The works of Francis Bacon

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THE WORKS

FRANCIS BACON.

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THE

WORKS

FRANCIS BACON,

BARON OF VERULAM, VISCOUNT ST. ALBANS, AND
LORD HIGH CHANCELLOR OF ENGLAND.

Collected anfl IStJiteU

JAMES SPEDDING, M. A.

OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE,

ROBERT LESLIE ELLIS, M.A.

LATE FELLOW OF TKINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE;
AND

DOUGLAS DENON HEATH,

BARRISTEK-AT-LAW; LATE FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

VOLUME VI.

M DCCC LX

I ) m

„i.

BOSTON:
r TAGGARD |A]>TD TM

UCROFORMED B

PRESERVATION

SERVICES

date. AUG -8 1989

RIVERSIDE, CAMBRIDGE:

STEREOTYPED AND PRINTED BT

H. 0. HOUGHTON.

CONTENTS

THE SIXTH VOLUME.

PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS.

PART HI. — CONTINUED.

WORKS ORIGINALLY DESIGNED FOR PARTS OF THE IN-
STAURATIO MAGNA, BUT SUPERSEDED OR ABANDONED.

PAGE

Preface to Valerius Terminus, by Robert Leslie
Ellis 9

Valerius Terminus 25

Advancement of Learning, Book 1 77

" « Book II. . . .171

Filum Labyrinthi 413

De Interpretations Nature Procemium . . 429

. TO THE BINDER.
The Facsimile to face the back of the Fly-title.

VALERIUS TEEMINUS.

PREFACE

TO

VALERIUS TERMINUS.

BY ROBERT LESLIE ELLIS.

The following fragments of a great work on the
Interpretation of Nature were first published in Ste-
phens's Letters and Remains [1734], They consist
partly of detached passages, and partly of an epitome
of twelve chapters of the first book of the proposed
work. The detached passages contain the first, sixth,
and eighth chapters, and portions of the fourth, fifth,
seventh, ninth, tenth, eleventh, and sixteenth. The
epitome contains an account of the contents of all the
chapters from the twelfth to the twenty-sixth inclu-
sive, omitting the twentieth, twenty-third, and twenty-
fourth. Thus the sixteenth chapter is mentioned both
in the epitome and among the detached passages, and
we are thus enabled to see that the two portions of the
following tract belong to the same work, as it appears
from both that the sixteenth chapter was to treat of the
doctrine of idola.

It is impossible to ascertain the motive which deter-
mined Bacon to give to the supposed author the name
of Valerius Terminus, or to his commentator, of whose

10 PREFACE TO

annotations we have no remains, that of Hermes Stella.
It may be conjectured that by the name Terminus he
intended to intimate that the new philosophy would
put an end to the wandering of mankind in search of
truth, that it would be the terminus ad quern in which
when it was once attained the mind would finally ac-
quiesce.

Again, the obscurity of the text was to be in some
measure removed by the annotations of Stella ; not
however wholly, for Bacon in the epitome of the eigh-
teenth chapter commends the manner of publishing
knowledge " whereby it shall not be to the capacity
nor taste of all, but shall as it were single and adopt
his reader." Stella was therefore to throw a kind of
starlight on the subject, enough to prevent the stu-
dent's losing his way, but not much more.

However this may be, the tract is undoubtedly ob-
scure, partly from the style in which it is written, and
partly from its being only a fragment. It is at the
same time full of interest, inasmuch as it is the earliest
type of the Instauratio. The first book of the work
ascribed to Valerius Terminus would have corre-
sponded to the De Augmentis and to the first book
of the Novum Organum, the plan being that it should
contain whatever was necessary to be known before
the new method could be stated. In the second book,
as in the second book of the Novum Organum, we
should have found the method itself.

The Advancement of Learning, which was developed
into the De Augmentis, corresponds to the first ten
chapters of Valerius Terminus, and especially to the
first and tenth. To the remainder of the book (a few
chapters are clearly wanted after the last mentioned in

VALERIUS TERMINUS. 11

the epitome) corresponds the first book of the Novum
Organum. The tenth chapter, of which we have only
a small fragment, is entitled " The Inventory, or an
Enumeration and View of Inventions already discov-
ered and in use ; together with a note of the wants, and
the nature of the supplies." It therefore corresponds
to the second book of the Advancement, and to the last
eight books of the De Augmentis, but would doubtless
have been a mere summary.1 When Bacon subse-
quently determined to give more development to this
part of the subject, he was naturally led to make a
break after the inventory, and thus we get the origin
of the separation between the De Augmentis and the
Novum Organum.

The most important portion of Valerius Terminus is
the eleventh .chapter, which contains a general state-
ment of the problem to be solved. It corresponds to
the opening axioms of the second book of the Novum
Organum, but differs from them in containing very
little on the subject of forms. What Bacon afterwards
called the investigation of the form he here calls the
freeing of a direction. The object to be sought for
is, he says, " the revealing and discovering of new in-
ventions and operations." — " This to be done without
the errors and conjectures of art, or the length or diffi-
culties of experience." In order to guide men's trav-
els, a full direction must be given to them, and the
fulness of a direction consists in two conditions, cer-
tainty and liberty. Certainty is when the direction is
infallible ; liberty when it comprehends all possible
ways and means. Both conditions are fulfilled by the
knowledge of the form, to which the doctrine of direc-
i See my note at the end of this Preface. — J. S.

12 PREFACE TO

tion entirely corresponds. This correspondency Bacon
recognises towards the end of the chapter, but in illus-
trating the two conditions of which we have been
speaking he does not use the word form. The notion
of the form or formal cause comes into his system only
on historical grounds. In truth, in Valerius Terminus
he is disposed to illustrate the doctrine of direction not
so much by that of the formal cause as by two rules
which are of great importance in the logical system of
Ramus. " The two commended rules by him set down,"
that is by Aristotle, " whereby the axioms of sciences
are precepted to be made convertible, and which the
latter men have not without elegancy surnamed, the
one the rule of truth because it preventeth deceipt ;
the other the rule of prudence because it freeth elec-
tion ; are the same thing in speculation and affirmation,
which we now affirm." And then follows an example,
of which Bacon says that it " will make my meaning
attained, and yet percase make it thought that they
attained it not." In this example the effect to be pro-
duced is whiteness, and the first direction given is to
intermingle air and water ; of this direction it is said
that it is certain, but very particular and restrained,
and he then goes on to free it by leaving out the unes-
sential conditions. Of this however it is not now ne-
cessary to speak at length ; but the " two commended
rules" may require some illustration.

In many passages of his works Peter Ramus con-
demns Aristotle for having violated three rules which he
had himself propounded. To these rules Ramus gives
somewhat fanciful names. The first is the rule of
truth, the second the rule of justice, and the third the
rule of wisdom. These three rules are all to be ful-

VALERIUS TERMINUS. 13

filled by the principles of every science (axiomata
artium). The first requires the proposition to be in
all cases true, the second requires its subject and pred-
icate to be essentially connected together, and the
third requires the converse of the proposition to be
true as well as the proposition itself. The whole of
this theory, to which Ramus and the Ramistae seem
to have ascribed much importance, is founded on the
fourth chapter of the first book of the Posterior Analyt-
ics. Aristotle in speaking of the principles of demon-
stration explains the meaning of three phrases, Kara
7ravTos, de omni; ko.6' avro, per se; and ko.66\ov, universal-
iter. When the predicate can be affirmed in all cases
and at all times- of the subject of a proposition, the
predication is said to be de omni or Kara xavTos. Again,
whatever is so connected with the essence of a thing as
to be involved in its definition is said to belong to it per
se, ko.6' avro, and the same phrase is applicable when the
thing itself is involved in the definition of that which
we refer to it. Thus a line belongs per se to the notion
of a triangle, because the definition of a triangle in-
volves the conception of a line, and odd and even
belong per se to the notion of number, because the
definition of odd or even introduces the notion of a
number divisible or not divisible into equal parts.1
Lastly, that which always belongs to any given sub-
ject, and belongs to it inasmuch as it is that which it
is, is said to belong to it naOokov, universaliter. Thus
to have angles equal to two right angles does not be-
long to any figure taken at random, it is not true of
figure Kara 7ravTos, and though it is true of any isosceles

1 Aristotle mentions a third sense of /card mivroc, which it is not here
necessary to mention.

14 PREFACE TO

triangle yet it is not true of it in the first instance1 nor
inasmuch as it is isosceles. But it is true of a triangle,
in all cases and because it is a triangle and therefore
belongs to it k<x06\ov, universallter. It is manifest that
whenever this is the case the proposition is convertible.
Thus a figure having angles equal to two right angles is
a triangle.

Aristotle is not laying down three general rules, but
he was understood to do so by Ramus — whose rules
of truth, justice, and wisdom respectively correspond
to the three phrases of which we have been speaking.

Bacon adopting two of these rules, (he makes no
allusion to that of justice,) compares them with the
two conditions which a direction ought to fulfil. ' If it
be certain, the effect will follow from it at all times
and in all cases. And this corresponds to the rule of
truth. If it be free, then whenever the effect is pres-
ent the direction must have been complied with. The
presence of either implies that of the other. And this
is the practical application of the rule of wisdom.

I have thought it well to enter into this explanation,
because it shows in the first place that the system of
Peter Ramus had considerable influence on Bacon's
notions of logic, and in the second that he had formed
a complete and definite conception of his own method
before he had been led to connect it with the doctrine
of forms.

At the end of the eleventh chapter Bacon proposes to
give three cautions whereby we may ascertain whether
what seems to be a direction really is one. The gen-
eral principle is that the direction must carry you a
degree or remove nearer to action, operation, or light ;

1 uXk' ov npurov, iMa rd rpiyuvov nporepov.

VALERIUS TERMINUS. 15

else it is but an abstract or varied notion. The first
of the three particular cautions is " that the nature
discovered be more original than the nature supposed,
and not more secondary or of the like degree: " a re-
mark which taken in conjunction with the illustrations
by which it is followed, serves to confirm what I have
elsewhere endeavoured to show, that Bacon's idea of
natural philosophy was the explanation of the second-
ary qualities of bodies by means of the primary. The
second caution is so obscurely expressed that I can only
conjecture that it refers to the necessity of studying
abstract qualities before commencing the study of con-
crete bodies. Composition subaltern and composition
absolute are placed in antithesis to each other. The
latter phrase apparently describes the synthesis of ab-
stract natures by which an actual ultimate species is
formed, and the former [refers] to the formation of a
class of objects which all agree in possessing the nature
which is the subject of inquiry. The fragment breaks
off before the delivery of this second caution is com-
pleted, and we therefore know nothing of the third
and last.

16 NOTE TO PREFACE TO

NOTE.

The manuscript from which Robert Stephens printed these
fragments was found among some loose papers placed in his hands
by the Earl of Oxford, and is now in the British Museum ; Harl.
MSS. 6462. It is a thin paper volume of the quarto size, written
in the hand of one of Bacon's servants, with corrections, erasures,
and interlineations in his own.

The chapters of which it consists are both imperfect in them-
selves (all but three), — some breaking off abruptly, others being
little more than tables of contents, — and imperfect in their con-
nexion with each other ; so much so as to suggest the idea of a
number of separate papers loosely put together. But it was not
so (and the fact is important) that the volume itself was actually
made up. However they came together, they are here fairly and
consecutively copied out Though it be a collection of fragments
therefore, it is such a collection as Bacon thought worthy not only
of being preserved, but of being transcribed into a volume ; and
a particular account of it will not be out of place.

The contents of the manuscript before Bacon touched it may
be thus described.

1. A titlepage, on which is written " Valerius Terminus of

the Interpretation of Nature, with the annotations of
Hermes Stella."

2. " Chapter I. Of the limits and end of knowledge ; " with a

running title, " Of the Interpretation of Nature."

3. " The chapter immediately following the Inventory ; being

the 11th in order."

4. " A part of the 9 th chapter, immediately precedent to the

Inventory, and inducing the same."

5. " The Inventory, or an enumeration and view of inventions

already discovered and in use, together with a note of the

VALERIUS TERMINUS. 17

wants and the nature of the supplies; being the 10th chap-
ter, and this a fragment only of the same."

6. Part of a chapter, not numbered, " Of the internal and pro-

found errors and superstitions in the nature of the mind,
and of the four sorts of Idols or fictions which offer them-
selves to the understanding in the inquisition of knowl-
edge."

7. " Of the impediments of knowledge ; being the third chapter,

the preface only of it."

8. " Of the impediments which have been in the times and in

diversion of wits ; being the fourth chapter."

9. " Of the impediments of knowledge for want of a true suc-

cession of wits, and that hitherto the length of one man's
life hath been the greatest measure of knowledge ; being
the fifth chapter."

10. " That the pretended succession of wits hath been evil placed,

forasmuch as after variety of sects and opinions the most
popular and not the truest prevaileth and weareth out the
rest ; being the sixth chapter."

11. " Of the impediments of knowledge in handling it by parts,

and in slipping off" particular sciences from the root and
stock of universal knowledge ; being the seventh chapter."

12. " That the end and scope of knowledge hath been generally

mistaken, and that men were never well advised what it
was they sought " (part of a chapter not numbered).

13. "An abridgment of divers chapters of the first book;"

namely, the 12th, 13th, and 14th, (over which is a running
title " Of active knowledge ; ") and (without any running
title) the 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 21st, 22nd, 25th, and
26th. These abridgments have no headings ; and at the
end is written, " The end of the Abridgment of the first
book of the Interpretation of Nature."

Such was the arrangement of the manuscript as the transcriber
left it ; which I have thought worth preserving, because I seem to
see traces in it of two separate stages in the developement of the
work; the order of the chapters as they are transcribed being
probably the same in which Bacon wrote them ; and the numbers
inserted at the end of the headings indicating the order in which,
when he placed them in the transcriber's hands, it was his inten-

18 NOTE TO PREFACE TO

tion to arrange them ; and because it proves at any rate that at
that time the design of the whole book was clearly laid out in his
mind.

There is nothing, unfortunately, to fix the date of the transcript,
unless it be implied in certain astronomical or astrological symbols
written on the blank outside of the volume ; in which the figures
1603 occur.' This may possibly be the transcriber's note of the
time when he finished his work ; for which (but for one circum-
stance which I shall mention presently) I should think the year
1603 as likely a date as any ; for we know from a letter of Bacon's,

1 See the second page of the facsimile at the beginning of this volume.
The writing in the original is on the outside of the last leaf, which is in
fact the cover. The front cover, if there ever was one, is lost. The ink
with which the line containing the symbols is written corresponds with
that in the body of the MS.; and the line itself is placed symmetrically in
the middle of the page, near the top. The two lower lines are apparently
by another hand, probably of later date, certainly in ink of a different
colour, and paler. The word " Philosophy" is in Bacon's own hand, writ-
ten lightly in the upper corner at the left, and is no doubt merely a docket
inserted afterwards when he was sorting his papers. What connexion
there was between the note and the MS. it is impossible to say. But it
is evidently a careful memorandum of something, set down by somebody
when the MS. was at hand ; and so many of the characters resemble those
adopted to represent the planets and the signs of the zodiac, that one is
led to suspect in it a note of the positions of the heavenly bodies at the
time of some remarkable accident; — perhaps the plague, of which 30,578
persons died in Loudon, during the year ending 22nd December, 1603.
The period of the commencement, the duration, or the cessation of such
an epidemic might naturally be so noted. Now three of the characters
clearly represent respectively Mercury, Aquarius, and Sagittarius. The
sign for Jupiter, as we find it in old books, is so like a 4, that the first
figure of 45 may very well have been meant for it. The monogram at
the beginning of the line bears a near resemblance to the sign of Capricorn
in its most characteristic feature. And the mark over the sign of Aqua-
rius appears to be an abbreviation of that which usually represents the
Sun. (The blot between 1603 and B is nothing; being only meant to rep-
resent a figure 6 blotted out with the finger before the ink was dry.) Sus-
pecting therefore that the writing contained a note of the positions of
Mercury and Jupiter in the year 1603, I sent a copy to a scientific friend
and asked him if from such data he could determine the month indicat-
ed. He found upon a rough calculation (taking account of mean motions
only) that Jupiter did enter the sign of Sagittarius about the 10th of
August, 1603, and continued there for about a twelvemonth; that tho Sun
entered Aquarius about the 12th or 13th of January, 1603-4; and that Mer-

VALERIUS TERMINUS. 19

dated 3rd July 1603, that he had at that time resolved " to meddle
as little as possible in the King's causes," and to " put his ambition
wholly upon his pen ; " and we know from the Advancement of
Learning that in 1605 he was engaged upon a work entitled " The
Interpretation of Nature : " to which I may add that there is in
the Lambeth Library a copy of a letter from Bacon to Lord Kin-
losse, dated 25th March, 1603, and written in the same hand as
this manuscript.

Bacon's corrections, if I may judge from the character of the
handwriting, were inserted a little later ; for it is a fact that about
the beginning of James's reign his writing underwent a remark-
able change, from the hurried Saxon hand full of large sweeping
curves and with letters imperfectly formed and connected, which
he wrote in Elizabeth's time, to a small, neat, light, and compact
one, formed more upon the Italian model which was then coming
into fashion ; and when these corrections were made it is evident
that this new character had become natural to him and easy. It
is of course impossible to fix the precise date of such a change, —
the more so because his autographs of this period are very scarce,
— but whenever it was that he corrected this manuscript, it is
evident that he then considered it worthy of careful revision. He
has not merely inserted a sentence here and there, altered the

cury was about the 16th or 17th of the same month in the 26th or 27th
degree of Capricorn : — coincidences which would have been almost conclu-
sive as to the date indicated, if Capricorn had only stood where Aquarius
does, and vice versa. But their position as they actually stood in the MS.
is a formidable, if not fatal, objection to the interpretation.

According to another opinion with which I have been favoured, the
first monogram is a nota bene ; the next group may mean Dies Mercuni
(Wednesday) IQth January, 1603; and the rest refers to something not con-
nected with astronomy. But to this also there is a serious objection. The
26th of January, 1603-4, was a Friday; and it seems to me very improb-
able that any Englishman would have described the preceding January as
belonging to the j^ear 1603. Bacon himself invariably dated according to
the civil year, and the occasional use of the historical year in loose memo-
randa would have involved all his dates in confusion. I should think it
more probable that the writer (who may have been copying a kind of no-
tation with which he was not familiar) miscopied the sign of Venus into
that of Mercury; in which case it would mean Friday, 26th January,
1603-4. But even then the explanation would be unsatisfactory, as leav-
ing so much unexplained. Those however who are familiar with old MSS.
relating to such subjects may probably be able to interpret the whole.

20 NOTE TO PREFACE TO

numbers of the chapters, and added -words to the headings in
order to make the description more exact ; but he has taken the
trouble to add the running title wherever it was wanting, thus
writing the words "of the Interpretation of Nature" at full length
not less than eighteen times over ; and upon the blank space of
the titlepage be has written out a complete table of contents.1 In
short, if he had been preparing the manuscript for the press or for
a fresh transcript, he could not have done it more completely or
carefully, — only that he has given no directions for altering the
order of the chapters so as to make it correspond with the num-
bers. And hence I infer that up to the time when he made these
corrections, this was the form of the great work on which he was
engaged : it was a work concerning the Interpretation of Nature ;
which was to begin where the Novum Organum begins ; and of
which the first book was to include all the preliminary considera-
tions preparatory to the exposition of the formula.

I place this fragment here in deference to Mr. Ellis's decided
opinion that it was written before the Advancement of Learning.
The positive ground indeed which he alleges in support of that
conclusion I am obliged to set aside, as founded, I think, upon a
misapprehension ; and the supposition that no part of it was writ-
ten later involves a difficulty which I cannot yet get over to my
own satisfaction. But that the body of it was written earlier I see
no reason to doubt ; and if so, this is its proper place.

The particular point on which I venture to disagree with Mr.
Ellis I have stated in a note upon his preface to the Novum Or-
ganum, promising at the same time a fuller explanation of the
grounds of my own conclusion, which I will now give.

The question is, whether the "Inventory" in the 10th chapter
of Valerius Terminus was to have exhibited a general survey of
the state of knowledge corresponding with that which fills the
second book of the Advancement of Learning. I think not

It is true indeed that the title of that 10th chapter, — namely,
" The Inventory, or an enumeration and view of inventions al-
ready discovered and in use, with a note of the wants and the
nature of the supplies," — has at first sight a considerable resem-
blance to the description of the contents of the second book of

1 See the facsimile. I am inclined to think that there was an interval
between the writing of the first eleven titles and the last two; during
which the Italian character had become more familiar to him.

VALERIUS TERMINUS. 21

the Advancement of Learning, — namely, "A general and faithful
perambulation of learning, with an inquiry what parts thereof lie
fresh and waste, and not improved and converted by the indus-
try of Man ; wherein nevertheless my purpose is
at this time to note only omissions and deficiencies, and not to
make any redargutions of errors," and so on. But an " enumera-
tion of Inventions " is not the same thing as " a perambulation of
Learning ; " and it will be found upon closer examination that the
" Inventory " spoken of in Valerius Terminus does really corre-
spond to one, and one only, of the fifty-one Desiderata set down
at the end of the De Augmentis ; viz. that Inventarium opum hu-
manarwn, which was to be an appendix to the Magia naturalis.
See De Aug. iii. 5. This will appear clearly by comparing the
descriptions of the two.

In the Advancement of Learning Bacon tells us that there are
two points of much purpose pertaining to the department of Nat-
ural Magic : the first of which is, " That there be made a calendar
resembling an Inventory of the estate of man, containing all the
Inventions, being the works or fruits of nature or art, which are
now extant and of which man is already possessed ; out of which
doth naturally result a note what things are jet held impossible or
not invented ; which calendar will be the more artificial and ser-
viceable if to every reputed impossibility you add what thing is
extant which cometh the nearest in degree to that impossibility :
to the end that by these optatives and essentials man's inquiry
may be the more awake in deducing direction of works from the
speculation of causes."

The Inventory which was to have been inserted in the 10th
chapter of Valerius Terminus is thus introduced : — " The plainest
method and most directly pertinent to this intention will be to
make distribution of sciences, arts, inventions, works, and their por-
tions, according to the use and tribute which they yield and render
to the condition of man's life ; and under those several uses, being
as several offices of provisions, to charge and tax what may be
reasonably exacted or demanded, .... and then upon
those charges and taxations to distinguish and present as it were
in several columns what is extant and already found, and what is
defective and further to be provided. Of which provisions because
in many of them, after the manner of slothful and faulty accompt-
ants, it will be returned by way of excuse that no such are to be

22 NOTE TO PREFACE TO

had, it will be fit to give some light of the nature of the supplies ;
whereby it will evidently appear that they are to be compassed
and procured." And that the calendar was to deal, not with
knowledge in general, but only with arts and sciences of invention
in its more restricted sense — the pars operativa de natura (De A ug.
iii. 5.) — appears no less clearly from the opening of the 1 1 th chap-
ter, which was designed immediately to follow the "Inventory."
" It appeareth then what is now in proposition, not by general cir-
cumlocution but by particular note. No former philosophy," &c.
&c. " but the revealing and discovering of new inventions and opera-
tions, .... the nature and kinds of which inventions have been
described as they could be discovered," &c. If further evidence
were required of the exact resemblance between the Inventory of
Valerius Terminus and the Inventarium of the Advancement and the
De Augmentis, I might quote the end of the 9th chapter, where the
particular expressions correspond, if possible, more closely still.
But I presume that the passages which I have given are enough ;
and that the opinion which I have elsewhere expressed as to the
origin of the Advancement of Learning, — namely, that the writing
of it was a by-thought and no part of the work on the Interpre-
tation of Nature as originally designed, — will not be considered
inconsistent with the evidence afforded by these fragments.

That the Valerius Terminus was composed before the Advance-
ment, though a conclusion not deducible from the Inventory, is
nevertheless probable : but to suppose that it was so composed
exactly in its present form, involves, as I said, a difficulty; which
I will now state. The point is interesting, as bearing directly
upon the development in Bacon's mind of the doctrine of Idols;
concerning which see preface to Novum Organum, note C. But
I have to deal with it here merely as bearing upon the probable
date of this fragment.

In treating of the department of Logic in the Adrancement,
Bacon notices as altogether wanting "the particular elenclns in-
cautious against three false appearances " or fallacies by which
the mind of man is beset : the " caution " of which, he says, " doth
extremely import the true conduct of human judgment." These
false appearances he describes, though he does not give their names ;
and they correspond respectively to what he afterwards called the
Idols of the Tribe, the Cave, and the Forum. But he make* no
mention of the fourth ; namely, the Idols of the Theatre. Now

VALERIUS TERMINUS. 23

in Valerius Terminus we find two separate passages in which the
Idols are mentioned ; and in both all four are enumerated, and all
by name ; though what he afterwards called Idols of the Forum,
he there calls Idols of the Palace ; and it seems to me very unlike-
ly that, if when he wrote the Advancement he had already formed
that classification he should have omitted all mention of the Idols
of the Theatre ; for though it is true that that was not the place
to discuss them, and therefore in the corresponding passage of the
De A ugmentis they are noticed as to be passed by " for the pres-
ent," yet they are noticed by name, and in all Bacon's later writ-
ings the confutation of them holds a very prominent place.

To me the most probable explanation of the fact is this. I have
already shown that between the composition and the transcription
of these fragments the design of the work appears to have under-
gone a considerable change ; the order of the chapters being en-
tirely altered. We have only to suppose therefore that they were
composed before the Advancement and transcribed after, and that
in preparing them for the transcriber Bacon made the same kind
of alterations in the originals which he afterwards made upon the
transcript, and the difficulty disappears. Nothing would be easier
than to correct " three " into " four," and insert " the Idols of the
Theatre " at the end of the sentence.

And this reminds me (since I shall have so much to do with these
questions of date) to suggest a general caution with regard to them
all; namely, that in the case of fragments like these, the compar-
ison of isolated passages can hardly ever be relied upon for evi-
dence of the date or order of composition, or of the progressive
development of the writer's views ; and for this simple reason, —
we can never be sure that the passages as they now stand formed
part of the original writing. The copy of the fragment which we
have may be (as there is reason to believe this was) a transcript
from several loose papers, written at different periods and contain-
ing alterations or additions made from time to time. We may
know perhaps that when Bacon published the Advancement of
Learning he was ignorant of some fact with which he afterwards
became acquainted; we may find in one of these fragments, —
say the Temporis Partus Masculus, — a passage implying acquaint-
ance with that fact. Does it follow that the Temporis Partus
Masculus was written after the Advancement of Learning? No;
for in looking over the manuscript long after it was written, he

24 NOTE TO PREFACE TO VALERIUS TERMINUS.

may have observed and corrected the error. And we cannot con-
clude that he at the same time altered the whole composition so as
to bring it into accordance with the views he then held ; for that
might be too long a work. He may have inserted a particular
correction, but meant to rewrite the whole ; and if so, in spite of
the later date indicated by that particular passage, the body of
the work would still represent a stage in his opinions anterior to
the Advancement of Learning.

I have felt some doubt whether in printing this fragment, I
should follow the example of Stephens, who gave it exactly as
he found it ; or that of later editors, who have altered the order
of the chapters so as to make it agree with the numbers. The
latter plan will perhaps, upon the whole, be the more convenient.
There can be little doubt that the numbers of the chapters indi-
cate the order in which Bacon meant them to be read ; and if
any one wishes to compare it with the order in which they seem
to have been written, he has only to look at Bacon's table of con-
tents, which was made with reference to the transcript, and which
I give unaltered, except as to the spelling.

The notes to this piece are mine. — J. S.

VALERIUS TERMINUS

OF

THE INTEKPEETATION OF NATUKE:

WITH THE

ANNOTATIONS OF HERMES STELLA.*

A few fragments of the first book, viz.

1. The first chapter entire. [Of the ends and limits

of knowledge.]

2. A portion of the 11th chapter. [Of the scale.]

3. A small portion of the 9th chapter [being an In-

ducement to the Inventory.]

4. A small portion of the 10th chapter [being the

preface to the Inventory.]

5. A small portion of the 16th chapter [being a pref-

ace to the inward elenches of the mind.]

6. A small portion of the 4th chapter. [Of the im-

pediments of knowledge in general.]

1 This is written in the transcriber's hand: all that follows in Bacon's.
The words between brackets have a line drawn through them. For an
exact facsimile of the whole made by Mr. Netherclift, see the beginning
of the volume.

26 VALERIUS TERMINUS.

7. A small portion of the 5th chapter. [Of the di-

version of wits.]

8. The 6th chapter entire. [Of]

9. A portion of the 7th chapter.

10. The 8th chapter entire.

11. Another portion of the 9 th chapter.

12. The Abridgment of the 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

19. 21. 22. 25. 26th chapters of the first book.

13. The first chapter of [the] a book of the same

argument written in Latin and destined [for]
to be [traditionary] separate and not public.1

None of the Annotations of Stella are set down
in these fragments.

1 This refers to the first chapter of the Temporis Partus Masculut ; which
follows in the MS. volume, but not here. It is important as bearing upon
the date of that fragment.

OF

THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE.

Cap. 1.

Of the limits and end of knowledge.

In the divine nature both religion and philosophy
hath acknowledged goodness in perfection, science or
providence comprehending all things, and absolute sov-
ereignty or kingdom. In aspiring to the throne of
power the angels transgressed and fell, in presuming to
come within the oracle of knowledge man transgressed
and fell ; 1 but in pursuit towards the similitude of
God's goodness or love (which is one thing, for love
is nothing else but goodness put in motion or applied)
neither man or spirit ever hath transgressed, or shall
transgress.

The angel of light that was, when he presumed be-
fore his fall, said within himself, I will ascend and be
like unto the Highest ; not God, but the highest. To
be like to God in goodness, was no part of his emula-
tion ; knowledge, being in creation an angel of light,
was not the want which did most solicit him ; only
because he was a minister he aimed at a supremacy ;
therefore his climbing or ascension was turned into a
throwing down or precipitation.

Man on the other side, when he was tempted before he

1 This clause is repeated in the margin, in the transcriber's hand.

28 OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE.

fell, had offered unto him this suggestion, that he should
be like unto God. But how ? Not simply, but in this
part, knowing good and evil. For being in his creation
invested with sovereignty of all inferior creatures, he
was not needy of power or dominion ; but again, being
a spirit newly inclosed in a body of earth, he was fit-
test to be allured with appetite of light and liberty of
knowledge; therefore this approaching and intruding
into God's secrets and mysteries was rewarded with a
further removing and estranging from God's presence.
But as to the goodness of God, there is no danger in
contending or advancing towards a similitude thereof,
as that which is open and propounded to our imitation.
For that voice (whereof the heathen and all other er-
rors of religion have ever confessed that it sounds not
like man), Love your enemies; be you like unto your
heavenly Father, that suffereth his rain to fall both upon
the just and the unjust, doth well declare, that we can
in that point commit no excess ; so again we find it
often repeated in the old law, Be you holy as I am holy ;
and what is holiness else but goodness, as we consider
it separate and guarded from all mixture and all access
of evil ?

Wherefore seeing that knowledge is of the number
of those things which are to be accepted of with cau-
tion and distinction ; being now to open a fountain,
such as it is not easy to discern where the issues and
streams thereof will take and fall ; I thought it good and
necessary in the first place to make a strong and sound
head or bank to rule and guide the course of the wa-
ters ; by setting down this position or firmament, name-
ly, That all knowledge is to be limited by religion, and
to be referred to use and action.

OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE. 29

For if any man shall think by view and inquiry into
these sensible and material things, to attain to any light
for the revealing of the nature or will of God, he shall
dangerously abuse himself. It is true that the contem-
plation of the creatures of God hath for end (as to the
natures of the creatures themselves) knowledge, but
as to the nature of God, no knowledge, but wonder ;
which is nothing else but contemplation broken off, or
losing itself. Nay further, as it was aptly said by one
of Plato's school the sense of man resembles the sun,
which openeth and revealeth the terrestrial globe, but ob-
scureth and concealeth the celestial; so doth the sense
discover natural things, but darken and shut up divine.
And this appeareth sufficiently in that there is no pro-
ceeding in invention of knowledge but by similitude ;
and God is only self-like, having nothing in common
with any creature, otherwise than as in shadow and
trope. Therefore attend his will as himself openeth
it, and give unto faith that which unto faith belongeth ;
for more worthy it is to believe than to think or know,
considering that in knowledge (as we now are capable
of it) the mind suffereth from inferior natures ; but in
all belief it suffereth from a spirit which it holdeth su-
perior and more authorised than itself.

To conclude, the prejudice hath been infinite that
both divine and human knowledge hath received by
the intermingling and tempering of the one Avith the
other ; as that which hath filled the one full of here-
sies, and the other full of speculative fictions and van-
ities.

But now there are again which in a contrary extrem-
ity to those which gave to contemplation an over-large
scope, do offer too great a restraint to natural and law-

30 OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE.

ful knowledge, being unjustly jealous that every reach
and depth of knowledge wherewith their conceits have
not been acquainted, should be too high an elevation
of man's wit, and a searching and ravelling too far into
God's secrets ; an opinion that ariseth either of envy
(which is proud weakness and to be censured and not
confuted), or else of a deceitful simplicity. For if they
mean that the ignorance of a second cause doth make
men more devoutly to depend upon the providence of
God, as supposing the effects to come immediately
from his hand, I demand of them, as Job demanded
of his friends, Will you lie for G-od as man will for man
to gratify him ? But if any man without any sinister
humour doth indeed make doubt that this digging fur-
ther and further into the mine of natural knowledge
is a thing without example and uncommended in the
Scriptures, or fruitless ; let him remember and be in-
structed ; for behold it was not that pure light of nat-
ural knowledge, whereby man in paradise was able to
give unto every living creature a name according to
his propriety, which gave occasion to the fall ; but it
was an aspiring desire to attain to that part of moral
knowledge which defineth of good and evil, whereby
to dispute God's commandments and not to depend
upon the revelation of his will, which was the orig-
inal temptation. And the first holy records, which
within those brief memorials of things which passed
before the flood entered few things as worthy to be
registered but only lineages 1 and propagations, yet
nevertheless honour the remembrance of the inven-
tor both of music and works in metal. Moses again
(who was the reporter) is said to have been -< < n
i linages in original. See note 2. p. 3S7. of vol. v.

OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE. 31

in all the Egyptian learning, which nation was early
and leading in matter of knowledge. And Salomon
the king, as out of a branch of his wisdom extraor-
dinarily petitioned and granted from God, is said to
have written a natural history of all that is green from
the cedar to the moss, (which is but a rudiment be-
tween putrefaction and an herb,) and also of all that
liveth and moveth. And if the book of Job be turned
over, it will be found to have much aspersion of nat-
ural philosophy. Nay, the same Salomon the king
affirmeth directly that the glory of God is to conceal a
thing, but the glory of the king is to find it out, as if ac-
cording to the innocent play of children the divine
Majesty took delight to hide his works, to the end to
have them found out ; for in naming the king he in-
tendeth man, taking such a condition of man as hath
most excellency and greatest commandment of wits
and means, alluding also to his own person, being truly
one of those clearest burning lamps, whereof himself
speaketh in another place, when he saith The spirit of
man is as the lamp of God, wherewith he searcheth all
inwardness ; which nature of the soul the same Salo-
mon holding precious and inestimable, and therein
conspiring with the affection of Socrates who scorned
the pretended learned men of his time for raising great
benefit of their learning (whereas Anaxagoras con-
trariwise and divers others being born to ample patri-
monies decayed them in contemplation), delivereth it
in precept yet remaining, Bug the truth, and sell it not ;
and so of wisdom and knowledge-
Arid lest any man should retain a scruple as if this
thirst of knowledge were rather an humour of the
mind than an emptiness or want in nature and an

32 OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE.

instinct from God, the same author defineth of it fully,
saying, God hath made every thing in beauty according
to season ; also he hath set the world in man's heart, yet
can he not find out the work which God workeih from
the beginning to the end: declaring not obscurely that
God hath framed the mind of man as a glass capable
of the image of the universal world, joying to receive
the signature thereof as the eye is of light, yea not
only satisfied in beholding the variety of things and
vicissitude of times, but raised also to find out and
discern those ordinances and decrees which through-
out all these changes are infallibly observed. And
although the highest generality of motion or sum-
mary law of nature God should still reserve within
his own curtain, yet many and noble are the inferior
and secondary operations which are within man's
sounding. This is a thing which I cannot tell wheth-
er I may so plainly speak as truly conceive, that as
all knowledge appeareth to be a plant of God's own
planting, so it may seem the spreading and flourish-
ing or at least the bearing and fructifying of this plant,
by a providence of God, nay not only by a general
providence but by a special prophecy, was appointed
to this autumn of the world : for to my understand-
ing it is not violent to the letter, and safe now after
the event, so to interpret that place in the prophecy
of Daniel where speaking of the latter times it is said,
Many shall pass to and fro, and science shall be in-
creased ; as if the opening of the world by navigation
and commerce and the further discovery of knowledge
should meet in one time or age.

But howsoever that be, there are besides the au-
thorities of Scriptures before recited, two reasons of

OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE. 33

exceeding great weight and force why religion should
dearly protect all increase of natural knowledge : the
one, because it leadeth to the greater exaltation of the
glory of God ; for as the Psalms and other Scriptures
do often invite us to consider and to magnify the
great and wonderful works of God, so if we should
rest only in the contemplation of those shews which
first offer themselves to our senses, we should do a
like injury to the majesty of God, as if we should
judge of the store of some excellent jeweller by that
only which is set out to the street in his shop. The
other reason is, because it is a singular help and a pre-
servative against unbelief and error ; for, saith our
Saviour, You err, not knowing the Scriptures nor the
power of God; laying before us two books or volumes
to study if we will be secured from error; first the
Scriptures revealing the will of God, and then the
creatures expressing his power; for that latter book
will certify us that nothing which the first teacheth
shall be thought impossible. And most sure it is, and
a true conclusion of experience, that a little natural
philosophy inclineth the mind to atheism, but a fur-
ther proceeding bringeth the mind back to religion.

To conclude then, let no man presume to check
the liberality of God's gifts, who, as was said, hath set
the world in man's heart. So as whatsoever is not God
but parcel of the world, he hath fitted it to the com-
prehension of man's mind, if man will open and di-
late the powers of his understanding as he may.

But yet evermore it must be remembered that the
least part of knowledge passed to man by this so large
a charter from God must be subject to that use for
which God hath granted it ; which is the benefit and

34 OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE.

relief of the state and society of man ; for otherwise
all manner of knowledge becometh malign and ser-
pentine, and therefore as carrying the quality of
the serpent's sting and malice it maketh the mind
of man to swell ; as the Scripture saith excellently,
knowledge bloweth up, but charity buildeih up. And
again the same author doth notably disavow both
power and knowledge such as is not dedicated to
goodness or love, for saith he, If I have all faith so as
I could remove mountains, (there is power active,) if 1
render my body to the fire, (there is power passive,) if
I speak with the tongues of men and angels, (there is
knowledge, for language is but the conveyance of
knowledge,) all were nothing.

And therefore it is not the pleasure of curiosity, nor
the quiet of resolution, nor the raising of the spirit, nor
victory of wit, nor faculty of speech, nor lucre of pro-
fession, nor ambition of honour or fame, nor inable-
ment for business, that are the true ends of knowledge;
some of these being more worthy than other, though
all inferior and degenerate : but it is a restitution and
reinvesting (in great part) of man to the sovereignty
and power (for whensoever he shall be able to call
the creatures by their true names he shall again com-
mand them) which he had in his first state of crea-
tion. And to speak plainly and clearly, it is a dis-
covery of all operations and possibilities of operations
from immortality (if it were possible) to the meanest
mechanical practice. And therefore knowledge that
tendeth but to satisfaction is but as a courtesan, which
is for pleasure and not for fruit or generation. And
knowledge that tendeth to profit or profession or glory
is but as the golden ball thrown before Atalanta, which

OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE. 35

while she goeth aside and stoopeth to take up she hin-
dereth the race. And knowledge referred to some
particular point of use is but as Harmodius which put-
teth down one tyrant, and not like Hercules who did
perambulate the world to suppress tyrants and giants
and monsters in every part.1 It is true, that in two
points the curse is peremptory and not to be removed ;
the one that vanity must be the end in all human ef-
fects, eternity being resumed, though the revolutions
and periods may be delayed. The other that the con-
sent of the creature being now turned into reluctation,
this power cannot otherwise be exercised and adminis-
tered but with labour, as well in inventing as in execut-
ing ; yet nevertheless chiefly that labour and travel
which is described by the sweat of the brows more
than of the body ; that is such travel as is joined with
the working and discursion of the spirits in the brain :
for as Salomon saith excellently, The fool putteth to
more strength, but the wise man considereih which way,
signifying the election of the mean to be more material
than the multiplication of endeavour. It is true also
that there is a limitation rather potential than actual,
which is when the effect is possible, but the time or
place yieldeth not the matter or basis whereupon man
should work. But notwithstanding these precincts and
bounds, let it be believed, and appeal thereof made to
Time, (with renunciation nevertheless to all the vain
and abusing promises of Alchemists and Magicians,
and such like light, idle, ignorant, credulous, and fan-
tastical wits and sects,) that the new-found world of
land was not greater addition to the ancient continent

1 The words " that is, man's miseries and necessities," which followed in
the transcript, have a line drawn through them.

36 OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE.

than there remaineth at this day a' world of inventions
and sciences unknown, having respect to those that are
known, with this difference, that the ancient regions of
knowledge will seem as barbarous compared with the
new, as the new regions of people seem barbarous com-
pared to many of the old.

The dignity of this end (of endowment of man's life
with new commodities) appeareth by the estimation
that antiquity made of such as guided thereunto. For
whereas founders of states, lawgivers, extirpers of
tyrants, fathers of the people, were honoured but with
the titles of Worthies or Demigods, inventors were
ever consecrated amongst the Gods themselves. And
if the ordinary ambitions of men lead them to seek the
amplification of their own power in their countries,
and a better ambition than that hath moved men to
seek the amplification of the power of their own coun-
tries amongst other nations, better again and more
worthy must that aspiring be which seeketh the am-
plification of the power and kingdom of mankind over
the world ; the rather because the other two prosecu-
tions are ever culpable of much perturbation and in-
justice ; but this is a work truly divine, which cometh
in aura lent without noise or observation.

The access also to this work hath been by that port
or passage, which the divine Majesty (who is un-
changeable in his ways) doth infallibly continue and
observe ; that is the felicity wherewith he hath blessed
an humility of mind, such as rather laboureth to spell
and so by degrees to read in the volumes of his creat-
ures, than to solicit and urge and as it were to invo-
cate a man's own spirit to divine and give oracles unto
him. For as in the inquiry of divine truth, the pride

OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE. 37

of man hath ever inclined to leave the oracles of God's
word and to vanish in the mixture of their own inven-
tions ; so in the self-same manner, in inquisition of
nature they have ever left the oracles of God's works,
and adored the deceiving and deformed imagery which
the unequal mirrors of their own minds have repre-
sented unto them. Nay it is a point fit and necessary
in the front and beginning of this work without hesi-
tation or reservation to be professed, that it is no less
true in this human kingdom of knowledge than in
God's kingdom of heaven, that no man shall enter
into it except he become first as a little child.1

Of the impediments of knowledge, being the 4ih 2 chapter,
the preface only of it.

In some things it is more hard to attempt than to
achieve, which falleth out when the difficulty is not so
much in the matter or subject, as it is in the crossness
and indisposition of the mind of man to think of any
such thing, to will or to resolve it. And therefore
Titus Livius in his declamatory digression wherein he
doth depress and extenuate the honour of Alexander's
conquests saith, Nihil aliud quam bene ausus vana con-
temner : in which sort of things it is the manner of
men first to wonder that any such thing should be
possible, and after it is found out to wonder again
how the world should miss it so long. Of this nature
I take to be the invention and discovery of knowl-
edge, &c.

1 This chapter ends at the top of a new page. The rest is left blank.

2 The word i( third " has a line drawn through it, and 4th is written over
it in Bacon's hand.

38 OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE.

The impediments which have been in the times, and in
diversion of wits, being the 5th chapter,1 a small frag-
ment in the beginning of that chapter.

The encounters of the times have been nothing
favourable and prosperous for the invention of knowl-
edge ; so as it is not only the daintiness of the seed to
take, and the ill mixture and unliking of the ground
to nourish or raise this plant, but the ill season also
of the weather by which it hath been checked and
blasted. Especially in that the seasons have been
proper to bring up and set forward other more hasty
and indifferent plants, whereby this of knowledge hath
been starved and overgrown ; for in the descent of
times always there hath been somewhat else in reign
and reputation, which hath generally aliened and di-
verted wits and labours from that employment.

For as for the uttermost antiquity which is like fame
that muffles her head and tells tales, I cannot presume
much of it; for I would not willingly imitate the
manner of those that describe maps, which when they
come to some far countries whereof they have no
knowledge, set down how there be great wastes and
deserts there : so I am not apt to affirm that they knew
little, because what they knew is little known to us.
But if you will judge of them by the last traces that
remain to us, you will conclude, though not so scorn-
fully as Aristotle doth, that saith our ancestors were
extreme gross, as those that came newly from being
moulded out of the clay or some earthly substance ;
yet reasonably and probably thus, that it was with

1 Originally "being the fourth chapter the beginning:" the correction
all in Bacon's hand.

OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE. 39

them in matter of knowledge but as the dawning or
break of day. For at that time the world was alto-
gether home-bred, every nation looked little beyond
their own confines or territories, and the world had
no through lights then, as it hath had since by com-
merce and navigation, whereby there could neither be
that contribution of wits one to help another, nor that
variety of particulars for the correcting of customary
conceits.

And as there could be no great collection of wits of
several parts or nations, so neither could there be any
succession of wits of several times, whereby one might
refine the other, in regard they had not history to any
purpose. And the manner of their traditions was
utterly unfit and unproper for amplification of knowl-
edge. And again the studies of those times, you shall
find, besides wars, incursions, and rapines, which were
then almost every where betwixt states adjoining (the
use of leagues and confederacies being not then
known), were to populate by multitude of wives and
generation, a thing at this day in the waster part of
the West-Indies principally affected ; and to build
sometimes for habitation towns and cities, sometimes
for fame and memory monuments, pyramids, colosses,
and the like. And if there happened to rise up any
more civil wits ; * then would he found and erect some
new laws, customs, and usages, such as now of late
years, when the world was revolute almost to the like
rudeness and obscurity, we see both in our own nation
and abroad many examples of, as well in a number of
tenures reserved upon men's lands, as in divers cus-
toms of towns and manors, being the devices that

1 witts in MS. Probably a mistake for witte.

40 OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE

such wits wrought upon in such times of deep igno-
rance, &C.1

The impediments of knowledge for want of a true suc-
cession of wits, and that hitherto the length of one
man's life hath been the greatest measure of knowl-
edge, being the 6th chapter, the whole chapter.2

In arts mechanical the first device comes shortest
and time addeth and perfecteth. But in sciences of
conceit the first author goeth furthest and time leeseth
and corrupteth. Painting, artillery, sailing, and the
like, grossly managed at first, by time accommodate
and refined. The philosophies and sciences of Aris-
totle, Plato, Democritus, Hippocrates, of most vigour
at first, by time degenerated and imbased. In the
former many wits and industries contributed in one : In
the latter many men's wits spent to deprave the wit
of one.

The error is both in the deliverer and in the re-
ceiver. He that delivereth knowledge desireth to
deliver it in such form as may be soonest believed,
and not as may be easiliest examined. He that re-
ceiveth knowledge desireth rather present satisfaction
than expectant search, and so rather not to doubt than
not to err. Glory maketh the author not to lay open
his weakness, and sloth maketh the disciple not to
know his strength.

Then begin men to aspire to the second prizes ; to
be a profound interpreter and commenter, to be a
sharp champion and defender, to be a methodical com-

1 The "&c." in Bacon's hand.

* Originally " the fifth chapter:" "6th" substituted, and "the whole
chapter" added, in Bacon's hand.

OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE. 41

pounder and abridger. And this is the unfortunate
succession of wits which the world hath yet had,
whereby the patrimony of all knowledge goeth not on
husbanded or improved, but wasted and decayed. For
knowledge is like a water that will never arise again
higher than the level from which it fell ; and therefore
to go beyond Aristotle by the light of Aristotle is to
think that a borrowed light can increase the original
light from whom it is taken. So then no true succes-
sion of wits having been in the world, either we must
conclude that knowledge is but a task for one man's
life, and then vain was the complaint that life is short,
and art is long : or else, that the knowledge that now
is, is but a shrub, and not that tree which is never
dangerous, but where it is to the purpose of knowing
Good and Evil ; which desire ever riseth upon an
appetite to elect and not to obey, and so containeth
in it a manifest defection.

Tliat the pretended succession of wits hath been evil placed,
forasmuch as after variety of sects and opinions, the
most popular and not the truest prevaileth and weareth
out the rest ; being the 1th chapter ; a fragment.1

It is sensible to think that when men enter first into
search and inquiry, according to the several frames and
compositions of their understanding they light upon
different conceits, and so all opinions and doubts are
beaten over, and then men having made a taste of all
wax weary of variety, and so reject the worst and hold
themselves to the best, either some one if it be eminent,
or some two or three if they be in some equality, which

1 Originally " the sixth chapter: " " 7th " substituted, and " a fragment"
added in Bacon's hand.

42 OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE.

afterwards are received and carried on, and the rest
extinct.

But truth is contrary, and that time is like a river
which carrieth down things which are light and blown
up, and sinketh and drowneth that which is sad and
weighty. For howsoever governments have several
forms, sometimes one governing, sometimes few, some-
times the multitude ; yet the state of knowledge is ever
a Democratie, and that prevaileth which is most agree-
able to the senses and conceits of people. As for ex-
ample there is no great doubt but he that did put the
beginnings of things to be solid, void, and motion to the
centre, was in better earnest than he that put matter,
form, and shift ; or he that put the mind, motion, and
matter. For no man shall enter into inquisition of
nature, but shall pass by that opinion of Democritus,
whereas he shall never come near the other two opin-
ions, but leave them aloof for the schools and table-talk.
Yet those of Aristotle and Plato, because they be both
agreeable to popular sense, and the one was uttered
with subtilty and the spirit of contradiction, and the
other with a stile of ornament and majesty, did hold
out, and the other gave place, &cl

Of the impediments of knowledge in handling it by parts,
and in slipping off particular sciences from the root
and stock of universal knowledge, being the Sth 2 chap-
ter, the whole chapter.

Cicero, the orator, willing to magnify his own pro-
fession, and thereupon spending many words to main-

* The " &c." in Bacon's hand.

* Originally "seventh;" "8th" substituted, and "the whole chapter"
added, in Bacon's hand.

OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE. 43

tain that eloquence was not a shop of good words and
elegancies but a treasury and receipt of all knowledges,
so far forth as may appertain to the handling and mov-
ing of the minds and affections of men by speech, mak-
eth great complaint of the school of Socrates ; that
whereas before his time the same professors of wisdom
in Greece did pretend to teach an universal Sapience
and knowledge both of matter and words, Socrates
divorced them and withdrew philosophy and left rhet-
oric to itself, which by that destitution became but
a barren and unnoble science. And in particular sci-
ences we see that if men fall to subdivide their labours,
as to be an oculist in physic, or to be perfect in some
one title of the law, or the like, they may prove ready
and subtile, but not deep or sufficient, no not in that
subject which they do particularly attend, because of
that consent which it hath with the rest. And it is a
matter of common discourse of the chain of sciences
how they are linked together, insomuch as the Gre-
cians, who had terms at will, have fitted it of a name
of Circle Learning. Nevertheless I that hold it for a
great impediment towards the advancement and further
invention of knowledge, that particular arts and sci-
ences have been disincorporated from general knowl-
edge, do not understand one and the same thing which
Cicero's discourse and the note and conceit of the Gre-
cians in their word Circle Learning do intend. For I
mean not that use which one science hath of another
for ornament or help in practice, as the orator hath of
knowledge of affections for moving, or as military sci-
ence may have use of geometry for fortifications ; but
I mean it directly of that use by way of supply of light
and information which the particulars and instances of

44 OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE.

one science do yield and present for the framing or cor-
recting of the axioms of another science in their very
truth and notion. And therefore that example of ocu-
lists and title lawyers doth come nearer my conceit than
the other two ; for sciences distinguished have a de-
pendence upon universal knowledge to be augmented
and rectified by the superior light thereof, as well as
the parts and members of a science have upon the
Maxims of the same science, and the mutual light
and consent which one part receiveth of another. And
therefore the opinion of Copernicus in astronomy,
which astronomy itself cannot correct because it is
not repugnant to any of the appearances, yet natural
philosophy doth correct. On the other side if some
of the ancient philosophers had been perfect in the ob-
servations of astronomy, and had called them to coun-
sel when they made their principles and first axioms,
they would never have divided their philosophy as the
Cosmographers do their descriptions by globes, mak-
ing one philosophy for heaven and another for under
heaven, as in effect they do.

So if the moral philosophers that have spent such
an infinite quantity of debate touching Good and the
highest good, had cast their eye abroad upon nature
and beheld the appetite that is in all things to receive
and to give ; the one motion affecting preservation and
the other multiplication ; which appetites are most
evidently seen in living creatures in the pleasure of
nourishment and generation ; and in man do make the
aptest and most natural division of all his desires, being
either of sense of pleasure or sense of power ; and in
the universal frame of the world are figured, the one
in the beams of heaven which issue forth, and the

OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE. 45

other in the lap of the earth which takes in : and
again if they had observed the motion of congruity
or situation of the parts in respect of the whole, evi-
dent in so many particulars ; and lastly if they had
considered the motion (familiar in attraction of things)
to approach to that which is higher in the same kind ;
when by these observations so easy and concurring in
natural philosophy, they should have found out this
quaternion of good, in enjoying or fruition, effecting or
operation, consenting or proportion, and approach or
assumption ; they would have saved and abridged
much of their long and wandering discourses of
pleasure, virtue, duty, and religion. So likewise in
this same logic and rhetoric, or arts 1 of argument and
grace of speech, if the great masters of them would but
have gone a form lower, and looked but into the ob-
servations of Grammar concerning the kinds of words,
their derivations, deflexions, and syntax ; specially en-
riching the same with the helps of several languages,
with their differing proprieties of words, phrases, and
tropes ; they might have found out more and better
footsteps of common reason, help of disputation, and ad-
vantages of cavillation, than many of these which they
have propounded. So again a man should be thought
to dally, if he did note how the figures of rhetoric and
music are many of them the same. The repetitions
and traductions in speech and the reports and haunt-
ings of sounds in music are the very same things. Plu-
tarch hath almost made a book of the Lacedaemonian
kind of jesting, which joined ever pleasure with dis-
taste. Sir, (saith a man of art to Philip king of Ma-
cedon when he controlled him in his faculty,) Grod
1 acts in MS., I think.

46 OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE.

forbid your fortune should be such, as to know these things
better than I. In taxing his ignorance in his art he rep-
resented to him the perpetual greatness of his fortune,
leaving him no vacant time for so mean a skill. Now
in music it is one of the ordinariest flowers to fall from
a discord or hard tune upon a sweet accord. The
figure that Cicero and the rest commend as one of the
best points of elegancy, which is the fine checking of
expectation, is no less well known to the musicians when
they have a special grace in flying the close or cadence.
And these are no allusions but direct communities, the
same delights of the mind being to be found not only
in music, rhetoric, but in moral philosophy, policy, and
other knowledges, and that obscure in the one, which
is more apparent in the other, yea and that discovered
in the one which is not found at all in the other, and
so one science greatly aiding to the invention and aug-
mentation of another. And therefore without this
intercourse the axioms of sciences will fall out to be
neither full nor true ; but will be such opinions as Aris-
totle in some places doth wisely censure, when he saith
These are the opinions of persons that have respect lut to
a few things. So then we see that this note leadeth us
to an administration of knowledge in some such order
and policy as the king of Spain in regard of his great
dominions useth in state ; who though he hath partic-
ular councils for several countries and affairs, yet hath
one council of State or last resort, that receiveth the ad-
vertisements and certificates from all the rest. Hitherto
of the diversion, succession, and conference of wits.

That the end and scope of knowledge hath been generally
mistaken^ and that men were never well advised what

OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE. 47

it was they sought ; being the 9th chapter, whereof
a fragment (which is the end of the same chapter)
is before.1

It appeareth then how rarely the wits and labours
of men have been converted to the severe and original
inquisition of knowledge ; and in those who have pre-
tended, what hurt hath been done by the affectation
of professors and the distraction of such as were no
professors ; a and how there was never in effect any
conjunction or combination of wits in the first and
inducing search, but that every man wrought apart,
and would either have his own way or else would go
no further than his guide, having in the one case the
honour of a first, and in the other the ease of a second;
and lastly how in the descent and continuance of wits
and labours the succession hath been in the most popu-
lar and weak opinions, like unto the weakest natures
which many times have most children, and in them
also the condition of succession hath been rather to
defend and to adorn than to add ; and if to add, yet
that addition to be rather a refining of a part than an
increase of the whole. But the impediments of time
and accidents, though they have wrought a general
indisposition, yet are they not so peremptory and bind-
ing as the internal impediments and clouds in the mind
and spirit of man, whereof it now followeth to speak.

The Scripture speaking of the worst sort of error
saith, Errare fecit eos in invio et non in via. For a

1 See p. 49. note 2. ; and compare Table of Contents (p. 25.) No. 3.

The number of this chapter was not stated in the transcript as it origi-
nally stood: the words in Roman characters are all added in Bacon's hand,
at the end of the title: nothing is struck out.

2 This clause is repeated in the margin and marked for insertion in its
proper place.

48 OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE.

man may wander in the way, by rounding up and
down. But if men have failed in their very direction
and address that error will never by good fortune cor-
rect itself. Now it hath fared with men in their con-
templations as Seneca saith it fareth with them in their
actions, De partibus vitce. quisque deliberate de summa
nemo. A course very ordinary with men who receive
for the most part their final ends from the inclination
of their nature, or from common example and opinion,
never questioning -or examining them, nor reducing
them to any clear certainty ; and use only to call
themselves to account and deliberation touching the
means and second ends, and thereby set themselves in
the right way to the wrong place. So likewise upon
the natural curiosity and desire to know, they have
put themselves in way without foresight or considera-
tion of their journey's end.

For I find that even those that have sought knowl-
edge for itself, and not for benefit or ostentation or any
practical enablement in the course of their life, have
nevertheless propounded to themselves a wrong mark,
namely satisfaction (which men call truth) and not
operation. For as in the courts and services of princes
and states it is a much easier matter to give satisfaction
than to do the business ; so in the inquiring of causes
and reasons it is much easier to find out such causes as
will satisfy the mind of man and quiet objections, than
such causes as will direct him and give him light to
new experiences and inventions. And this did Celsus
note wisely and truly, how that the causes which are
in use and whereof the knowledges now received do
consist, were in time minors and subsequents to the
knowledge of the particulars out of which they were

OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE. 49

induced and collected ; and that it was not the light
of those causes which discovered particulars, but only
the particulars being first found, men did fall on gloss-
ing and discoursing of the causes ; which is the reason
why the learning that now is hath the curse of barren-
ness, and is courtesan-like, for pleasure, and not for
fruit.1 Nay to compare it rightly, the strange fiction
of the poets of the transformation of Scylla seemeth
to be a lively emblem of this philosophy and knowl-
edge ; a fair woman upwards in the parts of show, but
when you come to the parts of use and generation,
Barking Monsters; for no better are the endless dis-
torted questions, which ever have been, and of neces-
sity must be, the end and womb of such knowledge.

But yet nevertheless2 here I may be mistaken, by
reason of some which have much in their pen the
referring sciences to action and the use of man, which
mean quite another matter than I do. For they mean
a contriving of directions and precepts for readiness of
practice, which I discommend not, so it be not occasion
that some quantity of the science be lost ; for else it
will be such a piece of husbandry as to put away a
manor lying somewhat scattered, to buy in a close that
lieth handsomely about a dwelling. But my intention
contrariwise is to increase and multiply the revenues
and possessions of man, and not to trim up only or
.order with conveniency the grounds whereof he is
already stated. Wherefore the better to make myself
understood that I mean nothing less than words, and

1 Here in the transcript the chapter ended. The next sentence is writ-
ten in the margin in Bacon's own hand. s

2 This paragraph, which stands as the third fragment in the order of the
transcript, is headed in the transcriber's hand, UA part of the 9th chapter
immediately precedent to the Inventory and inducing the same."

VOL. VI. 4

50 OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE.

directly to demonstrate the point which we are now
upon, that is, what is the true end, scope, or office of
knowledge, which I have set down to consist not in
any plausible, delectable, reverend, or admired dis-
course, or any satisfactory arguments, but in effecting
and working, and in discovery of particulars not re-
vealed before for the better endowment and help of
man's life ; I have thought good to make as it were
a Kalendar or Inventory of the wealth, furniture, or
means of man according to his present estate, as far as
it is known ; which I do not to shew any universality
of sense or knowledge, and much less to make a satire
of reprehension in respect of wants and errors, but
partly because cogitations new had need of some gross-
ness and inculcation to make them perceived ; and
chiefly to the end that for the time to come (upon
the account and state now made and cast up) it may
appear what increase this new manner of use and ad-
ministration of the stock (if it be once planted) shall
bring with it hereafter ; and for the time present (in
case I should be prevented by death to propound and
reveal this new light * as I purpose) yet I may at the
least give some awaking note both of the wants in
man's present condition and the nature of the supplies
to be wished ; though for mine own part neither do I
much build upon my present anticipations, neither do
I think ourselves yet learned or wise enough to wish.
reasonably : for as it asks some knowledge to demand
a question not impertinent, so it asketh some sense to
make a wish not absurd.2

i direction had been written first.

2 The chapter ends before the bottom of the page ; leaving about a fifth
of it blank.

OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE. 51

The Inventory, or an enumeration and view of inventions
already discovered and in use, together with a note of
the wants and the nature of the supplies, being the
10£A chapter; and this a small fragment thereof,
being the preface to the Inventory.1

The plainest method and most directly pertinent to
this intention, will be to make distribution of sciences,
arts, inventions, works, and their portions, according
to the use and tribute which they yield and render to
the conditions of man's life, and under those several
uses, being as several offices of provisions, to charge
and tax what may be reasonably exacted or demanded;
not guiding ourselves neither by the poverty of expe-
riences and probations, nor according to the vanity of
credulous imaginations ; and then upon those charges
and taxations to distinguish and present, as it were in
several columns, what is extant and already found,
and what is defective and further to be provided. Of
which provisions, because in many of them after the
manner of slothful and faulty officers and accomptants
it will be returned (by way of excuse) that no such
are to be had, it will be fit to give some light of the
nature of the supplies, whereby it will evidently ap-
pear that they are to be compassed and procured.2
And yet nevertheless on the other side again it will
be as fit to check and control the vain and void assig-
nations and gifts whereby certain ignorant, extrava-
gant, and abusing wits have pretended to indue the

1 The words fragment only of the same, with which the original heading
ended, have a line drawn through them, and the words in Roman charac-
ter are added in Bacon's hand.

2 The concluding sentence, which is crowded into the page and over-
flows into the margin, has evidently been inserted subsequently to the
original transcript. After " procured " there seems to be an " &c."

52 OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE.

state of man with wonders, differing as much from
truth in nature as Caesar's Commentaries differeth from
the acts of King Arthur or Huon of Bourdeaux in
story. For it is true that Caesar did greater things
than those idle wits had the audacity to feign their
supposed worthies to have done ; but he did them not
in that monstrous and fabulous manner.

The chapter immediately following the Inventory ; being
the VLth in order ; a part thereof.1

It appeareth then what is now in proposition not by
general circumlocution but by particular note. No
former philosophy varied in terms or method ; no new
placet or speculation upon particulars already known ;
no referring to action by any manual of practice ; but
the revealing and discovering of new inventions and
operations. This to be done without the errors and
conjectures of art, or the length or difficulties of ex-
perience ; the nature and kinds of which inventions
have been described as they could be discovered ; for
your eye cannot pass one kenning without further sail-
ing ; only we have stood upon the best advantages of
the notions received, as upon a mount, to shew the
knowledges adjacent and confining. If therefore the
true end of knowledge not propounded hath bred large
error, the best and perfectest condition of the same end
not perceived will cause some declination. For when
the butt is set up men need not rove, but except the
white be placed men cannot level. This perfection we
mean not in the worth of the effect, but in the nature
of the direction ; for our purpose is not to stir up men's
hopes, but to guide their travels. The fulness of di-

1 The words in Roman letters are inserted in Bacon's hand.

OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE. 53

recti on to work and produce any effect consisteth in
two conditions, certainty and liberty. Certainty is
when the direction is not only true for the most part,
but infallible. Liberty is when the direction is not re-
strained to some definite means, but comprehendeth all
the means and ways possible ; for the poet saith well
Sapientibus undique latce sunt vice, and where there is
the greatest plurality of change, there is the greatest
singularity of choice. Besides as a conjectural direc-
tion maketh a casual effect, so a particular and re-
strained direction is no less casual than an uncertain.
For those particular means whereunto it is tied may be
out of your power or may be accompanied with an
overvalue of prejudice ; and so if for want of certainty
in direction you are frustrated in success, for want of
variety in direction you are stopped in attempt. If
therefore your direction be certain, it must refer you
and point you to somewhat which, if it be present, the
effect you seek will of necessity follow, else may you
perform and not obtain. If it be free, then must it
refer you to somewhat which if it be absent the effect
you seek will of necessity withdraw, else may you have
power and not attempt. This notion Aristotle had in
light, though not in use. For the two commended
rules by him set down, whereby the axioms of sciences
are precepted to be made convertible, and which the
latter men have not without elegancy surnamed the
one the rule of truth because it preventeth deceit, the
other the rule of prudence because it freeth election,
are the same thing in speculation and affirmation which
we now observe. An example will make my meaning
attained, and yet percase make it thought that they
attained it not. Let the effect to be produced be

54 OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE.

Whiteness ; let#the first direction be that if air and
water be intermingled or broken in small portions to-
gether, whiteness will ensue, as in snow, in the break-
ing of the waves of the sea and rivers, and the like.
This direction is certain, but very particular and re-
strained, being tied but to air and water. Let the
second direction be, that if air be mingled as before
with any transparent body, such nevertheless as is un-
coloured and more grossly transparent than air itself,
that then &c. as glass or crystal, being beaten to fine
powder, by the interposition of the air becometh white ;
the white of an egg being clear of itself, receiving
air by agitation becometh white, receiving air by
concoction becometh white ; here you are freed from
water, and advanced to a clear body, and still tied to
air. Let the third direction exclude or remove the re-
straint of an uncoloured body, as in amber, sapphires,
&c. which beaten to fine powder become white ; in
wine and beer, which brought to froth become white.
Let the fourth direction exclude the restraint of a body
more grossly transparent than air, as in flame, being a
body compounded between air and a finer substance
than air ; which flame if it were not for the smoke,
which is the third substance that incorporated! itself
and dyeth the flame, would be more perfect white. In
all these four directions air still beareth a part. Let
the fifth direction then be, that if any bodies, both
transparent but in an unequal degree, be mingled as
before, whiteness will follow ; as oil and water beaten
to an ointment, though by settling the air which gath-
ereth in the agitation be evaporate, yet remainoth
white ; and the powder of glass or crystal put into
water, whereby the air giveth place, yet remaineth

OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE. 55

white, though not so perfect. Now are you freed from
air, but still you are tied to transparent bodies. To
ascend further by scale I do forbear, partly because it
would draw on the example to an over-great length,
but chiefly because it would open that which in this
work I determine to reserve ; for to pass through the
whole history and observation of colours and objects
visible were too long a digression ; and our purpose is
now to give an example of a free direction, thereby to
distinguish and describe it; and not to set down a form
of interpretation how to recover and attain it. But as
we intend not now to reveal, so we are circumspect not
to mislead ; and therefore (this warning being given)
returning to our purpose in hand, we admit the sixth
direction to be, that all bodies or parts of bodies which
are unequal equally, that is in a simple proportion, do
represent whiteness;1 we will explain this, though we
induce it not. It is then to be understood, that abso-
lute equality produceth transparence, inequality in sim-
ple order or proportion produceth whiteness, inequality
in compound or respective order or proportion pro-
duceth all other colours, and absolute or orderless in-
equality produceth blackness ; which diversity, if so
gross a demonstration be needful, may be signified by
four tables ; a blank, a chequer, a fret, and a medley ;
whereof the fret is evident to admit great variety.
Out of this assertion are satisfied a multitude of effects
and observations, as that whiteness and blackness are

1 Compare De Aug. iii. 4. Vol. II. p. 290. "At in Metaphysica, si fiat in-
quisitio, hujusmodi quidpiam reperies; Corpora duo Diaphana intermixta,
Portionibus eorum Opticis simplici ordine sive aequaliter collocatis, consti-
tuere Albedinem." And observe that this sentence is not to be found in the
corresponding passage of the Advancement of Learning, but is interpolated
in the translation.

56 OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE.

most incompatible with transparence ; that whiteness
keepeth light, and blackness stoppeth light, but neither
passeth it ; that whiteness or blackness are never pro-
duced in rainbows, diamonds, crystals, and the like ;
that white giveth no dye, and black hardly taketh dye;
that whiteness seemeth to have an affinity with dryings,
and blackness with moisture ; that adustion causeth
blackness, and calcination whiteness ; that flowers are
generally of fresh colours, and rarely black, &c. All
which I do now mention confusedly by way of deriva-
tion and not by way of induction. This sixth direc-
tion, which I have thus explained, is of good and
competent liberty for whiteness fixed and inherent,
but not for whiteness fantastical or appearing, as shall
be afterwards touched. But first do you need a re-
duction back to certainty or verity ; for it is not all
position or contexture of unequal bodies that will pro-
duce colour ; for aqua fortis, oil of vitriol , &c. more
manifestly, and many other substances more obscurely,
do consist of very unequal parts, which yet are trans-
parent and clear. Therefore the reduction must be,
that the bodies or parts of bodies so intermingled as
before be of a certain grossness or magnitude ; for the
unequalities which move the sight must have a further
dimension and quantity than those which operate many
other effects. Some few grains of saffron will give a
tincture to a tun of water ; but so many grains of civet
will give a perfume to a whole chamber of air. And
therefore when Democritus (from whom Epicurus did
borrow it) held that the position of the solid portions
was the cause of colours, yet in the very truth of his
assertion he should have added, that the portions are
required to be of some magnitude. And this is one

OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE. 57

cause why colours have little inwardness and neces-
situde with the nature and proprieties of things, those
things resembling in colour which otherwise differ
most, as salt and sugar, and contrariwise differing in
colour which otherwise resemble most, as the white
and blue violets, and the several veins of one agate or
marble, by reason that other virtues consist in more
subtile proportions than colours do ; and yet are there
virtues and natures which require a grosser magnitude
than colours, as well as scents and divers other require
a more subtile ; for as the portion of a body will give
forth scent which is too small to be seen, so the portion
of a body will shew colours which is too small to be
endued with weight ; and therefore one of the prophets
with great elegancy describing how all creatures carry
no proportion towards God the creator, saith, That all
the nations in respect of him are like the dust upon the
balance, which is a thing appeareth but weigheth not.
But to return, there resteth a further freeing of this
sixth direction ; for the clearness of a river or stream
sheweth white at a distance, and crystalline glasses de-
liver the face or any other object falsified in whiteness,
and long beholding the snow to a weak eye giveth an
impression of azure rather than of whiteness. So as
for whiteness in apparition only and representation by
the qualifying of the light, altering the intermedium, or
affecting the eye itself, it reacheth not. But you must
free your direction to the producing of such an inci-
dence, impression, or operation, as may cause a precise
and determinate passion of the eye ; a matter which is
much more easy to induce than that which we have
passed through ; but yet because it hath a full coher-
ence both with that act of radiation (which hath hith-

58 OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE.

erto been conceived and termed so improperly and
untruly by some an effluxion of spiritual species and
by others an investing of the intermedium with a mo-
tion which successively is conveyed to the eye) and
with the act of sense, wherein I should likewise open
that which I think good to withdraw, I will omit.
Neither do I contend but that this motion which I call
the freeing of a direction, in the received philosophies
(as far as a swimming anticipation could take hold)
might be perceived and discerned ; being not much
other matter than that which they did not only aim at
in the two rules of Axioms before remembered, but
more nearly also in1 that which they term the form or
formal cause, or that which they call the true differ-
ence ; both which nevertheless it seemeth they pro-
pound rather as impossibilities and wishes than as
things within the compass of human comprehension.
For Plato casteth his burden and saith that he will
revere him as a God, that can truly divide and define;2
which cannot be but by true forms and differences.
Wherein I join hands with him, confessing as much as
yet assuming to myself little ; for if any man can by
the strength of his anticipations find out forms, I will
magnify him with the foremost. But as any of them
would say that if divers things which many men know
by instruction and observation another knew by reve-
lation and without those meanS, they would take him
for somewhat supernatural and divine ; so I do ac-
knowledge that if any man can by anticipations reach
to that which a weak and inferior wit may attain to by
interpretation, he cannot receive too high a title. Nay
I for my part do indeed admire to see how far some of

l than in MS. a See Nov. Org. ii. 26. Vol. I. p. 413.

OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE. 59

them have proceeded by their anticipations ; but how ?
it is as I wonder at some blind men, to see what shift
they make without their eye-sight ; thinking with my-
self that if I were blind I could hardly do it. Again
Aristotle's school confesseth that there is no true knowl-
edge but by causes, no true cause but the form, no true
form known except one, which they are pleased to al-
low ; and therefore thus far their evidence standeth
with us, that both hitherto there hath been nothing
but a shadow of knowledge, and that we propound
now that which is agreed to be worthiest to be sought,
and hardest to be found. There wanteth now a part
very necessary, not by way of supply but by way of
caution ; for as it is seen for the most part that the
outward tokens and badges of excellency and perfection
are more incident to things merely counterfeit than to
that which is true, but for1 a meaner and baser sort;
as a dubline is more like a perfect ruby than a spinel,
and a counterfeit angel is made more like a true angel
than if it were an angel coined of China gold ; in like
manner the direction carrieth a resemblance of a true
direction in verity and liberty which indeed is no direc-
tion at all. For though your direction seem to be
certain and free by pointing you to a nature that is
unseparable from the nature you inquire upon, yet if it
do not carry you on a degree or remove nearer to ac-
tion, operation, or light to make or produce, it is but
superficial and counterfeit. Wherefore to secure and
warrant what is a true direction, though that general
note I have given be perspicuous in itself (for a man
shall soon cast with himself whether he be ever the
nearer2 to effect and operate or no, or whether he have
1 So MS. qu. oft 2 neare MS.

60 OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE.

won but an abstract or varied notion) yet for better
instruction I will deliver three particular notes of cau-
tion. The first is that the nature discovered be more
original than the nature supposed, and not more sec-
ondary or of the like degree ; as to make a stone
bright or to make it smooth it is a good direction to
say, make it even ; but to make a stone even it is no
good direction to say, make it bright or make it
smooth ; for the rule is that the disposition of any
thing referring to the state of it in itself or the parts,
is more original than that which is relative or transi-
tive towards another thing. So evenness is the dispo-
sition of the stone in itself, but smooth is to the hand
and bright to the eye, and yet nevertheless they all
cluster and concur ; and yet the direction is more im-
perfect, if it do appoint you to such a relative as is in
the same kind and not in a diverse. For in the direc-
tion to produce brightness by smoothness, although
properly it win no degree, and will never teach you
any new particulars before unknown ; yet by way of
suggestion or bringing to mind it may draw your con-
sideration to some particulars known but not remem-
bered ; as you shall sooner remember some practical
means of making smoothness, than if you had fixed
your consideration only upon brightness ; but if the
direction had been to make brightness by making re-
flexion, as thus, make it such as you may see your face
in it, this is merely secondary, and helpeth neither by
way of informing nor by way of suggestion. So if in
the inquiry of whiteness you were directed to make
such a colour as should be seen furthest in a dark
light ; here you are advanced nothing at all. For
these kinds of natures are but proprieties, effects, cir-

OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE. 61

cumstances, concurrences, or what else you shall like
to call them, and not radical and formative natures
towards the nature supposed. The second caution is
that the nature inquired be collected by division before
composition, or to speak more properly, by composition
subaltern before you ascend to composition absolute,
&c.i

Of the internal and profound errors and superstitions in
the nature of the mind, and of the four sorts of idols
or fictions which offer themselves to the understanding
in the inquisition of knowledge ; being the 16th chap-
ter, and this a small fragment thereof, being a pref-
ace to the inward elenches of the mind.2

The opinion of Epicurus that the gods were of
human shape, was rather justly derided than seriously
confuted by the other sects, demanding whether every
kind of sensible creatures did not think their own
figure fairest, as the horse, the bull, and the like,
which found no beauty but in their own forms, as in
appetite of lust appeared. And the heresy of the
Anthropomorphites was ever censured for a gross con-
ceit bred in the obscure cells of solitary monks that
never looked abroad. Again the fable so well known
of Quis pinxit leonem, doth set forth well that there is
an error of pride and partiality, as well as of custom
and familiarity. The reflexion also from glasses so
usually resembled to the imagery of the mind, every
man knoweth to receive error and variety both in
colour, magnitude, and shape, according to the quality
of the glass. But yet no use hath been made of these

1 The word " subaltern " (for which a blank was left by the transcriber)
and the " &c." have been inserted by Bacon. The chapter ends nearly at
the bottom of the page.

2 The words in Roman character have been added by Bacon.

62 OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE.

and many the like observations, to move men to search
out and upon search to give true cautions of the native
and inherent errors in the mind of man which have
coloured and corrupted all his notions and impressions.
I do find therefore in this enchanted glass four Idols
or false appearances of several and distinct sorts, every
sort comprehending many subdivisions : the first sort,
I call idols of the Nation or Tribe; the second, idols
of the Palace; the third, idols of the Cave; and the
fourth, idols of the Theatre, &C.1

Here followeih an abridgment of divers chapters of the
first book of Interpretation of Nature.2

Cap. 12.

That in deciding and determining of the truth of
knowledge, men have put themselves upon trials not
competent. That antiquity and authority ; common
and confessed notions ; the natural and yielding con-
sent of the mind ; the harmony and coherence of a
knowledge in itself; the establishing of principles with
the touch and reduction of other propositions unto
them; inductions without instances contradictory ; and
the report of the senses ; are none of them absolute
and infallible evidence of truth, and bring no security
sufficient for effects and operations. That the discov-
ery of new works and active directions not known
before, is the only trial to be accepted of; and yet not
that neither, in case where one particular giveth light

1 The " &c." in Bacon's hand. The chapter ends in the middle of the
second page, and the heading of the next (which is the 4th), follows imme-
diately; whence I infer that the whole formed part of the original tran-
script.

8 The words " Interpretation of Nature " added in Bacon's hand.

OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE. 63

to another ; but where particulars induce an axiom or
observation, which axiom found out discovereth and
designeth new particulars. That the nature of this
trial is not only upon the point, whether the knowl-
edge be profitable or no, but even upon the point
whether the knowledge be true or no ; not because
you may always conclude that the Axiom which dis-
covereth new instances is true, but contrariwise you
may safely conclude that if it discover not any new
instance it is in vain and untrue. That by new in-
stances are not always to be understood new recipes
but new assignations, and of the diversity between
these two. That the subtilty of words, arguments,
notions, yea of the senses themselves, is but rude and
gross in comparison of the subtilty of things ; and of
the slothful and flattering opinions of those which pre-
tend to honour the mind of man in withdrawing and
abstracting it from particulars, and of the inducements
and motives whereupon such opinions have been con-
ceived and received.

Cap. 13.

Of the error in propounding chiefly the search of
causes and productions of things concrete, which are
infinite and transitory, and not of abstract natures,
which are few and permanent. That these natures
are as the alphabet or simple letters, whereof the va-
riety of things consisteth ; or as the colours mingled
in the painter's shell, wherewith he is able to make
infinite variety of faces or shapes.1 An enumeration
of them according to popular note. That at the first
one would conceive that in the schools by natural

1 This last illustration is added in the margin in Bacon's hand.

64 OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE.

philosophy were meant the knowledge of the efficients
of things concrete ; and by metaphysic the knowledge
of the forms of nature simple ; which is a good and
fit division of knowledge : but upon examination there
is no such matter by them intended. That the little
inquiry into the production of simple natures sheweth
well that works were not sought ; because by the
former knowledge some small and superficial deflexions
from the ordinary generations and productions may be
found out, but the discovery of all profound and radical
alteration must arise out of the latter knowledge.

Cap. 14.

