliquatenus
cognosci. Spectat autem ad philosophiam primam, seu
metaphysicam, de iis agere. Quodsi cuique scientiae
provincia sua 2 tribuatur, limites assignentur, principia
et objecta accurate distinguantur, quae ad singulas pertinent,
tractare licuerit majore, cum facilitate, turn perspicuitate.

'Berkeley sees in motion only 2 'provincia sua.' The De Motu,

a link in the chain which connects so far as it treats of motion per-

the sensible and intelligible worlds ceptible to the senses, is assigned to

— a conception unfolded in his physics ; in contrast to theology

Sin's, more than twenty years or metaphysics, alone concerned

later. with active causation.

END OF VOL. I

OXFORD
PRINTED AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

BY HORACE HART, M.A.
PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY

B 1304 .M8 1901
v.l SMC
Berkeley, George,

1685-1753.
The works of George

Berkeley D. D. ...
AKN-4571 (sk)