Of the error in propounding the search of the ma-
terials or dead beginnings or principles of things, and
not the nature of motions, inclinations, and applica-
tions. That the whole scope of the former search is
impertinent and vain ; both because there are no such
beginnings, and if there were they could not be known.
That the latter manner of search (which is all) they
pass over compendiously and slightly as a by-matter.
That the several conceits in that kind, as that the
lively and moving beginnings of things should be shift
or appetite of matter to privation ; the spirit of the
world working in matter according to platform ; the
preceeding or fructifying of distinct kinds according
to their proprieties; the intercourse of the elements
by mediation of their common qualities; the appetite
of like portions to unite themselves ; amity and dis-
cord, or sympathy and antipathy ; motion to the cen-
tre, with motion of stripe or press ; the casual agita-
tion, aggregation, and essays of the solid portions in
the void space ; motion of shuttings and openings ;

OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE. 65

are all mere nugations ; and that the calculating and
ordination of the true degrees, moments, limits, and
laws of motions and alterations (by means whereof
all works and effects are produced), is a matter of a
far other nature than to consist in such easy and wild
generalities.

Cap. 15.

Of the great error of inquiring knowledge in Anti-
cipations. That I call Anticipations the voluntary
collections that the mind maketh of knowledge j which
is every man's reason. That though this be a solemn
thing, and serves the turn to negotiate between man
and man (because of the conformity and participation
of men's minds in the like errors), yet towards inquiry
of the truth of things and works it is of no value.
That civil respects are a lett that this pretended reason
should not be so contemptibly spoken of as were fit
and medicinable, in regard that1 hath been too much
exalted and glorified, to the infinite detriment of man's
estate. Of the nature of words and their facility and
aptness to cover and grace the defects of Anticipations.
That it is no marvel if these Anticipations have
brought forth such diversity and repugnance in opin-
ions, theories, or philosophies, as so many fables2 of
several arguments. That had not the nature of civil
customs and government been in most times somewhat
adverse to such innovations, though contemplative,
there might have been and would have been many
more. That the second school of the Academics and
the sect of Pyrrho, or the considerers that denied

1 So MS. by mistake probably for it; the transcriber taking yt for yt.

2 fable in MS.

vol. vt. 5

66 OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE.

comprehension, as to the disabling of man's knowledge
(entertained in Anticipations) is well to be allowed,
but that they ought when they had overthrown and
purged the floor of the ruins to have sought to build
better in place. And more especially that they did
unjustly and prejudicially to charge the deceit upon
the report of the senses, which admitteth very sparing
remedy ; being indeed to have been charged upon the
Anticipations of the mind, which admitteth a perfect
remedy. That the information of the senses is suffi-
cient, not because they err not, but because the use
of the sense in discovering of knowledge is for the
most part not immediate. So that it is the work,
effect, or instance, that trieth the Axiom, and the sense
doth but tiy the work done or not done, being or not
being. That the mind of man in collecting knowledge
needeth great variety of helps, as well as the hand of
man in manual and mechanical practices needeth great
variety of instruments. And that it were a poor work
that if instruments were removed men would overcome
with their naked hands. And of the distinct points
of want and insufficiency in the mind of man.

Cap. 16.

That the mind of a man, as it is not a vessel of that
content or receipt to comprehend knowledge without
helps and supplies, so again it is not sincere, but of an
ill and corrupt tincture. Of the inherent and pro-
found errors and superstitions in the nature of the
mind, and of the four sorts of Idols or false appear-
ances that offer themselves to the understanding in the
inquisition of knowledge ; that is to say, the Idols of
the Tribe, the Idols of the Palace, the Idols of the

OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE. 67

Cave, and the Idols of the Theatre. That these four,
added to the incapacity of the mind and the vanity
and malignity of the affections, leave nothing but im-
potency and confusion. A recital of the particular
kinds of these four Idols, with some chosen examples
of the opinions they have begot, such of them as have
supplanted the state of knowledge most.

Cap. 17.

Of the errors of such as have descended and applied
themselves to experience, and attempted to induce
knowledge upon particulars. That they have not had
the resolution and strength of mind to free themselves
wholly from Anticipations, but have made a confusion
and intermixture of Anticipations and observations, and
so vanished. That if any have had the strength of mind
generally to purge away and discharge all Anticipa-
tions, they have not had that greater and double
strength and patience of mind, as well to repel new
Anticipations after the view and search of particulars,
as to reject old which were in their mind before ; but
have from particulars and history flown up to prin-
ciples without the mean degrees, and so framed all the
middle generalities or axioms, not by way of scale or
ascension from particulars, but by way of derivation
from principles ; whence hath issued the infinite chaos
of shadows and notions,1 wherewith both books and
minds have 2 been hitherto, and may be yet hereafter
much more pestered. That in the course of those
derivations, to make them yet the more unprofitable,

1 This word is written between the lines in Bacon's hand, and I am not
sure that I read it right. Stephens read it moths, which is certainly wrong.
It is more like nocons than any word I can think of.

« hath in MS.

68 OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE.

they have used when any light of new instance oppo-
site to any assertion appeared, rather to reconcile the
instance than to amend the rule. That if any have
had or shall have the power and resolution to fortify
and inclose his mind against all Anticipations, yet if
he have not been or shall not be cautioned by the full
understanding of the nature of the mind and spirit of
man, and therein of the seats pores and passages both
of knowledge and error, he hath not been nor shall
not be possibly able to guide or keep on his course
aright. That those that have been conversant in ex-
perience and observation have used, when they have
intended to discover the cause of any effect, to fix their
consideration narrowly and exactly upon that effect
itself with all the circumstances thereof, and to vary
the trial thereof as many ways as can be devised ;
which course amounteth but to a tedious curiosity, and
ever breaketh off in wondering and not in knowing ;
and that they have not used to enlarge their observa-
tion to match and sort that effect with instances of a
diverse subject, which * must of necessity be before any
cause be found out. That they have passed over the
observation of instances vulgar and ignoble, and stayed
their attention chiefly upon instances of mark ; whereas
the other sort are for the most part more significant'
and of better light and information. That every par-
ticular that worketh any effect is a thing compounded
(more or less) of diverse single natures, (more mani-
fest and more obscure,) and that it appeareth not to
whether of the natures the effect is to be ascribed, and
yet notwithstanding they have taken a course without

1 The words " according to their own rules " follow in the MS., but a
line is drawn through them.

OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE. 69

breaking particulars and reducing them by exclusions
and inclusions to a definite point, to conclude upon
inductions in gross, which empirical course is no less
vain than the scholastical. That all such as have
sought action and work out of their inquiry have been
hasty and pressing to discover some practices for pres-
ent use, and not to discover Axioms, joining with them
the new assignations as their sureties. That the fore-
running of the mind to frame recipes upon Axioms at
the entrance, is like Atalanta's golden ball that hinder-
eth and interrupteth the course, and is to be inhibited
till you have ascended to a certain stage and degree of
generalities ; which forbearance will be liberally recom-
pensed in the end ; and that chance discovereth new
inventions by one and one, but science by knots and
clusters. That they have not collected sufficient quan-
tity of particulars, nor them in sufficient certainty and
subtilty, nor of all several kinds, nor with those advan-
tages and discretions in the entry and sorting which
are requisite ; and of the weak manner of collecting
natural history which hath been used. Lastly that
they had no knowledge of the formulary of interpre-
tation, the work whereof is to abridge experience and
to make things as certainly found out by Axiom in
short time, as by infinite experiences in ages.

Cap. 18.

That the cautels and devices put in practice in the
delivery of knowledge for the covering and palliating
of ignorance, and the gracing and overvaluing of that
they utter, are without number ; but none more bold
and more hurtful than two ; the one that men have
used of a few observations upon any subject to make a

70 OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE.

solemn and formal art, by filling it up with discourse,
accommodating it with some circumstances and direc-
tions to practice, and digesting it into method, whereby
men grow satisfied and secure, as if no more inquiry
were to be made of that matter ; the other, that men
have used to discharge ignorance with credit, in defin-
ing all those effects which they cannot attain unto to
be out of the compass of art and human endeavour.
That the very styles and forms of utterance are so
many characters of imposture, some choosing a style
of pugnacity and contention, some of satire and rep-
rehension, some of plausible and tempting similitudes
and examples, some of great words and high discourse,
some of short and dark sentences, some of exactness
of method, all of positive affirmation, without disclos-
ing the true motives and proofs of their opinions, or
free confessing their ignorance or doubts, except it be
now and then for a grace, and in cunning to win the
more credit in the rest, and not in good faith. That
although men be free from these errors and incum-
brances in the will and affection, yet it is not a thing so
easy as is conceived to convey the conceit of one man's
mind into the mind of another without loss or mistak-
ing, specially in notions new and differing from those
that are received. That never any knowledge was
delivered in the same order it was invented, no not
in the mathematic, though it should seem otherwise
in regard that the propositions placed last do use the
propositions or grants placed first for their proof and
demonstration. That there are forms and methods
of tradition wholly distinct and differing, according to
their ends whereto they are directed. That there are
two ends of tradition of knowledge, the one to teach

OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE. 71

and instruct for use and practice, the other to impart
or intimate for re-examination and progression. That
the former of these ends requireth a method not the
same whereby it was invented and induced, but such
as is most compendious and ready whereby it may be
used and applied. That the latter of the ends, which
is where a knowledge is delivered to be continued and
spun on by a succession of labours, requireth a method
whereby it may be transposed to another in the same
manner as it was collected, to the end it may be dis-
cerned both where the work is weak, and where it
breaketh off. That this latter method is not only
unfit for the former end, but also impossible for all
knowledge gathered and insinuated by Anticipations,
because the mind working inwardly of itself, no man
can give a just account how he came to that knowledge
which he hath received, and that therefore this method
is peculiar for knowledge gathered by interpretation.
That the discretion anciently observed, though by the
precedent of many vain persons and deceivers dis-
graced, of publishing part, and reserving part to a pri-
vate succession, and of publishing in a manner whereby
it shall not be to the capacity nor taste of all, but shall
as it were single and adopt his reader, is not to be laid
aside, both for the avoiding of abuse in the excluded,
and the strengthening of affection in the admitted.
That there are other virtues of tradition, as that there
be no occasion given to error, and that it carry a vigour
to root and spread against the vanity of wits and inju-
ries of time ; all which if they were ever due to any
knowledge delivered, or if they were never due to any
human knowledge heretofore delivered, yet are now
due to the knowledge propounded.

72 of the interpretation of nature.

Cap. 19.

Of the impediments which have been in the affec-
tions, the principle whereof hath been despair or diffi-
dence, and the strong apprehension of the difficulty,
obscurity, and infiniteness which belongeth to the in-
vention of knowledge, and that men have not known
their own strength, and that the supposed difficulties
and vastness of the work is rather in shew and muster
than in state or substance where the true way is taken.
That this diffidence hath moved and caused some never
to enter into search, and others when they have been
entered either to give over or to seek a more compen-
dious course than can stand with the nature of true
search. That of those that have refused and prejudged
inquiry, the more sober and grave sort of wits have
depended upon authors and traditions, and the more
vain and credulous resorted to revelation and intelli-
gence with spirits and higher natures. That of those
that have entered into search, some having fallen upon
some conceits which they after consider to be the same
which they have found in former authors, have sudden-
ly taken a persuasion that a man shall but with much
labour incur and light upon the same inventions which
he might with ease receive from others ; and that it is
but a vanity and self-pleasing of the wit to go about
again, as one that would rather have a flower of his
own gathering, than much better gathered to his hand.
That the same humour of sloth and diffidence suggest-
eth that a man shall but revive some ancient opinion,
which was long ago propounded, examined, and reject-
ed. And that it is easy to err in conceit that a man's
observation or notion is the same with a former opinion,

OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE. 73

both because new conceits must of necessity be uttered
in old words, and because J upon true and erroneous
grounds men may meet in consequence or conclusion,
as several lines or circles that cut in some one point.
That the greatest part of those that have descended into
search have chosen for the most artificial and compen-
dious course to induce principles out of particulars, and
to reduce all other propositions unto principles ; and so
instead of the nearest way, have been led to no way or
a mere labyrinth. That the two contemplative ways
have some resemblance with the old parable of the two
moral ways, the one beginning with incertainty and
difficulty, and ending in plainness and certainty, and
the other beginning with shew of plainness and cer-
tainty, and ending in difficulty and incertainty. Of
the great and manifest error and untrue conceit or
estimation of the infiniteness of particulars, whereas
indeed all prolixity is in discourse and derivations ; and
of the infinite and most laborious expence of wit that
hath been employed upon toys and matters of no fruit
or value. That although the period of one age cannot
advance men to the furthest point of interpretation of
nature, (except the work should be undertaken with
greater helps than can be expected), yet it cannot fail
in much less space of time to make return of many
singular commodities towards the state and occasions
of man's life. That there is less reason of distrust in
the course of interpretation now propounded than in
any knowledge formerly delivered, because this course
doth in sort equal men's wits, and leaveth no great
advantage or preeminence to the perfect and excellent

1 A parenthesis "(as the Schools well know) " which follows here, has a
line drawn through it.

74 OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE.

motions of the spirit. That to draw a straight line or
to make a circle perfect round by aim of hand only,
there must be a great difference between an unsteady
and unpractised hand and a steady and practised, but
to do it by rule or compass it is much alike.

Cap. 21.

Of the impediments which have been in the two ex
treme humours of admiration of antiquity and love of
novelty, and again of over-servile reverence or over-
light scorn of the opinions of others.

Cap. 22.

Of the impediments which have been in the affection
of pride, specially of one kind, which is the disdain
of dwelling and being conversant much in experiences
and particulars, specially such as are vulgar in occur-
rency, and base and ignoble in use. That besides
certain higher mysteries of pride, generalities seem to
have a dignity and solemnity, in that they do not put
men in mind of their familiar actions, in that they
have less affinity with arts mechanical and illiberal, in
that they are not so subject to be controuled by persons
of mean observation, in that they seem to teach men
that they know not, and not to refer them to that
they know. All which conditions directly feeding the
humour of pride, particulars do want. That the majes-
ty of generalities, and the divine nature of the mind in
taking them (if they be truly collected, and be indeed
the direct reflexions of things,) cannot be too much
magnified. And that it is true that interpretation is
the very natural and direct intention, action, and pro-
gression of the understanding delivered from impedi-

OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE. 75

merits. And that all Anticipation is but a deflexion
or declination by accident.

Cap. 25.

Of the impediments which have been in the state of
heathen religion and other superstitions and errors of
religion. And that in the true religion there hath not1
nor is any impediment, except it be by accident or
intermixture of humour. That a religion which con-
sisteth in rites and forms of adoration, and not in
confessions and beliefs, is adverse to knowledge ; be-
cause men having liberty to inquire and discourse of
Theology at pleasure, it cometh to pass that all in-
quisition of nature endeth and limiteth itself in such
metaphysical or theological discourse ; whereas if men's
wits be shut out of that port, it turneth them again to
discover, and so to seek reason of reason more deeply.
And that such was the religion of the Heathen. That
a religion that is jealous of the variety of learning,
discourse, opinions, and sects, (as misdoubting it may
shake the foundations,) or that cherisheth devotion
upon simplicity and ignorance, as ascribing ordinary
effects to the immediate working of God, is adverse
to knowledge. That such is the religion of the Turk,
and such hath been the abuse of Christian religion at
some several times, and in some several factions. And
of the singular advantage which the Christian religion
hath towards the furtherance of true knowledge, in that
it excludeth and interdicteth human reason, whether by
interpretation or anticipation, from examining or dis-
cussing of the mysteries and principles of faith,
i So MS.

76

OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE.

Cap. 26.

Of the impediments which have been in the nature
of society and the policies of state. That there is no
composition of estate or society, nor order or quality
of persons, which have not some point of contrariety
towards true knowledge. That monarchies incline wits
to profit and pleasure, and commonwealths to glory and
vanity. That universities incline wits to sophistry and
affectation, cloisters to fables and unprofitable subtilty,
study at large to variety ; and that it is hard to say,
whether mixture of contemplations with an active life,
or retiring wholly to contemplations, do disable and
hinder the mind more.

ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

PREFACE

THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEAENING.

The first edition of the Advancement of Learning is
dated 1605. In what month it appeared is doubtful ;
but from certain allusions in a letter sent by Bacon to
Tobie Matthew with a presentation copy, I gather (for
the letter bears no date) that it was not out before the
latter end of October.

Tobie Matthew, eldest son of the Bishop of Durham,
was then about 27 years old, and had been intimate
with Bacon, certainly for the last three years, and prob-
ably for more. Bacon had a high opinion of his abili-
ties and seems to have consulted him about his works.
" I have now at last (he says in this letter) taught that
child to go, at the swaddling whereof you were. My
work touching the Proficiency and Advancement of
Learning I have put into two books, whereof the
former, which you saw, I account but as a Page to
the latter. I have now published them both, where-
of I thought it a small adventure to send you a copy,
who have more right to it than any man, except
Bishop Andrews, who was my Inquisitor."1

1 Sir Tobie Matthew's collection of English letters, p. xi. Andrews was
made a Bishop on the 3d of November, 1605.

80 PREFACE TO

Now Matthew had been abroad since April, 1605 ;
and as he had seen the first book only, it is probable
that the second was not then written ; a circumstance
which may be very naturally accounted for, if I am
right in supposing that the Advancement of Learning
was begun immediately after the accession of James I.
From the death of Elizabeth, 24th March, 1602-3, to
the meeting of James's first Parliament, 19th March,
1603-4, Bacon had very little to do. He held indeed
the same place among the Learned Counsel which he
had held under Elizabeth, but his services were little if
at all used. On the 3d of July, 1603, we find him
writing to Lord Cecil : — " For my purpose or course,
I desire to meddle as little as I can in the King's
causes, his Majesty now abounding in counsel. . . .
My ambition now I shall only put upon my pen, where-
by I shall be able to maintain memory and merit of the
times succeeding." And in the trial of Sir Walter Ra-
leigh at Winchester in the following November (though
it was a complicated case involving many persons and
requiring a great number of examinations) he does not
appear to have been employed at all. But from
the meeting of Parliament in March till the end of
1604 he was incessantly employed ; first during the
session (which lasted till the 7th of July) in the busi-
ness of the House of Commons ; then during the vaca-
tion, in preparation for the Commission of the Union1
which was to meet in October ; and from that time to
the beginning of December in the business of the Com-
mission itself; — all matters of extreme urgency and

1 See "Certain Articles or Considerations touching the union of the
Kingdoms of England and Scotland; collected and dispersed for His Maj-
esty's better service."

THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 81

importance, and the "labour whereof, for men of his
profession, rested most upon his hand."1

On the 4th of December the Commissioners signed
their report ; and on the 24th the next meeting of Par-
liament, which had been fixed for February, was post-
poned till October. This prorogation secured Bacon
another interval of leisure ; an interval longer perhaps,
considering the nature of the public services which had
now fallen upon him, than he was likely soon again to
enjoy ; and which it was the more important therefore
to use in finishing the great literary work which he
had begun. The same consideration may have deter-
mined him to be content with a less perfect treatment
of the subject than he had originally designed ; for cer-
tainlv the second book, though so much the more im-
portant of the two, is in point of execution much less
careful and elaborate than the first, and bears many
marks of hasty composition. The presumption that
an interval occurred between the writing of the two is
further confirmed by the fact that they were not printed
at the same time. The first ends with a half-sheet, and
the second begins upon a fresh one with a new signa-
ture ; whence I suppose we may infer that the first
had been printed off before the second was ready for
the press.

Of the motives which induced Bacon to undertake
and hurry forward the Advancement of Learning at
that particular time, and of those which afterwards
suggested the incorporation of it into his great work
on the Interpretation of Nature, I have already ex-
plained my own view in my preface to the De Aug-
mentis. Upon all matters requiring explanation or

1 Letter to the King, touching the Solicitor's place.

82 PREFACE TO

illustration the reader is referred to Mr. Ellis's notes
upon the corresponding passages in that more finished
work ; and that the reference may be more easy I have
marked the places where the several chapters begin ;
adding some account, more or less complete, of the
principal differences between the two. In many cases
these differences are so extensive that no adequate idea
of their nature could be given within the limits of a
note ; and in such cases I have been content with a
simple reference to the place. But where the sub-
stance of any addition or alteration which seemed to
me material could be stated succinctly, — especially if
it involved any modification of the opinion expressed
in the text, — I have generally endeavoured to state
it ; sometimes translating Bacon's words, sometimes
giving the effect in my own, as I found most conven-
ient.

For the text, I have treated the edition of 1605 as
the only original authority ; the corrections introduced
by later editors, though often unquestionably right,
being (as far as I can see) merely conjectural. And
therefore, though I have adopted all such corrections
into the text whenever I was satisfied that they give
the true reading, I have always quoted in a note the
reading of the original. Only in the typographical ar-
rangement with respect to capitals, italics, &c, (which
in the original was probably left to the printer's taste,
and is inconsistent in itself, and would be perplexing to
modern eyes,) and also in the punctuation, which is
extremely confused and inaccurate, I have used the
full liberty of my own judgment ; altering as much as
I pleased, and endeavouring only to make the sense
clear to an eye accustomed to modern books, with-

THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 83

out encumbering the page with any notice of such
alterations.

There is one innovation however which I have ven-
tured to introduce and which it is necessary to explain.
The Advancement of Learning was written for readers
who were familiar with Latin, and abounds with Latin
quotations. In these days it may be read with profit
by many persons of both sexes to whom such quota-
tions are a very perplexing obstruction. Forming as
they generally do a part of the context, so that the
sentence is not complete without them, those who
cannot read Latin are in many cases unable to follow
the sense of the English. To give such readers the
means of understanding them seemed therefore no less
than necessary ; and I thought the true effect of them
would be conveyed to the mind most perfectly and sat-
isfactorily by presenting the interpretations in such a
form that they might be read in their places, just as
they would have been had they formed part of the
original text, and just as they are in those passages
where Bacon has himself furnished the interpretation.
Following his example therefore as nearly as I could, I
have endeavoured to give the effect of each of these
Latin quotations in such a form as seemed to suit best
the English idiom and to fall best into the English con-
text ; not tying myself to literal translation, but rather
preferring to vary the expression, especially where I
could by that means give it such a turn as to throw the
emphasis more distinctly upon that part of the quota-
tion which was more particularly in point. Thus it
will be found, I think, that those who understand the
Latin may still read the English without feeling it to
be a mere repetition, while those who do not will in

84

PREFACE TO THE ADV. OF LEARNING.

reading the English alone find the sense always com-
plete. It was evident however that translations of
this kind could not be read in this way conveniently if
inserted in notes at the bottom of the page ; and there-
fore, there being no room in the margin, I have ven-
tured to insert them in the text ; from which however,
that they may not be mistaken for a part of it, I have
always taken care to distinguish them by brackets. In
a few cases where a Latin quotation occurs, not fol-
lowed by a translation within brackets, it is to be un-
derstood that it is introduced merely as a voucher for
what has just been said in the English, or for the pur-
pose of suggesting a classical allusion which a transla-
tion would not suggest except to a classical reader, and
that the sense is complete without it. In a few other
cases where a quotation is followed by a translation not
included within brackets, it is to be understood that
it is Bacon's own translation and forms part of the
original text.

For all the notes except those signed R. L. E.,
which are Mr. Ellis's, I am responsible.

J. S.

THE

TWOO BOOKES OF FBANCIS BACON

OF THE

PKOFICIENCE

AND

ADVANCEMENT OF LEAENING

DIVINE AND HUMANE.
TO THE KING.

At London:

Printed for Henrie Tomes, and are to be sold at his shop at Graies

Inne Gate in Holborne.

1605.

THE

FIRST BOOK OF FEANCIS BACON

OF THE

PROFICIENCE AND ADVANCEMENT OF
LEARNING

DIVINE AND HUMAN.

TO THE KING.

There were under the Law (excellent King) both
daily sacrifices and freewill offerings ; the one proceed-
ing upon ordinary observance, the other upon a devout
cheerfulness. In like manner there belongeth to kings
from their servants both tribute of duty and presents
of affection. In the former of these I hope I shall not
live to be wanting, according to my most humble duty,
and the good pleasure of your Majesty's employments :
for the later, I thought it more respective to make choice
of some oblation which might rather refer to the pro-
priety and excellency of your individual person, than
to the business of your crown and state.

Wherefore representing your Majesty many times
unto my mind, and beholding you not with the in-
quisitive eye of presumption to discover that which

88 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

the Scripture telleth me is inscrutable, but with the
observant eye of duty and admiration ; leaving aside
the other parts of your virtue and fortune, I have been
touched, yea and possessed with an extreme wonder at
those your virtues and faculties which the philosophers
call intellectual ; the largeness of your capacity, the
faithfulness of your memory, the swiftness of your
apprehension, the penetration of your judgment, and
the facility and order of your elocution : and I have
often thought that of all the persons living that I have
known, your Majesty were the best instance to make
a man of Plato's opinion, that all knowledge is but
remembrance, and that the mind of man by nature
knoweth all things, and hath but her own native and
original notions x (which by the strangeness and dark-
ness of this tabernacle of the body are sequestered)
again revived and restored : such a light of nature I
have observed in your Majesty, and such a readiness
to take flame and blaze from the least occasion present-
ed, or the least spark of another's knowledge delivered.
And as the Scripture saith of the wisest king, That his
heart was as the sands of the sea; which though it
be one of the largest bodies yet it consisteth of the
smallest and finest portions ; so hath God given your
Majesty a composition of understanding admirable,
being able to compass and comprehend the greatest
matters, and nevertheless to toucli and apprehend the
least ; whereas it should seem an impossibility in nature
for the same instrument to make itself fit for great and
small works. And for your gift of speech, I call to
mind what Cornelius Tacitus saith of Augustus Ctesar ;
Augusto projluens, et qua principem deceret, eloquentia

1 So edd. 1629 and 1633. Ed. 1605 has motions.

THE FIRST BOOK. 89

fuit ; [that his style of speech was flowing and prince-
like : J] for if we note it well, speech that is uttered
with labour and difficulty, or speech that savoureth
of the affectation of art and precepts, or speech that
is framed after the imitation of some pattern of elo-
quence, though never so excellent, — all this has some-
what servile, and holding of the subject. But your
Majesty's manner of speech is indeed prince-like, flow-
ing as from a fountain, and yet streaming and branching
itself into nature's order, full of facility and felicity,
imitating none and inimitable by any. And as in your
civil estate there appeareth to be an emulation and con-
tention of your Majesty's virtue with your fortune ; a
virtuous disposition with a fortunate regiment ; a virt-
uous expectation (when time was) of your greater
fortune, with a prosperous possession thereof in the
due time ; a virtuous observation of the laws of mar-
riage, with most blessed and happy fruit of marriage ;
a virtuous and most Christian desire of peace, with a
fortunate inclination in your neighbour princes there-
unto : so likewise in these intellectual matters, there
seemeth to be no less contention between the excellen-
cy of your Majesty's gifts of nature and the universality
and perfection of your learning. For I am well assured
that this which I shall say is no amplification at all,
but a positive and measured truth ; which is, that
there hath not been since Christ's time any king or
temporal monarch which hath been so learned in all
literature and erudition, divine and human. For let

1 Observe that the translations within brackets are not in the original,
but inserted by myself. My reasons for adopting this plan, and the prin-
ciple upon which I have proceeded in translating, are explained in the
preface.

90 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

a man seriously and diligently revolve and peruse the
succession of the emperors of Rome, of which Caesar
the dictator, who lived some years before Christ, and
Marcus Antoninus were the best learned ; and so de-
scend to the emperors of Grsecia, or of the West, and
then to the lines of France, Spain, England, Scotland,
and the rest ; and he shall find this judgment is truly
made.1 For it seemeth much in a king, if by the com-
pendious extractions of other men's wits and labours
he can take hold of any superficial ornaments and
shews of learning, or if he countenance and prefer
learning and learned men : but to drink indeed of the
true fountains of learning, nay to have such a fountain
of learning in himself, in a king, and in a king born,
is almost a miracle. And the more, because there is
met in your Majesty a rare conjunction as well of di-
vine and sacred literature as of profane and human ;
so as your Majesty standeth invested of that triplicity
which in great veneration was ascribed to the ancient
Hermes ; the power and fortune of a King, the knowl-
edge and illumination of a Priest, and the learning and
universality of a Philosopher. This propriety inherent
and individual attribute in your Majesty deserveth to
be expressed not only in the fame and admiration of
the present time, nor in the history or tradition of the
ages succeeding ; but also in some solid work, fixed
memorial, and immortal monument, bearing a charac-
ter or signature both of the power of a king and the
difference and perfection of such a king.

Therefore I did conclude with myself, that I could

1 In the translation the reference to the particular dynasties is omitted ;
he only says, — Percurrat qui volutrit imperatorum el rerum seriem, et
juxta mecum sentiet.

THE FIRST BOOK. 91

not make unto your Majesty a better oblation than of
some treatise tending to that end ; whereof the sum
will consist of these two parts : the former concerning
the excellency of learning and knowledge, and the
excellency of the merit and true glory in the augmenta-
tion and propagation thereof; the later,1 what the par-
ticular acts and works are which have been embraced
and undertaken for the advancement of learning, and
again what defects and undervalues I find in such par-
ticular acts ; to the end that though I cannot positively
or affirmatively advise your Majesty, or propound unto
you framed particulars, yet I may excite your princely
cogitations to visit the excellent treasure of your own
mind, and thence to extract particulars for this purpose
agreeable to your magnanimity and wrisdom.

In the entrance to the former of these, — to clear
the way, and as it were to make silence to have the
true testimonies concerning the dignity of learning to
be better heard without the interruption of tacit objec-
tions, — I think good to deliver it from the discredits
and disgraces wrhich it hath received ; all from igno-
rance ; but ignorance severally disguised ; appearing
sometimes in the zeal and jealousy of divines, some-
times in the severity and arrogancy of politiques, and
sometimes in the errors and imperfections of learned
men themselves.

I hear the former sort say, that knowledge is of

1 1 have observed elsewhere, that it was only the latter part which en-
tered into the original scheme of the Instauratio Magna. And though in
adapting the Advancement of Learning to it, he retained the former part,
yet he marks it in the translation as comparatively unimportant ; adding
with regard to the first, qua levior est, neque tamen ullo modo pratermittenda,
and with regard to the second, quod caput rei est.

92 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

those things which are to be accepted of with great
limitation and caution ; that the aspiring to over-much
knowledge was the original temptation and sin, where-
upon ensued the fall of man ; that knowledge hath in
it somewhat of the serpent, and therefore where it
entereth into a man it makes him swell, — Scientia
inflat, [knowledge puffeth up ;] that Salomon gives a
censure, That there is no end of making books, and that
much reading is weariness of the flesh ; and again in
another place, That in spacious knowledge there is much
contristation, and that he that increaseth knowledge in-
creaseth anxiety ; that St. Paul gives a caveat, That we
be not spoiled through vain philosophy ; that experience
demonstrates how learned men have been arch heretics,
how learned times have been inclined to atheism, and
how the contemplation of second causes doth derogate
from our dependence upon God, who is the first cause.
To discover then the ignorance and error of this
opinion and the misunderstanding in the grounds there-
of, it may well appear these men do not observe or
consider that it was not the pure knowledge of nature
and universality, a knowledge by the light whereof
man did give names unto other creatures in Paradise,
as they were brought before him, according unto their
proprieties, which gave the occasion to the fall ; but it
was the proud knowledge of good and evil, with an
intent in man to give law unto himself and to depend
no more upon God's commandments, which was the
form of the temptation. Neither is it any quantity of
knowledge how great soever that can make the mind
of man to swell ; for nothing can fill, much less extend,
the soul of man, but God and the contemplation of
God ; and therefore Salomon speaking of the two prin-

THE FIRST BOOK. 93

cipal senses of inquisition, the eye and the ear, affirmeth
that the eye is never satisfied with seeing, nor the ear
with hearing ; and if there be no fulness, then is the
continent greater than the content: so of knowledge
itself and the mind of man, whereto the senses are but
reporters, he defineth likewise in these words, placed
after that calendar or ephemerides which he maketh of
the diversities of times and seasons for all actions and
purposes ; and concludeth thus : God hath made all
things beautiful, or decent, in the true return of their
seasons : Also he hath placed the world in maris heart,
yet cannot man find out the work which God workeih
from the beginning to the end: declaring not obscurely
that God hath framed the mind of man as a mirror or
glass capable of the image of the universal world, and
joyful to receive the impression thereof, as the eye joy-
eth to receive light ; and not only delighted in behold-
ing the variety of things and vicissitude of times, but
raised also to find out and discern the ordinances and
decrees which throughout all those changes are infalli-
bly observed. And although he doth insinuate that
the supreme or summary law of nature, which he
calleth the work which God workeih from the beginning
to the end, is not possible to be found out by man ; yet
that doth not derogate from the capacity of the mind,
but may be referred to the impediments, as of shortness
of life, ill conjunction of labours, ill tradition of knowl-
edge over from hand to hand, and many other incon-
veniences whereunto the condition of man is subject.
For that nothing parcel of the world is denied to man's
inquiry and invention he doth in another place rule
over, when he saith, The spirit of man is as the lamp
of God, wherewith he searcheth the inwardness of all

94 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

secrets. If then such be the capacity and receit of
the mind of man, it is manifest that there is no danger
at all in the proportion or quantity of knowledge, how
large soever, lest it should make it swell or out-compass
itself; no, but it is merely the quality of knowledge,
which be it in quantity more or less, if it be taken
without the true corrective thereof, hath in it some
nature of venom or malignity, and some effects of that
venom,« which is ventosity or swelling. This corrective
spice, the mixture whereof maketh knowledge so sov-
ereign, is Charity, which the apostle immediately add-
eth to the former clause ; for so he saith, knowledge
bloweth up, but charity buildeth up ; not unlike unto
that which he delivereth in another place: If I spake
(saith he) with the tongues of men and angels, and had
not charity, it were bat as a tinkling cymbal; not but
that it is an excellent thing to speak with the tongues
of men and angels, but because if it be severed from
charity, and not referred to the good of men and man-
kind, it hath rather a sounding and unworthy glory than
a meriting and substantial virtue. And as for that
censure of Salomon concerning the excess of writing
and reading books and the anxiety of spirit which re-
doundeth from knowledge, and that admonition of St.
Paul, That ice be not seduced by vain philosophy ; let
those places be rightly understood, and they do indeed
excellently set forth the true bounds and limitations
whereby human knowledge is confined and circum-
scribed ; and yet without any such contracting or co-
arctation, but that it may comprehend all the universal
nature of things. For these limitations arc three.
The first, that we do not so place our felicity in knowl-
edge, as we forget our mortality. The second, that we

THE FIRST BOOK. 95

make application of our knowledge to give ourselves re-
pose and contentment, and not distaste or repining. The
third, that we do not presume by the contemplation of na-
ture to attain to the mysteries of God. For as touching
the first of these, Salomon doth excellently expound
himself in another place of the same book, where he
saith ; I saw well that knowledge recedeth as far from
ignorance as light doth from darkness, and that the wise
mail's eyes keep watch in his head, whereas the fool round-
eth about in darkness : but withal I learned that the same
mortality involveth them both. And for the second, cer-
tain it is, there is no vexation or anxiety of mind which
resulteth from knowledge otherwise than merely by
accident ; for all knowledge and wonder (which is
the seed of knowledge) is an impression of pleasure
in itself: but when men fall to framing conclusions out
of their knowledge, applying it to their particular, and
ministering to themselves thereby weak fears or vast
desires, there groweth that carefulness and trouble of
mind which is spoken of: for then knowledge is no
more Lumen siccum [a dry light], whereof Heraclitus
the profound said, Lumen siccum optima anima,1 [the
dry light is the best soul ;] but it becometh Lumen
madidum or maceratum, [a light charged with moist-
ure,] being steeped and infused in the humours of the
affections. And as for the third point, it deserveth to
be a little stood upon and not to be lightly passed over :
for if any man shall think by view and inquiry into

l avyrj %T)pf/ ipvxrj (70<j>ututt] : a corruption, according to the conjecture
of Professor W. H. Thompson, of avrj xjjv^t/ oo<j>ururn ; ^rjpfj having been
first inserted by one commentator, to explain the unusual word avrj, and
so passed into the text ; alij having been turned into avyij by another, to
make sense. See Remains of Professor Archer Butler, vol. i. p. 314.

96 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

these sensible and material things to attain that light
whereby he may reveal unto himself the nature or will
of God, then indeed is he spoiled by vain philosophy :
for the contemplation of God's creatures and works
produceth (having regard to the works and creatures
themselves) knowledge ; but having regard to God, no
perfect knowledge, but wonder, which is broken knowl-
edge. And therefore it was most aptly said by one of
Plato's school, That the sense of man carrieth a resem-
blance with the sun, which (as we see) openeth and re-
vealeth all the terrestrial globe; but then again it obscur-
eih and concealeth the stars and celestial globe : so doth
the sense discover natural things, but it darkeneth and
shutteth up divine. And hence it is true that it hath
proceeded that divers great learned men have been
heretical, whilst they have sought to fly up to the se-
crets of the Deity by the waxen wings of the senses.
And as for the conceit that too much knowledge should
incline a man to atheism, and that the ignorance of
second causes should make a more devout dependence
upon God which is the first cause ; first, it is good to
ask the question which Job asked of his friends, Will
you lie for God, as one man will do for another, to grat-
ify him ? For certain it is that God worketh nothing
in nature but by second causes ; and if they would
have it otherwise believed, it is mere imposture, as it
were in favour towards God ; and nothing else but to
offer to the author of truth the unclean sacrifice of a lie.
But farther, it is an assured truth and a conclusion of
experience, that a little or superficial knowledge of phi-
losophy may incline the mind of man to atheism, but a
farther proceeding therein doth bring the mind back
again to religion ; for in the entrance of philosophy,

THE FIRST BOOK. 97

when the second causes, which are next unto the senses,
do offer themselves to the mind of man, if it dwell and
stay there, it may induce some oblivion of the highest
cause ; but when a man passeth on farther, and seeth
the dependence of causes and the works of Providence ;
then, according to the allegory of the poets, he will
easily believe that the highest link of nature's chain j
must needs be tied to the foot of Jupiter's chair. To
conclude therefore, let no man, upon a weak conceit of
sobriety or an ill-applied moderation, think or maintain
that a man can search too far or be too well studied in
the book of God's word or in the book of God's works ;
divinity or philosophy ; but rather let men endeavour
an endless progress or proficience in both ; only let
men beware that they apply both to charity, and not
to swelling ; to use, and not to ostentation ; and again,
that they do not unwisely mingle or confound these
learnings together.

And as for the disgraces which learning receiveth
from politiques, they be of this nature ; that learning ,
doth soften men's minds, and makes them more unapt
for the honour and exercise of arms ; that it doth mar
and pervert men's dispositions for matter of government
and policy, in making them too curious and irresolute
by variety of reading, or too peremptory or positive
by strictness of rules and axioms, or too immoderate
and overweening by reason of the greatness of exam-
ples, or too incompatible and differing from the times
by reason of the dissimilitude of examples ; or at least
that it doth divert men's travails from action and^
business, and bringeth them to a love of leisure and
privateness ; and that it doth bring into states a relax-

98 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

ation of discipline, whilst every man is more ready to
argue than to obey and execute. Out of this conceit
Cato surnamed the Censor, one of the wisest men in-
deed that ever lived, when Carneades the philosopher
came in embassage to Rome, and that the young men
of Rome began to flock about him, being allured with
the sweetness and majesty of his eloquence and learn-
ing, gave counsel in open senate that they should give
him his dispatch with all speed, lest he should infect
and inchant the minds and affections of the youth, and
at unawares bring in an alteration of the manners and
customs of the state. Out of the same conceit or hu-
mour did Virgil, turning his pen to the advantage of
his country and the disadvantage of his own profession,
make a kind of separation between policy and govern-
ment and between arts and sciences, in the verses so
much renowned, attributing and challenging the one to
the Romans, and leaving and yielding the other to the
Grecians ; Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memen-
to, Hce tibi erunt artes, &c.

[Be thine, O Rome,
With arts of government to rule the nations.]

So likewise we see that Anytus, the accuser of Socra-
tes, laid it as an article of charge and accusation against
him that he did with the variety and power of his dis-
courses and disputations withdraw young men from due
reverence to the laws and customs of their country ;
and that he did profess a dangerous and pernicious
science, which was to make the worse matter seem
the better, and to suppress truth by force of eloquence
and speech.

But these and the like imputations have rather a
countenance of gravity than any ground of justice:

THE FIRST BOOK. 99

for experience doth warrant that both in persons and
in times there hath been a meeting and concurrence
in learning and arms, nourishing and excelling in the
same men and the same ages. For as for men, there
cannot be a better nor the like instance, as of that pair,
Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar the dictator;
whereof the one was Aristotle's scholar in philosophy,
and the other was Cicero's rival in eloquence ; or if
any man had rather call for scholars that were great
generals than generals that were great scholars, let him
take Epaminondas the Theban, or Xenophon the Athe-
nian ; whereof the one was the first that abated the
power of Sparta, and the other was the first that made
way to the overthrow of the monarchy of Persia. And
this concurrence is yet more visible in times than in
persons, by how much an age is greater object than a
man. For both in iEgypt, Assyria, Persia, Graecia, and
Rome, the same times that are most renowned for arms
are likewise most admired for learning ; so that the
greatest authors and philosophers and the greatest
captains and governors have lived in the same ages.
Neither can it otherwise be : for as in man the ripeness
of strength of the body and mind cometh much about
an age, save that the strength of the body cometh some-
what the more early ; so in states, arms and learning,
whereof the one correspondeth to the body, the other
to the soul of man, have a concurrence or near sequence
in times.

And for matter of policy and government, that learn-
ing should rather hurt than enable thereunto, is a thing
very improbable. We see it is accounted an error to
commit a natural body to empiric physicians, which
commonly have a few pleasing receits whereupon they

100

OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

are confident and adventurous, but know neither the
causes of diseases, nor the complexions of patients, nor
peril of accidents, nor the true method of cures. We
see it is a like error to rely upon advocates or lawyers
which are only men of practice and not grounded in
their books, who are many times easily surprised when
matter falleth out besides their experience, to the preju-
dice of the causes they handle. So by like reason it
cannot be but a matter of doubtful consequence, if
states be managed by empiric statesmen, not well
mingled with men grounded in learning. But con-
trariwise, it is almost without instance contradictory,
that ever * any government was disastrous that was in
the hands of learned governors. For howsoever it hath
been ordinary with politic men to extenuate and disable
learned men by the names of Pedantes ; yet in the rec-
ords of time it appeareth in many particulars, that the
governments of princes in minority (notwithstanding
the infinite disadvantage of that kind of state) have
nevertheless excelled the government of princes of
mature age, even for that reason which thev seek to
traduce, which is, that by that occasion the state hath
been in the hands of Pedantes : for so was the state of
Rome for the first five years, which are so much mag-
nified, during the minority of Nero, in the hands of
Seneca, a Pedanti : so it was again for ten years space
or more, during the minority of Gordianus the younger,
with great applause and contentation in the hands of
Misitheus, a Pedanti: so was it before that, in the
minority of Alexander Severus, in like happiness, in
hands not much unlike, by reason of the rule of the
women, who were aided by the teachers and precep-

1 So in all the editions.

THE FIRST BOOK. 101

tors. Nay let a man look into the government of the
bishops of Rome, as by name into the government of
Pius Quintus and Sextus Quintus in our times, who
were both at their entrance esteemed but as pedantical
friars, and he shall find that such popes do greater
things, and proceed upon truer principles of estate,
than those which have ascended to the papacy from
an education and breeding in affairs of estate and
courts of princes ; for although men bred in learning
are perhaps to seek in points of convenience and ac-
commodating for the present, which the Italians call
ragioni di stato, whereof the same Pius Quintus could
not hear spoken with patience, terming them inventions
against religion and the moral virtues ; yet on the oth-
er side, to recompense that, they are perfect in those
same plain grounds of religion, justice, honour, and
moral virtue ; which if they be well and watchfully
pursued, there will be seldom use of those other, no
more than of physic in a sound or well-dieted body.
Neither can the experience of one man's life furnish
examples and precedents for the events of one man's
life : for as it happeneth sometimes that the grandchild
or other descendant resembleth the ancestor more than
the son ; so many times occurrences of present times
may sort better with ancient examples than with those
of the later or immediate times : and lastly, the wit of
one man can no more countervail learning than one
man's means can hold way with a common purse.

And as for those particular seducements or indispo-
sitions of the mind for policy and government, which
learning is pretended to insinuate ; if it be granted that
any such thing be, it must be remembered withal, that
learning ministereth in every of them greater strength

102 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

of medicine or remedy, than it offereth cause of indis-
position or infirmity. For if by a secret operation it
make men perplexed and irresolute, on the other side
by plain precept it teacheth them when and upon what
ground to resolve ; yea, and how to carry things in sus-
pense without prejudice till they resolve. If it make
men positive and regular, it teacheth them what things
are in their nature demonstrative, and what are conject-
ural ; and as well the use of distinctions and exceptions,
as the latitude of principles and rules. If it mislead
by disproportion or dissimilitude of examples, it teach-
eth men the force of circumstances, the errors of com-
parisons, and all the cautions of application ; so that in
all these it doth rectify more effectually than it can per-
vert. And these medicines it conveyeth into men's
minds much more forcibly by the quickness and pen-
etration of examples. For let a man look into the
errors of Clement the seventh, so lively described by
Guicciardine, who served under him, or into the errors
of Cicero painted out by his own pencil in his epistles
to Atticus, and he will fly apace from being irresolute.
Let him look into the errors of Phocion, and he will
beware how he be obstinate or inflexible. Let him
but read the fable of Ixion, and it will hold him from
being vaporous or imaginative. Let him look into the
errors of Cato the second, and he will never be one of
the Antipodes, to tread opposite to the present world.
And for the conceit that learning should dispose men
to leisure and privateness, and make men slothful ; it
were a strange thing if that which accustometh the
mind to a perpetual motion and agitation should induce
slothfulness ; whereas contrariwise it may be truly af-
firmed that no kind of men love business for itself but

THE FIRST BOOK. 103

those that are learned ; for other persons love it for
profit, as an hireling that loves the work for the wages ;
or for honour, as because it beareth them up in the eyes
of men, and refresheth their reputation which other-
wise would wear ; or because it putteth them in mind
of their fortune, and giveth them occasion to pleasure
and displeasure ; or because it exerciseth some faculty
wherein they take pride, and so entertaineth them in
good humour and pleasing conceits toward themselves;
or because it advanceth any other their ends. So that
as it is said of untrue valours that some men's valours
are in the eyes of them that look on, so such men's
industries are in the eyes of others, or at least in regard
of their own designments ; x only learned men love busi-
ness as an action according to nature, as agreeable to
health of mind as exercise is to health of body, taking
pleasure in the action itself, and not in the purchase :
so that of all men they are the most indefatigable, if it
be towards any business which can hold or detain their
mind.

And if any man be laborious in reading and study
and yet idle in business and action, it groweth from
some weakness of body or softness of spirit, such as
Seneca speaketh of ; Quidam tarn sunt umbratiles, ut pu-
tent in turbido esse quicquid in luce est, [there are some
men so fond of the shade, that they think they are in
trouble whenever they are in the light ;] and not of
learning. Well may it be that such a point of a man's
nature may make him give himself to learning, but it is
not learning that breedeth any such point in his nature.

1 t. e. they have for their object either the applause of others or some
inward gratification of their own. {hoc videntur agere, aut ut alii plaudant,
aut ut ipsi intra se gestiant.)

104 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

And that learning should take up too much time or
leisure ; I answer, the most active or busy man that
hath been or can be hath (no question) many vacant
times of leisure, while he expecteth the tides and re-
turns of business, (except he be either tedious and of
no dispatch, or lightly and unworthily ambitious to
meddle in things that may be better done by others;)
and then the question is but how those spaces and times
of leisure shall be filled and spent ; whether in pleas-
ures or in studies ; as was well answered by Demos-
thenes to his adversary ./Eschines,1 that was a man
given to pleasure, and told him that his orations did
s-rnell of the lamp : Indeed (said Demosthenes) there
is a great difference between the things that you and I
do by lamp-light. So as no man need doubt that learn-
ing will expulse business ; but rather it will keep and
defend the possession of the mind against idleness and
pleasure, which otherwise at unawares may enter to
the prejudice of both.

Again, for that other conceit that learning should
undermine the reverence of laws and government, it
is assuredly a mere depravation and calumny without
all shadow of truth. For to say that a blind custom
of obedience should be a surer obligation than duty
taught and understood, it is to affirm that a blind man
may tread surer by a guide than a seeing man can by a
light. And it is without all controversy that learning
doth make the minds of men gentle, generous, man-
iable, and pliant to government ; whereas ignorance
makes them churlish, thwart, and mutinous : and the
evidence of time doth clear this assertion, considering
that the most barbarous, rude, and unlearned times

1 Pytheas, according to Plutarch.

THE FIRST BOOK. 105

have been most subject to tumults, seditions, and
changes.

And as to the judgment of Cato the Censor, he
was well punished for his blasphemy against learn-
ing, in the same kind wherein he offended ; for when
he was past threescore years old, he was taken with
an extreme desire to go to school again and to learn
the Greek tongue, to the end to peruse the Greek au-
thors ; which doth well demonstrate, that his former
censure of the Grecian learning was rather an affect-
ed gravity, than according to the inward sense of his
own opinion. And as for Virgil's verses, though it
pleased him to brave the world in taking to the Ro-
mans the art of empire, and leaving to others the arts
of subjects ; yet so much is manifest, that the Romans
never ascended to that height of empire till the time
they had ascended to the height of other arts ; for in
the time of the two first Caesars, which had the art of
government in greatest perfection, there lived the best
poet, Virgilius Maro; the best historiographer, Titus
Livius ; the best antiquary, Marcus Varro ; and the
best, or second orator, Marcus Cicero, that to the
memory of man are known. As for the accusation
of Socrates, the time must be remembered when it
was prosecuted ; which was under the thirty tyrants,
the most base, bloody, and envious persons that have
governed ; which revolution of state was no sooner
over, but Socrates, whom they had made a person
criminal, was made a person heroical, and his mem-
ory accumulate with honours divine and human ; and
those discourses of his, which were then termed cor-
rupting of manners, were after acknowledged for sov-
ereign medicines of the mind and manners, and so

106 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

have been received ever since till this day. Let this
therefore serve for answer to politiques, which in their
humorous severity or in their feigned gravity have pre-
sumed to throw imputations upon learning ; which re-
dargution nevertheless (save that we know not whether
our labours may extend to other ages) were not needful
for the present, in regard of the love and reverence
towards learning which the example and countenance
of two so learned princes, queen Elizabeth and your
Majesty, being as Castor and Pollux, lucida 8idera,
stars of excellent light and most benign influence,
hath wrought in all men of place and authority in
our nation.

Now therefore we come to that third sort of discred-
it or diminution of credit, that groweth unto learning
from learned men themselves, which commonly cleav-
eth fastest. It is either from their fortune, or from their
manners, or from the nature of their studies. For the
first, it is not in their power; and the' second is acci-
dental ; the third only is proper to be handled. But
because we are not in hand with true measure, but
with popular estimation and conceit, it is not amiss to
speak somewhat of the two former. The derogations
therefore which grow to learning from the fortune or
condition of learned men, are either in respect of scar-
city of means, or in respect of privateness of life and
meanness of employments.

Concerning want, and that it is the case of learned
men usually to begin with little and not to grow rich
so fast as other men, by reason they convert not their
labours chiefly to lucre and increase ; it were good to
leave the common place in commendation of poverty

THE FIRST BOOK. 107

to some friar to handle,1 to whom much was attributed
by Machiavel in this point, when he said, That the king-
dom of the clergy had been long before at an end, if the
reputation and reverence towards the poverty of friars
had not borne out the scandal of the superfluities and ex-
cesses of bishops and prelates. So a man might say that
the felicity and delicacy of princes and great persons
had long since turned to rudeness and barbarism, if
the poverty of learning had not kept up civility and
honour of life. But without any such advantages, it
is worthy the observation what a reverend and hon-
oured thing poverty of fortune was for some ages in the
Roman state, which nevertheless Avas a state without
paradoxes. For we see what Titus Livius saith in his
introduction : Cozterum aut me amor negotii suscepti fal-
lity aut nulla unquam respublica nee major, nee sanctior,
nee bonis exemplis ditior fuit ; nee in quam tarn serai
avaritia luxuriaque immigraverint ; nee ubi tantus ac
tarn diu paupertati ac parsimonios honos fuerit : [that
if affection for his subject did not deceive him, there
was never any state in the world either greater or pur-
er or richer in good examples ; never any into which
avarice and luxury made their way so late ; never any
in which poverty and frugality were for so long a time
held in so great honour]. We see likewise, after that
the state of Rome was not itself but did degenerate,
how that person that took upon him to be counsellor
to Julius Caesar after his victory, where to begin his
restoration of the state, maketh it of all points the most
summary to take away the estimation of wealth : Ve-
rum hose et omnia mala pariter cum honore pecuniae des-
inent ; si neque magistratus, neque alia vulgo cupienda,

1 Patribus mendicantibus (pace eorum dixerim). — De Aug.

108 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

venalia erunt : [but these and all other evils (he says)
will cease as soon as the worship of money ceases ;
which will come to pass when neither magistracies nor
other things that are objects of desire to the vulgar shall
be to be had for money]. To conclude this point, as it
was truly said that rubor est virtutis color, [a blush is
virtue's colour,] though sometime it come from vice ;
so it may be fitly said that paupertas est virtutis fortuna,
[poverty is virtue's fortune,] though sometime it may
proceed from misgovernment and accident. Surely
Salomon hath pronounced it, both in censure, Qui fes-
tinat ad divitias non erit insons, [he that maketh haste
to be rich shall not be innocent ;] and in precept, Buy
the truth, and sell it not ; and so of wisdom and knowl-
edge ; judging that means were to be spent upon learn-
ing, and not learning to be applied to means. And as
for the privateness or obscureness (as it may be in vul-
gar estimation accounted) of life of contemplative men ;
it is a theme so common to extol a private life, not
taxed with sensuality and sloth, in comparison and to the
disadvantage of a civil life, for safety, liberty, pleasure,
and dignity, or at least freedom from indignity, as no
man handleth it but handleth it well ; such a conso-
nancy it hath to men's conceits in the expressing and to
men's consents in the allowing. This only I will add,
that learned men forgotten in states, and not living in
the eyes of men, are like the images of Cassius and
Brutus in the funeral of Junia ; of* which not being
represented, as many others were, Tacitus saith, Eo
ipso prafulgebant, quod non visebantur ; [they had the
preeminence over all — in being left out] .

And for meanness of employment, that which is
most traduced to contempt is that the government

THE FIRST BOOK. 109

of youth is commonly allotted to them ; which age,
because it is the age of least authority, it is transfer-
red to the disesteeming of those employments wherein
youth is conversant, and which are conversant about
youth. But how unjust this traducement is (if you
will reduce things from popularity of opinion to meas-
ure of reason) may appear in that we see men are more
curious what they put into a new vessel than into a
vessel seasoned, and what mould they lay about a
young plant than about a plant corroborate ; so as
the weakest terms and times of all things use to have
the best applications and helps. And will you hearken
to the Hebrew Rabbins ? Your young men shall see
visions, and your old men shall dream dreams ; say they1
youth is the worthier age, for that visions are nearer
apparitions of God than dreams. And let it be noted,
that howsoever the conditions of life of Pedantes have2
been scorned upon theatres, as the ape of tyranny ; and
that the modern looseness or negligence hath taken no
due regard to the choice of school-masters and tutors ;
yet the ancient wisdom of the best times did always
make a just complaint that states were too busy with
their laws and too negligent in point of education :
which excellent part of ancient discipline hath been
in some sort revived of late times by the colleges of
the Jesuits ; of whom, although in regard of their su-
perstition I may say, quo meliores, eo deteriores,3 [the

1 So in the original. Edd. 1629 and 1633 have the. The meaning is,
" upon this text they observe," &c. (Ex hoc textu colligunt.)

2 So ed. 1633. The original has hath.
8 This parenthesis is omitted in the translation, no doubt as offensive to

0 the Roman Catholics. Several other passages of the same kind occur in
the Advancement, and they are all treated in the same way. The motive
for which is sufficiently explained by Bacon himself in the letter which he
sent to the King along with the De Augmentis. " I have been also (he

110 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

better the worse ;] yet in regard of this, and some
other points concerning human learning and moral
matters, I may say, as Agesilaus said to his enemy
Pharnabazus, talis quum sis, utinam noster esses, [they
are so good that I wish they were on our side] . And
thus much touching the discredits drawn from the for-
tunes of learned men.

As touching the manners of learned men, it is a
thing personal and individual : and no doubt there
be amongst them, as in other professions, of all temper-
atures : but yet so as it is not without truth which is
said, that abeunt studio, in mores, studies have an in-
fluence and operation upon the manners of those that
are conversant in them.1

But upon an attentive and indifferent review, I for
my part cannot find any disgrace to learning can pro-
ceed from the manners of learned men ; not inherent to
them as they are learned ; 2 except it be a fault (which
was the supposed fault of Demosthenes, Cicero, Cato
the second, Seneca, and many more) that because the
times they read of are commonly better than the times
they live in, and the duties taught better than the du-
ties practised, they contend sometimes too far to bring
things to perfection, and to reduce the corruption of

says) mine own Index Expurgatorius, that it may be read in all places.
For since my end of putting it into Latin was to have it read everywhere,
it had been an absurd contradiction to free it in the language and to pen it
up in the matter." Mr. Ellis made a list of these passages, which will be
noticed in their places. The word enemy in the next clause is omitted,
probably from the same motive.

1 And that learning (the translation adds), unless the mind into which
it enters be much depraved, corrects the natural disposition and changes it
for the better.

3 i. e. not [I mean, from such manners as are] inherent, &c. (nullum oc-
currit dedecus Uteris, ex literatorum moribus, quatenus sunt literati, adhe-
rens.)

THE FIRST BOOK. Ill

manners to honesty of precepts or examples of too
great height. And yet hereof they have caveats
enough in their own walks. For Solon, when he
was asked whether he had given his citizens the best
laws, answered wisely, Yea of such as they would re-
ceive : and Plato, finding that his own heart could
not agree with the corrupt manners of his country,
refused to bear place or office ; saying, TJiat a man's
country was to be used as his parents were, that is,
with humble persuasions, and not with contestations :
and Caesar's counsellor put in the same caveat, Nbn
ad Vetera instituta revocans quce jampridem corruptis
moribus ludibrio sunt : [not to attempt to bring things
back to the original institution, now that by reason of
the corruption of manners the ancient simplicity and
purity had fallen into contempt :] and Cicero noteth
this error directly in Cato the second, when he writes
to his friend Atticus ; Cato optime sentit, sed nocet in-
terdum reipublicoe ; loquitur enim tanquam in republica
Platonis, non tanquam in fcece Romuli : [Cato means
excellently well ; but he does hurt sometimes to the
state ; for he talks as if it were Plato's republic that
we are living in, and not the dregs of Romulus :] and
the same Cicero doth excuse and expound the philoso-
phers for going too far and being too exact in their
prescripts, when he saith, Isti ipsi prozceptores virtutis
et magistri videntur fines officiorum paulo longius quam
natura vellet protulisse, ut cum ad ultimum animo con-
tendissemus, ihi tamen, ubi oportet, consisteremus : [that
they had set the points of duty somewhat higher than
nature would well bear ; meaning belike to allow for
shortcomings, and that our endeavours aiming beyond
the mark and falling short, should light at the right

112 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

place :] and yet himself might have said, Monitis sum
minor ipse meis, [that he fell short of his own pre-
cepts] ; for it was his own fault, though not in so
extreme a degree.

Another fault likewise much of this kind hath been
incident to learned men ; which is, that they have
esteemed the preservation, good, and honour of their
countries or masters before their own fortunes or safe-
ties. For so saith Demosthenes unto the Athenians:
If it please you to note it, my counsels unto you are not
such whereby I should grow great amongst you, and you
become little amongst the Grecians : but they be of that
nature, as they are sometimes not good for me to give,
but are always good for you to follow. And so Seneca,
after he had consecrated that Quinquennium Neronis
to the eternal glory of learned governors, held on his
honest and loyal course of good and free counsel, after
his master grew extremely corrupt in his government.
Neither can this point otherwise be ; for learning endu-
eth men's minds with a true sense of the frailty of their
persons, the casualty of their fortunes, and the dig-
nity of their soul and vocation ; so that it is impos-
sible for them to esteem that any greatness of their
own fortune can be a true or worthy end of their
being and ordainment ; and therefore are desirous to
give their account to God, and so likewise to their
masters under God (as kings and the states that they
serve), in these words ; Ecce tibi lucrefeci, and not
Ecce mihi lucrefeci, [* Lo, I have gained for thee,'
not ' Lo, I have gained for myself : '] whereas the
corrupter sort of mere politiques, that have not their
thoughts established by learning in the love and ap-
prehension of duty, nor never look abroad into uni-

THE FIBST BOOK. 113

versality, do refer all things to themselves, and thrust
themselves into the centre of the world, as if all lines
should meet in them and their fortunes ; never caring
in all tempests what becomes of the ship of estates, so
they may save themselves in the cockboat of their own
fortune ; whereas men that feel the weight of duty, and
know the limits of self-love, use to make good their
places and duties, though with peril. And if they
stand in seditious and violent alterations, it is rather
the reverence which many times both adverse parts
do give to honesty, than any versatile advantage of
their own carriage. But for this point of tender
sense and fast obligation of duty, which learning
doth endue the mind withal, howsoever fortune may
tax it and many in the depth of their corrupt prin-
ciples may despise it, yet it will receive an open
allowance, and therefore needs the less disproof or
excusation.

Another fault incident commonly to learned men,
which may be more probably defended than truly de-
nied, is that they fail sometimes in applying themselves
to particular persons : which want of exact application
ariseth from two causes ; the one, because the largeness
of their mind can hardly confine itself to dwell in the
exquisite observation or examination of the nature and
customs of one person : for it is a speech for a lover
and not for a wise man, Satis magnum alter alteri
theatrum sumus, [each is to other a theatre large
enough]. Nevertheless I shall yield, that he that
cannot contract the sight of his mind as well as dis-
perse and dilate it, wanteth a great faculty. But
there is a second cause, which is no inability but a re-
jection upon choice and judgment. For the honest

114 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

and just bounds of observation by one person upon
another extend no farther but to understand him suf-
ficiently, whereby not to give him offence, or whereby
to be able to give him faithful counsel, or whereby to
stand upon reasonable guard and caution in respect of
a man's self: but to be speculative into another man,
to the end to know how to work him or wind him or
govern him, proceedeth from a heart that is double
and cloven, and not entire and ingenuous ; which as
in friendship it is want of integrity, so towards princes
or superiors is want of duty. For the custom of the
Levant, which is, that subjects do forbear to gaze or
fix their eyes upon princes, is in the outward ceremony
barbarous ; but the moral is good : for men ought not
by cunning and bent observations to pierce and pene-
trate into the hearts of kings, which the Scripture hath
declared to be inscrutable.

There is yet another fault (with which I will con-
clude this part) which is often noted in learned men,
that they do many times fail to observe decency and
discretion in their behaviour and carriage, and com-
mit errors in small and ordinary points of action ; so
as the vulgar sort of capacities do make a judgment
of them in greater matters by that which they find
wanting in them in smaller. But this consequence
doth oft deceive men ; for which I do refer them
over to that which was said by Themistocles, arro-
gantly and uncivilly being applied to himself out of
his own mouth, but being applied to the general state
of this question pertinently and justly ; when being
invited to touch a lute, he said he could not fiddle,
but he could make a small town a great state. So no
doubt many may be well seen in the passages of gov-

THE FIRST BOOK. 115

eminent and policy, which are to seek in little and
punctual, occasions. I refer them also to that which
Plato said of his master Socrates, whom he com-
pared to the gallypots of apothecaries, which on the
outside had apes and owls and antiques, but con-
tained within sovereign and precious liquors and
confections ; acknowledging that to an external re-
port he was not without superficial levities and de-
formities, but was inwardly replenished with excellent
virtues and powers. And so much touching the point
of manners of learned men.

But in the mean time I have no purpose to give
allowance to some conditions and courses base and
unworthy, wherein divers professors of learning have
wronged themselves and gone too far ; such as were
those trencher philosophers, which in the later age
of the Roman state were usually in the houses of
great persons, being little better than solemn para-
sites ; of which kind, Lucian maketh a merry de-
scription of the philosopher that the great lady took
to ride with her in her coach, and would needs have
him carry her little dog, which he doing officiously and
yet uncomely, the page scoffed, and said, That he
doubted the philosopher of a Stoic would turn to be a
Cynic. But above all the rest, the gross and palpa-
ble flattery whereunto many (not unlearned) have
abased and abused their wits and pens, turning (as
Du Bartas saith) Hecuba into Helena and Faustina
into Lucretia, hath most diminished the price and es-
timation of learning. Neither is the moral ' dedication
of books and writings, as to patrons, to be commended :

1 t. c. customary. Morem ilium receplum libros patronis nuncupandi. —
De Aug. Ed. 1629 has moderne.

116 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

for that books (such as are worthy the name of books)
ought to have no patrons but truth and reason ; and
the ancient custom was to dedicate them only to pri-
vate and equal friends, or to intitle the books with their
names ; or if to kings and great persons, it was to some
such as the argument of the book was fit and proper
for. But these and the like courses may deserve rath-
er reprehension than defence.

Not that I can tax or condemn the morigeration or
application of learned men to men in fortune. For
the answer was good that Diogenes made to one that
asked him in mockery, How it came to pass that phi-
losophers were the followers of rich men, and not rich
men of philosophers ? He answered soberly, and yet
sharply, Because the one sort knew what they had need
of and the other did not. And of the like nature was
the answer which Aristippus made, when having a pe-
tition to Dionysius and no ear given to him, he fell
down at his feet, whereupon Dionysius staid and gave
him the hearing and granted it ; and afterward some
person tender on the behalf of philosophy, reproved
Aristippus that he would offer the profession of phi-
losophy such an indignity, as for a private suit to fall
at a tyrant's feet: but he answered, It was not his
fault, but it was the fault of Dionysius, that had his
ears in his feet. Neither was it accounted weakness,
but discretion, in him that would not dispute his best
with Adrianus Caesar ; excusing himself, That it was
reason to yield to him that commanded thirty legions.
These and the like applications and stooping to
points of necessity and convenience cannot be dis-
allowed ; for though they may have some outward
baseness, yet in a judgment truly made they are to

THE FIRST BOOK. 117

be accounted submissions to the occasion and not to
the person.

Now I proceed to those errors and vanities which
have intervened amongst the studies themselves of the
learned; which is that which is principal and proper
to the present argument; wherein my purpose is not
to make a justification of the errors, but, by a censure
and separation of the errors, to make a justification of
that which is good and sound, and to deliver that from
the aspersion of the other. For we see that it is the
manner of men to scandalize and deprave that which
retaineth the state and virtue, by taking advantage
upon that which is corrupt and degenerate: as the
Heathens in the primitive church used to blemish
and taint the Christians with the faults and cor-
ruptions of heretics. But nevertheless I have no
meaning at this time to make any exact animadver-
sion of the errors and impediments in matters of
learning which are more secret and remote from vul-
gar opinion ; but only to speak unto such as do fall
under, or near unto, a popular observation.

There be therefore chiefly three vanities in studies,
whereby learning hath been most traduced. For those
things we do esteem vain, which are either false or
frivolous, those which either have no truth or no use :
and those persons we esteem vain, which are either
credulous or curious ; and curiosity is either in mat-
ter or words: so that in reason as well as in experi-
ence, there fall out to be these three distempers (as
I may term them) of learning ; the first, fantastical
learning ; the second, contentious learning ; and the
last, delicate learning ; vain imaginations, vain alter-
cations, and vain affectations ; and with the last I will

118 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

begin.1 Martin Luther, conducted (no doubt) by an
higher Providence, but in discourse of reason finding
what a province he had undertaken against the Bishop
of Rome and the degenerate traditions of the church,
and finding his own solitude, being no ways aided by
the opinions of his own time, was enforced to awake
all antiquity, and to call former times to his succors
to make a party against the present time; so that the
ancient authors, both in divinity and in humanity, which
had long time slept in libraries, began generally to be
read and revolved. This by consequence did draw on
a necessity of a more exquisite travail in the languages
original wherein those authors did write, for the better
understanding of those authors and the better advan-
tage of pressing and applying their words. And there-
of grew again a delight in their manner of style and
phrase, and an admiration of that kind of writing;
which was much furthered and precipitated by the
enmity and opposition that the propounders of those
(primitive but seeming new) opinions had against the
schoolmen ; who were generally of the contrary part,
and whose writings were altogether in a differing style
and form ; taking liberty to coin and frame new terms
of art to express their own sense and to avoid circuit
of speech, without regard to the pureness, pleasantness,

1 The passage which follows is much curtailed in the translation ; no
doubt for the reason mentioned in note p. 109. All allusion to the " higher
Providence," the " degenerate traditions " of the church, the study of the
ancient authors, and the " primitive but seeming new opinions" is left out:
and we are only told that this distemper of luxuriance of speech (though
in former times it had been occasionally in request) began to prevail very
much about the time of Luther; chiefly on account of the demand for
fervour and efficacy of preaching, &c. The remarks on the style of the
schoolmen, and the hatred which at that time began to be conceived against
them are retained.

THE FIRST BOOK. 119

and (as I may call it) lawfulness of the phrase or word.
And again, because the great labour then * was with
the people, (of whom the Pharisees were wont to
say, Ejcecrabilis ista turba, quce non novit legem,} [the
wretched crowd that has not known the law,] for the
winning and persuading of them, there grew of neces-
sity in chief price and request eloquence and variety of
discourse, as the fittest and forciblest access into the
capacity of the vulgar sort. So that these four causes
concurring, the admiration of ancient authors, the hate
of the schoolmen, the exact study of languages, and
the efficacy of preaching, did bring in an affectionate
study of eloquence and copie of speech, which then
began to flourish. This grew speedily to an excess ;
for men began to hunt more after words than matter ;
and more after the choiceness of the phrase, and the
round and clean composition of the sentence, and the
sweet falling of the clauses, and the varying and illus-
tration of their works with tropes and figures, than after
the weight of matter, worth of subject, soundness of
argument, life of invention, or depth of judgment.
Then grew the flowing and watery vein of Osorius,
the Portugal bishop, to be in price. Then did Stur-
mius spend such infinite and curious pains upon Cicero
the orator and Hermogenes the rhetorician, besides his
own books of periods and imitation and the like. Then
did Car of Cambridge, and Ascham, with their lectures
and writings, almost deify Cicero and Demosthenes, and
allure all young men that were studious unto that del-
icate and polished kind of learning. Then did Eras-
mus take occasion to make the scoffing echo ; De-
cern annos consumpsi in legendo Cicerone, [I have spent

i So edd. 1629 and 1633. The original has that then.

120 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

ten years in reading Cicero :] and the echo answered
in Greek, owe, Anne. Then grew the learning of the
schoolmen to be utterly despised as barbarous. In sura,
the whole inclination and bent of those times was rath-
er towards copie than weight.

Here therefore [is] the first distemper of learning,
when men study words and not matter : whereof
though I have represented an example of late times,
yet it hath been and will be secundum majus et minus
in all time. And how is it possible but this should
have an operation to discredit learning, even with
vulgar capacities, when they see learned men's works
like the first letter of a patent or limned book ; which
though it hath large flourishes, yet it is but a letter ?
It seems to me that Pygmalion's frenzy is a good em-
blem or portraiture of this vanity : for words are but
the images of matter ; and except they have life of
reason and invention, to fall in love with them is all
one as to fall in love with a picture.

But yet notwithstanding it is a thing not hastily to
be condemned, to clothe and adorn the obscurity even
of philosophy itself with sensible and plausible elocu-
tion. For hereof we have great examples in Xeno-
phon, Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch, and of Plato also in
some degree ; and hereof likewise there is great use ;
for surely to the severe inquisition of truth, and the deep
progress into philosophy, it is some hinderance ; because
it is too early satisfactory to the mind of man, and
quencheth the desire of further search, before we come
to a just period ; but then if a man be to have any
use of such knowledge in civil occasions, of conference,
counsel, persuasion, discourse, or the like ; then shall he
find it prepared to his hands in those authors which

THE FIRST BOOK. 121

write in that manner. But the excess of this is so
justly contemptible, that as Hercules, when he saw
the image of Adonis, Venus' minion, in a temple, said
in disdain, Nil sacri es, [you are no divinity ;] so there
is none of Hercules' followers in learning, that is, the
more severe and laborious sort of inquirers into truth,
but will despise those delicacies and affectations, as in-
deed capable of no divineness.1 And thus much of
the first disease or distemper of learning.

The second, which followeth, is in nature worse than
the former ; for as substance of matter is better than
beauty of words, so contrariwise vain matter is worse
than vain words : wherein it seemeth the reprehension
of St. Paul was not only proper for those times, but
prophetical for the times following ; and not only re-
spective to divinity, but extensive to all knowledge :
Devita profanas vocum novitates, et oppositiones falsi
nominis sciential : [shun profane novelties of terms
and oppositions of science falsely so called]. For he
assigneth two marks and badges of suspected and fal-
sified science; the one, the novelty and strangeness
of terms ; the other, the strictness of positions, which
of necessity doth induce oppositions, and so questions
and altercations. Surely, like as many substances in

1 In the translation he mentions another vanity of style, though not of
so bad a kind, as commonly succeeding the last in point of time, — a style
in which all the study is to have the words pointed, the sentences concise,
and the whole composition rather twisted into shape than allowed to flow
(oratio denique polius versa quam fusa) : a trick which has the effect of
making everything seem more ingenious than it really is. Such a style
(he says) is found largely in Seneca, less in Tacitus and the second Pliny,
and has found favour of late with the ears of our own time; but though it
is agreeable to ordinary understandings and so procures some respect for
literature, yet to more exact judgments it is deservedly distasteful, and
may be set down among the distempers of learning, being, as well as the
other, a kind of hunting after words and verbal prettiness.

122 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

nature which are solid do putrefy and corrupt into
worms, so it is the property of good and sound knowl-
edge to putrefy and dissolve into a number of subtile,
idle, unwholesome, and (as I may term them) vermic-
ulate questions, which have indeed a kind of quick-
ness and life of spirit, but no soundness of matter or
goodness of quality. This kind of degenerate learn-
ing did chiefly reign amongst the schoolmen ; who
having sharp and strong wits, and abundance of lei-
sure, and small variety of reading ; but their wits
being shut up in the cells of a few authors (chiefly
Aristotle their dictator) as their persons were shut
up in the cells of monasteries and colleges ; and
knowing little history, either of nature or time ; did
out of no great quantity of matter, and infinite agi-
tation of wit, spin out unto us those laborious webs
of learning which are extant in their books. For
the wit and mind of man, if it work upon matter,
which is the contemplation of the creatures of God,
worketh according to the stuff, and is limited thereby ;
but if it work upon itself, as the spider worketh his
web, then it is endless, and brings forth indeed cob-
webs of learning, admirable for the fineness of thread
and work, but of no substance or profit.

This same unprofitable subtility or curiosity is of two
sorts ; either in the subject itself that they handle, when
it is a fruitless speculation or controversy, (whereof there
are no small number both in divinity and philosophy,)
or in the manner or method of handling of a knowl-
edge ; which amongst them was this ; upon every par-
ticular position or assertion to frame objections, and
to those objections, solutions ; which solutions wore
for the most part not confutations, but distinctions :

THE FIRST BOOK. 123

whereas indeed the strength of all sciences is, as the
strength of the old man's faggot, in the bond. For
the harmony of a science, supporting each part the
other, is and ought to be the true and brief confuta-
tion and suppression of all the smaller sort of objec-
tions ; but on the other side, if you take out every
axiom, as the sticks of the faggot, one by one, you
may quarrel with them and bend them and break
them at your pleasure : so that as was said of
Seneca, Verborum minutiis rerum frangit pondera,
[that he broke up the weight and mass of the matter
by verbal points and niceties ;] so a man may truly
say of the schoolmen, Qucestionum minutiis scientiarum
frangunt soliditatem ; [they broke up the solidity and
coherency of the sciences by the minuteness and nicety
of their questions]. For were it not better for a man
in a fair room to set up one great light, or branching
candlestick of lights, than to go about with a small
watch candle into every corner ? And such is their
method, that rests not so much upon evidence of
truth proved by arguments, authorities, similitudes,
examples, as upon particular confutations and solu-
tions of every scruple, cavillation, and objection ;
breeding for the most part one question as fast it
solveth another ; even as in the former resemblance,
when you carry the light into one corner, you darken
the rest : so that the fable and fiction of Scylla seemeth
to be a lively image of this kind of philosophy or knowl-
edge ; which was transformed into a comely virgin for
the upper parts ; but then Candida succinctam latran-
tibus inguina monstris, [there were barking monsters
all about her loins :] so the generalities of the school-
men are for a while good and proportionable ; but then

124 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

when you descend into their distinctions and decisions,
instead of a fruitful womb for the use and benefit of
man's life, they end in monstrous altercations and
barking questions. So as it is not possible but this
quality of knowledge must fall under popular con-
tempt, the people being apt to contemn truth upon
occasion of controversies and altercations, and to think
they are all out of their way which never meet : and
when they see such digladiation about subtilities and
matter of no use nor moment, they easily fall upon
that judgment of Dionysius of Syracusa, Verba ista
sunt senum otiosorum, [it is the talk of old men that
have nothing to do].

Notwithstanding certain it is, that if those school-
men to their great thirst of truth and unwearied trav-
ail of wit had joined variety and universality of
reading and contemplation, they had proved excel-
lent lights, to the great advancement of all learning
and knowledge. But as they are, they are great un-
dertakers indeed, and fierce with dark keeping ; ' but
as in the inquiry of the divine truth their pride in-
clined to leave the oracle of God's word and to vanish
in the mixture of their own inventions, so in the in-
quisition of nature they ever left the oracle of God's
works and adored the deceiving and deformed images
which the unequal mirror of their own minds or a few
received authors or principles did represent unto them.
And thus much for the second disease of learning.

1 That is, fierce from being kept in the dark; the allusion being, as we
see more clearly from a corresponding passage in an early Latin fragment
[ferocitatem autem et confidenliam quce illos qui pauca norunt sequi sole!, (ut
animalia in tenebris educata,) &c. — Cog. de Sci. Hum. 1st fragm. § 10.],
to the effect of darkness on the temper of animals. — R. L. E. The rest
of this sentence, from " but as they are" is omitted in the translation. See
note p. 109.

THE FIRST BOOK. 125

For the third vice or disease of learning, which con-
cerneth deceit or untruth, it is of all the rest the foul-
est ; as that which doth destroy the essential form of
knowledge, which is nothing but a representation of
truth : for the truth of being and the truth of know-
ing are one, differing no more than the direct beam
and the beam reflected. This vice therefore brancheth
itself into two sorts ; delight in deceiving, and aptness
to be deceived ; imposture and credulity ; which, al-
though they appear to be of a diverse nature, the one
seeming to proceed of cunning, and the other of sim-
plicity, yet certainly they do for the most part concur :
for as the verse noteth,

Percontatorem fugito, nam garrulus idem est,

an inquisitive man is a prattler, so upon the like rea-
son a credulous man is a deceiver: as we see it in fame,
that he that will easily believe rumours will as easily
augment rumours and add somewhat to them of his
own ; which Tacitus wisely noteth, when he saith,
Fingunt simul creduntque, [as fast as they believe
one tale they make another : *] so great an affinity
hath fiction and belief.

This facility of credit, and accepting or admitting
things weakly authorized or warranted, is of two kinds,
according to the subject : for it is either a belief of
history (as2 the lawyers speak, matter of fact), or
else of matter of art and opinion. As to the former,
we see the experience and inconvenience of this er-

1 I think this is the sense in which Bacon must have understood these
words; but it is not the sense in which Tacitus employs them (An. v. 10.).
He meant that they at once invented the tale and believed it : they " cred-
ited their own lie." — J. 8.

2 So the original. Edd. 1629 and 1633 have or a».

126 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

ror in ecclesiastical history ; which hath too easily re-
ceived and registered reports and narrations of miracles
wrought by martyrs, hermits, or monks of the desert,
and other holy men, and their relics, shrines, chapels,
and images : * which though they had a passage for a
time, by the ignorance of the people, the superstitious
simplicity of some, and the politic toleration of others,
holding them but as divine poesies ; yet after a period
of time, when the mist began to clear up, they grew
to be esteemed but as old wives' fables, impostures
of the clergy, illusions of spirits, and badges of an-
tichrist, to the great scandal and detriment of re-
ligion.

So in natural history, we see there hath not been
that choice and judgment used as ought to have been ;
as may appear in the writings of Plinius, Cardunus,
Albertus, and divers of the Arabians ; being fraught
with much fabulous matter, a great part not only un-
tried but notoriously untrue, to the great derogation
of the credit of natural philosophy with the grave
and sober kind of wits. Wherein the wisdom and
integrity of Aristotle is worthy to be observed ; that
having made so diligent and exquisite a history of
living creatures, hath mingled it sparingly with any
vain or feigned matter ; and yet on the other side 2
hath cast all prodigious narrations which he thought
worthy the recording into one book ; excellently dis-
cerning that matter of manifest truth, such where-
upon observation and rule was to be built, was not
to be mingled or weakened with matter of doubtful

1 The rest of the paragraph is omitted in the translation. See note
p. 109.
8 Sake in the original, and also in edd. 1629 and 1633.

THE FIRST BOOK. 127

credit ; and yet again that rarities and reports that
seem uncredible are not to be suppressed or denied
to the memory of men.

And as for the facility of credit which is yielded to
arts and opinions, it is likewise of two kinds ; either
when too much belief is attributed to the arts them-
selves, or to certain authors in any art. The sciences
themselves which have had better intelligence and con-
federacy with the imagination of man than with his
reason, are three in number ; Astrology, Natural Mag-
ic, and Alchemy ; of which sciences nevertheless the
ends or pretences are noble. For astrology pretendeth
to discover that correspondence or concatenation which
is between the superior globe and the inferior : natural
magic pretendeth to call and reduce natural philosophy
from variety of speculations to the magnitude of works :
and alchemy pretendeth to make separation of all the
unlike parts of bodies which in mixtures of nature are
incorporate. But the derivations and prosecutions to
these ends, both in the theories and in the practices,
are full of error and vanity ; which the great professors
themselves have sought to veil over and conceal by
enigmatical writings, and referring themselves to au-
ricular traditions, and such other devices to save the
credit of impostures. And yet surely to alchemy this
right is due, that it may be compared to the husband-
man whereof .iEsop makes the fable, that when he died
told his sons that he had left unto them gold buried
under ground in his vineyard ; and they digged over
all the ground, and gold they found none, but by rea-
son of their stirring and digging the mould about the
roots of their vines, they had a great vintage the year
following : so assuredly the search and stir to make

128 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

gold hath brought to light a great number of good
and fruitful inventions and experiments, as well for
the disclosing of nature as for the use of man's
life.

And as for the overmuch credit that hath been
given unto authors in sciences, in making them dic-
tators, that their words should stand, and not coun-
sels J to give advice ; the damage is infinite that sci-
ences have received thereby, as the principal cause
that hath kept them low, at a stay without growth
or advancement. For hence it hath comen that in
arts mechanical the first deviser comes shortest, and
time addeth and perfecteth ; but in sciences the first
author goeth furthest, and time leeseth and corrupteth.
So we see, artillery, sailing, printing, and the like,
were grossly managed at the first, and by time ac-
commodated and refined ; but contrariwise the phi-
losophies and sciences of Aristotle, Plato, Democritus,
Hippocrates, Euclides, Archimedes, of most vigour at
the first, and by time degenerate and imbased ; where-
of the reason is no other, but that in the former many
wits and industries have contributed in one ; and in the
later many wits and industries have been spent about
the wit of some one, whom many times they have rather
depraved than illustrated. For as water will not as-
cend higher than the level of the first spring-head from
whence it descendeth, so knowledge derived from Aris-
totle, and exempted from liberty of examination, will
not rise again higher than the knowledge of Aristotle.
And therefore, although the position be good, Oportet dis-

1 So the original. Edd. 1629 and 1633 have consuls. The translation
has dictatoria quadam potestate munivit ut edicant, non senatoria ut consulant.
Bacon probably wrote counsel^:

THE FIRST BOOK. 129

centem credere, [a man who is learning must be content
to believe what he is told,] yet it must be coupled with
this, Oportet edoetum judicare, [when he has learned
it he must exercise his judgment and see whether it
be worthy of belief;] for disciples do owe unto masters
only a temporary belief and a suspension of their own
judgment until they be fully instructed, and not an
absolute resignation or perpetual captivity : and there-
fore to conclude this point, I will say no more but, so
let great authors have their due, as time which is the
author of authors be not deprived of his due, which is
further and further to discover truth. Thus have I
gone over these three diseases of learning ; besides the
which, there are some other rather peccant humours
than formed diseases, which nevertheless are not so
secret and intrinsic but that they fall under a popular
observation and traducement, and therefore are not to
be passed over.

The first of these is the extreme affecting of two
extremities ; the one Antiquity, the other Novelty :
wherein it seemeth the children of time do take after
the nature and malice of the father. For as he de-
voureth his children, so one of them seeketh to devour
and suppress the other ; while antiquity envieth there
should be new additions, and novelty cannot be con-
tent to add but it must deface. Surely the advice of
the prophet is the true direction in this matter, State
super vias antiquas, et videte qucenam sit via recta et
bona, et ambulate in ca : [stand ye in the old ways, and
see which is the good way, and walk therein]. An-
tiquity deserveth that reverence, that men should make
a stand thereupon, and discover what is the best way ;
but when the discovery is well taken, then to make

130 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

progression. And to speak truly, Antiquitas sceculi
juventus mundi. These times are the ancient times,
when the world is ancient, and not those which we
account ancient ordine retrogrado, by a computation
backward from ourselves.

Another error, induced by the former, is a distrust
that any thing should be now to be found out, which
the world should have missed and passed over so long
time ; as if the same objection were to be made to time
that Lucian maketh to Jupiter and other the heathen
gods, of which he wondereth that they begot so many
children in old time and begot none in his time, and
asketh whether they were become septuagenary, or
whether the law Pappia, made against old men's mar-
riages, had restrained them. So it seemeth men doubt
lest time is become past children and generation ;
wherein contrariwise we see commonly the levity and
unconstancy of men's judgments, which, till a matter
be done, wonder that it can be done ; and as soon as it
is done, wonder again that it was no sooner done ; as
we see in the expedition of Alexander into Asia, which
at first was prejudged as a vast and impossible enter-
prise ; and yet afterwards it pleaseth Livy to make no
more of it than this, Nil aliud qudm bene ausus >-ana
contemnere : [it was but taking courage to despise vain
apprehensions]. And the same happened to Columbus
in the western navigation. But in intellectual matters
it is much more common ; as may be seen in most of
the propositions of Euclid, which till they be demon-
strate, they seem strange to our assent ; but being de-
monstrate, our mind accepteth of them by a kind of
relation (as the lawyers speak) as if we had known
them before.

THE FIRST BOOK. 131

Another error, that hath also some affinity with the
former, is a conceit that of former opinions or sects,
after variety and examination, the best hath still pre-
vailed and suppressed the rest ; so as if a man should
begin the labour of a new search, he were but like to
light upon somewhat formerly rejected, and by rejec-
tion brought into oblivion : as if the multitude, or the
wisest for the multitude's sake, were not ready to give
passage rather to that which is popular and superficial
than to that which is substantial and profound ; for
the truth is, that time seemeth to be of the nature of a
river or stream, which cai'rieth down to us that which
is light and blown up, and sinketh and drowneth that
which is weighty and solid.

Another error, of a diverse nature from all the
former, is the over-early and peremptory reduction of
knowledge into arts and methods ; from which time
commonly sciences receive small or no augmentation.
But as young men, when they knit and shape perfectly,
do seldom grow to a further stature ; so knowledge,
while' it is in aphorisms and observations, it is in
growth ; but when it once is comprehended in exact
methods, it may perchance be further polished and il-
lustrate,1 and accommodated for use and practice ; but
it increaseth no more in bulk and substance.

Another error, which doth succeed that which we
last mentioned, is that after the distribution of particu-
lar arts and sciences, men have abandoned universality,
or philosophia prima ; which cannot but cease and stop
all progression. For no perfect discovery can be made
upon a flat or a level : neither is it possible to discover
the more remote and deeper parts of any science, if

1 So the original. Ed. 1633 has illustrated.

132 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

you stand but upon the level of the same science, and
ascend not to a higher science.

Another error hath proceeded from too great a rev-
erence, and a kind of adoration of the mind and un-
derstanding of man ; by means whereof men have
withdrawn themselves too much from the contempla-
tion of nature and the observations of experience, and
have tumbled up and down in their own reason and
conceits. Upon these intellectualists, which are not-
withstanding commonly taken for the most sublime and
divine philosophers, Heraclitus gave a just censure,
saying, Men sought truth in their own little ivorlds, and
not in the great and common world; for they disdain to
spell and so by degrees to read in the volume of God's
works ; and contrariwise by continual meditation and
agitation of wit do urge and as it were invocate their
own spirits to divine and give oracles unto them, where-
by they are deservedly deluded.

Another error that hath some connection with this
later is, that men have used to infect their meditations,
opinions, and doctrines, with some conceits which they
have most admired, or some sciences which they have
most applied ; and given all things else a tincture ac-
cording to them, utterly untrue and unproper. So
hath Plato intermingled his philosophy with theology,
and Aristotle with logic, and the second school of
Plato, Proclus and the rest, with the mathematics.
For these were the arts which had a kind of primo-
geniture with them severally. So have the alchemists
made a philosophy out of a few experiments of the
furnace ; and Gilbertus, our countryman, hath made
a philosophy out of the observations of a loadstone. So
Cicero, when, reciting the several opinions of the na-

THE FIRST BOOK. 133

ture of the soul, he found a musician that held the soul
was but a harmony, saith pleasantly, Hie ah arte sua
non recessit, $c. [he was constant to his own art]. But
of these conceits Aristotle speaketh seriously and wise-
ly, when he saith, Qui respiciunt ad pauca de facili
pronunciant : [they who take only few points into ac-
count find it easy to pronounce judgment].

Another error is an impatience of doubt, and haste
to assertion without due and mature suspension of
judgment. For the two ways of contemplation are
not unlike the two ways of action commonly spoken
of by the ancients ; the one plain and smooth in the
beginning, and in the end impassable ; the other rough
and troublesome in the entrance, but after a while fair
and even. So it is in contemplation ; if a man will
begin with certainties, he shall end in doubts ; but if
he will be content to begin with doubts, he shall end
in certainties.

Another error is in the manner of the tradition and
delivery of knowledge, which is for the most part
magistral and peremptory, and not ingenuous and
faithful ; in a sort as may be soonest believed, and
not easiliest examined. It is true that in compendi-
ous treatises for practice that form is not to be dis-
allowed. But in the true handling of knowledge, men
ought not to fall either on the one side into the vein of
Velleius the Epicurean, Nil tarn metuens, qudm ne
dubitare aliqua de re videretur, [who feared nothing so
much as the seeming to be in doubt about anything,]
nor on the other side into Socrates his ironical doubting
of all things ; but to propound things sincerely, with
more or less asseveration, as they stand in a man's own
judgment proved more or less.

134 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

Other errors there are in the scope that men pro-
pound to themselves, whereunto they bend their en-
deavours ; for whereas the more constant and devote '
kind of professors of any science ought to propound
to themselves to make some additions to their science,
they convert their labours to aspire to certain second
prizes ; as to be a profound interpreter or eommenter,
to be a sharp champion or defender, to be a methodical
compounder or abridger ; and so the patrimony of
knowledge cometh to be sometimes improved, but sel-
dom augmented.

But the greatest error of all the rest is the mistaking
or misplacing of the last or furthest end of knowledge.
For men have entered into a desire of learning and
knowledge, sometimes upon a natural curiosity and in-
quisitive appetite ; sometimes to entertain their minds
with variety and delight ; sometimes for ornament and
reputation ; and sometimes to enable them to victory
of wit and contradiction ; and most times for lucre and
profession ; and seldom sincerely to give a true account
of their gift of reason, to the benefit and use of men :
as if there were sought in knowledge a couch, where-
upon to rest a searching and restless spirit ; or a ter-
race, for a wandering and variable mind to walk up
and down with a fair prospect ; or a tower of state,
for a proud mind to raise itself upon ; or a fort or
commanding ground, for strife and contention ; or a
shop, for profit or sale ; and not a rich storehouse, for
the glory of the Creator and the relief of man's estate.
But this is that which will indeed dignify and exalt
knowledge, if contemplation and action may be more
nearly and straitly conjoined and united together than
1 So the original. Ed. 1633 has detoutt.

THE FIRST BOOK. 135

they have been ; a conjunction like unto that of the
two highest planets, Saturn the planet of rest and con-
templation, and Jupiter the planet of civil society and
action. Howbeit, I do not mean, when I speak of
use and action, that end before-mentioned of the ap-
plying of knowledge to lucre and profession : for I am
not ignorant how much that diverteth and interrupteth
the prosecution and advancement of knowledge ; like
unto the golden ball thrown before Atalanta, which
while she goeth aside and stoopeth to take up, the race
is hindered,

Declinat cursus, aurumque volubile tollit.

Neither is my meaning, as was spoken of Socrates, to
call philosophy down from heaven to converse upon the
earth ; that is, to leave natural philosophy aside, and
to apply knowledge only to manners and policy. But
as both heaven and earth do conspire and contribute
to the use and benefit of man, so the end ought to be,
from both philosophies to separate and reject vain
speculations and whatsoever is empty and void, and
to preserve and augment whatsoever is solid and fruit-
ful ; that knowledge may not be as a curtesan, for
pleasure and vanity only, or as a bond-woman, to ac-
quire and gain to her master's use ; but as a spouse,
for generation, fruit, and comfort.

Thus have I described and opened, as by a kind of
dissection, those peccant humours (the principal of
them) which have 1 not only given impediment to the
proficience of learning, but have given also occasion to
the traducement thereof: wherein if I have been too
plain, it must be remembered Fidelia vulnera amantis,
sed dolosa oscula malignantis : [faithful are the wounds

1 hath in all the old editions.

136 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

of a friend, but the kisses of an enemy are deceitful].
This I think I have gained, that I ought to be the bet-
ter believed in that which I shall say pertaining to
commendation, because I have proceeded so freely in
that which concerneth censure. And yet I have no
purpose to enter into a laudative of learning, or to
make a hymn to the muses, (though I am of opinion
that it is long since their rights were duly celebrated :)
but my intent is, without varnish or amplification, just-
ly to weigh the dignity of knowledge in the balance
with other things, and to take the true value thereof
by testimonies and arguments divine and human.

First therefore, let us seek the dignity of knowledge
in the arch-type or first platform, which is in the at-
tributes and acts of God, as far as they are revealed
to man and may be observed with sobriety; wherein
we may not seek it by the name of learning; for all
learning is knowledge acquired, and all knowledge in
God is original : and therefore we must look for it by
another name, that of wisdom or sapience, as the Scrip-
tures call it.

It is so then, that in the work of the creation we see
a double emanation of virtue from God ; the one re-
ferring more properly to power, the other to wisdom ;
the one expressed in making the subsistence of the
matter, and the other in disposing the beauty of the
form. This being supposed, it is to be observed, that
for any thing which appeareth in the history of the
creation, the confused mass and matter of heaven and
earth was made in a moment, and the order and dis-
position of that chaos or mass was the work of six
days ; such a note of difference it pleased God to put
upon the works of power and the works of wisdom ;

THE FIRST BOOK. 137

wherewith concurreth, that in the former it is not set
down that God said, Let there be heaven and earth, as
it is set down of the works following; but actually,
that God made heaven and earth : the one carrying
the style of a manufacture, and the other of a law,
decree, or counsel.

To proceed to that which is next in order, from God
to spirits ; we find, as far as credit is to be given to
the celestial hierarchy of that supposed Dionysius the
senator of Athens,1 the first place or degree is given to
the angels of love, which are termed Seraphim ; the
second to the angels of light, which are termed Cheru-
bim ; and the third and so following places to thrones,
principalities, and the rest, which are all angels of
power and ministry ; so as the angels of knowledge
and illumination are placed before the angels of office
and domination.

To descend from spirits and intellectual forms to
sensible and material forms ; we read the first form
that was created was light, which hath a relation and
correspondence in nature and corporal things, to knowl-
edge in spirits and incorporal things.

So in the distribution of clays, we see the day where-
in God did rest and contemplate his own works, was
blessed above all the days wherein he did effect and
accomplish them.

After the creation was finished, it is set down unto
us that man was placed in the garden to work therein ;
which work so appointed to him could be no other than
work of contemplation ; that is, when the end of work

1 qua Dionytii Areopagitce nomine evulgatur, are the words of the trans-
lation: the insinuation implied in the word supposed, being withdrawn, or
at least not so strongly expressed. See note p. 109.

138 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

is but for exercise and experiment, not for necessity ;
for there being then no reluctation of the creature, nor
sweat of the brow, man's employment must of conse-
quence have been matter of delight in the experiment,
and not matter of labour for the use. Again, the first
acts which man performed in Paradise consisted of the
two summary parts of knowledge ; the view of creat-
ures, and the imposition of names. As for the knowl-
edge which induced the fall, it was, as was touched
before, not the natural knowledge of creatures, but the
moral knowledge of good and evil ; wherein the sup-
position was, that God's commandments or prohibitions
were not the originals of good and evil, but that they
had other beginnings, which man aspired to know, to
the end to make a total defection from God, and to de-
pend wholly upon himself.

To pass on : in the first event or occurrence after
the fall of man, we see (as the Scriptures have infinite
mysteries, not violating at all the truth of the story or
letter,) an image of the two estates, the contemplative
state and the active state, figured in the two persons
of Abel and Cain, and in the two simplest and most
primitive trades of life ; that of the shepherd, (who,
by reason of his leisure, rest in a place, and living in
view of heaven, is a lively image of a contemplative
life,) and that of the husbandman : where we see
again the favour and election of God went to the shep-
herd, and not to the tiller of the ground.

So in the age before the flood, the holy records
within those few memorials which are there entered
and registered have vouchsafed to mention and honour
the name of the inventors and authors of music and
works in metal. In the age after the flood, the first

THE FIRST BOOK. 139

great judgment of God upon the ambition of man was
the confusion of tongues ; whereby the open trade and
intercourse of learning and knowledge was chiefly ini-
barred.

To descend to Moses the lawgiver, and God's first
pen : he is adorned by the Scriptures with this addi-
tion and commendation, that he was seen in all the
learning of the Egyptians ; which nation we know
was one of the most ancient schools of the world :
for so Plato brings in the Egyptian priest saying
unto Solon : You Grecians are ever children ; you
have no knowledge of antiquity, nor antiquity of knowl-
edge. Take a view of the ceremonial law of Moses ;
you shall find, besides the prefiguration of Christ, the
badge or difference of the people of God, the exercise
and impression of obedience, and other divine uses and
fruits thereof, that some of the most learned Rabbins
have travelled profitably and profoundly to observe,
some of them a natural, some of them a moral, sense
or reduction of many of the ceremonies and ordi-
nances. As in the law of the leprosy, where it is said,
If the whiteness have overspread the flesh, the patient
may pass abroad for clean ; but if there be any whole
flesh remaining, he is to be shut up for unclean ; one
of them noteth a principle of nature, that putrefaction
is more contagious before maturity than after : and
another noteth a position of moral philosophy, that
men abandoned to vice do not so much corrupt man-
ners, as those that are half good and half evil. So
in this and very many other places in that law, there
is to be found, besides the theological sense, much
aspersion of philosophy.

So likewise in that excellent book of Job, if it be

140 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

revolved with diligence, it will be found pregnant
and swelling with natural philosophy ; as for example,
cosmography and the roundness of the world ; Qui
extendit aquilonem super vacuum, et appendit terrain
super nihilum ; [who stretcheth out the north upon
the empty space, and hangeth the earth upon noth-
ing ;] wherein the pensileness of the earth, the pole
of the north, and the finiteness or convexity of heaven
are manifestly touched. So again matter of astron-
omy ; Spiritus ejus ornavit ccelos, et obstetrieante manu
ejus eductus est Coluber tortuosus : [by his spirit he
hath garnished the heavens ; his hand hath formed
the crooked Serpent]. And in another place; Nun~
quid conjungere valebis micantes Stellas Pleiadas, aut
gyrum Arcturi poteris dissipare? [canst thou bring
together the glittering stars of the Pleiades, or scat-
ter the array of Arcturus?] where the fixing of the
stars, ever standing at equal distance, is with great
elegancy noted. And in another place, Qui facit
Arcturum, et Oriona, et JSyadas, et interiora Austri ;
[which maketh Arcturus, Orion, and Hyades, and the
secrets of the South;] where again he takes knowl-
edge of the depression of the southern pole, calling
it the secrets of the south, because the southern
stars were in that climate unseen. Matter of gen-
eration ; Annon sicut lac mulsisti me, et sicut caseum
coagulasti me? &c. [hast thou not drawn me forth
like milk, and curdled me like cheese ? ] Matter of
minerals ; Habet argentum venarum suarum principia :
et auro locus est in quo confiatur, ferrum de terra tol-
lilur, et lapis solutus calore in as vertitur : [surely
there is a vein for the silver, and a place for gold
where they fine it. Iron is taken out of the earth,

THE FIRST BOOK. 141

and brass is molten out of the stone : ] and so for-
wards in that chapter.

So likewise in the person of Salomon the king, we
see the gift or endowment of wisdom and learning, both
in Salomon's petition and in God's assent thereunto,
preferred before all other terrene and temporal felicity..
By virtue of which grant or donative of God, Salomon
became enabled not only to write those excellent para-,
bles or aphorisms concerning divine and moral philoso-
phy, but also to compile a natural history of all verd- ^
ure,1 from the cedar upon the mountain to the moss
upon the wall, (which is but a rudiment between
putrefaction and an herb,) and also of all things that
breathe or move. Nay, the same Salomon the king,
although he excelled in the glory of treasure and mag-
nificent buildings, of shipping and navigation, of ser-
vice and attendance, of fame and renown, and the like,
yet he maketh no claim to any of those glorjes, but
only to the glory of inquisition of truth ; for so he saith
expressly, The glory of God is to conceal a thing, but
the glory of the king is to find it out ; as if, according to
the innocent play of children, the Divine Majesty took
delight to hide his works, to the end to have them
found out ; and as if kings could not obtain a greater
honour than to be God's playfellows in that game, con-
sidering the great commandment of wits and means,
whereby nothing needeth to be hidden from them.

Neither did the dispensation of God vary in the
times after our Saviour came into the world ; for our
Saviour himself did first shew his power to subdue
ignorance, by his conference with the priests and doc-

1 verdor in edd. 1605, 1629, 1633 ; which perhaps ought to be retained,
as another form of the word rather than another way of spelling it.

142 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

tors of the law, before he shewed his power to subdue
nature by his miracles. And the coming of the Holy
Spirit was chiefly figured and expressed in the simili-
tude and gift of tongues, which are but vehicula scien-
tice, [carriers of knowledge].

So in the election of those instruments which it
pleased God to use for the plantation of the faith,
notwithstanding that at the first he did employ persons
altogether unlearned otherwise than by inspiration,
more evidently to declare his immediate working,
and to abase all human wisdom or knowledge ; yet
nevertheless that counsel of his was no sooner per-
formed, but in the next vicissitude and succession
he did send his divine truth into the world waited
on with other learnings as with servants or hand-
maids : for so we see St. Paul, who was only learned
amongst the apostles, had his pen most used in the
scriptures of the New Testament.

So again we find that many of the ancient bishops
and fathers of the Church were excellently read and
studied in all the learning of the heathen ; insomuch
that the edict of the emperor Julianus, (whereby it was
interdicted unto Christians to be admitted into schools,
lectures, or exercises of learning,) was esteemed and
accounted a more pernicious engine and machination
against the Christian faith, than were all the sangui-
nary prosecutions of his predecessors ; neither could
the emulation and jealousy of Gregory the first of
that name, bishop of Rome, ever obtain the opinion
of piety or devotion ; but contrariwise received the
censure of humour, malignity, and pusillanimity,1 even

1 This clause is omitted in the translation; and the words eatera viri
egregii are introduced after the name of Gregory. See note p. 109.

THE FIRST BOOK. 143

amongst holy men ; in that he designed to obliterate
and extinguish the memory of heathen antiquity and
authors. But contrariwise it was the Christian Church,
which amidst the inundations of the Scythians on the
one side from the north-west, and the Saracens from
the east, did preserve in the sacred lap and bosom
thereof the precious relics even of heathen learning,
which otherwise had been extinguished as if no such
thing had ever been.

And we see before our eyes, that in the age of our-
selves and our fathers, when it pleased God to call the
church of Rome to account for their degenerate man-
ners and ceremonies, and sundry doctrines obnoxious
and framed to uphold the same abuses ; at one and the
same time it was ordained by the Divine Providence
that there should attend withal a renovation and new
spring of all other knowledges : * and on the other side
we see the Jesuits, who partly in themselves and partly
by the emulation and provocation of their example,
have much quickened and strengthened the state of
learning, — we see (I say) what notable service and
reparation they have done to the Roman see.

Wherefore to conclude this part, let it be observed
that there be two principal duties and services, besides
ornament and illustration, which philosophy and human
learning do perform to faith and religion. The one, be-
cause they are an effectual inducement to the exalta-
tion of the glory of God : For as the Psalms and other
Scriptures do often invite us to consider and magnify
the great and wonderful works of God, so if we should
rest only in the contemplation of the exterior of them

1 All this, from the beginning of the paragraph, is omitted in the trans-
lation. See note p. 109.

1*44 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

as they first offer themselves to our senses, we should
do a like injury unto the majesty of God as if we
should judge or construe of the store of some excellent
jeweller by that only which is set out toward the street
in his shop. The other, because they minister a sin-
gular help and preservative against unbelief and error :
For our Saviour saith, You err, not knowing the Scrip-
tures, nor the power of God; laying before us two books
or volumes to study, if we will be secured from error ;
first the Scriptures, revealing the will of God, and then
the creatures expressing his power ; whereof the latter
is a key unto the former ; not only opening our under-
standing to conceive the true sense of the Scriptures,
by the general notions of reason and rules of speech ;
but chiefly opening our belief, in drawing us into a due
meditation of the omnipotency of God, which is chiefly
signed and engraven upon his works. Thus much
therefore for divine testimony and evidence concerning
the true dignity and value of learning.

As for human proofs, it is so large a field, as in a
discourse of this nature and brevity it is fit rather to
use choice of those things which we shall produce,
than to embrace the variety of them. First therefore,
in the degrees of human honour amongst the heathen
it was the highest, to obtain to a veneration and ado-
ration as a God. This unto the Christians is as the
forbidden fruit. But we speak now separately of hu-
man testimony : according to which that which the
Grecians call apotheosis, and the Latins relatio inter
divos, was the supreme honour which man could at-
tribute unto man ; specially when it was given, not by
a formal decree or act of state, as it was used among
the Roman emperors, but by an inward assent and be-

THE FIRST BOOK. 145

lief; which honour being so high, had also a degree or
middle term ; for there were reckoned above human
honours, honours1 heroical and divine; in the attribu-
tion and distribution of which honours we see antiquity
made this difference : that whereas founders and unit-
ers of states and cities, lawgivers, extirpers of tyrants,
fathers of the people, and other eminent persons in civil
merit, were honoured but with the titles of worthies or
demi-gods ; such as were Hercules, Theseus, Minos,
Romulus, and the like ; on the other side, such as were
inventors and authors of new arts, endowments, and
commodities towards man's life, were ever consecrated
amongst the gods themselves ; as was Ceres, Bacchus,
Mercurius, Apollo, and others ; and justly ; for the
merit of the former is confined within the circle of
an age or a nation ; and is like fruitful showers, which
though they be profitable and good, yet serve but for
that season, and for a latitude of ground where they
fall ; but the other is indeed like the benefits of
heaven, which are permanent and universal. The
former again is mixed with strife and perturbation ;
but the latter hath the true character of divine pres-
ence, coming2 in aura lent, without noise or agitation.
Neither is certainly that other merit of learning, in
repressing the inconveniences which grow from man
to man, much inferior to the former, of relieving the
necessities which arise from nature ; which merit was
lively set forth by the ancients in that feigned relation
of Orpheus theatre ; where all beasts and birds assem-
bled, and forgetting their several appetites, some of

1 honour in edd. 1605, 1629, 1633.

2 commonly in edd. 1629 and 1633. In the original, com- ends a line and
the rest of the word has accidentally dropped out.

VOL. vi. 10

146 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

prey, some of game, some of quarrel, stood all soci-
ably together listening unto the airs and accords of
the harp ; the sound whereof no sooner ceased, or was
drowned by some louder noise, but every beast re-
turned to his own nature : wherein is aptly described
the nature and condition of men ; who are full of
savage and unreclaimed desires, of profit, of lust, of
revenge, which as long as they give ear to precepts,
to laws, to religion, sweetly touched with eloquence
and persuasion of books, of sermons, of harangues, so
long is society and peace maintained ; but if these in-
struments be silent, or that sedition and tumult make
them not audible, all things dissolve into anarchy and
confusion.

But this appeareth more manifestly, when kings
themselves, or persons of authority under them, or
other governors in commonwealths and popular estates,
are endued with learning. For although he might be
thought partial to his own profession, that said Then
should people and estates be happy, when either kings
were philosophers, or philosophers kings; yet so much
is verified by experience, that under learned princes
and governors there have been ever the best times :
for howsoever kings may have their imperfections in
their passions and customs, yet if they be illuminate
by learning, they have those notions of religion, policy,
and morality, which do preserve them and refrain them
from all ruinous and peremptory errors and excesses ;
whispering evermore in their ears, when counsellors
and servants stand mute and silent. And senators or
counsellors likewise which be learned, do proceed upon
more safe and substantial principles than counsellors
which are only men of experience ; the one sort keep-

THE FIRST BOOK. 147

ing dangers afar off, whereas the other discover them
not till they come near hand, and then trust to the
agility of their wit to ward or avoid them.

Which felicity of times under learned princes (to
keep still the law of brevity, by using the most emi-
nent and selected examples) doth best appear in the
age which passed from the death of Domitianus the
emperor until the reign of Commodus ; comprehend-
ing a succession of six princes,1 all learned or singular
favourers and advancers of learning ; which age, for
temporal respects, was the most happy and flourishing
that ever the Roman empire (which then was a model
of the world) enjoyed : a matter revealed and pre-
figured unto Domitian in a dream the night before he
was slain ; for he thought there was grown behind
upon his shoulders a neck and a head of gold, which
came accordingly to pass in those golden times which
succeeded : of which princes we will make some com-
memoration ; wherein although the matter will be vul-
gar, and may be thought fitter for a declamation than
agreeable to a treatise infolded as this is, yet because it
is pertinent to the point in hand, neque semper arcwn
tendit Apollo, [and Apollo does not keep his bow al-
ways bent,] and to name them only were too naked
and cursory, I will not omit it altogether.2

The first was Nerva ; the excellent temper of whose
government is by a glance in Cornelius Tacitus touched
to the life : JPostquam divus Nerva res olim insociabiles
miscuisset, imperium et libertatem : [he united and rec-
onciled two things which used not to go together —

1 So edd. 1629 and 1633. The original has sciences.

2 In the De Augmentis he merely says ude qvibus," i. e. the golden times,
" sigillalim sed brevissime verba faciam." And the next five paragraphs
are condensed into one.

148 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

government and liberty].1 And in token of his learn-
ing, the last act of his short reign left to memory was
a missive to his adopted son Trajan, proceeding upon
some inward discontent at the ingratitude of the times,
comprehended in a verse of Homer's ;

Telis, Phoebe, tuis lacrymas ulciscere nostras.
[0 Phoebus, with thy shafts avenge these tears.]

Trajan, who succeeded, was for his person not
learned : but if we will hearken to the speech of our
Saviour, that saith, He that receiveth a prophet in the
name of a prophet, shall have a prophet's reward, he
deserveth to be placed amongst the most learned princes :
for there was not a greater admirer of learning or
benefactor of learning ; a founder of famous libraries,
a perpetual advancer of learned men to office, and
a familiar converser with learned professors and pre-
ceptors, who were noted to have then most credit in
court. On the other side, how much Trajan's virtue
and government was admired and renowned, surely
no testimony of grave and faithful history doth more
lively set forth, than that legend tale of Gregorius
Magnus, bishop of Rome, who was noted for the ex-
treme envy he bare towards all heathen excellency :
and yet he is reported, out of the love and estimation
of Trajan's moral virtues, to have made unto God pas-
sionate and fervent prayers for the delivery of his soul
out of hell ; and to have obtained it, with a caveat

1 Agric. 8. : Quanquam .... Nerva Ctesar res dim dissociabiles miscu-
erit, principalum ac libertatem. This quotation is omitted in the transla-
tion, where nothing is said of the character of Nerva's government except
that he was clementissimus imperator, quique, si nihil aliud, orbi Trnjanum
dedil ; from which it would almost seem that Bacon thought it hardly de-
served the praise which Tacitus bestows upon it. In evidence of his learn-
ing he adds that he was the friend, and as it were the disciple, of Apol-
lonius the Pythagorean.

THE FIRST BOOK. 149

that he should make no more such petitions.1 In this
prince's time also the persecutions against the Chris-
tians received intermission, upon the certificate of
Plinius Secundus, a man of excellent learning and by
Trajan advanced.

Adrian, his successor, was the most curious man that
lived, and the most universal inquirer ; insomuch as it
was noted for an error in his mind, that he desired to
comprehend all things, and not to reserve himself for
the worthiest things ; falling into the like humour that
was long before noted in Philip of Macedon, who when
he would needs over-rule and put down an excellent
musician in an argument touching music, was well
answered by him again, God forbid, Sir, (saith he,)
that your fortune should be so bad, as to know these
things better than I? It pleased God likewise to use
the curiosity of this emperor as an inducement to the
peace of his church in those days. For having Christ
in veneration, not as a God or Saviour, but as a won-
der or novelty, and having his picture in his gallery

1 To this stoty Dante alludes in the tenth canto of Purgatory ; taking it
apparently from the life of Gregory by Paul the Deacon. It seems first to
have been mentioned by John Damascene in his discourse "De iis qui in
fide dormierunt; " from whom St. Thomas Aquinas quotes it in his Supple-
mentary Questions, 71. 5. The hymn sung in the fourteenth century in the
Cathedral of Mantua on St. Paul's day, is another curious instance of the
appreciation of Heathen worth in the middle ages. It is there said of St.
Paul,

Ad Maronis mausoleum

Ductus fudit super eum

Pise rorem lacrymae ;

Quern te, inquit, reddidissem

Si te vivum invenissem

Poetarum maxime!

See Schcell's Histoire de la Litterature Romaine. — R. L. E. This whole
passage is omitted in the translation.
3 Plutarch, Apoph.

150 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

matched with Appollonius (with whom in his vain im-
agination he thought he had some conformity), yet it
served the turn to allay the bitter hatred of those
times against the Christian name ; so as the church
had peace during his time.1 And for his government
civil, although he did not attain to that of Trajan's2
in glory of arms or perfection of justice, yet in deserv-
ing of the weal of the subject he did exceed him. For
Trajan erected many famous monuments and build-
ings ; insomuch as Constantine the Great in emulation
was wont to call him Parietaria, wall flower, because
his name was upon so many walls : but his buildings
and works were more of glory and triumph than use
and necessity. But Adrian spent his whole reign,
which was peaceable, in a perambulation or survey of
the Roman empire ; giving order and making assigna-
tion where he went for re-edifying of cities, towns, and
forts decayed, and for cutting of rivers and streams,
and for making bridges and passages, and for policing 3
of cities and commonalties with new ordinances and
constitutions, and granting new franchises and incor-
porations ; so that his whole time was a very restora-
tion of all the lapses and decays of former times.

Antoninus4 Pius, who succeeded him, was a prince
excellently learned ; and had the patient and subtile
wit of a schoolman ; insomuch as in common speech
(which leaves no virtue untaxed) he was called cymini

1 There seems here a confusion of two stories. It was Alexander Severus
who according to Lampridius had a picture of our Saviour "matched with
Apollonius " and with some others. Hadrian however did honour Apol-
lonius and is said to have thought of dedicating a temple to Christ, which,
if I remember rightly, Alexander actually did. — R. L. E.

2 So in all three editions. Qy. Trajan ?
*pollicing, edd. 1605 and 1629. pollishintj, ed. 1633.
* AtUonius, edd. 1605, 1629, 1633.

THE FIRST BOOK. 151

sector, a carver or divider of cummin seed, which is
one of the least seeds ; such a patience he had and
settled spirit to enter into the least and most exact
differences of causes ; a fruit no doubt of the exceed-
ing tranquillity and serenity of his mind ; which being
no ways charged or incumbered either with fears, re-
morses, or scruples, but having been noted for a man
of the purest goodness, without all fiction or affecta-
tion, that hath reigned or lived, made his mind con-
tinually present and entire. He likewise approached
a degree nearer unto Christianity, and became, as
Agrippa said unto St. Paul, half a Christian ; holding
their religion and law in good opinion, and not only
ceasing persecution, but giving way to the advance-
ment of Christians.

There succeeded him the first Divi fratres, the two
adoptive brethren, Lucius Commodus Verus, son to
jElius Verus, who delighted much in the softer kind
of learning, and was wont to call the poet Martial his
Virgil; and Marcus Aurelius Antoninus ; whereof the
later, who obscured his colleague 1 and survived him
long, was named the Philosopher : who as he excelled
all the rest in learning, so he excelled them likewise
in perfection of all royal virtues ; insomuch as Julianus
the emperor, in his book intitled Ccesares, being as a
pasquil or satire to deride all his predecessors, feigned
that they were all invited to a banquet of the gods, and
Silenus the jester sat at the nether end of the table and
bestowed a scoff on every one as they came in ; but when
Marcus Philosophus came in, Silenus was gravelled and

1 In the translation he says that Lucius though not so good as his brother
was better than most of the other emperors. (Fratri quidem bonitate cedens,
reliquos iniperatores plurimos super cms.)

152 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

out of countenance, not knowing where to carp at
him ; save at the last he gave a glance at his patience
towards his wife. And the virtue of this prince, con-
tinued with that of his predecessor, made the name of
Antoninus so sacred in the world, that though it were
extremely dishonoured in Commodus, Caracalla, and
Heliogabalus, who all bare the name, yet when Alex-
ander Severus refused the name because he was a
stranger to the family, the Senate with one acclama-
tion said, Quomodo Augustus, sic et Antoninus : [let
the name of Antoninus be as the name of Augustus :]
in such renown and veneration was the name of these
two princes in those days, that they would have it as a
perpetual addition in all the emperors' style. In this
emperor's time also the church for the most part was
in peace ; so as in this sequence of six princes we
do see the blessed effects of learning in sovereignty,
painted forth in the greatest table of the world.

But for a tablet or picture of smaller volume, (not
presuming to speak of your Majesty that liveth,) in
my judgment the most excellent is that of queen Eliza-
beth, your immediate predecessor in this part of Brit-
ain ; a prince that, if Plutarch were now alive to write
lives * by parallels, would trouble him, I think, to find
for her a parallel amongst women. This lady was
endued with learning in her sex singular, and rare a
even amongst masculine princes ; whether we speak of
learning of3 language or of science ; modern or an-
cient ; divinity or humanity. And unto the very last

i lynes, ed. 1605 and 1629. lines ed. 1633.

2 So edd. 1629 and 1633. Ed. 1605 has grace.

8 Edd. 1629 and 1633 have or ; with a semicolon after learning, where
the original has a comma; the omission of which makes the meaning and
construction clear.

THE FIRST BOOK. 153

year of her life she accustomed to appoint set hours
for reading, scarcely any young student in an univer-
sity more daily or more duly. As for her1 govern-
ment, I assure myself I shall not exceed if I do affirm
that this part of the island never had forty-five years
of better times ; and yet not through the calmness of
the season, but through the wisdom of her regiment.
For if there be considered of the one side, the truth
of religion established ; the constant peace and secu-
rity ; the good administration of justice ; the temper-
ate use of the prerogative, not slackened, nor much
strained ; the flourishing state of learning, sortable to
so excellent a patroness ; the convenient estate of
wealth and means, both of crown and subject ; the
habit of obedience, and the moderation of discontents ;
and there be considered on the other side, the differ-
ences of religion, the troubles of neighbour countries,
the ambition of Spain, and opposition of Rome ; and
then that she was solitary and of herself: these things
I say considered, as I could not have chosen an in-
stance so recent and so proper, so I suppose I could
not have chosen one more remarkable or eminent, to
the purpose now in hand ; which is concerning the
conjunction of learning in the prince with felicity in
the people.2

Neither hath learning an influence and operation
only upon civil merit and moral virtue, and the arts
or temperature of peace and peaceable government ;
but likewise it hath no less power and efficacy in

i So edd. 1629 and 1633. The original has the.

2 This paragraph is entirely omitted in the De Augmentis ; no doubt as
one which would not be allowed at Rome and might lead to the proscrip-
tion of the book. See note p. 109.

154 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

enablement towards martial and military virtue and
prowess ; as maj be notably represented in the ex-
amples of Alexander the Great and Cassar the Dic-
tator, mentioned before, but now in fit place to be
resumed ; of whose virtues and acts in war there
needs no note or recital, having been the wonders
of time in that kind ; but of their affections towards
learning, and perfections in learning, it is pertinent to
say somewhat.

Alexander was bred and taught under Aristotle the
great philosopher, who dedicated divers of his books
of philosophy unto him. He was attended with Callis-
thenes and divers other learned persons, that followed
him in camp, throughout his journeys and conquests.
What price and estimation he had learning in doth
notably appear in these three particulars : first, in
the envy he used to express that he bare towards
Achilles, in this that he had so good a trumpet of
his praises as Homer's verses ; secondly, in the judg-
ment or solution he gave touching that precious cab-
inet of Darius, which was found among his jewels,
whereof question was made what thing was worthy
to be put into it, and he gave his opinion for Homer's
works ; thirdly, in his letter to Aristotle, after he had
set forth his books of nature, wherein he expostulateth
with him for publishing the secrets or mysteries of
philosophy, and gave him to understand that himself
esteemed it more to excel other men in learning and
knowledge than in power and empire. And what use
he had of learning doth appear, or rather shine, in all
his speeches and answers, being full of science and use
of science, and that in all variety.

And herein again it may seem a thing scholastical,

THE FIRST BOOK. 155

and somewhat idle, to recite things that every man
knoweth ; but yet since the argument I handle leadeth
me thereunto, I am glad that men shall perceive I am
as willing to flatter (if they will so call it) an Alex-
ander or a Caesar or an Antoninus, that are dead
many hundred years since, as any that now liveth :
for it is the displaying of the glory of learning in
sovereignty that I propound to myself, and not an
humour of declaiming in any man's praises.1 Observe
then the speech he used of Diogenes, and see if it
tend not to the true state of one of the greatest
questions of moral philosophy ; whether the enjoy-
ing of outward things or the contemning of them be
the greatest happiness ; for when he saw Diogenes so
perfectly contented with so little, he said to those that
mocked at his condition, Were I not Alexander, 1 would
wish to be Diogenes. But Seneca inverteth it, and
saith, Plus erat quod hie nollet accipere, qudm quod ille
posset dare. There were more things which Diogenes
would have refused, than those were which Alexander
could have given or enjoyed.

Observe again that speech which was usual with
him, That he felt his mortality chiefly in two things, sleep
and lust ; and see if it were not a speech extracted out
of the depth of natural philosophy, and liker to have
comen out of the mouth of Aristotle or Democritus
than from Alexander.2

See again that speech of humanity and poesy ; when

1 All this from the beginning of the paragraph is omitted in the transla-
tion.

2 cmot tarn indigenha lam redundantia naturae, per ilia duo designaia, mortis
sin tanquam arrhabones ; the two opposite imperfections of nature, deficiency
and superfluity, exhaustion and incontinence, being as it were earnests of
mortality.

156 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

upon the bleeding of his wounds, he called unto him
one of his flatterers that was wont to ascribe to him
divine honour, and said, Look, this is very blood ; this
is not such a liquor as Homer speaketh of, which ran
from Venus'1 hand when it was pierced by Diomedes.

See likewise his readiness in reprehension of logic, in
the speech he used to Cassander upon a complaint that
was made against his father Antipater : for when Alex-
ander happed to say, Do you think these men would have
come from so far to complain, except they had just cause
of grief? and Cassander answered, Tea, that was the
matter, because they thought they should not be disproved;
said Alexander laughing, See the subtilties of Aristotle,
to take a matter both ways, pro et contra, &c.

But note again how well he could use the same art
which he reprehended, to serve his own humour, when
bearing a secret grudge to Callisthenes because he was
against the new ceremony of his adoration, feasting one
night where the same Callisthenes was at the table, it
was moved by some after supper, for entertainment sake,
that Callisthenes who was an eloquent man might
speak of some theme or purpose at his own choice ;
which Callisthenes did ; choosing the praise of the
Macedonian nation for his discourse, and perform-
ing the same with so good manner as the hearers
were much ravished ; whereupon Alexander, nothing
pleased, said, It was easy to be eloquent upon so good a
subject : but saith he, Turn your style, and let us hear
what you can say against us : which Callisthenes pres-
ently undertook, and did with that sting and life, that
Alexander interrupted him, and said, The goodness of
the cause made him eloquent before, and despite made
him eloquent then again.

THE FIRST BOOK. 157

Consider further, for tropes of rhetoric, that excel-
lent use of a metaphor or translation, wherewith he
taxed Antipater, who was an imperious and tyrannous
governor : for when one of Antipater's friends com-
mended him to Alexander for his moderation, that he
did not degenerate, as his other lieutenants did, into
the Persian pride, in use of purple, but kept the
ancient habit of Macedon, of black ; True, (saith Alex-
ander,) but Antipater is all purple ivithin. Or that
other, when Parmenio came to him in the plain of
Arbella, and shewed him the innumerable multitude
of his enemies, specially as they appeared by the in-
finite number of lights, as it had been a new firma-
ment of stars, and thereupon advised him to assail
them by night : whereupon he answered, That he
would not steal the victory.

For matter of policy, weigh that significant distinc-
tion, so much in all ages embraced, that he made be-
tween his two friends Hephasstion and Craterus, when
he said, That the one loved Alexander, and the other
loved the king ; describing the principal difference of
princes' best servants, that some in affection love their
person, and others in duty love their crown.

Weigh also that excellent taxation of an error ordi-
nary with counsellors of princes, that they counsel
their masters according to the model of their own
mind and fortune, and not of their masters ; when
upon Darius' great offers Parmenio had said, Surely I
would accept these offers, were I as Alexander ; saith
Alexander, So would I, were I as Parmenio.

Lastly, weigh that quick and acute reply which he
made when he gave so large gifts to his friends and
servants, and was asked what he did reserve for him-

158 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

self, and he answered, Hope; weigh, I say, whether
he had not cast up his account aright, because hope
must be the portion of all that resolve upon great
enterprises. For this was Caesar's portion when he
went first into Gaul, his estate being then utterly over-
thrown with largesses. And this was likewise the
portion of that noble prince, howsoever transported
with ambition, Henry duke of Guise, of whom it
was usually said, that he was the greatest usurer in
France, because he had turned all his estate into
obligations.

To conclude therefore : as certain critics are used to
say hyperbolically, That if all sciences were lost, they
might be found in Virgil ; so certainly this may be said
truly, there are the prints and footsteps of learning
in those few speeches which are reported of this
prince : the admiration of whom, when I consider him
not as Alexander the Great, but as Aristotle's scholar,
hath carried me too far.

As for Julius Caesar, the excellency of his learning
needeth not to be argued from his education, or his
company, or his speeches ; but in a further degree
doth declare itself in his writings and works ; whereof
some are extant and permanent, and some unfortu-
nately perished. For first, we see there is left unto
us that excellent history of his own wars, which he
intitled only a Commentary, wherein all succeeding
times have admired the solid weight of matter, and
the real passages and lively images of actions and per-
sons, expressed in the greatest propriety of words and
perspicuity of narration that ever was ; which that it
was not the effect of a natural gift, but of learning and
precept, is well witnessed by that work of his intitled

THE FIRST BOOK. 159

De Analogia, being a grammatical philosophy, wherein
he did labour to make this same vox ad placitum to
become vox ad licitum, and to reduce custom of speech
to congruity of speech ; and took as it were the pic-
ture of words from the life of reason.1

So we receive from him, as a monument both of his
power and learning, the then reformed computation of
the year ; well expressing, that he took it to be as great
a glory to himself to observe and know the law of the
heavens as to give law to men upon the earth.

So likewise in that book of his Anti-Cato, it may
easily appear that he did aspire as well to victory of
wit as victory of war ; undertaking therein a conflict
against the greatest champion with the pen that then
lived, Cicero the orator.

So again in his book of Apophthegms which he col-
lected, we see that he esteemed it more honour to
make himself but a pair of tables to take the wise and
pithy words of others, than to have every word of his
own to be made an apophthegm or an oracle ; as vain
princes, by custom of flattery, pretend to do. And
yet if I should enumerate divers of his speeches, as I
did those of Alexander, they are truly such as Salomon
noteth, when he saith, Verba sapientum tanquam aculei,
et tanquam clavi in altum defixi: [the words of the wise
are as goads, and as nails fixed deep in : ] whereof I
will only recite three, not so delectable for elegancy,
but admirable for vigour and efficacy.

1 This passage is translated without addition or alteration. But Bacon
seems to have changed his opinion afterwards upon the point in question.
For in the sixth book of the Be Augmentis, c. i., he intimates a suspicion
that Ca?sar's book was not a grammatical philosophy, but only a set of
precepts for the formation of a pure, perfect, and unaffected style. See
Vol. II. p. 414.

r

160 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

As first, it is reason he be thought a master of
words, that could with one word appease a mutiny in
his army ; which was thus. The Romans, when their
generals did speak to their army, did use the word
Milites ; but when the magistrates spake to the people,
they did use the word Quirites. The soldiers were in
tumult, and seditiously prayed to be cashiered ; not
that they so meant, but by expostulation thereof to
draw Caesar to other conditions ; wherein he being
resolute not to give way, after some silence, he began
his speech, Ego, Quirites ; which did admit them al-
ready cashiered ; wherewith they were so surprised,
crossed, and confused, as they would not suffer him
to go on in his speech, but relinquished their demands,
and made it their suit to be again called by the name
of Milites.

The second speech was thus : Caesar did extremely
affect the name of king ; and some were set on, as he
passed by, in popular acclamation to salute him king;
whereupon, finding the cry weak and poor, he put it
off thus in a kind of jest, as if they had mistaken his
surname ; Non Rex sum, sed Ccesar : [I am not King,
but Caesar : ] a speech, that if it be searched, the life
and fulness of it can scarce be expressed : for first it
was a refusal of the name, but yet not serious : again
it did signify an infinite confidence and magnanimity,
as if he presumed Caesar was the greater title ; as by
his worthiness it is come to pass till this day : but
chiefly it was a speech of great allurement towards
his own purpose ; as if the state did strive with him
but for a name, whereof mean families were vested ;
for Rex was a surname with the Romans, as well as
King is with us.

THE FIRST BOOK. 161

The last speech which I will mention, was used to
Metellus ; when Caesar, after war declared, did possess
himself of the city of Rome ; at which time entering
into the inner treasury to take the money there accu-
mulate, Metellus being tribune forbade him : whereto
Caesar said, That if he did not desist, he would lay him
dead in the place ; and presently taking himself up, he
added, Young man, it is harder for me to speak it than
to do it. Adolescens, durius est mihi hoc dicere qudm
facere. A speech compounded of the greatest terror
and greatest clemency that could proceed out of the
mouth of man.

But to return and conclude with him : it is evident
himself knew well his own perfection in learning, and
took it upon him ; as appeared when upon occasion
that some spake what a strange resolution it was in
Lucius Sylla to resign his dictature, he scoffing at him,
to his own advantage, answered, That Sylla could not
skill of letters, and therefore knew not how to dictate.

And here it were fit to leave this point touching the
concurrence of military virtue and learning ; (for what
example would come with any grace after those two of
Alexander and Caesar?) were it not in regard of the
rareness of circumstance that I find in one other par-
ticular, as that which did so suddenly pass from ex-
treme scorn to extreme wonder ; and it is of Xenophon
the philosopher, who went from Socrates' school into
Asia, in the expedition of Cyrus the younger against
king Artaxerxes. This Xenophon at that time was
very young, and never had seen the wars before ;
neither had any command in the army, but only fol-
lowed the war as a voluntary, for the love and conver-
sation of Proxenus his friend. He was present when

VOL. VI. 11

162 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

Falinus came in message from the great king to the
Grecians, after that Cyrus was slain in the field, and
they a handful of men left to themselves in the midst
of the king's territories, cut off from their country by
many navigable rivers, and many hundred miles. The
message imported that they should deliver up their
arms, and submit themselves to the king's mercy. To
which message before answer was made, divers of the
army conferred familiarly with Falinus ; and amongst
the rest Xenophon happened to say, Why Falinus, we
have now but these two things left, our arms and our
virtue ; and if we yield up our arms, how shall we make
use of our virtue ? Whereto Falinus smiling on him,
said, If I be not deceived, young gentleman, you are an
Athenian ; and I believe you study philosophy, and it is
pretty that you say ; but you are much abused if you
think your virtue can withstand the king's power. Here
was the scorn ; the wonder followed : which was, that
this young scholar or philosopher, after all the captains
were murdered in parley by treason, conducted those
ten thousand foot through the heart of all the king's
high countries from Babylon to Graecia in safety, in
despite of all the king's forces, to the astonishment of
the world, and the encouragement of the Grecians in
time succeeding to make invasion upon the kings of
Persia ; as was after purposed by Jason the Thessalian,
attempted by Agesilaus the Spartan, and achieved by
Alexander the Macedonian ; all upon the ground of
the act of that young scholar.

To proceed now from imperial and military virtue to
moral and private virtue : first, it is an assured truth
which is contained in the verses,

Scilicet ingenuns didicisse fideliter artes
Emollit mores, nee sinit esse feros;

THE FIRST BOOK. 163

[a true proficiency in liberal learning softens and hu-
manises the manners]. It taketh away the wildness
and barbarism and fierceness of men's minds : but in-
deed the accent had need be upon jideliter : [it must be
a true proficiency :] for a little superficial learning l
doth rather work a contrary effect. It taketh away
all levity, temerity, and insolency, by copious sugges-
tion of all doubts and difficulties, and acquainting the
mind to balance reasons on both sides, and to turn
back the first offers and conceits of the mind, and to
accept of nothing but examined and tried. It taketh
away vain admiration of any thing, which is the root
of all weakness. For all things are admired, either
because they are new, or because they are great. For
novelty, no man that wadeth in learning or contem-
plation throughly, but will find that printed in his
heart Nil novi super terram : [there is nothing new
under the sun]. Neither can any man marvel at the
play of puppets, that goeth behind the curtain and
adviseth well of the motion. And for magnitude, as
Alexander the Great after that he was used to great
armies and the great conquests of the spacious prov-
inces in Asia, when he received letters out of Greece of
some fights and services there, which were commonly
for a passage or a fort or some walled town at the
most, he said, It seemed to him that he was advertised
of the battles of the frogs and the mice, that the old tales
went of: so certainly if a man meditate much upon the
universal frame of nature, the earth with men upon it
(the divineness of souls except) will not seem much
other than an ant-hill, whereas some ants carry corn,
and some carry their young, and some go empty, and

1 tumulluaria cognitio.

164 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

all to and fro a little heap of dust. It taketh away or
mitigateth fear of death or adverse fortune ; which is
one of the greatest impediments of virtue and imper-
fections of manners. For if a man's mind be deeply
seasoned with the consideration of the mortality and
corruptible nature of things, he will easily concur with
Epictetus, who went forth one day and saw a woman
weeping for her pitcher of earth that was broken, and
went forth the next day and saw a woman weeping for
her son that was dead ; and thereupon said, Heri vidi
fragilem frangi, hodie vidi mortalem mori : [yesterday
I saw a brittle thing broken, to-day a mortal dead].
And therefore Virgil did excellently and profoundly
couple the knowledge of causes and the conquest of all
fears together, as concomitantia.

Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas,
Quique metus omnes et inexorabile fatum
Subjecit pedibus, strepitumque Acherontis avari.

[Happy the man who doth the causes know
Of all that is : serene he stands, above
All fears; above the inexorable Fate,
And that insatiate gulph that roars below.]

It were too long to go over the particular remedies
which learning doth minister to all the diseases of the
/ mind ; sometimes purging the ill humours, sometimes
opening the obstructions, sometimes helping digestion,
sometimes increasing appetite, sometimes healing the
wounds and exulcerations thereof, and the like ; and
therefore I will conclude with that which hath rationem
totius ; which is, that it disposeth the constitution of
the mind not to be fixed or settled in the defects
thereof, but still to be capable and susceptible of
growth and reformation. For the unlearned man
knows not what it is to descend into himself or to call

THE FIRST BOOK. 165

himself to account, nor the pleasure of that suavissima
vita, indies sentire se fieri meliorem, [to feel himself
each day a better man than he was the day before].
The good parts he hath he will learn to shew to the
full and use them dexterously, but not much to in-
crease them : the faults he hath he will learn how to
hide and colour them, but not much to amend them ;
like an ill mower, that mows on still and never whets
his scythe : whereas with the learned man it fares
otherwise, that he doth ever intermix the correction
and amendment of his mind with the use and employ-
ment thereof. Nay further, in general and in sum,
certain it is that Veritas and bonitas differ but as the
seal and the print ; for truth prints goodness, and they
be the clouds of error which descend in the storms of
passions and perturbations.

From moral virtue let us pass on to matter of power
and commandment, and consider whether in right reason
there be any comparable with that wherewith knowledge
investeth and crowneth man's nature. We see the dig-
nity of the commandment is according to the dignity of
the commanded : to have commandment over beasts, as
herdsmen have, is a thing contemptible ; to have com-
mandment over children, as school-masters have, is a
matter of small honour ; to have commandment over
galley-slaves is a disparagement rather than an honour.
Neither is the commandment of tyrants much better,
over people which have put off the generosity of their
minds : and therefore it was ever holden that honours
in free monarchies and commonwealths had a sweet-
ness more than in tyrannies ; because the command-
ment extendeth more over the wills of men, and not
only over their deeds and services. And therefore

166 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

when Virgil putteth himself forth to attribute to Au-
gustus Cassar the best of human honours, he doth it in
these words :

victorque volentee
Per populos dat jura, viamque affectat Olympo:

[Moving in conquest onward, at his will
To willing peoples he gives laws, and shapes
Through worthiest deeds on earth his course to Heaven.]

But yet the commandment of knowledge is yet higher
than the commandment over the will ; for it is a com-
mandment over the reason, belief, and understanding
of man, which is the highest part of the mind, and
giveth law to the will itself. For there is no power on
earth which setteth up a throne or chair of estate in
the spirits and souls of men, and in their cogitations,
imaginations, opinions, and beliefs, but knowledge and
learning. And therefore we see the detestable and
extreme pleasure that arch-heretics and false prophets
and impostors are transported with, when they once
find in themselves that they have a superiority in the
faith and conscience of men ; so great, that if they have
once tasted of it, it is seldom seen that any torture or
persecution can make them relinquish or abandon it.
But as this is that which the author of the Revelation
calleth the depth or profoundness of Satan ; so by ar-
gument of contraries, the just and lawful sovereignty
over men's understanding, by force * of truth rightly
interpreted, is that which approacheth nearest to the
similitude of the divine rule.

As for fortune and advancement, the beneficence
of learning is not so confined to give fortune only
to states and commonwealths, as it doth not likewise
give fortune to particular persons. For it was well

1 So edd. 1629 and 1633. The original has fact.

THE FIRST BOOK. 167

noted long ago, that Homer hath given more men
their livings than either Sylla or Caesar or Augus-
tus ever did, notwithstanding their great largesses
and donatives and distributions of lands to so many-
legions. And no doubt it is hard to say whether
arms or learning have advanced greater numbers.
And in case of sovereignty, we see that if arms or
descent have carried away the kingdom, yet learning
hath carried the priesthood, which ever hath been in
some competition with empire.

Again, for the pleasure and delight of knowledge
and learning, it far surpasseth all other in nature :
for shall the pleasures of the affections so exceed the
senses, as much as the obtaining of desire or victory
exceedeth a song or a dinner ; and must not of con-
sequence the pleasures of the intellect or understand-
ing exceed the pleasures of the affections ? We see
in all other pleasures there is satiety, and after they
be used, their verdure * departeth ; which sheweth
well they be but deceits of pleasure, and not pleas-
ures ; and that it was the novelty which pleased, and
not the quality. And therefore we see that volup-
tuous men turn friars, and ambitious princes turn
melancholy. But of knowledge there is no satiety,
but satisfaction and appetite are perpetually inter-
changeable ; and therefore appeareth to be good in
itself simply, without fallacy or accident. Neither is
that pleasure of small efficacy and contentment to
the mind of man, which the poet Lucretius describ-
eth elegantly,

Suave mari magno, turbantibus sequora ventis, &c.
i verdour in the original and also in edd. 1629 and 1633. See p. 141.

168 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

It is a view of delight (saith he) to stand or walk
upon the shore side, and to see a ship tossed ivith tem-
pest upon the sea ; or to be in a fortified tower, and
to see two battles join upon a plain. But it is a pleas-
ure incomparable, for the mind of man to be settled,
landed, and fortified in the certainty of truth ; and
from thence to descry and behold the errors, perturba-
tions, labours, and wanderings up and down of other
men.

Lastly, leaving the vulgar arguments, that by learn-
ing man excelleth man in that wherein man excelleth
beasts ; that by learning man ascendeth to the heavens
and their motions, where in body he cannot come ; and
the like ; let us conclude with the dignity and excel-
lency of knowledge and learning in that whereunto
man's nature doth most aspire ; which is immortality
or continuance ; for to this tendeth generation, and
raising of houses and families ; to this buildings, foun-
dations, and monuments ; to this tendeth the desire
of memory, fame, and celebration ; and in effect, the
strength of all other human desires. We see then
how far the monuments of wit and learning are more
durable than the monuments of power or of the hands.
For have not the verses of Homer continued twen-
ty-five hundred years or more, without the loss of a
syllable or letter ; during which time infinite palaces,
temples, castles, cities, have been decayed and demol-
ished ? It is not possible to have the true pictures
or statuaes of Cyrus, Alexander, Cassar, no nor of
the kings or great personages of much later years ;
for the originals cannot last, and the copies cannot
but leese of the life and truth. But the images of
men's wits and knowledges remain in books, exempted

THE FIRST BOOK. 169

from the wrong of time and capable of perpetual reno-
vation. Neither are they fitly to be called images,
because they generate still, and cast their seeds in
the minds of others, provoking and causing infinite
actions and opinions in succeeding ages. So that if
the invention of the ship was thought so noble, which
carrieth riches and commodities from place to place,
and consociateth the most remote regions in partici-
pation of their fruits, how much more are letters to
be magnified, which as ships pass through the vast
seas of time, and make ages so distant to participate
of the wisdom, illuminations, and inventions, the one
of the other ? Nay further, we see some of the phi-
losophers which were least divine and most immersed
in the senses and denied generally the immortality
of the soul, yet came to this point, that whatsoever
motions the spirit of man could act and perform with-
out the organs of the body they thought might re-
main after death ; which were only those of the under-
standing, and not of the affection ; so immortal and
incorruptible a thing did knowledge seem unto them
to be. But we, that know by divine revelation that
not only the understanding but the affections purified,
not only the spirit but the body changed, shall be
advanced to immortality, do disclaim in 1 these rudi-
ments of the senses. But it must be remembered
both in this last point, and so it may likewise be
needful in other places, that in probation of the dig-
nity of knowledge or learning I did in the beginning
separate divine testimony from human ; which method
I have pursued, and so handled them both apart.

1 So all three editions. The translation has nos autem .... conculcan-
te$ hcec rudimenla aique offucias sensuum, novlmus &c.

170 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

Nevertheless I do not pretend, and I know it will
be impossible for me by any pleading of mine, to
reverse the judgment, either of JEsop's cock, that
preferred the barleycorn before the gem ; or of Midas,
that being chosen judge between Apollo president of
the Muses, and Pan god of the flocks, judged for
plenty ; or of Paris, that judged for beauty and love
against wisdom and power ; or of Agrippina, oceidat
matrem, modo imperet, [let him kill his mother so he
be emperor,] that preferred empire with condition
never so detestable ; or of Ulysses, qui vetvlam prcet-
ulit immortalitati, [that preferred an old woman to
an immortality,] being a figure of those which prefer
custom and habit before all excellency ; or of a num-
ber of the like popular judgments. For these things
continue as they have been : but so will that also con-
tinue whereupon learning hath ever relied, and which
faileth not : Jmtificata est sapientia a film suis : [wis-
dom is justified of her children].

THE

SECOND BOOK OF FRANCIS BACON

OF THE

PKOFICIENCE AND ADVANCEMENT OF
LEAKNING

DIVINE AND HUMAN.

TO THE KING.

It might seem to have more convenience, though
it come often otherwise to pass, (excellent King,) that
those which are fruitful in their generations, and have
in themselves the foresight of immortality in their de-
scendants, should likewise be more careful of the good
estate of future times ; unto which they know they
must transmit and commend over their dearest pledges.
Queen Elizabeth was a sojourner in the world in re-
spect of her unmarried life ; and was a blessing to
her own times ; and yet so as the impression of her
good government, besides her happy memory, is not
without some effect which doth survive her.1 But to
your Majesty, whom God hath already blessed with so
much royal issue, worthy to continue and represent
you for ever, and whose youthful and fruitful bed

1 This last clause is omitted in the translation. See note p. 109.

172 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

doth yet promise many the like renovations, it is
proper and agreeable to be conversant not only in
the transitory parts of good government, but in those
acts also which are in their nature permanent and
perpetual. Amongst the which (if affection do not
transport me) fohere is not any more worthy than the
further endowment of the world with sound and fruit-
ful knowledge : for why should a few received authors
stand up like Hercules' Columns, beyond which there
should be no sailing or discovering, since we have so
bright and benign a star as your Majesty to conduct
and prosper us ? To return therefore where we left,
it remaineth to consider of what kind those acts are,
which have been undertaken and performed by kings
and others for the increase and advancement of learn-
ing : wherein I purpose to speak actively without di-
gressing or dilating.

Let this ground therefore be laid, that all works
are overcomen by amplitude of reward, by sound-
ness of direction, and by the conjunction of labours.
The first multiplieth endeavour, the second prevent-
eth error, and the third supplieth the frailty of man.
But the principal of these is direction : for claudus
in via antevertit cursorem extra viam ; [the cripple that
keeps the way gets to the end of the journey sooner
than the runner who goes aside ;] and Salomon ex-
cellently setteth it down, If the iron be not sharp, it
requireth more strength ; but wisdom is that which pre-
vaileth ; signifying that the invention or election of
the mean is more effectual than any inforcement or
accumulation of endeavours. This I am induced to
speak, for that (not derogating from the noble inten-
tion of any that have been deservers towards the

THE SECOND BOOK. 173

state of learning) I do observe nevertheless that their
works and acts are rather matters of magnificence and
memory than of progression and proficience, and tend
rather to augment the mass of learning in the multi-
tude of learned men than to rectify or raise the sci-
ences themselves.

The works or acts of merit towards learning are
conversant about three objects ; the places of learn-
ing, the books of learning, and the persons of the
learned. For as water, whether it be the dew of
heaven or the springs of the earth, doth scatter and
leese itself in the ground, except it be collected into
some receptacle, where it may by union comfort and
sustain itself; and for that cause the industry of man
hath made and framed spring-heads, conduits, cisterns,
and pools, which men have accustomed likewise to
beautify and adorn with accomplishments of magnifi-
cence and state, as well as of use and necessity ; so this
excellent liquor of knowledge, whether it descend from
divine inspiration or spring from human sense, would
soon perish and vanish to oblivion, if it were not pre-
served in books, traditions, conferences, and places ap-
pointed, as universities, colleges, and schools, for the
receipt and comforting of the same.

The works which concern the seats and places of
learning are four ; foundations and buildings, endow-
ments with revenues, endowments with franchises and
privileges, institutions and ordinances for government ;
all tending to quietness and privateness of life, and dis-
charge of cares and troubles ; much like the stations
which Virgil prescribeth for the hiving of bees :

Principio sedes apibus statioque petenda,
Quo neque sit ventis aditus, &c.

174 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

[First for thy bees a quiet station find,
And lodge them under covert of the wind.1]

The works touching books are two : first libraries,
which are as the shrines where all the relics of the
ancient saints, full of true virtue and that without
delusion or imposture,2 are preserved and reposed ;
secondly, new editions of authors, with more correct
impressions, more faithful translations, more profita-
ble glosses, more diligent annotations, and the like.

The works pertaining to the persons of learned
men (besides the advancement and countenancing of
them in general) are two : the reward and designa-
tion of readers in sciences already extant and invent-
ed ; and the reward and designation of writers and
inquirers concerning any parts of learning not suf-
ficiently laboured and prosecuted.

These are summarily the works and acts, wherein
the merits of many excellent princes and other wor-
thy personages have been conversant. As for any
particular commemorations, I call to mind what Ci-
cero said, when he gave general thanks ; Difficile non
aliquem, ingratum quenquam prceterire: [it were hard
to remember all, and yet ungracious to forget any].
Let us rather, according to the Scriptures, look unto
that part of the race which is before us than look
back to that which is already attained.

First therefore, amongst so many great foundations
of colleges in Europe, I find it strange that they
are all dedicated to professions, and none left free to
arts and sciences at large. For if men judge that
learning should be referred to action, they judge well ;

1 Dryden.

2 This clause is omitted in the De AugmentU. See note p. 109.

THE SECOND BOOK. ] 75

but in this they fall into the error described in the
ancient fable ; in which the other parts of the body
did suppose the stomach had been idle, because it
neither performed the office of motion, as the limbs
do, nor of sense, as the head doth ; but yet notwith-
standing it is the stomach that digesteth and distrib-
uteth to all the rest. So if any man think philoso-
phy and universality to be idle studies, he doth not
consider that all professions are from thence served
and supplied. And this I take to be a great cause
that hath hindered the progression of learning, be-
cause these fundamental knowledges have been stud-
ied but in passage. For if you will have a tree
bear more fruit than it hath used to do, it is not
any thing you can do to the boughs, but it is the
stirring of the earth and putting new mould about
the roots that must work it. Neither is it to be
forgotten that this dedicating of foundations and do-
tations to professory learning hath not only had a
malign aspect and influence upon the growth of sci-
ences, but hath also been prejudicial to states and
governments. For hence it proceedeth that princes
find a solitude in regard of able men to serve them
in causes of estate, because there is no education
collegiate which is free ; where such as were so dis-
posed might give themselves to histories, modern lan-
guages, books of policy and civil discourse, and other
the like enablements unto service of estate.

And because founders of colleges do plant and
founders of lectures do water, it followeth well in
order to speak of the defect which is in public lec-
tures ; namely, in the smallness and meanness of the
salary or reward which in most places is assigned

176 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

unto them ; * whether they be lectures of arts, or of
professions. For it is necessary to the progression
of sciences that readers 2 be of the most able and
sufficient men ; as those which are ordained for gen-
erating and propagating of sciences, and not for tran-
sitory use. This cannot be, except their condition
and endowment be such as may content the ablest
man to appropriate his whole labour and continue his
whole age in that function and attendance; and there-
fore must have a proportion answerable to that me-
diocrity or competency of advancement which may
be expected from a profession or the practice of a
profession. So as, if you will have sciences flourish,
you must observe David's military law, which was,
That those which staid with the carriage should have
equal part with those which were in tlie action ; else
will the carriages be ill attended : So readers in sci-
ences are indeed the guardians of the stores and pro-
visions of sciences whence men in active courses are
furnished, and therefore ought to have equal enter-
tainment with them ; otherwise if the fathers in sci-
ences be of the weakest sort or be ill-maintained,

Et patrura invalidi refereut jejunia nati:

[the poor keeping of the parents will appear in the
poor constitution of the offspring.]

Another defect I note, wherein I shall need some al-
chemist to help me, who call upon men to sell their
books and to build furnaces ; quitting and forsaking
Minerva and the Muses as barren virgins, and relying
upon Vulcan. But certain it is that unto the deep,

1 In the De Augmentis he adds prasertim apud not.

2 i. e. lecturers.

THE SECOND BOOK. 177

fruitful, and operative study of many sciences, specially
natural philosophy and physic,1 books be not only the
instrumentals ; wherein also the beneficence of men
hath not been altogether wanting ; for we see spheres,
globes, astrolabes, maps, and the like, have been pro-
vided as appurtenances to astronomy and cosmography,
as well as books : we see likewise that some places in-
stituted for physic have annexed the commodity of
gardens for simples of all sorts, and do likewise com-
mand the use of dead bodies for anatomies. But these
do respect but a few things. In general, there will
hardly be any main proficience in the disclosing of
nature, except there be some allowance for expenses
about experiments ; whether they be experiments ap-^
pertaining to Vulcanus or Daedalus, furnace or engine,
or any other kind ; and therefore as secretaries and
spials of princes and states bring in bills for intelli-
gence, so you must allow the spials and intelligencers
of nature to bring in their bills, or else you shall be ill
advertised.

And if Alexander made such a liberal assignation to
Aristotle of treasure for the allowance of hunters, fowl-
ers, fishers, and the like, that he might compile an His-
tory of nature, much better do they deserve it that
travail 2 in Arts of nature.3

Another defect which I note, is an intermission or
neglect in those which are governors in universities of

1 i. e. medicine.

2 travaiks in the original, and also in edd. 1629 and 1633.

8 i. e. in working upon and altering nature by art. The meaning is ex-
pressed more clearly in the translation : majus quiddam debetur iis qui non
in saltibus natures pererrant, sed in fabyrinthis artium viam aperiunt : the
compiler of a history of nature being likened to a wanderer through the
woods, the " travailer in arts of nature " to one who makes his way through
a labyrinth.

VOL. vi. 12

178 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

consultation, and in princes or superior persons of visi-
tation ; to enter into account and consideration, whether
the readings, exercises, and other customs appertaining
unto learning, anciently begun and since continued, be
well instituted or no ; and thereupon to ground an
amendment or reformation in that which shall be found
inconvenient. For it is one of your Majesty's own
most wise and princely maxims, that in all usages and
precedents, the times be considered icherein they first
began ; which if they ivere weak or ignorant, it derogateth
from the authority of the usage, and leaveth it for sus-
pect. And therefore in as much as most of the usages
and orders of the universities were derived from more
obscure times, it is the more requisite they be re-
examined. In this kind I will give an instance or two
for example sake, of things that are the most obvious
and familiar. The one is a matter which though it be
ancient and general, yet I hold to be an error ; which
is, that scholars in universities come too soon and too
unripe to logic and rhetoric ; arts fitter for graduates
than children and novices : for these two, rightly taken,
are the gravest of sciences ; being the arts of arts, the
one for judgment, the other for ornament ; and they be
the rules and directions how to set forth and dispose
matter ; and therefore for minds empty and unfraught
with matter, and which have not gathered that which
Cicero calleth sylva and supellex, stuff and variety, to
begin with those arts, (as if one should learn to weigh
or to measure or to paint the wind,) doth Avork but
this effect, that the wisdom of those arts, which is great
and universal, is almost made contemptible, and is de-
generate into childish sophistry and ridiculous affecta-
tion. And further, the untimely learning of them hath

THE SECOND BOOK. 179

drawn on by consequence the superficial and unprofit-
able teaching and writing of them, as fitteth indeed to
the capacity of children. Another is a lack I find in
the exercises used in the universities, which do make
too great a divorce between invention and memory ; for
their speeches are either premeditate in verbis conceptis,
where nothing is left to invention, or merely extem-
poral, where little is left to memory : whereas in life
and action there is least use of either of these, but
rather of intermixtures of premeditation and invention,
notes and memory ; so as the exercise fitteth not the
practice, nor the image the life ; and it is ever a true
rule in exercises, that they be framed as near as may
be to the life of practice ; for otherwise they do pervert
the motions and faculties of the mind, and not prepare
them. The truth whereof is not obscure, when scholars
come to the practices of professions, or other actions of
civil life ; which when they set into, this want is soon
found by themselves, and sooner by others. But this
part, touching the amendment of the institutions and
orders of universities, I will conclude with the clause
of Caesar's letter to Oppius and Balbus, Hoc quemad-
modum fieri possit, nonnulla mild in mentem veniunt, ct
multa reperiri possunt ; de Us rebus rogo vos ut cogita-
tionem suscipiatis : [how this may be done, some things
occur to me and more may be thought of. I would
have you take these matters into consideration.]

Another defect which I note, ascendeth a little higher
than the precedent. For as the proficience of learning
consisteth much in the orders and institutions of universi-
ties in the same states and kingdoms, so it would be yet
more advanced, if there were more intelligence mutual
between the universities of Europe than now there is.

180 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

We see there be many orders and foundations, which
though they be divided under several sovereignties and
territories, yet they take themselves to have a kind of
contract, fraternity, and correspondence one with the
other, insomuch as they have Provincials and Gen-
erals.1 And surely as nature createth brotherhood in
families, and arts mechanical contract brotherhoods in
communalties, and the anointment of God superin-
duceth a brotherhood in kings and bishops ; so in like
manner there cannot but be a fraternity in learning
and illumination, relating to that paternity which is
attributed to God, who is called the Father of illumi-
nations or lights.

The last defect which I will note is, that there hath
not been, or very rarely been, any public designation
of writers or inquirers concerning such parts of knowl-
edge as may appear not to have been already suffi-
ciently laboured or undertaken ; unto which point it
is an inducement, to enter into a view and examination
what parts of learning have been prosecuted, and what
omitted ; for the opinion of plenty is amongst the causes
of want, and the great quantity of books maketh a shew
rather of superfluity than lack ; which surcharge never-
theless is not to be remedied by making no more books,
but by making more good books, which, as the serpent
of Moses,2 might devour the serpents of the enchanters.

The removing of all the defects formerly enumerate,
except the last, and of the active part also of the last,
(which is the designation of writers,) are opera basilica,
[works for a king ;] towards which the endeavours of

1 Prafeclos {alios provinciates, alios generates) quibus omnes parent. —
De Aug.

2 Not Moses, but Aaron. Ex. i. 17. — R. L. E.

THE SECOND BOOK. 181

a private man may be but as an image in a cross-
way, that may point at the way but cannot go it. But
the inducing part of the latter (which is the survey
of learning) may be set forward by private travel.
Wherefore I will now attempt to make a general and
faithful perambulation of learning, with an inquiry what
parts thereof lie fresh and waste, and not improved and
converted by the industry of man ; to the end that
such a plot made and recorded to memory may both
minister light to any public designation, and also serve
to excite voluntary endeavours ; wherein nevertheless
my purpose is at this time to note only omissions and
deficiencies, and not to made any redargution of errors
or incomplete prosecutions ; * for it is one thing to set
forth what ground lieth unmanured, and another thing
to correct ill husbandly in that which is manured.2

In the handling and undertaking of which work I
am not ignorant what it is that I do now move and at-
tempt, nor insensible of mine own weakness to sustain
my purpose ; but my hope is that if my extreme love
to learning carry me too far, I may obtain the excuse
of affection ; for that it is not granted to man to love and
to be wise. But I know well I can use no other liberty
of judgment than I must leave to others ; and I for my
part shall be indifferently glad either to perform my-
self or accept from another that duty of humanity, Nam
qui erranti comiter monstrat viam, &c. [to put the wan-
derer in the right way]. I do foresee likewise that of
those things which I shall enter and register as de-
ficiencies and omissions, many will conceive and cen-
sure that some of them are already done and extant ;
others to be but curiosities, and things of no great use ;

1 infelicitates. — De Aug. 2 i. e. cultivated.

182 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

and others to be of too great difficulty and almost im-
possibility to be compassed and effected. But for the
two first, I refer myself to the particulars. For the
last, touching impossibility, I take it those things are
to be held possible which may be done by some person,
though not by every one ; and which may be done by
many, though not by any one ; and which may be done
in succession of ages, though not within the hourglass
of one man's life ; and which may be done by public
designation, though not by private endeavour. But
notwithstanding, if any man will take to himself rather
that of Salomon, Dicit piger, Leo est in via, [the sloth-
ful man saith there is a lion in the path,] than that of
Virgil, Possunt quia posse videntur, [they find it possi-
ble because they think it possible,] I shall be content
that my labours be esteemed but as the better sort of
wishes ; for as it asketh some knowledge to demand a
question not impertinent, so it requireth some sense to
make a wish not absurd.

^[ 1 The parts of human learning have reference to
the three parts of Man's Understanding, which is the
seat of learning : History to his Memory, Poesy to his
Imagination, and Philosophy to his Reason. Divine
learning receiveth the same distribution ; for the spirit
of man is the same, though the revelation of oracle

1 De Aug. ii. 1. The substance of the following paragraph will be found
considerably expanded in the first chapter of the Descriptio Giobi Intellec-
tualis, and set forth much more clearly and orderly in the first chapter of
the second book of the De Augmentis; which begins here; the previous
observations being introductory. As it may be convenient to the reader
to have the means of referring at once to the corresponding passages of the
more finished work, I shall mark with a If the places where the several
chapters begin; adding (where the case admits of it) some notice, more or
less complete, of the differences between the two. See Preface, p. 82,

,

THE SECOND BOOK. 183

and sense be diverse : so as theology consisteth also of
History of the Church ; of Parables, which is divine
poesy ; and of holy Doctrine or precept. For as for
that part which seemeth supernumerary, which is
Prophecy, it is but divine history; which hath that
prerogative over human, as the narration may be be-
fore the fact as well as after.

^[ 1 History is Natural, Civil, Ecclesiastical, and
jEstoria Literary ; whereof the three first I allow
Literarum. &g extantj fa fourth I note as deficient.
For no man hath propounded to himself the general
state of learning to be described and represented from
age to age, as many have done the works of nature
and the state civil and ecclesiastical ; without which
the history of the world seemeth to me to be as the
statua of Polyphemus with his eye out ; that part be-
ing wanting which doth most shew the spirit and life
of the person. And yet I am not ignorant that in
divers particular sciences, as of the jurisconsults, the
mathematicians, the rhetoricians, the philosophers, there
are set down some small memorials of the schools, au-
thors, and books ; and so likewise some barren rela-
tions touching the invention of arts or usages. But a
just story of learning, containing the antiquities and
originals of knowledges, and their sects ; their inven-
tions, their traditions ; their diverse administrations and
managings ; their flourishings, their oppositions, decays,
depressions, oblivions, removes ; with the causes and

1 De Aug. ii. 4. In the translation the divisions are altered : History
being divided into Natural and Civil, — History of Nature and History of
Man ; and Literary and Ecclesiastical History being considered as separate
departments of the latter. See chap. 2. paragraph 1. This alteration in-
duces an alteration in the order of treatment; the precedence being given
to the History of Nature, which is the subject of the second chapter.

184 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

occasions of them, and all other events Concerning
learning, throughout the ages of the world;1 I may
truly affirm to be wanting. The use and end of which
work I do not so much design for curiosity, or satis-
faction of those that are the lovers of learning ; but
chiefly for a more serious and grave purpose, which is
this in few words, that it will make learned men wise
in the use and administration of learning. For it is
not St. Augustine's nor St. Ambrose works that will
make so wise a divine, as ecclesiastical history through-
ly read and observed ; and the same reason is of learn-
ing.

^[ 2 History of Nature is of three sorts ; of nature
in course, of nature erring or varying, and of nature
altered or wrought ; that is, history of Creatures, his-
tory of Marvels, and history of Arts.3 The first of
these no doubt is extant, and that in good perfection ;
the two later are handled so weakly and unprofitably,
as I am moved to note them as deficient. For I find
Historia no sufficient or competent collection of the
Enantis. works of nature which have a digression and
deflexion from the ordinary course of generations, pro-
ductions, and motions ; whether they be singularities
of place and region, or the strange events of time and
chance, or the effects of yet unknown proprieties, or
the instances of exception to general kinds. It is true,
I find a number of books of fabulous experiments
and secrets, and frivolous impostures for pleasure and
strangeness. But a substantial and severe collection

1 The description of the required history is set forth much more partic-
ularly in the translation; and the whole paragraph rewritten and enlarged.

2 De Aug. ii. 2.

8 This division is retained in the translation, but the exposition of it is
extended into a long paragraph.

THE SECOND BOOK. 185

of the Heteroclites or Irregulars of nature, well ex-
amined and described, I find not; specially not with
due rejection of fables and popular errors : for as things
now are, if an untruth in nature be once on foot, what
by reason of the neglect of examination and counte-
nance of antiquity, and what by reason of the use of
the opinion in similitudes and ornaments of speech, it
is never called down.

The use of this work, honoured with a precedent in
Aristotle,1 is nothing less than to give contentment to
the appetite of curious and vain wits, as the manner of
Mirabilaries is to do ; but for two reasons, both of great
weight ; the one to correct the partiality of axioms and
opinions, which are commonly framed only upon com-
mon and familiar examples ; the other because from
the wonders of nature is the nearest intelligence and
passage towards the wonders of art : for it is no more
but by following and as it were hounding Nature in her
wanderings, to be able to lead her afterwards to the
same place again. Neither am I of opinion, in this
History of Marvels, that superstitious narrations of
sorceries, witchcrafts, dreams, divinations, and the like,
where there is an assurance and clear evidence of the
fact, be altogether excluded. For it is not yet known
in what cases, and how far, effects attributed to super-
stition do participate of natural causes ; and therefore
howsoever the practice of such things is to be con-
demned, yet from the speculation and consideration of
them light may be taken, not only for the discerning
of the offences, but for the further disclosing of nature.

1 De Miris Auscultationibus; which is now however generally admitted
to be not Aristotle's. — R. L. E. See De Aug. ii. 2. Mr. Blakesley is of
opinion that the nucleus of it was probably Aristotle's, but that it has been
added to by subsequent writers.

186 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

Neither ought a man to make scruple of entering into
these tilings for inquisition of truth, as your Majesty
hath shewed in your own example ; who with the two
clear eyes of religion and natural philosophy have
looked deeply and wisely into these shadows, and yet
proved yourself to be of the nature of the sun, which
passeth through pollutions and itself remains as pure
as before. But this I hold fit, that these narrations
which have mixture with superstition be sorted by
themselves, and not to be mingled with the narrations
which are merely and sincerely natural. But as for
the narrations touching the prodigies and miracles of
religions, they are either not true or not natural ; and
therefore impertinent for the story of nature.

For History of Nature Wrought or Mechanical, I
Historia find some collections made of agriculture, and
Meehamta. ]j]-ewjse 0f manual arts ; but commonly with
a rejection of experiments familiar and vulgar. For it
is esteemed a kind of dishonour unto learning to de-
scend to inquiry or meditation upon matters mechani-
cal, except they be such as may be thought secrets, rari-
ties, and special subtilties ; which humour of vain and
supercilious arrogancy is justly derided in Plato ; where
he brings in Hippias, a vaunting sophist, disputing with
Socrates, a time and unfeigned inquisitor of truth ;
where the subject being touching beauty, Socrates,
after his wandering manner of inductions, put first an
example of a fair virgin, and then of a fair horse, and
then of a fair pot well glazed, whereat Hippias was
offended, and said, More than for courtesy's sake, he did
think much to dispute with any that did allege such base
and sordid instances : whereunto Socrates answereth,
You have reason, and it becomes you well, being a /nan

THE SECOND BOOK. 187

80 trim in your vestiments, &c. and so goeth on in an
irony. But the truth is, they be not the highest in-
stances that give the securest information ; as may be
well expressed in the tale so common of the philoso-
pher, that while he gazed upwards to the stars fell* into
the water ; for if he had looked down he might have
seen the stars in the water, but looking aloft he could
not see the water in the stars. So it cometh often to
pass that mean and small things discover great better
than great can discover the small ; and therefore
Aristotle noteth well, that the nature of every thing
is best seen in his smallest portions, and for that cause
he inquireth the nature of a commonwealth, first in a
family, and the simple conjugations of man and wife,
parent and child, master and servant, which are in
every cottage : even so likewise the nature of this
great city of the world and the policy thereof must
be first sought in mean concordances and small por-
tions. So we see how that secret of nature, of the
turning of iron touched with the loadstone towards
the north, was found out in needles of iron, not in
bars of iron.

But if my judgment be of any weight, the use of
History Mechanical is of all others the most radical
and fundamental towards natural philosophy ; such
natural philosophy as shall not vanish in the fume of
subtile, sublime, or delectable speculation, but such as
shall be operative to the endowment and benefit of
man's life : for it will not only minister and suggest for
the present many ingenious practices in all trades, by a
connexion and transferring of the observations of one
art to the use of another, when the experiences of
several mysteries shall fall under the consideration of

188 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

one man's mind ; but further it will give a more true
and real illumination concerning causes and axioms
than is hitherto attained. For like as a man's dis-
position is never well known till he be crossed, nor
Proteus ever changed shapes till he was straitened
and held fast ; so the passages and variations of nature
cannot appear so fully in the liberty of nature, as in
the trials and vexations of art.1

^[ 2 For Civil History, it is of three kinds ; 3 not
unfitly to be compared with the three kinds of pictures
or images. For of pictures or images, we see some
are unfinished, some are perfect,4 and some are defaced.
So of histories we may find three kinds, Memorials,
Perfect Histories, and Antiquities; for Memorials are
history unfinished, or the first or rough draughts of
history, and Antiquities are history defaced, or some
remnants of history which have casually escaped the
ship wrack of time.

Memorials, or Preparatory History, are of two sorts ;
whereof the one may be termed Commentaries, and
the other Registers. Commentaries are they which

1 A paragraph is added in the translation, to say that not the mechanical
arts only, but also the practical part of the liberal sciences, as well as many
crafts which have not grown into formal arts (such, he means, as hunting,
fishing, &c), are to be included in the History Mechanical.

2 De Aug. ii. 6. The 3rd chapter, concerning the two uses of natural
history, and the 5th concerning the dignity and difficulty of civil history,
have nothing corresponding to them here.

8 "I am not altogether ignorant in the laws of history and of the
kinds. The same hath been taught by many, but by no man better
and with greater brevity than by that excellent learned gentleman
Sir Francis Bacon." — Ralegh : Preface to the History of the World. —
R. L. E.

* parfile in the original; the form in which the word was commonly
written in Bacon's time.

THE SECOND BOOK. 189

set down a continuance of the naked events and ac-
tions, without the motives or designs, the counsels,
the speeches, the pretexts, the occasions, and other
passages of action : for this is the true nature of a
Commentary ; though Caesar, in modesty mixed with
greatness, did for his pleasure apply the name of a
Commentary to the best history of the world. Regis-
ters are collections of public acts, as decrees of council,
judicial proceedings, declarations and letters of estate,
orations, and the like, without a perfect continuance
or contexture of the thread of the narration.

Antiquities or Remnants of History are, as was said,
tanquam tabula naufragii, [like the planks of a ship-
wreck ;] when industrious persons by an exact and
scrupulous diligence and observation, out of monu-
ments, names, words, proverbs, traditions, private rec-
ords and evidences, fragments of stories, passages of
books that concern not story, and the like, do save
and recover somewhat from the deluge of time.

In these kinds of unperfect histories I do assign
no deficience, for they are tanquam imperfecte mista,
[things imperfectly compounded ;] and therefore any
deficience in them is but their nature. As for the
corruptions and moths of history, which are Epitomes,
the use of them deserveth to be banished, as all men
of sound judgment have confessed ; as those that have
fretted and corroded the sound bodies of many excel-
lent histories, and wrought them into base and un-
profitable dregs.

^[ 1 History which may be called Just and Perfect
History is of three kinds, according to the object which
it propoundeth, or pretendeth to represent: for it either
i De Aug. ii. 7.

190 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

represented a Time, or a Person, or an Action. The
first we call Chronicles, the second Lives, and the third
Narrations or Relations. Of these, although the first
be the most complete and absolute kind of history and
hath most estimation and glory, yet the second excel-
leth it in profit and use, and the third in verity and
sincerity. For History of Times representeth the
magnitude of actions and the public faces and deport-
ments of persons, and passeth over in silence the small-
er passages and motions of men and matters. But
such being the workmanship of God as he doth hang
the greatest weight upon the smallest wires, maxima
e minimis suspendens^ it comes therefore to pass, that
such histories do rather set forth the pomp of business
than the true and inward resorts thereof.1 But Lives,
if they be well written,2 propounding to themselves a
person to represent in whom actions both greater and
smaller, public and private, have a commixture, must
of necessity contain a more true, native, and lively
representation. So again Narrations and Relations
of actions, as the War of Peloponnesus, the Expedi-
tion of Cyrus Minor, the Conspiracy of Catiline, can-
not but be more purely and exactly true than Histories
of Times, because they may choose an argument com-
prehensible within the notice and instructions of the
writer : whereas he that undertaketh the story of a
time, especially of any length, cannot but meet with

1 And even (he adds in the translation) where they attempt to give the
counsels and motives, yet still out of the same love of dignity and great-
ness they introduce into men's actions more gravity and wisdom than they
really have; insomuch that you may find a truer picture of human life in
some satires than in such histories.

8 ». e. not mere eulogies. The translation adds: " neque enim de elogiis
et hujusmodi commemorationibus jejunis loquimur."

THE SECOND BOOK. 191

many blanks and spaces which he must be forced to
fill up out of his own wit and conjecture.1

For the History of Times, (I mean of civil history)
the providence of God hath made the distribution : for
it hath pleased God to ordain and illustrate two ex-
emplar states of the world, for arms, learning, moral
virtue, policy, and laws ; the state of Grsecia, and the
state of Rome ; the histories whereof occupying the
middle part of time, have more ancient to them, his-
tories which may by one common name be termed the
Antiquities of the World ; and after them, histories
which may be likewise called by the name of Modern
History.2

Now to speak of the deficiencies. As to the Hea-
then Antiquities of the world, it is in vain to note
them for deficient. Deficient they are no doubt, con-
sisting most of fables and fragments ; but the defi-
cience cannot be holpen ; for antiquity is like fame,
caput inter nubila condit, her head is muffled from
our sight. For the History of the Exemplar States,
it is extant in good perfection. Not but I could
wish there were a perfect course of history for
Grsecia from Theseus to Philopoemen, (what time the

1 On the other hand it must be confessed (he reminds us in the transla-
tion, — I give only the general import of the passage, which is of consider-
able length) that relations of this kind, especially if published near the
time to which they refer, are in one respect of all narratives the most to be
suspected; being commonly written either in favour or in spite. But then
again it seldom happens that they are all on one side, so that the extreme
views of each party being represented, an honest and judicious historian
may, when the violence of faction has cooled down Avith time, find the
truth among them.

2 This paragraph and the next are omitted in the translation, and their
place supplied by a general complaint that very many particular histories
are still wanting: much to the injury in honour and reputation of the
kingdoms and commonwealths which they concern.

192 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

affairs of Graecia drowned and extinguished in the
affairs of Rome ;) and for Rome from Romulus to
Justinianus, who may be truly said to be ultimus
Romanorum. In which sequences of story the text
of Thucydides and Xenophon in the one, and the
texts of Livius, Polybius, Sallustius, Caesar, Appi-
anus, Tacitus, Herodianus in the other, to be kept
entire without any diminution at all, and only to be
supplied and continued. But this is matter of mag-
nificence, rather to be commended than required : and
we speak now of parts of learning supplemental, and
not of supererogation.

But for Modern Histories, whereof there are some
few very worthy, but the greater part beneath medi-
ocrity, leaving the care of foreign stories to foreign
states, because I will not be curio8U8 in aliena repub-
lican [a meddler in other nations' matters,] I cannot
fail to represent to your Majesty the unworthiness of
the history of England in the main continuance there-
of, and the partiality and obliquity of that of Scotland
in the latest and largest author that I have seen ; sup-
posing that it would be honour for your Majesty and a
work very memorable, if this island of Great Britain,1
as it is now joined in monarchy for the ages to come,
so were joined in one history for the times passed ;
after the manner of the sacred history, which draweth
down the story of the Ten Tribes and of the Two
Tribes as twins together. And if it shall seem that
the greatness of this work may make it less exactly
performed, there is an excellent period of a much
smaller compass of time, as to the story of England ;
that is to say, from the Uniting of the Roses to the

1 Spelt Brittanie in the original; Brittany in edd. 1629 and 1633.

THE SECOND BOOK. 193

Uniting of the Kingdoms ; a portion of time, wherein
to my understanding, there hath been the rarest varie-
ties that in like number of successions of any heredi-
tary monarchy hath been known. For it beginneth
with the mixed adeption of a crown, by arms and title;
an entry by battle, an establishment by marriage ; and
therefore times answerable, like waters after a tempest,
full of working and swelling, though without extremity
of storm ; but well passed through by the wisdom of
the pilot, being one of the most sufficient kings of all
the number. Then followeth the reign of a king,
whose actions, howsoever conducted,1 had much inter-
mixture with the affairs of Europe, balancing and in-
clining them variably ; in whose time also began that
great alteration in the state ecclesiastical, an action
which seldom cometh upon the stage : then the reign
of a minor : then an offer of an usurpation, though it
was but as febris ephemera, [a diary ague :] then the
reign of a queen matched with a foreigner : then of a
queen that lived solitary and unmarried, and yet her
government so masculine as it had greater impression
and operation upon the states abroad than it any ways
received from thence : 2 and now last, this most happy
and glorious event, that this island of Britain, divided
from all the world, should be united in itself; and that
oracle of rest given to ^Eneas, Antiquam exquirite ma-
trem, [seek out your ancient mother,] should now be

1 The distinction between the father and the son is more clearly marked
in the translation. Of Henry VII he says qui unus inter antecessores reges
consilio enituit ; of Henry VIII. 's actions, licet magis impetu quam consil'-o
administrate. Had Bacon gone on with his history of Henry VIII. it.
would have been curious to contrast the portrait of the son governing more
by passion than policy, with that of the father governing by policy without
passion.

2 This last clause is omitted in the De Augmentis. See note p. 109.

vol. vi. 13

194 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

performed and fulfilled upon the nations of England
and Scotland, being now reunited in the ancient
mother name of Britain, as a full period of all insta-
bility and peregrinations : so that as it cometh to pass
in massive bodies, that they have certain trepidations
and waverings before they fix and settle ; so it seemeth
that by the providence of God this monarchy, before
it was to settle in your Majesty and your generations,
(in which I hope it is now established for ever,) it had
these prelusive changes and varieties.

For Lives, I do find strange that these times have
so little esteemed the virtues of the times, as that the
writing of lives should be no more frequent. For
although there be not many sovereign princes or ab-
solute commanders, and that states are most collected
into monarchies, yet are there many worthy personages
that deserve better than dispersed report or barren
elogies. For herein the invention of one of the late
poets1 is proper, and doth well enrich the ancient
fiction : for he feigneth that at the end of the thread
or web of every man's life there was a little medal
containing the person's name, and that Time waited
upon the shears, and as soon as the thread was cut,
caught the medals and carried them to the river of
Lethe ; and about the bank there were many birds
flying up and down, that would get the medals and
carry them in their beak a little while, and then let
them fall into the river : only there were a few swans,
which if they got a name, would carry it to a temple
where it was consecrate. And although many men
more mortal in their affections than in their bodies, do

1 Ariosto, Orlando Furioso ; at the end of the 34th and the beginning of
the 35th books.

THE SECOND BOOK. 195

esteem desire of name and memory but as a vanity and
ventosity,

Animi nil magna? laudis egentes;

[souls that have no care for praise ;] which opinion
cometh from that root, non prius laudes eontempsimus,
quam laudanda facere desivimus ; [men hardly despise
praise till they have ceased to deserve it;] yet that
will not alter Salomon's judgment, Memoria justi cum
laudibus, at impiorum nomen putrescet ; [the memory
of the just is blessed ; but the name of the wicked
shall rot ;] the one flourisheth, the other either con-
sumeth to present oblivion, or turneth to an ill odour.
And therefore in that style or addition, which is and
hath been long well received and brought in use,
felicis memorice, pice memories, bonce memorice, [of
happy, of pious, of good memory,] we do acknowl-
edge that which Cicero saith, borrowing it from De-
mosthenes, that bona fama propria possessio defuncto-
rum ; x [good fame is all that a dead man can pos-
sess ;] which possession I cannot but note that in our
times it lietli much waste, and that therein there is a
deficience.

For Narrations and Relations of particular actions,
there were also to be wished a greater diligence there-
in ; for there is no great action but hath some good
pen which attends it. And because it is an ability not
common to write a good history, as may well appear
by the small number of them ; yet if particularity of
actions memorable were but tolerably reported as they
pass, the compiling of a complete History of Times
might be the better expected, when a writer should

1 Compare Cicero, Philippic. 9. 5., with the opening of the TJrryoq
tmrdfiog, 1389-10.

196 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

arise that were fit for it : for the collection of such re-
lations might be as a nursery garden, whereby to plant
a fair and stately garden when time should serve.

^[ x There is yet another portion of history which
Cornelius Tacitus maketh, which is not to be forgot-
ten, specially with that application which he accoupleth
it withal, Annals and Journals : appropriating to the
former matters of estate, and to the later acts and ac-
cidents of a meaner nature. For giving but- a touch
of certain magnificent buildings, he addeth, Cum ex
dignitate populi Romani repertum sit, res illustres an-
nalibus, talia diurnis urbis aciis mandate : [that it had
been thought suitable to the dignity of the Roman
people to enter in their annals only matters of note
and greatness ; leaving such things as these to the
journal records of the city.] So as there is a kind
of contemplative heraldry, as well as civil. And as
nothing doth derogate from the dignity of a state more
than confusion of degrees ; so it doth not a little em-
base the authority of an history, to intermingle mat-
ters of triumph or matters of ceremony or matters of
novelty with matters of state. But the use of a Jour-
nal hath not only been in the history of times,2 but
likewise in the history of persons, and chiefly of ac-
tions ; for princes in ancient time had, upon point of
honour and policy both, journals kept of what passed
day by day : for we see the Chronicle which was read
before Ahasuerus,3 when he could not take rest, con-

1 De Aug. ii. 9. Between this paragraph and the last there is introduced
in the translation a chapter on the advantages and disadvantages of his-
tories of the world, as distinguished from histories of particular countries.

2 time in the original and also in edd. 1629 and 1633. The translation
omits this clause.

» Esther, vi. 1.

THE SECOND BOOK. 197

tained matter of affairs indeed, but such as had passed
in his own time, and very lately before : but the Jour-
nal of Alexander's house expressed every small par-
ticularity, even concerning his person and court ; 1 and
it is yet an use well received in enterprises memora-
ble, as expeditions of war, navigations, and the like, to
keep diaries of that which passeth continually.

^[ 2 I cannot likewise be ignorant of a form of writ-
ing which some grave and wise men have used, con-
taining a scattered history of those actions which they
have thought worthy of memory, with politic discourse
and observation thereupon ; not incorporate into the
history, but separately, and as the more principal in
their intention ; which kind of Ruminated History I
think more fit to place amongst books of policy, where-
of we shall hereafter speak, than amongst books of
history ; 3 for it is the true office of history to represent
the events themselves together with the counsels, and
to leave the observations and conclusions thereupon to
the liberty and faculty of every man's judgment. But
mixtures are things irregular, whereof no man can
define.

So also is there another kind of history manifoldly
mixed, and that is History of Cosmography : being

1 Not that greater matters were excluded ; but great and small were
entered promiscuously as they occurred. (Neque enbn sicut annates tan-
tum gravia, it a diaria tan turn levia complexa sunt ; sed omnia promiscue et
cursim diariis excipiebantur, seu majoris seu minoris momenti.)

2 De Aug. ii. 10.

8 This remark is omitted in the translation, and another substituted, tc
the effect that this kind of ruminated history is an excellent thing, pro-
vided it be understood that the matter in hand is not history but observa-
tions upon history (modo hvjusmodi scriptor hoc agal et hoc se agere con-
Jiteatur); for in a regular history the narrative ought not, he says, to be
interrupted by comments of this kind. It should be pregnant with politic
precepts, but the writer should not play the midwife.

198 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

compounded of natural history, in respect of the re-
gions themselves ; of history civil, in respect of the
habitations, regiments, and manners of the people ;
and the mathematics, in respect of the climates and
configurations towards the heavens : which part of
learning of all others in this latter time hath obtained
most proficience. For it may be truly affirmed to the
honour of these times, and in a virtuous emulation
with antiquity, that this great building of the world
had never through-lights made in it, till the age of us
and our fathers ; for although they had knowledge of
the antipodes,

Nosque ubi primus equis oriens afflavit anhelis.
Illic sera rubens accendit himina Vesper:
[And while on us the fresh East breathes from far,
For them the red West lights her evening star:]

yet that might be by demonstration, and not in fact ;
and if by travel, it requireth the voyage but of half the
globe. But to circle the earth, as the heavenly bodies
do, was not done nor enterprised till these later times :
and therefore these times may justly bear in their word,
not only plus ultra, in precedence of the ancient non
ultra, and imitabile fulmen in precedence of the an-
cient non imitabile fulmen,

Demens qui nimbos et non imitabile fulmen &c-

but likewise imitabile ccelum ; in respect of the many
memorable voyages, after the manner of heaven, about
the globe of the earth.

And this proficience in navigation and discoveries
may plant also an expectation of the further proficience
and augmentation of all sciences ; because it may seem
they are ordained by God to be coevals, that is, to

THE SECOND BOOK. 199

meet in one age. For so the prophet Daniel speaking
of the latter times foretelleth, Plurimi pertransibunt, et
multiplex erit scientia : [many shall pass to and fro,
and knowledge .shall be multiplied :] as if the open-
ness and through passage of the world and the in-
crease of knowledge were appointed to be in the same
ages ; as we see it is already performed in great part ;
the learning of these later times not much giving place
to the former two periods or returns of learning, the
one of the Grecians, the other of the Romans.

^[ 1 History Ecclesiastical receiveth the same divis-
ions with History Civil : but further in the propriety
thereof may be divided into History of the Church,
by a general name ; History of Prophecy ; and His-
tory of Providence. The first describeth the times of
the militant church ; whether it be fluctuant, as the
ark of Noah ; or moveable, as the ark in the wilder-
ness ; or at rest, as the ark in the temple ; that is, the
state of the church in persecution, in remove, and in
peace. This part I ought in no sort to note as de-
ficient ; only I would that the virtue and sincerity of
it were according to the mass and quantity. But I am
not now in hand with censures, but with omissions.

The second, which is History of Prophecy, con-
sisted! of two relatives, the prophecy and the accom-
plishment ; and therefore the nature of such a work
ought to be, that every prophecy of the scripture be
sorted with the event fulfilling the same, throughout
the ages of the world ; both for the better confirmation
of faith, and for the better illumination of the church
touching those parts of prophecies which are yet un-

1 De Aug. ii. 11.

200 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

fulfilled ; allowing nevertheless that latitude which is
agreeable and familiar unto divine prophecies ; being
of the nature of their author, with whom a thousand
years are but as one day ; and therefore are not ful-
filled punctually at once, but have springing and ger-
minant accomplishment throughout many ages, though
the height or fulness of them may refer to some one
Histma a»e* This is a work which I find deficient,
Prop/uuca. kut js to jje cjone w;tn wisdom, sobriety, and

reverence, or not at all.

The third, which is History of Providence, eontain-
eth that excellent correspondence which is between
God's revealed will and his secret will ; which though
it be so obscure as for the most part it is not legible to
the natural man ; no, nor many times to those that be-
hold it from the tabernacle ; yet at some times it pleas-
eth God, for our better establishment and the confuting
of those which are as without God in the world, to write
it in such text and capital letters that, as the prophet
saith, he that runneth by may read it ; 1 that is, mere
sensual persons, which hasten by God's judgments and
never bend or fix their cogitations upon them, are
nevertheless in their passage and race urged to discern
it. Such are the notable events and examples of God's
judgments, chastisements, deliverances, and blessings.
And this is a work which hath passed through the labour
of many,2 and therefore I cannot present as omitted.

1 Habak. ii. 2. Mr. Ellis has remarked in his note on the corresponding
passage in the De Augmentis that this expression, now so familiar and al-
most proverbial, is in fact a misquotation of the text and a misrepresenta-
tion of the meaning of the prophet. " Write the vision and make it plain
upon the tables that he may run that readeth it." It would be a curious
inquiry, who first made this mistake.

8 In the translation he says, "tane incalamot nonnuBorum piorvm tiro-

THE SECOND BOOK. 201

^f 1 There are also other parts of learning which are
Appendices to history. For all the exterior proceed-
ings of man consist of words and deeds ; whereof his-
tory doth properly receive and retain in memory the
deeds, and if words, yet but as inducements and pas-
sages to deeds ; so are there other books and writings,
which are appropriate to the custody and receit of
words only ; which likewise are of three sorts ; Ora-
tions, Letters, and Brief Speeches or Sayings. Ora-
tions are pleadings, speeches of counsel ; laudatives,
invectives, apologies, reprehensions ; orations of formal-
ity or ceremony, and the like. Letters are according
to all the variety of occasions ; advertisements, advices,
directions, propositions, petitions, commendatory, ex-
postulatory, satisfactory, of compliment, of pleasure, of
discourse, and all other passages of action. And such
as are written from wise men are, of all the words of
man, in my judgment the best ; for they are more
natural than orations and public speeches, and more
advised than conferences or present speeches. So
again letters of affairs from such as manage them or
are privy to them are of all others the best instructions
for history, and to a diligent reader the best histories in
themselves. For Apophthegms, it is a great loss of
that book of Caesar's ; for as his history and those few
letters of his which we have and those apophthegms
which were of his own excel all men's else, so I sup-
pose would his collection of Apophthegms have done ;

rum incidit, sed non sine partium studio." Indeed it is difficult to see how,
without partiality, such a history of Providence could be written at all.
For take any signal calamity and look at it in its historical character only,
— who shall say whether it is a chastisement or a martyrdom? a judgment
upon the sinner, or a trial of the saint?
1 De Aug. ii. 12.

202 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

for as for those which are collected by others, either I
have no taste in such matters, or else their choice hath
not been happy.1 But upon these three kinds of writ-
ings I do not insist, because I have no deficiences to
propound concerning them.

Thus much therefore concerning History ; which is
that part of learning which answereth to one of the
cells, domiciles, or offices of the mind of man ; which
is that of the Memory.

^f 2 Poesy is a part of learning in measure of words
for the most part restrained, but in all other points ex-
tremely licensed, and doth truly refer to the Imagina-
tion ; which, being not tied to the laws of matter, may
at pleasure join that which nature hath severed, and
sever that which nature hath joined, and so make un-
lawful matches and divorces of things : Pictoribus atque
poetis, &c. [Painters and Poets have always been
allowed to take what liberties they would.] It is taken
in two senses, in respect of words or matter. In the
first sense it is but a character of style, and belongeth
to arts of speech, and is not pertinent for the present.3
In the later, it is (as hath been said) one of the prin-
cipal portions of learning, and is nothing else but

1 Some further remarks upon the value and use of Apophthegms are in-
troduced in the Dt Augmentis: of these, a translation will be given in my
preface to Bacon's own collection of Apophthegms.

2 De Aug. ii. 13. The arrangement is partly altered in the transla-
tion, and much new matter introduced: among the rest, a whole para-
graph concerning the true use and dignity of dramatic poetry, as a vehi-
cle of moral instruction ; which is connected in a striking manner with
the remark that men in bodies are more open to impressions than when
alone.

8 A sentence is added in the translation to explain that under this head
satires, elegies, epigrams, and odes are included.

THE SECOND BOOK. 203

Feigned History, which may be styled as well in prose
as in verse.

The use of this Feigned History hath been to give
some shadow of satisfaction to the mind of man in
those points wherein the nature of things doth deny it ;
the world being in proportion inferior to the soul ; by
reason whereof there is agreeable to the spirit of man
a more ample greatness, a more exact goodness, and a
more absolute variety, than can be found in the nature
of things. Therefore, because the acts or events of
true history have not that magnitude which satisfieth
the mind of man, poesy feigneth acts and events greater
and more heroical ; because true history propoundeth
the successes and issues of actions not so agreeable to
the merits of virtue and vice, therefore poesy feigns
them more just in retribution, and more according to
revealed providence ; because true history representeth
actions and events more ordinary and less interchanged,
therefore poesy endueth them with more rareness, and
more unexpected and alternative variations. So as it
appeareth that poesy serveth and conferreth to magna-
nimity, morality, and to delectation. And therefore it
was ever thought to have some participation of divine-
ness, because it doth raise and erect the mind, by sub-
mitting the shews of things to the desires of the mind ;
whereas reason doth buckle and bow the mind unto the
nature of things. And we see that by these insinua-
tions and congruities with man's nature and pleasure,
joined also with the agreement and consort it hath with
music, it hath had access and estimation in rude times
and barbarous regions, where other learning stood ex-
cluded.

The division of poesy which is aptest in the propriety

204 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

thereof, (besides those divisions which are common unto
it with history, as feigned chronicles, feigned lives ; and
the appendices of history, as feigned epistles, feigned
orations, and the rest ;) is into Poesy Narrative, Repre-
sentative, and Allusive. The Narrative is a mere im-
itation of history, with the excesses before remembered ;
choosing for subject commonly wars and love, rarely
state, and sometimes pleasure or mirth.1 Representative
is as a visible history, and is an image of actions as if
they were present, as history is of actions in nature as
they are, (that is) past. Allusive or Parabolical is a
narration applied only to express some special purpose or
conceit.2 Which later kind of parabolical wisdom was
much more in use in the ancient times, as by the fables
of JEsop and the brief sentences of the Seven and the
use of hieroglyphics may appear. And the cause was,
for that it was then of necessity to express any point
of reason which was more sharp or subtile than the
vulgar in that manner ; because men in those times
wanted both variety of examples and subtilty of con-
ceit : and as hieroglyphics were before letters, so para-
bles were before arguments : and nevertheless now and
at all times they do retain much life and vigour, be-
cause reason cannot be so sensible, nor examples so
fit.

But there remaineth yet another use of Poesy Para-
bolical, opposite to that which we last mentioned : for
that tendeth to demonstrate and illustrate that which is
taught or delivered, and this other to retire and obscure

1 The last clause of this sentence is omitted in the translation.

2 This obscure sep'ence is explained in the translation to mean that
Parabolic Poesy is historia cum typo, qua intelleclualia deducit ad senium, —
typical history, by which ideas that are objects of the Intellect are repre-
serted in forms that are objects of the Sense.

THE SECOND BOOK. 205

it : that is when the secrets and mysteries of religion,
policy, or philosophy are involved in fables or parables.
Of this in divine poesy we see the use is authorized.
In heathen poesy we see the exposition of fables doth
fall out sometimes with great felicity ; as in the fable
that the giants being overthrown in their war against
the gods, the Earth their mother in revenge thereof
brought forth Fame :

Illam Terra parens, ira irritata deorum,
Extremani, ut perhibent, Coeo Enceladoque sororem
Progenuit:

expounded that when princes and monarchs have sup-
pressed actual and open rebels, then the malignity of
people (which is the mother of rebellion) doth bring
forth libels and slanders and taxations of the state,
which is of the same kind with rebellion, but more
feminine. So in the fable that the rest of the gods hav-
ing conspired to bind Jupiter, Pallas called Briareus
with his hundred hands to his aid : expounded that
monarchies need not fear any curbing of their absolute-
ness by mighty subjects, as long as by wisdom they
keep the hearts of the people, who will be sure to come
in on their side. So in the fable that Achilles was
brought up under Chiron the Centaur, who was part a
man and part a beast : expounded ingeniously but cor-
ruptly by Machiavel, that it belongeth to the education
and discipline of princes to know as well how to play
the part of the lion in violence and the fox in guile, as
of the man in virtue and justice.1 Nevertheless in

1 The Prince, c. 18. As two of the animals are the same it is possible
\ that Macchiavelli was thinking of what was said of Boniface VIII. by the
predecessor whom he forced to abdicate, — that he came in like a fox,
would reign like a lion, and die like a dog. — R. L. E.

206 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

many the like encounters, I do rather think that the
fable was first, and the exposition devised, than that
the moral was first, and thereupon the fable framed.
For I find it was an ancient vanity in Chrysippus, that
troubled himself with great contention to fasten the
assertions of the Stoics upon the fictions of the ancient
poets. But yet that all the fables and fictions of the
poets were but pleasure and not figure, I interpose no
opinion. Surely of those poets which are now extant,
even Homer himself, (notwithstanding he was made a
kind of Scripture by the later schools of the Grecians,)
yet I should without any difficulty pronounce that his
fables had no such inwardness in his own meaning ; but
what they might have upon a more original tradition, is
not easy to affirm ; for he was not the inventor of many
of them.1

In this third part of learning, which is poesy, I can
report no deficience. For being as a plant that cotneth
of the lust of the earth, without a formal seed, it hath
sprung up and spread abroad more than any other kind.
But to ascribe unto it that which is due ; for the express-
ing of affections, passions, corruptions, and customs, we
are beholding to poets more than to the philosophers'
works ; and for wit and eloquence not much less than
to orators' harangues.2 But it is not good to stay too
long in the theatre. Let us now pass on to the judicial
place or palace of the mind, which we are to approach
and view with more reverence and attention.

1 For these examples there is substituted in the translation a full expo-
sition of the three fables of Pan, Perseus, and Dionysus. And it is worth
observing that, upon the question whether there was really a mystic MMl
at the bottom of the ancient fables, Bacon expresses in the translation a
more decided inclination to the affirmative than he does here.

2 This sentence is omitted in the translation.

THE SECOND BOOK. 207

^[ J The knowledge of man is as the waters, some
descending from above, and some springing from be-
neath ; the one informed by the light of nature, the
other inspired by divine revelation. The light of na-
ture consisteth in the notions of the mind and the re-
ports of the senses ; for as for knowledge which man
receiveth by teaching, it is cumulative and not original ;
as in a water that besides his own spring-head is fed
with other springs and streams. So then according to
these two differing illuminations or originals, knowl-
edge is first of all divided into Divinity and Philoso-
phy-

In Philosophy, the contemplations of man do either
penetrate unto God, or are circumferred to Nature, or
are reflected or reverted upon Himself. Out of which
several inquiries there do arise three knowledges, Di-
vine philosophy, Natural philosophy, and Human phi-
losophy or Humanity. For all things are marked and
stamped with this triple character, of the power of God,
the difference of nature, and the use of man. But be-
cause the distributions and partitions of knowledge are
not like several lines that meet in one angle, and so
touch but in a point ; but are like branches of a tree
that meet in a stem, which hath a dimension and quan-
tity of entireness and continuance, before it come to
discontinue and break itself into arms and boughs ;
therefore it is good, before we enter into the former
distribution, to erect and constitute one universal sci-
ence, by the name of Philosophia Prima, Primitive or
Summary Philosophy, as the main and common way,
before we come where the ways part and divide them-

1 De Aug. Hi. 1. The order of this chapter is changed in the translation
and a good deal added.

208 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

selves ; which science whether I should report as defi-
cient or no, I stand doubtful. For I find a certain
rhapsody of Natural Theology, and of divers parts of
Logic ; and of that part of Natural Philosophy which
concerneth the Principles, and of that other part of
Natural Philosophy which concerneth the Soul or
Spirit ; all these strangely commixed and confused ;
but being examined, it seemeth to me rather a depreda-
tion of other sciences, advanced and exalted unto some
height of terms,1 than any thing solid or substantive
of itself. Nevertheless I cannot be ignorant of the
distinction which is current, that the same tilings are
handled but in several respects ; as for example, that
logic considereth of many things as they are in notion,
and this philosophy as they are in nature ; the one in
appearance, the other in existence. But I find this
difference better made than pursued. For if they had
considered Quantity, Similitude, Diversity, and the rest
of those Extern Characters of things, as philosophers,
and in nature, their inquiries must of force have been
of a far other kind than they are. For doth any of
them, in handling Quantity, speak of the force of
union, how and how far it multiplieth virtue ? Doth
any give the reason, why some things in nature are so
common and in so great mass, and others so rare and in
so small quantity ? Doth any, in handling Similitude
and Diversity, assign the cause why iron should not
move to iron, which is more like, but move to the load-
stone, which is less like? Why in all diversities of

1 Et sublimitatt quidam sernwnis hominum qui se ipsos admirari amant
tanqumn in vertice scientinmm collocatam. — De Aug. The substance of the
rest of this paragraph, till we come to the last sentence, is transferred to
the end of the chapter in the De Augmentit and set forth more fully and
clearly.

THE SECOND BOOK. 209

things there should be certain participles in nature,
which are almost ambiguous to which kind they should
be referred ? But there is a mere and deep silence
touching the nature and operation of those Common
Adjuncts of things, as in nature ; and only a resuming
and repeating of the force and use of them in speech
or argument. Therefore, because in a writing of this
nature I avoid all subtility, my meaning touching this
original or universal philosophy is thus, in a plain and
gross description by negative : That it be a receptacle
for all such profitable observations and axioms as fall not
within the compass of any of the special parts of phi-
losophy or sciences, but are more common and of a higher
stage.

Now that there are many of that kind need not be
doubted. For example ; is not the rule, Si incequali-
bus cequalia addas, omnia erunt inosqualia, [if equals be
added to unequals, the wholes will be unequal,] an
axiom as well of justice as of the mathematics ? l

1 This clause is printed out of its place both in the original and in the
editions of 1629 and 1633; being inserted after the next sentence. It is
obviously an error of the printer; but worth noticing as evidence of the
imperfection of the arrangements then made for correcting the press. I
am inclined to think that in Bacon's time the proof-sheets were never re-
vised by the author.

In the translation we are told that the axiom holds with regard to dis-
tributive justice only. (Eadem in Ethicis obtinet quatenus ad jusliliam dis-
tributivam : siquidem in justitid commutativa, ut paria imparibus tribuantur
ratio mquitatis poslulat ; at in distributiva, nisi imparia imparibus prasteniur,
iniquitas fuerit maxima.) Equal measure distributed to unequal conditions
produces an unequal result; a truth of which many striking illustrations
are furnished by the operation of our own laws as between the rich and
the poor, when the same penalty inflicted for the same offence falls heavily
on the one and lightly on the other. In matter of commutation, — as in a
question, for instance, of compensation for property destroyed, — this of
course does not hold. The coincidence between commutative and dis-
tributive justice and arithmetical and geometrical proportion is not alluded
to in the translation. But this may have been by accident; the translator

VOL. vi. 14

210 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

And is there not a true coincidence between com-
mutative and distributive justice, and arithmetical and
geometrical proportion ? Is not that other rule, Qucn
in eodem tertio conveniunt, et inter %e conveniunt, [things
that are equal to the same are equal to each other,] a
rule taken from the mathematics, but so potent in logic
as all syllogisms are built upon it ? Is not the obser-
vation, Omnia mutantur, nil interit, [all things change,
but nothing is lost,] a contemplation in philosophy
thus, That the quantum of nature is eternal ? in natu-
ral theology thus, That it requireth the same omnipo-
tence to make somewhat nothing, which at the first
made nothing somewhat ? according to the scripture,
Didici quod omnia opera qum fecit Deus perseverent in
perpetuum ; non possumus eis quicquam addere nee au-
ferre : [I know that whatsoever God doeth, it shall be
for ever ; nothing can be put to it, nor anything taken
from it]. Is not the ground, which Machiavel wisely
and largely discourseth concerning governments, that
the way to establish and preserve them is to reduce
them ad principia? a rule in religion and nature 2 as
well as in civil administration ? Was not the Persian
Magic a reduction or correspondence of the principles
and architectures of nature to the rules and policy of
governments ? Is not the precept of a musician, to
fall from a discord or harsh accord upon a concord
or sweet accord, alike true in affection ? Is not the
trope of music, to avoid or slide from the close or
cadence, common with the trope of rhetoric of deceiv-
ing expectation ? Is not the delight of the quavering

perhaps not having observed where the misplaced sentence was meant to
come in.

1 I>iscorsi, iii. 1.

- The translation says in phyticis, omitting the word rtliyion.

THE SECOND BOOK. 211

upon a stop in music the same with1 the playing of
light upon the water?

Splendet tremulo sub lumine pontus:
[Beneath the trembling light glitters the sea.]

Are not the organs of the senses of one kind with the
organs of reflexion, the eye with a glass, the ear with
a cave or strait determined and bounded ? 2 Neither
are these only similitudes, as men of narrow observa-
tion may conceive them to be, but the same footsteps
of nature, treading or printing upon several subjects or
matters. This science therefore (as I under- Philosophia
stand it) I may justly report as deficient ; for ^"ponmus
I see sometimes the profounder sort of wits, Scientiarum-
in handling some particular argument, will now and
then draw a bucket of water out of this well for their
present use ; but the springhead thereof seemeth to
me not to have been visited, being of so excellent use
both for the disclosing of nature and the abridgment
of art.

^[ 3 This science being therefore first placed as a
common parent, like unto Berecynthia, which had so
much heavenly issue,

Omnes coelicolas, omnes supera alta tenentes:
[All dwellers in the heaven and upper sky:]

we may return to the former distribution of the three
philosophies ; Divine, Natural, and Human. And as
concerning Divine Philosophy or Natural Theology, it
is that knowledge or rudiment of knowledge concern-
ing God which may be obtained by the contempla-

1 So ed. 1633. The original and the ed. 1629 have which.

2 Some other instances are added in the translation.

3 De Aug. iii. 2.

212 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

tion of his creatures ; which knowledge may be truly
termed divine in respect of the object, and natural in
respect of the light. The bounds of this knowledge
are, that it sufficeth to convince atheism, but not to in-
form religion : and therefore there was never miracle
wrought by God to convert an atheist, because the
licrht of nature might have led him to confess a God :
but miracles have been wrought to convert idolaters
and the superstitious, because no light of nature ex-
tendeth to declare the will and true worship of God.
For as all works do shew forth the power and skill of
the workman, and not his image ; so it is of the works
of God ; which do shew the omnipotency and wisdom
of the maker, but not his image : and therefore therein
the heathen opinion differeth from the sacred truth ;
for they supposed the world to be the image of God,
and man to be an extract or compendious image of the
world ; but the Scriptures never vouchsafe to attribute
to the world that honour, as to be the image of God,
but only the work of his hands ; neither do they speak
of any other image of God, but man. Wherefore by
the contemplation of nature to induce and inforce
the acknowledgement of God, and to demonstrate his
power, providence, and goodness, is an excellent argu-
ment, and hath been excellently handled by divers.
But on the other side, out of the contemplation of
nature, or ground of human knowledges, to induce
any verity or persuasion concerning the points of faith,
is in my judgment not safe : Da Jidei qua; fidei sunt :
[give unto Faith that which is Faith's]. For the
Heathen themselves conclude as much in that excel-
lent and divine fable of the golden chain : TJuit men
and gods were not able to draw Jupiter down to the

THE SECOND BOOK. 213

earth ; but contrariwise, Jupiter was able to draw them
up to heaven. So as we ought not to attempt to draw
down or submit the mysteries of God to our reason ;
but contrariwise to raise and advance our reason to the
divine truth. So as in this part of knowledge touch-
ing divine philosophy, I am so far from noting any de-
ficience, as I rather note an excess : whereunto I have
digressed, because of the extreme prejudice which both
religion and philosophy hath received and may receive
by being commixed together ; as that which undoubt-
edly will make an heretical religion, and an imaginary
and fabulous philosophy.

Otherwise it is of the nature of angels and spirits,
which is an appendix of theology both divine and
natural, and is neither inscrutable nor interdicted ;
for although the Scripture saith, Let no man deceive
you in sublime discourse touching the worship of angels,
pressing into that he knoweth not, &c. yet notwithstand-
ing if you observe well that precept, it may appear
thereby that there be two things only forbidden, ado-
ration of them, and opinion fantastical of them ; either
to extol them further than appertaineth to the degree
of a creature, or to extol a man's knowledge of them
further than he hath ground. But the sober and
grounded inquiry which may arise out of the pas-
sages of holy Scriptures, or out of the gradations of
nature, is not restrained. So of degenerate and re-
volted spirits, the conversing with them or the employ-
ment of them is prohibited, much more any veneration
towards them. But the contemplation or science of
their nature, their power, their illusions, either by
Scripture or reason, is a part of spiritual wisdom.
For so the apostle saith, We are not ignorant of his

214 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

stratagems ; and it is no more unlawful to inquire
the nature of evil spirits than to enquire the force of
poisons in nature, or the nature of sin and vice in
morality. But this part touching angels and spirits,
I cannot note as deficient, for many have occupied
themselves in it ; I may rather challenge it, in many
of the writers thereof, as fabulous and fantastical.

^[ 1 Leaving therefore Divine Philosophy or Natural
Theology (not Divinity or Inspired Theology, which
we reserve for the last of all, as the haven and sabbath
of all man's contemplations), we will now proceed to
Natural Philosophy. If then it be true that Democ-
ritus said, That, the truth of nature lieth hid in certain
deep mines and caves ; and if it be true likewise that
the Alchemists do so much inculcate, that Vulcan is a
second nature, and imitateth that dexterously and com-
pendiously which nature worketh by ambages and length
of time ; it were good to divide natural philosophy into
the mine and the furnace, and to make two professions
or occupations of natural philosophers, some to be pio-
ners and some smiths ; some to dig, and some to refine
and hammer. And surely I do best allow of a division
of that kind, though in more familiar and scholastieal
terms ; namely, that these be the two parts of natural
philosophy, — the Inquisition of Causes, and the Pro-
duction of Effects ; Speculative, and Operative ; Natu-
ral Science, and Natural Prudence. For as in civil
matters there is a wisdom of discourse and a wisdom
of direction ; so is it in natural. And here I will
make a request, that for the latter (or at least for a
part thereof) I may revive and reintegrate the misap-
plied and abused name of Natural Magic ; which in

1 De Aug. iii. 3.

THE SECOND BOOK. 215

the true sense is but Natural Wisdom, or Natural
Prudence ; taken according to the ancient acception,
purged from vanity and superstition.1 Now although
it be true, and I know it well, that there is an inter-
course between Causes and Effects, so as both these
knowledges, Speculative and Operative, have a great
connexion between themselves ; yet because all true
and fruitful Natural Philosophy hath a double scale
or ladder, ascendent and descendent ; ascending from
experiments to the invention of causes, and descending
from causes to the invention of new experiments ;
therefore I judge it most requisite that these two parts
be severally considered and handled.

^[ 2 Natural Science or Theory is divided into Physic
and Metaphysic : wherein I desire it may be conceived
that I use the word Metaphysic in a differing sense
from that that is received : and in like manner I doubt
not but it will easily appear to men of judgment that
in this and other particulars, wheresoever my concep-
tion and notion may differ from the ancient, yet I am
studious to keep the ancient terms. For hoping well
to deliver myself from mistaking by the order and per-
spicuous expressing of that I do propound, I am other-
wise zealous and affectionate to recede as little from
antiquity, either in terms or opinions, as may stand
with truth and the proficience of knowledge. And
herein I cannot a little marvel at the philosopher
Aristotle, that did proceed in such a spirit of difference
and contradiction towards all antiquity ; undertaking
not only to frame new words of science at pleasure,
but to confound and extinguish all ancient wisdom ;

1 This request is omitted in the translation.

2 De Aug. iii. 4.

216 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

insomuch as he never nameth or mentioneth an ancient
author or opinion, but to confute and reprove ; where-
in for glory, and drawing followers and disciples, he
took the right course. For certainly there cometh to
pass and hath place in human truth, that which was
noted and pronounced in the highest truth : Veni in
nomine Patris, nee recipitis me ; si quis venerit in nom-
ine mo, eum recipietis ; [I have come in my Father's
name, and ye receive me not ; if one come in his own
name, him ye will receive]. But in this divine apho-
rism (considering to whom it was applied, namely to
Antichrist, the highest deceiver,) we may discern well
that the coming in a maris mvn name, without regard
of antiquity or paternity, is no good sign of truth ; al-
though it be joined with the fortune and success of an
Eum recipietis. But for this excellent person 1 Aris-
totle, I will think of him that he learned that humour
of his scholar, with whom it seemeth he did emulate,
the one to conquer all opinions, as the other to conquer
all nations. Wherein nevertheless, it may be, he may
at some men's hands that are of a bitter disposition get
a like title as his scholar did ;

Felix terrarum prsedo, non utile mundo
Editus exemplum, &c.

[a fortunate robber, who made prize of nations] ; so

Felix doctrinae prsedo,

[a fortunate robber, who made prize of learning].
But to me on the other side that do desire, as much
as lieth in my pen, to ground a sociable intercourse3

1 viro tarn eximio certe, et ob acumen ingenii mirabili. — De Aug.

2 entercourse in the original, — the form of the word commonly used by
Bacon.

THE SECOND BOOK. 217

between antiquity and proficience, it seemeth best to
keep way with antiquity usque ad aras, [as far as may
be without violating higher obligations ;] and therefore
to retain the ancient terms, though I sometimes alter
the uses and definitions ; according to the moderate
proceeding in civil government, where although there
be some alteration, yet that holdeth which Tacitus
wisely noteth, eadem magistratuum vocabula, [the name
of the magistracies are not changed].

To return therefore to the use and acception of the
term Metaphysic, as I do now understand the word :
It appeareth by that which hath been already said,
that I intend Philosophia Prima, Summary Philoso-
phy, and Metaphysic, which heretofore have been con-
founded as one, to be two distinct things. For the one
I have made as a parent or common ancestor to all
knowledge, and the other I have now brought in as a
branch or descendent of Natural Science. It appear-
eth likewise that I have assigned to Summary Philoso-
phy the common principles and axioms which are pro-
miscuous and indifferent to several sciences. I have
assigned unto it likewise the inquiry touching the opera-
tion of the relative and adventive characters of essences,
as Quantity, Similitude, Diversity, Possibility, and the
rest ; with this distinction and provision ; that they be
handled as they have efficacy in nature, and not logi-
cally. It appeareth likewise that Natural Theology,
which heretofore hath been handled confusedly with
Metaphysic, I have inclosed and bounded by itself.
It is therefore now a question, what is left remaining
for Metaphysic ; wherein I may without prejudice
preserve thus much of the conceit of antiquity, that
Physic should contemplate that which is inherent in

218 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

matter and therefore transitory, and Metaphysic that
which is abstracted and fixed. And again that Physic
should handle that which supposeth in nature only a
being and moving,1 and Metaphysic should handle that
which supposeth further in nature a reason, under-
standing, and platform.2 But the difference, perspicu-
ously expressed, is most familiar and sensible. For as
we divided Natural Philosophy in general into the
Inquiry of Causes and Productions of Effects ; so that
part which concerneth the Inquiry of Causes we do
subdivide, according to the received and sound division
of Causes ; the one part, which is Physic, enquireth
and handleth the Material and Efficient Causes ; and
the other, which is Metaphysic, handleth the Formal
and Final Causes.

Physic (taking it according to the derivation, and
not according to our idiom for Medicine,) is situate in
a middle term or distance between Natural History
and Metaphysic. For Natural History describeth the
variety of things ; Physic, the causes, but variable or
respective causes ; and Metaphysic, the fixed and con-
stant causes.

Limus ut hie durescit, et ha?c ut cera liquescit,
Uno eodemque igni:

[As the same fire which makes the soft clay hard
Makes hard wax soft:]

Fire is the cause of induration, but respective to clay ;
fire is the cause of colliquation, but respective to wax ;
but fire is no constant cause either of induration or
colliquation. So then the physical causes are but the
efficient and the matter. Physic hath three parts ;
whereof two respect nature united or collected, the third

1 The translation adds "and natural necessity." a ideam.

THE SECOND BOOK. 219

contemplateth nature diffused or distributed. Nature is
collected either into one entire total, or else into the
same principles or seeds. So as the first doctrine is
touching the Contexture or Configuration of things, as
de mundo, de universitate rerum. The second is the doc-
trine concerning the Principles or Originals of things.
The third is the doctrine concerning all Variety and
Particularity of things, whether it be of the differing
substances, or their differing qualities and natures ;
whereof there needeth no enumeration, this part being
but as a gloss or paraphrase, that attendeth upon the
text of Natural History.1 Of these three I cannot re-
port any as deficient. In what truth or perfection they
are handled, I make not now any judgment : but they
are parts of knowledge not deserted by the labour of man.
For Metaphysic, we have assigned unto it the in-
miry of Formal and Final Causes ; which assignation,
is to the former of them, may seem to be nugatory and

roid, because of the received and inveterate opinion
that the inquisition of man is not competent to find out
essential forms or true differences : of which opinion we

all take this hold ; that the invention of Forms is of
all other parts of knowledge the worthiest to be sought,
if it be possible to be found. As for the possibility,
they are ill discoverers that - think there is no land
when they can see nothing but sea. But it is manifest
that Plato in his opinion of Ideas, as one that had a
wit of elevation situate as upon a cliff, did descry that
forms were the true object of knowledge ; but lost the
real fruit of his opinion, by considering of forms as
absolutely abstracted from matter, and not confined

1 On this branch of the subject there is a large addition of ten or twelve
pages in the De Augmentis.

220 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

and determined by matter ; and so turning his opinion
upon Theology, wherewith all his natural philosophy
is infected. But if any man shall keep a continual
watchful and severe eye upon action, operation, and
the use of knowledge, he may advise and take notice
what are the Forms, the disclosures whereof are fruit-
ful and important to the state of man. For as to the
Forms of substances — Man only except, of whom it
is said, Formavit hominem de limo terra?, et spiravit in
faciem ejus spiraculum vitce, [He formed man of the
dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the
breath of life,] and not as of all other creatures, Pro-
ducant aquce, produced terra, [let the waters bring forth,
let the earth bring forth,] — the Forms of Substances I
say (as they are now by compounding and transplant-
ing multiplied) are so perplexed, as they are not to be
enquired ; l no more than it were either possible or to
purpose to seek in gross the forms of those sounds which
make words, which by composition and transposition of
letters are infinite. But on the other side, to enquire
the form of those sounds or voices which make simple
letters is easily comprehensible, and being known, in-
duceth and manifesteth the forms of all words, which
consist and are compounded of them. In the same
manner to enquire the Form of a lion, of an oak, of
gold, nay of water, of air, is a vain pursuit : but to
enquire the Forms of sense, of voluntary motion, of
vegetation, of colours, of gravity and levity, of density,
of tenuity, of heat, of cold, and all other natures and
qualities, which like an alphabet are not many, and of
which the essences (upheld by matter) of all creatures

1 Or at least (adds the translation) the enquiry must be put off till forms
of simpler nature have been discovered.

THE SECOND BOOK. 221

do consist ; to enquire I say the true forms of these, is
that part of Metaphysic which we now define of. Not
})ut that Plrysic doth make inquiry and take considera-
tion of the same natures : but how ? Only as to the
Material and Efficient Causes of them, and not as to
the Forms. For example ; if the cause of Whiteness
in snow or froth be enquired, and it be rendered thus,
that the subtile intermixture of air and water is the cause,
it is well rendered ; but nevertheless, is this the Form
of Whiteness ? No ; but it is the Efficient, which is
ever but vehiculum forma?, [the carrier of the Metaphysha,
Form].1 This part of Metaphysic I do not DeFormis
find laboured and performed ; whereat I Remm.
marvel not, because I hold it not possible to be in-
vented by that course of invention which hath
been used ; in regard that men (which is the root of
all error) have made too untimely a departure and too
remote a recess from particulars.

But the use of this part of Metaphysic which I
report as deficient, is of the rest the most excellent in
two respects ; the one, because it is the duty and virtue
of all knowledge to abridge the infinity of individual
experience as much as the conception of truth will
permit, and to remed}r the complaint of vita brevis, ars
longa, [life is short and art is long ;] which is per-
formed by uniting the notions and conceptions of
sciences.2 For knowledges are as pyramides, whereof
history is the basis : so of Natural Philosophy the basis
is Natural History ; the stage next the basis is Physic ;

1 A sentence is added here in the translation; see note on Valerius Ter-
minus, c. 11.

8 i. e. collecting them into axioms more general, applicable to all the in-
dividual varieties: (axiomata scientiarum in magis generalia, et quae omni
materia rerum individuarum competant, colligendo et uniendo).

222 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

the stage next the vertical point is Metaphysic. As
for the vertical point, Opus quod operator Deus a prin-
cipio usque ad jinem, [the work which God worketh
from the beginning to the end,] the Summary Law of
Nature, we know not whether man's inquiry can at-
tain unto it. But these three be the true stages of
knowledge ; and are to them that are depraved no
better than the giants' hills, [Pelion, Ossa, and Olym-
pus, piled upon each other,]

Ter sunt conati imponere Pelio Ossam,

Scilicet atque Ossse frondosum involvere Olympian:

but to those which refer all things to the glory of God,
they are as the three acclamations, tSancte, sancte,
sancte ; holy in the description or dilatation of his
works, holy in the connexion or concatenation of them,
and holy in the union of them in a perpetual and uni-
form law. And therefore the speculation was excel-
lent in Parmenides and Plato, although but a specula-
tion in them, That all things by scale did ascend to
unity. So then always that knowledge is worthiest,
which is charged with least multiplicity ; which ap-
peareth to be Metaphysic ; as that which considereth
the Simple Forms or Differences of things, which are
few in number, and the degrees and co-ordinations
whereof make all this variety. The second respect
which valueth and commendeth this part of Metaphysic,
is that it doth enfranchise the power of man unto the
greatest liberty and possibility of works and effects.
For Physic carrieth men in narrow and restrained
ways, subject to many accidents of impediments, im-
itating the ordinary flexuous courses of nature ; but
lata? undique sunt sapientibus vice: to sapience (which
was anciently defined to be rerum divinarum et huma-

THE SECOND BOOK. 223

narum scientia, [the knowledge of things human and
divine],) there is ever choice of means. For physical
causes give light to new invention in simili materia ;
but whosoever knoweth any form, knoweth the utmost
possibility of superinducing that nature upon any variety
of matter, and so is less restrained in operation, either
to the basis of the Matter, or the condition of the
Efficient : which kind of knowledge Salomon likewise,
though in a more divine sense, elegantly describeth :
Non arctabuntur gressus tui, et currens non habebis
offendiculum ; [thy steps shall not be straitened; thou
shalt run and not stumble]. The ways of sapience
are not much liable either to particularity or chance.1
The second part of Metaphysic is the inquiry of
final causes, which I am moved to report not as omit-
ted, but as misplaced.2 And yet if it were but a fault
in order, I would not speak of it ; for order is matter
of illustration, but pertaineth not to the substance of
sciences : but this misplacing hath caused a deficience,
or at least a great improficience in the sciences them-
selves. For the handling of final causes mixed with
the rest in physical inquiries, hath intercepted the
severe and diligent inquiry of all real and physical
causes, and given men the occasion to stay upon these
satisfactory and specious causes, to the great arrest and
prejudice of further discovery. For this I find done
not only by Plato, who ever anchoreth upon that shore,
but by Aristotle, Galen, and others, which do usually
likewise fall upon these flats of discoursing causes. For
to say that the hairs of the eye-lids are for a quickset

1 i. e. neither confined to particular methods, nor liable to be defeated by
accidental obstructions. (Nee angustiis nee obicibus obnoxias esse.)

2 i. e. placed in the department of Physic instead of Metaphysic. (Solent
enim inyuiri inter Physica, non inter Metaphysica.)

224 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

and fence about the sight ; or that the firmness of the
skins and hides of living creatures is to defend them
from the extremities of heat or cold ; or that the bones
are for the columns or beams, whereupon the frames of
the bodies of living creatures are built ; or that the leaves
of trees are for protecting of the fruit ; or that the clouds
are for watering of the earth ; or that the solidness of
the earth is for the station and mansion of living creat-
ures, and the like, is well enquired and collected in
Metaphysic ; but in Physic they are impertinent. Nay,
they are indeed but remoras and hinderances to stay
and slug the ship from further sailing, and have
brought this to pass, that the search of the Physical
Causes hath been neglected and passed in silence.
And therefore the natural philosophy of Democritus
and some others, who did not suppose a mind or rea-
son in the frame of things, but attributed the form
thereof able to maintain itself to infinite essays or proofs
of nature, which they term fortune, seemeth to me (as
far as I can judge by the recital and fragments which
remain unto us) in particularities of physical causes
more real and better enquired than that of Aristotle
and Plato ; whereof both intermingled final causes,
the one as a part of theology, and the other as a part
of logic, which were the favourite studies respectively
of both those persons. Not because those final causes
are not true, and worthy to be enquired, being kept
within their own province ; but because their excur-
sions into the limits of physical causes hath bred a
vastness and solitude in that track. For otherwise
keeping their precincts and borders, men are extreme-
ly deceived if they think there is an enmity or repug-
nancy at all between them. For the cause rendered,

THE SECOND BOOK. 225

that the hairs about the eye-lids are for the safeguard of
the sight, doth not impugn the cause rendered, that
pilosity is incident to orifices of moisture ; Muscosi
fontes, [the mossy springs,] &c. Nor the cause ren-
dered, that the firmness of hides is for the armour of
the body against extremities of heat or cold, doth not
impugn the cause rendered, that contraction of pores is
incident to the outwardest parts, in regard of their ad-
jacence to foreign or unlike bodies ; and so of the rest :
both causes being true and compatible, the one declar-
ing an intention, the other a consequence only. Neither
doth this call in question or derogate from divine provi-
dence, but highly confirm and exalt it. For as in civil
actions he is the greater and deeper politique, that can
make other men the instruments of his will and ends
and yet never acquaint them with his purpose, so as
they shall do it and yet not know what they do, than
he that imparteth his meaning to those he employeth ;
so is the wisdom of God more admirable, when na-
ture intendeth one thing and providence draweth forth
another, than if he had communicated to particular
creatures and motions the characters and impressions
of his providence. And thus much for Metaphysic ;
the later part whereof I allow as extant, but wish it
confined to its proper place.

^[ 1 Nevertheless there remaineth yet another part
of Natural Philosophy, which is commonly made a
principal part, and holdeth rank with Physic special
and Metaphysic ; which is Mathematic ; but I think it
more agreeable to the nature of things and to the light
of order to place it as a branch of Metaphysic ; for the

1 De Aug. iii. 6. Observe that in translating this part of the work Ba-
con has not only made great additions, but changed the order.

VOL. VI. 15

226 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

subject of it being Quantity ; not Quantity indefinite,
which is but a relative and belongeth to philosophia
prima (as hath been said,) but Quantity determined or
proportionable ; it appeareth to be one of the Essential
Forms of things ; as that that is causative in nature of
a number of effects ; insomuch as we see in the schools
both of Democritus and of Pythagoras, thaty the one did
ascribe figure to the first seeds of things, and the other
did suppose numbers to be the principles and originals of
things : and it is true also that of all other forms (as
we understand forms) it is the most abstracted and
separable from matter, and therefore most proper to
Metaphysic ; which hath likewise been the cause why it
hath been better laboured and enquired than any of the
other fonns, which are more immersed into matter. For
it being the nature of the mind of man (to the extreme
prejudice of knowledge) to delight in the spacious
liberty of generalities, as in a champion region, and not
in the inclosures of particularity ; the Mathematics of
all other knowledge were the goodliest fields to satisfy
that appetite. But for the placing of this science, it is
not much material : * only we have endeavoured in
these our partitions to observe a kind of perspective,
that one part may cast light upon another.

The Mathematics are either Pure or Mixed. To
the Pure Mathematics are those sciences belonging
which handle Quantity Determinate, merely severed
from any axioms of natural philosophy ; and these are
two, Geometry and Arithmetic ; the one handling

* In the De Augmenlis he concludes by placing it as an appendix and
auxiliary to Natural Philosophy, in order to mark more distinctly its
proper function ; which he complains that the mathematicians are apt to
forget, and to exalt it, as the logicians exalt logic, above the sciences which
it is its business to serve.

THE SECOND BOOK. 227

Quantity continued, and the other dissevered. Mixed
hath for subject some axioms or parts of natural philos-
ophy, and considereth Quantity determined, as it is
auxiliary and incident unto them. For many parts of
nature can neither be invented with sufficient subtilty
nor demonstrated with sufficient perspicuity nor accom-
modated unto use with sufficient dexterity, without the
aid and intervening of the Mathematics : of which sort
are Perspective, Music, Astronomy, Cosmography, Ar-
chitecture, Enginery, and divers others. In the Math-
ematics I can report no deficience, except it be that
men do not sufficiently understand the excellent use of
the Pure Mathematics, in that they do remedy and cure
many defects in the wit and faculties intellectual. For
if the wit be too dull, they sharpen it; if too wander-
ing, they fix it ; if too inherent in the sense, they
abstract it. So that as tennis is a game of no use in
itself, but of great use in respect it maketh a quick eye
and a body ready to put itself into all postures ; so in
the Mathematics, that use which is collateral and in-
tervenient is no less worthy than that which is prin-
cipal and intended.1 And as for the Mixed Mathe-

1 The whole of this passage relating to the use of pure mathematics in
the training of the intellect is omitted in the translation; and the omission
has been represented as indicating a change in Bacon's opinion either as
to the value of this particular study in that respect, or as to the expediency
of encouraging any study which is " useful only to the mind " of the stu-
dent. This conjecture is hardly reconcilable however with the fact that
the same recommendation of mathematics as a cure for certain defects of
the intellect is repeated both in a later chapter of the De Augmentis (vi. 4;
to which place indeed the observation properly belongs), and in the Essay
on Studies as published in 1625. Nor is there any difficulty in accounting
for the omission of it here. When Bacon wrote the Advancement in 1605,
he had no deficiency to report in the department of Mathematics: he could
not name any branch of the study which had not been property pursued,
and merely took the opportunity of observing by the way that the study
of the pure mathematics had a collateral and incidental value as an in-

228 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

matics, I may only make this prediction, that there
cannot fail to be more kinds of them, as nature grows
further disclosed. Thus much of Natural Science, or
the part of nature Speculative. -

^[ J For Natural Prudence, or the part Operative of
Natural Philosophy, we will divide it into three parts,
Experimental, Philosophical, and Magical ; 2 which
three parts active have a correspondence and analogy
with the three parts Speculative, Natural History,
Physic, and Metaphysic. For many operations have
been invented, sometimes by a casual incidence and
occurrence, sometimes by a purposed experiment ; and
of those which have been found by an intentional ex-
periment, some have been found out by varying or
extending the same experiment, some by transferring
and compounding divers experiments the one into the
other, which kind of invention an empiric may man-
age.3 Again, by the knowledge of physical causes
there cannot fail to follow many indications and desig-
nations of new particulars, if men in their speculation
will keep one eye upon use and practice. But these
are but coastings along the shore, premendo Uttm
iniquum: for it seemeth to me there can hardly be

strument of education : an observation very good and just in itself, but
not at all to the purpose of the argument. When he revised the work in
1622 he knew more about mathematics, and was able to point out certain
deficiencies which were very much to the purpose, — especially as to the
doctrine of Solids in Geometry and of Series in Arithmetic; and in in-
troducing a relevant observation he naturally struck out the irrelevant
one.

1 De Aug. iii. 5.

2 In the translation the name Natural Prudence is omitted; the pari
operative is divided into two parts, instead of three; viz. Mechanic and
Magic ; and the whole exposition is much altered and enlarged.

8 Being a matter of ingenuity and sagacity, rather than philosophy
(qua magis ingeniosa res est tt sagax, quam philonophica). This is in fact
the Experientia Literata of which we hear more further on.

THE SECOND BOOK. . 229

discovered any radical or fundamental alterations and
innovations in nature, either by the fortune and essays
of experiments, or by the light and direction of physi-
cal causes. If therefore we have reported Metaphysic
deficient, it must follow that we do the like of Natural
Magic, which hath relation thereunto. For Naturaiu
as for the Natural Magic whereof now there S3 Physua

, , . . . Operativa

is mention in books, containing certain cred- Major.
ulous and superstitious conceits and observations of
Sympathies and Antipathies and hidden proprieties,
and some frivolous experiments, strange rather by dis-
guisement than in themselves ; it is as far differing in
truth of nature from such a knowledge as we require,
as the story of king Arthur of Britain, or Hugh of
Bourdeaux, differs from Caesar's commentaries in truth
of story. For it is manifest that Caesar did greater
things de vero than those imaginary heroes were
feigned to do. But he did them not in that fabulous
manner. Of this kind of learning the fable of Ixion
was a figure, who designed to enjoy Juno, the goddess
of power ; and instead of her had copulation with a
cloud, of which mixture were begotten centaurs and
chimeras. So whosoever shall entertain high and va-
porous imaginations instead of a laborious and sober
inquiry of truth, shall beget hopes and beliefs of
strange and impossible shapes. And therefore we may
note in these sciences which hold so much of imagi-
nation and belief, as this degenerate Natural Magic,
Alchemy, Astrology, and the like, that in their prop-
ositions the description of the means is ever more
monstrous than the pretence or end. For it is a thing
more probable, that he that knoweth well the natures
of Weight, of Colour, of Pliant and Fragile in respect

230 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

of the hammer, of Volatile and Fixed in respect of the
fire, and the rest, may superinduce upon some metal
the nature and form of gold by such mechanique as
belongeth to the production of the natures afore re-
hearsed, than that some grains of the medicine pro-
jected should in a few moments of time turn a sea
of quicksilver or other material into gold. So it is
more probable, that he that knoweth the nature of are-
faction, the nature of assimilation of nourishment to
the thing nourished, the manner of increase and clear-
ing of spirits, the manner of the depredations which
spirits make upon the humours and solid parts, shall by
ambages of diets, bathings, anointings, medicines, mo-
tions, and the like, prolong life or restore some degree
of youth or vivacity, than that it can be done with the
use of a few drops or scruples of a liquor or receit.
To conclude therefore, the true Natural Magic, which
is that great liberty and latitude of operation which
dependeth upon the knowledge of Forms, I may report
deficient, as the relative thereof is. To which part, if
we be serious and incline not to vanities and plausible
discourse, besides the deriving and deducing the opera-
tions themselves from Metaphysic, there are pertinent
two points of much purpose, the one by way of prep-
aration, the other by way of caution. The first is,
that there be made a Calendar resembling an inventory !
of the estate of man, containing all the inventions (be-
inventarium ing the works or fruits of nature or art)

Opum huma- , . . , , „ .

narum. which are now extant and whereot man is

already possessed ; out of which doth naturally result

1 This is the Inventarr which (as I think) was to be contained in the
tenth chapter of the Valerius Terminus. See my note on Mr. Ellis's
preface.

THE SECOND BOOK. 231

a note, what things are yet held impossible, or not in-
vented ; which calendar will be the more artificial and
serviceable, if to every reputed impossibility you add
what thing is extant which cometh the nearest in de-
gree to that impossibility ; to the end that by these
optatives and potentials man's inquiry may be the more
awake in deducing direction of works from the spec-
ulation of causes. And secondly, that those experi-
ments be not only esteemed which have an immediate
and present use, but those principally which are of
most universal consequence for invention of other ex-
periments, and those which give most light to the
invention of causes ; for the invention of the mariner's
needle, which giveth the direction, is of no less benefit
for navigation than the invention of the sails, which
give the motion.1

2 Thus have I passed through Natural Philosophy,
and the deficiences thereof; wherein if I have differed
from the ancient and received doctrines, and thereby
shall move contradiction ; for my part, as I affect not
to dissent, so I purpose not to contend. If it be truth,

Non canimus surdis, respondent omnia sylvse :
[All as we sing the listening woods reply:]

the voice of nature will consent, whether the voice of
man do or no. And as Alexander Borgia was wont
to say of the expedition of the French for Naples, that
they came with chalk in their hands to mark up their

1 This example is omitted in the translation, to make room for a better
(with which Bacon was probably not acquainted in 1605) — the artificial
congelation of water; an experiment which he especially valued as giving
light as to the secret process of condensation.

2 The passage corresponding to this paragraph concludes the third book
of the De Augmentis. That which follows is transferred to the middle of
the fourth chapter.

232 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

lodgings, and not with weapons to fight ; so I like bet-
ter that entry of truth which cometh peaceably with
chalk to mark up those minds which are capable to
lodge and harbour it, than that which cometh with
pugnacity and contention.

1 But there remaineth a division of Natural Philoso-
phy according to the report of the inquiry, and hotliing
concerning the matter or subject ; and that is Positive
and Considerative ; when the inquiry reporteth either
an Assertion or a Doubt. These doubts or non Uquets
are of two sorts, Particular and Total. For the first,
We see a good example thereof in Aristotle's Problems,
which deserved to have had a better continuance, but
so nevertheless as there is one point whereof warning
is to be given and taken. The registering of doubts
hath two excellent uses : the one, that it saveth phi-
losophy from errors and falsehoods ; when that which
is not fully appearing is not collected into assertion*
whereby error might draw error, but reserved in doubt :
the other, that the entry of doubts are as so many
suckers or spunges to draw use 2 of knowledge ; inso-
much as that which if doubts had not preceded a man
should never have advised but passed it over without
note, by the suggestion and solicitation of doubts is
made to be attended and applied. But both these com-
modities do scarcely countervail an inconvenience which
Will intrude itself, if it be not debarred ; which is, that
when a doubt is once received men labour rather how
to keep it a doubt still than how to solve it, and ac-
cordingly bend their wits.3 Of this we see the famil-

1 The substance of this paragraph will be found in the middle of the
fourth chapter of the third book of the De Augmentis (Vol. II. p. 284).

2 i. e. increase, (qwe incrementa scientist perpeiuo ad se suganl et alliciant.)
8 This is explained in the translation by adding that the recognition of

THE SECOND BOOK. 233

iar example in lawyers and scholars, both which if they
have once admitted a doubt, it goeth ever after author-
ised for a doubt. But that use of wit and knowledge
is to be allowed, which laboureth to make doubtful
things certain, and not those which labour to make
certain things doubtful. Therefore these cal- continuatio
endars of doubts I commend as excellent things, ^fivT"1"
so that there be this caution used, that when Natura-
they be thoroughly sifted and brought to resolution,
they be from thenceforth omitted, decarded, and not con-
tinued to cherish and encourage men in doubting. To
which calendar of doubts or problems, I advise be annex-
ed another calendar, as much or more material, which
is a calendar of popular errors : I mean chiefly, cataiogus

, , . ■• . . •, , Falsitatum

in natural history l such as pass in speech and grassantium
conceit, and are nevertheless apparently de- Natura.
tected and convicted of untruth ; that man's knowledge
be not weakened nor imbased by such dross and vanity.
As for the doubts or non liquets general or in total, I
understand those differences of opinions touching the
principles of nature and the fundamental points of the
same, which have caused the diversity of sects, schools,
and philosophies ; as that of Empedocles, Pythagoras,
Democritus, Parmenides, and the rest.2 For although
Aristotle, as though he had been of the race of the Ot-
tomans, thought he could not reign except the first
thing he did he killed all his brethren ; yet to those
that seek truth and not magistrality, it cannot but seem
a matter of great profit to see before them the several

the doubt has the effect of raising champions to maintain each side, and so
keeping it up.

1 vel in Historia Naturali, vel in Dogmatibus. — De Aug.

2 In the translation Empedocles is omitted ; and Philolaus, Xenophanes,
Anaxagoras, Leucippus, added.

234 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

opinions touching the foundations of nature ; not for
any exact truth that can be expected in those theories ;
for as the same phaenomena in astronomy are satisfied
by the received astronomy of the diurnal motion and
the proper motions of the planets with their eccentrics
and epicycles and likewise by the theory of Copernicus
who supposed the earth to move ; and the calculations
are indifferently agreeable to both ; so the ordinary face
and view of experience is many times satisfied by
several theories and philosophies ; whereas to find the
real truth requiretli another manner of severity and
attention. For as Aristotle saith that children at the
first will call every woman mother, but afterward they
come to distinguish according to truth ; so experience,
if it be in childhood, will call every philosophy mother,
but when it cometh to ripeness it will discern the true
mother. So as in the mean time it is good to see the
several glosses and opinions upon nature, whereof it
may be every one in some one point hath seen clearer
than his fellows. Therefore I wish some collection to
d« Antiqw De ma^e painfully and understandingly de anti-
Phiiosophiis. qui& ^110^]^^ out of all the possible light

which remaineth to us of them.1 Which kind of work
I find deficient. But here I must give warning, that
it be done distinctly and severely;2 the philosophies
of every one throughout by themselves ; and not by
titles packed and faggoted up together, as hath been
done by Plutarch. For it is the harmony of a philos-
ophy in itself which giveth it light and credence ;

i Such (according to the translation) as the Lives of the ancient Philoso-
phers, Plutarch's collection of placita, Plato's quotations, Aristotle's con-
futations, and the scattered notices in Lactantius, Philo, Philostratus, &c.

2 So both in the original and in ed. 1633; perhaps a misprint for "sev-
erally." Ed. 1629 has severally. The translation has dislincte only.

THE SECOND BOOK. 235

whereas if it be singled and broken, it will seem more
foreign and dissonant. For as when I read in Tacitus
the actions of Nero or Claudius, with circumstances of
times, inducements, and occasions, I find them not so
strange ; but when I read them in Suetonius Tranquil-
lus gathered into titles and bundles, and not in order
of time, they seem more monstrous and incredible ; sc
is it of any philosophy reported entire, and dismem-
bered by articles. Neither do I exclude opinions of
latter times to be likewise represented in this calendar of
sects of philosophy, as that of Theophrastus Paracelsus,
eloquently reduced into an harmony by the pen of
Severinus the Dane ; and that of Telesius, and his
scholar Donius, being as a pastoral philosophy, full of
sense but of no great depth ; and that of Fracastorius,
who though he pretended not to make any new phi-
losophy, yet did use the absoluteness of his own sense
upon the old ; and that of Gilbertus our countryman,
who revived, with some alterations and demonstrations,
the opinions of Xenophanes ; 1 and any other worthy
to be admitted.

Thus have we now dealt with two of the three
beams of man's knowledge ; that is Radius Directus,
which is referred to nature, Radius Refractus, which is
referred to God, and cannot report truly because of

1 This passage is considerably altered in the translation, and the differ-
ences are worth noticing as bearing upon the course of Bacon's reading and
the development of his views in the interval. After the notice of Paracel-
sus the translation proceeds " or of Telesius of Consentium, who revived
the philosophy of Parmenides and so turned (he arms of the Peripatetics
against themselves ; or of Patricius the Venetian, who sublimated the fumes
of the Plafonists ; or of our countryman Gilbert, who set up again the doc-
trines of Philolaus." The names of Donius, Fracastorius, and Xenophanes
are entirely omitted. I do not know whether Mr. Ellis's attention had
been directed to these changes.

236 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

the-inequality of the medium. There resteth Radius
Reflexus whereby Man beholdeth and contemplateth
himself.

^[ 1 We come therefore now to that knowledge
whereunto the ancient oracle directeth us, which is the
knowledge of ourselves ; which deserveth the more ac-
curate handling, by how much it toucheth us more
nearly. This knowledge, as it is the end and term of
natural philosophy in the intention of man, so notwith-
standing it is but a portion of natural philosophy in the
continent of nature. And generally let this be a rule,
that all partitions of knowledges be accepted rather for
lines and veins, than for sections and separations ; and
that the continuance and entireness of knowledge be
preserved. For the contrary hereof hath made particu-
lar sciences to become barren, shallow, and erroneous ;
while they have not been nourished and maintained
from the common fountain. So we see Cicero the
orator complained of Socrates and his school, that he
was the first that separated philosophy and rhetoric ;
whereupon rhetoric became an empty and verbal art.
So we may see that the opinion of Copernicus touch-
ing the rotation of the earth,2 which astronomy itself
cannot correct because it is not repugnant to any of the
phaenomena, yet natural philosophy may correct. So
we see also that the science of medicine, if it be desti-
tuted and forsaken by natural philosophy, it is not
much better than an empirical practice. With this
reservation therefore we proceed to Human Philosophy

1 De Aug. iv. 1. The whole of this chapter is much altered and en-
Urged ; rewritten rather than translated.
3 The translation adds, qua nunc quoque invaluii.

THE SECOND BOOK. 237

or Humanity, which hath two parts : the one consider-
ed man segregate, or distributively ; the other congre-
gate, or in society. So as Human Philosophy is either
Simple and Particular, or Conjugate and Civil. Hu-
manity Particular consisteth of the same parts whereof
man consisteth ; that is, of knowledges which respect
the Body, and of knowledges that respect the Mind.
But before we distribute so far, it is good to constitute.
For I do take the consideration in general and at large
of Human Nature to be fit to be emancipate and made
a knowledge by itself; not so much in regard of those
delightful and elegant discourses which have been made
of the dignity of man,1 of his miseries, of his state and
life, and the like adjuncts of his common and undivided
nature ; but chiefly in regard of the knowledge con-
cerning the sympathies and concordances between the
mind and body, which, being mixed, cannot be properly
assigned to the sciences of either.

This knowledge hath two branches : for as all leagues
and amities consist of mutual Intelligence and mutual
Offices, so this league of mind and body hath these two
parts ; how the one discloseth the other, and how the one
worketh upon the other; Discovery, and Impression.
The former of these hath begotten two arts, both of
Prediction or Prenotion ; whereof the one is honoured
with the inquiry of Aristotle, and the other of Hip-
pocrates. And although they have of later time been
used to be coupled with superstitious and fantastical

1 In the De Augmentis this part is numbered among the Desiderata.
The miseries of man, he says, have been well set forth both by philosophers
and theologians ; but of what he calls the triumphs of man, (that is, instances
of the highest perfection which the human faculties, mental or bodily,
have exhibited,) he wishes a collection to be made from history; and gives
a page or two of anecdotes by way of example.

238 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

arts, yet being purged and restored to their true state,
they have both of them a solid ground in nature, and
a profitable use in life. The first is Physiognomy,
which discovereth the disposition of the mind by the
lineaments of the body. The second is the Exposi-
tion of Natural Dreams, which discovereth the state
of the body by the imaginations of the mind. In the
former of these I note a deficience.1 For Aristotle
hath very ingeniously and diligently handled the fac-
tures of the body, but not the gestures of the body,
which are no less comprehensible by art, and of greater
use and advantage. For the Lineaments of the body
do disclose the disposition and inclination of the mind
in general ; but the Motions of the countenance and
parts do not only so, but do further disclose the present
humour and state of the mind and will. For as your
Majesty saith most aptly and elegantly, As the tongue
speakeih to the ear, so the gesture speakeih to the eye.
And therefore a number of subtile persons, whose eyes
do dwell upon the faces and fashions of men, do well
know the advantage of this observation, as being most
part of their ability ; neither can it be denied but that
it is a great discovery of dissimulations, and a great
direction in business.

The latter branch, touching Impression, hath not
been collected into art, but hath been handled dis-
persedly ; and it hath the same relation or antistrophe

1 With regard to the latter, of which nothing more is said here, he ob-
serves in the Be Augmentis that the treatment it has received is full of
follies, and not grounded upon the most solid basis, — which is that when
the same sensation is produced in the sleeper by an internal cause which is
usually the effect of some external act, he will dream of that act; as in
the case of nightmare, where the sensation of oppression on the stomach
created by the fumes of indigestion makes a man dream that his body is
oppressed by a weight superimposed.

THE SECOND BOOK. 239

that the former hath. For the consideration is double:
Either how, and how far the humours and affects 1 of
the body do alter or work upon the mind ; or again,
how and how far the passions or apprehensions of the
mind do alter or work upon the body. The former of
these hath been inquired and considered as a part and
appendix of Medicine, but much more as a part of
Religion or Superstition. For the physician prescrib-
eth cures of the mind in phrensies and melancholy
passions ; and pretendeth also to exhibit medicines to
exhilarate the mind, to confirm the courage, to clarify
the wits, to corroborate the memory, and the like ; but
the scruples and superstitions of diet and other regi-
ment of the body in the sect of the Pythagoreans, in
the heresy of the Manicheans, and in the law of Ma-
homet, do exceed. So likewise the ordinances in the
Ceremonial Law, interdicting the eating of the blood
and the fat, distinguishing between beasts clean and
unclean for meat, are many and strict. Nay the faith
itself being clear and serene from all clouds of Cere-
mony, yet retaineth the use of fastings, abstinences,
and other macerations and humiliations of the body,
as things real, and not figurative.2 The root and life
of all which prescripts is, (besides the ceremony,3) the
consideration of that dependency which the affections
of the mind are submitted unto upon the state and dis-
position of the body. And if any man of weak judg-
ment do conceive that this suffering of the mind from
the body doth either question the immortality or der-
ogate from the sovereignty of the soul, he may be

1 temperamentum. — De Aug.

a tanquam rerum non mere ritualium sed etiam fructuosarum. — De Aug.

8 The translation adds, " and the exercise of obedience."

240 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

taught in easy instances, that the infant in the mother's
womb is compatible with the mother1 and yet separa-
ble ; and the most absolute monarch is sometimes led
by his servants and yet without subjection. As for
the reciprocal knowledge, which is the operation of
the conceits and passions of the mind upon the body,
we see all wise physicians in the prescriptions of their
regiments to their patients do ever consider accidentia
animi, as of great force to further or hinder remedies
or recoveries ; and more specially it is an inquiry of
great depth and worth concerning Imagination, how
and how far it altereth the body proper of the imagi-
nant. For although it hath a manifest power to hurt,
it followeth not it hath the same degree of power to
help ; no more than a man can conclude, that because
there be pestilent airs, able suddenly to kill a man in
health, therefore there should be sovereign airs, able
suddenly to cure a man in sickness. But the inquisi-
tion of this part is of great use, though it needeth, as
Socrates said, a Delian diver, being difficult and pro-
found. But unto all this knowledge de communi vin-
culo, of the concordances between the mind and the
body, that part of inquiiy is most necessary, which
considereth of the seats and domiciles which the sev-
eral faculties of the mind do take and occupate in the
organs of the body ; which knowledge hath been at-
tempted, and is controverted, and deserveth to be
much better enquired. For the opinion of Plato, who
placed the understanding in the brain, animosity (which
he did unfitly call anger, having a greater mixture
with pride) in the heart, and concupiscence or sensuality

l». e. suffers together with the mother: simul cum mairibus affectibut
compatitur.

THE SECOND BOOK. 241

in the liver, deserveth not to be despised ; but much
less to be allowed.1 So then we have constituted (as
in our own wish and advice) the inquiry touching hu-
man nature entire, as a just portion of knowledge to be
handled apart.

^[ 2 The knowledge that concerneth man's body is
divided as the good of man's body is divided, unto
which it referreth. The good of man's body is of
four kinds, Health, Beauty, Strength, and Pleasure :
so the knowledges are Medicine, or art of Cure ; art
of Decoration, which is called Cosmetic ; art of Ac-
tivity, which is called Athletic ; and art Voluptuary,
which Tacitus truly calleth eruditus luxus, [educated
luxury]. This subject of man's body is of all other
things in nature most susceptible of remedy ; but then
that remedy is most susceptible of error. For the
same subtility of the subject doth cause large possi-
bility and easy failing ; and therefore the inquiry ought
to be the more exact.

To speak therefore of Medicine, and to resume that
we have said, ascending a little higher : The ancient
opinion that man was Microcosmus, an abstract or
model of the world, hath been fantastically strained
by Paracelsus and the alchemists, as if there were to
be found in man's body certain correspondences and
parallels, which should have respect to all varieties of
things, as stars, planets, minerals, which are extant in
the great world. But thus much is evidently true,
that of all substances which nature hath produced,
man's body is the most extremely compounded. For

1 Neither (he adds in the translation) is that other arrangement free from
error, which places the several intellectual faculties, Imagination, Reason,
and Memory, in the several ventricles of the brain.

2 De Aug. iv. 2.

VOL. vi. 16

242 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

we see herbs and plants are nourished by earth and
water ; beasts for the most part by herbs and fruits ;
man by the flesh of beasts, birds, fishes, herbs, grains,
fruits, water, and the manifold alterations, dressings,
and preparations of these several bodies, before they
come to be his food and aliment. Add hereunto that
beasts have a more simple order of life, and less change
of affections to work upon their bodies ; whereas man
in his mansion, sleep, exercise, passions, hath infinite
variations ; and it cannot be denied but that the Body
of man of all other things is of the most compounded
mass. The Soul on the other side is the simplest of
substances, as is well expressed,

Purumque reliquit
JEthereum sensum atque aura! simplicis ignem:

[Pure and unmixed
The etherial sense is left — mere air and fire.]

So that it is no marvel though the soul so placed enjoy
no rest, if that principle be true that Motus rerum est
rajridus extra locum, placidus in loco : [things move
rapidly to their place and calmly in their place]. But
to the purpose. This variable composition of man's
body hath made it as an instrument easy to distemper ;
and therefore the poets did well to conjoin Music and
Medicine in Apollo : because the office of medicine is
but to tune this curious harp of Man's body and to
reduce it to harmony. So then the subject being so
variable hath made the art by consequent more con-
jectural ; and the art being conjectural hath made so
much the more place to be left for imposture. For
almost all other arts and sciences are J judged by acts
or masterpieces,2 as I may term them, and not by the

l So edd. 1629 and 1633. The original omits are.
* virlute sua et Junctione. — De Aug.

THE SECOND BOOK. 243

successes and events. The lawyer is judged by the
virtue of his pleading, and not by the issue of the
cause. The master in the ship is judged by the di-
recting his course aright, and not by the fortune of the
voyage. But the physician, and perhaps the politique,
hath no particular acts demonstrative of his ability,
but is judged most by the event ; which is ever but
as it is taken : for who can tell, if a patient die or re-
cover, or if a state be preserved or ruined, whether it
be art or accident ? And therefore many times the
impostor is prized, and the man of virtue taxed. Nay,
we see [the *] weakness and credulity of men is such,
as they will often prefer a montabank 2 or witch before
a learned physician. And therefore the poets were
clear-sighted in discerning this extreme folly, when
they made ^Esculapius and Circe brother and sister,
both children of the sun, as in the verses,

Ipse repertorem medicinas talis et artis
Fulmine Phcebigenam Stygias detrusit ad undas:
[Apollo's son from whom that art did grow
Jove struck with thunder to the shades below].

And again,

Dives inaccessos ubi Solis filia lucos, &c.
[Now by the shelves of Circe's coast they run, —
Circe the rich, the daughter of the sun.8]

For in all times, in the opinion of the multitude,
witches and old women and impostors have had a
competition with physicians. And what followeth ?
Even this, that physicians say to themselves, as Salo-

1 the omitted both in the original and in edd. 1629 and 1633.

2 This is the spelling of the old editions; and ought apparent!}' to be re-
vived by those who believe that our orthography is the guardian of our
etymologies.

8 Dryden. ,

244 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

mon expresseth it upon an higher occasion ; If it befal
to me as befalleth to the fools, why should I labour to be
more wise ? And therefore I cannot much blame phy-
sicians, that they use commonly to intend some other art
or practice, which they fancy, more than their profession.
For you shall have of them antiquaries, poets, human-
ists, statesmen, merchants, divines, and in every of
these better seen than in their profession ; and no
doubt upon this ground, that they find that mediocrity
and excellency in their art maketh no difference in
profit or reputation towards their fortune ; for the
weakness of patients and sweetness of life and nature
of hope * maketh men depend upon physicians with all
their defects. But nevertheless these things which we
have spoken of are courses begotten between a little
occasion and a great deal of sloth and default ; for if
we will excite and awake our observation, we shall see
in familiar instances what a predominant faculty the
subtilty of spirit2 hath over the variety of matter or
form. Nothing more variable than faces and coun-
tenances ; yet men can bear in memory the infinite
distinctions of them ; nay, a painter with a few shells
of colours, and the benefit of his eye and habit of his
imagination, can imitate them all that ever have been,
are, or may be, if they were brought before him.
Nothing more variable than voices ; yet men can like-
wise discern them personally ; nay, you shall have a
buff on or pantomimus will express as many as he pleas-
eth. Nothing more variable than the differing sounds
of words ; yet men have found the way to reduce
them to a few simple letters. So that it is not the

1 The translation adds et amicorum commendatio.

3 i. e. of the understanding: inteUectus subtilitas et acumen.

THE SECOND BOOK. 245

insufficiency or incapacity of man's mind, but it is the
remote standing or placing thereof, that breedeth these
mazes and incomprehensions : for as the sense afar
off is full of mistaking but is exact at hand, so is it
of the understanding ; the remedy whereof is not to
quicken or strengthen the organ, but to go nearer to
the object ; and therefore there is no doubt but if the
physicians will learn and use the true approaches and
avenues of nature, they may assume as much as the
poet saith :

Et quoniam variant morbi, variabimus artes;
Mille mali species, mille salutis erunt:

[varying their arts according to the variety of diseases,
— for a thousand forms of sickness a thousand methods
of cure]. Which that they should do, the nobleness
of their art doth deserve ; well shadowed by the poets,
in that they made -lEsculapius to be the son of the Sun,
the one being the fountain of life, the other as the
second stream ; but infinitely more honoured by the
example of our Saviour, who made the body of man
the object of his miracles, as the soul was the object
of his doctrine. For we read not that ever he vouch-
safed to do any miracle about honour, or money (ex-
cept that one for giving tribute to Caesar), but only
about the preserving, sustaining, and healing the body
of man.

Medicine is a science which hath been (as we have
said) more professed than laboured, and yet more
laboured than advanced ; the labour having been, in
my judgment, rather in circle than in progression.
For I find much iteration, but small addition. It con-
sidered causes of diseases, with the occasions or impul-
sions ; the diseases themselves, with the accidents ; and

246 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

the cures, with the preservations.1 The deficiencies
which I think good to note, being a few of many, and
those such as are of a more open and manifest nature,
I will enumerate, and not place.

The first is the discontinuance of the ancient and
Nanationes seri°us diligence of Hippocrates, which used
medtcmaies. to gej. <]own a narrative of the special cases of
his patients, and how they proceeded, and how they
were judged by recovery or death. Therefore having
an example proper in the father of the art, I shall not
need to allege an example foreign, of the wisdom of
the lawyers, who are careful to report new cases and
decisions for the direction of future judgments. This
continuance of Medicinal History I find deficient ; which
I understand neither to be so infinite as to extend to
every common case, nor so reserved as to admit none
but wonders : for many things are new in the manner,
which are not new in the kind ; and if men will intend
to observe, they shall find much worthy to observe.

In the inquiry which is made by Anatomy I find
Anatomi* much deficience : for they inquire of the
comparata. parts, and their substances, figures, and col-
locations; but they inquire not of the diversities of the
parts,2 the secrecies of the passages, and the seats or

1 Here the translation departs 'widely from the original. The parts, or
offices, into which Medicine is divided in the De Aue/mentis are: I. the
preservation of health; 2. the cure of diseases; 3. the prolongation of life:
with regard to the first of which Bacon complains that physicians have
treated it in several respects unskilfully or imperfectly; and with regain
to the last that they have not recognised the prolongation of natural life
as a principal part of their science, being satisfied if they can prevent it
from being shortened by diseases. Under the second he includes the whole
doctrine of diseases, — the causes, the symptoms, and the remedies, all in
fact that is here included under the general head of Medicine, — and so
strikes again into the text.

2 t. e. they inquire of the parts, &c, of the human bod}' in general, but

THE SECOND BOOK. 247

nestling of the humours, nor much of the footsteps and
impressions of diseases : the reason of which omission
I suppose to be, because the first inquiry may be satis-
fied in the view of one or a few anatomies ; but the
latter, being comparative and casual, must arise from
the view of many. And as to the diversity of parts,
there is no doubt but the facture or framing of the in-
ward parts is as full of difference as the outward, and
in that is the cause continent of many diseases ; which
not being observed, they quarrel many times with the
humours, which are not in fault ; the fault being in
the very frame and mechanic of the part, which can-
not be removed by medicine alterative, but must be
accommodate and palliate by diets and medicines fa-
miliar. And for the passages and pores, it is true
which was anciently noted, that the more subtle of
them appear not in anatomies, because they are shut
and latent in dead bodies, though they be open and
manifest in live : which being supposed, though the
inhumanity of anatomia vivorum [anatomy of the liv-
ing subject] was by Celsus justly reproved ; yet in
regard of the1 great use of this observation, the in-
quiry needed not by him so slightly to have been re-
linquished altogether, or referred to the casual practices
of surgery ; but might have been well diverted upon
the dissection of beasts alive, which notwithstanding
the dissimilitude of their parts, may sufficiently satisfy
this inquiry. And for the humours, they are com-
monly passed over in anatomies as purgaments ; where-
as it is most necessary to observe what cavities, nests,

not of the diversities of the parts in different bodies, — of simple, but not
of comparative, anatomy. This whole paragraph is much enlarged in the
translation, and the order changed.

1 So edd. 1629 and 1633. The original omits the.

248 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

and receptacles the humours do find in the parts, with
the differing kind of the humour so lodged and re-
ceived. And as for the footsteps of diseases, and their
devastations of the inward parts, imposthumations, ex-
ulcerations, discontinuations, putrefactions, consump-
tions, contractions, extensions, convulsions, dislocations,
obstructions, repletions, together with all preternatural
substances, as stones, camosities, excrescences, worms,
and the like ; they ought to have been exactly observed
by multitude of anatomies and the contribution of
men's several experiences, and carefully set down both
historically according to the appearances, and artificial-
ly with a reference to the diseases and symptoms which
resulted from them, in case where the anatomy is of a
defunct patient ; whereas now upon opening of bodies
they are passed over slightly and in silence.

In the inquiry of diseases, they do abandon the
inquintio cures of many, some as in their nature
MrntZin- incurable, and others as past the period of
*" ' cure ; so that Sylla and the triumvirs never
proscribed so many men to die, as they do by their
ignorant edicts ; whereof l numbers do escape with
less difficulty than they did in the Roman proscrip-
tions. Therefore I will not doubt to note as a defi-
cience, that they inquire not the perfect cures of
many diseases, or extremities of diseases, but pro-
nouncing them incurable do enact a law of neglect,
and exempt ignorance from discredit.

Nay further, I esteem it the office of a physician
De Euthana- not only to restore health, but to mitigate
sia txtmore. ^n anfj Colors ; and not only when such
mitigation may conduce to recovery, but when it

1 *'. e. of whom nevertheless : quorum lamen plurimi <f c. — De Aug.

THE SECOND BOOK. 249

may serve to make a fair and easy passage : for
it is no small felicity which Augustus Ca3sar was
wont to wish to himself, that same Euthanasia; and
which was specially noted in the death of Antoni-
nus Pius, whose death was after the fashion and sem-
blance of a kindly and pleasant sleep. So it is writ-
ten of Epicurus, that after his disease was judged
desperate, he drowned his stomach and senses with
a large draught and ingurgitation of wine ; where-
upon the epigram was made, Hinc stygias ebrius hau-
sit aquas: he was not sober enough to taste any
bitterness of the Stygian water. But the physicians
contrariwise do make a kind of scruple and religion
to stay with the patient after the disease is deplored ;
whereas, in my judgment, they ought both to enquire
the skill and to give the attendances for the facilitat-
ing and assuaging of the pains and agonies of death.
In the consideration of the Cures of diseases, I
find a deficience in the receipts of proprie- Medicina Ex.
ty respecting the particular cures of dis- PmmentaUa-
eases : 1 for the physicians have frustrated the fruit
of tradition and experience by their magistracies, in
adding and taking out and changing quid pro quo
in their receipts, at their pleasures ; commanding so
)ver the medicine as the medicine cannot command
over the disease. For except it be treacle and mith-
ridatum, and of late diascordium? and a few more,
they tie themselves to no receipts severely and reli-
giously : for as to the confections of sale which are
in the shops, they are for readiness and not for pro-

1 i. e. the particular medicines proper for particular diseases, as distin-
guished from "general intentions."

2 In the translation he adds " the confection of Alkermes."

250 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

priety ; for they are upon general intentions of purg-
ing, opening, comforting, altering, and not much ap-
propriate to particular diseases : and this is the cause
why empirics and old women are more happy many
times in their cures than learned physicians, because they
are more religious in holding their medicines. There-
fore here is the deficience which I find, that physi-
cians have not, partly out of their own practice,
partly out of the constant probations reported in books,
and partly out of the traditions of empirics, set down
and delivered over certain experimental medicines for
the cure of particular diseases, besides their own con-
jectural and magistral descriptions. For as they were
the men of the best composition in the state of Rome,
which either being consuls inclined to the people, or
being tribunes inclined to the senate ; so in the mat-
ter we now handle, they be the best physicians, which
being learned incline to the traditions of experience,
or being empirics incline to the methods of learning.
In preparation of Medicines, I do find strange,
jmitatioNa- specially considering how mineral medicines
neisetAquL have been extolled, and that they are safer
bus. for the outward than inward parts, that no

man hath sought to make an imitation by art of
Natural Baths and Medicinable Fountains ; which nev-
ertheless are confessed to receive their virtues from
minerals : and not so only, but discerned and distin-
guished from what particular mineral they receive
tincture, as sulphur, vitriol, steel, or the like ; which
nature if it may be reduced to compositions of art,
both the variety of them will be increased, and the
temper of them will be more commanded.1

1 So edd. 1629 and 1633. The original has commended.

THE SECOND BOOK. 251

But lest I grow to be more particular than is
agreeable either to my intention or to pro- Filum Medi.
portion, I will conclude this part with the cJl^SMedt
note of one deficience more, which seemeth nnarum-
to me of greatest consequence ; which is, that the
prescripts in use are too compendious to attain their
end : for, to my understanding, it is a vain and flat-
tering opinion to think any medicine can be so sov-
ereign or so happy, as that the receit or use of it
can work any great effect upon the body of man.
It were a strange speech which spoken, or spoken
oft, should reclaim a man from a vice to which he
were by nature subject. It is order, pursuit, sequence,
and interchange of application, which is mighty in
nature ; which although it require more exact knowl-
edge in prescribing and more precise obedience in
observing, yet is recompensed with the magnitude
of effects. And although a man would think, by
the daily visitations of the physicians, that there
were a pursuance in the cure ; yet let a man look
into their prescripts and ministrations, and he shall
find them but inconstancies and every day's devices,
without any settled providence or project. Not that
every scrupulous or superstitious prescript is effectual,
no more than every straight way is the way to heaven ;
but the truth of the direction must precede severity of
observance.1

1 The latter part of this paragraph is considerably enlarged in the trans-
lation, rather however by way of explanation than addition, till he comes
to the end; when in closing his account of the Desiderata in the science of
curing diseases, he adds that there is however one other remaining which is
of more consequence than all the rest — namely that of a true and active
Natural Philosophy for the Science of Medicine to be built upon.

Between this paragraph and the next is interposed a long passage upon
the prolongation of life, of which there are no traces at all here.

252 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

For Cosmetic, it hath parts civil, and parts effemi-
nate : for cleanness of body was ever esteemed to
proceed from a due reverence to God, to society, and
to ourselves.1 As for artificial decoration, it is well
worthy of the deficiencies which it hath ; being neither
fine enough to deceive, nor handsome to use, nor
wholesome to please.2

For Athletic, I take the subject of it largely ; that
is to say, for any point of ability whereunto the body
of man may be brought, whether it be of activity or of
patience ; whereof activity hath two parts, strength and
swiftness; and patience likewise hath two parts, hard-
ness against wants and extremities, and indurance of
pain or torment : whereof we see the practices in
tumblers, in savages,3 and in those that suffer punish-
ment : nay, if there be any other faculty which falls
not within any of the former divisions, as in those that
dive, that obtain a strange power of containing respira-
tion, and the like, I refer it to this part. Of these
things the practices are known, hut the philosophy that
concerneth them is not much enquired ; the rather, I
think, because they are supposed to be obtained either
by an aptness of nature, which cannot be taught, or
only by continual custom, which is soon prescribed ;
which though it be not true, yet I forbear to note any

1 To whom (he adds in the translation) we owe no less reverence — nay
even more — than to others. So in the New Atlantis, " and they say («". e.
the people of Bensalem) that the reverence of a man's self is, next to Relig-
ion, the chiefest bridle of all vices."

2 So all the editions. He must have means to write, " handsome to
please, nor wholesome to use."

By artificial decoration he means painting the face, as we learn from the
translation; where he expresses wonder that this prava consuetudo fucantS
is not prohibited by the laws, along with sumptuous apparel and lovelocks.

8 The translation adds " in the stupendous strength shown by maniacs."

THE SECOND BOOK. 253

deficiencies ; for the Olympian Games are down long
since, and the mediocrity of these things is for use ; as
for the excellency of them, it serveth for the most part
but for mercenary ostentation.

For Arts of Pleasure Sensual, the chief deficience in
them is of laws to repress them.1 For as it hath been
well observed that the arts which flourish in times
while virtue is in growth, are military ; and while vir-
tue is in state, are liberal ; and while virtue is in
declination, are voluptuary ; so I doubt that this age
of the world is somewhat upon the descent of the
wheel. With arts voluptuary I couple practices joeu-
lary ; for the deceiving of the senses is one of the
pleasures of the senses. As for games of recreation,
I hold them to belong to civil life and education.2

1 Here we have an important addition in the translation. Whether when
he wrote the Advancement of Learning Bacon had forgotten Painting and
Music or meant to find another place for them, I cannot say; but in the De
Augmentis he includes them among the Artes Voluptarice ; which he cannot
have intended to do when he wrote this sentence. The passage in which
they are introduced is to this effect: — The arts of pleasure, he says, are as
many as the senses themselves are. To the eye belongs Painting, with in-
numerable other arts of magnificence in matter of Buildings, Gardens,
Dresses, Vases, Gems, &c. ; to the ear Music, with its various apparatus of
voices, wind, and strings; and of all the sensual arts those which relate
to Sight and Hearing are accounted the most liberal ; for as these two
senses are the purest and most chaste, so the sciences which belong to them
are the most learned ; both being waited upon by the Mathematics, and one
having some relation to memory and demonstrations, the other to manners
and affections of the mind. The rest of the sensual pleasures, with the
arts appertaining to them, are held in less honour, as being nearer akin to
luxury and magnificence. Unguents, perfumes, delicacies of the table, and
especially stimulants of lust, stand more in need of a censor to repress than
a master to teach them; and as it has been well observed, &c.

2 This observation is omitted in the translation ; and a new paragraph is
introduced, stating that everything which relates to the body of man
(though there be some which do not properly belong to either of the three
offices above mentioned, viz. the preservation of health, the cure of diseases
and the prolongation of life) is to be considered as included in Medicine.

254 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

And thus much of that particular Human Philosophy
which concerns the Body, which is but the tabernacle
of the mind.

^[ * For Hiiman Knowledge which concerns the
Mind, it hath two parts ; the one that enquireth of the
substance or nature of the soul or mind, the other that
enquireth of the faculties or functions thereof. Unto
the first of these, the considerations of the original of
the soul, whether it be native or adventive, and how far
it is exempted from laws of matter, and of the immortal- *
ity Hiereof, and many other points, do appertain : winch
have been not more laboriously enquired than variously
reported ; so as the travail therein taken seemeth to
have been rather in a maze than in a wav. But al-
though I am of opinion that this knowledge may be
more really and soundly enquired, even in nature, than
it hath been ; yet I hold that in the end it must be
bounded by religion, or else it will be subject to deceit
and delusion ; for as the substance of the soul in the
creation was not extracted out of the mass of heaven
and earth by the benediction of a producat, but was
immediately inspired from God ; so it is not possible
that it should be (otherwise than by accident) subject
to the laws of heaven and earth, which are the subject of
philosophy ; and therefore the true knowledge of the
nature and state of the soul, must come by the same
inspiration that gave the substance.2 Unto this part

1 De Aug. iv. 3.

2 In the translation a new division is introduced which does not appear
to be distinctly recognized here — the human soul being divided into Ra-
tional and Irrational; the one divine and peculiar to humanity, the other
(which is merely its instrument) being of the earth and common to man
and brute ; and the remark in the text is confined to the first of these only.

THE SECOND BOOK. 255

of knowledge touching the soul there be two appen-
dices ; which, as they have been handled, have rather
vapoured forth fables than kindled truth ; Divination
and Fascination.

Divination hath been anciently and fitly divided into
artificial and natural; whereof artificial is when the
mind maketh a prediction by argument, concluding
upon signs and tokens ; natural is when the mind hath
a presention by an internal power, without the induce-
ment of a sign. Artificial is of two sorts ; either when
the argument is coupled with a derivation of causes,
which is rational ; or when it is only grounded upon a
coincidence of the effect, which is experimental : where-
of the later for the most part is superstitious ; such as
were the heathen observations upon the inspection of
sacrifices, the flights of birds, the swarming of bees ;
and such as was the Chaldean Astrology, and the like.
For artificial divination, the several kinds thereof are
distributed amongst particular knowledges. The As-
tronomer hath his predictions, as of conjunctions,
aspects, eclipses, and the like. The Physician hath his
predictions, of death, of recovery, of the accidents and
issues of diseases. The Politique hath his predictions ;
0 urbem venalem, et cito perituram, si emptorem in~
venerit ! [a city in which all things are for sale and
which will fall to the first purchaser,] which stayed
not long to be performed, in Sylla first, and after in
Caesar. So as these predictions are now jmpertinent,
and to be referred over. But the divination which

The other soul, which he Galls the anima sensibilis sive producta,, is repre-
sented as a fit subject of physical enquiry, in its nature and substance as
well as in its faculties; though the enquiry has not been well pursued with
regard to either. Concerning the doctrine of the Duality of the Soul see
Mr. Ellis's General Introduction, § 14.

256 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

springeth from the internal nature of the soul, is that
which we now speak of; which hath been made to be
of two sorts, primitive and by influxixm. Primitive is
grounded upon the supposition that the mind, when it
is withdrawn and collected into itself and not diffused
into the organs of the body, hath some extent and lat-
itude of prenotion ; which therefore appeareth most in
sleep, in extasies, and near death ; and more rarely in
waking apprehensions ; and is induced and furthered
by those abstinences and observances which make the
mind most to consist in itself. By influxion, is grounded
upon the conceit that the mind, as a mirror or glass,
should take illumination from the foreknowledge of
God and spirits ; unto which the same regiment doth
likewise conduce. For the retiring of the mind within
itself is the state which is most susceptible of divine in-
fluxions ; save that it is accompanied in this case with
a fervency and elevation (which the ancients noted by
fury), and not with a repose and quiet, as it is in the
other.

Fascination is the power and act of imagination, in-
tensive upon other bodies than the body of the imagi-
nant : for of that we spake in the proper place : wherein
the school of Paracelsus and the disciples of pretended
Natural Magic have been so intemperate, as they have
exalted the power of the imagination to be much one
with the power of miracle-working faith ; others that
draw nearer to probability, calling to their view the
secret passages of things, and especially of the conta-
gion that passeth from body to body,1 do conceive it
should likewise be agreeable to nature that there should

i In the translation he adds " the irradiations of the senses, and the con-
veyance of magnetic virtues."

THE SECOND BOOK. 257

be some transmissions and operations from spirit to
spirit, without the mediation of the senses ; whence the
conceits have grown (now almost made civil) of the
Mastering Spirit, and the force of confidence, and the
like. Incident unto this is the inquiry how to raise and
fortify the imagination ; for if the imagination fortified
have power, then it is material to know how to fortify
and exalt it. And herein comes in crookedly and dan-
gerously a palliation of a great part of Ceremonial
Magic. For it may be pretended that Ceremonies,
Characters, and Charms, do work not by any tacit or
sacramental contract with evil spirits, but serve only to
strengthen the imagination of him that useth it ; as
images are said by the Roman church 1 to fix the cogi-
tations and raise the devotions of them that pray before
them. But for mine own judgment, if it be admitted
that imagination hath power, and that Ceremonies for-
tify imagination, and that they be used sincerely and
intentionally for that purpose ; 2 yet I should hold them
unlawful, as opposing to that first edict which God
gave unto man, In sudore vultus comedes panem tuum,
[in the sweat of thy brow shalt thou eat bread]. For
they propound those noble effects which God hath set
forth unto man to be bought at the price of labour, to
be attained by a few easy and slothful observances.
Deficiences in these knowledges I will report none,
other than the general deficience, that it is not known
how much of them is verity and how much vanity.3

1 In the translation, the words " said by the Roman church " are omitted,
and in Reliyione usus imaginum .... invaluit are substituted. See note
p. 109.

2 i. e. as a physical remedy, without any thought of inviting thereby the
assistance of spirits, — as explained in the translation.

8 This sentence is omitted in the translation altogether ; and the chapter

VOL. vi. 17

258 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

^f1 The knowledge which respecteth the Faculties
of the Mind of man is of two kinds ; the one respect-
ing his Understanding and Reason, and the other his
Will, Appetite, and Affection ; whereof the former
produceth Position or Decree, the later Action or Exe-
cution. It is true that the Imagination is an agent or
nunciu8 in both provinces, both the judicial and the
ministerial. For Sense sendeth over to Imagination
before Reason have judged : and Reason sendeth over to
Imagination before the Decree can be acted ; for Imag-
ination ever precedeth Voluntary Motion : saving that
this Janus of Imagination hath differing faces ; for the
face towards Reason hath the print of Truth, but the
face towards Action hath the print of Good ; which nev-
ertheless are faces,

Quales decet esse sororum, —
[sister-faces]. Neither is the Imagination simply and
only a messenger ; but is invested with or at leastwise
usurpeth no small authority in itself, besides the duty
of the message. For it was well said by Aristotle,
That the mind hath over the body that commandment,
which the lord hath over a bondman ; but that reason hath
over the imagination that commandment which a magis-
trate hath over a free citizen ; who may come also to
rule in his turn. For we see that in matters of Faith
and Religion we raise our Imagination above our Rea-
son ; 2 which is the cause why Religion sought ever
access to the mind by similitudes, types, parables, vis-
concludes with a notice at considerable length of two Desiderata not men-
tioned here; the doctrine of Voluntary Motion, and the doctrine of Sense
and the Sensible.

1 De Aug. v. 1.

2 Not. (he adds in the translation,) that the divine illumination resides in
the Imagination, — its seat being rather in the very citadel of the mind aud

THE SECOND BOOK. 259

ions, dreams. And again in all persuasions that are
wrought by eloquence and other impression of like
nature, which do paint and disguise the true appear-
ance of things, the chief recommendation unto Reason is
from the Imagination.1 Nevertheless, because I find not
any science that doth properly or fitly pertain to the
Imagination, I see no cause to alter the former division.
For as for Poesy, it is rather a pleasure or play of im-
agination, than a work or duty thereof. And if it be
a work, we speak not now of such parts of learning as
the Imagination produceth, but of such sciences as
handle and consider of the Imagination ; no more than
we shall speak now of such knowledges as Reason pro-
duceth, (for that extendeth to all philosophy,) but of
such knowledges as do handle and inquire of the fac-
ulty of Reason : so as Poesy had his true place.2 As
for the power of the Imagination in nature, and the
manner of fortifying the same, we have mentioned it
in the doctrine De Anima, whereunto most fitly it be-
longeth. And lastly, for Imaginative or Insinuative
Reason, which is the subject of Rhetoric, we think it

understanding; — but that the divine grace uses the motions of the Imagina-
tion as an instrument of illumination, just as it uses the motions of the will
as an instrument of virtue.

1 This is better explained in the translation ; where it is observed that
the arts of speech by which men's minds are soothed, inflamed, or carried
away, consist in exciting the Imagination till it gets the better of the
Reason.

2 This whole sentence is omitted in the translation ; the reason for not
altering the former division being stated simply thus: Nam Phantasia
scittitins fere non pant ; siquidem Poesis (qua> a principio Phantasies attri-
buta est) pro lusu potius ingenii quam pro scientia habenda. Poesy, which
belongs properly to Imagination, is not to be considered as a part of knoicl-
edge ; and the two other offices of the Imagination belong, one to the doc-
trine de anima, the other to Rhetoric. There is no occasion therefore to
make a place for Imagination among the parts of knowledge which concern
the faculties of the human mind.

260 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

best to refer it to the Arts of Reason. So therefore
we content ourselves with the former division, that
Human Philosophy which respecteth the faculties of
the mind of man hath two parts, Rational and Moral.

The part of Human Philosophy which is rational, is
of all knowledges, to the most wits, the least delightful ;
and seemeth but a net of subtility and spinosity. For
as it was truly said, that knowledge is pabulum animi,
[the food of the mind ;] so in the nature of men's ap-
petite to this food, most men are of the taste and
stomach of the Israelites in the desert, that would fain
have returned ad ollas carnium, [to the flesh-pots,] and
were weary of manna ; which, though it were celestial,
yet seemed less nutritive and comfortable. So gener-
ally men taste well knowledges that are drenched in
flesh and blood, Civil History, Morality, Policy, about
the which men's affections, praises, fortunes, do turn
and are conversant ; but this same lumen siccum, [this
dry light,] doth parch and offend most men's watery
and soft natures. But to speak truly of things as they
are in worth, Rational Knowledges are the keys of all
other arts ; for as Aristotle saith aptly and elegantly,
That the hand is the Instrument of Instruments, and the
mind is the Form of Forms : so these be truly said to
be the Art of Arts : neither do they only direct, but
likewise confirm and strengthen ; even as the habit of
shooting doth not only enable to shoot a nearer shoot,
but also to draw a stronger bow.

The Arts Intellectual are four in number; divided
according to the ends whereunto they are referred : for
man's labour is to invent 1 that which is sought or pro-

1 It may perhaps be worth while to observe that Bacon uses the word
invent simply as equivalent to invenire — to find out.

THE SECOND BOOK. 261

pounded ; or to judge that which is invented; or to re-
tain that which is judged ; or to deliver over that which
is retained. So as the arts must be four ; Art of In-
quiry or Invention : Art of Examination or Judgment ;
Art of Custody or Memory ; and Art of Elocution or
Tradition.

^[ * Invention is of two kinds, much differing ; the
one, of Arts and Sciences ; and the other, of Speech
and Arguments. The former of these I do report de-
ficient ; which seemeth to me to be such a deficience
as if in the making of an inventory touching the estate
of a defunct it should be set down that there is no ready
money. For as money will fetch all other commodities,
so this knowledge is that which should purchase all the
rest. And like as the West-Indies had never been dis-
covered if the use of the mariner's needle had not
been first discovered, though the one be vast regions
and the other a small motion ; so it cannot be found
strange if sciences be no further discovered, if the
art itself of invention and discovery hath been passed
over.

That this part of knowledge is wanting, to my judg-
ment standeth plainly confessed : for first, Logic doth
not pretend to invent Sciences or the Axioms of Sci-
ences, but passeth it over with a cuique in sua arte cre-
dendum, [the knowledge that pertains to each art must
be taken on trust from those that profess it]. And
Celsus acknowledgeth it 2 gravely, speaking of the
empirical and dogmatical sects of physicians, That med-
icines and cures were first found out, and then after the
reasons and causes were discoursed ; and not the causes
first found out, and by light from them the medicines and
1 De Aug. v. 2. 2 See note on Nov. Org. i. 73.

262 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

cures discovered. And Plato in his Theaetetus 1 noteth
well, That particulars are infinite, and the higher gener-
alities give no sufficient direction ; and that the pith of
all sciences, which maketh the arts-man differ from the
inexpert, is in the middle propositions, which in every par-
ticular knowledge are taken from tradition and experience.
And therefore we see that they which discourse of the
inventions and originals of things, refer them rather to
chance than to art, and rather to beasts, birds, fishes,
serpents, than to men.

Dictaranum genetrix Cretaea carpit ab Ida,
Puberibus caulem foliis et flore comantera
Purpureo: non ilia feris incognita capris
Gramina, cum tergo volucres hsesere sagittse.
[A sprig of dittany his mother brought,
Gathered by Cretan Ide; a stalk it is
Of woolly leaf, crested with purple flower;
Which well the wild-goat knows when in his side
Sticks the winged shaft.]

So that it was no marvel (the manner of antiquity be-
ing to consecrate inventors) that the ^Egyptians had
so few human idols in their temples, but almost all
brute :

Omnigenumque Deum monstra, et latrator Annbis,
Contra Neptunum et Venerem, contraque Minervam, &c.
[All kinds and shapes of Gods, a monstrous host,
The dog Anubis foremost, stood arrayed
'Gainst Neptune, Venus, Pallas, &c]

And if you like better the tradition of the Grecians,
and ascribe the first inventions to men, yet you will
rather believe that Prometheus first struck the flints,
and marvelled at the spark, than that when he first
struck the flints he expected the spark ; and there-

1 Instead of " Plato in his Thecetetus noteth " the translation has Plato
non semel innuit. See note Vol. II. p. 363.

THE SECOXD BOOK. 263

fore we see the "West-Indian Prometheus had no in-
telligence with the European, because of the rareness
with them of flint, that gave the first occasion.1 So
as it should seem that hitherto men are rather be-
holden to a wild goat for surgery, or to a nightingale
for music, or to the Ibis for some part of physic,2 or to
the pot lid that flew open for artillery, or generally to
chance or any thing else, than to Logic, for the inven-
tion of arts and sciences. Neither is the form of in-
vention which Virgil describeth much other :

1 This curious passage, which is omitted in the De Augmentis, must refer
to what Bacon had read in Hamusio of the way in which the natives of the
West Indian islands kindled their fires, by rubbing pieces of wood to-
gether. Several passages in Bacon's writings show that he was a reader
of Hamusio. See Kamusio, vol. iii. p. 103. a. for Oviedo's description of
the method.

In reality the coincidence between the customary mode of kindling fire
in the West Indies and the superstitious usages of Europe is remarkable.
The latter seem to point back to a time when the use of steel and flint was
unknown. The Noth-feuer of the Germans was kindled by rubbing pieces
of wood together. This fire, originally connected with the worship of Fro,
was lighted when cattle were threatened with murrain, and they were made
to pass through it. Dr. Jamieson in his Scottish Dictionary mentions pre-
cisely the same practice at a comparatively recent period in Scotland in a
case in which the murrain had done great mischief. The long continuance
of this practice is a sort of illustration of Spinosa's bitter remark that
Superstition is the child of Adversity, there being no man, he observes,
who in prosperity does not think himself wise enough to take care of him-
self. See Spinosa, Tract. Theol. Politicus, chap. i. : and for the German
superstition Wolf's Die Deutsche Gotterlehre, pp. 27. 83.

The holy fire of Vesta, according to Festus (in voce Ignis), was rekindled
when it had been allowed to go out, by friction of two pieces of wood.
Plutarch's statement that the rays of the sun concentrated by reflexion
were employed for the purpose seems improbable, and is apparently founded
on a misconception or mistranslation of some earlier account of the matter.
Pliny mentions, but without reference to Vesta, this mode of kindling fire,
and states that the best combination is laurel wood with ivy. — R. L. E.

It is worth observing that though the passage in the text is omitted in
the De Augmentis, the substance of it is retained in the Cogitata et Visa.
Nam ideo in ignis invenio Prometheum Nova: India! ab Europao dissensisse,
quod aptid eos silicis non est copia. — J. S.

2 pro lavationibus intestinorum. — De Aug.

264 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

TJt varias usus meditando extunderet artes
Paulatim :

[that practice with meditation might by degrees ham-
mer out the arts]. For if you observe the words well,
it is no other method than that which brute beasts are
capable of, and do put in ure ; which is a perpetual
intending or practising some one thing, urged and im-
posed by an absolute necessity of conservation of being :
for so Cicero saith very truly, Usus uni rei deditus et
•aaturam et artem scepe vincit : [practice applied con-
stantly to one thing will often do more than either na-
ture or art can] . And therefore if it be said of men,

Labor omnia vincit
Improbus, et duris urgens in rebus egestas,
[Stern labour masters all,
And want in poverty importunate,]

it is likewise said of beasts, Quis psittaco docuit suum
Xatpe ? [who taught the parrot to say how d'ye do ?]
Who taught the raven in a drowth to throw pebbles
into an hollow tree where she spied water, that the
water might rise so as she might come to it ? Who
taught the bee to sail through such a vast sea of air,
and to find the way from a field in flower a great way
off to her hive ? Who taught the ant to bite every
grain of corn that she burieth in her hill, lest it should
take root and grow ? Add then the word extundert^
which importeth the extreme difficulty, and the word
paulatim, which importeth the extreme slowness, and
we are where we were, even amongst the ^Egyptians'
gods ; there being little left to the faculty of Reason,
and nothing to the duty of Art, for matter of inven-
tion.

Secondly, the induction which the logicians speak of,

THE SECOND BOOK. 265

and which seemeth familiar with Plato,1 whereby the
Principles of sciences may be pretended to be invented,
and so the middle propositions by derivation from the
principles, — their form of induction, I say, is utterly
vicious and incompetent : wherein their error is the
fouler, because it is the duty of Art to perfect and
exalt Nature ; but they contrariwise have wronged,
abused, and traduced nature. For he that shall at-
tentively observe how the mind doth gather this ex-
cellent dew of knowledge, like unto that which the
poet speaketh of, Aerei mellis coelestia dona, [the gift
of heaven, aerial honey,] distilling and contriving it
out of particulars natural and artificial, as the flowers
of the field and garden, shall find that the mind of
herself by nature doth manage and act an induction
much better than they describe it. For to conclude
upon an enumeration of particulars without instance con-
tradictory is no conclusion, but a conjecture ; for who
can assure (in many subjects) upon those particulars
which appear of a side, that there are not other on
the contrary side which appear not ? As if Samuel
should have rested upon those sons of Issay 2 which
were brought before him, and failed of David, which
was in the field. And this form (to say truth) is so
gross, as it had not been possible for wits so subtile as
have managed these things to have offered it to the
world, but that they hasted to their theories and dog-
maticals, and were imperious and scornful toward par-
ticulars ; which their manner was to use but as lictores

1 This reference to Plato is omitted in the translation, as well as the
allusion to the derivation of the middle propositions. The induction in
question is merely described as " the form of induction which Logic pro-
poses, whereby to discover and prove the principles of sciences."

2 So in all three editions. The De Augmentis has hai.

266 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

and tiatores, for sergeants and whifflers, ad summoven-
dam turbam, to make way and make room for their
opinions, rather than in their true use and service.
Certainly it is a thing may touch a man with a re-
ligious wonder, to see how the footsteps of seducement
are the very same in divine and human truth : for as
in divine truth man cannot endure to become as a
child ; so in human, they reputed the attending the
Inductions (whereof we speak) as if it were a second
infancy or childhood.

Thirdly, allow some Principles or Axioms were
rightly induced, yet nevertheless certain it is that
Middle Propositions cannot be deduced from them
in subject of nature l by Syllogism, that is, by touch
and reduction of them to principles in a middle term.
It is true that in sciences popular, as moralities, laws,
and the like, yea and divinity (because it pleaseth God
to apply himself to the capacity of the simplest), that
form may have use ; and in natural philosophy like-
wise, by way of argument or satisfactory reason, qua?
assensum parity operis effosta est, [which procures as-
sent but can do no work :] but the subtilty of nature
and opei*ations will not be enchained in those bonds:
for Arguments consist of Propositions, and Propositions
of Words ; and Words are but the current tokens or
marks of Popular Notions of things ; which notions,
if they be grossly and variably collected out of par-
ticulars, it is not the laborious examination either of
consequences of arguments or of the truth of proposi-
tions, that can ever correct that error ; being (as the
physicians speak) in the first digestion : and therefore
it was not without cause, that so many excellent phi-

1 in rebus naturalibus, qua participant ex materia. — De Aug

THE SECOND BOOK. 267

losophers became Sceptics and Academics, and denied
any certainty of knowledge or comprehension, and held
opinion that the knowledge of man extended only to
appearances and probabilities. It is true that in Soc-
rates it was supposed to be but a form of irony, Sci-
entiam dissimulando simidavit, [an affectation of knowl-
edge under pretence of ignorance :] for he used to
disable his knowledge, to the end to enhance his
knowledge ; 1 like the humour of Tiberius in his be-
ginnings, that would reign, but would not acknowl-
edge so much ; 2 and in the later Academy, which
Cicero embraced, this opinion also of acatalepsia (I
doubt) was not held sincerely : for that all those which
excelled in copie of speech seem to have chosen that
sect, as that which was fittest to give glory to their
eloquence and variable discourses ; being rather like
progresses of pleasure than journeys to an end. But
assuredly many scattered in both Academies did hold
it in subtilty and integrity. But here was their chief
error ; they charged the deceit upon the Senses ; which
in my judgment (notwithstanding all their cavillations)
are very sufficient to certify and report truth, though
not always immediately, yet by comparison,3 by help
of instrument, and by producing and urging such
things as are too subtile for the sense to some effect
comprehensible by the sense, and other like assistance.
But they ought to have charged the deceit upon the
weakness 4 of the intellectual powers, and upon the man-

1 i. e. pretended not to know what it was plain he knew, that he might
be thought to know likewise what he knew not — renunciando scilicet Us
qua manifesto sciebat ut to modo ea etiam qua nesciebat scire putaretur.

2 This allusion to Tiberius is omitted in the translation.
8 There is nothing about comparison in the translation.

4 In the translation he adds contumacy — turn erroribus turn contumacies
{qua rebus ipsis morigera esse recusat) — and also praxis demonstrationibus ;

268 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

ner of collecting and concluding upon the reports of the
senses. This I speak not to disable the mind of man,
but to stir it up to seek help : for no man, be he never
so cunning or practised, can make a straight line or
perfect circle by steadiness of hand, which may be
easily done by help of a ruler or compass.1

This part of invention, concerning the invention of
Expmentia sciences, I purpose (if God give me leave)
iMi££tuaio hereafter to propound ; having digested it
Nature. ^^ ^WQ parts . w]iereof the one I term
Experientia liter ata, and the other Interpretatio No-
turce : 2 the former being but a degree and rudiment
of the latter. But I will not dwell too long, nor
speak too great upon a promise.

^[ 3 The invention of speech or argument is not
properly an invention : for to invent is to discover
that we know not, and not to recover or resummon
that which we already know ; and the use of this in-

an insertion which (though the observation is implied perhaps in the Eng-
lish) I have thought worth noticing; because these prarcc demonstrations
were Idols of the Theatre, of which in the Advancement of Learning there
is no mention.

1 This it is then (he adds, writing eighteen rears later) which I have in
hand, and am labouring with mighty effort to accomplish — namely to
make the mind of man by help of art a match for the nature of things, —
to discover an art of Indication and Direction whereby all other arts with
their axioms and works may be detected and brought to light.

a The one being the method of inquiry which proceeds from one experi-
ment to another by a kind of natural sagacity; the other that which
ceeds from experiments to axioms, and thence by the light of the axic
to new experiments. Aut enim defertur indicium ab experimentis ad <
men/a, aut ab experimentis ad axiomata qua et ipsa nova experimenta desi$
nent. Of this Experientia literala there follows in the De Augmtntis
exposition at considerable length; in which the several methods of exper
menting are described, with illustrations. And this concludes the chapte
the exposition of the other part, the Interpretatio Naturae, being reserved
for the Novum Orgunum.

« De Aug. v.,3.

THE SECOND BOOK. 269

vention is no other but out of the knowledge whereof
our mind is already possessed, to draw forth or call be-
fore us that which may be pertinent to the purpose which
we take into our consideration. So as, to speak truly,
it is no Invention, but a Remembrance or Suggestion,
with an application ; which is the cause why the schools
do place it after judgment, as subsequent and not pre-
cedent. Nevertheless, because we do account it a
Chase as well of deer in an inclosed park as in a
forest at large, and that it hath already obtained the
name, let it be called invention : so as it be perceived
and discerned, that the scope and end of this invention
is readiness and present use of our knowledge, and not
addition or amplification thereof.

To procure this ready use of knowledge there are
two courses, Preparation and Suggestion.1 The for-
mer of these seemeth scarcely a part of Knowledge, con-
sisting rather of diligence than of any artificial erudi-
tion. And herein Aristotle wittily, but hurtfully, doth
deride the sophists near his time, saying, they did as if
one that professed the art of shoe-making should not
teach how to make up a shoe, but only exhibit in a readi-
ness a number of shoes of all fashions and sizes. But
yet a man might reply, that if a shoe-maker should
have no shoes in his shop, but only work as he is
bespoken, he should be weakly customed. But our
Saviour, speaking of Divine Knowledge, saith, that the
kingdom of heaven is like a good householder, that bring-
eth forth both new and old store ; and we see the ancient
writers of rhetoric do give it in precept, that pleaders

1 In the translation he calls these respectively Prompluaria and Topica:
the one being a collection of arguments such as you are likely to want, laid
up ready for use ; the other a system of directions to help you iu looking
for the thing you want to find.

270 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

should have the Places whereof they have most con-
tinual use ready handled in all the variety that may
be ; as that, to speak for the literal interpretation of
the law against equity, and contrary ; and to speak
for presumptions and inferences against testimony, and
contrary. And Cicero himself, being broken unto it
by great experience, delivereth it plainly, that whatso-
ever a man shall have occasion to speak of, (if he will
take the pains) he may have it in effect premeditate,
and handled in thesi ; so that when he cometh to a
particular, he shall have nothing to do but to put to
names and times and places, and such other circum-
stances of individuals. We see likewise the exact
diligence of Demosthenes ; who, in regard of the great
force that the entrance and access into causes hath to
make a good impression, had ready framed a number
of prefaces for orations and speeches. All which
authorities and precedents may overweigh Aristotle's
opinion, that would have us change a rich wardrobe
for a pair of shears.

But the nature of the collection of this provision or
preparatory store, though it be common both to logic
and rhetoric, yet having made an entry of it here,
where it came first to be spoken of, I think fit to refer
over the further handling of it to rhetoric.

The other part of Invention, which I term Sugges-
tion, doth assign and direct us to certain marks or
places, which may excite our mind to return and pro-
duce such knowledge as it hath formerly collected, to
the end we may make use thereof. Neither is this
use (truly taken) only to furnish argument to dispute
probably with others, but likewise to minister unto our
judgment to conclude aright within ourselves. Nei-

THE SECOND BOOK. 271

ther may these Places serve only to apprompt our in-
vention, but also to direct our inquiry. For a faculty
of wise interrogating is half a knowledge. For as Plato
8aith, Whosoever seeketh, knoweth that which he seeketh
for in a general notion ; else how shall he know it when
he hath found it ? And therefore the larger 1 your An-
ticipation is, the more direct and compendious is your
search. But the same Places which Avill help us what
to produce of that which we know already, will also
help us, if a man of experience were before us, what
questions to ask ; or if we have books and authors to
instruct us, what points to search and revolve : so as I
cannot report 2 that this part of invention, which is
that Avhich the schools call Topics, is deficient.

Nevertheless Topics are of two sorts, general and
special. The general we have spoken to ; but the
particular hath been touched by some, but rejected
generally as inartificial and variable. But leaving the

1 amplior et certior. — De Aug.

2 Thus the sentence stands both in the original and in the editions of
1629 and 1633; though I do not understand the connexion between it and
the sentence preceding. Possibly an intermediate sentence has dropped
out, or some alteration has been inadvertently made which disturbs the
construction. In the translation the arrangement of the whole passage is
changed, and all is made clear. He begins by dividing Topics into two
kinds, General and Particular. The General (he says) has been sufficiently
handled in Logic, and therefore he leaves it with a passing remark (Mud
tamen obiter monendum videtur) to the effect of that in the text; "neither
is this use," &c. down to "search and revolve." But Particular Topics,
he proceeds, are more to the purpose and of great value, and have not re-
ceived the attention they deserve. He then goes on to explain at length
what he means; repeating the observations in the next paragraph with
some amplification and greater clearness, and then giving a specimen of
the thing, in a series of Particular Topics or articles of inquiry concerning
Heavy and Light; with which the chapter concludes. With regard to the
importance of these Topicce as a part of Bacon's method of inquiry — an
importance so considerable that he meant to devote a special work to the
subject, — see my prefaces to the Parasceve (Vol. II. p. 36.) and to the
Tupica Inquisititmis de Luce el Lumine (Vol. IV. p. 129.).

272 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

humour which hath reigned too much in the schools,
(which is to be vainly subtile in a few things which
are within their command, and to reject the rest,) I do
receive particular Topics, that is places or directions
of invention and inquiry in every particular knowl-
edge, as things of great use ; being mixtures of Logic
with the matter of sciences ; for in these it holdeth,
Ars inveniendi adolescit cum inventis, [every act of dis-
covery advances the art of discovery ;] for as in going
of a way we do not only gain that part of the way
which is passed, but we gain the better sight of that
part of the way which remaineth ; so every degree of
proceeding in a science giveth a light to that which
followeth ; which light if we strengthen, by drawing it
forth into questions or places of inquiry, we do greatly
advance our pursuit.

^[ 1 Now we pass unto the arts of Judgment, which
handle the natures of Proofs and Demonstrations ;
which as to Induction hath a coincidence with Inven-
tion ; for in all inductions, whether in good or vicious
form, the same action of the mind which invent eth, judg-
cth; all one as in the sense; but otherwise it is in proof
by syllogism ; for the proof being not immediate but
by mean, the invention of the mean is one thing, and
the judgment of the consequence is another ; the one
exciting only, the other examining. Therefore for the
real and exact form of judgment we refer ourselves to
that which we have spoken of Interpretation of Nature.

For the other judgment by Syllogism, as it is a thing

most agreeable to the mind of man, so it hath been

vehemently and excellently laboured. For the nature

of man doth extremely covet to have somewhat in his

1 De Aug. v. 4.

THE SECOND BOOK. 273

understanding fixed and immoveable, and as a rest and
support of the mind. And therefore as Aristotle en-
deavoureth to prove that in all motion there is some
point quiescent ; and as he elegantly expoundeth the
ancient fable of Atlas (that stood fixed and bare up
the heaven from falling) to be meant of the poles or
axle-tree of heaven, whereupon the conversion is ac-
complished ; so assuredly men have a desire to have
an Atlas or axle-tree within to keep them from fluc-
tuation, which is like to a perpetual peril of falling ;
therefore men did hasten to set down some Principles
about which the variety of their disputations might
turn.

So then this art of Judgment is but the reduction of
propositions to principles in a middle term : the Prin-
ciples to be agreed by all and exempted from argu-
ment ; the Middle Term to be elected at the liberty
of every man's invention ; the Reduction to be of two
kinds, direct and inverted ; the ono when the proposi-
tion is reduced to the principle, which they term a
Probation ostensive ; the other when the contradictory
of the proposition is reduced to the contradictory of
the principle, which is that which they call per incom-
modum, or pressing an absurdity ; the number of mid-
dle terms to be1 as the proposition standeth degrees
more or less removed from the principle.

But this art hath two several methods of doctrine ;
the one by way of direction, the other by way of cau-
tion : the former frameth and setteth down a true form
of consequence, by the variations and deflexions from
which errors and inconsequences may be exactly
judged ; toward the composition and structure of which

1 i. e. to be more or fewer.
VOL. vi. 18

274 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

form, it is incident to handle the parts thereof, which
are propositions, and the parts of propositions, which
are simple words ; l and this is that part of logic which
is comprehended in the Analytics.

The second method of doctrine was introduced for
expedite use and assurance sake ; discovering the more
subtile forms of sophisms and illaqueations with their
redargutions, which is that which is termed blenches.
For although in the more gross sorts of fallacies it hap-
peneth (as Seneca maketh the comparison well) as in
juggling feats, which though we know not how they
are done, yet we know well it is not as it seemeth to
be ; yet the more subtile sort of them doth not only
put a man besides his answer, but doth many times
abuse his judgment.

This part concerning Elenches 2 is excellently han-
dled by Aristotle in precept, but more excellently by
Plato in example, not only in the persons of the Soph-
ists, but even in Socrates himself; who professing to
affirm nothing, but to infirm that which was affirmed
by another, hath exactly expressed all the forms of ob-
jection, fallace,8 and redargution. And although we

* This clause is omitted in the translation ; and a new observation is in-
troduced in its place; viz. that though this direction contains in itself a
kind of Elenche or confutation (for the straight indicates the crooked), yet
it is safest to employ Elenches (that is, Elenches properly so called) as mon-
itors, for the better detection of fallacies by which the judgment would
otherwise be ensnared.

2 In the translation the Doctrine of Elenches is divided into three kinds
— Elenchos Sophismatum, Eknchos Hermenia, Eltnchos imnginutn five Idafo-
rum: i. e. Cautions against Sophisms, against ambiguity of words, against
Idols or false appearances ; and it is to the first only that the observation
-which follows is applied.

• So in all the editions; and not (I think) a misprint for fallacie, but
another word, formed not from fallacia but from fallax. Compare " Colours
of Good and Evil," § 1. " The fallax of this colour," &c.

THE SECOND BOOK. 275

have said that the use of this doctrine is for redargu-
tion, yet it is manifest the degenerate and corrupt use
is for caption and contradiction ; x which passeth for a
great faculty, and no doubt is of very great advantage :
though the difference be good which was made between
orators and sophisters, that the one is as the greyhound,
which hath his advantage in the race, and the other as
the hare, which hath her advantage in the turn, so
as it is the advantage of the weaker creature.

But yet further, this doctrine of Elenches hath a more
ample latitude and extent than is perceived ; namely,
unto divers parts of knowledge ; whereof some are
laboured and other omitted. For first, I conceive
(though it may seem at first somewhat strange) that
that part which is variably referred sometimes to Logic
sometimes to Metaphysic, touching the common adjuncts
of essences, is but an elenche ; 2 for the great sophism
of all sophisms being equivocation or ambiguity of
words and phrase, specially of such words as are most
general and intervene in every inquiry, it seemeth to
me that the true and fruitful use (leaving vain sub-
tilties and speculations) of the inquiry of majority,
minority, priority, posteriority, identity, diversity, pos-
sibility, act, totality, parts, existence, privation, and
the like, are but wise cautions against ambiguities of
speech. So again the distribution of things into cer-
tain tribes, which we call categories or predicaments,
are but cautions against the confusion of definitions
and divisions.

Secondly, there is a seducement that worketh by the

1 i. e. the true use is to answer sophistical arguments, the corrupt use to
invent sophistical objections.

2 This is the part which in the translation he calls Elenchot Hermenia ;
and explains much more clearly and fully.

276 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

strength of the impression and not by the subtilty of
the illaqueation ; not so much perplexing the reason as
overruling it by power of the imagination. But this
part I think more proper to handle when I shall speak
of Rhetoric.1

But lastly, there is yet a much more important and
profound kind of fallacies in the mind of man, which I
find not observed or enquired at all, and think good to
place here, as that which of all others appertaineth
most to rectify judgment: the force whereof is such, as
it doth not dazzle or snare the understanding in some
particulars, but doth more generally and inwardly in-
fect and corrupt the state thereof.2 For the mind of
man is far from the nature of a clear and equal glass,
wherein the beams of things should reflect according to
their true incidence ; nay, it is rather like an enchanted
glass, full of superstition and imposture, if it be not de-
livered and reduced. For this purpose, let us consider
the false appearances that are imposed upon us by the
general nature of the mind,3 beholding them in an ex-
ample or two ; as first, in that instance which is the
root of all superstition, namely, That to the nature of
the mind of all men it is consonant for Hie affirmative or
active to affect more than the negative or privative : so
that a few times hitting or presence, countervails oft-

1 This paragraph is omitted altogether in the translation.

8 Here we have the doctrine of Idols, in its earliest form; the names not
being yet given, and the Idols of the Theatre not yet introduced into the
company. For the history of this doctrine see preface to the Novum Or-
ganum, note C In the Be Augmentis the names are given, and the fourth
kind mentioned, though only to be set aside as not belonging to the present
argument. The exposition of the three first is also considerably fuller than
here, though not nearly so full as in the Novum Organum, to which we are
referred.

• These are the Idols of the Tribe.

THE SECOND BOOK. 277

times failing or absence ; 1 as was well answered by
Diagoras to him that shewed him in Neptune's temple
the great number of pictures of such as had scaped
shipwrack and had paid their vows to Neptune, saying,
Advise now, you that think it folly to invocate Neptune
in tempest : Yea but (saith Diagoras) w here are they
painted that are drowned? Let us behold it in another
instance, namely, Tliat the spirit of man, being of an
equal and uniform substance, doth usually suppose and
feign in nature a greater equality and uniformity than is
in truth. Hence it cometh that the mathematicians can-
not satisfy themselves, except they reduce the motions
of the celestial bodies to perfect circles, rejecting spiral
lines, and labouring to be discharged of eccentrics.
"Hence it cometh, that whereas there are many things
in nature as it were monodica,2 sui juris, [singular, and
like nothing but themselves ;] yet the cogitations of man
do feign unto them relatives, parallels, and conjugates,
whereas no such thing is ; as they have feigned an ele-
ment of Fire, to keep square with Earth, Water, and
Air, and the like : nay, it is not credible, till it be
opened, what a number of fictions and fancies the
similitude of human actions and arts,3 together with the
making of man communis mensura, have brought into
Natural Philosophy ; not much better than the heresy of

1 which (he adds in the translation) is the root of all superstition and vaiu
credulity, in matters of astrology, dreams, omens, &c.

2 So the word is spelt throughout Bacon's writings, as observed by Mr.
Ellis, Vol. I. p. 253. The introduction here of mi juris as the Latin equiva-
lent seems to show that the error arose from a mistake as to the etymology
of the Greek word.

8 i. e. the supposed resemblance between the arts and actions of Man and
the operations of Nature: nituralium operat'wnum (id similitudinem actionum
humanarum reductio: hoc ipsum inquam, quod putelur talia Naturam facere
qualia Honwfacit.

278 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

the Anthropomorphites, bred in the cells of gross and soli-
tary monks, and the opinion of Epicurus, answerable to
the same in heathenism, who supposed the gods to be
of human shape. And therefore Velleius the Epicu-
rian 1 needed not to have asked, why God should have
adorned the heavens with stars, as if he had been an
jEdilis, one that should have set forth some magnificent
shews or plays. For if that great work-master had
been of an human disposition, he would have cast the
stars into some pleasant and beautiful works and orders,
like the frets in the roofs of houses ; whereas one can
scarce find a posture in square or triangle or straight
line amongst such an infinite number ; so differing an
harmony there is between the spirit of Man and the
spirit of Nature.

Let us consider again the false appearances imposed
upon us by every man's own individual nature and cus-
tom,2 in that feigned supposition that Plato maketh of
the cave : for certainly if a child were continued in a
grot or cave under the earth until maturity of age, and
came suddenly abroad, he would have strange and
absurd imaginations ; so in like manner, although our
persons live in the view of heaven, yet our spirits are
included in the caves of our own complexions and cus-
toms ; which minister unto us infinite errors and vain
opinions, if they be not recalled to examination.8 But '

1 So in the original: the word being pronounced in Bacon's time Epic*-
rian. See Walker on Shakespeare's versification, p. 211.

2 These are the Idols of the Cave.

8 i. e. if they be not corrected by the continual contemplation of nature
at large : si e specu sua raro tantum et ad breve aliquod lempus prodeant, et
non in contemplatione naturat perpetuo, tanquam sub dio, movent ur.

It may be worth observing that Bacon guards himself against being sup-
posed to represent the full intention of Plato'9 parable, by adding in a pa-
renthesis missa ilia exquisita parabola subtilitate.

THE SECOND BOOK. 279

hereof we have given many examples in one of the er-
rors, or peccant humours, which we ran briefly over in
our first book.

And lastly, let us consider the false appearances that
are imposed upon us by words,1 which are framed and
applied according to the conceit and capacities of the
vulgar sort: and although we think we govern our
words, and prescribe it well, Loquendum ut vulgus, sen-
tiendum ut sapientes, [a man should speak like the
vulgar and think like the wise ;] yet certain it is that
words, as a Tartar's bow, do shoot back upon the un-
derstanding of the wisest, and mightily entangle and
pervert the judgment ; so as it is almost necessary in
all controversies and disputations to imitate the wisdom
of the Mathematicians, in setting down in the very be-
ginning the definitions of our words and terms, that
others may know how we accept and understand them,
and whether they concur with us or no.2 For it cometh
to pass for want of this, that we are sure to end there
where we ought to have begun, which is in questions
and differences about words. To conclude therefore, it
must be confessed that it is not possible to divorce our-
selves from these fallacies and false appearances, be-
cause they are inseparable from our nature and
condition of life; so yet nevertheless the EUnchi magm,

n ±i sr> i, i i sive de Idolis

caution or them (tor all elenches, as was animi humani,

.j , • x i i i nativis et ad-

said, are but cautions) doth extremely lm- vemuiu.

1 These are the Idols of the Market-place.

2 It might seem from this that Bacon thought the premising of defini-
tions would be a sufficient remedy for the evil. But in the translation he
changes the sentence and expressly warns us that it is not: for the defini-
tions themselves, he says, are made of toords ; and though we think to
remove ambiguities by the use of technical terms, &c, yet all is not enough,
and we must look for a remedy which goes deeper.

280 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

port the true conduct of human judgment. The par-
ticular elenches or cautions against these three i'alse
appearances I find altogether deficient.

There remaineth one part of judgment of great ex-
cellency, which to mine understanding is so slightly
touched, as I may report that also deficient ; which is
the application of the differing kinds of proofs to the
differing kinds of subjects ; for there being but four
kinds of demonstrations, that is, by the immediate
consent of the mind or sense; by induction; by
sophism : and by congruity, which is that which Aris-
totle calleth demonstration in orb or circle, and not a
notioribus ; 1 every of these hath certain subjects in the
matter of sciences, in which respectively they have
chiefest use ; and certain other, from which respectively
they ought to be excluded : and the rigour and curios-
ity in requiring the more severe proofs in some things,
and chiefly the facility in contenting ourselves with the
more remiss proofs in others, hath been amongst the
greatest causes of detriment and hindrance to knowl-

De Anaio- edge. The distributions and assignations of

gta Demon- ^ , 0

atmtionum. demonstrations, according to the analogy of
sciences, I note as deficient.

^[ 2 The custody or retaining of knowledge is either
in Writing or Memory ; whereof Writing hath two
parts, the nature of the character, and the order of the
entry. For the art of characters, or other visible notes of
words or things, it hath nearest conjugation with gram-
mar, and therefore I refer it to the due place.3 For

1 non a notioribus scilicet, sed tanqttam de piano. — De Aug.

2 De Aug. v. 5.

8 All this is omitted in the translation. The art of retaining knowledge
is divided into two doctrines: viz. concerning the helps (adminicula) of
memory, and concerning Memory itself. The only help of memory which

THE SECOND BOOK. 281

the disposition and collocation of that knowledge which
we preserve in writing, it consisteth in a good digest of
common-places ; wherein I am not ignorant of the prej-
udice imputed to the use of common-place books, as
causing a retardation of reading, and some sloth or re-
laxation of memory. But because it is but a counter-
feit thing in knowledges to be forward and pregnant,
except a man be deep and full, I hold the entry of
common-places to be a matter of great use and essence
in studying ; as that which assureth copie of invention,
and coUtracteth judgment to a strength. But this is
true, that of the methods of common-places that I have
seen, there is none of any sufficient worth ; all of them
carrying merely the face of a school, and not of a world;
and referring to vulgar matters and pedantical divisions
without all life or respect to action.

For the other principal part of the custody of knowl-
edge, which is Memory, I find that faculty in my judg-
ment weakly enquired of. An art there is extant of it ;
but it seemeth to me that there are better precepts than
that art, and better practices of that art than those re-
ceived. It is certain the art (as it is) may be raised to
points of ostentation prodigious : but in use (as it is
now managed) it is barren ; not burdensome nor dan-
gerous to natural memory, as is imagined, but barren ;
that is, not dexterous to be applied to the serious use
of business and occasions. And therefore I make no
more estimation of repeating a great number of names
or words upon once hearing, or the pouring forth of a

is mentioned is writing; concerning which, after remarking that without
this help the memory cannot be trusted to deal with matters of length
and requiring exactness, especially such as the interpretation of nature,
he insists upon the value of a good digest of common-places even in the
old and popular sciences, and so proceeds as in the text.

282 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

number of verses or rhymes ex tempore, or the making
of a satirical simile of every thing, or the turning of
every thing to a jest, or the falsifying or contradicting
of every thing by cavil, or the like, (whereof in the
faculties of the mind there is great copie, and such as
by device and practice may be exalted to an extreme
degree of wonder,) than I do of the tricks of tum-
blers, funambuloes, baladines ; the one being the same
in the mind that the other is in the body ; matters of
strangeness without worthiness.

This art of Memory is but built upon two intentions ;
the one Prenotion, the other Emblem. Prenotion dis-
chargeth the indefinite seeking of that we would re-
member, and directeth us to seek in a narrow com-
pass ; that is, somewhat that hath congruity with our
■place of memory. Emblem reduceth conceits intellect-
ual to images sensible, which strike the memory more :
out of which axioms may be drawn much better prac-
tique than that in use ; and besides which axioms, there
are divers moe touching help of memory, not inferior
to them.1 But I did in the beginning distinguish, not
to report those things deficient, which are but only ill
managed.

^[ 2 There remaineth the fourth kind of Rational
Knowledge, which is transitive, concerning the express-
ing or transferring our knowledge to others ; which I
will term by the general name of Tradition or Deliv-
ery. Tradition hath three parts ; the first concern-
ing the organ of tradition ; the second concerning the

1 The nature and use of these praenotions and emblems is explained
and illustrated in the translation by several examples; but the substance
of the observation is not altered.

2 De Aug. vi. 1.

THE SECOND BOOK. 283

method of tradition ; and the third concerning the illus-
tration of tradition.1

For the organ of tradition, it is either Speech or
Writing : for Aristotle saith well, Words are the images
of cogitations, and letters are the images of words ; but yet
it is not of necessity that cogitations be expressed by
the medium of words. For whatsoever is capable of
sufficient differences? and those perceptible by the sense,
is in nature competent to express3 cogitations. And
therefore we see in the commerce of barbarous 4 people
that understand not one another's language, and in the
practice of divers that are dumb and deaf, that men's
minds are expressed in gestures, though not exactly,
yet to serve the turn. And we understand further5
that it is the use of China and the kingdoms of the high
Levant to write in Characters Real, which express nei-
ther letters nor words in gross, but Things or Notions;
insomuch as countries and provinces, which understand
not one another's language, can nevertheless read one
another's writings, because the characters are accepted
more crenerallv than the languages (J0 extend ; and
therefore they have a vast multitude of characters ; as
many, I suppose, as radical words.6

These Notes of Cogitations are of two sorts ; the

1 In the De Augmenlis, tradition (in these three last cases) is translated
termo: which appears to be used in the general sense of communica-
tion.

2 i. e. sufficient to explain the variety of notions.

8 i. e. to convey the cogitations of one man to another (fiere posse ve-
hiculum cogitationum de homine in hominem), and so to be an organ of (tradi-
tion (traditivce.)

* Barbarous is omitted in the translation : the thing being equally seen
in civilised people who know no common language.

6 noiissimum fieri jam cmpit.

• This observation is transferred in the De Augmeniis to the next para-
graph, and applied generally to all systems of writing in Characters Real.

284 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

one when the note hath some similitude or congruity
with the notion ; the other ad placitum, having force
only by contract or acceptation. Of the former sort
are Hieroglyphics and Gestures. For as to Hierogly-
phics, (things of ancient use, and embraced chiefly by
the ^Egyptians, one of the most ancient nations,) they
are but as continued impresses and emblems. And
as for Gestures, they are as transitory Hieroglyphics,
and are to Hieroglyphics as words spoken are to words
written, in that they abide not ; but they have ever-
more, as well as the other, an affinity with the things
signified: as Periander, being consulted with how to
preserve a tyranny newly usurped, bid the messenger
attend and report what he saw him do ; and went into
his garden and topped all the highest flowers ; signifying,
that it consisted in the cutting off and keeping low of
the nobility and grandest Ad placitum are the Char-
acters Real before mentioned, and Words : although
some have been willing by curious inquiry, or rather
by apt feigning, to have derived imposition of names
from reason and intendment ; a speculation elegant,
and, by reason it searcheth into antiquity, reverent ;
but sparingly mixed with truth, and of small fruit.2
De Notts This portion of knowledge, touching the
Rerwn. Notes 0f Things and cogitations in general,
I find not enquired, but deficient. And although it
may seem of no great use, considering that words and

1 So in the original; and I believe always in Bacon; the Spanish word
being still treated as a foreigner, and the accent falling no doubt upon the
first syllable.

2 The substance of this remark is introduced in the translation in another
place. Here it is merely said that Characters Real have nothing emblem-
atic in them ; but are merely surds, framed ad placitum and silently
agreed upon by custom.

THE SECOND BOOK. 285

writings by letters do far excel all the other ways ; yet
because this part concerneth as it were the mint of
knowledge, (for words are the tokens current and ac-
cepted for conceits, as moneys are for values, and that
it is fit men be not ignorant that moneys may be of
another kind than gold and silver,) I thought good to
propound it to better enquiry.

Concerning Speech and Words, the consideration of
them hath produced the science of Grammar : for man
still striveth to reintegrate himself in those benedic-
tions, from which by his fault he hath been deprived ;
and as he hath striven against the first general curse by
the invention of all other arts, so hath he sought to come
forth of the second general curse (which was the con-
fusion of tongues) by the art of Grammar : whereof
the use in a mother 1 tongue is small : in a foreign
tongue more ; but most in such foreign tongues as have
ceased to be vulgar tongues, and are turned only to
learned tongues. The duty of it is of two natures ;
the one popular,2 which is for the speedy and perfect
attaining languages, as well for intercourse of speech
as for understanding of authors ; the other philosophi-
cal, examining the power and nature of words as they
are the footsteps and prints of reason : which kind of
analogy between words and reason is handled sjMrsim,
brokenly, though not entirely ; 3 and therefore I cannot

1 in another tongue ed. 1605 : in mother tongue edd. 1629 and 1633. The
translation has in Unguis quibusque vernaculis.

a In the translation he substitutes literary for popular.

8 Here are introduced in the translation some interesting remarks on the
subject of the analog}' between words and reason ; in which it is worth
observing among other things, that Bacon appears to have changed his
opinion as to the nature of Caesar's book De Analogia, since he wrote the
first book of the Advancement. See above p. 159. There he describes it
as " a grammatical philosophy, wherein he did labour to make this same vox

286 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

report it deficient, though I think it very worthy to be
reduced into a science by itself.

Unto Grammar also belongeth, as an appendix, the
consideration of the Accidents of Words ; which are
measure, sound, and elevation or accent, and the sweet-
ness and harshness of them ; whence hath issued some
curious observations in Rhetoric, but chiefly Poesy, as
we consider it in respect of the verse and not of the
argument : wherein though men in learned tongues do
tie themselves to the ancient measures, yet in modern
languages it seemeth to me as free to make new meas-
ures of verses as of dances ; for a dance is a measured
pace, as a verse is a measured speech.1 In these things
the sense is better judge than the art ;

Ccenae fercula nostra
Mallem convivis quam placuisse cocis :

[the dinner is to please the guests that eat it, not the
cook that dresses it.] And of the servile expressing

adplacifum to become vox ad licitum, and to reduce custom of speech to
congruity of speech, and took as it were the picture of words from the life
of reason." Here he says he has doubted whether that book of Caesar's
treated of such a grammatical philosophy as he is speaking of; but that he
father suspects it contained nothing very high or subtile, but only precepts
for the formation of a chaste and perfect style, free from vulgarity and af-
fectation.

1 This observation is omitted in the translation, and instead we have a
censure of the attempts (made not long before Bacon's time) to force the
modern languages into the ancient measures; measures (he says) which
are incompatible with the frame of the languages themselves, and not less
offensive to the ear. But this censure may perhaps be considered as a de-
velopment of the remark which concludes this paragraph, and which is
also omitted. Certainly there is no English metre which represents the
metrical effect of the Virgilian hexameter worse than the English hex-
ameter as people write it now : and if any one would try to write it so as
to represent the metrical effect truly, by attending to the distinction be-
tween accent and quantity, and distributing them according to the same
laws, he would find the truth of Bacon's remark that ipsa lingua fabrica
respuit ; the English language does not supply the materials.

THE SECOND BOOK. 287

antiquity in an unlike and an unfit subject, it is well
said, Quod tempore antiquum videtur, id incongruitate
est maxime novum ; [there is nothing more new than
an old thing that has ceased to fit].

For Ciphers, they are commonly in letters or alpha-
bets, but may be in words. The kinds of Ciphers (be-
sides the simple ciphers with changes and intermixtures
of nulls and non-significants) are many, according to the
nature or rule of the infolding ; Wheel-ciphers, Key-
ciphers, Doubles, &c. But the virtues of them,' whereby
they are to be preferred, are three ; that they be not
laborious to write and read ; that they be impossible to
decipher ; and, in some cases, that they be without sus-
picion. The highest degree whereof is to write omnia
per omnia ; which is undoubtedly possible, with a pro-
portion quintuple at most of the writing infolding to
the writing infolded, and no other restraint whatsoever.1
This art of Ciphering, hath for relative an art of Dis-
ciphering ; by supposition 2 unprofitable ; but, as things
are, of great use. For suppose that ciphers were well
managed, there be multitudes of them which exclude
the discipherer. But in regard of the rawness and un-
skilfulness of the hands through which they pass, the
greatest matters are many times carried in the weakest
ciphers.

In the enumeration of these private and retired arts,
it may be thought I seek to make a great muster-roll

1 In the De Augmentis he gives a specimen of a cipher by which this
feat of writing omnia per omnia (that is of conveying any words you please
under cover of any other words you please, provided only that they con-
tain not less than five times as many letters) may be accomplished; a
cipher invented, he says, bjr himself when he was at Paris.

2 t. e. if things were as they might be: aiiamen prmcautione solerti fieri
possit inutilis.

288 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

of sciences ; naming them for shew and ostentation,
and to little other purpose. But let those which are
skilful in them judge whether I bring them in only for
appearance, or whether in that which I speak of them
(though in few marks) there be not some seed of profi-
cience. And this must be remembered, that as there
be many of great account in their countries and prov-
inces, which when they come up to the Seat of the
Estate are but of mean rank and scarcely regarded ;
so these arts being here placed with the principal and
supreme sciences, seem petty things ; yet to such as
have chosen them to spend their studies in them,1 they
seem great matters.

^[ 2 For the Method of Tradition, I see it hath moved
a controversy in our time.3 But as in civil business, if
there be a meeting and men fall at words there is com-
monly an end of the matter for that time and no pro-
ceeding at all ; so in learning, where there is much
controversy there is many times little inquiry. For
this part of knowledge of Method seemeth to me so
weakly enquired as I shall report it deficient.

Method hath been placed, and that not amiss, in
Logic, as a part of Judgment : for as the doctrine of
Syllogisms comprehendeth the rules of judgment upon
that which is invented, so the doctrine of Method con-

1 qui operant illis prcecipue impenderint. — De Aug. The original edition
and that of 1629 have "to spend their labours studies in them," — which is
also the reading of the edition 1633, except that it has a comma after
" labours." " Labours and studies " is the reading of modern editions;
but I think it is more likely that one of the words was meant to be substi-
tuted for the other.

« De Aug. vi. 2.

8 Besides Ramus himself and Carpentier, one of the principal persons in
this controversy was the Cardinal D'Ossat, of whom some account will be
found in De Thou's memoirs. — R. L. E.

THE SECOND BOOK. 289

taineth the rules of judgment upon that which is to be
delivered ; for judgment precedeth Delivery, as it fol-
loweth Invention.1 Neither is the method or the na-
ture of the tradition material only to the use of knowl-
edge, but likewise to the progression of knowledge :
for since the labour and life of one man cannot attain
to perfection of knowledge, the wisdom of the Tradi-
tion is that which inspireth the felicity of continuance
and proceeding. And therefore the most real diversity
of method is of method referred to Use, and method
referred to Progression ; whereof the one may be
termed Magistral, and the other of Probation.2

The later whereof seemeth to be via deserta et inter-
clusa, [a way that is abandoned and stopped up] . For
as knowledges are now delivered, there is a kind of
contract of error between the deliverer and the re-
ceiver : for he that delivereth knowledge desireth to
deliver it in such form as may be best believed, and not
as may be best examined ; and he that receiveth knowl-
edge desireth rather present satisfaction than expectant
inquiry ; and so rather not to doubt than not to err :
glory making the author not to lay open his weakness,
and sloth making the disciple not to know his strength.

But knowledge that is delivered as a thread to be
spun on, ought to be delivered and intimated,8 if it
were possible, in the same method wherein it was in-
vented; and so is it possible of knowledge induced.

1 So edd. 1629 and 1633. The original has Inventions.

2 Called Initiativa in the translation ; and explained to mean the method
which discloses the inner mysteries of science; and distinguished from the
other not as more secret but as more profound; the one announcing the
results of enquiry, the other exhibiting the method and process which led
to them.

8 So in all the editions; but probably a misprint for insinuated. The
translation has insinuanda.

VOL. vi. 19

290 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

But in this same anticipated and prevented knowledge,
no man knoweth how he came to the knowledge which
he hath obtained. But yet nevertheless, secundum
majus et minus, a man may revisit and descend unto
the foundations of his knowledge and consent ; and so
transplant it into another as it grew in his own mind.
For it is in knowledges as it is in plants : if you mean
to use the plant, it is no matter for the roots ; but if
you mean to remove it to grow, then it is more assured
to rest upon roots than slips. So the delivery of knowl-
edges (as it is now used) is as of fair bodies of trees
without the roots ; good for the carpenter, but not for
the planter ; but if you will have sciences grow, it is
less matter for the shaft or body of the tree, so you
De Method* ^00^ we^ *° *ne taking up of the roots. Of
sinceta, she which kind of deliverv the method of the

aaJUios oa- *

tntiarum.i mathematiques, in that subject, hath some
shadow ; but generally I see it neither put in ure nor
put in inquisition, and therefore note it for deficient.

Another diversity of Method there is, which hath
some affinity with the former, used in some cases by the
discretion of the ancients, but disgraced since by the
impostures of many vain persons, who have made it as
a false light for their counterfeit merchandises ; and
that is, Enigmatical and Disclosed.2 The pretence

1 In the translation he gives it the additional name of Traditio Lampadis;
alluding to the transmission of the lighted torch from one to another in the
Greek torch-race. See Preface to Nov. Org. p. 154. note.

2 In the translation he calls the latter exqterica, the former acroaviatica ;
and explains that the affinity between the acroamatica and the initiniiva
lies in this only — that each addresses itself to a select audience; for in
themselves (re ipsa) they are opposite; the initiativa adopting a method of
delivery more open than ordinary; the acroamatica, one more obscure;
the " vulgar capacities " being excluded in the one case by the necessary
subtilty of the argument, in the other by an affected obscurity in the ex-

THE SECOND BOOK. 291

whereof1 is to remove the vulgar capacities from being
admitted to the secrets of knowledges, and to reserve
them to selected auditors, or wits of such sharpness as
can pierce the veil.

Another diversity of Method, whereof the conse-
quence is great, is the delivery of knowledge in Apho-
risms, or in Methods ; wherein we may observe that it
hath been too much taken into custom, out of a few
Axioms or observations upon any subject to make a sol-
emn and formal art ; filling it with some discourses,
and illustrating it with examples, and digesting it into
a sensible Method ; but the writing in Aphorisms hath
many excellent virtues, whereto the writing in Method
doth not approach.

For first, it trieth the writer, whether he be super-
ficial or solid : for Aphorisms, except they should be
ridiculous, cannot be made but of the pith and heart
of sciences ; for discourse of illustration is cut off; re-
citals of examples are cut off; discourse of connexion
and order is cut off; descriptions of practice are cut
off; so there remaineth nothing to fill the Aphorisms
but some good quantity of observation : and therefore
no man >can suffice, nor in reason will attempt, to write
Aphorisms, but he that is sound and grounded. But
in Methods,

Tantum series juncturaque, pollet
Tantura de medio sumptis accedit honoris,

[the arrangement and connexion and joining of the
parts has so much effect,] as a man shall make a great
shew of an art, which if it were disjointed would come
to little. Secondly, Methods are more fit to win consent

position. Concerning the latter method, see Preface to the Novum Or-
ganum, note B.
1 i. e. of the enigmatical method.

292 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

or belief, but less fit to point to action ; for they carry
a kind of demonstration in orb or circle, one part illu-
minating another, and therefore satisfy ; but particu-
lars, being dispersed, do best agree with dispersed direc-
tions. And lastly, Aphorisms, representing a knowl-
edge broken, do invite men to enquire farther ; whereas
Methods, carrying the shew of a total, do secure men,
as if they were at furthest.

Another diversity of Method, which is likewise of
great weight, is the handling of knowledge by Asser-
tions and their Proofs, or by Questions and their De-
terminations ; the latter kind whereof, if it be immod-
erately followed, is as prejudicial to the proceeding of
learning, as it is to the proceeding of an army to go
about to besiege every little fort or hold. For if the
field be kept and the sum of the enterprise pursued,
those smaller things will come in of themselves : in-
deed1 a man would not leave some important piece
enemy at his back. In like manner, the use of con-
futation in the delivery of sciences ought to be very
sparing ; and to serve to remove strong preoccupations
and prejudgments, and not to minister and excite dis-
putations and doubts.

Another diversity of Methods is according to the
subject or matter which is handled; for there is a great
difference in delivery of the Mathematics, which are
the most abstracted of knowledges, and Policy, which
is the most immersed : and howsoever contention hath
been moved touching an uniformity of method in mul-
tiformity of matter, yet we see how that opinion, be-
sides the weakness of it, hath been of ill desert towards
learning, as that which taketh the way to reduce learn-

l». e. " although indeed :" (Mud tamen inficia* rum iverim, &c.)

THE SECOND BOOK. 293

ing to certain empty and barren generalities ; being
but the very husks and shells of sciences, all the ker-
nel being forced out and expulsed with the torture and
press of the method ; 1 and therefore as I did allow well
of particular Topics for invention, so I do allow like-
wise of particular Methods of tradition.

Another diversity of judgment2 in the delivery and
teaching of knowledge is according unto the light and
presuppositions of that which is delivered; for that
knowledge which is new and foreign from opinions re-
ceived, is to be delivered in another form than that that
is agreeable 3 and familiar ; and therefore Aristotle,
when he thinks to tax Democritus, doth in truth com-
mend him, where he saith, If we shall indeed dispute,
and not follow after similitudes, &c. For those whose
conceits are seated in popular opinions, need only but
to prove or dispute ; but those whose conceits are be-
yond popular opinions, have a double labour ; the one
to make themselves conceived, and the other to prove
and demonstrate ; so that it is of necessity with them
to have recourse to similitudes and translations to ex-
press themselves. And therefore in the infancy of
learning, and in rude times, when those conceits which
are now trivial were then new, the world was full of
Parables and Similitudes ; for else would men either

1 This observation is introduced in the translation at the beginning of
the chapter, and applied particularly to the method of dichotomies; which
are not mentioned, I think, by name in the Adcancement.

2 i. e. a diversity of method to be used with judgment. (Sequitur alitid
methodi discrimen in tradendis scientiis cum judicio adkibendum.) This
may perhaps be an error of the press or of the transcriber, some words
having accidentally dropped out. It may however be merely an effect
of hasty composition, of which there are many evidences in this part of
the work.

8 i. e. in accordance with received opinions. ( Opinionibus jam pridem
imbibitis et receptis affinis.)

294 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

have passed over without, mark or else rejected for par-
adoxes that which was offered, before they had under-
stood or judged. So in divine learning we see how fre-
quent Parables and Tropes are : 1 for it is a rule, That
whatsoever science is not consonant to presuppositions,
must pray in aid of similitudes.

There be also other diversities of Methods, vulgar
and received ; as that of Resolution or Analysis, of
Constitution or Systasis, of Concealment or Cryptic,2
&c. which I do allow well of; though I have stood
upon those which are least handled and observed. All
Depntdentia which I have remembered to this purpose,
Traduwms. Decause J wcmld erect and constitute one
general inquiry, which seems to me deficient, touch-
ing the Wisdom of Tradition.

But unto this part of knowledge concerning Method
doth further belong not only the Architecture of the
whole frame of a work, but also the several beams and
columns thereof; not as to their stuff, but as to their
quantity and figure ; and therefore Method considereth
not only the disposition of the Argument or Subject,
but likewise the Propositions ; not as to their truth or
matter, but as to their limitation and manner. For
herein Ramus merited better a great deal in reviving
the good rules of Propositions, Ka66\ov -n-puTov, *ara 7rav-
tos, &c.3 than he did in introducing the canker of Epit-
omes ; 4 and yet (as it is the condition of human things

1 This allusion to divine learning is omitted in the translation.

8 In the translation he adds Dlmretica and Homerica, and observes that
he does not dwell upon these because they have been rightly invented and
distributed.

• That they should be true generallv, primarily, and essentially. — R
L.E.

* Instead of " the canker of Epitomes," the translation substitutes '
peculiar method and dichotomies."

THE SECOND BOOK. 295

that, according to the ancient fables, The most precious
things have the most pernicious keepers ;) it was so, that
the attempt of the one made him fall upon the other.1
For he had need be well conducted that should design
to make Axioms convertible, if he make them not withal
circular, and non-promovent, or incurring into themselves:
but yet the intention was excellent.

The other considerations of Method concerning Prop-
ositions are chiefly touching the utmost propositions,
which limit the dimensions of sciences ; for every
knowledge may be fitly said, besides the profundity,
(which is the truth and substance of it, that makes it
solid,) to have a longitude and a latitude ; accounting
the latitude towards other sciences, and the longitude
towards action ; that is, from the greatest generality
to the most particular precept: the one giveth rule
how far one knowledge ought to intermeddle within the
province of another, which is the rule they call Ka#au-
to ; 2 the other giveth rule unto what degree of particu-
larity a knowledge should descend : which latter I find
passed over in silence, being in my judgment the more
material ; for certainly there must be somewhat left to
practice ; 3 but how much is worthy the inquiry. We
see remote and superficial generalities do but offer
knowledge to scorn of practical men ; and are no more
aiding to practice, than an Ortelius' universal map is
to direct the way between London and York. The

1 The attempt to amend propositions cast him upon those epitomes and
shallows of knowledge, as they are called in the translation — ejniomas illas
et scientiarum vada.

2 This is omitted in the translation. " The rule they call nadavrd "
is the rule that propositions should be true essentially.

8 For we must not fall into the error of Antoninus Pius (he adds in the
translation) — to become Cymini Sectores, multiplying divisions to the last
degree of minuteness.

296 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

better sort of rules have been not unfitly compared to
glasses of steel unpolished, where you may see the im-
ages of things, but first they must be filed : so the rules
will help, if they be laboured and polished by practice.
peproduc- But how chrystalline they may be made at
Axiomatum. the first, and how far forth they may be pol-
ished aforehand, is the question ; the inquiry whereof
seemeth to me deficient.

There hath been also laboured and put in practice
a method, which is not a lawful method, but a method
of imposture ; which is to deliver knowledges in such
manner, as men may speedily come to make a shew of
learning who have it not : such was the travail of Ray-
mundus Lullius, in making that art which bears his
name ; not unlike to some books of Typocosmy which
have been made since ; being nothing but a mass of
words of all arts, to give men countenance that those
which use the terms might be thought to understand
the art ; which collections are much like a fripper's or
broker's shop, that hath ends of every thing, but noth-
ing of worth.

^[ l Now we descend to that part which concerneth
the Illustration of Tradition, comprehended in that
science which we call Rhetoric, or Art of Eloquence ;
a science excellent, and excellently well laboured. For
although in true value it is inferior to wisdom, as it is
said by God to Moses, when he disabled himself for
want of this faculty, Aaron shall be thy speaker, and
thou shalt be to him as G-od ; yet with people it is the
more mighty : for so Salomon saith, Sapiens corde ap-
pellabitur prudens, sed dulcis eloquio majora reperiet,
[the wise in heart shall be called prudent, but he that
1 De Aug. vi. 3.

THE SECOND BOOK. 297

is sweet of speech shall compass greater things ;] sig-
nifying that profoundness of wisdom will help a man
to a name or admiration, but that it is eloquence that
prevaileth in an active life. And as to the labouring of
it, the emulation of Aristotle with the rhetoricians of
his time, and the experience of Cicero, hath made them
in their works of Rhetorics exceed themselves. Again,
the excellency of examples of eloquence in the orations
of Demosthenes and Cicero, added to the perfection
of the precepts of eloquence, hath doubled the progres-
sion in this art ; and therefore the deficiences which I
shall note will rather be in some collections which may
as handmaids attend the art, than in the rules or use
of the art itself.

Notwithstanding, to stir the earth a little about the
roots of this science, as we have done of the rest : The
duty and office of Rhetoric is to apply Reason to Im-
agination l for the better moving of the will. For we
see Reason is disturbed in the administration thereof
by three means ; by Illaqueation or Sophism, which
pertains to Logic ; by Imagination or Impression,2
which pertains to Rhetoric ; and by Passion or Affec-
tion, which pertains to Morality.3 And as in negoti-
ation with others men are wrought by cunning, by
importunity, and by vehemency ; so in this negotia-
tion within ourselves men are undermined by Inconse-
quences, solicited and importuned by Impressions or
Observations, and transported by Passions. Neither
is the nature of man so unfortunately built, as that

1 Rhetoric being to the Imagination what Logic is to the Understanding.
— De Aug.

2 In the translation he substitutes per prmstigias verborum ; false im-
pressions produced by words on the imagination.

8 t*. e. moral philosophy. (Ethica.)

298 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

those powers and arts should have force to disturb
reason, and not to establish and advance it : for the
end of Logic is to teach a form of argument to secure
reason, and not to entrap it ; the end of Morality is to
procure the affections to obey1 reason, and not to in-
vade it ; the end of Rhetoric is to fill the imagination
to second reason, and not to oppress it : for these
abuses of arts come in but ex obliquo, for caution.

And therefore it was great injustice in Plato, though
springing out of a just hatred of the rhetoricians of his
time, to esteem of Rhetoric but as a voluptuary art,
resembling it to cookery, that did mar wholesome
meats, and help unwholesome by variety of sauces to
the pleasure of the taste. For we see that speech is
much more conversant in adorning that which is good
than in colouring that which is evil ; for there is no
man but speaketh more honestly than he can do or
think : and it was excellently noted by Thucydides in
Cleon,2 that because he used to hold on the bad side
in causes of estate, therefore he was ever inveighing
against eloquence and good speech ; knowing that no
man can speak fair of courses sordid and base. And
therefore as Plato said elegantly, That virtue, if she
could be seen, would move great love and affection; so
seeing that she cannot be shewed to the Sense by cor- i
poral shape, the next degree is to shew her to the .
Imagination in lively representation : for to shew her
to Reason only in subtilty of argument, was a thing

1 In the translation he says ut rationi militent; to fight on the side of
reason.

2 In the translation he says, more correctly, " it was noted by Thucyd-
ides as a censure passed upon Cleon " {tale quidpiam solitum fuisse objici
Cleoni) ; for the observation is made by Diodotus in his answer to Cleon' i
speech, iii. 42.

THE SECOND BOOK- 299

ever derided in Chrysippus and many of the Stoics ;
who thought to thrust virtue upon men by sharp dis-
putations and conclusions, which have no sympathy
with the will of man.

Again, if the affections in themselves were pliant
and obedient to reason, it were true there should be
no great use of persuasions and insinuations to the will,
more than of naked proposition and proofs ; but in
regard of the continual mutinies and seditions of the
affections,

Video meliora, proboque;
Deteriora sequor:

[whereby they who not only see the better course, but
approve it also, nevertheless follow the worse,] reason
would become captive and servile, if Eloquence of Per-
suasions did not practise and win the Imagination from
the Affection's part, and contract a confederacy be-
tween the Reason and Imagination against the Affec-
tions. For the affections themselves carry ever an
appetite to good, as reason doth ; the difference is, that
the affection beholdeth merely the present ; reason behold-
eth the future and sum of time ; and therefore the pres-
ent filling the imagination more, reason is commonly
vanquished ; but after that force of eloquence and per-
suasion hath made things future and remote appear as
present, then upon the revolt of the imagination reason
prevaileth.

We conclude therefore, that Rhetoric can be no more
charged with the colouring of the worse part, than
Logic with Sophistry, or Morality with Vice.1 For

1 The last clause is omitted in the translation. I do not know why.
For according to Bacon's doctrine, expounded originally in the Medita-
tiones Sacrce upon the text non accipit stultus verba j/rudeniice nisi ea dixeris
qua versanlw in corde ejus, and repeated here a little further on, — namely,

300 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

we know the doctrines of contraries are the same,
though the use be opposite. It appeareth also that
Logic differeth from Rhetoric, not only as the fist from
the palm, the one close the other at large ; but much
more in this, that Logic handleth reason exact and
in truth, and Rhetoric handleth it as it is planted in
popular opinions and manners. And therefore Aris-
totle doth wisely place Rhetoric as between Logic on
the one side and moral or civil knowledge on the other,
as participating of both : for the proofs and demonstra-
tions of Logic are toward all men indifferent and the
same ; but the proofs and persuasions of Rhetoric ought
to differ according to the auditors :

Orpheus in sylvis, inter delphinas Arion:

[to be in the woods an Orpheus, among the dolphins
an Arion :] which application, in perfection of idea,
ought to extend so far, that if a man should speak of
the same thing to several persons, he should speak to
them all respectively and several ways : though this
politic part of eloquence in private speech it is easy for
the greatest orators to want, whilst by the observing
De prudential their well-graced forms of speech they leese
vati. the volubility of application : and therefore

it shall not be amiss to recommend this to better
inquiry ; 1 not being curious whether we place it here,
or in that part which concerneth policy.

Now therefore will I descend to the deficiences,

that a man can neither protect his own virtue against evil arts, nor reclaim
others from vice, without the help of the knowledge of evil, — Morality has
a relation to Vice exactly corresponding with that of Logic to Sophistry;
unless it be maintained that the Logician ought to be prepared to practice
Sophistry as well as to detect and defeat it.

1 Being a thing which the more it is considered the more it will be
valued (rem certe quam quo attentius quis recogitel, to pluris facitt).

THE SECOND BOOK. 301

which (as I said) are but attendances : 1 and first, I
do not find the wisdom and diligence of Aristotle well
pursued, who began to make a collection of the popular
signs and colours of good and evil, both simple Coiores boni a

, t • i ioi- mali, simplicis

and comparative, which are as the Sophisms et comparaa.
of Rhetoric (as I touched before). For example :

SOPHISMA.
Quod laudatur, bonum: quod vituperatur, malum.

KEDARGUTIO.

Laudat venales qui vult extrudere merces.
Malum est, malum est, inquit emptor: sed cum recesserit, turn gloriabitur.2

The defects in the labour of Aristotle are three :
one, that there be but a few of many ; another, that
their Elenches are not annexed : 3 and the third, that
he conceived but a part of the use of them : for their
use is not only in probation, but much more in im-
pression. For many forms are equal in signification
which are differing in impression ; as the difference is
great in the piercing of that which is sharp and that
which is flat, though the strength of the percussion be
the same ; for there is no man but will be a little more

1 and which are all of the nature of collections for store (pertinent omnia
ad promptuariam).

2 Sophism. — That which people praise is good, that which they blame

is bad.
Elknche. — He praises his wares who wants to get them off his
hands.
It is naught, it is naught, sayth the buyer; but when he is gone
he will vaunt.
8 In the translation, instead of the single example given above, he in-
serts a collection of twelve, by way of specimen ; each having the elenche
annexed and completel}' explained. This collection is a translation, with
corrections and additions, of the English tract entitled " Colours of Good
and Evil," which was printed along with the Essays in 1597, and will be
found in this edition among the literary works.

302 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

raised by hearing it said, Your enemies will be glad of
this :

Hoc Ithacus velit, et magno mercentur Atridae:

than by hearing it said only, This is evil for you.

Secondly, I do resume also that which I mentioned
before touching Provision or Preparatory store for the
furniture of speech and readiness of invention ; which
appeareth to be of two sorts ; the one in resemblance
to a shop of pieces unmade up, the other to a shop of
things ready made up ; both to be applied to that
which is frequent and most in request : the former of
these I will call Antitheta, and the latter Formula.

Antitheta are Theses argued pro et contra ; wherein
Antitheta men may De more large and laborious : but

Rerttm. Q^ suc\1 ag &re a)j]e fa Jq \£y ^0 avoi(J pro_

lixity of entry, I wish the seeds of the several argu-
ments to be cast up .into some brief and acute sen-
tences ; not to be cited, but to be as skeins or bottoms
of thread, to be unwinded at large when they come to
be used ; supplying authorities and examples by refer-
ence.

PRO VERBIS LEGIS.

Non est interpretatio, sed divinatio, quae recedit a litera.
Cum recedit ur a litera, judex transit in legislatorem.

PRO SENTENTIA LEGIS.
Ex omnibus verbis est eliciendus sensus qui interpretatur singula.1

Formulae are but decent and apt passages or convey-

1 For the Words of the Law. — Interpretation which departs from
the letter, is not interpretation but divination.

When the letter is departed from the Judge becomes the Lawgiver.

For the Intention of the Law. — The sense according to which
each word is to be interpreted must be collected from all the words to-
gether.

Of these antitheta a large collection will be found in the De Augmentu,
set forth by way of specimen in the manner here recommended.

THE SECOND BOOK. 303

ances of speech, which may serve indifferently for dif-
fering subjects ; as of preface, conclusion, digression,
transition, excusation, &c. For as in buildings there
is great pleasure and use in the well-casting of the
stair-cases, entries, doors, windows, and the like ; so
in speech the conveyances and passages are of special
ornament and effect.

A CONCLUSION IN A DELIBERATIVE.

So may we redeem the faults passed, and prevent the inconveniences
future.1

^[ 2 There remain two appendices touching the
tradition of knowledge, the one Critical, the other
Pedantical.3 For all knowledge is either delivered
by teachers, or attained by men's proper endeavours :
and therefore as the principal part of tradition of
knowledge concerneth chiefly writing 4 of books, so
the relative part thereof concerneth reading of books.
Whereunto appertain incidently these considerations.
The first is concerning the true correction and edition
of authors ; wherein nevertheless rash diligence hath
done great prejudice. For these critics have often
presumed that that which they understand not is false
set down : as the Priest that where he found it writ-
ten of St. Paul, Demissus est per sportam, [he was let
down in a basket,] mended his book, and made it
Demissus est per portam, [he was let out by the gate ;]

1 Of these formulas — or formulas minor es as he afterwards called them
— three other examples are given in the De Augmentis, all from Cicero.
Bacon's own speeches and narrative writings would supply many very
good ones.

2 De Aug. vi. 4.

3 P&dagogica, in the translation.

4 in icriting, in the original; and also in the editions 1629 and 1633.
The translation has in lectione Ubrorum consistit.

304 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

because sporta was an hard word, and out of his read-
ing ; l and surely their errors, though they be not so
palpable and ridiculous, are yet of the same kind.
And therefore as it hath been wisely noted, the most
corrected copies are commonly the least correct.

The second is concerning the exposition and expli-
cation of authors, which resteth in annotations and
commentaries ; wherein it is over usual to blanch the
obscure places, and discourse upon the plain.

The third is concerning the times, which in many
cases give great light to true interpretations.2

The fourth is concerning some brief censure and
judgment of the authors ; that men thereby may make
some election unto themselves what books to read.

And the fifth is concerning the syntax and disposi-

1 For this illustration, which as reflecting upon a Priest might have
been offensive at Rome, another is substituted in the De Augmentis, which
is " not so palpable and ridiculous." A striking instance of the same kind
occurs in two recent editions of this very work. In an edition of the Ad-
vancement of Learning, published by J. W. Parker in 1852, Orosius is sub-
stituted for Osorius in the passage (p. 119.), "Then grew the flowing and
watery vein of Osorius, the Portugal Bishop, to be in price; " with the fol-
lowing note: "All the editions have Osorius, which however must be a
mere misprint. He was not a Portuguese, but a Spaniard, born at Tarra-
gona, nor indeed ever a bishop. He was sent by St. Augustine on a mis-
sion to Jerusalem, and is supposed to have died in Africa in the earlier
part of the fifth century." In the following year Mr. H. Bohn published
a translation of the De Augmentis, which is little more than a reprint of
Shaw's translation, revised and edited by Mr. Joseph Devey. In this
edition Orosius is silently substituted for Osorius in the same passage, with
this note : " Neither a Portuguese, nor a bishop, but a Spanish monk born
at Tarragona, and sent by St. Augustine on a mission to Jerusalem in the
commencement of the fifth century." The mistake is the more remark-
able because the passage in Bacon refers obviously and unmistakably to
the period of the Reformation.

2 This point is omitted in the translation, except in so far as it is in-
volved in an observation which is added under the next head — viz. that
editors besides giving "some brief censure and judgment of their authors"
should compare them with other writers on the same subjects. But I am

THE SECOND BOOK. 305

tion of studies ; that men may know in what order or
pursuit to read.1

For Pedantical knowledge, it containeth that differ-
ence of Tradition which is proper for youth ; where-
unto appertain divers considerations of great fruit.

As first, the timing and seasoning of knowledges ;
as with what to initiate them, and from what for a
time to refrain them.

Secondly, the consideration where to begin with the
easiest and so proceed to the more difficult ; and in
what courses2 to press the more difficult and then to
turn them to the more easy : for it is one method to
practise swimming with bladders, and another to prac-
tise dancing with heavy shoes.

A third is the application of learning according unto
the propriety of the wits ; for there is no defect in the
faculties intellectual but seemeth to have a proper cure
contained in some studies : as for example, if a child
be bird-witted, that is, hath not the faculty of atten-
tion, the Mathematics giveth a remedy thereunto ; for
in them, if the wit be caught away but a moment, one
is new to begin. And as sciences have a propriety
towards faculties for cure and help, so faculties or
powers have a sympathy towards sciences for excel-
lency or speedy profiting ; and therefore it is an in-
quiry of great wisdom, what kinds of wits and natures
are most apt and proper for what sciences.

inclined to suspect that the omission was accidental; for the truth is, that
•without constant reference to the times and circumstances in which he
wrote hardly any author can be properly understood.

1 This point is also omitted in the translation; perhaps as included in
the "censure and judgment;" which (he adds) is as it were the Critic's
chair ; an office ennobled in his time by some great men, majores eerie nos-
tro jadicio quam pro modulo criticorum, — men above the stature of critics.

2 So all the editions: probably a misprint for cases.
VOL. vi. 20

306 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

Fourthly, the ordering of exercises is matter of great
consequence to hurt or help ; for as is well observed
by Cicero, men in exercising their faculties, if they be
not well advised, do exercise their faults and get ill
habits as well as good ; so as there is a great judgment
to be had in the continuance and intermission of exer-
cises. It were too long to particularise a number of
other considerations of this nature, things but of mean
appearance, but of singular efficacy. For as the wrong-
ing or cherishing of seeds or young plants is that that
is most important to their thriving ; and as it was
noted that the first six kings being in truth as tutors
of the state of Rome in the infancy thereof, was the
principal cause of the immense greatness of that state
which followed : so the culture and manurance of
minds in youth hath such a forcible (though unseen)
operation, as hardly any length of time or contention
of labour can countervail it afterwards. And it is not
amiss to observe also how small and mean faculties
gotten by education, yet when they fall into great men
or great matters, do work great and important effects ;
whereof we see a notable example in Tacitus of two
stage-players, Percennius and Vibulenus, who by their
faculty of playing put the Pannonian armies into an
extreme tumult and combustion. For there arising a
mutiny amongst them upon the death of Augustus
Caesar, Blaesus the lieutenant had committed some of
the mutiners ; which were suddenly rescued ; where-
upon Vibulenus got to be heard speak, which he did
in this manner : — These poor innocent wretches, ap-
pointed to cruel death, you have restored to behold the
light. But who shall restore my brother to me, or life
unto my brother ? that, was sent hither in message from

1

THE SECOND BOOK. 307

the legions of Germany to treat of the common cause,
and he hath murdered him this last night by some of his
fencers and ruffians, that he hath about him for his ex-
ecutioners upon soldiers. Answer, Bbxsus, what is done
with his body? The mortalest enemies do not deny burial.
When I have performed my last duties to the corpse with
kisses, with tears, command me to be slain besides him ;
so that these my fellows, for our good meaning and our
true hearts to the legions, may have leave to bury us.1

1 The last clause does not give the exact meaning of the original, from
■which it may seem that Bacon was reporting the speech from memory ;
unless it be that a line has accidentally dropped out. By inserting after
"fellows" the words "seeing us put to death for no crime, but only for,"
&c. the sense would be represented with sufficient accuracy.

In the translation, this passage relating to '' Pedantical knowledge," —
that is the knowledge which concerns the instruction of youth, — is con-
siderably enlarged, and a distinct opinion is expressed upon many of the
points which are here only noticed as worthy of enquiry. He begins by
recommending the schools of the Jesuits as the best model, — an opinion
which he had already intimated in the first book of the Advancement. He
approves of a collegiate education both for boys and young men, as dis-
tinguished from a private education under masters. He wishes compendi-
ums to be avoided, and the system which, aiming at precocity, produces
overconfidence and a mere shew of proficiency. He would encourage in-
dependence of mind, and if any one shews a taste for studies which lie out
of the regular course, and can find time to pursue them, he would by no
means have him restrained. Of the two methods mentioned in the text,
one beginning with the easiest tasks, the other with the most difficult, he
recommends a judicious intermixture, as best for the advancement of the
powers both of mind and body. "With regard to the "application of learn-
ing according unto the propriety of the wits," he observes (besides its use
as a corrective of mental defects) that masters ought to attend to it for the
guidance of the parents in choosing their sons' course of life; and also be-
cause a man will advance so much faster in studies for which he has a
natural aptitude than in any others. With regard to the " ordering of ex-
ercises" he recommends the system of intermissions. (Itaque iutius est in-
termitlere exercilia et subinde repetere, quam assidue continuare el urgere.)
Lastly he would decidedly have the art of acting (actio theatralis) made a
part of the education of youth. The Jesuits, he says, do not despise it;
and he thinks they are right; for though it be of ill repute as a profession
(si sit profess&ria, in/amis est) yet as a part of discipline it is of excellent
use. It strengthens the memory, it regulates the tone and effect of the

308 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

With which speech he put the army into an infinite
fury and uproar ; whereas truth was he had no brother,
neither was there any such matter, but he played it
merely as if he had been upon the stage.

But to return : we are now come to a period of Ra-
tional Knowledges ; wherein if I have made the divisions
other than those that are received, yet would I not be
thought to disallow all those divisions which I do not
use. For there is a double necessity imposed upon me
of altering the divisions. The one, because it differeth
in end and purpose, to sort together those things which
are next in nature, and those things which are next in
use. For if a secretary of state should sort his papers,
it is like in his study or general cabinet he would sort
together things of a nature, as treaties, instructions,
&c. but in his boxes or particular cabinet he would sort
together those that he were like to use together, though
of several natures ; so in this general cabinet of knowl-
edge it was necessary for me to follow the divisions of the
nature of things ; whereas if myself had been to handle
any particular knowledge, I would have respected the
divisions fittest for use. The other, because the bring-
ing in of the deficiences did by consequence alter the

voice and pronunciation, it teaches a decent carriage of the countenance
and gesture, it begets no small degree of confidence, and accustoms young
men to bear being looked at. In Bacon's time, when masques acted by
young gentlemen of the Universities or Inns of Court were the favourite
entertainment of princes, these things were probably better attended to
than they are now — and he could have pointed no doubt to many living
examples in illustration of his remark. The examples which modern ex-
perience supplies are all of the negative kind, but not therefore the less
significant. The art of speaking, of recitation, even of reading aloud, is
not now taught at all; and the consequence is, that even among men
otherwise accomplished not many will be found who can either speak a
speech of their own, or recite the speech of another, or read a book aloud,
so as to be listened to with pleasure in a mixed company for a quarter of
an hour together.

I

THE SECOND BOOK. 309

partitions of the rest : for let the knowledge extant
(for demonstration sake) be fifteen ; let the knowledge
with the deficiences be twenty ; the parts of fifteen are
not the parts of twenty ; for the parts of fifteen are
three and five ; the parts of twenty are two, four, five,
and ten. So as these things are without contradiction,
and could not otherwise be.

^[ 1 We proceed now to that knowledge which con-
sidered of the Appetite 2 and Will of Man ; whereof
Salomon saith, Ante omnia, fili, custodi cor tuum ; nam
inde procedunt actionem vitce : [keep thy heart with all
diligence, for thereout come the actions of thy life].
In the handling of this science, those which have writ-
ten seem to me to have done as if a man that professeth
to teach to write did only exhibit fair copies of alpha-
bets and letters joined, without giving any precepts or
directions for the carriage of the hand and framing of
the letters. So have they made good and fair exem-
plars and copies, carrying the draughts and portraitures
of Good, Virtue, Duty, Felicity ; propounding them
well described as the true objects and scopes of man's
will and desires ; but how to attain these excellent
marks, and how to frame and subdue the will of man
to become true and conformable to these pursuits, they
pass it over altogether or slightly and unprofitably. For
it is not the disputing that moral virtues are in the mind
of man by habit and not by nature, or the distinguish-
ing that generous spirits are won by doctrines and per-
suasions, and the vulgar sort by reward and punishment?

1 De Aug. vii. 1.

2 In the translation the word Appetite is omitted : and the Will is de-
scribed as governed by right reason, seduced by apparent good, having
the passions for spurs, the organs and voluntary motions for ministers.

8 Or the giving it in precept (he adds in the translation) that if you

310 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

and the like scattered glances and touches, that can ex-
cuse the absence of this part.

The reason of this omission I suppose to be that
hidden rock whereupon both this and many other barks
of knowledge have been cast away ; which is, that men
have despised to be conversant in ordinary and com-
mon matters ; the judicious direction whereof never-
theless is the wisest doctrine (for life consisteth not in
novelties or subtilities) ; but contrariwise they have
compounded sciences chiefly of a certain resplendent or
lustrous mass of matter, chosen to give glory either to
the subtility of disputations or to the eloquence of dis-
courses. But Seneca giveth an excellent check to elo-
quence ; Nocet illis eloquentia, quibus non rerum cupid-
itatem facit, sed sui : [eloquence does mischief when
it draws men's attention away from the matter to fix it
on itself]. Doctrines should be such as should make
men in love with the lesson, and not with the teacher ;
being directed to the auditor's benefit, and not to the
author's commendation : and therefore those are of the
right kind which mav be concluded as Demosthenes
concludes his counsel, Quce si feceritis, non oratorem
duntaxat in prcesentia laudabitis, sed vosmetipsos etiam
non ita multo post statu rerum vestrarum meliore : [if
you follow this advice you will do a grace to yourselves
no less than to the speaker, — to him by your vote to-
day, to yourselves by the improvement which you will
presently find in your affairs].

Neither needed men of so excellent parts to have
despaired of a fortune which the poet Virgil promised
himself, (and indeed obtained,) who got as much glory

would rectify the mind you must bend it like a wand in the direction con-
trary to its inclination.

THE SECOND BOOK. 311

of eloquence, wit, and learning in the expressing of the
observations of husbandry, as of the heroical acts of
^Eneas : —

Nee sum animi dubius, verbis ea vincere magnum
Quam sit, et angustis his addere rebus honorem.
[How hard the task alas full well I know
With charm of words to grace a theme so low.]

And surely if the purpose be in good earnest not to
write at leisure that which men may read at leisure,
but really to instruct and suborn action and active life,
these Georgics of the mind, concerning the husbandry
and tillage thereof, are no less worthy than the heroical
descriptions of Virtue, Duty, and Felicity. Where-
fore the main and primitive division of moral knowl-
edge seemeth to be into the Exemplar or Platform of
Good, and the Regiment or Culture of the Mind ; the
one describing the nature of good, the other prescribing
rules how to subdue, apply, and accommodate the will
of man thereunto.

The doctrine touching the Platform or Nature of
Good considereth it either Simple or Compared ; either
the kinds of good, or the degrees of good : in the later
whereof those infinite disputations which were touching
the supreme degree thereof, which they term felicity,
beatitude, or the highest good, the doctrines concern-
ing which were as the heathen divinity, are by the
Christian faith discharged. And as Aristotle saith, That
young men may be happy, but not otherwise but by hope ;
so we must all acknowledge our minority, and embrace
the felicity which is by hope of the future world.

Freed therefore and delivered from this doctrine of
the philosophers' heaven, whereby they feigned an high-
er elevation of man's nature than was, (for we see in

312 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

what an height of style Seneca writeth, Vere magnum,
habere fragilitatem hominis, securitatem Dei, [it is true
greatness to have in one the frailty of a man and the
security of a God,] we may with more sobriety and
truth receive the rest of their inquiries and labours.
Wherein for the Nature of Good Positive or Simple,
they have set it down excellently, in describing the
forms of Virtue and Duty, with their situations and
postures, in distributing them into their kinds, parts,
provinces, actions, and administrations, and the like :
nay farther, they have commended them to man's na-
ture and spirit with great quickness of argument and
beauty of persuasions ; yea, and fortified and intrenched
them (as much as discourse can do) against corrupt and
popular opinions. Again, for the Degrees and Com-
parative Nature of Good, they have also excellently
handled it in their triplicity of Good, in the compari-
sons between a contemplative and an active life, in the
distinction between virtue with reluctation and virtue
secured, in their encounters between honesty and profit,
in their balancing of virtue with virtue, and the like ;
so as this part deserveth to be reported for excellently
laboured.1

Notwithstanding, if before they had comen to the pop-
ular and received notions of virtue and vice, pleasure
and pain, and the rest, they had stayed a little longer
upon the inquiry concerning the roots of good and evil,
and the strings of those roots, they had given, in my
opinion, a great light to that which followed ; and
specially if they had consulted with nature, they had

1 Well by the ancient philosophers, but still better (according to the
translation) by the divines in their discussions of moral duties ami vir-
tues, cases of conscience, sins, &e.

THE SECOND BOOK. 313

made their doctrines less prolix and more profound ;
which being by them in part omitted and in part han-
dled with much confusion, we will endeavour to resume
and open in a more clear manner.

There is formed in every thing a double nature of
good : the one, as every thing is a total or substantive
in itself; the other, as it is a part or member of a greater
body ; whereof the later is in degree the greater and
the worthier, because it tendeth to the conservation of
a more general form. Therefore we see the iron in
particular sympathy moveth to the loadstone ; but yet
if it exceed a certain quantity, it forsaketh the affection
to the loadstone, and like a good patriot moveth to the
earth, which is the region and country of massy bodies ;
so may we go forward, and see that water and massy
bodies move to the centre of the earth ; but rather than
to suffer a divulsion in the continuance of nature, they
will move upwards from the centre of the earth, for-
saking their duty to the earth in regard of their duty
to the world. This double nature of good, and the
comparative thereof, is much more engraven upon man,
if he degenerate not ; unto whom the conservation of
duty to the public ought to be much more precious than
the conservation of life and being: according to that
memorable speech of Pompeius Magnus, when being
in commission of purveyance for a famine at Rome,
and being dissuaded with great vehemency and instance
by his friends about him that he should not hazard
himself to sea in an extremity of weather, he said only
to them, Necesse est ut earn, non ut vivam : [it is needful
that I go, not that I live]. But it may be truly af-
firmed that there was never any philosophy, religion,
or other discipline, which did so plainly and highly exalt

314 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

the good which is communicative, and depress the good
which is private and particular, as the Holy Faith ;
well declaring, that it was the same God that gave the
Christian law to men, who gave those laws of nature
to inanimate creatures that we spake of before ; for we
read that the elected saints of God have wished them-
selves anathematized and razed out of the book of life,
in an ecstasy of charity and infinite feeling of com-
munion.

This being set down and strongly planted, doth
judge and determine most of the controversies wherein
Moral Philosophy is conversant. For first it decideth
the question touching the preferment of the contempla-
tive or active life, and decideth it against Aristotle.
For. all the reasons which he bringeth for the contem-
plative are private, and respecting the pleasure and
dignity of a man's self, (in which respects no question
the contemplative life hath the pre-eminence:) not
much unlike to that comparison which Pythagoras
made for the gracing and magnifying of philosophy and
contemplation ; who being asked what he was, answered,
That if Hiero were ever at the Olympian games, he kneio
the manner, that some came to try their fortune for the
prizes, and some came as merchants to utter their com-
modities, and some came to make good cheer and meet their
friends, and some came to look on ; and that he was one
of them that came to look on. But men must know, that
in this theatre of man's life it is reserved only for God
and Angels to be lookers on. Neither could the like
question ever have been received in the church, not-
withstanding their Pretiosa in oculis Domini mors sanc-
torum ejus, [precious in the sight of the Lord is the
death of his saints,] by which place they would exalt

THE SECOND BOOK. 315

their civil death and regular professions, but upon this
defence, that the monastical life is not simple * contem-
plative, but performeth the duty either of incessant
prayers and supplications, which hath been truly
esteemed as an office in the church, or else of writing
or taking 2 instructions for writing concerning the law
of God, as Moses did when he abode so long in the
mount. And so we see Henoch the seventh from
Adam, who was the first Contemplative and walked
with God, yet did also endow the church with proph-
ecy, which St. Jude citeth. But for contemplation
which should be finished in itself without casting beams
upon society, assuredly divinity knoweth it not.

It decideth also the controversies between Zeno and
Socrates and their schools and successions on the one
side, who placed felicity in virtue simply or attended ;
the actions and exercises whereof do chiefly embrace
and concern society ; and on the other side,3 the Cyre-
naics and Epicureans, who placed it in pleasure, and
made virtue (as it is used in some comedies of errors,
wherein the mistress and the maid change habits,) to
be but as a servant, without which pleasure cannot be
served and attended ; and the reformed school of the
Epicureans, which placed it in serenity of mind and
freedom from perturbation ; as if they would have de-
posed Jupiter again, and restored Saturn and the first

» Edd. 1629 and 1633 have simply.

2 So edd. 1629 and 1633. The original has in taking. In the translation
the words "taking instructions for writing " are omitted; as applicable, I
suppose, to the case of Moses only, not of the Church ; and multo in otio
substituted.

8 Et reliqnas camplures seclas et scholas, ex altera parte : veluti, &c. All
the opinions which are about to be cited belong to " the other side " — i. e.
the side opposed to that of Zeno and Socrates; a point which from the
careless composition of the English is not immediately clear.

316

OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

age, when there was no summer nor winter, spring nor
autumn, but all after one air and season ; and Herillus,1
which placed felicity in extinguishment of the disputes
of the mind, making no fixed nature of good and evil,
esteeming things according to the clearness of the de-
sires, or the reluctation ; 2 which opinion was revived
in the heresy of the Anabaptists, measuring things ac-
cording to the motions of the spirit, and the constancy
or wavering of belief: all which are manifest to tend
to private repose and contentment, and not to point of
society.

It censureth also the philosophy of Epictetus, which
presupposeth that felicity must be placed in those things
which are in our power, lest we be liable to fortune and
disturbance : as if it were not a thing much more happy
to fail in good and virtuous ends for the public, than to
obtain all that we can wish to ourselves in our proper
fortune ; as Consalvo said to his soldiers, shewing them
Naples, and protesting he had rather die one foot for-
wards than to have his life secured for long by one foot
of retreat ; whereunto the wisdom of that heavenly
leader hath signed, who hath affirmed that a good eon-
science is a continual feast : shewing plainly that the
conscience of good intentions, howsoever succeeding,
is a more continual joy to nature than all the provision
which can be made for security and repose.

It censureth likewise that abuse of philosophy which
grew general about the time of Epictetus, in converting

i The translation has " and lastly that exploded school of Pyrrho and
Herillus."

2 That is, esteeming those actions good which are attended with clear-
ness and composure of mind, those bad which proceed with dislike and re-
luctation — {acliones pro bonis aut mails habenles, prout ex animo, motu puro
et irref ratio, aut contra cum aversatione et reluctatione, prodirent).

THE SECOND BOOK. 317

it into an occupation or profession ; as if the purpose
had been, not to resist and extinguish perturbations, but
to fly and avoid the causes of them, and to shape a
particular kind and course of life to that end ; intro-
ducing such an health of mind, as was that health of
body of which Aristotle speaketh of Herodicus, who
did nothing all his life long but intend his health :
whereas if men refer themselves to duties of society, as
that health of body is best which is ablest to endure all
alterations and extremities, so likewise that health of
mind is most proper1 which can go through the greatest
temptations and perturbations. So as Diogenes' opinion
is to be accepted, who commended not them which ab-
stained, but them which sustained, and could refrain
their mind in prcecipitio, and could give unto the mind
(as is used in horsemanship) the shortest stop or turn.

Lastly, it censureth the tenderness and want of ap-
plication 2 in some of the most ancient and reverend
philosophers and philosophical men, that did retire too
easily from civil business, for avoiding of indignities
and perturbations ; whereas the resolution of men truly
moral ought to be such as the same Consalvo said the
honour of a soldier should be, e teld crassiore, [of a
stouter web,] and not so fine as that every thing should
.patch in it and endanger it.

^[ 3 To resume Private or Particular Good, it falleth
into the division of Good Active and Passive : for this
difference of Good (not unlike to that which amongst
the Romans was expressed in the familiar or household

1 i. e. that mind is to be considered truly and properly healthy — (ani-
mus Hie demum vere et propria sanus et validus censendus est).

2 meaning -what we should now rather call want of compliance or accom-
modation — (inepiitudinem ad morigerandum).

8 De Aug. vii. 2.

318 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

terms of Promus and Condus) is formed also in all
things ; and is best disclosed in the two several appe-
tites in creatures, the one to preserve or continue them-
selves, and the other to dilate or multiply themselves ;
whereof the later seemeth to be the worthier. For in
nature, the heavens, which are the more worthy, are
the agent ; and the earth, which is the less worthy, is
the patient. In the pleasures of living creatures, that
of generation is greater than that of food. In divine doc-
trine, Beatius est dare quam aceipere : [it is more blessed
to give than to receive] . And in life, there is no man's
spirit so soft, but esteemeth the effecting of somewhat
that he hath fixed in his desire more than sensuality.
Which priority of the Active Good is much upheld by
the consideration of our estate to be mortal and exposed
to fortune ; for if we might have a perpetuity and cer-
tainty in our pleasures, the state 1 of them would ad-
vance their price ; but when we see it is but Magni
cestimamus mori tardius, [we think it a great matter to
be a little longer in dying,] and Ne glorieris de crastino,
nescis partum diei, [boast not thyself of to-morrow,
thou knowest not what the day may bring forth,] it
maketh us to desire to have somewhat secured and ex-
empted from time ; which are only our deeds and
works ; as it is said Opera eorum sequuntur eos : [their
works follow them]. The pre-eminence likewise of
this Active Good is upheld by the affection which is
natural in man towards variety and proceeding ; which
in the pleasures of the sense (which is the principal
part of Passive Good) can have no great latitude:
Cogita quamdiu eadem feceris ; cibus, somnus, Indus ;
per hunc circulum cwrritur ; mori velle non tantum fortis,

1 f. e. the stability, (stcuritas et mora.)

THE SECOND BOOK. 319

aut miser, aut prudens, sed etiam fastidiosus potest : [if
you consider, says Seneca, how often you do the same
thing over and over ; food sleep exercise, and then food
sleep exercise again, and so round and round ; you will
think that there needs neither fortitude nor misery nor
wisdom to reconcile a man to death ; one might wish to
die for mere weariness of being alive]. But in enter-
prises, pursuits, and purposes of life, there is much
variety ; whereof men are sensible with pleasure in
their inceptions, progressions, recoils, reintegrations, ap-
proaches, and attainings to their ends : so as it was
well said, Vita sine propositi languida et vaya est : [life
without an object to pursue is a languid and tiresome
thing]. Neither hath this Active Good any l identity
with the good of society, though in some case it hath
an incidence into it : for although it do many times
bring forth acts of beneficence, yet it is with a respect
private to a man's own power, glory, amplification, con-
tinuance ; as appeareth plainly when it findeth a con-
trary subject. For that gigantine state of mind which
possesseth the troublers of the world, such as was
Lucius Sylla, and infinite other in smaller model, who
would have all men happy or unhappy as they were
their friends or enemies, and would give form to the
world according to their own humours, (which is the
true Theomachy.) pretendeth and aspireth to active
good,2 though it recedeth furthest from good of society,
which we have determined to be the greater.

To resume Passive Good, it receiveth a subdivision
of Conservative and Perfective. For let us take a brief

1 So edd. 1629 and 1633. The original has and.

2 ». e. apparent good of the individual — (bormm activum individuate saltern
apparent).

320 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

review of that which we have said : we have spoken
first of the Good of Society, the intention whereof em-
braceth the form of Human Nature, whereof we are
members and portions, and not our own proper and
individual form ; we have spoken of Active Good, and
supposed it as a part of Private, and Particular Good ;
and rightly ; * for there is impressed upon all things a
triple desire or appetite proceeding from love to them-
selves ; one of preserving and continuing their form ;
another of advancing and perfecting their form ; and a
third of multiplying and extending their form upon
other things ; whereof the multiplying or signature of
it upon other things is that which we handled by the
name of Active Good. So as there remaineth the con-
serving of it, and perfecting or raising of it ; which
later is the highest degree of Passive Good. For to
preserve in state is the less, to preserve with advance-
ment is the greater. So in man,

Igneus est ollis vigor, et coelestis origo.*
[The living fire that glows those seeds within
Remembers its celestial origin.]

His approach or assumption to divine or angelical na-
ture is the perfection of his form ; the error or false
imitation of which good is that which is the tempest of
human life ; while man, upon the instinct of an ad-
vancement formal and essential, is carried to seek an
advancement local. For as those which are sick, and
find no remedy, do tumble up and down and change

1 This passage, from for let us take &c. to rightly, is omitted in the trans-
lation ; and the argument proceeds more clearly without it.

2 The connexion of this with the preceding sentence is made clearer in
the translation by the remark that there are found throughout the universe
certain nobler natures which inferior natures recognise as their origin and
towards which they aspire.

THE SECOND BOOK. 321

place, as if by a remove local they could obtain a re-
move internal ; so is it with men in ambition, when
failing of the mean to exalt their nature, they are in a
perpetual estuation to exalt their place. So then Pas-
sive Good is, as was said, either Conservative or Per-
fective.

To resume the good of Conservation or Comfort,
which consisteth in the fruition of that which is agree-
able to our natures ; it seemeth to be the most pure and
natural of pleasures, but yet the softest and the lowest.
And this also receiveth a difference, which hath neither
been well judged of nor well enquired. For the good
of fruition or contentment is placed either in the sin-
cereness of the fruition, or in the quickness and vigour
of it ; the one superinduced by the equality, the other
by vicissitude ; the one having less mixture of evil,
the other more impression of good. Whether of these
is the greater good, is a question controverted ; but
whether man's nature may not be capable of both, is a
question not enquired.

The former question being debated between Socrates
and a Sophist, Socrates placing felicity in an equal and
constant peace of mind, and the Sophist in much desir-
ing and much enjoying, they fell from argument to ill
words : the Sophist saying that Socrates' felicity was
the felicity of a block or stone ; and Socrates saying
that the Sophist's felicity was the felicity of one that
had the itch, who did nothing but itch and scratch.
And both these opinions do not want their supports.
For the opinion of Socrates is much upheld by the gen-
eral consent even of the Epicures themselves, that vir-
tue beareth a great part in felicity ; and if so, certain it
is that virtue hath more use in clearing perturbations

VOL. VI. 21

322 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

than in compassing desires. The Sophist's opinion is
much favoured by the assertion we* last spake of, that
good of advancement is greater than good of simple
preservation ; because every obtaining a desire hath a
shew of advancement,1 as motion though in a circle
hath a shew of progression.

But the second question, decided the true way,
maketh the former superfluous. For can it be doubted
but that there are some who take more pleasure in en-
joying pleasures than some other, and yet nevertheless
are less troubled with the loss or leaving of them ? so
as this same Non uti ut non appetas, non appetere ut non
metuas, sunt animipusilli et diffidentis: [to abstain from
the use of a thing that you may not feel a want of it \
to shun the want that you may not fear the loss of it ;
are the precautions of pusillanimity and cowardice2].
And it seemeth to me, that most of the doctrines of the 1
philosophers are more fearful and cautionary than the I
nature of things requireth. So have they increased the
fear of death in oifering to cure it. For when they
would have a man's whole life to be but a discipline or
preparation to die, they must needs make men think
that it is a terrible enemy against whom there is no
end of preparing. Better saith the poet :

Qui finem vitse extremum inter munera ponat
Naturae :

[the end of life is to be counted among the boons of
nature]. So have they sought to make men's minds

1 t. e. towards the perfection of nature; only a shew of advancement,
however, not necessarily a real one — (quia rerum cupitarum adeptiones na-
turam videantur sensim perficere ; quod licet vere nonfaciant, tamen, kc.

2 Compare Shakspeare's sonnet —

I cannot chuse
But weep to have that which I fear to lose.

THE SECOND BOOK. 323

too uniform and harmonical, by not breaking them
sufficiently to contrary motions : the reason whereof I
suppose to be, because they themselves were men dedi-
cated to a private, free, and unapplied course of life.
For as we see, upon the lute or like instrument, a
ground, though it be sweet and have shew of many
changes, yet breaketh not the hand to such strange and
hard stops and passages as a set song or voluntary;
much after the same manner was the diversity between
a philosopical and a ciyil life.1 And therefore men are
to imitate the wisdom of jewellers ; who, if there be a
grain or a cloud or an ice which may be ground forth
without taking too much of the stone, they help it ;
but if it should lessen and abate the stone too much,
they will not meddle with it : so ought men so to pro-
cure serenity as they destroy not magnanimity.

Having therefore deduced the Good of Man which
is Private and Particular as far as seemeth fit, we will
now return to that good of man which respecteth and
beholdeth society, which we may term Duty ; because
the term of Duty is more proper to a mind well framed
and disposed towards others, as the term of Virtue is
applied to a mind well formed and composed in itself;
though neither can a man understand Virtue without
some relation to society, nor Duty without an inward
disposition. This part may seem at first to pertain to
science civil and politic ; but not if it be well observed.
For it concerneth the regiment and government of
every man over himself, and not over others. And
as in architecture the direction of framing the posts,
beams, and other parts of building, is not the same

1 This illustration is omitted in the translation.

324 OF "THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

with the manner of joining them and erecting the
building ; and in mechanicals, the direction how to
frame an instrument or engine, js not the same with the
manner of setting it on work and employing it ; and
yet nevertheless in expressing of the one you incidently
express the aptness towai'ds the other ; so the doctrine
of conjugation of men in society differeth from that of
their conformity thereunto.1

This part of Duty is subdivided into two parts : the
common duty of every man, as a man or member of a
state ; the other, the respective or special duty of every
man, in his profession, vocation, and place. The first
of these is extant and well laboured, as hath been said.
The second likewise I may report rather dispersed than
deficient ; which manner of dispersed writing in this
kind of argument I acknowledge to be best. For who
can take upon him to write of the proper duty, virtue,
challenge, and right of every several vocation, profes-
sion and place ? For although sometimes a looker on
may see more than a gamester, and there be a proverb
more arrogant than sound, That the vale best discovered
the hill ; yet there is small doubt but that men can
write best and most really and materially in their own
professions; and that the writing of speculative men of
active matter for the most part doth seem to men of ex-
perience, as Phormio's argument of the wars seemed to
Hannibal, to be but dreams and dotage. Only there is
one vice which accompanieth them that write in their
own professions, that they magnify them in excess. But
generally it were to be wished (as that which would
make learning indeed solid and fruitful) that active men
would or could become writers.

1 i. e. of the conformation of men to the business of society — {qva
reddit ad hujusmodi societatis commoda amformes et bene affectos).

tern

THE SECOND BOOK. 325

In which kind I cannot but mention, Iwnoris causa,
your Majesty's excellent book touching the duty of a
king : a work richly compounded of divinity, morality,
and policy, with great aspersion of all other arts ; and
being in mine opinion one of the most sound and health-
ful writings that I have read ; not distempered in the
heat of invention, nor in the coldness of negligence ;
not sick of dizziness,1 as those are who leese themselves
in their order ; nor of convulsions,3 as those which
cramp in matters impertinent ; not savouring of per-
fumes and paintings, as those do who seek to please the
reader more than nature 3 beareth ; and chiefly well
disposed in the spirits thereof, being agreeable to truth
and apt for action ; and far removed from that natural
infirmity, whereunto I noted those that write in their
own professions to be subject, which is, that they exalt
it above measure. For your Majesty hath truly de-
scribed, not a king of Assyria or Persia in their extern
glory, but a Moses or a David, pastors of their people.
Neither can I ever leese out of my remembrance what
I heard your Majesty in the same sacred spirit of gov-
ernment deliver in a great cause of judicature, which
was, That Kings ruled by their laws as God did by
the laws of nature, and ought as rarely to put in use
their supreme prerogative as God doth his power of work-
ing miracles. And yet notwithstanding, in your book

1 Dusinesse in the original. Businesse in edd. 1629 and 1633. Vertigine
in De Aug.

2 The words " convulsion " and " cramp " seem to describe a forced and
abrupt style ; an idea not implied in the words of the translation, which
may be retranslated thus: "not distracted in digressions, as those which

. wind about to take in matters impertinent " — {ut ilia quce nihil ad rlwmbiim
sunt expatiatione aliqua flexuosa complectatur).

8 ». e. the nature of the argument. — {qui lectoi-um potius delectalioni quara
argumenti natures inserviunt).

326 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

of a free monarchy, you do well give men to under-
stand, that you know the plenitude of the power and
right of a King, as well as the circle of his office and
duty. Thus have I presumed to allege this excellent
writing of your Majesty, as a prime or eminent ex-
ample of tractates concerning special and respective
duties ; wherein I should have said as much, if it had
been written a thousand years since. Neither am I
moved with certain courtly decencies, which esteem it
flattery to praise in presence. No, it is flattery to
praise in absence ; that is, when either the virtue is
absent, or the occasion is absent ; and so the praise is
not natural, but forced, either in truth or in time.
But let Cicero be read in his oration pro Marcello,
which is nothing but an excellent table of Caesar's
virtue, and made to his face ; besides the example of
many other excellent persons, wiser a great deal than
such observers ; * and we will never doubt, upon a
full occasion, to give just praises to present or absent.
But to return : there belongeth further to the han-
dling of this part2 touching the duties of professions
and vocations, a Relative or opposite, touching the
frauds, cautels, impostures, and vices of every profes-
sion ; which hath been likewise handled : but how ?
rather in a satire and cynically, than seriously and
wisely : for men have rather sought by wit to deride
and traduce much of that which is good in professions,
than with judgment to discover and sever that which is
corrupt. For, as Salomon saith, He that cometh to

1 In the translation he merely adds the single example of Pliny the
younger in his Panegyric on Trajan. When he wrote the Advancement of
Learning, he appears to have been under the impression that Pliny's
Panegyric was spoken after Trajan's death. See below, p. 344.

2 So edd. 1629 and 1633. The original has partie.

i

THE SECOND BOOK. 327

seek after knowledge with a mind to scorn and cen-
sure, shall be sure to find matter for his humour, but no
matter for his instruction : Qucerenti derisori scientiam
ipsa se abscondit ; sed studioso fit obviam. But the man-
aging of this argument with integrity and truth, which
I note as deficient, seemeth to me to be one of the best
fortifications for honesty and virtue that can be planted.
For as the fable goeth of the Basilisk, that if he see you
first you die for it, but if you see him first he dieth ; so
is it with deceits and evil arts ; which if they be first
espied they leese their life, but if they prevent they en-
danger. So that we are much beholden to Machiavel
and others, that write what men do and not what they
ought to do. For it is not possible to join serpentine
wisdom with the columbine innocency, except men
know exactly all the conditions of the serpent; his
baseness and going upon his belly, his volubility and
lubricity, his envy and sting, and the rest ; that is, all
forms and natures of evil. For without this, virtue
lieth open and unfenced. Nay an honest man can do
no good upon those that are wicked to reclaim them,
without the help of the knowledge of evil. For men of
corrupted minds presuppose that honesty groweth out
of simplicity of manners, and believing of preachers,
school-masters, and men's exterior language : so as,
except you can make them perceive that you know the
utmost reaches of their own corrupt opinions, they
despise all morality. Non recipit stultus verba pruden-
tice, nisi ea dixeris quce versantur in corde ejus : [the
fool will not listen to the words of the wise, unless you
first tell him what is in his own heart].1

1 In the translation this is set down as a desideratum under the title of
Satira Seria sice traclatus de inlerioribus rerum.

328 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

Unto this part touching Respective Duty doth also
appertain the duties between husband and wife, parent
and child, master and servant : so likewise the laws of
friendship and gratitude, the civil bond of companies,
colleges, and politic bodies, of neighbourhood, and all
other proportionate duties ; not as they are parts of
government and society, but as to the framing of the
mind of particular persons.

The knowledge concerning good respecting Society
doth handle it also not simply alone, but comparatively ;
whereunto belongeth the weighing of duties between
person and person, case and case, particular and public :
as we see in the proceeding 2 of Lucius Brutus against
his own sons, which was so much extolled ; yet what
was said?

Infelix, utcunque ferent ea facta 2 minores ;

[unhappy man ! whatever judgment posterity shall pass
upon that deed, &c.]. So the case was doubtful, and
had opinion on both sides. Again, we see when M.
Brutus and Cassius invited to a supper certain whose
opinions they meant to feel, whether they were fit to
be made their associates, and cast forth the question
touching the killing of a tyrant being an usurper, they
were divided in opinion ; some holding that servitude
was the extreme of evils, and others that tyranny was
better than a civil war : and a number of the like cases
there are of comparative duty. Amongst which that
of all others is the most frequent, where the question is
of a great deal of good to ensue of a small injustice.
Which Jason of Thessalia determined against the truth :
Aliqua sunt injuste facienda, ut multa juste fieri possini ':

1 in animntlversione ilia severa et atroci. — De Aug.

2 Fata both in the Advancement and in the De Aug mentis.

1

THE SECOND BOOK. 329

[that there may be justice in many things there must
be injustice in some]. But the reply is good, Auihorem
prcesentis justitioe habes, sponsorem futurce non habes :
[the justice that is to be done now is in your power, but
where is your security for that which is to be done
hereafter?] Men must pursue things which are just
in present, and leave the future to the divine Provi-
dence. So then we pass on from this general part
touching the exemplar and description of good.

^[ 2 Now therefore that we have spoken of this fruit
of life, it remaineth to speak of the husbandry De CuUura
that belongeth thereunto ; without which part An,mt-
the former seemeth to be no better than a fair image or
statua, which is beautiful to contemplate, but is without
life and motion : whereunto Aristotle himself subscrib-
eth in these words : Necesse est scilicet de virtute dicere,
et quid sit, et ex quibus gignatur. Inutile enim fere fuerit
virtutem quidem nosse, acquirendce autem ejus modos et
vias ignorare. Non enim de virtute tantum, qua specie
sit, qucerendum est, sed et quomodo sui copiam faciat :
utrumque enim volumus, et rem ipsam nosse, et ejus com-
potes fieri: hoc autem ex voto non succedet, nisi sciamus
et ex quibus et quomodo : [it is necessary to determine
concerning Virtue not only what it is but whence it
proceeds. For there would be no use in knowing Vir-
tue without knowing the ways and means of acquiring
it. For we have to consider not only what it is, but
how it is to be had. For we want both to know virtue
and to be virtuous ; which we cannot be without know-
ing both the whence and the how]. In such full words
and with such iteration doth he inculcate this part. So
saith Cicero in great commendation of Cato the second,

1 De Aug. vii. 3.

330 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

that lie had applied himself to philosophy non ita dis-
putandi causa, sed ita vivendi : [not that he might talk
like a philosopher, but that he might live like one].
And although the neglect of our times, wherein few
men do hold any consultations touching the reforma-
tion of their life, (as Seneca excellently saith, De par-
tibus vital quisque deliberate de summd nemo,} [every
man takes thought about the parts of his life, no man
about the whole,] may make this part seem superflu-
ous ; yet I must conclude with that aphorism of Hip-
pocrates, Qui gravi morbo correpii dolores non sentiunt,
Us mens ozgrotat ; [they that are sick and yet feel no
pain are sick in their minds ;] they need medicine not
only to assuage the disease but to awake the sense.
And if it be said that the cure of men's minds belongeth
to sacred Divinity, it is most true : but yet Moral
Philosophy may be preferred unto her as a wise servant
and humble handmaid. For as the Psalm saith, that
the eyes of the handmaid look perpetually towards the
mistress, and yet no doubt many things are left to the
discretion of the handmaid to discern of the mistress'
will ; so ought Moral Philosophy to give a constant
attention to the doctrines of Divinity, and yet so as it
may yield of herself (within due limits) many sound
and profitable directions.

This part therefore, because of the excellency there-
of, I cannot but find exceeding strange that it is not
reduced to written inquiry ; the rather because it con-
sisteth of much matter wherein both speech and action
is often conversant, and such wherein the common talk
of men (which is rare, but yet cometh sometimes to
pass) is wiser than their books. It is reasonable there-
fore that we propound it in the more particularity, both

THE SECOND BOOK. 331

for the worthiness, and because we may acquit our-
selves for reporting it deficient ; which seemeth almost
incredible, and is otherwise conceived and presupposed
by those themselves that have written. We will there-
fore enumerate some heads or points thereof, that it
may appear the better what it is, and whether it be ex-
tant.

First therefore, in this, as in all things which are
practical, we ought to cast up our account, what is in
our power and what not ; for the one may be dealt with
by way of alteration, but the other by way of applica-
tion only. The husbandman cannot command neither
the nature of the earth nor the seasons of the weather ;
no more can the physician the constitution of the pa-
tient nor the variety of accidents. So in the culture
and cure of the mind of man, two things are without
our command ; points of nature, and points of fortune ;
for to the basis of the one, and the conditions of the
other, our work is limited and tied. In these things
therefore it is left unto us to proceed by application :

Vincenda est omnis fortuna ferendo :

[all fortune may be overcome by endurance or suffer-
ing ;] and so likewise,

Vincenda est omnis natura ferendo:

[all nature may be overcome by suffering]. But when
that we speak of suffering, we do not speak of a dull
and neglected suffering, but of a wise and industrious
suffering, which draweth and contriveth use and advan-
tage out of that which seemeth adverse and contrary ;
which is that property which we call Accommodating
'or Applying.1 Now the wisdom of application resteth

1 These observations are omitted in the translation, and the whole pas-

332 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

principally in the exact and distinct knowledge of the
precedent state or disposition unto which we do apply :
for we cannot fit a garment, except we first take meas-
ure of the body.

So then the first article of this knowledge is to set
down sound and true distributions and descriptions of
the several characters and tempers of men's natures
and dispositions, specially having regard to those differ-
ences which are most radical in being the fountains and
causes of the rest, or most frequent in concurrence or
commixture ; l wherein it is not the handling of a few
of them in passage, the better to describe the medioc-
rities of virtues, that can satisfy this intention ; for if
it deserve to be considered, that there are minds which
are proportioned to great matters, and others to small,
(which Aristotle handleth or ought to have handled by
the name of Magnanimity,) doth it not deserve as well
to be considered, that there are minds proportioned to in-
tend many matters, and others to few ? 2 so that some can
divide themselves, others can perchance do exactly well,
but it must be but in few things at once ; and so there
cometh to be a narrowness of mind, as well as a pusilla-
nimity. And again, that some minds are proportioned
to that which may be dispatched at once, or within a sJiort
return of time ; others to that which begins afar off, and
is to be won with length of pursuit ;

Jam tutu tenditque fovetque :

[he begins to attend and nurse his project while it is yet

sage is rewritten, though rather with a view of expressing the meaning
more clearly than of altering it.

1 It is remarkable that the observations which follow, down to " benignity
or malignity," are entirely omitted in the translation.

2 So all the editions : a second intend having probably dropped out
cidentally.

THE SECOND BOOK. 333

in the cradle ;] so that there may be fitly said to be a
longanimity ; which is commonly also ascribed to God
as a magnanimity. So further deserved it to be con-
sidered by Aristotle, that there is a disposition in con-
versation (supposing it in things which do in no sort touch
or concern a man's self) to soothe and please, and a
disposition contrary to contradict and cross; and de-
serveth it not much better to be considered, that there
is a disposition, not in conversation or talk but in matter
of more serious nature, (and supposing it still in things
merely indifferent,*) to take pleasure in the good of an-
other, and a disposition contrariwise to take distaste at the
good of another ; which is that property 1 which we call
good-nature or ill-nature, benignity or malignity ? And
therefore I cannot sufficiently marvel that this part of
knowledge touching; the several characters of natures
and dispositions should be omitted both in morality and
policy, considering it is of so great ministry and sup-
peditation to them both. A man shall find in the tra-
ditions of astrology some pretty and apt divisions of
men's natures, according to the predominances of the
planets ; lovers of quiet, lovers of action, lovers of vic-
tory, lovers of honour, lovers of pleasure, lovers of arts,
lovers of change, and so forth. A man shall find in the
wisest sort of these Relations which the Italians make
touching Conclaves, the natures of the several Cardinals
handsomely and lively painted forth. A man shall
meet with in every day's conference the denominations
of sensitive, dry, formal, real, humorous, certain, huomo
di prima impressione, huomo di ultima impressione, and
the like ;2 and yet nevertheless this kind of observa-

1 properly both in the original, and in edd. 1629 and 1633.

2 This sentence is omitted in the translation ; perhaps from the difficulty

334 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

tions wandereth in words, but is 1 not fixed in inquiry.
For the distinctions are found (many of them), but we
conclude no precepts upon them ; wherein our fault
is the greater, because both history, poesy, and daily
experience are as goodly fields where these observa-
tions grow ; whereof we make a few posies to hold
in our hands, but no man bringeth them to the con-
fectionary, that receits might be made of them for use
of life.2

Of much like kind are those impressions of nature,
which are imposed upon the mind by the sex, by the
age, by the region, by health and sickness, by beauty and
deformity, and the like, which are inherent and not
extern ; and again those which are caused by extern
fortune ; as sovereignty, nobility, obscure birth, riches,
want, magistracy, privateness, -prosperity, adversity, con-

of finding equivalent terms in Latin ; but the substance of the observa-
tion is contained in the remark (transplanted from a former paragraph)
that in this matter the common talk of men is wiser than their books.

1 as both in the original and in edd. 1629 and 1633.

2 In place of this we have in the translation a passage of considerable
length recommending the wiser sort of historians as supplying the best
material for this kind of treatise; not only in the formal character which
they commonly give of any principal personage on recording his death,
but still more in the occasional observations interwoven into the body of
the narrative, when in relating any of his actions they introduce some
remark upon his nature and disposition. Bacon instances the character of
Africanus and the elder Cato as drawn by Livy; of Tiberius, Claudius,
and Nero, in Tacitus; of Septimius Severus, in Herodian; of Louis XI. in
Philip de Comines; of Ferdinand, Maximilian, Leo, and Clement, in
Guicciardini. (His own Henry VII. would have furnished another in-
stance, as good as any.) Of these he would have a full and careful anal-
ysis made, exhibiting not the entire character, but the several features and
individual peculiarities of mind and disposition which make it up, (imag-
inum ipsarum lineas et ductus magis simplices,) with their connexion and
bearing one upon another: — a kind of moral and mental anatomy, as a
basis for a system of moral and mental medicine. He prefers the histo-
rians to the poets for this purpose, because in the poets the characters are
commonly drawn with exaggeration.

THE SECOND BOOK. 335

stunt fortune, variable fortune, rising per salt um, per gra-
dus, and the like. And therefore we see that Plautus
maketh it a wonder to see an old man beneficent ; be-
nignitas hujus ut adolescentuli est : [he is as generous
as if he were a young man :] St. Paul concludeth that
severity of discipline was to be used to the Cretans,
Increpa eos dure, [rebuke them sharply,] upon 'the dis-
position of their country ; Cretenses semper mendaees,
malce bestioz, ventres pigri: [the Cretans are alway
liars, evil beasts, slow bellies :] Sallust noteth that it is
usual with Kings to desire contradictories ; Sed ple-
rumque region voluntates, ut vehementes sunt, sic mobiles,
sapeque ipsce sibi adversos : [royal desires, as they are
violent, so are they changeable, and often incompatible
with each other :] Tacitus observeth how rarely rais-
ing of the fortune mendeth the disposition ; Solus Ves-
pasianus mutatus in melius : [Vespasian the only one
of the emperors that changed for the better :] Pindarus
maketh an observation that great and sudden fortune
for the most part defeateth men ; x Qui magnam felici-
tatem concoquere non possunt : [that cannot digest great
felicity :] so the Psalm sheweth it is more easy to keep
a measure in the enjoying2 of fortune than in the in-
crease of fortune ; Divitios si affluant, nolite cor ap~
ponere: [if riches increase set not your heart upon
them]. These observations and the like I deny not
but are touched a little by Aristotle as in passage in
his Rhetorics, and are handled in some scattered dis-
courses ; but they were never incorporate into Moral
Philosophy, to which they do essentially appertain ; as
the knowledge of the diversity of grounds and moulds

1 animos plerumque enervare et solvere. — De Aug.

2 statu. — De Aug.

336 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

doth to agriculture, and the knowledge of the diversity
of complexions and constitutions doth to the physician ;
except we mean to follow the indiscretion of empirics,
which minister the same medicines to all patients.

Another article of this knowledge is the inquiry
touching the affections ; for as in medicining of the
body it is in order first to know the divers complexions
and constitutions, secondly the diseases, and lastly the
cures ; so in medicining of the mind, after knowledge
of the divers characters of men's natures, it follow-
eth in order to know the diseases and infirmities of
the mind, which are no other than the perturbations
and distempers of the affections. For as the ancient
politiques1 in popular estates were wont to compare
the people to the sea and the orators to the winds, be-
cause as the sea would of itself be calm and quiet if the
winds did not move and trouble it, so the people would
be peaceable and tractable if the seditious orators did
not set them in working and agitation ; so it may be
fitly said, that the mind in the nature thereof would
be temperate and stayed, if the affections, as winds, did
not put it into tumult and perturbation. And here
again I find strange, as before, that Aristotle should
have written divers volumes of Ethics, and never
handled the affections, which is the principal subject
thereof; and yet in his Rhetorics, where they are con-
sidered but collaterally and in a second degree (as they
may be moved by speech), he findeth place for them, and
handleth them well for the quantity; but where their
true place is, he pretermitteth them. For it is not his
disputations about pleasure and pain that can satisfy
this inquiry, no more than he that should generally

1 So edd. 1629 and 1633. The original has in politiques.

THE SECOND BOOK. 337

handle the nature of light can be said to handle the
nature of colours ; for pleasure and pain are to the par-
ticular affections as light is to particular colours. Bet-
ter travails I suppose had the Stoics taken in this
argument, as far as I can gather by that which we have
at second hand : but yet it is like it was after their
manner, rather in subtilty of definitions (which in a
subject of this nature are but curiosities) than in active
and ample descriptions and observations. So likewise
I find some particular writings of an elegant nature
touching some of the affections ; as of anger, of comfort
upon adverse accidents,1 of tenderness of countenance?
and other. But the poets and writers of histories are
the best doctors of this knowledge ; where we may
find painted forth with great life, how affections are
kindled and incited ; and how pacified and refrained ;
and how again contained from act and further degree ;
how they disclose themselves, how they work, how
they vary, how they gather and fortify,3 how they are
inwrapped one within another, and how they do fight
and encounter one with another, and other the like
particularities : amongst the which this last is of special
use in moral and civil matters ; how (I say) to set
affection against affection, and to master one by an-
other ; even as we use to hunt beast with beast and fly
bird with bird, which otherwise percase we could not so
easily recover : upon which foundation is erected that
excellent use of prcemium and poena, whereby civil
states consist ; employing the predominant affections

1 This is omitted in the translation.

2 This I suppose is what the French call mauvaise honte. The translation
is De inulili verecundia, -which is the Latin rendering of nepl dvauiriaf,
the title of a tract by Plutarch.

8 This is omitted in the translation.
VOL. vi. 22

338 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

of fear and hope, for the suppressing and bridling the
rest. For as in the government of states it is some-
times necessary to bridle one faction with another, so it
is in the government within.

Now come we to those points which are within our
own command, and have force and operation upon the
mind to affect the will and appetite and to alter man-
ners : wherein they ought, to have handled custom, ex-
ercise, habit, education, example, imitation, emulation,
company, friends, praise, reproof, exhortation, fame, laws,
books, studies : these as 1 they have determinate use in
moralities, from these the mind suffereth, and of these
are such receipts and regiments compounded and de-
scribed, as may seem to recover or preserve the health
and good estate of the mind, as far as pertaineth to
human medicine : of which number we will visit a
upon some one or two as an example of the rest, be-
cause it were too long to prosecute all ; and therefore
we do resume Custom and Habit to speak of.

The opinion of Aristotle seemeth to me a negligent
opinion, that of those things which consist by nature
nothing can be changed by custom ; using for example,
that if a stone be thrown ten thousand times up, it will
not learn to ascend ; and that by often seeing or hear-
ing, we do not learn to see or hear the better. For
though this principle be true in things wherein nature
is peremptory, (the reason whereof we cannot now
stand to discuss,) yet it is otherwise in things wherein

1 So in all the editions. Perhaps it should be are. (Hcec enim sunt ilia
quce regnant in moralibus.) If as be right, we should probably read,jfaj
from tiiese &c.

2 So the original. Edd. 1629 and 1633 have insist: perhaps rightly.
The translation has unum aut altervm deligemus in quibus paiilliilum immo-
rabimur.

I

THE SECOND BOOK. 339

nature admitteth a latitude. For he might see that a
strait glove will come more easily on with use, and that
a wand will by use bend otherwise than it grew, and
that by use of the voice we speak louder and stronger,
and that by use of enduring heat or cold we endure it
the better, and the like : which later sort have a nearer
resemblance unto that subject of manners he handleth
than those instances which he allegeth. But allowing
his conclusion, that virtues and vices consist in habit, he
ought so much the more to have taught the manner of
superinducing that habit : for there be many precepts
of the wise ordering the exercises of the mind, as there
is of ordering the exercises of the body ; whereof we
will recite a few.

The first shall be, that we beware we take not at the
first either too high a strain or too weak : for if too
high, in a diffident 1 nature you discourage ; in a con-
fident nature you breed an opinion of facility, and so a
sloth : and in all natures you breed a further expectation
than can hold out, and so an insatisfaction 2 on the end :
if too weak of the other side, you may not look to per-
form and overcome any great task.

Another precept is, to practise all things chiefly at
two several times, the one when the mind is best dis-
posed, the other when it is worst disposed ; that by the
one you may gain a great step, by the other you may
work out the knots and stonds of the mind, and make
the middle times the more easy 3 and pleasant.

1 So edd. 1629 and 1633. The original has different.

2 And thence a discouragement — (id quod animum semper dejicit et cov"
fundit).

8 So edd. 1629 and 1633. The original has easily. Possibly Bacon
wrote run more easily. The translation has facile et placide delabentur.
This part of the original edition is carelessly printed.

340 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

Another precept is, that which Aristotle mentioneth
by the way, which is to bear ever towards the contrary
extreme of that whereunto we are by nature inclined :
like unto the rowing against the stream, or making a
wand straight by bending1 him contrary to his natural
crookedness.

Another precept is, that the mind is brought to any
thing better, and with more sweetness and happiness,
if that whereunto you pretend be not first in the inten-
tion, but tanquam aliud agendo, because of the natural
hatred of the mind against necessity and constraint.
Many other axioms there are touching the managing
of Exercise and Custom ; which being so conducted,
doth prove indeed another nature ; but being governed
by chance, doth commonly prove but an ape of nature,
and bringeth forth that which is lame and counterfeit.

So if we should handle books and studies, and what
influence and operation they have upon manners, are
there not divers precepts of great caution and direc-
tion appertaining thereunto ? Did not one of the fa-
thers in great indignation call Poesy vinum dcemonum,
because it increaseth temptations, perturbations, and
vain opinions ? Is not the opinion of Aristotle worthy
to be regarded, wherein he saith that young men are
no fit auditors of moral philosophy,2 because they are
not settled from the boiling heat of their affections, nor

1 So ed. 1633. The original has bynding, and ed. 1629 binding.

8 Not of moral but of political philosophy. See Mr. Ellis's note, Vol. III.
p. 44. That in the passage there quoted from Troilus and Cressida the ob-
servation and the error were both derived directly from the Advancement of
Learning admits of little doubt. But how came Virgilio Malvezzi, in his
Discorsi sopra Comelio Tacito published in 1622, to make the same mistake?
" E non e discordante da questa mia opinione Aristotele, il qual dice, che i
giovani non sono buoni ascultatori delle men-all." I quote from ed. 1635.
The passage occurs in the address to the reader, p. 3.

THE SECOND BOOK. 341

attempered with time and experience ? And doth it not
hereof come, that those excellent books and discourses
of the ancient writers (whereby they have persuaded
unto virtue most effectually, by representing her in
state and majesty, and popular opinions against virtue
in their parasites' coats, fit to be scorned and derided,)
are of so little effect towards honesty of life, because
they are not read and revolved by men in their mature
and settled years, but confined almost to boys and be-
ginners ? But is it not true also, that much less young
men are fit auditors of matters of policy, till they have
been throughly seasoned in religion and morality ; lest
their judgments be corrupted, and made apt to think
that there are no true differences of things, but accord-
ing to utility and fortune ; as the verse describes it,
Prosperum et felix scelus virtus vocatur ; [a crime that
is successful is called a virtue ;] and again, Hie crucem
pretium seeleris tulit, hie diadema ; [the same crime is
rewarded in one man with a gibbet and in another with
a crown ;] which the poets do speak satirically, and in
indignation on virtue's behalf; but books of policy do
speak it seriously and positively ; for so it pleaseth
Machiavel to say, that if Ocesar had been overthrown he
would have been more odious than ever was Catiline ; as
if there had been no difference but in fortune, between
a very fury of lust and blood, and the most excellent
spirit (his ambition reserved) of the world ? Again, is
there not a caution likewise to be given of the doctrines
of moralities themselves (some kinds of them,) lest
they make men too precise, arrogant, incompatible ; as
Cicero saith of Cato, In Marco Catone hose bona quce
videmus divina et egregia, ipsius scitote esse propria;
qua? nonnunquam requirimus, ea sunt omnia non a natura.

342 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

sed a magistro ; [his excellencies were his own, his de-
fects came from the school-master] ? Many other ax-
ioms and advices there are touching those proprieties
and effects which studies do infuse and instil into man-
ners. And so likewise is there touching the use of all
those other points, of company, fame, laws, and the
rest, which we recited in the beginning in the doctrine
of morality.

But there is a kind of Culture of the Mind that
seemeth yet more accurate and elaborate than the rest,
and is built upon this ground ; that the minds of all
men are at some times in a state more perfect, and at
other times in a state more depraved. The purpose
therefore of this practice 1 is to fix and cherish the good
hours of the mind, and to obliterate and take forth the
evil. The fixing of the good hath been practised by
two means ; vows or constant resolutions ; and observ-
ances or exercises ; which are not to be regarded so
much in themselves, as because they keep the mind in
continual obedience. The obliteration of the evil hath
been practised by two means ; some kind of redemp-
tion or expiation of that which is past ; and an incep-
tion or account de novo for the time to come. But this
part seemeth sacred and religious, and justly ; for all
good Moral Philosophy (as was said) is but an hand-
maid to religion.

Wherefore we will conclude with that last point
which is of all other means the most compendious and
summary, and again the most noble and effectual, to
the reducing of the mind unto virtue and good estate ;
which is the electing and propounding unto a man's
self good and virtuous ends of his life, such as may be

1 i. e. method of culture (hujus culiura intentio et inslitutum).

THE SECOND BOOK. 343

in a reasonable sort within his compass to attain. For
if these two things be supposed, that a man set before
him honest and good ends, and again that lie be reso-
lute, constant, and true unto them, it will follow that
he shall mould himself into all virtue at once. And
this is indeed like the work of nature ; whereas the
other course is like the work of the hand. For as
when a carver makes an image, he shapes only that
part whereupon he worketh ; as if he be upon the face,
that part which shall be the body is but a rude stone
still, till such times as he comes to it ; but contrariwise
when nature makes a flower or living creature, she
formeth rudiments of all the parts at one time ; so in
obtaining virtue by habit, while a man practiseth tem-
perance, he doth not profit much to fortitude, nor the
like ; but when he dedicateth and applieth himself to
good ends, look what virtue soever the pursuit and
passage towards those ends doth commend unto him,
he is invested of a precedent disposition to conform
himself thereunto ; which state of mind Aristotle doth
excellently express himself, that it ought not to be
called virtuous, but divine : his words are these : Im-
manitati autem consentaneum est opponere earn, quce
supra humanitatem est, heroicam sive divinam virtutem :
and a little after, Nam utferai neque vitium neque virtus
est, sic neque Dei : sed hie quidem status altius quiddam
virtute est, ille aliud quiddam a viiio : [that which an-
swers to the brutal degree of vice is the heroical or
divine degree of virtue. . . . For as neither virtue nor
vice can be predicated of a brute, so neither can it of
a God : the divine condition being something higher
than virtue, the brutal something different from vice].
And therefore we may see what celsitude of honour

344 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

Plinius Secundus attributetli to Trajan in his funeral
oration,1 where he said, that men needed to make no
other prayers to the gods, but that they would continue as
good lords to them as Trajan had been ; as if he had
not been only an imitation of divine nature, but a pat-
tern of it. But these be heathen and profane passages,
having but a shadow of that divine state of mind which
religion and the holy faith doth conduct men unto, by
imprinting upon their souls Charity, which is excel-
lently called the bond of Perfection, because it com-
prehendeth and fasteneth all virtues together. And
as2 it is elegantly said by Menander of vain love,
which is but a false imitation of divine love, Amor
melior sophista Icevo ad humanam vitam, that love teach-
eth a man to carry himself better than the sophist or
preceptor, which he calleth left-handed, because with
all his rules and preceptions he cannot form a man so
dexterously, nor with that facility to prize himself and
govern himself, as love can do ; so certainly if a man's
mind be truly inflamed with charity, it doth work him
suddenly into greater perfection than all the doctrine
of morality can do, which is but a sophist in compari-
son of the other. Nay further, as Xenophon observed
truly that all other affections, though they raise the
mind, yet they do it by distorting and uncomeliness
of ecstasies or excesses ; but only love doth exalt the
mind, and nevertheless at the same instant doth settle
and compose it ; so in all other excellencies, though
they advance nature, yet they are subject to excess ;
only charity admitteth no excess : for so we see, aspir-

1 The words '"funeral oration" are omitted in the translation. It was
not a funeral oration, but a Panegyric spoken in Trajan's presence. See
above, p. 326.

2 So edd. 1629 and 1633. The original omits as.

THE SECOND BOOK. 345

ing to be like God in power, the angels transgressed
and fell ; Ascendant, et ero similis Altissimo ; [I will
ascend and be like unto the Highest :] by aspiring to
be like God in knowledge, man transgressed and fell ;
JSritis sicut Dii, scientes bonum et malum ; [ye shall be
as Gods, knowing good and evil ;] but by aspiring to
a similitude of God in goodness or love, neither man
nor angel ever transgressed or shall transgress. For
unto that imitation we are called : Diligite inimicos
vestros, benefacite eis qui oderunt vos, et orate pro per-
8equentibii8 et calumniantibus vos, ut sitis filii Patris
vestri qui in ccelis est, qui solem suum oriri facit super
bonos et malos, et pluit super justos et injustos ; [love
your enemies, do good to them that hate you, and pray
for them which despitefully use you and persecute you ;
that ye may be the children of your Father which is
in Heaven, who maketh his sun to rise on the evil and
on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the
unjust]. So in the first platform of the divine nature
itself, the heathen religion speaketh thus, Optimus Max-
imus, [Best and Greatest :] and the sacred Scriptures
thus, Misericordia ejus super omnia opera ejus, [his
mercy is over all his works].

Wherefore I do conclude this part of moral knowl-
edge, concerning the Culture and Regiment of the
Mind ; wherein if any man, considering the parts
thereof which I have enumerated, do judge that my
labour is but to collect into an Art or Science that
which hath been pretermitted by others as matter of
common sense and experience, he judgeth well. But
as Philocrates sported with Demosthenes, You may not
marvel {Athenians,*) that Demosthenes and I do differ,
for he drinketh water, and I drink wine ; and like

346 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

as we read of an ancient parable of the two gates of
deep,

Sunt geminae somni portse: quarum altera fertur
Cornea, qua veris facilis datur exitus umbris:
Altera candenti perfecta nitens elephanto,
Sed falsa ad ccelutn inittunt insomnia manes:
[Two gates there are of sleep ; of horn the one,
By which the true shades pass ; of ivory
Burnished and white the other, but through it
Into the upper world false dreams are sent:]

so if we put on sobriety and attention, we shall find it
a sure maxim in knowledge, that the more pleasant
liquor (of wine) is the more vaporous, and the braver
gate (of ivory) sendeth forth the falser dreams.1

But we have now concluded that general part of
Human Philosophy, which contemplateth man segregate,
and as he eonsisteth of body and spirit. Wherein we
may further note, that there seemeth to be a relation
or conformity between the good of the mind and the
good of the body. For as we divided the good of the
body into health, beauty, strength, and pleasure: so the
good of the mind, inquired in rational and moral
knowledges,2 tendeth to this, to make the mind sound,
and without perturbation ; beautiful, and graced with
decency ; and strong and agile for all duties of life.

1 The allusion to Philocrates and Demosthenes and to the difference be-
tween wine and water is omitted in the translation; probably because
Bacon had since used the same illustration in an opposite sense (see Nov.
Org. i. 123.), taking the wine to represent his own philosophy, with its
variety of material and elaborate processes of manufacture, and the water
to represent the popular philosophy of his time which was content with
what came; and the present passage reads the clearer and better for the
omission. After "he judgeth well," yet let him remember (he says) that
the object I am in pursuit of is not beauty and fair appearance, but utility
and truth; and let him a little call to mind the meaning of that ancient
parable, Sunt geminas somni porta, &c. Great no doubt is the magnificence
of the ivory gate, but the true dreams pass by the gate of horn.

2 i. «. considered with reference to reason and morals — («' juxta moralis
doctrincB scila Mud contemplemur).

THE SECOND BOOK. 347

These three, as in the body so in the mind, seldom
meet, and commonly sever. For it is easy to observe
that many have strength of wit and courage, but have
neither health from perturbations, nor any beauty or
decency in their doings : some again have an elegancy
and fineness of carriage, which have neither soundness
of honesty, nor substance of sufficiency : and some
again have honest and reformed minds, that can nei-
ther become themselves nor manage business : and
sometimes two of them meet, and rarely all three.
As for pleasure, we have likewise determined that the
mind ought not to be reduced to stupid, but to retain
pleasure ; confined rather in the subject of it, than in
the strength and vigour of it.1

^[ 2 Civil Knowledge is conversant about a subject
which of all others is' most immersed in matter, and
hardliest reduced to axiom. Nevertheless, as Cato the
censor said, That the Romans were like sheep, for that a
man might better drive a flock of them, than one of them ;
for in a flock, if you could get but some few go right, the
rest would follow' : so in that respect moral philosophy
is more difficile than policy. Again, moral philosophy
propoundeth to itself the framing of internal goodness ;
but civil knowledge requireth only an external good-
ness ; for that as to society sufficeth ; and therefore it
cometh oft to pass that there be evil times in good gov-

1 For in a mind properly disposed, the act and exercise of virtue ought
to be accompanied with a sense of pleasure; as is more clearly expressed
in the translation. There are some, he says, who have both health, beaut}',
and strength of mind; and so perform their duties well; but, from a kind
of Stoical severity and insensibility, take no pleasure in them (sed tamen
Stoica quadam tristitia et. stupiditate prcediti, virtutis quidem actiones exer-
cent, gaudiis non perfruuntur).

2 De Aug. viii. 1.

348 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

ernments : for so we find in the holy story, when the
kings were good, yet it is added, Sed adhuc populus non
direxerat x cor suum ad Dominum Deum patrum suorum ;
[but as yet the people had not turned their hearts
towards the Lord God of their fathers]. Again, States,
as great engines, move slowly, and are not so soon put
out of frame : for as in Egypt the seven good years
sustained the seven bad, so governments for a time well
grounded do bear out errors following : but the resolu-
tion of particular persons is more suddenly subverted.
These respects do somewhat qualify the extreme diffi-
culty of civil knowledge.

This knowledge hath three parts, according to the
three summaiy actions of society ; which are Conversa-
tion, Negotiation, and Government. For man seeketh
in society comfort, use, and protection : and they be
three wisdoms of divers natures, which do often sever ;
wisdom of the behaviour, wisdom of business, and wis-
dom of state.

The wisdom of Conversation ought not to be over
much affected, but much less despised ; for it hath not
only an honour in itself, but an influence also into busi-
ness and government.2 The poet saith,

Nee vultu destrue verba tuo:

a man may destroy the force of his words with his
countenance : so may he of his deeds, saith Cicero ;
recommending to his brother affability and easy access ;
Nil interest habere ostium apertum, vultum clausum ; it
is nothing won to admit men with an open door, and to

1 dixerat in the original and also in edd. 1629 and 1633. direxerat. — Do
Aug.

2 In the translation he compares the value of Conversation in business to
that of action in oratory.

THE SECOND BOOK. 349

receive them with a shut and reserved countenance.
So we see Atticus, before the first interview between
Caesar and Cicero, the war depending, did seriously ad-
vise Cicero touching the composing and ordering of his
countenance and gesture. And if the government of
the countenance be of such effect, much more is that
of the speech, and other carriage appertaining to con-
versation ; the true model whereof seemeth to me well
expressed by Livy, though not meant for this purpose ;
Ne aut arrogans videar, aut obnoxius ; quorum alterum
est alienee libertatis obliti, alterum suce : the sum of be-
haviour is to retain a man's own dignity, without in-
truding upon the liberty of others. On the other side,
if behaviour and outward carriage be intended too
much, first it may pass into affection,1 and then quid de-
formius quam scenam in vitam transferrer [what more
unseemly than to be always playing a part ;] to act a
man's life ? But although it proceed not to that ex-
treme, yet it consumeth time, and employeth the mind
too much. And therefore as we use to advise young
students from company keeping, by saying, Amici fares
temporis, [friends are thieves of time ;] so certainly the
intending of the discretion of behaviour is a great thief
of meditation. Again, such as are accomplished in
that honor 2 of urbanity please themselves in name,3

1 So the original. Edd. 1629 and 1633 have affectation ; which is the
more modern form of the word. But the other was I think the more com-
mon when the Advancement was written.

2 howr in original: hour in ed. 1633. Ed. 1629 has forme ; which is the
reading of all the modern editions. But fourme could not easily be mistaken
for hoior, whereas honor carelessly written would be hardly distinguishable
from it. The translation also, though the expression is altered, preserves the
idea of honour. Qui primas adeo in urbanitate obtinent et ad hanc rem
unam quasi nati videntur.

« So both the original and ed. 1633. Ed. 1629 has " in it ; " which has

350 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

and seldom aspire to higher virtue ; whereas those that
have defect in it do seek comeliness by reputation : for
where reputation is, almost every thing becometh ; but
where that is not, it must be supplied by puntos and com-
pliments. Again, there is no greater impediment of ac-
tion than an over-curious observance of decency, and the
guide of decency, which is time and season. For as Salo-
mon sayeth, Qui respicit ad ventos, non seminal ; et qui
respicit adnubes, non metet ; [he that looketh to the winds
doth not sow, and he that regardeth the clouds shall not
reap :] a man must make his opportunity, as oft as find it.
To conclude ; Behaviour seemeth to me as a garment
of the mind, and to have the conditions of a garment.
For it ought to be made in fashion ; it ought not to be
too curious ; it ought to be shaped so as to set forth any
good making of the mind, and hide any deformity ;
and above all, it ought not to be too strait or restrained
for exercise or motion. But this part of civil knowl-
edge hath been elegantly handled, and therefore I can-
not report it for deficient.

\ l The wisdom touching Negotiation or Business
hath not been hitherto collected into writing, to the
great derogation of learning and the professors of learn-
ing. For from this root springeth chiefly that note or
opinion, which by us is expressed in adage to this effect,
that there is no great concurrence between learning
and wisdom. For of the three wisdoms which we
have set down to pertain to civil life, for wisdom of
Behaviour, it is by learned men for the most part

been followed by modern editors. The translation has ut sibi ipsis in ilia
sola complaceant. If name be the right word (which I doubt) the meaning
must be that they are satisfied with the good report which it procures them.
Perhaps it should be " please themselves in the same."
1 De Aug. viii. 2.

THE SECOND BOOK. 351

despised, as an inferior to virtue and an enemy to
meditation ; for wisdom of Government, they acquit
themselves well when they are called to it, but that
happeneth to few ; but for the wisdom of Business,
wherein man's life is most conversant, there be no books
of it, except some few scattered advertisements, that
have no proportion to the magnitude of this subject.
For if books were written of this as the other, I doubt
not but learned men with mean experience would far
excel men of long experience without learning, and
outshoot them in their own bow.

Neither needeth it at all to be doubted that this
knowledge should be so variable as it falleth not under
precept; for it is much less infinite than science of
Government, which we see is laboured and in some
part reduced. Of this wisdom it seemeth some of the
ancient Romans in the saddest and wisest times were
professors ; for Cicero reporteth that it was then 1 in
use for senators that had name and opinion for general
wise men, as Coruncanius, Curius, Laelius, and many
others, to walk at certain hours in the Place, and to
give audience to those that would use their advice ; and
that the particular citizens would resort unto them, and
consult with them of the marriage of a daughter, or of
the employing of a son, or of a purchase or bargain, or

I of an accusation, and every other occasion incident to
man's life ; so as there is a wisdom of counsel and ad-
vice even in private causes, arising out of an universal
insight into the affairs of the world ; which is used in-
deed upon particular cases 2 propounded, but is gathered

1 t. e. in the times of which he writes, — a little before his own. (paulo
ante ma secula. )

2 So the original. Edd. 1629 and 1633 have causes.

352 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

by general observation of causes of like nature. For
so we see in the book which Q. Cicero x writeth to his
brother De petitione consulatus (being the only book of
business that I know written by the ancients), although
it concerned a particular action then on foot, yet the
substance thereof consisteth of many wise and politic
axioms, which contain not a temporary but a perpetual
direction in the case of popular elections. But chief-
ly we may see in those aphorisms which have place
amongst divine writings, composed by Salomon the
king, of whom the Scriptures testify that his heart was
as the sands of the sea, encompassing the world and
all worldly matters ; we see, I say, not a few pro-
found and excellent cautions, precepts, positions, ex-
tending to much variety of occasions ; whereupon we
will stay awhile, offering to consideration some number
of examples.2

Sed et cunetis sermonibus qui dicuntur ne accommodes
aurem tuam, ne forte audias servum tuum maledicentem
tibi. [Hearken not unto all words that are spoken, lest
thou hear thy servant curse thee.] Here is concluded
the provident stay of inquiry of that which we would
be loth to find : 3 as it was judged great wisdom in
Pompeius Magnus that he burned Sertorius' papers
un perused.

Vir sapiens si cum stulto contenderit, sive irascatur
sive rideat, non inveniet requiem. [A wise man if he

1 So edd. 1629 and 1633 and De Aug. The original omits Q.

8 This is what he calls in the translation Doctrina de Negotiis Sparsit.
The example which follows is greatly enlarged : the number of proverbs
commented upon being increased by a third, and the comments being much
fuller.

8 Compare L'Estrange's Fables and storyes mot-alized, vol. ii. p. 6 ed.
1708.

THE SECOND BOOK. 353

contend with a fool, whether he be angry or whether
he laugh, shall find no rest.] Here is described the
great disadvantage which a wise man hath in under-
taking a lighter person than himself; which is such an
engagement as whether a man turn the matter to jest,
or turn it to heat, or howsoever he change copy, he can
no ways quit himself well of it.

Qui delicate a pueritia nutrit servum suum, posted
sentiet eum contumacem. [He that delicately bringeth
up his servant from a child shall have him become fro-
ward at the length.] Here is signified, that if a man
begin too high a pitch in his favours, it doth commonly
end in unkindness and unthankfulness.

Vidisti virum velocem in opere suo? Coram regibus
stabit, nee erit inter ignobiles. [Seest thou a man that
is quick in his business ? He shall stand before kings ;
his place shall not be among mean men.] Here is ob-
served that, of all virtues for rising to honour, quick-
ness of dispatch is the best ; for superiors many times
love not to have those they employ too deep or too
sufficient, but ready and diligent.

Vidi cunctos viventes qui ambulant sub sole, eum ado-
lescente seeundo qui consurgit pro eo. [I beheld all the
living which walk under the sun, with the second
youth that shall stand in his place.] Here is expressed
that which was noted by Sylla first, and after him by
Tiberius : Plures adorant solem orientem quam oceiden-
,tem vel meridianum} [there be more that worship the
rising sun than the sun setting or at mid-day].

jSi spiritus potestatem habentis ascenderit super te, lo

1 The words vel meridianum are omitted in the translation ; and it is dif-
ficult to understand how they got in ; for they are not to he found in either
of the passages alluded to, and they seem to carry the observation beyond
the truth.

vol. vi. 23

354 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

cum tuum ne dimiseris ; quia euratio faciei cessare pecca-
ta maxima. [If the spirit of the ruler rise up against
thee, leave not thy place ; for observance will remove
great offences.] Here caution is given that upon dis-
pleasure, retiring is of all courses the unfittest ; for a
man leaveth things at worst, and depriveth himself of
means to make them better.

HJrat civitas parva, et pauci in ea viri : venit contra
earn rex magnus, et vadavit earn, intruxitque munitiones
per gyrum, et perfecta est obsidio : inventusque est in ea
vir pauper et sapiens, et liberavit earn per sapientiam
suam ; et nullus deinceps recordatus est hominis illius
pauperis. [There was a little city and few men within
it; and there came a great king against it and besieged
it and raised great bulwarks round about it : and there
was found in it a poor wise man, and he by his wisdom
delivered the city ; yet no man remembered that same
poor man.] Here the corruption1 of states is set forth,
that esteem not virtue or merit longer than they have
use of it.

Mollis responsio frangit iram. [A soft answer de-
feateth wrath.] Here is noted that silence or rough
answer exasperateth ; but an answer present and tem-
perate pacifieth.

Iter pigrorum quasi sepes spinarum. [The way of
the slothful is as an hedge of thorns.] Here is lively
represented how laborious sloth proveth in the end ; f
for when things are deferred till the last, instant and
nothing prepared beforehand, every step findeth a brier
or an impediment, which catcheth or stoppeth.

Melior est finis orationis quam principium. [Better
is the end of a speech than the beginning thereof.]

l So edd. 1629 and 1633. The original has corruptions.

THE SECOND BOOK, 355

Here is taxed the vanity of formal speakers, that study
more about prefaces and inducements than upon the
conclusions and issues of speech.

Qui cognoscit in judieio faciem, non bene facit ; iste
et pro buccella panis deseret veritatem. [He that re-
specteth persons in judgment doth not well ; even for
a piece of bread will that man depart from the truth.]
Here is noted, that a judge were better be a briber
than a respecter of persons ; for a corrupt judge offend-
eth not so lightly Jasa facile.

Vir pauper ealumnians pauperes similis est imbri ve-
hement^ in quo paratur fames. [A poor man that
beareth witness against the poor is like a sweeping rain
which leaveth no food.] Here is expressed the ex-
tremity of necessitous extortions, figured in the ancient
fable of the full and hungry horse-leech.

Fons turbatus pede, et vena corrupta, est Justus cadens
coram impio. [A righteous man falling down before
the wicked is as a troubled fountain and a corrupt
spring.] Here is noted, that one judicial and ex-
emplar iniquity in the face of the world, doth trouble
the fountains of justice more than many particular
injuries passed over by connivance.

2 Qui subtrahit aliquid a patre et a matre, et dicit hoc
non esse peccatum, particeps est homicidii. [Whoso
robbeth his father and his mother, and saith it is no
transgression, is the companion of a destroyer.] Here
is noted, that whereas men in wronging their best

1 So the original. Edd. 1629 and 1633 have highly: a conjectural emen-
dation probably, by some critic who did not know that lightly meant easily,
readily, upon slight occasion ; or did not observe that the point of the obser-
vation rests entirely upon this word. The corrupt judge does not offend
less highly than the facile ; but less frequently.

2 This proverb is omitted in the translation.

356 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

friends use to extenuate their fault, as if they might
presume or be bold upon them, it doth contrariwise
indeed aggravate their fault, and turneth it from injury
to impiety.

Noli esse amicus homini iracundo, nee ambulato cum
homine furioso. [Make no friendship with an angry
man, neither go with a furious man.] Here caution
is given, that in the election of our friends we do
principally avoid those which are impatient, as those
that will espouse us to many factions and quarrels.

Qui conturbat domwm suam, possidebit ventum. [He
that troubleth his own house shall inherit the wind.]
Here is noted, that in domestical separations and
breaches men do promise to themselves quieting of
their mind and contentment ; but still they are de-
ceived of their expectation, and it turneth to wind.

Filiu& sapiens Icetificat patrem : filius vero stultus
mcestitia est matri sua?. [A wise son maketh a glad
father, but a foolish son is the heaviness of his mother.]
Here is distinguished, that fathers have most comfort
of the good proof of their sons ; but mothers have
most discomfort of their ill proof, because women have
little discerning of virtue, but of fortune.1

Qui celat delictum, qwxrit amicitiam ; sed qui altero
sermone repetit, separat foederatos. [He that covereth
a transgression seeketh love, but he that repeateth a

1 In the translation he adds two other causes — the greater tenderness
of the mother's affection, and (perhaps) a consciousness that her own in-
dulgence has spoiled her son ; and instead of saying that the mother has
" little discerning of virtue," he only says that the father understands its
value better. The allusion to fortune is omitted altogether; and indeed it
is not easy to see how it bears upon the case in point; the son in question
being by the supposition not unfortunate but foolish. I thought it right
to mention this alteration, because it is more than a development of the
remark in the text; it is a correction of the opinion implied in it.

THE SECOND BOOK. 357

matter separateth very friends.] Here caution is given,
that reconcilement is better managed by an amnesty,
and passing over that which is past, than by apologies
and excusations.

In omni opere bono erit abundantia ; ubi autem verba
sunt plurima, ibi frequenter egestas. [In every good
work there shall be abundance, but where there are
many words there is penury.] Here is noted that
words and discourse abound most where there is idle-
ness and want.

Primus in sua causa Justus ; sed venit altera pars, et
inquirit in eum. [He that is first in his own cause
seemeth just; but the other party cometh and search-
eth him.] Here is observed, that in all causes the
first tale possesseth much ; in sort l that the prejudice
thereby wrought will be hardly removed, except some
abuse or falsity in the information be detected.

2 Verba bilinguis quasi simplicia, et ipsa perveniunt
ad interiora ventris. [The words of the double-tongued
man which seem artless are they that go down to the
innermost parts of the belly.] Here is distinguished,
that flattery and insinuation which seemeth set and
artificial sinketh not far ; but that entereth deep which
hath shew of nature, liberty, and simplicity.

Qui erudit derisorem, ipse sibi injuriam facit ; et qui
arguit impium, sibi maculam generat. [He that re-
proveth a scorner doth himself wrong, and he that
rebuketh a wicked man getteth himself a blot.] Here
caution is given how we tender reprehension to arro-
gant and scornful natures, whose manner is to esteem
it for contumely, and accordingly to return it.

1 So the original. Edd. 1629 and 1633 have in such sort : an attempt
at correction where none was wanted.

2 This proverb is omitted in the translation.

358 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

Da sapienti oeeasionem, et addetur ei sapientia. [Give
opportunity to a wise man, and he will be yet wiser.]
Here is distinguished the wisdom brought into habit,
and that which is but verbal and swimming only in
conceit ; for the one upon the occasion presented is
quickened and redoubled, the other is amazed and
confused.

Quomodo in aquis resplendent vidtus prospicientium^
sic corda hominum manifesto, sunt prudentibus. [As
the face of one that looketh upon the water is reflected
therein, so the hearts of men are manifest unto the
wise.] Here the mind of a wise man is compared to
a glass, wherein the images of all diversity of natures
and customs are represented ; from which representa-
tion proceedeth that application,

Qui sapit, innumeris moribus aptus erit:

[a wise man will know how to apply himself to all
sorts of characters].

Thus have I staid somewhat longer upon these sen-
tences politic of Salomon than is agreeable to the pro-
portion of an example ; led with a desire to give
authority to this part of knowledge, which I noted as
deficient, by so excellent a precedent ; and have also
attended them with brief observations, such as to my
understanding offer no violence to the sense, though I
know they may be applied to a more divine use : but
it is allowed even in divinity, that some interpretations,
yea and some writings, have more of the Eagle than
others. But taking them as instructions for life, they
might have received large discourse, if I would have
broken them and illustrated them by deducements and
examples.

THE SECOND BOOK. 359

Neither was this in use only with the Hebrews ; but
it is generally to be found in the wisdom of the more
ancient times, that as men found out any observation
that they thought was good for life, they would gather
it and express it in parable or aphorism or fable. But
for fables, they were vicegerents and supplies where ex-
amples failed : now that the times abound with history,
the aim is better when the mark is alive. And there-
fore the form of writing which of all others is fittest for
this variable argument of negotiation and occasions is
that which Machiavel chose wisely and aptly for gov-
ernment ; namely, discourse upon histories or examples.
For knowledge drawn freshly and in our view out of
particulars, knoweth the way best to particulars again.
And it hath much greater life for practice when the dis-
course attendeth upon the example, than when the ex-
ample attendeth upon the discourse. For this is no
point of order, as it seemeth at first, but of substance.
For when the example is the ground, being set down
in an history at large, it is set down with all circum-
stances, which may sometimes control the discourse
thereupon made and sometimes supply it, as a very pat-
tern for action ; x whereas the examples alleged for the
discourse's sake are cited succinctly and without partic-
ularity, and carry a servile aspect toward the discourse
which they are brought in to make good.

But this difference is not amiss to be remembered,
that as history of Times is the best ground for discourse
of government, such as Machiavel handleth, so histories

1 So edd. 1629 and 1633. The original has gaine. I doubt whether ac-
tion be the right word, and should rather suspect aime, which might look
very like gaine if the tail of a letter from the line above happened to
strike through the a. The translation has uncle Jit hco exemplaris ad imita-
iionem el praclicam.

360 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

of Lives is the most proper for discourse of business,
as 1 more conversant in private actions. Nay there is
a ground of discourse for this purpose fitter than them
both, which is discourse upon letters, such as are wise
and weighty, as many are of Cicero ad Attieum and
others. For letters have a great 2 and more particular
representation of business' than either Chronicles or
Lives. Thus have we spoken both of the matter and
form of this part of civil knowledge touching Negotia-
tion,3 which we note to be deficient.

But yet there is another part of this part, which dif-
fereth as much from that whereof we have spoken as
sapere and sibi sapere, [to be wise and to be wise for
oneself, ~\ the one moving as it were to the circumference,
the other to the centre. For there is a wisdom of
counsel, and again there is a wisdom of pressing a man's
own fortune ; and they do sometimes meet, and often
sever. For many are wise in their own ways that are
weak for government or counsel ; like ants, which is a
wise creature for itself, but very hurtful for the garden.
This wisdom the Romans did take much knowledge of: 4
Nam pol sapiens (saith the comical poet) fingit fortunam
sibi, [the wise man fashions his fortune for himself;]
and it grew to an adage, Faber quisque fortune propria?,
[every man has tools to make his own fortune with,]
and Livy attributeth it to Cato the first, In hoe viro

1 is both in orig. and in edd. 1629 and 1633. Blackbourne substituted
because it is. Instead of "private actions," the translation substitutes
" actions of all kinds great and small " — (quoniam ornnem occasionum et
negotiorum, tarn grandium quant leciorum, varietatem complectuntur).

2 So all three editions, though great can hardly be the right word. I
should suspect nearer. The translation has magts in proximo et ad vivum
negotia solent reprasentare.

8 i. e. de negotiis sparsis.

* And yet (he adds in the translation) there were no better patriots, —
licet patriae qptimis curatoribus.

THE SECOND BOOK. 361

tanta vis animi et ingenii inerat, ut quocunque loco natus
esset, sibi ipse fortunam facturus videretw, [such was his
force of mind and genius that in whatever state he had
been born he would have made himself a fortune].

This conceit or position l if it be too much declared
and professed, hath been thought a thing impolitic and
unlucky ; as was observed in Timotheus the Athenian ;
who having done many great services to the estate in
his government, and giving an account thereof to the
people as the manner was, did conclude every particu-
lar with this clause, and in this fortune had no part.
And it came so to pass that he never prospered in
any thing he took in hand afterward : for this is too
high and too arrogant, savouring of that which Ezekiel
saith of Pharaoh, Diets, Fluvius est mens, et ego feci
memet ipsum, [thou sayest the river is mine, and I made
myself;] or of that which another prophet speaketh,
that men offer sacrifices to their nets and snares ; and
that which the poet expresseth,

Dextra mihi Deus, et telum quod missile 2 libro,
Nunc adsint !

[my right hand and my spear are the God I trust in].
For these confidences were ever unhallowed, and un-
blessed. And therefore those that were great politiques
indeed ever ascribed their successes to their felicity, and
not to their skill or virtue. For so Sylla surnamed

* The translation has hoc genus prudentice.

2 inutile in the original, and also in ed. 1633 : obviously a misprint.
Ed. 1629 and the Be Augmentis have it right.

In addition to these instances he cites in the translation another from
Julius Caesar himself. When the soothsayer reported the auspices unfa-
vourable, he was heard to mutter '• they will be more favourable when I
will." The anecdote comes from Suetonius. It was the only occasion
(Bacon adds) on which Caesar so far forgot himself as to betray his secret
thoughts — {nunquam, quod memini, impotentiam cogitationum suar-um ar-
canarum prodidil nisi simili dicto) ; and his death followed soon after.

362 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

himself Felix, not Magnus, [the Fortunate, not the
Great]. So Caesar said1 to the master of the ship,
Ccesarem portas etfortunam ejus, [you carry Caesar and
his fortune].

But yet nevertheless these positions, Fabcr quisque
fortunce suce ; Sapiens dominabitur astris ; Invia virtuti
nulla est via ; [every man should be the maker of his
own fortune ; the wise man will command his stars ;
nothing impossible to virtue :] and the like, being taken
and used as spurs to industry, and not as stirrups to in-
solency, rather for resolution than for presumption or
outward declaration, have been ever thought sound and
good, and are no question imprinted in the greatest
minds ; who are so sensible of this opinion as they can
scarce contain it within. As we see in Augustus
Caesar, (who was rather diverse from his uncle than
inferior in virtue,2) how when he died, he desired his
friends about him to give him a Plaudite ; as if he
were conscient to himself that he had played his part
Faber For- well upon the stage. This part of knowledge

tutur, sive de , , , _ . . ,

Ambitu vita, we do report also as deficient : not but that
it is practised too much, but it hath not been reduced
to writing. And therefore lest it should seem to any
that it is not comprehensible by axiom, it is requisite,
as we did in the former, that we set down some heads
or passages of it.

Wherein it may appear at the first a new and
unwonted argument to teach men how to raise and

1 better (adds the translation) than in the instance above mentioned.

2 sed vir certe paulo moderatior. In Bacon's character of Augustus —
the fragment entitled Imago Civilis Augusti Ccesaris — he acknowledges
that he was inferior to Julius in strength of mind, but asserts that ha was
superior in beauty and health of mind; Julius's aspirations being restless,
boundless, and inordinate ; those of Augustus sober, well ordered, and
within compass

THE SECOND BOOK. 363

make their fortune : a doctrine wherein every man
perchance will be ready to yield himself a disciple, till
he see the difficulty : for Fortune layeth as heavy im-
positions as Virtue ; and it is as hard and severe a
thing to be a true politique, as to be truly moral. But
the handling hereof concerneth learning greatly, both
in honour and in substance : in honour, because prag-
matical men may not go away with an opinion that
learning is like a lark, that can mount and sing and
please herself, and nothing else ; but may know that
she holdeth as well of the hawk, that can soar aloft,
and can also descend and strike upon the prey : in sub-
stance, because it is the perfect law of inquiry of truth,
that nothing be in the globe of matter, which should not
be likewise in the globe of crystal, or form; that is that
there be not any thing in being and action, which
should not be drawn and collected into contemplation
and doctrine. Neither doth learning admire or esteem
of this architecture of fortune otherwise than as of an
inferior work : for no man's fortune can be an end
worthy of his being, and many times the worthiest
men do abandon their fortune willingly for better re-
spects : but nevertheless fortune as an organ of virtue
and merit deserveth the consideration.

First therefore, the precept which I conceive to be
most summary towards the prevailing in fortune, is to
obtain that window which Momus did require, who see-
ing in the frame of man's heart such angles and re-
• cesses, found fault there was not a window to look into
them ; that is, to procure good informations of partic-
ulars touching persons, their natures, their desires and
ends, their customs and fashions, their helps and ad-
vantages, and whereby they chiefly stand ; so again

i

364 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

their weaknesses and disadvantages, and where they lie
most open and obnoxious ; their friends, factions, de-
pen dances ; and again their opposites, enviers, com-
petitors, their moods and times, Sola viri molles aditus
et iempora noras ; their principles, rules, and observa-
tions, and the like : and this not only of persons, but
of actions ; what are on foot from time to time, and
how they are conducted, favoured, opposed ; and how
they import, and the like. For the knowledge of
present actions is not only material in itself, but with-
out it also the knowledge of persons is very erroneous :
for men change with the actions ; and whiles they are
in pursuit they are one, and when they return to their
nature they are another. These informations of par-
ticulars touching persons and actions are as the minor
propositions in every active syllogism ; for no excellency
of observations (which are as the major propositions)
can suffice to ground a conclusion, if there be error and
mistaking in the minors.

That this knowledge is possible, Salomon is our
surety ; who saith, Consilium in corde viri tanquam aqua
profunda; sed vir prudens exhauriet Mud, [counsel in
the heart of man is like deep water ; but a man of un-
derstanding will draw it out]. And although the
knowledge itself falleth not under precept, because it
is of individuals, yet the instructions for the obtaining
of it may.

We will begin therefore with this precept, according
to the ancient opinion, that the sinews of wisdom are
slowness of belief and distrust ; that more trust be
given to countenances and deeds than to words ; and
in words, rather to sudden passages and surprised words,
than to set and purposed words. Neither let that be

THE SECOND BOOK. 365

feared which is said, frond nulla fides, [no trusting to
the face :] which is meant of a general outward be-
haviour, and not of the private and subtile motions and
labours of the countenance and gesture ; which as Q.
Cicero elegantly saith, is animi janua, the gate of the
mind. None more close than Tiberius, and yet Tacitus
saith of Gallus, Etenim vultu offensionem conjectaverat,
[he had seen displeasure in his countenance]. So
again, noting the differing character and manner of his
commending Germanicus and Drusus in the senate, he
saith touching his fashion wherein he carried his speech
of Germanicus, thus ; Magis in speciem adornatis verbis,
quam ut penitus sentire videretur, [it was in words too
laboured and specious to be taken for what he really
felt ;] but of Drusus thus ; Paucioribus, sed intentior,
et fida oratione, [he said less, but more earnestly, and in
a style of sincerity ;] and in another place, speaking
of his character of speech when he did any thing that
was gracious and popular, he saith that in other things
he was velut eluctantium verborum, [of a kind of strug-
gling speech ;] but then again, solutius loquebatur quando
subveniret ;] he spoke with more freedom when he was
speaking in a man's favour]. So that there is no such
artificer of dissimulation, nor no such commanded
countenance (vultus jussus) that can sever from a feigned
tale some of these fashions, either a more slight and
careless fashion, or more set and formal, or more tedious
and wandering, or coming from a man more drily and
hardly.

Neither are deeds such assured pledges, as that they
may be trusted without a judicious consideration of
their magnitude and nature : Fraus sibi in parvis fidem
prcestruit, ut majore emolumento f allot, [it is a trick of

366 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

treachery to win itself credit at the first by fidelity in
small things, that being thereupon trusted in greater it
may deceive with more advantage ;] and the Italian
thinketh himself upon the point to be bought and sold,
when he is better used than he was wont to be without
manifest cause. For small favours, they do but lull
men asleep, both as to caution and as to industry, and
are as Demosthenes calleth them, Alimenta socordice,
[sops to feed sloth]. So again we see how false the
nature of some deeds are, in that particular which
Mutianus practised upon Antonius Primus, upon that
hollow and unfaithful reconcilement which was made
between them ; whereupon Mutianus advanced many
of the friends of Antonius: simul amicis ej us prcefectu-
ras et tribunatus largitur, [making them prefects and
tribunes :] wherein under pretence to strengthen him,
he did desolate him, and won from him his depend-
ances.

As for words, (though they be like waters to physi-
cians, full of flattery and uncertainty,) yet they are not
to be despised, specially with the advantage of passion
and affection. For so we see Tiberius upon a stinging
and incensing speech of Agrippina came a step forth
of his dissimulation, when he said, You are hurt because
you do not reign; of which Tacitus saith, Audita lime
raram occulti pectoris vocem elicuere ; correptamque
Crrozco versu admonuit, ideo losdi quia non regnaret,
[these words drew from Tiberius the voice, so rarely
heard, of his secret heart : he retorted upon her with a
Greek verse, that she was hurt, &c.]. And therefore
the poet doth elegantly call passions tortures, that urge
men to confess their secrets :

Vino tortus et ira.

THE SECOND BOOK. 367

And experience sheweth, there are few men so true to
themselves and so settled, but that, sometimes upon
heat, sometimes upon bravery, sometimes upon kind-
ness, sometimes upon trouble of mind and weakness,
they open themselves ; specially if they be put to it
with a counter-dissimulation, according to the proverb
of Spain, Di mentira, y sacaras verdad, Tell a lie and
find a truth.

As for the knowing of men which is at second hand
from reports ; men's weaknesses 1 and faults are best
known from their enemies, their virtues and abilities
from their friends, their customs and times from their
servants, their conceits and opinions from their familiar
friends with whom they discourse most. General fame
is light, and the opinions conceived by superiors or
equals 2 are deceitful ; for to such men are more masked :
Veriorfama e domesticis emanat, [the truer kind of re-
port comes from those who see them at home].

But the soundest disclosing and expounding of men
is by their natures and ends ; wherein the weakest sort
of men are best interpreted by their natures, and the
wisest by their ends.3 For it was both pleasantly and
wisely said (though I think very untruly) by a nuncio
of the pope, returning from a certain nation where he
served as lieger ; whose opinion being asked touching
the appointment of one to go in his place, he wished
that in any case they did not send one that was too
wise ; because no very wise man would ever imagine
what they in that country were like to do. And cer-
tainly it is an error frequent for men to shoot over, and

1 So ed. 1633. The original and ed. 1629 have weaknesse.

2 The translation omits equals: a correction no doubt of Bacon's own.
8 According to the translation, the weaker and the more simple by their

nature-, the wiser and the more close by their ends.

368 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

to suppose deeper ends and more compass reaches than
are : the Italian proverb being elegant, and for the
most part true :

Di danari, di senno, e di fede,
Ce ne manco che non credi:

There is commonly less money, less wisdom, and less
good faith, than men do account upon.

But Princes upon a far other reason are best inter-
preted by their natures, and private persons by their
ends ; for princes being at the top of human desires,
they have for the most part no particular ends whereto
they aspire,1 by distance from which a man might take
measure and scale of the rest of their actions and de-
sires ; which is one of the causes that maketh their
hearts more inscrutable.2 Neither is it sufficient to in-
form ourselves in men's ends and natures of the variety
of them only, but also of the predominancy, what hu-
mour reigneth most, and what end is principally sought.
For so we see, when Tigellinus saw himself outstripped
by Petronius Turpilianus in Nero's humours of pleas-
ures, metus ejus rimatur? he wrought upon Nero's fears,
whereby he brake the other's neck.

But to all this part of inquiry the most compendious
way resteth in three things. The first, to have general
acquaintance and inwardness with those which have
general acquaintance and look most into the world ;
and specially according to the diversity of business and
the diversity of persons, to have privacy and conversa-

1 i. e. not earnestly and constantly — {ad quos, prastrtim Vehementev et
constanter, aspirent).

2 Whereas private persons are almost all like travellers making for
their journey's end; and if you know what they are aiming at, you may
guess by that what they are likely to do and what not to do.

« So edd. 1629 and 1633. The original has rinaeur.

THE SECOND BOOK. 369

tion with some one friend at least which is perfect and
well intelligenced in every several kind. The second
is to keep a good mediocrity in liberty of speech and
secrecy ; in most things liberty ; secrecy where it im-
porteth ; for liberty of speech inviteth and provoketh
liberty to be used again, and so bringeth much to a
man's knowledge ; and secrecy, on the other side, in-
duceth trust and inwardness. The last is the reducing
of a man's self to this watchful and serene habit, as to
make account and purpose, in every conference and
action, as well to observe as to act. For as Epictetus
would have a philosopher in every particular action to
say to himself, Et hoc volo, et etiam institutum servare,
[I would do this and keep my course too ;] so a politic
man in every thing should say to himself, Et hoc volo,
ac etiam aliquid addiscere, [I would do it and also learn
something from it].1 I have stayed the longer upon
this precept of obtaining good information, because it
is a main part by itself, which answereth to all the rest.
But, above all things, caution must be taken that men
have a good stay and hold of themselves, and that this
much knowledge do not draw on much meddling ; for
nothing is more unfortunate than light and rash inter-
meddling in many matters ; so that this variety of
knowledge tendeth in conclusion but only to this, to
make a better and freer choice of those actions which
may concern us, and to conduct them with the less
error and the more dexterity.

The second precept concerning this knowledge is,

1 i. e. something which may be of use hereafter. And therefore (adds
the translation) those who are so intent on the business in hand that, like
Montaigne, they pay no attention to anything that turns up by the way,
make excellent ministers for Kings and Commonwealths, but bad man-
agers of their own fortune.

vol. vi. 24

370 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

for men to take good information touching their own
person, and well to understand themselves : knowing
that, as St. James saith, though men look oft in a
glass, yet they do suddenly forget themselves ; wherein
as the divine glass is the word of God, so the politic
glass is the state of the world or times wherein we
live ; in the which we are to behold ourselves.

For men ought to take an unpartial view of their
own abilities and virtues ; and again of their wants
and impediments ; accounting these with the most, and
those other with the least ; and from this view and ex-
amination to frame the considerations following.

First, to consider how the constitution of their nature
sorteth with the general state of the times ; which if
they find agreeable and fit, then in all things to give
themselves more scope and liberty ; but if differing
and dissonant, then in the whole course of their life
to be more close, retired, and reserved : as we see in
Tiberius, who was never seen at a play and came not
into the senate in twelve of his last years ; whereas
Augustus Caesar lived ever in men's eyes, which Ta-
citus observeth : Alia Tiberio morum via, [Tiberius's
ways were different].1

Secondly, to consider how their nature sorteth with
professions and courses of life, and accordingly to make
election, if they be free ; and, if engaged, to make the
departure at the first opportunity : as we see was done
by duke Valentine, that was designed by his father to
a sacerdotal profession, but quitted it soon after in re-
gard of his parts and inclination ; being such never-
theless, as a man cannot tell well whether they were
worse for a prince or for a priest.

1 In the translation Pericles is mentioned as another instance — (eadem
et Periclis ratio fuit).

THE SECOND BOOK. 371

Thirdly, to consider how they sort with those whom
they are like to have competitors and concurrents, and
to take that course wherein there is most solitude, and
themselves like to be most eminent : as Caesar Julius
did, who at first was an orator or pleader ; but when
he saw the excellency of Cicero, Hortensius, Catulus,
and others, for eloquence, and saw there was no man
of reputation for the wars but Pompeius, upon whom
the state was forced to rely, he forsook his course be-
gun toward a civil and popular greatness, and trans-
ferred his designs to a martial greatness.

Fourthly, in the choice of their friends and depend-
ances, to proceed according to the composition of
their own nature ; as we may see in Caesar, all whose
friends and followers were men active and effectual,
but not solemn or of reputation.1

Fifthly, to take special heed how they guide them-
selves by examples, in thinking they can do as they
see others do ; whereas perhaps their natures and car-
riages are far differing ; in which error it seemeth
Pompey was, of whom Cicero saith, that he was wont
often to say, Sylla potuit, ego non potero ? [Sylla coidd
do it, why not I ?] wherein lie was much abused, the
natures and proceedings of himself and his example
being the unlikest in the world ; the one being fierce,
violent, and pressing the fact ; the other solemn, and
full of majesty and circumstance, and therefore the less
effectual.

But this precept touching the politic knowledge of
ourselves hath many other branches whereupon we
cannot insist.

1 And men (the translation adds) who were infinitely loyal to Caesar
himself, but arrogant and contemptuous towards all men else; such as
Antonius, Hirtius, Pansa, Oppius, Balbus, Dolabella, Pollio, and the rest.

372 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

Next to the well understanding and discerning of a
man's self, there followeth the well opening and reveal-
ing1 a man's self; wherein we see nothing more usual
than for the more able man to make the less shew.
For there is a great advantage in the well setting forth
of a man's virtues, fortunes, merits ; and again in the
artificial covering of a man's weaknesses, defects, dis-
graces ; staying upon the one, sliding from the other ;
cherishing the one by circumstances, gracing the other
by exposition, and the like : wherein we see what
Tacitus saith of Mutianus, who was the greatest po-
litique of his time, Omnium qua? dixtrat feeeratque arte
quddam ostentator, [having a certain art of displaying
to advantage all he said and did ;] which requireth
indeed some art, lest it turn tedious and arrogant ; but
yet so as ostentation (though it be to the first degree
of vanity) seemeth to me rather a vice in manners
than in policy : for as it is said, Audacter calumniare?
semper aliquid hceret, [slander boldly, there is ever
some that sticks ;] so, except it be in a ridiculous
degree of deformity, Audacter te vendita, semper ali-
quid *7i&reti [put forward your own pretensions boldly
— something always sticks]. For it will stick with
the more ignorant and inferior sort of men, though
men of wisdom and rank do smile at it and despise it ;
and yet the authority won with many doth countervail
the disdain of a few. But if it be carried with de-

1 In the translation this part of the subject is distributed into three sep-
arate heads; — the art of setting a man's self forth to advantage (se os-
tentare) — of making himself understood (se declarare) — of turning and
shaping himself according to occasion {Jlectere se et effingert); and the
order of the precepts which follow is changed to suit this arrangement.
The three next paragraphs belong to the first head, — the art of ostenta-
tion.

2 calumniari in the original.

THE SECOND BOOK. 373

cency and government, as with a natural, pleasant,
and ingenious l fashion ; or at times when it is mixed
with some peril and unsafety, (as in military persons ;)
or at times when others are most envied ; or with easy
and careless passage to it and from it, without dwelling
too long or being too serious ; or with an equal free-
dom of taxing a man's self as well as gracing himself;
or by occasion of repelling or putting down others' in-
jury or insolency ; it doth greatly add to reputation :
and surely not a few solid natures, that want this ven-
tosity and cannot sail in the height of the winds, are
not without some prejudice and disadvantage by their
moderation.

But for these flourishes and enhancements of virtue,
as they are not perchance unnecessary, so it is at least
necessary that virtue be not disvalued and imbased
under the just price ; which is done in three manners :
by offering and obtruding a man's self; wherein men
think he is rewarded, when he is accepted : by doing
too much ; 2 which will not give that which is well
done leave to settle, and in the end induceth satiety :
and by finding too soon the fruit of a man's virtue, in
commendation, applause, honour, favour ; wherein if a
man be pleased with a little, let him hear what is truly
said, Cave ne insuetus rebus majoribus videaris, si ha>c
te res parva sicuti magna delectat, [if he take so much
delight in a little thing, he will be thought unused to
greater things].

But the covering of defects is of no less importance
than the valuing of good parts ; which may be done

1 t. c. ingenuous.

2 Especially in the beginning, and at once — (quando quis in principio
ret gerendas viribus suis nimium abutitur, et quod sensim erat prastandum una
impetu effundit).

374 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

likewise in three manners ; by Caution, by Colour, and
by Confidence. Caution is when men do ingeniously
and discreetly avoid to be put into those things for
which they are not proper : whereas contrariwise bold
and unquiet spirits will thrust themselves into matters
without difference, and so publish and proclaim all
their wants. Colour is when men make a way for
themselves to have a construction made of their faults
or wants as proceeding from a better cause, or intended
for some other purpose : for of the one it is well said,
Scepe latet vitium proximitate boni, [a vice will often
hide itself under the shadow of a neighbouring virtue ;]
and therefore whatsoever want a man hath, he must
see that he pretend the virtue that shadoweth it ; as if
he be dull, he must affect gravity ; if a coward, mild-
ness ; and so the rest : for the second, a man must
frame some probable cause why he should not do his
best, and why he should dissemble his abilities ; and
for that purpose must use to dissemble those abilities
which are notorious in him,1 to give colour that his
true wants are but industries and dissimulations. For
Confidence, it is the last 2 but the surest remedy ;
namely, to depress and seem to despise whatsoever a
man cannot attain ; observing the good 3 principle of
the merchants, who endeavour to raise the price of
their own commodities, and to beat down the price of
others. But there is a confidence that passeth4 this
other ; which is, to face out a man's own defects, in

1 This clause is omitted in the translation; which says only ut quod non
possimus nolle videamur.

2 Meaning, I think, the least worthy — the last to be resorted to. The
translation has impudens certe est remedium, sed tamen &c.

8 i. e. prudent — mercatorum prudentium more, quibus solenne est el pro-
prium, ut &c.

* i. e. in impudence — (hoc ipso inynidentius).

THE SECOND BOOK. 375

seeming to conceive that he is best in those things
wherein he is failing ; and, to help that again, to seem
on the other side that he hath least opinion of himself
in those things wherein he is best : like as we shall see
it commonly in poets, that if they shew their verses,
and you except to any, they will say that that line cost
them more labour than any of the rest ; and presently
will seem to disable and suspect rather some other line,
which they know well enough to be the best in the
number. But above all, in this righting and helping
of a man's self in his own carriage, he must take heed
he shew not himself dismantled and exposed to scorn
and injury, by too much dulceness, goodness, and facil-
ity of nature, but shew some sparkles of liberty, spirit,
and edge : which kind of fortified carriage, with a
ready rescuing1 of a man's self from scorns, is some-
times of necessity imposed upon men by somewhat in
their person or fortune ; 2 but it ever succeedeth with
good felicity.3

Another precept of this knowledge is, by all possible
endeavour to frame the mind to be pliant and obedient
to occasion ; for nothing hindereth men's fortunes so

1 So ed. 1633. The original and ed. 1629 have rescussing.

2 As in the case of deformed persons, and bastards, and persons disgraced
— (veluti Jit in def omnibus, et spuriis, et ignominia aliqua mulctatis).

8 According to the arrangement adopted in the translation, the observa-
tions on the first head — the art of ostentation — end here; and the art of
declaration, that is of making oneself understood, is next handled. The
substance of the remarks on this head will be found in page 378. post,
in the paragraph beginning "Another part of this knowledge is the observ-
ing a good mediocrity." &c. Then follows the paragraph, which stands
next in the text; which refers to the third head, — quod ad animum flec-
tendum et effingendum attinet. And with this he concludes what he has to
say of " the two summary precepts concerning the architecture of Fortune."
The rest he gives as a sample of particular precepts (pratcepta sparsa) on
the same subject.

376 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

much as tills Idem manebat neque idem decebat, [contin-
uing the same when the same is no longer fit :] men
are where they were, when occasions turn : and there-
fore to Cato, whom Livy maketh such an architect of
fortune, he addeth that he had versatile ingenium, [a
wit that could turn well]. And thereof it cometh that
these grave solemn wits, which must be like themselves
and cannot make departures, have more dignity than
felicity. But in some it is nature to be somewhat
viscous and inwrapped, and not easy to turn. In
some it is a conceit that is almost a nature, which is,
that men can hardly make themselves believe that they
ought to change their course, when they have found
good by it in former experience. For Machiavel noteth
wisely, how Fabius Maximus would have been tempo-
rizing still, according to his old bias, when the nature of
the war was altered and required hot pursuit. In some
other it is want of point and penetration in their judg-
ment, that they do not discern when things have a
period, but come in too late after the occasion ; as De-
mosthenes compareth the people of Athens to country
fellows when they play in a fence school, that if they
have a blow, then they remove their weapon to that
ward, and not before. In some other it is a lothness
to leese labours passed, and a conceit that they can
bring about occasions to their ply ; 1 and yet in the
end, when they see no other remedy, then they come
to it with disadvantage ; as Tarquinius, that gave for
the third part of Sibylla's books the treble price, when
he might at first have had all three for the simple. But
from whatsoever root or cause this restiveness of mind
proceedeth, it is a thing most prejudicial ; and nothing
1 The rest of this sentence is omitted in the translation.

THE SECOND BOOK. 377

is more politic than to make the wheels of our mind
concentric and voluble with the wheels of fortune.

1 Another precept of this knowledge, which hath some
affinity with that we last spake of, but with difference,
is that which is well expressed, Fatis accede Deisque,
[take the way which the Fates and the Gods offer ;]
that men do not only turn with the occasions but also
run with the occasions, and not strain their credit or
strength to over hard or extreme points, but choose in
their actions that which is most passable : for this will
preserve men from foil, not occupy them too much
about one matter, win opinion of moderation, please
the most,2 and make a shew of a perpetual felicity in
all they undertake ; which cannot but mightily increase
reputation.

Another part of this knowledge seemeth to have
some repugnancy with the former two, but not as I un-
derstand it ; and it is that which Demosthenes uttereth in
high terms ; Et quemadmodum reception est, ut exercitum
ducat imperator, sic et a cordatis viris res ipsce ducendoc ;
ut quce ipsis videntur, ea gerantur, et non ipsi eventus
persequi cogantur ; [as the captain leads the army, so
should wise men lead affairs ; they should get that done
which they think good to be done, and not be forced to
follow at the heels of events]. For if we observe, we
shall find two differing kinds of sufficiency in manag-
ing of business : some can make use of occasions aptly

1 This, in the translation, stands as the second of the prcecepla sparsa ;
that of accustoming the mind to value things according as they conduce to
our particular ends being placed first. Throughout this part of the work
the meaning is expressed more fully and clearly in the Latin, but where no
material alteration or addition is introduced, and where the meaning of the
English is plain enough, I do not stay to point out the differences.

2 That is, I suppose, by bringing us less into collision with them —
(pauciores offendemus).

378 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

and dexterously, but plot little ; some can urge and
pursue their own plots well, but cannot accommodate
nor take in ; 1 either of which is very unperfect with-
out the other.

Another part of this knowledge is the observing a
good mediocrity in the declaring or not declaring a
man's self: for although depth of secrecy, and making
way qualis est via navis in mari, [like the way of a ship
through the water,] (which the French calleth sourdes
menees, when men set things in work without opening
themselves at all,) be sometimes both prosperous and
admirable ; yet many times Dissimulatio errores parit qui
dissimulator em ipsum illaqueant, [dissimulation breeds
mistakes in which the dissembler himself is caught]. And
therefore we see the greatest politiques have in a natural
and free manner professed their desires, rather than been
reserved and disguised in them. For so we see that Lu-
cius Sylla made a kind of profession, that he wished all
men happy or unhappy as they stood his friends or enemies.
So Caesar, when he went first into Gaul, made no scruple
to profess that he had raster be first in a village than
second at Rome. So again as soon as he had begun the
war, we see what Cicero saith of him ; Alter (meaning
of Caesar) non recusat, sed quodammodo postulat, ut (ut
est) sic appelletur tyrannus, [he does not refuse, but in a
manner demands, to be called what he is — tyrant].
So we may see in a letter of Cicero to Atticus, that
Augustus Caesar in his very entrance into affairs, when
he was a dearling of the senate, yet in his harangues

1 So in all three editions, though the sentence seems to be imperfect.
The meaning must be that they cannot seize and turn to advantage acci-
dents which fall out unexpectedly in their favour. The translation has
alii toti sunt in machinando, qui occasiones qua opportune incidunt non arri-
piunt.

THE SECOND BOOK. 379

to the people would swear Ita parentis honores eonse-
qui Uceat, [as I hope to attain my father's honours ;]
which was no less than the tyranny, save that, to help
it he would stretch forth his hand towards a statua
of Caesar's that was erected in the place : and ] men
laughed and wondered and said Is it possible ? or Did
you ever hear the like ? 2 and yet thought 3 he meant
no hurt, he did it4 so handsomely and ingenuously.
And all these were prosperous : whereas Pompey, who
tended to the same end but in a more dark and dissem-
bling manner, as Tacitus saith of him, Oecultior non
melior, [having his intentions better concealed but not
better,] wherein Sallust concurreth, ore probo, animo
inverecundo, [an honest tongue but a shameless mind,]
made it his design by infinite secret engines to cast the
state into an absolute anarchy and confusion, that the
state might cast itself into his arms for necessity and
protection, and so the sovereign power be put upon him,
and he never seen in it : and when he had brought it
(as he thought) to that point, when he was chosen con-
sul alone, as never any was, yet he could make no
great matter of it, because men understood him not ;
but was fain in the end to go the beaten track of get-
ting arms into his hands, by colour of the doubt of
Caesar's designs : so tedious, casual, and unfortunate
are these deep dissimulations ; whereof it seemeth Ta-
citus made this judgment, that they were a cunning
of an inferior form in regard of true policy ; attribut-
ing the one to Augustus, the other to Tiberius, where

1 So the original; edd. 1629 and 1633 have whereat many men.

2 So the original; edd. 1629 and 1633 have like to this.
8 though in orig.

4 t. e. he seemed to say what he felt — (nihil malitice in eo suspicabantur
qui tarn candide et ingenue quid sentiret loqueretur).

380 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

speaking of Livia he saith, Et cum artibus mariti iimu-
latione jilii bene composita, [that she was of a happy
composition, uniting the arts of her husband with the
dissimulation of her son ;] for surely the continual habit
of dissimulation is but a weak and sluggish cunning,
and not greatly politic.

Another precept of this Architecture of Fortune is
to accustom our minds to judge of the proportion or
value of things as they conduce and are material to our
particular ends ; and that to do substantially, and not
superficially. For we shall find the logical part (as I
may term it) of some men's minds good, but the mathe-
matical part erroneous ; that is, they can well judge of
consequences, but not of proportions and comparison ; 1
preferring things of shew and sense before things of
substance and effect. So some fall in love with access
to princes, others with popular fame and applause, sup-
posing they are things of great purchase ; when in
many cases they are but matters of envy, peril, and
impediment. So some measure things according to the
labour and difficulty or assiduity which are spent about
them ; and think if they be ever moving, that they
must needs advance and proceed ; as Caesar saith in a
despising manner of Cato the second, when he describ-
eth how laborious and indefatigable he was to no great
purpose ; Hoec omnia magno studio agebat. So in most
things men are ready to abuse themselves in thinking
the greatest means 2 to be best, when it should be the
fittest.

As for the true marshalling of men's pursuits towards

1 Be pretiis vero imperitissime. — De Aug.

2 t. e. the greatest persons used as means — (si magni alicujus aut honoraii
viri opera utantur).

I

THE SECOND BOOK. 381

their fortune as they are more or less material, I hold
them to stand thus. First the amendment of their own
minds ; for the remove of the impediments of the mind
will sooner clear the passages of fortune, than the obtain-
ing fortune will remove the impediments of the mind.
In the second place I set down wealth and means ;
which I know most men would have placed first, be-
cause of the general use which it beareth towards all
variety of occasions. But that opinion I may condemn
with like reason as Machiavel doth that other, that
moneys were the sinews of the wars ; whereas (saith
he) the true sinews of the wars are the sinews of men's
arms, that is, a valiant, populous, and military nation ;
and he voucheth aptly the authority of Solon, who
when Croesus shewed him his treasury of gold said to
him, that if another came that had better iron he would
be master of his gold. In like manner it may be truly
affirmed that it is not moneys that are the sinews of
fortune, but it is the sinews and steel of men's minds,
wit, courage, audacity, resolution, temper, industry, and
the like. In third ] place I set down reputation, be-
cause of the peremptory tides and currents it hath ;
which if they be not taken in their due time are seldom
recovered, it being extreme hard to play an after-game
of reputation. And lastly I place honour, which is
more easily won by any of the other three, much more
by all, than any of them can be purchased by honour.
To conclude this precept, as there is order and priority
in matter, so is there in time, the preposterous placing
whereof is one of the commonest errors ; while men
fly to their ends when they should intend their begin-
nings, and do not take things in order of time as they

1 So the original and ed. 1629. Ed. 1633 has the third.

382 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

come on, but marshal them according to greatness and
not according to instance ; not observing the good pre-
cept, Quod nunc instat agamus,

[Despatch we now what stands us now upon].

Another precept of this knowledge is, not to em-
brace any matters which do occupy too great a quan-
tity of time, but to have that sounding in a man's ears,
Sedfugit interea, fugit irreparabile tempus, [while he is
making ready to do it the time for doing it is gone ;]
and that is the cause why those which take their course
of rising by professions of burden, as lawyers, orators,
painful divines, and the like, are not commonly so
politic for their own fortune,1 otherwise than in their
ordinary way, because they want time to learn particu-
lars, to wait occasions, and to devise plots.2

Another precept of this knowledge is to imitate na-
ture which doth nothing in vain ; which surely a man
may do, if he do well interlace his business, and bend
not his mind too much upon that which he principally
intendeth.3 For a man ought in every particular ac-
tion so to carry the motions of his mind, and so to have
one thing under another, as if he cannot have that he
seeketh in the best degree, yet to have it in a second,
or so in a third ; and if he can have no part of that
which he purposed, yet to turn the use of it to some-
what else ; 4 and if he cannot make any thing of it for
the present, yet to make it as a seed of somewhat in

1 So the original. Edd. 1629 and 1633 have fot-tunes.

2 Whereas (he adds in the translation) you will find in courts and com-
monwealths that the best promoters of their own fortune are those who
have no public duty to discharge, and make their own rising their only
business.

8 This last clause is omitted in the translation.

4 t. e. to turn his labour taken therein to some other use — (ad alium
quempiam prxettr deoiinatum Jinem operam impensam Jltciamus).

THE SECOND BOOK. 383

time to come ; and if he can contrive no effect or sub-
stance from it, yet to win some good opinion by it, or
the like ; so that he should exact an account l of him-
self, of every action to reap somewhat, and not to stand
amazed and confused if he fail of that he chiefly meant :
for nothing is more impolitic than to mind actions
wholly one by one ; for he that doth so leeseth infinite
occasions which intervene, and are many times more
proper and propitious for somewhat that he shall need
afterwards, than for that which he urgeth for the
present ; and therefore men must be perfect in that
rule, Hcec oportet facere, et ilia non omittere, [these
things ought ye to do, and not to leave the other un-
done] .

Another precept of this knowledge is, not to engage
a man's self peremptorily in any thing, though it seem
not liable to accident ; but ever to have a window to
fly out at, or a way to retire ;2 following the wisdom
in the ancient fable of the two frogs, which consulted
when their plash was dry whither they should go ; and
the one moved to go down into a pit, because it was
not likely the water would dry there ; but the other
answered, True, but if it do, how shall we get out again ?

Another precept of this knowledge is that ancient
precept of Bias, construed not to any point of perfidi-
ousness but only to caution and moderation, Et ama
ianquam inimicus futurus, et odi tanquam arnaturus,
[love your friend as you would love one who may here-
after be your enemy ; hate your enemy as one who
may hereafter be your friend ;] for it utterly betrayeth
all utility for men to embark themselves too far in un-

1 So the original. Edd. 1629 and 1633 omit an.

2 The rest of this paragraph is omitted in the translation.

384 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

fortunate friendships, troublesome spleens, and childish
and humorous envies or emulations.

But I continue this beyond the measure of an ex-
ample ; led, because I would not have such knowledges
which I note as deficient to be thought things imagina-
tive or in the air, or an observation or two much made
of; but things of bulk and mass, whereof an end is
hardlier made than a beginning. It must be likewise
conceived, that in these points which I mention and
set down, they are far from complete tractates of them,
but only as small pieces for patterns. And lastly, no
man I suppose will think that I mean fortunes are not
obtained without all this ado ; for I know they come
tumbling into some men's laps ; and a number obtain
good fortunes by diligence in a plain way, little inter-
meddling, and keeping themselves from gross errors.

But as Cicero, when he setteth down an Idea of a
perfect Orator, doth not mean that every pleader should
be such ; and so likewise, when a Prince or a Courtier
hath been described by such as have handled those
subjects, the mould hath used to be made according to
the perfection of the art, and not according to com-
mon practice : so I understand it that it ought to be
done in the description of a Politic man ; I mean pol-
itic for his own fortune.

But it must be remembered all this while, that the
precepts which we have set down are of that kind
which may be counted and called bonce artes, [hon-
est arts]. As for evil arts, if a man would set down
for himself that principle of Machiavel, that a man
seek not to attain virtue itself, but the appearance only
thereof ; because the credit of virtue is a help, but the
use of it is cumber ; or that other of his principles,

THE SECOND BOOK. 385

that he presuppose that men are not fitly to be wrought
otherwise but by fear, and therefore that he seek to have
every man obnoxious, low, and in strait, which the Ital-
ians call seminar spine, to sow thorns ; or that other
principle contained in the verse which Cicero citeth,
Cadant amid, dummodo inimici intercidant, [down with
friends so enemies go down with them,] as the Trium-
virs, which sold every one to other the lives of their
friends for the deaths of their enemies ; or that other
protestation of L. Catilina, to set on fire and trouble
states, to the end to fish in droumy waters, and to un-
wrap their fortunes ; Ego si quid in fortunis meis ex-
citatum sit incendium, id non aqua sed ruina restinguam,
[if my fortunes be set on fire I will put it out not with
water but with demolition :] or that other principle of
Lysander that children are to be deceived with comfits,
and men with oaths : and the like evil and corrupt po-
sitions, whereof (as in all things) there are more in
number than of the good : certainly with these dispen-
sations from the laws of charity and integrity the
pressing of a man's fortune may be more hasty and
compendious. But it is in life as it is in ways ; the
shortest way is commonly the foulest, and surely the
fairer way is not much about.

But men if they be in their own power and do bear
and sustain themselves, and be not carried away with a
whirlwind or tempest of ambition, ought in the pursuit
of their own fortune to set before their eyes not only
that general map of the world, that all things are vanity
and vexation of spirit, but many other more particular
cards and directions : chiefly that, that Being without
well-being is a curse and the greater being the greater
curse, and that all virtue is most rewarded and all

VOL. VI. 25

386 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

wickedness most punished in itself: according as the
poet saith excellently :

Quae vobis, quae digna, viri, pro laudibus istis
Fraemia posse rear solvi? pulcherrima primum
Dii moresque dabunt vestri :

[What recorapence, 0 friends, can I hold out
Worthy such deeds ? The best is that ye have,
God's blessing and your proper nobleness :]

and so of the contrary. And secondly they ought to
look up to the eternal providence and divine judgment,
which often subverteth the wisdom of evil plots and
imaginations, according to that Scripture, He hath con-
ceived mischief, and shall bring forth a vain thing. And
1 although men should refrain themselves from injury
and evil arts, yet this incessant and Sabbathless pursuit
of a man's fortune leaveth not tribute which we owe
to God of our time ; who (we see) demandeth a tenth
of our substance, and a seventh, which is more strict,
of our time : and it is to small purpose to have an
erected face towards heaven, and a perpetual grovelling
spirit upon earth, eating dust as doth the serpent ;
Atque affigit humo divince particulam aura, [fixing to
earth the etherial spark divine]. And if any man
flatter himself that he will employ his fortune well
though he should obtain it ill, as was said concerning
Augustus Caesar, and after of Septimius Severus, that
either they should never have been born or else they should
never have died, they did so much mischief in the pur-
suit and ascent of their greatness, and so much good
when they were established ; yet these compensations
and satisfactions are good to be used, but never good to
be purposed. And lastly, it is not amiss for men in
their race toward their fortune to cool themselves a

THE SECOND BOOK. 387

little with that conceit which is elegantly expressed by
the emperor Charles the fifth in his instructions to the
king his son, that fortune hath somewhat of the nature
of a woman, that if she be too much wooed she is the farther
off. But this last is but a remedy for those whose
tastes are corrupted : let men rather build upon that
foundation which is as a corner-stone of divinity and
philosophy, wherein they join close, namely that same
Primum qucerite. For divinity saith, Primum qucerite
regnum Dei, et ista omnia adjicientur vobis, [seek ye
first the kingdom of God, and all these things shall be
added unto you :] and philosophy saith, Primum qucerite
bona animi, ccetera aut aderunt aut non oberunt, [seek ye
first the good things of the mind, all other good things
will either come or not be wanted] . And although the
human foundation hath somewhat of the sand,1 as we
see in M. Brutus when he brake forth into that speech,

Te colui, Virtus, ut rem; at tu nomen inane es;

[I took thee, Virtue, for a reality, but I find thee an
empty name ;J yet the divine foundation is upon the
rock. But this may serve for a taste of that knowledge
which I noted as deficient.

^[ 2 Concerning Government, it is a part of knowl-

1 same in the original : sands in edd. 1629 and 1633.

2 De Aug. viii. 3. The first part of this chapter is entirely altered in the
translation; the remarks on the secret nature of Government, as a subject
not proper for scrutiny, being omitted altogether; and the complimentary
excuse for not entering upon it himself being transferred to the opening of
the book. In this place indeed he speaks of it as a subject which his own
long experience as an officer of state qualified him to handle, and on which
he had some work in contemplation, though he thought it would be either
abortive or posthumous ; alluding probably to the New Atlantis, in which we
know from Dr. Rawley that he did intend to exhibit a model of a perfect
government. For the present however he confines himself to two treatises,
given by way of example ; one on the art of extending the bounds of Em-

388 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

edge secret and retired, in both these respects in which
things are deemed secret ; for some things are secret
because they are hard to know, and some because they
are not fit to utter. We see all governments are ob-
scure and invisible.

Totamque infusa perartus
Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet.

[In every pore diffused the great mind works,
Stirs all the mass, and thro' the huge frame lives.]

Such is the description of governments. We see the
government of God over the world is hidden, insomuch
as it seemeth to participate of much irregularity and
confusion. The government of the Soul in moving the
Body is inward and profound, and the passages thereof
hardly to be reduced to demonstration. Again, the
wisdom of antiquity (the shadows whereof are in the
poets) in the description of torments and pains, next
unto the crime of rebellion which was the Giants'
offence, doth detest the offence of futility,1 as in Sisy-
phus and Tantalus. But this was meant of particulars :
nevertheless even unto the general rules and discourses
of policy and government there is due a reverent and
reserved handling.

But contrariwise in the governors toward the gov-
erned all things ought, as far as the frailty of man per-
mitteth, to be manifest and revealed. For so it is ex-
pressed in the Scriptures touching the government of
God, that this globe, which seemeth to us a dark and
shady body, is in the view of God as crystal : Et in con-
spectu sedis tanquam mare vitreum simile crystallo, [and

pire (which is a translation of the twenty -ninth Essay); the other on Uni-
versal Justice.

i So edd. 1629 and 1633. The original has faciiitie. By futility I un-
derstand idle, curiosity.

THE SECOND BOOK. 389

before the Throne there was a sea of glass, like unto
crystal]. So unto princes and states, and specially
towards wise senates and councils, the natures and
dispositions of the people, their conditions and neces-
sities, their factions and combinations, their animosities
and discontents, ought to be, in regard of the variety
of their intelligences, the wisdom of their observations,
and the height of their station where they keep sen-
tinel, in great part clear and transparent. Wherefore,
considering that I write to a king that is a master of
this science, and is so well assisted, I think it decent to
pass over this part in silence, as willing to obtain the
certificate which one of the ancient philosophers aspired
unto ; who being silent, when others contended to make
demonstration of their abilities by speech, desired it
might be certified for his part, that there was one that
knew how to hold his peace.

Notwithstanding, for the more public part of govern-
ment, which is Laws, I think good to note only one
deficience ; which is, that all those which have written of
laws, have written either as philosophers or as lawyers,
and none as statesmen. As for the philosophers, they
make imaginary laws for imaginary commonwealths ;
and their discourses are as the stars, which give little
light because they are so high. For the lawyers, they
write according to the states where they live, what is
received law, and not what ought to be law : for the wis-
dom of a lawmaker is one, and of a lawyer is another.
For there are in nature certain fountains of justice,
whence all civil laws are derived but as streams ; and
like as waters do take tinctures and tastes from the
soils through which they run, so do civil laws vary ac-
cording to the regions and governments where they are

390 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

planted, though they proceed from the same fountains.
Again, the wisdom of a lawmaker consisteth not only
in a platform of justice, but in the application thereof;
taking into consideration by what means laws may be
made certain, and what are the causes and remedies of
the doubtfulness and incertainty of law ; by what means
laws may be made apt and easy to be executed, and
what are the impediments and remedies in the execution
of laws ; what influence laws touching private right of
meum and tuum have into the public state, and how
they may be made apt and agreeable ; how laws are to
be penned and delivered, whether in Texts or in Acts ;
brief or large ; with preambles or without ; how they
are to be pruned and reformed from time to time ; and
what is the best means to keep them from being too
vast in volumes or too full of multiplicity and crossness ;
how they are to be expounded, when upon causes emer-
gent and judicially discussed, and when upon responses
and conferences touching general points or questions ;
how they are to be pressed, rigorously or tenderly ; how
they are to be mitigated by equity and good conscience ;
and whether discretion and strict law are to be mingled
in the same courts or kept apart in several courts ;
again, how the practice, profession, and erudition of law
is to be censured and governed ; and many other points
Depmdentia touching the administration, and (as I may
m£dtf£ti- term iO animation of laws. Upon which
bus Juns. j insist the less, because I purpose (if God
give me leave), having begun a work of this nature in
aphorisms,1 to propound it hereafter noting it in the
mean time for deficient.

1 This was no doubt the treatise which is given by way of specimen in
the De Aug/nentis. The perfection of a law is there described as consisting

THE SECOND BOOK. 391

And for your Majesty's laws of England, I could
say much of their dignity, and somewhat of their de-
fect ; but they cannot but excel the civil laws in fitness
for the government : for the civil law was non hos quae,-
gitum munus in usus ; it was not made for the countries
which it governeth. Hereof I cease to speak, because
I will not intermingle matter of action with matter of
general learning.1

Thus have I concluded this portion of learning
touching Civil Knowledge ; and with civil knowledge
have concluded Human Philosophy ; and with human
philosophy, Philosophy in General. And being now
at some pause, looking back into that I have passed
through, this writing seemeth to me, (si nunquam fallit
imago) as far as a man can judge of his own work, not
much better than that noise or sound which musicians
make while they are tuning their instruments ; which
is nothing pleasant to hear, but yet is a cause why the
music is sweeter afterwards. So have I been content
to tune the instruments of the muses, that they may
play that have better hands. And surely, when I set
before me the condition of these times, in which learn-
ing hath made her third visitation or circuit, in all the
qualities thereof; as the excellency and vivacity of the
wits of this age ; the noble helps and lights which we
have by the travails of ancient writers ; the art of
printing, which communicateth books to men of all

in five things: it must be certain in its meaning; just in its rules; conven-
ient in execution ; agreeable to the form of government; and productive
of virtue in the governed. Of these heads the first only is discussed ; but
under it almost all the points enumerated in the text come under considera-
tion, more or less completely.
1 This paragraph is omitted in the translation.

392 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

fortunes ; the openness of the world by navigation,
which hath disclosed multitudes of experiments, and a
mass of natural history ; the leisure wherewith these
times abound, not employing men so generally in civil
business, as the states of Graecia did in respect of their
popularity, and the state of Rome in respect of the
greatness of their monarchy ; the present disposition of
these times at this instant to peace ; * the consumption
of all that ever can be said in controversies of religion,
which have so much diverted men from other sciences ;
the perfection of your Majesty's learning, which as a
phoenix may call whole vollies of wits to follow you ;
and the inseparable propriety of time, which is ever
more and more to disclose truth ; I cannot but be
raised to this persuasion, that this third period of time
will far surpass that of the Graecian and Roman learn-
ing : only if men will know their own strength and
their own weakness both ; and take one from the other
light of invention, and not fire of contradiction ; and
esteem of the inquisition of truth as of an enterprise,
and not as of a quality or ornament ; and employ wit
and magnificence to things of worth and excellency,
and not to things vulgar and of popular estimation.
As for my labours, if any man shall please himself or
others in the reprehension of them, they shall make
that ancient and patient request, Verbera sed audi,
[strike me if you will, only hear me ;] let men repre-
hend them, so they observe and weigh them. For the

1 This was written just after the conclusion of peace between England
and Spain; when the translation was published the disposition of the times
was less peaceable, but a greater part of Europe was actually at peace ; and
accordingly instead of the expression in the text he substitutes, " the peace
which is at this time enjojred by Britain, Spain, Italy, France too at last,
and other regions not a few."

THE SECOND BOOK. 393

appeal is (lawful though it may be it shall not be need-
ful) from the first cogitations of men to their second,
and from the nearer times to the times further off.
Now let us come to that learning, which both the for-
mer times were not so blessed as to know, sacred and
inspired Divinity, the Sabaoth and port of all men's la-
bours and peregrinations.

^[ * The prerogative of God extendeth as well to the
reason as to the will of man ; so that as we are to
obey his law though we find a reluctation in our will,
so we are to believe his word though we find a reluc-
tation in our reason. For if we believe only that
which is agreeable to our sense, we give consent to
the matter and not to the author ; which is no more
than we would do towards a suspected and discred-
ited witness ; but that faith which was accounted to
Abraham for righteousness was of such a point as
whereat Sarah laughed, who therein was an image of
natural reason.

Howbeit (if we will truly consider it) more worthy
it is to believe than to know as we now know. For

1 De Aug. ix. 1. This chapter is greatly altered in the translation; much
of it being entirely omitted, much condensed, and a little added. In the
exordium he announces the subject of the book as one which does not
belong to human reason and natural philosophy. He will not therefore
attempt to lay out the " partitions " of it, but merely offer a few sugges-
tions, concerning not the matter revealed by Theology, but the manner of
the revelation. These suggestions, which are but three in number, together
with the remarks by which they are introduced, agree substantially with
those in the text: all that does not bear immediately upon them being
omitted. And I think all the differences may be sufficiently accounted for
by the change of design; while the change of design itself may probably
have been suggested by the difficulty of expounding the subject of theol-
ogy on a scale similar to that adopted with regard to other subjects, with-
out introducing matter which might have caused the work to be proscribed
in Italy. See note, p. 109.

394 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

in knowledge man's mind suffereth from sense, but in
belief it suffereth from spirit, such one as it holdeth
for more authorised than itself,1 and so suffereth from
the worthier agent. Otherwise it is of the state of
man glorified ; for then faith shall cease, and we shall
know as we are known.

Wherefore we conclude that sacred Theology (which
in our idiom we call Divinity) is grounded only upon
the word and oracle of God, and not upon the light
of nature : for it is written, Coeli enarrant gloriam Dei,
[the Heavens declare the glory of God,] but it is not
written, Coeli enarrant voluntatem Dei, [the Heavens
declare the will of God,] but of that it is said, Ad
legem et testimonium : si non fecerint secundum verbum
istud, &c, [to the law and to the testimony : if they
do not according to this word, &c.]. This holdeth
not only in those points of faith which concern the
great mysteries of the Deity, of the Creation, of the
Redemption, but likewise those which concern the law
moral truly interpreted : Love your enemies : do good
to them that hate you : be like to your heavenly Father,
that suffereth his rain to fall upon the just and unjust.
To this it ought to be applauded, Nee vox hominem
sonat: it is a voice beyond the light of nature. So
we see the heathen poets, when they fall upon a lib-
ertine passion, do still expostulate with laws and
moralities, as if they were opposite and malignant to
nature : Et quod natura remittit, invida jura negant,

1 In the translation this is expressed rather differently. In sctentin enim
mens humana patitur a sensu, qui a rebus materiatis retilit ; in fide autem
anima patitur ab anima, qua est agens dignius : Knowledge being (if I
understand the meaning rightlj') a function of the anima sensibilia, faith
of the anima rationales ; the one receiving its impressions from things
material, the other from things spiritual.

THE SECOND BOOK. 395

[what Nature suffers envious laws forbid]. So said
Dendamis the Indian unto Alexander's messengers,
That he had heard somewhat of Pythagoras and some
other of the wise men of Grsecia, and that he held
them for excellent men : but that they had a fault,
which was that they had in too great reverence and
veneration a thing they called law and manners. So it
must be confessed that a great part of the law moral is
of that perfection, whereunto the light of nature can-
not aspire. How then is it that man is said to have
by the light and law of nature some notions and con-
ceits of virtue and vice, justice and wrong, good and
evil ? Thus ; because the light of nature is used in
two several senses ; the one, that which springeth
from reason, sense, induction, argument, according to
the laws of heaven and earth ; the other, that which
is imprinted upon the spirit of man by an inward
instinct, according to the law of conscience, which is
a sparkle of the purity of his first estate : in which
later sense only he is participant of some light and
discerning touching the perfection of the moral law :
but how ? sufficient to check the vice, but not to in-
form the duty. So then the doctrine of religion, as
well moral as mystical, is not to be attained but by
inspiration and revelation from God.

The use notwithstanding of reason in spiritual things,
and the latitude thereof, is very great and general : for
it is not for nothing that the apostle calleth religion
our reasonable service of God; insomuch as the very
ceremonies and figures of the old law were full of
reason and signification, much more than the ceremo-
nies of idolatry and magic, that are full of non-sig-
nificants and surd characters. But most specially the

896 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

Christian Faith, as in all things so in this, deserveth
to be highly magnified ; holding and preserving the
golden mediocrity in this point between the law of
the Heathen and the law of Mahumet, which have
embraced the two extremes. For the religion of the
Heathen had no constant belief or confession, but left
all to the liberty of argument; and the religion of
Mahumet on the other side interdicteth argument alto-
gether : the one having the very face of error, and the
other of imposture : whereas the Faith dpth both ad-
mit and reject disputation with difference.

The use of human reason in religion is of two sorts :
the former, in the conception and apprehension of the
mysteries of God to us revealed ; the other, in the
inferring and deriving of doctrine and direction there-
upon. The former extendeth to the mysteries them-
selves ; but how ? by way of illustration, and not by
way of argument. The later consisteth indeed of pro-
bation and argument. In the former we see God
vouchsafeth to descend to our capacity, in the express-
ing of his mysteries in sort as may be sensible unto
us ; and doth grift 1 his revelations and holy doctrine
upon the notions of our reason, and applieth his in-
spirations to open our understanding, as the form of
the key to the ward of the lock : 2 for the later, there
is allowed us an use of reason and argument second-
ary and respective, although not original and absolute.

1 So the original and ed. 1629. Ed. 1633 has graft.

2 It being our own duty at the same time to open and enlarge our under-
standing that it may be capable of receiving them. Qua tamen in parte
nobis ipsis deesse minitne debemus ; cum enim Deus ipse opera rationis nos-
tra in illuminationibus suis utatur, etiam nos eandem in omnes parUs rcrsarc
debemus quo magis capaces simus ad mysteria recipienda et imbibenda : modo
animus ad amplitudinem mysteriorum pro modulo suo diiatetur, non mysteria
ad angustias animi constringanlur.

THE SECOND BOOK. 397

For after the articles and principles of religion are
placed, and exempted from examination of reason, it
is then permitted unto us to make derivations and in-
ferences from and according to the analogy of them,
for our better direction. In nature this holdeth not ;
for both the principles are examinable by induction,
though not by a medium or syllogism ; and besides,
those principles or first positions have no discordance
with that reason which draweth down and deduceth
the inferior positions. But yet it holdeth not in re-
ligion alone, but in many knowledges both of greater
and smaller nature, namely wherein there are not only
posita but placita ; for in such there can be no use
of absolute reason. We see it familiarly in games of
wit, as chess, or the like ; the draughts and first laws
of the game are positive, but how ? merely ad placi-
tum, and not examinable by reason ; but then how to
direct our play thereupon with best advantage to win
the game, is artificial and rational. So in human laws
there be many grounds and maxims which are placita
juris, positive upon authority and not upon reason,
and therefore not to be disputed : but what is most
just, not absolutely, but relatively and according to
those maxims, that affordeth a long field of disputation.
Such therefore is that secondary reason which hath
place in divinity, which is grounded upon the placets
of God.

Here therefore I note this deficience, that there
hath not been to my understanding suffi- De usu legi,
ciently enquired and handled the true limits tuman*°in
and use of reason in spiritual things, as a divm,s-
kind of divine dialectic : which for that it is not done,
it seemeth to me a thing usual, by pretext of true

398 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

conceiving that which is revealed, to search and mine
into that which is not revealed ; and by pretext of
enucleating inferences and contradictories, to examine
that which is positive; the one sort falling into the
error of Nicodemus, demanding to have things made
more sensible than it pleaseth God to reveal them ;
Quomodo possit homo nasci cum sit senex ? [how can a
man be born when he is old ?] the other sort into
the error of the disciples, which were scandalized at
a show of contradiction ; Quid est hoc quod dicit nobis ?
Modicum, et non videbitis me ; et iterum, modicum, et
videbitis me, &c. [what is this that he saith unto us ?
a little while and ye shall not see me, and again a
little while and ye shall see me, &c]

Upon this I have insisted the more in regard of the
great and blessed use thereof; for this point well la-
boured and defined of would in my judgment be an
opiate to stay and bridle not only the vanity of curious
speculations, wherewith the schools labour, but the
fury of controversies, wherewith the church laboureth.
For it cannot but open men's eyes, to see that many
controversies do merely pertain to that which is either
not revealed or positive ; and that many others do grow
upon weak and obscure inferences or derivations : which
latter sort, if1 men would revive the blessed style of
that great doctor of the Gentiles, would be carried thus,
Ego, non Dominus, [I, not the Lord,] and again, Secun-
dum consilium meum, [according to my counsel ;] in
opinions and counsels, and not in positions and opposi-
tions. But men are now over-ready to usurp the style
Non ego, sed Dominus, [not I, but the Lord ;] and not
so only, but to bind it with the thunder and denuncia-
i The original and also edd. 1629 and 1633 have of.

THE SECOND BOOK. 399

tion of curses and anathemas, to the terror of those
which have not sufficiently learned out of Salomon that
the causeless curse shall not come.1

Divinity hath two principal parts ; the matter in-
formed or revealed, and the nature of the information
or revelation : and with the later we will begin,2 be-
cause it hath most coherence with that which we have
now last handled. The nature of the information con-
sisted! of three branches ; the limits of the information,
the sufficiency of the information, and the acquiring or
obtaining the information. Unto the limits of the in-
formation belong these considerations ; how far forth
particular persons continue to be inspired ; how far
forth the church is inspired ; and how far forth reason
may be used : the last point whereof I have noted as
deficient. Unto the sufficiency of the information be-
long two considerations ; what points of religion are
fundamental, and what perfective, being matter of
further building and perfection upon one and the same
foundation ; and again, how the gradations of light ac-
cording to the dispensation of times are material to the
sufficiency of belief.

Here again I may rather give it in advice than note
it as deficient, that the points fundamental, Degrades

, , . p o -\ n • 1 unitatis in

and the points of further perfection only, avitate Dei.
ought to be with piety and wisdom distinguished : a
subject tending to much like end as that I noted be-
fore ; for as that other were likely to abate the number
of controversies, so this is like to abate the heat of many

1 In the translation this last sentence is omitted, and the substance both
of this and of the preceding paragraph is set forth in a better order and
more concisely, though to the same general effect.

2 In the translation he expressly confines himself to the latter only, and
the rest of the paragraph is omitted.

400 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

of them. We see Moses when he saw the Israelite and
the ^Egyptian fight, he did not say, Why strive you? but
drew his sword and slew the ^Egyptian : but when he
saw the two Israelites fight, he said, You are brethren,
why strive you ? If the point of doctrine be an ^Egyp-
tian, it must be slain by the sword of the Spirit, and
not reconciled ; but if it be an Israelite, though in the
wrong, then, Why strive you? We see of the funda-
mental points, our Saviour penneth the league thus,
He that is not with us, is against us ; but of points not
fundamental, thus, He that is not against us, is with us.
So we see the coat of our Saviour was entire without
seam, and so is the doctrine of the Scriptures in itself;
but the garment of the Church was of divers colours,
and yet not divided. We see the chaff may and ought
to be severed from the corn in the ear, but the tares
may not be pulled up from the corn in the field : so as
it is a thing of great use well to define what and of
what latitude those points are, which do make men
merely aliens and disincorporate from the Church of
God.1*

For the obtaining of the information, it resteth
upon the true and sound interpretation of the Script-
ures, which are the fountains of the water of life.
The interpretations of the Scriptures 2 are of two sorts ;

1 Of this paragraph again the substance is given in the translation,
though in a somewhat different order; and a sentence is added to the fol-
lowing effect: If any one thinks (he says) that this has been done already,
let him consider again and again how far it has been done with sincerity
and moderation. In the mean time he who speaks of peace is like enough
to receive the answer which Jehu gave to the messenger—/* U peace. Jthut

What hast thou to do with peace T Get thee behind me. For it is not peace
between the contending opinions that most men have at heart, but the estab-
lishment of their own opinions (cum nonpax, sed partes, pleritque cordi tint).

2 A sentence is introduced here in the translation, to say that he speaks

THE SECOND BOOK. 401

methodical, and solute or at large. For this divine
water, which excelleth so much that of Jacob's well, is
drawn forth much in the same kind as natural water
useth to be out of wells and fountains ; either it is first
forced up into a cistern, and from thence fetched and
derived for use ; or else it is drawn and received in
buckets and vessels immediately where it springeth.
The former sort whereof, though it seem to be the
more ready, yet in my judgment is more subject to
corrupt.1 This is that method which hath exhibited
unto us the scholastical divinity ; whereby divinity
hath been reduced into an art, as into a cistern, and
the streams of doctrine or positions fetched and derived
from thence.

In this men have sought three things, a summary
brevity, a compacted strength, and a complete perfec-
tion ; whereof the two first they fail to find, and the
last they ought not to seek. For as to brevity, we see
in all summary methods, while men purpose to abridge
they give cause to dilate. For the sum or abridgment
by contraction becometh obscure, the obscurity requir-
eth exposition, and the exposition is deduced into large
commentaries, or into common places and titles, which
grow to be more vast than the original writings whence
the sum was at first extracted. So we see the volumes
of the schoolmen are greater much than the first writ-
ings of the fathers, whence the Master of the Sen-
tences2 made his sum or collection. So in like manner

only of the method of interpretation, not of the authority: the ground of
the authority being the consent of the Church.

1 This censure, as well as the remarks upon the methodical system which
are contained in the three following paragraphs, are omitted in the transla-
tion; probably as involving matter which would not have been allowed at
Rome.

2 Peter the Lombard, Bishop of Paris, wrote a Sum of Theology in four
vol. vi. 26

402 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

the volumes of the modern doctors of the civil law
exceed those of the ancient jurisconsults, of which
Tribonian compiled the digest.1 So as this course of
sums and commentaries is that which doth infallibly
make the body of sciences more immense in quantity,
and more base in substance.

And for strength, it is true that knowledges reduced
into exact methods have a shew ot strength, in that
each part seemeth to support and sustain the other ;
but this is more satisfactory than substantial ; like unto
buildings which stand by architecture and compaction,
which are more subject to ruin than those which are
built more strong in their several parts, though less
compacted. But it is plain that the more you recede
from your grounds the weaker do you conclude ; and
as in nature the more you remove yourself from partic-
ulars the greater peril of error you do incur, so much
more in divinity the more you recede from the Script-
ures by inferences and consequences, the more weak
and dilute are your positions.

And as for perfection or completeness in divinity, it
is not to be sought ; which makes this course of artifi-
cial divinity the more suspect. For he that will reduce

books, entitled " The Sentences; " and according to the taste of the middle
ages acquired the title of" Master of the Sentences." Many of these scho-
lastic titles are curious. Thus Thomas Aquinas is Doctor Angelicus; Buon-
a vent ura, Doctor Seraphicus ; Alexander Hales, Doctor Irrefragabilis; Duns
Scotus, Doctor Subtilis; Raymund Lully, Doctor Illuminatus; Roger Bacon,
Doctor Mirabilis; Occam, Doctor Singularis. — R. L. K

1 Compare wiih this remark that of Maphaus Vegius — " Existimabas,
ut opinor," — he is apostrophising Tribonian — " plurimum conducere util-
itati studentium, si quod antea in multitudine tractatuum tarditis eftece-
runt coangustatis postea libris citius adsequi possunt. . . . Sed longe secus
ac persuadebas tibi cessit. Quis namque nesciat infinitas et nonnunquam
ineptas vanasque interpretationes quibus nulla fere lex exempta est?"
See Maphaeus Vegius de Verborum significatione, xiv. 77., apud Savigny;
History of Roman Law in the Middle Ages, ch. 59. — R. L. E.

THE SECOND BOOK. 403

a knowledge into an art, will make it round and uni-
form : but in divinity many things must be left abrupt
and concluded with this : 0 altitudo sapientice et scien-
tice Dei/ quam incomprehensibilia sunt judicia ejus, et
non investigabiles vice ejus! [O the depth of the wis-
dom and knowledge of God ! How incomprehensible
are his judgments, and his ways past finding out !] So
again the apostle saith, Ex parte scimus, [we know in
part,] and to have the form of a total where there is
but matter for a part, cannot be without supplies by
supposition and presumption. And therefore I con-
clude, that the true use of these Sums and Methods
hath place in institutions or introductions preparatory
unto knowledge ; but in them, or by deducement from
them, to handle the main body and substance of a
knowledge, is in all sciences prejudicial, and in divinity
dangerous.

As to the interpretation of the Scriptures solute and
at large, there have been divers kinds introduced and
devised ; some of them rather curious and unsafe, than
sober and warranted. Notwithstanding thus much
must be confessed, that the Scriptures, being given by
inspiration and not by human reason, do differ from all
other books in the author ; which by consequence both
draw on some difference to be used by the expositor.
For the inditer of them did know four things which no
man attains to know ; which are, the mysteries of the
kingdom of glory ; the perfection of the laws of nature ;
the secrets of the heart of man ; and the future suc-
cession of all ages.1 For as to the first, it is said, He

1 Of these four things he mentions in the translation only the two last ;
introducing the mention of them in the next paragraph but three, and in
the mean time omitting altogether both this and the following paragraph.

404 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

that presseth into the light, shall be opp-essed of the glory :
and again, No man shall see my face and live. To the
second, When he prepared the heavens I was present,
when by law and compass he inclosed the deep. To the
third, Neither was it needful that any should bear wit-
ness to him of Man, for he knew well what was in Man.
And to the last, From the beginning are known to the
Lord all his works.

From the former two1 of these have been drawn
certain senses and expositions of Scriptures, which had
need be contained within the bounds of sobriety ; the
one anagogical, and the other philosophical. But as
to the former, man is not to prevent his time : Vide-
mus nunc per speculum in osnigmate, tunc autem facie
ad faeiem : [now we see through a glass darkly, but
then face to face :] wherein nevertheless there seemeth
to be a liberty granted, as far forth as the polishing
of this glass, or some moderate explication of this sen'ig-
ma. But to press too far into it, cannot but cause
a dissolution and overthrow of the spirit of man. For
in the body there are three degrees of that we receive
into it ; Aliment, Medicine, and Poison ; whereof ali-
ment is that which the nature of man can perfectly
alter and overcome : medicine is that which is partly
converted by nature, and partly converteth nature ;
and poison is that which worketh wholly upon nature,
without that that nature can in any part work upon
it. So in the mind whatsoever knowledge reason can-
not at all work upon and convert, is a mere intoxi-

1 i. e. from the intimations in the Scriptures concerning the Kingdom of
Glory and the Laws of Nature. Edd. 1629 and 1633 have " from the
former of these two; " obviously a misprint, though adopted in all modern
editions.

THE SECOND BOOK. 405

cation, and endangereth a dissolution of the mind and
understanding.

But for the latter,1 it hath been extremely set on
foot of late time by the school of Paracelsus, and some
others, that have pretended to find the truth of all
natural philosophy in the Scriptures ; scandalizing and
traducing all other philosophy as heathenish and pro-
fane. But there is no such enmity between God's
word and his works. Neither do they give honour
to the Scriptures, as they suppose, but much imbase
them. For to seek heaven and earth in the word of
God, whereof it is said, Heaven and earth shall pass,
but my word shall not pass, is to seek temporary things
amongst eternal : and as to seek divinity in philosophy
is to seek the living amongst the dead, so to seek phi-
losophy in divinity is to seek the dead amongst the
living : 2 neither are the pots or lavers whose place
was in the outward part of the temple to be sought
in the holiest place of all, where the ark of the tes-
timony was seated. And again, the scope or purpose
of the Spirit of God is not to express matters of na-
ture in the Scriptures, otherwise than in passage, and
for application to man's capacity and to matters moral
or divine. And it is a true rule, Authoris aliud agentis
parva authoritas; [what a man says incidentally about
matters which are not in question has little author-

1 f. e. the philosophical exposition. The "former" i. e. the anagogic.al
exposition, is not mentioned in the translation ; which only says that the
method of interpretation solute and at large has been carried to excess in
two ways; first in supposing such perfection in the Scriptures that all phi-
losophy is to be sought there, secondly in interpreting them in the same
manner as one would interpret an uninspired book. The remarks on the
first of these excesses coincide with the first half of this paragraph (the
rest being omitted), those on the second with the next paragraph.

2 The rest of this paragraph is omitted in the translation.

406 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

ity ;] for it were a strange conclusion, if a man should
use a similitude for ornament or illustration sake, bor
rowed from nature or history according to vulgar con-
ceit, as of a Basilisk, an Unicorn, a Centaur, a Bria-
reus, an Hydra, or the like, that therefore he must
needs be thought to affirm the matter thereof posi-
tively to be true. To conclude therefore, these two
interpretations, the one by reduction or aenigmatical,
the other philosophical or physical, which have been
received and pursued in imitation of the rabbins and
cabalists, are to be confined with a Noli altum sapere,
sed time, [be not overwise, but fear.]

But the two later points, known to God and unknown
to man, touching the secrets of the heart, and the succes-
sions of time, doth make a just and sound difference
between the manner of the exposition of the Scriptures,
and all other books. For it is an excellent observation
which hath been made upon the answers of our Sav-
iour Christ to many of the questions which were pro-
pounded to him, how that they are impertinent to the
state of the question demanded ; the reason whereof
is, because not being like man, which knows man's
thoughts by his words, but knowing man's thoughts
immediately, he never answered their words, but their
thoughts : * much in the like manner it is with the
Scriptures, which being written to the thoughts of
men, and to the succession of all ages, with a fore-
sight of all heresies, contradictions, differing estates of
the church, yea and particularly of the elect, are not
to be interpreted only according to the latitude of the

1 And also (the translation adds) because he addressed himself not solely
to those present, but to men of all times .and places to whom the gospel
was to be preached.

THE SECOND BOOH. 407

proper sense of the place, and respectively towards that
present occasion whereupon the words were uttered ;
or in precise congruity or contexture with the words
before or after ; or in contemplation of the principal
scope of the place ; but have in themselves, not only
totally or collectively, but distributively in clauses and
words, infinite springs and streams of doctrine to water
the church in every part ; 1 and therefore as the literal
sense is as it were the main stream or river ; so the
moral sense chiefly, and sometimes the allegorical or
typical, are they whereof the church hath most use:
not that I wish men to be bold in allegories, or in-
dulgent or light in allusions ; but that I do much
condemn that interpretation of the Scripture which is
only after the manner as men use to interpret a pro-
fane book.

In this part touching the exposition of the Script-
ures, I can report no deficience ; but by way of re-
membrance this I will add : In perusing books of
divinity, I find many 2 books of controversies ; and
many of common places and treatises ; 3 a mass of
positive divinity, as it is made an art ; a number of
sermons and lectures, and many prolix commentaries
upon the Scriptures, with harmonies and concord-
ances : but that form of writing in divinity, which in
my judgment is of all others most rich and precious,
is positive divinity collected upon particular texts of
Scriptures in brief observations ; not dilated into com-
mon places, not chasing after controversies, not re-
duced into method of art ; a thing abounding in ser-

1 The rest of the paragraph is omitted in the translation.

2 In the translation he says too many.

8 also " cases of conscience " — which he especially commends further
on, in a passage not translated.

408 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

mons, which will vanish, but defective in books, which
will remain ; and a thing wherein this age excelleth.
For I am persuaded, and I may speak it with an
Absit invidia verbo, [meaning no offence,] and no ways
in derogation of antiquity, but as in a good emulation
between the vine and the olive, that if the choice and
best of those observations upon texts of Scriptures
which have been made dispersedly in sermons within
this your Majesty's island 1 of Britain by the space of
Emanations these forty years and more (leaving out the
ftTfoctriZaT largeness of exhortations and applications
postnvas. thereupon) had been set down in a continu-
ance, it had been the best work in divinity which had
been written since the apostles' times.2

The matter informed by divinity is of two kinds ;
matter of belief and truth of opinion, and matter of
service and adoration ; which is also judged and di-
rected by the former; the one being as the internal
soul of religion, and the other as the external body
thereof. And therefore the heathen religion was not
only a worship of idols, but the whole religion was an
idol in itself; for it had no soul, that is, no certainty
of belief or confession ; as a man may well think, con-

1 So edd. 1629 and 1633. The original has Hands.

2 This last sentence is omitted in the translation, — no doubt as being in-
admissible at Rome. But in its place is introduced one of Bacon's hap-
piest illustrations, and one which is not, I think, to be found anywhere in
his own English. "Certainly (he says) as we find it in wines, that those
which flow freely from the first treading of the grape are sweeter than
those which are squeezed out by the wine-press, because the latter taste
somewhat of the stone and the rind ; so are those doctrines most wholesome
and sweet which ooze out of the Scriptures when gently crushed, and are
not forced into controversies and common places.''

The next six paragraphs are entirely omitted, — as belonging to that
part of the subject with which he has professed in the beginning that he
will not meddle.

THE SECOND BOOK. 409

sidering the chief doctors of their church were the
poets ; and the reason was, because the heathen gods
were no jealous gods, but were glad to be admitted
into part, as they had reason. Neither did they re-
spect the pureness of heart, so they might have ex-
ternal honour and rites.

But out of these two do result and issue four main
branches of divinity ; Faith, Manners, Liturgy, and
Government. Faith containeth the doctrine of the
nature of God, of the attributes of God, and of the
works of God. The nature of God consisteth of three
persons in unity of Godhead. The attributes of God
are either common to the Deity, or respective to the
persons. The works of God summary are two, that
of the Creation, and that of the Redemption ; and
both these works, as in total they appertain to the
unity of the Godhead, so in their parts they refer to
the three persons: that of the Creation, in the mass
of the matter to the Father ; in the disposition of
the form to the Son ; and in the continuance and con-
servation of the being to the Holy Spirit : so that of
the Redemption, in the election and counsel to the
Father ; in the whole act and consummation to the
Son ; and in the application to the Holy Spirit ; for by
the Holy Ghost was Christ conceived in flesh, and
by the Holy Ghost are the elect regenerate in spirit.
This work likewise we consider either effectually in
the elect ; or privatively : in the reprobate ; or accord-
ing to appearance in the visible church.

For Manners, the doctrine thereof is contained in
the law, which discloseth sin. The law itself is di-
vided, according to the edition thereof, into the law of

1 The original, and also edd. 1629 and 1633, have privately.

410 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

Nature, the law Moral, and the law Positive ; and ac-
cording to the style, into Negative and Affirmative,
Prohibitions and Commandments. Sin, in the matter
and subject thereof, is divided according to the com-
mandments ; in the form thereof, it referreth to the
three persons in Deity : sins of Infirmity against the
Father, whose more special attribute is Power ; sins of
Ignorance against the Son, whose attribute is Wisdom ;
and sins of Malice against the Holy Ghost, whose at-
tribute is Grace or Love. In the motions of it, it
either moveth to the right hand or to the left ; either
to blind devotion, or to profane and libertine trans-
gression ; either in imposing restraint where God
granteth liberty, or in taking liberty where God im-
poseth restraint. In the degrees and progress of it, it
divideth itself into thought, word, or act. And in this
part I commend much the deducing of the law of God
to cases of conscience ; for that I take indeed to be a
breaking, and not exhibiting whole, of the bread of
life. But that which quickeneth both these doctrines
of faith and manners, is the elevation and consent of
the heart ; whereunto appertain books of exhortation,
holy meditation, Christian resolution, and the like.

For the Liturgy or service, it consisteth of the re-
ciprocal acts between God and man ; which, on the
part of God, are the preaching of the word and the
sacraments, which are seals to the covenant, or as the
visible word ; and on the part of man,1 invocation of
the name of God, and under the law, sacrifices, which
were as visible prayers or confessions : but now the
adoration being in spiritu et veritate, [in spirit and in
truth,] there remaineth only vituli labiorum, [offerings
1 So edd. 1629 and 1633. The original has mans.

THE SECOND BOOK. 411

of the lips ;] although the use of holy vows of thank-
fulness and retribution may be accounted also as sealed
petitions.

And for the Government of the church, it consisteth
of the patrimony of the church, the franchises of the
church, and the offices and jurisdictions of the church,
and the laws of the church directing the whole ; all
which have two considerations, the one in themselves,
the other how they stand compatible and agreeable to
the civil estate.

This matter of divinity is handled either in form of
instruction of truth, or in form of confutation of false-
hood. The declinations from religion, besides the priv-
ative,1 which is atheism and the branches thereof, are
three ; Heresies, Idolatry, and Witchcraft ; Heresies,
when we serve the true God with a false worship ;
Idolatry, when we worship false gods, supposing them
to be true ; and Witchcraft, when we adore false gods,
knowing them to be wicked and false. For so your
Majesty doth excellently well observe, that Witchcraft
is the 'height of Idolatry. And yet we see though
these be true degrees, Samuel teacheth us that they are
all of a nature, when there is once a receding from
the word of God; for so he saith, Quasi peecatum ario-
landi est repugnare, et quasi scelus idololatrice nolle ac-
quiescere ; [rebellion is as the sin of Witchcraft, and
Stubbornness as the crime of Idolatry.]

These things I have passed over so briefly because 1
can report no deficience concerning them : for I can
find no space or ground that lieth vacant and unsown
in the matter of divinity ; so diligent have men been,
either in sowing of good seed or in sowing of tares.

1 So edd. 1629 and 1633. The original has primitive.

412 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

Thus have I made as it were a small Globe of the
Intellectual World, as truly and faithfully as I could
discover ; with a note and description of those parts
which seem to me not constantly occupate, or not well
converted by the labour of man. In which, if I have
in any point receded from that which is commonly re-
ceived, it hath been with a purpose of proceeding in
melius, and not in aliud ; a mind of amendment and
proficience, and not of change and difference. For I
could not be true and constant to the argument I han-
dle, if I were not willing to go beyond others ; but
yet not more willing than to have others go beyond me
again : which may the better appear by this, that I
have propounded my opinions naked and unarmed, not
seeking to preoccupate the liberty of men's judgments
by confutations. For in any thing which is well set
down, I am in good hope that if the first reading move
an objection, the second reading will make an answer.
And in those things wherein I have erred, I am sure
I have not prejudiced the right by litigious arguments ;
which certainly have this contrary effect and operation,
that they add authority to error, and destroy the au-
thority of that which is well invented : for question is
an honour and preferment to falsehood, as on the other
side it is a repulse to truth. But the errors I claim and
challenge to myself as mine own. The good, if any
be, is due tanquam adeps sacrificii, [as the fat of the
sacrifice,] to be incensed to the honour, first of the
Divine Majesty, and next of your Majesty, to whom on
earth I am most bounden.

FILUM LABYRINTHI,

FORMULA INQUISITIONIS.

PREFACE.

The following fragment was first printed in Stephens's
second collection (1734), from a manuscript belonging
to Lord Oxford, which is now in the British Museum
(Harl. MSS. 6797. fo. 139.) As far as it goes, it
agrees so nearly with the Cogitata et Visa that either
might be taken for a free translation of the other, with
a few additions and omissions. But I think the Eng-
lish was written first ; probably at the time when the
idea first occurred to Bacon of drawing attention to his
doctrine by exhibiting a specimen of the process and
the result in one or two particular cases. The Cogitata
et Visa professes to be merely a preface framed to pre-
pare the way for an example of a legitimate philo-
sophical investigation proceeding regularly by Tables.
Such an example, or at least the plan and skeleton of
it, will be found further on, with the title Filum Laby-
rinthi, sive Inquisitio legitima de Motu ; and the title
prefixed to this fragment is most easily explained by
supposing that a specimen of an Inquisitio legitima was
meant to be included in it.

It is here printed from the original MS. which is a
fair copy in the hand of one of Bacon's servants, care-
fully corrected in his own.

J. s.

FILUM LABYRLNTHI,

SIVE FORMULA INQUISITIONIS.

AD FILIOS.1

PARS PRIMA.

1. Francis Bacon thought in this manner. The
knowledge whereof the world is now possessed, espe-
cially that of nature, extendeth not to magnitude and
certainty of works. The Physician pronounceth many
diseases incurable, and faileth oft in the rest. The
Alchemists wax old and die in hopes. The Magicians
perform nothing that is permanent and profitable.
The Mechanics take small light from natural philos-
ophy, and do but spin on their own little threads.
Chance sometimes discovereth inventions ; but that
worketh not in years, but ages. So he saw well, that
the inventions known are very unperfect ; and that new
are not like to be brought to light but in great length
of time ; and that those which are, came not to light
by philosophy.

2. He thought also this state of knowledge was the
worse, because men strive (against themselves) to save
the credit of ignorance, and to satisfy themselves in
this poverty. For the Physician, besides his cauteles

1 This is written at the top of the page, in the left-hand corner, in
Bacon's hand.

FILUM LABYRINTHI. 417

of practice, hath this general cautele of art, that he dis-
charged the weakness of his art upon supposed impos-
sibilities : neither can his art be condemned, when it-
self judgeth. That philosophy also, out of which the
knowledge of physic, which now is in use, is hewed,
receiveth certain positions and opinions, which (if they
be well weighed) induce this persuasion, that no great
works are to be expected from art, and the hand of
man; as in particular that opinion, that the heat of the
sun and fire differ in kind; and that other, that Com-
position is the work of man, and Mixture is the work of
nature, and the like ; all tending to the circumscription
of man's power, and to artificial despair ; killing in
men, not only the comfort of1 imagination, but the in-
dustry of trial ; only upon vain glory to have their art
thought perfect, and that all is impossible that is not
already found. The Alchemist dischargeth his art
upon his own errors, either supposing a misunderstand-
ing of the words of his authors, which maketh him
listen after auricular traditions ; or else a failing in the
true proportions and scruples of practice, which maketh
him renew infinitely his trials ; and finding also that he
lighteth upon some mean experiments and conclusions
by the way, feedeth upon them, and magnifieth them
to the most, and supplieth the rest in hopes. The Ma-
gician, when he findeth something (as he conceiveth)
above nature effected, thinketh, when a breach is once
made in nature, that it is all one to perform great
things and small ; not seeing that they are but subjects
of a certain kind, wherein magic and superstition hath
played in all times. The Mechanical person, if he can
refine an invention, or put two or three observations

1 of is omitted in the MS.
vol. vi. 27

418 FILUM LABYRINTHI.

or practices, together in one, or couple things better
with their use, or make the work in less or greater vol-
ume, taketh himself for an inventor. So he saw well,
that men either persuade themselves of new inventions
as of impossibilities ; or else think they are already
extant, but in secret and in few hands ; or that they
account of those little industries and additions, as of
inventions : all which turneth to the averting of their
minds from any just and constant labour to invent
further in any quantity.

3. He thought also, when men did set before them-
selves the variety and perfection of works produced by
mechanical arts, they are apt rather to admire the pro-
visions of man, than to apprehend his wants ; not con-
sidering, that the original inventions and conclusions
of nature which are the life of all that variety, are not
many nor deeply fetched ; and that the rest is but the
subtile and ruled motion of the instruments and hand ;
and that the shop therein is not unlike the library,
which in such number of books containeth (for the
far greater part) nothing but iterations, varied some-
times in form, but not new in substance. So he saw
plainly, that opinion of store was a cause of want ;
and that both works and doctrines appear many and
are few.

4. He thought also, that knowledge is uttered to
men, in a form as if every thing were finished ; for it is
reduced into arts and methods, which in their divisions
do seem to include all that may be. And how weakly
soever the parts are filled, yet they carry the shew and
reason of a total ; and thereby the writings of some
received authors go for the very art : whereas antiquity
used to deliver the knowledge which the mind of man

FILUM LABYRINTHI. 419

had gathered, in observations, aphorisms, or short and
dispersed sentences, or small tractates of some parts
that they had diligently meditated and laboured ; which
did invite men, both to ponder that which was invented,
and to add and supply further. But now sciences are
delivered to be believed and accepted, and not to be
examined and further discovered ; and the succession is
between master and disciple, and not between inventor
and continuer or advancer: and therefore sciences stand
at a stay, and have done for many ages, and that which
is positive is fixed, and that which is question is kept
question, so as the columns of no further proceeding
are pitched. And therefore he saw plainly, men had
cut themselves off from further invention ; and that it
is no marvel that that is not obtained, which hath not
been attempted, but rather shut out and debarred.

5. He thought also, that knowledge is almost gener-
ally sought either for delight and satisfaction, or for
gain and profession, or for credit and ornament, and
that every of these are as Atalanta's balls, which hinder
the race of invention. For men are so far in these
courses from seeking to increase the mass of knowledge,
as of that mass which is they will take no more than
will serve their turn : and if any one amongst so many
seeketh knowledge for itself, yet he rather seeketh to
know the variety of things, than to discern of the truth
and causes of them ; and if his inquisition be yet more
severe, yet it tendeth rather to judgment than to inven-
tion ; and rather to discover truth in controversy, than
new matter ; and if his heart be so large as he pro-
poundeth to himself further discovery or invention, yet
it is rather of new discourse and speculation of causes,
than of effects and operations : and as for those that

420 FILUM LABYRINTHI.

have so much in their mouths, action and use and prac-
tice and the referring of sciences thereunto, they mean
it of application of that which is known, and not of a
discovery of that which is unknown. So he saw plainly,
that this mark, namely invention of further means to
endow the condition and life of man with new powers
or works, was almost never yet set up and resolved in
man's intention and inquiry.

6. He thought also, that, amongst other knowledges,
natural philosophy hath been the least followed and
laboured. For since the Christian faith, the greatest
number of wits have been employed, and the greatest
helps and rewards have been converted upon divinity.
And before time likewise, the greatest part of the stud-
ies of philosophers was consumed in moral philosophy,
which was as the heathen divinity. And in both times
a great part of the best wits betook themselves to law,
pleadings, and causes of estate ; specially in the time
of the greatness of the Romans, who by reason of their
large empire needed the service of all their able men
for civil business. And the time amongst the Grecians
in which natural philosophy seemed most to flourish,
was but a short space ; and that also rather abused in
differing sects and conflicts of opinions, than profitably
spent : since which time, natural philosophy was never
any profession, nor never possessed any whole man,
except perchance some monk in a cloister, or some gen-
tleman in the country, and that very rarely ; but be-
came a science of passage, to season a little young and
unripe wits, and to serve for an introduction to other
arts, specially physic and the practical mathematics.
So as he saw plainly, that natural philosophy hath been
intended by few persons, and in them hath occupied

FILUM LABYRINTHI. 421

the least part of their itime, and that in the weakest of
their age and judgment.

7. He thought also, how great opposition and preju-
dice natural philosophy had received by superstition,
and the immoderate and blind zeal of religion ; for he
found that some of the Grecians which first gave the
reason of thunder, had been condemned of impiety ;
and that the cosmographers which first discovered and
described the roundness of the earth, and the conse-
quence thereof touching the Antipodes, were not much
otherwise censured by the ancient fathers of the Chris-
tian Church ; and that the case is now much worse, in
regard of the boldness of the schoolmen and their de-
pendances in the monasteries, who having made divin-
ity into an art, have almost incorporated the contentious
philosophy of Aristotle into the body of Christian relig-
ion. And generally he perceived in men of devout
simplicity, this opinion, that the secrets of nature were
the secrets of God and part of that glory whereinto the
mind of man if it seek to press shall be oppressed ; and
that the desire in men to attain to so great and hidden
knowledge, hath a resemblance with that temptation
which caused the original fall : and on the other side in
men of a devout policy, he noted an inclination to have
the people depend upon God the more, when they are
less acquainted with second causes ; and to have no
stirring in philosophy, lest it may lead to an innovation
in divinity, or else should discover matter of further
contradiction to divinity. But in this part resorting to
the authority of the Scriptures, and holy examples, and
to reason, he rested not satisfied alone, but much con-
firmed. For first he considered that the knowledge of
nature, by the light whereof man discerned of every

422 FILUM LABYRIXTHI.

living creature, and imposed names according to their
propriety, was not the occasion of the fall ; but the
moral knowledge of good and evil, affected to the end
to depend no more upon God's commandments, but for
man to direct himself; neither could he find in any
Scripture, that the inquiry and science of man in any
thing, under the mysteries of the Deity, is determined
and restrained, but contrariwise allowed and provoked ;
for concerning all other knowledge the Scripture pro-
nounceth, That it is the glory of God to conceal, but it is
the glory of man (or of the king, for the king is but the
excellency of man) to invent ; and again, The spirit of
man is as the lamp of God, wherewith he searcheih every
secret; and again most effectually, That God hath made
all things beautiful and decent, according to the return of
their seasons ; also that he hath set the world in man's
heart, and yet man cannot find out the work which God
workeih from the beginning to the end; shewing that the
heart of man is a continent of that concave or capacity,
wherein the content of the world (that is, all forms
of the creatures and whatsoever is not God) may be
placed or received ; and complaining that through the
variety of things and vicissitudes of times (which are
but impediments and not impuissances) man cannot
accomplish his invention. In precedent also he set be-
fore his eyes, that in those few memorials before the
flood, the Scripture honoureth the name of the invent-
ors of music and works in metal ; that Moses had this
addition of praise, that he was seen in all the learning
of the Egyptians ; that Solomon,1 in his grant of wis-
dom from God, had contained as a branch thereof, that
knowledge whereby he wrote a natural history of all
1 So spelt in MS.

FILUM LABYRINTHI. 423

verdor, from the cedar to the moss, and of all that
breatheth ; that the book of Job, and many places of
the prophets, have great aspersion of natural philoso-
phy ; that the Church in the bosom and lap thereof, in
the greatest injuries of times, ever preserved (as holy
relics) the books of philosophy and all heathen learn-
ing ; and that when Gregory the bishop of Rome be-
came adverse and unjust to the memory of heathen
antiquity, it was censured for pusillanimity in him, and
the honour thereof soon after restored, and his own
memory almost persecuted by his successor Sabinian ;
and lastly in our times and the ages of our fathers,
when Luther and the divines of the Protestant Church
on the one side, and the Jesuits on the other, have en-
terprised to reform, the one the doctrine, the other the
discipline and manners of the Church of Rome, he saw
well how both of them have awaked to their great
honour and succour all human learning. And for
reason, there cannot be a greater and more evident
than this ; that all knowledge and specially that of
natural philosophy tendeth highly to the magnifying of
the glory of God in his power, providence, and bene-
fits ; appearing and engraven in his works, which with-
out this knowledge are beheld but as through a veil ;
for if the heavens in the body of them do declare the
glory of God to the eye, much more do they in the
rule and decrees of them declare it to the understand-
ing. And another reason not inferior to this is, that
the same natural philosophy principally amongst all
other human knowledge doth give an excellent defence
against both extremes of religion, superstition and infi-
delity ; for both it freeth the mind from a number of
weak fancies and imaginations, and it raiseth the mind

424 FILDM LABYRINTHI.

to acknowledge that to God all things are possible : for
to that purpose speaketh our Saviour in that first can-
on against heresies delivered upon the case of the
resurrection, You err, not knowing the Scriptures, nor
the power of God; teaching that there are but two
fountains of heresy, not knowing the will of God re-
vealed in the Scriptures, and not knowing the power
of God revealed or at least made most sensible in his
creatures. So as he saw well, that natural philosophy
was of excellent use to the exaltation of the Divine
Majesty ; and that which is admirable, that being a
remedy of superstition, it is nevertheless an help to
faith. He saw likewise, that the former opinions to
the prejudice thereof had no true ground ; but must
spring either out of mere ignorance, or out of an excess
of devotion, to have divinity all in all, whereas it should
be only above all (both which states of mind may be
best pardoned) ; or else out of worse causes, namely
out of envy, which is proud weakness and deserveth to
be despised ; or out of some mixture of imposture,
to tell a lie for God's cause ; or out of an impious
diffidence, as if men should fear to discover some
things in nature which might subvert faith. But
still he saw well, howsoever these opinions are in
right reason reproved, yet they leave not to be most
effectual hindrances to natural philosophy and inven-
tion.

8. He thought also, that there wanted not great con-
trariety to the further discovery of sciences, in regard
of the orders and customs of universities, and also in
regard of common opinion. For in universities and
colleges men's studies are almost confined to certain
authors, from which if any dissenteth or propoundeth

FILUM LABYRINTHI. 425

matter of redargution, it is enough to make him
thought a person turbulent ; whereas if it be well
advised, there is a great difference to be made between
matters contemplative and active. For in government
change is suspected, though to the better ; but it is
natural to arts to be in perpetual agitation and growth ;
neither is the danger alike of new light, and of new
motion or remove. And for vulgar and received opin-
ions, nothing is more usual nor more usually com-
plained of, than that it is imposed1 for arrogancy and
presumption for men to authorise themselves against an-
tiquity and authors, towards whom envy is ceased, and
reverence by time amortised ; it not being considered
what Aristotle himself did (upon whom the philosophy
that now is chiefly dependeth) ; who came with a pro-
fessed contradiction to all the world, and did put all
his opinions upon his own authority and argument,
and never so much as nameth an author but to confute
and reprove him ; and yet his success well fulfilled the
observation of Him that said, If a man come in his own
name, him will you receive. Men think likewise, that
if they should give themselves to the liberty of inven-
tion and travail of inquiry, that they shall light again
upon some conceits and contemplations which have
been formerly offered to the world, and have been put
down by better, which b^ave prevailed and brought
them to oblivion ; not seeing that howsoever the prop-
erty and breeding of knowledges is in great and excel-
lent wits, yet the estimation and price of them is in
the multitude, or in the inclinations of princes and
great persons meanly learned. So as those knowledges
are like to be received and honoured, which have their
1 So MS. : a miscopy, I suspect, for imputed.

426 FILUM LABYRINTHI.

foundation in the subtility or finest trial of common
sense, or such as fill the imagination ; and not such
knowledge as is digged out of the hard mine of history
and experience, and falleth out to be in some points as
adverse to common sense or popular reason, as religion,
or more. Which kind of knowledge, except it be
delivered with strange advantages of eloquence and
power, may be likely to appear and disclose a little to
the world and straight to vanish and shut again. So
that time seemeth to be of the nature of a river
or flood, that bringeth down to us that which is
light and blown up, and sinketh and drowneth that
which is solid and grave. So he saw well, that both
in the state of religion, and in the administration of
learning, and in common opinion, there were many
and continual stops and traverses to the course of
invention.

9. He thought also, that the invention of works and
further possibility was prejudiced in a more special
manner than that of speculative truth ; for besides the
impediments common to both, it hath by itself been
notably hurt and discredited by the vain promises and
pretences of Alchemy, Magic, Astrology, and such
other arts, which (as they now pass) hold much more
of imagination and belief than of sense and demon-
stration. But to use the poets' language, men ought
to have remembered that although Ixion of a cloud in
the likeness of Juno begat Centaurs and Chimeras,
yet Jupiter also of the true Juno begat Vulcan and
Hebe. Neither is it just to deny credit to the great-
ness of the acts of Alexander, because the like or
more strange have been feigned of an Amadis or an
Arthur, or other fabulous worthies. But though this

FILUM LABYRINTHI. 427

in true reason should be, and that men ought not
to make a confusion of unbelief; yet he saw well it
could not otherwise be in event, but that experience
of untruth had made access to truth more difficult,
and that the ignominy of vanity had abated all great-
ness of mind.

10. He thought also, there was found in the mind of
man an affection naturally bred, and fortified and fur-
thered by discourse and doctrine, which did pervert the
true proceeding towards active and operative knowledge.
This was a false estimation, that it should be as a dimi-
nution to the mind of man to be much conversant in
experiences and particulars subject to sense and bound
in matter, and which are laborious to search, ignoble
to meditate, harsh to deliver, illiberal to practise, infi-
nite as is supposed in number, and no ways accommo-
date to the glory of arts. This opinion or state of mind
received much credit and strength by the school of
Plato, who thinking that particulars rather revived the
notions or excited the faculties of the mind, than
merely informed ; and having mingled his philosophy
with superstition, which never favoureth the sense ;
extolleth too much the understanding of man in the
inward light thereof. And again Aristotle's school,
which giveth the due to the sense in assertion, denieth
it in practice much more than that of Plato. For
we see the schoolmen, Aristotle's succession, which
were utterly ignorant of history, rested only upon
agitation of wit ; whereas Plato giveth good exam-
ple of inquiry by induction and view of particulars ;
though in such a wandering manner as is of no force
or fruit. So that he saw well, that the supposition

428 FILUM LABYRINTHI.

of the sufficiency of man's mind hath lost the means
thereof.1

1 Here the MS. ends abruptly in the middle of the page. At the top is
written in Bacon's hand " The English as much as was parlited." The
blank part of the last page seems to have formed the outside of a miscel-
laneous bundle, and bears the following docket, also in Bacon's hand,
" Severall fragments of discourses."

DE

INTERPRETATIONS NATURE
PEOCEMIUM.

PREFACE

DE INTERPBETATIONE NATUM PRCHEMIIX

The paper that bears this title was first published
by Gruter. lie printed it among the Impetus Pldlo-
sophici (concerning which sec Preface to Part II. Vol.
V. p. 187.) where it stands by itself, unconnected with
the neighbouring pieces. Hence I conclude that it
was one of the loose papers.

Its date may be partly inferred from the contents.
Bacon speaks of himself in it as a man no longer
young,1 yet not old;2 and as one who having been a
candidate (apparently without success) for office in the
state, had at length resolved to abandon that pursuit
and betake himself entirely to this work.3 All this
suits very well with his position in the summer of
1003, when he desired iv to meddle as little as he could
in the King's causes" and "put his ambition wholly
upon his pen ;" at which time also he was engaged on
a work concerning the " Invention of Sciences,'" which
he had digested into two parts, whereof one was enti-
tled Interpret at io Natures. And since this prooemium
was evidently intended to stand as a general intro-

1 cum atasjam consisteret. 2 hominem non senem.

3 (ib is/is cogitationibus me promts alienavi ct in hoc opus ex prion thereto
me totum recepi.

432 PREFACE TO THE

ductiou to some great work bearing that title, we
cannot be far wrong, I think, in placing it next to the
Advancement of Learning and in connexion with the
pieces which follow.

All that is of general application in it was afterwards
digested into the first book of the Novum Organum.
But it retains a peculiar interest for us on account of
the passage in which he explains the plans and pur-
poses of his life, and the estimate he had formed of his
own character and abilities; — a passage which was re-
placed in the days of his greatness by a simple De nobis
ipsis silemus. It is the only piece of autobiography in
which he ever indulged, and deserves on several ac-
counts to be carefully considered.

When a man's life and character have any interest
for posterity, it is always good to have his own account
of them ; for no one can tell so well what objects he
proposed to himself, and how he set about to accomplish
them ; without a knowledge of which it must always be
impossible to form a true judgment of his career. We
have here Bacon's own account, written when he was
between 40 and 50, of the plan upon which his life had
been laid out. And if we accept it as sincere, — if we
believe that such were indeed the objects which he
mainly aimed at, and such the motives which mainly
guided him, — the course which he actually followed
in the various conjunctures of his life will present few
difficulties ; but will be found (after reasonable allow-
ance made for human accidents without, and human in-
firmities within) very natural and consistent from first
to last, — in fact a very remarkable example of con-
stancy to an original design. He began by conceiving
that a wiser method of studying nature would give man

DE INTERPRETATIONS NATURiE PROCEMIUM. 433

the key to all her secrets, and therewith the mastery of
all her powers. If so, what boon so great could a man
bestow upon his fellow-men ? But the work would be
long and arduous, and the event remote ; and in the
mean time he was not to neglect the immediate and
peculiar services which as an Englishman he owed to
his country and as a Protestant to his religion. He set
out with the intention of doing what he could towards
the discharge of all three obligations, and planned his
course accordingly. With regard to the two last how-
ever, he found as life wore away that the means and
opportunities which he had hoped for did not present
themselves ; and fearing that all would fail together if
he lost more time in waiting for them, he resolved to
fall back upon the first as an enterprise which de-
pended for success upon himself alone.

So his case stood when he drew up this paper. After-
wards, though new exigencies of state gave him an
opening for service and drew him again into business
and politics, he did not cease to devote his leisure to
the prosecution of his main object ; and as soon as his
fall restored to him the entire command of his time, he
again made it his sole occupation.

So far therefore, his actual course was quite consist-
ent with his first design ; and it is even probable that
this very constancy was in some degree answerable for
the great error and misfortune of his life. That an
absorbing interest in one thing should induce negligence
of others not less important, is an accident only too
natural and familiar ; and if he did not allow the No-
vum Organum to interfere with his attention to the
causes which came before him in Chancery, it did prob-
ably prevent him from attending as carefully as he

vol. vi. 28

434 PREFACE TO THE

should and otherwise would have done to the proceed-
ings of his servants and the state of his accounts.

Had his main design been successful, the story of his
life would have stood simply thus, and called for no
further speculation. But there is one thing (though
his popular reputation as the father of modern science
has prevented it from being remarked) which still re-
mains to be explained ; and which is in fact very diffi-
cult to reconcile with the opinion almost universally
entertained with regard to his philosophical genius.
How is it that abilities like his, applying themselves to
a practical object for so many years together with such
eager interest and laborious industry, met with so little
success ? I assume of course (what indeed cannot be
reasonably doubted) that he was no mere talker or
trifler, but a true workman, with genuine zeal and faith
in his work. How is it then that he did not succeed,
if not in accomplishing, yet in putting in a way to be
accomplished, or in persuading somebody to think capa-
ble of accomplishment, some part at least of the work
which he had so much at heart ? If the end was unat-
tainable, how is it that he did not find that out ? If
he had mistaken the way, how is it that he did not
himself discover the error as he proceeded ? If he
failed from not well understanding the use of some of
the necessaiy implements, why did he not apply him-
self to learn the use of them, or seek help from those
who did understand it ? He may have neglected
mechanics and mathematics in his youth because he did
not then know their importance ;'but he could hardly
have proceeded far in the attempt to weigh and measure
and analyse the secret forces of nature, without find-
ing the want, long before it was too late to commence

DE INTERPRETATIONS NATURE PROCEMIUM. 435

the study of them. For although, as taught at Cam-
bridge in those days, they did not perhaps promise
much help ; yet in the hands of the leading scientific
men of Europe they had become an instrument of too
much value to have long escaped the notice of a dili-
gent enquirer into the true condition of knowledge.

The only explanation which appears to me sufficient
to account for the fact is this : Bacon's deficiency lay in
the intellect itself. It seems that there was one intel-
lectual faculty in which he was comparatively weak, and
that not being himself aware of the extent and impor-
tance of the defect, he miscalculated the amount of his
own forces. That he was not altogether aware of this
deficiency, may be inferred I think from the remarkable
passage to which I have alluded in the paper before us,
and which it is worth while to examine in detail.

After considering what was the best thing to be
done, he proceeds to consider what he was himself best
fitted to do. He finds in himself a mind at once dis-
cursive enough to seize resemblances, and steady enough
to distinguish differences ; a mind eager in search,
patient of doubt, fond of meditation, slow to assert,
ready to reconsider, careful to dispose and set in order;
not carried away either by love of novelty or by admira-
tion of antiquity, and hating every kind of imposture ;
a mind therefore especially framed for the study and
pursuit of truth.

Such it seems was Bacon's deliberate, candid, and
sober estimate of his own qualities ; and (high as it
sounds) I conceive it to be, in all respects but one, a
just estimate. In the large discursive faculty which
detects analogies and resemblances between different
and distant things, it would be difficult probably to

436 PREFACE TO THE

name his equal. In the moral qualities for which he
gives himself credit, he was not less eminent. His
senses and powers of observation were lively and ex-
quisite ; and his judgment also, where it had to deal
with the larger features of things, or with those which
being too subtle and fleeting to admit of exact demon-
stration and analysis, must be studied by the broader
light of the imagination and discursive reason, was clear
and deep and sound. But it is impossible, I think, to
read Mr. Ellis's remarks upon those parts of his works
in which he comes in contact with what we call the
exact sciences, — mathematics, for instance, and me-
chanics,— and not to feel that in the faculty of distin-
guishing differences, — the faculty whose office is (as he
describes it in the Novum Organum, i. 55.) figere con-
templationes, et morari et hcerere in omni subtilitate diffe-
rentiarum, — he was (comparatively at least) deficient.
This appears both from the imperfect account of the
existing condition of those sciences which he gives in
the De Augmentis Scientiarum ; no notice being there
taken of some of the most important advances which
had been made by the writers immediately preceding
him ; and from his own experiments and speculations
upon subjects which required their help. Though he
paid great attention to Astronomy, discussed carefully
the methods in which it ought to be studied, con-
structed for the satisfaction of his own mind an elabo-
rate theory of the heavens, and listened eagerly for the
news from the stars brought by Galileo's telescope, he
appears to have been utterly ignorant of the discoveries
which had just been made by Kepler's calculations.1
Though he complained in 1623 of the want of compen-
1 See Mr. Ellis's Preface to the Descriptio Gbbi Intellectualis.

DE INTERPRETATIONS NATURE PROOEMIUM. 437

dious methods for facilitating arithmetical computa-
tions, especially with regard to the doctrine of Series,
and fully recognised the importance of them as an aid
to physical enquiries ; he does not say a word about
Napier's Logarithms, which had been published only
nine years before and reprinted more than once in the
interval.1 He complained that no considerable advance
had been made in Geometry beyond Euclid, without
taking any notice of what had been done by Archime-
des and Apollonius.2 He saw the importance of de-
termining accurately the specific gravities of different
substances, and himself attempted to form a table of
them by a rude process of his own, without knowing
of the more scientific though still imperfect methods
previously employed by Archimedes, Ghetaldus, and
Porta.3 He speaks of the evp-qica of Archimedes in a
manner which implies that he did not clearly appre-
hend either the nature of the problem to be solved or
the principles upon which the solution depended.4 In
reviewing the progress of Mechanics, he makes no
mention either of Archimedes himself, or of Stevinus,
Galileo, Guldinus, or Ghetaldus.5 He makes no allu-
sion to the theory of Equilibrium.6 He observes that
a ball of one pound weight will fall nearly as fast
through the air as a ball of two, without alluding to
the theory of the acceleration of falling bodies, which
had been made known by Galileo more than thirty
years before.7 He proposes an inquiry with regard
to the lever, — namely, whether in a balance with
arms of different length but equal weight the distance

i See Vol. II. p. 306. note 1. " Id. p. 305. note 1.

3 See Preface to the Historia Demi et Rari, Vol. IV. p. 15.

4 Id. p. 16. 6 See Vol. II. p. 299. note 1.
6 Id. p. 307. note 1. 7 Id. p. 374. note 2.

438 PREFACE TO THE

from the fulcrum has any effect upon the inclination —
though the theory of the lever was as well understood
in his own time as it is now.1 In making an exper-
iment of his own to ascertain the cause of the mo-
tion of a windmill, he overlooks an obvious circum-
stance which makes the experiment inconclusive, and
an equally obvious variation of the same experiment
which would have shown him that his theory was
false.2 He speaks of the poles of the earth as fixed,
in a manner which seems to imply that he was not
acquainted with the precession of the equinoxes ; 3 and
in another place of the north pole being above, and
the south pole below, as a reason why in our hemi-
sphere the north winds predominate over the south.4

This list, for which I am entirely indebted to Mr.
Ellis's prefaces and notes, might probably be increased ;
but the instances enumerated are sufficient to shew not
only that Bacon was ill read in the history of these
branches of learning, (and vet it was in this direction
that science was making the most real and rapid ad-
vances,) but also that upon such subjects his ideas were
not clear ; this latter defect being no doubt the cause
of the other ; for where he could not readily follow the
steps of the investigation, he could hardly appreciate
the value of the result.

In the fact itself there would be nothing to create
surprise. That of two faculties so opposite in their
nature as to suggest a main division of human intel-
lects according to their several predominance,6 the same

1 Vol. II. p. 392. note 2.

a See Preface to Historia Ventorum, Vol. III. p. 198.
8 Vol. I. p. 507. note 3. * Vol. III. p. 229. note 1.

6 Maximum et velut radicale discrimen ingeniorum, quoad philosophi-
am et scientias, illud est; quod alia ingenia sint fortiora et aptiora ad

DE INTERPRETATIONS NATURE PROCEMIUM. 439

mind should be largely endowed with one and scantily
with the other, is an accident far less singular than the
perfect developement in the same mind of both to-
gether. The only wonder is (since a good understand-
ing is generally aware of its own defects) that if Bacon's
was really weak in this department, he did not find the
weakness out before he was five-and-forty. A suf-
ficient explanation of this may however be found, I
think, partly in the excessive activity of his discursive
faculty, which coming to the rescue in every perplexity
with a throng of ingenious suggestions, seduced his at-
tention from the exact point at issue and flattered him
that the time was come for a permissio intellectus ; —
partly in the great pains which he took to lay his sub-
ject out in titles, articles, sections, divisions, and sub-
divisions, all named and numbered ; the effect of which
would be to give his investigations an appearance,
though a superficial and delusive one, of exact and
delicate discrimination ; — and partly in the magnani-
mous hopefulness of his nature, which inclined him to
trust too much to the labor omnia vincit and the possunt
quia posse videntur. As he would not believe that
nature contained labyrinths impenetrable by the mind,
so he would not believe that the mind contained ob-
structions insuperable by patient industry. And be-
lieving on the other hand as he certainly did, that the
divine blessing was upon his enterprise, he accepted all
delays and disappointments as nothing more than

the protractive trials of great Jove
To find persistive constancy in men.

But however this may be, I see no way of escaping

notandas rerum differentias ; alia ad notandas rerum similitudines. — Nov.
Org. i. 55.

440

PREFACE TO THE

the conclusion that his intellect was in this particu-
lar faculty originally defective ; and that, whether he
knew of the defect or not, he did not succeed in over-
coming it.

Nor am I aware that the supposition involves any
further difficulty. It does not require us to question
any of his other intellectual attributes. For it is cer-
tain that as an eye which has lost the power of reading
small print may yet be perfect in its judgment of form,
colour, distance, and proportion ; so a mind which can-
not take distinct impressions of subtle and minute dif-
ferences of ideas, or cannot retain such impressions
long enough or easily enough for the purpose of exact
comparison, may nevertheless be perfect in its power
of dealing with all ideas which it can distinguish and
compare. And I suppose that if Bacon could have put
on a pair of intellectual spectacles, analogous in their
effect on the understanding to that of clearers on an
eye which is growing dim with age, he would have
seen in an instant the true import and value of the rea-
sonings of Archimedes, Copernicus, Galileo, Ghetaldo,
and Kepler, and would have become aware in the same
instant that he had never before really understood them.
The lens through which he had been looking had not
been adjusted to the object, and had transmitted a con-
fused image to the mental retina.

The existence of this defect being once admitted and
allowed for, the rest of the wonder disappears at once.
Grant this, and the question which I began by propos-
ing is readily answered. Bacon failed to devise a
practicable method for the discovery of the Forms of
Nature, because he misconceived the conditions of the
case ; he expected to find the phenomena of nature

DE INTERPRETATIONS NATURE PROCEMIUM. 441

more easily separable and distinguishable than they
really are ; a misconception into which a discursive
intellect, an enterprising spirit, and a hopeful nature,
would most naturally fall. He failed to discover his
error, because in all the cases in which he tried to carry
his method out, the further he advanced towards his
object the more he needed the very faculty in which
he was most wanting, and was baffled by the difficulties
which presented themselves before he had met with any
which were in their nature insuperable. For the same
reason he failed even to make any single discovery
which holds its place as one of the steps by which sci-
ence has in any direction really advanced. The clue
with which he entered the labyrinth did not reach far
enough : before he had nearly attained the end, he was
obliged either to come back or to go on without it.
He began with an attempt to investigate the nature of
Motion in general : the result remains in a long list of
titles and divisions, exhibiting merely the plan upon
which he proposed to conduct the enquiry ; 1 and this
plan he appears afterwards to have abandoned ; for the
doctrine of motion was ultimately remitted to a subor-
dinate place in the Novum Organum among the Pre-
rogatives of Instances. He then tried the nature of
Sound: the result remains in the Sylva Sylvarum, in
a large collection of curious observations and experi-
ments ; rough materials for an induction which he does
not seem to have carried further. Finally he selected
the nature of Heat as the subject to try his method
upon, and commenced a systematic enquiry which was
to be offered as a specimen of it : the result of this we
have seen in the Novum Organum ; and though he

1 See Inquisilio Legitime de Motu, ; in Vol. VII.

442 PREFACE TO THE

proceeded in it but a little way, it appears that he was
already beginning to lose himself among the subtler
phenomena which presented themselves ; for it is the
opinion of the best judges that he has there confounded
things essentially different, and rested in conclusions
not legitimately deducible from the facts from which
they profess to be deduced.1 And so no doubt it would
have been in any other subject of investigation which
he might have taken in hand. He would soon have
arrived at a point wdiere the phenomena of nature
could not be separated accurately enough for the pur-
poses of the enquiry without instruments more delicate
and exact, or modes of calculation more subtle and
complicated, than any which he could have devised or
used.

Nor is this the only difficulty of which we thus ob-
tain a more natural explanation than has hitherto I
think been suggested. For the same defect would in-
terfere with his metaphysical speculations ; and may
serve therefore to account for the misappreciation of
Aristotle with which he is now commonly charged,
apparently upon good authority. It would interfere
with his success as a lawyer ; the law having then
(very unfortunately, in my opinion) fallen entirely
into the hands of men whose strength was in subtlety
of distinction, and not in that broad common sense
which ought (one would think) to be the ruling prin-
ciple in an institution with which all classes are alike
concerned ; and thus it serves to account for his failure
to obtain that authority in his profession to which he
certainly thought himself entitled. It would interfere

1 See Mr. Ellis's note on the Vindtviiatio prima (Vol. I. p. 397.); and
compare Whewell, Phil, of Ind. Sci. book ii. ch. 11.

DE INTERPRETATIONS NATURAE PROCEMIUM. 443

with his speculations in a science like political econ-
omy, and so accounts for his being so little before his
age in his views with regard to usury, trade, &c. It
supplies also a natural explanation of another singular
fact ; namely, the little communication which he seems
to have had with the scientific men of his own time,
and the solitude in which (as he himself complained)
he was compelled to prosecute his enterprise. For we
know of no man of any scientific eminence, who was
either a fellow-labourer or a disciple. But the truth
is that such a defect (though the perfection of his in-
tellect in those departments where we can all more or
less judge of it, coupled with his reputation for genius
in regions into which few are competent to follow him,
has prevented posterity from suspecting it) could hardly
have escaped the notice of competent judges in his
own time who knew him. And accordingly we find
that William Harvey, " though he esteemed him much
for his wit and style, would not allow him to be a great
philosopher. ' He writes philosophy ' (said Harvey to
Aubrey) ' like a Lord Chancellor ' — speaking in deris-
ion." 1 And it is easy to imagine that if Newton (for
instance) had been a young man in Bacon's later
years, they would not have been able to work together,
but would probably have kept by mutual consent re-
spectfully aloof from each other. And this enables us
to account for that silence with regard to his contem-
poraries for which he has been so severely censured
by Coleridge and others, better than by supposing that
he was either jealous of their rivalry or illiberally in-
credulous as to their merit. It was merely that he
did not like to pronounce judgment where he did not
1 Aubrey's Lives, ii. 281.

444 PREFACE TO THE

feel that he understood the case ; and if he did not
take more pains to understand the case, it was only
because it lay in a region in which he could not him-
self find conclusions which he felt that he could safely
depend upon. He could follow Gilbert in his enqui-
ries concerning the loadstone ; and he was not silent
about Mm, but refers to him frequently, with praise
both of his industry and his method ; censuring him
only for endeavouring to build a universal philosophy
upon so narrow a basis. So again with regard to
Galileo. The direct revelations of the telescope were
palpable, and he was not silent about them ; but hailed
the invention as a memorabilis conatus, — a thing
dignum humano genere : there was no doubt that it
brought within the range of vision things invisible be-
fore. But when it came to the inferences deducible
from the phenomena thus revealed, he could no longer
speak with confidence. It was then " hinc demon-
strari videtur" and " quatenus fides hujusmodi demon-
strationibus tuto adhiberi possit : " the language of a
man who did not feel certain in his own mind whether
the demonstration was conclusive or not, — which is the
natural condition of a man who does not thoroughly
understand it.

I need hardly add that the admission of this defect
in Bacon does not in any way diminish either the
value of his real services to philosophy, — of the gen-
eral principles which he laid down, and those large
and just views as to the nature of science and of
man's mind which came out of the real depths of his
own genius, — or the respect due to himself. The
truths which he told must stand for ever, because they
are truths ; and until some one else shall embody them

DE INTERPRETATIONS NATURAE PROCEMIUM. 445

in language juster, nobler, more impressive, and more
comprehensive than his, his name will stand as the
author of them. And for the rest, a more correct
appreciation of the difficulties with which he had to
struggle, instead of diminishing our sense of what we
owe him, ought only to increase our admiration of
the high instinct which suggested the end, the coura-
geous hope with which he entered upon the pursuit
of it, and the undaunted resolution with which (how-
ever unsuccessfully) he followed it up.

Another thing in the paper before us, not to be
found elsewhere in Bacon's writings, is the prophecy
of civil wars ; which he anticipates propter mores quos-
dam non ita pridem introductos : a prediction well
worthy of remark, especially as being uttered so early
as the beginning of James the First's reign.

J. s.

DE

INTERPRETATION NATURE
PROGEMIUM.

Ego cum me ad utilitates humanas natum existi-
marem, et curam reipublicae inter ea esse quae publici
sunt juris et velut undam aut auram omnibus patere
interpretarer ; et quid hominibus maxime conducere
posset quaasivi, et ad quid ipse a natura optime faetus
essem deliberavi. Inveni autem nil tanti esse erga
genus humanum meriti, quam novarum rerum et ar-
tium, quibus hominum vita excolatur, inventionem et
auctoramentum. Nam et priscis temporibus, apud
homines rudes, rudium rerum inventores et monstra-
tores consecratos fuisse, et in deorum numerum opta-
tos, animadverti ; et acta heroum, qui vel urbes con-
diderunt, vel legumlatores extiterunt, vel justa imperia
exercuerunt, vel injustas dominationes debellarunt, lo-
corum et temporum angustiis circumscripta esse notavi :
rerum autem inventionem, licet minoris pompae sit res,
ad universalitatis et aeternitatis rationem magis accom-
modatam esse censui. Ante omnia vero, si quis non
particulare aliquod inventum, licet magna? utilitatis,

DE INTERPRETATIONE NATURAE PROCEMIUM. 447

eruat, sed in natura lumen accendat, quod ortu ipso
oras rerum quae res jam inventas contingunt illustret,
dein paulo post elevatum abstrusissima quaeque pate-
faciat et in conspectum det, is milii humani in uni-
versum imperii propagator, libertatis vindex, necessita-
tum expugnator visus est. Me ipsum autem ad veri-
tatis contemplationes, quam ad alia, magis fabrefactum
deprehendi ; ut qui mentem et ad rerum similitudinem
(quod maximum est) agnoscendam satis mobilem, et
ad differentiarum subtilitates observandas satis fixam
et intentam haberem ; qui et quaerendi desiderium, et
dubitandi patientiam, et meditandi voluptatem, et as-
serendi cunctationem, et resipiscendi facilitatem, et dis-
ponendi sollicitudinem tenerem ; quique nee novitatem
affectarem, nee antiquitatem admirarer, et omnem im-
posturam odissem. Quare naturam meam cum veri-
tate quandam familiaritatem et cognationem habere
judicavi. Attamen cum genere et educatione rebus
civilibus imbutus essem, et opinionibus aliquando,
utpote adolescens, labefactarer, et patriae me aliquid
peculiare, quod non ad omnes alias partes ex aequo
pertineat, debere putarem, speraremque me, si gradum
aliquem honestum in republica obtinerem, majore in-
genii et industriae subsidio quae destinaveram perfec-
turum ; et artes civiles didici, et qua debui modestia
amicis meis, qui aliquid possent, salva ingenuitate me
commendavi. Accessit et illud, quod ista, qualiacun-
que sint, non ultra hujusce mortalis vitae conditionem
et culturam penetrant ; subiit vero spes me natum
religionis statu baud admodum prospero, posse, si
civilia munia obirem, et aliquid ad animarum salutem
boni procurare. Sed cum studium meum ambitioni

448 DE INTERPRETATIONS NATURAE PROCEMIUM.

deputaretur, et aetas jam consisteret, ac valetudo af-
fecta et malae tarditatis meae me admoneret, et sub-
inde reputarem me officio meo nullo modo satisfacere,
cum ea per quae ipse hominibus per me prodesse pos-
sem omitterem, et ad ea quae ex alieno arbitrio pende-
rent me applicarem ; ab illis cogitationibus me prorsus
alienavi, et in hoc opus ex priore decreto me totum
recepi. Nee mihi animum minuit, quod ejus quae nunc
in usu est doctrinae et eruditionis, declinationem quan-
dam et ruinam in temporum statu prospicio. Tametsi
enim barbarorum incursiones non metuam (nisi forte
imperium Hispanum se corroboraverit, et alios armis,
se onere, oppresserit et debilitarit), tamen ex bellis
civilibus (quae mihi videntur propter mores quosdam
non ita pridem introductos multas regiones peragra-
tura), et ex sectarum malignitate, et ex compendiariis
istis artificiis et cautelis quae in eruditionis locum sur-
repserunt, non minor in literas et scientias procella
videbatur impendere. Nee typographorum officina his
malis sufficere queat. Atque ista quidem imbellis doc-
trina, quae otio alitur, praemio et laude efflorescit, quae
vehementiam opinionis non sustinet, et artificiis et im-
posturis eluditur, iis quae dixi impedimentis obruitur.
Longe alia ratio est scientiae, cujus dignitas utilitati-
bus et operibus munitur. Ac de temporum injuriis
fere securus sum, de hominum vero injuriis non laboro.
Si quis enim me nimis altum sapere dicat, l'espondeo
simpliciter, in civilibus rebus esse modestiae locum, in
contemplationibus veritati. Si quis vero opera statim
exigat, aio sine omni impostura, me hominem non
senem valetudinarium, civilibus studiis implicatum,
rem omnium obscurissimam sine duce ac luce aggres-

DE INTERPRETATIONS NATURE PROCEMIUM. 449

sum, satis profecisse si machinam ipsam ac fabricam
exstruxerim, licet earn non exercuerim aut moverim.
Ac eodem candore profiteor, interpretationem naturae
legitimam, in primo adscensu antequara ad gradum
certum generalium perventum sit, ab omni applica-
tione ad opera puram ac sejunctam servari debere.
Quin et eos omnes qui experientiae se undis aliqua ex
parte dediderunt, cum animo parum firmi aut osten-
tationis cupidi essent, in introitu operum pignora in-
tempestive investigasse, et inde exturbatos et naufragos
fuisse scio. Si quis autem pollicitationes saltern par-
ticulares requirat, is noverit homines per earn quae
nunc in usu est scientiam ne satis doctos ad optan-
dum quidem esse. Quod autem minoris momenti res
est, si quis ex politicis judicium suum in istiusmodi re
inserere praesumat, quibus moris est ex personae cal-
culis singula aestimare vel ex similis conatus exemplis
conjecturam facere, illi dictum volo et illud vetus,
claudum in via cursorem extra viam antevertere, et
de exemplis non cogitandum, rem enim sine exemplo
esse. Publicandi autem ista ratio ea est, ut quse ad
ingeniorum correspondentias captandas et mentium
areas purgandas pertinent, edantur in vulgus et per
ora volitent ; reliqua per manus tradantur cum elec-
tione et judicio. Nee me latet usitatum et tritum
esse impostorum artificium, ut quaedam a vulgo secer-
nant, nihilo iis ineptiis quas vulgo propinant meliora.
Sed ego sine omni impostura ex providentia sana pro-
spicio, ipsam interpretationis formulam et inventa per
eandem, intra legitima et optata ingenia clausa, vege-
tiora et munitiora futura. Ipse vero alieno periculo
ista molior. Mihi enim nil eorum quae ab externis

vol. vi. 29

450 DE INTERPRETATIONE NATURE PROCEMIUM.

pendent cordi est. Neque enlm famae auceps sum, nee
haeresiarcharum more sectam condere gratum habeo,
et privatum aliquod emolumentum ex tanta molitione
captare ridiculum et turpe duco. Mihi sufficit meriti
conscientia, et ipsa ilia rerum effectio, cui ne fortuna
ipsa intercedere possit.

END OF VOL. VI.

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